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T H E T R I N I T Y F. 0 R U M
~·
FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION SHEET
TO:
DonBaer
A 'ITENllON:
'ORGANIZATION:
FAX NUMB~:
The 'White House
202-456..5709
·DATE~ .·.May 19. 1995
PAGPS:
FROM:
R.EMAAKS:
lots (J,o)
Peter Edman for Os Guinness
Dear Mr.· Baer,
Os had to leave soon after you spoke, but he asked me
to send these
.items along to you.
.
He hoped the Williamsburg Charter might give you some language,
whereas the sections frotn his book might g'ive you some background
ideas.
Please feel free to call if you have any questions.
With kind regards,
SENDER'S NAME:
Peter Edman
5210 L YNGATE COURT, SUITE B
BURitE, VIRGINIA 2201S.I631
703-764-1070
FAX 703-764.()993
.
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·From The Americczn HouT by Os Guinneas (The Free Press, 1993).
Copyright C 1993 by Os Ouinneas, reprinted by pennission of the autho.-.
Two sections from Chapter 13: Tribespeople, Idiots, or Citizens.
AmericaPs fket liberty
The first step in reforging the public philosophy is to show why the notion of religious
liberty remains important to the public philosophy today. For, to underscore the point once
more, to many Americans, especially the thought leaden,. the question of religion in public life
has become unimportant. It is viewed as a nonissue or a nuisance factor--something that should
be purely a private issue, which inevitably becomes messy and controverSial when it does not
stay so, and which should therefore revert to being private as quickly as possible.
·
·A mote helpful way of seeing things is to see that the swirling controversies that sur..
round religion and public life create a sott of sound barrier effect: At one level, the issue appears
all passions,· problems, prejudices. But break through to a higher level and it touches on several
of the deepest questions of human life in the modem world. Once these are appreciated, lt
clearly becomes in the highest interest of the common good to resolve the problems rather than
. ban the topic out of personal disdain or fear.
There are at least five reasons why r~ligious liberty remains a vital part of America's
public philosophy. First, religious liberty,· or freedom of conscience, is a precious, fundamental,
and inalienable human right-the freedom to reach, hold, freely exercise:, or change one's
beliefs, subject solely to the dictates of consciences and independent of all outside, especially
governmental, control. Prior to and existing quite apart from the Bill of Rights that protects it,
religious liberty is not a luxury, a second-class right, a constitutional redundancy or a subcategory of free spe~ch. Since it does not finally depend on the discovedes of science, the lavon
of the state and its officials, or·the vagaries of tyrants or majorities, it is a right that may not be
submitted to any vote nor encroached upon by the expansion of the bureaucratic state. Since it
is a free-standing right, It is inteplly linked to other basic rights, such a5 freedom of speech, but.
it does not need them to supplement lts legitimacy. There is no more searching test of the
health _of the public philosophy than this non-majoritarian standard set forth in the
Williamsburg Charter: ••A society is only as just and free as it" is respectful of this right for its
smallest minorities and least popular communities." 1R.e llgious liberty as a political right
guaranteed by a legal institution is barely two hundred years old in the world. But considering
why and how it was formulated, it has correctly been called America's "fil'St liberty."
Unless America's public philosophy respects and protects this right for aU Americans,
the American promise ·of individual freedom and justice is breached.
·
Second, the Religious Liberty clauses of the First Amendment are the democratic world's
moat distinctive answer. to one of the entire world'~- most pressing questions: How do we live
with our deepest-that is, our religiously intense-differences?
.
.
Some regions of the world (for example, in western Europe) exhibit a strong political
civility that is directly linked to their weak religious commitments; and others (for example, in
the Middle East) exhibit a strong religious commitment directly linked to their wealc political
civility. Owing to the manner o( the Pint Amendment's ordering of religious liberty and public:
�/
life, American democracy has afforded the fullest opportunity for strong religious commitment
and strong political civility tO complement, rather than threaten, each other.
Unless America's public philosophy respects and protects this distinctive American
achievement, the American promise of de~ocratic libt;rtv and justice will be he ttayed.
Third, the Religious liberty clauses He close to the genius of the Amedcan experiment.
Far p1ore than a luxury, let alone a redundancy, the First Amendment is essential and
indispensable to the character ·of the American republic. Not simply a guarantee of individual
and communal liberty, the Firat Amendment's ordering of the relationship of religion and publie
life is the boldest and most successful part of the entire American experiment. Daring in lts
titne, distinctive throughout the world both then and now, it has proved decisive ln shaping key
aspects of the American story. It is not too much even to say that as the Religious Uberty
clauses go, so goes America.
Unless America's public philosophy respeets and protects dtis remarkable American
ordering, the civic vitallty of the Amedcan republic will be sapped.
Fourth, the Religious Lihertv· clauies are the single, strongest non~theological reason why
ftee speech and the free exercise of religion have been closely related and why religion _in
eeneral has penlsted more strongly in the United States than ih any other comparable modem
country. In most modem countries, there appears to be an almost ironclad equation: the more
, modernized .the country, the more secularized the people. America, howeve·r, is a striking
exception to the trend, being at once the most modernized country and having the most
religious of modem peoples.
The reason lies in the effect of the American style of disestablishment. By separating
church and state, but not religion and government or public life, disestablishment does two
things. lc undercuts the forces of cultural antipathy built up against religious communities by
church,scate establishments-historically speaking, established churches have contributed
strongly to their own rejection and to secularization .in general. At the same time,
dise5tabliahment throws each faith onto reliance on its own claimed resources. The overall
effect is. to release a free and unfettered competition of people and beliefs similar to the free ..
market competition of capitalism. .
Unless America's public philosophy respects and protects this enterprising relationship,
both American religious liberty and public discourse will be handicapped.
Fifth, the interpretation and application of the First Amendment today touches on some
of the deepest and most revolutionary developments in contemporary thought. A genemdon
ago lt was common to draw a deep dichotomy between science and religion, reason and
revelation, objectivity and commitment. and so on. T od.ay such dichotomies ate impossible. All
thinking is acknowledged to be presuppositional. Value~neutrality in social affairs is impossible.
To-demand "neutral d~course" in public life, as some still do, should now be recognized aa a wav
of coercing people to speak publicly in someone else's language and thus never "to -be true to
their own.
Unless America's public philosophy respects and protects this new (or restored) under,
standing, the republican requirement of free democratic debate and responsible participa don ·in
democratic ll{e will be thwarted.
.
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One conclusion is b:~escap~ble: The place of religious liberty in American public life is
not merely a religious issue, but a national issue. It is not only a private issue, but a public one.
Far from being simply partisan or. sectatian, religious liberty is in the inteteSt of Americans of all
faiths or none, and its reaffirmation should be a singular and treasured part of the American
public philosophy.
·
·
.
Charter for the third century
The thlrd step in reforging the public philosophy is to. introduce the concept of
covenantalism, or chartered pluralism, as the basis of the public philosophy. This means to
examine io contribution to the civil society and to show its advantages over the two existing
visio~ of religion and public life that are now deadlocked-namely, communitadanism, the
social vision that degenerates into "tribalism." and libertarianism, the vision that degenerates
into political "idiocy.'' Anyone who appreciates the factors behind the present co11fltcts ls
confronted with tough questions. Above all, can there be a healing of the schism of the spirit, a
resolution to the culture wan, and an adjustment to the new pluraUsm without endangering the ·
logic of religious Hbetty in public life? Can there be an agteed centef of national unity that
complements. f&ther than contradicts, American diversity l Is mere a 'Yay in which diverse faiths
. can fulfill their respective responsibility- to the requirements of order, freedom, and justice
without favoring one of the three at the expense of the other two?
.
· At first sight, the search for a just and commonly acceptable solution to these challenges
seems as futile as squaring the circle or searching for esperanto. The question of the public: role
of religion in an increasingly pluralistic society appears to be a minefield of contrOversies, with
the resulting ignorance, confusion, and reluctance an unders~able outcome. Yet if lt is. cor..
rect to ttace the problem to forces, such as pluralism, as much as to ideologies, individuals, and
groups, then we have more victims than villains over this issue, and the wisest approach is to
search together for a solution. not for a scapegoat.
In fact, the present stage of the conflict offers a sttategic oppottunity in the 1990s.
Extreme positions and unwelcome consequences are readily identifiable on many sides. and a
new desire for consensus is evident. But where and on what grounds could consensus emerge? As
so often, the most conatruc:tive wav. forward ls to go back~r, more accurately, to reforge the
public: philosophy through the renewal of a concept that is at the heart of American democracy
and the American constitutional tradition-covenantalism.
The recovery of the idea of covenant as a key tC? American democracy and th~ American
constitutional tradition is one of the freshest and most important findings of recent scholarship.6
Far from being completely new and stardlngly original, the Constitution of 1787 is now seen to
be the climax of a long tradition of covenants, compacts, and· chartets that goes b~ck to the
earliest colonial expetl,ence. Far from being the legacy of John Locke in the seventeenth century
or Whig and Enlightenment thinkers in the eighteenth century, the American conatitutional
tradition was in place and operating strongly by the 1640s when John Locke was not yet a
· teenager and Charles .. Louis Montesquleu, ]ean~Jacques Rousseau, and William Blackstone had
not been born.
·
Seen in this new light, the Arnetican Constitution and the constitutional tradition grew
_dittcdy from the seedbed of Puritan ideals and inatltutions that were rooted in the notion of
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covenant. Dlssenting English colo"ists relied on Swiss, Dutch, and German theologians who
themselves relied on the biblical principles of a Jewish covenantal republic to create a
distinctively American style of government. The term "federalism" did not come into use until
later, but Puritan notions, such as "federal liberty,'' were the twin..concepts to "federal theology"
and all went back to the core of covenant (foedw in Latin and B'rir in Hebrew). The
foundational ·covenant was the one· between God and human beings, but there were multiple
extensions to different levels of community-the covenant of marriage, the local church, the
town, the colony, and eventually the nation.
The Mayflower Compact on November 11, 1620, wu the fil'St explicitly political uae of
the religious covenant form and an historic milestone on the road to the more secular and
national covenant of the "miracle in Philadelphia" in 1787. But in all the do%ens of cases that
made up the early American system of institutions and set of ideals, one feature was
unmistakable: The covenant/ compact/chatter represents a distinctive combination of unity and
diversity, commonality and independence, obligation and voluntary consent. Almost bv itself,
the principle of free consent carried all the promise and the perils of "federal liberty." For free
consentt bei~ 8s different as can be from a forced rontract, is a matter of the spirit as well as the
letter of the law. Therein lie the seeds of both the risk and the renewal of the unfinished
· Ametic:an experiment. In the best traditions of covenantal agreement, the constitutional
tradition would alway& have to remain the living faith of the dead rather than the dead faith of
living..
the
a
This idea of covenantal, or federal, liberty holds the promise'of resolution of out
present problems through the concept of chanered pluralism. At the base of the notion is a
defining feature of modem experience: The present state of intellectual divisions in modem
pluralistic so.c:ieties does not permit agreement at the level of the origin of beliefs (where
justifications for behavior ate theoretical, ultimate, and irreconcilable). But a significant,
though limited, agreement is still possible at the level of the outworking of beliefs· (where the
expression of beliefs in behavior is more practical, less ultimate, and often overlapping with the '
practical beliefs and behavior of other people).
Covenantalism, or chartered pluralism, is therefore a vision of religious liberty in public
life that, across the deep religious differences of a pluralistic society, guarantees and sustains
religious liberty for all by forging a substantive agreement, or freely chosen compact, over three
things that are the "Three Rs" of religious liberty: rights, responsibilities, and respect. The
compact affirms: first, in terms of rights,. that religious libeny, or freedom of conscience, is a
fundamental and inalienable right for peoples of all faiths and none; second, in term of
responsibilities, that religious liberty is a universal tight joined to a universal duty to respect that
right for others; and third, In terms of respect, that the fi~t principles of religious liberty,
combined w.ith the lessonS pf two hundred years of c:Onsticutional experience, require and shape
certain practical guidelines by which a robust yet civil discourse may be sustained in a free
soeiety that would remain free.
.
More detailed implications of t):lis principled pact will be spelled out in the next chapter. ·
But stated like this, the social viSion of covenantalism is a modem form of ''federal liberty" that
~ombines the best, and avoids the worst, of the libertarian and communltarian visions. Put
differently. ~he notion of chartered pluralism is an example of what John Rawls calls the
''overlapping consensus" that is needed in a liberal democracy. The core of its principled pact
over the Three Rs is a variation of what Jacques Marltain de~tlbed as ..a sort of unwrltteh
common law, at the point of practical convergence of extremely different theoretical ideologies
�--···---···"'···,,.-,-,-,-...... ........,~
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and spidtu~l ttaditions!' Maritain used himself to provide the example of the difference between
the theoretical and the practical levels. "I am fully convinced that my way of justifying the
belie( in the rights of man and the ideal of liberty, equality, fraternity, is the only one which is
solidly based on truth. Tha:t does not prevent me- from agreeing on these practical tenets with
those who are convinced that their way of justifying them, entirely different from mine, OJ' even
opposed to mine in its theoretical dynamism, is likewise the only one. that is based on truth.
Assuming· they both believe in the democratic charter, a Christian and a rationalist will. ·
nevenheless give JU$dficadons that are incompatible with each. other, to which their souls, their
minds and their blood are committed, and about: these justifications they will fight. And God
keep me from saying that it is not important to know which of the two is right! That is
essentially importan~. They remain, however, in agree~nt on ·the practical affirmation of that
·charter, and tJ:ley can formulate common principles of action." 1
The covenantal element in chattered pluralism is obvious. The social vision is solidly
founded on such a pdnclpied pact that it can be seen to give due weight to the first of its two
terms. It is therefore properly a fonn of chartered pluralism, or pluralism within the fratti.ework of
a principled charter that spells out the rights, responsibilities, and respect required by religious
liberty. So long as the pact over the Three Rs of religious liberty remains strong. the vision ·
avoids the respective weaknesses of relativism, interest-group liberalism, or any or the
minimalist approaches to unity that relies solely on "process'' and "proceduralism.'p (For
example, claims that seek to go beyond proceduralism but only a little, such as: •'We are held
together by the coherence of our moral disagreement and argument within an ongoing cultural
conversation.".,)
·
But at the same time the area of public agreement is strictly limited in both substance
and in scope. The pact does not pretend to include agreement over religious beliefs, political
policies, constitutional interpretations, or even the philosophical justifications of the three parts
of the compact. Chartered pluralism is an agreement within disagreements over deep differences
that make a .difference. It therefore gives due weight to the second of its two terms, and. remains
a form of chartered pluralism. By doing so, it avoids the equal but opp~site maximalist
approaches to unity, such as the dangers of majoritarianism, civil religion, or any form of
overreaching consensus that is blind or insensitive to tiny minorities and unpopular com ..
munit.ies. Thus social unity is maintained. but religious liberty and diversity are respected in that
religious unity is either made dependent upon persuasion or deferred as a messianic hope to be·
fulfilled only at me end of time.
Seyeral features of this compact at the heart of chartered pluralism need to be high·
lighted indelibly, if the compact is to pass muster under the exacting challenges of the present
situation. First, the character of the compact is not a form of civil religion or public theology. Its
content does not grow ftom shared 'beliefs, religious or political, because the recent expansion of
pluralism means that we are now beyond the point where that is possible. It grows instead from a
common commitment to univenal rights. dghts.thatate shared'by an overlaPping consensus of
commitment although grounded and justified different}y by the different faiths behind them."
Second, the achievement of this compact does not come through the process of a general
dilutlon of beliefs, as in the case of civil religion moving from Protestantism to "Judeo·
Christlan" theism. It comes through the process of a particular concentration of universal rights
and mutual responsibilities, within which the deep differences of belief can be negotiated.
/
s
�Third, the fact that religious consensus Is now impossible does not mean that moral con~
sensus (for example~ "consensual'' or ·"common core" values in public education) is either
unimportant or unattainable. It meaN, however, that moral consensus must be viewed as a goal,
not as a given; something to be achievecl through persuasion and ongoing conversation rather
than assumed on the basis of tradition. Thus chartered pluralism means that there is a way to
give positive meaning to public life without coercive imposition, and at the same time to foster
an emphasis on freedom and divenity that need not lead toward fragmentation.
Fourth, the fact that the different religious :roots of the public philosophy are largely
· invisible in public does not mean that they ate unimportant or that the public philosophy is
secular in a secularist ideological sense. On the contrary, a cut..flower public philosophy will not
work. So the health of the public philosophy depends not only on a public: conversation of
citizens across the divisions of creed and generation, but on the private cultivation of the first
principles of the public philosophy within each home and faith community. Should the diverse
roots of those first principles ~vet grow weak or be poisoned from some antidemocratic source,
such a private crisis would have inevitable public consequences.
'
Fifth, chartered pluralism allows even "radically monotheist" religiqns, such as Judaism
and the Christian faith, to balance the twin demands of theological integrity and civli unity.
Such faiths can never be content with religious liberty as freedom from; to them it must always
be freedom far. Chartered pluralism therefore allows them to exercise their responsibilities to
their conceptions of order, freedom, and justice, yet without infringing on the rights of othen or
'becoming 5ocially disruptive. Whereas the "idiocy" bred by libertarianism can be notoriously
casual about order, and the "tribalism" bred by communitariantsm on the Right and the Left can
grow blind to freedom and justice for others, the federal liberty of charteted pluralism makes
room for the free exercise of transcendent faiths that can address all three concerns with their
only proviso
own integrity. yet without compromise to themselves or damage to civil unity.
is that such influence is generally best exercised spiritually rather than politically, indirectly
rather than directly, and persuasively rather than coercively.
The
Doubtless, further questions are raised by these five p(,ints. Do all the different faiths
mean the same thing when they affirm common rights? Do all have an adequate philosophical
basis for their individual affirmations? Are all such divergences and inadequacies a matter of
sheer indifference to the ·strength and endurance of the compact? Will such a principled pact
always be enough in practice, to keep self.. interest from breaking out of the harness? The
probable answer ·in each case is ctno,"· which is a reminder of both the fragility of the historical
achievement of religious liberty for all and the sobering task Americans face if they are to
sustain such freedom today. Indeed, the challenge might appear quixotic were it not for the
altemativa.
Viewed in the light of the alternatives, chartered pluralism provides a way between
communitarianism and libertarianism. Communitarianism, found on both the Left and the
Right, virtually equates politics with morality. When transferred to the level of a public,
philosophy, it tends to see everything in terms of its ideology wl'it large all over public life.
Whereas libertarianism, also found on both the Left and the Right, virtually excludes morality
from politics. When transferred to the level of a public philosophy, it tends to see everything in
tetms of an individualism that sucks the commemness out of public life altogether.
Curiously, both social visions betray their inadequacies as candidates for the public
philosophy, partly because of the ironies they exhibit and partly because they rule themselves
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out on th~ grounds of their own principles. In the. politically unlikely event that
cornmunitarianism were to prevail !\& the public philosophy, it would become a form of
majoritarianism. In seeking to impose a style of traditional solidarity on modem pluralism~ it
would end in denyinJ pluralism (a smaller and milder recapitulation of the totalitarian error).
On the other hand, ·if the communitarian vision does not seek to prevail as the public
philosophy-which the majority of communitarians probably prefer anyway-the effect of
communitarianism on public life would be to reinforce relativism, not community. For
relativism in public life is less the planned offspring of a speCific philosophical movement than
an unwanted bastard born of general frUstration with the apparently irreconcilable positions of
different communities. Thus, ironically, if American public life is to retain and strengthen a
sense of community, it cannot be on the basis of communitarianism as the public philosophy.
Libertarianism, in conttast, sets out to widen the sphere of public fre~om by reiatividng
all faiths. Everyone will be more free if no one's position is "imposed" on anyone else because
"everything depends on where you're comin1 from., But the effect is to relatlvize aU positions
except relativism and so to assert a new imposition in public life-that of a dogmatized
· . relativism and a universalized libertarianism. Thus if communitarianism ends in denying the
reality of pluralism, libertarianism ends in distorting it. For currently pluralism goes more closely
with particularism than with relativism. Most believets who make up toclay's pluralistic society
want to affitm their distlnctives. They believe that the beliefs that make them different are
finally riaht and important. They are committed to them in terms of absolutes-just as for many
relativists relativism itself has become the last surviving absolute. Thus libettarianism rules itself
out as a candidate for the public philosophy too. Ironically again, if Amerian public life is to
retain and saengthen the sphere of liberty, it cannot be on the basis of libertarianism as the
. public phil~hy.
·
Expressed differently. chartered/luralism owes much to John Courtney Murray's
valuable inststence that the unity asserte in the American motto, E pluribus unum, is a unity
with limits. And therefore that the Religious Liberty clauses are ''articles of peace'' rather than
"articles of faith."'~~~ But Father Murray's distinction, which was borrowed from Samuel Johnson,
must never be widened into a divorce. For one thing, the articles of peace are principled before
they are procedural, and they need to stay principled if priJlcipled procedutes are not to be
sucked into the nihilism of empty proceduralism. The articles of peace are not sacred or ultimate
themselves, but they derive from articles of faith and cannot be sustained lonJ without them.
For the same reason, genuine civility is substantive before it· is fotmal. It is not a rhetoric of
niceness, .let alone a fear of nastiness. Not is it a psychology of S()Cial adjustment. Civility is both
an attltude and a discourse shaped by a principled respect for people, truth, the common good.
and the American constitUtional tradition.
For another thinJ, neither chartered pluralism nor the notion of articles of peace should
be understood as leading to unanimity, but to that unity within which diversity can be
transformed into rkhness and disagreement itself into an achievement that betokens strength.
Again, the old term '"fedetallibeny" carries rich meanings •. As Murray wrote, "The one civil
society contains within its new unity the communities that are divided amona themselves; but it
does not seek to reduce to its own unity the differences that divide them .•,. The introduction to
the Williamsburg Charter includes a vivid cuttent statement of this recognition:
·
We readily acknowledge our continuing differences. Signing this Charter implies
no pretense that we believe the same things .or that our differences over policy
proposals. legal interpretations and philosophic:al groundings do not uJtimately
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matter. The truth is not even that what unites us is deeper than what divides us.
for differences over belief are the deepest and least negotiated of all.
The Charter sets forth a renewed national compact, in the sense of a solemn
mutual agreement between parties, on how we view the place of religion in
American life and how we should contend with each other's deepest differences
in the public sphere. It is a call to a vision of public life that will allow conflict to
lead to consensus, religious commitment to reinforce political Civility. In this
way, diversity is not a point of weakness but a source ohtrength. ~
Understood properly, these three idea.s--covenantalism, chattered pluralism, and federal
liberty-are critical 'to reforging the aspect of the public philosophy that bears on questions of
religion and American public life, especially in the light of the deftdencies.of the alternatives.
They therefore contribute vitally to keeping democracy safe for diversity. If this vision of a
promise-keeping covenant gains acceptance in the three main arenas of conflict-public policy
debates. the resort to law, and public education-and if it succeeds in addressing their problems
constructively,· chartered pluralism could serve as a public philosophy for the public square, truly
a charter for religion and public life in America's third century of constitutional government. .
"The Williamsburg Chatter" In James Davison Hunter and Os Guinness, eds.,
Articles of Faith, Ankles of PetJ.Ce (Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution,
1990), p 129.
1
·
See Donald S. Lutz, "Religious Dimension
in the Development of American
Constitutionalism'' Emory Law Journal, Vol 39, Winter 1990. p. 21.; Elazar
"Covenant as the basis of Jewish Politlcal T~dition'' ]ewish]oumtJL of Soc:iolDc, .
.Vol. 2 no. 5, 1978, pp. 5-37.
1!1
Jacques Maritain "11l.e Possibilities for Co-operation in a Divided World" Inaugural
Address to the Second-International Conference of UNESCO, 6 November,
1947..
Steven Tipton "Religion in an Ambiguous Polity" Emcrr,y Law ]oumal 39, Winter
1990, p. 196.
See john Rawls "The Idea of an Ovetlapping Consensus" (Oxford ]ouTT11Jl of Legal
Sl.14&s, Vol. 7, No. l. 1987).
8
�John Courtney Murray, We Hol4 These Tnaru, p. 49.
Ibid., p. 45.
vi
The Williamsburg Clumer, p 145.
9
�The Williamsburg Charter
A National Celebration and Reaffirmation of
the First Amendment Religious.
Liberty Clauses .
K
eenly a~ of the high national purpose of cOmmemorating the bicentennial of the
United States Constitution~ we who sign this Charter seek tO celebrate the
Constitution,s greatness, and to call for a bold reaffirmation and reappraisal of its vision
ud guiding principles. In particular, we call for a fresh consideration of religious liberty
in our time, and Qf the place of the First Amendment Religious Liberty clauses in our
national life.
I
We g~tefully acknowledge that 'the Constitution lias been hailed as America's
"chief export" and "the most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the brain
and purpose of man."' Today,~ hundred years after its signing, the Constitution is not
only the world's oldest. still-effective Written constitution, but the admired pattern of
ordered liberty for c:oundess people in many lands~
In spite of its enduring and uriiversal qualities, however, some provisions of the
Constitution are now the subject of widespread conuoversy in the United Stares. One
area of intense controversy concerns the First Amendment Religious Liberty clauses,
whose m,utually reinforcing provisions act as a double guar;uuee of religious liberty, one ·
part barring the making of any law "respecting an establishment of religion" and the
other barring any law "prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
The First Amendment Religious Libeny provisions epitomize the Constitution9s
visionary realism. They were, as James Madison said. the "aue remedy" 1t0 the
predicament of religious conflict they originally addressed, and they well express the
responsibilities and limits of the state with respect to liberty· and justice.
Our commemoration of the Constitution's bicenrennial·must therefore go beyOnd
celebration to rededication. Unless this is done, an irreplaceable part of national life will
be endangered, and a remarkable opponunity fOr the expansion of liberty will be lost.
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For we judge that the present controVersies over religion in public life pose both a
danger and an opportunity. There is evident danger in the fact that certain forms of
politically reassenive religion in parts
the warld are, in principle, enemies of
democratic freedom and a source of deep social antagOnism. ·There is also evident ·
opportunity in the. growing philosophical·and cultural awareness that all people live by
commitments and ideals, that value-neutrality is imp0ssiple in the ordering of society,
and that we are on the edge of a promising moment for a fresh assessment of pluralism
·and liberty. It is with an eye to both the promise and the peril that we publish thi.s Charter
and pledge ourselves to its principles.·
of
We readily acknowledge our continui~g differences. Signing this. Charter implies
no pretense that we believe the same things or that our differences over policy proposals, ·
legal interpretations and philosophicalgroundings do not .ultimately matter. The truth is ,
not even that what unites us is deeper than what divides us~ for differences over belief are
the deepest and least easily negotiated of all.
The Charter sets forth a renewed national compact, in the sense of a solemn
mutual agreement between parties, on how we· view the place of religion in American
life and how we should contend with each other's deepest differences in the public
sphere. It is a call to a vision of public life that will allow conflict to lead tO consensus9
religious commitment to reinforce political civility. In this way. diversity is not a point of
weakness but a source of strength.
�9
l A TIME FOR REAFFIRMATION
e believet in the first place, that the nature of the Religious Liberty clauses must
be understood befOre the. problems surrounding them can be resolved. We
therefore affirm both their cardinal assum~tions and the reasons for their crucial
national importance.
. ·
·
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W
With regard to the assumptions of the First Amendment Religious Liberty clauses,
we hold
oo be chief:
·
three
L The Inalienable Right
Nothing is more characteristic of humankind than the natural and inescapable
drive toward meaning and belonging, roward making sense of life and finding
community in the world. As fundamental and precious as life itself, this "will to
meaning" ·finds expression in ·ultimate beliefs, whether theistic or non-theistic,
transcendent or naturalistic, and these beliefs are most. our own when a matter of
conviction rather than coercion. They are most our own when, in the words of George
Mason, the' principal.author of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, they are "directed.
only by reason and conviCtion, not by force or violence." . ·
As james Madison expressed it in his Memorial and Remonstrance, "The Religion
then ofevery man must be left.to the conviction and conScience of C\'ety man; and it is .
the righ~ of every man to exercise it as these may dictate. This right is in its nature an
unalienable right...
'
1Wo hundred years later, despite dramatic changes in life and a marked increase of
naturalistic philosophies in some parts of the_ world and in certain sectors of our society,
this right to religious liberty based upon freedom of conscience remains fundamental
and inalienable. While particular ~liefs may be true or false, better or worse, the right to
reach, hold, exercise them freely, or change them, is basic and non-negotiable.
Religious liberty finally depends on neither the favors of the state and its officials
nor the vagaries of tyrants or majorities. Religious liberty in a democracy is a right that
may not be submitted to vote and depends on the outcome of no election. A society is.
only as just and free as it is respectful of this right, especially toward the beliefs of its
smallest minorities and least popular communities. .
The right tO freedom of conscience is premised not upon science, nor upon social
utility. nor upon pride of speciei. Rather, it is premised upon the inviolable dignity of the
human person. It is the foundation·of, and·is integrally telated to, all other rights and
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freedoms secured by the Constitution. This basic civil liberty is clearly acknowledged in
the Declaration of Independence and is. ineradicable from the long tradition of rights
and liberties from which the Revolution sprang.
2.. The Ever Praent Danger
:
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No threat to freedom of conscience and religious liberty has historically been
greater than the coercions of both Church and State. These twO institutions- the one
religious, the other political- have through the centuries succumbed to the temptation
of coercion in their claims over minds and souls. When these institutions and their
claims have been combined, it haS tOo. often resulted in terrible violations of human
liberty and dignity. They are so combined when the sword and purse of the State are in
the hands of the Church~ or when the State usurps the mantle of the Church so as to
coerce the. conscience and compel belief. These and other such confusions of religion
and state authority represent the misordering of religion and government which it is the
purpose of the Religious Liberty provisions to prevent.
Authorities and orthodoxies have changed, kingdoms and empires have come and
gone 9 yet as John Milton once warned, "new Presbyter is but old priest writ large."
Similarly. the modern persecutor of religion is but ancient tyrant with more refined
instruments of eontrol. Moreover~ many of the greatest crimes against conscience of this/
century have been committed, not by religious authorities, but by ideologues virulently
opposed to traditional religion.
·.
Yet whether ancient or modem, issuing from religion or ideology, the result is the
same: religious and ideological orthodoxies, when politic:ally established, lead only too
naturally toward what Roger Williams called a "spiritual rape" that coerces the
conscience and produces "rivers of civil blood" that stain the record of human history.
Less dramatic but also lethal-to freedom, and the chief menace to religious liberty
today. is the expanding power of government control over personal behavior ·and the
institutions of society, when the governmentacts not so much in deliberate hostility to,
'but in reckless disregard of, communal belief and personal conscience.
Thanks principally to the wisdom of the First Amendment, the American
expcrience is different. But even in America where state-established orthodoxies are
unlawful and the state is constitutionally limited, religious. liberty can never be·takcn for
granted. It is a ,rare achievement that requires constant protection.
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3. The Most Nearly Perfect Solution
Knowing well that "riothing human can be perfect" Oames M~ison) and that the
Constitution was not "a fauldess work" (Gouvem~ur Morris), the Framers nevertheless
saw the First Amendment as a "uue remedy" and the most nearly perfect solution yet
devised for properly ordering the relationship of religion and the state in a free society.
There have bCen occasions when the protections of the First Amendment ha-Ve .
been overridden or imperfectly appliect. Nonetheless, the First Amend~ent is a
momentous decision for religious liberty, the most important political decision for
religious liberty and public j~stice ·in the history of humankind. Limitation upon
religious liberty is allowable only where the State has borne a heavy burde~ of proof that
the limitation is justified- not by any ordinary public interest, but by .a supreme public
necessity ...... and that no Jess resuictive alternative to limitation exists.
The Religious Liberty clauses are a brilliant construct in which both· No
establishment and Free exercise serve the ends of religious liberty and freedom of
conscience. No longer can sword, purse and sacred mantle be equated. Now, the
government is barred from using religion's mantle to become a confessional State, and
from allowing religion to use the goverment's sword and purse to become a coercing
Church. in this new order, the freedom of the government from religious control and the
freedom of religion from government control are a double guarantee of the protection of
rights. No faith is preferred or prohibited; for where there is no state-definable
orthodoxy, there can be no state-punishable heresy.
·
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With regard to the reasons why ~e First Amenc;lment Religious Liberty clauses are
important for the nation· today. we hold five to be preeminent:
1. The First Amendment Religious Liberty provisions haw both a logical .
and historical priority the Bill ofRights. They have logical priority because
the security ofall rights reSts upon the reC:ognition that they are neither given by the
state, nor Can they be taken away by the state. Such rights are inherent in the
inviolability of the human persOn. History demonstrateS that unless these rights are
protected our society's slow. painful progress toward f~om would not have been
possible..
in
2. The First Amendment Religious Liberty provisions lie close to the
heart of the distinctiveness ofthe American experiment.. The uniqueness of
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the American way of disestablishment and its consequences have often been more
obvious to foreign observers sl1ch as Alexis de Tocqueville and Lord James Bryce,
'Who wrote that "Of alJ the differences between the Old world and the New, this is
perhaps the most salient." In particular; the Religious Liberty clauses are vital to
harnessing otherwise Qen~gal forces such as personal liberty and social diversity,
thus sustaining republican vitality Vlt'hile making possible a necessary measure of
national concord.
·
3. The Fint Amendment Religious Liberty provisions are the dem0a
eratic world's most salient alternative to the totalitarian repression of
human rights and provide a corrective to unbridled nationalism and
reJ.iaious warfare around the world.
· ·.
4. The First Amendment Religious Liberty prOvisions. provide ·the
United States' most distinctive answer tO one of the world's most pressing
questions in the late-tWentieth century. They address the problem: How
do we live with each other's deepest differences? How do religious convictions
and political freedom complement rather than threaten each other on a small
planet in a pluralistic age? In a world in which bigotry, fanaticism, terrorism and rhe
state control of religion are all too common response$ to these questions, sustaining
the justice and liberty of the American arrangement is an urgent moral task.
5. The First Amendment Religious Liberty· provisions give American
society a unique position in relation to both the First and Third worlds.
: Highly. modernized like the rest of the First World, yet not so secularized, this
society -largely because of religious freedom ~ remains, like most of die Third .
World, deeply religious. This fact, which is critical for possibilities of better human
understanding, has not been sufficiendy appreciated in American self-understanda
ing, or drawn upon in American diplomacy and communication throughout the
world.
:.
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In sum, as much if nQt ~ore than any other single prQvision in the entire
Constitution, the Religious Liberty provisions hold the key to American distinctiveness
and American destiny. Far from being setded by the interpretations of judges and
historians, the last word on the First Amendment likely rests· in a ehapr.er yet to be
written, documenting the unfolding drama of America. If religious liberty is neglected,
all ·civil liberties will suffer. If it is guarded and sustained, the American experiment will
be· the more secure.
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It A TIME FOR REAPPRAISAL
uch of the current controversy about religion and palitics neither ~fleas the
highest wisdom of the First Amendment nor serves the best ·interests of the
disputants or the nation.· We therefore call for .a critical reappraisal of the course an~
consequences of such controversy. Four widespread errors have exacerbated the
controversy needlessly.
M
1. The Issue Is Not Orily What We Debate, But How
The debate about religion in.public life is too often· misconstrued as a clash of
ideologies alone, pitting "secularists" against the "sectarians"or vice versa.· Though .
competing and even contrary world views are involved, the controVersy is not solely
iderilogical. It also flows from a breakdown in understanding of how pe~nal and
communal beliefs should be related to public life.
·
The American republic depends upon the answers to two questions. By what
ultimate truths ought we to live? And how should these be related to public life? The
first question is personal, but has a public dimension because of the connection between
bell~fs and public virme. ·The. American answer to the first question is that the
government is excluded from giving an answer. The se~nd question, however, is .
thoroughly public in character, and a public answer is appropriate and necessary to the
well-being of this society.
·
This second question was central to the idea of the First Amendment. The
Religious Liberty provisions are not "articles of faith" concerned with the substance of
particular doctrines or of policy issues. They are "articles of peace?~ concerned with dte
constitutional constraints and the shared prior understanding within which the
American people can engage their differences in a civil inaniler and thus provide for both
religious liberty and stable public government.·
Conflicts over the relati-onship between deeply held beliefs and public policy will
remain a c:o~tinuing feature of democratic li~ They do not discredit the First
Amendment, but confirm its wisdom and point to the need to distinguish the Religious
Liberty clauses from the particular ex»ntrovcrsies they address. The clauses can never be
di\'Orced from the conuoversies they address, but should always be held distinct. In the
public discussion, an open commitment to·the consttaints and standards of the dauses
should precede and accompany debate over the controversies.
·
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· · 2. The &sue Is Not Sectarian, But National
The role of religion in American public life is too often devalued or dismis.cted in
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public debate, as though the AmeriCan people's historically vital religious traditions
were at best a purely private matter and at worst~essentially sectarian and divisive.
Such a position betraYs a failure of civil respect for the convictions of others. It also
underestimates the degree tO which the Framers relied on the American people's
religious convictions to be what T0cqueville descri~ as "the first of their political
' institutions." In America,, this crucial public role, has been
played by diverse beliefs,
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so much despite disestablishment as because of disestablishment.
The Founders knew well that the republic they established represented· an
audacious gamble against long historical odds. This form of ~rnment depends upon
ultimate beliefs, for otherwise we have no right to the rights by which it thrives. yet
rejects any official formulation of them. The republic will therefore always remain an
"undecided experiment" that stands or falls by
dynamism of its non-established
faiths.
the
3. The Issue Is Larger Than the Disputants
Recent controversies over religion and public life have too often become a form of
warfare ·in which individuals, motives and reputations haVe been impugnedo The
· intensity of the debate is C::ommensurate with the importance of the issues debated, but
to those engaged in this warfare we present two argumentS for reappraisal and restraint.
The lesser argument is one ofexpediency and is based on the ironic fact that each·
side has become the best argument for the other. One side's excesses have become the
other side 9s arguments; one side's exuemists the other side's recruiters. The danger is
that, as the ideological 'Warfare becomes self-perpetuating, more serious issues and
broader national interests will be forgotten and the bitterness deepened.
The more important argument is one of principle. and is based on the fact that me
several sides have pursued their objectives in ways which contradict their own best ·
ideals. Tho often, for example, religious believers have been uncharitable, liberals have· · .
.been illiberal, conservatives have been insensitive to tradition, champions of tolerance
have been intolerant, defenders of free speech have been censorious, and citW:ns of a
republic based on democratic accommodation have succumbed to a habit of relentless
confrontation.
4•. The lt~~ue Is .Understandably Threatening
The First Amendment's meaning is too often debated in ways that ignore the
genuine grievances or justifiable fears of opposing points ofview. This happens when the
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logic of opposing arguments favors either an unwarranted intrusion of religion into
public life or an unwarranted exclusion of religio~ from it: History plainly shows that
with religious control over government, political freedom dies; with political control over
religion, religious freedom dies.
The First Amendment has .contribu~ to awiding both these perils, but this·
happy experience is no cause for complacency. Though the United States has escaped
the worst excesses experienced elsewhere in the world. the republic has shown two
distinct tendencies of its own, one in the past and one today.·
·
., In earlier times, though lasting well into the twentieth century, there was a de facto
se~-establishment of one religion in the United States: a generalized Protestantism
given dominant status in national ,institutions. especially in the public schools. This
development was largely approved by Protestants, but widely opposed by nonProtestants, including Catholics and Jews.
In more recent times, and partly in reaction, constitutional jurisprudence has
tended, in the view of many, tO move toWard the de facto semi-establishment of a wholly ,
· secular understanding of the origin,. nature and destiny of humankind and· of the
American nation. During this period, the exclusion of teaching about the tole of religion
in society, based partly upon a nlisunderstanding of First Amendment decisions, has
. ironically resulted in giving a dominant .status to such wholly secular understandings in
many national institutions. Many secularists appear as unconcerned over the
·~nsequences of this development as were Protestants unconcerned about their de facto
establishment earlier.
Such d8 fatto establishments, though seldom extreme, usually benign and often
unwitting9 are the source of grievances and· fears among the several· parties in current
controversies. Together with the encroachments of the expanding modern state, such
tk fodo establishments, as much as any ·official establishment, are likely to remain a
threat to freedom and justice fOr all.
·
Justifiable fears are raised by those who advocate theocracy or the coercive power of
law to establish a t6Christian America." While this advocacy is and should be legally
p~~~ such proposals· contradict 'freedom of conscience and the genius of the
Religious Liberty provisions.
·
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· . At the same .time there are Qthera who raise justifiable fears of an unwarranted
exclusion of religion from public life. The assertion of moraljudgmenrs as though they
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were morally neutral, and interpretations of the "waal of separation" that would exclude
religious expression and argument from public life, also contradict freedom of
conscience and the genius of the provisions.
Civility obliges citizens in a pluralistic society to take great care in using words and
casting issues. The comniuriications media have a primary role, and thus a special
responsibility, in shaping public opinion and debate. Words such as public, secular and
tr/igiousshould be free from di5criminatory bias. "Serular purpose," for e~ple, should
not mean ~non-religious purpose" but ~generaJ public purpose." Otherwise, the
impression is gained that ~public is equivalent tO secillar; .religion is equivalent to
private~" Such equations are neither accurate· nor just. Similarly, it is ..false to. equate
"public" and "governmental." In a society that sets store by the necesSary limits on
government, there are many spheres of life that are public but non-governmentaL
Two important conclusions follow from a reappraisal of the present controversies
over religion in public life.. First, the process of adjustment and readjustment to the
Constraints and standards of the Religious Liberty provisions is an ongoing requirement
of American democracy. The Constitution is not a self-interpreting, self-executing
document; and the· prescriptions of the ·Religious Liberty provisions ·cannot by
themselves resolve the myriad confusions and ambiguities surrounding the right
ordering of the relationship between religion and government in a free society. The
Framers clearly understood that the Religious Liberty provisions provide the l~gal
construct for what must be an ongoing process of adjustment and mutual give-and-take
in a democracy.
We are keenly aw8re that, especially over state-supported education, we as a people
must continue to wrestle with the c:omplex connections between religion and the
transmission of moral values in a pluralistic society. Thus, we cannot have, and should
not seek, a definitive, once' for all solution to the questions that will continue to surround
the Religious Liberty provisions.
Second, the n~ for such .a readjustment today can best be addressed by
remembering that the two clauses are e5sentially one provision for preserving religious
libetty. Both parts, No establishment and Free exercise, are to be comprehensively
understoOd as being in the service of religious liberty as a positive good. At the heart of
the Establishment clauSe is 'the prohibition of state sponsorship· of religion and at the
heanofFree Exercise clause is the prohibition of state interference with religious liberty.
�No sponsorship means that .the· state must leave to the free citizenry the public
expression of ultimate beliefs, religious or otherwise, providing only that no expression
is excluded from~ and none governmentally favored, in the continuing democratic
·
d~u~
No interference means the assurance of voluntary religious expression free from
governmental intervention. This includes placing religious expression· on an equal
footing with all other forms of expression in genfiinely public forpms.
\
No sponsorship and no int.Crference together mean fair opportunity. That is oo say,
all' faiths are free to enter vigorously into public life and to exercise such influence as their ·
followers and ideas engender. Such democratic exercise of influence is in the best
tradition of American voluntarism and is not an unwarranted "imposition" or
"estlblishment~
·
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Ill. A TIME FOR RECONSTITUTION
e believe, finally, that the time is ripe for· a genuine expansion of democratic
.
liberty, and that this goal may be attained through a new engagement of citizens in
debate that is reordered .. ip accord with constitutional first principles and
Considerations of the comm~n ~•.This amounts to no less than the reconstitution of a
free republican people in our day. <;:areful consideration of three precepts would advance
l~ possibility: .
.
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L The Criteria Must Be Multiple
Reconstitution requires the recognition that the great dangers in interpreting the
Constitution today are either m release interpretation from any demanding criteria or to
narrow the criteria excessively., The first relaxes the neCessary restraining force of the
Constitution. while the second overlooks the insights that have arisen from the
.Q9nstitution in two centuries· of. nati~nal experience.
~
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./ :. Re~gious' liberty is the only freedom in the First Amendment to be given two
provisions. Together the clauses form a strong bulwark against suppression of reli~ous
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liberty, yet they emerge from a series of dynamic tensions which cannot ultimately be
. relaxed. The Religious Liberty provisions grow out of an understanding not only of
rights and a due recognition of faiths but of realism and a due recogrtition of factions.
They themselves reflect both faith and skepticism. They raise questions of equality and
liberty, majority rule and minority rights, individual convictions and communal
tradition.
The Religious Liberty provisions must be understOOd both i~ .terms of the
Framers' intentions and history's sometimes surprising results. Interpreting and
applying them ·today .requires not only ·historical research but moral and political
reflection.
· ·
·
The intention of the Framers is th.erefore a necessary but insufficient criterion for
interpreting and applying the Constitution. But applied by itself, without any
consideration of immutable principles ofjustice, the intention can easily be wielded as a
weapon for governmental or sectarian causes, some quoting jefferson and brandishing
establishment and others citing Madison and brandishing Free exercise. Rather, we
must take the purpose and teXt of the Constitution seriously, sustain the principles
behind the words and add an appreciation of the many-sided genius of the First
Amendment and;its complex development over time.
No
2. The Consensus Must Be Dynamic:
Reconstitution requires a shared understanding of the relationship between the .
ConstitUtion and the society it is to· serve. The Framers understood that the
Constitution is more than parchment and ink. The principles embodied in the
document must be affirmed in practice by a free people since these principles reflect
everything that constitutes 'the essential forms and substance of their society- the
institutions, customs and ideals as well as the laws. Civic vitality and the effectiveness of
law can be undermined when they overlook this broader cultural context of the
Constitution..
Notable, in this conneCtion is the striking absence today of any national consensus
about religious liberty as a positive good. Yet religious liberty is indisputably what the
Framers intended and what the First Amendment has preserved. Far from being a
matter of exemption, exception or even toleration, religious liberty is an inalienable
right. Far ftom being a sub-category of free speech or a constitutional redundancy,
religious liberty is distinct and foundational. Far from being simply an individual right,
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religious liberty is a positive social good. Far from denigrating religion as a social or
political "problem," the separation of Church and State is both the saving of religion .
from the temptation of political power and an achievement inspired in large part by
religion itself. Far from weakening ieligion·, disestablishment has, as an historical fact,
enabled it to flourish.
. In light of the First Am~ndment, the government should stand in relation to the
churches. synagogues and other comrillinities of faith as the· guarantor of freed~m. In
light of the First Amendment, the Churches, synagogues and other communities of faith
stand in relation to the government as generators of faith, and therefore contribute to the
spiritual and moral foundations of democracy. Thus, the government acts as a safeguard,
but not the sourc;e, of freedom for faithS, whereas the churches and synagogues act as a
source, but not the safeguard, of faiths for freedom.
. The Religious Liberty provisions work for each other and for the federal idea as a
whole. Neither established nor excluded, neither preferred nor proscribed, each faith
(Whether. transcendent or naturalistic) is brought into a relationship with the
government so that each is separated from the state in terms of its institutions, but·
democratically related to the state in terms of individuals and its ideas.
The result is neither a na,Ju:d public square where all religion is excluded, nor a
~public square with any religion established or semi-established. The result,
ra~er, is a civil public square in which citizens of all religious faiths. or none, engage one
~other in the continuing democratic diseourse. ·
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Mutual
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Rec:x>nstitution of a free rep~~lican ~~ple ·requires the t:emgnition that religious
li~rty is ~ universal right joined. to universal duty to respect that right.
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. . In the turns and twist$ of history, victims of religious discrimination have often later
~me perpetrators. In th~ '-nous image of Roger Williams, those at the helm of the
Ship of State forget they were onee under the hatches. They have, he said, "One weight
for dle~ when they~ ~der the ha~hes, ~d another for others when they come
to. ;~e helm." 1"hey show themselves, said james Madison, "as ready to set up an
· establishment which ijs to take them in as they were to pull down that which shut them
out.• Th'lls, benignly or otherwise, ProtestantS have treated Catholics as they were once
~~' and secularists have done likeWise with both.
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Such inconsistencies are the natural seedbed for the growth of a de flldtJ
establishment. Against such i~c:onsisrencies we affirm that a right for one is a righ~ for
another and a responsibility for all.' A right for a Protestant is a right for an Orthodox is a
right for a Catholic is a right for a Jew is a right for a Humanist is a right for a Mormon is a
right for a Muslim is a right for a Buddhist-and for the followers of any other faith within
the wide bounds of the republic.
·
That rights are unive~ and responsibilities mutual is both the premise and the
promise of democratic pluralism. The First Amendment, in this sense, is the epitome of
public justice and serves a5 the golden rule for civic life. Rights are best guarded and
· responsibilities best exercised when each person and group gUards for all others those
ri~ts· they wish guarded for themselves. Whereas the wearer of the 'English crown is
officially the Defender of the Faith, all who uphold the American Constitution are
defenders of the rights of ali faiths.
From this axiom, ·that. rights are universal and responsibilities mutual, derives
guidelines for conducting public debates involving religion in a manner that is
democratic and civil. These guidelines are not, and must not be, mandated by law. But
they are, we believe, necessary to reconstitute and revitalize the American understand~
ing of the role of religion in a· free society.'
First, those who claim the right to dissent should assume the responsibility
.to debate: Commitment to democratic pluralism-assumes the coexistence Within one
political community ofgroups whose ultimate faith commitments may be incompatible9
yet whose common commitment to social unity and diversity does justice to both the
requirements of individual conscience and the wider community. A general consent to
. the obligations of citizenship is therefore inherent in the American experiment, both as
·a founding principle ("We the people") and as a matter of daily practice.
There must always be room for those who do not wish to panicipate in the public
ordering of our common life, who desire to pursue their own religious witness separately
as conscience dictates. But at the same time, for ~ose who do wish to participate, it
should be understood that those claiming the right to dissent should assume the
responsibility to debate. As this responsibility is exercised, the characteristic American
formula of individual liberty complemented by respect for the opinions of others permits
·differences ·to be asserted,· yet a broad, active community of underStanding to be
sustained.
Second, those who olaim the right to criticize should assume the
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responsibility to comprehend: One of the ironies of democratic life is that freedom of
conscience is jeopardized by false tolerance as well as by ouiright intolerance. Genuine
tolerance considers contrary views fairly and judges them on me fit. Debased tolerance
so refrains from making any judgment that it refuses to listen at all. Genuine tolerance
honestly weighs honest differences and· promotes both impartiality and pluralism.
Debased tolerance results in indifference to the differences that vitalize a pluralistic
. democracy.
Central ·to the difference between ge~uine and debased tolerance ·is the
. recognition that peace and truth must be held in tension. Pluralism must not be
·confused with, and is in fact endangered .by, philosophical and ethical indifference.
Commitment to strong, clear philosophical and ethical ideas need not imply· either,
intolerance or opposition tci democratic pluralism. On the contrary, democratic pluialism
requires an· agreement to be locked. in ·public argument over disagreements of
consequence within the bonds of civility.
The right to argue. for any public policy is a fundamental right for every citi7.en;
· respecting that right is a fundamental responsibility for all other citizens. When any view
is expressed, all must uphold as constitutionally protected its advocate's right to express
it. But others are free to challenge that view as politically ·pernicious, ·philosophically
false, ethically evil, theologically idolatrous, or simply absurd, as the case may be seen to
.'
be.
Unless this tension between peace and uuth is respected, civility cannot be
sustained. In that event, tolerance degenerates into either apathetic relativism or a
dogmatism as uncritical of itself as it is uncomprehending of others. The result is a
general corruption of principled public debate.
·. ·. ··Third, those who·claim the right to influence should accept the respon.S1Dility not to inflame: Too often in recent disputes over religion and public affairs,
·sOme have insisted that any evidence of religious influence on public policy represents
an establishment of religion and is therefore precluded as an improper "imposition." .
Such exclusion of religion from public 'life is hisrorically unwarranted, philosophically
inconsistent and profoundly undemocratic. The Framers' intention is indisputably.
.ignored when public policy. debates can appeal to the theses of Adam Smith and Karl
~arx, or Charles Darwin and Sigmund Freud but not to the Western religious tradition ·
.~~·general and the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures in particular. Many of the most
dynamic. social movements in American history, including that of civil rights, were
legitimately inspired and shaped by religious motivation.
.
25
�THE TRINITY FORUM
PAGE
26
·.'t '•
22
Freedom of conscience·and the right to influence ·public policy on the basis of
religiously informed ideas are inseverably linked.ln short,.a key to democratic renewal is \
the fullest possible participation in the most open possible debate.
'
Religious liberty and democratic ciVility are also threatened, however, from another
quarter. Overreacting to an impr9per veto on religion in public life, many have used
religious language and images not for the legitimate inftuencing of policies but to
inflame politics. Politics is indeed an extension of ethics and therefore engages religious
principles; but some err by refusing to recognize that tht:re is a distinction, though not a
separation, between religion and politics. As a result, they bring to politics a misplaced
absoluteness that idolizes politics, "Satailizes" their enemies and politicizes their own
~~
~
Even the most morally informed policy positions involve prudential judgments as
, well as pure principle. Therefore, to make an absolute equation of principles and
. policies inflates politics and does violence to reason, civil life and faith itself. Politics has
. recently been inflamed by a number of confusions: the confusion of personal religious
affiliation with qualification or disqualification for public office; the confusion of claims
to divine guidance with claims to divine endorsement; and the confusion of government
neutrality among faiths with government indifference or hostility to religion.
Fourth, those who claim the· right to participate should accept the
responsibility to persuade: Central to the American experience is the power of
political persuasion. Growing partly from principle and partly from the pressures
democratic pluralism, commitment to persuasion is the corollary of the belief that
conscience is inviolable, coercion of conscience is evil, ·and the public interest is best
served by consent hard won from vigorous debate. Those who believe themselves privy
to the will of history brook no argument and need never tarry for consent. But to those
who subscribe m the id~ ~f.go:vernment by the consent of the governed, compelled
beliefs are a violation of first principles. The natural logic of the Religious Liberty
\ provisions is to foster a politiCal culture of persuasion which admits the challenge of
opinions . from. all so~...
Arguments for public policy should be more than private convictions shouted out
loud. For persuasion to be principled, private convictions should be translat¢ into
publicly accessible· claims. Such public claims should be made publicly accessible for
twO reasons: firs't, because they must engage those who do not share the same private
convictions, and second. because they should be directed toward the common good.
of
\
.
�THE TRINITY FORUM
PAGE
2J
RENEWAL OF FIRST PRINCIPLES
e who live in the third cen~ry of the American republic can learn well from the
past as we look to the future. Our Founders were both idealists and realists. Thei~
confidence in human abilities was tempered by their skepticism about human nature.
Aware of what was new in their times, they also knew the need for ren~ in times after
theirs. "No free government, or the blessings of liberty," wrote George Mason in 1776,
"can be preserved tO any people, but by a firm adherence to justice, moderation,
temperance, frugality, and virtue 9 and by frequent recurrence to fundamental
principles."
W
True to the ideals and realism of that vision, we who sign this Charter. people of
many and various beliefs, pledge ourselves to the enduring precepts of the First
Amendment as the cornerstone of the American experiment in liberty under law.
We address ourselves to our fellow citizens, daring to hope that the strongest desire
of the greatest number is for the common good. We are firmly persuaded that the
principles asserted here require a fresh cOnsideration, and that the renewal of religious
· liberty is crucial. to sustain a free people that would remain free. We therefore commit
ourselves to speak, write and act according to this vision and these principles. We urge
our fellow citizens to do the same.
10 agree on such guiding principles and to achieve such a compact will not be easy.
Whereas a law is a. command directed to us, a compact is a promise that must proceed
freely from us.Th achieve it demands a measure of the vision, s~crifice and perseverance
shown by our Founders. Their task was to defy the past, seeing and securing religious
liberty against. the terrible precedents of history. Ours is to challenge the· future,
sustaining vigilance and broadening protections against every new menace, including
that of our own complacency. Knowing the unquenchable desire for freedom, they lit a
beacon. It is for us who know its blessings to keep it burning brightly.
27
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Don Baer
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Office of Communications
Don Baer
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1994-1997
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36008" target="_blank">Collection Finding Aid</a>
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7431981" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2006-0458-F
Description
An account of the resource
Donald Baer was Assistant to the President and Director of Communications in the White House Communications Office. The records in this collection contain copies of speeches, speech drafts, talking points, letters, notes, memoranda, background material, correspondence, reports, excerpts from manuscripts and books, news articles, presidential schedules, telephone message forms, and telephone call lists.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Extent
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537 folders in 34 boxes
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
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Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Healing Conference
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Office of Communications
Don Baer
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2006-0458-F
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Box 1
<a href="http://www.clintonlibrary.gov/assets/Documents/Finding-Aids/2006/2006-0458-F.pdf" target="_blank">Collection Finding Aid</a>
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7431981" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Format
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Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
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Reproduction-Reference
Date Created
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1/12/2015
Source
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42-t-7431981-20060458F-001-016-2014
7431981