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Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
001a. memo
Anthony Lake to President William J. Clinton re: Your Meeting with
Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev (2 pages)
03/24/1993
Pl/b(l)
00lb. briefing
paper
Meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev (4 pages)
03/24/1993
Pl/b(l), P5
001c. memo
Warren Christopher to President William J. Clinton re: Meeting with
Foreign Minister Kozyrev of the Russian Federation (3 pages)
03/22/1993
Pl/b(l), P5
00Id. talking
points
Points to be Made for Meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Andrey
Kozyrev (7 pages)
ca.
03/24/1993
Pl/b(l), P5
001 e. report
U.S. Government Report (2 pages)
2/28/1992
Pl/b(l)
00If. report
U.S. Government Report (1 page)
06/02/1992
Pl/b(l)
00 Ig. report
U.S. Government Report (2 pages)
06/12/1992
Pl/b(l), P6/b(6)
OOlh. report
U.S. Government Report (1 page)
n.d.
Pl/b(l)
002a. briefing
paper
Meeting with Russian Constitutional Court Chairman Valeriy Zorkin
(2 pages)
03/15/1993
Pl/b(l), P5
002b. talking
points
Points to be Made for Meeting with Russian Constitutional Court
Chairman Valeriy Zorkin (1 page)
ca.
03/15/1993
Pl/b(l), P5
002c. letter
Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President William J. Clinton (2
pages)
03/11/1993
Pl/b(l)
U.S. Government Report (2 pages)
02/16/1993
Pl/b(l)
002d. report
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Press (Philip J. (PJ) Crowley)
OA/Box Number:
3106
FOLDER TITLE:
Russia [6]
20II-0516-S
kh640
RESTRICTION CODES
Prcsidcnlial Records Acl -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
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I'2
P3
P4
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of gift.
PRM. Personal record misflle defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
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�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
001a. memo
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Anthony Lake to President William J. Clinton re: Your Meeting with
Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev (2 pages)
03/24/1993
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Press (Philip J. (PJ) Crowley)
OA/Box Number 3106
FOLDER TITLE:
Russia [6]
201 1-05 16-S
kh640
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA)
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA|
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA)
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA|
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an agency 1(b)(2) of the FOI A|
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the FOIA|
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) of the FOIA|
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) of the FOIA)
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfilc defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
001b. briefing
paper
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev (4 pages)
03/24/1993
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l), P5
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Press (Philip J. (PJ) Crowley)
OA/Box Number:
3106
FOLDER TITLE:
Russia [6]
201 I-0516-S
kh640
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - (44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - |S U.S.C. 552(b)]
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA)
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA]
V3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA|
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA)
1 6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
*
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the FOI A]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfilc defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
001c. memo
SU BJECT/TITLE
DATE
Warren Christopher to President William J. Clinton re: Meeting with
Foreign Minister Kozyrev of the Russian Federation (3 pages)
03/22/1993
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l), P5
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Press (Philip J. (PJ) Crowley)
OA/Box Number: 3106
FOLDER TITLE:
Russia [6]
201 I-0516-S
kh640
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(I) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) of the FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA)
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfilc defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
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�T a l k i n g Points
Summit Issues
Economic Issues
Importance of the economic agenda
A s s i s t a n c e t o Russia
U.S. B i l a t e r a l A s s i s t a n c e
G-7 A s s i s t a n c e f o r Russia
S e c u r i t y Issues
N o r t h Korean Withdrawal from
ABM T r e a t y
Nuclear T e s t i n g
F o r e i g n P o l i c y Issues
Bosnia
Somalia
Georgia
I r a q and I r a n
Ukraine
NPT
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
00Id. talking
points
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Points to be Made for Meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Andrey
Kozyrev (7 pages)
ca.
03/24/1993
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l), P5
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Press (Philip J. (PJ) Crowley)
OA/Box Number:
3106
FOLDER TITLE:
Russia [6]
2011-0516-S
kh640
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - (5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA)
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA)
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA)
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfilc defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�PRESS GUIDANCE ON RUSSIA
Maior Points t o Make on U.S.
Position
1)
U.S. supports h i s t o r i c movement toward democratic
and market economic reform i n Russia;
political
2)
Y e l t s i n i s the leader of t h a t process--a d e m o c r a t i c a l l y e l e c t e d n a t i o n a l leader, and f i r s t i n a thousand years of
Russian h i s t o r y ;
3)
Y e l t s i n has U.S. support, as do h i s reform government and
a l l reformers throughout Russia;
4)
Russia i n g r i p s of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s .
Y e l t s i n proposes to break the logjam by l e t t i n g the Russian
people decide on A p r i l 2 5 - - t h a t i s a p p r o p r i a t e i n a
democracy;
5)
Our i n t e r e s t i s to see t h i s process u n f o l d p e a c e f u l l y .
Encouraged t h a t government w i l l defend c i v i l l i b e r t i e s ,
continue economic reform, continue f o r e i g n p o l i c y
cooperation.
6)
U.S. and a l l i e s committed t o support reform-- through
concerted G-7 e f f o r t s on an economic package;
7)
Bottom l i n e :
1) U.S. i n t e r e s t s i n more secure w o r l d
(through fewer nukes), c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h Russia on r e g i o n a l
c r i s e s , and f u t u r e economic c o o p e r a t i o n - - a l l best served by
reform; and 2) Russia i s and must remain a democracy--that
is basis f o r continued U.S.-Russian p a r t n e r s h i p , and f o r a
b e t t e r and more prosperous f u t u r e f o r Russian people.
Questions and Answers
Summi t
Q:
Russia's Dep. Prime M i n i s t e r (Fyodorov) s a i d today the
summit should be moved t o Moscow. W i l l you go t h e r e i n s t e a d
of Vancouver?
A:
Looking f o r w a r d t o seeing President Y e l t s i n . S t i l l p l a n n i n g
on Vancouver and have heard n o t h i n g o f f i c i a l from the
Russian government. I f they want t o change the s i t e , w e ' l l
c e r t a i n l y discuss i t .
Q:
CNN
A:
I t ' s r i g h t on schedule.
Q:
Would you meet Rutskoi and
i s r e p o r t i n g the summit may
Looking
be delayed?
forward t o seeing
Yeltsin.
Khasbulatov i f you go t o Moscow?
�A:
Right: now scheduled f o r Vancouver f o r a summit between two
heads of s t a t e - t h e usual p r a c t i c e .
Can't comment on Moscow
because we haven't g o t a request t o go t h e r e .
Q:
W i l l there be a G-7 Summit i n Moscow i n s t e a d of your
b i l a t e r a l meeting?
A:
We t h i n k i t i s important f o r us t o meet w i t h Y e l t s i n
b i l a t e r a l l y . We have a l o t t o discuss. A G-7 summit would
only be h e l p f u l i f i t was c a r e f u l l y prepared and produced
concrete economic package f o r Russia.
U.S. Support f o r Y e l t s i n
Q:
Aren't you making t h e same mistake Bush made w i t h Gorbachev
by your support of Y e l t s i n now?
A:
Two s i t u a t i o n s are e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t .
Back then, was a choice between a S o v i e t leader (Gorbachev)
and a democrat ( Y e l t s i n ) .
Now. Y e l t s i n i_s most i m p o r t a n t reform leader and
d e m o c r a t i c a l l y - e l e c t e d President of Russia.
Opposition
i n c l u d e s many opposed t o reform.
He i s leading reform movement t h a t we support - f u t u r e o f
democracy and f r e e markets.
Bumpy as i t i s , the reform movement has made progress -- f o r
example, i n p r i v a t i z i n g thousands o f i n d u s t r i e s and i n
c r e a t i n g thousands of p r i v a t e farms.
No q u e s t i o n U.S. i n t e r e s t s are best served ( n u c l e a r
r e d u c t i o n s , f o r e i g n p o l i c y c o o p e r a t i o n , economic
p a r t n e r s h i p ) by our r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Y e l t s i n ' s reform
government.
Would remind you t h a t a l l o t h e r major c o u n t r i e s --Germany,
UK, Japan, France, take same p o s i t i o n as we do.
Q:
Was Christopher s i g n a l l i n g a backing o f f from U.S. support
of Y e l t s i n by emphasizing importance o f c i v i l l i b e r t i e s i n
this crisis?
A;
We support Y e l t s i n . We a l s o support c i v i l l i b e r t i e s -freedom o f speech, press, assembly -- f o r Russian people.
Y e l t s i n has pledged t o defend those r i g h t s .
Q:
What i f Y e l t s i n f a l l s ?
successors?
A:
I t h i n k reform w i l l succeed i n Russia. Look forward t o
working c l o s e l y w i t h Y e l t s i n b r i n g democracy and free
markets t o Russia.
Q:
Aren't you making contingency
I s U.S. p o s i t i o n e d t o work w i t h h i s
plans t o d e a l w i t h
Rutskoi?
�A:
Wouldn't be h e l p f u l t o d i s c u s s c o n t i n g e n c i e s or d a i l y
p o l i t i c a l maneuvers as the s i t u a t i o n u n f o l d s .
Q:
Do you t h i n k our support helps or h u r t s Y e l t s i n ?
A:
Y e l t s i n and the reform movement have our support and t h a t of
whole w o r l d - - a l l those who b e l i e v e m democratic f u t u r e .
U.S. P o s i t i o n on Russia's P o l i t i c a l
Crisis
Q:
Do you t h i n k Y e l t s i n a c t e d w i t h i n C o n s t i t u t i o n
for "Special Rule"?
in calling
A:
I'm not going t o be the judge of t h a t - - t h a t i s f o r Russians
to decide. I do know t h a t he's asking the people t o decide
t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c r i s i s - - t h a t i s normal i n a democracy,
and a p p r o p r i a t e .
Q:
Do you t h i n k Y e l t s i n w i l l be impeached?
A:
I'm not a soothsayer.
No one can p r e d i c t events t h e r e .
Looking forward t o c o n t i n u i n g t o work w i t h Y e l t s i n .
Q:
Aren't you t a k i n g sides by open support f o r Y e l t s i n ?
A:
We support the Y e l t s i n government and work w e l l w i t h i t , b u t
have no d e s i r e t o i n t e r f e r e i n Russia's i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s .
U.S./Western Assistance
Q:
I f Russia's so i m p o r t a n t , why have you c a l l e d f o r o n l y $700
m i l l i o n i n U.S. a i d next year?
A:
We are committed
t o doing e v e r y t h i n g we can t o h e l p :
1) I w i l l present a U.S. b i l a t e r a l a i d package a t our summit
t h a t focusses on help f o r r e f o r m . I haven't y e t decided on
the e n t i r e package b u t am d i s c u s s i n g i t i n t e n s i v e l y w i t h my
own e x p e r t s , and look f o r w a r d t o c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h
Congress.
2) I've also c a l l e d f o r G-7 t o combine e f f o r t s by April/May
t o produce a much l a r g e r economic package of support f o r
Russia.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
00 le. report
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
U.S. Government Report (2 pages)
12/28/1992
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Press (Philip J. (PJ) Crowley)
OA/Box Number: 3106
FOLDER TITLE:
Russia [6]
2011-0516-5
kh640
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)l
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 5S2(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA)
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA)
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA)
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfilc defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
001 f. report
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
U.S. Government Report (1 page)
06/02/1992
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Press (Philip J. (PJ) Crowley)
OA/Box Number:
3106
FOLDER TITLE:
Russia [6]
2011-0516-S
kh640
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - |S U.S.C. SS2(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) of the FOIA|
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfilc defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
00Ig. report
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
U.S. Government Report (2 pages)
06/12/1992
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(I),P6/b(6)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Press (Philip J. (PJ) Crowley)
OA/Box Number: 3106
FOLDER TITLE:
Russia [6]
2011-0516-S
kh640
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - |5 U.S.C. S52(b)|
PI
P2
P3
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�THE WHITE HOUSE
O f f i c e of t h e Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
March 24, 1993
REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
IN PHOTO OPPORTUNITY WITH FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV
The Oval O f f i c e
1:10 P.Sfi. EST'
Q
W i l l you answer a couple of questions? Do you have
any r e a c t i o n t o what Mr. Kozyrev suggested t h i s morning as t o the
f u t u r e economic r e l a t i o n s between us and Russia?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we haven't had a conversation
about i t y e t . Let me j u s t say t h a t I'm d e l i g h t e d t o have him here.
I'm glad t o have a f i r s t h a n d account o f what's going on i n Russia.
And I want t o r e a f f i r m my support f o r democracy and f o r reform, and
say I'm l o o k i n g very much forward t o t h e Vancouver summit w i t h
President Y e l t s i n .
Russia.
aid?
Q
Mr. President, apparently you seem t o oppose a i d i n g
What w i l l you do t o t r y t o s e l l your program f o r Russian
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I would t e l l t h e American people
what I've been saying f o r w e l l over a year now, t h a t i t i s very much
i n our i n t e r e s t t o keep Russia a democracy, t o keep moving toward
market reforms and t o keep moving toward reducing the nuclear t h r e a t .
I t w i l l save t h e American people b i l l i o n s of d o l l a r s i n money we
don't have t o spend maintaining a nuclear arsenal, i f we can continue
t o denuclearize t h e world. I t w i l l make the American people b i l l i o n s
of d o l l a r s i n f u t u r e trade o p p o r t u n i t i e s , and i t w i l l make t h e world
a safer place.
So, I t h i n k t h i s i s a good investment f o r America. I've
always believed t h a t . And I hope I can persuade t h e American people
and t h e United States Congress t h a t i t i s .
Q
Do you t h i n k there's s t i l l a chance f o r a
compromise i n Russia?
THE PRESIDENT: That's something t h e Russians w i l l have
to work out among themselves. I presume there i s , b u t t h a t ' s
obviously something t h a t has t o be decided by t h e Russian people.
The United States can't d i c t a t e t h a t .
Q
Mr. Kozyrev, can you t e l l us, d i d t h e meetings go
poorly t h i s morning, because i t seems as though t h e l i n e was harder
when they came out from those meetings.
FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV: — ( i n a u d i b l e ) — w e l l , I
t h i n k t h e people w i l l pass f i n a l judgment. As President j u s t said,
i t i s f o r Russians and Russian people t o pass f i n a l judgment and
President c a l l s f o r vote, popular vote. And I t h i n k t h i s w i l l be the
decisive event. But on t h e — , President as always, i s open t o
compromise where there are those p o l i t i c a l forces who are not apt t o
j u s t reverse t h e reform and advance the democracy.
Q
W i l l you support t h e idea of Russia j o i n i n g G-7 as
soon as possible.
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�- 2 -
THE PRESIDENT: I wouldn't r u l e out or i n anything
p a r t i c u l a r . We're going t o be dealing w i t h a whole broad range of
issues between the United States and Russia and w i t h the G-7.
And
l e t ' s j u s t see what happens.
Q
You wouldn't r u l e i t out?
THE PRESS: Thank you.
END
^
1:15 P.M.
EST
�THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
March 23,
1993
PRESS CONFERENCE BY THE PRESIDENT
The East Room
1:02
P.M.
EST
THE PRESIDENT: Good afternoon. Before taking your
questions today I would l i k e to speak very b r i e f l y about some foreign
and domestic issues.
F i r s t , I want to r e i t e r a t e that the United States
supports the h i s t o r i c movement toward democratic p o l i t i c a l reform in
Russia. President Y e l t s i n i s the leader of that process. He i s a
democratically-elected national leader; indeed, the f i r s t
democratically-elected president in a thousand years of Russian
history. He has United States support, as do h i s reformed government
and a l l reformers throughout Russia.
At t h i s moment, Russia i s in a constitutional and
p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s . President Y e l t s i n proposes to break the logjam by
l e t t i n g the people of Russia decide on A p r i l 25th. That i s an
appropriate step in a democracy. Our i n t e r e s t i s to see that t h i s
process unfolds peacefully.
We're encouraged that President Y e l t s i n i s committed to
defend c i v i l l i b e r t i e s , to continue economic reform, to continue
foreign policy cooperation toward a peaceful world. Russia i s — and
must remain — a democracy. Democratic reform in Russia i s the basis
for a better future for the Russian people, for continued United
States-Russian partnership, and for the hopes of a l l humanity for a
more peaceful and secure world.
The United States has great r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s abroad and
at home. To meet these r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , we must not only continue
to support reform and change abroad, but also the r e v i t a l i z a t i o n of
our economy here at home. We need to fundamentally change as our
times require i t .
On February 17th, I offered an economic plan to provide
for that kind of fundamental change. Just f i v e days ago the House of
Representatives took a giant step toward breaking the logjam and the
gridlock here i n Washington i n approving the economic plan. And in
j u s t one or two days, the Senate w i l l have the opportunity to
demonstrate that i t , too, has heard the people's c a l l for change.
Make no mistake about i t — our people, too, have demanded a new
direction i n our economy: cutting the d e f i c i t , investing i n our
people, and creating h i g h - s k i l l , high-wage jobs for working men and
women and for our children.
Our plan does reduce the federal d e f i c i t now by about
$500 b i l l i o n over the next five years. And, j u s t as important, i t
w i l l grow the economy by investing in our people, t h e i r s k i l l s , t h e i r
technological future, t h e i r health, and by offering new incentives
for businesses to create jobs.
In helping the economy to create millions of new jobs,
the great majority of them in private business, we are building the
foundations of a future prosperity — from world-class transportation
and communication networks, to safer s t r e e t s and smarter schools.
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Each of these elements — reducing the d e f i c i t , asking the wealthy t o
pay t h e i r f a i r share, i n v e s t i n g i n the f u t u r e , and c r e a t i n g jobs —
w i l l work as a package; and Congress should pass the package.
Just as the best s o c i a l program i s a job, the best
d e f i c i t reduction program i s a growing economy. This plan sets our
country on a new course that honors our oldest values; moving away
from gridlock to action, away from a government that serves only
privileged i n t e r e s t s to a government that serves the public i n t e r e s t ;
away from paying for the mistakes of the past and the expediencies of
the present toward investing i n the needs of the future.
The work has only begun. The Vice President i s heading
our e f f o r t t o r e i n v e n t government. C u t t i n g back programs t h a t don't
work or whose work i s already done, we're going t o do what the
smartest companies have already done i n our country: streamline our
operations, e l i m i n a t e w a s t e f u l l e v e l s of management, and empower our
f r o n t l i n e workers t o take i n i t i a t i v e and t o take us on a b e t t e r
course. We're going t o make government less expensive and more
effective.
And as we pursue fundamental change i n our economy, our
h e a l t h care system and our schools, we w i l l ask a l l our people t o do
their part.
The change the American people voted f o r i s now
beginning. We have a r a r e moment i n Washington's h i s t o r y when
people's voices are being heard, and a r a r e o p p o r t u n i t y t o get t h i n g s
done. With the continued involvement of our people and the support
of Congress, we can d e l i v e r the changes the people demand here a t
home. We can give the country the best years i t has ever had, and we
can have the United States s t i l l on the side of freedom and democracy
and market reform around the world. Those are the o b j e c t i v e s of t h i s
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ; and I ' l l be glad t o answer your questions.
Helen.
Q
Mr. President, would you be w i l l i n g t o h o l d the
summit meeting i n Moscow i f i t would be best f o r President Y e l t s i n ' s
p o l i t i c a l health? Have you spoken t o President Y e l t s i n ? And don't
you t h i n k t h a t i f you d i d go t o Moscow, i t would engage the U.S. too
c l o s e l y i n the power s t r u g g l e i n the c a p i t a l ?
THE PRESIDENT: You've got me on both sides of the issue
before I even s t a r t e d . Well, l e t me say: f i r s t , I have not t a l k e d
to President Y e l t s i n , but I have sent him two l e t t e r s — one i n
response t o h i s statement, and the other, of course, a l e t t e r of
condolence on h i s mother's death. I am going t o meet i n the morning
w i t h Foreign M i n i s t e r Kozyrev t o get a d i r e c t f i r s t - h a n d a p p r a i s a l of
where we are, a f t e r which i t might be a p p r o p r i a t e f o r us t o have a
telephone conversation. But I thought I should have the Kozyrev
meeting f i r s t .
As of t h i s time, we have not received any i n d i c a t i o n s
t h a t the Russians, s p e c i f i c a l l y President Y e l t s i n and h i s government,
have any d e s i r e t o change the s i t e of the meeting or the time. So we
are working very hard; indeed, I'm going t o have a long session
t o n i g h t t o t r y t o prepare f o r the summit a t the a p p r o p r i a t e date i n
Vancouver. I w i l l spend — I expect t o spend a good deal of time
t h i s week c o n s u l t i n g w i t h the congressional leaders of both p a r t i e s
and others who might have ideas about what we ought t o put i n our
package. And I i n t e n d t o go t h e r e w i t h an aggressive and q u i t e
s p e c i f i c plan f o r American p a r t n e r s h i p . So t h a t ' s where we are now.
Q
Are you going t o go t o Moscow i f i t was c a l l e d for?
THE PRESIDENT:
express an i n t e r e s t i n t h a t ,
would have t o consider. But
were some conversations t h i s
Well, l e t me say t h i s . I f they were t o
then i t ' s obviously something t h a t we
t h a t has not been done y e t . And t h e r e
morning between the Secretary of State
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�- 3-
and Mr. Kozyrev — t h a t has not been done y e t . I f t h a t were t o
happen, then we would cross t h a t bridge when we come t o i t .
Q
Mr. President, what would t h e U.S. p o l i c y be i f the
Soviet l e g i s l a t u r e votes t o impeach Mr. Y e l t s i n , as appears
i n c r e a s i n g l y l i k e l y ? Would you continue t o view Mr. Y e l t s i n as t h e
duly e l e c t e d leader o f Russia?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I view him as such now. He i s the
only person who has been elected. The others are preceding under a
constitution that goes back to the communist era. What I would do
under those circumstances, I don't want to speculate about.
This i s another one o f those — f i r s t o f a l l , l e t me
say, we have t o appreciate, I t h i n k , the unique character o f t h e
events going on i n Russia. I t i s a Russian experience. I , myself,
have been, I t h i n k , i n a way, most i n t e r e s t e d by t h e t e l e v i s i o n
i n t e r v i e w s o f the people i n the s t r e e t i n Russia — you know, j u s t
t a l k i n g about i t , they sound almost l i k e our people might sound
t a l k i n g about some f i g h t we were having here. They've been
remarkably level-headed about i t and o f d i f f e r e n t opinions,
obviously.
I t h i n k we j u s t have t o l e t t h i s play out. I don't want
t o speculate about what the p o s i t i o n o f the United States would be i n
a hypothetical s i t u a t i o n .
Q
Mr. President, have you received any assurances
about t h e command and c o n t r o l o f Russian nuclear weapons i n t h i s
crisis?
THE PRESIDENT: We are monitoring t h a t very c l o s e l y , and
we w i l l continue t o monitor t h a t very c l o s e l y . At the present time,
we have no reason t o be concerned t h a t t h e command and c o n t r o l
procedures t h a t are appropriate have been i n t e r r u p t e d or face any
imminent t h r e a t o f i n t e r r u p t i o n . We f e e l good about i t a t t h i s time,
and we w i l l continue t o monitor i t c l o s e l y .
Q
Mr. President, I wonder what your view o f t h e
American p o s s i b i l i t i e s are. How do you see the U.S. r o l e ? Can t h e
U.S. play a d e c i s i v e r o l e , or are we r e a l l y j u s t u l t i m a t e l y
bystanders?
THE PRESIDENT: I t h i n k somewhere i n between. I t h i n k
i n the end the Russian people w i l l have t o resolve t h i s f o r
themselves, and I hope t h e y ' l l be given the o p p o r t u n i t y t o do t h a t i n
some appropriate fashion. I'm not sure t h a t — I have only the same
access i n a way t h a t you do i n terms o f a l l t h e p o s s i b l e developments
t h a t are i n the a i r . I do not b e l i e v e t h a t we can be d e c i s i v e i n t h e
sense t h a t we can determine the course o f events i n Russia o r ,
f r a n k l y , i n the other r e p u b l i c s o f the former Soviet Union, which we
also have a deep i n t e r e s t . But I do b e l i e v e t h a t we are n o t
bystanders.
For one t h i n g , I don't t h i n k t h a t t h i s country can do
what i t needs t o do i n any acceptable time frame i n moving t o a
successful economy unless we move t o a c t across a whole broad range
of areas. And over the next few days, I should have more t o say
about t h a t as I work hard on t h i s package.
Q
Mr. President, t h e former Secretary o f State, Dick
Cheney, and t h e Chairman o f t h e Senate Armed Services Committee, Sam
Nunn have both suggested t h a t your proposed Pentagon budget cuts
would perhaps be i n a p p r o p r i a t e a t t h i s time o f u n c e r t a i n t y i n Russia
and elsewhere around the world. Are you t a k i n g another look a t a l l
of those cuts t o perhaps r e v i s i t the whole issue?
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�- 4-
THE PRESIDENT: I'm not taking another look at the cuts
at t h i s time. Let me remind you that, b a s i c a l l y , I think we have
s t i l l presented a responsible defense budget. But what I am doing i s
trying to make sure that we can f u l f i l l the missions that we have to
f u l f i l l based on any projected developments within the confines of
that budget as i t ' s staged over the next f i v e years. And we'll be
able to constantly review that. Obviously, these budgets are passed
every year for f i v e years i n the future. And I expect to whatever
extent the world i s uncertain, we'll have to be more v i g i l a n t i n
reviewing what our commitments are.
Q
Mr. President, you've made c l e a r t h a t you support
both Russian reform and Y e l t s i n as the embodiment o f t h a t reform
movement. But i f President Y e l t s i n i s removed e i t h e r
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y o r u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y , would i t a f f e c t the package
of a i d , both the s i z e and the s p e c i f i c package t h a t the United States
would o f f e r Russia w i t h o u t a President Y e l t s i n ? Should t h e
conservatives, the n a t i o n a l i s t s i n the Parliament be on n o t i c e t h a t
i t could a f f e c t the k i n d o f a i d we'd c o n t r i b u t e ?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, l e t me say, again, I don't want t o
get i n t o h y p o t h e t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s because I don't want anything I say
or do t o e i t h e r undermine or r i g i d i f y the s i t u a t i o n t h e r e . I mean,
t h i s i s something the Russians are going t o have t o develop.
The United States has t h r e e i n t e r e s t s i n our cooperation
w i t h Russia. One i s t o make the world a s a f e r place, t o continue t o
reduce the t h r e a t o f nuclear war, and the p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f nuclear
weapons. Two i s t o support the development o f democracy and freedom
f o r the people o f Russia; i t i s a vast and great country and, indeed,
f o r a l l o f the Commonwealth o f Independent States. And t h r e e i s t o
support the development o f a market economy. At every step along t h e
way, w i t h o r w i t h o u t President Y e l t s i n i n a u t h o r i t y , from now — I
suppose u n t i l t h e end o f time or a t l e a s t f o r the foreseeable f u t u r e ,
the United States w i l l have those i n t e r e s t s , and we w i l l be guided by
those i n t e r e s t s .
Q
Mr. President, you seem t o be having some
d i f f i c u l t y w i t h the Pentagon. When you went t o the USS Theodore
Roosevelt, t h e s a i l o r s there were mocking you before your a r r i v a l ,
even though you are the Commander-in-Chief. The s e r v i c e s have been
u n d e r c u t t i n g your proposal f o r p e r m i t t i n g gays t o be i n the m i l i t a r y .
There's been no Pentagon c r e a t i o n o f the task f o r c e t h a t was supposed
to be created. The hearings are t o s t a r t a week from now, and
Congress has n o t g o t t e n any advice from the Pentagon o r from t h e
services as t o what t o propose. Do you have a problem, perhaps
because o f your l a c k o f m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e , or perhaps because o f
issues such as gays i n the m i l i t a r y , i n being e f f e c t i v e i n your r o l e
as Commander-in-Chief, and what do you propose t o do about i t ?
THE PRESIDENT: No. No, I don't have a problem being
Commander-in-Chief. You knew t h a t a l o t o f the s e r v i c e o f f i c e r s
disagreed w i t h the p o s i t i o n on gays i n the m i l i t a r y before I ever
took o f f i c e . The Secretary o f Defense has not been i n the best o f
h e a l t h ; I t h i n k he i s e i t h e r f u l l y recovered now or on the verge o f
i t . And I asked him t o give me a r e p o r t on June 15th. Senator Nunn
said back i n January t h a t he would have hearings sometime probably i n
March, so I t h i n k we're a t the outer l i m i t s o f t h e time t h a t he was
going t o have hearings. And h i s schedule t o have hearings, i n my
view, has nothing t o do w i t h the f a c t t h a t I asked the Secretary o f
Defense t o present t o me on June 15th a r e p o r t which I expect t o
receive.
Q
Can I f o l l o w , s i r ? The task f o r c e was supposed t o
be created by now, t h e Pentagon has not created t h e task f o r c e , and
there has been no r e p o r t t o the H i l l . And, i n f a c t , Senator Nunn has
i n d i c a t e d t h a t he t h i n k s some o f the compromises t h a t might have been
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possible, such as not having gays to go sea or be i n combat are not
constitutional. Does that give you cause?
THE PRESIDENT:
Q
Not constitutional?
Would not pass constitutional muster.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't want to get into a
constitutional debate, but i f you can discriminate against people in
terms of whether they get into the service or not based on not what
they are but what they say they are, then I would think you could
make appropriate d i s t i n c t i o n s on duty assignments once they're i n .
The courts have h i s t o r i c a l l y given quite wide berth to the m i l i t a r y
to make judgments of that kind i n terms of duty assignments.
Q
Mr. President, on another topic, you've l a i d out
some of the c r i t e r i a you're going to use to choose the next Supreme
Court j u s t i c e : a fine mind, experience in the law, experience
dealing with people and a big heart. Does Governor Mario Cuomo f i t
that c r i t e r i a , and do you think that he would make a good Supreme
Court j u s t i c e ?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I'm on record on that, but the
l a s t time I said i t , he wound up in the midst of a l o t of
conversation that I don't think either he or I intended.
I w i l l stay
with my c r i t e r i a , I w i l l make the appointment as soon as I reasonably
can. J u s t i c e White, I think, tendered h i s l e t t e r at t h i s time before
the end of t h i s term of Court in order to give me a s i g n i f i c a n t
amount of time to make a judgment. This i s a very busy time around
here, as you know, because of a l l the foreign and domestic
a c t i v i t i e s , but I intend to spend a l o t of time on that.
Yes?
Q
Mr. President, aides suggest that you've made a
preliminary decision to remove William Sessions, the FBI Director,
from o f f i c e , you're only waiting for a recommendation from Janet
Reno. Can you deny that?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, that's not correct. I've not had a
decision about that. I have asked Janet Reno to look at i t . My
review of the Director and the issues surrounding h i s appointment i s
largely confined to what has already been i n the press. And I want
to wait u n t i l — I wanted to wait u n t i l I had an Attorney General and
u n t i l she could make a review. I have not made a decision, and I am
going to wait for her judgment on i t .
Q
Americans are eagerly awaiting May 1st to find out
what you have i n mind for health care reform. Are you ready to stand
here now and make a pledge that, by the end of your f i r s t term, a l l
Americans w i l l have health insurance? And how much l a t i t u d e do you
think you have p o l i t i c a l l y to r a i s e taxes to be sure that that
happens before the end of your f i r s t term? And I have a follow-up.
(Laughter.)
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I'm ready to t e l l you that I w i l l
present a plan which would provide the American people the
opportunity to have the security of health care coverage by the end
of my f i r s t term. Whether or not that plan w i l l pass the Congress in
the form I w i l l propose i t i s s t i l l — you know, that's a matter for
conjecture. But I think we've got an excellent chance of passing i t .
In terms of how i t w i l l be paid for, l e t me say that no decision has
been made on that. A l l the surveys show lopsided majorities of the
American people w i l l i n g to pay somewhat more, a l i t t l e more, i f they
were guaranteed the security of health care coverage when they change
jobs, when someone in t h e i r family's been sick, when other things
happen, when t h e i r company can no longer afford i t under present
circumstances.
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But what I'm trying to do now i s to reconcile — the key
f i n a n c i a l c o n f l i c t i n the health care issue i s t h i s : We've got to
give the American people the right to know they're going to covered
with health insurance, that they're not going to have t h e i r costs
going up two or three times the rate of i n f l a t i o n , and they're not
going to lose the right to pick t h e i r doctor. And we know that i f we
do i t i n any one of three or four ways, i t w i l l save l i t e r a l l y
hundreds of b i l l i o n s of dollars between now and the end of the decade
of tax money — and more importantly ~ of private money. Massive
amounts of money w i l l be saved.
So the question i s : How much do you have t o r a i s e now
i n order t o save a l l t h a t money l a t e r ? Those are t h e judgments w e ' l l
be making i n the next month. We've s t i l l got about f i v e weeks t o
make the decisions.
You had a follow-up.
Q
I d i d . I wanted t o ask you i f long-term care would
a b s o l u t e l y be included i n t h a t package o f b e n e f i t s t h a t you're
t a l k i n g about everybody having by the end o f the f i r s t term.
THE PRESIDENT: To what extent i t w i l l be hasn't been
resolved because o f the cost questions t h e r e .
Q
Are you prepared t o support r e s t r i c t i o n s on — t o
f o l l o w up on Andrea's question — prepared t o support r e s t r i c t i o n s on
the deployment o f homosexual members o f the service? And i f you are,
do you t h i n k t h a t f u l f i l l s the c r i t e r i a t h a t you l a i d o u t , t h a t
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n should be on the basis o f conduct, not o r i e n t a t i o n ?
THE PRESIDENT: That depends on what t h e r e p o r t says.
That's why I'm w a i t i n g f o r the Secretary o f Defense t o issue t h e
r e p o r t . But I wouldn't r u l e t h a t out depending on what the grounds
and arguments were.
Q
Mr. President, your own advisers have s a i d t h a t
your h e a l t h care reform might cost from $30 b i l l i o n t o $90 b i l l i o n
more a year — cost the government more. That's i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e
tax hikes you proposed f o r your economic program. Are you saying you
cannot t e l l the middle class and working people t h a t you w i l l not
seek h i g h e r taxes f o r h e a l t h care reform?
THE PRESIDENT: I'm saying t h a t I have not made a
judgment y e t about how t o recover what monies i t would take t o
provide the s e c u r i t y t o a l l f a m i l i e s t h a t they would have some h e a l t h
insurance. That's r i g h t , I have not made t h a t d e c i s i o n y e t . We have
— I have made — I have sat through now probably 10, 12 hours,
maybe, o f intense s t a f f b r i e f i n g s on the h e a l t h care issue, and I
would say we have 12 t o 15 hours t o go before I w i l l be i n a p o s i t i o n
t o make some o f these c a l l s .
I can t e l l you t h i s : I w i l l not ask the American people
t o pay f o r a h e a l t h care plan u n t i l the people who have — who w i l l
be making money out o f the changes t h a t we propose are asked t o give
back some o f the money they w i l l make. Keep i n mind, these changes
w i l l save massive amounts o f money immediately t o some o f the h e a l t h
care p r o v i d e r s .
Q
Mr. President, i f I may r e t u r n t o Russia f o r a
moment. As your spokespersons have t o l d us over the past few days,
there are other reformers there. I s there a danger i n p u t t i n g t o o
much American weight behind Boris Y e l t s i n ?
THE PRESIDENT: I don't t h i n k so. This i s — I know
t h a t there i s ~ some people say, w e l l , what's the d i f f e r e n c e i n t h i s
and the Gorbachev s i t u a t i o n before and i s t h i s the same s o r t o f
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problem. I t r i e d to answer that question e a r l i e r about what the
United States i n t e r e s t s are and how we would pursue them. And I've
t r i e d to be supportive of reformers throughout Russia and, indeed,
throughout a l l the former communist countries and the former
republics of the Soviet Union. But he i s , a f t e r a l l , the f i r s t
elected President i n a thousand years. He has the mandate of having
been voted on i n a free and open election where people were free to
vote and free to stay home; something that was not true previously.
And that i s something you would expect me to do.
Let's put i t i n a d i f f e r e n t context. Suppose — w e l l ,
we j u s t has the Prime M i n i s t e r of Great B r i t a i n here, r i g h t ? And the
United States and Great B r i t a i n have had h i s t o r i c t i e s and shared
values. You expect me t o work w i t h the Prime M i n i s t e r of Great
B r i t a i n , even i f he i s of a p a r t y t h a t was openly s u p p o r t i v e of my
opponent i n the l a s t e l e c t i o n . I mean, you know — (laughter) —
t h i s i s not a — Boris Y e l t s i n i s the e l e c t e d President of Russia,
and he has shown a great deal of courage i n s t i c k i n g up f o r democracy
and c i v i l l i b e r t i e s and market reforms, and I'm going t o support
that.
Q
Mr. President, you congratulated the House of
Representatives f o r a speedy a c t i o n on your economic p l a n l a s t week,
but you face some tougher hurdles i n the Senate i n p a r t because some
members of your own p a r t y , l i k e Senator Breaux, are not on board w i t h
you. Why haven't you been able t o get some of these Democratic
Senators on board, and are you prepared t o make some compromises i n
breaking the g r i d l o c k there?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, l e t me j u s t answer you t h i s way.
There were two b i g problems t h a t we confronted when we got here i n
terms of how the people's money was being spent. One problem was the
d e f i c i t had exploded. I t had gone from $1 t r i l l i o n — the debt
had — t o $4 t r i l l i o n i n 12 years. The other problem was we'd
managed t o explode our n a t i o n a l debt w h i l e reducing our investment i n
the f u t u r e .
Now, t h e r e are a block of people i n the Senate,
i n c l u d i n g some Democrats, who b e l i e v e t h a t the only t h i n g t h a t
matters i s t o reduce the d e f i c i t . Now, b e l i e v e me, t h a t ' s a b i g
improvement over the past. But I j u s t disagree w i t h them. I don't
t h i n k t h a t ' s the only t h i n g t h a t matters. I b e l i e v e t h a t i n v e s t i n g
i n the f u t u r e matters, too. And I b e l i e v e i f we don't change the
spending p a t t e r n s of the government and i n v e s t and put some of the
American people back t o work t o create some — m i l l i o n s o f j o b s , t h a t
we're not going t o have an economic recovery. So we j u s t have a
d i f f e r e n c e of o p i n i o n .
Now, Senator Breaux i s much c l o s e r t o me than many
others are i n the sense t h a t he b a s i c a l l y wants t o phase-in t h i s
spending; but the problem w i t h phasing i t i n i s i f you delay the
investment, you also delay the impact of the investment, which means
you put o f f impact of the investment which means you put o f f the
e f f e c t i v e date of the jobs being created. That's my only argument
w i t h him.
He, t o be f a i r t o him, has said t h i s i s an acceptable
stimulus package and an acceptable l e v e l of investment, but I t h i n k
we should, i n e f f e c t , slow down the r a t e of spending u n t i l we have
the whole package passed. And my p o s i t i o n i s , i f the United States
Senate w i l l adopt a budget r e s o l u t i o n l i k e the House d i d , the
American people w i l l know we are not going t o r a i s e t h e i r taxes u n t i l
we cut spending, and we are going t o create j o b s . And t h i s i s a plan
where 70 percent of i t ' s paid by people w i t h incomes above
$100,000 ~ $500 b i l l i o n of d e f i c i t r e d u c t i o n , but m i l l i o n s of jobs
over the next four years, i n c l u d i n g a h a l f a m i l l i o n i n t h i s program.
So t h a t ' s my argument, and I hope I ' l l be able t o persuade enough t o
get the vote.
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Q
Mr. President, could you e x p l a i n , please, the
s i t u a t i o n on nuclear weapons i n Russia?
impressive.
THE PRESIDENT: This i s s e l f - s e l e c t i o n over here. I t ' s
(Laughter.) Go ahead. No, no — go ahead.
Q
Mr. President, given the fact that both the START I
and the START I I t r e a t i e s are hostage to the p o l i t i c a l outcome i n
Moscow, and given, also, the potential for c o n f l i c t — armed c o n f l i c t
between Russia and Ukraine, are you prepared to draft contingency
plans, at least, that would either restore funding or add funding to
the Strategic Defense I n i t i a t i v e , i f not the space-based part, at
l e a s t the ground-based element, as a hedge against the worst possible
outcome?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we're not i n a p o s i t i o n t o make a
judgment about the worst possible outcome now.
I mean, keep i n mind
— and l e t me say, I've t a l k e d t o President Kravchuk t w i c e about the
Ukraine's p o s i t i o n on START I , and I'm very concerned about the very
issues you r a i s e d . But l e t me say t h a t even as we speak I'm not
ready t o say t h a t there i s a strong l i k e l i h o o d t h a t we can't proceed
w i t h both START I and START I I and t h a t we can't resolve the
c o n f l i c t s between Russia and Ukraine. I f t h a t becomes apparent t h a t
we can't, then we w i l l obviously assess our p o s i t i o n and a l l of our
options.
Q
Mr. President, on A p r i l 2, the Free Trade Agreement
n e g o t i a t o r s are going t o meet again t o t a l k about the a d d i t i o n a l
agreements. Now there has been a l o t of t a l k t h a t your
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n plans t o be very tough. How do you c h a r a c t e r i z e being
tough? Do you agree w i t h t h a t statement, and i s t h e r e any room f o r
compromises? How are you seeing those n e g o t i a t i o n s ?
THE PRESIDENT: I wouldn't c a l l i t being tough. I would
say t h a t I intend t o t r y t o get a t r a d e agreement t h a t w i l l be i n the
best i n t e r e s t of both the United States and Mexico. And keep i n mind
— t h i s i s not simply a trade agreement, t h i s i s also an investment
agreement. And the issue i s whether — when we make i t much more
a t t r a c t i v e f o r the United States i n i n v e s t i n Mexico and much more
secure, shouldn't we a l s o , i n the i n t e r e s t of both the economies of
Mexico and the United States, see t h a t basic environmental standards
and l a b o r standards are observed, and shouldn't we have some
p r o t e c t i o n s g r e a t e r than those embodied i n the present agreement i n
the event t h a t there i s severe economic d i s l o c a t i o n s because of
unintended consequences?
I b e l i e v e t h a t we should. And I b e l i e v e t h a t ' s i n
Mexico's i n t e r e s t . And I would j u s t p o i n t you t o a much smaller
example. We had examples i n our a i d program where t h e United States
spent taxpayers' money t o encourage American companies t o i n v e s t i n
Central America, who then went down t h e r e and a c t u a l l y lowered wages
instead of r a i s i n g them i n the host country. So what I'm t r y i n g t o
do i s t o promote market reforms and the b e n e f i t s of them t o both
countries.
Second t h i n g l e t me say, I have enormous a d m i r a t i o n f o r
President Salinas and f o r what he's doing. I want t o support t h a t .
And I want t o remind a l l of you t h a t i n s o f a r as t o t r a d e p o r t i o n of
the NAFTA agreement goes, j u s t look a t the u n i l a t e r a l r e d u c t i o n s by
the Salinas government, i n t r a d e b a r r i e r s , took the United States
over the past f i v e years from a $ 6 - b i l l i o n t r a d e d e f i c i t t o a $5b i l l i o n - p l u s t r a d e surplus w i t h Mexico. So I have no q u a r r e l w i t h
the trade p r o v i s i o n s . But the investment p r o v i s i o n s need t o be used
i n ways t h a t w i l l r a i s e wages on both sides of the border i n s t e a d of
lower wages on both sides of the border and p o l l u t e the environment.
That's want I want t o avoid.
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Q
Among the people you have charmed, i t seems you
have charmed President Fidel Castro because ~ (laughter) — in a
recent interview with a TV station — a TV network, he wanted to meet
with you. Would you be willing to meet with him and a Democratic
administration might change the approach towards Cuba versus a
Republican?
THE PRESIDENT: I have no change in Cuba policy except
to say that I supported the Cuban Democracy Act, and I hope someday
that we'll a l l be able to travel to a democratic Cuba.
Q
Would you meet with President Castro?
THE PRESIDENT: I said democratic Cuba.
Elections.
Q
A totally different subject, although i t i s south
of here, I wonder about, in Mississippi, where, as you know, c i v i l
rights and human rights groups are asking for your help in
investigating the 40-plus hangings, suicides supposedly in
Mississippi j a i l s . Some of the c i v i l rights groups say that they are
asking you, in fact, to order a Justice Department investigation.
Have you heard from them directly, and are you amenable to that
request?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I'm very much concerned about the
deaths in the j a i l s . I have not had a — i f they have communicated
with me directly, my staff has not yet discussed i t with me, although
they may have done so. What I would always do in a situation like
that i s to f i r s t discuss i t with the Attorney General after an
assessment of the facts and to see whether i t i s appropriate. But,
obviously, i f we were asked to look into i t , I would certainly at
least discuss i t with the Attorney General.
Q
Mr. President, on another trade issue, during your
campaign last year in Michigan and other states, you c r i t i c i z e d a
Bush administration decision which allowed foreign-made minivans,
MPVs to come into the country at low t a r i f f rates. This led the auto
industry and auto workers to believe that you would take action early
in your administration to do something about this. Have you changed
your mind on that subject, or do you s t i l l intend to take action?
THE PRESIDENT: No, I haven't changed my mind on that
subject. That issue i s now under review, along with a number of
others relating to our trade relations with Japan.
And l e t me just say this: I had hoped, and s t i l l hope,
to engage the Japanese government in an ongoing dialogue across a
whole broad range of these issues. I f you look at the history of
American trade relationships, the one that never seems to change very
much i s the one with Japan. That i s , we're sometimes in a position
of trade deficit, but we're often in a position of trade surplus with
the European Community. We once had huge trade deficits with Taiwan
and South Korea, but they've changed now quite a bit; they move up
and down. But the persistence of the surplus the Japanese enjoy with
the United States and with the rest of the developed world can only
lead one to the conclusion that the possibility of obtaining real
even access to the Japanese market i s somewhat remote.
And I was — and I w i l l say again — I was astonished
that the Bush administration overruled i t s own customs office and
gave a $300 million a year freebie to the Japanese for no apparent
reason. And we got nothing — and I emphasize nothing — in return.
So, no, I haven't changed my position about that.
I did hope to put i t in the context of a larger set of
trade issues to be raised f i r s t with the Japanese government before
acting unilaterally. But my own opinion about that has not changed.
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Q
Mr. President, you've been
—
THE PRESIDENT: I'm going to come back to the r i g h t .
I'm left-handed, you know, and I — (laughter) — sometimes
discriminate. No, go ahead.
Q
Mr. President, during the campaign you gave some
pretty strong indications that your Supreme Court nominee — you
would c e r t a i n l y consider t h e i r position on abortion.
I s that s t i l l
the case?
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you f o r asking, because I want t o
emphasize what I s a i d before. I w i l l not ask any p o t e n t i a l Supreme
Court nominee how he or she would vote i n any p a r t i c u l a r case. I
w i l l not do t h a t . But I w i l l endeavor t o appoint someone who has
c e r t a i n deep c o n v i c t i o n s about the C o n s t i t u t i o n . I would not, f o r
example, knowingly appoint someone t h a t d i d not have a very strong
view about the F i r s t Amendment's freedom of r e l i g i o n , freedom of
a s s o c i a t i o n , and freedom of speech p r o v i s i o n s . And I s t r o n g l y
b e l i e v e i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o p r i v a c y . I b e l i e v e i t i s one
of those r i g h t s embedded i n our C o n s t i t u t i o n which should be
protected.
Q
Mr. President, on the issue of the Supreme Court,
i s your commitment t o a government t h a t looks l i k e America — does
t h a t also extend t o the Supreme Court t o the extent you can i n f l u e n c e
t h a t through your appointments? W i l l you be t a k i n g age i n t o
consideration? And given what you j u s t s a i d about the r i g h t t o
p r i v a c y , do you t h i n k i t ' s appropriate and w i l l you or members of
your a d m i n i s t r a t i o n be asking p o t e n t i a l nominees i f they support the
r i g h t t o p r i v a c y and whether they t h i n k t h a t r i g h t includes the r i g h t
t o abortion?
THE PRESIDENT: I ' l l answer the question. I w i l l not
ask anybody how they w i l l vote i n a s p e c i f i c case. I w i l l endeavor
t o appoint someone who has an attachment t o , a b e l i e f i n , a strong
and broad c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o p r i v a c y . And on the age issue, I
w i l l not d i s c r i m i n a t e against people who are o l d e r than I am.
(Laughter.) Yes.
I won't d i s c r i m i n a t e against people who are of a
d i f f e r e n t gender, of a d i f f e r e n t r a c i a l or e t h n i c group.
Q
How about a government and the c o u r t t h a t looks
l i k e America, s i r — on d i v e r s i t y ?
THE PRESIDENT: I don't know how many appointments I ' l l
get t o the Supreme Court; I don't know what w i l l happen t h e r e . I'm
going t o appoint someone I t h i n k w i l l be a great j u s t i c e .
Q
Mr. President, on campaign finance reform, could
you t e l l us how you plan to end soft money contributions to state and
national p a r t i e s ?
THE PRESIDENT: F i r s t l e t me say t h a t I plan t o — I
intend t o come forward w i t h a proposal t h a t w i l l end the use of s o f t
money i n p r e s i d e n t i a l campaigns i n the next few days. We're working
on i t now.
We're working on t r y i n g t o hammer i t out w i t h the people
— w i t h the f r i e n d s of campaign finance reform i n both Houses of the
Congress. I w i l l attempt t o do i t i n a d i f f e r e n t way t h a t w i l l a t
l e a s t enable the p a r t i e s t o r a i s e s u f f i c i e n t funds t o i n v o l v e
grassroots people and empower people t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n the p o l i t i c a l
process, but I t h i n k t h a t we should do away w i t h t h i s s o f t money
issue and make a l o t of other changes as w e l l , and we're working on
i t . _ We should have a b i l l out t h a t has the support of the
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n q u i t e soon. We've been working very hard now f o r the
l a s t couple of weeks oh i t .
MS. MYERS: Last question.
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Q
Mr. President, you've been going to the forest
conference i n a couple of weeks, looking for a solution to an issue
that has dragged on for a long time partly because both sides are
unwilling to compromise or share the pain and, some say, the previous
administration's unwillingness to obey the law of the land. How do
you propose to find a solution where so many have f a i l e d or been
unwilling to find a solution?
THE PRESIDENT: Let me say, I would l i k e to begin by
having the United States have one position. And l e t me come back to
the larger issue. The forest summit involves, as you know, what w i l l
happen to the old growth forest and to adjacent forest i n the P a c i f i c
Northwest which are the habitat of the spotted owl, but which also
are now a very small part of what once was a massive old growth
forest up there.
Thousands of jobs are at stake, but the very
ecostructure of the P a c i f i c Northwest i s also at stake. The parties
on both sides have been paralyzed i n court b a t t l e s and a l l timber
sales have been frozen, including many timber sales that v i r t u a l l y
a l l environmentalists think should go forward because of the impasse.
One of the problems has been that the United States i t s e l f has taken
different positions across the agencies. So the f i r s t thing I hope
to do i s to be able to a t least adopt a uniform legal position for
the United States.
The second thing I want to do i s go out there along with
the Vice President and l i s t e n , hammer out the alternatives, and then
take a position that I think w i l l break the logjam.
The position — i t may be l i k e my economic program,
i t ' l l probably make everybody mad, but I w i l l t r y to be f a i r to the
people whose livelihoods depend on t h i s and f a i r to the environment
that we are a l l obligated to maintain. And l e t me say, I l i v e i n a
state with — that's 53 percent timberland. I have dealt with a l o t
of these timber issues for many years. The issue i s , i n t h i s case,
what i s the right balance, given some facts that are inevitable about
what's going to happen. And I think we can hammer out a solution and
as I said, a l o t of people — everybody may be somewhat disappointed,
but the p a r a l y s i s now gripping the l i v e s of the people out there i s
t o t a l l y unacceptable.
Q
S i r , did you screen those projects i n the economy
stimulus package before you sent them to the H i l l ? The Republicans
are saying there are so many things i n there that are t o t a l l y
unnecessary.
I can't believe that you sent those up there; and maybe
somebody did i t for you.
(Laughter.) But there are —
(inaudible) — i n there, and swimming pools and copying statutes —
THE PRESIDENT:
Sicily.
Q
—
No.
and even a project on studying the r e l i g i o n i n
THE PRESIDENT: No, — (laughter) — l e t me say, you
w i l l read those b i l l s for years i n vain and not find those projects.
The —
Q
Well, the —
THE PRESIDENT: — l e t me say, I have a l e t t e r here
dated on March 22nd to Senator Byrd from Leon Panetta about those to
Senator Byrd from Leon Panetta about those alleged projects. What
Mr. Panetta points out i s to say that none of the s p e c i f i c projects
referenced are actually i n the l e g i s l a t i o n proposed by me. What they
have done i s to go to these departments and say, i f you had t h i s more
money — much more money, give me every absurd thing you could
possibly spend the money on. I am not going to l e t those things be
done.
*
�- 12 -
The other thing they have done i s to go to some isolated
parts of the country and pick atypical examples of community
development block grant funds. I would remind you that i t was the
Republicans who've always supported the community development block
grant proposal on the theory that we ought to rely more on the states
and local governments to make judgments about how best to create
jobs.
So, I w i l l do everything I can to keep undue waste and
abuse from coming into this process. I do not support i t .
We've got to quit, thank you. We'll do i t again
sometime, I like this. (Laughter.)
END
MORE
1:42 P.M. EST
�THE WHITE HOUSE
OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY
For Immediate Release
March 20, 1993
U.S. STATEMENT ON THE YELTSIN SPEECH
The United States supports the h i s t o r i c movement toward democracy
and free markets i n Russia. Russian President Boris Y e l t s i n i s
the leader o f t h a t process. As Russia's only d e m o c r a t i c a l l y elected n a t i o n a l leader, he has our support, as do h i s reform
government, and a l l reformers throughout the Russian Federation.
President Y e l t s i n proposes t o break the p o l i t i c a l impasse i n
Russia by l e t t i n g the Russian people decide t h e i r f u t u r e . We
were encouraged t o hear him say t h a t c i v i l l i b e r t i e s w i l l be
respected.
We also welcome President Y e l t s i n ' s assurance of c o n t i n u i t y i n
Russia's f o r e i g n p o l i c y . We w i l l work t o maintain the close
r e l a t i o n s between our two countries. The President looks forward
t o h i s summit meeting w i t h President Y e l t s i n i n Vancouver on
A p r i l 3-4. And we w i l l continue t o work i n concert w i t h our
a l l i e s t o support those i n Russia who wish t o f u r t h e r reform.
What matters most i s t h a t Russia i s , and must remain, a
democratic country moving toward a market economy. That i s the
basis f o r a continued U.S.-Russian p a r t n e r s h i p , and f o r a b e t t e r
and more prosperous f u t u r e f o r the Russian people.
# # #
�THE WHITE HOUSE
OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY
March 20,
For Immediate Release
U.S.
1993
STATEMENT ON THE YELTSIN SPEECH
The United States supports the h i s t o r i c movement toward democracy
and free markets in Russia. Russian President Boris Y e l t s i n i s
the leader of that process. As Russia's only democraticallyelected national leader, he has our support, as do his reform
government, and a l l reformers throughout the Russian Federation.
President Y e l t s i n proposes to break the p o l i t i c a l impasse in
Russia by l e t t i n g the Russian people decide t h e i r future. We
were encouraged to hear him say that c i v i l l i b e r t i e s w i l l be
respected.
We also welcome President Y e l t s i n ' s assurance of continuity in
Russia's foreign policy. We w i l l work to maintain the close
relations between our two countries. The President looks forward
to h i s summit meeting with President Y e l t s i n in Vancouver on
A p r i l 3-4. And we w i l l continue to work in concert with our
a l l i e s to support those in Russia who wish to further reform.
What matters most i s that Russia i s , and must remain, a
democratic country moving toward a market economy. That i s the
basis for a continued U.S.-Russian partnership, and for a better
and more prosperous future for the Russian people.
#
#
/
�THE WHITE HOUSE
OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY
March 20,
For Immediate Release
U.S.
1993
STATEMENT ON THE YELTSIN SPEECH
The United States supports the h i s t o r i c movement toward democracy
and free markets in Russia. Russian President Boris Y e l t s i n i s
the leader of that process. As Russia's only democraticallyelected national leader, he has our support, as do h i s reform
government, and a l l reformers throughout the Russian Federation.
President Y e l t s i n proposes to break the p o l i t i c a l impasse in
Russia by l e t t i n g the Russian people decide their future. We
were encouraged to hear him say that c i v i l l i b e r t i e s w i l l be
respected.
We also welcome President Yeltsin's assurance of continuity in
Russia's foreign policy. We w i l l work to maintain the close
relations between our two countries. The President looks forward
to h i s summit meeting with President Y e l t s i n in Vancouver on
A p r i l 3-4. And we w i l l continue to work in concert with our
a l l i e s to support those in Russia who wish to further reform.
What matters most i s that Russia i s , and must remain, a
democratic country moving toward a market economy. That i s the
basis for a continued U.S.-Russian partnership, and for a better
and more prosperous future for the Russian people.
#
#
#
�THE WHITE HOUSE
OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY
March 20,
For Immediate Release
U.S.
1993
STATEMENT ON THE YELTSIN SPEECH
The United States supports the h i s t o r i c movement toward democracy
and free markets in Russia. Russian President Boris Y e l t s i n i s
the leader of that process. As Russia's only democraticallyelected national leader, he has our support, as do h i s reform
government, and a l l reformers throughout the Russian Federation.
President Y e l t s i n proposes to break the p o l i t i c a l impasse in
Russia by l e t t i n g the Russian people decide their future. We
were encouraged to hear him say that c i v i l l i b e r t i e s w i l l be
respected.
We also welcome President Yeltsin's assurance of continuity in
Russia's foreign policy. We w i l l work to maintain the close
relations between our two countries. The President looks forward
to h i s summit meeting with President Y e l t s i n in Vancouver on
A p r i l 3-4. And we w i l l continue to work in concert with our
a l l i e s to support those in Russia who wish to further reform.
What matters most i s that Russia i s , and must remain, a
democratic country moving toward a market economy. That i s the
basis for a continued U.S.-Russian partnership, and for a better
and more prosperous future for the Russian people.
t * *
�THE WHITE HOUSE
OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY
For Immediate Release
March 20, 1993
U.S. STATEMENT ON THE YELTSIN SPEECH
The United States supports the h i s t o r i c movement toward democracy
and free markets i n Russia. Russian President Boris Y e l t s i n i s
the leader o f t h a t process. As Russia's only democraticallyelected n a t i o n a l leader, he has our support, as do h i s reform
government, and a l l reformers throughout the Russian Federation.
President Y e l t s i n proposes t o break the p o l i t i c a l impasse i n
Russia by l e t t i n g the Russian people decide t h e i r f u t u r e . We
were encouraged t o hear him say t h a t c i v i l l i b e r t i e s w i l l be
respected.
We also welcome President Y e l t s i n ' s assurance of c o n t i n u i t y i n
Russia's f o r e i g n p o l i c y . We w i l l work t o maintain the close
r e l a t i o n s between our two c o u n t r i e s . The President looks forward
t o h i s summit meeting w i t h President Y e l t s i n i n Vancouver on
A p r i l 3-4.
And we w i l l continue t o work i n concert w i t h our
a l l i e s t o support those i n Russia who wish t o f u r t h e r reform.
What matters most i s t h a t Russia i s , and must remain, a
democratic country moving toward a market economy. That i s the
basis f o r a continued U.S.-Russian p a r t n e r s h i p , and f o r a b e t t e r
and more prosperous f u t u r e f o r the Russian people.
# # #
�MftR 22 'S3 9i36
FROM OASD-PA
TO UHITEH0U9E
PAGE.001
O
A U.S. nuclear-powered submarine/ the U3S GRAYLING (SSN646),
on routine operations in the Barents Sea accidentally collided
with a Russian Navy submarine in international waters around
12:46 AM EST Saturday (200546 Greenwich Mean time). The incident
occurred 105 nautical miles north of the Murman coastal region of
the Kola peninsula. Damage to the U.S. vessel was minimal and no
one was injured. The Russian submarine is reported to be safe.
The U.S. Navy is conducting an investigation. The United States
regrets the incident.
** TOTAL PAGE.aTl **"
�THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
March 20, 1993
PRESS BRIEFING
BY GEORGE STEPHANOPOULOS
The Briefing Room
4:55 P.M. EST
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: Good afternoon.
statement from President Clinton.
This i s a
The United States supports the h i s t o r i c movement toward
democracy and free markets i n Russia. Russian President Boris
Y e l t s i n i s the leader of that process. As Russia's only
democratically-elected national leader, he has our support, as do his
reform government and a l l reformers throughout the Russian
federation.
President Y e l t s i n proposes to break the p o l i t i c a l
impasse i n Russia by l e t t i n g the Russian people decide t h e i r future.
We were encouraged to hear him say that c i v i l l i b e r t i e s w i l l be
respected. We also welcome President Yeltsin's assurance of
continuity i n Russia's foreign policy. We w i l l work to maintain the
close relations between our two countries.
The President looks forward to h i s summit meeting with
President Y e l t s i n in Vancouver on A p r i l 3rd and 4th, and we w i l l
continue to work i n concert with our a l l i e s to support those i n
Russia who wish to further reform.
What matters most i s that Russia i s , and must remain, a
democratic country moving toward a market economy. That i s the basis
for a continued U.S.-Russian partnership and for a better and more
prosperous future for the Russian people.
today?
Q
How do you describe President Y e l t s i n ' s decision
Was i t a coup, in your view?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: I'm not going to get into
characterizing, beyond saying the President — as President Clinton
said, that he supports the movement toward democracy and free markets
in Russia. We can't characterize a l l the s p e c i f i c s .
Q
— then, i s h i s move undemocratic?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: President Y e l t s i n has proposed to
allow the Russian people to decide. That i s what democracies do.
Q
George, did the White House have advanced knowledge
that President Y e l t s i n was going to do t h i s ? And, more importantly,
did the White House suggest to Y e l t s i n that he do t h i s ?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: The White House c e r t a i n l y didn't
suggest to President Y e l t s i n that he take any action. I believe
there might have been some consultation by Mr. Kozyrev with other —
with the U.S. and other countries — e a r l i e r today.
MORE
#41-03/20
�- 2-
Q
The Russian constitutional court i s c a l l i n g t h i s
i l l e g a l , and the Russian Vice President also seems to be describing
i t as i l l e g a l . Does that concern the United States that perhaps t h i s
could be an i l l e g a l action?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: There's no question that there's a
p o l i t i c a l impasse i n Russia. President Y e l t s i n has proposed to break
that p o l i t i c a l impasse by taking i t to the people. That i s
appropriate i n democracies.
Q
— these actions may be outside the constitution.
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: That i s not for us to decide,
that's for the Russian people to decide.
Q
George, do you think i t ' s safe for President
Y e l t s i n to leave h i s country for a summit i n April?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS:
summit with President Y e l t s i n .
We look forward to having the
Q
How does t h i s step today complicate your efforts to
get the G-7 and the Congress to approve additional assistance for
Yeltsin?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: I think i t reinforces the need for
us to continue to do what we can to support the reform process. And
Secretary Christopher i s i n the process right now of consulting with
our G-7 a l l i e s .
Q
I s t h i s step good, or i s i t bad for the United
States.
Q
George, w i l l you t r y to rush anything i n now i n
l i g h t of what's happened today?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: We are i n continuing consultation
on the G-7 process, and we expect that w i l l continue as i t has over
the l a s t several days.
Q
Nothing s p e c i f i c i n response to today?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS:
announce now.
Q
We have nothing s p e c i f i c to
Are there s t i l l plans to meet with Kozyrev t h i s
coming week?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS:
I believe so.
Nothing's changed.
Q
I s i t a p o l i t i c a l gamble for you a l l to wait u n t i l
A p r i l 25th before considering whether to change your policy?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: I don't think t h i s i s about
p o l i t i c s . I mean, we support the process of reform i n Russia and we
are looking forward to meeting with President Y e l t s i n and we are
looking forward to continuing to consult with our G-7 a l l i e s to
further that process.
Q
George, any prediction on the referendum?
r e s u l t s w i l l be, or by a wide margin?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS:
predict things here.
Oh, I can't do that.
MORE
What the
I can't
#41-03/20
�- 3-
Q
George, are you considering that be internal
security in Russia — that i t could be an unstable, dangerous
situation at t h i s point?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: Excuse me on t h i s .
Q
That t h i s could be a dangerous, unstable situation
in Russia?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: Well, we are c l o s e l y following the
situation. Obviously, there i s an impasse here. President Y e l t s i n
has proposed to break the impasse by going to the people. But we're
watching i t closely.
I j u s t want to point out one thing, j u s t to — when I
said Prime Minister — Mr. Kozyrev informed us there was no
consultation. I thought I was clear on that, but I j u s t want to be
extra clear — there was no consultation and c l e a r l y no clearance of
anything l i k e that.
Q
When did he inform you?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: Exactly.
know that exact time.
Q
I n Serbia today.
I don't
Has the President spoken to Y e l t s i n ?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: No.
Q
Will he?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS:
the l i n e s of h i s statement.
I think he sent him a message along
Q
Y e l t s i n seems to be pretty much isolated right now.
He has been condemned — been condemned by h i s own vice president,
the court, the constitutional court, the general prosecutor, who have
called the move i l l e g a l or null and void. How do you see h i s
position right now? I s i t a big concern for you, for the President?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: We continue to follow i t closely.
There i s an impasse; there's no denying that. President Y e l t s i n has
proposed to resolve i t by going to the people.
Q
How strong do you think h i s position i s right now?
He seems completely isolated.
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: I don't know that that's true, but
we can j u s t say that there i s a movement toward democracy and reform
in Russia. President Y e l t s i n i s the leader of that reform. We w i l l
continue to support that.
Q
You don't think he i s isolated?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: We believe that President Y e l t s i n
embodies the reform process, i s the leader of the reform process. We
support that process.
Q
George, i s your support of him unconditional?
i f he f a i l s and the country becomes seriously destabilized?
that.
What
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: I can't get into hypotheticals l i k e
We support President Y e l t s i n and the reform process.
Q
George, has the U.S. sent any signal of certain
things that i t could not tolerate and continue to do business with
Y e l t s i n i f he takes certain steps?
MORE
#41-03/20
�- 4-
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: Again, those are hypotheticals that
we haven't addressed. The statement today stands on i t s own.
Q
George, i s i t your view, whether i t ' s
constitutional or not, the impasse was such that t h i s i s something
Y e l t s i n , i n fact, had to do?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: Again, I can't characterize h i s
needs, except to say that we support the process.
Q
George — the nuclear control?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS:
Nothing's changed as far as I know.
Q
I s he looking at alternatives?
that he f e l t that he ~
I s that one reason
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: I t ' s not for us to comment on
alternatives, except to say we support the process of reform.
Q
How does i t change your plans for Vancouver?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: We look forward to going to
Vancouver on April 3rd and 4th, and we expect to.
Q
What w i l l you bring with you that might be
different that might be different than what you would have brought
otherwise?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: Again, we've been engaged i n the
process with our G-7 a l l i e s of putting forward a package of
reform, of coming up with a package of reform. I don't know that
anything has changed s p e c i f i c a l l y i n the package.
Q
— was told that Kozyrev was supposed to meet with
Christopher t h i s week, early t h i s . I s that s t i l l on or —
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: Yes.
Q
It's
s t i l l on?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS:
As far as we know, yes.
Q
George, does t h i s make i t safer for Y e l t s i n to
leave the country and go to the summit without a l o t of fear that
there's going to be a coup, h e ' l l get rear-ended i n some way?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS:
one way or the other on that.
Q
might r e t a l i a t e ?
I don't know that i t has any impact
Did Kozyrev give you any idea of how the Congress
Do they feel they have the power to impeach?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: I don't know that that was
discussed. Clearly, the Congress can speak on i t s own, but I don't
know that there was any s p e c i f i c discussion on that.
Q
Do you have any idea how the congress would react
or what steps they might take?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS:
the
No.
No.
Q
George, has the administration been i n touch with
members of Parliament or —
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#41-03/20
�- 5-
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: I don't know i f there's been any
direct contact. We've seen the same reports that you a l l are
reading.
Q
What happens i f he loses the referendum? What
happens then?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: Again, i t ' s a hypothetical and I
j u s t can't discuss i t t h i s time. Right now, he's proposed that he
takes i t to the people. That i s appropriate i n a democracy and that
i s something we support.
Q
Do you have contingency plans i n case i t happens?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS:
I t ' s nothing I can comment on.
Q
George, can you t e l l us about the President's
meetings today? Who did he meet with i n the White House? Who has he
reached out to i n Congress and elsewhere to discuss i t ?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: There are c a l l s now going out to
members of Congress. He has discussed, obviously, the situation with
his National Security Advisor, Tony Lake; h i s Secretary of State
Warren Christopher; Strobe Talbott; Sandy Berger; h i s entire national
security s t a f f .
Q
They meet together, and i n the White House?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: There were some meetings together.
I can't speak for every s p e c i f i c moment. U.N. Ambassador Albright i s
also here.
Q
— speak to?
Did he t a l k to someone d i r e c t l y t h i s
morning?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS:
No, I believe the briefings were in
Russia.
Q
Your representative?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS:
With our representative, yes.
Q
So, George, when you say that you support the
process of democracy, then you are saying that, i n effect, not
l e g a l l y shutting down the Congress, but b a s i c a l l y going around the
Congress, establishing the presidential rule, i t ' s part of the
democratic —
MR. STEPHkNOPOULOS: Let's be clear on what hasn't
happened. President Yfeltsin has not dismissed the Parliament, he has
not imposed presidential rule, he has not suspended c i v i l l i b e r t i e s .
He's proposed taking t h i s to the people.
Q
As I understand, i t established a special rule,
which means that i f the Congress took a step against him he would say
that that i s i l l e g a l , that nobody should follow that.
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: I can't comment on a l l the s p e c i f i c
edicts, except to say that President Y e l t s i n has proposed to break
t h i s impasse by taking i t to the people.
Q
What's your sense of where the Russian m i l i t a r y i s
in t h i s situation?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS:
We haven't heard anything changed.
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#41-03/20
�- 6-
Q
I s i t your knowledge they're s t i l l under Yeltsin's
control?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS:
We have no information to the
contrary.
Q
I s i t ambivalence?
I s i t what?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: Again, I mean, President Yeltsin's
declared the p l e b i s c i t e for A p r i l 25th. I don't think that I can
comment on where the Russian people are from inside the Beltway.
Q
But surely you would have had to have gotten some
sort of intelligence f e e l , obviously, or else —
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS:
Well, I'm not going to comment on
intelligence.
Q
The President met e a r l i e r t h i s week with the head
of the constitutional court that's now ruling t h i s action i l l e g a l .
What was the — who asked for that meeting, what was the purpose of
i t , what —
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: I believe that the head of the
court was v i s i t i n g several people i n the United States, including the
President. I'm not certain where the s p e c i f i c request came from.
Q
Did anything come out of that? Did the court t e l l
the President they wouldn't accept t h i s , or did the President t e l l
the Court that he —
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: I don't know — not that I know of.
Again, t h i s was before any of t h i s happened, and I think they j u s t
had a general discussion of the situation i n Russia.
Q
Will you give us an update on the war and our
participation i n i t — Europe?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: The war i n Europe? Why don't we
f i n i s h questions on Russia f i r s t , and then I ' l l come back. Any more
on Russia?
Q
George, i s t h i s step a positive one as far as the
United States i s concerned?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: Again, I'm not going to get into
characterizing the s p e c i f i c steps, except to say that we support the
movement for democratic and economic reform i n Russia.
Q
And my follow-up i s , i s any increased state of
a l e r t involved for any U.S. m i l i t a r y forces?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS:
Q
leaders today?
No.
Not that I know of.
Has the President consulted with any foreign
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: I'm not certain that he's had any
conversations yet today. I wouldn't necessarily rule i t out. But I
don't think that he has — I believe that Secretary Christopher w i l l
be sending a message to our a l l i e s .
Q
How did you learn about t h i s ?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: I believe that f i r s t , t h i s morning,
he was consulting with National Security Advisor Tony Lake.
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�- 7-
Q
What i s the message that Christopher
Q
—
(Inaudible.)
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: Yes.
Q
You said Christopher i s sending a message?
Q
He's sending a message to Y e l t s i n , or w i l l send a
message to Yeltsin?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: No, I said that Secretary
Christopher i s sending a message to our a l l i e s . The President i s
sending a message to President Y e l t s i n .
Q
Any package of aid?
Q
Secretary Christopher said e a r l i e r t h i s week that
the p r i n c i p a l U.S. contacts with members of Parliament would be
through congressional delegations. Does the President think those
should go forward, those sort of meetings, and how important are they
in the face i f Y e l t s i n should lose?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: Again, I can't look into the
future, but we are now consulting with members of Congress, talking
to members of Congress, and there's no change i n any plans right now.
Q
You would encourage them to go ahead with those
meetings? I think there are some sort of interparliamentary things
that were going to occur.
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: We certainly wouldn't t e l l the
Congress not to go i f they were inclined to go.
to you?
Q
Are the mechanics of t h i s referendum c l e a r at a l l
Do you know what w i l l constitute a —
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: No, I think i t ' s too early to t e l l
exactly, so we j u s t know of an A p r i l 25th date.
Q
Who are the others t h e y ' l l be talking with?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: I don't have the exact l i s t , but
the s t a f f w i l l be consulting with the members of the leadership and
the foreign a f f a i r s leadership.
Q
Secrietary Christopher i s supposed to go to Chicago
on Monday to begin discussing the administration's position i n
regards to Russia — Russia aid. I s that speech s t i l l on?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: As far as I know there's no change.
You can check with the State Department.
Q
— Secretary Christopher's messages — what i s he
going to be conveying to the a l l i e s , some message of reassurance?
You said he's —
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: Well, e s s e n t i a l l y the message that
the President has given to the American people today.
Q
W i l l any package of aid be announced by the
administration before the referendum?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: Again, I don't think I can announce
anything u n t i l the President's ready to announce i t . But he said he
looks forward to meeting with President Y e l t s i n on A p r i l 3rd and 4th.
MORE
#41-03/20
�- 8-
Q
Does i t , i n fact, heighten the need to move those
forward more quickly and to make them more generous?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: Again, I can't characterize the
package except to say that we've been consulting intensively with our
a l l i e s on the appropriate response to the situation i n Russia.
Q
I s i t f a i r to say that the administration w i l l do
everything i t can to make sure that President Y e l t s i n i s successful
on the 25th of April?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: I t ' s f a i r to say that the President
supports the process of reform, believes that President Y e l t s i n i s
the leader of the process of reform.
Q
And the best chance to have that reform continue
would be for Y e l t s i n to be successful?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: President Y e l t s i n i s leader of the
reform and we support that. We support him i n that.
Q
So the Russian people can expect aid from us before
A p r i l 25th?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: I didn't say that. I said that we
were i n the meeting with President Y e l t s i n i n Vancouver on April 3rd
and 4th, and we expect to announce packages of support. I don't have
a s p e c i f i c date, but we are working on a package of support. That
was already i n the President's budget.
Q
Did Prime Minister Kozyrev notify or inform the
United States before or after Y e l t s i n went on t e l e v i s i o n in Moscow?
And were there any extra d e t a i l s provided to the White House that
were not i n Yeltsin's speech?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: Again, there wasn't direct contact
with the White House, i t was with our representatives i n Russia. And
i t was j u s t a general characterization.
Q
Before or after?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS:
THE PRESS:
Before.
Thank you.
END
5:05 P.M. EST
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
O f f i c e of the Assistant Secretary/Spokeeman
-
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Match 22, 1993
For Immediate Release
AS Delivered
REMARKS BV
AND QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SESSION WITH
SECRETARY OF STATE WARREN CHRISTOPHER
BEFORE THE
CHICAGO COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
THE EXECUTIVES' CLUB OF CHICAGO,
AND THE MID-AMERICA COMMITTEE
Chicago/ I l l i n o i s
March 22, 1992
Thank you very much, Jim O'Connor;
Senator Carol Braun, who i s witn us t h i s afternoon, to the
Members of the Executives' Club, the Mid-America Committee, and
the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.
MAYOR RTCHARD M. DAILEY:
I t i s my p r i v i l e g e today to introduce a man w i t h a long and
distinguished caceer i n the public and p r i v a t e sector, warren
Christopher brings t o the C l i n t o n Administration four years
experience as Deputy Secretary of State under Jimmy Carter.
He was also Deputy Attorney General from 1967-69, a very
turbulent time i n oar nation.
In a d d i t i o n , he was Clerk f o r the Supreme Court Justice William
Douglas. He's been a leading member of the legal profession
for many years.
I t i s comforting to know that the i n t e r n a t i o n a l ship of state
i s being guided by a f i r m and sure hand of someone w i t h
Secretary Christopher•5 wide-range experience.
At the same time, the global economy has progressed to the
point where any business owner, no matter how small or large
they are, has the a b i l i t y to reach markats I n the most remote
regions of the earth.
This spells a special opportunity f o r here i n the c i t y of
Chicago. As an i n t e r n a t i o n a l c i t y , Chicago i s eager t o
p a r t i c i p a t e i n the economic opportunities that w i l l help Our
c i t y and our people prosper.
W share his enthusiasm and excitement of the new
e
Administration i n Washington, D.C. I'm very proud to welcome
to Chicago the U.S. Secretary of State, Wacran Christopher.
(Applause)
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-2gsgRgTARY C B S Q H R Mr, O'Connor, Mr. Mayor, ladies and
HTTPE:
gentlemen:
You know i t ' s a pleasure f o r me to ba here today. This might
surprise you, but I am happy to be here on a white and snowy
morning.
I t reminds me of growing up i n North Dakota, walking
home from school and having my mother greet me with a cup of
hot chocolate. You can see I have happy memories of the
Midwest, so I'm especially happy to be here. And I'm
p a r t i c u l a r l y pleased to De speaking to t h i s very audience,
secretaries of State spend probably too much of t h e i r time
explaining American foreign policy to foreign alplomats, and
they might tend to take for granted audiences such as t h i s , the
audiences that r e a l l y count: the American people.
I want to say a special welcome today to the students that are
here from the congressional d i s t r i c t s of Congressmen Reynolds
and Congressman Rush- you students have a tremendous stake i n
our foreign p o l i c y . After a l l . you are the ones that w i l l have
to l i v e with the consequences of a i l that we do. So i t ' s
c r i t i c a l that your voice be heard, and 1 am p a r t i c u l a r l y glad
that you're here today.
My t r i p today i s only the f i r s t of many that
making to the c i t i e s and towns of the United
mission i s quite a simple one: to begin an
conversation with the people here i n America
l i v e i n and our country's proper role i n i t .
I hope to be
States. My
ongoing
about the world we
I t i s f i t t i n g that I launch t h i s process, I t h i n k , here i n
Chicago- Your c i t y i s a c i t y that symbolizes America i n so
many ways — by i t s location here i n the country's heartland,
by i t s f i g h t i n g s p i r i t , by i t s broad shoulders, and most of a l l
by i t s good common sense.
Yet at the same time Chicago i s very much at the center of the
world — with i t s mighty industries exporting goods around the
globe, w i t h i t s commodity markets l i n k i n g i n t e r n a t i o n e l
investors near and f a r .
Chicagoans and a l l Americans have a r i g h t to a foreign p o l i c y
that serves t h e i r i n t e r e s t s i n very concrete ways. They want a
foreign p o l i c y that w i l l b u i l d a safer world, a more prosperous
world, and a world where t h e i r values can be secure.
That i s exactly the kind of foreign p o l i c y that Governor —
that President Clinton -- r s t i l l c a l l him Governor Clinton
sometimes — has charged me to carry out. At the State
Department, we have a desk responsible t o r every foreign
country, or v i r t u a l l y every foreign country — the China desk,
an Argentine desk, a Russia desk.
As Secretary of State, I am determined that the State
Department w i l l also have an "American desk" — and r want to
be s i t t i n g behind that desk. My foremost miesion i s to advance
the v i t a l i n t e r e s t s of the c i t i z e n s of the United States.
�03/22/83
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oucline how the Clinton
objective -- pursue the objective of f u r t h e r i n g the i n t e r e s t s
of the American people.
As you a l l Know, our world has changed fundamentally i n recent
years. Walls have come down. Empires have collapsed. Most
importsnt. the Cold War ia over, and the Soviet Union i s no
more.
Soviet Communism i s dead. But with i t so i s the reference
point thst guided our p o l i c i e s for over 40 years. I t was easy
when we could Simply point to the Soviet Union and aay that
what we had to do was to contain Soviet expansion.
That
reference point explained why cur i n t e r n a t i o n a l leadership was
so necessary; why our defenae burden was so heavy; and why
assistance to other countries was eo c r i t i c a l .
Today, we face a vastly mere complicated world, i t i s a world
of breath-taking opportunities to expand democracy and free
markets. But i t is also a world of grave new p e r i l s .
Long-simmering ethnic c o n f l i c t s have f l a r e d up anew i n the
former Yugoslavia and elsewhere. Weapons o£ mass d e s t r u c t i o n
are f a l l i n g into the hands of very dangerous d i c t a t o r s .
And
new global challenges cry out for a t t e n t i o n around our e n t i r e
wcrld — challenges l i k e the environment, over-population, drug
t r a f f i c k i n g , and AIDS.
Like the last generation's great leaders who met the challenges
of the Cold War, we need a new strategy for protecting and
promoting American i n t e r e s t s i n t h i s new era. We need a
strategy that w i l l face the questions that Americans are
asking, and most understandably asking: Why, they say, w i t h
the threat of Soviet expansionism gone, do we need to be active
on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l front? Why must America continue to carry
the heavy burdens of leadership? Why, when we so urgently need
renewal here at home, should we continue to dedicate large
resources abroad?
President C l i n t o n has responded to these challenges by laying
out an American foreign policy based upon three p i l l a r s .
F i r s t , tiuilding American prosperity, second, modernizing
America's armed services. And t h i r d , promoting democracy and
human r i g h t s abroad. This policy's fundamental premise ia that
i n today's world foreign and domestic p o l i c y i s inseparable.
I f we f a i l to maintain our strength at home, we w i l l be
c e r t a i n l y unable to lead abroad. I f we retreat i n t o
i s o l a t i o n i s m , i t w i l l be impossible to r e v i t a l i z e our domestic
strength. America cannot t h r i v e i n a world of economic
recession or v i o l e n t c o n f l i c t s , or a world which i s riven w i t h
dictatorships.
i t i s no accident that President Clinton has i d e n t i f i e d
promotion of America's economic s e c u r i t y as the f i r s t p i l l a r of
our foreign p o l i c y . We've entered an era where economic
competitiveness i s v i t a l to our a b i l i t y to succeed abroad. As
�03/22/83
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an essential first step, as you k o , the President has put
nw
Eocwara a bold new program to get America's own GCCnomiC flOUSe
i n order. I t ' s a comprehensive strategy that w i l l invest i n
the needs of our people, reduce our d e f i c i t s , and lay the
foundation for long-term economic growth.
The single most important step that we can take to strengthen
oar foreign p o l i c y , to strengthen our p o s i t i o n i n the world, i s
to enact the President's economic program — and to do so j u s t
as soon as possible.
But ateps at home cannot ensure America's p r o s p e r i t y . Today,
we «re i r r e v e r s i b l y linked to the global economy. Our l i v e s
are constantly touched by huge flows of trade and finance that
cross many borders. To take another example, over seven
m i l l i o n Americans are now employed i n export-related jobs; many
of them here, of course, r i g h t i n the Chicago area.
Our a b i l i t y to prosper i n t h i s global economy depends upon our
a b i l i t y to compete. That means harnessing our diplomacy to
serve our economic goals. W must ensure that foreign markets
e
are open to U.S. goods and U.S. investments. W must f i g h t
e
unfair competition against U.S. business and labor. And we
must press the world's other f i n a n c i a l powers to enact
responsible p o l i c i e s that foster growth.
The second p i l l a r of our foreign p o l i c y w i l l be to modernize
our armed forces to meet new needs around the world and to meet
continuing threace. The collapse of the Soviet Union enables
us to s i g n i f i c a n t l y scale back our m i l i t a r y establishment.
But. nevertheless, our power must always be s u f f i c i e n t to
counter any threat to our v i t a l i n t e r e s t s . W must be able t o
e
deter and, when necessary, to defeat any p o t e n t i a l foe. That's
why we are taking steps to make our m i l i t a r y more a g i l e ,
mobile, f l e x i b l e , and emart. Let me emphasize that President
Clinton i s determined to have the best equipped and best
f i g h t i n g force i n America to defend America.
As we t a l k about our armed forces, I think i t ' s important f o r
me to say that America cannot be the world's policeman. We
cannot tie responsible for s e t t l i n g every dispute or answering
every alarm, we are indispensable, but we c e r t a i n l y must not
be indiscriminate.
America's leadership w i l l require that we wisely marshal the
West's c o l l e c t i v e strength. Ethnic c o n f l i c t s — and the
humanitarian disasters they generate — deeply offend our
conscience.
In many cases, they also pose a serious r i s k to
i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace. And they produce thousands of refugees so
often that s t r a i n the p o l i t i c a l and economic s t a b i l i t y of an
e n t i r e region.
Our imperative i s to develop i n t e r n a t i o n a l means to contain
and, more important, to prevent these c o n f l i c t s before they
erupt. Here, i t Is c r i t i c a l that we use the United Nations i n
the manner i t s founders intended, and there i s high, new hope
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that t h i s may take place,
united Nations
paaceltQeping
c a p a b i l i t i e s must be
preventive action. AnC our other instruments of c o l l e c t i v e
security, such as our NATO a l l i a n c e , must ae adapted i n t h i s
new era to support the United Nations e f f o r t s .
One of the most promising areas for preventive Olplomacy i s i n
the Middle East. Here, f o r t u n a t e l y , the end of the Cold War
has not unleashed c o n f l i c t but, rather, i t has created new
opportunities, new chances f o r ending c o n f l i c t . I recently
returned from - seven-day t r i p to the region where I held
a
extensive t a l k s w i t h a l l tne top leaders of the Arab and
I s r a e l i governments.
I came back absolutely convinced that there i s a h i s t o r i c
opportunity to take new strides toward peace i n t h i s troubled
region. New, i t ' s imperative that a l l sides to t h i s long,
simmering c o n f l i c t seize t h i s opportunity to return to the
negotiating table i n Washington on A p r i l 20th, as we have
i n v i t e d them to do. I f they return and enter negotiations, the
United States is ready to act as a f u l l partner i n t h e i r
e f f o r t s . I f they do not, however, i f they allow t h i s unique
chance to s l i p away, another generaticn i n the Middle East
could be l o s t to an endless cycle of c o n f r o n t a t i o n and,
e v e n t u a l l y , t o renewed c o n f l i c t .
Let me now turn to the t h i r d p i l l a r of t h i s Administration's
foreign p o l i c y : encouraging the global r e v o l u t i o n f o r
democracy and human rigttts that i s transforming the world. By
helping promote demccrscy, we do more than honor our deepest
values, we are also making a s t r a t e g i c investment i n our
nation's s e c u r i t y . History has shown that a world of more
democracies i s a safer world. I t i s a world that w i l l devote
more to human development ana less to humsn d e s t r u c t i o n . And
i t is a world that w i l l promote what a l l people have i n cornraon
rather than what tears them apart.
These three p i l l a r s of American foreign p o l i c y — building
American's p r o s p e r i t y , modernizing America's armed forces, and
promoting democratic values — form the core of the Clinton
Administration's new diplomacy. Now i would l i k e to t e l l you
how these three p i l l a r s converge and form the basis for one of
our highest foreign policy p r i o r i t i e s , and that i s , helping the
Russian people to b u i l d 6 free society and s market economy.
This, i n my judgment, i s the greatest gtrategic challenge of
our time. Bringing Russia -- one of h i s t o r y ' s most powerful
nations -- into the family of peaceful nations w i l l serve our
highest s e c u r i t y , economic, and moral i n t e r e s t s .
For America and the world, the stakes are j u s t monumental, i f
we succeed, we w i l l have established the foundation f o r our
l a s t i n g s e c u r i t y into the next century. But i f Russia Calls
into anarchy or lurches back to despotism, the p r i c e that we
pay could be f r i g h t e n i n g . Nothing less i s involved than the
p o s s i b i l i t y of renewed nuclear threat, higher defense budgets;
spreading i n s t a b i l i t y ; the loss of new markets; and a
�03/22/83
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deveateting set-back f o r the woriawide democrafci
This circumefcance deserves the a t t e n t i o n of each and every
American.
Over the days end weeks ahead, the Clinton Administration w i l l
set f o r t h a comprehensive strategy t o support Russia's
democracy and i t s e f f o r t s to b u i l d a market economy. My
i n t e n t i o n today i s not to announce a d e t a i l e d program of new
i n i t i a t i v e s . Bather, what I would l i k e t o do i s t o t r y t o
provide a s t r a t e g i c context f o r the approach that we w i l l
follow. I want tc explain the tremendous i n t e r e s t we have i n
doing everything we can to help Russia's democracy succeed.
Let me stress here today that by focusing on Ruesia, I do not
mean to neglect the other new Independent States. The
well-being of Ukraine, of Kazakhstan, of Belarus, of Armenia,
and, indeed, of each of the former republics, i s a matter of
utmost importance t o America, we are committed t o developing
strong b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s with each of these countries. We
w i l l support t h e i r independence and do everything we can to
assist i n t h e i r i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o the world cemmunity. Indeed,
i t i s p a r t l y out of concern for t h e i r welfare that I want to
concentrate on Russia today. For the fact i s that the future
security of each cf these neighbors oe Russia depends so
heavily on Russians own democratic r e v o l u t i o n .
Let me step back for j u s t a moment and analyze with you the
breath-taking benefits that the end of the cold War has brought
to the United states and the world. To mention j u s t a few of
the r e s u l t s :
H i s t o r i c agreements have been reached to slash the nuclear
arsenals that threatened our country with a n n i h i l a t i o n .
The nations of the former Warsaw Pact are now free of
Soviet domination and of the burden of communism.
The p o s s i b i l i t y of a superpower c o n f l i c t on the European
continent has now a l l but vanished, allowing us to bring home
thousands of troops and t c reduce our defense budgets.
Around the globe, t o t a l i t a r i a n regimes that looKed t o the
Soviet Union for help and support are now i s o l a t e d and on the
defensive.
And from V i l n i u s on the B a l t i c to Vladivostok on tne
P a c i f i c , vast new markets are opening, opening slowly but
nonetheless opening, to Western business.
With a reforming Russia, a l l of these h i s t o r i c
achievements were possible. But without i t , many w i l l not be
sustainable.
So we stand again at a h i s t o r i c crossroads. I t i s very
reminiscent of the crossroads that we faced i n 1918 and 1945.
Then we were summoned a f t e r c o n f l i c t s t o lead the world by
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b u i l d i n g a new peace. After world War I , we chose t o retread.
And the consequences were disastrous.
However, a f t e r World War I I , our leaders had the wisdom t o
answer the c a l l . We fostered i n s t i t u t i o n s that r e b u i l t the
free world's prosperity. And we helped to lead a democratic
a l l i a n c e that contained and, u l t i m a t e l y , drained Soviet
Communism.
Today, for the t h i r d time t h i s century, we have a h i s t o r i c
opportunity t o b u i l d a more secure world. We must re-double
our e f f o r t s to help the Russian people as they struggle i n an
e f f o r t that has no h i s t o r i c a l precedent. With great courage,
they ere attempting to carry out three simultaneous
revolutions. F i r s t , transforming a t o t a l i t a r i a n system i n t o a
democracy. Second, transforming 3 ccmmand economy i n t o one
based upon free markets. And t h i r d , transforming an
aggressive, expansionist empire intc a peaceful, modern
nation-state. I f they succeed i n t h i s tremendous experiment,
we a l l w i l l succeed.
Now i t appears that another turning point has been reached i n
Russia's t r a n s i t i o n . For months, a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c r i s i s
between President Y e l t s i n and the parliament has paralyzed
Russian p o l i t i c s . That c r i s i s caffe — as you a l l know, came to
g head over the weekend. President Y e l t s i n has c a l l e d for a
national p l e b i s c i t e t o resolve the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l impasse. i n
doing so, he has again demonstrated his f a i t h that the only
force that can guarantee reform i s the people — the Russian
people.
We welcome President Yeltsiri's assurance that c i v i l l i b e r t i e s ,
including freedom of speech and of the press, w i l l be respected
at t h i s d i f f i c u l t moment. We also welcome his f i r m r e j e c t i o n
of imperial and Cold War p o l i c i e s . The most important point i s
that Russia must remain a democracy during t h i s period, moving
toward a market economy. This i s the basis, the only basis foe
the U.S.-Russian partnership.
The United Ststes has strongly supported Russia's e f f o r t s to
b u i l d a democracy. Under President Y e l t s i n ' s leadership,
h i s t o r i c progress has b?en made toward a free society. We urge
that t h i s progress continue and that the Russian people be
allowed to determine t h e i r future through peaceful means and
w i t h f u l l respect for c i v i l l i b e r t i e s . On that basis, Russia
can be assured of our f u l l support i n the days ahead.
wow, today's c r i s i s I n Russia results from one indisputable
f a c t : the pain of building a new system v i r t u a l l y from scratch
is exacting a tremendous t o l l . The patience of the Russian
people i s wearing t h i n , a fact that i s r e f l e c t e d i n Russia's
current p o l i t i c a l stalemste.
Nevertheless, we should notice that ever the l a s t year.
President Y e l t s i n and Russia's other democrats have
demonstrated t h e i r commitment to reform i n many ways. C i v i l
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l i b e r t i e a have been dramatically expanded. The m i l i t a r y budget
has been s i g n i f i c a n t l y cut. Prices have been freed i n most
sectors, and the r e s u l t has been the once long lines that
formed outside Russia's stores have come to an end. Tens of
thousands of shops, restaurants and other firms have been put
into private hands, and a real s t a r t has been made on the most
d i f f i c u l t process of even p r i v a t i z i n g the large enterprises.
As a result of these steps, the share of the work force engaged
in private commerce has more than doubled over the last two
years.
I'm glad to say that over the weekend, President Y e l t s i n
recommitted his government to economic reform. He l a i d out i n
clear and strong language the key elements or auch a program:
continued p r i v a t i z a t i o n of firms, s e l l i n g land to farmers,
stepping i n f l a t i o n , and s t a b i l i z i n g the ruble. I f t h i s program
is implemented, our capacity to help w i l l be g r e a t l y enhanced.
Russia's reformers are now looking to the West f o r support at
t h i s moment of extreme d i f f i c u l t y .
The United States has a
deep s a l f - i n t e r e s t m responding to t h i s h i s t o r i c challenge.
We should extend to the Russian people not a hand of p i t y , but
a hand of partnership. We must lead a long-term Western
strategy of engagement for democracyHere i n America, I t is very important that we not create a
f a l s e choice netween what is required to renew our economy 3t
home, and what i s necessary to protect our i n t e r e s t s abroad.
We can and must do both. During the long struggle of the Cold
War, we kept the American Dream a l i v e f o r a l l people here at
home. At the same time, we made great s a c r i f i c e s to protect
our national security, and today we can and must meet the same
challenge.
To succeed, we must f i r s t change our mindsets. We must
understand that helping consolidate democracy i n Russia ia not
a matter of c h a r i t y , but a s e c u r i t y concern of the highest
order. I t i s no less important to our well-being than the need
to contain a h o s t i l e Soviet Union was at an e a r l i e r day.
Tomorrow and the next day. In Washington, President C l i n t o n and
I w i l l meet w i t h the Russian Foreign M i n i s t e r , Andrei Kozyrev.
we w i l l communicate to him our support f o r Russia's continued
democratic development. And we w i l l r e i t e r a t e that the current
s i t u a t i o n i n Moscow must be resolved peacefully and i n a way
consistent w i t h c i v i l l i b e r t i e s .
At his meeting w i t h President Y e l t s i n next month i n Vancouver,
President C l i n t o n intends to s p e l l out the t a n g i b l e steps we
w i l l take to assist Russian reform. The President i s s t i l l
considering the s p e c i f i c measures he w i l l announce. But our
bottom l i n e i s that we w i l l be increasing and accelerating our
support for Russia's democracy. We cannot do i t alone, but we
must be prepared to do our part and to do i t f u l l y . The united
States favors a meeting l a t e r i n A p r i l where the foreign and
finance ministers of the leading i n d u s t r i a l democracies w i n
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-9coordir.ate t h e i r j o i n t e f f o r t s t o assist i n Russia's h i s t o r i c
transformation.
As I said e a r l i e r i n my remarks, my task today i s not t o s p e l l
out s p e c i f i c i n i t i a t i v e s . Nevertheless, I would l i k e t o o f f e r
j u s t a few thoughts on the c e n t r a l issue of Western aid t o
Russia i n general terms, c l e a r l y , our assistance must be
better t a r g e t t e d and better coordinated than i t ' s been i n the
past. I t must focus on areas and constituencies i n Russia that
have the greatest impact on t h e i r long-term reform. I t must
not and cannot be l i m i t e d solely to public funds. Rather, i t
must catalyze our p r i v a t e sectors t o take a leading role i n
Russia's transformation through trade, investment, and
t r a i n i n g . And our aid must be f e l t at the grass roots, t o ease
the pain of the Russian c h i l d r e n , workers, and senior c i t i z e n s
who are s u f f e r i n g through t h i s transformation.
Despite a l l of i t s current economic d i f f i c u l t i e s , i t i s worth
remembering that Russia i s inherently a r i c h country. I t s
people are w e l l educated. I t s natural resource base exceeds
that of any other country i n the world. Tor example, Russia's
o i l reserves are huge and i f properly exploited could probably
finance much of Russia's economic reform. But today, thousands
of aging c i i wells and pipelines i n Russia stand i d l e , decaying
and desperately i n need of c r i t i c a l spare parts. I f Russia
could f i n d the means to repair them, perhaps w i t h our help, the
o i l sold would be a l u c r a t i v e source of f o r e i g n exchange that
could be do a great deal to s t a b i l i z e t h e i r economy.
One area of possible assistsnce where America's v i t a l i n t e r e s t s
are d i r e c t l y engaged i s Our e f f o r t t o dismantle the nuclear
weapons of the former Soviet Union. The $800 m i l l i o n program
established through the leadership of Senators Nunn and Lugar
to destroy these weapons i s a d i r e c t investment i n our own
security. Unfortunately, some bottlenecks, both here and i n
Russia, have allowed only a small f r a c t i o n of the $800 m i l l i o n
to be spent up to t h i s point. Pact of I t has been caused by
bureaucratic delays i n Washington, and we are f u l l y determined
to remove these obstacles. We want t o see these weapons
dismantled i n the very shortest possible time.
Another important goal we should have i s strengthening the
groups i n Russia that w i l l form the bulwark of a t h r i v i n g
democracy. There are public opinion p o l l s i n Russia, too, as
ycu know, and time a f t e r time they show one t h i n g : by large
margins, i t ' s the younger generation that expresses the
greatest sympathy for democracy. The younger people are the
ones who are pushing for more economic freedom and closer
contacts w i t h the West, u l t i m a t e l y , whatever the r e s u l t of
today's p o l i t i c a l t u r m o i l , t h i s i s the group that w i l l carry
the day for Russia's successful t r a n s i t i o n to democracy.
Through exchange programs, many young Russians can be brought
to the West and exposed to the workings of democracy and our
free market. Russian students, public o f f i c i a l s , s c i e n t i s t s ,
and businessmen are hungry for such experiences.
Upon t h e i r
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return home, they can adapt t h e i r Knowledge to best s u i t
Russia's conditions. And, perhaps most important of a l l , we
can win long-term friends and partners f o r freedom.
The existence, to take another example, of a strong,
independent media is also essential f o r a democratic society,
wmie Russia's free press has experienced tremendous growth i n
recent years, there i s s t i l l a real need for professional
t r a i n i n g of reporters, e d i t o r s , and news managers. Here,
technical assistance can make a real d i f f e r e n c e .
Another area that deserves strong support i s Russia's
p r i v a t i s a t i c n e f f o r t which, as I said, has made some progress.
This process has continued across many of Russia's regions
despite the p o l i t i c a l problems i n Moscow. Putting p r i v a t e
property into the hands of tne Russian people i s a c r i t i c a l
step i n building a free-market economy. I t w i l l create
m i l l i o n s of property owners and p r i v a t e entrepreneurs
a
genuine middle class w i t h a powerful stake i n continued reform.
Of course, at the end of the day, Russia's progress toward the
market and democracy cannot occur without an overhaul of the
general ground rules of the Russian economy. I t w i l l be v i t a l
to reduce t h e i r budget d e f i c i t , c o n t r o l the money supply,
s t a b i l i z e the ruble, and close down i n e f f i c i e n t f a c t o r i e s .
Unfortunately, these are also steps that w i l l cause the
greatest pain and p o l i t i c a l r i s k . Here again, Russia needs our
help. The West must f i n d a way t o respond. And the response
can't be l i m i t e d to big promises and l i t t l e d e l i v e r y . We are
now engaged i n intensive consultations w i t h our partners from
the leading i n d u s t r i a l democracies to develop a program of
j o i n t assistance to Russia i n these areas.
Let me close by making two points. F i r s t , we must have no
i l l u s i o n s about the s i t u a t i o n i n Russia. Even w i t h our help,
the road ahead i s rocky. Setbacks w i l l be i n e v i t a b l e .
Russia's transformation w i l l take a great deal of hard work;
probably a generation to complete.
As we meet, a great struggle i s underway, as you know, t o
determine the kind of nation that Russia w i l l be. However, as
we focus on today's drama, i t ' s important that we maintain a
long-term perspective. Just as our v i g i l a n c e i n the Cold War
took more than four decades to pay o f f , our commitment to
Russia's democracy must De f o r the duration. Our engagement
w i t h the reformers must be for the long haul — whether they're
"out" as well as when they're " i n " , whether they're "down" as
well as when they're "up."
However d i f f i c u l t things may be i n the short run, we should
have f a i t h that the s t r a t e g i c course we have set
supporting
democracy's triumph
i s the correct one.
Second, we should know that any r e a l i s t i c program to assist
Russia won't be cheap, But there's no question that our nation
can a f f o r d i t s f a i r share of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l e f f o r t , we
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-11cen't a f f o r d , indeed, t o do otherwise. Together w i t h President
Clinton 1 am determined to work w i t h the Congress t o f i n d the
funding. I am confident that th« necessary resources can be
found as we restructure our defense budget. But i t w i l l
require bipartisanship, leadership and v i s i o n , and v i t a l l y i t
w i l l take a Russian partner committed to democratic values and
to market refcrm.
At a time of grsat domestic challenge, some would say t h a t we
should delay bole action i n the foreign realm. But h i s t o r y
w i l l not wait. As Abraham Lincoln advised his countrymen, " e
W
cannot escape h i s t o r y . We . - . w i l l be remembered i n s p i t e of
ourselves." • And today, h i s t o r y i s c a l l i n g again for our nation
to decide whether we w i l l lead or defer, whether we w i l l shape
t h i s new era or be shaped by i t . How w i l l h i s t o r y remember
us? I , f o r one, am confident that v- w i l l make the r i g h t
.e
choice
that we w i l l be cold and brave i n r e v i t a l i z i n g our
nation here at home, while continuing to promote our i n t e r e s t s
and ideals abroad..
Thank you very much.
(Applause)
MR. JAMES O C N O ; Mr. Secretary, why I don't I announce who
'ONR
the panelists w i l l be very quickly.
SECREyARY CHRTSTpPHER:
Fine.
I^ft. 0' C N O • Thank you so much, Mr. Secretary, f o r your very
ONR '
provocative and timely remarks. Yours i s a huge
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , and we thank you so much f o r j o i n i n g us today.
W have about 15 minutes i n which we can have questions
e
addressed to the Secretory. We have three people on my
immediate l e f t who w i l l be asking the questions and they are —
end most of you have met them — f i r s t , on my l e f t , i s John E.
R e i l l y , President of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations;
Kearina Koskenalusta, who i s President of the Executives' Club
of Chicago; and Tom Miner, who i s Chairman of the Mid-America
Committee,
A number of you have w r i t t e n down your questions on cards,
which we have asked that you please provide to people i n the
aisles who can bring them up f r o n t .
I'd l i k e f i r s t to c a l l on John R e i l l y , who i s the President o£
the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, to d i r e c t his
question to the Secretary.
pjR. .REjLXiY: Mr. Secretary, you said that Russia i s looking f o r
support from outside and that you have a program of j o i n t
assistance underway.
One of the i n d u s t r i a l nations that's proved up u n t i l now to be
s reluctant partner i n t h i s endeavor i s Japan, i n great part
because of the. island dispute smar-.ating a f t e r World War I I .
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-liWhen the former Prime Minister of Russia, Igor Gaidar, was here
three weeks ago at t h i s platform, we asked him. "When i s Russia
going to give back those islands to Japan and s e t t l e the
dispute?" He responded, "When the United States gives back
Alaska."
(Laughter)
Obviously, Japan i s interested, we t h i n k , i n resolving that
issue. My question to you i s , since Japan i s such a key
potential'partner in t h i s e f f o r t , how do you see the r e s o l u t i o n
of that s p e c i f i c issue, and what role would you l i k e to see
Japan play i n t h i s j o i n t endeavor you've described?
S.qcRETAgY CHRISTOPHER: I'm very o p t i m i s t i c that Japan w i l l
play a strong role i n t h i s j o i n t endeavor. Japan i s , t h i s
year, the chairman of the G-7, and w i l l be chairing the G-7
meeting i n Tokyo. I think they f u l l y understand t h e i r world
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . They have agreed to i n v i t e President Y e l t s i n
to j o i n that meeting.
I lock f o r Japan to play an active role
in the j o i n t e f f o r t to assist Russia.
There i s the long-standing controversy regarding the islands,
but my own feeling i s that the Japanese recognize the urgency
of aid to democracy and free market reform i n Russia. Although
they do want to s e t t l e t h i s problem and s e t t l e i t q u i c k l y , they
w i l l not l e t that stand i n the way of aiding i n the j o i n t
e f f o r t and bringing t h e i r great resources to bear i n the j o i n t
effort.
MS. KpSKgsALUgTA: instead of focusing on b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s
to solve problems i n Russia and Yugoslavia, how can the United
States work more closely together w i t h Western European
countries, especially Germany, to resolve these issues?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: The United States i s determined to deal
w i t h problems i n a m u l t i l a t e r a l way whenever i t can. We w i l l
act alone, i f we must, but we much prefer to act together. I
believe we're doing so i n Tooth of the instances mentioned.
We're working very c a r e f u l l y through the United Nations and
through NATO i n connection with Yugoslavia; and as far as
Russia i s concerned, we're coordinating our e f f o r t s very
i n t e n s i v e l y through the G-7, the group of leading
i n d u s t r i a l i z e d nations.
As I mentioned i n ray speech, the United States supports a very
early meeting of Foreign and Finance M i n i s t e r s , and a meeting
at the highest level -- that i s , at the heads of state level —
thereafter to fccus on the issue of Russian aid,
I can a f f i r m the i n t e n t of that question by saying that the
United States w i l l do i t s part, but we intend to work w i t h
others i n t h i s endeavor.
MR. MINER: Mr. Secretary, the Midwest
Chicago and I l l i n o i s
-- have been on the c u t t i n g edge of working w i t h the former
Soviet Union. For example, Chicago and Kiev are " s i s t e r
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c i t i e s . " The State of I l l i n o i s ana Russia are " s i s t e r
states." Many of our c i t i e s have r e l a t i o n s h i p s . And, also,
many of our multinationals ere already established, plus many
small and middle-size companies.
in your new program, what i n i t i a t i v e s and what i s the
Administration going to De asking or o f f e r i n g U.S. businessmen
of s l l sires regarding t h e i r involvement .^nd future a c t i v i t i e s
in the former Soviet Union?
:
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1
3 a i d
ir
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SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER S
' Y remarks, I'm quite
determined that the State Department w i l l have an American Desk
and w i l l be shown to be f r i e n d l y to American business i n
promoting i t s i n t e r e s t s abroad. That i s d e f i n i t e l y true i n a i l
the countries of the former Soviet Union.
W- have established embassies i n each of the Newly independent
e
States, even at the cost of closing consulates i n other areas;
so we'll have an ambassador and some ways to assist American
businessmen when they go to those countries.
In addition, I've t r i e d t o , myself, set a standard f o r
assistance to American business that I hope w i l l send a signal
to our Ambassadors abroad. I t i s proper policy t o support
American businesses, to help them I n t h e i r e f f o r t s to secure
business i n each of the Newly Independent States.
with respect t o Russia, I'd l i k e to underscore the point that I
made e a r l i e r , t h s t Russia i s proceeding toward free markets,
toward a democratic structure. But i f that i s set back, i f the
course of h i s t o r y i s i n t e r r u p t e d by the forces that are i n t e n t
on overthrowing the democratic trend, then American businesses
w i l l be set back, too. That's part Of the stake i n t h i s
h i s t o r i c struggle that's going on i n Russia,
M _ REHiLY; Mr. Secretary, I think th'ire i s c e r t a i n l y general
%.
sympathy f o r the view you stated, hoping that a democratic
Russia w i l l emerge. But to some hers, the events of t h i s
weekend suggest that there i s at least a p o s s i b i l i t y that an
a u t h o r i t a r i a n government might emerge i n Russia and an
a u t h o r i t a r i a n government l i k e l y to be more expansionist.
i f that should occur, would i t be wise f o r the United States
and i t s NATO a l l i e s t o revise the j o i n t plans t o reduce the
size of our m i l i t a r y forces?
c^pi^TQ^HER: I prefer not to deal i n hypotheticals
at the moment. W are encouraging support for democratic
e
? ? o r i and f o r free-market reform i n Russia. W think that's
i£rT
e
the constructive path f o r the Soviet Union — f o r Russia to
take. W believe that President Y e l t s i n has chosen a
e
responsiblft course i n putting the issue to the people. He
proposes to have s p l e b i s c i t e on the future of the Russian
i
economy, as w e l l as the future of the Ruesian governmental
s t r u c t u r e , end I think that we w i l l support him i n that
e f f o r t . And as f a r as hypotheticals, we'll have t o deal with
them when they come along.
SECRETARY
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-14The s i t u a t i o n i s f a r too dynamic to t r y t o comment on any
precise possible a l t e r n a t i v e . They're j u s t quite innumerable
in nature and content, and I think i t ' s best f o r me t o withhold
any comment and indicate support for tne course that President
Y e l t s i n i s on.
MS. KOSKENALUSTA: W i l l the scope of the Russian aid program
approech that of the Marshall Plan a f t e r the Second World War,
and how do we plan to pay for t h i s plan?
As I said t o you i n my remarks, my role
tie re today was to o u t l i n e the s t r a t e g i c concept that the United
States has i n connection with Russia. The precise scope of the
aid program w i l l be following along. Certainly, president
Clinton w i l l be making t h i s a major focus of his summit meeting
with President Y e l t s i n on the 'Ith of A p r i l .
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER:
So I think i t ' s best for me not today t o comment on the scope
of the plan. But every era i s d i f f e r e n t . Every era involves
d i f f e r e n t resources. And I think analogies and metaphors ere
useful, but I think we need to work out a plan that i s
appropriate end do-able i n the current circumstances.
MR. MINER: Mr. Secretary, there are several questions here
asking i f our government is going to look to or possibly
encourage former President Gorbachev i n any of these -- look
for a mediatcr
or do we have any p o s i t i o n whatsoever
regarding Mr. Gorbachev?
SECRETARY CHRIgTOpHEB: Let me say that former President
Gorbachev, i chink, accomplished a great deal i n the former
Soviet Union i n moving forward and enabling the world to be
released from the pressures of the nuclear threat and
permitting the independence of the now Newly Independent
States. But I t h i n k he's a f i g u r e now consigned to h i s t o r y ,
and I think h i s t o r y w i l l evaluate him very p o s i t i v e l y .
But the f i r s t elected leader i n a century i n Russia i e
president Y e l t s i n . He i a there now. He i s the one person i n
that country who has the support of the Russian people, and I
would not think that we would t u r n back the p r i o r f i g u r e s , but
to support him and a l l of those i n Russia who believe i n reform
— democratic reform, free-market reform.
Mp. PEII.LY: Mr. Secretary, one of the areas where considerable
progress has been made i n the l a s t two years between Russia and
several of i t s nelghDors of the old Soviet Union and the
Western powers i s on the question of arms c o n t r o l — both
reducing the number of nuclear weapons and c o n t r o l l i n g t h e i r
dissemination.
In your view, are the events of t h i s past weekend l i k e l y t o
undermine that e f f o r t ?
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-13HEcyETARY cpigisTOPHER: we think not, and we hope not. There
has been considerable progress. Certainly, the START I
agreement and the START 11 agreement are major steps toward
enabling the United States to reduce i t s defense budget and
focus i t s e f f o r t s on .its own economy.
The dynflmic and samewhat turbulent s i t u a t i o n i n Russia i s one
that i s a matter of concern on t h i s subject, but a l l the more
reason why we think i t ' s important to move i n the d i r e c t i o n of
democracy and free-market reform there, so that they can move
to an early r a t i f i c a t i o n of START I I .
That question brings to mind the rather d i f f e r e n t i a l treatment
that has now existed i n seme of the Newly Independent States
with respect to the START I Treaty. I want to commend the
Republic of Belarus for having r a t i f i e d the START Treaty and
joined Che Non-Proliferation Treaty. And I want t o express
concern, over the fact that Ukraine has not yet done so, and to
express the hope thst they w i l l take prompt steps to move i n
that d i r e c t i o n .
MS. KQSKKNAUJSTA: This i s a question about Vietnam.
be the U.S. approach to and the embargo i n Vietnam?
What w i l l
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: As you know, the United States.has had
two primary preconditions to ending the embargo and to the
normalization of relationships with Vietnam. F i r s t was t h e i r
support f o r the United Nations peacekeeping e f f o r t s i n
Cambodia, and on that score I would say that Vietnam has
f u l f i l l e d i t s obligations.
The second precondition was that we would be s a t i s f i e d cn the
POW/MIA issue. And once again here considerable progress has
been made. The report of Senator John Kerry and the views of
Senator McCain 1 think are indications that progress has been
made here.
Our Administration w i l l be assessing that progress very
c a r e f u l l y to determine whether we can move f u r t h e r down the
road or down the "roadniap," to use the technical term, toward
normalization with Vietnam.
Personally, I t h i n k there are very strong business and
commercial i n t e r e s t s for our normalizing our relationships with
Vietnam aa soon as we can have the confidence that they are
coming — they're being very forthcoming with respect t o the
MIA and P W issue.
O
I think i t ' a unfortunate that many other countries around the
world ate g e t t i n g ahead of us i n t h e i r commercial endeavors i n
Vietnam, and I hope that we can enable our businesses and
industries to catch up by moving more r a p i d l y down the road —
down the "readmap," i f you w i l l .
frlK. HIKER; Mr. Secretary, another somewhat related question,
but there are quite a few people here that seem to be concerned
about the present Administration's p o l i c y toward Cuba.
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SECRETARY rpp^TOPHER: Well, out present p o l i c y toward Cuba i s
bound up, r e a l l y , i n the Cuban Democracy Act which was passed
in the last session of Congress. I t c a l l s f o r the maintenance
of the embargo; continuing to have sanctions against Cubs i n
the hope that that w i l l cause a change i n t h e i r governing
structure.
But at the aarce time, I think we should look at the plus
factors i n the Cuban Democracy Act. i t allows f o r considerably
more contact between the United States and Cuba, better
telscotmiuniceticns, better contacts of various others kinds.
But f o r the time being, I think that w e ' l l continue t h i s policy
of sanctions', of f i r m l y attempting to obtain a change i n the
leadership of the Cuban Government.
M . Q'CONNOR: Mr. Secretary, thank you.
R
(Applause)
M . O'CQNNPR: In order to keep f a i t h with the Secretary's
R
schedule, regrettably i t ' s necessary f o r us to conclude t «
h
question period et t h i s time.
we can't thank you enough f o r being with us. W hope that t h i s
e
is but the f i r s t of a number of v i s i t s that y o u ' l l be making to
Chicago i n the coming years. I t has been a great p r i v i l e g e to
have you with us. Won't you please j o i n me i n a f i n a l thank
you to Secretary Warren Christopher.
(Sustained applause)
# ##
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DOCUMENT NO.
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002a. briefing
paper
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Meeting with Russian Constitutional Court Chairman Valeriy Zorkin
(2 pages)
03/15/1993
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l), P5
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Press (Philip J. (PJ) Crowley)
OA/Box Number: 3106
FOLDER TITLE:
Russia [6]
2011-0516-S
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Freedom of Information Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)l
PI
P2
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b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the FOI A]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy |(a)(6)of the PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfilc defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
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DOCUMENT NO.
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002b. talking
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SUBJECT/TITLE
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Points to be Made for Meeting with Russian Constitutional Court
Chairman Valeriy Zorkin (1 page)
ca.
03/15/1993
RESTRICTION
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National Security Council
Press (Philip J. (PJ) Crowley)
OA/Box Number: 3106
FOLDER TITLE:
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2011-0516-S
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PI
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b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) of the F O I A |
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
h(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA)
National Security Classified Information |(a)(l) of the PRA)
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA|
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfilc defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
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DOCUMENT NO.
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002c. letter
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President William J. Clinton (2
pages)
03/11/1993
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
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Press (Philip J. (PJ) Crowley)
OA/Box Number: 3106
FOLDER TITLE:
Russia [6]
2011-0516-S
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PI
P2
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b(l) National security classified information | ( b ) ( l ) o f the F O I A |
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) of the F O I A ]
b(J) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) o f t h c FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA)
National Security Classified Information |(a)(l) o f t h c PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(J) of the PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) o f t h c PRA]
Pd Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfilc defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
��Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
002d. report
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
02/16/1993
U.S. Government Report (2 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Press (Philip J. (PJ) Crowley)
OA/Box Number:
3106
FOLDER TITLE:
Russia [6]
2011-0516-S
kh640
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) of the FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthc FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthc FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) of the FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA)
National Security Classified Information |(a)(l) of the PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthc PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) ofthc PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
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No.004 P.02
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Assistant secretary/Spokesman
(Geneva, Switzerland)
February 25, 1993
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
JOINT U.S.-RUSSIAN STATEMENT
O
N
NAGORNO-KARABAKH
Russian Mission
Thursday, February 25, 1993
The Russian Federation and the United States of
America confirm their determination to continue efforts
within the CSCE-sponsored Minsk Group to obtain a peaceful
settlement to the conflict on and around Nagorno-Karabakh.
The course of events once again demonstrates the danger for
the Armenian and Azeri peoples of any attempt to settle the
conflict by military means.
A l l sides should look to remove obstacles to serious
negotiations within the framework of the CSCE Minsk
Conference on Nagorno-Karabakh with the participation of a l l
interested parties. Only a compromise p o l i t i c a l agreement on
the basis of mutual concessions and mutual benefit can be
strong and durable enough to bring peace and s t a b i l i t y back
to this region.
Russia and the United States strongly appeal to a l l
parties to the conflict to accept their historic
responsibility for the destiny of their peoples and to
demonstrate the political will to settle the conflict solely
through peaceful means. The most important taks now i s to
put an immediate end to the bloodshed.
They urge the conflicting parties, as a gesture of
good w i l l and as the f i r s t step toward overcoming mutual
distrust, voluntarily to refrain from offensive operations in
Nagorno-Karabakh and neighboring areas and to stop the use of
military aviation and missile-artillery systems, the
employment of which causes needless c i v i l i a n casualties.
Russia and the United states await a positive response to
this proposal.
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U.S. Department of state
Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman
(Brussels, Belgium)
For Planning Purposes Only
Not for Release
H2l£:
As of February 26, 1993
1
a
>
n
#
Please check with USls for ground transportation
schedule.
Friday. February 26. -jgoi
9:15 a.m.
Arrive NATO Headquarters
OPEN PRESS COVERAGE
10:00 a.m.
NAC Meeting, NATO Headquarters
PRESS POOL COVERAGE (NATO TV and
s t i l l photographers only)
12;35 p.m. Secretary General Woerner's
Press Conference
12:55 p.m.
Secretary's Press Conference
OPEN PRESS COVERAGE
Press Note: 45 minutes f i l i n g time.
2:10 p.m.
Press Bus Departs for Airport
2 :
Depart Brussels, Belgium enroute Andrews
Air Force Base
i n
?L?; '
LOCAL
8:45 a.m.
E S T
5 : 2 5
EST
1
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FLIGHT TIME: 8 hrs., 40 mine.
TIME CHANGE: -6 hrs.
Arrive Andrews Air Force Base.
###
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OP STATU
the A s s i s t a n t Secretary/SpoknAnuin
(Geneva, Switzerland)
PRESS CONFERENCE BY
SECRETARY OF STATE WARREN CHRISTOPHER
AND
FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI KOZYREV
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 25. 1993
RUSSIAN EMBASSY
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND
I
MINISTER JTOZYRKV (THROUGH TRANSTJkTOR) : Ladies and
gentleman,
I would like in the Ciibt place to eApieub my satisfaction
with the very bueineee-like meeting that we had, especially
with the fact that i t was not just a get-acquainted aesflion.
although, of course, I am quite happy to meet personally the
secretary and also with thn ai-.mnfipheret that we developed right
from the very outset., but I am aleo eaiiafied with the very
bueinvee-like discussion that we've juet had.
This meeting made i t possible for us to see once again that,
in the multi-polar world that we live now, Russia and the
United States, instead of confronting each other, are in a
position to realize the partnership relationship and che
cooperative relationship that has been already agreed to.
And a major event that would make i t possible to broaden that
cooperation, to remove a l l a r t i f i c i a l delaye, and to
accftlerar-.A i t , would be a summit meeting of the two
Presidents. At leabt we agreed, and this i s something that we
want to recommend to the two Presidents, that the Summit
Meeting take place April the 4th.
1 can t e l l you that thin dar.ft has h««n suggested by the U.S.
eide. The U.S. side also suggested several other dates
fcArlier dates — but we believe that the meeting calls for
additional preparation, therefore we picked out of the dates
suggested by the U.S. side a later date, eo wc believe that i t
could be better prepared.
We alflo agreed that we would proceed forthwith with
preparatione Tur the Summit meeting on a l l levels, including a
possibility, i f there ie a need for that, of an additional
meeting between the two of us.
We dincuRRftri several questions related, among other things, to
the fact that the two sides are now concentrating on their
domestic economic situation. But this i s not to suggest that
there i s less interest in cooperation between che two sides.
On the contrary, we believe that cooperation and assistance to
Russian reforms is in the agenda, in the domestic agenda, of
the two countries.
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we also discussed che possibility tor. and tbe need for.
s t r a t e g i c cooperation, including: opening access to markets,
state support of invsBtm«nr.; promoting the rescheduling of
Rut-tola's eAiemal debt; the p o s s i b i l i t y of Russia gaining
acceoe to conventional arms markets, of course, under the
conditions that there would be f u l l compliance with the
e x i s t i n g international norms and standards.
We also discussed situations in sevexal flash points, and I
appreciate the fact that the Secretary of State shared some of
the information that he brought back from his t r i p to the
Kiddle Bast, and I must alco note that that trip has resulted
in fiomft poRltiv« movement i n the diractinn in which we Intend
to move further as co-sponsors. That i s the direction of the
peace process.
And I believe that Mr. Secretary w i l l have a few words to say
on h i s t r i p .
I can t e l l you that there i s a symbolic coincidence in our
b i l a t e r a l movement, although from Geneva we intend to go i n
d i f f e r e n t geographic directions. I'm leaving for Copenhagen
and MT. secretary for Brussels. But Brussels i s the
headquarters of the European Economic Community and NATO,
while Copenhagen and nenmarlc i s the coordinator of the
European Economic Community. Therefore in the p o l i t i c a l
sense, we w i l l be moving in the same direction
that i s the
d i r e c t i o n of broader European cooperation.
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER:
Thank you very much Mr. Minister.
Foreign Minister Kozyrev and I have had a very good, and as he
said, a business-like session. I believe we have established
a good working relationship, building on our prior contacts
and building on contacts between Presidents Clinton and
Y e l t s i n , which we've been i n touch quite frequently and they
have been since the f i r s t days of our new administration.
Our meeting today has set the stage for a Summit between the
two Presidents. As the Minister said, we are pleased to
announce that Presidents Clinton and Y e l t s i n w i l l be meeting
together on the 4th of April at a s i t * to be mutually-agreed
upon during the inter-regnum between now and then. President
Clinton sent me to this meeting today to underscore his strong
personal support for the reform policies of the Yeltsin
Administration. I t i s of the utmost importance to the United
States, and indeed to the wftrld, that President Yeltsin's
reform e f f o r t s succeed. A strong and cooperative U.S. -Rubuiciii
relationship, a relationship of genuine partnership, i s of the
highest p r i o r i t y for President Clinton and his administration.
The united states and Russia have important interests in
Common. Today, as Minister Kozyrev and I prepared the ground
for the summit, we discussed a full range of these common
i n t e r e s t s . I gave Minister Kozyrev a thumb-nail skeUwh wf my
t r i p to seven Middle Bast countries, and we discussed the
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reapective consultations chat I've had td-th the parties in
those countries. I t i c an important beginning for our
relationship, a very hopetul retieetion on what f h
.«
partnership may mean that Mr. Kosyrev and I today are able to
jointly announce that we will be extending invitations for the
ninth Round of the bilateral Arab-israeli negotiacione, to be
held in Washington during the month of April.
W also exchanged views on the continuing bloodshed and
e
suffering in the former Yugoslavia, and we explored way to
promote a peaceful settlement there. W are commicced, both
e
of us and our governments, to consulting and aoordinating very
carefully and closely in pursuit of that goal, in addition r.o
the matters I've mentioned, we also dealt with questions of
arms control, including the important matter of proliferation.
And we discussed economic cooperation, which can uerve our
mutual interests.
The United States is determined to support the cause of reform
in Kueeia. I t is in the interest of the world, as well as
being in the interest of the Russian people.
ThanX you very much.
Wc would be glad to take some of your questions....
Q: Mr. Secretary, last night you were unable to announce a
date for the resumption of the talks, and today you arc. What
changed between last night and today? And secondly, do you
have Palestinian agreement to come to this ninth round of
talks in April?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Well, first and perhaps most obvious,
what has happened between lasc night and today i s that I've
had an opportunity to meet with Minister Kozyrev and give him
a report on my consultations in the seven Middle Baetern
countries. Of course he had been keeping up with me as I
followed along. Put until then i t was not appropriate for me
to indicate that we could set a date as being sometime in
April. W haven't set a specific date. But, I think that i s
e
probably the most important thing, we are co-sponsors. W
e
are working closely together on this. W are consulting
e
closely together, we need each other's cooperation and
support. So i t would have been quite improper. I think, for
me to have tried to go ahead last night. I ' l l allow time for
translation, then I ' l l answer the second part of the question.
On che second part of the question: we've been consulting
closely with the Palestinians. Last uiyht and again this
morning. All I can say at the present tine i s that we felt
confident enough about the situation to have indicated chat we
think the next round of these negotiations should consnence in
April. I might also say, as I've said before, that at every
country that I went to in the Middle East there was a strong
indication that these negotiations should resume in the
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,
interest of peece. And that is a very strong motivating
fac.ror. We are continuing to work on the problem, but we felt
tliere were enough positive signs to make the statement that
I've made today. And incidently, we'll have a somewhat longer
statement that we'll pass out to you on che subject, that you
can get from our assistants.
Q: Mr. Secretary, are you essantially trying to force the
hands of che parties here, by sending out invlcations and
essentially forcing them to come to moke a decision? And i f I
may ask Minister Kozyrev, in your opening statement you talked
about discussing Russian access to international arms markets,
the Secretary talked about non-proliferation. Would i t be
accurate to write a headline that says "U.S. and Russia
DiecucE Expanding Russia's Sales of Weapons Around the World"
-- i s that wr.at the U.S. and Russia are up co right now?
Mr. Secretary ... on the Middle East f i r s t .
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Well, with respect to the
announcement on the re-commencement on the calks in April,
we're simply putting that forward aa our best judgement as to
when the parties would like to recommence thee© negotiations.
This i s based upon my best estimate of the situation after
having concentrated on i t over the last eight days. As I
said, I think the very strong consensus in the Middle sasc i s
that the parties want to return to these negotiations- This
is a historic moment. I've been surprised by the number of
people who have told me that, the number of leaders of
countries who have told me that in the Middle Bast. They
think this may be a one-time opportunity for peace and I think
they will a l l want to graop the moment. And, i t io that
context chac this statement was made, rather than trying to
force anyone's hand.
Q;
Minister, and the expansion of arms sales . . .
MIKISTBR KOZYRUV (THROUCUI TRAMCIATOR): Well, I would suggest
that you read carefully the text of the joint statement of the
two sides on the Middle Bast and the impression that can be
gained from the discussions that we had i s that there has
indeed been a very significant movement, including in the
direction of an acceptable resolution of the deportation
problem, we intend to continue our work and in the next few
days in Moscow we'll have a meeting with the Palestinians. We
invited them to come to Moscow. So i t would serve a common
interest i f we continue to move along the path of peace
process, and I believe that as we continue that work, wc would
be able to fix a specific date.
Now with respect ro your question.
Well, I b e l i e v e that we
had a v e r y conetrvctiv©, pragmatie d i s c u s s i o n , tt mutually
satisfying disnission, of the question of Russia gaining
access to such weapons markets, and markets of such weapons
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and weapons syatcma, which instead of couneering the nonproliferation regime would rather promote the strengthening
that regime and in a general sense, uverall stabilization.
of
Q: Mr. Minictcr, in your discueeions, I believe, that you've
Spent considerable time disouss-ing disarmament issues.
Sometimes these issues are not fully wider stood in our country
and in the United States, so could you t e l l us whether or not
you had some specific results coming out of the discussions?
MINISTER KOZYREV (THROUGH TRANSLATOR): we discussed the need
for coordinating our approaches to ratification process of the
START I I treaty. This treaty serves the interests of both
sides, and also the interests of world stability and we also
discussed the future agenda, ecpecially ways to strengthen the
non-proliferation regime that bans proliferation of nuclear
and other weapons of mass destruction, and most destabilizing
arms systems
Q: Because I'm baffled, Mr. Foreign Minister, and I'm really
directing the question to the Secretary, how Russia pumping
more arms into the Middle Rast somehow serves the cause of
proliferation.
May I ask. Mr. Secretary, have you attempted
to impose any restriction on the kind of weapons and, indeed,
i f Russia i s selling weapons to gain capital, wouldn't that
mean that the United States needn't provide as much technical
aid as maybe you would otherwise be. inclined to provide?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: we've had a very preliminary
discussion of this matter. There i s a whole congery Of issues
here that the Minister and Z could only begin to touch on
today, AS he mentioned ratification of SALT I I * , the
ratification of SALT I * by those who haven't ratified the nonproliferation regime, defense conversion, various investment
issues, we certainly reached no conclusion on that subject.
We identified a number of agenda items for future discusBion
at subsequent meetings between our experts, and perhaps at
higher levels. But I would, I think, guide you away from any
indication that at this very f i r s t meeting, when we were
getting acquainted and laying down a agenda, that we reached
any conclusions at a l l . But rather, I think, established a
working relationship for the resolution of these matters in
the future. And also established, I think, a very sound basis
fur consultation.
Q:
Mr. Minister:
Three questioub.
MINISTER KOZYREV (AWER SPEAKING IN RUSSIAN) :
Okay, I make
self-translation. I f not correct, then Z stand to be
corrected by the interpreter.
* START I and START I I
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In seeking foe ai-ros ivutx.-kets, Che most important issue i s to
choose appropriate elientc. And now ity client will be
Margaret Warner.
Q: Thank you Mr. Minlater. I have three related questions
about the plans £or the air l i f t into Bosnia. First of a l l •
do you support the current U.S./UN plan to have aa a i r l i f t ?
secondly, would you support i t i f i t was neceasary co use
combat planes to protect the convoys or the a i r drops?
Thirdly, would Russia participate in the a i r drop in any way?
MINISTER KOZYREV (THROUGH TRANSLATOR); Well, I believe i t i s
quite natural for a lady to anticipate things a l i t t l e bit.
well anyway, this idea has not yet been officially announced
but. I can t e l l you that we believe that i t goes I n the
positive direction and of course wc should use a l l available
channels so that we can deliver humanitarian assiotance to
people living in Bosnia, to Muslims and to other people.
9 n#
�<ORIG> UPI
<TOR> 930126171536
<TEXT>al328na—wr w b c - c l i n t o n - p i c k e r i n g : 5 1 5 p e s I d 1-26 0463
(complete w r i t e t h r u _ c l i n t o n statement; d e t a i l s )
P i c k e r i n g p i c k e d as ambassador t o Moscow@
WASHINGTON (UPI) _ P r e s i d e n t C l i n t o n Tuesday nominated Thomas
P i c k e r i n g , t h e c a r e e r d i p l o m a t who helped engineer t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l
e f f o r t a g a i n s t I r a q w h i l e U.S. ambassador t o t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s , t o be
ambassador t o Russia.
P i c k e r i n g , who h o l d s t h e h i g h e s t rank i n t h e F o r e i g n S e r v i c e and
speaks Spanish, French, S w a h i l i and A r a b i c , was tapped by P r e s i d e n t Bush
t o serve a t t h e U n i t e d Nations i n 1988. He was most r e c e n t l y ambassador
to India.
Besides s e r v i n g as envoy t o I s r a e l and as ambassador t o Jordan,
N i g e r i a and E l Salvador, he a l s o h e l d p o s t s a t t h e S t a t e Department,
i n c l u d i n g as a s s i s t a n t s e c r e t a r y o f s t a t e f o r oceans and i n t e r n a t i o n a l
e n v i r o n m e n t a l and s c i e n t i f i c a f f a i r s .
I n a statement, C l i n t o n pledged t o * Mo e v e r y t h i n g I can t o support
democratic and economic r e f o r m ' ' i n Russia, s a y i n g , * ' I t i s e s s e n t i a l
t h a t we c o n t i n u e t o expand and develop our r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Russia.''
''Ambassador P i c k e r i n g has demonstrated t h r o u g h o u t h i s c a r e e r t h a t he
has t h e a b i l i t y and wisdom t o c a r r y out t h i s i m p o r t a n t assignment. I
have f u l l c o n f i d e n c e i n him,'' C l i n t o n s a i d .
White House spokesman George Stephanopoulos e a r l i e r noted P i c k e r i n g ' s
years o f e x p e r i e n c e , i n c l u d i n g a t t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s where he s a i d t h e
career d i p l o m a t ' ' l e d t h e d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t t o achieve S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l
s o l i d a r i t y i n o p p o s i t i o n t o I r a q ' s i l l e g a l o c c u p a t i o n o f Kuwait.''
And though h i s e f f o r t s t o achieve peace i n C e n t r a l America and t h e
Middle East and t o curb t h e p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f n u c l e a r weapons, t h e
spokesman added: ''Tom P i c k e r i n g ' s r e c o r d o f achievement demonstrates
t h a t he stands a t t h e t o p o f h i s p r o f e s s i o n . ' '
C l i n t o n met w i t h P i c k e r i n g i n L i t t l e Rock l a s t month and
Stephanopoulos s a i d t h e p r e s i d e n t ' 'was deeply impressed by h i s
knowledge and wisdom.''
P i c k e r i n g , 62, was s e l e c t e d , he added, ''because ( C l i n t o n ) b e l i e v e s
t h e r e ' s no more i m p o r t a n t c h a l l e n g e than a s s i s t i n g our Russian f r i e n d s
as t h e y attempt t o c r e a t e democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s and a f r e e market
system.''
''This i s s u r e l y a t a s k worthy o f Ambassador P i c k e r i n g ' s
e x t r a o r d i n a r y t a l e n t s , ' ' he s a i d .
P i c k e r i n g , who w i l l be based i n Moscow, w i l l work w i t h Strobe
T a l b o t t , a former t o p e d i t o r o f Time magazine and f r i e n d o f t h e new
p r e s i d e n t ' s . T a l b o t t was r e c e n t l y a p p o i n t e d as a s p e c i a l envoy i n charge
of t h e newly independent s t a t e s o f t h e former S o v i e t Union.
P i c k e r i n g was born Nov. 5, 1931, i n Orange, N.J., and was graduated
Phi Beta Kappa from Bowdoin College i n 1953. He r e c e i v e d a 1954 master's
degree from t h e T u f t s U n i v e r s i t y School o f Law and Diplomacy and earned
another master's i n 1956 as a F u l b r i g h t Scholar a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f
Melbourne i n A u s t r a l i a .
u p i 01-26-93 05:12 pes
�THE WHITE HOUSE
O f f i c e o f the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
February 4, 1993
February 3, 1993
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
SUBJECT:
Delegation of A u t h o r i t y w i t h Respect t o Reports
Concerning Russian M i l i t a r y Exports
By v i r t u e of the a u t h o r i t y vested i n me by the C o n s t i t u t i o n and
laws of the United States of America, i n c l u d i n g Section 301 o f
T i t l e 3 of the United States Code, I hereby delegate t o the
Secretary of State a l l f u n c t i o n s vested i n me by Section 599B of
T i t l e V of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, F i s c a l Year 1993 (Pub. L. 102-391).
These f u n c t i o n s s h a l l be exercised i n c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h
appropriate departments and agencies.
The Secretary o f State i s authorized and d i r e c t e d t o p u b l i s h t h i s
memorandum i n the Federal Register.
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
# # #
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Office of Press and Communications - Philip J. “P.J.” Crowley
Creator
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National Security Council
Is Part Of
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<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36076">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Identifier
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2011-0516-S
Description
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This collection consists of White House press releases from the files of P.J. Crowley. Crowley served as Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Senior Director of Public Affairs the National Security Council from 1997–1999. The press releases are arranged by subject or, as in the case of the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, by date.
Provenance
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Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Extent
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370 folders in 33 boxes
Text
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Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Russia [6]
Creator
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National Security Council
Office of Press and Communications
Philip "PJ" Crowley
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2011-0516-S
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Box 13
<a href="http://catalog.archives.gov/id/7585702"></a>
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36076">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Source
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7585702
42-t-7585702-20110516s-013-001-2015
Provenance
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Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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Adobe Acrobat Document
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Preservation-Reproduction-Reference