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Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full.
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCO^^
UNITKn NATIONS MISSION TO HAirF: TRAINTNfi OR OCCUPATION?
fosue EQC Decision: As a part of the recent policy review, we have pledged to reconfirm
our willingness to participate in a UN military mission in Haiti, and noted that it might be
necessary to have a "reconfigured" mission, and consequently a restated UNSC
mandate. When he was asked to confirm that he would agree to a new UN military
mission, President Aristide asked what its "reconfigured" mission would be.
To answer President Aristide's question, and to have clarity in our policy, a
decision is needed to determine whether the mission we have in mind is similar to that
provided for in the Governors Island Agreement, namely to train and professionalize the
Haitian military, and perform limited "civic action" construction, or whether the UN
military mission should also have an internal security role and other peace enforcement
tasks.
Considerations Common Xa Both Options:
Under both approaches, an important issue is whether the UN military force
would be sent in before President Aristide had returned to power in Haiti, or only after
his successful return. Sending the force only after he had resumed the powers of the
presidency would reduce the impression that the force was intended to assure his return,
either by deterring non-cooperation by the Haitian military or by direct military action.
Whether that is an advantage or a disadvantage depends on one's view of what the
mission of the force should be. Sending the force before Aristide's return could help
calm the situation and regime cooperation with it would be a manifestation of a real
intent to cooperate in implementing GIA fully. If, however, the force is intended to have
a limited mission, sending it before the most difficult part of GIA -- President Aristide's
actual return to power in Haiti -- is accomplished, could imply a willingness to use US
military force that we did not intend.
Deployment of either mission would follow only after the UN provided approval
via a UN Security Council resolution. Consistent with the principle of making our
action regarding Haiti multilateral, we would not unilateral y intervene. Whether the
UNSC would authorize a mission of the second kind, which could reasonably be
characterized as an intervention, is problematic. There is no possibility that the OAS
would authorize such a mission.
Either approach would entail significant costs. For either the US would have to
provide the overwhelming majority, if not all, the troops. For the training mission, the
USG would seek to have the mission conducted as the basis of UN reimbursement by
assessments under Chapter VI. For the internal security mission, we would seek
reimbursement as a Chapter VII operauon. Whether we would succeed in getting
significant cost-sharing under any approach is dubious.
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�Options
Option I: Military training for professionalization-The October 93 model updated,
with no internal security functions.
Under this approach the military mission's main task would be to retrain the
Haitian military into a non-political, professional force capable of carrying out the normal
functions of military establishments in small, underdeveloped states with constitutional
governments. Its premise is that the phase out of police functions from the army, along
with concunent redefinition of military roles, would gradually help Haiti develop a
responsible military with a legitimate purpose in a democratic society. This would be a
long-term effort, requiring substantial commitment of personnel and resources (from
foreign aid, not DoD 0& M, budgets) for a period of several years.
For this mission, revision of the present UN mandate would be required to permit
shifting the focus of the mission from civic action construction projects to training, and
to assure that the mission could be the size and composition needed to carry out the
mission while providing for its own security. That option is temporarily provided by
UNSCR 905, which will expire June 30.
Under this UNMIH configuration, internal security would remain the
responsibility solely of Haitian security forces, throughout thetimethe unit was in
Haiti. Initially those forces would be responsive to the Haitian authorities awaiting
Aristide's return; afterward they would be those on whom President Aristide chose to
place the responsibility. The UNMIH forces would provide training, serve as role models
and, in respect to police functions, monitor performance of the Haitian forces. The UN
military mission would have neither the authority nor responsibility to monitor
compliance with the key political terms of the GIA nor to intervene in local security
matters or to insure compliance with the GIA. In the event of violence or noncompliance, UNMIH would take steps to assure its own safety, but would not engage in
peace enforcement, or, indeed, in traditional peacekeeping.
1
The US element of the UN military training mission would not be deployed to
Haiti until it would go as part of a viable political agreement having the support of all
^
parties, and steps had been taken to begin putting the other elements of the settlement in
place. In particular, it would be a precondition of deployment of the military mission that
the police monitoring units were in place. In addition, the US would require that all
parties formally confirm their agreement to the deployment and give strong assurances,
backed by demonstrated changes in behavior, that the mission was coming as part of an
accepted overall settlement and would receive the support and cooperation of the
Haitian authorities, both military and civilian. In this connection, we would insist on
their active help in carrying out its mission, as well as in being properly received and
protected while in country. We would also insist on appropriate host nation support
J
There would also be an international police assistance mission. However, its role
would be monitoring the activities of the (reconstituted) Haitian police and certain forms
of technical assistance, not itself policing the country.
GCCRCT
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�arrangements, including a Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA), assured access to ports
and airfields, and agreements on how the training mission would be conducted.
However, in configuring the force, we would not count on a permissive
environment. The detailed force requirements for the force would be set by the relevant
command. Illustratively, the US training team could consist of approximately 100
trainers and 200 support personnel. It would carry such weapons, have such security
personnel, and be governed by such ROE as the US deems appropriate to enable the
force to provide for its own protection and to ensure that it could land and move safely
to its facilities in the event Haitian authorities do not cooperate or they fail to provide
security. We would not negotiate with either President Aristide or the Haitian military
on these points, though we would inform them of our intentions.
2
The force would not be configured to keep order in Haiti, provide protection for
Aristide and his government, or (if sent in before he returns) deal with military refusal to
accept his return. In briefing Congress and the press, we would need to make clear the
limited character of the mission, so it would be public knowledge that we did not intend
to use force to install or protect Aristide or deal with violence in the country. Should the
situation deteriorate to the point where it was unsafe or infeasible for the mission's
training activity to continue, it would remain in a protective posture until the situation
improved or it was withdrawn.
Option II: Internal security tasks included in mission
This approach would give the UNMIH the authority and responsibility to perform
internal security functions, as well as training. Its tasks would include preventing and if
necessary suppressing violence among Haitians, providing personal security to Aristide
and his key government associates after his return, and disarming/disbanding armed
civilian groups, such as the FRAPH. Its mission could also include using military force to
protect him physically in the course of his return.
Adopting this approach would be based on the premise that the return of Aristide
could precipitate violence on a massive scale between Aristide partisans seeking
revenge on the army and army enlisted seeking to preempt such attacks through terror
and intimidation of their own, and that Haitian security forces either could not or would
not deal with the problems themselves. It assumes that, without a foreign (and in
practice US) military force, Aristide cannot count on returning to power in Haiti and
keeping control of the country and the security forces. It does not assume that
reconciliation and fundamental political and social reform is impossible, only that it will
take a long time to reform and rebuild institutions based on democratic principles and
that, in the meantime, it is both necessary and in the US interest to provide the muscle to
sustain President Aristide in office.
A force assigned this internal security mission would be configured quite
differently from one assigned only a training and self-protection mission. The force
would be significantly larger, and would operate essentially as an occupying army,
2
To the extent it was part of the force's mission to conduct civic action
construction projects, additional personnel would be needed.
S E I C n [ : T
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�-sccncT
4
pending the establishment of Aristide's full and effective authority in the country,
including winning loyalty of the security forces, or inauguration of a new president in
February 1996. Over time US casualties would be certain, as would be Haitian casualties
caused by US actions. Under the War Powers Act, its introduction would appear to
begin the timetable for congressional authorization, unless the Act is considered not to
apply to operations of this character.
It would be necessary to resolve in advance the relationships between the US
commander of the force and the Haitian government, as to the circumstances in which
the force would intervene in internal conflicts in Haiti, and its ROE for doing so.
Because such a force could be involved in conflict situations, it would require complete
freedom of action, under U.S. command, in determining which measures were necessary
for its own protection, and in determining how to carry out its broad mission. For
obvious reasons, there would be a tension between the requirement of clear US
command and control - which is necessary for legal and practical political reasons -- and
its function as the de facto internal security force of a foreign government.
It is not clear that President Aristide could give permission for a US force to
operate in this way, given the traditional Haitian view of US military intervention. It is
certain that the OAS would not mandate such a mission. Whether the UN would do so is
problematic, though Russian support could almost certainly be achieved because of the
desirable precedent it would set for Russian action in its own "near abroad."
Eras and Cons QllhsTm Options
Option I: Training Mission. No internal security functions
Pros;
•
Keeps the onus on Haitian parties for maintaining security, and for avoiding
provocative acts towards each other. A limited US role is consistent with the basic
xoposition that the future of Haiti is a Haitian issue, in which the US has only a very
imited interest (however strong our sympathies and preferences) and requires that
Haitians take responsibility for solution.
•
Avoids drawing US and other foreign forces into internal conflicts, thus reducing
security risks to our personnel and scale of US commitment ,
•
Avoids placing US and other foreign personnel in the positipn of taking law
enforcement measures against Haitian citizens and all the potential for legal and other
difficulties such a mission would entail.
•
Keeps the mission focus on professionalization, a task for which US military is
experienced.
• Has been accepted by President Aristide, the Haitian military (at least formally),
elements of the Parliament and by the UN and other troop contributors.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
SCOnCT
�•cccmrf•
5
Has a reasonable chance of winning UN and hemisphere approval. International
support is essential for legitimacy and credibility (at home as well as abroad).
•
Would not involve defacto US occupation. Avoids giving the US military a police
function.
•
Requires a modest investment of US forces and funds.
Cons;
•
Does not provide deterrent or counter against Haitian military moving against
President Aristide or his supporters, and vice versa.
• Presence of any US military capability in Haiti will to lead to calls for it to become
involved if violence erupts.
•
Should significant levels of violence occur, the UN and member states will almost
certainly be criticized for failing to intervene.
• The Administration could be compelled to withdraw forces if conditions made its
training mission unsafe of impractical.
• Without the active cooperation of the Haitian military, this mission will not succeed.
• Does not guarantee professionalization of the Haitian armed forces. This is a longterm process for which no funding, beyond the FY92 set-aside within the FAA,
currently exists. Nor is any outyear funding planned which would allow the robust
degree of FMF/IMET funded training necessary to accomplish a realistic
professionalization mission.
Option II: Mandate to intervene militarily in Haiti if the internal security situation
warrants.
• Would diminish probability of major hostilities between pro and anti- Aristide groups
• Would provide greater security for Aristide and his government.
•
Assumes a military defeat or internal collapse of the Haitian security forces. (It is not
conceivable that any Haitian military leadership would agree to the introduction of
foreign forces to perform sovereign internal security functions.)
• Maximizes chances of President Aristide's successful return to power in Haiti by
providing US military guarantee
Cons:
• Difficult to secure support from Congress, where enthusiasm for direct US military role
in administration of Haiti is limited even among strong supporters of democratic
reform.
SECRET
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�QEORCT
Ignores Haiti's sovereignty. Neither Aristide nor any other Haitian political figure has
been willing to take responsibility for inviting foreign forces to intervene, citing both
historical and constitutional reasons.
Requires a major effort to obtain approval of such a mandate at the UN. Other
countries are very unlikely to make meaningful troop contributions.
Requires a substantial commitment of U.S. resources, including a significant combat
military presence for an extended period.
Places US and other foreign soldiers in the position of carrying out police functions
(the UN has been unable to recruit sufficient police personnel for even a limited
monitoring mission) in an unfamiliar environment in which they do not speak the
language.
Likely to result in guerrilla/terrorist activities by nationalist groups against the US
mission.
Potential for conflict with President Aristide and other authorities if we refuse to
comply with their directives, and, conversely, places responsibility on the US for
controversial reform and security policies if we do.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
GECRET
�
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Declassified documents concerning Haiti
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2013-0122-M
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This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on correspondence between the National Security Advisor (or Deputy), regarding Haiti, from 1993 through 1994. Included is a Department of Defense paper on the role of the United Nations in Haiti.
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Foreign Policy
Haiti