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Case Number: 2006-0459-F
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SRB Press Club Speech on Iraq 12/23/98
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�Draft Press Club Speech on Iraq
Thank you for having me today. Before I take your questions, I want to talk about where we
stand on Iraq- about what we accomplished in the military operation that concluded over the
weekend and about our strategy for moving forward.
For the last eight years, American policy toward Iraq has been based on the direct threat Saddam
poses to international security. That threat is clear. Saddam's history of aggression leaves little
doubt that he would resume his drive for regional domination and his quest for weapons of mass
destruction if he had the chance.
Over these years, through the Bush and Clinton Administrations, we have met that threat with a
consistent policy of containment, based on four pillars: economic sanctions; UN inspections; the
credible threat of force; and diplomacy to sustain an international consensus in pursuit of this
goal. In the face of periodic challenges since the GulfWar ended, this strategy essentially has
held Saddam in check. We have prevented him from attacking his neighbors and slowly but
surely worked to reduce his nuclear, chemical and biological weapons capability and the missiles
needed to deliver it
But over the past year in particular, Saddam has tried to cripple the UN inspection system that
has caused Iraq to destroy a significant part of its prohibited arsenal. Clearly, he hoped to
destroy UNSCOM and to cajole the UN Security council into declaring him in compliance with
his disarmament obligations, leading to the lifting of sanctions. For Saddam 1998 was the year
to break out of the box he has been in -the year to end containment.
But when Saddam refused to cooperate with UNSCOM in August, he did not split the Security
Council -- he united it. And when he backed down in the face of imminent force in November,
the United States and Great Britain made clear that our restraint was conditional, that he had to
cooperate fully with UNSCOM or we would act without further diplomacy or delay. Last week,
we did exactly what we said we would do, and we were right to do it. If Saddam could
eviscerate UNSCOM without a firm response, not only would there be no effective UNSOCM;
there would be no deterrence against future aggression because the threat of force would no
longer be credible. And there would be no prospect for keeping his program of weapons of mass
destruction in check.
The operation that ended on Saturday inflicted substantial damage on Saddam's weapons of
mass destruction programs and on his military capability to threaten his neighbors. That does not
mean the threat is gone. UNSCOM has not been able to account for all of the chemical and
biological weapons it believes Iraq once had; but neither has it been able to locate them. We
cannot disarm Saddam from the air as precisely as we can from the ground. But disarmament
from the ground- that is an UNSCOM that is permitted to do its job -- has been thwarted by
Saddam. And there is much we can do from the air. We can damage the systems Saddam needs
to deliver his weapons of mass destruction, the security forces he needs to direct and protect
those weapons, and the industrial facilities he needs to produce more. And that is exactly what
we did.
�2
We damaged or destroyed much ofthe machinery that Iraq uses to develop, test and produce the
delivery systems for its WMD. Iraq's missile program has been seriously set back. We also
targeted the military apparatus that oversees Saddam's WMD programs and provides security for
him and his leaders. We destroyed the headquarters of the Special Republican Guard, and a
number of other Republican Guard headquarters, barracks and training facilities throughout Iraq.
We attacked airfields throughout Iraq, where we destroyed a number of unmanned, "drone"
aircraft we believe were fitted to spray anthrax, and almost a fifth of the helicopter force Iraq has
used for internal oppression .. We disrupted Saddam's command and control apparatus. That
includes Iraq's military intelligence headquarters, which was completely destroyed. It includes
TV and radio transmitters used to communicate with troops, broadcast propaganda, and jam
transmissions. It includes Bath Party Headquarters and presidential palaces around the country
that are part of Saddam's command system.
It was neither the purpose nor the effect of the strike to dislodge Saddam from power. That is
not a military objective that plausibly can be achieved with air power. It was not achieved after
a month of air strikes in Desert Storm. But today, after taking his country from one crisis to
another over weapons inspections this year, promising a lifting of trade sanctions, Saddam has
nothing to show for his efforts. He is weaker, deterrence is stronger and the Middle East is safer
than before the operation. Saddam has learned that we have not lost our resolve to block his
aggressive aims. He has learned that there is no path to sanctions relief that does not pass
through compliance with his obligations. And he has learned that what cannot be inspected can
in many cases be destroyed.
·
The question today, of course, is where do we go from here? Let me start to answer that
question by discussing some of the approaches we reject.
At one end, some have suggested that we have invested too much for too long in Saddam and
that the time has come to downgrade the threat and move on. This view is shared by some
nations that are eager to end sanctions by lowering the bar for compliance.
But we cannot evade the reality that Saddam's external aggression and internal repression still
pose a genuine threat to his neighbors and the world. Year after year, in conflict after conflict,
Saddam has proven that he seeks weapons, including WMD, not for some abstract concept of
deterrence, but for the very real purpose of using them. There is no doubt that if he could rebuild
his arsenal, he would. And make no mistake: we would find once again that dealing with an
armed, unrestrained Iraq is far more costly and dangerous than dealing with a contained Iraq.
And walking away in the face of Saddam's defiance ultimately would destroy the credibility of
the UN Security Council.
r
At the other extreme, most people are so fed up with Saddam's unending deception and defiance
that they say we should just get rid of him, now, no matter what the cost. That may be.
emotionally satisfying, but it is not a strategy. It is certainly not something we can do by air
power alone. Cruise missiles and smart bombs by themselves will not destroy this regime, nor
can they deliver the motivation, leadership and spine that Saddam's forces will need to rise
against him.
�3
The only sure way for us to effect his departure now would be to commit hundreds of thousands
of American troops to fight on the ground inside Iraq. I do not believe that the costs of such a
campaign would be sustainable at home or abroad. And the reward of success would be an
American military occupation oflraq that could last years.
The strategy we can arid will pursue is to contain Saddam in the short and medium term, by force
if necessary, and to work toward a new government over the long term.
The goal of containment is to prevent Saddam from rebuilding his deadly weapons and from
threatening his neighbors. The question is how do we do that in the wake of the recent crisis?
The best alternative is for Saddam to allow UNSCOM back to Iraq with clear assurances that
they will be able to complete their job. Why would he do that? If the UN Security Council
makes clear that consideration of sanctions relief can only come with verified compliance by Iraq
of its disarmament obligations. Indeed, lifting sanctions before there is verifiable compliance
would be a sad day for the UN.
We should not reward Iraqi intransigence with new, watered down monitoring mechanisms
designed to meet Saddam's demands. We should not be interested in helping Ii-aq create.the
illusion of compliance. Iraq needs to change its approach to inspections, not the international
community. Iraq must demonstrate it will fully cooperate with the inspectors by taking
affirmative steps. This is not hard for Iraq to do. Chairman Butler has proposed a roadmap to
compliance that would take between 3 and 6 months to complete. If Saddam had the will to end
this confrontation, he certainly has the way.
If there is not credible outside verification that Iraq has fulfilled its obligations, we must be ready
to use force again if we determine Saddam is reconstituting his biological, chemical or nuclear
weapons program or the missiles to deliver his WMD .
Disarmament by force does not promise p.erfect results .. But then, neither did disarmament by
inspections. Even at its most effective, UNSCOM never had it in its power to uncover every act
of deception in every nook and cranny of Baghdad. And for much of the last year, the Iraqis
have only been allowing UNSCOM to look where Iraq knows there was nothing to be found.
With or without UNSCOM, we have formidable intelligence capabilities. We will continue to
conduct air reconnaissance. We can act if Iraq resumes production of missiles, or tries to test
any missile system. We can act iflraq tries to resume large scale production of chemical or
biological weapons. We will watch Iraq's external procurement activity and we will know what
it is trying to build and buy. And of course we can also act if Sad dam prepares to move against
his neighbors or the Kurds in· northern Iraq, or if he threatens our aircraft.
With respect to Saddam's arsenal of deadly weapons, our strategy will be simple: if he rebuilds
it, we will come. We have the obligation to do this; we have the will to do it; and we have forces
in the region that are ready to do it.
�4
Moreover, the sanctions regime that has already cost Saddam $120 billion will stay in place
without change until UNSCOM returns. We will continue the oil for food program to ensure
·
·
Iraq's oil revenues are spent on people, not arms
In all these ways, we will continue to contain Saddam. But we also recognize that containment
is a difficult policy to sustain in the long run. It is, first of all, a costly policy in economic and
strategic terms. And even a contained Iraq is harmful to its region.
Sad dam's continued misrule of Iraq is partly responsible for the pervasive sense of insecurity
that prevents the Middle East as a whole from evolving in a positive way. It requires us to keep
a costly presence in the Persian Gulf It helps foster the false perception of a conflict between
Muslims and the United States - a perception President Clinton has done much to erase, but
which inevitably persists and is exploited by those who wish us harm. It means the continuation
of oppressive policies against all the peoples of Iraq that threaten that country's integrity. It
condemns the Iraqi people to a future of unending isolation in a murderous police state, a future
in which their basic needs are met but their hopes of a normal life are constantly da~hed.
That is why we are going to do all we can to strengthen the Iraqi opposition so.that it can seek
',
change inside Iraq. We will do so in a practical and effective way, step by step. If we are
serious, we must do this carefully, not noisily. We will not play recklessly with the lives of those
who may risk their lives to oppose Saddam. And we must not imply commitments before we
are clear about their risks and costs and likely benefits.
The responsibility to mount an effective movement that appeals to people inside Iraq and inspires
them to struggle for change lies with the opposition leaders themselves. But there is much we
can and will do. Already, we have reconciled the two Kurdish factions and worked with them to
improve the lives of the three million Iraqis who live outside of Saddam's control in the North.
We have set up Radio Free Iraq to get uncensored news and information to the Iraqi people. We
are intensifying our contacts with the entire spectrum oflraqi opposition groups, working with
the Congress to help them become a more effective voice for the aspirations of the Iraqi people.
When the time is right and the opposition is ready, we will decide what kind of additional
support it will need to overcome Saddam's apparatus ofviolence and terror. We will not
overreach. But we are willing to use whatever means are appropriate to advance our interests in
Iraq, as long as the means are effective.
We will also stand ready to help a new government in Iraq that respects the rights of its people
and meets its obligations to the world. We would work to ease economic sanctions against such
a new Iraq as quickly as possible. We would work to relieve Iraq's massive economic debts.
We will pursue this strategy with patience and resolve and with confidence that our goals will be
met. We know from history that when tyrannies are prevented from expanding they often retreat
and decay. We know from experience that when people struggling for freedom gain the moral
and material support of the American people, they usually prevail in the end. We know as well
that change, when it does come, often comes suddenly and at unexpected times.
�0,
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Change will come to Iraq, at a time and in a manner that we can influence but cannot predict.
And when-it does, we'll look back and say "thank goodness we persevered." That is what we
intend to do, with the support and understanding of the American people.
Thank you very much.
�
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Speechwriting Office - Antony Blinken
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<p>Antony Blinken served in the Clinton Administration as the chief foreign policy speechwriter in the National Security Council Speechwriting Directorate from 1994 thru 1998.</p>
<p>Blinken prepared remarks for President Clinton, Anthony Lake, Samuel Berger, James Steinberg, and General Donald Kerrick. His speechwriting topics cover a variety of subjects for various audiences including but not limited to: foreign trips or head of state visits, United Nations General Assembly addresses, and State of the Union and weekly radio addresses. As an NSC speechwriter, Blinken produced speeches on major foreign policy actions during the Clinton Administration on Haiti, Iraq and Bosnia. The documents in the collection consist of speech drafts, newspaper and magazine articles, memos, correspondence, schedules, and handwritten notes.</p>
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Antony Blinken
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SRB Press Club Speech on Iraq 12/23/98
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Antony Blinken
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