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September^ 1993
N o
MEMORANDUM FOR CORRESPONDENTS
Secretary of Defense Les Afipin leaves Washington Friday, September 10, to travel to
Belgium, Germany and Italy.
Sccfttary Aspin will meet in Brussels with European security experts and U.S. military
commanders from the European theater in thefirstof several planned regional defense policy
conferences. These conferences will provide an opportunity forregionalcivilian and military
experts to discuss issues, concerns and trends leading to better policy formulation for their
geographicregionsof the world.
While in Brussels, Secretary Aspin will also speak to members of the International
Institute for Strategic Studies. He will address the Bottom-Up Review and its implications
for Europe. The address will be delivered at the Hilton Hotel Conference Center (Palace
d'Egmond) ai 8:30 AM, Sunday, 12 September, and is open to the media. Media desiring to
cover the event should contact Colonel Andrew Duncan, Press Officer for the IISS, at
32-2-504-2608.
Secretary Aspin will make a brief scop at Rhef Main Air Base, Germany to observe
operations and visit U.S. troops supporting humanitarian airdrops over the former Republic of
Yugoslavia. In Rome, he will meet with Italian Minister of Defense Fabio Fabbri and with
Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda, NATO's Commander In Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe.
Secretary Aspin will return to Washington Monday, September 13.
-End-
�Statement dy
Honorable Les Aspin
Secretary of Defense
September 9.1993
A recent news account of a 1984 missile defense experiment raised a number
of serious questions about conduct of the program. Thoea questions fall into three
categories.
o
First, was the experiment "rigged?" That is, were the apparently
successful results demonstrated in the experiment ihe product of
misrepresentation?
o
Second, waa there a deception program aimed at convincing tne Soviet
Union that our missiie defense capaoility was greater than it was, and did
this program have the consequence of also misleading the Congress?
0
Third, have any such oeception programs misled the Congress about
teet results on other systems and could that happen in the future?
1 want to say it the outset that we take these questions with the utmc ,t
seriousness, They go to the heart of the integrity of our testing programs and to the
integrity of our dealings with the Congress on testing. I want to assure everyone that
WG wiil have honest testing and we will report the results honestly.
in this case, I askea Deputy Secretary Perry to get to the bottom of the
assertion of rigged testing. He directed an inquiry by Under Secretary for Acquisition
and Technology John Deutch. It is this effort we are reporting on today.
Let me begin by briefly describing the experiment in question. It occurred on
June to, 1984. it was conducted by the Department of the Army and was called the
Homing Overlay Experiment. It's aim was to demonstrate that an interceptor missile
couid hit an incoming simulated Soviet re-entry vehicle. The test on June io was the
fourth in a series. The previous shots had failed to hit the target.
On June 10, a missile carrying the simulated Soviet warhead was fired from
Vandenberg Air Force Base m California. An interceptor missile was fired from MecK
Island in the Kwajalein Missile Range m the Pacific. The interceptor's on-board, heatseeking detector picked up the target m the last few seconos ot flight and guided it to
a direct hit.
�7
Let me now take tha three questions in order. Was th© experiment rigged A
New York Timee story August 18 quoted unnamed sources as saying it was "rigged"
because a radar beacon had been placed cn the target re-entry vehicle inai airec'eo
ihe ir.terceptor to the target.
There were four elements of tne experiment shat might give rise to questions
about the validity of the reEults. Here is what we found:
o
Finding one. There was a racar oeacon aooarc! the target vehicle. We
aiso found that there was no receiver or, Doard the interceptor lor wis
radar. The beacon had been placed to assist m range and safGty
tracking of the target from the ground, The beacon was of a type not
capable Of the final guidance of interceptor to target Cur conclusion
that the experiment was not riggea. ana in tact could noi De nggeo, Oy
the presence of the racar beacon.
The inclusion cf the beacon was discussed in unclassified portions ot a
1984 report on the experiments written for the Army's Ballistic Missile
Systems command. The repon was available to Congress at the time
and we have a declassified version ot that repon available here today.
o
Finding Two. The re-entry vehicle was heated to increase its visibility tc
the heat-seeking interceptor. The RV was heated to 100 decrees FT
Gentigrado. The heating of the RV and other aspects of the experiment
were discussed in an unclassified study published by the congressional
Office of Technology Assessment in "957 which was available to the
public. The OTA repon suggests that the RV may have been heated to
temperatures higher than were expected in actual Soviet re-entry
vehicles. Hsd tne experiment been an operational test, this would have
been a suspect action, As it was. tne experiment was intenaeo to
demenstrate the basic process rather than test the sensitivity of the neatseeker,
o
Finding Three. There was a data link from the ground to the interceptor
that could have been used io guide the missiie to the target independent
of the radar beacon, it was not usee.
o
Finding Four. The target earned optical enhancers to make a direct hit
more visible. These enhancers included flash powder. Since these
enhancers come into play only after there is a direct hit. their presence
does not constitute rigging of the result.
�Overall, our conclusion on the experiment :s tms. ;T was not riggea Dy tne
inclusion of a radar beacon cn the target, nor oy other means. The experiment
demonstrated what It purported to demonstrate, tnat the final guidance of the
interceptor to a direct hit was done by the cn-ooard nea^ seeker. We shouia also
understand that this was not a test of a aeveloping system, but rather a demonstration
done under experimental conditions. The independent Office cf Technology
Assessment said in its 1968 repon mat the hommg Overlay Experiments were "sound
experiments properly designed..."
That brings us to the second set of questions. Was tnere a decepticn program
associated with the Homing Overlay Experiments designed to deceive the Soviets and
did it aiso deceive the Congress?
The answer is that there was a deception orogram aimed at the Soviet Union
associated with the experiments, but it deceived no one because it was not used.
The deception program was part cf that category of highly secret activities
called special access programs. It consisted of an explosive cnarge aboard the target
vehicle, The plan was to detonate the charge in order to give a near miss the
appearance of a direct hit tc give Moscow cur efforts were more successful than they
were. In the early flights, the interceptor did not come close enough to the target to
allow detonation of the charge. In the final flight, the charge was not activated and
could not have been detonated.
Sc, our conclusion is one, that there was a deception program asscciated with
the Homing Overlay Experiment two, Congress was net informed about but three,
ultimately it was not usedI should point out here that conducting such a program today without inlorming
Congress would be illegal. But in 1984, there was no requirement to tell Congress
about special access programs. That changed in 1988 when Congress requirad that
all special access programs be reported. I had a hand in establishing that
requirement as chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, as Old Senator
Sam Nunn, chairman otthe Senate Armed Services Committee, then-Representative
and now Senator Barbara Boxer, and former Senator Lowell Weicker.
That brings us to our third set of questions. Has the Congress been misled on
test results on other systems and couid it be misled about results in the future Let
me deal with the part about tne future first, we do not confirm or deny the existence
of any particular special programs, but we dc state tnat Congress is being informed of
all special access program. The Homing Overlay deception program could not happen
today without Congress knowing about it.
9
�Now on other systems, we nave gone tc ser.ous lencths tc ieterrr.ne ii sast
test results were tainted by decepticn. Our concusicn at this point is that no past, test
results have involved deception programs tnat could have oece.ved Confess pr a
American people. The Homing Overlay Exoerimen; episode could not be repeated
today.
r ;
Our conclusion is that past test results were unaffected by the Kind cf deceoiion
effort attempted on the Homing Overlay Experiments, and that tne Homing Overlay
episode could not be repeated today.
To sum up. the experiment was net rigged and deception did not take place,
although a program to practice deception existed. Ana I guarantee this. W'mie I am
here. Defense Department tests will be conducted nonesiiy and reported hsnesv.y.
# n n ff
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MEWS RELEASE
OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SFZCRCTARY OF DEFENSE
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WASHINCIIUN DC
R L E A S P
M O T E
IWJUI
LJATE
No. 406-93
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ASPINttFTAILSBl
Inremarksprepared fbr delivery to the National Security Studies Program at
Georgetown University, Secretary of Defense Les A«pin outlined the Clinton admimsnation's
plan to restructure our military forces for the new ere.
Georgetown University was chosen as a forum to address the Bottom-Up Review force
structure because in December 1991, Presidem Clinton, then a presidential hopeful, first
announced his vision to nsstnicture our military forces for America's national security in the
post-Cold War era, said Secretary Aspin.
Tm pleased to be back at Georgetown to announce the fulfullment of this pledge,"
said Secretary Aspin.
In comparing the Base Force and the Bottom-Up Review force structure. Aspin looked
at the post-Cold War era in two revolutions. The fustrevolutionwas the fall of the Beiiin
Wall and a collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. This was the end of the Warsaw Pact.
The secondrevolutionwas the fall of the Soviet Union. The Base Force was "a one-revolurion" defense plan thatrespondedto the security threat at the end of the first revolution,
said Secretary Aspin.
"We need a new force structure, a 'two-revolution' defense plan that responds to the
post-Cold War, post-Soviet threats," said Aspin.
Aspin spelled out the new dangers that faced by the United States in the post-Cold War
era:regionalconflicts; the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction; a
threat to our economic strength; and the failure of democratic reform in the former Soviet
Bloc.
(more)
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The Bottom-Up Review force structure will be smaller and less expensive than the Base
Force, with fewer people,fewer- but increasingly capable - systems, and smaller programs.
There will be 10 Army active divisions instead of 12 envisioned by the Base Force. The Air
Force will have 20 active and reserve fighter wings instead of more than 26. The Navy will
decrease from 12 to 11 earners, plus one in the reserves for training. The Navy's ship total
will decrease to approximately 345froma Base Force of 450. The Navy's attack submarine
force will have 45 to 55 submarines, down from 88. Aspin said.
Aspin confirmed that the total active duty personnel wiil decline from 1.6 million to
1.4 million, while other elements of the Base Force will be beefed up. Marine Corps strength,
for example, will be 174,000 active duty personnel, 13,000 more than the Base Force
envisioned.
Aspin concluded his comparison of the Bottom-Up Review force structure and the Base
Force with a look at the defense programs developed specifically with the superpower nuclear
threat in mind. Because the soviet nuclear threat no longer crista, the Bottom-Up Review
examined the need for the Strategic Defense Iniuadve (SDI), the MILSTAR satellite constellation, and the B-2 "stealth" bomber. The SDI program has beenreplacedwith the Ballisnc
Missile Defense organization with a new focus on die short-range ballistic missile threat. The
MILSTAR was suited forfteCold War world and plans are made now deploy a new, snrller,
lower-cost satellite - the advanced Extra High Frequency satellite. Finally, the B-2 "stt .ith"
will become a "silver bullet" and will no longer serve exclusiveiy as an intercontinental nuclear
bomber.
"We're committed to maintaining an effective,rcady-to-ftgMmilitaiy force for the
security challenges America faces in the post-Cold War worid. The Bottom-Up Review force
has put us on that track." said Secretary Aspin.
A complete text of the Secrettry's preparedremarksis attached-END-
�SF.P
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Prapvod Rvnarin by
Honorable Les Aspin
Secretary of Defense
Georgetown University
September 2,1993
Thank you very much. I'm delighted to be here. And given the subject I
wanted to discuss today, 1 wanted to grvd this talk ftere at Georgetown University.
That's because it was at this very university that, on December 1991, a presidentjai
hopeful named Bill Clinton gave a major speech outlining his vision for America's
national security in the post-Cold War era.
In that speech, Bill Clinton outlined a
numoer ot objectives. But his number*one objective was this - he said, and I quote,
"we must restructure our military forces for a new era." Well, consider It done. I have
come back here today to outline the Clinton administration's plan to restructure our
military forces for the new era.
So let me say this - on behalf of President Clinton, I'm pleased to be back at
Georgetown to announce the fulfillment of this pledge.
The new Clinton force structure grew out of a major review by the Department
of Defence of the military strategy, forces and defense programs we'll need for
America's security in the new era. We called this comprehensive, start-from-ecratoh
examination the Bottom-Up Review. So we're calling our new force structure the
Bottom-Up Review force structure.
We're making available here today a copy of the force structure part of the
Sortom-Up Review report. I hope you'll take one home, read it and let us know about
any questions or comments you have. But for today, I'd like to take some time to talk
about what's in it.
Ag you examine the details of the Bottom-Up Review force stiucture, it's natural
to compare it to th© defense program that we inherited from the previous
Administration, which was based on a concept they called the Base Pores.
Comparing the Base Force with the Bottom-Up Review force is also useful, because It
can help us look at where we've been, and where we're going.
Indeed, the difference between the Bottom-Up Review force and the Base
Force distills the essence of this Administration's response to the new era.
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To understand that response and the demands of thie new era, let's briefly
recall how we reached this point. Future historians, I think, will see the recent pact in
terms of tworevolutionsthat are very important to this period of history.
The firstrevolutionbegan on December 7,1988 when then Soviet President
Mikhail Gorbachev announced to the United Nations that he would withdraw tens of
thousands of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe and unilaterally reduce Soviet forces
by half a million troops. This sent a signal to ail the countries of Eastern Europe that
Soviet troops would no longer enforce Soviet rule. So those countries began to probe,
to test that signaltosee if it was real. It was. Within the year, the Berlin Waif came
down. Communism collapsed in Eastern Europe. The Warsaw Pact disintegrated.
That was revolution number one. it took place during calendar year 1989.
Then revolution number two took place a year and a half later, roughly during
the second half of 1091. It began when hard-liners in Moscow tried to turn the dock
back and reassert their control. Their coup attempt not only failed, it accelerated
change. Thereformerswere empowered and emboldened. And within months the
Soviet Union ceased to exist On Christmas Day in 1991, Gorbachev resigned, and
the Soviet Union shattered Into separate, often quarreling nations.
So there were two revolutione. Revolution one - no more Warsaw Pact.
Revolution two - no more Soviet Union.
That's where we are today. But the Base Force was established in 1990, after
revolution one, and before revolution two. In effect, the Base Force was a "onerevolution" defense plan. It was a legitimate response to the security threat we faced
at the end of the first revolution. The Soviet Union still existed, and the Base Force
continued to reflect substantial U.S. concern about the mttttary threats It posed.
The Base Force took our first step toward redirecting the U.S. defense program
away from the Warsaw Pact threat and toward post-Cold War threats, such as
regional aggression. Those changes have helped us. For instance, the previous
administration launched a study of mobility requirements - the airlift and sealift
needed for the future. This study became enormously useful to us.
But the Base Force was a product of its time. In effect, it hedged against the
resurgence of a hostile and powerful Soviet threat.
Today, thai threat is gone. We donl have to hedge against a resurgent Soviet
superpower. We don't need a "one-revolution" defense plan. We recognize that there
are circumstances in which Russia could become ft major regional threat. But like
Humpty-Dumpty, the massive Soviet military machine can't be put back together
again.
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So we need a new force structure, a "two-revolution" defense plan if you will,
thatrespondsto the post-Cold War, post-Soviet threats. Our advantage today over
Base Force planners is that we now know the Soviet threat cant be revived; they
couldn't know.
To fulfill President Clinton's campaign pledge to restructure our military forces
for the new era, we needed to start our defense planning from scratch. For many
years, so much of our defense program was geared.against the Soviet threat Now
that the Soviet threat is gone, we needed to ask ourselves some pretty basic
questions, starting with this one - what should our defense establishment be geared
against now?
As we looked around the world, what we came up with is this - in the post*
Cold War era, America faces four new dangers. One, regional conflicts. Two, the
proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Three, a threat to our
economic strength. Four, the failure of democratic reform in the former Soviet Bloc.
Let me elaborate on these, because they were the driving force behind the
Bottom-Up Review.
First the d6iger from regional ethnic, and religious conflicts. Thess dangers
don't put the existence of the United States at risk. But they could threaten vital
American interests, American friends, American allies, and the American sense of
decency.
This threat most directly drives our defense budget and the size and shape of
our forces, it is extremely difficult to predict, but we can anticipate that regional
conflicts will arise. And we must have the military capability to act to defend our
interests - either by ourselves if necessary or with allies if possible.
Second danger - the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
The area of the former Soviet Union still contains thousands of nudear weapons
whose security may be atriskwith the removal of the old mechanisms of control.
There are large numbers of people in the area with weapons-making knowledge
whose expertise could wind up on the worid market. Nations hostile to freedom and
democracy, like Iraq and North Korea, are determined to acquire nudear weapons.
This concerns us, especially since more nations are developing ballistic missiles that
can deliver weapons of mass destruction. So while the threat of massive Soviet
nudear attack has subsided, the new nudear danger stems from the prospect of
terrorists or rogue states with a handful of nudear weapons.
Danger three - failure to see our national security interests in a way that
includes economic concerns. Economic well-being is vital to our security. President
Clinton's economic program acknowledges this fundamental fact. Given the worid
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situation today, and given the situation in the United States, the most important thing
we can do for our security is to strengthen the economy. In the short run, our defense
depends upon strong, effective military forces capatte of meeting any threats to our
security. We've got that. America's military today is the best in the world. But in the
long run, our ability to remain a superpower depends upon our economic might.
Danger four - the possibility that democratic reform win fail in the former Soviet
Union and elsewhere. The Soviet superpower threat may be behind us. But if
dictatorships arise from the pieces, it would mean a less peaceful world, and a more
difficult world for the United States. More expensive, as well.
Add up these four dangers, and you see the whole threat picture has changed.
During the Cold War, we knew who our primary potential adversary was. We used to
stare at that adversary across the Fulda Gap in Germany. Now we're looking at tour
lesser dangers, but we don't know where they'll emerge, or when.
Through the Bottom-Up Review, we considered the four new security dangers
and built a new strategy and force structure, block by block. The force we developed
responds to the new world. Where the Base Force reflected the world that existed In
1990, the Bottom-Up Review reflects the worid we see in 1993.
Sc naturally, the Bottom-Up Review force ie significantly different from the Base
Force. Let's take a look at how they compare.
First, the Bottom-Up Review forces wH be smaller than the Base Force overall.
i
That makes sense, because the new threats we face, taken as a whole, don't add up
to the Soviet throat The Bottom-Up Review force ie going to be smaller and less
expensive than the Base Force, with fewer people, fewer systems and smaller
programs. Let's look at some of the numbers.
Active Army divisions. There will be 10 active divisions instead of the 12
envisioned by the Base Force.
Active and reserve fighter wings. We'll have 20 instead of 26 and a half.
Active aircraft carriers. We'll have 11 instead of 12, plus one reserve and
training carrier.
Total navy ships. We'll need approximately 345. The Base Force called for
450.
Attack submarines. We'll have 45 to 55, down from 88.
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As we reduce our combat forces, we'll make related cuts - support forces, the
massive and costly infrastructure of bases, centralized maintenance and supply
facilities - all of which were built up during the Cold War. At the same time, we are
committed to maintain, as our foremost priority, high-qualtty forces that are ready to
fight, and we will spend the resources needed to do so.
But not every difference between the Bottom-Up Review force and the Base
Force involves subtractions. Within the smaller overall forces, we'll actually make
some additions compared to the Base Force. To take one example, our Marine Corps
strength will be 174.000 active duty personnel, 15,000 more than the Base Force.
Expanding the Marine Corps is important to our post-Cold War strategy. That strategy
calls on the Marines to respond to a wide range of regional dangers and provide
robust, flexible forces overseas in peacetime.
So the Bottom-Up Review will beef up some elements of the Base Force, even
as overall force levels come down. And they wiil come down. Total active duty
personnel will decline from 1.6 million to 1.4 million.
That's the bottom line of the Bottom-Up Review - most elements of the force
will be smaller. But not all the elements will decrease equally. Some will decrease
proportionately less than others, in other wdMs, we're changing the mix of forces to
respond to the post-Cold War security challenges.
Let s take an example from the Navy - attack submarines and carriers.
During the Cold War era, the most important mission for our naval forces was
to counter the Soviet Navy - to keep the Soviets from restricting our freedom of the
seas, and to hunt down and, if necessary, " D Soviet missile-carrying submarines
W"
before they could launch their nuclear weapons at the United States, in this context,
the attack submarine was one of our most valuable naval assets.
But in the post-Cold War, post-Soviet era, these missions essentially are no
more. With out the Soviet Navy, no one challenges us for control of the seas. Now
our naval forces must focus on projecting conventional power ashore in regional
conflicts, particularly during the critical opening phase of a major conflict. In addition,
they must "show theflag,"that is, help maintain a significant U.S. presence overseas
to uphold our international commitments. In this context, aircraft carriers are the
centerpiece of our naval forces.
So during the Cold War era, we needed a substantial carrier and submarine
force. During the post-Cold War era, we'll need less of each overail. But not
proportionately less. We're changing th» mix. As our forces overall get smaller, the
number of carriers in the Bottom-Up Review force wiil decline much less than the
number of attack submarines.
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There's one final point of comparison I'd like to make between the Base Force
and the Bottom-Up Review force. That Is, the Bottom-Up Review takes a fresh look at
a number of large defense programs that were developed specifically with the
superpower nudear threat in mind. Most of these programs were developed before
the Base Force was adopted, and maintained by the Base Force because the Soviet
Union still existed at the time. But today the Soviet nudear threat no longer exists.
So we have to ask ourselves what do we do with these Cold War programs, what
makes sense in the new era.
Let me give you three exampies of how we've taken a fresh look at these
programs - the Strategic Defense Initiative, the MILSTAR satellite constellation, and
the B-2 "stealth" bomber.
Start with SDI. We've already reconfigured the program. Indeed, the SDI
organization is no more. It's been replaced by tha Ballistic Missiie Defense
Organization. But we've done much more than change the name. Wo're changing
the focus of the program because the threats have changed.
SDI focused on defending the United States against a Soviet nudear missile
attack. But the danger of that attack has receded. At the same time, the short-range
ballistic missile threat has IncreaWd. So under BMDO, we're swinging the emphasis
away from a nationwide defense, and toward defenses to protect American and allied
forces In regional conflicts. Given the current low threat to the United States from
intercontinental ballistic missile attack in the foreseeable future, we are refocusing our
efforts on research and development on a national defense system, should this prove
necessary.
Then there's the MILSTAR satellite constellation. It was the centerpiece of our
Cold War plans for reliable wartime communications, inducing sustained operations
during a nudear war. MILSTAR was wen-suited to the Cold War worid. where we
prepared for battle against an adversary armed with thousands of nudear weapons,
sophisticated jamming capabilities, and anti-satellite weapons. Some changes were
made to MILSTAR after revolution one. More were needed. Fdlowing the Bottom-Up
Review, we plan to deploy a new, smaller, lower-cost satellite - the advanced Extra
High Frequency satellite - that can provide reliable, jam-resistant worldwide
communications at a savings of billions of dollars. We plan to deploy this new satellite
as soon as possible.
Finally, the B-2 "stealth" bomber. It was designed as a strategic nudear
bomber to be used against the Soviet Union. Today, we're buying it in much smaller
numbers - twenty, to be predse. And the B-2's role is changing. Instead of serving
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exdusrvely aa an interoontinontaf nuclear bomber, It will be used primarily in regional
conflicts to slip by enemy defenses and deliver precision-guided conventional weapons
- like the F-117 bomber was used during Operation Desert Storm. The B-2 will be
our silver bullet.
That's my report on how the Bottom-Up Review force structure compares with
the Base Force structure. I'm confident, and President Clinton and General Powell
are confidant, that our new force structure will protect and advance American Interests
into the next century. We're committed to maintaining an effective, ready-to-fight
military force for the security challenges America faces in the post-Cold War world.
The Bottom-Up Review force has put us on that track.
Thank you very much.
# # #
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Provides additional Army prepositioned equipment
Enhances readiness of Army National Guard combat brigades
Retains additional Marine Corps endstrength
Proposes New Initiatives to meet New Dangers
Develops V-22
Provides precision strike capabilities for F-14, F-22, B-l, B-2
Establishes Joint Advanced Strike Technology Program for next
generation aircraft
Preserves submarine industrial base
Preserves carrier industrial base
Begins acquisition refonn
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• Reduces Infrastructure
Reduces about 115,000 civilian
personnel
• Reduces about 160,000 active
personnel
« Cancels A/FX
• Cancels MRF
• Cancels F-16 after FY94
• Cancels F/A-18C/D after FY97
• Retires A-6
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Cuts 1 reserve Army division
Cuts 3 active Air Force fighter
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Cuts 4 reserve Air Force fighter
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Cuts 1 active Navy airwing
Cuts 1 reserve Navy airwing
Cuts 1 aircraft carrier
Reduces carrier force level to 11
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PAGE.002
TALKING POI>nrS FOR BOTTOM UP REVIEW
Why did we undertake the Bottom Up Review? The Cold War is over. It istimeto overhaul
Cold War thinking to reflect new dangers that face us. The Bottom Up Review was just that.
It started with the new dangers and determined what force structure is needed to deal with
them.
Obviously there are budget constraints. Bat this is not a budget-driven effort.
The point of the Bottom Up Review was to get the right-sized andright-shapedforce to deal
with a vastly changed world.
The review was unprecedented for two reasons: its comprehensiveness (first review In decades
to knit together forces, strategy, infrastructure, modernization and industrial base) and its
collaborative nature (JCS worked with civilian team to a greater extent than on any previous
review).
In the coming days, there will be a series of speeches by Defense Department leadership to
expand on these elements and the reasoning behind the choices.
Is Aspin asking for more money to pay for this new force? No but specific numbers that
ciane out of the Bottom Up Review will be discussed next week in conjunctioo with
"Reinventing Government."
**
TOTRL
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�RUG
31
'93 20:51
PROM OASD-PA
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PAGE. 201
talking points for morning shews.
Bottom up review:
1. We hear i t will cost 20 billion more than the budget.
AJ That number i s wrong. This was not atouclget-drivenreview. The
administration tried to find the right-sized and right shaped
force for a vastly chanced world. There will be substantial
savings compared to the bush administration budgets. We w i l l
discuss those savinfls more fully next week, in conjunction with
the vice-president's national perfonnance review.
2. Are you going to have to ask CLinton for more money.
A: Not to meet the needs of the bottom up review, the differences
between the bottom up review dollars and Clinton budget
projections over five years are snail enough to be reconciled
here at the pentagon as we prepare our budgets.
Again, not a budget review. Before you can ask dollars questions
, you have to ask "what forces do we need, now that the soviet
union i s no more.' That's the question that several hundred
people have spent several months analyzing here at the pentagon.
3. We hear this i s not so revolutionary.
A: This i s the f i r s t time in at least 40 years that a review has
included so many facets in an integrated fashions strategy, force
level, modernization, infrastructure, industrial base. And this
is the f i r s t time in decades that the military and civilian teams
have worked so closely together on such a review.
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Force Structure Excerpts
Bottom-Up Review
Les Aspin
Secretary of Defense
September 1,1993
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PAGE.002
NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD
Introduction
The Cold War is behind us. The Soviei Union is no
longer. The threat ihai drove our defense decisionmaking for four and a half decades — that determined
our strategy and tatties, our doctnrie. the size and shape
of our forces ihe design of our weapons, snd the size of
our defense budgets — is gone.
In the aftermath of such epochal events, it has
become clear that the framework that guided our jecurity policy during the Cold War is inedequate for the
future. We must determine the characteristics of this
new era, develop a new strategy, andrestructureour
armed forces and defense program? accordingly. We
cannot, as we did for the past several decades, premise
this year's forces, programs, and budgets on incremental shifts from last year's efforts. We must rebuild our
defense strategy, forces, and defense programs and
budgets from the bottom up.
Now that the Cold War is over, the questions we
face in the Department of Defense are; How do wc
structure the armed forces of ihe United States for the
The purpose of the Bottom-Up Review is to define
future? How much defense is enough in the post-Cold
the strategy, force structure, modernization programs,
War era?
industrial base, and infrastructure needed to meet new
Several impoiunt events over the past four yeaj-s dangers and seize new opportunities.
underscore the revolutiortary nature of recent changes
in the intematiortal security environment and &hed light An Era of New Dangers
on this new era and on Ajrerica's future defense and
security requirements.
Most striking in the transition from the Coid War
is the shift in the nature of the dangers to our interests,
• In 1989. the fail of the Berlin Wall and the as illustrated in Figure 1.
collapse of communism throughout Eastern Eutope precipitated a strategic shift away from conThe new dangers fall into four broad categories:
tainment of the Soviet etnpire.
• Dangers posed by nudear weapons and other
•to1990, Iraq's brutal invasion of Kuwait signaled weapons of mass destruction, including dangers asa new class ofregionaldangers facing America- sociated with the proliferation of nuclear, biological,
dangers spurred not by a global, empire-building and chemical weapons as well as those associated with
ideological power, but by rogue leaders set on the large stocks of these weapons that remain in the
regional domination through military aggression former Soviet Union.
while simultaneously pursuing nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons capabilities. The world's
• Regional dangers, posed primarily by the threat
response to Saddam's invasion also dfitnenstratedof large-scale aggression by major regional powers
the potential in the r.ew era for broad-ba*ed. collec- with interests antithetical to our own, but also by the
tive military action tc thwart such tyrants.
potential for smaller, often internal, conflicts based on
ethnic or lellgtous animosities, statc-sponjorcd terror• In 1991. the failed Soviet coup demonstrated the ism, and subversion of friendly governments.
Russian people' s desire for democratic change and
hastened the collapse of the Soviet Union as a
national entity and military foe.
�PUG 31
' 9 3 2 0 : 56
TO WHITEHOUSE
FROM OASD-Ptt
New Dangers
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Figure 1
• Dangers to democracy and refonn, m the
former Soviet Union. Eastern Europe, and elsewhere.
• Economic dangers to our national security,
which couldresultif we fail to build a strong, competitive and growing economy.
Our armed forces are central to combating the first
two dangers and can play a significant role in meeting
the second two. Our predictions and conclusions about
the nature and characteristics of these dangers will help
mold our strategy and size and shape our future military forces.
PAGE.003
As Figure 2 shows, beyond new dingers, there ax?
new opportunities: realistic aspirations that. If we
dedicate ourselves to pursue worthy goals, we can
reach a world of greater safety, freedom, and prosperity. Our armed forces can contribute to this objective.
In brief, we see new opportunities to;
• Expand and adapt our existing security partnerships and alliances and build a larger communiiy
of democratic nations.
• Promote new regional security arrangements and
alliances to improve deterrence anc reduce the
potential for aggression by hostile regional powers.
• Implement the dramatic reductions in the strategic nuclear arsenals of che United States and the
former Soviet Union achieved in the START I and
1 treaties.
1
• Protect and advance our security with fewer
resources, freeing excess resources to be invested
in other areas vital to our prosperity.
New Opportunities
Opportuniti
An E r a of New Opportunities
During the Cold War. few entertained realistic
aspirations for a markedly safer,freerworld. Our
strategy of containment was. perforce, defensive in
nature, designed primarily to hold the Soviet Union
and China in check. Today, there is promise that we
can replace the East-West confrontation of the Cold
War with an era In which the community of nations,
guided by a common commitment to democratic principles, free-market economics, and the rule of law, can
be significantly enlarged.
t t M L—mUi| m MiVKrrtt;
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Figure 2
�AUG 31 '33 20:57
FROM OASD-PA
Objectives and Methodology of the
Bottom-Up Review
TO UHITEHOUSE
PAGE.004
3. Constructing buildingblockscf forces to implement this strategy.
4. Combining these force building blocks to proWe undencok the Bottom-Up Review to select the
duce options for our overall force structure.
right strategy, fotie jtractiire,raodemizaiionprograms,
and suppcrtins industrial base and infrastructure tc
5. Complementing the force structure with weapprovide fcr America's defense in the post-Cold War
ons acquisition programs to modernize our forces,
era.
defense foundations to sustain them, and policy initiatives to address newdangers and take advantage of new
Figure 3 shows the step-by-step process we used to
opportunities.
deveiop key assumptions, broad principles, and general objectives and translate them into a specific plan
Wiih ihe Bottom-Up Review now complete, we
for our strategy, forces, and defense resources.
will utilize its results to build a multi-year plan for
America's future security, detailing the forces, proThese steps included:
grams, and defense budgets the United States needs to
protect and advance its interests in the post-Cold War
1. Assessing the post-Cold War era. and pantcuperiod.
larly the new dangers, opportunities, and uncertainties
it presents.
The BottomrVp Review represented a close collaboration between the civilian and military sectors of
2. Devising a U.S. defense strategy to protect and
the Department of Defense. Task forces were estabAdvance our interests in thk new period.
lished—including representatives from the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the unified
Methodology of the Bottom-Up Review
and specified commands, each of the armed services
and. where appropriate, other defense agencies—to
review the major issues entailed in planning defense
ASSESS THE
POST-COLD WAR
strategy, forces, modernization programs, anc other
ERA
defense foundations- Numerous studies helped to
formulate the key issues for decisionmakers and provided the analytical underpinning for our review.
DECISIONS FOR
DEVISE
U.S. DEFENSE
STRATEGY
BOTTOfc-UP
REVIEW
ftflM Stt-ueturt
CONSTRUCT
FORCE BUILDING
BLOCKS
COMBINE
FORCE
BUILDING BLOCKS
Figure 3
BUILD MUITTYEAH
OEFtNCC PLAN
We offer this plan for public consideration as a
means of forming a new national consensus on
America's strategic role in global affairs, the military
instmmenu needed to fulfill that role, and the level of
resources necessary to provide those instruments.
Building Future Capabilities: Guiding
Principles
Certain other underlying principles guided our
effort during the Bottom-Up Review. In his inaugural
address. President Clinton pledged to keep America" s
military the best trained, best equipped, best prepared
�AUG 31 '93 20:57
FROM CASD-PA
fighting force in the world. To fulfill that pledge, we
must keep it the focus of our effort throughout the
planning, programming, and budgeting process.
TO WHITEHOUSE
PAGE.005
A key element of maintaining forces ready to fight
is to maintain the quality of our people, so that they
remain the best fighting force in the world. This means
keeping our personnel highly motivated by treating
First, we must ke?p our forces ready tofight.Wc them fairly and maintaining theirquality of life. It also
have already witnessed the challenges posed by the means continuing to recruit talented young men and
women, expanding career opportunities for all service
new dangers in operations like Just Cause (Panama).
personnel, and putting in place programs to ease the
Desert Storm (Iraq), and Restore Hope (Somalia).
Each of these was a "come as you are" campaign with transition to civilian life for many of our troops as we
little time to prepare our forces for the challenges they bring down the size of our forces.
met.
We must aiso maintain the technological super!,
ority of our weapons and equipment. Operation Desert
Th- new dangen thus demand that we keep our
forces ready to fight as a top priority in allocating Stonn dememtrated that wc produce the best weapons
scarce defenseresources.We must adequately fund and military equipment in the worid. This technologioperations and maintenance accounts, maintain suffi- cal edge helps us to achieve victory more swiftly and
cient stocks of spare pans, keep our forces well-trained with fewer casualties. We must design a balanced
modernization program that will safeguard this edge
and equipped, and take the other steps essential to
and the necessary supporting industrial base without
preserving readiness.
buying more weapons than we need or can afford.
�AUG 31 '33 20:58
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PAGE.00S
FORCES TO IMPLEMENT OUR DEFENSE STRATEGY
Scenarios as Planning Tools. Every war that the
United States has fought has been different from the
last, and different from what defense planners had
During the Cold War, our military planning was
dominated by the need to confront numerically supe- envisioned. Forexample. the majority of the bases and
rior Soviet forces in Europe, the Far East, and South- facilities used by the United States and its coalition
west Asia. Now, ocr focus is on the need to project partners in Operation Desert Storm were built in the
1980s, when we envisioned a Soviet invasion through
power into regions imponant to our interests and to
Iran to be the principal threat to the Gulf region. In
defeat potentially hostile regional powers, such as
planning forces capable of fighting and winning major
North Korea and Iraq. Although these powers are
unlikely to <hrcatcn the United States directly, these regional conflicts (MRCs), we must avoid preparing
countries and others like ihem have shown that they are for past wars. History suggests that we most often deter
the conflicts that we plan for and actually fight the ones
willing and able to field forces sufficient to threaten
imporunt U.S. interests, friends, and allies. Operation we do not anticipate.
Desert Storm was a powerful demonstration of the
For planning and assessment purposes, we have
need to counter such regional aggression.
selected two illustrative scenarios that are both plausible and that posit demands characteristic of those that
Potentialregionalaggressors are expected to be
could be posed by conflicts with a wide range of
capable of fielding military forces in the following
regional powers. While a number of scenarios were
ranges:
examined, the two that we focused on most closely in
the Bonom-Up Review envisioned aggression by a
* 400.000 - 750.000 total personnel under arms
remilitarized Iraq against Kuwait and Saudi Arabia,
•2.000-4,000 tanks
and by North Korea against the Republic of Korea.
»3.000 - 5.000 armored fighting vehicles
• 2.000 - 3.000 artillery pieces
Neither of these scenarios should be regarded as a
•500-1.000 combat aircraft
prediction of future conflicts, but each provides a
* 100 - 200 naval vessels, primarily patrol craft
armed with surface-to-surface missiles, and up to usefulrepresentationof the challenge presented by a
well-armed rtgionai power initiating aggression thou50 submarines
sands of miles from the United States. As such, the
• 100 - 1000 Scud-class ballistic missiles, some
scenarios serve as yardsticks against which to assess, in
possibly with nuclear, chemical, or biological
gross terms, the capabilities of U.S. forces. Figure 4
warheads.
illustrates the scenarios and their relationship to planning for force employment across a range of potential
Military forces of this size can threaten regions
conflicts.
important to the United States because allied or friendly
states are often unable to match the power of such a
In each scenario, we examined the performance of
potentially aggressive neighbor. Hence, we must preprojected U.S, forces in relation to many cmical papare our forces to assist those of our friends and allies
rameters, including warning time, the ihrsat, terrain,
in deterring, and ultimately, defeating aggression,
weather, duration of hosulities, and combat intensity.
should it occur.
Overall, these scenarios were representative of likely
ranges of these, critical parameters.
Major Regional Conflicts
�AUG 31 '33 20:59
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PAGE.S07
it may also not be possible, prior to an attack, to neach
Both sceniirios assumed a similar enemy operatier.: an armor-heavy, combined-arms offensive against a political consensus on the proper U.S. response or to
the outnumbered forces of a neighboring state. U.S. convince our allies to grant U.S. forces access to
forces, most of which wtn: not present in the region facilities in their countries.
when hostilities commenced, had to deploy to the
We also expect that the United States will often be
region quickly, supplement indigenous forces, halt the
Fighting as the leader of a coalition, with allies providinvasion, and defeat the aggressor.
ing some support and combat forces. A s was the case
in Desert Storm, the need to defend common interests
Such a short-notice scenario, in which only a
modest number of U.S. forces are in a region at the should prompt our allies in many cases to contribute
capable forces to the war effort. However, our forces
commencement of hostilities, is both highly stressing
and plausible. History shows that we frequently fail to must be sized and structured to preserve the flexibility
and the capability to act unilaterally. should we choose
anticipate the location and timing cf aggnrssion. even
large-scale attacks against our Interests. In such cases, to do so.
Scenarios as Planning Tools
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�A ' 31 '83 20:59
U3
FROM OASD-PA
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PAGE.QBG
a large-scale, air-land counteroffensive to defeat the
enemy decisively by attacking his centers of gravity,
retaking territory he had occupied, destroying his warOur first priority In preparing for regional conflicts making capabilities, and successfully achieving other
operational or strategic objectives.
is to prevent them from ever occurring. This is the
purpose of our overseas presence forces and operaPhase 4: Provide for post-war stability. Altions, joint exercises, and other military capabilities
though a majority of U.S. and coalition forces would
— to deter potential regional aggressors from even
begin returning to their home bases, some forces might
coruemplaring in attack. Should deterrence fail and
conflict occur, it is envisioned that combat operations be called upon to remain in the theater after the enemy
had been defeated to ensure that the conditions that
would unfold in four main phases:
resulted in conflict did not recur. These forces could
Phase 1: Halt the Invasion. The highest priority help repatriate prisoneo. occupy and administer some
or all of the enemy's territory, or to ensure compliance
in defending against a large-scale attack will most
often be to minimize the territory and critical facilities with the provisions of war-tenninalion or cease-fire
that the invader can capture. Should impenant strate- agreements.
gic assets fall to the invader, it might attempt to use
Forces for Combat Operations
them as bargaining chips. In addition, stopping the
invasion quickly may be key to ensuring that the
Described below arc " i types of forces that arc
de
threatened ally con continue its crucial role in the
collective effort to defeat che aggressor. Further, the needed to conduct joint combat operations in all four
more territory the enemy captures, the greater the price phases of an MRC.
to take it back: The number of forces required for the
counteroffensive tc repel an invasion can increase,
Forces Tor Phase 1, Primary responsibility for the
with correspondingly greater casualties, depending on initial defense of their territory rests, of course, with
the progress, the enemy makes. In the event of a short- our allies. As forces of the besieged country move to
warning aaack, more U.S. forces would reed to deploy blunt an attack, U.S. forces already in the theater would
rapidly to the theater and enter the battle as quickly as move rapidly to provide assistance. However, as
possible.
already mentioned, wc arc drawing down our overseas
presence in response to the end of the Cold War. Thus,
Phase 2: Build up VS. combat power in the the bulk of our forces, even during the early stages of
conflict, would have to come from the United States.
theater wiiile reducing the enemy's. Once the
enemy attack had been stopped and thefrontstabilized, This places a premium on rapidly deployable yet
U.S. and allied efforts would focus on continuing 1
0 highly lethal forces to blunt an attack.
build up combat forces and logistics support in the
theater while reducing the enemy's capacity to fight.
The major tasks to be performed in this phase and
Land, air, maritime, and special operations forces from beyond are:
the United States and coalition countries would con• Help allied forces establish a viable defense chat
tinue to arrive. These forces would seek to ensure that
halts enemy ground forces before they can achiev e
the enemy did not regain the initiative on the ground,
and they would mount sustained attacks to reduce the
critical objectives.
enemy's militant' capabilities in preparation for the
• Delay, disrupt, and destroy enemy ground forces
combined-arms counteroffensive.
snd damage theroadsalong which they are moving, in order to halt the attack. U.S. attacks would
Pkasc 3: Decisireiy defeat the enemy. In the
be mounted by a combination oflard- and seabased
third phase, U.S. and allied forces would seek to mount
The Four Phases of U.S. Combat
Operations
�AUG 31 '93 £ 1:00
FROM OfiSD-Pfi
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PAGE.009
stnlce aircraft, heavy bombers, long-range tactical
missilas. ground maneuver forces with antiarmor
capabilities, and special operations forces.
Forces for Phase 2. Many of the same forces
employed in Phase 1 would be used in the second phase
to perfonn similar tasks — grinding down the enemy's
rtulitary potential while additional U.S. and other coa• Protect friendly forces and rear-area assets from lition combat power is brought into the region. As
more land- and sea-based air forces arrived, emphasis
attack by aircraft or cruise and ballistic missiles,
using land and sea-based aircraft, ground-and sea- would shift from halting the invasion to isolating
enemy ground forces and destroying them, destroying
based surface-to-air missiles, and special operaenemy air and naval forces, destroying stocks of suptions forces.
plies, and broadening attacks on military-related tar- Establish air superiority and suppress enemy air gets in the enemy'sreararea. These attacks could be
defenses as needed, including those in rear areas supplemented with direct and indirect missile and
and tno5e accompanying invading ground forces, artillery Are from ground, air. and sea forces.
using land- and sea-based strtlce and jamming
aircraft as well as surface-to-surface missiles, such
Meanwhile, other U.S. forces, including heavy
ground forces, would begin arriving in the theater to
as the Amy Tactical Missile System
help maintain the defensive line established at the end
(ATACMS).
of Phase I and to begin preparations for the counteroffensive.
• Destroy high-value targets, such as weapons of
moss destruction, and degrade the enemy' s ability
Forces for Phase 3. The centerpiece of Phase 3
to prosecute military operations through attacks
focused on his central command, control, and would be the U.S. and allied counteroffensive. aimed
communications facilities. For such attacks, we at engaging, enveloping, and destroying ot capturing
would rely heavily on long-range bombers, land enemy ground forces occupying friendly territory.
and sea-based strike aircraft, cruise missiles, and Major tasks within the counteroffensive include:
special operations forces.
• Breaching tactical and protective minefields,
• Establish maritime superiority, using naval task
• Maneuvering to envelop or flank and destroy
forces with mine countermeosure ships, in order to
enemy forces, including armored vehicles in dugensure access to ports and sea lines of communicain positions.
tion, and as a precondition for amphibious assaults.
• Conducting or threatening an amphibious invasion.
• Dislodging and defeating infantry fighting from
dug-in positions; defeating light infantry in urban
terrain.
• Destroying enemy artillery.
• Locating and destroying mobile enemy reserves.
Combat power in this phase would include highly
mobile armored, mechanized, and air assault forces,
supported by the full complement of air power, special
An ATACMS launch.
�RUG 31
'33
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PAGE.010
opwaiions forces, and land - and sea-based fire support- location and disposition of enemy forces is a prerequiAmphibious forces would provide additional opera- site for effective miiitary operations. Hence, our planning envisions the early deployment of reconnaissance
tional fiexibiliiy to che theater comir.ardci-.
and command and control aircraft and ground-based
Forces for Phase 4. Finally, a smaller comple- assets to enable our forces to see the enemy and to pass
ment of joint forces would remain in the theater once information quickly through all echelons of our forces.
the enemy had been defeated. These forces might Total U S. intelligence and surveillance capability will
include a cfu-rier battle group, one to two wings of be less than it. was during the Cold War. but it will be
fighter?., a division o: less of ground forces, and special better able to provide timely information lo battlefield
commanders. Advanced systems, such as the Joint
operations units.
Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System
(JSTARS). the upgraded Airborne Warning and ConSupporting Capabilities
trol System (AWACS), and the MILSTAR sate'ilue
The foiegoing list of forces for the various phases communications system, will ensure that U.S. forces
of combat operations included only combat force ele- have a decisive advantage in tactical intelligence and
ments. Several types of support capabilities would communications.
play essential roles throughout all phases.
Airlift. Adequate airlift capacity is needed to
bring in forces and materiel required for thefirstweeks
of an operation. In Operations Desert Shield/Desert
Storm, the United States delivered to the Gulf region,
on average, more than 2.400 tonsof material per day by
airlift. We anticipate thai at least the same level of lift
capacity will be needed to suppon high-intensity military operations in the. opening phase of a future. MRC
and to help sustain operations thereafter.
Preposldoning. Prepositioning heavy combat
equipment and supplies, both ashore and afloat, can
greatly reduce both the timerequiredto deploy forces
Maritime prepositioning ships.
to distantregionsand the number of airlift sorties
Advanced Monitions. As U.S. operations in the
devoted to moving such supplies. Initiatives now
Gulf War demonstrated advanced precision-guided
underway will accelerate the arrival of the Army's
munitions can dramatically increase the effectiveness
heavy forces ill distant theaters.
of U.S. forces. Precision-guided munitions already in
Sealift. In any majorregionalconflict, most com- the U.S. inventory (forexample. laser-guided bombs)
as well as new types of munitions still under developbat equipment and supplies would be transponed by
sea. While airlift and prepositioning provide the most ment are needed to ensure that U.S.forcescan operate
rapidresponsefor deterrence and initial defense, the successfully in future MRCs and other types of condeployment, of significant heavy ground and air forces, flicts. New "smart" and "brilliant" munitions under
their support equipment, and sustainment must come development hold promise of dramatically improving
the capabilities of U.S. air. ground, and maritime forces
by sea.
to destroy enemy annored vehicles and halt invading
BattieBdd SurveiUaoce; Commsmd, Control ground forces, as well as destroy fixed targets at longer
and Communications. Accurate information on the ranges,reducingexposure to enemy air defenses.
�1 Q 31 '93 21:01
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Aerial Refueling. Large numbers of aerialrefueling aircraft would be needed to support many
components of a U S. theater campaign. Fighter aircraft deploying over long distances require aerial
refueling. ALrlitrers can also carry more cargo longer
distances if enroute aerial refueling is available. Aerial
surveillance and control platforms, such as AW ACS
ard JSTARS. also need airborne refueling in order to
achieve maximum mission effectiveness.
force requirements and increase the responsiveness
and effectiveness of our power projection forces.
The MRC Building Block
In planning future force structure and allocating
resources, we established forces levels and support
which should enable us to win one MRC across a wide
range of likely conflicts. Our detailed analyses of
future MRCs. coupled with military judgment of the
outcomes, suggest that the following forces will be
adequate to execute the strategy outlined above for a
single MRC:
4-5 Army divisions
4.-5 Marine Expeditionary Brigades
10 Air Force Fighter wings
100 Air Force heavy bombers
4-5 Navy aircraft carrier battle groups
Special operations forces
US Marines conducting
amphibious assault exercise.
Fighting Two MRCs
E this context, we decided early in the Bottom-Up
n
review that the United States must field forces sufficient tofightand win two nearly simultaneous major
regional conflicts. This is pnideni for two reasons.
• First, we need to avoid a situation in which the
United States in effect makes simultaneous wars more
likely by leaving an opening for potential aggressors,
to attack their neighbors, should our engagement in a
war in oneregionleave little or no force available to
respond effectively to defend our interests in another.
These forces constitute a prudent building block
for force planning purposes. In the event of an actual
regional conflict, our response would depend on the
•Second,fieldingforces sufflcienuo win two wars
nature and scale of the aggression and circumstances
nearly simultaneously provides a hedge against the
elsewhere in the world. If the initial defense fails to halt
possibility that a future adversary — or coalition of
the invasion quickly, cr if circumstances in other parts
adversaries—might one day confront us with a largerof the world permit, U.S. decisionmakera may decide
than-expected threat. In short, it is difficult to predict
to commit more forces than those listed (for example,
precisely what threats we will confront ten to twenty
two additional Army divisions.) These added forces
years fiom now. In this dynamic and unpredictable
would help either to achieve the needed advantage
post-Cold War world we must maintain military capaover the enemy, to mount the decisive counteroffenbilities that are flexible and sufficient to cope with
sive. cr accomplish more ambitious war objectives,
unforeseen threats.
such as the complete destruction of the enemy's warmaking potemial. But our analysis also led us to the
For the bulk of our ground, naval, and air forces,
conclusion that enhancements to our miiitary forces,
fielding forces sufficient to provide this capability
focused on ensuring our ability to conduct a successful involves duplicating the MRC building block described
initial-defense, would bothreduceour overall ground above. However, in planning our overall force sttvc-
�• AUG 31 '93 21:02
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PAGE.012
11
tune, we must recognize two other factors. First, we
must have sufficient strategic lift to deploy forces
when and where we need them. Second, certain speciaiized high-leverage units or unique assets might be
"dual tasked," that is, used in both MRCs.
forces to improve their capability, flexibility, and lethality. These enhaacemems are especially geared
toward buttressing our ability to conduct a successful
initial defense in any major regional conflict.
As shown in Figure 5. these enhancements include
improving: (1) strategic mobility through more
For example, certain advanced aircraft — such as
B-2s. F-117s, JSTARs, AW ACS, and EF-111 s — that prepositioning and enhancements to airlift and sealift:
we have purchased in limited numbers because of their (2) the strike capabilities of aircraft carriers: (3; the
lethality of Army firepower; and (4) the ability of longexpense would probably be dual-tasked.
range bombers to deliver conventional smart munitions.
Force Eohancenrents to Support Our Strategy
As previously mentioned, we have already undertaken or are planning a series of enhancements to our
Strategic Mobility. Our plans cal! for substantial
enhancements to our siraiegic mobility — most of
Force Enhancements to Halt a Short-Warning Attack
Future Force
Today's Force
Persian
Gulf
Region
Prepo
2 Brigade Sets asftcm
1 arigade Set afloat*
i WPS Squaaron
' BattabOT Training Set
1 Mantime Prspositioring Ship (MPS) Squairon
/PeepesitiwingSNps
7 Prepositioning 6^93
Forces
PHASE!
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- L c ot »«» hrtat u Mto San irnflsr
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a a By
- 3 w<f( orqite orpfiqoMWW mifrm*
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n
- Ar. iantL anfl SM i w t w er.nafta!Tems
- irr.prarM A B
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OD
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A
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Build Up Forcss In Theater
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- SXm CMSJ* out to moWBt wart swiWity
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PHASE I
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a
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- SIO«flow™Cut» modMi awl* «*caD'.ty
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• ?np* S«i MuU be pafiAOM 10 "Swoff" tc M^r 'r,'--
Figure 5
�•RUG
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which were first identified in the 1991 Mobility Requirements Study (MRS). Firti, we will either continue the program to purchase and deploy the C-17
airiifter or purchase other airlifters to replace our aging
C-1.41 transport aircraft. Development of the C- IT has
been troubled from the start and we will continue to
monitor the program's progress closely, but significant, modem, flexible airlift capacity is essential, to our
defense strategy. A decision on the C-17 will be made
after a thorough review by the Defense Acquisition
Board is completed over the next several weeks. Second, we plan to keep an Army brigade set of heavy
armoi afloat on ships deployed abroad thai could be
sent either to the Persian Gulf or to Northeast Asia on
short notice. Other preposiucning initiatives would
accelerate the arrival of .Army heavy units in Southwest
Mia and Korea. Third, we wiil increase the capacity of
our sur ge sealift fleet to uanspon forces and equipment
rapidly from the United States to distant regions by
purchasing additional roll-on/ roll-off ships. Fourth,
we will improve thereadinessand responsiveness of
the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) through a variety of
enhancements. Finally, we will fund various efforts to
improve the "fort-to-pon" flow of personnel, equipment, and supplies ir the United States.
.Naval Strike Aircraft. The Navy is examining a
number of innovative vf&yi to improve the firepower
aboard its aircraft carriers. First, the Navy will improve its strike potential by providing a precision
ground-snack capability to many of its?-14 aircraft. It
will also acquire stocks of new "brilliant" antiarmor
weapons for delivery by attack aircraft. Finally, the
Navy plans to develop the capability to fly additional
squadrons of F/A-18s to forward-deployed aircraft
carriers that would be the finn to arrive in response tc
a regional contiageticy . These additional ainrntft would
increase the power of the carriers during the critical
eariy stages of a conflict.
Army Firepower. The Array is developing new,
smart submuninonsthatcanbedeliveredby ATACMS,
the Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS). tbe TriScrvice Standoff Attack Missiie (TSSAM) now under
development, and by standard tube artillery. In acditton, the Longbow fire control radar system will in-
TO UHITEHOUSE
PflQE.013
crease the effectiveness and surv ivability of the AH-64
Apache attack helicopter. We are also examining
more prepositioning of ATACMS and MLRS and
having Apaches self-deploy from their overseas bases
so that all would be available in the early stages of a
conflict.
Air Force Long-Range Bombers and Munitions. The Air Force enhancements will be in two
areas.bombers and munitions. First, we plan to modify
the Air Force's B-1 and B-2 long-range, heavy bombera to improve their ability to deliver "smart' conventional munitions against attacking enemy forces and
fixed targets. Second, we will develop all-weather
munitions. Forexample. the Air Force is developing a
guidance package for a tactical munitions dispenser
filled with anti-armor submunitions that can be used • n
all types of weather. These programs will dramatically
increase our capacity to attack and destroy critical
targets b the crucial opening days of a short-warning
conflict.
In addition, two other force enhancements are
important to improving our ability to respond to the
demanding requirement of two nearly simultaneous
MRCs;
Reserve Component Forces. We have undertaken several initifttives to improve the readiness and
flexibility cf Army Nationai Guard combat units and
other Reserve Component forces in order to make them
more readily available for MRCs and other tasks. For
example, one impoitantroleforcombat elements of the
Army National Guard is to provide forces to supplement active divisions, should more ground combat
power be. needed to deter or fight a second MRC. In the
future. Army National Guard combat units will be
better trained, more capable, and more ready. If mobilized early during a conflict, brigade-sized units could
provide extra security and flexibility if a second conflict arose whiletoefirst was still going on. In addition,
the Navy plans to increase the capability and effectiveness cf its Navy/Marine Corps Reserve Air Wine
through the introduction of a reserve/training aircraft
carrier.
�flU5
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'33 Z1:03
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UHITEHOUSE
PRGE.014
13
ment or intervention operation, each of which would
Allied Mtliury Capabilities. We will continue to
require certain types of combat forces to achieve;
help our allies in key regions improve their own defense capabihiies. Forexample. we are assisting South
• Forced entry into defended airfields, pons, and
Korea in its efforts to modernize its armed forces and
other facilities and selling and holding these facilitake on greater responsibility for its own defense —
ties.
including conclusion of an agreement to co-produce
F-; 6 aircraft.
In Southwest Asia, we are continuing to improve
our defense ties with ourfriendsand allies in the region
through defense cooperation agreements, more frequent joint and combined exercises, equipment
prepositioning, frequent force deployments, and secuniy ajsistancc. We are also providing modem weapons, such as the M1A2 Lank to Kuwait and the Patriot
system to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, to improve the
self-defense capabilities of cur friends and allies in the
Gulf region.
Peace Enforcement and Intervention
Operations
The second set of operations for which we must
shape and size our forces includes peace enforcement
and intervention. The ty pes, numbers, and sophisticauon of weapons in the hands of potential adversaries in
such operations car vary widely, with enforcementtype operations being the most demanding. For planning purposes, we assume that the threat w e would face
would include a mix of regular and irregular forces
possessing mostly light weapons, supplemented by
moderately sophisticated systems, such as antitank and
antiship guided missiles, surface-to-air missiles, land
and sea mines. T-54 and T-72-class tanks, armored
personnel camera, and towed aitiilery and mortars.
Adversary forces might also possess a limited number
of mostly older combat aircraft (e.g., MiO-2l5.235). a
few smaller surface ships, (e.g., patrol craft), and
perhaps a few submarines.
• Comiollingthe movement of troops and supplies
across borders and within the target country, including enforcing a blockade or quarantine of
mantime commerce.
• Establishing and defending zones in which civilians are protected from extern ai attacks.
• Securing protected zones from internal threats,
such as snipers, terrorist anacks. and sabotage.
• Preparing to turn overresponsibilityfor security
to peacekeeping units and/or areconstitutedadministrative authority.
The prudent level of forces that should be planned
for a major intervention or peace enforcement operation is;
1 air assault or airborne division
1 light infantry division
1 Marine Expeditionary Brigade
1 - 2 canter battle groups
1 - 2 composite wings of Air Force aircraft
Special operations forces
Civil affairs units
Airlift and sealift forces
Combat support and service support units
50,000 total combat add support personnel.
These capabilities can be provided largely by the
same collection of general purpose forces needed for
the MRCs, so long as those forces had the appropriate
training needed for peacekeeping or peace enforceIn most cases. U.S. involvement in peace enforce- ment This means that the United States would have
to forgo the option of conducting sizable peace enment operations would be as pan of a multinational
forcementOTintervention operations at the same time
effort under the auspices of the United Nations or
it was fighting two MRCs.
another international body. U.S. and coalition forces
woultThave several key objecdvea in a peace enforce-
�PUG
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PAGE . 0 1 3
12
which were firs; idenufied in the 1991 Mobility Re- crease the effectiveness and surv ivability of the AH-64
quirements Study (MRS). Firti, we will either con- Apache attack helicopter. We are also examining
tinue the program to purchase and deploy the C-l" more prepositioning of ATACMS and MLRS and
airiifter or purchase other airlifters to replace cur aging having Apaches self-deploy from their overseas baaes
C-141 transport aircraft. Development of the C-17 has so that all would be available in the early stages of a
been troubled from the start and we will continue to conflict.
monitor the program's progress closely, but signifiAir Force Long-Range Bombers and Municant, modem,flexibleairlift capacity is essential to our
tions. The Air Fcrce enhancements will be in two
defenm strawgy. A decision on the C-J7 will be made
areas.bcmbers and munitions. First, we plan to modify
after a thorough review by the Defense Acquisition
Board is completed over the pext several weeks. Second, we plan to keep an Anny brigade set of heavy
the Air Force's B-1 and B-2 long-range, heavy bombera to improve their ability to deliver "smart" convenbe tional munitions against attacking enemy forces ar.d
armor afloat on ships deployed abroad that couid
sent either to the Persian Gulf or to Northeast Asia cn fixed targets. Second, we will develop all-weather
short notice. Other prepositioning iniiiatives would munitions. Forexample. the Air Force is developing a
accelerate the am val of .Army heavy units in Southwest guidance package for a tactical munitions dispenser
Asia and Korea. Third, we wiil increase the capacity of filled with anti-armor submunitions that can be used in
our surge sealift fleet to transport forces and equipment all types of weather. These programs will dramatically
rapidly from the United States to distant regions by increase our capacity to attack and destroy critical
purchasing addhionai roll-on/ roll-c ships. Fourth, targets in the crucial opening days of a short-wan .r.g
we will improve the readiness and responsiveness of conflict.
the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) through a variety of
In addidon. two other force enhancements are
enhancements. Finally, we will fund various efforts to
important to improving our ability to respond to the
improve the "fort-to-pcrt" flow of personnel, equipdemandingrequirementof two nearly simultaneous
ment and supplies ir the United States.
MRCs:
Naval Strike Aircraft. The Navy is examining a
Reserve Component Forces. We have undernumber of innovative ways to improve the firepower
aboard its aircraft carriers. First, the Navy will im- taken several initiatives to improve the readiness and
prove its strike potential by providing a precision flexibility of Anny Nationai Guard combat units and
ground-attack capability to many of its F-14 aircraft. It other Reserve Component forces in order to make them
will also acquire stocks of new "brilliant" antiarmor more readily available for MRCs and other tasks. For
weapons for delivery by attack aircraft Finally, the example, one important role forcombat elements of the
Navy plans to develop the capability toflyadditional Army National Guard is to provide forces to supplesquadrons of F/A-lSi toforwairi-deployedaircraft ment active divisions, should more ground combat
cdmcis that would be the fir&t to arrive inresponseto power be needed to deter or fight a second MRC. In the
a regional contingency. These additional aircraft would fumie. Army National Guard combat units wili be
increase the power of the carriers during the critical better trained, more capable, and more ready If mobilized early during a conflict bngade-stzed units could
early stages of a conflict.
provide extra security and flexibility if a second conArmy Firepower. The Array is developing new. flict arose while the first was still going on. In addition,
smart submunitions that can bedeliveredby ATACMS, the Navy plans to increase the capability and effectiveness cf its Navy/Marine Corps Reserve Air wing
the Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS). the TnService Standoff Attack Missiie (TSSAM) now under through the introduction of a reserve/training ajreraft
development, and by standard tube artillery. In addi- carrier.
;
tion, the Longbow fire control radar system will in-
�RUG 31 '33 Z1:34
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PAGE.315
U
Clinton, our commitmen: to South Korea's security
remains undiminished, as demonstrated by the one
The final set ofrequirementsthat we use to size U.S. Army division consisting of two brigades and one
general purpose forces are thoserelatedto sustaining wing of U.S. Air Force combat aircraft we have stationed there. In light of the continuing threat of
the overseas presence of U.S. military forces. U.S.
aggression from North Korea, we have frozen our
forces deployed abroad protect and advance our interests and perform a wide range of functions thai contrib- troop levels ir South Korea and are modernizing South
Korean and American forces on the peninsula. We are
ute to our security.
also exploring the possibility of prepositioning more
The Bottom- Up Review reacheu a number of con- military equipment in South Korea to increase our
clusions on the future size and shape of our overseas crisis-response capability. While plans call for the
eventual withdrawal of one of our two Army brigades
presence.
from South Korea. President Clintonrecentlyreiterated that our troops will stay in South Korea as long as
In Europe, we will continue to provide leadership
in a reinvicorated NATO, which has been the bedrock its people want and need us there.
of European security for over four decades. We plan to
On Okinawa, we will continue to station a Marine
retain about 100.000 troops there—a conurvi tment that
Expeditionary Force and an Army special forces batwill allow ihe United States to continue to play a
leading role in the NATO alliance and provide a robust talion. In Japan, we have homepened the aircraft,
capability forraultinauonal training andcrisis response. carrier •adependence. the amphibious assault ship
This force will include about two and one-third wings Bellau Wood, and their support ships. We will also
of Air Force fighters and substantial elements of two retain approximately one and one-half wings of Air
Army divisions, along with a corps headquarters and Force combat aircraft in Japan and Okinawa, and the
other supporting elements. Equipment for bringing Navy' s Seventh Fleet will continue to routinely patrol
the western Pacific.
these in-place divisions to full strength will remain
prepositioned in Europe, along with the equipment of
one additional division that would deploy to the region
in the event of conflict
Overseas Presence
U.S. Array forces will participate in two multinational corps >Mth German forces. Their training will
focus on missions involving rapid deployment to conflicts outside of central Europe and "nontradinonal"
operations, such as peace enforcement in addition to
their. iong-standing mission of stabilization of central
Europe. These missions might lead, over time, to
changes in the equipment and configuration of Army
units stationed in Europe. The Air Force will continue
to provide unique theater intelligence, lift, and allweather precision-strike capabilities critical to U.S.
and NATO missions. In addition, U.S. Navy ships and
submarines will continue to patrol the Mediteiranean
Sea and other waters surrounding Europe.
In~Northeast Ajsia, we also plan toretainclose to
100.000 troops. As tecently announced by President
US. F~15 fighter UaJs two Japanese
Self Defense fighters.
In Southwest Asia, local sensitivities to a largescale Western military presence on land necessitate
heavierrelianceon periodic deployments of forces,
rather than routine stationing of forces on the ground.
The Navy's Middle East Force of four to six ships.
�AUG 31 '93 £1:05
FPOM OPSD-PA
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PAGE.016
which has been continuously on patrol in the Persian
Gulf since 19.25. will remain. In addition, we plan to
have a brigade-sized set of equipment in Kuwait to be
used by ronaiina deployments of U.S. forces that will
train and eacrcije there with their Kuvaiti counterparts. We are also exploring options co preposition a
second brigade set elsewhere on the Arabian peninsula.
robust force stmcture that can easily support other,
smaller regional operations. However, our overseas
presence needs can impose requirements for naval
forces, especially aircraft earners, that exceed these
needed to win two MRCs. The flexibility of our
carriers, and their ability to operate effectively with
relative independence from shore bases, makes them
well suited to overseas presence operations, especially
in areas such as the Persian Gulf, where our land-based
These forces have been supplemented temporarily military infrastructure isrelativelyunderceveioped.
by several squadrons of land-based combat aircraft that For these reasons, the force of earners, amphibious
ships, and other surface combatants in the Clintonhave remained in the Gulfregionsince Operation
Desert Storm and, along with other coalition aircraft, Aspin defense plan was sized based on the exigencies
are now helping :o enforce U.N.resolutionstoward of overseas presence, as well as the MRCs.
Iraq.
U.S. Navy and Marine forces play important roles
Another significant element of our military posin our approach to overseas presence in these three
ture in Southwest Asia is the equipment prepositioned regions, as well as others. In recent years, we have
on ships that are normally anchored at Diego Garcia. In sought to deploy a sizable U.S. naval presence —
addition to a brigade-sized set of equipment for the generally, a carrier battle group accompanied by an
Mirine Corps, we have seven afloat prepositioning.
amphibious ready group — more or less continuously
ships supporting Army, Air Force, and Navy forces. in the waters off Southwest Asia. Northeast Asia, and
Europe (most often, in the Mediterranean Sea;. However, in order to avoid serious morale and reiendon
In Africa, we will continue important formal and
informal access agreements tcfceyfacilities and pons problems that can arise when our forces are asked to
which allow our forces tc transit or stop on the African remain deployed for excessively long periods, we will
continent. We wtll also deploy forces to Africa, as in experience some gaps in carrier presence in these areas
recent operations like Sharp Edge (Liberia) and Re- in the future.
store Hope (Somalia), when our interests are threatened or our a^istance is needed end requested. Today,
more than 4,000 U S. troops remain deployed in Somalia as part of the U.N. force seeking to provide humanitarian assistance to that country.
in Latin America, our armed forces will help to
promote and expandrecenttrends toward democracy
in many countriet. They will also continue to work in
concert with the armed forces and police of Latin
American countries to combat drug traffickers. The
United States will also retain a milliary presence in
Panama, acting as Panama's partner in operating and
defending the Cenal during the transition to full Panamanian control of the canal in 1999.
NavaJ Praence. Sizing our naval forces for two
nearly simultaneous MRCs provides a fairly large and
77ie aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower
Transiting the Suez CanaL
�AUG 31 'S3 21:05
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TO WHITEHOUSE
PAGE.017
16
However, a number of issues affecting our future
In order to avoid degradation in our regional security- posture, we have identified a number of ways to fill strategic nuclear posture must still be addressed. Tens
these gaps and to supplement our posmre even when of thousands of nuclear weapons continue to be decarriers arc present. For example, in some Circum- ployed on Russian territory and on the territory of three
siances. we may find it possible to center naval expe- other former Soviet republics. Even under START II.
ditionary forces around large-deck amphibious assault Russia will retain a suable residual nuclear arsenal.
And. despite promising trends, the future political
ships carrying AV-8B attack jets and Ccbra attack
helicopters, as well as a 2.000-man Marine Expedition- situation in Russia remains highly uncertain.
ary Unit. Another force might consist of a Tomahawk
sea-launched cruise missile-equipped Aegis cruiser, a
guided missile destroyer, attack submarines, and P-3
land-based maritime patrol aircraft.
In addition to these "maritime" approaches to
sustaining overseas presence, a new concept i» being
developed that envisions using tailored joint forces to
conduct overseas presence operations. These "Adaptive Joint Force Packages" could contain a mix of air.
land, special operations, and maritime forces tailored
to meet a ihcnter commander's needs. These forces,
plus designated backup units in the United States,
would train jointly to provide the specific capabilities
needed on station and on call during any particular
period. Like maritime task forces, these joint force
packages will also be capable of participating in combined military exercises with allied andfriendlyforces.
Together, these approaches will give us a variety
of ways to manage our overseas presence profile,
balancing carrier availability with the deployment of
other types of units. Ghen this flexible approach to
providing forces for overseas presence, we can meet
the needs of our strategy with a fleet of eleven active
aircraft carriers and one reserve/training carrier.
Strategic Nuclear Forces
B-2 bombers being refueled by KC10 tanker.
In addition, many obstacles must be overcome
before the ratificanon of STARTIL foremost of which
are Ukrainian ratification of START I and Ukraine's
and Katakhstan's accession to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as nonnuclcar-wcapon states — a ccndilionrequiredby Russiapriorto implemenrins START
I. Moreover, even if these obstacles can be overcome,
implementation of thereductionsmandated in START
I and II will not be completed for almost 10 years.
Thus, while the United States has already removed
more than 3,500 warheads from ballistic missile systems slated for elimination under START I (some 90
percent of the total required), in light of current uncertainties, we must take araeasuiecapproach to further
reductions.
The changing security environment presents us
with significant uncertainties and challenges in planning our strategic nuclear force stmcture. In light ofthc
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the break-up of the
Two principal guidelines shape our future requireSoviet Union, the conclusion of the START I and II
treaties, and our improving relationship with Russia, ments for strategic nuclear forces: to provide an effecthe threat of massive nuclear attack on the United tive deterrent whileremainingwithin START I/II
limits, and to allow iat additional forces to be reconstiStatesls lower than at any time in many years.
tuted, in the event cf a threatening reversal of events.
�AUG 31 '33 21:06
TO WHITEHOUSE
FROM OASD-PA
PAGE.016
17
The Bonom-Up Review did not address nuclear decade, can carry out our strategy anc meet our naforce structure in detail. As a follow-up to the Bottom- tional security requirements.
Up review, a comprehensive study of U.S. nuclear
forces is being conducted. For planning purposes, we
This force structure meets ourrequirementsfcr
arc evolving toward a future strategic nuclear force that overseas presence in peacetime and a wide range of
by 2003 will include:
smaller-scale operations. It will also give the United
States the capability to meet the most stressing litua-
• 1 Trident submarines equipped with C-4 and tion we may face - therequirementto fight and win
8
two majorregionalconflicts occurring neariy simultaD-5 missiles.
neously.
• 500 Minuteman IH missiles, each carrying a
In addition, this force stmcture provides sufficient
single warhead.
capabilities for strategic deterrence and defense. It also
• Up to 94 B-52H bombers equipped with airlaunched cruise missiles and 20 B-2 bombers.
provides sufficient forces, primarily Reserve Component, to be held in strategic reserve and utilized if and
when needed. Forexample, they could deploy to one or
both MRCs. If operations do not go as we had planned.
Alternatively, these forces couid b used to "backfill"
e
for overseas presence forcesredeployedto an MRC.
At the conclusion of its comprehensive assessment Fmally, this force structure also meets an important
of future U.S. defense needs, the Bottom-Up Review new criterioG for our forces — flexibility to deal with
determined that thereducedforce stmcture shown in the uncertain narure of the new dangers.
Conclusion
Figure 6, which will be reached by about the end of the
U.S. Force Structure - 1 9 9 9
•
•
•
•
Navy
•
•
•
Air Force
•
•
•
Marine Corps
•
•
•
Strategic Nuclear •
Forces (Dy 2003) •
•
Army
10 divisions (active)
S-f divisions (reserve)
11 aircraft carriers (active)
1 aircraft carrier (reserve/training)
45-55 attack submarines
346 ships
13 fighter wings (active)
7 fighter wings (reserve)
Up to 184 bombers
3 Marine Expeditionary Forces
174,000 personnel (active endstrength)
42.000 personnel (reserve endstrennth)
18 ballistic missile submarines
up to 94 B-52 H bombers
Z0 8-2 bombers
500 Minuteman III ICBMs (single warhead)
Figure 6
TOTAL PAGE.018 * *
�SEP
1 '93 7;10
FROM OASD-PA
TO UHITEHOUSE
PAGE.001
NEWS RELEASE
OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PURt IC AKKAIRS)
WASHINGTON
PI E A S E
D C • i'UjOl
N O T E
O A T F
No. 403-93
MMBDIATE RELEASE
(703) 695-0192 (media)
(703) 697-3189 (copies)
(703) 697-5737 (public/iiKlustry)
September 1,1993
SETRFTARY ASPfN ANNOUNCES BOTTOM UPHEVIEWRESULTS
It was December 1991 at Georgetown University that candidate Bill Clinton pledged to
"restnicture our military forces for a new era." Today, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin
announced fulfillment of that pledge. "We'll have a force based on tomorrow's irquiremcnts,
a lean, mobile, high-tech force ready to protect Americans against the real dangers they face in
this new era," Secretary Aspin said.
Thereviewwas a highly collaborative effort composed of a steering group chaired by
the Uoder Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and includedrepresentativesfrom the offices
within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Services.
Its unprecedented scope encompasses ail major elements of defense planning,fromthe
formuiadon of strategy, to construction of force structure, to weapon system modernization, and finally the reconfiguring of the Department of Defense (DoD) infrastructure.
"It couldn't be any other way. The process has brought the civilian and military
commnnities closer together. We've established a woridng relationship over the last five
months that would have taken a year or two to develop with this review.*' said Secretary
The Bonom-Up Review's analytic processreviewedboth the new dangers and
opportunities foreseen in the post-Cold War world. The review developed new military
strategies and plans to carry out these strategics in force structure, weapons modernization,
and new defense initiatives.
Thereviewidentifies force stmcture required to maintain the capabilities to win two
neariy simultaneous major regional conflicts. In this force structure the Army will have 10
active divisions and 15 reserve brigades, the Navy will maintain 11 carrier battlegroups and
one reserve carrier, the Marine Corps will havefiveactive brigades and onereservedivision,
and the Atr Force willretain13 active duty and seven reservefighterwings.
(MORE)
OPTIMAL FOAM M (7-00)
FAX
F„#
^
TRANSMITTAL
[>«*
<SENERM. SBNICES AOMINISTRATON
�SEP
1 '93
7:11
FROM OASD-PA
TO UHITEHOUSE
PAGE.002
To help these smaller forces remain c m a ready, the review calls for force enhanceo bt
ments such as:
- Additional pie positioned equipinenG
- Additional airiifi/sealift;
- Improved ana-aimor and precision-guided munitions;
- Improved Army National Guard combat brigade readiness.
The United States will continue its overseas presence to deterregionalaggression, while
retaining its commitments to peacekeeping and other military operations under the Bottom-Up
Review.
As President Clinton said in February 1993, "The men and women who serve under the
Americftr. Flag will be die best trained, best equipped, best preparedfightingforce in the
world, so long as I am President."
'END-
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Former Soviet Union
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In the Former Soviet Empire
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Initiatives
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Equivalents
Equivalents
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Battlegroups
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U.S. Force Structure
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International Cooperation
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•
•
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Regional theater ballistic missile threat here today
New ballistic threat to US may emerge in future
How much Theater Missile Defense (TMD)?
Need for National Missile Defense (NMD)?
How to reconcile programs with ABM treaty?
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development or deployed system
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$ J MUML
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Tech
Demo
$7 Billion
Acquisition
Program
$H Billion
$lt) BilHtHi
Additional
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- Define Theater Air Capability that Meets
Military Need at Affordable Costs
Current Program
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F-14; retire
cancel F/A-18C/D after 1997
• Proceed with F-22 (2003) with ground attack capability
• Cancel A/F-X, MRF now; cancel F-16 after FY94
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Bridge production
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Decisions:
• Complete third SSN 21 at Groton, CT
to maintain two nuclear capable
shipyards
• Develop and build New Attack
Submarine (NAS)
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Carrier Force Levels, Warfighting Risk
and Overseas Presence
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Warfighting Risk
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Cooperative Threat Reduction
Counter New Nuclear Dangers
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Environmental Security
Dual Use Technology
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• Major Regional Conflict
• Reserve Componenls
• Peace Enforcement
Operations
• Overseas Prcstuce
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I'lepositioning
• Deter the Use of WMD
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DANGEliS,
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Modernization Choices
• Ballistic Missile Defense
•Theater Air
• Submarines
• Aircraft Carriers
• Sf>acctift
• Military Satellite Comuts
• At lack Helicopters
Initiatives
• Cooperative Threat
Reti uction
• Countef Nt'w Nuclear
Dangers
• Democratization/
lUinianitariau Ops
Foundations
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• Accuisilion RoJ'or'm
« Infrastructure
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• Close or realign bases
• Consolidate training, maintenance
and supply
• Reduce costly overhead
Reform the defense acquisition
process
Boltom
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What Does It Change?
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FY95 - 99
Provides additional Army prepositioned equipment
Enhances readiness of Army National Guard combat brigades
Retains additional Marine Corps endstrength
Proposes New Initiatives to meet New Dangers
Develops V-22
Provides precision strike capabilities for
F~22, B~1, B-2
Establishes Joint Advanced Strike Technology Program for next
generation aircraft
Preserves submarine industrial base
Preserves carrier industrial base
Begins acquisition reform
Properly sizes support establishment
Restructures Ballistic Missile Defense Program
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39
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Bottom-Up Review:
What Does It Change?
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Reduces Infrastructure
Reduces about 115,000 civilian
personnel
Reduces about 160,000 active
personnel
Cancels A/FX
Cancels MRF
Cancels F-16 after FY94
Cancels F/A-18C/D after FY97
Retires A-6
•
%
Cuts 2 active Army divisions
Cuts 1 reserve Army division
Cuts 3 active Air Force fighter
wings
Cuts 4 reserve Air Force fighter
wings
Cuts 1 active Navy airwing
Cuts 1 reserve Navy airwing
Cuts 1 aircraft carrier
Reduces carrier force level to 11
Cuts 55 surface ships and
submarines
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"The men and women who serve
under the American Flag will be the
best trained, best equipped, best
prepared fighting force in the world,
so long as I am President/'
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President Bill Clinton
February, 1993
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41
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�DEPARTMENT OF STATE
(WE)
OS. 0 1.
W A S H F A X
DEPARTMENT
'93
10:31
NO.
|46UI<:0D.C .-AU£
R E C E I P T
OF" S T A T E
'93 A G 32 A10:3,
U
MESSAGE NO.
FROM:
~mm
ROSS dJILSON
(Officer name)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION
CLASSIFICATION
(Office symbol)
(Extension)
JOINT STATE/POD MESSAGE:
(Room number)
ANNOUNCEflENT OF
B.0.TT0n-UP REVIEtJ RESULTS
TO: (Agency)
NSC
Extension
DELIVER TO:
315-1,313
nilES H R H
UPY
FOR:
CLEARANCE
REMARK^
Room No.
INFORMATION
PER REQUEST
m SIT Rn
COMMENT
URGENT
— PER CONVERSATION MITH HARCELLA HEflBRY
S/S Officer:
ROSS L . WILSON
D C A SFE
E L SI I D
L0.13S26
ByJ^lNARA,DtteiijV^l
�NIDS PRINT REQUESTED BY DDO AT CRT #5.
JOKING PAPERS \ .
NMCCWOf
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**
eO'WyiDDHfPI
PAGE
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DO!
CDSN - NID514
MCN - 93244/03902
J 3 3
TOR - 932440
0 D
ZNY CCCCC
BT
•COMF1
53
D D M T I A B
SECTION 01 OF 04
ro) CNOD
$ J
DESTROY CR BRING UNDER
CONTROL WITHIN 90 DAYS
SUBJECT:
ANNOUNCEMENT OF BOTTOM,UP REVIEW RESULTS (U)
FOR AMBASSADOR/CHARGE
1. (U) THIS IS A JOINT STATE/DOD MESSAGE.
2. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE, SEE PARA 3.
3. (U) THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS TALKING POINTS WHICH
EMBASSIES/MISSIONS SHOULD PASS TO APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS
CONCERNING THE RECENTLY RELEASED DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BOTTOM,UP
REVIEW. WE PLAN TO PROVIDE SIMILAR BRIEFINGS TO SELECTED EMBASSY
OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON ON THE AFTERNOON OF 1 SEPTEMBER 1993.
WHILE TALKING POINTS WILL BECOME UNCLASSIFIED AND CAN BE RELEASED
AT 1100 EDT, 1 SEPTEMBER 1993, EMBASSIES MAY SHARE THEM ON A
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL BASIS WITH APPROPRIATE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
PRIOR TO THAT TIME. REGION SPECIFIC TALKING POINTS ARE PROVIDED
(EUROPE-PARAS 15-17, EAST A.SIA,PARAS 18-22, MIDDLE EAST/SOUTHWEST
ASIA-PARAS 23-26, LATIN AM RICA-PARAS 27-28, AFRICA,PARA 29)
ALTHOUGH EACH EMBASSY MAY, AT ITS DISCRETION, SHARE TALKING
POINTS FROM DIFFERENT REGIONS WITH ITS COUNTERPARTS. TALKING
POINTS FOLLOW.
4. LZj THE RECENTLY COMPLETED BOTTOM,UP REVIEW HAS BEEN
SECRETARY ASPIN'S PRIMARY VEHICLE FOR REDEFINING U.S. DEFENSE
STRATEGY, FORCE STRUCTURE-, AND MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS IN LIGHT OF
THE DRAMATIC CHANGES IN THE GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT. WITH
THE COLD WAR OVER AND THE BREAK UP OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION,
DOD HAS ANALYZED THE DANGERS POSED IN THE NEW ERA, DEVELOPED A
NEW DEFENSE STRATEGY, AND DEVELOPED PLANS TO RESTRUCTURE THE
AMERICAN ARMED FORCES AND DEFENSE PROGRAMS TO ADDRESS POST-COLD
WAR DANGERS TO U.S. INTERESTS. THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION HAS
RECAST AMERICAN DEFENSE STRATEGY, FORCES, PROGRAMS AND BUDGETS
FROM THE BOTTOM UP.
5. Cef THE DANGERS TO U.S. INTERESTS FALL INTO FOUR BROAD
CATEGORIES. FIRST ARE DANGERS POSED BY NUCLEAR WEAPONS,
PARTICULARLY THOSE REMAINING IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, AND
OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, INCLUDING DANGERS ASSOCIATED
WITH THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL
WEAPONS. SECOND ARE REGIONAL DANGERS, INCLUDING THOSE POSED
PRIMARILY BY THE THREAT OF LARGE-SCALE AGGRESSION BY MAJOR
REGIONAL POWERS WITH INTERESTS ANTITHETICAL TO OUR OWN AS WELL AS
SMALLER, OFTEN INTERNAL, CONFLICTS BASED ON ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS
"ANIMOSITIES AND THE POTENTIAL FOR STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM.
THERE ARE ALSO DANGERS TO DEMOCRACY AND REFORM, IN THE FORMER
SOVIET UNION, EASTERN EUROPE, AND ELSEWHERE. FINALLY, THERE ARE
ECONOMIC DANGERS TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY, WHICH COULD HAMPER OUR
PAGE
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LO. 1 5 6
32
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EFFORTS TO BUILD A STRONG, COMPETITIVE AND GROWING ECONOMY.
THESE DANGERS FORMED THE BASIS FOR OUR STRATEGY, FORCES AND
POLICIES IN THE BOTTOM UP REVIEW.
6. pef ALTHOUGH THE US WILL RETAIN THE CAPABILITY TO ACT
UNILATERALLY TO PROTECT ITS SECURITY INTERESTS, MULTILATERAL
COOPERATION WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO ADDRESS ALL OF THE NEW DANGERS.
WE CANNOT TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF THE OPPORTUNITIES OF THE NEW
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT WITHOUT THE CONTINUED COOPERATION OF THE
ALLIES AND FRIENDS W O WERE SO CRUCIAL TO VICTORY IN THE COLD
H
WAR. OUR C M O VALUES AND OBJECTIVES—SUCH AS PROMOTING
OMN
DEMOCRACY, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND FREE MARKETS,;HUMAN DIGNITY AND
THE PEACEFUL RESOpUTION OF CONFLICT—PROVIDE A BASIS-FOR
COOPERATION ACROSS A BROAD SPECTRUM OF POLICY AREAS.
7. (JZj A CONTINUED WILLINGNESS ON THE PAftT OF THE UNITED STATES
TO ACT AS A SECURITY PARTNER AND LEADER WILL BE AN IMPORTANT
FACTOR IN SUSTAINING COOPERATION• IN MANY AREAS. WE NEED TO ADAPT
OUR ALLIANCES TO MEET THE FAST MOVING CHANGES IN THE WORLD, AND
BEGIN N W TO DEFINE AND CREATE NEW MUTUAL EXPECTATIONS,
O
ARRANGEMENTS, AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE COMING DECADES.
8. ££f BASED ON,THIS STRATEGY, OUR FORCE STRUCTURE WAS
DETERMINED BY CONSTRUCTING "BUILDING BLOCKS" OF FORCES NEEDED TO
(JXHRY OUT KEY MILITARY MISSIONS, SUCH AS FIGHTING AND WINNING A
MAJOR REGIONAL CONFLICT (MRC), MAINTAINING OVERSEAS PR;!SENCE,
AND PARTICIPATING IN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, PEACEKEEPING AND
PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS. THESE BUILDING BLOCKS WERE THEN
COMBINED TO PRODUCE OPTIONS FOR OUR OVERALL FORCE STRUCTURE. THE
LARGEST DRIVER OF FORCE STRUCTURE REQUIREMENTS'IS THE CAPABILITY
TO BE ABLE TO FIGHT AND WIN TWO NEARLY SIMULTANEOUS MAJOR
REGIONAL CONFLICTS ON THE SCALE OF DESERT STORM. THIS IS PRUDENT
BECAUSE 1) WE NEED TO AVOID A-SITUATION IN WHICH THE U.S., IN
EFFECT, MAKES SIMULTANEOUS WARS M R - LIKELY BY LEAVING AN OPENING
OE
FDR POTENTIAL AGGRESSORS SHOULD OUR. ENGAGEMENT IN A WAR IN ONE
REGION LEAVE LITTLE. OR NO FORCE AVAILABLE TO RESPOND EFFECTIVELY
TO DEFEND OUR INTERESTS IN ANOTHER, AND 2) IT PROVIDES A HEDGE
AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY THAT A FUTURE ADVERSARY, OR COALITION OF
ADVERSARIES, MIGHT ONE DAY CONFRONT US WITH A LARGER THAN
EXPECTED THREAT.
9.
IN ORDER TO MEET THE CHALLENGE POSED BY REGIONAL
AGGRESSORS, WE WILL UNDERTAKE A NUMBER OF CRITICAL FORCE
ENHANCEMENTS WHICH WILL ENABLE US TO GET ttORE COMBAT POWER TO THE
THEATER EARLY IN A CONFLICT AND TO HALT AN ENEMY INVASION MORE
QUICKLY. THESE ENHANCEMENTS WILL NOT ONLY HELP US TO STOP AN
INVADING FORCE, BUT SHOULD ALSO HELP TO DETER AN INVASION IN THE
FIRST PLACE. SOME OF THESE CRITICAL ENHANCEMENTS ARE:
ADDITIONAL ARMY PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT; ENHANCED SEA AND
AIRLIFT! UPGRADED ANTIAF<MOR AND PRECISION GUIDED MUNITIONS;
INCREASED EARLY ARRIVING NAVAL AIR ASSETS;' AND ENHANCED READINESS
OF ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE SUPPORT UNITS. IN PARTICULAR,
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THESE ENHANCEMENTS WILL INCREASE OUR ABILITY TO SURGE ASSETS TO
SOUTHWEST AND NORTHEAST ASIA, THE TWO REGIONS ON WHICH MUCH OF
OUR PLANNING FOR MRCS IS BASED.
10. J^J WE CONSIDER THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS OF OUR COALITION
PARTNERS TO BE VERY IMPORTANT IN COUNTERING LARGE-SCALE REGIONAL
AGGRESSION. THUS, IN FUTURE CONTINGENCIES INVOLVING C M O
OMN
.INTERESTS THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK THE
PARTICIPATION OF ITS FRIENDS AND ALLIES IN MILITARY COALITIONS.
BUT THE END OF THE COLD WAR HAS CHANGED THEY WAY IN WHICH WE MUST
PLAN COALITION OPERATIONS. IN THE COLD WAR, U.S. PLANNING
FOCUSED ON FIGHTING A K O N AGGRESSOR (THE SOVIET-LED WARSAW
NW
PACTS IN A K O N THEATER (EUROPE) ALONGSIDE K O N ALLIES (NATO)
NW
NW
WITH K O N CAPABILITIES AND RDLES IN COMBINED OPERATIONS. IN THE
NW
NEW ERA, WE AGAIN ANTICIPATE COALITION OPERATIONS. BUT IN M N
AY
AREAS WHERE OUR C M O INTERESTS MAY BE THREATENED, WE HAVE NO
OMN
FORMAL ALLIANCE STRUCTURE WHERE WE CAN PREDICT IN ADVANCE WHICH
NATIONS WILL PARTICIPATE, WHEN, WITH W A FORCES, AND TO
HT
UNDERTAKE WHICH MISSIONS. WE ASSUME THAT AFFECTED REGIONAL
ALLIES — THE SOUTH KOREANS OR SAUDIS, FOR EXAMPLE — WOULD
PARTICIPATE IN COALITION OPERATIONS IN A GIVEN CONFLICT.
HOWEVER, FAILING MORE FORMAL COMMITMENTS FROM OTHER NATIONS, IT
WOULD BE PRESUMPTUOUS FOR THE UNITED STATES TO PLAN ON
BT
-6-0 N P I
D D N T I A L
SECTION 02 OF 04
SIGNIFICANT MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS FROM ALLIES AND FRIENDS
OUTSIDE THE REGION. THEREFORE, THE BOTTOM-UP REVIEW RESULTS DO
NOT ASSUME COALITION PARTICIPATION BY PARTICULAR NATIONS BEYOND
OUR K O N ALLIES IN A GIVEN REGION. HOWEVER, THIS POINT
NW
HIGHLIGHTS THE NEED FOR US TO W R IN CONCERT WITH OUR SECURITY
OK
PARTNERS TOWARD MORE SERIOUS MILITARY COOPERATION IN AREAS
CRITICAL TO OUR SHARED INTERESTS. WE MUST W R TOWARD COALITION
OK
ARRANGEMENTS TO THWART THE NEW DANGERS WE FACE IN C M O
OMN
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. WE MUST DO SO TO ENSURE THAT, W E
HN
COALITION PARTNERS JOIN IN BATTLE, WE HAVE PLANNED AND TRAINED
TOGETHER ENOUGH TO BE AN EFFECTIVE FIGHTING FORCE. WE MUST DO SO
TO ENSURE THAT, AS WE PLAN OUR FUTURE FORCES AND DEFENSE BUDGETS,
WE DO NOT SHOULDER BURDENS THAT WILL IN FACT BE SHARED BY OTHERS.
11. pet THE OTHER PRINCIPAL DETERMINANT OF FORCE STRUCTURE IS
THE NEED TO SUSTAIN VISIBLE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN KEY REGIONS
DURING PEACETIME. OUR PEACETIME PRESENCE DETERC- ADVENTURISM AND
COERCION BY POTENTIALLY HOSTILE STATES, REASSURES OUR FRIENDS,
ENHANCES REGIONAL STABILITY, AND IMPROVES OUR ABILITY TD RESPOND
EFFECTIVELY AND IN A TIMELY MANNER TO CRISES OR AGGRESSION W E
HN
12. iCf THE BOTTOM,UP REVIEW ALSO CAREFULLY EXAMINED OUR PLANNED
ACQUISITIONS AND MADE DECISIONS ON MODERNIZATION INITIATIVES IN
NINE CORE AREAS: THEATER AIR, ATTACK AND-RECONNAISSANCE
HELICOPTERS, BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE., AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, ATTACK
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:
SUBMARINES, SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES, MILITARY SATELLITE
COMMUNICATIONS, THE V-22, AND STRATEGIC MOBILITY.
13. pTf THE MAJOR FORCE STRUCTURE DECISIONS FOLLOW (WITH FY1993
NUMBERS IN PARENS)S
ARMY:
10 ACTIVE DIVISIONS (FROM 14).
NAVY:
11 ACTIVE CARRIERS PLUS ONE FOR TRAINING AND
LIMITED DEPLOYMENT MISSIONS (FROM 13—AS OF 11
SEPTEMBER 1993—PLUS 0); OTHER SHIPS TO
APPROXIMATELY 3 40 (FROM 443).
AIR FORCE: 13 ACTIVE WINGS (FROM 16); 7 RESERVE WINGS (FROM
12).
MARINES: SAME FORCE STRUCTURE, END STRENGTH AT 174,000
(FROM 182,000).
14. J^T MAINTAINING A CREDIBLE OVERSEAS MILITARY PRESENCE IN
SEVERAL KEY REGIONS OF THE WORLD IS CRUCIAL TO THE NEW AMERICAN
STRATEGY. THE CENTRAL CHALLENGE IN EACH REGION WHERE THE U.S.
HAS IMPORTANT INTERESTS IS TO BALANCE THE LIMITATIONS OF A
SMALLER U.S. FORCE STRUCTURE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF READINESS
AND THE NEED TO UPHOLD IMPORTANT U.S. COMMITMENTS OVERSEAS.
THERE ARE DIFFICULT AND UNAVOIDABLE TRADEOFFS THAT MUST BE MADE
HERE: SUSTAINING OUR KEY SECURITY COMMITMENTS I S CRUCIAL, BUT
WITH OUR RESOURCES DECLINING AND WITH OUR FIRM COMMITMENT TO
MAINTAIN HIGH READINESS, WE NEEDED TO REEXAMINE OUR OVERSEAS
PRESENCE POSTURE IN THE BOTTOM-UP REVIEW.
15. J^ef THE UNITED STATES HAS IMPORTANT, LONGSTANDING
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, MILITARY AND CULTURAL TIES TO EUROPE. THE
THREAT OF A SOVIET INVASION HAS BEEN REPLACED WITH LESS 6MINOUS
BUT MORE UNPREDICTABLE THREATS TO STABILITY IN EUROPE. THE RISE
OF ETHNIC NATIONALISM AND THE UNCERTAIN TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY
OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION AND COMMUNIST COUNTRIES IN CENTRAL AND
EASTERN EUROPE HAVE PRODUCED SERIOUS SUFFERING AND POPULATION
DISLOCATIONS AT A TIME W E WESTERN EUROPE IS SEEKING CLOSER
HN
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION.
16. J t f WE ARE LOOKING TO CONTINUE U.S. LEADERSHIP IN A
REINVIGORATED NATO, THE BEDROCK OF EUROPEAN SECURITY FOR OVER
FOUR DECADES. OUR MAIN OBJECTIVES IN EUROPE ARE JUST W A THEY
HT
HAVE ALWAYS BEEN — TO DETER CONFLICT IN EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE
THAT COULD THREATEN THE INTERESTS OF THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY.
HOWEVER, WE N W HAVE AN UNPARALLELED OPPORTUNITY TO ENHANCE THE
O
SPREAD OF DEMOCRACY THROUGHOUT EUROPE AND TO HELP RESOLVE
CONFLICT ELSEWHERE«
17. fCf OUR FORCES DEPLOYED IN EUROPE DEMONSTRATE OUR ONGOING
COMMITMENT TO EUROPEAN SECURITY AND HELP TO MEET THE U.S.
COMMITMENT TO THE NEW NATO FORCE STRUCTURES (SUCH AS
MULTINATIONAL CORPS). WE WILL CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN A CREDIBLE
OVERSEAS PRESENCE IN EUROPE. BUT N W THAT THE COLD WAR IS OVEP.
O
AND THE WARSAW PACT HAS DISSOLVED, WE CAN' AFFORD TO REDUCE THE
:
LEVEL OF AMERICAN PRESENCE TO APPROXIMATELY 100,000 U.S. MILITARY
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PERSONNEL WITHOUT UNDERCUTTING OUR STRONG COMMITMENT TO THE
TRANS-ATLANTIC SECURITY PARTNERSHIP. WE WILL MAINTAIN A CORPS
HEADQUARTERS, WITH SUPPORT UNITS, AND TWO HEAVY ARMY DIVISIONS
CONSISTING OF 2 BRIGADES EACH, AS WELL AS APPROXIMATELY TWO AND
ONE-THIRD AIR FORCE FIGHTER WINGS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER. IN
ADDITION, THERE WILL BE FIVE BRIGADE-SIZED SETS OF ARMY
PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT AND ONE SET OF FORWARD DEPLOYED MARINE
CORPS EQUIPMENT. THE NAVY'S SIXTH FLEET WILL CONTINUE TO
ROUTINELY PATROL THE MEDITERRANEAN. WHILE OUR TROOPS STATIONED
IN EUROPE WILL REMAIN THERE PRIMARILY TO REINFORCE EUROPEAN
SECURITY, THEY WILL ALSO BE AVAILABLE TO DEPLOY ON RELATIVELY
SHORT NOTICE, FOR OTHER MISSIONS, SUCH AS PEACEKEEPING OR PEACE
ENFORCEMENT.
18. U2f THE UNITED STATES HAS LONG BEEN ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN
ASIA, AND WE HAVE IMPORTANT ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, MILITARY AND
CULTURAL TIES TO MANY OF THE NATIONS OF EAST ASIA. AMERICA'S
T O W Y TRADE WITH THE REGION, FOR EXAMPLE, EXCEEDS $3 50 BILLION
W-A
ANNUALLY. YET MAJOR UNCERTAINTIES EXIST REGARDING EAST ASIA'S
FUTURE STABILITY. DESPITE RECENT POSITIVE TRENDS TOWARD
POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION AND MARKET-ORIENTED ECONOMIC REFORMS,
THE REGION CONTINUES TO BE BURDENED BY UNRESOLVED TERRITORIAL
DISPUTES, COMMUNIST REGIMES FACING TRANSITIONS WITH U K O N
NNW
CONSEQUENCES FOE REGIONAL STABILITY, A DIVIDED KOREA, TIE
EMERGENCE OF NATIONALISM AMIDST LONG-STANDING RIVALRIES, AND THE
THREAT OF PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. OUR
ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, THE PROMOTION OF DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND H M N
UA
RIGHTS, AND OUR TRADITIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS ALL REQUIRE
SUSTAINED U.S. ENGAGEMENT IN ASIA. ASIAN SECURITY IS FOUNDED ON
A BALANCE OF POWER, AND THE UNITED STATES HAS AN IMPORTANT ROLE
TO PLAY AS THE REGIONAL BALANCER.
19.
WE HAVE DEVELOPED A STRONG NETWORK OF SECURITY
ARRANGEMENTS AND ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS WITH OUR ASIAN ALLIES AND
FRIENDS WHICH PROVIDES THE BASIS FOR OUR ENGAGEMENT, PRESENCE AND
COOPERATION THERE. WE WILL SUSTAIN AND ADAPT THESE ALLIANCES AND
RELATIONSHIPS TO MEET THE NEW CHALLENGES OF THE POST-COLD WAR
ERA. TO SUPPORT THIS EFFORT, WE WILL MAINTAIN SUFFICIENT
FORWARD,DEPLOYED FORCES IN JAPAN AND KOREA TO REASSURE OUR
REGIONAL ALLIES AND FRIENDS, TO DISCOURAGE DESTABILIZING MILITARY
RIVALRIES AND PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, TO
SECURE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS, TO DETER THREATS TO OUR KEY POLITICAL
BT
^ • e i f F I D E W T I A I r
SECTION 03 OF 04
AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND TO PRECLUDE ANY HOSTILE REGIONAL POWER
FROM ATTEMPTING TO DOMINATE THE REGION. A CONTINUED U.S.
MILITARY PRESENCE IN THESE COUNTRIES I S WELCOMED BY LEADERS
THROUGHOUT THE REGION AND BUTTRESSES THE IMPORTANT POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS WE HAVE ALONG THE PACIFIC RIM, WHILE
ALLOWING US TO REMAIN PREPARED TO RESPOND TO REGIONAL CHALLENGES
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�DEPARTMENT OF
PAGE
STATE
(WE) 09. 0 :
' 93
iG:32
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SHOULD THEY ARISE.
20. (Pf IH EAST ASIA, WE ALSO PLAN TO RETAIN CLOSE TO 100,000
TROOPSr AS RECENTLY ANNOUNCED BY PRESIDENT CLINTON, OUR
COMMITMENT TO SOUTH KOREA'S SECURITY REMAINS UNDIMINISHED. THIS
COMMITMENT IS MOSTLY UNDERWRITTEN BY AN ARMY DIVISION CONSISTING
OF TWO BRIGADES AS WELL AS HEADQUARTERS AND SUPPORT ELEMENTS AND
• WING OF U.S. AIR FORCE COMBAT AIRCRAFT WE HAVE STATIONED THERE.
A
IN LIGHT OF THE CONTINUING THREAT OF AGGRESSION FROM NORTH KOREA-,
WE HAVE HALTED THE PREVIOUSLY PLANNED D A D W OF OUR TROOPS ON '
RWON
THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND ARE MODERNIZING THE AMERICAN FORCES
THERE AS WELL.AS ASSISTING THE ROK IN MODERNIZING ITS FORCES. WE
ARE ALSO EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF PREPOSITIONING MORE
MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN THE REGION TO INCREASE OUR ABILITY TO
RESPOND TO CRISES. WHILE PLANS CALL FOR THE EVENTUAL WITHDRAWAL
OF 6500 PERSONNEL FROM SOUTH KOREA, AS PRESIDENT CLINTON RECENTLY
REITERATED, OUR TROOPS WILL STAY IN SOUTH KOREA AS LONG AS ITS
PEOPLE WANT AND NEED US THERE.
21. 112) ON OKINAWA, WE WILL CONTINUE TO STATION A MARINE
EXPEDITIONARY FORCE. IN JAPAN, WE WILL ALSO-CONTINUE TO FORWARD
DEPLOY THE AIRCRAFT. CARRIER "INDEPENDENCE" AND ITS BATTLE GROUP,
AS WELL AS AN AMPHIBIOUS SQUADRON WHICH INCLUDES THE AMPHIBIOUS
ASSAULT SHIP "BELLEAU W O " AND ITS SUPPORT SHIPS. WE WILL ALSO
OD,
RETAIN APPROXIMATELY PNE AND ONE HALF WINCiJ OF AIR FORCE COMBAT
AIRCRAFT IN JAPAN AND OKINAWA> AND THE NAVY'S SEVENTH FLEET WILL
CONTINUE TO ROUTINELY PATROL THE WESTERN PACIFIC.
22. t ^ l IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, WITH THE LOSS'OF OUR BASES AT CLARK
AND SUBIC IN THE PHILIPPINES, OUR FOCUS HAS TURNED AWAY FROM
PERMANENT BASING STRUCTURES TOWARD ESTABLISHING ACCESS
ARRANGEMENTS WITH MANY NATIONS IN THE AREA. THESE NEW
ARRANGEMENTS RANGE FROM THE FORMAL ACCESS AGREEMENT NEGOTIATED
WITH SINGAPORE TO THE ARRANGEMENTS UNDER•CONSIDERATION WITH
COUNTRIES SUCH AS MALAYSIA, AUSTRALIA AND THAILAND TO PROVIDE OUR
FORCES IN THE AREA WITH BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL TRAINING
OPPORTUNITIES AND TO ASSIST WITH REPAIR, MAINTENANCE AND
LOGISTICS SUPPORT. THESE ARRANGEMENTS WILL ALLOW U.S. FORCES TO
MAINTAIN THEIR ABILITY- TO DEPLOY QUICKLY TO ANY LOCATION WITHIN
THE REGION AND TO SUSTAIN THAT DEPLOYMENT AS LONG AS NECESSARY.
23. i&f THE UNITED STATES HAS IMPORTANT AND ENDURING INTERESTS
IN SOUTHWEST ASIA. HERE, PERHAPS MORE THAN IN ANY OTHER REGION
IN THE WORLD/ POTENTIAL SdURCES" OF INSTABILITY MERGE WITH
IMPORTANT AMERICAN INTERESTS TO DEMAND DETERMINED U.S. EFFORTS TO
REINFORCE STABILITY AND DETER CONFLICT. THE GULF WAR IS ONLY THE
MOST RECENT REMINDER OF THIS. OUR MILITARY PRESENCE IN THIS
REGION IS CENTRAL TO MAINTAINING SECURE ACCESS TO THIS REGION'S
VITAL PETROLEUM RESERVES, DETERRING THREATS TO OUR KEY ALLIES IN
THE AREA, STEMMING THE SPREAD OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND
THEIR ASSOCIATED DELIVERY SYSTEMS, AND RETAINING UNHINDERED
MARITIME AND AIR TRANSIT RIGHTS THROUGHOUT THE REGION.
;
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24. J ^ f CLEARLY, THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTHWEST ASIA WILL REMAIN
AN IMPORTANT FOCUS OF OUR STRATEGY AND FORCE PLANNING. WE MUST
EMPHASIZE TO FRIENDLY REGIONAL STATES THE NECESSITY OF TAKING
STEPS N W TO REDUCE THE PROBABILITY OF FUTURE CRISES, SUCH AS
O
ASSISTING US IN SUSTAINING AND BROADENING U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE
IN THE REGION INCLUDING SUPPORT FOR INCREASED PREPOSITIONING OF
• MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES ASHORE, JOINT MILITARY PLANNING
AND EXERCISES, AS WELL AS OTHER COOPERATIVE EFFORTS TO IMPROVE
OUR ABILITY TO DETER AND RESPOND TO CRISES IN THE REGION.
25. ^ef OUR LONG TERM PEACETIME PRESENCE IN THIS REGION WILL
COMPRISE A VARYING MIX OF FORCES AND CAPABILITIES WHICH WILL
INCLUDE A CONTINUOUS NAVAL PRESENCE. WE HAVE CONCLUDED
AGREEMENTS AND ARE NEGOTIATING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE
PREPOSITIONING OF MATERIAL, INCLUDING HEAVY ARMY EQUIPMENT, IN
SEVERAL COUNTRIES TO SUPPORT THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT, I F NEEDED, OF
SEVERAL SQUADRONS OF LAND , BASED COMBAT AIRCRAFT/ AS WELL AS AN
ARMY BRIGADE. ADDITIONALLY, WE HAVE PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT AND
SUPPLIES AFLOAT AT DIEGO GARCIA, WHICH INCLUDE A BRIGADE,SIZED
SET FOR- MARINES AS WELL AS LOGISTICS SUPPORT FOR ARMY, AIR FORCE
AND NAVY FORCES. THE ARMY IS CURRENTLY PLANNING TO DEPLOY A
HEAVY BRIGADE SET OF EQUIPMENT AFLOAT ON MODERN ROLL -ON, ROLLOFF SHIPS THAT WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO RAPIDLY REINFORCE SOUTHWEST
ASIA AS WELL AS AN ADDITIONAL HEAVY BRIGADE SET OF EQUIPMENT
ASHORE IN THE REGION.
ACTIVE AIRCRAFT CARRIERS WILL.HAVE AN IMPACT ON DEPLOYMENTS
WORLDWIDE, THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS VITAL AREA WILL DICTATE THAT A
CARRIER ALWAYS BE WITHIN SEVERAL DAYS STEAMING OF THE REGION W E
HN
NOT ACTUALLY IN THE GULF ITSELF. DURING THE BOTTOM,UP REVIEW, WE
EXAMINED SEVERAL WAYS OF PROVIDING PRESENCE OVERSEAS. A PREMIUM
WAS PLACED ON THINKING CREATIVELY AND THINKING JOINT ,- THAT
IS, DRAWING ON ALL OF THE SERVICES FOR NEW AND COOPERATIVE WAYS
OF PROVIDING PEACETIME PRESENCE OVERSEAS. SOME OF THE POSSIBLE
SOLUTIONS INCLUDE: "ADAPTIVE FORCE PACKAGES" OF AIR, GROUND,
SPECIAL OPERATIONS, AND NAVAL. FORCES' TAILORED TO MEET THE
REGIONAL CINCS NEEDS; INCREASED AND ENHANCED MILITARY-TO,
MILITARY CONTACTS WITH THE;ARMED FORCES OP FRIENDLY OR ALLIED
COUNTRIES; AND/OR ADDITIONAL COMBINED EXERCISES AND COMBINED
TRAINING WITH LOCAL FORCES. • .
*
27.
Oe? THE SHEER PROXIMITY TO THE UNITED STATES MAKES THE
CARIBBEAN AND LAtflN AMERICA SIGNIFICANT REGIONS FOR OUR PLANNING
AND STRATEGY. U.S. POLICY IN THE PAST HAS TENDED TO FOCUS ON OUR
OWN HEMISPHERE ONLY WHEN A CRISIS HAS RISEN. WE N W HAVE THE
O
OPPORTUNITY TO RECAST OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH LATIN AMERICAN STATES
TO HELP PROMOTE AND EXPAND RECENT TRENDS TOWARDS DEMOCRACY
THROUGHOUT THE REGION. WE WILL ALSO BE LOOKING FOR EXPANDED
INVOLVEMENT BY THE LARGER AND MORE PROSPEROUS LATIN STATES IN
HELPING TO CREATE A MORE ORDERLY WORLD BEYOND OUR HEMISPHERE.
AND BECAUSE OUR FORCES WILL CONTINUE TO REQUIRE GLOBAL MOBILITY,
,,
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�DEPARTMENT OF STATE
PAGE
(WE) 0 9 . 0 1 .
8
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NO.
1 4 6 0 1 2 0 5 1 6 PAGE
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•i ** i 0 O N > I D D iU T ' l A!L ' **
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'
"
•
•
9
<
1
i
SECDEF y 2
,
8
!
<
-CO N F I D E N T"I AiL• FINAL SECTION OF 04
AT STAKE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, WE WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE•AN
INTEREST IN MAINTAINING- ACCESS TO STRATEGIC AND CRITICAL
MATERIALS IN THESE AREAS, AND IN PROTECTING ADJACENT SEA LINES OF
COMMUNICATION. WE ALSO HAVE AN INTEREST IN SUPPORTING THE
PROGRESS TOWARD DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION THAT M N
AY
COUNTRIES IN AFRICA HAVE MADE AND IN COUNTERING THE SPREAD OF
RADICAL, ANTI-WESTERN' IDEOLOGIES, DOD WILL-PLAY A CONTINUING
ROLE IN SUPPORTING AND ADVANCING THESE INTEREST BY HELPING TO
PROFESSIONALIZE AND DOWNSIZE AFRICAN MILITARIES. OUR MILITARY
ROLE IN THIS REGION WILL BE TO'ENSURE THE SAFETY OF U.S. CITIZENS
AND COMMERCIAL FACILITIES, INCLUDING UNDERTAKING K -NCOMBATANT
EVACUATION OPERATIONS W E NECESSARY; TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN
HN
ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER/FAMINE RELIEF, WHERE POSSIBLE, IN
SITUATIONS OF ACUTE' HUMAN SUFFERING; AND TO SUPPORT AND
PARTICIPATE IN, AS APPROPRIATE, INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING
EFFORTS, AS IN. SOMALIA..
30.
(& DESPITE THE END OF THE COLD WAR, THE UNITED-STATES MUST
REMAIN ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN KEY REGIONS. THE NATURE AND LEVELS OF
OUR PEACETIME OVERSEAS PRESENCE WILL BE ADJUSTED IN LIGHT OF THE
DISSOLUTION OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE THREAT IT POSED, BUT THE
MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL MILITARY PARTNERSHIPS WHICH W N THE
O
COLD WAR REMAIN CRUCI&t TO PROTECTING U.S^INTERESTS. GIVEN THE
GLOBAL NATURE OF MANY OF THE DANGERS WE N W FACE, WE CANNOT HOPE
O
TO MEET THESE CHALLENGES ALONE. OUR FORCES STATIONED AND
PERIODICALLY DEPLOYED ABROAD ALLOW US TO W R CLOSELY WITH OUR
OK
ALLIES AND ENGAGE IN COOPERATIVE EFFORTS TO HEAD OFF THESE
DANGERS BEFORE THEY ARISE AND TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF'OPPORTUNITIES
TO ADVANCE OUR SHARED INTERESTS WHEREVER POSSIBLE.
DECL AT 1100 HRS EDT ON 1 SEPTEMBER 19.93
BT
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'
IT IS CRUCIAL THAT ACCESS THROUGH THE PANAMA CANAL REMAIN SECURE'
28.
(jef OUR EVENTUAL. WITHDRAWAL FROM PANAMA, WILL REDUCE AMERICAN
PRESENCE IN THE REGION. IN ANTICIPATION OF THIS, W WILL-NEED TO
E
FIND N W WAYS.TO W R WITH FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS IN THE REGION, E
OK
ADVISING THEM AND.ASSISTING THEM IN COPING WITH SECURITY
CHALLENGES. W WILL ALSO NEED TO MAINTAIN MILITARY PRESENCE AND
E
.CAPABILITIES IN THIS REGION, INCLUDING MILITARY,TO-MILITARY
CONTACTS AND MILITARY TRAINING TEAMS, NECESSARY TO PROTECT AND
ADVANCE OUR INTERESTS*
29. (JPf ALTHOUGH-THE. UNITED STATES HAS FEW• IMPORTANT INTERESTS '
BT
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!
�THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Iimediate Release
August 30, 1993
REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
IN PHOTO OPPORTUNITY WITH
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
The Cabinet Room
4:16 P.M. EDT
Q
I s t h i s a c r i s i s meeting, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: I hope not. (Laughter.) The Secretary
of Defense and the Joint Chiefs say i t ' s a meeting to discuss their
review of the defense needs of the country and how we're going —
Q
Was the Somalia raid bungled?
THE PRESIDENT:
I don't think I would characterize i t i n
that way.
THE PRESS:
Thank you.
END
4:17 P.M. EDT
�TOAST BY PRESIDENT WILLIAM J . CLINTON
Dinner for M i l i t a r y Leaders
August 10,
1993
I t i s an honor t o be j o i n e d t h i s evening by such o u t s t a n d i n g
l e a d e r s of our n a t i o n ' s Armed Forces.
Let me extend t o you a l l a
warm welcome t o t h i s house.
I t i s a s p e c i a l honor being here t o n i g h t w i t h General Powell.
you a l l know, t h i s i s t h e l a s t CINCs conference
As
t h a t General
Powell w i l l a t t e n d as Chairman of the J o i n t C h i e f s .
I look
f o r w a r d t o j o i n i n g many of you next month i n p a y i n g t r i b u t e t o
his service to his nation.
T o n i g h t , l e t me s i m p l y note what a g r e a t honor and p l e a s u r e i t
has been working c l o s e l y w i t h him over these past seven months.
And
l e t me ask you a l l t o j o i n me i n t h a n k i n g him f o r h i s g r e a t
service.
The m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s c o l l e c t e d i n t h i s room t o n i g h t , and t h e more
than a m i l l i o n you l e a d and r e p r e s e n t , r e f l e c t a l l t h a t i s b e s t
about our n a t i o n .
T h i s room speaks o f a commitment t o c o u n t r y ; a
l i f e - l o n g d e d i c a t i o n t o s e r v i c e ; and a f a i t h t h a t
working
t o g e t h e r we can b u i l d a b e t t e r and more secure f u t u r e .
I have seen t h a t same s p i r i t and d e d i c a t i o n as I have met w i t h
t h e men
and women i n our s e r v i c e s across t h e c o u n t r y
overseas.
I saw
i t when I v i s i t e d t h e DMZ
a t our m i l i t a r y academies a t Annapolis
and
i n Korea.
and West P o i n t .
I felt i t
And
I
c e r t a i n l y r e l i e d on i t when I c a l l e d on our t r o o p s t o respond t o
I r a q ' s planned
a t t a c k on P r e s i d e n t Bush.
�2
T h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s t o defend America r e p r e s e n t s t h e g r e a t e s t
c o n t r i b u t i o n a c i t i z e n can make.
Our h i g h e s t o b l i g a t i o n i s t o
ensure t h a t they always have t h e l e a d e r s h i p , t r a i n i n g ,
equipment
and s u p p o r t t o do what i s necessary t o defend o u r n a t i o n .
So,
as we gather t o g e t h e r t h i s evening,
l e t us r a i s e a t o a s t t o
those t o whom we owe our g r e a t e s t g r a t i t u d e , t h e g u a r a n t o r s o f
our n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y :
Armed Forces.
To t h e men and women o f t h e U n i t e d
States
�DEFENSE ISSUES
Vol. 8 No. 50
Turning Base Closings Into
Economic Opportunities
Remarks by Secretary of Defense Les
Aspin and Chairman of the joint Chiefs
of Staff Cen. Colin Powell, USA, at a
meeting with local officials concerning
reuse of closed military bases,
Pentagon, Aug. 2, 1993.
Aspin. ... I was — I really asked
to open this session and make some
brief remarks because I think it's —
this right here is one of the most
important things that we are doing
in the Pentagon right now.
Basically, there are two ways in
which the Defense Department can
influence the economic health of
the United States. One is through
our direct expenditures from the
defense budget, and we're trying to
get smarter about doing that with
emphasis on things like technology
and dual-use commitments, dualuse uses between the commercial
and the military. That is the money
that we spend on a day-to-to-day
basis, and there ought to be a way
to get more economic pop out of
our normal budgetary expenditures
in the defense budget. But the
second way — and that really
comes to one of the reasons why
we're all here today — the other
way is by making better use of...
resources made redundant by the
drop in the forces that are required
in this post-Soviet, post-Cold War
world. That really gets to what
we're doing here today.
Our force structure is being
substantially reduced, and I think
Colin Powell will talk about that
here in just a moment. Reductions
must come in infrastructure and
overhead as well as in forces. It's
just inevitable; otherwise, we end
up with a big defense budget spent
all on infrastructure and overhead
and no fighting forces. So they have
to come down roughly proportional, and as you know, that means
we have to close bases. But it also
means that we ought to spend a lot
of time and a lot of thought on
taking those resources that are
made redundant by the drawdown
in defense expenditures — people,
land, buildings, factories, bases,
whatever they are — and figure out
some way to make better commercial products and make some —
convert those resources into
commercial economic strength.
Committed to Help
This afternoon, I would like to
offer you an assurance that we are
committed to help to turn these
base closings into real domestic
economic opportunities. The
president is committed to this, I am
committed to this, and as you see
here, the senior leaders of the
Defense Department and the armed
forces are committed to this.
[Deputy Secretary of Defense) Bill
Perry in particular has taken on this
big — on this in a very big way. His
recent visits ... to Homestead, to
Alameda and to Charleston show
what that's all about.
Now, the president has directed
that concrete actions to back that
commitment be put into place. We
looked at this issue, and as under
the direction of the president, we
put together at the Cabinet level a
task force that looked at the
question of base closures and
asked, "What do we learn from the
past base closures?" Not just the
last rounds of the current kind of
system where we had the commission, but the base closures that
occurred in the '50s and the '60s,
going back to the first big round of
base closures was after World War
II, and asked ourselves the question: "What have we learned from
all of that experience? What have
we learned that tells you how to do
it?" Because there's been some
successes in that — in that history—
and there's been some pretty
dramatic failures and some pretty
dramatic time-consuming inaction
on a whole bunch of fronts, as well
as some rather dramatic breakthroughs in turning the bases
around. So we asked ourselves a
question: "What makes for a
successful conversion, and what
makes for a not successful conversion?"
Incidentally, the overall prognostication is good. The number — if
you look back at the base closures,
there have been really two major
times that bases have been closed
in American history. One was after
World War II, where the United
States military went from a military
of about 12 million down to the
military that was around for a great
number of years during the Cold
War, which was sort of in the 3'/2 to
4 million range. There was a big
drawdown ... right after the Cold
War. We are now in the second
phase of a big — after World War
11. We're now in the phase of a
second serious drawdown after the
Cold War. And the base structure is
being collapsed dramatically.
But if you look at the bases that
were closed after World War II, the
results are pretty encouraging.
Ninety-four thousand jobs were lost
in those bases that were closed in
the 1950s, and 158,000 jobs were
created at the bases that were
closed in the 1950s. So the prognostication is good if you do it right.
Now since those bases got
closed after World War II, it's a lot
more complicated to close bases
�today. You have a whole agenda —
environmental agenda — that
nobody was worried about when
we were closing bases after World
War II that are now at the core of
being able to close any bases and
convert the land to any other
commercial use now. So it's a
wholly different picture. But if you
can overcome the obstacles and the
difficulties, the record seems to
indicate that there's some opportunity there.
What we learned when we went
and did this study as to what was
the difference between bases that
were closed successfully — meaning converted quickly to economic
commercial viability — and those
that were not successful, it came
down to about five things, and that
became the focal point for the
administration's proposal here on
how to make this better and to help
here today.
One of the problems ... that we
have had with closing bases
successfully is that the bases don't
know who to talk to. The people in
the communities just flat out don't
know who to talk to, and they will
call one agency and get one
answer, and call another agency
with the same question and get a
different answer.
Central Coordinators
So one of the things that we
decided to do out of this was to
make a central coordinator for each
of the bases that is being closed.
There will be a single person that
you can call and talk to and get
answers to your questions. Now,
that person might — will be —
certainly working for one of the
departments involved in the base
closing business here, but they
would be able to answer questions
not only for the department that
they came from but for other
departments as well. And we are
organizing back in Washington to
make sure that the backup for that
single individual is there.
So, point No. 1, a single coordinator, a single phone call, a single
person that you need to get in touch
with to answer questions, whether it
be a legal question, a regulatory
question, a funding question, an
availability of resources question,
anything like that, there will be a
single point of contact for you in
every base that we're talking about.
The second thing was that what
we found on looking at this example of what it was that caused
bases to be closed successfully, the
places where it was successful was
where the local communities
organized themselves in a way in
which they had a structure with a
single decision-making center of
focus. In other words, the places
that successfully converted the
assets to commercial use, what they
did was they established a local
committee made up of all of the
relevant decision-makers as part of
that committee, usually set up by
the governor. But it need not
always be set up by the governor,
but somebody took the lead and
established a committee so that all
of the relevant players were represented on the committee, and there
was a chairman of the committee,
and there was a secretary of the
committee, and there was a structure to that committee that could
make decisions, and everybody
who was part of the decisionmaking process was represented on
that committee. So, if the committee decided they were going to do
X, that happened, and there weren't
people left out that were throwing
stones at the proposal. You need a
structure that can make decisions
and a decision-making body.
In order to facilitate that, one of
the things is you need some money,
some planning money. So up front
there is going to be planning money
available to any community that
organizes such a structure, and it's
going to be available to any
community as soon as they get that
structure in place. We want to
encourage that structure, and we
think that that kind of a structure,
getting that up and running right
away, is absolutely critical.
Environmental Cleanup
The third problem on the list of
five — the third problem that comes
up is the problem with the environmental statements, the environmental delays, the delays due to the
cleanup enormous trouble that
we've had in the past in getting the
process working that puts local
economic development in play
when the community has problems
— environmental problems on
these bases. And most of the bases
and most of the facilities have some
environmental problems.
One thing that we do is that we
have a couple of things. The first
things that we will do is that we will
make the environmental cleanup
simultaneous rather than sequential.
The biggest problem that we've had
in the past and the thing that took
so long was that you had to finish
one phase of an environmental
cleanup before you started the
second phase of an environmental
cleanup. A lot of that need not ...
wait— until one is done — so
we've ordered that the process be
simultaneous in places where you
can start two, three, four environmental cleanup pieces of the thing
— start them all at once, because
there's no sense in wasting time and
delaying.
The second thing that we can do
to clean up this thing is to have the
Department of Defense accept
responsibility for the environmental
cleanup. In the past, the Defense
Department very often fought these
issues in the courts and delayed the
cleanup forever because there was
enormous legal cases over how
much it cost, who was responsible.
The Defense Department was
always somewhat responsible, but
how much were they responsible
for this? Could they evade some of
the responsibility through legal
challenges? We're not going to do
that. We're going to accept responsibility, start the cleanup, help pay
for it and get it going.
Those two things and other
things we're going to try and do,
but the third problem is getting the
environmental cleanup going
quicker.
The fourth problem is the
disposal problem — disposing of
the property. In the past, in the
places where base closing has not
been successful, the biggest problem has been disposal of the land
and disposing of that land quickly.
There's a couple of things that we
can do that would help.
One of the things that we'll do is
to let lower-level people do the
disposal. In the past, the disposal
decisions had to go all the way to
the top of the Pentagon or very high
up into the Pentagon to sort of the
John Deutsch [undersecretary of
defense for technology and acquisition]/Bill Perry level. We're going to
�fix it so that the people at the lower
levels can make those disposals,
and that ought to speed things up.
The second thing is that we're
going to allow for partial disposals.
In the past, the practice has been
that until all of the environmental
problems have been straightened
out, you did not dispose of any of
the land. What is going to be the
policy now is that — and inevitably
what happens is that, if you have an
environmental problem, it doesn't
affect the whole base, but it affects
a part of the base. No sense holding
up the disposal of the land that is
not affected waiting ... on the
cleanup of the problem that is
affected.
We're going to subdivide, and
we're going to be willing and ready
and able, and we will go ahead and
dispose of the land that is not
affected, so that even though the
part we still worry about the
cleanup and the time it will take to
do the part that's been environmentally contaminated, any part that's
not environmentally contaminated
we're going to be willing to go
ahead and get that disposal taken
care of and get that out into the
community and available for public
use.
Whole Lot of Money
Final ... point — and those of you
members of Congress will be
appreciative of this point — there is
a whole lot of law — of money
tucked away in various appropriation bills to help clean up these
bases, to help with these bases, to
transform these bases from public
facilities to booming commercial —
available commercial enterprises.
The problem is that the money is in
different appropriation bills; it's
known to the members of the
appropriations committee or the
people on that subcommittee who
knew about it; it's not known to the
general public. What we will do —
and this information will be in the
hands of a single coordinator for
each base — is to compile that
information in a single source
document so that any community
knows what's available. In other
words, there's money in the FAA
account, in the appropriations for
the Federal Aviation Administration,
that allows bases that have an
airport on it to convert that to a
commercial airport. But who would
know it unless you happen to know
a lot about the law and about the
various appropriations bills. But
there has been money put into a lot
of appropriations bills for a lot of
different uses. What we need to do
is to compile that into a single
document, a single source of
information that will be available to
the communities. And we're going
to do that, and that coordinator will
have that information and make it
available to all of you.
Making Lemonade
...This is what we're trying to do;
we're trying to learn from the past
and we're trying to make some
lemonade here. We're trying to take
a situation which we know is very,
very difficult for all of you and
trying to ... give you some help.
There is that old gag that says,
"We're here from the federal
government and we're here to help
you with your problems." That
usually is followed by weary
chuckles. Let me tell you that this
time we are determined to be
genuinely helpful. Call on us early
and often for help with these bases.
We want to learn from the mistakes, we want to convert these
bases into booming economic,
commercial, viable commercial
areas, and we're going to do
everything we can to help with that.
Thank you all very much for
coming today. Thank you. ...
Powell. Good afternoon, ladies
and gentlemen. It's a great pleasure
to welcome you all to the Pentagon
this afternoon.
When I became chairman four
years ago, it also signaled the
beginning of the end of the Cold
War, the beginning of the end of
the Soviet Union and the beginning
of the end of 40 years of American
military history. And the challenge
that the chiefs faced at that time
was how to take this victory in the
Cold War and how to take that
victory and convert our armed
forces in a sensible way.
Because unlike all previous wars
we had won, the world was still
going to be a dangerous place. We
also were not going to repeat the
mistakes of the past where we tore
apart our armed forces, we totally
demobilized only to discover that
weakening ourselves in such a way
merely encouraged people to
challenge us on the world stage.
We were also reminded as we
started through this downsizing
process of the truth of this theory
when we had to fight a small
conflict in Panama and we had to
fight a big conflict in the deserts of
the Persian Gulf and as we had to
deal with a very untidy world that
came upon us after the end of the
Cold War.
But, nevertheless, what the Joint
Chiefs of Staff did was sit down and
say the Cold War is over, and it
ain't coming back, and we have to
face up to that reality. We faced up
to it in several ways.
One, the size of the force had to
come down, and it had to come
down significantly. The first increment of that was about 25 percent,
500,000 active duty troops going
off the rolls in a volunteer force.
We also faced up to what it
meant in terms of our acquisition
and research and development
efforts. For the last 40 years, we
were chasing technology to make
sure that our quality was always
better than Soviet quality so that we
could compensate for Soviet
quantity. But now we were no
longer chasing the Soviet Union,
and they were no longer chasing
us.
New Choices
So that allowed us to make
different sorts of choices with
respect to the weapons systems that
we kept in production, with respect
to how we chased technology
really for the purpose of staying at
the forward edge of the state of the
art and even beyond, replacing
weapons that became obsolete, but
we no longer had to do it at the
same rate we had been doing it
before because the Soviet Union
was gone.
We also could change assumptions with respect to the supplies
we had to buy, the depot maintenance activities we had to conduct.
In other words, repairing our
equipment.
Why? Because for 40 years, we
thought World War III would be
upon us, and we'd have to fight the
Soviet Union everywhere in the
world, in the Pacific, in the Atlantic,
in Europe and the Mediterranean,
you name it, everywhere we would
�be faced with the Soviet empire in
one single, huge world war. That
went away.
When World War III went away,
we replaced World War III with a
different set of planning assumptions that said we might have to
fight regional conflicts, not world
conflicts, regional conflicts, perhaps
ones somewhere in the Middle East,
Southwest Asia. And we saw very
early on we had to do just that. And
we may still have to do that at some
point in the future. And we should
also keep enough force that we can
perhaps have to, you know, have to
engage — if we ever have to
engage, in a place like Northeast
Asia, Korean peninsula, keep that
amount of force around. But it's
unlikely that they would happen
exactly at the same time and it's
unlikely that the two of them
together would ever rise to the level
of the World War III scenario.
So we tossed all of that over the
side. And that allowed us to begin
to pay to the American public the
peace dividend they were expecting and the peace dividend that we
wanted to pay to the American
public. And so as we brought the
force down, we had to bring down
the active duty force; we had to
bring down the size of our reserves
to some extent because they were
geared against fighting the Red
Army in Europe, and the Red Army
is gone from Europe. We had to
bring down all the stocks we have,
all the war reserve stockpiles.
A little example: We kept about
110 billion barrels of oil in our
theater reserves, we called it, in
order to be able to fight World War
III. No World War III, we can get
oil from many sources if we're
fighting in one particular theater or
another. We could cut that amount
in half and save almost $400
million in investment costs.
And as we went through this
entire calculus, we began to make
these reductions across the force.
And one area that we looked at that
simply had to be reduced along
with all other areas was the base
structure that we had.
Base Structure Rationale Gone
It was a base structure that really
does not have a rational underpinning any longer. The bases were
built over many, many decades,
many, many wars. Some of them
have a World War II origin, some of
them have a World War I origin. I
can show you some bases out in
parts of the Midwest and down to
the Southwest that have been there
essentially since the Indian wars
and grew over time. All of that had
to be restructured, reduced, realigned and made relevant to a new
war-fighting concept of two major
regional contingencies, some ability
to surge forces out from the United
States, but no longer the kind of
base structure or force structure that
we retained for World War II. And
so we have aggressively gone after
bases — bases that no longer serve
the intended purpose or we no
longer need for any possible future
emergency.
We have to do it in order to
continue to pay the American
people their peace dividend so that
we can reduce the claim that the
defense budget makes on our
national treasure. We do it also that
we are not wasting money on bases
that we no longer need so we can
use that defense dollar. If we don't
give it back to the American
people, we can use it more effectively to buy real capability for the
kinds of challenges that the armed
forces of the United States and the
American people are liable to be
facing. And so you are a part of that
peace dividend that must be paid in
order to come through this process
of change, this process of restructuring and downsizing in a very,
very sensible way.
I and all of my colleagues on the
Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize how
painful this is to your communities.
It distresses us also because you
have been our friends over the
years. You have been the ones who
have always been willing to support
us, to support a strong defense. And
more importantly than that and on a
more personal note, you have been
the ones who are willing to take
care of our youngsters and to take
care of their families when those
youngsters had to go overseas and
go in harm's way.
So you have been part of our
military family all of these years.
And we want to make sure as we
go through this downsizing process
that, as the secretary noted and as
you will hear from other representatives here today, we do everything
possible to help with the downsizing
process, to help with the conversion
process, to help with providing this
peace dividend to the American
people because we all will benefit
from a smaller defense budget as
long as we make sure that we have
a sufficient defense budget to satisfy
these new challenges we are facing
and we are not investing in things
that are left over from our Cold War
heritage.
And so the Joint Chiefs of Staff
are hard at work with our commanders throughout the United
States to help you convert these
properties into much more hopefully economic, efficient and
worthwhile commercial endeavors
which will benefit our country
overall.
I might also point out that as part
of this drawdown, we are significantly reducing bases overseas as
well. Close to 800 bases, installations, small stations, big stations
have been eliminated or are going
to be eliminated during the period
of this drawdown. The place where
I entered the Army and first served
in Germany has been closed. The
corps that I commanded just seven
years ago in Europe, 75,000 men
strong, they are all now on their
way home, and all of the bases
associated with that corps are being
closed.
So this is a worldwide drawdown, and it's a sensible drawdown. And I hope we can count on
your support as we go through this
process. You certainly can count on
our support.
Thank you very much.
Published for internal information use by the
American Forces Information Service, a field activity
of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Public Affairs), Washington, D.C. This material is in
the public domain and may be reprinted without
permission.
�DEFENSE ISSUES
Vol. 8 No. 50
Turning Base Closings Into
Economic Opportunities
Remarks by Secretary of Defense Les
Aspin and Chairman of the joint Chiefs
of Staff Gen. Colin Powell, USA, at a
meeting with local officials concerning
reuse of closed military bases.
Pentagon, Aug. 2, 1993.
Aspin. ... I was — I really asked
to open this session and make some
brief remarks because I think it's —
this right here is one of the most
important things that we are doing
in the Pentagon right now.
Basically, there are two ways in
which the Defense Department can
influence the economic health of
the United States. One is through
our direct expenditures from the
defense budget, and we're trying to
get smarter about doing that with
emphasis on things like technology
and dual-use commitments, dualuse uses between the commercial
and the military. That is the money
that we spend on a day-to-to-day
basis, and there ought to be a way
to get more economic pop out of
our normal budgetary expenditures
in the defense budget. But the
second way — and that really
comes to one of the reasons why
we're all here today — the other
way is by making better use of...
resources made redundant by the
drop in the forces that are required
in this post-Soviet, post-Cold War
world. That really gets to what
we're doing here today.
Our force structure is being
substantially reduced, and I think
Colin Powell will talk about that
here in just a moment. Reductions
must come in infrastructure and
overhead as well as in forces. It's
just inevitable; otherwise, we end
up with a big defense budget spent
all on infrastructure and overhead
and no fighting forces. So they have
to come down roughly proportional, and as you know, that means
we have to close bases. But it also
means that we ought to spend a lot
of time and a lot of thought on
taking those resources that are
made redundant by the drawdown
in defense expenditures — people,
land, buildings, factories, bases,
whatever they are — and figure out
some way to make better commercial products and make some —
convert those resources into
commercial economic strength.
Committed to Help
This afternoon, I would like to
offer you an assurance that we are
committed to help to turn these
base closings into real domestic
economic opportunities. The
president is committed to this, I am
committed to this, and as you see
here, the senior leaders of the
Defense Department and the armed
forces are committed to this.
[Deputy Secretary of Defense) Bill
Perry in particular has taken on this
big — on this in a very big way. His
recent visits ... to Homestead, to
Alameda and to Charleston show
what that's all about.
Now, the president has directed
that concrete actions to back that
commitment be put into place. We
looked at this issue, and as under
the direction of the president, we
put together at the Cabinet level a
task force that looked at the
question of base closures and
asked, "What do we learn from the
past base closures?" Not just the
last rounds of the current kind of
system where we had the commission, but the base closures that
occurred in the '50s and the '60s,
going back to the first big round of
base closures was after World War
II, and asked ourselves the question: "What have we learned from
all of that experience? What have
we learned that tells you how to do
it?" Because there's been some
successes in that — in that history—
and there's been some pretty
dramatic failures and some pretty
dramatic time-consuming inaction
on a whole bunch of fronts, as well
as some rather dramatic breakthroughs in turning the bases
around. So we asked ourselves a
question: "What makes for a
successful conversion, and what
makes for a not successful conversion?"
Incidentally, the overall prognostication is good. The number — if
you look back at the base closures,
there have been really two major
times that bases have been closed
in American history. One was after
World War II, where the United
States military went from a military
of about 12 million down to the
military that was around for a great
number of years during the Cold
War, which was sort of in the 3'/2 to
4 million range. There was a big
drawdown ... right after the Cold
War. We are now in the second
phase of a big — after World War
II. We're now in the phase of a
second serious drawdown after the
Cold War. And the base structure is
being collapsed dramatically.
But if you look at the bases that
were closed after World War II, the
results are pretty encouraging.
Ninety-four thousand jobs were lost
in those bases that were closed in
the 1950s, and 1 58,000 jobs were
created at the bases that were
closed in the 1950s. So the prognostication is good if you do it right.
Now since those bases got
closed after World War II, it's a lot
more complicated to close bases
�today. You have a whole agenda —
environmental agenda — that
nobody was worried about when
we were closing bases after World
War II that are now at the core of
being able to close any bases and
convert the land to any other
commercial use now. So it's a
wholly different picture. But if you
can overcome the obstacles and the
difficulties, the record seems to
indicate that there's some opportunity there.
What we learned when we went
and did this study as to what was
the difference between bases that
were closed successfully — meaning converted quickly to economic
commercial viability — and those
that were not successful, it came
down to about five things, and that
became the focal point for the
administration's proposal here on
how to make this better and to help
here today.
One of the problems ... that we
have had with closing bases
successfully is that the bases don't
know who to talk to. The people in
the communities just flat out don't
know who to talk to, and they will
call one agency and get one
answer, and call another agency
with the same question and get a
different answer.
Central Coordinators
So one of the things that we
decided to do out of this was to
make a central coordinator for each
of the bases that is being closed.
There will be a single person that
you can call and talk to and get
answers to your questions. Now,
that person might — will be —
certainly working for one of the
departments involved in the base
closing business here, but they
would be able to answer questions
not only for the department that
they came from but for other
departments as well. And we are
organizing back in Washington to
make sure that the backup for that
single individual is there.
So, point No. 1, a single coordinator, a single phone call, a single
person that you need to get in touch
with to answer questions, whether it
be a legal question, a regulatory
question, a funding question, an
availability of resources question,
anything like that, there will be a
single point of contact for you in
every base that we're talking about.
The second thing was that what
we found on looking at this example of what it was that caused
bases to be closed successfully, the
places where it was successful was
where the local communities
organized themselves in a way in
which they had a structure with a
single decision-making center of
focus. In other words, the places
that successfully converted the
assets to commercial use, what they
did was they established a local
committee made up of all of the
relevant decision-makers as part of
that committee, usually set up by
the governor. But it need not
always be set up by the governor,
but somebody took the lead and
established a committee so that all
of the relevant players were represented on the committee, and there
was a chairman of the committee,
and there was a secretary of the
committee, and there was a structure to that committee that could
make decisions, and everybody
who was part of the decisionmaking process was represented on
that committee. So, if the committee decided they were going to do
X, that happened, and there weren't
people left out that were throwing
stones at the proposal. You need a
structure that can make decisions
and a decision-making body.
In order to facilitate that, one of
the things is you need some money,
some planning money. So up front
there is going to be planning money
available to any community that
organizes such a structure, and it's
going to be available to any
community as soon as they get that
structure in place. We want to
encourage that structure, and we
think that that kind of a structure,
getting that up and running right
away, is absolutely critical.
Environmental Cleanup
The third problem on the list of
five — the third problem that comes
up is the problem with the environmental statements, the environmental delays, the delays due to the
cleanup enormous trouble that
we've had in the past in getting the
process working that puts local
economic development in play
when the community has problems
— environmental problems on
these bases. And most of the bases
and most of the facilities have some
environmental problems.
One thing that we do is that we
have a couple of things. The first
things that we will do is that we will
make the environmental cleanup
simultaneous rather than sequential.
The biggest problem that we've had
in the past and the thing that took
so long was that you had to finish
one phase of an environmental
cleanup before you started the
second phase of an environmental
cleanup. A lot of that need not...
wait— until one is done — so
we've ordered that the process be
simultaneous in places where you
can start two, three, four environmental cleanup pieces of the thing
— start them all at once, because
there's no sense in wasting time and
delaying.
The second thing that we can do
to clean up this thing is to have the
Department of Defense accept
responsibility for the environmental
cleanup. In the past, the Defense
Department very often fought these
issues in the courts and delayed the
cleanup forever because there was
enormous legal cases over how
much it cost, who was responsible.
The Defense Department was
always somewhat responsible, but
how much were they responsible
for this? Could they evade some of
the responsibility through legal
challenges? We're not going to do
that. We're going to accept responsibility, start the cleanup, help pay
for it and get it going.
Those two things and other
things we're going to try and do,
but the third problem is getting the
environmental cleanup going
quicker.
The fourth problem is the
disposal problem — disposing of
the property. In the past, in the
places where base closing has not
seen successful, the biggest problem has been disposal of the land
and disposing of that land quickly.
There's a couple of things that we
can do that would help.
One of the things that we'll do is
to let lower-level people do the
disposal. In the past, the disposal
decisions had to go all the way to
the top of the Pentagon or very high
up into the Pentagon to sort of the
John Deutsch [undersecretary of
defense for technology and acquisition]/Bill Perry level. We're going to
�fix it so that the people at the lower
levels can make those disposals,
and that ought to speed things up.
The second thing is that we're
going to allow for partial disposals.
In the past, the practice has been
that until all of the environmental
problems have been straightened
out, you did not dispose of any of
the land. What is going to be the
policy now is that — and inevitably
what happens is that, if you have an
environmental problem, it doesn't
affect the whole base, but it affects
a part of the base. No sense holding
up the disposal of the land that is
not affected waiting ... on the
cleanup of the problem that is
affected.
We're going to subdivide, and
we're going to be willing and ready
and able, and we will go ahead and
dispose of the land that is not
affected, so that even though the
part we still worry about the
cleanup and the time it will take to
do the part that's been environmentally contaminated, any part that's
not environmentally contaminated
we're going to be willing to go
ahead and get that disposal taken
care of and get that out into the
community and available for public
use.
Whole Lot of Money
Final ... point — and those of you
members of Congress will be
appreciative of this point — there is
a whole lot of law — of money
tucked away in various appropriation bills to help clean up these
bases, to help with these bases, to
transform these bases from public
facilities to booming commercial —
available commercial enterprises.
The problem is that the money is in
different appropriation bills; it's
known to the members of the
appropriations committee or the
people on that subcommittee who
knew about it; it's not known to the
general public. What we will do —
and this information will be in the
hands of a single coordinator for
each base — is to compile that
information in a single source
document so that any community
knows what's available. In other
words, there's money in the FAA
account, in the appropriations for
the Federal Aviation Administration,
that allows bases that have an
airport on it to convert that to a
commercial airport. But who would
know it unless you happen to know
a lot about the law and about the
various appropriations bills. But
there has been money put into a lot
of appropriations bills for a lot of
different uses. What we need to do
is to compile that into a single
document, a single source of
information that will be available to
the communities. And we're going
to do that, and that coordinator will
have that information and make it
available to all of you.
Making Lemonade
...This is what we're trying to do;
we're trying to learn from the past
and we're trying to make some
lemonade here. We're trying to take
a situation which we know is very,
very difficult for all of you and
trying to ... give you some help.
There is that old gag that says,
"We're here from the federal
government and we're here to help
you with your problems." That
usually is followed by weary
chuckles. Let me tell you that this
time we are determined to be
genuinely helpful. Call on us early
and often for help with these bases.
We want to learn from the mistakes, we want to convert these
bases into booming economic,
commercial, viable commercial
areas, and we're going to do
everything we can to help with that.
Thank you all very much for
coming today. Thank you. ...
Powell. Good afternoon, ladies
and gentlemen. It's a great pleasure
to welcome you all to the Pentagon
this afternoon.
When I became chairman four
years ago, it also signaled the
beginning of the end of the Cold
War, the beginning of the end of
the Soviet Union and the beginning
of the end of 40 years of American
military history. And the challenge
that the chiefs faced at that time
was how to take this victory in the
Cold War and how to take that
victory and convert our armed
forces in a sensible way.
Because unlike all previous wars
we had won, the world was still
going to be a dangerous place. We
also were not going to repeat the
mistakes of the past where we tore
apart our armed forces, we totally
demobilized only to discover that
weakening ourselves in such a way
merely encouraged people to
challenge us on the world stage.
We were also reminded as we
started through this downsizing
process of the truth of this theory
when we had to fight a small
conflict in Panama and we had to
fight a big conflict in the deserts of
the Persian Gulf and as we had to
deal with a very untidy world that
came upon us after the end of the
Cold War.
But, nevertheless, what the Joint
Chiefs of Staff did was sit down and
say the Cold War is over, and it
ain't coming back, and we have to
face up to that reality. We faced up
to it in several ways.
One, the size of the force had to
come down, and it had to come
down significantly. The first increment of that was about 25 percent,
500,000 active duty troops going
off the rolls in a volunteer force.
We also faced up to what it
meant in terms of our acquisition
and research and development
efforts. For the last 40 years, we
were chasing technology to make
sure that our quality was always
better than Soviet quality so that we
could compensate for Soviet
quantity. But now we were no
longer chasing the Soviet Union,
and they were no longer chasing
us.
New Choices
So that allowed us to make
different sorts of choices with
respect to the weapons systems that
we kept in production, with respect
to how we chased technology
really for the purpose of staying at
the forward edge of the state of the
art and even beyond, replacing
weapons that became obsolete, but
we no longer had to do it at the
same rate we had been doing it
before because the Soviet Union
was gone.
We also could change assumptions with respect to the supplies
we had to buy, the depot maintenance activities we had to conduct.
In other words, repairing our
equipment.
Why? Because for 40 years, we
thought World War III would be
upon us, and we'd have to fight the
Soviet Union everywhere in the
world, in the Pacific, in the Atlantic,
in Europe and the Mediterranean,
you name it, everywhere we would
�be faced with the Soviet empire in
one single, huge world war. That
went away.
When World War III went away,
we replaced World War III with a
different set of planning assumptions that said we might have to
fight regional conflicts, not world
conflicts, regional conflicts, perhaps
ones somewhere in the Middle East,
Southwest Asia. And we saw very
early on we had to do just that. And
we may still have to do that at some
point in the future. And we should
also keep enough force that we can
perhaps have to, you know, have to
engage — if we ever have to
engage, in a place like Northeast
Asia, Korean peninsula, keep that
amount of force around. But it's
unlikely that they would happen
exactly at the same time and it's
unlikely that the two of them
together would ever rise to the level
of the World War III scenario.
So we tossed all of that over the
side. And that allowed us to begin
to pay to the American public the
peace dividend they were expecting and the peace dividend that we
wanted to pay to the American
public. And so as we brought the
force down, we had to bring down
the active duty force; we had to
bring down the size of our reserves
to some extent because they were
geared against fighting the Red
Army in Europe, and the Red Army
is gone from Europe. We had to
bring down all the stocks we have,
all the war reserve stockpiles.
A little example: We kept about
110 billion barrels of oil in our
theater reserves, we called it, in
order to be able to fight World War
III. No World War III, we can get
oil from many sources if we're
fighting in one particular theater or
another. We could cut that amount
in half and save almost $400
million in investment costs.
And as we went through this
entire calculus, we began to make
these reductions across the force.
And one area that we looked at that
simply had to be reduced along
with all other areas was the base
structure that we had.
Base Structure Rationale Gone
It was a base structure that really
does not have a rational underpinning any longer. The bases were
built over many, many decades,
many, many wars. Some of them
have a World War II origin, some of
them have a World War I origin. I
can show you some bases out in
parts of the Midwest and down to
the Southwest that have been there
essentially since the Indian wars
and grew over time. All of that had
to be restructured, reduced, realigned and made relevant to a new
war-fighting concept of two major
regional contingencies, some ability
to surge forces out from the United
States, but no longer the kind of
base structure or force structure that
we retained for World War II. And
so we have aggressively gone after
bases — bases that no longer serve
the intended purpose or we no
longer need for any possible future
emergency.
We have to do it in order to
continue to pay the American
people their peace dividend so that
we can reduce the claim that the
defense budget makes on our
national treasure. We do it also that
we are not wasting money on bases
that we no longer need so we can
use that defense dollar. If we don't
give it back to the American
people, we can use it more effectively to buy real capability for the
kinds of challenges that the armed
forces of the United States and the
American people are liable to be
facing. And so you are a part of that
peace dividend that must be paid in
order to come through this process
of change, this process of restructuring and downsizing in a very,
very sensible way.
I and all of my colleagues on the
loint Chiefs of Staff recognize how
painful this is to your communities.
It distresses us also because you
have been our friends over the
years. You have been the ones who
have always been willing to support
us, to support a strong defense. And
more importantly than that and on a
more personal note, you have been
the ones who are willing to take
care of our youngsters and to take
care of their families when those
youngsters had to go overseas and
go in harm's way.
So you have been part of our
military family all of these years.
And we want to make sure as we
go through this downsizing process
that, as the secretary noted and as
you will hear from other representatives here today, we do everything
possible to help with the downsizing
process, to help with the conversion
process, to help with providing this
peace dividend to the American
people because we all will benefit
from a smaller defense budget as
long as we make sure that we have
a sufficient defense budget to satisfy
these new challenges we are facing
and we are not investing in things
that are left over from our Cold War
heritage.
And so the Joint Chiefs of Staff
are hard at work with our commanders throughout the United
States to help you convert these
properties into much more hopefully economic, efficient and
worthwhile commercial endeavors
which will benefit our country
overall.
I might also point out that as part
of this drawdown, we are significantly reducing bases overseas as
well. Close to 800 bases, installations, small stations, big stations
have been eliminated or are going
to be eliminated during the period
of this drawdown. The place where
I entered the Army and first served
in Germany has been closed. The
corps that I commanded just seven
years ago in Europe, 75,000 men
strong, they are all now on their
way home, and all of the bases
associated with that corps are being
closed.
So this is a worldwide drawdown, and it's a sensible drawdown. And I hope we can count on
your support as we go through this
process. You certainly can count on
our support.
Thank you very much.
Published for internal information use by the
American Forces Information Service, a field activity
of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Public Affairs), Washington, D C. This material is in
the public domain and may be reprinted without
permission.
�5866
THE
WHITE
HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 9, 1993
THE
DINNER WITH
LEADERSHIP OF THE U.S. ARMED FORCES
DATE: August 10, 1993
LOCATION: The White House
TIME: 7:30 p.m.
FROM:
I.
SAMUEL R.
PURPOSE
To have d i n n e r w i t h t h e c i v i l i a n and m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s h i p o f
the U.S. armed f o r c e s and t h e i r spouses.
II.
BACKGROUND
'
The Commanders-in-Chief o f the u n i f i e d and s p e c i f i e d
commands w i l l be meeting w i t h the S e c r e t a r y o f Defense and
the Chairman o f t h e J o i n t C h i e f s o f S t a f f on August 9-10.
This p r o v i d e s an e x c e l l e n t o p p o r t u n i t y f o r you t o meet w i t h
the Chiefs o f t h e m i l i t a r y Services and the c i v i l i a n
l e a d e r s h i p o f t h e Department o f Defense i n a s o c i a l
environment. The two Service S e c r e t a r i e s you have a p p o i n t e d
t o date w i l l a l s o be a t t e n d i n g .
The Commanders-in-Chief o f the U n i f i e d and S p e c i f i e d
Commands are u n i f o r m l y committed t o m a i n t a i n i n g t h e o v e r a l l
morale, r e a d i n e s s and w e l l - b e i n g o f t h e i r p e r s o n n e l d u r i n g a
d i f f i c u l t time o f t r a n s i t i o n f o r t h e U.S. m i l i t a r y . The
CINCs are on t h e r e c e i v i n g end o f concerns and a n x i e t i e s
t r a n s m i t t e d up t h e c h a i n o f command t h a t r e f l e c t t h e s t r e s s
c u r r e n t l y f e l t i n t h e Armed Forces a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e
downsizing o f our f o r c e s t r u c t u r e , r e d u c t i o n s i n defense
spending, p e r s o n n e l p o l i c y changes r e l a t e d t o women i n
combat and gays i n t h e m i l i t a r y , and u n c e r t a i n t i e s over
r e t e n t i o n and r e e n l i s t m e n t o p p o r t u n i t i e s .
I n t h i s r e g a r d , t h e CINCs have taken note o f and d e e p l y
a p p r e c i a t e d y o u r commitment, as s t a t e d most f o r c e f u l l y i n
your May 29th speech a t West P o i n t , t o "be m i n d f u l , even as
we t r y so hard t o , r e d u c e t h i s t e r r i b l e n a t i o n a l d e f i c i t ,
t h a t t h e r e i s a L i m i t beyond which we must n o t go; we have
t o ensure t h a t ttfe U n i t e d S t a t e s i s ready, ready t o win and
s u p e r i o r t o a l l o t h e r m i l i t a r y f o r c e s i n the w o r l d . "
At Tab C i s background i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e o f f i c e r s who are
a t t e n d i n g from o u t s i d e o f Washington and t h e i r key issues o f
concern.
III.
PARTICIPANTS
Attached
a t Tab A.
�IV.
PRESS PLAN
No Press.
V.
White House Photographer o n l y .
SEQUENCE
C o c k t a i l s f o l l o w e d by Dinner. To be h e l d i n t h e Yellow,
Oval and Blue Rooms. A proposed Toast i s p r o v i d e d a t Tab B
Attachments
Tab A
List of Participants
Tab B
Proposed Toast
Tab C
Background I n f o r m a t i o n
�PRESIDENTIAL DINNER WITH THE CINCs
AUGUST 10, 1993
THE PRESIDENT AND MRS.
CLINTON
THE VICE PRESIDENT
Hon. Les Aspin & Guest
S e c r e t a r y o f Defense
Hon. (Dr.) & Mrs. W i l l i a m Perry (Lee)
Deputy S e c r e t a r y o f Defense
General & Mrs. C o l i n L. Powell (Alma)
Chairman, J o i n t C h i e f s o f S t a f f
A d m i r a l & Mrs. David Jeremiah (Connie)
Vice Chairman, J o i n t C h i e f s o f S t a f f
A d m i r a l & Mrs. Frank B. Kelso I I (Landess)
Chief o f Naval Operations
General M e r r i l l A. McPeak
Chief o f S t a f f , U n i t e d S t a t e s A i r Force
General & Mrs. Gordon R. S u l l i v a n (Gay)
Chief o f S t a f f o f t h e Army
General & Mrs. C a r l E. Mundy, J r . ( L i n d a )
Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps
A d m i r a l & Mrs. W i l l i a m Kime ( V a l e r i e )
Commandant o f t h e U.S. Coast Guard
Hon. & Mrs. Samuel R. Berger (Susan)
Deputy A s s i s t a n t t o t h e P r e s i d e n t f o r
National Security A f f a i r s
A d m i r a l & Mrs. Charles R. Larson ( S a l l y )
Commander-in-Chief, P a c i f i c Command
General & Mrs. George A. Joulwan (Karen)
Commander-in-Chief, Southern Command
General & Mrs. George L. B u t l e r (Dorene)
Commander-in-Chief, S t r a t e g i c Command
A d m i r a l & Mrs. Paul D. M i l l e r (Becky)
Supreme A l l i e d Commander, A t l a n t i c
General & Mrs. Dennis J. Reimer (Mary Jo)
Commander-in-Chief, Forces Command
General & Mrs. Joseph P. Hoar ( C h a r l i e )
Commander-in-Chief, C e n t r a l Command
General & Mrs. John M. D. S h a l i k a s h v i l i (Joannie)
Supreme A l l i e d Commander, Europe
General & Mrs. Charles A. Horner (Mary Jo)
Commander-in-Chief, Space Command
General & Mrs. Ronald R. Fogleman (Jane)
Commander-in-Chief, T r a n s p o r t a t i o n Command
General Wayne A. Downing & Miss Kathryn Naumann
Commander-in-Chief, S p e c i a l O p e r a t i o n s Command
General & Mrs. Gary E. Luck (Leah)
Commander-in-Chief, U n i t e d Nations Command Korea
A d m i r a l & Mrs. W i l l i a m D. Smith (Sabra)
U.S. R e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o t h e NATO M i l i t a r y Command
Hon. John D a l t o n , S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Navy (Margaret)
Hon. Dr. S h e i l a W i d n a l l , S e c r e t a r y o f t h e A i r Force ( W i l l i a m )
�Mr. & Mrs. L a r r y K. Smith (Louise)
Counselor t o t h e S e c r e t a r y o f Defense
Hon. & Mrs. Leon F u e r t h (Lynn)
O f f i c e o f t h e Vice P r e s i d e n t
Mr. Robert G. B e l l & Ms. Rosemary Jackson
Senior D i r e c t o r f o r Defense P o l i c y & Arms C o n t r o l , NSC
Mr. & Mrs. Rudy F. de Leon (Anne)
Chief o f S t a f f t o t h e S e c r e t a r y o f Defense
�Toast To Be Provided
�BACKGROUND ON UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED
COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF
General John S h a l i k a s h v i l i (Army). Commander-in-Chief, U.S.
European Command (EUCOM) and Supreme A l l i e d Commander, Europe
(SACEUR).
I n a d d i t i o n t o h i s c r u c i a l r o l e i n p r e p a r i n g NATO f o r c e s f o r
p o s s i b l e m i l i t a r y a c t i o n i n Bosnia, General S h a l i k a s h v i l i i s
p r e s e n t l y i n v o l v e d i n t h r e e o t h e r major u n d e r t a k i n g s : p l a n n i n g
f o r next January's NATO Summit, managing the drawdown o f U.S.
t r o o p s i n Europe t o the 100,000 l e v e l and expanding m i l i t a r y - t o m i l i t a r y c o n t a c t s w i t h Eastern Europe and the s t a t e s o f the
former S o v i e t Union (FSU).
General S h a l i k a s h v i l i was born June 27, 1936 i n Warsaw, Poland.
He graduated from Bradley U n i v e r s i t y w i t h a BS degree i n
Mechanical E n g i n e e r i n g . He was commissioned from the O f f i c e r
Candidate School program i n 1958.
He a l s o holds a MS degree i n
I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s and i s a graduate o f the U.S. Army War
College.
General Joe Hoar (Marine Corps).
C e n t r a l Command (CENTCOM).
Commander-in-Chief, U.S.
General Hoar commands a p p r o x i m a t e l y 20,000 U.S. p e r s o n n e l a t sea
and ashore i n the Persian Gulf r e g i o n , and over 4,000 p e r s o n n e l
i n Somalia.
His focus i s on f o r w a r d presence, c r i s i s response,
s e c u r i t y a s s i s t a n c e and d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n . Over t h e p a s t year, he
has been p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h m a i n t a i n i n g a c r e d i b l e U.S.
presence i n the Persian G u l f , responding t o I r a q i v i o l a t i o n s o f
t h e c e a s e - f i r e agreement and f o l l o w i n g t h r o u g h on the
h u m a n i t a r i a n e f f o r t and t r a n s i t i o n t o UNISOM i n Somalia.
An i m p o r t a n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r CENTCOM i s t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y o f
s u f f i c i e n t t a c t i c a l a i r p o w e r t o accomplish U.S. m i s s i o n s i n the
r e g i o n . E a r l i e r t h i s summer, the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n c o n s i d e r e d the
i m p l i c a t i o n s o f a two month "gap" i n c o n t i n u o u s c a r r i e r presence
i n the P e r s i a n Gulf area. You might ask General Hoar h i s
assessment o f the importance o f c a r r i e r s t o CENTCOM's m i s s i o n s
and h i s e v a l u a t i o n o f p o s s i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e s t o having a c a r r i e r
always on s t a t i o n . These a l t e r n a t i v e s c o u l d i n c l u d e u s i n g
temporary deployments t o t h e r e g i o n o f land-based f i g h t e r u n i t s
or s u b s t i t u t i n g amphibious s u p p o r t s h i p s c a r r y i n g Marine Corps
AV-8B H a r r i e r f i g h t e r s .
General Hoar was born on December 30, 1934, i n Boston,
Massachusetts.
He was commissioned a second l i e u t e n a n t i n the
Marine Corps i n 1957, a f t e r g r a d u a t i o n from T u f t s U n i v e r s i t y , i n
Medford, Mass. He has a master's degree from George Washington
�U n i v e r s i t y , and has graduated from the N a t i o n a l War College. He
and h i s w i f e r e s i d e on M a c D i l l A i r Force Base, F l o r i d a . She i s a
licensed psychologist.
A d m i r a l Charles Larson
Command (PACCOM).
(Navy).
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. P a c i f i c
A d m i r a l Larson i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r 36,500 personnel i n Korea and
46,000 i n Japan. When you v i s i t e d w i t h him i n Hawaii, he a l s o
discussed the 180 people PACCOM has assigned i n Vietnam who are
seeking a f u l l a c c o u n t i n g o f our POW/MIAs. His focus i s on our
network o f b i l a t e r a l , v i c e m u l t i n a t i o n a l , s e c u r i t y r e l a t i o n s and
on c r i s i s response.
Major issues f a c i n g h i s Command i n c l u d e
n u c l e a r p r o l i f e r a t i o n i n North Korea, peacekeeping o p e r a t i o n s i n
Cambodia and h u m a n i t a r i a n o p e r a t i o n s on t h e s u b c o n t i n e n t . PACCOM
i s predominantly a m a r i t i m e t h e a t e r , so A d m i r a l Larson i s very
a c t i v e i n g a i n i n g and m a i n t a i n i n g access t o p o r t and base
f a c i l i t i e s throughout the region.
A d m i r a l Larson was born i n Sioux F a l l s , South Dakota on November
20, 1936.
He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy on June 4,
1958 and was d e s i g n a t e d a naval a v i a t o r i n 1960.
He was accepted
i n t o the nuclear-powered submarine program and graduated from the
Naval Submarine School i n 1964.
He was a White House Fellow i n
1968 and subsequently served as Naval Aide t o the P r e s i d e n t . He
a t t e n d e d the Senior E x e c u t i v e Course, JFK School o f Government,
Harvard U n i v e r s i t y .
General George Joulwan (Army).
Command (SOUTHCOM).
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern
General Joulwan i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r U.S. f o r c e s i n C e n t r a l and
South America. His focus i s on c o u n t e r d r u g o p e r a t i o n s , c r i s i s
response, n a t i o n a s s i s t a n c e ( i n c l u d i n g road b u i l d i n g t h r o u g h o u t
C e n t r a l and South America) and d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n ( i n c l u d i n g working
t o b u i l d an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the r o l e m i l i t a r y f o r c e s p l a y ) . He
i s working t o e f f e c t a smooth t u r n - o v e r o f the Panama Canal by
December 31, 1999.
He i s a l s o l o o k i n g a t o p t i o n s f o r a postt r a n s f e r r o l e f o r U.S. f o r c e s i n Panama.
General Joulwan was born November 16, 1939 i n P o t t s v i l l e
Pennsylvania.
He graduated from t h e U.S. M i l i t a r y Academy i n
1961.
He a l s o holds a MA degree i n P o l i t i c a l Science from Loyola
U n i v e r s i t y and i s a graduate o f t h e U.S. Army War C o l l e g e . He
and h i s w i f e r e s i d e a t Quarry H e i g h t s , Panama.
A d m i r a l Paul M i l l e r (Navy). Commander-in-Chief, U.S. A t l a n t i c
Command (LANTCOM) and NATO Supreme A l l i e d Commander, A t l a n t i c
(SACLANT).
When you met w i t h A d m i r a l M i l l e r d u r i n g your v i s i t t o the USS
Theodore Roosevelt, he d e s c r i b e d h i s new approach t o f l e x i b l e
f o r c e packaging - - a way t o m a i n t a i n U.S. presence abroad w i t h
s m a l l e r , j o i n t f o r c e s . He has been i n s t r u m e n t a l i n the
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
001. list
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
DOB (Partial) (1 page)
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RESTRICTION
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COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Press (Philip J. (PJ) Crowley)
OA/Box Number:
3104
FOLDER TITLE:
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2011-0516-S
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�f u n d a m e n t a l change i n the LANTCOM m i s s i o n r e s u l t i n g from t h e end
of t h e Cold War and i s i n the process o f t a k i n g on a new
m i s s i o n -- o r g a n i z i n g and t r a i n i n g a l l U.S. f o r c e s i n a u n i f i e d
way so t h a t t h e y can surge r a p i d l y t o s u p p o r t f o r w a r d d e p l o y e d
forces i n contingencies.
He i s a l s o d e v e l o p i n g p l a n s f o r
p o s s i b l e c o n t i n g e n c i e s i n v o l v i n g Cuba and H a i t i .
A d m i r a l M i l l e r was born
i n Roanoke, V i r g i n i a .
;
P6/(b)(6). : •
He r e c e i v e d a BS degree'trom F l o r i d a S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y i n 1963 and
MA degree from t h e U n i v e r s i t y of Georgia i n 1964.
He was
commissioned t h r o u g h the O f f i c e r Candidate School i n Newport, RI
i n December 1964.
He i s a s u r f a c e w a r f a r e o f f i c e r and has
completed t h e Harvard Business School E x e c u t i v e Management
Program.
i
General Lee B u t l e r ( A i r F o r c e ) .
S t r a t e g i c Command (STRATCOM).
Commander-in-Chief,
U.S.
General B u t l e r has overseen t h e merger o f A i r Force and Navy
s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s i n t o a s i n g l e command h e a d q u a r t e r e d i n Omaha.
Under t h i s new arrangement, command of STRATCOM's s t r a t e g i c
bombers, b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e submarines and ICBMs w i l l r o t a t e
between an A i r Force g e n e r a l and a Navy a d m i r a l .
G e n e r a l B u t l e r has a l s o been a major f o r c e b e h i n d many o f t h e
r e c e n t changes i n U.S. s t r a t e g i c p o s t u r e as t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and
Russia have moved back from t h e n u c l e a r p r e c i p i c e o f t h e Cold
War.
He i s p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned t h a t as we draw down our
s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s t r u c t u r e p u r s u a n t t o t h e START I and START I I
t r e a t i e s , we maximize t h e u t i l i t y o f our r e s i d u a l bomber f o r c e
f o r c o n v e n t i o n a l c o n t i n g e n c i e s w h i l e m a i n t a i n i n g an o v e r a l l
n u c l e a r d e t e r r e n t c a p a b i l i t y commensurate w i t h t h e changed
c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h e new i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y e n v i r o n m e n t .
Two i s s u e s General B u t l e r i s c u r r e n t l y s t u d y i n g w i t h p a r t i c u l a r
i n t e r e s t a r e p o s s i b l e changes i n U.S. n u c l e a r t a r g e t i n g p o l i c y
and t h e r e l e v a n c e o f U.S. n u c l e a r c a p a b i l i t i e s i n d e t e r r i n g
p o s s i b l e s m a l l - s c a l e n u c l e a r t h r e a t s from f u t u r e T h i r d World
n u c l e a r s t a t e s . You might e x p l o r e these themes w i t h G e n e r a l
B u t l e r d u r i n g your d i s c u s s i o n s .
G e n e r a l B u t l e r was born June 17, 1939 a t F o r t Benning, GA and
g r a d u a t e d i n 1957 from Washington - Lee High School, A r l i n g t o n , VA.
He earned a BS degree from t h e U.S. A i r Force Academy i n 1961 and
a master's degree i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s from t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f
P a r i s i n 1967.
He i s a p i l o t and has f l o w n b o t h f i g h t e r and
bomber a i r c r a f t .
G e n e r a l Chuck Horner ( A i r F o r c e ) .
Command (SPACECOM).
Commander-in-Chief, U.S.
Space
General Horner commands a l l U.S. m i l i t a r y space a s s e t s and space
s u r v e i l l a n c e systems, i n c l u d i n g t h e s a t e l l i t e s and ground-based
r a d a r s t h a t would p r o v i d e w a r n i n g o f m i s s i l e a t t a c k . He a l s o has
�a p r i n c i p a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r r e f l e c t i n g the m i l i t a r y ' s
p e r s p e c t i v e on b a s i c U.S. p o l i c y issues r e l a t i n g t o space. I n
a d d i t i o n , General Horner c o o r d i n a t e s t h e use o f commercial and
m i l i t a r y space launch p l a t f o r m s and m o n i t o r s t h e p r o g r e s s o f t h e
space programs i n o t h e r c o u n t r i e s .
General Horner was born October 19, 1936 i n Davenport, Iowa and
graduated from Urbandale High School, Des Moines, Iowa i n 1954.
He earned a BA degree from t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f Iowa i n 1958 and
earned h i s p i l o t wings i n November 1959.
He a l s o earned a MA i n
business a d m i n i s t r a t i o n from t h e College o f W i l l i a m and Mary i n
1972 .
General Donald Fogleman ( A i r F o r c e ) .
T r a n s p o r t a t i o n Command (TRANSCOM).
Commander-in-Chief, U.S.
General Fogelman i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e movement o f t h e
equipment, troops and s u p p l i e s f o r a l l U.S. f o r c e s .
In this
r e g a r d , he i s w o r k i n g t o improve s t r a t e g i c a i r and s e a l i f t
t h r o u g h programs such as t h e C-17, t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f new
s e a l i f t s h i p s and t h e m o d i f i c a t i o n o f e x i s t i n g s h i p s f o r m i l i t a r y
purposes.
General Fogleman was born January 27, 1942 i n Lewistown, PA, and
graduated from J u n i a t a J o i n t High School, M i f f l i n t o w n , PA i n
1959.
He earned a BS degree from t h e U.S. A i r Force Academy i n
1963 and completed p i l o t t r a i n i n g i n 1965.
He a l s o earned a
master's degree i n m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y and p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e from
Duke U n i v e r s i t y i n 1970 and i s a graduate o f t h e U.S> Army War
College.
General Wayne Downing (Army).
Operations Command (SOCCOM).
Commander-in-Chief, S p e c i a l
General Downing commands t h e s p e c i a l f o r c e s o f a l l m i l i t a r y
s e r v i c e s and ensures t h a t t h e U.S. has t h e r i g h t mix o f f o r c e s ,
equipment, l i n g u i s t i c c a p a b i l i t i e s and procedures t o conduct
o p e r a t i o n s a t lower l e v e l s o f c o n f l i c t .
General Downing was born May 10, 1940 i n P e o r i a , I l l i n o i s .
He
graduated from t h e U.S. M i l i t a r y Academy i n 1962 became an
Infantry Officer.
He a l s o holds an MBA degree i n O p e r a t i o n s
Research from Tulane U n i v e r s i t y and i s a graduate o f t h e A i r War
C o l l e g e . He and h i s w i f e l i v e a t M a c D i l l A i r Force Base,
Florida.
General Dennis Reimer (Army).
Command (FORSCOM).
Commander-in-Chief, Forces
General Reimer i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r Army f o r c e s based i n t h e
C o n t i n e n t a l U n i t e d S t a t e s (CONUS). His i s s u e s o f concern i n c l u d e
t h e drawdown i n t h e number o f Army p e r s o n n e l , base c l o s u r e s and
s e c u r i n g access t o t r a i n i n g f a c i l i t i e s f o r U.S. a c t i v e , Reserve
and N a t i o n a l Guard f o r c e s . These r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s w i l l a l l be
�t r a n s f e r r e d t o LANTCOM under a new command arrangement being
proposed by JCS.
General Reimer was born J u l y 12, 1939 i n Enid Oklahoma, but he
h a i l s from Medford, Oklahoma. He graduated from the U.S.
M i l i t a r y Academy w i t h a BS degree i n m i l i t a r y science i n 1962.
He a l s o holds an MS degree i n p u b l i c a d m i n i s t r a t i o n from
Shippensburg S t a t e College and i s a graduate o f the U.S. Army War
C o l l e g e . He and h i s w i f e l i v e a t F o r t McPherson, GA.
General Gary Luck (Army). Commander-in-Chief, U n i t e d Nations
Command Korea and Commander o f U.S. Forces Korea.
As you were b r i e f e d when you v i s i t e d h i s command i n Korea,
General Luck i s seeking t o t r a n s f e r some U.S. f a c i l i t i e s i n Korea
and some command r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f o r t h e defense o f the Republic
of Korea t o the South Koreans. He i s a l s o p r i m a r i l y engaged w i t h
the issue o f North Korea n u c l e a r p r o l i f e r a t i o n .
General Luck was born August 5, 1937 i n Alma, Michigan. He
graduated from Kansas S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y and r e c e i v e d h i s
commission t h r o u g h the Reserve O f f i c e r T r a i n i n g Program i n 1960.
He a l s o holds an MBA degree from F l o r i d a S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y and a
PhD i n o p e r a t i o n s r e s e a r c h and i n f o r m a t i o n technology from George
Washington U n i v e r s i t y , and i s a graduate o f t h e U.S. Army War
College.
A d m i r a l B i l l Smith
M i l i t a r y Command.
(Navy).
U.S. R e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o the NATO
A d m i r a l Smith i s t h e s e n i o r U.S. m i l i t a r y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o NATO
headquarters.
He has been f o c u s i n g on t h e r o l e o f NATO i n
peacekeeping o p e r a t i o n s i n Bosnia.
He i s a l s o t r y i n g t o d e f i n e
the r o l e o f NATO i n t h e new s e c u r i t y environment and t o
establishment m i l i t a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h other m u l t i n a t i o n a l
o r g a n i z a t i o n s , such as the WEU and CSCE.
A d m i r a l Smith was born on February 9, 1933 i n Denver, Colorado.
He graduated from t h e U.S. Naval Academy and was commissioned an
Ensign on June 3, 1955.
He subsequently completed Naval
Submarine School i n 1958 and Nuclear Power T r a i n i n g i n 1961.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Office of Press and Communications - Philip J. “P.J.” Crowley
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36076">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2011-0516-S
Description
An account of the resource
This collection consists of White House press releases from the files of P.J. Crowley. Crowley served as Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Senior Director of Public Affairs the National Security Council from 1997–1999. The press releases are arranged by subject or, as in the case of the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, by date.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Extent
The size or duration of the resource.
370 folders in 33 boxes
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Department of Defense [3]
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Office of Press and Communications
Philip "PJ" Crowley
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2011-0516-S
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Box 5
<a href="http://catalog.archives.gov/id/7585702"></a>
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36076">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
7585702
42-t-7585702-20110516s-005-014-2015
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Format
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Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
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Preservation-Reproduction-Reference