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Speechwriting
Series/Staff Member:
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[State ofthe Union 1999] MW [Michael Waldman]/SW [Steve Waldman] Memoranda: Unsolicited
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�June 12 / Administration
of Ronald Reagan, 1987
Further, our objective in these and other
negotiations is to establish equality between
the U.S. and U.S.S.R. at lower levels of
arms. However, the Soviet Union has long
tried to assert a right to equality with the
U.S. and various other nations put together.
To grant them this would threaten Western
security and create a dangerous precedent
across the entire front of negotiations.
The Soviets did not demand a limit on
German Pershing IA missiles in the 19811983 INF talks or in the current talks,
which began in 1985. They did not raise
this issue in the 1985 Geneva summit, the
1986 Reykjavik meeting, or in the meetings
between Secretary Shultz and Soviet leaders in Moscow in April of this year. I doubt
that the Soviets will block an INF agreement by creating a new and artificial issue.
Remarks on East-West Relations at the Brandenburg Gate in West
Berlin
June 12, 1987
Thank you very much. Chancellor Kohl,
Governing Mayor Diepgen, ladies and gentlemen: Twenty four years ago, President
John F. Kennedy visited Berlin, speaking to
the people of this city and the world at the
city hall. Well, since then two other presidents have come, each in his tum, to
Berlin. And today I , myself, make my
second visit to your city.
We come to Berlin, we American Presidents, because it's our duty to speak, in this
place, of freedom. But I must confess, we're
drawn here by other things as well: by the
feeling of history in this city, more than 500
years older than our own nation; by the
beauty of the Grunewald and the Tiergarten; most of all, by your courage and determination. Perhaps the composer, Paul
Lincke, understood something about American Presidents. You see, like so many Presidents before me, I come here today because wherever I go, whatever I do: "Ich
hab noch einen koffer in B e r l i n " [ I still
have a suitcase in Berlin.]
Our gathering today is being broadcast
throughout Western Europe and North
America. I understand that it is being seen
and heard as well in the East. To those
listening throughout Eastern Europe, I
extend my warmest greetings and the good
will of the American people. To those listening in East Berlin, a special word: Although I cannot be with you, I address my
remarks to you just as surely as to those
standing here before me. For I join you, as I
634
join your fellow countrymen in the West, in
this firm, this unalterable belief: Es gibt nur
ein Berlin. [There is only one Berlin.]
Behind me stands a wall that encircles
the free sectors of this city, part of a vast
system of barriers that divides the entire
continent of Europe. From the Baltic,
south, those barriers cut across Germany in
a gash of barbed wire, concrete, dog runs,
and guardtowers. Farther south, there may
be no visible, no obvious wall. But there
remain armed guards and checkpoints all
the same—still a restriction on the right to
travel, still an instrument to impose upon
ordinary men and women the will of a totalitarian state. Yet it is here in Berlin
where the wall emerges most clearly; here,
cutting across your city, where the news
photo and the television screen have imprinted this brutal division of a continent
upon the mind of the world. Standing
before the Brandenburg Gate, every man is
a German, separated from his fellow men.
Every man is a Berliner, forced to look
upon a scar.
President von Weizsacker has said: "The
German question is open as long as the
Brandenburg Gate is closed." Today I say:
As long as this gate is closed, as long as this
scar of a wall is permitted to stand, it is not
the German question alone that remains
open, but the question of freedom for all
mankind. Yet I do not come here to lament.
For I find in Berlin a message of hope, even
in the shadow of this wall, a message of
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ere to lament,
of hope, even
a message of
triumph.
In this season of spring in 1945, the
people of Berlin emerged from their airraid shelters to find devastation. Thousands
of miles away, the people of the United
States reached out to help. And in 1947
Secretary of State—as you've been told—
George Marshall announced the creation of
what would become known as the Marshall
plan. Speaking precisely 40 years ago this
month, he said: "Our policy is directed not
against any country or doctrine, but against
hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos."
In the Reichstag a few moments ago, I
saw a display commemorating this 40th anniversary of the Marshall plan. I was struck
by the sign on a burnt-out, gutted structure
that was being rebuilt. I understand that
Berliners of my own generation can remember seeing signs like it dotted throughout the Western sectors of the city. The
sign read simply: "The Marshall plan is
helping here to strengthen the free world."
A strong, free world in the West, that
dream became real. Japan rose from ruin to
become an economic giant. Italy, France,
Belgium—virtually every nation in Western
Europe saw political and economic rebirth;
the European Community was founded.
In West Germany and here in Berlin,
there took place an economic miracle, the
Wirtschaftswunder.
Adenauer,
Erhard,
Reuter, and other leaders understood the
practical importance of liberty—that just as
truth can flourish only when the journalist
is given freedom of speech, so prosperity
can come about only when the farmer and
businessman enjoy economic freedom. The
German leaders reduced tariffs, expanded
free trade, lowered taxes. From 1950 to
1960 alone, the standard of living in West
Germany and Berlin doubled.
Where four decades ago there was
rubble, today in West Berlin there is the
greatest industrial output of any city in Germany—busy office blocks, fine homes and
apartments, proud avenues, and the spreading lawns of park land. Where a city's culture seemed to have been destroyed, today
there are two great universities, orchestras
and an opera, countless theaters, and museums. Where there was want, today there's
abundance—food, clothing, automobiles—
the wonderful goods of the Ku'damm. From
of Ronald Reagan, 1987 / June 12
devastation, from utter ruin, you Berliners
have, in freedom, rebuilt a city that once
again ranks as one of the greatest on Earth.
The Soviets may have had other plans. But,
my friends, there were a few things the
Soviets didn't count on—Berliner herz, Berliner humor, ja, und Berliner
schnauze.
[Berliner heart, Berliner humor, yes, and a
Berliner schnauze.] [Laughter]
In the ^SO's, Khrushchev predicted:
"We will bury you." But in the West today,
we see a free world that has achieved a
level of prosperity and well-being unprecedented in all human history. In the Communist world, we see failure, technological
backwardness,
declining standards of
health, even want of the most basic kind—
too little food. Even today, the Soviet Union
still cannot feed itself. After these four decades, then, there stands before the entire
world one great and inescapable conclusion:
Freedom leads to prosperity. Freedom replaces the ancient hatreds among the nations with comity and peace. Freedom is
the victor.
And now the Soviets themselves may, in a
limited way, be coming to understand the
importance of freedom. We hear much
from Moscow about a new policy of reform
and Openness. Some political prisoners have
been released. Certain foreign news broadcasts are no longer being jammed. Some
economic enterprises have been permitted
to operate with greater freedom from state
control. Are these the beginnings of profound changes in the Soviet state? Or are
they token gestures, intended to raise false
hopes in the West, or to strengthen the
Soviet system without changing it? We welcome change and openness; for we believe
that freedom and security go together, that
the advance of human liberty can only
strengthen the cause of world peace.
There is one sign the Soviets can make
that would be unmistakable, that would advance dramatically the cause of freedom
and peace. General Secretary Gorbachev, if
you seek peace, if you seek prosperity for
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, if
you seek liberalization: Come here to this
gate! Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate! Mr.
Gorbachev, tear down this wall!
I understand the fear of war and the pain
635
�June 12 / Administration
of Ronald Reagan, 1987
of division that afflict this continent—and I
pledge to you my country's efforts to help
overcome these burdens. To be sure, we in
the West must resist Soviet expansion. So
we must maintain defenses of unassailable
strength. Yet we seek peace; so we must
strive to reduce arms on both sides. Beginning 10 years ago, the Soviets challenged
the Western alliance with a grave new
threat, hundreds of new and more deadly
SS-20 nuclear missiles, capable of striking
every capital in Europe. The Western alliance responded by committing itself to a
counterdeployment
unless the Soviets
agreed to negotiate a better solution;
namely, the elimination of such weapons on
both sides. For many months, the Soviets
refused to bargain in earnestness. As the
alliance, in turn, prepared to go forward
with its counterdeployment, there were difficult days—days of protests like those
during my 1982 visit to this city—and the
Soviets later walked away from the table.
But through it all, the alliance held firm.
And I invite those who protested then—I
invite those who protest today—to mark
this fact: Because we remained strong, the
Soviets came back to the table. And because we remained strong, today we have
within reach the possibility, not merely of
limiting the growth of arms, but of eliminating, for the first time, an entire class of
nuclear weapons from the face of the Earth.
As I speak, NATO ministers are meeting in
Iceland to review the progress of our proposals for eliminating these weapons. At the
talks in Geneva, we have also proposed
deep cuts in strategic offensive weapons.
And the Western allies have likewise made
far-reaching proposals to reduce the danger
of conventional war and to place a total ban
on chemical weapons.
While we pursue these arms reductions, I
pledge to you that we will maintain the
capacity to deter Soviet aggression at any
level at which it might occur. And in cooperation with many of our allies, the United
States is pursuing the Strategic Defense Initiative—research to base deterrence not on
the threat of offensive retaliation, but on
defenses that truly defend; on systems, in
short, that will not target populations, but
shield them. By these means we seek to
increase the safety of Europe and all the
636
world. But we must remember a crucial
fact: East and West do not mistrust each
other because we are armed; we are armed
because we mistrust each other. And our
differences are not about weapons but
about liberty. When President Kennedy
spoke at the City Hall those 24 years ago,
freedom was encircled, Berlin was under
siege. And today, despite all the pressures
upon this city, Berlin stands secure in its
liberty. And freedom itself is transforming
the globe.
In the Philippines, in South and Central
America, democracy has been given a rebirth. Throughout the Pacific, free markets
are working miracle after miracle of economic growth. In the industrialized nations,
a technological revolution is taking place—a
revolution marked by rapid, dramatic advances in computers and telecommunications.
In Europe, only one nation and those it
controls refuse to join the community of
freedom. Yet in this age of redoubled economic growth, of information and innovation, the Soviet Union faces a choice: It
must make fundamental changes, or it will
become obsolete. Today thus represents a
moment of hope. We in the West stand
ready to cooperate with the East to promote true openness, to break down barriers
that separate people, to create a safer, freer
world.
And surely there is no better place than
Berlin, the meeting place of East and West,
to make a start. Free people of Berlin:
Today, as in the past, the United States
stands for the strict observance and full implementation of all parts of the Four Power
Agreement of 1971. Let us use this occasion, the 750th anniversary of this city, to
usher in a new era, to seek a still fuller,
richer life for the Berlin of the future. Together, let us maintain and develop the ties
between the Federal Republic and the
Western sectors of Berlin, which is permitted by the 1971 agreement.
And I invite Mr. Gorbachev: Let us work
to bring the Eastern and Western parts of
the city closer together, so that all the inhabitants of all Berlin can enjoy the benefits
that come with life in one of the great cities
of the world. To open Berlin still further to
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11 further to
all Europe, East and West, let us expand
the vital air access to this city, finding ways
of making commercial air service to Berlin
more convenient, more comfortable, and
more economical. We look to the day when
West Berlin can become one of the chief
aviation hubs in all central Europe.
With our French and British partners, the
United States is prepared to help bring
international meetings to Berlin. It would
be only fitting for Berlin to serve as the site
of United Nations meetings, or world conferences on human rights and arms control
or other issues that call for international cooperation. There is no better way to establish hope for the future than to enlighten
young minds, and we would be honored to
sponsor summer youth exchanges, cultural
events, and other programs for young Berliners from the East. Our French and British friends, I'm certain, will do the same.
And it's my hope that an authority can be
found in East Berlin to sponsor visits from
young people of the Western sectors.
One final proposal, one close to my heart:
Sport represents a source of enjoyment and
ennoblement, and you many have noted
that the Republic of Korea—South Korea—
has offered to permit certain events of the
1988 Olympics to take place in the North.
International sports competitions of all
kinds could take place in both parts of this
city. And what better way to demonstrate
to the world the openness of this city than
to offer in some future year to hold the
Olympic games here in Berlin, East and
West?
In these four decades, as I have said, you
Berliners have built a great city. You've
done so in spite of threats—the Soviet attempts to impose the East-mark, the blockade. Today the city thrives in spite of the
challenges implicit in the very presence of
this wall. What keeps you here? Certainly
there's a great deal to be said for your fortitude, for your defiant courage. But I believe
there's something deeper, something that
involves Berlin's whole look and feel and
way of life—not mere sentiment. No one
could live long in Berlin without being
completely disabused of illusions. Something instead, that has seen the difficulties
of life in Berlin but chose to accept them,
that continues to build this good and proud
of Ronald Reagan, 1987 / June 12
city in contrast to a surrounding totalitarian
presence that refuses to release human energies or aspirations. Something that speaks
with a powerful voice of affirmation, that
says yes to this city, yes to the future, yes to
freedom. In a word, I would submit that
what keeps you in Berlin is love—love both
profound and abiding.
Perhaps this gets to the root of the
matter, to the most fundamental distinction
of all between East and West. The totalitarian world produces backwardness because it
does such violence to the spirit, thwarting
the human impulse to create, to enjoy, to
worship. The totalitarian world finds even
symbols of love and of worship an affront.
Years ago, before the East Germans began
rebuilding their churches, they erected a
secular structure: the television tower at Alexander Platz. Virtually ever since, the authorities have been working to correct what
they view as the tower's one major flaw,
treating the glass sphere at the top with
paints and chemicals of every kind. Yet
even today when the Sun strikes that
sphere—that sphere that towers over all
Berlin—the light makes the sign of the
cross. There in Berlin, like the city itself,
symbols of love, symbols of worship, cannot
be suppressed.
As I looked out a moment ago from the
Reichstag, that embodiment of German
unity, I noticed words crudely spray-painted upon the wall, perhaps by a young Berliner, "This wall will fall. Beliefs become
reality." Yes, across Europe, this wall will
fall. For it cannot withstand faith; it cannot
withstand truth. The wall cannot withstand
freedom.
And I would like, before I close, to say
one word. I have read, and I have been
questioned since I've been here about certain demonstrations against my coming.
And I would like to say just one thing, and
to those who demonstrate so. I wonder if
they have ever asked themselves that if
they should have the kind of government
they apparently seek, no one would ever be
able to do what they're doing again.
Thank you and God bless you all.
Note: The President spoke at 2:20 p.m. at
the Brandenburg Gate. In his opening re-
637
�June 12 / Administration
of Ronald Reagan, 1987
marks, he referred to West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Prior to his remarks.
President Reagan met with West German
President Richard von Weizsacker and the
Governing Mayor of West Berlin Eberhard
Diepgen at Schloss Bellevue,
President
Weizsdcker's official
residence
Berlin. Following the meeting.
Reagan went to the Reichstag,
viewed the Berlin Wall from the
cony.
in West
President
where he
East Bal-
Remarks on the 750th Anniversary of the Founding of Berlin
June 12, 1987
The President. Well, Chancellor Kohl and
Mayor Diepgen, Ambassador Burt, ladies
and gentlemen: It's an honor for me to be
able to join you today at this 750th birthday
party for the city of Berlin. I'm especially
pleased to be here today because—well, it's
not often that I get to go to a birthday
party for something that's older than I am.
[Laughter]
But to subject you to a second speech
here—[laughter]—you
know, I keep thinking of a story of ancient Rome, where, on a
Saturday afternoon, the hungry lions were
turned loose on the little group of people
there on the floor of the Coliseum, and they
came charging toward them. And one individual stepped out of the group, said something very quietly, and the lions all laid
down. Well, the crowd was enraged and
horrified that they're going to be denied
the show. And Caesar sent for the man who
had spoken to the lions. And they brought
him, and he said, "What did you say to
them that made them act like that?" And
he said, "I just told them that after they ate,
there'd be speeches." [Laughter]
Well, let me begin by conveying the
warmest greetings of the American people
to all of you here today. While only a small
fraction of the Berlin community can be
here in this hall, our good wishes go to all
the residents of this marvelous city, wherever they may live. And I am happy to see so
many young people here this afternoon.
There are two groups of local teenagers I
would like to greet in a special way—the
graduating classes of the Berlin-American
High School and of the city's John F. Kennedy School. Congratulations on a job well
done!
638
Well, this is a celebration for all of Berlin.
To those of you in the East who are watching on television but unable to attend in
person, you're here with us in spirit. The
traditional banners of Berlin's 20 districts,
East and West, around this hall, remind me
of the kinship that exists among all people
of this city. By its very existence and character, Berlin remains the most compelling
argument for an open world. We're reminded of the many traditions of openness and
democracy that have marked the history of
this city.
America—missed me! [referring to a loud
noise] [Laughter] America has a special relationship with Berlin that extends beyond
formal political or economic ties. Like
America, Berlin is a place of great energy.
We see our own hopes and ideals mirrored
in the energy and courage of Berliners and
draw strength from our joint efforts here.
This sense is symbolized by the nearly
14,000 American soldiers, airmen, and their
families who live and work in close cooperation with Berliners to ensure the defense of
our common goals. And let me make one
point clear: Our troops will remain here as
long as they are wanted and needed by
Berliners to demonstrate to the other side
that force and coercion cannot succeed.
Several thousand other Americans from all
walks of life make an important contribution to the business and cultural life of this
city. We've joined the centuries-old tradition of Berlin and, in a real sense, we have
become Berliners.
A few moments ago here at Tempelhof, I
shook hands with three men who testify to
the way you Berliners and we Americans
play such a proud role in each others' lives:
I
��1
DEC-30-1998
12:51
P02
i
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Re:
State of the Union Address/Foreign PoUcy
From:
Daniel Yergin
Date:
December 27,1998
Topics:
(1) Overview (2) Global Economy (3) Energy (4) Russia (5) Europe
(6) Japan
1. Overview
We are not only at the edge of a new century, but also a new era in international relations.
Our challenge - and our special responsibility - is to put in place the solid foundations
that will protect the security and enhance the well-being of Americans in the 21 century.
st
This year marks the tenth anniversary of the crumbling of the Berlin Wall and the
collapse of totalitarian communism - the events that thrust us into the post-Cold War era.
What was unimaginable a decade ago has turned into reality. The ideological conflict
that powered a deadly confrontation is over. The grim specter of nuclear war that held
the world hostage has turned into a cooperative, if rocky, effort to dismantle the tools of
nuclear war. These years have seen the growth of a truly global and much more
integrated world economy. New nations, struggling to establish their identities and build
their institutions, have joined the world community.
The American people are benefiting enormously from these great changes, whether it be
in the lifting ofthe risk of nuclear conflict or the far-reaching economic success that can
be measured in job creation and economic growth. Underpinning the post-Cold War era
has been a generous optimism about the world and our place in it, and a renewed
confidence in the strength of our institutions and the reliability of our purpose. All these
accomplishments are undeniable.
Yet events do not stand still. A decade after it began, the post-Cold War era is receding
into history. Its end is marked by the crisis in Asia and the depression that has come with
it; the financial contagion that has swept the world and the threats to the international
economy the contagion revealed; the setbacks in Russia; the questioning of markets
worldwide; and the deadly plagues of ethnic hatred and warfare. The reality of weapons
proliferation, mixed in with a deadly brew of micro-terrorism, is a threat as never before,
requiring a new vigilance and alert.
We need to come to grips with both the opportunities and also the risks of a new era with
an American foreign pohcy that is focused on the critical issues, and that is resilient.
�DEC-30-1998
12=52
P.Q;
creative, dynamic - and sure. A foreign policy that recognizes our special responsibilities
in the world - and that these are also, at one and the same time, our responsibilities to the
American people.
American foreign policy begins at home. It is built upon the strength and vigor of our
economy, on the forthrightness and originality of our people, and on the American values
that have been our greatest export - and our greatest succor - to the peoples of the world.
As always is true of American leadership, our foreign policy must rest upon a common
framework that transcends partisanship, that expresses the ideals and aspirations of our
people, that captures the greatness of our nation. It must meet the basic tests by which
our contributions will be judged in the 21 century - that our policies and actions protect
and enhance America's security on the great issues of war and peace and against the
insidious dangers of terrorism and local war, that they promote peace and a just and
democratic world, that they help build a global economy that serves the well being of the
American people and assures people around the world the benelits of a rising standard of
living.
31
Unity and common purpose are the essential underpinnings of an effective American
foreign pohcy. The price to be paid for failing to grasp these responsibilities of this era at
the dawn of the new century will be borne not only by us today but also by Americans of
the twenty-first century.
2. The Global Economy
The tumult that has swept through the world economy over the last year and a half has
sent large parts of Asia into economic depression, wiped out a decade of economic
growth, and pushed hundreds of millions back into poverty. The contagion did not stop
at Asia's door. It undermined reform in Russia, took Latin America to the brink of crisis,
shook the world's banking system, and even carried the United States to the edge of
panic.
Fortunately, our economic strength - and our leadership and good sense - succeeded in
stopping and rolling back the contagion. But we must act on the lessons of this
unprecedented bout offinancialturbulence. The new interconnected global economy
brings enormous benefits. But the scale of the turmoil makes evident the risk and
dangers that we must address.
We have a sustained broad international agenda that promotes trade, investment, and
development. In 1999, wc must focus on two prime tasks.
First, we must build the institutions that ensure that global financial markets are engines
of an expanding world economy, not carriers of contagion.
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�DEC-30-199B
12=53
p.04
Second, we must renew our commitment to promoting economic growth to offset a
slowing world economy to which we are not immune.
The explanations for the contagion that began in Asia are manifold. But the heart of the
matter is the mismatch between national financial systems and the explosively-growing
global financial markets. The systems in many countries are too inadequate, too
compromised, too weak to regulate - or even understand the extent - of the tremendous
flows of fast-footed capital that sweep across national borders.
These flows are great engines of growth. But, without proper grounding, without proper
regard for risk, they can also be destroyers of value. We cannot risk another bout of
contagion. Next time, the consequences could be even more deadly.
We will respond by working with the other major industrial countries, developing
nations, and international institutions to create a cooperative global information and
regulatory system that will insure that investors, governments, and publics alike will have
the requisite knowledge about capital flows and debt to make informed judgments.
If contagion is the risk, crony capitalism is the soil in which it festers, then the cure is
what Justice? said long ago - sunlight is the best disinfectant. Today, "sunlight" means
"transparency." Wc will encourage the adoption of international codes and systems of
financial reporting that are analogous to the accounting standards that underpin healthy
functioning of our economy. This will push - and indeed provide incentives - for
countries to keep their economic houses in order. Treating international financial flows
like warfare is not acceptable, because the victims are the innocent publics of the attacked
countries. Thus, the enhanced reporting standards will apply not only to countries, but
also to global investors.
We will share our knowledge and experience with other countries so that they can
strengthen their own regulatory institutions.
There is nothing abstract about these initiatives. They are essential for the well-being of
every American concerned about the prospects of his or her 40IK or retirement plan.
We must also focus on growth in the global economy in 1999.
First and foremost, we must maintain the strength and vigor of our own economy, and
that means continuing to follow the economic polices that have served us so well since
1993 - and have earned us so much respect around the world.
Second, we will continue to work to lower barriers to the free flow of goods, services,
and investment.
Third, we will continue to encourage governments around the world to reduce the
overweening control and manipulation of their economies that distort markets and reduce
the abihty to deliver rising standards of living. We will - as we consistently have -
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�DEC-30-1998
12:53
p.0c
promote market-oriented policies and fiscal prudence. The era of big government is over
not only in the United States, but around the world.
But this does not mean the dismantling of government, which have so many important
roles. Governments should not do too much, but rather do what they do best - and are
needed to do. Markets cannot flourish without the institutions and legal systems that
make them legitimate. Governments need to focus on their proper roles of ensuring
fairness, opportunity, and competition, and providing appropriate and sensible regulation.
Privatization can be a great boon both to governments and the publics. We have seen that
in our own country. But we have also seen in other countries how public monopolies can
be turned into private monopohes or into mechanisms for private plunder. Much of the
world is moving toward market-based systems. But, for them to persevere, they must be
seen as legitimate and fair. Robber barons, crony capitalism, under-the-table payments these are not acceptable substitutes for law-based open market systems.
3. Energy
Today, a quarter century after the oil crisis of 1973-74, we are seeing oil prices that, on
an inflation-adjusted basis, are below what they were in the autumn of 1973, prior to the
crisis. Low prices are beneficial to our economy and to consumers. But very low prices
for oil and other commodities point to a dangerous specter - global deflation. Our own
domestic oil and gas industry, so important to our security, is being decimated by the
plunge in prices. We will seek to provide buffers to the industry through a series of
measures that will preserve producing wells and assist the hard-hit companies through the
turbulence.
We are concerned about the collapse in the price of many commodities and what this
deflationary trend means for so many commodity-producing countries around the world,
for their political stabihty, and for the well-being of their publics - who are our very good
customers.
Though oil prices are very low today, we see the need for the development of significant
oil and gas resources to meet the needs of a growing world in the twenty-first century and to contribute to world security through diversification of energy supply.
Some of the most important projects are not only very long-term. They also involve, as
in the Caspian region, transit of oil and gas pipelines across many unsetded borders.
Because these projects arc essential to our security and our economic well-being, and to
peace and sovereignty in the region, we will continue to work as an honest broker with
other governments and the private sector to facilitate this development and minimize the
poUtical tensions that can impede these projects.
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We believe that the promotion of regional natural gas pipeline systems is an important
mid-term contribution to meeting the world's common campaign against climate change
and global warming.
4. Russia
We have overarching common interest with Russia in settling the legacy of the Cold War,
especially in terms of accounting for and disposing of the vast arsenals of destruction.
This is essential to our security. Keeping to that commitment is something that we owe
all Americans, now and in the future. We also observe that, whatever the turmoil,
Russia's politics remains within the context of constitutionalism.
But our differences over the last year have become sharper. We are deeply concerned
about continuing exports of weaponry and weapons-related technology, whether by the
Russian government itself or by semi-private or bandit groups. Russia is exporting the
know-how for proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare. We will seek lo
provide Russia - and Russians - with incentives to control this flow. We also will
remind them that Russia itself is on the very front lines to feel first the impact of
proliferation.
Our Administration has made a very large effort to support market reform and institutions
in Russia. We are deeply alarmed by the backsliding from reform and the hasty
withdrawal from participation in the world economy. Pulling up the drawbridges only
impoverishes the Russian people and shrinks their opportunities.
At this point, it is up to the Russian people themselves to sort out what kind of future they
want. But we observe the continuing failure to create an environment of laws and
contracts to encourage foreign investment. Old-fashioned, angry super-nationalistic
chants may win some poUtical points at home, but they impose a heavy cost on the
Russian people. Foreign investment in Russia today is less than that in Hungary, a
country that is only a tenth the size in terms of people (check). Foreign investment in
Russia last year was only TK percent that in China.
We welcome the opportunity to work with Russia as friend and partner as it makes its
transition into the twenty-first century. We do this with generosity of spirit and with .
great respect and admiration for the Russian people. And we are prepared, as necessary,
to help the Russian people with humanitarian aid. But it must be understood in Moscow
that we are not prepared to provide the aid and support tofinancecapital flight or
underwrite a retreatfromreform.
5. Europe and the Euro
This year marks a decisive change in the global economy - the arrival ofthe euro - a
single currency for 15 countries of the European Union. This means the advent of a
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currency that will match, for the first time since World War I I , our own dollar. For, when
the rest ofthe European Union members join, the euro, Europe's single currency, will be
backed up by a single market and a single economy that will be larger than our own,
whether measured in people or gross domestic product.
Some seek to promote the euro as the beginning a new rivalry, the incipient clash of two
vast economic blocs. But this reflects neither reality nor intention. We have always
supported European federalism both as a way to put the past behind and as a way to build
a better future. We see the euro as initiating a new stage in our historic friendship and
partnership with the nations of Europe - a partnership that is the bedrock of peace. We
welcome the euro as a means for strengthening the economies of countries that are closest
to us and with whom we are so deeply bound. We look forward to even deeper
collaboration in the future both with the nations of Europe and with the institutions of the
European Union.
6. Japan
Our friendship and partnership with Japan is central to peace and stability in Asia and the
Pacific. We continue to be deeply alarmed by the long slump in Japan. It is not healthy
for the world economy to have the second largest economy in the world in such a state.
Japan alone represents two-thirds (check) of the entire GDP of Asia, and it is difficult to
see recovery in the rest of Asia without recovery in Japan.
We applaud Japan's efforts to come to grips with its problems. In particular, we urge it
to continue on the path to restoring economic growth, removing the regulations and
restraints that repress competition and growth and trade, and healing its banking system.
Japan has a very important role to play throughout the world, and we will welcome the
return of its vitality and vigor that will enable it to regain its rightful place as a leader in
the global economy.
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Mernorandum
lhe Presidenl
From.
Joseph S. Nye, Jr.
Subject:
Implicalions for U.S. Policy of Power Shifts Between
China and Japan
Since the end of the Cold War and the collapse ofthe Snviel threat that oriented
our foreign policy lor almost half a century, Americans have had a difficull time
understanding our position in the world. Nowhere is this more true than Fast Asia. At
the beginning of the decade, many believed that Japan would replace the \ JSSR as our
primary challenger Today, fears are fixed on China.
As a recent Commission on America's National Interests pointed out. preventing
the emergence of a hostile hegemon in liurope or Asia, and ensuring ihe survival of U.S.
allies arc two of the live vital ''blue chip" interests we have today. China is a rising
power in Asia, and Japan is not only a major ally, but is central to your China strategy.
Shi lis in power between them have profound implicalions for American policy.
The Rise of China
1 listorians have long known that the rise of a new power is often accompanied by
Linccrtaintv. anxiehes, and sometimes violent conflict. The rise in lhe economic and
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military power of China, the world's most populous country, will be a central question
for the Asia Pacific region, and for American foreign policy at the beginning of a new
century. Many observers have compared the rise of China to lhat of Germany in the
period preceding the Firsl World War. For Arthur Waldron, "sooner or later, if present
irends continue, war is probable in Asia." In the view of Robert Kagan, "Chinese
leadership views the world loday in much lhe same way Kaiser Wilhelm IT did a century
ago...Chinese leaders chafe al the constraints on them and worry that they musl change
[he rules of tbe international system before the inlernational system changes them." This
analogy is flawed. Germany had surpassed Britain in industrial power, and was pursuing
an adventurous foreign policy ai the beginning of ihe twentieth century.
What are lhe facts about China's power? The '"rise of China" is, of course, a
misnomer. 'Re-cmergence" would be more accurate. By its size and history, China has
long been a major power in the Asia-Pacific region. Technologically and economically,
China was lhe world's leader (though without global reach) from 500 to 1500. Only in
the last hall millennium was il overtaken by F.urope and America. China's experience
was partly lhe result of internal problems, but it also reflected broader global changes.
Japan led Asia in adapting to these global economic forces, and its early success
compounded China's losses between 1895 and 1945.
Before 1979. China was noi yet part of the East Asian transformalion. In 1978.
China was poorer per capita than Korea and Taiwan in I 960. Since ihen, China's history
has been dominated by economics, wilh growth rates of 8 lo 9 percent per year lhal have
led to a iripling of its GNP in less than two decades. At a more realistic ( percent per
>
capita growth, China would reach $10,000 per capila income in 30 years, and its
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economy would then total $16 trillion, or twice the size ofthe current U.S. economy.
Tlie Asian Development Hank projects China's per capita income to reach the equivalent
of about 38 percent ofthe United States in 2025, about the same relative level that Soulh
Korea reached in 1990.
Linear projections arc suspect, and China faces short term problems with ils sialeowncd enterprises, its shaky banking system, and the value of its cunency Over the long
term, the Asian Development Bank posits two scenarios (assuming no major political
dismpiions). The opiimistic scenario has a 7 to 8 percent per capita growth over the next
decade falling toward 5 lo 6 percent in the 2020*s as dependency rates rise and savings
fall. Under lhe pessimistic scenario, China would fail to make essential reforms, and
bottlenecks and growing income inequality would slow growth lo 4 io 5 percent per
capila. Even at the higher growth rates, China will lag well behind both the U.S. and
Japan in per capila income.
Is China's growing economic strength a base for equivalent miliiary power? l he
answer is conlenlious since China docs not divulge all of ils defense-related expenditure.
The official miliiary budget does not account for the 600,000 People's Armed Police, nor
nuclear weapons procurement, some defense relalcd R&D, and soldiers' pensions. In a
recent book. The Coming Conflicl with China. Richard Bemstcin and Ross Munro argue
that "The official Chinese military budget for 1996 was 69.8 billion yuan or about $8.7
billion. The most conscrvaiive Western analysis would multiply that figure by three, to
reach a $26.1 billion amount. That is already close to hallThc Japanese defense budget,
which is roughly $50 billion. Our multiple of len would pul China's actual defense
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spending al around $87 billion per year, which would make it nearly one-third the amount
of American spending. Moreover, the 1996 figure was 11.3 percent higher lhan 1995.''
Other analysts are less alarmist than Bemstcin and Munro. The Fast-West Center
argues lhat 'China's military modemi/ation is still far from meeiing its defense needs.
Military expenditures have been very low, especially when considered againsl lhe size of
the country a"d military -China's low military spending reflects a clear-cut polity choice
- lhat military modernization is subordinaied to and supportive of national economic
reconstruction." Miliiary spending dropped steadily in the 1980s. Tn lhe 1990s it began
to increase moderately, partly in response to lhe Tiananmen events and partly due to the
lessons ol lhe Gulf War. Much of lhe increased spending was applied lo salaries and
infrastructure, nol weapons systems.
American govemmenl figures show that adjusted for inflation, China's military
spending declined slightly from 1984 Ihrough 1994. Much of China's cquipmenl is
obsolelc; command, control and communication capabilities arc weak; combined forces
exercises are limiled; and power projeclion capabilities are very limited. In the Taiwan
SlrailS imbroglio of 1996, most expert observers believed that Taiwan could have
repelled a cross straits invasion even without the United States Navy becoming involved.
Chinese capability to fight a serious engagemem in lhe South China Sea is also doubtful.
The Gulf War showed how far China lagged behind modern military capabilities,
and the Taiwan events of 1996 rcmlbrced their military Leaders' concern to improve iheir
offshore capabiliiy. Because ofthe eeonomic dislress ofthe former Soviet states, and
joint Russian and Chinese concerns about U.S. global dominance, China has been able to
import impressive ex-Soviel equipment at reasonable prices. The key question, however.
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is how quickly new imports and investments will remedy lhe current defects of Chinese
miliiary forces. Those who wish to paint a less alarming picture point out that success in
battle requires the integration of new equipment with existing capabilities and doctrines,
many of which remain deficient. For instance, having first class long distance lighiers or
even an aircraft carrier does not ensure dominance ofthe Soulh China Sea unless logistics
and command and control are adequate to the task. It is not enough just to have a few
pieces of ihe puzzle. David Shambaugh, an analyst of the Chinese military, argues that
China will al best be able lo field by 2005 a conventional military equivalent lo that of a
typical NATO country in the early 1980s, lie concludes that, "The recenl hype in the
media and by those in the American political system about the so-called Chinese threat is
grossly overblown, not empirically grounded, irresponsible and politically dangerous."
Whatever the accuracy of such assessments of China's military programs, the key
question is net assessment, and lhal depends on what lhe 1 Jniicd States (and other
countries) will be doing over the nexl decades, l he United Slates and Japan will noi be
slanding still. Miliiary power in the information age will depend on the ability lo collect,
process, aet upon.and disseminate infonnalion so as to achieve dominant battlcspace
awareness. This will depend on such technologies as space-based surveillance, direct
broadcasting, high speed compu'.ers, and, above all. the ability to integrale complex
information systems. China will develop some of these technologies, but the key
capacity will be the ability to integrate a system of systems. Again, having a piece ofthe
puzzle is not suflicicnt. The position ofthe American aod Japanese economies as leaders
in information technologies combined wilh the investmenis in the American defense
budget make it very unlikely that the U.S. will lose ihis lead. According lo the Australian
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expcn, F'aul Dibb, lhe revolution in military altairs will continue to favor heavily
American military predominance, ll is not likely lhat China will in any meaningful way.
close the gap with tlie U.S.
Chinese military sircngth is likely to grow over the next decades. Lven il" thai
does noi make China a global power or one regionally equivalent to the United States, it
does mean lhat China is likely to look more awesome lo its neighbors, including Japan,
and its enhanced capabilities will mean that any American military lasks will require
greater forces and resources than is presently the case. In other words, the rise of China
LIS a military power, like its economic re-emergence, must be taken seriously as a new
factor in the region. But China will not be a global challenger to the U.S., nor will it be
able io exercise regional hegemony so long as the Uniled States stays involved in Kast
Asia and maintains its alliance with Japan.
China and Japan
Unlike Europe, the Asia-Piicilic region did not develop a rich web of institutions
during the Cold War, and there was no reconciliation belwecn China and Japan such as
occurred belwecn France and Germany in the context ofthe European Union and NATO.
The receding of lhe Cold War has exposed the earlier historical conflicts in the region.
China continues lo worry about .Tapanis military (and nuclear) potential, and it frequently
refers to lhe historical experience of Japanese aggression in the 1930s. In part, these
references are Ladies designed to play on Japanese guilt and lo put it on the defensive, but
ihey also represent residual real fears.
During the 1970s and 1980s. American, Japanese, and Chinese power balanced
against the Soviel Union. The collapse of Soviet power left the Amencan position
�Dec=-22v38
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preponderant. Many Asians, such as Lcc Kuan Yew, believe that the current distribution
of power has produced the political stability that has undergirded the Asian economic
miracle. Amencan preponderance is acceptable because lhe United States is a distant
power with no local territorial claims, and can provide the reassurance of stability that
makes local arms races unnecessary. They point to ihe fact that the presence of American
forces in the region is welcome in nearly all capitals. Lven in Beijing, there is al least
ambivalence on Ihis point. To lhe extent that American forces reduce any pressures for
Japan to remilitarize, they are welcome; to lhe extent that they reduce China's pressures
on Taiwan, they are not. While China's official position is that it opposes any country
having troops ouiside its borders, il makes an exception regarding U.S. troops in Japan
"for historical reasons."' At the same time. China has expressed concern that the 1997
revision of the guidelines for U.S.-Japan defense cooperation should not cover Taiwan.
The irianglc of U.S., Japan, and China is nol an equilateral one and China realizes
that fact. Japan is an American ally, and Japan is quietly wary of lhe future of Chinese
strength. Public opinion mirrors strategic concerns. A 1996 poll showed more Japanese
with unfriendly than friendly feelings toward China. A 1997 Asahi Shimbun poll in
Bcij ing
found four times as many Chinese disliking as liking Japan'.
Power Shifts
' (Kaki Yuji. "'C'hmii uml Japan in Asia Pncilic: 1 noVntp Ahead." in Ryusci Kukulmiv cd. Challenges j(» China.ln/iiin-li.S. ( iiufvr-oiion (Tokyo: liiprm Center for Inlnrniiiioiiiil HvchanRc. IW8)
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A number of recent commentators believe that power in East Asia has already
shil ted from Japan to China. Stephen Roach, chief economist of Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter, writes thai "the economie and geopolitical leader ol the region is no longer Japan
hut China." fNew York Times. June 26. 1998). Business Week refers to "a tectonic shift
for future histories." (July 13, 1998). William Pfalf even believes thai "America's
relationship with Japan and Taiwan. Washington's iwo closest Far F.astcrn allies for
acarly half a century, have been subordinated to a new relationship with China." (Boston
Globe. July 13. 1998). Japan's current recession compared to China's 7 percent growth
in the face ofthe Asian eeonomic crisis has reinforced such perceptions, but the situation
is considerably more complex than such comments support.
table I : Sonic Measures of Relative Power
China
Pppulalion*
(million. July 1997)
1.221 eST.
268
9.6
1996 GDP (rrillionS)
(.-it exchange rates)**
7.6
1996 (JDF (trillion $)
(purchase price parity)*
7.6
1996 Defense Outlays
(billion $ ) • •
265
Long finite
nuclear missiles'*
126 csl.
96
Size (million sq. km)*
Armed Forces
(million /1997/aclivi;)**
Japan
.62
3.39 est.
IS
1.012
Aircraft earners**
12
1996 Overseas Development
Assislance (billion $)**"
9.38
38
28
A
4.6
2.85 est.
44.5
.23
75
0
0
I)
9.44
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Sources: * CIA I ' m Kactbook;
IntcrnulioDal Insiilulc for Sirwcgjc Studies. Tht Miliiary Biiluwe: lO'J'/N
(London: IIS\S & Osfonl University IVcss. 1797):
OECD Devdopmenl Assistance Cormniucc (DAC) lltrures:
June. IWX press release.
China is a nuclear weapons country with ten limes the population of Japan and the
number of men under arms. It is also a pcrmanenl member of lhe UN Security Council
On ihe other hand. China is still a less developed country while Japan vies with the U.S
for supremacy in a number of advanced lechnologies and in standards of living. Japan
remains lhe world's leading provider of economic aid. Despiie current economic growth
rates no one would seriously prefer to have the Chinese rather than the Japanese
economy, and as discussed above, for certain purposes, ihe Japanese military far
outclasses thai of China The case for China's power being greater than Japan's is based
largely on expedations about lhe future.
Policy Options for Grand StratCEV
The United Stales has as least five major alternatives for a strategy towards the
Asia-Paci lie region, and for dealing wilh future shifts in power between Chira and Japan.
I
Withdraw and pursue an Allantic (and/or hemispheric) only policy. This is
costly and unlikely. History, geography, demographics, and economics make
ihe United States a Pacific power. Hawaii is in the middle of the PacificOcean. Light million Americans trace their ancestry to the region. Isolation
from the most rapidly growing area ofthe world economy would have high
costs. America's military presence is generally welcomed and enhances our
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10
inllucnce in the region. Because ol" Japanese support, ii costs the U.S. less to
keep Iroops in Japan than in the conlinental Uniled States.
2. Create a local balance of power. America would withdraw from formal
alliance wiih Japan and let a local balance wilh China evolve. In one analogy
with nineieenth-ceniury Britain's relation to the European continent, the U.S.
could then play one stale against the other, and isolate ourself more easily
Irom some contentious issues. This would likely lead lo a re-mililari/cd Japan
and an arms race in the region which, ironically, could make occasional U.S.
participation more costly and more dangerous as the U.S. tried to balance the
new and enhanced forces that would be created. Altemalivcly, if Japan
believes it impossible to balance Chinese power, it might choose to join the
Chinese bandwagon, and this too would be costly for US inlcrcsts. In
addilion. American domestic polities is poorly attuned to such 1 ^ century
style balance of power polilics
3
Create reuional security institulions, The U .S. could create a set of regional
securiry institulions to replace its existing structure of bilateral alliances, thus
providing stabilily with less direct involvement. ASF.AN and its Regional
Forum already exist, and a Northeast Asian Security Forum has been
discussed. As a supplement to alliances, such institutions make sense, but
they are weak reeds, and not easily or quickly developed under any
circumstances, liuropean inslilutions took decades to develop. A regional
institutional strategy alone is unlikely to provide a sufficient framework for
stability in the region
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1)
4. Create a coaliiion to umtain China. Advocates such as Robert Kagan argue
that "the changes in the external and internal behavior of the Soviet Union in
the late I'iSOs resulted at least in part from an American strategy that might be
called 'integration through containment and pressure for change." Such a
strategy needs to be applied lo China loday...Containment would seek to
compel Bei jing to choose political liberalization as lhe best way io safeguard
iheir economic gains and win acceptance in the intemational community."
1 here arc at least ihrec flaws in ihis approach. First, sanctions and isolation
are less likely than economic growth and engagement to produce
liberalization. Second, it discounts the changes already under way in China
and tlie possibility thai China can evolve to define its inleresls as a responsible
power. I f we ireat China as an enemy now, we arc likely to guarantee
ourselves an enemy, particularly given that nationalism is rapidly replacing
Communism as the dominant ideology among the Chinese people. Third, as a
quick survey of Asian capilals makes clear, the U.S. could not now develop a
coalition to contain China even if wc tried. China's neighbors do not see it as
a threat in the way the Soviet Union's neighbors saw it during the Cold War.
Unly i f China becomes more aggressive in the fuiure could such a coalition be
formed.
5. Formal alliance with Japan and constructive engagement with China. The
U.S.. Japan, and China each has an interest in lhe stability thai allows lhe
prosperity of lhe Asian region to grow io lhe benefit ofall. None ofthe three
wants a conflict on the Korean Peninsula or a nuclear arms race in the region.
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12
Neither lhe U.S. nor Japan wants a weak or chaotic China that could not feed
ils people, stem flows o f refugees, or manage its environmental problems.
That is nol in America's interest. In I'ebruary 1995, lhe Defense Department
issued its security strategy report for the region. Uniled States Stratcev for the
East Asia-Pacific Region outlined a four part strategy; (1) maintain the
forward presence of about 100.000 American troops; (2) try to develop
multilateral inslilutions as a reinforcing mechanism; (3) put our alliances,
particularly with Japan, on a lirm basis after the Cold War; and (4) from that
position of strength, encourage China to define ils interests in ways that could
be compatible with ours. The American alliance with Japan, where the largest
number of troops are stationed, is cntical to American strategy. Over the past
three years, the security relationship has been strenglhencd despiie
controversy over the rape of a schoolgirl by American marines in Okinawa in
September. 1995 and the ensuing conlention over the presence of American
bases ihere. Nonetheless, the Japanese Diet promised $25 billion in support ol
American forces over live years, and Japan's national Defense Program
Outline refers to the cenlrality of the American alliance for defense planning.
In April 1996, the two countries publicly affirmed ihe work of a joint group
lhat redefined the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty as the basis for stability in the
region after the Cold War, and in Sepicmber 1997. they drafied new
guidelines for defense cooperation. That reaffirmaiion will tum out to be one
ofthe most important policy developments for lhe region Our alliance wilh
Japan is crucial and will grow even more so as power shifts, l l means thai
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11
China cannot play a Japan card against the U.S.. or try to expel the Americans
Irom the region From lhat position of strength, the United Stales and Japan
can work together to engage China as its power grows in the region.
Recommendation
Unders land ing ihe balance of power in Last Asia is only the beginning of a sound
policy for the region, but a policy that is nol based on a stable balance will be like a house
built without a lirm foundation. To locus only on economics, even in a time of economic
crisis, is like ignoring the mr we breathe. Security is like oxygen. You do not notice il
until you begin to miss it. Then you will think of nothing else. In option live, you have a
long run strategy to proteel American interests and foster stabilily and prosperity as
power shifts in the Last Asian region. Do not be lured off course by shifting lads in
current commentaries about relations between China and Japan. Stick to your game plan!
ll is a good one.
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Democracies Have a B i g Edge in the I n f o n n a l i o n Revolution"
Nvc.
Joseph S. Nyc Jr.
T
Not all democracies arc leaders in the information revolution, but many are. This is no
aeeideiu. Their societies are familiar with the free exchange of information, and their
systems o f governance arc not threatened by i l . I hey can shape information because ihey
can also take it. Authoritarian states, typically among the laggards, have more trouble
Governments such as China's can still limit their ciiizens'" access to the Imernet by
controlling service providers and monitoring the relatively small number of users
Singapore has thus far been able to reconcile its polilical controls with an increasing role
fm the Internet
But as societies such as Singapore reach higher levels o f development where more
cilizens want fewer restrictions on access lo lhe Internet, they run the risk o f losing the
people w h o are their key resource for competinu in the information economy. I hus
Singapore is wrestling w i i h the dilemma o f reshaping its educaiional system to encourage
the individual creaiivily that the information revolution w i l l demand while maintaining
social controls over the flow o f information.
Another reason that closed societies have become more costly is that it is risky for
foreigners to invest funds in a country where the key decisions are made in an opaque
fashion. Transparency is becoming a key asset for countries seeking investments 1 he
ability to hoard in formation, which once seemed so valuable to authoritarian slates,
undermines the credibility and transparency necessary to attract investment on globally
competitive terms.
Geographical communilies still matter most, but govemmems lhat want rapid
development w i l l have to give up some o f the barriers to information flows that protected
officials f r o m outside scrutiny. No longer will governments that want high levels of
development be able to afford the luxury o f keepinif Iheir financial and political silualions
a secret
From a business standpoint, the information revolution has vastly increased the
marketability and value o f commercial information by reducing costs o f transmission and
the transaction costs o f charging information users As Adam Smith would have
recognized, lhe value o f information increases when the costs o f transmitting it decline
just as the value o f a good increases when transporlaiion costs fall, increasing demand by
giving ils makers a larger market
Politically, however, rhe most imponani shift has concerned free information The abiiily
to disseminate lice information increases the potcniial for persuasion in world politics
NGOs and states can more readily influence the beliefs o f people in oihei jurisdictions I f
one aeior can persuade others to adopt similar values and strategic information may
become less impoitanl
�12/21/98
M N 16:48 FAX
O
2] 003
N A T I O N A L
U R B A N
L E A G U E
Chairman
k w n i A N S, LINI:N
Senior
Vice
December 21, 1998
Chtlirman
^
C I U K I . K S M . C.DI.I.IN.i
Vict
VIA FAX
Chairmen
R E G I N A L D K. M A C K . Jit.
Maria Echeveste
Doputy Chief of Staff
The White House
Washington, DC 20500
TCrNMu n D, L l ' w i ^
Sttrclnry
MfiWiVA
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Mnvimu.
Trensurer
WM.I.IAM M , LIIWI.M. lu.
Frtsiilent
& CEO
Dear Maria:
HUCH U. I'TIICF.
Board
af
Trusted
I am aware from conversations with Congressmen Charles
Riangel and with Mike Smith of DOE that President Clinton is
mapping several domestic initiatives that will help define hi;; legacy. I
Wias encouraged to share any ideas we have that he and the
administration might wish to consider.
MlCHAU. V>. ALfSrtNIHIK
S H A W N M . UAKNEY
STni'HANlP. HKI.I.-ROSP.
D O N A I J ) P. Bn'.iuiiKAli
t.l'.l A N D C . n i l l l N D M l l .
WlUAttP W. URfTTAIN
GLENN M . BROOKS
"l l IELMA iCOTT ailUNSON
RON.vl.l) W . (luUKLll
I forwarded the enclosed letter to the President today. I
wunted you to have a copy right away as well. This represents our
host real-world thinking about how the federal government can
accelerate the pace of academic improvement amcng urban
youngsters.
PlIILII* J. C A R H O L L
UONAItl) 5. COLEMAN. ]lt.
M I C K A I ' . I . J. G i i v m . i
CAI
DAKPIIN
i-nw/vRp t-, L>GGRAAN
U A N I E L L : V. HADDY, t s o .
PATWCk' A. EWINC
LMNUIt I. Pl-.IUJUN
5,\MVJi',i C^HI'.SIIAM, III.
It's our strongly held view that vastly more attention must t e
p<iid to what transpires in the homes, schools and communities where
values are shaped and youngsters are actually nurtured and
educated. What with all the emphasis on tests, assessments ard
Scinctions, we believe there's been far too little emphasis on the
adults and the "delivery systems' that actually do the work of
preparing our children. That's the basic impetus behind our policy
recommendations.
lOSLI'H S. HELEWICZ
BONNIE GUITON I-IELI.
K r v i N P.. t i u ^ . s
ELliANCK V. HOKNI:
M A I ? C. I K M I S U K . M . D .
C, RODLKT KlLU^H
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KINO
RICMAII;'. I . n v u r r
A i r n i L i i C. M A U T I N E ^
C A R O L A. M A S O N
W I L L I A M G. M A Y S
T H O M A S 2. M ^ K I N N O N
J^MKS P. O l I S T l . U H H I C I l r K
lONATHAN U C D E N
R/.v
D u . W . PIIAWKLTN R I I : M A I I U S ( ] N
D l A N H STUVUNS R()IIINS<]rJ
I hope you find these ideas helpful in the administration's
deliberations.
(GliHALP S. ROIIINSON
I V A N SEiDLNiisuc
Sincerely,
G»Ni»M-i: M, SMI I'll
UlLL a"TCI*HN£Y
1 I'llll.lA S rilATI'llllt.N
P A U L 'I'AC:I IAIIUI"
l<ODERT D 'I'AVLOU
IsiL\jiL TmauLi;. l u . . E d . D .
C A I U I L Y N 1.. Wim'.H r.f.HWis
Honorary
Hugh B. Price
P esident
Trmues
M . ANTHONY BUHNi
C O Y C.
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�N A T I O N A L
U R B A N
L E A G U E
Chtirman
JONATHAN 3. UNEN
Senior Vict Chairman
December 21,1998
CHMUJS M . COUJNi
VIM
Chmirvten
VIA FAX
RKINAIU K. Bluer, r«.
KENNETH D. LEWB
MAKIHA M.
The Honorable William J. Clinton
President
Tho White House
Washington, DC 20500
MncHEa
Trcasunr
WUUAM M. UWIS. Ih.
Pnnieni
& CEO
HlXHll.PWCI
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Dear President Clinton:
MlCXAU H, ALEJAhDER
SHAWN VL aAjmrt
S T W H A M I BOU-ROM
I am writing at what I know is an agonizing timefo- you and
your family. The Urban League movement is pulling for you to
navigate the treacherous terrain ahead and to survive the Jissault on
your presidency, which unquestionably has been good for this
country and for the African-American community.
O N L F. B U U U
O AD
ODA
LELtNOC B U N C S U
WlUAKO W . B U T T A I N
G E N M. BI O
LN
IO O
. ALMA AUINCTON DROWN
THILMA Scorr BJUNJOU
RONALD W. Buiuaf
PT^IUI* I C A H O U
LSONAHC S. COUMAN. I X
MICHAEL J. G u n u i
My good friend Congressman Charles Rangel haf; told me
about the lengthy and stimulating meeting the two of you had recently
about the challenges and imperatives of preparing America's young
people for the future. I gather from him that you were quite intrigued
by the ideas he broached.
He also said you were quite
complimentary of me and of the work of our movement. I was greatly;
touched and gratified that you think so highly of us.
CAL DAOOEN
EXIWAIO P. DECHAAN
D A N I I L U V, EAUDT, ESQ.
PATWCS A. EWINO
ElMOU ].
filVOH
SAMUEL GncsHAM, lit.
IOSEJ-H 3. H U J I X I O !
DONWE CUITON m u
K»viN E. HOOKJ
EUANQa V. HOKNE
MAECJOMISON.M.D.
C. H S X XD M
OE T / P
llw KJNC
RlCHAXD LOVCTT
AUTHUll C MAinTNtZ
CVBOL A. MASON
W l U l A M G . M-VVS
T H O M A * E. MCJCINNOAI
JAMES £. OESTERUICIIER
JONATHAN OCDEN
K v , Du. W. F « A N W N RWHAKUTOH
O I A N E STEVENS R 0 9 I N S O N
GURALD 5. ROSINTON
[VAN S B 0 E N J E 5 G
I have been meaning to follow up on your meeting with Mr.
Rangel. But to be truthful, I have been hesitant to intrude on your
time. Nevertheless, I know how committed you are to equipping
ev«ry American child with the academic and social skills needed to
become successful, self-sufficient and law-abiding citizeis in the
century ahead. I also know that your commitment to children spring*
from the very marrow of your bones and from the centrality cf
education in your own life experience.
C v U A a N . .SA<I™
a m 5TE?HNEY
LOUISA S T K A ' K O K N
PAUL TACUAOUI
ROBERT [>. TATLOR
IIUA/J. THISJU. In., EJ.D.
Cuuil.TN L WIUL'HT'L'WIl
In my view - and, I'm certain, in Congressman Ranger's view the greatest and most enduring legacy you can leave this nation is to
advance a set of public policies and investments that propel our
children successfully toward the 2 1 century.
st
Honorury T t v t t m
M. ANTHONY BURNS
I was astounded and alarmed to read just the other day that
my own slate of New York is the latest where outlays for pr sons now
COY G. •H.LHD
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THEtUlORE W. KHEEL
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�Tha Honorable William J. Clinton
December 21,1996
Page Two
exceed expenditures on higher education. According to a RAND
study that I read recently, as recently as 1995, the State of California
spent twice as much on higher education as on criminal justice. By
2005, the ratio will have reversed!
If America persists in going down this path, we will cripple our
economy, undermine our families and communities and, in the end,
bankrupt our society - morally as well as financially.
To paraphrase the title of Spike Lee's film "Mo' Bettar Blues,"
one viable and low-cost solution to the Social Security cris is is "Mo"
Beter Workers."
In other words, more workers who are well
educated and highly skilled, and thus who eam more money and pay
higher taxes.
The best place to find them is America's schools, not its
prijjons. Millions of eager yet ill-prepared youngsters with oncrmouis
unlapped potential attend the nation's urban and rural schools. They
are the vast reservoir of "Mo' Better Workers" just waitng to be
nurtured and developed, if only we will invest in them.
As I discussed with Congressman Rangel, however, I'm
deeply troubled by the near total emphasis in public debate and
policy on standards, assessments and sanctions. Figuring cut how to
hoist youngsters up to those loftier standards is barely on the radar
screen in most states.
To invoke an automobile analogy, it's as though we've
prcmulgated the specs for a world class car, only to assume that thi:?
act alone will produce it, without attending adequately to the arduous
task of retooling the manufacturing plants, assembly lines a nd factor/
workers who actually make the vehicles.
I urge you to use your bully pulpit repeatedly to help
policymakers, the media and the general public see that we. must
invest in the "delivery systems," namely the schools, cofnmunitie: j
and families - in order for young people to meet the lofty expectation:-:;
that we hold for them
:
In this spirit, I would like to share the policy recommendation a
that I presented to Congressman Rangel. Some - and perhaps even
�The Honorable William J. Clinton
December 21,1998
Pa ge Three
all - all cf them may have occurred to you already.
In each
instance, I assume that the federal government would have to figure
out how to collaborate with states and local school districts in order to
try to circumnavigate those ideological conflicts about federal control
of local education. Here then are my suggestions:
1. It goes without saying that the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act should be renewed. We are gearing up to
work closely with your administration to protect this vitally
important investment in public schools that serve America's
neediest pupils.
2. The shortage of qualified teachers in urban schools is well
documented by the National Commission on Teaching and
America's Future, among others. The problem is sspecially
acute in disciplines like science and math. Children have
little chance of meeting high standards in these r.ubjects if
there aren't skilled teachers to educate them. Adding
100,000 teachers to shrink class sizes is enormously
important, but it may not quite reach to teacher quality
question in key disciplines.
The federal government could provide matchinc funds to
states to recruit, retool and train teachers for urban and
rural school districts faced with these shortages. Go after
new recruits, but also after military retirees and skilled
workers who are laid off by corporations. Use the fast-trad-c
learning systems devised by the military to retool this vast
corps of potential teachers. Supplement the salaries
offered by school districts in order to lure them into this
field.
3. Everyone agrees that school principals are critically
important. One can only wonder, though, how many cf
them have "state-of-the-art" skills for running urban
schools. Are they up to speed on research and best
practice, on management and motivation, and on
functioning like mavericks inside complex bureaucracies?
�ij/2i/ao
aiui's its :5U K U .
Tha Honorable William J. Clinton
December 21,1998
Page Four
The federal government could provide matching grants for
states to offer intensive training for current and future
principals. Model the experience after those mid-career
management training programs offered by leading business
and public policy schools. Sending an army of fresh and
refreshed leaders into urban schools could move the ball
downfield. And it probably wouldn't cost all that much in
the grand scheme of things.
4. Research shows that urban and minority kids fare better In
smaller schools with no more than 800 or so students. Yet
we continue to "sentence" them to attend massive,
pedagogically obsolete schools with several thousand
students. Most pupils, not to mention teachers, haven't a
prayer of succeeding in these settings.
Federal investments to refurbish school infrastructure;
should be guided by this body of research. Perhaps
Washington could join with the states to create a matchincj
fund for decommissioning obsolete schools (the way we do
military bases and massive housing projects) and for
building or leasing smaller, state-of-the-art schools. Thuv
fund might also be utilized to help subdivide bii:j schooli;
into smaller, more autonomous units.
5. By many accounts, schools of education typically fall short
when it comes to equipping their graduates to teach urban
kids. There's a mismatch between curricula and faculty, on
the one hand, and the needs of urban youngsters, on the
other.
Perhaps the U.S. Department of Educaticn could
administer a matching fund to support the establishment of
21 century schools of education that are genuinely
attuned to the unique educational and deve opmental
needs of urban and rural youngsters. A series of challenge
grants could really shake up the system and send strong
signals about the caliber of teacher education that k;
needed and expected in this day and age.
strongly
suspect that some exciting new models of teacher
education would surface quickly in response :o such a
stimulus.
st
�The Honorable William J . Clinton
De cember 21,1998
Page Five
6. The evidence is abundantly clear that constructive afterschool programs pay huge dividends to youngsters and ta
society. Young people who routinely participate in such
programs tend to perform better in school and steer clear cf
such deleterious behaviors as violence, crime and sex.
You have succeeded in placing this under-appreciated
issue on the national agenda. Now that a beachhead has
been established in the federal budget, is it possible to pull
out all the stops and go for scale? Can tts federsil
government create a sizable matching fund :o induce
states to invest in this arena? The beneficial impact would
be swift and it would help boost the academic achievemen t
and social development of urban youngsters.
7. Some urban school districts have really begun tc push the
achievement envelope, with encouraging results. For
instance, the College Board, under Don Stewarts
leadership, launched Equity 2000 some years aqo. They
prevailed upon six urban districts to require that all pupils
take algebra - and then figure out how the schools should
deliver for the children. These districts have put their
teachers, principals and guidance counselors through
intensive professional development. They've instituted
after-school and summer academies to shore up students
who are struggling. And so forth.
Though the districts don't have perfect batting averages by
any means, the evidence thus far is enormously
encouraging. I'm immensely impressed by the followincj
statistics on the impact of Equity 2000 across th a six pilot
districts from its inception in 1991 through 1997:
m
•
9 grade enrollment in Algebra 1 or higher increased
from 50 percent to 87 percent of all students.
•
It jumped from 45 percent to 86 percent of African
American pupils.
�12/21/98
IB: 5tJ
f.W
The Honorable Wilfiam J. Clinton
December 21,1998
Page Six
•
And from 4(3 percent to 87 percent of Latino students,
63 percent to 95 percent of Asian students, and 59
percent to 85 percent of white students.
•
Enrollment in Geometry or higher soared from 39
percent to 67 percent of students in the pilot districts.
The lift occurred among all students and the proportion!;
were actually highest among Aftican-American and
Latino youngsters.
•
Although the passing rates declined a bit, vastly more
youngsters were enrolled in Algebra and Geometry by
1997.
•
As a result, nearly four thousand more S'* graders
actually passed Algebra by the end of 1997 than were
even enrolled in the course at the start of Equi ty 2000 in
1991.
•
Much the same is true of Geometry.
1
I could readily imagine the federal government establishing
an incentive fund, matched by states, to support
comprehensive strategies like this by districts that are
determined to lift the level of student achievement. Give
them the flexible supplemental funds to address the various
facets of what must be done in a coherent way. If a crosssection of urban districts really managed to move tht*
needle, thafd be an invaluable contribution by Washington
to the cause of improving achievement.
8. Lastly, you could look at utilizing a military model to reach
youngsters who've dialed out of traditional schools. When
you and I were growing up, the Army routinely rescued
thousands of aimless young men from the streels. - Later
on, the military went upscale and stopped recruiting school
dropouts. This cut off a well-worn escape route for young
people who needed an alternative path.
For years I tried to figure out how to get the military back in
the business of helping to develop youngsters who weren":
�12/21/93
JlUiN I B : 5 1
FAi
The Honorable William J. Clinton
December 21,1998
Pjigo Seven
being reached by the schools. I came up with the idea of
trying to get one of the branches to operate a domestic
youth corps for school dropouts. It would operate on
military bases, with all of the structure and trairing of the
military, except that participants would perform community
service instead of prepare for combat.
In early 1989, while I was with the Rockefeller Foundation, I
broached this idea to General Herbert Temple, head of ths
National Guard, and Dan Donohue, director of tf e Guard's
Public Information Bureau. Several sentences into my
pitch, they said they got the concept and would do it.
Dan took my nugget of an idea and has since transformej
it into a gem of a program, known as the National Guard
Youth ChalleNGe Corps. It has become one ov the mosit
potent interventions I know of for rescuing teenagers
who've dialed out, but haven't yet gone completely over the
edge, deep into the criminal justice system.
Enlistees spend 22 weeks on a military base in basis
education and training. There they are subjec:ed to the
rigorous regimen you'd expect of a military operation. Dan
and his colleagues have designed an elaborate human .
development curriculum that draws heavily on t heir trac<
record of molding recmits into functional and effective
members of the military. The curriculum covers s jch topics
as:
•
Leadership and, every bit as important, "followsrship"
Community service
Job skills
Academic excellence
Responsible citizenship
Life coping skills
�Thie Honorable William J . Clinton
Decembor 21,1998
Page Eight
•
Health, sex education and nutrition
The impacts documented to date are quite impressive!.
According to the National Guard:
The ChalleNGe Corps has graduated 13,000 young people
in six years.
•
9,330 of the grads have obtained their GED.
•
Thafs a GED attainment rate of over 70 percent, which
about equals the national average.
•
The retention rate is 91 percent for the most recent class.
That actually exceeds the national high school completion
rate.
•
An assessment of the 5,000 most recent grads £is of June
1995, shows that 43 percent of them were employed, 2:2
percent were attending college, 14 percent were pursuing
vocation education, 12 percent had returned to high school,
and nearly 9 percent were in the military.
These statistics are especially striking because the ChalleNGe
Corps deals only with school dropouts and expellees.
The federal government could ramp up funding in a big way
and challenge the states to follow suit by putting some of their
burgeoning criminal justice budget into the pot. That way, tho
Corps could really go to scale. The underutilized military
facilities exist, so this expansion could be implemented in a
hurry.
There are variations on the basic concept that the Nations I
Guard is open to exploring as well, including:
•
The National Urban League and the National Guard are
discussing the feasibility of creating an intensive, but nonresidential model, also for dropouts. This would fortify
their academic and social skills, and equip them to enroll in
post-secondary education and/or enter the labor market.
�The Honorable William J. Clinton
Dt'camber 21,1998
Page Nine
The Guard would offer its core academic and
developmental
program,
while we offer
intensive
mentoring, guidance and placement services. We have
broached this idea to Secretary of Labor Alexis Herman
and will follow up this week with a concept paper.
•
Charter schools and other forms of altemative schools can
be created in the image of the ChalleNGe Corps. For
instance, just this fall, our local Urban League and the
Massachusetts National Guard opened a charter school in
Springfield. The Guard is eager to create some nonresidential ChalleNGe Academies that adhere to assentially
the same philosophy, curriculum and regimen.
The
Academy would mn from about 7:00 AM in tha morning
until 8:00 PM or so in the evening. These schools could be
seeded with joint federal/state support and financed on an
ongoing basis with support from the school district, coupled
with supplementary aid from the state.
1 hope these policy notions will prove usefu in your
deliberations. Needless to say, my colleagues and I are available for
follow-up discussions with you or members of your admiristration if
that would be helpful.
Thanks for hearing me out. Once again, we are puli ng for you
and praying for you.
Sincerely,
�
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Title
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Michael Waldman
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<p>Michael Waldman was Assistant to the President and Director of Speechwriting from 1995-1999. His responsibilities were writing and editing nearly 2,000 speeches, which included four State of the Union speeches and two Inaugural Addresses. From 1993 -1995 he served as Special Assistant to the President for Policy Coordination.</p>
<p>The collection generally consists of copies of speeches and speech drafts, talking points, memoranda, background material, correspondence, reports, handwritten notes, articles, clippings, and presidential schedules. A large volume of this collection was for the State of the Union speeches. Many of the speech drafts are heavily annotated with additions or deletions. There are a lot of articles and clippings in this collection.</p>
<p>Due to the size of this collection it has been divided into two segments. Use links below for access to the individual segments:<br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=43&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=2006-0469-F+Segment+1">Segment One</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=43&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=2006-0469-F+Segment+2">Segment Two</a></p>
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Michael Waldman
Office of Speechwriting
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1993-1999
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2006-0469-F
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Segment One contains 1071 folders in 72 boxes.
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Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
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[State of the Union 1999] MW [Michael Waldman] /SW [Steve Waldman] Memoranda: Unsolicited Materials
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Office of Speechwriting
Michael Waldman
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Box 52
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36403"> Collection Finding Aid</a>
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White House Staff and Office Files
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7763296
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