MEMORANDUM FOR

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SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia

There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia, Friday, August 18, 1995, from 4:30 - 6:30 p.m. Attendance is principals plus one. An agenda for the meeting is attached at Tab A. At Tabs B and C are discussion papers that will be reviewed during the meeting.

Attachments
Tab A Agenda
Tab B Discussion Paper on Humanitarian Assistance and Refugees
Tab C Discussion Paper on Implementing a Balkan Peace Settlement
NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA
DATE: August 18, 1995
LOCATION: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
TIME: 4:30 - 6:30 p.m.

Agenda


II. Policy Issues Relating to Arming and Training Bosnian Government Forces..........................OSD/JCS

III. Policy Issues Relating to Humanitarian and Refugee Assistance Deliveries to Serbia...........State/NSC

IV. Status Report on Holbrooke Mission.........................State

Declassify on: OADR
Bosnia

Deputies Committee Discussion Paper
Humanitarian Assistance and Refugees

1. **Access for humanitarian deliveries throughout FRY:** Little has come of this effort. UNHCR is supportive; Belgrade said it has little control over the actions of the Bosnian Serbs.

   Possible initiatives: Amb. Spiegel could raise with Mrs. Ogata and urge public statement from UNHCR; 2) we could demarche European capitals and urge public statements from them; 3) we could seek formal action at UN; 4) we could ask that this issue be raised by U.S. negotiators in the region.

2. **Humanitarian assistance to Belgrade:** Currently, State/PRM aid to UNHCR can go to Bosnian Serbs in Bosnia, but not to activities in the FRY. Likewise, State/PRM aid to ICRC is earmarked for use “particularly” in Bosnia and Croatia. State’s political statement has not, up to now, had a large impact on the amount of humanitarian aid reaching priority beneficiary populations in the FRY. Based on recent increase in humanitarian needs and subject to a needs assessment, State and AID would now like to consider relief support to UNHCR, ICRC and other international and non-governmental organizations for projects in the FRY.

3. **Money for Humanitarian Assistance:** We have substantial monies remaining in humanitarian assistance accounts at State for the end of FY 95 (more than $80 million in unspent MRA and ERMA). Some of this will need to go to Rwanda and other areas of dire need, but much might go to Bosnian relief.

   Possible initiative: Should we come forward with more aid and, if so, can and should we use it as a means to encourage greater access to all areas of need?
Implementing a Balkan Peace Settlement (U)

Scenario: (S) A peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina is accepted by all warring parties and includes a cessation of hostilities. There is international commitment to implement the provisions of the plan, including economic, diplomatic and military components. The principal military requirement is to create a stable environment during a limited period wherein the Bosnian Muslim-Croat Federation (the "Federation") is able to develop an effective self-defense relative to the Bosnian Serbs. To meet this requirement, two parallel programs are conducted: Multilateral security assistance to provide equipment and training to the Federation forces; a NATO force to implement the peace plan.

Assumptions: (S)
- Public and Congressional support for the plan has been achieved.
- All parties to the conflict agree to the settlement and the peace plan; both NATO and the UN Security Council endorse it by resolution as a NATO-led, non-blue helmeted, operation.
- At the appropriate time, as specified in the peace agreement, forces of all sides move to designated areas, except in isolated instances.
- The arms embargo is lifted for all of the former Yugoslavia.
- Croatia continues its support for and cooperation with the Federation.
- Border monitors on the Bosnia-Serbia border are withdrawn.
- There will be no UN involvement in military decision making for the operation.
- UNPROFOR mission completed, withdrawal authorized.
- UNCRO/UNPREDEP operations continue under UN control.
- Humanitarian assistance operations now underway continue and are adequate.
- US ground forces will be committed to the peace implementation force.
- Federation forces, once armed and trained, have to defend their country.

Mission: (S) On order, CINCSOUTH assumes operational control of designated NATO and non-NATO forces and conducts operations to enforce the terms of the peace agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Specified Tasks: (S) The Peace Implementation Force ("PIF") will:
- Deter violations of the cease-fire,
- Monitor and enforce compliance by all parties with the peace agreement,
- Ensure self defense and freedom of movement of the peace force,
- Facilitate the provision of humanitarian aid in Bosnia-Herzegovina and be prepared to secure convoys, and
- Employ NATO air power in support of peace enforcement operations and in defense of peace implementation forces.
Parallel functions: (S) The following functions will be performed by entities other than the PIF:

- **Security Assistance (Arm/Train):** Multilateral security assistance forces will provide equipment and related training to Federation forces to improve their ability to defend against outside aggression. This function could be conducted principally outside B-H and would be accomplished as rapidly as possible to permit early withdrawal of the PIF.
- **Air Support:** Deny Flight operations will continue throughout the PIF's mission in Bosnia. These forces will provide no-fly zone enforcement, close air support, suppression of enemy air defenses, and possibly strike operations to support the PIF (along the lines agreed in London in July).
- **UNPROFOR Withdrawal:** The UN will organize and conduct the withdrawal of those UNPROFOR forces not transitioning to the PIF.
- **Other Support:** Humanitarian assistance, human rights monitoring, and economic reconstruction efforts will proceed in parallel with the implementation of the plan.

Desired End State: (S) The mission of the PIF will be complete when the terms of the peace plan have been implemented by all parties and the Federation has enhanced its self-defense capability relative to the Bosnian Serbs.

Issues: (S) The following issues should be discussed in the interagency before proceeding with further planning for execution of the peace plan:

1. **Mission/Force Calculus:** SACEUR, who will execute the mission, will refine the forces he will need to do the job, seeking to develop a force sufficient to do the tasks assigned based on mission analysis. He has been requested by CJCS to provide an estimate of the forces required and a timeline for the operation as soon as possible.

2. **Initiation:** Deployment of the PIF should be ordered as promptly as feasible upon all parties' acceptance of the peace plan and issuance of the necessary mandates.

3. **Timing:** Building the existing FR/UK/NL RRF onto the PIF will significantly reduce the time needed to assemble the force. The time needed to fully deploy the PIF will depend on its size and sourcing.

4. **UNPROFOR Withdrawal:** The UN-organized withdrawal of those elements of UNPROFOR which will not transition to the PIF while the other elements of the PIF are deploying into the region will represent a considerable logistic effort and will tax the logistic infrastructure in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.
(5) **Transition Period:** The most vulnerable period with the greatest potential for a breakdown of the cease-fire will be during the simultaneous movement of NATO, UN and warring parties to transition to the peace agreement. Quick transition to the PIF will minimize the risk of early violation of the peace plan. Issues include enhanced authority for the UNPROFOR commander's use of airpower in advance of turnover, prompt withdrawal of those elements of UNPROFOR least capable of self-defense, rapid and clear transfer of authority to the PIF commander, explicit definition of PIF tasks and those assigned to UNFF during the transition, and rapid deployment of the US element of the PIF.

(6) **Continuation of Air Support:** An additional period of NATO Deny Flight support to the Federation after departure of the PIF could be needed to provide additional support to the Federation while its self-defense capabilities are being upgraded.

(7) **Force Recruitment:** Forces beyond those currently in the RRF and other NATO elements of UNPROFOR and those contributed by the US may be needed for the operation. A diplomatic effort to solicit additional forces may be needed.

(8) **Force Composition:** US/NATO policy must be formulated with respect to (a) Russian participation in the PIF, (b) Islamic nation participation in the PIF, and (c) Radical Islamic entities' involvement in arming/financing Federation forces.

(9) **Mandate:** For the PIF to work, both UNSC and NAC must support the mission with the appropriate mandate(s) (including Chapter VII ROE) and provide authority to the PIF as necessary for it to carry out its mission as a NATO-led (vice UN) operation with rules of engagement appropriate to its mission.

(10) **Status of Forces:** Given recent experiences in deploying the RRF, early attention should be given to completing comprehensive status of forces agreements for the PIF.

(11) **Financing:** Mission cost and financing arrangements must be determined. As this will be a NATO rather than a UN operation, the same questions will arise as have arisen during the staffing of OPLAN 40104. Within the US, a decision will be needed to seek new appropriations from the Congress. A timeline for financial decisions will be needed.
(12) **Sequencing:** The sequence of events within the USG, within the Contact Group, at NATO, at the UN and within the US, NATO, and UN military chains of command required to execute the plan remains to be developed.

(13) **Congressional Consultation:** A legislative plan must be developed for the Congressional consultations/approvals and/or legal processes that will be necessary and the steps which should be taken to avoid having Congressional and legal processes inordinately delay necessary military steps.

(14) **Participation Criteria:** The USG should set the same criteria for participation in this mission as were set for OPLANs 40103 and 40104. (Exclusively NATO C3, demonstrated peace in place, robust ROE, etc.)

(15) **Follow-on Activities:** Consideration should be given now to developing the concept for a much smaller UN or regionally-organized peacekeeping force that would monitor continuing compliance with the peace agreement following withdrawal of the PIF.

**Deputies' Committee Action:** (9) Recommend that the Deputies' Committee:

- Confirm the principles contained in this paper.
- Recommend Principals approve the above mission statement.
- Conduct preliminary discussion of and assign staffing responsibility for the issues identified.
- Direct State/OSD/JCS to initiate US planning and push for prompt initiation of NATO planning for the mission.

Rev 15 (Final plus two), 17 Aug 95
Multilateral Equipping and Training of the Bosnian Federation (U)

Scenario: (S) A peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina is accepted by all warring parties and includes a cessation of hostilities. There is international commitment to implement the provisions of the plan, including economic, diplomatic and military components. The principal military requirement is to create a stable environment during a limited period wherein the Bosnian Muslim-Croat Federation (the "Federation") is able to develop an effective self-defense relative to the Bosnian Serbs. To meet this requirement, two parallel programs are conducted: multilateral equipping and training of the Federation forces; a NATO force to implement the peace plan.

Assumptions: (S)

- Public and Congressional support for the plan has been achieved.
- The arms embargo is lifted for all of the former Yugoslavia.
- Legal requirements for provision of equipment have been met.
- Overt operation.
- Bosnian Federation requests assistance.
- Croatia continues its support for and cooperation with the Federation.
- Croatia will grant access through its territory to Bosnia.
- "No-Fly" Zone will continue to be enforced.
- BSA will retain its offensive capability.
- Bosnian Federation Army can disengage to re-equip, re-organize, and train.
- Adequate training facilities and logistics are available.

Mission: (S) On order, USCINCEUR assumes operational control of a multi-national force from designated NATO and Non-NATO nations and conducts operations to equip and train selected elements of the Bosnian Federation Army to enhance its capability to defend the territorial integrity of the Bosnian Federation.

Intent: (S)

- Multi-national effort, US led.
- Enhance Federation Army existing core capabilities and units.
- Develop Federation Army capability to sustain training program.
- Counter-balance Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) strengths.
- Focus on defensive tasks at the company and battalion levels and on brigade and higher staff operations.

Specified Tasks: (S)

- USCINCEUR assume operational control of a multi-national force for the mission.
- Assess Federation Army capabilities and needs.
- Classified By: Multiple Sources
- Declassify On: OADR

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SECRET
In coordination with the Federation Army, plan their reorganizing, reequipping, and training.
- Form a multi-national training and equipping team to execute the mission
- Facilitate the provision of equipment to the Federation Army by donor nations.
- Assist the Federation Army to execute the plan
- Ensure the self-defense and freedom of movement of the training and equipping team.

**Framework:**
- Equip/train would not be conducted by NATO Peace Implementation Force.
- Multilateral equip/train effort would be under US leadership.
- Training conducted primarily outside the Bosnian Federation. Other alternatives include Croatia, other European locations, or US.
- Equipment would be US, Former Warsaw Pact, or a mix.

**Concept of Operations:** This would be a five-phase operation with phases overlapping:
- Phase I -- Assessment. Assess the doctrine, organization, equipment and training status. Determine equipment and training required; assess availability of equipment and training. Prepare legal basis for provision of equipment.
- Phase II -- Establish the support structure. Position equipment, organize training teams, and establish training facilities.
- Phase III -- Equip.
- Phase IV -- Train. Integrate leaders and equipment into units, complete individual training, and conduct unit training.
- Phase V -- Sustainment. Exercise units and transition units to training base facilities.

**Desired End State:** Bosnian Federation Army has the capability of defending the territorial integrity of the Bosnian Federation against aggressors without external combat support (less "No Fly" Zone enforcement) within six months of mission start.

**Issues:** The following issues should be discussed in the interagency before proceeding with further planning for execution of multilateral security assistance:

1. Initiation: Should begin as promptly as feasible upon all parties' acceptance of the peace plan and issuance of the necessary mandates.

2. Timing: The most vulnerable period with the greatest potential for a breakdown of the cease-fire is the transition period between the present situation with UNPROFOR in place and implementation of the peace plan with NATO in place. Needs to move on same timeline as peace implementation plan.
3. Continuation of Air Support: Sustainment of “No-Fly” Zone operations and future Bosnian Federation air defense and air forces.

4. Methods/Financing: Costs, authorities, and financing arrangements (drawdown, security assistance, international contributions) must be determined. Within the US, a decision will be needed to seek new appropriations from the Congress. A timeline for financial decisions will be needed.

5. Sequencing: The sequence of events within the USG, within the Contact Group, at NATO, at the UN and within the US, NATO, and UN military chains of command are required to execute a multilateral equip/train program.

6. Congressional Consultation: A legislative plan must be developed for the Congressional consultations/approvals and/or legal processes that will be necessary and the steps which should be taken to avoid having Congressional and legal processes inordinately delay the necessary steps.

7. Legal: SOFAs, status of trainers/training area under the Law of Armed Conflict. Transfer of classified equipment and information.

8. Command and Control: US leadership of multinational effort. Missions tasked to CINCEUR, and most likely delegated to USAREUR for detailed planning, coordination and execution. Integrating the activities of the other donor nations.


10. Availability of Equipment: Availability of Former Warsaw Pact equipment, spare parts, and consumables.

Deputies' Committee Action: (S) Recommend the Deputies' Committee:

• Confirm the assumptions, mission, and specified tasks to meet the arming and training requirements while the two parallel programs (Arm & Train and Implementation of the peace plan) are conducted.
• Recommend Principals approve the above mission statement.
• Conduct preliminary discussion of and assign staffing responsibility for these issues, and possibly others which are identified.
• Direct State/OSD/JCS to initiate US planning and push for prompt initiation of multilateral involvement.