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a
�April
"l...-,
1996
Dear
The accompanying essay addresses how President Clinton has
been ill-served by those who have been attempting to graft upon
his Administration a weak American posture towards the Balkans
and towards Caucasian and Central Asia.
In the case of Caucasian and Central Asia, some senior
military officers and Department of Defense executives have
engaged in a campaign to have the u.s. cede its interests in the
region to the dictates of the Russian Federation for its
aggressive projects.
Likewise, in the case of the Balkans, some have urged a
deferring to the u.s. partners in Europe (Germany, France,
England, and Italy).
The effect of carrying this through on both u.s. commercial
and security outcomes could potentially be damaging. For one
item, by letting the Russian Federation set the pace and course
of events in Caucasian and Central Asia, the u.s. will let the
Russian Federation control the transport and sale of petroleum
and natural gas from Central Asia and the Caspian basin.
The logical outcome of the u.s. laissez-faire attitude in
Europe is an increasing destabilization and polarization of
Europe.
Please consider the enclosed essay and recommendations. If
you have any questions please feel free to call or write. Thank
you for your assistance.
Kendall P. Brown
&.' 'l
~-.
':.~>:·"~~~~·'
I":,
�GUIDING U.S. ACTIONS IN THE BALKANS AND CENTRAL ASIA
USING RATIONAL LONG-TERM AMERICAN GOALS
Over the last eighteen months, President Clinton has been
ill-served by those who have been trying to weaken American
strategy towards the Balkans and towards Caucasian and Central
Asia.
Who .are these advocates of withdrawal ? They are, in part,
within the Pentagon and the Department of Defense, qnQ have been
influencing America to move towards weakness in Bosnia and toward
marginal response~ in the Balkans. These exponents are adamantly
opposed to American leadership in security for Europe.
For instance, the u.s. has failed to enforce crucial
portions of the Dayton Pace Accords. The u.s. Armed forces have
not stopped ethnic cleansing, nor stopped terrorism against
civilians, nor has it ensured the free transit of civilians
within Bosnia.
Perhaps it is true that some of the provisions of the Dayton
Peace Accord are impractical or difficult to enforce. However,
these deficiencies in enforcem.ent have not been due to
impracticality or difficulty of enforcement. The difficult
operation to close down a training center that included Iranian
paramilitaries and terror-type anti-civilian methods of warfare
was completed quickly and succe·ssfully. This· rapid response
added to the credibility, the reputation, and the visibility of
the u.s. Armed Forces in Bosnia.
On the other hand, the u.s. Command in NATO and the u.s.
Armed Forces in Bosnia made a deliberate decision not to
interfere with the ethnic cleansing of the suburbs of Sarajevo by
p,aramilitary parts of the Jugoslav National Army (JNA) and its
auxiliaries, despite .their use of standard weapons of terror-type
anti-civilian methods, including timed incendiaries, bombing and
booby-trapping of civilian targets, and direct violence against
civilians, emergency response, and fire emergency personnel.
Then, at the penultimate point of the ethnic cleansing of
the Sarajevo suburbs, the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR)
took limited steps (after nation-wide and world-wide horror at
its passivity), by first catching and then releasing terrorists
to the Serbian police. !FOR has put minimal efforts into
preventing ethnic cleansing.
Most notoriously, !FOR has had a hand in preventing the·
Federation police from halting ethnic cleansing. !FOR restricted
the numbers of Federation policemen that could enter Ilidza
immediately following the removal of the Serb occupation forces.
On March 29, !FOR turned reality on its·head by its claims that
attempts by the Federation police to halt arson and looting in
�.
.
2
the Sarajevo suburbs constituted a violation of the Dayton
Accords.
!FOR arid NATO have given the astonishing appearance that
they are encouraging the ethnic cleansing of the Sarajevo
suburbs, by issuing statements "telling the Serbs that they "have
the right to burn their own houses~""
·
At the same time, no visible efforts have yet bee~ made to
ensure the free and safe passage of civilians across lines of
separation of armed forces within aosnia, with some limited
exceptions in Mostar and a si~gle late-stage initi~~ive beginning
at the end of March.
Given that the Dayton Agreement is to be adhered to, flaws
and all, then it jhould not be selectively enforced, especially
in not in such a way as to increase or maintain ethnic cle~nsing.
In these matters, the approach of the u.s. Armed Forces and
the NATO Command, especially that of the senior u.s. command in
NATO, has been to defer to the wishes of Germany, France, Italy,
and England in how the Dayton Peace Accords are enforced.
However, the European powers have been complicit in the
ethnic cleansing of Bosnia and attempts at annexation by Croatia
and Serbia. .A prime example of this is the overturning by the
Rome Conference in March, 1996, of the Koschnick Settlement for
peace in Mostar, replacing the Koschnick Settlement with a plan
for the final partitioning and ethnic cleansing.of Mostar, and by
implication, Bosnia.
There are those within the u.s. NATO Command and within the
Department of Defense that wish to cede the decision-making on
enforcement of the Dayton Accords to the European powers (who
were never happy with the ~otential positive outcomes of these
accords to begin with, not least because of the u.s. leadership
role}.
In the case of Caucasian and Central Asia, these same
advocates of passivity have engaged in a campaign to have the
u.s. cede its interests in the region to the dictates and the
whims of an aggressive and dangerous push by the Russian
Federation.
The outcomes of war in the Caucasus will have real
significance for the United States. This significance .does not
·just originate in the changes in·u.s. influence over the
transport of .transport and sale of Central Asian petroleum and
natural gas through the Caucasus.
We only have to look at the impact of the Russian war
against the Caucasus on Russian domestic politics to realize the
serious global impact of how American decisions are made and what
decisions are made in response to the crisis in the Caucasus.
�3
There was an explicit decision made, again following the
influence of some groups within the Department of Defense and
parts of the u.s. Armed Forces command structure, to comply with
the Russian Federation decision to send the Russi~n Army ~nd
Interior Ministry troops into a war against Chechnya, and now
Ingushetia.
The origin and explanation for such an agenda is not plainly
However, .its outcome is apparent. As a consequence of
refusing to halt the war, the u.S. has drasti~ally weakened
Yeitsi~'s political positi6n, and with it the political position
of the liberals and reformers within. the Russian Fe~e;ation.
~isible.
The United State~ has had a major hand in.creating a
situation in the Russian.Federation where Boris Yelt~in will be
in the same position that Prime Minister Alexander Kerensky was
in July of 1917. Kerensky and his cabinet made the decision to
defer to the Russian General Staff and to carry through on the
Romanov war plans for a June offensive in 1917. Within one
month, there had not only been a victorious German
counteroffensive, but the Kronstadt sailors and the Vyborg
district workers had almost carried through a seizure of
Petrograd, even without the encouragement of Lenin and the
Bolsheviks.
·
·
Yeltsin and the reformers and liberals (even.if they oppose
him on the war) are now tainted with.being the war party. The
Communists and their political allies (even if they are
imperialistic or jingoists) will get the popular· political credit
for at least not having started the war.
Of course, many Russians to this day believe that it was the
machinations of the English, the French, and the u.s., that led
to Alexander Kerensky not reaching a separate peace with Germany
in 1917. And the Communist Party, with Lenin at its head, got
the popular credit for being the party of peace; it was this
popular credit for being the party of peace that drove the
political revolution into a status where the Communists could
seize power.
Although it is extremely unlikely that the Communists, if in
power once more, would withdraw the Army and the Interior
Ministry troops from Chechnya and Ingushetia, they will benefit
prior the election from the public anti-war sentiment.
By inserting deficiencies into American actions affecting
the Caucasus and Central Asia, this network withi~ the ·Joint
Chiefs and the Department of Defense has hindered our
strategi~asks in Russia, North Asia, Central Asia, and Europe.
Likewise, in the case of the Balkans, parts of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and some civilian executives within the
Department of Defense have urged that we defer to the principal
powers in Europe (Germany, France, England, and Italy).
�4
In particular, the u.s. has allowed Germany to influence our
activities in the Balkans. The State Department, when it
reflects these views, asserts that "the German government and
public are deeply averse to all forms of militarism". Such an
assurance has no basis in reality; the Bundestag is now
considering a law to criminalize further any public statements
against the German military, putting it even farther beyond
either public scrutiny or criticism.
In similar assurances, the Department of State has said that
"over the past forty-five years, the· Federal Republic of Germany
has proved itself to be a reliable ally which shares many of our
interests and values." As for the present reliability and extent
of shared interests with Germany, please consider the following:
(1) German industrial interests have played a key role in
supplying equipment to construct chemical weapons factories in
Libya, which may soon become operational.
(2) Germany has unconditionally provided diplomatic
recognition to rump Jugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), despite
the strong objections of the European Union, warnings from the
majority of the other member nations of the EU, and the protests
of the Social Democratic opposition in Germany. This recognition
was extended simultaneously with the escalation of attacks by the
Milosevic regime on the independent media and escalating .
violations of human rights in Kosovo.
(3)
to Iraq.
German industries supplied weapons and arms technology
{4) Germany is a primary financier of Iran, allowing it
sufficient cash to finance terrorism, revolution, and weapons of
mass destruction. Germany has refused t~ assist with the embargo
on Iran.
(5) Germany has directed a tremendous flow of weaponry to
the Croatian Armed Forces, both in violation of the arms embargo
and with damaging consequences for European peace.
Germany has been attempting to reinsert military and
economic influence back into Croatia, Bosnia, Slovenia, Hungary,
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, and Poland, using money
and arms where thes• will work (in Slovakia and Croatia), and
political intimidation, based on its position at the political
fulcrum of the European Union, where arms and money will not work
(such as towards the Czech· Republic).
It has also exhibited an
interest in extending similar influences into Moldova and
Bulgaria.
In this effort, Germany will have to come into some medium
term agreement with the Russian Federation. Again, the State
Department has reassurances.
" The Germans have no desire
�5
to repeat these policies, which ended in disaster for their
country." It is useful to point out that past German agreements
with Russia on spheres of influence in Europe have not been based
on r~tional long-term interests, but on short-term political
criteria. At the present, as in the 1920s, Germany is near the
edge of an economic and political crisis, with resurgent
militaristic habits. However, in this case, a stale nationalist
government is attempting to fend off an even worse economic
crisis and the potential political consequences. In such a
context, any faith in continuity and rationality of the German
role in Europe is poorly placed.
·
The model for such an agreement with Russia can be seen in
the negotiations betwe~n West Germany and the U.S.S.R. on the
merger.with East Germany.
Clearly, the West Germans, under
Kohl, were able to get what they wanted. What .did the U.S.S.R.
get in return ?
The Russians have stated publicly that the quid
pro quo was to be a secret German effort for waiver of restraints
on Russian military activity in Eastern Europe and Central Asia
·(such as the Conventional Weapons in Europe treaty or the arms
embargo on Serbia).
In the same way, Germany has been able to place its armed
forces back into the Balkans without any visible protests by the
Russian Federation. What else has the Russian Federation
obtained in return ?
There are strong indications.that what the Russian
Federation received in return was a free hand, with no complaint
from the Europe Union (or Germany, France, England, or Italy
individually) to reconsolidate a military and economic hegemo~y
in the Caucasus and in Central Asia.
For instance, in visits by German Foreign Minister Klaus
Kinkel and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl to the Russian
Federation, there have been no criticisms of the war in the
Caucasus, which has generally been at its most gruesome and
hellish during these placid congratulatory visits by high German
officials. In the follow-up to the heavy lobbying by the
European Union for the new $12 billion loan by the IMF to the
Russian Federation, Germany followed this with a new $4.5 billion
loan (on top of the tens of billions of dollars that the Russian
Federation already owes Germany).
Even more ominous are the military and diplomatic tentacles
that Germany has put into the Balkans.
For instance, Germany
now has a plan afoot to train the Croatian Army on German
territory, this September (agreed to by German Defense Minister
Volker Rube and his Croatian counterpart Gojko Susak in January,
1996).
In the normal course of geopolitics in Europe, one would
expect the Russian Federation to oppose the military, economic,
and diplomatic entrance of Germany into the Balkans, particularly
�6
into Bosnia and Croatia. Nevertheless, and most curiously, the
Russian Federation has been silent during this reentry.
It is not possible to conclude other than that Germany and
Russia have come to an understanding.
If Russia permits Germany
to place troops and military bases in Croatia and
Croatian-occupied Bosnia, then. Germany will turn -a blind eye to
the Russian actions in Central Asi~, the Caucasus,
Serbian-occupied Bosnia, and Serbia.
Consistent with this close political relationship between
the governments of Boris Yeltsin and. Dr. Helmut Kohl, there has
been not a word of dismay from Germany in response to the open
plans by Yeltsin to continue arming the JNA, and by extension,
its paramilitary auxiliaries in o6cupied Bosnia.
What has been the American response ? We can be no less
than astonished at the level of American complicity in the arming
and training of the Croatian Army.
Rather than providing a swift
veto to both the German and Russian actions, the u.s. has stood
aside and let arms and training flow to the two occupying armies.
It is impossible to assume other than U.S. compliance· when these
arms were transferred from countries very sensitive to u.s.
viewpoints, such as Germany, Ukraine, Hungary, and Austria.
The Department of State has ~ccepted these German actions,
even defending them, and has posited absurdities such as, in May
of 1995, saying that "Chancellor Kohl has said that the tragic
history of the German occupation of Yugoslavia precludes
deployment of ground troops there." Of course, his government
never intended to do so, and chose to ignore this commitment
within a matter of months, sending one installation of ground
troops to Croatia in June of 1995 and another in December of
1995.
The consequences of the u.s. laissez faire approach will be
that these two occupying armies will be strengthened, and
American interests in Central Europe and Eastern Europe will be
damaged.
The outcome for Europe is increasing destabilization
and regional polarization. The countries of Central and Eastern
Europe will find that they are forced to choose military and
economic alignment with either Germany or Russia, ~ sure recipe
for undermining the broad western alliance led by th~ United
States.
In much the same way, in the case of Caucasian and Central
Asia, there have been powerful advocates within the u.s.
government who wish to have America cede its interests in the
region to Russian designe.
The outcome will have real significance for the United
States; both the commercial and the military results are
potentially damaging. On at least·one account, by letting the
Russian Federation set the pace and course of events in Caucasian
�7
and Central Asia, the u.s. will let the Russian Federation
control the transport and sale of petroleum and natural gas from
Central Asia and the Caspian basin.
In the context of the issue of oil in the Caspian basin, it
is useful to consider how American decision-making on Central
Asia has been driven. The iational way forward is to consider
America's broad commercial and security interests, develop a plan
to enhance them, and then let individual companies make their own
way within those uutlines.
But rather than this approach, we
have been swayed by company particulars.
For instance, specific companies have influenced u.s.
traffic with Iran. Rather than maintaining a stable regime over
the volume and particulars of commercial and financial
transactions, we have oscillated between permissiveness and
rigor.
The rational approach to the Iranian government is to openly
assert that we recognize their intentions to sponsor terrorism,
violent revolution, and weapons proliferation. Then, having done
so, American diplomats or intermediaries (such as retired u.s.
diplomats and politicians) can sit down with the government in
Teheran and establish a working channel for communication that
will not give the Iranian regime the.benefits of public
friendliness by America.
Iranian actions in the Middle East and Central Asia have not
been substantially more hostile than those of Russia, Syria,
China, or Pakistan. Fortunately, the American strategy of
containment has at least been clearly put forth, but because of
the loose cannons of private industry.and the foolishness of the
Republican Congress, there have been difficulties in
implementation.
One aspect of this difficulty in implementation has been
what to do about the transshipment of oil and natural gas from
the Caspian basin to Europe and East Asia.
Private u.s.
companies have different interests in different routes, but
American interests lie in giving neither Turkey nor Iran nor
Russia a lock on transshipment.
If possible, the countries of
origin (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkm~nistan, and the Caucasian
Republics) should have as much autonomy as possible to choose
routes without susceptibility to military or economic pressure.
For this reason, the route through Iran must be left open,
and although it is in our interest to do so, we should be getting
something from the Iranians in return. This could include, for
instance, restraint in nuclear weapons development, perhaps
coupled with Iranian willingness to provide diplomatic support·
for a test ban treaty and a nuclear-free zone in Central and
South Asia.
In return, Iran would have u.s. technology and
financing for a small oil pipeline from a Caspian Sea port to the
Gulf.
This would be a small price for the u.s. to pay for
�8
something that is in our natural interests (i.e., a viable
alternative to a pipeline route through Russia or Armenia).
For
face-saving reasons, the u.s. could nominate commercial proxies
in Pakistan, Azerbaijan, or Kazakhstan to carry out the
transactions.
By these means, if we have the political resilience to
resist specific commercial lobbie~, we would keep Iran on our
active communication list, while enhancing our clout in Iraq,
Turkey, the Russian Federation, and all of Central Asia.
Again, this strategy will not ~e pursued .if we simply follow
the lead of Russia and Turkey in their separate pursuits of
selfinterest and agendas in the region.
Those who have ·advocated
abdicating our directive role have made assurances similar to
those mad~ about Germany.
And they suggest that "exercises with
the Russian military· improve our understanding of this.key
institution in Russian·society and lays the foundation for
effective cooperation with Moscow on important security issues of
common interest like Bosnia."
This brand of neglect could be characterized as willful
naivety.
It certainly will neither produce positive outcomes or
enhance our diplomatic and military reputation.
Perhaps the type of cooperation that can be expected from
the Russiari Federation in Central Asia can be extrapolated based
on the following:
(1) The senior Russian military officer sent to oversee American
officers in Bosnia at Bjeljina and to share u.s. intelligence
windfalls in Bosnia was a senior Russian officer in the battle to
capture Grozny in 1995 (Colonel Alexander Lentzov). This fact
alone is a damning indictment of the current American approach to
military cooperation with the Russian Federation. The primary
fact of the war against Chechnya is that more than 40,000
civilians have been intentionally slaughtered, while the Russian
General Command and Ministry of the Interior has succeeded in
brutalizing an entire generation of young Russian men.
One would think that after experiences in Vietnam, Haiti, and El
Salvador, that the u.s. Armed Forces commanders would be shy of
close and supportive association with such war criminals and
sociopaths. However, the u.s. senior commanders appear to be as
indifferent as ever to the contamination of American fighting men
and women, in this case by close cooperation with the Russian and
Serbian armed forces.
It seems to remain the Pentagon•·sunwritten
rule to enforce passivity on American soldiers in the face of war
crimes and attacks on civilians.
(2) The Russian Federation has adamantly proceeded with sales of
nuclear technology to Iran.
It continues with arms sales,
including advanced fighteis, to China and to India.
�9
'
(3)
It remains to be seen what the Russian role has been and
continues to be in the development of Indian ballistic missiles.
Boris Yeltsin has been habitually deceptive in his public
statements on the Russian war against Chechnya. For example, he
has repeatedly stated that the assault on the Caucasus will
cease, while in fact, these attacks continue unabated.
The Russian President has mad~ it clear that it is his
intention that neither Chechnya nor any other part of his
dominion will be allowed to determine its own future.
This
dictum has been accompanied by a final solution that.includes the
razing of villages and towns, the subjection of surrounded towns
and villages and their populations to sustained air and ground
artillery attacks, and the use of concentration camps, as well as
an enlargement of the war to Ingushetia. The Russian war plan is
to use massive retaliation against the civilian population in
return for any armed resistance; these acts will inevitably lead
to greater political decay in Central Asia and Russia~
To see where the Kremlin's war in the Caucasus and expansion
in Central Asia is aimed, one need only consider that.Russia,
under new Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov's direction, by
arming Iran and encouraging Iraq, will now directly oppose u.s.
dual contalnment strategy.
Again, the u.s. cannot encourage this behavior. Just.as we
blundered by permitting the rearming and training of Croatia,
prior to the expulsion of the Krajina Serbs, we have too long
acquiesced to German and Russian· intentions.
It is not hard to find where the sources of this error are.
There are those, both in the private parties used in such
mistaken actions (such as Military Professional Resources Inc.)
and in the portions of senior officer staff linked to them (such
as those in the DIA), who are intentionally undermining our
influence over the European powers. We cannot continue to do so
and retain our national safety.
We must place American strategic needs ahead of any private
or institutional players. This means recognizing that we cannot
continue to sponsor the Russian Federation's plans for empire and
its wars in Asia. And we cannot let Germany create satellites in
Central Europe, in either Croatia or elsewhere.
�Don-A draft of the speech for Thursday in New York.
Please call me with your comments at 6-9179.
�1/8/96 3:30 p.m.
PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON
REMARKS TO STUDENTS AT UNIVERSITY TK
NEW YORK, NY
JANUARY 11, 1996
Acknowledgments: TK
I'm delighted to have this chance to speak with you today. I am especially pleased to have an
opportunity to talk to you about our nation's role abroad. As our world grows closer with each
passing year ... as the global village becomes more of a reality ... more and more Americans are
finding themselves working on behalf of American interests with other nations. More people in
your generation will have this kind of experience -- through involvement in business or
government -- than in any previous generation. And all of you already have an important say in
the role America plays in the world.
Our nation needs to hear your voices and your thoughts in this time of great change. The new
realities of the post-Cold War world ... the revolutionary advances of the Information Age ... the rise
of interdependence all mean that we must think anew about our goals today and what we want
our nation to achieve in the years ahead -- when the torch passes from my generation to yours.
It is fitting that we are discussing these issues here and now. Tomorrow, I will leave to visit our
troops in Bosnia -- where they are deployed in a mission as new and different as the age we
inhabit. Like all Americans, I am deeply proud of the job they are doing. They are demonstrating
again the supreme professionalism and dedication that make our armed forces the greatest on
�2
earth. In difficult, often dangerous circumstances, they are performing the work of heroes. In
bitter cold ... amid snow and fog .. .in towns reduced to rubble .. .in fields and roads strewn with
mines ... they are giving a people ravaged by war a chance for peace -- and to find their way back
to a decent, human existence.
Today, because of their efforts, men, women and children who lived through unspeakable horrors
are beginning to trust that the guns are silent and the slaughter is over for good. The combatants
are withdrawing to the positions agreed upon in the Dayton treaty. And our troops are helping
create a secure environment, taking down the barricades and roadblocks, putting up bridges and
opening the way for refugees to return to their homes. For the people of Bosnia, an enduring
peace -- and a better life for their children -- is no longer a cruel mirage but a reality that is within
grasp.
The American troops in Bosnia are also doing vital work by putting out a fire that threatened
stability in the heart of Europe. Now, because our young men and women are making peace in
Bosnia, they and hundreds of thousands more won't be called to fight another major war on a
continent where Americans have sacrificed so much in this century for freedom. These troops are
giving new life to one of the most hopeful developments of our age -- the global tum to peace and
security... to freedom, democracy and free markets ... which is making a real difference in the lives
of people on virtually every continent.
�3
We see the benefits of peace in the Middle East, where Arabs and Israelis have turned the page on
a past of bloody conflict-- and where Palestinians now control their towns and villages and are
writing their own destiny ... where Israeli mothers and fathers need fear no more that their sons
must face the dangers of patrolling angry streets. [Poss. Syria track sent.] We heard it so
powerfully in Northem Ireland last month in the cheering crowds of Protestants and Catholics
who know that decades of bloodshed are giving way to a future of reconciliation.
We see the embrace of democracy in Haiti. The recent elections there have paved the way toward
the first peaceful, democratic handover of power in the 192-year history of that nation next
month. The Haitian people now have a real chance to break the cycle of poverty and repression in
their country -- instead of being forced to flee by the tens of thousands for our shores.
The American people feel the benefit of this global change in a new sense of security. Now, when
we tum out the lights at night -- for the first time in a generation -- there are no nuclear missiles
pointed at our children.
Our nation feel the benefits as well because we are building the foundation of a prosperity that
will last far into the coming century. Through far-reaching efforts to expand free trade-- through
GATT, NAFTA and our initiatives in the Americas and the Asia-Pacific region-- we are opening
the markets of tomorrow. Already, this work is paying off: in the last three years, these
agreements have helped create more than 2 million export-related jobs. (ck) These are high-skill,
�4
high-paying jobs-- the kind our economy must generate if we want to overcome the income
stagnation that is perhaps our greatest problem today.
All these events ought to hearten all who seek a better, more peaceful and prosperous future.
Even more, this is a record all Americans should be proud of-- because every one of these
developments became possible because of one essential ingredient: American leadership.
In the Old World and the New .. .in the Northern Hemisphere and the Southem... America is
making the difference. Without our constant, vigorous leadership, old hatreds would persist
unchecked, the carnage would continue-- and hope would be denied. We have come so far
because we have steered by our values. We have stood up around the world because we know
that by strengthening others in their search for freedom and democracy ... security and
prosperity ... we strengthen ourselves. American leadership is making the difference for the
American people. It is providing tangible improvements in security and prosperity that will
determine the kinds of lives we live today, tomorrow and for decades to come.
Ironically, at this hopeful moment, some are sounding the call to retreat. They say the Cold War
is over, communism has been defeated and we can withdraw behind our borders. They say that
there are no threats so great that America must confront them.
But those who counsel retreat are deaf to history and blind to the dangers of the present. They
forget one of the great lessons of this century: that America must be engaged before an ideology
---------------
�5
of destruction takes hold abroad -- so we are not forced to send our troops into battle against an
imminent peril to our homes and freedom. We made that mistake after one World War -- and we
were compelled to fight a second.
We must not make that mistake again -- and we must not underestimate the threats of today just
because we see no strutting dictator or aggressive empire. Nations still compete and battle one
another -- and we must remain vigilant to prevent old threats from taking on dangerous
dimensions. New dangers-- many of which know no boundaries-- confront us as well.
Nuclear smuggling, international terrorism, the drug trade and international crime -- these require
America involvement. Without American leadership, they will not be defeated. We have seen
already the destruction caused by a vial of sarin gas in Tokyo or the bombs in Riyadh, Paris,
Karachi and Oklahoma City. We dare not be complacent. We must go out to meet these new
threats.
We can defeat them-- because today we enjoy an unparalleled opportunity for advancing our
interests and promoting our values. In the wake of the Cold War, the United States stands as the
sole remaining superpower on earth. Never, in more than 500 years since the emergence of the
nation-state has there been a strategic moment like this one. Never has one nation occupied such
an unchallenged position of leadership.
Ultimately, what makes this moment so promising is not our unrivaled might. Instead, it is the
fact that around the world, nations want us involved .. .look to us for help ... share our values and
�6
aspirations. Wherever I have traveled ... whether I was speaking with prime ministers or
passersby ... with parliamentarians or plain citizens ... the message was always the same: America
must be involved. America must make the difference.
These nations look to us because -- through good times and bad -- America has stood by its
values. They know our commitment to liberty and democracy. They know that more than
military strength and economic power, our ideals are the heart of our arsenal. Which is why
America -- like no other country -- can swing the balance between strife and
reconciliation... between prosperity and poverty... between the forces of civilization and chaos.
Now, the task before our nation-- and the task that will face your generation as you take the reins
in the years to come -- is to decide how we can best use this extraordinary moment. Because the
chasm of ideology has closed ... and because so much of the world shares our values ... for the first
time, the limits on our action are the ones we set. No longer must we feel compelled to act
reflexively someplace in the name of containment because we have been challenged there by a
powerful rival, as we did at times in the Cold War. We are the ones who determine where we will
go -- and we will do that by deliberating about our interests ... our aims ... the resources we want to
devote to our goals.
But we must choose carefully. There is an abundance of conflict and tragedy in the world -- far
more than our nation could ever remedy. America cannot be the world's policeman. We must
match our actions with our interests and our capacities. That is my job as President. But in the
-----------
�7
pivotal events of our time .. .in those places where our values and interests are truly at
stake... America must stand strong and ready to act. America must do what only a superpower
can: keep the tide of freedom and security running our way.
So let us be clear: Our first priority must be upholding the tradition of American
leadership ... guided by our values and interests ... which we have inherited from the generations that
fought World War II and the long twilight struggle of the Cold War. Without this leadership, we
would not have seen the incredible events of the last few months in Bosnia, the Middle East,
Northern Ireland and Haiti. If we do not maintain it, we cannot expect to go forward.
To redeem the possibilities of this moment, we also must not hobble ourselves with self-defeating
limits... by demanding that we call all the shots ... or insisting that we act alone.
Of course, when our vital interests are at stake, America will act alone when it must. But we
must also have the wisdom to join with others -- to spread the risks and responsibility of action.
Time and again, the United States has benefited from coalitions-- as President Bush did in Desert
Storm, and as we have done in Bosnia and Haiti. [For all its problems, the United Nations has
served American interests well over five decades-- and we must not abandon it now.] Today,
with so many nations sharing our values -- and eager to help us further those values -- it makes no
sense to tum away. If we insist on unilateral action, we will act only when our deepest interests
are at stake ... we will slip into isolation... we will lose the mantle ofleadership.
�8
We can build a safer, more prosperous future-- but it will take resolve. We must be united-just as we were through the historic fight against fascism and the struggle against communism.
Throughout the decades of bipartisan consensus in foreign policy, Democrats and Republicans
debated issues with a vigor that honors our liberty. But at the end of the day, they stood together
for the good of the nation. If we allow ourselves to be divided .. .ifwe squabble over every step to
advance freedom and prosperity and do not join together in common cause... we risk squandering
a chance that will only come once. I urge both parties to maintain the bipartisan tradition that is
one of our great inheritances. We must not let posterity ask, "Who lost the 21st century."
So much is within reach: We can close the circle of peace in the Middle East and further lessen
the chance that our troops would ever be called to fight again in this region where our nation has
so many vital interests. CHRISTOPHER STORY TK. But only if America leads.
We can continue supporting the young democracies of Central and Eastern Europe as they
overcome the legacy of communism and consolidate their freedom. As this work goes forward,
we are helping create a stable, undivided and free Europe for the first time ever. This has long
been a goal of our nation. And it is something we must achieve for America to have a partner
who will face the challenges of the coming century. But it will only happen if America leads.
We can increase our security and push farther into the distance the cloud of nuclear danger. This
year, ratification of the START II treaty can set in motion deep cuts that will reduce weapons
levels to a third of their Cold War levels. We can achieve a Comprehensive Test Ban-- which has
�9
been an American goal for more than 30 years -- and help ensure that no nuclear weapons are
ever again detonated on earth. And we can make further strides toward preventing nuclear
material from the former Soviet Union from falling into the wrong hands. But only if America
leads.
We can continue opening new markets and expanding trade, which we must do to create exportrelated jobs .. .increase our prosperity... and keep the American dream alive. But we can only do
that if America leads.
In the years ahead, America must uphold its leadership for the sake of our security and prosperity.
But America must also continue to lead because our ideals of freedom and democracy demand it
ofus... because they are universal and the core of our nation's mission. If we do not stand up for
our values around the world, we risk losing our way home. We cannot champion liberty for
ourselves and watch in complacence as others are denied. Yes, our decision regarding where,
I
when and how America acts must be determined by our interests and our abilities. But an
America that ceases striving for freedom and democracy for others is an America that courts the
danger of losing its soul at home.
Generations of Americans have understood why we needed to be engaged in the world. They
heard the call of our ideals. They recognized the responsibility these values carry. They accepted
the burden ofleadership for our values-- and they rose to carry out their duty ... when the costs
were highest and the outlook was dark. They never faltered. They never wanted it any other way.
--------
-------
�10
Today, I challenge the coming generation to prepare itself for this burden of leadership in the
world ... to accept the responsibility that our values carry... to rise to this unprecedented moment,
when America can make the difference. I challenge you to ready yourselves ... to pick up where
those who have gone before leave off And I challenge you to start taking your place in the great
chain of generations that have upheld American leadership ... and turned history to our advantage.
What many call the American Century is coming to a close. I believe that the one ahead can be an
even greater American Century, when our nation's leadership, more than ever, makes the vital
difference between peace and war ... between freedom and repression ... between security and
fear ... between prosperity and poverty. Let us join together to seize this extraordinary moment.
And let us unite in common purpose behind the ideals that have carried us so far -- and can carry
us so much farther.
God bless you. God bless America.
###
-
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~------
--
------------~------
�~/( '( j
ro.-. Po\.
September 20, 1995
To:
Don Baer
George Stephanopoulos
Mike McCurry
From:
Antony Blinken
I attach a memo I did for Tony Lake on themes for this fall's
foreign policy speeches. Please let me know your thoughts.
PfC{~
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
001. memo
DATE
SUBJECTffiTLE
Blinken to Lake, et al. RE: Fall Foerign Polci Speech Themes (4
pages)
09/18/1995
RESTRICTION
P1/b(1)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
Communications
DonBaer
OA/Box Number: 10132
FOLDER TITLE:
Fall'95- For. Pol. [Foerign Policy] Plan
2006-0458-F
dbll49
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
December 20, 1995
Mr. Donald Baer
OEOB Room 197
Office of Speechwriting
Washington, DC 20500
Dear Don:
Enclosed is an article from the new Foreign Policy that I thought might interest you. In
it, I offer some thoughts on the political trends that are driving U.S. foreign policy away
from internationalism, and on what kind of politics must be practiced if we hope to move
U.S. policy back in the other direction.
Best regards,
Jeremy Rosner
Senior Associate
Enclosure
2400 N Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037-1153/ Phone: (202) 862-7900 I Fax: (202) 862-2610
�Clinton Presidential .Records
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This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
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�FOREIGN POLICY
NUMBER 101
I
WINTER 1995-96
The Know-Nothings
Know Something
by Jeremy D. Rosner
merica's campaign season has now begun in earnest.
The races for the White House and Congress will revolve around domestic affairs, just as they did in 1992
and 1994. Once again, however, America's foreign programs will play a key supporting role. Most often, the
role will be that of prodigal, fool, or foil, as candidates attack the cost,
wisdom, and effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping, foreign
aid, and other international efforts. For those who wish to preserve
America's leadership and presence abroad, it is a troubling spectacle.
It is thus worth examining why foreign-affairs bashing on the hustings and in Congress has become so popular and what can be done
about it.
It should not be any mystery why anti-internationalism now makes
for good politics. Foreign aid, never popular, is even less so in the face
of lingering federal deficits, economic anxiety, and diminished threats
from abroad. The U.N., long suspect, is even more so after vivid failures in Somalia and Bosnia. The Republican majority in Congress,
looking for sharp contrasts with a Democratic White House, finds a
target-rich environment in the latter's mixed record of internationalism. Add new strains of nativism and protectionism, and attacks on
all things foreign become irresistible.
The attacks have grown increasingly strident, especially on the
A
I
I
J E R E M Y D • R 0 S N E R , a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment,
was counselor and senior director for legislative affairs on the staff of the National
Security Council from 1993 to 1994. He is author of The New Tug-of-War:
Congress, the Executive Branch, and National Security (Carnegie, 1995).
�
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