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�with him, and he was not allowed to take notes about them. Dickerson further testified that
Huang was not particularly interested in the material on which he was briefed:
0
Q:
During your briefings, did he ask you a lot of questions
A:
I would say he asked very few questions.
Q:
Did he seem to be aggressively pursuing classified information?
A:
No, to the contrary. He was not very aggressive in that regard at all.
Q:
Do you have any reason to believe that he handled classified
information in an improper fashion?
A:
I have no reason to believe that.
121
Overall, Huang appears to have been a passive recipient of briefings provided to him
as a matter of routine. He further appears to have had minimal interest in gaining access to
classified information. Dickerson told the Committee that had he believed Huang to be a
security risk he would not have given him classified information.
122
123
No evidence was presented to the Committee that Huang mishandled or compromised
any classified material provided to him. Indeed, this very question was put to three securityofficials from the Department of Commerce:
Q:
To your knowledge, was there ever any time when he divulged any
classified information that was not given to people fully cleared to
receive it, or misused any of this intelligence information in any way,
all three of you?
Mr. Dickerson:
No.
Mr. Gallagher:
No, sir.
Mr. McNair:
No, sir.
124
The fact that Huang had made use of a spare office in the Washington, D.C, offices
of Stephens, Inc. ("Stephens") during his tenure at Commerce was thought to support an
allegation that Huang was passing classified information to the Lippo Group, the Chinese
government, or both. No evidence was presented to the Committee, however, to prove that
Huang used the Stephens office for such purposes. Indeed, no conclusive evidence was ever
presented to the Committee as to exactly what Huang did at the Stephens office.
125
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�Huang's Use of the Stephens Office
Stephens, Inc. is one of the largest investment banking firms in the U.S. It is based in
Linle Rock and has offices in Washington and other cities. Stephens has a business
relationship with the Lippo Group that dates back to 1977. In the 1980s, Huang, as a Lippo
employee, was involved in Lippo's dealings with Stephens. As a result, Huang has had a
long personal relationship with Vemon Weaver, who headed Stephens's Washington office. It
was this office, located across the street from the Department of Commerce, that Huang made
use of while employed at the Commerce. Indeed, many of Huang's visits to the Stephens
office involved a meeting or lunch with Weaver.
126
The Committee's investigation of Huang's use of the Stephens office focused on the
testimony of two clerical employees: Paula Greene and Celia Mata. Greene worked as an
administrative assistant in the Stephens office from 1993 through 1996, while Mata worked as
a receptionist. Vernon Weaver was interviewed by committee staff in the early stages of the
investigation, but was not later asked to give a deposition or public testimony.
According to the testimony of Greene and Mata, Stephens had a spare office that was
used by visiting Stephens employees and friends of the firm. The office was not specifically
set aside for Huang's use and there was no special arrangement for him to use this office.
The office, which contained a desk, a telephone, and a chair, was located two doors down
from where Greene sat. In order to enter the suite where the office was located, a visitor
would have to ring a bell and be buzzed in by Mata.
Regular Stephens employees all had
a key to the suite -- Huang was never given a key.
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According to Greene, anyone who used the spare office had unrestricted access to the
photocopier and fax machines. There were no security or recordkeeping measures in place
to monitor such use. Green testified that anyone using the machines would have to pass
two receptionists and several other offices to get to the machines. No testimony was ever
presented from anyone in the Stephens office who had witnessed Huang using either the
photocopier or the facsimile machine.
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Greene did testify that Huang used the phone in the Stephens office. The Committee
subpoenaed Stephens's telephone records; however, even after analyzing the records, the
Committee was unable to find a reasonable basis for attributing specific calls to Huang's use
of the spare office and was unable to indentify any inappropriate calls on the records.'"
14
Greene testified that Huang was the most frequent non-employee user of the spare
office, visiting about once or twice a week. ' Mata's testimony, however, was that Huang
"would come, you know, once or twice every week or there would be, like, weeks where he
wouldn't come." She also stated that his visits would last "the most, ten minutes" Not
only were Huang's visits short in length, but they occurred primarily at lunchtime, a time
when he would have been seen by a number of people moving in or out of the office. This
would hardly seem to comport with the behavior of someone who was trying to
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�surreptitiously pass classified infonnation to foreign contacts.
Greene testified that she would notify Huang if any packages or facsimiles came into
the Stephens office for him. This was done at Weaver's request. Greene testified that
she was specifically instructed by Weaver to speak directly to Huang if she had to notify him
of a package or fax, and not to leave a detailed message if he was unavailable. While it
was insinuated that this was a peculiar practice (and indeed, Greene stated this was not
Weaver's usual practice), Greene testified that it was her impression that Weaver merely did
not want his name to "appear on the logs very frequently" in order to "avoid bad
appearances."'
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Greene stated that she would put any packages or faxes for Huang in the "in" box of
the spare office. She said that she was not aware of Huang sending packages from, the
Stephens office, only receiving them.' ' With regard to facsimile transmissions, Greene
testified that Huang received two to three such transmissions per week. She was unaware,
however, of the nature or source of these transmissions.
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144
145
The evidence received by the Committee failed to support allegations that Huang used
the Stephens office to pass classified information to the Lippo Group, the Chinese
government, or anyone else. Indeed, the evidence before the Committee failed to establish in
any manner what Huang's purpose was in using the Stephens office. What the evidence
showed was that Huang stopped by the Stephens office from time to time at lunch to visit
with Weaver, to use the telephone, or to pick up packages or messages. It is possible that
Huang's use of the Stephens office was for no other purpose than maintaining personal
contacts. Indeed, the Committee did receive evidence that throughout his tenure at
Commerce, Huang continued his personal involvement with many organizations, including the
Committee of 100. The evidence simply does not allow conclusive determinations to oe
made. What is clear, though, is that Huang's use of the Stephens office was open and
obvious, not secretive as might be expected from one attempting to pass classified
information.
146
Huang's Post-Commerce Clearance
The final issue pertaining to Huang's access to classified information concerns the fact
that he had an active security clearance for over a year following his departure from
Commerce. This fact has been used to insinuate that Huang was involved in a scheme to
continue obtaining classified material. Once again, however, there is no evidence that Huang
used this clearance after leaving Commerce or that he even knew that his clearance was
active. Indeed, the evidence establishes that due to procedures required for any use of a
security clearance, Huang would not have been able to make use of the clearance even if he
had attempted to do so.
147
148
During his tenure at Commerce, Huang found himself in the midst of a turf battle
among several factions due to the changes that Ganen had made to the way the ITA
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�conducted business. Huang, Assistant Secretary Meissner. and several other officials had been
marginalized in favor of those supported by Garten. After a little more than one year,
Huang began to make inquiries and ultimately secured a position at the Democratic National
Committee as a fundraiser.
149
Evidence presented to the Committee established that Meissner attempted to retain
Huang as a consultant after he announced his intention to leave Commerce. Such an
arrangement was conceived as a way for Huang to assist Meissner during the transition period
between the time he left and the time his replacement was found. Before obtaining
approval for the arrangement, Meissner initiated paperwork for such a consulting position, an
application for a clearance through the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office of the
Department of Defense ("DISCO"). This type of clearance is generally used for government
contractors.
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Meissner discussed this proposed arrangement with Alan Neuschatz, Director of
Personnel, and Tim Hauser, Deputy Under Secretary. Both men immediately disagreed with
the idea and told Meissner that the appointment would not be approved. Meissner, however,
determined to take the proposal up with more senior officials. In response, Neuschatz penned
a note which was attached to the paperwork for this proposed appointment. Neushchatz
described the note in deposition testimony in the following terms:
I knew Meissner had wanted to make this appointment, and what I was saying
to them here is. . . I think this issue is dead, and that's because we told him,
no, we weren't going to do it. But it may not be, and the "may not be" reflects
Meissner's parting shot that he was going to discuss this upstairs.
So what I'm telling them is to hold on to this package for a while, or at least
until the smoke clears, meaning we get absolute clear and final guidance. I
didn't want to throw paperwork away that might actually be needed eventually,
but I didn't think it would be needed.
152
Meissner did, in fact, take the issue up with Will Ginsberg, Secretary Brown's Chief
of Staff. Ginsberg ultimately denied the request, and Huang never became a consultant.
While the consultant position was in the process of being denied, the paperwork for the
security clearance that went along with the position was still going forward. An
administrative assistant at IEP stated that she had walked the application for the securityclearance up to the security office at the direction of Meissner prior to the final decision not
to make Huang a consultant. The request for the security clearance went forward in one
office, while the authority to make the underlying appointment was being considered, and
ultimately denied, in another. Neuschatz described this process in the following terms:
153
The fact that the ITA Security Office acted without authorization, I think,
reflects more their desire to support management than any intent to circumvent
it.
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�Clearly what happened was staff approached the ITA Security Office and said
"Meissner. . . is going to convert Huang to a consultant and we'll need the
appropriate clearance."
These people, I think, in the interest of minimizing red tape and minimizing
confusion, put the train on the track assuming that they had Meissner's
authorization. What they could not have known was that when Meissner
approached me and [Deputy Undersecretary] Tim Hauser who do have the
authority to approve positions such as this, we turned it down cold.
154
On December 14, 1995, the Defense Department sent a form to the Commerce
Security Office indicating that Huang had been granted a clearance through the DISCO.
According to the testimony of the two highest-ranking members of the Commerce Security
Office, a clerk filed Huang's DISCO clearance form with all other DISCO clearance forms
received from the Defense Department. The form remained in the file until it was discovered
in January 1997.
155
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According to the Deputy Director of the Security Office, proper procedure would have
been for the DISCO clearance to have been input into the Security Office database. Due to
personnel changes in the Security Office, however, some 90 days went by during which no
one was inputting incoming DISCO clearances into the database. Had the clearance been
input in mid-December, it conceivably would have raised issues because Huang was still on
the payroll and still had a clearance. Further, had it been properly input, the Security Office
would have been aware of the DISCO clearance when it was notified in January 1996 that
Huang had left Commerce.
157
In his deposition, Neuschatz stated that after learning that Huang's clearance had been
extended, he investigated whether Huang had used the clearance to gain access to classified
material. This investigation led him to conclude that Huang had never attempted to gain
such access nor could he have done so had he tried. According to Neuschatz, classified
document access has two components: clearance and need to know. The granting agency has
to verify clearance for any request for access from outside of that agency. Neuschatz told
Senate investigators that for Huang to have used his clearance, a request would have to have
been forwarded from the issuer, and a record would have been kept. No such request was
ever found in Commerce's records. Furthermore, Huang's clearance was contingent on his
contemporaneous employment in some manner with Commerce. As Neuschatz described it:
158
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160
Because the requirements for the issuance of the clearance went away with the
disappearance of his job; therefore, this really was not a valid clearance once he
terminated his employment with [DOC].
161
Testimony is unequivocal that no one in ITA was notified of the clearance. In fact,
there is no evidence that anyone other than the clerk who initially filed the form was aware
that the clearance existed. This includes Huang. Neuschatz testified, " I have no reason to
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�believe that Huang would have been aware of this [extension],
While the fact that Huang neither knew about nor used the clearance dispels any
concern about sinister motives with respect to this episode, the fact that the security clearance
was granted even though the consultancy was not reveals a failure in the Department of
Commerce security screening procedures.
No Evidence of Espionage
While the Committee's investigation uncovered some serious shortcomings in the
operation of the Commerce Department's Security Office, there was no evidence presented to
the Comminee that any security measures were circumvented, ignored, or compromised
specifically to benefit Huang. Indeed, to the extent that these shortcomings led to the
approval of Huang's clearance prior to his arrival at Commerce and to the extension of his
clearance after he had departed, the evidence before the Comminee shows that Huang was not
even aware of these facts.
More importantly, there was no evidence presented to the Committee that Huang
exploited his position at the Commerce Department to pass classified information to the Lippo
Group, the Chinese government, or anyone else. Indeed, the evidence shows that Huang
availed himself of considerably less information than he could have obtained in light of his
position. He declined the opportunity to obtain a higher level of clearance, he declined the
opportunity to broaden his access to cable traffic, and he declined the opportunity to use his
intelligence briefings from the OIL to aggressively pursue classified information.
Evidence before the Committee does not allow for any conclusion with respect to
Huang's continued contact with the LippoBank in Califomia. In his deposition, James Per
Lee, current President of the LippoBank Califomia testified that he had undertaken an internal
investigation of Huang's calls to the bank that showed Huang's calls from the Department of
Commerce to the bank were largely an exchange of telephone messages received for Huang
by the executive secretary and that conversations with Huang lasted an average of three
minutes. Per Lee later publicly stated that in his investigation of the calls he saw no
indication Huang was "in any way relaying messages abroad." Despite being interviewed
and deposed by the Committee, subpoenaed to appear for hearing, and given a date and time
for testimony, less than forty-eight hours before his scheduled appearance, Per Lee's
testimony was abruptly canceled.
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164
It should also be noted that at the outset of this Committee's hearings Huang offered
to come before the Committee and to.testify fully about any allegations that he may have
misused his position on behalf of foreign governments or corporations. While he requested
limited immunity, he offered to testify without immunity with respect to matters pertaining to
espionage, economic espionage, or the unlawful disclosure of classified information.
Although the Minority does not conclude that Huang's offer of testimony is proof of his
innocence, we do believe that in light of the lack of evidence to the contrary, his offer to
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�testify without r-ervation regarding these allegations -- and with all the applicable penalties
of perjury attenaant to such testimony -- should be given some consideration. Unfonunatelv,
the Comminee did not pursue Huang's offer and, as a result, a potentially important
opportunity to receive a response to these allegations was lost.
The evidence before the Committee -- or more appropriately, the lack thereof -- was
encapsulated in the following exchange during the Committee's questioning of the CIA's John
Dickerson and Robert Gallagher of Department of Commerce Security Office:
Senator Durbin:
Gentlemen, if I can try to summarize my own view of
where we have come to this point in regard to Mr.
Huang, I think there are two concerns and perhaps a
third. The first concern is whether or not Mr. Huang
played fast and loose in his fundraising activities,
especially when it came to raising foreign funds, and the
second concern is whether or not he compromised our
national security. . . .
I want to ask you open-ended questions, not shepherding
you in any direction here, just to get your opinion based
on what you knew then and what you know now. Mr.
Gallagher, maybe I will start with you, and maybe Mr.
Dickerson can follow.
First, is it your opinion that Mr. Huang was properly
cleared to leam classified information at the Department
of Commerce?
Mr. Gallagher:
Yes, sir.
Senator Durbin:
Mr. Dickerson, is that your opinion, or do you have an
opinion?
Mr. Dickerson:
That is my opinion, yes.
Senator Durbin:
Has anything come to light since this controversy has
arisen to change your view on that? Mr. Gallagher?
Mr. Gallagher:
I have seen no evidence to the contrary. No, sir.
Senator Durbin:
Mr. Dickerson?
Mr. Dickerson:
And similarly, I have seen no evidence that would
indicate that.
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�Senator Durbin:
Now, the second thing, the second charge is that Mr.
Huang while at the Department of Commerce was shown
things he should not have seen for any number of
reasons, his business connections, his security clearance,
whatever.
Mr. Gallagher, based on what you knew then, is there any
question in your mind as to what you showed Mr. Huang
and whether or not what Mr. Dickerson showed Mr.
Huang and whether he should have seen it?
Mr. Gallagher:
In terms of the information that my office controls, we
were 100-percent correct in what we showed him.
Senator Durbin:
Now, with all the information that has come out and all
the allegations since today, do you believe there are
things that Mr. Huang should not have seen at the U.S.
Department of Commerce?
Mr. Gallagher:
I think we have to distinguish between the information
and allegations. All I have seen is allegations. Until I saw
hard evidence of these allegations and as long as he
continued to have both his need-to-know and his
clearance, we would continue to brief him as we had.
Senator Durbin:
Mr. Dickerson, the same questions. Did you feel that you
were showing things, did you have any suspicion in your
mind, that Mr. Huang should not have seen while he
worked at the Department of Commerce?
Mr. Dickerson:
No, I had no suspicions whatsoever that what I was
showing him was inappropriate for him.
Senator Durbin:
And today, based on allegations and information, do you
have a different view?
Mr. Dickerson:
No, I don't have a different view because I have no
personal knowledge that he did anything in an
unauthorized manner in the handling of this classified
informatiDn.
Senator Durbin:
The third allegation appears to be that he may have
misused the information which was given to him. may
have compromised a source or compromised the
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�information. As you sit there today, Mr. Gallagher, do
you have any information to suggest that that is the case?
Mr. Gallagher:
I have never been presented with any evidence to prove
or disprove that allegation.
Senator Durbin:
Mr. Dickerson?
Mr. Dickerson:
I would echo what Mr. Gallagher has said in that regard.
Senator Durbin:
Now, I assume in your business, when you are sharing
delicate and secured classified information that there is a
counterintelligence aspect to this to determine whether or
not the people that you are sharing it with are keeping it
to themselves, is there not? Mr. Gallagher?
Mr. Gallagher:
Certainly, with all intelligence, sir.
Senator Durbin:
Now, in terms of this period of time, some 13 months at
the Department of Commerce, was there any evidence
that the information that was being shared with Mr.
Huang or anyone at the Department at that time was
being compromised?
Mr. Gallagher:
I was not presented with any such evidence.
Senator Durbin:
Mr. Dickerson?
Mr. Dickerson:
To the best of my knowledge, no.
165
Evidence of Solicitations of Contributions
While there was no evidence presented to the Committee to support an allegation that
Huang engaged in espionage while employed at the Commerce Department, there were
indications that he may have engaged in soliciting donors to the Democratic National
Committee while so employed. Specifically, Huang may have been involved in soliciting
donations by Kenneth and A. Sihwarini Wynn, Mi Ahn, and Arief and Soraya Wiriadinata
while employed at the Commerce Department. Although the evidence is not conclusive, it is
sufficient to warrant further investigation by appropriate authorities.
Evidence before the Committee shows that on August 1, 1994, Wynn, the president of
Lippoland, Ltd.. and his wife each made a $5,000 contribution to the DNC in connection with
an event celebrating the President's birthday. The check tracking form completed by the
DNC for these donations listed John Huang as the solicitor. This was only one month after
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�Huang had begun working for the Department of Commerce and almost a year and a half
before he began working for the DNC. When questioned in a deposition about this listing,
David Mercer, DNC deputy finance director (and the individual responsible for filling out the
form), testified that he did not know at the time that Huang was working at the Commerce
Department. He further testified that he.did not recall who solicited the Wynns, nor how he
received the checks from the Wynns.
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Slightly over a year later, on October 12, 1995, Wynn contributed 512,000 to the DNC
in connection with another event. This time, the DNC tracking form listed Jane Huang
(John Huang's wife) as the solicitor. Just before Jane Huang's name, however, is a word
that has been crossed out. This word appears to be ''John." When questioned about this
contribution. Mercer testified that he did not know if Jane Huang had solicited this
contribution and funher, that he "did not know the circumstances leading to this check being
submitted." When asked how he knew to put Jane Huang's name down as the solicitor,
Mercer first stated that someone told him to, but he could not remember who it was.'
Mercer then suggested in the alternative that he may have done so because of his recollection
that the Huangs were associated with the Wynns. Upon being asked why he chose to put
Jane Huang's name down if his recollection was that the Huangs generally were associated
with the Wynns, Mercer stated he could not recall.
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The DNC's listing of John Huang as the solicitor for the Wynns' August 1994
contributions, followed by what appears to be a listing of John Huang's name on the October
1995 contribution — only to be crossed out in favor of Jane Huang - tends to support the
allegation that Huang was involved in soliciting contributions while a Commerce employee.
Moreover, Mercer's testimony with respect to these contributions raises more questions than it
answers.
Similar questions are raised with respect to a contribution by Mi Ahn. On June 12,
1995, Ahn, the president of Pan Metals, contributed $10,000 to the DNC in connection with a
Presidential Gala. The DNC check tracking form filled out by Mercer lists Jane Huang as
the solicitor. When asked in his deposition why he listed Jane Huang as the solicitor,
Mercer testified that he did not have a clear recollection and that it "either [had] something to
do with either sending the check or getting the check to us in some way involved or knowing
Mi Ahn. . . ." Asked directly if he knew Jane Huang had solicited Ahn's check, Mercer
stated, " I don't know that for a fact."
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It appears, however, that John Huang may have been involved in the Mi Ahn
solicitation. Evidence was presented to the Comminee that on May 26, 1995 -- two-and-ahalf weeks before Ahn's contribution — four telephone calls were placed between Huang and
.Ahn. Ten days later — on June 5, 1995 — two more phone calls were placed.' On June 6.
1995, Mercer called Huang at the Commerce Department and left the following message:
"Have talked to Mi, thank you very much."
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When asked why he was thanking Huang, Mercer testified: " I don't know. I don't
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�recall. It could have been he gave me her number. It could have been a number of things. I
don't know particularly what I was thanking him for." Again, Mercer's testimony vvith
regard to his listing of Jane Huang as the solicitor and his inability to recall his reason for
thanking John Huang leaves room for concern about Huang's role as the possible solicitor of
this contribution.
184
Jane Huang was also listed as the solicitor of two contributions made in November
1995 by Arief and Soraya Wiriadinata. The Wiriadinatas, who were permanent legal
residents at the time of their contributions, are the daughter and son-in-law of Hashim Ning, a
business associate of Lippo founder Mochtar Riady. Between 1995 and 1996, the
Wiriadinatas contributed about $450,000 to the DNC in multiple checks. Once again, when
questioned as to how he knew to credit the two 1995 contributions to Jane Huang, Mercer
stated that it was "[tjhrough an understanding prior of the Wiriadinatas having association
with the Huangs." Mercer could not recall, however, how he had come to that
understanding, nor could he recall what his understanding was as to how they were
associated. When asked why he didn't put John Huang down as the solicitor, Mercer
testified as follows: " I don't recall why. I, you know, I don't recall. I didn't, you know - I
don't. . . [sic] I don't recall. Jane could have — I could have been told that Jane was the one
that brought these checks in. I don't know."
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Committee staff interviewed the Wiriadinatas concerning their contributions.
According to Arief Wiriadinata, they first met John Huang when he came to visit Soraya's
father in the hospital in the summer of 1995. Huang encouraged the Wiriadinatas to
support the Democratic Party at that time, although it does not appear that he directly solicited
a specific contribution. Indeed, the Wiriadinatas' first contributions were not until
November 1995. According to the Wiriadinatas, the November 1995 contributions were
solicited by John Huang. In fact, Arief Wiridiadinata told the Committee staff that all of
their contributions were made in consultation with John Huang. When asked if any of their
contributions had been solicited by Jane Huang, the Wiriadinatas stated that they had never
met Jane Huang, nor did they believe that they had ever spoken to her.
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The evidence clearly indicates that John Huang played a role in the contributions from
the Wiridinatas and that this role began while he was still an employee of the Department of
Commerce. Moreover, the evidence also points to his having played a role in the
contributions of the Wynns and Mi Ahn. These instances are all worthy of further
investigation by the appropriate authorities to determine whether John Huang violated the
Hatch Act, which limits certain political activity by federal employees, or other campaign
laws.
Perhaps even more disturbing is the documentary evidence which shows the DNC
listing Huang as a solicitor during a time when he was a Commerce Department employee.
The fact that David Mercer, DNC's deputy finance director, listed Huang as a solicitor and
called him at the Commerce Department, combined with Mercer's questionable recollection
regarding the tracking form containing Jane Huang's name, raises serious questions about the
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�forthrightness of Mercer, the procedures at the DNC at this time, and the level of oversight
that was provided in connection with Huang's activities. Indeed, this lack of oversight proved
even more problematic once Huang joined the DNC staff.
HIRING HUANG TO WORK AT THE DNC
Having perhaps become disillusioned with his position at the Department of Commerce
as a result of internal power struggles within the ITA, Huang began searching for another way
to serve the Administration. That search led him to the DNC. Although he had raised money
for the 1992 Clinton campaign, he had done so at that time as an unpaid volunteer
fundraiser. The position he sought in 1995 was that of a full-time paid fundraiser. In seeking
this position, Huang apparently utilized the network of contacts he had developed while
working for the Lippo Group.
196
In his deposition before the Committee, C. Joseph Giroir, an Arkansas lawyer for the
Lippo Group and a friend of John Huang, said he learned of Huang's interest to move to the
DNC to raise money in the Asian-American community. As he conveyed this information
to then-DNC Finance Chairman, Truman Arnold, he le?rned that Arnold was leaving his post
at the DNC. As a result, in the summer of 1995, Giroir arranged a meeting with DNC
Chairman Donald Fowler to suggest that Fowler hire Huang as a fundraiser. Because Giroir
was viewed by the DNC as a potential contributor, DNC Finance Director Richard Sullivan
attended the meeting with Fowler. In his deposition, Sullivan testified that he thought Giroir
came on too strong and, for some reason, "had rubbed him [Fowler] the wrong way during
their meeting." Sullivan speculated that, perhaps because of this, Fowler did not want to
hire Huang. Fowler testified in his own deposition that he did not immediately commit to
hiring Huang because the DNC did not have room on its staff for any new fundraisers at that
time.
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On September 13, 1995, Huang, Riady, and Giroir met with Sullivan and Fowler in
the Four Seasons Hotel in Washington, D.C. Sullivan recalled this meeting as fairly social;
it was called for Riady to get to know Fowler, since "he thought Don was a player and that
they wanted to get to know each other on a social basis." Fowler testified that Giroir
"made it clear. . . that he would like Mr. Huang hired at the DNC."
202
203
204
Later that same day, Huang, Giroir, Riady, and Riady's wife, Aileen, went to the
White House for a visit with White House staff and the President. Also in attendance was
Bruce Lindsey, deputy counsel to the President. By all accounts, this visit was a social call/
Riady had lived in Little Rock during the 1980s and met the President during that period.
Riady supported the President during his gubernatorial campaigns, during his presidential
campaign, and after his election as well. Giroir testified that there was no structure to the
September 13 visit; people were just talking. In fact, Giroir had no recollection of any
mention of Huang going to the DNC. But Lindsey recalled a discussion of the importance
of the Asian-American community to the President's re-election effort and the suggestion that
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�Huang would be well-suited to work on such an initiative at the DNC.
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After that visit, and because, according to Lindsey, it was his experience that most
people preferred to move from politics to government, rather than vice versa, he subsequently
contacted Huang to ensure that he was interested in moving to the DNC. Lindsey testified in
a deposition that the President may have indicated to him that if Huang, in fact, wanted to
move to the DNC, that it would be a "good idea," but he stated that this was not a directive
from the President to "follow up" on the discussion. Lindsey ultimately informed White
House Deputy Chief of Staff Harold Ickes of Huang's interest.
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On September 26, 1995, Huang and Giroir also met informally with newly-appointed
DNC Finance Chairman Marvin Rosen to discuss Huang's desire to move to the DNC.
This meeting had been arranged by Mark Middleton, a former White House staffer from
.Arkansas. Rosen indicated during this meeting that he would look into the idea of initiating a
DNC outreach program within the Asian-American community.
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At the time, the DNC had employees who were responsible for political and
fundraising outreach in most minority communities, including the African-American
community, the Hispanic community, and women's groups. During the period that Huang
was being interviewed, the DNC had an employee who was responsible for political outreach
in the Asian-American community. Bill Kaneko; however, it did not yet have a staff person
responsible for Asian-American fundraising. In his deposition before the Committee, Kaneko
testified that he understood that Huang left Commerce to "give the Asian community an
opportunity to participate in the political process." Other witnesses confirm that when
Huang was being interviewed by the DNC, he indicated that he was interested in AsianAmerican outreach generally, not just fundraising, and witnesses involved in Huang's hiring
testified that they perceived Huang as capable of providing the necessary assistance to the
DNC's political and fundraising outreach efforts for the Asian-American community,
particularly in California.
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Rosen testified that Ickes subsequently asked him to formally interview Huang.
Such an interview took place at DNC headquarters in November 1995, with Rosen and
Sullivan, who were later joined by Fowler. During the interview, Huang suggested that he
could help to raise money in the Asian-American community for the 1996 campaign, citing
his effectiveness in raising funds during the 1992 campaign. According to Sullivan, Huang
felt "there was a void in terms of outreach from the national parties to the Asian-American
community." Fowler, Rosen, and Sullivan agreed. Recognizing the untapped potential of
the Asian-American community for Democratic fundraising efforts and political outreach,
Fowler decided, on Rosen and Sullivan's recommendation, to hire Huang to manage the
DNC's outreach efforts to this community.
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In negotiating his position and salary with the DNC, Huang said that he needed
credibility to raise money in the Asian-American community because he was older than most
other fundraisers. Fowler called it "a technique to convey respect and prestige," and
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thought that giving Huang an elevated title would ultimately benefit the DNC."" They
negotiated the title of Vice Chair of Finance, a title normally reserved for volunteer
fundraisers who are elected as honorary officers of the DNC and do not raise money full time.
While Rosen was unfazed by the title, DNC General Counsel Joseph Sandler was concerned
because this position did not actually exist for paid staff. Sandler ultimately acceded to the
request.
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Salary was another concern for Huang. Seeing himself as a successful, older, more
experienced person (he was 50 years old), Huang initially wanted a salary comparable to the
one he had received at Commerce. Sullivan testified that they decided to pay Huang a
salary of $60,000 and also to give him a lump-sum, bonus-type payment at some point.
Huang readily accepted this arrangement; indeed, Sullivan testified that Huang did not seem
all that concerned about his salary.
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Huang's Understanding of Applicable Law
DNC procedures require every paid fundraiser to receive an oral briefing on campaign
finance law and to familiarize himself with a written packet of information. During the
1996 election cycle, the briefings were conducted by DNC General Counsel Sandler or his
deputy, Neil Reiff. Reiff testified in his deposition that these briefings covered many topics,
including which contributions are allowable under the law, as well as what the DNC considers
appropriate or inappropriate contributions. Most importantly, Reiff said, fundraisers were told
to seek advice from the general counsel's office if they had any questions about specific
contributions.
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Sullivan testified that he was "nervous" about Huang's fundraising because Huang was
inexperienced in raising money full time. Sullivan testified that he requested Huang be given
a special, individualized briefing. Sam Newman, director of the DNC's National Finance
Council, who shared an office with Huang, testified that he recalled Huang attending one of
the group briefings; Sandler had a vague recollection of this. Although there is some
discrepancy between the testimony of Sandler and Sullivan as to what type of briefing Huang
received, there is no dispute that he was briefed on the applicable law, and, in fact, a copy of
the DNC's training materials was found in Huang's files after he left.
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In addition to whatever type of initial briefing he may have received, Huang also
received assistance from the general counsel's office following his first major fundraising
event. According to Sandler, DNC Treasurer Scott Pastrick suggested that Sandler review
with Huang some of the checks Huang had collected from that event. Sandler testified that he
believed this suggestion was made because the Asian-American community for which Huang
was responsible was a new one being tapped for funds, and therefore some of the donors
would be unfamiliar to the DNC. Marvin Rosen, DNC Finance Chair, also believed that
this briefing was necessary because some of the contributors to that event were connected to
American subsidiaries of foreign corporations. In Rosen's mind, this automatically raised a
red flag and called for review, especially for contributions from a new fundraiser.^ DNC
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�policy required that all contributions by U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations be approved
by the general counsel's office. '
2 7
Sandler testified that he did conduct such a review with Huang. Within days of
Huang's first event, a February 19, 1996 fundraiser at the Hay Adams Hotel in Washington,
D.C, Sandler had a 45-minute meeting with Huang during which he reviewed checks about
which Huang had questions, asked Huang the citizenship status of each individual who wrote
a check, and inquired into the ownership of corporations that donated. He then inquired
into the basis of Huang's knowledge and was satisfied from Huang's disclosures and claims of
firsthand knowledge (which, according to Sandler, is traditionally the best information on
which to rely) that the checks were legal. During this meeting, Sandler and Huang reviewed
the legal limits on contributions.- Sandler testified that he felt comfortable that Huang was
familiar with the rules he was to follow.
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Having received an initial briefing on the laws and procedures applicable to campaign
contributions, and having gone over specific instances of concern following his first
fundraiser, Huang should have known what kinds of contributions the DNC could and could
not accept. In light of this training, Huang's involvement in organizing a number of
fundraisers which brought in questionable -- and in some cases, illegal -- contributions is
disturbing.
Huang's Fundraisers
As was true of other fundraisers targeting ethnic communities, Huang was assigned
various dates for events to organize at which the President or the Vice President would be in
attendance. Once given a date, Huang would have been responsible for reaching a certain
fundraising goal. During his tenure at the DNC, Huang oversaw the following fundraising
events, all held in 1996:
O
February 19 event at the Hay Adams Hotel, Washington, D.C;
O
May 13 event at the Sheraton Carlton Hotel in Washington, D.C;
O
July 22 event at the Century Plaza Hotel in Los Angeles; and
O
July 30 event at the Jefferson Hotel in Washington, D.C.
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In addition, after the July 30 event, Huang continued to help raise money at events, such as
the President's birthday party in August 1996 at Radio City Music Hall in New York City.
February 1996 Hav Adams APALC Events, Washington. D.C.
The first fundraising event for which Huang was responsible was actually a series of
two events on Febmary 19 and 20, 1996 at the Hay Adams Hotel in Washington, D.C. These
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�events were held in connection with the Asian Pacific American Leadership Council
("APALC"). The APALC had been created to engage and empower Asian-Pacific Americans,
give them a stronger voice in the Democratic Party, and focus on issues of concern to the
community. Ultimately, it was also used as the fundraising arm for this community within
the DNC. Mona Pasquil testified that she was responsible for forming the APALC in late
1995. She testified that it was bom out of her traveling and meeting with Asian-Pacific
American leaders who recognized that there was no caucus within the DNC for this ethnic
group.
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The events included a dinner with the President on Febmary 19 and breakfast with the
Vice President and a tour of the White House on Febmary 20. Individuals paid $12,500 each
to anend these events. The Hay Adams events were organized to coincide with a "summit"
of Asian-Pacific Americans at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C. on Febmary 24.
1996.
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It is estimated that around 100 people attended the Hay Adams event. By all accounts,
these events were successful in bringing Asian-Americans into the DNC. Fowler testified in
his deposition that he recalled the events as positive in terms of outreach to the AsianAmerican community. He stated that there were a number of Asian nationalities represented
and that he appreciated that diversity. He said he never gave a second thought to the
citizenship of these individuals.
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According to DNC records, the DNC raised $716,000 from this event from 50
individuals or corporations. A number of these contributions turned out to be suspect,
however, leading the DNC ultimately to return over $100,000 from this event.
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A total of $50,000 was returned to Charlie Trie, Keshi Zhan, Yue Chu and Xiping
Wang. Trie attended the event and, in fact, was the event's co-chairman. Neither Chu nor
Wang attended. These contributions - which are discussed in detail in Chapters 5 and 21 of
the Minority Report - were returned because of questions as to the source of the funds
contributed.
Pauline Kanchanalak, a Thai businesswoman, and her sister-in-law, Duagnet
Kronenberg, attended the event and contributed $35,000. Their contributions were similarly
returned by the DNC when it was determined that the funds contributed by Kanchanalak were
actually those of her mother-in-law (see Chapter 21).
Finally, monastics from the Hsi Lai Buddhist Temple are also recorded as having
contributed $25,000 to this event. Although none attended, Maria Hsia, a longtime
Democratic activist and Temple devotee, did. These contributions were returned to the U.S.
Treasury over questions that the monastics may have been reimbursed for their contributions
(see Chapter 21).
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As noted above, Joseph Sandler, DNC general counsel, testified that after the event,
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�Huang came to see him with contributions about which he had questions. Sandler testified in
his deposition that he did not recall whether any of the contributions they reviewed were
returned as a result of their conversation, but Huang initiated the return of several
contributions within a month of the event because of questions of citizenship of the donors.
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The evidence before the Committee does not establish that Huang, or any other DNC
employee or official, knew at the time that any of the returned contributions had problems.
Kanchanalak appeared as a successful businessperson and had a long history of contributions.
Trie likewise also appeared successful. There is no hard evidence establishing Huang's
knowledge of reimbursements to the monastics, as explained below and in Chapter 21 of the
Minority Report.
In addition, Jessica Elnitiarta, who runs her family's real estate company, Panda
Estates Investment Inc., had been contacted by Huang about attending this event. On
February 10, 1996, Elnitiarta contributed $100,000 to purchase eight seats at the event.
Among Elnitiarta's guests at the event were her father, Ted Sioeng, and two of Sioeng's
business associates. Elnitiarta did not attend the event herself because of an unexpected
illness in her family. Elnitiarta was eligible to contribute (she is a legal permanent
resident), and her contributions have not been returned. (Sioeng-related contributions are
discussed in detail in Chapter 7.)
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Mav 13, 1996 Sheraton Carlton Event. Washington. D.C.
Huang's next major event was held at the Sheraton Carlton Hotel in Washington, D.C.
on May 13, 1996, attended by the President. This event was attended by approximately 100
people. Approximately $579,000 was raised at this event from 20 individuals and
corporations.
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Over half of the money raised at this event came from one individual -- Yogesh
Gandhi. Gandhi, a permanent legal resident of the United States, contributed $325,000 to the
DNC in exchange for 26 tickets to the event. This contribution was attributed in DNC
records to both Huang and Trie. This contribution was ultimately returned when the DNC
could not verify the source of Gandhi's funds; it was later determined that Gandhi used
foreign funds from Japan supplied by an associate to pay for the contribution. A detailed
discussion is provided in Chapter 21.
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In addition, contributions totalling $125,000 were deemed inappropriate and were
returned to legal permanent residents Soraya and .Arief Wiriadinata, the daughter and son-inlaw of Lippo associate Hashim Ning, because the source of the funds could not be verified.
The Wiriadinatas are not listed as having attended the event. Their contributions are
discussed in detail in Chapter 21 of the Minority Report. Charlie Trie's $10,000 contribution
to this event was also returned.
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In all, the DNC returned $475,000 of the $579,000 raised at this event.
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�July 22, 1996 Century Plaza Hotel Event. Los Angeles
One event for which there is relatively little testimony and only a few documents is an
APALC gala organized by Huang at the Century Plaza Hotel in Los Angeles on July 22,
1996. A three-page briefing paper prepared for the President, the keynote speaker at the
event, shows that the DNC expected to raise one million dollars from the 700 expected
attendees; this was to be a 'hard money" event. Most of the attendees were from
California.
News organizations have reported that the event was a "who's who of Asian
Americans," including Ted Sioeng and James Riady.
;
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Monastics from the Hsi Lai Buddhist Temple were recorded as having contributed
S30,000 to this event, although only the Temple's abbess attended. These contributions
have been returned as a result of questions as to whether the monastics were reimbursed for
their contributions, as explained in Chapter 21 of the Minority Report. A contribution of
$3,000 from one of Charlie Trie's companies was returned for insufficient information. Other
contributions totalling $25,000 were returned because, according to the DNC, it was
inappropriate for the DNC to have accepted such contributions, contributions were not made
by the named donor, the decision to contribute was participated in by a foreign national, or
simply because there was insufficient information.
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A total of $58,500 worth of contributions was returned by the DNC from this event,
which the DNC recorded as having raised $367,850.
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July 30. 1996 Jefferson Hotel Event, Washington. D.C.
Richard Sullivan testified that the White House had open dates for July 1996 which
were available to the DNC for events. He and Marvin Rosen offered one of these dates to
Huang. According to Sullivan, he and Huang were clear that Huang should only agree to
organize an event on this date if he thought he could organize another "hard" money event
that would raise $400,000 to $500,000. According to Sullivan, Huang said he could meet
these criteria.
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This event ~ which turned out to be the final event Huang organized - was held on
July 30 at the Jefferson Hotel in Washington, D.C. It turned out to be a small gathering of
individuals, many of whom were not eligible to contribute to the DNC. Contrary to the
instructions given to Huang for this event, most, if not all, of the contributions Huang raised
at this event were large, soft-money contributions.
265
In addition to the President and other DNC officials, attendees at the event, many of
whom brought spouses and children, included James Riady of the Lippo Group, his wife
Aileen, and three prominent Taiwanese businessmen: Eugene T.C. Wu, chairman of the Shin
Kong Group, a conglomerate that includes Taiwan's second-largest life insurance company;
Sen Jong (Ken) Hsui, president of Prince Motors Co. in Taipei and a former member of the
central committee of Taiwan's Kuomintang party; and James L.S. Lin, a Taiwanese business
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associate of Wu.
Hsui, who has U.S. residency status, contributed 5150,000 to the DNC
which has been attributed to this event.
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Other contributions attributed to this event were from Jessica Elnitiarta's Panda
Investments; Loh Sun International, a Los Angeles firm that imports Chinese cigarettes to the
U.S.; and Edmund Pi of Hacienda Heights, California. In total, this event took in
$259,000 -- far short of expectations.
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Neither Wu nor Lin made contributions to the DNC in connection with this event, nor
did anyone else who attended this event who was ineligible to contribute. The question has
been raised, however, as to why the President was dining at a DNC event with such a small
group of individuals, many of whom were ineligible to contribute to the DNC. Although this
event was designed as a fundraiser, videotapes of the event show that the President discussed
current events and issues of ethnic diversity but did not discuss fundraising. While there is
nothing illegal about such an event -- so long as those who are ineligible to contribute do not
in fact do so - there is a legitimate issue that can be raised with respect to the perception that
such an event creates. This issue could have — and should have ~ generally been addressed
in advance through a more careful review of attendees at small dinners with the President,
Vice President or First Lady and greater supervision of DNC fundraisers and the fundraising
process.
272
.Another important question is why Huang, who had promised to raise 5400,000 to
5500,000 in "hard" money at this event, would put together an event with only a limited
number of participants, a large proportion of whom were ineligible to contribute.
Unfortunately, the Committee was unable to obtain an answer to this question from Huang.
All we are left with is Sullivan's speculation that perhaps Huang was trying to impress the
attendees (all of whom he knew) with his ability to arrange an intimate gathering for them
with the President of the United States.
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With respect to this event, and all of Huang's other events, there is no evidence that
either the White House or the DNC had any knowledge of any illegal contributions as a result
of these events to the DNC at the time the contributions were made.
Other Huang Activities
In addition to organizing fundraising events, Huang was involved in a number of other
activities on behalf of the DNC that were of questionable propriety.
Hsi Lai Temple Event
On April 29, 1996, Vice President Gore attended an event organized by Huang and
held at the Hsi Lai Temple in Hacienda Heights, Califomia. The Hsi Lai Temple is the
largest U.S. branch of the Fokuangshan Buddhist Order, a Taiwan-based Buddhist sect. The
Temple operates under an umbrella organization called the International Buddhist Progress
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Society, a nonprofit organization incorporated in California/' Approximately 100 community
leaders and others from the Asian-American community had lunch with the Vice President at
this event.
Criticism of the Temple event arises from three sets of allegations: that the event was
a DNC fundraiser in possible violation of tax laws barring religious organizations from
engaging in campaign activities; that the Temple reimbursed Temple monastics for DNC
contributions in possible violation of federal election laws barring contributions in the name
of another; and that the Temple used foreign funds for the reimbursements in possible
violation of federal election laws barring foreign contributions. The latter two allegations are
discussed in detail in Chapter 21 ofthe Minority Report which concludes that Temple
reimbursements did take place, though without the use of foreign funds and without the
knowledge of the Vice President or officials at the DNC. This section focuses on the event
itself and the involvement of Huang and the Vice President.
In 1996, the Vice President routinely attended fundraisers and community outreach
events organized by the DNC to motivate financial and political supporters during the
campaign. Documents show that the Vice President's office was involved in scheduling
two possible events for the Vice President in the Los Angeles area in April 1996, one of
which was supposed to be a fundraising lunch at a private restaurant and the other a
community outreach event at the Hsi Lai Temple. The evidence suggests that the fundraising
lunch was canceled a few weeks before it was to take place, and Huang invited the persons
scheduled to attend the lunch to the Hsi Lai Temple instead.
275
The evidence before the Committee shows that the Temple event was not a DNC
fundraiser. It was not proposed, agreed to, organized or conducted as a fundraiser. The event
was proposed by the Temple, and the Vice President agreed to it as a community outreach
event. Invitations made no mention of fundraising or an admission price to attend the event.
No tickets were taken or sold at the door; no campaign materials were present; neither the
Vice President nor any other speaker ever solicited contributions or thanked attendees for
contributing; and most of those who attended did not contribute to the DNC.
The evidence also shows, however, that Huang did use the Temple event to raise
money for the DNC, both from a small number of persons who attended the event and from
Temple monastics who did not attend the event. Contributions totaling $159,000 were
attributed in DNC records by Huang to this event. There is no evidence before the
Committee, however, that the Vice President had any knowledge of Huang's activities or
reason to believe that Huang used the Hsi Lai Temple event to raise funds for the DNC.
276
The Vice President and the Temple Event
In 1996, the DNC frequently requested that the Vice President attend fundraisers and
community outreach events in different cities across the country. The Vice President's office
worked with the DNC to schedule dates and locations that fit into his busy schedule.
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�Typically, the DNC would identify a city where they wanted to hold an event and then
request a date from the Vice President's office to schedule it. During the early planning
stages, the only details provided to the Vice President's office were cities and dates for
proposed DNC events. The scheduling staff would then present the DNC proposals to the
Vice President for his approval. The Vice President would sign off on cities and dates, not
the exact sites for events. Kimberly Tilley, the Vice President's director of scheduling,
testified about the general process of scheduling the Vice President at a DNC event in another
city. She stated:
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... as an example there would be a request for the Vice President, let's say, to go to
Chicago, and we -- I would talk to the Vice President and say there is a request for
you to go to Chicago for a DNC event and here's what's happening on your family
schedule, are you okay with this, and he would sign off on that.
279
Tilley explained that as the date drew near, the scheduling office would work on the
details and often discovered that the site had been changed. She testified, "many times we
would find out that it was not in Chicago. It was in Winnetka."
280
When the Vice President attended a DNC event in a particular city, other events were
generally scheduled before and after the DNC event. The other events on the Vice
President's schedule would often include speeches, meetings and appearances at other
locations near the DNC event. The different events scheduled for a particular day would
often change and not be finalized until shortly before the Vice President's trip to a city.
Scheduling by the Vice President's office for April 1996 events was handled in the usual
manner. Early in the planning process for April 1996, the Vice President agreed to travel to
Califomia long before the details of the trip were determined. The details, including the
number of events he would attend, the cities he would visit and the sites of each event were
determined over a period of time and were not finalized until shortly before the Vice
President's trip.
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Beginning in January 1996, the DNC proposed a series of fundraisers for the President
and Vice President to schedule in April, May and June. No specific dates or sites were
identified, the DNC simply suggested in its proposed calendar a month and a city in which to
hold a fundraiser. A January 2, 1996 memo from Harold Ickes to the Vice President and
others, included a proposal that the Vice President anend three DNC fundraisers in the month
of April in Washington, D.C, Los Angeles and San Jose. The event sites for the proposed
cities were not identified in the DNC's proposal.
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283
Between January 2 and Febmary 22, 1996, the Vice President's office worked on the
general DNC request to schedule fundraisers for the Vice President to attend in Califomia in
April 1996. As an example, the Vice President's ever-changing Califomia trip included a
proposal to add an event in San Francisco that was later dropped. While the schedule
changed often, there is no evidence that the Hsi Lai Temple was considered as a potential site
for an event during the early planning stages of the Vice President's trip to Califomia.
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�In March 1996, the dates of the Vice President's trip to Califomia and the events he
would attend were still not determined. Tilley received an e-mail message from one of her
assistants on March 12, 1996, that showed the Vice President would travel to San Jose and
Los Angeles for three days, from April 27th to the 29th, and that he could attend "some
combination of possible Olympic torch event in LA, DNC fundraisers in San Jose & LA" and
"Family/Private time."
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On March 15, Tilley sent the Vice President an electronic message asking if he would
like to give a keynote address at an event in New York on "the same evening that you wanted to
fly out to Califomia overnight and then do the two fund-raisers in San Jose and L.A. while Sarah
and Mrs. Gore visit colleges.... We've confirmed the fimd-raisers for Monday, April 29th."
The Vice President responded that, "If we have already booked the fund-raisers, then we have to
decline."
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While some have tried to claim that the Vice President's use of the word "fund-raisers" in
this message proves that he knew the Temple event was a fundraiser, it proves only that the Vice
President was planning to attend a fundraising event in Los Angeles well before the Temple
event was added to his schedule and had coordinated the date with when his daughter was
visiting colleges. As discussed below, an invitation to visit the Temple was extended by the
Temple for the first time on March 15th and was not formally incorporated into the Vice
President's schedule for another month, after an evaluation by the Vice President's national
security adviser. The Vice President's deputy chief of staff David Strauss testified at the
Committee hearing that the confirmed "fund-raisers" referenced in the Tilley message could not
possibly refer to the Temple event because that event had not yet been scheduled. "There
wasn't even an event scheduled at the temple on the 15th of March," Strauss said. "That
occurred much later." The Tilley message demonstrates that the Temple event was a separate
consideration from the DNC fundraising events that the Vice President had agreed to attend in
Califomia.
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The Temple event was first proposed during a March 15th meeting between the Vice
President and the head of the Temple, the Venerable Master Hsing Yun. This meeting had
been arranged by Huang and Maria Hsia, a fellow Democratic activist in the Asian-American
community.
In an interview with Committee investigators, the Master said, " I only met
with Gore for 10 minutes. We had a very polite conversation, then I departed." Briefing
papers for the Vice President state that the two "discussed Master Hsing Yun's charity work
in Califomia and elsewhere." At the end of this brief meeting, the Master invited the Vice
President to visit the Hsi Lai Temple in California. Vice President Gore responded that he
would consider it since he was expecting to be in California in late April. This exchange
reinforces the fact that the Vice President was already planning to visit Califomia at the time of
this meeting, and the Temple visit was a possible additional event, rather than the original reason
for his visiting the area.
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The evidence indicates that after the meeting between the Temple's master and the
Vice President, Huang and Hsia began planning two events in the Los Angeles area for April
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�29, a fundraising lunch at the Harbor Village Restaurant in Monterey Park and an AsianAmerican community outreach event at the Temple. Although the Harbor Village Restaurant
in Monterey Park has no record of a reservation for April 1996, a draft invitation produced
to the Comminee by Hsia corroborates the planning for this event and that the organizers
originally proposed two different events at two different locations for the Vice President.
Moreover, a March 23, 1996, letter from Hsia to the Vice President demonstrates that the
Vice President was specifically told of the plans for two events. The letter to the Vice
President stated:
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John Huang has asked me to help with organizing a fundraising lunch event, with your
anticipated presence, on behalf of the local Chinese community. After the lunch, we
will attend a rallv at Hsi Lai Temple where you will have the opportunity to meet
representatives from the Asian American community and visit again with Master Hsing
Yun. The event is tentatively scheduled for April 29 and I am hoping you will be able
to attend. [emphasis added]
299
Further corroboration that two events were planned was provided by Charlie Woo, an
attendee of the Temple event and contributor to the DNC, who told Committee staff that
Huang had contacted him to attend an Aprii event with the Vice President. Woo identified
this event as originally scheduled to be held at the Harbor Village Chinese Restaurant in
Monterey Park. Woo said Huang called with the location change to the Hsi Lai Temple less
than a month before the event and Woo was told that due to scheduling problems, there
would only be this one event. Because Huang never told him otherwise, Woo said he arrived
at the Temple event "with a check in my pocket" believing that he was going to a fundraiser.
He said that he thought it was "weird" that there was "no mention of money at the event."'
300
01
At some point in early April 1996, the DNC canceled the Los Angeles fundraiser but
not the community outreach event at the Hsi Lai Temple. Huang contacted Richard
Sullivan, the DNC's finance director, to inform him that there were problems with the
proposed site for the fundraiser. Sullivan testified,
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I think Maura (McManimon) and/or John said they were having problems working in
the location, and then ... subsequently, I believe John told me that the place that he
wanted -- that the home -- I believe it was a home that he wanted to have it at -would not work with the Vice President's schedule, that he was doing things
downtown and couldn't put enough time in the schedule to get out to this home -- it
may have been a restaurant, but I remember it as a home - and that he had to change
the location. Then he came back, I think a day or two later, and said that he wanted
to do it at a temple.
}0A
One or two days later Huang and Sullivan discussed the Hsi Lai Temple as a possible
site for a DNC event. Sullivan told Huang "you can't do a fundraiser at a temple," and
Sullivan was assured by Huang that the temple event would not be a fundraiser.
Instead,
the Hsi Lai Temple event was intended to express appreciation to past contributors to the
305
306
4-37
�1.
Proposed location:
Hsi Lai Temple
Hacienda Heights, Califomia
This temple was established by Venerable iMaster Hsing Yun during 1980's with many
structures including Large dinning [sic] facility ... To show his appreciation and
friendship to Vice President Gore, Master Hsing Yun would like to host this upcoming
Vice Presidential event in L.A....
3.
Hsi Lai Temple has hosted other political events before ...
5.
... Please let me know i f i can provide any further information. I certainly
would appreciate to know the answer asap if we can proceed on this maner. If so, in
what parameters can we do, or not do.
j15
Jackie Dycke, who worked on the April 29, 1996 schedule until mid-April, before it
was reassigned to Ladan Manteghi, prepared notes for the April 11th meeting which included
the following information: "DNC Luncheon in LA/Hacienda Heights: 1000-5000 head /150200 people." Dycke testified that she obtained this infonnation for a proposed event from
Maura McManimon who worked with John Huang for the DNC.
316
317
The character of an event would often change during the scheduling process. Strauss
was questioned during the Committee hearings about the scheduling process and he testified:
Q:
Is it common in your experience with regard to the Vice President's schedule
and how it evolves that an event may be contemplated, but that over time and indeed
on fairly short notice, its character could change or the event itself could be canceled
0
Mr. Strauss: That is conect.
Q:
Does that happen often?
318
Mr. Strauss: That is correct.
As of April 11, 1996, Huang, an organizer of the Hsi Lai Temple event, had not yet
received confirmation that the Vice President would even be attending an event at the Hsi Lai
Temple on April 29, 1996. Other documents, including an April 19th message just ten days
before the event, indicate that a decision on the Temple event was delayed pending an
evaluation by the Vice President's national security advisers who approved the event but
cautioned against permitting it to be characterized as one favoring Taiwan.' John Nonis,
who works in the Vice President's foreign policy office, wrote-a note to Bill Wise, deputy
director of the Vice President's foreign policy office, regarding the Hsi Lai Temple event. In
his April 16, 1996 note, Nonis wrote:
19
4-39
�State notes that any affair involving Taiwan involves some risk of political
exploitation by people from Taiwan.
State's advice is to make John Huang of the DNC responsible for managing the
event to ensure the VP is not embarrassed — the event is for the Chinese community of Southern Califomia; it is not a
"Taiwan" event;
-- there are no Taiwan flags or
embarrassing for the VP;
KJMT
symbols or other signs that would be
-- no Taiwan politician should be allowed to exploit this event/320
Wise wrote a hand note to Leon Feurth, the Vice President's National Security
Advisor, on the bottom of Norris's April 16, 1996, note with his opinion regarding the Hsi
Lai Temple site. Wise wrote:
I think it may be difficult for the sponsors to meet the ihree criteria suggested
by State -- but they will certainly claim that they can.
I suspect the VP might get to go ahead since we cannot point to a specific
problem."
321
On April 19, 1996, Norris received an e-mail message from Robert Suettinger
regarding the foreign policy ramifications of holding an event at the Hsi Lai Temple.
Suettinger wrote:
This is terra incognita to me. Certainly from the perspective of Taiwan/China
balancing, this would be clearly a Taiwan event and would be seen as such. I guess
my reaction would be one of great, great caution. They may have a hidden agenda/
2-
Tilley explained that the Vice President's National Security Office needed to approve
the Hsi Lai Temple as an appropriate site for. the Vice President to visit, based on foreign
policy considerations. Tilley testified, "for an event like this, we would not have proceeded the Vice President would not have done it if the National Security Office had not signed
off." In response, the Vice President's office informed the Temple that the Vice President
could anend the event only if all Taiwanese national symbols were removed from the site
before the event took place. The Temple agreed to this condition.
323
324
Once the event was agreed to, the evidence indicates that the Vice President's staff
organized it as a community outreach effort, rather than a fundraiser. When the event was
officially added to the Vice President's schedule in the latter half of April, the key scheduler
responsible for the event in the Vice President's office was Ladan Manteghi who, in mid4-40
�April, had assumed responsibility for the Vice President's April 29 schedule. Manteghi
testified at her deposition that she clearly understood the event to be a community outreach
event and not a fundraiser. She testified as follows:
325
Q. Do you recall ever discussing with Kim Tilley whether or not the event at the Hsi
Lai Temple -- what type of an event it was?
A. She and I had conversations, obviously, about the event and the type of event it
would be, and it was to be an outreach event and to basically give us exposure to the
Asian community and vice versa as well. You know, this was something very major
for them as well as for us in the sense that this was monumental in demonstrating an
ability to participate in the political process and to have the ability to vote. ... I am an
immigrant, and I know what a phenomenal sensation that is. ... [Tjhat's why this was
such a great effort in terms of outreach to this community and the Vice President
having an opportunity to be exposed to the community and to talk about leadership
and activity. ...
Q. Did you have any conversations with John Huang or Maura McManimon or
anyone with the DNC about whether this was a finance-related event?
A. We had conversations, and if this were a finance event, we would have spoken in
terms of dollar amounts and people's donations to participate in the event, and no such
conversation ever took place, neither with John Huang nor with Maura McManimon.
Q. Or with anyone else at the DNC?
A. Or with anyone else at the DNC or the Vice President's Office. ...
Q. [D]o you recall if you received any documentation that talked about the Hsi Lai
Temple event being a fundraiser?
A. No, I do not .... I would have known from the advance people if, you know, there
were some indication of money. In the typical setting of a fundraiser, again,
somebody who would have given a significant amount of money ... they would have
an opportunity to shake the Vice President's hand separately from 150 people. But
that was not the case, and I would have had a conversation with John Huang, and that
didn't happen. ...
Q. Did you ever discuss with anyone ... about if you had concerns that the event was
taking place at the Hsi Lai Temple, which was a religious center?
A. No, I did not, because ... I asked the question of John to ... explain the
significance of the Temple to me, and he did, and I was comfortable with the fact that
this was a place where the community congregates on special occasions ... not only a
4-41
�holy place, but also a community center. ...
Q. And you stated earlier that after the press accounts came out you were surprised
because you didn't know anything about any fundraising activities.
A. That's correct. I mean, those were all accounts that came out in the press, and it
was rather shocking to me.
Q. Because you had been talking with John Huang prior to the event, and you had
had no discussions with him about fundraising activities?
A. That's correct. ... [T]his was such a 'feel good' type event, if I can really say. ...
[Wje're delving into yet another group that has been a part of Americana for so many
years, and you know, these people were so excited about this event. ...
0
Q. So there was never a time that you believed that this was going to be a fundraiser
A. No.
326
•
Despite this critical testimony from the key scheduler in the Vice President's office,
the Majority refused to call her as a hearing witness, rejecting a unanimous request from
Committee Democrats to have her testify.
327
The other person on the Vice President's staff who played a key role in the Temple
event was the Vice President's deputy chief of staff, David Strauss, who personally briefed
the Vice President about the event, counseled him on the type of remarks that would be
appropriate at the event, and actually accompanied the Vice President to the Temple event.
Strauss testified unequivocally that he understood the event to be a community outreach event
and not a fundraiser, and informed the Vice President accordingly. Strauss testified:
328
I was the person who was solely responsible for telling the Vice President what this
event was. He relied on my judgment about this event. I explained to him what the
event was all about, suggested to him what sort of remarks to make that would be
appropriate for this event. I take full responsibility for the Vice President's knowledge
about this event. He got the significant information from me and from the briefina
book."
329
The briefing book, which Strauss testified that the Vice President would have reviewed
immediately prior to the Temple event,- also presented it as a community outreach event and
not a fundraiser. Particularly compelling are the differences between the briefing materials
given to the Vice President for the Temple event compared to the briefing materials given to
him for a San Jose fundraiser later the same day. The briefing materials for the Temple event
described it as a DNC Asian-Pacific American Leadership Council luncheon honoring Vice
President Gore. Talking points prepared for the Temple event did not include any references
330
4-42
�to campaign contributions or any amounts being raised by the event, nor did they call for the
Vice President to thank the participants for making a contribution. ' Furthermore, the talking
points prepared for the Hsi Lai Temple event were much longer than the boilerplate
fundraising speech and covered many different issues, including ethnic diversity. In contrast,
the briefing materials prepared for the San Jose fundraiser specified the amount of money to
be raised at the event:
J 1
332
This is the first San Jose-based event during the Clinton/Gore Administration,
so most of the guests are new supporters of the DNC. San Jose Mayor Susan
Hammer has been extremely helpful with this event as co-chair with George
Marcus, the event host. Estimated attendance at the reception is 100-125
guests. This event is raising S250.000 for the DNC. [Emphasis added.]
333
That type of information was not included in the Temple briefing materials.
In addition, the event itself was conducted like a community outreach event and not as
a fundraiser. No money was collected at the door, no campaign materials were present, and
no one discussed contributions at the event. According to an audio tape of the event produced
to this Committee, the Vice President never made a request for contributions during his
speech nor did he thank the luncheon attendees for their support. He spoke instead about
diversity in America.
334
335
Individuals who attended the Hsi Lai Temple luncheon on April 29, 1996, verified that
the event did not appear to be a fundraiser. John Aloysius Farrell, a Boston Globe reporter,
the Venerable Master Hsing Yun, and David Strauss attended the April 29, 1996, luncheon
and provided consistent accounts that, based on the objective evidence at the event and the
content of the Vice President's remarks, the Hsi Lai Temple event was not a fundraiser.
On September 4, 1997, Farrell provided significant confirmation that the Hsi Lai
Temple event did not appear to be a fundraiser. Farrell accompanied the Vice President on
the "marathon trip from Washington to Califomia on April 29, 1996, and interviewed the vice
president on Air Force I I . "
Farrell wrote:
336
... Gore's own words and actions at the Buddhist temple, witnessed by a Globe
reporter and described here for the first time, give credence to the Vice President's
assertion that while he knew there was a fund-raising component to the event, he
viewed it more as a good-will visit with Asian-American leaders.
Although other party leaders warmed up the audience with political rhetoric, Gore's
remarks were non-partisan and restrained, markedly different from the biting one-liners
he offered at another fund-raiser that evening in Northern Califomia.
At the Hsi Lai Temple, Gore spoke in personal terms of his acquaintance with Hsing
Yun, the venerable maser and leader of the temple and its growing worldwide
4-43
�congregation, and of the U.S. tradition of tolerance for immigrant cultures. Gore made
no explicit pitch for contributions.
337
The Venerable Master Hsing Yun confirmed in his interview with Comminee staff that
fundraising was not discussed at the Hsi Lai Temple event. He stated, "'In addition to
Buddhists, there were also Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim friends at the event, also some
people I didn't know
We did not speak about the campaign or anything about politics or
donations."
338
Strauss, who attended the event with the Vice President, explained to the Committee
that the Vice President did not give a fundraising speech at the Hsi Lai Temple event.
Strauss testified, "it was a very good speech, but it had nothing to do with fundraising.'' '
Strauss described the Vice President's speech to the Committee:
3
A:
... typically my role for this sort of event, what I would try to do is quickly
size up the situation for the Vice President. I talked briefly to Congressman Matsui
who had heard the Vice President a week or so beforehand give what I called his E
Pluribus Unum speech, and after consulting with Congressman Matsui, I suggested that
considering the nature of this group, where you had Asians, Hispanics, African
Americans, that that would be an appropriate set of remarks for this particular event,
and in that speech, he would refer to the richness of our diversity and what a strength
it is in this country and draw the comparison with Bosnia, Rwanda, Burundi, NagornoKaravakh. I mean, he had this very moving speech about tolerance that he would
make, and that those were the remarks that he made at this particular event.
Q:
Did it include any request for money or any thank you for people having
contributed?
A:
It did not.
340
Strauss also testified that the event did not appear to be a fundraiser. The typical
elements of a fundraiser or a political event were not present at the Hsi Lai Temple on April
29, 1996: there were no ticket tables, no one collected or asked for contributions, there were
no political campaign posters, there was no campaign literature, nobody tried to recruit
volunteers for the campaign and nobody thanked attendees for making a financial
contribution.
Strauss concluded that the Hsi Lai Temple event was not a fundraiser:
341
Q:
Based on your experience and all the years that you have been doing this sort
of thing and attending hundreds of fundraisers, did this appear to you to have the
indicia of a fundraiser, this event?
A:
I believe that I know what a fundraiser is. and this was not a fundraiser.
[emphasis added]
4-44
�Other attendees at the event confirm that it did not appear to be a fundraiser. Charlie
Woo, mentioned earlier, told Comminee investigators that there was "no mention of money at
the event." "' Mona Pasquil, DNC Western States political director and former director of
Asian-Pacific affairs, testified that she saw.no signs of fundraising, such as a table at the door,
name tags, checks being exchanged, or solicitations for money.
DNC Chairman Fowler
described it as an "outreach event" similar to those he attended at churches in the 1960s; not
everyone who attended also contributed, and there were none of the typical trappings of a
fundraiser.' DNC Chairman Donald Fowler testified, "[TJhere were three people who made
presentations there - myself, the temple master, and the Vice President. None of the three of
us made any reference to raising money, contributing money, giving money before or after."
3,4
344
45
Persons associated with the Temple who helped organize the event also indicated that
they did not consider the event to be a fundraiser.' Man-Ho, assistant to the Temple abbess,
testified at the hearing that Temple personnel did not focus on fundraising during planning
before the event. In her deposition, she said that the guests "were not required to pay a
buck for [the] luncheon. . . ." She also told the Committee that she did not see anything at
the event that would indicate that it was a fundraiser. The head of the Temple, Venerable
Master Hsing Yun, provided a slatement to the Committee with consistent information.
47
348
349
350
351
The evidence also indicates that no invitation associated with the event contained
anything remotely resembling a solicitation. Such solicitations are generally included in
invitations to DNC fundraisers and range from a price stamped on the invitation to a card
enclosed with different contribution levels. The absence of any solicitation or admission price
on any invitation is further evidence that a contribution was neither required nor expected, and
the purpose ofthe event was not to raise funds.
352
353
354
Further, most of the attendees did not contribute. For example, Ted Sioeng, his wife,
daughter and two other relatives were invited by Huang and attended the event without making
any contribution. While DNC records attribute 42 contributions to the Temple event, 12 of
which were from monastics who did not attend the event itself, and only another 15 or so were
from attendees. That means of the 100 or so persons who attended the event, only about 15
contributed in connection with their attendance.
355
356
The allegation has been made that the participation of John Huang and Maria Hsia in
organizing the event should have told the Vice President that the event was a fundraiser, but both
had previously been involved in arranging non-fundraising, political outreach events for the
Asian-American community. For example, both helped organize a September 27, 1993,
meeting with Asian-American leaders.that was described in the Vice President's briefing
papers as an Asian-American community outreach event. Moreover, Hsia had been
involved in the organization of only one prior fundraiser for the Vice President but had
organized his 1989 trip to Taiwan with the Pacific Leadership Council which had no
fundraising aspects. And as indicated above, Huang had never given any indication to anyone
on the Vice President's staff that any fundraising was involved in the Temple event.'
357
58
4-45
�Strauss addressed this issue in his testimony to the Comminee. He testified
emphatically that he had no knowledge that the Vice President or anyone on the Vice
President's staff knew anything about the post-event fundraising activities engaged in by
Huang or Hsia/
Strauss testified:
59
Q:
Prior to the time that the newspaper articles appeared in the fall of 1996, did
you have any reason to believe that anybody on the Vice President's staff had heard
that there was any fundraising engaged in by Ms. Hsia, by virtue of a call from
Huang?
A:
I have no knowledge that anyone did know.
Q:
Did you ever know anything about contributions having been collected or
monies having been collected prior to the April 29th event at the Hsi Lai Temple?
There has been testimony that a certain amount of money was generated in advance of
the event.
A:
I had no knowledge of that.
Q:
Do you have any reason to believe that the Vice President knew anything
relative to this event, either prior to the event or that after the event any monies had
been collected?
I have no reason to believe that he knew anything about this. 360
A:
Ladan Manteghi, the scheduling staff person who put together the final details of the
Vice President's April 29, 1996 schedule, confirmed that the information regarding Huang and
Hsia's activities were a surprise to the Vice President's staff when they were first reported by
the news media. She explained in her deposition that the scheduling staff was "meticulous"
and that they "scrutinized, really, everything" to make sure that "all the i's were dotted, the
t's crossed." ' She testified:
36
A:
So that's where the element of surprise came in when all the accounts started
coming out. It was, like, wait a minute, we really went through everything, and so
how could this be? This seems really kind of off the wall. You know, from my
perspective, that's how it seemed.
Q:
So there was never a time that you believed that this was going to be a
fundraiser?
A:
362
No. By the time I received it, this was not going to be a fundraiser.
There are two types of evidence suggesting that the Temple event was a fundraiser.
The first involves the fact that Huang did solicit contributions in connection with the event, as
4-46
�discussed below, but there is no evidence that the Vice President had any knowledge of those
solicitations. The second involves several internal communications -- e-mails and memoranda
between staff members for the Vice President - that refer to the Temple event as a
"fundraiser," as discussed above. Relevant testimony included Tilley's statements regarding
the "sloppiness in the terms we were using, whether it was finance or fundraising," and
Strauss's testimony that the character of an event would often change during the scheduling
process, making it difficult to ensure that the proper term was used.
In addition, Tilley
testified that the Vice President's scheduling office usually referred to an event from the DNC
Finance Department as a. fundraiser, even though it may not have been a fundraiser.
363
364
365
366
From the perspective of Vice President Gore, the Vice President's office, and the DNC,
the Hsi Lai Temple event was not a fundraiser. There is no evidence before the Committee that
Vice President Gore knew that contributions were solicited or received in relation to the Temple
event. The information received by the Vice President regarding the event described it as an
opportunity for the Vice President to meet with members ofthe local Asian-American
community. John Huang assured DNC Finance Director Richard Sullivan that the event was not
a fundraiser, but instead would involve community outreach. Moreover, the event had none of
the trappings of a fundraiser.
John Huang and the Temple Event
Although the Temple event was not a fundraiser and Huang had represented that to
Richard Sullivan, DNC finance director, when specifically asked, Huang did use it as an
opportunity to obtain contributions to the DNC. Huang attributed $159,000 in DNC
contributions to this event. Many of these contributions were from monastics at the Temple
and were subsequently and possibly illegally reimbursed by the Temple. (See Chapter 21 of
the Minority Report.)
367
As mentioned above, Sullivan testified that, while he was not involved in the day-today planning of this event, he ensured that Huang knew that he could not hold a fundraising
event at a Temple, and Huang confirmed to him that he was aware of this restriction/
Sullivan further testified that he facilitated a conference call between himself, Huang and
David Strauss, Deputy Chief of Staff to the Vice President, to reassure Strauss that the event
was not a fundraiser.
68
369
It appears, however, that when the original fundraiser tentatively planned for the
Harbour Village restaurant was canceled, Huang invited the guests for that event to the
"community outreach" event at the Temple. Huang then apparently used the Temple event to
solicit contributions despite his contrary representations to the DNC.
Man-Ho, the assistant to the abbess at the Temple, testified that at a particular meeting
of monastics, the abbess told monastics that it would be all right for them to ask devotees to
contribute $5,000 to come to the luncheon and have their picture taken with the Vice
President. Man-Ho testified that she did not know whose idea this was, though it appears
4-47
�that, from other evidence, this likely was the result of direction from Maria Hsia or John
Huang.
370
On April 28, 1996, the day before the event, at the third of three meetings between
Man-Ho and Huang, Man-Ho handed Huang a list of names and amounts contributed prior
to the event. Despite Huang's representations to Sullivan and Strauss, Huang told Man-Ho
that any other devotees who would like to attend the event could do so for $2,500, as opposed
to the $5,000 that had been requested until then.
371
372
373
Prior to the April 29 event, checks written out to the DNC were collected totaling
$45,OOO/ In addition, some who contributed before the event also had their pictures taken
with the Vice President.
74
375
Man-Ho testified that on April 30, the day after the Temple event, Maria Hsia called
her to say that "'John Huang hoped that the Temple could contribute more money," since
only $45,000 of an anticipated $100,000 had been collected. The ensuing facts of how the
monastics contributed additional amounts to help Huang reach this goal are covered in
Chapter 21 of the Minority Report. Man-Ho testified that she believed that the money the
monastics collected was given to Huang later that day.
376
377
While there is no evidence that Huang spoke directly with anyone at the Temple
regarding a request for additional contributions, it is clear that Hsia communicated Huang's
fundraising appeal. She also assisted the monastics, for a fee, with many immigration matters
and advised them on other legal matters. Yi Chu testified that the Temple monastics had been
responding to fundraising requests by Hsia since 1993. Though the amount requested was
larger than previous requests, it was viewed, once again, as helping Hsia, and the Temple
complied. Huang and Hsia had known each other for a long time, and it is likely that
Huang would have known about Hsia's relationship with individuals associated with the
Temple. There is insufficient evidence, however, to determine whether Huang knew that
the Temple planned to reimburse its monastics' contributions to the DNC.
378
379
John H. K. Lee and the Cheong Am America Contribution
Huang's involvement in obtaining a $250,000 contribution from Cheong .Am America
in the spring of 1996 is disturbing for a number of reasons. This incident not only involves a
campaign contribution later discovered to have been paid for with foreign funds at the
direction of a Korean national, it also demonstrates Huang's apparent willingness to disregard
established DNC procedures for evaluating contributions.
Cheong Am America, Inc. was a joint venture between two South Korean firms that
were considering constmcting a large-screen television manufacturing plant in Carson,
Califomia. The two firms were the Cheong Am Group and Ateck Company. The Cheong
Am Group was headed by Korean businessman John H. K. Lee, the moving force behind the
joint venture. Lee was later revealed to be a convicted criminal and was subsequently
4-48
�80
indicted in Seoul in connection with this matter/ Ateck, a S50 million company with a
history of successful manufacture of large-screen televisions, was headed by Korean
businessman Young Chull Chung, whom Lee was pressing to finance the U.S. plant. Their
joint venture, Cheong Am America, was established in February 1996 as a U.S. subsidiary of
the Cheong Am Group.
If the large-screen television manufacturing plant had been built,
it apparently would have been the first of its kind outside of Asia.
381
382
383
In the spring of 1996, Lee contacted Carson mayor Michael Mitoma and told him that
before a final decision could be made on building the plant in Carson, Lee and his associates
would like to meet with President Clinton. Lee had been advised to contact Mitoma by
Lucy Ham, a Choeng Am America officer and friend of Mitoma.
In testimony before the
Committee, Mitoma said that he agreed to try to arrange a meeting for Lee by telephoning
Doris Matsui, Deputy Director of the White House Office of Public Liaison in charge of
Asian American issues. When Matsui failed to return his telephone messages, Mitoma
called the DNC at the suggestion of Ham, who was aware that an Asian American was
organizing fundraising events with the President. The person Mitoma talked to at the DNC
was Huang.
384
385
386
387
Mitoma and Huang apparently had several discussions about a possible meeting
between Cheong Am America associates and the President, including Lee's preference for a
30-minute private meeting in Washington or Korea. Mitoma told the Committee that the
final arrangement reached was that Lee, Chung, Lucy and Won Ham, and Mitoma would
attend a small fundraising dinner with the President on April 8, 1996, at the Sheraton Carlton
Hotel in Washington. In exchange, Cheong Am America would make a contribution to the
DNC covering five dinner tickets at $50,000 apiece, for a total of $250,000. Although
Cheong Am America did in fact purchase five tickets to the dinner, what actually took place
was a five to ten minute meeting in a hotel reception room.
388
389
390
Documents show that on April 8 ~ the day of the dinner - Huang faxed DNC finance
director Sullivan a two-page handwritten document, "per our conversation," stating that
Cheong Am America was looking for "a large U.S. broadcasting company" for a joint venture
to manufacture and market large-screen televisions, with the plant to be built in Carson. The
document listed five meeting "participants," identified Lee as chairman of the Cheong Am
Group in Korea, and inaccurately identified Chung as head of a Cheong Am Group
"division." In response to the fax, Sullivan sent a memorandum - also dated April 8 - to
Doug Sosnick and Karen Hancox of the White House Office of Political Affairs stating that
the Carson mayor wanted "five minutes" with the President that evening "before our first
dinner" to discuss the proposed plant in Carson.
Neither document indicated that the
Cheong .Am representatives would be attending the dinner itself.
391
392
393
Mitoma told the Committee that in a phone call on the day of the dinner, Huang had
hinted that it might only be possible for Lee to have a private meeting with the President and
not attend the dinner. Mitoma testified that he was upset by this conversation in light of
the large sum of money Lee was paying for an opportunity to dine with the President. He
394
4-49
�testified that, in addition, Lee was flying into Washington from Korea for the sole purpose of
attending the dinner and bringing the check with him from Korea.
395
Mitoma told the Committee that when his party arrived at the Sheraton Carlton Hotel,
they waited for about an hour in the hotel lobby before being met by Huang. They were
then ushered into a "side room." According to Mitoma, he handed Huang the 5250,000
check while they were in the lobby, prior to being taken to the side room. Mitoma testified
that the President arrived in the side room and a brief meeting followed. Mitoma indicated
that he told the President that Lee was interested in opening a manufacturing plant that would
create much-needed jobs in Carson, and that the President said that was a "very good idea"
and he hoped it would happen. Mitoma testified that Lee and the others then had their
pictures taken with the President.''
396
397
398
399
00
While Mitoma's testimony makes clear that neither he, Lee, nor Chung advocated any
substantive policy change nor requested special treatment during or after the meeting, the
evidence before the Committee indicates that Cheong Am America's $250,000 contribution
was made for the sole purpose of obtaining access to the President. The evidence also
demonstrates that Huang was an apparently willing and uncritical participant in an apparent
sale of access.
401
The evidence also indicates that Huang apparently failed to meet his core responsibility
of carefully evaluating the $250,000 contribution to ensure that the DNC could properly
accept it. A 1995 DNC memorandum, authored by DNC General Counsel Sandler, required
all contributions from U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations to be thoroughly reviewed by
the DNC general counsel's office before acceptance. The memorandum identified four
requirements for accepting such contributions: (1) the subsidiary must be incorporated and
have its principal place of business in the U.S.; (2) the subsidiary must have sufficient funds
from its own U.S. operations to support the contribution; (3) the subsidiary cannot be
reimbursed by the foreign owners or parent corporation for its contribution; and (4) the
decision to contribute must be made by U.S. citizens or permanent residents and not by
foreign nationals. The last paragraph of the memorandum stated the following:
402
403
Each situation must be examined on a case-bv-case basis before anv decision to
accept a contribution can be made. As we discussed, the procedure should be
that you or your staff discuss the situation with Neil or myself, that DNC
counsel review the above requirements with counsel or another official of the
company, and that either the company confirm to us in writing that the
requirements have been met or that we issue a letter to the company setting out
their factual representations to us showing that these requirements have been
met and confirming that on the basis of those representations the contribution is
lawful. [Emphasis in original.]
404
The evidence indicates that Huang, due to his DNC training, knew or should have
known of these DNC procedures and legal requirements. Mitoma testified that at one point
405
4-50
�-- it is unclear whether it was before or after he had delivered the check -- Huang asked him
whether Cheong Am was incorporated in the United States and whether the contribution
would be drawn on a bank account belonging to the U.S. corporation. Mitoma stated he
responded in the affirmative after checking with Lucy Ham at Cheong Am America.' He
testified that Huang never asked him whether any foreign national, such as Lee or Chung, was
involved in the contribution decision, or whether the company was using U.S.-generated
income to pay for the S250,000.
106
407
According to DNC Finance Director Sullivan, when Huang gave him the S250.000
check in April 1996, he told Huang that he had expected personal contributions from Ham
and her husband (who were U.S. citizens), and expressed concern about the eligibility of
Cheong Am America to contribute. Sullivan testified that Huang told him that he held onto
the check for two days, and Sullivan assumed, based on his conversation with Huang, that he
had run the check by the general counsel's office. He said:
I remember looking at it with him and saying, are you okay with this and have you
vetted this with Sandler, and he responded, yes.
408
Sandler testified, however, that Huang had not discussed the Cheong Am contribution
with him prior to September 1996, when the DNC received information that there might be a
problem with the contribution.
409
A memorandum dated September 20, 1996, attended by Sandler and Jake Siewert,
states that after learning on September 19th that there might be a problem with the
contribution, the DNC immediately investigated, uncovered significant questions, and returned
the funds the same day, seven weeks before the election. The memorandum states:
410
The DNC's fundraiser [Huang] understood that the company had been in
existence in the U.S. for some months. He also was led to believe that all
three of the company's principals. . . were U.S. citizens or permanent residents.
. . . We learned yesterday. . . the company had no operations in the U.S. at the
time the contribution was made. . . [and] one of the three principals, its
chairman, John Lee, was not a U.S. citizen. The DNC's fundraiser had been
led to believe that Mr. Lee was a permanent resident because he has a social
security number, and had resided in Los Angeles for some time; there may
have been some confusion because his son is a permanent resident. The other
two principals are in fact U.S. citizens and it is our fundraiser's firm
understanding that these two made the decision to contribute. However, the
involvement - and presence at'the fundraiser - of Mr. Lee, raises sufficient
additional questions. . . that we would not have accepted the contribution had
we known Mr. Lee was not a permanent resident. "
4
4
The memorandum admits, ' i n this case, the [DNC's] normal vetting process broke down." '"
Sandler also testified at his deposition that when he asked Huang about the contribution in
4-51
�413
September, Huang admitted that he "had made a mistake."
The evidence is clear that, with respect to the Cheong Am America contribution,
Huang apparently failed to follow the DNC's procedures for evaluating contributions from
U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations. He did not ask all of the required questions of the
company and apparently failed to consult the DNC general counsel's office. When asked by
Sullivan in April if he had spoken with the general counsel's office, Huang apparently
indicated that he had, even though the general counsel has testified that the first time he was
contacted about the contribution was in September. While the evidence does not establish that
Huang knew that foreign nationals had participated in the contribution decision and used
foreign funds to pay for the contribution, the evidence does show that Huang knew that Lee
had flown in from Korea for the dinner and had originally wanted to meet with the President
in Korea. Given these facts, Huang should have exercised greater care in determining
whether Lee was a foreign national, whether Chung, his Korean partner, had participated in
the contribution decision, and whether funds from Korea had been used for the contribution.
DNC officials should have exercised more careful oversight over Huang's fundraising.
However, once the-DNC became aware of questions about the Cheong Am contribution, it
initiated a prompt investigation, Huang admitted his missteps to Sandlei, and the DNC
immediately returned the funds.
June 18. 1996, DNC Coffee at the White House
Another event Huang helped organize was a DNC coffee held at the White House on
June 18, 1996. This was the only coffee Huang attended. Thai businesswoman Pauline
Kanchanalak also attended with several of her business associates who were foreign nationals
and nonresidents and, therefore, ineligible to contribute to the DNC. Kanchanalak was known
at the DNC as a significant contributor. The Committee investigated whether Huang sold
access to the President through this coffee or whether he made a solicitation at the coffee.
The Committee did not receive testimony from Huang, or from Kanchanalak, who reportedly
has left the country.
414
415
Also present at the coffee were Clarke Wallace, executive director of the U.S.Thailand Business Council, which promotes trade and investment between Thailand and the
United States; Beth Dozoretz, a volunteer fundraiser for the DNC, and her guests, Renee and
Robert Belfer; the DNC's Donald Fowler and Marvin Rosen; and Bob Nash, Director of
Presidential Personnel.
Kanchanalak was a well-established supporter ofthe DNC prior to the 1996 election
cycle. Sullivan testified that she had been giving to the DNC since at least 1991. She
was active in Asian-American political circles, and as an existing DNC Trustee, had attended
the inaugural Asian Pacific American Leadership Council dinner with Vice President Gore on
November 2, 1995. Huang was put in charge of Kanchanalak's "account."
416
417
418
419
4-52
�In late spring 1996, Kanchanalak expressed her desire "to come and bring a couple of
people to [a] coffee.'"' Sullivan testified that he initially opposed Kanchanalak's list of
proposed coffee attendees because they did not serve the purpose of cultivating new
contributors and appeared to be designed as an opportunity for Kanchanalak to impress her
business clients. Thus, unlike the many other DNC events at the White House in which
both established and prospective Democratic supporters were invited, the June 18, 1996 coffee
did not involve an opportunity for the President to interact with a variety of party supporters
but rather appeared to be a favor for Kanchanalak. However, John Huang was insistent that
her Thai guests must be allowed to attend, and Sullivan and Rosen acceded.
20
421
422
Sullivan testified that it was his sense that Kanchanalak wanted to attend this coffee to
impress her clients from the CP Group, a large Thai conglomerate, and that the DNC included
Kanchanalak and her guests as a favor to her. FEC records also indicate that "P.
Kanchanalak" gave contributions of $85,000 on June 19, 1996, and $50,000 on July 10, 1997,
and Pauline Kanchanalak's sister-in-law, Duagnet (Georgie) Kronenberg, gave $50,000 on
June 19, 1996. Two contributions from attendees to this event were attributed to this coffee.
For internal tracking purposes, the DNC assigns "codes" to contributions associated with
particular events. Because coffees were not considered "fundraisers," they did not normally
have contributions credited to them.
423
424
While both the DNC and the White House both approved the. list of prospective
attendees, this is the very system which is to blame for the fact that this coffee occurred at all.
For instance, the knowledge that a donor was "insisting" on bringing her business associates to
a DNC coffee with the President should have raised a warning flag for Sullivan, who had
earlier expressed concerns about Huang's fundraising.
The second allegation is of a possible solicitation at the coffee. Karl Jackson, a
Republican, was President of the U.S.-Thailand Business Council with which Kanchanalak
was also involved. Jackson testified that he was invited to the coffee a day before it was
held and was told that representatives of the council, including the chairman, would be
there. Jackson said he understood this to be a policy meeting with the President and was
surprised when he heard "DNC" mentioned as he arrived at the White House for the coffee.
Jackson alleged that at the beginning of the coffee, Huang stood up and said '"Elections cost
money, lots and lots of money, and I am sure that every person in this room will want to
support the re-election of President Clinton.'" Jackson was contradicted by other
attendees.
425
426
427
428
429
The Committee heard public testimony from three of the nine attendees at this coffee:
Jackson, Wallace, and Dozoretz. Committee staff also deposed Wallace, Dozoretz, and Robert
Belfer, but not Jackson. Much of this testimony focused on Jackson's allegation.
Wallace testified that he did not consider the coffee to be a fundraiser. He said "what
it appeared to be was a relationship-building type event with major donors." ' Wallace
recalled that the President introduced Huang to the group at the end of the coffee, not at the
4 0
4-53
�Jj
beginning as Jackson recounted. '
Wallace testified that at that time:
John Huang spoke and he said [to] the President, "Thank you very much for
being here, Mr. President," and I think speaking more to the table, he said, as
you know," he said, "this President is the right man to lead [the] country into
the 21st century, into the next millennium and I think we have one small
hurdle" or something like that, "which is the elections in November and f m
sure you will do everything you can to support that, support the -- everyone at
this table will do what they can to support the President."
;i
432
Wallace has no independent recollection of Huang making any statement about "elections
being expensive," although he does not contest that this may have been said. Wallace
testified in his deposition that he did not understand Huang to be suggesting to the coffee
attendees that they themselves should contribute. Rather, Wallace testified that he interpreted
Huang's remarks as follows: "Helping to either . . . raise money or help to strengthen the
DNC somehow either through networking to get people to support the President or . . .
networking to get people to give donations."
433
434
Dozoretz has been a volunteer DNC fundraiser since 1992 and is familiar with
fundraising events and how they are organized and carried out. She testified that she has
never been told that if she raised a certain amount of money she would be given access to the
President; indeed, she said she was always told that access to the President was not dependent
upon the quantity of contributions given. Prior to press accounts, Dozoretz does not recall
anyone at the DNC referring to the coffees as fundraisers.
435
436
437
Dozoretz who unlike Jackson, sat right next to Huang at the coffee, testified that
Huang did not solicit the coffee guests. She said that she would have remembered if Huang
had solicited the coffee attendees because "he would have been soliciting people that I
brought to the coffee. He would have been soliciting me, and I certainly would have
remembered it, and I certainly would have left there having a clear understanding that he
worked for the DNC." In fact, she initially thought Huang was a member of Kanchanalak's
group.
438
439
440
Dozoretz's guest at the coffee, Robert Belfer, likewise testified he never formed the
impression that he was attending a fundraiser. In his deposition, Belfer testified: "Nothing
occurred in that room to lead me to understand that I was asked or expected to give money as
a result of that coffee. . . . I was not asked at the coffee, nor did I hear anybody else being
asked at the coffee to give money." Belfer also had no recollection of Huang making any
remarks during the coffee. In his deposition. Belfer testified that he, too, assumed that Huang
was a member of Kanchanalak's Thai delegation, and he would have "clearly had an
understanding that [Huang] was somehow not a part of this delegation if he got up and gave a
fundraising pitch to the people there."
441
442
Jackson is the only coffee attendee who recalls Huang making a solicitation for money.
4-54
�Jackson's own testimony reveals that even his version of what Huang purportedly stated was
not an express solicitation. Others who attended the coffee do not support even this version
of Jackson's testimony; even Jackson's subordinate at the U.S. Thailand Business Council,
Clarke Wallace, does not support Jackson's recollection. It is noteworthy that over 1,000
people attended numerous coffees over two years and that Jackson, a longtime Republican, is
the only attendee who claimed that there was a solicitation at a coffee.
The Pendleton Act prohibits solicitations for political contributions on federal property.
Under the Pendleton Act, such solicitations are prohibited only in certain areas of the White
House. This coffee occurred in the Map Room," which has been expressly excluded from
the prohibition on solicitations on federal property. While the alleged solicitation, even if it
had occurred, might not have been illegal, it would have been improper. The preponderence
of evidence before the Committee, however indicates a solicitation did not, in fact occur.
143
444
Rawlein Soberano
Rawlein Soberano, is an independent consultant and also co-founder and vice president
of the Virginia-based Asian American Business Roundtable ("AABR"). The AABR is a small
organization that helps promote Section 8(a) contracts between its members (small,
disadvantaged companies) and the federal government. Soberano testified before the
Committee that he met with Huang for lunch in early August 1996 to discuss potential
sponsors for the annual AABR dinner banquet. Soberano alleged that when the
conversation turned to a discussion of the AABR's small operating budget, Huang offered to
provide the organization with SSOO.OOO. He described the offer in the following terms:
445
446
47
4
And I told him about the organization. I remembered that it was during the
discussion about the budget when he mentioned — and I remember this as if it
was yesterday. He said, "Perhaps we can help you out," and that's when I
looked at him and said "How?" and he said categorically and plainly, "We can
give you $300,000 and you can give it back to us later, and you can give 15
percent for the organization," but that is when I told him, "John, this
conversation never took place."
448
As a result of this alleged conversation, Soberano inferred that Huang was offering to
provide the AABR with money that he thought may come from the DNC. Soberano testified,
however, that Huang never identified either the source of the money that could be provided to
the AAI .. or to where the money would be repaid by the AABR. In both his deposition
testimony and his hearing testimony, Soberano also confirmed that Huang never used the
word "DNC" during their conversation. Soberano also testified that he did not ask Huang
any follow-up questions, nor did the two have any other discussion at all about this except for
the alleged statements recounted above.
449
450
451
The Committee was presented with no evidence to support Soberano's allegations.
Soberano's calendar, which was produced to the Committee, shows no appointment with
4-55
�Huang on the date in question. Soberano admitted that he did not make reservations for his
lunch with Huang and that he knew of no one who saw the two at the restaurant.
Soberano also stated that following the incident, he did not tell his boss at the AABR or
anyone else, including his wife, about his alleged conversation with Huang.
452
453
454
Soberano's understanding of his conversation with Huang is subject to question.
Soberano's allegation is based on his understanding of a brief comment by Huang, a man with
whom he had never before had a one-on-one conversation. Soberano is a registered
Republican and former political appointee of the Bush Administration. Soberano did not
come forward with this story until six months after this alleged event. His supervisor, a
Republican activist, set up a meeting with a Washington Post reporter without Soberano's
approval to urge Soberano to levy this charge against Huang. In fact, Soberano testified
that he had refused to meet with reporters for many weeks and only did so after his supervisor
set up an appointment without conferring with him. In the Post story that resulted from this
interview, his supervisor appeared on the front page although she had no involvement with or
knowledge of the activities at issue. Based on this evidence, the possibility cannot be
ignored that Soberano misunderstood his conversation with Huang and that he was encouraged
to assume a fundraising violation based on much publicized media accounts of allegations
against Huang.
455
456
457
458
459
460
The DNC's Supervision of Huang
Richard Sullivan, former DNCfinancedirector, testified that as early as the Sheraton
Carlton event in May 1996, he was concerned and "nervous" about the number of foreign
nationals attending events organized by Huang. Despite this concern, Sullivan stated that he
did not closely monitor Huang's fundraising in the months following this event because he
believed Huang was reviewing questionable contributions with DNC general counsel Joseph
Sandler. However, the only time Sandler reviewed contributions with Huang was after
Huang's first fundraising event in February. Despite his concerns, there is no evidence that
Sullivan ever raised the issue directly with Sandler or ever talked to Sandler to see if there
were, in fact, any problems with the contributors Huang was soliciting.
461
462
Following the Jefferson Hotel event, Sullivan became particularly concerned about
small events organized by Huang with significant numbers of non-citizens in attendance.
Although attendees at DNC events are often allowed to bring a guest, even if the guest is a
noncitizen without permanent residence, Sullivan was worried about the impression created by
an intimate DNC event with the President at which a large portion of the guests were unable
to contribute because they were neither citizens nor permanent legal residents. Sullivan
believed such events could invite unwanted press stories.
463
464
Sullivan also felt that it was possible that Huang had set up the Jefferson Hotel dinner
as a way to impress his former boss, James Riady, and the other guests with his ability to
arrange an intimate dinner for them with the President. Sullivan, however, apparently took
no steps to stop the dinner or to expand the number of attendees. Sullivan evidently was
465
4-56
�aware of the guest list because he testified that he had run the list by Karen Hancox at the
White House for her approval. Sullivan also testified that after the event Marvin Rosen the
DNC finance chairman, mentioned to him that some of the attendees were nonresidents and.
thus, ineligible to contribute.
466
;
467
Although Huang had been hired to develop outreach efforts in the Asian Pacific
American community, Rosen testified that he and Sullivan ultimately became concerned with
Huang's failure to broaden the contributor base among this community. It appeared that
Huang was inviting the same people to his events time and time again. Rosen stated that
the DNC was looking for new sources of money, and he and Sullivan did not feel that Huang
was producing such new sources. None of these concerns, however, led Rosen or Sullivan
to scrutinize the contributors that Huang was bringing in, or to supervise him more carefully.
Ultimately, the DNC did forbid Huang from arranging events at which the President would be
in attendance.
468
469
470
While the DNC may not have had evidence that Huang was involved in soliciting
foreign contributions, it does appear that there were sufficient concerns about the nature of the
events Huang was involved in to warrant better supervision of his activities by his DNC
supervisors
CONCLUSION
John Huang has been a central figure of the Committee's investigation into the 1996
federal elections, and the Minority believes that this scrutiny was fully justified. Although he
did not hold a senior position in either the Democratic National Committee or any other
Democratic organization, he has been linked to a large number of questionable and possiblyillegal contributions. It would be impossible to conduct a serious inquiry into party
fundraising without taking a close look at such an individual as well as the environment in
which he operated. Who is John Huang? How was he hired as a fundraiser? How was he
trained? How did he carry out his fundraising responsibilities? How well was he supervised
and monitored by his superiors? The Committee examined all of those issues, and this
chapter is an attempt to provide answers.
But John Huang was a subject of the Special Investigation not only because of alleged
fundraising abuses. Since the fall of 1996, he has been accused -- directly or through
insinuation -- of betraying his country, the United States, by acting as a spy for the People's
Republic of China. The evidence gathered by this Committee does not support that allegation
and, in some respects, seriously undermines it. The evidence shows that Huang did nothing
to exploit his Commerce Department post to obtain classified information. Morever, Huang
stated, through his attorney, that he was willing to testify before the Committee with a limited
grant of immunity that would not have protected him from prosecution for any form of
espionage or mishandling of classified information.
Although the espionage allegations were not substantiated by the Committee's
4-57
�investigation, the Committee did find ample grounds for concern about the way Huang
conducted himself when he was employed by.the Democratic National Comminee. No one at
the DNC appears to have condoned Huang's improprieties, but the record shows that warning
signs were ignored and that the DNC failed in its responsibility to ensure that Huang was
complying with internal DNC policies and the federal campaign finance laws.
4-58
�1. John Huang SF-l71 Application for Federal Employment. DOC 03AM0042.
2. John Huang SF-171 Application for Federal Employment, DOC 03AM0042.
3. John Huang SF-171 Application for Federal Employment, DOC 03AM0042.
4. John Huang SF-86 Application for Sensitive Position, DOC 03AM0047.
5. Los .Angeles Times. 10/21/96; Washington Post. 5/13/97. Huang spent seven years at
American Security Bank in Washington, starting as a trainee and working his way up to assistant
vice president.
6. John Huang Deposition, 10/30/96, in Judicial Watch Inc. v. Dept. Commerce. CA. 95-0133
(RCL).
7. John Huang Deposition, 10/30/96, in Judicial Watch Inc. v. Dept. Commerce. CA. 95-0133
(RCL).
8. John Huang Deposition, 10/30/96, in Judicial Watch Inc. v. Dept. Commerce. CA. 95-0133
(RCL).
9. John Huang Deposition, 10/30/96, in Judicial Watch Inc. v. Dept. Commerce. CA. 95-0133
(RCL).
10. Newsweek. 10/21/96.
11. Time. 12/11/96.
12. Los .Angeles Times. 11/17/96.
13. .American Spectator. 12/96.
14. Los Angeles Times. 11/17/96.
15. John Huang Deposition, 10/30/96, in Judicial Watch Inc. v. Dept. Commerce. CA. 95-0133
(RCL).
16. John Huang Deposition, 10/30/96, in Judicial Watch Inc. v. Dept. Commerce. CA. 95-0133
(RCL).
17. John Huang Deposition, 10/30/96 in Judicial Watch Inc. v. Dept. Commerce. C.A. 95-0133
(RCL).
4-59
�18. John Huang Deposition, 10/30/96, in Judicial Watch Inc. v. Dept. Commerce. CA. 95-0133
(RCL): Huang SF-171, DOC 03 AM0042.
19. Harvard Business School Profile of the Lippo Group, 1992, pp. 1-3.
20. Harvard Business School Profile of the Lippo Group, 1992, pp. 1-3.
21. Harvard Business School Profile of the Lippo Group, 1992, pp. 3, 7.
22. Harvard Business School Profile ofthe Lippo Group, 1992, p. 1.
23. Thomas Hampson, 7/15/97 Hrg., pp. 64-65.
24. Harvard Business School Profile of the Lippo Group, 1992, pp. 1-3.
25.
Time Magazine. 5/5/97.
26. Thomas Hampson, a private investigator called to testify on the structure of the Lippo Group
testified that China R.esources is used by the Chinese government as "an agent of espionage,
economic military and political." However, Hampson introduced no evidence that the Lippo
Group engaged in espionage, economic or otherwise, testifying that he had no information
that would indicate there was any activity on the part of the Chinese Government through
China Resources or through Lippo, in the United States. Thomas Hampson, 7/15/97 Hrg., pp.
71-73, 77-78. Hampson also testified that China Resources has a broader purpose, "to foster
trade and to promote development to the mainland's economy. Through business ties it has
established, the group seeks out technology that the country needs and buys it." Thomas
Hampson, 7/15/97 Hrg., pp. 70-71.
27. Thomas Hampson, 7/15/97 Hrg., p. 56.
28. Thomas Hampson, 7/15/97 Hrg., pp. 80-81.
29. Fort Worth Star-Telegram. 10/31/96; Thomas Hampson, 7/15/97 Hrg., pp. 76-81.
30. Exhibit 105.
31. Harold Arthur, 7/15/97 Hrg., p. 98.
32. John Huang SF-86 Application for Sensitive Position, DOC 03AM0047.
.33. John Huang SF-86 Application for Sensitive Position, DOC 03AM0047.
34. HHH 2378. Documents produced to the Committee by Hip Hing Holdings indicate that
Huang was asked to join Commine of 100 in 1993. HHH 2378. His work with this
orgainization continued through his work with this organization after he left Lippo for the
4-60
�Department of Commerce. See 9/22/95 Comminee of 100 directory identifying Huang as
Director.
.
35. Hip Hing Holdings documents, HHH 3037-38, 4609, 4967-68.
36. Los Angeles Times. 10/21/96.
37. Los Angeles Times. 12/23/96.
38. Los .Angeles Times. 12/23/96.
39. Washington Post. 10/18/96.
40. Washington Post. 5/13/97.
41. Los Angeles Times. 12/23/96.
42. John Huang Deposition, 10/30/96, in Judicial Watch Inc. v. Dept. Commerce. CA. 95-0133
(RCL).
43. Los Angeles Times. 12/23/96.
44. John Huang Deposition, 10/30/96 in Judicial Watch Inc. v. Dept. Commerce. CA. 95-0133
(RCL).
45. Los Angeles County, CA tax records of holdings of Hip Hing Holdings.
46. Juliana Utomo, 7/15/97 Hrg., p. 14.
47. Juliana Utomo, 7/15/97 Hrg., p. 53.
48. Exhibits 101, 104: Profit and Loss statements of Lippo Group Holding Companies, HHH
0233, HHH 0236-37, CHI 0085.
49. Exhibit 103.
50. See legal analysis in Part 1 Overview (Chapter 1), supra.
51. FEC public disclosure reports of contributions by Hip Hing Holdings, Toy Center Holdings
and San Jose Holdings. See www.tray.com for contribution records.
52. Lippo Group holding companies requests for reimbursement of expenses from August to
December 1993, HHH 0236-37.
53. Exhibit 105. During the July 15 hearing, Senator Thompson referred to an Advisory
Opinion issued by the Federal Election Commission, the summary of which states that 'in
order for a contribution to be legal, a domestic subsidiary must make contributions out of net
;
4-61
�profits." Advisory Opinion 1992-16. While the Opinion holds it is proper for the particular
domestic subsidiary seeking the Opinion to make contributions from its net profits, it does
advise whether contributions from the net income of a domestic subsidiary operating at a loss
are permissible. See legal analysis in Chapter I, supra.
54. Thomas Hampson, 7/15/97 Hrg., pp. 82-83.
55. 1992 Riady contribution checks to state parties, HHH 1360, 1362-63.
56. 1992 Riady contribution checks to the Inaugural Committee, HHH 1361.
57. Check from Hip Hing Holdings to John Huang dated 2/3/94, HHH 5067.
58. Juliana Utomo, 7/15/97 Hrg., pp. 39-40.
59. Check from Hip Hing Holdings to John Huang dated 7/15/94, HHH 5184.
60. Harvard Business School Profile of the Lippo Group, 1992, p. B4.
61. The main issue in the cease and desist orders has been the quality of the loan assets and
the balance of capitol reserves relative to the loan portfolio, in part because of the poor
performance of the bank prior to Lippo's purchase of it. See Harold Arthur's opening
statement, pp. 12-14, 7/15/97 Hrg., p. 92. However, in 1990, the bank was found to have
failed to file a number of reports of international wire transfers over $10,000 in violation of
the reporting provisions of the laws meant to combat money laundering. While the FDIC
referred this action to other agencies, the evidence before the Committee does not indicate
that any investigation of money laundering was ever initiated against the bank.
62. Harold Arthur, 7/15/97 Hrg., p. 145; Juliana Utomo, 7/15/97 Hrg., p. 58.
63. Assistant Secretary Charles Meissner was a victim of the 1996 plane crash in Croatia which
also claimed the life of Commerce. Secretary Ron Brown, among others.
64. EOP 002062-067.
65. Gary Christopherson deposition, 6/4/97, p. 140.
66. DOC document No. 03AK0461
67. Gary Christopherson deposition, 6/4/97, pp. 42-46.
68. Gary Christopherson deposition, 6/4/97, p. 47.
69. EOP 002068, 002071, 009452, 009454, 009487.
4-62
�70. Gary Christopherson deposition, 6/4/97, p. 41.
71. Gary Christopherson deposition, 6/4/97, pp. 50-51, 53.
72. Gary Christopherson, 7/16/97 Hrg., p. 50.
73. Jeffrey Garten, 7/16/97 Hrg., p. 117.
74. Jeffrey Garten, 7/16/97 Hrg., p. 118.
75. Jeffrey Garten, 7/16/97 Hrg., p. 119:
76. Gary Christopherson, 7/16/97 Hrg., p. 23.
77. Gary Christopherson, 7/16/97 Hrg., p. 49.
78. Gary Christopherson deposition, 6/4/97, pp. 42-46.
79. Jeffrey Garten, 7/16/97 Hrg., pp. 120-21.
80. Jeffrey Garten, 7/16/97 Hrg., pp. 120.
81. David Rothkopf deposition, 6/2/97, p. 30.
82. Jeffrey Garten, 7/16/97 Hrg., p. 121.
83. Jeffrey Garten, 7/16/97 Hrg., p. 121.
84. DOC Documents 03BA1258 and 03BA0891.
85. DOC Document 03CC0269.
86. DOC document 03CC0269.
87. DOC Documents 03AB2372, 03BA2959, 03BA2974, 03BA1754 and 03BA1755.
88. The requests that Huang fielded from Senators and Representatives on behalf of their
constituents included requests from Congresswoman lleana Ros-Lehtinen, whose constituent,
Dr. Donn J. Tilson, wanted a list of U.S. companies doing business in Ecuador, (DOC
document 03BA2985); Senator Daniel Moynihan, who inquired on behalf of Louis R. Soto,
who wanted licensing forms for the export of tires to South America, (DOC document
03BA2982); Congressman Bob Goodlatte, whose constituent Gregory W. Feldmann was
seeking information on incentives available to companies interested in purchasing companies
in Mexico (DOC document 03BA3053); Congressman John Tanner, who wanted information
on crossing the border with equipment for missionary work and taking tour groups into
Mexico for Dr. Ernest C. Gambrell, (DOC document 03BA3050); and Senator Trent Lort.
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�who contacted Huang on behalf of Marcus Byrd seeking assistance removing squaners on his
company's land holdings in Costa Rica. (DOC document 03BA2987). Additionally, Huang.
Susan Blackman and Hong Phong-Pho presented a briefing to Rep. Bennie Thompson
regarding Vietnam. (DOC document 03AB0148).
89. Wall Street Joumai. 7/14/97.
90. Jeffrey Garten deposition, 6/3/97, p. 82.
91. Jeffrey Garten, 7/16/97 Hrg., p. 137.
92. Jeffrey Garten, 7/16/97 Hrg., p. 122.
93. See generally David Rothkopf deposition, 5/22/97; Timothy Hauser deposition, 6/2/97; Alan
Neuchatz deposition, 5/22/97.
94. Alan Neuchatz deposition, 5/22/97, p. 17.
95. DOC Document" 03ABO 172.
96. DOC Document 03ABO 172.
97. DOC Document 03AB0172.
98. Senator Specter, 7/16/97 Hrg., pp. 156-157.
99. John Dickerson deposition, 5/30/97, p. 13.
100. Joseph Bums deposition, 5/3/97, pp. 100-101.
101. Joseph Bums deposition, 5/3/97, pp. 99-100.
102. Steven Garmon deposition, 5/23/97, p. 28.
103. Steven Garmon deposition, 5/23/97, pp. 33-34. In March 1997, pursuant to an executive
order doing away with interim clearances and in response to a request by Secretary Daley,
the Security Office changed its policy to require a request from a supervisor before any
employee, career or political, be granted a temporary clearance.
104. In the course of the limited background check, an NCIC computer notation surfaced on
John Huang. The NCIC form states that Huang was "arrested or received 8/17/72" and lists
"Agency-USINS Baltimore," and "Charge - Dep Proc." When he received this information,
the reviewing officer took it to his supervisor Al Buskirk. Buskirk testified that while he was
unable to determine whether Huang had been arrested from the face of the NCIC form, his
review of Huang's SF-171 and SF-86 revealed that Huang had married an American citizen
on 8/6/72, several days before he entered the country. Based on his own understanding of the
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�immigration process, Buskirk concluded that Huang was fingerprinted as a required step in the
administrative citizenship process. Documents obtained from the INS support Buskirk's
supposition and confirm that Huang appeared at the INS in Baltimore on August 17. 1972,
where a Record of Deportable Alien form vvas filled out noting his marriage. A fingerprint
card in his file dated 9-5-72 indicates that the result of the FBI check was that he had never
been arrested. On August 30, 1972, Huang applied for permanent resident status. No
deportation proceedings were ever initiated against John Huang and he has never been
arrested.
105. Steven Garmon deposition, 5/23/97, pp. 76-77. Huang's file contained the typical form
letter from the Security Office noting that:
is granted this waiver [of the OPM
background investigation] due to the critical need for his expertise in the new Administration
for Secretary Brown."
:i
106. Steven Garmon deposition, 5/23/97.
107. Paul Buskirk, 7/16/97 Hrg., p. 29; staff interview with Lewis Williams, 6/12/97.
108. Questions have also been raised about Huang obtaining classified information from
outside DOC during this period. In order for an individual with a clearance to receive
classified information from an outside agency, the individual's clearance must be "passed"
from the Security Office of the employing agency to the Security Office of the agency
granting access to the information. Whenever a clearance is "passed" to another agency, a
form is filled out authorizing the clearance being passed. No such forms exist indicating
Huang's clearance was passed at any time.
109. Gordon Bums deposition, 5/23/97, pp. 101-102.
110. Robert Gallagher deposition, 5/30/97, p. 13.
111. Staff interview with Richard L. Johnston, Jr., 6/12/97.
112. Robert Gallagher deposition, 5/30/97, p. 13.
113. Robert Gallagher deposition, 5/30/97, p. 13.
114. Staff Interview with Lewis Williams, 6/12/97.
115. Staff Interview with Lewis Williams, 6/12/97.
•116. Staff Interview with Lewis Williams. 6/12/97.
117. Staff Interview with Lewis Williams. 6/12/97.
118. Robert Gallagher deposition, 5/30/97. pp. 7, 15.
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�119. John Dickerson deposition, 5/5/97, pp. 6, 8.
120. Robert Gallagher deposition, 5/30/97, p. 7.
121. Robert Gallagher deposition, 5/30/97, p. 15.
122. John Dickerson deposition, 5/5/97, pp. 8-9.
123. John Dickerson deposition, 5/5/97, pp. 8-9.
124. Senator Glenn, 7/16/97 Hrg., p. 213.
125. Chairman Thompson, 7/17/97 Hrg., p. 4. In his opening statement, the Chairman referred
to Huang's use ofthe Stephens office in the following terms: "He used the office of a private
company for phone calls and faxes while he worked at Commerce,frequentlycorresponding to
times when he had just received briefings on classified material."
126. Celia Mata deposition, 8/1/97, pp. 50, 68.
127. Paula Greene and Celia Mata, 7/17/97 Hrg, pp.24-25.
128. Paula Green and Celia Mata, 7/17/97 Hrg., pp.110-111.
129. Celia Mata deposition, 8/1/97, p. 71.
130. Celia Mata, 7/17/97 Hrg., pp. 29-30.
131. Celia Mata, 7/17/97 Hrg., p. 13.
132. Celia Mata, 7/17/97 Hrg., p. 13.
133. Celia Mata, 7/17/97 Hrg., pp. 11-13.
134. Celia Mata, 7/17/97 Hrg., p. 119.
135. Celia Mata, 7/17/97, Hrg., p. 21.
136. Celia Mata deposition, 8/1/97, p. 49.
137. Celia Mata deposition, 8/1/97, p. 54.
138. Celia Mata deposition, 8/1/97, p. 50.
139. Paula Greene deposition, 7/2/97, p. 42.
140. Paula Greene, 7/17/97 Hrg., p. 14.
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�141. Paula Greene deposition, 7/2/97, pp. 43-44.
142. Paula Greene, 717/97 Hrg., pp. 19-20; Paula Greene deposition, 7/2/97, p. 45.
143. Paula Greene, 7/17/97 Hrg., p. 54.
144. Paula Greene deposition, 7/2/97, p. 38.
145. Paula Greene deposition, 7/2/97, p. 38.
146. A Committee of 100 Directory lists Huang as a director as of September 22, 1995.
Moreover, during his tenure at Commerce, Huang recieved phone calls from people associated
with the Committtee of 100. See DOC 03 AB0017, records of call received by Huang while at
the Department of Commerce.
147. Paul Buskirk Deposition, 6/3/97, pp. 80-83.
148. Staff interview of Alan Neushatz, 3/13/97.
149. Alan Neushatz deposition, 5/22/97, pp. 17-18.
150. DOC Document 03AB0022.
151. DOC Document 03AB0022. "As a former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for IEP.
Mr. John Huang will help the Assistant Secretary for International Economic Policy during the
transition time of the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary's position in IEP.... The time frame
for Mr. Huang's consultations on transition will not-to-exceed 30 days."
152. Alan Neuschatz deposition, 5/22/97, p. 58.
153. Staff Interview with Helena Malinowski, 3/13/97.
154. Alan Neuschatz deposition, 5/22/97, p. 51.
155. Paul Buskirk deposition, 6/3/97, pp. 68-70, 80-83.
156. Paul Buskirk deposition, 6/3/97, p. 68.
157. Paul Buskirk deposition, 6/3/97, pp. 80-83.
158.,Staff interview of Alan Neushatz, 3/13/97.
159. Staff interview of Alan Neushatz, 3/13/97.
160. Staff interview of Alan Neushatz, 3/13/97.
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�161. Alan Neuschatz deposition, 5/22/97, p. 60.
162. Alan Neuschatz deposition, 5/22/97, p. 55.
163. James Per Lee deposition, 5/2/97, pp. 93-102.
164. Los Aneeles Times. 8/29/97.
165. Senator Durbin, 7/16/97 Hrg., pp. 222-227.
166. DNC 1276339-40.
167. DNC 1276339.
168. David Mercer deposition, 5/27/97, p. 14.
169. David Mercer deposition, 5/14/97, p. 230; David Mercer deposition, 5/27/97, pp. 17-18.
170. DNC Public Disclosure Records. See 1995 year end report.
171. DNC 1276339.
172. DNC 1276339.
173. David Mercer deposition, 5/27/97, p. 31.
174. David Mercer deposition, 5/27/97, p. 31.
175. David Mercer deposition, 5/27/97, p. 31.
176. David Mercer deposition, 5/27/97, pp. 31-32.
177. DNC 1277722.
178. DNC 1277722.
179. David Mercer deposition, 5/27/97, pp. 8-9.
180. David Mercer deposition, 5/27/97, p. 9.
181. Exhibit 170.
182. Exhibit 170.
183. David Mercer deposition Exhibit 38, 5/14/97.
184. David Mercer deposition, 5/14/97, p. 212.
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�185. DNC 1276337.
186. David Mercer deposition, 5/27/97, p. 33.
187. David Mercer deposition, 5/27/97, p. 33.
188. David Mercer deposition, 5/27/97, p. 33.
189. David Mercer deposition, 5/27/97, pp: 33-34.
190. Staff interview with Arief and Soraya Wiriadinata, II13/97.
191. Staff interview with Arief and Soraya Wiriadinata, 7/13/97.
192. Staff interview with Arief and Soraya Wiriadinata, 7/13/97.
193. Staff interview with Arief and Soraya Wiriadinata, 7/13/97.
194. Staff interview-with Arief and Soraya Wiriadinata, 7/13/97.
195. Staff interview with Arief and Soraya Wiriadinata, 7/13/97.
196. Richard L. Sullivan deposition, 6/4/97, p. 208.
197. C. Joseph Giroir deposition, 4/30/97, pp. 75-76.
198. Richard L. Sullivan deposition, 6/4/97, pp. 210; C. Joseph Giroir deposition, 4/30/97, pp.
109-10.
199. Richard L. Sullivan deposition, 6/4/97, p. 219.
200. Richard L. Sullivan deposition, 6/4/97, pp. 210-219.
201. Donald L. Fowler deposition, 5/21/97, p. 170.
202. Donald L. Fowler deposition, 5/21/97, Exhibit 14: Fowler's schedule listing meeting at
the Four Seasons with Giroir, Sullivan as contact, 9/13/95, DNC 3020731-3020732.
203. Richard L. Sullivan deposition, 6/4/97, p. 241.
204. Donald L. Fowler deposition, 5/21/97, p. 170.
205. C. Joseph Giroir deposition, 4/30/97, pp. 84-86; Nancy Hernreich deposition, 6/21/97.
Exhibit 51: President's schedule, 9/13/95, EOP 02758-02760, the President's 9/13/95
schedule. Huang was not originally scheduled to meet with the President at this time. Upon
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�arrival at the White House, Huang had to make special arrangements to be "waved" in for the
visit. C. Joseph Giroir deposition, 4/30/97, pp. 86-87.
206. Bruce Lindsey deposition, 7/1/97, p. .106-114; C. Joseph Giroir deposition, 4/30/97, p.
87.
207. C. Joseph Giroir deposition, 4/30/97, p. 87.
208. C. Joseph Giroir deposition, 4/30/97, p. 97. Huang had indicated his interest in moving
to the DNC to Giroir earlier in the year. C. Joseph Giroir deposition, 4/30/97, p. 75. The
Clinton campaign had not done well with this group in the 1992 election and it was
acknowledged that they should endeavor to do better in the 1996 election. Donald L. Fowler
deposition, 5/21/97, p. 190-191.
209. Bruce Lindsey deposition, 7/1/97, p. 115-117.
210. Bruce Lindsey deposition, 7/1/97, pp. 117-118.
211. Bruce Lindsey deposition, 7/1/97, p. 124.
212. C. Joseph Giroir deposition, 4/30/97, pp. 101-104; Marvin S. Rosen deposition,
5/19/97, pp. 129-133. See also C. Joseph Giroir deposition, 4/30/97, Exhibit 7/Marvin S.
Rosen deposition, 5/19/97, Exhibit 5: Letter from Giroir to Rosen referencing a meeting of
the previous day, 9/27/97. Middleton was involved because he knew Rosen. Marvin S.
Rosen deposition, 5/19/97, pp. 129-130.
213. C. Joseph Giroir deposition, 4/30/97, pp. 103-104.
214. Bill Kaneko deposition, 4/29/97, p. 119.
215. Harold Ickes deposition, 6/26/97, p. 115.
216. Marvin S. Rosen deposition, 5/19/97, pp. 138-139.
217. Rosen discussed Huang's hiring with Ickes, Middleton, Fowler, Sullivan and the
President in a receiving line conversation in which the President requested the status of
Huang's hiring. Sullivan received recommendations from Middleton (Richard L. Sullivan
deposition, 6/4/97, pp. 216-217) and Arnold, but did not speak with anyone in the White
House. Richard L. Sullivan deposition, 6/4/97, p. 249.
218. Richard L. Sullivan deposition, 6/4/97, p. 224-225.
219. Richard L. Sullivan deposition, 6/5/97, p. 12.
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�220. Richard L. Sullivan deposition, 6/5/97, pp. 12-14.
221. Donald L. Fowler deposition, 5/21/97, p. 171.
222. Richard L. Sullivan deposition, 6/4/97, p. 226.
223. Donald L. Fowler deposition, 5/21/97, p. 191.
224. Donald L. Fowler deposition, 5/21/97, pp. 190-191.
225. Marvin S. Rosen deposition, 5/19/97, pp. 148-150.
226. Joseph E. Sandler deposition, 5/30/97, pp. 93-96.
227. Huang's Department of Commerce salary was $117,927. DOC document 03CC0226.
228. Richard L. Sullivan deposition, 6/4/97, p. 226.
229. Richard L. Sullivan deposition, 6/4/97, p. 231.
230. Joseph E. Sandler deposition, 5/15/97, p. 58.
231. Neil Paul Reiff deposition, 6/20/97, pp. 55-58.
232. Richard L. Sullivan, 7/9/97 Hrg., pp. 44-46; Richard L. Sullivan deposition, 6/4/97, pp.
226-230.
233. Samuel Newman deposition, 7/17/97, pp. 142-143; Joseph E. Sandler, 9/10/97 Hrg., p.
13.
234. Sullivan testifed that he told Sandler of this desire for special attention for Huang. He
further testified that Sandler said that he would ensure that Huang received such a briefing
and that Sandler later told him that they did, indeed, have such a session shortly after Huang's
arrival. Richard L. Sullivan, 7/9/97 Hrg., pp. 142-144; Richard L. Sullivan deposition,
6/5/97, pp. 23-25. Sandler testified that he did not recall such a request from Sullivan.
Joseph E. Sandler, 9/10/97 Hrg., pp. 12-14; Joseph E. Sandler deposition, 8/21/97, pp. 13-15.
235. Joseph E. Sandler deposition, 5/30/97. pp. 100-101.
236. Marvin Rosen deposition, 5/19/97, pp. 263-265.
237. Neil Paul Reiff deposition, 6/20/97, Exhibit 9: Updated Legal Guidelines for Fundraising
memorandum for Finance Staff from Joe Sandler and Neil Reiff, 4/24/95, DNC 1485662-145675
at DNC 145665.
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�238. Joseph E. Sandler deposition, 5/30/97. pp. 100-102.
239. Joseph E. Sandler deposition, 8/21/97, p. 17. Sandler testified that he communicated this
level of comfort to either Sullivan or Pastrick.
240. Memorandum from Richard Sullivan for Chairman Fowler re: Asian .American events,
10/21/96, D 0000967.
241. Richard L. Sullivan deposition, 6/5/97. p. 86.
242. Briefing for the President for Asian Pacific American Leadership Council dinner at the
Hay Adams Hotel in Washington, D.C. 2/19/96, DNC 0624297-308; briefing for the Vice
President for Asian Pacific American Leadership Council breakfast at the Hay Adams Hotel in
Washington, D.C, 2/20/96, DNC 1208377-388.
243. Simeona Fortunata Pasquil deposition, 7/30/97, pp. 17-18.
244. Briefing for the President for Asian Pacific American Leadership Council dinner at the
Hay Adams Hotel in Washington, D.C, 2/19/96, DNC 0624297-308; briefing for the Vice
President for Asian Pacific American Leadership Council breakfast at the Hay Adams Hotel in
Washington, D C , 2/20/96, DNC 1208377-388.
245. Democratic National Committee Asian Pacific American Leadership Council Summit
Participant List, DNC documents B 0001094-1099.
246. Donald L. Fowler deposition, 5/21/97, p. 273.
247. DNC Finance Systems Source Detail Report, Asian Diner, 2/19/96, DNC documents D
0000968-0000973.
248. Democratic National Committee Asian Pacific American Leadership Council Donor
Participant List, DNC 1208901-902.
249. Joseph E. Sandler deposition, 8/21/97, pp. 21-25; Sandler deposition Exhibits # 23-27,
8/21/97.
250. Staff Interview with Jessica Elnitiarta, 6/19/97.
251. DNC Finance System Source Detail Report, POTUS Asian Dinner, DNC documents D
0000978-980.
252. DNC Finance System Source Detail Report, POTUS Asian Dinner, DNC documents D
0000978-980.
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�253. DNC check tracking form for Yogesh Gandhi $325,000 contribution to the DNC, 5/28/96,
DNC 0829404.
254. DNC Press Release, "DNC Refunds Contributions," 6/27/97.
255. DNC Contributions Returned Since September, 1996 (as of 11/22/96), DNC D 0000637.
256. See DNC Press Release, "DNC Refunds Contributions," 6/27/97.
257. See DNC Contributions Returned Since September, 1996 (as of 11/22/96), DNC D
0000637; DNC Finance System Source Detail Report, POTUS Asian Dinner, DNC
documents D 0000978-980; DNC Press Release, "DNC Refunds Contributions," 6/27/97.
258. Briefing for the President for DNC Asian Pacific American Leadership Council event at
Century Plaza Hotel, Century City, Califomia, 7/22/97, DNC documents C 0000233-235.
259. Los Angeles Times. 12/21/97.
260. Man Ho deposition, 8/6/97, pp. 202-204.
261. DNC Press Release, "DNC Refunds Contributions," 6/27/97.
262. DNC Press Release, "DNC Refunds Contributions," 6/27/97.
263. DNC Finance Systems Source Detail Report, L.A. Gala, DNC documents D 0000981-996.
264. Richard L. Sullivan deposition, 6/5/97, pp. 59-61, 66-67.
265. USA Today. 2/19/97.
266. See discussion of Riady and the Lippo Group, supra.
267. POTUS Dinner July 30 Attendees for an event at the Jefferson Hotel, Washington, D.C,
DNC documents D 0000597-598.
268. DNC Finance Systems Source Detail Report, POTUS Asian D.C. Dinner, DNC document
D 0000997. DNC National Chairman Donald Fowler testified that the DNC occasionally
requests that donors write their checks to state Democratic parties who need the financial help,
sometimes in lieu of a contribution to the DNC or in lieu of the DNC making a donation.
Donald L. Fowler deposition, 5/21/97, pp. 352-356.
269. DNC Finance Systems Source Detail Report, POTUS Asian D.C. Dinner, DNC document
D 0000997. See Washington Post, 5/13/97.
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�270. DNC Finance Systems Source Detail Report, POTUS Asian D.C. Dinner. DNC document
D 0000997.
271. Richard L. Sullivan deposition, 6/5/97, p. 70.
272. White House Tape # 8.
273. Richard L. Sullivan deposition, 6/5/97, p. 71.
274. For more information, see Chapter 21 of the Minority Report.
275. For more infonnation on why the DNC considers both types of events to be important
during a campaign, see Chapter 25 of the Minority Report.
276. DNC documents # D 0000974-977.
277. Kimberly Tilley deposition, 6/23/97, p. 22-23.
278. Kimberly Tilley deposition, 6/23/97, p. 54.
279. Kimberly Tilley deposition, 6/23/97, p. 47.
280. Kimberly Tilley deposition, 6/23/97, p. 47.
281. For example, the April 29, 1996 schedule for the Vice President included a speech at the
National Cable Television Association conference, a meeting with African American community
leaders, an event at the Hsi Lai Temple, a community policing event in San Jose and a fundraiser
in Los Altos Hills, Califomia. Committee Exhibit 774, EOP 007195 to 7204.
282. Memorandum that included a request for the President and Vice President to attend a
certain number of DNC fundraisers in various cities, 1/2/96, SCGA-00270 to 291.
283. Memorandum, 1/2/96, SCGA-00270 to 291, SCGA-00286.
284. The early stages of trip planning were illustrated in a Febmary 22, 1996, e-mail message
to Tilley from Karen Hancox. Hancox wrote:
The DNC has asked, once we know, to be told what cities the VP will be in CA
March 8/9. They can probably use him, depending on the cities.
thanks
PS - POTUS is going to do SF when he is in CA March 8/9 - ergo - the DNC is
dropping its SF request for the VP in April - thev just need L.A. and San Jose in
April.
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�Exhibit 767, EOP 047939.
285. Exhibit 1004: E-mail message from Lisa Berg to Kimberly Tilley, 3/12/96. EOP 053290.
286. Jacqueline Dycke deposition exhibit #4, 8/8/97.
287. Exhibit 771: E-mail message from Vice President Gore to Kimberly Tilley, 3/15/96, EOP
053291.
288. The meeting between the Vice President and Hsing was at 1:40 p.m., and the electronic
messages were exchanged at about-2:20 p.m. Senator Levin, 9/5/97 Hrg., p. 66-67.
289. David Strauss, 9/5/97 Hrg., p. 29.
290. David Strauss, 9/5/97 Hrg., p. 27.
291. Exhibit 1006: Vice President Gore's schedule, 3/15/96, EOP 053033-036.
292. David Strauss, 9/5/97 Hrg., p. 62.
293. Statement of the Venerable Master Hsing Yun presented during his interview with
Committee investigators, 6/17/97.
294. EOP 892.
295. David Strauss, 9/5/97 Hrg., p. 15.
296. Staff Interview with Hsing Yun, 6/17/97.
297. Letter from Diana So to FBI Agent Gayle Jacobs, 5/20/97.
298. Invitation to DNC Asian Pacific American Leadership Council event at Harbor Village
Restaurant in Monterey Park, Califomia; the name of the restaurant is crossed out and Hsi Lai
Temple is written in; SEN 00111.
299. Exhibit 772: Letter from Maria Hsia to the Vice President, 3/23/96, SEN 01719.
300. Staff interview of Charlie Woo, 5/30/97.
301. Staff interview of Charlie Woo, 5/30/97.
302. R i c h a r d S u l l i v a n d e p o s i t i o n , 6/25/97, p. 28.
303.
R i c h a r d S u l l i v a n d e p o s i t i o n , 6/25/97, p. 28.
304. Richard Sullivan deposition, 6/25/97, pp. 21-22.
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�305. Richard Sullivan deposition, 6/25/97, p. 23.
306. Richard Sullivan deposition, 6/25/97, pp. 23-24.
307. Richard Sullivan deposition, 6/25/97, pp. 23-24.
308. Richard Sullivan deposition, 6/25/97, p. 24.
309. Richard Sullivan deposition, 6/25/97, p. 31. Sullivan was able to determine that he called
David Strauss on or about April 3, 1997 to notify him ofthe changes regarding the Los .Angeles
fundraiser and the Hsi Lai Temple event after reviewing an April 11, 1996 memo written by
Huang that references a phone conversation with Strauss a week earlier. EOP 000809.
310. David M. Strauss deposition, 6/30/97, p. 92.
311. Exhibit 1003: Vice President Gore's trip schedule, EOP 056497-499; Exhibit 1009:
electronic mail from Dycke to Tilley, et. al., 4/10/96, EOP 053292; Exhibit 1010: Memorandum
from Huang to Tilley re 6/29/96 [sic] fundraising lunch, 4/11/96, Bates # 000809.
312. Kimberly Tilley deposition, 6/23/97, p. 124.
313. Kimberly Tilley deposition, 6/23/97, pp. 127-128.
314. Kimberly Tilley deposition, 6/23/97, pp. 158-159.
315. Exhibit 1010: MemofromJohn Huang to Kim Tilley, 4/11/96.
316. Exhibit 1003: Document prepared by Jackie Dycke, 4/11/96, EOP 056497 to 99.
317. Jacqueline Dycke deposition, 8/8/97, p. 66.
318. David Strauss, 9/5/97 Hrg., pp. 36-37.
319. See Exhibits 1011 (EOP 047955), 1012 (EOP document, illegible Bates stamp), 1013 (EOP
005407), a series of internal notes between and among the Vice President's foreign policy and
national security staff. These evaluations of the proposed Temple event are dated April 16 and
April 19, 1996.
320. Exhibit 1012: Handwritten note from John Norris to Bill Wise, 4/16/96.
321. Exhibit 1012: Handwritten note from John Norris to Bill Wise, 4/16/96.
322. Exhibit 1013: E-mail from Robert Suettinger to John Norris, 4/19/96, EOP 005407.
Suettinger's e-mail message was written in response to an e-mail from Norris in which he refers
to the Hsi Lai Temple event as a "fundraising lunch" and he states that the "event would take
place at the end of June." Mr. Norris's use of the word "fundraising lunch" was due to the
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�fact that he did not know how to properly characterize DNC events. In response to a question
posed by Senator Collins regarding Mr. Norris's e-mail Mr. Strauss stated:
It's accurate that it's referenced as a fundraising lunch here, but you have people who
have no background in how to correctly describe DNC events characterizing events
here. .And so the important implications of this are the foreign policy implications
rather than how the event is described because the person who's describing this would
have no basis for how to correctly describe a DNC event.
David Strauss, 9/5/97 Hrg., p. 78.
323. ICimberly Tilley deposition, 6/23/97, pp. 131-132.
324. Staff interview with Robert Suettinger, NSC Director of Asian Affairs, 6/3/97.
325. Manteghi testified that she understood from Tilley and McManimon that this was an
outreach event. Ladan Manteghi deposition, 8/26/97, pp. 31-32, 53-55.
326. Ladan Manteghi deposition, 8/26/97, pp. 53-67.
327. See letters from all GAC Minority Members to Chairman Thompson and from Chairman
Thompson to Senator Glenn requesting and refusing, respectively, Ladan Manteghi to appear
before the Committee, 9/3/97.
328. David Strauss, 9/5/97 Hrg., pp. 30, 37, 57, 64-65.
329. David Strauss, 9/5/97 Hrg. pp. 64-65.
330. See David Strauss, 9/5/97 Hrg., p. 39 (indicating that the Vice President would have
reviewed the briefing materials "right before the event").
331. Exhibit 775: Briefing for Vice President Gore for Asian Pacific American Leadership
Council luncheon honoring Vice President Gore, Hsi Lai Temple, Hacienda Heights, Califomia,
4/29/96, EOP 000938 to 950.
332. David Strauss, 9/5/97 Hrg., p. 40.
333. Exhibit 776: Briefing for Vice President Gore for reception honoring Vice President Gore
at the home of George and Judy Marcus, Los Altos Hills, Califomia, 4/29/96, EOP 063338-40.
334. Transcript of Vice President Gore's speech at the Hsi Lai Temple on 4/29/96.
335. See Donald L. Fowler, 9/9/97 Hrg., pp. 27-28; Mona Pasquil deposition, 7/30/97, pp. 65-66;
Man Ho deposition, 8/6/97, p. 181.
Strauss, who attended the event with the Vice President, explained to the Committee that
4-77
�the Vice President did not give a fundraising speech at the Hsi Lai Temple event. Strauss
testified, "it was a very good speech, but it had nothing to do with fundraising." David Strauss,
9/5/97 Hrg., p. 42. See David Strauss, 9/5/97 Hrg., pp. 41-42 for further details on the Vice
President's speech.
336. Boston Globe. 9/4/97.
337. Boston Globe. 9/4/97.
338. Statement of the Venerable Master Hsing Yun presented during his interview with
Comminee investigators, 6/17/97, p. 3.
339. David Strauss, 9/5/97 Hrg., p. 42.
340. David Strauss, 9/5/97 Hrg., pp. 41-42.
341. David Strauss, 9/5/97 Hrg., pp. 43-44.
342. David Strauss,-9/5/97 Hrg., pp. 43-44.
343. Staff interview of Charlie Woo, 5/30/97.
344. Mona Pasquil deposition, 7/30/97, pp. 59-62.
345. DNC Chairman Fowler testified as follows:
It was not an event, a fund-raising event like many events are. There was no specifically
designated sum of money required to be admitted.
There was nobody at the door taking up tickets, nobody at the door receiving
checks. Some people contributed prior to the time they came and some people
contributed after they came. Many people who came did not contribute at all. It was, in
fact, part of a political outreach that the Democratic National Committee had with the
Asian community. It was a blended event, if you will, partly political and partly fundraising.
The question arises-it arose in my mind-was this appropriate? And let me say
that, as my deposition indicated, I did have some apprehension about a fund-raiser in a
house of worship, but I learned that with Buddhists and with people from the Asian
community that a temple like that is as much a community center as it is a house of
worship. And,frankly,I related that to my own experience in the '60's in the civil rights
movement where much of the political activity was held in African American churches
and much of what went on stemmed from the spirit and the motivation received in those
churches. And I considered, when I was going through that in the '60's, that to be an
appropriate activity. So, that allayed my concerns about the propriety of the fund-raising.
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�Donald L. Fowler, 9/9/97 Hrg., pp. 26-28.
...[T]here were three people who made presentations there - myself, the temple
master, and the Vice President. None of the three of us made any reference to raising
money, contributing money, giving money before or after. So it did not have that aspect.
Donald L. Fowler, 9/9/97 Hrg., p. 29; see also, pp. 71-72.
346. Donald L. Fowler, 9/9/97 Hrg., p. 29.
347. Man-Ho Shih, 9/4/97 Hrg., p. 83; Man-Ho Shih deposition, 8/6/97, pp. 136-146.
348. Buddhist nuns, 9/4/97 Hrg, p. 143.
349. Man-Ho Shih deposition, 8/6/97, pp. 134-37.
350. Man-Ho Shih, 9/4/97 Hrg., pp. 137-139.
351. Statement of the Venerable Master Hsing Yun presented during his interview with
Committee investigators, 6/17/97, p. 3.
352. Man-Ho Shih, 9/4/97 Hrg., pp. 125-126. See, for example, DNC invitation to the Temple
event, 000776.
353. See, e.g, contribution levels for a DNC gala, DNC document B 0001621; contribution
levels for a Democratic Business Council dinner at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C.
3/19/96,8 0000867-869.
354. Man-Ho Shih, 9/4/97 Hrg., p. 70.
355. Staff interview of Jessica Elnitiarta, 6/19/97.
356. DNC Finance System Source Detail Report for Gore L.A. DNC event, DNC documents D
0000974-977; Bates # 000669-671.
357. EOP 000965-969.
358. Ladan Manteghi deposition, 8/26/97, pp. 54-57.
359. David Strauss, 9/5/97 Hrg, pp. 44-45.
360. David Strauss, 9/5/97 Hrg, pp. 44-45.
361. Ladan Manteghi deposition, 8/26/97, p. 66.
4-79
�362. Ladan Manteghi deposition, 8/26/97, pp. 66-67.
363. See, for example, a memorandum by Jackie Dycke, who worked on the April 29, 1996
schedule until mid-April, and described the Temple event for an April 11 scheduling meeting
as a "DNC Luncheon." She testified that she obtained this information for a proposed event
from Maura McManimon who worked on this event with Huang.
364. Kimberly Tilley deposition, 6/23/97, p. 124.
365.
Q: Is it common in your experience with regard to the Vice President's schedule and
how it evolves that an event may be contemplated, but that over time and indeed on fairly
short notice, its character could change or the event itself could be canceled?
Strauss:
Q:
That is correct.
Does that happen often?
Strauss:
• That is correct.
David Strauss, 9/5/97 Hrg., pp. 36-37.
366. Kimberly Tilley deposition, 6/23/97, pp. 127-128. In addition, Tilley testified:
A:
There were traditional fundraisers that were ticketed events at the door.
There were events that were community outreach like this Asian-Pacific
where it was part of the DNC Finance plan, where in order for someone
to be a member, there was a certain amount of money they paid to be a
part of that, you know, committee or whatever they called; and then
there were those people to whom they wanted to reach out to, who they
hoped would become donors.
Q:
And would you define outreach events as different than fundraisers?
A:
Yes, I would.
Kimberly Tilley deposition, 6/23/97, pp. 158-159.
367. DNC Finance System Source Detail Report for Gore L.A. DNC event, DNC documents D
0000974-977.
368. Richard L. Sullivan, 7/9/97 Hrg., p. 91.
369. Richard L. Sullivan, 7/9/97 Hrg., pp. 93-94.
4-80
�370. Man-Ho Shih, 9/4/97 Hrg, pp. 27, 93. Neither Huang nor Hsia's name was mentioned
in connection with this request from the abbess. Man-Ho Shih, 9/4/97 Hrg, p. 93.
371. Man-Ho Shih, 9/4/97 Hrg, pp. 30-32. These meetings were covered in more detail at
her deposition, see Man-Ho deposition, 8/6/97, pp. 136-155. Man Ho testified that these
contacts were for logistics planning and had nothing to do with whether the event was a
fundraiser. Man-Ho Shih deposition, 8/6/97, pp. 143-145.
372. Man-Ho Shih, 9/4/97 Hrg, p. 31.
373. Man-Ho testified that she did proceed to invite her friend, Catherine Chen who
contributed S2500. Man-Ho Shih, 9/4/97 Hrg, pp. 32-33.
374. Man-Ho Shih, 9/4/97 Hrg, pp. 33; Yi Chu, pp. 73-74. These checks were written out of
the Temple's general expense account. See Chapter 21 of the Minority Report.
375. Man-Ho Shih, 9/4/97 Hrg, p. 38.
376. Man-Ho Shih, 9/4/97 Hrg, p. 41.
377. Man-Ho Shih, 9/4/97, p. 48.
378. Howard Horn deposition, 8/27/97, pp. 23-25.
379. Exchange between Majority Counsel and Man-Ho Shih, 9/4/97 Hrg, pp. 22-24.
380. See, for example, Washington Post. 4/16/97.
381. See, for example, Washington Post. 4/16/97.
382. Cheong Am America, Inc. was incorporated in the State of Califomia on 2/28/96. See
Exhibits 807 and 810.
383. See Richard Sullivan deposition, 6/25/97, pp. 41-59.
384. Michael Mitoma, 9/5/97 Hrg, pp. 126-27. Mitoma was the elected mayor of Carson, a city
of approximately 100,000 persons located near Long Beach, Califomia. According to Mitoma.
the unemployment rate in Carson approached 12 percent following the closure ofthe Long
Beach Naval Shipyard and other defense-related downsizings in the early 1990s. The
recmitment of Asian-based manufacturers such as Nissan, Pioneer, Kenwood and Mikasa had
been an important part of Carson's strategy to decrease this unemployment rate, and Mitoma
visited Lee in Seoul, South Korea, as part of this redevelopment effort. Michael Mitoma. 9/5/97
Hrg, pp. 144-45.
4-81
�385. Lucy Ham is an Asian American businesswoman who owns a Los Angeles legal services
plan and had beenfriendswith Mitoma for some time. Michael Mitoma, 9/5/97 Hrg, p. 170.
Lucy and her husband, Won Ham, were both officers of Cheong Am America, Inc. Michael
Mitoma, 9/5/97 Hrg, pp. 125, 146.
386. Michael Mitoma, 9/5/97 Hrg, p. 148.
387. Michael Mitoma, 9/5/97 Hrg, p. 127. Ham's suggestion that Mitoma call the DNC
apparently was based on a suggestion of afriendof hers in the Los Angeles Asian-American
business community.
388. Michael Mitoma, 9/5/97 Hrg., pp. 128-131. In a 4/1/96 faxed message to Huang, Mitoma
wrote that Lee would accept attendance at a fundraising dinner, but "still prefers private meeting
before trip to Korea by the President. Is it possible to have Lee meet Clinton privately for 30
minutes in Korea when he visits instead of the private meeting in Washington? If possible let me
know how what [sic] kind of fund raising would be appropriate." Faxed message from Mitoma
to Huang, 4/1/96, B 0000754. Mitoma also wrote directly to the White House requesting a
private meeting in Korea with the President. Letter from Mitoma to the White House, 4/8/96,
DNC 0625244. DNC Chairman Don Fowler informed Huang that such a meeting could not be
arranged, writing on a copy of the Mitoma letter, "President cannot see these folks in Korea."
Letter from Mitoma to the White House, 4/8/96, DNC 0625244. See also Donald L. Fowler
deposition, 5/21/97, pp. 418-21.
389. Michael Mitoma, 9/5/97 Hrg, pp. 128-130.
390. Michael Mitoma, 9/5/97 Hrg, p. 141.
391. Exhibit 805: fax cover sheet and two page document from John Huang to Richard Sullivan,
4/8/96, B 000747-49.
392. Exhibit 806: memorandum from Sullivan to Sosnik and Hancox, 4/8/96, DNC 1143204.
Sullivan testified that this memorandum was based upon conversations that he had with Huang,
rather than on Huang's faxed document that he does not recall seeing at any time. Richard
Sullivan deposition, 6/25/97, p. 44.
393. The Huang and Sullivan documents differ in one important respect: the Sullivan
memorandum indicates that three of the four Cheong Am officials are from Los .Angeles, while
the Huang document apparently was meant to convey that that the two senior officials were from
Seoul, Korea. This difference may have contributed to a misimpression at the DNC that Cheong
Am America was an ongoing concern in Los Angeles seeking to open a new operation in Carson.
Califomia, rather than a brand new subsidiary not yet engaged in any U.S. business.
394. Michael Mitoma, 9/5/97 Hrg, p. 134.
4-82
�395. Michael Mitoma, 9/5/97, Hrg, pp. 132-34. Mitoma told the Committee that he explicitly
informed Huang at the hotel that Lee had flown in from Korea for the dinner, but never stated
whether he told Huang that Lee had brought the contribution check with him from Korea. See
Michael Mitoma, 9/5/97 Hrg, p. 162. The check itself provides an address in Los Angeles, and
contains no indication of a foreign origin. See DNC check tracking form, DNC 0564548.
396. Michael Mitoma, 9/5/97 Hrg, p. 137-139.
397. Michael Mitoma, 9/5/97 Hrg, p. 139.
398. Michael Mitoma, 9/5/97 Hrg, p. 138.
399. Michael Mitoma, 9/5/97 Hrg, p. 154.
400. Michael Mitoma, 9/5/97 Hrg, p. 140. Mitoma testified that after the meeting with the
President he was able to persuade Lee and Chung to have dinner elsewhere. During his
testimony, when asked to review documents he had not seen before, Mitoma apparently
realized that there had actually been two DNC dinners occurring that evening at the Sheraton
Carlton, and that the President had stopped by in between speeches at each. Michael Mitoma,
9/5/97 Hrg, p. 141.
401. Michael Mitoma, 9/5/97 Hrg, p. 153.
402. Exhibit 851: MemorandumfromDNC General Counsel Joseph Sandler to DNC Finance
Director Richard Sullivan, regarding contributions by U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations,
5/11/95, DNC 1683964-66.
403. Michael Mitoma, 9/5/97 Hrg, pp. 149-150.
404. Exhibit 851: MemorandumfromDNC General Counsel Joseph Sandler to DNC Finance
Director Richard Sullivan, regarding contributions by U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations,
5/11/95, DNC 1683964-66.
405. See discussion above of steps taken by the DNC to educate Huang about federal election
law requirements, including regarding contributions by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations.
406. Michael Mitoma, 9/5/97 Hrg, pp. 142, 151.
407. Michael Mitoma, 9/5/97 Hrg, pp. 142, 151.
408. Richard Sullivan deposition, 6/5/97, p. 52:9-11.
409. Joseph Sandler deposition, 5/15/97, pp. 82-84, 91. Sandler indicated that an attorney who
had been contacted by a journalist about the Cheong Am America contribution called him to let
him know that there might be a problem with the contribution. Joseph Sandler deposition,
5/15/97, p. 77.
4-83
�410. Memorandum from Jake Siewert and DNC General Counsel Joe Sandler to David
Eichenbaum, with copies to DNC Chairman Fowler and others, regarding the Cheong Am
.America contribution, 9/20/96, DNC 3111214. Joseph Sandler deposition, 5/15/97, p. 91.
411. Memorandum from Jake Siewert and DNC General Counsel Joe Sandler to David
Eichenbaum, with copies to DNC Chairman Fowler and others, regarding the Cheong Am
America contribution, 9/20/96, DNC 3111214.
412. Memorandum from Jake Siewert and DNC General Counsel Joe Sandler to David
Eichenbaum, with copies to DNC Chairman Fowler and others, regarding the Cheong Am
Amenca contribution, 9/20/96, DNC 3111214.
413. Joseph Sandler deposition, 5/15/97, p. 84.
414. Richard Sullivan deposition, 6/4/97, p. 140. See Chapter 27, White House Coffees and
Overnights.
415. Richard L. Sullivan deposition, 6/4/97, pp. 124-126.
416. See Clarke Wallace deposition, 8/27/97. Exhibit 18: Ethnic NewsWatch article written
by Asian American Democratic activist Maeley Tom, describes a dinner party hosted by
Kanchanalak and one other "major Democratic party supporter" for 50 people attending the
first APEC Leaders' Forum in Seattle in November, 1993, 12/10/93.
417. Richard L. Sullivan deposition, 6/4/97, p. 124. Sullivan said "she was very well-to-do."
Richard L. Sullivan deposition, 6/4/97, p. 134.
418. Samuel Newman deposition, 7/17/97, p. 198, referencing Newman Deposition Exhibit 3:
guest list for dinner with the Vice President at the Mayflower Hotel, 11/2/95.
419. Richard L. Sullivan deposition, 6/4/97, p. 125. Thereafter, Huang, Sullivan and Rosen
discussed "working with Pauline to get her to come to the table, to make her contribution, to
raise some money, when she was going to do it." Hoping that it would spur Kanchanalak on,
in early 1996 the DNC invited her to a number of White House events early in 1996,
(Richard L. Sullivan deposition, 6/4/97, p. 125) and Kanchanalak visited the White House for
a coffee on January 25, a lunch on January 29, and a dinner on February 8. (White House
WAVES records for Pauline Kanchanalak, EOP 002958-59.) According to FEC records.
Kanchanalak-and her sister-in-law, Daugnet "Georgie" Kronenberg, contributed a total of
515,000 in hard money in February, 510,000 in soft money in March, and another 510.000 in
soft money on June 6, 1996.
420. Richard L. Sullivan deposition, 6/4/97, p. 126.
421. Richard Sullivan deposition, 6/4/97, pp. 125-130
4-84
�422. Richard L. Sullivan deposition, 6/4/97, pp. 127-128.
423. Richard L. Sullivan deposition, 6/4/97, pp. 133-134.
424. Joseph E. Sandler deposition, 8/21/97. pp. 151-153.
425. Karl Jackson, 9/16/97 Hrg., p. 4. Jackson and Quayle have a continuing relationship.
For example, Quayle is affiliated with the Hudson Institute, a conservative think tank based in
Indianapolis that financed a 1993 trip by Quayle and Dr. Jackson to Japan, China and Taiwan;
Clarke Wallace deposition, 8/27/97, p. 134, referencing Deposition Exhibit 27: Washington
Post, 6/20/93. Dr. Jackson is a Senior Fellow and an Associate Director of the Competitive
Center of the Hudson Institute. Biography of Karl Jackson, UST 2006. Dr. Jackson also is a
business partner with Dan Quayle in various enterprises, including FX Strategic Advisors, Inc.
and FX Concepts, Inc. Clarke Wallace deposition, 8/27/97, p. 130, referencing Deposition
Exhibit 28: Financial Times. 9/6/93.
426. Jackson testified that Wallace may have called him with the invitation. Karl Jackson,
9/16/97 Hrg., p. 5. The CP Group, as explained by Jackson, "was Thailand's largest
trading group, an organization that was deeply involved with business in China and
elsewhere around Asia." Karl Jackson, 9/16/97 Hrg., p. 6.
427. Karl Jackson, 9/16/97 Hrg., p. 7.
428. Karl Jackson, 9/16/97 Hrg., p. 11.
429. Clarke Wallace, 9/16/97 Hrg, p. 108. Beth Dozoretz, 9/16/97 Hrg, p. 119; Robert
Belfer, 9/16/97 Hrg, p. 25; Clarke Wallace deposition, 8/27/97, p. 106.
430. Clarke Wallace, 9/16/97 Hrg, pp. 110, 128.
431. Clarke Wallace, 9/16/97 Hrg, p. 105.
432. Clarke Wallace. 9/16/97 Hrg, p. 106-107, quoting Clarke Wallace deposition, 8/27/97, p.
54-55.
433. Clarke Wallace, 8/27/97 deposition, p. 56; Clarke Wallace, 9/16/97 Hrg, p. 108.
434. Clarke Wallace deposition, 8/27/97. p. 55:9-12.
435. Beth Dozoretz, 9/16/97 Hrg, p. 156; Beth Dozoretz deposition, 9/2/97, pp. 11-12. 28.
Dozoretz is a DNC Trustee and friend of the President and First Lady. Beth Dozoretz,
9/16/97 Hrg.. p. 122; Beth Dozoretz deposition, 9/2/97, p. 28 Dozoretz and her husband have
a history of being supporters of both Democratic and Republican candidates and partyorganizations. In addition to their support of President Clinton, the Dozoretz's continue to
4-85
�
Dublin Core
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Title
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Michael Waldman
Description
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<p>Michael Waldman was Assistant to the President and Director of Speechwriting from 1995-1999. His responsibilities were writing and editing nearly 2,000 speeches, which included four State of the Union speeches and two Inaugural Addresses. From 1993 -1995 he served as Special Assistant to the President for Policy Coordination.</p>
<p>The collection generally consists of copies of speeches and speech drafts, talking points, memoranda, background material, correspondence, reports, handwritten notes, articles, clippings, and presidential schedules. A large volume of this collection was for the State of the Union speeches. Many of the speech drafts are heavily annotated with additions or deletions. There are a lot of articles and clippings in this collection.</p>
<p>Due to the size of this collection it has been divided into two segments. Use links below for access to the individual segments:<br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=43&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=2006-0469-F+Segment+1">Segment One</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=43&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=2006-0469-F+Segment+2">Segment Two</a></p>
Creator
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Michael Waldman
Office of Speechwriting
Date
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1993-1999
Identifier
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2006-0469-F
Extent
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Segment One contains 1071 folders in 72 boxes.
Segment Two contains 868 folders in 66 boxes.
Provenance
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Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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Adobe Acrobat Document
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paper
Dublin Core
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Title
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[1996 Final Minority Report Volume I] [Binder] [3]
Creator
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Office of Speechwriting
Michael Waldman
Is Part Of
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Box 69
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36403"> Collection Finding Aid</a>
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7763296">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
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2006-0469-F Segment 1
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White House Staff and Office Files
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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Adobe Acrobat Document
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Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
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6/3/2015
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7763296
42-t-7763296-20060469F-Seg1-069-006-2015