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:« 1
�THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
May
7,
1993
REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
IN PHOTO OPPORTUNITY WITH PRIME MINISTER RASMUSSEN OF DENMARK
AND PRESIDENT JACQUES DELORS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
The Oval Office
10:40
A.M.
EDT
Q
Mr. President, what makes you so confident that
you're going to get a consensus, and a consensus for what? A i r
s t r i k e s ? L i f t i n g the arms embargo?
THE PRESIDENT: F i r s t of a l l , I think I should receive a
report from Mr. Christopher before I make a f i n a l comment on that.
The Secretary i s coming home and we're going to meet, and we're going
to meet with our p r i n c i p a l s , and we're a l l going to compare notes.
We also are going to be — I want to get a good personal b r i e f i n g
from Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar and any of the other Senators who
want to t a l k to me who went on that t r i p .
I j u s t have the feeling based on my conversations i n the
l a s t week and the reports I've been getting that we can reach a
common policy, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n l i g h t of the events of the l a s t two
days. And we'll j u s t see how we do an.? go forward.
Q
Mr. President, do you feel that you could reach a
common policy that would not include m i l i t a r y force i f the a l l i e s are
r e s i s t a n t to that, but a policy that could s t i l l be successful and
that wouldn't undermine your authority?
THE PRESIDENT: I think we have to turn up the heat and
keep the pressure on. You know what our policy has been, what we've
been pushing. I think I shouldn't say more u n t i l a f t e r I see
Secretary Christopher.
Q
Mr. President, how
change the equation i f at a l l ?
does Belgrade's action
yesterday
THE PRESIDENT: I t ' s hard to say. I t was welcome i f
i t ' s r e a l and i f i t can be followed through on. But I have to get an
i n t e l l i g e n c e report on what the p r a c t i c a l impact of that i s . You
know, I need to — that's one of the things we'll be discussing.
Our weekends the l a s t few weeks have been given over to
these kinds of matters, and I expect tomorrow morning, I ' l l t a l k
about i t quite a b i t .
Q
While the deliberations are going on won't the
Serbs be simply confirming t h e i r hold on a l l t h i s land and k i l l i n g
more people? How do you —
THE PRESIDENT: We'll have to wait and we'll have to
see. But that w i l l obviously, at l e a s t for me, i t w i l l a f f e c t how
view t h i s and what I w i l l do.
Q
I s i t strange to have Milosevic on your side?
THE PRESIDENT:
I s i t strange to what?
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Q
To have Milosevic on your side?
THE PRESIDENT:
hope h e ' l l stay there.
Yes, i t ' s an unusual feeling.
*
And I
* * * *
Q
Mr. President, do you expect the Europeans to come
along now and support the use of force i n Bosnia?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think that we have to take
stronger steps. We have to keep turning the pressure up. I think
that, obviously, some of what has been done i s having an effect, even
though the so-called assembly did not approve the Vance-Owen plan
the Serb leaders seem to be i n favor of.
I'm going to discuss that with the Prime Minister and
with President Delors, and then we're going to t a l k tomorrow among
ourselves. My Secretary of State i s j u s t coming home now, and after
that I ' l l have more to say.
Q
Mr. President, do you find Mr. Milosevic's actions
and the sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs encouraging?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I hope i t ' s r e a l . I haven't had
time to be advised about the p r a c t i c a l impact of i t i n the short run,
but perhaps i t w i l l have a psychological impact. I would think these
fights between the Serbs and the Bosnia Muslims and the Croats, they
go back so many centuries, they have such powerful roots that i t may
be that i t ' s more d i f f i c u l t for the people on the ground to make a
change i n t h e i r policy than for the leaders. And so I think i t may
be that over the next several days some change can be effected on the
ground. And i f i t i s a genuine effort by Mr. Milosevic, than of
course I would be quite happy about that, and we'll see what we can
do with i t .
END
10:46 A.M. EDT
�AHA
�THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
May
7,
1993
REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
PRIME MINISTER RASMUSSEN OF DENMARK,
AND EC PRESIDENT JACQUES DELORS
UPON DEPARTURE
The South Grounds
2:03 P.M.
EDT
PRESIDENT CLINTON: Good afternoon, ladies and
gentlemen. We have just completed our f i r s t meeting of the leaders
of the United States and the European Community. I would l i k e to
offer a warm welcome to Washington and the White House to Prime
Minister Rasmussen and to President Delors.
I had the pleasure of meeting with President Delors
e a r l i e r , i n March, and I'm delighted now to have the opportunity to
see the Prime Minister of Denmark and the leader of the EC. Before I
comment on some elements of the meeting, I want to describe f i r s t the
attitude of t h i s administration toward the European Community.
I t often seems to be the case that there i s a great deal
of focus, understandably, on some of the trade disputes that divide
us rather than the bonds which unite us. I t ' s useful to r e c a l l that
our common ground i s far, far wider than the areas of disagreement.
The United States has long been a strp-g proponent of European unity
and the importance of our t r a n s a t l a n t i c t i e s .
Thirty-one years ago, President Kennedy made a statement
that I believe holds as true today as i t did then. He said, "We see
in Europe a partner with whom we could deal on the basis of f u l l
equality i n a l l the great and burdensome tasks of building and
defending a community of free nations." That same v i s i o n guides t h i s
administration.
The European Community i s our largest single trade and
investment partner. Our relationships with Europe are d i r e c t l y
responsible for an inordinate number of American jobs, and i f we
c u l t i v a t e that relationship properly and grow our trade and
investment, i t w i l l mean more economic opportunities for the American
people.
Even more important perhaps i s our shared commitment to
democratic values, to the protection of basic human rights, and to
our c o l l e c t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to a s s i s t others who aspire to those
values in t h e i r own society. We f u l l y support Europ 's e f f o r t s
toward further integration, and we w i l l work with the European
Community to achieve our common goals.
We believe a strong and
ited European Community as a
key partner in the pressing problems around the world i s very much in
the i n t e r e s t s of the United States. I want our partnership to be
effective i n finding solutions to the problems that we face together
and to those few problems which continue to divide us.
Today we agreed to provide leadership to assure a
successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round. A new GATT agreement
could spark economic recovery in Europe and create of growth around
the world. I have worked quite hard on t h i s in the l a s t several
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weeks. Just a few days ago I met with the finance ministers and the
central bankers from the G-7 countries. And I said to them what I
said today to Prime Minister Rasmussen and what I r e i t e r a t e d to
President DeLors — the United States wants a successful GATT Round
and we are prepared to take a l o t of trouble to get i t done. We
agreed that we would do that. My guests and I are committed to
wrapping up these negotiations by the end of the year. We directed
our negotiators to proceed urgently with other trading partners to
restore momentum to the negotiations. Our aim i s to have tangible
progress to report when Prime Minister Miyazawa hosts us i n Tokyo i n
July.
We also reviewed the continuing tragedy in the Balkans.
We agreed to work closely to avert further aggression against
innocent populations. I've already answered some questions about
t h i s today, and I think I w i l l l e t my guests make t h e i r statements
before we make further comments.
We discussed our common ex forts to support democratic
reform in Russia, Ukraine and the other newly independent states of
the former Soviet Union. The r e s u l t s of the referendum i n Russia
c l e a r l y indicates support for the approach that we have taken. We
agreed that the G-7 summit partners must continue to demonstrate
t h e i r support for reform in Russia and i n these other countries.
I thank the EC leaders for the role they have played i n
encouraging the Middle East peace t a l k s and the support they have
given to the United States in working toward a successful conclusion
to those t a l k s . We also had a b r i e f discussion about the growing
s i m i l a r i t y of our approaches toward protection of our environment and
other global problems.
These are areas in which we can do more together. I
asked the Prime Minister for some advice on health care and how they
dealt with that in Denmark. We talked a l i t t l e b i t about the role of
training the work force and i t s impact on productivity and how we
need i t to make both Europe and the United States more competitive in
the global environment. And we agreed that we had a l o t of things
that we could learn from each other on and work together on.
We believe, f i n a l l y , that we have proved in Europe and
the United States that you can have s o c i e t i e s that are diverse and
strong; s o c i e t i e s that have a r i c h mosaic of d i f f e r e n t cultures but
band together i n common values of democracy and economic freedom and
human r i g h t s . We know from the hard experiences of t h i s century the
importance of c o l l e c t i v e action in Europe to advance our common
security. For a l l these reasons, I believe today more strongly than
ever that we share a future of cooperation and progress.
Thank you both for coming to Washington. I look forward
to the progress we can make together i n the weeks and months and
years ahead.
Mr. Prime Minister.
PRIME MINISTER RASMUSSEN: Thank you, President.
Mr. Prime Minister, ladies and gentlemen, I wish to j o i n
the President of the United States in h i s positive appreciation of
the r e s u l t of t h i s meeting.
We had throughout constructive t a l k s . And of a l l
important issues, I think we have been basing our t a l k s on openness
and on common ground.
In view of the i n i t i a t i v e of the Danish presidency to
strengthen the t r a n s a t l a n t i c dialogue, I find that the consultations
today were most encouraging.
May I mention that we have underlined
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and we did agree today, I think, that tne kmerican-E.C. consensus on
the need to strengthen our cooperation, not l e a s t on the economic
growth area and the need for creating new employment, i s so important
that i t did play a major role in our discussion. And I f e e l that we
also, as the true upholders of democracy and free markets, have a
wide range of jobs to do together.
That leads me, Mr. President, to the subject you
mentioned yourself, which I feel that the whole world are waiting
upon the next answer to give. We have had an extensive and useful
discussion on the tragic c o n f l i c t in the former Yugoslavia, in
p a r t i c u l a r i n Bosnia-Hercegovina.
We both confined and confirmed
ourself i n having responsibility here. We both agreed upon on the
need to go forward together. And i t i s my view that t h i s w i l l
happen.
On Monday the Foreign Minister w i l l meet i n Brussels of
the E.G. We have seen some new developments during the l a s t couple
of days. Let me mention the most important ones. The leadership in
Belgrade have said they w i l l i s o l a t e the Serbs in Bosnia.
Consequently, we must keep President Milosevic to h i s word.
Secondly, t h i s means that the Bosnian Serbs now defy the
whole international community's acceptance of the Vance-Owen plan.
We, therefore, do not take the so-called Bosnian parliament's no for
an answer.
And t h i r d l y , I think that the international community,
in p a r t i c u l a r the United States, the European Community, and Russia,
i s considering ways to increase the pressure on the Serbs i n Bosnia.
And may I confirm also, Mr. President, that the effectiveness of the
sanctions has been a very, very, important — has an important
e f f e c t s , and I wanted to thank you of the e f f e c t i v e cooperation on
that area also.
Let me f i n a l i z e my comment about the Bosnian case. We
keep a l l options open. We must continue to follow the path we have
taken up t i l l now, namely that any additional measure should be taken
and that we should take i t together under the auspices of the United
Nations Security Council.
Allow me to turn to a few other major issues which I
think i s important. You mentioned yourself, Mr. President, the
r e v i t a l i z a t i o n of the war of the economy. I was very happy today to
state that a f t e r comments by President DeLors and yourself, we did
confirm each other once more in more d e t a i l the progresses on the
GATT negotiations and the Uruguay Round should be r e a l i z e d and would
be r e a l i z e d also so that we together
the G-7 meeting in summer can
present some — positive r e s u l t s .
I f e e l also that our discussion about Russia was very
promising and I want to thank you about these interesting positive
attitude. And may I f i n a l i z e by underlining our environmental common
issue and goals. Once more I feel that what we have done today i s
the next important step also in environmental question. What we do
in Europe and what you do in the United States do have important
issues and e f f e c t s on both countries and s i t u a t i o n s .
So what we s h a l l do once more i s to cooperate, be i t
economics, be i t foreign policy, be i t the t r a g i c war i n Bosnia.
Thank you so much for a good meeting and very constructive attitude,
Mr. President.
PRESIDENT CLINTON:
Thank you.
Mr. President.
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PRESIDENT DELORS: President, Prime Minister, j u s t a few
words a f t e r the declaration of Mr. Rasmussen. My colleagues and
myself thank President Clinton to give us the opportunity to
discussion. I don't come back on Bosnia, but discussion was very
f r u i t f u l j u s t before an important meeting of the minister of foreign
r e l a t i o n s next Monday i n Brussels.
On the other subject, we have deepened our discussion on
the Uruguay Round. And since my f i r s t v i s i t to President Clinton, I
note that we have made progress together in terms of procedure and
also i n terms of substance. We concentrate our mind on the market
access with the hope to f i n a l i z e concrete r e s u l t s and to come back to
Geneva through a m u l t i l a t e r a l declaration.
We have also spoken about the economic outlook. For the
f i r s t time, the Community has taken an i n i t i a t i v e at the European
l e v e l — mixed i n i t i a t i v e with Community action and national action
to improve the s i t u a t i o n of the economy. We expect more growth with
t h i s f i r s t package, but we intend to rule over the s i t u a t i o n and to
complete, i f possible, t h i s package as far as the room to maneuver of
the Community and each country allow the p o s s i b i l i t y to complete t h i s
package.
And we have also discussed about the future framework of
the large Europe with the e f f o r t s met by the Community to open t h e i r
market to the Eastern European countries and also to have t h i s
country's close cooperation, not only on the economic f i e l d but also
in the p o l i t i c a l f i e l d .
Thank you.
Q
Mr. President, does t h i s mean that you are closer
now to getting the European Community to match up tougher military
action i n Bosnia?
PRESIDENT CLINTON: Well, I think i t means that the
Prime Minister's words mean exactly what they say, that — the Prime
Minister said to me i n our conversation that he thought that some of
the reports of the journey of Secretary Christopher across the
European c a p i t a l s had minimized the extent to which European leaders
and c i t i z e n s i n Europe feel responsible to do more to t r y to put an
end to the k i l l i n g and the suffering in Bosnia. And that as long as
I was committed to the idea that we ought to do these things
together, he thought we would move forward together to take more
aggressive steps.
I told you, I can't be more s p e c i f i c than I have been.
You know pretty much where I am; but I think I have to wait u n t i l
Secretary Christopher comes home and gives me h i s report.
Q
So far, though, they have not gone along with you.
PRESIDENT CLINTON: That's not e n t i r e l y true. There are
a l o t of — there has been a l o t of agreement on what should be done.
There i s s t i l l some disagreement around the edges about what the
overall s p e c i f i c t a c t i c a l steps should be, but I think that there i s
a l o t more agreement than you think. And I think i n the next few
days you w i l l see a common approach emerging.
Q
Mr. President, you t a l k about a common approach.
Does that automatically assume the use of force? And i s the United
States w i l l i n g to provide arms to the Bosnians?
PRESIDENT CLINTON: I think you know how I f e e l about
that. I think that the know how I f e e l about that. I think that the
imposition of the arms embargo by the United Nations before actually
t h i s country was even created and recognized, had the unintended
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consequence of giving the Serbs and insurmountable military
advantage, which they have pressed with ruthless e f f i c i e n c y .
So I feel very badly about what happened there. I think
that's one of the options that — that's c e r t a i n l y one of options
that we have urged that be considered, and I think i t ' s c e r t a i n l y one
of the options that's s t i l l on the table. I think we've got to keep
the heat on.
Let me ask f i r s t — we ought to rotate t h i s . I s there a
member of the European press here? Anvbody here from Denmark or from
the European Community covering the European Community? (Laughter.)
PRIME MINISTER RASMUSSEN: I see a couple of Danes over
there.
Minister?
PRESIDENT CLINTON: Could you c a l l of them, Prime
We're going to have some equal opportunity here.
Q
Mr. President, do you understand the many things
people don't want to j o i n the E.G.?
PRESIDENT CLINTON:
Q
Don't want to j o i n the E.G.?
Yes.
PRESIDENT CLINTON: Of course. That's a decision that's
up to Denmark, of course. You'll get to vote on the Maastricht
Treaty. But I can only — i t ' s not for me to t e l l the people of
Denmark how to vote, but I support the European Community. I support
the Maastricht process. I hope i t w i l l p r e v a i l ; but that's, of
course, up to you.
Q
Mr. President, i t appears, s i r , that however things
go, you may soon be asking Congress for some sort of approval or
authorization for further action in the Balkans. Have you thought
through, s i r , what form you would want that to take and what i t would
be?
PRESIDENT CLINTON: I have given some thought to i t ,
B r i t . I'm going to be heavily guided there by the leadership, the
bipartisan leadership in the Congress and people who care most about
these issues. I think that, again, before I make a f i n a l decision on
that, I'm very, very anxious to t a l k to Senators Nunn and Lugar and
the other four senators who went across the region and a l l the way to
Moscow in the l a s t week. And obviously i t ' s important that I have my
l a s t — my report from Secretary Christopher, but I've given some
thought to i t . I think i t depends in large measure on the sense of
the Congress about how we ought to proceed as well —
Q
Mr. President, our bombing campaign during the Gulf
war had only limited effectiveness. The A i r Force was unable, for
example, to take out the mobile SCUD m i s s i l e s i t e s . Given that fact,
what rationale would there be for going to a i r s t r i k e s in Bosnia
which i s much more d i f f i c u l t t e r r a i n with a r t i l l e r y and i n s t a l l a t i o n s
that could be moved very e a s i l y ?
PRESIDENT CLINTON: Well, l e t me answer you in t h i s way.
I f I decide to ask the American people and the United States Congress
to support an approach that would include the use of a i r power, I
would have a very s p e c i f i c , c l e a r l y defined strategy to pursue, and
very clear t a c t i c a l objectives for the use of that a i r power, which
would have a beginning, a middle, and an end. And which, not only I ,
but our m i l i t a r y advisors had advised me could be achieved. To be
f a i r to the m i l i t a r y i n the Gulf, that's exactly what they said.
I f you remember, we had a d i f f e r e n t set of objectives in
the Gulf and a very different opponent. The land was more open and
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easier to bomb, but they also were more heavily armed with m i s s i l e s .
So i t was a completely different situation.
I assure you today that i f I decide to ask for the
authority to use a i r power from the Congress and from the American
people, I w i l l make i t very clear what the t a c t i c a l objectives are
and they w i l l be objectives that our m i l i t a r y leaders say can, i n
fact, be achieved.
Q
You said that you asked Mr. Rasmussen about the
health care in Denmark. What about s o c i a l a f f a i r s ? Could you use
anything from Denmark or the Scandinavian welfare system?
PRESIDENT CLINTON: Perhaps. One of the things that we
talked about, generally, was the extent that which a l l of our
countries are now facing common probltii.s; but each nation i n Europe
and the United States i s perhaps done one thing better or more
completely or i n a more advanced way than another nation. And I
think — something that's important not to reinvent the wheel.
Yesterday I had a meeting with Republican leaders of the
House and the Senate on the question of health care, and one of the
things that encouraged me quite a l o t i s that some of them had
actually t r a v e l l e d to Europe to look at some of the health care
systems there. I think the more we can share with each other and
learn from one another across a wide range, the better off we're
going to be.
Q
Mr. President, why do you think the Europeans have
been so reluctant on the issue of l i f t i n g the arms embargo, whereas
they have considered other options, but on that they seem to be
f a i r l y w e l l stuck? And then I'd l i k e i t i f Prime Minister Rasmussen
could comment on h i s views on l i f t i n g the arms embargo.
PRESIDENT CLINTON: Well, I don't think i t ' s for me to
speak for the Europeans. I think the arguments against l i f t i n g the
arms embargo are f a i r l y clear. You might argue that i t w i l l only
widen the violence. You might argue that during the time between
when you vote to do i t and when i t has an impact, i t w i l l only
encourage the Serbs to intensify theix e f f o r t s to k i l l and to gain
t e r r i t o r y . I think you might argue that i t might make i t d i f f i c u l t
in the end to have a settlement. I understand a l l those arguments.
For me, they are outweighed by other considerations. But there are
very serious concerns about that.
Q
Mr. Prime Minister?
PRIME MINISTER RASMUSSEN: Yes. F i r s t of a l l , I think
that what the President said — that we want to go together; and
that, point two, we haven't closed any options — any options; and
point three, I think that the discussion about l i f t i n g the weapons
embargo — you cannot take that isolated.
You have, as the President said, to evaluate and to take
decisions upon the f i r s t step, the next step, and the next step. And
you have to have clear p o l i t i c a l goals — what should you obtain, and
what i s a t stake, and what i s your means. So, in my mind — and I
think we had a quite useful and constructive discussion — i n my
mind, you cannot exclude any options, which I have underlined,
including the question you mentioned. But, on the other hand, I feel
that you cannot discuss weapon embargo l i f t i n g without placing i t i n
a whole range of issues with other steps. That i s at stake i n the
discussion right now.
Q
A non-Balkan question. We have a p o l l out tonight
that shows that your job approval rating has gone from 64 to 49
percent i n the l a s t two months, with p a r t i c u l a r erosion on the
economy, which i s what most people think you were elected to f i x .
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Why do you think t h i s has happened, and what, s p e c i f i c a l l y , do you
think you can do about that?
PRESIDENT CLINTON: I think there are
two reasons, one i s that I've been forced to deal with a l o t of other
issues. Most voters i n t h i s country don't l i k e i t when you spend any
time on foreign policy because of the economic problems of the
country. Secondly, I think even though the voters overwhelmingly
supported the job stimulus package, what they r e a l l y want i s for the
gridlock to end. And, t h i r d l y , I think that there i s an inevitable
sense that things take — people want things to happen immediately
that don't happen immediately.
And, f i n a l l y , I think that the stimulus got more
p u b l i c i t y than the budget resolution. I think that, for example, I
bet not f i v e percent of the American people know that we passed a
budget which has record-breaking d e f i c i t reduction and a long-term
investment plan and i t passed at the most rapid point of any budget
i n 17 years. I bet not one in 2 0 American voters knows that because
we did i t ; and success and the lack of discord i s not as noteworthy
as f a i l u r e s . So a m u l t i - t r i l l i o n - d o l l a r budget resolution got — I'm
not c r i t i c i z i n g you t h i s i s j u s t part of the deal — got l e s s play
than a $16-billion stimulus f a i l u r e . So I think that people only can
vote on and express what they know.
I think the other big problem i s , I haven't been out
there as much as I should have been engaging the American people
d i r e c t l y since February. I've been h^re doing huge, heavy l i f t i n g
and long meetings on health care and the economy — that's what I've
been working on and I've been forced to deal with a l o t of other
i s s u e s . When people — I think when the American people see that the
program that I promised them on February 17th i s s t i l l intact and on
the boards and going forward, when they r e a l i z e that we are going
forward with health care and that that i s , notwithstanding, what the
perception i s — taking the lion's share of my time and attention,
and when I get back out there and engage them again on i t , I think
that those things w i l l turn around. But you can't — you know, you
can't operate t h i s job by p o l l s .
Anybody who thinks they can be president by p o l l s — I
didn't run the governor's o f f i c e that way.
The only thing that
matters i s the p o l l s that come around on election day, those are the
things that matter. And you have to be w i l l i n g to take on tough
decisions. I t takes a certain amount of time to do things, to make
d i f f i c u l t decisions and to work through them, and you can't carry on
a t o t a l l y continuous campaign; i t ' s simply not possible.
Q
Mr. President, on the Middle East, you mentioned
the Middle East t a l k s . Do you think the U.S. should now offer
proposals to bridge the gaps? Should the Syrians o f f e r a f u l l peace
before I s r a e l agrees to withdraw from the Golan Heights? And could
you accept or see a P a l e s t i n i a n state eventually emerging from the
talks?
PRESIDENT CLINTON: I f I answer any of those questions I
w i l l undermine the Middle East peace t a l k s . The question i s — the
r e a l answer to that question i s , i f those parties can agree among
themselves i n good f a i t h to proposals which w i l l bring an end to the
h o s t i l i t i e s between Egypt and Syria — I mean, between I s r a e l and
S y r i a , between I s r a e l and the Palestinians; they can get the
m u l t i l a t e r a l t a l k s going, i f they bring in the Jordanians, the
Lebanese that the United States w i l l be prepared to be supportive of
t h e i r agreements. That i s the answer to that. And I hope they can
reach them.
Thank you very much.
THE PRESS:
Thank you.
END
2:29 P.M.
EDT
�THE WHITE HOUSE
O f f i c e of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
May 7, 1993
REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
IN PHOTO OPPORTUNITY WITH PRIME MINISTER RASMUSSEN OF DENMARK
AND PRESIDENT JACQUES DELORS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
The Oval O f f i c e
10:40 P.M. EDT
Q
Mr. President, what makes you so c o n f i d e n t t h a t
you're going t o get a consensus, and a consensus f o r what? A i r
s t r i k e s ? L i f t i n g the arms embargo?
THE PRESIDENT: F i r s t of a l l , I t h i n k I should receive a
r e p o r t from Mr. Christopher before I make a f i n a l comment on t h a t .
The Secretary i s coming home and we're going t o meet, and we're going
t o meet w i t h our p r i n c i p a l s , and we're a l l going t o compare notes.
We also are going t o be — I want t o get a good personal b r i e f i n g
from Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar and any of the other Senators who
want t o t a l k t o me who went on t h a t t r i p .
I j u s t have the f e e l i n g based on my conversations i n the
l a s t week and the r e p o r t s I've been g e t t i n g t h a t we can reach a
common p o l i c y , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n l i g h t o f the events o f the l a s t two
days. And w e ' l l j u s t see how we do and go forward.
Q
Mr. President, do you f e e l t h a t you could reach a
common p o l i c y t h a t would not include m i l i t a r y f o r c e i f the a l l i e s are
r e s i s t a n t t o t h a t , but a p o l i c y t h a t could s t i l l be successful and
t h a t wouldn't undermine your a u t h o r i t y ?
THE PRESIDENT: I t h i n k we have t o t u r n up t h e heat and
keep the pressure on. You know what our p o l i c y has been, what we've
been pushing. I t h i n k I shouldn't say more u n t i l a f t e r I see
Secretary Christopher.
Q
Mr. President, how does Belgrade's a c t i o n yesterday
change the equation i f a t a l l ?
THE PRESIDENT: I t ' s hard t o say. I t was welcome i f
i t ' s r e a l and i f i t can be followed through on. But I have t o get an
i n t e l l i g e n c e r e p o r t on what the p r a c t i c a l impact o f t h a t i s . You
know, I need t o — t h a t ' s one of the t h i n g s w e ' l l be discussing.
MORE
�- 2-
Our weekends the l a s t few weeks have been given over t o
these kinds of matters, and I expect tomorrow morning, I ' l l t a l k
about i t q u i t e a b i t .
Q
While the d e l i b e r a t i o n s are going on won't the
Serbs be simply confirming t h e i r hold on a l l t h i s land and k i l l i n g
more people? How do you —
THE PRESIDENT: We'll have t o w a i t and w e ' l l have t o
see. But t h a t w i l l obviously, a t l e a s t f o r me, i t w i l l a f f e c t how I
view t h i s and what I w i l l do.
Q
I s i t strange t o have Milosevic on your side?
THE PRESIDENT:
Q
I s i t strange t o what?
To have Milosevic on your side?
THE PRESIDENT:
hope h e ' l l stay there.
Yes, i t ' s an unusual f e e l i n g .
And I
* * * * *
Q
Mr. President, do you expect the Europeans t o come
along now and support the use of force i n Bosnia?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I t h i n k t h a t we have t o take
stronger steps. We have t o keep t u r n i n g the pressure up. I t h i n k
t h a t , obviously, some of what has been done i s having an e f f e c t , even
though the so-called assembly d i d not approve the Vance-Owen plan
the Serb leaders seem t o be i n favor o f .
I'm going t o discuss t h a t w i t h the Prime M i n i s t e r and
w i t h President Delors, and then we're going t o t a l k tomorrow among
ourselves. My Secretary o f State i s j u s t coming home now, and a f t e r
t h a t I ' l l have more t o say.
Q
Mr. President, do you f i n d Mr. Milosevic's actions
and the sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs encouraging?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I hope i t ' s r e a l . I haven't had
time t o be advised about the p r a c t i c a l impact o f i t i n the short run,
but perhaps i t w i l l have a psychological impact. I would t h i n k these
f i g h t s between the Serbs and the Bosnia Muslims and the Croats, they
go back so many c e n t u r i e s , they have such powerful r o o t s t h a t i t may
be t h a t i t ' s more d i f f i c u l t f o r the people on the ground t o make a
change i n t h e i r p o l i c y than f o r the leaders. And so I t h i n k i t may
be t h a t over the next several days some change can be e f f e c t e d on the
ground. And i f i t i s a genuine e f f o r t by Mr. M i l o s e v i c , than of
course I would be q u i t e happy about t h a t , and w e ' l l see what we can
do w i t h i t .
END
4:46 A.M. EDT
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United States Department of State
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Phone: (202)647-2492
Fax: (202)647-0244
TO: hlfrptu E
FROM:
DATE:
Srtva^
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Message
Following this cover sheet, there will be ^
pages
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BC-YUGOSLAVIA-CHRISTOPHER 2NDLD
CHRISTOPHER SEEKS PUNITIVE MEASURES AGAINST SERBS (Eds5 updates
throughout, previous Bruasela)
By Alan Eisner
BONN, May 6, Reuter - U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher
vowed an Thursday to concentrate efforts to end the war i l T ^ S W ^ ™
exclusively on punitive meaaursa against the Serbs and said he was no
longe^|iurs\njn3^aU.N. peace plan^
"
Christopher, spe5TttTrg 'TfEer meeting German Chancellor Helmut Kohl
and Foreign Minister Klaus Kirkel, said the f a i l u r e of the self-styled
Bosnian Serb parliament to back the peace plan meant that pption was
now clofifid.
'
TVCT^r—— —
—^VxThe focus now w i l l be solely on what we might do to demise some
more effective actions to take against the Bosnian Serbs," he said.
'*Until today we were basically discussing tvo different tracks.
Now, we're focusing on a single track.'
But he dismissed speculation that he might extend his European
t r i p beyond Friday, saying President B i l l Clinton had instructed him
to complete his mission and return home at the weekend to report to
the White House.
This meant an international consensus was unlikely to emerge
quickly on what to do about the war. The United States has vowed not
to act unilaterally and i t s European a l l i e s s t i l l seem far from
backing the tough military action i t i s proposing.
However, the Bosnian Serb decision not to approve the plan devised
by mediators Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen strengthened Christopher's
hand.
He l e f t Washington l a s t weekend with the aim of lining up European
support for military action against the Bosnian Serbs and l i f t i n g an
arms embargo against the mainly Moslem government.
He found tne Europeans unprepared to discuss military measures and
pinning their hopes on the Bosnian Serb assembly. Those hopes were
dashed In the early hours of Thursday when the parliament f a i l e d to
endorse the Vance-owen plan.
Kinkel said the international community should use " a l l possible
pressure on the Serbs because that seems to be the only means to which
they respond.''
Christopher said h i s talks in Bonn were "unusually helpful and
f u l l of understanding.'' However, Germany's constitution precludes i t s
participation in military action against the Serbs.
E a r l i e r in Brussalc, Christopher also won backing from NATO
Secretary-General Manfred Woerner. He then met European Community
o f f i o i a l s , who told him they were reluctant to scrap the arms embargo
and allow arms shipments to Bosnia's Moslems.
Christopher appeared anxious not to allow the Bosnian Serb
decision to c a l l a referendum on the peace plan to be used as an
exousQ to delay further international action.
He called the referendum decision '^another cynical ploy,'' saying
the aggressors i n the war had no right to dictate the future of
-
r
7
Bosnia.
"The deaieion of the so-called parliament l a s t night makes a
mockery of their signatures in Athens and does a grave disservice to
�05/06/83
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a l l the people of Bosnia," he said.
Christophec planned a three-hour v i s i t t s Rome on Friday before
returning •to Washington.
REUTER AE PAE Reuti3:53 CS-06
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18:31.
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B N GR A Y
ON EMN
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office at the Spokesman
(Bonn, Germany)
REMARKS BY
U.S. SECRETHRY O " STATE WARREN CHRISTOPHER
F
AND
GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER KLAUS XINKEL
Garnian Foreign Ministry
May 6, 1593
FOREIGN MINISTER KINKEL: Ladies and gentlemen, thank ycu vary
mucn for your intsreat. Thank ycu for having come here
tonight. We've Juat cone from an hoL-r and a naif of talMs with
tne Federal Chancellor. Tn that hour and a half :he American
Secretary af State was so kind to r t o s i t to us about nig tcur
to several European countries. I should like to use this
opoortunlty to welcome you catdially again to Germany and to
the Federal Foreign Office. He reported to us about the talks
he had in Russia and about tne talus that, he had in erussala
today. He's Just coirie from Brussal* actually to Bonn. We have
discussed a l l the questions, the issues that come UD in tha
content of the former Yugoslavia, and 4a have reached aareement
on a l l important issues. We w i l l now continue our talks and
discussions here in the Federal Foreign Ministry. And
therafore, I snould like to ask your understanding far the fact
that, right now. we have no intention whatsoever to A£ into the
details or individual issues. We hava, as we have dme in the
past, agreed on that the things that happen in the former
Yugoslavia are Indeed terrible things, terrible crimes, and we
hava daolored very much the fact that tne Sarb-proclaimed
Serbian-Bosnian parliament has refused to agree to ihe
signature by Karadzic to the vanee-Cwen Plan, We also aoree,
as we have done In the pest, on that sanctions should continue
to apply, and tnat we should make use of a l l possible pressure
on the Serbs because tnat saarcs to be the only means to which
they veiict. Further details about the talks, that we are no*
going to have w i l l be made available to you later on.
SECRETARY OF STATE CHRISTOPHER: I w i l l only say a few words
and then we'll take your auestians. I am very oleased to be
hers in 3onn. I find the dealings with the Germar, government
to be particularly satisfying, and this one was unusually
helpful and f u l l of understanding.
As the Foreign Minister has
said, we have a wide range of agreement on subjects tnat we
discussed today. I thinK that we s t i l l have some convsrsations
as to rieeoer details about the matters, but tnere i s 6 ^ign
degree of convergence on our views about our aopr&isai of the
situation, and best be done. So I thank the Foreign Minister
for receiving
so warmly and, of course, the Chancellor. :
am grateful for 4 cfiance to be with nim for 90 minutes or so.
fflcoi
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- 2 Press: Mr. Secretary, given the fact that the German
confititution pravanta out-of-area participation in
peace-keeping CDerations, what do you want the Germans to do to
participate in any action against the Serbs?
Secrgtary of State: Let me sey that the German government has
already been as helpful as i t could be within the limits of
their constitution. They participated in air drops, they
participated in connection with the no-fly zone, they are
involved
in th- AWACS s u r v e i l l a n c e Of former Yugoslavia.
They
have been very actively involved in the sanctions enforcement
so i t isn't as i f they were completely on the sidelines i f we
look for their added involvement here, particulary in the
enforcement of the sanctions, but beyond that in the areas that
are within the scope of President Clinton's recomirendations
that we think they can be oarticulaxy helpful because of their
relationships with others who are close to the situation. I
think that we found them to be a mast useful oartnsr in the
discussion of the matter, in trying to analyze ways in which
they might te helpful with others closer to the situation, i
don't want tp be nore specific than that, hut I thinK i t is
chat role of being helpful to the United States in crying to
carry out the aims of President Clinton's program that they
will be most helpful.
Press: Mr. Secretary, do you have fresh instructions' from
President Clinton on the consuItation orocess in what you would
call i t s intensificetion?
Sec: I talked to President Clinton on the telephone this
afternoon and he instructed me to continue on ths track that we
began last Saturday, to complata i t with rasolve and
determination and to ifeturn hone and talk with hin and thjt is
what 1 intend to do. So there are no differart instructions,
simply * confirmation of his determination that I move forward
in the way that we had decided last Saturday and continue now
with this being the only track that is relevant at the present
time.
Press: Mr. Secretiiiy, you indicated this morning that you felt
there was a need to intensify your diplomatic efforts. I t
sounds as though you are just wrapoing tham up and going home.
How is there an intensification?
�05/08/23
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BOCU
- 3 Sec: 8y intensify I thlnK, tnat I mean that the focua now will
he solely on what *e might ao to try to devise some more
effective action to take against the Bosnian Seros. Until
today w were basically discussing two different tracks, n w w
e
o e
^re focusing o a single track, so I think the intensification
n
is primarily in the increased focus. I intend not only to wrap
up m consultation, but to De in touch hy telephone with many
y
of those who I talked with in tne course of the earlier part of
the consultation to see what their reaction is to the svents
that took place overnight. You know, I thought when i came
here to Germany tne Questions would be primarily for the
Foreign Minister and I think he ought to feal a l i t t l e left
out.
Mr. Foreign Minister, does Germany support i f necessary tne use
of force by allied powers against the Bosnisn Serbs?
FM:
Interprster: As I said earliar on w have discussed a l l the
e
important Questions touching upon the issue on the former
Yugoslavia with the federal Chancellor an hour and a half ago.
What w also touched upon what is legally speaking possible "or
e
us and w have done everything that is legally speaking,
e
possible for us in everything that w are capable of doing w
e
e
have done i t so fine w have every intention of continuing to
e
do so in close harmonization with our American friends and with
our Eurooean partners.
Thank you very nuch.
�THE WHITE HOUSE
O f f i c e of t h e Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
May 6, 1993
REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
TO THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK CONFERENCE
The J.w. M a r r i o t t
Washington, DC
11:02
A.M. EDT
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. Good morning
everyone. I'm d e l i g h t e d t o see a l l o f you here i n such large
numbers. I want t o thank my good f r i e n d , Ken Brody, f o r i n v i t i n g me
t o come and speak w i t h you f o r a few moments. He's t h e PresidentDesignate of t h e Ex-Im Bank. That's a d e l i c a t e way of saying t h a t i t
takes a long time t o get confirmed i n today's Washington.
(Laughter.) I know a l i t t l e about t h a t i n another context.
(Laughter.)
I have thought a good deal about what I wanted t o say t o
you today about the subject which b r i n g s you here. I hope you w i l l
understand i f I ask f o r a few moments t o address t h e s i t u a t i o n i n
Bosnia f i r s t , not only because t h e n a t i o n a l press i s here, but
because you are very much a p a r t of t h e world which w i l l be a f f e c t e d
by what happens there and how t h a t impacts our f r i e n d s and neighbors
i n Europe and p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e Mediterranean area.
Over t h e past week we saw some very encouraging progress
toward a negotiated settlement o f the t r a g i c c o n f l i c t i n BosniaHercegovina.
Two of the three Bosnian p a r t i e s signed the Vance-Owen
agreement. The t h i r d p a r t y , t h e Bosnian Serbs, signed contingent on
approval by t h e i r s e l f - s t y l e d parliament. Progress u n f o r t u n a t e l y was
stopped by the Bosnian Serb assembly's de f a c t o r e j e c t i o n yesterday
of t h e Vance-Owen agreement. Their a c t i o n i s a grave disappointment
t o a l l of us who seek an early and peaceful r e s o l u t i o n t o what has
been a very b r u t a l c o n f l i c t . I t abrogates the e a r l i e r approval of
the peace plan by the Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic.
Their c a l l f o r a referendum on t h e peace plan can only
be seen as a delaying t a c t i c t o f u r t h e r consolidate t h e gains they
have made because of the enormous advantage they have i n heavy
a r t i l l e r y coming as i t does from the former Yugoslav army. I t
ignores the r e a l i t y t h a t everybody else i n the world has recognized
sooner or l a t e r , an enduring peace can only come from good f a i t h
n e g o t i a t i o n s t h a t lead t o a peace plan acceptable t o a l l the p a r t i e s .
The i n t e r n a t i o n a l community, I b e l i e v e , must not allow
the Serbs t o s t a l l progress toward peace and continue b r u t a l assaults
on innocent c i v i l i a n s . We've seen too many t h i n g s happen, and we do
have fundamental i n t e r e s t s t h e r e , not only t h e United States, but
p a r t i c u l a r l y the United States as a member of the world community.
The Serbs' actions over t h e past year v i o l a t e t h e
p r i n c i p l e t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y - r e c o g n i z e d borders must not be
v i o l a t e d or a l t e r e d by aggression from w i t h o u t . Their actions
t h r e a t e n t o widen the c o n f l i c t and f o s t e r i n s t a b i l i t y i n other p a r t s
of Europe i n ways t h a t could be exceedingly damaging. And t h e i r
savage and c y n i c a l ethnic cleansing offends the world's conscience
and our standards of behavior.
MR
OE
�- 2 -
Therefore, I have t h i s morning d i r e c t e d Secretary
Christopher t o continue t o pursue h i s c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h our a l l i e s
and f r i e n d s i n Europe and Russia on tougher measures which can be
taken c o l l e c t i v e l y — not by the United States alone, but
c o l l e c t i v e l y — t o make c l e a r t o the Serbs t h a t we are embarked on a
course of peace and they are embarked on a c o s t l y course.
The vote l a s t n i g h t simply makes t h i s Christopher
mission more important. Secretary Christopher w i l l be i n s i s t e n t t h a t
the time has come f o r the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community t o u n i t e and t o act
q u i c k l y and d e c i s i v e l y . America has made i t s p o s i t i o n c l e a r and i s
ready t o do i t s p a r t . But Europe must be w i l l i n g t o act w i t h us.
We
must go forward together.
Your presence here — your understanding of the
importance of exports t o America's f u t u r e , t o the blending of our
n a t i o n and our c u l t u r e and our values w i t h those of like-minded
persons throughout the world should only r e i n f o r c e our determination
t o c o n f i n e , inasmuch as the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community can p o s s i b l y
confine, savage act of inhumanity t o people s o l e l y because of t h e i r
e t h n i c i t y or t h e i r r e l i g i o n ; and t o confine i n s o f a r as we p o s s i b l y
can as an i n t e r n a t i o n a l community the a b i l i t y of one country t o
invade another and upset i t s borders; and c e r t a i n l y t o t r y t o confine
t h i s c e n t u r i e s - o l d s e r i e s of ethnic and r e l i g i o n s enmities t o the
narrowest p o s s i b l e geographical boundaries.
That i s what we seek. Not t o act alone, not t o act
r a s h l y , not t o do t h i n g s which would draw the United States i n t o a
c o n f l i c t not of i t s own making and not of i t s own a b i l i t y t o resolve,
but simply concerted a c t i o n t h a t the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community can and
should take t o deal w i t h these issues.
I ' l l have more t o say about i t l a t e r , but i n view of
what happened today, I thought I ought t o say t h i s .
For 59 years, since President F r a n k l i n Roosevelt created
i t t o help increase f o r e i g n a i d and t r a d e w i t h the Soviet Union, the
Ex-Im Bank has a s s i s t e d United States companies t o s e l l more than
$270 b i l l i o n i n our exports a l l around the world. And now the Bank's
r o l e i n h e l p i n g our economy and helping our exports has never been
more important. You are the people who generate an enormous p o r t i o n
of our high-wage, high-growth jobs. Without expanding our exports,
t h i s country cannot grow — cannot grow economically and cannot
create more jobs.
I n the g l o b a l economy which we now are shaped by we see
a c r i t i c a l p a r t of every economy's f u n c t i o n i n g i s r e l a t e d t o i t s
l e v e l of p r o d u c t i v i t y , e s p e c i a l l y i n the export sector. We also know
t h a t America has some s p e c i a l problems e n t i r e l y of our own making
without regard t o what we may or may not t h i n k of every aspect of our
trade p o l i c y . We have r e l a t i v e l y low savings and investment.
We
have an enormous budget d e f i c i t , which we ran up not i n i n v e s t i n g i n
productive investments at home t h a t would produce l a t e r wealth, but
l a r g e l y i n i n c r e a s i n g consumption.
Indeed, f o r the l a s t f i v e years, the s p i r a l i n g growth of
the government's d e f i c i t has been r e l a t e d almost e n t i r e l y t o paying
more f o r t h e same healzh care and t o bigger and bigger i n t e r e s t
payments on accumulated debt. This i s a t e r r i b l e burden on the
economic performance of t h i s country as w e l l as on our f u t u r e .
F i n a l l y , we have — as I s a i d e a r l i e r , i n p u t t i n g more
of our government's money t o h e a l t h care, we've also seen more
p r i v a t e s e c t o r d o l l a r s go t o health care, so t h a t now we are spending
35 percent more of our n a t i o n a l treasure on h e a l t h care than any
other n a t i o n i n the world, imposing s i g n i f i c a n t new burdens on
American businesses as they seek t o compete w i t h i n the American
market and beyond the American market.
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We now, t h e r e f o r e , face an i n t e r e s t i n g set of
challenges, p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r a country used t o l o o k i n g f o r simple
answers and d e a l i n g w i t h one issue at a time. That i s , indeed, one
of the great debates i n which I am engaged here. Some people say,
w e l l , you j u s t ought t o do one t h i n g , j u s t reduce the d e f i c i t , no
matter what. For the l a s t 12 years we were on a t r a c k t h a t , at l e a s t
at e l e c t i o n time, was focused on one t h i n g — j u s t lower taxes, no
matter what. Never mind what happens t o the d e f i c i t . Never mind
what happens t o the investment of the country. Never mind what
happens t o the long-term economic h e a l t h .
Do we need t o reduce the d e f i c i t ? Yes, we do. Do we
also need a t a r g e t e d program of investment i n the education and
t r a i n i n g of the American work f o r c e and i n the technologies t h a t w i l l
shape t h i s economy i n t o the future? Yes, we do. Do we have anything
so f a r t o replace the steep, steep cuts i n defense spending which
have gone t o the very heart of a l o t of our high-wage, high-tech
economy, w i t h many s p i n - o f f s b e n e f i t t i n g the commercial economy t o
date? No, we don't. But we need a technology p o l i c y and a defense
conversion p o l i c y t h a t attempts t o replace t h a t . So we need t o b r i n g
down the d e f i c i t and we need a t a r g e t program of investments i n jobs
technology and t r a i n i n g .
And t h i r d l y , I would argue t h a t we w i l l never reduce the
d e f i c i t t o zero and never r e s t o r e fundamental h e a l t h t o t h i s economy
u n t i l we address the h e a l t h care c r i s i s i n terms of p r o v i d i n g
s e c u r i t y t o Americans and c o n t r o l l i n g the cost. And t h a t i s
obviously a b i g p a r t of what we're about up here.
I do not believe we should be forced i n t o the f a l s e
choice of saying we must do one or the other. I n the past, our
governments have come t o people saying, w e l l , w e ' l l j u s t spend money
and solve your problems f o r you. Or w e ' l l j u s t cut taxes and solve
your problems f o r you. Today, we have t o have a much more
d i s c i p l i n e d and coherent approach t h a t says we are going t o b r i n g the
d e f i c i t down, we are going t o t a r g e t investments and technology and
t r a i n i n g , and we are going t o do something about the h e a l t h care
c r i s i s . But we must have an economic p o l i c y t h a t i s more than
investments, t h a t involves doing the r i g h t things w i t h technology
p o l i c y , the r i g h t t h i n g s w i t h defense conversion, the r i g h t t h i n g s
w i t h the Ex-Im Bank, the r i g h t t h i n g s t o expand our commitment t o
exports. Indeed, the economy, I t h i n k , must continue t o be the
number one p r i o r i t y of our country, and t h e r e f o r e , the number one
p r i o r i t y of t h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .
The work t h a t exporters and the Ex-Im Bank do t o expand
jobs and growth i s fundamentally important, because every time we
s e l l $1 b i l l i o n of American products and services overseas, we create
about 20,000 jobs. I n a l l , more than seven m i l l i o n Americans c l e a r l y
owe t h e i r jobs t o exports. And because those workers i n exportr e l a t e d jobs make about 17 percent more than the average worker, we
need more of those jobs.
I have t h i s chart here I wanted t o show. I t ' s the only
one I brought today. I'm t r y i n g t o r e s i s t my p o l i c y wonk impulses.
(Laughter.) But I do want t o — you can't see i t over there — i t
shows t h a t i n a l l i n d u s t r i e s , e x p o r t - r e l a t e d jobs have average hourly
wages of $11.69 as compared w i t h $10.02 f o r nonexport-related jobs.
I n manufacturing, the f i g u r e s are v i r t u a l l y the same — $11.93 t o
$10.83. And i n services, the margin i s ever bigger — $11.30 t o
$9.83. I t i s c l e a r , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t one of the answers t o the wage
s t a g n a t i o n which has gripped the American economy f o r almost 20 years
now w i t h most hourly-wage workers i n the country working longer work
weeks f o r stagnant or lower wages — one of the answers t o t h a t i s t o
increase our exports.
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I n the l a s t f i v e years, exports have accounted f o r
almost h a l f o f our nation's economic growth. Goods and services
exports made up 10.7 percent of our GDP i n 1992, up d r a m a t i c a l l y from
only 7.5 percent i n 1985, j u s t seven years e a r l i e r .
Your work i s important, because i f U.S. technology,
whether i t i s r e l a t e d t o the environment, energy, t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , or
telecommunications, i s t o secure i t s preeminence i t must have a
g l o b a l reach. Only w i t h world markets can we a f f o r d the research and
development t o stay competitive. Export expansion obviously
encourages our most advanced i n d u s t r i e s . I am committed t o promoting
these exports, and t h a t ' s where the Ex-Im Bank plays an important
role.
I n F i s c a l Year 1992, the Ex-Im Bank f o s t e r e d more than
one quarter o f a m i l l i o n American jobs t h a t we an outgrowth o f t h e
Bank's support f o r $14 b i l l i o n i n exports. That's p r e t t y impressive,
but i t won't be enough j u s t t o hold our own ground. I know we can
top t h a t by strengthening the partnership between our government and
the p r i v a t e sector through the Ex-Im Bank.
I t ' s helped t o send abroad everything from machine t o o l s
to computer software. I t ' s been a t the f o r e f r o n t o f the new export
i n d u s t r y t h a t our Vice President has championed, t h e environmental
i n d u s t r y — one t h a t i s so important t h a t I have d i r e c t e d Commerce
Secretary Ron Brown t o work w i t h the Ex-Im Bank, the EPA, and t h e
Department o f Energy t o c r a f t a n a t i o n a l s t r a t e g y f o r environmental
exports. These e f f o r t s w i l l not only help t o clean up the p l a n e t ,
they w i l l p u t a l o t more Americans t o work.
We have several environmental services exporters w i t h us
here today. One of them, Harza Engineering o f Chicago, helped a
r u r a l community i n Venezuela t o f i g h t o f f t h e t h r e a t of cholera and
other diseases by channeling a f r e s h water supply. At t h e same time
i t created more than a thousand jobs f o r Americans. That's j u s t one
case among many.
We want t o increase e x p o n e n t i a l l y these successes i n a l l
areas o f exports. We can also make ourselves more competitive by
s t r e a m l i n i n g our programs, an a c t i o n long overdue. Right now, there
are more than 150 d i f f e r e n t export promotion programs i n more than 10
agencies.
They are tangled l i k e a b a l l of yarn. And our goal i s t o
untangle them.
We want t o end the d u p l i c a t i o n and overlap t o make sure
a l l these programs are customer-driven. We want our guide t o be the
needs of t h e exporters and the lenders.
Our v e h i c l e t o a coherent export promotion plan w i l l be
the Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee, an interagency group
created by t h e Congress l a r g e l y through the e f f o r t s of Senator Don
Riegle. The Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown c h a i r s the group, which
has been meeting d a i l y . And once he i s confirmed, Ken w i l l also have
hands-on involvement i n t h a t e f f o r t .
With the Department o f Commerce and the Trade Promotion
Coordinating Committee, Ex-Im w i l l help lead the way toward
developing an export m e n t a l i t y throughout our government and
throughout our n a t i o n . At t h e same time, t h e Bank w i l l become more
of an a c t i v e consumer-friendly Bank, one t h a t w i l l get more a t t e n t i o n
— give more a t t e n t i o n t o small and medium-sized businesses. For
every a p p l i c a n t , the Bank w i l l aim t o bypass unnecessary red tape.
Right now, i t takes the s t a f f about s i x months t o
process a p r e l i m i n a r y commitment a p p l i c a t i o n and only one i n s i x such
p r e l i m i n a r y commitment leads t o an actual export sale. But w i t h new
procedures t h e Bank w i l l be able t o respond t o most requests w i t h i n
seven days. Now, t h a t ' s r e i n v e n t i n g government.
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The s t a f f w i l l be able t o process more cases and support
more r e a l deals. I n short, the Ex-Im Bank w i l l use b e t t e r management
measures t o do more without spending more. I n these days of d e f i c i t
reduction, the Bank w i l l have t o l i v e w i t h i n i t s means l i k e a l l other
government agencies. But Ken has assured me t h a t he has a number of
ways t o make your tax d o l l a r s work harder and more e f f e c t i v e l y .
What we do domestically and how we do i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y
are inseparable. As I said e a r l i e r i n my remarks, as the Ex-Im Bank
b u i l d s exports markets abroad, we have t o do more t o assure t h a t our
workers are equipped w i t h the s k i l l s t h a t they need. The average
worker w i l l now change jobs e i g h t times i n a l i f e t i m e . We have t o do
a b e t t e r j o b of t h e i r education and t r a i n i n g .
We need t o become b e t t e r students of economics. The o l d
ways of doing business simply don't t r a n s l a t e i n t o r e a l i t y today.
One of the f i r s t things I d i d when I became President was t o
e s t a b l i s h a National Economic Council. I t j u s t made good sense t o
me.
We had a National Security Council t h a t met w i t h the President
on a r e g u l a r basis t o deal w i t h s e c u r i t y issues, but a g r e a t deal of
our s e c u r i t y i s i n the economic area. And there was no r e g u l a r
d i s c i p l i n e mechanism by which a l l the economic decisions were
considered i n terms of t h e i r impact on one another; and the United
States could develop a coherent p o l i c y .
Today, we have t h a t mechanism, and i t works.
w e l l and we're working hard t o make i t work b e t t e r .
I t works
One of the reasons I was so g r a t i f i e d t o get
congressional approval of the o v e r a l l budget plan t h a t I presented i n
record time — i t was the f i r s t time i n 17 years t h a t Congress had
passed a budget r e s o l u t i o n w i t h i n the l e g a l mandate — which reduces
the d e f i c i t by over $500 b i l l i o n , through spending cuts and tax
increases and there w i l l be not be one w i t h o u t the other, I can t e l l
you t h a t . I'm not about t o r a i s e your taxes unless the spending cuts
are there f i r s t — there w i l l be no budget without both.
(Applause.)
This i s very important i n the export area. I can't t e l l
you how many years — you probably know t h i s as w e l l as I do — how
many years the United States would show up a t some meeting of the G7 or another i n t e r n a t i o n a l meeting and a l l of our t r a d i n g partners
w i l l spend a l l t h e i r time t e l l i n g us t h a t we ought t o get our
f i n a n c i a l house i n order, we ought t o b r i n g our d e f i c i t down, we
ought t o do something t o clean up our own backyard before we l e c t u r e d
our t r a d i n g partners about changes i n p o l i c y .
But now we're i n a d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n . When I go t o the
G-7 meeting i n J u l y i n Tokyo the United States w i l l be a success
s t o r y i n the making.
For s t a r t e r s , we have a responsible budget
plan t h a t does reduce the d e f i c i t . Our i n t e r e s t r a t e s , as a r e s u l t ,
have f a l l e n i n many areas t o h i s t o r i c lows, a l l o w i n g American
homeowners and businesses t o refinance w i t h ways t h a t , i f we can keep
these r a t e s down f o r a year, v i r t u a l l y a l l economists concede w i l l
put $100,000 b i l l i o n - p l u s back i n t o t h i s economy, simply because of
lower i n t e r e s t r a t e s .
In t h i s room today I bet there are scores of people who
have refinanced t h e i r home mortgages or been able t o have lower
business loans as a r e s u l t of these i n t e r e s t r a t e s . This i s the
u l t i m a t e stimulus f o r the American economy i f we can pass the budget
t h a t reduces the d e f i c i t and keep these r a t e s down. I t i s very, very
important.
When we can p o i n t t o these accomplishments i t makes i t
much easier f o r us t o work w i t h the Japanese i n g e t t i n g them t o
s t i m u l a t e t h e i r economy and buy more exports. I t makes i t much
easier f o r us t o argue t o our f r i e n d s i n Germany t h a t i t ' s a good
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t h i n g t o keep b r i n g i n g i n t e r e s t r a t e s down. I t makes i t easier t o
t r y t o help work together w i t h a coordinated economic p o l i c y t o l i f t
the world out of the economic stagnation t h a t we now see i n Europe
and the P a c i f i c , as w e l l as i n North America.
These t h i n g s are very, very important. But there i s
more t h a t we have t o do. A f t e r seven years of t a l k s , I would very
much l i k e t o see a successful completion of the Uruguay Round of the
GATT by December the 15th. World economic p r o s p e r i t y depends on i t .
I t ' s the foundation of the g l o b a l t r a d i n g system. A few days ago, I
met w i t h the Finance M i n i s t e r s and the Central Bankers of the G-7
nations and I t o l d them t h a t the United States was prepared t o make
e x t r a o r d i n a r y e f f o r t s t o complete the Uruguay Round successfully —
t h a t we were w i l l i n g t o go the e x t r a mile i n doing t h a t , but we
needed t h e i r help and support. And I hope we w i l l get i t .
The GATT agreement would be a b l e s s i n g f o r the United
States exporters because i t w i l l lower f o r e i g n t a r i f f s , curb
subsidies t h a t t i l t the p l a y i n g f i e l d , and strengthen the p r o t e c t i o n
of i n t e l l e c t u a l p r o p e r t y , the p i r a c y of which costs our companies
about $60 b i l l i o n a year. I n the GATT and i n a l l of our trade t a l k s ,
we have put our t r a d i n g partners on n o t i c e t h a t I expect access t o
t h e i r markets comparable t o the access we want t o extend t o them.
But we welcome f o r e i g n products and services and investments here, as
long as our products, services, and investments have a chance t o be
welcomed i n other c o u n t r i e s as w e l l . I t ' s f a i r and i t ' s good
business.
These are the p r i n c i p l e s t h a t w i l l underscore not only
our m u l t i l a t e r a l , but our b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s as w e l l . With the
r i g h t markets a t home and the r i g h t r u l e s i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l markets,
our export o p p o r t u n i t i e s are v i r t u a l l y l i m i t l e s s .
I want t o say a s p e c i a l word about our o p p o r t u n i t i e s i n
our own backyard i n L a t i n America. L a t i n America i s r e i n i n g i n i t s
debt and what i s emerging from a more stable economy i s a populace
clamoring f o r consumer products and entrepreneurs who are shopping
f o r c a p i t a l goods. I t ' s a market f o r our exports t h a t i s growing a t
three times the r a t e of any other market i n the world. That i s why I
s t r o n g l y support the North American Free Trade Agreement, w i t h the
supplemental agreements we are p r e s e n t l y n e g o t i a t i n g w i t h Canada and
Mexico r e l a t i n g t o l a b o r and the environment.
NAFTA w i l l help us t o unlock a market t h a t w i l l create
hundreds of thousands of high-paying jobs. And NAFTA, t h e r e f o r e , i s
a high p r i o r i t y f o r t h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . The reason i t i s so
c o n t r o v e r s i a l i s t h a t the American people have seen 12 years i n which
t h e i r wages have gone down and t h r e e years i n which we a c t u a l l y have
fewer p r i v a t e sector jobs. And everybody i s a f r a i d of change. But
the only way a r i c h country can grow r i c h e r i s by e x p o r t i n g more and
by having more p a r t n e r s and economic progress. And i f we can make
t h i s agreement w i t h Mexico work, then we can move forward t o the
other market economies of L a t i n America, t o Chile, t o Argentina, t o
any number of other nations who want t o be a p a r t of t h i s kind of
p a r t n e r s h i p . I t h i n k i t i s very, very important.
Just l i s t e n t o t h i s : Exports t o Canada already support
1.5 m i l l i o n American jobs. And i n the past f i v e years, the number of
American jobs t i e d t o Mexico have grown from 300,000 t o 700,000 jobs,
almost e x c l u s i v e l y because of the u n i l a t e r a l r e d u c t i o n of trade
r e s t r i c t i o n s by Mexico, which have allowed the volume of trade twoway t o go up, and the trade d e f i c i t t o be erased. These are very
encouraging signs. We p r o j e c t another 200,000 good jobs i f we can
have a successful implementation of the NAFTA process.
Mexico i s a valued customer f o r another reason. We also
b e l i e v e t h a t t h i s new economic t h i n k i n g , i f i t works, w i l l help t o
spread a l l across the developing world. We know t h a t there are an
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impressive array of p o l i t i c a l and economic leaders i n Mexico, and I
know t h a t the Secretary of Finance Pedro Aspe i s w i t h us today. I
want t o welcome him and extend my best wishes t o President Salinas
f o r our emerging partnership.
Outside t h i s hemisphere, I t h i n k we have t o look
i n c r e a s i n g l y t o the newly i n d u s t r i a l i z i n g countries of Asia. I know
we have someone here from Indonesia. Indonesia i s the f i f t h biggest
country i n the world. Indonesia i s now the leader of the nonaligned
nations. They have a r e s o l u t i o n on Bosnia a c t u a l l y being debated i n
the United Nations today. Maybe they can f i g u r e out how t o do a
b e t t e r job w i t h t h i s .
We have enormous o p p o r t u n i t i e s t h e r e . When I go t o the
G-7 meeting i n Japan, I'm going t o meet w i t h the President of
Indonesia t o send a signal t o the nonaligned n a t i o n s , t o the emerging
nations of the world, t h a t the United States wants t o be t h e i r
partner i n new trade r e l a t i o n s , t h a t there are a l l kinds of t h i n g s
t h a t we can continue t o do t h a t we have not done before.
(Applause.)
F i n a l l y , l e t me say j u s t a l i t t l e word about Russia.
The Bank i s now s e t t i n g out t o do what i t was o r i g i n a l l y set up t o do
because Russia may be able t o absorb i t s e f f o r t s .
To date, the Bank has approved $205 m i l l i o n i n f i n a l
commitments t o Russia. I t ' s working on an o i l and gas agreement
framework t h a t could support as much as $2 b i l l i o n i n American goods
and services f o r Russia's energy sector. As I t o l d President Y e l t s i n
when we met i n Vancouver, the United States once had a famous c i t i z e n
named W i l l i e Sutton who was asked why he was devoting h i s e n t i r e l i f e
t o robbing banks, and he said, because that's where the money i s .
(Laughter.) I n Russia, energy i s where the money i s . I f we can work
i t out, we can make a huge p a r t n e r s h i p there i n ways t h a t are
enormously b e n e f i c i a l f o r the American economy and good f o r the
Russians as w e l l .
At d i f f e r e n t junctures i n t h i s century, our country has
shown i t s e l f t o be a c a t a l y s t f o r g l o b a l reform. We have faced o f f
fascism and communism. We helped t o b u i l d the i n t e r n a t i o n a l
i n s t i t u t i o n s a f t e r World War I I t h a t made so many good t h i n g s happen
i n the noncommunist world, and now, because of the collapse of
communism are coming i n t o t h e i r own w i t h the r e a l p o t e n t i a l t o f u l l y
flower.
The world of tomorrow w i l l reward those of us who not
only have the values which made these i n s t i t u t i o n s p o s s i b l e , but
which behave i n ways t h a t w i l l be rewarded i n the hard g l a r e of
i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic competition.
I j u s t saw today another set of f i g u r e s showing t h a t i n
the f i r s t quarter of t h i s year, there was another huge increase i n
p r o d u c t i v i t y i n the American manufacturing sector. We want those
manufacturers who are increasing t h e i r p r o d u c t i v i t y . We want t h e i r
workers who are the source of t h a t increased p r o d u c t i v i t y t o be
rewarded. I am convinced t h a t the only way we can do i t i s by
opening markets t o the United States and g i v i n g the American people
the chance t o enjoy the b e n e f i t s , the f r u i t s of t h e i r labor and
g i v i n g other c o u n t r i e s the chance t o grow through mutual t r a d e and
development.
You are on the f r o n t l i n e s of t h a t . I came here t o
s a l u t e you and t o assure you t h a t through the Ex-Im Bank and every
other means a t t h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s command we w i l l do our best t o
have the k i n d of trade p o l i c y t h a t w i l l grow the American economy and
b e n e f i t the e n t i r e world.
Thank you very much.
END
(Applause.)
11:30 A.M.
EDT
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E.^."V£NT OF S.ATE .
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U.S. DtPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of tho Spokesman
(Brussels, Belgium)
RtMAKKS BY
U.S, SECRETARY OF STATE W R E CHRISTOPHER
ARN
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N
NATO SECRETAKY GENERAL MANFRED WOERNER
N T Hfiadquarcers
AO
May 6, 1993
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHERi Good morninfl. iHe decision of the
so-callod parliamRnt last night really makes a mockery of rhe
signatures in Athens. It's a gravo disservice to a l l the people
of Bosnia. I t makes a n r.ne more urgent m consultatione which
y
I intend to continue. I think there will bo a new tocus on
those consultationa today.
With respect to the proposed rgfarandum, T would not b« inclined
to invest i t with any leoirimacy. It looks to m like another
e
cynical ploy to accomplish delay while they ara roUina up
additional territory in Bosnia. I find tfte conduct really very
unuaual and I must say that I'm going to remain on tha track
that T started on at President Clinton's direction last Saturday
consulting with our allies about new, stronger, tougher
measures.
I've had a good conversation with the Secretary General about
these matters this morning. I must say he shares m view of the
y
seriousness of the overnight developments but ho certainly is
able to speak for himself. I thank him for his hospitality and
friendship, as always. Mr. Secretary rtaneral?
SECRETARY GENLKAL W E N R * Thank you, Mr. Secretary of State,
ORE.
we had a very in-depth discussion, exchange of views on tho
situation which is considered to be very aorioua and on possible
opt < ons.
Our member nations will have to consult here in NATO about
further steps, of course, we will stay in close contact with
the United Nations and l hope the international community win
now consider additional measures to come ro a solution which
stops this terrible war in former Yugoslavia. And, as the
Secretary of State. I a very disappointed by the vote and I
m
think i t i s a blow - - a severe blow
to the efforts to reach a
peaceful settlement, we have to continue our efforts. Thank
you very much.
�0 5.06.
' 92 0 6 • - i
'iC.
- i I '. 2 3 5 i
-5-
0: Mr. secretary, would you expect that this will have a
galvanizing effect on tho allies and that you will, in fact,
raach a consensus nn future military options against the Bosnian
Serfc-S?
SECRETARY CWRTSTOPHEK: well, based on my conversations that
I've had so far, and I've been about halfway through my trip
now, I would say that certainly last night's action will bring
into focus the Importance of taking decisions on new And
stronger measures. As long as the Vance-Owen plan had taken on
new l i f e with the decisions taken last Sunday in Athens, I think
people naturally wanted to focus on those as well as on the new
measures. Now, our focus win he very sftarp on the new,
stronger measures that President Clinton has asked mo to talk
with them about.
0: Mr. Secretary, why is i t not reasonable for the Bosnian Serb
parliament which is not so legitimate in and of itself, to ask
tho people -- the Serbian people -- to vote on this?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Well, in the first place, the Bosnian
Serb parliament gained a certain legitimacy from the fact that
the signature of Mr. Karadzic was expressly dependent on their
approval. The tact that they have disapproved makes null and
void hia signature in Athens by the terms of his signature. The
reason that I think that there is no
I wouldn't invest any
legir.lmacy in the referendum of the people, ic that the voting
population there, i t seems to me. has no right to determine the
future of Bosnia, no right to receive the approbation of the
international community. It's the group of aggressors voting to
decide what they want to do about, the future, so I'd
as I
say, I think it'S another ploy to gain delay and I , for ono,
will not be thrown off track by i t .
Q'
-
Is the Owen-Vance plan dead now, Secretary of State?
SECRETARY C.HRISTOPHKR: well, in the long run, this ia a matter
that will require an international settlement. It's not the
kind of a matter that nan be resolved without an international
ser.tiemenc. The Vance-Owen plan has carried the matter a long
ways forward, but at this point. I think we need co talk about
some stronger measures and we need to calk about some actions on
the ground that will bring to an end the aggression, AS many of
you know who have followed me around, I've been skeptical about
the vote of Che -- the decision last Cunday in Athena
skeptical about whether i t would have any real effect and I've
been looking for some determined action on the ground by the
Bosnian Serbs, we are s t i l l looking for that, we're s t i l l
looking for them to take some action thac shows they want to
bring this war to an end rather than continue the aggression.
Thank you very much. I'm late now for my next meeting.
# t #
3
A0£
�THE WHITE HOUSE
O f f i c e o f t h e Press S e c r e t a r y
For Immediate Release
May 5, 1993
REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
IN PHOTO OPPORTUNITY WITH BIPARTISAN LEADERSHIP
The Cabinet Room
11:00
A.M. EDT
Q
Mr. P r e s i d e n t , w i l l you be g o i n g t o Congress t o g e t
a u t h o r i z a t i o n b e f o r e any t r o o p s would be sent t o Bosnia?
THE PRESIDENT: We're here c o n s u l t i n g about Bosnia
today, and I have been e x t e n s i v e l y c o n s u l t i n g and no d e c i s i o n has
been made by t h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n about t h i s y e t . So when I do, t h e n
w e ' l l c o n t i n u e t o have proper process.
Q
Do you t h i n k t h e War Powers A c t i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ?
(Laughter.)
THE PRESIDENT: Ask my lawyer.
t h i n k i t ' s worked reasonably w e l l .
Q
I don't p l a y l a w y e r .
I
How do you t h i n k t h e v o t e w i l l go i n t h e Serb
parliament?
THE PRESIDENT: I don't know. I hope t h e y ' l l n o t o n l y
v o t e f o r i t , I hope t h e y ' l l observe i t , which i s two d i f f e r e n t
i s s u e s . We have t o s t a r t o u r meeting here i n a m i n u t e , b u t I t h i n k
one o f t h e t h i n g s t h a t we have t o d i s c u s s i s t h a t we want an
agreement i n words and an agreement i n f a c t . And t h a t ' s what we've
g o t t o watch.
i s saying?
Q
Are you f e e l i n g any c o m f o r t i n what Mr. C h r i s t o p h e r
I t sounds as though he's r u n n i n g i n t o r o a d b l o c k s .
THE PRESIDENT: No, I t a l k e d t o him s e v e r a l t i m e s s i n c e
he's been on t h e t r i p .
I'm p r e t t y pleased, a c t u a l l y , w i t h t h e
p r o g r e s s he's made. We're a l o t -- we're i n a much d i f f e r e n t p l a c e
and much n e a r e r agreement t h a n we were 10 o r 12 days ago.
Q
Have you and Senator Dole made up?
THE PRESIDENT:
what he s a i d y e s t e r d a y .
THE PRESS:
Absolutely.
(Laughter.)
I agree w i t h
Thank you.
END
11:10 A.M. EDT
�THE WHITE HOUSE
O f f i c e of the Press Secretary
For
Immediate Release
May 2, 1993
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
The developments i n the Vance/Owen process are a p o s i t i v e step,
but we have yet t o determine whether the Serbs are serious about
peace. We w i l l make t h a t judgement based upon t h e i r actions on
the ground i n Bosnia. As Lord Owen said t h i s morning, " e s t i l l
W
have a long way t o go."
Other agreements i n t h i s p r o t r a c t e d war have r a i s e d hopes but not
changed behavior. We w i l l judge i n t e n t i o n s by a c t i o n s .
Accordingly, I have i n s t r u c t e d Secretary Christopher t o continue
as planned w i t h h i s c o n s u l t a t i o n s through Europe on the measures
we w i l l take i f the Serbs do not a c t i n good f a i t h .
I have spoken i n the past two days w i t h a number o f Congressional
leaders as w e l l as President Y e l t s i n , Prime M i n i s t e r Major,
Chancellor Kohl, President M i t t e r r a n d , Prime M i n i s t e r Mulroney,
and Prime Minister-designate Ciampi. I w i l l continue such
consultations.
We a l l hope f o r a t r u e and j u s t peace i n Bosnia. I t must include
not only the provisions of peace on paper but also the p r a c t i c e s
of peace on the ground.
-30-
�w.n i wi •«nic
.'.an
iinyaj)/
0197074599
• ^ - 3-3J • ^ • 1 0
202 547 u122;# 2
U.S. D P R M N OF STATE
BA T B T
Office of the Spokesman
(London, United Kingdom)
For Iininediate Release
M y 2, 1993
a
JOINT U.S. - U K STATEMENT
..
The United States and the united Kingdom have a c m o approach
omn
cowards the fonner Yugoslavia and have agreed today on the
following points:
1. w warmly congratulate Lord O e and Mr. Cyrus Vance on the
e
wn
agreement signed today in Athens. The Bosnian parties
should n w show their genuine commitment and good faith by
o
coming to a cease-fire and implex anting the agreement
without delay.
2. we are developing a c m o position with our partners and
omn
allies on stronger measures to be taken if the Serbs fail to
implement the peace settlement. Several options are under
consideration, including military steps.
3. Our Governments plan further consultations with our other
partners and allies, including a meeting later this week
between the EC Foreign Ministers and the U.S. Secretary of
State.
w. All existing measures should remain in place. W shall work
e
with other governments to ensure vigorous enforcement of
sanctions, to maintain humanitarian aid, and to prevent the
spread of fighting.
# # #
�U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS
(London, U.K.)
STATEMENT OF
SECRETARY OF STATE W R E CHRISTOPHER
ARN
upon departure for Chevening
Sunday, May 2. 1993
Churchill Hotel, London
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: The news today from Athens is good news,
so far as i t goes. Being here in London, I can't help but
remember the signatures that were put on documents here before,
I can't help but remember tha broken promises and the horror and
killing thac followed that, so I greet i t with hope but with a
good deal of skepticism.
what really counts is what happens on the ground, whether
the killing stops, whether the shelling stops, whether aid is
permitted to get through, certainly those things are the aims
of the peace plan and we can hope with a geed deal of skepticism
as to whether thie is going to come about.
So my plan here today is to continue on the mission that
President Clinton sent me on to consult with our allies and to
try to work through the plans, because i t seems to me to be
Important that we stay on course and on track. I'm sorry, but
I'm late for my meeting with my British colleagues and I won't
be able to take any questions.
# # #
�THE WHITE HOUSE
O f f i c e o f t h e Press S e c r e t a r y
For Immediate Release
May 1, 1993
PRESS BRIEFING
BY
SECRETARY OF STATE WARREN CHRISTOPHER
The
1:35
B r i e f i n g Room
P.M. EDT
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Good a f t e r n o o n . Upon t a k i n g
o f f i c e , P r e s i d e n t C l i n t o n i n h e r i t e d a complex and t r a g i c s i t u a t i o n i n
t h e former Y u g o s l a v i a .
T h i s s i t u a t i o n has b e d e v i l e d t h e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l community now f o r almost two y e a r s .
I t ' s a problem
w i t h deep h i s t o r i c r o o t s .
I n t h e p o s t - C o l d War p e r i o d , t h e former
Yugoslavia has been t h e scene o f v i o l e n c e , t r a g e d y and outrageous
conduct.
The Presided has acted t o d e a l w i t h t h i s c o n f l i c t . We
have undertaken i n c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h o u r a l l i e s and f r i e n d s an
i n t e n s i v e d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t i n an a t t e m p t t o s o l v e t h e c r i s i s and
b r i n g some measure o f peace t o t h i s area.
Our a c t i v i t y t o date has been i n t e n s e along a number o f
fronts.
These i n c l u d e an a c t i v e d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t t h a t has helped t o
b r i n g two o f t h e t h r e e Bosnian p a r t i e s i n t o agreement on a peace
p l a n ; second, an e f f o r t t o save thousands o f l i v e s by way o f
h u m a n i t a r i a n programs, which i n c l u d e o u r a i r d r o p program, which has
now f u r n i s h e d more t h a n 2 m i l l i o n meals; t h i r d , passage o f a U.N.
r e s o l u t i o n t o e s t a b l i s h a war crimes t r i b u n a l ; f o u r t h , a U.N.
r e s o l u t i o n t o e n f o r c e a n o - f l y zone t o p r e v e n t t h e use o f a i r power
by t h e p a r t i e s t o t h e c o n f l i c t ; and f i f t h , an e x t r e m e l y r i g o r o u s
s a n c t i o n s r e s o l u t i o n a t t h e U n i t e d Nations t h a t went i n t o e f f e c t l a s t
Monday a t m i d n i g h t .
Under t h i s s a n c t i o n s regime, Serbia i s b e i n g t r e a t e d as
a p a r i a h s t a t e , v i r t u a l l y i s o l a t e d from t h e r e s t o f t h e w o r l d . Yet
t h e outrages have c o n t i n u e d i n t h e former Y u g o s l a v i a area.
I n the
face o f Serbian a g g r e s s i o n t h e P r e s i d e n t has been r i g o r o u s l y
r e v i e w i n g f u r t h e r o p t i o n s f o r a c t i o n d u r i n g t h e course o f t h e l a s t
week. He has been c o n s u l t i n g w i t h our a l l i e s and f r i e n d s i n t h e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l community, members o f Congress, h i s n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y
team, and t h e J o i n t C h i e f s o f S t a f f . He has been e x p l o r i n g
a d d i t i o n a l a c t i o n s t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community can t a k e t o respond t o
t h e v i o l e n c e , s t o p t h e a g g r e s s i o n and c o n t a i n t h e c o n f l i c t .
The P r e s i d e n t has j u s t completed a meeting w i t h h i s
p r i n c i p a l n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y a d v i s e r s . A t t h i s meeting t h e P r e s i d e n t
decided on t h e d i r e c t i o n t h a t he b e l i e v e s t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and t h e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l community should now t a k e i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n .
This
d i r e c t i o n i n v o l v e s a number o f s p e c i f i c recommendations, i n c l u d i n g
m i l i t a r y steps.
The P r e s i d e n t i s sending me t o Europe t o c o n s u l t w i t h
our a l l i e s and f r i e n d s on a course o f a c t i o n . T h i s problem i s a t t h e
h e a r t o f Europe's f u t u r e . Our e f f o r t s w i l l be undertaken w i t h our
p a r t n e r s . We're ready t o p l a y our p a r t , b u t o t h e r s must be as w e l l .
Along these l i n e s , I ' l l be l e a v i n g a t 9:00 p.m. t o n i g h t
t o engage i n these c o n s u l t a t i o n s . Over the next week I ' l l t r a v e l t o
B r i t a i n , France, Russia and Germany. I ' l l a l s o be t r a v e l i n g t o
MORE
�- 2 -
B r u s s e l s , where I ' l l c o n s u l t w i t h t h e S e c r e t a r y General o f NATO and
t h e Presidency o f t h e European Community.
I n these sessions I ' l l be conveying t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s
d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community should t a k e f u r t h e r
action.
I ' l l be c o n s u l t i n g w i t h o u r p a r t n e r s on t h e d i r e c t i o n t h e
P r e s i d e n t b e l i e v e s t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community should t a k e t o g e t h e r .
We must have a u n i f i e d and cohesive p o s i t i o n .
With r e s p e c t t o t h e s p e c i f i c d i r e c t i o n s t h a t I ' l l be
d i s c u s s i n g i n Europe, I t h i n k y o u ' l l understand t h a t p r i o r t o t h e
c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h our a l l i e s , I cannot d i s c u s s them w i t h you here i n
t h i s p u b l i c forum.
Let me c l o s e w i t h two i m p o r t a n t p o i n t s .
F i r s t , the
P r e s i d e n t and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a r e p u r s u i n g a d d i t i o n a l a c t i o n w i t h
our a l l i e s because we b e l i e v e t h a t t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e U n i t e d States
and t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community a r e a t s t a k e . There a r e , o f course,
i s s u e s o f conscience and h u m a n i t a r i a n concerns a t stake i n t h i s
situation.
But f u n d a m e n t a l l y our a c t i o n s a r e a l s o based upon t h e
s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . A l l o f us seek t o l i m i t
the r i s k o f a widening i n s t a b i l i t y t h a t could lead t o a g r e a t e r
Balkan war.
Second, as you know, t h e p a r t i e s t o t h e c o n f l i c t a r e
meeting i n Athens t h i s weekend w i t h S e c r e t a r y Vance and Lord Owen.
The Serbs know t h a t they exhausted t h e p a t i e n c e o f t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l
community. I t i s i n t h e i r i n t e r e s t t o t a k e c o n c r e t e a c t i o n s now t o
reach peace and t o do so w i t h o u t f u r t h e r d e l a y .
But I must underscore t h a t t h e y must do more t h a n j u s t
speak o u t , t h e y must do more than s i m p l y g i v e us a s i g n a t u r e on a
peace p l a n . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , we've heard t h e i r words and seen t h e
s i g n a t u r e s b e f o r e . I t w i l l t a k e deeds, immediate c o n c r e t e a c t i o n by
t h e Serbs, a c t i o n s on t h e ground t o convince t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l
community o f t h e i r seriousness and good f a i t h .
I'll
be g l a d t o t r y t o respond
Q
Mr. S e c r e t a r y , can you t e l l us — o b v i o u s l y , you've
had p r e l i m i n a r y c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h a l l i e s ; r e a l i s t i c a l l y do you t h i n k
y o u ' l l be a b l e t o f i n d a consensus based on what t h e P r e s i d e n t has
decided today?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Yes, I'm q u i t e h o p e f u l t h a t we
can f i n d a consensus. I t seems t o me t h a t o u r European a l l i e s and
f r i e n d s a r e l o o k i n g f o r w a r d t o these meetings. I t h i n k t h e y expect
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o o f f e r l e a d e r s h i p i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n . I have no
reason t o t h i n k t h a t my c o n s u l t a t i o n s t h e r e won't be w e l l r e c e i v e d .
And I have some c o n f i d e n c e t h a t we can reach a s i t u a t i o n o f u n i t y and
cohesion.
Q
You s a i d you c o u l d n ' t g i v e us d e t a i l s o f what was
decided today, b u t can you t e l l us whether a n y t h i n g was r u l e d o u t
s p e c i f i c a l l y i n v o l v i n g the embargo?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: What has been r u l e d o u t by t h e
P r e s i d e n t b e f o r e , as you know, i s f o r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o i n v o l v e
l a r g e numbers o f ground t r o o p s , except as ground t r o o p s might be
i n v o l v e d i n t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f a peace p l a n . That doesn't break
any new ground. What I have s a i d here i s s i m p l y t h e one t h i n g t h a t
we w i l l n o t be d i s c u s s i n g , but beyond t h a t we w i l l be d i s c u s s i n g a
v e r y wide range o f o p t i o n s i n t h e c o n t e x t , o f course, o f t h e
d i r e c t i o n s t h a t t h e P r e s i d e n t has g i v e n me today.
Q
Mr. S e c r e t a r y , do we understand you c o r r e c t l y t h a t
the P r e s i d e n t has taken t h e d e c i s i o n today t h a t w i l l i n v o l v e m i l i t a r y
MORE
�- 3-
-- p o t e n t i a l m i l i t a r y a c t i o n by American f o r c e s , b u t t h e Europeans
w i l l be i n f o r m e d o f t h i s d e c i s i o n b e f o r e t h e American people?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: The P r e s i d e n t has n o t taken any
f i n a l d e c i s i o n s . He has marked o u t some d i r e c t i o n s t h a t he wants t o
have c o n s u l t a t i o n s undertaken w i t h o u r European a l l i e s and our
f r i e n d s . A f t e r those meetings, I ' l l be r e t u r n i n g here t o t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s and a t t h a t t i m e be r e p o r t i n g t o t h e P r e s i d e n t and he w i l l
make f i n a l d e c i s i o n s based upon these c o n s u l t a t i o n s .
Q
American people?
So t h e Europeans w i l l be c o n s u l t e d b e f o r e t h e
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: The American people a r e b e i n g
c o n s u l t e d as we move along i n t h e s i t u a t i o n .
I t ' s being widely
d i s c u s s e d a l l over t h e U n t i e d S t a t e s , b u t you can understand t h a t
u n t i l we've reached a u n i f i e d and cohesive p o s i t i o n w i t h o u r European
a l l i e s t h a t t h e r e i s n o t h i n g t h a t we can p r o p e r l y announce a t t h e
present time.
Q
Have you changed t h e g o a l l i n e here f o r t h e Serbs
— t h e g o a l p o s t , because i t seems t h a t you're s a y i n g t h a t you need
more t h a n t h e s i g n a t u r e on a peace p l a n , t h a t you need c o n c r e t e
a c t i o n s on t h e ground? What s p e c i f i c a l l y a r e those . a c t i o n s t h a t you
want?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: The Serbs know w e l l t h e a c t i o n s
t h a t t h e y must t a k e t o s a t i s f y us i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n and s a t i s f y t h e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. They must honor t h e c e a s e - f i r e t h a t was
c a l l e d f o r i n t h e London accords.
They must s t o p bombing t h e c i t i e s
i n Bosnia. They must p e r m i t h u m a n i t a r i a n a i d t o go f o r w a r d . There's
no mystery and no s e c r e t about t h a t . The Serbs know what they must
do. What we're t i r e d o f i s s i m p l y t h e i r words and a c t i o n s and
manipulation.
Q
Mr. S e c r e t a r y , do t h e a l l i e s have v e t o power over
t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s plans?
What i f they say no? W i l l t h e P r e s i d e n t
change h i s plans?
And, number two, i f they do go a l o n g w i t h i t , when
would t h e a c t i o n a c t u a l l y begin?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: By no means do t h e a l l i e s have
v e t o power, b u t t h i s i s a m u l t i l a t e r a l s i t u a t i o n .
T h i s problem has
deep European r o o t s . The European c o u n t r i e s a r e a l r e a d y deeply
i n v o l v e d . They have ground f o r c e s i n Bosnia. I t ' s a s i t u a t i o n where
we want t o t a k e u n i f i e d a c t i o n w i t h Europe, and w e ' l l be d i s c u s s i n g
i t i n that context.
The second p a r t o f your q u e s t i o n had t o do w i t h t i m i n g ,
did i t ?
Yes, s i r .
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: I don't want t o e s t a b l i s h any
d e a d l i n e , b u t we understand t h e v i o l e n c e i s g o i n g ahead i n Bosnia.
We want t o move as b r i s k l y as we can. On t h e o t h e r hand, I t h i n k
i t ' s e s s e n t i a l we move w i t h d e l i b e r a t i o n here.
These a r e v e r y
i m p o r t a n t d e c i s i o n s . And, as you a l l know, t h e y a r e v e r y d i f f i c u l t
decisions.
Q
Mr. S e c r e t a r y , d i d you open up a new p o s s i b i l i t y of
u s i n g U.S. t r o o p s on t h e ground t o p i n p o i n t t h e Serbian p o s i t i o n s ,
because you used t h e phrase " r u l i n g o u t l a r g e numbers o f ground
t r o o p s . " What about s m a l l numbers?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: I don't want t o change what t h e
P r e s i d e n t has s a i d on t h a t s u b j e c t . We do n o t contemplate t h e use o f
ground f o r c e s except i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f a peace
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�- 4 -
p l a n t h a t was agreed t o i n good f a i t h -- a v i a b l e peace p l a n agreed
t o i n good f a i t h .
Q
What f o r c e s would be used t o p i n p o i n t t h e Serbian
positions?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: I'm n o t g o i n g t o g e t i n t o
d e t a i l e d m i l i t a r y o p t i o n s . I s i m p l y stand on my p r i o r statement w i t h
r e s p e c t t o ground f o r c e s .
Q
Mr. S e c r e t a r y , Lord Owen has s a i d i t would be
unwise t o use m i l i t a r y f o r c e a g a i n s t t h e Serbs a t t h i s j u n c t u r e , and
he s a i d t h a t t h e y a r e now c l o s e r t o a peace agreement t h a n t h e y have
been i n t h e l a s t e i g h t months. Do you share t h a t assessment?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: We're p r o c e e d i n g on o u r own
t r a c k here.
I t h i n k t h a t t h e P r e s i d e n t has been v e r y d e l i b e r a t e over
t h e l a s t 10 days i n moving toward a d e c i s i o n , which he's t a k e n today,
t o send me t o Europe and on t h e d i r e c t i o n s he wants t o have t h e
d i s c u s s i o n s t a k e i n Europe. We're n o t g o i n g t o be d i v e r t e d from
t h a t t r a c k . O b v i o u s l y , we're i n t e r e s t e d i n what's g o i n g on i n
Athens, b u t I t h i n k t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and i t s a l l i e s need t o c o n c e r t
t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n t h i s important s i t u a t i o n .
And l e t me say t h i s a l s o : I have n o t i c e d over t h e l a s t
s e v e r a l months t h a t I have been i n o f f i c e t h a t t h e Serbs t e n d t o
respond when t h e y t h i n k t h a t something might be done by t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s and t h e i r a l l i e s o f a s e r i o u s c h a r a c t e r . I'm n o t — I don't
t h i n k i t ' s an e n t i r e l y — a c o i n c i d e n c e t h a t t h e y ' r e back a t t h e
b a r g a i n i n g t a b l e now as we approach these d e c i s i o n s . So we're going
t o s t a y on t r a c k . We're g o i n g t o c o n t i n u e o u r course.
Q
Mr. S e c r e t a r y , do you see your r o l e i n Europe as
s e l l i n g t h i s s t r a t e g y t o t h e European a l l i e s , o r s o l i c i t i n g t h e i r
i n p u t t o amend t h i s s t r a t e g y ?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: I c e r t a i n l y am g o i n g t o t r y t o
persuade t h e a l l i e s t h a t t h e d i r e c t i o n s t h e P r e s i d e n t has l a i d down
are ones t h a t t h e y ought t o embrace. That's p a r t o f my t a s k as being
S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e and engaging i n these c o n s u l t a t i o n s .
Q
Mr. S e c r e t a r y , you have on s e v e r a l occasions
p o i n t e d o u t t h i s i s a deep and h i s t o r i c a l c o n f l i c t t h a t ' s g o i n g on.
And today you p o i n t o u t t h a t i t ' s a l s o i n t h e s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t o f
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o g e t i n v o l v e d here. Most people don't understand
why we a r e g e t t i n g i n v o l v e d . Can you e x p l a i n more what you mean by
strategic interest?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: W e l l , i t has two main
dimensions. Of course, i t has t h e deep h u m a n i t a r i a n dimension.
The
e t h n i c c l e a n s i n g t h a t has gone on t h e r e has evoked concern a l l over
t h e w o r l d . But coming t o your s p e c i f i c q u e s t i o n , t h e r e i s an
i m p o r t a n t s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t here o f t r y i n g t o c o n t a i n t h i s c o n f l i c t .
The U n i t e d S t a t e s does n o t want t h i s c o n f l i c t t o spread i n a way t h a t
would i n v o l v e o u r a l l i e s , Greece and Turkey. I t does n o t want i t t o
spread t o Kosovo o r Macedonia. So i t ' s an e f f o r t t o c o n t a i n t h e
c o n f l i c t , t o keep i t where i t i s , t o stop t h e a g g r e s s i o n t h a t i s such
of s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t n o t o n l y o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s b u t o u r a l l i e s as
well.
Q
Mr. S e c r e t a r y , does t h e d e c i s i o n t h a t t h e P r e s i d e n t
has reached today r e p r e s e n t an u l t i m a t u m t o t h e Serbs? And i f so,
when does i t e x p i r e ? By when must we see these deeds?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: I t h i n k t h e Serbs know what they
have t o do. And they know t h a t they need t o do i t p r o m p t l y , because
our course o f d e c i s i o n i s w e l l s e t here.
We're g o i n g t o be c a r e f u l
and d e l i b e r a t e . We're going t o go through these c o n s u l t a t i o n s .
I ' l l
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�- 5 -
come back and report t o the President, and h e ' l l be r e p o r t i n g t o the
American people on t h i s subject; but the clock i s t i c k i n g .
Thank you very much.
END
1:47 P.M.
EDT
�THE WHITE HOUSE
O f f i c e o f the Press S e c r e t a r y
For Immediate Release
May 1, 1993
PRESS BRIEFING
BY
SECRETARY OF STATE WARREN CHRISTOPHER
The B r i e f i n g Room
1:35
P.M. EDT
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Good a f t e r n o o n . Upon t a k i n g
o f f i c e , P r e s i d e n t C l i n t o n i n h e r i t e d a complex and t r a g i c s i t u a t i o n i n
t h e former Y u g o s l a v i a .
T h i s s i t u a t i o n has b e d e v i l e d t h e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l community now f o r almost two y e a r s .
I t ' s a problem
w i t h deep h i s t o r i c r o o t s . I n t h e p o s t - C o l d War p e r i o d , t h e former
Yugoslavia has been t h e scene o f v i o l e n c e , t r a g e d y and outrageous
conduct.
The Presided has acted t o d e a l w i t h t h i s c o n f l i c t . We
have undertaken i n c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h our a l l i e s and f r i e n d s an
i n t e n s i v e d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t i n an a t t e m p t t o s o l v e t h e c r i s i s and
b r i n g some measure o f peace t o t h i s area.
Our a c t i v i t y t o date has been i n t e n s e along a number o f
f r o n t s . These i n c l u d e an a c t i v e d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t t h a t has helped t o
b r i n g two o f t h e t h r e e Bosnian p a r t i e s i n t o agreement on a peace
p l a n ; second, an e f f o r t t o save thousands o f l i v e s by way o f
h u m a n i t a r i a n programs, which i n c l u d e our a i r d r o p program, which has
now f u r n i s h e d more than 2 m i l l i o n meals; t h i r d , passage o f a U.N.
r e s o l u t i o n t o e s t a b l i s h a war crimes t r i b u n a l ; f o u r t h , a U.N.
r e s o l u t i o n t o e n f o r c e a n o - f l y zone t o p r e v e n t the use o f a i r power
by t h e p a r t i e s t o t h e c o n f l i c t ; and f i f t h , an e x t r e m e l y r i g o r o u s
s a n c t i o n s r e s o l u t i o n a t the U n i t e d Nations t h a t went i n t o e f f e c t l a s t
Monday a t m i d n i g h t .
Under t h i s s a n c t i o n s regime, S e r b i a i s being t r e a t e d as
a p a r i a h s t a t e , v i r t u a l l y i s o l a t e d from the r e s t o f t h e w o r l d . Yet
t h e outrages have c o n t i n u e d i n the former Yugoslavia area.
I n the
face o f Serbian aggression the P r e s i d e n t has been r i g o r o u s l y
r e v i e w i n g f u r t h e r o p t i o n s f o r a c t i o n d u r i n g t h e course o f t h e l a s t
week. He has been c o n s u l t i n g w i t h our a l l i e s and f r i e n d s i n t h e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l community, members o f Congress, h i s n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y
team, and t h e J o i n t C h i e f s o f S t a f f . He has been e x p l o r i n g
a d d i t i o n a l a c t i o n s t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community can take t o respond t o
t h e v i o l e n c e , stop t h e aggression and c o n t a i n t h e c o n f l i c t .
The P r e s i d e n t has j u s t completed a meeting w i t h h i s
p r i n c i p a l n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y a d v i s e r s . A t t h i s meeting t h e P r e s i d e n t
decided on t h e d i r e c t i o n t h a t he b e l i e v e s t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and t h e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l community should now t a k e i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n .
This
d i r e c t i o n i n v o l v e s a number o f s p e c i f i c recommendations, i n c l u d i n g
m i l i t a r y steps.
The P r e s i d e n t i s sending me t o Europe t o c o n s u l t w i t h
our a l l i e s and f r i e n d s on a course o f a c t i o n . T h i s problem i s a t t h e
h e a r t o f Europe's f u t u r e . Our e f f o r t s w i l l be undertaken w i t h our
p a r t n e r s . We're ready t o p l a y our p a r t , b u t o t h e r s must be as w e l l .
Along these l i n e s , I ' l l be l e a v i n g a t 9:00 p.m. t o n i g h t
t o engage i n these c o n s u l t a t i o n s . Over the next week I ' l l t r a v e l t o
B r i t a i n , France, Russia and Germany. I ' l l a l s o be t r a v e l i n g t o
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�- 2 -
B r u s s e l s , where I ' l l c o n s u l t w i t h t h e S e c r e t a r y General o f NATO and
t h e Presidency o f t h e European Community.
I n these sessions I ' l l be conveying t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s
d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community should t a k e f u r t h e r
action.
I ' l l be c o n s u l t i n g w i t h our p a r t n e r s on t h e d i r e c t i o n t h e
P r e s i d e n t b e l i e v e s t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community should t a k e t o g e t h e r .
We must have a u n i f i e d and cohesive p o s i t i o n .
With r e s p e c t t o t h e s p e c i f i c d i r e c t i o n s t h a t I ' l l be
d i s c u s s i n g i n Europe, I t h i n k y o u ' l l understand t h a t p r i o r t o t h e
c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h our a l l i e s , I cannot d i s c u s s them w i t h you here i n
t h i s p u b l i c forum.
Let me c l o s e w i t h two i m p o r t a n t p o i n t s .
F i r s t , the
P r e s i d e n t and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a r e p u r s u i n g a d d i t i o n a l a c t i o n w i t h
our a l l i e s because we b e l i e v e t h a t the i n t e r e s t s o f t h e U n i t e d States
and t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community a r e a t s t a k e . There are, o f course,
issues o f conscience and h u m a n i t a r i a n concerns a t stake i n t h i s
situation.
But f u n d a m e n t a l l y our a c t i o n s a r e a l s o based upon t h e
s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . A l l o f us seek t o l i m i t
t h e r i s k o f a widening i n s t a b i l i t y t h a t c o u l d l e a d t o a g r e a t e r
Balkan war.
Second, as you know, t h e p a r t i e s t o t h e c o n f l i c t a r e
meeting i n Athens t h i s weekend w i t h S e c r e t a r y Vance and Lord Owen.
The Serbs know t h a t they exhausted t h e p a t i e n c e o f t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l
community. I t i s i n t h e i r i n t e r e s t t o t a k e c o n c r e t e a c t i o n s now t o
reach peace and t o do so w i t h o u t f u r t h e r d e l a y .
But I must underscore t h a t they must do more than j u s t
speak o u t , they must do more than s i m p l y g i v e us a s i g n a t u r e on a
peace p l a n . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , we've heard t h e i r words and seen t h e
s i g n a t u r e s b e f o r e . I t w i l l t a k e deeds, immediate c o n c r e t e a c t i o n by
t h e Serbs, a c t i o n s on t h e ground t o convince t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l
community o f t h e i r seriousness and good f a i t h .
I'll
be g l a d t o t r y t o respond --
Q
Mr. S e c r e t a r y , can you t e l l us — o b v i o u s l y , you've
had p r e l i m i n a r y c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h a l l i e s ; r e a l i s t i c a l l y do you t h i n k
y o u ' l l be a b l e t o f i n d a consensus based on what t h e P r e s i d e n t has
decided today?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Yes, I'm q u i t e h o p e f u l t h a t we
can f i n d a consensus. I t seems t o me t h a t o u r European a l l i e s and
f r i e n d s a r e l o o k i n g f o r w a r d t o these meetings. I t h i n k they expect
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o o f f e r l e a d e r s h i p i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n . I have no
reason t o t h i n k t h a t my c o n s u l t a t i o n s t h e r e won't be w e l l r e c e i v e d .
And I have some c o n f i d e n c e t h a t we can reach a s i t u a t i o n o f u n i t y and
cohesion.
Q
You s a i d you c o u l d n ' t g i v e us d e t a i l s o f what was
decided today, b u t can you t e l l us whether a n y t h i n g was r u l e d o u t
s p e c i f i c a l l y i n v o l v i n g the embargo?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: What has been r u l e d o u t by t h e
P r e s i d e n t b e f o r e , as you know, i s f o r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o i n v o l v e
l a r g e numbers o f ground t r o o p s , except as ground t r o o p s might be
i n v o l v e d i n t h e implementation' of a peace p l a n . That doesn't break
any new ground. What I have s a i d here i s s i m p l y t h e one t h i n g t h a t
we w i l l n o t be d i s c u s s i n g , b u t beyond t h a t we w i l l be d i s c u s s i n g a
very wide range o f o p t i o n s i n the c o n t e x t , o f course, o f t h e
d i r e c t i o n s t h a t t h e P r e s i d e n t has g i v e n me today.
Q
Mr. S e c r e t a r y , do we understand you c o r r e c t l y t h a t
the P r e s i d e n t has taken the d e c i s i o n today t h a t w i l l i n v o l v e m i l i t a r y
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-- p o t e n t i a l m i l i t a r y a c t i o n by American f o r c e s , b u t t h e Europeans
w i l l be informed o f t h i s d e c i s i o n b e f o r e t h e American people?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: The P r e s i d e n t has n o t taken any
f i n a l d e c i s i o n s . He has marked o u t some d i r e c t i o n s t h a t he wants t o
have c o n s u l t a t i o n s undertaken w i t h our European a l l i e s and our
f r i e n d s . A f t e r those meetings, I ' l l be r e t u r n i n g here t o t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s and a t t h a t t i m e be r e p o r t i n g t o t h e P r e s i d e n t and he w i l l
make f i n a l d e c i s i o n s based upon these c o n s u l t a t i o n s .
Q
American people?
So t h e Europeans w i l l be c o n s u l t e d b e f o r e t h e
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: The American people a r e being
c o n s u l t e d as we move along i n t h e s i t u a t i o n .
I t ' s being widely
d i s c u s s e d a l l over t h e U n t i e d S t a t e s , b u t you can understand t h a t
u n t i l we've reached a u n i f i e d and cohesive p o s i t i o n w i t h o u r European
a l l i e s t h a t t h e r e i s n o t h i n g t h a t we can p r o p e r l y announce a t t h e
present time.
Q
Have you changed t h e g o a l l i n e here f o r t h e Serbs
-- t h e g o a l p o s t , because i t seems t h a t you're s a y i n g t h a t you need
more t h a n t h e s i g n a t u r e on a peace p l a n , t h a t you need c o n c r e t e
a c t i o n s on t h e ground? What s p e c i f i c a l l y a r e those .actions t h a t you
want?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: The Serbs know w e l l t h e a c t i o n s
t h a t they must t a k e t o s a t i s f y us i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n and s a t i s f y t h e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. They must honor t h e c e a s e - f i r e t h a t was
c a l l e d f o r i n t h e London accords.
They must s t o p bombing t h e c i t i e s
i n Bosnia. They must p e r m i t h u m a n i t a r i a n a i d t o go f o r w a r d . There's
no mystery and no s e c r e t about t h a t . The Serbs know what they must
do. What we're t i r e d o f i s simply t h e i r words and a c t i o n s and
manipulation.
Q
Mr. S e c r e t a r y , do t h e a l l i e s have v e t o power over
t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s plans?
What i f they say no? W i l l t h e P r e s i d e n t
change h i s plans?
And, number two, i f they do go along w i t h i t , when
would t h e a c t i o n a c t u a l l y begin?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: By no means do t h e a l l i e s have
v e t o power, b u t t h i s i s a m u l t i l a t e r a l s i t u a t i o n .
T h i s problem has
deep European r o o t s . The European c o u n t r i e s a r e a l r e a d y deeply
i n v o l v e d . They have ground f o r c e s i n Bosnia. I t ' s a s i t u a t i o n where
we want t o t a k e u n i f i e d a c t i o n w i t h Europe, and w e ' l l be d i s c u s s i n g
i t i n that context.
The second p a r t o f your q u e s t i o n had t o do w i t h t i m i n g ,
did i t ?
Yes, s i r .
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: I don't want t o e s t a b l i s h any
d e a d l i n e , b u t we understand t h e v i o l e n c e i s g o i n g ahead i n Bosnia.
We want t o move as b r i s k l y as we can. On t h e o t h e r hand, I t h i n k
i t ' s e s s e n t i a l we move w i t h d e l i b e r a t i o n here.
These a r e very
i m p o r t a n t d e c i s i o n s . And, as you a l l know, they a r e v e r y d i f f i c u l t
decisions.
Q
Mr. S e c r e t a r y , d i d you open up a new p o s s i b i l i t y of
u s i n g U.S. t r o o p s on t h e ground t o p i n p o i n t t h e Serbian p o s i t i o n s ,
because you used t h e phrase " r u l i n g o u t l a r g e numbers o f ground
t r o o p s . " What about small numbers?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: I don't want t o change what t h e
P r e s i d e n t has s a i d on t h a t s u b j e c t . We do n o t contemplate t h e use of
ground f o r c e s except i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e implementation o f a peace
MORE
�- 4-
plan t h a t was agreed t o i n good f a i t h -- a v i a b l e peace plan agreed
to i n good f a i t h .
Q
What forces would be used t o p i n p o i n t the Serbian
positions?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: I'm not going t o get i n t o
d e t a i l e d m i l i t a r y options. I simply stand on my p r i o r statement with
respect t o ground forces.
Q
Mr. Secretary, Lord Owen has said i t would be
unwise t o use m i l i t a r y force against the Serbs a t t h i s j u n c t u r e , and
he said t h a t they are now closer t o a peace agreement than they have
been i n the l a s t e i g h t months. Do you share t h a t assessment?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: We're proceeding on our own
track here. I t h i n k t h a t the President has been very d e l i b e r a t e over
the l a s t 10 days i n moving toward a decision, which he's taken today,
to send me t o Europe and on the d i r e c t i o n s he wants t o have the
discussions take i n Europe. We're not going t o be d i v e r t e d from
t h a t t r a c k . Obviously, we're i n t e r e s t e d i n what's going on i n
Athens, but I t h i n k the United States and i t s a l l i e s need t o concert
t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n t h i s important s i t u a t i o n .
And l e t me say t h i s also: I have noticed over the l a s t
several months t h a t I have been i n o f f i c e t h a t the Serbs tend t o
respond when they t h i n k t h a t something might be done by the United
States and t h e i r a l l i e s of a serious character. I'm not — I don't
t h i n k i t ' s an e n t i r e l y — a coincidence t h a t they're back a t the
bargaining t a b l e now as we approach these decisions. So we're going
to stay on t r a c k . We're going t o continue our course.
Q
Mr. Secretary, do you see your r o l e i n Europe as
s e l l i n g t h i s strategy t o the European a l l i e s , or s o l i c i t i n g t h e i r
input t o amend t h i s strategy?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: I c e r t a i n l y am going t o t r y t o
persuade the a l l i e s t h a t the d i r e c t i o n s the President has l a i d down
are ones t h a t they ought t o embrace. That's p a r t of my task as being
Secretary of State and engaging i n these c o n s u l t a t i o n s .
Q
Mr. Secretary, you have on several occasions
pointed out t h i s i s a deep and h i s t o r i c a l c o n f l i c t t h a t ' s going on.
And today you p o i n t out t h a t i t ' s also i n the s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t of
the United States t o get involved here. Most people don't understand
why we are g e t t i n g involved. Can you explain more what you mean by
strategic interest?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Well, i t has two main
dimensions. Of course, i t has the deep humanitarian dimension. The
ethnic cleansing t h a t has gone on there has evoked concern a l l over
the world. But coming t o your s p e c i f i c question, there i s an
important s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t here of t r y i n g t o contain t h i s c o n f l i c t .
The United States does not want t h i s c o n f l i c t t o spread i n a way that
would involve our a l l i e s , Greece and Turkey. I t does not want i t to
spread t o Kosovo or Macedonia. So i t ' s an e f f o r t t o contain the
c o n f l i c t , t o keep i t where i t i s , t o stop the aggression t h a t i s such
of s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t not only of the United States but our a l l i e s as
well.
Q
Mr. Secretary, does the decision t h a t the President
has reached today represent an ultimatum t o the Serbs? And i f so,
when does i t expire? By when must we see these deeds?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: I t h i n k the Serbs know what they
have t o do. And they know t h a t they need t o do i t promptly, because
our course of decis.on i s well set here. We're going t o be c a r e f u l
and d e l i b e r a t e . We're going t o go through these c o n s u l t a t i o n s . I ' l l
MR
OE
�-
o
-
come back and report to the President, and h e ' l l be r e p o r t i n g to the
American people on t h i s subject; but the clock i s t i c k i n g .
Thank you very much.
END
1:47 P.M.
EDT
�THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Iimnediate Release
A p r i l 29, 1993
REMARKS BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE
IN QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION WITH THE PRESS
The North Portico
5:33 P.M.
EDT
Q
Mr. Secretary, i s the decision by the Bosnian Serbs
and apparently a l l the other various parties to meet t h i s weekend in
Athens, Greece with Owen and Vance — does that change at a l l the
President's thinking on what the options are right now?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Let me say t h i s . Former
Secretary Vance called me t h i s afternoon to t e l l me about the
anticipated meeting t h i s weekend i n Athens, and we discussed that
during the afternoon meeting. I t does not change our plans at a l l .
The President's decision-making process i s on track, i t ' l l go forward
as i t was intended to go forward.
I think what we need from the Serbs, both the Bosnian
Serbs and the Serbs from Serbia i s deeds, not words; so we'll be
proceeding with our plans j u s t as they were before t h i s announcement.
Q
I t sounds, Mr. Secretary, as i f the President's
already made a decision. I s that the case? And how soon w i l l you be
going to Europe?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: The President has not made a
decision. The decision-making process i s as before. There's going
to be a meeting of principals on Saturday morning. I'd expect the
President's decision to come, as he said, sometime within t h i s week.
Q
When do you leave for Europe?
Saturday evening?
Will you leave on
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: I don't have any plans to go to
Europe right now.
We'll f i n a l i z e any plans of that kind on Saturday.
Q
So, then, h i s decision would come Saturday, s i r ?
I s that what you're saying?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: He said the decision would be by
the end of the week, and I think Saturday i s the end of the week.
Q
Are you looking for a t o t a l cessation of
h o s t i l i t i e s from the parties? I s that what you're i n s i s t i n g on right
now?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Right now we're simply trying to
f i x our own plans. The President i s i n the process of making h i s
decisions on these matters and I think when he's ready to announce
those, you'll hear from him as to what our goals are and what our
plans are.
Q
Mr. Secretary, why did you come out here today? I s
i t some kind of a threat to the Serbs? I s that supposed to be the
intent of your appearance out here, and General Powell's as well?
MORE
�- 2-
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: I came out because I understood
there was some interest i n having a comment on the announcement made
by former Secretary Vance and Lord Owen t h i s afternoon, and I thought
i t would be useful for me to say right now, and say i t c l e a r l y , that
we're on track here, we're not deterred by that announcement. We're
interested i n i t , but we're going to follow our decision-making
process here because we've indicated that we think i t ' s important the
United States s t i c k s to i t s decision, and then t a l k to our a l l i e s
about i t .
Q
What sort of action do you want the Serbs to take?
THE PRESS:
Thank you.
END
5:37 P.M. EDT
�THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
A p r i l 29, 1993
REMARKS BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE
IN QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION WITH THE PRESS
The North Portico
5:33 P.M.
EDT
Q
Mr. Secretary, i s the decision by the Bosnian Serbs
and apparently a l l the other various parties to meet t h i s weekend in
Athens, Greece with Owen and Vance — does that change at a l l the
President's thinking on what the options are right now?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Let me say t h i s . Former
Secretary Vance called me t h i s afternoon to t e l l me about the
anticipated meeting t h i s weekend i n Athens, and we discussed that
during the afternoon meeting. I t does not change our plans at a l l .
The President's decision-making process i s on track, i t ' l l go forward
as i t was intended to go forward.
I think what we need from the Serbs, both the Bosnian
Serbs and the Serbs from Serbia i s deeds, not words; so we'll be
proceeding with our plans j u s t as they were before t h i s announcement.
Q
I t sounds, Mr. Secretary, as i f the President's
already made a decision. I s that the case? And how soon w i l l you be
going to Europe?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: The President has not made a
decision. The decision-making process i s as before. There's going
to be a meeting of principals on Saturday morning. I'd expect the
President's decision to come, as he said, sometime within t h i s week.
Q
When do you leave for Europe?
Saturday evening?
Will you leave on
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: I don't have any plans to go to
Europe right now. We'll f i n a l i z e any plans of that kind on Saturday.
Q
So, then, h i s decision would come Saturday, s i r ?
I s that what you're saying?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: He said the decision would be by
the end of the week, and I think Saturday i s the end of the week.
Q
Are you looking for a t o t a l cessation of
h o s t i l i t i e s from the parties? I s that what you're i n s i s t i n g on right
now?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Right now we're simply trying to
f i x our own plans. The President i s i n the process of making h i s
decisions on these matters and I think when he's ready to announce
those, you'll hear from him as to what our goals are and what our
plans are.
Q
Mr. Secretary, why did you come out here today? I s
i t some kind of a threat to the Serbs? I s that supposed to be the
intent of your appearance out here, and General Powell's as well?
MORE
�- 2-
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: I came out because I understood
there was some interest i n having a comment on the announcement made
by former Secretary Vance and Lord Owen t h i s afternoon, and I thought
i t would be useful for me to say right now, and say i t c l e a r l y , that
we're on track here, we're not deterred by that announcement. We're
interested i n i t , but we're going to follow our decision-making
process here because we've indicated that we think i t ' s important the
United States s t i c k s to i t s decision, and then t a l k to our a l l i e s
about i t .
Q
What sort of action do you want the Serbs to take?
THE PRESS:
Thank you.
END
5:37 P.M. EDT
�THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
April 29, 1993
REMARKS BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE
IN QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION WITH THE PRESS
The North Portico
5:33 P.M.
EDT
Q
Mr. Secretary, i s the decision by the Bosnian Serbs
and apparently a l l the other various parties to meet t h i s weekend in
Athens, Greece with Owen and Vance — does that change at a l l the
President's thinking on what the options are right now?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Let me say t h i s . Former
Secretary Vance called me t h i s afternoon to t e l l me about the
anticipated meeting t h i s weekend i n Athens, and we discussed that
during the afternoon meeting. I t does not change our plans at a l l .
The President's decision-making process i s on track, i t ' l l go forward
as i t was intended to go forward.
I think what we need from the Serbs, both the Bosnian
Serbs and the Serbs from Serbia i s deeds, not words; so we'll be
proceeding with our plans j u s t as they were before t h i s announcement.
Q
I t sounds, Mr. Secretary, as i f the President's
already made a decision. I s that the case? And how soon w i l l you be
going to Europe?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: The President has not made a
decision. The decision-making process i s as before. There's going
to be a meeting of principals on Saturday morning. I'd expect the
President's decision to come, as he said, sometime within t h i s week.
Q
When do you leave for Europe?
Saturday evening?
Will you leave on
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: I don't have any plans to go to
Europe right now. We'll f i n a l i z e any plans of that kind on Saturday.
Q
So, then, h i s decision would come Saturday, s i r ?
I s that what you're saying?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: He said the decision would be by
the end of the week, and I think Saturday i s the end of the week.
Q
Are you looking for a t o t a l cessation of
h o s t i l i t i e s from the parties? I s that what you're i n s i s t i n g on right
now?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Right now we're simply trying to
f i x our own plans. The President i s i n the process of making h i s
decisions on these matters and I think when he's ready to announce
those, you'll hear from him as to what our goals are and what our
plans are.
Q
Mr. Secretary, why did you come out here today? I s
i t some kind of a threat to the Serbs? I s that supposed to be the
intent of your appearance out here, and General Powell's as well?
MORE
�- 2-
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: I came out because I understood
there was some interest i n having a comment on the announcement made
by former Secretary Vance and Lord Owen t h i s afternoon, and I thought
i t would be useful for me to say right now, and say i t c l e a r l y , that
we're on track here, we're not deterred by that announcement. We're
interested i n i t , but we're going to follow our decision-making
process here because we've indicated that we think i t ' s important the
United States s t i c k s to i t s decision, and then t a l k to our a l l i e s
about i t .
Q
What sort of action do you want the Serbs to take?
THE PRESS:
Thank you.
END
5:37 P.M. EDT
�THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
A p r i l 29, 1993
REMARKS BY
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF GENERAL COLIN POWELL
IN QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION WITH THE PRESS
The North Portico
5:25
P.M. EDT
Q
General, thank you for being patient.
GENERAL POWELL: Not at a l l . I j u s t might say that my
colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I have j u s t had a couple
of hours of meetings with the President, a very useful exchange of
views on the situation i n Bosnia.
W explored a wide range of options having to do with
e
the diplomatic efforts, as well as some of the other items under
discussion. And I would j u s t characterize i t as a f u l l discussion of
a wide range of m i l i t a r y options as well as consideration of the
current diplomatic situation.
Q
Have you ruled anything on or off the table?
GENERAL POWELL: W haven't ruled anything off the
e
table, other than what the President had previously ruled off the
table. And I don't want to get into any s p e c i f i c s of d e t a i l s of any
of the m i l i t a r y options; I think they have been covered rather
broadly i n the press. And, as you know, i t i s not our practice to go
into the d e t a i l s .
Q
I t ' s been widely reported, General, that many i n
the Pentagon, including many of those i n the Joint Chiefs, are
reluctant to endorse limited a i r s t r i k e s against either a r t i l l e r y
positions or supply l i n e s , that sort of thing.
GENERAL POWELL: Well, l o t s of things are always
reported about the views of the Pentagon. What we do i s examine a l l
of the pros and cons, advantages and disadvantages of a l l m i l i t a r y
options, and then we give the r e s u l t s of that analysis to the
President, and the President has been very, very kind i n taking the
time to hear that analysis.
We also discuss with our p o l i t i c a l leaders the proper
linking of m i l i t a r y actions to p o l i t i c a l objectives and policy
objectives to make sure there i s that linkage, and the President
understands the need to have that kind of conversation.
But i t i s also clear that once a l l of that consideration
has been given and the President makes h i s decision, the Armed Forces
of the United States w i l l be f u l l y able to carry out the instructions
that we have been given. And at that point, there i s never any
reluctance. W have demonstrated repeatedly, e s p e c i a l l y i n recent
e
years, our a b i l i t y to accomplish any assigned mission.
Q
Does the meeting t h i s weekend between the Croats
and the Muslims and the Serbs, the meeting t h i s weekend, does that
change the equation at a l l — the m i l i t a r y equation i n your mind?
MORE
�- 2 -
GENERAL POWELL: We w i l l continue with our thinking and
planning on t h i s issue. I'm, of course, pleased, as everybody, that
there i s another chapter unfolding in t h i s diplomatic effort. But
we've seen previous chapters unfold and close right away, so l e t ' s be
hopeful, l e t ' s be optimistic that there i s a breakthrough; but,
nevertheless, we'll continue with our planning and thinking.
Q
General, do you believe that a i r s t r i k e s can be
effective and can be accomplished without too much r i s k to our
people?
GENERAL POWELL: Air s t r i k e s , depending on the nature of
the s t r i k e and the target and a l o t of other considerations, can have
an effect. Whether they have the effect that some of the more
strident advocates hope that they would have i s the question to be
answered. There i s always a r i s k associated with i t . We w i l l do
everything possible, i f we are ever called upon to conduct a i r
s t r i k e s anywhere, to minimize that r i s k , but there i s always a level
of r i s k .
Q
General, as you understand i t right now, what i s
the p o l i t i c a l objective in Bosnia — as you understand i t right now?
GENERAL POWELL: I don't speak p o l i t i c a l objectives.
Thank you.
THE PRESS:
Thank you.
END
5:27 P.M.
EDT
�THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
A p r i l 29, 1993
REMARKS BY
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF GENERAL COLIN POWELL
IN QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION WITH THE PRESS
The North Portico
5:25
P.M. EDT
Q
General, thank you for being patient.
GENERAL POWELL: Not at a l l . I j u s t might say that my
colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I have j u s t had a couple
of hours of meetings with the President, a very useful exchange of
views on the situation i n Bosnia.
W explored a wide range of options having to do with
e
the diplomatic efforts, as well as some of the other items under
discussion. And I would j u s t characterize i t as a f u l l discussion of
a wide range of m i l i t a r y options as well as consideration of the
current diplomatic situation.
Q
Have you ruled anything on or off the table?
GENERAL POWELL: W haven't ruled anything off the
e
table, other than what the President had previously ruled off the
table. And I don't want to get into any s p e c i f i c s of d e t a i l s of any
of the m i l i t a r y options; I think they have been covered rather
broadly i n the press. And, as you know, i t i s not our practice to go
into the d e t a i l s .
Q
I t ' s been widely reported, General, that many i n
the Pentagon, including many of those i n the Joint Chiefs, are
reluctant to endorse limited a i r s t r i k e s against either a r t i l l e r y
positions or supply l i n e s , that sort of thing.
GENERAL POWELL: Well, lots of things are always
reported about the views of the Pentagon. What we do i s examine a l l
of the pros and cons, advantages and disadvantages of a l l m i l i t a r y
options, and then we give the r e s u l t s of that analysis to the
President, and the President has been very, very kind i n taking the
time to hear that analysis.
W also discuss with our p o l i t i c a l leaders the proper
e
linking of m i l i t a r y actions to p o l i t i c a l objectives and policy
objectives to make sure there i s that linkage, and the President
understands the need to have that kind of conversation.
But i t i s also c l e a r that once a l l of that consideration
has been given and the President makes h i s decision, the Armed Forces
of the United States w i l l be f u l l y able to carry out the instructions
that we have been given. And at that point, there i s never any
reluctance. W have demonstrated repeatedly, e s p e c i a l l y i n recent
e
years, our a b i l i t y to accomplish any assigned mission.
Q
Does the meeting t h i s weekend between the Croats
and the Muslims and the Serbs, the meeting t h i s weekend, does that
change the equation at a l l — the m i l i t a r y equation i n your mind?
MORE
�- 2 -
GENERAL POWELL: We w i l l continue with our thinking and
planning on t h i s issue. I'm, of course, pleased, as everybody, that
there i s another chapter unfolding in t h i s diplomatic effort. But
we've seen previous chapters unfold and close right away, so l e t ' s be
hopeful, l e t ' s be optimistic that there i s a breakthrough; but,
nevertheless, we'll continue with our planning and thinking.
Q
General, do you believe that a i r s t r i k e s can be
effective and can be accomplished without too much r i s k to our
people?
GENERAL POWELL: Air s t r i k e s , depending on the nature of
the s t r i k e and the target and a l o t of other considerations, can have
an effect. Whether they have the effect that some of the more
strident advocates hope that they would have i s the question to be
answered. There i s always a r i s k associated with i t . We w i l l do
everything possible, i f we are ever called upon to conduct a i r
s t r i k e s anywhere, to minimize that r i s k , but there i s always a level
of r i s k .
Q
General, as you understand i t right now, what i s
the p o l i t i c a l objective in Bosnia — as you understand i t right now?
GENERAL POWELL: I don't speak p o l i t i c a l objectives.
Thank you.
THE PRESS:
Thank you.
END
5:27 P.M.
EDT
�THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
A p r i l 29, 1993
REMARKS BY
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF GENERAL COLIN POWELL
IN QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION WITH THE PRESS
The North Portico
5:25
P.M. EDT
Q
General, thank you for being patient.
GENERAL POWELL: Not at a l l . I j u s t might say that my
colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I have j u s t had a couple
of hours of meetings with the President, a very useful exchange of
views on the situation i n Bosnia.
W explored a wide range of options having to do with
e
the diplomatic efforts, as well as some of the other items under
discussion. And I would j u s t characterize i t as a f u l l discussion of
a wide range of m i l i t a r y options as well as consideration of the
current diplomatic situation.
Q
Have you ruled anything on or off the table?
GENERAL POWELL: W haven't ruled anything off the
e
table, other than what the President had previously ruled off the
table. And I don't want to get into any s p e c i f i c s of d e t a i l s of any
of the m i l i t a r y options; I think they have been covered rather
broadly i n the press. And, as you know, i t i s not our practice to go
into the d e t a i l s .
Q
I t ' s been widely reported, General, that many i n
the Pentagon, including many of those i n the Joint Chiefs, are
reluctant to endorse limited a i r s t r i k e s against either a r t i l l e r y
positions or supply l i n e s , that sort of thing.
GENERAL POWELL: Well, l o t s of things are always
reported about the views of the Pentagon. What we do i s examine a l l
of the pros and cons, advantages and disadvantages of a l l m i l i t a r y
options, and then we give the r e s u l t s of that analysis to the
President, and the President has been very, very kind i n taking the
time to hear that analysis.
W also discuss with our p o l i t i c a l leaders the proper
e
linking of m i l i t a r y actions to p o l i t i c a l objectives and policy
objectives to make sure there i s that linkage, and the President
understands the need to have that kind of conversation.
But i t i s also c l e a r that once a l l of that consideration
has been given and the President makes h i s decision, the Armed Forces
of the United States w i l l be f u l l y able to carry out the instructions
that we have been given. And at that point, there i s never any
reluctance. W have demonstrated repeatedly, e s p e c i a l l y i n recent
e
years, our a b i l i t y to accomplish any assigned mission.
Q
Does the meeting t h i s weekend between the Croats
and the Muslims and the Serbs, the meeting t h i s weekend, does that
change the equation at a l l — the m i l i t a r y equation i n your mind?
MORE
�- 2 -
GENERAL POWELL: We w i l l continue with our thinking and
planning on t h i s issue. I'm, of course, pleased, as everybody, that
there i s another chapter unfolding in t h i s diplomatic effort. But
we've seen previous chapters unfold and close right away, so l e t ' s be
hopeful, l e t ' s be optimistic that there i s a breakthrough; but,
nevertheless, we'll continue with our planning and thinking.
Q
General, do you believe that a i r s t r i k e s can be
effective and can be accomplished without too much r i s k to our
people?
GENERAL POWELL: Air s t r i k e s , depending on the nature of
the s t r i k e and the target and a l o t of other considerations, can have
an effect. Whether they have the effect that some of the more
strident advocates hope that they would have i s the question to be
answered. There i s always a r i s k associated with i t . We w i l l do
everything possible, i f we are ever called upon to conduct a i r
s t r i k e s anywhere, to minimize that r i s k , but there i s always a level
of r i s k .
Q
General, as you understand i t right now, what i s
the p o l i t i c a l objective in Bosnia — as you understand i t right now?
GENERAL POWELL: I don't speak p o l i t i c a l objectives.
Thank you.
THE PRESS:
Thank you.
END
5:27 P.M.
EDT
�THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
A p r i l 27, 1993
PRESIDENT CLINTON MEETS WITH BI-PARTISAN
CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS ON BOSNIA
Washington, D.C. - President C l i n t o n met today w i t h b i - p a r t i s a n
members of Congress i n the State Dining Room t o discuss Bosnia.
Due t o attend were:
The President
Vice President
Secretary Christopher
Secretary Aspin
National Security Advisor Anthony Lake
Howard Paster, Assistant t o the President f o r L e g i s l a t i v e A f f a i r s
Admiral Jeremiah, Vice Chairman of the J o i n t Chiefs of S t a f f
Leon Fuerth
Jenonne Walker
Jeremy Rosner
Senator M i t c h e l l
Senator Dole
Congressman Foley
Congressman Gephardt
Congressman Michel
Senator P e l l
Senator Biden
Senator Lugar
Senator Nunn
Senator Thurmond
Senator DeConcini
Senator Warner
Congressman Hamilton
Congressman Gilman
Congressman Dellums
Congressman Spence
Congressman Glickman
Congressman Combest
Congressman Murtha
Congressman Lantos
Congressman Bereuter
-30-30-30-
�THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
April 29, 1993
REMARKS BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE
IN QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION WITH THE PRESS
The North Portico
5:33 P.M.
EDT
Q
Mr. Secretary, i s the decision by the Bosnian Serbs
and apparently a l l the other various parties to meet t h i s weekend in
Athens, Greece with Owen and Vance — does that change at a l l the
President's thinking on what the options are right now?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Let me say t h i s . Former
Secretary Vance called me t h i s afternoon to t e l l me about the
anticipated meeting t h i s weekend i n Athens, and we discussed that
during the afternoon meeting. I t does not change our plans at a l l .
The President's decision-making process i s on track, i t ' l l go forward
as i t was intended to go forward.
I think what we need from the Serbs, both the Bosnian
Serbs and the Serbs from Serbia i s deeds, not words; so we'll be
proceeding with our plans j u s t as they were before t h i s announcement.
Q
I t sounds, Mr. Secretary, as i f the President's
already made a decision. I s that the.case? And how soon w i l l you be
going to Europe?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: The President has not made a
decision. The decision-making process i s as before. There's going
to be a meeting of principals on Saturday morning. I'd expect the
President's decision to come, as he said, sometime within t h i s week.
Q
When do you leave for Europe?
Saturday evening?
Will you leave on
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: I don't have any plans to go to
Europe right now. We'll f i n a l i z e any plans of that kind on Saturday.
Q
So, then, h i s decision would come Saturday, s i r ?
I s that what you're saying?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: He said the decision would be by
the end of the week, and I think Saturday i s the end of the week.
Q
Are you looking for a t o t a l cessation of
h o s t i l i t i e s from the parties? I s that what you're i n s i s t i n g on right
now?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Right now we're simply trying to
f i x our own plans. The President i s i n the process of making h i s
decisions on these matters and I think when he's ready to announce
those, you'll hear from him as to what our goals are and what our
plans are.
Q
Mr. Secretary, why did you come out here today? I s
i t some kind of a threat to the Serbs? I s that supposed to be the
intent of your appearance out here, and General Powell's as well?
MORE
�- 2-
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: I came out because I understood
there was some interest i n having a comment on the announcement made
by former Secretary Vance and Lord Owen t h i s afternoon, and I thought
i t would be useful for me to say right now, and say i t c l e a r l y , that
we're on track here, we're not deterred by that announcement. We're
interested i n i t , but we're going to follow our decision-making
process here because we've indicated that we think i t ' s important the
United States s t i c k s to i t s decision, and then t a l k to our a l l i e s
about i t .
Q
What sort of action do you want the Serbs to take?
THE PRESS:
Thank you.
END
5:37 P.M. EDT
�THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For immediate Release
A p r i l 29, 1993
REMARKS BY
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF GENERAL COLIN POWELL
IN QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION WITH THE PRESS
The North Portico
5:25
P.M. EDT
Q
General, thank you for being patient.
GENERAL POWELL: Not at a l l . I j u s t might say that my
colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I have j u s t had a couple
of hours of meetings with the President, a very useful exchange of
views on the situation i n Bosnia.
W explored a wide range of options having to do with
e
the diplomatic efforts, as well as some of the other items under
discussion. And I would j u s t characterize i t as a f u l l discussion of
a wide range of m i l i t a r y options as well as consideration of the
current diplomatic situation.
Q
Have you ruled anything on or off the table?
GENERAL POWELL: W haven't ruled anything off the
e
table, other than what the President had previously ruled off the
table. And I don't want to get into any s p e c i f i c s of d e t a i l s of any
of the m i l i t a r y options; I think they have been covered rather
broadly i n the press. And, as you know, i t i s not our practice to go
into the d e t a i l s .
Q
I t ' s been widely reported, General, that many i n
the Pentagon, including many of those i n the Joint Chiefs, are
reluctant to endorse limited a i r s t r i k e s against either a r t i l l e r y
positions or supply l i n e s , that sort of thing.
GENERAL POWELL: Well, l o t s of things are always
reported about the views of the Pentagon. What we do i s examine a l l
of the pros and cons, advantages and disadvantages of a l l m i l i t a r y
options, and then we give the r e s u l t s of that analysis to the
President, and the President has been very, very kind i n taking the
time to hear that analysis.
We also discuss with our p o l i t i c a l leaders the proper
linking of m i l i t a r y actions to p o l i t i c a l objectives and policy
objectives to make sure there i s that linkage, and the President
understands the need to have that kind of conversation.
But i t i s also clear that once a l l of that consideration
has been given and the President makes h i s decision, the Armed Forces
of the United States w i l l be f u l l y able to carry out the instructions
that we have been given. And at that point, there i s never any
reluctance. W have demonstrated repeatedly, e s p e c i a l l y i n recent
e
years, our a b i l i t y to accomplish any assigned mission.
Q
Does the meeting t h i s weekend between the Croats
and the Muslims and the Serbs, the meeting t h i s weekend, does that
change the equation at a l l — the m i l i t a r y equation i n your mind?
MORE
�- 2 -
GENERAL POWELL: We w i l l continue with our thinking and
planning on t h i s issue. I'm, of course, pleased, as everybody, that
there i s another chapter unfolding in t h i s diplomatic effort. But
we've seen previous chapters unfold and close right away, so l e t ' s be
hopeful, l e t ' s be optimistic that there i s a breakthrough; but,
nevertheless, we'll continue with our planning and thinking.
Q
General, do you believe that a i r s t r i k e s can be
effective and can be accomplished without too much r i s k to our
people?
GENERAL POWELL: Air s t r i k e s , depending on the nature of
the s t r i k e and the target and a l o t of other considerations, can have
an effect. Whether they have the effect that some of the more
strident advocates hope that they would have i s the question to be
answered. There i s always a r i s k associated with i t . We w i l l do
everything possible, i f we are ever called upon to conduct a i r
s t r i k e s anywhere, to minimize that r i s k , but there i s always a level
of r i s k .
Q
General, as you understand i t right now, what i s
the p o l i t i c a l objective in Bosnia — as you understand i t right now?
GENERAL POWELL: I don't speak p o l i t i c a l objectives.
Thank you.
THE PRESS:
Thank you.
END
5:27 P.M.
EDT
�THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
A p r i l 29, 1993
REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
IN PHOTO OPPORTUNITY
DURING MEETING WITH HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE
The Roosevelt Room
10:20 A.M. EDT
Q
Mr. President —
THE PRESIDENT: Let me j u s t make a b r i e f remark, and
then I ' l l answer your questions.
F i r s t , I want to thank these members of the Ways and
Means Committee for coming in for t h i s meeting. This morning's
economic figures on the performance of the United States economy in
the f i r s t three months of the year c l e a r l y , I think, support the
p o l i c i e s of t h i s administration. They support f i l l i n g out and
implementing the budget commitment that the Congress has made to
reduce the d e f i c i t and to increase targeted investments and to
generate jobs.
I t also p l a i n l y proves, I think, that the administration
was right i n trying to hedge against t h i s economic slow growth by
passing the jobs b i l l that the House of Representatives passed and
that the Senate wanted to pass. I t proves that we were right in both
reducing the d e f i c i t and i n trying to create some jobs right now in
t h i s economy. But i t also proves that the long-term interests of the
country w i l l be served i f we f u l f i l l our commitments on the budget.
The budget, I think, i s well under way.
The Ways and
Means Committee had a good day yesterday. And I think we can continue
to show our commitment to bring the d e f i c i t down and to target our
investments in areas that w i l l create jobs. We'll have a long-term
plan that's good. But i t also proves, I think c l e a r l y , beyond any
doubt, that the strategy of the administration to create some more
jobs right now was the right strategy. The American people s t i l l
need more employment, and we're going to do our best to give i t to
them.
Q
Mr. President, 100 days — have there been
mistakes? Are there things you would do d i f f e r e n t l y ? What have you
learned, what lessons?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I learned that things are not
going to change quite as fast as I wanted them to. But I noticed
there was — one columnist a day or two ago i n one of the major
papers pointed out that at l e a s t the American people know that the
Democratic Party i s serious and the President i s serious about
d e f i c i t reduction. They know we're going to do something about
health care reform. They know we're going to try to be partners with
the private sector in rebuilding the economy. And they know we're
trying to make the government work again — with the National Service
Program that I w i l l announce tomorrow, and a whole other range of
issues to t r y to give people educational and other opportunities. So
I feel b a s i c a l l y quite good about what's happened.
But t h i s country has some serious problems, and we're
going to have to get everybody serious about dealing with the
problems. Now, I am very impressed so f a r with the work that we've
MORE
�- 2 -
been able t o do w i t h the House and w i t h the m a j o r i t y i n the Senate i n
g e t t i n g the d e f i c i t down and i n focusing on the investment needs o f
our people. But we've got a l o t of work t o do.
I t h i n k i f you look a t — I don't know t h a t 100 days i s
a r a t i o n a l category, but i f you look a t how much we've done and how
much i s w e l l underway now as compared w i t h most previous
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s i n a s i m i l a r time p e r i o d , I t h i n k we're doing p r e t t y
well.
Q
Did you take on t o o much, Mr. President?
Q
Have you reached a decision on Bosnia y e t , Mr.
President?
THE PRESIDENT: Helen, I have not. I s t i l l ~ as you
probably know, General Powell was away f o r most of the week i n
Europe. And I want t o see and t a l k w i t h him p e r s o n a l l y and have some
other c o n s u l t a t i o n s on some o f the m i l i t a r y issues. And I have n o t .
But we w i l l do so soon and then w e ' l l begin some p r e t t y aggressive
c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h our a l l i e s .
Q
— took on t o o much, Mr. President?
some concerns about t h a t ?
Do you have
THE PRESIDENT: No, I w i l l .
You know, i t ' s a question
of — t h e Vice President has a word f o r i t — sequence and t i m i n g , I
t h i n k he c a l l s i t . I t h i n k — I b e l i e v e I got h i r e d t o t r y t o do
something about the economy and the h e a l t h care issue, and t o t r y t o
promote p o l i t i c a l reform and many other t h i n g s we're t r y i n g t o do. I
don't expect — when we put a l l these t h i n g s out here, I don't expect
them a l l t o be resolved r i g h t away. But I t h i n k we're going t o focus
on t h e budget f i r s t . That's what we're doing today. Then we're
going t o take up — we're going t o focus on h e a l t h care.
But t h i s country s t i l l needs t o remember t h a t we've got
to do these t h i n g s t o put people back t o work and t o solve t h e i r
economic problems. That i s t h e issue — the economy. And t h a t i s
what we are spending — I'm spending t w o - t h i r d s of my time or more on
the economy and h e a l t h care. And t h a t ' s what I hope we can do i n the
Congress i n the few weeks ahead.
Q
So you're more o p t i m i s t i c than Mr. Panetta?
more o p t i m i s t i c than Mr. Panetta?
THE PRESIDENT: I have more f a i t h i n Mr.
colleagues than he does. (Laughter.)
You're
Panetta's
I t h i n k we're going t o b r i n g t h i s d e f i c i t down, and I
t h i n k we're going t o get some investments passed. I t h i n k we're
going t o t u r n t h i s economy around. I wish we could have done i t
f a s t e r . I s t i l l t h i n k we ought t o create some jobs now. I t h i n k
t h a t was a mistake. But I t h i n k we j u s t keep going. We'll make the
progress we can and go on.
Q
Thank you.
END
10:26 A.M.
EDT
�THE WHITE HOUSE
O f f i c e of the Press Secretary
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
A p r i l 26, 1993
The B r i e f i n g Room
1:45 P.M. EDT
MR. CLARK: This w i l l be a BACKGROUND b r i e f i n g on
Serbian sanctions. I t ' l l be conducted by Leon Fuerth, who i s the
National Security Advisor t o the Vice President. And V i c Comras from
the State Department, and Richard Newcomb from t h e Treasury
Department. I t ' s ON BACKGROUND, i t can be a t t r i b u t e d t o senior
administration
officials.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
help make you b r i l l i a n t about sanctions.
sanctions.
Okay. We're here t o
Okay. We a l l b r i e f e d you a couple o f weeks ago on the
We're back. Things have been evolving. The —
Q
I can't b e l i e v e you came back a f t e r t h a t other
briefing.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I asked Dee Dee how d i d
I do. You know, she wasn't i n here. She was l i s t e n i n g t o i t . She
said, "You d i d f i n e . " And I said, "How do you know?" And she said,
"Because they d i d n ' t get mad a t you by the end." (Laughter.) So
t h a t was t h e index of achievement.
I'm prepared t o — I t h i n k t h e best way t o do t h i s i s t o
run through the executive order, which has j u s t been issued —
Q
We've seen i t . Can we take up from there?
you expect t h e sanctions t o achieve?
What do
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me j u s t doublecheck. I f — I want t o make sure t h a t other people have seen i t and
I don't have t o worry about s t a r t i n g from a d i f f e r e n t baseline. And
i f i t ' s — i f you're a l l a t the same s t a r t i n g p o i n t , then w e ' l l s t a r t
w i t h your question.
Okay.
What do we expect them t o achieve?
Q
Wait a minute.
Q
You might as w e l l not have seen i t .
Q
I t h i n k i t would be h e l p f u l i f we j u s t — a t l e a s t
you kind of summarized what they are.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
out what's happening?
Q
I f you can do t h a t .
MORE
Do you want us t o block
�- 2 -
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay, w e ' l l do i t
q u i c k l y and not lose time f o r those who have seen i t .
Okay, would you j u s t q u i c k l y block out what b a s i c a l l y i s
— w e l l , you d r a f t e d i t , so t a l k about what's i n t h e executive order.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: To e x p l a i n i t i n i t s
perhaps greatest perspective, i t goes back t o U.N. Resolution 757,
Paragraph 5, which p r o h i b i t e d the t r a n s f e r o f an economic resource t o
Yugoslavia. The United States i n t e r p r e t e d t h a t f a i r l y broadly. So
f o r t h e greatest p a r t , everything required of U.N. Resolution 82 0 has
been already completed w i t h i n t h e United States. There are, however,
a few a d d i t i o n a l steps t h a t w e ' l l be t a k i n g now.
Whereas before, i t blocked property and i n t e r e s t s of
property o f t h e government of Yugoslavia i n t h e United States, i t now
blocks a l l property or businesses organized or located i n t h e Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, or Serbia. So t h a t means i f a company has a
headquarters i n Serbia, i t i s now blocked i n t h e United States.
Secondly, vessels were blocked as property i n t h e United
States from t h e l a s t executive order. The new executive order
permits charges t o owners of the property f o r expenses. I t also
allows d e t e n t i o n of vessels i n t h e United States f o r i n v e s t i g a t i o n of
a v i o l a t i o n t h a t occurred i n Yugoslavia, so i f a t h i r d country vessel
has v i o l a t e d the p r o v i s i o n s of U.N. Resolution 820, i t gives us the
a u t h o r i t y t o block these vessels i n t h e United States.
I t p r o h i b i t s U.S. vessels from e n t e r i n g t h e t e r r i t o r i a l
waters of Serbia and i t p r o h i b i t s United States persons from
conducting any business i n the U.N. protected area o f Croatia or the
Bosnian-Serb c o n t r o l l e d areas of Bosnia-Hercegovina.
In summary, t h a t ' s what i t does; t h a t ' s a l l i t does.
Q
What about f r e e z i n g the assets?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They were already
frozen i n t h e United States from the e a r l i e r executive order. What
t h i s U.N. r e s o l u t i o n does i s , i t puts a much broader mandate on our
a l l i e s t o take greater steps because i t requires t h e f r e e z i n g of
funds w i t h i n t h e i r t e r r i t o r i e s and p r o h i b i t t h e dealing or t r a n s f e r
of funds t o or f o r t h e b e n e f i t of anyone located —
Q
Would i t be f a i r t o say t h a t what t h e r e s o l u t i o n
does mostly i s r e q u i r e our a l l i e s t o do what we, f o r t h e most p a r t ,
have already done?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
That's f a i r l y accurate.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: To some extent.
However, what w e ' l l do i s s h i f t gears f o r a moment. As you r e a l i z e ,
the executive order simply sets up the a u t h o r i t y t o execute i n the
United States what are the new r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s t h a t come t o us out
of t h e new r e s o l u t i o n . So, b a s i c a l l y , your questions have now
s h i f t e d t o what does the new r e s o l u t i o n accomplish, and I ' d l i k e t o
ask you t o summarize i t s p r i n c i p a l p a r t s .
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The r e s o l u t i o n covers a
l o t of t h e loopholes t h a t we found as we d e a l t w i t h t h e 757, 787
language. P r i n c i p a l l y , i t cuts o f f t h e movement of a l l goods across
Serbian Montenegro, so-called transshipment p r o v i s i o n , except on an
occasional basis — exceptional basis when approved by t h e U.N.
Sanctions Committee.
With respect t o t r a n s i t i n g cargoes moving through Serbia
on t h e Danube, since we couldn't cut o f f a l l t r a f f i c on t h e Danube,
t h a t t r a f f i c also requires approval by t h e Sanctions Committee on a
MR
OE
�- 3-
case-by-case basis; but t h e presumption i n t h i s case i s not one of
d e n i a l , as i t would be f o r the land transshipment.
I n t h i s case,
though, very close monitoring i s r e q u i r e d , i n c l u d i n g t h e presence of
a monitor on board from the p o i n t , from C a l a f a t - V i d i n , which i s the
l a s t p o i n t on t h e Romanian Bulgarian side, which — where t h e r i v e r
i s not y e t i n Serbia, t o the town of Mojas, which i s t h e f i r s t main
p o i n t on t h e Hungarian side, where there i s no Serbian c o n t r o l of the
river.
Q
What kind of goods would t h i s be?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This now covers a l l
goods. The previous r e s o l u t i o n , 787, required a l l what might be
c a l l e d "key i n d u s t r i a l commodities" t o be preapproved before they
moved along t h e Danube. I n t h i s case now, a l l goods — everything
requires preapproval.
Q
Do you have any idea how many businesses w i l l be
a f f e c t e d , or how many — do you have any idea how many ships might be
a f f e c t e d by t h i s order today?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are major f l e e t s ,
r i v e r f l e e t s along t h e r i v e r . A l l t h e r i p a r i a n s t a t e s have t h e i r own
r i v e r f l e e t s , so there i s a considerable amount of commerce, which
w i l l be subject t o these c o n t r o l s . The Danube, as you know, i s the
main l i n k between the Black Sea and the Balkan States, w i t h the r e s t
of Europe and vice-versa.
Q
But you t a l k about d e t e n t i o n of ships, f o r example,
U.S. t e r r i t o r i a l water —
maritime.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
Not t h e Danube. Sorry.
Nowhere onto t h e
Q
I'm s o r r y , the maritime. How many ships? You must
have some kind o f idea how many ships may have been v i o l a t i n g
previous sanctions.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are two p a r t s of
the maritime coverage of ships. One i s , those ships which are owned
and c o n t r o l l e d by Serbia — Serbian ships. There are about 3 5 of
those — 55 of those, sorry. And we already have seven or e i g h t —
seven i n t h e United States.
With respect t o t h e other ships, as we f i n d a ship t h a t
has v i o l a t e d the sanctions, there i s now c l e a r a u t h o r i t y under the
new r e s o l u t i o n f o r such ships t o be detained pending i n v e s t i g a t i o n .
And i f t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n demonstrates reasonable cause, they are
held. And i f , i n f a c t , g u i l t y of a v i o l a t i o n , these cargos may be
seized and confiscated.
Q
How many businesses?
Yugoslavia t h a t are now frozen?
where?
The ones t h a t are based i n
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
What are you r e f e r r i n g to?
Businesses located
Q
Well, your number one p o i n t — now blocks out
property i f companies have headquarters i n Bosnia. Who does t h a t
affect?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
Q
Fourteen?
Fourteen.
And what kind of businesses are they?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
companies.
MR
OE
Generally, t r a d i n g
�_ 4 -
Q
What personnel are you using?
Guard or the Navy t o enforce t h i s ?
I s i t the Coast
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There i s a f l e e t i n the
A d r i a t i c . There are Naval vessels — the United States but also of
several other nations under the NATO and there's a WEU presence as
w e l l t o enforce the embargo o f f the coast of Montenegro i n the
A d r i a t i c Sea.
I n a d d i t i o n , the requirements f a l l upon a l l states t o
d e t a i n any vessel found i n t h e i r t e r r i t o r i a l waters which i s deemed
to have v i o l a t e d the sanctions, or any ship which i s owned or
c o n t r o l l e d by Serbian Montenegro.
Q
You j u s t returned from Europe. Senator Biden and
others have had recent t r i p s . Did you f i n d i n your discussions any
increased w i l l i n g n e s s t o t a l k about m i l i t a r y options?
Any
f r u s t r a t i o n w i t h sanctions as a way of changing Serbian behavior?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: When I l e f t , I was
mandated t o t a l k t o them about doing the best possible job on the
sanctions. I f they t r i e d t o move the subject beyond t h a t , I
b a s i c a l l y said, I r e a l l y can't go beyond t h a t . That's another matter
to be d e a l t w i t h a t a d i f f e r e n t l e v e l .
But as regards t h e i r a t t i t u d e towards the sanctions, we
found them aware of problems and previous —
Q
Who
are —
who
—
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: These were people t h a t
— the mission I l e d l a s t week had contact w i t h i n Europe l a s t week.
They represented f a i r l y senior l e v e l s i n the B r i t i s h government —
the EC, the WEU, the German government, the I t a l i a n government, and
the French government. They were a l l very candid and aware of
problems i n implementing the sanctions i n the past. They were each,
at each stop, determined t h a t when the new r e s o l u t i o n enters i n t o
force, i t would be administered t o f u l l e f f i c i e n c y . They f e l t t h a t
they j u s t had t o , f o r the sake of t h e i r own c r e d i b i l i t y , make sure
t h a t the job was done as close t o the t h e o r e t i c a l maximum as you
could get.
Q
To what extent do you t h i n k t h a t the weakness of
the previous actions have encouraged Milosevic t o b e l i e v e t h a t the
United States and the other a l l i e s w i l l not be f o r c e f u l and t h a t they
can get away w i t h l i t e r a l l y murder?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I t ' s hard t o say what
goes on i n Milosevic's mind. But, obviously, everybody concerned
believes, regardless of any d i f f e r e n c e s there might be about
subsequent steps, there i s now uniform b e l i e f we've got the
sanctions; we have got t o use them f o r a l l they are worth; and a
readiness t o do t h a t t h a t I t h i n k i s now i n place i n Europe.
Q
The use of sanctions i n the past have not changed
Serbian behavior. Why do we t h i n k these sanctions are going t o make
a difference?
least.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: For two reasons, at
I f you were here the l a s t time when we b r i e f e d you —
Q
—
not.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. Well, the same
l i n e of questioning came up, and a l l I could say was t h a t we were not
using the sanctions as a smart munition. I n other words, we d i d n ' t
t h i n k the sanctions could destroy the w i l l of Milosevic or the w i l l
of somebody l i k e Karadzic t o continue. A l l we knew t h a t the
sanctions could do would be t o r a i s e the cost of what they were
doing, and the impact of the new r e s o l u t i o n should be t o
MR
OE
�- 5 -
s u b s t a n t i a l l y r a i s e the cost above anything t h a t they have already
paid, which i s considerable. Now, where i s the t h r e s h o l d when t h i s
w i l l make a d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e i r p o l i c y ? The answer i s , we can't
p r e d i c t i t and we're not r e a l l y t r y i n g . We are simply t r y i n g t o make
the sanctions e f f e c t i v e .
threshold?
Q
Do you t h i n k these sanctions w i l l reach t h a t
I s i t your judgment t h a t you t h i n k they w i l l ?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I t h i n k t h a t these
sanctions, p r o p e r l y administered, are capable of reaching the
t h r e s h o l d where i t w i l l become extremely d i f f i c u l t f o r the Serbs t o
f i n d some k i n d of manageable e q u i l i b r i u m s t a t e f o r t h e i r economy. I
mean, t h e i r economy has been badly h u r t , but they have managed t o
lash i t together by one means or another, and t o s o r t of keep t h i n g s
running. I mean, we can go i n t o the d e t a i l s of what we t h i n k the
s t a t e of t h e i r economy now i s . But the broad answer t o your question
i s , these sanctions w i l l make i t much harder f o r them t o f i n d any
e q u i l i b r i u m l e v e l i n t h e i r economy.
Q
I s t h a t a nice way o f saying t h a t what you're
looking f o r i s a t o t a l economic breakdown, i n e f f e c t ?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm being h e s i t a n t
about t h a t , because I don't want t o overstate even what the
o b j e c t i v e s f o r these are. Let's j u s t say t h a t we t h i n k we w i l l come
close t o a complete stoppage of transshipments across boundaries over
the A d r i a t i c and down the Danube. I would warn you t h a t i t ' s going
to take a l i t t l e time t o get t h i s machinery i n place. I t i s not
going t o be i n place running smoothly the day a f t e r the sanctions go
i n t o e f f e c t . But I am confident — or more confident than when I
l e f t f o r Europe, t h a t they w i l l be i n place s h o r t l y .
Q
Does t h a t mean i t w i l l stop t h e i r arms supply? And
also — I mean, w i l l i t h i t them i n terms of food and necessities?
Medicine?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Where arms supply i s
concerned, u n f o r t u n a t e l y , I don't t h i n k so, because the o l d Yugoslav
Army — the Federal Yugoslav Army had an immense supply of weapons
based on s i z i n g t h e i r force t o deal w i t h the Warsaw Pact. And they
also had a very s u b s t a n t i a l m i l i t a r y base i n t h e i r economy t o produce
weapons.
So, b a s i c a l l y , t h i s war has been fought w i t h the stocks
of the o l d Yugoslav Army, much of which were l e f t i n place i n Bosnia
when the Federal Army — i n quotes — p u l l e d out back t o Serbia. So
t h a t s t u f f i s s t i l l there. I t gets used up a t whatever r a t e i t ' s
used up on the b a t t l e f i e l d . We aren't going t o be able t o a f f e c t
t h a t . I t ' s the c i v i l i a n economy which i s p r i m a r i l y a f f e c t e d .
Q
Are there i n d i c a t o r s i n t h a t c i v i l i a n economy t h a t
we can look a t several weeks from now t o determine whether or not the
sanctions are a c t u a l l y working? What a c t i v i t i e s w i l l we be able t o
see a f f e c t e d by t h i s a month or two from now?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I t h i n k i t w i l l be hard
to c a l c u l a t e the impact, looking a t the d i n a r , because the dinar has
already s o r t of imploded. My colleague here says t h a t the r a t e of
i n f l a t i o n i s on the order of 4 percent per day, which comes out on an
annualized basis t o some number l i k e 80 m i l l i o n percent. One could
check i n a month t o see whether or not there are any banks l e f t
f u n c t i o n i n g i n Belgrade; one of them has already gone out of
operation, another i s i n bad shape.
Those banks were p a r t i c u l a r l y important because they
were p o i n t s where people put t h e i r hard currency as place, as a store
of value. And the banks were operated i n cahoots w i t h the government
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�- 6-
of Serbia, and so, i n e f f e c t , t h e banks were kind o f uptake s l u i c e
f o r hard currency i n t o the system.
To t h e extent t h e banks cease t o operate, then a very
important p a r t of the mechanism t h a t f l o a t e d t h e government
f i n a n c i a l l y — thought i t was a b e l l y - u p , and also a very important
p a r t of t h e system t h a t keeps the economy lashed together goes up
because, b a s i c a l l y w i t h the dinar close t o not worth t h e paper i t ' s
p r i n t e d on, i t ' s the hard currency t h a t ' s l e f t i n t h e system t h a t
forms t h e basis f o r exchange.
Q
How f a r along are you i n terms of t h e maximum
sanctions t h a t could be imposed? I mean, are there a l o t of t h i n g s
t h a t could yet be done? I mean, are you almost a l l t h e way t o the
edge of t h e l i n e ?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Can I come back t o your
question i n a second? I don't t h i n k I r e a l l y exhausted the answer t o
your question. I t ' s going t o be v a r i a b l e . You could look a t how
long i t takes t o get a t a n k f u l of gas, f o r example. But t h a t might
depend upon how much e f f o r t i s being made by a u t h o r i t i e s t o be sure
t h a t conspicuous locations l i k e Belgrade are well-served.
You could look e s p e c i a l l y a t the cost of t h e average
basket o f goods and services t h a t a t y p i c a l family has t o procure and
what i t costs them t o procure t h a t . And you could t r y t o do some
estimating of how many people are unemployed, what i s t h e i r
i n d u s t r i a l production a f t e r a c e r t a i n p o i n t . So, there are
i n d i c a t o r s and we w i l l be looking f o r them.
Now, l e t me come back t o your question.
Q
What's t h e extent o f these i n terms of how f a r you
could p o s s i b l y go? I s there a l o t more t h a t could be done through
sanctions, or i s t h i s about as f a r as you can go?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
I don't
know.
One o f
the meetings we need t o have i s what's l e f t . But i t was my
impression as we prepared on t h i s t h a t we are g e t t i n g close t o t h e
maximum.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The only
d i s t i n c t i o n s — the only t h i n g l e f t i n terms of t h e trade side i s
there s t i l l i s carved out a very small number of food, medicine,
humanitarian items which can go without very s t r i c t c o n t r o l i n terms
of movement of the good i n , but such items are s t i l l subject t o close
inspection and monitoring t o determine t h a t they are going f o r a
l e g i t i m a t e humanitarian need and t h a t they are t h e commodities t h a t
are i d e n t i f i e d i n the paperwork.
Q
So, s i r , e s s e n t i a l l y — c o r r e c t us i f I'm wrong,
but e s s e n t i a l l y you're a t the same place you were a t t h e previous
b r i e f i n g , which i s t o say sanctions are having an e f f e c t on the
economy, but i n terms of prosecuting the war, you're acknowledging
t h a t they are i n e f f e c t i v e ?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not sure whether
I'm acknowledging t h a t they are i n e f f e c t i v e . I don't want t o
t h e o r i z e , e i t h e r , but there's an awful l o t of c r o s s - t a l k going on i n
diplomatic channels, p a r t of which appears t o be i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of
the e f f e c t of the sanctions.
There's an awful l o t o f behavior i n Serbia i t s e l f t h a t
suggests a b e l i e f or an expectation there i n t h e general populace, as
w e l l as i n t h e p o l i t i c a l leadership —
Q
You mean hoarding?
MR
OE
What are you t a l k i n g about?
�- 7-
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Hoarding. People t o go
over t h e borders t o t r y t o f i l l up a tank of gas. The k i n d of things
t h a t a population does when they expect t h i n g s t o get worse q u i c k l y ,
we're seeing. I n my opinion, r a t h e r than speculate, l e t ' s j u s t see
what t h e h e l l happens. But t h i s i s going t o be a tougher regime than
we had before. I f everything goes r i g h t , i t w i l l be s u b s t a n t i a l l y
tougher. Then we see what happens.
I had c a l l e d you when you —
Q
How d i f f i c u l t i s i t t o enforce these sanctions a t
the borders i n t h a t t e r r i t o r y ? I t ' s not as f l a t and open an area,
say, as I r a q .
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me e x p l a i n t o you
what you might be l o o k i n g f o r i n terms o f the machinery. Just go
around t h e c i r c u i t . On t h e A d r i a t i c , there i s a Western European
Union — WEU — naval contingent and a NATO naval contingent. They
are working together t o t r y t o block shipments o f contraband
p r i m a r i l y i n t o t h e p o r t of Bar i n Montenegro. That's t h e main p o i n t
where you would go t o d e l i v e r anything.
There have been instances i n t h e past where there have
been i n c i d e n t s where we l o s t a l o t of ground. I t doesn't take more
than one b i g ship f u l l o f o i l p u l l i n g i n there t o undo a l o t o f
previous work, even though many other ships — on t h e order o f
thousands o f them — have been r o u t i n e l y challenged and boarded.
NATO and the WEU are upgrading t h e i r r u l e s o f engagement. They are
making i t t i g h t e r . They are redeploying. They have got more
e f f e c t i v e t a c t i c s . We t h i n k t h a t t h a t problem i s p r e t t y w e l l i n
hand. We'll j u s t have t o watch i t as i t goes out.
On t h e Danube, the Europeans — the Western European
Union — i s prepared t o put on the Danube as many as — what i s i t ,
e i g h t — boats manned by customs and p o l i c e personnel from t h e WEU.
They have a l l o c a t e d on the order of 250 people t o make t h i s process
work. So t h a t would take care of a l o t o f the problems t h a t one sees
on the upper Danube i n the v i c i n i t y of Hungary. We have already sent
s i x boats, t o be d i v i d e d evenly between t h e Bulgarians and t h e
Romanians. They have a r r i v e d . Our Coast Guard i s t r a i n i n g t h e i r
people. They w i l l be on the r i v e r by t h e end of t h i s month, using
those c r a f t t o t r y t o help p o l i c e them.
Around the perimeter of Serbia on the ground, there are
already t h e so-called SAM monitoring s t a t i o n s . This i s the Sanctions
Assistance Missions which are m u l t i n a t i o n a l , and what we are
a n t i c i p a t i n g i s t h a t they w i l l be upgraded. I am w a i t i n g f o r the
exact r e s u l t s o f a meeting between f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s t h a t occurred i n
Denmark over t h i s weekend so t h a t I can t e l l i n e x a c t l y what way the
Europeans have decided t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n upgrading those s t a t i o n s .
there?
Q
By what a u t h o r i t y d i d you send those ships over
I s t h a t under the executive order or under another order?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, t h a t was done
e a r l i e r as a matter of — I don't want t o t r i p over my f e e t here, so
perhaps you can —
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
I t i s a NATO f l e e t .
I t was a NATO exercise.
Q
So i n other words, we are already a t war —
m u l t i n a t i o n a l war over there already.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me c l a r i f y .
you r e f e r r i n g t o t h e s i x boats t h a t we sent t o —
MR
OE
Were
�- 8 -
Q
Yes. I'm r e f e r r i n g t o a l l of t h i s — the upgrading
forces, as you say, and adding forces and sending ships.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The s i x boats t h a t were
sent t o t h e Danube were s i x boats. They are unarmed r i v e r p a t r o l
boats o f t e n used by harbor p a t r o l s and customs services t o p o l i c e
harbors and r i v e r s i n t h e United States.
Q
But j u s t the same, they i n v o l v e American personnel
t h a t could be k i l l e d .
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, these boats w i l l be
manned by t h e l o c a l customs services of Romania and Bulgaria. The
U.S. Coast Guard i s providing them a course i n boat maintenance, boat
use, and r i v e r p a t r o l techniques. Once t h i s i s passed over, i t ' s
t h e i r boats t o use.
Q
I n other words, we are already a t war.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
Q
M u l t i n a t i o n a l war.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
Q
No.
No.
Can I f o l l o w up on t h a t one question?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
Just before we go.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we are not. And i f
we — you know, i f i t takes a l i t t l e more discussion t o deal w i t h
t h a t p o i n t , we'd be happy t o have i t .
Q
No.
Q
What do you see i n t h e Serbian government t o
suggest t h a t the f o l k s there are s t a r t i n g t o f e e l t h e pressure?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Anytime one of them
engages i n a discussion w i t h a Western leader, t o t h e best of our
knowledge there i s one universal p a r t of t h e package, which i s what
would i t take t o get t h e sanctions o f f .
Q
I r a q t a l k e d about t h a t a l o t , t o o .
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And we t h i n k t h a t i s
p a r t of t h e calculus where they are concerned.
Q
I know, but look a t — I mean what's — i t ' s not
g e t t i n g c o n t r o l o f anything w i t h the U.N. r e s o l u t i o n s .
I mean, I
understand the l i m i t a t i o n s on the mission t h a t you have, and I don't
mean t o be — not t o disregard t h a t , but I assume t h e President has
spoken of l o o k i n g a t the undertaking there w i t h some h u m i l i t y , and I
assume you do as w e l l recognizing t h a t sanctions are inexact and not
exactly a s u r g i c a l weapon, I —
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The j o b t h a t we f i l l i s
t o make t h e sanctions work t o maximum e f f e c t i v e n e s s w i t h nothing on
the b o t t l e i n terms of f a l s e a d v e r t i s i n g . We don't know — i f i t
grows h a i r , w e ' l l l e t you know i f i t does. (Laughter.)
Q
I f I could f o l l o w up on t h a t very p o i n t . Last time
you were here, you took pains t o say you would not argue t h a t the
sanctions t o t h a t p o i n t had had any e f f e c t on the s i t u a t i o n on the
ground i n Bosnia a t a l l . Could you j u s t update us on your view on
t h a t now?
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�- 9 -
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I t ' s s u b s t a n t i a l l y the
same. The sanctions are b a s i c a l l y aimed mainly a t t h e Republic of
Serbia and a t t h e government i n Belgrade.
I t becomes very dicey t o
t r y t o c a l c u l a t e what impact t h e sanctions have on t h e Serb m i l i t a r y
e f f o r t i n Bosnia proper.
The assumption here i s t h a t t h e address of t h e war i n
whole or i n large p a r t i s Belgrade. At t h e minimum, an assumption i s
t h a t Belgrade has a strong voice i n determining some o f t h e decisions
t h a t are c r i t i c a l t o t h i s t h a t would have t o be made. And, so, the
underlying assumption i s t h a t economic pressure t h a t i s e f f e c t i v e on
Serbia proper w i l l have an e f f e c t sooner or l a t e r on t h e i r own
decision-making and on Milosevic's calculus about what's i n h i s
interest.
Q
You may have answered t h i s already, I got confused.
How long do you t h i n k i t w i l l be before the f u l l impact of these
sanctions takes hold? And d i d any of t h e Europeans you spoke w i t h
argue i n favor of l e t t i n g t h a t happen before contemplating anything
further?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Going t o your second
question, as I t o l d you, as soon as these f o l k s began t o t r y t o push
me i n t o a discussion of the l i n k — t h e nexus between sanctions and
other possible options, I had t o t e l l them I can't do t h a t . I'm only
here t o t a l k t o you about the sanctions.
As t o how long t o estimate, we're t r y i n g t o form
t h a t — we w i l l know b e t t e r ourselves when we get a l i t t l e more
i n f o r m a t i o n out of our posts — our d i p l o m a t i c posts i n Europe how
long we t h i n k i t w i l l take f o r the Europeans t o put t h e i r a d d i t i o n a l
resources — t h e ones t h a t they have committed t o p u t i n place. But
as I s a i d , I expect some period of m i l l i n g around and confusion while
a l l t h i s happens.
Q
A week?
Two weeks? A month?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
What do you think?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I t h i n k as soon as
possible. Some w i l l begin t o deploy very q u i c k l y . We've deployed 17
a d d i t i o n a l sanctions assistance monitors, b r i n g i n g our t o t a l t o 27
already. Our 17 a d d i t i o n a l ones went out over l a s t weekend. So I
t h i n k i t w i l l happen once the decisions are confirmed now very
quickly.
Q
Can you describe what one of these — what i s one
of these monitors?
I s t h i s a person w i t h a tank and a gun t h a t stops
shipments? Or do they j u s t stand there w i t h a c l i p b o a r d and check
these t h i n g s o f f as they go past?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sanctions — go ahead.
You have p r a c t i c a l l y invented t h i s subject, so describe i t .
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They are Customs
o f f i c e r s — l e t me t a l k about the 27 American Customs o f f i c e r s . They
are t r a i n e d Customs o f f i c e r s , t r a i n e d i n both border work, cargo
i n s p e c t i o n , and i n v e s t i g a t i o n techniques. What they do i s they work
very c l o s e l y w i t h the l o c a l Customs services, p r o v i d i n g advice and
counsel i n terms of what ought t o be done and how i t can be done, and
monitoring. That i s t o say they're looking over t h e shoulders of the
l o c a l Customs a u t h o r i t i e s t o make sure they are doing t h e i r j o b . And
i f they are not doing t h e i r j o b , t h i s i s being reported back t o the
c e n t r a l government a u t h o r i t i e s of t h a t country, and t o t h e
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Community through a s t r u c t u r e t h a t has been created f o r
t h a t purpose under t h e EC and the CSCE.
MR
OE
�- 10 -
Let me j u s t add one other aspect t o i t , which i s k i n d of
unique. The sanctions monitors are t i e d i n w i t h each other w i t h
communications equipment — M-RSAT systems and through a c e n t r a l
communications system i n Brussels which we c a l l SAMCOMM. This allows
them t o question any p a r t i c u l a r shipment and send i t back through
Brussels t o t h e domestic customs services of t h e country of o r i g i n
and supposedly t h e country of r e c e i p t t o v e r i f y t h e shipment, t o make
sure i t ' s l e g i t i m a t e and t o make sure t h a t i t a r r i v e s . And t o the
extent t h a t they do not, i t puts i n t r a i n t h e a b i l i t y t o i n v e s t i g a t e
and prosecute f o r t h e v i o l a t i o n .
Q
Could I do a f o l l o w up on Susan's question? You
mentioned t h a t people you have t a l k e d t o would b r i n g up subjects.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Next, f o r sure. This
guy's got dibs. No matter what happens, don't even t r y .
(Laughter.)
Q
— would go beyond t h e sanctions. You have people
from t h e EC, people from W U would t r y t o engage you i n conversations
E
about t h i n g s t h a t went beyond sanctions. Are they t r y i n g t o do t h a t
more than they used to? Do you detect a d i s p o s i t i o n t o discuss w i t h
you f u r t h e r steps t h a t you are now holding back on? Give us a sense
of how t h e Europeans are addressing the questions about what happens
a f t e r t h e sanctions before you c u t them o f f ? What are they saying t o
you?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That was a wonderfully
posed question, but I have a wonderfully e f f i c i e n t answer, which i s
t h i s i s t h e f i r s t time I've gone over there. So there was no before
and, consequently, I don't have a baseline.
Q
conversation.
You mentioned they t r i e d t o engage you i n
What d i d they say? Did they say l e t ' s —
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: P r e t t y much what you
s a i d ; could you give us an idea of what your government i s
t h i n k i n g — what might happen, please.
Q
And you said no.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
And I said no.
Q
I ' l l bet y o u ' l l f e e l g u i l t y .
couple of questions.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
I'm going t o ask a
I may not f e e l t h a t
guilty.
Q
You're t a l k i n g about i f a l l t h i s works y o u ' l l have
a complete stoppage of transshipments. Armies need f u e l . What
e f f e c t i s t h a t going t o have on the Serbians i n terms of t h e i r
mechanized s t u f f and whatever they need t o r o l l ?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have a f e e l i n g t h a t
the Serbs w i l l probably d i r e c t f u e l a t t h e i r army and a t m i l i t a r y
u n i t s t h a t need i t i n Bosnia, no matter what.
Q
Taking i t away from t h e people
—
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: T h e y ' l l take i t away
from t h e c i v i l i a n economy f o r as long as they need i t t o support what
they consider t o be t h e i r m i l i t a r y operations. So one would look f o r
t h i s t o show up i n various d i s l o c a t i o n s and shortages i n t h e c i v i l i a n
economy. Now, t o the extent t h a t there have been holes, t h e Serbs
have concentrated on t r y i n g t o get as much o i l through those holes as
they could; and t h e r e f o r e , t o t h e extent t h a t we're successful i n
plugging t h e holes, i t may take time t o d r a i n s t u f f out o f there.
Moreover, as t h e i r economy s p i r a l s down, i t s demands f o r inputs, l i k e
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�- 11 -
o i l , also diminish. So the r a t e of consumption from e x i s t i n g stocks,
you could expect also t o decline.
Q
knows they're
And what e f f e c t i s t h i s having on t h e Muslims? God
—
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
Q
On what?
On the Muslims.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You'd have t o ask the
Muslims. I n my opinion, the Muslims look upon t h i s a t l e a s t as being
i n t h e r i g h t d i r e c t i o n . Beyond t h a t , I suppose the Muslims would
l i k e something else, but t h e something else i s not f o r me t o t a l k
about.
Q
What kind of upgrading — you don't know what i s
going t o occur, but what possible kind o f upgrading could a ground
monitor have? How could i t change?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The f i r s t and major
upgrading i s t o make sure t h a t you've got enough s h i f t s on t o do 24hour-a-day operations. And t h a t would be t h e most important t h i n g
f o r us t o get i n place i n each of these l o c a t i o n s .
Q
Where do you resupply r i v e r b o a t p a t r o l from?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
riverboat patrol.
Q
We don't have a
Well, you have r i v e r b o a t s there.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have r i v e r b o a t s
which we have given t o the Romanians and t h e Bulgarians — three
each.
Q
By what a u t h o r i t y d i d you do t h i s ?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: One more question.
We've got a grand t o t a l of three, and you've got t o help me out of
t h i s here.
One.
Q
By what a u t h o r i t y d i d you give those boats away?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
We gave them away --
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
Did we give them away?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we d i d n ' t — yes,
we — they are p a r t o f a package of t e c h n i c a l assistance, which was
provided t o t h e r i p a r i a n states t o upgrade t h e i r customs services and
public administration.
Q
Where were the Serbians g e t t i n g most of t h e i r o i l
from before the embargo? Which countries were t h e main suppliers?
Are there any oleoducts — Serbia, or does i t a l l come by ocean or by
the r i v e r ?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: One t h i n g t h a t ' s
impressive i s t h e degree t o which t h e Serbs organized an e f f o r t t o
get whatever they could from whatever d i r e c t i o n . So t h e answer i s
a l l o f t h e above. I can't give you t h e p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y , because t h a t
would mean t h a t I would have t o s t a r t discussing t h e foundation of
our knowledge, which i s i n t e l l i g e n c e data and I can't get i n t o i t .
Q
I have a follow-up. Russia — we a l l know t h e
Russian people have a l o t of a f f e c t i o n f o r t h e Serbs. Russia
produces o i l . Are the Serbs g e t t i n g any o i l from Russia?
�- 12 -
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The same answer t o t h a t
question. But don't read i n t o t h a t — an i n c l i n a t i o n as t o whether
i t ' s a l o t or a l i t t l e .
I j u s t can't answer i t .
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
That's two.
Q
Okay. I f I'm not mistaken, you've said i n the past
t h a t you f e e l s t r o n g l y t h a t more ought t o be done t o help t h e
Bosnians i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n . Do you f e e l f r u s t r a t i o n these days as
you go about working on t h i s s i t u a t i o n ?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
I think I feel j e t lag.
And you, s i r , i n the back.
Q
I wanted t o f o l l o w on t h e upgrading. Do you mean
there are some places t h a t you can't have a monitor around-theclock? And what does t h a t mean f o r t h e times t h a t he's not there?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The answer i s yes,
there are places where there are not monitors around-the-clock. And
what i s means i s when the monitors go home, t h e smugglers come out,
which i s why we need monitors around-the-clock. And an index of how
serious t h e Europeans are i s , w i l l they help f i l l t h e gaps. We're
hopeful they w i l l .
THE PRESS: Thank you.
END
MR
OE
2:17 P.M. EDT
�THE WHITE HOUSE
O f f i c e of t h e Press Secretary
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
A p r i l 26, 1993
The B r i e f i n g Room
1:45 P.M. EDT
MR. CLARK: This w i l l be a BACKGROUND b r i e f i n g on
Serbian sanctions. I t ' l l be conducted by Leon Fuerth, who i s the
National S e c u r i t y Advisor t o t h e Vice President. And V i c Comras from
the State Department, and Richard Newcomb from t h e Treasury
Department. I t ' s ON BACKGROUND, i t can be a t t r i b u t e d t o senior
administration
officials.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
help make you b r i l l i a n t about sanctions.
sanctions.
Okay.
We're here t o
Okay. We a l l b r i e f e d you a couple of weeks ago on t h e
We're back. Things have been e v o l v i n g . The —
Q
I can't b e l i e v e you came back a f t e r t h a t other
briefing.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I asked Dee Dee how d i d
I do. You know, she wasn't i n here. She was l i s t e n i n g t o i t . She
said, "You d i d f i n e . " And I said, "How do you know?" And she said,
"Because they d i d n ' t get mad a t you by t h e end." (Laughter.) So
t h a t was t h e index of achievement.
I'm prepared t o — I t h i n k t h e best way t o do t h i s i s t o
run through t h e executive order, which has j u s t been issued —
Q
We've seen i t . Can we take up from there?
you expect t h e sanctions t o achieve?
What do
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me j u s t doublecheck. I f — I want t o make sure t h a t other people have seen i t and
I don't have t o worry about s t a r t i n g from a d i f f e r e n t b a s e l i n e . And
i f i t ' s — i f you're a l l a t t h e same s t a r t i n g p o i n t , then w e ' l l s t a r t
w i t h your question.
Okay.
What do we expect them t o achieve?
Q
Wait a minute.
Q
You might as w e l l not have seen i t .
Q
I t h i n k i t would be h e l p f u l i f we j u s t — a t l e a s t
you kind of summarized what they are.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
out what's happening?
Q
I f you can do t h a t .
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Do you want us t o block
�- 2 -
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay, we'll do i t
quickly and not lose time for those who have seen i t .
—
Okay, would you j u s t quickly block out what b a s i c a l l y i s
well, you drafted i t , so t a l k about what's in the executive order.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: To explain i t i n i t s
perhaps greatest perspective, i t goes back to U.N. Resolution 757,
Paragraph 5, which prohibited the transfer of an economic resource to
Yugoslavia.
The United States interpreted that f a i r l y broadly. So
for the greatest part, everything required of U.N. Resolution 820 has
been already completed within the United States. There are, however,
a few additional steps that we'll be taking now.
Whereas before, i t blocked property and i n t e r e s t s of
property of the government of Yugoslavia in the United States, i t now
blocks a l l property or businesses organized or located in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, or Serbia. So that means i f a company has a
headquarters in Serbia, i t i s now blocked in the United States.
Secondly, vessels were blocked as property in the United
States from the l a s t executive order. The new executive order
permits charges to owners of the property for expenses. I t also
allows detention of vessels in the United States for investigation of
a v i o l a t i o n that occurred in Yugoslavia, so i f a t h i r d country vessel
has violated the provisions of U.N. Resolution 820, i t gives us the
authority to block these vessels in the United States.
I t prohibits U.S. vessels from entering the t e r r i t o r i a l
waters of Serbia and i t prohibits United States persons from
conducting any business in the U.N. protected area of Croatia or the
Bosnian-Serb controlled areas of Bosnia-Hercegovina.
In summary, that's what i t does; that's a l l i t does.
Q
What about freezing the assets?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They were already
frozen in the United States from the e a r l i e r executive order. What
t h i s U.N. resolution does i s , i t puts a much broader mandate on our
a l l i e s to take greater steps because i t requires the freezing of
funds within t h e i r t e r r i t o r i e s and prohibit the dealing or transfer
of funds to or for the benefit of anyone located —
Q
Would i t be f a i r to say that what the resolution
does mostly i s require our a l l i e s to do what we, for the most part,
have already done?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
That's f a i r l y
accurate.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: To some extent.
However, what we'll do i s s h i f t gears for a moment. As you r e a l i z e ,
the executive order simply sets up the authority to execute in the
United states what are the new r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s that come to us out
of the new resolution. So, b a s i c a l l y , your questions have now
shifted to what does the new resolution accomplish, and I'd l i k e to
ask you to summarize i t s principal parts.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The resolution covers a
lot of the loopholes that we found as we dealt with the 757, 787
language. P r i n c i p a l l y , i t cuts off the movement of a l l goods across
Serbian Montenegro, so-called transshipment provision, except on an
occasional basis — exceptional basis when approved by the U.N.
Sanctions Committee.
With respect to t r a n s i t i n g cargoes moving through Serbia
on the Danube, since we couldn't cut off a l l t r a f f i c on the Danube,
that t r a f f i c also requires approval by the Sanctions Committee on a
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�- 3 -
case-by-case b a s i s ; b u t t h e presumption i n t h i s case i s not one of
d e n i a l , as i t would be f o r t h e land transshipment.
I n t h i s case,
though, very close monitoring i s r e q u i r e d , i n c l u d i n g t h e presence o f
a monitor on board from t h e p o i n t , from C a l a f a t - V i d i n , which i s t h e
l a s t p o i n t on t h e Romanian Bulgarian s i d e , which — where t h e r i v e r
i s n o t y e t i n Serbia, t o t h e town of Mojas, which i s t h e f i r s t main
p o i n t on t h e Hungarian s i d e , where t h e r e i s no Serbian c o n t r o l of t h e
river.
Q
What k i n d o f goods would t h i s be?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This now covers a l l
goods. The previous r e s o l u t i o n , 787, r e q u i r e d a l l what might be
c a l l e d "key i n d u s t r i a l commodities" t o be preapproved before they
moved along t h e Danube. I n t h i s case now, a l l goods — everything
r e q u i r e s preapproval.
Q
Do you have any idea how many businesses w i l l be
a f f e c t e d , or how many — do you have any idea how many ships might be
a f f e c t e d by t h i s order today?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are major f l e e t s ,
r i v e r f l e e t s along t h e r i v e r . A l l t h e r i p a r i a n s t a t e s have t h e i r own
r i v e r f l e e t s , so there i s a considerable amount of commerce, which
w i l l be subject t o these c o n t r o l s . The Danube, as you know, i s the
main l i n k between the Black Sea and the Balkan States, w i t h t h e r e s t
of Europe and vice-versa.
Q
But you t a l k about d e t e n t i o n of ships, f o r example,
U.S. t e r r i t o r i a l water —
maritime.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
Not t h e Danube. Sorry.
Nowhere onto t h e
Q
I'm s o r r y , the maritime. How many ships? You must
have some k i n d of idea how many ships may have been v i o l a t i n g
previous sanctions.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are two p a r t s of
the maritime coverage o f ships. One i s , those ships which are owned
and c o n t r o l l e d by Serbia — Serbian ships. There are about 35 of
those — 55 o f those, s o r r y . And we already have seven or e i g h t —
seven i n t h e United States.
With respect t o the other ships, as we f i n d a ship t h a t
has v i o l a t e d t h e sanctions, there i s now c l e a r a u t h o r i t y under the
new r e s o l u t i o n f o r such ships t o be detained pending i n v e s t i g a t i o n .
And i f t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n demonstrates reasonable cause, they are
held. And i f , i n f a c t , g u i l t y o f a v i o l a t i o n , these cargos may be
seized and c o n f i s c a t e d .
Q
How many businesses?
Yugoslavia t h a t are now frozen?
where?
The ones t h a t are based i n
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
What are you r e f e r r i n g to?
Businesses located
Q
Well, your number one p o i n t — now blocks out
property i f companies have headquarters i n Bosnia. Who does t h a t
affect?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
Q
Fourteen?
Fourteen.
And what k i n d o f businesses are they?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
companies.
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Generally, t r a d i n g
�- 4 -
Q
What personnel are you using?
Guard or the Navy t o enforce t h i s ?
I s i t the Coast
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There i s a f l e e t i n the
A d r i a t i c . There are Naval vessels — the United States but also of
several other nations under the NATO and there's a WEU presence as
w e l l t o enforce the embargo o f f the coast of Montenegro i n the
A d r i a t i c Sea.
I n a d d i t i o n , the requirements f a l l upon a l l s t a t e s t o
d e t a i n any vessel found i n t h e i r t e r r i t o r i a l waters which i s deemed
t o have v i o l a t e d the sanctions, or any ship which i s owned or
c o n t r o l l e d by Serbian Montenegro.
Q
You j u s t returned from Europe. Senator Biden and
others have had recent t r i p s . Did you f i n d i n your discussions any
increased w i l l i n g n e s s t o t a l k about m i l i t a r y options?
Any
f r u s t r a t i o n w i t h sanctions as a way of changing Serbian behavior?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: When I l e f t , I was
mandated t o t a l k t o them about doing the best p o s s i b l e j o b on the
sanctions. I f they t r i e d t o move the subject beyond t h a t , I
b a s i c a l l y s a i d , I r e a l l y can't go beyond t h a t . That's another matter
to be d e a l t w i t h a t a d i f f e r e n t l e v e l .
But as regards t h e i r a t t i t u d e towards the sanctions, we
found them aware of problems and previous —
Q
Who
are —
who
—
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: These were people t h a t
— the mission I l e d l a s t week had contact w i t h i n Europe l a s t week.
They represented f a i r l y senior l e v e l s i n the B r i t i s h government —
the EC, the WEU, the German government, the I t a l i a n government, and
the French government. They were a l l very candid and aware of
problems i n implementing the sanctions i n the past. They were each,
at each stop, determined t h a t when the new r e s o l u t i o n enters i n t o
f o r c e , i t would be administered t o f u l l e f f i c i e n c y . They f e l t t h a t
they j u s t had t o , f o r the sake of t h e i r own c r e d i b i l i t y , make sure
t h a t the j o b was done as close t o the t h e o r e t i c a l maximum as you
could get.
Q
To what extent do you t h i n k t h a t the weakness of
the previous a c t i o n s have encouraged M i l o s e v i c t o b e l i e v e t h a t the
United States and the other a l l i e s w i l l not be f o r c e f u l and t h a t they
can get away w i t h l i t e r a l l y murder?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I t ' s hard t o say what
goes on i n Milosevic's mind. But, obviously, everybody concerned
b e l i e v e s , regardless of any d i f f e r e n c e s t h e r e might be about
subsequent steps, there i s now uniform b e l i e f we've got the
sanctions; we have got t o use them f o r a l l they are worth; and a
readiness t o do t h a t t h a t I t h i n k i s now i n place i n Europe.
Q
The use of sanctions i n the past have not changed
Serbian behavior. Why do we t h i n k these sanctions are going t o make
a difference?
least.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: For two reasons, at
I f you were here the l a s t time when we b r i e f e d you —
Q
—
not.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. Well, the same
l i n e of questioning came up, and a l l I could say was t h a t we were not
using the sanctions as a smart munition. I n other words, we d i d n ' t
t h i n k the sanctions could destroy the w i l l of M i l o s e v i c or the w i l l
of somebody l i k e Karadzic t o continue. A l l we knew t h a t the
sanctions could do would be t o r a i s e the cost of what they were
doing, and the impact of the new r e s o l u t i o n should be t o
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�- 5-
substantially r a i s e the cost above anything that they have already
paid, which i s considerable. Now, where i s the threshold when t h i s
w i l l make a difference i n t h e i r policy? The answer i s , we can't
predict i t and we're not r e a l l y trying. We are simply trying to make
the sanctions e f f e c t i v e .
threshold?
Q
Do you think these sanctions w i l l reach that
I s i t your judgment that you think they w i l l ?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that these
sanctions, properly administered, are capable of reaching the
threshold where i t w i l l become extremely d i f f i c u l t for the Serbs to
find some kind of manageable equilibrium state for t h e i r economy. I
mean, t h e i r economy has been badly hurt, but they have managed to
lash i t together by one means or another, and to sort of keep things
running.
I mean, we can go into the d e t a i l s of what we think the
state of t h e i r economy now i s . But the broad answer to your question
i s , these sanctions w i l l make i t much harder for them to find any
equilibrium l e v e l i n t h e i r economy.
Q
I s that a nice way of saying that what you're
looking for i s a t o t a l economic breakdown, i n effect?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm being hesitant
about that, because I don't want to overstate even what the
objectives for these are. Let's j u s t say that we think we w i l l come
close to a complete stoppage of transshipments across boundaries over
the A d r i a t i c and down the Danube. I would warn you that i t ' s going
to take a l i t t l e time to get t h i s machinery i n place. I t i s not
going to be i n place running smoothly the day a f t e r the sanctions go
into effect. But I am confident — or more confident than when I
l e f t for Europe, that they w i l l be i n place shortly.
Q
Does that mean i t w i l l stop t h e i r arms supply? And
also — I mean, w i l l i t h i t them i n terms of food and n e c e s s i t i e s ?
Medicine?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Where arms supply i s
concerned, unfortunately, I don't think so, because the old Yugoslav
Army — the Federal Yugoslav Army had an immense supply of weapons
based on s i z i n g t h e i r force to deal with the Warsaw Pact. And they
also had a very substantial military base i n t h e i r economy to produce
weapons.
So, b a s i c a l l y , t h i s war has been fought with the stocks
of the old Yugoslav Army, much of which were l e f t i n place i n Bosnia
when the Federal Army — i n quotes — pulled out back to Serbia. So
that stuff i s s t i l l there. I t gets used up at whatever rate i t ' s
used up on the b a t t l e f i e l d . We aren't going to be able to affect
that. I t ' s the c i v i l i a n economy which i s primarily affected.
Q
Are there indicators i n that c i v i l i a n economy that
we can look at several weeks from now to determine whether or not the
sanctions are actually working? What a c t i v i t i e s w i l l we be able to
see affected by t h i s a month or two from now?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think i t w i l l be hard
to c a l c u l a t e the impact, looking at the dinar, because the dinar has
already sort of imploded. My colleague here says that the rate of
i n f l a t i o n i s on the order of 4 percent per day, which comes out on an
annualized basis to some number l i k e 80 m i l l i o n percent. One could
check i n a month to see whether or not there are any banks l e f t
functioning i n Belgrade; one of them has already gone out of
operation, another i s i n bad shape.
Those banks were p a r t i c u l a r l y important because they
were points where people put t h e i r hard currency as place, as a store
of value. And the banks were operated i n cahoots with the government
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of Serbia, and so, i n effect, the banks were kind of uptake s l u i c e
for hard currency into the system.
To the extent the banks cease to operate, then a very
important part of the mechanism that floated the government
f i n a n c i a l l y — thought i t was a belly-up, and also a very important
part of the system that keeps the economy lashed together goes up
because, b a s i c a l l y with the dinar close to not worth the paper i t ' s
printed on, i t ' s the hard currency that's l e f t i n the system that
forms the basis for exchange.
Q
How far along are you i n terms of the maximum
sanctions that could be imposed? I mean, are there a l o t of things
that could yet be done? I mean, are you almost a l l the way to the
edge of the l i n e ?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Can I come back to your
question i n a second? I don't think I r e a l l y exhausted the answer to
your question. I t ' s going to be variable. You could look at how
long i t takes to get a tankful of gas, for example. But that might
depend upon how much effort i s being made by authorities to be sure
that conspicuous locations l i k e Belgrade are well-served.
You could look especially at the cost of the average
basket of goods and services that a t y p i c a l family has to procure and
what i t costs them to procure that. And you could t r y to do some
estimating of how many people are unemployed, what i s t h e i r
i n d u s t r i a l production after a certain point. So, there are
indicators and we w i l l be looking for them.
Now,
l e t me come back to your question.
Q
What's the extent of these i n terms of how far you
could possibly go? I s there a l o t more that could be done through
sanctions, or i s t h i s about as far as you can go?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know. One of
the meetings we need to have i s what's l e f t . But i t was my
impression as we prepared on t h i s that we are getting close to the
maximum.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The only
d i s t i n c t i o n s — the only thing l e f t in terms of the trade side i s
there s t i l l i s carved out a very small number of food, medicine,
humanitarian items which can go without very s t r i c t control i n terms
of movement of the good i n , but such items are s t i l l subject to close
inspection and monitoring to determine that they are going for a
legitimate humanitarian need and that they are the commodities that
are i d e n t i f i e d i n the paperwork.
Q
So, s i r , e s s e n t i a l l y — correct us i f I'm wrong,
but e s s e n t i a l l y you're at the same place you were at the previous
briefing, which i s to say sanctions are having an effect on the
economy, but i n terms of prosecuting the war, you're acknowledging
that they are ineffective?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
I'm acknowledging that they are i n e f f e c t i v e .
theorize, either, but there's an awful l o t of
diplomatic channels, part of which appears to
the effect of the sanctions.
I'm not sure whether
I don't want to
cross-talk going on in
be i n anticipation of
There's an awful l o t of behavior i n Serbia i t s e l f that
suggests a b e l i e f or an expectation there in the general populace, as
well as i n the p o l i t i c a l leadership —
Q
You mean hoarding?
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What are you talking about?
�- 7-
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Hoarding. People to go
over the borders to t r y to f i l l up a tank of gas. The kind of things
that a population does when they expect things to get worse quickly,
we're seeing. In my opinion, rather than speculate, l e t ' s j u s t see
what the h e l l happens. But t h i s i s going to be a tougher regime than
we had before. I f everything goes right, i t w i l l be substantially
tougher. Then we see what happens.
I had called you when you —
Q
How d i f f i c u l t i s i t to enforce these sanctions at
the borders i n that t e r r i t o r y ? I t ' s not as f l a t and open an area,
say, as Iraq.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me explain to you
what you might be looking for i n terms of the machinery. Just go
around the c i r c u i t . On the Adriatic, there i s a Western European
Union — WEU — naval contingent and a NATO naval contingent. They
are working together to t r y to block shipments of contraband
primarily into the port of Bar in Montenegro. That's the main point
where you would go to deliver anything.
There have been instances i n the past where there have
been incidents where we l o s t a l o t of ground. I t doesn't take more
than one big ship f u l l of o i l pulling i n there to undo a l o t of
previous work, even though many other ships — on the order of
thousands of them — have been routinely challenged and boarded.
NATO and the WEU are upgrading t h e i r rules of engagement. They are
making i t tighter. They are redeploying. They have got more
e f f e c t i v e t a c t i c s . We think that that problem i s pretty well i n
hand. We'll j u s t have to watch i t as i t goes out.
On the Danube, the Europeans — the Western European
Union — i s prepared to put on the Danube as many as — what i s i t ,
eight — boats manned by customs and police personnel from the WEU.
They have allocated on the order of 250 people to make t h i s process
work. So that would take care of a l o t of the problems that one sees
on the upper Danube i n the v i c i n i t y of Hungary. We have already sent
six boats, to be divided evenly between the Bulgarians and the
Romanians. They have arrived. Our Coast Guard i s training t h e i r
people. They w i l l be on the r i v e r by the end of t h i s month, using
those c r a f t to t r y to help police them.
Around the perimeter of Serbia on the ground, there are
already the so-called SAM monitoring stations. This i s the Sanctions
Assistance Missions which are multinational, and what we are
anticipating i s that they w i l l be upgraded. I am waiting for the
exact r e s u l t s of a meeting between foreign ministers that occurred i n
Denmark over t h i s weekend so that I can t e l l i n exactly what way the
Europeans have decided to participate i n upgrading those stations.
there?
Q
By what authority did you send those ships over
I s that under the executive order or under another order?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, that was done
e a r l i e r as a matter of — I don't want to t r i p over my feet here, so
perhaps you can —
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
I t i s a NATO f l e e t .
I t was a NATO exercise.
Q
So in other words, we are already at war —
multinational war over there already.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me c l a r i f y .
you referring to the s i x boats that we sent to —
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Q
Yes. I'm referring to a l l of t h i s — the upgrading
forces, as you say, and adding forces and sending ships.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The s i x boats that were
sent to the Danube were s i x boats. They are unarmed r i v e r patrol
boats often used by harbor patrols and customs services to police
harbors and r i v e r s in the United States.
Q
But j u s t the same, they involve American personnel
that could be k i l l e d .
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, these boats w i l l be
manned by the l o c a l customs services of Romania and Bulgaria.
The
U.S. Coast Guard i s providing them a course in boat maintenance, boat
use, and r i v e r patrol techniques. Once t h i s i s passed over, i t ' s
t h e i r boats to use.
Q
In other words, we are already at war.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
Q
Multinational
war.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
Q
No.
No.
Can I follow up on that one question?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
Just before we
go.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we are not. And i f
we — you know, i f i t takes a l i t t l e more discussion to deal with
that point, we'd be happy to have i t .
Q
No.
Q
What do you see in the Serbian government to
suggest that the folks there are s t a r t i n g to feel the pressure?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Anytime one of them
engages in a discussion with a Western leader, to the best of our
knowledge there i s one universal part of the package, which i s what
would i t take to get the sanctions off.
Q
Iraq talked about that a l o t , too.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And we think that i s
part of the calculus where they are concerned.
Q
I know, but look at — I mean what's — i t ' s not
getting control of anything with the U.N. resolutions. I mean, I
understand the limitations on the mission that you have, and I don't
mean to be — not to disregard that, but I assume the President has
spoken of looking at the undertaking there with some humility, and I
assume you do as well recognizing that sanctions are inexact and not
exactly a surgical weapon, I —
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The job that we f i l l i s
to make the sanctions work to maximum effectiveness with nothing on
the bottle in terms of false advertising. We don't know — i f i t
grows hair, we'll l e t you know i f i t does. (Laughter.)
Q
I f I could follow up on that very point. Last time
you were here, you took pains to say you would not argue that the
sanctions to that point had had any e f f e c t on the s i t u a t i o n on the
ground in Bosnia at a l l . Could you j u s t update us on your view on
that now?
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�- 9-
same.
Serbia
try to
effort
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I t ' s substantially the
The sanctions are b a s i c a l l y aimed mainly at the Republic of
and at the government i n Belgrade. I t becomes very dicey to
calculate what impact the sanctions have on the Serb m i l i t a r y
i n Bosnia proper.
The assumption here i s that the address of the war i n
whole or i n large part i s Belgrade. At the minimum, an assumption i s
that Belgrade has a strong voice i n determining some of the decisions
that are c r i t i c a l to t h i s that would have to be made. And, so, the
underlying assumption i s that economic pressure that i s e f f e c t i v e on
Serbia proper w i l l have an effect sooner or l a t e r on t h e i r own
decision-making and on Milosevic's calculus about what's i n h i s
interest.
Q
You may have answered t h i s already, I got confused.
How long do you think i t w i l l be before the f u l l impact of these
sanctions takes hold? And did any of the Europeans you spoke with
argue i n favor of l e t t i n g that happen before contemplating anything
further?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Going to your second
question, as I told you, as soon as these folks began to t r y to push
me into a discussion of the l i n k — the nexus between sanctions and
other possible options, I had to t e l l them I can't do that. I'm only
here to t a l k to you about the sanctions.
As to how long to estimate, we're trying to form
that — we w i l l know better ourselves when we get a l i t t l e more
information out of our posts — our diplomatic posts i n Europe how
long we think i t w i l l take for the Europeans to put t h e i r additional
resources — the ones that they have committed to put i n place. But
as I said, I expect some period of milling around and confusion while
a l l t h i s happens.
Q
A week?
Two weeks?
A month?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
What do you think?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
I think as soon as
possible. Some w i l l begin to deploy very quickly. We've deployed 17
additional sanctions assistance monitors, bringing our t o t a l to 27
already. Our 17 additional ones went out over l a s t weekend. So I
think i t w i l l happen once the decisions are confirmed now very
quickly.
Q
Can you describe what one of these — what i s one
of these monitors? I s t h i s a person with a tank and a gun that stops
shipments?
Or do they j u s t stand there with a clipboard and check
these things off as they go past?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sanctions — go ahead.
You have p r a c t i c a l l y invented t h i s subject, so describe i t .
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They are Customs
o f f i c e r s — l e t me t a l k about the 27 American Customs o f f i c e r s . They
are trained Customs o f f i c e r s , trained i n both border work, cargo
inspection, and investigation techniques. What they do i s they work
very closely with the local Customs services, providing advice and
counsel i n terms of what ought to be done and how i t can be done, and
monitoring. That i s to say they're looking over the shoulders of the
local Customs authorities to make sure they are doing t h e i r job. And
i f they are not doing t h e i r job, t h i s i s being reported back to the
central government authorities of that country, and to the
International Community through a structure that has been created for
that purpose under the EC and the CSCE.
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Let me j u s t add one other aspect to i t , which i s kind of
unique. The sanctions monitors are tied i n with each other with
communications equipment — M-RSAT systems and through a central
communications system i n Brussels which we c a l l SAMCOMM. This allows
them to question any p a r t i c u l a r shipment and send i t back through
Brussels to the domestic customs services of the country of origin
and supposedly the country of receipt to v e r i f y the shipment, to make
sure i t ' s legitimate and to make sure that i t a r r i v e s . And to the
extent that they do not, i t puts i n t r a i n the a b i l i t y to investigate
and prosecute for the v i o l a t i o n .
Q
Could I do a follow up on Susan's question? You
mentioned that people you have talked to would bring up subjects.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Next, for sure. This
guy's got dibs. No matter what happens, don't even t r y . (Laughter.)
Q
— would go beyond the sanctions. You have people
from the EC, people from WEU would t r y to engage you i n conversations
about things that went beyond sanctions. Are they trying to do that
more than they used to? Do you detect a disposition to discuss with
you further steps that you are now holding back on? Give us a sense
of how the Europeans are addressing the questions about what happens
after the sanctions before you cut them off? What are they saying to
you?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That was a wonderfully
posed question, but I have a wonderfully e f f i c i e n t answer, which i s
t h i s i s the f i r s t time I've gone over there. So there was no before
and, consequently, I don't have a baseline.
Q
conversation.
You mentioned they t r i e d to engage you i n
What did they say? Did they say l e t ' s —
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pretty much what you
said; could you give us an idea of what your government i s
thinking — what might happen, please.
Q
And you said no.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
And I said no.
Q
I ' l l bet you'll feel guilty.
couple of questions.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
I'm going to ask a
I may not f e e l that
guilty.
Q
You're talking about i f a l l t h i s works you'll have
a complete stoppage of transshipments. Armies need f u e l . What
effect i s that going to have on the Serbians i n terms of t h e i r
mechanized stuff and whatever they need to r o l l ?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have a feeling that
the Serbs w i l l probably direct fuel at t h e i r army and at m i l i t a r y
units that need i t i n Bosnia, no matter what.
Q
Taking i t away from the people
—
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They'll take i t away
from the c i v i l i a n economy for as long as they need i t to support what
they consider to be t h e i r military operations. So one would look for
t h i s to show up in various dislocations and shortages i n the c i v i l i a n
economy. Now, to the extent that there have been holes, the Serbs
have concentrated on trying to get as much o i l through those holes as
they could; and therefore, to the extent that we're successful in
plugging the holes, i t may take time to drain s t u f f out of there.
Moreover, as t h e i r economy s p i r a l s down, i t s demands for inputs, l i k e
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�- 11 -
o i l , also diminish. So the rate of consumption from existing stocks,
you could expect also to decline.
Q
knows they're
And what effect i s t h i s having on the Muslims?
God
—
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
Q
On what?
On the Muslims.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You'd have to ask the
Muslims. I n my opinion, the Muslims look upon t h i s at l e a s t as being
in the right direction. Beyond that, I suppose the Muslims would
l i k e something else, but the something else i s not for me to t a l k
about.
Q
What kind of upgrading — you don't know what i s
going to occur, but what possible kind of upgrading could a ground
monitor have? How could i t change?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The f i r s t and major
upgrading i s to make sure that you've got enough s h i f t s on to do 24hour-a-day operations. And that would be the most important thing
for us to get i n place i n each of these locations.
Q
Where do you resupply riverboat patrol from?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We don't have a
riverboat patrol.
Q
Well, you have riverboats there.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have riverboats
which we have given to the Romanians and the Bulgarians — three
each.
Q
By what authority did you do t h i s ?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: One more question.
We've got a grand t o t a l of three, and you've got to help me out of
t h i s here.
One.
Q
By what authority did you give those boats away?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We gave them away —
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
Did we give them away?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we didn't — yes,
we — they are part of a package of technical assistance, which was
provided to the r i p a r i a n states to upgrade t h e i r customs services and
public administration.
Q
Where were the Serbians getting most of t h e i r o i l
from before the embargo? Which countries were the main suppliers?
Are there any oleoducts — Serbia, or does i t a l l come by ocean or by
the r i v e r ?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: One thing that's
impressive i s the degree to which the Serbs organized an e f f o r t to
get whatever they could from whatever direction. So the answer i s
a l l of the above. I can't give you the proportionality, because that
would mean that I would have to s t a r t discussing the foundation of
our knowledge, which i s intelligence data and I can't get into i t .
Q
I have a follow-up. Russia — we a l l know the
Russian people have a l o t of affection for the Serbs. Russia
produces o i l . Are the Serbs getting any o i l from Russia?
�- 12 -
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The same answer to that
question. But don't read into that — an i n c l i n a t i o n as to whether
i t ' s a l o t or a l i t t l e . I j u s t can't answer i t .
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
That's two.
Q
Okay. I f I'm not mistaken, you've said i n the past
that you f e e l strongly that more ought to be done to help the
Bosnians i n t h i s situation. Do you f e e l frustration these days as
you go about working on t h i s situation?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
I think I f e e l j e t lag.
And you, s i r , i n the back.
Q
I wanted to follow on the upgrading. Do you mean
there are some places that you can't have a monitor around-theclock? And what does that mean for the times that he's not there?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The answer i s yes,
there are places where there are not monitors around-the-clock. And
what i s means i s when the monitors go home, the smugglers come out,
which i s why we need monitors around-the-clock. And an index of how
serious the Europeans are i s , w i l l they help f i l l the gaps. We're
hopeful they w i l l .
THE PRESS:
Thank you.
END
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2:17 P.M. EDT
�THE WHITE HOUSE
O f f i c e of t h e Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
A p r i l 26, 1993
TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:
On June 1, 1992, pursuant t o s e c t i o n 204(b) o f t h e
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1703(b)) and s e c t i o n 301 of the N a t i o n a l Emergencies Act
(50 U.S.C. 1631), President Bush reported t o t h e Congress
by l e t t e r s t o the President of t h e Senate and t h e Speaker
of t h e House, dated May 30, 1992, t h a t he had exercised h i s
s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y t o issue Executive Order No. 12808 o f
May 30, 1992, d e c l a r i n g a n a t i o n a l emergency and b l o c k i n g
"Yugoslav Government" p r o p e r t y and p r o p e r t y o f t h e Governments
of Serbia and Montenegro.
On June 5, 1992, pursuant t o t h e above a u t h o r i t i e s as
w e l l as s e c t i o n 1114 of t h e Federal A v i a t i o n Act (49 U.S.C.
App. 1514), and s e c t i o n 5 o f t h e United Nations P a r t i c i p a t i o n
Act (22 U.S.C. 287c), t h e President r e p o r t e d t o t h e Congress by
l e t t e r s t o t h e President of t h e Senate and t h e Speaker of t h e
House t h a t he had exercised h i s s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y t o issue
Executive Order No. 12810 o f June 5, 1992, b l o c k i n g p r o p e r t y o f
and p r o h i b i t i n g t r a n s a c t i o n s w i t h t h e Federal Republic o f
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).
This l a t t e r a c t i o n was
taken t o ensure t h a t the economic measures taken by t h e
United States w i t h respect t o t h e Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro) conform t o U.N. Security Council
Resolution No. 757 (May 30, 1992).
On January 19, 1993, pursuant t o the above a u t h o r i t i e s ,
President Bush reported t o the Congress by l e t t e r s t o t h e
President o f the Senate and the Speaker o f the House t h a t he
had exercised h i s s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y t o issue Executive Order
No. 12831 of January 15, 1993, t o impose a d d i t i o n a l economic
measures w i t h respect t o t h e Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro) t o conform t o U.N. S e c u r i t y Council
Resolution No. 787 (November 16, 1992). Those a d d i t i o n a l
measures p r o h i b i t e d t r a n s a c t i o n s r e l a t e d t o transshipments
through t h e Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro), as w e l l as t r a n s a c t i o n s r e l a t e d t o vessels owned
or c o n t r o l l e d by persons or e n t i t i e s i n t h e Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).
On A p r i l 17, 1993, the U.N. Security Council adopted
Resolution No. 820, c a l l i n g on the Bosnian Serbs t o accept
the Vance-Owen peace plan f o r Bosnia-Hercegovina and, i f they
f a i l e d t o do so by A p r i l 26, c a l l i n g on member s t a t e s t o take
a d d i t i o n a l measures t o t i g h t e n t h e embargo against t h e Federal
Republic o f Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).
Effective
12:01 a.m. EDT on A p r i l 26, 1993, I have taken a d d i t i o n a l
steps pursuant t o t h e above s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t i e s t o enhance
the implementation o f t h i s i n t e r n a t i o n a l embargo and t o conform
t o U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 820 ( A p r i l 17, 1993).
more
(OVER)
�The order t h a t I signed on A p r i l 25,
1993:
blocks a l l property of businesses organized or located
i n the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia or
Montenegro), i n c l u d i n g the p r o p e r t y of e n t i t i e s owned
or c o n t r o l l e d by them, wherever organized or l o c a t e d ,
i f t h a t p r o p e r t y i s i n or l a t e r comes w i t h i n the
United States or the possession or c o n t r o l of U.S.
persons, i n c l u d i n g t h e i r overseas branches;
charges t o the owners or operators of p r o p e r t y blocked
under t h a t order or Executive Order No. 12808, 12810,
or 12831 a l l expenses i n c i d e n t t o the b l o c k i n g and
maintenance of such p r o p e r t y , r e q u i r e s t h a t such
expenses be s a t i s f i e d from sources other than blocked
funds, and permits such property t o be s o l d and the
proceeds ( a f t e r payment of expenses) placed i n a
blocked account;
orders (1) the d e t e n t i o n , pending i n v e s t i g a t i o n , of
a l l nonblocked vessels, a i r c r a f t , f r e i g h t v e h i c l e s ,
r o l l i n g stock, and cargo w i t h i n the United States
t h a t are suspected of v i o l a t i n g U.N. S e c u r i t y Council
Resolution No. 713, 757, 787 or 820, and (2) the
b l o c k i n g of such conveyances or cargo i f a v i o l a t i o n
i s determined t o have been committed, and permits
the sale of such blocked conveyances or cargo and
the p l a c i n g of the net proceeds i n t o a blocked
account;
p r o h i b i t s any vessel r e g i s t e r e d i n the United States,
or owned or c o n t r o l l e d by U.S. persons, other than
a United States naval vessel, from e n t e r i n g the
t e r r i t o r i a l waters of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); and
p r o h i b i t s U.S. persons from engaging i n any dealings
r e l a t i n g t o the shipment of goods t o , from, or
through United Nations Protected Areas i n the
Republic of Croatia and areas i n the Republic of
Bosnia-Hercegovina under the c o n t r o l of Bosnian Serb
forces.
The order t h a t I signed on A p r i l 25, 1993, a u t h o r i z e s the
Secretary of the Treasury i n c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the Secretary of
State t o take such a c t i o n s , and t o employ a l l powers granted t o
me by the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Emergency Economic Powers Act and the
United Nations P a r t i c i p a t i o n Act, as may be necessary t o c a r r y
out the purposes of t h a t order, i n c l u d i n g the issuance of
licenses a u t h o r i z i n g t r a n s a c t i o n s otherwise p r o h i b i t e d .
The
sanctions imposed i n the order apply n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g any
p r e e x i s t i n g c o n t r a c t s , i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreements, l i c e n s e s or
a u t h o r i z a t i o n s . However, licenses or a u t h o r i z a t i o n s p r e v i o u s l y
issued pursuant t o Executive Order No. 12808, 12810, or 12831
are not i n v a l i d a t e d by the order unless they are terminated,
suspended or modified by a c t i o n of the i s s u i n g f e d e r a l agency.
The d e c l a r a t i o n of the n a t i o n a l emergency made by Executive
Order No. 12808 and the c o n t r o l s imposed under Executive Orders
No. 12810 and 12831, and any other p r o v i s i o n s of those orders
not modified by or i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the A p r i l 25, 1993, order,
remain i n f u l l f o r c e and are unaffected by t h a t order.
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
THE WHITE HOUSE,
A p r i l 26, 1993.
#
#
�THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
A p r i l 26, 1993
EXECUTIVE ORDER
ADDITIONAL MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
YUGOSLAVIA (SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO)
By the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America,
including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seg.), the National Emergencies Act
(50 U.S.C. 1601 et seg.), section 5 of the United Nations
Participation Act of 1945, as amended (22 U.S.C. 287c),
and section 301 of t i t l e 3, United States Code, in view of
United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 757 of May 30,
1992, No. 787 of November 16, 1992, and No. 820 of A p r i l 17,
1993, and in order to take additional steps with respect to
the actions and p o l i c i e s of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro) and the national emergency described
and declared in Executive Order No. 12808 and expanded in
Executive Order No. 12810 and No. 12831,
I , WILLIAM J . CLINTON, President of the United States of
America, hereby order:
Section 1. Notwithstanding the existence of any rights or
obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement
or any contract entered into or any license or permit granted
before the effective date of t h i s order, except to the extent
provided in regulations, orders, d i r e c t i v e s , or licenses which
may hereafter be issued pursuant to t h i s order:
(a) A l l property and interests in property of a l l
commercial, i n d u s t r i a l , or public u t i l i t y undertakings or
e n t i t i e s organized or located in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), including, without
limitation, the property and interests in property of e n t i t i e s
(wherever organized or located) owned or controlled by such
undertakings or e n t i t i e s , that are in the United States,
that hereafter come within the United States, or that are
or hereafter come within the possession or control of
United States persons, including t h e i r overseas branches,
are hereby blocked;
(b) A l l expenses incident to the blocking and maintenance
of property blocked under Executive Order Nos. 12808, 12810,
12831 or t h i s order s h a l l be charged to the owners or operators
of such property, which expenses s h a l l not be met from blocked
funds. Such property may also be sold or liquidated and the
proceeds placed in a blocked interest-bearing account in the
name of the owner;
(c) A l l vessels, freight vehicles, r o l l i n g stock,
a i r c r a f t and cargo that are within or hereafter come within the
United States and are not subject to blocking under Executive
Order Nos. 12808, 12810, 12831 or t h i s order, but which are
suspected of a violation of United Nations Security Council
Resolution Nos. 713, 757, 787 or 820, s h a l l be detained pending
investigation and, upon a determination by the Secretary of
the Treasury that they have been in violation of any of these
more
(OVER)
�r e s o l u t i o n s , s h a l l be blocked. Such blocked conveyances and
cargo may also be s o l d or l i q u i d a t e d and the proceeds placed
i n a blocked i n t e r e s t - b e a r i n g account i n the name o f the owner;
(d)
No vessel r e g i s t e r e d i n the United States or owned or
c o n t r o l l e d by United States persons, other than a United States
naval vessel, may enter the t e r r i t o r i a l waters o f t h e Federal
Republic o f Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); and
(e)
Any d e a l i n g by a United States person r e l a t i n g t o t h e
i m p o r t a t i o n from, e x p o r t a t i o n t o , o r transshipment through t h e
United Nations Protected Areas i n the Republic o f Croatia and
those areas o f the Republic o f Bosnia-Hercegovina under t h e
c o n t r o l o f Bosnian Serb f o r c e s , o r a c t i v i t y o f any k i n d t h a t
promotes o r i s intended t o promote such d e a l i n g , i s p r o h i b i t e d .
Sec. 2. The Secretary of the Treasury, i n c o n s u l t a t i o n
w i t h the Secretary o f State, i s hereby authorized t o take
such a c t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g the promulgation o f r u l e s and regul a t i o n s , and t o employ a l l powers granted t o the President
by the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Emergency Economic Powers Act and t h e
United Nations P a r t i c i p a t i o n Act as may be necessary t o
c a r r y out the purposes o f t h i s order. The Secretary o f t h e
Treasury may redelegate the a u t h o r i t y set f o r t h i n t h i s order
t o other o f f i c e r s and agencies o f the Federal Government, a l l
agencies o f which are hereby d i r e c t e d t o take a l l a p p r o p r i a t e
measures w i t h i n t h e i r a u t h o r i t y t o c a r r y out the p r o v i s i o n s o f
t h i s order, i n c l u d i n g suspension o r t e r m i n a t i o n o f licenses o r
other a u t h o r i z a t i o n s i n e f f e c t as o f the date o f t h i s order.
Sec. 3. Nothing i n t h i s order s h a l l apply t o a c t i v i t i e s
r e l a t e d t o the United Nations P r o t e c t i o n Force, t h e
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, and t h e
European Community Monitor Mission.
Sec. 4. The d e f i n i t i o n s contained i n s e c t i o n 5 of
Executive Order No. 12810 apply t o the terms used i n t h i s order.
Sec. 5. Nothing contained i n t h i s order s h a l l create
any r i g h t or b e n e f i t , substantive o r procedural, enforceable
by any p a r t y against the United States, i t s agencies or
i n s t r u m e n t a l i t i e s , i t s o f f i c e r s o r employees, or any other
person.
Sec. 6. This order s h a l l not a f f e c t the p r o v i s i o n s o f
licenses and a u t h o r i z a t i o n s issued pursuant t o Executive Order
Nos. 12808, 12810, 12831 and i n f o r c e on the e f f e c t i v e date o f
t h i s order, except as such licenses o r a u t h o r i z a t i o n may
h e r e a f t e r be terminated, modified or suspended by the i s s u i n g
f e d e r a l agency.
Sec. 7. (a) This order s h a l l take e f f e c t a t 12:01 a.m.
Eastern D a y l i g h t Time, A p r i l 26, 1993.
(b)
This order s h a l l be t r a n s m i t t e d t o the Congress and
published i n the Federal Register.
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
THE WHITE HOUSE,
A p r i l 25, 1993.
�THE WHITE HOUSE
O f f i c e o f t h e Press S e c r e t a r y
For Immediate Release
A p r i l 26, 1993
TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:
On June 1, 1992, p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 204(b) o f t h e
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Emergency Economic Powers A c t (50 U.S.C.
1703(b)) and s e c t i o n 301 o f t h e N a t i o n a l Emergencies A c t
(50 U.S.C. 1631), P r e s i d e n t Bush r e p o r t e d t o t h e Congress
by l e t t e r s t o t h e P r e s i d e n t o f t h e Senate and t h e Speaker
o f t h e House, d a t e d May 30, 1992, t h a t he had e x e r c i s e d h i s
s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y t o i s s u e E x e c u t i v e Order No. 12808 o f
May 30, 1992, d e c l a r i n g a n a t i o n a l emergency and b l o c k i n g
"Yugoslav Government" p r o p e r t y and p r o p e r t y o f t h e Governments
of S e r b i a and Montenegro.
On June 5, 1992, p u r s u a n t t o t h e above a u t h o r i t i e s as
w e l l as s e c t i o n 1114 o f t h e F e d e r a l A v i a t i o n A c t (49 U.S.C.
App. 1514), and s e c t i o n 5 o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s P a r t i c i p a t i o n
Act (22 U.S.C. 287c),- t h e P r e s i d e n t r e p o r t e d t o t h e Congress by
l e t t e r s t o t h e P r e s i d e n t o f t h e Senate and t h e Speaker o f t h e
House t h a t he had e x e r c i s e d h i s s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y t o i s s u e
E x e c u t i v e Order No. 12810 o f June 5, 1992, b l o c k i n g p r o p e r t y o f
and p r o h i b i t i n g t r a n s a c t i o n s w i t h t h e F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c o f
Y u g o s l a v i a ( S e r b i a and Montenegro).
T h i s l a t t e r a c t i o n was
t a k e n t o ensure t h a t t h e economic measures t a k e n by t h e
United States w i t h respect t o t h e Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia
( S e r b i a and Montenegro) conform t o U.N. S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l
R e s o l u t i o n No. 757 (May 30, 1992).
On January 19, 1993, p u r s u a n t t o t h e above a u t h o r i t i e s ,
P r e s i d e n t Bush r e p o r t e d t o t h e Congress by l e t t e r s t o t h e
P r e s i d e n t o f t h e Senate and t h e Speaker o f t h e House t h a t he
had e x e r c i s e d h i s s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y t o i s s u e E x e c u t i v e Order
No. 12831 o f January 15, 1993, t o impose a d d i t i o n a l economic
measures w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c o f Y u g o s l a v i a
( S e r b i a and Montenegro) t o conform t o U.N. S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l
R e s o l u t i o n No. 787 (November 16, 1992). Those a d d i t i o n a l
measures p r o h i b i t e d t r a n s a c t i o n s r e l a t e d t o t r a n s s h i p m e n t s
t h r o u g h t h e F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c o f Y u g o s l a v i a ( S e r b i a and
Montenegro), as w e l l as t r a n s a c t i o n s r e l a t e d t o v e s s e l s owned
or c o n t r o l l e d by persons o r e n t i t i e s i n t h e F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c
of Y u g o s l a v i a ( S e r b i a and Montenegro).
On A p r i l 17, 1993, t h e U.N. S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l adopted
R e s o l u t i o n No. 820, c a l l i n g on t h e Bosnian Serbs t o a c c e p t
t h e Vance-Owen peace p l a n f o r Bosnia-Hercegovina and, i f t h e y
f a i l e d t o do so by A p r i l 26, c a l l i n g on member s t a t e s t o t a k e
a d d i t i o n a l measures t o t i g h t e n t h e embargo a g a i n s t t h e F e d e r a l
R e p u b l i c o f Y u g o s l a v i a ( S e r b i a and Montenegro).
Effective
12:01 a.m. EDT on A p r i l 26, 1993, I have t a k e n a d d i t i o n a l
s t e p s p u r s u a n t t o t h e above s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t i e s t o enhance
t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h i s i n t e r n a t i o n a l embargo and t o conform
t o U.N. S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l R e s o l u t i o n No. 820 ( A p r i l 17, 1993).
more
(OVER)
�The
o r d e r t h a t I s i g n e d on A p r i l
25,
1993:
b l o c k s a l l p r o p e r t y o f businesses o r g a n i z e d or l o c a t e d
i n the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia or
Montenegro), i n c l u d i n g t h e p r o p e r t y o f e n t i t i e s owned
o r c o n t r o l l e d by them, wherever o r g a n i z e d o r l o c a t e d ,
i f t h a t p r o p e r t y i s i n o r l a t e r comes w i t h i n t h e
U n i t e d S t a t e s o r t h e p o s s e s s i o n or c o n t r o l o f U.S.
persons, i n c l u d i n g t h e i r overseas branches;
charges t o t h e owners or o p e r a t o r s o f p r o p e r t y b l o c k e d
under t h a t o r d e r o r E x e c u t i v e Order No. 12808, 12810,
o r 12831 a l l expenses i n c i d e n t t o t h e b l o c k i n g and
maintenance o f such p r o p e r t y , r e q u i r e s t h a t such
expenses be s a t i s f i e d from sources o t h e r t h a n b l o c k e d
f u n d s , and p e r m i t s such p r o p e r t y t o be s o l d and t h e
proceeds ( a f t e r payment o f expenses) p l a c e d i n a
b l o c k e d account;
o r d e r s (1) t h e d e t e n t i o n , pending i n v e s t i g a t i o n , o f
a l l nonblocked v e s s e l s , a i r c r a f t , f r e i g h t v e h i c l e s ,
r o l l i n g s t o c k , and cargo w i t h i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
t h a t are suspected o f v i o l a t i n g U.N. S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l
R e s o l u t i o n No. 713, 757, 787 o r 820, and (2) t h e
b l o c k i n g o f such conveyances o r cargo i f a v i o l a t i o n
i s d e t e r m i n e d t o have been committed, and p e r m i t s
the s a l e o f such b l o c k e d conveyances o r cargo and
the p l a c i n g o f t h e n e t proceeds i n t o a b l o c k e d
account;
p r o h i b i t s any v e s s e l r e g i s t e r e d i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ,
or owned or c o n t r o l l e d by U.S. persons, o t h e r t h a n
a U n i t e d S t a t e s n a v a l v e s s e l , from e n t e r i n g t h e
t e r r i t o r i a l waters of the Federal Republic of
Y u g o s l a v i a ( S e r b i a and Montenegro); and
p r o h i b i t s U.S. persons from engaging i n any d e a l i n g s
r e l a t i n g t o t h e shipment o f goods t o , from, o r
t h r o u g h U n i t e d N a t i o n s P r o t e c t e d Areas i n t h e
R e p u b l i c o f C r o a t i a and areas i n t h e R e p u b l i c o f
Bosnia-Hercegovina under t h e c o n t r o l o f Bosnian Serb
forces.
The o r d e r t h a t I s i g n e d on A p r i l 25, 1993, a u t h o r i z e s t h e
Secretary of the Treasury i n c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the Secretary of
S t a t e t o t a k e such a c t i o n s , and t o employ a l l powers g r a n t e d t o
me by t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Emergency Economic Powers A c t and t h e
U n i t e d N a t i o n s P a r t i c i p a t i o n A c t , as may be necessary t o c a r r y
o u t t h e purposes o f t h a t o r d e r , i n c l u d i n g t h e issuance o f
licenses a u t h o r i z i n g transactions otherwise p r o h i b i t e d .
The
s a n c t i o n s imposed i n t h e o r d e r a p p l y n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g any
p r e e x i s t i n g c o n t r a c t s , i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreements, l i c e n s e s o r
a u t h o r i z a t i o n s . However, l i c e n s e s o r a u t h o r i z a t i o n s p r e v i o u s l y
i s s u e d p u r s u a n t t o E x e c u t i v e Order No. 12808, 12810, o r 12831
are n o t i n v a l i d a t e d by t h e o r d e r u n l e s s t h e y a r e t e r m i n a t e d ,
suspended o r m o d i f i e d by a c t i o n o f t h e i s s u i n g f e d e r a l agency.
The d e c l a r a t i o n o f t h e n a t i o n a l emergency made by E x e c u t i v e
Order No. 12808 and t h e c o n t r o l s imposed under E x e c u t i v e Orders
No. 12810 and 12831, and any o t h e r p r o v i s i o n s o f t h o s e o r d e r s
not m o d i f i e d by or i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e A p r i l 25, 1993, o r d e r ,
remain i n f u l l f o r c e and are u n a f f e c t e d by t h a t o r d e r .
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
THE
WHITE HOUSE,
A p r i l 26, 1993.
#
#
#
�THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Inunediate Release
A p r i l 26, 1993
EXECUTIVE ORDER
ADDITIONAL MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
YUGOSLAVIA (SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO)
By the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America,
including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seg.), the National Emergencies Act
(50 U.S.C. 1601 et seg.), section 5 of the United Nations
Participation Act of 1945, as amended (22 U.S.C. 287c),
and section 301 of t i t l e 3, United States Code, i n view of
United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 757 of May 30,
1992, No. 787 of November 16, 1992, and No. 820 of A p r i l 17,
1993, and in order to take additional steps with respect to
the actions and p o l i c i e s of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro) and the national emergency described
and declared in Executive Order No. 12808 and expanded in
Executive Order No. 12810 and No. 12831,
I , WILLIAM J . CLINTON, President of the United States of
America, hereby order:
Section 1. Notwithstanding the existence of any rights or
obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement
or any contract entered into or any license or permit granted
before the effective date of t h i s order, except to the extent
provided in regulations, orders, d i r e c t i v e s , or licenses which
may hereafter be issued pursuant to t h i s order:
(a) A l l property and interests in property of a l l
commercial, i n d u s t r i a l , or public u t i l i t y undertakings or
e n t i t i e s organized or located in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), including, without
limitation, the property and interests i n property of e n t i t i e s
(wherever organized or located) owned or controlled by such
undertakings or e n t i t i e s , that are in the United States,
that hereafter come within the United States, or that are
or hereafter come within the possession or control of
United States persons, including t h e i r overseas branches,
are hereby blocked;
(b) A l l expenses incident to the blocking and maintenance
of property blocked under Executive Order Nos. 12808, 12810,
12831 or t h i s order s h a l l be charged to the owners or operators
of such property, which expenses s h a l l not be met from blocked
funds. Such property may also be sold or liquidated and the
proceeds placed in a blocked interest-bearing account in the
name of the owner;
(c) A l l vessels, freight vehicles, r o l l i n g stock,
a i r c r a f t and cargo that are within or hereafter come within the
United States and are not subject to blocking under Executive
Order Nos. 12808, 12810, 12831 or t h i s order, but which are
suspected of a violation of United Nations Security Council
Resolution Nos. 713, 757, 787 or 820, s h a l l be detained pending
investigation and, upon a determination by the Secretary of
the Treasury that they have been in v i o l a t i o n of any of these
more
(OVER)
�resolutions, s h a l l be blocked. Such blocked conveyances and
cargo may also be sold or liquidated and the proceeds placed
in a blocked interest-bearing account i n the name of the owner;
(d) No vessel registered i n the United States or owned or
controlled by United States persons, other than a United States
naval vessel, may enter the t e r r i t o r i a l waters of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); and
(e) Any dealing by a United States person r e l a t i n g to the
importation from, exportation to, or transshipment through the
United Nations Protected Areas i n the Republic of Croatia and
those areas of the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina under the
control of Bosnian Serb forces, or a c t i v i t y of any kind that
promotes or i s intended to promote such dealing, i s prohibited.
Sec. 2. The Secretary of the Treasury, i n consultation
with the Secretary of State, i s hereby authorized to take
such actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations, and to employ a l l powers granted to the President
by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the
United Nations Participation Act as may be necessary to
carry out the purposes of t h i s order. The Secretary of the
Treasury may redelegate the authority set forth i n t h i s order
to other o f f i c e r s and agencies of the Federal Government, a l l
agencies of which are hereby directed to take a l l appropriate
measures within t h e i r authority to carry out the provisions of
t h i s order, including suspension or termination of licenses or
other authorizations i n effect as of the date of t h i s order.
Sec. 3. Nothing i n t h i s order s h a l l apply to a c t i v i t i e s
related to the United Nations Protection Force, the
International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, and the
European Community Monitor Mission.
Sec. 4. The definitions contained i n section 5 of
Executive Order No. 12810 apply to the terms used i n t h i s order,
Sec. 5. Nothing contained i n t h i s order s h a l l create
any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable
by any party against the United States, i t s agencies or
instrumentalities, i t s o f f i c e r s or employees, or any other
person.
Sec. 6. This order s h a l l not affect the provisions of
licenses and authorizations issued pursuant to Executive Order
Nos. 12808, 12810, 12831 and i n force on the e f f e c t i v e date of
t h i s order, except as such licenses or authorization may
hereafter be terminated, modified or suspended by the issuing
federal agency.
Sec. 7. (a) This order s h a l l take effect at 12:01 a.m.
Eastern Daylight Time, April 26, 1993.
(b) This order s h a l l be transmitted to the Congress and
published i n the Federal Register.
WILLIAM J . CLINTON
THE WHITE HOUSE,
A p r i l 25, 1993.
�THE WHITE HOUSE
O f f i c e o f t h e Press S e c r e t a r y
For Immediate Release
A p r i l 26, 1993
TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:
On June 1 , 1992, p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 204(b) o f t h e
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Emergency Economic Powers A c t (50 U.S.C.
1703(b)) and s e c t i o n 301 o f t h e N a t i o n a l Emergencies A c t
(50 U.S.C. 1631), P r e s i d e n t Bush r e p o r t e d t o t h e Congress
by l e t t e r s t o t h e P r e s i d e n t o f t h e Senate and t h e Speaker
of t h e House, d a t e d May 30, 1992, t h a t he had e x e r c i s e d h i s
s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y t o i s s u e E x e c u t i v e Order No. 12808 o f
May 30, 1992, d e c l a r i n g a n a t i o n a l emergency and b l o c k i n g
"Yugoslav Government" p r o p e r t y and p r o p e r t y o f t h e Governments
of S e r b i a and Montenegro.
On June 5, 1992, p u r s u a n t t o t h e above a u t h o r i t i e s as
w e l l as s e c t i o n 1114 o f t h e F e d e r a l A v i a t i o n A c t (49 U.S.C.
App. 1514), and s e c t i o n 5 o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s P a r t i c i p a t i o n
Act (22 U.S.C. 2 8 7 c ) , t h e P r e s i d e n t r e p o r t e d t o t h e Congress by
l e t t e r s t o t h e P r e s i d e n t o f t h e Senate and t h e Speaker o f t h e
House t h a t he had e x e r c i s e d h i s s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y t o i s s u e
E x e c u t i v e Order No. 12810 o f June 5, 1992, b l o c k i n g p r o p e r t y o f
and p r o h i b i t i n g t r a n s a c t i o n s w i t h t h e F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c o f
Y u g o s l a v i a ( S e r b i a and Montenegro).
T h i s l a t t e r a c t i o n was
t a k e n t o ensure t h a t t h e economic measures t a k e n by t h e
United States w i t h respect t o t h e Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia
( S e r b i a and Montenegro) conform t o U.N. S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l
R e s o l u t i o n No. 757 (May 30, 1992).
On January 19, 1993, p u r s u a n t t o t h e above a u t h o r i t i e s ,
P r e s i d e n t Bush r e p o r t e d t o t h e Congress by l e t t e r s t o t h e
P r e s i d e n t o f t h e Senate and t h e Speaker o f t h e House t h a t he
had e x e r c i s e d h i s s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y t o i s s u e E x e c u t i v e Order
No. 12831 o f January 15, 1993, t o impose a d d i t i o n a l economic
measures w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c o f Y u g o s l a v i a
( S e r b i a and Montenegro) t o conform t o U.N. S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l
R e s o l u t i o n No. 787 (November 16, 1992). Those a d d i t i o n : : !
measures p r o h i b i t e d t r a n s a c t i o n s r e l a t e d t o t r a n s s h i p m e n t s
t h r o u g h t h e F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c o f Y u g o s l a v i a ( S e r b i a and
Montenegro), as w e l l as t r a n s a c t i o n s r e l a t e d t o v e s s e l s owned
or c o n t r o l l e d by persons o r e n t i t i e s i n t h e F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c
of Y u g o s l a v i a ( S e r b i a and Montenegro).
On A p r i l 17, 1993, t h e U.N. S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l adopted
R e s o l u t i o n No. 820, c a l l i n g on t h e Bosnian Serbs t o a c c e p t
t h e Vance-Owen peace p l a n f o r Bosnia-Hercegovina and, i f t h e y
f a i l e d t o do so by A p r i l 26, c a l l i n g on member s t a t e s t o t a k e
a d d i t i o n a l measures t o t i g h t e n t h e embargo a g a i n s t t h e F e d e r a l
R e p u b l i c o f Y u g o s l a v i a ( S e r b i a and Montenegro).
Effective
12:01 a.m. EDT on A p r i l 26, 1993, I have t a k e n a d d i t i o n a l
s t e p s p u r s u a n t t o t h e above s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t i e s t o enhance
t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h i s i n t e r n a t i o n a l embargo and t o conform
t o U.N. S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l R e s o l u t i o n No. 820 ( A p r i l 17, 1993).
more
(OVER)
�The
o r d e r t h a t I s i g n e d on A p r i l 25,
1993:
b l o c k s a l l p r o p e r t y o f businesses o r g a n i z e d o r l o c a t e d
i n t h e F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c o f Y u g o s l a v i a ( S e r b i a or
Montenegro), i n c l u d i n g t h e p r o p e r t y o f e n t i t i e s owned
o r c o n t r o l l e d by them, wherever o r g a n i z e d o r l o c a t e d ,
i f t h a t p r o p e r t y i s i n or l a t e r comes w i t h i n t h e
U n i t e d S t a t e s o r t h e p o s s e s s i o n or c o n t r o l o f U.S.
persons, i n c l u d i n g t h e i r overseas branches;
charges t o t h e owners o r o p e r a t o r s o f p r o p e r t y b l o c k e d
under t h a t o r d e r o r E x e c u t i v e Order No. 12808, 12810,
o r 12831 a l l expenses i n c i d e n t t o t h e b l o c k i n g and
maintenance o f such p r o p e r t y , r e q u i r e s t h a t such
expenses be s a t i s f i e d from sources o t h e r t h a n b l o c k e d
f u n d s , and p e r m i t s such p r o p e r t y t o be s o l d and t h e
proceeds ( a f t e r payment o f expenses) p l a c e d i n a
b l o c k e d account;
o r d e r s ( l ) t h e d e t e n t i o n , pending i n v e s t i g a t i o n , o f
a l l nonblocked v e s s e l s , a i r c r a f t , f r e i g h t v e h i c l e s ,
r o l l i n g s t o c k , and cargo w i t h i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
t h a t a r e suspected o f v i o l a t i n g U.N. S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l
R e s o l u t i o n No. 713, 757, 787 o r 820, and (2) t h e
b l o c k i n g o f such conveyances or cargo i f a v i o l a t i o n
i s d e t e r m i n e d t o have been committed, and p e r m i t s
the s a l e o f such b l o c k e d conveyances o r cargo and
the p l a c i n g o f t h e n e t proceeds i n t o a b l o c k e d
account;
p r o h i b i t s any v e s s e l r e g i s t e r e d i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ,
or owned or c o n t r o l l e d by U.S. persons, o t h e r t h a n
a U n i t e d S t a t e s n a v a l v e s s e l , from e n t e r i n g t h e
t e r r i t o r i a l waters of the Federal Republic of
Y u g o s l a v i a ( S e r b i a and Montenegro); and
p r o h i b i t s U.S. persons from engaging i n any d e a l i n g s
r e l a t i n g t o t h e shipment o f goods t o , from, or
t h r o u g h U n i t e d N a t i o n s P r o t e c t e d Areas i n t h e
R e p u b l i c o f C r o a t i a and areas i n t h e R e p u b l i c o f
Bosnia-Hercegovina under t h e c o n t r o l o f Bosnian Serb
forces.
The o r d e r t h a t I s i g n e d on A p r i l 25, 1993, a u t h o r i z e s t h e
Secretary of the Treasury i n c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h t h e Secretary of
S t a t e t o t a k e such a c t i o n s , and t o employ a l l powers g r a n t e d t o
me by t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Emergency Economic Powers A c t and t h e
U n i t e d N a t i o n s P a r t i c i p a t i o n A c t , as may be necessary t o c a r r y
o u t t h e purposes o f t h a t o r d e r , i n c l u d i n g t h e issuance o f
licenses a u t h o r i z i n g transactions otherwise p r o h i b i t e d .
The
s a n c t i o n s imposed i n t h e o r d e r a p p l y n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g any
p r e e x i s t i n g c o n t r a c t s , i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreements, l i c e n s e s o r
a u t h o r i z a t i o n s . However, l i c e n s e s or a u t h o r i z a t i o n s p r e v i o u s l y
i s s u e d p u r s u a n t t o E x e c u t i v e Order No. 12808, 12810, or 12831
are n o t i n v a l i d a t e d by t h e o r d e r u n l e s s t h e y a r e t e r m i n a t e d ,
suspended or m o d i f i e d by a c t i o n o f t h e i s s u i n g f e d e r a l agency.
The d e c l a r a t i o n o f t h e n a t i o n a l emergency made by E x e c u t i v e
Order No. 12808 and t h e c o n t r o l s imposed under E x e c u t i v e Orders
No. 12810 and 12831, and any o t h e r p r o v i s i o n s o f t h o s e o r d e r s
n o t m o d i f i e d by or i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e A p r i l 25, 1993, o r d e r ,
remain i n f u l l f o r c e and are u n a f f e c t e d by t h a t o r d e r .
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
THE
WHITE HOUSE,
A p r i l 26, 1993.
#
#
#
�THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
A p r i l 26, 1993
EXECUTIVE ORDER
ADDITIONAL MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
YUGOSLAVIA (SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO)
By the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America,
including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seg.), the National Emergencies Act
(50 U.S.C. 1601 et seg.), section 5 of the United Nations
Participation Act of 1945, as amended (22 U.S.C. 287c),
and section 301 of t i t l e 3, United States Code, in view of
United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 757 of May 30,
1992, No. 787 of November 16, 1992, and No. 820 of A p r i l 17,
1993, and in order to take additional steps with respect to
the actions and p o l i c i e s of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro) and the national emergency described
and declared in Executive Order No. 12808 and expanded in
Executive Order No. 12810 and No. 12831,
I , WILLIAM J . CLINTON, President of the United States of
America, hereby order:
Section 1. Notwithstanding the existence of any rights or
obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement
or any contract entered into or any license or permit granted
before the effective date of t h i s order, except to the extent
provided in regulations, orders, d i r e c t i v e s , or licenses which
may hereafter be issued pursuant to t h i s order:
(a) A l l property and interests i n property of a l l
commercial, i n d u s t r i a l , or public u t i l i t y undertakings or
e n t i t i e s organized or located in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), including, without
limitation, the property and interests in property of e n t i t i e s
(wherever organized or located) owned or controlled by such
undertakings or e n t i t i e s , that are in the United States,
that hereafter come within the United States, or that are
or hereafter come within the possession or control of
United States persons, including their overseas branches,
are hereby blocked;
(b) A l l expenses incident to the blocking and maintenance
of property blocked under Executive Order Nos. 12808, 12810,
12831 or t h i s order s h a l l be charged to the owners or operators
of such property, which expenses s h a l l not be met from blocked
funds. Such property may also be sold or liquidated and the
proceeds placed in a blocked interest-bearing account in the
name of the owner;
(c) A l l vessels, freight vehicles, r o l l i n g stock,
a i r c r a f t and cargo that are within or hereafter come within the
United States and are not subject to blocking under Executive
Order Nos. 12808, 12810, 12831 or t h i s order, but which are
suspected of a violation of United Nations Security Council
Resolution Nos. 713, 757, 787 or 820, s h a l l be detained pending
investigation and, upon a determination by the Secretary of
the Treasury that they have been in violation of any of these
more
(OVER)
�resolutions, s h a l l be blocked. Such blocked conveyances and
cargo may also be sold or liquidated and the proceeds placed
in a blocked interest-bearing account i n the name of the owner;
(d) No vessel registered i n the United States or owned or
controlled by United States persons, other than a United States
naval vessel, may enter the t e r r i t o r i a l waters of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); and
(e) Any dealing by a United States person r e l a t i n g to the
importation from, exportation to, or transshipment through the
United Nations Protected Areas i n the Republic of Croatia and
those areas of the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina under the
control of Bosnian Serb forces, or a c t i v i t y of any kind that
promotes or i s intended to promote such dealing, i s prohibited.
Sec. 2. The Secretary of the Treasury, i n consultation
with the Secretary of State, i s hereby authorized to take
such actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations, and to employ a l l powers granted to the President
by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the
United Nations Participation Act as may be necessary to
carry out the purposes of t h i s order. The Secretary of the
Treasury may redelegate the authority set forth i n t h i s order
to other o f f i c e r s and agencies of the Federal Government, a l l
agencies of which are hereby directed to take a l l appropriate
measures within t h e i r authority to carry out the provisions of
t h i s order, including suspension or termination of licenses or
other authorizations i n effect as of the date of t h i s order.
Sec. 3. Nothing i n t h i s order s h a l l apply to a c t i v i t i e s
related to the United Nations Protection Force, the
International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, and the
European Community Monitor Mission.
Sec. 4. The definitions contained i n section 5 of
Executive Order No. 12810 apply to the terms used i n t h i s order.
Sec. 5. Nothing contained i n t h i s order s h a l l create
any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable
by any party against the United States, i t s agencies or
instrumentalities, i t s o f f i c e r s or employees, or any other
person.
Sec. 6. This order s h a l l not affect the provisions of
licenses and authorizations issued pursuant to Executive Order
Nos. 12808, 12810, 12831 and i n force on the e f f e c t i v e date of
t h i s order, except as such licenses or authorization may
hereafter be terminated, modified or suspended by the issuing
federal agency.
Sec. 7. (a) This order s h a l l take effect a t 12:01 a.m.
Eastern Daylight Time, April 26, 1993.
(b) This order s h a l l be transmitted to the Congress and
published i n the Federal Register.
WILLIAM J . CLINTON
THE WHITE HOUSE,
A p r i l 25, 1993.
�THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
A p r i l 17,1993
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
Excerpted From Remarks to the People of Pittsburgh
This verdict was a tribute to the work and the judgment of
the jury and the e f f o r t s of the federal government i n putting the
case together. I t was, once again, a reminder that our courts
are the proper forum for the resolution of even our deepest legal
disputes. And i t did e s t a b l i s h what a l o t of people have f e l t in
t h e i r hearts for two years, that the c i v i l rights of Rodney King
were violated.
But I ask you to think about the deeper meaning of t h i s
whole issue. A l l across the world today people are fighting with
each other and k i l l i n g each other because of t h e i r r a c i a l and
r e l i g i o u s differences. In Eastern Bosnia, i n the town of
Srebrenica, Muslims and Serbs lived together for centuries, and
tens of thousands of the Muslims are now about to be forced from
t h e i r homes through a process c a l l e d ethnic cleansing, and
because the Serbs had decided that they j u s t can't l i v e unless
they can l i v e alone and without others who are d i f f e r e n t from
them.
Our country has always been about something d i f f e r e n t from
that. We see these kinds of r a c i a l and ethnic c o n f l i c t s on very
continent a l l across the globe. But we've always been about
something d i f f e r e n t than that. I once gave a speech to a
university i n Los Angeles County where there were students from
122 difference countries. There are now people from 150
d i f f e r e n t r a c i a l and ethnic groups i n that county alone. And I
say to you, my fellow Americans, unless we r e a l l y do believe that
underneath the differences of race and r e l i g i o n and e t h n i c i t y ,
underneath the differences of p o l i t i c a l party and p o l i t i c a l
opinion, there i s a core in each one of us given us by God in
which we share in common which obliges us to respect one another
and to wish to l i v e together in harmony and peace, none of the
other things I came to t a l k to you about today can come to pass.
For the people of Los Angeles and the people of t h i s country
— a l l around the country who need more opportunity, the time has
come to go forward, to rededicate ourselves to the c i v i l r i g h t s
for a l l Americans, to rededicate ourselves to the fight against
crime and drugs, and violence — t o put 100,000 more police
o f f i c e r s on the street, to pass the Brady B i l l and t r y to reduce
the v u l n e r a b i l i t y to violence and crimes by p e o p l e — to commit
ourselves to a new agenda of expanding opportunity and
�empowerment. But, i n the beginning, must be the willingness of
every American to assume a personal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to respect the
differences of h i s other fellow Americans r e j o i c e i n what unites
us as human beings.
Surely the lasting legacy of the Rodney King t r i a l ought to
be that — a determination to reaffirm our common humanity and to
make a strength of our d i v e r s i t y . And i f we can do that, then we
can get on about the business of t h i s great land.
�THE WHITE HOUSE
O f f i c e o f t h e Press S e c r e t a r y
For Immediate Release
A p r i l 14, 1993
TEXT OF A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO THE SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND
THE PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE OF THE SENATE
A p r i l 13, 1993
Dear Mr. Speaker:
(Dear Mr. P r e s i d e n t : )
As p a r t o f my c o n t i n u i n g e f f o r t t o keep t h e Congress f u l l y
i n f o r m e d , I am p r o v i d i n g t h i s r e p o r t , c o n s i s t e n t w i t h s e c t i o n 4
of t h e War Powers R e s o l u t i o n , t o a d v i s e you o f a c t i o n s t h a t I
have ordered i n s u p p o r t o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s e f f o r t s i n
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Beginning w i t h U.N. S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l R e s o l u t i o n 713 o f
September 25, 1991, t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s has been a c t i v e l y
a d d r e s s i n g t h e c r i s i s i n t h e former Y u g o s l a v i a . The S e c u r i t y
C o u n c i l a c t e d i n R e s o l u t i o n 781 t o e s t a b l i s h a ban on a l l
u n a u t h o r i z e d m i l i t a r y f l i g h t s over Bosnia-Herzegovina.
There
have, however, been b l a t a n t v i o l a t i o n s o f t h e ban, and v i l l a g e s
i n Bosnia have been bombed.
I n response t o these v i o l a t i o n s , t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l decided,
i n R e s o l u t i o n 816 o f March 31, 1993, t o extend t h e ban t o a l l
u n a u t h o r i z e d f l i g h t s over Bosnia-Herzegovina and t o a u t h o r i z e
Member S t a t e s , a c t i n g n a t i o n a l l y o r t h r o u g h r e g i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s , t o t a k e a l l necessary measures t o ensure compliance.
NATO's N o r t h A t l a n t i c C o u n c i l (NAC) agreed t o p r o v i d e NATO a i r
enforcement f o r t h e n o - f l y zone. The U.N. S e c r e t a r y General
was n o t i f i e d o f NATO's d e c i s i o n t o proceed w i t h O p e r a t i o n DENY
FLIGHT, and an a c t i v a t i o n o r d e r was d e l i v e r e d t o p a r t i c i p a t i n g
allies.
The U n i t e d S t a t e s a c t i v e l y supported these d e c i s i o n s . A t my
d i r e c t i o n , t h e J o i n t C h i e f s o f S t a f f sent an execute o r d e r t o
a l l U.S. f o r c e s p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h e NATO f o r c e , f o r t h e conduct
of phased a i r o p e r a t i o n s t o p r e v e n t f l i g h t s n o t a u t h o r i z e d by
t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s over Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The U.S. f o r c e s
i n i t i a l l y assigned t o t h i s o p e r a t i o n c o n s i s t o f 13 F-15 and
12 F-18A f i g h t e r a i r c r a f t and s u p p o r t i n g t a n k e r a i r c r a f t .
These
a i r c r a f t commenced enforcement o p e r a t i o n s a t 8:00 a.m. e . d . t . on
A p r i l 12, 1993. The f i g h t e r a i r c r a f t a r e equipped f o r combat t o
accomplish t h e i r m i s s i o n and f o r s e l f - d e f e n s e .
NATO has p o s i t i o n e d f o r c e s and has e s t a b l i s h e d combat a i r
p a t r o l (CAP) s t a t i o n s w i t h i n t h e c o n t r o l o f A i r b o r n e E a r l y
Warning (AEW) a i r c r a f t . The U.S. CAP a i r c r a f t w i l l n o r m a l l y
operate from bases i n I t a l y and from an a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r i n t h e
A d r i a t i c Sea. Unauthorized a i r c r a f t e n t e r i n g o r approaching
t h e n o - f l y zone w i l l be i d e n t i f i e d , i n t e r r o g a t e d , i n t e r c e p t e d ,
e s c o r t e d / m o n i t o r e d , and t u r n e d away ( i n t h a t o r d e r ) .
I f these
s t e p s do n o t r e s u l t i n compliance w i t h t h e n o - f l y zone, such
a i r c r a f t may be engaged on t h e b a s i s o f proper a u t h o r i z a t i o n by
NATO m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s and i n accordance w i t h t h e approved
more
(OVER)
�r u l e s o f engagement, a l t h o u g h we do n o t expect such a c t i o n w i l l
be necessary. The Commander o f UNPROFOR ( t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s
P r o t e c t i o n Force c u r r e n t l y o p e r a t i n g i n Bosnia-Herzegovina) was
c o n s u l t e d t o ensure t h a t h i s concerns f o r h i s f o r c e were f u l l y
c o n s i d e r e d b e f o r e t h e r u l e s o f engagement were approved.
I t i s n o t p o s s i b l e t o p r e d i c t a t t h i s t i m e how l o n g such
o p e r a t i o n s w i l l be necessary. I have d i r e c t e d U.S. armed f o r c e s
t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n these o p e r a t i o n s pursuant t o my c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
a u t h o r i t y as Commander i n C h i e f . I am g r a t e f u l f o r t h e cont i n u i n g s u p p o r t t h a t t h e Congress has g i v e n t o t h i s e f f o r t , and
I l o o k f o r w a r d t o c o n t i n u e d c o o p e r a t i o n as we move f o r w a r d
toward a t t a i n m e n t o f our g o a l s i n t h i s r e g i o n .
Sincerely,
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
#
#
#
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Office of Press and Communications - Philip J. “P.J.” Crowley
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36076">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2011-0516-S
Description
An account of the resource
This collection consists of White House press releases from the files of P.J. Crowley. Crowley served as Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Senior Director of Public Affairs the National Security Council from 1997–1999. The press releases are arranged by subject or, as in the case of the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, by date.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Extent
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370 folders in 33 boxes
Text
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Original Format
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Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Yugoslavia (former) [5]
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Office of Press and Communications
Philip "PJ" Crowley
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2011-0516-S
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Box 33
<a href="http://catalog.archives.gov/id/7585702"></a>
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36076">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
7585702
42-t-7585702-20110516s-033-006-2015
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Format
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Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
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Preservation-Reproduction-Reference