Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee
DATE: April 28, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 4:30 - 5:45 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth

State
Warren Christopher

DOD
William Perry

OMB
Alice Rivlin

USUN
Rick Inderfurth

Chief of Staff
No Representative

CIA
Admiral William Studeman

JCS
General John Shalikashvili

White House
Samuel Berger

NSC
Alexander Vershbow

Brigadier General Don Kerrick

Summary of Conclusions

1. Principals reviewed the Deputies recommendations on next steps in the Contact Group's efforts to gain recognition of Bosnia by Milosevic. They agreed that we should offer to suspend some additional sanctions if Milosevic unambiguously recognizes Bosnia within its internationally-recognized borders. They agreed, however, that this offer should be contingent on a commitment by our Contact Group partners to tighten the closure of the Serbian-Bosnian border and to take similar measures to seal Croatia's border with Bosnian Serb areas, the "back door" through which significant circumvention has occurred. (S)

2. Principals discussed the deteriorating situation in Sarajevo and agreed on the unacceptability of recent Serb actions to
assert control over Sarajevo airport and to prohibit the use of UN flights by our Ambassador and Contact Group representative. They were concerned at signs that the UN is prepared to accede to Serb dictates, which would further erode UN credibility. Principals agreed that, while there is no immediate humanitarian crisis in the Bosnian capital, the Serbs' actions amount to an attempt at the "strangulation" of Sarajevo, which NATO and the UN have pledged to prevent. Therefore, Principals asked the Interagency Working Group to develop options for NATO action to reopen Sarajevo airport, together with a diplomatic strategy for gaining Allied and UN support. (Action: IWG. Taskings provided by separate memorandum) (S)

3. Principals discussed the status of NATO OPLAN 40104 for supporting UNPROFOR withdrawal and agreed that, in purely military terms, the plan should continue to receive U.S. support at NATO as the plan that NATO will use should the Alliance agree to participate in an UNPROFOR withdrawal operation. Accordingly, they authorized our representatives at NATO to support the plan as long as support did not entail actual commitment of U.S. forces to the operation. They further authorized the CJCS to identify U.S. forces that would be involved in the operation. Principals emphasized that actual commitment of U.S. forces to the operation would require another Principals and Presidential decision and consultations with Congress. (Action: State/JCS) (S)

4. Principals agreed that the sensitive political questions relating to OPLAN 40104 must be answered before the plan can be presented to the President for approval. Principals directed that a post-UNPROFOR withdrawal strategy be developed to facilitate answering the unanswered policy questions relating to the actual operation. (Action: State) In the meantime, Principals asked that a senior interagency team brief key members and committees of Congress on the concept of OPLAN 40104, seeking their views on the unanswered policy questions, as part of our efforts to encourage opposition to a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo. (Action: State, OSD, JCS, CIA) (S)

5. Principals briefly discussed the situation of Jonathan Knapp, the American relief worker captured March 4, 1995, along with four French colleagues by the Bosnian Serbs. They reaffirmed the use of quiet diplomacy as the preferred strategy, working through the French and the UN, to secure his release. However, with the Serbs threatening to put Knapp on trial, Principals asked State to consider the possibility of a direct message to one of the Bosnian Serb leaders from a middle-level USG official, based on indications that this may be the facesaver the Serbs are looking for to release Knapp. (Action: State) (S)