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Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Sections 1.4 (c) and (d) of E.O. 13526.
�377B6E05.FIN
Page 1 of2
Exchange Mai
DATE-TIME
6/8/99 1:31:13PM
FROM
Clarke, Richard A.
CLASSIFICATION
TOP SECRET
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(a)(c)(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
06/08/1999
DECLASSIFYON
06/08/2009
SUBJECT
RE: PAKISTAN AND UBL [TOP SECRET]
TO
Riedel, Bruce O.
Sutphen, Mona K.
CARBON COPY
Sutphen, Mona K..
TEXT BODY
^jb^'"^ ^"3
Bruce and I are in complete accord on this. - rac
Original
Message
From: Riedel, Bruce O.
Sent: Tuesday, June 08, 1999
1:32 PM
To: Sutphen, Mona K.
Cc: Sutphen, Mona K.; Riedel, Bruce
O.; Clarke, Richard A.
Subject: PAKISTAN AND UBL [TOP SECRET]
MONA--PLS
PASS TO SRB
[601 L 3
>
SANDY YOU ASKED DICK AND I FOR VIEWS ON HOW TO
PROCEED
WITH UBL. WE AGREE THE CORE OF THE UBL/TALIBAN ISSUE
IS HOW TO PRESS
PAKISTAN TO TAKE ACTION TO FORCE TALIBAN TO ACT ON
UBL. STATE STRATEGY
EO 13526 1.4d
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
�377B6E05.FIN
Page 2 of2
•t
EO 13526 1.4d
THE PAKISTAN PROBLEM IS NOW GREATLY COMPLICATED
BECAUSE OF THE KASHMIR ISSUE.
�18S4A21F.FIN
Exchange
Page 1 of 14
Mail
DATE-TIME
12/2/99 10:53:49 AM
FROM
Benjamin, Daniel (TNT)
CLASSIFICATION
TOP SECRET
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(c)(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
12/02/1999
DECLASSIFYON
12/02/2009
SUBJECT
UBL Small Group [TOP SECRET]
TO
Sutphen, Mona K. (NSA)
CARBON_COPY
TEXT BODY
Co io-«.
MonaThe second document is the paper SRB asked for from Dick
for tomorrow's small group. The two flanking memos are grist for
a future PC. They are 1) the memo Bruce did at SRB's request on
the big picture in Afghanistan/Pakistan and 2) a discussion paper
that was tasked in the CSG and coordinated among the agencies. The
papers are somewhat complementary in that the first is longer term,
the second shorter term.
TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 8717srb
.doc
November 30, 1999
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
FROM: BRUCE RIEDEL
SUBJECT: Taliban - Next Steps
C 1 bj
O0
You asked for my views on a Taliban strategy post-sanctions
imposition. The
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
2.007 - 1D<O3- n
-7/|(P/I5K6M
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confluence of sanctions, the winter lull in the civil war and the coup in
Pakistan may offer us a window of opportunity to achieve our
objectives in
Afghanistan. A major U.S. diplomatic effort to seek (1) an end to the
war, (2) a
new government in Kabul and (3) Afghan compliance with the UN
resolutions will be
required. Its chances for success are a long shot but in my judgement
worth the
effort especially as we have few other options to achieve our goals.
Afghanistan has become a cancer in Asia, exporting terror and drugs.
It is also
remarkably invulnerable to outside influence. It has virtually no
modem economy
and has been so ravaged by two decades of war that there is nothing
worth
bombing. Normal economic or military pressures will not succeed. It
is time to
try a comprehensive approach.
The Opportunity: The UN sanctions have gotten the Taliban's
attention.
Combined with a wheat shortage and a cold start to winter there is
some grumbling
in Afghanistan about Taliban's decision not to comply with UNSCR
1267. This is
not regime threatening, however, and will not compel compliance.
More worrisome
for the Taliban leadership was the failure of their 1999 offensives
against the
Northern Alliance which have left them vulnerable to counter attacks
this spring
when the weather improves. Again the Taliban is not in any danger of
losing the
war but they could see some of their 1998 gains lost. Most alarming
for Mullah
Omar and his lieutenants is the regime change in Pakistan. Pakistani
support
(food, oil, advisors, recruits, etc.) remains the single most essential
outside
leverage over Taliban. The Afghan policy of the Musharraf
government remains
unclear. At least some in'Islamabad
EO 13526 1.4d
have
Snarcaxed they want to move away from close alliance with the
Taliban.
This opportunity will not be open-ended. Sanctions' impact will be
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�3854A21F.FIN
Page 3 of 14
stronger
now than later as the Afghans adapt. Once spring comes the war will
resume in
earnest. Musharraf will
develop an Afghan approach soon and the default position will be the
status quo.
U.S. Diplomatic Offensive: We should consider launching a major
diplomatic
effort to secure both compliance with the UNSCRs (i.e. an end to
Taliban support
for terrorism in general and UBL in particular) and an end to the civil
war.
Indeed the two issues are inextricably linked. Mullah Omar supports
Mujahedin
like UBL because of their role in fighting the Russians and now the
Northern
Alliance, and in securing popular support for the regime in the war.
Only a
settlement that seeks to resolve the larger Afghan picture will succeed
in
resolving the sub-problem of Taliban's role in terrorism.
What we should offer is a package deal which includes a negotiated
end of the war
through the creation of a Taliban dominated unity government. All
factions would
be represented but the Taliban would have the upper hand, a reflection
of their
superior position and control of 80% of the country. EO 13526 1.4d
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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Page 4 o f M
EO 13526 1.4d
To sell such a deal to the Afghan parties and their outside supporters
will
require a fiill court press with a great number of countries. This should
be a
U.S.-led effort and will replace the now moribund 6+2 effort the UN
led for the
last several years.
Pakistan is the most important actor. We should run our ideas past
them first
Iran is also a critical player as the Northern Alliance chief supporter.
Tehran
Russia and Iran are partners
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�3g'64A21F.FrN
Page 5 of 14
sunnortine the Nnrthem Alliance
Saudi Arabia and the UAE can be critica
China can also be a help
Finally we need to bring the Indians on board as well
The Afghan diaspora,
should be mobilized to bring its talents to bear on reconstruction.
A major public diplomacy campaign will also be essential. We should
kick off our
effort with a major speech by you on our policy toward Afghanistan in
this
Administration. This would review our many efforts to get a peace
process moving
including Bill Richardson's trip in 1997, our support for the UN 6+2
effort and
our considerable aid to Afghan NGOs (we are Afghanistan's largest
aid donor in
the '90s). We would then propose the way forward to end the war and
try to
appeal directly to the Afghan people. We would make clear we have
no quarrel
with their brand of Islam but do have an interest in ending support for
terror.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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This effort will encounter some domestic criticism from human rights
advocates
who want us to have no dealings with the Taliban. Our best response
to their
concerns is that the most immediate human rights help we can give
the Afghan
people is to end the war. We can also still press our concerns about
women's
rights with a new government. But we should have no illusions
~ in my view, pressing the human rights issue aggressively during
these
negotiations will doom them to failure.
If this effort fails we will still have all other options to explore. If fact
we
will be better placed to seek additional sanctions against Taliban if we
have
tried to resolve the war and they rejected our effort.
2
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET LIMITED ACCESS 8717
SECRET
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 11/30/09
TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT
S
R
B
JJBL Small Group.doc
TOP SECRET DELENDA
UBL Review 3 December 1999
There are two broad areas of concern. The first is the regional context
- our
policy on Afghanistan and Pakistan. You may want to hold a full PC
on this
issue. Attached is discussion paper that has been coordinated with the
agencies
and could be the basis of a PC. To tee that up, you may want to
discuss briefly
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�3864A21F.FrN
Page 7 of 14
the outstanding issues in the small group.
The second area is UBL himself - what he is up to, what is the state
of our
intelligence, what operations are under way.
The Region:
1. US Policy on Taliban: Given the Taliban's refusal to comply with
the UNSC
call for an end to terrorist support and their attitude in the attempted
peace
talks, should we review our policy of neutrality in the afghan conflict?
Do we
want to state our support for non-Taliban alternatives?
2. How do we maximize the sanctions?
EO 13526 1.4d
Bin Ladin:
1. What is he up to? Where has he been? Is there any reality to the talk
of
his leaving Afghanistan? What role has al Qida played in Chechnya?
What do you
expect him to do next?
EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d
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EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d
2
TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT
T a ] i b a n
D i s c u s s i o n
Paper.doc
Discussion Paper: Next Steps on Bin Ladin,
the Taliban and Pakistan
[pjo d J
Background: The passage of UNSCR 1267 and the November 14
imposition of
sanctions appear to have shaken the Taliban leadership. In the weeks
since the
vote, they have soufiht to intensify their talks with uJ FO 13576 i Ad
They also tried two different stratagems for dealing with Bin Ladin.
The first
was to declare that Bin Ladin had asked the Taliban leadership for
permission to
leave Afghanistan and for assistance in securing safe passage. This
effort
appears to havefizzledout, possibly because we made clear that such
an outcome
was not in accordance with UNSCR 1267 and would not get the
Taliban off the hook.
The Taliban may have tried this ploy as the first step in a ruse they
have
attempted before: Declaring that Bin Ladin had departed when he had
not. In
retrospect, it is not clear that Bin Ladin ever offered to leave. If he did
not,
he may be rattled by the Taliban's public discussion of the matter.
The Taliban's other maneuver has been to float what they consider
different
'offers' to us, including the idea of convening a religious council, or
ulema, to
decide Bin Ladin's fate - specifically whether he should be expelled to
a country
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�3g64A21F.FIN
Page 9 of 14
that can try him under Sharia law. The members of the ulema would
likely come
from Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan and a third country. The Taliban has
also spoken
about putting Bin Ladin under house arrest in Afghanistan, where he
would be
monitored by an organization such as the OIC.
EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�38f64A21F.FIN
Page 10 of 14
EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d
Discussion:
UNSCR Sanctions: Ensure Implentation/lncrease the Pressure?
It will take some time for sanctions to bite. The UNSC has to set up a
sanctions
|
committee, and we are working to ensure its effectiveness
While time is
passing, we
should underscore to the Taliban that the current sanctions are not our
only - or
last - shot. UNSCR 1267 holds out the promise of further action, and
we should
let the Taliban know that we will consider additional sanctions,
including
ftirther travel restrictions and/or a trade embargo EO 13526 1.4d
�3g64A21F.FIN
Page 11 of 14
However we proceed, we need to ensure that the Taliban recognize
that they can
get out of the box they are in. Some among them may believe that
handing over
Bin Ladin will not lead to sanctions relief. We need to convince them
that their
choices will indeed make a difference. We should also continue to
emphasize that
sanctions were unanimously voted by the Security Council ~ that they
express the
will of the international community, not just the US ~ and that this
effort is
directed against Bin Ladin and not the Afghan people or Islam.
Engaging the Taliban: Should We Persist or Enlist the UN? Although
the Taliban's
intentions are not clear, we have heard from some contacts that they
want to send
a team here to discuss sanctions and other issues. We have repeatedly
said that
we would welcome such a discussion but have not received a
definiuvg rgsponsg,
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EO 13526 l.4d
Intelligence
EQ 13526 1.4c. EQ 13526 1.4d
�3864A21F.FIN
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EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d
EO 13526 1.4d
EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�Page 14 of 14
3&64A21F.FIN
EO 13526 1.4d
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
Classified by: Daniel Benjamin
Reason: 1.5 (c) (d),xl
Declassify On: exempt
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�
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Terrorism
Usama bin Ladin