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Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) of E.O. 13526.
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4683
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS HIN GTO N
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
B i l a t e r a l Meeting w i t h President Jacques
Chirac o f France
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Warren Christopher, Secretary o f State
Anthony Lake, A s s i s t a n t t o the President
for National Security A f f a i r s
Pamela Harriman, Ambassador t o France
Alexander Vershbow, Senior D i r e c t o r f o r
European A f f a i r s , NSC S t a f f , Notetaker
France
Jacques Chirac, President
Herve De Charette, Foreign M i n i s t e r
Jacques Andreani, Ambassador t o the U.S.
Jean-David L e v i t t e , Diplomatic Adviser
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
June 14, 1995, 2:45 p.m. - 3:37 p.m.
Oval O f f i c e
President Chirac: Thank you f o r r e c e i v i n g me. I would l i k e t o
ask one q u e s t i o n . We received i n f o r m a t i o n a few hours ago about
a massing o f Bosnian government troops i n Sarajevo. We are
w o r r i e d by t h a t . f&)
The P r e s i d e n t : You should be w o r r i e d . Let me t e l l you what we
know. I wanted t o r a i s e t h i s i n our discussions on Bosnia. The
Bosnian government has been improving the s t r e n g t h o f i t s f o r c e s .
They b e l i e v e they are q u i t e strong now and are i n t e r e s t e d i n
launching an o f f e n s i v e t o open the road t o Sarajevo.
Secretary
C h r i s t o p h e r has cautioned Prime M i n i s t e r S i l a j d z i c very s t r o n g l y
about the p o s s i b l e adverse consequences. We have t o l d them t h a t
they c o u l d l o s e , t h a t they could put the peacekeepers i n more
danger, t h a t t h i s could lead t o more s h e l l i n g o f Sarajevo, t h a t
i t c o u l d endanger the continued existence o f UNPROFOR. We don't
know i f t h i s message had any impact on S i l a j d z i c o r others i n h i s
government. They are g e t t i n g a l o t o f encouragement here from
the new Republicans i n Congress who are pushing f o r a u n i l a t e r a l
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l i f t i n g o f the arms embargo. They know I i n t e n d t o veto t h a t and
t h a t they cannot o v e r r i d e my veto — a t l e a s t i n the Senate. But
we are v e r y concerned about the o f f e n s i v e .
We don't know i f i t
w i l l go forward, b u t we are t r y i n g t o discourage i t , p a r t i c u l a r l y
as i t c o u l d occur d u r i n g the G-7 Summit. fe)
President Chirac:
U.S.
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1 4
.d
h e l c t o D r e v e n t t h e d e f e a t o f thm R n s n i s n s .
The P r e s i d e n t : We w i l l do whatever we can. They h o n e s t l y
b e l i e v e t h a t they can defeat the Serbs and t h a t they can f o r c e a
l i f t i n g o f the arms embargo. They b e l i e v e t h a t i f they can get
heavy weapons and get t r a i n e d on them, they could use them before
the Bosnian Serbs are able t o overwhelm them w i t h t h e i r
a r t i l l e r y . Our m i l i t a r y b e l i e v e s t h a t t h i s i s a b s o l u t e l y wrong
and we have t o l d them so repeatedly. But r i g h t now they are
l i f t e d by t h e f a c t t h a t they have improved t h e i r c a p a b i l i t y over
the past months. f&)
President Chirac: This means t h a t they have been g e t t i n g arms
and t h a t the embargo i s n ' t working. f&)
The P r e s i d e n t : They are also emboldened by a l l the t a l k i n
Congress about u n i l a t e r a l l i f t .
But we have t o l d them r e p e a t e d l y
t h a t they can't win and t h a t I w i l l veto u n i l a t e r a l l i f t .
We
have t o l d them t h a t we support the UN mission and t h a t we are
determined t o work i n p a r t n e r s h i p w i t h our a l l i e s — e s p e c i a l l y
the UK and France — t o strengthen UNPROFOR. Maybe they b e l i e v e
t h a t they can open the road w i t h o u t any o t h e r consequences.
Maybe they t h i n k t h a t t h i s w i l l speed the day o f l i f t i n g the arms
embargo. But we are doing what we can t o discourage t h i s . fG4
President Chirac:
Summit.
They may launch the o f f e n s i v e d u r i n g the G-7
The P r e s i d e n t : We t h i n k they may do t h i s i n order t o focus the
a t t e n t i o n o f t h e w o r l d on Bosnia, and t o p u t t h e heat on a l l o f
us d u r i n g t h e G-7. Of course, i t would be good t o get the road
opened. But i f they launch the o f f e n s i v e , t h e Serbs w i l l n o t be
seen by t h e Russians and others as i n the wrong when they r e a c t .
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Secretary Christopher: Our l a t e s t i n t e l l i g e n c e i s t h a t t h e
Bosnians are not q u i t e ready t o launch t h e o f f e n s i v e and may w a i t
u n t i l t h e 20th o r 21st, b u t they could go e a r l i e r than t h i s . I
t o l d S i l a j d z i c t h a t i f they do, they w i l l be on t h e i r own. We
w i l l n o t come t o t h e i r rescue i f they s t a r t something and then
get a b l a c k eye. f&)
The P r e s i d e n t : I f t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n i s r i g h t and they aren't
going t o be ready d u r i n g the G-7, i t w i l l give us more time t o
work on them. fe)
President Chirac: We have the same i n f o r m a t i o n as you. I was
informed t h a t a few hours ago the c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f forces was
g e t t i n g b i g g e r and b i g g e r as we speak. fe)
The P r e s i d e n t : I suggest we p u t the issue o f the Bosnian
o f f e n s i v e t o t h e side and come back t o i t l a t e r . I would l i k e t o
t a l k about t h e s t a t u s o f the Rapid Reaction Force. I w i l l do a l l
I can t o deal w i t h the o f f e n s i v e , b u t every day more and more
members o f Congress want t o f o r c e t h e u n i l a t e r a l l i f t i n g o f the
arms embargo. You may have had an impact i n your d i s c u s s i o n w i t h
the Senators and Congressmen over lunch. I understand you t o l d
them what I have been saying f o r months. f&)
President Chirac:
I doubt I had much e f f e c t .
fe)
The P r e s i d e n t : You are there on the ground and have a f i r s t - h a n d
appreciation of the s i t u a t i o n .
^
President Chirac: I can only say, before l e a v i n g t h e s u b j e c t o f
the o f f e n s i v e , t h a t i n the c u r r e n t circumstances i t would be good
to have t h e UN S e c u r i t y Council R e s o l u t i o n on the Rapid Reaction
Force enacted tomorrow. They are ready i n New York.f
1 4b 1 4
.d
] The
Russians w i l l support i t . We j u s t need the "yes" vote o f the
United S t a t e s .
We should do t h i s before t h e G-7. I t w i l l be a
major s i g n a l , even though I know you have problems w i t h the
Congress. f&)
The P r e s i d e n t : The main issue w i t h t h e Congress i s t h e f a c t
t h a t , under t h e proposal, we would be o b l i g e d t o fund 30 percent
of the Rapid Reaction Force, and Congress would have t o
a p p r o p r i a t e t h e funds. This new Congress i s t h e most
i s o l a t i o n i s t Congress since the 1930s. Last n i g h t I sent them
another budget w i t h a c l e a r plan t o balance t h e budget over 10
years. I t would p r o v i d e f o r cuts i n o v e r a l l spending — except
f o r defense, r e t i r e m e n t and healthcare f o r t h e e l d e r l y — by 20%
across t h e board i n r e a l d o l l a r s (or 40% w i t h o u t i n f l a t i o n ) . I t
would h o l d on t o a l l o f our f o r e i g n a f f a i r s investments and
increase spending on education. You must see t h i s issue i n t h a t
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c o n t e x t . I would vote l i k e t h i s [snapping h i s f i n g e r s ] i f I
d i d n ' t have t o get the money. I f we voted tomorrow, i t c o u l d
undermine our a b i l i t y t o keep the word o f the United States on
f u n d i n g o f the Rapid Reaction Force, and i t could cause more
t r o u b l e . That i s the o n l y issue.
The head o f the House Foreign A f f a i r s Committee, Ben Oilman — a
p r e t t y good guy, not a r e a c t i o n a r y — has w r i t t e n t o me on t h i s .
A l o t o f people i n the Senate are good on f o r e i g n a f f a i r s and
they want t o see us m a i n t a i n our commitments. But we haven't
f i g u r e d out a s t r a t e g y t h a t would enable us t o vote tomorrow i n
f a v o r o f the Rapid Reaction Force. There has been some change i n
the m i s s i o n o f the f o r c e since the o r i g i n a l d i s c u s s i o n a t the
P a r i s meeting.
I f I could f i g u r e out a way not t o make t h i n g s
worse w i t h the Congress, I would vote tomorrow. Our request f o r
a delay i s so t h a t we can f u l l y b r i e f the Congress on why we
support the Force and why the U.S. should finance p a r t o f i t .
Ambassador Harriman knows w e l l t h a t every Senator b e l i e v e s he or
she should be P r e s i d e n t . I f we voted f o r the Rapid Reaction
Force w i t h o u t t e l l i n g them, they would almost c e r t a i n l y deny me
the funds.
fG}
I f you s a i d t o me t h a t i t would be worth r i s k i n g the funds, then
I would consider v o t i n g tomorrow. But i f you can give me two
days t o a l l o w the Congress t o beat up on the Secretary and the
N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y Adviser, t o t e l l us how t e r r i b l e Bosnia i s , and
t o make speeches, i t would increase the chances t h a t I c o u l d fund
the f o r c e .
{G)
-But again, i f i n your judgment, you need the vote tomorrow
because something bad could happen, and you are ready t o increase
the r i s k t h a t I can't pay, then t e l l me.
You have stuck your
neck out time and time again. I support the Rapid Reaction Force
and want t o do the r i g h t t h i n g . I f we have an agreement, I want
t o h e l p . But i f we go t o a vote tomorrow, i t would reduce the
chances s u b s t a n t i a l l y t h a t I can persuade Congress t o fund i t .
President Chirac: There are two problems, p o l i t i c a l and
f i n a n c i a l . P o l i t i c a l l y , everyone i n c l u d i n g the Russians i s ready
t o vote f o r the r e s o l u t i o n . The s i t u a t i o n i n Bosnia being what
i t i s , I t h i n k we should approve the r e s o l u t i o n tomorrow ~ t h a t
i s , b e f o r e the G-7 Summit. On the f i n a n c i a l problem, maybe you
cannot get the funds from the Congress t o pay the U.S. share.
We
w i l l see.
The P r e s i d e n t : Ours i s a p r e t t y b i g share —
do i t , I would l i k e t o do i t r i g h t .
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President Chirac: But we are in such a situation that I will
take the risk. ^Gj
The P r e s i d e n t : So you would choose the p o l i t i c a l b e n e f i t now,
even w i t h an increased f i n a n c i a l r i s k ? fe)
President Chirac: Yes, I ' l l take the f i n a n c i a l r i s k , although I
know you w i l l do your utmost t o get funding. fe)
Secretary Christopher: I t h i n k t h a t i f we go ahead w i t h o u t
c o n s u l t i n g t h e Congress, we r i s k i n c u r r i n g great outrage on t h e
Hill.
I r e c e i v e d the most angry l e t t e r I have ever r e c e i v e d from
Oilman. He was outraged t h a t we would go ahead w i t h t h e
r e s o l u t i o n w i t h o u t c o n s u l t i n g Congress. I t w i l l be d i f f i c u l t t o
get support i n t h e best o f circumstances.
You helped a l o t w i t h
your e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e Rapid Reaction Force a t today's lunch
w i t h t h e Congressional leaders. But i f , on t o p o f the normal
d i f f i c u l t i e s we face, we added the d i s c o u r t e s y o f f a i l i n g t o
c o n s u l t , i t would almost guarantee the f a i l u r e t o secure f u n d i n g ,
coupled w i t h the r i s k o f a negative Congressional r e s o l u t i o n .
The President:
Hill?
Chris, what consultations are planned on the
m
Secretary Christopher: We w i l l t a l k t o a l l t h e committee
chairmen, t h e l e a d e r s h i p , and t h e chairmen o f the A p p r o p r i a t i o n
and Foreign A f f a i r s Committees. fG)
The P r e s i d e n t : I s there any chance t h a t we could c o n s u l t on an
emergency b a s i s , b u i l d i n g on t h e d i s c u s s i o n a t the lunch today?
Secretary Christopher: I would l i k e t o assess t h a t
recommendation. President Chirac made some progress a t lunch
w i t h Lugar, Nunn, McCain and others — many o f t h e key Senators
were t h e r e . We should see how they f e e l i n t h e wake o f t h a t
d i s c u s s i o n . I know t h a t President Chirac s a i d t h a t he and John
Major don't understand t h e need f o r delay. But t h e r e has been
great c o n f u s i o n engendered by two f a c t o r s . F i r s t , we o r i g i n a l l y
thought t h a t the Rapid Reaction Force would i n v o l v e n a t i o n a l
f o r c e s ; t h i s was our understanding a t the Paris Defense
M i n i s t e r s ' meeting.
Second, there were statements by t h e UN l a s t
weekend — e s p e c i a l l y by Akashi — which drove our Congress up
the w a l l . Those statements spoke of not doing a n y t h i n g w i t h o u t
the consent o f t h e Bosnian Serbs. Your c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h t h e
Congressmen helped c l a r i f y t h a t and I understand you w i l l be
seeing Dole and G i n g r i c h t h i s a f t e r n o o n . These two issues have
added t o our f i n a n c i a l problems, so we need t o c o n s u l t c a r e f u l l y
and l e t i t s e t t l e i n . (€)
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President Chirac: Dole asked t o meet me t h i s a f t e r n o o n and I
w i l l see what I can do.
The P r e s i d e n t : Very good. From t h e day I took o f f i c e . Dole has
been encouraging t h e Bosnian government t o ignore what I want t o
do and pushing f o r an independent s t r a t e g y t o l i f t t h e arms
embargo. When you see him, you should t e l l him your p o s i t i o n on
the arms embargo. On the issue o f the Rapid Reaction Force, you
should t e l l Dole t h a t whatever he may t h i n k about t h e arms
embargo and UNPROFOR, we need the Rapid Reaction Force and we
should never be i n a p o s i t i o n where our f o r c e s can be taken
hostage... f&)
President Chirac:
...or h u m i l i a t e d . f&)
The P r e s i d e n t : I am going t o say t h a t I support President
Chirac's e f f o r t s and back the Rapid Reaction Force, and t h a t I
b e l i e v e we should pay a p a r t i a l share o f t h e cost because, as
long as our A l l i e s are t h e r e , we have t o p r o t e c t our people. We
need t o separate the Rapid Reaction Force i n Dole's mind from h i s
d e s i r e t o l i f t t h e arms embargo. I f we p l a y on t h e n a t i o n a l
honor i s s u e , on the importance o f not having our people captured,
we have a chance o f persuading him. G i n g r i c h has been g e n e r a l l y
more s u p p o r t i v e o f our f o r e i g n p o l i c y . He i s not an
i s o l a t i o n i s t , b u t he i s l o o k i n g f o r ways t o please h i s p a r t y on
c e r t a i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y issues. So I would make t h e same
arguments t o G i n g r i c h . He w i l l be very moved by t h e argument
r e g a r d i n g p r o t e c t i n g the p r i d e o f French and B r i t i s h f o r c e s . . .
President Chirac:
...and t h a t o f other UNPROFOR c o n t r i b u t o r s . . .
The P r e s i d e n t :
...and t h e i n t e g r i t y o f the UN presence, as w e l l
as t h e s a f e t y o f the t r o o p s . This w i l l resonate w i t h them.
A f t e r your meeting, we w i l l take soundings. When you r e t u r n t o
dinner t o n i g h t , you can r e p o r t on your t a l k s and we can assess
where we are. Okay?
President Chirac:
Okay. (U)
The President: I understand what you are saying about how good
it would be to have a vote before the G-7 Summit. (£J
President Chirac: I t w i l l be very u s e f u l v i s - a - v i s t h e Serbs.
I t w i l l p u t b i g pressure on M i l o s e v i c .
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1.4b,.1.4d
, When we
decided on t h e Rapid Reaction Force, I c a l l e d M i l o s e v i c and t o l d
him t h a t i t wasn't designed t o a t t a c k anyone, b u t t o p r o t e c t
UNPROFOR.'
i
^Mr. Frasure had almost
succeeded i n g e t t i n g r e c o g n i t i o n o f Bosnia. This could have been
a very i m p o r t a n t step toward peace b u t he d i d n ' t get t h e r e .
^ e have persuaded Y e l t s i n t o agree. I f t h e U.S.
W
slows t h e pace a t the UN, i t w i l l give Y e l t s i n and M i l o s e v i c more
oxygen. I understand your problems w i t h t h e Congress. We c o u l d
vote tomorrow and then Congress wouldn't fund i t . That would be
too bad. I understand the argument o f Secretary Christopher
about t h e d i s c o u r t e s y and the p o l i t i c a l consequences o f n o t
c o n s u l t i n g . Only you can judge the importance o f t h i s . I f I say
to Dole and G i n g r i c h as I d i d a t lunch t h a t t h e i r behavior i s
h e l p i n g t h e Serbs and not the Bosnians, maybe t h i s w i l l h e l p .
The P r e s i d e n t :
and we can see
t e l l them t h a t
Rapid Reaction
w i l l play into
Yes, say t h a t t o Dole. I w i l l c a l l both o f them
where we are t o n i g h t . Maybe we can do i t . I f you
i f the U.S. i s n ' t able t o vote tomorrow f o r the
Force (which i n v o l v e s no U.S. ground f o r c e s ) , i t
t h e hands of the Serbs, t h a t c o u l d h e l p . fG-)
Secretary C h r i s t o p h e r :
argument. fG^
President Chirac:
The P r e s i d e n t :
They w i l l be very impressed by t h a t
Plus i t i s t r u e .
We w i l l work on t h i s
I have c a l l e d M i l o s e v i c
today.
President Chirac: I know we have l i t t l e time l e f t and President
Santer i s w a i t i n g around the corner, b u t I wanted t o t a l k about
U.S. disengagement from a i d t o the developing c o u n t r i e s . We are
very w o r r i e d about t h i s . We are t a l k i n g about c o u n t r i e s who need
assistance and whose p o p u l a t i o n i s i n c r e a s i n g f a s t . I f we don't
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c r e a t e t h e means o f keeping t h e i r p o p u l a t i o n i n t h e i r own
c o u n t r i e s , we w i l l have a r e a l problem. Today t h e European
Union, which has roughly t h e same GNP as t h e United States, i s
making t h r e e times t h e e f f o r t i n f o r e i g n a s s i s t a n c e . Our
impression i s t h a t you are moving backwards based on the present
behavior o f t h e Republicans.
We f i n d t h i s very w o r r y i n g and w i l l
raise t h i s at Halifax.
There i s a q u e s t i o n o f r e p l e n i s h i n g t h e funds f o r the World
Bank's I n t e r n a t i o n a l Development A s s o c i a t i o n (IDA). We should
support t h e r e s u s c i t a t i o n o f the IDA. They do a b e a u t i f u l j o b ,
I t would not be moral o r acceptable
1.4b, 1.4d
i n h u m a n i t a r i a n terms t o allow people t o d i e o f hunger. I t would
also be p o l i t i c a l l y very dangerous. There too, I know you have
problems w i t h t h e Congress.
The P r e s i d e n t : I've been t r y i n g f o r months t o send a c l e a r
message t h a t i f t h e c u r r e n t l e g i s l a t i o n passes the House, I w i l l
veto i t . This l e g i s l a t i o n i s very r e s t r i c t i v e on f o r e i g n
a s s i s t a n c e . I sent up a budget t h a t would f u l f i l l our
obligations t o the i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s i n f u l l .
The new budget, while- making l a r g e r c u t s , w i l l s t i l l m a i n t a i n our
commitments. I want you t o know t h a t when we come t o the end o f
the process — i n August or September — I w i l l be very f i r m i n
h o l d i n g on t o these programs. I n t h e U.S. t h e r e i s now no
p o l i t i c a l c o n s t i t u e n c y f o r f o r e i g n a i d , b u t I agree t h a t i t i s
m o r a l l y and p o l i t i c a l l y t h e r i g h t t h i n g t o do. I w i l l be f i r m
and I t h i n k i t i s a b a t t l e t h a t I w i l l win. You should hammer
anyone you see on C a p i t o l H i l l on t h i s . Congress i s very s h o r t s i g h t e d . The American people want t o balance the budget and c u t
f o r e i g n a s s i s t a n c e because they b e l i e v e we spend 15 percent on
f o r e i g n a i d . The r e a l i t y i s t h a t we o n l y spend one-tenth o f t h a t
amount. fe-)
President Chirac:
I understand it's 1.5 percent.
{G)
The P r e s i d e n t : I t ' s about one percent o f our budget. I f you ask
the people what we should be spending they say about t h r e e
percent o f the budget. People don't know the f a c t s , and Congress
shouldn't be g i v i n g i n t o i s o l a t i o n i s m .
I am determine t o f i g h t
and b e l i e v e I w i l l win. You should say e x a c t l y what you t o l d me
t o Congressional leaders. They know i t i s t r u e . Dole and
G i n g r i c h know t h e importance of t h i s i s s u e .
^
President Chirac: The cuts would be very bad f o r the U.S. image
i n the w o r l d . fG-)
The P r e s i d e n t : Dole wants t o be President. How does he expect
t o r e s t o r e t h e cuts i f he becomes President? But I b e l i e v e I
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w i l l win, although i t i s good f o r you t o help press on t h i s
issue.
President Chirac: There are some other s u b j e c t s we c o u l d
discuss. Perhaps we can discuss European s e c u r i t y a r c h i t e c t u r e
i n the meeting w i t h Santer. f€-)
Secretary Christopher: There i s a danger t h a t Bosnia w i l l h i j a c k
the H a l i f a x Summit. The way f o r us t o a v o i d t h i s i s t o stay very
close t o g e t h e r and not a l l o w the press t o p u l l us a p a r t . One o f
the keys i s saying t h a t we have agreed t h a t UNPROFOR should s t a y
and t h a t i t would be t r a g i c i f UNPROFOR were t o leave. We should
say t h a t the Rapid Reaction Force i s the best insurance t h a t
UNPROFOR w i l l s t a y . f € j
President Chirac: That i s a b s o l u t e l y t r u e and i t i s best t o
speak the t r u t h . (U)
Secretary Christopher: That's r i g h t . We have t o keep our
s t o r i e s s t r a i g h t . We also can say t h a t we are c o n t i n u i n g t o seek
a p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n w i t h the new assistance of C a r l B i l d t . The
t h r e e p o i n t s are: UNPROFOR remains, we are s t r e n g t h e n i n g
UNPROFOR w i t h the Rapid Reaction Force, and we are seeking a
p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n . I f we can m a i n t a i n t h i s consensus, we can
keep the Summit from becoming a Bosnian Summit. KH
President Chirac:
1.4b, 1.4d
The P r e s i d e n t : Yes, but we do want t o help i f i t becomes
necessary. (€)
-President
Chirac:
The P r e s i d e n t : I support what Secretary Christopher j u s t s a i d .
When you won the e l e c t i o n , I was very pleased because I b e l i e v e
t h a t you would b r i n g energy and g r e a t e r u n i t y t o the European
position.
I have done what I could here t o move our system t o
the p o i n t t h a t we would be c l e a r l y committed i f there had t o be
w i t h d r a w a l , o r i f UN forces were i s o l a t e d and needed our help
s h o r t o f w i t h d r a w a l . My decisions caused a b i g s t i r .
I had t o
make c l e a r we are not o f f e r i n g a t a x i s e r v i c e , but t h a t we are
m o r a l l y o b l i g a t e d t o help i f c o n d i t i o n s r e q u i r e a s s i s t i n g our
a l l i e s . f&)
I t i s not p o s s i b l e f o r us t o send ground f o r c e s , but I can't t e l l
you how i m p o r t a n t i t i s t h a t we t r y t o m a i n t a i n a u n i t e d f r o n t —
not o n l y p u b l i c l y , but i n what our advisers say to the media.
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The press i s f u l l o f s t o r i e s i n which Europeans are saying t h a t
the Americans are weak and d i v i d e d . I am t r y i n g t o get money f o r
the Rapid Reaction Force and t o do what I can so t h a t you w i l l
have g r e a t e r confidence. This task w i l l be harder i f t h e r e are
s t o r i e s coming out o f other governments c r i t i c i z i n g our p o s i t i o n .
Our press i s out o f step w i t h our people on t h i s i s s u e . They are
offended by the f a c t t h a t t h e r e i s a h o r r i b l e problem i n t h e
h e a r t o f Europe and i t i s n o t being solved. Never mind t h a t
Northern I r e l a n d took 25 years t o solve, and the Middle East was
deadlocked f o r f i v e decades. The press b e l i e v e s t h a t we c o u l d
j u s t snap our f i n g e r s and the Bosnian problem would go away. The
press i s l o o k i n g a l l t h e time t o d i v i d e us from our a l l i e s . So
we need t o stay t o g e t h e r both o f f i c i a l l y and on background. fe)
President
Chirac:
I n speaking t o one of
the Senators a t lunch, he asked whether t h i s f o r c e was t o p e r m i t
UNPROFOR t o withdraw.
I s a i d no, i t was p r e c i s e l y t h e o p p o s i t e ,
and he had a complete misunderstanding o f our p o l i c y . We are
sending t h e Rapid Reaction Force t o ensure t h a t we are respected.
The P r e s i d e n t :
Santer? f€^
What are our o b j e c t i v e s f o r our next meeting w i t h
President Chirac:
a n i c e chat. fG-)
The P r e s i d e n t :
Union.
This i s the Euro-American summit.
We can have
We want t o help w i t h Turkey and the Customs
President Chirac: I am very f a v o r a b l e toward the Turks.
the Customs Union i s under c o n t r o l .
End o f Conversation
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5422
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE
CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Chancellor Helmut Kohl o f Germany
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Chancellor Helmut Kohl
Notetakers: Alexander Vershbow and Anthony
Gardner
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
J u l y 13, 1995, 6:15-6:35 p.m.
Oval O f f i c e
The P r e s i d e n t :
Chancellor Kohl:
The P r e s i d e n t :
Bosnia. (U)
Hello? (U)
Hello, B i l l ?
Yes, Helmut.
(U)
I ' d l i k e t o t a l k t o you about
Chancellor Kohl: Yes. I can w e l l imagine your
s i t u a t i o n i s c a t a s t r o p h i c . (U)
concern,
The
The P r e s i d e n t : We need t o decide what we are going t o do about
UNPROFOR. Jacques Chirac j u s t c a l l e d me w i t h a r a d i c a l p r o p o s a l :
e i t h e r we r e t a k e Srebrenica by m i l i t a r y a c t i o n w i t h U.S., French,
UK and German ground t r o o p s , o r we withdraw immediately because
o t h e r w i s e we can't defend the honor o f t h e UN. I t o l d him t h a t
t h i s wasn't a good idea. Even i f we r e t o o k Srebrenica, what
would we do t o defend i t ? We couldn't be sure t h a t t h e Muslims
would be any more ready t o defend i t than b e f o r e . We agreed t o
t a l k t o our Chiefs o f S t a f f and t h a t they would f o l l o w up.
General S h a l i k a s h v i l i spoke t o Admiral Lanxade. The French
m i l i t a r y agrees t h a t r e t a k i n g Srebrenica would be a b i g r i s k f o r
l i t t l e g a i n . They are focusing on r e i n f o r c i n g Gorazde w i t h 1,000
French peacekeepers and reopening the Mount Igman road t o
Sarajevo w i t h t h e Rapid Reaction Force. We t h i n k t h a t i s more
r e a l i s t i c . I know you spoke t o him e a r l i e r today. What do you
t h i n k ? Does Chirac e a r n e s t l y want t o p u l l out UNPROFOR i f we
don't agree? f^)
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Let me j u s t say one t h i n g before t u r n i n g t o you: here i n the
U.S., t h e Congress i s saying t h a t the f a l l o f Srebrenica proves
t h a t UNPROFOR i s no good and t h a t we should l i f t the embargo
unilaterally.
I'm s t i l l opposing t h a t . I t h i n k I can defeat i t ,
but I may have t o veto i t . I wanted t o t a l k t o you about the
s i t u a t i o n and get your o p i n i o n . <€)
-Chancellor Kohl: Thank you, B i l l .
I was n o t able t o t a l k t o
Chirac h i m s e l f , b u t spoke t o Juppe. I spoke w i t h Chirac
yesterday and the day b e f o r e . I n my o p i n i o n , he i s , c o r r e c t l y ,
extremely upset by the whole s i t u a t i o n . However, I t h i n k we need
t o c l a r i f y a few t h i n g s before we go any f u r t h e r . F i r s t ,
Chirac's proposal would r e q u i r e UN S e c u r i t y Council approval.
The P r e s i d e n t :
Chancellor Kohl:
Absolutely.
(U)
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1 4
.d
The t h i r d problem which we should explore i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l i s
p r e v e n t i n g the other "safe areas" from being taken. This i s one
of Chirac's other ideas. We need t o f i n d out i f we can r a l l y
Major's support since t h a t i s where he has h i s s o l d i e r s . Troops
from s m a l l e r c o u n t r i e s are also on the ground; we shouldn't
overlook t h a t . f&)
I would f a v o r one more d i s c u s s i o n between the Chiefs o f
S t a f f w i t h B r i t i s h p a r t i c i p a t i o n . As you know, we don't have
troops on the ground and don't p l a n t o . What do you t h i n k ?
The President: I think you have made some good points. I agree
that the Chiefs of Staff need to talk again. We can't do
something stupid. Defending Gorazde and opening the Mount Igman
road is a better course. It is still better to keep UNPROFOR
there than to withdraw it. tG)
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Chancellor Kohl: I agree completely: UNPROFOR should stay. On
the o t h e r hand, we need to recognize t h a t the s i t u a t i o n i s
i n e x t r i c a b l e , even impossible. How can we avoid the f a c t t h a t
UNPROFOR troops may be taken hostage? The s i t u a t i o n i s
c a t a s t r o p h i c i n the eyes of world o p i n i o n .
1 4h 1 4d
In that
|
respect, Chirac i s c o r r e c t . (ۥ
The President:
Perhaps he meant the Bosnians? f6-)
Chancellor Kohl:
p e r s o n a l l y . f&)
The P r e s i d e n t :
Whatever the case, the Dutch took i t
That's not good. (U)
Chancellor Kohl: No, i t ' s not. The whole s i t u a t i o n i s
c a t a s t r o p h i c . The p i c t u r e s we see of refugees are t e r r i b l e .
B i l l , t h i s i s what I would suggest we do. I would be a v a i l a b l e
f o r f u r t h e r t a l k s Friday, Saturday o r Sunday between 2000 and
2400 our time, t h a t i s 1400 and 1800 Washington time. I ' l l be a t
home i n Ludwigshafen, so your side should provide an i n t e r p r e t e r .
(U)
The President: We need to stay together on t h i s .
you on Friday, Saturday o r Sunday. (U)
I will
call
Chancellor Kohl: You can count on my e n t i r e support. You can
t a l k very f r a n k l y w i t h me.
I know what the U.S. Congress might
p l a n . The l a s t t h i n g I want i s f o r you to be maneuvered i n t o a
dead end. fG}
The P r e s i d e n t :
Chancellor Kohl:
The President:
Chancellor Kohl:
I understand
and agree.
(U)
My best t o your w i f e .
(U)
And t o yours. Good-bye. (U)
Good-bye. (U)
—
End of Conversation
—
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Page 1 of 4
MSMai
DATE-TIME
17 July 95 16:19
FROM
Vershbow, Alexander R.
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
SUBJECT
Options Paper for breakfasl-fGECRET]"
TO
Bass, Peter E.
Cicio, Kristen K.
Emery, Mary C.
Hall, Wilma G.
Veit, Katherine M.
CARBON_COPY
NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT BODY
Since we've added some new material, we'd like TL to review one more time
before we send to the Principals.
[[ GORAZDE.DOC : 4145 in GORAZDE.DOC ]]
ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE
ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME
17 July 95 16:18
GORAZDE.DOC
-SECRET July 17, 1995
-SECRET
Options Paper: Position on French Request For Assistance in Defense of Gorazde
Background: The French and British remain far apart following Sunday's meeting
ofC
HODS in London on their
approach to the issue of reinforcing Gorazde against potential Bosnian Serb
attack:
The French have portrayed the
survival of Gorazde as a litmus test of UNPROFOR's future viability; they are
prepar
ed to support our proposals
for robust use of air power to protect Gorazde, but have tied this to their proposal
to reinforce the peacekeepers
on the ground as a deterrent to Serb aggression; moreover, they insist that only a
v
isible commitment of additional
U.S. support in Gorazde, i.e. helicopter airlift, will satisfy Chirac and head off a
French decision to withdraw. The
UK argues against anything that would change the nature of the existing
UNPROFOR mis
sion, is skeptical about
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Page 2 of 4
robust use of air power, and has indicated it does not see the survival of Gorazde
a
s essential to the continuation
of UNPROFOR. The British have indicated, however, that they may be willing to
consi
der the option of a
"private" warning to the Bosnian Serbs that if they attack Gorazde, NATO will
retali
ate with a massive air
campaign (similar to the UK/U.S./French warning delivered in early June with
respect
to the hostages).
Our own military analysis (and that of Bosnian Foreign Minister Sacirbey) is that
a
truly robust air campaign would
be far more critical to the defense of Gorazde than the addition of French troops;
b
ut it may be difficult to
persuade the French to delink this from the deployment of additional ground
forces.
The challenge is to find a
means of satisfying the French concerns over Gorazde that will not be blocked by
the
UK, while at the same time
bolstering UNPROFOR for the more critical task of protecting Sarajevo and
central Bo
snia and avoiding making
the fall of Gorazde the trigger for UNPROFOR withdrawal.
Options: There are two basic options for a U.S. response to the French in
preparati
on for the Foreign and Defense
Ministers' meeting scheduled for London on Friday, July 21.
u Option 1 "Yes, but..." Tell the French that we are prepared to support their req
uest, but that we view the
reinforcement of UNPROFOR in Gorazde as mainly symbolic (as they have
implied). The
numbers and
mission therefore could be scaled back, with emphasis on enhancing the ability to
co
ordinate NATO air
support for the enforcement of the exclusion zone and for the Bosnian
Government's d
efense of the enclave.
We would make clear that there can be no compromise on insisting that
preemptive SE
AD and a robust air
campaign, without the existing dual key, are the preconditions for U.S. support in
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1
ifting the troops: we do not
intend to take part in flying troops into harm's way if there is no additional reali
stic capability to defend their
positions once they are in place. We would also stress that we are not committing
t
o participation in any
resupply effort. And we would state that, while we are in favor of making a
determi
ned effort to deter a
Serb offensive against Gorazde, we would still favor maintaining UNPROFOR in
Sarajev
o and Central Bosnia
in the event Gorazde falls.
u Option 2 "No, because..." Tell the French that, absent their ability to present
a realistic mission for the forces
they are proposing to send to Gorazde, the troops could be more effectively
employed
around Sarajevo, and
that therefore we could not justify providing helicopters to move them. However,
ag
ree with the French that
a major change in UNPROFOR credibility must be signaled at Gorazde, and
encourage th
em to join us in
persuading the British to support a robust air campaign, supported by preemptive
SEA
D, to enforce the
exclusion zone and assist the Bosnian forces in protecting the Gorazde Safe Area.
Analysis: Either option may be rejected by the British and other troopcontributing
Allies, probably resulting in a
French decision to pull out of UNPROFOR. Option 1 would reduce French
ability to p
ut the blame on us in that
event. If accepted and our questions are satisfactorily answered, Option 1 would
re
quire us to make good on the
offer to provide helicopter air lift. This would prompt Congressional and public
op
position to crossing the "red
line" toward ground involvement -- opposition that could become unmanageable
if one
of our helicopters were
shot down. Moreover, it could commit us to follow-on actions to save Gorazde if
the
Serbs attacked and
threatened to overrun the enclave.
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The robust air campaign envisaged by both options would increase the risk of UN
pers
onnel being taken hostage,
but without this, neither Gorazde nor Sarajevo may prove viable in the long term.
T
he British willingness to issue
a "private" warning (that we would, of course, leak) of a massive air response to
an
attack on Gorazde could be
incorporated into either option. It may not, however, go far enough to satisfy the
French interest in visible action
on the ground, but it may be the means to unlocking the UN key on SEAD and
robust ai
r strikes. If we support
this approach, the authority for single-key SEAD and air strikes must be granted
in
advance, triggered by a
Bosnian Serb attack on Gorazde. If also linked to a robust campaign to open land
ro
utes to Sarajevo, this might
be sufficient to bring the French along, but probably not without direct lobbying
by
the President with Chirac.
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5597
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h French President Chirac
PARTICIPANTS
The President
President Chirac
I n t e r p r e t e r : Carol Wolter
Notetakers: Alexander Vershbow, Nelson Drew,
Katherine O'Loughlin
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
J u l y 19, 1995
8:20 - 9:00 a.m.
P r e s i d e n t Chirac:
The P r e s i d e n t :
Hello B i l l .
(U)
(U)
H e l l o Jacques.
President Chirac: Fine and you?
i n t e r p r e t e r . I t w i l l be e a s i e r .
How are you?
(U)
Do you mind i f we use an
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t : That w i l l be f i n e . I would l i k e t o t a l k about
where we are here on t h e Bosnia question. I agree w i t h you t h a t
the s t a t u s quo i s c l e a r l y no longer t o l e r a b l e . You have done
tremendous s e r v i c e i n r a l l y i n g support i n Europe f o r s t r o n g e r
a c t i o n . I agree w i t h you t h a t we need t o draw t h e l i n e a t
Gorazde.
The issue i s how, f i n d i n g the best way t o do t h i s
m i l i t a r i l y . f&)
Our m i l i t a r y advisors here f e e l s t r o n g l y the best t h i n g i s t o be
able t o b r i n g a i r power t o bear i n a d e c i s i v e manner and n o t i n a
t i m i d way as has been done l a t e l y . We propose i s s u i n g a c l e a r
warning t o Bosnian Serbs t h a t any a t t a c k on Gorazde o r Sarajevo
w i l l be met by a sustained a i r campaign t h a t w i l l a c t u a l l y
c r i p p l e t h e i r m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y . Now i f we do t h i s we must a l l
be prepared t o f o l l o w through, w i t h o u t wavering. Of course, we
should b e g i n now, o r soon, t o reduce the exposure o f UN personnel
to keep them from being taken hostage. (€4
Our planners b e l i e v e t h e f i r s t t a r g e t s would have t o be a f u l l
range o f Bosnian Serb a i r defense c a p a b i l i t i e s : SAMs, a n t i a i r c r a f t a r t i l l e r y , radar and command centers. They a l s o b e l i e v e
once a i r defenses are n e u t r a l i z e d , we would be able t o a mount a
i-i
in
a*
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major a i r campaign against any Bosnian Serb forces a t t a c k i n g
Gorazde o r Sarajevo or any m i l i t a r y t a r g e t s elsewhere. But t o do
t h i s and make i t work we would have t o have some changes. The
dual key could not be maintained i n i t s present form. Of course
l o c a l ground commanders could r e t a i n a voice i n close a i r support
and c l o s e - p r o x i m i t y a i r s t r i k e s d i r e c t l y a f f e c t i n g t h e i r t r o o p s .
But t h e r e c o u l d be no UN p o l i t i c a l veto over i n d i v i d u a l missions.
Also c u r r e n t r e s t r i c t i o n s r e g a r d i n g s t r i c t p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y would
a l s o have t o be removed. We would have t o have the a b i l i t y t o
s t r i k e s t r a t e g i c t a r g e t s throughout Bosnia, and t h a t would be a
b i g d e t e r r e n t t o them doing anything t o UN f o r c e s . Now, I have
t a l k e d t o John Major yet, but Warren Christopher met w i t h R i f k i n d
l a s t n i g h t u r g i n g the B r i t i s h t o get on board w i t h t h i s . I n
order t o get t h e r e , we w i l l also need t o get o t h e r A l l i e s and
Boutros Ghali on board.
^
I n a d d i t i o n t o s u p p o r t i n g an e f f e c t i v e Bosnian defense o f
Gorazde, i t i s important t o open secure l a n d access routes t o
Sarajevo.
I b e l i e v e t h i s should be the most p r e s s i n g mission f o r
the RRF.
f€)
With r e g a r d t o the suggestion you made l a s t week r e g a r d i n g
d e p l o y i n g 1,000 o f your troops t o Gorazde — I would l i k e t o t a l k
t o you about t h a t f o r a few minutes.
Our m i l i t a r y people b e l i e v e
t h a t since the primary t h r e a t t o Gorazde i s from a r t i l l e r y
s h e l l s , adding 1,000 troops might increase deterrence but i t
would n o t m a t e r i a l l y change the m i l i t a r y balance, and might
c r e a t e an increased problem o f resupply and reinforcement. They
also say t h a t i f we were t o do i t , we have t o take pre-emptive
a c t i o n a g a i n s t a i r defenses. Otherwise French troops and our
h e l i c o p t e r s w i l l be s i t t i n g ducks and the l i k e l i h o o d t h a t we w i l l
lose h e l i c o p t e r s w i t h your troops on board i s q u i t e s t r o n g .
I agree w i t h you t h a t we cannot abandon Gorazde, b u t we must make
c e r t a i n we have what are the most e f f e c t i v e means we can take t o
defend i t . I know i n sending another 1,000 troops — e s p e c i a l l y
French troops — i t may have a p s y c h o l o g i c a l e f f e c t on the Serbs.
But i n sending i n troops our m i l i t a r y people b e l i e v e (and I agree
w i t h them) t h a t t h e r e would be considerable r i s k s and t h a t i t
wouldn't change the m i l i t a r y balance i n Gorazde. At any r a t e , I
t h i n k i t ' s i m p e r a t i v e t h a t you and I work t o g e t h e r between now
and F r i d a y . We have t o make sure we have a common approach t h a t
t o g e t h e r we can s e l l t o John Major. I'm sure Kohl w i l l support
us i f we are i n t h i s t o g e t h e r . We can't l e t t h i s go on. I t w i l l
mean d i s a s t e r f o r Bosnia and the West i f i t happens. f&)
Let me make one more p o i n t , and then
I n the two years I have labored w i t h
you became President, the only t h i n g
has been a c l e a r and c r e d i b l e t h r e a t
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I ' d l i k e t o l i s t e n t o you.
t h i s problem, since before
t h a t has made t h i n g s b e t t e r
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take s t r o n g a i r a c t i o n . I t has always bought us time f o r the
p o l i t i c a l process. I t got t h e peace process back on t r a c k ,
allowed t h e c r e a t i o n o f t h e safe areas, t h e end o f t h e s h e l l i n g
of Sarajevo, t h e weapons c o l l e c t i o n p o i n t s , e t c .
I t has worked.
But when the UN has moved away from a p o s i t i o n o f s t r e n g t h , the
Serbs have taken advantage. I b e l i e v e t h i s w i l l work i f we stay
t o g e t h e r behind i t . fe}
President Chirac: B i l l , I understand your p o s i t i o n v e r y w e l l ,
but i t would be d i f f i c u l t t o implement.!
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 l.4d
The minute we a t t a c k , and we're n o t sure i f
the s t r i k e s w i l l be e f f e c t i v e , they w i l l r e t a l i a t e by t a k i n g
s o l d i e r s hostage or a t t a c k i n g w i t h the massive a r t i l l e r y they
have. The p l a n proposed by the U.S. m i l i t a r y presupposes the
w i t h d r a w a l o f UNPROFOR b u t we have UN troops everywhere t h e r e .
I f we want t o adopt i t , we have t o regroup or e x t r a c t our forces,
I t could be a good
s o l u t i o n , b u t time i s necessary t o implement the s o l u t i o n . This
would mean the l o s s o f Gorazde and probably Sarajevo. This i s
the reason we made a compromise s o l u t i o n t h a t i n any case would
m a i n t a i n the r i g h t s o f the UN i n Gorazde and, i n o t h e r words,
guarantee t h e s a f e t y o f 60,000 Muslims i n Gorazde. I n order t o
do t h i s , we t h i n k 1,000 men would be enough.
I realize the
problem i s t r a n s p o r t i n g them t o Gorazde, and t h e r e o n l y U.S.
i n t e r v e n t i o n makes t h e t r a n s p o r t p o s s i b l e , u s i n g a i r power t o
open a c o r r i d o r t o ensure the s a f e t y of t h e h e l i c o p t e r s . I f we
adopt a i r s t r i k e s as t h e o b j e c t i v e , i t ' s a s o l u t i o n b u t n o t an
immediate s o l u t i o n . I t h i n k Gorazde w i l l have f a l l e n by then.
This i s our p o s i t i o n — the l e a s t bad s o l u t i o n would be t o defend
Gorazde.
The P r e s i d e n t : Let me comment on the p o i n t s you have made.
F i r s t , w i t h any s o l u t i o n , greater a c t i o n c a r r i e s a r i s k o f
g r e a t e r danger. I f we p u t 1,000 French troops i n Gorazde as p a r t
of a r e a l defense o f t h e c i t y , t h a t would also go beyond the UN
mandate and past what the B r i t i s h said they would do. I t also
would i n c r e a s e t h e r i s k o f hostage t a k i n g throughout the country.
I f French troops were k i l l e d i n the a c t u a l defense o f Gorazde, I
b e l i e v e we would have t o take r e t a l i a t o r y a c t i o n . I do n o t agree
w i t h you i f we c a r r y out the p l a n f o r a i r power, we have t o
withdraw UN t r o o p s . But we would have t o concentrate them i n
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Gorazde, Sarajevo and C e n t r a l Bosnia i n places the Government
c o n t r o l s . f€H
President Chirac: B i l l , the minute our troops s t a r t t o move, t h e
Serbs w i l l understand t h e maneuver and grab people. fe)
The P r e s i d e n t : I understand the p r a c t i c a l problems.
You s a i d
t h a t i f we issue the t h r e a t , i t amounts t o t h e U.S. being w i l l i n g
to go t o war w i t h Serbia. I f you go back t o when we got the
agreement t o e s t a b l i s h the safe areas and p u t a l l Serb heavy
a r t i l l e r y i n c o l l e c t i o n areas, t h i s happened o n l y because two
t h i n g s occurred a t t h e same time: we t h r e a t e n e d s t r o n g a i r
a c t i o n through NATO, and the Russians t o l d t h e Serbs t h a t they
had t o do t h i s and get back t o the n e g o t i a t i o n s . They thought
t h a t t h e a i r a c t i o n would be d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e , not s e l e c t i v e l y
c a l i b r a t e d t o take out one o r two guns o r a s i n g l e tank here o r
t h e r e . f€}
Let me say another t h i n g w i t h regard t o your p r o p o s a l . I t seems
to me t h a t i f we work w i t h you and deploy your f o r c e s and t h e
Serbs shoot down one h e l i c o p t e r , or i f we redeploy f o r c e s and one
of your s o l d i e r s i s k i l l e d , even by d i s t a n t s h e l l i n g , t h a t we
would have t o take the most e f f e c t i v e r e t a l i a t o r y a c t i o n , which
i s from t h e a i r . We may have t o do some i n advance t o c r e a t e a
s e c u r i t y c o r r i d o r f o r the h e l i c o p t e r s . We w i l l have t o c a r r y out
our o p t i o n one way o r another. Before you became President, our
UN and NATO a l l i e s agreed on two previous occasions t h a t an a i r
t h r e a t i s t h e o n l y way t o save the UN mission w i t h o u t i n v o l v i n g
NATO t r o o p s on t h e ground i n combat. f€-)
Let me say two o t h e r t h i n g s and then I w i l l l i s t e n . I want t o
reemphasize t h a t t h i s w i l l not mean war on t h e Serbs i f they
don't a t t a c k . There w i l l be no a i r a c t i o n i f Gorazde i s not h i t
and Sarajevo i s not s h e l l e d . We simply w i l l be r e e s t a b l i s h i n g
the weapons e x c l u s i o n zones t h a t have eroded.
I have also been
handed a note t h a t t h e B r i t i s h are prepared t o keep t h e i r 300
troops i n Gorazde under t h i s proposal and n o t withdraw. f&)
Jacques, I have t o give a speech today, b u t a f t e r t h a t I w i l l be
working on t h i s f o r t h e next 48 hours. Perhaps you would l i k e t o
t a l k t o your m i l i t a r y people some more. You have done a
tremendous j o b p u t t i n g u n i t y i n t o the A l l i e d e f f o r t , but we want
something t h a t works. We don't want t o c o l l a p s e the UN mission.
Those i n Congress who say otherwise are wrong. Based on my
experience over the past two years, t h i s w i l l work. I t i s our
best chance, p a r t i c u l a r l y i f coupled w i t h a new d i p l o m a t i c
i n i t i a t i v e along the l i n e s you have already discussed w i t h me.
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P r e s i d e n t Chirac:
experts B i l l
O.K.
I have one q u e s t i o n ,
embargo?
Well, I don't mind t a l k i n g t o t h e
1,4h, 1,4ri
W i l l Congress succeed i n l i f t i n g t h e arms
The P r e s i d e n t : They l i k e l y w i l l vote t o l i f t i t i n some form. I
w i l l veto i t and b e l i e v e I can s u s t a i n the veto i f , and o n l y i f ,
a l l o f us are working on an a l t e r n a t e program w i t h some chance o f
success. Otherwise I'm a f r a i d t h a t i f they voted today, they
would o v e r r i d e t h e v e t o . They b e l i e v e t h e UN has f a i l e d and the
embargo denies t h e Bosnian Government t h e a b i l i t y t o defend
themselves.
(€3
Let me ask two questions. First, several months ago when the
safe areas were worked out for the first time, the Serbs had
artillery and they gave it up; and I still believe Milosevic
would like some relief from sanctions. If we put 1,000 French
troops in Gorazde and the Serbs attack the city what will the
French do? Will they shoot back?
m
President Chirac:
Of course, n a t u r a l l y .
The P r e s i d e n t : A l l r i g h t , b u t i f t h a t happens, then you can
argue t h a t t h a t i s as much a change i n the UN mission as dropping
bombs. Mladic i s a smart man. I f you r e p e l him, h e ' l l take
a c t i o n elsewhere.
He w i l l take Ukrainians or Canadians hostage.
I f we f l y you i n t h e r e and they take a c t i o n , shoot down a
h e l i c o p t e r , we both have t o take a c t i o n . So please t h i n k i t
through. E i t h e r our o p t i o n or yours, or t h e two o f them i n
combination, w i l l increase the r i s k they w i l l take UN
peacekeepers hostage.
But we have t o p r o t e c t Gorazde. The
q u e s t i o n i s t h e best way t o do i t . E i t h e r course runs t h e r i s k
of hostages.
We have never i n the past had t o take extreme
a c t i o n when they r e a l l y thought we would f o l l o w through, and n o t
j u s t h i t one o r two tanks. We got Gorazde, Srebrenica, t h e safe
areas. Somehow, we have t o r e c r e a t e those c o n d i t i o n s . We o n l y
have a few months ago get a peace agreement. We can't keep doing
t h i s f o r another t h r e e or f o u r more years. We have t o c r e a t e the
environment i n which we can push f o r a d i p l o m a t i c s o l u t i o n . fG-)
President Chirac:
Yes, I understand.
Gorazde w i l l be taken i n 10
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days, and a f t e r t h a t Sarajevo.
Let's ask our Chiefs o f S t a f f .
We need time f o r t h i s s t r a t e g y .
f€4
The Preside nt:
I understand.
I r e a l l y want t o work on t h i s w i t h
you. Here' s the question: Ask your s t a f f i f there i s a g r e a t e r
l i k e l i h o o d of hostage t a k i n g i f a i r power i s used as opposed t o
the chance hostages w i l l be taken i f the French f i g h t back and
k i l l a l o tof Serbs. Our e x p e c t a t i o n i s t h a t Mladic i s very
smart and w i l l go elsewhere. He works the country as one b i g
piece. I f they shoot down a h e l i c o p t e r and k i l l Frenchmen, we
have t o s t ike hard. Talk t o your people.
r
I t h i n k we can s e l l
our proposa 1 t o the B r i t s . They don't want t o p u l l o u t .
President Chirac: There are also others beyond us —
and U k r a i n i a n s . f&)
Canadians
The P r e s i d e n t : I know. There's a l o t o f work t o do. We have t o
discuss i t w i t h Canada. We have a close r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e
U k r a i n i a n s . We also need t o work w i t h Russia. I t h i n k I can
convince Y e l t s i n t o go along. f^)
President Chirac: I don't t h i n k Y e l t s i n i s ready t o do a n y t h i n g
because o f h i s domestic p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n . { &
-)
The P r e s i d e n t : We don't want t o do anything t h a t would i m p e r i l
him. But l a s t time, Y e l t s i n went t o M i l o s e v i c saying you can't
do t h i s t o y o u r s e l f or me, and you need t o stop the a t t a c k s . He
was h e l p f u l because he d i d n ' t want us t o use force t o p r o t e c t
these areas. We need t o explore whether he i s i n the p o s i t i o n t o
do a n y t h i n g . fG-)
President Chirac:
Let's get back i n touch w i t h i n 48 hours.
^
The P r e s i d e n t : Maybe we should t a l k i n 24 hours. We cannot
a f f o r d t o go t o the London meeting and have i t be a d i s a s t e r .
President Chirac: I agree completely, b u t we must get i n touch
w i t h t h e o t h e r s . fG)
The P r e s i d e n t : I have t a l k e d t o C h r e t i e n and Kohl, b u t n o t y e t
to t h e U k r a i n i a n s , Dutch or Y e l t s i n . You and I need t o agree on
a s t r a t e g y , work together, and s e l l i t t o Major and t h e o t h e r s .
We must get close on an agreement. fC-)
President Chirac:
The P r e s i d e n t :
Okay, thank you very much.
(U)
Good-bye. (U)
End of Conversation
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h B r i t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r Major
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime M i n i s t e r John Major
Notetakers: Mary Ann Peters, Katherine
O'Loughlin, Kenneth Baldwin, A l e j a n d r o
Martinez and Andrew Kerr
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
J u l y 19, 1995, 9:15 - 9:50 a.m.
Oval O f f i c e
The P r e s i d e n t :
Hello?
Prime M i n i s t e r Major:
The P r e s i d e n t : H e l l o .
t a l k w i t h Chirac. (U)
Prime M i n i s t e r Major:
(U)
(U)
Hello.
(U)
Hey John, how are you?
I j u s t had a long
What k i n d o f mood i s he i n today.
(U)
The President: He was in a pretty tough mood today. You know,
based on Secretary Christopher's conversation with Foreign
Secretary Rifkind, exactly where we are going. I need to tell
you of my conversation with Chirac. Let me start by saying I am
convinced that the only way I can sustain the position we have
taken is to work, support and cooperate with UNPROFOR and our
allies to take some new action to save Gorazde. I think I can
then sustain a veto of unilateral lift.
^
Prime M i n i s t e r Major:
When i s the vote?
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t : The f i r s t vote could be tomorrow i n t h e Senate.
Then t h e r e ' s t h e vote i n the House, then t h e r e c o n c i l i a t i o n .
They s t a r t r o l l i n g me tomorrow. (U)
Prime M i n i s t e r Major:
What i s the veto-proof m a j o r i t y ?
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t : I t i s 67 Senate members and 290 some-odd House
members. Here's the issue: whatever they pass w i l l pass w i t h a
v e t o - p r o o f m a j o r i t y , b u t some w i l l f a l l o f f i f they b e l i e v e I
have an a l t e r n a t i v e w i t h any chance o f working. The arguments
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are t h a t i t would Americanize the c o n f l i c t . I t would undermine
support f o r o t h e r UN embargoes, on I r a n , I r a q and Libya, which
they l i k e . We are being k i l l e d i n the press. A l l the papers,
not j u s t i n Washington and New York, but even the l o c a l paper i n
my hometown of L i t t l e Rock are saying "Why won't the Americans
help us defend o u r s e l v e s . " The whole U.S. press i s s p i n n i n g l i k e
t h a t . I t appears t h a t the UN cannot defend the Muslims and w i l l
not l e t them defend themselves. We have t o do more so I can
p r e v a i l here and also t o t r y t o r e e s t a b l i s h the v i g o r we had i n
the s p r i n g of l a s t year, when we e s t a b l i s h e d the safe areas and
got the heavy weapons out and achieved d i p l o m a t i c progress i n the
peace t a l k s .
fG)
Our p l a n here i s t o come up w i t h a concentrated UN f o r c e and a
d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e a i r t h r e a t . P r o p o r t i o n a l response does not
work. Chirac i s s t i l l pushing the idea of f l y i n g i n 1,000 troops
to j o i n your guys. You are w o r r i e d about r e t a l i a t i o n a g a i n s t UK
and o t h e r t r o o p s . I asked him d u r i n g our conversation, i f French
troops go i n and Serbs a t t a c k , would the French p l a n on s h o o t i n g
back? He s a i d "yes, these w i l l be r e a l s o l d i e r s , not blue
helmets." Mladic i s a smart man, he w i l l r e t a l i a t e and take
hostages i f he can. I f one U.S. h e l i c o p t e r i s shot down, he
agrees t h a t we would have to r e t a l i a t e . So, i f t h a t i s the end
game, why not get the same b e n e f i t by e s t a b l i s h i n g the d e t e r r e n t
now? I asked him t o work through i t . Our common p a r t n e r s h i p ,
UN, NATO and the s t r e n g t h of the West, depend on us not showing
up F r i d a y w i t h o u t a common p o s i t i o n among the UK, France and the
U.S.
I t h i n k C h r e t i e n w i l l go along, and I can get the Ukraine
to support us. Y e l t s i n w i l l not l i k e i t , but he i s not i n any
p o s i t i o n t o do anything e l s e . We need t o t e l l him t o go back t o
t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n February 1994.
f&j
Prime M i n i s t e r Maior:
The P r e s i d e n t : E x a c t l y . I l i k e Chirac because he i s s t r o n g and
smart and wants t o do the r i g h t t h i n g , but he i s very French; he
wants t o make the grand gesture. He c l e a r l y hopes f o r
p s y c h o l o g i c a l impact.
f&)
Primp' M i n i s t p r M a i n r :
The P r e s i d e n t : I t doesn't help the UK troops to have 1,000
French s o l d i e r s w i t h o u t a r t i l l e r y come i n on h e l i c o p t e r s .
(£-)
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Prime Minister Major:
The reverse!
(U)
The President: I f we do take aggressive action, we could t i p the
balance against you. We have to hope the 9,000 Bosnians stay and
f i g h t . f€*
Prime M i n i s t e r Major: On the issue of the 1,000 troops, I don't
rule i t out e n t i r e l y , depending on what other decisions we take.
Let's turn to Gorazde, where we have 300 Welsh f u s i l i e r s and
9,000 government troops who w i l l probably f i g h t , but lose. They
may not f i g h t at a l l l i k e i n Srebrenica. |
1.4b, 1.4d~
The wider issue i s there i s not a shred of doubt that we cannot
stay where we are. Ideally, the objective i s to deter the Serbs
from taking Gorazde.
Our objectives are to deter the Serb seizure
of Gorazde and keep Sarajevo going and to enable the UN to carry
out i t s mission more e f f e c t i v e l y . The UN w i l l be unable to
remain i n Bosnia without an e f f e c t i v e policy. We need a cohesive
U.S./British/French plan and to get others on board. On Gorazde,
we need some f l e x i b i l i t y ; we don't want anyone digging i n t o r i g i d
public positions l i k e l a s t week.
^
The President: I agree. M i l i t a r i l y , t h i s proposal i s not sound;
i t only makes sense f o r i t s psychological value or i f you're
looking f o r a pretext, i f they shoot down a helicopter, to kick
the crap out of them. fG)
Prime M i n i s t e r Major:
I t ' s a gamble anyway.
CONFI DENT IMJ ,
CLINTO
Where we are coming from
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t o g e t h e r i s t h a t something has t o be done; i t i s not p r a c t i c a l
p o l i t i c s t o do n o t h i n g . Something must be done and i t w i l l
i n v o l v e t h e t h r e a t o f a i r power. I f i t has a chance o f being
e f f e c t i v e , Mladic must b e l i e v e we mean i t .
I n the past, he has
o n l y been slapped on the w r i s t . We need t o give him two messages
— one i n p u b l i c and one i n p r i v a t e . The one i n p r i v a t e must be
very s p e c i f i c on the s i z e and scale o f the response so he knows
we mean i t .
The Serbs have t o see p h y s i c a l movement o f assets,
so they see we're not b l u f f i n g . I f we make the t h r e a t , we must
be prepared t o c a r r y i t out i n spades. I f we do t h i s , s e v e r a l
t h i n g s may f o l l o w : hostages may be taken — c i v i l i a n and
m i l i t a r y personnel who are exposed must be hunkered down before
F r i d a y . We are d e a l i n g w i t h a madman who has a Dutch b a t t a l i o n
i n h i s hands. We can't r u l e out the thought o f Mladic's
s l a u g h t e r o f the Dutch. fG)
Here's a marginal p o i n t t h a t I'm not q u i t e sure o f the answer t o .
I f we use Suppression o f Enemy A i r Defenses o r a i r a t t a c k s ,
arguably t h a t means the end o f the UNPROFOR mission. I t may be a
d e c i s i o n t o be taken immediately, o r n o t . But i f i t i s and we
must leave, t h a t would i n v o l v e the NATO p l a n i n c l u d i n g U.S.
t r o o p s . So we're i n the process o f s e t t i n g i n motion a chain o f
events l e a d i n g t o committing 50,000 NATO troops i n Bosnia t o
b r i n g out UNPROFOR. I'm happy t o consider t h i s as long as we
understand the consequences: the impact o f an a i r a t t a c k ,
p o s s i b l e hostages and the need t o take UNPROFOR out i f necessary.
Once t h e y ' r e o u t , we have t o guard against a wider Balkan war.
You have assets i n Macedonia. We would need t o consider p u t t i n g
assets elsewhere t o prevent a trans-Balkan war from b r e a k i n g out
i f t h e r e i s t r o u b l e i n Kosovo o r elsewhere. f&)
Regarding the a i r t h r e a t , the t h r e a t t o Mladic has t o be
c r e d i b l e . I t i s debatable, depending on the nature o f the
s i t u a t i o n , whether t o go s t r a i g h t t o f u l l a i r a t t a c k o r i f i t
should be gradual r e t a l i a t i o n . We must ensure t h a t UN personnel
are i n r e l a t i v e l y safe places a t the time we issue the t h r e a t .
That's what I t h i n k . I hope you, Chirac and I can agree today o r
tomorrow i n time t o come up w i t h a p o s i t i o n f o r F r i d a y . ( O
The P r e s i d e n t : You've thought i t through w e l l . Two t h i n g s need
to be done. I do not know the exact p o s i t i o n o f a l l the UNPROFOR
troops and associated c i v i l i a n s . And I do not know how long i t
w i l l take them t o get i n t o p o s i t i o n s t h a t are r e l a t i v e l y immune.
Secondly, I agree w i t h your a n a l y s i s t h a t i f we had t o launch a
major a i r campaign, i t might be the end of the UNPROFOR mission.
We have t o c a l c u l a t e what t h a t means. Can we get m u l t i l a t e r a l
l i f t ? Do we do a NATO l i f t i f Russian blocks m u l t i l a t e r a l l i f t
i n the UN? Does a new i n t e r n a t i o n a l f o r c e come i n o r , do we take
a l l i n t e r n a t i o n a l forces out? Also, depending on the r e s u l t s o f
the bombing, we must consider the s i t u a t i o n under which i t could
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b r i n g about a c e a s e - f i r e or meaningful movement i n the peace
process. I f we are s u c c e s s f u l , UNPROFOR can s t a y w i t h o u t f e a r o f
hostages being taken; they can continue w i t h humanitarian r e l i e f ,
resume a i r drops and open the Mt. Igman r o u t e . Time i s running
out on us.
I f bombing secures our p o s i t i o n , we would s t i l l have
o n l y a few months t o j u i c e up the peace e f f o r t and reach an
agreement. We need t o see what we could do t o change the
dynamics of the process and hasten an agreement. I b e l i e v e i t ' s
p o s s i b l e i t would work l i k e i t d i d i n 1994 when the safe areas
were e s t a b l i s h e d . Those decisions bought us a few months. This
assumes t h a t you and others want t o stay.
f&)
Prime M i n i s t e r Major:
Yes,
we want t o stay. fG-)
The President: We s t i l l need a f a s t t i m e l i n e f o r t h i s e f f o r t or
the Serbs w i l l q u i c k l y b i t e us i n the r e a r .
fG-)
Prime M i n i s t e r Major: We also have t o consider how they w i l l
r e a c t . They may r e a c t savagely or they may be smart. They may
not a t t a c k but j u s t leave Gorazde b o t t l e d up and a t t a c k Sarajevo.
The President: Yes.
Then we would have t o p u l l out a l l the
stops. I f Sarajevo f a l l s , i t w i l l be a d i s a s t e r f o r a l l of us.
Prime M i n i s t e r Major: I t h i n k the French w i l l ask i f we are
ready t o add troops i n Sarajevo.
I n p r i n c i p l e , we would.
We
would replace someone else's b a t t a l i o n , because t h e r e i s not
b i l l e t i n g f o r another u n i t . We would replace l e s s e f f e c t i v e
t r o o p s w i t h more e f f e c t i v e t r o o p s . We need cohesion. We need t o
look a t land routes, both summer and w i n t e r . For example, i n
Sarajevo, Mt. Igman i s not a w i n t e r route w i t h o u t a great deal of
.nolirina.l
1.4b. 1.4d
The
President:
They're very a r t f u l at t h a t .
Prime M i n i s t e r Major:
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The P r e s i d e n t : They never ask UNPROFOR t o leave. They want i t
a l l — the embargo l i f t e d and UNPROFOR t h e r e t o boot. fe)
Prime M i n i s t e r Major: I doubt anyone has been keener t o keep the
UN t h e r e than me. I f i t t u r n s out t o be an a i r o f f e n s i v e , there
w i l l be no c r e d i b l e work f o r the UN, and i t w i l l be p o i n t l e s s and
r i s k y t o leave troops when they could more e f f e c t i v e l y be
s t a t i o n e d i n Macedonia o r elsewhere. W i l l the Congress accept
c o n t r i b u t i n g U.S. troops t o get the UN out? fe)
The P r e s i d e n t : Yes. Even Dole has acknowledged t h a t we have a
moral duty t o ensure the safe withdrawal o f our a l l i e s . f&)
Prime M i n i s t e r Major: I f we go t h i s r o u t e , I am prepared t o do
something dramatic i n Gorazde. I don't want t o r u l e out l i f t i n g
our boys out. f€-)
The P r e s i d e n t : You and I t h i n k along the same l i n e s . This may
lead t o the c o l l a p s e of UNPROFOR, but i t i s b e t t e r t o go out w i t h
a bang than w i t h a whimper; otherwise we go out w i t h our t a i l
between our l e g s . f G)
Prime M i n i s t e r Major: I'm not sure whether the Mladic message
should be graduated o r the b i g bang response. I need t o run i t
by my Defense M i n i s t e r , Chief of S t a f f and s o l d i e r s on the
ground. Supposing we go down t h i s r o u t e , we have t o do something
p o l i t i c a l i n tandem. W i l l you e n t e r t a i n i n v i t i n g the Pale Serbs
to a conference at the f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r o r head of s t a t e l e v e l ,
which c o u l d discuss land swaps and p o l i t i c a l settlement? We may
be going down the m i l i t a r y route one-legged. fG)
The P r e s i d e n t : I've had no d i s c u s s i o n of the d e t a i l s o f t h i s ,
but i f we make a b o l d m i l i t a r y t h r u s t , we should accompany i t
w i t h a b o l d d i p l o m a t i c i n i t i a t i v e . We need t o f i n d out where
B i l d t i s , whether t h e r e i s any progress i n h i s t a l k s . Regarding
the message t o Mladic, I w i l l t a l k t o my people who understand
his psychology and h i s way of o p e r a t i n g . f£)
Prime M i n i s t e r Major: The b i g question i s what happens on the
ground. I f we issue the ultimatum, i f the Serbs take us up and
we proceed, the UN comes out. The government troops w i l l begin
to be armed but t h a t takes time, and the Serbs w i l l make a great
deal o f advance i n i t i a l l y . I
1.4b. 1.4d
With the UN out, there w i l l be no c r e d i b l e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l reason t o i n t e r v e n e unless we enter on the s i d e o f
the government, which would be a de f a c t o d e c l a r a t i o n of war on
Serbia and M i l o s e v i c . Yet, could we s i t on the bench, say we had
done our best and watch on BBC and CNN the slaughter? Or would
we be prepared t o declare war on the Serbs?
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The P r e s i d e n t : There i s a t h i r d o p t i o n t h a t would have t o be
done by NATO since Russia would veto a UN r e s o l u t i o n . We could
consider t h e use o f NATO a i r power t o s t a b i l i z e the s i t u a t i o n on
the ground pending the development o f some k i n d o f e q u i l i b r i u m i n
artillery.
Prime M i n i s t e r Major: I have thought o f t h a t , e s t a b l i s h i n g some
e q u i l i b r i u m w i t h a i r power. I'm not sure how t o j u s t i f y i t
l e g a l l y , a l t h o u g h i t i s p o s s i b l e m i l i t a r i l y . And i t r a i s e s a b i g
problem e s p e c i a l l y f o r the U.S.
The P r e s i d e n t : That i s a d i f f i c u l t t h i n g . The e f f o r t would have
t o be c a r e f u l l y circumscribed. The p o i n t t o make t o the Russians
would be t h a t they supported the Contact Group p l a n and the Serbs
s a i d no, ignored Russian wishes and screwed them.
Prime M i n i s t e r Major:
That might be what i s a t t h e end o f the
y e l l o w b r i c k road.
The P r e s i d e n t : Yes, we know a l l o f t h a t .
are i n i s untenable. fe)
But the p o s i t i o n we
Prime M i n i s t e r Major: I agree. We have tended t o look down the
road too many times over the past 3-4 years and have crossed our
f i n g e r s l i k e Dickens' Mr. Micawber, hoping something good would
come o f i t .
But l i k e Micawber's benefactor, n o t h i n g turned up.
S t i l l , we have done what we thought was r i g h t . fG)
The President: We bought a year w i t h UNPROFOR i n which no one
was k i l l e d and peace might have been achieved. I t wasn't, b u t i t
might have been. fG)
Prime M i n i s t e r Major: We have saved l i v e s . Peace was achieved
i n c e n t r a l Bosnia. We have n o t h i n g t o reproach ourselves about.
I j u s t want t o do the r i g h t t h i n g . We may go down t h i s path, t h e
end o f which could lead i n the d i r e c t i o n I have been l a y i n g o u t .
f€)
The President: We w i l l work through a l l the s h o r t - t e r m questions
— where the troops are and how long i t w i l l take t o get them
i n t o s a f e r p o s i t i o n s ; what t o say t o Mladic — and the longerterm issues you have been t a l k i n g about. I suggest we get back
i n touch i n 24 hours. You, I and Chirac need t o be together a t
t h i s meeting on Friday. f€)
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Prime M i n i s t e r Major: A b s o l u t e l y . I'm committed t o t h a t .
w i l l speak t o t h e French today. fG)
I
The P r e s i d e n t : Your a n a l y s i s o f the m i l i t a r y wrongheadedness o f
t h e i r p r o p o s a l i s the same as ours, i n c l u d i n g the p o t e n t i a l f o r
f a i l u r e . I'm n o t sure i t would do any good b u t i t wouldn't make
i t much worse. And, i f they shoot down one h e l i c o p t e r , t h e
bombing s t a r t s . I don't want t o r u l e i t o u t . We can't a f f o r d t o
r u l e o u t some v e r s i o n o f the French p r o p o s a l . I have t o go g i v e
an i m p o r t a n t speech. I ' l l be a v a i l a b l e t o t a l k w i t h you a f t e r
t h a t . Thank you, John. f€)
Prime M i n i s t e r Major: We a l l have t o g i v e a l i t t l e , I w i l l
t o you tomorrow o r l a t e r today. f&)
End o f Conversation
COMriDEMTIiMj
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5670
THE WHITE H O U S E
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE
CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
P r e s i d e n t i a l Telephone C a l l w i t h French
President Jacques Chirac, J u l y 20, 1995
PARTICIPANTS;
The President
French President Jacques Chirac
Notetakers: Kenneth Baldwin, Katherine
O'Louglin, Kyle Bakke, Matt M i l l e r , Alexander
Vershbow
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The P r e s i d e n t :
J u l y 20, 1995, 3:15 p.m. - 4:13 p.m. EDT
Oval O f f i c e
Hello?
P r e s i d e n t Chirac:
The P r e s i d e n t :
(U)
Hello B i l l ,
Yes, h e l l o .
I'm i n Morocco now.
How i s t h e King?
(U)
(U)
President Chirac: I heard you wanted me t o c a l l .
Majesty and w i l l give him your best. (U)
I am w i t h His
The P r e s i d e n t : T e l l him t h a t I am using the g o l f clubs he gave
me. But I s t i l l want t o come and p l a y on h i s course. He has got
a n i g h t g o l f course.
I understand our m i l i t a r y planners are
coming c l o s e r t o g e t h e r on an agreement. I understand you propose
t o open a road between Sarajevo and Gorazde. fG)
President Chirac:
Yes, b u t n o t h i n g i s c e r t a i n y e t .
fG)
The P r e s i d e n t :
I got my l a s t r e p o r t , about 30 minutes ago, t h a t
our people and yours are c l o s e r t o g e t h e r and we now have t o
persuade t h e B r i t i s h . I f we can, we w i l l have one proposal going
i n t o t h e meeting.
fG)
P r e s i d e n t Chirac:
The P r e s i d e n t :
And t h e Dutch?
Yes, o f course.
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P r e s i d e n t Chirac:
F i r s t l e t me t e l l you B i l l , I am s t i l l
a g a i n s t a i r s t r i k e s , but I w i l l not oppose them. What i s
e s s e n t i a l i s t o draw a r e d l i n e around Goradze and then make sure
i t i s respected i n order t o enforce i t . |
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 I 4d
But i f everyone else agrees
w i t h your s o l u t i o n and they a l l agree t o r e j e c t my s o l u t i o n , then
o b v i o u s l y I won't oppose i t because I don't want t o take t h e
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f having tomorrow's conference f a i l . But I could
be wrong.
I f we agree on t h e r e d l i n e and are t o be sure i t won't be
AmexLcan. .solution.
The P r e s i d e n t : F i r s t , I t h i n k t h a t i f we decide t o draw a l i n e
around Gorazde, we might be able t o do both what you suggest and
what I suggest.
I f we issue an ultimatum, we might n o t have t o
do i t — t h a t i s what happened i n 1994. We might be able t o open
a ground c o r r i d o r from Gorazde t o Sarajevo and then warn t h e
Serbs t h a t we w i l l p r o t e c t both, and i f they a t t a c k Gorazde o r
i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h e c o r r i d o r , then t h e r e would be a i r s t r i k e s .
Let me say, we r e c e i v e d some good i n t e l l i g e n c e l a s t n i g h t t h a t
the Serbs b e l i e v e t h e UN w i l l not do anything and they are
t h i n k i n g o f t a k i n g not j u s t Gorazde, b u t Sarajevo as w e l l . ( €
•)
President Chirac:
Absolutely.
4^
The P r e s i d e n t : They also t o l d the source o f t h i s i n t e l l i g e n c e
t h a t they d i d n o t want t o pay the p r i c e o f heavy a i r s t r i k e s .
So
what I t h i n k we should look a t doing i s t o open the ground
c o r r i d o r w i t h t h e warning o f heavy a i r s t r i k e s , and w i t h t h e
understanding t h a t t h i s time we w i l l do i t . They w i l l be l a r g e ,
not p r o p o r t i o n a l , s t r i k e s so t h a t whatever they do t o our people,
they w i l l s u f f e r more. fG)
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President Chirac: Yes. I want t o repeat, I won't prevent an
agreement. I f we agree on your proposal then I w i l l accept i t ,
even though I p r e f e r my s o l u t i o n . I would l i k e t o t e l l you one
more t h i n g , Mr. President. I was t a l k i n g t o t h e King o f Morocco
about t h i s i s s u e . He i s c u r r e n t l y t h e President, or Chairman, o f
the O r g a n i z a t i o n o f I s l a m i c Conference and he t o l d me t h a t t h e
OIC Contact Group i s meeting i n Geneva tomorrow a t 4:00 pm, j u s t
a t the end o f t h e meeting i n London. |
1,4b, 1.4d
The P r e s i d e n t : I t h i n k a l l o f our options are somewhat
dangerous, Jacques. The consequences o f a Serb m i l i t a r y v i c t o r y ,
under t h e w a t c h f u l eye o f t h e UN, are very dangerous. There are
no r i s k - f r e e courses. We need t o f i n d a balanced one. I f a i r
power i s used i n the form o f an ultimatum i n s t e a d o f using i t i n
advance t o c l e a r out the a i r defenses, t h a t way t h e r e w i l l be no
dual-key empty t h r e a t s . We may n o t have t o use i t . But they
have t o know we w i l l do i t . That i s my hope. fG)
P r e s i d e n t Chirac: We s h a l l see. But I agreed i t i s time t o stop
the Serbs. I t i s also time t o speak w i t h Karadzic.
I don't
understand why our f r i e n d Holbrooke i s stopping i t . I t i s a very
grave mistake. fG-)
The P r e s i d e n t : I w i l l take t h a t up here today and be prepared t o
say something t o you and your f o l k s tomorrow. (C-)
President Chirac:
The P r e s i d e n t :
(U)
Thank you B i l l .
Good n i g h t .
Good n i g h t .
(U)
Say h e l l o t o His Majesty f o r me.
End o f Conversation
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SECRETARY'S CONVERSATION WITH FRENCH FM DE
CHARETTE
TEXT:
S E C R E T
STATE 1 7 4 5 6 1
QQQQ
NODIS
MERCURY EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM EXEC SEC
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, BK, FR
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S CONVERSATION WITH FRENCH FM DE
CHARETTE
1.
SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
NODIS MERCURY
2.
THIS CABLE CONTAINS A DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF
THE SECRETARY'S TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH FM DE CHARETTE
ON JULY 19, 1995. THE SECRETARY INITIATED THE CALL. I
ASK THAT YOU NOT PERMIT COPIES TO BE MADE OF THIS
MESSAGE, AND THAT YOU DO NOT DISTRIBUTE I T OUTSIDE OF
THE MISSION'S EXECUTIVE OFFICE. DEPARTMENT RECIPIENTS
SHOULD NOT DISTRIBUTE OUTSIDE THE BUREAU'S F RONT OFFICE.
3. BEGIN TEXT:
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
DATE:
WEDNESDAY, JULY 19, 1995
TIME:
1935 EDT
PARTICIPANTS: THE SECRETARY AND FM DE CHARETTE
SUBJECT:
DE CHARETTE WORRIES ABOUT LACK OF
CONSENSUS AT JULY 21 LONDON MEETING ON
BOSNIA
THE SECRETARY ASKED I F FM DE CHARETTE INTENDS TO BE AT
THE LONDON MEETING.
DE CHARETTE, W O IS ACCOMPANYING
H
CHIRAC IN MORRBCCO, SAID HE WOULD NOT ARRIVE IN LONDON
BEFORE MIDNIGHT, JULY 20. THE SECRETARY THEN ASKED I F
C I T N LIBRARY P O O O Y
LN O
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DE CHARETTE WOULD BE ABLE TO TAKE A CONFERENCE CALL FROM
BOTH THE SECRETARY AND FM RIFKIND DURING THE AFTERNOON
OF JULY 20. DE CHARETTE RESPONDED THAT HE WOULD WELCOME
SUCH A CALL.
DE CHARETTE THEN SAID HE WISHED TO MAKE SEVERAL CONCERNS
KNOWN TO THE SECRETARY PRIOR TO THE LATTER'S DEPARTURE
FOR THE AIRPORT.I
THE FRENCH POSITION HAD BEEN MADE VERY
CLEAR DURING THE JULY 19 TELCON BETWEEN PRESIDENTS
CLINTON AND CHIRAC. Tw REITERATE, IT IS ABSOLUTELY
NECESSARY TO D A A LINE AT GORAZDE AND UNPROFOR TROOPS
RW
THERE MUST BE REINFORCED.
DE CHARETTE REFERRED TO THE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS THE GOF
HAS MADE TO REINFORCE GORAZDE AND SAID FRANCE COULD NOT
JOIN IN ANY AGREEMENTS AT THE LONDON MEETING WHICH DID
NOT FOLLOW ALONG THOSE LINES . E O 13526, 1.4(b), E.O. 13526, 1.4(dV
|..
E O 13526, 1.4(b), E O 13526, 1.4(d)
..
..
"IDE CHARETTE THEN ASKED FOR
THE SECRETARY'S READOUT OF THE CLINTON-CHIRAC CALL.
THE SECRETARY CHARACTERIZED THE PRESIDENTIAL CALL AS
POSITIVE. HE WAS ENCOURAGED BY THE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING
THAT THERE MUST BE CHANGES IN THE WEST'S POLICY. NOTING
FRENCH AND U.S. AGREEMENT THAT A LINE MUST BE DRAWN AT
GORAZDE, THE SECRETARY ALSO UNDERSCORED C M O U.S.,U.K.
OMN
AND FRENCH GROUND ON THE NEED FOR A VIGOROUS AIR
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE SERBS SHOULD THEY ATTACK GORAZDE.
THE SECRETARY WELCOMED THE CONVERGENCE OF IDEAS AMONG
THE THREE COUNTRIES ON HOLDING THE LINE AT GORAZDE AND
DETERRING THE SERBS WITH THREATS OF A VIGOROUS AIR
CAMPAIGN.
THE SECRETARY SAID U.S. MILITARY LEADERS HAVE STUDIED
THE FRENCH PROPOSAL TO REINFORCE THE ENCLAVE WITH 1000
FRENCH TROOPS AND HAVE CONCLUDED IT IS AN UNWISE MOVE.
HE STRESSED THIS IS A MILITARY VIEW, AND NOT A POLITICAL
ONE. HE REITERATED HIS BELIEF THAT WARNING THE SERBIAN
LEADERSHIP PUBLIQLY AND PRIVATELY AS TO WHAT AIRSTRIKES
COULD DO TO ANY SERBIAN INCURSION FORCE INTO GORAZDE
WILL DETER SUCH AN ATTACK BETTER THAN REINFORCEMENT.
REINFORCEMENT OF GORAZDE WITH MORE TROOPS IS A SYMBOLIC
GESTURE THAT WOULD SURELY HAVE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES.
THE SECRETARY TOLD DE CHARETTE THE WORLD IS LOOKING TO
THE PLAYERS AT THE LONDON MEETING TO ACHIEVE A C M O
OMN
POSITION. HE ASKED DE CHARETTE TO CONSIDER THE AIR
CAMPAIGN OPTION AND SAID HE WOULD DISCUSS OTHER OPTIONS
WITH FM RIFKIND IN THE MORNING.
DE CHARETTE THANKED THE SECRETARY.FOR HIS VIEWS BUT
UNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Page 2 of 3
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CDO 14\JUL95\MSGS\M 1774424.html
REPEATED HIS CONCERNS ABOUT THE MEETING'S PROSPECTS.
E.O. 13526, 1.4(b), E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)
COURSE HE AND OTHER FRENCH OFFICIALS WILL CONTINUE TO
EXPLORE OPTIONS AND MAINTAIN CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION
OPEN;!
_E.Q.J.3526...t.4(b.).,E.Q.J.3.526..A.4.(d)-
E.O. 13526, 1.4(b), E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)
HE REITERATED THAT GROUND
REINFORCEMENT WAS THE ONLY PRACTICAL MILITARY MOVE WHICH
COULD EFFECTIVELY DETER THE SERBS.
THE SECRETARY SAID IT WOULD BE MOST UNFORTUNATE SHOULD
THE MEETING NOT PRODUCE AN AGREEMENT. HE URGED DE
CHARETTE TO COMMUNICATE TO HIS POLITICAL AND MILITARY
COLLEAGUES THE NEED FOR A SUCCESS IN LONDON.
THE SECRETARY STRESSED GORAZDE IS A MILITARY PROBLEM;
REINFORCEMENT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN MILITARY, NOT
POLITICAL TERMS.
THE CALL ENDED AT 1927 EDT WITH BOTH PARTIES AGREEING TO
SPEAK THURSDAY, JULY 20 IN A CONFERENCE CALL INCLUDING
THE BRITISH FOREIGN MINISTER.
4. END TEXT
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�T E P E I E T HS SE
H R S O N A EM
-CONFIDENTIAL
"ViM/qS
5696
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH IN GTO N
July 22, 1995
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PSSSlDENT
FROM:
ANTHONY L7
SUBJECT:
Your Meeting w i t h Christopher and S h a l i k a s h v i l i on
the London Meeting on Bosnia. (Perry cannot
attend; John White w i l l attend.)
M i l i t a r y Results o f London: We got e s s e n t i a l l y what we wanted i n
London on Gorazde, taking i n t o account the l i m i t s on consensus
created by the composition of the meeting (see press p o i n t s ,
attached). The m i l i t a r y paper agreed by the U.S., UK and France
i s a tremendous advance over previous NATO a i r s t r i k e decisions i n
terms o f broader t a r g e t i n g and m o d i f i c a t i o n of the dual key:
•
a u t h o r i t y t o i n i t i a t e t h e a i r campaign would be i n t h e
hands o f t h e NATO a i r commander, A d m i r a l Smith, and t h e
UNPROFOR f o r c e commander on t h e ground, General Smith.
This i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h normal m i l i t a r y p r a c t i c e ;
•
i n a d d i t i o n , once t h e a i r campaign i s i n i t i a t e d , t h e NATO
commander would have s o l e a u t h o r i t y t o c o n t i n u e t h e a i r
s t r i k e s u n t i l t h e Serbs h a l t t h e i r a t t a c k s on Gorazde. The
UN commander c o u l d n ' t t u r n o f f h i s key.
Follow-up: The p l a n w i l l be taken up by NATO's M i l i t a r y
Committee over t h e weekend. The NAG meets today t o endorse
the London r e s u l t s and p r o v i d e t h e necessary t a s k i n g s t o t h e
NATO M i l i t a r y A u t h o r i t i e s , w i t h a view t o NAG a p p r o v a l on
Monday. I n p a r a l l e l , we, t h e B r i t s and French w i l l weigh i n
w i t h B o u t r o s - G h a l i t o delegate h i s key.
We suggest you ask S h a l l :
• whether he sees any l i m i t a t i o n s on t a r g e t i n g ;
• whether we can count on General Smith to turn h i s key; and
• whether NATO needs to deploy any a d d i t i o n a l a i r a s s e t s to
implement the plan.
You should a l s o ask Chris:
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• how to manage the Russians.
Warning to the Serbs: I t was agreed i n London that we, the
B r i t i s h and French would d e l i v e r a p r i v a t e warning to General
Mladic even before the NAG has approved the plan (either
tomorrow or on Monday). The B r i t i s h w i l l send a senior A i r
Force o f f i c e r as t h e i r emissary, along with an Under Secretary
of Defense; the French are doing roughly the same. We should
probably designate an A i r Force General as w e l l .
Other Safe Areas: The London warning applies only to Gorazde;
the other A l l i e s were r e l u c t a n t to extended the new m i l i t a r y
plan to Sarajevo or other safe areas, but agreed t h i s could be
done l a t e r through another NAG d e c i s i o n i f necessary. With
the e s c a l a t i o n i n Bihac and threat of Croatian i n t e r v e n t i o n ,
you might ask whether we should move q u i c k l y to extend the
warning to Bihac and, perhaps, Sarajevo as w e l l .
D i p l o m a t i c Track: The B r i t i s h made a l a s t - m i n u t e push t o have
the London meeting endorse the package t h a t C a r l B i l d t has
worked out w i t h M i l o s e v i c on r e c o g n i t i o n of Bosnia and b o r d e r
closure i n r e t u r n f o r sanctions r e l i e f .
B i l d t threatened t o
r e s i g n i f t h e p l a n wasn't approved, but he was calmed (at
l e a s t t e m p o r a r i l y ) by b e i n g given an audience w i t h Contact
Group F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s l a s t n i g h t . We r e f u s e d t o endorse t h e
B i l d t package because:
•
t h e Bosnian Government has problems w i t h the package (and
we have always r e f u s e d t o impose terms on the B o s n i a n s ) ;
•
we s t i l l have problems w i t h the mechanism f o r r e i m p o s i n g
s a n c t i o n s and t h e o v e r l y generous amount o f s a n c t i o n s
r e l i e f p r o v i d e d up f r o n t ; and
•
i t i s d e b a t a b l e whether now i s the r i g h t time t o g i v e any
new rewards t o M i l o s e v i c , a f t e r Srebrenica and Zepa.
You should ask C h r i s to:
•
give h i s view on where we go with the B i l d t package; and
•
whether we should modify our p o s i t i o n on contacts with the
Bosnian Serbs i n order to get d i r e c t t a l k s going among the
p a r t i e s while we have a window of opportunity f o l l o w i n g the
London meeting.
Attachment
Tab A
Press Points on London Meeting
•eesTTDFimnT
CLI NTQWmm P O O O Y
HTCP
�7/22/95
LONDON MEETING ON BOSNIA
We went to London convinced that the status quo in Bosnia was untenable and that only
strong and decisive action would be sufficient to halt Serb aggression, restore
UNPROFOR's effectiveness, and reestablish conditions that could lead to a political
settlement.
We were particularly determined that clear decisions be taken to prevent the Bosnian
Serbs from attacking the last remaining safe area in eastern Bosnia, Gorazde, and that
measures be adopted for relieving the Serbs' siege of Sarajevo.
The London meeting achieved these objectives. The key now is to move quickly to
translate these decisions into reality. Let me review the decisions and their significance:
First, there was agreement that any Bosnian Serb attack on Gorazde would be met with a
"substantial and decisive response." This means a strong and decisive response by
NATO air power, going beyond the limited strikes conducted previously, if the Serbs
defy our warning.
-
The U.S., UK and France agreed on a concept of operations that provides for broadgauged strikes against military forces attacking Gorazde or concentrating for an
attack, against supporting forces and command-and-control and, if necessary, against
military targets elsewhere in Bosnia.
-
It would also modify the "dual key" in a significant way, taking UN political
authorities out of the chain of command and placing authority to initiate the air
campaign in the hands of the NATO air commander, Admiral Leighton Smith, and
the UNPROFOR force commander on the ground, General Rupert Smith. This is
consistent with normal military practice.
-
Moreover, once the air campaign is initiated, the NATO commander would have sole
authority to continue the air strikes until the Serbs halt their attacks on Gorazde.
The NAC will meet today to task work by NATO's military authorities. The plan will
then be discussed by the NATO Military Committee, with a view to a decision by the
North Atlantic Council (NAC) on Monday to put the new approach into effect.
-
I should point out that existing authority for air strikes and close air support is still in
effect should the Serbs move on Gorazde (or other safe areas) before the NAC has
acted.
We have agreed with the British and French that the new approach could be applied to
the other safe areas if necessary. This would require only a decision by the NAC to do
so.
The second important decision in London was to take decisive action to ensure access to
Sarajevo for delivery of humanitarian aid and resupply of UN forces, through early use
of the Rapid Reaction Force. The British announced their decision to send a battalion to
Sarajevo to further strengthen the effectiveness of UN capabilities there.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�The London meeting also reaffirmed the international community's commitment to
achieving a political settlement, stressing the urgency of renewed negotiations among the
Bosnian parties based on the Contact Group plan.
-
The participants voiced their support for the efforts of EU mediator Carl Bildt to
secure recognition of Bosnia by Serbia-Montenegro and a sealing of Serbia's border
with Bosnia.
- Bildt briefed Contact Group Ministers on the package he has worked out with
Milosevic, but that package was not approved; in fact, we see a number of issues that
still need to be satisfactorily resolved, and we also need to consult with the Bosnian
Government on whether the terms for mutual recognition are acceptable.
The participants in the meeting also agreed to increase support for efforts to address
Bosnia's humanitarian crisis, which was exacerbated by the Serb attacks on Srebrenica
and Zepa and the new wave of brutal ethnic cleansing. The participants demanded the
international community be given immediate access to all detainees still being held by
the Bosnian Serbs.
Underlying all these decisions is a reaffirmation that a strengthened and more effective
UNPROFOR should remain in Bosnia.
-
We continue to believe that UNPROFOR's withdrawal would lead to a larger human
tragedy in Bosnia and an increased danger of wider conflict in the Balkans.
-
Our allies made clear in London that action by the U.S. to lift the arms embargo
unilaterally will force the withdrawal of UNPROFOR. It would also undermine the
London meeting's renewed display of resolve for UNPROFOR to deal firmly with
the Bosnian Serbs' outrageous behavior.
-
We should not be taking actions that drive UNPROFOR out at the very moment it
has committed to take action to protect the Bosnian people in Gorazde and other safe
areas.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�
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<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
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Declassified Documents concerning Bosnia
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2013-0517-M
Description
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This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on Bosnia related documents from the summer of 1995 referenced in the book, The Road to Dayton. A cable summarizing Secretary of State Warren Christopher's conversation with French Foreign Minister Herve De Charette from July 1995 is included.
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NSC Cables
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Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
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2/6/2015
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2013-0517-M
Bosnia
Declassified
Diplomacy
Foreign Policy
France
Warren Christopher