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FOIA Number: 2006-0458-F
FOIA
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the William J. Clinton
Presidential Library Staff.
Collection/Record Group:
Clinton Presidential Records
Subgroup/Office of Origin:
Communications
Series/Staff Member:
Don Baer
Subseries:
OA/ID Number:
10135
FolderiD:
Folder Title:
Two-Term History Memos
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MEMORANDUM
TO:
Don
FROM:
Eli
RE:
LBJ Follow-Up
DATE:
Thursday,
O~ober
24, 1996
You asked for more infomiation on LB1s cabinet chariges after the '64 election, and
also on policy initiatives announced between the election and the inauguration. In both cases,
the LBJ precedent, while interesting, does not seem especially useful for our purposes.
First, LBJ did not have a cabinet or staff· shake-up; and second, the 120 small projects
announced by Sergeant Shri~er, the only specific, programmatic announcements of their kind
after the election (other than military base closings), seemed slapped together and incoherent,
and would almost certainly invite ridicule today (though they didn't then).
CABINET CHANGES
No cabinet shake-~p~ LBJ was pleased with JFK's cabinet. Apparently, LBJ did
not have much of an interest· in shaking up his cabinet. He was cited in one book as praising
the cabinet overall, even though he admitted having no role in picking them, and he was
quoted in the New York Times shortly after the election as saying that there wasn't a man he .
wouldn't want to keep. There was one major vacancy -'!' Attorney-general, since RFK
resigned to run for the Senate:-- but LBJ was even pleased with acting Attorney-General
Nicholas Katzenbach, and thus told the press he felt no need to move quickly on that post.
LBJ tells press he anticipates no major cabinet changes, emphasizing "reasonable
continuity." Perhaps not surprising, since stability had been a major campaign theme. On
November 28, at his first pos~-election press conference, LBJ was asked if he anticipated any
cabinet changes. LBJ mentioned that an Under Se~retary of the Treasury would ·be leaving,
then said: "there will be changes in the administration from time to time because of the long
period that some men have served, because of financial demands, because of family problems.
I don't anticipate that I will have the degree of changes that you would have in a change of
administration. I hope that vv~ will have reasonabie continuity, and I think we have had. It is
rather unusual. I am deeply indebted to the men
women who have made sacrifices to
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In case it is of inter~S1.; here is a list of the astonishingly few changes made before the
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�State of the Union on January 5, 1965:
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--December 16 --The only major change. :LBJ accepted the resignation of Commerce
Secretary Luther Hodges, and, nominated John Connor. It was noted that Hodges's resignation
letter was dated in October; qe was 67 and had always intended to leave after four years.
-- December 26 -- L:aJ. made two minor appointments to fill existing vacancies:
Chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and Administrator of Veterans Affairs.
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--:December 28 --In his second post-election press conference (which began with the
words "I don't have any important news for you"), LBJ announced a few more minor changes:
a new Under Secretary of the Treasury, a new General Counsel of the IRS, and a new Chief
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Counsel of the IRS.
-- December 29 -- LBJ announced a new Chief of Protocol; the outgoing Chief of
Protocol was nominated to be Ambassador to Spain.
: . POLICY ANNOUNCEMENTS
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Two phases after t ..~ election: a November flurry of small announcements, then
holding back and planning ;" December. As indi~ated in the earlier memo, there seemed to
be two phases to LBJ's post-election period. First, in November, a small flurry of activity and
announcements: he appoints l3 task forces to make proposals to him; he announces that he is
shutting 95 military install~ti9ns; and Sergeant Shriver announced the 120 anti-poverty .
projects that caught your attention. Then, by December, LBJ seems to hold back more,
planning for his State of the Union, downplaying ~is mandate, and generally focussing on
previously announced propos~s (such as Medicare) rather than bold new ones.
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The 120 anti-poverty, projects: hastily thrown together due to LBJ's impatience.
After taking a closer look, I think the 120 anti-poverty projects are an aberration for either
period, and probably stemmed from ~B~s impatienc,e right after the election. Here is what
seems to have happened:
LBJ's War Against Poverty -- a hodge-podge, of grants and programs -- passed
Congress in the summer of '64, and Congress appropriated $800 million for it. By the
election, not a single plan or program had been announced. On November 21, at a visit to a
college in Texas, LBJ anno~Ges off the cuff (and unbeknownst to aides) that the first job
corps center would be located; there -- a job training center for young people. The press
interprets as a sign of his impatience with "foot-dragging" by his aides in getting the War
Against Poverty off the grq~d.
A hodge-podge of pr()grams with no overall coherence. On November 23, Shriver
announces a second Job Corp,s training center in New York. On November 24, it is leaked to
the press that about 100 anti-poverty ,projects and grants will be announced the next day. On
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November 25, Shriver annoulices 120 "community ;action grants," ranging from $13,000 to $2
million -- money given to lo~al communities for just about everything you can imagine: more
Job Corps training centers, ;1d&;Y care and pre-school programs. adult education and retraining
programs, college work studY, programs. slum clearance. a project to teach English to children
in Arizona's Papago tribe, ~v~n a $25,000 small b~jness loan to a fruitcake factory. The
projects were chosen from abo~ut 400 applications received by the federal government. There
is proof that this list was slapped together, probably as a result of LBJ's impatience: Shriver
announced 120 projects, but the list he released con~ned only 118, and The San Marcos
project LBJ announced on his own was ilot included.
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Press reaction is favorable, an4 barely mentions the package's incoherence. In
fact, the press seems to foc~.on its modesty, since this initial announcement is only $35
million out of an overall $800 1 million. Interestingly, this seems to be the exact moment when
FDR's liberal vision goes awry: the War Against Poverty. encompassing everything from
literacy to fruitcakes, almost Fterally throws money aro~d...
Now you may be askihg...
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If Shriver's announcement wlas a mess and an aberration, why does LBJ seem to
have done such a good job sustaining a mandate 1between election and inauguration?
My opinion is that while h~ ~.ade .few concrete ann<;>uncements. he did three things very
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1. He kept up the rh,etoric of the camp:aign•. ~ther than hiding out at Camp David.
he still talked about the goal~ and ideals· of the <;Jre~ Society. to give the sense that he was
intent on moving forward.
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2. He gave the sense ~~f serious, substantive planning for a second term (even when
out at the LBJ ranch)-- and this was accompani~d· t)y the understanding that most of what he
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proposed would zoom throJgh Congress. (I believe this is much more important than making
any new proposals or annoynpements anyway.)
3. While giving the pq~lic (and himself) a bit. of a rest. he was on the front pages at
least once or twice a week ~ith something positive -- his speech tO the Urban League about
civil rights, the fact that he11 w~ wQr~ing on new pr~posals, the announcement in San Marcos,
etc.
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In other words. eveq \Yhen not making hard' hews: he had the aura of momentum, not
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MEMORANDUM
TO:
Don
FROM:
Eliw~:i:
RE:
LBrs "OverWhelming Mandate"
DATE:
Tuesday, .Octob~r 22, 1996
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After spending some ti~e looking at '64,, it is hard for me to overstate how different
the overall press/politicall~dscape was in the pre-Vietnam, pre-Watergate, post-New Deal
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era. Two things to keep in mind:
Caveat #1: in '64, big, activist government is taken for granted by press and
electorate. Even in early '64~ LBJ was ·a bold and: activist President, and by the time the
campaign got underway he had already passed the .Civil Rights Act and some anti-poverty
programs. What is interesting about press accounts from the period is that this kind of
government activism is largely taken for granted. After FDR, Truman, and even Ike,
ambitious, ever-expanding government was the accepted norm (and deficits were minimal).
So ironically, even though t~rs activism was strongly attacked by Goldwater, LBJ was able
to run as the candidate of s8fe~ status-quo stability -• which meant that he would continue
expanding government's role.i:' I think this is critical to understanding the strength of his
mandate. Unlike later electi~ns, LBJ did not need to stress an explicit activist agenda to
claim a mandate for it, because that kind of agenda. was assumed from the beginning.
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Caveat #l: press co'ierage that was more respectful of the President, and much
less analytical, probably y.aggerated his mandate. .In assessing media reaction to LBrs
win, we should keep in mind ,that the '64 press corps wasn't given to the kind of poll-combing
scrutiny we saw just eight years later. Speeches were reported largely at face value, and not
on the level of back-room ~~tegy. Because of this, I actually believe LBrs mandate was a
bit exaggerated by today's standards. Even though the '64 was largely a referendum on
Goldwater, and many traditionally Republican states went to LBJ only because of Goldwater's
perceived extremism, LBJ got the credit, as if it had all been an affirmation of his leadership
and agenda. In fact, in post-~lection ~overage, it is, almost as if victory equals a mandate -and unlike later election coyerage, there is little attempt· to qualify or define what a mandate
actually is. An 80's or 90's, wess corps would not have reacted this way.
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to be learned from LBrs landslide:
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1. It is possible to create a sense of momentum behind one's agenda in November
and December, with the right story ~r anno~nceme~t every few days. Unlike Nixon's
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and. Reagan's relative presslpblicy bl~ko~ts. I tllin~ 1 LBJ struck the right post-election balance
going into his State of the pqion address -- staying in· the news, but not necessarily
dominating it.
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l. If one's agen·da *~es with :th~ gen~r&:( dHft ~f public and press opinion (as
LBJ's expanding-government
agenda did in '64), 'it seems to be easier to claim a
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mandate. This seems a hopeful lesson for our p~o~es.
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THE CAMPAIGN:
LBJ's campaign st~ategy: first the Rose Garden, then the stump. As a fairly
popular President -- both in the wake of the Kennedy assassination and at a time of relative ·
peace and prosperity
-- and someone who professed not to like partisan campaigning,. LBJ
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initially planned to stick to·ai:Rose Garden strategy, like Eisenhower in '56 and Nixon in '72,
both of whom barely campaigned even ih late October. According to some press analyses,
LBJ abandoned this strategy ~>Ut of a desire to win "big," as well as to refute claims that he
had no .personal appeal (~lqwate~ c~ll~~ h,im th~ ~inte~m President") and to answer the
Repubhcans' personal char~e~ agamst h1~ ("moral: rot" at the top levels of government, a
"moral crisis" in America, etc.).
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By the last few weeks;of the C8lllpaign, LBJ:h~d reverted to a full-blown, oldfashioned whistle-stop campaign, flyi~g all over ~the· co~try and making openly political
appeals, although he still ~e~'to make "presidentjal" ners on foreign policy and other issues.
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Goldwater's strategy: belief that bold conservatism would rally a big "silent
vote." One of the premises of the whole Goldwater movement was that Eisenhower and even
Nixon in '60 had been "me~tQo" Republicans-- vying for votes in the center, and not pushing
true conservative ideology.: By '64, sonie conservatives had developed a theory (seemingly
unsupported by data) that if they nominated a true believer like Goldwater, rather than a
Rockefeller- or a Lodge-type moderate -- if they offered a "real choice" on the big issues -they could build an electoral :Jictory be¢ause a large "silent vote" really supported their
reactionary positions on civil;'rights, moraiity, big government, etc., but was afraid to admit it
(or even to vote in the abs~n9~ of a real conserv~tiye on the ballot).
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Hence Goldwater's ~ainpaign slogan "In Your Heart You Know He's Right," and his
constant attempts to highlight rufferences with LBJ rather than to blur them. His campaign
centered on several issues: fo1reign poli~ and tqe ·~har~e that LBJ was soft on communism;
attacks on big government (ii:l~luding the broadly popular Social Security and newly-proposed
Medicare); charges of a "mot~ crisis". in America; and less explicitly, opposition to civil
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LBJ's campaign message: stability abroad, preserving and extending social gains
at home. Given that context1of support for activist government, and given Goldwater's
intemperate public stateme~ts' (give the NATO commander authority over use of nuclear
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weapons, Humphrey is a "sbihi-socialist," LBrs foreign policy is "treason") LBrs message
was fairly obvious: he would be more stable and responsible in foreign affairs, and he would
not roll back 30 years of soc~ progress but continue it. LBJ also attacked Goldwater almost
directly as a radical. LBJ ~ai~ in one televised speech: "We are now told that we... should
withdraw from education, from
public power, from agriculture... that we should end Social
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Security as we know it, sell TVA... this is a radical departure."
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In articles I saw, LJ:lfs heir-of-the-New-Deal approach was called moderate much
more than it was called liberlil. (In fact, the choice of Humphrey, from the party's liberal
wing, as running-mate was .a:big plus because it helped to highlight Goldwater's right-wing
extremism.)
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LBJ: some explicit P,romises for a second-term, but mostly sweeping goals. LBJ
did say late in the campaign that passage of Medicare 'would be a top priority for '65, and
pledged to cut taxes to keep tHe economy growing. Beyond that, he mostly outlined the
Great Society vision he beganithat Spring: no pov~rty. no illiteracy, no slums, helping every
qualified student go to coll~ge~ conservation~ etc: · ,~pitomized by the famous LBJ line at one
campaign rally, "We're in favqr of a lot,ofthing~. and; we're against mighty few.") But I do
think that, in LBJ's case, v~g\leness didn't hurt his mandate. Unlike Nixon or Reagan, LBJ's
general rhetoric still made ~t fairly clear what direction he planned to go in -- and since he
had been very successful \\j~ ;a Democratic Congress throughout '64 and no one expected
them to lose seats, there was ,_.ways a very real pro5pect of his program being enacted.
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· LBrs final couple o,f ~eeks ~ a Fandidate ~ere filled with rallies, stump speeches,
and televised addresses wrapping himself in the. JFK legacy, talking up the Great Society, and
sustaining a negative attack! (though not by name) on Goldwater's anti-government agenda.
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. THE VICTORY:
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A total landslide -: );~lding biggest Deino~r~tic Congressional majority in 30
years. LBJ won the largest popular vote in history-- 61.3% --and a gain of 39 House seats
and 2 Senate seats (the electoral vote, second only ·to FDR in '36, was 486-52). These
numbers only tell part of tQeiStory: moderates fared.' 1better than conservatives ~ationwide, and
a number of conservative S-outhern Senators of boib; parties lost, breaking the Southern
coalition that had been LBrs,,only
roadblock in Congress.
While Republicans made strong
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gains in the South for the fjrst· time, LBJ's 90% ·of':the black vote more than made up for it,
and the civil rights issue Was,~~us a net gain. Goldwater's "silent vote" never materialized,
throwing the Republican PW into a· period of infighting and general disarray.
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LBJ, in a short, mo~>;: rhetorlcallvictQry: sp~ech, claimed a "mandate for unity," and
for a "government that pro'Yid~s equal opportunity ,for all and special privilege for none."
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Perceived as a stro~g '~andate,; despite: 1feakness of the challenger. The press
coverage after the election barely tempers LBrs victory at all, and part of that may simply be
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the style of the era On the ~ve of the vote, Tom ~icker wrote of how LBJ was drawing
support from "every politic'81 ;~lement in~ America" i!.l labor, business groups, Southern
Democfats --and would "be ~le to claim a true, national mandate." Columns after the
victory referred to "the mandate to lead 1and govem11that has been so overwhelmingly
tendered," and "the greates~ ~~pular mandate in A~~rican history." Several columns note that
his campaign had been filled with platitudes more than promises, but it was clear that the
election reaffirmed the fund~ental qirection of ~U:~lic policy, described by one editorial as
of federal powers is inevitable."
"acceptance that some expansion
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LBJ retreats to Texas. ranch to plan agenda '""! but in November, there is sense of
momentum. Much of Nove¢ber is spent examining different proposals for '65, and LBJ is
not .on the front pages every .aay. But unlike Nixon and Reagan, there is a definite sense of
momentum: he appoints 13: task forces to make:proposals to him. Sergeant Shriver, who
headed the War on Poverty~ announces 120 small initiatives that are getting underway. In late
November, at a visit to a college in Texas,
LBJ announces off the cuff (and unbeknownst to
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aides) that the first job corP,(~enter woUld be located ~.ere -- which the press interprets as a
sign of his impatience withi "foot-dragging" by his aides and cabinet in getting his agenda
ready. He announces that he,i.s shu~ng 1 95 1 milit~ry)nstallations. He tells the Urban League
in an early-December spee~hi~Ptat he ·Will press hltehli ~n civil rights. Every few days, some
story appears to let people ~ri~w that even though he is resting and planning, LBJ is itching
to move ahead on his agenda,.'1:
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Much of the news fo,cusses on the LBJ ·as President, dealing with every-day
foreign policy events. In ~o\rerage of ~elations. with ~ussia, the war in Vietnam, NATO, etc.,
there is little sense that anything has changed, and this seems to be the impression that LBJ
wanted to convey both befqre. and after the elec#on: Commander-in-Chief, conducting
business of the nation. This kind of coverage is much more prevalent than post-election,
what-will-he-do-now coverl;lgp1 Along the same lines, LBJ's first post-election press
conference, in late-Novembe~, :centers more on ongoing foreign and domestic events than on
any new agenda; he keeps insi'~ng decisions have·not yet been made when asked about new
proposals.
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By December, LBJ.:goes out·ofhis way to downplay mandate and promise caution
-to avoid FDR '36 precedent. So~ething m~~,:~av,e changed in LBJ's thinking or strategy
by December, because he say·s·:publicly: .~'1 do not consider the election a mandate to embark
on any reckless, dangerous,: ~Qyel, or unique comse." One New York Times headline reads:
"President Charts Soft Apprq~ch on ~asic 1 Policies ,;Y C~utious on Mandate." In background
briefings with reporters, he says he does not w~t ~o dissipate his mandate as FDR did after
'36, being too ambitious an~ ~~bling in Congress (FDR's first major effort was to try to
pack the Supreme Court). Th,erefore, ,LBJ talks i~qess~tly to reporters about "consensus,"
and how he will pushing o~ly. those proposals for whic~ there is broad public support, as
opposed to narrow legislativ~ majorities.
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(Privately, he apparently believed that the election had broken a "tie" between the two
parties that dated back to Truman's '48 plurality:~--·he thought only Ike's personal popularity .
. had given him two landslid,es. ; He hoped to keep small business and voters in small
Northeastern and Midwesteln;.:towns in the Demo~t~~d fold to create a more permanent
Democratic majority.)
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In December, few copcrete proposals are outlined. Perhaps because of the above
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comments, there is a slight shift in LBJ's posture from November to December. The sense of
impatience is gone, and he ,seems to be determinedly cautious and quiet on any new agenda.
Aside from proposals remaining from the previous year (Medicare, a measure to combat
poverty in Appalachia), LBJ takes his time to announce new proposals. Curiously, one Times
editori81 criticizes LBJ for not·making the most of his "handsome majority," having so far
vowed to push forward only on Medicare. "The time for boldness is now," they write.
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State of the Union .me,ssage --an "open door." Commentary on his State of the
.Union address focusses on th~ 'fact that most of the specific proposals are the existing ones -Medicare, Appalachia, an hnln,igratioq hill. But, ;h~:·:~ea;ks of very lofty Great Society and
anti-poverty goals, leaving aq:t"open door" to m~e more concrete proposals later.
Throughout the speech, he :~s~~ words li,ke "launc~·~. "~egin," "develop," and "attack."
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·Post-election cover~ge, both before and after State of the Union, assumes that
LBJ will have little probl~m :passing his agenda through Congress. Other than one or two
stories speculating about h~~~LBI will deal with remaining Southern Democrats, there is no
sense that' he has any problems
at all within his.;own party or on the Hill.
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�MEMORANDUM
TO:
Don
FROM:
EJi
RE:
Reagan's '84 "Mandate"
DATE:
Tuesday. October 1S, 1996
As discussed, this is a bit more time-consumins than I had anticipated, so I thousht I'd
give you the first installment by itself. Please let me know if this is heJpful, and in the
meantime, I'll keep working my way backwards (Nixon, LBJ, Eisenhower, and PDR).
keaaan's '84 landslide. I thiQk;.'84 offers an instructive example, because it shows:
A. that it is possible to have a'huge landslido without much of a perceived mandate
for specific policies or programs; and-·
B. that perceptions of a mandate (and/or the ability to carry out that mandate) tend to
be linked not only to the size of a president's re-election maraill, but also to his pany's
success in capturing Congressional seats.
The Reagan '84 campaign: vel')' short oa specifics. There have been many &c:NOunts
of the utter lack of concrete second·tenn proposals in Reagan's '84 campaign. In '80, he was
seen to have campaigned very explicitly on a few Issues •• tax cuts, increased defense
spending, and balancing the b~dget. by 1984. Therefore, he ~as at least perceived to have
enough of a mandate to pass a great deal of his .,g,nda Jhrougb Congress (including a
strongly Democratic House) in ·s1.
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A vague "peace aod prosper4tr" message. In 1984, however, Reagan's continuing
commitment to low taxes and high military spending made it hard enough to pay for existing
programs, let alone new ones. Some, of Reagan's political strategists have said that when they
began to shape a re·election blueprint in early '84, they found that there was simply no new
policy in the pipeline. Their solution was to craft a vague "peace and prosperity" message.
which largely contrasted an unpopular Carter-Mondale past to a considerably rosier present.
(Morning in America, images of the '84 Olympics. we're better off than we were four years
ago. etc.) Needless to say, with a growing economy and Reagan's personal strengths, this
strategy worked extremely well, even though some Reagan aides later claimed it had been a
default strategy.
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Reagan aides chose a "wideD•the-margia~' .. strateo over appeals for aa issue-specific mandate or for more Republicans in Congress. Looking back at a number of
winning re-election campaigns (LBJ, Nixon, Reagan), once it seems clear that the candidate
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will be re-elected, an inevitable conflict emerges: should the President widen his own margin
and win as many states as possible; or should he do· more to directly help Congressional
candidates, and/or spell out a clearer agenda to c;reace a more sp~ific mandate? Reagan
chose the former course (as did Nixon; LBl' seems to have tried to do both). In his final
campaign swings, he kept his message as broad. vague, and non-ideological as possible, to
avoid alienating any potential voters; and he visited states such as Massachusetts and
Mondale's own Minnesota (where Republican Congressif:mal prospects were bleak), even as
his aides told Republican Congressional leaders that Reagan did not have much time to stump
for their candidates.
The lostant analysis: weak aains in Congreu aad latk of tampai111 specifics
meaat Reagaa did not have much or a concrete mpdate. While Reagan won 49 states
and 59 percent of the popular vote, Republicans lost two Senate seats (still keeping the
Senate) and made only meager .gains in the House (a U-seat pick-up). Combined with his
lack of a concrete second-term agenda. ibis created .the instant impression among opinion
elites that Reagan's mandate had more to do with his personality and the strength of the
economy than any party or p,togrammatic appeal.
Some interesting facts:
-- A vague victory speech. Reagan's ele(ftion,.n~ght statement spoke very vaguely of
tho "principles" they campaigned for, and of "work• unf~ished." but still offered no specifics
for a second term. (Perhaps he should have spun ~is own mandate a bit more, since this
speech received wall-to·wall ~overage.)
-- Polls outweizhed spin. While Reagan aides uied to spin his victory as a mandate
for his policies, polls immediately showed this wasn't the case. In fact. Mondale gained more
suppon on the basis of having a "vision .for the future." . The economy and personal support
for Reagan were bigger factors. (This wasn't surprising; in polls throll3hout his first term,
Reagan's own popularity often surpassed that of his specific polic;ies, as if he were somehow
above them.) This shows the .real di.fficl!,lt)l of eve" fryU,g 10 "spin" a mandate, Iince there
will be do%ens of polls wtrh ~arrl illterprellltion of lhe electoral result1.
•• Congressional lo,ses rained on Reagao's pa.-ade. In the face of a divided
Congress, even Reagan's Chief of Staff Jim Baker, while claiming a mandate for Reagan's
economic policies and efforts arms control, was careful not to overstate it, because of the
difficulties the President would face on the Hill. Overall press reaction mirrored this. The
tone was essentially: "even .if it was a mandate, it's of questionable use with a Democnti"
House." (Note. however, that· Reagan didn't do any real read1ing out to Congress during this
period, which might have altered this perception somewhat.)
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•• Embittered Repub~itans also rained on Reagan's parade. Among his own allies
on Capitol Hill (especially Republican House Leader Bob Michel), there was some bitterness
that Reagan hadn't done more f.or them, and this W&$ air:ed in the press.
•• A "personal mand .. te... The phrase "personal mandate" was used in a handful of
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articles I saw •• as if to stre~. that it wasn't the kind of landslide you could bank on
legislatively. At 1he same time, 'ountless articles pointed out that weeks after the election.
Reagan still hadn't really spelled out what he would do in a second term.
Between election day and inauguration day •. several things are apparent in the press
coverage:
1. Reaaaa himself doesn't app~ar very mucb (at least in the print coverage I looked
at). Of course, 'there are occasional photos of him with world leaders and thanksgiving
turkeys and the like, but he waited until mid-January to bold his first post-election pre&$
conference, and didn't give any notable speeches. Most of the stories depict him as a passive
observer of internal cabinet battles over what his upconling budget and legislative agenda
would look like.
1. Two broad poliCJ goals are announced, ·but lack of detail leads to internal aad
Hill bickering. While Reagan did lay out two broad soals for his second term right after the
election -- reform or "simplifj~ation" of the tax code, &Qd -.rms control agrooments with the
Soviets •• he offered no d~ or direction, so that· the press coveraae of these two issues
(especially the tax plan) was driven by intornal administration bickering. leaks, reports on how
'they would be affected by white House staff &bake-ups. and Hill response (which was
mh,ed).
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l. Budget/deficit doom and gloom quickly dominates. A$ new and worse deficit
projections were made publ·it .in the wee~s after ~~. election, the issue of the deficit and the
deep cuts that would be required to control it began to dominate coverage. Reagan is barely
in these stories, and they are ·mostly bad~news stories. Many are leaks, describing potential
cuts in Medicare and So~ial Security COLA's. and .~.the~ ideas that were quickly shot down on
the Hill. One article in January described the n~w.session of Congress as opening "under a
darkening cloud" because of all the tough choices that lay ahead.
[Needless to say. som~ of these precede~ts Jnay not apply to '96. In particular, given
President Clinton's tendency to work across party lines, perceptions of his mandate may not
be so closely linked to his
party'$ margins in Congress.]
ovrn
Let's discuss if you have time or further interest...
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Don
TO:
FROM:
BU~'
RE:
Nixon's "Lonely Landslide•
DATE:
Wednesday, October 16, 1996
Installment number two.
interestingly, the two biggest lessons of Nixon's '72 victory are quite similar to the
ones I would draw from Reasan's '84 win:
1. A huge landsUde, mitigated hy weak! gaia~ Ia .Congress, is oot interpreted as a
poUq maodate.
2. A vague peace aad prosperity campaign (Ia this case, barely a campalp at all)
leaves oo sense of a second-term agenda with aay pabUc or um support heldod it.
I would add one additional lesson. which for some reason didn't seem to apply to the
press coverage I saw of Mondale's '84 loss:
t :·
3. Ao especially weak opponent Omits the perceptioa of a mandate, particalarly
when then is massive ticket-splitting. The implication of some coverage was that
McGovcm was sucb a disaster. as a candidate. with many Democrats openly (and
successfully) disassociating themselves from him in the final weeks. that he was more
responsible for the landslide than Naxon was. ;·
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Ni:~:oa's '72 re-elec:t strategy: a
aoa-campalga. Nixon was the ultimate practitioner
of the R.ose Garden strategy, choosing for the ~ost.part to avoid direct campaigning.
Between the '72 Republican Convention and the beginnins of November, he had made
campaign trips to only .1 0 states. During that final week, he visited only a few more.
Obviously, a comfortable lead (roughly 60-32 by late October) allowed ibis strategy.
. :.i :· ;) .
Surrogates deliver Nixoa's negative message; he stays· above the ri-ay. Vice
Presideat Agnew and other administration surrogates delivered daily attacks at McGovern. and
McGovem delivered daily attacks at Nixon. BUt because Nixon was barely campaiping,
even in the final stretch there is very ·little political coverage of the Naxon himself - i.e. what
his strategy was, what his motivations were. etc. There u.e a few stories about Watergate
allegations and other mini-scandals, and many stories about the inevitability of a Nixon
landslide. But Nixo.n really. 111anases to ,See!Jl above..it. &;11 ~ speuding much more time trying
to secure a truce iii Vietnam. and much less time campaigning. Astoundingly, the press
seems to play along with this (they never woul" today).
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ReachiDg out to Dellfoerats and Independents, not eampaipinl for his own party.
Perhaps because he had been a plurality President ila '68 (43% in a three-way race), Nixon
had a deliberate strategy of re~ing out to Democrats and independents which precluded him
from doing direct campaigqiqg ·for Republican Co~gressional candidates. He dropped this in
the fanal week. and did do a few even,ts ~tb ~qbli~ as part of his own campaign travel.
But his campaign materials:·and ads ne-Yer mention.t4 party. aftiliation. and appareody he didn't
help his party that much fin~cjally.
Overall message from Nixon: vague pro~ises of.leadenhip and prosperity. The
Republicans' negative attacks on McGovern played a strong role in this campaip, and in
relatively good economic times, Nixp-. was portrayed as a strcms leader, meoting the country's
challenges above tho level of politics, (some campaign posters read •ne President for
President"). When Nixon finally did some serious campaisnins in the tirst week of .
November, his own message was future-oriented but vague. In a radio address on November
Sth, he asked voters to show world leaders tl1at •the American people are not going to
retreat. • The next day, in a m&;ior campaign speech, he:oQtlined ten goals that the wiDner of
the election must pursue, no ~atter who the winner was; ·they included a •world at peace,•
•elimination of discriminati~n and quotas,• •a healthy America,• •an education system. that
calls each of us to excellence~" "economic prosperity.•. "a clean and livable America," etc.
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The Nixon landsBde: the ~nt major ti~~t·spBttinlln presidential blstol')'. Nixon
won a huge landslide, carrying, every :state but Ma~~!lliSettS and 60% of the popular vote (a
close second to LBrs 61%).•. ()ther presidents had been re-elected without carrying Congress
(such as Ike in '56), but in those cases the presidentill and Congressional margins were fairly
close. In '72, Democrats gained two S~ate sea~ ;and lost ooly 13 House seats, despite
N'lXOn's huge margin. At the same time, many of the more liberal Republicans in Congress
(not the staunchest Nixon allies) survived.
t:.
The press analysis: decline or po&tieal parties, negative nacdon to McGovern, a
"lonelylands&de." The failure to make gains in. ~OJP'OSS colored much of the analysis of
Nixon's victory. Some pointed out that people ~ted (our more years of Nixon but with
safeguards in Congress. Others said that parties must be losins relevance (Democratic
registration was 3-2 against Republicans, yet NixoQ. cap•ed one-third of all Democratic
votes). Most seemed to think•. as the New York Times editorialized the momins after, that the
election was aless a vindication of specific policies .than an expression of mistrust of Senator
McGovem." The terms "~andate~ and "lonely •andslide• pop up occasionally - and while
no one denies Nixon's populanty and strong approval ratings, most seem stunned by the
disconnect between his win and his par:ty's weak p~r.fo~ce overall.
Nixon's victory speech: a vague call to arms. In a short statement lacking specifics,
Nixon does not try to spin or explain his victory, b_ut says· that the country is united and that
"it is time to get on with the great tasks that lie before us," which he describes as "peace with
honor," and "prosperity witho~t war and without inflation."
WuhiDgton Star inte,-view: Nixon lays out a few second·term plus. In an
interview conducted before the election but publ~~~. right after it, Nixon speaks of his desire
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down". social programs. lO avoid. new taxes. and to pursue the second
round of SALT talks. Sin~ he soon goes off to C~p David and gives very few public
statements or interviews for ~e rest of the year,. this interview is widely cited and analyzed.
to "shuck otr and "triin
Post-election: statT shake-ups and the Christmas bombing. After the election.
Nixon signals· his intention to, significantly shake up his administration. and retreats to Camp
David to plan his reorganization. In late-December, when Nixon bombs North Korea, that
dominates coverage, and as the new session of Co~ approaches, many of the stories are
about Democrats' intention to force an end to the war,· and expected acrimony on the Hill.
Here are some notable features of the press coverage between election day and
inauguration day:
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- Nixon is barely Ia ~e papen directly, and gives no major ~hes. The two
recurring stories are his staff shake-up and Kissinger's ·effort to secure the Vietnam truce
(which soon falls apart).
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- Because of his low·.:prorde, ~J Nixo.- ·aiiJatlog is big aew.. A family weekend in
New York gets front-page treatment. ·and although. there is no substance, these stories are
overwhelmingly positive.
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- At his fint post-ele~tion press confe~ce, from Camp David, Nixon IBJI
electioa was "mandate for change that works, not radical change." On November 27th.
in a rare press conference (to .'announce staff ch~ges); he gives that slight spin on his victory,
· ·· . .
without much elaboration.
- Stories about posidve Whi~e Bouse action are very lafrequent during this
period. I was struck by two headlines - "White House drafts tough rules on contents of TV
programming," and "White House said to plan freeze on public housing" - because those
kinds of executive-action stories (which still don't mention Nixon directly) are rare in this
period
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- Before the Christmas bombing, there are surprisingiJ few stories about
expected tensions between ~i.xon aJJd :the H~ :~~ ~ to be because the Democrats
were in utter disarray themselves, trying,to elect.new leaders and to figure out why
McGovern had failed so badly; In that sense. N'IXon escaped many o£ the negative stories that
Reagan got after his re-election, predicting showdowns oa all the meJor issues. Of course,
this changes after the bombu-ss, which are not explained by the administration to either the
public or the Hill, and lead. to· very harsh criti~. from all quarters.
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Dublin Core
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Title
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Don Baer
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Office of Communications
Don Baer
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1994-1997
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<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36008" target="_blank">Collection Finding Aid</a>
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7431981" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
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2006-0458-F
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Donald Baer was Assistant to the President and Director of Communications in the White House Communications Office. The records in this collection contain copies of speeches, speech drafts, talking points, letters, notes, memoranda, background material, correspondence, reports, excerpts from manuscripts and books, news articles, presidential schedules, telephone message forms, and telephone call lists.
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Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
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537 folders in 34 boxes
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Two-Term History Memos
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Office of Communications
Don Baer
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2006-0458-F
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Box 16
<a href="http://www.clintonlibrary.gov/assets/Documents/Finding-Aids/2006/2006-0458-F.pdf" target="_blank">Collection Finding Aid</a>
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7431981" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
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Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
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42-t-7431981-20060458F-016-018-2014
7431981