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Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Section 1.4 (b) ofE.O. 13526 or (b)(6) ofthe FOIA.
�CONFIBEN'l'IAL
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER JOHN MAJOR
Calling to update you regarding our decisions on what to do
about Gorazde and Sarajevo in the coming weeks.
Status
quo is clearly no longer tolerable.
Need to ensure meeting in London is success.
Must not
result in public discord or become forum for mere posturing
by participants.
Chris will discuss our views on London meeting
detail with Malcolm Rifkind later on tonight.
in more
We have reached defining moment for our policy toward
Bosnia.
We need to draw line at Gorazde, make UN presence
work and avert UN withdrawal.
Issue is finding the best way to do this.
My military advisors feel strongly most important
to be able to bring air power to bear decisively,
timid manner done to date.
thing is
not in
They propose issuing clear warning to Bosnian Serbs:
any
attack on Gorazde or Sarajevo will be met by a sustained air
campaign.
Do not intend to cross line to all-out war against Bosnian
Serbs.
If they heed warning and do not attack, there will
be no air campaign.
Would have effect of restoring strict enforcement of heavy
weapons exclusion zones, without complication of weapons
collection points.
This means UNPROFOR neutrality is
retained.
However -- cannot be just another empty threat.
If Bosnian
Serbs ignore our warning and attack, we must all be prepared
to follow through, without wavering even if we suffer losses
or additional hostages are taken.
Will need to begin now to
reduce exposure of UN personnel.
First targets would have to be full range of Bosnian Serb
air defense capabilities:
SAMs, Anti-aircraft guns, radar
and command centers.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O] 13526
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�CONFIDENTIAL/
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Once air defenses neutralized, mount major air campaign
against any Bosnian Serb forces attacking Gorazde or
Sarajevo.
However, dual key could not apply in its current form.
Local ground commanders would of course retain voice in
Close Air Support role and close-proximity air strikes
directly affecting their troops.
But there could be no UN
political veto over individual missions.
Current restrictions regarding strict proportionality
would
also have to be removed.
Would want ability to strike
strategic targets throughout Bosnia, if necessary.
Will need your help in moving
approaching Boutros-Ghali.
this to a NAC decision
and in
In addition to supporting effective Bosnian defense of
Gorazde, important to open secure land access routes to
Sarajevo.
We see this as most pressing mission for RRF.
My military advisors agree with your assessment that
deploying 1,000 French troops to Gorazde will diminish the
ability of RRF to act in Sarajevo, without materially
contributing to improved the military balance in Gorazde.
I
have relayed (will relay) this to Jacques.
We will need to work together to arrive at common U.S.-UKFrench approach by Friday, and then bring other allies
along.
I hope we will be able to generate the political
support needed at the London meeting and in the NAC to move
forward together on this.
�-5"l':""C"'R""EI:"''l''r~
20838
THE WHITE
HOUSE
WASHINGTON
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM
FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ANTHONY LAKE
SUBJECT:
Response to the Fall of Srebrenica
Deputies met on July 11 and 12 to consider appropriate responses
to the Bosnian Serb assault and occupation of the UN Safe Area at
Srebrenica.
Chris, Bill Perry, Shali and I have also been in
continuing contact in shaping a U.S. strategy.
Everyone agrees on the need to reassert UNPROFOR's ability to
carry out its humanitarian and protection missions in Bosnia, and
to halt the pattern of successful Bosnian Serb military
aggressiveness that has marked the past month.
Failure to
reverse this pattern will result in attacks on the other enclaves
and renewed strangulation of Sarajevo, precipitating the collapse
of the UNPROFOR mission and initiation of a withdrawal under
circumstances that will be perceived as defeat for the UN, NATO
and our allies.
It will also accelerate passage of unilateral
lift legislation by the Congress in a manner that will damage
relations with our allies.
Deputies
agreed on the following immediate actions:
• To support the UNSCR introduced by the French calling for the
use of all available resources to restore the Srebrenica Safe
Area, although acknowledging privately that UNPROFOR does not
now possess the military capability to reverse the Bosnian
Serb occupation of Srebrenica (nor, in all likelihood, to
prevent the fall of Zepa).
• To weigh in with Milosevic (and, through the UN, with Karadzic
and Mladic) to obtain support for UNHCR efforts to assist in
the movement, care and supply of the refugees and the Dutch
UNPROFOR troops in Srebrenica; at the same time, to work with
the Bosnian government to obtain their consent for the
evacuation of the refugees to Tuzla rather than forcing them
to remain unsupported behind Serb lines.
• To use our public statements and our consultations with allies
to send a clear signal of continuing U.S. resolve to support
the retention of UNPROFOR as the best available option for
resolving the crisis short of a major Balkan war.
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•
To review the viability of U.S. and NATO quick/emergency
withdrawal options as a matter of highest priority, in light
of the speed with which Srebrenica was overrun.
Beyond these immediate actions, Deputies also agreed on the need
to work with allies on the development of a follow-on strategy to
deter further Serb provocations and prevent the collapse of the
UNPROFOR mission:
• At a minimum, this strategy must preserve Bosnian government
presence in and access to Sarajevo, and it must sustain
UNPROFOR deployments in Federation territory so as to continue
maintaining peace where it exists.
•
To this end, we will support robust use of the existing
elements of the RRF to secure overland access, to Sarajevo
using the Mt. Igman route, and possibly to restore control
over Sarajevo airport.
•
Given the political imperative not to be seen as abandoning
all of the eastern enclaves, and the fact that NATO
credibility (through commitment to enforcing the weapons
exclusion zone) is engaged in Gorazde, the strategy should
include a commitment to protect this safe area, even if
protection of Zepa proves unfeasible.
Deputies agreed that efforts to stabilize the situation will be
critical to our efforts to avoid Congressional action on
unilateral lift.
The current Dole language, while not requiring
immediate lifting of the embargo, would require unilateral U.S.
action in violation of binding UN resolutions within 12 weeks of
a request by the Bosnian Government for UNPROFOR withdrawal.
Failure to demonstrate that UNPROFOR retains a viable mission
after the fall of Srebrenica will virtually guarantee passage of
the bill and encourage the Bosnian government to pull the
trigger.
�THE PRESltENT HAS ~FN
-.-.."_ '\ '-\
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J
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
CHANCELLOR HELMUT KOHL
Calling
about Bosnia
situation
after fall of Srebrenica.
We need to regroup and devise strategy for making
presence work, so we can halt Serb aggressiveness
UN withdrawal.
UN
and avert
Jacques Chirac has just called with a more radical proposal:
to retake Srebrenica militarily by deploying ground forces
of the four major powers.
Jacques posed this as an either/or choice:
large-scale
intervention in Srebrenica, or UNPROFOR must pullout.
I told Jacques that we believe UNPROFOR should not withdraw,
but that I agreed we need to shore up its credibility after
Srebrenica.
We agreed our Chiefs of Staff would follow up so that we
could get a better understanding of the proposal and its
implications.
Shali spoke to Admiral Lanxade this evening, learned that
French military believes retaking Srebrenica too risky.
They are focusing on reinforcement of Gorazde (possibly with
1000 French peacekeepers) as well as opening Mt. Igman route
into Sarajevo using Rapid Reaction Force.
We think that is more realistic approach: to reestablish
UNPROFOR's resolve in more important areas.
Understand he spoke to you earlier today.
What is your
interpretation of Chirac's proposal?
Do you think he really
wants to pullout
if we don't agree?
Want to stay in close touch with you over coming days so
that we can avoid a rift with France and come up with a
realistic approach to reestablish UNPROFOR's effectiveness
and credibility.
Failure in this effort will mean devastating setback for
NATO and UN, and humanitarian disaster of large proportions.
Will also make it harder to defeat unilateral lift
legislation in Congress.
IfAnLr:Declassify on:
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THE WHITE
HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORP~DUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with.French President Jacques Chirac
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
President Jacques Chirac
Notetaker: Alexander Vershbow and Anthony
Gardner
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
July 13, 1995, 3:22-3:58 p.m.
Oval Office
The President:
I
Hello, Jacques?
(U)
President Chirac: Hello, Bill. How are you? I will speak in
French. I'm very worried about Bosnia and there are things we
want you to know.
(Swi tching to French)
First of all, my
congratulations on the strong statement you issued that if we
cannot restore the UN mission, then the days of UNPROFOR are
numbered and that that causes you concern. Our. analysis is the
same. The fall of Srebrenica, the probable fall of Zepa tomorrow
and the real threat to Gorazde represent a major failure of the
UN, NATO and all the democracies. You see what we are seeing on
TV, how the Serbs are separating men from women, sending women to
be raped and killing men who are old enough to bear arms. In m
o inion we can no Ion er .
ust stand b and watch this. ,._- -----. I.~
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Therefore we must restore
Eei"'""Efie l. was guaranteed by the UN. That means
way
situation in the eastern enclaves. ~
Therefore, firm and limited military action is called for.
France is ready to put all of its forces behind the mission. I
don't yet know what the British want to do. They are directly
concerned since they are in Gorazde, next door to Srebrenica. I
wonder whether or not their intention is to pick up and leave
Gorazde just as the Dutch left Srebrenica. I don't want France
to be an accomplice to such a situation. Either we agree to
carry out a joint military intervention to protect the three
enclaves -- to recapture Srebrenica and guarantee the integrity
of Gorazde and Zepa, which account for 100,000 Muslims (today
20,000 to 40,000 Muslims are fleeing Srebrenica) and we use
military intervention to impose the'will of the UN, which can
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only come from the U.S., France, the UK and Germany -- and France
is prepared to throw all of its forces into the effort to restore
the situation in Srebrenica -- or we do nothing.
But if the
option is to do nothing, then that is exactly the situation we
were in in 1939, and France will withdraw -- of course, by
agreement with our British friends and the rest of UNPROFOR.
So
the issue is whether the U.S. is prepared to cooperate in
combating ethnic cleansing, or do we sit back and let these
people fight each other and we go home.
We cannot allow
ourselves to be accomplices! ~
The President:
Let me first say that we appreciate the strong
stance you have taken and your determination to do something.
Obviously, we have been thinking about this a lot.
I will take
up your specific proposals with my military commanders, but I
wanted to speak with you first.
I would like you to think about
a few things.
Gorazde is much more important than Zepa and
Srebrenica in terms of its size and psychological impact.
The
Bosnian Government has 9000 troops in Gorazde, who are apparently
are willing to fight.
In Srebrenica there were about 3000
Bosnian troops but, as you know, they left under pressure of
shelling.
They left without putting up a fight, although I think
they could have done so. The British have 300 troops in Gorazde,
so I think they will be more inclined to take a stand there.
We
all know that if something happens to Gorazde, the Bosnian Serb
army will feel they have a free hand to move on to Sarajevo.
Our
military advisers say there are significant hazards in attempting
to land a force with helicopters in Srebrenica and that UNPROFOR
might be better off securing Gorazde first and then move back
eastward dye to the inherent difficulty of defending the area
there.
ye)
The other issue I would like to raise with you -- which we
discussed in Halifax and here during your visit, and which has
become more pressing -- is the necessity of knowing what the
rules of engagement are going to be if you take the initiative in
Srebrenica, Zepa or Gorazde.
You cannot be in a position to
fight in Zepa and then ask for NATO support without clear rules
of engagement.
If there is going to be fighting, it has to be
different than in the past.
Before we provide air power, we have
to know that it would be used and that we could inflict real pain
on the Serbs in other areas.
Before UNPROFOR gets into a
military campaign, we must have a clear sense of what the next
move is and what the acceptable military options are under
UNPROFOR and NATO. Now that you have told me what you want to
do, I will talk to our military advisers, but they are very
skeptical about bringing in forces with helicopters, especially
if the Bosnians won't fight.
I think we should first secure
Gorazde and then Sarajevo.
I will have conversations with them
and get back in touch with you. ~
CONFIB8MTIM.,
�!
CONiIB8N'fI1\L
3
I would like to make two more points. Fi=st, I think your stated
intentions to reopen Mount Igman road is very important -- a
critical point. Second, we need General Shalikashvili to speak
with Admiral Lanxade or have Secretary Cr-=istopher speak with
your foreign minister to talk in detail aoout what you have in
mind for the enclaves. We need to consider whether the Muslims
will return to the enclaves, how we will protect them if they
come back, and whether it would be under the old UN rules of
engagement. Will the Bosnian Serb Army just end their advances?
Therefore, I believe we should focus on ,Gorazde and press for
ministerial and military talks. You have given me many things to
think about. I would like to have a follow up be~een the
generals and foreign ministers on the details. jCl
The President: We cannot defend democratic values in the
abstract. My military advisers tell me the Muslims could have
made a hell of a fight in Srebrenica and raised the price of the
Serbs' occupation, but they wouldn't do it. We can't fight just
because the UN says they are ."safe areas". We can't send the
Muslims back and commit ourselves to stay forever if they won't
�4
defend themselves. That's the problem with the strategy you
suggest. Yesterday we saw the effects of the imbalance in arms.
Have you had any second thcughts about lifting the arms embargo?
yr
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•
I
The President: If we intervene to regain the enclaves on their
behalf and they won't fight, how do we keep them open?
UNPROFOR's mission would be completely changed and you would have
entered into combat on the side of the Bosnian Government when
they don't fight for themselves. I agree the Serbs have made a
mockery of the UN. They took Srebrenica and got it for free. We
didn't even bomb them. We should raise the price, and even hit
Pale. I have argued that we should allow NATO to take tougher
action, but that was not to be. If we enter the war to defend
the Bosnians, they have to be ready to defend themselves. That's
what worries me. ~
President Chirac:
embargo? JPf
When does the Congress vote on lifting the
The President: Next week. I'm trying to defeat it. I agree
with you: I am vehemently opposed to unilateral lift. If they
pass it, I will veto it, and they would be obliged to override my
veto. )Il1
President Chirac:
Can Congress override the veto?
~)
The President: Yes, with a two-thirds vote, but I don't think
they'll have two thirds. I'm not worried about it. I would like
CONFIBSN'f:l:AL
�C9~IHDl>NHAL
5
to confer with my military
rna tt e r .
advisers
and get back in touch on this
.;.e:r
President Chirac:
to contact General
very much. ~
The President:
OK, I quite agree.
I will ask Admiral Lanxade
Shalikashvili as soon as possible.
Thank you
OK. Good-bye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation
CONFTDEHTIAL
�•
OUR OWN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY TEAM MET THIS MORNING
WILL MEET AGAIN TOMORROW TO CONSIDER MANY OF THE POINTS
ARE DEALING WITH IN YOUR CABINET MEETING.
•
DEFINITIVE ANSWERS TO SEVERAL OF THE QUESTIONS YOU RAISE WILL
HAVE TO AWAIT THE OUTCOME OF TOMORROW'S SESSION
•
I CAN PROVIDE YOU WITH OUR GENERAL THINKING
ISSUES THE PM RAISED IN HIS LETTER.
•
WHILE WE INTEND TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO SUSTAIN A VETO OF.ANY
UNILATERAL LIFT LEGISLATION, YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THERE IS A
REAL CHANCE THAT A VETO COULD BE OVERRIDDEN, ESPECIALLY IF WE
FAIL TO TAKE ACTION TO RESTORE UNPROFOR CREDIBILITY
•
IF GORAZDE
HILL.
ON MOST OF THE
FALLS, COULD MAKE THINGS MORE DIFFICULT
ON THE
•
I AM MEETING WITH SACIRBEY THIS AFTERNOON, AND WILL PRESS HIM
ON GIVING US A CHANCE TO RESTORE UNPROFOR CREDIBILITY.
THIS
MUST INCLUDE ALLOWING UNPROFOR TO REMAIN, AND ASSISTING IN THE
DEPLOYMENT OF THE RRF. BUT AGAIN, WE MUST BE WILLING TO DO
MAKE UNPROFOR MORE CREDIBLE.
THE STATUS QUO WILL NOT SUFFICE.
•
REGARDING THE OPTIONS FOR GORAZDE, YOU ARE RIGHT IN YOUR VIEW
THAT WE WOULD NOT BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT DEPLOYMENT OF 500015,000 TROOPS TO REPEL A SERB ATTACK ON ITS OWN.
•
WE AGREE THAT THE WEIGHT OF THE EFFORT TO DEFEND GORAZDE
THE GROUND STILL RESTS WITH THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT.
•
WE DO SOME MERIT IN THE FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR A MORE MODEST
REINFORCEMENT OF THE UN PEACEKEEPERS THERE, AND ARE WEIGHING
THE PROS AND CONS OF PROVIDING THE NECESSARY LIFT FOR A SMALL
FRENCH DEPLOYMENT.
•
ON
SUCH A DEMONSTRATION OF RESOLVE, IF DONE IN PARALLEL WITH
A ROBUST AIR CAMPAIGN, WOULD PROVIDE A DETERRENT TO THE
BOSNIAN SERBS THAT WAS CLEARLY LACKING AT SREBRENICA AND
ZEPA.
•
YOUR THIRD OPTION, WHICH AMOUNTS TO SIMPLY STAYING WITH THE
STATUS QUO, IS CLEARLY UNACCEPTABLE.
•
IF UNPROFOR MAKES NO EFFORT TO CHANGE THE CALCULUS OF THE
SITUATION FOLLOWING THE BRUTAL ETHNIC CLEANSING OF SREBRENICA:
•
THE FRENCH HAVE ALREADY
WITHDRAW,
INDICATED
•
THE U.S. CONGRESS WILL BE CERTAIN
LIFT BILL OVER A VETO, AND
•
THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT
UNPROFOR'S WITHDRAWAL.
THAT THEY WILL
TO PASS A UNILATERAL
IS INCREASINGLY
LIKELY TO DEMAND
�2
•
REALISTICALLY, HOWEVER, IT MAY BE MORE IMPORTANT TO LAY DOWN A
MARKER OF CHANGED UNPROFOR RESOLVE AT GORAZDE THAN TO COMMIT
TO HOLDING IT AT ALL COSTS INDEFINITELY.
BUT CLEARLY
SOMETHING MUST BE DONE NOW
TO KEEP THE FRENCH ON BOARD AND
AVOID ENCOURAGING A SERB ONSLAUGHT NOT'ONLY AGAINST GORAZDE,
BUT SARAJEVO AS WELL.
•
TURNING TO OUR PROPOSAL FOR THE USE OF AIR POWER, SINCE THE
BOSNIAN SERBS HAVE INDICATED THAT ANY USE OF NATO AIR POWER
WOULD BE REGARDED AS AN ACT OF WAR, THEIR VIEWS ON THIS MATTER
CANNOT BE THE DETERMINING FACTOR.
•
THE USE OF AIR POWER HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED BY THE UN AS
PART OF THE CHAPTER VII APPROACH TO THE MANDATE TO WHICH
WE HAVE ALL AGREED.
•
THUS FAR, THERE HAS BEEN NO SERIOUS EFFORT TO APPLY THAT
AIR POWER IN A MANNER THAT MIGHT ACTUALLY HAVE AN IMPACT
ON BOSNIAN SERB FORCES VIOLATING UN MANDATES .
• AS A RESULT, THE THREAT TO UN PERSONNEL FROM BOSNIAN
SERBS WILLING TO RESORT TO CRIMINAL TACTICS OF HOSTAGETAKING HAS OUTWEIGHED THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS.
•
CLEARLY, ANY RENEWED AIR CAMPAIGN WOULD NEED UNPROFOR TO
TAKE REALISTIC MEASURES TO REMOVE ITS PERSONNEL FROM HIGH
THREAT AREAS WHERE THEY ARE UNNECESSARILY DEPLOYED.
•
WHAT WE PROPOSE FOR GORAZDE IS A MILITARILY SOUND AIR CAMPAIGN
TO RESTORE SERB RESPECT FOR THE HEAVY WEAPONS EXCLUSION ZONE,
AND, IF NECESSARY, ATTACK FORCES VIOLATING IT AS PART OF A
SERB OFFENSIVE EARLY ENOUGH TO SUPPORT EFFORTS TO DEFEND THE
SAFE AREA.
•
SUCH A CAMPAIGN WOULD GREATLY ENHANCE THE DETERRENT POSTURE OF
THE UN AND THEREBY CONTRIBUTE TO SUCCESSFUL MAINTENANCE OF THE
UN'S ROLE IN SARAJEVO.
�3025660E.FIN
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DATE-TIME
06 August 95 18:00
Vershbow, Alexander R.
CLASSIFICATION
-€ONFIfJEN HAL
SUBJECT
FW: Bosnia Human Rights Abuses [CONrID~IlAL]
TO
Drew, Samuel N.
CARBON_COPY
NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY
From: Malley, Robert
To: Schwartz, Eric P.; Vershbow, Alexander R.
CC: /R, Record at Al
Subject: Bosnia [CONFIDENTIAL]
Date: Friday, August 04, 199506:26 PM
[[ 6054.DOC : 4671 in 6054.DOC ]][[ BOSNIA2,DOC : 4672 in
BOSNIA2.DOC ]]
Sandy B. asked us to draft a possible presidential statement on atrocities
in Srebrenica and Zepa. Attached for your comments/concurrence is a package
that includes a draft statement (I am still waiting for an attached fact
sheet from the agency).
ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE
ATTACHMENT
FILENAME
4 August 95 18:21
6054.DOC
.(J ONi"lDEI'ITiAL
6054
Crn-JfIDliblTIkL
.('ONfIDRNTIAh
CONFmS~ITIAh
August 4, 1995
ACTION
�3025660E.FIN
Page 2 of4
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
THROUGH: MORTON HALPERIN
FROM: ROB MALLEY
SUBJECT: Human Rights Atrocities ih Bosnia
There is increasingly solid evidence of atrocities committed by the
Bosnian Serb army during its attack on Srebrenica and Zepa. During
a mission to central and northeastern Bosnia, A/S Shattuck was able
to confirm through interviews with refugees reports and
. intelligence we have been receiving. Approximately 12,000 persons
from the two former enclaves are still missing and unaccounted for.
Hundreds, perhaps up to a thousand, persons (principally men and
boys) appear to have been killed in mass executions. Others are
either in detention or seeking to flee the area. Reports of other
brutalities, including rape, sexual abuse and mutilations abound.
There also are some indications that chemical weapons might have
been used.
State is undertaking a series of steps to pressure the Bosnian
Serbs to grant access to and permit free passage for those still at
large or in detention:
I. Demarche to Belgrade to communicate the requirement that an
international mission be permitted to enter the former safe areas
and extract all former residents.
2. Demarche to Russia and Greece to exercise pressure on Belgrade
and Pale.
3. Efforts at the UNSC for the issuance of a statement on the need
for accounting, access to and safe passage for those remaining in
enclaves.
White House action will be needed to support this effort which,
given the unknown fate of thousands of persons, is of the utmost
urgency. A first step would be a presidential statement that
condemns the atrocities, calls for access to and safe passage for
those remaining in the enclaves, and reminds perpetrators of these
actions that they will be held accountable. (A draft statement is
attached at Tab A). The statement would be released in conjunction
with a fact sheet detailing known incidents of atrocities (attached
at Tab B). If these initial efforts prove to be unsuccessful, more
forceful action should be considered.
Concurrence by: Sandy Vershbow; Eric
Schwartz
RECOMMENDATION
�3D25660E.FIN
Page 3 of4
That you approve release of the attached presidential statement and
fact sheet.
Approve __
Disapprove __
Attachments
Tab A Presidential Statement
Tab B Fact Sheet
ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE.
4 August 95 18:25
ATTACHMENT
FILENAME
BOSNIA2.DOC
Evidence is mounting every day of unspeakable atrocities committed
by Bosnian Serb armed forces during their attack on Srebrenica and
Zepa. There are reports of mass executions, beatings, rape, sexual
abuse and other flagrant violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law. Thousands of civilians from
Srebrenica and Zepa are missing and unaccounted for. As I have made
clear before, the United States condemns these outrageous actions in
the strongest terms.
Our first obligation is to the men, women and children held by the
Bosnian Serbs or still at large in and around the former enclaves of
Srebrenica and Zepa. The Bosnian Serbs must provide international
access to and safe passage for those persons still being detained.
They must provide a full accounting of people from the two areas
whose fate remains unknown. And they must not harm persons who have
survived the Bosnian Serb onslaught and are in need of immediate
protection and assistance. I have directed my Administration to
make our concerns known to all relevant parties and to work with the
international community to see to it that these basic requirements
are met.
Public condemnation of the atrocities alone is insufficient. There
also must be justice, and those who have committed these acts must
be held accountable. To that end, I also have directed my
Administration to intensify efforts to collect information on what
happened in Srebrenica and Zepa. Evidence will be turned over to
the War Crimes Tribunal and serve to prosecute those culpable of war
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. I urge States to
fulfill their international obligation to arrest those already
indicted by the Tribunal if they enter their territory and surrender
them to the Tribunal.
�3.025660E.FIN
Page 4 of4
Bosnian Serbs need to be on notice that such criminal actions
constitute the single most important obstacle to a political
solution. Ongoing atrocities make it impossible for the
international community even to consider any sanctions relief. They
must not and will not remain unpunished
�30 I 5B9A6.FIN
Page I of3
MSMail
DATE-TIME
25 July 95 20:42
FROM
Vershbow, Alexander R.
CLASSIFICATION
• CmWIDmn'fAL
SUBJECT
Subject: Massacres at Srebrenic/t' fCQNFIDEN'fIAf+.'
TO
Bass, Peter E.
Cicio, Kristen K.
Emery, Mary C.
Hall, Wilma G.
Veit, Katherine M.
Drew, Samuel N.
Gardner, Anthony
Marshall, Betty A.
Maxfield, Nancy H.
Peters, Mary A.
Schmidt, John R.
Vershbow, Alexander R.
For TL and SRB:
.
,
Whatever you think of Galbraith's recommendation re Zepa, the fact of Serb
mass killings at Srebrenica is becoming increasingly clear. Grim reading.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS. CQNFIDE?<f'fIAL DTG:251907Z mL 95
FM: AMEMBASSY ZAGREB
TO:SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6565
--..c.G:....Q::UO'N~F~I A L ZAGREB 002788
J:)A-f~r-l!<;T~'I""t"t
~IQDIliE.O. 12356: DECL: 07/25/00
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, BK, HR
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE MASS EXECUTION OF SREBRENICA
MALES IS REASON TO SAVE ZEPA
I. A UN OFFICIAL HAS RECOUNTED TO ME AN INTERVIEW
SHE CONDUCTED OF A SREBRENICA REFUGEE IN TUZLA. THE
ACCOUNT, WHICH SHE FEL T WAS HIGHLY CREDIBLE, PROVIDES
DISTURBING EVIDENCE THAT THE BOSNIAN SERBS HAYE...
MASSACRED MANY IF NOT MOST OF:rHE 5 OOOPLUSUEl:LASSIFIED
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Page 2 aD
MILITARY AGE MEN IN THEIR CUSTODY FOLLOWING THE FALL
OF SREBRENICA.
2. IF THE BOSNIAN SERB ARMY MASSACRED THE DEFENDERS
OF SREBRENICA, WE CAN BE SURE A SIMILAR FATE AWAITS
MANY OF THE 16,000 PEOPLE IN ZEPA. THE LONDON
DECLARATION IMPLICITLY WRITES OFF ZEPA. IN VIEW OF
THE NUMEROUS ACCOUNTS OF ATROCITIES IN SREBRENICA A.1"'lD
THE POSSIBILITY OF A MAJOR MASSACRE THERE, I URGE
RECONSIDERATION OF AIR STRIKES TO HELP ZEPA.
3. THE SREBRENICA REFUGEE IS A 35-YEAR-OLD MAN. HE
FLED SREBRENICA AS THE SERBS TOOK OVER, BUT WAS LATER
ROUNDED UP IN A FOREST ALONG WITH SEVERAL THOUSAND
OTHER REFUGEES. AT LEAST OVERNIGHT HE WAS HELD IN A
SMALL BUILDING PACKED WITH MEN. THROUGH THE NIGHT
THE SERBS TOOK OUT MEN IN SMALL GROUPS AND THEY WERE
NOT SEEN AGAIN. THE REFUGEES WERE TRANSPORTED IN
TRUCKS A1\'D BUSES TO A STADIUM, APPARENTL Y AT
BRATUNAC. ALONG THE WAY, SERBS FIRED INTO THE TRUCKS
AND BUSES APPARENTLY KILLING NUMEROUS REFUGEES.
4. AT THE STADIUM, GENERAL MLADIC ADDRESSED THE
PRISONERS, TAUNTING THEM THAT "THEIR ALIJA" HAD BEEN
UNABLE TO HELP THEM AND THAT THE MUSLIMS OUGHT TO
HAVE STAYED IN YUGOSLAVIA. HE THEN ASSURED THE MEN
THAT, IF THEY WERE COOPERATIVE, THEY WOULD BE
RETURNED TO THEIR FAMILIES. AT THIS STAGE, THE MEN
WERE BOUND WITH HANDS TIED BEHIND THEIR BACKS.
5. FROM THE STADIUM, THE MEN WERE TAKEN ON TRUCKS TO
KONJEVIC POLIE. THEY WERE TAKEN FROM THE TRUCKS,
MADE TO LIE DOWN, AND THEN MACHINE GUNNED. THIS
REFUGEE SURVIVED BECAUSE THE BULLET GRAZED HIS .
TEMPLE, CREATING A VERY BLOODY APPEARANCE BUT DOING
LITTLE REAL DAMAGE. AFTER THE SOLDIERS LEFT, HE, AND
ANOTHER MAN WHO ALSO SURVIVED, HID IN A DITCH. THE
SOLDIERS CAME BACK AND BULLDOZED THE BODIES.
6. ACCORDING TO THE UN SOURCE, THE MAN HAD MARKS ON
HIS WRISTS FROM WHERE HIS HANDS HAD BEEN BOUND. HE
ALSO HAD WOUNDS ON HIS LEGS AND ARMS FROM WHERE
MACHINE GUN BULLETS HAD SPRAYED ROCKS ONTO HIM.
7. THE REFUGEE BELIEVES THAT ALL THE MEN IN THE
STADIUM WERE MURDERED IN THIS WAY._(i;)(~
WHO ALSO INTERVIEWED SREBRENICA
REFUGEES IN TUZLA (pLEASE PROTECT), TOLD ME THATlf!b)(6)~
ALSO BELIEVES THAT THOUSANDS MAY HAVE DIED IN TRANSIT
TO KONJEVIC POLJE OR AT THE EXECUTION SITE.
�3015B9A6.FIN
Page 3 of3
8. IF THIS ACCOUNT IS ACCURATE, THERE MAYBE NO
SURVIVORS OF THE MEN ROUNDED UP IN SREBRENICA. WE
SHOULD REDOUBLE EFFORTS TO SEE THESE MEN. IF THE
SERBS REFUSE ACCESS, THE IMPLICATIONS ARE OBVIOUS.
9. AGAIN, IT IS NOT TOO LATE TO PREVENT A SIMILAR
TRAGEDY AT ZEPA. ZEPA'S DEFENDERS VALIANTL Y CONTINUE
TO HOLD ON. UNDOUBTEDLY THEY REALIZE THE FATE THAT
AWAITS THEM. THEY SHOULD NOT BE ABANDONED.
GALBRAITH
�DEPARTMENT
OF STATE
(SA)
07.22.
• 95
22.' I 1
NO.
1460120825
PAGE
Rer
I.
APPR:
RF
DRAFT:
JC
OTHER:
SB
OTHER:
WFD
OTHER:
ML
~
~
C8I1FIBEMTli'd> -
OTHER:
OTHER:
NIACT
IMMEDIATE
IMMEDIATE
E.O. 12356:
TAGS:
ANATO
USUN, MOSCOW,
KIEV
DECL:OADR
NATO, MARR
SUBJECT:
PRESIDENTIAL
MESSAGE
TO NATO CAPITALS
1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
NIACT IMMEDIATE PRECENDENCE
BECAUSE OF ONGOING NAC MEETINGS AND BECAUSE TEXT MUST BE
DELIVERED AT OOB MONDAY, JULY 24, AND TOMORROW IS SUNDAY.
2. NATO CAPITALS EXCEPT LONDON AND PARIS SHOULD DELIVER
THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT AT OOB MONDAY,
JULY 24. THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL WILL MEET AT 3:30
PM THAT DAY TO REVIEW PROGRESS IN THE NATO MILITARY
COMMITTEE ON FORMULATING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
IMPLEMENTING THE DECISIONS REACHED AT THE LONDON BOSNIA
CONFERENCE LAST FRIDAY.
EMBASSIES LONDON AND PARIS
SHOULD INFORM AUTHORITIES OF THE FACT AND CONTENT OF
THIS MESSAGE.
3.
BEGIN
TEXT.
(FOR BRUSSELS, OTTAWA, COPENHAGEN, BONN, ITALY, THE
HAGUE, OSLO, MADRID, AND ANKARA)
WE WENT TO LONDON
CONVINCED THAT THE STATUS QUO IN BOSNIA WAS UNTENABLE
AND THAT ONLY STRONG AND DECISIVE ACTION WOULD BE
eeUF I Qg,~TTT A I ,
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
\1"
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Of
lW,-
�DEPARTMENT
OF STATE
••..
C~e""l~l f1DrTEfClNf1"''Ff II:AirLi:PP-I'
(SA) 07.22.
. 95 22: I J
NO.
1460120825
2
SUFFICIENT TO HALT SERB AGGRESSION, RESTORE UNPROFOR'S
EFFECTIVENESS, AND REESTABLISH CONDITIONS THAT COULD
LEAD TO A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.
WE WERE PARTICULARLY
DETERMINED THAT CLEAR DECISIONS BE TAKEN TO PREVENT THE
BOSNIAN SERBS FROM ATTACKING THE LAST REMAINING SAFE
AREA IN EASTERN BOSNIA, GORAZDE, AND THAT MEASURES BE
ADOPTED FOR RELIEVING THE SERBS' SIEGE OF SARAJEVO.
THE
LONDON MEETING ACHIEVED THESE OBJECTIVES.
OUR EFFORTS
THERE MUST NOW BE PURSUED WITHIN NATO, WITHOUT DELAY, IN
ORDER TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM AND TO CONFIRM THE
.SERIOUSNESS OF OUR PURPOSE.
(FOR ATHENS, LUXEMBOURG, REYKJAVIK, AND LISBON)
THE
LONDON CONFERENCE ON BOSNIA WAS SUCCESSFUL IN SENDING AN
IMPORTANT SIGNAL TO THE BOSNIAN SERBS OF RESOLVE AND
DETERMINATION.
THAT EFFORT MUST NOW BE PURSUED WITHIN
NATO, WITHOUT DELAY, IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM AND
TO CONFIRM THE SERIOUSNESS OF OUR PURPOSE.
(CONTINUATION FOR ALL)
LONDON WAS IN OUR VIEW AN
IMPORTANT SUCCESS.
THE CONFERENCE SEIZED THE
INITIATIVE, DESPITE THE VARIETY OF VIEWS REPRESENTED
THERE, AROUND THE BASIC PROPOSITIONS OUTLINED IN MALCOLM
RIFKIND'S CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT.
CLARITY OF WILL, AND
EXPEDITIOUS ACTION AT NATO IN THE NEXT DAYS, WILL BE
ESSENTIAL TO AVOIDING ANY CONFUSION IN PALE LEADING TO
MISCALCULATION.
WE CANNOT AFFORD ANY MISSTEPS OR
HESITATION IF WE ARE TO AVOID THE SORT OF ESCALATION OF
CONFLICT WHICH WE WISH TO AVOID.
AT THE SAME TIME, NATO
MUST BE PREPARED TO RESPOND QUICKLY IF THE WARNINGS OF
LONDON ARE NOT HEEDED.
IT IS BY MOVING FORWARD RESOLUTELY TOGETHER THAT WE CAN
BEST ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVES, INCLUDING THE RETENTION OF
UNPROFOR.
BY STANDING TOGETHER AS ALLIES WE PROVIDE THE
STRONGEST DETERRENT TO FURTHER ATTACKS, AND THE BEST
PROTECTION TO UNPROFOR ON THE GROUND.
THE COURAGE OF
THOSE TROOPS, AND THE COMMITMENT OF THE NATIONS WHO HAVE
PROVIDED THEM, MERITS NATO'S STRONG SUPPORT.
WE ARE .
CONVINCED THAT THE OUTCOME OF THE LONDON CONFERENCE,
COUPLED WITH A CLEAR AND RAPID DISPLAY OF ALLIANCE
DECISIvENESS, IS THE BEST HOPE FOR TURNING THE BOSNIAN
SERBS FROM THE BATTLEFIELD.
SATURDAY'S DISCUSSIONS AT NATO ON FOLLOWUP TO THE LONDON
CONFERENCE WENT WELL AND DEMONSTRATED A CONSIDERABLE
DEGREE OF CONSENSUS.
NATO'S MILITARY AUTHORITIES WILL
NOW EXAMINE THE SPECIFICS OF HOW NATO WILL IMPLEMENT THE
LONDON DECISIONS, AND THE COUNCIL WILL MEET MONDAY
-AeAOI~l:PF~I"'eEtI':!I1'N'T'ITI1rAD'h
PAGE
3
�DEPARTMENT
OF STATE
(SA)
07.22.
. 95
22: I I
NO.
c.
Cg~IFI I:lEM'UAL
3
AFTERNOON TO MOVE FORWARD.
WE WOULD HOPE THAT ON MONDAY
DECISIONS CAN BE TAKEN THAT ARE FIRM AND CLEAR IN
SUPPORT OF THE LONDON MEETING.
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE,
NATO SHOULD STATE THAT IT IS PREPARED TO USE ITS AIR
POWER IN A SUBSTANTIAL AND DECISIVE RESPONSE TO ANY
ATTACKS ON GORAZDE.
AS THE CONFERENCE CHAIRMAN STATED IN LONDON, THE
SITUATION IN BOSNIA AND THE FUTURE OF THE UN MISSION IS
NOW AT A TURNING POINT.
THERE ARE OBVIOUS QUESTIONS,
GIVEN PAST EXPERIENCE, ABOUT WHETHER WE WILL BE PREPARED
TO FOLLOW THROUGH.
NATO MUST MAKE IT CLEAR THAT IT IS.
END TEXT.
YY
1460120825
PAGE
4
�CQHFIbENTIAL
6886
NAnONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON.
D.C. 20506
September 18, 1995
INFORMATION
.
,MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
"
IU
FROM
RICHARD SCHIFTER
SUBJECT:
A Proposal for a Southeastern European Cooperative
Development Initiative
More Balkanization?
I had a visit last week from a delegation from Sanjak. Sanjak, a
Turkish generic term for district, is the label given to an area
lying immediately east of Bosnia, now divided between Serbia and
Montenegro and populated predominantly by persons who refer to
themselves as Bosniaks. They are Muslims. The delegation was in
Washington to gain support for their effort to establish an
autonomous region of Sanjak within the FRY.
I heard the delegation out, explained that we now sought to end the
fighting and suggested that they could assert their cause at a
later date, when an effort is made to reach an overall settlement.
But before the delegation left, I asked its leader what his native
language was. He said it was Serbo-Croatian. I asked him whether
people who saw him in the street would be able to identify him as a
"Bosniak," as distinct from a Serb. He conceded that most people
think he looked like a German. I asked whether he thought that a
fervent religious belief separated the people in his region from
the Serbs. He said that that was not the case. When I then asked
what this effort at separation was all about, he spoke vaguely
about different cultures. I did not embarrass him by asking him to
spell out the cultural differences forme.
-
A Vision of a Better Regional Order
~----_.-----
-----
-- ..
_
---
The Sanjak delegation's outlook contrasted sharply with the world
view expressed to me over a year ago by one of the leaders of the
ethnic Greeks of Albania. He made the point that he was committed
to the preservation of the ethnic and linguistic identity of
Albania's Greeks but was not interested'in the redrawing of borders
or in autonomy.
He was impressed by the progress made by the
European Union in making borders increasingly irrelevant and was
hopeful that.in twenty years his region will have reached the same
level of political development.
..JC:lOJl~~lFE'Ir:bI":EE:NNTTIIALA1~'
Declassify on:
DECLA ::ILl kFlED
" . ~ PER E.O. 13526
· ~~ l.J"ln
•.. 1-<> \1;- 63 ~ - ".
�It now seems as if the end of the war in the former Yugoslavia is
in sight.
Even if that end does not arrive iImnediately, it is
likely to come about in the foreseeable future. We have begun to
plan the funding of a major construction effort to bind up the
area's wounds. I recommend that without adding to the cost of the
Bosnia reconstruction effort, we try to do more than recreate the
',status quo ante, that we use the opportunity to deal with the
'iregion's underlying problems.
To be specific, I recommend that we embed the Bosnia reconstruction
efforts in a comprehensive regional initiative designed to realize
the dream of my Greek-Albanian interlocutor. The initiative would
seek to bring the countries of Southeastern Europe together in a
joint effort to develop their respective economies, build a
coordinated transportation and communications system, deal jointly
.with the problem of intergroup distrust and hatred, and create a
sturdy democratic infrastructure. This project would contribute to
our objective of enlargement of democratic space and would help
solidify Western ties to countries that might not be early
candidates for NATO and EU membership.
It would also be an
exercise which Russia could not rationally view as threatening.
Under the OSCE Umbrella
The effort could appropriately be undertaken under the umbrella of
the OSCE, with its emphasis on security, economic development, and
human rights. It should encompass Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, the
states of the former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania.
The OSCE
should create a Southeastern European Cooperative Development
Initiative (SECD!?), led by a Coordinating Board on which the
countries of the region. and the donors of assistance would be
represented.
(Perhaps we need to find an excuse for giving Russia
a seat as well.)
The Board would plan and recommend development
projects, first and foremost relating to reconstruction and
coordinated regional economic development (giving real meaning to
the OSCE second basket), but also focusing on imprOVing relations
among the countries of the region and among its ethnic groups
(fi~st basket), and creating governmental institutions protective
of human rights ("l;hirdasket).
b
With regard to the latter, the
establishment of OSCE jurisdiction would allow linkage of economic
development with third-basket issues in countries such as Croatia,
the FRY, Albania, and Slovakia.
The Board's role should be to coordinate rather than direct. Each
donor would be free to adopt its own .program and each recipie.nt
would be free to make its own arrangement with any donor. But the
Board, if effectively led, would seek to enlist the cooperation of
all donors and of the relevant international lending agencies and
would from that base be able to urge the regional recipients to
cooperate as well.
G8~lFIBElf'fI1tL
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.
The Board should not. have a staff of its own.
Secretarial
assistance should be rendered by the OSCE.
Each board members
should be supported by technical staff from the country the member
represents. The Board would seek to work closely with the IMF, the
IBRD, the EBRD, UNHCR, OECD, and COE. The staffs of these agencies
.
,could be enlisted in providing relevant studies.
'j
As distinct from the OSCE coordinating role with regard to economic
development, effective centralized authority will be needed to make
certain that'Helsinki human-rights standards are applied. Problems
posed by the OSCE consensus principle can be overcome by entrusting
application of third-basked standards to the OSCE High Commissioner
on National Minorities and insisting at the outset on a broad grant
of authority to him.
As national minority issues are closely
related to the region's human rights problems, he would be the
logical person to take the-lead regarding third-basket issues.
u.S. Leadership
If we decide to go forward with such an effort and are able to
persuade the donors and the countries of the region to join in it,
we should make a major effort to gear ourselves up for the exercise
of effective leadership. A USG support group for SECDI should be
established by Executive Order.
In contrast to the OSCE
Coordinating Board, which should coordinate by persuasion, the
support group should have directive authority over all USG funds
allocated for economic development and' democracy building in the
region (AID and USIA) and should work closely with such USG-funded
organizations as USIP and NED. It should also coordinate closely
with all Federal agencies which could contribute to this effort
(Treasury and Commerce could play a particularly significant role)
and should seek to enlist the support of the private sector, both
profit and nonprofit. Given the region's great humanitarian needs,
the churches should be involved in a major way.
A high-profile effort of this kind would be right and proper on its
own merits. It would also be appreciated by members of the general
public, because of its humanitarian character, by the churches, by
the ethnic groups. with roots in the region, and by the U.S •
businesses which could be invited to play a constructive role in
this effort. Our leadership in this undertaking, as a follow-up to
our leadership in bringing peace to the region, could overcome the
negative image created by our inability to solve the problem
earlier. It would be an effort with which the White House couJ.d
appropriately identify itself.
.
Can we discuss this idea?
cc: Dan Fried, Mort Halperin, Sandy Vershbow
�WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: BASS, BERGER, DOHSE, FUERTH, HARMON, LAKE, SENS, SIT, SODERBERG, SIT:, BELL,
CLARKER, DREW, HARMON, LAKEA, NSC, PETERS, SAUNDERS, SCHWARTZ, SESTAK, SUM,
SUM2, VERSHBOW
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------PREC: IMMEDIATE
FM: AMEMBASSY
CLASS.' eOI'UFI DEN"fIAI..,
DTG:141622Z
JUL 95
LONDON
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1260
RHEHAAAIWHITEHOUSE
WASHDC IMMEDIATE
. RUSNAAA/USEUCOM
VAIHINGEN AB GE PRIORITY
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY
ZAGREB PRIORITY 1619
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY
SARAJEVO PRIORITY 0009
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY
BELGRADE PRIORITY 9077
RUFOAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION
US UN NEW YORK PRIORITY 7193
€
Q N ~ I Q E r~ 'f I A"LLONDON
r
009960
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL UK FR BK
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S TELCON WITH MAJOR:
PROPOSE BOSNIA CONFERENCE
PM LIKELY TO
REF: LONDON 9894
1. COFJFIBErmAC
ENTIRE TEXT.
2. A CONTACT AT NUMBER TEN ADVISES THAT PRIME MINISTER
MAJOR IS LIKELY TO PROPOSE AN EARLY MINISTERIAL LEVEL
MEETING ON BOSNIA (REFTEL) DURING HIS TELCON WITH THE
PRESIDENT LATER TODAY. MAJOR IS SAID TO BE CONSIDERING
A MEETING OF FOREIGN AND DEFENSE MINISTERS OF CONTACT
GROUP AND TROOP CONTRIBUTOR COUNTRIES WHICH WOULD TAKE
PLACE IN LONDON LATE IN THE WEEK OF JULY 17. THE
MEETING MIGHT BE PRECEDED BY A SESSION, A DAY OR TWO
EARLIER, OF SENIOR MILITARY ADVISORS.
3. THE BACKDROP TO THE PROSPECTIVE MEETING IS BRITISH
CONCERN OVER THE STATE OF ALLIED COHESION AGAINST A
DANGEROUS, FAST CHANGING SITUATION ON THE GROUND. THE
BRITISH OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO EMERGE FROM THE MEETING
WITH A CONSENSUS ON A WAY FORWARD, INCLUDING ON MILITARY
OPERATIONS. THEY ARE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT THE
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
tJ'I 't(/TlII~
~\v N;o!~
r..
�eOrJrIOEi\J i iAL
ONTACT GROUP MEMBER COUNTRIES FIND THEIR WAY BACK TO A
COMMON APPROACH.
4. OUR CONTACT SAID THE FRENCH ARE TELLING LONDON THAT
THE U.S. IS RECEPTIVE TO PARIS' PROPOSAL OF "DRAWING A
LINE IN THE SAND" AT GORAZDE AND THAT WASHINGTON HAS
INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE HELICOPTER LIFT AND
CAS FOR THEIR FORCES. HE ADDED THAT HMG HAS CONCERNS
ABOUT THE FRENCH PROPOSAL, WHICH IT CONSIDERS A
NON-VIABLE MILITARY OPERATION WHICH WOULD RESULT IN
TURNING UNPROFOR INTO A PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATION.
CROWE
BT
#9960
NNNN
<'SECT>SECTlON:
01 OF 01
<'SSN>9960
<'TOR> 950714125133
M1764412
FROM:
SITREPRT
�GOPJFlBEIIi IIAl '
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: BASS, BERGER, DOHSE, FUERTH, HARMON, LAKE, SENS, SIT, SODERBERG, SIT:, BELL,
CLARKER, DREW, HARMON, LAKEA, NSC, PETERS, SAUNDERS, SCHWARTZ, SESTAK, SUM,
SUM2, VERSHBOW
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS:66QQ~N~FI~B~EroroTiIIPA~LDTG:141544Z
JUL 95
FM:AMEMBASSYLONDON
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE
WASHDC IMMEDIATE
1251
RUEHV..}/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO PRIORITY 0006
. RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY
ZAGREB PRIORITY 1616
RUCNDT/USMISSION
USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 7190
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY
MOSCOW PRIORITY 3874
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY
BELGRADE PRIORITY 9074
CO"
--
J:' I ~E N T I A L LONDON 009948
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL BK UK
SUBJECT: HMG PAUSES TO REFLECT ON BOSNIA POLICY,
REAFFIRMS VALUE OF UNPROFOR
REF: LONDON 9894
1. SONFiElEi'< IIAL AS MARKED.
INFORMATION.
OADR FOR FOREIGN GOVERNMENT
,.
2.
SUMMARY:
THE BRITISH ARE NOT PREPARED TO TAKE
~ Y QUICK DECISIONS ON POSSIBLE MILITARY ACTIONS IN
BOSNIA, INCLUDING DRAWING A LINE IN THE SAND AT GORAZDE,
DESPITE STRONG FRENCH PRESSURES TO DO SO. SENIOR
OFFICIALS ARE HIGHLY SKEPTICAL OF ANY OPERATION TO
REINFORCE ZEPA OR GORAZDE, BUT BELIEVE THAT OPENING UP
OVERLAND ACCESS TO SARAJEVO WOULD BE FEASIBLE MILITARILY
AND DESIRABLE IN POLICY TERMS. MEANWHILE, BOTH THE
PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN SECRETARY HAVE REAFFIRMED THE
BRITISH COMMITMENT TO REMAIN IN BOSNIA UNLESS THE
SITUATION DETERIORATES SIGNIFICANTLY FURTHER. END
SUMMARY.
DECLASSIFIED
PER EoO. 13526
NO HASTY DECISIONS
;:-;;;(~~-~I-~R-LEVEL
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CONTACTS AT THE FCO, MOD AND
~~ q 11 l
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OWNING STREET (CONTACT GROUP REPRESENTATIVE CHARLTON,
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�CONFIOEN IIJl.L
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OMAND, AND ASSISTANT PRIVATE
SECRETARY FOR OVERSEAS AFFAIRS OAKDEN) TOLD US JULY 14
THAT HMG WAS NOT PREPARED TO TAKE ANY QUICK DECISIONS ON
POSSIBLE MILITARY ACTIONS IN BOSNIA DESPITE STRONG
PRESSURES FROM PARIS TO DO SO. THE BRITISH AGREE THAT A
DEFINING MOMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON BOSNIA, BUT FOR THIS
VERY REASON THEY BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO TAKE A FEW DAYS
TO LOOK QUIETLY AT THE OPTIONS BEFORE TAKING ANY
DECISION. WE ARE TOLD THAT A HIGH-LEVEL GROUP, TO
INCLUDE THE PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN AND DEFENSE
SECRETARIES) IS TO MEET SHORTLY TO ASSESS THE SITUATION.
4. j.ef'PART OF THIS RELUCTANCE TO TAKE SNAP DECISIONS
SfEMS FROM UNCERTAINTY IN WHITEHALL AS TO EXACTLY WHAT
THE FR~NCH ARE PROPOSING. WHAT EXACTLY DOES PRESIDENT
· CHIRAC HAVE IN MIND WHEN HE SPEAKS OF "LIMITED MILITARY
ACTION TO .PROTECT THE OTHER ENCLAVES?" AS NOTED SEPTEL,
PRIME MINISTER MAJOR WILL BE CALLING CHIRAC TODAY TO TRY
TO CLARIFY FRENCH INTENTIONS.
PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ON THE MILITARY OPTIONS
5. JJA"'OUR CONTACTS STRESSED TO US THAT THERE ARE FEW
"'ffABLE MILITARY OPTIONS IN BOSNIA. CHARLTON REAFFIRMED
THE BRITISH VIEW THAT IT WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION TO
THINK THAT SREBRENICA COULD BE RETAKEN WITH THE
ASSISTANCE OF THE RRF. HE NOTED THAT IT WOULD TAKE AN
AIRBORNE DIVISION OR TWO, WHICH WOULD HAVE TO COME FROM
THE U.S. AS TO ZEPA, CHARLTON SAID THAT THE BRITISH
WERE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS THAT IT COULD BE HELD, EVEN WITH
REINFORCEMENT IF THAT WERE POSSIBLE, AGAINST A BOSNIAN
SERB ATTACK. TO BE AT ALL EFFECTIVE, REINFORCEMENT
WOULD REQUIRE THE PARTICIPATION OF U.S. ATTACK
. HELICOPTERS. OMAND SAID THAT THE BOSNIAN SERBS COULD
TAKE ZEPA TOMORROW IF THEY WANTED, ALTHOUGH HE DOUBTED
THEY WOULD MOVE OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS. IT WAS MORE
LIKELY THAT THEY WOULD PAUSE TO "DIGEST" SREBRENICA AND
"BEHAVE" FOR A WHILE IN ORDER TO MITIGATE THE
INTERNATIONAL REACTION. (OMAND NOTED THERE WERESOME
SIGNS OF THIS; THE BOSNIAN SERBS WERE AT THE MOMENT
BEING MORE COOPERATIVE ON SARAJEVO CONVOYS.)
s.LJ OMAND SAID THAT THERE WAS NO SUPPORT IN HMG FOR
PULiiNG OUT OF GORAZDE, BUT EQUALLY MOD SAW NO POINT IN
EINFORCING THE ENCLAVE. (OAK DEN SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD US
THAT THE POLITICAL LEVEL HAD NOT MADE ANY DECISION YET
ON THE ISSUE OF REINFORCEMENT OF GORAZDE.) THE BRITISH
TROOPS WERE NOT THERE TO FIGHT. HE THOUGHT IT STILL
UNCLEAR WHETHER THE BOSNIAN SERBS WOULD MOVE ON GORAZDE;
SURELY THEY RECKONED THEY WOULD BE IN FOR A FIGHT, THE
ASSUMPTION BEING THAT BOSNIAN FORCES, WHO WERE FAR MORE
NUMEROUS THAN THEY HAD BEEN IN SREBRENICA, WOULD STAND
RATHER THAN FLEE. EVENTUALLY, HOWEVER, THE BOSNIAN
SERBS COULD TAKE GORAZDE. WHEN ASKED HOW HMG WOULD
�~L
REACT IF GORAZDE WERE ATTACKED, OMAND COUNTERED THAT
THIS WAS A HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION THAT COULD ONLY BE
DECIDED AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL. HIS ASSUMPTION,
HOWEVER, WAS THAT BRITISH TROOPS WOULD BE TOLD TO DEFEND
THEIR POSITIONS AS BEST THEY COULD UNTIL IT BECAME CLEAR
THAT THE TOWN WAS LOST, FOLLOWING WHICH THEY WOULD ACT
MIJCH AS THE DUTCH HAD IN SREBRENICA, FOCUSING ON HELPING
REFUGEES.
7 jPl'THE
BRITISH HAVE BEEN TALKING TO THE FRENCH FOR
SOME TIME ABOUT SECURING OVERLAND ACCESS TO SARAJEVO, .
AND THEY REGARD THIS AS A MUCH MORE FEASIBLE MILITARY
OPERATION THAN REINFORCING THE EASTERN ENCLAVES.
CHARLTON SAID THAT THE MORE LOGICAL ROUTE WAS OVER MT .
. IGMAN; ALTHOUGH THE ROAD WAS POOR AND VULNERABLE TO
BOSNIAN SERB ARTILLERY, IT RAN THROUGH GOB-HELD
TERRITORY. TRYING TO PUSH THROUGH FROM KISLEYAK WOULD
BE CONSIDERABLY MORE DIFFICULT, IN THAT IT WOULD INVOLVE
CROSSING A LARGE EXPANSE OF BOSNIAN SERB TERRITORY.
CHARLTON THOUGHT THAT OPENING UP AN OVERLAND ROUTE TO
SARAJEVO WAS CRUCIAL IF THE VIABILITY OF THE CITY WAS TO
BE RESTORED. OMAND REITERATED HIS PREVIOUS INFORMATION
TO US THAT GENERAL SMITH HAS AUTHORITY FROM HMG TO MOVE
TO SECURE ACCESS TO SARAJEVO WHENEVER HE IS READY, USING
EITHER ROUTE. HOWEVER, SMITH'S VIEW IS THAT NOW (I.E.
THE NEXT FEW DAYS) IS NOT THE BEST TIME TO DO THIS,
SINCE AT PRESENT THE BOSNIAN SERBS ARE BEING MORE
HELPFUL IN ALLOWING CONVOYS THROUGH TO THE CITY.
MOREOVER, SMITH NEEDS THE RRF TO BOLSTER UNPROFOR
POSITIONS ELSEWHERE.
FRANCO-BRITISH
DIFFERENCES
8. JZf CHARLTON SOUGHT TO DOWNPLAY ANY PERCEPTION OF
t1BSTANTIVE DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN PARIS AND LONDON OVER
BOSNIA. ANY DIFFERENCES THERE MIGHT BE WERE MATTERS OF
STYLE RATHER THAN POLICY. IT WAS NOT THE BRITISH
CUSTOM, HE NOTED, TO LAUNCH INITIATIVES WITHOUT
CAREFULLY THINKING THROUGH WHETHER THEY WERE FEASIBLE.
NOR WAS LONDON IN THE HABIT OF GOING AROUND THREATENING
TO WITHDRAW BRITISH TROOPS. THIS SAID, CHARLTON
ACKNOWLEDGED A FAIR DEGREE OF IRRITATION IN LONDON OVER
PRECIPITATE FRENCH RHETORIC, WHICH HE HOPED COULD BE
SMOOTHED OUT IN TODAY'S PHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN MAJOR
AND CHIRAC. SOMEWHAT IN CONTRAST, OMAND AND OAKDEN
ACKNOWLEDGED DIFFERENCES, WITH BOTH EXPRESSING CONCERN
OVER FRENCH PRESSURE FOR SOME MILITARY ACTION SUCH AS
DRAWING A LINE IN THE SAND AT GORAZDE. OAKDEN NOTED
THAT THIS WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO TURNING UNPROFOR INTO A
PEACEMAKING OPERATION.
SUPPORT FOR CONTINUED UNPROFOR PRESENCE
�I
,
I
I
I
I
CQPJFlDEi\J HAL
9. (U) MEANWHILE, THE PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN
SECRETARY HAVE PUBLICLY REITERATED THEIR COMMITMENT
KEEP BRITISH TROOPS IN BOSNIA UNLESS CONDITIONS
DETERIORATE SIGNIFICANTLY FURTHER. SPEAKING TO THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS JULY 13, MAJOR SAID:
TO
i
I
-- "IF UNPROFOR WITHDREW WE WOULD CERTINL Y PUT AT
RISK THE PEACE WHICH REMAINS IN CENTRAL BOSNIA, NOT
LEAST BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF BRITISH TROOPS.
WE MIGHT PUT AT RISK THE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF
LIVES THAT HAVE BEEN SAVED AS A RESULT OF THE
PRESENCE OF UN TROOPS."
)
I
-- "ONE OF THE PRIMARY REASONS WHY I FELT IT RIGHT
TO SEND BRITISH TROOPS THERE IN THE FIRST PLACE AND
WHY I WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO REMOVE THEM UNLESS IT
BECAME IMPERATIVE TO DO SO, IS THE DANGER OF A
WIDER BALKANS WAR. I CONCEDE THE SITUATION IS
SERIOUS AND I HAVE SAID TO THIS HOUSE BEFORE THAT
CIRCUMSTANCES COULD ARISE IN WHICH IT WOULD BE
IMPOSSIBLE FOR UN TROOPS TO REMAIN."
-- "BUT UNTIL AND UNLESS THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES ARISE,
I BELIEVE IT IS RIGHT FOR THEM TO DO SO AND TO
CONTRIBUTE TO PEACEKEEPING IN THE WAY THEY HAVE
THUS FAR."
10. (U) SEPARATELY, FOREIGN SECRETARY RIFKIND TOLD THE
PRESS THAT BRITISH TROOPS WOULD REMAIN IN BOSNIA IF IT
WAS FELT THAT THEY COULD STILL CARRY OUT THE UNPROFOR
MANDATE WITHOUT UNACCEPTABLE RISK. HE POINTED OUT THAT
THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE BOSNIAN MUSLIM POPULATION IS
LOCATED IN CENTRAL BOSNIA, WHERE BRITISH AND OTHER
TROOPS CONTINUED TO CARRY OUT THEIR MISSION SUCCESSFULLY.
11,.;erBOTH
OMAND AND CHARLTON CONFIRMED TO US THAT THE
G'fNERAL MOOD AMONG MINISTERS WAS STILL IN FAVOR OF
.
STAYING IN BOSNIA.
12.
SARAJEVO
CROWE
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Elements o f a Post-UNPROFOR S t r a t e g y ;
Support t h e F e d e r a t i o n ; C o n t a i n t h e C o n f l i c t
Overvj.evf
At t h e May 23 P r i n c i p a l s Committee m e e t i n g t h e r e was a
g e n e r a l consensus t h a t U.S. p o l i c y f o l l o w i n g UNPROFOR
w i t h d r a w a l would be t o seek m u l t i l a t e r a l l i f t o f t h e arms
embargo, l i m i t e d s u p p o r t f o r arming and t r a i n i n g t h e Bosnian
Army, b u t no commitment t o a i r s t r i k e s . P r i n c i p a l s a l s o agreed
t h a t U.S. s e c u r i t y a s s i s t a n c e s h o u l d be l a r g e l y l i m i t e d t o t h e
p r o v i s i o n o f f i n a n c i n g f o r Bosnian arms purchases f r o m o t h e r
s u p p l i e r s and t h a t t r a i n i n g s h o u l d be conducted by a t h i r d
p a r t y , i f p o s s i b l e . There was a l s o agreement t h a t such
p o l i c i e s would have t o be accompanied by enhanced e f f o r t s t o
c o n t a i n t h e f i g h t i n g w i t h i n c u r r e n t bounds, i n c l u d i n g
m a i n t a i n i n g , and p o s s i b l y r e i n f o r c i n g , peacekeepers i n
Macedonia.
P r i n c i p a l s agreed t h a t a l l t h e s e elements o f a p o s s i b l e
post-UNPROFOR s t r a t e g y need f u r t h e r a n a l y s i s , as do s e v e r a l
o t h e r q u e s t i o n s i n c l u d i n g : What r e l i e f and o t h e r m i l i t a r y
o p e r a t i o n s c o u l d o r s h o u l d remain i n p l a c e ? How would we work
w i t h A l l i e s and f r i e n d s t o c o n t a i n t h e f i g h t i n g ? What are
Russia's l i k e l y responses t o our e f f o r t s t o l i f t t h e arms
embargo and b o l s t e r t h e s e c u r i t y o f Bosnia-Herzegovina?
Political/Military
Goals
Our p r i n c i p a l g o a l s f o l l o w i n g UNPROFOR's p a r t i a l o r
complete w i t h d r a w a l would be t o :
P r e s e r v e ' t h e s o v e r e i g n t y o f t h e GOBH over as much o f i t s
t e r r i t o r y as p o s s i b l e ;
We c o u l d c o n t i n u e t o r e c o g n i z e t h e b o r d e r s o f t h e
R e p u b l i c o f Bosnia-Herzegovina as o f 1992 and n o t
accept t h e t e r r i t o r i a l s t a t u s quo c r e a t e d by Serb
m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s and e t h n i c c l e a n s i n g , j u s t as we
d i d w i t h S o v i e t conquest o f t h e B a l t i c s i n t h e 1940s.
•
M a i n t a i n t h e Bosniac-Croat F e d e r a t i o n and good
between Zagreb and S a r a j e v o ;
relations
Whether t h e s e a l l i a n c e s o f convenience can endure
remains t o be seen. The F e d e r a t i o n o f f e r s t h e b e s t
p r o s p e c t f o r d e v e l o p i n g a c o u n t e r w e i g h t t o extreme
n a t i o n a l i s m and Serbian r e g i o n a l hegemony. M a i n t a i n i n g
some common sense o f purpose between Zagreb and
Sarajevo i s t h e b e s t way t o s a f e g u a r d t h e GOBH from a
Serb-Croat grand b a r g a i n t h a t c o u l d l e a v e Bosnia a
Balkan P a l e s t i n e i n t h e m i d d l e o f G r e a t e r S e r b i a and
Greater C r o a t i a .
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Croatian support would be e s s e n t i a l t o success o f
e f f o r t s t o arm and t r a i n the Bosnian Army, i f only t o
ensure t r a n s i t o f equipment. But Zagreb would surely
want some s i m i l a r s e c u r i t y assistance and closer t i e s
t o NATO (through PFP) and the EU.
Prevent a widening of the c o n f l i c t and b o l s t e r r e g i o n a l
stability;
This remains our abiding s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t . We must
prevent the c o n f l i c t from widening i n t o a general
Balkan War t h a t could engage two NATO a l l i e s (with very
d i f f e r e n t agenda), threaten the s t a b i l i t y of f r a g i l e
new democracies i n the region, and increase the r i s k s
of deeper U.S. engagement.
Deter f u r t h e r aggression by Belgrade, while keeping a l i n e
open t o Milosevic and h i s successors.
Threats t o Kosovo, Macedonia, and other neighbors would
have t o be deterred, but moderation of Serb p o l i c i e s i s
the long-term goal.
gegerai Elemeotg of the strategy
Security Assistance
We would seek support o f a l l NATO a l l i e s , PFP Partners, and
moderate Islamic states f o r a s e c u r i t y assistance package f o r
the GOBH. But we should be prepared t o proceed w i t h a
c o a l i t i o n of the w i l l i n g .
A l l i e s would balk at supporting l i f t f o r fear t h a t i t would
prolong the war and exacerbate the r i s k s o f i t s widening. We
would need t o convince them t h a t we only want t o give the GOBH
a chance t o survive and be able t o negotiate a v i a b l e
settlement. A convincing containment s t r a t e g y would also be
e s s e n t i a l t o e n l i s t i n g t h e i r support.
Security assistance t o Bosnian government would be designed
t o give i t s u f f i c i e n t m i l i t a r y capacity t o defend the t e r r i t o r y
s t i l l under i t s c o n t r o l and enhance i t s a b i l i t y t o regain, by
force o r at the n e g o t i a t i n g t a b l e , t e r r i t o r y now c o n t r o l l e d by
the BSA. The magnitude o f assistance could range from what
would be required t o defend the status quo, t o a more robust
package t h a t would allow i t t o make s t r a t e g i c gains, t o an
extensive reequipping t h a t would allow i t t o r e e s t a b l i s h i t s
c o n t r o l over t e r r i t o r y a l l o t t e d i t under the Contact Group
Plan. C l e a r l y cost w i l l be a major f a c t o r here, and past
estimates o f the robust package have exceeded $1 b i l l i o n .
We and the GOBH would have t o balance various goals w i t h
the r i s k s of t r i g g e r i n g engagement o f superior Yugoslav Army
(VJ) and K r a j i n a Serb Army (KSA) forces i n the f i g h t i n g i n ways
t h a t could only be countered by d i r e c t U.S. and/or A l l i e d
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i-lJ-ICllEi'l'
-3m i l i t a r y support. A l l but t h e f i r s t o p t i o n r i s k b r i n g i n g other
Serb f o r c e s t o Pale's defense.
Bosnian/Croat Harmony
Sarajevo has few a l t e r n a t i v e s o t h e r t h a n a l l i a n c e w i t h
Zagreb. Zagreb, on t h e o t h e r hand, may need a d d i t i o n a l
i n c e n t i v e s s t a y w i t h t h e program. We and o t h e r A l l i e s might
o f f e r Zagreb c e r t a i n rewards f o r c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h Sarajevo such
as a d d i t i o n a l t e c h n i c a l and m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e , deeper
b i l a t e r a l economic and p o l i t i c a l t i e s , and membership i n PFP.
Dealing With
Serbia
D e t e r r i n g f u r t h e r Serb a g g r e s s i o n would l i k e l y r e q u i r e
r e i n f o r c i n g t h e "Christmas warning" t o M i l o s e v i c about
responding t o S e r b - t r i g g e r e d v i o l e n c e i n Kosovo, and adding
t h r e a t s t o take u n s p e c i f i e d m i l i t a r y a c t i o n s against Serbia i f
i t e s c a l a t e s i t s support t o t h e Bosnian Serbs o r i n t i m i d a t e s
Macedonia o r o t h e r n e i g h b o r s .
F o r g i n g a n t i - M i l o s e v i c c o a l i t i o n c o u l d cause d i v i s i o n s
w i t h i n t h e A l l i a n c e and t h e EU and r e i n f o r c e Serb n a t i o n a l i s m
u n l e s s we make i t c l e a r o u r e f f o r t s a r e n o t d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t
S e r b i a p r o p e r b u t a t t h e a g g r e s s i v e n a t i o n a l i s m sponsored by
t h e c u r r e n t government. A t t h e same t i m e , we c o u l d t a k e steps
t o s u p p o r t o p p o s i t i o n p o l i t i c a l groups i n S e r b i a who f a v o r more
moderate r e g i o n a l p o l i c i e s . We c o u l d c o n t i n u e t o h o l d o u t t o
M i l o s e v i c t h e promise o f f u r t h e r i n t e g r a t i o n i f he r e a l l y
breaks w i t h Pale and r e s p e c t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l norms.
Regional
Our
Containment
r e g i o n a l containment
e f f o r t s might i n c l u d e :
R e t a i n some r e s i d u a l UNPROFOR o r o t h e r peacekeeping
presence i n t h e F e d e r a t i o n t e r r i t o r y t o m a i n t a i n
Bosniac-Croat harmony.
•
R e t a i n a r o b u s t UNCRO t o p r e v e n t a re-eruption o f t h e
Serb-Croat war and l i m i t KSA support t h e BSA.
KSA support was i n s t r u m e n t a l i n t h e BSA's a b i l i t y
t o beat back t h e Bosnian V Corps o f f e n s i v e i n Bihac
d u r i n g t h e f a l l o f 1994.
—
•
There i s i n t e l l i g e n c e s u g g e s t i n g t h a t i f t h e KSA
were d r i v e n o u t o f UN Sectors N o r t h and South by
t h e C r o a t i a n Army, t h e y would move i n t o t h e
Posavina c o r r i d o r and support BSA o p e r a t i o n s
a g a i n s t t h e Gorazde p o c k e t .
M a i n t a i n and p o s s i b l y augment UNPREDEP i n Macedonia t o h e l p
s t a b i l i z e t h a t c o u n t r y and d e t e r a Serb crackdown i n
Kosovo. I n t h e c o n t e x t o f arming t h e Bosnians, we would
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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-4have t o be c a r e f u l n o t t o g i v e Kosovar A l b a n i a n s t h e sense
t h a t U.S. o r A l l i e d f o r c e s would come t o t h e a i d o f an
armed u p r i s i n g a g a i n s t Serb a u t h o r i t i e s .
Deploy some o t h e r b o r d e r m o n i t o r i n g f o r c e s l i k e UNPREDEP i n
Hungary and A l b a n i a . This and o t h e r a c t i o n s t o p r e v e n t
s p i l l o v e r c o u l d be o r g a n i z e d by NATO t h r o u g h PFP.
R e i n f o r c e s t a b i l i t y a l o n g t h e p e r i p h e r y by r e d i r e c t i n g
resources c u r r e n t l y used f o r peacekeeping and h u m a n i t a r i a n
a s s i s t a n c e t o promote economic development and c o o p e r a t i o n
among t h e f r o n t - l i n e Balkan s t a t e s .
E f f o r t s g r i p r tQ Withdraw?!
To be e f f e c t i v e , elements o f t h i s s t r a t e g y would need t o be
i n p l a c e w e l l b e f o r e e x t r a c t i o n o f UNPROFOR a c t u a l l y b e g i n s .
The m i l i t a r y imbalance i s such t h a t t h e BSA c o u l d r e a d i l y p u t
p r e s s u r e on t h e enclaves and Sarajevo b e f o r e and d u r i n g
UNPROFOR w i t h d r a w a l . A l s o , as t h e SNIE 95-7 notes, t h e Bosnian
government would be l i k e l y t o s t r o n g l y r e s i s t a p a r t i a l o r
complete w i t h d r a w a l o f UNPROFOR unless t h e U.S. o r NATO commits
t o m i l i t a r y s u p p o r t . T h i s commitment would j u s t as s u r e l y
t r i g g e r BSA a c t i o n s t o p r e c l u d e complete w i t h d r a w a l .
We would need t o b u i l d consensus among t h e A l l i e s and o t h e r
p o t e n t i a l p a r t n e r s and secure a t l e a s t Russian acquiescence
f o r t h e main goals o f t h i s approach.
To g i v e t h e GOBH f o r c e s a chance, we would need t o e x p l o r e
ways t o h e l p t h e Bosnians "creep o u t " o f t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s
of- t h e arms embargo. T h i s might i n c l u d e :
P r o v i d i n g some i n t e l l i g e n c e s u p p o r t t o GOBH t o enhance
t h e i r a b i l i t y t o o r g a n i z e defenses a g a i n s t BSA
a c t i o n s . For example, we might s t a r t p r o v i d i n g t h e
GOBH w i t h data from t h e P r e d a t o r UAV f l i g h t s and o t h e r
sources.
Programs t h a t Gen. Sewell has broached w i t h t h e
F e d e r a t i o n f o r r e a r area o p e r a t i o n s , NCO t r a i n i n g , e t c .
Developing m i l i t a r y - t o - m i l i t a r y c o n t a c t s between t h e
GOBH and t h i r d c o u n t r i e s ( C r o a t i a , Turkey, o r
n o n - f r o n t - l i n e CE s t a t e s such as Poland o r t h e Czech
R e p u b l i c ) , t h a t would enable r a p i d l a u n c h i n g o f t h e
e n v i s i o n e d t r a i n i n g programs.
Reconsider t h e o p t i o n o f a l l o w i n g UNPROFOR u n i t s , on a
n a t i o n a l b a s i s , t o t u r n t h e i r equipment o v e r t h e GOBH
upon w i t h d r a w a l . I n t h i s way t h e Bosnian Army c o u l d
a l s o p r o v i d e some p r o t e c t i o n t o t h e e v a c u a t i o n f o r c e .
Our assumption has been t h a t t h i s would t r i g g e r h o s t i l e
Serb a c t i o n a g a i n s t these f o r c e s , b u t i f t h e e x t r a c t i o n
environment i s h o s t i l e i n any event t h i s may n o t be so
d
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Multilateral
We would c a l l f o r an end o f t h e arms embargo because i t s
c o n t i n u a t i o n i n t h e absence o f a peacekeeping f o r c e o r o t h e r
UNSC a c t i o n t o p r e s e r v e t h e peace would deny Bosnia-Herzegovina
i t s r i g h t t o s e l f - d e f e n s e under A r t i c l e 51 o f t h e UN C h a r t e r .
I t would seem d i f f i c u l t f o r Russia o r o t h e r s t a t e s t o j u s t i f y
c o n t i n u a t i o n o f t h e arms embargo i n t h i s c o n t e x t .
Indeed,
Russian Rep C h u r k i n proposed l i f t i n g t h e arms embargo l a s t year
as p a r t o f t h e Contact Group's package o f i n c e n t i v e s and
d i s i n c e n t i v e s i f Bosnia accepted t h e CG p l a n and t h e Serbs d i d
not.
S t i l l , one c o u l d expect Russia and even some NATO a l l i e s
t o argue t h a t l i f t i n g t h e embargo would o n l y e s c a l a t e t h e
v i o l e n c e w i t h o u t a l t e r i n g t h e outcome f u n d a m e n t a l l y and r u n t h e
r i s k o f w i d e n i n g o f t h e c o n f l i c t . A l l i e s would a l s o be wary o f
l i f t because o f t h e i n e v i t a b l e p r e s s u r e s t o p r o v i d e m i l i t a r y
a s s i s t a n c e t o t h e Bosnian government.
NATO/Coalition
I f Russia o r some a n o t h e r UNSC member (China) appeared t o
be t h e p r i n c i p a l o b s t a c l e t o m u l t i l a t e r a l l i f t , we might press
f o r a N A T O / c o a l i t i o n a c t i o n t o achieve t h e d e s i r e d g o a l . Our
argument would h i n g e on r i g h t s t o s e l f - d e f e n s e under A r t i c l e 51
o f t h e UN C h a r t e r . However, absent a UNSC a c t i o n t o remove t h e
embargo, we would s t i l l be v u l n e r a b l e t o t h e c r i t i c i s m s we have
l e v e l e d a t proponents o f u n i l a t e r a l l i f t and r i s k l o o s i n g
s u p p o r t f o r compliance w i t h o t h e r UN-mandated s a n c t i o n s regimes.
L i f t Only
" L i f t and p r a y " would seem t o be a c o m p l e t e l y i n d e f e n s i b l e
s t r a t e g y b o t h a t home and abroad. Even t h e most i s o l a t i o n i s t
Republicans a r e n o t a d v o c a t i n g t h i s approach. While t h i s would
end t h e stigma o f s u p p o r t i n g UNPROFOR, i t would c r e a t e t h e
i m p r e s s i o n t h a t we had d e c i d e d t o l e a v e t h e Bosnian government
t o f e n d f o r i t s e l f on t h e b l a c k market o r r e l y on I s l a m i c
states.
,
The GOBH m i g h t w e l l r e s i s t w i t h d r a w a l i n t h i s c o n t e x t .
Indeed, t h e o n l y advantage o f t h i s approach would seem t o be
t h a t i t would decrease t h e BSA's i n c e n t i v e t o c o m p l i c a t e o r
r e s i s t w i t h d r a w a l . However, t h e BSA would know t h a t t h e GOBH
would r e c e i v e arms from I s l a m i c and o t h e r c o u n t r i e s , even i f
the U.S. and Europe had made no commitments.
T h i s outcome
would p u t p r e s s u r e on t h e F e d e r a t i o n and would r i s k t h e ensuing
c o n f l i c t from becoming a c l a s h between Muslims and C h r i s t i a n s .
Arming and T r a i n i n g
On t h e f a c e o f i t , arming and t r a i n i n g by " t h i r d c o u n t r i e s "
has a number o f b e n e f i t s .
I t would l i m i t t h e e x t e n t o f U.S.
engagement, making i t e a s i e r t o a v o i d t h e " A m e r i c a n i z a t i o n " o f
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-6the post-withdrawal c o n f l i c t . In t u r n , t h i s could help prevent
the s t r u g g l e from becoming a surrogate c o n f l i c t between
Russian-backed Serbs and the U.S.-backed GOBH.
I d e n t i f y i n g l i k e l y " t h i r d c o u n t r i e s " i s more problematic.
As f o r arming, many West European governments might be
r e l u c t a n t t o f u e l the c o n f l i c t due t o fears o f widening. Some
f r o n t l i n e Central European governments might have s i m i l a r
fears, and e n l i s t i n g them i n such an e n t e r p r i s e would run
contrary t o our e f f o r t s t o continue the d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n o f
these s o c i e t i e s . This leaves Turkey, I r a n , and/or other
Islamic c o u n t r i e s , a l l o f whom have l o t s o f capacity and high
m o t i v a t i o n . But i f these states get involved, modulating the
flow w i l l become more complicated, not t o mention the
p o l a r i z i n g impact of making t h i s a clash between Islam and
Christianity.
As f o r t r a i n i n g , i f the Bosniac/Croat Federation holds,
Croatia would o f f e r s p r o x i m i t y , high m o t i v a t i o n , and an
eagerness t o cooperate w i t h NATO. The downside r i s k s are t h a t
e n l i s t i n g Croatia so f r o n t a l l y i n the c o n f l i c t against the
Bosnian Serbs would r i s k reopening the Serb-Croat c o n f l i c t i n a
bigger way.
C l e a r l y , Croatia's cooperation would be e s s e n t i a l
to any arming and t r a i n i n g package f o r Bosnia. However, i t s
use as a t r a n s i t and staging area are d i f f e r e n t than i t s use as
the t r a i n i n g ground and launch pad f o r o f f e n s i v e operations
against Serbs.
Robust L i f t and S t r i k e
Here the assessment i s i n many ways unchanged from the
e a r l y days o f the war i n 1992.
L i f t i n g the arms embargo and
beginning some arming and t r a i n i n g o f the GOBH forces w i l l take
time. During t h a t time they would be very vulnerable t o BSA
m i l i t a r y a c t i o n s . The most e f f e c t i v e way t o m i t i g a t e t h i s
would be t o conduct supporting a i r s t r i k e s against BSA heavy
weapons, m i l i t a r y f a c i l i t i e s , and operations. I f l i a i s o n w i t h
the Bosnian Army was established, i t might be possible t o use
Bosnian forces as forward a i r c o n t r o l l e r s and t a r g e t
designators. At a minimum, we could argua t h a t NATO's August
1993 decisions t o undertake a i r s t r i k e s t o prevent the
s t r a n g u l a t i o n o f Sarajevo and other safe areas remain v a l i d .
An even more robust option, would be designed t o l i m i t VJ
involvement by t h r e a t e n i n g t o t a r g e t VJ m i l i t a r y i n s t a l l a t i o n s
i n the FRY and the Drina River Bridges and other t r a n s i t points
between the FRY and Bosnia i f m i l i t a r y support continues.
This would give the GOBH the best chance f o r s u r v i v a l , but
i t has several s i g n i f i c a n t r i s k s . Such strong a c t i o n against
the Serbs might t r i g g e r more d i r e c t Russian support. I t could
also spark an u p r i s i n g i n Kosovo or Vodjvodina provinces t h a t
could t r i g g e r the wider war we seek t o avoid.
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s t r i t e , Np L i f t
T h i s o p t i o n , a l s o c o n s i d e r e d i n l a t e 1992, i s g a i n i n g
s u p p o r t e r s o u t s i d e government once a g a i n f o r d i f f e r e n t
reasons. T h i s approach would seek t o " l e v e l t h e p l a y i n g f i e l d "
by t a r g e t i n g BSA heavy weapons and o t h e r m i l i t a r y t a r g e t s .
Once UNPROFOR was o u t , i t c o u l d be accomplished w i t h o u t f e a r o f
hostage t a k i n g . Forward a i r c o n t r o l l e r s would be r e q u i r e d , b u t
i t m i g h t be p o s s i b l e t o t r a i n Bosnian government f o r c e s t o
p e r f o r m t h a t f u n c t i o n f o r NATO f o r c e s . Most m i l i t a r y
assessments have concluded t h a t a i r s t r i k e s a l o n e would be
i n s u f f i c i e n t t o save t h e enclaves and break a s i e g e o f
S a r a j e v o . However, a i r s t r i k e s m i g h t be s u c c e s s f u l i n
a c h i e v i n g o t h e r , l e s s demanding g o a l s a t t h e n e g o t i a t i n g t a b l e .
Ruroanitarian R e l i e f : Over t o t h e Bosnians
PRM's paper e x p l a i n s i n g r e a t d e t a i l how t h e w i t h d r a w a l o f
UNPROFOR would d i s r u p t r e l i e f e f f o r t s by i n t e r n a t i o n a l
o r g a n i z a t i o n s . However, we need t o e x p l o r e t h e f e a s i b i l i t y o f
t u r n i n g over management and d e l i v e r y o f r e l i e f e f f o r t s t o t h e
Bosnian government.
Our p r o v i s i o n o f s e c u r i t y a s s i s t a n c e might
f r e e r e s o u r c e s and p e r s o n n e l f o r such e f f o r t s and t h e Bosnians
c o u l d o p e r a t e w i t h o u t c u r r e n t r e s t r i c t i o n s on UN and
i n t e r n a t i o n a l a g e n c i e s . A l s o , i f we can h o l d t h e F e d e r a t i o n
t o g e t h e r , t h e s e r e g i o n s and C r o a t i a c o u l d remain secure s u p p l y
bases.
Assessing/Managing t h e Russian R e a c t i o n
I n Moscow's f r a c t i o u s p o l i t i c a l environment, an expanded
U.S.-NATO r o l e i n Bosnia would appear a t f i r s t g l a n c e t o be a
t e m p t i n g t a r g e t e i t h e r f o r Y e l t s i n ' s opponents o r f o r Y e l t s i n
h i m s e l f and o t h e r s eager t o p o s t u r e i n defense o f Russian
n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s i n t h e r u n up t o p a r l i a m e n t a r y and
p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n s . While some s u p p o r t t o t h e Serbs and
p o i n t e d c r i t i c i s m o f U.S. moves would be i n e v i t a b l e , t h e
o v e r a l l impact on e l i t e and p o p u l a r s e n t i m e n t may be more
manageable and l e s s e x p l o s i v e t h a n g e n e r a l l y p r e d i c t e d .
How
S t r o n g i s Pan-Slavism? .
U.S. and Russian p o l l i n g d a t a r o u t i n e l y h i g h l i g h t t h e
absence o f any s i g n i f i c a n t p o p u l a r Russian s u p p o r t f o r S e r b i a
o r i t s agenda i n t h e Balkans. D e s p i t e c o n s t a n t Russian (and
Western) a s s e r t i o n s t o t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e Russian view o f S e r b i a
corresponds r o u g h l y w i t h a t t i t u d e s t o w a r d Poland o r Turkey
( i . e . , t h e s e s t a t e s a r e seen as m i l d l y f r i e n d l y t o Russia a t
b e s t ) . L i k e most f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e s , events i n a
post-UNPROFOR Bosnia would r e s o n a t e f a i n t l y w i t h a Russian
e l e c t o r a t e p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h day-to-day socioeconomic concerns.
P o l i t i c i a n s from across t h e p o l i t i c a l spectrum would f i n d i t
d i f f i c u l t t o rouse average Russians o u t o f t h e i r i n d i f f e r e n c e
or t o s t i r up s e r i o u s o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e Y e l t s i n government f o r
it. — - ^ [ f N ^ r r i f e M l P O O O Y
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-8Moscow has been a c t i v e l y w o r k i n g t o r e t a i n and expand i t s
p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e i n t h e Balkans ( i n c l u d i n g w i t h Greece) and
c l e a r l y does n o t -want t o be m a r g i n a l i z e d by Western d e c i s i o n s
on Bosnia. B u t a c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h t h e West over e f f o r t s t o
save t h e rump Bosnia would n o t n e c e s s a r i l y advance t h o s e
i n t e r e s t s . Moreover, such an stance would a l s o be p e r c e i v e d as
a n t i - M u s l i m and t h e r e f o r e do damage t o Moscow's warming
r e l a t i o n s w i t h I r a n and o t h e r I s l a m i c s t a t e s .
Russia's s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s i n t h e Balkans, d e s p i t e
Z h i r i n o v s k y ' s r h e t o r i c , a r e f a r from e v i d e n t t o t h e average
Russian. Given t h e l i n g e r i n g o u t r a g e o v e r t h e war i n Chechnya
— much c l o s e r t o home — Moscow would have a h a r d t i m e
j u s t i f y i n g d i r e c t m i l i t a r y i n v o l v e m e n t i n S e r b i a , even
a d v i s o r s / t r a i n e r s , t o t h e Russian p u b l i c .
The Duma has gone on r e c o r d as f a v o r i n g m i l i t a r y s u p p o r t t o
the Serbs i f t h e arms embargo on Bosnia i s l i f t e d .
B u t Russian
arms s a l e s now g e n e r a l l y o p e r a t e on a cash b a s i s . I t i s n o t
c l e a r t h a t Russia has e i t h e r t h e r e s o u r c e s o r t h e p o l i t i c a l
m o t i v a t i o n t o p r o v i d e s i g n i f i c a n t amounts o f m i l i t a r y
a s s i s t a n c e on c r e d i t t o a b a n k r u p t S e r b i a . The p o s s i b i l i t y o f
n o n - o f f i c i a l Russian s u p p o r t t o t h e Serbs, i n t h e form o f
v o l u n t e e r s and arms, i s a r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y , b u t t h e magnitude
of such s u p p o r t seems u n l i k e l y t o be d e c i s i v e .
Managing Russian E l i t e P e r c e p t i o n s
To be sure, t h e Moscow-based e l i t e i s l i k e l y t o b r i s t l e a t
a more muscular U.S.-NATO p o s t u r e i n Bosnia. A l t h o u g h most
f o r e i g n p o l i c y c i r c l e s have embraced g r e a t power r h e t o r i c and
b l u s t e r on many h i g h - p r o f i l e i s s u e s , t h e r e i s l i t t l e f i r e i n
the b e l l y l e f t f o r t h e Balkans. The e l i t e ' s Bosnia a n x i e t i e s
reached t h e i r h i g h - w a t e r mark more t h a n a year ago and were
sparked l a r g e l y by t h e A p r i l 1994 a i r s t r i k e s around S a r a j e v o .
T h i s g r o w i n g Bosnia f a t i g u e has a l s o been f e d by t h e a c t i o n s o f
the Bosnian Serbs on t h e ground and by Moscow's h i g h - p r o f i l e
d i p l o m a t i c f o r a y s — and f a i l u r e s — i n t h e r e g i o n , t h e Contact
Group, and t h e UNSC. Churkin's u n p r o d u c t i v e v i s i t and gloomy
assessment a r e a n o t h e r example o f t h i s f r u s t r a t i o n .
The steady downgrading o f Russian e f f o r t s i n t h e Balkans
a l s o i s l i n k e d i m p l i c i t l y t o t h e Russian e l i t e ' s g r o w i n g
p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h NATO expansion. While Y e l t s i n and Kozyrev
would s t i l l be t h e key p l a y e r s i n how t h e Russian i n t e r n a l
debate on post-UNPROFOR Bosnia develops, t h e y w i l l need a c l e a r
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e p o t e n t i a l c o s t s o f opposing i n t e r n a t i o n a l
consensus on t h i s i s s u e . Given t h e Russian l e a d e r s h i p ' s
o v e r r i d i n g s t a k e i n t r y i n g t o h o l d t h e l i n e on NATO expansion
and r e p a i r i n g t h e damage caused by Chechnya, we can expect t h a t
Moscow w i l l be f a r l e s s i n c l i n e d t o f a n a new round o f c r i s i s
i n r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e U.S. and i t s A l l i e s over Bosnia.
S t i l l , i t w i l l be p a r t i c u l a r l y i m p o r t a n t f o r t h e U.S. t o
engage d i r e c t l y w i t h Russian o f f i c i a l s e a r l y and t r y t o
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-9i n f l u e n c e e l i t e opinion as our o v e r a l l d i r e c t i o n becomes
c l e a r e r . I n a d d i t i o n t o g i v i n g Russian o f f i c i a l s a sense o f
engagement i n the development of p o l i c y , we should also look a t
face-savers t h a t would make i t easier f o r Moscow t o abstain
from a UNSC vote on l i f t i n g the arms embargo. For example, we
could advance a UNSC r e s o l u t i o n t h a t would l i f t the arms
embargo on a l l the Yugoslav successor s t a t e s . This would have
l i t t l e p r a c t i c a l impact on Serbia's m i l i t a r y p o t e n t i a l .
S h i f t i n g Alignments
In the post-UNPROFOR environment, we would l i k e l y have t o
deal w i t h s h i f t i n g alignments among Contact Group members.
While Germany and the UK would probably be supportive o f
e f f o r t s t o i s o l a t e Serbia, one can imagine Russo-French
resistance t o t h i s tack and even c o l l u s i o n t o cut deals w i t h
Belgrade and Pale. The EU's Common Foreign and Security P o l i c y
would o f f e r countervaling pressures t h a t might l i m i t the depth
of such f i s s u r e s . But maintaining even the l i m i t e d degree o f
Western u n i t y we have today would be d i f f i c u l t as o l d biases
and d i f f e r i n g g e o p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s became more pronounced.
Drafted: S/P: SFlanagan
6/14/95, Revised 7/7/95, SPEUR 5169
CLINTON LI
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