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DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
SUBJECTffiTLE
001. notes
[Notes from Bosnia Statement Meeting, Cabinet Room] (8.pages)
DATE
11/14/1996
002. briefmg paper ~Military Force Options for :aosnia (t'l pages)
· ca. 11/1996
.
.~
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Clinton Presidential Records
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FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia Statement (&Zaire), 11/15/1996
2006-0459-F
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�. THE WHITE HOUSE
Office,of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
November 15, 1996
REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
IN PRESS AVAILABILITY
The Briefing Room
11:20 A.M. EST
THE PRESIDENT: ·.· Good morning. One· year ago in Dayton,
the leaders of Bosnia, Crqatia and Serbia turned from the horror
of war to the promise of peace. Their historic decision came
· neaply four years of horrible bloodshed, the bloodiest
conflict Europe has seen since World War II; after a quarter
million deaths, after 2 million people were made refugees, after
countless atrocities that shocked the conscience of the world.
:when the Balkan leaders chose peace, I asked the
American people to help them by suppor.ting the partie
ion of
our troops in a NATO-led implementation force to -secure the
Dayton Agreement.
L promised that
mission would be carefully
de
with clear ~nd realistic gqals·.
I said it would be
ed in about a year.
IFOR has succeeded beyond.our expectations. As a
result, its mission will end as planned on December 20th, and
every.single item on IFOR's military checklist has been
accomplished.
It has maintained the.cease-f
and separated the
parties along a new demilitarized zone.
It has monitored the
placement of thousands of heavy weapons and holding .areas,
overseen a massive ·troop. demobilizat
and· the trans r of
hundreds of square mi s of territory .from one side to another,
and allowed the people of Bosnia to vote .in
e national
elections.
has been a remarkable a~hievement.
In the
process we have see how important and effective the NATO Alliance
remains. And we have seen the possibilities for cooperation with
Russia and the other members of· the Partnership.
Peace.
Today, the Bosnian people are
better off than they we
a.
�(~
..
2
year ago, their prospects for a future of peace and fr~edom are
much brighter.
Already, the change in the day-to-day lives of the
Marketplaces are full of life, not
death, more people .have roofs over their head, food on ·their
tables, heat and hbt water.
The routines of normal life -- going
to work, coming home from school -- are slowly becoming a
reality. Bosnia's bitter harvest of hatred, however, has not yet
disappeared .
p~ople there i~ dramatic.
•
For the last 12 months, the killing has stopped, and
with time, the habits of peace can take hold.
This success we
owe to IFOR. But its achievements on the military side have not
been match~d1despite all our efforts by similar progress on the
civilian side.
Quite fiankly, rebuilding the fabric of Bosnia's
economic and political life is taking longer than anticipated.
Economic activity is only just resuming.
Its pace
must be quickened and its reach extended.
The presidency, the
parliament, the constitutional court, created by the elections,
are still.in their infancy.
They need time to work.
Civilian
police forces must be better trained. We must complete .training
.
and equipping the Bosnian Federation military so that a stable
balance of power can take hold.and renewed aggression is· less
likely. And municipal elections remain to be organized and held.
Let me emphasize that the Bosnian people, with the
help of international civilian groups, will be responsible for
all this work.
But foi a time, they will need the stability and
the confidence that only an outside security force can provide.
NATO has been studying options to give them the help
that time will provide by providing a new security presence in
Bosnia when IFOR withdraws. That study is now complete.
I have
carefully reviewed ·its options, and I have decided to instruct
the United States representative to NATO to ·inform our allies
that, in principle, the United States will take part in a
follow-on force in Bosnia.
For my agreement in principle to become a commitment,
however, I must be satisfied that the final recommendation NATO
adopts and the operational plan it develops are clear, limited
and achievable.
The new mission's focus should be to prevent a
resumption of hostilities so that economic reconstruction and
political reconciliation can accelerate.
That will require a
strong but limited military presenc~ in Bosnia, able to respond
quickly and decisively to any violations of the cease-fire.
�3
The new mission will be more limited tpan IFOR and
will require fewer troops.
It will not
the fundamental
military challenge of separating two ho
le armies, because IFOR
has accomplished that
k.
It .will be charged with working to
maintain the stabili
that IFOR cre.ated.
It will. di:scourage the
parties from taking up .arms again; while encouraging them
resume full responsibility for their own security as quickly as
possible.
IFOR plowed the. field in which the seeds of peace have
been planted.
This new mission will pr6vide
climate ·for them
to take root and the time to begin growing.
·our-military planners have concluded that this new
mission will require fewer than half the number of troops we
contributed to IFOR, about 8,500. There will be an Am~rican
commander and tough rules of engagement. Every six months we
will review whether the ~t~bility can be maintained with fewer
rces. By,
end of 1997, ·we expect to draw down· to. a much
smaller deterrent force, about half the i'nitia~·size, and we will
propose
our NATO allies that by June of 1998 the missl.on's
work should be done and the forces should be ab
to withdraw.
~~e United Stat~s cannot and should not try to solve
every problem in the world, but.where our. interests are ~lear and
orir v~lues are at stake,~kh~re we can ~ak~ a difference, ~e must
act and we must lead~ Clea'rly, Bosnia is such an example. Every
American shoulQ. be proud of the. di.fference . the United States has
alre~dy made i~ Bosnia, ending a terrible slaughter,· saving
thousands of lives, s~curing countless ~uture~. W~ have a
responsibility to se·e that cbmmi tment through, to' give the peace
America helped to make.
.:Bosnia a chance to grow s.trong,
self-sufficient and.lasting.
Earli
this wee~, , I also de~ided that, in principlei
the United States_should take part in an -international
humanitarian. effort to be. part· .of a release force that Canada
will lead in Zaire . . Two years ago,
llowing genocide in Rwanda,
:more ~han 1 million Rwandans fl~d f6r Zair~. Recently, their
plight has worsened as fight{ng. among militant
rces has driven
them from their camps. Vio
has begun to spiral out of·
control, preventing relie( agencies from providing food and
medicine
the refugees who are now vulnerable-to starvation and
to disease. J'he world' s· most powerful nation must not. turn its . ·
back on so many desperate people and so·many innocent childLen
who are now at risk.
�4
The miss.ion Canada proposes to lead,. a~d,that I
believe America should take part in, would prqvide security for
civilian relief agencies to deliver the aid these people must
h~ve; and to help the refugees who so desire to return home to
Rwanda.
America's contribution to such a force would match our
special capabilities, such as: providing security at the Goma
airfield and helping to airlift Allied forces.
Neither the new
security force in Bosnia nor the humanitarian relief effort in
Zaire will _be free o£ risk. But r ·will do everything in my power
to minimize the risks by making sure both missions are clear and
achievable before I give the green light. American leadership
places a special burden on the men and women of our armed forces
and their families·.
We ask a lot from them, and without fail,
they deliver for us.
Now, as we contemplate calling on them again I ask us,
first of all, .to remember the astonishing job that they have
done, remarkably free of violence in Bosnia. And I a&k that
every American to keep them in their thoughts and prayers.
Q
Mr. President, what do you say to critics who say
that you waited till after the election to make the announcement
that you're sending troops abroad, or keeping troops in Bosnia?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I would say two· things.
First
of all, it was well'before the election that the NATO Allies in
Europe most closely concerned with this came to us and said, we
do not believe that the civilian and political and ~conomic
functions have developed to the point where there can be no
security piesence in Bosnia, even though IFOR has done everything
it was asked to do. And I said that !would consider American
participati6n if there were a clear mission with an achievable
goal. And that was clear before the election.
But_more importantly, I would say that the NATO
ministers met and made their recommendation to me just last week.
We needed some time to study it.
I had a meeting last evening,
quite an extensive one, with General Shalikashvili ma~ing the
military case and -with Secretary Christopher and Secretary Perry.
And the whole national security team met with the Vice President
and me.
We have . done this in a· timely fashion following the NATO
timetable,
'
The most important thing the American people need to
know is that mission succeeded, .it did do what it was supposed to
do in 12 months. But we, frankly-- when I say "we," I mean all
�5
-
the people involved in NATO, believe that we could make more
economic and political progress than we were able to make.
So,
we believe there should be a new, but much more Limited mission
simply to maintain the security that has been established and to
maintain the conditions in which the political and economic
progress can be made.
Q
Do
though, while you
that part of what
extension of this
you think you should have laid this idea out,
were campaigning so that people had a sense
they got when they got your reelection was the
mission?
THE PRESIDENT: Well~ I believe that they did believe
that . . Keep in mind, before the election it was said that the
Europeans thought we ought to stay in a more limited way, and I
said I would consider doing that.
Frankly, I want to pay a
compliment to Senator Dole -- I think because he said, in a very
statesman-like way, that he would support doing that, that we had
too big an investment in the success of the process; there was
not a difference of opinion on it.
So, that it did not -- I
think that it did not become more hotly debated in the campaign
and therefore it maybe wasn't .focused on by as many people.
Bfit
the issue was out there.
I couldn't agree and describe a mission that had not
yet been developed by the NATO military planners or recommended
to us.
So, I would say that it maybe didn't get the attention
that it othetwise would have gotten, and it may be because
Senator Dole ma¢e what I thought was a very statesman-like
statement early on that, of course~ ·if it had to be done that he
would agree.
Q
Mr: President, there are some reports of .refugees
in quite large numbers moving within Zaire back toward the
Rwandan border and across, ·relief agencies in Rwanda saying that
they have plenty of food and equipment and so forth once they're
back across the boarder, is there a chance, ·sir, that this
mission may not be needed?
·THE PRESIDENT: Well, let me say we have some very
good preliminary news about the prospects that the refu9ees would
be able to go back to Rwanda, and then it may work out better
than we had originally thought. But I would say first of all it
is preliminary, a.nd secondly -.- obviously, if the dimensions of
what has to be don~ can change based on the realities on.the
ground, we're watching it every day -- I think we have to be
prepared for tbe prospect that we will still have to have some
�.---------------------------;---:------------------
-------
6
presence there to facilitat~ this ~nd to make sure that as
quickly as possible we get everything that is needed to them.
I don't think we kno~ enough yet, Brit, to say that
the mission won't be needed.
It's ,a hopeful sign, but that's all
I can say right now.
Q
Mr. President, on Bosnia, do you technically
consider this to be a different mission, and will there be a
wholesale change of forces over there?
THE' PRESIDENT:
Yes, we are withdrawing. the IFOR
·forces, and this is a different mission.
Q
American forces -- I'm sorry.
THE -PRESIDENT:
That's correct.
This will be a·
different misslon. And there will be some overlap there, becau~e
if you remember, the planning, I think, called for a phased
draw-down that would run into early next year, a~yway.
B~t.~e
tielieve,the size of this ~ill be about 8,500 --what will be
required. Arid it _will be different ~,}-
.Q
Mr~ Pre~ide~t, you have your ihtern~tional policy
team here standing with ybu, and we were led to believe, at least
a little while ago, that·you would be.na~ing people rather
quickly to that. · That process seems ·to have slowed down.
Can
. yo~ tell us why?
THE PRESIDENT:
Yes.
One of the things that all of
the people who are here with me have·said, including Secretary
Perry and Secretary Christopher, and thit a lot of people I have
talked to about this, including people who might be a part of it,
and 'others, · "rhey'·have reminded me tha't the thing that has really
made our wor,k as successful as it has been in so many ways is
that we' v.e had. a remarkable amount of teamwork; remarkably free
of rancor and re~arkably free of the kind·of undercutting that
has too often hap~ened in our_national politics.
Se~eial people have said if you h~ve to take a little
more time ·to feel good about the composition of .the team you put
t'ogether, by all means do it, because it is ·the team that will
rise or. fall ·and that will advance America's ·cause. And so I
h~ve been thinking,· obviously, with a lot of gratitude of the
level of teamwo.rk we've. had, the level . of ·cooperation, how we've
worked together, arid what I cdncluded after talkin~ about this
extensively with the Vice President in pa:rticular is that we
�7
needed to make absolutely sure that we knew what the team was
going to be.
Now let me also tell you that all of us on the
transition team, the Vice President and Mr. Panetta and Mr.
Bowles and all the rest of us are working very hard.
I have
never worked any harder than I have in the days since the last
election to make sure that we make the most of this transition.
I need a little bit of vacation, and I hope those of you who are
going with me will get a little one, too. But we will be make
timely appointments, they will be ready well in advan~e of the
Congress beginning and they will have adequate opportunity for
the Senate to review them and I think we will be in very good
shape.
But the specific·answer to your qtiestion is that I
want to .make sure that the team works.
Q
We're told that one of the conditions for sending
U.S. troops into Zaire as part of this humanitarian mission is
that the U.S. gets some kind of assurances from these rival
militias that they will cease their hostility so American Gis
don't have to shoot their way in.
Is that really a realistic
expectation. or do you suspect that there will ·be so much
firepower that will be sufficient to stop .the hostilities?
THE PRESIDENT:
Well, I might let Secretary Perry
answer this question, but I'll take a crack at it.
We will have, as we always do, very tough rules of
engagement if somebody tak~s action against us.
It is h~ving
those kinds of rules, that. kind of strength-- that's one of the
reasons that we had the almost incredible experienc~ we've had in
Bosnia so far in terms of there not being conflict.
But, on the other hand, when we send a mission in of
peace like that, we don't believe that we should have to assume
on· the front end that we'll have to shoot our way in.
So what we
want to kno~ is at least that ~here is a receptivity to our
cqming :ln there,' all of us 'in the multinational force.
We,
obviou~ly, und~rstand it you've got a lot of people around there
with guns, somebody might shoot at you and you have to be able to
shoot back, but that's different from·.having an official policy
that if this international mission goes in, they're going to be
considered an. invading force and be subject to attack from the
minute that the airplane lands.
That's the difference, I think.
�8
Do you thirik.that is a fair statement?
to add to that?
Would you like
SECRETARY PERRY:
That is exactly right. We require a
cooperation from. the governments, ·because we do not want to ma:ke.
forc~d landings at the airport.
On the· other hand, the guerrilla
foices that are locat~d in that area, whatever they tell ~s, we
want acquiescence. We do not expect to have any formal agreement
from them, or would not have ~ny ~onfidence they can carry out.
any formal agree~ent.
It is important, however, that both the gov.ernment of
Rwanda and :the government of Zaire give us not only acquiescence,·
but cooperation. We need that.
They also have a lot of
influence on those guerrilla forces.
That's important.
THE PRESIDENT:
Thank you.
END
11:37 A.M. EST
�----------------
'···-··-
t
11/14/96 3:30 p.m.
PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON
STATEMENT ON BOSNIA AND ZAIRE
THE WHITE HOUSE
NOVEMBER 15, 1996
Good morning.
One year ago, in Dayton, Ohio, the leaders of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia agreed to turn from the
horror of war to the promise of peace. Their historic decision came after nearly four years of the
bloodiest conflict Europe has known since World War II ... after.a quarter of a million deaths ...
after two million people ·were made refugees ... and after countless atrocities that shocked the
conscience of the world.
When the Balkan leaders chose peace, I asked the American people to do the same by supporting
.
.
the participation of our troops in a NATO-led International Force to help secure the Bosnian
peace agreement. I promised that the mission would be carefully defined, with clear, realistic
goals. And I said that it would be completed in about one year.
IFOR has succeeded beyond most people's expectations. It has maintained the cease-fire and
made sure the parties withdrew their forces from a separation zone ... taken control of heavy
weapons and supervised their destruction ... overseen a massive troop demobilization and the
t~ansfer ofhundreds of square miles ofterritory from one entity to another... anfstored·a
climate of security that hi/allowed humanitarian assistance to flow, reconstruction to begin, and
the people of Bosnia to vote in free national elections.
�------------------------
.
'
2
IFOR has completed the difficult tasks we set for it. Therefore, the IFOR mission will end as
planned on December 20 of this year.
Thanks to the heavy lifting IFOR has done, the Bosnian people are far better off than they were a
year ago -- and their prospects for the future are brighter. Killing fields are once again playing
fields. Cafes and marketplaces are full of life, not death. More people have roofs over their
heads, food on the table, heat and hot water. And the routines of a normal life -- going to work,
going to school, eating a meal as a family-- are once more a reality.
But for all the progress we've seen in Bosnia, much more work remains to be done to fulfill the
Dayton Agreement's promise of a lasting, self-sustaining peace. Economic activity is only just
resuming-- its pace should be quickened and its reach extended.· The Presidency, Parliament, and
Constitutional Court created by the elections are still in their infancy -- they need time and help to
work fairly and efficiently. Not enough refugees have returned to Bosnia and too few people
within Bosnia have been able to reclaim their old homes. A civilian po~ needs more
resources and technical assistance. We must create a stable balance of ·
forces in Bosnia
by training and equipping the Bosnian Federation military so that renewed aggression is less
likely. And municipal elections remain to be organized and held.
In short, the people of Bosnia need more time to lay a firmer economic, political and security
_foundation so that peace takes on a life and logic of its own. NATO has been asked to help give
them that time by providing a new security presence in Bosnia when IFOR withdraws. Together
�.
'
3
with my military and national security advisers, I have carefully reviewed the options NATO is
now studying. I have decided to instruct the United States representative to NATO to inform our
Bosnia.
For this ag eement in principle to become a commitment, I must be satisfied that the final
~
tion NATO adopts and the operational plan it develop~lear, limited and
achievable.
primary focus should be to prevent a resumption of hostilities by maintaining a
strong presence near major flashpoints and responding quickly and decisively to any violations of
the cease-fire. More broadly,. its mandate should be to maintain a secure environment so that
.
economic reconstruction and political reconciliation continue to move forward.
Until NATO finalizes its plans, we cannot know what force requirements·will be necessary-- or
the size and specific tasks of America's contribution. But given IFOR' s success -- and because
this new mission will be different and more limited-- the number ofU.S. forces should be much·
less that our 20,000-troop contribution to IFOR. As the Bosnian people take more and more
· responsbility for rebuilding the economy, working together politically, resettling refugees and
establishing a stable military balance of power, the security force ~c~-...
presence. It should be able to complet within 18 months.
1suJ~
As I have said before, the United States cannot and should not
But where our interests are clear and our values at stake -~ and where we can make a difference --
�4
'
we must act, and we must lead. Every American should be proud that we have made a dramatic
ditferencein Bosnia-- ending a terrible slaughter, saving thousands oflives, securing countless
futures. Now, I believe we have a responsibility to see our commitment through-- so that the
peace America helped to make in Bosnia: grows strong. and self.: sufficient.
.
.
Earlier this week, I also decided that the United States should take part, in principle, in an
international humanitarian relief force that Canada will lead in Zaire.
Two years ago, a civil war of horrifying brutality forced thousands ofRwandans to flee for Zaire.
Since then, genocidal forces in Rwanda have prevented them from returning and attacked them in.
.
their camps in Eastern Zaire. Violence has begun to spiral out of control -- preventing relief
agenCies from providing food and medicine to the refugees, who are vulnerable to starvation and
disease.
·The world's most-powerful nation must not turnits back·on so many innocent people-- and so
· .many children -- who are now at risk. The mission Canada proposes to lead, and that I believe
. America should take part in, would provide security for civilian relief agencies to deliver the aid
these people must have ... and help refugees who so desire return home to Rwanda. It would not
separate or disarm militants or carry out police operations in the refugee camps. America's
contribution to such a force would match our special capabilities -- such as providing security at
the Goma airfield and helping to airlift allied forces.
�:.1
~
•
•
5
Neither the new security force in Bosnia nor the humanitarian relief effort in Zaire would be free
of risk. But I will do everything in my power to minimize the risks by making sure both missions
are clear.and achievable ... that our troops have robust rules of engagement... that, as always, they
remain under American command ... before I give the green light. American leadership places a
special burden on the men and women of our armed forces and their families~ We ask a lot of
them-- and without fail, they deliver for us. Now, as we contemplate calling on them again, I
know that they wilr be in the thoughts and prayers of every American.
�-------------------
-D13
11/14/96 9 p.m.
PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON
STATEMENT ON BOSNIA AND ZAIRE
THE WHITE HOUSE
NOVEMBER 15, 1996
·Good morning.
One year ago, in Dayton, Ohio, the leaders of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia agreed to turnfrom the
horror of war to the promise of peace. Their historic decision came after nearly four years of the
bloodiest conflict Europe has known since World War II ... after a quarter of a million deaths ...
after two million people were made refugees ... and after countless atrocities that shocked the
conscience of the world.
When the Balkan leaders chose peace, I asked the American people to do the same by supporting
the participation of our troops in a NATO-led Implementation Force to help secure the Dayton
agreement. I promised that the mission would be carefully defined, with clear, realistic goals.
And I said that it would be completed in about one year.
~vr-~
IFOR has succeeded beyondst p4le1 s best expectations-- as a result, its mission will end as
planned on December 20 of this year. Every item on IFOR's checklist has been accomplished. It
has maintained the cease-fire and separated the parties along a new demilitarized zone ...
~·(,
monitored the cantonment of thousands ofheavy weapons ... overseen a massive troop
· demobilization and the transfer of hundreds of square miles of territory from one entity to
I
:;.-r-
af -:JfO t2- fl)
.fl..- bjOt"'-t.~ h.,.. -1.-kL"'
another. .. and allowed the people of Bosnia to vote in free national elections.
Sec-;-
rD b~ + ~.r ,
,..._,~ ;~ ..f 41..-.:
V\.....- . . 1~ 'AJ t--..... d ~.H'O - ArJ J lu rJ.J 'h. r,tLbP-(.A ~ bJ-J d~ ~~ L w.il- /Jtm,___ -i7 -rHt..-~J~ .s -t P4 P.
�2
Thanks to the heavy lifting IFOR has
~one,
the Bosnian people are far better off than they.were a
year ago -- and their prospects for the future are brighter. Cafes and marketplaces are full oflife,
...
not death. More people have roofs over their heads, food on the table; heat .and hot water. And
the routines of a normal life -- going to work, coming home from school, eating a meal as a family
But for 11 IFOR' s success in completing its military mission on schedule and bringing stability to
Bosnia, we underestimated the time it would take to put Bosnia's economic and political life back
together -- and to fulfill the Dayton Agreement's promise of a lasting, self-sustaining peace.
Economic activity is only just resuming -- its pace must be quickened and its reach extended. The
Presidency, Parliament, and Constitutional Court created by the elections are in their infancy--
.
~N·~4 refugees
enu~h
they need time and help to begin meeting regularly and get down to work.or
~ r~un~ to Bosnia an~ people within Bosnia have been able to reclaim their old
homes. Civilian police forces must be trained to international standards and need more equipment
to be effective. We must complete the training and equipping of the Bosnian Federation military
so that a stable balance of power takes hold and renewed aggression is less likely. And municipal
elections remain to be organized and held.
In short, thanks to IFOR, Bosnia is at peace -- but it is not yet stable e ough for the international
economic, political and security foundation so that peace takes on a life and logic df its own .
·
.
.
2
_
.
ceut t•-,
. II
..AAs.!J,e. 11,, l·t1
~rC4 ~ nw"'
JLy vr 1v,.of,
tlr-
�3
NATO has been studying options for helping td give them that time by providing a new security··.
presence in Bosnia when IFOR withdraws. Together with my military and national security ..
·advisers, I have carefully reviewed these options. I have decided to instruct the United States
representative to NATO to inform our allies that, in principle, the United States will take part in a
follow-on security presence based in Bosnia.
For this agreement in principle to become a commitment, I must be satisfied that the final
recommendation NATO adopts and the operational plan it develops are clear, limited and
. achievable.
T~on;s primary focus should be to prevent a resumption of hostilities so that
~(l~~
.
economic reconstruction and political reconciliation canundtiue to II
.
e ferv;ard. That will
require a strong but limited military. presence in Bosnia, able to respond quickly and decisively to
any violations of the cease-fire.
.,·J~..~+.,,_.· A~/r~u, '(~.:o
. . .'' r-t--. . ~rPr . I
~
~"'
(I
1M •• -.
This mission will be more limited than IFOR. n\should operate Ill a less ptecai1ous securiey"
e~ thanks to IFOR' s work over the past year. It will be charged with maintaining the
stability that IFOR created. It will discourage any of the parties from taking up arms again ...
while clearing the way for them to assume full responsibility for their own security as quickly as
possible.
· Our military planners believe this new mission will require fewer than half the number of troops
we contributed to IFOR -- about 8,500. Every six months, we will review the progress the
Bosnian people have made toward rebuilding the economy, working together politically, resettling
�B"' ~ r.1 h ,,J "¥.:...
4
refugees and establishing a stable military balance of pows As progress is made and stability ......
becomes self-sustcpning, the securitx force should be able to draw down
( l/1 ,, ,.:, o..f ~n•t-r
p~
Ju
unu-
deterrent force ~d ultimately to zero by
.
-
.-I'
.
.
..
.
\·
~~
rw' \d,."" <
L.
J"m~f8BBi ody to aball.t'f'
.
.
·
.
As I have said before, the United States cannot and should not try to solve every problem in the
world. But where our interests are clear and our values at stake-- and where we can make a
difference -- we must act, and we must lead. Every American should be proud that we have made ·
a dramatic difference in Bo~nia -- ending a terrible slaughter, saving thousands of lives, securing
countless futures. We have a responsibility to see our commitment through-- so that the peace
America helped to make in Bosnia grows strong and self-sufficient.
Earlier this week, I also decided that the United States should take part, in principle, in an
.
~
international humanitarian relief force that Canada will lead
i~
Zaire.
Two years ago, a civil war of horrifying brutality forced thousands of Rwandans to flee for Zaire.
Recently, their plight has worsened. Violence has begun to spiral out of control-- preventing · .
relief agencies from providing food and medicine to the refugees, who are vulnerable to starvation
and disease.
The world's most powerful nation must not turn its back on so many innocent people-- and so
many children -- who are now at risk. The mission Canada proposes to lead, and that I believe
America should take part in, would provide security for civilian relief agencies to deliver the aid
�5
these people must have ... and help refugees who so desire return home to Rwanda. It would not .
separate or disarm militants or carry out police operations in the refugee camps. America's
contribution to such a force would match our special capabilities -- such as providing security at
.
'
..
the Goma airfield and helping to airlift allied forces.
Neither the new security force in Bosnia nor the humanitarian relief effort in Zaire would be free
of risk. But I will do ,everything in my power to minimize the risks by making sure both missions
are clear and achievable ... that our troops have robust rules of engagement. .. that, as always, they
remain under American command ... before I give the green light. American leadership places a
special burden on the men and women of our armed forces and their families. We ask a lot of
them -- and without fail, they deliv.er for us. Now, as we contemplate calling on them again, I
.
..
.
'
know that they will be in the thoughts and prayers of every American.
�Withdrawal/Redaction ·Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.·
AND TYPE
001. notes·
SUBJECTffiTLE
DATE
[Notes from Bosnia Statement Meeting, Cabinet Room] (8 pages)
11114/1996
RESTRICTION
. Pllb(1), P5
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Anthony Blinken (Speechwriting)
OA/Box Number: 3381
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia Statement (&Zaire), 11115/1996
2006-0459-F
rs328
.RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act ·[44 U.S.C. 2204(a))
Freedom oflnformation Act- [S U.S.C. SS2(b))
Pl National Security Classified Information [(a)(l) of the PRA)
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA)
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information ((a)(4) of the PRA]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors (a)(S) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy ((a)(6) of the PRA]
b(l) National security classified information l(b)(l) of the FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of ·
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for Jaw enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions ((b)(8) of the FOIAI
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells ((b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined i.n accordance with 44 U.S,C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�11/14/96 Midnight
PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON
STATEMENT ON BOSNIA AND ZAIRE
THE WHITE HOUSE
NOVEMBER 15, 1996
Good morning.
One year ago, in Dayton, Ohio, the leaders of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia turned from the horror
of war to the promise of peace. Their historic decision came after nearly four years of the
bloodiest conflict Europe has known since World War II .... after a quarter of a million deaths ...
after two million people were made refugees ... and after countless atrocities that shocked the
conscience of the world. ·
When the Balkan leaders chose peace, I asked the American people to do the same by supporting
the participation of our troops in a NATO-led Implementation Force to help secure the Dayton
agreement. I promised that the mission would be carefully defined, with clear, realistic goals.
And I said that it would be completed in about one year.
IFOR has succeeded beyond our best expectations -- as a result, its mission will end as planned on
· \JV\;Irl~
.
December 20. Every item on IFOR~klist has been accomplished on schedule.· It has
maintained the cease-fire and separated the parties along a new demilitarized zone ... monitored
the placement of thousands of heavy weapons in. holding areas ... overseen a massive troop
demobilization and the transfer of hundreds of square miles of territory from one side to another ...
and allowed the people of Bosnia to vote in free national elections. In the process, we have seen
)(
�,,
• -c.-
.2
how important and effective the NATO alliance remains-- and the possibilities for cooperation
with Russia and the other members of the Partnership for Peace.
Today, the Bosnian people are far better off than they were a year ago-- and their prospects for a
future of peace and freedom are brighter. Aln;ady, the change in their day-to-day lives is
dramatic .
...en anti Mr~etplaces are full oflife, not death.
More people have roofs over their
heads, food on the table, heat and hot water. The routines of a normal life ,:._ going to work,
coming home from school, eating a meal as a family-- are slowly becoming a reality. Bosnia's
\, ...
..~~1
otc..t\A·n
·
bitter harvest of hatred has not ye~ But for the last.twelve months, the killing has
stopped and with time, the habits of peace can take hold.
We owe this success to IFOR. But its achievements on the military side have not been matched
by progress on the civilian side. Quite frankly, it will take longer than we and all our NATO allies
anticipated for Bosnia's economic and political life to reach the point where an outside security
presence is no longer required.
·~t~bsl. ~.l.l.. ~~
'J
'
.
~
.
.
Economic activity is only just resuming -- its pace must be quickened and its reach extended. The
Presidency, Parliament, and Constitutional Court created by the elections are in their infancy -they need time
kd Help to t)e"gin meetmg regutady and gee down to work. . Civilian police forces
must be trained. We must complete the training,and equipping of the Bosnian Federation military
so that a stable balance of power takes hold and renewed aggression is less likely. And municipal
elections remain to be organized and held. The Bosnian people, with the help of international
�il-
3
civilian groups, will be responsible for all this work. But for a time, they will need the stability
and confidence that only an outside security force can provide.
:--]1.\ S'~ ~ V n--.J c~~t"L.it · J:
~ .. -(:r'"J k-'-'~ ,~r ,p·h\1\S ·
NATO has been studying options to help gi e them that time bY. providlng a new security
·
Jho"" op4''""
h...., b.,.. p.,.,. <J:&J. -1e
presence in Bosnia when IFOR withdraws. I have carefully reviewed lJnff.~s. I have
J}tw
. .
~_
decided to instruct the United States representative to NATO to inform our allies that, Jn
principle, the United
.
Sta~es will take part in a follow-on securit~s~ased in Bosnia.
. .~
'h
.
'~
For my agreement in principle to become a commitment, must be satisfied that the final
recommendation NATO adopts and the operational plan it develops are clear, limited and
achievable. The new mission's primary focus should be to prevent a resumption of hostilities so
that economic reconstruction and political reconciliation can accelerate. That will require a
strong but limited military presence in Bosnia, able to respond quickly and decisively to any
violations of the cease-fire.
This new mission will be more limited than IFOR. It will. not face the fundamental military
.
.
.
challenge of separating two hostile armies -- because IFOR has accomplished that task. It will be
charged with maintaining the stability that IFOR created. It will discourage the parties from
.
.
taking up arms again ... while encouraging them to assume full responsibility for their own security
as quickly as possible. IFOR plowed the field iQ. which the seeds of peace have been planted.
This new mission will provide the climate for them to take root and the time to grow.
�-----------~----------------
..' -
--
4
·Our military planners have.concluded that this new mission will require fewer than half the
number of troops we contributed to IFOR .;._about 8,500. Every six months, we will review
whether stability can be maintained with fewer forces. By the end of 1997, we expect to be able
.
.
;
to draw down to a. much smaller deterrent force -- half its initial size -- and ultimately to zero
once the mission ends in June, 1998.
The United States cannot and should not try to solve every problem in the world. But where our
interests are clear and our values are at stake -- and where we can make a difference -- we must
act, and we must lead. Every American should be proud of the difference we hav~ already made
in Bosnia -- ending a terrible slaughter, saving thousands oflives, securing countless futures. We
have a responsibility to see our commitment through -- to give the peace America helped to make
in Bosnia a chance to grow strong and self-sufficient.
* *·*
· Earlier this week, I also decided that the United States should take p
man
international humanitarian relief force that Canada· will lead in Zaire.
Two years ago, genocidal violence forced more than a million Rwandans to flee for Zaire.
Recently, their plight has worsened as militant forces have driven them from their camps.
Violence has begun to spiral out of control -- pr~venting relief agencies from providing food and
medicine to the refugees, who are vulnerable to starvation.and disease.
�~--·\:
...
5
The world's most powerful nation must not tum its back on so many innocent people-- and so
•.
...
many children -- who are now at risk. The ID:ission Canada proposes to lead, and that I believe
America should take part in, would provide security for civilian relief agencies to deliver the aid
these people must have ... and help refugees who so desire return home to Rwanda. It would not ·
separate or disarm militants· or carry out police operations in the refugee camps. America's
contribution to such a force would match our· special capabilities -- such as providing s~curity at
the Goma airfield and helping to airlift allied forces.
Neither the new security force in Bosnia nor the humanitarian relief effort in Zaire will be free of
risk. But I will do everything in my power to minimize the risks by making sure both missions are
clear and achievable ... that our troops have robust rules of engagement. .. and that, as always, they
·remain under Ameripan command ... before I give the green light. Amerlcari leadership places a.
special burden on the men and women of our armed forces and their fa.rllilies. We ask a lot of
them-- and without fail, they deliver for us. Now, as we contemplate calling 01i them again, I
know that they will be in the thoughts and prayers of every American.
�..
11/14/96 Midnight
PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON
STATEMENT ON BOSNIA AND ZAIRE
THE WHITE HOUSE
NOVEMBER 15, 1996
Good morning.
One year ago, in Dayton, Ohio, the leaders of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia tm;ned from the horror
of war to the promise of peace. Their historic decision came after nearly four years of the
bloodiest conflict Europe has known since World War II ... after a quarter of a million deaths ...
after two million people were made refugees ... and after countless atrocities that shocked the
conscience of the world.
When the Balkan leaders chose peace, I asked the American people to do the same by supporting
the participation of our troops in a NATO-led Implementation Force to help secure the Dayton
agreement. I promised that the mission would be carefully defined, with clear, realistic goals.
And I said that it would be completed in about one year.
IFOR has succeeded beyond our best expectations -- as a result, its mission will end as planned on
maintained the cease-fire and separated the parties along a new demilitarized zone .. monitored
the placement ofthousands of heavy weapons in holding areas ... overseen a massive troop
demobilization and the transfer of hundreds of square miles of territory from one side to another ...
and allowed the people of Bosnia to vote in free national elections. In the process, we have seen
�2
how important and effective the NATO alliance remains·-- and the possibilities for. cooperation
with Russia and the other members of the Partnership for Peace.
Today, the Bosnian people are far better off than they were a year ago-- and their prospects for a
future of peace and freedom are brighter. Already, the change in their day-to-day lives is
dramatic. Cafes and marketplaces are full of life, not death. More people have roofs over their
heads, food on the table, heat and hot water. The routines of a normal life -- going to work,
coming home from school, eating a meal as a family-- are slowly becoming a reality. Bosnia's
bitter harvest of hatred has not
~r the last twelve months, the killing has
stopped and with time, the habits of peace can take hold.
We owe this success to IFOR. But its achievements on the military side have not been matched
by progress on the civilian side. Quite frankly, it will take longer than we and all our NATO allies
t...rfU~~~Y/
.
anticipated for Bosnia's economic and political life to reach the point wherexan 0USJeSe n'~ 7
presence is no longer required.
Economic activity is only just resuming -- its pace must be quickened and its reach extended. The
Presidency, Parliament, and Constitutional Court created by the elections are in their infancy --
~He help t9 9~g~n:~~8tieg n~gwlarly aael ~et devv" te
f:6 4Jarl<.. ~
they need time
II'EJFk Civilian police forces
must be trained. We must complete the training and equipping of the Bosnian Federation military
so that a stable balance of power takes hold and renewed aggression is less likely. And municipal
'f.ef- 114. ~AA.,. '~ ¢I.A.Jr.
.
elections remain to be organized and held. 'fpe BosniaJ people, with the help of international
"
�3
civilian groups, will be responsible for all this work. But for a time, they will need the stability
and confidence that only an outside security force can provide.
NATO has been studying options to help give them that time by providing a new security
presence in Bosnia when IFOR withdraws. I have carefully reviewed these options. I have
decided to instruct the United States representative to NATO to inform our allies that, in
~~OA
principle, the United States will take part in a follow-on securityJ\'~s~nii:lF~ in .Bosnia.
For my agreement in principleto becorrie a commitment, I must be satisfied that the final
recommendation NATO adopts and the operational plan it develops are clear, limited and
achievable. The new mission's primary focus should be to prevent a resumption of hostilities so
that economic reconstruction and political reconciliation can accelerate. That will require a
strong but limited military presence in Bosnia, able to respond quickly and decisively to any
violations ofthe cease-fire.
This new mission will be more limited than IFOR. It will not face the fundamental military
challenge of separating two hostile armies -- because IFOR has accomplished that task. It will be
charged with maintaining the stability that IFOR created. It will discourage the parties from
taking up arms again ... while encouraging them to assume full responsibility for their own security
as quickly as possible. IFOR plowed the field in which the seeds of peace have been planted.
This new mission will provide the climate for them to take root and the time to grow.
�4
Our military planners have concluded that this new mission will require fewer than halfthe
number of troops we contributed to IFOR --about 8,500. Every six months, we will review
whether stability can be maintained with fewer forces. By the end of 1997, we expect to be able
to draw down to a much smaller deterrent force -- half its initial size -- and ultimately to zero
once the mission ends in June, 1998.
The United States cannot and should not try to solve every problem in the world. But where our
interests are clear and our values are at stake -- and where we can make a difference -- we must
act, and we must lead. Every American should be proud of the difference we have already made
in Bosnia-- ending a terrible
s~aughter,
saving thousands.oflives, securing countless futures. We
have a responsibility to see our commitment through -- to give the peace America helped to make
in Bosnia a chance to grow strong and self-sufficient.
** *
Earlier this week; I also decided that the United States should take part, in principle, in an
international humanitarian relief force that Canada will lead in Zaire.
Two years ago, genocidal violence forced more than a million Rwandans to flee for Zaire.
Recently; their plight has worsened as militant forces have driven them from their camps.
Violence has begun to spiral out of control -- preventing relief agencies from providing food and
medicine to the refugees, who are vulnerable to starvation and disease.
�5
The world's most powerful nation must not turn its back on so many innocent people-- and so
many children -- who are now at risk. The mission Canada proposes to lead, and that I believe
America should take part in, would provide security for civilian relief agencies to deliver the aid
these people must have ... and help refugees who so desire return home to Rwanda. It would not
separate or disarm militants or carry out police operations in the refugee camps. America's
contribution to such a force would match our special capabilities -- such as providing security at
the Goma airfield and helping to airlift allied forces.
Neither the new security force in Bosnia nor the humanitarian relief effort in Zaire will be free of
risk. But I will do everything in my power to minimize the risks by making sure both missions are
clear and achievable ... that our troops have robust rules of engagement. .. and that, as always, they
remain under American command ... before 1 give the green light. American leadership places a
special burden on the men and women of our armed forces and their families. We ask a lot of
them-- and without fail, they deliver for us. Now, as we contemplate calling on them again, I
know that they will be in the thoughts and prayers of every American.
�IL
11/14/96 Midnight
PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON
STATEMENT ON BOSNIA AND ZAIRE
THE WHITE HOUSE .
NOVEMBER 15, 1996
Good morning.
One year ago, in Dayton; Ohio, the leaders of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia turned from the horror
of war to the promise of peace. Their historic decision came after nearly four years of the
bloodiest conflict Europe has known since World War II ... after a quarter of a million deaths ...
after two million people were made refugees ... and after countless atrocities that shocked the
conscience of the world.
When the Balkan leaders chose peace, I asked the American people to do the same by supporting
the participation of our troops in a NATO-led Implementation Force to help secure the Dayton
agreement I promised that the mission would be carefully defined, with clear, realistic goals.
And I said that it would be completed in about one year.
IFOR has succeeded beyond our best expectatio_ns. tt~s a result, its mission will end as planned on
December 20. Every item on !FOR's checklist has been accomplished on schedule. It has
maintained the cease-fire and separated the parties along a new demilitarized zone ... monitored
the placement of thousands of heavy weapons in holding areas ... overseen a massive troop
demobilization and the transfer of hundreds of square miles of territory from one side to another...
and allowed the people of Bosnia to vote in free national elections. In the process, we have seen
�---------------------~~-----------
-----------------------------
2
· how important and effective the NATO alliance remains-- and the possibilities for cooperation
with Russia and the other members of the Partnership for Peace.
Today, the Bosnian people are far better off than they were a year ago-- and their prospects for a
future of peace and freedom are brighter. Already, the change in their day-to-day Jives is
dramatic. Cafes and marketplaces are full oflife, not death. More people have roofs over their
heads, food on the table, heat and hot water. The routines of a normal life -- going to work,
coming home from school, eating a meal as a family-- are slowly becoming a reality. Bosnia's
bitter harvest of hatred has not yet been depleted. But for the last twelve months, the killing has
stopped and with time, the habits of peace can take hold.
We owe this success to IFOR. But its achievements on the military side have not been matched
by progress on the civilian side. Quite frankly, it will take longer than we and all our NATO allies
anticipated for Bosnia's economic and political life to reach the point where an outside security
presence is no longer required.
Economic activity is only just resuming -- its pace must be quickened and its reach extended. The
Presidency, Parliament, and Constitutional Court created by the elections are in their infancy -they need time and help to begin meeting regularly and get down to work. Civilian police forces
must
~\\'h'
be~rained.
We must complete the training and equipping of the Bosnian Federation military
so that a stable balance of power takes hold and renewed aggression is less likely. And municipal
elections remain to be organized and held. The Bosnian people, with the help of international
�3
civilian groups, will be responsible for all this work. But for a time, they will need the stability
and confidence that only an outside security force can provide.
NATO has been studying options to help give them that time by providing a new security
~ ol.,.A' ·4 All"1 CP ~ ·
. \.4
~~
presence in Bosnia when IFOR withdraws. I have carefully reviewed ~e options. LI have
decided to instruct the United States representative to NATO to inform our allies that, in
principle, the United States will take part in a follow-on security presence based in Bosni·a.
For my agreement in principle to become a commitment, I must be satisfied that the final
..,:::;o
reco~mendation NATO adopts and the operational plan it develops are clear, limited and
achievable. The new mission's primary focus should be to prevent a resumption of hostilities so
that economic reconstruction and political reconciliation can accelerate. That will require a
strong but limited military presence in Bosnia, able to respond quickly and decisively to any
violations of the cease-fire.
This new mission will be more limited than IFOR. It will not face the fundamental military
(
challenge of separating two hostile armies -- because IFOR has accomplished that task. It will be
wnl"'i ~ .M.1"''"'~
charged with
I'Ra.~Rtaieiae_the
stability that IFOR created. It will discourage the parties from
taking up arms again ... while encouraging them to assume full responsibility for their own security
as quickly as possible. IFOR plowed the field in which the seeds of peace have been planted.
This new mission will provide the climate for them to take root and the time
t~d;~~~ .
�..
4
Our military planners have concluded that this new mission will require fewer than half the
number of troops we contributed to IFOR --about 8,500: Every six months, we will review
whether stability can be maintained with fewer forces. By the end of 1997, we expect to be able
to draw down to a much smaller deterrent force -- half its initial size -- and ultimately to zero
once the mission ends in June, 1998.
The United States cannot and should not try to solve every problem in the world. But where our
interests are clear and our values are at stake -- and where we can make a difference -- we must
act, ami we must lead. Every American should be proud of the difference we have already made
in Bosnia -- ending a terrible slaughter, saving thousands of lives, securing countless futures. We
have a responsibility to see our commitment through -- to give the peace America helped to make
in Bosnia a chance to grow strong and self-sufficient.
Earlier this week, I also decided that he United States should take pa
international humanitarian relief force that Canada will lead in Zaire.
~JI,w,·"':( boc.;k "'- P.w~"-J
Two years ago,
8eAG~itia
iQleH:ee fotees more than a million Rwandans
.tk J.
~for
.
Zaire.
Violence has begun to spiral out of control -- preventing relief agencies from providing food and
medicine to the refugees, who are vulnerable to starvation and disease.
�. ,,
~-
5
r)J,f?:'_ ,..k
.
The world's most powerful nation must not turn its back on so many iRHeeent people-- and so
c..-",., tBM'"*'~
many~hildren
-- who are now at risk. The mission Canada proposes to lead, and that I believe
America should take part in, would provide security for civilian relief agencies to deliver the aid
these people must have ... and help refugees who so desire return home to Rwanda. OR weHie J:lOt
sevarate or Elisarm militl:tllts 01 CMfJ emt police Of'enttien5 in the
refug~
eaFAp!t. America's
contribution to such a force would match our special capabilities -- such as providing security at
the Goma airfield and helping to airlift allied forces.
Neither the new security force in Bosnia nor the humanitarian relief effort in Zaire will be free of·
risk. But I will do everything in my power to minimize the tisks by making sure both missions are ·
special burden on the men and women of our armed forces and their families. We ask a lot of
them-- and without fail, they deliver for 'us. Now, as we contemplate calling on them again, I
know that they will be in the thoughts and prayers of every American.
�11/14/96 9:30p.m.
PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON
STATEMENT ON BOSNIA AND ZAIRE
THE WIDTE HOUSE
NOVEMBER 15, 1996
Good morning.·
One year ago, in Dayton, Ohio, the leaders of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia agreed to turn from the·
horror of war to the promise of peace. Their historic decision came after nearly four years of the
bloodiest conflict Europe has known since World War II ... after a quarter of a million deaths.,.
after two million people were made refugees ... and after countless atrocities that shocked the
conscience of the world.
When the Balkan leaders chose peace, I asked the American people to do the same by supporting
a
the participation of our troops in NATO-led Implementation Force to help secure the Dayton
agreement. I promised that the mission would be carefully defined, with clear, realistic goals.
. .
.
.
'
'
'
And I said that it would be completed in about one year.
IFOR has succeeded beyond our best expectations -- as a result, its mission will end as planned on
December 20 of this year. Every item on IFOR' s checklist has been accomplished. It has
maintruned the cease-fire and separated the parties along a new demilitarized zone ... monitored
the placement of thousands of heavy weapons in holding areas ... overseen a massive troop
demobilization and the transfer of hundreds of square miles of territory from one entity to
another... and allowed the people of Bosnia to vote in free national elections. In the process, we
�2
have seen how important and effective the NATO alliance remains--. and the possibilities for
.
.
'
"
cooperation with Russia and the other members of the Partnership for Peace.
Thanks to the heavy lifting IFOR has done, the Bosnian.people are far better off than they were a ·
year ago-- and their prospects for a future of peace and freedom are brighter. Already, the
'
change in their day to day lives is dramatic. Cafes and marketplaces are full of life, not death.
More people have roofs over their heads, food on the table, heat and hotwater. And the routines
of a normal life -- going to work, coming home from school, eating a meal as a fainily -- are
~
slowly becoming a reality.
. \~ ~'-..r
~ ¥
~\'Ill; •I
.
~
'h.,, bcl,n~
Butfor <>II IFO
~·
-success in compte
·
h
.
. /,')
tO
1
1ts military mis on on schedule
f:<" .. } .
.
\+ ~o~r "''"" &.Jl,"
t"' 'v\ Bosnia, it will take longer than w~ anticipated
,.
lj (.[c-
/!. f Br ct&h +It\~ .i
I
I~ '
k I I 1 c (\~
~ ~Lf btL "' ti-l 'i'Y a,i J l
So 1\.- f , ... o..-lraLl tn• ·~
.
J
k
an~ stability to ~
'""1
..
.
ff~ J
.
'
~If' together -- and to fulfill the DaYton Agreemeni' s promise of a lasting, self-sustaining peace.
Economic activity is only just resuming -- its pace must be quickened and its reach extended. The
Presidency, Parliament, and Constitutional Court created by the elections are in their infancy-they need time and help to begin meeting regtifarly artd get down to work. Mcm: refiJgees m~::tSt
-
F8WF:A
ie Bosma ag,g more people wjtbjn Bosnia mmt be al:!lle ie reelttim their eld .bemes. Civilian
police forces must be trained te- iat~atiomll stftfieares ..alld. g,eed more equipmem to be effectiY!L
Ir
f'e
h
.•
h't\k~
r
'"'"-e(.
�3
-'
In short, thanks to IFOR, Bosnia is at peace -- but it is not yet stable enough for the international
community to
L
.
~ c,.., ~~ e.·~'"-"
~t
.
te it&. own <1 · s. The people of Bosnia need more time to lay a firmer
economic, political. and security foundation so that peace takes on a life and logic of its own.·
.
;
NATO has been studying options for helping to give them. that time by providing a new security
presence in Bosnia when IFOR withdraws. Together with my military and national security
advisers, I have carefully reviewed these options. I have decided to instruct the United States
representative to NATO to inform our allies that, in principle, the United States will take part in a
follow-on security presence based in Bosnia.
(('X\
v -tit\\~ =r; ~jx
e-
f,nJJ csl.c.W1l~
·
·
T'of tfiis agreement ia flRR.Giple to becolll@ a ee:fB:initment, I must be satisfied that the final
· recommendation NATO adopts and the operational plan it develops are clear, limited and
achievable. The new mission's primary focus should~
brevent a resumption of hostilities so
'
: .
(tf'l
that economic reconstruction and political reconciliation
'
ccelarate. That will require a strong
but limited military presence in Bosnia, able to respond quickly and decisively to any violations of
f the parties from taking up arms again... while clearing the way
for them to assume full responsib lity for their own security as quickly as possible.
�tll.\
.
4'
L LOV''-\"""""
lu'~' - 4'\,.;\
Our military planne~ this new mission will require fewer than
we contributed to IFOR -:-about 8,500. 'Every six months, we ~ill review the pr~
L refugees and estaohshmg a stable military attlttnee
OfJ'6YYeT'.
By the end
0
'
s Pli~S
.
. \
~ ex. te~ ~ I
.;s made Mid strrbility becomes self-sustahing, the seettfoity ~¥eEil s~ be able to draw down to a
much smaller deterrent force -- half its initial presence -- and ultimately to zero once the mission
ends in June, 1998.
I
As I have said before, the United States cannot and should not try to solve every problem in the
world. But where our interests are clear and our values at stake-- and where we can make a
difference -- we must act, and we must lead. Every American should be proud that we have made
a dramatic difference in Bosnia -- ending a terrible slaughter, saving thousan~ds
of lives, securing
countless futures .. We have a re~onsibility to see our commitment through
.
\.)
t.h-
""'
;.~
America helped to make\in Bosnia row,. strong and self-sufficient.
eace
.
Earlier this week, I also decided that the United States should take part, in principle, in an
international humanitarian relief force that Canada will lead in Zaire.
Two years ago, genocidal violence forced more than a million Rwandans to flee for Zaire.
Recently, their plight has worsened as militant forces have driven them from their camps.
Violence has beguri to spiral out of control -- preventing relief agencies from providing food and
medicine to the refugees, who ·are vulnerable to starvation and ·disease.
�- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
..
":.'
r
5
.,
.
.
.
.
'
.
The world's most powerful nation must not turn its back on so manyinnocent people-- and so
.
.
.
.
'
.
many children ~- who are now at risk. The mission Canada proposes to lead, and. that I believe
~erica
should take part in, would provide security for civilian relief agencies to deliver the aid
- these people must ha~e ... and help refugees who so de-sire. return home to Rwanda. It would not
separate or disarm militants or carry out police operations in the refugee c~ps, America's-
contributio~ to such a force would match our special capabilities -- such as providing security at
the· Goma airfield and helping to airlift allied forces .
.
'
'
..
Neither the new security force in Bosnia nor the. humanitarian relief effort in Zaire would be free
of risk. But I will do everything in my power to minimize the risks by making sure both missions
are clear and achievable ... that our troops have robust rul~s of ~ngagement. .. that, as always, ~.hey
.
.
remain under American command ... before I give the green light. -American leadership places a
special burden ori the men and women of our armed forces and their families. We ask a lot of
them-- and without fail, they deliver for us. Now, as we .contemplate catlirig. on them again, I
.
know that they will be in the thoughts and prayers of every American.
'
.
�--------------;----------
-------:---~----------
·~
J
11/14/96 10 a.m.
PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON
STATEMENT ON BOSNIA AND ZAIRE
· THE WHITE HOUSE
NOVEMBER 15, 1996
Good morning.
One year ago, in Dayton, Ohio, the leaders of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia agreed to turn from the
horror ofwar to the promise of peace. Their historic decision came after nearly four years of the
bloodiest conflict Europe has known since World War II... after a quarter of a million deaths ...
after two million people were made refugees ... and after countless atrocities that shocked the
conscience of the world.
When the Balkan leaders chose peace, I asked the American people to do the same by supporting
the participation of our troops in a NATO-led Implementationnternational Force to help secure
the Bosnian peace agreement. I promised that the mission would be carefully defined, with clear,
realistic goals. And I said that it would be completed in about one year.
IFOR has succeeded beyond most people's expectations. It has maintained the cease-fire and
separated the parties along a new demilitarized zonemade sure the parties vlithdre>..v their forces
from a separation zone ... monitored the cantonment of thousands of taken control of heavy
weapons and supervised their destruction ... overseen a massive troop demobilization and the
transfer of hundreds of square miles of territory from one entity to another ... and restored a
climate of security that has allowed humanitarian assistance to flow, reconstruction to begin, and
the people of Bosnia to vote in free national elections.
�.
,.
24
IFOR has completed the difficult tasks we set for it. Therefore, the IFOR mission will end as
planned on December 20 of this year.
Because IFOR has done the heavy lifting in Bosnia, the Bosnian people are far better off than they
were a year ago -- and their prospects for the future are brighter. Killing fields are once again
playing fields. Cafes and marketplaces are full of life, not death. More people have roofs over
their heads, food on the table, heat and hot water. And the routines of a normal life -- going to
work,
.9.Q_m!ngJm.m.~_
_fmm_going
to school, eating a meal as a family -- are once again a reality.
But for all the progress we've seen in Bosnian, much more work remains to be done to fulfill the
promise of a lasting, self-sustaining peace. E;conomic activity is only just resuming -- its pace
should be quickened and its reach extended. The Presidency, Parliament; and Constitutional
Court created by the elections are still in their infancy -- they need time and help to begin meeting
r~g1ll~IlY..M1Q_
_1Q_£.!:1.t_QQ.WD:J_Q__work
fairly and efficiently. Not enough refugees have returned to
Bosnia and too few people within Bosnia have been able to reclaim their old homes. A-·Ceivilian
equipment to be effective resemees--an<:l-tee!mieal--assistanee. We must complete see-tmt}ugfi-the
training and equipping of the Bosnian Federation military so there is a stable balance of military
forces in Bosnia that makes renewed aggression less likely. And municipal elections nee~ to be
organized and held.
�34
In short, the people of Bosnia need more time to lay a firmer economic, political and security
foundation so that peace takes on a life and logic of its own. NATO has been examining options
for helping asked to help 1Q_give them that time by. providing a new security presence in Bosnia
when IFOR withdraws. Together with my military and national security advisers, I have carefully
reviewed these options NATO is now studying. I have decided to instruct the United States
representative to NATO to inform our allies that the United States agrees, in principle, to take
part in a follow-on security presence based in Bosnia.
For this agreement in principle to become a commitment, I must be satisfied that the operational
plan for a new mission that NATO develops over the coming weeks is clear, limited and
achievable. Its primary focus should be to prevent a resumption of hostilities by maintaining a
strong presence in Bosnia near major flashpoints and responding quickly and decisively to any
violations of the cease-fire. At the same time, More broadly, its presence should help mandate
should be to maintain a secure environment so that economic reconstruction and political
reconciliation continue to move forward.
This mission \Vill be more limited !FOR's. The force will operate in a far less precarious security
situation-- thanks to IFOR's presence overthe last 11 months. IFOR's role was to enforce the
military aspects of Dayton-- in effect creating the very stability and security that now exists.
W"ith many of these militarv tasks completed, IFOR' s successor's mission is to maintain that
stability. It will discourage any of the parties trom considering the resort to arms, while clearing
the way for them to assume full responsibility for their own security as quicklv as possible.
�44
[Graf on 'v\rhat ne>.v force should not· do?]
Our military planners believe that a total force substantially smaller than IFOR of XX troops will
'-
suffice to carry out this mission_. Ofthat, the United States would provide no more than YY.
(NOT SURE WE CAN USE ANY NUMBERS \\71TH CONFIDENCE.) As the Bosnian people
move forward with rebuilding the economy, working together politically, resettling refugees and
establishing a stable military balance of power, the security force could decrease its in country
presence in Bosnia to a small deterrent force by the end of 1997. It should be able to complete its
mission by June,-1998 and then withdraw.
As I have said before, the United States cannot and should not solve every problem in the world.
But where our interests are clear and our values· at stake -- and where we can make a difference -we must act, and we must lead. Every American should be proud that we have made a dramatic
difference in Bosnia-- ending the worst war in Europe since World War II, saving thousands of
lives, securing countless futures. Now, I believe we have a responsibility to see our commitment
through -- so that the peace America helped
t~
make grows strong and self-sufficient.
�1 1/14/96 9:30p.m.
PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON
STATEMENT ON BOSNIA AND ZAIRE
THE WHITE HOUSE
NOVEMBER 15, 1996
Good morning.
One year ago, in Dayton, Ohio, the leaders of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia agreed to turn from the
horror of war to the promise of peace. Their historic decision came after nearly four years of the
bloodiest conflict Europe has known since World War II ... after a quarter of a million deaths ...
after two million people were made refugees ... and after countless atrocities that shocked the
conscience of the world.
When the Balkan leaders chose peace, I asked the American people to do the same by supporting
the participation of our troops in a NATO-led Implementation Force to help secure the Dayton
agreement. I promised that the mission would be carefully defined, with clear, realistic goals.
And I said that it would be completed in about one year.
IFOR has succeeded beyond our best expectations-- as a result, its mission will end as planned on
December 20 ofthis year. Every item on !FOR's checklist has been accomplished. It has
maintained the cease-fire and separated the parties along a new demilitarized zone ... monitored
the placement of thousands of heavy weapons in holding areas ... overseen a massive troop
demobilization and the transfer of hundreds of square miles of territory from one entity to
another... and allowed the people ofBosnia to vote in free national elections. In the process, we
�~---~~~~~~~~----------~~~~-
2
have seen how important and effective the NATO alliance remains-- and the possibilities for
cooperation with Russia and the other members of the Partnership for Peace.
Thanks to the heavy lifting IFOR has done, the Bosnian people are far better off than they were a
year ago -- and their prospects for a future of peace and freedom are brighter.· Already, the
change in their day to day lives is dramatic. Cafes and marketplaces are full of life, not death.
More people have roofs over their heads, food on the table, heat and hot water. And the routines
~fi~--~;=n ~e ~s~~~n~L~t~e 1fa~jl;lf-:s~e~
Economic activity is only just resuming-- its pace mu~ quickened and its reach extended. The ---==~ 1
Presidency, Parliament, and Constitutional Court created by the elections are in their infancy they need time and help to begin meeting regularly and get down to work.
balance of power takes hold and renewed aggression is less likely.
remain to be organized and held.
�3
In short, thanks to IFOR, Bosnia is at peace -- but it is not yet stable enough for the international
community to leave it to its own devices. The people of Bosnia need more time to lay a firmer
economic, political and security foundation so that peace takes on a life and logic of its own.
NATO has been studying options for helping to give them that time by providing a new security
presence in Bosnia when IFOR withdraws.
ttd~
T6~etfl:er
co'itli ~s
~ihtary
aaa aatieeal seeurity
I have carefully reviewed these options. I have decided to instruct the United States
representative to NATO to inform our allies that, in principle, the United States will take 'part in a
follow-on security presence based in Bosnia.
For this agreement in principle to become a commitment, I must be satisfied that the final
recommendation NATO adopts and the operational plan it develops are clear, limited and
achievable. The new mission's primary focus should be to prevent a resumption of hostilities so
that economic reconstruction and political reconciliation to accelarate. That will require a strong
but limited military presence in Bosnia, able to respond quickly and decisively to any violations of
the cease-fire.
This mission will be more limited than IFOR. It will not face the difficult military challenge of
separating two opposing armies. It will be charged with maintaining the stability that IFOR
, created. It will discourage any of the parties from taking up arms again ... while clearing the way
for them to assume full responsibility for their own security as quickly as possible.
�4
Our military planners believe this new mission will require fewer than halfthe number of troops
we contributed to IFOR --about 8,500. Every six months, we will review the progress the
Bosnian people have made toward rebuilding the economy, working together politically, resettling
refugees and establishing a stable military balance of power. By the end of next year, ss progress
is made and stability becomes self-sustaining, the security force should be able to draw down to a
much smaller deterrent force -- half its initial presence -- and ultimately to zero once the mission
ends in June, 1998.
As I have said before, the United States cannot and should not try to solve every problem in the
world. But where our interests are clear and our values at stake -- and where we can make a
difference -- we must act, and we must lead. Every American should be proud that we have made
a dramatic difference in Bosnia -- ending a terrible slaughter, saving thousands of lives, securing
countless futures. We have a responsibility to see our commitment through -- so that the peace
America helped to make in Bosnia grows strong and self-sufficient.
Earlier this week, I also decided that the United States should take part, in principle, in an
international humanitarian relief force that Canada will lead in Zaire.
Two years ago, genocidal violence forced more than a million Rwandans to flee for Zaire.
Recently, their plight has worsened as militant forces have driven them from their camps.
Violence has begun to spiral out of control -- preventing relief agencies from providing food and
medicine to the refugees, who are vulnerable to starvation and disease.
�5
The world's most powerful nation must not turn its back on so many innocent people-- and so
many children --who are now at risk. The mission Canada proposes to lead, and that I believe
America should take part in, would provide security for civilian relief agencies to deliver the aid
these people must have ... and help refugees who so desire return home to Rwanda. It would not
separate or disarm militants or carry out police operations in the refugee camps. America's
contribution to such a force would match our special capabilities -- such as providing security at
the Goma airfield and helping to airlift allied forces.
Neither the new security force in Bosnia nor the humanitarian relief effort in Zaire would be free
of risk. But I will do everything in my power to minimize the risks by making sure both missions
are clear and achievable ... that our troops have robust rules of engagement. .. that, as always, they
t:emain under American command ... before I give the green light. American leadership places a
I
special burden on the men and women of our armed forces and their families. We ask a lot of
them -- and without fail, they deliver for us. Now, as we contemplate calling on them again, I
know that they will be in the thoughts and prayers of every American.
�•
··-
'=·
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
HILL LEADERS ON BOSNWIFOR SUCCESSOR MISSION
•
Calling to talk about Bosnia. Met last night with my national security team to discuss
situation and consider requirements for next year.
•
Let me stress at outset that !FOR's mission completed successfully. IFOR enforced
ceasefrre, created zone of separation, supervised transfer of territory, monitored
cantonment of heavy weapons, and ensured large-scale demobilization of parties'
armed forces.
•
It provided secure conditions in which democratic elections could be held and
rebuilding of Bosnia's shattered economy could begin.
•
That is why IFOR'smission can and will end on schedule December 20.
• · Have concluded, however, that a NATO-led successor mission to IFOR .is needed to
ensure that implementation of Dayton agreement continues to move forward. ·
•
Such a NATO force can provide parties and civilian organizations additional time to
lay ftnner foundation for a lasting peace, one in which Bosnians themselves take full
responsibility for their future.
•
Mission of successor force must be carefully defmed -- will not accept open-ended
commitment to Bosnia.
•
Many ofiFOR's military tasks have been accomplished, permittfug smaller force with
narrower range of tasks.
•
Fundamental mission would be to deter resumption of hostilities by maintaining
presence in region and responding frrmly to major disturbances and ceasefrre
violations:
•
Successor force should also contribute to stabilization of Bosnia by providing secure
environment for acceleration of economic reconstruction and political reconciliation.~
•
While responsibility for Dayton Accords must continue to shift to parties and civilian
agencies, believe mission needs to be 18 months to help create conditions for lasting
peace.
�-
'.
...,u
2
•
As always, will insist on a clear exit strategy. We expect that toward end of 1997,
there will have been major strides in rebuilding economy, creating joint political
institutions, resettling refugees, and establishing stable military balance.
•
At that time, we and our Allies would reduce forces in Bosnia to a much more limited,
deterrence posture, unless doing so ran significant risk of renewed hostilities.
•
Force would completely withdraw from Bosnia by June 1998.
•
If NATO decides to support this kind of successor mission, with limited objectives
and clear endpoint, I have agreed in principle that U.S. forces should participate.
•
I have instructed my national security team to work with our NATO allies to ensure
we can come to agreement in Brussels on this kind of successor force.
•
Until NATO has fmalized its plans, cannot know what force requirements -- or nature
and size of U.S. contribution-- are. But because IFOR has been success and mission
will be different and more limited, number of U.S. troops will be much less than ou:r
20, 000-troop contribution to IF OR.
•
I will reserve my fmal decision to commit U.S. troops until NATO has developed an
operational plan, I have carefully reviewed it, I am fully satisfied that it meets all my
requirements, and I have further consulted with Congress.
•
As always, my advisers will be ready to answer any of your questions as the process
moves forward.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
·
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
Clinton Library
SUBJECTrfiTLE
DATE
002. briefing paper Military Force Options for Bosnia (11 pages)
ca. 11/1996
RESTRICTION
Pllb(1)
I
COLLECTION:
Clinton President'ial Records
National Security Council
Anthony Blinken (Speechwriting)
OA!Box Number: 3381
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia Statement (& Zaire), 11115/1996
2006-0459"F
rs328
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Presidential Records Act· (44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act· (S U.S.C. SSZ(b)J
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P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA)
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financial information ((a)(4) of the PRA)
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors (a)(S) of the PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
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b(l) National security classified information [(b)(l) ofthe FOIA)
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an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA)
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_information [(b)(4) of the FOIAJ
· b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accor~ance with 44 U.S.C•.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�--·· .•. ·
"""-'•,o~'
. POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
HILL LEADERS ON BOSNWIFOR SUCCESSOR MISSION
•
Calling to talk about Bosnia. Just met with my national security team to discuss
situation, including completion ofiFOR's mission and question of whether NATO
needs to consider a new mission next year.
• · Let me stress at outset that !FOR's mission has been completed successfully and will
end as scheduled on December 20.
·
.
.
-
IFOR enforced ceasefrre, created zone of separation, supervised exchange
territory, monitored cantonment of hundreds of heavy weapons, and ensured largescale demobilization of parties' armed forces~
-
It provided secure conditions in which democratic elections could be held and
rebuilding of Bosnia's fractured shattered society could begin.
-
Thanks to NATO's robust force and no-nonsense.rules of engagement, operation
has taken place without any combat casualties, and has had unexpected sidebenefit of building closer security links with Russia and other members of
Partnership for Peace.
•
In short, IFOR exceeded all our expectations in bringing an end to the war and
removing threat to stability of Europe.
•
But must also state frankly that we ·and our Allies all underestimated how long it
would take for civilian side of equation to match IFOR's success in creating stable
environment.
-
Creation of joint political institutions· is proving to be difficult process, as parties
fmd it hard to move from hostility to coexistence.
-
Also has taken much longer than we had hoped to get economic reconstruction
moving -- lot of money pledged, but tan 'ble results just beginning to show up on
grolind.
lfn-u It)
•
Have therefore. concluded that a new A TO-led mission is needed to deter resumption
of hostilities and maintain the stable environment so that there is enough time for the
peace to take hold.
•
By not letting parties slide. back to war and giving a little more breathing space to
political and economic efforts, NATO's new mission can h~lp enable Bosnians
themselves to take full responsibility for their future, without requiring outside
.
·
military presence.
•
New mission must be carefully defmed --will not accept open-ended commitment to
·Bosnia.
0(
�2
•
Since IFOR has completed the hard~st military-tasks, we can design a much smaller
force with a more lmuted set of tasks. ·
-
Fundamental military mission of new forc.e wouid be to· deter resumption of
hostilities by maintaining presence in region and responding firmly to major ·
disturbances and ceasefrre violations.
-
This' would ensure secure environment for. acceleration of economic reconstruction
and political reconciliation ..
-
Believe mission needs to be 18 months in 4uration to help create conditions for
lasting peace.
Expect force size to ·be about half of the 60,000-man force that IFOR deployed at
outset of its mission.
Our s.hare would be less than half oflast year's commitment, that is about 8500
· troops inside Bosnia. {Final numbers could be a little higher or a little lower
depending on fmal shape of NATO plan.)
•
•
As always, will insist on a clear exit strategy. We will review progress every six
months to see whether can draw. down force -- for example, aft~r municipal elections
are held as we hope in spr.ing.
Expect that toward end of.1997, there will have been inajor strides in.rebuilding
· economy, creating joint political institutions,.resettling refugees, and establishing
stable military balance.
.
·
•
At that time, we and our Allies would reduce forces in Bosnia to a much more limited,
deterrence posture -- half again as large as initial force -- unless doing so ran high
risk of renewed hostilities.
:
•
Mission would end in June 1998, and force would completely withdraw from Bosnia
quickly thereafter.
•
If NATO. decides to support this kind of new mission, with limited objectives and
clear endpo~t, I· have agreed in prmciple that U.S. forces should participate.
•
I have instructed my national security team to work with our NATO allies to ensure
. we can come to agreement in Brussels on this kind of new force.
•- I will reserve my fmal decision to commit U.S. troops until NATO has developed an
operational plan, I have carefully reviewed it, I am fully satisfied.that it meets all my
requirements, and I have further- consulted with Congress.
•
As always, my advisers
moves forward.
will be ready to answer any of your questions a~ the process
�POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
HILL LEADERS ON BOSNIAIIFOR SUCCESSOR MISSION
.
.
•
Calling to talk about Bosnia. Just met with my national security team to discuss
situation, including completion of IFOR' s ID.ission and why NATO needs to consider
·
a new, more limited mission next year.
•
Let me stress at outset that IFOR's mission has been completed successfully and will
end as scheduled on December 20.
.
.
IFOR enforced ceasefrre, created zone of separation, supervised exchange
territory, monitored c~tonment of hundreds of heavy weapons, and ensured largescale demobilization of parties' armed forces. .
-
It provided secure conditions in which democratic elections were held and
rebuilding of Bosnia's fractured shattered society beg~ ..
-
Thanks to NATO's robust force and no-nonsense rules of engagement, operation
has taken place without any. combat casualties. Has also had unexpected sidebenefit of building closer security links with Russia and other members of PFP.
•
In short, IFOR exce~ded all olir expectations in. bringing an end to the war that
threatened the very stability of Europe.
•
But must also state frankly that we and NATO underestimated how long it would take
for political and economic efforts to gain momentum.
-
[Creation ofjoin(politicalinstituiions is proving slow process, as parties fmd it
hard to move from. hostility to coexistence.
Also has taken longer to get economic reconstruction moving -- lot of money
pledged, but tangible resU;lts just beginning to show up on ground.
-
We have not yet completed our train-and-equip program, which is key to
establishing a stable military balance among the parties.
· There is also much inore work to be done in retraining and reforming local police
forces so that they meet democratic standards.]
•
All our NATO partners have -- and I agree -- therefore concluded that a new, limited
NATO-led mission is needed to deter resumption of hostilities and to preserve an
overall security umbrella .so that there is enough time for the peace to take hold.
•
By not letting parties slide back to war and giving a more breathing space to political
and economic efforts, NATO's new mission can enable Bosnians themselves to take
full responsibility for their future, without requiring outside military presence.
�2
•
New mission will be carefully defmed -- wiU not accept open-ended commitment to ·
Bosnia.
•
Since IFOR has completed the hardest military tasks, we can design a much smaller
force with a more limited set of tasks.
·- Fundamental military mission ofnew force would be to deter resumption of
hostilities by maintaining presence in country and responding fmnly to major
disturbances and ceasefrre violations.
-
This would ensure secure environment for acceleration of economic reconstruction
and political reconciliation.
-
Believe mission needs to be 18 months in duration to help create conditions for
lasting peace.
Expect force size to be about half of the 60,000-man force that IFOR deployed at
outset of its mission.
-
Our share would be less than half oflastyear's commitment, that is about 8500
troops inside Bosnia. (Numbers could be a little higher or a little lower depending
on fmal shape of NATO plan.).
·
•
As always, will insist on a clear exit strategy. We will review progress every six
months and consult with Congress on whether can draw down force -- for example,
after municipal elections are held as we anticipate in spring.
•
Expect that toward end of 1997, there will have been major strides in rebuilding
economy, creating joint political institutions, resettling refugees, and establishing
stable military balance.
•
At that time, we and our Allies would expect to reduce forces in Bosnia to a much
·
more limited, deterrence posture -- half as large as initial force.
•
Mission would end in June 1998, and force would completely withdraw from Bosnia
quickly thereafter.' If peace is not s:ustainable by then, international community would
have done all that could be expected.
•
If NATO decides to support this kind of new mission, with limited objectives and
clear endpoint, I have agreed in principle that U.S. forces should participate.
• · I have instructed my national security team to work with our NATO allies to ensure
we can. come to agreement in Brussels on this kind of new force.
•
I will reserve my fmal decision to colnmit U.S. troops. until NATO has developed an
operational plan, I have carefully reviewed it, I am fully satisfied that it meets all my
requirements, and I have further consulted with Congress.
.
•
As always, my advisers will be ready to answer any of your questions as the process
moves forward.
�11/14/96 4 p.m.
PRESIDENT Wll..LIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON
STATEMENT ON BOSNIA AND ZAIRE
THE WHITE HOUSE
NOVEMBER 15,1996
Good morning.
One year ago, in Dayton, Ohio, the leaders ofBosnia, Croatia, and Serbia agreed to turn from the
horror of war to the promise of peace. Their historic decision came after nearly four years of the ·
bloodiest conflict Europe has known since World War II ... after a quarter of a million deaths ...
after two million people were made refugees ... and after countless atrocities that shocked the
conscience of the world.
/
When the Balkan leaders chose peace, I asked the American people to do the same by supporting
the participation of our troops in a NATO-led Implementation Force to help secure
th~~:;/
..pooce agreement. I promised that the mission would be carefully defined, with clear, realistic
goals. And I said that it would be completed in about one year.
IFOR has succeeded beyond most people's expectations. It has maintained the cease-fire and
separated the parties along a new demilitarized zone ... monitored the cantonment of thousands of
heavy weapons ... overseen a massive troop demobilization and the transfer of hundreds of square
miles of territory from one entity to another ... and allowed humanitarian assistance to flow,
reconstruction to .begin, and the people of Bosnia to vote in free national elections.
�. ,,
2
IFOR has completed the difficult tasks we set for it. Therefore, the IFOR mission will end as
planned on December 20 of this year.
Thanks to the heavy lifting IFOR has done, the Bosnian people are far better off than they were a ·
year ago -- and their prospects for the future are brighter. Cafes and marketplaces are full of life,
not death. More people have roofs over their heads, food on the table, heat and hot water. And
the routines of a normal life -- iOing to work, coming
hom~ool; eating a meal as a family -- ~'
are once more a reality.
But for all the progress we've seen in Bosma, much more work remains to be done to fulfill the
Dayton Agreement's promise of a lasting, self-sustaining peace. Economic activity is only just
resuming-- its pace should be quickened and its reach extended. The Presidency, Parliament, and
Constitutional Court created by the elections are still in their infancy -- they need time and help to
begin meeting regularly and get down to work.. Not enough refugees have returned to Bosnia and
too few people within Bosnia have been able to reclaim their old homes. Civilian police forces
must be trained to international standards and need more equipment to be effective. We must
complete the training and equipping of the Bosnian Federation military so that a stable balance of
power takes hold and renewed aggression is less likely. And municipal elections remain to be
organized and held.
In short, the people of Bosnia need more time to lay a firmer economic, political and security
foundation so that peace takes on a life and logic of its own. NATO has been studying options
for helping to give them that time by providing a new security presence in Bosnia when IFOR
�3
withdraws. Together with my military and national security advisers, I have carefully reviewed
these options. I have decided to instruct the United States representative to NATO to inform our
allies that, in principle, the United States will take part in a follow-on security presence based in
Bosnia.
For this agre ment in principle to become a commitment, I must be satisfied that the final
recommend tion NATO adopts and the operational plan it develops are clear, limited and
achievable.
primary focus should be to prevent a resumption of hostilities by maintaining a
\X..
strong presence in Bosnia and responding quickly and decisively to any violations ofthe ceasefire. At the same time, its presence should help'maintain a secure environment so that economic
reconstruction and political reconciliation continue to move forward.
MJ·· . . . .
This mission will be more limited than IFOR. It
~e in
•X
less precarious security
environillent thanks to IFOR' s work over the past year. IFOR' s role was to enforce the military
part of the Dayton Agreement-- to create the very stability that now exists in Bosnia. The
successor mission would be charged with maintaining that stability. It would discourage any of the
parties from taking up arms
ag~le clearing the .way for them to assume full responsibility for
their own security as quickly as possible.
Until NATO finalizes its plans, we cannot know what force requirements will be necessary-- or
the size and specific tasks of Americ.a' s contribution. But given IFOR' s success -- and because
this new mission will be different and more limited-- the number ofU.S. forces should be much
�4
less that our 20,000-troop colitributioli to IFOR. As the Bosnian people take more and more
responsibility for rebuilding the economy, working together politically, resettling refugees and
establishing a stable military balance of power, the
small
deterren~by the end of 1997.
securit~e could decre~se its presence to a
It should be able to complete its mission by June, 1998 -
-and then withdraw.
As I have said before, the United States cannot and should not try to solve every problem in the
world. But where our interests are clear and our values at stake-- and where we can make a
difference -- we must act, and we must lead. Every American should be proud that we have made
a dramatic difference in Bosnia-- en1ing a terrible slaughter, saving thousands of lives, securing
countless futures. Now,
IDelieve
W
have a responsibility to see our commitment through -- so
that the peace America helped to make in Bosnia grows strong and self-sufficient.
Earlier this week, I also decided that the United States should take part, in principle, in an·
agencies from providing food and medicine to the re gees, who are vulnerable to starvation and
disease.
�,;:.t)
II
.... , \
5
The world's most powerful nation must not tum its back on so many innocent people-- and so
many children -- who are now at risk. The mission Canada proposes to lead, and that I believe
America should take part in, would provide security for civilian relief agencies to deliver the aid
these people must have ... and help refugees who so desire return home to Rwanda. It would not
separate or disarm militants or carry out police operations in the refugee camps. America's
contribution to such a 'force would match our special capabilities -- such as providing security at
the Goma airfield and helping to airlift allied forces.
Neither the new security force in Bosnia nor the humanitarian relief effort in Zaire would be free
of risk. But I will do everything in my power to minimize the risks by making sure both missions
are clear and achievable ... that our troops have robust rules of engagement. .. that,. as always, they
remain under American command ... before I give the green light. American leadership places a
special burden on the men and women of our armed forces and their families. We ask a lot of
them-- and without fail, they deliver for us. Now, as we contemplate calling on them again, I
know that they will be in the thoughts and prayers of every American.
�
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Speechwriting Office - Antony Blinken
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<p>Antony Blinken served in the Clinton Administration as the chief foreign policy speechwriter in the National Security Council Speechwriting Directorate from 1994 thru 1998.</p>
<p>Blinken prepared remarks for President Clinton, Anthony Lake, Samuel Berger, James Steinberg, and General Donald Kerrick. His speechwriting topics cover a variety of subjects for various audiences including but not limited to: foreign trips or head of state visits, United Nations General Assembly addresses, and State of the Union and weekly radio addresses. As an NSC speechwriter, Blinken produced speeches on major foreign policy actions during the Clinton Administration on Haiti, Iraq and Bosnia. The documents in the collection consist of speech drafts, newspaper and magazine articles, memos, correspondence, schedules, and handwritten notes.</p>
<p>This collection was made available through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/freedom-of-information-act-requests">Freedom of Information Act</a> request. </p>
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National Security Council
Speechwriting Office
Antony Blinken
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1994-1998
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<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36017" target="_blank">Collection Finding Aid</a>
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2006-0459-F
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Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
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941 folders in 39 boxes
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Bosnia Statement (& Zaire) 11/15/96
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National Security Council
Speechwriting Office
Antony Blinken
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2006-0459-F
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Box 25
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<a href="http://catalog.archives.gov/id/7585787" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
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Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
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9/17/2014
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42-t-7585787-20060459f-025-014-2014
7585787