-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/009160a3103a77b1eda7a69186e690bf.pdf
1bf0878429e7de1b87a085c3cb243657
PDF Text
Text
FOIA Number: 2014-0045-F
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the William J. Clinton
Presidential Library Staff.
Collection/Record Group:
Clinton Presidential Records
Subgroup/Office of Origin:
Records Management - SUBJECT FILE
Series/Staff Member:
Subject Files
Subseries:
OA/ID Number:
100665
Scan ID:
041893 [Note to Begala]
Document Number:
Folder Title:
FG006-01
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
S
88
6
5
5
�THE WHITE
HOUSE
OA
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Paul Begala
329 Maryland Avenue, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002
�Ca'rl'Hie& Begala
MEMORANDUM
TO:
Mack MacLarty
George Stephanopoulos
David Gergen
Maggie Williams
Roy Neel
Mark Gearan
Dee Dee Myers
Maria Romash
Jack Quinn
Stan Greenberg
Mandy Grunwald
Rahm Emanuel
Joan Baggett
Marcia Hale
FROM:
RE:
DATE:
Paul Begala
Margaret Thatcher and the Politics of Conviction & Compromise
August 30, 1993
Pleasefindattached a copy of a memo by Philip Gould on Margaret Thatcher's first year.
Philip, you may recall, is a British political consultant who advised the campaign. His
memo is interesting reading - and includes some very useful insights on rhetoric and strategy.
329 Maryland Avenue NE
Washington, D.C. 20002
PHONE: (202) 543-1196
FAX: (202) 546-1490
�GaryiHe & Begala
MEMORANDUM
TO:
Mack MacLarty
George Stephanopoulos
David Gergen
Maggie Williams
Roy Neel
Mark Gearan
Dee Dee Myers
Maria Romash
Jack Quinn
Stan Greenberg
Mandy Grunwald
Rahm Emanuel
Joan Baggett
Marcia Hale
FROM:
RE:
DATE:
Paul Begala
Margaret Thatcher and the Politics of Conviction & Compromise
August 30, 1993
Pleasefindattached a copy of a memo by Philip Gould on Margaret Thatcher's first year.
Philip, you may recall, is a British political consultant who advised the campaign. His
memo is interesting reading - and includes some very useful insights on rhetoric and strategy.
329 Maryland Avenue NE
Washington, D.C. 20002
PHONE: (202) 543-1196
FAX: (202) 546-1490
�LI P
i^ffy
O OiU L D
A'? 8 O C I A T B 8
THATCHERS FIRST YEAR:
I D E O L O G Y . R H E T O R I C AND T A C T I C S
l . Summary
Prime Minister Thatcher's first year was characterised by a continuing
conflict between the instincts of the political visionary and the instincts of
the gut politician. Her objectives and her rhetoric were alwaysradicaland
unflinching, but her tactics were often cautious and pragmatic. However,
on core issues where compromise was impossible she took intransigent,
unyeilding positions and braved the consequences, whatever the reaction.
She performed frequent U-tums, but in characteristic style; she would
approach the U-tum adopting one position with apparent conviction, and
then take a precisely opposite direction with equal certainty and
confidence. She did not apologise, and never softened the rigour of her
rhetoric, whatever the pragmatism of her actions.
Despite her later reputation, she was not considered a successful Prime
Minister until at least year three of her first four year term. In 1981 the
political editor of the Financial Times described her as "weak" and her poll
rating plummeted to the lowest level in recorded history.
The secret of Thatcher's success was:
The political skill to know when to advance with intransigence,
when to advance with stealth, and when to retreat.
The presentational skill to mask political pragmatism with
uncompromising, unflinching rhetoric.
A bedrock ideology that drove and sustained her government
through continuing intense hostility.
COWLEY HOUSK. 9 L I T T L E COLLEGE STREET. L O N D O . ^ S W 1 P 3.XS T E L E P H O N E
: T 3 - 2 I * *«66
FAX . > " : - J 3 3 t'S 1 !
�2.
Thatcher's Method
Thatcher operated on three levels:
her ideology;
her style and rhetoric;
her tactics.
This is illustrated infigure(1).
a)
Thatcher's Ideology
Thatcher probably had a stronger and more rigid set of values
and ideology than any other post-war Western leader. This not only
gave her administration a direction and constancy, it gave her the
confidence to be able to make tacticalretreatswhere necessary.
Her ideology was a reaction to the welfarist, collectivised consensus
that had dominated British politics since the war.
The main elements of Thatcher's ideology were:
A reduction in the role of the state, a shift to the power
of the individual;
A reduction in the levels of taxation (marginal/top rates
were at 83%), an increase in personal incentive;
Curbing trade union power.
Cutting public expenditure;
The elimination of inflation by establishing tough and
precise monetary targets;
An end to consensus politics, their replacement by adversarial
politics;
The application of the principles of "good housekeeping" to
the national economy: "thrift", "prudence", "balanced
budgets", "not spending what you cannot afford".
�When she became Prime Minister most of these ideas were
revolutionary. She was determined to achieve a complete sea-change
in the direction of British politics and society, and in the state of
Britain's fortunes.
Thatcher did not achieve all of her objectives, but she achieved
many of them. And there is no doubt that in the extraordinarily
hostile political environment she inhabited for the first three years of
her premiership, it was her values and ideology that enabled her
Government to survive and eventually succeed.
b)
Thatcher's Style and Rhetoric
Thatcher's style and rhetoric matched her ideology. It was
radical, unflinching, adversarial:"Unless we change our ways and our direction we will soon
be a footnote in the history books, like Came/of, remembered
kindly for a noble past
May 1979
"It is a Herculean task. But we are not fainthearted pilgrims. We
will not be defeated by a stony path".
N V 1979
O
"Conviction " is "in mv bones " and "in my mind" • to take a step
backwards would be "absolutely fatal".
July 1989
"You turn if you want. The Lady's not for turning".
Oct. 1980
Radical rhetoric was supported by symbolic examples of her
toughness. This was called (by her) the "demonstration effect".
Examples were the humiliation of one of her cabinet colleagues who
had stepped out of line, and an apparently tough line with the steel
workers in 1980 (although in reality she compromised).
�c)
Thatcher's Tactics
Beneath the unflinching radicalism of her ideology, and of her
rhetoric, and the salutory influence of her "demonstration effects",
Thatcher had three prime politic tactics: intransigence, stealth and
retreat.
i)
Intransigence
To Thatcher, the economy was crucial and on this she did not
compromise, and showed great political courage.
She was completely persuaded by her moneterist ideology, and
went about implementing it without quarter.
In her first budget in 1979 she cut public expenditure by £3.5
billion (after personally insisting that her Treasury minister
increase the cuts from the £0.5 billion he had initially
suggested), almost doubled Value Added Tax from 8 to
%
15%. increased interestratesfrom 12% to 14%. cut the top
rate of tax from 83% to 60% and the standard rate from 33%
to 30% and set a money supply target of 9%.
In the next budget in 1980 the money supply target was cut to
6%. and further public expenditure cuts were made, despite
the worsening recession.
And in 1981 in the teeth of what was by now the worst UK
post-war recession personal tax, indirect taxes and petrol tax
were increased, and further cuts of £3.5 billion made. This
budget defied all conventional economic wisdom and 364
economists wrote to the Times to dissent But Thatcher would
not be deferred or deflected, and despite enormous opposition
from all quarters, pressed on.
The only other significant area of policy where Thatcher
displayed uncompromising intransigence was in her
negotiations with the European Community. She constantly
hectored her priministerial colleagues, but into surly
resentment,ratherthan submission. However, she claimed
there were some times when a bulldozer was needed to break a
road block of attitudes. In the end, however (in 1991) it was
Europe that broke her.
�ii)
Stealth
The economy and the European Community were the only
major areas where Thatcher avoided compromise. In nearly
all other areas she attempted to achieve policy objectives by a
strategy of stealth.
Trade Unions
Thatcher did not try to take the trade unions on directly.
She appointed as Employment Minister James Prior, her
most pro-labour minister, and initially introduced
legislation that only marginally constricted the powers
of unions. But through classic "salami cutting tactics",
she progressively introduced tougher and tougher
legislation, until by 1990 she had achieved the most
restrictive trade union legislation in Europe.
The Miners
A similar strategy was used with the coal miners, whose
1974 strike had brought down the previous
Conservative administration. Rather than take on the
miners on their terms in 1981, the Government backed
down. However, secretly Thatcher arranged for
massive coal stocks to be built, alternative energy
sources to be made available, and she waited until 1984
to provoke the miners into humiliating defeat, with now
only a few pitsremainingopen.
The Cabinet
Despite advice to the contrary, Thatcher initially refused
to pick a cabinet of her own making, accepting for the
first year that die would be in a minority in her own
team. But as her position strengthened she gradually
and ruthlessly eliminated her political opponents,
leaving only token and insignificant opposition.
Civil Service
Here also Thatcher was cautious, rejecting advice to take
on the civil service from the start In her first year she
accepted the Civil Service she had inherited, but moved
gradually to control it, "slowly neutralising the
resistance of the bureaucracy".
�In all these cases Thatcher proceeded with caution, but with a
plan. She did not confront unnecessarily but moved only as
quickly as her power base allowed. But despite the subtlety of
her tactics, her control over all these powerful institutions and
organisations eventually became all but absolute.
iii) Retreat
Despite her protestations to the contrary, Thatcher was
constantly performing U-tums, most noticably on Rhodesia,
the British National Oil Corporation and immigration.
Thatcher's approach to U-tums was characteristic. She did not
apologise for a U-tum. nor even admit that it had happened.
She simply adopted the new position with the same gusto that
only hours or davs earlier she had shown for the other one.
The best example of this was Rhodesia, where Thatcher had
long been a supporter of the Muzorewa regime (backed by
Ian Smith and the white minority) and an opponent of Robert
Mugabe and the nationalist Patriotic Front, who she had
earlier compared to the IRA.
When persuaded by Lord Carrington, her foreign secretary,
that Britain's strategic interests lay with the Patriotic Front,
she changed tack: T o the astonishment of those involved,
having totally changed her position, Mrs Thatcher now became
an even greater enthusiast for a settlement involving the
Patriotic Front than Lord Carrington himseir.
�THE THATCHER METHOD
IDEOLOGY
Strongly held personal ideology:
anti-welfare, anti-state, anti-unions,
anti-tax, anti-public expenditure.
Pro-monetarism, pro individualism.
I
RHETORIC
Confident, resolute, unyielding,
adversarial.
The lady's not for turning"
"We are not fainthearted pilgrims'
1
INTRANSIGENCE
REIREAI
Economic policy
European Community
Negotiations
Fig. 1.
SIEALIH
Cabinet selection
Trade union reform
Coal miners
Civil serice
U-tums on:
• Rhodesia
• BNOL
• Immigration
�3.
Thatcher's First Year: The Contemporary
Assessment
Thatcher's first year was not a triumph; she was frequently and repeatedly
written-off. Malcolm Rutherford, Political Editor of the Financial Times
said in February 1980 (see attached article):
"Mrs Thatcher is turning out to be a weak Prime Minister".
"The Government is ill-organised and weakly led".
"Mrs Thatcher so far is neither a strong, nor a consistent Prime
Minister.
Hugh Stevenson, in a contemporary account of Mrs Thatcher's first year,
said:'7/1 February 1980 the crisis of confidence in Mrs Thatcher became
increasingly public... Her Government appeared to be falling apart As so
often happens when such a mood takes hold, individual episodes take on
unusual importance".
Hugo Young, her biographer, wrote:The 1981 party conference opened in a continuing atmosphere of strife
and doom. For the previous three months the Government had scored no
more than 30% in the opinion polls".
John Biffen (a Cabinet Minister) said that the Government was "within
touching distance of the debacles of1906 and 1945".
"In December 1981 Thatcher became the most unpopular Prime
Minister since polling began" (only 23% saying she was doing a goodjob).
'For most of 1981...there remained the idea that she might be
obligated to depart".
Thatcher's response to all this was to relish it, only happy when in
combat: '1 am therebelleader of an establishment Government". However,
the most unpopular Prime Minister in history became eventually the most
long-standing and arguably the most successful peacetime Conservative
Prime Minister of the century. But it took her three years of intense and
unremitting hostility before the tide began to turn.
�4^ The U.S. and the U K: Differences & Implications
i)
Differences;
a)
Mrs Thatcher had a substantial parliamentary majority, and
had no difficulty getting her legislation through. She did not
have to compromise on her economic proposals.
b)
Mrs Thatcher was at heart an adverserial politician who
wanted to achieve change through confrontation. This was
effective in the early 1980s, but its long run success is highly
questionable, and has left a legacy of national bitterness.
President Clinton wants to achieve change through consensus,
which is the model for successful change for example, in most
of Europe.
c)
Thatcher's ideological project was more simplistically certain,
than that available to President Clinton or any other
progressive politician of the 1990s. The changes that are
needed now - economic restructuring, investment, skills,
welfare reform - are simply not amenable to the
uncomplicated certainties of Thatcher and her contemporaries.
ii) Implications
a)
Successful governments need:-
m gxplicit set of values and beliefs that both drive the
administration towards a mutually agreed goal, and sustain the
administration through periods of unpopularity.
a confident consistent rhetoric that is true to the beliefs and
values of the administration, even when short-term political
manoevering is necessary.
astute and adroit political tactics that know when to advance
without compromise, when to proceed with caution and when
to retreat
b)
Confrontation may succeed in the short-term, but for change
to stick, it has to be supported over time.
8
�5. Conclusions
nhatcher succeeded because;
1.
She had a coherent and strongly held ideology and set of values.
2.
She knew when to advance with intransigence, when to proceed with
caution and stealth, and when to retreat
3.
She maintained a public rhetoric of unflinching radicalism, and
unyielding consistency, despite frequent pragmatism and occasional
defeat.
4.
When making a U-tum, she adopted her new position with the same
gusto and enthusiasm as the last one.
5.
She focused on the economy and did not compromise.
6.
She was prepared to weather three years of intense unpopularity
before the tide turned in her favour.
7.
In Summary: she was intransigent where necessary, pragmatic where
possible and rhetorically certain always. If there is one key to her
success it was the values and ideology that drove and sustained her.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Margaret Thatcher
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
White House Office of Records Managment
National Security Council Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47953">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2014-0045-F
Description
An account of the resource
This collection consists of records mentioning former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher who left office two years prior to the beginning of the Clinton Administration. The records consist of congressional correspondence, greeting cards, letters, memos, notes, and routing forms. Topics cover congratulations, greetings, invitations, the general secretariats of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United Nations, and the North American Free Trade Agreement.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: WHORM: Subject File
Clinton Presidential Records: WHORM Unclassified NSC Records Management System
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Extent
The size or duration of the resource.
15 folders in 1 box
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
041893 [Note to Begala]
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
White House Office of Records Management
Subject File
FG006-01
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2014-0045-F
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Box 1
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/1127610">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47953">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
1127610
42-t-1127610-20140045F-001-001-2015
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Office of Records Management
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/11/2015