-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/04da2290a7820666497610614a734fd1.pdf
374c1833e8ae91231793252c4c1cbedd
PDF Text
Text
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
001a. talking
points
001b. paper
001c. paper
00Id. paper
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
Haitian Migrant Processing (2 pages)
ca.
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
06/09/1994
New Sanctions (2 pages)
ca.
06/09/1994
Haitian Migrant Processing (1 page)
Pl/b(l)
Pl/b(l)
ca.
The UN Mission in Haiti (1 page)
06/09/1994
Pl/b(l)
ca.
06/09/1994
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Press (Philip J. (PJ) Crowley)
OA/Box Number: 3105
FOLDER TITLE:
Haiti [1]
2011-0516-S
kh681
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - (44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) o f t h e FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) o f t h e FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) of the F O I A |
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) o f t h e FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) o f t h e FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) o f t h e F O I A j
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) o f t h e FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) o f t h e PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) o f t h e PRA)
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) o f t h e PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�MAY CONTAIN DOCUMENTS CLASSIFIED
UP TO TOP SECRET/CODEWORD
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Box INVENTORY
OFFICE: NSC PRESS
STAFF OFFICER: P. .1. CROWLEY
PREPARED BY: NATALIE WOZNIAK
BOX NUMBER
DATE: 12/21/2000
FILE TITLE(S) OR DESCRIPTION(S)
Haiti
Hispanice
Honduras
Hong Kong
Human Rights
Hungary
Iceland
Immigration
India
Intelligence
Intemational Broadcasting
Iran
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Ivory Coast
Japan
Jamaica
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kuwait
Korea
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Lebanon
Liberia
Libya
DO NOT WRITE BELOW I RECORDS MANAGEMENT USE ONL Y
Reviewed by:.
MAY CONTAIN DOCUMENTS CLASSIFIED
UP TO TOP SECRET/CODEWORD
(CONTINUED)
�MAY CONTAIN DOCUMENTS CLASSIFIED
UP TO TOP SECRET/CODEWORD
Date:
BOX NUMBER
MAY CONTAIN DOCUMENTS CLASSIFIED
UP TO TOP SECRET/CODEWORD
�MAY CONTAIN DOCUMENTS CLASSIFIED
UP TO TOP SECRET/CODEWORD
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
BOX INVENTORY
OFFICE: NSC PRESS
STAFF OFFICER: P. J. CROWLEY
PREPARED BY: NATALIE WOZNIAK
BOX NUMBER
DATE: 12/21/2000
FILE TITLE(S) OR DESCRIPTION(S)
Lithuania
Malaysia
Mexico
Middle East - General
Morocco
END
•
DO NOT WRITE BELOW I RECORDS MANAGEMENT USE ONL Y
Reviewed by:_
MAY CONTAIN DOCUMENTS CLASSIFIED
UP TO TOP SECRET/CODEWORD
�MAY CONTAIN DOCUMENTS CLASSIFIED
UP TO TOP SECRET/CODEWORD
Date:
BOX NUMBER
MAY CONTAIN DOCUMENTS CLASSIFIED
UP TO TOP SECRET/CODEWORD
�THE WHITE HOUSE
O f f i c e of the Press Secretary
BACKGROUND BRIEFING BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
June 22, 1994
The B r i e f i n g Room
3:45 P.M. EDT
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The purpose of t h i s
b r i e f i n g i s t o f i l l i n as best we can t h e d e t a i l s of what t h e
p a r t i c u l a r measure t h a t was announced e a r l i e r does and answer your
questions as t o t h e consequence. My colleagues here are experts i n
t h i s . There i s one other person who damn w e l l b e t t e r get here from
OFAC. But we're going t o go ahead without him.
Q
Couldn't you make t h e announcement again?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. I w i l l s t a r t from
the top. This i s a c t u a l l y from her announcement. Do you r e a l l y want
me t o read i t ? Okay.
I t says: "As p a r t of t h e C l i n t o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s
commitment t o r e s t o r e democracy t o H a i t i , t h e President has imposed
a d d i t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l sanctions t o block assets of a l l H a i t i a n
n a t i o n a l s r e s i d i n g i n H a i t i . The order also reconfirms p r i o r
blockings o f named persons who have p a r t i c i p a t e d i n or supported the
i l l e g a l regime i n H a i t i . "
I s t h i s ' a comfortable speed, i f you're t a k i n g i t down?
Okay.
"And extends t o a l l H a i t i a n f a m i l y members of already
blocked i n d i v i d u a l s wherever r e s i d e n t . Blocked assets include assets
i n t h e United States or subject t o U.S. j u r i s d i c t i o n , such as
deposits i n f o r e i g n banks of U.S. banks."
This new executive order i s e f f e c t i v e immediately. I t
does not a f f e c t property of the United States government, t h e United
Nations, t h e Organization of American States or f o r e i g n d i p l o m a t i c
missions in. H a i t i . I t i s also i n a p p l i c a b l e t o nongovernmental
organizations p r o v i d i n g e s s e n t i a l humanitarian assistance or
conducting refugee and m i g r a t i o n operations i n H a i t i .
Q . How many people are a f f e c t e d compared t o t h e
previous number?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm r e v e r t i n g back t o
l e c t u r e h a l l techniques here and am watching as t h e pens go down, and
then I ' l l continue and f i n i s h t h i s , and then I ' l l take your answers.
This executive order i s intended t o t a r g e t p r o p e r t i e d
Haitians who have supported the de facto regime and prolonged the
s u f f e r i n g of t h e H a i t i a n people. We w i l l continue t o work c l o s e l y
w i t h nongovernmental groups t o minimize the, impact of t h e new
sanctions on t h e i r operations i n H a i t i .
This executive order does not a f f e c t f i n a n c i n g f o r
continued shipments of basic f o o d s t u f f s and medical supplies t o
MORE
�- 2-
H a i t i , as w e l l as t r a n s a c t i o n s t h a t are associated w i t h such
shipments, consistent w i t h previous executive orders and U.N.
sanctions.
The new sanctions the President has imposed w i l l amplify
our message t o the H a i t i a n m i l i t a r y leadership and those who have
supported them, t h a t we are determined t o b r i n g about t h e r e t u r n of
democracy and President A r i s t i d e t o H a i t i .
Coupled w i t h previous a c t i o n s , t h e freeze executed today
by President C l i n t o n w i l l make i t unmistakably c l e a r t o t h e H a i t i a n
e l i t e t h a t i t w i l l not escape the consequences of continued r u l e by
the i l l e g i t i m a t e de facto regime.
We urge those e l i t e s t h i s now and t o j o i n i n t h e
r e s t o r a t i o n of democracy t o H a i t i .
A c t u a l l y , I have a sets of Qs and As here, which are
r a t h e r w e l l s t r u c t u r e d . So, i f you l i k e —
Q
Did you w r i t e your own questions?
(Laughter.)
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Of course. Of course.
L i s t e n , t h i s i s an exercise best conducted alone anyway, so —
(laughter) —
Q
Q
• This i s r e a l l y
Q
I s t h i s a new way of —
Could we ask how many people are a f f e c t e d , though?
—
And then, i s t h a t one of your Qs?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, you can. I t ' s
there, b u t we can go out of t u r n i f you l i k e . A l r i g h t . Hang on.
Has my colleague gotten here yet? No? Okay, a l r i g h t .
The t o t a l number of persons who might be a f f e c t e d by
t h i s we cannot know. (Laughter.) Wait, j u s t a minute. You have t o
hear t h e subordinate clause before you have t o decide whether the
g i g g l e f a c t o r i s involved. F i r s t of a l l , we assume t h a t t h e H a i t i a n
poor are not l i k e l y t o have assets i n t h e c o n t r o l of U.S. banks or
subject t o t h i s freeze. So, wherever they are, t h i s freeze gets t o
the wealthy, however many of them there are. I don't t h i n k t h a t ' s
laughable, e s p e c i a l l y i f you discover tha/t your property i s frozen i n
Miami, or wherever.
Now, i n a d d i t i o n , i n order t o ensure immediate
a p p l i c a t i o n against these wealthy e l i t e s , more than 250 i n d i v i d u a l s
were specified,as being covered by the order i n implementing
i n s t r u c t i o n s t h a t accompanied the order as d i s t r i b u t e d t o U.S. banks.
So t h i s executive order catches any H a i t i a n c i t i z e n who has assets
w i t h i n t h e g r i p of t h e United States government. But, i n a d d i t i o n ,
there was a l i s t of 250 named persons t o whom t h i s executive order
has been e x p l i c i t l y applied.
Q
Could you characterize those people?
Q
What k i n d of people?'
G e n e r i c a l l y , who are these
250 people?
here.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I see my colleague i s
How i s i t you managed t o run three blocks and not look warm?
The l i s t was prepared f o r t h i s purpose. I t h i n k t h a t we
can c h a r a c t e r i z e who was selected t o go on i t w i t h o u t necessarily
p r o v i d i n g t h e names.. I don't know i f there's a problem about g i v i n g
the names. Do you t h i n k so?
MORE
�- 3-
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The names have been
supplied to the U.S. financial institutions to ensure that i n
addition to every other covered individual, any Haitian national
resident of Haiti — but these people in particular are, i n fact,
s p e c i f i c a l l y blocked by banks, and so they have the names so they can
immediately take action on these individuals.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
question here i s , can we provide the l i s t ?
I think the logical
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
• SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
provide the l i s t ?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
We can?
Yes. •
"
Okay.
When could you
Later today.
Q
You said there were 250 names on the f i r s t
and I thought there were 600.
list,
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This i s a new l i s t .
This i s a l i s t that was associated with the executive order that j u s t
went into effect.
Q
I s i t the feeling — i f I can press that question,
i s i t the feeling that t h i s second request•covers a larger group of
people than the f i r s t — 600 i n the f i r s t , are you trying to pick up
folks who you missed, are you trying to h i t a larger category of
folks trying to stop? Obviously, there was a — rush to switch
accounts out of U.S. banks, and a f i r s t order was implemented. We're
trying to get a sense of whether the horse has l e f t the barn, of .
whether you're catching a small group of people who theoretically
f e l l through the cracks, or whether you acted to get a broad group
after the rush to switch assets prompted by the i n i t i a l order.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
sweeping and decisive.
Q
This order i s more
But does i t cover a larger group of people?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm — that was dot,
dot, dot. As to who got caught, one must l i s t e n to who i s screaming
in the next couple of days. I expect that we w i l l hear from t h e i r
attorneys i n due course.
Remember, we are not aiming necessarily for vast numbers
of persons. What we're aiming for are.persons who happen to have
assets that are within the grasp of t h i s order. And as I said
before, there i s no way for us to know, conclusively, how extensive
that number of persons might be.
On the other hand, the l i s t of 250 people that was
provided i n association with t h i s order was carefully devised to be
as close to a smart bomb f i n a n c i a l l y as we could get.
Q
What indication do you have that you're not simply
putting a freeze on a bunch of empty accounts, that there are, i n
fact, assets there that have not been shifted out somewhere else
where you can't get ahold of them?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Of course, you would
never have that information, but i t ' s broader than j u s t accounts,
i t ' s property and interest and property in the United States subject
MORE
�- 4 -
to U.S. j u r i s d i c t i o n and f o r e i g n branches of U.S. banks.
Moreover,
i t would p r o h i b i t f i n a n c i a l transactions as w e l l by t h e black
minority.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I ' d ask you t o give a
l i t t l e more d e t a i l about the composition of t h e second l i s t .
That
i s , i n terms of whether or not i t i s r e s t r i c t e d t o persons supporting
the regime, or represents a broader category of persons.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I t h i n k i t ' s a' broad
cross-section o f those i n d i v i d u a l s who, i n a d d i t i o n t o the standard
l a i d out i n t h e executive order, a l l H a i t i a n n a t i o n a l s resident i n
H a i t i includes s p e c i f i c a l l y these people by name t o ensure, i n f a c t ,
t h a t f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s have caught these people i n t h e net as
w e l l . I t was a l i s t devised i n c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h those s p e c i f i c a l l y
acknowledged of these i n d i v i d u a l s and names.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Please c o r r e c t me i f
I'm wrong; I could be. But t h i s applies not merely t o those who are
known t o be d i r e c t l y i n p o l i t i c a l support of the regime, but t o those
who are e s s e n t i a l l y deemed t o have p r o f i t e d through t h e i r
associations and t r a n s a c t i o n s w i t h them. So. i t i s a wider c i r c l e of
persons, and a broader standard f o r who s h a l l be a f f e c t e d .
Q
Understanding t h a t you don't have a t o t a l number of
people t h a t t h i s i s going t o a f f e c t , you have an approximate idea.
Do you also have an approximate idea of how much money t h i s e n t a i l s ?
M i l l i o n s and m i l l i o n s ? A few hundred thousand?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There i s no way t o have
an estimate because those numbers are not kept anywhere i n t h e
system. The p o i n t abput t h i s measure i s t h a t i t severs t h e a b i l i t y
of wealthy H a i t i a n s t o hold property and assets i n t h e United States
of America, a place where people l i k e t o hold property and assets.
I t i s a very severe message t o them about t h e f u t u r e . So I w i l l say
q u i t e b l u n t l y t h a t i f you t h i n k t h a t you have t o know how many
d o l l a r s are involved i n order t o assess t h e punch t h i s c a r r i e s , you
are not q u i t e catching t h e way i n which t h e message i s phrased.
I t i s t e l l i n g a community of people who are accustomed
t o regarding t h e United States as a backyard t h a t i t i s n ' t .
Q
But t h e question about whether i t could be empty
accounts I don't t h i n k has r e a l l y been adequately answered. I s there
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
I said before.
Because i t can't be,- as
Q
So there's a chance, though, t h a t some of t h a t
money could have been put i n accounts —
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
Of course, always a
chance.
Q
And could you also j u s t explain f o r those of us who
don't always look i n t o t h i s i n great d e t a i l , generally who those
people are? I mean, could i t range from f a c t o r y owners t o drug
dealers, o r who are we t a l k i n g about?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
dealers have t h a t on t h e i r business cards.
Q
Are they entrepreneur??
I'm not sure t h e drug
Who are these people?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They w i l l be a crosss e c t i o n , arid when you get the l i s t , y o u ' l l have a chance t o have a
MORE
�- 5-
look at that yourself.
elite.
But i t w i l l be a cross-section of the Haitian
Q
Will countries i n the Caribbean be following suit?
Have you a l l been talking to other countries down there who might
also be able to freeze assets?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have an e a r l i e r
executive order, which has stopped dollar transfers out of H a i t i .
And we are s t i l l talking to banks i n the region and elsewhere to try
to secure t h e i r voluntary cooperation with that standard. Of course,
at the time that that e a r l i e r measure went into effect, the United
States accounted for a l i t t l e b i t over 80 -percent of the volume by
dollar of what was going through there. So, i h effect, we had the
lion's share; i t gave us our leverage; and we used i t . But, of
course, we would l i k e for others to back us up.
The U.N. sanction that we have does not make that kind
of approach mandatory for other banks, though i t urges them to
consider it.. So we are out talking to them about that.
I have not even thought through myself yet or talked to
my colleagues about whether t h i s p a r t i c u l a r measure can be replicated
elsewhere or whether i t ' s advisable to t r y . I think i t ' s s u f f i c i e n t
at t h i s point to say what I've said already, which i s , i t . denies the
United States as a place of investment to the Haitian e l i t e and costs
them what they have invested here. That i s a very stern message.
Q
Would you explain the legal language that i t
freezes the assets of Haitian nationals residing i n H a i t i , and then
the families of the 250 named individual wherever they reside? Why
not simply freeze the assets of the Haitian nationals wherever?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I f you froze the assets
of Haitians wherever, you would get a c l a s s of persons who
e s s e n t i a l l y are expatriate, who have severed t h e i r l i v i n g t i e s with
Haiti, who l i v e elsewhere, work elsewhere, and who don't deserve to
be sucked into t h i s .
The President of Haiti i s here for the purpose of
continuing his struggle to be returned to the pursuit of his
constitutional obligations.
Q
Can people named i n the l i s t move and reclaim
control of t h e i r assets?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
Would' you want to
amplify?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Once the assets are
blocked, they're blocked within the United States. I f they f i t under
the executive order, the standard i s any resident, any Haitian
national resident i n H a i t i , t h e i r assets are blocked and are subject
to U.S. j u r i s d i c t i o n . That i s in the United States, i n the foreign
branch of a U.S. bank, or doing business with a U.S. person would be
prohibited because of the blocking order. But once i t ' s blocked, i t
cannot be removed without a license.
Q
So l e t me understand t h i s . These people have had
t h e i r assets frozen u n t i l , theoretically, A r i s t i d e i s returned to
power and you drop t h i s sanction?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
the President n u l l i f i e s the executive order.
Q
They're frozen u n t i l
There i s nothing they can do to regain control of
t h e i r assets?
MORE
�- 6-
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
Absolutely nothing.
Q ' They cannot pledge allegiance to Aristide?
cannot disavow any association with the military government?
They •
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: When the President of
the United States i s ready, they can regain control over t h e i r
assets, period. Excuse me. That's many, many questions, and .there's
one person behind you who has had quite a few.
Q
Accepting the fact that you can't put a dollar
figure on t h i s , could you t e l l us how you can gauge the scope as
large enough to r e a l l y make i t bite? What i s the scope of i t so that
these folks — you talked in terms of future investment, but what
about the property that's here now, and —
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
here now i s frozen.
A l l property that i s
Q
I -hear that. But what's the scope of that
property? Why — i f you don't know how much i t ' s worth, how can you
t e l l us i t ' s large enough to make them feel the pain?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
Why don't we j u s t find
out?
Q
What are some of the anticipated next steps,
further actions, other sanctions?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm here to discuss
sanctions. And t y p i c a l l y , you w i l l see me nameless, faceless and
odorless — maybe odorless — when the government announces what i t
i s doing. I can't speculate i n advance what we might do next.
There are some things' that I would l i k e to say about our
efforts to make sure that these sanctions do not interfere with
humanitarian r e l i e f efforts i n Haiti. I ' l l return to your questions,
but i t i s an important message to get out, i f you would care to carry
it.
(Laughter.)
I'm not sure what's amusing about i t , but l e t me go
ahead —
Q
I ' l l t e l l you, i f you'd l i k e to know.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
No.
Q
You are among the more patronizing o f f i c i a l s i n
t h i s briefing room,- I think. Maybe we could have an exchange of
information without being treated l i k e three-year-olds.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I apologize ~
I didn't know I was. Truly. Can we s t a r t a l l over again?
Q
That would be nice.
Q
really,' .
Not with Dee Dee's statement:
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: A l l right. No, not
with Dee Dee's statement. Let me j u s t answer the question. The key
point that I wanted to make i n connection with t h i s i s that the
freeze s p e c i f i c a l l y exempts nongovernmental organizations providing
essential humanitarian assistance or conducting refugee operations i n
H a i t i . We are continuing to work closely with these organizations to
ensure that the impact of expanded sanctions on t h e i r operations i s
minimized. The freeze also exempts- food and medical shipments to
H a i t i as well as transactions associated with those shipments.
MORE
�- 7 •
Mort Halperin has been working closely and so has Mark
Schneider, has been working closely with the NGOs as these sanctions
take effect in order to explain to them in d e t a i l what they are and
to t a l k them through the administrative procedures that have to be
set up so that they can continue to function, better f u l f i l l i n g ' a
very v i t a l function, feeding.an increasingly large number of people
in H a i t i . And we are making every effort to be sure i n designing
these orders and in executing them that we continue to support t h e i r
operation.
Q
Can I ask a fundamental question here? What's the
legal or constitutional basis for t h i s kind of action? Are we
entitled at any'time, or i s the President at any time he chooses to
freeze or seize the assets of someone who supports a government we
don't l i k e ?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
can answer that best.
I think my
colleague
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, which i s the authority delegated to
the President to take action —
Q
When was t h i s law passed?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: 1977 —
in Iraq, Kuwait; Libya, Serbia, Panama, H a i t i .
Q
c i t i z e n s in any
i t ' s been used
I assume t h i s couldn't be used against American
instance?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That i s a very complex
legal question that we could s i t and debate. The point here i s that
t h i s i s any foreign national — any Haitian national resident in
H a i t i . That's a much larger question.
I t doesn't r e a l l y relate to
what we're doing here.
Q
But also the rubric i s that i t ' s under U.N.
Security Council resolution, too, as well as the Act of 1977.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Because of the
incorporate by reference of e a r l i e r executive orders that were indeed
part of the U.N. participation act that was included and cited in the
preamble, however, t h i s action was taken u n i l a t e r a l l y within the
United States and i s not part of a larger U.N. a c t i v i t y .
Q
What happens with a Haitian national resident in
H a i t i who's covered by t h i s , who s h i f t s legal residence?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I f he can demonstrate
that for a period of time prior to imposition of the executive order
for a continuing period, then he can go forward to the bank or the
holder of the assets and make a case that indeed he would not
qualify i f for that period of time he was indeed not a resident.
Q
What I'm trying to figure out i s i f someone looks
at t h i s order that comes out, someone who — o f f i c i a l , whatever, and
says, .all right, I've upped stakes, I move out, ship my legal
residence to another country wherever i t i s , establish whatever may
be — another citizenship, which can c e r t a i n l y be done. Can they be
avoided that way? I'm j u s t trying to find out how
—
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, i f the assets were
blocked underneath the standard I've j u s t mentioned, they w i l l remain
blocked.
MORE
�- 8 -
Q
So under — i f I may ask y e t another question,
under t h e '77 law, any f o r e i g n n a t i o n a l who places assets i n the
United States leaves himself open f o r t h i s k i n d of t h i n g .
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: These kinds of
executive orders are not issued l i g h t l y ; i t ' s i n e x t r a o r d i n a r y
circumstance. I t took us a long time t o get t o t h i s p o i n t . There
are very few examples of instances where we have done something l i k e
t h i s . Any f o r e i g n person who invests i n the United States i n good
f a i t h can expect h i s investment t o be honored. This i s , I t h i n k
everyone would agree, a f a i r l y unique set of circumstances.
Q
Unless h i s government does something we don't l i k e ,
even i f he i s innocent of involvement i n that.government.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are l o t s of
governments t h a t do t h i n g s we disagree w i t h . One has t o get t o a
f a i r l y intense t h r e s h o l d before something l i k e t h i s can happen.
Q . Why i s t h i s happening a t t h i s p a r t i c u l a r point? I s
i t an i n d i c a t i o n t h a t nothing seems t o be working and you must t r y
one more time? Or has there been some progress, as Dee. Dee
i n d i c a t e d , but I wasn't q u i t e c l e a r on e x a c t l y what k i n d o f progress
we're t a l k i n g about?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On the,second question,
I have t o beg o f f because I don't know e x a c t l y what she s a i d . As t o
why i t i s happening, i n t h i s fashion, e s s e n t i a l l y the hope i s t h a t a t
lower l e v e l s of t h e sanctions, people who are running H a i t i would get
the message t h a t they need t o get out of t h e way of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
a u t h o r i t y . Since t h a t hasn't happened, we have moved t o a sanction
a t a h i g h e r ' l e v e l of i n t e n s i t y . And you can't t e l l f o r sure whether
they w i l l get t h a t message, but the i n t e n t of the sanction i s t o be a
more powerful message than before.
Q
I s there any appeals process here f o r H a i t i a n s who
are affected? And, second of a l l , does t h i s include a l l assets, such
as automobiles, mutual funds? I s i t a l l - i n c l u s i v e ?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: To t h e second question,
yes, e v e r y t h i n g . The f i r s t question, there's a t e c h n i c a l answer and
then there's t h e answer which my colleague gave you, which i s t h e
p o l i t i c a l answer.
The t e c h n i c a l answer i s , anyone can always p e t i t i o n ,
send a l e t t e r , request t o have a l i c e n s e ; so t h e mechanism i s there.
The question then would be, should we do i t ?
Q
So t h e operating assumption i s t h a t every H a i t i a n
w i t h assets i h t h e United States f o r the moment' i s a supporter of the
m i l i t a r y regime.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
every H a i t i a n i n t h e universe, but t o —
This applies not t o .
Q
I d i d n ' t say t h a t . I s every H a i t i a n w i t h assets i n
the United States — your operating assumption i n i t i a l l y i s t h a t
t h e i r support i s pf t h e —
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
what we're t a l k i n g about.
Right.
Let's q u a l i f y
, SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The standard i s •
r e s i d e n t i n H a i t i — H a i t i a n n a t i o n a l r e s i d e n t i n H a i t i . I f they
have assets i n t h e United State's and they're r e s i d e n t i n H a i t i ,
they're blocked. I f they have refugee s t a t u s , i f they've been out of
H a i t i f o r a p e r i o d of time —
MR
OE
�- 9 -
Q
My question was, your operating assumption i s t h a t
every H a i t i a n l i v i n g i n H a i t i w i t h assets i n the United States i s
assumed t o be a supporter of the Cedras regime.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I s assumed e i t h e r t o be
a supporter or t o be i n a r e l a t i o n s h i p t o that, regime which enables
-them t o p r o f i t from i t . Okay? I t h i n k t h a t ' s r i g h t . I ' l l be r i g h t
w i t h you, I'm j u s t checking. I s n ' t t h a t r i g h t ? Okay.
Q
I n your theory, are there any remaining sanctions
you could take against the m i l i t a r y or anything l e f t now i n terms of
economic sanctions?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's a good question.
I am not sure, as I stand here before you, t h a t there would be any
l e f t . But i n any event, i n terms of d i r e c t sanctions t o freeze
property, we have b a s i c a l l y done i t w i t h t h i s sanction. There are
other possible sanctions, measures, but not i h t h i s f a m i l y , not i n
t h i s group.
Q
I t h i n k t h a t ' s what the question i s —
there are more t h i n g s you can do — whatever.
whether -
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yeah, there are other
p o s s i b i l i t i e s , but as I said before, I ' l l come before you t o t a l k
about them i f there's, a decision made t o c a r r y them out. I can't
speculate about them i n advance.
Q
How much i s the expected impact, or hoped-for
impact o f these sanctions diminished by t h e p o s s i b i l i t y or l i k e l i h o o d
t h a t a l o t of the money t h a t these — t h e people t h a t you're
t a r g e t i n g here has i s not i n the United States, but i n places l i k e
the Cayman Islands, Switzerland, which I gather are outside t h e ambit
of t h e s e —
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You can't know. A l l I
can t e l l you i s t h a t by t h e i r nature, these sanctions are b l u n t ,
they're not s c i e n t i f i c . So you take a step o f t h i s s o r t and i t ' s
e m p i r i c a l . We —
Q
What i s your knowledge o f t h e d i s p o s i t i o n o f the —
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
We do n o t know t h e
d i s p o s i t i o n o f assets i n places l i k e the Caymans.
way t h a t I can provide a —
And so there i s no
Q
Do you have any sense or estimate o f whether these
people have t i e d t h e i r money up here, or t h e r e , or what?
• SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
Q
No.
I s t h a t correct? .
Just f l a t don't know?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
Would y o u l i k e t o
q u a l i f y that?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That i s c o r r e c t . '
However, i t would apply t o deposits i n U.S. banks which have branches
i n those l o c a t i o n s or any branch around the world. I f there was a
bank i n Paris or a bank i h the Cayman I s l a n d s , t h a t would apply. We
w i l l , however, be g e t t i n g r e p o r t s over a period of time as t o t h e
amount.
Q
instructions.
days.
I ' d l i k e t o ask you about t h e commercial a i r l i n e
I understand American A i r l i n e s stops f l y i n g i n two
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
MR
OE
Yes.
�- 10 -
Q
And how e f f e c t i v e have you been w i t h other
c o u n t r i e s i n g e t t i n g them t o stop — France, Canada?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I haven't checked as of
t h i s morning about t h e French. But everybody else who had f l i g h t s
going i n and out has v o l u n t a r i l y decided t o go along w i t h t h a t , and
we're hopeful t h a t the French w i l l go along, t o o .
Q
second.
I'm a l i t t l e confused about t h e e f f e c t
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
This was her f i r s t —
—
Excuse me j u s t a
Q
-- confirm r e p o r t s t h a t the U.S. i s considering
buying o f f t h e m i l i t a r y leaders, paying them o f f t o leave t h e
country.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
or even comment about those r e p o r t s .
I can't confirm, deny,
Q
Didn't e a r l i e r executive orders r e s t r i c t the asset
movement of family members of the 600 or so named e v i l doers w i t h —
i s t h i s new order f i l l i n g a loophole about family members o f those
e a r l i e r named people, or were they named — f a m i l y members not named
o r i g i n a l l y as being on the —
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Those e a r l i e r orders
established a s e r i e s of standards by which f a c t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n
would be applied as t o t h e degree of o b s t r u c t i n g t h e implementation
of t h e Governors I s l a n d Accords, c o n t r i b u t i n g t o t h e c l i m a t e of
violence,, o b s t r u c t i n g t h e implementation of t h e U.N. r e s o l u t i o n s , and
so f o r t h .
Several weeks ago there was a t r a n s f e r p r o h i b i t i o n from
j u r i s d i c t i o n t o j u r i s d i c t i o n , or through t h e United States t o H a i t i .
This goes s t i l l one step f u r t h e r arid blocks a l l assets t o a H a i t i a n
n a t i o n a l r e s i d e n t of H a i t i . So i t ' s a progressive step. The 650 are
s t i l l i n place. Any H a i t i a n n a t i o n a l r e s i d e n t of H a i t i i s i n place,
and these names now meet the standard H a i t i a n n a t i o n a l r e s i d e n t i n
Haiti.
Q
Was there anything before about every H a i t i a n
n a t i o n a l i n H a i t i , or i s t h a t new?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
That's new.
That's new
today.
—
t o include the main people and t h a t ' s new.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That 250 name i s
i n c l u s i v e o f t h e names who might meet t h e standard. I t i s a p o r t i o n
of those names who might meet the standard, but who are l i k e l y t o
have accounts.
Q
been.
They weren't on the f i r s t
list?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Some o f them may have
There may be some overlap, but s u b s t a n t i a l l y , no.
Q
. — t h e l a s t time the United States invoked t h i s ,
and w i t h whom against whom?
Q
Iraq.
Q
Yugoslavia.
MORE
�- 11 -
against I r a q .
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This was. not done
Vietnam i n 1975; i t was done i n t h e n o r t h i n 1963.
Q
I'm sorry —
what.was done i n —
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
p r i v a t e assets.
Blocking o f i n d i v i d u a l
Q
Not since then?
Q
I thought you said t h i s was done under a '77 law.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIAL: Those actions were
taken on an e a r l i e r s t a t u t e t h a t has s i m i l a r a u t h o r i t y but has not
been used since t h e new law was passed, but was grandfathered i n .
.That was c a l l e d Trading With The Enemy Act.
MR. MITCHELL: Could we j u s t take one more question. I f
you have some d e t a i l e d questions, we can do t h i s afterwards.
Q
I n a p o l i t i c a l context, t h i s i s a p o l i c y , i t ' s a
broadly-framed order. And I t h i n k one of t h e questions we have been
touching on around the borders i s , don't you run t h e r i s k of
a l i e n a t i n g a s u b s t a n t i a l p a r t of the middle class population i n
H a i t i , those people who are not supporters, don't you run t h e r i s k
t h a t they w i l l be c l e a r l y not on our side a t some p o i n t down t h e
road, because we've been t a k i n g a s i g n i f i c a n t b i t e out of t h e i r
assets?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: To t h i s p o i n t , and has
been possible f o r such persons, t o f i n d a r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e
people who are running H a i t i t h a t i s a workable and presumably
comforable enough f o r them. The purpose of t h i s order i s t o focus
t h e i r a t t e n t i o n on the f a c t t h a t t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p now leads t o
conditions t h a t aren't workable and aren't comfortable, so t h a t
h o p e f u l l y they w i l l come o f f the fence and become a source o f
pressure f o r t h e r e s t o r a t i o n of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r u l e i n H a i t i .
I can take two more, i f t h a t ' s okay w i t h you.
Q
I ' d l i k e t o ask you how e f f e c t i v e has been t h e
o r i g i n a l order f o r the 600. I mean, has i t r e a l l y turned t h e screws
on t h e m i l i t a r y ?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not only does i t block
i n d i v i d u a l accounts, i t p r o h i b i t s t r a n s a c t i o n s , so t h e b l o c k i n g order
locks i n place what i s there and p r o h i b i t s contacts w i t h t h e United
States. For those names, 650 people h e r e t o f o r e , f i n a n c i a l contacts
w i t h t h e United States, were also p r o h i b i t e d .
Q
I wanted t o f o l l o w up on what he was saying. Why
i s i t appropriate f o r the United States t o say t h a t you must take
sides? I t i s not appropriate f o r you t o not take sides i n t h i s .
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I t ' s up t o these
persons t o decide f o r themselves what they want t o do. But unless
they become a force f o r r e s t o r a t i o n of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government i n
H a i t i , democracy i s not going t o be able t o l i v e t h e r e . I t h i n k i t ' s
l e g i t i m a t e f o r the President t o use h i s l e g a l a u t h o r i t y t o underscore
that point.
Now, of course, i f they s t i l l wish t o remain on t h e
fence, so t o speak, t h a t ' s a choice t h a t ' o n l y they can make. But a
choice t h a t we can make i s whether t o allow them t o do so and s t i l l
enjoy t h e i r a b i l i t y t o operate f i n a n c i a l l y i n t h e United States.
Q
But what we were saying i s i f you dtm't take sides,
we w i l l punish you. Why i s t h a t appropriate?
MR
OE
�i
- 12 -
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: One could say t h a t what
we are t r y i n g t o do here i s t o b r i n g an end t o the s u f f e r i n g of t h e
l a r g e s t p a r t o f t h e - H a i t i a n people, which we t h i n k i s a process t h a t
begins when c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government i s restored and given a chance
t o exercise t h e promise i t had before i t was kicked out by t h e de
f a c t o regime.^
Q
I wanted t o ask you, you've been using — you and
Dee Dee used t h e words wealthy e l i t e . I s there a c u t o f f among — .
l e t ' s say a H a i t i a n who i s wealthy or e l i t e has managed t o save
$10,000 and has some i n the United States and resides i n H a i t i , w i l l
he be affected? I s there a c u t o f f q u a n t i t y t h a t d i v i d e s the wealthy
and e l i t e from normal amount?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
a l l H a i t i a n n a t i o n a l s resident i n H a i t i .
Q
Regardless of the amount.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:
million?
The order applies t o
That i s c o r r e c t .
Q
But what i s the population o f H a i t i —
six million.
about 4
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. I t h i n k we're
done. The lady i n the second row, whom I offended, can we t a l k and
make peace on t h e side?
THE PRESS:
Thank you.
END
4:20 P.M. EDT
�THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
June 22,
1994
STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY
As part of the Clinton Administration's commitment to
restore democracy to H a i t i , the President has imposed additional
f i n a n c i a l sanctions to block assets of a l l Haitian nationals
residing in Haiti. The order also reconfirms prior blockings of
named individuals who have participated in or supported the
i l l e g a l regime in Haiti and extends to a l l Haitian family members
of already blocked individuals, wherever resident.
Blocked assets include assets in the U.S. or subject to U.S.
j u r i s d i c t i o n , such as deposits in foreign branches of U.S. banks.
This new Executive Order i s effective immediately. I t does not
affect property of the United States Government, the United
Nations, the Organization of American States and the foreign
diplomatic missions in H a i t i . I t i s also inapplicable to nongovernmental organizations providing essential humanitarian
assistance or conducting refugee and migration operations in
Haiti.
This Executive Order i s intended to target propertied
Haitians who have supported the de facto regime and prolonged the
suffering of the Haitian people.
We w i l l continue to work closely with non-governmental
groups to minimize the impact of the new sanctions on t h e i r
operations in Haiti. This Executive Order does not affect
financing for continued shipments of basic food stuffs and
medical supplies to Haiti, as well as transactions associated
with such shipments, consistent with previous Executive Orders
and UN sanctions.
The new sanctions the President has imposed w i l l amplify our
message to the Haitian m i l i t a r y leadership and those who have
supported them that we are determined to bring about the return
of democracy and President Aristide to Haiti. Coupled with
previous actions, the freeze executed today by President Clinton
w i l l make i t unmistakably clear to the Haitian e l i t e that i t w i l l
not escape the consequences of continued rule by the i l l e g i t i m a t e
de; facto regime. We urge those e l i t e s to.recognize t h i s now and
to join in the restoration of democracy in Haiti.
# #
#
�THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
June 22,
1994
STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY
As part of the Clinton Administration's commitment to
restore democracy to Haiti, the President has imposed additional
f i n a n c i a l sanctions to block assets of a l l Haitian nationals
residing in H a i t i . The order also reconfirms prior blockings of
named individuals who have participated in or supported the
i l l e g a l regime in Haiti and extends to a l l Haitian family members
of already blocked individuals, wherever resident.
Blocked assets include assets in the U.S. or subject to U.S.
j u r i s d i c t i o n , such as deposits in foreign branches of U.S. banks.
This new Executive Order i s effective immediately. I t does not
affect property of the United States Government, the United
Nations, the Organization of American States and the foreign
diplomatic missions in H a i t i . I t i s also inapplicable to nongovernmental organizations providing e s s e n t i a l humanitarian
assistance or conducting refugee and migration operations in
Haiti.
This Executive Order i s intended to target propertied
Haitians who have supported the de facto regime and prolonged the
suffering of the Haitian people.
We w i l l continue to work closely with non-governmental
groups to minimize the impact of the new sanctions on t h e i r
operations in H a i t i . This Executive Order does not affect
financing for continued shipments of basic food stuffs and
medical supplies to Haiti, as well as transactions associated
with such shipments, consistent with previous Executive Orders
and UN sanctions.
The new sanctions the President has imposed w i l l amplify our
message to the Haitian m i l i t a r y leadership and those who have
supported them that we are determined to bring about the return
of democracy and President Aristide to H a i t i . Coupled with
previous actions, the freeze executed today by President Clinton
w i l l make i t unmistakably clear to the Haitian e l i t e that i t w i l l
not escape the consequences of continued rule by the i l l e g i t i m a t e
de facto regime. We urge those e l i t e s to recognize t h i s now and
to join in the restoration of democracy in Haiti.
#
#
#
�THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
June 22,
1994
STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY
As part of the Clinton Administration's commitment to
restore democracy to H a i t i , the President has imposed additional
f i n a n c i a l sanctions to block assets of a l l Haitian nationals
residing in Haiti. The order also reconfirms prior blockings of
named individuals who have participated in or supported the
i l l e g a l regime in Haiti and extends to a l l Haitian family members
of already blocked individuals, wherever resident.
Blocked assets include assets in the U.S. or subject to U.S.
j u r i s d i c t i o n , such as deposits in foreign branches of U.S. banks.
This new Executive Order i s effective immediately. I t does not
affect property of the United States Government, the United
Nations, the Organization of American States and the foreign
diplomatic missions in Haiti. I t i s also inapplicable to nongovernmental organizations providing essential humanitarian
assistance or conducting refugee and migration operations in
Haiti.
This Executive Order i s intended to target propertied
Haitians who have supported the de facto regime and prolonged the
suffering of the Haitian people.
We w i l l continue to work closely with non-governmental
groups to minimize the impact of the new sanctions on t h e i r
operations in H a i t i . This Executive Order does not affect
financing for continued shipments of basic food stuffs and
medical supplies to Haiti, as well as transactions associated
with such shipments, consistent with previous Executive Orders
and UN sanctions.
The new sanctions the President has imposed w i l l amplify our
message to the Haitian military leadership and those who have
supported them that we are determined to bring about the return
of democracy and President Aristide to Haiti. Coupled with
previous actions, the freeze executed today by President Clinton
w i l l make i t unmistakably clear to the Haitian e l i t e that i t w i l l
not escape the consequences of continued rule by the illegitimate
de facto regime. We urge those e l i t e s to recognize t h i s now and
to join in the restoration of democracy in H a i t i .
�THE WHITE HOUSE
O f f i c e o f t h e Press S e c r e t a r y
For Immediate Release
June 22, 1994
EXECUTIVE ORDER
BLOCKING PROPERTY OF CERTAIN HAITIAN NATIONALS
By t h e a u t h o r i t y v e s t e d i n me as P r e s i d e n t by t h e
C o n s t i t u t i o n and t h e laws o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o f America,
i n c l u d i n g t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Emergency Economic Powers A c t
(50 U.S.C. 1701 e t seg.), t h e N a t i o n a l Emergencies A c t
(50 U.S.C. 1601 e t seg.), s e c t i o n 5 o f t h e U n i t e d Nations
P a r t i c i p a t i o n A c t o f 1945, as amended (22 U.S.C. 287c), and
s e c t i o n 301 o f t i t l e 3, U n i t e d States Code, and i n o r d e r t o take
a d d i t i o n a l steps w i t h respect t o t h e a c t i o n s and p o l i c i e s o f t h e
de f a c t o regime i n H a i t i and t h e n a t i o n a l emergency d e s c r i b e d
and d e c l a r e d i n Executive Order No. 12775, i t i s hereby o r d e r e d
as f o l l o w s :
S e c t i o n i . Except t o t h e e x t e n t p r o v i d e d i n r e g u l a t i o n s ,
o r d e r s , d i r e c t i v e s , o r l i c e n s e s t h a t may h e r e a f t e r be i s s u e d
pursuant t o t h i s o r d e r , a l l p r o p e r t y and i n t e r e s t s i n p r o p e r t y
of .
(a)
any H a i t i a n n a t i o n a l r e s i d e n t i n H a i t i ; o r
(b)
any o t h e r person s u b j e c t t o t h e b l o c k i n g p r o v i s i o n s
o f Executive Order Nos. 12775, 12779, 12853, 12872, o r
12914 and H a i t i a n c i t i z e n s who a r e members o f t h e
immediate f a m i l y o f any such person, as i d e n t i f i e d by
the S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Treasury;
t h a t a r e i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , t h a t h e r e a f t e r come w i t h i n
the U n i t e d S t a t e s , o r t h a t are o r h e r e a f t e r come w i t h i n t h e
possession o r c o n t r o l o f U n i t e d States persons, i n c l u d i n g t h e i r
overseas branches, a r e blocked. This s e c t i o n s h a l l n o t apply
t o p r o p e r t y o f nongovernmental o r g a n i z a t i o n s engaged i n t h e
p r o v i s i o n o f e s s e n t i a l humanitarian a s s i s t a n c e i n H a i t i o r i n
the conduct o f refugee and m i g r a t i o n o p e r a t i o n s i n H a i t i , as
i d e n t i f i e d by t h e S e c r e t a r y o f the Treasury.
Payments and
t r a n s f e r s p r e v i o u s l y a u t h o r i z e d by E x e c u t i v e Order No. 12920 o f
June 10, 1994, may c o n t i n u e t o be made i n a manner d i r e c t e d by
the S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Treasury.
Sec. 2. Any t r a n s a c t i o n by a U n i t e d S t a t e s person t h a t
evades o r a v o i d s , o r has t h e purpose o f evading o r a v o i d i n g , o r
a t t e m p t s t o v i o l a t e , any o f t h e p r o h i b i t i o n s s e t f o r t h i n t h i s
order i s p r o h i b i t e d .
Sec.
3.
For t h e purposes o f t h i s o r d e r :
(a) The term " H a i t i a n n a t i o n a l " means a c i t i z e n o f H a i t i
or an e n t i t y o r g a n i z e d under t h e laws o f H a i t i .
(b) The d e f i n i t i o n s contained i n s e c t i o n 3 o f Executive
Order No. 12779 apply t o t h e terms used i n t h i s o r d e r .
Sec. 4. The S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Treasury, i n c o n s u l t a t i o n
w i t h t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e , i s hereby a u t h o r i z e d t o take such
a c t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g t h e promulgation o f r u l e s and r e g u l a t i o n s ,
and t o employ a l l powers granted t o me by t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l
more
(OVER)
�Emergency Economic Powers Act and the U n i t e d Nations
P a r t i c i p a t i o n A c t , as may be necessary t o c a r r y out the
purposes o f t h i s o r d e r . The Secretary of t h e Treasury may
r e d e l e g a t e any of these f u n c t i o n s t o o t h e r o f f i c e r s and
agencies o f t h e U n i t e d States Government. A l l agencies o f
the U n i t e d States Government are hereby d i r e c t e d t o take a l l
a p p r o p r i a t e measures w i t h i n t h e i r a u t h o r i t y t o c a r r y out the
p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s o r d e r , i n c l u d i n g suspension o r t e r m i n a t i o n of
l i c e n s e s o r o t h e r a u t h o r i z a t i o n s i n e f f e c t as o f t h e e f f e c t i v e
date o f t h i s o r d e r .
Sec. 5. Nothing c o n t a i n e d i n t h i s o r d e r s h a l l c r e a t e
any r i g h t o r b e n e f i t , s u b s t a n t i v e o r p r o c e d u r a l , e n f o r c e a b l e
by any p a r t y a g a i n s t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , i t s agencies o r
i n s t r u m e n t a l i t i e s , i t s o f f i c e r s o r employees, o r any o t h e r
person.
Sec. 6.
(a) This o r d e r s h a l l take e f f e c t a t 10:09 p.m.,
d a y l i g h t time on June 21, 19 94.
eastern
(b) This o r d e r s h a l l be t r a n s m i t t e d t o t h e Congress and
p u b l i s h e d i n the Federal R e g i s t e r .
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
THE WHITE HOUSE,
June 21, 1994.
# # #
�THE WHITE HOUSE
O f f i c e o f t h e Press S e c r e t a r y
For Immediate Release
June 22, 1994
EXECUTIVE ORDER
BLOCKING PROPERTY OF CERTAIN HAITIAN NATIONALS
By t h e a u t h o r i t y vested i n me as P r e s i d e n t by t h e
C o n s t i t u t i o n and t h e laws o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o f America,
i n c l u d i n g t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Emergency Economic Powers Act
(50 U.S.C. 1701 e t seg.), t h e N a t i o n a l Emergencies A c t
(50 U.S.C. 1601 e t seg.), s e c t i o n 5 o f t h e U n i t e d Nations
P a r t i c i p a t i o n A c t o f 1945, as amended (22 U.S.C. 287c), and
s e c t i o n 301 o f t i t l e 3, U n i t e d States Code, and i n o r d e r t o take
a d d i t i o n a l steps w i t h respect t o t h e a c t i o n s and p o l i c i e s o f t h e
de f a c t o regime i n H a i t i and t h e n a t i o n a l emergency d e s c r i b e d
and d e c l a r e d i n Executive•Order No. 12775, i t i s hereby o r d e r e d
as f o l l o w s :
S e c t i o n 1. Except t o t h e e x t e n t p r o v i d e d i n r e g u l a t i o n s ,
o r d e r s , d i r e c t i v e s , o r l i c e n s e s t h a t may h e r e a f t e r be i s s u e d
pursuant t o t h i s order, a l l p r o p e r t y and i n t e r e s t s i n p r o p e r t y
of:
(a)
any H a i t i a n n a t i o n a l r e s i d e n t i n H a i t i ; o r
(b)
any o t h e r person s u b j e c t t o t h e b l o c k i n g p r o v i s i o n s
o f Executive Order Nos. 12775, 12779, 12853, 12872, o r
12914 and H a i t i a n c i t i z e n s who are members o f t h e
immediate f a m i l y o f any such person, as i d e n t i f i e d by
the S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Treasury;
t h a t a r e i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , t h a t h e r e a f t e r come w i t h i n
the U n i t e d S t a t e s , o r t h a t a r e o r h e r e a f t e r come w i t h i n t h e
possession o r c o n t r o l o f U n i t e d States persons, i n c l u d i n g t h e i r
overseas branches, are blocked. This s e c t i o n s h a l l n o t apply
t o p r o p e r t y o f nongovernmental o r g a n i z a t i o n s engaged i n t h e
p r o v i s i o n o f e s s e n t i a l humanitarian assistance i n H a i t i o r i n
the conduct o f refugee and m i g r a t i o n o p e r a t i o n s i n H a i t i , as
i d e n t i f i e d by t h e S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Treasury.
Payments and
t r a n s f e r s p r e v i o u s l y a u t h o r i z e d by Executive Order No. 12920 o f
June 10, 1994, may c o n t i n u e t o be made i n a manner d i r e c t e d by
the S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Treasury.
Sec. 2. Any t r a n s a c t i o n by a U n i t e d S t a t e s person t h a t
evades o r a v o i d s , o r has t h e purpose o f evading o r a v o i d i n g , o r
a t t e m p t s t o v i o l a t e , any o f t h e p r o h i b i t i o n s s e t f o r t h i n t h i s
order i s p r o h i b i t e d .
Sec.
3.
For t h e purposes o f t h i s o r d e r :
(a) The term " H a i t i a n n a t i o n a l " means a c i t i z e n o f H a i t i
or an e n t i t y organized under t h e laws o f H a i t i .
(b) The d e f i n i t i o n s c o n t a i n e d i n s e c t i o n 3 o f Executive
Order No. 12779 apply t o t h e terms used i n t h i s o r d e r .
Sec. 4. The S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Treasury, i n c o n s u l t a t i o n
w i t h t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e , i s hereby a u t h o r i z e d t o take such
a c t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g t h e p r o m u l g a t i o n o f r u l e s and r e g u l a t i o n s ,
and t o employ a l l powers g r a n t e d t o me by t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l
more
(OVER)
�Emergency Economic Powers Act and the U n i t e d Nations
P a r t i c i p a t i o n A c t , as may be necessary t o c a r r y out the
purposes o f t h i s o r d e r . The Secretary o f t h e Treasury may
r e d e l e g a t e any o f these f u n c t i o n s t o o t h e r o f f i c e r s and
agencies o f t h e U n i t e d States Government. A l l agencies o f
the U n i t e d S t a t e s Government are hereby d i r e c t e d t o take a l l
a p p r o p r i a t e measures w i t h i n t h e i r a u t h o r i t y t o c a r r y out t h e
p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s o r d e r , i n c l u d i n g suspension o r t e r m i n a t i o n of
l i c e n s e s o r o t h e r a u t h o r i z a t i o n s i n e f f e c t as o f the e f f e c t i v e
date o f t h i s o r d e r .
Sec. 5. Nothing c o n t a i n e d i n t h i s o r d e r s h a l l c r e a t e
any r i g h t o r b e n e f i t , s u b s t a n t i v e o r p r o c e d u r a l , e n f o r c e a b l e
by any p a r t y a g a i n s t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , i t s agencies o r
i n s t r u m e n t a l i t i e s , i t s o f f i c e r s o r employees, o r any o t h e r
person.
Sec. 6.
(a) T h i s o r d e r s h a l l take e f f e c t a t 10:09 p.m.,
d a y l i g h t time on June 21, 1994.
eastern
(b) T h i s o r d e r s h a l l be t r a n s m i t t e d t o t h e Congress and
p u b l i s h e d i n t h e Federal R e g i s t e r .
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
THE WHITE HOUSE,
June 21, 1994.
# # #
�THE WHITE HOUSE
O f f i c e o f t h e Press S e c r e t a r y
For Immediate Release
June 22, 1994
TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:
On October 4, 1991, pursuant t o t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Emergency
Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA") (50 U.S.C. 1701 e t seg.) and
s e c t i o n 301 o f t h e N a t i o n a l Emergencies Act ("NEA") (50 U.S.C.
1601 e t seg.), P r e s i d e n t Bush e x e r c i s e d h i s s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y
t o i s s u e E x e c u t i v e Order No. 12775, d e c l a r i n g a n a t i o n a l
emergency and b l o c k i n g H a i t i a n government p r o p e r t y .
On October 28, 1991, pursuant t o t h e above a u t h o r i t i e s ,
P r e s i d e n t Bush e x e r c i s e d h i s s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y t o i s s u e
E x e c u t i v e Order No. 12779, b l o c k i n g c e r t a i n p r o p e r t y o f and
prohibiting certain transactions with H a i t i .
On June 30, 1993, pursuant t o above a u t h o r i t i e s , as w e l l
as t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s P a r t i c i p a t i o n Act o f 1945, as amended
("UNPA"), (2 U.S.C. 287c), I e x e r c i s e d my s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y
t o i s s u e E x e c u t i v e Order No. 12853, t o impose a d d i t i o n a l
economic measures w i t h respect t o H a i t i .
This l a t t e r a c t i o n
was taken, i n p a r t , t o ensure t h a t t h e economic measures t a k e n
by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w i t h respect t o H a i t i would f u l f i l l i t s
o b l i g a t i o n s under U n i t e d Nations S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l R e s o l u t i o n 841
of June 16, 1993.
On October 18, 1993, pursuant t o t h e IEEPA and t h e NEA, I
a g a i n e x e r c i s e d by s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y t o i s s u e E x e c u t i v e Order
No. 12872, b l o c k i n g p r o p e r t y o f v a r i o u s persons w i t h r e s p e c t t o
Haiti.
On May 6, 1994, t h e U n i t e d Nations S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l adopted
R e s o l u t i o n 917, c a l l i n g on S t a t e s t o take a d d i t i o n a l measures t o
t i g h t e n t h e embargo a g a i n s t H a i t i .
On May 7, 1994, pursuant t o
the above a u t h o r i t i e s , I e x e r c i s e d by s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y t o
i s s u e E x e c u t i v e Order No. 12914, t o impose a d d i t i o n a l economic
measures w i t h r e s p e c t t o H a i t i . On May 2 1 , 1994, pursuant t o
t h e above a u t h o r i t i e s , I e x e r c i s e d my s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y t o
i s s u e TLxecutive Order No. 12917, to. impose those economic .
measures r e q u i r e d by R e s o l u t i o n 917 t h a t became e f f e c t i v e
May 2 1 , 1994. These l a t t e r a c t i o n s were taken, i n p a r t , t o
ensure t h a t t h e economic measures taken by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
w i t h r e s p e c t t o H a i t i would f u l f i l l i t s o b l i g a t i o n s under t h e
p r o v i s i o n s o f U n i t e d Nations S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l R e s o l u t i o n 917.
On June 10, 1994, pursuant t o t h e above a u t h o r i t i e s , I
e x e r c i s e d my s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y t o i s s u e E x e c u t i v e Order
No. 12920, p r o h i b i t i n g a d d i t i o n a l t r a n s a c t i o n s w i t h H a i t i .
On June 2 1 , 1994, pursuant t o t h e above a u t h o r i t i e s , I
e x e r c i s e d my s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y t o i s s u e E x e c u t i v e Order
No. 12922.
T h i s new E x e c u t i v e
order:
blocks a l l property i n the United States, o r w i t h i n
the p o s s e s s i o n o r c o n t r o l o f U n i t e d S t a t e s persons,
of any H a i t i a n n a t i o n a l r e s i d e n t i n H a i t i , o r any
o t h e r person s u b j e c t t o t h e b l o c k i n g p r o v i s i o n s o f
E x e c u t i v e Order Nos. 12775, 12779, 12853, 12872, o r
12914 o r a H a i t i a n c i t i z e n who i s a member o f the
more
(OVER)
�immediate f a m i l y o f such a person, as i d e n t i f i e d
by t h e S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Treasury; and makes l i m i t e d
e x c e p t i o n s f o r c e r t a i n payments and t r a n s f e r s , and f o r
the p r o p e r t y o f nongovernmental o r g a n i z a t i o n s engaged
i n the p r o v i s i o n of e s s e n t i a l humanitarian assistance
or t h e conduct o f refugee and m i g r a t i o n o p e r a t i o n s i n
H a i t i , t h a t a r e i d e n t i f i e d by t h e S e c r e t a r y o f t h e
Treasury;
p r o h i b i t s any t r a n s a c t i o n t h a t evades o r a v o i d s o r
has t h e purpose o f evading o r a v o i d i n g , o r a t t e m p t s
t o v i o l a t e , any o f t h e p r o h i b i t i o n s o f t h e o r d e r ; and
a u t h o r i z e s t h e S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Treasury, i n
c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the Secretary o f State, t o issue
r e g u l a t i o n s implementing t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e o r d e r .
The new E x e c u t i v e o r d e r i s necessary t o t i g h t e n t h e embargo
a g a i n s t H a i t i w i t h t h e g o a l o f t h e r e s t o r a t i o n o f democracy i n
t h a t n a t i o n and t h e prompt r e t u r n o f t h e l e g i t i m a t e l y e l e c t e d
P r e s i d e n t , J e a n - B e r t r a n d A r i s t i d e , under t h e framework o f t h e
Governors I s l a n d Agreement.
I am p r o v i d i n g t h i s n o t i c e t o t h e Congress p u r s u a n t t o
s e c t i o n 204(b) o f t h e IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1703(b)) and s e c t i o n 301
of t h e NEA (50 U.S.C. 1631) . I am e n c l o s i n g a copy o f t h e
E x e c u t i v e o r d e r t h a t I have i s s u e d .
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
THE WHITE HOUSE,
June 2 1 , 1994.
# # #
�THE WHITE HOUSE
O f f i c e o f t h e Press S e c r e t a r y
For Immediate Release
June 22, 1994
TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:
On October 4, 1991, pursuant t o t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Emergency
Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA") (50 U.S.C. 1701 e t seg.) and
s e c t i o n 301 o f t h e N a t i o n a l Emergencies Act ("NEA") (50 U.S.C.
1601 e t s e g . ) , P r e s i d e n t Bush e x e r c i s e d h i s s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y
t o i s s u e E x e c u t i v e Order No. 12775, d e c l a r i n g a n a t i o n a l
emergency and b l o c k i n g H a i t i a n government p r o p e r t y .
On October 28, 1991, pursuant t o t h e above a u t h o r i t i e s ,
P r e s i d e n t Bush e x e r c i s e d h i s s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y t o i s s u e
E x e c u t i v e Order No. 12779, b l o c k i n g c e r t a i n p r o p e r t y o f and
p r o h i b i t i n g certain transactions with H a i t i .
On June 30, 1993, pursuant t o above a u t h o r i t i e s , as w e l l
as t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s P a r t i c i p a t i o n Act o f 1945, as amended
("UNPA"), (2 U.S.C. 287c), I e x e r c i s e d my s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y
t o i s s u e E x e c u t i v e Order No. 12853, t o impose a d d i t i o n a l
economic measures w i t h respect t o H a i t i .
This l a t t e r a c t i o n
was t a k e n , i n p a r t , t o ensure t h a t t h e economic measures t a k e n
by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w i t h respect t o H a i t i would f u l f i l l i t s
o b l i g a t i o n s under U n i t e d Nations S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l R e s o l u t i o n 841
of June 16, 1993.
On October 18, 1993, pursuant t o t h e IEEPA and t h e NEA, I
a g a i n e x e r c i s e d by s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y t o issue E x e c u t i v e Order
No. 12872, b l o c k i n g p r o p e r t y o f v a r i o u s persons w i t h r e s p e c t t o
Haiti.
On May 6, 1994, t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l adopted
R e s o l u t i o n 917, c a l l i n g on S t a t e s t o t a k e a d d i t i o n a l measures t o
t i g h t e n t h e embargo a g a i n s t H a i t i .
On May 7, 1994, pursuant t o
the above a u t h o r i t i e s , I e x e r c i s e d by s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y t o
i s s u e E x e c u t i v e Order No. 12914, t o impose a d d i t i o n a l economic
measures w i t h r e s p e c t t o H a i t i . On May 2 1 , 1994, pursuant t o
t h e above a u t h o r i t i e s , I e x e r c i s e d my s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y t o
i s s u e H x e c u t i v e Order No. 12917, t o impose those economic-.'.,
measures r e q u i r e d by R e s o l u t i o n 917 t h a t became e f f e c t i v e
May 2 1 , 1994. These l a t t e r a c t i o n s were taken, i n p a r t , t o
ensure t h a t t h e economic measures t a k e n by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
w i t h r e s p e c t t o H a i t i would f u l f i l l i t s o b l i g a t i o n s under t h e
p r o v i s i o n s o f U n i t e d Nations S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l R e s o l u t i o n 917.
On June 10, 1994, pursuant t o t h e above a u t h o r i t i e s , I
e x e r c i s e d my s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y t o i s s u e E x e c u t i v e Order
No. 12920, p r o h i b i t i n g a d d i t i o n a l t r a n s a c t i o n s w i t h H a i t i .
On June 2 1 , 1994, pursuant t o t h e above a u t h o r i t i e s , I
e x e r c i s e d my s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y t o i s s u e E x e c u t i v e Order
No. 12922.
T h i s new E x e c u t i v e
order:
b l o c k s a l l property- i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , o r w i t h i n
the possession o r c o n t r o l o f U n i t e d S t a t e s persons,
of any H a i t i a n n a t i o n a l r e s i d e n t i n H a i t i , o r any
o t h e r person s u b j e c t t o t h e b l o c k i n g p r o v i s i o n s o f
E x e c u t i v e Order Nos. 12775, 12779, 12853, 12872, o r
12914 o r a H a i t i a n c i t i z e n who i s a member o f t h e
more
(OVER)
�immediate f a m i l y o f such a person, as i d e n t i f i e d
by t h e S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Treasury; and makes l i m i t e d
e x c e p t i o n s f o r c e r t a i n payments and t r a n s f e r s , and f o r
the p r o p e r t y o f nongovernmental o r g a n i z a t i o n s engaged
i n the p r o v i s i o n of essential humanitarian assistance
or t h e conduct o f refugee and m i g r a t i o n o p e r a t i o n s i n
H a i t i , t h a t a r e i d e n t i f i e d by t h e S e c r e t a r y o f t h e
Treasury;
p r o h i b i t s any t r a n s a c t i o n t h a t evades o r avoids o r
has t h e purpose o f evading o r a v o i d i n g , o r a t t e m p t s
t o v i o l a t e , any o f t h e p r o h i b i t i o n s o f t h e o r d e r ; and
a u t h o r i z e s t h e S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Treasury, i n
c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the Secretary o f State, t o issue
r e g u l a t i o n s implementing t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e o r d e r .
The new E x e c u t i v e o r d e r i s necessary t o t i g h t e n t h e embargo
a g a i n s t H a i t i w i t h t h e g o a l o f t h e r e s t o r a t i o n o f democracy i n
t h a t n a t i o n and t h e prompt r e t u r n o f t h e l e g i t i m a t e l y e l e c t e d
P r e s i d e n t , Jean-Bertrand A r i s t i d e , under t h e framework o f t h e
Governors I s l a n d Agreement.
I am p r o v i d i n g t h i s n o t i c e t o t h e Congress pursuant t o
s e c t i o n 204(b) o f t h e IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1703(b)) and s e c t i o n 301
o f t h e NEA (50 U.S.C. 1631).
I am e n c l o s i n g a copy o f t h e
E x e c u t i v e o r d e r t h a t I have i s s u e d .
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
THE WHITE HOUSE,
June 2 1 , 1994.
# # #
�THE WHITE HOUSE
O f f i c e o f t h e Press S e c r e t a r y
For Immediate Release
June 22, 1994
TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:
On October 4, 1991, pursuant t o t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Emergency
Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA") (50 U.S.C. 1701 e t seg.) and
s e c t i o n 301 o f t h e N a t i o n a l Emergencies Act ("NEA") (50 U.S.C.
1601 e t s e g . ) , P r e s i d e n t Bush e x e r c i s e d h i s s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y
t o i s s u e E x e c u t i v e Order No. 12775, d e c l a r i n g a n a t i o n a l
emergency and b l o c k i n g H a i t i a n government p r o p e r t y .
On October 28, 1991, pursuant t o t h e above a u t h o r i t i e s ,
P r e s i d e n t Bush e x e r c i s e d h i s s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y t o i s s u e
E x e c u t i v e Order No. 12779, b l o c k i n g c e r t a i n p r o p e r t y o f and
p r o h i b i t i n g certain transactions with H a i t i .
On June 30, 1993, pursuant t o above a u t h o r i t i e s , as w e l l
as t h e U n i t e d Nations P a r t i c i p a t i o n Act o f 1945, as amended
("UNPA"), (2 U.S.C. 287c), I e x e r c i s e d my s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y
t o i s s u e E x e c u t i v e Order No. 12853, t o impose a d d i t i o n a l
economic measures w i t h r e s p e c t t o H a i t i .
This l a t t e r a c t i o n
was taken, i n p a r t , t o ensure t h a t t h e economic measures t a k e n
by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w i t h r e s p e c t t o H a i t i would f u l f i l l i t s
o b l i g a t i o n s under U n i t e d Nations S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l R e s o l u t i o n 841
of June 16, 1993.
On October 18, 1993, pursuant t o t h e IEEPA and t h e NEA, I
a g a i n e x e r c i s e d by s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y t o i s s u e E x e c u t i v e Order
No. 12872, b l o c k i n g p r o p e r t y o f v a r i o u s persons w i t h r e s p e c t t o
Haiti.
On May 6, 1994, t h e U n i t e d Nations S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l adopted
R e s o l u t i o n 917, c a l l i n g on S t a t e s t o take a d d i t i o n a l measures t o
t i g h t e n t h e embargo a g a i n s t H a i t i . On May 7, 1994, pursuant t o
t h e above a u t h o r i t i e s , I e x e r c i s e d by s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y t o
issiue E x e c u t i v e Order No. 12914, t o impose a d d i t i o n a l economic
measures w i t h r e s p e c t t o H a i t i . On May 2 1 , 1994, pursuant t o
the above a u t h o r i t i e s , I e x e r c i s e d my s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y t o
i s s u e E x e c u t i v e Order No. 12917, t o impose those economic .
measures r e q u i r e d by R e s o l u t i o n 917 t h a t became e f f e c t i v e
May 2 1 , 1994. These l a t t e r a c t i o n s were t a k e n , i n p a r t , t o
ensure t h a t t h e economic measures taken by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
w i t h r e s p e c t t o H a i t i would f u l f i l l i t s o b l i g a t i o n s under t h e
p r o v i s i o n s o f U n i t e d Nations S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l R e s o l u t i o n 917.
On June 10, 1994, pursuant t o t h e above a u t h o r i t i e s , I
e x e r c i s e d my s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y t o i s s u e E x e c u t i v e Order
No. 12920, p r o h i b i t i n g a d d i t i o n a l t r a n s a c t i o n s w i t h H a i t i .
On June 2 1 , 1994, pursuant t o t h e above a u t h o r i t i e s , I
e x e r c i s e d my s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y t o i s s u e E x e c u t i v e Order
No. 12922.
T h i s new E x e c u t i v e
order:
blocks a l l property i n the United States, o r w i t h i n
t h e possession o r c o n t r o l o f U n i t e d S t a t e s persons,
of any H a i t i a n n a t i o n a l r e s i d e n t i n H a i t i , o r any
o t h e r person s u b j e c t t o t h e b l o c k i n g p r o v i s i o n s o f
E x e c u t i v e Order Nos. 12775, 12779, 12853, 12872, o r
12914 o r a H a i t i a n c i t i z e n who i s a member o f t h e
more
(OVER)
�immediate f a m i l y o f such a person, as i d e n t i f i e d
by t h e S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Treasury; and makes l i m i t e d
e x c e p t i o n s f o r c e r t a i n payments and t r a n s f e r s , and f o r
t h e p r o p e r t y o f nongovernmental o r g a n i z a t i o n s engaged
i n the p r o v i s i o n of essential humanitarian assistance
o r t h e conduct o f refugee and m i g r a t i o n o p e r a t i o n s i n
H a i t i , t h a t a r e i d e n t i f i e d by t h e S e c r e t a r y o f t h e
Treasury;
p r o h i b i t s any t r a n s a c t i o n t h a t evades o r a v o i d s o r
has t h e purpose o f evading o r a v o i d i n g , o r a t t e m p t s
t o v i o l a t e , any o f t h e p r o h i b i t i o n s o f t h e o r d e r ; and
a u t h o r i z e s t h e S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Treasury, i n
c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the Secretary o f State, t o issue
r e g u l a t i o n s implementing t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e o r d e r .
The new E x e c u t i v e o r d e r i s necessary t o t i g h t e n t h e embargo
a g a i n s t H a i t i w i t h t h e g o a l o f t h e r e s t o r a t i o n o f democracy i n
t h a t n a t i o n and t h e prompt r e t u r n o f t h e l e g i t i m a t e l y e l e c t e d
P r e s i d e n t , Jean-Bertrand A r i s t i d e , under t h e framework o f t h e
Governors I s l a n d Agreement.
I am p r o v i d i n g t h i s n o t i c e t o t h e Congress pursuant t o
s e c t i o n 204(b) o f t h e IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1703(b)) and s e c t i o n 301
of t h e NEA (50 U.S.C. 1631).
I am e n c l o s i n g a copy o f t h e
E x e c u t i v e o r d e r t h a t I have i s s u e d .
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
THE WHITE HOUSE,
June 2 1 , 19 94.
# # #
�THE WHITE HOUSE
O f f i c e o f t h e Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
June 22, 1994
EXECUTIVE ORDER
BLOCKING PROPERTY OF CERTAIN HAITIAN NATIONALS
By t h e a u t h o r i t y vested i n me as P r e s i d e n t by t h e
C o n s t i t u t i o n and t h e laws o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o f America,
i n c l u d i n g t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Emergency Economic Powers A c t
(50 U.S.C. 1701 e t seg.), t h e N a t i o n a l Emergencies A c t
(50 U.S.C. 1601 e t seg.), s e c t i o n 5 o f t h e U n i t e d Nations
P a r t i c i p a t i o n A c t o f 1945, as amended (22 U.S.C. 287c), and
s e c t i o n 3 01 o f t i t l e 3, U n i t e d S t a t e s Code, and i n o r d e r t o take
a d d i t i o n a l steps w i t h respect t o t h e a c t i o n s and p o l i c i e s o f t h e
de f a c t o regime i n H a i t i and t h e n a t i o n a l emergency d e s c r i b e d
and d e c l a r e d i n Executive•Order No. 12775, i t i s hereby o r d e r e d
as f o l l o w s :
S e c t i o n 1. Except t o t h e e x t e n t p r o v i d e d i n r e g u l a t i o n s ,
o r d e r s , d i r e c t i v e s , o r l i c e n s e s t h a t may h e r e a f t e r be i s s u e d
pursuant t o t h i s o r d e r , a l l p r o p e r t y and i n t e r e s t s i n p r o p e r t y
of:
(a)
any H a i t i a n n a t i o n a l r e s i d e n t i n H a i t i ; o r
(b)
any o t h e r person s u b j e c t t o t h e b l o c k i n g p r o v i s i o n s
o f Executive Order Nos. 12775, 12779, 12853, 12872, o r
12914 and H a i t i a n c i t i z e n s who are members o f t h e
immediate f a m i l y o f any such person, as i d e n t i f i e d by
the S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Treasury;
t h a t a r e i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , t h a t h e r e a f t e r come w i t h i n
the U n i t e d S t a t e s , o r t h a t a r e o r h e r e a f t e r come w i t h i n t h e
possession o r c o n t r o l o f U n i t e d States persons, i n c l u d i n g t h e i r
overseas branches, are blocked.
This s e c t i o n s h a l l n o t apply
t o p r o p e r t y o f nongovernmental o r g a n i z a t i o n s engaged i n t h e
p r o v i s i o n o f e s s e n t i a l humanitarian assistance i n H a i t i o r i n
the conduct o f refugee and m i g r a t i o n o p e r a t i o n s i n H a i t i , as
i d e n t i f i e d by t h e S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Treasury.
Payments and
t r a n s f e r s p r e v i o u s l y a u t h o r i z e d by Executive Order No. 12920 o f
June 10, 1994, may c o n t i n u e t o be made i n a manner d i r e c t e d by
the S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Treasury.
Sec. 2. Any t r a n s a c t i o n by a U n i t e d S t a t e s person t h a t
evades o r avoids, o r has t h e purpose o f evading o r a v o i d i n g , o r
a t t e m p t s t o v i o l a t e , any o f t h e p r o h i b i t i o n s s e t f o r t h i n t h i s
order i s p r o h i b i t e d .
Sec.
3.
For t h e purposes o f t h i s o r d e r :
(a) The term " H a i t i a n n a t i o n a l " means a c i t i z e n o f H a i t i
o r an e n t i t y organized under t h e laws o f H a i t i .
(b) The d e f i n i t i o n s c o n t a i n e d i n s e c t i o n 3 o f Executive
Order No. 12779 a p p l y t o t h e terms used i n t h i s o r d e r .
Sec. 4. The S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Treasury, i n c o n s u l t a t i o n
w i t h t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e , i s hereby a u t h o r i z e d t o take such
a c t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g t h e p r o m u l g a t i o n o f r u l e s and r e g u l a t i o n s ,
and t o employ a l l powers g r a n t e d t o me by t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l
more
(OVER)
�Emergency Economic Powers Act and t h e U n i t e d Nations
P a r t i c i p a t i o n A c t , as may be necessary t o c a r r y out t h e
purposes o f t h i s o r d e r . The S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Treasury may
r e d e l e g a t e any o f these f u n c t i o n s t o o t h e r o f f i c e r s and
agencies o f t h e U n i t e d States Government. A l l agencies o f
the U n i t e d States Government are hereby d i r e c t e d t o take a l l
a p p r o p r i a t e measures w i t h i n t h e i r a u t h o r i t y t o c a r r y out t h e
p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s order, i n c l u d i n g suspension o r t e r m i n a t i o n o f
l i c e n s e s o r o t h e r a u t h o r i z a t i o n s i n e f f e c t as o f t h e e f f e c t i v e
date o f t h i s o r d e r .
Sec. 5. Nothing c o n t a i n e d i n t h i s o r d e r s h a l l c r e a t e
any r i g h t o r b e n e f i t , s u b s t a n t i v e o r p r o c e d u r a l , e n f o r c e a b l e
by any p a r t y a g a i n s t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , i t s agencies o r
i n s t r u m e n t a l i t i e s , i t s o f f i c e r s o r employees, o r any o t h e r
person.
Sec. 6.
(a) This o r d e r s h a l l take e f f e c t a t 10:09 p.m.,
d a y l i g h t time on June 21, 1994.
eastern
(b) This o r d e r s h a l l be t r a n s m i t t e d t o t h e Congress and
p u b l i s h e d i n t h e Federal R e g i s t e r .
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
THE WHITE HOUSE,
June 21, 1994.
# # #
�THE WHITE HOUSE
O f f i c e of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
June 19, 1994
PRESS BRIEFING
BY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE ROBERT GALLUCCI
The B r i e f i n g Room
1:10 P.M. EDT
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: Good afternoon. I ' d l i k e
t o begin w i t h a comment or two on t h i s morning's meeting.
President
Carter met t h i s morning w i t h the National Security Advisor and some
other o f f i c i a l s , i n c l u d i n g myself. We met f o r about two hours. I t
was a good meeting. I t provided more d e t a i l on h i s v i s i t t o DPRK —
t o North Korea. We learned more about the message t h a t he i s
c a r r y i n g back. I ' d say the t a l k s were very c o n s t r u c t i v e and very
useful.
During t h e course of t h a t ireeting, President C l i n t o n
also spoke w i t h President Carter f o r over a h a l f an hour. And I ' d
say, on balance, we now are i n a p o s i t i o n t o do as we said we would,
which i s t o f o l l o w up on the r e s u l t s of President Carter's t r i p i n
d i p l o m a t i c channels. And we plan t o do chat j u s t as soon as
possible.
I'd be prepared t o answer questions now.
Q
c r i s i s i s over?
Do you agree w i t h the former President t h a t the
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: We have never said t h a t
t h i s was a c r i s i s . Our view of t h i s i s t h a t we are working very hard
t o avoid a c r i s i s from m a t e r i a l i z i n g . And i t may w e l l be t h a t
President Carter has brought back something upon which we can b u i l d
and defuse the s i t u a t i o n .
Q
Do you agree w i t h h i s assessment, whatever i t was,
whether i t was a c r i s i s or not, t h a t the serious s i t u a t i o n has been
ameliorated or m i t i g a t e d t o some extent?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: I t h i n k what we have here
— I t h i n k you're looking f o r a c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f what has
happened. And I t h i n k the c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n I'm comfortable w i t h i s
t h a t there may be an opening here. C e r t a i n l y we're very appreciative
of President Carter's good e f f o r t s . I f they do i n f a c t lead t o
p r a c t i c a l r e s u l t s , w e ' l l be extremely pleased, obviously. But a t
t h i s p o i n t , we're — our posture i s one i n which we r e a l l y do need t o
f o l l o w up on what he has brought back t o see j u s t e x a c t l y how much i s
there.
Q
Did you get precise d e t a i l from President Carter
about what the North Koreans mean by a freeze i n t h e i r nuclear
program?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: We spoke a t some length
w i t h President Carter about h i s understandings o f what the North
Koreans had t o l d him. I w i l l t e l l you t h a t our view i s as we stated
i t l a s t week, t h a t what we are looking f o r a t t h i s p o i n t i s f o r t h e
North Koreans t o agree t h a t they r e a l l y w i l l not reprocess any of
MR
OE
�- 2-
t h a t spent f u e l , not separate any more plutonium; t h a t they w i l l not
r e f u e l t h e r e a c t o r — t h a t i s t o say, no.; produce any more plutonium;
t h a t they w i l l maintain the presence or permit t h e IAEA t o maintain
the presence o f the inspectors and, g e n e r a l l y , t o maintain t h e
c o n t i n u i t y o f safeguards.
And when I say we're going t o f o l l o w up i n d i p l o m a t i c
channels, t h a t ' s what we're going t o do.
Q
I f I could j u s t f o l l o w up on t h a t — i s i t your
understanding from what he has t o l d you so f a r , i s i t your
understanding t h a t the North Koreans are w i l l i n g t o meet those three
s p e c i f i c conditions?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: What I can t e l l you a t
t h i s p o i n t i s we have a b e t t e r a p p r e c i a t i o n of t h e p o s i t i o n o f the
DPRK, but our i n t e n t i o n t o get a precise and o f f i c i a l view i s t o do
t h a t i n a d i p l o m a t i c channel. And I r e a l l y can't go beyond t h a t .
Q
t h a t there are no
what the step i s .
delegation? What
Could you give us your r e a c t i o n t o h i s statement
unanswered questions? And t e l l me, i f you would,
Do you go t o New York? Do you t a l k t o t h e U.N.
i s your —
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: Sorry, I need f o r you t o
help me here — "there are no more unanswered questions" — can you
give me a context?
Q
He j u s t says, as f a r as I'm concerned, there are no
unanswered questions.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: I'm s o r r y , I can't
explain what President Carter meant by t h a t , and I would r e a l l y ask
you t o ask him what the context i s f o r t h a t .
I s there another question tnere t h a t I —
Q
Yes. Do you go t o New York now?
What happens now?
Tomorrow —
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI:
The m o d a l i t y , as
diplomats l i k e t o say, f o r f o l l o w i n g up i n d i p l o m a t i c channels I
r e a l l y can't comment on a t t h i s p o i n t . What I can t e l l you i s , we
w i l l f o l l o w up> w e ' l l f o l l o w u p j u s t as q u i c k l y as we can.
Q
Are you reconsidering, s i r , t h e need f o r sanctions?
Are sanctions, indeed, held i n abeyance, as he suggested?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: Our p o s i t i o n on sanctions
i s , as we have said i t i s , and t h a t i s t h a t we are pursuing
c o n s u l t a t i o n s i n New York. C e r t a i n l y , our hope i s t h a t i f as a
r e s u l t o f t h e follow-up i n a diplomatic channel, we can agree on the
p u r s u i t o f a settlement through a d i p l o m a t i c means, through a t h i r d
round, t h a t i n t h a t context, c e r t a i n l y once t h a t i s agreed we would
suspend t h e i r e f f o r t a t sanctions.
Q
Do you generally agree w i t h Mr. C l i n t o n j u s t t h a t
you can g e n e r a l l y t r u s t what they're t e l l i n g you a t t h i s p o i n t , what
the North Koreans are saying t h a t they w i l l agree t o do? Do you f e e l
that?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI:
I t h i n k what I would
p r e f e r t o say i s t h a t we w i l l be going back t o t h e DPRK. We w i l l t r y
to be precise about exactly what they are prepared t o do, and i f what
they are prepared t o do w i l l meet our needs w i t h respect t o a basis,
then w e ' l l go t o a t h i r d round. I t h i n k a t t h i s p o i n t , as we have
been f o r some time, we've taken the p o s i t i o n t h a t what happens on the
ground i n North Korea a t the nuclear f a c i l i t i e s i s something t h a t
MR
OE
�- 3-
needs t o be monitored by the IAEA. We need t o have v e r i f i c a t i o n .
That's a standard i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n ; i t ' s nothing s p e c i a l i n
t h i s case, and i t ' s something we hold t o .
Q
What i s there i n Mr. Carter's r e p o r t t o you t h i s
morning t h a t leads you t o the conclusion t h a t , quote, "there may be
an opening here." What makes you t h i n k there i s an opening?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: President Carter reported
when he was i n t h e DPRK and, indeed, gavo us more d e t a i l t h i s morning
about the i n t e r e s t of Kim I I Sung and others i n the DPRK government
t o , i n the f i r s t instance, be w i l l i n g t o freeze the nuclear program,
an i n t e r e s t i n genuinely decommissioning and p u t t i n g aside a graphite
technology, which i s , from a p r o l i f e r a t i o n perspective, very
t r o u b l i n g , and move t o l i g h t water r e a c t o r s ; g e n e r a l l y an i n t e r e s t i n
improving r e l a t i o n s and meeting i n t e r n a t i o n a l standards; and i n the
context o f an o v e r a l l settlement, i n f a c t , even s e t t l i n g questions of
the past o f s p e c i a l inspections, which was t h e issue, you w i l l
r e c a l l , over which t h i s current s i t u a t i o n m a t e r i a l i z e d over a year
ago.
So there's much t h a t could be t h e r e , and the issue,
again, t o say i t over again i s , we need t o determine whether i t i s
there.
Q
What was there a t Camp David today t h a t was so
important t h a t President C l i n t o n can coma here t o the White House and
meet w i t h President Carter i n person?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCT: I'm s o r r y , I cannot
answer t h a t . I simply don't know what was going on a t Camp David
today, so I can't speak t o t h a t .
Q
What was the r e a c t i o n t o t h e o f f e r by Kim t o allow
j o i n t searches f o r men missing from the Korean War through the U.S.
and North Korea? And t h i s i s something t h a t ' s been hanging f i r e f o r
a long time and he's now professed t o o f f e r agreement on i t .
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI:
Yes.
I can't
speak t o
t h i s i n any d e t a i l , but the p r e l i m i n a r y assessment o f t h i s , l i k e much
else, i s very p o s i t i v e . I f , indeed, t h i s i s a new p o s i t i o n by the
DPRK, i f , indeed, they are o f f e r i n g t o have j o i n t e f f o r t s and
l o c a t i n g and then executing the r e t u r n of remains, i t would be very
welcome. .But e x a c t l y what's involved here and what i s t h e DPRK
p o s i t i o n I can't say a t t h i s p o i n t .
Q
W i l l i t be pursued through t h e same channels as the
v e r i f i c a t i o n on t h e nuclear issue, or i s there a separate channel on
that?
channel.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI:
I t w i l l be a separate channel.
Q
I t w i l l be a separate
Can you t e l l us about that?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: I'm a f r a i d I can't speak
to t h a t . I t w i l l be a separate channel i n Korea, I'm c e r t a i n , but
not i n the same context as we're pursuing the nuclear issue.
Q
I understand t h a t you want t o hear from the North
Koreans d i r e c t l y p r e c i s e l y what they're w i l l i n g t o do. But from what
President Carter reported, are they w i l l i n g t o meet the c o n d i t i o n s
you've l a i d out? Or, a l t e r n a t i v e l y , was there anything t h a t he had
to r e p o r t t h a t gives you pause?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: I t h i n k t h a t r e a l l y goes
back t o t h e same question, and I can't go beyond what I said before.
We have s u b s t a n t i a l l y more d e t a i l as a r e s u l t o f today's meetings,
MR
OE
�- 4-
and they were very u s e f u l , but f o r an o f f i c i a l i n an a u t h o r i t a t i v e
p o s i t i o n o f the DPRK, i t i s reasonable t o expect t h a t we would get
t h a t i n d i p l o m a t i c channel. And that's e x a c t l y what we're going
after.
Q
Did you express any concerns, or d i d Mr. Lake, t o
President Carter about mixed messages?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: There i s no question that
a l l of us read the newspapers over the l a s t few days.
Q
But was there any d i r e c t concern expressed t o him
i n t h i s meeting today?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: I t h i n k we a l l agreed i n
the course o f t h i s meeting t h a t U.S. p o l i c y was s t a t e d by President
C l i n t o n . I don't t h i n k President Carter had any problem w i t h t h a t
whatever. And I t h i n k we are a l l on the same sheet of music.
Q
A l l on t h e same sheet o f music?
Q
You are now?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI:
That i s my understanding,
yes.
music?
Q
Were there some dissonant chords on t h a t sheet of
(Laughter.)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI:
I can't go any f u r t h e r w i t h i t .
I love the metaphor, but
Q
How are you going t o coordinate w i t h South Korea as
t o North and South Korean summit? That's another message t h a t
President Carter brought up.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: Obviously, we welcome the
concept o f a summit meeting between the two Presidents as a step we
hope would u l t i m a t e l y lead i n a reduction o f tensions between North
and South Korea. And, obviously also, we w i l l be t a l k i n g t o the
Republic o f Korea about t h e i r plans, as we w i l l be d e s c r i b i n g t o them
our plans w i t h respect t o f o l l o w i n g up on the matters t h a t President
Carter brought back from him. Consultations, i n s h o r t , w i t h the
Republic o f Korea w i l l continue across the whole range o f these
issues.
Q
How can you say t h a t you're a l l on the same sheet
of music when President Carter j u s t t o l d us t h a t t h e agreement i s a
done deal, t h a t there's no need f o r sanctions, we should go d i r e c t l y
i n t o a t h i r d round? And you're saying something q u i t e d i f f e r e n t —
t h a t i t ' s n o t a done deal, you need t o have c l a r i f i c a t i o n through
d i p l o m a t i c channels, you need v e r i f i c a t i o n o f what Kim I I Sung said?
We're g e t t i n g a message from Carter even today t h a t i s t o t a l l y a t
variance from what you're g i v i n g us. Can you r e c o n c i l e those two?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: What I can do f o r you i s
t e l l you t h a t by saying t h a t we're on the sheet o f music I d i d not
mean t o say t h a t everything t h a t President Carter t h i n k s and
everything t h a t President C l i n t o n t h i n k s are e x a c t l y the same about
a l l matters. What I meant t o say by t h a t i s , on t h e issue I thought
was before us, whether President Carter had a d i f f e r e n t view about
what we were doing i n New York, I d i d not t h i n k he d i d based upon our
conversations today.
My own view, having l i s t e n e d t o President Carter, i s
t h a t he understands t h a t we are indeed c o n t i n u i n g t o consult on
sanctions. And President Carter has views about the u t i l i t y of
sanctions; he has views about the North Koreans, and those are the
MR
OE
�- 5-
views of President Carter. And I i n v i t e you t o explore them w i t h
him. I can't say t o you t h a t at every p o i n t , t h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n
w i l l agree w i t h President Carter. But he c e r t a i n l y has a r i g h t t o
those views.
On the substance of what we are doing r i g h t now, I don't
detect any d i f f e r e n c e i n p r i n c i p l e or important d i f f e r e n c e whatever.
He w e l l understands t h a t our i n t e n t i o n i s t o take advantage of t h i s
opening t h a t he may w e l l have created here. And I t h i n k he's
c e r t a i n l y extremely supportive of t h a t . That's what we t a l k e d t o him
about i n d e t a i l , as w e l l as the message he was b r i n g i n g back. So I
say again, I don't t h i n k there i s any substantive d i f f e r e n c e , and I
t h i n k the c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n as i t being otherwise i s i n c o r r e c t .
Q
So o v e r a l l , you view the t r i p as h e l p f u l t o forming
U.S. p o l i c y . You view the Carter mission as an a s s i s t r a t h e r than as
something negative.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: I would l i k e t o answer
t h a t unambiguously and c l e a r l y — yes, we welcome President Carter's
e f f o r t s , and we intend on f o l l o w i n g up on them immediately.
Q
Dee Dee, w i l l we hear from the President today or
do you have a statement from him, a w r i t t e n statement on t h i s ?
MS MYERS: No.
Q
I s there any reason why he has nothing t o say?
MS. MYERS: Secretary G a l l u c c i j u s t spoke on behalf of
the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , and we don't have anything else planned f o r
today.
Q
Do you expect him t o t a l k when he gets in?
MS. MYERS: No.
Q
Do you know when he's coming back?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: I thinK sometime between 6:30 p.m.
and 7:00 p.m.
Q
A 30-minute telephone conversation w i t h i n the two-
hour meeting?
MS. MYERS: No. The meeting l a s t e d two hours.
phone conversation was an a d d i t i o n a l h a l f hour.
Q
You mean a f t e r the two hours?
MS. MYERS:
Q
j u s t a f t e r noon.
The
I t h i n k i t was a c t u a l l y before.
— j u s t before 10:00
a.m. The meeting broke up
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: Yes. He met w i t h Tony and a couple
of others. Then they took the phone c a l l f o r about h a l f an hour.
Then he continued meeting.
Q
The t o t a l o v e r a l l time was two hours.
Q
When Carter met w i t h these guys, was i t one-onone, or was i t l i k e a round robin meeting, or how was i t ?
MS. MYERS: I t was Tony one-on-one f o r a while, and then
the expanded group t h a t included Win Lord, Sandy Berger, Bob Gallucci
and Dan Poneman.
Q
Do you care t o characterize the phone conversation
he had w i t h the President?
�- 6-
MS. MYERS:
Q
I t was a very good conversation.
Where was i t i n the meeting?
Was i t the end,
middle-end?
MS. MYERS: Middle.
Q
(Laughter.)
You mean i t was close t o e i t h e r the beginning or
the end?
MS. MYERS:
Correct.
I t was n e i t h e r the beginning, nor
the end.
Q
What I'm r e a l l y t r y i n g t o ask, Dee Dee or George,
i s was there something the President wanted t o hear before he'd get
on the phone? Was there something they wanted t o e l i c i t ?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: He j u s t wanted a b r i e f i n g .
Q
Okay.
END
1:23 P.M. EDT
�THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
June 19,
1994
PRESS BRIEFING
BY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE ROBERT GALLUCCI
The Briefing Room
1:10
P.M.
EDT
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: Good afternoon. I'd like
to begin with a comment or two on t h i s morning's meeting. President
Carter met this morning with the National Security Advisor and some
other o f f i c i a l s , including myself. We met for about two hours. I t
was a good meeting. I t provided more d e t a i l on h i s v i s i t to DPRK —
to North Korea. We learned more about the message that he i s
carrying back. I'd say the t a l k s were very constructive and very
useful.
During the course of that ireeting, President Clinton
also spoke with President Carter for over a half an hour. And I'd
say, on balance, we now are in a position to do as we said we would,
which i s to follow up on the r e s u l t s of President Carter's t r i p in
diplomatic channels. And we plan to do chat j u s t as soon as
possible.
I'd be prepared to answer questions
Q
c r i s i s i s over?
now.
Do you agree with the former President that the
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: We have never said that
t h i s was a c r i s i s . Our view of t h i s i s that we are working very hard
to avoid a c r i s i s from materializing. And i t may well be that
President Carter has brought back something upon which we can build
and defuse the situation.
Q
Do you agree with his assessment, whatever i t was,
whether i t was a c r i s i s or not, that the serious situation has been
ameliorated or mitigated to some extent?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: I think what we have here
— I think you're looking for a characterization of what has
happened. And I think the characterization I'm comfortable with i s
that there may be an opening here. Certainly we're very appreciative
of President Carter's good e f f o r t s . I f they do i n fact lead to
p r a c t i c a l results, we'll be extremely pleased, obviously.
But at
t h i s point, we're — our posture i s one in which we r e a l l y do need to
follow up on what he has brought back to see j u s t exactly how much i s
there.
Q
Did you get precise d e t a i l from President Carter
about what the North Koreans mean by a freeze in t h e i r nuclear
program?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: We spoke at some length
with President Carter about his understandings of what the North
Koreans had told him.
I w i l l t e l l you that our view i s as we stated
i t l a s t week, that what we are looking for at t h i s point i s for the
North Koreans to agree that they r e a l l y w i l l not reprocess any of
MORE
�- 2-
t h a t spent f u e l , not separate any more plutonium; t h a t they w i l l not
r e f u e l the reactor — t h a t i s t o say, no;: produce any more plutonium;
t h a t they w i l l maintain the presence or permit the IAEA t o maintain
the presence of the inspectors and, g e n e r a l l y , t o maintain the
c o n t i n u i t y of safeguards.
And when I say we're going t o f o l l o w up i n d i p l o m a t i c
channels, t h a t ' s what we're going t o do.
Q
I f I could j u s t f o l l o w up on t h a t — i s i t your
understanding from what he has t o l d you so f a r , i s i t your
understanding t h a t the North Koreans are w i l l i n g t o meet those three
s p e c i f i c conditions?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI:
What I c a n t e l l
you a t
t h i s p o i n t i s we have a b e t t e r a p p r e c i a t i o n o f the p o s i t i o n o f the
DPRK, but our i n t e n t i o n t o get a precise and o f f i c i a l view i s t o do
t h a t i n a diplomatic channel. And I r e a l l y can't go beyond t h a t .
Q
t h a t there are no
what the step i s .
delegation? What
Could you give us your r e a c t i o n t o h i s statement
unanswered questions? And t e l l me, i f you would,
Do you go t o New York? Do you t a l k t o the U.N.
i s your --
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: Sorry, I need f o r you t o
help me here — "there are no more unanswered questions" — can you
g i v e me a context?
Q
He j u s t says, as f a r as I'm concerned, there are no
unanswered questions.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCT: I'm s o r r y , I can't
e x p l a i n what President Carter meant by t h a t , and I would r e a l l y ask
you t o ask him what the context i s f o r t h a t .
Is there another question tnere t h a t I —
Q
Yes. Do you go t o New York now?
What happens now?
Tomorrow —
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: The modality, as
diplomats l i k e t o say, f o r f o l l o w i n g up i n d i p l o m a t i c channels I
r e a l l y can't comment on at t h i s p o i n t . What I can t e l l you i s , we
w i l l f o l l o w up>. we'11 . f o l l o w up j u s t as q u i c k l y as. we- can*
Q
Are you reconsidering, s i r , the need f o r sanctions?
Are sanctions, indeed, held i n abeyance, as he suggested?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: Our p o s i t i o n on sanctions
i s , as we have said i t i s , and t h a t i s t h a t we are pursuing
c o n s u l t a t i o n s i n New York. C e r t a i n l y , our hope i s t h a t i f as a
r e s u l t o f the follow-up i n a d i p l o m a t i c channel, we can agree on the
p u r s u i t o f a settlement through a d i p l o m a t i c means, through a t h i r d
round, t h a t i n t h a t context, c e r t a i n l y once t h a t i s agreed we would
suspend t h e i r e f f o r t a t sanctions.
Q
Do you generally agree w i t h Mr. C l i n t o n j u s t t h a t
you can generally t r u s t what they're t e l l i n g you a t t h i s p o i n t , what
the North Koreans are saying t h a t they w i l l agree t o do? Do you f e e l
that?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: I t h i n k what I would
p r e f e r t o say i s t h a t we w i l l be going back t o the DPRK. We w i l l t r y
t o be precise about e x a c t l y what they are prepared t o do, and i f what
they are prepared t o do w i l l meet our needs w i t h respect t o a basis,
then w e ' l l go t o a t h i r d round. I t h i n k at t h i s p o i n t , as we have
been f o r some time, we've taken the p o s i t i o n t h a t what happens on the
ground i n North Korea a t the nuclear f a c i l i t i e s i s something t h a t
MR
OE
�- 3 -
needs to be monitored by the IAEA. We need to have v e r i f i c a t i o n .
That's a standard international condition; i t ' s nothing special in
t h i s case, and i t ' s something we hold to.
Q
What i s there in Mr. Carter's report to you this
morning that leads you to the conclusion that, quote, "there may be
an opening here." What makes you think there i s an opening?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: President Carter reported
when he was in the DPRK and, indeed, gavo. us more d e t a i l this morning
about the interest of Kim I I Sung and others in the DPRK government
to, in the f i r s t instance, be w i l l i n g to freeze the nuclear program,
an interest in genuinely decommissioning and putting aside a graphite
technology, which i s , from a p r o l i f e r a t i o n perspective, very
troubling, and move to light water reactors; generally an interest in
improving relations and meeting international standards; and in the
context of an overall settlement, in fact, even s e t t l i n g questions of
the past of special inspections, which was the issue, you w i l l
r e c a l l , over which this current situation materialized over a year
ago.
So there's much that could be there, and the issue,
again, to say i t over again i s , we need to determine whether i t i s
there.
Q
What was there at Camp David today that was so
important that President Clinton can con.2 here to the White House and
meet with President Carter in person?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI:: I'm sorry, I cannot
answer that. I simply don't know what was going on at Camp David
today, so I can't speak to that.
Q
What was the reaction to the offer by Kim to allow
j o i n t searches for men missing from the Korean War through the U.S.
and North Korea? And this i s something that's been hanging f i r e for
a long time and he's now professed to offer agreement on i t .
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI:
Yes.
I c a n ' t speak t o
t h i s in any d e t a i l , but the preliminary assessment of t h i s , l i k e much
e l s e , i s very positive. I f , indeed, t h i s i s a new position by the
DPRK, i f , indeed, they are offering to have j o i n t efforts and
locating and then executing the return of remains, i t would be very
welcome. But exactly what's involved here and what i s the DPRK
position I can't say at t h i s point.
1
Q
Will i t be pursued through the same channels as the
v e r i f i c a t i o n on the nuclear issue, or i s there a separate channel on
that?
channel.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI:
I t w i l l be a separate channel.
Q
I t w i l l be a separate
Can you t e l l us about that?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: I'm afraid I can't speak
to that. I t w i l l be a separate channel in Korea, I'm certain, but
not in the same context as we're pursuing the nuclear issue.
Q
I understand that you want to hear from the North
Koreans d i r e c t l y precisely what they're w i l l i n g to do. But from what
President Carter reported, are they w i l l i n g to meet the conditions
you've l a i d out? Or, alternatively, was there anything that he had
to report that gives you pause?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: I think that r e a l l y goes
back to the same question, and I can't go beyond what I said before.
We have substantially more d e t a i l as a result of today's meetings,
MORE
�- 4 -
and they were very useful, but for an o f f i c i a l in an authoritative
position of the DPRK, i t i s reasonable to expect that we would get
that in diplomatic channel. And that's exactly what we're going
after.
Q
Did you express any concerns, or did Mr. Lake, to
President Carter about mixed messages?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: There i s no question that
a l l of us read the newspapers over the l a s t few days.
Q
But was there any direct concern expressed to him
in t h i s meeting today?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: I think we a l l agreed in
the course of t h i s meeting that U.S. policy was stated by President
Clinton. I don't think President Carter had any problem with that
whatever. And I think we are a l l on the same sheet of music.
Q
A l l on the same sheet of music?
Q
You are now?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI:
That i s my understanding,
yes.
music?
Q
Were there some dissonant chords on that sheet of
(Laughter.)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI:
I can't go any further with i t .
I love the metaphor, but
Q
How are you going to coordinate with South Korea as
to North and South Korean summit? That's another message that
President Carter brought up.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: Obviously, we welcome the
concept of a summit meeting between the two Presidents as a step we
hope would ultimately lead in a reduction of tensions between North
and South Korea. And, obviously also, we w i l l be talking to the .
Republic of Korea about their plans, as we w i l l be describing to them
our plans with respect to following up on the matters that President
Carter brought back from him. Consultations, in short, with the
Republic of Korea w i l l continue across the whole range of these
issues.
Q
How can you say that you're a l l on the same sheet
of music when President Carter j u s t told us that the agreement i s a
done deal, that there's no need for sanctions, we should go d i r e c t l y
into a third round? And you're saying something quite different —
that i t ' s not a done deal, you need to have c l a r i f i c a t i o n through
diplomatic channels, you need v e r i f i c a t i o n of what Kim I I Sung said?
We're getting a message from Carter even today that i s t o t a l l y at
variance from what you're giving us. Can you reconcile those two?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: What I can do for you i s
t e l l you that by saying that we're on the sheet of music I did not
mean to say that everything that President Carter thinks and
everything that President Clinton thinks are exactly the same about
a l l matters. What I meant to say by that i s , on the issue I thought
was before us, whether President Carter had a different view about
what we were doing in New York, I did not think he did based upon our
conversations today.
My own view, having listened to President Carter, i s
that he understands that we are indeed continuing to consult on
sanctions. And President Carter has views about the u t i l i t y of
sanctions; he has views about the North Koreans, and those are the
MORE
�- 5-
views of President Carter. And I i n v i t e you t o explore them w i t h
him. I can't say t o you t h a t a t every p o i n t , t h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n
w i l l agree w i t h President Carter. But he c e r t a i n l y has a r i g h t t o
those views.
On the substance o f what we are doing r i g h t now, I don't
detect any d i f f e r e n c e i n p r i n c i p l e or important d i f f e r e n c e whatever.
He w e l l understands t h a t our i n t e n t i o n i s t o take advantage o f t h i s
opening t h a t he may w e l l have created here. And I t h i n k he's
c e r t a i n l y extremely supportive o f t h a t . That's what we t a l k e d t o him
about i n d e t a i l , as w e l l as the message he was b r i n g i n g back. So I
say again, I don't t h i n k there i s any substantive d i f f e r e n c e , and I
t h i n k the c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n as i t being otherwise i s i n c o r r e c t .
Q
So o v e r a l l , you view the t r i p as h e l p f u l t o forming
U.S. p o l i c y . You view the Carter mission as an a s s i s t r a t h e r than as
something negative.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: I would l i k e t o answer
t h a t unambiguously and c l e a r l y — yes, we welcome President Carter's
e f f o r t s , and we intend on f o l l o w i n g up on them immediately.
Q
Dee Dee, w i l l we hear from the President today or
do you have a statement from him, a w r i t t e n statement on t h i s ?
MS MYERS: No.
Q
I s there any reason why he has nothing t o say?
MS. MYERS: Secretary G a l l u c c i j u s t spoke on behalf of
the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , and we don't have anything else planned f o r
today.
Q
Do you expect him t o t a l k when he gets in?
MS. MYERS: No.
Q
Do you know when he's coming back?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: I t h i n x sometime between 6:30 p.m.
and 7:00 p.m.
Q
A 30-minute telephone conversation w i t h i n the two-
hour, meeting?
MS. MYERS: No. The meeting l a s t e d two hours.
phone conversation was an a d d i t i o n a l h a l f hour.
Q
You mean a f t e r the two hours?
MS. MYERS:
Q
j u s t a f t e r noon.
The
I t h i n k i t was a c t u a l l y before.
— j u s t before 10:00
a.m. The meeting broke up
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: Yes. He met w i t h Tony and a couple
of others. Then they took the phone c a l l f o r about h a l f an hour.
Then he continued meeting.
Q
The t o t a l o v e r a l l time was two hours.
Q
When Carter met w i t h these guys, was i t one-onone, or was i t l i k e a round r o b i n meeting, or how was i t ?
MS. MYERS: I t was Tony one-on-one f o r a w h i l e , and then
the expanded group t h a t included Win Lord, Sandy Berger, Bob Gallucci
and Dan Poneman.
Q
Do you care t o characterize the phone conversation
he had w i t h the President?
�- 6-
MS. MYERS:
Q
I t was a very good conversation.
Where was i t i n the meeting?
Was i t the end,
middle-end?
MS. MYERS: Middle.
Q
(Laughter.)
You mean i t was close t o e i t h e r the beginning or
the end?
MS. MYERS: Correct.
I t was n e i t h e r the beginning, nor
the end.
Q
What I'm r e a l l y t r y i n g t o ask, Dee Dee or George,
i s was there something the President wanted t o hear before he'd get
on the phone? Was there something they wanted t o e l i c i t ?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: He j u s t wanted a b r i e f i n g .
Q
Okay.
END
1:23 P.M. EDT
�THE WHITE HOUSE
O f f i c e o f the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
June 16, 1994
PRESS BRIEFING BY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR POLITICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS ROBERT GALLUCCI
The B r i e f i n g Room
4:52
P.M. EDT
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI:
f i r s t reading a statement.
I'm going t o begin by
The United States welcomes i n d i c a t i o n s given t o
President Carter t h a t North Korea desires t o f i n d a c o n s t r u c t i v e
s o l u t i o n t o the very serious issues between North Korea and the
i n t e r n a t i o n a l community.
The United States has always been ready t o engage i n a
t h i r d round o f t a l k s under the proper circumstances.
In this
connection, we note North Korea's assurances t h a t IAEA inspectors and.
IAEA monitoring equipment would be kept i n place. We also note North
Korea's d e s i r e t o replace i t s gas graphite f u e l cycle w i t h more,
p r o l i f e r a t i o n - r e s i s t a n t l i g h t water technology, and i t s w i l l i n g n e s s
to r e t u r n t o f u l l compliance w i t h the N o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n Treaty and
IAEA safeguards, i n c l u d i n g s p e c i a l inspections, as p a r t o f an o v e r a l l
settlement o f t h i s issue.
That could be a c o n s t r u c t i v e step i f i t means t h a t North
Korea i s also committed t o f r e e z i n g the major elements of i t s nuclearprogram w h i l e new t a l k s took place. That i s , not r e f u e l i n g the
reactor or reprocessing the spent f u e l i t has j u s t removed, and
p e r m i t t i n g the IAEA to. maintain the c o n t i n u i t y of safeguards..
A f t e r confirming t h i s meaning o f the message from North
Korea i n d i p l o m a t i c channels, we would be prepared t o go a t h i r d
round, a c t i n g as we have before, pursuant t o U.N. r e s o l u t i o n s .
Meanwhile, we are continuing t o consult on our sanctions r e s o l u t i o n
at the S e c u r i t y Council.
Q
Secretary G a l l u c c i , why would we go t o a t h i r d
round a t t h i s time when we s t i l l have not been s a t i s f i e d about the
prior — violations?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: We have, from the
beginning o f the e f f o r t t o engage the North Koreans b i l a t e r a l l y ,
described a basis f o r these t a l k s . And the basis f o r the t a l k s
involve a number o f elements. Among those elements was an element
t h a t described the requirement t h a t the- North Koreans not discharge
f u e l from t h e i r reactor w i t h o u t p r o v i d i n g f o r adequate IAEA
safeguards.
The reason f o r t h a t i s because when the f u e l i s
discharged from the r e a c t o r , i t i s possible i f the IAEA can do what
i t wants t o do, f o r the agency t o f i g u r e out what happened i n 1989,
to get a t the cause of t h i s problem i n the f i r s t place.
The reason we are not t a l k i n g t o the North.Koreans today
i s because, although they met the other bases f o r our dialogue, a t
the end pf May and through e a r l y June, they d i d discharge f u e l
without the adequate safeguards. What we said at t h a t p o i n t i s we
would r e t u r n the matter t o the Security Council. We also said t h a t
MORE
�- 2-
i f an adequate basis could be established, we would, o f course,
always r e t u r n t o t a l k w i t h the North Koreans.
Our o b j e c t i v e i n t h i s matter i s not t o seek sanctions;
seeking sanctions i s a means. The o b j e c t i v e , of course, i s t o get
the North Koreans t o t h e t a b l e t o discuss t h i s issue and resolve i t .
And t h a t ' s what we're aiming t o do. The p o i n t today, I t h i n k f o r
you, i s t h a t there may .be, i n t h i s message, a basis f o r r e t u r n i n g t o
t a l k s w i t h the North Koreans.
Q
Should we delay the sanctions then? Should we
delay the r e s o l u t i o n o r should we proceed i n t r y i n g t o . g e t support
f o r the r e s o l u t i o n since i t has i t s own b u i l t - i n delay?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: As I i n d i c a t e d , we are a t
the United Nations i n New York today, continuing our c o n s u l t a t i o n s on
sanctions. At the same time, we plan t o explore i n d i p l o m a t i c
channels the meaning o f the message we received today.
Q
Why do you need f u r t h e r explanation? Don't you
t h i n k President Carter i s able t o convey a message? You don't t r u s t
his words?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: We l i s t e n e d very
c a r e f u l l y t o President Carter today, and we understood h i s message, I
t h i n k i n whatever d e t a i l President Carter conveyed i t t o us. This i s
a complicated matter. There are elements, as I t r i e d t o i n d i c a t e i n
the statement, which remain t o be c l a r i f i e d .
Our i n t e n t i o n i s , i n f a c t , through d i p l o m a t i c channels
to t r y t o c l a r i f y those elements. I f the message conveys the k i n d o f
meaning t h a t I i n d i c a t e d , namely t h a t the North Koreans are prepared
to take p a r t i c u l a r steps t o r e e s t a b l i s h the basis f o r a dialogue —
and t h a t i s the suspension of reprocessing, suspension o f r e f u e l i n g
of t h e r e a c t o r , and maintaining the c o n t i n u i t y of o f safeguards —
under those circumstances, we would f i n d the basis adequate t o resume
a dialogue.
Q
Mr. G a l l u c c i , i n the past you've s a i d t h a t the
North Koreans should discuss these nuclear issues w i t h the
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Atomic Energy Agency, and not w i t h the United States,•
t h a t i f - they made progress w i t h the IAEA, t h a t would set the stage
f o r a higher l e v e l resumption of discussion w i t h the United States.
I s t h e C l i n t o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n now backing away from t h a t p o s i t i o n and
opening up the door t o d i r e c t t e c h n i c a l n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h North
Korea, s k i r t i n g the IAEA?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI:
No.
A l l along, t h e
United States has made i t c l e a r t h a t when i t gets down t o u l t i m a t e l y
what i s acceptable i n terms of i n t e r n a t i o n a l safeguards, i t i s going
to be a matter f o r the IAEA t o set t h a t standard. That's what i t
does.
What we have been doing i s undertaking a dialogue w i t h
the North Koreans when the circumstances were r i g h t f o r such a
dialogue — and they have not, I remind you, been r i g h t , since l a s t
J u l y — i n order t o e s t a b l i s h a basis f o r the IAEA t o continue i t s
e f f o r t o f the North Koreans t o apply the c o r r e c t safeguards.- That
w i l l s t i l l be the o b j e c t i v e of a dialogue. I t ' l l s t i l l be t o create
circumstances i n which the North Koreans can come i n t o compliance
w i t h IAEA safeguards.
The determination of when they're i n compliance w i l l not
be made by the United States, i t w i l l be made by the IAEA.
Q
Mr. Carter seemed t o t h i n k he had the breakthrough
today. I take i t from what you're saying here today t h a t i t might
be, but you can't . t e l l .
MR
OE
�- 3-
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: I t h i n k i t ' s f a i r t o say
t h a t we've looked at the message, we see possibly some new elements
i n the message, we w i l l be exploring the meaning o f the message i n
diplomatic channels, and only a f t e r we're able t o do t h a t w i l l we be
able t o characterize i t .
Q . W i l l you also see, possibly,. an attempt here t o
create an atmosphere i n which sanctions are less l i k e l y t o buy more
time?
.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI:
t o buy more time.
Q
Our o b j e c t i v e here i s not
Them.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: Oh, I see. you're t a l k i n g
about the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t the North Koreans — yes, I don't —
Q
Can we get t h a t answer on camera, please?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: The question was, as I
understand i t , might t h i s be an e f f o r t by the North Koreans to s t a l l
and buy more time. I s t h a t .correct?
I'm w e l l past myself t r y i n g t o i n t e r p r e t the motivation
of North Korea. And what I w i l l t e l l you i s , we w i l l look at what
they say and what they are prepared t o dp, and w e ' l l act on t h a t
basis.
Q
S i r , you sounded r a t h e r degrading o f Mr. Carter.
Why don't you j o i n us? Aren't you happy t h a t he's g o t t e n t o some
conclusion? He's gone f a r t h e r along than you a l l have.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: Our r e a c t i o n — the
question i s , why don't I have more j o y , I guess, at what Mr. Carter
has accomplished. I t h i n k we're going t o wait u n t i l we can a c t u a l l y
determine what the content of t h a t message i s before we respond w i t h
any more j o y than we now have.
Q
There's one t h i n g t h a t President Carter c l e a r l y
accomplished t h a t you a l l had not accomplished. Namely, he extracted
a commitment from North Korea not t o e j e c t the inspectors, and he d i d
so i n ' an i n t e r e s t i n g way: - he d i d so by speaking d i r e c t l y w i t h the
senior leader of North Korea who he said was not well-informed about
the l i k e l i h o o d t h a t they were about t o be ejected.
I t raises questions, does i t not, about the American
s t r a t e g y o f d e c l i n i n g t o address these issues w i t h senior North
Korean o f f i c i a l s i n the past? Here, you have a p r i v a t e c i t i z e n .
going, or someone you have described as a p r i v a t e c i t i z e n repeatedly,
not as an o f f i c i a l government emissary, making headway when, and not
as p a r t o f the government, but r e a l l y outside of the government's
e f f o r t . Does t h a t cause you t o engage i n any s e l f - q u e s t i o n i n g about
the approach t h a t you've taken over the past months?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: J e f f , I always engage i n
s e l f - q u e s t i o n i n g , but not on t h i s p o i n t . My f e e l i n g about t h i s , as I
said before, i s I don't r e a l l y know what North Korean motivations .
are. The p r o p o s i t i o n , I t h i n k , t h a t underlies your question i s t h a t
somehow or-other, because of a f a i l u r e t o communicate up u n t i l now.
Kim I I Sung d i d not understand t h a t we wished the inspectors to be
t h e r e , and w i t h Jimmy Carter i n f r o n t o f him, he was able t o discern
t h a t - o b j e c t i v e of ours.
That, t o me, appears, w i t h a l l due respect, ludicrous.
I do not know what the purpose of the decision of the North Koreans'
MR
OE
�- 4-
at t h i s p o i n t t o make t h i s o f f e r . What i s important i s t h a t you
have, I t h i n k , c o r r e c t l y i d e n t i f i e d an element which i s
i n t e r e s t i n g — namely, a commitment t o leave the inspectors i n place.
By the way, I would note t o you t h a t l e a v i n g the
inspectors i n place i s something the Security Council, by
p r e s i d e n t i a l statement, r e q u i r e d the North Koreans t o do, but indeed
the commitment i s new.
Q
There are two things. The IAEA said e a r l i e r t h i s
month t h a t they l o s t c o n t i n u i t y on those f u e l rods. I s there some
way t h a t genie can be put back i n the b o t t l e and you can regain them?
Secondly, what i s t h e response t o Mr. Carter's hope and suggestion
t h a t Mr. C l i n t o n speak d i r e c t l y t o Kim?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: Okay. The IAEA d i d not
say they l o s t c o n t i n u i t y on t h e f u e l rods. The question o f
c o n t i n u i t y o f safeguards i s , i n f a c t , not a problem a t the moment i n
North Korea, and has not been now f o r about a month or so. I t was
r e a f f i r m e d , t h e c o n t i n u i t y o f safeguards knowledge, w i t h the l a s t
i n s p e c t i o n t h a t occurred i n May. And i t was on the basis of t h a t
i n s p e c t i o n t h a t we had announced our w i l l i n g n e s s t o go t o a t h i r d
round.
What happened w i t h the discharge o f f u e l by the North
Koreans w i t h o u t proper IAEA safeguards, i s t h a t the agency l o s t the
a b i l i t y t o use t h a t methodology, namely the a n a l y s i s of the f u e l , t o
determine what happened i n 1989. That loss i s , by the agency's own
c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n , i r r e v o c a b l e . And t h a t was an important method o f
g e t t i n g a t t h e t r u t h of what happened i n 1989. There are some
others, i n c l u d i n g special i n s p e c t i o n s . Those are s t i l l open t o the
agency when, and i f , the North Koreans permit the agency t o do such
inspections.
Q
What about the other question about the p o s s i b i l i t y
of a d i r e c t conversation? Has Mr. Carter suggested t h a t President
C l i n t o n speak d i r e c t l y t o President Kim?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: There were a number o f
ideas and suggestions, I t h i n k , coming from President Carter, and I
t h i n k I ' l l l e t him speak t o t h a t .
Q
Bob, what s p e c i f i c a l l y do you need d i p l o m a t i c a l l y
from North Korea i n order t o engage i n a t h i r d round of t a l k s ? Do
you need a w r i t t e n message, o r a w r i t t e n pledge or promise? And how
w i l l you hold those talks? W i l l i t be Mr. Hubbard and h i s Korean
counterpart i n New York?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: What I a n t i c i p a t e w i t h o u t
g o i n g ' i n t o overwhelming d e t a i l , Lee, i s t h a t we w i l l probably use a
New York channel as the open d i p l o m a t i c channel we have t o the North
Koreans, t o get a t the meaning of today's message. And beyond t h a t ,
i n terms of what we understand t h a t they are prepared t o do, and what
we w i l l r e q u i r e t o do, I t h i n k has t o be a matter o f c o n s u l t a t i o n
w i t h i n government, which, q u i t e f r a n k l y , today we have not had time
t o do.
,
Q
Has there been come communication by the
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of your w i l l i n g n e s s t o provide t h e North Koreans w i t h
the l i g h t water technology t h a t they're a f t e r ? W i l l t h a t be p a r t of
the t h i r d round, or have you communicated t h a t , or d i d Carter
communicate i t i n some way?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: I n the J u l y round, t h e
second round, the North Koreans raised the s u b j e c t o f g i v i n g up
g r a p h i t e moderated reactor technology i f they could be provided w i t h •
a l i g h t water r e a c t o r . We, a t the time, i n a j o i n t statement,
MR
OE
�- 5-
i n d i c a t e d t h a t we are w i l l i n g t o commit ourselves t o helping b r i n g
t h a t about as p a r t of an u l t i m a t e settlement, and t h a t i s s t i l l our
position.
That does not mean t h a t we would finance a l i g h t water
r e a c t o r . I t does not mean t h a t we would provide a l i g h t water
r e a c t o r or even provide any technology. I t means t h a t we are
prepared t o be h e l p f u l i n having the North Koreans o b t a i n one. And
there are many c o u n t r i e s t h a t can provide t h a t technology.
Q
I n what way would i t be h e l p f u l ?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI:
Well, I think that
would
be l e f t t o a t h i r d round discussion as we f i n d out e x a c t l y what's on
t h e i r mind as w e l l .
Q
How long ago d i d you speak t o President Carter and
how long d i d the conversation l a s t ?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: Hours.
hours ago i s t h e l a s t time I spoke w i t h him.
Q
More than f i v e
How many times?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI:
I spoke t o h i m , m y s e l f ,
once.
Q
. Did he t e l l you - - d i d he t a l k t o t h e President?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: I'm going'to go t h i s f a r :
He d i d not t a l k t o the President o f the United States, and I would
r a t h e r not go i n t o who else he t a l k e d t o . I'm c e r t a i n l y prepared t o
t e l l you I t a l k e d t o him, though.
Q
Did he t e l l you he was going t o do an i n t e r v i e w
w i t h CNN r i g h t a f t e r he spoke w i t h you?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI:
Q
Yes, he d i d .
Did you have any problem w i t h h i s going p u b l i c l i k e
that?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI:" I d i d not express a view.
Q
There were some c r i t i c a l words from Moscow today
about the way t h e U.S. i s going about pursuing sanctions. Has there
been a kind of breach w i t h Moscow, and t o get any contact w i t h
Russian o f f i c i a l s today?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: I t h i n k as you know, t h e
Russians have had a view, p a r t i c u l a r l y , about t h e r o l e a conference
might play i n sanctions r e s o l u t i o n , and u l t i m a t e l y a r e s o l u t i o n o f
the issue. Since we have, I b e l i e v e as of yesterday, began t o
consult i n d e t a i l w i t h the Permanent Five members o f t h e S e c u r i t y
Council over our sanctions r e s o l u t i o n . Those c o n s u l t a t i o n s are
ongoing and c e r t a i n l y they're ongoing w i t h t h e Russians. I r e a l l y
can't go i n t o t h e d e t a i l of those c o n s u l t a t i o n s .
Q
A new problem w i t h Russia?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: What I t h i n k i s t h a t
Russia and other states both the permanent and non-permanent members
are going t o have t h e i r own views about what ought t o be i n t h a t
r e s o l u t i o n . And t h a t i s normal and usual a t the United Nations when
there i s a r e s o l u t i o n on the t a b l e , p a r t i c u l a r l y o f t h i s type.
Q
What i s your understanding about what the North
Koreans said about the idea of f r e e z i n g t h e i r nuclear a c t i v i t i e s , t h e
MORE
�- 6 -
ones i n dispute — t h e r e f u e l i n g . I n a way t h a t i s something they
can do on an i n t e r i m basis because i t ' s . n o t r e a l l y an issue yet? The
rods are i n a cooling pool f o r the next period of weeks o r months, so
i t i s a no-cost give-up f o r them? What i s t h e i r p o s i t i o n on that?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: I t ' s indeed, as I t h i n k I
i n d i c a t e d i n my opening statement, e x a c t l y what t h e i r p o s i t i o n i s , i s
of r e a l i n t e r e s t t o us. I f , as I i n d i c a t e d , f o r example, we can
understand by t h a t , and they are prepared t o confirm t h a t they w i l l
not engage i n reprocessing, t h a t i s , t h e separation of plutonium from
the f u e l rods t h a t are n o t i n t h e pond, and they w i l l n o t r e f u e l the
reactor and they w i l l continue t o accept IAEA c o n t i n u i t y o f
safeguards inspections, then t h a t ' s an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t would
provide a basis f o r a t h i r d round. But i t i s p r e c i s e l y t h a t , t h a t we
need — i s one of t h e issues we need t o discern.
Q
You're not — the President — t h a t t h a t i s
s p e c i f i c a l l y what President Carter was t o l d , or were you e s s e n t i a l l y
coming back t o them w i t h an a d d i t i o n a l request f o r —
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: We took — we understood
from t h e message t h a t President Carter passed t o us t h a t they were
prepared t o take c e r t a i n steps, such as leaving the inspectors i n
place, a l l o w i n g them t o stay, and they also described t h e i r
w i l l i n g n e s s . i n the course of a t h i r d round t o address other issues
t h a t we.are very i n t e r e s t e d i n .
We'do not y e t know, cannot a t t h i s p o i n t , confirm t h a t
the elements I described t o you they also meant t o convey or are
prepared t o convey a t some p o i n t i n t h e f u t u r e . I t i s t h a t p o i n t ,
among o t h e r s , t h a t we s t i l l need t o c l a r i f y .
Q
I n e f f e c t , you w i l l come back w i t h an a d d i t i o n a l
c o n d i t i o n f o r a t h i r d round — the a d d i t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n t h a t they
e x p l i c i t l y agree t o freeze these a c t i v i t i e s ?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: .1 would discourage you
from, t h a t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . What I would say i s t h a t we have, a l l
along f o r a year, had a basis f o r a dialogue,, t h a t very r e c e n t l y ,
they undercut t h a t basis i n such a way t h a t we were forced t o r e t u r n
the issue t o t h e S e c u r i t y Council, w h i l e t e l l i n g them t h a t i t was
always p o s s i b l e , and it.must always be possible t o r e e s t a b l i s h a
basis f o r a dialogue.
What I was doing a t t h i s p o i n t was d e s c r i b i n g t o you a
way
-/hich the dialogue could be reconvened, i n .which we could
rer:
i t , a way t h a t draws from, p o s s i b l y , the message we received
tod.: . . b u t n o t i n such a way t h a t !• could say t h a t i t was p a r t of the
message, and t h e r e f o r e something we wished t o f o l l o w up through
f u r t h e r d i p l o m a t i c contacts.
Q
You were asked e a r l i e r , whether you thought they
were s t a l l i n g , and you said you couldn't t e l l what t h e i r motivations
were. At. what p o i n t i n time, though, does continuing t h i s dialogue
or t h i s debate become hazardous i n terms of t h e i r nuclear program?
At what p o i n t i n time are you concerned t h a t they change t h e status
quo?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: That's a very important
question. Because as we engage in a dialogue with North Korea, that
is bound to come up as we have passed the one v^ar mar-v in nnv ^ffrvriMORE
plutonium, t h a t they maintain the c o n t i n u i t y of safeguards, and as I
i n d i c a t e d , they not r e f u e l the r e a c t o r .
What I'm t e l l i n g you i s , over the l a s t year, as t h i s
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n has t r i e d t o pursue a dialogue w i t h the North Koreans,
MR
OE
�- 7 -
we have had a basis f o r the dialogue which assured t h a t not a s i n g l e
a d d i t i o n a l gram of plutonium would be separated. I t i s our i n t e n t ,
i f we resume t h a t dialogue now, t h a t there not be a s i n g l e a d d i t i o n a l
gram of plutonium produced. That's what happens when you don't
r e f u e l the reactor.
So I'm — a t t h i s moment, depending upon, again, what
the meaning of the message i s today, I'm not concerned about a
s t a l l i n g t a c t i c t h a t disadvantages us. I t h i n k over t h e longer term,
c e r t a i n l y we do i n s i s t , as we said l a s t year, on achieving some
progress, because they are r i g h t now i n v i o l a t i o n o f IAEA safeguards
commitments, they're i n v i o l a t i o n of t h e N o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n Treaty
commitments. The S e c u r i t y Council can expect t o take up t h a t issue
unless t h e r e i s an ongoing diplomatic e f f o r t aimed a t i t s r e s o l u t i o n .
We are moving t o the S e c u r i t y Council now because t h a t d i p l o m a t i c
e f f o r t was put aside because of what the North Koreans d i d .
reengage.
What may be happening now i s there may.be a basis t o
That's what w e ' l l have t o explore. Thank you very much.
END
5:05 P.M. EDT
�THE WHITE HOUSE
O f f i c e of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
June 16, 1994
REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
IN PRESS AVAILABILITY
The B r i e f i n g Room
5:45
P.M. EDT
THE PRESIDENT: Good afternoon.
I n recent weeks, we have been c o n s u l t i n g w i t h our a l l i e s
and f r i e n d s on the i m p o s i t i o n of sanctions against North Korea
because of i t s r e f u s a l t o permit f u l l inspections of i t s nuclear
program. Today t h e r e are reports t h a t the North Koreans, i n
discussions w i t h President Carter, may have o f f e r e d new steps t o
resolve the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community's concerns, saying t h a t
i n t e r n a t i o n a l Atomic Energy Agency inspectors and monitoring
equipment would be l e f t i n place and t h a t North Korea desires t o
replace i t s present nuclear program w i t h a new l i g h t water r e a c t o r
technology t h a t i s more r e s i s t e n t t o nuclear p r o l i f e r a t i o n .
I f North Korea means by t h i s , also, t h a t i t i s w i l l i n g
t o freeze i t s nuclear program w h i l e t a l k s take place, t h i s could be a
promising development. As we review these r e p o r t s today and i n the
days ahead, I want t o take a moment t o e x p l a i n the extent of our
i n t e r e s t s and the steps we are t a k i n g t o p r o t e c t them.
Our n a t i o n c l e a r l y has v i t a l i n t e r e s t s on the Korean
Peninsula. Four decades a f t e r the c o n f l i c t there t h a t claimed
hundreds of thousand' of South Korean and American l i v e s , South Korea
continues t o face a t h r e a t of a m i l l i o n troops, most of them massed
near i t s border.
America's commitment t o South Korea, our t r e a t y a l l y ,
our t r a d i n g ' p a r t n e r , our f e l l o w democracy, i s unshakable. We have
some 37,000 American troops i n Korea t o maintain t h a t commitment, and
t h e i r s a f e t y i s of v i t a l importance t o us.
We also have an i n t e r e s t i n preserving the s t a b i l i t y o f
the Asian-Pacific r e g i o n . And we have a compelling i n t e r e s t i n
preserving the i n t e g r i t y of the N o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n Treaty, and t o
prevent the spread of g l o b a l nuclear weapons and b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s .
Therefore, i n response t o North Korea's nuclear
a c t i v i t i e s , we have c o n s i s t e n t l y pursued two goals: a non-nuclear
Korean Peninsula and a strong i n t e r n a t i o n a l n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n regime.
We've made serious and extensive e f f o r t s t o resolve the-North Korean
issue through n e g o t i a t i o n s , and have given North Korea many
o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o r e t u r n t o compliance w i t h i t s own n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n
commitments, made f i r s t nine years ago when North Korea signed the
Nuclear N o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n Treaty; and i n 1991, when North Korea signed
— agreed w i t h South Korea t o pursue a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula.
We've made c l e a r t h a t these n e g o t i a t i o n s could continue,
b u t only i f North Korea cooperated w i t h the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Atomic
Energy Agency, and d i d not deepen i t s v i o l a t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l
nuclear safeguards.
I f today's developments mean t h a t North Korea i s
genuinely and v e r i f i a b l y prepared t o f r e e z e . i t s nuclear program w h i l e
t a l k s go on — and we hope t h a t i s the case — then we would be
MORE
�- 2 -
w i l l i n g t o resume h i g h - l e v e l t a l k s . I n the meantime, we w i l l pursue
our c o n s u l t a t i o n s on sanctions a t the United Nations.
I n recent weeks I've consulted — or days, i n recent
days I've consulted w i t h President Kim of South Korea, Prime M i n i s t e r
Hata of Japan, President Y e l t s i n of Russia and others. I w i l l
continue t o consult c l o s e l y w i t h them on t h i s matter, w i t h other
i n t e r n a t i o n a l leaders and, of course, w i t h members of Congress of
both p a r t i e s .
Through a l l appropriate, means, I w i l l keep working t o
ensure the s e c u r i t y of South Korea, the s a f e t y of our troops, the
s t a b i l i t y of the Asian P a c i f i c , and the p r o t e c t i o n of our n a t i o n , our
f r i e n d s and our a l l i e s from the spread o f nuclear .weapons.
There i s a great deal at stake. We are pursuing our
i n t e r e s t s w i t h resolve and steadiness. We are hopeful t h a t t h i s
development today w i l l be p o s i t i v e , and we are awaiting f u r t h e r
evidence.
Q
I s i t p o s s i b l e , or probable, t h a t you could know
w i t h f u l l confidence t h a t North Korea has frozen i t s program? I s
time a f a c t o r ? Are you w o r r i e d about the clock t i c k i n g i f they
r e a l l y are bent on a nuclear program?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the answer t o the second question
i s , yes, time i s a f a c t o r . The answer t o the f i r s t question i s , yes,
we b e l i e v e we would be able t o know, based on the representations
t h a t were apparently made today whether they have, i n f a c t , frozen •
t h e i r program w h i l e t a l k s continue. •
Q
How
long might t h a t t a k e , s i r ?
Q
Mr. President, are you concerned t h a t they might be
p l a y i n g f o r time and t r y i n g t o weaken your hand w i t h the Chinese an:;
perhaps the Russians and others who might be worried about sanctions":
-
THE PRESIDENT: Well, w e ' l l j u s t have t o see. These
discussions occurred today; there w i l l be more discussions tomorrow,
tomorrow Korean time, which i s there now.
And we w i l l j u s t have t o
see. But i t depends on what the Koreans a c t u a l l y meant by what they
said today, and we w i l l have t o see.
So Ambassador, A l b r i g h t continued today pursuing our
c c n s u l t a t i o n s on sanctions w i t h the non-permanent members of the
Security Council of ths United Nations, and we are proceeding and
we're j u s t going t o watch developments.
Q
i n t h e i r eyes.
But t h e r e were some concerns about appearing weak
THE PRESIDENT: No.
I t depends on what they mean.
That's why we're being very c l e a r today t o say t h a t we want t o know
what they meant by t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and whether i t represents a
change of, p o s i t i o n . I f i t i s a d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n on which we can
honorably resume n e g o t i a t i o n s , knowing, i n f a c t , t h a t t h e r e w i l l be
no development of the nuclear program w h i l e we are having discussions
w i t h them, then i t i s not an i n a p p r o p r i a t e delay. Then i t i s a
genuine e f f o r t t o resolve disputes which could lead t o a s a f e r world
at a much lower cost. I t simply depends on what t h e i r i n t e n t i o n s and
actions are.
v
Q
Mr. President, why have you put so much distance
between the White House and President C a r t e r ' s < v i s i t ? Your aides
have always stressed t h a t , no, t h i s i s p r i v a t e ; no, the President has
not t a l k e d t o President Carter. Why don't you t a l k t o him? I mean,
why don't you t r y t o f i n d out what's r e a l l y going on, and why would
you not d e b r i e f him when he comes back?
MORE
�- 3-
comes back.
personally.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I intend t o d e b r i e f him when he
I absolutely do. And I t a l k e d t o him before he went,
Q
You did?
THE PRESIDENT:
Absolutely.
So
~
Q
Well, there seems t o be some sense t h a t he's not
representing us, and —
THE PRESIDENT: No. Well, I t h i n k i t ' s been important
i n t h i s whole development f o r the way i t ' s unfolded, t h a t he was
i n v i t e d there as a c i t i z e n , as a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e Carter Center,
t o have a dialogue not as a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f the government, b u t as
someone who could see Kim I I Sung and could have a d e t a i l e d
conversation w i t h him. And I t h i n k t h a t the way t h i s has unfolded
proves t h a t , a t l e a s t t h a t some — we have g o t t e n some i n f o r m a t i o n
t h e r e t h a t might not have otherwise been the case.. So I don't have
any problem w i t h i t .
But I t h i n k i t i s important t h a t the United States, and
i t s i n t e r e s t s , can only be s t a t e d by people who are u l t i m a t e l y i n
charge w i t h doing t h a t . And I t h i n k President Carter f u l l y agreed
w i t h the c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of h i s r o l e i n h i s mission. That i s t h e
way he wanted " i t as .,well as the way we wanted i t , and we t h i n k t h a t
t h a t gives us. some p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t something w i l l come out o f t h i s .
Whether i t w i l l or not, we s t i l l don't know.
Q
Mr. President, two t h i n g s , s i r . W i l l t h i s
i n e v i t a b l y take t h e steam out o f your e f f o r t t o b u i l d support f o r
possible sanctions, and second, t h e Senate today passed by a q u i t e
overwhelming vote a-sense of t h e Senate r e s o l u t i o n c a l l i n g on you t o
b o l s t e r f o r c e , your forces i n South Korea. Your r e a c t i o n t o both of
those matters.
THE PRESIDENT: F i r s t , we w i l l do whatever i s necessary
t o p r o t e c t our own forces there and t o f u l f i l l our commitments t o the
South Koreans.
I met r e c e n t l y w i t h a l l the commanders-in-chief,
i n c l u d i n g General Luck, our commander i n South Korea. I met today,
again, w i t h the Secretary of Defense and General S h a l i k a s h v i l i t o
discuss t h i s and other issues. And we w i l l take appropriate steps as
we should, as we must. So t h e r e i s nothing t o be concerned about.
Now, on the other issue, what happens here depends upon
whether t h i s i s , i n f a c t , a new development. That i s r e a l l y what i s
at stake. Can — w i l l i t take t h e steam out o f sanctions? Not i f
t h e r e i s nothing new here. I f there i s a genuine prospect f o r n o t
only leaving the IAEA monitors and equipment i n place and moving away
from the present nuclear technology, which i s very susceptible t o
p r o l i f e r a t i o n , t o a l i g h t water technology which i s less susceptible,
i n an environment i n which — and I stress — i n an environment i n
which .there i s freeze on any nuclear a c t i v i t i e s , then the
i n t e r n a t i o n a l community w i l l be able t o pursue i t s o b j e c t i v e s - o f
adherence by North Korea t o the NPT, t h w a r t i n g the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of
nuclear weapons, achieving the agreement North Korea made f o r a nonnuclear Korean Peninsula i n an appropriate way..
I t depends on the f a c t s . I t a l l depends on the f a c t s ,
and t h a t i s what we w i l l attempt t o determine over the next several
hours.
Thank you very much.
END
5:53 P.M. EDT
�UNCLASSIFIED w i t h
CONriDCNTIAL a t t a c h m e n t
4597
THE-WHITE
WASH
HOUSE
INGTON
,June 9 , 19 9 4
MEETING WITH
ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS AGAINST HAITI
June 10, 1994
DATE
White House Press B r i e f i n g Room
LOCATION
11:30 a.m.
TIME
FROM: ANTHONY
I.
PURPOSE
To announce t h e i m p o s i t i o n o f a d d i t i o n a l economic s a n c t i o n s
a g a i n s t H a i t i and t o d e s c r i b e t h e progress made s i n c e you
announced our new H a i t i p o l i c y a month ago.
II.
BACKGROUND
We have completed c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h groups which a r e
a f f e c t e d by t h e a d d i t i o n a l s a n c t i o n s you approved l a s t week
' .(bans on p r i v a t e f i n a n c i a l t r a n s f e r s and scheduled
•
•
commercial a i r service'between t h e U.S. and H a i t i ) and have
made arrangements t o reduce o u r Embassy s t a f f and i n c r e a s e
s e c u r i t y . Having today s i g n e d t h e E x e c u t i v e Order t o •
implement t h e f i n a n c i a l t r a n s f e r s ban and t h e l e t t e r t o
S e c r e t a r y Pena d i r e c t i n g him t o ban scheduled commercial
f l i g h t s , you can now announce t h e new s a n c t i o n s .
Your announcement p r o v i d e s an i d e a l v e h i c l e f o r you to'
h i g h l i g h t progress one month a f t e r you s e t o u t t h e broad
l i n e s o f our p o l i c y and s e l e c t e d B i l l Gray as your new
Special Adviser.
( B i l l w i l l j o i n you f o r t h i s
announcement.)' I n a l l main areas o f t h e new p o l i c y we have
p o s i t i v e developments:
The imminent s t a r t u p o f our new m i g r a n t p r o c e s s i n g
f a c i l i t y , i n Jamaica which w i l l g i v e c l a i m a n t s t o
refugee s t a t u s t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o a p p l y and have a - f u l l
and f a i r h e a r i n g ;
Dominican P r e s i d e n t Balaguer's agreement t o s e a l t h e
border, welcome a 60-man m u l t i l a t e r a l o b s e r v e r f o r c e
working a l o n g s i d e h i s m i l i t a r y t o m o n i t o r s a n c t i o n s
enforcement (which we w i l l h e l p equip) and a u t h o r i z e
naval c o o p e r a t i o n a g a i n s t c o a s t a l smuggling.
Our Navy's enhanced enforcement c a p a b i l i t y underpinned
by t h e deployment o f f a s t p a t r o l boats t o t h e coas-tal
areas and d e t e n t i o n o f v e s s e l s . v i o l a t i n g t h e sanctions'.
UNCLASSIFIED w i t h
-eOMFI-PENTIAL attachment
cc:• Vice P r e s i d e n t
Chief of Staff
�UNCLASSIFIED' w i t h
-eeMriDEMg-tftfr attachment
2
Growing s u p p o r t f o r the r e c o n f i g u r a t i o n o f t h e UN
M i s s i o n i n H a i t i (UNMIH) t o g i v e i t . the mandate and
.. c a p a b i l i t y t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e t r a n s i t i o n back t o
democracy once the. m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s have' r e l i n q u i s h e d
power. P r e s i d e n t A r i s t i d e , t h e O r g a n i z a t i o n o f
American S t a t e s and t h e F r i e n d s o f H a i t i have a l l
endorsed t h e type o f UNMIH we seek.The statement a t Tab A p o i n t s t o these p o s i t i v e developments
as c o n c r e t e evidence t h a t t h e new p o l i c y you announced l a s t
month i s making headway toward t h e r e s t o r a t i o n o f democracy
and President, A r i s t i d e ' s r e t u r n t o H a i t i .
III.
PARTICIPANTS
William
IV.
Gray, S p e c i a l Adviser'on
PRESS PLAN
Haiti
:
Open press.
V.
' .SEQUENCE
The event begins a t 11:30 a.m. and ends a t 11:40 a.m. You
w i l l s t e p onto t h e Press Room podium from stage l e f t ,
accompanied by S p e c i a l Adviser Gray. A f t e r r e a d i n g t h e
statement a t Tab A you w i l l take b r i e f q u e s t i o n s from t h e
p r e s s . A t t h e c o n c l u s i o n o f t h e q u e s t i o n p e r i o d you w i l l '
leave t h e podium and r e t u r n t o t h e Oval O f f i c e .
B i l l Gray,
w i l l be j o i n e d by o t h e r s e n i o r o f f i c i a l s t o background- t h e
press oh t h e new s a n c t i o n s and t h e s t a t u s o f o u r p o l i c y .
Attachments
Tab A
Statement'
•Tab B
Questions and Answers .
Tab C
Background Paper- on New Sanctions
Tab D
Background Paper on H a i t i a n M i g r a n t s
Tab E
Background Paper on UN M i s s i o n i n H a i t i (UNMIH)
Tab F
B i l l Gray's Congressional Testimony o f June 8
UNCLASSIFIED w i t h
<ONlr'lCrENT-i'A'L 'attachment
�A
�THE WHITE HOUSE
O f f i c e o f t h e Press S e c r e t a r y
For Immediate Release
1
June-10, 1994.
STATEMENT BY THE.PRESIDENT
Good morning.
Today I am announcing two steps t h a t w i l l
i n t e n s i f y t h e p r e s s u r e on t h e m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s who c o n t r o l H a i t i '
i n o r d e r t o r e s t o r e democracy and r e t u r n P r e s i d e n t A r i s t i d e t o
that nation.
My message t o t h e H a i t i a n m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s i s s i m p l e : t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s w i l l n o t r e s t u n t i l you r e l i n q u i s h ' y o u r g r i p .
Your coup
w i l l n o t endure. Democracy w i l l be r e s t o r e d .
F i r s t , I have today s i g n e d an E x e c u t i v e Order banning p r i v a t e
f i n a n c i a l t r a n s a c t i o n s between H a i t i and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and
t h r o u g h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s between H a i t i and o t h e r c o u n t r i e s . L e t
me note t h a t t h i s ban does n o t a p p l y t o h u m a n i t a r i a n a c t i v i t i e s ,
i n c l u d i n g t h e expanding programs t o feed over a m i l l i o n H a i t i a n s
daily.
i t a l s o exempts r e m i t t a n c e s o f up' t o $5.0 p e r month t o
i n d i v i d u a l H a i t i a n s who depend on such funds.
Second, I have d i r e c t e d S e c r e t a r y o f T r a n s p o r t a t i o n Pena t o .
i n s t r u c t a l l U n i t e d S t a t e s and H a i t i a n a i r ' c a r r i e r s t o cease
scheduled s e r v i c e s between our'two n a t i o n s . I n o r d e r t o a l l o w
those Americans and o t h e r s who w i s h t o leave H a i t i t o do so i n an
o r d e r l y f a s h i o n , t h i s measure w i l l t a k e e f f e c t as' o f June 25.
Our i n t e r e s t s i n removing t h e m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s from power and
r e s t o r i n g democracy t o H a i t i c o u l d n o t be c l e a r e r .
O u r ' n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s • d e m a n d "that.we c o n s o l i d a t e democracy i n
our hemisphere, a t r e n d which o n l y H a i t i and Cuba d e f y . Our
i n t e r e s t s demand t h a t we take a c t i o n when an e n t i r e people i s
abused and repressed.
Our i n t e r e s t s ' demand t h a t we p r o t e c t t h e
thousands o f American c i t i z e n s l i v i n g and w o r k i n g i n H a i t i .
And t h e i n t e r e s t s o f humanity demand t h a t we p r e v e n t a dangerous .
mass exodus o f H a i t i a n s by sea w h i l e o f f e r i n g r e f u g e t o those
m i g r a n t s who a r e a t genuine r i s k o f p o l i t i c a l persecution-.
One month ago, we concluded a r e v i e w o f our p o l i c y and took
immediate steps t o advance t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e H a i t i a n people
and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . Under t h e d i r e c t i o n o f S p e c i a l Adviser
B i l l Gray, these steps aire a l r e a d y b e a r i n g f r u i t .
• e have brought comprehensive U n i t e d Nations t r a d e s a n c t i o n s i n t o
W
f o r c e . We have won a commitment from t h e Dominican Republic t o
welcome a m u l t i l a t e r a l s a n c t i o n s m o n i t o r i n g team t o h e l p the',
Dominicans s e a l t h e i r border w i t h H a i t i .
We' have deployed .U.S.
Navy f a s t p a t r o l boats t o t h e area t o c o n t r o l c o a s t a l smuggling
�as we b u i l d cooperation w i t h the Dominican Navy. And we have
begun detaining ships suspected of v i o l a t i n g the sanctions.
We have also made great progress i n b u i l d i n g the complicated
arrangements needed t o a f f o r d Haitians i n t e r d i c t e d a t sea the
chance t o apply f o r refugee status. Thanks t o the cooperation of
the.Jamaican government and the UN High Commissioner f o r
Refugees, a f a c i l i t y t o interview Haitians w i l l soon open i n
Jamaica. One month from now, w i t h the help of the government of
the Turks and Caicos [KAY-Kose] Islands, we w i l l . o p e n a second
f a c i l i t y on those i s l a n d s .
Let me be very c l e a r : I continue t o urge a l l Haitians t o avoid
r i s k i n g t h e i r l i v e s i n treacherous boat voyages. Those who fear
persecution should apply f o r refugee s t a t u s a t our three
processing o f f i c e s i n H a i t i . They have already arranged
resettlement f o r some 3,000 Haitian p o l i t i c a l refugees since the •
beginning of my A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .
The new measures I have announced today have been endorsed by the
Organization of American States, the Friends of H a i t i and
President A r i s t i d e . Through these'actions we are sending a
strong message t o H a i t i ' s m i l i t a r y leaders t h a t they cannotcontinue repressing t h e i r .people and d e f y i n g world opinion w i t h
impunity. Working w i t h our i n t e r n a t i o n a l and Haitian partners, I
w i l l act t o p r o t e c t our n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s and hasten the day
when Haitian democracy i s restored and President A r i s t i d e can
r e t u r n t o the people who f r e e l y elected him as t h e i r . l e a d e r . .
��Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
001a. talking
points
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Haitian Migrant Processing (2 pages)
ca.
06/09/1994
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Press (Philip J. (PJ) Crowley)
OA/Box Number:
3105
FOLDER TITLE:
Haiti [ I ]
2011-0516-S
kh681
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)l
Freedom of Information Act - |5 U.S.C. S52(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIAj
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency |(b)(2)ofthe FOIA|
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions ((b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) ofthe FOIA|
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information |(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�• Q/As ON N W SANCTIONS
E
TO BE PROVIDED.
��Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
00lb. paper
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
New Sanctions (2 pages)
ca.
06/09/1994
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Press (Philip J. (PJ) Crowley)
OA/Box Number:
3105
FOLDER TITLE:
Haiti [1]
2011-0516-S
kh68l
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)l
Freedom of Information Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
PI
P2
PJ
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the KOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIAJ
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
h(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions |(b)(8) ofthe FOIA)
h(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
National Security Classified Information |(a)(l) ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA]
C Closed in accordance w ith restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
��Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
001c. paper
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
Haitian Migrant Processing (1 page)
ca.
06/09/1994
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Press (Philip J. (PJ) Crowley)
OA/Box Number:
3105
FOLDER TITLE:
Haiti [1]
2011-0516-S
kh68l
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - |S U.S.C. 5.S2(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA|
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) ofthe FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(K) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA|
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) ofthe FOIA)
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA)
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
��Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
00Id. paper
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
ca.
06/09/1994
The UN Mission in Haiti (1 page)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Press (Philip J. (PJ) Crowley)
OA/Box Number:
3105
FOLDER TITLE:
Haiti [I]
2011-0516-S
kh68l
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act -15 U.S.C. S52(b)|
PI
P2
PJ
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) of the FOIAj
b(J) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIAj
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) ofthe FOIAj
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office |(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(J) ofthe PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) ofthe PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(J).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
��.
06/09/94
12:24
^ 2 0 2 647 3341
MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE:
IT IS . O D TO BE HERE.
GO
AS YOU WILL•RECALL, MR. CHAIRMAN,
I BEGAN M CAREER IN CONGRESS ON THIS COMMITTEE. •THEN, AS
Y
TODAY, I W S FOLLOWING MY MOTHER'S ADMONITION TO KEEP G O
A
OD
COMPANY. Tims, I WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO TESTIFY BEFORE
YOU TODAY TO W R WITH OLD COLLEAGUES AND N W PARTNERS AS W
OK
E
E
CONFRONT THE DIFFICULT ISSUES FACING . S IN HAITI.
U
MR. CHAIRMAN, ON MAY 8TH, PRESIDENT CLINTON ANNOUNCED A
CHANGE IN O R POLICY ON HAITI.
U
LIKE MANY OF YOU, HE FELT THE
CONTINUED INTRANSIGENCE OF THE MILITARY'JUNTA IN HAITI LEFT US
NO CHOICE BUT TO STEP UP O R EFFORTS TO BRING D W ' HAITI'S
U
ON
DICTATORS AND TO EXTEND EVERY CONSIDERATION TO THOSE FLEEING
THEIR, OPPRESSIVE. RULE.
�.
06/09/94
12:24
© 2 0 2 647 3341
l^OOj
-2-
SINCE THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT, WE HAVE ACHIEVED .
SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS.
OUR EFFORTS HAVE BEEN DISTINGUISHED BY
THREE CHARACTERISTICS.
THEY HAVE MULTILATERAL PARTICIPATION.
THEY ARE TOUGH ON THE DE FACTO REGIME AND ITS SUPPORTERS, AND
THEY ARE COMPASSIONATE TOWARDS THE REGIME'S VICTIMS.
TO
APPRECIATE THESE CHARACTERISTICS ONE NEED ONLY REVIEW WHAT'S
BEEN ACCOMPLISHED SINCE MAY 8.
PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PRESIDENT'S NEW POLICY ON
SANCTIONS
--ON MAY 2 1 , AS A CONSEQUENCE OF UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP,
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 917, IMPOSING
STRINGENT NEW SANCTIONS ON HAITI, WENT INTO EFFECT.
.--ON MAY 26,' THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARIES
GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OF' THE ORGANIZATION OF
AMERICAN STATES, MR. DANTE CAPUTO, AND I MET WITH PRESIDENT
BAT.AGUER AND REACHED AGREEMENT ON A PLAN TO SEAL THE BORDER
BETWEEN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND H A I T I , AND TO SEND 60
INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL ADVISERS TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC TO
HELP IN THAT EFFORT. '
�06/09/94
' 12:25
© 2 0 2 647 5341
iffluiu
-
3 -
—ON JUNE 3, THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FRIENDS OF THE
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS ON HAITI, WHICH
INCLUDE ARGENTINA, CANADA FRANCE, THE UNITED STATES, AND
VENEZUELA, DECIDED A O G OTHER THINGS TO CONSIDER ON A
MN
NATIONAL BASIS EXPANDED SANCTIONS THAT WOULD CUT OFF
COMMERCIAL AIR FLIGHTS TO AND FROM HAITI AND BAN INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS WITH THAT COUNTRY. THE FRIENDS ALSO
EXPRESSED THEIR DETERMINATION TO.PROMOTE THE FULL REDEPLOYMENT
OF A STRENGTHENED AND RECONFIGURED UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN
HAITI.
AND ON REFUGEES
--ON MAY 19, THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER ON REFUGEES,
MRS. OGATA, AND I WERE PLEASED TO ANNOUNCE AGREEMENT ON A PLAN
FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE UNITED
STATES IN THE PROCESSING OF HAITIAN APPLICANTS FOR REFUGEE
STATUS, AND IN LOCATING COUNTRIES OF RESETTLEMENT FOR HAITIAN
REFUGEES.
--ON JUNE 1, THE GOVERNMENTS OF JAMAICA AND OF THE UNITED
STATES ANNOUNCED JOINTLY A PLAN FOR SHIPBOARD PROCESSING OF
HAITIAN MIGRANTS IN JAMAICAN PORTS.
�'
P6/Q.9/94
12:25
© 2 0 2 647 5341
^1005
-4-
—ON JUNE 3, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS
AGREED TO THE UNITED STATES PROPOSALS FOR A LAND BASED
PROCESSING CENTER ON GRAND TURK ISLAND.
AND ON MULTILATERAL SUPPORT
—ON JUNE 6, DEPUTY SECRETARY'TALBOTT AND I ATTENDED THE
MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN
STATES ON HAITI IN BELEM, BRAZIL.
A STRONG RESOLUTION WAS
ENACTED WHICH INCLUDES A CALL UPON ALL MEMBER STATES TO ASSIST
IN THE RESETTLEMENT OF HAITIAN REFUGEES, TO SUPPORT MEASURES
BY THE UNITED NATIONS TO STRENGTHEN- THE UNITED NATIONS POLICE
AND MILITARY MISSION IN HAITI, AND TO SUPPORT AND REINFORCE
EXISTING AND ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS AGAINST THE MILITARY REGIME.
WHILE MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE, I BELIEVE WE HAVE
.ESTABLISHED THE BASIS FOR A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION TO THE
HAITIAN CRISIS.
ALLOW ME TO EXPLAIN WHY THESE STEPS ARE
IMPORTANT AND H W THEY FIT INTO THE PRESIDENT'S, OVERALL
O
STRATEGY.
�* 06'0.9''94
12:23
.
© 2 0 2 '647 5341
.
ifflUOb
-
5 -
UNITED STATES INTERESTS ARE AT STAKE IN HAITI
PRESIDENT CLINTON IS COMMITTED TO THE PROMPT RETURN OF.
DEMOCRACY AND Of PRESIDENT ARISTIDE TO HAITI. .
WHY ARE WE SO COMMITTED TO THIS TASK? WHY DOES HAITI
MATTER THIS MUCH TO THE UNITED STATES? H W DOES HAITI DIFFER
O
FROM OTHER TROUBLED COUNTRIES AROUND , H GLOBE? PRESIDENT
TE
CLINTON HAS RECENTLY EXPLAINED OUR INTERESTS QUITE CLEARLY:
—FIRST, HAITI IS A CLOSE NEIGHBOR.
--SECOND, THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY ONE MILLION PERSONS OF
HAITIAN DESCENT RESIDENT IN THE UNITED STATES.
--THIRD, SEVERAL THOUSAND AMERICAN CITIZENS LIVE IN HAITI.
�06/09/94
12:26
*B'202 647 5341
11 00"
4
- 6-
—FOURTH, WE BELIEVE DPUGS ARE COMING TO THE UNITED
STATES FROM HAITI.
—FIFTH, WE FACE THE CONTINUOUS POSSIBILITY OF A MASSIVE
OUTFLOW OF HAITIAN MIGRANTS TO' THE UNITED' STATES BECAUSE OF
CONDITIONS IN HAITI.
--FINALLY, HAITI AND CUBA ARE THE ONLY TWO
NON-DEMOCRACIES LEFT IN OUR HEMISPHERE, AND IN HAITI THE
RESULTS OF A DEMOCRATIC ELECTION WERE OVERTURNED BY
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ANTI-DEMOCRATIC MEANS.
CONCLUSION
MR. CHAIRMAN, LET ME BE AS CLEAR AS I CAN BE. PRESIDENT
CLINTON HAS DETERMINED THAT OUR INTERESTS REQUIRE THE
RESTORATION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN HAITI, AND THE RETURN
OF PRESIDENT ARISTIDE.
THIS GOAL.
WE ARE EMBARKED ON A NEW PATH TOWARD
MUCH HAS BEEN ACHIEVED SINCE PRESIDENT CLINTON'S
ANNOUNCEMENT ON MAY 8. FURTHER STEPS WILL BE TAKEN IN THE
COMING DAYS AND WEEKS. NO .'OPTION IS EXCLUDED.
HAITI WILL PREVAIL.
DEMOCRACY IN
NEITHER WE, NOR THE HAITIAN PEOPLE CAN
LONG WAIT FOR THIS EVENT.
�THE WHITE HOUSE
O f f i c e of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
June 10,
1994
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
The B r i e f i n g Room
12:22 P.M.
EDT
THE PRESIDENT: Good afternoon. Today I want t o have
B i l l Gray, our Special Advisor on H a i t i , announce two new steps t h a t
are necessary t o i n t e n s i f y the pressure on t h a t country's m i l i t a r y
leaders: a ban on commercial a i r t r a f f i c and sanctions on f i n a n c i a l
transactions.
As B i l l Gray w i l l explain, these steps represent an
important new stage i n our e f f o r t s t o r e s t o r e democracy and r e t u r n
President A r i s t i d e t o H a i t i . The message i s s i m p l e ' — democracy must
be r e s t o r e d ; the coup must not endure.
In the past month, we have taken steps t o advance the
i n t e r e s t s of the H a i t i a n people and the United States. Our national
i n t e r e s t s — t o help democracy t h r i v e i n t h i s hemisphere, and t o
p r o t e c t the l i v e s of thousands of Americans who l i v e and work i n
H a i t i — r e q u i r e us t o strengthen these e f f o r t s .
Under our leadership, comprehensive United Nations trade
sanctions have gone into force. To enforce these sanctions, we are
moving to a s s i s t the Dominican Republic to seal i t s shared border
with H a i t i . The Dominican Republic has agreed to welcome a
multilateral sanctions monitoring team to help the Dominicans seal
their border.
We've deployed U.S. naval p a t r o l boats t o the area t o
stop smugglers, and have begun detaining ships suspected of v i o l a t i n g
the sanctions. We've also made important s t r i d e s i n dealing w i t h the
d i f f i c u l t issue of Haitians who leave t h a t country by sea. A
f a c i l i t y t o interview Haitians who have been i n t e r d i c t e d w i l l soon
open i n Jamaica. And one month from now, we w i l l open a second
interview f a c i l i t y on the Turk and Caicos I s l a n d s . I want t o thank
the governments of those countries and the U.N. High Commissioner f o r
Refugees f o r t h e i r c o l l a b o r a t i o n i n t h i s e f f o r t .
I want t o be clear about t h i s issue. I continue t o urge
a l l H a i t i a n s t o avoid r i s k i n g t h e i r l i v e s i n treacherous boat
voyages. Anyone who fears persecution should apply f o r refugee
status at our f a c i l i t i e s w i t h i n H a i t i . Since our a d m i n i s t r a t i o n
began, those o f f i c e s have arranged resettlement f o r some 3,000
H a i t i a n p o l i t i c a l refugees; f a r , f a r more than was the case p r i o r t o
t h a t time. They stand ready t o review f u r t h e r cases and represent
the safest and f a s t e s t way f o r Haitians t o seek refuge.
Now I'd l i k e t o ask B i l l Gray, who stepped i n t o t h i s
very d i f f i c u l t r o l e and has used great s k i l l t o make r e a l progress,
to e x p l a i n these new steps which we're announcing today.
END
2:24
P.M.
EDT
�THE WHITE HOUSE
O f f i c e of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
June 10,
1994
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
The B r i e f i n g Room
12:22
P.M.
EDT
THE PRESIDENT: Good afternoon. Today I want t o have
B i l l Gray, our Special Advisor on H a i t i , announce two new steps t h a t
are necessary t o i n t e n s i f y the pressure on t h a t country's m i l i t a r y
leaders: a ban on commercial a i r t r a f f i c and sanctions on f i n a n c i a l
transactions.
As B i l l Gray w i l l explain, these steps represent an
important new stage i n our e f f o r t s t o r e s t o r e democracy and r e t u r n
President A r i s t i d e t o H a i t i . The message i s s i m p l e - — democracy must
be r e s t o r e d ; the coup must not endure.
In the past month, we have taken steps t o advance the
i n t e r e s t s of the H a i t i a n people and the United States. Our national
i n t e r e s t s — t o help democracy t h r i v e i n t h i s hemisphere, and t o
p r o t e c t the l i v e s of thousands of Americans who l i v e and work i n
H a i t i — r e q u i r e us t o strengthen these e f f o r t s .
Under our leadership, comprehensive United Nations trade
sanctions have gone into force. To enforce these sanctions, we are
moving to a s s i s t the Dominican Republic to seal i t s shared border
with H a i t i . The Dominican Republic has agreed to welcome a
multilateral sanctions monitoring team to help the Dominicans seal
t h e i r border.
We've deployed U.S. naval p a t r o l boats t o the area t o
stop smugglers, and have begun detaining ships suspected of v i o l a t i n g
the sanctions. We've also made important s t r i d e s i n dealing w i t h the
d i f f i c u l t issue of Haitians who leave t h a t country by sea. A
f a c i l i t y t o interview Haitians who have been i n t e r d i c t e d w i l l soon
open i n Jamaica. And one month from now, we w i l l open a second
i n t e r v i e w f a c i l i t y on the Turk and Caicos I s l a n d s . I want t o thank
the governments of those countries and the U.N. High Commissioner f o r
Refugees f o r t h e i r c o l l a b o r a t i o n i n t h i s e f f o r t .
I want t o be clear about t h i s issue. I continue t o urge
a l l H a i t i a n s t o avoid r i s k i n g t h e i r l i v e s i n treacherous boat
voyages. Anyone who fears persecution should apply f o r refugee
status a t our f a c i l i t i e s w i t h i n H a i t i . Since our a d m i n i s t r a t i o n
began, those o f f i c e s have arranged resettlement f o r some 3,000
H a i t i a n p o l i t i c a l refugees; f a r , f a r more than was the case p r i o r to
t h a t time. They stand ready t o review f u r t h e r cases and represent
the safest and f a s t e s t way f o r Haitians t o seek refuge.
Now I'd l i k e t o ask B i l l Gray, who stepped i n t o t h i s
very d i f f i c u l t r o l e and has used great s k i l l t o make r e a l progress,
to e x p l a i n these new steps which we're announcing today.
END
2:24
P.M.
EDT
�THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
June 10, 1994
REMARKS BY SPECIAL ADVISOR ON HAITI BILL GRAY
The Briefing Room
12:24
P.M. EDT
MR. GRAY: Thank you, Mr. President.
As the President has indicated, we are announcing two
new steps i n our efforts to restore democracy in H a i t i . F i r s t , the
President has signed an executive order banning private financial
transactions between Haiti and the United States and, through the
United States, between Haiti and other countries. Let me note that
t h i s ban does not apply to humanitarian a c t i v i t i e s , including the
expanding programs to feed over a million Haitians daily. I t also
exempts remittances of up to $50 a month to individual Haitians who
depend on such funds.
Second, the President has directed Secretary of
Transportation Pena to instruct a l l United States and Haitian a i r
c a r r i e r s to cease scheduled services between our two nations. I n
order to allow those Americans and others who wish to leave Haiti to
do so in an orderly fashion, t h i s measure w i l l take effect as of June
25th.
The new measures we are announcing today have been
endorsed by the Organization of American States, the Friends of Haiti
and President A r i s t i d e . Through these actions, we are sending a
strong message to Haiti's m i l i t a r y leaders that they cannot continue
repressing t h e i r people and defying world opinion with impunity.
Working with our international and Haitian partners, we w i l l act to
protect our national interest and hasten the day when Haitian
democracy i s restored and President A r i s t i d e can return to the people
who freely elected him as t h e i r leader.
At t h i s time I w i l l entertain questions.
Q
How effective do you think these new sanctions w i l l
be in restoring Aristide to his power?
MR. GRAY: Well, sanctions create an environment where
we hope we w i l l be able to have a diplomatic breakthrough. As you
know, the sanctions under U.N. Resolution 917 were only imposed about
three weeks ago, and they are having a s i g n i f i c a n t effect. These
additional sanctions are targeted i n such a way to have a maximum
effect upon the coup leaders and those who are t h e i r supporters. And
i t i s our b e l i e f that they w i l l further create that kind of an
atmosphere where we can have a diplomatic breakthrough and a solution
where the coup leaders step down.
Q
How long i s i t going to be before you expect to see
any kind of results from the additional sanctions? How long are you
going to give i t before you know i f i t works?
MR. GRAY: Well, we're going to be analyzing and
reviewing the situation daily and weekly in H a i t i to determine the
effectiveness of these sanctions as well as those that are now i n
place and determining what our next steps should be.
MORE
�- 3 -
Q
— you have figured out some plan whereby the
United States, with a l l of t h i s interfering on behalf of democracy,
some plan to keep those poor children in Haiti from starving to
death? You see pictures of that a l l the time.
MR. GRAY: Well, f i r s t of a l l , l e t me j u s t point out
that I'm glad you raised that question — that certainly the economic
sanctions that have only been in place about three and a half weeks
did not create those pictures. In fact, i t i s U.S. policy that has
helped to provide humanitarian aid in Haiti for some time. We are
providing, right now, over $70 million of humanitarian aid. Right
now we are presently feeding one million Haitians — that's
approximately one out of five.
So those who say sanctions should not be applied because
somehow we're going to increase the suffering of children ignore the
fact that our aid programs right now — and have been over the past
year — feeding one out of every five Haitians i n that country. We
are planning to increase that assistance by another 300,000 who w i l l
go on the feeding programs. And we w i l l be looking for an additional
expenditure of PL-480 program money and humanitarian a i d that w i l l
a s s i s t those who are suffering.
The suffering of those children i s not a suffering
caused by United States sanctions or world sanctions. The suffering
of those children has been caused by a society that continues to
ignore the needs of i t s majority c i t i z e n s for the needs of the few.
And i f you're going to correct that situation, democracy i s the f i r s t
step in bringing about an economic prosperity that affects a l l of the
people i n that society. And so American policy i s not simply to
restore democracy and restore the dually-elected leadership, but we
are also providing right now, over $70 million of humanitarian aid to
those who are hungry, those who are suffering. And that i s beside
the aid that comes from the numerous nongovernmental agencies,
humanitarian and missionary groups that are also there providing
medicine and health and a variety of other things.
Q
Mr. Gray, can you pull apart for us the f i n a n c i a l
aspects of what you're trying to accomplish? I n the past, when the
administration has t r i e d to freeze assets, most of the assets have
been gone. When you have t r i e d to block the flow of money, i t ' s
proved to be very d i f f i c u l t . Who are you going to go after? Do you
believe that there i s anything to r e a l l y get at t h i s point? And what
about other governments such as France, the Bahamas and Switzerland?
Are we going after them as well?
MR. GRAY: Let me begin by starting at the rear of that
question and moving backwards. Last Friday i n a communique the
Friends of H a i t i of the United Nations issued a statement supporting
t h i s kind of action that President Clinton i s taking today. Also
l a s t Monday i n B r a z i l , the Organization of American states issued a
statement supporting t h i s same kind of action.
I t i s our expectation that other nations w i l l be doing
the same — those nations where such actions can have an effect. For
instance, not every a i r l i n e i n the world f l i e s . i n t o Port-au-Prince.
There are e s s e n t i a l l y five that do — American A i r l i n e s , A i r France,
Canada, the Dominican Republic and the Dutch A i r l i n e s . And so,
therefore, these actions have to be taken b i l a t e r a l l y by individual
nations as opposed to an organization such as the OAS or the United
Nations.
We expect that other nations w i l l also j o i n us i n t h i s
a c t i v i t y with regard to isolating the coup leadership and the .
supporters i n the Haiti situation. What i t means i s e s s e n t i a l l y
t h i s : When you ban American a i r l i n e s from flying, that's
approximately 65 to 75 percent of a l l the a i r t r a f f i c to H a i t i . Air
MORE
�- 5 -
And then, also, when you t a l k about carrying out
international transactions, the payment of trade b i l l s and so forth,
that payment i s usually preferred in certain kinds of currencies, the
United States dollar being the foremost. And so, yes, I think
someone may have t r i e d to take t h e i r assets and move them as a result
of hearing what the OAS did on Monday. But eventually, i f you're
going to do business in the world marketplace, there are certain
currencies that are the accepted currencies of the market. The
dollar i s one of them. So, yes, t h i s w i l l have a very s i g n i f i c a n t
impact upon those who are the e l i t e and who have been supporting the
coup leadership.
Q
million of U.S.
done anything?
Last week, the Haitian government seized $12
AID funds. What i s our response to that? Have we
MR. GRAY: What have we done? E s s e n t i a l l y , they seized
about $12 million of U.S. assets. Those assets were primarily for
humanitarian purposes in deposit in order to carry out our feeding
programs of the poor, of the children and the needy. And we have
decided to continue those programs and to go on without that money at
t h i s time.
Q
How w i l l t h i s measure on the cut-off of f l i g h t s
affect the OAS-U.N. human rights mission that's i n H a i t i now? And
also, how w i l l i t affect the humanitarian aid programs, the workers
in the country? Do you anticipate any kind of action —
MR. GRAY: Our conversations that we've had with the
humanitarian groups i s that t h i s prohibition on a i r l i n e f l i g h t s i s
not going to cause them to leave. Their commitment i s based upon a
strong commitment to aid the poor, the hungry. There are those
groups that do use a i r charter service to bring i n supplies —
medical, as well as humanitarian aid. Those f l i g h t s have to be
cleared through a United Nations procedure. We are working with the
United Nations now to come up with an expedited procedure mechanism
so that there w i l l not be delays for those who have medical supplies
and other supplies — missionaries, humanitarian groups — that want
to get them i n .
And so we're hoping that we'll have an expedited
procedure. We have worked already with regard to two requests of
groups that have had that problem. But we do not see the banning of
commercial a i r l i n e s as somehow affecting the humanitarian aid
programs that w i l l be going on there.
Q
But there were some aid programs that depended on
commercial a i r l i n e s , Mr. Gray.
Q
I f the Haitian military does not agree to these
conditions by the time that your term expires, w i l l you see these
efforts e s s e n t i a l l y as a failure?MR. GRAY: My term expires — oh, my term expires after
130 days, but l e t me explain to you what 130 days means. I t means
the days that I work for President Clinton. And so, every day I'm
not working for President Clinton. I s t i l l remain as the President
of the College Fund and there are days when I am not doing t h i s job.
And so, therefore, those who think i f you wait u n t i l October 1st B i l l
Gray w i l l be gone, they may be surprised. (Laughter.)
Q
Mr. Gray, what's the p r a c t i c a l effect for those
groups which did send in t h e i r humanitarian supplies, primarily
medical, by commercial a i r l i n e r ? I know of at l e a s t two.
What are
they going to do?
MR. GRAY: Well, we w i l l work with those groups to find
a different way for them to get t h e i r supplies i n . There are charter
MORE
�THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
June 10, .1994
REMARKS BY SPECIAL ADVISOR ON HAITI BILL GRAY
The Briefing Room
12:24
P.M. EDT
MR. GRAY: Thank you, Mr. President.
As the President has indicated, we are announcing two
new steps in our efforts to restore democracy in H a i t i . F i r s t , the
President has signed an executive order banning private financial
transactions between Haiti and the United States and, through the
United States, between Haiti and other countries. Let me note that
t h i s ban does not apply to humanitarian a c t i v i t i e s , including the
expanding programs to feed over a million Haitians d a i l y . I t also
exempts remittances of up to^ $50 a month to individual Haitians who
depend on such funds.
Second, the President has directed Secretary of
Transportation Pena to instruct a l l United States, and Haitian a i r
c a r r i e r s to cease scheduled services between our two nations. I n
order to allow those Americans and others who wish to leave H a i t i to
do so i n an orderly fashion, t h i s measure w i l l take effect as of June
25th.
The new measiures we are announcing today have been
endorsed by the Organization of American States, the Friends of Haiti
and President A r i s t i d e . Through these actions, we are sending a
strong message to H a i t i ' s m i l i t a r y leaders that they cannot continue
repressing t h e i r people and defying world opinion with impunity.
Working with our international and Haitian partners, we w i l l act to
protect our national interest and hasten the day when Haitian .
democracy i s restored and President A r i s t i d e can return to the people
who freely elected him as t h e i r leader.
At t h i s time I w i l l entertain questions.
Q
How effective do you. think these new sanctions w i l l
be i n restoring A r i s t i d e to his power?
MR. GRAY: Well, sanctions create an environment where
we hope we w i l l be able to have a diplomatic breakthrough. As you
know, the sanctions under U.N. Resolution 917 were only imposed about
three weeks ago, and they are having a s i g n i f i c a n t effect. These
additional sanctions are targeted i n such a way to have a maximum,
effect upon the coup leaders and those who are t h e i r supporters. And
i t i s our b e l i e f that they w i l l further create that kind of an
atmosphere where we can have a diplomatic breakthrough and a solution
where the coup leaders step down.
Q
How long i s i t going to be before you expect to see
any kind of r e s u l t s from the additional sanctions? How long are you
going to give i t before you know i f i t works?
MR. GRAY: Well, we're going to be analyzing and
reviewing the situation daily and weekly in H a i t i to determine the
effectiveness of these sanctions as well as.those that are now i n
place and determining what our next steps should be.
MORE
�- 2-
Q
Mr. Ambassador, does t h i s mean that the military •
option, at l e a s t for now, i s on hold?
MR. GRAY: As the President has said, a l l options are on
the table. We are pursuing a multilateral policy with our a l l i e s i n
the region — the- Organization of American States that j u s t met, and
B r a z i l as well as the Four Friends of Haiti and the United Nations.
We w i l l continue to work i n a multilateral way to apply the maximum
amount of pressure and to use every option available to restore
democracy.
Q
There are reports today from within the
administration that the sanctions already i n place are beginning to
take t h e i r bite. What evidence can you t e l l us today that the
sanctions are beginning to have an effect?
MR. GRAY: Well, I think that we have information that
there are some shortages, gasoline prices that had dropped early have
now come back up a l i t t l e b i t . And we suspect that those sanctions
that were put i n place by U.N. Council Resolution 917 on May 21st are
beginning to have an impact. These w i l l heighten the impact rather
dramatically, and we think that we w i l l , hopefully, see some changes
in the behavior of those i n Haiti, and perhaps the coup leaders w i l l
do what they agreed to do i n Governors Island, which was to step
down.
Q
I f I could follow up please. S p e c i f i c a l l y , some
administration o f f i c i a l s are talking about the business e l i t e that
surround the miiitary leaders in Haiti are beginning to feel the
pressure of the sanctions. What kind of. intelligence — what can you
t e l l us, can you share with us today, about that aspect of the
sanctions?
.
\
MR. GRAY: Well, I think there i s s i g n i f i c a n t evidence
that they are feeling the bite of the present sanctions and that
these w i l l also have a significant impact on them. And I think
you've seen statements i n the news media coming from people i n the
business e l i t e who have supported the coup leaders i n t h e i r taking
over democracy i n H a i t i . And we expect that these w i l l have a
s i g n i f i c a n t impact, especially upon the business e l i t e who have beensupporting the coup .leaders.
Q
Mr. Gray, the Latin American governments are not in
favor of the military intervention, nor seem to be the other friends
— the other three countries. You say a l l options on the table. I s
the U.S. w i l l i n g to go i t alone i f need be?
MR. GRAY: Well, f i r s t of a l l , I don't know where you
get your information from with regard to Latin American countries and
CARICOM countries. I have j u s t been, in the l a s t two weeks,
traveling, meeting with a l l of the leaders of the CARICOM nations,
also' at the OAS nations and also at the Four Friends. The statement
that none of them are interested i n the p o s s i b i l i t y that you j u s t
described i s not accurate at a l l .
Secondly, I think that what everyone i s concerned about
i s applying the maximum amount of pressure to sieek a diplomatic
solution. I think there are mixed views with regard to the timing,
as well as the t a c t i c s of other possible solutions.
Right now, our policy continues to be that of working
with other nations to apply the maximum amount of economic pressure
to have a diplomatic breakthrough. But the President has said, and
we continue to make clear to our a l l i e s i n the region, that a l l
options are. on the table. And those who would suggest that there has
already been a vote or there i s a consensus that a l l options are not
on the table i s not accurate, from my conversations with leaders
throughout the regions.
1
MORE
�- 3 -
Q
— you have figured out some plan whereby the
United States, with a l l of t h i s interfering on behalf of democracy,
some plan to keep those poor children in H a i t i from starving to
death? You see pictures of that a l l the time.
MR. GRAY: Well, f i r s t of a l l , l e t me j u s t point out
, that I'm glad you raised that question — that c e r t a i n l y the economic
sanctions that have only been i n place,about three and a half weeks
did not create those pictures. In fact, i t i s U.S. policy that has
helped to provide humanitarian aid i n H a i t i for some time. We are
providing, right now, over $70 million of humanitarian aid. Right
now we are presently feeding one million Haitians :— that's
approximately one out of five.
So those who say sanctions should not be applied^ because
somehow we're going to increase the suffering of children ignore the
fact that our aid programs right now — and have been over the past
year — feeding one out of every five Haitians i n that country. We
are planning to increase that- assistance by another 300,000 who w i l l
go on the feeding programs. And we w i l l be looking for an additional
expenditure of PL-480 program money and humanitarian aid that w i l l
a s s i s t those who are suffering.
The suffering of those children i s not a suffering
caused by United States sanctions or world sanctions. The suffering
of those children has been caused by a society that continues to
ignore the needs of i t s majority c i t i z e n s for the needs of the few.
And i f you're going to correct that situation, democracy i s the f i r s t
step i n bringing about an economic prosperity that affects a l l of the
people i n that society. And so American policy i s not simply to
restore democracy and restore the dually-elected leadership, but we
are also providing right now, over $70 million of humanitarian aid to
those who are hungry, those who are suffering. And that i s beside
the aid that comes from the numerous nongovernmental agencies,
humanitarian and missionary groups that are also there providing
medicine and health and a variety of other things.
Q
Mr..Gray, can you p u l l apart for us the f i n a n c i a l
aspects of what you're trying to accomplish? In the past, when the
administration has t r i e d to freeze assets, most of the assets have
been gone. When you have t r i e d to block the flow of money, i t ' s
proved to.be very d i f f i c u l t . Who are you going to go after? Do you
believe that there , i s anything to r e a l l y get at t h i s point? And what
about other governments such as France, the Bahamas and Switzerland?
Are we going after them as well?
MR. GRAY: Let me begin by s t a r t i n g at the rear of that
question and moving backwards. Last Friday i n a communique the
Friends of H a i t i of the United Nations issued a statement supporting
t h i s kind of action that President Clinton i s taking today. Also
l a s t Monday i h B r a z i l , the Organization of American States issued a
statement supporting t h i s same kind of action.
I t i s our expectation that other nations w i l l be doing
the same — those nations where such actions can have an e f f e c t . For
instance, not every a i r l i n e i n the world f l i e s into Port-au-Prince.
There are e s s e n t i a l l y five that do — American Airlines., A i r France, ,
Canada, the Dominican Republic and the Dutch A i r l i n e s . And so,
therefore, these actions have to be taken b i l a t e r a l l y by individual
nations as opposed to an organization such as the OAS or the United
Nations.
We expect that other nations w i l l also j o i n us in t h i s
a c t i v i t y with regard to i s o l a t i n g the coup leadership and the
supporters i n the H a i t i situation. What i t means i s e s s e n t i a l l y
t h i s : When you ban American a i r l i n e s from f l y i n g , that's
approximately 65 to 75 percent of a l l the a i r t r a f f i c to H a i t i . Air
MORE
�- 4,-
France, Canada has about another ,25 percent, and we expect that they
w i l l be reviewing the recommendations that come from the Four Friends
as. well as the OAS i n determining what they w i l l do on t h i s issue.'
With regard to f i n a n c i a l transactions, we are talkingabout the prohibition of hundreds of millions of dollars on an annual
basis. That includes prohibitions such as carrying amounts of cash
. into the United States, wire transfers, trade financing such as
l e t t e r s of credit, dollar clearing, and a host of other types of
a c t i v i t y . Since the United States.dollar i s an international
currency that i s very important in trade, we think i t w i l l have a
very s i g n i f i c a n t impact.
,
We expect, again, that other nations/ p a r t i c u l a r l y those
who, l i k e the Four Friends, as well as the OAS who voted j u s t
recently for these recommendations, w i l l also be doing the same
thing.. So we think i t w i l l have a very s i g n i f i c a n t impact. And even
though someone may attempt to relocate t h e i r resources, after today
i t w i l l be impossible —
Q
Are you going after a new named l i s t of individual's
that goes beyond the group of roughly 600 that have been targeted
before? Or are you doing i t i n a more general sense?
MR. GRAY: We are constantly evaluating the l i s t of
those who are subject to v i s a revocation, as well as the freezing of
assets. To that l i s t has been added, as you well know, those who are
part of the front government that was set up by the coup leaders.
And as we find evidence of those who are supporting the coup
leadership and i t s unconstitutional government, t h e i r names w i l l be
also added.
Q
Mr. bray, i f these sanctions make sense, can you
t e l l us why they were not imposed e a r l i e r , why i t made sense to wait ,
u n t i l now?
MR. GRAY: Well, I think that e s s e n t i a l l y , one, these
r e s t r i c t i o n s that we re talking about here are r e s t r i c t i o n s that have
to be applied primarily b i l a t e r a l l y . Again, as I said before, there
are only five countries that have a i r l i n e s f l y i n g into Port-auPrince. And so, thus, a U.N. resolution, even though i t i s broadbased as 917, i t leaves the p o s s i b i l i t y for other nations to take
a d d i t i o n a l actions and r e s t r i c t i o n s .
1
We have worked i n a m u l t i l a t e r a l way, and that i s why
t h i s action i s now coming upon the heels of a vote by the OAS and
also by the support of the Four Friends. And so, these are r e a l l y a
continuation of U.N. Resolution 917. Prior to that imposition of
917, which was on the 21st, you had voluntary sanctions on arm
embargo, or j u s t o i l .
I think what the world community said was that
after the coup leaders f a i l e d to l i v e up to t h e i r previous
agreements, especially the Governors Island Agreement to step down,
that stronger steps had to be taken, and we joined the. world
community i n doing that.
.
Q
— of the size of the assets that you're talking
about? And i f people have had a week to consider t h i s , i f the OAS
has talked about t h i s a week ago, by now c e r t a i n l y a prudent person
would have already moved t h e i r assets or taken steps to cover i t up.
How do you counter that?
MR. GRAY: Where would you take your assets and where
would you want them to be? What are the international — what does
the international marketplace respect i n terms of currency? So,
therefore, i f you also get other countries to j o i n in, I doubt very
seriously you'll find too many places to run with those assets.
MORE
�- 5 -.
And then, also, when you t a l k about carrying out
international transactions, the payment of trade b i l l s and so forth,
that payment i s usually preferred in certain kinds of currencies, the
United States dollar being the foremost. And so, yes, I think
someone may have t r i e d to take t h e i r assets and move them as a result
of hearing what the OAS did on Monday. But,eventually, i f you're
going to do business in the world marketplace, there are certain
currencies that are the accepted currencies of the. market. The
d o l l a r . i s one of them. So, yes, t h i s w i l l have a very s i g n i f i c a n t
impact upon those who are the e l i t e and who have been supporting the
coup leadership.
Q
million of U.S.
done anything?
Last week, the Haitian government seized $12
AID funds. What i s our response to that? Have we
MR. GRAY: What have we done? E s s e n t i a l l y , they seized
about $12 million of U.S. assets. Those' assets were primarily for
humanitarian purposes in deposit in order to carry out our feeding
programis of the poor, of the children and the needy. And we have
decided to continue those programs and to go on without that money at
t h i s time.
Q
How w i l l t h i s measure on the'cut-off of f l i g h t s
affect the OAS-U.N. human rights mission that's in H a i t i now? And
also, how. w i l l i t affect the humanitarian aid programs, the workers
in the country? Do you.anticipate any kind of a c t i o n —
MR. GRAY: Our conversations that we've had with the
humanitarian groups.is that t h i s prohibition on a i r l i n e f l i g h t s i s
not going to cause them to leave. Their commitment i s based upon a
strong commitment to aid the poor, the hungry. There are those
groups that do use a i r charter service to bring in supplies —
medical, as well as humanitarian aid. Those f l i g h t s have to be
cleared through a United Nations procedure. We are working with the
United Nations now to come up with an expedited procedure mechanism
so that there w i l l not be delays for those who have medical supplies
and other supplies — missionaries, humanitarian groups — that want
to get them i n .
And so we're hoping that we'll have an expedited
procedure. We have worked already with regard to two requests of
groups that have had that problem. But we do not see the banning of
commercial a i r l i n e s as somehow affecting the humanitarian aid
programs that w i l l be going on there.
s
'
•
Q
But there were some aid programs that depended on
commercial a i r l i n e s , Mr. Gray.
Q
I f the Haitian m i i i t a r y does not agree to these
conditions by the time that your term expires, w i l l you see these
efforts e s s e n t i a l l y as a failure?.
MR. GRAY: My term expires — oh, my term expires after
13 0 days, but l e t me explain to you what 13 0 days means. I t means
the days that I work for President Clinton. And so, every day I'm
not working for President Clinton. I s t i l l remain as-the President
of the College Fund and there are days when I am not doing t h i s job.
And so, therefore, those who think i f you wait u n t i l October 1st B i l l
Gray w i l l be gone,, they may be surprised. (Laughter.)
Q
Mr. Gray, what's the p r a c t i c a l effect for those
groups which did send in t h e i r humanitarian supplies, primarily
medical, by commercial a i r l i n e r ? I know of at l e a s t two.
What are
they going to do?
MR. GRAY: Well, we w i l l work with those groups to find
a different way for them to get t h e i r supplies i n . There are charter
' MORE
�- 6 -
f l i g h t s and there are other ways in which we can get those supplies
in. But I don't think that we should take the position or imply that
these additional r e s t r i c t i o n s are going to hurt the poor and
humanitarian. In fact, what they hurt are those people who are the
supporters of the coup who presently can now go and get on an Air
France plane, go to Paris, shop and come back, or get on an American
A i r l i n e s plane and come to New York. I assure you that not too many
of the poor children or the poor people of Haiti are flying American
A i r l i n e s , either economy or business or f i r s t c l a s s , coming to Miami
or New York.
And so, therefore, the emphasis here i s seeking to apply
pressure to those groups that are supporting the coup leadership.
And l e t me point out that most of the humanitarian aid that i s going
in, most of the medical aid i s not going in by these commercial
a i r l i n e f l i g h t s . And as I said before, we are w i l l i n g to work with
those groups that have used these f l i g h t s through a i r cargo.
But we should also point out that i f they can use a i r
cargo', so can those who want to break the embargo use a i r cargo. So
we w i l l work with those humanitarian groups to make sure that there
i s no loss of humanitarian aid that w i l l be going in to provide help
for the poor or the needy.
Q
Why do you think that these w i l l work?
Q
Mr. Gray, how does t h i s impact people who have
families in New York, in Port-au-Prince who wire money into people in
to aid them?
MR. GRAY: Well, I'm glad you raised that question
because one of the.things that i s a part of t h i s whole set.of
f i n a n c i a l r e s t r i c t i o n s i s that we are providing for remittances of
about $50 a month, which allows someone who l i v e s ' i n the United
States who has some family members and would l i k e to send small
amounts to the poor there, up to $50 a month, they w i l l be able to
continue to do so.
And when you're talking about a society where the annual
income i s around $350, even though $50 a month may not sound l i k e a
great deal here' in America, i t i s a s i g n i f i c a n t amount. So,
therefore, we think that these, r e s t r i c t i o n s have been targeted and
fashioned in such a, manner that i t w i l l provide for the need of the
neediest c i t i z e n s and for those in America — we have over one
million Haitian Americans -- who w i l l be able to provide some help
for t h e i r families. So, therefore, there i s a provision that allows
remittances up to $50.
The question that was asked before — and I ' l l conclude
on the other question, and that i s , why do we think these w i l l work.
We believe that, joining with other nations of the
world, we must restore democracy. Whenever the United States can •
influence a direction for democracy, i t has the responsibility to do
so, working with i t s neighbors. We have been working with our
neighbors and been working with the nations of the world to bring
about a change. We believe that the sanctions under U.N. Resolution
917 plus these heightened sanctions that have been announced today by
President Clinton w i l l create that kind of environment where we can
have a solution to t h i s c r i s i s .
Sanctions alone don't solve any c r i s i s . They didn't
solve i t alone in South Africa, and they won't solve i t anywhere
else. But what they can do i s they can create an environment where
those who are the coup leaders, those who took democracy away from
the Haitian people at the point of a gun, can rethink t h e i r position
and come to t h e i r senses. We're hoping :.that that w i l l happen, that
t h i s w i l l create the kind of situation where they w i l l not choose to
MORE
�- 7 -
destroy t h e i r country or themselves.- And certainly, these kinds of
economic r e s t r i c t i o n s make that choice very clear to the coup leaders
and to t h e i r supporters.
And that's why we think i t i s important to t r y every
diplomatic arrow in our quiver so that we'can restore democracy. And
i f we can restore democracy, we w i l l end the huge number of Haitians
who are fleeing as refugees, risking t h e i r livies. At the same time,
we w i l l be .able to create an environment of economic hope with the
other nations of the world to provide a long-term solution.
I want to make i t very clear, the financial transaction
prohibition, which i s quite different from seizing and freezing
assets, i s extremely important because i t i s targeted s p e c i f i c a l l y at
those groups who have been the supporters of the coup leaders and of
the coup leaders themselves. We think i t ' s a positive step. Again,
i t i s a step that has been supported by the OAS in i t s recent
communique from B r a z i l and also by the Four Friends of Haiti at- the
United Nations.
Thank you very, very much.
END
' 12:45 P.M.
EDT
�THE WHITE HOUSE
O f f i c e o f the Press S e c r e t a r y
For Immediate Release
June 10, 1994
TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:
On October 4, 1991, pursuant t o t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Emergency
Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA") (50 U.S.C. 1701 e t seg.) and
s e c t i o n 301 o f t h e N a t i o n a l Emergencies Act ("NEA") (50 U.S.C.
1601 e t s e g . ) , P r e s i d e n t Bush e x e r c i s e d h i s s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y
t o i s s u e E x e c u t i v e Order No. 12775 o f October 4, 1991, d e c l a r i n g
a n a t i o n a l emergency and b l o c k i n g H a i t i a n government p r o p e r t y .
On October 28, 1991, pursuant t o t h e above a u t h o r i t i e s .
P r e s i d e n t Bush e x e r c i s e d h i s s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y t o i s s u e
E x e c u t i v e Order No. 12779 o f October 28, 1991, b l o c k i n g p r o p e r t y
of and p r o h i b i t i n g t r a n s a c t i o n s w i t h H a i t i .
On June 30, 1993, pursuant t o t h e above a u t h o r i t i e s , as
w e l l as t h e U n i t e d Nations P a r t i c i p a t i o n Act o f 1945, as amended
("UNPA") (22 U.S.C. 287c), I e x e r c i s e d my s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y
t o i s s u e E x e c u t i v e Order No. 12853 o f June 30, 1993, t o impose
a d d i t i o n a l economic measures w i t h respect t o H a i t i . T h i s l a t t e r
a c t i o n was t a k e n , i n p a r t , t o ensure t h a t t h e economic measures
t a k e n by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w i t h respect t o H a i t i would f u l f i l l
i t s o b l i g a t i o n s under U n i t e d Nations S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l
R e s o l u t i o n 841 o f June 16, 1993.
On October 18, 1993, pursuant t o t h e IEEPA and t h e NEA,
I a g a i n e x e r c i s e d my s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y t o i s s u e E x e c u t i v e
Order No. 12872 o f October 18, 1993, b l o c k i n g p r o p e r t y o f
various, persons w i t h r e s p e c t t o H a i t i .
On May 6, 1994, t h e U n i t e d Nations S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l
adopted R e s o l u t i o n 917, c a l l i n g on Member S t a t e s t o take
a d d i t i o n a l measures t o t i g h t e n t h e embargo a g a i n s t H a i t i . On
May 7, 1994, pursuant t o t h e above a u t h o r i t i e s , I e x e r c i s e d my
s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y t o issue Executive Order No. 12914 o f May 7,
1994, t o impose a d d i t i o n a l economic measures w i t h r e s p e c t t o
H a i t i . On May 2 1 , 1994, pursuant t o t h e above a u t h o r i t i e s ,
I e x e r c i s e d my s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y t o issue E x e c u t i v e Order
No. 12917 o f May 21, 1994, t o impose economic measures r e q u i r e d
by R e s o l u t i o n 917. These l a t t e r a c t i o n s were t a k e n , i n p a r t , t o
ensure t h a t t h e economic measures taken by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
w i t h r e s p e c t t o H a i t i would f u l f i l l i t s o b l i g a t i o n s under t h e
p r o v i s i o n s o f U n i t e d Nations S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l R e s o l u t i o n 917.
On June 10, 1994, pursuant t o t h e above a u t h o r i t i e s , I
e x e r c i s e d my s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y t o i s s u e E x e c u t i v e Order
No. 12920 o f June 10, 1994, p r o h i b i t i n g a d d i t i o n a l t r a n s a c t i o n s
with Haiti.
T h i s new Executive
order:
-- p r o h i b i t s payment o r t r a n s f e r o f funds o r o t h e r a s s e t s
t o H a i t i from o r t h r o u g h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o r t o o r t h r o u g h
the U n i t e d S t a t e s from H a i t i , w i t h e x c e p t i o n s f o r
a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Government, t h e U n i t e d
N a t i o n s , t h e O r g a n i z a t i o n o f American S t a t e s , o r f o r e i g n
d i p l o m a t i c m i s s i o n s , c e r t a i n payments r e l a t e d t o
humanitarian assistance i n H a i t i , l i m i t e d f a m i l y
r e m i t t a n c e s , funds f o r t r a v e l - r e l a t e d expenses, and
payments i n c i d e n t a l t o exempt shipments o f food, medicine,
medical s u p p l i e s , and i n f o r m a t i o n a l m a t e r i a l s ;
more
• (OVER)
�-- p r o h i b i t s the s a l e , supply, o r e x p o r t a t i o n by
U n i t e d S t a t e s persons o r from the U n i t e d S t a t e s , o r u s i n g
U . S . - r e g i s t e r e d v e s s e l s o r a i r c r a f t , o f any goods,
technology, o r services t o H a i t i o r i n connection w i t h
H a i t i a n businesses, o r a c t i v i t i e s by U n i t e d S t a t e s persons
o r i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s t h a t promote such s a l e , s u p p l y , o r
e x p o r t a t i o n , except f o r the s a l e , supply, o r e x p o r t a t i o n o f
i n f o r m a t i o n a l m a t e r i a l s , c e r t a i n f o o d s t u f f s , and medicines
and medical s u p p l i e s ;
-- p r o h i b i t s any t r a n s a c t i o n t h a t evades o r avoids o r has
the purpose o f evading o r a v o i d i n g , o r a t t e m p t s t o v i o l a t e ,
any o f the p r o h i b i t i o n s o f t h i s o r d e r ; and
-- a u t h o r i z e s the S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Treasury, i n
c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e , t o i s s u e
r e g u l a t i o n s implementing the p r o v i s i o n s o f the E x e c u t i v e
order.
The new Executive o r d e r i s necessary t o t i g h t e n t h e embargo
a g a i n s t H a i t i w i t h the g o a l o f the r e s t o r a t i o n o f democracy i n
t h a t n a t i o n and the prompt r e t u r n o f t h e l e g i t i m a t e l y e l e c t e d
P r e s i d e n t , Jean-Bertrand A r i s t i d e , under the framework o f the
Governors I s l a n d Agreement.
I am p r o v i d i n g t h i s n o t i c e t o the Congress pursuant t o
s e c t i o n 204(b) o f the IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1703(b)) and s e c t i o n 301
of t h e NEA (50 U.S.C. 1631).
I am e n c l o s i n g a copy o f t h e
E x e c u t i v e o r d e r t h a t I have i s s u e d .
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
THE
WHITE HOUSE,
June 10, 1994.
# # #
�THE WHITE HOUSE
O f f i c e o f t h e Press S e c r e t a r y
For Immediate Release
June 10, 1994
TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:
On October 4, 1991, pursuant t o t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Emergency
Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA") (50 U.S.C. 1701 e t seg.) and
s e c t i o n 301 o f t h e N a t i o n a l Emergencies Act ("NEA") (50 U.S.C.
1601 e t seg.). P r e s i d e n t Bush e x e r c i s e d h i s s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y
t o i s s u e E x e c u t i v e Order No. 12775 o f October 4, 1991, d e c l a r i n g
a n a t i o n a l emergency and b l o c k i n g H a i t i a n government p r o p e r t y .
On October 28, 1991, pursuant t o t h e above a u t h o r i t i e s ,
P r e s i d e n t Bush e x e r c i s e d h i s s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y t o i s s u e
E x e c u t i v e Order No. 12779 o f October 28, 1991, b l o c k i n g p r o p e r t y
of and p r o h i b i t i n g t r a n s a c t i o n s w i t h H a i t i .
On June 30, 1993, pursuant t o t h e above a u t h o r i t i e s , as
w e l l as t h e U n i t e d Nations P a r t i c i p a t i o n Act o f 1945, as amended
("UNPA") (22 U.S.C. 287c), I e x e r c i s e d my s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y
t o i s s u e E x e c u t i v e Order No. 12853 o f June 30, 1993, t o impose
a d d i t i o n a l economic measures w i t h respect t o H a i t i .
This l a t t e r
a c t i o n was taken, i n p a r t , t o ensure t h a t the economic measures
t a k e n by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w i t h respect t o H a i t i would f u l f i l l
i t s o b l i g a t i o n s under U n i t e d Nations S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l
R e s o l u t i o n 841 o f June 16, 1993.
On October 18, 1993, pursuant t o the IEEPA and the NEA,
I a g a i n e x e r c i s e d my s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y t o issue E x e c u t i v e
Order No. 12872 o f October 18, 1993, b l o c k i n g p r o p e r t y o f
v a r i o u s persons w i t h respect t o H a i t i .
On May 6, 1994, t h e U n i t e d Nations S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l
adopted R e s o l u t i o n 917, c a l l i n g on Member S t a t e s t o take
a d d i t i o n a l measures t o t i g h t e n t h e embargo a g a i n s t H a i t i . On
May 7, 1994, pursuant t o t h e above a u t h o r i t i e s , I e x e r c i s e d my
s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y t o issue Executive Order No. 12914 o f May 7,
1994, t o impose a d d i t i o n a l economic measures w i t h r e s p e c t t o
Haiti.
On May 2 1 , 1994, pursuant t o t h e above a u t h o r i t i e s ,
I e x e r c i s e d my s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y t o issue Executive Order
No. 12917 o f May 21, 1994, t o impose economic measures r e q u i r e d
by R e s o l u t i o n 917. These l a t t e r a c t i o n s were taken, i n p a r t , t o
ensure t h a t t h e economic measures taken by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
w i t h r e s p e c t t o H a i t i would f u l f i l l i t s o b l i g a t i o n s under t h e
p r o v i s i o n s o f U n i t e d Nations S e c u r i t y Council R e s o l u t i o n 917.
On June 10, 1994, pursuant t o t h e above a u t h o r i t i e s , I
e x e r c i s e d my s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y t o i s s u e E x e c u t i v e Order
No. 12920 o f June 10, 1994, p r o h i b i t i n g a d d i t i o n a l t r a n s a c t i o n s
with Haiti.
T h i s new Executive
order:
-- p r o h i b i t s payment o r t r a n s f e r o f funds o r o t h e r assets
t o H a i t i from o r through t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o r t o o r through
the U n i t e d S t a t e s from H a i t i , w i t h e x c e p t i o n s f o r
a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e U n i t e d States Government, t h e U n i t e d
N a t i o n s , t h e O r g a n i z a t i o n o f American S t a t e s , o r f o r e i g n
d i p l o m a t i c m i s s i o n s , c e r t a i n payments r e l a t e d t o
humanitarian assistance i n H a i t i , l i m i t e d family
r e m i t t a n c e s , funds f o r t r a v e l - r e l a t e d expenses, and
payments i n c i d e n t a l t o exempt shipments o f food, medicine,
medical s u p p l i e s , and i n f o r m a t i o n a l m a t e r i a l s ;
more
' (OVER)
�THE WHITE HOUSE
O f f i c e of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
June 10, 1994
EXECUTIVE ORDER
PROHIBITING CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO HAITI
By the a u t h o r i t y vested i n me as President by the
C o n s t i t u t i o n and the laws of the United States o f America,
i n c l u d i n g the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Emergency Economic Powers Act
(50 U.S.C. 1701 e t seg.), the National Emergencies Act
(50 U.S.C. 1601 e t seg.), section 5 of the United Nations
P a r t i c i p a t i o n Act of 1945, as amended (22 U.S.C. 287c), and
section 301 of t i t l e 3, United States Code, and i n order t o take
a d d i t i o n a l steps w i t h respect t o the actions and p o l i c i e s of the
de f a c t o regime i n H a i t i and the n a t i o n a l emergency described
and declared i n Executive Order No. 12775, i t i s hereby ordered
as f o l l o w s :
Section 1. The f o l l o w i n g are p r o h i b i t e d , except t o the
extent provided i n r e g u l a t i o n s , orders, d i r e c t i v e s , o r licenses
which may h e r e a f t e r be issued pursuant t o t h i s order, and
notwithstanding the existence of any r i g h t s or o b l i g a t i o n s
conferred or imposed by any i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreement or any
contract entered i n t o or any license or permit granted before
the e f f e c t i v e date of t h i s order: (a) Any payment o r t r a n s f e r
of funds or other f i n a n c i a l or investment assets o r c r e d i t s t o
H a i t i from or through the United States, o r t o or through the
United States from H a i t i , except f o r :
( i ) payments and t r a n s f e r s f o r the conduct o f
a c t i v i t i e s i n H a i t i of the United States Government, the
United Nations, the Organization of American States, o r
f o r e i g n diplomatic missions;
( i i ) payments and t r a n s f e r s between the United States
and H a i t i f o r the conduct of a c t i v i t i e s i n H a i t i o f
nongovernmental organizations engaged i n the p r o v i s i o n i n
H a i t i of e s s e n t i a l humanitarian assistance as authorized by
the Secretary of the Treasury;
( i i i ) payments and t r a n s f e r s from a United States
person t o any close r e l a t i v e of the r e m i t t e r or of the
r e m i t t e r ' s spouse who i s resident i n H a i t i , provided t h a t
such payments do not exceed $50 per month t o any one
household, and that n e i t h e r the de f a c t o regime i n H a i t i
nor any person designated by the Secretary o f the Treasury
as a blocked i n d i v i d u a l or e n t i t y of H a i t i i s a b e n e f i c i a r y
of the remittance;
(iv) reasonable amounts of funds c a r r i e d by t r a v e l e r s
to o r from H a i t i t o cover t h e i r t r a v e l - r e l a t e d expense; and
(v) payments and t r a n s f e r s i n c i d e n t a l t o shipments
to H a i t i of food, medicine, medical supplies, and
informational materials exempt from the export p r o h i b i t i o n s
of t h i s order,more
(OVER)
�(b) The s a l e , supply, o r e x p o r t a t i o n by U n i t e d S t a t e s
persons o r from t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , o r u s i n g U . S . - r e g i s t e r e d
v e s s e l s o r a i r c r a f t , o f any goods, technology, o r s e r v i c e s ,
r e g a r d l e s s o f o r i g i n , t o H a i t i , o r f o r t h e purpose o f any
business c a r r i e d on i n o r operated from H a i t i , o r any a c t i v i t y
by U n i t e d S t a t e s persons o r i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t h a t promotes
such s a l e , supply, o r e x p o r t a t i o n , o t h e r than t h e s a l e , s u p p l y ,
or e x p o r t a t i o n o f :
( i ) i n f o r m a t i o n a l m a t e r i a l s , such as books and o t h e r
p u b l i c a t i o n s , needed f o r t h e f r e e f l o w o f i n f o r m a t i o n ; o r
( i i ) medicines and medical s u p p l i e s , as a u t h o r i z e d by
the S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Treasury, and r i c e , beans, sugar,
wheat f l o u r , cooking o i l , c o r n , c o r n f l o u r , m i l k , and
e d i b l e t a l l o w , p r o v i d e d t h a t n e i t h e r t h e de f a c t o regime i n
H a i t i n o r any person d e s i g n a t e d by t h e S e c r e t a r y o f t h e
Treasury as a blocked i n d i v i d u a l o r e n t i t y o f H a i t i i s a
d i r e c t or i n d i r e c t party t o the transaction; or
( i i i ) donations o f food, medicine, and medical
s u p p l i e s i n t e n d e d t o r e l i e v e human s u f f e r i n g ; and
(c) Any t r a n s a c t i o n by U n i t e d S t a t e s persons t h a t evades o r
a v o i d s , o r has t h e purpose o f evading o r a v o i d i n g , o r a t t e m p t s
t o v i o l a t e , any o f t h e p r o h i b i t i o n s s e t f o r t h i n t h i s o r d e r .
Sec. 2. For t h e purposes o f t h i s o r d e r , t h e d e f i n i t i o n s
c o n t a i n e d i n s e c t i o n 3 o f Executive Order No. 12779 a p p l y t o t h e
terms used i n t h i s o r d e r .
Sec. 3.
The S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Treasury, i n c o n s u l t a t i o n
w i t h t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e , i s hereby a u t h o r i z e d t o t a k e such
a c t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g t h e p r o m u l g a t i o n o f r u l e s and r e g u l a t i o n s ,
and t o employ a l l powers g r a n t e d t o me by t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l
Emergency Economic Powers Act and t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s
P a r t i c i p a t i o n Act, as may be necessary t o c a r r y o u t t h e purposes
o f t h i s o r d e r . The S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Treasury may r e d e l e g a t e any
of these f u n c t i o n s t o o t h e r o f f i c e r s and agencies o f t h e
U n i t e d S t a t e s Government. A l l agencies o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
Government a r e hereby d i r e c t e d t o take a l l a p p r o p r i a t e measures
w i t h i n t h e i r a u t h o r i t y t o carry out the provisions of t h i s
o r d e r , i n c l u d i n g suspension o r t e r m i n a t i o n o f l i c e n s e s o r o t h e r
a u t h o r i z a t i o n s i n e f f e c t as o f t h e e f f e c t i v e date o f t h i s o r d e r .
Sec. 4. N o t h i n g c o n t a i n e d i n t h i s o r d e r s h a l l c r e a t e any
r i g h t o r b e n e f i t , s u b s t a n t i v e o r p r o c e d u r a l , e n f o r c e a b l e by
any p a r t y a g a i n s t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , i t s agencies o r
i n s t r u m e n t a l i t i e s , i t s o f f i c e r s o r employees, o r any o t h e r
person.
Sec.
5.
(a) T h i s o r d e r s h a l l take e f f e c t a t 11:59 a.m.,
d a y l i g h t time on June 10, 1994.
eastern
(b) T h i s o r d e r s h a l l be t r a n s m i t t e d t o t h e Congress and
p u b l i s h e d i n t h e Federal R e g i s t e r .
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
THE WHITE HOUSE,
June 10, 1994.
# # #
�THE WHITE HOUSE
O f f i c e o f t h e Press S e c r e t a r y
For Immediate Release
June 10, 1994
EXECUTIVE ORDER
PROHIBITING CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO HAITI
By t h e a u t h o r i t y v e s t e d i n me as P r e s i d e n t by t h e
C o n s t i t u t i o n and t h e laws o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o f America,
i n c l u d i n g t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Emergency Economic Powers A c t
(50 U.S.C. 1701 e t seg.), t h e N a t i o n a l Emergencies A c t
(50 U.S.C. 1601 e t seg.), s e c t i o n 5 o f t h e U n i t e d Nations
P a r t i c i p a t i o n A c t o f 1945, as amended (22 U.S.C. 287c), and
s e c t i o n 301 o f t i t l e 3, U n i t e d S t a t e s Code, and i n o r d e r t o take
a d d i t i o n a l steps w i t h respect t o t h e a c t i o n s and p o l i c i e s o f t h e
de f a c t o regime i n H a i t i and t h e n a t i o n a l emergency d e s c r i b e d
and d e c l a r e d i n Executive Order No. 12775, i t i s hereby o r d e r e d
as f o l l o w s :
S e c t i o n 1. The f o l l o w i n g a r e p r o h i b i t e d , except t o t h e
extent provided i n r e g u l a t i o n s , orders, d i r e c t i v e s , o r licenses
which may h e r e a f t e r be i s s u e d pursuant t o t h i s o r d e r , and
n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e e x i s t e n c e o f any r i g h t s o r o b l i g a t i o n s
c o n f e r r e d o r imposed by any i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreement o r any
c o n t r a c t e n t e r e d i n t o o r any l i c e n s e o r p e r m i t g r a n t e d b e f o r e
the e f f e c t i v e date o f t h i s o r d e r :
(a) Any payment o r t r a n s f e r
o f funds o r o t h e r f i n a n c i a l o r investment assets o r c r e d i t s t o
H a i t i from o r t h r o u g h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , o r t o o r t h r o u g h t h e
U n i t e d S t a t e s from H a i t i , except f o r :
( i ) payments and t r a n s f e r s f o r t h e conduct o f
a c t i v i t i e s i n H a i t i o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Government, t h e
U n i t e d N a t i o n s , t h e O r g a n i z a t i o n o f American S t a t e s , o r
f o r e i g n d i p l o m a t i c missions;
( i i ) payments and t r a n s f e r s between t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
and H a i t i f o r t h e conduct o f a c t i v i t i e s i n H a i t i o f
nongovernmental o r g a n i z a t i o n s engaged i n t h e p r o v i s i o n i n
H a i t i o f e s s e n t i a l h u m a n i t a r i a n a s s i s t a n c e as a u t h o r i z e d by
t h e S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Treasury;
( i i i ) payments and t r a n s f e r s from a U n i t e d S t a t e s
person t o any c l o s e r e l a t i v e o f t h e r e m i t t e r o r o f t h e
r e m i t t e r ' s spouse who i s r e s i d e n t i n H a i t i , p r o v i d e d t h a t
such payments do n o t exceed $50 p e r month t o any one
household, and t h a t n e i t h e r t h e de f a c t o regime i n H a i t i
nor any person d e s i g n a t e d by t h e S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Treasury
as a b l o c k e d i n d i v i d u a l o r e n t i t y o f H a i t i i s a b e n e f i c i a r y
of the remittance;
( i v ) reasonable amounts o f funds c a r r i e d by t r a v e l e r s
t o o r from H a i t i t o cover t h e i r t r a v e l - r e l a t e d expense; and
(v) payments and t r a n s f e r s i n c i d e n t a l t o shipments
t o H a i t i o f food, medicine, medical s u p p l i e s , and
i n f o r m a t i o n a l m a t e r i a l s exempt from t h e e x p o r t p r o h i b i t i o n s
of t h i s order;
more
(OVER)
�THE WHITE HOUSE
O f f i c e o f t h e Press S e c r e t a r y
For Immediate Release
June 10, 1994
June 10, 1994
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
SUBJECT:
Scheduled A i r S e r v i c e Ban
I n f u r t h e r a n c e o f t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l e f f o r t t o remove t h e
de f a c t o regime i n H a i t i and t o r e s t o r e t h e d e m o c r a t i c a l l y
e l e c t e d A r i s t i d e government, I have taken c e r t a i n steps i n
the E x e c u t i v e o r d e r t h a t I issued today.
I n a d d i t i o n , I have determined t h a t i t i s i n t h e e s s e n t i a l
f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n t e r e s t s o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s t h a t a d d i t i o n a l
a c t i o n beyond t h a t i n Executive Order No. 12914 o f May 7, 1994,
be taken r e g a r d i n g t r a n s p o r t a t i o n by a i r t o H a i t i . ; I have
d e t e r m i n e d t h a t , w i t h respect t o r e g u l a r l y scheduled commercial
passenger f l i g h t s o f U.S. and H a i t i a n a i r c a r r i e r s , and except
to the extent provided i n regulations, orders, d i r e c t i v e s ,
a u t h o r i z a t i o n s , o r l i c e n s e s t h a t may be i s s u e d by t h e Department
of t h e T r e a s u r y i n c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the Departments o f S t a t e
and T r a n s p o r t a t i o n , t h e f o l l o w i n g i s p r o h i b i t e d :
the granting
of p e r m i s s i o n t o any a i r c r a f t t o take o f f from, l a n d i n , o r
o v e r f l y the t e r r i t o r y o f the United States, i f t h e a i r c r a f t ,
as p a r t o f t h e same f l i g h t o r as a c o n t i n u a t i o n o f t h a t f l i g h t ,
i s d e s t i n e d t o l a n d i n o r has taken o f f from t h e t e r r i t o r y o f
Haiti.
The Department o f T r a n s p o r t a t i o n should take a p p r o p r i a t e a c t i o n
t o implement t h i s d e c i s i o n .
That a c t i o n s h o u l d be e f f e c t i v e as
o f 11:59 p.m., e a s t e r n d a y l i g h t time on June 24, 1994, and these
measures s h o u l d remain i n e f f e c t u n t i l f u r t h e r n o t i f i c a t i o n .
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
# # #
�THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
June 10, 1994
REMARKS BY SPECIAL ADVISOR ON HAITI BILL GRAY
The Briefing Room
12:24
P.M. EDT
MR. GRAY: Thank you, Mr. President.
As the President has indicated, we are announcing two
new steps in our e f f o r t s to restore democracy in H a i t i . F i r s t , the
President has signed an executive order banning private financial
transactions between Haiti and the United States and, through the
United States, between Haiti and other countries. Let me note that
t h i s ban does not apply to humanitarian a c t i v i t i e s , including the
expanding programs to feed over a m i l l i o n Haitians daily. I t also
exempts remittances of up to $50 a month to individual Haitians who
depend on such funds.
Second, the President has directed Secretary of
Transportation Pena to instruct a l l United States and Haitian a i r
c a r r i e r s to cease scheduled services between our two nations. I n
order to allow those Americans and others who wish to leave H a i t i to
do so i n an orderly fashion, t h i s measure w i l l take effect as of June
25th.
The new measures we are announcing today have been
endorsed by the Organization of American States, the Friends of Haiti
and President A r i s t i d e . Through these actions, we are sending a
strong message to H a i t i ' s m i l i t a r y leaders that they cannot continue
repressing t h e i r people and defying world opinion with impunity.
Working with our international and Haitian partners, we w i l l act to
protect our national interest and hasten the day when Haitian
democracy i s restored and President A r i s t i d e can return to the people
who freely elected him as t h e i r leader.
At t h i s time I w i l l entertain questions.
Q
How effective do you think these new sanctions w i l l
be in restoring A r i s t i d e to h i s power?
MR. GRAY: Well, sanctions create an environment where
we hope we w i l l be able to have a diplomatic breakthrough. As you
know, the sanctions under U.N. Resolution 917 were only imposed about
three weeks ago, and they are having a s i g n i f i c a n t effect. These
additional sanctions are targeted in such a way to have a maximum
effect upon the coup leaders and those who are t h e i r supporters. And
i t i s our b e l i e f that they w i l l further create that kind of an
atmosphere where we can have a diplomatic breakthrough and a solution
where the coup leaders step down.
Q
How long i s i t going to be before you expect to see
any kind of r e s u l t s from the additional sanctions? How long are you
going to give i t before you know i f i t works?
MR. GRAY: Well, we're going to be analyzing and
reviewing the situation daily and weekly in H a i t i to determine the
effectiveness of these sanctions as well as those that are now i n
place and determining what our next steps should be.
MORE
�- 2-
Q
Mr. Ambassador, does t h i s mean that the military
option, at least for now, i s on hold?
MR. GRAY: As the President has said, a l l options are on
the table. We are pursuing a multilateral policy with our a l l i e s i n
the region — the Organization of American States that j u s t met, and
B r a z i l as well as the Four Friends of Haiti and the United Nations.
We w i l l continue to work i n a multilateral way to apply the maximum
amount of pressure and to use every option available to restore
democracy.
Q
There are reports today from within the
administration that the sanctions already i n place are beginning to
take t h e i r bite. What evidence can you t e l l us today that the
sanctions are beginning to have an effect?
MR. GRAY: Well, I think that we have information that
there are some shortages, gasoline prices that had dropped early have
now come back up a l i t t l e b i t . And we suspect that those sanctions
that were put i n place by U.N. Council Resolution 917 on May 21st are
beginning to have an impact. These w i l l heighten the impact rather
dramatically, and we think that we w i l l , hopefully, see some changes
in the behavior of those i n Haiti, and perhaps the coup leaders w i l l
do what they agreed to do i n Governors Island, which was to step
down.
Q
I f I could follow up please. S p e c i f i c a l l y , some
administration o f f i c i a l s are talking about the business e l i t e that
surround the miiitary leaders i n Haiti are beginning to feel the
pressure of the sanctions. What kind of intelligence — what can you
t e l l us, can you share with us today about that aspect of the
sanctions?
MR. GRAY: Well, I think there i s s i g n i f i c a n t evidence
that they are feeling the bite of the present sanctions and that
these w i l l also have a significant impact on them. And I think
you've seen statements i n the news media coming from people i n the
business e l i t e who have supported the coup leaders i n t h e i r taking
over democracy i n H a i t i . And we expect that these w i l l have a
s i g n i f i c a n t impact, especially upon the business e l i t e who have been
supporting the coup leaders.
Q
Mr. Gray, the Latin American governments are not i n
favor of the military intervention, nor seem to be the other friends
— the other three countries. You say a l l options on the table. I s
the U.S. w i l l i n g to go i t alone i f need be?
MR. GRAY: Well, f i r s t of a l l , I don't know where you
get your information from with regard to Latin American countries and
CARICOM countries. I have j u s t been, i n the l a s t two weeks,
traveling, meeting with a l l of the leaders of the CARICOM nations,
also at the OAS nations and also at the Four Friends. The statement
that none of them are interested i n the p o s s i b i l i t y that you j u s t
described i s not accurate at a l l .
Secondly, I think that what everyone i s concerned about
i s applying the maximum amount of pressure to seek a diplomatic
solution. I think there are mixed views with regard to the timing,
as well as the t a c t i c s of other possible solutions.
Right now, our policy continues to be that of working
with other nations to apply the maximum amount of economic pressure
to have a diplomatic breakthrough. But the President has said, and
we continue to make clear to our a l l i e s i n the region, that a l l
options are on the table. And those who would suggest that there has
already been a vote or there i s a consensus that a l l options are not
on the table i s not accurate, from my conversations with leaders
throughout the regions.
MORE
�- 3 -
Q
— you have figured out some plan whereby the
United States, with a l l of t h i s i n t e r f e r i n g on behalf of democracy,
some plan t o keep those poor children i n H a i t i from starving t o
death? You see pictures of that a l l the time.
M . GRAY: Well, f i r s t of a l l , l e t me j u s t point out
R
that I'm glad you raised that question — that certainly the economic
sanctions that have only been i n place about three and a half weeks
did not create those pictures. I n fact, i t i s U.S. policy that has
helped t o provide humanitarian aid i n H a i t i for some time. W are
e
providing, r i g h t now, over $70 m i l l i o n of humanitarian aid. Right
now we are presently feeding one m i l l i o n Haitians — that's
approximately one out of f i v e .
So those who say sanctions should not be applied because
somehow we're going t o increase the suffering of children ignore the
fact that our aid programs r i g h t now — and have been over the past
year — feeding one out of every f i v e Haitians i n that country. W
e
are planning t o increase that assistance by another 300,000 who w i l l
go on the feeding programs. And we w i l l be looking f o r an additional
expenditure of PL-480 program money and humanitarian aid that w i l l
assist those who are suffering.
The suffering of those children i s not a suffering
caused by United States sanctions or world sanctions. The suffering
of those children has been caused by a society that continues to
ignore the needs of i t s majority citizens for the needs of the few.
And i f you're going to correct that situation, democracy i s the f i r s t
step in bringing about an economic prosperity that affects a l l of the
people in that society. And so American policy i s not simply to
restore democracy and restore the dually-elected leadership, but we
are also providing right now, over $70 million of humanitarian aid to
those who are hungry, those who are suffering. And that i s beside
the aid that comes from the numerous nongovernmental agencies,
humanitarian and missionary groups that are also there providing
medicine and health and a variety of other things.
Q
Mr. Gray, can you p u l l apart f o r us the f i n a n c i a l
aspects of what you're t r y i n g t o accomplish? I n the past, when the
administration has t r i e d t o freeze assets, most of the assets have
been gone. When you have t r i e d t o block the flow of money, i t ' s
proved t o be very d i f f i c u l t . Who are you going t o go after? Do you
believe that there i s anything t o r e a l l y get a t t h i s point? And what
about other governments such as France, the Bahamas and Switzerland?
Are we going a f t e r them as well?
MR. GRAY: Let me begin by s t a r t i n g a t the rear of that
question and moving backwards. Last Friday i n a communique the
Friends of H a i t i of the United Nations issued a statement supporting
t h i s kind of action that President Clinton i s taking today. Also
l a s t Monday i n B r a z i l , the Organization of American states issued a
statement supporting t h i s same kind of action.
I t i s our expectation that other nations w i l l be doing
the same — those nations where such actions can have an e f f e c t . For
instance, not every a i r l i n e i n the world f l i e s i n t o Port-au-Prince.
There are essentially f i v e that do — American A i r l i n e s , A i r France,
Canada, the Dominican Republic and the Dutch A i r l i n e s . And so,
therefore, these actions have t o be taken b i l a t e r a l l y by individual
nations as opposed t o an organization such as the OAS or the United
Nations.
W expect that other nations w i l l also j o i n us i n t h i s
e
a c t i v i t y with regard t o i s o l a t i n g the coup leadership and the .
supporters i n the H a i t i situation. What i t means i s essentially
t h i s : When you ban American a i r l i n e s from f l y i n g , that's
approximately 65 t o 75 percent of a l l the a i r t r a f f i c t o H a i t i . A i r
MR
OE
�- 4-
France, Canada has about another 25 percent, and we expect t h a t they
w i l l be reviewing the recommendations t h a t come from the Four Friends
as w e l l as the OAS i n determining what they w i l l do on t h i s issue.
With regard t o f i n a n c i a l t r a n s a c t i o n s , we are t a l k i n g
about the p r o h i b i t i o n of hundreds of m i l l i o n s of d o l l a r s on an annual
basis. That includes p r o h i b i t i o n s such as c a r r y i n g amounts of cash
i n t o the United States, wire t r a n s f e r s , trade f i n a n c i n g such as
l e t t e r s of c r e d i t , d o l l a r c l e a r i n g , and a host o f other types o f
a c t i v i t y . Since the United States d o l l a r i s an i n t e r n a t i o n a l
currency t h a t i s very important i n trade, we t h i n k i t w i l l have a
very s i g n i f i c a n t impact.
We expect, again, t h a t other nations, p a r t i c u l a r l y those
who, l i k e t h e Four Friends, as w e l l as t h e OAS who voted j u s t
r e c e n t l y f o r these recommendations, w i l l also be doing the same
t h i n g . So we t h i n k i t w i l l have a very s i g n i f i c a n t impact. And even
though someone may attempt t o r e l o c a t e t h e i r resources, a f t e r today
i t w i l l be impossible —
Q
Are you going a f t e r a new named l i s t o f i n d i v i d u a l s
t h a t goes beyond the group of roughly 600 t h a t have been targeted
before? Or are you doing i t i n a more general sense?
MR. GRAY: We are constantly e v a l u a t i n g the l i s t o f
those who are subject t o v i s a revocation, as w e l l as the f r e e z i n g o f
assets. To t h a t l i s t has been added, as you w e l l know, those who are
p a r t of the f r o n t government t h a t was s e t up by t h e coup leaders.
And as we f i n d evidence of those who are supporting the coup
leadership and i t s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government, t h e i r names w i l l be
also added.
Q
Mr. Gray, i f these sanctions make sense, can you
t e l l us why they were not imposed e a r l i e r , why i t made sense t o w a i t
u n t i l now?
MR. GRAY: Well, I t h i n k t h a t e s s e n t i a l l y , one, these
r e s t r i c t i o n s t h a t we're t a l k i n g about here are r e s t r i c t i o n s t h a t have
t o be applied p r i m a r i l y b i l a t e r a l l y . Again, as I said before, there
are only f i v e countries t h a t have a i r l i n e s f l y i n g i n t o Port-auPrince. And so, thus, a U.N. r e s o l u t i o n , even though i t i s broadbased as 917, i t leaves the p o s s i b i l i t y f o r other nations t o take
a d d i t i o n a l actions and r e s t r i c t i o n s .
We have worked i n a m u l t i l a t e r a l way, and t h a t i s why
t h i s a c t i o n i s now coming upon the heels o f a vote by t h e OAS and
also by t h e support of t h e Four Friends. And so, these are r e a l l y a
c o n t i n u a t i o n of U.N. Resolution 917. P r i o r t o t h a t i m p o s i t i o n o f
917, which was on the 21st, you had v o l u n t a r y sanctions on arm
embargo, o r j u s t o i l . I t h i n k what the world community s a i d was t h a t
a f t e r the coup leaders f a i l e d t o l i v e up t o t h e i r previous
agreements, e s p e c i a l l y the Governors I s l a n d Agreement t o step down,
t h a t stronger steps had t o be taken, and we j o i n e d the world
community i n doing t h a t .
Q
— of the size of the assets t h a t you're t a l k i n g
about? And i f people have had a week t o consider t h i s , i f t h e OAS
has t a l k e d about t h i s a week ago, by now c e r t a i n l y a prudent person
would have already moved t h e i r assets or taken steps t o cover i t up.
How do you counter that?
MR. GRAY: Where would you take your assets and where
would you want them t o be? What are the i n t e r n a t i o n a l — what does
the i n t e r n a t i o n a l marketplace respect i n terms o f currency? So,
t h e r e f o r e , i f you also get other countries t o j o i n i n , I doubt very
s e r i o u s l y y o u ' l l f i n d too many places t o run w i t h those assets.
MR
OE
�- 5 -
And then, also, when you t a l k about c a r r y i n g out
i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a n s a c t i o n s , the payment of trade b i l l s and so f o r t h ,
t h a t payment i s u s u a l l y p r e f e r r e d i n c e r t a i n kinds of currencies, the
United States d o l l a r being the foremost. And so, yes, I t h i n k
someone may have t r i e d t o take t h e i r assets and move them as a r e s u l t
of hearing what the OAS d i d on Monday. But e v e n t u a l l y , i f you're
going t o do business i n the world marketplace, there are c e r t a i n
currencies t h a t are the accepted currencies o f the market. The
d o l l a r i s one of them. So, yes, t h i s w i l l have a very s i g n i f i c a n t
impact upon those who are the e l i t e and who have been supporting the
coup leadership.
Q
Last week, the H a i t i a n government seized $12
m i l l i o n o f U.S. AID funds. What i s our response t o t h a t ? Have we
done anything?
MR. GRAY: What have we done? E s s e n t i a l l y , they seized
about $12 m i l l i o n o f U.S. assets. Those assets were p r i m a r i l y f o r
humanitarian purposes i n deposit i n order t o c a r r y out our feeding
programs of the poor, o f the c h i l d r e n and the needy. And we have
decided t o continue those programs and t o go on w i t h o u t t h a t money a t
t h i s time.
Q
How w i l l t h i s measure on t h e c u t - o f f o f f l i g h t s
a f f e c t t h e OAS-U.N. human r i g h t s mission t h a t ' s i n H a i t i now? And
also, how w i l l i t a f f e c t the humanitarian a i d programs, t h e workers
i n t h e country? Do you a n t i c i p a t e any k i n d o f a c t i o n —
MR. GRAY: Our conversations that we've had with the
humanitarian groups i s that t h i s prohibition on a i r l i n e f l i g h t s i s
not going to cause them to leave. Their commitment i s based upon a
strong commitment to aid the poor, the hungry. There are those
groups that do use a i r charter service to bring i n supplies —
medical, as well as humanitarian aid. Those f l i g h t s have to be
cleared through a United Nations procedure. We are working with the
United Nations now to come up with an expedited procedure mechanism
so that there w i l l not be delays for those who have medical supplies
and other supplies — missionaries, humanitarian groups — that want
to get them i n .
And so we're hoping t h a t w e ' l l have an expedited
procedure. We have worked already w i t h regard t o two requests o f
groups t h a t hcve had t h a t problem. But we do n o t see t h e banning of
commercial a i r l i n e s as somehow a f f e c t i n g t h e humanitarian a i d
programs t h a t w i l l be going on there.
Q
But there were some a i d programs t h a t depended on
commercial a i r l i n e s , Mr. Gray.
Q
I f the H a i t i a n m i l i t a r y does n o t agree t o these
c o n d i t i o n s by the time t h a t your term expires, w i l l you see these
e f f o r t s e s s e n t i a l l y as a f a i l u r e ? .
MR. GRAY: My term expires — oh, my term expires a f t e r
130 days, but l e t me e x p l a i n t o you what 130 days means. I t means
the days t h a t I work f o r President C l i n t o n . And so, every day I'm
not working f o r President C l i n t o n . I s t i l l remain as t h e President
of t h e College Fund and there are days when I am n o t doing t h i s j o b .
And so, t h e r e f o r e , those who t h i n k i f you w a i t u n t i l October 1st B i l l
Gray w i l l be gone, they may be surprised. (Laughter.)
Q
Mr. Gray, what's the p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t f o r those
groups which d i d send i n t h e i r humanitarian s u p p l i e s , p r i m a r i l y
medical, by commercial a i r l i n e r ? I know of a t l e a s t two. What are
they going t o do?
MR. GRAY: Well, we w i l l work with those groups to find
a different way for them to get t h e i r supplies i n . There are charter
MORE
�- 6 -
f l i g h t s and there are other ways in which we can get those supplies
in. But I don't think that we should take the position or imply that
these additional r e s t r i c t i o n s are going to hurt the poor and
humanitarian. In fact, what they hurt are those people who are the
supporters of the coup who presently can now go and get on an Air
France plane, go to Paris, shop and come back, or get on an American
A i r l i n e s plane and come to New York. I assure you that not too many
of the poor children or the poor people of Haiti are flying American
A i r l i n e s , either economy or business or f i r s t c l a s s , coming to Miami
or New York.
And so, therefore, the emphasis here i s seeking to apply
pressure to those groups that are supporting the coup leadership.
And l e t me point out that most of the humanitarian aid that i s going
in, most of the medical aid i s not going in by these commercial
a i r l i n e f l i g h t s . And as I said before, we are w i l l i n g to work with
those groups that have used these f l i g h t s through a i r cargo.
But we should also point out that i f they can use a i r
cargo, so can those who want to break the embargo use a i r cargo. So
we w i l l work with those humanitarian groups to make sure that there
i s no loss of humanitarian aid that w i l l be going in to provide help
for the poor or the needy.
Q
Why do you think that these w i l l work?
Q
Mr. Gray, how does t h i s impact people who have
families in New York, in Port-au-Prince who wire money into people in
to aid them?
MR. GRAY: Well, I'm glad you raised that question
because one of the things that i s a part of t h i s whole set of
financial r e s t r i c t i o n s i s that we are providing for remittances of
about $50 a month, which allows someone who l i v e s i n the United
States who has some family members and would l i k e to send small
amounts to the poor there, up to $50 a month, they w i l l be able to
continue to do so.
And when you're talking about a society where the annual
income i s around $350, even though $50 a month may not sound l i k e a
great deal here in America, i t i s a s i g n i f i c a n t amount. So,
therefore, we think that these r e s t r i c t i o n s have been targeted and
fashioned i n such a manner that i t w i l l provide for the need of the
neediest c i t i z e n s and for those in America — we have over one
million Haitian Americans — who w i l l be able to provide some help
for t h e i r families. So, therefore, there i s a provision that allows
remittances up to $50.
The question that was asked before — and I ' l l conclude
on the other question, and that i s , why do we think these w i l l work.
We believe that, joining with other nations of the
world, we must restore democracy. Whenever the United States can •
influence a direction for democracy, i t has the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to do
so, working with i t s neighbors. We have been working with our
neighbors and been working with the nations of the world to bring
about a change. We believe that the sanctions under U.N. Resolution
917 plus these heightened sanctions that have been announced today by
President Clinton w i l l create that kind of environment where we can
have a solution to t h i s c r i s i s .
Sanctions alone don't solve any c r i s i s . They didn't
solve i t alone in South Africa, and they won't solve i t anywhere
else. But what they can do i s they can create an environment where
those who are the coup leaders, those who took democracy away from
the Haitian people at the point of a gun, can rethink t h e i r position
and come to t h e i r senses. We're hoping .that that w i l l happen, that
t h i s w i l l create the kind of situation where they w i l l not choose to
MORE
�- 7 -
destroy their country or themselves. And certainly, these kinds of
economic r e s t r i c t i o n s make that choice very clear to the coup leaders
and to their supporters.
1
And t h a t s why we think i t i s important to try every
diplomatic arrow in our quiver so that we can restore democracy. And
i f we can restore democracy, we w i l l end the huge number of Haitians
who are fleeing as refugees, risking t h e i r l i v e s . At the same time,
we w i l l be able to create an environment of economic hope with the
other nations of the world to provide a long-term solution.
I want to make i t very clear, the f i n a n c i a l transaction
prohibition, which i s quite different from seizing and freezing
assets, i s extremely important because i t i s targeted s p e c i f i c a l l y at
those groups who have been the supporters of the coup leaders and of
the coup leaders themselves. We think i t ' s a positive step. Again,
i t i s a step that has been supported by the OAS in i t s recent
communique from B r a z i l and also by the Four Friends of Haiti at the
United Nations.
Thank you very, very much.
END
12:45 P.M.
EDT
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Office of Press and Communications - Philip J. “P.J.” Crowley
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36076">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2011-0516-S
Description
An account of the resource
This collection consists of White House press releases from the files of P.J. Crowley. Crowley served as Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Senior Director of Public Affairs the National Security Council from 1997–1999. The press releases are arranged by subject or, as in the case of the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, by date.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Extent
The size or duration of the resource.
370 folders in 33 boxes
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Haiti [1]
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Office of Press and Communications
Philip "PJ" Crowley
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2011-0516-S
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Box 7
<a href="http://catalog.archives.gov/id/7585702"></a>
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36076">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
7585702
42-t-7585702-20110516s-007-012-2015
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference