Search the Collection
Limit your search
Tag- Declassified (144)
- Northern Ireland (1)
- Text (144)
- Item (144)
- false (144)
144 results
- chaired the meeting to review diplomatic efforts to get Serbian President Milosevic to recognize Bosnia, as well as options for improving the situation around Sarajevo and containing the conflict in Croatia. In addition to the DDI, attendees included
- SITUATION ROOM _ _ _ _ _ (WE) ~ ~ _ 01.03 '6 8:17 NO. 1146024592 r.... PAGE - Eastern Slavonia 2. Deputies agreed to recommend to the President that he approve an approach to the North Atlantic Council to extend NATO's in extremis commitment
- -national effort, US led. e Enhance Federation Army existing core capabilities and units. " Develop Federation Army capability to sustain training program. . Counter-balance Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) strengths. -Focus on defensive tasks at the company
- means that this conflict will be "Americanized" sooner or later.' Our previous strategy -- give primary responsibility tothe Europeans, help the Bosnians rhetorically and hope the parties will choose peace -- is no longer sustainable. With a stronger
- community has the will to undertake major military operations and sustain the long-term presence necessary to preserve a multiethnic Bosnia. They will test this resolve at every opportunity but probably will avoid large-scale, direct attacks on UN forces
- are highly responsive to the orders of Croatian President Franjo Tudjman. A former major general, Tudjman is the armed forces' Commander in Chief and personally directs their activities. Tudjman heads the Council of Defense and NationalSecurity, which
- 1992-12-28, National Intelligence Council Memo re Responses to Transition Team Questions on the Balkans
- C06002393 The Di. of Central Intelligence Washi gton, D.C. 20505 00000 1 pproved for Release CIA Historical Collections AR 70-14 10CT2013 IMDivision 03 0 0 National Intelligence Council NFIB 2.12/3 28 December 1992 ME IORANDUM FOR: FROM
- of a group to mobilize is also tied to its location in relation to demographic and settlement patterns. There is considerable evidence to suggest that culturally distinct groups without a significant urban base are unlikely to develop and sustain a serious
1995-05-25, Ambassador Madeleine Albright to Anthony Lake re The FRY and the Outer Wall of Sanctions
(Item)
- ; this provision was included with the intention of marginalizing revanchist Bosnian Croats who are ·now .impeding the Federation's development. And Haris Silajdzic has strongly urged sustained u.s. support for the Tribunal, with the possible intention of using
- C05960714 S'G 20872 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON. O.C. 20506 Approved for Release CIA Historical Collections Division R 70-14 10CT2013 Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee DATE: July 11-12, 1995 LOCATION
- L- I C05955859 .;._....._. 20095 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506 Summary of Conclusions for Approved for Release Cor i of of Concluies , Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee DATE: February 22, 1995. IA Historical Collections
- Q C0 5 9 5 6118 SERE-T- \g ---- NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 20940 - WASHINGTON. O.C. 20806 Approved for Release CIA Historical Collections Division AR 70-14 1OCT2013 Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee SVTS DATE
- for draft of the questions and also the MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD in the WEDNESDAY DC tab.] E C)7 2. BACKGROUND. Sandy Berger and the other Deputies are becoming increasingly apprehensive that a disconnect is developing between what NATO planners
- 739317 (ROO389) 5·96 • . • ••. , __.... __ "':·.l~.,· . '_. _ ,_.' C05922077 SesFet The political and economic development envisioned by the Dayton process will take sustained effort and time-well beyond the life of IFOR's current mandate
- C05955849 -&E20164 ______ NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506 Approved for Release CIA Historical Collections Division AR 70=14 1OCT2013 SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for. Meeting of the.NSC Principals Committee DATE: February
- C05955918.. >~-~'" .- '*IUUUUJ~%C NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON. 0.C..20508 Approved for Release CIA Historical Collections Division Summary of Conclusions R 70-14 10CT2013 for Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee DATE: March 17
- at the United Nations to enact a UN Security Council resolution containing the mandate for a new UN peacekeeping force in Croatia, as well as companion resolutions on peacekeeping forces in Bosnia'Herzegovina and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
- 1995-05-29, Anthony Lake to President Clinton re Policy for Bosnia Use of U.S. Ground Forces to Support NATO Assistance for Redeployment of UNPROFOR within Bosnia
- a range of policy options in light of the recent developments in Bosnia. They agreed on the following basic points for U.S. policy: " Prospects of additional airstrikes: The U.S. will not press allies with troops on the ground for further strikes now
- C05960252: SEC'RT NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL -__WASHINGTON. 20562 O.C. 20506 Approved for Release CIA Historical Collections Division R 70-14 10CT2013 Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee DATE: April 28, 1995
- C05 962151 i crORP'T NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 21164. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506 Approved for Release CIA H istorical Collections Division AR 70-14 10CT2013 Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee DATE: October 4, 1995
1995-05-04B, Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia May 4, 1995
(Item)
- C05960827 .......... NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL . . 20588 WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506 Approved for Release CIA Historical Collections Division AR 70-14 10CT2013 SUBJECT: - -Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee ..DATE
- to the nonaligned nations. And they would bring those views into the Council. An early version of the Contact Group would get together, and the Russians would say, "We object to that." Then we would try to develop a balanced statement. But there was no way
1995-05-15A, BTF Memorandum re Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia May 16, 1995
(Item)
- with Zagreb, particularly since Vice President Gore had read Tudjman the riot act and thought he had assurances the Croatians would avoid actions' that could lead t_ an escalation of f htin . C05960866 4. Sarajevo Developments. Senior policymakers
- it starts in spring, when the cease fire had been negotiated in part by former President Carter came in an end to early May of 1995. And during this time we have been told there is sort of informal discussions started among a group here, yourself included
1993-01-29 BTF Memorandum re Principals Committee Meeting on the Former Yugoslavia January 28, 1993
(Item)
- -Owen proposals), refuse to accept borders changed by force or to legitimize ethnic cleansing, condemn war crimes, seek No-Fly enforcement, and arm the Bosnian Muslims (which the Allies refused to do). -- Sandy Berger noted that President Clinton during
- C05916014 Director of Central Intelligence Approved for Release CIA Historical Collections Division AR 70-14 1OCT2013 - . : . IC ~r National Intelligence Council Memorandum Lifting the Arms Embargo: Impact on the War in Bosnia :;.. Key A UN
- 1995-07-15, Anthony Lake to President Clinton re Principals July 14 Conclusions on Bosnia
- CO6031037 ~, ' 20845 THE WHITE HOUSE WASH INGTON July 15, 1995 INFORMATION Approved for Release CIA Historical Collections MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT Division AR 70-14 10CT2013 FROM: ANTHONY LA SUBJECT: Principals' July 14 Conclusions
1995-09-01B, BTF List re Balkan Crisis Chronology of International Response, Significant Events
(Item)
- C05961552 Approved for Release CIA Historical Collections Division AR 70-14 10CT2013· UNCLAS g n' I ~D Balkan Crisis: Chronology of International Response, Significant Events 1 September 1995 1991 28 March The Presidents of Yugoslavia's six
- C05960243 20487 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL -- - WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506 - Approved for Release CIA Historical Collections Division AR70-1410CT2013 SUBJECT: Summary of:Conclusions for Meeting of,the NSC Principals Committee DATE: April 14, 1995
- for the President. The paper is extremely sensitive and should be held closely. I have scheduled a Deputies' meeting for Saturday, July 22 at 3:00-4:00. Attendance will be Principals plus one. Attachment Tab A ___T July 17 NSC paper: Bosnia Endgame Strategy
1995-09-05A, Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia September 5, 1995
(Item)
- y LC0596154U. -:L. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 2032 WASHINGTON. O.C. 20500 - Approved for Release CIA Historical Collections Division AR 70-14 10CT2013 Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee DATE: September 5
- . * A large-scale,organizedRomanianfuel-smuggling operationhas developed along the DanubeRiver. UN sanctions continue to suppress FRY trade, however. Sanctions continue to largely adeny the FRY access to maritime shipments, barge traffic, and trains for moving
- --:which should build on the comprehensive list developed by NSC for the President (Action: NSC/All) . They agreed that a concerted effort was required to explain strong administration opposition to unilateral lift measures being introduced in both
- will try to manipulate divisions in NATO and Russian support in the UN Security Council to prevent an international effort to reverse Serbia's territorial gains. He will view the recent Russian elections and the Greek presidency of the EU as factors
- to Sarajevo marketplace shelling 13,14 Bombing pause New York Principles 14 Hoibrooke with Tudjman and Izetbegovic on continuing offensive Models/site for Proximity Peace Talks 16 17,18 Presidents' handshake in Dayton 18 Tudjman-Milosevic talks
- C05962613 'USE SITUATION (T) ROOM 12. 19. 95 20:36 -NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL NO. 460024240 5- - 95-5996 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504 pproved for Release CIA Historical ollections Division AR 70-14 1OCT201 December 19, 2 PAGE 1995
- , the Bosnian Government has developed an extensive supply system to sustain their war effort. The government continues to operate a number of domestic defense industries to produce ammunition and some weapons. As stockpiles at these factories have declined
1995-10-25, Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia October 25, 1995
(Item)
- NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 21260 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504 Approved for Release CIA Historical Collections Division AR 70-14 10CT2013 Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee DATE: October 25, 1995 LOCATION: White House
- plans for new offensives, but President Tudjman is staying his hand. A new offensive could jeopardize Croatia's ties to the West. Moreover, negotiations on a Bosnian peace settlement and parallel Serb-Croat talks on Serb-held territory in Croatia
- possibility and several recent developments-including armed violence in Serb-dominated regions of Croatia, the growing possi- result, the keys to Belgrade's strategy-universal military training, mass mobilization, redundant conmand and control structures
1996-06-18, Dayton History Project Interview with Richard Holbrooke and Roberts Owen June 18, 1996
(Item)
- a word Leon said. RO: Exactly. And you leaned over and said, "It's all bull----. Don't worry about it." RH: "No one else can understand him either," I think were my words. Okay, that was the 24th. You didn't go to the President's eulogy the day before
1995-10-26C, BTF Report re The Military Role of the Serbian Interior Ministry in the Yugoslav
(Item)
- and queries are welcome and may be directed to Norm Schindler, Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force. 2 C05962148 Training and Equipment. The Special Police have developed a reputation as elite combat forces because of their rigorous and thorough
- C05952436 pproved for Release CIA Historical Collections Division AR 70-14 10CT201 The Director of Central Intelligence Washington, D.C 20505 1046/93 NI National Intelligence Council 5 ugust 93 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
- C05955772 fi__- 20025 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506 Approved for Release CIA Historical. Collections Division . R 70-14 10OCT2013- Summary of Conclusions Meeting of NSC Deputies Committee DATE: LOCATION: TIME: SUBJECT
- NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 21217 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504 Approved for Release CIA Historical Collections Division AR 70-14 1OCT2013 Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee DATE: October 18, 1995 LOCATION: White House
- armor forces) Training e e e Training will focus on defensive deficiencies and developing a sustainable organic training capability. Offensive tasks will not be addressed. Training may address individual, unit, or multi-unit needs. Training
- or drastically reduce their contingents in the former Yugoslavia in the near term. Sustained escalation of the fighting is likely to prompt renewed calls by major European contributors for a reexamination of the UN peacekeeping effort. Should the fighting
- C05740379 21335 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504 Approved for Release CIA LIB 8 Historical Collections Division AR 70-14 10CT20-13 Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee DATE: November. 13, 1995
- with a discussion of intelligence reporting suggesting that Serbian President Milosevic and Croatian President Tudjman were close to an agreement on mutual recognition that would also include some territorial swaps in Bosnia. Some participants viewed
- C05962531 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL - 21278 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504 Approved for Release CIA Historical Collections Division R 70-14 10CT2013 Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee DATE: November 1, 1995 LOCATION: White
- (WE) 05.24. ROOM CSITUATION 95 0847 NO. 1460051238 PAGE 20662 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON. o-C. 20506 pproved for Release CIA Historical Collections Division AR 70-14 10OCT2013 Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC
- multilateral program for Eastern Europe, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the European Investment Bank as well as through member-state programs and multilateral institutions. e The EU would probably negotiate trade and cooperation
- to produce a list of briefees. 5. Leon Fuerth will review the status of inter-Serbian sanctions and related US diplomatic efforts based on the . paper at TAB D of the MEETING PAPERS TAB. The INTER-SERBIAN SANCTIONS TAB includes the latest developments
1995-04-13A, BTF Memorandum re Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia April 14, 1995
(Item)
- for briefing Congress on OPLAN 40104 and the evils of lifting the arms embargo. -- You will not be required to take the lead on any issue. At the pre-brief, the BTF will provide you with talking points on recent military developments and intelli ence
- on the situation on the ground, where there have been some recent developments. I will present you with the latest information during the drive from your residence to the White House. . According to UN information, the Bosnian Muslims today launched an offensive
- . The meeting did not result in any new tasking for the Intelligence Community. NSC was tasked to develop talking points for use with Congress and the press on current US policy toward Bosnia. OSD was tasked with preparing a decision memorandum for the President
- points you can make during the meeting on recent military developments (Bihac, Croatia), the humanitarian, situation, status of UNPROFOR personnel being detained by the Serbs, and reactions to recent US policy decisions. -- The POST-BIHAC BOSNIA TAB
- C05962556 ER 95-5481/2 Approved for Release CIA Historical Collections Division AR 70-14 10CT2013 27 November 1995 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Principals Meeting on Bosnia, 22 November 1995, The White House m ATTENDEES: President
- C05960716 S y h20873 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON. D.C. 20505 Approved for Release CIA Historical Collections Division R 70-14 10CT2013 Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee DATE: July 14, 1995 LOCATION
- C05962049 - C-21176 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506 Approved for Release CIA Historical Collections Division AR 70-14 10CT2013 Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the.NSC Deputies Committee DATE: October 6, 1995 LOCATION: White
- UNPROFOR threatens to destroy even the limited economic confidence-building measures developed over the past year. As the CIA paper makes clear, there is no "peace faction" among any of the parties, and Milosevic's willingness to pressure his Serb cousins
- 1995-09-23, Anthony Lake to President Clinton re Your Participation in Principals Committee
- 06031042 T7~121107 ___ Approved for Release CIA Historical Collections Division AR 70-14 10CT2013 ___ E" IHE PRES THE WHITE HOUSE C - - WASHINGTON September 23, INFORMATION SEP 3 PG : 28 1995 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM: ANTHONY
1995-11-16A, Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia November 16, 1995
(Item)
- C0 59 625 42 i urv C-B21336 (SA) I 11. 18. 95 14: 17. NO. 1460024193 PAGE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504 Approved for Release CIA Historical Collections Division AR 70-1410CT2013 - Summary of Conclusions for Meeting
- focused on separate diplomatic, public/press, and Congressional strategies on the former Yugoslavia. In attendance were Berger (NSC), Fuerth (Vice President's office), Walker (NSC), Tarnoff.(State), Wisner Jeremiah (JCS), and the DDCI. (OSD
- coverage if the situation deteriorates. Please spread the word about the inauguration of the task force as you find it appropriate within your office. I'll let you know of any further developments that might affect you. help, Z Distribution: - addressee
- 1993-08-25, Anthony Lake to President Clinton re Bosnian End-Game Strategy
- 6412 Approved for Release CIA Historical Collections Division AR 70-14 110CT2013 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON August 25, 19:3 INFORMATION MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM: ANTHONY L SUBJECT: Bosnian End-Game Strategy All the parties left
- 1995-03-18, Anthony Lake to President Clinton re U.S. Participation in Step Two of UNPROFOR Withdrawal from Bosnia
- . This was subject to completion of Congressional consultations and a subsequent decision by Principals before actual deployment of U.S. personnel to Croatia. Facing criticism from some Allies, NATO military authorities this week developed a scaled-back
- and firms. -- Prepare talking points at least once a month for Ambassador Albright Security Council. to use with the - Prepare regular reports-with the frequency dicta of information we receive toay. uch epot ce We are in the t such report today
1995-05-22, BTF Memorandum re Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia May 23, 1995
(Item)
- and Krajina Serbs have not withdrawn completely from the zones of separation. -- We will .advise you at the' pre-brief of any significant new developments. 2. The big story, of course, is Ambassador Frasure's f continuing effort to get Milosevic
- on Eastern Slavonia (C-)-. SUBJECT: PARTICIPANTS: The Vice President's Office Leon Fuerth Richard Saunders STATE AID Thomas Dine Dalena Wright - . - Peter Tarnoff JCS -Wesley Clark John Walsh George Ward _ John Kornblum Transition Administrator
1993-06-03, BTF Memorandum re Deputies Committee Meeting on the Former Yugoslavia May 26-27, 1993
(Item)
- Undersecretary Wisner (OSD), (State), Ambassador Bartholomew, National Security Advisor to the Vice President Fuerth, Ambassador Inderfurth (by telephone), Jenonne Walker (NSC) and DDI MacEachin. 2. The participants spent the first meeting and a good part
- included an update of diplomatic developments since the last D Also, we have included an update on the current status of the cessation of hostilities agreement. The Bituation in Croatia 3. Last weekend, he Croatians had a man ae when it expires
- to the agenda items and any late-breaking developments. 2. Policymakers have been seized this week with implementing the agreement Assistant Secretary Holbrooke negotiated with Tudiman. A number of hurdles need to be overcome. Talks at the UN on a new mandate
- on Bosnia, 6 June 1995 1. Tomorrow's Principals-only meeting will assess options for UNPROFOR reconfiguration and how to deal with the plethora of developments in Bosnia, including responding to the F-16 shootdown, hostage relief efforts, the possible need
- on the President's phone Declassify on: OADR CO5960752CE-T-- 2 call with French President Chirac (who wanted to ensure a role for General Janvier, UNPF Theater Commander, and the UN SYG in the decision cycle for initiating any Bosnia-wide phase in an air
- on Bosnia 7 February 1995 1. Tuesday's Principals-only meeting will focus on 1) a strategy to persuade Serbian President Milosevic to recognize Croatia and Bosnia, 2) a possible recommendation to the President to commit in principle to the deployment of US
- unclear where all is going. Attached Wes Clark report provides good wrap on key issues.Sanctions became issue of day on Monday. Separate sanctions checklist provided. Strobe has firsthand report from dinner with Presidents. Talks at all levels continued
- will be held Wednesday to approve the Deputies' recommendations and also to consider sanctions issues related to the proximity talks 2. BACKGROUND. Sandy Berger and the other Deputies are becoming increasingly apprehensive that a disconnect is developing
- Meeting on Bosnia/Croatia, April 28, 1630-1800 1. State and the Office of the Vice President will lead on near-term diplomatic strategy, and JCS will brief on OPLAN 40104. You have not been tasked with any agenda items, but you probably can comment
- Meeting on Bosnia 18 April 1994 1. As of 0800, we still had not received.a formal agenda for this morning'.s PC. President Clinton is quoted in the press as playing down the possibility of additional air-strikes to save Gorazde. At the same time
- parliament and presidency. BdOtiamia making progress on developing internal positions, but differences remain evident Izy/Mo in sync with Harris S on margin. Iy agreed to talk directly with Milosevio on Sunday. MoAt Dick Holbrooke's urging to took Izy
- President Tudjman continues to parlay his cooperation into international political and military help to regain control of the Krajina. * The Bosnian Croats are enjoying their relative political autonomy within Bosnia. - Even with large-scale international
- C 0 5 9 6 2 0 7 8 SE SITUATION ROOM (TH) 11.02. 95 12:20 NO, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 1460024577 PAGE 21255 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504 Approved for Release CIA Historical Collections Division AR 70-14 10CT2013 Summary of Conclusions
- from Bosnia. President Clinton subsequently decided to provide the allies with a commitment. in principle. to provide ground forces "subject to US approval of the plan and further consultations with Congress." -- The US POLICY TAB includes the talking
- a positive outcome to the negotiations, as well as a recommended strategy in the event negotiations break down (Action: (S-)State) . Croatia: Tudjman's decision to terminate UNPROFOR's mandate Deputies considered options for responding to President 3
- extraction plan of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Croatia that has not even been completed yet, much less approved by the President. JCS and OSD argue that the prepositioning needs to go forward as a precaution. 4. JCS is now offering a choice of three alternatives
- 1995-10-20A, BTF Report re President Tudjman Stacks the Elections
- CO 5 917 4 6 8 Approved for Release CIA Historical geegg- Collections Division AR 70-14 10CT2013 - Intelligence Memorandum 20 October1995 DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force \eLIG Y President Tudjman Stacks the Elections
- 1995-04-25, Office of the Vice President, National Security Advisor Memorandum re Sanctions Enforcement Issues
- Approved for Release CIA Historical Collections Division . AR 70-14 1OCT201 I OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT WASHINGTON April 25, 1995 MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE DEPUTIES COMMITTEE SUBJECT: Sanctions Enforcement Issues The Principals agreed
- meeting of yesterday. President Clinton convinced President Yelt'sin that at a minimum, the Russians will provide a small number of engineer battalions to work with IFOR in the areas of mine clearance, logistic support and airlift. These battalions would
- and Rice from NSC; Deutch and Slocombe from the Department of Defense; Tarnoff, Frasure, and Holbrooke from State; Fuerth and Saunders from the Office of the Vice President; Schefer from US/UN, Clarke and Christman from JCS; Adams for OMB, and MacEachin
- to the rhetoric surrounding the discussion of the mandate for the new force, particularly on the issue of UN forces on Croatia's border with Bosnia and Serbia. The influence of Bosnian Serb "President" Karadzic and, more importantly, that of Serbian President
- 1995-05-02, Anthony Lake to President Clinton re Principals Review of Bosnia April 28, 1995
- that the UN is prepared to accede cto lSerb 'dictates, which would destroy what little UN credibility remains. Principals agreed that, while there is no immediate humanitarian crisis in the Declassify on:0 on: O. - Vice President Chief of Staff C06031033
- was operating throughout the summer when demand for fertilizers was highest, has ceased operations temporarily as fuel stocks are directed towards producing heat. some firms have reaped windtalls by using sanctions as a pretext for developing more efficient
- -S-ER - ° 20554 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506 Approved for Release CIA - Historical Collections Division AR 70-1410CT2013 SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Meeting .of the NSC Deputies Committee DATE:a April 27, 1995
1995-05-01B, Office of Resources, Trade, and Technology Paper re Croatia Using the Gray Market
(Item)
- of Defense Vladimir Zagorec-have become proficient in using a wide array of gray-market concealment techniques to evade the Yugoslav arms embargo: - The Croatians have established front companies and developed ties to international brokers and corrupt
- of his personal historical role, mounting nationalist/political pressures which he has helped generate, and frustration with the international community, President Tudjman is now prepared to initiate large-scale military action to reintegrate the Krajina
- 1994-11-27B, Anthony Lake to President Clinton re Bosnia Policy after the Fall of Bihac
- : - 0 RINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPCi LRARE' PHOTOCOP.>~ 1 Vice President Chief of Staff o t C06031025"' ________ 2 Bosnians' recent offensive as the cause of Bihac's demise. Against this backdrop, our efforts to use NATO air strikes to prevent
- serious challenges over the long run as he tries to keep the economy on track and permanently absorb large numbers of refugees. 1 C05917470 Still the Dominant Force in Serbian Politics Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic is carefully controlling
1995-08-17, BTF Memorandum re Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia August 18, 1995
(Item)
- , may want a mission of longer duration as a condition for acceptance of an aar7emnt along the lines of the .Lake-Holbrooke plan.g 4. The MILITARY BALANCE TAB includes an. assessment of the extent to which recent developments may have improved
- the lead in delivering the message that prospects for peace are dim in Bosnia and that the main danger is an explosion in the Krajina. State is talking about a renewed effort to convince President Tudjman of Croatia that "no" is not an acceptable answer
- officials say the former President is unlikely to re-enter-the. fray wi.thou.t..DOth sides' concurrence. These developments have ended any realistic chance that Izetbegovic's conditions for extending the cease-fire -- Milosevic's recognition of Bosnia
- of the grace period; sanctions would be suspended during this time, but with the clear understanding that they would be reimposed if Bosnian Serb agreement were not forthcoming. 1 We would need to develop a list of verifiable criteria to minimize the risk
- there was this end-game strategy that was presented to the principals, which was largely based on an NSC draft and eventually was worked out and improved with the President's participation. What was your sense of the crisis that had developed in July? ST: When
- President Clinton's possible visit 11 to Dayton Christopher's characterization of 12 13 three Balkan presidents Plans for possible failure in Dayton Additional issues considered at Dayton 13 13,14 The Map Room at Dayton U UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED
- from the Bosnian government that the foreign forces have departed, President Clinton recently certified the Bosnian government in compliance. The Administration has worked closely with the Bosnian government on this issue. UNCLASSIFIED C05922080
- them, and Washington's perceived determination to lift the embargo against Bosnia. weapons Bosnian Serb "Vice President" Koljevic claimed last month that government was developing a broad "victory" strategy to achievehis changes the Contact Group plan
1995-09-27B, BTF Report re The Bosnian Government Divisions Show Confusion in Peace Negotiations
(Item)
- Prime Minister Silajdzic and Federation Vice President Ganic, as a way to control potential challengers, according to US diplomats. " .Since becoming Foreign Minister this year, Sacirbey has become Izetbegovic's right-hand man in negotiations, and has
1995-05-01C, Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum re Military Options for Reopening Sarajevo Airport
(Item)
- Discussion. The following options are available for consideration for the delivery of humanitarian aid into Sarajevo: Assumptions: e New UNSCR(s) required to implement a military option will be adopted by the Security Council. * A parallel diplomatic effort
- hosted. We have accepted - someone has to do it. Walt Slocombe says Speaker himself has suggested joint session of Congress for all three Presidents to welcome peace and ask for U.S. troops. Never cease to be amazed. Thanks again for coming to Dayton
- alter the military and security situation in Bosnia in the Bosnian Government's favor and increase the prospects for an eventual substantial decrease in the level of violence. The force, however, almost certainly would sustain significant casualties
1995-12-26, Office of European Affairs Report re EU-Bosnia Groping for the Initiative in Peace
(Item)
- arguments to press for European--and French--leadership in other peace implementation organs. * Other EU member states, also have expressed concern over US dominance of the peace process. Italy, which assumes the EU Presidency on 1 January, has pledged
- of Reference to be developed between NATO and Russia will spell out additional details of the relationship. OPTION II: RUSSIAN UNITS PERFORM FUNCTIONALLY SEPARATE ONLY LIAISON LINKS TO NATO-LED IFOR. Russian-units under full national command and control
- organization has been shattered and its ideological appeal leached away by recent developments elsewhere in Central Europe and the Balkans. [= The Yugoslav National Army (JNA), because of its strong party identification and because much of the country
- the prospect of a negotiated settlement increasingly unlikely. * Croatia's recapture of Sector West in early May and its recent military activity in Bosnia's Livno Valley aimed at isolating Knin have hardened Krajina Serb intransigence. Croatian President
- point to goodprospects for sanctionsrelief and normalization of international relations to counter balance the loss. T n-ete C05962065 Croatian Intentions President Tudjman and other Croatian leaders are determined to retake the last piece of Serb
- materials suppliers, as well as markets for Krajina products. The effects of international trade sanctions covering the Serb-occupied UN sectors under UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 820, as well as the breakdown of social order, widespread crime
- intact, but the flight of more than 150,000 Krajina Serb refugees was a big blow to the region's economy. Journalists and US officials touring Knin and other This memorandum was re ared for Leon Fuerth, Assistant to the Vice President for National Office
- to play the ta}p role in separating-thecombatants. Others will providefive-man teams of military observers, eight-man teams of military policemen, and 30- eral-presidency,the JNA is responsive to civilian controlftom Belgrade otly to the extent
- SECRETClassified by OASD Declassify on OADR (i 13 The plan developed below attempts to draw upon the strengths of the two existing proposals, bearing in mind the political and military realities. Since we do not have a clear sense of what different Russians
- in developing a "military stabilization package (its less euphemistic title until Wednesday's Principals' Meeting was "equip and train"). None of the anticipated meeting papers have arrived. * You will not be required to take the lead on any issue. The Task
1995-10-27, Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia October 27, 1995
(Item)
- of a peace settlement. They agreed to have State, JCS, and OSD develop options for (Action: Principals' consideration prior to the proximity talks. JCS/OSD/State) 4. -- - Principals agreed that the IFOR commander at the Corps level should have
- developments in the Contact Group's efforts to achieve Serb and Muslim agreement to resume peace negotiations. It was noted, based on information received from Special Envoy Thomas, that press reports of divisions within the Contact Group and that efforts to re
- --on the options n likelv reactions to them. 2. According to the agenda, you will not be required to present an Intelligence Update. We nonetheless have -SEGR-T C05916076 prepared one that includes intelligence on recent military developments on the ground
- on the status of the cease-fire and how long it will hold, since this is an important consideration in determining when,we may need to be ready to assist an UNPROFOR withdrawal. The MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS TAB includes a paper the BTF circulated this week. 2
- discussions with the British, French, and Russians to establish contingency plans in the event the situation around Bihac deteriorates further. -- The Principals developed a list of possible "triggers" for more robust action, including Serb advances beyond
- for renewed conflict in Croatia. The MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS TAB includes an updated version of the "hotspots" paper we prepared last Friday at your request. The CPAS cartographers have prepared a new hand-out map showing milita developments-between 4 and 8 May
1995-05-18, BTF Memorandum re Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia May 19, 1995
(Item)
- to take the lead on any agenda item. - - However, given developments on the ground, you may be called on to assess the fighting around Saraievo and the status of the Croatian withdrawal from the zones of separation. The Task Force will provide you
- . There are no meeting papers expected. 2. Holbrooke and team plan to return to Europe later this week to resume the US peace initiative. Wes Clark has been engaged in intensive discussions with Milosevic aimed at developing a 51-49 percent territorial division of Bosnia
- on the momentum from.a Bosnia deal, we -should begin now to work to-develop precise arrangements for meaningful autonomy- for the Krajina -Serbs.. This will not only help us be prepared to move forward quickly when the opportunity arises, it. will also-underscore
- not be brought any nearer by such a development. -- For their part, the Serbs, who have been willing to accept a settlement leaving the Muslims in control of a third of Bosnia, might be provoked to try for more. -- In this case, an UNPROFOR withdrawal might
- Developments.) 4. An additional issue that could arise is the impact of the Bosnian offensive on the humanitarian situation. Our assessment indicates that even with a government offensive, Sarajevo will not face a food crisis until at least August. However
- - UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. 0-2013-04186 Doc No. C05323091 Date: 03/19/2013 C05 9 6 0 2 4 9 ECL:OADR 57M(P'#p SECRET CRAIA PC. Mee1nn RELEASED IN FULL UN' efforts to-develop operational plans- for .UNCRO are; lagging
- . Other Contact Group members increasingly will want to explore other options for a political settlement, including efforts to develop a new map, but will continue to resist lifting the arms embargo. Sanctions regime against Serbia gradually erodes. II
- units --into the area between Turbe and Travnik in central Bosnia. There are reportedly only two Serb brigades in the area. In midApril the government launched an attack that captured a key mountain. . The Bosnian Government has developed plans
- at the meeting, including military developments, Serb and Muslim views of the Contact Group, the extent of Yugoslav support for the Bosnian Serbs, and the latest on arms transfers to the Muslims. -- I would recommend in particular that you flag our revised
- for options to get out of the current dilemma on lift: -- The easiest development would be if the Muslims themselves concluded that they didn't want the embargo lifted. Although they are speaking strongly in favor of lift in publicl a e Bosnians privately
- will review discussion of the need to begin developing a funding strategy. 4. In preparation for this meeting, I recommend you read the INTEL UPDATE tab for events while you were gone. Also, the AIRSTRIKES-IMPACT tab summarizes CL BY: DECL: DRV FR
- will provide you with specific talking points based on these two papers and any late-breaking developments. -- You will also have updated page-size maps of the Bihac area and Serb air defenses to distribute at the meeting in support of your briefing. 2
1994-12-16, BTF Memorandum re Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia December 19, 1994, 1100-1230
(Item)
- . There is some confusion at the working level about the goals the Principals wanted the Deputies to accomplish. Norm Schindler will accompany you to the meeting. 2. The purpose of the meeting is to consider the next steps in the development of Bosnia policy. You
- . Other than that agreed point, it was felt that additional lift must be calibrated to implementation of the plan. This framework can.be developed later. Financial transactions will be freed up, as the. -- Europeans wanted. However, assets will remain
- free..of: ,. market-minded Bosnian Serb leadership. By contrast, we would expect to see economic ties develop between the Republika Srpska and the vibrant Croatian economy. And Bosnian economic reconstruction assistance-{ 'J C05951838 SECft@T
- variations on this concept. pIn la: Extend UNCRO beyond November 30, 1995. UNCRO currently has a Chapter VII mandate and two battalions in Sector East. This mandate could be extended for a brief period (e.g., 30-60 days) while other options are developed
- Jure Radic announced 9 August that Zagreb would pay the full cost of repairing the basic elements of all homes-roofs, exterior walls, and windows. e The Croatian Bank for Reconstruction and Development will furnish low-interest credits for repairs
- and a stockpile of. comestible items.. Given our role -in helping create the Federation and our interest in seeing i~t take root, we believe the. United States. can and should pursue.this idea. Specifically, we should work with SilajdIid to develop immediately
