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Clinton Library
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001. Speech
RE: DCI Tene! Articulates Vision for Agency (5 pages)
7/21197
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COLLECTION:
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[Celltra! Intelligence Agency]
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Dece~ber
2000
Mr, Ted ~,iidmer
Nacional security Council
Old Executive Office Bldg,
ROom 216
washington, D.C.
20500
Dear Mr. Widmer;
The attached documents represent the'Central Intelligence
Agency's second delivery of information in response to the White
House's tasking on 10 July 2000 concerning the Administration
History Pro:ect. You will recall that our first delivery on 25
August ccr.'.:.ained copies of the OCI's unclassified Annual Report
to the Cc'ngress for the years 1993, 199,4, 1996-1999.
Per your
earlier discussions wit'r: Mr, Ken Levit this new information
includes a series
2000 time~ frame.
o~
unclassified DCI statements from the 1997 to
If you require additional infor:nation 0:;: wish to discuss the
matter further, please contact me at (703) 482-0312, or the OCI's
Chief of Staff, John Brennan, at (703} 482-7144,
£J.
Sincerely,
=Jr-
Executive Assistant to the
Exec"Jt i ve Director
Attachments
As Stat.cd
�1
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,
"
,
UNCLASSIFIED
SPEECHES/DOCUMENTS
.~
,
.
I
Jo.USFlT.EI1 DOCUMENT
REFILEDBY
CLINTON LIBRARY S1'AFF
L"~DAm~/o5
July 21, 1997
Headlines:
(V)
(tJ)
:JeI Tenet Artic:llates Vision for Agency,
Announces New Management Team
DC] Tenet Articulates Vision for Agency. Announces New Management Team
En on (ulifress to employees in tItt' HtYldquarters Auditorium on fuly 21, DCI George
Tend offered Iris thoughts at1 tire directions for the Agency and named til!! individuals who will
help Mm in leading tire Agency, The following is a transcript ofthe session,
DDA Dick Calder: I want to ask one question: Who would have thought? Who
would have thought that last December, when John Deutch stood in this very position,
extolling George Tenet as the best deputy he had ever had, that a mere seven months
later we would all gather to hear from George on his first address to the Agency as the
Director of CcntrallnteHigence? There are a lot of reasons why rm pleased, and the
Agency should be pleased, about Gt.'t'lrge-'s confirmation as DCI ten days ago. He
brint,"S to the job a unique combination of skms~ experiences~ and viewpoints. As the
staff director of one of our principaJ oversight committees, he knows the Hill. His
unanimous endorsement by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, as well as the
Senate's unnnimolls confirmation speaks to a high mutual regard, Most importantly, he
knows thIS Agency and the Community frorn the Hill's perspective. This is vital as we
embark on a new em in the Agency. As Special Assistant to the President on the
National Security Council, George was the point man for the White House on
intelligence, For two years he was immersed in the day-to~day operations of our
business, He was it central figure in defining the future of the Irttelligence Community,
by creating new directives such as PDD-35, For the past two years, George has been
here, in the midst oi, and teading the Agency and the Community, through-to
paraphrase an old Chinese saying-interesting times. He knows us; he knows our
mission; he knows our proud history; and he knows our aspirations for our future, In
short, no one-no Single person-has ever come into this office with such a broad
perspective of the intellig~nce business, But equally irnportant, beyond George Tenet's
resume, is George Tenet. You are about to hear him, and what you will hear beyond
the words, is someone whose commitment to the mission and values of CIA is intense,
.
'
UNCLASSIFIED
�UNCLASSIFIED
whose excitement about what we do is palpable, and whose passion about our future
direction and purpose is cle'lf. In this special year when we are celebrating our 50th
anniversary, I am honored to introduce a man whose talent, experience, and energy will
lead us into the next century. Please join with me in welcoming the Honorable George
j. Tenet, the 18th Director of Central Intelligence.
DC! George Tenet: Let me begin by simply saying how privileged I feel to be
here today, standing at the helm of this Agency - one that has completed 50 years of
proud service to Ollr country-- and looking ahead with optimism and enthusiasm to the
next chapter in CIA's history.
Let me suy also how honored I am that the President has asked me to lead you -
the women and men of CIA - - into this new era. Together we now stand at an historic
turning point - - one that is full of opportunity and challenge for all of us. If we
approach this turning point with "the right stuff" - - with energy, with decisiveness,
with conviction, with unity of purpose, and with an unrelenting focus on our mission
- we will do great things together. We will do great things for our country. We will be
the best intelligence service in the world. As your leader, I aspire to nothing less.
Our mission is clear. At the end of the day, it is our job to ensure that our nation'
s leaders have the information and time they need to avert danger to the United,States
and, when it cannot be averted, the wherewithal to prevail. I haven't the slightest
doubt about what the President and the American people expect of us:
•
First and foremost, they want to know that the CIA is working to protect the
lives of Americans everywhere.
•
They want to know that we aie working to protect the lives of our men and
women in uniform and to ensure that they dominate the battlefield when they deploy
to remote parts of the world.
•
They want t<? know we are protecting Americans from other threats, such as
those that come from terrorists and weapons of mass destruction.
•
They want us to make sure that our diplomats have the critical insights and
foreknowledge they need to advance American interests and avert conflicts.
•
They want us to track and give advance warning about major geopolitical
transformations in the world.
•
They want us to focus not just on threats but also on opportunities -
opportunities to act before danger becomes disaster and opportunities to create
circumstances favorable to American interests.
UNCLASSIFIED
�'I
,
.
.
UNCLASSIFIED
•
They want our reporting and analysis to add real value to what they already
know about the toughest problems facing the United States.
To live up to these expectation5~ we need to do two things: we need to focus and
greatly strengthen our core capabilities; and we need to operate much more effectively
as a team, crossing directorate lint'S without pause to accomplish our mission.
CIA exists because it offers unique analytical and clandestine collection
capnbilitit.'S that reside no place else in government. I want to improve measurably our
four core capabilities: all-source analysis, clandestine collection, counterintelligence and
covert action.
But It is not enough to improve our capabilities, we must also focus our efforts
against those targets that matter the most. Ultimately, we succeed or fail by virtue of
our,nbility to deliver - on a continuing basis - intelligence or analysis that the
pOlicymaker could not get any other way.
What do we need to do?
•
We need to produce outstanding all-source analysis that is timely. prescient and
persuasive. To do that we must be, and be seen to be, the nation's leading experts in a
wide: variety of Helds. And through every means available to US, we must reach out to
the rich body of expertise that cxiS:L~ outside the US government.
•
We need to mount imaginative and sophisticated dandestine human and
lechnical operations in order to get vital information our nation cannot get in any other
way, I know this will involve risks J and not every operation will be a success, But ( will
stand alongside my people, for without risk we are often "vithout intelligence-.
Concentrating our attention on these hard targets will demand the highest standards of
profeSSionalism, tradecraft and innovation. To do what our country neeas# we can be
nothing less than the world's best espionage organization.
•
We need to be vigilant on the counterintelligence front. \'\Ie would do a great
disservice teo ourselves and all that we hope to achieve if '\.ve neglected this arena, In
the world we live in today, it is not enough to play strong offense,. \'\'e must also play
strong defense.
•
We need to sharpen CIA's capacity to effectively employ covert action on those
unique occasions when our nation's leaders conclude that an important aim can be
achieved through no other means.
•
And we need in all of our endeavors to use technology to advance our mission,
not only to ensure we have the support infrastructure we need to perform, but also to
ensure that we grow the scientific and technological expertise that allows CIA to be a
UNCLASSIFIED
�.
.
UNCLASSIFIED
national"center for excellence" in technological innovation. The Agency that once
brought our country the U-2 and imagery from space has no less an obligation today.
How do we assure our excellence in all of these arenas? I think the key is
teamwork and partnership.
,
We must realize CIA has to be: greater than the sum of its parts to achieve our
true potentiaL We are all in this together. Everyone here matters. \'Vhether you recruit
agents, do analysis; run printing presses, work with complex technology, handle
logistics, keep offices funning provide 5eCuTlty. or furnish human resources support!
you are part of a common interdependent enterprise. We need each other. We are all
the CIA.
l
Let me be dear: CIA must operate as a partnership, And as wilh mosl
partnershipE', no one really gets ahead unless the whole enterprise prospers. To make
this partnership work, there are some things you need from me and some things [ need
from you.
•
From me, you need clarity of vision, honesty and a dear 5Cn~ of purpose.
Standing before you I c"nnot tell you today that I have all of the answers, but you will
have no doubt about where I want us to go and about the standards we should set for
CIA.
You need to kno\..' that an atmosphere where challenging conventional wisdom
•
and taking risks is essential to our identity as the CentrallnteHigence Agency. From its,
earliest days, CIA's greatest successes have come at times when one of our officers was
able to see what others could not, dare what others would not or refuse to give up in
the face of overwhelming odds. Next to integrity and objectivity, this ethic is the most
important part of our professional identity.
•
You need from me commitment to an atmosphere and to programs that will
encourage the full development of all our people. This means opportunities that allow
us to deepen our expertise through continuous training and education. We wiH do
whatever it takes to ensure that the people of this agency have the diverSity, expertise,
language skills, and "ground truth" area knowledge to stand out in Washington and in
our country. And we will link our promotion and rewards system to this kind of
expertise. The development of our talent is one of my highest priorities,
•
You nl"€:d to be able to challenge me - - and to know that I welcome it - - when I
am not clear or when there is something that you simply think I need to know. As I
said in my <;onfirmation hearingsi I will lead, but I will also listen.
•
You need from me continuity and stability in leadership. Let me say
unequivocally that there is no other job I want and no other job that has the potential
UNCLASSIFIED
�UNCLASSIFIED
for ,challenge, reward, and impact that we have here at CIA. I am signing up for the
long haul. My heart and soul are dedicated to this Agency and to the people I've been
asked to lead. You can expect to see a lot of me - - God willing-- and for a long time.
B~I as [ said, this is a partnership. As such, I expect some things from you.
I need the hard work and dedication that we at CIA simply take for granted. I
know I can ('ount on that. I know you do not bring just your expertise to work. You
bring your deep conviction that national security is neither a nine to five job nor just a
career, but a public service of grave importance.
But beyond that, I need you to embrace the spirit of partnership that I have
invoked, because I believe it is as essential to our corporate success as hard work and
dedication.
•
In.prnctical terms, this means looking out for each other.
•
It means supporting each other. .
•
It means not running other people down and not getting personal when we
disagree.
•
It J.1leans being decent when things get tense or when difficult decisions have to
be made.
•
It means being straight with each other.
•
It means asking, when looking across directorates or disciplines: how can we
make CIA more effective by sharing our expertise, our talents, and our experience.
And as a large organization with increasingly complex functions, we must never
let process overwhelm us. We must take every opportunity to simplify what is
needlessly complex. And we all need to raise our sights and keep an unwavering focus
on the mission the American people have given us: to be their first line of defense in a
world that still holds plenty of surprise and danger. To do that with maximum
effectivenes5 we must pull together. We are a team. We are all the CIA.
We must all focus beyond ourselves. To be sure, our business has its share of
problems and frustrations. But I cannot imagine a business with more opportunities
for people to seize the initiative, exert influence, and have an impact far beyond what
most people experience in a lifetime. My point is simply this: when the problems
inherent in any large organization tempt us toward self-absorption or pessimism, it is
probably time to remember that ours is a business with special responsibilities and
enormous opportunity for achievement. If we keep our focus on our work, our morale"
UNCLASSIFIED
�...
..:.
UNCLASSIFIED
will be high, and we will never have enough hours in our days.
And to those of you who hold leadership positions, I want you to do more than
just define problems. I want you to solve problems. To make decisions, to press ahead,'
and to take responsibility for implementing them. In essence, I want you to get things
done. I want you to know that you can go up the line when you need guidance or
when you know the stakes are high, but I want you to have the judgment to know when
keeping me informed is enough.
•
Above all, I want leaders who will take care of their people.
•
You should have confidence that I will care about your work at all levels, be
there when you need me, and, take responsibility when CIA is on the line.
I have set forth today my expectations, values and commitments. And now I
want to introduce a team of leaders for CIA who will embody and advance them with
me and.with you.
UNCLASSIFIED
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
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,\:'\1)'1'\'1'/0:
001, Speech
RE: DCI 'l'cnel Articulalcs Vision Cor Agency (5 pages)
7121/91
PIIb(I)
This marker identities the original location of the withdrawn item listed above.
For a complete list of items withdrawn from this folder, see the
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COLLECnO!\':
Clinton Adfllillistratioll H ist{)ty Project
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SPEECHES/DOCUMENTS
MISFII,EO DOCUMENT
REFILED BY
CLINTON L1llRARY STAFF
nrr1t:rfD/JE~/OS
November 19, 1997
Headlines: DCI Tenet's Remarks at conference on "Does America
Need the CIA?", Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor,
Michigan, November 19, 1997
19 November 1997
Gerald R. Ford Library
Ann Arbor. Michigan
Does America Need the CIA?
Remarks as prepared for delivery by DCI George Tenet
Thank YOLI very much, President Ford, for that kind introduction. I am delighted
to be »,ith you and the distinguished panelists you have assembled here today.
You have chosen as your topic the question of whether America still needs the
CIA. I think this is the first time I've ever been asked to keynote a conference where the
stated objective is deciding whether I should bother coming in to work in the morning.
You will doubtless hear many views on the CIA during this conference. In
stating mine, let me break the suspense and say that my answer to your question -- does
America still need the CIA -- is an unambiguous "yes". I imagine that is what you
would expect to hear from me. But let me be equally clear about why I say it. In a
nutshell, it flows from my conviction that the compelling factors behind the creation of
the CIA are still present in the world th,at America must live in today.
The CIA was created by President Truman as an insurance policy against the
kind of surprise that caught America off guard in World War II. He was also annoyed
by the confused and conflicting nature of the reports landing on his desk from various
departments. He wanted someone to make sense of them -- someone who had no
policy axe to grind and someone whose exclusive mission was to work for him, and to
UNCLASSIFIED
�UNCLASSIFIED
ensure that he was not taken off guard by dangerous developments overseas.,
As ( look at the world today, it is clear to me that the potential for dangerous
surprise is as grea t as ever.
•
That is true whether I look at terrorist groups whose sole purpose is to harm
American interests, the biological weapons that Saddam Hussein is still trying to build
and to hide in Iraq, or the programs Iran has for building intermediate range missiles
and nuclear weapons.
•
It is true when I look at the ethnic tensions that make life dangerous for US
forces in Bosnia, the build up of North Korean forces near the DMZ, or the vast and
unfinished transformations underway in countries with large nuclear arsenals, such as
Russia and China. .
Against that backdrop, we can debate whether or not CIA should exist, but I
must tell you that I have no doubt about what the American people expect of us as long
as we do. They want us to:
•
Protect the lives of Americans everywhere;
•
_:Protect our men and women in uniform and ensure that they dominate the
battlefield whenever they are called and wherever they are deployed.
•
They want us to protect Americans from threats posed by terrorists, drug'
traffickers or weapons of mass destruction.
•
They want intelligence to arm our diplomats with critical insights and
foreknowledge that can help them advance American interests and avert conflicts.
•
They want us to focus not just on threats but also on opportunities-
opportunities to act before danger becomes disaster and opportunities to create·
circumstances favorable to America's interests .
..
•
They want us to track and give advance warning about major geopolitical
transformations in the world.
•
And, they want our reporting and analysis to add real value to what they
already know about the toughest problems facing the United States.
To live up to these expectations, we need h) do four things very well.
•
We need to produce outstanding all-source analysis that is timely, prescient, and
persuasive.
UNCLASSIFIED
�UNCLASSIFIED
•
We need to mount imaginative and sophisticated clandestine human and
technical operations in order to get vital intorrY4"'1tion OUf nation cannot get in any other
way.
•
\'Ve need to be vigilant on the cQunlerjnleHlgence front.
•
And, we need to sharpen CIA's capacity to effectively employ covert action on
those occasions when our natton'sleaders conclude that an important aim can be
achieved through no other means.
These are ~s~entiany the 4 core mission areas of our business that 1 do not believe can be
replicated anyplace else in our government.
It is against this buckdropt however, that we must address the key question of
your conference because it is an important one, So let's talk about CIA:
•
Whal does CIA bring to the table?
•
Why is it important?
•
•
. What difference does it make?
Is it an investment worth making?
•
And perhaps most important, can the American people trust us to carry out
our responsibilities in a manner consistent with the values of our democratic society?
•
If Wt.~ cannot answer these questions in a compelling and thoughtful
we should not exist.
way~
then
•
If WE~ cannot prove to the President that we arc making progress against the
most difficult and enduring threats to our national security, then we should not exist
•
If we cannot prove that we will attack these targets with the highest standards
of professional integrity, professional performance and dispaSSionate objectivity. then
again we should not exist.
I believe we will meet these tests and, at the end of the day, we in the business
of intelligence must have the courage and foresight to understand that this is precisely
the kind of dialogue we must have with the American people.
For my part, I do not intend to spend a lot of time discus-l:iing the past. As in any
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�UNCLASSIFIED
endeavor, we must learn from the past and never shy away from confronting mistakes.
But as I said in my confirmation hearings, my gaze is fixed on the future, and on the
task of creating the best intelligence service for the 21st century. Moreover, focusing on
the past assumes that the CIA of yesterday is necessarily going to be the CIA of
tomorrow. The fact is, the CIA has been, and must continue to be, an evolving
institution. Not only have OUf targets changed, but the way we go about our work has
changed -- in part because of the revolution in information and communications
technology, and in part because of the vast amount of information which is now
available to all of us. .
In addition, our relationship to the rest of the federal government has changed.
We are more transparent than we used to be to policymakers within the Executive
branch, and more integrated into their decisionmaking. There are detailed procedures
for coordinating our activities outside the United States which ensure that the President
receives the views of other departments.and agencies with legitimate interests in these
activities before he approves them.
There also is intense scrutiny from the Congress, not only of our operational
activities, but of our analysis as well. I dare say the CIA receives more oversight from
the Congress than any other agency in the federal government. This is not a complaint.
In fact, this oversight is our most vital and direct link to the American people-a source
of strength that separates us from all other countries of the wor1d.
So focusing on today, what do we bring to the table and what difference does it
make?
I start with our analysis because, as former Director Dick Helms told our
employees a few weeks ago, this is our "core function." As I noted earlier, it is what
motivated President Truman to create a Central Intelligence Agency. Truman wanted
an Agency that could pull together the relevant information from all available sources
bearing upon foreign policy matters, analyze it, and provide him a timely and objective
assessment, free of a policy bias.
Does the President still need such a resource at his or her disposal? Having
watched the decision making process at the White House myself over the last five years,
the answer must be a resounding "yes." Indeed, there are far more sources of
information available to a President today --and far more sourCes of intelligence
information -- than could have been imagined in 1946.
If President Truman had trouble tracking events in the age of slow moving
paper, imagine coping with the fire hose of information on world events that exists
today. In my view, the CIA's classic mission of separating fact from fiction and
presenting analysis objectively has become only more important.
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If the CIA did not pull it together, sort it out, and present it who would? Some
argue that individual agencies such as State and Defense should do it. But in my view
this would"place an unfair burden on them, Our democratic system obUges these
agencies to formulate policies on behalf of the President and to defend them in public
and before the Congress. That is a heavy responsibility.
T
We also have to question whether it is realistic to assume that they also can
collectand persuasively present jnformation that would often raises questions about
th~ very policies they espouse. That in fact, is the role that erA often fills as an
independent source of information for the President -~ a source that he or she can use to
evaluate the policy positions being presented.
f
,Earlier I asked you to consider whether support for the CIA is an investment
worth making. That question can't be answered without understanding and
appreciating the benefits derived from the clandestine collection of foreign intelhgence.
Espionage, if you will.
When many people assert we no longer need CIA, they often mean the
clandestine part. Welt think about it. The goal of our clandestine collection is very
simple: it is to get for the United States vital information it cannot get in any other way.
"We are not out to duplicate or compete with open sources of information.
Access
to countries like North Korea, Iraq~ Iran, and Libya is denied. and we know that these
governments are trying actively to deceive us.
VV'e m<ly be able to discern how wen they are doing in developing their
capabilities or how they intend to use them by taking pictures frolt'!. the air or from
intercepting their communications. But i can tell you that just as frequently. a human
source is the key to understanding their true intentions and cap,abilities,
When: does that leave us? It leaves us trying to find people on the inside ~~
inside hostile and repressive regimes, inside drug cartels, inside terrorist groups
people who will help fill in the picture or provide the missing pieces of the puzzle,
Seeking this ,nformationF puts our people directly in harrnts way in some of the world's
most dangerous environments. So we must ask seriously, is it worth the effort and the
risk entaHed in trying to mount such operations? To answer that, you have to consider
th;; magnitude of the harm that hostile states or lawless groups could potentiaUy cause.
"'{hUe few may threaten our national survivaL they do dearly threaten American lives,
Indeed, vital interests are often at stake in OUf dealings \vith olher countries even
when those countries do not threaten us with violence or military action, In those cases
we need to know if what they are telling us is true, what they say publicly as wen as
what they say privately. \Vhen there is reason to be skeptical of \vhat other countries
l
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afe saying to us -- when we wonder what their true intentions are -- we at CIA seek
independent verification.
Finally, let me turn to covert action. The National Security Act of 1947 defines it
as action taken abroad to affe~t political, military, or economic conciitlons in other
countries without the role of the US Govemment being revealed or becoming apparent.
Of th(: CIA's major functions, covert action 15 by far the smallest. It is a)so the
most controversial, both with the public and the Congress. During the 40+ years of the
Cold War, Presidents frequently turned to the CIA to undertake operations to thwart
the spread of Communism where diplomatic means were ineffective or unavailable,
and where military action ,\Could have raised the ante to an unacceptable level.
CIA maintains a capability to carry out such operations because every President
since Truman has wanted to have this option av·ailable, 1v1oreover, Congress has
\vanted the President to have this option.
We can argue, of course, about how this capability has been used in the past.
There have been notable failures and impressive successes. But the fact remains: our
leaders have wanted this capability, and they continue to want it.
Nmv, as I approach the dose of my remarks, J'd like to put some questions on
the table \vith the hope that they will give concreteness to your deliberations on the"
added value" t~at intelligence can bring to national policymaking,
Ponder if you will how important it was to the United States to know about the
missiles the Soviets put into Cuba in 1962 or to understand accurately the nature of
Soviet weaponry as we sought to negotiate landmark arms control agreements,
Skippmg thirty years ahead, how important was it in 1992 to accurately
understand North Korea's developing nudear capability as we sought to arrest H?
And now:
•
How important tS it. as the US seeks to disrupt the flow of poisonous drugs into
our country, to have arrested or captured all of the Cali druglords?
•
Or how valuable is it to have intelligence that helped defuse a crisis in the
Taiwan strait was the case in 1996,
as
Or to accurately portray a lessening of civil strife in Rwanda just last year which
•
made it unne<:€ssary to place US forces at fisk there?
•
What value should we place oil intelligence that has helped protect our troops in
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Bosnia -- so that there have been no casualties to date from hostilities.
And how would world leaders have accurately documented the waf crimes that
•
occurred there without the clear intelligence provided to Ollf policymakers and the
United Nations.
•
How important is it to have a CIA that is able to detect those that would steal our
technology secrets for economic and military gain, and to protect our critical civil
infrastructure against computer terrorism.
The list can go on, but my point is a simple one. To those who say the CIA is just
another newsgathering organization or reference service, I have to say that they just
don't "get it". OUf mission is not to observe, or catalog or comment, it is to warn and
protect.
In a world where the US has a significantly smaller military and much less global
presence diplomatically than ten years ago, global intelligence reach becomes an even
more critical deterrent to bad actors. The CIA gives the President and the Congress an
extraordinary unilateral advantage to shape the global environment.
So how important is it to have a CIA? Vitally important.
As CIA celebrated its 50th Anniversary in September, President Clinton honored
us by <lddressing our employees. He said: "As your first customer, I depend upon your
unique, accurate intelligence more than ever. Your work informs every foreign policy
decision I make, from dealings with leaders in the Middle East to Russia."
.
"You, better than most, understand that we are not free from risks. We
still need dedicated men and women to monitor foreign communications and sound the
right alarms. We still need analysts to weave varied strands of data into logical, honest
assessments, and, when necessary, into warnings, and we still need sophisticated
counterintelligence to keep our secrets in and keep foreign agents out."
I've thought a lot about Harry Truman as I prepared this speech. In fact, I
walked by his photo portrait on our ground floor the other d~y. The inscription he
wrote below his photograph reads simply: "To the CIA -- a necessity to the President
of the United States -- from one who knows". My fondest hope is that this conference
will help the American people come to know what I-larry Truman knew.
In clo~iing, I want the American people to know that the world is safer for them
because of the CIA.
•
I want- them to know that we have a clear sense of purpose and mission.
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•
I want them to understand that our intelligence activities are conducted in a way
that is \vorthy of their trust, confidence, and continued support.
•
And J want them to know that the men and women who serve in the Intelligence
Community are the very best that this nation has to offer, America should know that
these men and women take serious risks every single day to protect US lives and US
interests. They do w in sHence, without public acclaim, simply for the love of their
country.
Thank you very much'Hand now ...Iet the debate begin... (This is
UNCLASSlFIED.i
(Edite,r's Note: This is an edited copy of the transcript completed by the Federal
News Service of the Question and Answer session following the OCI's address on the
Future of !ht~ CIA at the Gerald Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan,
November 19, 1997,)
QUEST[ON: How do we, how can we know what Harrv Truman knew if the CIA is not
more forthcoming in declassifying classified materials. I mean, we're right now in a
structure dedicated to preserving historical records, and yet it's become apparent
recently that the CIA systematically destroyed part of this historical record-not
recently, of course, but at one pOint. How do we know that that's not being con.
...idered
even now or in the future?
-
.
DCI: I can only give you a categorical assurance tt«'1t no one is destroying historical
records. Let me say to you that I believe that an open dialogue wIth the American
people about- Ollr successes and our failures are very important
We've recently_ by example, declassified SOO national Estimates, J1,OOO pages of
our thinking with regards to what the Soviet Union wns or wasn'L VVc declassified
thousands- 01 pagt.'S or information from the Venona tapes, which you may know went
back into the: '40s and documented Russian espIonage activities in the,ljnited States.
\'Ve've declassified thousands of feet of Corona imagery to give people a sense of what
our coverage was.
[ believe that we have to continue down the road to have a meaningful
interaction with historians and scholars on critical events in our history because it
serves Qur scholarship, it serveS an instructive use to our future officers. And I believe
it's a benefit to us overall. I don't believe that we should hide behind the cloak of
secrecy. But as the Director of CentrallntelJigence I also believe that I will be fair and
relentless in the protection of sources and methods. And I believe that's a balance I can
strike.
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QUEST[ON: Does the protection of sources nnd methods continue indefinitely into the
future, or can we see a daYt if you have n'50~year rule or a 75-year rule, or whatever,
where at some point we can understand how the elA actually did its job so we know
how well th~ CIA dId its job?
DCI: Well, I can only tell you that it's now a 30 year rule by Executive Order. I can only
ten that each case will be different And there is no automatic formula .... I ,..'ould be
lying to you if I said I can promise you that I'm going to declassify 30,000 documents
tomorrow without ('are for what the sourcing was, the human beings involved, and the
technical methods involved in ollr collection, because some of those people are still
alive and some of those methods are still valuable. Having said thatr 'we'll do it
honestly, we'll try to do it openly, and we'll try to do it in a way that engages you in a
way that I think you'll trust us.
QUESTION: (inaudible)
DCI: There are a number of parts to the issue: offense and defense. We talk about
information opera lions today, but the world is now wiring itself into vast computer
network..:;. It wouldn't shock you to know that people arc attempting to penetrate these
net\'\'~orks <\nd penetrate our information systems for purposes that are not entirely
good,
Someone brought down the 911 system in tv1iami a number of months ago; shut
it down for three month. A hacker hacked-in and attacked our infrastructure. These
...
are the kinds of threats that we are attempting to discern, The sophistication is out
there, the technical damage is great You can be remote, and it's difficult to track.
On the other side,. we see that these computers and these networks also afford us
opportunities. Ar:d we and the military are now trying to think through what the
implication."> are for warfare in the future and what the implications arc for our
domestic protection, So it's a two-sided issue, and it's a very difficult issue, one that the
government is struggling to evolve a policy about
QUESTION: About 25 years ago, there was an efforl made to upgrade the'Defense
Intelligence Agency people and organization. There has been some competition
between th~ CIA and the upgraded DIA. Where do we stand today?
DCI: I think we stand at a very good place. I think that there is a real synergy between
the dviliitn agency and the defense agencies, of which the Defense Intelligence Agency
is only one. We attempt to rationalize our work so that \.ve don't duplicate our work,
particularly in the analytical arena.
But 111.0re importantly, the relationship that we have with our n:Hitary customer
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may be our most important relationship. We pay a lot of time and attention to it. And I
think if you talk to our commanders in Bosnia and ask them about the synergy between
the CIA and defense agencies and the quality of information that's presented, 1 think
they would tell you it's the best intelligence story in the history of the United States,
and it's something we've worked very, very hard on.
QUESTION: What about CIA's relationship to the NSA?
:
DCI: The relationship with NSA is a deep one and an important one for us. Remember,
I talked about clandestine operations-human and technical. And the National Security
Agency is a vital component of our community. And what we've done in the last few
years, that I think is unprecedented, is we have tried to break down Oim Woolsey
started this, as did Bob Cates before him) the stovepipes in these disciplines to get them
to cooperate more effectively, to bring all their talents together to attack problems
together. You not only save some money, but you get more creative in the process.
And I think that those relationships are better than they've ever been.
QUESTION: What can students be, doing in school to prepare themselves for a role in
the CIA.
DCl: That's a good question. We want'a lot of distinguished University of Michigan
students to come join us.
What they can do is be very, very good at what they do. The CIA employee of
the future will be an engineer, will be a physicist, will be a chemist, will be a political
science major. But we're looking for people who have'a deep understanding of their
disciplines, who understand foreign languages and foreign cultures.
But we employ so many different types of people. We're looking for people that
will be challenged by the opportunity we provide them to deal with some of the
toughest problems we face. And in return, we promise them a career structure that will
educate them and nurture them and make them want to stay with us for many, many
years.
So we recruit across disciplines. And the world and the threats we face dictate
that we have a more diverse work force and a talent base that's far different than one
we've ever had.
QUESTION: In the history of the CIA, human sources haven't always been the best
method of gathering intelligence. In fact, during the Cold War, the CIA and American
intelligence was more successful with satellites and technical intelligence, whereas the
East Bloc was extremely successful with human sources. And part of the reason was
th<1t in the Soviet Union, it was a closed society and it wasn't easy to penetrate.
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Now, I wonder, similarly, with the new geographical areas-you've identified
North Korea, Iran-I ~ean, it's going to take a long time training all these students in
those languages and methods. And so I wonder whether one should really develop
that area or maybe build on the technical strength?
DCI: I don'1 think it's an "either-or" proposition, as between the technical and human.
OUf disciplines have to be integrated in a way that they feed off of each other. And
technical collection is enormously important, particularly about big things--military
deployments, rocket tests. These are all things that we need to know about.
But at the end of the day, the penetration of these difficult places-the
penetration of leadership structures, the understanding of how decisions are made
sometimes can be acquired technically, but more often than not, require us to have
people who have the ability to recruit people in those societies. And there is a mix that
we always have to maintain.
It's not an either-or proposition. If you have a wild swing one way, I can
guarantee that your Intelligence Community won't function very, very effectively in the
future.
QUESTION: I know YOLI didn't want to talk too much about the past, but I wondered if
you might address how the culture of the Agency has changed since the Church period,
and when, you know, it was plain that the rule of law was not all that important to the
Agency, particularly overseas, and when the standard now that I think you outlined is
not necessarily the national security, but national interest, defined by the
Administration, I suppose. Just how has the Agency changed from those days?
DCI: I didn't live there in those days. President Ford's right, I wasn't around at the
creation. But let me just say that the commitment to Congressional oversight, for
example, which is far more extensive than Americans understand, the commitment to
play by the rules, the commitment to keep senior policy makers informed, the
commitment not to surprise people, the commitment to think through how acts, if
revealed, would strike the American people-these are all things that are ingrained in
the people that work for us. This is not some rogue operation running around the
world doing things that are inimical to American interests. It's a difficult image to
dispel. That's not what's going on.
These people-as I said in my closing-I didn't throw it out because it was a nice
thing to say-~heir dedication and commitment to this country and to the rule of law
and to the standards of decency that they know Americans expect is something that I
think we are sllcceeding and have succeeded in ingraining in this organization. The
past is full of instances where we can learn from.
I would only note that when we look at the past, the focus has always been on
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�UNCLASSIFIED
what the CIA did; the (DeLIs has never been on what the policymaker asked the CIA to
do. Jt doesn't excuse your operational behavior when it's wrong. but the picture is not
a$ myopic as sometimes it's. portrayed. There's always a policy predicate that leads you
someplace, whether it's a covert action or an operation. And sometimes, historIans and
others should backtrack that all the way back and ask questions historically about.. welt,
what did the policy maker expect? What kind of standards did they impose? What was
their thinking about what these operations would me-an Or not mean? I think we have a
relationship today with our pollcymakers that's deep and abiding, and J think we are at
a far different place- than many people believed we were.
You know, there's a debate about Russian analysis. Harvard has just finished an
extensive study about what we said about the Soviet Union in those YCilfS. People who
did the analysis may present a more mixed picture. It's not always perfect and it's not
always right, but each and every day, what you prin.t is in front of the' President of the
!; nited State·s.
There is no other agency in the government that prints every day and makes
judgments for people. You're going to be wrong sometimes. The'consequenccs of
being wrong are serious, but it's not a "gotcha" game. When you're wrong, you have to
stand up and say you were wrong and correct it And this institution is resilient
enough to do it and own up to what we do wrong or right.
future,
So I think we have exactly the right tension and exactly the right flavor
.
fOf
the
QUESTION: You want to recruit the best you can for the technical and
political/analytical roles. You said that you'd like to hold them for their careers. And
one of the great features of this society is the openness und the mobility of people
between private sector; public sector, Congress, and the CIA. How open are the
records-let's say the talents and skills-of the people who work for you as they seek
jobs in universities or in private think tanks or in corporations (as they leave)? And
what is the cart'Cr set of pathways for your good people on your analytical staff?
DCI: I must tell you, I don't know the complete anSwer. \Vhen someone let'H/t.'S, how
much do they come and tell their employer about. They certainly should have a
responsibility to tell you where they worked. And depending on where they worked,
they can certainly be open ubout what they've done-untess people are under cover
, and remain under cover. Then it becomes a more difficult issue.
QUESTION: What are the pathways of the people building their careers after 15 years
in the CIA? Do they have a publication record? Are they able to document what they
could do intellectually and analytically?
OCI: I think that sometimes they
do~
sometimes they don't It's an excellent question,
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�•
UNCLASSIFIED
hecause I believe that the toughest analytical questions that face us today will require a
more open engagement with our academic community and our business community,
and the trading of ideas in a way that I don't think we've done in the past.
We ('an't-as we focus on very difficult targets-know everything. And our
analysts and the people that do this analytical work do today actively engage the
academic community. do today present ~heir view's, And it's something that we simply
have to de;. more of, so the academic community can make some judgment~ about the
quality of,the people that we have,
So in an era of openness, this is a vital strategy for our success in the'future.
(Til is is UNCLASSIFIED.)
Pmdure'd hv
Offi« of Public Aff'lir,!
Illt~mal
Gomn'l1uu£7Irions Brandt
Susan Brown at 482~0707 or x35545
CL BY, 0669446
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[EXIT11'61 M,iin1Men"Ji
IAEitt1Fn\to iIndei'll
SPEECHES/DOCUMENTS
Misr:n .ED DOCUMENT
REFltED BY
CLINTON LIDRARY STAFl'
1Nt"S;;2D.KJE¥/05
January 28. 1998
Headlines: DCI's Statement on the Worldwide Threat
STATEMENT BY
DIRECfOR OF CENTRAL INTElLIGENCE
GEORGE J. TENET
BEFORE THE SENATE SELECf COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
HEA.RING ON CURRENT AND PROJECfED NATIONAL SECURITY
THREATS
28 January 1998
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to address the Committee again this year
on the worldwide threats to our nationnl security. I have submitted a detaile,d
Statement for the Record and would like to summarize its key points in my opening
remarks.
Before plunging into the details, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to step back for a moment and
put the threats to our security into a broader strategic conte-xt. Scholars and pundits, as
you know/ are still struggling to. capture the eSSence of this post..cold War world we
live in, but no one, in my view, has quite put their finger on the things that make it
uniquely challenging for US interests. From the perspective of an intelligence officer,
Mr. Chairman, I think it comes down to three words: complexity, scope, and speed.
Let me explain what I mean,
•
I say complexity because, as my testimony will make dear, the dangers facing
the United S!·ates today ~~ ranging from chernic;)l \vadnrc to terrorism, regional crises,
and sodetul turmoil ~~ are linked in unprecedented ways and frequently spun multiple
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countries or continents. Dealing with them therefore requires multiple intelligence
disciplines, along with the combined tools of diplomacy, law enforcement, and
sometimes, military force.
•
When I talk about scope, I am snying simply that today we must worry as much
about a hard-to-detect small scale biological weapons producer as we do about the large
scale nuclear weapons that we have foclised on for years. And we mllst help our
military achieve dominance in situations ranging from peacekeeping to sustained
combat.
•
And when I refer to speed, I mean that we arc living in an era of incredibly rapid
technological change. We see this in everything from weapons technology to the global
communications revolution that provides the means for its rapid dissemination and
",:hich is likely to revolutionize our worldview in so many other ways.
Moving on to specifics, Mr. Chairman, [see five key challenges as I look at the world in
1998 and beyond:
•
At the top of my list this year I place a set of transnational issues that pose
dangers to the lives of all Americans, especially American troops abroad, while also
threatening US strategic interests in important ways. These issues include the
proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), international terrorism, drug
trafficking, information warfare and, most recently, the fallout from the Asian financial
cnsis.
•
Second, Mr. Chairman, the stakes remain high for the United States in countries
like China and Russia as they struggle through unprecedented political and economic
transformations.
•
Third, are the challenges facing us from countries that continue in the post-Cold
War era to view the United States with varying degrees of hostility or suspicion--iraq,
North Korea, Libya, Sudan, and in a more complicated way this year, Iran.
•
Fourlh, we are challenged still by regional trouble spots that could flare into
conflict, whether in the Middle East, South Asia, the Aegean, or Bosnia.
•
Fifth, we must continue to be alert to humanitarian emergencies--caused by
natural disasters, ethnic conflict, and foreign government mismanagement--that emerge
rapidly and place heavy demands on,US military and financial resources.
CHALLENGE I: TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES
Mr. Chairman, in today's world few events occur in isolation, and rational boundaries
are much less reliable shields against danger. Emblematic of this new era is an
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assortment of transnational issues that hold grave threats for the United States. That is
where I would like to begin today.
Proliferation
I am most concerned, Mr. Chairman, about the proliferation of WMD because of the
direct threat this poses to the lives of Americans. Despite some successes for US policy
and US intelligence, technologies related to this threat continue to be available, and
potentially hostile states are still developing and deploying WMD-related systems.
Efforts to halt proliferation continue to be complicated, moreover, by the fnet that most
WMD programs are based on technologies and materials that have civil as well as
military applications. Finally, a growing trend toward indigenous production of
WMD-related equipment has decreased the effectiveness of sanctiol)s and other
national and multinational tools designed to counter proliferation.
Chinese and Russian assistance to proliferant countries requires particular attention,
despite signs of progress. My statement for the record provides the details but some
,
key points should be made here.
With regard to China, its defense industries are under increasing pressure to become
profit making organizations--an imperative that can put them at odds with US interests.
'Conventional arm sales have lagged in r~cent years, encouraging Chinese defense
industries to look to WMD technology-related sales, primarily to Pakistan and Iran, in
,order to rt:coup. There is no question that China has contributed to WMD advances in
these countries.
On the positive side, there have recently been some signs of improvement in China's
proliferation posture. China recently enacted its first comprehensive laws governing
nuclear technology exports. It also appears to have tightened down on its most
worrisome nuclear transfers, and it recently renewed its pledge to halt sales of anti-ship
cruise missiles to Iran.
But China's relations with some proliferant countries are long-standing and deep, Mr.
Chairman. The jury is still out on whether the recent changes are broad enough in
scope and whether they will hold over the longer term. As such, Chinese activities in
this area will require continued close watching.
The Russian proliferation story is similar. On paper, Russia's export controls
specifically regulate the transfer of missile-related technologies as well as missile
components. But the system has not worked well, and proliferant countries have taken
advantage of its shortcomings.
Iran is one of those countries. When I testified here a year ago, Mr. Chairman, I said
that Iran, which had received extensive missile assistance from North Korea, would
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probably have medium-range missiles capable of hitting Saudi Arabia and Israel in less
than ten years.
.
Since I testified, Iran's success in gaining technology and materials from Russian
companies, combined with recent indigenous Iranian i1dvances, means that it could
have a medium range missile much sooner than I assessed last year.
Following intense engagement with the United States, Russian officials have taken some
positive steps. Just last week Prime Minister Chernomyrdin issued a broad decree
prohibiting Russian companies from exporting items that would be used for developing
WMD or their delivery systems-whether or not these items are on Russia's export
controllisl'. If it is enforced, this could be an important step in .keeping Iran from
getting the tt:chnolob'Y it needs to build missiles with much longer ranges.
Without minimizing the importance of Russia's response, Mr. Chairman, I must tell you
that it is too soon to close the books on this matter. Russian action is what matters, and
lherefore monitoring Russian proliferation behavior will have to be a very high priority
for some time to come.
Mr. Chairman, in focusing on China and Russia, we should not lose sight of other
proliferators. North Korea is the most notable here, as it continues to export missile
,components and materials to countries of proliferation concern.
-Likewise, Mr. Chairman, in focusing on Iran's acquisition of WMD technology-as we
'should since it is one of the most active countries seeking such materials-we cannot
lose sight of other proliferants.
•
Iraq retains the technological expertise to quickly resurrect its WMD program if
UN inspections were ended.
•
Syria continues to seek missile-related equipment and materials.
•
Despite the UN embargo, Libya continues to aggressively seek ballistic
missile-related equipment, materials, and technology.
Asian Economic Instability
Moving on to a very different transnational challenge, Mr. Chairman, the recent
financial troubles in Asia remind us that global markets are so interconnected--and
that economics and politics are so intertwined--that economic problems in one country
can have far reaching consequences for others.
At the root of this crisis' is a confluence of economic, social, and political factors.
UNCLASSIFIED
�UNCLASSIFIED
•
Soaring growth and financial systems that lacked adequate regulation led to a
speculative boom.
•
Lending decisions by banks and finance companies ignored fundamental
economic risks and when export growth began to slow regionally in 1995, corporate
borrowers had trouble repaying loans. Faced with high levels of short term debt and
limited foreign exchange reserves, Thailand first and then Indonesia and South Korea
were forced to devalue their currencies. Because of the high Jevel of economic
integration and reaction of investors, the currency crisis spread rapidly t<;> other
countries in the region.
•
The crisis has been difficult to resolve, in part because governments must take
some politically risky steps like closing weak banks and shelving projects that will add
to unemployment.
The current troubles in Asia will, of course, have economic CO~t5 (or the United States
most important, a reduction in US exports to the region, But the troubles also carry
political risks, Social tensions which we already see in Indonesia and other states in the
region, are likely to increase as prices go up for things like food and fuel. and as
unemployment rises,
IDJ~!1h1.U.QD.!d Terrorism
'Turninz; now to terrorismr Mr. Chairman, l must stress that the threat to US interests
and citizens \vorldwide remains high. Even though the number of international
terrorist incidents in 1997 was about the same as 1996, US citizens and facilities suffered
mort: than 30 percent of the total number of terrorist attacks--up from 25 percent last
year.
Moreover, there has been a trend toward increasing lethality of attacks, especially
against civilian targets. The most recent examples, of course, are the suicide bombings
in Israel in 1996 and 1997 and the attacks on tourists in LUXOfr Egypt last November.
Perhaps most worrisome, we have seen in the last year growing indications of terrorist
interest in acquiring chemical,. biological, and nuclear weapons,
In addition, a confluence of recent developments increases the risk that individuals or
groups wiU attack US interests. Terrorist passions have probably been inflamed by
events ranging from the US Government's designation of 30 terrorist groups to the
conviction and sentencing of Mir Aimal Kasi and Ramzi Ahn'\ed Yosuf as well as the
ongOing US standoff with Iraq and frustration with the Middle East peace process.
Among :4pedfk countries, Iran remains a major concern, despite the election of a more
moderate president. Since President Khatami assumed office in August, Iran has
continued to engage in activities, such as support for Hizballah and its Palestinian
UNCLASSIFIED
�UNCLASSIFIED
clients, that would not require his specific approval.
Iraq, Sudan, and Libya also bear continued watching, both for their own activities and
for their support of terrorist organizations.
International Narcotics
Turning to the international narcotics threat,) must tell you, Mr: Chairman, that the
illicit drug industry is adapting to the counterdrug successes that we and other
governments have had in recent years. Most worrisome, the narcotics underworld is
becoming more diverse and fragmented. In addition, traffickers are infusing their
business with new technologies to enhance their operations, hide their illicit earnings,
and improve their security.
Mr. Chairman, I do not mean to downplay the impressive progress that has been made
against drug traffickers, especially those that deal in cocaine.
•
You know of the arrest of the Cali kingpins in Colombia-which has disrupted
long-held smuggling patterns there and forced traffickers still at large into hiding.
•
Drug interdiction efforts in Peru, once the world's leading producer of the leaf
used to make cocaine, have seriously damaged that country's drug economy and led to
;a 40 percent decline in cultivation over the last two years.
.
'The cocaine trade, however, is still a
ability to adapt.
form~dable
challenge - thanks to the industry's
•
Our success against the Cali kingpins has nurtured smaller groups that now
dominate trafficking through the Caribbean.
•
Violent Mexican drug cartels are exploiting the Cali mafia's setbacks to wrestle
away a greater share of the international drug business.
•
Despite declines in Peru and Bolivia, coca production continues to expand in
southern Colombia -- where the new ingredient is the involvement of insurgents who
tax drug profits to fund their war against the state.
I'm also concerned, Mr. Chairman, about developments in international heroin
trafficking.
•
Worldwide production of opium -- the source of all refined heroin -- continues at
record levels
•
And heroin traffickers are exploiting weak enforcement institutions in the former
UNCLASSIFIED
�UNCLASSIFIED
Soviet Unior. and Eastern Europe to expand traditional heroin smuggling routes from
the Golden Crescent and, to a lesser extent, the Golden Triangle regions.
As for international organized crime, the globalization of business and technology
have given crime syndicates unprecedented opportunities for micit activities. Yet law
enforcement authorities often remain constrained by national sovereignty and
jurisdictions.
'
Trends that cause us the greatest concern are:
•
An In,:'reasingly sophisticated fjnancial system that includes emerging financial
secrecy havens, stretching from islands in the Caribbean to the South Pacific.
•
A broader array of seemingly legitimate businesses that serve as fronts for
criminal enterprise,
The Increasing role of gray arm.'> brokers in arming rogue states, terrorists, and
•
criminJI groups. The activities of arms brokers make it even more difficult to judge
when such a,::tions are supported by govl."rnments and when they are not.
Inform~.U.~.m..W.~.rJ~J:~
As you know, Mr. Chairman! all of this is occurring in what we all caU the "Information
Age." With that in mind, it is dear that foreign entitles are aware that an increasing
proportion of our civil and military activity depends on the secure and uninterrupted
flow of digital information,
.
In fact, we have identified several countries that have government - sponsored
information warfare programs underway. It's clear that those
developing these programs recognize the value of attackjng it country's computer
systems - both on the battlefield and in the civilian arena. In addition, I believe
terrorist groups and olher non-state actors wilt increasingly view information systems
in the United States as a target.
Nir. Chairman,let me assure you that we are increasing our efforts to uncover
informauon warfare activities, We are ~lso developing the t~ols needed to improve our
ability to detect und counter information warfare attacks.
.
•
This is an el~ormously complex, sensitive, and innovahve endeavor, Mr.
Chairman, that will require insights from law enforcement and the private sector in
order to fully succeed.
UNCLASSIFIED
�UNCLASSIFIED
CHALLENGE II: Russia and China in Transition
Moving beyond these transnational issues, Mr. Chairman, I want to focus for a moment
on a second major challenge: the still unsettled state of affairs in key countries like
Russia and China--one time Cold War adversaries who now have the potential to be
major partners.
Russia
Today we see hopeful signs that the seeds of democracy and a free market economy
sown in Russia just a few years ago have taken root. Moreover~ Moscow cooperates'
with the United States and the West in ways that were unimaginable during Soviet
times.
But whether Russia succeeds as a stabl.e democracy, reverts to the autocratic and
expansionist impulses of its past, or degenerates into instability remains an open
question. "The answer will depend in large part on-how Russia'copes with'several major
challenges.
•
JDemocratic political institutions, while developing, are not yet deeply rooted.
The executive branch. and Communist-dominated Duma often deadlock, while crime
and corruption threaten to undermine confidence in political and economic reform.
<.
Russia has implemented many economic reforms and achieved a measure of
economic stability, but long-term steady growth is still dependent on other reforms
namely ensuring that economic activities are governed by the rule of law.
The Russian military, meanwhile, continues to suffer from serious social and economic
difficulties. Finding the wherewithal to pay the retirement costs of over 250,000
redundant military officers will be a particular challenge.
Despite these difficult times for the military, Russia retains a major nuclear
arsenal--some 6,000 deployed strategic warheads. As long as there is even the slightest
doubt about future political stability in Russia, those weapons must be a major
preoccupation for US intelligence.
•
We
must also remain mindful that Russia continues a wide-range of
'development" programs for conventional and strategic forces.
Finally, while Russia continues to seek close cooperation with the, United States on
matters of mutual concern, it is increasingly strident in opposing what it sees as US
efforts to create a "unipolar" world. And Moscow continues to place a high priority on
keeping others from gaining undue influence in the New Independent States--especially
UNCLASSIFIED
�UNCLASSIFIED
in the energy rich Caucasus and Central Asia.
China
Turning now to China, the leadership there has a clear goal: the transformation of their
country into East Asia's major power and a leading world economy on a par with the
United State,; by the middle of the 21st Century.
It is too soon to say what this portends, Mr. Chairman -- whether China in the future
will be an aggressive or a benign power. What is clear, though, is that China will be an
increasingly influential player -- one that will have the capacity to, at a minimum, alter
our security calculus in the Far East.
Hong Kong'~i 1997 reversion to Chinese rule was peaceful but involved important
changes to the political system. The Chinese Government disbanded the existing
legislative council and installed a hand-picked provisional legislature. A key question
now is whether new legislative elections ~cheduled for May will be free and fair.
Cross-strait relations with Taiwan are still tense. China has not renounced the use of
force and is placing its best new military equipment opposite Taiwan.
Chinese military modernization remains a key leadership goal. China is increasing the
size and survivability of its retaliatory nuclear missile force and is taking important
steps toward building a modern navy capable of fighting beyond China's coastal
waters.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, the post-Deng Xiaoping leadership shows no signs of
abandoning Communist political ideology, although it has committed itself to
market-oriented economic reforms. These are eroding State control over major sectors
of the economy as well as over the daily life of many Chinese citizens.
CHALLENGE III: Regional Troublemakers
Mr. Chairman, I would like now to turn to states for whom the end of the Cold War did
not mean an end to hostility to the United States.
Among these countries, Iran in many respects represents the greatest challenge we will
face over the next year. It appears to us that a genuine struggle is now underway
between hardline conservatives and more moderate elements represented by Iran's new
President Khatami. And so the challenge is how to cope with a still dangerous state in
which some positive changes may be taking place--changes that could, and I stress
could--lead to a less confrontational stance toward the United States.
UNCLASSIFIED
�UNCLASSIFIED
Khatami's strongest card is his electoral mandate - - a 70 percent vote representing
mostly youth and women, as well as ethnic and religious minorities in Iran. Since
assuming office in August, he has made limited but real progress toward fulfilling his
campaign pledges for political and social reforms.
•
.He gained approval for a new cabinet that puts his people in key posts such as
the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Islamic Culture.
•
Censorship is now less oppressive, with previously banned periodicals
reappearing and socially controversial films being shown.
•
And ag~inst this backdrop, there is even renewed debate about a central tenet of
the revolution - - rule by a supreme religious leader.
Progress is likely to be fitful, however, and hard-line elements remain formidable
obstacles.
•
They :~till control the country's defense and-securi~y organizations, for example,
and therefore exert heavy influence on issues most vital to the United States.
Statements by Khatami and his foreign 'ministry suggest he is trying to playa more
. constructive role in the international community. It is simply too early to tell, however,
whether this will lead to demonstrable changes in Iranian policies that matter most to
the United States. We have seen no reduction in Iran's efforts to support Hizballah,
radical Palestinians, and militant Islamic groups that engage in terrorism.
Moreover, even as it attempts to improve its international image, Tehran is continuing
to bolster its military capabilities. Iran is improving its ability potentially to interdict
the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. It has acquired Kilo-class submarines from
Russia and is upgrading its antiship-missile capabilities.
•
And, as I noted earlier, Iran continues its efforts to acquire the capability to
produce and deliver weapons of mass destruction.
North Korea
Turning to North Korea, we also face a more complex challenge than last year--some
progress but in the face of a worsening economic and social situation and a continued
. real military threat.
The North is still observing the terms of the Agreed Framework that directly relate to
freezing its nuclear reactor program. The IAEA has maintained a continued presence at
Yongbyon since the May 1994 refueling of the reactor, and P'yongyang and the IAEA
UNCLASSIFIED
�...
UNCLASSIFIED
continue to discuss steps the North needs to take to come into full compliance with its
safeguards commitments.
Amidst these signs of progress, however, a combination of economic stagnation and
social decay continues to raise doubts about North Korean stability.
North Korea's spreading economic failure is eroding the stability of the regime of Kim
Chong-il. Industrial and agricultural output continues to drop. The North's most
recent fall grain harvest was far less than the 4.5 million tons the North needs to meet
even minimal rations. Crime, corruption and indiscipline, including in the security
services and military, are increasing, and people are more willing to blame Kim
Chong-il for their plight.
While Kim reportedly is aware of the economic problems and their impact on soldiers
and civili[lns, his legitimacy remains closely tied to his father's legacy. As a result, P'
yongyang likely will avoid an avowedly reformist agenda and will try to package any
reform experiments in traditional ideological terms. As such; significant improvements
in the economy do not seem to be in the cards.
Its economic weaknesses notwithstanding, North Korea retains a military with the
capability to inflict serious damage on South Korea and the 37,000 US troops deployed
there.
•
The North's offensive posture along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) means that it
could go!o war with little additional preparation.
•
And North Korea's long-range artillery and surface-to-surface missiles near the
DMZ, some of which could deliver chemical warfare agents, can hit forward defenses,
US military installations, airfields and seaports, and Seoul.
Mr. Chairman, Iraq, under Saddam, continues to present a serious threat to US forces,
interests and allies. Our principal aim must be to ensure that Saddam does not have
weapons of mass destruction or the capacity to regain any he has lost.
As my statement for the record points out in greater detail, we assess that Iraq
continues to hide critical WMD production equipment and material from UN
inspectors.
•
Continued UN sanctions can keep pressure on his regime and cast uncertainty
over Saddam's hold on power.
•
But. as you know Mr. Chairman, Saddam is pushing more aggressively than last
year to erode the sanctions regime.
UNCLASSIFIED
�UNCLASSIFIED
More than seven years of sanctions have had a devastating effect on Iraq's economy.
Inflation is soaring, the civilian infrastructure is deteriorating, and the Iraqi population
continues to suffer from high rates of malnutrition and inadequate services--in part
because of Saddam's manipulation of relief supplies. Key regime officials and support
organizations remain largely immune to the harsh living conditions facing the general
population and even live off revenues generated through illicit trade--a fact that
engenders resentment and poses an underlying threat to Saddam and his family.
While its military forces continue to slowly deteriorate under UN sanctions and the
arms embargo implemented after the Gulf War, Iraq remains an abiding threat to
internal oppositionists and smaller regional neighbors.
CHALLENGE IV: REGIONAL TROUBLE SPOTS
Mr. Chairman, I propose again this year to provide you a brief description of where we
stand in several potential "hot spots." As I did last year, I will focus on the situation in
the Middle East, South Asia, and Bosnia.
Middle East
•
\With regard to the Middle East, Mr. Chairman, my bottom line message must be
that the region is more volatile and more troubled than when I testified here last year.
Many of the threats I have discussed today intersect in the Middle East, where the
historic strife and distrust that mark the region are now aggravated by the spread of
sophisticated weapons programs, an upsurge in terrorism, and demographic trends
that point to heightened social tensions.
•
Against this backdrop, the peace process has foundered, with dangerous
implications for all of the parties.
•
Iraq, as noted earlier, continues to defy the international community's effort to
deny it the means to again commit aggression.
•
And some of the fixed points have begun to change, Iran in particular, but not so
conclusively as to permit a dropping of our guard.
•
Meanwhile, world demand for imported energy will ensure the region's
strategic importance, along with the active, and sometimes competitive, engagement of
many nations.
In short, Mr. Chairman the period ahead is one of enormous challenge for the United
States as it seeks to ensure stability, prosperity, and peace in this most critical of
regions.
UNCLASSIFIED
�UNCLASSIFIED
South Asia
In South Asia, relations between India and Pakistan remain poor. The long-standing
dispute over Kashmir remains a major sticking point. A modest India-Pakistan
dialogue is underway, though progress is certain to be slow and subject to abrupt
setbacks. "We cannot be sure this tentative dialogue will continue when a new Indian
government assumes office after national elections in March.
The stakes of conflict are high, because both countries have nuclear capabilities and
have or are developing ballistic missile delivery systems. Although Indian and
Pakistani officials say deterrence has worked for years, it would be at risk in a crisis.
Bosnia and the Balkans
Turning to Bosnia, Mr. Chairman, the story is progress but with,significant remaining
challenges. On the positive side, developments in recent months have somewhat
improved the prospects for Dayton implementation.
•
The emergence in the Republika Srpska of a government backed by Muslim and
Croat deputies is a breakthrough that --if sustained -- could accelerate the pace of
Dayton implementation.
•
At the same time, the High Representative is using his new authority to impose
solutions on the parties to reinforce central institutions.
•
Bosnia's military forces remain demobilized with their heavy weapons stored in
sites that are regularly inspected by SFOR. Furthermore, each army has significantly
reduced its heavy weapons under the Dayton-mandated arms control agreement.
•
Iran has terminated its military aid and training in Bosnia and has focused its
involvement on economic assistance.
•
Although Bosnians are a long way from regaining their pre-war standard of
living, significant economic growth has resumed and unemployment is starting to
decline.
Relatively Iit.tle progress has been made, however, in implementing minority returns
and other provisions of Dayton relating to freedom of movement and resettlement. The
OSeE goal of 220,000 returns in 1997 was only about half met, and the bulk of those
who did return went to majority areas.
Looking to the future, most Bosnians recognize that continued international
engagement is essential for keeping the peace. Such involvement is required to
UNCLASSIFIED
�..
UNCLASSIFIED
continue weakening the hardline natioryalists who are obstructing Dayton, and national
elections in 1998 might increase the political clout of opponents of the nationalists who
currently dominate the three communities.
In addition, a number of volatile issues could still disrupt the gradual process of
reconciliation. These include the Brcka arbitration decision--postponed last year but
expected in March and the UN's stated goal of returning 50,000 refugees to minority
areas during the first six months of 1998. In addition, continuing mutual distrust
between Muslims and Croats will hamper the effort to create a functioning Federation.
I must also note the threat of instability in the southern Serbian province of Kosovo,
where animosity remains high between the 90 percent Albanian majority and th~ local
Serbian residents. There is increasing support for violence as a way to resolve the
situation.
Turning to the Aegean, there is reason for increased concern about tensions between
Greece and Turkey, particularly in the wake of the EU summit decision to proceed with
membership negoti<1tions with Cyprus--while rebuffing Turkey's,application--and the
expected arrival of SA-lO air defense batteries from Russia this summer. Ongoing
disputes over air and sea delineations in the Aegean have also heightened
long-standing Greek-Turkish animosity.
CHALLENGE V: HUMANITARIAN CHALLENGES
Mr. Chairman, last year I concluded my briefing by discussing with you the challenge
posed to US citizens and interests by humanitarian crises whose origins often go back
many years but which can escalate with dramatic suddenness. I regret to·say that the
dimension of this challenge remains unchanged.
•
.The totality of the problem is similar to that I described last year: 34 million
people worldwide unable to return to their homes; more than 20 million internally
displaced; 14.5 million refugees.
As it was last year, Africa is the region most troubled by these crises--with attendant
calls on US and UN resources to assist relief operations and attendant risks to US
citizens caught up in violence.
We have no reason to believe that 1998 in Africa will be any more stable than was 1997.
The instability in central Africa that led to the overthrow of governments in Zaire and
Congo (Brazzaville) last year lingers, and it is probably only a matter of time until
serious problems erupt again in Burundi and Rwanda. Apart from ethnic and polilical
conflict, for the coming months the impact of EI Nino, particularly in southern and
UNCLASSIFIED
�".
UNCLASSIFIED
eastern Africa, will bear careful watching--especially water shortages and consequent
food scarci ty.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
I hope these and the other challenges I have discussed with you today illustrate why I
opened these remarks by referring to complexity, broad scope, and speed as the
tOllchstones of this new era. These challenges will require the most sophisticated
intelligence collection and analysis that we can produce. Only by continuing to invest
in this kind of effort can the Intelligence Community play the role it must in protecting
American lives, guarding American int~rests, and slistaining American leadership.
Thank you Mr. Chairman, I would welcome your questions at this time.
Pr:odnced bv
OfficE" oCPnblir ,-\ffair,,,"
Int(,l1.l<ll Communications Bl'anch
FOl' gu('stions pl('as(' caU
Susan Brown at 482-0707 or x35545
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SPEECHES/DOCUMENTS
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CLn-.-roN LIURARY Sli\FF
INf~DAill¥L4/o5
April 6, 1998
Headlines:
(U) DCI Remarks on "Information Security Risks.
Opportunities, and the Bottom Line~
Remarks as prepared for delivery by OCI George J. Tenet at the Sam Nunn
NntionsBank PoHcy Forurn
(U)
('Information Security Risks. Opportunities, and the Bottom Line"
.
Georgia (nstitute of Technology, Atlanta
April 6, 1998
Senator Nunn, President Clough, Dean Freeman, General Marsh, Ladies and
Gentlemen:
On Febnmry 26, the Washington Post reported that eleven US military systems were
subjected to an "'electronic assault" \Vhile the perpetrators were not initially known,
they hid their tracks by routing their attack through the United Arab Emirates
computer systems, While no classified Bystems were penetrated and no classified
records Vlere accessed, logistics, administration, und accounting systems were accessed,
These systems are the central core of datn necL"Ssary to manage our military forces and
deploy them to the field, In the end, we found that two young hackers from California
had perpetr,lted the attacks via the UAE under the diredion of a teenage hacker from
Israel.
This shouldn't surprise us. A recent DoD study said that DoD systems were attacked a
quarter of a million times in 1995. As a test, a Defense Department organization that
same year conducted 38,000 attacks of their own. They were successful 65 percent of
the time. And 63 percent of the attacks went completely undetected.
UNCLASSIFIED
�UNCLASSIFIED
We h<lve spent years making systems interoperable, easy to access, and easy to use. Yet
we still rely on the same methods of security that we did when data systems consisted
of large mainframe computers, housed in closed rooms with limited physical access.
Ladies and Gentlem"en, we are currently building an information infrastructure-the
most complex systems the world has ever known-on an insecure foundation. We have
ignored the need to built trust into our systems. Simply hoping that someday we can
add the needed security before it's too late is not a strategy.
Protecting our critical information infrastructure is an issue that I am deeply concerned
about and one that requires attention f~om us all. OUf national security and our
economic well being depend upon it, and I am th.mkful that Senator Nunn and others
have chosen to bring this issue to the forefront to engage the leaders of industry in
finding creative solutions to this difficult issue.
I want to explore three themes today.
--First, we are growing increasingly dependent on information systems for commercial
and government activities.
--Second, our adversaries recognize this dependence and are developing tools to attack
our information systems.
--Third, protecting our systems will require an unprecedented level of cooperation
between government and the private sector.
Our American way of life increasingly relies on electronic networks for the flow of
essential information. As General Marsh just said, information networks are becoming
a backbone service we take for granted, much like we take electricity for granted today.
Every time we flick on a light switch, every time we use an ATM, every time we pick up
the phone ,we rely on the secure and uninterrupted flow of digital information and the
computers that control it.
Protecting our critical information systems and the data on them will be key to our
survival as the world's leading economic power and as the world's leader in
information technology. You know far better than I that the Internet and other digital
networks will create enormous opportunities for American business in a world where
electronic commerce and information flows without geographic boundaries.
The business of national security also relics on information technology and information
systems. More than 95 percent of all defense telecommunications travel on commercial
circuits and networks. Many of these networks provide vital connectivity between
facilities here and those overseas. These links allow the Defense Department to operate
with greater efficiency and at considerable savings.
UNCLASSIFIED
�UNCLASSIFIED
Operation Desert Storm highlighted the increasing reliance of US forces on
informatiol1 based technologies. Seven years ago deploying to the Gulf meant not only
high-tech weaponry and sophisticated intelligence systems but also a communications
volume of 100,000 messages and 700,000 telephone calls a day. There is little doubt that
information superiority will be key to surviving and winning military conflicts in the
21st century.
4
Unfortunately, our heavy and growing societal and strategic dependence on
information technologies and information systems has created vulnerabilities
vulnerabilities to our economic institutions, to the systems supporting public needs, to
ollr privacy, and to our military capabilities. I know that the extent of our vulnerability
is still to be studied and debate.
While the technical experts sort out the strengths and weaknesses in our information
'systems, L as the Director of Central Intelligence, have the job of determining what
foreign entities may be doing to penetrate, damage, or destroy our information systems;
in short, I'm talking about Information Warfare.
The White House, the Congress, the Defense Department, and public audiences like you
increasingly ask me about the IW threat. I am here to tell you that the threat is real and
it's growing.
The number of known potential adversaries conducting research on information attacks
is increasing rapidly and includes intelligence services, military organizations, and
non-state entities.
Technology will increase the sophistication of their capabilities and will continue to
reduce the cost of attack and the risk if security remains where it is today.
So it is reasonable to expect that, unless something is done to improve security, the
number of attacks and the damage they can do will continue to grow.
Attackers have plenty of incentives.
--Trillions of dollars in financial transactions and commerce moving over a medium that
has minimal protection and sporadic law enforcement.
--Increasing quantities of intellectual property residing on networked systems.
--And the opportunity to disrupt military effectiveness and public safety, with elements
of surprise and anonymity.
Who would do such a thing? Attackers include national intelligence and military
UNCLASSIFIED
�UNCLASSIFIED
organizations, terrorists, criminals, industrial competitors, hackers, and aggrieved or
disloyal insiders. Each of these adversaries is motivated by different objectives and
constrained by different levels of resources, technical expertise, access to the target, and
risk tolerance.
All of these adversaries are competent to conduct cyber attacks~ but the state sponsored
terrorists and militarY IW people pose the greatest risk to our critical infrastructure
because they have the greatest knowledge and resources.
I can tell YOli that foreign governments and their military services are paying increasing
attention to the concept of "Information Warfare." Foreign military writings discuss
the importance of disrupting the flow of information in combat. The battlespace of the
future will also extend to our domestic information infrastructure, such as our electric
power grids and our telecommunications networks-in short, the foundations of our
economy.
Terrorists and criminal groups have been using encryption and other information
technologie~; to hide their operations for some time. Terrorist groups now have their
own web pages. The emerging trend now is for these groups to use those technologies
offensively; that is, to gain access to information systems in order to damage them or to
ste<ll data. I can tell you that the level of sophistication of their attacks is growing.
The IW-threat is something we all have to worry about and take action to protect
ourselves against. Many of the threats that private sector CEOs face are similar to ours
in government-the same cyber tools, techniques, and skills are used against both our
assets. I call this "shared vulnerabilities." Though expensive, building reliable security
measures is less costly than suffering the theft of the "crown jewels." And the more
widespread the use of effective security technology, the lower the cost. Bank CEOs
don't think twice about making physical security investments in vault doors, alarms,
and so forth-investments which are hugely more costly than the investments currently
being made in cyber security. But how many vault doors will banks need in an era of
cyber cash and smart cards?
The most important action that I can take as Director of Central Intelligence is to
provide adequate warning of cyber threats to our nation's security dccisionmakers in
Washington and military command posts overseas. Through existing mechanisms,
threat information can be passed to the private sector.
To perform our warning function, intelligence analysts need to have the information
that will allow them to assess foreign intentions and capabilities.
Unfortunately, cyber threats are a difficult intelligence target. They are cheap, they
require little infrastructure, and the technology required is dual use. In short, they are
exceptionally easy to conceal.
UNCLASSIFIED
�·
.
UNCLASSIFIED
In addition, intrusion detection technology is still in its infancy. When attacks are
detected, the source of the attack is often disguised. Attacks are difficult to trace,
particularly since the US government is not allowed to conduct hot pursuit without a
warrant.
These arc enormous challenges and we in the Intelligence Community are taking them
on. Most importantly, we have taken steps to focus our analytic and collection
resources on this threat. I have also taken steps to increase the level of cooperation
between intelligence analysts and their counterparts in the law enforcement
community.
We as a nation need to develop totally new ways of thinking about this problem. Just
as we took on the Soviet nuclear threat in the middle of this century, we will need new
collection disciplines, new analytic approaches, and new partnerships to deal with the
information warfare threat in the 21st century. Neither government nor industry can
solve these problems alone. We will have a much better chance of finding solutions if
we work together over the long haul.
So what is needed is obvious to all-security. What is less discussed is the need to bind
a system of trust to the security systems. This is the only way that security will be truly
achieved.
What do I mean? Security is concerned with locks, fences, and guards. Trust is about
whether they work. In network terms, security is not just about encryption, but also is
about authentication, digital signatures, data integrity, and non-repudiation. Trust is
about key management, digital certificates, and policy-such as what your privileges
are, what you are authorized to do with your digital signature.
Much of the public discussion and rhetoric is about encryption-with little attention
focused on what is needed to make the use of encryption trustworthy. The technology
to bring good information security to networks is fairly well developed and
understood. It is based on the use of public key encryption and digital signatures. The
means to provide trust is less well understood and is called key management
infrastructure. It is the system hat binds public keys to users and provides the trust
component in electronic security.
The true potential of encryption will not be realized without key management
infrastructures that provide this trust. These infrastructures allow the generation and
distribution of encryption keys to a large number of people, making it possible for
millions to communicate easily with each other without advance preparation to
distribute an encryption/decryption key. They ensure that communications across
networks are trustworthy-so that individuals will have confidence in the identification
of those with whom they communicate.
UNCLASSIFIED
�UNCLASSIFIED
Efforts to provide key management infrastructure services for products with encryption
are currentl), uncoordinated, immature, and lagging behind the introduction of
electronic commerce services.
The result is twofold:
--First, products without a supporting infrastructure are usually not interoperable or
scalable.
--Second, the security of new network services is poor. The use of encryption without
digital certificate services, digital signature, and authentication provide inadequate
trust for widespread use.
The problem of trust will require shared effort across industry and government.
Neither of liS can solve it alone. The lack of trust is neither an entirely public nor an
entirely private problem.
The risk electronic networks pose without solving the trust issue if common to
government, business, and citizens alike. Reducing that risk will require coordinated
efforts within and between the private and public sectors.
Ladies and Gentlemen, we cannot keep building new capabilities on a poor foundation
of security. We cannot ignore the need to build trust into our information systems any
longer. It is folly to hope that someday we can add needed elements before it's too late.
The longer we wait, the more our country is exposed, and the costlier it will be to
address the problem.
Think about it-we share the same network with our adversaries. I will say it again:
We are staking our future on a resource that we have not yet learned to protect. The
number of known potential adversaries conducting research 011 information attacks is
growing rapidly. Technology is increasing the sophistication of their capabilities.
Meanwhile, if our security remains where it is now, the risks and costs of attacking us
will keep getting lower. Government and industry are in this together and we must
work the problems together.
The need for cooperation between government and industry in building trustworthy
key management infrastructure is paramount to meeting our common interests of
electronic networks that meet our business needs without introducing vulnerabilities
into those systems.
This may be among the most important questions for American leadership as we
approach the next century. The vitality of our industry depends on it, the security of
our country depends on it, and the solutions depend on trust.
UNCLASSIFIED
�UNCLASSIFIED
If we are going to lead the world in information technology, we must recreate the trust
that existed betvveen our government and industry that allowed us to lead the free
world for over 40 years. We still have the power to lead by our example, and we still
have time to do this right.
I want to·again express my gratitude to Sam Nunn, Georgi.. Tech, Emory University,
and NationsBank for giving me this opportunity to present my perspective on this
compelling national security issue. Sam Nunn continues to be a driving force on this
topic and I am looking forward to continuing the dialogue. (This is UNCLASSIFIED.)
Offie e of Public Aff'lil'sl
lute-mal COmmlllllC arions Bnmch
For question:'> )le<lse c<lll
Susan Brown at 482-0707 or x35545
CL BY:
0668446
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
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IEXIT to Main Menul
Return to Index
UNCLASSIFIED
�.•
..
UNCLASSIFIED
.- .--<'
SPEECHES/DOCUMENTS
,<~:.",
. ." ':.
,
,
,
.
' ."
"
,
.' ;i -.
Headlines =
.,' ",
MISFltED DOctJ~mNr
REFlJ.r~1J [j't
C
LINToN LllllW<y S'fAl'P
lNr:&PllATE¥2ijc6
(U j I;;DCT·"_-Staternent_on, Declassification
~
(U) DCI Statement on Declassification
The core of my job as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) is to mobilize the
collection and analytical capabilities of the Central Intelligence Agency and the other
U.s, intelligt!nce agencies to ensure that our national leaders have the information
necessary for info~med policy decision making. Although much of our work must be
done in se<:,recYf.we have a responsibility to the American people, and to history, to
account for our'actions and the quality of our work., Accordingly, [have made a serious
commitment to the public release of information that with the",passage of time no longer
needs to be protected under our security classification system. )'
,
,
Indeed, the CIA, like all agencies of the U.s. Government, is charged by
Executive Order 12958 with instituting declassification programs to provide for the
timely release of information it had previously classified. While intelligence information
often retains its sensitivity for many years-even dl"Cades--there will evenhlally come a '
time when the information produced by such sources and methods can be released to
the public without harm to the national security. \Vhile the Executive Order provides
uS authority to pr'Otect the identity of our confidential human sources indefinitely, and
we must take care not to violate the confidence of any foreign government who chooses
to work with us,;the.goal ofour declassification program h;"toidenHfy and release as.:;..;
cmuch of the information as,we can; as.soon,as,we can, without harm to out nationaL'.J
..1'~f1Lrity interest~,·~
Growing Demand for [nformation
~ suspect, in fact, that the public has relatively little appreciation of the extent to
which the CIA is already involved in declassification efforts,)
•
We declassify records requested by the John p, Kennedy Assassination Records
UNCLASSIFIED
~
�".
UNCLASSIFIED
Review Board.
We declassify records requested by the State Department for its Foreign Relations
aftlle United Stutes series.
•
•
We declassify records in response to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
requests. And the public is probably unaware that.not only are we required to answer
requests from American citizens and corporations, but also from foreign nationals and
foreign organizations as welL
~
We df'dn~sify records jn response to special requests from the Executive Branch
and Congress, to include documents pertaining to POW IMJA matters, foreign human
rights abuses, Gulf Vv'ar Veterans lilnesses, Nazi gold, and a myriad of other topics
under investigation by Executive agencies or congressional committees at any given
time,
•
And we are reviewing for declassification all nonexempt records 25-years old or
older. In the case of the CIA, this amounts to some 40-60 million pages of classified
materials,
~
"
;
:
\
"
\
None of this is easy. There are no shortcuts here. It takes experienced,
knowledgeable people sittlng down with each dOC\lment and going over it page by
page, line by line. There is no alternative. We take our obligation to protect those who
have worked with us in the past very seriously, We also have to consider the Impact of
release on our ongOing dlplomatic and mtelligence relationships.
A mistake on our part can put a life in danger' or jeopardize a bIlateral relationship
integral to our security.
n
<J
t :,"")
Suffice it to sail the.demands for-declassification review Jar exceed the
:: capabilities of the. personnel who are available,under current budgetary limitations-to
perform it. This'forces us to make chokes in terms of what information will be
reviewed first In setting these priorities;.the Agency is guided by its responsibilitie~=)]
under the low and Executive Order, as well as by the policies established by the DCI.;,
J'
.........
Agency Releases
As () result of these efforts over' the past five years; a significant amount of
t::material of higtoricaUmportance has'been declassWed)
•
Over 227,000 pages of records on the assasslrlation of President Kennedy have
been reJeased to the National Archives and Records Administration.
•
Over 50(J National Intelligence Estimates and more than 11,000 pages of finished
UNCLASSIFIED
�"
UNCLASSIFIED
intelligence on the former Soviet Union have been released; we expect to release
another 100 Soviet NIEs this year.
About 1,800 pages have been released on the Guatemala covert action and
•
approximately 3,000 pages are ready for release on the Bay of Pigs.
We have released over 4,000 pages from our intelligence journal, Studies in
Intelligence, and have reviewed over 14,000 pages for the State Department's Foreign
Relations of the United States series.
•
•
An additional 31,000 pages of materials on various subjects have been released
since 1992, including history source documents, monographs, and histories.
Improvements:
In order to improve further our ability to review and retease information,
effective last October, I established the Office of Information Management (OIM) to
serve as the umbrella organization and focal point for all declassification and release
programs within the Agency. I have asked the Director of OIM, Ed Cohen, to ensure
that all of our programs are effectively coordinated and our limited resources efficiently
managed, taking the fullest possible advantage of the latest automation technology. I
~am pleased to report that our output is increasing and shortly we will report numbers
that will dwarf our prior successes.
I also tasked Ed with ensuring that we have in place a records management
system that preserves and protects our records in full compliance with the guidelines
established by the National Archives and Records Administration. Indeed, without a
records management system that facilitates the identification of pertinent records in a
timely manner, the declassification effort is itself made considerably more difficult.
Plans for Historical Declassification
Notwithstanding these improvements in our ability to cope with the growing
demand;_we,continue,to face.the dilemma·of.where·to apply our available resources.~, . >,)
This becomes,particularly important, I believe,.where documents,of.historicai interest ,I
t::are~con<;.~rned:~Out of this vast universe of classified information potentially available
for review, where do we focus our declassification efforts that would make the most
difference?
cI-am'announcing.today the priorities~~h~t will guide the Agency's historical
declassification efforts. for_the foreseeable.ftiture._).
Top priority must continue to be given to the review and release of information
UNCLASSIFIED
�UNCLASSIFIED
related to the JFK assassination for so long as that particular inquiry continues, We
must satisfy our statutory and moral obligations in this regard.
Top priority must also be given on a continuing basis to support of the State
Department's Foreign Relafions of the United States series, which constitutes the basic
historical r""ord of American foreign policy. It is important that the public, through
access to these volumes, be able to judge for itself the contribution rna.de by the
Intelligence Community to the successful conduct of the Cold War.
I should also note that the Congress has asked that I give priority to the review
and release of information on Guatemala-Honduras human rights violations. We are
responding to requests from the Guatemala Historical Clarification Commission and to
the Honduran Government Human Rights Ombudsman, and responding to hundreds
of Freedom of Information Act requests on this subject. We are doing everything we
can to complete work on thjs by the end of the summer.
Anhe.next level of priority.are,records that will enable the public to understand ..
the_role tttgllltelligence Community. in the shaping of national policy. :ro assist me in
establishing priorities among these records, I have consulted with my Historical Review
Panel, chaired by Dr. S. Frederick Starr from Johns Hopkins University's School of
Advanced International Studies, and composed of six other distinguished academics
and historians: Dr. Lewis Bellardo, Dr. Robert jervis, Dr. Ernest R. May, Dr. Page
Putnam Miller~ Dr. Robert Pastor, and Dr. Henry S. Rowen. After considering the
recommenciatiors made to me by a majority of the panel and consulting with my own
staft-I-have directed the Office of [nforrnation Management to reviewtb-0se records that
pertain to policymaking at the highest leve'5-that IS, ~ational Intelligence Estimates 1
cand.the National Intelligence I?ail!::.r..
or
I
'
In addition, to help scholors research/explore the contribution of intelligence to
~ the development of policy;.thes.ffice files of'former Directors of CentrallntclligencE:..1
ti calso..
<
~iIl
be reviewed for declassification. In keeping with normal archival practice,.wc'
c.will.proceed 2ystematicallx.,to consider the earHest records fi~t;"presuming they would
_"be les~_?:ertsitive and.result in the.release.of a gt:~~J!:!'.E~~ber of c!~~_m~Dts. \We also
will consider records within a complete series rather than selecting records that
' pertained to particular topicS in_. Qrder that historians could gain as complete a picture as
[\ possible of a particular situation), I am hopeful that as certain projects such as the JFK
':assassination records review are completed, additional resources can be directed
toward this effort.
f;
Finally, I want to comment on the plans announced by two of my predecessors to
review for possible declassification records on 11 covert actions undertaken in the 19505
and 19605. The first tranche of documents--consisting of some 3200 pages--reiated to
the Bay of Pigs soon will be released to the public. The remaining records related to the
UNCLASSIFIED
'>
�UNCLASSIFIED
Bay of Pigs will be reviewed for release immediately thereafter. Work also is
continuing on Guatemala--about 1800 pages were released to NARA last May and some
16-17,000 additional pages are being processed for release. We also will initiate
declassification reviews, as soon as resources are available, of the materials involved in
the covert actions undertaken during the Korean War, and in the Congo, Laos, and
Dominican Republic during the 19605. These reviews will be undertaken in the order I'
ve just described.
We will address the remaining five covert adions identified by my predecessors
as soon as the others have been completed. The (act is, we do not have sufficient
resources at the current time to review the documentation involved in these five
remaining covert nctions, Moreover, in some cases.. because of national security and
foreign policy concernsr the amount of information that could be released about a
particular program would be limited, and in other cases~ the vo]ume of documentation
is so great that reviewing them for declassification would virtually prevent the release
of other documents, which, in the view of my Historical Advisory Panel, should be
given a higher priority. These include Nationallntelltgence Estimates and finished
intelligence analyses on the former Soviet Union, as well as the early records of the
Office of the DCI. I have opted, therefore, to hold the reviews of these covert actions in
abeyance for the time being.
I also \vish to point out that our support to the St1.te Department's Foreign
Relations scries--whkh 1 mentioned earlier wil) be given top priority-will itself 1ead to
the publication,of information concerning covert actions as they relate to the subject
matter of particular volumes in that series. Indeed, it's possible that certain of the
covert action programs selected by my predecessors for declassification review could be
addressed on a more expedited basis as part of our support to the Foreign Relations
senes,
In closing, let me reitcrat/my belief that the American people are best served by
having available the informatiori\necessary to understand how their government
functionv1n the case of CIA, this means information about il activities that allow the
...
public to judge its impact and effectiveness over the years.
No other nation's foreign intelligence agency has voluntarily released as much
information about its past as has the Central Intelligence Agency. And~wit~in.the.limjts-".t.
dmposed.upon me by·law not to jeopardize intelligence.sour~~s g~ ~~.tl}(),ds·;)mpinge on
oudiaison-relations with other cOi.mtries; or interfere with our ability to cairv out the
Agency's miSSion, we wiIi build upon that ¥ecord in the years ahead. (This
UNCLASSIFIED.)
i;
UNCLASSIFIED
�..
...
,
.
UNCLASSIFIED
IhdllC.d bv
Office of Public Affairs}
lute-nUll Couumuucatiou5 Branch
For gue.'itiolts Illease c...n
4St·om 0,' x:177§S
CL BY, 0668446
CL REASON. 1.5(c)
DECL on:
Xl
DRV FRM;
Multiple Categories
UNCLASSIFIED
�UNCLASSIFIED
IEXITiil\1M~jii1MeF!ll
.Betum~tmlrKteXll
SPEECHES/DOCUMENTS
July 15, 199B
Headlines~
{U)
DCI
Stateme~t
on Declassification
(U) DCI Statement on Dedassification
The core of my job as Director of Centra! Intelligence (DCI) is to mobilize the
colIcctkm and annlytkai capabilities of the CentrallnteHigence Agency and the other
L'.S, intelligence agencies to ensure that our national leaders have the Information
necessary for informed policy decision making. Although much of our work must be
done in secrecy, we have a responsibility to the American people~ and to history, to
account for our action..'i and the quality of our work. Accordingly, I have made a serious
commitment to the public release of inform<iuon that with the passage of time no longer
needs to be protected under our security classification system,
Indeed~ the CIA: Hke all' agencie's of the U.S. Governmenf, is charged by
Executive Order 12958 with instituting declassification programs to provide for the
timely release of information it had previously classified. While intelligence information
often retains its sensitivity for many years-~even decades-there will eventually come a
time when the information produced by such sources and methods can be released to
the public without harm to the national security,
the Executive Order provides
us authority to protect the identity of our confidential human sources indefinitely, and
we must lnkl:!' care not to violate the confidence of any foreign government who chooses
to work with us, the goal our dedassification program is to identify and release as
much of the information as we can, as soon tiS we can, without harm to our national
security interests.
""nile
or
Growing Demand for Infonnation
[suspect, in fact, that the public has reliltively little appreciation of the extent to
which the CIA is already involved in declassification cHarlo;.
•
We declassify records requested by the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records
Review Board.
UNCLASSIFIED
�"
UNCLASSIFIED
•
We declassify records requested by the State Department for its Foreign Relations
of fhe United States series.
•
We declassify records in response to Freedom of Information Act (FOrA)
requests. And the public is probably unaware that not only are we required to answer
requests from American citizens and corporations, but also from foreign nationals and
foreign organiz..1.tions as welL
•
We declassify records in response to special requests from the Executive Branch
and Congress, to include documents pertaining to POW /MIA matters! foreign human
rights abuses Gulf vVar Veterans illnesses, Nazi gold, and a myriad of other topics
under investigation by-Executive agencies or conh'Tcssional committees at any given
time.
f
•
And we are reviewing for declassification all nonexempt records 25-years old or
older, In the case of the CIA, this amounts to some 40-60 million pages of classified
materials.
None of this is casy. There are no shortcuts here. It takes experienced,
knowledgeable people sitting down with each document and going over it page by
page, line by line. There is no alternative. We take our obligation to protect those who
have worked with LIS in the past very seriously. We also have to .consider the impact of
release on Oitr ongoing diplomatic and intelligence relationships.
A mistake on our part can put a life in danger or jeopardiz~.a bilateral relationship,
integral to our security,
. .
Suffice it to say, the demands (or declassification review far exceed the
capabilities of the personnel who nre available under current budgetnry limitations to
perform it. This forces us to make chokes in terms of what information will be
reviewed first. In setting these priorities, the Agency is guided by its responsibilities
under the law and Exe<:utive Order, as well as by the policies established by the DCL
Agency Rele.ses
As a result of these efforts over the past five years, a significant amount of
material of historical importance has been d«'Classified:
•
Over 227,000 pages of records on the jjSSflssJnation of President Kennedy have
been released to the National Archives and Records Administration.
•
Over 500 National Intelligence Estimates and more than 11,000 pages of finished
intelHgence on the former Soviet Union have been released; we expect to release
another 100 Soviet NrEs this year,
UNCLASSIFIED
�.
UNCLASSIFIED
•
About 1,800 pages have been released on the Guatemala covert action and
approximately 3,000 pages are ready for release on the Bay of Pigs.
•
We have released over 4,000 pages from our intelligence journal, Studies in
Intelligence, and have reviewed over 14,000 pages for the State Department's Foreign
Relations of the United States series.
An additiona131,OOO pages of materials on various subjects have been released
•
since 1992, including history source documents, monographs, and histories.
Improvements:
In order to improve further OUf ability to review and release information,
effective last October, I established the Office of Information Management (OIM) to
serve as the umbrella organization and focal point for all declassification and release
programs within the Agency. I have asked the Director of OIM, Ed Cohen, to ensure
that all of our programs arc effectively coordinated and our limited resources efficiently
managed, taking the fullest possible advantage of the latest automation technology. I
am pleased 10 report that our output is increasing and shortly we will report numbers
that will dwarf our prior successes.
I also tasked Ed with ensuring that we have in place a records management
system that preserves and protects our records in full compliance with the guidelines
established by the National Archives and Records Administration. Indeed, without a
records management system that facilitates the identification of per.tinent records in a
timely manner, the declassification effort is itself made considerably more difficult.
Plans for Historical Declassification
Notwithstanding these improvements in our ability to cope with the growing
demand, we continue to face the dilemma of where to apply Ollr available resources.
This becomes particularly important, I believe, where documents of historical interest
are concerned. Out of this vast universe of classified information potenti<llly available
for review, where do we focus our declassification efforts that would make the most
difference?
I am ;mnouncing today the priorities that will guide the Agency's historical
declassification efforts for the foreseeable future.
Top priority must continue to be given to the review and release of information
related to th4;! JFK assassination for so long as that particular inquiry continues, We
must satisfy our statutory and moral obligations in this regard.
UNCLASSIFIED
"',
.
.
,
�UNCLASSIFIED
Top priority must also be given on a continuing basis to support of the State
Department's Foreign Relafions of the Ullifed Statt!s series, which constilutes the basic
historica1 reeord of American foreign policy. It is important that the public, through
access to these volumes, be able to judge for itself the contribution made by the
Intelligence Community to the successful conduct of the Cold War.
I should also note that the Congress has asked that I give priority to the review
and release of information on Guatemala~Honduras human rights violations. We are
responding to requests from the Guatemala Historical Clarification Commission and to
the Honduran Government Human Rights Ombudsman, and responding to hundreds
of Freedom of Information Act requests on this subject. We are doing everything we
Can to cornplete work on this by the end ot the summer.
At the next level of priority are records that "ill enable the public to understand
the role of the lntelhgence Community in the shaping of national policy" To assist me in
establishing priorities among these records, I have consulted with my Historical Review
Panet chaired by Dr. S. Frederick Starr from Johns Hopkins University'S School of
Advanced InternationaJ Studies, and composed of six other distinguished academ.ics
and historians: Dr. Lewis SeHardo, Dr, Robert Jervis, Dr. Ernest R. May, Dr. Page
Putnam Miller, Dr. Robert Pastor, and Dr. Henry S. Rowen. After considering the
recornmendatlons made to me by a majority of the panel and consulting with my own
staff; I have djrected the Office of Information Management to review those records that
pertain,to policymaking at the highest levels--that is~ National Intelligence Estimates
and the National Intelligence Daily.
,,"' ., In'n'd~iiti~~, to help ~~'h~la~ 'r~sea'~ch/explore the'c~~tri'buti~'n ~(intelligence to'·
the development of policy; the office files of former Directors of Central Intelligence
also will be reviewed for declassification, In keeping with normal archival practice, we
will proceed systematically to consider the earliest records Hrst, presuming they would
be less sensitive and result in the release of a greater number of documents, We also
will consider records within a complete series rather than sdecting records that
pertained to particular topics in order that historians could gain as complete a picture as
possible of a particular situntion. I am hopeful that as certain projects such as the JPK
assassination records review are completed, additional resources can be directed
toward this effort.
FinalIy, I want to comment on the plans announced by two of my predecessors to
review for possible dedassificntion records on 11 covert actIOns undertaken in the 1950s
and 19605. The first tranche of documents-consisting of some 3200 pages-related to
the Bay of Pigs soon will be released to the public. The remaining records related to the
Bay of Pigs wiH be reviewed for release immediately thereafter. Work also is
continuing on Guatemala~~about 1800 pagf..5 were released to NARA last May and some
16~17,OOO additional pages arc being processed for release. \Ve also wiH initiate
dedassification reviews, as soon as resources arc available, of the materials involved in
UNCLASSIFIED
�UNCLASSIFIED
the covert actions undertaken during the Korean War, and [n the Congo Laos~ and
D011'l:inkan Repuqlic during the 1960s. These reviews will be undertaken in the order f"
ve just described.
t
We will address the remaining five covert actions identified by my predecessors
as soon as the others have been completed. The fact is, we do not have sl,lffident
resources at the current time to review the documentation involved in these five
remaining covert actions. Moreover~ in some cases, because of national security and
foreign policy concerns, the amount of information that could be released about a
particular program would be limited,. and in other cases,. the volume of documentation
is so great that reviewing them for declassification would virtunlly prevent the release
of other documents, which, in the view of my Historical Adviso,ry Panel, should be
given a higher priority. These include National Intelligence Estimates and finished
intelligence analyses on the former Soviet Union~ as well ns the early records of the
Office of the DCI. J have opted. therefore. to hold the reviews of these covert actions in
abeyance for the time being.
1 aJso wish to point out that our support to the State Department's Foreign
Relntions series-~which I mentioned earlier will be given top priority--will itself lead to
the publication of information concerning covert nctions as they relate to the subject
matter of particular volumes in that series. Indeed, it's possible that certain of the
covert action programs selected by my predecessors for declassification review could be
addressed on a more exp~djted basis as part of our support to the Foreign Relations
series,
,..
. ..
In dOSing, let me reiterate my belief that the American peopl(fare best served by
having nvailnble the information necessary to understand how their government
functions, In the case of CIA r this means information about its activities that allow the
public to judge its impact and effectiveness over the years.
No other nation's foreign intelHgence agency hus voluntarily released as much
information about its past as ha.:; the Central Intelligence Agency. And within the limits
imposed upon me by law not to jeopardize intelligence sources or methods, impinge on
our liaison reJations with other countries; or interfere with our ability to carry out the
Agencts mission, we wiJI build upon that record in the years ahead. (This is
UNCLASSIFIED.)
UNCLASSIFIED
..
�UNCLASSIFIED
Office oCPnblic
Aff~iJ:sl
Intemnl COlmmullcatiOl1!'> Br;mrh
For questiollS' please call
Susan Brown at 482-0707 or 005545
CL BY.
0668446
CL REASON. 1.5(0)
DECL on:
DRV FRM:
."
Xl
Multiple Categories
,
-"
UNCLASSIFIED
.
-'
.,'
�-
----_.
UNCLASSIFIED
SPEECHES/DOCUMENTS
July 15, 1998
Headlines!
(U)
DC! Statement en
Declassificat~on
(U) DCI Statement on Declassification
The core of my job as Director of Central Intelligence (OCI) is to mobilize the
collection and analytical capabilities of the Central Intelligence Agency and the other
U.s, intelligc!nce agencies to ensure that our national leaders have the information
necessary for informed policy decision making, Although much of our work must be
done in secrecy, we have a responsibility to the American people, and to history,. to
account for our actions and the quality of our work.. Accordingly, I have made a serious
commitment to the public release of information that with the passage of time no longer
needs to be protectt:d under our security classification system,
,
.
...
.
"
Indeed, the CIA, like all agencies of the U.S. Government, is charged by
Executive Order 12958 with instituting declassification programs to provide for the
timely release of information it had previously classified. While intelligence information
often retains its sensitivity for many years-~even decades--there will eventuaBy come a
time when the information produced by such sourceS and methods can be released to
the public without harm to the national security, While the Executive Order provides
LIS authority to protect the identity of our confidential human sources indefinitely, and
we must tak~ care not to violate the confidence of any foreign government who chooses
/
to work with us, the goal of our declassification program is tOl~dentify'and release'as'
much of the information as we can, as soon as we can, WIthout harm to our national
V
security interests.
_.J
Growing Demand for [nformation
I suspect, in fact,. that the public has relatively little appreciation of the extent to
which the CIA is already involved in df..."Classification efforts.
•
We declassify records requested by the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records
:JNCLASSIFIED
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SPEECHES/DOCUMENTS
October 20, 1998
Headlines:
(U) Statement by the President
The White House
Office of the Press Secretary
For lnunediate Release
October 20,1998
Statement by the President
Today I have signed into law H.R. 3694, the "Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999." The Act authorizes
Fiscal Year 1999 appropriations for U.S. intelligence and
intelligence-related activities.
The Act is the product of the dedication and effort of many
people in the Congress·and my Administration.
I believe that the
Act will help our Nation maintain a strong intelligence
capability and preserve the safety and security of our country.
I am pleased that the Act provides enhanced protective
authority for CIA personnel and their family members.
This is
extremely important given the continuing terrorist threat against
u.s. citizens and interests.
I also note that the Act names the
CIA Headquarters Compound in Langley, Virginia, the "George Bush
Center for Intelligence." This is an appropriate and
well-deserved tribute to former President Bush.
Sections 601 and 602 of the Act enhance significantly our
ability to conduct effective counterintelligence and
international terrorism investigations.
In addition, section 604
expands the government's ability to conduct wiretaps when
investiga~ing a broad range of Federal felonies.
The Attorney
General will develop comprehensive guidelines and minimization
procedures for the use of this expanded authority and will amend
procedures currently contained in the manual for United States
attorneys to provide appropriate protections for the rights of
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Until such guidelines and procedures are finalized,
the gove:cr...'TI('mt will conduct .....iretaps in accordance with standards
provided under current· law. The Department of Justice will
include statistics on the use of the expanded authority in its
annual wiretap report to Congress.
A~ericar.s.
Finally, I am satisfied this Act contains an acceptable
protection provision, free of the constitutio~al
infirmities evident in the Senate-passed version of this
legislation. The Act does not constrain zny constitutional
authority to review and, if appropriate, control disclosure of
wh~stleblower
certain classified information to the Cor.gress.
I note
:::~at
the
Act's legislative history makes clear that the Congress, although
disagreeing with the executive brar.ch regarding the operative
cor:stitutional principles, does not intend ::0 foreclose ::he
exercise Qf my constitutional authorit.y in t:his area.
The (;onstltution vests the President with authority to
disclosure of information when necessary for the
discharge of his constitutional responsibi:ities. Nothing ir. this
Act purports to change this principle. I anticipate that this
authority will be exercised only in exceptiocal ci~cumstances and
that when agency heads decide that they must defer, limit, or
preclude the disclosure of sensitive information, they will
contact the appropriate cocgressional committees promptly to
begin the accommodation process that has traditionally been
followed with respect to disclosure of sensitive information.
cor.t.~ol
William J. Clinton
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SPEECHES/DOCUMENTS
April 26, 1999
Headlines:
(U) Remarks by Pre side nt George Bush at the
Dedication Ceremony for the George Bush Center for
Intelligence
REMARKS BY GEORGE BUSH, 41ST PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
AT THE DEDICAnON CEREMONY FOR THE
GEORGE BUSH CENTER FOR INTELLIGENCE
MONDAY, APRlL 26, 1999
President Bush:
Mr. Director, thank you for those overly kind remarks.
Let me thank the great team that we have running CIA. I think aU the former Directors
here would agree that in George Tenet we have one of the very, very best.
May I thank General Gordon with whom i worked closely when 1was President of the
United States, the Deputy here, who is doing a superb job, too.
I want to thank the Marines for showing up.
I, of course, want to thank Rob Portman [Rep, Rob Portman, (ROhio) who introduced
the legislation to name the C[A Compound after President Bush.]
I told Barbara that all of this hoopla was a little overwhelming, and she knew exactly
the right thing to say. She always does, my loving wife after 54 years, 6 months
whatever it is, (Laughter) Who's counting? "George, just remember," she said, "They
only name things after you when you're dead or really old," (Laughter)
You mentioned the parachute jumps, Director, I landed very proud, Jumped out of the
plane at 12,500 feet, fell at 120 miles an hour for 7500 feet, pulled the rip cord, floated
UNCLASSIFIED
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down into the tranquil sands of Yuma, Arizona. And said to my wife, "Now what do
you think?" She said, "I haven't seen a free faIl like that since the '92 election,"
(Laughter) Anyway, she is thrilled to be here.
And of course I want to thank Senator Shelby and Senator Kerry and Representative
Coss and Norm Dicks who I don't think is here, and every other Member of Congress
who had a hand in making this wonderful event in my life happen.
I would be remiss not to single out Rob Portman who served on my team when I was
privileged to be President. And if I'd known he was going to do this, I think we could
have given him a nicer office there at the White House. (L<lUghter) Thank you, Rob,
very much, and all of you who had a hand in this wonderful, wonderful event in my
life.
I want to thank, as a matter of fact, Members of Congress on both sides of the aisle. You
know I had tiome disagreements with Congress during my four years. What President
doesn't? And after a few dust-ups, 1 didn't know how such a vote in the Congress
might go on this high honor. Part of me expected it to be - this is a true anecdote -like
the vote in Midland, Texas, when the School Board decided to name a local school after
me. That was just a few years ago, I'd just left the White House. -The vote was three to
two. It's true. (Laughter) The two guys that voted "no" had a lot of excuses, but
anyway, that was it. But this was much nicer. (Laughter) You guys touched my heart.
So to George Tenet. our great Director, and everyone at CIA, all I can say is that the
gratitude in my heart literally knows no bounds.
I left here some 22 years ago after a limited tenure, and my stay here had a major
impact on me. The CIA became part of my h~artbeat back then, and it's never gone
away. In my opinion, of the ffi<1ny agencies comprising the Executive Branch, the men
and women of CIA - many of whom I'm privileged to say are here - exemplified the
best about public service, Here service to country comes first. You're ever vigilant,
always looking out for the nation's best interests, but rarely getting the credit that you
deserve. You never sit at the head table; never get singled out. You are there out of
love of country.
This is the full measure of devotion that you bring to your work, and that Barbara and f.
tried to bring to ours. I got some things right, and I'm sure r could have done many
things better. But I hope it will be said that.in my time here, and in the White House, I
kept the trust and treated my office with respect. I know you do that every single day,
and I know I tried. (Applause)
I also know that I walked in here 24 years ago untutored in the arts of intelligence. I see
my first Deputy, Dick Walters, sitting there. He will certainly attest to that. And he
helped me. You had every reason to be suspicious of this untutored outsider who had-
UNCLASSIFIED
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though he came out of a non-political post in China, spent a lot of my time in partisan
politics. I understood the anxiety and concerns on Capitol Hill about that. But this
Agency gave me their trust from Day One.
Your mission is different now than it was back then. The Soviet Union is no more.
Some people think, "what do we need intelligence for?" My an..'>wer to that is we have
plenty of en"mies, Plenty of enemies abound, Unpredictable leaders willing to export
instability or to commit crimes against humanity. Proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, terrorism, nareo-trafficking, people killing each other, fundamentalists
killing each other in the name of God, These and more. Many more. As our analysts
know, as our collectors of intelligence know - these are our enemies. To combat them
we need morc intelligence, not less. We need more human intelligence. That means we
need more proh."Ction for the methods \Ve use to gather intelligence and more protection
.
for our sources, particuJnriy our human sources, people that arc risking their lives for
their country, (Applause)
Even though I'm a tranquil guy now at this stage of my life, 1 have nothing but
contempt and anger for those who betray the trust by exposing the mime of our sources,
They arc, in my view, the most, insidious, or traitors.
And when it comes to the mission of CIA and the IntelHgence Community, George
Tenet has it exactly right. Give the President and the policymakers the best possible
intelligence product and stay out of the policymaking or policy implementing except as
specifically decreed in the law,
Because of your support - the N,-me support given to a fledgling OCI 24 years ago
George Tenet is able to do that. Just that. Able to provide the President the best
intelligence posS:ib,le in the entire world.
For Duuglas M.;'1cArthur, Duty, Honor, Country represented a great moral code of
conduct and chivalry for those who guard this beloved [and, That's true here at CIA.
It's true aJ! across the [ntelligence Community - the huge community that comes
together under the leadership of the: Director. This complex might well have been
named for more deserving men who preceded me as DeL You think of Bill Donovan or
Allen Dulles or Dick Helms here with us today, Giants in their field. Or it might have
been named for people like Welch, or Buckley [CIA officers Richard Welch and William
Buckley killed in the line of duty.] And like ,111 of them, and so many more, I'm proud
to have served WIth the men imd women of CIA, (Applause)
It has been said that "patriotism is not a frenzied burst of emotion, but rather the quiet
and steady dedication of a lifetime," To me, this sums up CIA - Duty, Honor, Country.
This timeless creative service motivates those who serve at Langley and in intelligence
all across the world,
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It is an honor to stand here and be counted among you. 'Thank you very, very much.
Office of Public Aff..irs/
lute-Illal Conunlllucations Branch
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SPEECHES/DOCUMENTS
April 26, 1999
Headlines: Remarks of DCI George J. Tenet at the Ceremony of the
George Bush Center For Intelligence (As Prepared for
Delivery)
Remarks of the Director of Central Intelligence
George J. Tenet
Introducing President Bush
at the ceremony
designating
the
George Bush Center for Intelligence
April 26, 1999
(As Prepared for Delivery)
This is a gre~t day at the Central Intelligence Agency - a
great day for our CIA Family.
I know that I speak for every man
and woman in this place when I say: Welcome Home George and
Barbara Bush I
Mrs. Bush, in your autobiography you tell a wonderful story
about your husband. A reporter once asked him what he considered
to be his greatest accomplishment.
In the seconds before the
President answered, you tried to guess what he'd say. Would it
be bringing the Cold War to a peaceful end? Leading the
coalition in the Gulf War? But the President replied:
"Our kids
still come home."
Mr. President, we hope that you and Mrs. Bush will always come
home to visit us at CIA. We consider it an honor to have our
compound named after you, and we will do all that we can to make
you and our wonderful country proud of us.
We are deeply proud that you are part of our CIA Family. As you
UNCLASSIFIED
�UNCLASSIFIED
know, the sense of family is very strong here. We care about
each other; we take care of each other. We are part of a
community that pulls together in times of crisis and sorrow and
celebrates together in times of joy, as we are doing today.
And fifty years from now, Mr. president, when a future
generation of intelligence officers is serving our nation here at
the George Bush Center for Intelligence, they, too, will be
inspired -- as we have been -- by the values of Duty, Honor and
Country to which you have devoted your life.
r would now like to read to you from a very special letter of
congratulations, which says, in part:
"Dear George:
"I want to J01D the men and women of the Intelligence
Community -- and all Americans - in saluting you, as our nation
designates the Central Intelligence Agency complex as the George
Bush Center for Intelligence."
"When you assumed your duties as Director of
Intelligence in January 1976, the nation had just
the most tumultuous periods in its history. Many
lost faith in government. Many asked whether the
continue to exist. II
Central
endured one of
Americans had
CIA should
"As Director, you accomplished a great deal. You restored
morale and discipline to the Agency while publicly emphasizing
the value of intelligence to the nation's security. You also
restored America's trust in the CIA and the rest of the
Intelligence Community.
"Of I:::ourse, we honor you today for more than your tenure as
Director; in your lifetime of service to America, you served not
only as the head of the Intelligence Community but also, as
President, as the nation's chief intelligence consumer. As
President, you stood for American leadership around the world
leadership for freedom and democracy, peace and prosperity.
"As you know, in my time as president, I have turned to you
more than once for your wise counsel, and I have benefited
greatly from it. And I have been well served by the talented and
dedicated men and women who make up the Intelligence Community
that you did so much to preserve and strengthen.
"On behalf of all Americans, I want to thank you for your
patriotism and leadership, and I want to convey to you my warmest
congratulations on receiving this fitting tribute.
"Sin(:erely, Bill Clinton, President of the United States"
Mr. President, President Clinton and Congressman Portman
have just eloquently described why our headquarters compound will
forever bear your name, and why all of us at CIA think so highly
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of you. There are men and women in the audience today who had
the honor and privilege of serving under your 1eadership as
Director of Central Intelligence. Many more here had the honor
and privilege of serving in this Agency and in the Intelligence
Community under your Presidency. The rest of us just consider it
an honor and privilege to pay tribute to you as one of this
nation's most distinguished public servants: war hero, Member of
Congress, UN Ambassador, Chief Envoy to China, Director of
Central Intelligence, Vice President and then President of the
United States.
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�UNCLASSIFIED
When we first learned about Mr. Portman's initiative, the
gesture seemed so fitting to us - and not just because you are
the only DeI to have become President of the United States, but
for so many other reasons'as well. Every component of this
Agency feels indebted to you in some way.
OUr Directorate of Administration remembers to this day the
exceptional attention that you and Mrs. Bush devoted to the needs
and conqerns of the men and women of this Agency and to their
families.
Never has a DCI written so many thank-you notes to his
employees!
Your belief in the
fund~ental
importance of our work
never faltered; your strong leadership restored our confidence;
more important, it restored the American public's confidence in
Y.!! •
To the wizards in our Directorate of Science and Technology,
you have been a champion of scientific intelligence - a leader
who deeply appreciated the crucial role that technology plays in
protecting our national security. You won the hearts of our
"masters of disguise" on your 52nd birthday. They gave you one
of their famous "make-overs." Not long after, a stranger quietly
took a chair at an important intelligence meeting. Nobody had a
clue until your familiar voice emanated from this guy with red
hair, a.big nose and thick glasses. He said: "Sweatin' under
this thingl"
The unbiased assessment of our Directorate of Intelligence
is that throughout your long years of public service you have
been among their most dedicated, enthusiastic and discriminating
customers. You have always understood how vitally important it
is for our national leaders to be able to make their decisions
based on the most complete information and best analysis
possible. As Director of Central Intelligence, as Vice President
and as President you read every single Daily Brief that the
Intelligence Directorate produced. Even if they doubted that
anybody else in the government was reading their stuff, they
could always count on you! As you know, our analysts pride
themselves on the accuracy of their predictions. They will
always be among your biggest fans, even though, Mr. president,
you didn't always call it right. After President Ford asked you
to take the CIA job, and you answered the call to duty, you wrote
the following to your good friend, Congressman Bill Steiger:
(quote) "I honestly feel my political future is' behind me n but
hell, I'm 51, and this new one gives me a chance to really
contribute."
Last but not least, you have the undying respect of the
fearless officers in our Directorate of Operations.
You were a
staunch defender of the need for human intelligence II for
espionage -- at a very tough time when it really counted. But
that's not the only reason why you rate with the Directorate of
Operations. You are the only former DCI and President to jump
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�UNCLASSIFIED
out of a plane II not once, but twice. As a young naval aviator,
you refused to leave your burning plane until the very last
second. Then, as a retired civilian, you dove out of a perfectly
good plane just for the heck of itl You are definitely their kind
of guy I
Mr. President, all of us from CIA -- whatever the
Directorate -- agree that there has been no stronger an advocate
and supporter of our work than you. We couldn't have asked for a
more interested and engaged intelligence consumer, a more
constructive advisor, a more knowledgeable leader of our national
security community, or a more faithful friend of the men and
women of this Agency than you. And we are very, very grateful to
you for that, Mr. President.
I don't have to tell you that each and every day, the
dedicated men and women of the CIA provide the President of the
united States and other decisionmakers the critical intelligence
they need to protect American lives and advance American
interests around the globe.
Thanks in great measure to your leadership, our country no
longer confronts the worldwide threat from a rival superpower
that we did during the Cold War. But as the 21st century
approaches, we must contend with a host of other dangerous
challenges" challenges of unprecedented complexity and scope.
The United States remains the indispensable country in this
uncertain and chaotic world. And time and again, the CIA has
proven itself to be the indispensable intelligence organization,
helping America build a more secure world for people everywhere.
To the patriotic men and women who work here at CIA, this
isn't just a job, it's a commitment to serve our wonderful
country. That kind of commitment lasts a lifetime.
It continues
long after any of us leave here. All of us feel that way, and
that's another reason why we think the world of you, Mr.
President. Because we know that you feel that way, too.
In January, 1977, as you and Mrs. Bush prepared to move your
family back to Texas and figure out what to do next, you
delivered a farewell address to the employees. You thanked them
for their unselfish dedication to our country" a dedication that,
I can assure you, is undiminished today. You concluded your
gracious good-bye with these words, and I quote~
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"I take with me many happy memories. Even the tough,
unresolved problems don't seem so awesome; for they are
overshadowed by our successes and by the fact that we do provide
the best foreign intelligence in the world. I am leaving, but I
am not forgetting.
I hope I can find some ways in the years
ahead to make the American people understand more fully the
greatness that is CIA."
Mr. President, over the decades and to this very day, you
have found many, many ways to help us fulfill our vital
Intelligence Mission in behalf of the American people. You did
not forget us, and we will never forget you.
Thank you,.
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IIReturnhOjriid9'mtl
SPEECHES/DOCUMENTS
MlSm,ED DOCUlI.tENT
REFILED BY
CLINTON LffiRARY STAFF
oo"J::d! DtJE~/a5
October 18, 1999
Headlines:
(U) DCI Remarks at the Oscar Iden Lecture,
Georgetown University
Remarks of the Director of Central Intelligence
. George J. Tenet
Oscar Iden Lecture, Georgetown University
October 18, 1999
My thanks to the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy and the Edmund A. Walsh School
of Foreign Service. My appreciation also to the Jden family, whose generous gift to
Georgetown made this evening possible.
It's great to be back at Georgetown. It was here that I learned to respect the integrity of
facts, to separate fact from fiction, to try to think searchingly and systematically about
the world in all its complexity, and to view the advancement of knowledge as a way to
serve the greater good. And what I learned at Georgetown I have carried with me
throughout my personal and professional life, right into the CIA.
When Cas Yost asked me to address you, I saw it as an excellent and enjoyable chance
to discuss the vital importance of intelligence with educators and especially with the
rising generation of international affairs students who will be grappling with the
national security challenges of the next century.
Intelligence Helps Us Shape the Future
When you leave here tonight, there are two things that I want you to remember. First:
On the eve of a new century, our country has unprecedented opportunities to advance
American ideals and interests. And second: US Intelligence can be the vital enabler of
those opportunities if we infuse it with the right ethos and support it by sustained
investments.
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Today, America finds itself with overwhelming military pre-eminence, unparalleled
political reach and immense economic power. We must not let this historic moment slip
through OUf fingers. In my view, the Intelligence Community's highest calling is'to
help policy makers identify opportunities to advance democracy and peace in the
world. The more we can nct, the less we need to n'act. In the end, being alert to historic
opportunities may do as much - if not more -- to secure our freedoms and ensure our
well being in the next century as combating the many threats that we face.
The United States has the opportunity:
To help consolidate democracy in former totalitarian states.
To help bring a comprehensive and lasting peace to the Middle East.
To stabilize struggling regions by helping more nations prosper in the global economy.
By helping our country seize these historic opportunities, we should ask what we might
save in American lives and treasure - in defense, in peacekeeping operations, in
foreign aid.
Some of you may remember the comic strip "Pogo" by the late Walt Kelly. I often think
about Pogo's frustmtion when he mused, "We are faced with insurmountable
opportunities.",
That is where intelligence comes in. We help policymakers overcome insurmountable
obstacles every day. US Intelligence gives our national leaders the insight and the
flexibility they need to take advantage of the vast opportunities before us. We broaden
our decisionmakers' choices and help them think through the difficult policy dilemmas
they face. We provide a very clear and constantly updated picture of events inside key
countries, of technological developments across a wide array of issues, and a projection
of future trends in all of those arenas.
I would like you to think about the Intelligence Community as the ultimate opportunity
cost. What our nation invests today on intelligence - on developing good sources, on
new collection methods, on hiring new analysts and on training them - may mean the
difference tomorrow between success and disaster, life and death - not just for those
involved in intelligence, but for the men and women of our armed forc.es and for all of
our citizens. Armed with the world's best intelligence, our national leaders may be able
to avert an emerging crisis, or minimize the costly fallout from one. When you are in
the dark, you have to prepare for everything. With the insights intelligence brings, you
can make prudent decisions about where to put your limited resources.
Placing a value on intelligence is not a simple "bang for the buck" calculation. But I
would ask you to consider tonight:
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�UNCLASSIFIED
vVhat is it vvorth for our country to have the abtlity to understand and infiltrate terrorist
groups that target American citJzens at home and abroad?
Do you want a windmv,on the dynamIcs between reformers and conservatives in iran?
\-Vhat is it v,mrth to know the status of Iran's nuclear program? Or Tehran's
intentions with regard to terrorism?
What is it worth to know if and when the North Koreans will test launch a new missile
capable of sending a nudear payload to the United States?
What is it worth to our military to have the intelligence support it needs to deploy
anywhere in the world to protect American interests, values and lives? :
What is it worth to locate a downed F-16 pilot in hostile territory during the middle of a
shooting war even before that pilot has been able to get out of his parachute? And
to have those same technical intelligence systems that located that pilot be able to
guide the search and rescue teams to bring him - or her - safely home?
These are not just rhetorical questions. They are very reaL And the answers wilt have
profound consequences not just for our lntelligence Community, but for our country.
It's not news to you that the world is in the midst of a technological revolution. Today;
having an information edge is critical to success in almost every field, The field of
inlelligence is no different. And I must tell you that the pace of technologIcal change is
rapidly outstripping our existing technica] edge in intelltgent"e that has long been one of
the piltars of our national security.
Compounding the problem, advanced technology is no longer in the exclusive dormiin
of g-ov€rnment_ The genie has exploded out of the bottle and he is providing
information to any and all masters - from CNN to terrorists: Friends and foes alike
have the same access we do to high-powered, portable computers and communications
systems safeguarded by encryption.
US intelligence no longer has a monopoly on overhead imagery. Very soon, anyone
who can pay will be able commercially to obtain real-Hmc/ one meter high-resolution
satenite pictures of a!1Y place on the planet. This will have major implications for denial
and deception and surprise - both on our part and on the part of our enemies, US
Intelligence lvill have to work with even greater-ingenuity to give our poHcymakers and
military commanders a critical information advantage.
The telecommunications industry is making a $1 trillion investment to encircle the
world in milliollS of miles of high bandwidth fiber-optic cable, What does that mean?
It means that the challenge for signals intelligence has grown, and that our targets are
harder than ev:er to cover.
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To ensure that our country preserves its precious unilateral advantage in information,
the Intelligence Community has developed an investment strategy. We have asked
Congress to allocate large amounts of money over many years to build OUf next
generation of satellite imagery and signals collection systems. I will be blunt with you:
Though not nearly on the scal.e of the investments being made by the private sector, the
price tag for these new intelligence capabilities is high. Nonetheless, I see our choice in
rather stark terms: do we invest, or do we allow ourselves to become deaf and blind?
And we are not only talking about the investment in these collections systems alone,
but also in the technologies and people we need to turn more and more of that collected
material into use<1ble intelligence. There is a signific<1nt price tag beyond s<1tellites.
We traditionally have justified advanced imagery and signals collection systems by
emphasizing the important role they play supporting our military. And I do not deny
or diminish that role. But we have to show how our collection systems will not only
enhance our military capabilities but our entire national security posture - our ability to
shape an international environment favorable to our interests and our values.
In other words, if we receive the kinds of investments in intelligence that I am talking
about..then we have to deliver.
What You Should Expect of your Intelligence Community
What should you expect of the Intelligence Community in return for this investment?
First and foremost, that we will call it as we see it. We will deliver intelligence that is
objective, pulls no punches, and is free from political taint.
Next, that we will not only tell policymakers about what is uppermost on their minds
we will also alert them to things that have not yet reached their in-boxes.
.
.
That we will'respond to the President's and other decision makers' needs on demand
juggling our intelligence priorities and capabilities as necessary to meet the most
urgent missions.
That we will innovatively develop cutting-edge technologies and apply them to our
collection and analysis work.
That we will uphold our country's laws always.
Finally, that we will take risks. Analytical risks - making tough calls when it would be
easier to waffle. Operational risks to secure vital information or to take some
necessary action.
UNCLASSIFIED
�UNCLASSIFIED
You should expect all of those things from U.S; and that is what we will deliver. I am
usking OUf people to think independently and creaiJvely, to constantly challenge the
conventional wisdom, to confront the toughest problems i'ind Jook far beyond the
immediate, and always to ad wah the highest standards of professionalism.
Most importantly, I am charging the men and women of US Intelligence to dare. We
agree with Britain's elite Special Air Servke motto, "Who dares, wins."
At the same time, there must be a realistk expectation of what intelligence can do. We
arc not omniscient and we are not perfect. The fact is, we simply cannot provide
continuous" contiguous coverage for every issue of concern, And when so much of our
mission involves warning and prediction, and when we must carry it out 24 hours u
day, 365 days a year, around the globe, we are bound Lo make mistakes, both in analysiS
and operations, We strive not to make them, but when we dOl my promise to the
American people is that we will take responsibility and learn from them.
We accept the fact that we must Bve within the world so aptly described by President
Kennedy when he said that our stlcces,Scs nre often unnoticed while Qur failures are
paraded in public. The terrorist attack that is foiled, the nuclear shipment that is
interc~pted, the regional crisis that is forestalled, the coup that is foretold, may never
lTh."1ke the news. And thaes fine. We are not in this business for headlines or kudos. Vie
are in it to make.a critical difference -- to advance our nation's interests and values.
\/Ve live in a world still in transition from something that was very well understood
the bipoLarity of the Cold War - to something that has yet to crystallize into a system
that can be readily named. As a result, [believe the potential for surprise is greater than
at any time since the end of World \<Var II.
We hope not to be surprised often, and we certainly hope not in an area we deem vital.
In May 1998, India tested a nudear weapon, We had (arreclly judged that the Indians
would respond to Pakistan's recent missite launch and that eventuaHy they would test
nuclear weapons. But we judged - wrongly - that TH Indians would fire a ml5."ile
tit-For-tat before they te~ted a nuclear weapon. This episode denrly ilh.l:.>:trates my point
that it is the nature of our high-risk, high-stakes ,"'\fork to get it wrong some of the time:.
I would also say to you that \,,'e wouid not be doing our job if we were to shrink from
making tough calls about very difficult issues.
In complex military operations there are all too many chances to make mistakes, I will
make no excuses for the intelligence errors that led to the bombing of the Chinese
embassy in Belgrade. We have identi(lt:d what went wrong and we have taken
corrective measures.
But do nollose sight of the larger point. U.s. intelligence played an inlegral role in a
highly complex and ultimately successful military operation in which 9,300 sorties were
UNCLASSIFIED
�UNCLASSIFIED
flown and not a single allied pilot was lost in combat. Our intimate knowledge of the
weapons $y~tems our pi lots were facing and the targets that they were up against
helped keep our pilot"> 5..1fe. That is a remarkable achievement for US Intelligence,
The men ilnd women of liS Intelligence are not just intelligence officers. They are
An1eJi~~n intelligence officers. Our performance is mCilsured against the highest
standards of professional and personal excellence. If we fail to meet those standards,
we will stand up and be accountable, then we will figure out what went wrong and we
wm fix it
But alwilys, always we must continue to dare - not only in our dangerous work abroad
but also in the predictions that our analysts make to pohcymakers here in \Vashlngton.
If Arnerici\ is to have the world's best intelligence, we must be fully engaged, we must
be ready to rlsk~ and we shquld noUet the fear of sometimes getting it wrong get in the
way of doing our job.
I have made a commitment to our people. If they do their jobs the best way they know
how - with profeSSionalism and integrity -- if they stick their necks out and dare, I will
back them lip. And I hope that the American people will do the very same.
I have discussed the opportunities that l see for US intelligence in today's world. But
for every opportunity out there, there are also chaHenges and threal,;;; - real or potential.
In fact, it is our country's great power and our values th.1.t make us the most attractive
target in the world. There are nations and groups who are envious of who we are, what
we have and what we stand for - and, yes/ they arc willing to act against us. What are
the threats that keep me awake at night?
International terrorism, both on its own i.lnd in conjunction with narcotics traffickers,
intcrnntiorml crimin;;tls and those seeking weapons or mass destruction, You need
go no further than U,ama Bin Ladin -the perpetrator of the East Africa bombings.
He has declared the acquisition of weapons of a mass destruction a religious duty
and idcnlified every Amerkan as a legitimate target.
The proliferation of chemica), biological and nuclear weapons, along with ever-longer
range missiles capable of delivering them not just as far as our deployed forces in
South Korea and the Persian Gulf, but to the continental United States as well.
Rogue states such as Iraq and North Korea continue to pose grave threal<; to their
neighbors, to regional stabiHty, and to American forces.
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�UNCLASSIFIED
We fnee a grmying cyber threat - the threat from so-called weapons of mass disruption.
Potentia) targets are not only government computers, but the lifellnes that we all
take for granted - our power grids, and our water and transportation systems.
And while dealing with these new, unconventional threats, we must keep a relentless
focus on more traditional concerns such as political and economic trends in volatile
regions like the Middle East and South Asia and the trajectories of major countries in
transition, such as China and Russia.
The chaUenges 1 just mentioned are among our highest intelligence priorities. And I
pledge to all of you that we at the CIA and in the Intelligence Community will continue
go after them with all that we've got.
'0
We cannot offer you an iron dad guarantee against any of the threats that face our
country. but I think our record is impres~ive. Let me tell you a little about that record:
Every day, the men and women of US Intelligence give our country an enormous
unilateral advantage:
In the last year, US lntelligence was responsible for stopping terrorist bombings against
American facilities overseas, and we have been successful in apprehending a
number of terrorist figures-including sonic linked to Usama Bin Laden.
Chances are when you hear about a major take-down of an international drug trader
overseas, that US Intelligence has provided valuable information and insights to
assist law enforcement.
We have supported the Middle East peace process by helping the Israeli Government
and the Palestinian Authority deat with terrorism. And we provided imagery and
mapping support to American negotiators that helped resolve the centuries-old
border dispute between Ecuador an.d Peru.
WI.! have assisted the State Department in the safe evacuation of American dtizens in
harm's way abroad, induding operations during the past year in the Congo,
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and indonesia.
We have helped the United States develop a long-range strategiC perspective by
preparing assessments that project years ahead on is-<:>ues as diverse as the global
economy, worldwide dernographic5r and leadership succession patterns in key
regions.
And time and again, we have alerted field commanders to threats against our deployed
(orces Hnd those of our allies. Aided by the most sophisticated intelligence, for more
than eight years now American pilots have flown daily missions over the Iraq
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No-Fly Zone with zero casualties. It is not an exaggeration to say that every day,
somewhere in the world, US Intelligence is saving American lives.
We do all of this - and more -- even as we are asked to take on new, non-traditional
roles..
We examined the state of worldwide Y2K preparations. Based on our study, the
President offered help to variolls countries in overcoming Y2K problems.
In recent years, we have assisted the international community in high-resolution
mapping of natural disasters, such as wildfire damage in Indonesia, the damage
from Hurricane Mitch in Central America. Most recently, we helped Turkey and
Greece after the recent earthquakes.
During the massive humanitarian crises in Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire and Kosovo, we
assisted international relief efforts in locating and responding to the needs of
displaced populations. And we continue to assist the International War Crimes
Tribunals in The Hague to bring the perpetrators of genocide to justice.
None of these efforts is traditional intelligence work, but each makes an important
contribution to the success of American diplomacy and our greater interest in the well
being of the international community.
As you can see from the sheer range of areas in which we are engaged, our operational
agenda is running hotter than ever - hotter than anyone expected in the aftermath of
the Cold \-\far - from Somalia, to Haiti, Bosnia, Rwanda, Burundi, Iraq, Kosovo, East
Timor. You can be sure that the list will go on.
Deciding to engage is not our call. The President calls, we serve whenever and
wherever - and whatever the other national security priorities and resource constraints
may be.' \Vhether or not you agree with a particular policy decision to intervene,
American Intelligence never has the luxury of sitting on the sidelines.
Meeting11\\ Century Intelligence Challeng§..
It is my highest priority as Director of Central Intelligence to ensure that in the next
century, US Intelligence is ready to help the President and other American
policymakeJ's deal with the unprecedented scope of opportunities and challenges that
lie ahead. In short, to ensure that US Intelligence can continue to perform its vital
national security mission successfully in the future.
Seventeen months ago, I launched a Strategic Direction plan for the CIA which now
encompasses the entire Intelligence Community.
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I told our people that we had to take charge of our destiny. That we would do all that
was within our power to maintain our edge and our vibrancy. That we had to
streamline and re-align ourselves and adopt best business practices like the best in the
private sector. That we would think big and think different. That we would work
smarter and in new ways so that we would have the agility and the resiliency to do
what the President - this President or a future President -- wants and the American
people expect. And that we were going to do all of that because it is the right thing to
do.
And that is exactly what we have done and are doing. We have increased ollr agility.
We have innovated. We h<lve found efficiencies. And we are now at the st<lge at which
strategically targeted, sustained funding can make an enormous qualitative difference.
I am glad to say that our strategic efforts have been well received by the President and
the Oversight Committees on Capitol Hill. And if we continue to receive their
bipartisan support, over the next five to seven years, we will have positioned the
Intelligence Community to perform its vital mission successfully in the next century.
Our strategic program entails strengthening our clandestine and analytical services to
achieve greater operational reach and greater analytical depth. We will put more
collectors in the field and more all-source analysts on key accounts. And we will
back them to the hilt with both human and technic~l support.
We are working more effectively across disciplines and across Agencies, because most
of the challenges we face are so complex that no one part of our intelligence
community - not just human intelligence, not just signals intelligence, and not just
imagery intelligence -- can tackle them alone.
We are coordinating more closely than ever with our colleagues in law enforcement.
You cannot defeat threats to our country from terrorists, proliferators and cyber
attackers. unless intelligence and law enforcement work together.
We also realize that the US Intelligence Community does not have a monopoly on
brains or insight, so we are reaching out to experts in academia and industry.
We will significantly recapitalize our signals and imagery systems.
We are working with industry to leverage their expertise and revolutionize the ways
we acquire technology. Everyone knows what an arms race is. We are in a
continuous intelligence race. You may have heard about the new enterprise In-Q-It
- one of the many innovative approaches we are taking to help us with
state-of-the-art information management. With offices in Silicon Valley and
Washington, DC, In-Q-It will operate as a non-profit firm specializing in
information technology development. Harnessing the capabilities of the private
sector to deal with tough intelligence problems is part of a very proud tradition
UNCLASSIFIED
�UNCLASSIFIED
going back to the earliest days of our Intelligence Community.
Most importantly, we <Ire building up and empowering our greatest assets of all: our
people. At the end of the day, the men and women of US intelligence -- not satellites,
or sensors or high-speed computers - are our most precious asset. All of our
technological advantages are worthless without the best and brightest people our
country has to offer.
CIA is now engaged in our biggest recruiting drive since the end of the Cold
War. We face major competition from the private sector. To the Georgetown
students in the audience, I say, I hope you will seriously consider a career in US
intelligence. We cannot offer you a private sector salary. No one in the
Intelligence field worth his or her salt is in it for the money. You will never get
rich. But we can offer you a deeply challenging and satisfying vocation - and a
mission unequaled anywhere in American society. You would be joining some
of the finest men and women you would ever hope to meet. I am proud to say, a
good many of them - about 400 at CIA alone -- are Georgetown graduates.
That, then, is where we are and where we are going as an Intelligence Community.
And I am convinced that we are on the right path.
A Moment of Challenge and Decision
In closing, let me say that, like you, the men and women of the Intelligence Community
are proud that our country is a force for good in the world. By engaging, America can
make a difference - as the President has said, an indispensable difference.
And when our country engages to do good - in order to make that critical difference
our national leaders must have every possible tool at their disposal- diplomatic tools,
military tools, and intelligence tools. That is the only way to ensure that we accomplish
our national objectives.
Along with the Intelligence Community, the State Department and the military are
crucial pillars of our national security. Each reinforces the other. Each must be strong,
or all are dangerously weakened. If the steady erosion of America's diplomatic
capabilities contil1ues, our entire security structure will be dangerously undermined.
I believe that we as nation are at an historic decision point. We are fortunate to have
more choices than any other nation as our country considers the security challenges of
the next century. What our country does or does not do now - the tremendous
opportunities that we seize or that we squander - can make an important difference in
the way events unfold. What we choose to do today will either enlarge or narrow the
options we have in the future.
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�r·
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As we confront a 21 " Century of unprecedented opportunities and mOfe diverse and
dispersed threats, our Intelligence Community is stretched to the limit. That is not a
comfortable position to be in - not for the Intelligence Community, not for our national
security community as a whole, and not for our country.
My deep concern is that if we as a nation do not make seriolIs, sustained investments in
intelligence over the next five to seven years - if we do not prepare wisely -- we will
find that we have missed opportunities and foreclosed options that we will dearly wish
we had. It is a classic case of pay now, or pay later. And paying later would be much
mOfe painful. Intelligence is not a free good. At the end of the day, you will get the
intelligence that you pay for. And when it comes to intelligence-when American lives
and vital interests are at stake -- second-best is not acceptable.
I put it to you that what our country really cannot afford is to make the wrong choices.
In a world of unparalleled opportunities, threats and complexities, do we really want to
opt for less presence, less information, less insight, less capacity, or less agility? If we
allow that to happen, 1 certainly would not envy future Directors of Central Intelligence
and future Presidents of the United States.
I hope that I have given you a sense of the role that I believe U.s. intelligence must play
in the years ahead and the sustained investments that I believe are in our interest and
that we must make. And that is why I welcomed this opportunity to speak to you
tonight.
Thank you for listening. I look forward to hearing from you this evening and I will be
happy to take your questions - as well as your answers.
Produced bv
Offire of Public Affnirsl
lutemal CommtUUcatiolls Branch
For questions plense inll
Susan Brown at 482-0707 or x35545
CL BY:
0668446
CL REASON: 1.S(c)
DECL on:
DRV FRM:
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Multiple Categories
IEXI1. to Main Men'ul
'-Return to Index,
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"
TRANSCRIPT
US INTELLIGENCE AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR
TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY
DCl GEORGE TENET LUNClIEON REMARKS
AND INTRODUCTION OF PRESIDENT BUSH
FRIDAY, 19 NOVEMBER 1999
MISFJLED DOCUMENT
REFILED ltV
CLINTON LIBllARY STAFP
INT:f.:rPD/JE~/oS
GEORGE TENET: Good afternoon.
At this lime of great sadness for everyone here at College Stalion. I want to first express the deepest sympathy of
the men and women of the intelligence community. Like our fellow Americans, we too have been watching the
unfolding tragedy here on tcievision and have been touched by the magniticcnt way that everyone at the
Univer~ity and in the town have responded as onc united community.
We arc all thinking especially about the f<lmilics and friends of the injured, and of those who lost their very young
lives. As a parent, I cannot imagine more devastating news than this. Our prayers - the prayers of the men and
women of our intelligence community - are with them, :md we wish that God grant them strength at this terrible
hour nnd comfort them in their sorrow.
On behalf of the intelligence community, I also want to express my sincere appreciation to the George Bush
School of Government and Public Service and Texas A&M University for co-hosting this conference with CIA's
Center for the Study of Intelligence. You have managed to extend exceptional hospitality to us, even in the face of
great tragedy, so we feel:m even deeper responsibility to ensure that this conference makes a significant
intellectual contrihution to the understanding of a pivotal period in our history.
The men and women of US intelligence are proud of the contributions that they made to defending the security
of the free world during five grim decades of the Cold War. We believe that a careful study of our role in th:lt great
global struggle will show that time and again US intelligence provided American leaders with critical information
and insights that saved American lives and advanced our most vital interests.
During thl! perilous peace that was the Cold War, the stakes, the risks, and the uncertainties were higher than at
any time in our history with the possible exception of the Second World War.
Keeping the Cold War from becoming a "hot" (me was the overriding goal of American national security policy
and US intelligence. An intelligence effort of such magnitude and fraught with such great risk and uncertainty
was boun,j to have its flaws, both operational and analytical. But I believe the overall record, a record you have
heard a little bit about this morning. is one of very impressive m:complishment.
Today we look back on the Cold War from a temporal distance often short years. It is alrelldy a world lIway,
replaced by a new and more hopcl"ul reality in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. And it is separated
from us by a new generation of young people who have no personal recollection of what it was like to have lived
on either side of tne Berlin Wall - that metaphor in reinforced concrete and barbed wire for totalitarian
repressi(l11.
It was a time when :tli humankind lived under the appalling threat of nuclear annihilation. Those forced to live
behind the cruel Wllll, closed off from Ine rest of the world, knew constant fear and countless indignities. Tney
struggled to keep hope alive. It was for us, tne lucky ones living in liberty, to stand fast in defense of tne
freedoms that we cherish, and keep faith wit.h the oppressed on the other side.
"
Ultimately, after the stlcrifice of millions of irreplaceable numan lives rmd trillions of dollars in treasure, the
human spirit on both sides of the WlIli triumphed.
�'/
'I'll the htudcnts of TeMs A&M (od1.lY who have gwwfl up with pmcticall), unlimited oppornmities to travel the
glotxl and roam at will whhin the b\)f(JcrJes:~ worlJ (11' the Int::rnct. the Berlin Wall· and lh~ physi:,;,)!, ptllilical and
psychn]ugital barriers 10 the free flow Ill' people, ideas, and information that it represented - must seem
absolutely sune,,\. But for the generations that lived in its ~had{)w it was very renl ;lnd very d.H1gerous,
No OIlC knows better lI1an the men und women here t(lday who ClIrried the heavy bmden of high office during the
Cold War decades. And no one carried It heavier burden than the f're..<;.idcn\ of the United States, Every American
President from Harry Truman onward knew that he would be tested in thc crudble of the Cold War. and that he
had better be ready to mcel the challenge, OUf country was blessed to have had leader:- .~ Republicans and
Demllcrats~·
who
mel
the challenge,
All of us herc who have ever servctl in govemmen! remember rtli~iJ1g. our right hlmd~ and :>oIGmn~y :>~;tring to
un o3th tf) ~UPPO(t and defend the Constlllltion against all enemies. But after saying: "so help me God''. onLy one
of us here lo(by was given the awesnrne respnnsibiJi!y of teading the Free World. And on inauguratiun day in
1989, nnne nf us including lIur new Prc~iden:. co\i!d have known Ih:lt soon, far snoner lh;m ;tRy nf U~ imagined,
we viQuld he living in a "'todd tmnsforme(L Kor could he or uny of us know tnUl his own Cold War crucibLe would
be to help tiS only Ibe Pre"idem of the United States could help, 10 bring thai chilling war 10 a virtually bloodless
cooclusiun.
Thiii i!. U hi"!('fY ;,:nnt'CfCncc, M:II1j' ul'you ure his~orians. You nrc all familiar with the 'Great l\hn Themy" of
hiMmy. Ou: distinguished Junelle,," "peuker does not s.ubscnbc to it • at least as il could be related to himself.
By all accounts.. he stlllers from a severe gcnetic ea~ of New England modcl'!Y_
llut il' yell were to vicw hiMnry as a M\Ccc,;.ion of gr,;n! moment"; to which Icaders must rise Of invite disaster,
surely it will record Ihat Ihis man was L'qllal to the great moment Ih;)t came 10 him, Thai hricfhistoril,:al span
when in thf\.'e short years, with astonishing s.peoo. the BerHn Walt fell. political revolution swept through Eastern
Europe. Gernuny reunified within NATO, and Ihe Soviet Uninn cnllap"c(L From the security of ten ycaTh of
hindsight. it is hard to remember thttl not one of {hose peaceful ott!c,,~es was inevitable.
jf ever a man and a moment were made for each other. George Bush and Ihc end of the Cold War were fhe
perfect match. To meet his momenl, President Bush drew on his Vas! experience in international affairs, on the
inslim:ts aot! judgments he had honed over a!iictlme of service in war and in peac,::, on the de.:ency and
humanity al his very coro, on a gifted nalional ,;ccurity I:c;im -:tlllj the key rc~m:d relationships he had cultivated,
aoo last. but flot certainly least, on lhe strengths of the greatest intelligence system that the world has ever
knowo,
ThtL~
equipped, with skilloo. quiet stnle<:raft, he wisely s:haped the rolidc,~ and guided Ihc <lctjon;o; of (he .~{)Ie
remaining superpov,cr thrmlgh N;lrt)C ( j f the most dramatic, con,..equentia! ,lOU ollngewus years of the 20th
Century, At such a momentous time, lite American people were fortunate indeed 10 have George Bush tL'> their
President. Germany and America's other European parlners were fortunate ttl have him a:> Iheil ally. ~1ikhail
Gmb:1chc.v W$ fortut),aic in have him as a cmlntefTJurt. And the brave pepples of Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union were truly furtunate Inat such a mallllS he was the leuder uf the Free World,
L3dies and Gentlemen. il is now my mInor and pleasure to present 10 you 1M unly President of Ihe United
Stales to have served as Director of Central Intelligence, our 41st Commander in Chief, George Bush.
(DCI George 1. Tenet remarks) (Memurial Ceremony) (president Bll~hs remarks)
(Judge William Webster's remarks) (Dr. Robert Gates' remarks)
�"
UNCLASSIFIED
IEXIT~to'jMairi1MenLiI
II Relurri!lo1ih'dex1lll1
SPEECHES/DOCUMENTS
MlSFTLED DOCUMENT
REFILED BY
CLINTON LIBRARY STAFF
INT:JGf' DATE.J/.:a 05
It-/
May 25, 2000
Headlines:
(U) DCI Remarks at Johns Hopkins University Diploma
Ceremony
"As Prepared for Delivery"
Remarks of the Director of Central Intelligence
George J. Tenet
at the
Johns Hopkins University Diploma Ceremony
Baltimore, May 25, 2000
Thank YOll, George. fknow the real reason why you and the selection committee asked
me to be the commencement speaker. Directors of Central Intelligence cannot say
much, so you knew I would be brief. Besides, my security detail tells me that it is not
good to be the only thing standing between 979 graduates and
P.).'s.
Dr. Brody, Provost Knapp, Distinguished Deans and Trustees, Members of the Class of
2000, Families, Friends, Graduates,
It has been a long four years - struggle and hard work, moments of anxiety and joy,
learning how to manage on your own. Congratulations Parents, you've made it. Oh,
'and congratulations to the graduates as well.
I came here on an important mission today. In fact, I came here to give a mission to
you, The Class of 2000, and I hope that youwill decide to accept it. It is not a Mission
Impossible. In fact, it is a Mission full of possibility. Your Mission is this: Whatever
you do in life, wherever you go, find a way to serve your community, your country and
the world.
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Everyone ,of you is smart and you know how to work hard, or you would not be
receiving a Hopkins degree. You have every reason to be a success in the profession
that you pursue. You are capable of making plenty of dollars. But the jury is still out
on this important question: Will you make a difference?
The diploma that you receive today represents the fulfillment of a serious commitment
that you made to yourself. It also symbolizes the enormous commitment that other
people in your life made to you. Your parents may have paid a lot of tuition, but most
important, they paid a lot of attention, and so did your mentors - your grandparents,
aunts and uncles, big brothers and sisters, school teachers, professors, coaches, clergy,
neighbors and friends -- who helped you along the way.
Each of you is here today because some wonderful human beings took the time to make
a difference in your life. They gave you a heritage to live up to. They gave you
opportunities that they never had. They gave you moral support and a moral compass
-- a set of values and a sense of possibility. They challenged you and inspired you to
excellence. Whatever you have accomplished - whatever you will accomplish - you
owe in greal measure to them.
If any of you think you earned a Hopkins ticket to success all by your good-looking self,
holed up on D level in the M.5.E., you are either delusional or very lonely, or both. I
think your families and your mentors, and all who love and care about you and helped
bring you to this day, deserve a big round of applause.
The Mission of Service to your community, your country and the world that I give to
you today is worthy of one of your most distinguished alumni Woodrow Wilson, who
is often accused of idealism. Wilson once said: "Sometimes people call me an idealist.
Well, that is the way I know I am an American."
Like every American, I am proud of our country and the fact that our nation uses its
unequaled power for good. But I do not believe for one minute that the love of
freedom, or the thirst for justice, or a compassionate regard for the well-being of other
people on this planet are uniquely American traits. As the foreign students graduating
today can attest, people all over the world feel these same things, and countless
.
numbers are prepared to serve and sacrifice for their sake. And if that makes you an
idealist, may we all have the character to plead guilty as charged, starting with me.
In the intelligence business, you have to be tough and deal with the world as it is. But I
can tell you that success in the intelligence business depends equally on a strong sense
of idealism, despite what some in Hollywood or the conspiracy theorists would have
you believe. The people who work with me are some of the most dedicated and
talented Americans you would ever hope to meet. They are conscientious citizens and
concerned parents like you in the audience, who want to see their children grow up safe
and free in a world that is at peace. And they have devoted their lives to that cause.
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Every single day, the men and women of US Intelligence·match their wits - and risk
their lives -- against tough people and tough countries that do not share those ideals:
terrorists, rogue regimes, drug traffickers, proliferators of weapons of mass destruction.
They do it with some of the most amazing technology ever developed. Even more
impressively, they do it with integrity and brains and courage- and more often than
not, they do it anonymously. Though you will seldom hear about them, I hope that
you 'will never, never take them for granted. I hope that all of you will do what I do:
say a prayer each day for the brave and patriotic Americans who silently defend uS'in a
world that is as dangerous as it is so full of promise.
America finds itself with military pre-eminence, unparalleled political reach and
overwhelming economic power. This historic moment may not last, but for now;
American leadership makes a crucial difference in this world. You may think that I
spend all of my time looking for threats. But it is also my job as Director of Central
Intelligence to alert the President to the unprecedented opportunities we have as a
nation. Opportunities:
To
To
To
To
help consolidate democracy in former totalitarian states.
help bring peace to the Middle East and other strife-ridden areas of the world.
help struggling nations increase their prospects for success in the global economy.
help strengthen the rule of law in countries whose stability is threatened by
unfettered crime.
And so many others.
It is the job of US Intelligence to give our national leaders the insight and the flexibility
they need to act rather than re-act - to look beyond the immediate and try to shape the
future.
The Intelligence Community is now working on a study of what the world might be
like in the year 2015. Now it does not take an Einstein to realize that predicting the
future is fraught with problems. In fact, Einstein once said: "I never think of the future.
It comes soon enough."
All you have to do is reflect on the astonishing events of the last century -- two world
wars, several vanished empires, the dominance of air power, the appearance of nuclear
weapons to name just a few -- to see the perils of projection. All of these would have
been hard to predict even ten or fifteen years before they occurred. And the world of
2015 may be dramatically different than we expect it to be today.
Just consider what the world was like only fifteen years ago:
•
Back in 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev had no clue that he wotild be the last Soviet
leader.
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,
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•
The Sunday morning talkshows were not talking about "globalization."
•
The American public was just beginning to awaken to the scourge of AIDs.
•
Nobody had heard of Bosnia Herzegovina, Osama bin Ladin - or Britney Spears
and the Backstreet Boys,
In 1985, 5teve Wozniak, the designer of the first Apple computer, told USA Today
•
,and I quote: "I don't think home computers will become cOfflmonplace. It's difficult
to justify why many homes would need one."
That was then. This is now. OUf world has entered an epoch of transition -- a time of
historic opportunities and unprecedented dangers. We live in an age when:
•
Rapid technological advances fascinate and enrich us, but also create new
vulnerabilities. Those who would do grievous harm have greater reach and
destructive power than ever before.
Ours is an age of tremendous medical advances and an AIDs pandemic that
•
threatens massive regional unrest.
It is an era when the end of repressive regimes and the advance of democracy are
all too often accompanied by outbursts of ethnic hatred that arc extraordinarily difficult
to contain.
•
But on a lighter note, let me say that for all the welcome opportunities and the
unwelcome surprises in this world, some things remain remarkably·consistent. Two
cases in point: In 1985, the biggest male pop artist actually was known as Prince. And
just last week, he became formerly known as "the artist formerly known as Prince."
And, on this very day, May 25, in 1985, the Bluejays won the NCAA Division I Lacrosse
Championship over Syracuse -- and I am betting that you are about to do it again!
As we learn in sports, life throws curves. We could bc struck by luck - or by lightning.
We human beings - however powerful or brilliant, good or evil- are falliblc, flawed,
fickle and fragile. And many of the factors that change our lives and our world
radically for the better - or for worse -- are inherently unpredictable and outside our
ability to control.
As human beings, as Americans, and as citizens of this world, our great hope and
responsibility is to use the will and the knowledge and the power we do have to try to
shape the future for the better. As new graduates.. I hope that you feel this challenge in
a special way.
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What are some of the trends that we identify today that hold far~reaching implication$
for the world of 2015? I will cite just a few, and not those you might expect from a
Director of Centrallntelligcncl'!. I would ask you to consider that:
•
[n the last year, Internet use in China jumped from 2 million to 10 million. I will
let the math majors extrapolate to 2015. But what will that mean? What will the imp~ct
be of an ever growing proportion of China's population entering cyberspace - a place
where few respect orthodoxy of any sort?
•
There wHl be over 7 billion people in the world in 2015, a billion more than
today. More than 95% of this additional population will be bom in developing
countries - countries that are least able to cope with the pressures this growth will
creatc. What are the implications for regional stability?
•
We expect the threat from infectious diseases - some rc-emergent some entirely
new -- to keep growing over the next 15 years, despite important progress that is being
made.
•
And think about the most commonplace ~ and necessary - of commodities:
water. \Vater, in and of itself, has not been a cause of war for more than 4500 years. (n
fact, water shortages often have stimulated sharing arrangements. But by 2015. about a
third ohhe world's population will be living in water-stressed regions. We must ask
ours-elves: This tirne, wiJ) the result be cooperation or conflict?
My question to the Class of 2000 is, fifteen years from now what wHl your Bves be like?
r
I hate to break this to you, but in 2015, you will be in your mid-thirties. By then, you
are likely to have spollses, mortgages, kids. 20 extra pounds and established car~rs.
But will you have enthusinsm? Will your life have meaning or will YOll be going
through the motions? '..viII you know who you are and stand up for what you believe?
Will you be living your life in a way that does honor to the wonderful people here with
you now - your family and your mentors who have enriched your lives, broadened
your horizons and helped launch you on the road to success?
What you do with your lives over the' next fHteen years -- how you choose to live them
~- can make aJl the difference ~- not only to you, but to countless people in this world
whom you wiH never meet. Because o( you - and your generation -- the world of 2015
can be much less dangerous - and much more humane and healthy -- than my best
intelligence analysts now dare to imagine. But will you help to make the world 012015
a better place to live? Will you put your first-class education to work for your
community, your country and the world?
As we contemplate the pO>sible >renarios for 2015, one thing that my top analysts and I
cannot know - and one thing that can make a powerful difference - is what is on your
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minds and what is in your hearts.
Whatever your chosen field -- medicine, public health, environmental science,
international relations, languages, physics, mathematics, biology, engineering, IT - even
if, God forbid, you become a lawyer like George Soterakis threatens to do -- or quit
physics and engineering to become a financial oracle and media mogul like Mike
Bloomberg·- I hope that you will consider engaging in some form of public service.
Service in government - devoting at least part of your career to it -- is one option that I
hope you will think about, though I realize that government is not the obvious career
choice in a prosperous, dot-com age, If you want excellence in government, then
exceptional people must be willing to serve in it.
For those of you who cannot resist the pull of the private sector - hey, this is the United
States of America, go for it, make a fortune. But I can tell you with confidence that you
will be even wealthier if you remember to "give something back." Devote a significant
percentage of your profits to charity. Become a private philanthropist like your founder
Johns Hopkins. Out-give Bill Gates. The key is to contribute some of yourself, as well
as your money, to a good cause.
Everyone of you can make the time to serve on a school board, volunteer at a local
shelter, or mentor a kid who needs someone to care. When you do that you are actually
exerting tremendous power: the power to create hope and opportunity.
I seldom reveal secrets, but, in closing -- and in summary -- I will share some with you
now. You could call them
"George Tenet's Seven Secrets to Success":
Tenet #1: Know who you are. My mother escaped from southern Albania on a British
submarine just as the Iron Curtain was closing - never to see her family again. My
father came to America just prior to thc Great Depression speaking no English, without
a nickel in his pocket or a friend in sight. Imagine their courage. I talk about them with
great pride to make my point. Each of you has family stories of courage and sacrifice.
They tell you what your values are and who you me as men and women - never forget
them. They will guide you through the darkest days in your life, and 'sweeten your
happiest moments.
Tenet #2: Honor the service and the sacrifice of men and women who protect this
country and our valucs. As you sit in Starbucks tomorrow night sipping your espressos
and your cappuccinos - remember the men and women in military uniform, the law
enforcement- officers, and the intelligence officers working arollnd the globe and around
the clock to protect your way of life - putting their lives on the line, so that you can
pursue your life's dream in total freedom. Honor their service. Better yet, be inspired
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by their example to render service yourself.
Tenet #3: Follow your heart and dare to take risks. If you do not wake up every day
with great passion for your work, you will be miserable. Do not just go through the
motions. Never put yourself in the position of regretting what you did not try to do.
Every experience - whether it is good or bad - if it is based on passionate belief and
doing what you love -- will give you the will and the character to learn, grow and
persevere. Stand up for yourself and your dreams. Do not lose your youthful idealism
for the world.
.
.
Tenet #4: Fight hatred and prejudice wherever you see it. If there is one thing in today'
5 world that is most responsible for the turmoil we sec, it is ethnic hatred. It haunts us
across continents - in the Balkans, in central Africa, in the Middle East, and even here in
our own country. The fundamental lack of tDlerance that men and women show for
each other drives so much of the instability that we confront. We all carry prejudice of
one sort or another inside us. Purge it from your souls and never turn a blind eye
toward hatred when you encounter it.
Tenet # 5: Laugh as much as you can. Never take yourself too seriously. Have the
ability tD stand back and admit your shortcomings and failures with humor and grace.
This ability will help you weather any storm.
Tenet #6: Take care of the people around you. If you take care of people, they will
always take care of you. Many of you will rise like meteors to the top of your chosen
professions. On the way up, treat the people around you with the decency and respect
and generosity that have been shown to you. Have a kind word. Offer a helping hand.
And when you reach the top, show a little humility. Why? Because there will come a
day when the crash occurs. When failure comes. When you plummet down the ladder.
The fall will be gentle if people remember you as a caring, considerate human being.
The Seventh, and final Tenet is: Love and serve your country. In no other country in
the world could someone like me stand before YDU as Director of Central Intelligence.
Americans are given opportunities that no other country provides. If you do not get a
lump in your throat when the National Anthem is played or the flag passes by - come
to your senses and recognize that you live in the greatest country in the world.
When you put my "Seven Tenets" tDgether, they add lip to one big secret for success as
a human being, and it is this: Serve someone other than yourself, something bigger
than yourself.
This is the MissiDn that I give to you today. I hope that you will choose to accept.
May God bless you and your families. Thank you.
UNCLASSIFIED
�••
0
..
UNCLASSIFIED
Produced by
Office of Public
Affair~1
Intent'll COInmuu.icarions Branch
For 9ue.'irion.'i please call
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~
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IExlTJt01MaiitjMeri'ul
IBetuFiiit01liWexiH
SPEECHES/DOCUMENTS
MISFll.E]) 1)( JClJ,\1E.VJ'
CL
rmFiLED /lY
INTON LillRARy STAFF
TNr~DATE-¥R-4/()5
August 11, 2000
Headlines:
(U)
DCI Letter to Congress on Recent Decisions
regarding the Release of Chile Documents
(U) Text of DCI Letter to Congress on August 11 on Recent Decisions
regarding the Release of Chile Documents
I write to update you on our Chile declassification efforts. Declassification
decisions require the most careful consideration. I believe we have taken a measured,
rational approach in supplementing the declassification guidelines initially issued by
the National Security Council (NSC) in November 1999. The CIA guidelines reflect our
fundamental commitment to protect intelligence sources and methods.
I believe the Agency can be proud of its Chile declassification efforts. We have
devoted several thousand hours over a nine month period to this endeavor. The review
was thorough, intensive, and dedicated to the release of as much relevant information
as possible consistent with my statutory obligation to protect sources and methods.
With regard to the latest release of material, we have fintshed our exhaustive
review of documents related to human rights and terrorism issues and the records
associated with the major covert action undertaken to provide support and
encouragement to groups seeking to mount a coup against the Salvador Allende
government in 1970. I have also evaluated the proposed release of other material
related to Chile during 1962-1975. As part of this review process, I asked the
Directorate of Operations to prepare an assessment of the proposed release of the
1962-1975 material and its potential impact on current operational equities. I carefully
reviewed that assessment in my effort to make a declassification decision that reflects
both the interest in providing information to the public as well as my statutory
responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods.
I have made the following determinations. First, I have approved for release
more than 500 documents comprising thousands of pages pertaining to human rights
abuses, terrorism and other acts of political violence that occurred during 1968-1991. I
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�UNCLASSIFIED
believe these documents will add important material to the historical record without
inhibiting our ability to protect sources and methods. Second, I approved for release
several hundred documents representing close to 1,000 pages pertaining to the major
covert action undertaken in Chile in 1970. Again, I believe the release will illuminate
the historical record without damaging intelligence sources and methods.
Finally, I decided to withhold at this time other documents from the 1962-1975
time frame. I made this decision by carefully evaluating the records after they had been
reviewed and redacted. This decision was not IDnde in an effort to shield from release
human rights or other information sought by the NSC Directive. It was solely made
because, in their aggregate, these materials present a pattern of activity that had the
effect of revealing intelligence methods that have been employed worldwide. While I
am not at this time releasing the additional documents, I have agreed to allow them to
be reviewed one more time, with the assistance of State Department and the NSC, to
ensure that there is not some subset of these documents that may be released without
doing harm to intelligence sources and methods. I also want to reemphasize that we
are in no way trying to withhold information embarrassing to the United States
Government.
What I have offered for release in this final tranche fully meets the scope of the
NSC directive which called for review and release of records pertaining to human rights
abuses, terrorism and acts of political violence, This final release will include:
•
numerous operational documents detailing the covert action designed to provide
support and encouragement to groups seeking to mount a coup against Salvador
Allende government in 1970.
•
the first significant release of documents related to topics discussed during the
Church Committee hearings,
•
Directorate of Operations intelligence reports chronicling the activities of
subversive groups, including information pertaining to the groups' kidnapping efforts,
plans to mount economic sabotage, and reports that suggest the groups' involvement in
a number of assassination attempts.
•
information on the assassination of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt;
operational cables describing Pinochet's handling of human rights issues, and reports
on the efforts of Pinochet and Manuel Contreras, a former head of DINA, to try to
implicate the CIA in the murder of Letelier.
•
several documents that discuss CIA's non-involvement in the 1973 coup which
toppled Allende from power as well as several National Intelligence Estimates and
relevant Directorate of Intelligence publications,
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�.
-
UNCLASSIFIED
A::. a result of careful review and redaction, I believe this final release of
information strikes the correct balance in providing the public with historically
important information pursuant to the NSC directive while also meeting our vital
statutory obligations. (This is UNCLASSIFIED.)
PJ."Odu(,E'd bv
Office of Public Affairsl
Intel11fll COInInlllUcariolls Branch
For q11estions plE'asE" call
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�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Clinton Administration History Project
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Cinton Administration History Project
Council of Economic Advisers
Department of Commerce
Central Intelligence Agency
Department of the Interior
Department of Defense
Corporation for National Service
Council on Environmental Quality
Department of Justice
Domestic Policy Council
Department of Education
Department of Energy
Environmental Protection Agency
Federal Emergency Management Agency
General Services Administration
Small Business Administration
Social Security Administration
United States Agency for International Development
National Economic Council
Office of Management & Budget
Office of National Drug Control Policy
Office of Personnel Management
Office of Science & Technology Policy
Office of the Vice President
United States Trade Representative
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The Clinton Administration History Project describes in detail the accomplishments of President Clinton's Administration for the period 1993-2001. The records consist of the histories of 32 agencies or departments within the Executive Branch. In general, each organization associated with the Project submitted a narrative history along with supporting documents. These narrative accounts are primarily overviews of the various missions, special projects, and accomplishments of the agencies. The supplementary records include substantive memos, press releases, briefing papers, and publications illustrated with photos and charts.</p>
<p>Agencies:<br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+of+the+Council+of+Economic+Advisers&range=&collection=21&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">History of the Council of Economic Advisers</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+of+the+Central+Intelligence+Agency&range=&collection=21&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">History of the Central Intelligence Agency</a><br /><a 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href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+of+the+Office+of+the+Vice+President&range=&collection=21&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">History of the Office of the Vice President</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+of+the+Small+Business+Administration&range=&collection=21&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">History of the Small Business Administration</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+of+the+Social+Security+Administration&range=&collection=21&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">History of the Social Security Administration</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+of+the+Department+of+State&range=&collection=21&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">History of the Department of State</a><br /><a 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href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+of+the+United+States+Agency+for+International+Development&range=&collection=21&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">History of the United States Agency for International Development</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+of+the+United+States+Department+of+Agriculture&range=&collection=21&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">History of the United States Department of Agriculture</a><br /><a 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Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36051">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
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Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Format
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Adobe Acrobat Document
Extent
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1474 folders in 111 boxes
Text
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Paper
Dublin Core
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Title
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[Central Intelligence Agency] [2]
Creator
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History of the Central Intelligence Agency
Clinton Administration History Project
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
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Box 2
<a href="http://clintonlibrary.gov/assets/Documents/Finding-Aids/Systematic/Administration-History-finding-aid.pdf">Collection Finding Aid</a>
<a href="http://catalog.archives.gov/id/1224983">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Format
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Adobe Acrobat Document
Publisher
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Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Medium
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Reproduction-Reference
Date Created
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6/24/2011
Source
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1224983-central-intelligence-agency-2
1224983