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Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full.
�OONriDCNTIAfc
YELTSIN AND THE STYLE OF RUSSIAN POLITICS
This note examines the background to Yeltsin's problems with the
Russian parliament, and makes some suggestions.
The old Soviet Union was a system of networking par excellence.
Those who rose to the top were very skilled politicians indeed.
The formal structures of the Soviet Union - the "most democratic
Constitution in history", a directly elected Supreme Soviet, a Government with
a Prime Minister and the normal complement of Ministers, a network of
elected local bodies, and a full panoply of courts - all mimicked the institutions
of a modern liberal state. They were all of course a sham.
The real network of power was the Communist Party, its Regional
Secretaries, its Central Committee, the Politburo, and - with near dictatorial
power - the General Secretary. Its "leading role" was enshrined in Brezhnev's
revised constitution. But from the start it rigged every election, approved every
appointment in industry as well as the administration, shadowed the
Government at each turning. Whatever the formal appearances, nobody in the
Soviet Union was ever in any doubt about where the real power lay.
Russia has no tradition of constitutional limits on the power of the
executive, or of the rule of law: the Russian Chief of Police said in the 1830s
that "Laws are written for underlings, not for their bosses". The central political
proposition is that of autocracy ("tempered by assassination", as a 19th
century observer remarked). Both the Tsars and the General Secretaries were
careful to ensure that none of their advisers could combine to limit their power.
They surrounded themselves with cronies - the Tsar's courtiers, Stalin's
Georgian mafia, Brezhnev's Ukrainians - and deliberately set out to provoke
rivalry amongst their entourage. There was no orderly system of Cabinet, nor
even a properly organised secretariat for the autocrat himself. Business was
conducted on the basis of personal relationships, intrigue in smoke filled
rooms, and - in this century - with the bullet and on the telephone.
During the Communist period the Party structure provided a readymade basis for networking throughout the country . It served for the conduct
of corrupt business as well as politics. The typical Russian political
phenomenon - in politics and in business - is the antechamber full of
petitioners. It is the atmosphere which surrounded a mediaeval or Middle
Eastern monarch. For all his break with the past, Gorbachev's style was
merely a comparatively benign version of the way in which previous General
Secretaries had run the Soviet Union.
Yeltsin, who is the same age as Gorbachev, grew up in the same
tradition. His career differed little from that of any other Party bureaucrat:
powerful regional boss, brought to Moscow in mid-career by the whim of the
General Secretary, bringing his cronies with him from Sverdlovsk. His political
style at that time was old-fashioned: bullying, impetuous, autocratic. To get
where he did, he must have used the techniques of Communist networking as
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well as the next man. But his challenge to the Politburo in 1987, and
Gorbachev's unprecedented willingness to let him retain a political foothold in
Moscow, marked a crucial break with the Russian and Communist political
tradition, which has never admitted the concept of a loyal opposition. Bukharin
once remarked :"Of course we could have a two party system in Russia: but
one party would be in power, and the other in prison". Gorbachev's reluctant
willingness to accept that this tradition could change may turn out to be one of
his main achievements.
Yeltsin played his role as leader of the "loyal opposition" from 1987 to
1991 with great skill. He was the object of a black propaganda campaign by
Gorbachev designed to show that he was an irresponsible and erratic drunk.
Not all the accusations were unjustified. But he was successful in distancing
himself increasingly from the Party and appealing to Russian patriotic
sentiment, while avoiding capture by the forces of virulent chauvinism and
anti-Semitism which in Russia are never far befbw the surface. Ordinary
Russians loved him precisely because he got drunk, fell into rivers, and hated
the Communists - just like they did.
The problem today is that the decay of the networks provided by the
Communist Party state within a state has not yet been matched by the growth
of robust new political organisations on a national scale. At one time
Gorbachev toyed with the idea of splitting the Communist Party into its liberal
and conservative fractions, thus creating the basis of a two party system. The
reactionaries within the Party prevented him; while the liberal politicians
surrounding him - Shevarnadze, Yakovlev and others - failed to ally
themselves effectively with the democrats who had got together into loose
political groupings distinguished more by common anti-Communist rhetoric
than by practicable common policy programmes.
Yeltsin has found the problem of politicking in the post-Communist
world as difficult as Gorbachev did. There are no set structures and none of
the organisational discipline formerly imposed by the rigid hierarchies of the
Party: only the struggle for dominance between individuals and groups, and
between Moscow and the provinces. Ever since Yeltsin came to power at the
end of 1991 people have suggested forming a "President's party", or an
effective democratic party, which could articulate and push through a coherent
policy of reform. During the Congress last December Yeltsin announced that
he would now set up such party.
Nothing has yet come of it, for reasons which run deep. First, and most
important, the lack of a democratic tradition means that Russians have no
experience of setting up parties rather than conspiracies. The democratic
experiment before the First World War failed partly because the democratic
parties spent most of their time quarrelling with oneanother: the democratic
groupings in the Supreme Soviet are doing the same. Second, many Russians
rationalise this failure on the grounds that Russia has had too much Party
government in the last seventy years, and that any attempt to create an
effective new party will therefore be deeply unpopular.
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The essence of the constitutional struggle in Russia at present is rather
different: it is whether the future political system should be "Presidential" or
"Parliamentary". There is an analogy with the struggle between King and
Parliament in England in the 17th century: it was only after this issue had
been settled in favour of Parliament that modern political parties began to
emerge in Britain. The same could be true in Russia.
In this contest, Yeltsin has not been ineffective. Like Gorbachev he
certainly spends a good deal of time - perhaps too much - meeting people
influential in current Russian politics. Operating through the "President's men"
in the Supreme Soviet he has at least held his own with his main opponent,
the Parliamentary speaker Khasbulatov. He remains vulnerable to biassed
and random advice from his cronies. He has recently sacked some of the
most unpopular. But he still cannot rely on a coherent and effective body of
support within the Supreme Soviet, and his popular appeal is inevitably
diminishing as life in Russia gets harder. His pdsition may not be much
restored even if the people support Presidential government in the referendum
in April, and even if the Parliamentary elections in 1995 sweep out the
Communist old guard who were elected in 1990.
What can we do to help?
What follows is based on the assumption that it is in the West's interest
that Russia should not descend into chaos, or reconstitute itself under an
authoritarian and potentially aggressive regime.
Genuine political and economic progress in Russia depend on
fundamental changes in the political culture. But significant qualitative change
is already occurring: the people are now almost universally literate, they live in
cities instead of villages, and they are in contact with the outside world
through travel, television, radio, and the press. There is a great difference
between the Soviet Union in Khrushchev's time and Russia today. Despite the
difficulties Russia now faces, all this provides some ground for hope that
Russia may indeed be at the beginning of an historic process of modernisation
and that a reversion to old patterns of authoritarianism - the nightmare of
liberal Russians - will be averted.
There is not all that much that foreigners can do to promote institutional
change directly, and not much we can do to teach Yeltsin about political
infighting in Moscow. The Russians are if anything getting too much advice.
The ultra nationalists claim that the reformers are selling out to the West,
which is simply exploiting Russia's present weakness for its own ends. There
is the risk of a backlash.
But that does not mean we have to stand idly by. Western political
mechanisms cannot of course be applied directly even in a chanaina Russian
reality. But good and tactfully managed schemes are already in place: to give
the ablest younger Russians - the rising politicians as well as journalists,
academics, and people from the infant world of Russian commerce and
finance - the opportunity to work and study in the West; to provide technical
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assistance and training programmes in Russia itself; and to offer discreet
advice on Parliamentary and political management. One such scheme - on the
reorganisation of central government machinery - draws on expertise from
several European countries and had the backing of Yeltsin's Chief of Staff,
Yuri Petrov, who has unfortunately recently been sacked. Another modest
scheme is successfully helping the Russians to set up a nationwide
employment service: vital when economic reform inevitably brings
unemployment in its wake. Such schemes need to be multiplied, not only in
Moscow but in the provinces as well.
The West must also continue to support the economic reform. This
involves not only the provision of humanitarian aid (a short term alleviation of
the hardship which reform brings), financial assistance, and debt relief. It also
requires policy advice which takes full account of the Russian reality. Some of
the advice which has been provided hitherto, by the IMF and others, has been
dangerously superficial in its concentration on macroeconomic issues and its
failure to grapple with the hideous difficulty of dismantling the Soviet Union's
rustbowl defence industry. This accounted for a substantial proportion of the
Soviet economy. An orderly scheme of restructuring, offering the hope of
alternative employment to the millions of skilled and unskilled people who
work in the sector, is a political as well as an economic imperative. The failure
by Gaidar and his Western advisers to propose a convincing scheme helped
to give the reactionaries their chance at the recent Congress. Western
governments, who find it hard enough to dismantle their own rustbowl
industries, should be well able to appreciate the underlying politics.
More broadly, we need to help the reformers in Russia demonstrate to
their reactionary critics that cooperation with the West is not turning Russia
into a mere satellite. It is very important that we should treat Russia as a
great, if not a super, power; that we should ensure that Russia is seen to be
fully involved in the international decisionmaking process on the great issues
such as Bosnia and Iraq; and that the Russian leadership - particularly Yeltsin,
Foreign Minister Kozyrev, and Defence Minister Grachev - should be seen by
their own people to be treated as full equals by their Western counterparts.
Gorbachev was greatly damaged in his last year in power by the popular
perception in Russia that he had become a mendicant of the West.
London, 12 January 1993
S i r Rodric Quentin B r a i t h w a i t e
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�BR CECIUDT
This infonnation has bsen conununicated in oonfit.ko.cas
to the United States Govommer.i cad should not bo
released without tho agresraent of tho British Government
British Embassy
Washington
3100 Massachusetts Avenue N.W.
Washington D.C. 20008-3600
21 September 1993
Telephone: (202) 898-4292
Facsimile: (202) 8984255
The Honorable
Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Room 1 W
/W
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue N
W
Washington D. C. 20500
From The Ambassador
I have been asked by the Prime Minister to pass to the
President the enclosed message on the GATT.
Tbis infonnation has beou coauxiiiDicated in aanfidenoa
to the United Statoa Govaremeai asd abouid not be
release without tho agrc^anJ of tho British Govermmmi
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MESSAGE DATED 21 SEPTEMBER 1993
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
TO PRESIDENT CLINTON
Dear B i l l ,
I t was u s e f u l t o have the chance o f a word about GATT
when you telephoned from A i r Force One the other day.
This
comes from a DC-10 between Tokyo and Kuala Lumpur!
As I was leaving Tokyo t h i s morning, I heard the outcome
of the "Jumbo" Council meeting i n Brussels a t which Douglas
Kurd and G i l l i a n Shepherd represented us.
I t c l e a r l y took
them a l o t of hard pounding, l a t e i n t o the n i g h t , t o get an
acceptable r e s u l t and make sure t h a t B l a i r House was not
re-opened.
I t was undoubtedly h e l p f u l t h a t you had
personally dissuaded a number o f European Community heads
from going down t h a t road.
Douglas w i l l be able t o explain the background more
f u l l y t o Warren Christopher i n t h e i r meetings t h i s week i n
Washington.
We are s t i l l on t r a c k f o r a conclusion w i t h i n
the 15 December deadline, provided t h a t we s t i c k t o the l i n e s
which you and I agreed t o be e s s e n t i a l .
Nothing I have heard
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in Japan, and nothing I have seen about the state of the
world's economy, causes me to doubt the c r u c i a l importance of
succeeding, however d i f f i c u l t the end game w i l l be for
different countries and constituencies.
The key points to emerge in the Brussels conclusions are
that there i s no mention of re-opening the B l a i r House
Agreement : the European Community has renewed i t s commitment
to completion by mid-December; the Community's negotiators Leon Brittan and h i s colleagues in the European Commission have not been given a different mandate or fettered; the way
i s clear for the renewal of the multilateral negotiating
process which Peter Sutherland i s driving forward i n Geneva
andf to which Leon Brittan i s anxious to give new impetus.
But, while we have evidently avoided a fundamental
show-down with the French on t h i s occasion, we certainly
cannot take their eventual agreement for granted.
Edouard
Balladur w i l l have genuine p o l i t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s i n carrying
his government through to f i n a l agreement.
The most powerful
figure in h i s own party, Jacques Chirac, veers towards
protectionism, and talks of the "desertification of France".
The President of the National Assembly, Seguin, i s France's
leading anti-European.
steam there.
There i s a huge head of p o l i t i c a l
Balladur w i l l remain under enormous pressure to
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to the United States <^pi£0>M, a^d should not be
do whatever he can to appease the farmers and the larger
number of other French people who passionately support the
farmers.
There seems to be l i t t l e effective counterweight
from the French interests which stand to benefit from an
agreement.
I understand that the next step i s for Leon Brittan to
meet Mickey Kantor again on 27 September to explore ways i n
which, while preserving B l a i r House, we can help France to
climb down, though i t w i l l be far from easy.
Just as you
were not bluffing when you warned the Community against
re-opening B l a i r House, I am sure that the French are serious
in saying that they need something more than mere cosmetics
i f they are to carry the necessary degree of p o l i t i c a l
support.
Indeed, one has only to look at the situation in
France to see how d i f f i c u l t i t w i l l be for the French
Government to climb down, though they did pull back
substantially at the Jumbo Council from the more extreme
positions they had adopted in advance.
I had a most interesting few days in Tokyo.
Hosokawa i s
out of a different mould, and the p o l i t i c a l environment has
changed considerably even since we were there in July.
Hosokawa i s c l e a r l y s t i l l feeling h i s way on international
questions, which i s no surprise after only s i x weeks.
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to the United States Govsinriaat and should noi be
loleased without the agi^meni ol t-ie British Govemmc-st
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i s absolutely determined to press ahead with p o l i t i c a l reform
as h i s highest p r i o r i t y , and in a s l i g h t l y more cautious way
i s moving on the economic front.
He could not have been more
friendly, and i s deliberately adopting a more informal s t y l e .
I talked to him at length about GATT.
I t i s a p r i o r i t y for
the Japanese Government, and I got a clear sense that at the
eleventh hour they w i l l do what they have to on r i c e .
He and
his colleagues stresses their attachment, as an exporting
nation, to free trade as well as their intention to continue
opening up the Japanese market.
I think we have now reached the point where a l l the
Geneva participants can reasonably be asked to put their
remaining offers on the table and press ahead for the widest
possible settlement by mid-December.
to t h i s end.
I s h a l l bend my efforts
I am sure that you w i l l do the same.
Yours sincerely,
John
Timi. iafonnation his been cwinsnraicato'd in coxiLd.:
to tha. United States Govoicjnont and should noi bo
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British Embassy
Washington
3100 Massachusetu Avenue N.W.
Washington D.C. 20008-3600
13 October 1993
Telephone: (202) 898-4292
Facsimile: (202) 898-4255
The Honorable
Anthony Lake
Assistant t o t h e President f o r
National Security A f f a i r s
Room 1 W
/W
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue N
W
Washington D. C. 20500
From Tkt Ambattador
I have been asked t o pass t o you the enclosed message
from the Prime M i n i s t e r t o the President about COCOM.
Robin RenvicJc
cc : The Hon. Warren Christopher
Secretary of State
CLINTON LIBRARY
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MESSAGE DATED 12 OCTOBER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
TO PRESIDENT CLINTON
Thank you for your message of 9 September about the
phasing out of C C M and about the need for tighter
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international controls on arms exports and on exports of
sensitive technology.
I agree with you that the time has cone to bring an end
to C C M I t served us well during the Cold War. But
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COCOM's complex procedures are no longer necessary for
managing our trade with Russia, or the other former Communist
countries. I think we can a l l agree that decisions on
sensitive exports to these countries should be a matter for
national discretion, as they are for the rest of the world.
You are right that great caution has to be exercised
with those states which present a threat to international
stability, such as Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea. The
United Kingdoa already operates extremely restrictive
policiss to a l l these destinations, as regards both weapons
and dual-use goods. W recently tightened our controls on
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Iran s t i l l further. But we would be happy to join in
international discussions to ensure that a l l the major
DECLASSIFIED suppliers apply equally tough standards.
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Like you, I believe that, as C C M i s phased out, new
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goods exported by western countries. These should ensure a
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�This iniormatioa has
coi.'un-jsicctad in confidence
to the United States Govenuncnt and should not be
released without the afifieemeni ci iho Britiah Govemmeni
continuing common basis f o r our n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l s and allow
them t o be applied, when necessary, elsewhere i n the world.
I also agree t h a t any new arrangements should be designed t o
e n l i s t the cooperation of the former Warsaw Pact countries.
But I hope t h a t whatever new arrangements we set up avoid any
more bureaucratic burdens on our business community. The
l a s t t h i n g our exporters need i s t o f i l l i n more forms.
On the r e l a t e d issue o f arms t r a n s f e r s , I t h i n k we
should t r y t o b u i l d up transparency both on a g l o b a l basis
( i n v o l v i n g the r e c i p i e n t s as w e l l as the s u p p l i e r s ) : and
through arrangements l i m i t e d t o the p r i n c i p a l arms exporters.
I remain committed t o b u i l d i n g up the UN r e g i s t e r - which I
have s t r o n g l y supported since the outset.
I am sympathetic t o the idea o f a new forum f o r the
p r i n c i p a l exporters. But we have t o t a r g e t our e f f o r t s
c a r e f u l l y . Western s u p p l i e r s generally act responsibly over
arms t r a n s f e r s . I t i s the p o l i c i e s o f other s u p p l i e r s such
as Russia, China, Ukraine, Poland and Slovakia which give us
r e a l cause f o r concern. Our aim should be t o f i n d a forum
which includes then from the s t a r t .
I see some p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s in using a successor
body to COCOM as t h i s new forum. The present COCOM
membership includes some countries which are l i k e l y i n
principle to be against almost a l l major arms transfers - to
the possible detriment of both your and our responsible arm
transfer p o l i c i e s .
A possible s o l u t i o n would be t o set up p a r a l l e l
procedures, w i t h i n the o v e r a l l framework o f the new
arrangements, f o r dealing w i t h the d i f f e r i n g requirements of
This infonnation has bsea comnrjnicatsd in oonfidenoe
CLINTON LIBRARY
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�This infonnation has been oonun-oniccted In oonfidence
to the United States Govamment and should not be
released without the agreai-.cr.: -: i'-.o Satish Government
trade in dual-use goods on the one hand and transfers of arms
on the other. In this structure consultations on arms
transfers could be limited to the principal Western and
Eastern suppliers and focus on the kind of major weapons
systems that are covered by the UN register.
I think an arrangement of this kind would meet our
common objectives in this area and I look forward to
continuing to work with you to achieve an effective
international system.
CLINTON LIBRARY
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LUtish Gov«n:-r : r i
-UK CONFIDENT I A L
�IO DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA
THE PRIME MINISTER
4 January 1995
We arc all beginning to look forward lo the Halifax Summit in June.
Our sherpas meet later this month to begin preparations. They will be
considering, in particular, how to take forward the review of the world's
financial and other institutions which we commissioned in Naples.
We have been thinking further about this review, and we will be
contributing our ideas shortly. But as you take over the chair for the 1995
summit, I would like to draw your attention to one specific issue.
At Naples, we discussed international financial markets, and expressed a
desire for greater market stability. I share that desire. Turbulent financial
markets undermine confidence, and damage the prospects for economic growth.
But I hope we can all agree, from the outset, that the way to achieve greater
financial market stability is above all to secure economic stability in each of our
countries. That means following sensible economic policies, which keep
inflation low, and which maintain sound publicfinances.Wc are already
committed to such policies.
There have been calls for Governments to try to influence the currency
markets through intervention, or to hold back financial flows by exchange
controls or new forms of taxation onfinancialtransactions. In my view, such
measures would be both ineffective and damaging, as experience over the past
20 years demonstrates. Global private financial flows have increased
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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enormously, so that total stock of foreign exchange reserves held by our seven
countries now represents well under half the value of turnover each fay in the
currency markets. In these circumstances, intervention is increasingly
ineffective.
/
Exchange controls or new taxes would be equally ill-conceived.
Countries have been scaling back controls in recent years - we abolished them
entirely in the UK 15 years ago, having concluded that such controls damaged
the economy, and that increasingly they did not work. The much greater
sophistication and global nature of today'sfinancialmarkets means that virtually
any attempt-to block or tax particularflowswould simply divert them
elsewhere. The existence of controls in the 1970s was a major reason why the
Euromarkets grew so rapidly.
Moreover, the free internationalflowof investment, like free trade,
brings significant economic gains, and I believe that to reintroduce direct
controls of this sort would be damaging, not only to our economies, but also to
others. W all want to see the reconstruction of Eastern Europe and the Former
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Soviet Union, and the further expansion of Asian and Latin American countries.
These developments will require large amounts of investment which, already,
we have seen that open world capital markets are providing. We should
continue to encourage that: greater world prosperity will help our economics,
and will buttress political and social stability, to everyone's benefit.
1 know personally - as do most of the others in the G7 - how damaging
and disruptive exchange market turbulence can be. I have therefore thought
hard about ideas put forward for direct action to control it. 1 do not dismiss
them lightly. But I am convinced they are a false solution, and that we would
be misleading ourselves if we thought we could help matters by embarking
down that road.
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I am sending copies of this letter to other G7 colleagues.
/
The Rt. Hon. Jean Chr6tien PC QC MP
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified documents concerning John Major
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2013-0449-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
9/21/2015
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on John Major, specifically on President Clinton's meetings with the Prime Minister from 1993 through 1995. Included are letters from Prime Minister Major to President Clinton regarding trade issues.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Records Management Office
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7388808">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Format
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Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/2/2015
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2013-0449-M
7388808
Declassified
Foreign Policy
John Major
United Kingdom