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�EXECUTIVE
THE
UNITED
OFFICE
STATES
OF
THE
TRADE
W A S H I N G T O N , D.C.
PRESIDENT
REPRESENTATIVE
20508
�Material Delivered by Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky
1.
November 14, 1997 — Farm Journal Forum "Prospering in the High Risk Food
Economy"
2.
September 30, 1997 — Testimony on Renewal of Fast Track Authority before
the Senate Commerce Committee
3.
March 20, 1997 — Remarks before the Council on Competitiveness
4.
March 19, 1997 — Statement on WTO Basic Telecom Agreement & Testimony
before the House Commerce Committee on Telecommunications, Trade &
Consumer Protection
5.
December 9-13, 1997 — Statement on WTO at the Ministerial Conference
6.
October 2, 1996 — Statement before the Women's Foreign Policy Group, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace
�Remarks Prepared for Delivery
Remarks for Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky
Farm Journal Forum
"Prospering in the High Risk Food Economy"
November 14,1997, 8:45 AM
Hyatt Regency Hotel
Washington, D.C.
Thank you Sonja (Sonja Hillgren, editor of Farm Journal) for your kind introduction. I
appreciate the opportunity to participate in your forum on "Prospering in the High Risk Food
Economy." This is a very timely topic for U.S. agriculture. Our producers have just completed
the second harvest under the 1996 farm bill, and they are in the midst of an historic transition
away from direct government involvement in the management of U.S. agriculture.
I'd like to expand on the traditional inventory of risk management tools and ask that you
add trade and exports to your thinking. In today's agricultural economy, risk management is
more than crop insurance and futures and options. It's about using foreign markets as a hedge
against market uncertainties, especially as the federal government shifts away from commodity
price supports.
I am disappointed, as are many in the agriculture community, that we postponed
consideration of fast track negotiating authority for the President earlier this week. But I am not
discouraged. There is simply no other way to guarantee agriculture's future health, or in the
context of today's forum, to reduce risk, than to gain and defend access to overseas markets. Our
trade agenda is export driven and focused on precisely those areas—like agriculture—where the
United States is the most competitive economy in the world.
We will continue to press forward to achieve the trade authority the President needs to
continue breaking down trade barriers when the Congress retums next year. We will also
continue our efforts, which have been successful, to make sure that nations live up to their
international agreements concerning agricultural trade, as well as devote the necessary resources
at USTR to promote an aggressive campaign for U.S. agriculture's interests overseas.
Why Are Trade Agreements Important?
Many ask "WTiy are trade agreements so important?" Our economy has the lowest
unemployment rate in nearly a quarter century, the good news continues on inflation, and U.S.
agricultural exports reached a record $60 billion last year. Why engage in the uncertainty of
foreign markets? I cannot think of another sector of the economy where the link between trade
and today's prosperity is clearer than in agriculture. Exports mean farm income, jobs, and
reduced risk for American agriculture.
Remarks Prepared for Delivery
�Remarks Prepared for Delivery
The contributions of agricultural exports to the U.S. economy are impressive and bear repeating:
record farm exports last year and the largest positive trade balance~$27 billion—of any sector.
It's not surprising, then, that America's farmers and ranchers are twice as reliant on foreign trade
as the U.S. economy as a whole, with exports accounting for an estimated 30 percent of gross
cash receipts. U.S. agriculture recognizes this, and I want to thank the 60-plus agricultural
groups and businesses that support renewed fast track negotiating authority.
Exports are critical to nearly every sector of U.S. agriculture. Nearly one half of the
wheat produced in this country is destined for export markets. Thirty percent of feed grains and
cotton are shipped abroad. USDA estimates that 47 percent of the U.S. soybean crop is exported.
Overall, one out of every three acres of America's farms is dedicated to exports.
Exports are also becoming increasingly important to U.S. ranchers and livestock
producers. The United States is now a net meat exporter, and six percent of this year's
production of pork and ten percent of beef output will end up on the plates of foreign consumers.
It's important to remember that U.S. exports are growing three times faster than domestic
demand for food, and that 96 percent of the world's consumers live outside our country. The
only way to ensure that prices stay strong and farmers and ranchers stay in business is to
continue to expand markets outside the United States.
Trade Agreements Work for U.S. Agriculture
Our pledge to U.S. agriculture is based on a simple and obvious premise: trade
agreements work for U.S. agriculture. The Uruguay Round Agreements and the NAFTA made a
solid start in liberalizing world farm trade by reducing export subsidies, putting in place
disciplines over certain types of trade activity, and instituting a working dispute settlement
mechanism. We have had some notable bilateral and multilateral successes:
•
U.S. agricultural exports to the NAFTA countries have increased from $8.9 billion in
1993 to a record $11.6 billion in 1996. The United States had an agricultural trade
surplus of over $1 billion with its NAFTA partners in 1996. Last year beef and veal
exports to Mexico alone jumped nearly 80 percent.
•
During the Uruguay Round, we negotiated new access to Japan for U.S. pork and rice
exports. Before these negotiations, Japan refused to purchase U.S. rice. Over the last two
years they have purchased approximately 420,000 tons of our rice.
•
The export value of U.S. pork topped $1 billion in 1996, up more than 210 percent since
1990. Over that period, exports to Japan~the largest U.S. market-rose 228 percent in
Remarks Prepared for Delivery
�Remarks Prepared for Delivery
value, while exports to Mexico increased 54 percent. U.S. pork, exports to the growing
Canadian and South Korean markets have more than tripled in value since 1990.
We have fought and successfully ensured that bio-engineered products are getting access
to the EU. As part of this effort, we have urged the EU to begin streamlining its approval
process so that GMO's are treated fairly and consistently, and reviewed on a scientific
basis in a timely and transparent manner.
We have opened up markets and overcome phytosanitary hurdles for a range of U.S.
citrus and other fruits in countries like Brazil, Chile, Mexico, China, Korea, Japan, and
Thailand.
In April, Japan removed its import ban on 25 varieties of U.S. tomatoes, a move which
could open a $100-million market. We used our success in Japan to leverage export
approval of these same 25 tomato varieties in Taiwan.
In China, we have opened the market for U.S. live horses, cattle, swine, and bovine
embryos, and China recently instituted a one year trial program to allow specific U.S.
meat processing plants to export to China for retail sale.
U.S. officials recently established export protocols to ship live swine to Argentina and
Peru and to also export live cattle to Peru.
In 1996, U.S. officials overcame food safety concerns used by Russian officials to ban
our poultry exports. U.S. poultry exports to Russia are expected to be approximately
$800 million in value this year.
In the past year, the Ukraine agreed to recognize the FSIS inspection system and
approved a bilateral certificate for U.S. exports of poultry. U.S. poultry exports to the
Ukraine are expected to exceed $40 million.
We have also actively used the Uruguay Round's dispute settlement procedures. Of the
34 complaints that the United States has filed thus far with the WTO, 13~more than one thirdhave involved agricultural trade barriers or unjustified sanitary and phytosanitary measures.
Two of our earliest victories in WTO panel proceedings involved agricultural goods: the
EU's hormone ban and the EU's import regime for bananas. In the hormone case, the United
States and Canada challenged Europe's ban on the use of six hormones to promote the growth of
cattle, and a WTO panel agreed that the EU has no scientific basis for blocking the sale of
American beef in Europe. This is a sign that the WTO dispute settlement system can handle
Remarks Prepared for Delivery
�Remarks Prepared for Delivery
complex and difficult disputes over food safety and health. The panel's ruling sets an important
precedent that will act to protect other U.S. exporters from unscientific and unjustified trade
barriers.
In addition, we have successfully used the WTO to obtain favorable settlements without
having to proceed all the way through the panel process in some important agricultural disputes
involving, for example, Korea on shelf-life restrictions for processed foods; the EU on grain
imports; and Hungary on export subsidies.
We continue to pursue vigorously the complaints that remain outstanding, and to monitor
closely foreign governments' compliance with their trade agreement obligations on agriculture.
Most recently we initiated dispute settlement procedures in the WTO on dairy export subsidies
with both Canada and the EC. We have scheduled consultations in Geneva with the EC on
November 18 and with Canada on November 19. We will also act to establish a dispute
settlement panel on November 18 to challenge Japan's varietal testing program for fruit.
An Aggressive Trade Agenda for Agriculture is Still Necessary
Despite progress in the Uruguay Round and the NAFTA, foreign agriculture remains one
of the most protected and subsidized sectors of the world economy. And because our farmers are
among the least protected and subsidized and most competitive in the world, trade distortions in
agriculture are a particular problem for the United States.
When we negotiated the Uruguay Round, the United States insisted on further
agricultural trade negotiations in 1999. We knew that despite the Uruguay Round's landmark
achievements, there remained unfinished business.
To prepare properly for the 1999 negotiations, we need to build consensus now for
moving our agricultural agenda forward. That means we must begin to lay the ground-work for
reducing tariffs on US agricultural exports, disciplining state trading enterprises, developing
consensus for scientifically justified rules governing biotechnology products, and strengthening
rules on the administration of tariff rate quotas. Let me talk briefly about each of these:
•
We will press for global tariff-reduction on agricultural products. The U.S. has on
average the lowest tariffs in the world (around 3 percent) while the world average is 56
percent. Other countries such as Korea, Norway, Pakistan and India have much higher
tariffs. Across the board tariff reductions will greatly benefit U.S. producers, and fast
track is essential to make this happen.
•
We will press for transparency and improved disciplines on State Trading Enterprises:
The United States has much to gain from disciplining STEs. STEs can distort trade and
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�Remarks Prepared for Delivery
they frequently operate behind a veil of secrecy. They allow some countries to undercut
US exports into third markets and restrict imports.
•
We will negotiate improved rules in the area of Genetically Modified Organisms: The
United States leads the world in developing GMOs and is poised to capture a larger share
of the global agricultural marketplace because of increased efficiencies and improved
product lines. Other countries, most notably those in Europe, threaten to adopt policies
regarding the importation and planting of GMO's and the labeling of products containing
GMO's that are not based on scientifically-justified principles.
•
We will strengthen the rules on the administration of tariff rate quotas: In the Uruguay
Round, many countries converted their non-tariff trade barriers to tariff rate quotas
(TRQ's). TRQ's provide increased market access within a defined import quota. Our goal
over time is to negotiate increases in the size of TRQ's. However, we are faced with
many cases of countries administering their TRQ's in a way that substantially or
completely restricts access. We need to negotiate improved rules for TRQ's and ensure
that countries cannot fall back on restrictive administrative procedures.
We have already begun preparations for 1999, and we will continue to consult with
interested parties in the public and private sectors about U.S. goals and objectives for the
negotiations. But let's not kid ourselves. There will be no serious negotiations on challenging
high tariffs, quotas, export subsidies, and state trading enterprises without fast track negotiating
authority.
At APEC in just two weeks, we will press ahead with an ambitious market-opening
strategy in key areas where the United States leads the world, beginning with an initiative to
expand the Information Technology Agreement. Once again, our ultimate success will rest
heavily on whether we can come to the table in the future with fast track in our pocket.
We must also face the reality that trade agreements will now go forward without us.
Barriers in South America and Asia will probably come down, but to the benefit of our
competitors in Europe, Canada and elsewhere, not to the benefit of our producers.
Conclusion
I was particularly pleased last week when the Vice President swore in Ambassador Peter
Scher as my Special Trade Negotiator for Agriculture. Peter will now be able to use his
considerable skills to negotiate on behalf of U.S. agriculture. As many of you know, this
Administration is committed to expanding the resources devoted to agricultural trade issues.
Formalizing Peter's position at USTR is the most recent example of this commitment. We have
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�Remarks Preparedfor Delivery
also added to our agricultural staff at USTR and reinvigorated the interagency review process
with our colleagues at other trade agencies such as USDA
We will continue to use every tool at our disposal to defend the trade interests of U.S.
agriculture. Because trade agreements allow our farmers and ranchers to spread the risk of the
market across the world economy, we have no choice but to remain engaged in our attempts to
break down barriers to U.S. agriculture.
Thank you.
Remarks Preparedfor Delivery
�Testimony of
U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky
Renewal of Fast Track Authority
Senate Commerce Committee
September 30,1997
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today to address an issue that is vital to the future of American farmers, businesses, and
workers, as well as our position as a leader in the global economy: that is, approval of the
Administration's proposal to renew fast track and the President's tariff proclamation authority under
the "Export Expansion and Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1997." Mr. Chairman, if enacted,
the President's proposal would renew more than 60 years of cooperation between the Congress and
the Executive Branch in the negotiation and implementation of market-opening trade agreements for
the benefit of American workers and companies.
What is at stake in your consideration of this proposal is nothing less than whether the United States
will continue to be at the forefront of nations seeking the reduction of trade barriers and the
expansion of more open, equitable and reciprocal trading practices throughout the world. As the
President said recently, the question before you is whether we are going to lead the way or follow.
This is not the time to shrink from the future, but to seize the opportunities it holds.
The President is right. Today, this country is at the pinnacle of its influence. Our economy is the
strongest in the world. In the last four and one half years, the United States has once again become
the world's number one exporter, the world's largest manufacturer of automobiles, the world's
premier agricultural exporter, and the world's leading producer of semiconductors. From the farms
of the Midwest to the high-tech firms of California and Massachusetts, businesses are growing,
unemployment is declining and inflation is under control. America leads the world in a very
competitive global marketplace. Our economy is the envy of our trading partners.
Today, international trade is an increasingly vital component of our economic strength at home and
leadership abroad. Exports are more important in our economy than ever. Since 1993, more than
a third of our economic growth has come directly from exports, and the number of export-related jobs
has increased by 1.7 million. A total of some 11.5 million U.S. jobs depend on exports, and these
jobs pay an average of 15% more than non-trade-related jobs. Since 1985, U.S. exports have roughly
tripled from about $300 billion to an expected $900 billion this year.
But, we cannot rest on our past accomplishments. We must find new markets for our goods and
services in order to help our economy to maintain strong growth. To frame our economic challenge
clearly: the United States represents four percent of the world's population, yet our share of global
income is 20%. How are we going to maintain our enviable position? We must sell to the more than
96% of the consumers that live outside our borders, which requires that we further open foreign
markets to our goods and services. We need fast track if our economy is to stay on the fast track.
�The Importance of Fast Track
Fast track is critical to increase access to foreign markets and shift trade conditions in our favor. Fast
track sends a strong signal to our trading partners. It tells them that when the President negotiates
a trade agreement, he has the confidence of the Congress behind him. It also indicates that the United
States is serious about reaching agreements that will reduce market barriers and trade distortions.
This proposal reactivates a partnership between the President and the Congress that dates back over
six decades. Recognizing that the high protective U.S. tariff walls it established in 1930 had only
served to deepen the Depression, Congress four years later enacted the first reciprocal trade
agreements act. In that act, Congress gave the President authority to negotiate mutual tariff
reductions with our trading partners. Congress renewed that authority repeatedly over the years, and
successive Presidents used the authority to dramatically reduce tariff barriers around the world.
"Fast track" was first put in place under the Ford Administration in 1974. Under fast track the
Congress and the President work together, ensuring that the United States can effectively negotiate
away foreign tariff barriers as well as non-tariff barriers ~ such as quotas, protectionist product
standards, and subsidies ~ which foreign governments have increasingly substituted for tariffs to
exclude U.S. products. It worked well for 20 years, a period over which every President had fast
track authority with bipartisan support. Fast track lapsed along with most of the President's tariff
reduction authority three years ago.
With this legislation, we are seeking to reactivate the process by which certain trade agreements can
come back to the Congress for an up or down vote without amendment. We are not seeking
Congress' approval of a particular trade agreement. Congress retains the last word.
Dangers of Inaction
There are serious and immediate consequences if we do not renew fast track. Increasingly over the
past few years, major trade agreements have been negotiated without our participation. Our
competitors are determined, sophisticated, strategic and focused. In every region of the world, but
particularly Latin America and Asia, the two fastest growing regions of the world, governments are
pursuing strategic trade policies and, in some cases, preferential trade arrangements. They are
forming relationships around us, rather than with us, and they are creating new exclusive trade
alliances to the detriment of U.S. interests. I can assure you that our trading partners are not waiting
for us to pass a bill.
A significant number of bilateral and regional trade agreements are already operating here in the
Western Hemisphere. The United States is party to only one. In fact, most U.S. trading partners in
the hemisphere have been actively forging closer ties with neighboring countries. In Latin America
and Asia alone, over 20 such agreements have been negotiated since 1992 ~ all without us.
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay have formed a common market, MERCOSUR, which has
�a GDP of approximately $1 trillion and ambitions to expand to all of South America. MERCOSUR
is the largest economy in Latin America and encompasses a population of 200 million. It has struck
agreements with Chile and Bolivia, and is discussing agreements with a number of Andean countries
(Colombia, Venezuela), as well as countries within the Caribbean Basin. There are recent reports that
Canada is also in discussions with MERCOSUR. And, the EU and MERCOSUR already have plans
to conclude a reciprocal trade agreement by 1999.
Furthermore, the nations of the Andean Community have started meeting with member nations of
CARICOM and the Central American Common Market to discuss negotiation of free trade
agreements.
And, Chile, with one of South America's leading economies, has signed trade agreements with
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Venezuela, Canada and the MERCOSUR states. Indeed, Chile
has preferential trading relationships with every major trading country in our hemisphere but one —
the United States.
In South Asia, the seven members of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SARC)
- India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives — have set 2001 as the
target for the creation of a free trade area. SARC now represents only about 1 percent of world
trade, but it encompasses roughly 20 percent of the world's population. This will increasingly be an
important market for U.S. goods and services
Access to markets in such developing nations is especially important to America's economic future,
particularly those in Asia and Latin America which are projected to grow at rates as much as three
times the U.S. growth rate. As noted, more than 96 percent of the world's consumers reside outside
the United States. Of the more than 30 million people who join the world's middle class annually,
an estimated three quarters are found in emerging markets and other low and middle- income
countries. Latin America alone, if current trends continue, will exceed both Japan and Western
Europe combined as an export market for U.S. goods by the year 2010. Already, Latin America is
our fastest growing export market, even though the tariff barriers within the region average three to
four times the average U.S. tariff. Similarly, the Asian Pacific Rim has been our second fastest
growing export market in recent years, but its market access barriers are also generally higher than
U.S. barriers. The elimination of these inequities is in America's fundamental interest, as we have the
most competitive economy in the world.
Our lack of fast track procedures also disadvantages us in comparison with our industrialized
competitors. As mentioned, Canada recently signed a new trade agreement with Chile, giving
Canadian exporters substantial advantages over their U.S. counterparts. Perhaps even more
disturbing, the EU, already the world's largest trading bloc, is poised for major expansion in the next
few years. The EU has secured for its exporters significant advantages in the transition economies
of Central and Eastern Europe. As noted, the EU also has begun a process aimed at reaching a free
trade agreement with MERCOSUR and one with Mexico. It has also concluded a framework
agreement with Chile which is expected to lead to afreetrade agreement by 1999 based on recent
�reports.
China has targeted Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Venezuela as "strategic priorities" in Latin
America. China wants to enhance commercial ties and ensure that key Latin countries are receptive
to its broader global agenda as a rising power, both in the WTO and other fora. The Chinese
leadership has undertaken an unprecedented number of trips to Latin America in the last two years,
and Latin America is China's second fastest growing export market.
Japan has undertaken high level efforts throughout Asia and Latin America to enhance commercial
ties through investment and financial initiatives. The Prime Minister of Japan recently visited Latin
America seeking closer commercial ties and a greater Japanese commercial presence in all respects.
The consequences of agreements being reached without us are not just theoretical; they are quite
real. Many U.S. firms are suffering from the competitive disadvantage caused by preferential
agreements that do not include us. Our companies are losing export opportunities. Our past efforts
to level the playing field will prove futile over the long-term if we begin to cede this ground to our
competitors. Examples abound:
•
A U.S. telecommunications equipment supplier lost significant sales to a Canadian competitor
in part because of an 11% tariff preference favoring Canadian producers.
•
A Massachusetts fabric producer recently lost a $1.8 million sale in Chile to a Canadian
competitor because of an 11% tariff preference favoring Canadian producers.
•
U.S. apple producers are at risk in their Latin American markets due to Chile's preferential
tarifffree,or near tariff-free, access to MERCOSUR, Venezuela, Colombia, and other South
American markets as a result of the FT As it has negotiated (six since 1991). U.S. producers
have to absorb the non-preferential tariff cost to enter these growing markets.
•
U.S. com producers are facing competition in Chile from Argentinean producers who enjoy
a 3.3% tariff preference, which will grow to 11% over time. U.S. corn producers are facing
competition in Chile from Argentinean producers who enjoy a tariff preference. Similarly,
U.S. com producers could lose half their market share in Venezuela to Argentina because of
Venezuela's relationship with MERCOSUR.
In the context of negotiating the MERCOSUR customs union, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay
raised their tariff on imported computer products to accommodate Brazil's interests. The net result
was that the common external tariff is significantly higher (from zero to 14 percent ad valorem in the
case of Argentina, the second largest economy in South America) than the original tariff on these
items in Argentina and others.
The United States can only redress these growing trade imbalances by concluding similar bilateral and
regional agreements, as well as negotiating new multilateral agreements that level the trade playing
�field. But no such agreements are likely as long as our trading partners believe that any agreement
the President negotiates will also have to be separately negotiated with the Congress.
Fast track, however, is about more than economics. It is about American leadership. As the President
said last week, fast track "is about whether other countries will continue to look to the United States
to lead to a future of peace and freedom and prosperity; about whether the world will be growing
together instead of coming apart; about whether our economic ties will lead to cultural ties and ties
of partnership, or whether we will be viewed as somehow withdrawn from the world, not interested
in leading it, and therefore, not nearly as influential as we might otherwise be for the causes in which
we so deeply believe."
Sidelining ourselves at this critical juncture will have repercussions that will be far more than
economic. Economic prosperity contributes to economic security, which in tum supports democracy
and stability. We are at the pinnacle of our influence and we should use that influence to shape
international economic rules and transmit our fundamental values.
The Uses of Fast Track
The absence of fast track does not only mean that we cannot match our competitors when they enter
into preferential trade arrangements. It also prevents us from achieving our own goals. There are
three major areas of pressing concern which require fast track now.
First, fast track would allow us to complete the built-in agenda of the World Trade Organization:
that is, conclusion of the major trade negotiations that were deferred at the end of the Uruguay
Round and participation in negotiations mandated by the Uruguay Round agreements in areas ranging
from rules of origin to services. This year, we resume negotiations to expand and improve the
government procurement agreement. Next year, we begin again the negotiations on intellectual
property rights, followed by agriculture negotiations in 1999, and then services negotiations. We
seek enhanced access to global markets in these areas, and the stakes are very high. The world's
government procurement market will be a trillion-dollar market over the next decade and bringing
more countries into the agreement will be critical. Agriculture and services represent another almost
$2 trillion market, with agriculture representing $600 billion globally; and services $1.2 trillion. We
must have fast track authority to enter these various talks or countries will not put meaningful offers
on the table.
Second, fast track would enable us to pursue market-opening initiatives in sectors where the United
States either leads the world or is a powerful competitor, and where there is extraordinary potential
for growth. A good example of what can be achieved in this area is the recently concluded
Information Technology Agreement (ITA), the United States and 43 other nations agreed to the
reduction and eventual elimination of tariffs on information technology and electronic products,
including semiconductors, computers, telecommunications equipment, faxes, phones, and integrated
circuits. This is an extraordinarily favorable agreement for the United States, since we are a major
exporter of these products and our applicable tariffs were already quite low. Because other countries
�generally maintained substantially higher duties, this agreement provides what amounts to a $5 billion
tax cut for the U.S., money that can be used for research and market development, creating new
business opportunities and jobs for Americans.
In fact, the agreement has proven so successful that we already have a consensus among our trading
partners to pursue an " I T A - i r — in which we are seeking to expand the scope of products covered
by the agreement, address non-tariff barriers in addition to tariff barriers, and increase access to the
Information Superhighway.
We also are considering other sectors in which the United States is very competitive, but in which
global barriers tend to be high. In particular, we are focusing on trade in chemicals, energy equipment
and services, environmental technology and services, medical equipment and services, and wood and
paper products. Within APEC, the United States and its Pacific Rim trading partners are working
together to identify a number of areas that may be the subject of accelerated market opening
discussions. Renewal of fast track would show APEC that the United States intends to fully take part
in the negotiations and conclude key agreements.
Third, fast track is essential if we are to negotiate more comprehensive market access agreements
with individual countries, as well as on a regional basis. This Administration, consistent with its
predecessors, has identified Chile as a promising candidate for a comprehensive trade agreement.
Chile appears in all respects to be prepared to enter into agreements with us that achieve our
economic objectives, as well as our goals with respect to labor and the environment. Chile also
symbolizes our commitment to proceed towards the conclusion of the Free Trade Agreement of the
Americas (FTAA) by 2005.
Prior to the pursuit of other specificfree-tradearrangements, the Administration would clearly define
our negotiating objectives and consult closely with Congress.
The Fast Track Legislation
Fast Track is about forging an American consensus on trade and negotiating with our trading partners
from a position of strength and unity. As many members of this Committee know, the Administration
spent significant time consulting with members in both Houses and of both parties to try to develop
a proposal that would reflect the views of the American people. The consultations were invaluable
in shaping this proposal, and I thank the members of this Committee and their staffs for their
significant contribution.
Let me now tum to the specifics of the President's proposal.
The proposal first sets out "overall" and "principal" trade negotiating objectives for the President.
The "overall" objectives call on U.S. negotiators (1) to obtain more open, equitable, and reciprocal
market access; (2) to obtain the reduction or elimination of barriers and other trade-distorting policies
and practices that are directly related to trade and reduce market opportunities for U.S. exports or
�distort U.S. trade; (3) to further strengthen the system of international trading disciplines and
procedures; (4) to foster economic growth, raise living standards, and promote full employment in
the United States and to enhance the global economy; and (5) to address those aspects of foreign
government policies and practices regarding labor, the environment, and other matters which are
directly related to trade and decrease market opportunities for United States exports or distort United
States trade.
The "principal" objectives specify that U.S. negotiators should seek (1) to reduce or eliminate trade
barriers, and foreign government policies and practices directly related to trade that decrease market
access for U.S. exports or that distort U.S. trade; (2) to reduce foreign government barriers that
discriminate against or impose unreasonable regulatory barriers on U.S. service providers; (3) to
reduce unreasonable barriers to U.S. foreign investment; (4) to obtain adequate and effective
protection for U.S. intellectual property rights and increased access to foreign markets for U.S.
businesses that rely on intellectual property; (5) to make the proceedings of international trade bodies
more open to public view; (6) to secure fairer and more open conditions of trade for U.S. agricultural
products; and (7) to promote through multilateral institutions worker rights and sustainable
development.
These objectives and guidance reflect the President's three primary concerns underlying the proposal.
The President has made clear that hisfirstconsideration in proposing this legislation is the expansion
of American trade opportunities abroad and the tearing down of barriers impeding U.S. access to
foreign markets. However, the President also has made clear that we have an obligation to promote
therightsof workers and the environment. Our commitment to workerrightsand the environment
reflects long-standing, fundamental values of the United States. The proposal's objectives properly
balance the need to open markets with the attention these vital issues deserve.
The proposal next provides that the President may enter into certain agreements regarding tariffs and
implement them by proclamation. For example, the proposal would re-establish the President's
traditional proclamation authority, under which he can reduce U.S. duties up to 50 percent and
eliminate duties of 5 percent ad valorem or less. This authority dates back to 1934. The proposal
adds a new provision that would allow the President to harmonize or eliminate tariffs in connection
with reciprocal tariff agreements in particular sectors, as we did in the ITA, as well as to carry out
reciprocal tariff elimination agreements consistent with WTO rules.
In order for an agreement to qualify for fast-track treatment under the bill, the President must comply
with extensive notice and consultation requirements. These provisions enable the Congress to set
priorities, provide advice, and exercise oversight at all stages of the negotiations. They ensure that
Congressional views will be reflected both in any final agreement and in the manner in which an
agreement is carried out.
The bill expands upon the notice and consultation requirements included in earlier trade acts. For
example, the President must provide notice to Congress before initiating negotiations, and he must
consult with all congressional committees having jurisdiction over relevant issues. Only by broadening
�the circle of consultations and the Members of Congress included in them will we ensure that the
trade agreements we bring home have broad, bipartisan support - maximizing the benefits fast-track
procedures are designed to achieve.
In addition, Members of Congress and their staff are to be named as cleared advisers with respect
to on-going negotiations. These Congressional advisers will be apprised of all critical phases of the
negotiations, and they will have direct input into our strategy and offers. When negotiations near
completion, the President must notify Congress of his intention to enter into an agreement and, once
the agreement is signed, the President must describe to Congress how he intends to implement the
agreement. Finally, the President and the Congress are to receive advice on any proposed agreement
from the International Trade Commission.
To strengthen these provisions, we have added further consultation requirements. The bill mandates
that, prior to entering into negotiations, the President must describe his specific negotiating
objectives. The President is required to consult with Congress both before and after negotiations
begin. In addition, the President is required to inform Congress of any other agreements he intends
to conclude with the country or countries in question in addition to the trade agreement itself. The
President must also state whether the fast track agreement will require additional implementing
legislation that can be enacted only outside the fast track process.
Moreover, Congress must be satisfied that the President has met his consultation obligations. Under
the proposal, if Congressfindsthat the President has not done so, an expedited procedure is available
for Congress to withdraw fast track procedures.
The proposal also builds on existing provisions to ensure that the public is informed of trade
negotiations and that a mechanism is available for ensuring that the public can make its views known
to U.S. negotiators. In addition, the proposal calls for the President and Congress to receive advice
from officially-designated advisory committees covering the fiill range of sectors and policy matters,
mcluding manufactured goods, agricultural products, services, intergovernmental matters, investment,
intellectual property, labor, and environmental matters. These provisions demonstrate the
Administration's hope that Americans will not only understand our trade agenda, but take an active
part in formulating it.
Under well-established practice, the President collaborates with the Congress in drafting fast track
implementing legislation. Such legislation is subject to informal public hearings and "mark-ups" by
all Congressional committees of jurisdiction before its introduction. Under the President's proposal,
provisions may be included in such legislation only if they are necessary or appropriate to implement
an agreement and are related to trade. This language was designed to provide the President and
Congress with sufficient flexibility to modify domestic law to achieve our trade objectives while
ensuring that implementing bills will retain their focus on trade issues.
The President's proposal seeks this authority until his term is completed, with the possibility for an
extension until 2005, subject to disapproval by Congress. This provides Congress and the next
�President the opportunity to ensure that the consensus that we hope can be achieved with this fast
track proposal endures during the first term of the next President.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, if enacted, the President's proposal would renew more than 60 years of cooperation
between the Congress and the Executive Branch in the negotiation and implementation of marketopening trade agreements for the benefit of American workers and companies. We have had a
bipartisan consensus on the importance of expanding trade for the American economy and creating
a trading system as a part of America's leadership for peace and freedom. It is now clearly more
important than ever that we build a new consensus on the framework for the global economy of the
21st century. I am committed to working with the Congress to make sure that this legislation
receives the full, bipartisan support it deserves and the American people expect.
As the President Clinton said recently: "Walking away from this opportunity will not create a single
job. No one suggests we should throw up greater barriers in our own marketplace. Walking away
from this opportunity will only leave inequalities in place ~ inequalities that do not work to the
advantage of either American businesses or American workers." The world is on a very fast track
to the 21st century. America must lead in shaping our future.
�Remarks by
USTR CHARLENE BARSHEFSKY
before the
Council on Competitiveness
March 20, 1997
In trade policy, as much as in any other discipline, it is useful to recall the parable that "to
understand where we are going, we must remember where we've been."
For the last four years, our trade policy has been driven by a market-opening strategy to help U.S.
businesses sell products and services overseas and in our own hemisphere. That strategy is
paying-off. You know that as a result of our two most recent trade agreements — the ITA and
the global agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services. As I look around the room I see
many of you who were instrumental in developing the partnerships that made the ITA and
telecom agreements possible.
These two agreements will unlock billions in new opportunities for U.S. companies and
encompass the hardware, software, services and infrastructure package to dramatically expand the
reach of the Information Superhighway around the world. For the United States, the ITA levels
the international playing field by dropping tariffs to zero by the year 2000. The telecom
agreement - which includes 69 countries and covers 99% of the global marketplace - opens the
world for telecommunications trade as never before.
Before this Agreement, only 17 percent of the top 20 telecom markets were open to U.S.
companies; now they have access to nearly 100 percent of those markets. Today,
telecommunications is a $600 billion industry; under this agreement that figure will double or even
triple over the next ten years.
The ITA which involves 36 countries that account for more than 92% of global technology
production, will in tum will fuel the pace of global technological development by eliminating
•tariffs on a huge array of technology products. In 1995, trade in information technology products
exceeded $500 billion. By the year 2000, it will eclipse $750 billion.
I want to underscore a point that most of you here understand: U.S. companies are the most
competitive in the world with exports which approached $100 billion in 1996. Our technology
exports were up 44% in 1996. For our companies and the 1.8 million high tech manufacturing
workers in the United States, the ITA amounts to a $5 billion annual tax cut because tariff barriers
on technology products overseas are so much higher than ours. It is worth noting that we were
able to gain an ITA agreement because we had the tools -- specifically, fast track negotiating
authority - which strengthened our hand. While the ITA was basically a tariff deal we
specifically included the ability to go after non-tariff barriers to expand the reach of this deal. We
will need further negotiating authority to make more progress.
Let's look at the larger picture of U.S. trade....
�We are the strongest and most competitive economy in the world, and expanded trade has played
an important role in building our strength. Over the past four years, we have created nearly 12
million new jobs, while the G-7 combined created roughly 600,000. We are once again the
world's largest exporter, setting historic records. Over the last four years, our manufactured
exports are up 42 percent, high technology exports jumped 45 percent, service exports climbed 26
percent, and farm exports rose 40 percent.
Along the way, we have negotiated more than 200 trade agreements, all designed to advance our
economic and trade interests. We pursued these agreements including GATT and the NAFTA
because we recognized that trade is increasingly important to the future of our nation. Trade is
now equivalent to nearly 30 percent of our GDP, up from 13 percent in 1970. Exports support an
estimated 11.3 million U.S. jobs, and over 1.4 million of these jobs were generated by increased
exports over the last four years.
Our economic expansion has been investment-led, building the foundation for even greater
economic strength. Our industrial production is up nearly 18 percent in real terms over the last
four years. Japan's production, by contrast, is up 5 percent and Germany's has declined 2 percent
over this period. Growth of our industrial capacity is at its highest level since the 1970s.
In short, no country in the world is better positioned to take advantage of the enormous
opportunities presented by a growing global economy. Our competitors cannot beat us, but we
can lose if we put ourselves on the sidelines.
The Challenges Ahead
None of this is to suggest that we don't face challenges and continuing problems. Too many
Americans have been left behind in the current economic expansion, without the skills or
education to benefit from the increased opportunities. Neither government nor the private sector
should rest while that is the case. But we face a very clear choice. The choice is this:
We can recognize that the American economy is the model for the world, and continue to open
foreign markets and seize the intiative when it comes to international competition. To do so, we
must position ourselves to take advantage of the extraordinary opportunities presented by the
growing global economy.
This approach also calls for us to recognize that some Americans are being left behind by the
global econom. We can face up to this problem by working to put in place education, training,
and adjustment policies for workers in need; advancing core labor standards and protecting the
environment; and being vigilant to the consequences and potential threat of forced technology
transfer in foreign countries.
In short, we can start from the proposition that we have been basically on the right track and
should stay fully engaged, using all our tools, taking advantage of all opportunities.
Or, we can convince ourselves — against the evidence -- that we are on the wrong track. We can
�choose our course guided by a picture of economic decline and disinvestment that bears no
resemblance to what is happening in our country. We can let ourselves instead bog down in an
endless debate over NAFTA and Mexico. We can permit markets to stay closed and let others
seize the initiative from us. The choice is that clear.
The Threat of Inaction
We must recognize the dangers of inaction. In every region of the world, but particularly Asia and
Latin America, the two fastest growing regions in the world, governments are pursuing strategic
trade policies and preferential trade arrangements, creating trade alliances around us rather than
with us and the consequences of disengagement are unacceptably high for our economy.
Examples of such new exclusive alliances among our foreign competitors abound:
MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay) is a developing customs union with
ambitions to expand to all of South America. MERCOSUR has struck agreements with Chile and
Bolivia, and is discussing agreements with a number of Andean countries (Colombia, Venezuela)
as well as countries within the Caribbean Basin.
The EU has begun a process aimed at reaching afreetrade agreement with MERCOSUR.
They have concluded a framework agreement with Chile that is set up to lead to a free trade
agreement. The President of France, just in the region, said Latin America's "essential economic
interests... lie not with the United States but with Europe."
China has targeted Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Venezuela as "strategic priorities"
in Latin America to ensure that key Latin countries are receptive to its broader global agenda as a
rising power, both in the WTO and other fora.
Japan has undertaken high level efforts throughout Asia and Latin America in country
after country.
Mexico wants to be the commercial hub between North and South America and serve as a
venue in which to enter North, Central and South America from Asia and Europe.
The cost of inaction is already upon us:
o
Southwest Bell selected Northern Telecom for a $180 million telecommunications project
it has in Chile to avoid paying $20 million in duties that if it had contracted with an American
company, thanks to the Chi'e-Canada free trade agreement.
[o
The competitive advantage of lower Chilean tariffs as a result of these exclusive trade
relationships with select trading partners extends to U.S. industrial and intermediate goods as
well. In Chile, Goodyear - a major supplier of tires and heavy mining equipment - now obtains
its raw materials and intermediate products from Mexico, instead of the United States. Caterpillar
will supply some of its lines of earth moving equipment to the mining industry from Brazil, rather
than the United States.]
�Our Global Trading Agenda
We should respond to these global challenges with the full arsenal of trade policy tools at our
disposal including "fast track" negotiating authority. What are we looking for? The United States
must be positioned at the center of a global constellation of trade activity. To the extent that our
trading partners are engaged in the development of exclusive trade relationships around us, that
can only mean that our long term strategic interests will suffer around the world -- if we cannot
intervene to redirect those alliance in our favor. We have important work ahead of us:
Within four years, major WTO negotiations will occur in key areas where the
United States is again a top global competitor with much to gain: agriculture,
services, and the rules for intellectual property rights. This year we will be
resuming WTO negotiations onfinancialservices. In the OECD, we are in active
negotiations over the Multilateral Agreement on Investment to ensure equitable
and fair treatment for U.S. investors.
With regards to the regional agenda, the United States is committed not only to concluding the
FTAA by 2005, but also to concrete progress by 2000. Chile should be our first step in this
process. The region views what we do with Chile as a litmus test for our future plans.
Latin America and the Caribbean were the fastest growing market for U.S. exports
in 1996. If trends continue, it will exceed the EU as a destination for U.S. exports
by the year 2000, and exceed Japan and the EU combined by the year 2010. It is
also the second fastest growing region in the world.
With building the FTAA very much in mind, the Administration remains committed
to Caribbean Basin Trade Enhancement.
The Asia Pacific region contains the fastest growing economies in the world,
encompassing nearly 3 billion people. Within APEC, we estimate that reaching the
goal of open markets would increase U.S. goods exports alone by 27 percent
annually, or almost $50 billion a year. Market-opening agreements with key
APEC partners offers the potential to catalyze this process and strengthen U.S.
strategic relationships.
[With Europe, our focus will be on non-tariff barriers which continue to impede
transatlantic commerce, especially regulatory barriers and agricultural
impediments. ]
Africa is a region rich in resources and potential, which we should engage with
determination to ensure its effective and sustainable development and democratic
governance.
�There is no substitute for our ability to implement comprehensive trade agreements. The absence
of agreed procedural authority is the single most important factor limiting our capacity at this time
to open markets. Such authority is a prerequisite to U.S. negotiating credibility and success on
major trade fronts.
Trade, Labor, and the Environment
We can no longer allow our disagreements over the relationship between trade, labor standards
and environmental protection to prevent us from granting the President fast track authority. It is
important to recognize that a commitment to protection of core labor standards and their
relationship to trade, is not new, nor is it unique to the United States. Advancing worker rights
and labor standards is in our national interest and it is consistent with our deepest national values.
Conclusion
I want to thank all of you in this room for making helping us achieve the very important
agreements we reached on IT products and telecommunications. But I want to caution you that
those agreements are not an end but a beginning. The one lesson that we cannot afford to forget
is that if the United States is not leading the fight -- as we did with ITA and telecom -- these
agreements cannot happen. With the emergence of exclusive trade alliances around us, we must
continue our fight to eliminate foreign trade barriers. I look forward to your continuing
engagement as we seek other sectoral trade pacts, and assure that the United States is always at
the center ofa constellation of regional trade alliances whether they are in Asia or our own
hemisphere. Thank you.
�Statement of Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky
WTO Basic Telecom Agreement
Testimony before the House Commerce Committee -Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade & Consumer Protection
March 19, 1997
I am pleased to testify today regarding the successful conclusion of the first important
trade agreement of the 21st century. Three years ago, in Buenos Aires, Vice President Gore
called on the nations of the world to join in building the Global Information Infrastructure. One
year ago, this Congress delivered a clear and compelling blueprint in the 1996 Telecommunication
Act. And now, thanks to that bipartisan achievement, the United States has effectively exported
American values of free competition, fair rules and effective enforcement to global telecom
services markets.
The WTO Basic Telecom Agreement represents a change of profound importance. It is
an achievement greater than we could have reasonably expected three years ago at Buenos Aires.
A 60-year tradition of telecommunications monopolies and closed markets will give way to
market opening, deregulation and competition ~ the principles championed in the United States
and embodied in the 1996 Telecommunications Act.
We did not expect at Buenos Aires that these principles would be adopted widely by both
the industrialized nations and by so many other countries. The Basic Telecom Agreement was
negotiated among 69 countries ~ both developed and developing -- that account for over 99% of
WTO member telecom revenues. It ensures that U.S. companies can compete-against and invest
in all existing carriers. Before this Agreement, only 17 percent of the top 20 telecom markets
were open to U.S. companies; now they have access to nearly 100 percent of these markets.
�The range of services and technologies covered by this Agreement is breath-taking. From
submarine cables to satellites, from wide-band networks to cellular phones, from business
intranets to fixed wireless for rural and underserved regions, the market access opportunities
cover the entire spectrum of innovative communications technologies pioneered by American
industry and workers.
The Agreement has four parts: market access, investment, procompetitive regulatory
principles and enforcement. With respect to market access, the Agreement provides U.S.
companies market access for local, long-distance and international service through any means of
network technology, either on a facilities basis or through resale of existing network capacity. On
investment, the Agreement ensures that U.S. companies can compete against, acquire or hold a
significant stake in telecom companies around the world. Finally, 65 countries adopted
procompetitive regulatory principles based upon the landmark 1996 Telecommunications Act.
And lastly, this Agreement is fully enforceable through WTO dispute settlement, supplemented
where necessary by U.S. trade laws.
Today, telecommunications is a $600 billion industry; under this Agreement it will double
or even triple over the next ten years. U.S. companies are the most competitive
telecommunications providers in the world; they are in the best position to compete and win
under this Agreement.
According to the Economic Strategy Institute, the Agreement will lead to the creation of
approximately one million jobs throughout the U.S. economy in the next ten years — in
communications companies, high-tech equipment makers, software and information services and in all other sectors of the economy, which will benefit equally from the lower prices and the
better service that competition among telecom networks will deliver.
�This Agreement will also save billions of dollars for American consumers. Executive
Branch agencies and the FCC estimate that the average cost of international phone calls will drop
by 80% -- from $1 per minute on average to 20 cents per minute over the next several years.
Every American with relatives or friends overseas and every business that operates internationally
will benefit.
The WTO Basic Telecom Agreement will build the Global Information Highway. It is the
perfect complement to the global Information Technology Agreement (ITA) which we brought to
fruition three months ago. U.S. makers of telecommunications equipment are among the world's
leaders. They will profit by meeting the new demand stimulated by the deregulatory,
procompetitve terms of this Agreement. Our information technology industry is poised to lead
the growth of the American economy in much the same way the automotive industry spurred
tremendous growth 40 years ago.
Scope of Market Access Commitments
Increased competition in the supply of international and/or domestic services will be the
rule for each of the 69 WTO members participating in the Agreement. These 69 markets account
for 99% of WTO member countries' international and domestic telecom services revenues.
Our international long distance industry will gain access to serve over 52 markets in
Europe, Asia, Latin American and Africa, and in 49 markets they will gain access to provide these
and other services by satellite. U.S. industry will gain the right to use their own facilities and to
work directly with their customers everywhere their customers go -- providing seamless
end-to-end services, instead of transferring calls to local providers at extra costs. From the
European Community to Korea, from Japan to El Salvador, Mexico and Canada, countries have
�made these commitments. And the range of services that can be provided internationally includes
all voice and data services, provided by fixed or by wireless service networks or both.
As for domestic services, U.S. communications companies operating in Europe will be
able to bypass former monopolies and build networks directly to and among customers in all
member states of the European Union. U.S.firmswill market communications services in
developing countries such as India, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Africa and elsewhere. They will
have a fair chance to build communications networks that are the key to worldwide economic
development. Mexico, for example, has guaranteed that U.S. firms can help provide fixed
wireless, mobile wireless and wireline local and long distance services.
This Agreement also provides market access and effective interconnection rights for the
resale of telecom services. Almost every offer made in these negotiations to provide market
access for facilities-based competition also included the opportunity to resell service and to
interconnect with existing networks at reasonable rates, terms and conditions.
Investment and regulatory commitments
The Agreement also offers important opportunities for American investors and
entrepreneurs who will be able to compete against, acquire or hold a significant stake in telecom
companies around the world. These opportunities span all sectors. American companies will, for
example, be free to have full control over companies that provide cellular telephone service in
Mexico, satellite-delivered intemet access in Japan, intra-Europe and domestic long distance
service in Germany, hand-held satellite telephony in Korea, international business networks in
Singapore, and video-conferencing in the United Kingdom. In all these technologies, our
companies are the world leaders, and in all these technologies our companies will be free to
compete.
�Our firms will gain not only the opportunity to compete but they will also benefit for the
first time from fair rules and effective enforcement. Sixty-five countries representing 93% of the
world market have bound themselves to enforceable regulatory principles based upon the
framework for competition that this Committee championed in the landmark Telecommunications
Act of 1996. Fifty-five of these countries have agreed to a uniform, specific set of regulatory
principles. The global adoption of these pro-competition principles, known as the Reference
Paper, is an extraordinary testimony to the compelling nature of Congress' vision in this area.
The Reference Paper commits foreign countries to establish independent regulatory bodies,
guarantees that our companies will be able to interconnect with networks in foreign countries at
reasonable prices, requires governments to take action to prevent anti-competitive practices such
as cross-subsidization, and mandates transparency of government regulations and licensing. We
will be able to enforce all of theserights,as well as the market access and investment
commitments, at the WTO and through our own legislation. The Agreement takes effect on
January 1, 1998. Countries remainfreeto improve further their offers and we will work to that
end.
Benefits to American workers and consumers
The Agreement will create jobs in the United States and it will raise standards of living by
opening the way for the more widespread supply of a wide range of telecommunications services
at lower costs. By spurring greater competition and investment than we would otherwise enjoy,
the Agreement will help the United States to maintain the world's most economical,
highest-performance telecommunications infrastructure
Prior to this Agreement, monopolies around the world were able to charge prices
excessive enough to limit economic growth. For example, one analysis of spending by the U.S.
business sector ten years ago found that it its telecommunications costs were higher than is costs
�for oil to heat its factories and run its transportation systems. That means that in our own market
and elsewhere, the benefits of this Agreement will not be limited simply to the expanded export of
telecom services and equipment.
There are three factors to consider. First and foremost, businesses and consumers across
the entire U.S. economy will benefit from lower prices. Under the Agreement, 52 countries
guaranteed market access to international telecommunication services and. As I noted earlier,
prices for international phone connections are likely, as a result, to fall by as much as 80%,
resulting in a great expansion of the volume of international telecommunication services. The cost
of U.S. domestic calls will also fall as the Agreement helps to achieve a major goal of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 -- to increase investment in the United States in competitive
telecommunications networks.
Second, experience demonstrates that a switch from monopoly to competition in telecom
services could double the size of the market, adding an extra $800 billion to the global telecom
services market from 1998-2008. For example, after the introduction of competition in Chile,
domestic long distance rates fell from $2 per minute to 20 cents per minute, and the
telecommunications sector grew by 250%.
To give another example, several years ago the
Philippines decided to allow numerous competitors into its telecommunications market. The
result was a 15-fold increase in the number of lines added in one year. As this subcommittee
knows well, increasing competition in U.S. domestic long distance markets has always meant
increased volumes and increased revenues for the entire industry. U.S. telecom services suppliers
- by virtue of their wealth of experience in the world's largest and most competitive telecom
services market — are in the best position to enter new markets and compete.
Third, the Agreement will allow U.S. telecom equipment providers -- among the world's
most competitive — to enjoy expanded sales abroad. For example, the foreign countries with the
�ten top telecom equipment markets all made commitments in these negotiations. In 1995, U.S.
telecom equipment exports to these 10 countries amounted to $7.3 billion, which was well under
10% of the needs of these markets. As new service suppliers enter these and other foreign
markets for the first time, and as former monopolists come under competitive pressures, the
preferred supplier relationships that limit access for U.S. equipment suppliers today will give way
to procurements based on price and quality terms. The workers at our satellite manufacturers,
computer manufacturers, telephone equipment manufacturers and companies throughout the U.S.
telecommunications equipment industry are ready, willing and able to compete on a level playing
field — such as the one this Agreement provides.
Implementation of the Agreement in the United States and Abroad
The implementation of the Agreement will be no less challenging than it was to negotiate.
There are two areas to mention: our own domestic implementation and implementation by our
trading partners.
First, with respect to implementation by the United States of its commitments under the
Agreement, I have great respect for differences of opinion among some Members of Congress.
The Administration believes, as does the FCC, that U.S. communications law provides authority
to implement the U.S. commitments made under this Agreement, without any further legislative
action. Under the Basic Telecom Agreement, the United States
maintained the 20% limit on direct foreign investment set by U.S. communications law;
allows foreign investment greater than 20% only by indirect investment;
reserves the exclusivity of Comsat, particularly regarding INTELSAT and INMARSAT;
and,
protects the right of each state, as set forth by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, to
make exceptions to interconnection obligations for certain local exchange carriers.
�The Federal Communications Commission has authority to exceed the 25% benchmark for
indirect foreign investment in common carriers. Under U.S. communications law, that authority is
based on the FCC's determination of the public interest. That authority has been exercised
repeatedly, for example, most recently, in approving recent foreign investments in MCI and
Sprint.
Finally, regarding new types of television and radio services that are regulated as telecom
services in the United States, we excluded the satellite-based delivery of the fast-growing
Direct-to-Home, Direct Broadcast Satellite and Digital Audio Services sectors from our
commitments in the WTO Basic Telecom Agreement.
The Clinton Administration supports the longstanding FCC practice, under the FCC's
interpretation of the public interest, to consider applications for foreign ownership of broadcast
licensees differently than applications for foreign ownership of common carrier licensees. The
20% statutory limit on direct foreign ownership and the 25% statutory benchmark on indirect
foreign ownership of broadcast licensees already are protected by the U.S. services commitments
made in the Uruguay Round Trade Agreement.
Nonetheless, I am sensitive to concerns of
Members regarding radio licenses for broadcasters and we will work with interested Members of
Congress on appropriate revisions to the foreign ownership provisions of U.S. communications
law concerning broadcast licenses.
The second area of implementation concerns our trading partners. Their obligations on
market access and investment are as wide-ranging as those of the United States, but our trading
partners' commitments must be implemented against a very different historical background. Most
of our peer countries -- the industrialized countries of the OECD -- are, by this Agreement,
introducing competition into all sectors of their basic telecom services markets for the first time.
The same is true, by definition, with respect to foreign investment in the basic telecommunications
�sector. Many of these countries must pass ratifying legislation and develop implementing
regulations in order to implement this Agreement next January 1. We will be monitoring closely
the timeliness and completeness of these near-term implementation processes; and, over the
longer term, we will do the same for commitments that are phased-in after 1998. I expect a
number of formal bilateral discussions to take place, later this year, in order to discuss reciprocally
and comment upon the implementation plans of our key trading partners.
I must also call attention to the fact that never before have we had a multilateral trade
agreement that incorporated as many elements of competition policy as the WTO Basic Telecom
Agreement's Reference Paper on pro-competitive regulatory principles. This presents a great
opportunity and also a great challenge.
The transition from monopoly markets to competitive markets in basic telecom services
requires a strong dose of regulatory intervention to compel the dominant former monopoly to
cooperate with new entrants on a reasonable economic and technical basis. To implement
successfully the competitive principles adopted by 65 countries, the United States will undertake a
wide-ranging effort that combines incentives and enforcement. The United States will support
work in appropriate international fora to help countries determine how to create regulatory
institutions, train regulatory personnel, and tum the principles of the Reference Paper into
statutes, regulations, rules and practices. Those fora will include, but are not limited to, the WTO
itself, the OECD, the International Telecommunication Union; the telecommunications sub-group
of APEC; and, CITEL the telecommunications sub-group of the Organization of American States.
At the same time, the Clinton Administration will undertake an enforcement effort in the
basic telecommunications services sector that is every bit as activist and strategic as our
enforcement program of annual reviews in other trade sectors. The United States will expect
countries that have made commitments to open their markets from next January 1 to do just that.
�We will not hesitate to use the dispute settlement mechanisms of the WTO and our trade laws to
bring cases early and often where benefits expected by the United States under this Agreement
have not been realized.
Conclusion
Our negotiating instructions, set by the Congress in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act,
were to obtain the opening on non-discriminatory terms and conditions of foreign markets for
basic telecom services, on a facilities- and a resale-basis. This Agreement meets the negotiating
objective that Congress set. The United States has effectively exported American values of free
competition, fair rules and effective enforcement not only to the markets whose industries are
ready and poised to compete here ~ but also to many other markets in Asia, Latin America and
Central Europe, where governments judged that only greater reliance on private investment and
competition can deliver the benefits of modem telecommunications infrastructure.
The WTO Basic Telecom Agreement meets the litmus test for any agreement undertaken
by the United States -- it strengthens the U.S. position in the global economy by creating new
opportunities for our most competitive industries. That means it will contribute to a healthier,
stronger U.S. economy, and that it will create jobs and higher incomes for American workers
within and outside the telecommunications sector. I must admit, however, that it is not a perfect
agreement. For that reason, we already are engaged in continuing efforts with Japan, Korea and
Mexico to open their markets wider. We expect that Canada also will find that its position on
foreign investment does not serve to strengthen its national competitiveness. We stand ready to
work with our Canadian colleagues on access to our DTH/DBS satellite market when they are
prepared to reconsider their position on foreign investment and content. Argentina has
approached us with respect to access to provide certain satellite-based services in the United
States, and we are willing to work with them to assure full access for U.S. suppliers ofall
�satellite-based services to Argentina.
There is a long list of countries negotiating to accede to the WTO. The conclusion of the
GBT Agreement effectively has "raised the bar" for their entry, by establishing that the United
States and the other parties to the Agreement will request basic telecom services commitments as
part of accession. We have done so in all the twenty-eight ongoing accession negotiations to the
WTO ~ just as we have requested commitments to zero-out tariffs for goods covered by the
Information Technology Agreement. As a result of the impetus given by the GBT Agreement to
ongoing accession talks, Taiwan just last week submitted an offer covering basic telecom services
for the first time.
We have always said that trade is not a zero sum game. Nothing could be more
illustrative than this Agreement. We sometimes forget that more half the world's population has
never made a telephone call. Thanks to this Agreement and the efforts of the United States, I
expect there will be more rapid progress towards universal service around the world in the next
ten years than we have seen in the past sixty. The Basic Telecom Agreement serves as a vivid
reminder that trade agreements can create jobs and prosperity at home while providing
opportunities for other nations also to prosper and develop.
�REMARKS BY
ACTING U.S.T.R. CHARLENE BARSHEFSKY
before the
Women's Foreign Policy Group
Carnegie Endowmenet for International Peace
Wednesday, Oct. 2,1996
[As prepared for delivery: This is not a verbatim transcript]
Thank you. It's a pleasure to be here with you today.
I want to focus my remarks today on the economic changes that America, under the leadership of
President Clinton, has made in the last four years and on what that means for America's trade
strategy as we go forward.
We have made remarkable progress. And people often don't realize how much has been
accomplished because it has happened on so many fronts and because we have moved so quickly
on to the next task or a higher goal.
Four years ago, the phrase "It's the economy, stupid" entered the political lexicon. It's important
to remember why that happened.
Foremost, there was a call throughout the country to focus on the immediate economic
predicament of Americans as it stood in 1992. People were worried, and with good cause.
We had high unemployment, at 7.5 %; stagnant incomes; low growth rates; a record-high budget
deficit of $290 billion; a growing gap between the haves and have-nots; a growing divide between
those who could get an education to prepare them for the future and those who could not.
Another part of the message was about the future. Americans didn't want their economy to be
just monitored, come what may. They wanted an active president with a clear, realistic, long-term
plan for renewing growth, renewing opportunity, and, at the most fundamental level, renewing
hope.
That's what President Clinton set out to do. As he said recently, the goal is to go into the 21st
century "with the American Dream alive and well for every American who is willing to work for
it, without regard to their race or their region or where they started out in life."
I want you to take a look at how things have turned around in the last four years.
•
Unemployment is down to 5.1 %. It has only gone lower once in the last 22 years. Four
years ago, unemployment was 7.5 %.
�•
We are currently in the 5th year of economic expansion. The economy in the last four
years under President Clinton has grown faster than it did during either the Bush or the
Reagan administrations.
•
More important, America's economic growth is on a solid footing; it is based on low
inflation, strong industrial production not yet at capacity constraint, and good prospects
for continued job and output growth.
•
Over 10.5 million net new jobs have been created and these jobs are geared toward higher
wage jobs. A CEA study reported that 68% of net new jobs created between February of
1994 and February of 1996 paid above median wages.
•
Our budget deficit today is half the size it was when President Clinton took office. The
budget deficit for thisfiscalyear is expected to be roughly $117 billion-that's the lowest
budget deficit in 15 years.
•
Consumer confidence is now double what it was just before President Clinton was elected
in 1992.
•
For the third year in a row the United States has been cited as the world's most
competitive major economy by the World Economic Forum.
•
Real wages are rising again. Over the past 12 months, average hourly wages increased 3 .6
%. That is faster than the rate of inflation.
•
Home ownership in America is at a 15-year high. Since President Clinton took office, 4.4
million more Americans have become homeowners.
Trade has been an important tool for accomplishing some of these successes. Under President
Clinton, we have made free and fair trade a key part of America's economic growth strategy.
In years past, trade was just an asterisk in a president's economic plans. As one historian put it,
Presidents have seen trade policy as "a second-order, technical business."
Well, not this President. He knew trade was going to play a greater role, not a lesser role, in our
economy. And he was right:
•
Trade (exports plus imports) in goods and services (including earnings on foreign
investment) has risen from a value equal to 25% of GDP in 1992 to one equal to nearly
30% of GDP in 1995, from $1.6 trillion to $2.1 trillion.
�•
Jobs supported by goods exports pay between 13 percent and 16 percent more than the
U.S. national average wage. Moreover, these jobs are in the areas where America has the
highest productivity: manufacturing, agriculture, high technology.
•
In the last decade, jobs supported by exports haverisenfivetimes faster than the rest of
the economy.
•
Export growth has accounted for one-fifth of the overall growth in our economy since
1992.
President Clinton has put in place a trade strategy recognizes and capitalizes on these changes in
the American economy and in the world economy.
Through negotiating and implementing new trade agreements, enforcing compliance with current
agreements, and pursuing new trade expansion in Asia, South America and Europe, that strategy
has paid off:
•
The increased exports we generated support an estimated 1.5 million new jobs. An
estimated total of 11.4 million jobs are now supported by exports.
•
U.S. exports in goods and services are running at an annual rate of $848 billion, some
37% or $230 billion higher than 1992.
•
U.S. exports of manufactured products are currently running at an annual rate of $525
billion in 1996, or 42 percent higher than in 1992.
U.S. exports of advanced technology products (in particular, among
manufactured products) have grown even faster. They are running at a rate
of $160 billion so far this year, some 49 percent higher than in 1992.
.[AD LIB: Just last week I toured one of the leading high-tech companies in Silicon Valley. The
company was called Cisco and it makes switches and software for networks and the Internet.
Cisco's export sales nearly quadrupled between 1993 and 1995,risingfrom$166.3 million in 1993
to $661.6 million in 1995. Those are products that have been or will be benefitting from our
efforts to protect intellectual property rights, open telecommunicaitons markets, and bring down
tariffs on technology related to the Information Highway, [source: cisco systems annual report] ]
•
The value of U.S. agricultural exports, after a number of years of slow growth, have
increased sharply in the last year and a half. They were up 22 percent in 1995 to a record
level of $56 billion and in the first six months of 1996 are up by another 13 percent,
relative to a year earlier.
�•
U.S. commercial service exports are currently running at an annual rate of $227 billion, up
28 percent from 1992.
•
Our goods trade deficit with Japan has reached its lowest level in four years. Our goods
exports to Japan has grown by 47% since 1992, despite the Japanese economy being at or
near recession during this time.
Our market opening agreements with Japan has paid off. According to the
CEA, U.S. exports in sectors covered by our market opening agreements-such as autos, auto parts, medical technology, flat glass, cellular phones,
and rice-have grown 85%, a rate that is 3 times faster than other exports
to Japan over the same time period.
In the first 6 months of 1996, U.S. exports of vehicles and parts to Japan
are up by over 18 percent, imports are down by almost 20 percent and the
6 month deficit has fallen by $4.6 billion, or 24 percent.
Let me note parenthetically that during the four years before President
Clinton, the auto industry as a whole had lost 35,000 jobs. In the four years
since President Clinton, the auto industry has added 131,000 jobs. America
has not had this many auto industry jobs since the days before Ronald
Reagan.
•
Even if you look at it from a regional standpoint, the picture is good. U.S. exports to the
European Union are up 24 percent, to Latin America, excluding Mexico, are up nearly 32
percent, and to Asia Pacific Rim countries, excluding Japan and China, are up by 47
percent (from the fourth quarter of 1992 to the second quarter of 1996).
•
Although the rate of expansion has slowed somewhat in the first half of 1996, U.S.
exports to China grew by 57 percent between 1992 and 1995. And even though we still
have a bilateral deficit with China, we have made more progress on market-opening
agreements than any previous administration.
•
Prospects for U.S. trade growth are likewise strong, particularly in the so-called "big
emerging markets" of the world, where 85 percent of the world's consumers reside. U.S.
exporters are particularly well placed to serve these markets through exports of the tools
of economic development (e.g. capital goods, industrial supplies, business services).
Under the leadership of President Clinton, this administration has expanded trade by completing
more than 200 market-opening agreements in the last three and a half years.
�•
We have laid the groundwork for long-term economic growth and opportunity with our
neighbors to the South through initiatives such as the Free Trade Area of the Americas at
the historic Summit of the Americas..
•
In the dynamic "big emerging markets" of the Asia-Pacific, the President was instrumental
in getting APEC-the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum-to define free trade as its
goal and set a time certain for liberalization.
•
With our oldest and best established trading partners in Europe, he has been the leader in
setting a New TransAtlantic Agenda, so that the worst vestiges of protectionism are
eventually eliminated there.
•
Even with respect to Africa, a continent that for too long has had its potential for
international commerce ignored, the President has taken steps to open America's markets
in a way that can generate economic development through productive two-way trade-not
just aid.
•
And in the final leg of the Uruguay Round of the GATT, when the stakes for free and fair
trade were higher than ever before, President Clinton came through and made sure the
deal was done and that it got a stamp of approval from the U.S. Congress. That agreement
not only created the World Trade Organization, it included more nations than ever,
opened markets for more products and services than ever, and it includes more protections
for American companies and workers than ever.
The list goes on: the largest procurement agreement in history with the European Union, bilateral
agreements on textiles, grain, film, construction contracts. This President has a record of trade
leadership-literally throughout the world-that is unequalled. The facts are there. The Clinton
trade strategy has worked.
We're going to make that same kind of diligence the hallmark of our implementation of existing
.trade agreements. We don't believe that trade deals should be just a handshake and a wave
goodbye. These are not just pieces of paper. They're binding contracts.
Foremost, we are devoting substantial time and effort to ensuring that the new World Trade
Organization becomes an effective means of settling trade disputes, achieving more progress on
free trade, and requiring nations to comply with their commitments in good faith.
And in our bilateral agreements, particularly those with Japan and China, we have gone—and will
go-back to our trading partners time and time again if these agreements are not producing the
desired result.
President Clinton's trade strategy has worked because he has insisted that our trading partners
play by the rules. His rule has been: you will no longer get America to give you free trade, unless
�you're willing to give us fair trade. And that means fair when the ink on the contract is wet, and
fair long after the ink is dry. You will not get something for nothing.
That is why we have have been so aggressive in our enforcement over the last four years. This
administration has pursued 42 trade enforcement actions against other countries in the last four
years.
Let me say in closing that this President has done more for the cause offreetrade than any
president in my lifetime. I want to urge you to look at the record, because it is truly remarkable.
He hasn't just talked about expanding free trade. He's been a leader who made it a reality.
Thank you.
�Statement by Ambassador Barshefsky
http://www.ustr.gov/agrcements/itabarshefslcv.htm
World Trade
Organization
\VT/MIN(96)/ST/5
9 December 1996
(96-5176)
Original: English
MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE
Singapore, 9-13 December 1996
UNITED STATES
Statement by the Honourable Charlene Barshefsky
Acting United States Trade Representative
On behalf of the US delegation, I want to express our appreciation to Prime Minister Goh, Minister Yeo
and the Government of Singapore, the General Council Chairman, Ambassador Rossier, and the
Director-General, Mr. Ruggiero and his staff for their efforts to prepare for this historic, inaugural
meeting of the World Trade Organization. You have been gracious beyond measure - and we are very
grateful.
Nearly 50 years ago, the formation of the GATT launched a period of trade liberalization unprecedented
in world history. Few present at that creation would have predicted the tremendous growth in world
trade - increasing 80 per cent by volume in the last decade alone - that has added immeasurably to the
prosperity of the world's people. GATT succeeded because we persisted in the goal of eliminating the
barriers that deny our people the benefits of free and fair trade. We saw new challenges, and we worked
together to seize new opportunities.
As we convene the first Ministerial Meeting of the WTO, our commitment to the ongoing work of trade
liberalization must be equally determined. We must prove to the world that the WTO is a vibrant
institution laying the foundations for a new period of global prosperity. Like our predecessors, we must
seize new opportunities.
The global economy will not wait for us. Technological change is advancing rapidly - all over the globe in the West and in the East. We salute the foresight of Prime Minister Mahathir for his vision to establish
the Multimedia Super Corridor plan that will lead to an information technology city of 100,000
inhabitants as well as the creation of the world's first paperless national government by the year 2000. The
World Bank estimates that the world's economies will demand US$1.5 trillion in capital over the next
decade for high quality infrastructure, advanced information technology and telecommunications systems.
We have an opportunity to meet these challenges. If we can succeed in three important negotiations information technology, basic telecommunications services andfinancialservices - we can build the
infrastructure for a more interconnected global economy of the 21st century.
The first of these, the Information Technology Agreement, would be the first concrete demonstration of
the WTO's ability to move forward in concert with the changing world around us. By creating a tariff-free
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environment for trade in information technology products, we can help lower consumer costs, make our
businesses more competitive and give our entire economies the benefits that flow from access to greater
information.
The biggest benefit may be to our economies more broadly. These products increasingly are used in
virtually every major industry sector. The largest users of semiconductors worldwide are auto makers.
Computers and computer driven-machines increasingly are essential for textiles, apparel and steel
manufacturing. And we all know the vital role a modem telecommunications system plays in the growth
of our economies.
That is why we must reach an agreement this week. Remaining issues are ripe for decision. We have an
historic opportunity to eliminate tariffs on these products. We must seize it.
Our second challenge is to proceed expeditiously to conclude the basic telecommunications negotiations
by 15 February 1997. Investors increasingly seek predictability in telecommunications as part of a
well-functioning international trade and investment regime. Telecom is a strategic industry and a
generator of economic growth and employment. If we are successful in the WTO, basic telecom
liberalization will spur investment and the use of new technologies in wider geographic and product areas.
The United States and Europe have recently announced improvements to the offers tabled in the basic
telecom negotiations, and we urge others to match our offers. This is certainly our hope and expectation.
With such a short amount of time after this Ministerial to conclude this negotiation, we hope all WTO
Members will contribute meaningfully to an agreement that provides market access and investment
opportunities in the 21st century.
But let me be clear. Today, the United States accounts for nearly 50 per cent ofall telecom revenue
worldwide. We cannot, and we will not, settle for a situation where we are unable to operate in the other
half of the world's markets. We are ready to lead by making the first best offer, but we cannot succeed
unless others come forward on a mutual basis.
This leads me to the third set of critical negotiations - financial services. For our part, we are committed
to achieving a comprehensive and meaningful agreement by the end of next year. Our first try at the
negotiations did not succeed. Why? Because the commitments of key countries were far below what was
necessary to achieve a truly liberalizing agreement. In fact, some countries would not even obligate
themselves to their existing levels of liberalization. To successfully conclude these talks, it is critical that
WTO Members significantly improve their commitments based on the GATS principles of market access,
national treatment and MFN.
We are convinced that an agreement is possible. We can and should look more carefully at phase-in
commitments, where appropriate, so there are assurances that after a reasonable period our financial
services providers will enjoy substantially full market access and national treatment in key markets. The
benefits of binding open regimes in this sector should be clear: to achieve increased access to international
capital and stronger "infrastructure" for continued investment and economic growth.
If we can succeed in the ITA, the basic telecom negotiations, and in the upcomingfinancialservices
negotiations, we will have taken a major step toward building the kind of global economy that will benefit
all of our citizens.
Of course, our vision for the WTO extends beyond these three negotiations. If the WTO is to stay
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relevant and responsive to new commercial realities, we must look ahead and create more market access
opportunities, and, when necessary, create new rules.
Work must continue in many areas. Those who already have benefited from the global trading system
must find new ways for those less advantaged to reap the system's benefits. We must continue the reform
effort called for in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. In addition to encouraging further cuts in tariffs
and subsidies, the WTO should develop disciplines against disguised subsidies and non- traditional forms
of protection, such as the trade-restraining and non-transparent activities of state trading enterprises. The
TRIPS Agreement should be fully implemented as rapidly as possible and existing obligations should be
met now. We also must continue efforts to ensure that the WTO is open and transparent. Opening this
Ministerial to outside observers is a good step forward. We will address these and other issues more fully
in the working sessions.
Public confidence in the integrity of government procurement decisions would be enhanced if all WTO
countries agreed to basic standards of transparency and due process. We believe this is the time to take
the first step toward a WTO agreement on transparency in government procurement.
The Committee on Trade and Environment must continue its work, recognizing the contribution that can
be made to sustainable development when trade liberalization complements appropriate national
environmental policies. It is critical to the WTO's credibility that the Committee take a more balanced
approach to dealing with trade and the environment, taking both policy perspectives fully into account.
Fulfilling the mandate for sustainable development which resulted from the Rio Summit demands more
from the WTO than simply a committee. The pursuit of sustainable growth and development should be a
common thread woven throughout all the work of this Organization.
With regard to broadening the WTO's agenda, we are prepared to consider whether the WTO should
begin careful examination of new issues some feel should be debated. Like others, we are concerned
about finding the right balance of interests. That is why we have been willing to go along with others who
wish to begin a modest work programme in the areas of investment and competition, as part ofa
balanced overall agenda for the WTO.
To remain viable, the WTO must reflect the needs of various constituencies involved in world trade. Each
of our economies will be facing more pressure from globalization in the coming years, and we must help
workers adjust to and benefit from an open trading system. We must do more to acknowledge that there
is a mutually reinforcing relationship between an open trading system and respect for core labour
standards.
That is why we hope to have an agreement that the WTO should, in cooperation with the International
Labour Organization, examine in greater detail the important nexus between trade and labour standards.
We believe strongly that increased trade and the economic growth that it brings should also engender
greater respect for the basic human rights which are the focus of our core labour standards proposal.
We are not proposing an agreement on minimum wages, changes that could take away the comparative
advantage of low-wage producers, or the use of protectionist measures to enforce labour standards. We
are proposing that the concerns of working people - people who fear that trade liberalization will lead to
distortion - be addressed in a modest work programme in the WTO. Trade liberalization can occur only
with domestic support; that support, and support for the WTO, will surely erode if we cannot address the
concerns of working people and demonstrate that trade is a path to tangible prosperity.
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*
http://www.ustr.gov/agrcements/ita/barshefsky.html
We do not lack challenges as we look ahead, but I am highly optimistic. This week we can send a strong
message that the WTO is ready to move forward with will and determination, to become the strong,
vibrant, and pragmatic institution we all want it to be. With much hard work, we can continue the historic
tradition of trade liberalization to which we are dedicated.
Webmaster (a, USTR - 16 December 1996
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�OFFICE O F T H E UNITED STATES T R A D E REPRESENTATIVE
EXECUTIVE O F F I C E O F T H E P R E S I D E N T
WASHINGTON,
D.C.
20508
USTR Press Releases are available on the USTR home page at WWW.USTR.GOV.
They are also available through the USTR Fax Retrieval System at 202-395-4809.
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Friday, September 5, 1997
Contact:
97-79
Jay Ziegler
Kirsten Powers
Christine Wilkas
(202) 395-3230
STATEMENT BY USTR CHARLENE BARSHEFSKY
U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky today welcomed the action by Taiwan's
Ministry of Finance in approving Allnation Insurance Company's application to set up a branch
office in Taiwan. Allnation is a subsidiary company of Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Delaware.
"This decision is a positive step toward further opening Taiwan's insurance sector to U.S.
participation," said Ambassador Barshefsky. "USTR will continue to press the Taiwan
authorities to resolve problems facing other U.S. insurance companies."
Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Delaware applied two years ago for a license to market a special
health insurance policy in Taiwan. This policy allows cross border insurance coverage of
particular interest to expatriates and other frequent travelers.
The approval is effective as of August 15, 1997.
-30-
�OFFICE O F T H E UNITED STATES T R A D E REPRESENTATIVE
EXECUTIVE O F F I C E OF T H E P R E S I D E N T
WASHINGTON,
D.C.
20508
USTR Press Releases are available on the USTR home page at WWW.USTR.GOV.
They are also available through the USTR Fax Retrieval System at 202-395-4809.
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
September 2, 1997
Contact:
97-77
Jay Ziegler
Kirsten Powers
Christine Wilkas
(202) 395-3230
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE CHARLENE BARSHEFSKY ANNOUNCES U.S.
SUGAR CONTAINING PRODUCT RE-EXPORT PROGRAM WILL CONTINUE
United States Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky announced today that the Canadian
govemmenthas agreed to drop its dispute settlement proceedings against the U. S. Sugar Containing
Products Re-export Program. At the same time, the United States agreed to provide Canada with
assurances that it would receive access to the U. S. refined sugar and crystal drink mix Tariff Rate
Quotas (TRQs) consistent with its historical share of the U. S. market. The U. S. did not increase
access in either of these TRQs to reach this agreement. Overall access remains unchanged.
Ambassador Barshefsky noted, "This agreement is an important victory for U. S. producers of sugar
containing products because it confirms that Canada will not question the ability of the U.S. to
continue to use this program for exporting to Canada."
-30 -
�
Dublin Core
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Title
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Michael Waldman
Description
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<p>Michael Waldman was Assistant to the President and Director of Speechwriting from 1995-1999. His responsibilities were writing and editing nearly 2,000 speeches, which included four State of the Union speeches and two Inaugural Addresses. From 1993 -1995 he served as Special Assistant to the President for Policy Coordination.</p>
<p>The collection generally consists of copies of speeches and speech drafts, talking points, memoranda, background material, correspondence, reports, handwritten notes, articles, clippings, and presidential schedules. A large volume of this collection was for the State of the Union speeches. Many of the speech drafts are heavily annotated with additions or deletions. There are a lot of articles and clippings in this collection.</p>
<p>Due to the size of this collection it has been divided into two segments. Use links below for access to the individual segments:<br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=43&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=2006-0469-F+Segment+1">Segment One</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=43&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=2006-0469-F+Segment+2">Segment Two</a></p>
Creator
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Michael Waldman
Office of Speechwriting
Date
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1993-1999
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2006-0469-F
Extent
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Segment One contains 1071 folders in 72 boxes.
Segment Two contains 868 folders in 66 boxes.
Provenance
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Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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Adobe Acrobat Document
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paper
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Research Requests: Trade
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Office of Speechwriting
Michael Waldman
Is Part Of
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Box 42
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36404"> Collection Finding Aid</a>
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7763296">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
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2006-0469-F Segment 2
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White House Staff and Office Files
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6/3/2015
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7763296
42-t-7763296-20060469F-Seg2-042-013-2015