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A History of the
U.S. Office of Management and Budget
During the Clinton Administration
1993-200r
Prepared for the Clinton Administration History Projeet
Washington, DC
2000
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�TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction .•....••....•..••...••••••....•••••...•••••... ~, ••••..... ~..............................................~.O#•••
Chronology .................................
H
............... u
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .n
. . . . .
Ensuring: Fiscal Discipline ,·••••·····•··· ............................
u
~n
u . u•••••••••••
. . . . . #O. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .n
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .n
••••••••••
1
3
5
A typical budget season .".."..."".".""" ..."""".."""....................................... " .............. 7
The first Clinton Budget ............................ " ......... " ...... " .............. "" ..... ,...... ,..... ,..,.... " 9
The 1993 Budget deal ...... " ......... ,....." ........................................................... ,,,,.. ,,,,.. ,.,,13
A typical appropriations season ............................... ,........ ,.... ,...... """...: ..................... , 16
Congressional readership change ...... ,.".,.,."" .......... ,.............. ,..................................... 18
Government shutdown ........................................................ ,.. ,........ ,...,.... ,',... ,",.......... , 20
Balanced Budget Proposed for FY 1997 ............. " ........... " ..... " ... """".... """."."."""...22
The Balanced Budget Act and Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 .. ",...... "" .... "", .. "".. "",,. 24
FY 1997 Omnibus Appropriations .." .... " .. "".....""""".. ,""" ... "..,.... " ", .." ",... " ..... ". " ..27
Line Item Veto ".""...... " ................. """ ..... """ ......... " ... ,"'''" .. "" ...... "" ... ,'" ,.. """".,," 30
First Budget Surplus Reported in a Generation .."....:..... """.."."....:.. """."""",,...,,,,.. 33.
FY 1999 Omnibus Appropriations .. """ ..... """ ..... ,,",, ... ,""" ..,""..,... ,",.... '.. '""""""'" 35
The Balanced Budget Refinement Act ".... """ ..... """,.. ,"", .... "" ....... ""... ",, ... ,,',,.... '.. 39
FY 2000 Omnibus Appropriations ... """".. " ...... "., """, .. """"..,,' ""....,", .. ",,:.. "..,.. "'" 42
Improving How the Government Works .•••
H
............................. "' ..........................................
46
Government Perfonnance and Results Act .... "' ................................................. ,,, ... ,..,. 47
Reinventing Government ...... ,.... ,." ..... ,",....."...,',.,,', .......... ,........ "",.,."""_,.">,.",,.,.,,., 50
Regul.tory Oversight and Executive Order ......"".. """".. ,,,",,.. ,,""",.. ,,,,.. ,,.,,,,.,,,,..,," 54
PapetWQrk Reduction Act ." ,,,.......... " " ......... " ........ "". " ... ," ...... " .. ,",," ". ".. "., ..".' ""'" ,56
.
'
PrlOrtty Management Ob' .
~ectlves .,', ... " ..,', .... ,......... " ..... " ...... ,", ..,.,.,., .... ,..... " .... ,......... 58
Year 2000 Preparation, ""... "....."..."., .......... "'.....,..,,""'''' "'" ",..,," ",..,,' "..,," '''''' "..,,' 60
Interagency Councils ., ".""..".... ", "... "....,"." """ ... """..... ," ...... ,..... ," .. ,.. ,... ".. ".... "" ..: 62
Additional Statutory Requirements Assumed by OMB "....""".. """."."."." ....... ,,,,.,," 64
Ensuring the Administration's Policy Agenda ...................................... ,.............................. 67
He~th
Security· Act. .... ,........ ,..,." ....... ,. " ...... " " ...... ," ...... ,., ",." ,., ""; ... "... " .... ,," :.... ,.." ... 68
Welfare Refonn ., ................. ,..:................ ,...." ......... " ....... ".""" ........... ,,........................73
. OMB and Foreign Policy ........................ " ....:........................ """."" ..... "".."" ...,, .....,,' 78
Saving Social Security First ." .... "".." ....... " ...""""." ................................. ""... " ..... " ... 82
Strengthening OMB .......... ,................................:••.•:...................... , u...............n . . . . .n ...............8S
The Directors ""'"..................... " ..." ............ " .... :...:."............. " ...... ""................. " ...... ' 86
Creation of Health PAD .................... ,............................ .,..." ..... " ........ "" .......... " ..".... 89
OMB 2000 .......................... ,.. ,............... ,............................................ ""................. "".,90
�OMB 25th Anniversary .,.......... ,"".""'''"."" ...... " ......... " ...................... "".. ,,.."" ....." .... 92
The Federal Interagency Task Force on the District of Columbia " ........ "" .... " .."..""". 94
Privacy .. ". ".. ". ".... " ...... " ". " "".,,"" " ...,," "" ........................... " ...... " .......... """ ..." ..... " ..96
APPENDIX: SELECTED SUPPORTING MATERJAL ................................................ i
��INTRODUCTION
�The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) assists the President as a key agency for
leading the coordination of policy development in the Executive Branch and for ensuring
cons:istency~
efficiency, and effectiveness in policy implementation. OMB's responsibilities
include:
•
Analysis to support the President's budget and other priorities;
•
•
The development of recommendations to improve the management of Federal programs~
The review of pending legislation for consistency with Presidential policy;
•
•
Cost~benefit analysis of proposed regulations; and
The development of policy concerning Federal financial management, Federal
procUIement~
and Federal information systems.
OMil is part of the Executive Office ofihe President, The Director DfOMB, who is a
official, the Deputy Director. and the Deputy Director for Management are
Presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed (PAS) officials,
Cabinet~lcvd
The vast majority orOMB's more than 500 staff arc career employees who provide
"institution;tl memory" and objective analysis for the President OMS is composed of five
Resource Management Offices, headed by non.,c;areer SES appointees and organized by agency
and program area; three statutory offices, with functional management responsibilities headed by
PAS officials; and seven offices that provide OMS-wide sUPP9rt headed by career SES staff.
These offices work 10gether to help the President develop fis<::ru policies and manage Federal
program,s.
2
�CHRONOLOGY OF THE ADMINISTRATION
3
�1993
Panetta Confirmed (Janu",)' 1993 - July 1994)
First Budget
1993 Budget Agreement
Government Perfomlancc and Results Act
Reinventing Government
Regulatory Executive Order
Health Security Act Developed
Establishment of Health Associate Director Position
1994
Rivlin Confirmed (October 1994 - June 1996)
OMB 2000
Congressional Leadership Change
1995
Government Shutdown
OMIl 25th Annivcrsmy
Paperwork Reduction Act
1996
Raines Confirmed (September 1996 - May 1998)
First Balanced Budget proposed
Omnibus: Appropriations Negotiations
Welfare Reform
1997
Balanced Budget Act
Line Item Vetc
Priority Management Objectives Established
1998
Lew Confirmed (August 1998 - Janumy 2000)
First Budget Surplus Reported
Omnibus Appropriations Negotiations
4
�1999
Year 2000 Preparation
Balanced Budget Refinement Act
Omnibus Appropriations Negotiations
2000
Final Budget Request
5
�E~SURING
FISCAL DISCIPLINE
6
�A TVPICAL BUDGET SEASON
The process of formulating the budget begins by establishing general budget and fiscal
polky guiddines. This occurs generally in the spring of each year, nine months before !.he
President tmnsmits the budget to Congress and 18 months before the fiscal year begins. Based
on these guidelines, OMB works with Federal agencies to establish specific policy directions and
planningJcveIs for the agencies for the budget year. Federal ugencies use these guidelines for
the preparation of their budget submissions to the President each fall.
Agency budget submissions
Normally, agencies submit their budget requests to OMB in mid-September, From mid;.
'September to mid-October, analysts in the Resource Management Offices (RMOs) review the
requests and identify jssues that OMB officials need to discuss with the agencies. Analysts in
other OMB offices also assist in this review. Concurrently, the OMB Director and other
members of the White House Economie Team are briefing the President on the '"moving piece$}~'
that wlillikdy impact his macro-policy decisions. These pieces include economic groVyW,
inflation l interest rates" and the size of the Federal surplus.
In late October, following RMO review of agency budget submissions, OMB begins an
extensive oral briefing and decision·making process with the Director referred to as I'Director's
Review," During this period, the Director is in close communication wjth the President and his
key advisers to ensure that decisioll.<;j reflect the President's priorities, There arc normally a
series of meeting with the President at this time where the Director rece~ves the PrcsidenCs
guidance on agency funding levels and Administration initiatives.
Prior to each Review session, the Review books are provided to OMB's top leadership
and other key OMB staff, The Director usually comes into a session having already reviewed
the materiuls and decided on which items to focus. Shortly after the Jast Review session. but
before Thanksgiving, R..\.10s prepare the passhack for each agency.
For a nonnal faU budget season, the Director convenes 20 to 30 individual oral Review
sessions: Separate sessions are held for each major agency, ,,"lith related smaller agencies
covered in the same session< Sessions arc also held on general overview topics (e.g., economic
overvjew, revenues) and priority crosscutting issues (e.g" anti-drug activities, counter~terrorism.
homc1essncss, District of Columbia). (Additional crosscutting topics may be addressed through
v.'ritten papers.) The comprehensive agency Review books the staff compiles structure
discussion.
.
Director's Review is the culmination of an evaluative process in which OMB stafT
analyze current programmatic performance and new budget proposals for their respective
agencies; search for better ways to perform the Government's work; balance individual agency
7
�resource needs against constrained totols; and craft legislative and funding proposals. to
implement Administration priorities. Over the past several years tbe RMOs have been asked to
prepare a recommendation to reduce agency requests to guidance levels, Preparation for
Director's Review takes much ofOMB's time and energy during the fall.
Final Decisions
The outcome of Director's Review is decisions on funding levels. agency priorities, and
legislative proposals. This process typically concludes by mid~November in time to "pass back"
policy decisions to the agencies immediately before Thanksgiving, Agencies appeal some of the
passback decisIons, These appeals begin at the RMO~teveL If the agency and'the RM:O cannot
reach res{)iution. the appeal is escalated to the OMB Director, the Chief ofStafT, and eventually,
the Prcsider:t, During this Administration, it has become practice that Presidential appeals are
settled the morning of December 241h,
In some cases, agencies appeal the passback. OMB, in consultation with the President,
works with the agencies to resolve as many of these as possible. Any that cannot be resolved are
decided directly by the President. Agencies and OMS staff complete the database that supports
the President's Budget in January and transmit the complete set of budget documents to
Congress by the statutory submission date of the first Monday ofFehruary,
Agencies and OMB require six weeks after decisions arc made in late December to
complete thtJ database and print materials associated \Vith the annua1 budget transmittal to the
Congress.
Preparation of the datab~se and print materials for the traditional budget documents
'n'e database and print material preparation process begins well before the final decisions
are made. Agencies need about five weeks to compile an accurate and comprehensive "current
services" baseline that updates technical assumptions and reflects the new economic assumptions
released in mid~November. After an OMS staff scrub, the updated baseline is available in mid~
December. The new baseline gives policy officials an approximate measure of how recent
policy changes might affect discretionary spending and mandatory spending relative to pay-as
you-go limits, as well as forecasts of the on~ and off· budget surplus, before fina] decisions are
made on pol icy proposals,
After OMB receives and reviews the agency detailed budget estimates reflecting the final
economic a$sumptions~ eliminates all of the technical problems in all of the budget accounts, and
resolves open policy issues, the final published database is "locked" around mid~January. OMB
preparation and GPO production of the February documents takes an additionaJ three weeks.
8
�THE FIRST BUDGET: A VISION OF CHANGE FOR AMERICA
Following the 1992 presidential election. the President~elect found that economic
conditions had changed worsened over the year, The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) had
reestimated the deficit upward in August 1992, and OMB had further increased the estimates in
January 1993.
The President~etect discussed many economic issues with CEOs, economists, and others
in the televised economic summit convened in Little Rock on December 14 and 15, 1992, Much
of the discussion focused on deficit reduction and, in part. the need for a stimulus to create jobs
in response to a sluggish recovery from the 1990-1991 recession. Unemployment rates had
increased well into 1992 and at the end of the year remained higher than the beginning. In
addition, there had been concern that the budget outlook remained dire. with budget projections
involving gimmickry. excessively optimistic economic assumptions, and assumed, but
unspecified, future savings,
It was in this atmosphere that the incoming' Administrntion was preparing its budget,
releasing its economic assumptions to the agencies, carrying out (he internal debate about
spending and taxes! and assessing which pledges might have to be revised, postponed, or
dropped.
To avoid controversy over the economic forecast in the consideration of the budget, the
President decided that the Administration should use the January CBO economic assumptions to
prepare the budget estimates. Because the Administration believed that enacting its program
would provide significant rewards for the economy and the budget, and, to continue to express
its independent judgment about the state of the economy, the Administration also provided an
alternate forec8!:t1 conditional upon enactment of its program,
On Jnnuary 29, J993, OMB released the CBO economic assumptions for use in preparing
its budget. 0:>13 also began an abbreviated budget production schedule.
~udget
TimeHne
Contact from transition team member
November 27, 1992
Economic assumptions released
January 29,1993
Schedules distributed
January 29, 1993
February 26, 1993
March 16, 1993
Initial
Rcvl£ed
Final revision
Passback
Director phone calls to agencies
Passback
February 9, 1993
February 18, 1993
9
�Resolution of policy issues
February 26, 1993
Database lock
March 22, 1993
Release of summary document
February 17, 1993
Detailed backup materials for summary document
Text on proposals and
crosscutting displays
February 16, 1993
Release ofdetailed document
April 8, 1993
Gujdance on non~Appendix documents
March 17,1993
Selected Data Requests during Policy Development of 1994 Budget
Materials for confirmation hearings
Request Sent out
Mah~rials due
December 28, 1992
December 30, 1992
Revisions to Bush baseline for technical changes
Rcquest sent out
'
Datn required to be in computer data base
December 29. 1992
January 8, 1993
Price~out
of various entitlement and Non~Dcfense DiscretIonary savings options
D,'Ocmher 30, 1992
January 5, 1993
Request sent out
OMB pricing due
Pros and cons of cntit1ement options
January 14, 1993
January 15, 1993
Request sent out
Response due
Pros and cons of investment and stimulus options
Request sent out
Response due
10
January 16, 1993
January 21, 1993·
�The first Administration budget document was A Vision of Change for America, a
summary refeased February 17, 1993, to accompany the President~s address to the Joint Session
of the Congress that evening. The detailed FY 1994 Budget ofth. United States Government
was released on AprilS, 1993. The budget had four key elements:
• Limited, targeted tax cuts for moderate-income families (espe-cially through increases in the
Earned-Income Tax Credit);
• economic stimulus to create jobs immediately while laying the foundation for long-term
economic growth;
• long-term public investments to increase productivity; and
• a deficit-reduction plan to stop the government from draining the NatioJil's pool of savings.
which finances the private investments that generate jobs and increase incomes
The President's budget supported the concept of "caps" to limit discretionary spending,
and pay-as-you-go, or "paygo," rules to ensure that any mandatory increases are ful1y paid for.
The Administration proposed to extend the caps through 1998. The pre-existiJig BEA had three
categories of discretionary spending (defense, international. und domestic) for 1991-1993, with
no separote categories for J994 and t995. The Administration proposed that the extension of the
caps for 1996 through 1998 also apply to total discretionary budget authority and outlays.
The Administration inherited a baseline deficit estimate of$319 billion for 1993. Or more
than 5 percent afGDP (see follov.ing Table). If the Administration's plan were adopted, the
Administration estimated that the resulting deficit would faU from $332 biIJion in 1993 (higher
than thc baseline be<::ause orthe proposed economic stimulus package) to $241 billion in J998, or
3.1 percent ofGDP.
tI
J
�HIGHLIGHTS OF THE INITIAL BUDGET PLAN
(In billions of dollars)
319
1994
301
1
-20
43
-73
-112
·128
·375
-3
-46
-51
-66
·83
·~2
·328
-2
-66
-93
-139
·195
·210
·704
8
6
2
9
1993
Baseline deficit (+)
Spending cuts (-J
Revenue increases (-)
Gross deficit reduction
1995 1996 1997 1998
296
297
346
390
Stimulus and investment:
Stimulus outlays
.. ..
6
13
15
27
20
17
39
13
·39
·54
332
262
242
·92
205
Resulting deficit as percent ofGUP
5.4%
4.0%
3.5%
2.9%
2.7%
3.1%
Addendum: Actual deficit/surplus(-)
255
203
164
108
22
-69
Investment outlays
Tax incentives
Total, stimulus and investment
Total, deficit reduction
6
Year
Tolal
(~)
Resulting deficit (+)
** indicates $500 million or less.
12
1,630
9
32
39
45
144
15
47
15
17
77
55
62
231
-140
-148
-473
206
241
1,157
3.2%
�THE 1993 BUDGET AGREI:MENT
The President's budget proposal was transmitted to a Congress with Democratic
majoritic~
in both the House and Senate, After the formulation of the plan, OMB monitored
congressional activity and supported the Administration's economic program with objective
analysis on a variety of budget and legislative related issues, Cabinet officials left Washington
for a two..day, 28~st3te tour in support of the budget as the Congress went to work on the
Administration's proposals. There were three major steps involved in approving the
Administration's plan: the budget resolution, reconciliation, and discretionary 'appropriations.
Budget Resolution
A budget resolution sets congressional targets for receipts, outlays, and the deficit, and
provides instructions. to the relevant committees to report spending and revenue amounts within
the targets. Congressional approval of 0. budget resolution that jn~luded the Presidenes
economic program was un Administration priority.
111e Congress approved a budget resolution for FY 1994 that embodied the essential
elements of the President's plan. The resolution included $496 billion of deficit reduction over
five years. In lotal, the deficit reduction package was increased by about $75 bilHon, with
reductions in discretionary spending accounting for about 80 percent the change. On Aprill,
or
1993, tlie final version of the budget resolution was approved in the House (240·1 84)and in the
Sennte (55-45). This VIM the earliest approval date In the history of the modem congressional
budget process. No Republicans voted for the resolution.
Reconciliation
Immediately after the resolution was passed, the Administration focused on the
reconciliation process. Reconciliation is the vehicle for enacting changes to entitlement
spending, revenues (including tax incentives) and, often, the discretionary spending limits,
ReconcHiation was the primary vehicle for putting the economic program into law. At the
direction of the President, the Administration set up a "war room," which came to be called the
Rec ("Reconciliation") Room, on the first floor of the Old Executive Office Building. to
coordinate legislative and analytic efforts in support of the President's agenda.
Each body adopted its own version of the budget reconciliation - the House on May 27
(219-213), and the Senate on June 25 (49-49), with the Vice President's vote needed to break the
tie in a hte-night session that did not conclude umil 3;00 a.01. The measures were similar to the
President's originai proposal, including approximately $500 biliion in deficit reduction over five
years. The reductions were roughly evenly split between spending cuts and tax increases, key
lnvestments, ftltd tax incentives for small businesses. Both raised the top marginal individual tax
rates to 36 percent and, for snme taxpayers. 39.7 percent; increased the top corporate rate from
34 percent to 35 percent; and raised taxes on the benefits of wealthier Social Security recipients.
13
�The President addressed the Nation from the Oval Office on August 3. 1993, to
encoumge support of the economic program, After much deliberation, the final reconciliation
bill was adopted by the House (218·216) on August 5 and the Senate (50·50) on August 6,1993,
with the Vice President again breaking the tie, As with the budget resolution, no Republicans
voted for the final reconciliation bill in either house or for the conference agreement. On August
10, 1993. the President signed the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA93).
which contained the essential elements of his economic plan.
The table below shows the deficit estimates in April and in September, including both the
changes enacted in OBRA93 and economic and technical changes, As a result of these changes,
the ScptcItlber deficit estimates were $636 billion lower than the pre~OBRA93 baseline deficit
estimates over five years, and the September deficit estimate for J998 declined to an estimated
2.2 pcrcent ofGDP, less than half of the pre.OBRA93 estimate for 1998 of 4,9 percent Thc
lower estimates were due in part to a more favorable economic forecast as a result ofenactment
of the President's program.
DEFICIT CHANGES: APRIL TD SEPTEMBER
(estimates. dollars in billi?ns)
1994·
1998
1994
305
1995
302
1996
298
1997
347
1998
388
-47
·83
·101
·129
-146
·505
G
I
I
I
-
I
10
·41
·82
-100
·128
·145
-495
·5
·20
. -19
·35
·62
·141
Subtotal, changes
-46
·101
-1l9
·163
·207
·636
September deficit
259
200
179
184
lSI
4.0%
2.9%
2.4%
2.4%
2.2%
203
164
108
22
-69
Pre·DIlRA baseline defieil (April)
Changes due to:
Policy:
Delicit reduction package (OBRA93)
Other policy
SubtNaI, policy
Economic and technical
As a percent ofGDP
Memorandum: Actual deficit/surplus(-)
In addition to the changes in spending and revenueS that were part of OBRA93, the
jegislation also contained significant budget enforcement measures that included:
• discretionary spending capsj requiring a five-year outlay freeze below the level of spending
of 1993 -~ a cut of about 15 percent below the level required to keep up with inflation;
14
�•
"pay~as-you-go"
•
sequester mechanisms to enforce both the discretionary spending; caps and the pay-as-you-go
requirement
procedures, requiring that entitlement spending and receipts legislation be
paid tor so as not to increase the deficit~ extended on a prospective tive-year basis through
1998; and
•
15
�A TYPICAL APPROPRIATIONS SEASON
OMB tracks and reports on appropriations measures at each stage of Congressional action
in support of efforts to gain acceptance for the Administration's priorities and to fulfill Budget
Enforcement Act (BEA) responsibilities. The process begins with transmittal of the PresldenCs
budget. and continues as long as appropriations measures of any kind are under consideration.
Budget Submission and Testimony
Tf'J.nsmittal of the President's budget to the Congress is the first official interaction
between the Executive and Legislative Branches during the appropriations process. OMB policy
officials· testify before the Appropriations or Budget Committees beginning the week the budget
is transmitted. supported by a variety of briefing materials, including agency-specific and general
tabular budget estimates, and an extensive collection of potential questions and answers that may
be asked at the hearings. OMB officials also respond to questions submitted for the record,
While the Director's testimony during this Administration tended to highlight macro-level
budgetary issues and nevI{ programs and proposals, questions from the Congress have addressed a
wide variety of topics.
Appropriations "Tracklnf(
After the Congress has established its budget resolution, legislative activity on the 13
regular appropriations bills begins. Work proceeds along two parallel tracks: (1) developing
letters and Statements of Administration Policy (SAPs) on pending bills that convey the
Administration's views on key funding and language issues; in an effort to influence
congressional action; and(2) fulfilling requirements oflhe SEA involving estimating and
reporting on the budget impact of spending bills.
At each stage of congressional action on appropriations bms~ OMB staff serving as bill
trackers anend the relevant House, Senate, Dr conference sessions and provide "real-time"
reports on the outcome. The bill trackers also analyze appropriations actions) comparing the
funding levels provided by the Congress with the Presiden(s request, identifying objectionable
funding and language provisions in the bills, assessing whether tlle bills comply with the SEA,
and evaluating how well the bills meet sound budgeting and policy practices.
Once analysis ofthc bill is complete, a letter or SAP lS sent from the Director ofOMB,
outlining the Administration's official views in reaction to the most current stage of action,
Generally speaking. letters are sent during House/Senate Committee stages of action, while SAPs
are sent in antiCipation of Floor consideration of the bill, Substantively, there is no difference
betwecn u letter and a SAP. In executing its responsibilities for appropriations bill tracking,
OMB works closely with the agencies represented in a given bill to obtain their views and, as
:lppropriate, incorporate agency views into letters and SAPs.
Preparing Nightly. Weekly, and Pcriodic Reports ~ To keep OMB policy officials and staffllp~to~
date, a variety of reports are prepared that highlight the status and budgetary impact of
16
�congressional appropriations action. Using information developed by the bill trackers,
infonTIation obtained from congressional resources. and other materials, OMS staff prepare a
"Nightly Report on Appropriations Action," which details the current status of appropriations
activity. At the end of every week during the bill tracking process, a summary report On
,congressional action is prepared that includeSI among other items: status tables showing
congressional action to date; summary data tables comparing congressional action to the request;
and detail tables for each appropriations biU identifying key programs and other relevant data,
Ailditionally. budget data js coHccted to meet the ad hoc requirements of OMB policy officials
'and the Director.
During this period, the Director and Deputy Director work very closely with the Chief of
Staff and other Wbite House officials to ensure thut appropriations issues are appropriately
coordinated and addressed. These conversations usually oceur during the 8:30 a,m. White House
meetings in the Chief of Staffs office. In addition, the Director also keeps the President
informed of the progress. in securing his priorities through a series ofpcriodic memos.
J'reparing Enrotled Bill Memoranda ~ As soon as each House of Congress has passed tile
conference report on an appropriations bill, an enrolled bill memorandum is prepared thnt
eontains an unalysis of congressional action on the appropriations blH and presents Ot...1B's and
tbe related agencies' recommendations for consideration by the President. A draft Presidential
signing statement is also usually prepared.
Preparing Sevcn~Day:After ReRorts ~ Once the President has signed an appropriations bill into
'law. a ilEA-required scven~day~after report is prepared, which is the final document transmitted
to the Congress for any appropriations bill. This report is primarily a technical document that
highlights the bHl's scoring in relation to the BEA spending limitations.. By law, the seven~day~
after report provides the omCial scoring of the bBI.,
17
�CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP CHANGE
The 1994 elections resulted in Republican lendership in the House for the first time in 40
years and Republican leadership in the Senate for the first time since 19&6, The combination of
divided go\'ernment between the President and the Congress and the tight margins in the House
(230.204·1) and Senate (53·47) resulted in a significant change in the role ofOMB in the budget
and appropriations process.
rn Implementing the technical aspects of the Budget Act, OMB has had a strong,
longstanding tradition of maintaining non~partisan relations with the staffs of the Budget and
Appropriations Committees and CBO. This tradition was sustained after the election of 1994.
However, the election did result in a significant change in the role of OMB in negotiating budget
and appropriations legislation with the Congress.
After the election of 1994, the Republican leadership shOWed no desire to work with the
Democratic congrcssionallcadcrshlp on compromise budget and appropriations legislation.
Instead, the Republican leadership chose to produce bills that could pass the I·louse and Senate
solely with Republican votes. Inevitably, this resulted in legislation that either was vetoed, or as
a result of a veto threat, was never sent to the President. During this Administration. the
President vt~toed 36 bills. including 20 appropriations, budget, or tax bills, There have been 48
continuing resolutions, two government shutdowns, 15 vetoed appropriations bills, four vetoed
tax bills (including one budget reconciliation bill) and one vetoed debt limit increase.
Prior to the 1994 elections, the typical appropriations bill would be negotiated between
the House and Senate Subcommittee Chairmen, Ranking members, and the respective cabinet
officers. The White House would be invoived only in a narrow range of issues of particular
interest to the White House, After the 1994 elections, because of the vetoes and veto threats, the
Chairmen needed a Vlhite I·louse assurance that their bill would be signed. Therefore, a pattern
deVeloped of having the OMB Director negotiate with whomever the Republican leadership
designated.
These negotiations typically included dozens of funding and }anguage issues for each bill,
and engendered considerable unhappiness: among the Members that the Executive Branch was
too involved in the drafting of budget and appropriations bills. However. it was their strategy
and thus their process that resulted in an FY 1997 Omnibus Appropriations Act that funded six
appropriations bills, an FY 1999 Omnibus Appropriations Act that funded eight appropriations
bills, and an FY 2000 Consolidated Appropriations Act that funded five biHs. Similar
negotiations produced the Balanced Budget Act of 1997.
Some of the President's most significant legislative victories were achieved in these measures"
such as funding for: 100,000 more police on the street; lOO.OOO teachers class size reduction
program and other education programs, including Head Start; promoting international
development through the Inlernational Monetary Fund; the Wyc River Accord; counter-terrorism
and bio-terrorism initiatives; preventive health programs at NIH and programs for combating and
18
�treating HJV/AIDS; and for the Federal Government to playa leading rale in successfully
addressing the Year 2000 Computer Conversion.
FoHmving vetoes ano veto threats. these negotiations were also used ta overcome prior
Congressior:ai funding decisions such as renninating the National Service and COPS programs,
and dramatically under funding the Legal Services Corporation, the National Endowment for the
Arts, Head Start, the Low Income Energy Assistance Program, Energy Conservation programs,
education programs for the disadvantaged, programs to protect the environment, research and
technology programs, numerous civil rights programs, and many others.
, The negotiations also resulted in the elimination or satisfactory modification of numerous
objectionable language issues such as: international family planning restrictions; parental
notification requirements related to family planning; private school vouchers mandated in the
District ofColumbia; mandated increases in logging in the Tongass National Forest; eftorts. to
block implementation of the Columbia River Basin Ecosystem Plan; provisions mandating
continued commercial fishing in the Glacier Bay Natiunal Park; limits on the hard rock mining
rule~ and restrictions on national forest plan revisions.
19
�GOVERNMENT SHUTDOW'"
Throughout 1995, the Congress drafted appropriations bills that would have cut domestic
discretionary spending dramatically, As the President opposed these cuts, none of ihe 13
appropriations biBs were passed before the beginning of the fiscal year. The first. the Military
Construction bill, was not enacted until October 3~ ! 995. The Congress responded by passing a
six-week continuing resolution (CR) set to expire on November 13, 1995. to provide temporary
funding to allow more time to complete the bills.
By November 13, 1995, only the Agriculture and Energy and Water bills had joined
Military Construction in becoming law~ with the Transportation conference report also
completed (it would be signed into law on the 15th). By th~t time, the Congress was also
completing action on its budget reconciliation bi1J, which included significant cuts in mandatory
programs 3S well as tax cuts. When a new CR was needed. the Congress added a key provision
of the pending reconciliation bill's Medicare provisions a provision to keep Medicare Part B
premiums at 3].5 percem, repealing a scheduled reduction to 25 percent on January I, 1996. The
Congress sought to use the need to pass a CR as leverage to win passage of a portion of its
broader budget agenda. However. the President refused to be pressured. Vlith both the
Administration and the Congress standing firm, the first partial government shutdown began.
One of the agencies affected by the shutdown was OMB. On Tuesday, November 14,
i 995 t the determination was made that Ofl,iB employees would be furloughed due to a Iapse of
appropriation. Employees needed to perform work associated with the orderly shutdown of
OMB and employees identified as performing excepted activities were instructed to remain at
work. AU other employees were provided with a \-vtiUen furlough notice and sent hame. The
furlough notice that employees received provided the following infannation and instruction:
..
the furlough was for a period not to exceed 30 days;
.. the reason for the furlough was the absence of either an FY 1996 appropriation or a
(;ontinuing resolution for OMB; ~nd.
.. employees were notified that they could not remain at work or volunteer their services
durjng the shutdown period.
Each day during the furlough period, OMB managers identified specific employees
required to work the next day based on their knowledge of specific activities to be performed at
OMB that day, Of Ihe approximately 5350MB employees on-board during the shutdown
period, between 220 and 232 were identified as perfonning excepted activities on any given day.
OMB's Associate Director for Administration and the Human Resources Manager held
daily meetings with division chiefs to identify excepted activities for the next day and review the
list of empll)yees required to carry out these activities. OMB managerS detennined specific
procedures [or staying in touch with their employees to keep them informed ofOMB's budget
status, and whether or not,they needed to report for work the next day. Additionally, a shutdown
2Q
�hotline was established, so that employees could call and get recorded information about the
status of the shutdown.
The shutdown ended on November 19) \\ith passage ofa new CR lasting four weeks,
through December 15. By that date, the Defense, Legislative Branch. and
Trcasury/PostaJlGenera1 Government bills had also become Jaw. Included within these bills was
funding for OMB, However. agencies funded in the remaining six bills faced ,a second
shutdown. That shutdown lasted until January 5, when the Congress passed a series ofCRs to
reopen the Federal Govemment. Nevertheless. the impasse continued. with the final FY 1996
spending bills not becoming law until April 25 l 1996 -- significantly complicating work on the
FY 1997 budget.
TIlroughout the period during which government shutdowns \¥ere threatened, O~1B
coordinated decision making across the Executive Branch. OMB collectea the relevant statutes
and legal opinions regarding activities by the affected agencies and assembl<:d the historical
record of past instances of hiatuses in funding. The OMS Deputy Director for Managem't)nt'
chaired meetings for contact persons represeming all of the major departments and agencies. In
these meetings and in \vritten conununications, OMB established a common understanding of the
requirement) of the law and answered questions about agency choices. O\<l.B set standards for
agency shutdown plans and reviewed the plans prepared by all of the agencies, to ensure t~.N
there was consistency across agencies, These plans detennined well ahead of time the crucial
decisions for each agency~ including which activities continue during an interruption of
appropriations and which employees would be exempted from a furlough in the event of' a
shutdown. At the same time, OMS provided information about likely congressional action so
that agencies could be prepared.
As it does at the end of every fiscal year, even when 3 shutdown is not threatened, OMS
prepared amilyses of the issues that would need to be addressed by any necessary eRs, so that
the Congress could forestall temporary meffects of what might otherwise be simple extensions
of prJor~yeal' funding, For exampie, if a straight extension of prior~year funding would force an
agency to separate pennanently any of its existing employees OMS would infonri tIte Congress
to anticipate this problem its CR.
j
21
�BALANCED BUDGET PROPOSED FOR FY 1997
Budget and other events. during much of 1996 were influenced by the presidential
primaries in the spring, campaigning that preceded the nominating conventions in August. and
further campaigning leading up to the November elections,
Because of the late appropriations in 1995 and other delays, the infonnation needed for a
detailed budget could not be ready by the first Monday of February 1996, the legal deadline for
transmittal of the budget to the Congress. In place of a detailed budget. the Administration
published a 20~page document entitled Budget of the United States Government. This document
included summaries of the Administration's priorities, and projected a surplus of$44 billion in
2002.
The President's FY 1997 budget requested $503 billion in discretionary spending to fund
the agencies and activities ofthe Federal Government. Oftbis amount, $247.6 billion w~s
requested for non~dcfense discretionary spending, and $255.4 billion was requested for defense
discretionary spending. tn his budget message to the Congress, the President stated that the FY
1991 Budget achieved two basic objectives .- it reuchcd balance in seven years and maintained
the his commitments to economic growth and protecting the most vulnerable Americans.
Among the goals the President set forth in the budget were providing funds to strengthen
Medicare and Medicaid; investing in education, the environment, science and technology;
reforming the welfare system; ensuring a strong defense; and providing tax relief to help families
mise their children, send their children to college. and save for the future.
TI,e FY 1997 Budget Supplement, which was released on March 19, 1996, projected a
surplus of$f; billion in 2001, one year earlier than in the February document. with surpluses
generally increasing through 2005. The March volume noted that if the use of CHO economic
assumptions, which were to be released in March or April. did not result in a surplus in 2002.
then the President's budget anticipated and would propose an immediate adjustment to the
djscretionary spending caps that would lower them enough to reach balance in 2002.
This: budget built on the Administration's strong economic record by balancing the
budget in seven years while continuing to inveslln the American people, This budget proposed
an estimated $461 billion in total seven-year savings (1996-2002), including $292 billion in
mandatory program savings, to achieve the proposed surpluses in 2001 and 2002.
Although there was much disagreement over budget issues between the President and the
Congress. and among Republicans:. towards the end of the session the RepubJicans were reiuctant
to challenge the President on appropriations. According to many press reports, the pubilc had
blamed the Republicans for the budget shutdowns in the prior years. As a result, the budget
negotiations at the end of 1996,just prior to the elections, were relatively tame compared to the
events of a year earlier.
A major legislative accomplishment of 1996 wa<; weifare refonn (the Persona!
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Recondliation Aet of 1996), which included an estimated
$55 billion in deficit reduction over the six year period, 1997~2002. Although there was much in
22
�the welfare reform legislation with which the Administration disagryed, the law authorized block
grants for temporary assistance for needy families along with many other welfare-related
changes. The President presented this as a bipartisan effort and was able to describe it as
"ending welfare as we know it,"
23
�THE BALANCE!) BU!)GET ACT AN!) TAXPAYER RELIEF ACT OF 1997
The Balanced Budget Act and the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 were companion
reconciliation bills signed by the President on August 5, 1997, which wrote into Jaw the first
balanced budget in a generation, The bills enacted net budget savings ofan estimated $247
billion for the five-year period 1998-2002, and $989 billion for the ten-year period 1998-2007.
The net savings included total mandatory and discretionary savings of$369 bil1ion over the five
year period, partially offset by domestic initiatives of $43 biJlJon and net tax cuts of$78 billion,
These two bills were the first signlficant deficit reduction bills since the Republicans took over
the Congress in 1995 and the largest deficit reduction bills since the Omnibus Budget
ReconcHiation Act of 1993, These savings, with economic, technical, and rclative1y minor
further policy proposals, reduced the baseline deficit estimate for FY 2002 from $JOl billion in
February 1997 to an estimated surplus of $63 billion in September.
The enacted legislation involved bipartisan votes that were in sharp contrast to the budget
wars that occurred at the end of 1995. The Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich gave credit to
the President for taking the steps necessnry to make the deal work. However, although the final
votes had substantial bipartisan support, there had been major disagreements since the beginning
of the year about how to move toward budget bu!ance.
,Defeat of the Balanced Budget Amendment to the Constitution in March
One of the top priorities of the Republicans in the IOSth Congress was to pass a balanced
budget amendment to the Constitution, so that the proposed amendment CQuld go to the States
for ratification. The previous Congress. with Republican majorities in both houses, had made
little progress in meeting this goal. The Republicans were disappointed ","'hen the amendment
failed, by one vOle, to get two thirds of the Senate 66-34, on March 4, 1997.
Balanced Budget Agreement in May
The first major step toward approval of the balanced budget legislation came with the
announcement by the President on May 2. 1997, of a bipartisan budget agreement that resulted in
the first balanced budget in three decades. The approved plan was incorporated into the
Congre:ssionaJ Budget Resolution on June 5.1997. which projected a $2 billion surplus in 2002,
but almost immediately there were strong disagreements about how to write the details into law,
The Final Agreement
Disagreements between the President nnd the Congress, and between House and Senate
Republicans about both the tax tind spending policies continued through the summer, until both
the House and Senate approved the conference report oflhe two Reconciliation bills: in late July.
The agreement was the culmination of2~ years of often bitter fighting, and intense bargaining
that led up to the agreement in late July.
Key Provisions ofthe Balanced Budget Act of 1997
24
�The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 was a balanced package of spending provisions that
targeted program cuts with investments in America's future, It included the several noteworthy
features.
First, it strengthened families by extending health insurance coverage to up to 5 million
chiidren in the State Children's Health Insurance Program. By investing $24 billion. the Nation
would be able to provide quality medical tafc for these chiJdren -~ everything from regular
check-ups to major surgery. This investment took a major step toward the goal e:fhaving every
child in America grow up healthy and strong. The Congress agreed to pay for this investment in
the Nation's children in part with a t 5--<:cnts-a-pack tax increase on cigarettes. Not only would
this new revenue help to pay for health care. but also would help deter children from taking up
smoking in the first place,
Second, the bill also continued the job of welfare reform by providing $3 billion to move
welfare recipients to private sector jobs. and $1.5 billion in Food Stamp assistance for people
who wanted to work but could not find ajob. In addition, the blU kept the President's promise to
provide $12 billion to restore disability and health benefits for 350,000 legal immigrants.
Finally, the bill honored the COllntry!s commitment to parents by extending the life ofihe
Medicare Trust Fund for a decade, The bill also provided structural reforms that would give
Medicare beneficiaries more infonned choices among competing health plans; authorized a
number of new anti-fraud provisions; and established a wide array of new preventative benefits.
In addition to the above changes, Title X of the Balanced Budget Act extended the
Budget Enforcement Act requirements through 2002 (2006 in part) and altered some of the
requirements.
Key provisions of the Taxpayer Relief Act
As the Administration worked with the Congress to develop the details of the balanced
budget agreement, the President insisted that the tax~eut package meet four basic tests. First, the
tax cuts had to be fiscally responsible, in that they must have avoided an explosion in revenue
costs in years outside the budget windows_ Second, the tax cuts had to provide a fair balance of
benefits for working Americans. Third, the tax cuts had to encourage economic grovvth. FOUrt11,
the tax package had to reflect the terms of the Bipartisan Budget Agreement. including a
significant (:xpansiQn of opportunities for higher education for Americans of all ages,
This Act met those tests. The Act provided au estimated $95 bilIion'in net tax cuts over
the next 5 years. It placed a priority on tax cuts targeted to education and provided a child tax
credit to famifies who worked hard and paid taxes. 1t also incorporated Republican priorities in a
gOOd-faith effort to honor the budget accord and to reach final agreement On a ta.x cut. The
legislation not only provided needed tax relief for middle-class Americans, but also encouraged
economic grov,rth. It was also fiscally responsible: the costs of these tax cuts were fully ofT.'>et in
accordance with the balanced budget agreement
25
�The President was especially pleased that the legislation included, with certain
modifications, the key features of his Middle Class Bill of Rights. which were designed to give
middle-income families the tax relief they needed to help them raise their children, save for the
future) and pay for postsecondary education,
26
�FY 1997 OMNIBUS APPROPRIATIONS
Follvwing transmittal of the President's budget, the Congress passed its budget resolution
in early June 1996, The resolution called for $497.4 billion in discretionary spending, with $231
billion for non-defense discretionary spending and $266.4 billion for defense discretionary .
spending. In total, the resolution was $5.6 billion below the President's request -- $16.6 billion
below the request for non-defense discretionary spending and $11 billion above for defense
discretionary spending.
Mpropriations Action
The House reported the first oftbe 13 annual spending bills out of Subcommittee on Mnj'
21,1996, and reported the last bill out ofSubeommittee on July 12, 1996. The Senate reported
its first bill out of Subcommittee on June 18. 1996, and the last on September 10, 1996. As the
bills moved through the Congress, seven of the 13 regular appropriations bills had veto
recommendations attached to either the House or Senate version (or both) due to the inclusion of
unacceptable provisions or levels of fWlding. The fOllowing is 0. brief synopsis of each of the
veto tbreats:
•
Commerce/Justice/State. Senior advisers veto recommendation (House and
Senate versions) due-to inadequate overall funding levels and specific reductions
to critical law enforcement, research and technology, and international affairs.
The House bill also included unacceptable language prohibiting use of any funds
included within the Act for Anti-BalHstic Missile treaty negotiations.
•
Defense. Sentor advisers veto recommendation (House and Senate verSions) due
to funding levels that were too high, The House Committee bill included $11.2
billion more, and the Senate Committee $10 billion more) than the President's
request.
•
~neJ'gy/Water Development.
Secretary of Energy veto recommendation (House
version) for several reasons, includjng: lack ofsupport for the nuclear waste
program; elimination of funding for international nuclear safety programs; and
drastic reductions in funding for solar and renewable energy research. The
Administration also opposed language in the House version lhat would have made
the availability of a significant portion of the funds for the nuclear waste
management program contingent upon the enactment of a subsequent
authorization bill.
•
Interior. Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior veto recommendation. The
recommendation stemmed in part from inadequate funding provided in the House
Committee bill. The House bill also included two highly objectioHable language
provisions that concerned tribal sovereignty and Federal Indian law and TribaI
State relations over trust lands. The Senate version also contained several
provisions that were objectionable to the Administration. including language
regarding; the Tongass National Forest; formula funding for certain Bureau of
27
�Indian Affairs programs; and the Cook Inlet Regional Corporation.
•
LaoorIHHSlEducation, Senior advisers veto recommendation (House and Senate
versions) over the inadequate level of funding (more than $S biIJion below the
request) provided in both versions of the bilL For example, the House bill
funding level for Head Start would have reduced available slots by up to' 15,000
as compared to FY 1996.
•
V AlrIUD. Presidential veto threat on the Senate bill over inadequate funding for
the National Service Program. The House version ofthe bill elicited this threat as
well because of inadequate funding levels provided for other programs, For
example. the Conunittee bill included a $479 million reduction to the Presidem's
request for the Environmental Protection Agency.
fQreign Operations. The House version nfthe bill contained items that the
•
Administration considered se:riously objectionable. These included an overall
inadequate funding level for the bill; and the restrictions on l and cuts in funding
for, international family planning ("Mexico City" language), A letter to the
Senate Appropriations Committee evaluating the House-passed version of the bill
contained a senior advisers veto threat based on this '"Mexico City" language.
Unlike FY 1996, when the Administration vetoed five appropriations bills, no vetoes
were required in FY 1997. Seven of the 13 appropriations bills were signed as freestanding bills:
AgriculturelRural Development, District of Columbia, :v1ilitary Construction, Legislative
Branch, VA/HUD/Independent Agencies, Energy and Water, and Transportation. The remaining
six bills were bundled into an omnibus package.
End~game
Negotiations
With six of the 13 regular appropriations bills incomplete as the end of the fiscal year
loomed. the Administration and the Congress engaged in end~garne negotiations to resolve
deficiencies in the remaining bills. No continuing resolutions were needed to keep the
Government operating while the Congress nnd the President resolved differences. The President
signed the omnibus appropriations bill into law on the evening of September 30, 1996.
Conclusion
At the beginning of the FY 1997 appropriations process, there \\o'a5 a gap of nearly $6
billion between the Administration's total request for discretionary spending und the
Congressional Budget Resolution. The enacted bins provided 5505.1 billion discretionary
spending, $2.1 billion above the President's request and $10,7 billion above FY 1996. Non
defeltse discretionary spending totaled $2393 billion, $83 billion below the request and $13
billion over FY 1996. Defense discretionary funding totaled nearly S266 billion, $10 billion over
the request and $243 billion over FY 1996,
28
�,
The vast majority of the objectionable language provisions contained in the earlier
versions of the six appropriations bills included in this omnibus bill were elimjnated or
acceptably modified. Some of the language provisions that were eliminated include international
fat:J1ily planning restrictions, tribal sovereignty restrictions. and a provision regarding the
Tongass National Forest 1and management plan.
The enacted omnibus bin provided $1.4 biUion for the Community Oriented Policing
Services program, the same level of funding provided in FY 1996. The bill provided $243
billion in discretionary spending for the Department of Defense, S9 billion more than was
requested by the Administration, Total fundi rig for the Department of Education was $263
,billion, $0.8 billion over the request Jevel. The bill provided $1,3 billion in discretionary budget
authority for the Department of Energy, $149 miHion above the request. The Forest Service was
funded at S2A billion, SIOO million above the request level.
The bill fully funded both the Goal, 2000 eclucation reform program and the Pell grant
program -~ funding levels originally opposed by the Congress. The enacted bill also included
funding for a number of othl.-,,!, Administration high~priority programs. These include: resources
to implement the recommendations for the Vice President's Commission on Aviation Safely and
Security, and the Federal Aviation Administration's 90-day safety review; additional funds for
water treatment in Boston Harbor; and continued funding for the Ounce of Prevention Council.
The overall funding level also provided $1.9 bilHon for emergency requirements such as damage
caused by Hurricanes Fran and Hortense; fires in the West; and anti-terrorism needs.
29
�THE LINE ITEM VETO
As the President stated in February 1993, he intended to work with the Con&,treS5 to obtain
a line item veto "that v..r:ill enable a President to reject wasteful items from an appropriations biU
and will require the Congress to cast u separate vote on those items. Items that have broad
support will survive; but over time millions. perhaps billions, ofdollars will be saved by the
defeat of items without broad support."
The Congress responded to the President's request for a Hne item veto, and the President
signed the Line Item Veto Act into law on April 9, 1996. The Act went into effect on January I,
1997, and was to continue in effect through 2004. It granted the President the authority to cancel
new spcndh~g items (discretionary spending or new direct spending) or limited tax benefits (as
defined in the Line Item Veto Act), The President had five days after signing a bill in which to
'cancel items in it The Act authorized the President to cancel the whole amount of individual
spending items that were identified in the statute or in congressional reports. As a result, the
President could cancei spending "eannarks" contained in reports, However, the President could
not cancel a part of a spending or tax item; he could cancel only the "whole" item. Under the
Act's ulockoox" provision, the budget savings from a canceJJlltion could not be used as a
budgetary offset for other spending or tax legislation. lnstead~ the savings would be applied to
reducing the Federal budget deficit When the President canceled discretionary spending items,
OMS was to reduce the discretionary spending caps by the same amount. When the President
canceled direct spending or limited tax benefits, those savings were not reflected in the Budget
Enforcement Act "Paygo" scorecard.
When the President canceled a spending or tax item. the Act required him to submit a
special mcs5age to the Congress. The Act provided the Congress with a fast-track process to
consider disapprovullegislatlon (subject to the President's veto) that would overturn the
President's cancellation, A cancellation was eITcctivc upon receipt by the Congress. and would
remain in effect, except if overturned by a disapproval law,
The President's Hne item veto authority went into effect on January J, 1997. OMB
worked to provide recommendations to the President. reviewing thousands of pages of bill text
and investigating little~known projects. During 1997, the President canceled 82 spending and tax
items that were contained in 11 bills. The cancellations totaled in excess of $2 billion over a 1O~
year period.
The President's first cancellations occurre_d in August 1997 1 when he canceled three
"items totaling $672 million over 10 years. One was a direct spending provision in the Balanced
Budget Act of J997, and the other two were limited tax benefits in the Taxpayer Relief Act of
1997.
During tlle fall of 1997. the President canceled another 79 items totaling nearly $1.34
billion. The President's first set of cancellations were 38 spending Hems (totaling $287 million)
in the Military Construction Appropriations Act most of which were spending "earmarks" in
congressional reports. During the faU, the President canceled another 41 items in appropriations
bills, totaling $1.05 billion.
30
�Undi!r the Line Item Veto Act, the Congress could overturn a cancellation by using fast~
track procedures to enact a disapprovat bill. The Congress exercised this disapproval authority
only once -~ in the case of the President's cancellations of38 spending items in the Military .
Construction Appropriations Act. In response to the Presidentts action, the Congress passed a
disapproval bill to restore the 38 items. The President vetoed the disapproval bill, but the
Congress overrode his veto, thereby restoring the 38 spending items .
.
The Congress left untouched the President's cancellations in the other 10 spending and
tnx bills. In many cases. no Senator or Representative even took the first step of introducing a
disapproval bill.· This response by the Congress continued the premise of the supporters of the
Line Item Veto Act, including the President, who believed that many items in the lengthy
spending and tax bills do not command broad support in the Congress.
The Line Item Veto Act was subject to almost continuous litigation) culminating in the
rulingof the United States Supreme Court in June 1998 that the Act \va5 unconstitutional.
The litigation began on the very day that the President signed the Act in April 1996,
when n Federal employee union filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the Act
(NTEU \I, United Stales), In July 1996, however, the U.S. District Court dismissed the suit.
Because the Act would not go into effect until January I, 1997. the District Court concluded that
the Act had not hanned the plaintiffs, and therefore they lacked tbe required "standing)' to sue,
In December 1996, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the dismissal.
On January 2,1997, the day after the Act went into effect, several Members of Congress
filed a lawsuit challenging the Act's constitutionality (Byrd v, Raines). (n April 1997, the
District Court concluded that the Act was unconstitutional. The case then went to the Supreme
Court. In June 1997. the Supreme Court issued its ruling (R.ines v. Byrd). The Supreme Court
did not dct;ide whether the Act \.V3S constitutional. Instead, the Court dismissed the challenge
based on its conclusion that Members of Congress lacked standing to challenge the Act's
constituliOlutlity.
In the fall of 1997, two lawsuit were filed raising a constitutional challenge to two of the
Presjdent's lirst three cancellations ~~ ofspending and tax items in the Balanced Budget and
Taxpayer Relief Acts of 1997. In addition. later in the fall of 1997. a lawsuit was filed
challenging the President's subsequent canceHation of a provision in an appropriations bill that
changed the Federal retirement system. This challenge raised constitutional is.sues as well~ but it
also made the statutory argument that the provision that the President canceled was outside the
scope of his cancellation authority.
In January 1998, the Justice Depanment settled the lawsuit challenging the cancellation
ofthe retirement system provisjon. by agreeing to a ruling by the District Court that the
cancellation was invulid as a statutory matter, As a result, the canceled rctlrement provision was
restored.
31
�In February 1998, in the lawsuits challenging the President's first set of cancellations, the
District Court concluded that the Act was WlconsthutlonaL
On June 25~ 1998, the Supreme Court decided the constitutional challenge to the Line
Item Veto Act. By a 6~3 vote. the Supreme Court (in CIi1!.~.on v, City of New York) held tbat the
Act was unconstitutional. and therefore that the President lacked the authority to cancel the direct
spending and limited tax benefit provisions in the Balanced Budget and Taxpayer Relief Acts,
The Court concluded that the Act violated the "Presentment Clausell of the Constitution, because
- in tilC Court's view - the Act authorized the President to "ve1o" parts of a bill rather than
restricting the Presidcnt to vetoing the whole bi1l.
In response to the Supreme Court's decision, the Executive Branch restored the 43
spending and tax items that remained canceled at the time of the Court's decision (the other 39
canceled items had previously been restored).
�FIRST BUDGET SURPLUS IN A GENERATION
On Octoher 28, 1998, the Administration announced a surplus of$10 billion for fiscal
year 1998 -- the first surplus since 1969, and the largest as a percent ofGDP (0.8 percent) since
1956. In dollar terms, it waS the largest ever.
When the President took office in January 1993, CBO projected a deficit of $357 billion
for fiscal year 1998. The $70 billion surplus announced in October 1998 marked the sixth
consecutive year of improvement in the Federal budget balance since the deficit peaked at $290
billion, or 4.7 percent of GDP, in 1992. Since 1992, thanks to slrong and continuing economic
gro....1-h, Federal Govenuncnt downsizing. and spending control, outlays grew at an average rate
of only 3.0 percent per year, from that year through 1998, less than half the average of7,}
percent per year over the preceding 12 years; while receipts advanced at a rate of7.9 percent per
year~ faster than the 6.4 percent average of 1980 through 1992 -- resulting in steady reductions in
the deficit, and eventually, the reali7lltion of a surplus.
Because of this progress in eliminating the budget deficit, the debt held by the public fell
to $3.7 trillion at the end of 1998 -- reduced over a fun fiscal year for the first time in 29 years,
As a share of the economy, the debt held by the public had declined for five consecutive fiscal
years, and at the end of1998 was 43.1 percent of GDP -- below its 1991 level.
From Deficit Estimate to the First Surplus in a Generation
The move from deficit to surplus since (993 was the result of both decreases in spending
and increases in receipts, relative to the size of the economy. In 1998, outlays were 19,1 percent
of GDP, the lowest since 1974; and receipt.;; were 19.9 percent ofGDP, the highest since World
War II.
The following table shows that in April 1993, before enactment of the Administration's
Economic Plan, the deficit was estimated to be $388 billion for 1998, and the sum of deficits for
the five-year period 1994-1998 was estimated to be $1,640 billion. The table also measures the
total change from the 1998 deficit esti1l1llte as of 1993 to the actual 1998 surplus of $69 billion at
$457 billion l and parses that improvement among rough estimates of three reasons: for the
change: pOJil:y; economic conditions; and tcchn1cal reestimates.
Policy changes arc the result of actions by the Congress, primarily through substantive
legislation affecting tax policy or mandatory programs, or appropriations that differ from those
assumed in the baseline estimate. The major policy change for the 1998 deficit was enactm~nt of
the President's Economic Plan in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA93),
which decreased the 1998 deficit by an estimated $146 billion. Subsequent policy changes,
largely those in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1991, partially
offset this decrease. so that total poliCy changes decreased the 1998 deficit an estimated $124
biHion.
Actual economic outeomes that differed from the initial economic assumptions were'
estimated to increase 1998 receipts by $61 billion, and decrease out1ays 530 billion, for a total
33
�,deficit reduction due to economic factors of an estimated $91 billion. These changes were
largely the rl~sult of stronger economic growth, which increased receipts and decreased certain
outlays! such as those for unemployment compensation, and also of lower than expected inflation
and interest rates.
Technical estimating differences, a residual; increased 1998 receipts by an estimated
$163 billion. and decreased outlays by an estimated $79 billion. for a total decrease in the deficit
of an estimated $242 binion. Much of the increase in receipts was due to difficult-to-project
indirect economic factors, such as the growth in the stock market. These had the effect of
increasing elfective taX rates (the amount of tax caHeeted per daUar ofGDP). as discussed
below,
FY 1998- FROM DEFICIT ESTIMATE TO THE FIRST SURPLUS IN A
GENERATION
(in billions ofdollars)
FY 1998
Prc-OBRA93 baseline deficit estimate (~)
Changes due to:
·388
Policy
Economics
124
91
Technical reestimates
242
Tatal changes
457
69
Actual
FY 1994
FY 1998
·1,640
475
189
548
1,213
-427
The Role of the President's Economic Program
TI\e President's 1993 Economic Plan induded $255 billion in spending cuts over five
years ~- more thun half of the total deficit reduction in the 1993 package. As spending was cut in
lower priority ar~as, the President dramatically increased funding in critical areas such as
education and training, children, the environment, health care, and research and development.
In addition. because of the tax cuts for working families signed into law by the President,
the typical American family of four was projected to face the lowest Federal tax burden in over
two decades. The President proposed in 1998 to build upon this record to provide additional
targeted, paid-for tax relief for childcare, education, pensions~ affordable housing, and the '
environment.
Experts agreed that the President's 1993 Economic Plan helped cut the deficit, reduce
interest rates, spur business investment, and strengthen the economy - the «virtuous cycle."
According to reports at the time, the economy and the budget were working in a virtuous circle -
lower deficits led to lower interest rates, which led to faster business investment. which led to
faster growth, which in tum led to even lower deficits.
34
�FY 1999 OMNIBUS APPROPRIATIONS
The President's FY 1999 budget, released on February I. 1998, requested over $554,2
billion [0 fund the disCretionary activities of the Federal Government. Of this amount, $279.8
billion was requested for non-defense discretionary spending (including emergencies,
Education's Title I advance. unallocated reserve, and excluding offsets); and $274,4 billion was
requested for defense discretionary spending. In his budget message to the Congress, the
President stated that this would be the first balllJlced Federal budget of the last 30 years, bringing
the era of exploding deficits to an end. Among the goals the President set forth in the budget
were investments in education and training; a child care initiative; expanded health care coverage
for seniors and children; increased support for key environmental programs; a Research Fund for
America to support continued leadership in science and tethnology; an expanded community
policing program to increase police on the streets; community development through more
Empowennent Zones and Enterprise Communities; continued support for the International
Monetary Fund and peacekeeping efforts; and a review of our militruy forces to support military
readiness fully.
Congressiona!. Budgct Resolution
Following transmittal of the President's budget. the Congress for the first time since the
enactment of the Budget Act failed to pass a budget resolution" The Appropriations Committees
developed bills based on allocations that called for $531.9 billion in discretionary spending based
on the average of the Senate and House resolutions, with $260.3 billion for non-defense
discretionary spending and $271.6 billion for defense discretionary spending, In total, the
resolution was $22.3 billion below the President's request, $19.5 billion below the non~dcfense
discretionary request, and $2,8 hUEon below the defense discretionary request
Appropriations Action
The House reported the first of the 13 annual spending bills out of Subcommittee on June
3rd, and reported the last bill out of Subcommittee on July 24th. The Senate reported its first bill
out of Subcommittee on June 2nd and the last on September 1st. By the end of the process, the
House had passed 12 bill, (all but LaborlHHS1Education), and the Senate had passed 10 (all but
Di'tric1 of Colnmbia, Interior, and LaborIHHS/Education), Only five bills made it completely
through the process as freestanding bills: Military Construction, Energy/Water Development.
Defense, V A1HUD/lndependent Agencies, and Legislative Branch. Eight bills had veto threats
attached to either the House or Senate version (or both), and one. Agriculture/Rural
Development, was vetoed by the President. In the eventual omnibus bill, virtually all of the
items that were tlie basis of veto threats on the Housc- or Senate-passed versions were dropped
or resolved in a manner acceptable to the Administration, A recap of veto threats on the FY
1999 appropriations bill, follows.
•
Agriculture!Rural Development. Senior advisers veto recommendation in
conferees letter based on two issues: the House provision that would have
prohibited FDA from using funds for the testing, development, or approval of any
drug for the chemical inducement of abortion; and agricu1tur..t1 disaster assistance
35
,
�that ",:as either inadequate or improperly strucrured. The hilt was vetoed on
October 7,1999.
•
Comn:terce/JustiteIState, Senior advisers veto recommendation on House-passed
bill due to inadequate funding of priority programs (e.g., Legal Services
Corporation), and objectionable language provisions including a restriction on
decennial census funding, The omnibus bill included $300 million for the Legal
Services Corporation~ $40 million below the request~ but a six~percent increase
over the FY 1998 level. The Community Oriented Policing Services Program
was funded at the request - $1.4 billion. The final bill pro,ided $189 million
more than the original request for the decennial census to proceed with a "dual
track" approach -- a census with and without sampling. In addition, the omnibus
bill limited the time availability ofFY 1999 funding to June 15, 1999 (the date by
which the Supreme Court was expected to render a verdict on the legality of the
use of sampling) for all the agencies funding in the e/J/S bilL
•
Defense. Senior national security advisers veto recommendation on House
passed bill due to section 8106 requirement for prior congressional approval
before the President can initiate offensive military operations. Senior advisers
veto recommendation based on Senate Floor amendments that would have:
prescribed a force draw~do\vn in Bosnia (tabled); require prior congressional
authorization before taking offensive military actions (tabled); and altered the
current commercial satellite export licensing jurisdictions of Executive Branch
agencies (withdrawn).
•
District of Columbia. Senior advisers veto reco"mrnendation on House-passed bill
due to funding for school vouchers. a prohibition on adoption in the District by
couples who are unmarried or not related by blood, and a prohibition on needle
exchange programs, The prohibition on the needle exchange program was
retained in the omnibus bill. Senior advisers veto on Senate Committee bill if an
amendment had been adopted to provide for the use of private school vouchers in
D,C. (not added in Senate Committee).
•
fQrcign Operations. Presidentiat veto (based on bill as a whole) on House~
Committee bill and senior advisers veto recommendation on Senate-passed bill
due to inadequate funding for key Administration priorities such as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (House); assistance to New Independent
States (House and Senate); the Korean Peninsular Development Organization
(House); the Global Environmental Facility (House and Senate); and 11 number of
objectionable language provisions (House and Senate). including "Mexico City"
restrictions {House) on international population programs. Funding for fon::ign
operations in the omnibus bm, excluding IMr, increased by one percent over FY
1998. The bill included the requested $3.4 billion for the New Arrangements to
Borrow and the $14.5 billion for the IMF quota increase, The omnibus retained
the FY 1998 appropriations language which caps funding for international
population programs (the "Mexico City" Janguage), and imposes monthly
36
�obligation limits, but does oat include the Mexico City restrictions.
•
Secretary of Transportation veto recommendation on Senate
Committee bill over Project Labor Agreements (PLAs). Compromise language
added on Senate Floor prohibited use of funds for requiring or directing the use of
PLAs by DOT.
•
TreasuryfGeneral Government. Secretary of the Treasury veto recommendation
on two potential arnt,'ndments. An amendment that would have severely restricted
the usc of the Exchange Stabilization Fund was defeated 00 the House Floor and
not offered in the Senate. An amendment to sunset the tax code fell on a Budgct
Act point of ordcr in the Senate.
Trans~ortation.
With cight of the 13 regular appropriations bills incomplete beforc the end ofFY 1998.
the Administration and the Congress engaged in a series of end~game negotiations to resolve
deficiencies in the remaining biHs. A total of six Continuing Resolutions \..'ere needed to keep
the Government opcrnth1g,as the Congress and the President worked 10 resolve differences. The
eight remaining bills were included in a 40-pound, 3.825-pagc omnibus/supplemental bill and
report that totaled $486 billion in budget authority (mandatory, discretionary.IMF, and
emergencies). The bill provided approximately $224 bilJion (net of offsets) in discretionary
budget authority, This included $20,8 billion in emergency supplemental funding composed of:
$5.9 billion for agricultural disasters; $3.0 billion for military readiness and peacekeeping; $3.35
billion for Year 2000 conversion activities ($2.25 billion for non~defense agencies); $2.4 billion
for anti~ and counter~terr()rism activities: $1.9 billion for natural disasters; $0,7 billion for
countcr~d":lg and narcotics interdiction efforts; and$3.5 billion for other emergency needs.
The White House/OMB negotiated principally \vith the congressionallcadership,
primarily Speaker Gingrich.
Conclusion
With the completion of negotiations between the Congress and the Administration, the
President signed into law the FY J999 Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations BiU on October 21 J 1998. At the beginning of the year's appropriations process,
there was a $22.3 billion gap between the Administration's total program level request for
discretionary spending and the Congressional Budget Resolution, The enacted bills provided
$28 J .7 billion for non-defense discretionary spending (including emergencies), $1.9 binion
above the President's request, and $22.6 billion (nine percent) above FY 1998. Defense
discretionary spending totaled $279.9 billion, $5.5 billion over the request. and $8.0 billion (three
percent) over FY 1998.
1l1rough the end-game negotiations, the Administration was able to add significant
funding to the omnibus bill for many Presidential priorities, The bill provided $35,8 billion for
the Department of Education, nearly $2,6 billion above the House level. TI1C Climate Change
37
�Technology lnitiativc received $1,0 billion. a 16.5-percent increase over the House level. The
Department of Labor's School-to-Work program was funded at the requested level of5125
million. 66.7 percent above the House level. Foreign Operations funding totaled $13,4 billion,
$578 million abnve the House level, Environmental programs received $31.5 billion, $ LI .
bHlion above the House levels.
The vast majority of the objectionable language provisions contained in earlier versions
of the eight appropriations bills included in the omnibus were elIminated or acceptably modified,
While the bill prohibited charging fees for the cost of the FBI's Insta-Check System, it provides
funding for these costs. The bill included provisions that reform the H~ 1B visa program,
reflecting over six months of negotiations between the Congress and the White House. An
Administration-supported provision to provide legislative relief to certain Haitians was included
in the bilL Funding was provided for a contribution to KEDO, tied to -certification requirements
that "''ere drafted by the Administration. The Administration succeeded in having language
removed 1haI would have required family planning grantees to acquire parental consent or
notification,
Many objectionable riders in House or Senate versions of the Interior bill were eliminated in the
omnibus bill. including provisions that would have allowed the following: the establishment of
the construction of a road through the King Covc/Izembek National Wildlife Refuge; the
operation of belicoptcrs in Alaslron wilderness areas; the establishment ofa rigbt~of~way through
the Chugach National Forest; a 55-percent increase in timber production in the Tongass National
Forest; and the amendment ofthe· 1920 Federal Power Act for hydro-electric facilities on the
Columbia-Snake River System.
In addition to the prohibition of the District of Columbia from using funds for needle
exchange. the bill prohibited the use of Federal funds, rather than aUowing the Secretary of
Health and Human Services to certify the use of such funds. The omnibus also included an
amendment prohibiting piJol national testing and a deiay in the implementation of an organ
donation regulation that would allow organs to be allocated according to medical urgency.
38
�THE BALANCED BL'DGET REFINEl\fENT ACT
On November 29, J999, the Balanced Budget Refinement Act of 1999 (BBRA) was
enacted into law. The SBRA restored $15 billion over five-years in Medicare payments to
health-care providers. and health plans in response to criticisms that the Balanced Budget Act of
1997 (BDA) }.<1edicare payment reductions were excessive, Health-care providers successfully
argued that some of the BBA payment reductions were no longer needed given faster-than
expected slowdowns in overall Medicare spending and largcr-than-expected budget surpluses.
The BBA represented one of the most dramatic changes to the Medicare program since
its inception. Medicare payments were reduced by about $150 billion over five years. Most of
these payment reductions lOok the fann of reductions to scheduled annual Medicare payment
updates and the replacement of traditional cost~based reimbursement systems with prospective
payment systems, The BBA also revamped the Medicare managed care program, adding new
plan choices such us medical savings accounts and preferred provider organizations,
Preliminary Medicare spending data confinued that Medicare outlays were falling faster
than prior projections. Both OMS and eBO reduced their Medicare baseline spending
projections in 1999. For the FY 2000 Mid-Session Review, OMB reported that Medicare
spending would be $l7 billion lower over five years relative to its most rC(:ent projection. C80
reported n similar decline in projected Medicare spending, In March, the Medicare Trustees
reported that the HI Medicare Trust Fund would remain solvent until 2015, a scven~year
improvement relative to its post~BBA projection. In October 1999. the Treasury Department
released nctual Medicare spending for FY 1999, reporting that Medicare spending fell 0.7
percent relative to FY 1998 spending. Never in the history of tbe Medicare program had the
Medicare program experienced ~egative spending growth.
However, many analysts were skeptica11hat the slowdowns in Medicare spending were
due solely to the payment reductions enacted-under the BBA, reasoning that the spending
declines were due to other factors. These other factors included declines in the general rate of
inflation which depresses Medicare payments, reductions. in the incidences of "up-coding" due to
increased vigilance against Medicare fraud and abuse, and claims processing slow-downs due to
the extensive system changes required by the BBA.
OMS atlrjbuted the slowdown to HHS and the Health Care Financing Administration's
(HCFA's) efforts to eliminate fraud, waste, and abuse in the Medicare program. CBO supported
OMB's explanation. Other analysts cautioned the Congress that it was too soon to tell what the
true impact of the BBA payment reductions were and what was causing the Medicare spending
slowdovms. At the June 10 Senate Finance Committee hearing the Medicare Payment Advisory
Commission stated:
j
The greater than expected slowdown in Medicare spending that occurred in fiscal year
1998 and that has continued this year was greater than expected. Unfortunately, we
cannot draw definitive conc1usions about what is happening ...to generate this slowdown.
Data for the BBA period are extremely limited) and we cannot easily isolate the effects of
the BBA from other changes,
.
39
�While the reasons for the Medicare spending slowdowns were not exactly clear, declining
hospitals margins, home health agency c1osures~ skilled nursing facility bankruptcies~ and plan
pull-Quts from the Medicare managed~care program nevertheless fueled pressure for the
Congress to enact legislation that would restore some Medicare funding to providers.
The BBRA restored $15 billion of Medicare funding over five years to health care
providers. The legislation was. widespread in scope, address.ing Medicare payment systems jor
almost all health~care providers that participate in the Medicare program. The major provisions
included:
• Inpatient Hospitals. The BBRA modified the payment reductions to Medicare
Disproportionate Share Hospital payments and the Indirect Medical Education payments.
The BBRA also modified several Medicare rural hospital programs to aUow more hospitals
to participate and to receive higher Medicare payment rates.
•
Q~tpatient Hospital Departments. TIle SBRA eased the transition to the new prospective
payment system for outpatient hospital services by providing additional Medicare funding,
• Skilled Nursing Facilities. The BBRA increased Medicare payments by 20 percent for 15 of
the more than 40 payment categories ofthe BBA~mandated prospective payment system..
• Home Health Care. The BBRA delayed by one year a scheduled 15 percent overall payment
reduction.
•
~anaged
Care Payments. The BBRA increased managed~care payment rates by modifying
scheduled payment reductions and delaying HCF A's schedule for phasing in risk-adjustment,
a method of adjusting payments to reflect the relative health of the managed~care enrollee.
Managed-care payment rates were also increased indirectly since they are automaticaHy
increased by payment increases to Medicare fee-for-service providers.
The nBRA also made a number of smaller changes to Medicaid and the State Children's
Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). In M,-dicaid, the bill extended the TANF/Medicaid welfare
refonn transition fund, increased Medicaid disproportionate share hospital allotments for three
States and the District of COlumbia. and modified the phase-do\.\'Il of payments to Federally
Qualified lh::alth Centers, In SCHIP, the bin stabilized the state allotment formula, increased
allotments to the Territories) and provided funds to the Census Bureau and HHS to improve data
collection and program evaluation.
The BBRA provided additional funding to almost an health-care providers. However, the
overall payment increase was relatively small when total Medicare spending is considered. The
$] 5 billion payment increase constituted about 10 percent of the total savings enacted under the
BBA, and about one percent of total Medicare baseline spending, 1f the improved stability of
health~care providers was the goa! of Congress when enacting the BBRA. the verdict on its
SU{;cess is still to be determined a year later. Measures of hospital. home-health provider and
nursing horne financial pcrforman:;e is mixed. and many providers continue to report negative
earnings and bankruptcy, Further. the Medicare managed care program experienced its largest to
date plan withdrawal in 2000. Attesting to provider success in lobbying for further Medicare
payment restorations (and additional budget surpluses), in the fall of2000 the Congress: began
40
�drafting a second Medicare payment ~estoration but that would likely double the spending
increases of the BBRA.
41
�FY 2000 OMNIBUS APPROPRIATIO;l1S
The President's FY 2000 budget, released on February 7, 1999, requested $576,1 billion,
as later amended. to fund the discretionary activities of the Federal Government. Of this amount.
$290.7 billion, induding emergencies, was requested for non~defense discretionary spending.
and $285.3 billion was requested for defense dlscretionary spending. In his budget message to
the Congress. the President stated that this "balanced" budget would uphold the fiscal discipline
of the Federal Government while fulfilling promises of new opportunity for OUf Nation, Among
the goals the President set forth in the budget were providing funds to reduce class size, put in
place a 21 st Century Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program, and institute an
interagency Lands Legacy initiative to protect America's histonc open spaces and Greiu Places.
Congressional Btl:~get Resolution
Following transmittal of the President's budget, the Congress passed its budget resolution
in early May .- which ca1led for $536.8 bjlJion in discretionary spending with $246.8 billion for
non-defense discretionary spending, and $290.0 billion for defense djscretionary spendjng. 1n
total, the resolution \\'as slightly above the Administration request for defense discretionary
spending, but $4l billion below the President's request for non-defense discretionary spending,
Initially, the House provided no funding for the Veterans Affairs and Housing and Orban
Development Departments. and for the Independent Agencies bHl portion of the Corporation for
National and Community Service. In addition. the House and Senate zeroed funding for
reducing class size and provided insufficient funding levels for the COPS program and the Lands
Legacy initiative.
~ropriations
Action
The House reported the first of the J3 annual spending bills out of Subcommittee on May
13, 1999, and reported the last bill out of Subcommittee on September 23, 1999, The Senate
reported its first bill out of Subcommittee on May 24, 1999, and the last on September 27, 1999,
As they moved through the Congress, 10 oftne 13 regUlar appropriations biHs. would have veto
recommendations attached to the House, Senate, and/or Conference versions due to the inclusion
of unacceptable provisions or levels offunding. As discussed below, objectionable provisions
and insufficient funding levels would be either dropped or resolved in five of the bills with veto
recommendations attached before October 1st, aHowing them to be sent to the White House and
signed into law before the beginning of the new fiscal year:
•
Energv/Water Development. Senior advisers veto recommendation (House
version) over anti~environmental riders concerning wetlands, The final version
was modified to be acceptable.
•
Transportation. Senior advisers veto recommendation (Senate version) on the
"Shelby mass transit formula" provision that cut assistance to New York and
California. The provision was removed from the final version of the bill.
•
Treasury/General Government. Secretary of State and Attorney General veto
recommendation on House and Senate versions of the bill based on section 118
provision concerning certain anti-terrorist judgments (I.e.; the Flatow amendment),
42
�The objectionable provision was removed from the finaJ version of the bilL
•
Agriculture/Rural Development. Senior advisers veto threat on House-passed
version of the bill based on inclusion of a provision prohibiting FDA approval of
drug RU-486. The final bill did not include the prohibition.
•
.
VAlHUDlIndc:)e.!ldent Agencies. Senior advisers veto threat on botb House and
Senate versions of the bill due to funding and language problems. The final bill
restored funding for National Service, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, National Science Foundation, Housing and Urban Development
vouchers, urban and rural empowerment zones/communities, Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) Disaster Relief. Montreal
Protocol~
New Markets,
Selective Service, and other programs.
Four of the remaining bills were vetoed, and one (Interior) was not be sent to the White
House:
•
Commerce/Justice/State. H.R 2670: Senior advisers veto recommendation on
House and Senate versions of the bill due to the lack of necessary funding to
support high~priority domestic and international programs at acceptable levels
(e,g., 21 st Century Policing. antj~drug activities; terrorismlcyhercrime, Brady
handgun initiative. Lands Legacy Initiative and Pacific Salmon Treaty, and
embassy security). The President vetoed the bill on October 26, 1999.
•
District of Columbia. H.R. 2587: Umbrella senior advisers veto recommendation
based on a number of objectionable provlsions in the House and/or Senate versions
of the bill that would undermine local control (e.g., abortion, domestic partners,
limit on attorneys' fees in special-education cases, needle-exchange programs"
voting representation). The President vetoed the bill on September 28. 1999.
•
District ofColumbia (revised). H.R. 3064: The conference version ofH.R. 3064
combined an improved D.C. bilI with an unacceptable Labor/HHS/Edm;ation bill
and an unacceptable offsets package (0.97 percent across~the·board cut in
discretionary spending). The President vetoed the bill on November 3,1999.
•
foreign Operations. H.R. 2606: Senior advisers veto recommendation over
significant funding shortfalls for key progrnms, including the multilateral .
development banks, NiS, limitations on Korean Energy Development Organization
contributions t and funding to honor Wye <::ommltments (House/Senate versions),
Presidential veto threat over "Mexico City" intemational population ptnrming
amendment (1·louse version). The President vetoed the bill on October 18, 1999.
•
foreign Operations (revised), H,R. 3196: Presidential veto threat due to problems
associated with the original Foreign Operations bill. The Administration did
express support for an amended version ofB.R. 3196 that corrected deficiencies
identified in the Director1 s letter.
43
�•
Interior. H.R. 2466: Senior advisers veto recommendation (House and Senate
versions) over environmental and other objectionable riders in the bill and
inadequate f!.lIlding for major portions of Lands Legacy Initiative and other key
programs, The unacceptable bill was never sent to the White House.
•
LaborlHealth and Human Services (HHS)lEducation. H.R. 3037: Presidential veto
threats on House Committee bill and Senate-passed bill due to inadequate funding
for the class size initiative, Education Technology, and After School. Bill vetoed
as part of DClLaborlHHSIEd bill on November 3, 1999.
.
End-game Negotiations
With five of the 13 regular appropriations bills incomplete before the end of FY 1999, the
Administration and the Congress engaged in end-game negotiations to resolve deficiencies in the
remaining flvl~ bills. A total of seven Continuing Resolutions were needed to keep the
Government (lperating as the Congress and the Administration worked to resolve differences.
White House and OMB officials engaged in negotiations with the House and Senate Full
Committee Chairs and Ranking Members and with the Subcommittee Chairs and Ranking
Members. Several issues were negotiated with the Congressional Leadership.
Conclusion
With the completion of negotiations between the Congress and the Administration, the
President signed the FY 2000 Consolidated Appropriations Bill into law on November 29, 1999,
At the beginning of the FY 2000 appropriations process, there was a $4 t billion gap between the
Administration's total program level request for non~defense discretionary spending and the
Congressional Budget Resolution, However. the enacted bills provided nearly $583.9 billion in
program level discretionary budget authority. with $294.9 billion for non-defense discretionary
spending (excluding emergency funding for Agriculture), $4.2 billion above the President's
request and $21.4 billion above the FY 1999 enacted level. The enacrcd bills a100 provided
$288.9 billion for defense discretionary programs, S3.6 billion above the request and nearly $17.0
.
billion above .he FY 1999 enacted level.
The enacted bills included $1 J billion for a class size initiative, $100 million over FY
1999; $439 million for National Service, the same as FY 1999; a program level of$913 million
for the new 21st Century Policing program; and$652 milliofi. for Lands Legacy. $194 million over
FY 1999.
WhUe several objectionahle legislative riders of minor conce-rn were enacted, the most hnrmful
riders were either dropped or substantIally modified, such as those inVOlving Pacific Coast
Salmon sufficiency language; limits on private funding of needle exchange programs in the
District of Co1umbia; a moratorium on changing hard rock mining regulations; unacceptable
restrictions on rules for mill she use; unacceptable delays in oll valuation rules designed to
provide a fair return to the taxpayer; a change to the mass transit fonnula that would have
punished California ana )Jew York: and a prohibition on FDA approval ofRU~486,
44
�The Administration proposed over $27 billion of outlay offsets for the increased level of spending
througb tobacco taxes and/or penalties; spectrum sales; Superfund tax extension; usc of the paygo
balances; a Federal Reserve assets balance transfer; a student loan reform; various new or
increased us(::r fees; such as meat inspection fees; and other proposals. Only about $7.2 billion of
these offsets were approved -- Spectrum sale, Federal Reserve transfer, and student Joan refonn.
Most ofibe offset proposals were not approved or even voted on.
The COn(;feS5 bridged the difference through a combination ofdesignating $31.1 billion in
spending as Hemergency" requirements (Agriculture disaster funding, t11e 2000 Census, Low.
Ineome Horne Energy Assistance Program, Head Start, Defense Operations and Maintenance and
the Deportment of Defense (000) 2000 pay raise, FEMA Disaster Relief, the Wye River accord,
and other activities ($16.7 billion of which is for base programs In the Departments of Commerce,
Defense, and HHS»; $23 billion ofadvance .ppropriations, $4,2 billion more tlmn the level
proposed and $14.4 billion more than the prior year; delaying the obligation of new budget
authority ($6.2 biilion) for National Institutes of Healtb and other HHS programs, DoD contractor
payments. and Foreign Military Financing payments to Israel; delaying the last FY 2000 pay date
for military employees and certain civilian employees for a few days, from FY 2000 into FY 2001
(oullay savings $3.6 billion); and by adding a 0.38 percent cut to discretionary funding (savings of
$2.4 billion in budget authority and $1.2 billion in outlays),
45
�IMPROVING HOW GOVERNMENT WORKS
46
�GOVERNME1H PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS ACT
The Government Performance and ResuIts. Act of J993 (GPRA) was enacted on August 3,
1993, und was the first major legislation affecting the operations of government signed by the
President.
OMB played an early and impllTtant role in the initial development and design of GPRA.
GPRA gave us a statutory framework for expanding the use of perfonnance information in the
decision~mak lng
process.
The underlying purpose of GPRA is to make government more accountable to the
American taxpayers. A fundamental step toward this end is measuring the performance of
government programs ~~ how well are they doing, and what effect are they having. Government
officials and employees are expected to manage and work for results. Budgets wiU increasingly
be based on how well programs are doing.
The legislation was first introduced by Senator Roth, then the ranking member of the
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, in October 1990, and reintroduced in 1991 and
1993. In lliy 1992, Committee staff asked OMB to draft a revised bin that would address several
major concerns OMB had with the legislation as introduced, Senator Glenn, the chairman of this
Committee, joined Senator Roth in sponsoring the revised bUL The Senate passed the bill
unanimously on October I. 1992. but the House took no action at that time. In 1993, the
reintroduced bill was quickly endorsed by the Presi~ent. spurring the House into timely action,
The Director of OMS and the heads of the Federal agencies are statutorily responsible tor
GPRA, implementation. Within OMB, the iIl!Plementation effort was overseen and guided by the
Deputy Dire\;tor for Management, with day-ta-day responsibility assigned to OMB's five
Resource Management Offices. OMB also organized a OPRA Implementation Oroup (GIO),
comprised of representatives from every division within OMS, The GIG, chaired by the Deputy
Director for Management, met periodically to coordinate OMS and agency implementation
efforts, and review draft policies and procedures.
Initiallmplernentation: the Pilot P~!ljects
aPRA provided for three sets of pilot projects:
•
Performance m~ll!ement pilot projects to test and demonstrate whether the
specifications and structure for the annual performance plan and program performance
report would work as intended.
•
Manageri~!" accountabilit,t and flexi~mty pilot P11{jects to assess the effect of giving
managers and staff greater latitude in administering and managing programs,
•
Pe~ormance budgeting pilot projects to examine the practicability of determining and
presenting the changes in performance levels that result from different funding 1evels.
47
�,
GPRA requires OMB to report to the Congress ort the performance budgeting pilots, and
whether additional legislation would be needed before performance budgeting concepts
teste<! by these pilots projects could be put in place government-wide,
Govemrnent~wide
Imelementation
OMB initiated GPRA implementation by choosing the performance measurement pilot
projects. OMS intentionally used a limited number ofcriteria for this program to ensure that a
range of fune-tions and agency capabilities was covered, beHeving that agencies could use these
pilot projects to gain experience in meeting GPRA requirements. In addition. OMS wanted the
pilot projects to encompass the range of activities undertaken by agencies across the government
This scope would be critical to drawing any conclusions on the feasibility ofdeveloping and using
performance measures. When the performance measurement pilot project designations cnded, 14
Cabinet departments and 14 independent agencies had been designated as pilots.
In October 1994, O:\1B solicited nominations for managerial accountability and flexibility
projects. GPR.A. required that the flexibiHty pilot projects be selected from the previollsly
designated pilot projects for performance plans and reports, This prerequisite underscored the
importance of having the flexibility pilot projects assess the effects of waivers on achieving their
perfonnance goals. Nominations for managerial flexibility and accountability pilots were
received from seven Cabinet departments and one independent agency. Following inter-agency
review of the requested waivers, OMS concluded none of the proposals served as a credible test
of the managerial accountability and flexibility provisions ofGPRA.
The final set of pilot projects - the performance budgeting pilots - flre currently underway_
OMB is using five case studies to look at the experience of using performance data to inform and
aid making budget decisions, Q.f\.·1B is required to report to the Congress on these pilot projects
by March 31. 2001.
Gove01ment~wide implementation of GPR.4 began in 1997. with agencies preparing
strategic and performance plans. TIle final element in GPRA implementation was completed in
March 2000, with agencies transmitting the FY 1999 performance reports to the President and the
Congress.
The principal elements of GPRA are the agency strategic plan, the annual performance
plan. the annual program performance report, and a govemment~wide perfomuince plan. OMS is .
responsible for developjng guidance and instructions for carrying out GPRA, and overseeing how
agencies carry out those instructions. The principal means for communicating this guidance is
OMB Circular A-II, issued annua1ly each summer. OMS reviews agency strategic plans and
annual performWlce plans before their transmittal to the Congress. and uses the performance
information {:ontained in the strategic plans, performance plans~ and performance reports in
reviewing agency budget requests and preparing the President's budget. OMS also must prepare
its own strategic plan, annual performance plan, and annual program perfonnancc report.
The government-wide performance plan is prepared by OMS and is a part ofthe
President's budget It contains a set of key perfonnance goals for the Federal Government. The
'8
�goals are excerpted from the agency perfonnance plans and grouped by budget functions. rather
than by agency. To date, three plans have been prepared (for FY 1999,2000, and 2001). The
fourth government.wide performance plan (for FY 2002) will be a part oflhe budget transmitted
by the new President
All Cabinet departments and virtually every .Executive Branch independent agency are
subject to GPRA. The total number of agencies submitting plans and reports is approximately
100. GPRA allmvs OMB to exempt agencies with $20 million or less in annual spending from
GPRA requirements. In 1997, about 35 agencies sought an exemption, O~B reviewed these
requests and decided to exempt only very small agencies (those with annual spending of no more
than several million dollars), About half the requesting agencies received an exemption.
The FY 2001 budget process lllustrates huw OMS has increased its use of perfonnance
information in its review of agency budget requests. In June 1999, Director Jack Lew directed
agencies to focus FY 2001 budget submissions on the extent to which current programs are
achieving the results intended, and new program inltjatives are structured to provide for clear
definiti0l1 of results and mechanisms tor accountability for achieving them. Subsequent1y~ in
developing tile Presidenes FY 2001 Budget, OMB included relevant performance infonnation for
every major bJdget is~ue presented during Director's Review sessions.
49
�REI!'lVENTING GOVERNMENT
OMB played a key role in the Administration's "reinventing government" (REGO)
initiative. REGO initially began in 1993 as a six-month review and evolved into the longest'
running J<edt:ral reform effort.
REGO I -- 1993
In March 1993~ the President asked the Vice President "to redesign, to reinvent. to
reinvigorate the entire National Govemment.lI The Vice President organized a team of Federal
employees, the National Performance Review (NPR), led by the OMB Deputy Director of
Management and the Vice President's Senior Policy Advisor. It took about six weeks to organize
and staff the 250~member interagency NPR task force. While this occurred, OMS pulled t'ogether
76 notebooks ofbllckgrouod information to serve as the context for the task force.
NPR divided itself into h\'o sets ofteams~ each with an OMB liaison. One set of teams
reviewed individual agencies. The other reviewed major governmental systems (procurement,
financial management, information technology, regulatory systems, etc.), and in a number of
cases, OMB staff served on those tearns as fun~time members. Each major agency~ in addition to
having an external NPR review team, created its own internal team. OMB coordinated the
comments and fiscal impHcations of the draft recommendations, and advised on the
implementation of over J,200 recommendations.
In September 1993, the Vice President presented the final report to the President in a
ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House, with a set offork lifts filled with rules and
regulations proposed to be abolished as the backdrop. The President highlighted OMB's role with
the task force in a ceremony that induded the entire Cabinet, congrcssionalleadership, and the
media. The President accepted the recommendations in the report, which totaled $108 billion in
savings over five years, and reduced the size of the workforce by 252,000.
The following week, OMS staff crafted an omnibus legislative package containing more
than 50 NPR recommendations. It passed the I-louse in less than a month, but staHed in the
Senate. However, in the following year, most of the items in the package were separately
adopted. In addition, OMB's Office of Federal Procurement Poliey (OFPP) led the development
and passage ofNPR '5 ~ecommendations related to reforming the procurement system, a landmark
piece of!egislation changing more than 700 existing laws.
Reinventing Government - 1994-95
In late 1994, the President asked the Vice President to launch a second round of
reinvention. Again, OMB worked closely with the NPR on an agency-by-agency approach,
crafting recommendations totaling $70 billion in savings. In addition, each of OMB '5 statutory
offices worked with NPR staff on key initiatives:
..
The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs worked with a separate NPR team to
host a series of discussions with the Vice President on how to approach the government's
50
�regulatory responsihilities differently. Out of those conversations came a series of
iJ1novative regulatory commitments on the part of those agencies, primarily to use
partnership rather than adversarial approaches to regulating. In addition, this led to the
review and elimiMtion of 16,000 pages of obsolete rules from the Federal Code of
Regulations, and the re'writing of another 31 ,000 pages into plain language.
•
The Office of Federal Financial Management led efforts to reform the Jaws related to
collecting delinquent debt, as well as improving financial management systems and
extending the CFO Act to the entire government
•
OFPP staff led the implementation of the recently passed procurement reform initiatives
relating to smaU~item purchases, and crafted additiorrnl reform legislation refated to large~
item purchases that was subsequently passed.
White many of these recommendations were publicly announced during the course of the
year, the Vice President presented the full package of recommendations to the President in
September 1995.
Transfonning Govemm_~nt - 1996
In 1996, OMB continued to lead the implementation of the recommendations from
REGO 1 and H~ but as part of the effort to balance the budget. it worked with NPR to develop
ne\v, more effective and less costly ways of governing. These included:
•
Performance-based grants, where states were given a great deat of flexibility to use
Federal funds to address identified local challenges, but the states"also had to agree to
mcet specific mutually agreed upon performance goals. The President's FY 1997 budget
included pilots in the areas of health, environment. and education.
..
Perfonnance~based
organizations (PBO). where discrete units within departments that
have strong: incentives to manage for results. A PBO commits to specific measurable
goals with targets for improved performance. In exchange, it is granted managerial
flexibilities to achieve these targets. The President's FY 1997 budget included nearly a
dozen potential candidates, By 1999, the Patent and Trademark Office and the Office of
Student Financial Assistance received the necessary statutory authorization.
•
Collaborative pilots with individuaJ states to reduce red tape in existing programs and
focus more energy on results -- for example, streamlining Federal grants so the state
could put more resources jnto programs and less into administrative costs. Likewise~
several states, including West Virginia, created a single state plan - instead of separate
plans ~- for more than 200 grants affecting children and families.
5t
\
�.
Reinventing Government - 1991-2000
In the second term, the Administration's reinvention efforts concentrated on longcr-tenn
transformation of the culture of agencies to be more results~oriented. performance-based, and
customer~focused.
NPR re-named itselfas the "National Partnership for Reinventing
Oovenunent1 ' to symbolize its shift in approach.
OMB worked closely with NPR to identify specific goals that "High lmpactll agencies
should commit to achieve by the end of the Administration, to signal that government was indeed
changing. These goals were published as part ofthe President's FY 1998 budget. They
included, for example, 24-hour phone answering service by the IRS during tax season.
With the maturation of GPRA. specific measures of agency performance were developed
that sen'cd as key indicators of agency culture change. In addition to infoonation about progress
toward program performance goals. NPR collected information about employee satisfaction as
well as customer satisfaction. OMB examiners used this information as they revie'\'Vcd agency
budget requests.
OMB and NPR also worked together on specific reinvention initiatives, including the
President's challenge to agencies to serve as a model employer for welfare-to-work recipients.
the implementation of the President's Plain Language initiative, and the President's Food Safety
CounciL OMS also served as the Administration's advocate for reinvention on the HiH>
testifying numerous times 011 the Administration's progress in reinventing agencies.
Conclusion
Arter eight years, the government has changed dramatically, taking thousands of small
steps that together have resulted in enormous changes. In addition, a key measure of the success
of reinventi 011- public trust in the Federal Government to do the right thing - rose for the first
time in years from 21 percent jn 1994 to 40 percent in 1998, In addition:
•
Between 1993 and 1999, the Administration reduced the size of the Federal civilian
workforce by 17 percent, or 317,000 full-time equivalent employees, This resuhed in the
smallest Federal Government since Dwight Eisenhower was President,
•
The President's executive order to establish cllstomer service standards led to the creation
of more than 3,500 standards across the government. As a result. an increasing number
of Federal managers saw customer service as an important part ofthei~jobs. In a 1991
survey, 36 percent of Federal managers thought customer service was an important part
of their jobs. By 1999,79 percent thought so. In 1999, the Administration sponsored the
first~ever government~wide survey ofcustomers of key Federal services using a survey
considered to be the benchmark by the private sector. The government-wide score was
68.6 on a I OOMpoint scale ~ not too far from the 71.9 average for private sector services.
In fae, in certain areas, agencies did better than their private sector counterparts.
•
OMB helpc.'tl lead the reform of outdated administrative systems and reduced useless red.
52
�tape. The President signed over 50 executive directives nnd more than 90 laws, including
procurement refonn, financial~management reform, travel refonn, deiinquent-debt
reform. gronts~management reform. reform of the pension regulatory system, the
elimination of hundreds of obsolete congressional reporting requirements, refonn of how
the government buys and management infonnation technology, and many others.
•
Agencies like the IRS, HUD, the Health Care Financing Administration, the U.S. Mint,
the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission completely reorganized their internal operations away from administrative
processes to an organization centered on their external customers.
53
�·REGULATORY OVERSIGHT AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866
,
Regulations, like other instruments of government policy. have enonnous potential for
both good and harm. Well-chosen and carefully crafted regulations can minimize fraud, limit
pollution, increase worker safety, discourage unfair business practices, and contribute in many
other ways to a safer, healthier, morc proouctive. and more equitable society. Excessive or
poorly designed regulations, by contrast, can cause confusion and delay, glve rise to
unreasonablt: compliance costs in the fonn of capital investments and/or ongoing paperwork,
retard innm'ation, reduce productivity, distort private incentives, and adversely affect living
standards.
The Process by which Regulations are Developed
The importance of regulations and the challenges that regulators face make it imperative
that integrity and accountability characterize the process by which regulations are developed. To
accomplish this, the President issued Executivc Order (£,0,) 12866. ""Regulatory Planning and
Review," un September 30.1993, E.Q, 12866 clearly articu1ated the President's regulatory
philosophy and his vicw of how the nation's regulatory system should work. As E.O. 12866
states:
The American people deserve a regulatory system that works for them. not against them;
a regulatory system that protects and improves their health, safety, environment, and
well-being and improves the performance ofihc economy 'Without imposing unacceptable
or unreasonable costs on society; regulatory policies that recognize that the private sector
and private- markets are the best engine for economic growth; regulatory approaches that
respect the role of State, local, and tribal governments; and regulations that are effective.
consistent, sensible, and understandable.'
First. E.O, 12866 balrulced the roles of the agencies and the White House. It affinned the
primacy of Federal agencies in the regulatory dc-cision~making process. At the same time, it
affinned the importance of centralized regulatory review to ensure that, to the extent pemlitted
by law. regulatiol1s v..'ere consistent with the President's. priorities, and did not interfere with n
policy or action taken or pJanned by another agency.
Second, to assist the agencies in carrying out their responsibilities, E.O. 12866 set forth
the President's regulatory philosophy and principles. The purpose of this guidance '-"''as to make
it clear to the agencies their responsibilities to the President. Among the many significant
principles were the following:
•
1n choosing among regulatory approaches, agencies were to select those approaches that
maximize net benefits.
•
Each agency was to base its decisions on the best rensonably obtainable scientific,
technical, economic, and other information concerning the need for~ and consequences of,
the intended regulation.
54
�•
Agencies were to analyze the benefits and costs of any intended reguJations and to choose
the most cost-effective manner to achieve the regulatory objective.
•
Consideration of costs and benefits is to include such factors as incentives for innovation,
consistency~ predictability. the costs of enforcement and compJiance (to the goyemmenl~
regulated entities~ and the public), flexibility, distributive impacts. and equity,
Third, E.O. 12&66 made the review process more focused and effective, To help
streamline the review process, E.O, 12866 provided for greater selectivity in reviewing
regulations. Under the E.O. 12866, agencies were to decide which rules they were considering
were "significant" (based on their economic, social. or legal importance). The Office of
Infonnation and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in OMS would review only those rules tbat the
agency. or OIRA, believed wnrranted review. Thus, rather than review all proposed and finat
rules, OIRA wouid free up its resources to focus on these regulations where the most value could
be added. TIlis would also pennit agencies to issue more expeditiously those regulations not
subject to review.
Another theme of the E.O. 12866 was openness and accountability. It called for the
public to become more involved, and set forth witb specificity who is responsible for what and
when~ so that those who are interested will know the status and results ofthe review by the
'Executive Office of the President OIRA made available a daily list of agency regulations under
review. OfRA also disclosed the contacts that it had with those from outside the Executive
Branch. their correspondence, and, after publication, the text of the regulations submitted for
review.
Under the order, an agency submitted its proposed rule to OIM prior to the pUblication
of the 1\otice of Proposed Rulemaking in the Federal Register, If the rule were considered to be
economically significant, the agency also provided an assessment, including the underlying
analysis, of the costs and benefits ofthe proposed rule, as well as oftbe costs and benefits of
potentially effective and reasonably feasible alternatives to the proposed rule. As a general
matter. OIM was to complete its review within 90 days. This process was repeated in t11e fillal
rulemaking stage,
OIRA desk officers, organized by Federal department or agency, reviewed each of these
rules as specified in E.O. 12866. For a rule that included an infonnation collection, OIRA desk
officers reviewed the regulation under the procedures for both E.Q, 12866 and for the Paperwork
Reduction Act. As occasion \varranted, OIRA desk officers wou1d share, as appropriate, the
draft propos<:(i or final rule with ofticials in the White I-louse. the Executive Office, and
regulatory departments and agencies, for their comment and review. Given the broad scope of
regulatory authority provided to the various agencies. occasions arose where it appeared,
desirable or necessary to coordinate the regulatory approaches, standards, or methodologies
involved in new and existing regulations. An agency refrained from publishing a proposed or
final rule until OIRA had concluded its review under E.O. 12866.
55
�PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT
The Federal Govenunent provides the American people with an enormous array of
protections Hod services, To carry out aU of these responsibilities carefully and effectiveJy~ the
Federal Government collects information, Much of this information is collected directly from
the public, Some ofthese Federal information collections are voluntary, such as when visitors
provide feedback on their experiences at a National Park. Other coHections are mandatory, with
noncompliance possibly subject to serious penalties.
Undc'f the Paperwork Reduction Act (PM), OMS must approve all proposed collections
of infonnatlon conducted or sponsored by Executive Branch agencies, including independent
regulatory commissions. To update and improve this statutory oversight mechanism; [he
President worked to recodify totally the then-existing PRA. The Preside-nt's proposal passed the
House by a vote of 418-0, and the Senate by a vote of 99-0. The President signed the 1995 PRA
inlo l<lw on May 22, 1995, stating:
The Ilaperwork Reduction Act helps us to conquer a mountain of paperwork that is
crushing our people and wasting a lot of tjmc and resources and which actually
accumulated not because anybody wanted to hann the private sector but because \ve tend
to think ofgood ideas in serial form without thinking of how the overall impact of them
impacts a system that is very dynamic and very sensitive to emerging technologies but
which Government does not always respond to in the same way.
As we reform. we need not compromise the quality of life or the needed oversight from
the Government. But the truth is. we can actually improve the system by making it tess
hidebound and by innovating as Americans are innovating. ,
Today I want to add another dimension to this effort: From this point forward. I want all
ofcur agencies to provide for the electronic submission of every new Government form
or demonstrate to OMB why it cannot be done that way. The old way will still be
availablc. but I think once people see how fast and efficient electronic filing can be, wc'lI
see less paperwork and more of these. So, we're trying to do our part act in good faith
the way these members of the Congress intended the executive branch to act.
to
In addition, this recodification of the PRA had a number of other purposes, including:
•
To clarify that the Act "applies to all Government-sponsored collections of infonnation
(including disc10surc requirements), eliminating any confusion over the coverage of'
third-party paperwork burdens."
•
To "[rJeaffirm the fundamental purpose of [the previous 1980 PM]- to minimize the
Federal paperwork burdens imposed on the public by Government l l
•
To ''[c)mphasize the fundamental responsibilities of each Federal agency to minimize
paperwork burdens and foster paperwork reduction, by requiring a thorough rcvlew of
56
�each proposed collection of information for need and practical utility. the Act's
fundamental standards, agency pl.arming to maximize the use of jnformation already
available within Government or already collected by the public, and improved
opportunity for public comment on a proposed paperwork requirement."
•
To "[s]eek to reduce the paperwork burdens imposed on the public through better
implomentation o~ the annual Government~mde paperwork reduction goal of 5 percent."
The 1995 PRA requires that OMB approve each collection of information by a Federal
agency before it can be implemented. Collections of infonnation include: (1) requests for
information for transmission to the Government, such as application fonus and written report
fOnTIs; (2) record keeping requirements~ and(3) third~party or public disclosure requirements,
Many infomtation collections. record keeping requirements. and third~party disclosure
rcquirement'7 are contained in or authorized by regulations as monitoring or enforcement tools,
while others appear in written questionnaires and their accompanying instructions. An
underlying goal of the 1995 PRA is to minimize the Federal paperwork burden on the public. At
the same time, the 1995 PRA recognizes the importance of infonnation to the successful
completion of agency missions, and cbarges OMB with the responsibility ofweighing the
burdens of the collection <!,O the public against the practical utility it will have for the agency,
In general terms, thc ChiefInformation Officer (CIO) in each agency is required to plan
for the development of new collections of information and the extension of ongoing coJlections
of information well in advance of sending the proposal to OMB. Advance planning is necessary
because agencies need to estimate potential burdens on respondents, seek public comment
through 60~([ay notice in the Federal Register~ and thereafter submit their clearance requests to
OMB for review and approvat In a paperwork clearance request. the agency needs to
demonstrate to OMS that the collection of information is. the least burdensome way of obtaining
information necessary for the proper perfonnance of its functions, that the collection is not
duplicative of others, and that the collection has practical utility, Additionally, the agency is
required to certify that a proposed coHection of information "reduces to the extent practicable
and appropriate the burden" on respondents, including, for small business) local government, and
other small entities, the use oftne techniques outlined in the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
To alert the public that OMB review has begun, agencies publish a notice in the Federal
Register of1he agency's submission to OMB ofa request for approval and tell the public how to
comment to OMB regarding the request. The public - during OMBls review and at any other
time - is to have full opportunity to make its views known concerning any Federal data ~
collection, both as to its perceived practical utility and the reporting burdens involved.
Under the 1995 PRA, OMS approval for an agency to use each data collection instrument
can last a maximum of three years. Approval is evidenced by granting an OMB control number
for the information collection instrument
57
�PRIORITY MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES
Beginning in 1997 with the FY 1999 Budget, the Administration tackled the
Government's biggest management challenges by designating them as Priority Management
Objectives (PMOs) and working with the agencies to institute real change.
The most recent list of PMOs in the FY 2001 Budget includes 24 agency specific and
governmem~wide management Issues.
Strengthening Government~wide Management
1. Use perfi)rmance information to improve program management and make better budget
decisions.
2 . .Improve financial management information.
3. Use capital pJanning and investment control to manage infonnation technology,
4. Provide for computer security and protect critical information infrastructure,
'5. Strengtho:m statistical programs.
6. Implement acquisition reforms.
7. Implement electronic GoveJ1l!Uent initiatives,
8. Better manage Federal financial portfolios.
9. Align Federal human resources management to support agency goals.
10. Verify that the right person is getting the right benefit.
11. Streamline and simplify Federal grants management.
12, Capitalize .on Federal energy efficiency.
Improving
P~ogram
Implementation
1. ~oderr1ize student aid delivery.
2. Improv,~ DOE program and contract management.
3. Strengthen the HCFA's management capacity.
4. Implement HUD reform.
5. Reform management of Indian trust funds.
6. Imp!ement FAA management reforms.
7. Implement IRS reforms,
8, Streamline SS.A·s disability claims process.
9. Revolutionize DOD business affairs.
10. Manage risks in building the International Space Station,
11. Improve security and management at overseas presence.
12. Re-engineer the naturalization process and reduce the citizenship application backlog.
58
�The issues were identified each year during Director's Reviews for the fall budget
process. Once it designated a PMO, the responsible OMB offices developed an action plan
(with detailed milestones, completion dates, etc.) and worked with the agencies and/or
interagency councils with responsibility for the effort.
,
OMB and agency attention to the PMOs has paid off. Three examples illustrate the
,progress that has been made:
Improve financial.!nan~gement infonnation. Before 1993, the Federal Government had
not e'ven attempted to provide an audited financial statement. When this Administration
first tried in J993, most agencies could nor produce consolidated financial statements.
Moreover. there was not a set of accepted Govemment~wide financial accounting
standards until 1996. Beginning in FY 1996, agellcies began issuing audited financial
statements. In FY 1996) six agencies received clean audited opinions, By FY 1999 that
number had jumped to 15. In March 2000, through the combined efforts ofOMB. the
Department of the Treasury, and other Federal agencies, the Government issued its
Consolidated Financial Statements of the United States Government for the third year a
row.
Modemize student aid delivery, The Department of Education's pcrfonnance-based
organization (PBO) has made significant progress in modernizing the delivery of student
aid benefits. To achieve its goals to improve customer satisfaction, reduce costs and
increase employee satisfaction, the PBO reorganized its structure into three custotner~
oriented channels (students, schools, and financial partners). Tbese channels have
implemented new processes and technologies, including web-based tools to reduce user
burdens and costs.
ReenginccT the natura1i~~Jon .proce.~s and re{t~lCe the citi2"enship backlog. The
Department of Justice's lmmigration and Naturalization Service (INS) is redesigning its
naturalization process to streamline and automate operations, while simultaneously
reducing a backlog of more than 1.8 miUion applications for citizenship. In 1999, INS
completed over 1.2 million applications, and reduced the backlog by more than 500;000
applications. INS reduced the average processing time between application and
naturalization ofqualified candidates from 27 months in 199& to 12 months in 1999, By
the end ofFY 2000, INS had reduced processing times further and achieved its fiscal year
goa) ora six to nine month processing time for qualified applicants. INS intends to
maintain this processing standard for citizenship applications in the future.
59
�YEAR 2000 PREPARATION
The Federal Government moved smoothly through the year 2000 rollover. The year 2000
computer problem impacted only a few Federal agency systems, none of which was significantly
affected, This was the result of the substantial preparations that agencies had undertaken over
several years leading up to January 1,2000.
The year 2000 computer problem posed probably the single largest technology
management challenge in history. While some agencies had been working on the problem
independently for a number of years, the Federa1 Government as a whole began in 1996. With
the enactment of the Clinger-Cohen Act, Federal agencies were creating ChiefInformation
Officers (CI0s). The CIO Council was established to facilitate communications among the
CIOs. By early 1997, the Council had adopted best practices for addressing the problem, and
work was underway, In May 1997, when the Federal Government first counted its mission
critical systems that were year 2000 compliant only 21 percent of the more than 6,000 systems
were ready for the date change. Over the next three years> under supervision of OMB, the major
cabinet departments and other agendes:
j
•
Made al16, 175 of their mission~critical systems compliant.
•
Made all of their more than 20,000 non*mission critical systems compliant.
•
Worked with their partners in State and local government and the private sector to assure
the delivery of 43 programs that directly affect people (such as student aid, disaster relief~
and Medicare).
•
Fixed all 284 data exchanges with the Stutes to enable them to administer Federal
programs, such as unemployment insurance and child support enforcement.
•
Fixed aU other data exchanges with the private sector. other govenlluental entities, and
between Federal agencies.
•
Made sure that all biomedical devices and laboratory equipment used by Federal agencies
were compliant.
•
Verified and fixed as necessary a118,000 Federally owned or managed buildings and all
privately owned, government leased buildings.
•
Verified and fixed as necessary aU telecommunications and networks across the Federal
Government
•
Prepared and used day one plans for the rollover weekend,
•
Developed business continuity and contingency plans for all critical functions and, in a
few instances, lIsed those plans to maintain operations"
60
�,
•
Established internal systems to monitor any problems that may have occurred during the
rollover weekend,
'
...
Communicated agency status to the national Information Coordination Center established
to monitor year 2000 problems worldwide.
In addition, under the leadership ofOMB and the President's Council on Year 2000
Conversion, Federal agencies undertook a massive outreach effort to State and local
govemment:. and the private sector both domestically and internationally. These efforts
succeeded in raising awareness of the problem and helping organizations throughout the world
effectively address it This outreach effort culminated in the creation and staffing of the National
lnfonnation Coordination Center (ICC), which collected information about year 2000 activities
and problems worldwide during the rollover weekend. The creation of the ICC requirea the
establishment of vast reporting mechanisms in an key sectOrS and the collection ofstatus
information about year 2000 impacts in those sectors, domestically and internationally, It also
required achieving the ability rapidly to summarize and report that information to senior
government officials and to the public. To accomplish this preparation, monitor activities during
the roUover and leap year. and react to those problems that did occur, agencies spent an
estimated S8,2 billion in preparing for and addressing the year 2000 problem.
Y2K Compli,mce at OMB
OMB's internal information systems include major application systems, desktop
hardware and software, and network component'i such as switches and routers. Each of these
components \-vas evaluated for Y2K compliance and was rcmediated or replaced where
necessary.
In some cases, notably the major applications, assessment and remediation began as early
as 1994. Activity intensified in 199&. OMS prepared an internal management plan and schedule
to become fully compliant on a timeline that matched the Y2K guidance to the agencies.
Noncompilant desktops and software were replaced or upgraded to become compliant; some
network components were also removed or replaced. Finally, the t;;ompleted work ofprcparation
was assessed by an outside agency contractor.
OMS worked closely with the Executive Office of the Pres.ident during this period (for
example to retire noncompliant mainframe software that was being used by OMB applicntions).
At the same lime. OMB prepared Business Continuity and Contingency Plans and work plans for
j
the days immediately proceeding January 1, 2000. As a result of our work, tJlere were no
adverse incidents experienced at OMB during the time leading up to the date change or the time
immediately foUowing the rollover,
61
�INTERAGlcNCY COUNCILS
OMB provides leadership and serves as a catalyst for several interagency groups. These
groups d!'aw together operationai, fmandai. procurement, integrity, labor~relations. and systems
technology e-xperts from across the Government. The groups establish Government-wide goals
in their areas ofexpertise, and they marshal the resources within individual agencies to meet
these goals. Though much of our work is done through these CouncilS, the actual work is done
by and in the agencies, For example:
President's tvfanagement CouncilJPMC)
The PMC consists of the "chief operating officersI' of the departments and major
agencies, The PMC was created by Presidential memorandum on October 1, 1993. and js chaired
by OMB's Deputy Director for Management. All PMC members are Presidentially appointed,
Senate confirmed officials. The PMC is a forum and catalyst for management refomls. For
example, it contributed to the Administration's efforts to rcroon procurement systems, improve
customer service, rationalize field office structures, and streamline the workforce. PMC
members wcrked closely with Members of Congress to craft buyout legis.lation to make
necessary downsizing more humane. The PMC also has taken a major role in moving toward
electronic government A recent study funded by The PricewaterhouseCoopers Endowment for
the Business of Government concluded that "The Coullcil. and the: \\Jay it operates, is a
significant management innovation" and that it has been "an important and effective vehicle for
the President to implement his management agenda."
Chief Financial Officers (CPO) Council
Authorized and established by the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, the CFO Council
is a governmentwwide body that col1aborates to address critical Federal financial management
issues. It is comprised of the CPOs and Deputy CFOs of the 24 largest Federal agencies, as well
as 5cnlor officials from the OMB and the Department oflhe Treasury. Sixteen of the 24 CFO
agencies are PrcsidentiaHy appointed, Scnate-confimled officials. with the others serving in
career positions appointed by the head of the agency. By law, OMS's Deputy Director for
Management serves as the chair of the Council, while one of the PAS CFOs, as elected by the
Council, serves as the Vice Chair.
Chief Infor~lation Officers (e(9) Council
The C10 Council was established by Executive Order 130) J. The Council consists of
CIOs and deputy CIOs from 2& executive agencies. Additional members to the Council are the
Administrators or OMS's Office ofInformation and Regulatory Affairs and Office of Federn1
Procurement Policy) the Controller of OMS's Ofiice of Federal Financial Management. a senior
representative from the White House Office ofSdence and Technology Policy, the chair of the
(nformation TeChnology Resources Board. and two representatives from the Small Agency
Council, The Chair of the CIO Council is the Deputy Director for Management of OMB. The
Vice Chair is an agency CIO. elected by the Council on a rotating basis, The Council is the
principal interagency forum to improve agency practices on such matters as the design,
62
�modernization, usc, sharing, and perfonnance of agency information resources. The CIO
Council is one element of an interagency support structure established to achieve the information
resource management objectives delineated in the Government Perfonnance and Results Act, the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, and the [nformation Technology Management Refonn Act of
1996.
President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE) and ~~ecutive Council on Integrity and
Efficiency (ECI E)
Executive Order 12805, signed May II, 1992, established the PCIE and ECIE to
coordinate and enhance governmental efforts to promote integrity and efficiency and to detect
and prevent fraud, waste, and abuse in Federal programs. (The PCIE originaHy was established
in 198 J by Executive Order, which was updated in May 1992 to reflect changes to the inspector
General.(IG) community and to create ECIE.) Both Councils are chaired by OMB's Deputy
Director for Management; a Vice Chair for each is selected by the Chair among the member
Inspectors General. The PCIE includes the 28 PAS IGS and the Vice Chair of the ECIE; the
ECIE includes the 29 ageney-head appointed lOS and the Vice Chair oflhe ECIE. In addition,
the Controller, OFFM; Associate Deputy Director for Investigation, Federal Bureau of
.
Investigation; Director, Office ofGovemment Ethics; Special Counsel, Office of Special
Counsel; and Deputy Director. Office ofPersonnel ~anagement! are; members of both Councils,
Procurement Executives Council (PEC)
The PEe, established in 1998, is an interagency council consisting of the major agencies'
procurement executives and aimed at providing a senior level forum for advancing the Federal
acquisition system. OMB's Deputy Director for Management IS the named Chair, and the Office
ofFederai Procurement Policy (OFPP) Administrator also is a member. OFPP is significantly
involved in the administration and activities of the PEe" The PEe establishes priorities in
acquisition workforce improvement. electronic commerce) socio-economic issues. and
performance measurement
Budget Officers Adyi""l'..Council (BOAC)
BOAC was established in April 1996 at the suggestion ofOMB. Its members ore the
senior career budget officials in OMS and senior career budget officials in the departments and
major independent agencies. The purpose of BOAC is to provide a forum for exchanging ideas
and discussing issues of concern to its members on an informal basis. BOAC discusses technical,
conceptual. and operational concerns of budget accounting, formulation. and execution. but not
matters of program policy or substance.
63
�ADDITIONAL 8TATUTORY REQUIREMENTS ASSUMED BY OMB
In assisting the President in managing the Executive Branch, OMB carried out more than
200 statutory provisions. Despite staffing levels that decreased by almost 10 percent since 1993;
OMB continued to carry out its traditional responsibilities and the new respon.o;ibilities the
Congress placed on it. For example, the Government Perfonnance and Results Act (GPRA)
became law in 1993, with fun govemrnent~wide implementation beginning in 1997, About 100
Federai agencies annually provide OMB with plans and reports that are reviewed and used by
OMS over the course of a year. Every three years, these agencies provide OMB with a strategic
pian, GPRA has greatly expanded the amount of perfonnance and program information being
provided to OMB.
Several pieces of landmark legislation increased significantly OMS's role in Federal
financial management The Government Management Reform Act of 1994 requ~res the 24 era
Act agencies annually to prepare and audit organl1..ation-wide financial statements, and requires
Treasury to prepare government-wide finan~ial statements, which are audited by the GAO.
OMB pJayed the key role in establishing guidance for these statements, and served as the catalyst
for the rapid improvements in the quality and timeliness of these statements, The Act also
established a pilot initiative to consolidate reporting requirements and deadlines across the
Federal Government; the Reports Consolidation Act of2000 just provided statutory authority for
these reports. The Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 required Federal
financial management systems to support full disclosure of Federal financial data, including full
costs of Federal programs and activities. to citizens, the Congress, and agency management, so
that programs and activities can be considered on tbeir full costs and merits. Once again, OMB
was in the forefront ofestablishing criteria and working with agencies to achieve compliance
with the Act' s requirements. Finally; the Single Audit Act Amendments of 1996 established
unifonn requirements for audits of Fedcral awards administered by non~Federal entities, to
promote the efficient and effective use of audit resources and reduce burden. To implement the
Single Audi-: Act, OMB issued a revised Circular A~ 133, lIAudits of States, Lo-.:ul Governments,
and Non*Profit Organizations;" annually issued a revised A-I33 Compliance Supptement to
provide guidance to lluditors, and oversa\.... the Federal Audit Clearinghouse witich maintains a
govemruent-wide database of the results of single audits.
The Fedeml Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 and Federal Acquisition Reform Act
of 1996 transformed how the Government contl1lcts for supplies and services. Together they
streamlined the acquisition process and made it more commerciaJ~Jike\ and empowered agency
contracting officials to exercise discretion and somld business judgment, as opposed to rules~
based procesS- management. These statutes assigned many new responsibilities to OMB -
principally the Office of Federal Procurement Policy -- including annual assessments to the
Congress; oversight of the use ofelectronic commerce and training of the acquisition workforce;
and participation in the development of small business policies and agency small business goals.
In 1996 the Clinger-Cohen Act gave agencies the authority, flexibility, and accountability
to manage information technology (IT) a'i a capital investment and encourages the
Administration to use intemgency groups to share expertise and technology, OMB chairs the
Chief Information Officers (CIO) Council that serves as tIlE; principal interagency forum for
�improving practices in the design, modernization, use. sharing, and performance of federal
Government a.gency information resources. The Council's role includes developing
recommendations for infonnation technology management policies, procedures, aod standards;
identifying opportunities to share infonnation resources; and assessing and addressing the needs
of the Federal Government's IT workforce. In addition l many of the cro Council committees
are active participants in a number ofimportant areas including computer security, electronic
government, and capital planning.
The Government Paperwork Elimination Act (GPEA), which was enacted in 1998, is
intended to increase the ability ofcitizens to interact with the Federal Government electronically.
The Act spedficaHy provides that e1ectronic records and their related electronic signatures are
not 10 be denied legal effect, validity> or enforceability merely lR.~ausc they are in electronic
form, and specifically sanctions the Federal Govenunent to use a range of electronic signature
altcrnatiycs. OMS published guidance directing agencies to plan for electronic filing by October
2003, and to use electronic signatures for the full range of government uctivitics and services if
risks, costs. and benefits can be properly balanced. Agency plans on implementing GPEA
arrived at lhl:! end ofOctober 2000.
j
The Federal Activities Inventory Refoffil Act of 1998 requires Federal agencies to submit
to OMB) anmlO.lly. ~ "list" (inventory) of their "commercial activities" performed by Federal
employees. OMB is required to review each inventory each year and to consult with the agency
regurding its content. This new and expansive review and consultation process is
administratively burdensome, It requires OMB to compare total end strength with the resources
committed to commercial support and mission activities. Agencies have refrained from
including commercial activities on the list or othef\vise seek to define activities -~ including some
that arc already performed by a mix of in-house and contract resources ~- as inherently
governmental.
Morl.! recent requirements -- ranging from the "Stevens Report" on the costs and benefits
of regulations to the report on climate change -- a1so imposed new workloads. The Congress
also imposed a number of new grant~management responsibilities on OMB. including revising
Circular A-I 10 to open access to research data, preparing tul inventory of aU Federal grants. and
fulfilling th(l provisions of the Grants r..1anagement Simplification Act
Laws that have imposed statutory responsibilities on OMB since 1993 ,include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Government Performance and Results Act (PL 103-62)
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (PL 103-355)
Government Management and Reform Act (PL 103-356)
Evaluation of De report (PL 103-373)
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (PL 104-4)
Paperwork Reduction Act (PL 104-13)
Federal Acquisition Reform Act (PL 104-106, Division D)
Information TeChnology Management Reform Act (Div. E, PL 104-106)
Regulatory Flexibility Act Amendments (Title II D, PL 104-121)
Congressional Review of Agency Rul.making (Title II E, I'L 104-121)
65
�•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
National Tec\mology Tr.nsfer and Advancement Act (PL 104- J J3)
Debt Collection Improvement Act, PL 104-134
Single Audit Amendment Act (PL 104-156)
Federal Financial Management Improvement Act (Title VIII, Pt 104-208
Fiscal Year FY 1998 Defense Authorization Act (PL \05-85)
Government Paperwork Elimination Act (Title XVII, PL 105-277)
Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act (PL 105-270)
Submission of an Accounting Statement and Report to the Congress on the Costs
and Benefits of Federal Rules and Paperwork Treasury/General Government (PL
\06-58)
Counterterrorism & Antiterrorism (PL \05-85, Sec, 1051)
A report on total Federal expenditure ofa.ll official international travel during the
previous fiscal year (Omnibus Consolidated & Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations. Act)
A report providing a final accounting of the finances and operations of
international agencies aboJished under Division G of the Act (Omnibus
Consolidated & Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act)
Federal Financial Assistance Management Improvement Act (PL 106-(07)
Submission to the Congress ofan inventory of Federal grant programs
(Treasury/General Government Appropdations, PL 106-58)
An accounting of climate change programs in the FY 200 I Budget (Consolidated
Appropriation Act, PL 106-113)
Designation of OMB to Chair the National Commission on Use ofOffsets in
Defense Trade, and submit a report to the Congress (Section I 247(d) ofFY .
2000-01 Foreign Relations Authorization Act; PL 106-1 \3)
66
�FURTHERING THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY AGENDA
67
�HEALTH SECURITY ACT
On January 25, 1993, the President established the President's Task Force on National
Health Care Reform, The President charged the Task Force with consulting with a wide range of
interested parties and preparing health-care refomllegislation to be submitted within) 00 days.
The 12 member Task Force, chaired by the First Lady, consisted of the Director a[OMB;
Secretaries of the Departments of Commerce, Defense, Health and HUman Services (HHS);
Labor, Treasury~ and Veterans Affairs; the Chairman of the Council ofEconomic Advisers; and
three White House Advisers. Each of the Departments and Offices dedicated staff who worked
full time putting together options and background analyses for health~reform packages.
Throughout 1993 and 1994, OMB staff actively supported analyses forthe President's health
care refonn proposals. OMS examiners and analysts from ail parts of the organization
participated in multiple analytic review groups responsible for deVeloping the President's Health
Care Plan, preparing cost estimates, and crafting legislation to implement the Plan,
The White House Office ofPolicy Development (OPD) managed the overall effort.
OMB's examiners, economists and analysts participated in the Working Group's deliberations
bet\veen January and June 1993. The Working Group's staff included Federal civil servants,
legislative branch staff, consultants and volunteers, Support for the President's Health Reform
Plan development was concurrent with OMB's preparation of the FY 1994 Budget between
January and April 8, 1993,
TIm Pre:;ident's Task Force met \vith more than 1.100 different groups, held over 200
meetings with Members of Congress, and involved more than 120 Congressional staffers on the
Working Group. Outside experts were consulted, nnd regularly presented. their views to the
Working Group. The First Lady also held public hearings and town meetings across the county.
In addition) the Working Group sought outside experts to challenge the assumptions and the
workabiUty of its proposed options. These critics included:
'"'
Fourteen panels ofconsumers.'
• A health professional review group of doctors. nurses, public health officials. hospital
administrators, and phannadsts.
• Audit teams.
Cabinet Secretaries and senior White House .officials met 21 times during April and May to
narrow the health refonn decisions for the President. The Administration was ready to move
forward at the end of May i 993 with its health care reform proposal, consistent with the
Presidenfs !DO days pledge. But given the importance of enacting the President's landmark
economic package, the introduction of the health reform proposal was delayed for several
months. As debate on the economic package continued, the introduction of health care refonn
was delayed from early Jl.llle to late September. Because the budget situation was so delicate, the
view was that leaked nccounts of health care meetings could only disrupt the delicate balance
being sought to pass the budget. As a re.;;ult. the Congressional1eadership and the
Administration came to the joint view that health care deliberations should be suspended and
68
�documents not distributed until after the economic package was passed, The President signed
the Omnibus, Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 on August 10, 1993.
The Task Force, Interdepartmental Working Group, Cluster Groups, as well as the smaller
working gre,ups, disbanded on May 31, 1993. after which the AdmJnistration's health~care
refonn effort focused on preparing legislation. Once the economic package had been enacted, the
cabinet-level group resumed meetings in late summer and early fall with the President. to resolve
, final issues.
In a speech to a Joint Session of Congress on'September 22, 1993; the Presid.ent proposed his
plan to provide health care coverage to all Americans and control escalating health care costs.
The President's Health Security Act was based on six principles:
..
Security for the family.
..
A comprehensive package Of benefits,
•
Heaith-care costs that are under control.
•
lmp:·oyed quality ofcare.
..
Increased choices for conswners.
..
Less paperwork and a simpler system.
As envisioned in the Plan. the basic numbers for the fiscal years 1996 - 2000 were as follows:
New Spending:
..
$80 billion to provide a new long-term care benefit for all disabled Americans as well as:
expanding existing benefits.
..
$72 billion to provide a new Medicare prescript,ion drug benefit
..
$29 billion in public health and administrative costs,
..
$9 biHion for the cost of increasing the health insurance tax deduction for self~ernployed
people from 25 percent to 100 percent and making it pennanent -- a major step for self
employed Americans.
..
Sl60 billion to provide discounts to businesses and workers for their health insurance
premium costs under the plan,
The source!; of nety funds were as foJlows:
..
$124 billion in Medicare savings.
69
�• $114 billion in Medicaid savings.
• $47 billion in cost savings in other Federal programs that provide health care to
beneficiaries who would shift to the new program. including veterans, defense, and
Federal employees,
.
• $51 billion in additional taxes on business income that would no longer go to tax~free
benefits.
• $105 billion in "sinH taxes, and possibly from an assessment on large corporations that
would have opted out of the plan.
The estimated new costs over five years totaled $350 billion; the estimated sources totaled
$441 billion, thus allocating $91 billion for deficit reduction.
The actual drafting of the legislation during October 1993 was an interdepartmental
effort. The Department of Treasury drafted the revenue sectiOllS~ HHS drafted the sections
relating to Medicare and Medicaid, public health, workforce and research, OMB led the effort to
ensure that the cost and savings estimates were vetted within OMB and other relevant
departments. OMB led a series of meetings three times a week beginning in September 1993 to
work through the outstanding policy issues.
The legislation to implement the plan went to the Congress in early November 1993, and
the Administration worked with the Congress throughout 1994 to achieve consensus and
enactment of the Presidenes ambitious plan. The far~reaching proposal was both comprehensive
and complicated, But as CBO observed. "The Health Security Act is unique among proposals to
restructure the hcalth~carc system both because of its scope and its attention to detail Some
critics of tbl!: proposal maintain that it is too complex. A major reason for its complexity,
however, is that the proposal outlines in legisiation the steps that would actual1y have to be taken
to accomplish its goals, No other proposal has come dose to attempting this. Other health care
proposals might appear equally complex if they provided the same level of detail as the
Administration on the implementation requirements,"
OMIl's stufrmle in support cfthe Health Security Act contiilUed in 1994 through the
presentation of the President's FY 1995 Budget and in working \\'ith HHS, other \Vhite House
staff, Treasury, and Congressional staff to support further analyses and options. Although the
Health Security Act was not enacted at the end of 1994, the legislation served as a basis for <;>ther
health care advances and coverage expansions achieved in the coming six years for children's
bea1th, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, the Ticket to Work and
Work Incentives Improvement Act, and extending the solvency of the Medicare Hospital Trust
Fund.
During the development of the President' s health care reform proposal, OMB' s role
reflected new institutional directions as poHcy officials and career staff actively participated in
the four-mouth work of the Task Force on National Health Care Reform; and reflected traditional
70
�roles and responsibilities in (I) bringing the Task Force's plan into a final consistent form that
could be scored by September IOctober 1993 and presented in legislative language by November
1993; (2) fonnulating the President's Budgets for FY 1994 (between Janunry and April 1993)
and FY 1995 (between September 1993 and January 1994); (3) completing the appropriations for
these two fiscal years; and, (4) leading the efforts to enact the President's economic package in
August 1993. Similar to the demands that OMS faced during President Reagan's first term in
19&1 and 19821 OMS's staff worked at an intense and consistently demanding pace throughout
1993 and 1994 in support oftbe President's policies and programs.
Almost immediately in January 1993, OMB's examiners were simultaneously involved
v.-ith many of the Task Force's Working Groups analytic teams (or clusters), often working on
weekends and evenings. At the same time, many o[these same OMWs examiners, analysts and
policy officials confronted the daunting -and at that time unique - challenge of constructing
from the beginning the FY 1994 President's Budget.
In previous transitions, the incoming President's first budget preparation actions typically
reflected amendments to the outgoing President's proposed budget, usually sent to the Congress
just before the January 20th inauguration. TIlls had occurred for example In 1977 as President
Carter amended President Ford's FY 1978 Budget, in 1981 as President Reagan amended
President Carter's FY 1982 Budget and then most recently in 1989 as President Bush amended
President Reagan's FY 1989 Budget. But in January 1993, the full demands of a regular
Executive Branch budget senson (which nomlally occurred between September and January)
proceeded from January through early April 1993 at the same time the Administration dealt with
the nonnal lransitional stresses confronting a new Administration and launched its major health
reform agenda.
As active participants and often leaders in the health reform clusters, many OMS staff
supported analytic work, options considerations and prepared cost estimates for issues such as
long term care, access, workforce reform, premiums, malpractice, administrative costs., and ,
organization structure for health reform administration. Following the completion of the four
month conceptual period that comprised the Task Force's existence, many of the OMB
examiners engaged in daily health refonn work had turned by the beginning of June 1993 to the
more immediate work of preparing analyses needed for the Vice President's Kational
Performance Review reinventing government initiative and supporting on a daily basis
Administration policy officials as they worked suecessfuBy to enact by early August 1993 the
President's economic reform package. Much of the broader OMB staff work for health care
reform paused during this period.
By late August and early September, OMB's full attention again turned to the need to
bring the htalth care reform conceptual plan - reflecting the spring and summer work of the Task
Force and 0thers - first into a final narrative form reflecting credible and complete actuarial
estimates and then into legislative language, This work reflected OMB's traditional role in
leading Executive Branch efforts to bring often incomplete but promising conceptual work to a
practical and unified conclusion, while ensuring that budget estimates and legislation dearly
reflect and support the President's decisions and policy objectives.
7t
�Many disparate parties had advanced important and valuable options for the
consideration throughout the health reform conceptual process. OMB recognized the clear need
,to ensure score keeping and budget concepts consistency with the policy assumptions made in
the preliminary process, with a view towards anticipating scoring of the health plan's
implementing legislation by the eBO. OMB moved quickly in early September to bring the
process to closure in an organized, fair, understandable, defensible and timely manner to support
the President's September 22. 1993) address to the Congress and subsequent submission of
supporting legislation.
n
�WELFARE REFORM
During the first year of the Administration, OMS worked with the Domestic Policy
Council> the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS" Treasury, Agriculture, the
Social Security Administration and others to develop detailed plans for how to achieve the
President's goallO <lEnd welfare as we know it!' OMB's efforts proceeded along two major
tracks: development of a legislative proposal and review of Slate welfare waiver requests.
Welfare Refonn Proposals in the FY 1993 Budget.
Although legislative proposa1s to restructure the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) program later became the main vehicle for welfare refoon) the
Administration's FY 1993 budget proposal addressed other key elements of welfare fefoon. The
Administration proposed substantial expansions in the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), which
became law in the Omnibus: Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993. This legislation expanded the
maximum BITe by $213 for families with one child and $1,447 for families with two Or more
children. It also made a major conceptual change by adding a modest credit for childless
workers, primarily for those who work part~time or part~year. As a result ofthese expansions.
credits paid through the ElTe program more than doubled from $7.5 billion in 1990 to $15.7
billion in 1994, and the number of families receiving assistance from the program increased from
12.5 million to 18 million. At the end of the Administration, the Council of Economic Advisers
nnd outside experts analyzed the factors that contributed to the dramatic declines in families
receiving ca5h assistance and found that the 1993 EITe expansions played a major role,
Expcditi~g
and Encouragins..§tate Waivers.
To speed the redesign of welfare at the local level, the Administration encouraged states
to propose waivers from Federal rules, Ultimately, 80 waivers (out of 120 applications) were
granted in 43 states. State proposals generally proposed changes across AFDC 1 Medicaid, Food
Stamps and other programs. Together with the affected agencies, OMB reviewed these waiver
requests to ensure that they had no adverse financial impact on the Federal Government (a
principle known as "cost neutrality") and were consistent with the Administration's policy
priorities.
The Administration's 1994 Welfare Reform Proposal.
After extensive interagency efforts, the President's welfare reform proposal, The Work
and Responsibility Act of 1994 (WRA), was released on June 14,1994. It proposed major
changes to the AFDC Program. intended to strengthen work effort and promote parental
responsibility. The bill had provisions to encourage the trupsltion to work, introduce time limits
on cash assistance, strengthen child support collections, expand access to childcare and
discourage teenage pregnancy. OMB played a central role in developing these proposals.
Concurrent with the program design effort. OMB took the lead on developing savings proposals
to offset the cost of the policies in the \VRA, The difficulty of identifying offsets the President
could support greatly expanded the time required to develop the bilL Eventually, WRA 's costs
were fully offset by proposals to save $9,3 billion over five years, with the majority of savings
73
�coming from proposals to strengthen rules for deeming sponsor income to sponsored immigrants~
establishing caps on state spending on the AFDC Emergency Assistance program. and limiting
SSI cligibHity for drug~ and alcohol~addlcted recipients.
Negotiating with Congress During 1995 and 1996,
Congress did not act on the Administration's welfare proposal in 1994. After the control
of the Congress shifted in 1994, the majority in the Congress pursued an alternative approach to
weJfare reform. During 1995 and early 1996, the President vetoed two Congressional welfare
refoTIn proposals that were included as part of broader legislation to balance the Federal budget.
During this period OMB sent the Congress numerous letters and Stntements of Administration
Policy (SAPs) that detailed Administration concerns with the Congressional bills. In addition.
OMB. through the Legislative Reference Division, reviewed. circulated and cleared numerous
agency letters.
During 1993, OMB analysis had focused primarily on programmatic changes aimed at
improving outcomes for low~income Individuals:. While the cost implications of the proposals
were important) welfare reform was not generally viewed by senior policy o~ciaIs as intended
. to produce substantial savings, The Administration's 1994 proposal was deliberately designed to
be cost neutraJ. During 1995 mid 1996, in response to the change in the Congress, OMB's
analysis shifted much more heavily towards prioritizing policies that could reduce Federal
spending on welfare programs. Little agreement had been reached with the Congress on the
extent to which welfare programs should contribute to deficit reduction goals. OMB analysts
prepared a wide range of funding options for OMS and White House policy officials. Areas
receiving the greatest attention included Food Stamps, Supplemental Security Income children's
benefits. and benefits to legal immigrants.
In a radio address on September 16, 1995, the President indicated general support for a
Senate welfare refonn bill that repJaced the AFDC program with a Federal block grant to stutes,
established time~limited benefits and provided the child support system with a variety of new '
tools to increase collect.ons. While many programmatic issues remained unresolved, which led
the President to veto two versions of welfare refonn in the coming year, the President's
statement narrowed the areas of disagreement.
1n the fall of 1995. OMB reviewed ana.lysis prepared primarily by HHS, with assistance
from Treasury and other agencies} of the poverty and distributional effects of welfare reform
'bllls. The "'port, "Potential Poverty and Distributional Effects of Welfare Reform Bills and
Balanced Budget Plans," was released on November 9, 1995. It concluded that under various
versions -of welfare reform being considered by the Congress, anywhere from several hundred
thousand to 2.1 million children could move into poverty, The Senate welfare refoTIn bill, the
Work Opportunity Act of 1995, was estimated to move 1.2 million children below the poverty
line. The report noted. however, that these estjmates did not take into account cbanges in
individual behavior or the consequences of other Administration efforts to alleViate poverty.
The Congress sent the President a welfare reform bin in December 1995 as part ofa
.broader budget reconciliation bill. Because ofconcerns over cuts in Medicare and Medicaid, as
74
�wen as obje,:tions to changes to low-income assistance progr.ams. the President vetoed this bill.
FoJlowing this veto, the Congress sent the President a freestanding welfare refonn bill, the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1995. ·On January 9,1996, the President
vetoed this bill, The President critkized the bill for wenkening important work provisions,
providing insufficient child care assistance, failing to guarantee health coverage for poor
families. and for other problems.
In 1996, after the President vetoed two Congressional versions of welfare reform, OMB
and the DPe worked with the affected agencies to develop a second Administration welfare
reform hill. The Work First and Personal Responsibility Act of 1996 replaced the AFDC
program with a time-limited. work~based Temporary Employment Assistance program and a
strengthened child support enforcement. It achieved savings by reducing nutrition assistance;
increasing deeming of sponsor income to sponsored immigrants, and tightening SSI benefits for
disabied children. Overall, the bill saved the Federal Government $38 biltlon over five years.
The majority in the Congress opposed the Administration's bill and proceeded \vith variations of
the earlier Congressional proposals.
in August 1996, the Congress scnt to the President the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunities Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), O:YfB prepared a series of briefing materials for
\\'bite House meetings regarding the decision whether to sign PRWORA Th~ President
announced he would sign PRWORA. though the President stated that he regretted that the bill
included cuw in Food Slamps and benefits for legal immigrants thaI had nothing to do with
\\'eifarc reform.
Implementing PR WORA.
From the rall of 1996 until the end of the Administration, OMB focused on implementing
PRWORA. On the administrative fmntt OMB reviewed and cleared regulations to implement
the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program, EspeciallY complex issues included
defining the term 1'assistance" for purposes of calculating which benefits count towards the five~
year time limit; creating an adequate data collection system; and establishing methodologies to
assess requisite levels of state expendjtures and compliance with work requirements. Together
with ope, OMS was also closely involved in the development of guidance and regulations
regarding the criteria for awarding high performance bonuses to states that could show
measurable results in achieving the goals ofTANF. Criteria ~ltimate)y included work~related
measures (job placement,job retention'and earnings gain) as well as family fonnation and work
support measures (Food Stamp participation among low-income families, Medicaid participation
among TANF leavers, and child~care access, affordnbility and quality). Inclusion of the work
support measures were part of broader OMB efforts to ensure that families leaving TANF casn
assistance retained access to other supports ~- such as Food Stampsl Medicaid; child care, and job
training -- that prior analysis showed were criticat to their keeping their jobs.
In addition to implementing TANF OMS reviewed and cleared regulations to impJement
a wide variety of other provisions in PRWORA, including those affecting SSI benefits for
children, Child Support Enforcement enhancements. Child Care, and Food Stamps. OMB
worked with the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, the \Vhite House General
j
75
�Counsel's office and others. to interpret a number of ambiguous phrases in PRWORA, especially
regarding provisions to restrict benefits for immigrants,
Legislation to Correct Flaws in PRWORA,
At the same time that OMB \\'as engaged in implementing PRWORA, OMB worked with
DPC and affected agencies to develop legislation to reverse those policies in the law that the
President criticized as having nothing to do with welfare refonn. PRWORA limited eligibility
for Food Stamps for ableRoodied childless adults to three months in every three years -- except in
certain circumstances) such as participation in a Food Stamps Education and Training program.
OMB developed a proposal, enacted in the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997, to increase
funding for Food Stamps Education and Training opportunities for these individuals. which in
tum would (:xtend their access to Food Stamps,
PRWORA denied eligibility to hundreds of thousands oflegal immigrants currently
receiving SSt and Food Stamps, and great'y restricted access to benefits for immigrants who
entered the United States after PR WORA was enacted On August 22, 1996, OMB worked with
SSA, HHS fmd USDA to develop proposals to restore benefits to many of these immigrants: In
the 1997 BBA and the Noncitizen Technical Amendments Act of 1998, the Administration
succeeded in restoring SSI benefits for all immigrnnts currently in the program and aU
immigrants in the country betore PRWORA was cnacted who become disabled. In the
Agriculture Research, Extension, and Education Refonn ALi of 1998, OMB successfully
negotiated an agreement for the Administration to restore Food Stamp eligibility for certain
immigrants -- children, the elderly and people with disabilities - who entered the country before
PRWORA was enacted.
Child Care.
PRWORA replaced four separate Federal childRcare programs with the Child Care and
Development Fund (CCDF), which operates under the Child Care and Development Block Grant
Act rules and regulations, The CCDF consists of entitlement funding (mandatory and matching)
and discretionary funds provided annually through appropriations for the Child Care and
Development Block Grant The consolidation both incfCased funding for chHdcarc and enhanced
state flexibility regarding how the funds are spent Welfare refonn and broader economic trends
contributed to an increase in employment among women with young children, which in tum
expanded the need for child-taTe. In 1997, OMB worked closely with DPC, the Office ofthe
first Lady. HHS, the Department of Education and the Department of Treasury to develop a.
child-care initiative that included increased child-care subsidy funding, increased Head Start
funding, expansions ofthe chi1d-care tux credit, and several quality initiatives. ChiJd~care
subsidy and Head Start increases were partially achieved in the FY 2001 appropriations process,
and components of the Administration's quality proposals were adopted between FY 1997 and
FY 2001, but the tax credit expansions were not enacted.
Welfare-to-Work.
16
�,
Since families receiving TANF have a five-year lifetime li~it for Federal assistance.
there was a great deal of concern about their future employment prospects. To address this
concern the Administration proposed a $3 billion welfare-lo-work program for famities leaving
j
welfare. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 authorized the Department of Labor to create a $3
billion Welfare-tn-Work grants program for states and local communities -- SI.S billion in
mandatory funding in both FY 1998 and FY 1999. The Act also authorized $100 million for
grants based on perfonnance (with funding taken from the FY 1999 authorization), The basic
gmnts were to assist long-tenn welfare recipients and certain low-income non-custodial parents
in high-poverty areas to get jobs and succeed inJhe workforce. OMB worked with DOL to
develop proposed changes to the program's eligibility and reporting requirements that would
allow the effort, within existing resources, better to serve the eligible population. The Congress
passed these changes in 1999.
Declines in FOQd Stamp Participation.
OMS also worked to address situations in which welfare reform was not being
lmplemented as planned. After seeing evidence that families leaving cash welfare for
employment were losing Food Stamp benefits despite Iheir continued eligibility, OMS worked
with the DPe and USDA to issue a series of initiatives to encourage states. 10 improve access to
Food Stamps. In the summer of 1999~ the Administration took action that allowed states to make
it easier for working families to own a car and still be eligible for fOQd stamps, simplified food
stamp reporting rules to reduce bureaucracy and encourage work, and launched a nationwide
public education campaign and toB-free hotline to help working families know whether they are
eligible for food stamps. Regulatory action in the fall of2000 will allow States to provide a
transitional food stamp benefit to families leaving TANF, further ease reporting rules for
working fami1ies~ and continue efforts to make it easier for a household to own a vehicle and be
eligible for food stamps. In addition, OMB, DPC and USDA developed a proposal for the FY
2001 budget to permit States to use more generous TANF rules for vehicles that were enacted
into Jaw in the Agriculture. Rural Development. Food and Drug Administration. and Related
.
'
Agencies Appropriations Act of2001.
77
�OMB AJliD FOREIGJIi POLICY
OMB played a key role in developing and implementing the Administration's foreign
policy. Staff at all levels of the agency worked with their counterparts at the National Security
Council (NSC), the National Economic Councii, and the agencies to:
•
develop or coordinate Administration initiatives, either in the budget or through
supplementals and budget amendments;
•
negotiate appropriatiollS for international affairs agenciesl particularly from 1995
on; and
•
help agencies implement and manage their programs.
The following list the major accomplishments afOMB's role on the Administration's
foreign polil:Y.
!??<panded A<;s~~!~nce Pr!?gram for Russia and the [omle! Soviet Union. In the spring of 1993, the
President directed NSC, OMB and the State Department to develop an immediate and significant
emergency assistance program to help Russia and the other New independent States (NIS)
maintain their fragile transitions to democratic market economies. OMS and NSC coordinated
the development of a $2.2 billion assistance program for the NIS, of which $1.7 billion (plus an
additional $700 million in food assistance) was for Russia, OMB then worked with'NSC and
State to secure appropriation of the entire amount requested, including FY 1993 supplemental
funds in the Departmeots of State and Defense and the full FY 1994 request.
Stabilizing the Mexican and Asian FinO:!lcial Crises, OMS played a crucial role in formulating
the Administration's response to the 1994 Mexican and 1997 Asian financial crises, During the
first crisis, OMB worked with the Department ofTreasury on a $20 billion credit to ensure there
was no cost to the US tnxpa)'er, either by way of interest subsidy or possibie default. The credit
proved instlUmel1tal in restoring investor confidence and allowing the Mexican economy to
resume growth. During the second crisis, OMB worked intensively with the Department of
Treasury to achieve congressional authorization and appropriation for the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) quota increase and the establishment of the New Arrangement to Borrow. The
availability of U.S. resources and the increase in IMF resources allowed the international
community to effectively contain the cdsis and assist the affected countries in recovery,
Negotiation of a Plan for United Nations RefQrms andJ)ayrnent o( Arrearages, Starting in 1996
and continuing until enactment of legislation sponsored by Senators Helms and Bjden in
November, 1999, OMB worked closely with lhe State Department and the NSC to develop a
plan to paioff US arrears to the UN and oilier international organizations, which by US
calculation in 1997) surpassed $1 billion. In 1997, the Administration and the Congress initiated
negotiations on a package to authorize payment ofarrears conditioned upon achievement of
tenain C'N refonn. The final package provided an authorization for three tranche:; of payments
totaling $926 million conditioned upon specific reforms at the UK and other international
7&
�organization. The appropriations were finally provided over three years, between FY 1998 and
FY 2000,
Imp~.9vlnB
Secuhty of U.S. Personnel Overseas. The simultaneous terrorist bombings of the
U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya~ and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on August 7} 199&, made
tragically apparent the immediate need to reduce the vulnerability of U.S. personnel and facilities
overseas. Working with the State Department, the NSC and other agencies, OMB played a
central role in developing an emergency supplemental to implement security enhancements at
US facilities abroad, OMB took the lead role in briefing the package to the Hill, and in
negotiating with the Appropriations Committee prior to the package's formal introduction. The
Administration's initial request of $1.4 billion was approved by the Congress presaged in
subsequent years a highly ambitious program of new embassy construction to provide the
greatest possible security to Americans officials working abroad. OMB has also worked to
support the Administrationls commitment to enhancing the security of our military forces
overseas. seeking increast->-d funding for vulnerability assessments, awareness and training
programs, and counterterrorism initiatives, Finally, OMS led the development of an emergency
supplemental request to ensure the effectiveness of the interagency team that assists ambassadors
and host government officials in managing terrorist incidents in a foreign country.
Developing the Wye River SupplementaL In the fall of 1999. to promote peace between Israel
and the Palestinians. the Administration proposed a $ 1.9 billion supplemental, colloquially
named after the venue of the successful negotiations between Israel. Jordan and the Palestinians
at Wye River Plantatioil in Maryland. OMB was instrumental in developing the package and in
negotiating its: subsequent acceptance by the Congress. The funding in the package allowed
Israel to withdraw from portions of the West Bank without threat to its national security, while
promoting economic progress for the Palestinians and Jordan.
Responses to Hurricanes Milch and Georges. Hurricanes Mitch and Georges, the most
dcva:'1ating stonns in the history of the Western hemisphere, hit Central America and the
Caribbean in late) 998 causing a staggering human and economic taB. The Vlhite House asked
Ol'...1B to take the lead in coordinating the U.s. response to lhe disaster by pulling together all
rclevant agencies to create a comprehensive supplemental request for disaster relief. The
President sent a 1999 supplemental appropriation request for $956 million to the Congress in
February, and the Congress appropriated $962 mJJlion in May, OMS staff subsequently worked
with otber agencies, primarily the Agency for International Development, to monitor effective
implementation of the package.
~ponse
to the Crisis in Kosovo, In 1998,,OMB staff and leadership participated fully in NSC
chaired meetings about the growing crisis in Kosovo, in which the Milosvic regime forced nearly
] million Kosovars to flee their homes, The humanitarian disaster that loomed as a result of this
displacement required massive hwnanitarian intervention by the U.S. and other Western nations,
These funding needs were compounded by the NATO air<:ampaign against Serbia, which began
in March 1999 and ultimately succeeded in driving the Serbian Army out of Kosovo. The
combination of humanitarian and military resources necessary for the U.s. participation in the
peacekeeping force, required OMB to lead the development of a comprehensive funding
79
�package. Eventually, the Congress provided over $1 billion for humanitarian and other needs
and almost $5.6 billion for military requirements.
.
Reviewing j\.merica's Overseas Presence. As part of the response to the 1998 embassy bombings
in Kenya and Tanzania, the Administration established an Overseas Presence Advisory Panel in
early 1999 t'O re-examine the role of US official missions abroad. Funding for this review was
included as part of the Administration's initial supplemental request to the Congress in the wake
ofthe bombings and was supported by OMB as a way to assess independently the size,
composition and location of US official overseas posts. The Panel found a need for the U.S.
Government to have an on-the~ground presence in every country, but challenged existing staffing
levels, and proposed sweeping reforms for the management of overseas personnel and facilities,
OMB, working with the Department of State and other agencies with significant presence
overseas, was actively involved and supported interagency efforts to implement some of the
Panel's findings. More work remains for full implementation of the Panel's recommendations.
Increased Response to Global HIV/AiDS. In 1999. the President and Vice President directed
the Office of National AIDS Policy and OMB to develop an emergency package to address the
increasing spread ofHI VIAIDS in sub-Saharan Africa and other regions of the developing world,
OMB staff coordinated the development ofa $100 million emergency package, providing
increased funding for global HlVlAIDS programs at AID, and the Departmentlt of Health and
I-(uman Services and Defense. This package was proposed as a budget amendment in Septt.·mher
of 1999. and the entire nmount was provided (although in slightly different allocations) by the
Congress in FY 2000 appropriations. OMB subsequently coordinated development of another
$100 mitlion increase in the FY 2000 President's Budget, which was more than fully funded in
FY 2001 appropriations,
US Assistance to Plan Colombia, During late 1999, OMB and NSC worked closely with
numerous government agencies including USAID and the DepartmentS of State, Defense,
Justice, and the Treasury in developing an integrated) comprehensive, regional plan to reduce the
volume of illegal drugs coming into the US from Andean countries and to bring greater stability
to Colombia. The Administration sent the resulting progrrun to the Congress in February 2001 as
an emergency supplemental request. OMS took the lead in shepherding the plan through the
Congress over the course of the spring. Since the President signed the appropriation into law on
July J3, 2000. OMS has continued to playa key tole in overseeing the implementation of the
plan's integrated programs
Southern Africa Floods SupplementaL After severe flooding in southern Africa in February and
March 2000. the State Department proposed several options for an emergency supplemental
assistance program. OMB coordinated the development ofoptions to detennlne the most
appropriate US response, and worked with State and AID to develop a suppJemental
appropriations request, which was sent to the Congress in April 2000. The Administration
received $160 million in FY 2000 supplemental and FY 2001 appropriations, After the
supplemental appropriation. OMB assisted USAID and the State Department in the development
of an implementation plan to ensure that our rehabilitation efforts are provided effectively and 011
schedule.
80
�Pro~~ting Peace in the Middle East Peace. During 1999 and 2000, OMB worked closely and'
continuously with the NSC and the State and Defense Departments to support the President's
efforts to achieve a peaceful resolution of the Middle East conflict. OMB's efforts focused on
reviewing Israeli requests for military and economic assistance and examining financial and
budget options that could facilitate peace agreements between Israel and Syria and the
Palestinians, Some of these efforts resulted in budget initiatives, namely. the interest bearing
account for the Goverrunent of Egypt, equivalent to what is provided to the Government of
ISrael. In addition, OMB worked with NSC, State and Defense to develop an FY 2001
supplemental to assist lsrael with the costs of withdrawing from l.ebanon and to provide
resources to Israel to deal with strategic threats and to Egypt and Jordan to address border
security needs
81
�SAVING SOCIAL SECURITY FIRST
An improving fiscal picture and increased public attention to Social Security solvency
combined to give the Administration an opportunity. to put Social Security refonn at the top of
the policy agenda.
In February \998, the President proposed the first balanced budget in almost 30 years.
With continued fiscal discipline, the President projected that budget surpluses 'could continue for
some time - but that deficits would recur in just a few decades. lne Administration~s
interpretation of this development was that it had conquered the structural deficit, but that there
remained the problem of the generational deficit - the b,udgetary pressure that was projected to
result from the aging of the population and especially the Impending retirement of the baby
boom generation. This increased public attention on demographically driven spending programs,
espccial!y Social Security and Medicare. Although there was a fairly widespread understanding
that these programs needed restructuring to withstand the coming demographic forces) there \\'US
no consensus regarding how they could be reformed. Emblematic of this dlvision, the Advisory
Council on Social Sccurity in 1997 was unable to reach consensus. and in its report of findings
nnd recommendations for restoring the Social Security program to Jong~rnnge financial health
oiTered three sets of recommendations.
j
The President's response linked his concern about the longAenn solvency of Social
Security with the immediate imperative to maintain fiscal discipline in the face of the stunning
improvement in the budget. The President's 1998 State of the Union Address called for a
commitment to ~'Save Social Security First." This motto combined a policy of short~term budget
discipline with a greatly enhanced focus on the longer-tenn needs of Social Security itself.
OMB contributed to the Social Security discussion by providing the Executive Office of
the President with neutral analysis ofa wide range of options for dealing with the program's
long-range financing shortfall. OMB began analyzing Social Security reform issues in earnest in
] 997. OMB staff prepared a series of briefings and papers analyzing the reasons for Social
Security's long-tenn (75-year) actuarial imbalance and options for bringing the prograr:t~s
receipts and expenditures back into balance. These briefings and papers explQred and expanded
on ideas circulated by Social Security policy experts. OMS staff provided objective analysis on
possibilities for increasing the system IS rate of return by diversifying the investment of its assets,
either collectively or through an individually managed retirement account system. The
impending budget surpluses opened up new options that had previously been unimaginable, such
as using general funds to Improve the financial status of the Social Security trust funds, or
making contributions on behalf of individuals to new, mandatory private retirement accounts.
OMB's analyses informed the work of the interagency Social Security Tt.'Chnical
Working Group, which the White House established in 1998 to sort through the various reform
options. During 1998 and 1999, OMB worked closely with the rest of the Tech.11ical Working
Group, which included the National Economic Council, Department of the Treasury, the Social
Security Administration and the Council of Economic Advisers. TIle Technical Working Group
developcd reform options and evaluated their policy tradeoffs for individuals, their
implementation and administrative issues) and their macroeconomic implications. In particular,
82
�•
OMB provided significant support in modeling the long-range budget effects of refonn options,
analyzing options to protc.:t vulnerable populations - particularly elderly wQrnen and persons
with disabilities - from poverty I and analyzing issues related to administering a system of private
accounts. The long-range budget analysis became even more complex because oftlte
Administration's other enduring priorities, including extending the solvency and broadentng"the
coverage of Medicare, The efforts of the Technical Working Group helped frame the
discussions .at the December 1998 White House Conference on Social Security, and through the
entire initiative to take the Social Security issue to the people in to\\l1 meetings across the
country.
The President's FY 2000 and FY 2001 budgets presented proposals to extend the
solvency of the Social Security trust funds through a commitment to sustained fiscal
responsibility. Rather than dissipating all of the currently projected surpluses on new spending
or tax ems, the President proposed to prepare the Nation for the challenges ahead by paying
down the entire debt held by the public and encouraging economic growth, The mechanism for
accomplishing this involved transferring a portion of expected on~budgct surpluses to the Social
Security trust funds over a period of several decades and reinforcing statutes that promote budget
discipline. The 2001 budget set the transfer amounts equivalent to the annual intcrest savings
expected to result from dedicating the Social Security surpluses to debt reduction. The President
,also suggested extending the solvency of the Social Security trust funds by investing half of the
transferred amounts in corporate equities to get a higher rate of return, with the portion of the
trust funds' balances to be invested in equities strictly limited to 14 percent Finally, the
President proposed to create new savings accounts, independent of Social Security, to help
individuals $ave for retirement.
Once the broad Social Security policy framework had been outlined, OMB staff worked
closely with the NEe und others to work out the details and draft legislation, which the President
transmitted to the Congress in October 1999, Among the details were issues of how the transfers
to Social Security would be scored in the budget to ensure that the surpluses used for the
transfers would be 'Ilocked away" and not used for other purposes. The OMS long-range budget
model also was critical in developing the Social Security policy, because it made projections of
the available surpluses to support the desired genera' fund transfers beyond the normal I O~year
budget horizon. OMB also led or assisted in the development of various \\TItten materials to
frame the President's Social Security proposal in a way that was easy for the American public 10
understand.
Public reaction to the President's dictum, and to his budget proposals for Social Security,
was positive. However, there foHowed soon thereafter a political development that was to
complicate the budgetary process~ but also to have enormous consequences for fiscal policy that
are likely to endure for years. The President's 2000 budget raised the issue of whether, nner its
propos(.'(] budgetary transfers to Social Security, the non-Social Security budget could be kept at
least in balance each and every year. In the resulting debate, there arose a broad political
consensus that fiscal responsibility would require that the non~Sodal Security budget, not just
tbe total hudget, be kept in annual balance. This consensus quickly achieved a level of political
strength thaI exceeded any of the budget rules set down by the two Houses of Congress, or even
83
�by the law. By calling attention to this issue, the President helped to raise the bar of fiscal
behavior in a fashion that will have enduring favorable consequences for the economy.
Thus, ahhough the President's proposed general fund transfers were not enacted, the
Administration>s framing of the Socia! Security issue generated bipartisan agreement for
substantial debt reduction over the next decade, to prepare the Nation for the needs of the future.
This development, plus the expanded public consciousness and understanding of the Social .
Security issue that arose from the Administration's efforts, will contribute to budget and
, retirement policy in the coming years.
84
�STREI'iGTHENING THE INSTIUTION
85
�THE DIRECTORS
OMB is led by its Director. The Director's position is a Presidentially appointed,
Senate~
confirmed position. Given,OMB's unique nature. the Director of OMB serves as both a Cabinet
level official and as an Assistant to the President. OMB's roles and responsibilities make the
Director of OMS one of the President's closest advisers and one of the Federal Government's
most influential officials. Four individuals served as Director ofOMS during this
Administration:
Leon Panetta
Leon Panetta served as Director ofOMB from January 1993. until he was appointed by
tlle President to be his Chief of St.If on July 17, 1994.
From 1977 to 1993, ML Panetta served as United States Representative from California's
16!h congressional district. From 1989 to 1993, Mr. Panetta was Chairman of the House
Committee on the Budget. He also chaired the Agriculture Committee's Subcommittee on
Domestic Marketing. Consumer Relations. and Nutrition; the House Administration
Committee's Subcommittee on Personnel and Police; and the Select Committee on Hunger's
Task Force on Domestic HWlger.
'
In i960 Mr. Panetta received his B,A magna cum laude from Santa Clara University. In
,1963, he received his 1.0 frorn Santa Clara University Law School, where he was an editor of the
Law Review. He served as a First Lieutenant in the U,S, Army from 1964 to 1966, and received
the Army Commendation Medal.
Beginning in 1966, Mr. Panetta sen'cd as legislative assistant to Senate Majority Whip
Thomas KucheL (n 1969, he became the special assistant to the Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare, and then Director of the U.S. Office of Civil Rights. In 1971 he returned to
California, whcre he practiced law with the Monterrey finn of Panetta, Thompson. and Panetta,
Alice Rivlin
After serving as Ule Deputy Director of OMB since 1993, Alice Rivlin was nominated 10
,become the Director of OMB in 1994 when Leon Panetta became the White House Chief of
Staff.
Dr, RivJin was born in Philadelphia. Pennsylvania, Sh~ graduated from Bryn Mawr
College and received her doctorate in economics from Radcliffe College. Dr. RivEn was the
founding Director ofCBO, serving from 1975 to 1983. She also was a senior fenow at the
Brookings lnstitution 1 and served as Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation at the U,S,
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, She was a professor of Public Policy at George
Mason University during 1992.
The experience Dr. Rivlin gained during her time as Deputy Director reinforced her
bclicfthat the ccntraljol)of OMS is helping the President manage the goverrunent's resources
more effectively. Dr. RivHn put enomlOUS emphasis 011 management and performance and
86
�worked extensively with the National Performance Review. The National Performance Review
created the president's Management Council, which Dr. Rivlin was selected to Chair, That
group, comprised of the ChlefOperating Officers from each major agency, worked to streamline
and restructure the government.
Franklin Raines
On May 24, 1996, Franklin D. Raines was nominated to be the Director ofOMB;
following Alice Rivlin's move to the Federal Reserve Board, From 1991 to 1996, Mr, Raines
was Vice Chairman of Fannie Mae, in charge of the company's legal, credit policy, finance, and
other corporate functions,
Prior to joining Fannie Mae, Mr. Raines was with Lazard Freres & Company for II
years, where he was a general partner. Before joining Lazard Freres, he served from 1977 to
1979 as Associate Director for Economics and Government at OMB. and Assistant Director of
the White House Domestic Policy Staff.
Mr. Raines graduate magna cum laude with a B,A. degree from Harvard College. He
received his J,D, degree cum laude from Harvard Law School. He also attended Magdalen.
CoJIege Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar.
j
At the time of Mr, Raines' nomination, the United States was enjoying one of the longest
economic expansions in 50 years, with a unemployment rate of 5.6 percent, inflation under 3
percent, and interest rutes low enough to drive the home ownership rate up to the highest level in
15 years, The outstanding economic performance was the result ofcomplementary fiscal and
monetary policies that facilitated steady groMh, the creation of jobs. and increased tax revenue.
Mr. Raines wanted to extend this record by continuing fiscal and monetary policies that provided
support for the resurgence of American business competitiveness in world markets, improved
productivity, and improved real wages for American workers.
Jacob J, Lew
Jacob 1. Lew served as Deputy Director of OMS from August 1995. Acting Director of
OMB from May 1998, and was confirmed as the Director of OMB on July 31, 1998, Prior to
becoming Deputy Director, Mr, Lew was OMB's Executive Associate Director nnd Associate
Director for Legislative Affairs, Mr. Lew also served in the White liouse as Special Assistant to
the President from February 1993 through October 1994, responsible for policy development and
the drafting of the national service initIative and health-care reform legislation,
Mr. Lew began his career in Washington in 1973 as a Jegislative aide. and became
_principal domestic policy adviser to the late House Speaker Thomas P. "Tip~' O'Neill, Jr., in
1979. He spent nearly eight years at the House Democratic Steering and Policy Committee as
Assistant Director and then Executive Director.
Mr. Lew also served as an attorney in private practice for five years, Executive Director
of the Center for Middle East Research, Issues Director for the Democratic National
87
�Committee~s Campaign 88, and Deputy Director of the Office of Program Ana1ysis in the city of
Boston's Office of Management and Budget.
Me. Lew was born in New York. New York. A member of the bar in the District of
Columbia and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. he graduated from Harvard College in 1978
and earned his law degree from Georgetown University Law School in 19&3,
As the Director ofOMB during a move from a generation of budget deficits into a world
of budget surpluses Mr. Lew was committed to the dua1 goals of maintaining a prudent fiscal
policy and investing in the future. The Director's responsibilities spanned the Federal'
Government, from domestic to'defense, from discretionary to mandatory. The Director must
focus not just on helping to set spending levels, but must help ensure that the government
perform well within spending levels.
j
88
�CREATION OF HEALTH PROGRAM ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR (PAD)
Between 1969 and 1993, the OMB PAD for Human Resources, Veterans and Labor
(HRVL) had re'p<lnsibility for Health and Human Services health activities, As part ofOMB's
efforts to support the President's hea1th reform proposal. O~B management staff led a review of
organizational options to support this priority, As a result, OMS,moved toward creating a new
organizatio.nal unit led by a senior health expert who reports directly to the Director,
OMB's new Health PAD began on February 18, 1993, with the reassignment of about 350MB
career staff. As adopted, the new Health PAD had organizational responsibility for HHS health
activities, The new organjzation reflected tile priority that the new Administration placed on
health reform and welfare refoon goals, The pre~existlng HRVL program area '\\'US reorgani~d
into two new program areas: (1) Health and (2) Human Resources. The Health PAD
organization included a new Health Division, with examining branches for Medicare and
Medicaid analyses and for pub1ic health, The Income Maintenance Branch. which shared
responsibility for certain HHS health activities and other Federal health-related analyses and
program int~!ractions; moved from the Health nnd Income Maintenance Division (HIMD). to a
new Human Resources Division, The HIMD staff with divisional and HHS~wide responsibi1ities
were transferred to a new HHS Unit that reponed simultaneously to the new PADs for Health
and Human Resources, reflecting a new split of responsibility for HHS activities under two
policy officials.
As it evolved during the analytic work in support of health reform during 1993 and 1994,
the new Health PAD played a lead role in OMB's interaction with the Health Refonn Task
Force.
89
�OMB2000
OMB 2000 represented the most comprehensive self-examination and reform undertaken
by OMB in decades. In response to two decades of expanding responsibilities, a Steering
Committee was tasked to provide recommendations to improve OMS's efficiency and
effectiveness. The overall goal was: to improve OMB's oversight, management review, and
policy development roles.
A project team spent morc than two months analyzing the organization. The team
conducted 125 internal interviews across the organization and 35 with OMB "alumni,!' agency
personnel, congressional slaff, and others. The team met a number of times with groups of OMS
employees to capture the widest range of opinions on OMB's strengths, weaknesses, and
opportunities for improvement. An "electronic suggestion box" was set up through e-mail to
encourage staff to contribute ideas.. and received more than 200 specific recommendations,
an
In addition> aU OMB branches completed "work profiles" that documented each area's
missions, activities and end products, These profiles, when combined with estimated time
allocations provided by the branches, enabled the project team to produce estimates of the OMB
resources devoted to various activities across the institution, This work profile analysis provided
a snapshot of how the organization worked, and where its resources were expended.
The OMB 2000 group identified several significanfproblems with OMB's then-current
operation and organization as it reluted to management issues that were hurling its ahllity to.
operate effectively:
•
OMS's influence on the quality of agency management was highly uneven. Despite the
efforts of staff from OMB's traditional management offices, in many cases they lacked
the leverage and agency relationships necessary both to gain an understanding and
provide continuing oversight of the many management issues facing Federal agencies, on
issues ranging from IT and financial management to procurement
•
In many cases understanding of programs and budget issues was essential to improving
management. By and large. this programmatic expertise resided in the old budget
divisions.
•
The budget-side's exploding workload under contemporary budget practices and the BEA
left few resources available for issues of program operation and management.
Nonetheless~
Congress was adding significantly to OMB's management oversight
responsibilities, Without a more effective way to provide oversight, OMS would lack the
resources necessary to perfonn these many mandates,
Historically, OMS had tried to improve oversight of agency management by adding
speciallmlts and functions outside of the budget and poJicy analysis process, This maintain~d
the separation of management expertise from ongoing program and agency knowledge and
relationships.
The OMB 2000 Steering Committee focused instead on ways to integrate OMB's "Mil
and "13" so both could be performed more effectively. This led to the creation of Resource
90
�Management Offices (RMOs). expanding on the traditional agency-based budget offices to be
responsible and held accountable for: budget formulation, analysis> and execution; program
effectiveness and efficiency; arumai midwand long·range policy and program analysIs; agency
implementation of govemment~wide management policies; and program evaluation. The
traditional management offices were re:.'1ructured to provide their expertise on a consultative
basis to the RMOs, who retained the primary agency relationships. On general management
policy issues and circulars (grants, procurement, IT reviews etc.), management office staffs
continue to work directly with agencies, either directly or through interagency councils,
Personnel from the management offices were in some cases transferred directly into the RMOs.
Some management offices were abolished entirely (e.g., the General Management Division),
Otl,ers were sharply reduced (e,g" OFFM, OFPP),
Specific changes induded:
•
The Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFI'P) and the Office of Fede"'l Financial
~1anagement (OFFM) would retain their statutory policy roles, but some of their staff
would be re~assigned to RMOs to provide additional anaJ}1icai capacity.
•
=?ome staff from the Office ofInformation and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) would be
mowd to the RMOs, but most (..fthe OIRA desk officers would remain in OIRJ\, Most
of OiRA's staff would be left in place to implement the Executive Order on regulatory
management issued on September 30, 1993. It was more important for OIRA to
implement successfully the timeframes and coordination requirements in the new
Executive Order on regulatory review.
•
Some staff from Economic Policy, Budget Review Divisions, and from the General
Management's Evaluation and Planning Branch \V'ere moved into the RMOs to enhance
OMB's mid~range analytical functions.
•
The Special Studies Divisions were absorbed by the RMOs to have as many staff as
possible involved in analysis grounded in an integrated view ofagency oversight. OMB
did not want to c6nf'ine such work to special units - even though those units had been
successful in doing some analysis that the rest of OMS did not have sufficient time to do.
Since implementation ofOMB 2000} we have worked to ensure that the overall design is
implemented in practice. The remaining former management offices (now referred to as
"statutory offices" to reinforce the notion that management is a responsibility of all of OMB)
participate in budget TCvi-ews, but the R1vl0 for each agency is responsible for knowing and
reporting on agency compliance with the many management directives contained in OMB
circulars.
The OMB 2000 interviews showed a remarkable consensus on the need to strengthen
OMB's focus on program oversight issues by integrating management skills with t110se areas of
Ofo.,fB that have program specific knowledge, Moreover, the OMB 2000 process itself, by
soliciting staff views on how OMB could work more effectively, provided OMB's political
leadership a unique opportunity to change OMB with career staff support and advice. It also
provided a more solid institutional basis for Directors and President's for years to Come.
91
�OMB 2S'h ANNIVE'RSARY
On June 30. 1995. OMB celebrated its 25th Anniversary. Invitations went out to about 75
fonner Dureau of the Budget (BOB) staff as well as an unprecedented number of former
Directors. Activities that day included:
•
•
•
•
An informal luncheon seminar in the White House Conference Center described the
history and institutional role of BOBtOMB.
A p<mel of distinguished fomler BOB staff provided their perspective on the institution
and gave anecdotes and examples from their experience.
A number of artifacts and memorabilia reflect BOBtOMB history ("The OMB
MuS'eum"), The Museum included displays of historical and morc current b\ldgct
preparation and printing processes, including the FY 1996 Budget on CD-ROM,
OMB's annual award ceremony was held in the afternoon at the Decatur House, foHowed
by a reception. Special recognition was provided to all fonner BOB and OMB
employees who were present, including 6 forner directors.
The following is a brief history ofOMB written specifically for the 25th Anniversary
celebration:
j
Article I, S(:cltOn 9 of the Constitution provides that Federal funds are to be expended only "in
consequence of appropriations made by law." Article II designates the President as Chief
Executive and otherwise describes the Executive powerS, but docs not refer directly to the
spending power.
The Organk Act for the Department of Treasury (1 Stat. 65) of 1789 was the first step tov.:ards a
Federal Budget. The Trea.o;ury collected and included, without review, the appropriation requests
of execmiv(; departments and agencies in the "Book of Estimates" which was transmitted to the
Congress. There was no effort at a central control for coordination of budget matters and
Presidents did not play an active role in the budget process,
Between 1887 and 1889 the Cockrell Committee recommended new administrative practices and
accounting procedures !.hat were subsequently adopted by the Treasury, In 1905, President
Theodore Roosevelt appointed members of the Keep Commission on Department Methods to
investigate charges of waste, inefficiency and corruption in the Federal budget process, The
Keep Commission laid the groundwork for President WilHam Howard Taft's Commission on
Economy and Efficiency. In 1912) the Tan Commission submitted its report to the Congress,
"The Need for a National Budget" The report described existing problems ruld practices,
considered various options, and set for!.h a model budget. President Tan endorsed the
recommendations for a National Budget l but lost the election; and the issue was dropped by
Congress.
In 1912, Pn:sident Woodrow Wilson endorsed the Democratic Party Platform for budget refonn
that consolidated appropriations into a single House committee rather than an executive budget
approach. President Wilson adopted the congressional focus of the Democrats instead of the
national budget approach as proposed by President Taft,
92
�The Select Committee on the Budget was created by the House in 1919 and produced a report
calling for a Bureau of the Budget (BOB) directly responsible to the President. In 1920, the
Congress passed a biB that housed BOB in the Treasury, President Wilson vetoed the 1920 bin
on the grounds that it contained a provision which would prohibit the President from removjng
officials if necessary.
The Budgeting and Accounting Act was signed by President Warren O. Harding on June 10,
1921" BOB was a unit 'lin but not of' the Trcasury~ headed by a Director appointed by the
President. Bon remained in Treasury until it was transferred to the newly established Executive
Office of the President, July I, 1939. Under the Executive Reorgani7.ation Act of 1939, BOB
became u central institutional component of the newly created Executlve Office of fhe President.
The OllieD of Management and Budget (OMB) waS created by Rcorgani7.ation Plan No.2 of
1970 which was submitted by President Richard Nixon to the Congress on March 13. 1970, .The
plan redesignated the BOB us the OMB and transferred all functions vested by law in the BOB
and its Director. to the President. who in tum. delegated his authority to the Director of OMB by
Executive Order 11541, effective July 1, 1970,
93
�THE FEDERAL INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
In the latc 1980s, the financial condition of the District of'Columbia began to deteriorate
dramatically. With a cumulative general fund deficit of$324 million by the end of FY 1994, the
bond market dov..ngraded the District government's credit ratltlg in early 1995. leaving the city
unable to borrow to meet its financial obligations. In addition, the District government did not
possess sound financial and accounting procedures and systems.
In 1995, the Administration worked with the Congress to enact the Financial
Responsibility and Management Assistance (FRMA) Act. The legislation established the
District ofColumbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority, a
-financial entity' similar to that which other municipalities have utilized to assist in
regaining financial stability.
In addition, the President asked OMS Director Alice M. Rivlin to convene a
group of officials from Executive Branch agencies to work with their D.C. counterparts.
to help the District cope with its financial problems and to improve the quality ofservices
that D.C. delivers to its residents, The D.C. Interagency Task Force became the focal
,point for Administration efforts to revitalize the District, and remains a top pri.ority of
OMB.
In 1996~ OMB and the Q,C, Task Force developed a plan to restructure the
relationship between the Federal and District Oovenunents to promote long-term
financial stability and improve self~governmenl within the city. The plan proposed that
the Federal Government directly assume certain District functions in which it has a clear
interest, such as pensions, criminal justice, and Medicaid, In addition, the Federal
Government established the National Capital Infrastructure Fund, to fund transportation
capital projects in the District, and nn economic development plan, to provide grants and
tax incentives for economic development. The comprehensive plan developed by the
Task Force was enacted as the National Capital Revitalization and Se)f~Govemment
Jmprovcment Act of 1997 ("the Revitalization Act"). The Revitalization Act
significantly restructured the Federal-District of Columbia government relationship.
Specifically, the Act:
• Increased the Federal match rate for Medicaid from 50 to 70 percent.
• Provided for the Federal Government to assume certain State justice functions,
including incarceration of adult felonst s.upervision of parolees, and financing of the
District Courts. The Act created 8 Corrections Trustee to oversee the transition of the
adult felon population to the Federal prison system and the closing of Lorton prison}
and an Offender Supervision Trustee to create a new Federal agency, the Court
Services and Offender Supervision Agency, The Act provides for new'
responsibilities for the US Parole Commission.
• Relieved the city of$5 billion of unfunded pension liabilities that the District of
Columbia had inhcnted from the Federal Government in the late 1970s; and
• Provided $1.2 billion in tax relief District of Columbia residents and businesses.
94
�The Revitaliz:ation Act implementation aJso provided hundreds of millions of doBars
in benefits 10 the District government every y,car, totaling $5.5 billion over the next 5
years:
•
$1.8 binion in funding pension liabilities;
•
$1.2 billion in increased Federal matching rate for Medicaid payments;
•
Sl.l billion for housing Di~tricl of Columbia relon,;
•
$0.6 billion for court services and offender supervision; and,
• . $0.7 billion for the District ofColumbia Courts and Defender Services
Even with the elimination of the $660 million annual Federal payment, the District
will still savc 52.2 billion over the next 5 years. The President also signed into law $1.2
bi!1ion in Federal tax incentjvcs over 5 years, including a wage credit for hiring District
of Columbia residents, additional small business deductions! tax exempt bond financing,'
a first time home buyer creditt and a targeted zcro GapitaJ gains rate. In 1999, the
Administration persuaded the Congress to enact further changes to the Medicaid fommla,
saving tbe District an additional $9 million per year,
Since 1997, in addition to funding for the Revitalization Act, the Administration has
obtained additional appropriations funding for the District of Columbia: $239 million in
FY 1999; $34 million in FY 2000; IlI1d over $57 million in FY 2001: These·
appropriations have been used for critical cconomlc development initiatives, including
$25 million to capitalize the National Capital Revitalization Corporation, S25 miIJion for
the New York A venue Metro station, and funding for key infrastructure projects,
management refonns, education, and public safety. In 1999> the President proposed and
enacted the College Access Act, providing $17 million per year for District of Columbia
high~school stugents ~o attend out~of-stale schools at in-s.tate tuition rates.
The Federal Interagency Task Force has been, and continues to be, involved in a range of
activities designed to draw on the Federal Government's technical expertise to improve the city's
tax collection. education and training, housing, transportation, health-care delivery, economic
developmenl, and other governmental functions.. 'l1lese activities are ongoing, and touch upon
virtually every aspect of District government.
95
�PRIVACY
The OMB traditionally has taken a lead role in the Federal Government's efforts to
protect personal privacy. In doing so, O~lB has focused on the Privacy Act of 1974 and its
implications concerning agency collection of individuals' information and the maintenance of
that information in Federal systems of records, The Privacy Act provides individuals with the
right to exercise control over many disclosures of personal information, in addition to the right to
access and correct infonnation held by the government! among other rights,
OMB's mission in ensuring privacy safeguards expanded significantly during tbe
Administration. The leadership role on guiding agencies in implementing the Privacy Act
continued. but new responsibilitIes were added, OMB began working on a broad range of
privacy issues in both the public and private sectors - from helping to VvTitC the nation's flrst
medical privacy rules, to working on proposals to boost consumers' financial privacy safeguards,
to prohibiting the usc of genetic information in hiring decisions. In addition, with the 1999
appointment of the Administration's first Chief Counselor for Privacy, OMB gained the
institutional responsibility for coordinating Executive Branch policies for privacy,
The Electronic Age Arrives.
This Administration's tenure coincided with the dramatic growth in the use of computer
resources by the private and public sectors. and significant boosts in the volume of electronic
information nows through society. Electronic government became a reality, with Americans
turning to thl! Internet to access agency resources. Massive quantities of information could. for
the first time, be exchanged among or within companies with the mere click of a computer
mouse. Previously unrelated data could also be compiled and compared with increasing ease by
both industry and the government. However, concerns arose about personal privacy and the·
possibility of damage resulting from flows of data within 1he government or within the private
sector. Surveys demonstrated that the loss of privacy resulting from the grov.1h in technology
was becoming a seno:us wony for many Americans.
Developing privacy policies for the Electronic Age emerged as a priority for the
Administration and for OMB, in pMticular. The core Administration philosophy on privacy for
the Information Age emphasized support for industry-led, self-regulatory approaches to
consumer privacy, These efforts focused on ensuring that consumers have notice about what
happens to ti:eir data and choice over limiting the use of personal data. At the same time~ there
was recognition by the Administration that some personal information is so sensitive that it
demands new legal protections. These areas include personal financial data, genetic information,
Social Security numbers, medicai records and protection of children on-line.
~ar1y Adm~~istration
Efforts.
, OMB played a central role ftom the start of the Administration in both framing this
philosophy and applying it to specific policy areas, OMS took the lead in framing infonnation
policy on the Information Infrastructure Task Force (!lTF) that grappled with policy on
electronic commerce and electronic government for the new Administration, 10 June of 199~,
96
�·
the IITF"s Privacy Working Group lssued a set of privacy principles that stressed notice and
choice for consumers' personal data in the information age. The report recognized the growing
ability of both the government and private sector to amass large quantities of personal
infonnation and to harness new technologies to use that data in unprecedented ways.
With these principles in mind, OMB led in drafting: the Benefit System Review Team's
January, t 997 report. which called for agencies to '\veigh the privacy risks of instituting newly
possible data matching atong with the efficiency gains. "Efficiency in information systems does
not necessarily come at the cost of privacy," they wrote in the report, "but traditional approaches
about how to protect individual privacy will need to be updated in light of new approaches to
data sharing." This call for balance by OMB continued through the end of the Administration.
with repeated efforts to ensure that the right benefits get to the right individuals - but without
significant individual privacy sacrifices. One key area where this has had an impact is in the use
of the ~ational Directory of New Hires. This database has been successful in helping to recovcr
child support debts of delinquent parents, but its use also raised privacy issues that were
addressed.
.
01'.1£1 also worked on broader privacy issues from early in the Administration. This
included, for example, helping to develop Health and Human Services recommendations to the
Congress in 1997 on legislation to protect the privacy of personal medical records, mandated
under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, These recommendations
then formed the basis for landmark medical privacy rules written undcr HIPAA after the
Congrt;:ss failed to pass protective legislation.
In 1998, OMB's role as the lead coordinating organization on privacy policy fully
emerged in the context of the Vice President's call for an "Electronic Bill of Rights." The Vice
President announced that OMS would gain new responsibilities to coordinate privacy policy for
the Administration. The move signaled a heightened recognition of the need for eonsi~1cnt
policy on pri vacy across the Federal Government and across jurisdictional areas.
Since this appointment, OMB has participated in a host of interagency efforts on privacy
policy. including work with the CIO Council (and its privacy subcommittee) and indi'vidual
departments, OMB officials have testified before Congressional panels on privacy Issues and
spoken before numerous government and industry conferences to raise awareness of privacy
issues and of Administration policy in this area.
Website Priv~~y Efforts.
OMB worked particularly hard to frame new policies governing privacy on Federal web~
sites - a rapidly expanding medium for public communication. Americans have legal privacy
protections stemming from the Privacy Act no matter how information is collected, be it on
paper or electronically. However, OMB recognized that the government had to take steps to
augment those legal safeguards with Federal policy on weo..site privacy, In t 999, OMB Director
Jack Lew issued a memorandum to agency heads, directing them to place privacy poJicies on the
main agency sites, major points of entry, and sites where substantial personal information is
collected. Each site . . vas required to clearly inform visitors what information is collected at the
97
�site, why the information is collected, and what the agency will do with it "We cannot realize
the full potential of the web," he told the agencies, "until people are confident we protect their
privacy when they visit our sites,"
A year later, in another memorandum, Director Lew expanded the protections that
agencies must provide for visitors to their sites. First, he announced the presumption that the
tracking technology "cookies" would not be used on Federal web sites except under limited
circumstances. Second, the memorandum stated that web sites must comply with the strict.
protective standards ofllie Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, even though the
law applies only to the private sector. Finally, the memorandum tied privacy protection to the
budget process by requiring that agencies include a description of their privacy practices with
their agency budget submissions.
Coordinat.!ng Broad Range ofJ)rivacy Initiatives,
OMS also has worked on behalf of the Administration to expand privacy safeguards in
other areas of government and the private sector, consistent with other important policy goals,
Among the most significant efforts have been coordinating or otherwise taking an important role
in developing privacy proposals in areas ranging from cyber~security to genetic privacy, Some
of the most important have been:
•
Coordinating the writing of the first...ever Federal medical privacy rules, under HIPPA, to
ensure that the most personal medical information of individuals is not released without
uuulCrrization, The rules were announced in draft in the fall of 1999 and went final a year
later. They give consumers more control over their records and set limits on the use of
their health information by others,
•
Issuing Executive Order 13145 to ban the use ofgenetic information in hiring decisions
in the Federal Government, and tailing to extend those privacy protections to the private
seetor through Federal legislation.
•
Helping to v.Tite a legislative proposal to boos.t privacy protections for consumer financial
infonnation. This proposal was announced by the President on April 30, 2000, and
introduced as H.R. 4380. It built on protections included in the landmark financial
modernization biH signed by the President in November 1999.
•
Working with the Justice Department and Treasury Department on a study to examine
privacy issues in bankruptcy, as a case study in how new issues have emerged regarding
the treatment of public records in the Electronic Age. The study was completed in the
fall of2000.
•
Coordinating the drafting ofan Administration legislative proposal to promote public
safety in cyberspace, alongside individual privacy. and to update laws for the Internet,
Age. This culminated in the introduction of the proposal us S. 3083. The legislation also
sought to harmonize the rules that apply to different technoJogies, such as telephones and
e-mail, so as to preserve fundamental privacy values in a time of technological change.
98
�•
Developing a new strategy to balance privacy. electronic commerce, and national security
in encryption policy, The updated guideiines were announced on September) 6, 1999.
•
Encouraging effective self~regulatory initiatives to promote on-line privacy and working
to frame the on~line network advertisers privacy principles. The network advertising
companies announced their principles. with Administration support, in July 0[2000, In
addition! there were strong signs that the self-regulatory approach was succeeding. While
only 14 percent ofcommercial wehsites had privacy policies posted in 1998. that figure
grew to 65 percent in 1999 and 88 percent a year later.
.
•
Working closely with the Department of Commerce on negotiations to develop the Safe
Harbor privacy pact with the European Union (EU), to bridge the different approaches to
privacy protection taken by the EV and the United States. The Safe Harbor \.\'as finalized
during the summer of 2000, and went into effect in November 2000,
•
Leading the Administration's legislative efforts to enact meaningful protections for
Social Security numbers, including a ban on their inappropriate sale or purchase. The
Administration proposal was introduced as the "Social Security Number Protection Act
of 2000."
Throughout these many initiatives, OMS worked hard to apply the core philosophy of
supporting scff~regulatory efforts to achieve meaningful privacy safeguards. but also pushing for
legal protections where most necessary and where the data involved were most sensitive. The
scope of OMS's role in developing, and coordinating, privacy policy for the Administration
certainly increased dram.atically over the eight years of the Adm.inistration. However, these
central~guiding principles ~emained consistent
�APPENDIX: SELECTED SUPPORTING MATERIAL
Introduction
.
•
.
FY 2001 Annual Performance Plan and FY 1999 Performance Report for the Office of
Management and Budget
.
Ensuring Fiscal Discipline
A typical budget season
•
•
•
•
•
FY 2001 Budget Decision Schedule
Memorandum for the President -- Preliminary FY 2000 Agency Funding Levels
Memorandum for the President - FY 2001 Budget Passback to Agencies
FY 2001 Budget - Agency Appeal Meeting
.
Memorandum for the President - FY 2001 Agericy Appeals Meeting
•
Representative Budget ~resentations to the President
The First Clinton Budget
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Memorandum for Heads of Agencies 93-05 - Testimony Before Congre~s on
Fiscal Year 1994 Budget Matters
OMB Bulletin No. 93-07 - Guidance on Preparation of the FY 1994 Budget
Testimony of Leon E. Panetta Before the Committee on the Budget, U.S. House
of Representatives
Office Memorandum 93-19 - Thank You (President's Budget FY 1994)
Memorandum for Heads of Agencies 93-06 - Additional Guidance on Preparation
of the FY 1994 Budget
Memorandum for Heads of Agencies 93-08 - Testimony Before Congress on the
FY 1994 Budget
Memorandum for Heads of Agencies 93-10 - Testimony Before Congress on the
FY 1994 Budget
The 1993 Budget deal
•
•
•
•
Bullets Highlighting Conference Action by Reconciliation Bill Title
Reconciliation Action By Title Table
Enrolled Bill HR 2264 - Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
Reducing the Deficit
A typical appropriations season
•
•
Appropriations Bill Tracking: Development of Letters and Statements of
Administration Policy
,
Sample Bills (Front Page Covers)·
�Government shutdovm
•
•
•
Memornndum for Heads of Agencies 95-16 - Planning in Light of Appropriations
Actions
Memorandum for Heads of Agencies 95-17 - Contingency Planning for Agency
Operations in Fiscal Year 1996
Memorandum for Heads of Agencies 95-18 - Agency Plans for Operations During
Funding Hiatus
•
Memorandum for the Director -- OMB Plan for Operations During Funding
•
Memorandum for Heads of Agencies 95-21 - Agency Plans for Operations During
Funding Hiatus
Memorandum for Heads of Agencies 96-01 - Planning for Agency Operations
:\1emorandum for Heads of Agencies 96-02 :. Planning for Age~cy Operations in
the Absence of Appropriatio!tS
,
.
Memorandum for Heads of Agencies 96-03 -Agency Operations in the Absence
of Appropriations
Memorandum for selected OMB staff -- Furlough Due to Lapse of Appropriations
Examples of Reduced Government Services
Memorandum for John Koskinen -- Pay Information
Memorandum for the Director -- Increasing Problems of a Continuing Shutdown
Hiatus
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
B.I.nced Budget Proposed for FY 1997
•
Testimony of Alice M. Rivlin Before the Committee on the Budget - United
States Senate (President's Budget for FY 1997)
The Balanced Budget Act and Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997
•
•
. Hipartisan Budget Agreement
Memof!IDdum for the President - Enrolled bill HR 2Q 14 - Taxpayer Relief Act of
1997
Memorandum for the President - Enrolled bill HR2015 - Balanced Budget Act of
1991
FY 1991 Omnibus Appropriations
•
•
•
Statement of Administration Policy - Department of Defense Appropriation:; !3ill;
FY 1997
Statement of Administration Policy - Department of the Interior and Related
Agencies Appropriations Bill, FY 1997
Letter.to the Honorable :vIark O. Hatfield from Jaeob j, Lew on the
Admini$tration's views on HR 3755, the Departments of Labor, Health and
. Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations BBI, FY 1997
II
•
�•
•
•
•
Letter to the Honorable Tom Harkin from Franklin D. Raines on the
Adminlstration>s views on the Departments of Labor, Health and Human
Services, Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill. FY 1997
Letter to the Honorable Ernest F. HoHings from Franklin D. Raines on the
Administration's views on the Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the
Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill. FY 1997
Letter to the Honorable Mark O. Hatfield from Franklin D. Raines on the
Administration's views on the Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government
Appropriations Bill, FY 1997
Letter to the Honorable Albert Gore from Franklin D. Raines on the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act
Line Item Veto
•
•
Testimony of Alice M. Rivlin, Director. Before the Senate COlI¥l1ittee on
Governmental Affairs and the House Conunittee on Government Reform and
Oversight
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Memorandum for the Presjdent - Follow·up on line Item Veto
First Budget Surplus Reported in a Generation
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Oral Testimony of Franklin D. Raines Before the committee on the Budget,
United States Senate ~ The President's proposed $1.7 trillion budget for fiscal
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Change in BaseHne Deficits Since Pre-OBRA
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Treasury News - Joint Statement of Robert E. Rubin !U1d Jacob J. Lew on Budget
Results for FY 1998
]999
FY 1999 Omnibus Appropriations
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Memorandum for the President - The FY 1999 Appropriations Process
'Memorandum for the President - Appropriations Update
Memorandum for the President - Appropriations Update
Memorandum for the President - FY 1999 Appropriations Negotiations
Letter to the Honorable Bob Livingston, from Jacob J. Lew on the
Administration's views on HR 41 04, the Treasury and General Government
Appropriations Bill, FY 1999
Letter to the: Honorable Bob Livingston, from Jacob J. Lew on the
Administration's viev,."s on HR 41 0I! the Agriculture) Rural Development, Food
and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, FY 1999
Letter to the Honorable Bob Livingston, from Jacob J. Lew on the
Administration's views on'the Commerce~ Justice, and State, the Judiciary~ and
Related Agencies Appropriations bill, FY 1999
Letter to the Honorable Bob Livingston, from Jacob 1 Lew on the
Administration's views on HR 4380 and S 2333, the District ofColumhia
Appropriations Bill, FY 1999 .
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Letter to the Honorable Ted Stevens, from Jacob 1. Lewan the Administration's
views on HR 4193 and S 2237, the Department of the Interior and Related
Agencies Appropriations Bill, FY 1999
Statement of Administration Poticy - HR 4274, Departments of Lahor, Health and
Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, FY 1999
Letter to the Honorable Bob Livingston, from Jacob J, Lewan the
Administration's views on HR 4328, the Department ofTransportation and
Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, FY 1999
,
Memorandum for the President - Final 1999 Appropriations Negotiations
Letter to the Honorable Albert Gore from Jacob}, Lew on tbe Balanced Budget
and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985
The Balanced Budget Refinement Ac-t
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Lettet to the Honorable Richard A, Gephardt - Balanced Budget Act Adjustment
Summary of the Balance Budget Refinement Act of 1999
Balanced Budget Refinement Act of 1999: Highlights (November 18, 1999)
FY 2000 Omnibus Appropriations
•
•
Memorandum for the President - FY 2000 Appropriations Update
Letter to the Honorable C.W. Bill Ymmg from Jacob J: Lew, on the
. Administration's views on the Commerce, Justice~ and State, the Judiciary, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, FY 2000
•
Memorandum for the President - FY 2000 Appropriations Update
•
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Meeting with the Democratic Congressional Leadership
Letter to· the Honorable C. W, Bill Young from Jacob J, Lew, Oil the
Administration's views on HR-2466, the Department of the Interior and Related
Agencies Appropriations bill, FY 2000
Memorandum for the President - FY 2000 Appropriations Update
Memorandum for the President - FY 2000 Appropriations Negotiations
Letter to the Honorable C. \V, Bill Young from Jacob 1, Lew, on the
Administration's views on HR 3037, the Labor, Health and Human Services, and
Education, and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, FY 2000
Letter to the Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison from Jacob J. Lew, on the District
of Columbia Appropriations Bill
Letter to the Honorable Richard A. Gephardt from Jacob 1. Lew, on HR 3196, the
revised Foreign Operations, Export Financing} and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 2000
Memorandum for the President - Final FY 2000 Appropriations Update
Lenet to the Honorable Ai Gore from Jacob J, Lew on separate appropriations and
pay-as-you-go reparts
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Improving lIow the Government Wor~
Government Perfonnance and Results Act
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Memorandum for Heads of Agencies 94-2 - Government perfonnance and Results
Act of 1993 (GPRA)
Memorandum for Heads of Agencies 94-11 - Pilot Projects under the Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA)
Memorandum· for Heads of Agencies 94-15 - Submission of Performance Plans
for Pilot Projects under PL. 103-62, The Government Performance and Results
Act of 1993 (GPRA)
Memorandum for Deputy Associate Directors -- GPRA Pilot Project Performance
Plans
Memorandwn for Heads of Agencies 94-32 - Submission ofFY 1995
Performance Plans for Pilot Projects under PL. 103-62, The Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA)
Memorandum for Heads of Agencies 95-05 - Submission ofFY 1996
Performance Plans for Pilot Projects under PL. 103-62, the Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA)
Memorandum for Heads of Agencies 95-01 - Submission of Nominations for
Managerial Accountability and Flexibility Pilot Projects under the Government
Performance and Results Act
Memorandum for Heads of Agencies -- Spring Review on Program Performance
Memorandum for Heads of Agencies 95-08 - Performance Partnerships
Memorandum for OMB Staff -- Selected Examples of Performance Measurement
Memorandum for Program Associate Directors -- Implementation of the
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA)
Memorandum for Heads of Agencies 96-26 - Exemptions for Selected Agencies
from Government Perfonnance and Results Act Requirements
Memorandum for Heads of Agencies 97-03 Supplement No.1 - Additional
Information on Congressional Consultation
Statement of Franklin D. Raines Before The Senate Appropriations and
Governmental Affairs Committees
Statement of Franklin D. Raines Before House Committee on Government
Reform and Oversight
Reinventing Government
•
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Testimony of OMB Director Leon E. Panetta - House Budget Committee to
discuss the National Performance Review
Testimony of OMB Director Leon E, Panetta - Subcommittee on Oversight,
House Ways and Means Committee to discuss the National Performance Review
Testimony of OMB Director Leon E, Panetta - Government Operations
.
Committee to discuss the National Performance Review
Testimony of Alice M. Rivlin, Director Before the Subcommittee on'Government
Management, Information and Technology Committee on Government Reform
and Oversight
v
�Regulatory Oversight and Executive Order 12866
•
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Executive Order 12&66 - Regulatory Planning and Review
The First Year of Executive Order No. 12866
Economic Analysis of Federal Regulations Under Executive Order 12866
Memorandwn for the Regulatory Working Group - Principles tor Risk Analysis
Memorandum for the Heads of Agencies ~~ Guidance for Implementing Executive
Order No. 12866
Priority Management Objectives
•
'Memorandum for the President ~ Priority Management Objectives
INFORMATlO:;
Year 2000 Preparations
•
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Getting Federal Computers Ready for 2000
Memorandwn for the President - The Year 2000 Problem
Statement of Jacob J, Lew~ Director Before the Committee on Appropriations and
The Senate Special Commiltee on the Year 2000 Technology Problem
En.'i-uring the Administration's Policy Agenda
Heallh Security Act
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Memorandum for the First Lady - Comments on the 816193 Draft of the Health
Care Reform Pion
Memorandwn for the First Lady - Comments on the 917193 Draft of the Health
Care Refonn Plan
Memorandum for Ira Magaziner -- Timetable for Budget Estimates
Testimony of Leon E. Panetta and Alice M. RivHn ~ Committee on Finance
United States Senate
.
Leon E. Panetta· Speecb to «Ie Center for National Policy
Welfare Reform
•
Statement of Administration Policy· S·1120 • Work Opportunity Act of 1995
•
Letter to the Honorable Bob Dole from Alice Rlvlin on Welfare Reform
-Letter to the Honorable Gerald BH Solomon from Alice Rivlin to transmit the
Administration's views on the actions that the House will. take to comply with
budget reconciliation instructions.
•
Letter to the Honorable Pete V. Dominici from Alice Rivlin to transmit the
Administration's views on the actions that the Senate committees have taken to
comply with budget reconciliation instructions
vi
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Letter to the Honorable Daniel Patrick Moynihan from Alice Rivlin on the impact
of the House and Senate welfare bills on children
Letter to the Honorable Sam Gibbons from Alice Rivlin on a preliminary
assessment of the potential poverty effects of the conference version of the
reconciliation bill and welfare reform bili
Letter to Newt Gingirch from Alice Rivlin on the Administration's "Work first
and personal Responsibility Act of 1996"
Potential Poverty and distributional Effects of Welfare Reform bills and Balanced
Budget Plans
•
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OMB and Foreign Policy
•
Memorandum for the President - Status of FY 2000 Colombia/Kosovo
Supplemental
Letter to U,e Honorable Thomas A. Daschle from Jacob J. Lew on the Byrd·
Warner Amendment
Memorandum fur the Pr~sident - Update on Africa Bombing Supplemental
McCaffrey note on additional Colombia funding
Memorandum for the President - Meeting \villi Secretary Cohen and Military
Chiefs to Discuss Defeose Budget
Memorandum for the President - Meeting with Congressional Leadership
Memorandum for the President - Emergency Funding Supplemental
Testimony of Jacob J, Lew, Director Before the U.S, Senate Appropriations
Committee
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Saving Socia1 Security First
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Testimony ofFranklin D, Raines) Director Beforc'the Task For~ on Social
Security, Committee on the Budget, U.S. Senate
Testimony ofJacob 1. Lew, Director Before the Committee on the Budget of the
U.S. Senate
Strengthening OMS
The Directors
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Nomination of Leon E. Panetta before the Committee on Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
Nomination of Franklin D, Raines before the Committee on Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
Nomination of Alice M. Rivlin before'the Committee on Governmental AtTairs
United Stutes Senate
Nomination of Jaeob J. Lew before the Committee 00 Governmental Affairs· United
States Seoat~
Creation of Health PAD
vii
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Health Care Package (Iable of Contents)
Organizational Change
•
PAD Health and PAD Human Resourccs- Next Steps
OMB2000
•
Office Memorandum 94--16 ~ Making OMB More Effective in Serving the Presidency
..
Testimony of Alice M. Rivlin Before the House Committee on Government
•
Oversight
GAO Report to Congressional Requesters - Changes Resulting From the OMS 2000
Reorganization
Management, Infonnation and Technology - Committee on Government Refonn and
The Federal fnteragency Task Force on the Distrlct ofCoJumbia
•
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:rvfemorandum for the President
Memorandum for the President - Restructuring Federal Assistance to the District of
Columbia '
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Memorandum for the President - Status of the National Capital Revitalization
an9
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Self Government Improvement Act
•
Testimony of Franklin D, Raines. Director Before the Committee on Government
Refonn and Oversightl Subconuniuee on the District of Columbia~ U.S, House of
Representatives on the President's National Capital Revitalization and Self
Government Improvement Plan
Memorandum for Attorney General Reno, Honorable Richard Riley} and the
Honorable David 1. Barrrun - Proposals for Phase II of the President's Plan
•
Privacy
•
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Selected Recent Privacy lnitiatives By The U,S. Federal Government
Memorandum for Heads of Agencies 99-18 - Privacy Policies on Federal Web Sites
Memorandum for Heads of Agencies 00-13 - Privacy Policies and Data CoHection on
Federal Web Sites
•
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Statement of John T, Spotila - Administrator1 Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs submitted to the Subcommittee on Government Management, information,
and Technology ~ Committee on Government Reform - United States House of
Representatives (5115100)
Statement for the Record· John I, Spotil•• Administrator, Office of Infonnatioo tUld
Regulatory Affairs submitted to the Subcommittee on Govemrnent Management
1
Information, and Technology
~
Commitlee on Government Reform - Cnited States
House of Representatives {51 I8100)
•
Statement of Sally Katzen ~ Deputy Director for Matlagement submitted to the
Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade~ and Consumer Protection - Committee
on Commerce· United States House ofRepresentatives (10111100)
vHi
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Clinton Administration History Project
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Cinton Administration History Project
Council of Economic Advisers
Department of Commerce
Central Intelligence Agency
Department of the Interior
Department of Defense
Corporation for National Service
Council on Environmental Quality
Department of Justice
Domestic Policy Council
Department of Education
Department of Energy
Environmental Protection Agency
Federal Emergency Management Agency
General Services Administration
Small Business Administration
Social Security Administration
United States Agency for International Development
National Economic Council
Office of Management & Budget
Office of National Drug Control Policy
Office of Personnel Management
Office of Science & Technology Policy
Office of the Vice President
United States Trade Representative
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The Clinton Administration History Project describes in detail the accomplishments of President Clinton's Administration for the period 1993-2001. The records consist of the histories of 32 agencies or departments within the Executive Branch. In general, each organization associated with the Project submitted a narrative history along with supporting documents. These narrative accounts are primarily overviews of the various missions, special projects, and accomplishments of the agencies. The supplementary records include substantive memos, press releases, briefing papers, and publications illustrated with photos and charts.</p>
<p>Agencies:<br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+of+the+Council+of+Economic+Advisers&range=&collection=21&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">History of the Council of Economic Advisers</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+of+the+Central+Intelligence+Agency&range=&collection=21&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">History of the Central Intelligence Agency</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+of+the+Department+of+Commerce&range=&collection=21&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">History of the Department of Commerce</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+of+the+Department+of+the+Interior&range=&collection=21&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">History of the Department of the Interior</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+of+the+Department+of+Defense&range=&collection=21&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">History of the Department of Defense</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+of+the+Corporation+for+National+Service&range=&collection=21&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">History of the Corporation for National Service</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+of+the+Council+on+Environmental+Quality&range=&collection=21&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">History of the Council on Environmental Quality</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+of+the+Department+of+Justice&range=&collection=21&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">History of the Department of Justice</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+of+the+Domestic+Policy+Council&range=&collection=21&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">History of the Domestic Policy Council</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+of+the+Department+of+Education&range=&collection=21&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">History of the Department of Education</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+of+the+Department+of+Energy&range=&collection=21&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">History of the Department of Energy</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+of+the+Environmental+Protection+Agency&range=&collection=21&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">History of the Environmental Protection Agency</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+of+the+Federal+Emergency+Management+Agency&range=&collection=21&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">History of the Federal Emergency Management Agency</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+of+the+General+Services+Administration&range=&collection=21&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">History of the General Services Administration</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+of+the+Department+of+Health+and+Human+Services&range=&collection=21&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">History of the Department of Health and Human Services</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+of+the+Department+of+Housing+and+Urban+Development&range=&collection=21&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">History of the Department of Housing and Urban Development</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+of+the+Department+of+Labor&range=&collection=21&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">History of the Department of Labor</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+of+the+National+Economic+Council&range=&collection=21&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">History of the National Economic Council</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+of+the+Office+of+Management+and+Budget&range=&collection=21&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">History of the Office of Management and Budget</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+of+the+Office+of+National+Drug+Control+Policy&range=&collection=21&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">History of the Office of National Drug Control Policy</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+of+the+Office+of+Personnel+Management&range=&collection=21&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">History of the Office of Personnel Management</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+of+the+Office+of+Science+and+Technology+Policy&range=&collection=21&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">History of the Office of Science and Technology Policy</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+of+the+Office+of+the+Vice+President&range=&collection=21&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">History of the Office of the Vice President</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+of+the+Small+Business+Administration&range=&collection=21&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">History of the Small Business Administration</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+of+the+Social+Security+Administration&range=&collection=21&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">History of the Social Security Administration</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+of+the+Department+of+State&range=&collection=21&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">History of the Department of State</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+of+the+Department+of+Transportation&range=&collection=21&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">History of the Department of Transportation</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+of+the+Department+of+the+Treasury&range=&collection=21&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">History of the Department of the Treasury</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+of+the+United+States+Agency+for+International+Development&range=&collection=21&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">History of the United States Agency for International Development</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+of+the+United+States+Department+of+Agriculture&range=&collection=21&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">History of the United States Department of Agriculture</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+of+the+United+States+Trade+Representative&range=&collection=21&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">History of the United States Trade Representative</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+of+the+Department+of+Veterans+Affairs&range=&collection=21&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">History of the Department of Veterans Affairs</a></p>
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36051">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Format
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Adobe Acrobat Document
Extent
The size or duration of the resource.
1474 folders in 111 boxes
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
[Office of Management & Budget – Official History, 1993-2001]
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
History of the Office of Management and Budget
Clinton Administration History Project
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Box 44
<a href="http://clintonlibrary.gov/assets/Documents/Finding-Aids/Systematic/Administration-History-finding-aid.pdf">Collection Finding Aid</a>
<a href="http://catalog.archives.gov/id/1504319">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Format
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Adobe Acrobat Document
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Medium
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Reproduction-Reference
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
6/24/2011
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
1504319-office-of-management-budget-official-history-1993-2001
1504319