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  • to attack the Bosnian Serb-held Ozren mountains to relieve pressure on the Maglaj region, These attacks would not only trap Serb forces but would open several government supply lines between Maglaj and Tuzla. -- The Government forces have launched several
  • 1994-05-19B, BTF Memorandum re Military Status Report for Sarajevo, Gorazde, and Tuzla
  • C05916021 pproved for Release CIA Historical ollections Division AR 70-14 1OCT201 DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force 19 May 1994 Military Status Report for Sarajevo, Gorazde, and Tuzla Summary Both Bosnian Serb and Government forces are now
  • request for an American officer to serve as Chief of Staff of UNPROFOR forces; whether or not to support UNPROFOR proposals to reopen Tuzla airport for humanitarian deliveries; possible steps to improve Macedonian sanctions enforcement and elevate
  • discouraging news on the negotiations in New York, made progress toward defining US policy options (tighter sanctions and military intervention), explored pros and cons of an airlift to Tuzla, and reviewed the status of interagency papers in preparation. 2. New
  • to strengthen sanctions? (We will wait at least until after completion of Russian legislature's meeting.) -- Should we try to open Tuzla airport? (Land convoys are getting in and it is not a good location for distributing goods to the countryside, but some see
  • privately that only 2,500 attempted to withdraw to Tuzla, not the thousands more stated publicly. There are also a number of reasons why government troops did not conduct a stronger positional defense of the enclave. " The Bosnian Army forces
  • Currently 285,000. GORAZDE The original population of 35,000 almost entirely Muslim. about 380,000. IIIIillllllllllllll lllllllllllll lls l l IllllIlII Food and Water TUZLA Estimated currently at 160,000, is now between 70,000 and 100,000.. Ten percent
  • areas -Srebrenica,. Zepa, Bihac and-Tuzla. In addition, NATO could strictly enforce the exclusion zones (which would require that new instructions be given to UNPROFOR, to ensure that the UN "key" is turned- when NATO-decides to strike).. Declaring
  • units. All are capable of rapid movement to the vicinity of high-interest areas, such as the Bihac enclave and Tuzla. The Bosnian Serbs routinely move their missiles and guns to make NATO targeting difficult. They are also well-versed in camouflage
  • operations there likely would be limited to securing the C05915995 main road between olovo and Kladanj. The Serbs may step-up their shelling of the area to maintain pressure on Bosnian forces and keep o en the possibility of driving north to isolate Tuzla.
  • in Srebrenica; at the same time, to work with the Bosnian government to obtain their consent for the evacuation of the refugees to Tuzla rather than forcing them (Action: State) to remain unsupported behind Serb lines. e To use public statements
  • air activity over Bosnia. This is a topic that comes up in regard to helicopter flights and the reports of fixed wing flights near Tuzla. Ray 'onverse 3
  • a paper for the meeting on options to strengthen UNPROFOR (see TAB D under MEETING PAPERS). Options include securing Sarajevo and Tuzla airports, establishing secure aid corridors to the eastern enclaves, increasing the number of safe areas, and enhancing
  • . There are specific options that may strengthen UNPROFOR ability to perform within its mandate. These include: * Securing Sarajev' and Tuzla Airports. The focal points of international interest in the conflict. Measures would include securing the perimeter
  • affiliated with ."Arkan" have been dispatched to Tuzla and Srebrenica in search of American hostages. We extrapolate from this Serbian paramilitary personnel in Serbia- -beyond the control of Milosevic--might be inclined to embarrass the Serbian President
  • , which is centered around Tuzla, probably could begin production in short order after reliable utility and transportation service resume of the major plants. The Bosnian Serbs use the Tuzla soda ash and the Tuzla coke and coal chemical plants to produce
  • that tens of were ethnically cleansed. thousands of Muslims were either killed or expelled from the area and were forced to seek refuge in remaining Muslim controlled areas such as Tuzla. In many villages an unmistakably deliberate method of destruction
  • the Serbs to dominate a key Bosnian Government-held, all-weather supply route from central Bosnia to Tuzla. * The Bosnian Serbs.claim to have advanced to within sight of the road from Mostar to Jablanica. The road was closed twice over the weekend
  • their advance south of the road. Route Python--which continues north to Olovo and eventually to Tuzla-was the only route the Serbs had from the north, allowing reinforcement of their forces around Vogosca and in Hadzici and Stup. If the Bosnian Army eventually
  • by immediate extension of that decision to Bihac, Tuzla and Sarajevo.) Analysis: This option would deny Milosevic the rewards of the Bildt package until he has obtained a down payment of positive performance from the Bosnian Serbs. We would thereby have a more
  • of the cease-fire. The Bosnian Army would not require major material assistance to defend the "core area"--the central region extending roughly from Tuzla to Mostar. The Croatian Army's breakthrough in UN Sector North has greatly improved the Bihac pocket's
  • the plan, in the first two weeks UK- and French-led units would secure the routes from the Adriatic to Sarajevo, opening the way for U.S. troops to push through to Tuzla and on to the eastern enclaves. The withdrawal of UNPROFOR troops would then unfold
  • into central Bosnia where they could overwhelm relief operations in Tuzla or Sarajevo. Any winter offensive would lead to substantial casualties amongst the civil population because of exposure. Serbs Want the Enclaves The Bosnian Serb leadership has long
  • in the Bosnian safe areas of Srebrenica and Tuzla. Arkan's apparently ongoing ties to Milosevic, however, may lessen the threat to ICFYfrom his forces. " The 32 US ICFY monitors are a large and accessible group of US citizens. If US ICFY personnel return to duty
  • attempt to cut off Tuzla and Sarajevo, seize the eastern enclaves, and interdict Bosnian Government lines of communication. It would be unable to destroy the Bosnian Government Army, howeveri I Serbia would be unlikely to undertake provocative action
  • C05961604 " C) Bosnian Army operations in the Ozren mountains have resulted in the capture of a critical stretch of highway that would greatly improve transit between central Bosnia and Tuzla, and Bosnian Government forces threaten to take the entire
  • S 1tiv''~ ' roat n "t Y cpta bo nd r .L, 2 M 2 iJ '-i utonomous e pro vce S}2t p a \ ta( ti: "j y' c 't 4 i ., ' r Mao f d Tuzla I VR tL'134Mrkont.j (t "ift } aj ® Lukan 4 dix Bo ni > hed urrs Viz! r .w 't r!TF
  • . Rape Sites Tend to be Small We have identified 34 facilities in Bosnia where women allegedly have, at one time or another, been held and raped (see map). All but two of these sites--one operated by Croats at Odzak and the other by Muslims at Tuzla
  • . To increase the airflow into Sarajevo wouldrequireincreased personnel for ground operations. If Tuzla is opened, the airport is limited to one C-141 or three C-1308 on the ground at any one time. Airdrop of anything other than food or medicine is a difficult
  • . * The Bosnian Serbs control segments of the railroad from Tuzla to Sarajevo and from Sarajevo to the Croatian port of Ploce. Only this main north-south rail line was electrified before the war; the other lines relied on steam and diesel locomotives. Several
  • leaders and won their agreement for the deployment. e US NATO forces set up Checkpoint Cadillac on a road between Orasje and Tuzla on 26 December, according to press. They reportedly crossed Croat and Serb lines and a US officer said IFOR forces were
  • in which Serbs are in the minority. doing in eastern Bosnia since early February 1993. They can follow this strategy until only Tuzla, Bihac, and Sarajevo are left and then take these towns one at a time after a prolonged siege. This approach would take
  • airs trikes to protect the UN safe areas and make it possible for relief workers to do their jobs. France and the UK call for airs trikes if the Bosnian Serbs hinder UN operations at Srebrenica and Tuzla. Bosnian Serb leader Karadzicreacts :to .t he
  • of Brcko will be determined by arbitration within one year. o I o Seeret 40 Kilometers I i 40 Miles a Canton names 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Una Sana Posavina Tuzla Podrinje Zenica Doboj Gorazde Middle Bosnia Neretva West Herzegovina Sarajevo 10 Uvno
  • corridor near Brcko by about 15 kilometers and cut-off the Sapna salient northeast of Tuzla. A second phase reportedly is planned to eliminate the Bosnian Croat-held Orasje enclave northwest of Brcko. The Croatians believe the offensive will involve about
  • 100 square kilometers of territory around Bihac, and limited territory elsewhere. Nevertheless, as the unsuccessful and costly attack in March around Stolice northeast of Tuzla demonstrated, improvements in Bosnian Government forces have not yet
  • (autonomous UN province) Northern Zone , Prijedor Orasje Bihac I Banja Luka Oobo Brcko' t Sask Bijeljina \-Most Tesanj Teslic UN Southern o Zone Jajce, n-- Tuzla-- ,Ribnica ,iZenica Srebrenica Olovo Vitez Vakuf. Knin . Maglai Glamoc
  • dreadful moments for me. I will never forget. After the mortar hit the Tuzla nightclub, the press said to me, "So now do you feel better? This is what happened because you kept insisting on bombing." It was perfectly dreadful, especially since the bombing
  • for UNHCR efforts to assist in the movement, care and supply of the refugees and the Dutch UNPROFOR troops in Srebrenica; at the same time, to work with the Bosnian government to obtain their consent for the evacuation of the refugees to Tuzla rather than
  • THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ISSUES THEMSELVES TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. WITH RESPECT TO THE SREBRENICA MISSING, SOMMARUGA TOLD AMB. SPIEGEL THAT HE IS SENDING A VERY STIFF LETTER TO KARADZIC DEMANDING AN EXPLANATION. ICRC INTERVIEWS OF SREBRENICA REFUGEES IN TUZLA INDICATE
  • a l i n g w i t h a p o t e n t i a l mounting refugee problem i n Tuzla. f £ ) -r SECRET 20227 M c U r \ LI NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506 March 15, 1993 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LEON FUERTH A s s i s t a n t t o t h e Vice President
  • SHELLED TUZLA AIRFIELD, WHI (H IS UNDER UN CONTROL. ACCORDING TO PRESSl 1.4c I ONE SHELL LANDED ON THE RUNWAY AND UN ENGINEERS ARE ASSESSING THE EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE. 1.4c UN MILITARY OBSERVERS REPORT THAT FIGHTING BETWEEN BOSNIAN SERB AND GOVERNMENT
  • ' ability to resist BSA attacks in built-up urban areas such as Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Bihac, it probably would not prevent the loss of smaller towns and villages. -- Muslim use of mortars would force the BSA to disperse its artillery, but the lack of fixed
  • h i s initiative? Tuzla: Reports i n d i c a t e serious shortages i n the Tuzla area. What are Mrs. Ogata's views on the opening o f Tuzla a i r p o r t and under what scenario does she t h i n k t h i s might be DECLASSIFIED IN PART CLINTON
  • does Mrs. Ogata assess the prospects f o r t h i s initiative? Tuzla: Reports i n d i c a t e serious shortages i n the Tuzla area. What are Mrs. Ogata's views on the opening of Tuzla a i r p o r t and under what scenario does she t h i n k t h i s