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This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker .by the William J. Clinton
Presidential Library Staff.
1
Collection/Record Group:
Clinton Presidential Records
Subgroup/Office of Origin:
Speechwriting
Series/Staff Member:
Carter Wilkie
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Subseries:
.;,
4273
OAIID Number:
FolderiD:
Folder Title:
Early Achievements [I]
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• !,~
.f'
CLINTON'S FIRST 100 D~
.THOMAS DIBACCO.
i'
T.a':~ Variati011S Of . the
fi$..~ lOO~dav:y·
ards_. tic
~
. a yardstick tbat .joumalists have de-
·
economy was in shambles, .with
·babies t'alliDi like so many ducks .on
a carniV,8.1.·~·1'8111e. -1\a.Will and the Housing Ac~. ·Johnson's
Rogers put.'lt ·.-.FDR's inaugura- Great SOciety program - enuncition: "I .clon't.Jmow wbat.additjcmal ated during the 1964 campaign authority ~t ·:QJ&y ·-ask, .'but . .was .impressive, but .sCarcely. a
·
i
'!
i
i
:·
giveittobijn,:evanifit'a-tod,rownall . lOCklay phenomenon af~r his inauthe boy babies." · .
.
. · · ·. · . guration on Jan: 20, 1965. Medicare,
.. .: ;The -pteiident :'In· ·an ';IDlprec· .~ · tbr .:-instance, . wasn't ..p&ssed until
: .ideDted-fidioil, called Congresa.into. · July. · ·
· · ....... · ·
rmectat~on~·; ....pbabet
-~· _lntheolddays,~residents..:....~ .
ligen~es, were ~ted .so. swiftly
for George Washington's adminis- ·
...tbat after :five-score days CongreSs · . tration ~thad to launch the new ·
adjourned lind someone decided to
govermnent under the Constitution
·count .the achievements: '15 mes6wereD't supposed to be activists.
881~ .of .PI;>~ had .~ translated
They ""re supposed -to run a tight
'into.15 plecea.~.legisla~on. .
·
ship, not waste. taxpayers' money
;: ButllOera,inthe~~year&has
and keep the nation unentangled in
necessitated iuch a .~h to .legisla-: foreign affairs. Not until the Protive achiewment.·Tbat's the reason ·gressive reform movement of the
President Harry S.'lhunan on Sept.
early .20th century did presidents
4,' 1945, hoping .to interpret the end
propose ·a legisJative agenda conof World War D as a sign to set Con· . spicuous for· enlargirig the federal
· gresstoquick)yenacta21-pointprogovernment's regulatory and social
gram .later ,dubbed the Fair: Deal, ' welfare arms. But the sentiment ,
· found that he couldn't outdo Roosewaxed and waned until FDR's New
velt. Calling Congress irito special
Deal.
. _
.
&eliSion, tie got only a watered-down
Afterward~ historians used many
employment law by Febi'U8J1' l!J:46.
tests for rating presidents. Historian
Thomas A. Bailey's groundbreaking
and lost OU! ~~pletely f?n ~s h1gh
work "Presidential Greatness"
hopes for c1vil nghts legJ.slation, an
education package, health ~re, and
(1964), focuses on 43 tests for the
pro-labor laws. Even after his stun·
nation's leaders, of which "achieveDing upset victory in 1948, 'Ihlman
ment" is only one. Shunning the
temptation to make presidents
was kept iri check by Southern
Democrats W~f? thwarted r~form
"great" because they maneuvered
save for the nusmg of the minimum.
Congress into passing laws, Mr. Bai·
wage, liberalization o~ displaced
ley could be brutally critical of FDR
persons laws, and a Natlonal Housand quite favorable toward Dwight
D. Eisenhower:
ing Act promoting the. const:uction
of 810,000 public housmg uruts.
"Whatever the necessity, RooseWhen the Korean War broke out
on June 25, 1950, the Fair Deal was · velt encouraged the masses to develop their wishbones more than
put on indefinite hold.
their backbones. At a cost of some
Even a stronged-armed, former
$20
billion and six years of agony, the
congressional leader like Lyndon B.
Johnson couldn't speed up the re- 'Happy B.orrower' did not cure. ~e
form process when he became pres- Depression: He merely admwsident after John F. Kennedy's assas- tered aspirin and sedatives!'
sination Nov. 22, 1963. In his first 100
"If he [Ike] achieVed no sensadays, LBJ got Congress to pass a taxcut bill, but it wasn't until Day 232- tional successes, he made no· cataJuly 12, 1964- that he got the Civil strophic blunders. . . . Historians
Rights Act. Mter a year in office, the will almost certainly never give him
president had also chalked up a War as high a mark as voters did, but
on Poverty law, Urban Mass 1\"ans- perhaps we ought to be grateful that
portation Act, Wilderness Areas Act this untrained soldier and popular
idol turned out to be 8n eminently
respectable and respected presiThomas V. DiBacco is a historian dent, remembered for, his dignity,
at American University.
decency and dedication."
'I
I
I
'
~
...
,
,
_
-
t•.:.;·So·Mr. ClintoD:~ not·~ wortied aboUt.tbe ~of bis Centen~
iU8l·~...~·mr~~•tth9ut achieving
·a FDR-le IeatSiatlve ~But
'
;die ·:42ilcl~t
ought not to
'.:breathe·1DO 1n1Bt.a sigh bf relief, for
the other ·lltiiK1uds of presidential
.Jeaderihip .....:·from appoin~ and
'tadvisers to ethic:iJ, integrity, han·
·.dling of ~crises, such as· the Waco,
·-n,xas, incident, and concern for the
national·in1el'e8t ·...,.., have a· w8Y of
making their imprinfoil a daily basis, with a cumulative total certain to
be scrutinized by 1996..
And no matter how well or poorly
Mr. Clinton thinks he may be faring,
there's the remark of William Shakespeare to contemplate: "Reputation:•
wrote the Bard, "is an idle and most
false impression; oft got without
merit, and lost without d~ei.'Viq!'
'lbokofflce
President
. April 30, 1789
• Revenue Act- July 4, 1789
AUGUST 8 -100TH DAY
• Judiciary Act-Sept 24,1789
Franklin D.
Rooeawtt
March 4, 1933
• Emergency Banking ActMarch9
·
• Economy Act- March 20
• Beer and Wine Revenue ActMarch22
• Emergency Farm Mortgage ActMarch27
• Civilian Conservation- Corps
Reforestation Relief Act- March 31
• Federal Emergency Relief ActMay12
• Agricultural Adjustment Act May 12
.
• Tennessee Valley Authority ActMay 18
· ·
• Federal Securities Act -May 27
• National Employment System Act
-June6
..
.
JUNE 12-100th DAY
• Home Owners Refinancing ActJune13
·
• National Industrial Recovery Act
-June16
.
• Farm Credit Act-June 16
• Glass-Steagall- Bariking Act of
1933-June 16
LEGISI
Dwight Eisenhower Jan
APRIL 30, 1953 -1 OOth OJ
• Submerged Lands Act21.1953
.
• Flammable Fabrics Act30, 1953
• Excess Profits Tax Extensi
July 16, 1953
• Creation of Small Busines:
Administration- July 30, 19:
• Farm Credit Acto~ 19531953
1
• Famine Relief Act~Aug. 7, ·
• Veterans Death Payment ~
Aug. 14, 1953.
Lrnd• 1. Johneon
Nov :
• Tax Cut Law-Feb 26, 1964
APRIL 2 -100th DAY
• Urban Mass Transportation
July9
• Civil Rights Act- July 12,
• Economic Opportunity Act
on Poverty) Aug. 20
• Housing Act- Sept. 2
• Wilderness Areas Act- S•
�Dwight Eisenhower Jan 20, 1953
APRIL 30, 1953 -100th DAY
D.
dt
I
Mai-ch 4, 1933
tncv Banking Act-
ny Act- March 20
1d Wine Revenue Act-
!mcy Farm Mortgage Act'·
1 Conservation-
Corps
1tion Relief Act- March 31
11 Emergency Relief Acttural Adjustment Act...:....
• Submerged Lands Act- May
21.1953
• Flammable Fabrics Act- June
30.1953
• Excess Profits Tax ExtensionJuly 16, 1953
• Creation of Small Business
Administration - July 30, 1953
• Farm Credit Act o11953- Aug. 6,
1953
1
• Famine Relief Act1Aug. 7, 1953 .
• Veterans Death Payment Act Aug. 14, 1953.
1888 Valley Authority Act-
d Securities Act- .May 27
al Employment System Act
-100thDAY
Owners Refinancing Act-
allndustrial Recovery Act
6
:redit Act- Jur)e 16
Steagall- Bariking Act of
une 16
Lyndon B. Johneon Nov 22,1963
• Tax Cut Law-Feb 26, 1964
APRIL 2 -100th DAY
• Urban Mass Transportation Act July9
• Civil Rights Act - July 12, 1964
• Economic Opportunity Act- (War
on Poverty) Aug. 20
• Housing Act- Sept. 2 ·
• Wilderness Areas Act- Sept. 3
Lyndon B. Johnson Jan 20, 1965
• Elementary and Secondary ·
Education Act - April 11
APRIL 30th -100th DAY
• Medicare- July 30
• Voting Rights Act of 1965- Aug.
6
.
. • Department of Housing and Urban
Development Act- Sept. 9
• Amendments to Immigration and
Nationality Act- Oct. 3
• Higher Education Act of 1965 Nov.8
Jimmy carter
Jan 20, 1977
• Emergency Natural Gas Act of
1977-Feb. 2, 1977
• Emergency Unemployment
Compensation Extension Act of 1977
-April12,1977
APRIL 30, 1977 -100th DAY
• Tax Reduction and Simplification
Act of 1977- May 23, 1977
·
• Dept of Energy Organization Act
-Aug. 4, 1977
.
• Cleari Air Act Amendments 01
1977-Aug. 7,1977
• Food and Agriculture Act of 1977,
Sept.·29, 1977
.
• Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and
Abuse Amendments- Oct. 25, 1977
Ronald Reagan
Jan. 20, 1981 •.
APRIL 30, 1981 -100th DAY
..
·
• Supplemental Appropriations and ;
Rescission Act of 1977 -.June 5,
:
1981
• Economic Recovery Act of 1981
(tax cuts) -Aug. 13, 1981
.,
0 Uniformed Services Pay Act- :
(pay increase) Oct 14, 1981
· ,
• Military Construction Authorization :
Act- (construction at military bases),
-Dec. 23,1981
'
George Bush
Jan. 20, 1989•
• Whistleblower Protection Act of · :
1989- April10, 1989
.
APRIL 30, 1989- 1DOth DAY
,
• Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol •
Act of 1989 ~ July 26, 1989
0 Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery and Enforcement Act of
,
1989-Aug. 9, 1989
·
•
• Ethics Reform Act of 1989- Nov. :
30 1989
.
'
• international Narcotics Control Act ;
of 1989- Dec. 13, 1989
•
:
• North American Wetlands
Conservation Act of 1989 - Dec: 13, 1
1989
.
:
• Medicare Catastrophic Coverage !
Repeal Act of 1989 - Dec. 13, 1989 ;
The Waaltlngton Till184
�December 2, 1993
MEMORANDUM TO TilE PRESIDENt'
From:
Gene Sperling
Subject:
11 Signs of Recovery
Below are 11 statistics that Alan Blinder, Eve Ehrlich, Joe Minarik. Sylvia Mathews and myself believe best
express the good news in the economy. WbUe we still must stress that our problems and solutions are long-term
and that people are still hurting, there is no denying that we are now experiencing consistent signs of a finn recovery.
(The unemployment number will be out tomorrow.) Cenainly an area where we need improvement is exports, yet
that reflects both why we are taking the trade steps that we are and the need for strong world economic growth.
1. PERSONAL INCOME IS UP: Today, it was announced that personal income is up 6% up over the
last month; non-farm personal income bas risen 9 months in a row.
2. PRIVATE SECI'OR JOBS IN NINE MONTHS SURPASS THE LAST FOUR YEARS: There bas
been 1.27 mUlion private sector jobs created over the last nine months -- more than 250,000 private sector
jobs than were created during the previous four years.
3. HISTORIC LOW INTEREST RATES:
10 Year Rates: One year ago, 10 year interest rates were at 6.94: today the are over a full point
lower at 5.82.
30 year rates: One year ago, 30 year rates were at 7.57. Today, they are over a full point lower
at 6.28.
Mortgage Rates: Are down a full point from last year to near 7% --a 2S year low.
4-7. LOW INTEREST RATES DUE TO THE SUCCESS OF OUR DEFICIT REDUCTION PLAN
IS SPURRING AN INVESTMENT-RECOVERY:
4. HOUSING: Housing Starts now 13% in the last 3 months. Single famUy starts are at highest
level in over 6 years. Construction spending is up 10% over the previous years spurred by 2S years
low mortgage rates. Existing home sales were at the highest in 14 years.
5. DURABLE GOODS: Durable goods order highest ever and up 9% over year over year.
6. BUSINESS INVESTMENT: Business spending on equipment is up 15% over the last year.
7. AUTO SALES: Auto sales are up 13% in the last 12 months.
8. MANUFACfURING: National Association of Purchasing Management's index in November rose to
SS. 7% a strong sign of expansion in manufacturing.
9. CONSUMER CONFIDENCE IS PICKING UP: The Conference Board's Consmner confidence was
up by a sharp 18% in November.
10. INFLATION IS AT HISTORIC LOWS: Core Inflation for the last 12 months were the lowest in 20
years -- to a time of price controls. Core PPI the last 12 months lowest since starting collecting the data
in 1974.
11. RETAIL SALES: We have had seven straight months of increases in retail sales-- up 6% over the
last year.
�THE 1993 CONGRESSIONAL SESSION :A WRAP-UP
"If we work hard and i£ we work together, if we re-dedicate ourselves to creating
jobs, to rewarding work, to strengthening our families, to reinventing our
government, we can lift our country's fortunes again. Tonight I ask everyone in
this chamber and every American to look simply into your own heart, to spark
your own hopes, to fire your own imagination. There's 80 much good, 80 much
possibility, so much excitement in thia country now that if we act boldly and
honestly as leaders should, our legacy will be one of prosperity and progress.
Thia must be America 'a new direction. Let us summon the courage to seize it.• ••
President Clinton in his Joint Session Address on February 17, 1993.
•
ENDING GRIDLOCK. From day one, President Clinton and V1ee President
Gore have worked with Congress to break the gridlock that paralyzed
Washington, D.C. for years. In one year, they have accomplished many of the
President's main priorities:
The Economic Package. Signed into law on Auguilt 10, 1993
National Service. Signed into law on September 21, 1993
Family and Medical Leave Act. Signed into law on February 6, 1993
NAFTA. Passed both Houses by November 20, 1998
Campaign Finance. Passed both Housea by November 22, 1998
Crime Bill. Passed both Houses by November 19, 1993
The Brady Bill. Passed both Houses by November 22, 1993
Health Care Reform. Introduced on October 22, 1998
•
LEGISLATIVE SUCCESS: Even before the tough vote on the NAFTA, studiea
showed that the president had a remarkable legislative record. Conpoesslonal
Quarterly found that legislation on which the president took a stand paaaecl
88.6 percent of the time, the highest first-year success rate since Eia8nhower in
1953. A Fordham University study found that the president won tough votes at
a higher rate: 91.3 percent of the tough votes in the House and 92.6 percent in
the Senate, better than the record of President Johnson in 1965.
•
BI-PARTISANSHIP, NO VETOES, MORE DEBATE, OPEN LINES OF
COMMUNICATION. Republicana have delivered crucial auppozt for National
Service, the NAFTA, the Family and Medical Leave Act and flood relief. For
oDly the second time in 60 years, there has been no Presidential veto. Impoztant
legislation that had fallen to President Bush's vetoea ··the Family and Medical
Leave Act, Motor-Voter·· was aiped into law. Congreaa has spent 40 percent
more time •• 1,920 houra - couideringlegialation thaD durin1 Beapn'a &nt
year. In the spirit of open commUDication, the president baa made 15 trips to
Capitol Hill thia year.
�,
November 23, 1993
REBUILDING THE ECONOMY
"OW' nation needs a new direction. Tonight, I present to you a comprehensive
plan to set OW' nation on that new course. I believe we will find our new
direction in the basic old values that brought us here over the last two centuries,
a commitment to opportunity, to individual responsibility, to community, to
work, to family, and to faith. We must now break the habits of both political
parties and say there can be no more something for nothing, and admit, frankly,
that we are all in this together." ··President Clinton in his Joint Session
Address on February 17, 1993.
•
HISTORIC DEFICIT REDUCTION. Working with Congresa, we have taken
bold and serious steps to bring down the federal budget deficit. We passed a
budget bill that will reduce the deficit by nearly $500 billion over five years, the
largest deficit cutting plan in history.
•
TARGETED INVESTMENTS. Congresa provided nearly 70 percent of the
President's investment proposals for Fiscal Year 1994, including funding for new
programs such as National Service, Goals 2000, and School to Work. These
included a 66 percent increase for the Ryan White Act; a 12 percent increase for
the Women, Infanta, and Children (WIC) feeding program; a 20 percent incnaae
for Head Start. an 11 percent increase for highways: a 118 percent increase for
dislocated worker assistance; and a 58 percent increase for immunization pants.
•
LARGE SPENDING CUTS AND A SPENDING FREEZE. The deficit
reduction package that Congresa pasaed included $255 billion in spending cuta
and an unprecedented "hard freeze"·· a 12 percent real reduction·· on all
disc:retionary spending. The House alao pasaed the President's additional
spending reduction bill that will cut $37 billion in spending.
•
HELPING SMALL BUSINESS. The economic package increases by 75 percent
the maximum expensing of investment and provides a new targeted capital gains
cut for long-term investments in small businesaes •• tax incentives that will
create hundreds of thousands of jobs in the next five years.
•
EXPANDING MARKETS FOR US EXPORTS. The President has worked
with Conpresa to expand markets for US exports, exports that support high·
paying American jobs. The President has worked with Congres8 to relu uport
controls on $37 billion worth of American goods.
•
MORE JOBS. Job creation is up in the first year of the administration •• more
than 1.2 miJJjou new private sector joba, 200,000 more than were created during
the entire four years of the Bush aclmiDistration.
•
LOWER INTEREST RATES~ American consumers an benefitting from
historically low interest and mortgage rates that make buying a home easier and
easing the burden on those who already pay their mortgagee.
.
•
UNEMPLOYMENT DROPPING. Unemployment baa dropped to just 6.8
percent in October, down from an average 7.4 percent last year.
�November 23, 1993
SAFE STREETS
"I ask you to help to protect our families against the violent crime which
terrorizes our people and which tears our communities apart. We must pass a
tough crime bill. ... I support ... an initiative to put 100,000 more police officers
on the street •• to provide boot camps for first-time non-violent offenders, for
more space for the hardened criminals in jail and I support an initiative to do
what we can to keep guns out of the hands of criminals. I will make you this
bargain. U you'll paaa the Brady Bill, I'll sure sign it." •• President Clinton in hie
Joint Session Address on February 17, 1993.
•
THE BRADY BILL. The President is ready to sign the Brady Bill, which will
make it more difficult for criminals to purchase handguDS.
•
100,000 NEW POLICE OFFICERS. The President will sign Concreaa' tough,
new crime bill that will help put 100,000 police officer& on the street and give
local and state officials the tools they need to atop crime.
•
MORE PRISONS. The crime bill will fund the construction of new prisons to
make sure that criminals stay behind bars.
•
SAFE SCHOOLS. The President proposed and the Senate pasaecl atronc new
measures as part of the crime bill to make our nation's achoola safer.
HELPING FAMILIES
•
FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE. The President signed the Family and
Medical Leave Act. That law gives American workers job security by providinc
them with up to 13 weeks per yeu of unpaid leave lor child-bhth, adoption, a
personal illneaa or an illneaa iD the family. Thanks to Congreaa and the
President, Americana no loncer have to face the diflicult choice between carinc
for 'their fami1iea or keepinc their jobs.
•
MAKING STVDENT LOANS MORE AFFORDABLE. Congreaa paaaed and·
the President sicned the Student Loan Reform Act, which will make collep more
affordable, lower interest ratea and save taxpayer money throuch direct federal
lendinc.
·
•
NATIONAL SERVICE. Congreaa paaaed and the President sicned a National
Service Act that will enable over 100,000 younc Americana to serve their
commUDities and to eam credit toward higher education.
•
TAX CUTS FOR WORKING FAMILIES WITH INCOMES BELOW 127,000.
The tu plan Congreaa passed was fair. It asked wealthy Americana to pay their
fair share, while pYiDJ more than 20 mi1Uon American famjUea a tu cut
through the Eamecl Income Tu C:redit (EITC.)
�November 23, 1993
REFORMING GOVERNMENT
"I think it is clear to every American including every member of Congress of
both parties that the confidence of the people who pay our bills and our
institutions in Washington is not high. We must restore it. We must begin
again to make government work for ordinary taxpayers, not simply for organized
interest groups ... I believe lobby reform and campaign finance reform are a sure
path to increased popularity for Republicans and Democrats alike because it says
to the voters back home, 'This is your House, this is your Senate. We're your
hired hands and every penny we draw is your money."'·· President Clinton in
his Joint Seaaion Addreaa on February 17, 1993.
•
REINVENTING GOVERNMENT. The President and Vice President Gore have
launched a major effort to reinvent government. The National Performance
Review report was released on September 7, 1993, containing over 1200
recommendations to make government work better and coat leas. These
initiatives will trim the government's payroll by 250,000 jobs and atreamUne
government operations. NPR will cut red tape, abandon the obsolete, eliminate
duplications and end special privileges. The administration baa introduced more
than 40 of NPR'a major propoaala: eliminating special interests like the wool and
mohair subsidies; moving forward on procurement reform; mavins from a paper·
baaed system to an automated-electronic one. The Bouse incorporated some of
those recommendations in a reaciaaion bill the President ia ready to sign.
•
MOTOR VOTER. The President signed the National Voter Registration Act,
which will make it easier for millions of Americana to register to vote.
•
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM. Both houaea have passed a campaign
finance reform bill that will reduce the influence of PACe and level the playing
field between challensera and incumbents. The President will sip the toughest
campaign finance reform bill Congress can paaa.
•
LOBBYING REFORM. AJJ part of the President's budget package, Congreaa
eHminated the tu deduction for lobbying expenaea.
DEMOCRATIC INTERNATIONALISM
•
FREE TRADE. Congreaa and the President have worked together to break
down trade barriers and to paaa the NAFTA. an historic agreement that will
create joba and markets for Americana and protect the environment on both
aides of the border. The President looks forward to continued cooperation from
Congreaa as he completes the GATT negotiations in Geneva and the initiatives
he began in at the G-7 summit in Tokyo and the APEC conference in Seattle.
•
AID TO DEMOCRATIC STATES. Congreaa has supported the President's
package of $2.5 billion in Ruaaian aid to bolster democn.cy in the former
Communist state and to lend stability to the new Rnaaien free market economy.
•
MIDEAST PEACE. The President appreciates the support Congreaa bu liven
him as he broken an agreement that will bring lasting peace to the Mideast.
�'
November 23, 1993
COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH CARE REFORM
"I believe if there is any chance that Republicans and Democrats who disagree on
taxes and spending ... could agree on one thing, surely we can all look at these
numbers and go home and tell our people the truth. We cannot continue these
spending patterns in public or private dollars for health care for lesa and lesa
and less every year. We can do better." ··President Clinton in his Joint Sesaion
Addresa on February 17, 1993.
•
HEALTH CARE SECURITY. The President is committed to passing
comprehensive health care legislation in the 103rd Congresa. For more than 60
years, Presidents and Congress have worked to enact a national health care
plan. Next year, Congresa and the President will deliver.
•
'
IMPROVING MEDICAL RESEARCH.
Congress passed and President Clinton
signed a National Institutes of Health bill that will help keep America at the
forefrOnt of biomedical research in key areas like cancer, heart diseases, women's
health, AIDS, and fetal tisaue transplantation.
PROTEcnNGTBEEMnRONMENT
"Backed by an effective national defeDSe and a stronger economy, our nation will
be prepared to lead a world challenged aa it Ia everywhere by. ethnic conflict, by
the proliferation of weapons of maaa destruction, by the global democratic
revolution, and by challenges to the health of our clobal environment.
"This (economic) plan..• provides the most ambitious environmental clean-up in
partnership with state and local government of 0\11" time to put people to work
and to preserve the environment for our future. • •• President Clinton in hia
Joint Session Address on February 17, 1993.
•
EPA CABINET STATUS. The President is poisecl to sip into law legialation
that would elevate the Environmental Protection Agency to Cabinet status. This
law will strengthen the acency's effectiveness and enhance ita ability to execute
national ancl international environmental policy.
•
FOREST PLAN. After a break-throuch Forest Conference in POrtland, Orecon
with groups on both sides of the issue, the Preaiclent announced a Forest Plan,
endinc contradictory policies from feudinc acenciea concerninclegia1ation
banninc the export of unprocesaed timber. ·
�'
November 23, 1993
SWIFT REACTION TO EMERGENCIES
The President and Congress have moved swiftly this year to address emergencies that
affected the lives of millions of Americans.
HELPING THE UNEMPLOYED. Last March, Congress approved and the
President signed extended unemployment benefits for up to 26 weeks for victims
of the recession. Quick action on the unemployment benefits bill kept 250,000 to
300,000 unemployed Americans from falling through the safety net each week.
•
NATURAL DISASTERS. Congress and the President moved quickly to provide
$6.3 billion in emergency assistance to victims of the tlooding in the Midwest and
$207 million to people affected by hurricanes. The President and Congress also
moved quickly to put federal resources in the hands of those fighting the fires in
southern California.
�THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
November 23, 1993
For Immediate Release
PRESIDENT NAMES C.F.O. AND INSPECTOR GENERAL
AT DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
The President announced today that he has nominated Richard F.
Keevey to be the Chief Financial Officer of the Department of Defense and
Stephen M. Ryan to be the Department's Inspector General.
"We must ensure that our nation's defense dollars are spent frugally,
and that the vast operations of the Pentagon are managed in the most
efficient manner possible," said the President. "Under Secretary Aspin's
leadership, great strides have been taken towards eliminating waste and
fraud, and ensuring the most cost-effective procurement and management
processes possible. With a seasoned manager like Richard Keevey and an
experienced investigator like Stephen Ryan on board, those efforts will
progress even further."
Richard Keevey has spent the last four years as the state of New
Jersey's Director of Management and Budget, responsible for the planning,
preparation, justification, and control of the state's $19 billion annual
budget. He was appointed to that position after more than twenty years'
service in the state's Office of Management and Budget, Department of the
Treasury, and Office of Community Mfairs. Among the other positions that
he has held have been Deputy Budget Director, Deputy Comptroller, and
Supervisor of the Bureau of the Budget. In addition, Keevey has taught
courses in financial management at Rider College and Rutgers University,
and is active in a wide range of community activities. An Army veteran, he
holds a bachelor's degree from LaSalle College, and master's from the
Wharton School of Finance at the University of Pennsylvania. Keevey, 51,
lives in Cinnaminson, NJ with his wife and three children.
Stephen M. Ryan, an attorney with thirteen years of experience in the
judicial, legislative and executive branches of government, is a partner in
the Washington law firm of Brand & Lowell, where he heads the
government contracts practice. Before joining the f1rm in 1990, he spent
three years as general counsel to the Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs. From 1984-87, he was an Assistant U.S. Attorney in Washington,
D.C., from 1984-86, he was deputy counsel to the President's Commission on
Organized Crime. He had previously been an associate in a large
Washington law f1rm, and a clerk to U.S. District Judge Robert A. Grant of
the Northern District of Indiana. Ryan holds a B.S. from Cornell University
and a J.D. from Notre Dame Law School. He is married, has three sons,
and is 37 years old.
# # #
�THE REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT
CBS ''FACE THE NATION''
WITH HOST: BOB SCHIEFFER
INTERVIEW WITH:
RICHARD REEVES, AUTHOR
DAVID MARANISS, AUTHOR
GARRY WILLS, AUTHOR
DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, AUTHOR
SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1993
MR. SCHIEFFER: Today on ''Face the Nation,'' it's
been a year now since the Democrats captured the White
House. It's been a bruising time for the Clintons. They
won some big ones, and they lost some.
So what is the read on the Clinton White House one
year after tbe election? And what is the state of the
American presidency and the American electorate on this
Thanksgiving weekend of 1993?
How does President Clinton's first year compare with
those of his predecessors? What are the lessons to be
drawn as we compare this presidency with those that came
before?
Questions we'll ask four noted observers of the
presidency -- Doris Kearns Goodwin, author of books on LBJ
and the Kennedys, now working on a book about the
Roosevelts; Garry Wills, whose last book on Lincoln won
the Pulitzer prize; David Maraniss, who won the Pulitzer
for his ''Washington Post'' series on Bill Clinton's
campaign and who's now writing a biography of the
president; and Richard Reeves, author of the widely
acclaimed new book on John Kennedy.
ANNOUNCER: ''Face the Nation,'' with Chief
Washington Correspondent Bob Schieffer.
And now, from CBS News in Washington, Bob Schieffer.
MR. SCHIEFFER: And welcome again to the broadcast
a special broadcast this morning. The subject: The
American presidency.
Joining us here in the studio, Garry Wills, Doris
Kearns Goodwin, and David Maraniss, and in the CBC studios
in Montreal, Richard Reeves.
Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much.
�It seems to me that trying to make a report card or
give a president a grade at this stage of the presidency
is kind of a
worthless exercise, but it does seem to me there are some
interesting things to talk about as we go back and compare
how this president is doing to what other presidents were
doing at this point in their presidency and just sort of
try to take stock of the American presidency, the modern
American presidency.
I want to start off the discussion by reading you
something that Bill Clinton said the other day in an
interview in the ''Rolling Stone'' magazine. It seems a
good place to start our discussion this morning.
Here's what Mr. Clinton said. He said, ''It is easy
to be president when the economy is rocking along, when
everybody thinks tomorrow is going to be better than
today, when they think America's a coherent society.''
Then he says, ''But what you've got today is a middle
class full of frustration, fear, and anxiety and a society
coming apart in a world that is more uncertain.''
This almost sounds in some ways like the famous
malaise speech that President Carter made deep in his
presidency -- I should add, of course, he never used the
word ''malaise''; that was picked up by others-- but it
sounds very much that way.
Let me start with you, Richard Reeves, up in
Montreal. Do you think that's a correct read? Has this
president got it right? Does he find a different America
than President Kennedy found when he came to office in
1960?
MR. REEVES: Well, I think the Americas when they
came to office were quite similar but that Clinton, in
talking that way, is going about it in exactly the wrong
way at the moment.
When John Kennedy came to office, Americans were down
on themselves. The economy had grown only one percent a
year in the second Eisenhower term. The Soviets had put up
Sputnik, which scared the heck out of us. They had shot
down our U2 spy plane and killed a summit. Then Kennedy
came on and talked about getting the country moving again,
and the country was ready to hear that.
Now, admittedly, he had it somewhat easier in some
ways than Clinton did, or at least when I last talked to
President Clinton a couple of weeks ago, the president was
talking about envying the fact that Kennedy had an
adversary. And having an adversary, the Soviet Union and
communism, did create a consensus in the country so that
�Kennedy was able to mobilize the country, inspired it. He
didn't tell them as much of what was wrong as he often
said what could be done about what was wrong.
And he was able to build a government which was
essentially bipartisan. The secretary of Defense,
secretary of Treasury, the head of the CIA, his national
security adviser -- down the line, these were prominent
Republicans, and America was ready to get moving, I think,
at that time, and Kennedy understood that and he rode it
for a while.
MR. SCHIEFFER: I guess one of the things you're
saying is that sometimes when you have a common enemy, it
is easier to build a consensus behind a program or some
project.
I'll tell you one of the things that I was struck by
in your book, Richard, one of the parallels is the
disorder. We hear so much these days about the disorder
and disorganization in the Clinton White House, but yet,
as you tell it in your book, it was chaos from day one in
President Kennedy's presidency. There seemed to be no
structure to deal with anything, and there was a lot of
flailing about going on.
MR. REEVES: Well, I think there's a great similarity
in the two men. These are men who rose to the top through
their charm, and I think they both believe that one on
one, they will always prevail. If they can get you alone,
they can talk you into anything, and people like that tend
to distrust organization. Where an Eisenhower or a Reagan
wanted to be on top of a pyramid or an organization chart,
a Kennedy or a Clinton wants to be at the center, not at
the top, so that they see the presidency as a wheel with
themselves at the center and they want to deal with people
one on one, and a certain bent toward chaos is a way of
controlling people. No one is ever quite sure where they
stand.
So that I think that you've got, in Clinton and
Kennedy, at least, two classic political personalities.
They really are lone rangers by nature who use other
people and don't want the other people too well organized
to know what's going on so that -MR. SCHIEFFER: Well, let's ask David Maraniss, who
covered Bill Clinton during the campaign and has watched
him closely over the past few years. Somebody -- I think
it was Stephen Hess, said the other day it's kind of a
mountain goat presidency, that he sort of leaps from one
mountain crisis to another and nobody -- people are always
worried about whether he's going to miss the next time
out. (Laughter)
�In Lyndon Johnson's first Congress, 89 important
bills got through. You had Medicare, you had aid to
education, you had voting rights, you had civil rights.
There's no comparison between that outpouring of
legislation, and I think the real difference is that what
Johnson was able to do in that short period before he got
lost in Vietnam, what Roosevelt was able to do, was to
move the country.
I mean, what we haven't seen yet with President
Clinton -- he's gotten victories in Washington. That's not
the same as making the country feel that they've got a
whole momentum going and that they're moving somewhere
together. I don't think we have that collective sense of
movement, and that's why I don't think it even begins to
compare to poor old LBJ.
MR. SCHIEFFER: Well, what was LBJ's secret? We
always look back on him as being the master of being able
to move the Congress, especially, to his will. Of course,
he failed in the end on Vietnam, but what was his secret?
MS. GOODWIN: He woke up every morning thinking about
the congressmen, went to bed every night dreaming about
the congressmen. He would wake up in the morning and start
calling congressmen. If the congressman wasn't there, he'd
speak to the wife. ''Tell your husband to vote for me.''
If the wife's not there, he'd get the daughter on the
phone-- ''Tell your father to vote for me.''
And then he had these huge charts on his wall all day
long. He knew where every bill was, in what subcommittee,
in what committee, which congressman was in charge of it,
who he needed to call up during the day, and then he'd go
to bed at night and get reports on what the -- reports of
-- his people told him about how the congressmen were
responding. He was called the great wampum man. He would
give them anything they wanted. He had a warehouse in
Texas where each time they came they'd get a gift.
(Laughter)
And you could choose from the bottom floor only at
the beginning, and you got to the top shelf after you'd
been there 20 times. (Laughter)
So he said, you deal with Congress incestuously
(sic), consistently, always. He just never let them go.
MR. SCHIEFFER: All right. That seems a good place to
take a little break. When we come back, we'll talk about
the new role of the
first lady, we'll talk about the changing role of the
�press -- if, indeed, it has changed -- in a minute when we
come back.
(Announcements.)
MR. SCHIEFFER: So we're back talking about the
Clinton presidency one year after the election, the state
of the American presidency, the state of the American
electorate.
David, let me ask you, Doris is talking about LBJ and
how he worked with the Congress. How does that compare
with the way Bill Clinton has gone about it?
MR. MARANISS: Well, people tend to compare Clinton
with Kennedy, but I think in some ways he's more
comparable to Johnson. Clinton always likes to talk about
how he learned from Johnson that, if you look in someone's
eyes and can't tell whether they're for you or against
you, you have no business being politics, and that's
really the way Clinton works, sort of the radar of the
eyes.
And in the legislature of Arkansas, he did a lot of
Johnsonian things. The biggest vote he ever won there on
education reform he got by one vote by pulling out a woman
legislator into the hallway and virtually tearing up and
telling her that she had to think of her grandchildren to
cast this vote. And she said, ''Well, if I vote for this,
I'll lose.'' And he said, ''Well, no, you won't.'' And she
vote for it and she lost. (Laughter)
MR. SCHIEFFER: All right. Let's talk about the new
role of the first lady, or if there is a new role, because
certainly this is a first lady unlike any that we have
seen before. How does all of this strike you, Garry? Is
this a role that has changed now forever?
MR. WILLS: Well, of course, because the position of
women has changed. Now we have a women's movement that has
-- it's the major social change of our time, which as
brought women into corporations, law, the courts, the
academies, everywhere, in vast numbers. And so the
ceremonial role of a woman that existed before will not
exist in the future, and even the Republican candidates
running this last time had lawyer wives and professional
wives. It's very hard now to find young politicians who
don't have, so that, when somebody like Hillary Rodham
Clinton goes into the White House, she's much more like
Louis Howe (sp).
She's a presidential adviser. She's a person who's a
friend or a relative -- Milton Eisenhower, say, with
Dwight Eisenhower -- who's a respected adviser who happens
�to be related to the president, and he takes the advice or
he doesn't. It's not because of any official role. In
fact, the whole idea of a first lady -- it's a nonconstitutional title -- is kind of silly and ceremonial.
If and when-- I shouldn't say ''if,'' but ''when'' --a
woman is elected president, we're not going to call the
spouse the ''first gentleman.'' (Laughter) That's absurd.
MR. SCHIEFFER:
title?
So what do you do, just drop the
MR. WILLS: Well, call her the president's wife. You
called Milton Eisenhower the president's brother. You
called Louis Howe the president's friend. In fact, the
last time I saw Ms. Clinton, she said, ''I'm Hillary
Clinton, PW --president's wife.'' (Laughter)
MS. GOODWIN: No, I agree with you in what I know
you've said, which is that Hillary resembles Louie Howe or
Harry Hopkins more than perhaps Eleanor Roosevelt, because
I think the real difference, even though I think Eleanor
Roosevelt was perhaps the most powerful first lady until
Hillary, Eleanor was an outsider always. From the time she
was a little child, she stood outside the parlor where her
mother -- beautiful mother -- stood inside with two little
handsome children on her lap, and Eleanor never felt she
belonged in that little family setting. And, as a result,
she became a voice for the outside people -- migrant
workers, labor, people who didn't have a voice in
government. Hillary's the ultimate insider. She's right in
the middle of all the policy settings.
But the interesting thing is that I think in
Eleanor's case, even though she was so powerful, when Bess
Truman came in after her, she panicked at the thought of
having to have a press conference like Eleanor had, and
she said, ''Do I really have to do this? I don't want to
talk to the press. I don't know anything about public
affairs.'' You didn't have a requirement for first ladies
to be important in those days. They could sink back into
the ceremonial role. Now it's going to be much tougher,
because the expectations are that she's going to do
something, and I don't know that that's fair, either. She
didn't ask for this. Suppose someone comes along and wants
to bring up a bunch of kids.
MR. SCHIEFFER: Well, let's ask Richard Reeves about
this, because, you know, when the president was elected
and you saw this first lady beginning to take an active
role, you began to hear people say, ''We didn't elect
her.'' But they said kind of the same thing about Bobby
Kennedy, didn't they? And I suppose that in retrospect,
she may have been more qualified for the role she has
taken, because she is truly an expert on health care, than
�perhaps Bobby Kennedy was as attorney general. Would that
be right, Richard?
MR. REEVES: Well, I think the Robert Kennedy
comparison is the one I relate to, too. The president
needs a confidante, he needs someone who has the same
agenda as he does, and I would disagree with Doris. I get
the impression Hillary Clinton asked for this. She didn't
get this by accident.
MS. GOODWIN: Well, not her. I'm talking about some
other women in the future. Oh, no. (Laughter)
MR. REEVES: Yeah, the -- but I think we are -Americans now marry by ambition. President Clinton, then
Bill Clinton at Yale,
married the smartest woman he could find, and I think he
did that for a good reason.
I think also that, taking off on what Dave said, it's
clear that Clinton has a better picture of the presidency
right now than he did earlier, although I agree with the
whining in the ''Rolling Stone'' interview. John Kennedy
would have said the same things, but he would have said
them in private, and he would have yelled them on a
telephone over to somebody to get them changed. He would
not whine, as it were, in public.
But Clinton now-- everybody says, ''Isn't this
terrible? The president is giving away all these things
and all this money.'' Well, the president's a politician,
and that's the way presidents prevail, so that he's
looking West now. He seems to have found a voice on things
like crime and on jobs, and it may be that at the end of
this first year that the Clinton presidency may be getting
ready to take off. The man certainly seems a lot more
comfortable with himself and with the job right now, and
any president in the first year has to learn the job
first.
Johnson had a great advantage in the sense that the
things that he signed on to -- Medicare, et cetera -- were
already in the pipeline from the Kennedy presidency and
the world wanted to do something, even the Congress, to
honor Kennedy, but it may be that Clinton is getting close
to that takeoff point. I hope.
MR. SCHIEFFER: David, what about these two power
centers that we now have in this White House, because that
is what's different. This is not Nancy Reagan working
behind the scenes to make sure that her husband doesn't
get slighted. I always thought that Nancy Reagan was the
ultimate show business wife. She stood back-to-back with
the president so she could watch the back while he was
�watching the front. (Laughter.) This was not what --this
is not the role that Hillary Clinton is playing. There are
definitely two separate power centers in this White House,
I think.
MR. MARANISS: Well, they're a team, but Richard said
that Clinton married Hillary for a reason. She married him
for a reason, too. I mean, I think they truly love each
other, but Hillary also, when she was working for the
Watergate inquiry staff, told her office mate that her
boyfriend was going to be president someday, and that was
20 years ago.
MS. GOODWIN:
Wow.
MR. SCHIEFFER:
MR. REEVES:
That's how smart she was. (Laughter)
MR. SCHIEFFER:
MR. REEVES:
Let's talk a little bit --
Let's talk --
She was that smart.
MR. SCHIEFFER: -- a little bit about the press. John
Kennedy got a great press. Everybody agrees with that.
There were things overlooked there that we look back on it
today and wonder how did that come about.
One of the things that struck me as I read you book,
Richard, is that what we didn't understand and what the
press didn't pick up on is that this man was seriously ill
most of his presidency, most of the time that we didn't
see him on camera he seemed to have been on crutches. He
was heavily sedated. He had to take all kinds of drugs to
just stay alive. Would that happen again today, do you
think?
MR. REEVES: Well, the last person that
question was President Clinton, who was just
Kennedy was able to hide his health problems
that among the things he was taking were not
corticosteroids to stay alive with Addison's
also was regularly using amphetamines.
asked me that
stunned that
and the fact
only
disease, but
Clearly that's not going to happen again, but one of
the reasons it's not going to happen again is that the
toughest scrutiny is during the campaign, not when a man
is president. Kennedy was a rich boy. They have long
driveways. They can get away with quite a lot without the
press sitting on their stoop the way they can with a Gary
Hart.
But Kennedy's health problems, in fact, had been
written about in technical journals, because he was the
�first Addisonian to survive traumatic surgery, so that all
that was available for the press then, but the press
didn't do things like that in those days. And the most
remarkable thing about Kennedy and the press was that
after the total disaster of the Bay of Pigs, when he got
on television and said that ''Victory has a thousand
fathers, defeat is an orphan -- I am responsible for
this,'' the next thing he said was, ''It's not in the
national interest to talk about this anymore, and I won't
talk about it,'' and no reporter every asked John Kennedy
a question about the Bay of Pigs.
MR. SCHIEFFER:
Yes.
MR. REEVES: If Bill Clinton has a Bay of Pigs in
Haiti, we will be on him like an avalanche.
MS. GOODWIN:
MR. SCHIEFFER:
You know, and I think
-~
Is that good or bad?
MS. GOODWIN: I think it's both good and bad. I mean,
I think it's good in that we'd be on him if there were a
Bay of Pigs analog today, but look at Roosevelt, for
example. Here was a man who was paralyzed essentially,
couldn't walk without the aid of crutches, could hardly
walk with crutches, couldn't even get out of his bed in
the morning without his valet helping him to the bathroom.
Yet, the press made a deal with themselves and with him
that they would never take a picture of him on his
crutches, never show him being carried from a car to his
wheelchair, so the country didn't know they had a helpless
cripple as a president. Were we better off? Probably we
were. Probably at that time, we needed the strength in the
White House to give us the confidence to get out of the
paralysis we were in with the Depression.
Today they find great pleasure in -- what's his name?
George? Ford -- President Ford floating down the stairs on
the airplane when he fell, suddenly that -- or you get
President Bush throwing up in
Japan. I mean, there's something wrong today. We don't let
mystery and distance remain in our leaders, and I think
the leaders contribute to it. I think, when President
Clinton went on and talked about his past in such great
detail, we lost a little distance from him that day. It
was like he was on Oprah Winfrey, and I think we've got to
be careful of that. The press is partly at fault, but our
leaders are at fault, too.
MR. SCHIEFFER:
Garry.
MR. WILLS: It's very hard, though, to say how you're
going to preserve that mystery. You know, the press is
�very intrusive and omnipresent and resented for that, but
when you look at the influence of the press on the civil
rights movement, on Vietnam, on current crises, the nation
is aware of things that it was never aware of. It didn't
want to face up to racism in the south, but it saw those
dogs on television and it changed history. It didn't want
to face up to Vietnam, but it saw atrocities over there.
So it seems to me that we really now have the most
informed, most highly developed electoral information that
we've ever had in our history, far greater than at any
other time. And there are disadvantages to that, but as a
whole, it's a very good change, and we were lucky that
something didn't go wrong with FOR and his health.
MR. SCHIEFFER: All right. We have to leave it there.
We'll all gather again on the Fourth of July and get part
two of this report.
Thanks to all of you.
END
~~-
-------------------
~-
--------------
----------
�TALKING POINTS ON WNG RANGE DIRECTION OF THE ADMINISTRATION
New economic vision.
America has moved out from under the dark shadows of a laissez-faire era and a donothing Presidency to a new Administration that sees tackling our economic challenges
as priority number one. The President's address to Congress (like the economic
conference in Little Rock during the transition) was a historic occasion. It showed how
the nation is willing to look very closely at the challenges of investment and training and
growth in new ways. Most now agree that our challenges are so great that government
cannot sit idly by. New coalitions are being formed. Consider the Chamber of
Commerce, which has come under attack from reactionaries who want conservatives to
oppose anything the President proposes.
New ethic of "Do more with less."
Along with growth incentives, the administration has won the largest deficit reduction
effort in history -- amounting to roughly $500 billion. The ironic thing is that for twelve
years, the GOP has tagged Democrats as the tax-and-spenders, but it took a Democratic
President to begin to reverse the deficit legacy of Ronald Reagan and George Bush.
Clinton has raised a sense of hope -· and people's expectations from government.
People expect more out of this administration than they did from Bush's and Reagan's,
when people were so beaten down with cynicism that they hardly blinked when new
scandals were announced. A new mood of hope and optimism brings forth new scrutiny,
where even the press holds you to a higher standard than your predecessors. From new
ethics rules to administrative cuts, to the performance review being overseen by VP
Gore, the President is tightening government's belt and bringing discipline to its
operations from top to bottom.
Health care is the next great challenge.
We expect the plan to be released in May. The nation realizes the system is broken; it
requires bold surgery. Freeing people from the fear of losing their coverage and
maintaining their choice of doctors will be our greatest aims.
An amazing amount of activity in the opening months.
The historically quick passage of the budget resolution (at this point in their terms, no
recent President had passed a program through Congress) shows how successful the
President can be when he stays disciplined and focused on economic concerns. The
family and medical leave act has been passed and signed, unemployment insurance
extended, sweeping policies outlined for long range defense conversion and technological
advances. No Presidency since LBJ or FDR matches this pace. There are some side
effects, however, that may be blessings in disguise: By taking such dramatic action so
quickly, this presidency has shaped public opinion (both pro and con) quicker than its
predecessors. Also, by focusing like a laser beam on the economy, some interest groups
have been disappointed that their agenda has not come before all others. This may
foreshadow long term success. Our first aim is to ftx the economy, and none of the great
Presidencies in American history were able to please everyone at the same moment.
�E X E C U T I V E
0 F F I C E
0 F
T H E
P R E S I D E
05-Apr-1993 01:02pm
TO:
Carter Wilkie
FROM:
Nestor M. Davidson
Office of Legislative Affairs
SUBJECT:
Memo for
u.
MEMORANDUM
TO:
Carter Wilkie
FROM:
Nestor Davidson
RE:
BC and Congress and the First 100 Days
DATE:
In past media attention to the President's success on
Capitol Hill during the First 100 Days, you listed three basic
categories that have formed the basis of judgement, "Direction,
scope and pace of legislation/Source and strength of
opposition/Personal reviews from members".
I would also consider looking into the following issues:
- Ability, compared to predecessors (Bush, I believe, was
perceived to have started with good potential, but rapidly
succumbed to bitter partisanship over issues like the Tower
confirmation, etc.).
- Unity within party (e.g. all the recent attention to Sen.
Shelby).
-Outlook for secondary agenda (other legislation, etc.).
- Knowledge/grasp of Hill parochialism (Reagan, for example, was
praised for attending prayer breakfasts).
- The President and Congressional electoral prospects for the
next cycle.
- Confirmation hearings, problems and successes.
Obviously, the resolution of the current filibuster will
likely play prominently in all coverage of the First 100, as it
is the first contentious challenge the President has faced on the
Hill.
There will likely be a great deal of comparison to Carter's
relations on the Hill, which were generally viewed as dismal. In
the April 16th New York Times, for example, Steven Weisman
�evaluated Reagan by saying, "And, perhaps by luck, [Reagan] has
managed to avoid the serious blunders of many predecessors.
Before the end of their first 100 days, after all, John F.
Kennedy had the Bay of Pigs and Jimmy Carter had already
alienated his congressional allies ••. ".
Carter -- where do you want to go from this?
#####
�THE PACE OF CHANGE: PRESIDENT CLINTON AND THE 103rd CONGRESS
m~Qor
*
Senate passage of the budget resolution marks another
President Clinton.
*
This is the quickest action ever taken on any recent President's economic
package during his first months in office; dates of passage of recent
Presidents' first economic packages:
President Clinton
President Bush
President Reagan
House
3/18/93
5/4/89
5/7/81
Senate
3/25/93
5/4/89
5/12/81
victory for
Conference
j,\ '\rx"
5/18/89
5/21/81
In theory, the budget law requires the concurrent budget resolution to be
completed by April 15. In practice, that has never occurred. If Congress
passes the budget resolution by April 15, it will be the first time ever under
the current budget law. (The Congress has not met the budget resolution
deadline on time in 17 years.)
*
This says a great deal about the President's ability to make his economic
program the top priority in Congress.
*
In just the first two months in office, President Clinton and the 103rd
Congress have moved quickly to improve the livelihood of the American
people: two weeks into President Clinton's term, Americans saw the
Family and Medical Leave Act signed; one month later, unemployment
insurance was extended.
In contrast to the early record of recent administrations: at this point in
their first months in office, President Bush had signed a cut in the salaries
of federal workers, and President Reagan had signed an increase in the
federal debt limit.
*
The change in direction is clear: President Clinton is forging a consensus to
turn government away from trickle down policies toward real deficit
reduction and bold, visionary investments in America's economy.
0
�iii
..
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 18, 1993
MEMORANDUM FOR: George Stephanopoulos, Director of Communications
FROM:
SUBJECf:
~
Carter Wilkie, Communications Research
measuring the pace of change
Since passage of the 1974 budget act (in affect from 1976), the earliest passage of the
budget resolution by both houses has come around May 12 or 13. In some years since
1976, passage has not occurred until June, August or even as late as October.
Under President Reagan in 1981, the House passed the budget resolution on May 7, the
Senate passed its budget resolution on May 12, and the joint resolution was passed on
May 14.
As the article I gave you from National Journal reported, Congress eventually passed
more cuts than Reagan had wanted. And not too far into his first year, Reagan was
backing away from his campaign pledge to balance the federal budget by 1983.
As of this point during Reagan's first year in office, the only major piece of legislation
· passed by the Congress and signed by the President was a temporary increase in the
public debt limit (approved February 7).
In contrast, the Clinton administration is quickly undoing the trickle down policies of the
previous administration faster than any administration since FDR's first in 1933. Two
major pieces of legislation affecting the livelihood of the American people have already
been approved: Family and Medical Leave Act (February 5), and Extended
Unemployment Insurance (March 4). Ultimate victories this year on the economic
package, a health care plan and political reform could make President Clinton's first year
in office rival Wilson's first year in 1913, said by some to be the greatest year of change
in the American system brought about by any administration in history.
As of March 16, President Clinton had met with Congressmen on 63 separate occasions
in his first 56 days in office. He has met with, or invited to meetings, all 100 Senators,
and he has met with 335 members of the House. He has had private meetings with one
or two members 13 times; and he has met with larger groups of Congressmen on
substantive matters 29 times; he has invited members to join him at 21 other events.
�MEMO
TO: CARTER WU.KIE
li'ROM: RARR\' TOIV
3111/93
flA "t.~"J
REi PASSAGE OF BUDGET
R~OLUTIONS
IN THE PAST
The concurrent resolution on lhe budget is a cansressional documenL Lh~ adtlplion of which
require~ no (lre~identlal aclion. Oncr. an identk.al re.solution is appruvoo by bolh houses of
Congress-- U$Ua11y in the fonn of a conference report-~ the l'Quluuun is ctmsidered adopted.
ln theory. budacc law requh"C& lhaL Lla" llull5~L Jcsuluuuu ~ \:uauplc~~ b1 Aprtl 1,. That has
never oc:eurrcd. If it happens &his year, it will bc.the ficst time ever. Fulluwing l'i a list of
\he completion dates for pa.,t hudget resolulions.
. .
.
s
Bsca1 Year
1976......................................................:-...........................................
_...May. 14, l97S
. '
1977...............................................~ ................................................ Ma)' 11. 1Q71t
1978........•.........•......•.•..........•........... ~···-··--··-······································Ma)' 17, 1977
1~7~................................................................................................... May 17, 1978
1980...........................................................·...................................... ~ .. May 24, 1979
1981 ................................................................................................... .June 12, 1980
198l.................................................................................................... May 21, 1981
M1
1983.................................................................................................. .June: 23. 19A2
1984................................................................................................... .June 23, 1983
1985....................................................................................................()ctoher 1, 1984
1986.................................................................................................... August I, l98S
1987....................................................................................................May 15. 1986
19RR....................................................................................................Junc 25, 1987
1989................................................................................................... .June 6, 1988
1990....................................................................................................Mny 18, 1989 ·
f'\
199l ....................................................................................................()ctc..lbef 9, 1990
1992....................................................................................................May 21, 1991
1993 ...................................................................................................Ma,Y 20, 1992
4-
M4
�-
<I'
�........
Acts of Congress approved by newly inaugurated Presidents. Cutoff: April 2.
CLINTON
2/5/93
2/8/93
2/25/93
3/4/93
Family and Medical Leave Act.
Designating Thurgood Marshall Federal Judiciary Building.
Designating "National FFA Organization Awareness Week."
Extension of Unemployment Insurance Act.
BUSH
---2/7/89
3/15/89
3/25/89
3/23/89
3/23/89
3/24/89
..,..---3/29/89
3/29/89
~/31/89
4/2/89
Cut increases in federal salaries under Federal Salary Act of 1967.
Designating "Federal Employees Recognition Week."
Designating "Greek Independence Day."
Proclaiming "National Agriculture Day."
Designating "Freedom of Information Day."
Designating "Women's History Month."
Provide more balance in stocks of dairy products purchased by the CCC.
Commendation on lOth Anniversary of Camp David Treaty of Peace.
Authorize AID funds~r election observer in Panama.
Designate "National Child Care Awareness Week."
REAGAN
1/26/81
~/7/81
2/10/77
2/17/81
~3/13/81
~/31/81
Designation honoring returned hostages.
Increase in public debt limit.
re: Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians.
re: membership of Joint Committee on Printing.
Extend authority of Energy Policy and Conservation Act.
End semiannual adjustment of milk support price.
CARTER
~/2/77
('/'~.:;rq,116/77
2/16/77
2/17/77
-->]./21/77
2/23/77
3/3/77
3/8/77
3/15/77
3/15/77
3/25/77
4/1/77
Emergency Natural Gas Act.
Supplemental appropriations for SW Power Admin. in 1977.
Authorizing continued Senate committee staff salaries.
Extension of deadline for Am. Indian Policy Review Commission.
Fishery Conservation Zone Transition Act.
Extension of filing date of 1977 Joint Economic Report.
Widen authority of Fishery Conservation Zone Transition Act.
Special gold medal award to Miss Marian Anderson.
Dedicate C&O Canal Historic Park to Justice Douglas.
Halt importation of Rhodesian chrome.
Rescind certain budget authority recommended on January 17, 1977.
Continuing appropriations for fiscal year 1977.
file: chrono.cw
�,..
.
\
,
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 18, 1993
MEMORANDUM FOR: Ricki Seidman, Deputy Director of Communications
FROM:
SUBJECI':
{j,;t_
Carter Wilkie, Communications Research
Reagan's early achievements
In an earlier memorandum, I compared the pace of legislative change so far with
previous presidencies. Here is a summary of Reagan's internal actions during his first
. 100 Days in office, taken from "Reagan's First 100 Days," by Steven R Weisman, New
York Times Magazine, April26, 1981:
Mr. Reagan's achievements so far are contained in a package of proposals including 83
major program changes, 834 amendments to the budget this year and next, 151 lesser
budgetary actions and 60 additional pieces of legislation. Not until March 31 did he sign
his first bill - cutting back dairy prices... [italics added]
... his proposal to consolidate at least 75 different health, education and social service
programs into a few big block grants, leaving the states to spend the money with no
strings attached. This move toward a "new federalism" ...
Turning to his critics, he asked, "Have they any alternative which offers a greater chance
of balancing the budget, reducing and eliminating inflation, stimulating the creation of
jobs and reducing the tax burden? And if they haven't, are they suggesting we can
continue on the present course without coming to a day of reckoning in the very near
future? ...
On Jan. 20, he gave an inaugural address devoted almost exclusively to the economy. He
spoke to the nation on television Feb. 5, and addressed Congress in a joint session Feb.
18, presenting the bulk of his economic package on that date. By March 10, he had
completed details of the package ... the boldest attempt of modem times to redirect the
resources of government...
In his very first days, Mr. Reagan therefore issued a blizzard of executive orders, lifting
dozens of Government regulations, dismissing hundreds of Carter holdovers, setting a
Federal hiring freeze and cutting back on travel, office redecoration, consultants and
furniture procurement.
�He met with everybody from the Congressional Black Caucus to the anti-abortionists.
He spoke to the nation on television, addressed a joint session of Congress and let NBC
film a day of his activities devoted to the economy for an hour-long special. Indeed, in
two months, he met face to face with 400 Congressmen and ostentatiously courted the
most powerful Democrat among them, Speaker of the House Thomas P. (Tip) O'Neill
Jr...
As part of his effort to keep the focus on the economy, Mr. Reagan deliberately avoided
speaking out on the controversial agreement that freed the hostages from Iran. He has
deferred such promises as those to dismantle the Departments of Energy and Education,
and he has tried to avoid embroilment in the abortion and crime issues.
Not once, meanwhile, has Mr. Reagan called for sacrifice. "Jimmy Carter talked about
accepting shortages, and look where it got him," said an aide ...
... just before Congress broke for Easter recess two weeks ago, some conservative Senate
Republicans dealt the administration a setback by defecting on a key resolution in the
Senate Budget Committee which didn't cut spending as fast as they wanted ...
Strategy set in early memo
Upon taking office, the memo went on, Mr. Reagan should gear his actions to his call for
renewed confidence in America and for passage of his economic program. He was
warned not to use 'grand rhetoric' until his program was ready, and then to seek to lower
expectations so that the public would understand that his goals could not be achieved
quickly. "Finally, to provide real leadership, President Reagan must engage in a
perennial campaign," the memorandum said and concluded: He should mount a daily
barrage of speeches, directives and meetings to support his legislation, and he should
forget any notion of being an "outsider" in the nation's capital.
fdc:Rcapn.c:w
�THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 17, 1993
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Stephanopoulos, Seidman, Dreyer, Emanuel
FROM:
Carter Wilkie, Communications Research
SUBJECT:
How the Press May Assess the First 100 Days
As the attached article shows, we are in for a range of
assessments due a little more than a month from now.
I suggest that a working group be formed to develop an internal
consensus on the following most likely expected measurements:
Ideological direction and sense of priorities:
Clarity or ambiguity
Comparison to previous Presidencies or eras
Expectations weighed against reality
Promises kept, promises altered
Allies and obstacles
Apparent and ultimate impact on state of the Nation
Relations with Congress:
Direction, scope and pace of legislation
Source and strength of opposition
Personal reviews from members
The President's style:
Persona
Political discipline
Relations with the press and individual political players
Public approval and popularity
.
Controversies, real or perceived, l..e.,:
Homosexuals in the military
Perot
Advisers, officials and staff:
Where the influence lies
What makes this administration's team unique
Pace of staff appointments
Will stars get credit or scapegoats get blame?
Public Opinion
file: FirstlOO.cw
�/(. (_.,-~,·
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 17, 1993
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
~
SUBJECT:
d: '
~~~;~<,) ~~
~r~o/~
~ ~~~ ul~j~
lo.v/,'
{ 'c; {q
IY
r L
{J)- t.V~T
Research ~ ~~
/stephanopoulos, Seidman, Dreyer, Emanuel
Carter Wilkie, communications
How the Press May Assess the First 100
As the attached article shows, we are in for a range of
assessments due a little more than a month from now.
Days~ ~
~ ~-'(r_'
{ QD
V~ (
~,
~
I suggest that a working group be formed to develop an internalu~
consensus on the following most likely expected measurements: ~
Ideological direction and sense of priorities:
Clarity or ambiguity
Comparison to previous Presidencies or eras
Expectations weighed against reality
Promises kept, promises altered
Allies and obstacles
Apparent and ultimate impact on state of the Nation
Relations with Congress:
Direction, scope and pace of legislation
Source and strength of opposition
Personal reviews from members
The President's style:
Persona
Political discipline
Relations with the press and individual political players
Public approval and popularity
Controversies, real or perceived, i.e.,:
Homosexuals in the military
Perot
Advisers, officials and staff:
Where the influence lies
What makes this administration's team unique
Pace of staff appointments
Will stars get credit or scapegoats get blame?
Public Opinion
file: FirstlOO.cw
�PRESS REPORT
(
From a 'Revolution' to a 'Stumble'The Press Assesses the First 100 Days
Ever since FOR ·s first three months in office, it has been almost obligatory for the
news media to review each President's baptismal period in the White House.
BY DO'vt BONAFEDE
o The Washington Star. Ronald
Reagan's First 100 Days were "a
smooth start." The .\'e"· Republic mag·
azine perceived the President as "hitting
the ground stumbling" during his baptismal period in office. .\'e"·s"·eek re·
ferred to "the Reagan Revolution." Se"·
}'"ork Times columnist James Reston
maintained that Reagan "is not presiding
over a ·revolution' but o\·er a ·correction·
of 'ew Deal policies he thinks have
gone too far."'
In print and over the airwaves. the
L.S. news media celebrated Reagan's
plunge into the presidency with vivid
recollections ranging from the release
of the American hostages from Iran
to the "second hone~ moon" following
the \tJrch 30 assassination attempt.
Re"!>ponding on cue to what has become
an obligatory journalistic ritual. the na·
tion's major news organizations indicated
that they were not completely in harmony
in thc:ir assessmc:nts of Reagan's First
I 00 Days. Yet their overriding perception
was that he had s..:ored a personal success
in his presidential debut and may turn
out to be a better Washington politician
than a Hollvwood actor.
'ormally: skeptical reporters seemed
to rcncct the accommodating mood of
the countrv toward the President. Ernest
B. Furgur~n. the bureau chief of The
Sun 1Baltimore). commented on Rea·
gan's "genial salesmanship and the calm
competence of his top-most staff." Writ·
ing in The .'Ve"· }"ork Times Maga:ine.
Ste,·en R. Weisman. the newspaper's
White House correspondent. noted.
"With a gift for political theater. Mr.
ReaJ!an has established his goals faster.
communicated a greater sense of economic urgency and come forward with
more comprehensive proposals than any
new President since the first I00 days
T
(
of Franklin D. Roosevelt. the hero of
his \Outh ......
There was considerably less effusion
over Reagan's economic proposals. with
~orne suggesting that his ta~ cuts could
fuel higher prices and that his spending
cuts could worsen the lot of the dis·
advantaged. As l.'.S. .\'ew.f & H'urld
Report cautioned. "His supply-side economics strategy to curb innation. recession and unemployment simulta·
neously is largely untested." Some
storie)l. though not all. pointed out that
Reagan had pulled back from his pledge
to balance the budget by I 983 e,·en
a~ he was seeking to assure the nation
of the soundncs.\ of a policy aimed at
stimulating economic growth.
.-\side from the merits of his economic
plan. there was general agreement that
Reagan was wise in clearly defining it
as the top priority in the early period
of his .-\dministration. when he was riding
a crest of public opinion polls and Democrats in Congress were virtually defense·
less.
There was critical notice in the re\·ic>AS
of the confusing foreign policy signals
coming out of the Administrationhardly in keeping with Secreta!) of State
Alexander M. Haig Jr."s promise of a
diplomacy based on "consistency. rc·
liability and balance."
:\mong Reagan's introductory o,·er·
tures in the foreign affairs area >Acre
the cfc,·ation of the El Salvador connie!
to a test of t.:.S.-Soviet relations. the
lifting of the Soviet grain embargo and
the proposed sale of AWACS surveil·
lance planes to Saudi Arabia. rSee this
is.we. p. 868.)
And then there was the une"pected
selection of Vice President George Bush
over Haig to head the White House
crisis management group.
The political motivation behind many
of the decisions was transparently evi·
dent. Wrote columnist Joseph Kraft: ··tn
ca..:h ..:asc:. the President let the connict
~urge. and then suddenly made a decision
on behalf of his domestic constituenC\.
To keep his farm interests happy. he
lifted the embargo. To appease the en·
ergy interc~ts and the military. he de·
..:idcd to ..ell the :\WACS to the Saudis.
To keep the domestic interest foremost.
he gave crisis management to Vice Presi·
dent George Bush."'
REAOI:\G TEA LEA \'ES
Whatc,er the risks in reading e,·ents
of the First I00 Days like scattered
tea lca\·e~. it docs offer a convenient
opportunity to take the measure of the
new man in the White House and project
"hat may be e~pected O\·er the balance
of his .-\dministration.
During that brief spell. presidential
..:haracter is developed. working habits
arc set and the tone and direction of
the .-\dministration is fi.,ed. The changing
of the guard is completed and the Pre->i·
dent settles into his job and his llC\\
home amid high expectations. Appr~>
priatcly. the First 100 Days coincide:
with spring. a time of hope and re·
ju\·enation in a connuence of politics
and nature.
lncvitabl~. media reviews recall what
historian .·\rthur \1. Schlesinger Jr. said
of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's lei!·
cndary First I 00 Days. "Congress a,;(j
the country were subjected to a presi·
dcntial barrage of ideas and programs
unlike an~ thing known to American his·
tory."' Schlesinger wrote in The Coming
uf the .\"t'". Deal (Houghton Mifflin
Co .. 195!S).
During that period. he wrote. Roose·
\·cit "sent I 5 messages to Congress.
guided 15 major laws to enactment. de·
li,ered 10 speeches. held press confer·
enccs and Cabinet meetings twice a week.
conducted talks with foreign heads of
....................._______________________
NATIONAL, JOOR!'Al S/16/81
879
�'
From the White House News Summary
The commercial news media were not alone in taking note of President
Reagan's First 100 Days. The White House news summary office published
a special edition on April 30 containing a sampling of media commentary
on the subject.
"Taking the Measure of Reagan's 100 Days," the 17-page report. includes
excerpts from storie~ published in The> Sun (Baltimore). The> Los Angel's
Timc>.t, The> WaJhington PoJt, Til' WaJhington Star, the Newhouse News
Service. the Atlanta Journal and ConJtitution and The New York Tim's
Muga:inc>. as well as various television commentary from the three major
networks.
In an introduction. editor William Hart wrote: "Most of the commentary
is favorable. A few common threads run throughout the articles: President
Reagan and President
Franklin Roosevelt; White
..... ,
House management team;
Secretary of State [Alexander M.] Haig [Jr.); the assassination attempt; [lnte·
rior] Secretary [James G.)
Watt; the President's at·
tempt to remain true to his
campaign pledges: and the
apparent fact that the President. himself. is more popular than his programs."
Criticisms. as well as tributes. are included in the spe·
cial edition.
It summarizes. for e:\ample. a Los Angele.t Times
article written by Robert
Shrum: "Reagan budget has Taking the Measure of R-"""'s 100 Days
its own sacred cows-to-·
,._
bacco subsidies and oil de·
::;:::;.,•,.:,pletion allowance-and a
·~........ " ...... ..._... tr "'*'" -- ... "'-'-•' ....
double standard when it
come~ to federal regula·
lion-deregulation when it comes to worker health or safety. but deregulation
has been all but forgotten in the trucking industry ever since the Teamsters
endorsed Reagan-Bush."
Another story. \\ritten by Lisa Myers of The Washington Star, is summarized
this way: '"White House has been acutely aware ·that delegation of authority
gives pc:n:c:ption that the President is somewhat superfluous to his own
· Administration ... imperative to retain the idea that the President is in
charge."
Originated by President ~ixon. the news summary is a daily compilation
of media commentary gathered by staff members of the White House
press office. It is distributed each morning to high-ranking Administration
officials. including--especially-the President.
....
....
-.
·-'-------------------J
......
state. sponsored an international conference. made all the major decisions
in domestic and foreign policy and never
displayed fright or panic and rarely even
bad temper."
From \1arch to June 1933. the Emer·
gency Banking :\ct. the Economy Act.
the farm Credit Act. the :--;ational In·
dustrial Reco,·ery Act. the Home Owners' Loan Act and the Tennessee Vallev
Act and other important laws were
adopted. the gold standard was aban·
doned and the Civilian Conservation
Corps was established.
880 NATtO,:\L JOLR'I;AL 5/16/11
In the I 00 days. Walter Lippmann
noted. "We became again an organized
nation confident of our power to provide
for our own security and to control our
own destiny."
Recently. Thomas G. (Tommy the
Cork) Corcoran. one of the bright young
lawyers attracted to Washington by Roosevelt. reminisced about the early ~ew
Deal era.
"People talk of Mr. Roose,·elt's first
I 00 D-.1ys and all those laws that were
enacted and programs put together."
said Corcoran. who is now 80. "What
they forget is that many of them were
declared unconstitutional or had to be
redone."
But that made no difference, according
to Corcoran: the imPQrtant thing was
that people were regaining confidence
in themselves and the country.
(
llfE ARBITRARY MILESTONE
Th~ London Observer's Anthony
Holden argued in a column that the
100-day mark is "the most arbitrary.
not to say premature [milestone] avail·
able for judging of political leadership."
Ironically. the news media universally
cite Reagan's first 100 Days in com·
parison with FOR's although, as Holden
noted. the President is bent on erasing
Roosevelt's "furious spate of liberal legislation" from the record.
Similarly. Richard L. Strout. writing
as TRB in The .\'ew Republic. recalled
the desperation of Americans in the early
1930s: "'The country was near revolution .... People were starving but farmer's couldn't sell food: people were cold
but clothing factories were shut. Every
bank was closed." Commenting on an
analogy between Roosevelt's 100 days
and Reagan's. Strout exclaimed. "How
silly can you get?"
!'Oevertheless. the t;.S. press has seldom been inhibited in making arbitrary
or premature political assessments.
Perhaps the earliest review of the Rea·
gan presidency was made by Lou Cannon
of The Washington Post in a piece on
Reagan's "first five days" in office. Not
suprisingly. the article's subhead proclaimed. "President's staff struggling to
gain control.·
A rereading of Cannon's story shows
that despite the frenetic activity of the
Reagan Administration in its First I 00
Days and the "smooth start" subsequently attributed to it by some re·
viewers. a major problem that afflicted
it at the beginning continues to this
day. Cannon reported that presidential
aides were "struggling with the difficult
task of speeding Reagan's lagging time·
table on sub-Cabinet and other political
appointments ... [and an) aide said that
security and ethics checks had taken
longer than anticipated."
In its May II edition. more than
100 days later. Time quotes E. Pendleton
James. assistant to the President for
personnel. as offering the same excuse
for what the magazine called "the molasses pace of presidential appoint·
ments."
Not content with merely making a
100 days assessment. Kraft jumped the
gun and wrote a review of Reagan's
performance after 60 days.
Published on March 19, II days before
the assassination attempt. Kraft's column
(
�~tressed
(
(
that "the Reagan
Administration has started
to lose ddinition and momentum ... He: uplained that
"a letdown of sorts was
bound to follow Reagan's
brilliant debut." Surveys
and other indicators at the
time suggest that Kraft was
correct in his analysis. He
ular resurgence
wake
of the \1arch 30 shooting.
The unofficial record in As ,·an be se~nfrom a sampling of arricl~s 011 Presid~nt Reagan's First /00 Days, the news
terms of news space devoted media -...·er~ not complet~ly in harmony in their assessments.
to Reagan's First 100 Days
goes to rh~ Los Ang~/~s Times. In ad·
From Paris. Cook reported that most the White House. Hargrove replied: Ml
dition to a long piece by Jack "elson. Europeans are taking a wait-and-see at· would give him an A-not necessarily
the newspaper's Washington bureau titude. "\1eanwhile." he wrote. "there in policy but ceruinly in political craftschief. it published two lengthy analyses is a sense of unease and apprehension. manship. Reagan has demonstrated. in
in its "Opinion'' section-one by Richard largely because the Administration has a way that Jimmy Carter never did.
A. Viguerie, a prominent member of not defined any clear diplomatic ob- that he understands how to be President.
the New Right who is recognized as jectives-what it intends to do and how He k
deal
being attuned to Reagan's political phi· it proposes it."
~y
~
Joining the commemoration of Realosophy. the other by Roben Shrum.
press secretary to Sen. Edward \t. Ken- gan's First 100 Days were the media _..._._.........
nedy. D-\1ass.. who presumably was polls.
An ABC :v~-..·s-Washington Post surspeaking as a member of the opposition.
A fourth article was written from the \·ey showed that Reagan's personal popEuropean viewpoint by Don Cook. the ularity is e.,tremely high with the
paper's Paris correspondent. Besides that. with the great majority approving h
the newspaper published the results of over-all performance and supponing his
Time magazine alone. of all the major
a poll it had taken on Reagan's per· proposed spending and tu cuts. The news publications. decided not to publish
formance.
survey indicated that the President's rat· a special section on Reagan's First 100
Both the Viguerie (as might be elt· ing soared II points. to 73 per cent. Days. "We made a conscious decision
peeled) and Shrum articles were fa· immediately following the assassination not to do it," said a member of the
vorable to Reagan.
attempt. just about the same level as magazine's editorial staff. "We had said
"I have been pleased and in many when he entered his tOOth day in office. everything we wanted to say and we
respects pleasantly surprised," Viguerie
A Los Angel~s Tinr~s poll similarly didn't want to simply do a rehash."
wrote. Alluding to one "small criticism ... renccted the President's high standing
he said. "Reagan could have made better with the public. Reagan received an TELEVISIO~ TREATMENT
use of his mandate at the beginning. 83 per cent approval rating in the poll
"etwork tele\'ision, not unnaturalh·.
He had great momentum from the elec- at the turn of his First 100 Days. a also marked Reag;m's First 100 Days. •
tion and he let much of it slow down. tO-point jump since mid-\1arch.
Of the three major networks. NBC
L'.S . .\'~-..·.t & World R~port took still made the greatest commitment to proFor a time. his new Administration
seemed to lack any clear direction. The another tack. It sought the opinion of ducing a progrJm on the genesis of
President and his advisers wanted to Erwin C. Hargrove. director of the In· the Reagan presidency.
'hit• the ground running.' This did not stitute for Public Policy Studies at Van"We made the decision even before
happen."
derbilt lniversity and author of The the inauguration." said les Crystal. NBC
Shrum acknowledged, "It is clear that Pot~.·~r of th~ Mod~rn Pr~sidenc_r (Knopf. vice president for news. "Here was an
America will work hard at liking this 1974). Asked what grade he would give Administration that was given a fairly
President even if his policies don't work." Reagan for his first three months in big mandate. that was proposing fun-
NATJtJNAL JOURNAL S/16/81
881
�damcntal change' and going to reverse
it. th~ opinion makers and sovernment pru,ram like that wouldn't make much
~n~.··
the trend or go\·ernment. This had the leader\. We're Vef)· pleased with that."
potential of being very sittniticant and
CBS-TV didn't decide to produce a
Strangcl). Reagan\ nc~~osmaking qual100 da~~ program until mid-February. itie!>. ;tmplitied b) the drama of the
bccummtt a reall~ important story."
. \"ignmenh ~ere given early on to
"W~ had anticipated it and were logging
'hootin~. were major factors in promptproducer~ and key correspondents.
practical!~ everything filmed in Washing other ne~s organintions to try to
":\11- Roger \1udd. \1arvin Kalb, Irving
ington ... reported Hal Haley. a senior '~nthe~i1c Reag;an\ fiN 100 Days.
R. le\inc. Judy Woodruff and othersprodu\:er ~ith the network. ~aut it was
had a dail) preoccupation with it," Cf)S·
really a crash program the last three EXPECTATIONS
tal ~id. Two camera crews were assittned
weckl> before the show ran. At the time.
Few of the commentaries on Reagan's
specifically to the program. a network·
we were busy in El Salvador and with 100 days made comparisons with Jimmy
d~ignated "White Paper" called "Reathe Atlanta murders."
Carter. It is almost as though Reagan
gan: The First Hundred Days." From
As Haley implied. CBS had not made came directly to the White House from
\1arch I until the program was aired
an all-out commitment to do the show. the Eiscnho~er or Rooscv·elt era.
Called "The first Three Months" and
on :\pril :!3. five producers were assigned
Weisman. ho~evc:r. observed that "bean\:hored by Dan Rather. it was broad- fore the end of their first I00 days.
to it full time and one part time. Two
resean.:hers and eight tape editors worked
cast in t\\O parts. both late at night. John F. Kenncd) had the Bay of Pigs
The liN part wal> shown at II :30 p.m. and Jimmy Carter had already alienated
on th~ l>how. Other technicians cataloged
tap." for possible inclusion in the proEa~tern Standard Time on \1onday.
his congressional allies and had been
gram and clipped articles for background
April ~0. and the second on Thursday, dramaticallv rebuffed b\· the Russians
infl)f'mation.
April ~-'. ;tt the s.ame time except in on his ar~s control initiative. setting
"We~m:t!
... ··_·~it.~?rial and ph)·sical conth\: Wa~hington area. ~here it was not ncg0tiations back as much as a year
tact ~ithi •.
s~"'Hoose very early."
bruadc;1~1 until I ~:-15 a.m. because it for the ill-fated nuclear arms treatv."
C~stal re
· ~'inally. this was
ran int0 " ~chcduling connict with the
Within his first three months. Carter
,.th a show the network,-"··•="!1'~------------------------------of the.,,._~
Ironically. the news media universally compare Reagan's
First I 00 Days with FDR 's although. as one columnist noted, the
President is bent on erasing Roosevelt's "furious spate of liberal
legislation" from the record.
six ~eeks were very hectic,"
c~~tal reported. "There was the added
fac10r 0f the shooting. As a result of
that. we lost a sl.'hedul~d interview with
the Pn:~idcnt. But wc decided to e\pand
thc program fmm 90 minutes to two
h0UI'o ...
.-\ dcl.'i~ion was abo m;td~ not to broadl.'a~t the pr0gwm chronologically but
rather topically-forcign policy. military
affair~. s~nior ad,·iscrs. the econom\' and
the ~houting. The documentary inciuded
comments on Rr.:agan and the presidency
b~ noted governmcntal scholars. including James David Barber and George
E. Reedy Jr.
.-\t the conclusion. commentator \1udd
summed up: "Thc \1arch 30th shooting
rr..>7C everything in place. In fact. thr.:
~hooting is probabl~ what most Amcri- can~ \\ill remember about the I00 davs .
.-\nd because he performed under fire
that da\' as if it had been a movie.
Pr..-,.id.:~t Reagan made it diflicult for
all 0f us to think of him. ever again.
as just another B·grade actor."
The program ''as broadcast in prime
timc. and H.·'tuhington Post television
critic Tom Shales. noted as a harsh
rc' ic:~er. called it a "thorough and pungc:nt report."
Said Crystal: "We got respectable ratings. We didn't look at it as a potential
for attracting a big audience. The question is the kind of people who watched
"The
882
la~t
l'liATIO:'IiALJOURNAL S/16/81
local CBS aflili;ttc ~lation.
The fiN part of "The First Three
\1onth~" dealt primarily with the White
House ~taff organi1ation. Reagan's economic propusab and the assassination
;allcmpt. The second part focused on
foreign puliq and Administration efforts
to roll back federal regulations.
.-\t the conclu~ion of the documentary.
Rather ~;aid: "\fore than most Presidents.
Ronald R.:agan has staked out his pr~>
gram~ c;arl~. He has given us. in these
liN three months. the blueprint by which
hi~ prr.:~idcncy will be judged."
In rc~ronsc to an inquiry about the
~how\ latc programming. Haley replied:
"We would h;l\'l: liked more time. Showing it that late in Washington hurt us
bcc;tusc that is "here our logical audience \\as l.xah:d .... I don't know
about the rating~ e\cept that we had
10 \:ompctc against Johnn~ Carson and
.-\BC .\iglrtline. We weren't happy with
the timc cithcr. We have to take whatever
the nei\\Ork gi\'CS US."
ABC -T\' decided against a special
program on Reagan's fil">t 100 Days.
preferring instead to feature Vice President Bu~h on the II :30 p.m . .Vightline
show. moderated by Ted Koppel.
Explaining ABC's decision. Alan Raymond. a network spokesman. said. "Reagan's 100 days ~ere so newsworthy in
general. a summary piece would not
add a lot to people's kn~·ledge." And
he added. "bc:cause of the shooting. a
had demonstrated that he was going
to rely on style to gain support for
hi~ programs. But even that ~as to fail
him before long. It quickly· became app~trent that he was presiding over a
house in di~rra\· and that he would
run into trouble ~ith his comprehensive
cncrJ.!y plan and government rcorganintion ~chcmc:s .
In contrast with Carter. Reagan's per~0nal appeal is his Administration's
trump suit. The Lus Angeles Times poll.
f0r e.\amplc. ~howed that "the public
generally thinks more: hiJ.!hly of Reagan
personally than they do of some: of his
programs." Reston said. "It is probably
fair to sav that he has disarmed more
people ~ iih his personality than he has
pcr~uadcd with his appointmc:nts or policie~ ... :\nd .\'e"-s"·eek said. "The bullet
meant to kill him has thus made him
a hero in~tcad. tloatinJ.! above the contentions of politics and the \'agarics of
good news 0r bad."
But there arc still the unconverted.
who believe thc most difficult phase
0f Reagan's presidency lies ahead and
that his Administration will rise or fall
on the workability of his programs and
not 0n his persona.
As Time's Hugh Sidey wrote: "Reagan
remains more of a promise than a
fullillmcnt. ... In his 100 days. Reagan
has merely set the stage. This drama
is going to be far more than a oneact play."
0
(
�'s First IIPirl Card
In 1111an: •••••ve1v1ra11
short run. eould further jade pubUc opinion and undermine
the ultimate success or his program.
8enltar Ted 8tevene (R-Aiulcl). Senate assistant ~or·
lty leader: No one reaDy beUevecl this new administration
would move as npldly as It has or anticipated It would do
such an in-depth study or the total Rscal and monetary
poUcles or the country. Some Democnts are saying the
President may set only 70 percent or what he asked ror and
Imply that would not be very soocl. B~t, In fact, to set that
much would be an overwhelming victory for the President.
IGnitor RUIHII I. Long (Dal.L): Reagan Is dolns Rne.
He received a mandate &om the people to cut taxes and
federal apencllq. That's what he Ia trylns to do. I think the
country wants Consrea to so alons, and I think we wiD.
8lnatar Robert C.l!lyrd (D-W.VL). Senate minority lead·
er: President Reagan hall struck a responsive chord with the
American people. Hv has the ability to communicate his
ideas and mobiUze opinion. These traits have served him
weD in the early days of his Presiclency. He should be given
high marks f'or his efforts to bolster our nation's defenses
and Cor his determination to reduce the federal budget.
Democrats support th'!&e goals. bu.t the President woulcf do
weD to consult and IM!.ek expertise &om Democnts on the
various Issues.
Reprelentatlve Trent Lott (R-Mial.). House minority
whip: Reaaan has surprised a lot or old pols In Washlqton
with his 8bdlty to communicate with the media and to
convey a warmth and Interest In the city that have been
missing f'or the last four yean. We won't know Cor sure
about lila abilities Cor a rew more yean. but I'm convinced
he's a true leader. Perhaps more Important Is his comins to
the Presidency with a clear understan~ or what we need
from the sovemment-and what we don t need.
8enator Edward II. Kennedy (D-11111.): The President
has a senulnely lmpresdve capacity to articulate goals that
we can aD agree with. I hope there will be a reafbasis for
cooperation with him. His tax cut Is based on an untried
theory, Is potentially Inflationary and is certainly inequtta·
ble to the forgotten middle class. I am disturbed by the
administration's apparent search for a quick ftx abroad. We
Houee Sptalcer Thoma& P. ''Tip" O'NeU~ Jr. (D-11111.): · must be strong miUtarily, but we cannot afford a foreign
The President has made a very positive lmpreulon on
poUcy based on narrow Ideological stereotypes. The admln·
Congress and the American people in his ftnt two months
lstratlon is wrong to give up tlie issue of human rights and
on Its decision to escalate U.S. involvement in E1 Salvador.
in office. He has extended himselr to members or Congress
in a manner that is greatly appreciated by those who will be
considering his proposals. Whde Democrats will caref'ully
Repreaentatlve Rlohanl a. Cheney (R•Wyo.): Amons a
scrutinize his much publicized economic program, we will
President's great powers is his capacity to decide what the
criticize It constructi'Vely and move it along expeditiously.
agenda will be for the country. Reagan has done that effectively by focusing the nation's attention on the economy
and refraining from gettlnglnvolved In nonessential issues.
Repreeantatlve Jamaa R. Jones (D-Okla.): There Is In
Congress a bipartisan spirit or cooperation to make the
I'm lntrtsued by his abdlty to simplify very complicated
economic program successful. A danger the administration
issues. What he wants to do to bolster the government In E1
faces is In overpromising. Overly optimistic predictions of Salvador is baslcaDy sound. But it's Important that he not let
economic performance, not likely to be realized In the
extraneous Issues dlatract him rrom his fundamental pur·
Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr. (R•Tenn.). Senate lft$rity
leader: I don't recaD a President since John F. Kennedy
getting off to as good a start. Reagan has an unerring
instinct for the right thing to do in terms or poUcy, relation·
ships with Congress and communication with citizens.
U.S.NEWB l WORLD REPORT, April I, 188 1
27
�pose of the next few months. which Is to get his economic
program In place. Allin all, I give him pretty hfgh marks.
Senator Alan cranaton (D-Cal".). Senate minority whip:
Reagan's East start, uong with his continuing porulartty, gives
him a good momentum to get a large part o his program
through. He won the election and Is entitled to a chalice to see
It hlR program works. He will get coopentlon-not obstruction-from most Democnts as long as his poUcies do not hurt
people who depend on government for their very survival.
Senator Jamu A. MCClure (R·Idaho). chairman of the
Senate RepubUcan Conference: I've never seen a President
move as positively to have good relations with Congress. It
Is not all pluses, however. We still have cllfl'erences on his
selection of personnel. Some oEhls appointments have been
disappointing to some RepubUcans. Also, the appointment
process has been slower than some would Ulce. In Eorelgn
poUcy, it Is encouraging that the President has established
good relatitma with our Eriends In Mexico and Canada.
Repree..'Rtatlve Robert H. Michel (R-IlL). House mlnorl~
leader: I a~•n't know oE any President in.:X time who a
gone out of! .ta way so much to cement a
relationship
with Congra Erom the beginning. What President in my
UEetlme-inclu~·.ans some RepubUcans-would have had
the guts to propose spending reductions as large as Reagan
has and, then, to go out and defend themP Of course, there
will still be the test to see how tough he hangs In there.
Repruentatlve Guy Vander Jagt (R-Mioh.): Rl'.agan has
given us seine razzmatazz and has galvanized American
pubUc opln!on behind his programs. But he Is giving us Ear
more than just style. There Is a great deal of liUbsttmce in his
proposals. His relationships with Congress have been out•
standing. I have had more contact with the White House in
the first few months of Reagan's administration than I had
In the entire four years under Carter. I think many Demoants would say the same thing.
Repreuntatlve James c. Wright, Jr. (D-Tex.). House
The President has done a superb job of
communicating with the pubUc. He's off to an auspicious
~ority le~er:
28
start in his relations with Consress. '11le future of that
relationship will be determined by how well he can work
with those of us willing to coopente and compromise.
There's been quite a bit of rhetoric. Now, we are settlns
some or the details and speolftcs of his program. We wiD
have to study them, but we Democnts want It undentood
we actively are coopentlng.
R.........tlve Thoma 8. Poley (D-Wuh.). House ma·
jorlty whip: Reagan has had a good beginning. He has
proceeded to build pubUo opinion behind his programs and
to set his adminlstntion moving in an orderly way. But I
never beUeved the ftnt hundreddays or a set period in the
beginning was a meanlngEul test oE a new President. He
will be judged further down the road. Meanwhile, we Dem·
oonts In Congress will coopente. Our hand II out to him•.
8eMtor Paul Laxalt (R-Nev.): I think the Preddent's
paclcqe of economic measures, including his tax-cut proposals, will be substantially adopted by Congress. In Eorelgn
poUcy, the administration's consultations with the NA'tO
allies have gone very well, due in great part to Secretary of
State Alexander Halg. Reagan's position oE ftrmness in respect to the Soviet Union Is approved by most memben oE
Congress. Conservatives approve of his poUcy on El Salva·
dor, although others may ti8 concemed by it.
Senator Henry 11. Jaolclon (D-Wuh.): The President is
oft' to a good start on defense and Eorelgn policy. On the
domestic side, there .. stro:'f..:;port ror the thrust or his
attack on Inflation. He faces
eement, however, on the
kind of tax outs that should be appUed. In the end, I beUeve
Congress will make changes in the apeolflc spending cuts
that the President has proposed but Will give him the bulk
of the outs he has asked for. The EeeUng generally Is that, In
Rghting Inflation, he has the only show In town and should
be given the beneRt of the doubt. I share that view.
Senator Bany Goldwater (R-AriL): On the whole, I'd give
Reagan an Anow-not because he has accomplished so much
yet but because he has succeeded In raising military spending
and Is seeking some needed outs in other spendfns. Clve hllll
another month, and we can rate him even higher.
C
U.S.NEWS • WORLD REPORT, April I, t 88 t
�'.'
..
Excluslve.Survey
·low ·aaaaan 'R
With congress
What are the President's strengths and weakne111a? What
·do the lawmakere really thlnk·ot hie pollolee? Will
he oontlnue to hfjve hie way on Capitol Hill? Demoorate
and Republloana give the answers In a USNAWR poll.
While respeotins ·aonald Reapn as a strons leader,
memben ol Collp'M are becomlns more and more doubt·
Eul that he baa the amwen to America's peralltent clomeatio
and forelp problelllli
·
Skepticism Ia mountfn8 particularly over the President's
economic prosram lncluc:Uns ·his propoaecl new round of
budset outs, and hj, abdlty to lhape and Implement a
comprehenatve forel61fl poltoy. As a result ol these and
other orltlolama, many aenaton and representatives are
foreoaatlns an lnoreaaJngly tense relationship between CapItol Hill and the White flouaeln the months ahead.
Consr•'s candid llppralaal ol Reapn-hla wealcneaea as
weU as hlastrensths--emersea from a U.S.NIIWI cl World
Rsport survey on th11 President's performance durlns hll
Rrst elsht months In offtce. Questionnaires were sent to all
. 434 repreaentativea-oORe seat Ia vacant-4Uld all 100 aena·
tors. Reapondfns were 228, or 43 percent, of the memben ·
of CoRif888, many of whom· elaborated on their anawen
with thoughtful, han~wrltten comments.
Althougn a hlsher proportion of Republlcana responded
than did Democrats--despite an overall Democratic ml\lor·
lty In Consrea-mernbers of the two ml\lor oppoalns par·
ties offered strlldngiJ• similar evaluations on key phases of
the President's perfoJ.mance.
More effective th11n Carter. Most Democrats joined with
virtually all RepubUuana In ratlns Reagan as the atronsest
President to come al(>ngln many yeara. Spealdng for many
of his coUoquea of both parties, Representative Daniel
Akalca (D·Hawoll) aatd Reagan "has managed to sfve the
people of this count!')' a sense of unity and of purpose we
haven't seen Blnce Fr·anklln D. Roosevelt.''
Added Senator James Abdnor (R·S.D.): "Any man who
can face the kind of }~redetermined judsmenta and oppoal·
tlon that Ronald Rearcan baa faced, and stlll achieve a ml\lor
reahaplns of a natlo\,'s economy, has to be recosnfzed as a
atrons Prealdent."
The survey found Reasan to be, In Consreu's eyes, a far
more efFective leadt~r than hla predece110r, Jimmy Carter.
Reasan was rated aa a "strons"
President by 88 pe'!'cent of par·
tlclpatlng lawmakers. Only 9 per·
cent ranked him as "averase"
and IS percent as "below aver·
ase" In job perfo1~mance. By
comparison, Carter was judsed
as strong by 49 per••ent, average
by 40 percent and bnlow averase
by 11 percent or la•;vmalcera par·
tlclpatlnsln a almllor poll by the
magazine In 1977.
Reagan received particularly
high sradea for hla electlveneu ........ bHn 1'rtmlrk•
in deallns with Capitol Hill. ably IUOHIItui"IO fir,
U.S.NEWS l WORLD RI!I.'ORT, Oot. 12, 188 1
Some 93 percent of the respondents rated him ''very
effective" with Consreas,
compared with· 7 percent
llviDS Carter a Uke rating In
'1811. Even orltlol of Rea·
pn'a ~ voiced respect f'or hla poUtloal abdltiea. ''I
dlsqree with many of hlijrlorltiea, but he baa been masterful In his approach,'' sal a Democratic House member.
Qted repeatedly was Reasan's poUtical aldU In Blmulta·
neoudy pUahina throwdl Consreu, deaplte determined
Democratic oppolltion,his 35-bl1Uon-doll8r budget-reduction prosram for 1981 and a 749-bliUon-doUar tuo0ut bW to
be Implemented over ftve years. ''The ftnt six months havo
tumed the country around, with Consreu clolns the row•.
Ins and Reapn In the bow yeWns, 'Stroke!' " commented
· Representative· Henry Hyde (R·IU.).
How baa 1\eapD maDilled toauoceed where Carter larsely
f'allecl In promotfn8 bll leslllative ppamP One nason,
aocordlns to Representative John}. LaFilce (0-N.Y.),Ia that
"Reasan wrltea ofF certain Institutions and caters to others.
Carter tried to please everyone on every lllue and suoceeclod
In aUenatlns almoat everyone."
Equally Important, In the view ol Representative Jim
CoWna <R·Tex.), Ia that Reasan "baa a completely honeat
approach to Collp'M. No aurprlael. He builds hll case on
facta and ftshta hard to put It throush." ·
Reapn's most potent aaaet, aocordlns to an overwhelm·
Ins nudorlty ·of lawmakers reapondlns, Ia "hll ablllty to
marshal public support for hll prosram."
RepubUcana were exuberant In pralalns Reapn'a mastery
oftelevlalon as a means of communlcatlns with and lnOuenolng the pubUc. Said Representa·
tlve Bob Llvlnpton (R·La.)s "He's
catalyzed the people who can
really set thlnp done up hereour constituents. After his taxo0ut
speech, the phones rans oft' the
walla to support hll prosram."
Democrats, too, were lm·
prel&ed by Reqan's aldllas a com·
munlcator. "He Ia eapeclally
atron1 on television and tiaa had a
sreat Impact on American attl·
tudel," concluded Representative
WllUam R. Ratchford (D-Conn.). heidi PN1Id1nt .._..,.
Asked what baa been the Prell· In hllforolgn polloJ.
dent'• moat notable achievement,
an overwhelmlns 75 percent of the napondenta pointed to
hll triumphs In tax and budget lellalatlon. Another 10
percent aald Reapn's ohlef accomplishment baa been In
reldndllna a aplrlt of oonfldonoe thrOushout the land.
Spealdria frOm a RepubUcan atandpolnt, Repnaontatlve
27
�handUng of the·alr·trafftc controllen' strike as an encouras·
lJvfngston said that Reagan "has led the country to a new,
positive attitude and turned us away f'rom the negativism of Ins sign that he will· stand up to pressure and opposition
within the government.
.
the last 10 to 20 years."
How etfeatlve In foreign affalra? It Is In coping with
Memben of Congress bad a wide ~ of opinions on.
America's allies and advenarles abroad that Reagan has
which lndlvlduala or groups.exert the·moat lnRuence over
shown the least aptitude, according to. a ~orlty of the
Reagan. A ~orlty of survey participants felt that business
respondents. Only ~ percent regarded the President as
leaden had his ear most often,
very eft'ectlve as a world leader, while 43 percent said he
followed by conservative poUtical
was average and 20 percent regarded him as below average;
groups, econombts and military
"He seems very unsure of himself on foreign aff'aln,"
leaden. Many said· they beUeved.
observed Representative William M. Brodheacf (D·Mich.).
Reagan was strongly lnRu·
Added a House RepubUcan anonymously: "His foreign poU·
. enced-tome said overly lnRuenced-by top White House aides
cy seems Ill-defined and somewhat na\'ve compared with
his comprehensive domestic poUcy.''
Edwin Meese Ill, James A. Baker
The President's proposal to sell AWACS surveillance air·
Ill and Michael !C. Deaver. "You
craft to Saudi Arabia despite Israel's opposition was cited by
might also throw In Budget Dl·
rector David Stockman and De-.
members of both parties as an example of misdirection In
fense Secretary Caspar Welnber·
forelln polloy. Al8o criticized were Reagan's decisions to
ger," added a House Democrat.
bullcf the neutron bomb, his tolerance of South American
But Representative Robert
dlctatonhlpa and "his willingness to permit the sale of
Walker (R·Pa.) said Reagan's cabmilitary hafdware everywhere,lnclucUns China."
Inet style of government "seems
But othen, such as Representative Don Bonker (D·Wash.),
to be working well, thus far, and appean to have the
said· It was too soon to·evaluate Reagan's abiUty as a world
greatest Impact on the President's thinking."
leader. ''The best that can be said Is that he hasmadeno~or
The President's economlo advlsen drew heated criticism
blunden," Booker concluded..
from some Democrats. Representative Peter A. P8)'88r (D·
~epubllcans generally were optimistic that Reagan's
N.Y.) asserted: "The President Is being led down the road
global stature would grow. "Our foreign poUcy will contln·
ually be stronser as the President has more time to devote ·
by economists whose theories are not going to hold up."
Over all,lawmalwll'S found Reagan deftclent In managing
to forelp aft'aln," contended Representative Denny Smith
the bureaucracy and deallns with foreign governments•.
(R·Oreg.). But Representative Vln Weber (R·Minn.).
The bureaucracy, said ~tatlve Arlan Stangeland
warneda "America has Callen so far In world esteem over
the last US. yean that It will be moat dlftlcult for any Amerl·
(R·Minn.), will be Reagan's ' toughest nut to crack." Representative Bill McCollum (R·Fia.) found fault with his "slow· . can Preddent to exert world leadership."
ness In Rlllns key lower-echelon positions."
Other criticisms of Reagan, mostly from Democrats, foMany memben, however, predicted Reagan eventually
cused heavily on his handllns of the economy. The Presl·
would come to grips with the bureaucraoy. Several cited his
dent was blamed by some for persistently high Interest
Rlllrlllrd Fra• BlllfiD
U.S.News & World Report asked 10 questions
of all members of Congress. Replies were received from 228 representatives and senators,
43 perc(lnt of the membership-
Q
After eiC.ht monthaln office,. how would you
rate Ronald Reagan aa President?
A strong President • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 88%
An average President • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 9%
A below-average President • • • • • • • • • • • • • 6%
Q
In what area, aa you aee .lt. does the Preal·
dent•a greatest ability lie? ·
Maraha!lng support for hla program • • • • • 61%
Exerting polltlcallaadarahlp •••••••••••• 26%
Working with Congress • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 18%
Managing the bureaucracy • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 3%
Dealing with foreign governments. • • • • • • • 3%
Q
Where, In your Judgment. Ia the Prealdant
weakest?
Dealing with foreign governments. • • • • • • 61%
Managing the bureaucracy • • • • • • • • • • • • • 40%
Exerting polltlcalleadarahlp ••••••••••••• 6%
· Marahallng support for hla program • • • • • • 2%
Working with Congress • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 2%
Q
How do you regard the Prealdent.aa a world
leader?
Very affective ...••••••..•............ 37%
Average. In effactlvanaaa • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 43%
Balow average In effectiveness. • • • • • • • • 20%
Q
How would you rate the President's effeotlvene• In dealing with Congre11?
Very effective . . . . . • • • • . .• . . • . . . . . . . . . . 83% ·
Average In effectlvenaaa • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 7%
Balow average In effactlvenass. • • • • • • • • • 1%
USNaWR lillie
28
U.S.NEWS a WORLD REPORT, Oat. 12, 1881 .
�ntes and economic atapatlon and tor champlonlng cut·
his position after a ftrestorm or protest &om retirees and
backs In socJal prOgrams. among other things. Represent&·
other beneftciarles.
tive Dave McCurdy (D.Olda.) accused Reagan or giving
The survey also exposed a Eesterlns:problem within the
away "too much revenue with the tax cut" and "grosalr,
Republican ranks that could threaten the almost solid supunderestimating the fmpact or Inflation and Interest ratea. •
port Reagan has received &om his party In Con...... 80 rar.
Representative Bob Traxler (D-Mtch.).found Reagan "In·
Moderate Republlcuis &om the North and Midwest are
aensitive to the pain and hardship he's causing the poor,"
srumbllns beCause they feel the admlnlstntion Is Ignoring
whde Representative ParrenJ, Mitchell (D·Md.) contended
their views and polltlcal·needs. One Northam Republican
that "he has rather·polnteclly Ignored minorities."
acoused the President or "not be~ sufRolently sensitive to
Other Democrats chided hfm Eor 'lnflulbWty, excealv_,
needs or the North and. Midwest. ' while another said he
zeal·ln pre8lllng his beUeti· and Imprecision on details. ·Rephad shown a "regional bias toward the South and West."
resentative Richard Gephardt (D-Mo.) complained that
Whlt'a.to ·oame. How wiD Reagan
with Capitol HID
Reagan lacks ~any lons·ranse vision· and comprehension or between now and the 1981 congressional eleotlonsP Facing
the Impact on tomorrow or today's policies."
a lqlslatlve apnda laden with political and 800ial contraAmons Republicans, dlscontent was scattered and rela· . veny, most respondents predicted that he wiD ftnd Con·
tlvely mild. The vast ~ority. or the RepubUcans qreec1
..... -pliant 1n the·ruture than·m the Rnt halE or 1ea1.
with Senator Thad ·Cochnn (R·Miss.), who found Reagan
Democrats generally were more pealmlstlo than Repub"remarbbly succesiEul with no real disappointments."
lloans, with many forecasting that Reapn's congr81810nal
'The chleE complaint or many Republl08ns: Reagan's poll·
relations· would •be. only fair, or perha.Jt8 wone than :they
have been. About a third or the respondents, mostly Repubcles are not conservative enough to suit them. Represent&·
tive WIWam E. Dannemeyer (R;.caw',) was disappointed
licans, said 1\eapn would continue to
or.very wen
with Capitol HilL Members oF both parties stressed, howevthat the President didn't aeek'.heavler outs In t'eder8l spend·
Ins this year. ·"Reagan's targeted budget 'OUts for ftscal·year ·er, that Coqress's continued aooeptanoe or Reapn'alead·
1981 are t'ar below what Is ·needed to brfns down·lnterest ·enblp WOl depend larsely on the economy. Representative
BW Alexander (D-Ark.) aalch ~'Reagan's contlnuid SU008881n
rates,'' Dannemeyer aald. "With
strong presidential leadership,
domestic polloy Is contingent upon some visible Improvement In economic oondlti• notably Interest rates;•
we could cut 40 to 150 biUion dol·
Iaramore."
·
Added Representative E. Clay Shaw, Jr. (R·FlfL)s"IEinfla·
tion and Interest ntes are not brought under control, I
Senator Steven D. S)'IDJDI (R·
Idaho) thought Reagan had been
would expect that coJ11re881Den on bOth aides or the aisle
would attempt to plao8 distance between themselves and
"too slow" In formUlating and ex· .·
the President as we approach November, 1881."
plalnlng his nationil-defense prosnm and in outlining his stnteIn sum. the results or the IIW'V8)' could be Interpreted ~
glc policy.
the White House as generally excellent poades on Reagan 1
Some Republicans said .the ·
= - c e · ·But the replies also. contained warnlnp to
:President blundered politically .·
that Congresa .Intends to take a harder look at his
pollOtesln the future· than It has In the past.
C
In makln1 an ·abrupt call last Repreetntatlve Hvdel
spring ·Eor ·cutbaCks In ·Social· Se- ·Prelldent ''1181 tumed
curlty beneftts. Reagan modified· oountrv.arounct."
rare
rare wen
t
.•
.•
i
•''
D
·Q
In .what field of presidential action 11 Reagan moat etteotlvet
.
·Q·:
:What, If anything, hal dlaappolnted you
· .about the Prealdant'a performance 10 tart
Domestic affaire ••••••••.•••••••••••••• 95%
Foreign affairs.•••••••••••••••••••••••••. &%
Q
Economlc.program ·Impact,
·lntereat·rates •••••••••••••••••••••• ,· 24CM.
Soclal..program cutbacka,
lnaenaltlvlty to:poor and aged • • • • • • • • 19%
·Nothing at all ••••••••••••••••.••••••••• 13%
Foreign and military policies,
AWACS deal ••••••••••••••••••••••• 12%
.Inflexibility, exc~lva zeal • • • • • • • • • • • • • 11%
.Not conservative enough ••••••••••••••• 9%
Other •••••••.•••••••••••••••••••••••• 11%
·who, In your Judgment, .Ia moat 'Influential
With ·the President?
·Buslneaa leaders • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 51%
ConaaNatlve political groups ••••••••••• 18%
Economists •••• ,,, •••••••••••••••••••• 12"MIIItary leaders • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 84M.
Religious 'activists. • • • • • • • • • • • •.• • • • • • • • • 1%
Other groupe • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 8%
•
What Ia th~ Prealdent•a moat notable
achievement ao far?
Q
Cutbackaln spending, reducing taxes • • • 75%
Creating mood of confidence .. .. .. .. .. • 1OCM.
Marshaling support from public •••••••••• 8%
Other •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 7%
Q
How do you expeot the :Prelldent to fare
with Congren between now and the 1•
eleotlonat
Not as well u flrat abc months • • • • • • • • • • 44CM.
Well or very well •••••••••••••••••••••• 30CM.
Fair or woraa •. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 14CM.
Depends on the economy ••••••••••••• 10%
·can't predict •••••••••••••••••••••••••• S%
Noll: Some reepondanla did not anawor Ml'l que111on. Peroontegoa n baed onlho IU'IIbclr oiiiiiWIII to oea11 quoa11on. Tlllllllmav liCit ldd beaaulo o1 ~
U.S.NEWB • WORLD R&PORT, Oot. , 2, , 88,
28
�NATIONAL AFFAIRS
The Second Hundred Days
or the month since his wounding by
F
a would-be assassin's bullet, Ronald
Reagan's Presidency and his economic pro·
gram had bobbed along at half speed await·
ing his recovery. But last week, on the 99th
day of his tenure and the 30th of his con·
valescence, he returned to the wars riding
an extraordinary surge of personal senti·
ment and Irresistible political force. He
chose the high ·theater of a joint session
of Congress In prime television time to dem·
onstrate that he ,Is back In charge and to
summon up support for his measures "to
clean up our economic mess." The tumul·
tuous welcome home he received there was
token enough, if any were needed, that he
has won what one aide called a rare Second
Hundred Days-and that he will be assured
of getting most of what he has asked before
they are over.
Whatever doubts lingered as to the out·
come seemed to evanesce when, at the eve
of a critical ftoor vote In the House this
week, Reagan :admonished the Congress
that It was "time we tried something new"
and brought even mainstream Democrats
22
to their feet to join a rinslns ovation. "I
wish we could take that as the vote and
go home," one Reasan man whispered to
another. The opposition In fact did besin
regroupins by the weekend, mounting a
spirited counterattack for their own draft
budset and against a thinly dissulsed "bl·
partisan" clone of Reagan's own. But the
smart-money betting on both sides of the
aisle was that the President would prevailthat he would hold all but three or four
of his own Republican troops In line and
lure away enough conservative Democrats
to win by anythins from a squeak-In to
a landslide.
Good Peella11 That prospect was in turn
a measure of the real triumph of Reagan's
hundred days: his success at clothing his
Presidency-and smotherlns his opposi·
tion-in a blanket ofpersonalaoodwlll un·
matched since Dwight Eisenhower. Wheth·
er his Era of Oood Feelina will indeed last
an era or only a season remained an open
question. But his people are satisfied that
he had established himself before the shoot·
Ins as the most likable President since Ike-
his popularity ratings In some surveys are
the hlshest In polllns history-and that he
has since bucked up the morale of a nation
with his gallantry under gunfire. Their ex·
hlblt A Is a Robert Teeter poll showing
that the number of Americans who think
the country oft' on the wrons track has
shrunk by nearly half, from 82 per cent
when Jimmy Carter discovered ~he great
national malaise two years ago to 48 per
cent In Reagan's third month.
The President's tactical problem was
transferring the slow from his person to
his proaram, and his people seized on his
return from his sickbed as a precious moment "to be pumped," one said, "for ev·
erything we can." They thousht first of
an untaxing radio speech, then a television
address from the Ovlll Office and finally
a dramatic trip to the Hill-an option they
tried out on Reaaan only after clearlna It
with his doctors and his wife. In draftina
sessions, they kidded openly about substl·
tutins the cue "Cough" for "Pause" In his
text as a play for sympathy. Among them·
selves, they fretted that it could happenNEWSWEEK/MAY ll, 19111
�swered, but his aJow or pleasure gave him
away. Theotherside, by contrast, had come
··back from a two-week Conaresslonal recess
more painfully aware than ever that the
country was behind the President. Speaker
O'Neill had sensed as much before the boll·
day and had gone oil' to Australia and New
Zealand Instead of staylna behind to ftaht
the tide. "Well, where do we stand?" he
asked his operatives on his return. "Fifty
to 60 votes down," party whip Thomas
S. Poley guessed from the scattered ftnt
returns. Afterward, the Speaker met the
press and all but conceded defeat. "I've
been a politician Ions enough," he said,
"to know when to ftght and when not to."
'Wbat Kbul of Pool AID II' In the days
thereafter, the Democratsedpd near panic.
"We're golns to set the crap kicked out
of us." said one, only barely oventatlns
the consensus odds. The dally meetlnp of
the party whips were hot with undirected
anger. The corridors rumbled with com·
plaints about O'Neill, for havlns ftnt left
the country and then having acknowledfed
aloud what his colleasues were whispertns
In the cloakrooms. Some traded rumon
that he would stand down as Speaker after
1982. (Not so, said O'Neill.) Some prased
him to so on TV and answer the President.
("What kind of fool do they think I amr•
spake the Speaker.) Some fluttered through
a day's flirtation with a proposal to out·
Reasan Reasan by deferrinslndlvldualln·
come-tax cuts for a year and thus balancing
the budget now Instead of In 1984, as the
Congrru-tmd exhort• It to hrlp him 'clftln up our «tH~omlc m•'
President has proposed. The Idea wilted
that he might fall into a painful paroxysm in the coming House ftght, was the $689 overnight.
of coughing on live TV and 10 divert at· billion Oramm-Latta budget resolutionThe outlines of a Democratic counter·
tentlon from the merits or his program to a nominally bipartisan measure that closely strateSY did begin emerslns by the week·
the slow repair of this 70-year-old body mirrored his own and was In fact mostly end, thouah without much Impact on the
aner a near-miss brush with death.
ghostwritten by his man David Stockman. pervasive sloom over the outcome this
They needn't have worried about Rea· The $714.5 billion Democratic model, even week. Party leaden tried a new sambit In
gan, in flesh or fighting spirit. Waiting in with Its lower deftcit, was no alternative the biddins war for 47 conservative DemoSpeaker Thomas P. (Tip) O'Neill's office at all-"an echo of the past" with too little cratic swing votes (followlna story), oll'er·
to go on, he did complain that his throat money for the military, too much for the Ina to restore $6.5 billion In military spend·
felt "raspy" and asked for a glass of hot welfare state and only a one-year Income- ina authority to the Democratic budaet and
water. But he managed denty not to notice
thus match Reagan dollar for dollar. They
an outsized book on poverty. in America
began a propaganda oll'enslve stressing that
that O'Neill had laid out to bait him withthe Reagan-Oramm·Latta cuts would be
not even when the Sptaker tried steering
crippllnaly deep and, because they would
him toward it. And his performance was
come out of authorizations rather than
year-by-year appropriations, would be next
a smash from the moment he entered the
soaring House chamber, smiling and wav·
to Irrevocable as well. And O'Neill was
ing, to a three-minute thunderburst ofwhis·
confcctlns his own scheme to force the Reties, huzzahs and hand clapping. By his
publicans to stand up and be counted on
own design, the President· had stripped his
a sampling or controvenlallndlvldual cuts,
speech of all but the briefest allusions to
not just the budset as a whole. "You don't
his wound. "I want them to be able to
think I'm solns to do this In one packase,
uy at the end that I didn't exploit the tax cut Instead of three. ''The old and com· do you?" he asked. "I'm golns to have
shooting," he told staffers who had urged fortable way," he said, to a show·stor'pina some selected votes-and I'm aolna to pick
him to milk it-and the roar of the crowd clap or applause, "is to shave a little ltere some beautifUl ones."
confirmed that he need not have mentioned and add a little there. Well, that's not ac·
But prospects were brisht In both cham·
it at all.
ben for Reasan's budset-end briahtenlns
ceptable any more."
'The Only Aaawer'1 His text instead
That Reagan had recovered the Initiative for at least a two-year modification of his
started and ended with patriotic homilies was evident, to him and to the opposition, tax cut at somethlns near the 10 per cent
on the health of the American spirit-"We In the public huzzahs and the private com· annual rate of reduction he wants. In the
have much greatness before us"-and ham· pliments as he handshook his way out of House, he needed a minimum of 26 Demomered hard in between on hiKcut·and-slash the House. "Terrific job," an aide told the cratic votes to carry Oramm-Latta and was
recovery plan as "the only answer we have President back at the White House. "Aaah, thought to have 31 to 36-enouah to win
leO" to the ills of the economy. His choice, I don't know about that," Reagan an· If discipline holds in his own party. In the
For Ronald Reagan, an
extended honeymoon
-and a dramatic
return to the wars for
his economic program.
NEWSWEI!K/MAY II, 19111
ll
�..
12-to-9 vote apinst the budget turned into back to before the '30s." If so, it is Rea·
san's triumph to have reduced that war
a 15-to-6 victory for it.
Reagan could be said indeed to have pre- from an epic strussJe over principle to a
Senate, three ultraconservative Republi·
cans who had deserted him in a humiliating vailed in the battle of the budget before hassle in the marketplace over the price.
Budget Committee vote before the recess It was formally joined on the House floor When his people approached him with the
returned to the fold under what one White last week. The choice there was between Idea of commemorating his tOOth day with
House operative blandly called "a lot of a Democratic version conceding him three- the usual recitation of his achievements,
peer pressure." Stockman provided them fourths or more of the spending cuts he he waved them away. 1'oo self-serving, he
a way back with some accounting sleight sought and a crypto-RepubUcan model bit· said-and, he might have added, a n~less
of hand to allay their doubts that Reagan Ins S6 billion deeper Into social spending celebration of the victory he has so obcould balance the budget by 1984 after all. than even he had dared ask. Tip O'NelU viously and decisively won.
"Aesop's fables," one. Democrat protested. ventured pmely at the weekend that the
PETER GOLDMAN with ELI!ANOR CLIFf,
But the three strays came home, with three comins vote wiU be only "the ftnt skirmish
HENRY W. HUBBARD and
JOHN J, UNDSAY Ia Wublnallon
Southern Democrats close behind-and a of many ••• in a war to change the nation
NATIONAL AFFAIRS
after last November's election, checking
each prospective member's voting record.
House Speaker Thomas P. (Tip) O'NelU,
reallziDs their potential power, quickly
honored their request for more influence
in an efort to avoid party defection. He
helped them win positions on the nuijority's Steering and Policy Committee, Ways
and Means, Appropriations, Budget and
other key Congressional committees from
which conservatives had been largely excluded in the years when big Democratic
~oritles made their votes less Important.
When liberals shrieked that O'Neill was
sabotaging them, he argued that It was
vital in order to keep the BoU Weevils
loyal to the party. "Let 'em read the election returns," said O'Neill of his critics.
The Speaker chose carefully, giving the
most sensitive committee posts to old
friends and men that he thought he could
Consem~tlv. Democrtlll Grt~mm, Slenholm and Hance: Will they VOU with Rltlgan? trust. Yet It was from a position on the
House Budget Committee that one promi·
nent Boll Weevil, Rep. Phil Gramm of Texas, a former economics professor, helped launch the Gramm-Latta budget
proposal-which is even more stringent than the President's
Ronald Reagan has personally lobbied him on the telephone, and which Reagan quickly endorsed.
and the President's men have offered him box seats at the
The Boll Weevils are determinedly informal-with no &taft',
Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts and a ticket to his no letterhead, no dues and no taste for test votes among
first state dinner at the White House this week. After seven themselves on iuues. They meet only periodically-once or
years in Congress, Rep. Carroll Hubbard Jr. of Kentucky has twice a week when a big iuue comes along-over coffee,
suddenly found himself a very Important person on capitol doughnuts and strawberries in the spacious Rayburn Building
Hill. The reason: he Is one of 47 conservative Democrats, office of Ml88iuippi Rep. G. V. (Sonny) Montgomery (his
most from the ~uth and West, who may determine whether office Is known as the "war room" because it houses Mont·
Congress p888CS Reagan's cut-and-slash budget this week.
gomery's impressive collection of swords and flags from vet·
Because the Democrats now hold only a 51-seat m~ority erans groups). Many of the Boll Weevils are plainly sym·
In the House, a net defection of 26 conservative Democrats pathetic to Reagan's views on the budget. Others are simply
could give Rea$an a victory. Aware of their awing-vote power aware that budget-cutting is popular with folks back home.
on this and other iuues, Hubbard and his like-minded col· Says Hubbard: "I have solid citizens calling me up and saying,
leagues formed the Conservative Democratic Forum late last 'We've tried everythlns else, let's try something new, vote
year. Some call them the "Boll Weevils"-after the bloc of with the President'."
powerful Southern Democrats who dominated Congress for
Sbow4oWIU Stlll, many conservative Democrats in Congress
two decades after World War II. Unlike the Weevils of old, were not saying how they would vote In the budget showdown
however, the new group is not concerned with holding the and they say that in the long run they will remain loyal to
line against civil rights, and Its members have widely varying the party. They squelched an early proposal to replace O'Neill
views on foreign policy, the environment and social issues. with a more conservative Democratic Speaker, and their diverse
But all arc ft~l conservatives and many made campaign views on matters other than spending suSBest that they are
pledges to cut federal spending that closely echoed Reagan's hardly closet Republicans. But they do Intend to use their
own. "This particular issue is about 80 to 85 per cent of the power to push the party to the right. "We arc Democrats,"
platform I caq~paigned on," says Rep. Charles W. Stenholm, says Rep. Kent Hance, a Lubbock, Texas, lawyer. "But the
42, a Texas cotton farmer who helped to form the conservative only hope for the Democratic Party Is a tum in the conservative
forum and now serves as its chairman.
direction."
Stcnholm and his colleagues set up the forum immediately
DAVID M. ALPERN with HENRY W. HUBBARD In Wuhlngton
The 'Boll Weevils' Bore In
24
NEWSWEEK/MAY II, 1981
�·····-·· ......."''"••••u
Fur mmc British h:trg:tlns, send tht.•
I ,.."...!.!.~f!~~!.~
Tile N- vorll'TMite tlidaazr,;,;
Reagan's First JOO Days
By Stevea R. Welsaacm
n a mild winter momlna nearly
100 days ago, Ronald Reagan
took his oath of office as the
American hostages In Iran took
an Algerian jet to freedom. Mr.
Reagan's smooth, Insistent
volc:e, summonlng·Americ:ans to
a "new begiMin&," has slni:e
had to compete with such Intrusions as the cracklin& barrage
of a would-be assassin's bullets, the dlsturbln& stac.
c:atoof terrorism In El Salvador, the rumble of Soviet
troops maneuvering near Poland and the lesser
static or quarreling among his Cabinet and staff. But
none of these distractions has' weakened the new
President's resolve to propel the Government Into
the greatest change of direction In half a century.
With a gift lor political theater, Mr. Reagan has established his goals faster, communicated a greater
Steven R. Weisman Is o While House correspondent
for The New Yorlr Times.
ATEST
-OF TilE MAll
MD THE
PIESIDEIICY
In the most dramatic first 100 days
since F.D.R., President Reagan
has set the agenda to win the
nation .to his conservative views.
sense of economic urgenc;y and come forward with
more comprehensive proPQsals than any new President slnc:e the first 100 days of Franklin D. Roose.
velt, the hero of his youth and the man whose record
of achlilvln& social cluulge Mr. Reagan seeks to emulate- albeit at the opposite end of the political spectrum.
In RooseVeltian fashion, Mr. Reagan has commanded the altentlon of the public, the Con&ress and
America's allies and advei'Sjlries. He has skillfully
couned new and old iriends, kept Democrats and
liberals on the defensive and maintained a friendly
posture even to those who, like labor leaders and
blacks, regard his program as anathema.
And, perhaps by luck, he has managed to avoid the
serious blunders of many predecessors. Before the
end or their first 100 days, after all, John F. Kennedy
had the Bay of Pigs, and Jimmy Caner had already
alienated his Conaresslonal allies and had been
dramatically rebuffed by the Russians on his early
arms-control Initiative, settln& negotiations back as
much as a year for the Ill-fated nuclear arms treaty.
Mr. Reagan's a~ents seem all the more remarkable for having come from one of the most Improbable figures ever to assume the Presidency - a one.
�Projecting
An Image
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�time baseball announcer, B-mo"" actor and television pitchman who has had to force the Establishment to take lim seriously. Havins become Presl·
dent In the face of such skepticism, he seeks nothtns
less than the blgesf military buildup since the Viet·
nam War and the adoption of a conservative Republi·
can prosram that· would all but repj!al the Great
Society; brtnstns about a seismic shift of resources
.from Government' to private hands. In the pi'QI:8SS,
he has proclaimed· an elusive soal elisentlal to the
success of his Presidency: restorins the.confldence·
of Americans In themselves and In the future.
Every modem President plasued by a11 ecOnomic
crisis has defined It In terms of confidence, from
Roosevelt's appeal- "The only thins we have to
fear Is fear itself" - to Gerald Ford's WIN buttons·
and Mr. Caner's 1979 speech llbout America's ma.
latse. With Mr. Reasan comes a nell!( resolve, contemptuous of 11 decade of talk about the need to accept limits on American &rowth, easer to embark on
sreat new deeds wonhy of his veralon of a simpler
past. "And after all," he declared on Inauguration
• .;.. Day, "why shouldn't we believe that? We are Amerl·
•
cans."
·
· :. ,
But If Mr. Reasan's soals are awe5ome, so are the
. ;. .obstacles that Impede him, and they have come into
,.
i. i sharper focus as well in his first 100 days. The slml.,..,....,f',,. .. larities between Roosevelt and Mr. Reaaan are
many, but one major difference Is thitt Mr. Reasan
has begun by outllntna a prosram, not enactins one.
Before the end of Roosevelt's first 100 days, he had
taken the nation off the sold standard, rescued the
bankins system and won passase of 15 major pieces
of lestslation, fro"! Federal welfare prosrams to
revisions In securities laws and enactment of the
CIVilian Conservation Corps, the A8ricultural Ad·
justment Act and the Tennessee Valley Authority.
Mr. Reasan's achievements so far are contained in
a packqe of proposals lncludlns 83 major prosram
chanses, 834 amendments to the budset this year and
next, 151 lesser budsetary actions and 60 additional
pieces of lqlslatlon. Not until March 31 did he stan
his first bill- cutttns back dairy price supports-on
a breakfast tray at Georse Washtnston University
Hospital the momtns after he was shot. If the bulk of
his prosram Is enacted, It won't be until nwch later
In the year, and It Is far from cenatn what form It
will.be In by then.
tc•--•
�.
..
'1 •
Narrow Estape
AJailed attempt-on the President's
life-may--tum--out-to-be-a~political
boon for advancing.. his ·policies.
As Mr. Rqan wavei after Ieavins a Waslllnston ·
hotel, siJt shots nns out and lur is lilt in tlur left lUIIf•.•
"~'a
people may be rl&btln wantlna a fut·
paCed 'ftrsliOO clays,'" says Rldlard E. Neustadt,
professor af polldcal acl~ at Harvard University.
"But die sltuatlan 111M Ia altopdler different from
tile collapae af die banJ11D8 sYstem that faced R velt Ia 181:13•• . . _ Reapn bas cfane an elfectJve job
ptUq started, and I'm lmpresaed with how he has
spent bla time. But that doesn't tell us how Ills poll·
· eta will fare aplnst the slloc:kof events."
"'lbe real P.UBbfnl and sbovlnlllas yet to happen,"
adds lllOiber President-watcher, Jama David Bar·
ber, professor of poiiUcal adeace •t Duke Unlvenl·
· ty. "Reapn's moved qutcldy, but our apectaUcms
llbollld be lower than tlley were for Roosevelt. So. far,
we've seen a lot af amllllll at meetlnp with eon.
sress. '111at's the oU, but It's nat die machinery of
Goverilment "
On ~ Hertleit H~s lasl day In office,
be c:urt1y told bla IIUCceSIOr:. "Mr. ~t. wileD
JOU bave beeD In Wasblqtaa u lana u I have, JOU
·will team that the PresldeDt af the United Stata
calls aa DObody." Roaseveltlpored die advice, and
·~~ere Mr. Re8pD has cfane aacdy the same. He IIU
am- borlleback rldllla In VfrBinla; visited baclllta,l~
at canceru, ballet and tbealeJ' In Wasblqtaa
· N- ~ork Qty; dined and luacbed at hotels
vate laDes; danned black ue and wlllte ue for
U. at tile 111011t elepDt clubs In towD, and
point af lllalself tnivellq to Capitol Hill to Ylstt
sressklnalleaden. .
.
.
.
ID tile proce111, Mr. ReapD b6s defined bls
Uvea wltb IIUCb amiable pnlallty tbat even aa
sillaUaaattempt became aa occasion for
self~. 'lllat, too, martledlll
wltb Raasevelt; wbo barely acaped a
BUlin's pllftre tbat left maa dead and
. otbers __...In MJaml tbree weelal before he
to tall8 amce. 111e puuy IDcldeat bi'OIIIht "a
nasb af fattb"ln Raasevelt at au- wbeD tbat
tty wu M8ded ..-t, accordlll& to t11e
thur M. Sc:lllatnaer Jr. 'lbose seliUments find
ecbotoday.
.
.
For after jolt upoa jolt to American prtde from
IMiclll ovenus and at bome, tile yeamiJI8 for aa
fsabiCIIIed caDodo aplrlt Is surely wbat Mr.
rode to vtctory wbeD he defeated Mr. caner aa
states and waaSI perCIIDl of tile popular vote. Nseelal to baiMII tile same spkttln a IIIPIY
way.
'l1le unortbodoa ecanamlsta wbo bave deviled
ReapD prGp'UII aclmGwledae that Americans
aaly c:blulp tbelr paltenll of bella\llor - tbat
..,. ---and be wti1ID8-- to
accept·-
:!!!~:!!!~!!t~[!~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~!S:~~~~~~~!!!!!!i~.
�•
t~"!"W""'
...... ·-
orr-
.
.,. ·-•
leD'
party for Intimates. When Mr. O'Neill
a &Ouventr tie to tbe White H - . Mr. Reapn IIMwed up at
tbelrnext meetlna wearinalt. "Now you're In tbe biB
leques," the Spealler had -med the new Prell·
deDI. But Mr. Reqan had already proved he knew ll.
· AI part of his effort to keep tbe focus on the econwaaelncreasell,
omy, Mr. Reapn dellbentely aVOided speaklnl out
dille
.
.
on the CDntroveralal qreemmt dial freed the hostqea from lrari. He hal deferred such promlles as
. ~ ~~~eory bebiDd
Rea&llll's propclll8la 1a unu- to dllmanlle the Departments ol EneriY and
te818d..and he conceded ill mucb In a speech to
Education, and he hal tried to aVOid embroilment In
1'Unlln8 to bls attlal, he aallecl: ·"Have they
the abortion and crime 1111111a.
any altematlve wlllc:b oilers a Jl'88ler c:bance ol bal·
Not once,'meariwhlle, hai.Mr. Reapn called for
IIDCIDa the budpt, reclucllli and ellmlnatllla IDfla.
sacrifice. "Jimmy carter talked about acceptlna
daa, &UmulatJna lbe creadon ol jCib8 and rec1uctna
ahortqes,
and look Where llpt him," said an aide to
die tax burden? Alld If they haven't, are Uley IIIII·
Mr. Reapn, defmdina die President's cleacriptlon
sest~n~we can CDntlnue an lbe preaeat CIIUI'II8 wltbo
of bls proaram as merely a reduction In waste and
outcomJna to a day of nciiDnlna In the very - r fu.
extravqance.
ture?"
.
.
.
1be "tnaly needy" are protected, .Mr. Reqan
. At .-y c:bance, Mr. Reapn l'fiCIII8IIa.& the need
uys, and anyone who llllnka otherwise hal faileD
torebulldapectaUanabJIIOIIIIdiD8thethemeolaelf.
captive 'to die .rtletortc of bureaucnts bent on pro.
CXIIIfklence, &hat "we are In CDntrol" and that "we
tectlna tbelr jobs and tbelr "dleDtele." 1be ease
can and will resolve the problema wlllch COIIfront .
wllll wlllch Mr. Reapn dllmlases criticism obvt·
. 118." But wbat be aeelaiiiiGIIt of allis a dupllcadon of
· ouslyderives from die practice he BOt In california.
· Roosevelt's polldcai8UCC188 altered to canaerwuve
Pollowlna tbe election, however, .Mr. Reqan's
needs-a creadon ol tbe candltlolls leadllll to a iww
economic advlsen had, In fact, dlaaareed ah&rply
enol Republican primacy IDAmertca.
.
.
behind the scenes about whether to attach a pqram
1'1118 may be Mr. Reqan's IIIG8t difficult task of
of deep spendiJ18 cuts to the 3D percmt cuts In Inall, for It Ia ID bls poUUcalapproach &hat Mr. Reapn
come
taxes that had been a comeistone of hll cam·
IIIG8t differs from RcaeveiL Roosevelt nn an a
palgn.
.
pledp to cut GoYemment apendiJI8 .., 25 percent,
tory Welnberwer (rl&IIC) after IUs European Crlp.
For example, Representative Jack F. Kemp, the
and dlea abDwed blmAif to be a praamaUst and an .
fall, lbe candidate's aides realized that voters perBuffalo, N.Y., Republican who was an orfBinal auImproviser capable of allaadonlna campalp promceJved Mr. Reapn to be
CODservaUve dian
tbor of die tax cut, wamecl there would be "blood on
laea. ''Talre a metbocl and t17lt," he aald. "I Itt falls,
they-perhaps too much 10. "We must minimize tbe
the Door" of CoftBress If Mr. Reagan tried to cut GoY·
t17 Blllllher. But above all, t17 -.etbJna."
perception &hat he Ia danaei'OUI and WIC8riJ18," said
By CODtnat, Mr. Reapn may be prqmatlc about
emmmt P"'lnm& as ah&rply as odlen were uJ'IIft&.
an
Internal
campatp
memorandum
In
October.
Mr. Kemp and otben ai'JIUed dial tax cuts diembls tactics, but he nn for office IDteat oalmplement·
campalan pollsten. tested different future
selves would produce l!ftCIUih economic Browth to
1118 an apnda be had adwcated for decadeS. To tbe
"icenartos"
Willi
voten
and
founcllllat
IIIey
vastly
pay
forextstlq Government services. ·
utonlnftlMit ol many, be Ia -'dq now to carry It
out:
. preferred to believe "America can do" nlher.dlan
In a pivotal decision, Mr. Reqan rejected Mr.
san actor and after.dlnner speaker
"le&l II better." 1be "can do" dleme thus formed
Kemp's aclvlce, atdlftl Willi die orthodox Republican
and as Governor of Callfomta, for
tbe veblcle for easlna voten' fears about Mr. Reaeconomlata who held &hat tax cuts without IJudBet .
example, Mr. Req&D had made It
pn's conservatllm and tnstiiiJna tbelr fallll In hll
cuts would Ignite a new round of lnftatlon.
clear &hat be dlda't 1111e lbe anupoy.
leadersbip poleDUal.
But not until the appointment of David A. Stockerty pnl8l'lllll8 of lbe Great Society,
Tile themes and actions of Mr. Reapn's flntiOO
man, die fiercely conservative ditector of die Office
even wbeD most voters did. Alld at
days have been as carefully piiUIIIed as tbe camof M811814!ment and Bud&et, did Mr. Reaaan beJin to
lbe llleiSbt olrlbe papularttyof Presl·
palp Itself, and by tbe same people. "Was the
review tbe specifics of tbe cuts. Seated at the cmter
Nlllon's policy of.
American dream over?" asked another Internal
of a 10111 table- lint at a tnnsltlon oHice and dieD
memonndum of last December. "1'11e voten said
tbe Soviet UniOJI, Mr.
In the cabinet room- Mr. Reapn llllened'as Mr.
NO, lbe American ~m was not over, or at least
.-aiDed a hawldah ~
Stockman presented cuts tbe budpt director had
IIIey boped ll was not."
Uc. He was apiDat Govemmmt reauJatloa evm
been wantiJII to make for yean while studyiJ18 tbe
UpoataJdn&offtce,thememoWeDton, Mr. Reqan
wbeD lhe CGIIUIIler,· envll'lllllftelltal and worker- '
bud&et as a Republican Coqressman frCim Michl·
safety movements were at their peak. He scoffed as
~d aear his actions to bls call for renewed confl- '
pn.
.
well at _..., canaerwuoa just as &hat Idea took
dence ID America and for Jl8lll8&8 of hll - m l c
In 80 ,percmt of die cases, the Pn!sldeDt 1ave a
hold. AI a polltlclaD, he had been nothlna I f - conpropam. He was wamed not to use "&rand rhetoatmple assent to what Mr. Stockman had wrouaht.
stateDt. Now tbe qiBtlon Ia: Has be a mandate to
ric" until bls proanm was ready, and then to seek to
Occasionally be sided wtth a cabinet secretary who
dismantle wbat be opposed and alter lbe American
lower expectat10111 10 dial the public would underobjected, and sometimes he asked why a certain pro.
landscape? Or did he Win last year &Imply because
stand &hat hll pall c:oucl not be achieved quickly.
ll'em couldn't be reduced even more. "Go ahead and
he vapely but lklllflllly tapped tbe frustntlons of
"Finally, to provide realleadenhlp, President Rea·
cut It," he Interjected at one point after a 10111 depn m111t enpae In a perennial campallft," die
AmeriCIIIII Willi a campalp dleme 8Willlled up bril·
bate. "1bey're BOIJII to IIana me In effiBY anyway;
ltantly at lbe debate Willi President Carter, wbeD
memorandum said; and lhen cancluded: He should
and ll doesn't matter how hllh."
mount a dally barnp of speeches, directives and
Mr. Reapn aallecl voters: "Are yau better oft !lOW
1'1le most heated debates were over tax policy,
meetlnp to support hll leatslatlon, and he should
Ulan yau were fouryearsaao?"
.
With Treasury secretary Donald T. Re1an arpin&
Tbe.-n to lbeaeca-Uan& are 10unclear, and
forpt any notion of beJna an "outsider" In tbe nafor areater benefits to pei'IICIIIS with hl&her Incomes,
American public oplnlan IIi 10 cbaJI&eable In any
tloa'• capital. Mr. carter had failed at dial, allmat·
a move he said would Increase savtnp and Invest·
C81111, dlat the political rtsiiB Mr. Reapn faces are
lnalbe power cmten Meded for a President to aov·
ment. Mr. Reqan rejected his advice on political
em effectively.
probably even more aertaus dian tbe - ' C rtska.
tp'OUI!ds. "We couldn't afford to have a pacllaae that
· 'J'1Ie Reapn proposals promise a poi1Ucal8tnlgle
In bls very lint days, Mt. Reqan therefore IISUed
loolced like a &lveaway for tile rich," an adviser said
w1.e outcome will affect American -lety for a
a billiard of executive orden,.llftllll dozens of GOY·
later.
·a-rattan. Canftdent of bls electoral mandate, the emment repletions, dilmiiiJna bundreds of c._rter
Al.consultatlcins proceeded, Mr. Reqan approved
President told aa applaudJna - t i f t audience
holdovers, settJna a Federal htrfn& f - and cut·
modifications to placate allies on capitol Hill. SUbsl·
lJna back on tnvel, office redeconllon, consultants
a few weeks aao: "We're- c:uttJna lbe bud&et atm.
dJes for lbe Clinch River breeder reactor In Tennesply for tbe salle of IIOIIIIder fiDanclal maM.......l,
and furnltureprocuremmt.
..
.
see were left untouc:hed lntlleference llllhe majority
He met with eveeytlody from lbe Con&resslonal
n - of 118 who call ounelvea Cllllllel'fttlve have
leader, Senator Howard H. Baker Jr., a Tennessee
Black caiiCIII to lbe anU..borUODIIts. He spoke to
poiDted out wbat'l WI'OII8 Willi Govemment policy
Republican. CUts In food Slam. . reduced to
tbe natloa on teleYislon, addresled a joint session of
for more dian a quarter of a CeDtury. Now we have
please Republican Senator Robert Dole of Kansaa.
an opportwdty ••• to c:banp our nadonal direc:tlona
and let NBC film a day of b1s activities de1be timetable of these actions telll the story of Mr.
voted to lbe eConomy for an hour-lontl special. In••• Pellow cltlrenl, fellow CD111181Yati'V88, our Ume II
Reaaan'• npld Presidential pace. On Jan. 20, he
deed, In two mandll, he met Ieee to face with 400
. -.OUr-thalarrtved."
save an lnaucuraJ addresl devoted aim.& exclusively to the economy. He spoke to the nation on tele~ and-Oitentau-ly courted tbe most
0
powerful Democrat 111ftC1118 them, Speaker ol tbe
vision Feb. 5, and addressed Ccllqp'ess In a jolni _:
H
Thotnal
P.
(Tip)
O'Neill
Jr.,
who
will
Invited
Ilion
Feb. 18, p,_lllll lJ¥1 bulk of his economic
In lbe atiate&Y of Mr: Reapn'• Presidential cam·
for dinner rand to the President's ~ bJrthclay
·packqeontbaldate.
(Conclnuedon f'aae '/&)
patp Ues tbe foundation of bls ftnt 100 days. Last
waae~~~creue~-tr they come to believe &hat GoY·
enu11111t can be curtled and &hat lafladon can be
~ down. If, Instead, Alllerlcans react to a tax ·
cut by speadlna today ntber dian IIWin8 for IAIIDOro ·
row, and bJ ciiiiiiCirlq as they have In die past for
Mr. Reqllll's pnl8l'lllll will be ane
oldie 111011t calamttGu&, laflatlanary failures of all
Mr.
:sress.
eon.
The. organizational prob!ems
have .been extremely senous.
Despite the drive for collegiality' a
series of acrimonious . disputes
imPedes the staff and the agencies.
more
conareaa
..
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-.~/.·.
..:
,.
.!
~· ·.
~~:
,.
..•.
- .
'
'.
''•·
... ····)·..
'
·:1 .•
.., ...
;;.
·.,' .
....
. ~.... .
1: .
"1;.'·.
Scorr fiTZGERALD WROTE A CLASSIC STORY
ABOUT A DIAMOND AS BIG AS A CERTAIN HOTEL.
NOBODY EVER ACCUSED MR. FITZGERALD OF SE'TTLING
FOR S~ND-BEST.
THE RITZ.
IOODAYS
Conrillllfd from Pale 58
By Marcb 10, be had CDID· the very we&llhy, the Pftiii'IUD
pleled details of lhe pacllaae.
. still leaves Mr. Reapnopea to
In sum, the pacllaae conalsl8 the cllarae lbat be 18 proffer·
of a tllll5 bllllaD budpt foraext
1118 traditlanal "Republlc:aD
year, lhe boldest attempl. of IICIIftllllllcs," favorbll the
.
modern Umes to redirect tbe uppel' claales.
l'eiiiUI'ce8 of perament. It
One 18 drawn, then, to the
features nearly 1110 blillon In CGIICiusloD tbat Mr. lteapn,'S
spenclli!s cuts, more dian 1110 budpt c:uts bave spared tbe
biiUoa In tax cuts, and the truly powerful more dian tbe
stan of a W..year, 27 per. ~ aeedy. T~ be eure, 8hlo
cent rise In military apendlna dent . . . . ~ laans,
- an Increase eo hup 11111DJ dairy prtee auppol18 and ather.
apert8 question Wbelher lhe
PI'CJ8I'IIIII8 for tbe middle clus
PealqDa can spend at tbat
an beiDa trimmed. But tbe
rate.
.
caatllest PI'CJ8I'IIIII8 for tbepoor
In Cclapess, the pacJraae - welfare, Medicaid, faod
met wtdl lnltJal pn!\UCUIIIIB,
stamps, IIOCial aemces and
retal8881stance- ... slated
81110118 Democrats, tbat
.Mr. Reapa ~ aet -a of· for tbe .sharpest cuts. Proo
what be propoaed. Indeed,
pams tbat masUy belp dae
Democrats joined wtdl Repub.
In the mJddle clus or abovellcai\S In IIUJIPOI'lln8 a set of Social Securtty, Medicare and
Reapn.badled llpl!lldiD& cuts
veteriUIII lbeneftts - ... pre.
on lhe Senate noor ID early served. Also IDitoucfled are
April. But just before CCift. · tens of bllltans of ciDIIanln tax
su~~s~
IP'ell8 bl'lllle for Easter receSs ~~enents tbat, 111
two wee11s aao. 110111e CODBer·
dize boustJ1a and bealdl can
vadve Senate . RepubUeans
for the mlddlecl888.
dealt lhe Admlnllltradon a set·
One more caatrovenllll feabeck by defectlna ca a key
ture of Mr. Reapn's Pftiii'IUD
~lllklll
ID tbe • Senate 18 bl8 prapasal to CXIIISOIIdate
Budpt Committee wlllcJI
at least 75 diffen!at bealdl,
. didn't c:Ut speDdiD8 .. fast ... educallan and 8IICial aemce ·
.lhey wanted.
Meanwllile, PI'CJ8I'IIIII8 Into a few 1111 block
Democradc · leaders ID lhe ll'!lftls, leavtna tbe states. to
HOUle were saYIDa Mr. Rea· spend the 1DC11111Y wtdl no
pn would have to awallea strlnp attachad. Tbl8 move
federallslll"
110011 to lhe niled to CDID~ ·toward a .._
mise, at least on bl8 tax cuts.
has been bodl a l q d - Re1be Democradc criUcs fo.
publican dream and CGIIII$8leDl
cusecl on botb lhe economic
wtdl Mr. Reapa's talk of
and polldcal premises of Mr.
"states' rtahts" durlq tbe
errea,
Reapn'spropam.
For- tJUna, manymlsl8 dispute Mr. Reapn'a
openiJia contention thai radl·
cal 8Urpry Is needed because
Govenlment spenclll'la and
deficits have left Americans
worse off dian 20 ,ean ap; In
fact~dley point out, tbe stand.
ard of llvtna for Americans 18
twtce as blah aslt was In 11180,
even after Inflation, al~
It 18 true tbat many Americans
are worse off dian lhey were
four yean 1180• as Mr. Reapn
suuested 1n t11e PresldenliaJ
campalp.
.
Also, lhe rate of relief In Mr•.
Reapn's tax cut srows wldl
-·s
Income, akewlna Its
benefits toward lhe well·to-do.
This ryvenal of the historic .
polley of taxlna lhe waldly at
blpr rates Is defended by
Reapn aides on lhe pound
thai lhe wealthy are more apt
10 save or Invest, and an ln.
crease In savlnp and Invest.
mentIs needed to Improve pro.
ducllvlty and dampen lnfta.
~ the
lion. Thus, President had earlier naled out
lncreasllll tax-cut benefits for
campalp.
Tile apprailch 18 Cllllltrover.
sial because nodlln8 would . .
main to Impel states to spend
the money on dlole deemed
needy by Caftlresllln the last
20 ~· Indeed, Caftlresll
would be deprived altopdler
of Its blsloric role In decldlna .
the purposes fOr wlllcJI Federal money aiDald be spent.
Small - * r tbat on lna"'''ratlan Day, the pemors m·
attendance applauded Mr.
Reapn's appeal for power 10 ·
be returned 10 the states; the'
Democradc leader& of CCift.
IP'ell8 p-eeled lhe Idea wtdl
stony silence.
0
11le ..-stlon of mandate
hoven over 811 of ·Mr. Rea-
pn's
doc~.
Americans,·
no doubl, encloned bl8 pledp.
to curb lhe lnlnaslve role of
Government. Bul' did lhelr
votes lor Mr. Reapn mean
that lhey wanted him to take
all dlese steps?
Did lhe election results
that VOI~~brace
biB efforts to / e n lbe Clean
mean
�I
\
\
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 16, 1993
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Bruce Lindsey, Personnel
George Stephanopoulos, Communications
FROM:
carter Wilkie, Communications Research
SUBJECT:
Correcting the Record on Reagan appointments
"OFF TO A SLOW START" read the table of contents in National
Journal on April 4, 1981. The story was synopsized:
President Reagan and his personnel director, E.
Pendleton James, have come under fire for the
President's appointments to top policy-making posts.
They have been hit for moving too slowly and have been
criticized from various quarters for picking the wrong
people.
The following week, the same publication ran a small item near
the back of that edition under the headline "The Appointment pace
quickens":
More than a score of nominations were announced in less
than a week, bringing to 112 the number of new
nominations that the new Administration has submitted
to the Senate after 11 weeks in office. By contrast,
the Carter Administration had sent the senate 1'1 names
through its 11th week. [4/11/81, p.626]
But one month later, National Journal returned to the critique:
••• a major problem that afflicted [the Reagan
administration] at the beginning continues to this day.
[Five days into the term Lou] Cannon reported that
presidential aides were "struggling with the difficult
task of speeding Reagan's lagging time-table on subCabinet and other political appointments ••• [and an)
aide said that security and ethics checks had taken
longer than anticipated.
In its May 11 edition, more than 100 days later,
Time quotes E. Pendleton James, assistant to the
President for personnel, as offering the same excuse
for what the magazine called 'the molasses pace of
presidential appointments'"
-- Dom Bonafede, National Journal,
5/16/81, p.880
�EXECUTIVE REPORT
You Say You Want a Sub-Cab~net Post?
Clear It with Marty, Dick, Lyn and Fred
•:
l'
Even before President Reagan was wounded, political, policy and legal barriers had
slowed the process of selecting presidential nominees to sub-Cabinet jobs.
BY DICK KJRSCHTEN
I
the bulk of the February issue of Conserl'atil'e Digest was devoted to an attack
n an Administration that started off on James and his staff and a demand
with some fast and fancy footwork. that Reagan fire him.
Ronald Reagan's personnel recruiters
A top Senate Republican aide described James as "in over his head"
have been sadly out of step.
The President drew raves for putting and predicted that "at some point he'll
together a comprehensive economic pro- probably have to bite the bullet and
gram in his first 30 days. but he has step down." And a source within the
drawn fire for being slow. even clumsy. White House. when asked about the
In the staftlng of his government.
tnals and tribulations of the personnel
The appomtments process. ilke much staff. replied, "Never rule out the posof the rest of policy making in Wash- s1b1hty of plain. old-fashioned incomington. ground to a brief halt when petence.
Reagan was wounded in the chest on
James. the target of all of this vitriol.
March 30 after delivering a speech at is standing his ground. He insisted in
a local hotel. But even before the shoot- a recent interview that the appointments
J.!lg., on only the 70th day of Reagan's process was never intended to be "a
presidency. his honeymoon was ruffled footrace with past Administrations" but
b_I persistent complaints about his aQ:- instead was carefully planned to produce
pointments to top pohcy-makmg posts.
professionally qualified officials whom
~Conservatives howled that ''true Rea- Reagan "will be able to live with for
ganites" were being left out in the cold. four or eight years."
There were bruised feelings among conFootrace or not. the Reagan team
gressional Republicans whose candidates had clearly hoped to do better than
for jobs were left dangling. Members iTS 1mmedwte predecessor. The Carter
of Congress complained of the lack of AdministratiOns recru1tmg had a somesub-Cabinet officials to testify about the what rocky start when it got caught
specifics of the President's economic pro- up in a turf struggle between aides Jack
posals. Minority and women's groups H. Watson Jr. and Hamilton Jordan.
grumbled about the preponderance of A Februar.Y, 1977 National Journal arwhite. male appointees. And even some ticle about the Carter talent hunt queof the recipients of "plum" jobs chafed ried: "Carter's Original Amateur Hour?"
Despite his reluctance to be drawn
because of long delays in making their
appointments official.
into a numbers game. James said he
Much of this static is simply par was finally driven to look them up. "and
for the course. The contest for top po- I found out that we arc a little ahead."
In a Washington Post interview conlitical jobs in a new Administration is
always spirited. and there is no way ducted on March '27. Reagan said he
that the selection process can avoid leav- was disappointed in the "slowness in
ing disappointed candidates and con- filling appointments" but said that the
blame could be attributed in part to
stituencies in its wake.
But t}le criticisms of the Reagan per- .rncw rules and re ulat1ons" that slow
sonnel operatiQn ana ol liS director, £". t e clearance ..12roccss. Like ames, e
Pendleton James. have been particularly asserted. "We're ahead. at th1s sta e
harsh. The forces of the so-called New of any recent] Administration except
!tight have called for his scalp, and Nixon s.
564
Ni\TIONi\1. JOLR,_·\1. 4/4/KI
The official compilations of presidential documents published each week tell
a different story. At the end of Carter's
I Oth week in office, 142 nominations
requiring confirmation had been sent
to the Senate. At the end of Reagan's
lOth week, 95 had been submitted, twothirds of Carter's total.
The official figures don't tell the whole
story. according to James. As of March
9. he said, selections had been made
for all 187 key sub-Cabinet posts that
had been targeted for priority treatment.
Of that number. however, 115 had not
yet been announced because of delays
in obtaining final clearances of one sort
or another.
Those clearance procedures, in addition to FBI background checks and
financial disclosure requirements, include several layers of White House
political screening. Accordingly, there
have been instances when candidates
on whom both James's shop and a Cabinet Secretary agreed have ended up
not getting the job.
Some of these last-minute political
checks have been abrupt and resulted
in adverse publicity. James confirmed
one published account in which Reagan's
political affairs adviser, Lyn Nofziger,
charged into the White House mess "all
agitated and excited" and demanded
of James. "Why are you hiring this
Democrat'!"
Political checks by senior White House
staffers. including policy advisers Martin
Anderson and Richard V. Allen, have
provided a channel for redressing some
of the grievances of the militant right
wing of the Republican Party. James.
angered by the personal attacks on him
and his aides. insists that the appointments system has not been altered. Lastminute changes. he said, "simply prove
the system works. that we catch things
before it is too late."
));
�White House personnel director£.
Pendleton James: "Never has so much
work been done to get ready to staff an
Administration. In some ways. /think we
are going too fast.··
SHAPING THE SYSTEM
(
That the Reagan personnel operation
has been accused of political insensitivity
comes as no surprise to Morton C. Blackwell, former editor of The Ne-..· Right
Report and now a White House liaison
to conservative groups.
Writing in March 197!.!, Blackwell predicted that a Reagan presidency "would
not be what many conservatives expect
and many liberals fear." He noted that
Reagan "comes across strongly as a citizen politician" whose interests and talents "would not build the GOP into
a mighty, permanently dominant power."
To staff his Administration. Reagan
did not turn immediately to the political
organizations that helped elect him but
instead to his "kitchen cabinet"-the
close circle of friends and advisers whose
success has been in business, not politics.
Selecting James. a private-sector executive talent hunter with social ties
to members of the kitchen cabinet and
to Edwin Meese II I. Reagan's counselor
and chief White
House aide, was a
logical course of
action for a citizen
politician. Political
pros such as Nofziger and former
Republican National Committee
chairman
Bill
Brock were not
given primary
roles in the recruitment process.
James, a longtime California
Republican and
Reagan booster,
lays no claims to
being a politician.
He was not a part
of the Reagan
campaign and had
no direct relationship with most of
those who labored
in the electoral
trenches.
But
James bridles at
charges that he is
apolitical or politically naive.
Under Meese's
orchestration,
James set up shop
several months before the election in quarters separate
from those of Reagan's national campaign staff. As one who takes pride
in his profession, James not surprisingly
turned for advice to senior colleagues
in his field. He assembled a task force
of corporate personnel officials to ferret
out potential candidates with "outstanding" qualifications for government service.
It also follows that a career spent
placing people successfully in new jobs
would lead him to place great store
on proven skills. Here. according to one
of James's critics on Capitol Hill, is
where the talent hunter first began to
get into hot water.
The talent pool of Republicans with
government experience is made up of
veterans of the Nixon and Ford Administrations, some of whom assisted
James in his pre-election hiring preparations. A great many of them stood
by President Ford in 1976, helping him
fend off Reagan's challenge for the presidential nomination that year. Some Reagan loyalists have long and unforgiving
memories.
It was never James's intention to limit
his sights to old Nixon-Ford hands. But
appearances were against him. He had
served in the Nixon White House per-
sonnel office from 1971-73. And, as the
Capitol Hill critic put it, many diedin-the-wool Reaganites were not pleased
to sec such people as M. Peter McPherson, a former assistant in the Ford
White House, "helping James write job
descriptions that called for government
experience." McPherson, like many others who have worked with James, has
since been awarded a Reagan plumadministrator of the Agency for International Development.
After the election, the water got hotter.
A recruiter for a New York executive
placement firm who is familiar with
James's work in the private sector described him as "an excellent and persuasive talent hunter, but not an adept
manager. He's ideally suited for what
he was doing in California, running a
small firm of his own."
Gearing up to hire 2,000 or more
government officials is a mammoth managerial challenge, and James quickly
turned for help to James H. Cavanaugh,
another veteran of the Nixon-Ford staff
and now a top executive of a California
pharmaceutical firm. In his White House
days, Cavanaugh had occasion to lock
horns with fellow Nixon staffer Howard
J. Phillips, an outspoken archconservative
who now directs the Conservative Caucus.
Cavanaugh ended up on the prevailing
side in several domestic policy disputes,
including the Nixon Administration's decision to support legal services for the
poor, a program Phillips violently opposes. (See NJ. 2/28/81. p. 358.) He
also outlasted Phillips in length of service.
·When Cavanaugh emerged as deputy
director of Reagan's transition personnel
office, Phillips and the New Right decided to wage war.
Because of the heat from the right,
Cavanaugh returned to his firm earlier
than he might otherwise have. His name
is scratched out on an organization chart
of James's White House personnel office.
Instead of being named the office's director. Cavanaugh on Feb. 6 was appointed as "a special consultant on the
management of the presidential appointment process." He is not on the White
House payroll and has gone back to
California.
William H. Draper Ill replaced Cavanaugh on the organization chart, but
not for long. He has since been nominated
to be president and chairman of the
Export-Import Bank of the United
States. Draper's case illustrates one of
the major problems that have beset the
personnel office: turnover. Most members of the team that James assembled
to help him during the transition have
either used the office as a launching
pad to find plum jobs of their own
NATIONAL JOURNAL 4/4/81
565
�or else returned to their private-sector
jobs.
The instability of the staffing of the
personnel team, particularly the post of
director, has magnified James's administrative and managerial weaknesses, say
critics of the personnel chief.
Draper's role in the personnel office,
however abbreviated, also caused James
more grief from the "anti-establishment"
Republicans of the New Right. Draper
has close ties to Vice President George
Bush, the very epitome of the establishment Republicanism that the right
wing of the party mistrusts.
Draper is not the only Bush protege
to fare well in the appointments process.
A transition assistant to James noted
that "the Bush people out-organized the
Reaganites at the start. They were better
prepared to go after the things
they wanted; they were way
ahead of the Reagan people
in getting their candidates
identified and named."
As the volume of appointments has increased, more
conservatives have gotten jobs
and much of the criticism of
James has abated. And as
the staffing process works its
way down to jobs below the
assistant secretary level, workers from the Reagan presidential campaign are more
likely to qualify for appointments, the personnel director said.
The system worked best where the
new Cabinet officers-Secretary of State
Alexander M. Haig Jr., for exampleknew the turf and knew what they wanted
to accomplish in the various job slots.
It worked worst where a new Secretary
lacked familiarity with both the issues
and the bureaucratic setup. That was
the case with Energy Secretary James
B. Edwards.
Once formal agreement on a candidate
was reached by James and a Cabinet
Secretary, the name was circulated to
Nofziger for political clearance, to White
House counsel Fred F. Fielding for legal
clearance and to either national security
adviser Allen or domestic policy adviser
Anderson for policy clearances. For a
while, Reagan's kitchen cabinet advisers,
office,
worki
h Nofz'
Policy checks by White House advisers
Martin Anderson (left) and Richard V.
GETIING CLEARANCES
Allen have remedied some ofthe
James has contended all along that grievances ofthe GOP's right wing on
most of the attacks on his work have Reagan's recruitment policies.
been the result of a "communications
problem." He said his critics "really
don't understand what we are trying
to do. To think that ·we are trying to
appoint liberals here is rather fallacious,
to say the least."
One problem has been the amount
of time it has taken for appointments
to work their way through the pipeline.
James noted that conservatives have expressed pleasure with several sub-Cabinet nominees recently announced in the
health and human services area, which
was one of Cavanaugh's specific responsibilities during the transition. "Many
of the names that are coming out now,"
he said, "were started through the pipeline before this vocal criticism began."
The process begins with the identification of likely candidates by the personnel team. Once the Cabinet Secretaries were named, they were invited
to add names of their own to the lists.
Personnel officials and the Cabinet Secretaries then began negotiating on the
best mix of qualified candidates for top
departmental posts.
566
NATIONAL JOURNAL 4/4/81
played a role in this stage of the screening.
That is as far as some candidates
got. Christopher T. Cross, a· former Republican aide in Congress, learned this
the hard way. He understood correctly that James and Education Secretary
Terrel H. Bell had approved of him
as the best choice for undersecretary.
But Cross's name got no further than
Anderson's Office of Policy Development, where objections were lodged and
his candidacy was torpedoed.
Even when names survive the Nofziger, Allen, Anderson and Fielding
clearances, there is another hurdle to
be surmounted. This comes at James's
daily 5 p.m. meetings with the three
ranking members of the White House
staff, Meese, chief of staff James A.
Baker Ill and deputy chief of staff
Michael K. Deaver. If these three guardians of the President's political wellbeing sign off, James then takes the
recommended appointment to Reagan
for his approval.
Only when the President himself signs
off is the name sent to the White House
press office for official announcement.
As a practical matter, however, the
names of most sub-Cabinet appointees
surface in the press long before that.
In many instances, they already are at
work at their new jobs, usually as consultants, while awaiting completion of
the formal approval process.
Because it took Reagan longer than
he expected to assemble his Cabinet,
the process of selecting the sub-Cabinet
necessarily lagged several weeks behind
James's original ambitious schedule.
The selection of heads of independent
agencies has also proved to be a timeconsuming process. White House policy
aides played a major role in that process.
James recalled that "before we announced Anne M. Gorsuch
as administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency, we must have gone
through five or six candidates.
Each one of them sat down
with Marty Anderson so that
he could make sure that philosophies and policies were in
sync. Because once we make
the appointment, we are
stuck."
A veteran of the transition
personnel office noted that the
upshot of Anderson's review
was that "none of the top
five names originally recommended for
the EPA job ended up getting either
the administrator's or the deputy administrator's post."
WOMEN AND MINORITIES
If Gorsuch's selection hasn't helped
Reagan win friends among environmentalists, it has helped in meeting the
pressure to place women in positions
of responsibility in his Administration.
Carter moved aggressively in trying to
recruit women and minorities, and James
acknowledged that the Reagan White
House is concerned about the numerical
comparisons that are likely to be made
between the two Administrations "at the
end of the first 100 days."
During the transition, James had expected to have an assistant specializing
in the recruitment of women. However,
when Nancy M. Chotiner, a former Republican National Committee aide,
joined the transition team, she was named
as an adviser to the entire office. Although not in James's direct chain of
command, Chotiner was well equipped
to provide the names of qualified women
who had been identified through the
RNC's "Target '80" project.
James also had a special assistant
during the transition for the recruitment
))y
�(
(,
of minorities, Melvin L. Bradley. Since
moving over to the White House, he
has lost Bradley to Anderson's policy
development staff. He has, however,
gained a full-time associate director,
Wendy Borcherdt, to concentrate on the
hiring of women.
Another female associate director on
James's team is Willa Johnson, vice president of the Heritage Foundation and
director of the foundation's resource
bank. Her mission, however, is to recruit
conservatives for national security posts,
not to increase the number of women
in government.
Another of James's associate directors,
Alex Armendaris, is Hispanic, but according to James, he is no more responsible than any other member of
the staff for aggressively seeking out
qualified minority group job candidates.
When Hispanic leaders publicly criticized Reagan for failing to include a
Latin in his Cabinet, a meeting was
set up by the White House public liaison
office, which includes two HispanicsDiana Lozano and Ernest E. Garciaon its staff. At the Feb. 12 meeting,
Reagan reportedly said he expected
shortly to appoint at least seven Hispanics
to sub-Cabinet posts.
The original Carter Cabinet included
two women. Reagan's includes only one,
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. In addition
to Gorsuch and Kirkpatrick, Reagan has
awarded top jobs to the following women:
Angela M. (Bay) Buchanan, treasurer
of the United States; Arlene Triplett,
assistant Commerce secretary for administration; Judith T. Connor, assistant
Transportation secretary for policy and
international affairs; Mary Claiborne
Jarratt. assistant Agriculture secretary
for food and consumer services; Dorcas
R. Hardy, assistant Health and Human
Services secretary for human development services; Carol E. Dinkins, assistant
attorney general for land and resources;
Annelise Anderson, associate director of
the Office of Management and Budget
for economics and government; Elizabeth
H. Dole, assistant to the President for
public liaison; Loret M. Ruppe, Peace
corps director; Leonore Annen berg, chief
of protocol; and Rosslee Green Douglas,
director of the Energy Department's office of minority economic impact.
Housing and Urban Development Secretary Samuel R. Pierce Jr. is the only
black in the Reagan Cabinet. That
matches Carter's record because the
United Nations ambassadorship was not
considered a Cabinet post.
Bradley and Dan J. Smith hold posts
on the White House policy development
staff. Only three other blacks have won
high-level appointments from Reagan:
Vincent E. Reed, assistant Education
secretary for elementary and secondary
education; Arthur E. Teele Jr., administrator of the Urban Mass Transportation Administration; and the Energy
Department's Douglas.
The Hispanic community is still waiting for those promised seven sub-Cabinet
appointments. To date, Michael Cardenas has been named administrator of
the Small Business Administration, John
Hernandez has been selected as deputy
EPA administrator, and Ricardo M. Urbina, originally put forward by Carter,
has been nominated as associate judge
of the District of Columbia Superior
Court, a non-federal post.
OUTLOOK
No one expected Reagan to emerge
as a champion of affirmative action programs for either women or minorities.
Nonetheless, many expected Reagan to
put together a broadly representative
Administration that could keep most of
his political fences in good repair and
help to sustain his personal popularity.
Many groups that were ready to support him are losing patience, however,
as the personnel appointments trickle
Morton C. Blackwell, a White House
liaison to conservative groups, predicted
in 1978 that a Reagan presidency "would
not he what many conservatives expect
and
liberals
"
out. Washington Post columnist William
Raspberry on March 25 quoted the following excerpt from a letter written by
William 0. Walker, a leader of the
Black Advisory Committee to the Reagan-Bush Campaign:
"Unfortunately, efforts to establish
meaningful contacts with members of
the Reagan team have been most discouraging. They neither return phone
calls nor answer letters. Plus the fact
that appointments of blacks are moving
at a slow pace, if at all."
Jo Ann Gasper, a columnist for Conservative Digest who offers the disclaimer
that "it's not often that I find myself
in agreement with feminists," has taken
Reagan to task for engaging in something
close to tokenism in the jobs he has
awarded to women. "Most of the women,
so far," she wrote, "have gone into jobs
which will not have strong policy implications."
Francisco Garza, legislative analyst for
the National Council of La Raza, said
in an interview that the Hispanic community, is "extremely disappointed" by
Reagan's appointments.
James, eternally optimistic in the midst
of the storm, insists that all will turn
out well. "Never has so much work
been done to get ready to staff an Administration," he said with pride. "In
some ways, I think we are going too
fast. That's sort of a shocking statement
for me to make, because everybody says
I'm going too slow .... My response is
that I don't know if we are ahead or
behind and, frankly, I don't care. My
only concern is whether we are doing
a good job and whether the appointments
we are turning out are quality appointments .... And that takes time."
History may yet vindicate James, even
though his critics think that time is
running out on him. Conservative Digest
credits the Reagan kitchen cabinet with
blowing the whistle on James's allegedly
"anti-Reaganite" operation. But, of late,
the kitchen cabinet seems to have fallen
into disfavor with the top echelon of
the White House staff.
To James, this is the final irony. "I've
supported Ronald Reagan longer than
most of these guys," he said of his
critics. "Remember, I'm from California." As for being at odds with the
kitchen cabinet, James replies that most
of its members, including its former
chairman and now Attorney General William French Smith, are old friends. "Bill
Smith and I belong to the same club-the
California Club."
In a real sense, James and his businessworld approach to personnel recruitingas opposed to a professional politician's
approach-is just what the Reagan kitchen cabinet ordered.
0
NATIONAL JOURNAL 4/4/81
567
�)I
APRIL 4, 1981, VOL. 13, NO. 14, PAGES 553-592
President and Publisher: John Fox Sullivan
Editor: RichardS. Frank
Deputy Editor: Joel Havemann
Chief Political Correspondent: Dom
Bonafede Staff Correspondents: Timothy
B. Clark, Richard E. Cohen, Richard
Corrigan, Linda E. Demkovich, Michael R.
Gordon, Dick Kirsch ten, William J.
Lanouette, Christopher Madison, Lawrence
Mosher, Robert J. Samuelson, James W.
Singer, Rochelle L. Stanfield
Contributing Editors: Maxwell Glen, Jerry
Hagstrom, Michael J. Mal bin, Neal R.
Peirce, Daniel Rapoport, Jane Stein
News Editor: Alice J. Porter
Production Editor: Jake Welch
Graphics Editor: Nancy M. Krueger
Picture Editor: Richard A. Bloom
Production Assistant: Lisa Cherubini
TAXATION
WHITEHOUSE
The Administration's liberalized
depreciation proposals may be the most
important part of its economiC package,
but their complicated details and likely
consequences are receiving less attention
than the personal tax cut proposals or the
list of budget cuts.
562 STILL IN CHARGE
By Dick Kirschten
~
EXECUTIVE
While still recuperating from his bullet
wound, President Reagan has taken steps
to make it clear at home and abroad that
he remains in charge and intends to carry
out his presidential duties.
564 OFF TO A SLOW START
By Dick Kirschten
Circulation Director: Joan Willingham
Subscription Manager: Janie D. Blackman
Conference Director: Barbara Norris
Conference Manager: Eleanor Evans
Reference Senke Director:
Nancy R. Miller
Admlnistrati~e Assistant: Julia M. Romero
Marketing Director: M. Cissel Gott
TRANSIT
President Reagan and his personnel
director, E. Pendleton James, have come
under fire for the President's
appointments to top policy-making posts.
They have been hit for moving too slowly
and have been criticized from various
quarters for picking the wrong people.
568 CRIPPLING CUTS?
B)' Neal R. Peirce
and Carol Steinbach
Government Research
Corporation
ANTITRUST
While many local mass transit officials
complain that the Administration's
proposed cuts in operating subsidies and
capital grants would cripple their systems,
some predict that they could force
overdue reforms.
573 SHIFTING GEARS
By James W. Singer
Chairman orthe Board: Anthony C. Stout
President, Publishing Di~lslon:
John Fox Sullivan
President, Qient Senkes Di~ision:
Raymond Garcia
Comptroller: Grace Geisinger
National Journal® (ISSN 0360-4217),
April 4, 1981, Vol. 13, No. 14. Published
weekly, except for a year-end double issue,
by the Government Research Corporation,
1730 M St. NW, Washington, D.C., 20036.
Telephone (202) 857-1400. Call toll free
for subscription service, 800-424-2921.
Available by subscription only at $415
per year. Academic library rate $265 per
year. Subscribers provided with semiannual
indexes. Binders available at $24 for a
set of two. Second-class postage paid at
Washington, D.C., and additional offices.
Typesetting by Unicorn Graphics Inc.
CJ981 by Tbe Go~emment Research Corporation. All rights resened. Reproduction
In whole or part without permission Is
strictly prohibited.
556 ECONOMIC SLEEPER
By Robert J. Samuelson
Focuses
CONGRESS
In a break with the policy of the Carter
Administration, the new antitrust teams
installed at the Justice Department and
the Federal Trade Commission are
looking more kindly on conglomerate
mergers, shared monopolies and vertical
restraints.
578 NEW BUDGET MATH?
By Richard E. Cohen
ENVIRONMENT
579 ANACIDTEST
By Lawrence Mosher
ECONOMY
580 FOR DATAHOLICS
By Robert J. Samuelson
PRESIDENCY
581 EXPECT THE WORST
By Dick Kirsch ten
Departments
WASHINGTON UPDATE
INFO FILE
PEOPLE
ATAGLANCE
555
585
586
588
Policy and politics in brief
Studies, surveys and statistics
Washington's movers and shakers
Weekly checklist of major issues
�PEOPLE
Fla., as president of the Overseas Private Investment
Corp.; Joseph ViUella, who has been working for the
You'd never know that President Reagan had been in California Specialized Training Institute, as deputy director
the hospital by the pace of sub-Cabinet nominations since of the Federal Emergency Management Agency; Kieran
his injury. More than a score of nominations were announced O'Doherty, a New York and Washington lawyer, as a
in less than a week, bringing to 112 the number of member of the Postal Rate Commission; Alex Kozinski,
nominations that the new Administration has submitted deputy legal counsel in Reagan's transition office, as special
to the Senate after 11 weeks in office. By contrast, the counsel to the Merit Systems Protection Board; Jay Fleron
Carter Administration had sent the Senate 161 names Morris, deputy director for administration during the traniiirough its 11th . week, or almost half agam as many sition, as assistant administrator for external affairs at
as Reagan. Three of tfie new nominees are at the Health the Agency for International Development; Winifred A.
and Human Services Department. Reagan chose Arthur Pizzano, from the health care practice of Arthur Young
HuU Hayes Jr., head of the clinical pharmacology division and Co. and formerly an official of Illinois's Public Health
of Pennsylvania State University's College of Medicine, Department, as deputy director of ACTION; and Thomas
as commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration. L. Lias, a veteran of the Reagan-Bush Committee and
WarrenS. Richardson, a lobbyist who has counted among a Health, Education and Welfare Department aide during
his clients the Associated General Contractors and the the Ford Administration, as ACTION's assistant director
Li~rty Lobby, was named assistant secretary for legislation,
for voluntary citizen participation.
and Pamela Needham Baily, director of government relations
for the American Hospital Supply Corp., assistant secretary
for public affairs. At the Interior Department, Reagan Around the Agencies
nominated Garrey E. Carruthers, a professor of agricultural After much speculation as to who would take the post
economics and business at New Mexico State University, of head of the Veterans Administration, it now seems
as assistant secretary for land and water resources; Kenneth
likely that the job will go to James
L. Smith, general manager of Oregon's Warm Springs
Webb, a decorated former Marine who
wrote A Sense of Honor, a novel about
Indian Tribe, as assistant secretary for Indian affairs;
and Daniel N. MiUer, Wyoming's state geologist, as assistant
the Vietnam war, and who currently
secretary for energy and minerals. The neglected Education
serves as minority counsel to the House
Veterans' Affairs Committee. The apDepartment also picked up three nominations. They !lre
pointment could help to reduce tension
Donald J. Senese, a senior research associate for the
House Republican Study Committee, as assistant secretary
between the Administration and Vietnam
for educational research and improvement; Gary L. Jones,
veterans, a group that has complained
from Chicago's MacArthur Foundation, as deputy unbitterly about proposed budget cuts ....
dersecretary for planning and budget; and Jollll H. RodAnother expected appointment is that
riguez, from the old Office of Education, as deputy unWebb
of Jonathan C. Rose, a senior official
dersecretary for intergovernmental and interagency affairs. in the Justice Department's Antitrust Division during the
Three nominations were made to the Housing and Urban Ford Administration, who is expected to be named assistant
Development Department: Antonio Monroig, who has held attorney general in charge of a new office of legal polseveral posts with the Puerto Rican government, as assistant icy .... After 24 years with the federal government, Robert
secretary for fair housing and equal opportunity; Judith Saloschin, director of the Justice Department's office of
L. Tardy, a Labor Department official and a member · information law and policy, has re_tired .... John Metelski,
of the transition team for the Export-Import Bank of who has been an associate chief counsel of the Commerce
the United States, as assistant secretary for administration; Department's National Telecommunications and Informaand Warren T. Lindquist, chairman of a New York man- tion Administration, has resigned to become senior counsel
agement consulting firm that specializes in regional eco- for telecommunications at Microbrand Corp .... At the
nomic development, as general manager and chief executive Internal Revenue Service, Jerome Sabastian has been moved
officer of the New Community Development Corp. In from the interpretive division to the post of deputy chief
assorted other nominations, Reagan named Frank Wesley counsel (technical), and James Keightley, who has been
Naylor Jr., senior vice president of a Farm Credit District director of the general litigation division, will become
in Sacramento, as assistant Agriculture secretary for rural deputy chief counsel (general). Elsewhere at the Treasury
development; William R. Gianelli, a civil engineer for Department, John E. Wilkins, who was director of the
California and former chairman of the Monterey Penninsula office of revenue sharing estimates, has been made director
Water Management District, as assistant Army secretary of the office of tax analysis, replacing Harvey Galper,
for civil works; Charles M. Butler III, administrative as- who is moving to the Advisory Committee on Intergovsistant to Sen. John Tower, R-Texas, as a member and ernmental Relations.
later woairman of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission: F Jward E. Noble, an Oklahoman whom the White
House describes as having "been involved in various busi- All the President's Men and Women
nesses," as chairman of the Synthetic Fuels Corp; Mary Reagan made it official and nominated William A. Niskanen
Ann (Mimi) Weyforth Dawson, administrative assistant Jr. to the Council of Economic Advisers. Niskanen was
to Sen. Bob Packwood, R-Ore., to succeed Robert E. a professor in the Graduate School of Management at
Lee on the Federal Communications Commission; Craig the University of California (Los Angeles) and economics
A. Nalen, director of the Barnett Bank of Palm Beach, director for the Ford Motor Co. before that. He spent
)
The Appointments Pace Quickens
6l6
_)
NATIONAL JOURNAL 4/11/81
.
~·
�.
'
\
\
{)IJ
~v~
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 10, 1993
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Rahm Emanuel, Director of Political Affairs
FROM:
Carter Wilkie, Communications Research
~
SUBJECT:
the pace of real change
As the attached chronology shows, President Clinton and the 103d
Congress have enacted, or will have enacted by April 2, more laws
with direct impact on Americans' livelihood during the first two
months of any presidency in the last 16 years.
Even though President Carter was the last to serve with a
Congress controlled by his own party, it does not appear that his
presidency was as productive in the time period studied. With
the exception of the special case of President Ford, who assumed
office in mid-term, we might have to go back to LBJ to find a
similar pace of achievements. I will talk to several friendly
historians to find a consensus on this point.
We could edit the attached chronology to exclude all honorary
designations and commendations. This would make the achievements
of this year stand out further.
One point you may want Stan Greenberg to research: When asked
whether the President or the Congress should have "the most say
in government," 65% of respondents in 1959 said the President and
only 17% said the Congress; in 1977, however, 58% of respondents
said the Congress and only 26% said the President (Guide to the
Presidency, p.122].
cc.
Ann Walker
�MEMO
TO: CARTER WU.KIE
li'ROM: RARR\:' TOIV
3111/93
RE: PASSAGE OF BUDGET RESOLUTIONS IN THE PAST
The concumnt resolution on lhc budget is a consressional docu&uenL Lhc atlupuon of which
require~ no rre~identlal action. Oncr. an identk.al rt".sc1ution is apptu\'00 by oolh houses of
Congre.~s -- usually in lhc fonn of a conference report -~ t.he ~ululiun is considered adopted.
ln theory, budaet law require& IJ•&L tl~ l.Ju\11~&. '"~lulluu be \:t..uuple&a;IJ by April 13. 1ltat has
never oc:c:urrcd. If it happens lhis year, it will be the first time ever. following l4i a list of
lhc completion dates for pa:u hudget resolutions.
Eiscal Year
1976....................................................................................................May 14, 1975
1977................................................................................................
Ma~ 1~. JQ7f\
1978.................................................................................................... Ma¥ 17, 1977
IY7Y................................................................................................... May 17, 1978
1980.................................................................................................... May 24, 1979
1981 ................................................................................................... June 12, 1980
l982.................................................................................................... May 21 . 19Hl
1983........................................................................................................... June 23. 19A2
1984................................................................................................... .June 23, 1983
1985.................................................................................................... Clctoher 1, 1984
1986.................................................................................................... August
1, 1985
1987....................................................................................................May 15. 1986
19RR....................................................................................................Junc 25, 1987
1989................................................................................................... .June 6, 1988
1990....................................................................................................Mny 18, 1989
J99l ....................................................................................................()ctc.lber 9, 1990
1992....................................................................................................May 21, 1991
1993 ......................................................................................................May 20. 1992
�THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 9, 1993
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
~
Rahm Emanuel, Director of Political Affairs
Carter Wilkie, Communications Research
selling the early achievements
For starters, OMB's Budget Timetable guidelines, published in
1988, state that Congress customarily completes action on
concurrent budget resolution by April 15. (These guidelines also
state that the President customarily submits budget on the first
Monday after January 3.) Clearly, we appear to be ahead of the
usual timeline, but I will compile actual dates since 1974 after
checking with OMB staff records tomorrow.
on a quick review of presidential papers, it appears on first
glance that President Clinton will have won more major
legislative achievements in this time frame since Lyndon
Johnson's Great Society of 1965, the last time both houses of
Congress and the White House have been under one party control.
I will verify (and quantify) this tomorrow.
We have two risks ahead of us:
1.
There could be a drawback on emphasizing speed.
may counter that haste makes waste.
Journalists
2.
There could be a drawback in emphasizing the President's
political achievements at the expense of establishing a new
governing ideology. Harry McPherson said LBJ's great failure was
not staying above the thrill of the game of politics long enough
to inspire and keep the nation behind a national cause.
Establishing an ideology (a la Reagan's first two years) lets
allies in Congress and the Party share in a President's success,
and it builds more public support for the agenda down the road.
As an alternative approach, would we want to emphasize more the
final death of trickle-down economics in America?
Lastly, former Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill might be a great
spokesman for the President's legislative achievements. I heard
from one of Tip's friends in Boston that Tip was deeply touched
by the President's video tribute at his birthday party recently.
Tip said that unlike Carter's team, Clinton's people have a
political view that rises above parochialism. He said Clinton
may turn out to be the best President since FDR. Perhaps one of
the Irish-related festivities around the 16th and 17th would be a
good time for the Speaker and the President to chat together
intimately.
�1134 VI Chief Executive and the Federal Government
I
Table 17 Ticket Splitting between Presidential and
House Candidates, 1920-1984
Year
Districts•
1920
1924
1928
1932
1936
1940
1944
1948
1952
1956
1960
1964
1968
1972
1976
1980
1984
344
356
359
355
361
362
367
422
435
435
437
435
435
435
435
435
435
Districts with split resultsh
Percentage
Number
11
42
68
50
51
53
41
90
84
130
114
145
139
192
124
143
196
3.2
11.8
18.9
14.1
14.1
14.6
11.2
21.3
19.3
29.9
26.1
33.3
32.0
44.1
28.5
32.8
45.0
Source: Norman J. Ornstein, Thomas E. Mann, and Michael J.
Malbin, Vital Statistics on Congress, 1987-1988 (Washington,
D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1988), 62.
a. Before 1952 complete data are not available on every congres-
sional district.
b. Congressional districts carried by a presidential candidate of
one party and a House candidate of another party.
party to raise money and field strong candidates for office.
If the opposition party is not strongly challenged in a
congressional race, the likelihood that the president's party
will suffer is greater.
An example of this phenomenon was the 1974 midterm
elections. The incumbent president, Repubican Richard
Nixon, had suffered precipitously in public standing after
his 1972 reelection because of the damaging revelations of
the Watergate investigation. Thus, the Republicans-who
also were coping with an economic downturn-found it
extremely difficult to raise money and select strong candidates for office. Moreover, an unusually large number of
legislators (mostly Republican) decided to retire in 1974,
thereby enhancing the Democratic challengers' chances.
Finally, Democratic antipathy toward Nixon and the Republicans was fanned by revelation of Watergate misdeeds,
in part because these offenses were directed against Democratic party leaders. As a result, Democrats at all levels
were motivated to run for office, give more money, and
otherwise work to defeat the party of Watergate. The net
result in Congress was a gain of forty-nine Democratic seats
in the House and four in the Senate. Some of the Democratic House gains occurred in districts that had been
Republican strongholds.
Evaluation of the president is not the only basis for
voter decisions during midterm elections. Despite the longterm erosion of partisanship, political party ties continue to
play an important role. A study of midterm elections in the
.1970s noted that party identification, incumbency, and
personal attributes of candidates were strong predictors of
voter choices. 153
Still, the inexorable erosion of support for the president's party at midterm elections emphasizes the large
shadow that the president casts over congressional elec-
Ii
tions. As the only nationally elected leader the president is
a natural referent for voter choices. Moreover, some observers argue that the electorate is more likely to vote
against policies or candidates than for them. Given that the
president's standing is invariably highest at the start of the
term, followed by a decline (although this decline may be
mitigated by short-term factors), it is likely that at
midterm a president, and his or her political party, will be
hurt by critics more than helped by supporters.
It has been suggested that midterm elections may provide a source of affirmation for, or rejection of, the president's issue positions, but there is little reason to believe
that this is true. First, experts agree that the public knows
little about the positions of congressional candidates on the
issues, even the controversial ones. Moreover, voters'
awareness of issues during midterm elections is even lower
than during presidential elections. Second, many congressional races are not competitive. In 1978, for example, no
effective competition was offered in 128 of the 435 congressional races. Third, congressional candidates are likely to
deemphasize specific issues in their campaigns, focusing
instead on broader abstractions such as government efficiency and invocations of political symbols. Fourth, turnout in midterm elections is low. In 1982, for instance, only
38 percent of the national electorate voted. This level of
turnout is not a measure of public opinion, and those who
do vote are not representative of the population as a whole.
Finally, to the extent that issues are raised in congressional
campaigns, they are bound to vary from district to district,
in part because they spring from local concerns. 154
High and Low Presidential Standing
Presidents who stand tall in the eyes of the public
possess the political high ground in their dealings with
Congress. Presidents who lack high standing face a politically problematic situation in which Congress actually
might gain politically from jousting with the president.
Presidents have long appreciated the political clout accompanying popular approval, especially when it comes to
dealing with Congress.
In the aftermath of his overwhelming victory in 1964,
President Johnson moved ahead quickly to enact major
legislation, particularly the highly controversial Voting
Rights Act of 1965. Despite warnings that the bill was too
explosive and that he ought to bide his time more carefully,
Johnson knew from his years of Senate experience that
presidents had to act when their popularity stood high.
Many presidents before and since have seen the wisdom in capitalizing on public standing to promote important programs in Congress. When presidents are reelected,
their ~nnual programs are infused with new proposals as
part onhe postelection mandate. By the end of their terms,
however, a ':far larger proportion are recycled proposals
from earlier in the administration. This trend reflects realization that the president no longer possesses the p'opular
mandate necessary to mount successful drives in Congress
for major new legislation. The progressive erosion of the
president's public standing results in a more assertive Congress and a less influential president. (See Table 18.)
Presidential Leadership Skills
Shortly before leaving office, Harry Truman observed
that his successor, former general Dwight Eisenhower, would
�President and Congress 1135
Table 18 Presidential Proposals Resubmitted to Congress, 1954-1974
Presidential proposals
previously submitted
but not enacted
Resubmitted bills
as percentage of
legislative proposals
President
Year
Presidential
legislative
proposals
Eisenhower
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
232
207
225
206
234
228
183
12
31
79
74
59
63
78
5.1
15.0
35.1
35.9
25.2
27.6
42.6
Kennedy
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
355
298
401
217
469
371
431
414
36
64
67
29
37
31
83
12.1
16.0
30.9
6.2
10.0
7.2
20.0
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
171
210
202
116
183
161
40
62
5
19.0
30.7
4.3
10
6.2
Johnson
Nixon
,I
Nixon/Ford
Source: "Presidential Boxscores," Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1954-1974 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1955·
1975). Table compiled by author.
be in for a rude awakening when he assumed the presidency.
Truman predicted: "He'll sit here ... and say, 'Do this! Do
that!' And nothing will happen. Poor Ike-it won't be a bit
like the Army. He'll find it very frustrating." u 5
Political scientist Richard Neustadt made a vital point
about the modern American presidency when he quoted
President Truman, his former boss. In observing that presidential power to command was both overrated and overstated, he was arguing that presidential power was primarily the power to persuade. Reliance on persuasion and
bargaining has become a hallmark of the presidency,
Neustadt observed, because the responsibilities, demands,
and expectations now inherent in the presidential office
have outstripped the powers of the office. As a consequence, presidents must rely on informal bargaining skills
to accomplish their goals.
Concern for the appropriate level of presidential leadership skills was articulated by two early twentieth-century
presidents. Theodore Roosevelt advocated an aggressive
stewardship role for the president. He argued that the
president was entitled, even obliged, to act as necessary to
promote the needs, goals, and interests of the people, unless such action was explicitly unconstitutional. Roosevelt's
successor, William Howard Taft, called instead for a restrained or whiggish view of the presidency, proposing instead that presidents could and should exercise only those
powers explicitly granted in the Constitution. 158 Both these
approaches require some level of presidential leadership
skills, but they vary widely as to the scope and limitation of
these skills.
While the philosophical debate over the relative merits
of the stewardship and whiggish views of presidential leadership persists, no modern president can ignore the fundamentals of effective executive leadership. To win enact-
ment of important (and therefore usually controversial)
legislation, the president cannot simply submit legislation
and sit back to wait for the finished product. Specialized
coalitions often must be built in Congress, even across
party lines. Lyndon Johnson, for example, admitted that
he could not have gained passage of key civil rights legislation without the support of moderate Republicans, despite
the fact that his party held substantial majorities in both
houses.
Often considered one of the most adept legislative
strategists ever to occupy the White House, Johnson knew
more than most about the key leadership role of the president. Johnson summarized his philosophy when he said:
"There is only one way for a President to deal with the
Congress, and that is continuously, incessantly, and without interruption."
Although many factors other than the president's leadership skills play a vital role in shaping presidential-congressional relations, presidents are nevertheless the personifications of their administrations. They take personal
credit for successes and personal blame for failures (although seldom willingly). More to the point, presidents are
personal, readily available reservoirs of influence. They are
an administration's handiest political balm.
Some presidents such as Lyndon Johnson bring with
them intimate knowledge of C~gress, while others acquire
such knowledge on the job. As president, Johnson paid
close attention to even small legislative details, and he
always made himself available to members of Congress who
wanted to see him.
Presidents also learn that the timing of legislative
maneuvers often contributes to a successful outcome. For
example, successful passage of Reagan's economic program
owed much to the rise in Reagan's popularity following the
�1136 VI Chief Executive and the Federal Government
A president's influence over Congress varies with each president's personality. Lyndon Johnson, aggressive as Senate majority
leader (shown here with Democratic Senator Theodore Francis Green of Rhode Island), was just as comfortable employing embarrassment and bullying to get his way as president.
1981 attempt on his life. Lyndon Johnson similarly found
that sending bills to Congress at the right time was important to a favorable outcome.
Consultation plays a vital role as well in executivelegislative relations. Presidents who do not bother to consult with key members of Congress often find that they
have made opponents out of potential allies. President
Nixon, for example, probably lost the support of Republican senator Margaret Chase Smith for the Carswell nomination to the Supreme Court when his administration informed members of the Senate that she was going to
support Carswell; in fact, she had not made up her mind.
Smith eventually voted against Carswell.
Frequently, presidents have found their cabinets to be
an important source of expertise and political pressure.
Johnson devoted much cabinet meeting time to pending
legislation, and he also directed his cabinet secretaries to
apply their departments to legislative ends. Cabinet secretaries and lower department officials often testify before
congressional committees, and the president can shape that
testimony to advantage.
One of the president's most important legislative resources is a personal appeal. Whether over the phone or
face to face, such an appeal is usually an effective (although
by no means unfailing) means of winning support. Some
presidents-such as Johnson, Ford, and Reagan-were frequent and effective users of personal appeals. Otherssuch as Eisenhower and Carter-were less comfortable
with the personal approach. Richard Nixon actively
avoided substantive personal contact with members of
Congress. Phone calls from members to the president were
screened carefully, with most not even getting through to
the president himself. His view of himself as more of an
administrator than a power broker, as well as his apparent
aloofness and detachment, did little to endear Nixon to
members of Congress.
As with any resource, the impact of direct involvement
by the president may decline if employed too frequently.
Presidents usually reserve personal pressure for close votes
on important bills and for instances when the president's
prestige is on the line. A good example of both of these
cases is presidential attempts to defeat a veto override
vote. In 1986, for example, Reagan tried to win support for
his veto of a congressional effort to block an arms sale to
Saudi Arabia by personally contacting twelve senators. One
senator who changed his vote to support Reagan's veto was
John P. East (R-N.C.). He was persuaded that "the president should be allowed to make foreign policy without
being managed at every turn by Congress." In this instance
Reagan's veto was upheld by the precise minimum of
thirty-four votes.
Although there is no consensus on the extent and
effectiveness of bargaining, it is indisputably an integral
presidential resource. President Kennedy, for example,
struck a bargain with Sen. Robert S. Kerr (D-Okla.) over
an Arkansas River project. (The Arkansas River runs
through Kerr's home state of Oklahoma.) When Kennedy
asked Kerr for help in getting an investment tax credit bill
out of the Senate Finance Committee, Kerr responded by
raising the Arkansas River bill, insisting on a trade. Kennedy replied, "You know, Bob, I never really understood
that Arkansas River bill before today." Kerr's project was
supported and enacted; in exchange, Kerr backed the Kennedy bill.
Every president engages in some degree of bargaining,
but the technique has its limitations. First, bargaining
resources are limited. The president cannot afford to use
bargaining or favor trading as a principal means of obtaining action. If bargains are made frequently and explicitly,
everyone in Congress will likely want to make such deals.
Like personal contact, bargains are most effective when
used prudently and implicitly. Moreover, members of Congress may not be swayed by the bargaining option, especially if they are motivated by such factors as constituent
pressure, ideology, or party ties. Although presidents use
bargaining to pursue their policy objectives, most of the
pressure for bargains emanates from Congress.
Sometimes, presidential influence extends to applying
�President and Congress 1137
coercion. Strictly speaking, the president can do little to
twist arms. Some presidents, such as Eisenhower, found
strong-arm tactics distasteful. Even after repeated attacks
against him and his administration by Sen. ,Joseph R.
McCarthy {R-Wis.), Eisenhower declined to respond aggressively ..Johnson, on the other hand, was not reluctant to
employ embarrassment, bullying, and threats to promote
his ends.
The Nixon administration also employed arm-twisting
tactics, although Nixon himself avoided personal involvement. These tactics came into play in 1969 over such
controversial issues as the antiballistic missile system and
the Haynsworth and Carswell nominations to the Supreme
Court. In addition, the Nixon administration threatened
rebellious representatives with reelection trouble. A wellknown example is the administration's support of James L.
Buckley, who was running for the Senate from New York.
Because the Republican incumbent, Charles E. Goodell,
had become a strong administration critic, the administration threw its support informally behind Buckley, the
nominee of the New York Conservative party. The weight
of the Nixon administration helped Buckley defeat Goodell
and the Democratic nominee, Richard Ottinger. Despite
this and other periodic successes for the arm-twisting technique, it frequently does not work, and it often serves to
fan and fortify opposition.
Presidents can provide a variety of services to members of Congress. These include presidential visits to home
districts, assistance with favored pork barrel and other
projects, patronage appointments, constituent service assistance (such as giving out presidential memorabilia and
signed photographs, arranging special White House tours,
interceding with federal agencies), access to privileged or
other inside information, campaign assistance, and personal favors and amenities for members of Congress (from
cuff links to choice theater tickets). The use of amenities
and social courtesies builds positive personal relations.
Early in his term President Lyndon Johnson was careful to
apportion credit for important legislation, but as Vietnamrelated criticism mounted, he began to refer to programs as
his own, which further eroded his relations with Congress.
As with other tactical devices, services and amenities are
limited in effectiveness.
In addition to these direct means of influence, presidents can marshal outside pressure, including that exerted
by constitutents. Thus, presidents may appeal directly to
geographic or other constituencies to urge that pressure be
placed on representatives. President Kennedy's legislative
chief, Lawrence O'Brien, frequently contacted state governors to urge them to pressure state representatives. Federal
agencies also may be called on to mobilize support for
presidential policies. Farmers, unions, business groups, and
regional or other interests may be persuaded to side with
the administration in attempting to swing congressional
support. President Johnson forged a coalition of the major
religious denominations and educational groups in support
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965
even before the bill was introduced. In fact, Johnson deliberately held the bill until both the National Education
Association and the National Catholic Welfare Conference
agreed on the bill's basics.•••
The sheer length of this list of leadership tools available to the president is convincing evidence that presidential persuasion is irresistible when applied firmly and consistently. Yet the actual presidential record suggests almost
the opposite. Many examples of all of these factors in
operation can be cited, but in fact the persuasive tools and
abilities of presidents constitute only one category of factors that influence the legislative process. A penetrating
analysis of presidential influence in Congress has concluded that the impact of presidential skills has been overstated, partly because of the tendency for such activities to
attract headlines. According to this study, "Presidential
legislative skills do not seem to affect support for presidential policies, despite what conventional wisdom leads us to
expect."'""
The Public Presidency
Presidents often use their rhetorical skills to bypass
Congress and sway public opinion. The potency of aroused
public sentiment already has been summarized. It is not
surprising, then, that presidents often seek public favor to
build support for major legislation or to head off possible
opposition.
One of the best-known examples of presidents seeking
public support to sway Congress occurred before the era of
television. In 1919 Woodrow Wilson stumped the country
to rally support for the beleaguered League of Nations
treaty then before the Senate. Although he gave forty
speeches in twenty-two days, Wilson's efforts fell short. He
suffered exhaustion, then a stroke, and the Senate defeated
the treaty by a fifteen-vote margin.
To cite a more recent example, Ronald Reagan met
increasing opposition from both Congress and the country
to his efforts to cut back on education aid programs. (Polls
indicated popular disapproval of Reagan's cutbacks by a
two-to-one ratio.) In response, the White House launched a
communications offensive, emphasizing the themes of excellence in education, merit pay for teachers, and greater
classroom discipline, and Reagan made over twenty-five
personal appearances to repeat these themes. Later polls
indicated that the public supported Reagan's education
program by a two-to-one ratio, even though no programmatic changes had occurred. By altering public perceptions, Reagan also helped alleviate pressure from Congress.
President Johnson also found a public appeal desirable, and even necessary, to impel congressional action.
When Johnson's tax surcharge bill stalled in the House
Ways and Means Committee, he appealed to the people
through several public forums, including his 1968 State
of the Union address. The impasse was eventually overcome, despite some congressional resentment over the pub·
lic approach.
Early in his administration President Carter used a
series of television addresses to rally public support for his
proposed energy legislation. To symbolize his own commitment to energy conservation, Carter wore a cardigan
sweater instead of the traditional suit jacket. But despite
his appeal to the public, Carter's energy program faced
difficult sailing in Congress.
Presidents also try to take advantage of changing public sentiments. Immediately after the 1968 assassination of
Martin Luther King, Jr., President Johnson pressed congressional leaders to act on his Fair Housing Act, which had
been stalled in committee for over two years. Within seven
days of King's death the bill was signed into law. One day
after Robert F. Kennedy's assassination in 1968, Congress
enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act,
even though the bill had been tied up in Congress for more
than a year. In both instances, dramatic swings in public
sentiment resulting from unforeseen events provided the
�1138 VI Chief Executive and the Federal Government
impetus needed to push a White House-favored proposal
through.
The presidential public appeal is nothing new, but
many analysts have noted that modern communications
technology, along with political changes, have had the effect of encouraging presidents to use the public forum to
pressure Congress. Presidents can command network television time almost at will, and no modern president would
think of launching a major political effort involving Congress without incorporating public communications channels. Indeed, presidents have progressively expanded their
prime time exposure. (See Figure 2.)
Political scientist Samuel Kernell has argued that
modern presidents "go public" more than their predecessors; they attempt to place themselves, and their proposals,
directly before the people in order to improve their political fortunes in Washington. These efforts may target particular groups or segments of the population, but since
virtually any presidential action is news, national coverage
usually results.
The consequence of this trend is that presidents, their
allies, and their foes have all become much more concerned
with public relations as a political tactic. Both allies and
critics agree that, among modern presidents, "No president
has enlisted public strategies to better advantage than has
Ronald Reagan." Reagan's acting background dovetailed
with a growing understanding of the impact of presidential
images to produce a presidency that cultivated Reagan's
national image as a means of promoting his congressional
agenda.
The idea that modern presidents can obtain powerful
political capital from public support is taken further by
Theodore J. Lowi. He argues that the country has entered
an era in which the government is centered around the
presidency. Presidential appeals have taken on a plebiscitary nature-that is, presidents seek popular support or
even adoration, as did the autocrats of ancient Rome and
the more recent French empires. And, according to Lowi,
the forceful ascendance of the personal presidency has
come at the expense of the separation of powers (especially
in a denigration of the role of Congress) and the two-party
system. The cult of presidential personality has been accompanied by expansion of the formal and informal powers
of the presidency, although these heightened powers cannot match public expectations. Under these conditions the
president may operate outside of the traditional presidential-congressional relations to impel Congress to act in
accordance with the president's wishes.
Thus, the powers and skills most important to presidents seeking an effective presidency have changed since
the 1950s. Communications skills have always been important, but past presidents known for their communications
skills-such as Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and
Franklin Roosevelt-did not rely solely or even primarily
on speechmaking and public oration to gain political results in Congress. Modern presidents have found public
appeals to be an increasingly important supplement to the
traditional bargaining with Congress. With the erosion of
strong party ties, the traditional institutional and partisan
links between the president and Congress have been further weakened.
Presidents as Leaders
Each president has left a mark on the presidency.
Historians, journalists, political scientists, and others pay
close attention to the strengths and weaknesses of each
president, and they often rank presidents according to
their relative "greatness." These rankings have been criticized for their unstated assumptions (such as the assumption that activism equals greatness), their reliance on subjective and reputational considerations, and the lack of
agreement about what constitutes greatness. Yet the varying leadership styles of recent presidents reveal much
about their dealings with Congress.
Roosevelt. Franklin Roosevelt oversaw the expansion of the modern presidency, in particular the legislative
realm. Early in his four-term presidency he shepherded
through Congress the enormous volume of legislation that
composed his New Deal program. And because he served as
president during World War II, he benefited from the
wartime deference to presidential authority. In both instances, severe national crises afforded Roosevelt singular
opportunities to shape and direct legislative affairs, and
even to redefine the president's role. His singular leadership skills were important as well.
As Richard Neustadt has noted, "No president in this
century has had a sharper sense of personal power .... No
modern President has been more nearly master in the
White House .... He wanted power for its own sake; he also
wanted what it could achieve."
In addition to the personal enjoyment he derived from
the use of power, much of Roosevelt's legacy is his impact
on the institution of the presidency. He created the Executive Office of the President and brought the Bureau of the
Budget into it from the Treasury Department. He increased staff and other executive resources, and he focused
these expanded resources on Congress to provide the necessary presidential input and to ensure the enforcement of
presidential preferences.
Roosevelt also knew how to use the media and other
external forces to bring pressure to bear on Congress. His
celebrated fireside chats highlighted his ability to use the
still new electronic medium of radio as a means of rallying
public support for his political agenda. Later, during the
war years, Roosevelt used the radio to instill confidence
and fan patriotic fervor.
For all of Roosevelt's skill, however, he made his share
of blunders and suffered his share of defeats. During his
second term he miscalculated congressional (and national)
sentiments when he proposed increasing the number of
seats on the Supreme Court so that he could appoint additional justices more receptive to his agenda. Congress
balked at Roosevelt's attempt at "Court packing," and the
president suffered no little political humiliation. In the
1938 primaries, Roosevelt ran pro-Roosevelt Democrats
against the Democratic legislators who had not been adequately receptive to many of his initiatives in Congress.
With one exception, every effort failed, and southern Democrats in particular harbored resentment for years.
Truman. Harry Truman sought to extend the legislative work of his predecessor. His "Fair Deal," which
emphasized economic security for Americans, was a continuation of Roosevelt's New Deal. Truman set forth a
twenty-one point program, which included proposals related to increasing the minimum wage, urban development,
national health insurance, social security, and full employment. Unlike his predecessor, however, Truman met vociferous opposition. In the midterm elections of 1946 the
Republicans gained control of both houses for the first time
since 1928, and Truman's programs were savaged, as was
he in the public press. Nonetheless, he challenged the
J
�President and Congress 1139
Figure 2 Presidential Addresses, 1929-1983 (Yearly Averages for First Three Years of First Term)
Number of
Addresses
Major Minor
3)
100
'Z1
00
24
fl)
21
70
18
00
15
50
12
40
9
3)
;
Minor _,."'
-----.;
/" ---....
~
;
~
~
6
a-1
3
10
0
0
/
;
;
/
Hoover
Roosevelt Truman Eisenhower Kennedy Johnson
Nixon
Carter
Reagan
(1929-1931) (1933-1935) (1945-1947) (1953-1955) (1961-1963) (1965-1967) (1969-1971) (1977-1979) (1981-1983)
Sources: Data for Hoover, Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Nixon, and Carter are from William W. Lammers, "Presidential AttentionFocusing Activities," in The President and the American Public, ed. Doris A. Graber (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human
Issues, 1982), 152. Data for Kennedy, Johnson, and Reagan are from Public Papers of the President series. See also Samuel Kernen, "The
Presidency and the People," in The Presidency and the Political System, ed. Michael Nelson (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1984), 242.
Cited in Samuel Kernen, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1986), 86.
Note: To eliminate public activities inspired by concerns of reelection rather than governing, only the first three years have been tabulated.
For this reason, Gerald Ford's record of public activities during his two and one-half years of office has been ignored.
Republicans head on, and in one of the great upsets in
modern presidential elections, he defeated his Republican
rival, Thomas E. Dewey in 1948, and carried into office
Democratic congressional majorities.
Truman could not match Roosevelt's reputation or
adroit leadership skills, but he was not without experience
and skill. Truman had served in the Senate for ten years
before becoming vice president in 1944, and he both knew
and respected the congressional decision-making process.
But Roosevelt's death took everyone by surprise, and Truman had little knowledge of White House decision making.
He spent his first two years establishing a coherent White
House structure to deal with legislative matters. While
contributing to the institutionalization process begun by
Roosevelt, Truman also took personal interest in and control over legislative matters. The well-known sign he kept
on his desk, proclaiming, "The buck stops here," embodied
his personal involvement.
Another indication of Truman's attitude was his frequent use of the veto-250 times in eight years. He used his
well-known veto of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 to enforce
his image as defender of the average working man. Truman
took special care with his veto messages and worked on
them personally. He became enmeshed in the unpopular
Korean War during his final two years in office, and suffered a precipitous decline in public standing that was
matched only by Nixon's decline during Watergate.
Eisenhower. The election of former general
Dwight Eisenhower represented the ascension of a relatively apolitical public figure inexperienced in the ways of
civilian governing. Initial assessments of Eisenhower's
presidential leadership, such as that of Richard Neustadt,
portrayed him as a man who served more out of a sense of
duty than a love of power, and as a president who saw his
role as that of referee rather than politician in chief.
Yet many presidential observers have argued that Eisenhower's leadership skills have been underrated. Despite
facing a Congress controlled by the opposition party for six
out of eight years, Eisenhower saw many of his important
programs enacted, presided over an era of peace and economic good times, and was elected twice by large margins.
Philosophically, he did not share the aggressive activism of
his two predecessors. In his first year in office he sent no
coordinated legislative program to Congress, but after stern
criticism from Congress, he followed through with annual
programs for the remainder of his term. His personal role
was one of relative detachment compared to his predecessors. He relied more on his staff and organizational hierarchies, and he generally disdained the backslapping, armtwisting style favored by some politicians.
One revised assessment of Eisenhower's leadership
style has argued that it was a "hidden hand"; that is, Ike
was in fact "politically astute and informed, engaged in
putting his personal stamp on public policy, a president
who applied a carefully thought-out conception of leadership to the conduct of his presidency." In addition to the
hidden hand, Eisenhower's political strategies included his
careful use of language, analysis of the personalities of
those with whom he was dealing in assessing options, refusal to engage in personality conflicts, and selective delegation. Eisenhower's leadership style with Congress and
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�1140 VI Chief Executive and the Federal Government
the country was relatively low key and detached. He benefited from and relied on his persistent public support.
Given the strong opposition congressional leadership of
Democratic House Speaker Sam Rayburn and Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson, Eisenhower probably deserves more credit for having leadership skills suited to the
circumstances of the time than critics initially conceded.
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Kennedy. Although his presidency conveyed a certain mystique, John F. Kennedy entered the White House
on a razor-thin margin that left him little in the way of a
political base. Congress was in the hands of the Democrats,
but southern conservatives held tight reins, and many of
Kennedy's most important "New Frontier" initiatives (including Medicare, aid to education, creation of an urban
affairs department, establishment of a youth conservation
corps, and civil rights) remained bottled up.
Kennedy had served in the Senate for eight years, but
he had taken little interest in Senate affairs and in the
traditional paths of congressional power. When he became
president, his desire to exert leadership was exceeded by
political reality and his own inexperience. In the area of
civil rights, for example, Kennedy had pledged important
advances, but, having lost twenty Democratic seats in the
House in the 1960 elections, he failed to win passage of any
important civil rights legislation. In response to political
pressure, Kennedy did issue a series of executive orders
directed at improving civil rights, and he appointed more
blacks to judicial and other positions than any of his predecessors. And he achieved some notable legislative successes,
including a minimum wage bill, aid to depressed areas, and
a housing bill. As leadership specialist Barbara Kellerman
has noted, Kennedy might have realized greater successes
in areas such as civil rights had he been willing to apply
more of the rewards and sanctions available to him. Kennedy lacked "an appreciation of the politics of leadership.
He failed to exert sufficient influence on those political
actors whose support he needed to win."
In terms of staffing, Kennedy shed Eisenhower's formalistic, hierarchical arrangements, preferring instead a
flexible arrangement that fed information more directly to
him. Kennedy's top aides also had considerable discretion
to act on his behalf. Although these mechanisms could have
maximized Kennedy's personal ability to have an impact
on the legislative process, his fear of outpacing his mandate
did much to slow his efforts.
Kennedy's mixed track record in legislative leadership
was to some extent overshadowed by a series of dramatic
foreign policy developments, including the attempted invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in 1961, the Cuban missile
crisis in 1962, completion of a nuclear test ban treaty in
1963, and the escalating war in Vietnam. Historians and
others have speculated about what course the Kennedy
administration might have taken had he lived to benefit
from the fruits of a strong showing in the 1964 elections. It
is difficult to believe, however, that Kennedy could have
equaled or surpassed the achievements of his successor.
Johnson. In many respects, Lyndon Johnson was
the political opposite of Kennedy. He knew the Congress
like few other politicians, having served there since 1937
and risen through the ranks to become majority leader
during the Eisenhower administration. As a southerner, he
knew how to play to southern Democratic conservatives
and Republican leaders in Congress. He also appreciated
the subtleties of promoting controversial legislation. In
1964, for example, he succeeded where Kennedy had failed
in enacting a major civil rights bill. After the 1964 elections, when the Democrats rolled up large congressional
majorities, he stepped up the pace.
Johnson's Great Society followed in the tradition of
the legislative agendas of Democratic presidents back to
Roosevelt. His successes were considerable during 19651966; of eighty-three major Johnson proposals, eighty were
enacted. Many of his proposals dated back to the Roosevelt
era. Johnson's prodigious record of achievement was the
product of both an overwhelming electoral mandate in the
1964 election and his well-known personal leadership skills.
To be the object of the "Johnson treatment" was to be
stroked, prodded, flattered, bullied, encouraged, and cajoled into supporting the president. Johnson was "the very
model of a political president."
Johnson's highly personal, hands-on style was reflected in his staff organization. Johnson actively participated in political and policy matters, reserving most important decisions for himself. Members of his White House
staff, of course, were heavily involved in such matters as
well. When Johnson's energy was directed at Congress, it
produced numerous achievements, but his pattern of close
personal involvement served him poorly when his attention
turned to Vietnam. As Johnson's public support lessened
and the country became more committed to the Vietnam
War, Johnson brooked little dissent and less disagreement.
He continued to log some legislative successes during the
last two years of his administration, but his unwavering
commitment to the Vietnam War inexorably sapped resources, political capital, and good will from his legislative
agenda. Johnson's considerable leadership skills could not
extract him from his own unyielding commitment to fight
an increasingly unpopular war.
Nixon. The 1968 elections inaugurated a period of
divided government. Although he had served in both
houses of Congress and as Eisenhower's vice president for
eight years, Richard Nixon failed to carry with him either
house of Congress. He was the first president to face this
difficulty since Zachary Taylor in 1848.
At the outset of his administration he forwarded over
forty legislative proposals to Congress, including election
law reform, tax reform, crime-related proposals, welfare
reform, and drug control. But despite these early efforts,
Nixon encountered problems with Congress almost from
the beginning, notably the Haynsworth and Carswell nominations to the Supreme Court. Nixon's initial organizational approach to Congress differed from that of his immediate predecessors. He sought to emulate Eisenhower's
strong cabinet model, emphasizing organizational hierarchy and more limited personal involvement by the president in day-to-day decisions. As his term progressed, however, the strong cabinet model was overthrown in favor of
an administrative approach, where power was concentrated
in the hands of key political aides. During Nixon's first
term, he sought to achieve policy successes through legislative remedy. By the second term, however, he had turned
increasingly to an administrative strategy that emphasized
circumventing congressional channels to the extent possible. This approach suited Nixon's personal leadership
style, which emphasized detachment, hierarchy, and managerial values.
Nixon's principal leadership efforts concerned foreign
policy. He began to scale down U.S. involvement in Vietnam (although he actually escalated the war, provoking
�President and Congress 1141
much criticism from Congress and the nation), opened ties
to China, and completed the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty with the Soviet Union. The Vietnam War was a
persistent source of friction between Congress and the
White House, with struggles over efforts to end funding for
the war and constitutional questions about the extent of
Nixon's discretion over the use of U.S. forces. Congress
scored several important legislative victories, including
passage of the War Powers Resolution.
Nixon's administrative approach conformed to his disdain for congressional critics, and he began to treat his
political opponents as enemies. This we-versus-they mentality did much to foster the Watergate scandal, which was
marked by efforts to turn the apparatus of government
against Nixon's political opponents. Nixon's reelection
campaign also diverted resources to political sabotage,
dirty tricks, and other illegal activities. As public exposure of Nixon campaign and administration misdeeds surfaced, a siege mentality gripped Nixon and his White
House more tightly. Despite the popular mandate accompanying Nixon's landslide 1972 reelection, White
House efforts focused increasingly on political damage control. Relations with Congress continued to deteriorate;
moreover, Congressional investigations were responsible
for Nixon's resignation.
Ford. The presidency of Gerald Ford was the product of historical accident. Had Vice President Spiro T.
Agnew not resigned over financial improprieties committed
during his tenure as governor of Maryland, Ford never
would have become president. Without the benefit of a
national campaign, Ford had no opportunity to construct
and promote his own political and policy agenda. This
simple fact explains much of the difficulty Ford faced with
Congress.
Ford's elevation to the presidency was welcomed by a
country anxious to put the troubled Nixon presidency behind it. Ford's simple, direct, unassuming style provided a
refreshing contrast to the cold and distant Nixon. Congress
too welcomed Ford. As House Republican minority leader,
he was known as a partisan, but also as a likeable, honest
leader. The Ford honeymoon was cut short, however, when
he pardoned Richard Nixon. The pardon provoked a sharp
drop in Ford's popularity and did little to improve Ford's
standing in the Democratic-controlled Congress.
Because the circumstances under which he became
president precluded proposal of a full-blown legislative
agenda at the beginning of his term, Ford had to rely
primarily on a veto strategy in his dealings with a Congress
whose Democratic majority had been enhanced significantly in the 1974 midterm elections. The inherent negativity of this approach fanned congressional resentment, and
it engendered a public image of Ford as a naysayer. (Ford
vetoed sixty-six bills in his two and one-half years in office.) Ford's aides were keenly aware of these problems, but
they felt that they had little room to maneuver unless and
until Ford won his own mandate in the 1976 elections
(although even an election victory might not neutralize the
cumulative ill will stemming from sixty-six vetoes).
Ford attempted a major legislative initiative in 1975
when he sent an energy plan to Congress, but Congress,
with its greater assertiveness, challenged and revised the
Ford proposal. Ford's overall support rate in Congress was
among the lowest of any president since approval records
were kept. His administrative apparatus was far more open
and flexible than that of Nixon's, but it operated less
decisively and authoritatively.
It is unclear whether another individual with more
adroit leadership skills could have exceeded Ford's performance, given the circumstances. Nevertheless, Ford's presidentialleadership style was similar to his style as minority
leader-that of a good man with limited vision who held
the reins of power loosely.
Carter. Former Georgia governor Jimmy Carter entered the White House as a Washington outsider. Because
in his four years as president he failed to shed the outsider
status, his legislative record was pockmarked with unfulfilled expectations and outright failures.
Carter's campaign promises filled over one hundred
pages, and he meant to carry all of them out. Although
Congress was controlled by the president's party, Democrats mistrusted Carter, and Carter did little to assuage the
mistrust. He underestimated the importance of building
careful relations with key congressional leaders, and he
overwhelmed Congress from the start by sending to Capitol
Hill numerous important bills all at once. This contrasted
with Johnson's practice of sending over one major bill at a
time. Carter's experiences testified to Johnson's wisdom.
Carter's top aides, including his legislative liaison
chief, Frank Moore, were non-Washingtonians, who were
inexperienced in Washington politics and did little to cultivate deep-seated support for the president. The Carter
staff was known for not returning phone calls, not informing key legislators of important decisions, and ignoring personal courtesies such as making photo sessions
available.
The post-Watergate Congress was not disposed to accept proposals simply because they came from the White
House. The composition of Congress also militated against
docility and pliability. Of the 289 Democratic House members elected in 1976, 118 had served no more than two
terms. The large proportion of junior members was interested in a share of congressional power, and Carter was less
disposed than most recent presidents to court members of
Congress.
Carter achieved some legislative successes, but most
observers saw him as incapable of getting an important
program through a Congress controlled by his own party.
For example, his 1977 energy package-really an amalgam
of different bills-encountered difficulties. Carter tried to
rally public support for the program as a means of overcoming congressional hurdles, but he found such support
broad and diffuse and insufficient for overcoming conventional congressional obstacles.
With foreign affairs he had more success, most notably
the Camp David accords that helped establish bonds between Israel and Egypt. Carter also concluded negotiations
for the Panama Canal Treaty, although Senate ratification
proved difficult.
Carter's leadership incorporated two divergent tendencies. First, he was a technocrat who immersed himself in
the details of complex programs. Second, he was a bornagain Christian who espoused high moral standards. What
he lacked was a middle-level concern for conventional political relationships.
·
Reagan. Like Carter, Ronald Reagan ran for president against Washington. Unlike Carter, Reagan's administration labored to gain political insider status, partly by
learning from Carter's mistakes. Bringing with him a Republican-controlled Senate (the Democrats retained con-
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�1142 VI Chief Executive and the Federal Government
trol of the House) and an electoral mandate based on
carrying forty-four states, Reagan labored to lay careful
political groundwork from the start.
After conducting a study of the first three months of
past presidencies, Reagan's aides concluded that they
should push a few selected initiatives and work to restore
the informal social courtesies and connections that Carter
had neglected. The outsider image successful in the campaign was sublimated after the election in the interest of
building better relations with Capitol Hill. Reagan selected
Max Friedersdorf, a Washington insider with experience in
two previous Republican administrations, as his legislative
liaison chief.
Like Carter, Reagan sought to rally public support for
high-priority programs, but the Reagan administration
paid greater attention to image-building, and Reagan excelled as the "Great Communicator." No president since
Eisenhower had demonstrated such enduring personal
popularity.
The primary issue thrust for the Reagan administration in 1981 was an economic package, incorporating major
increases in defense spending, cuts in social welfare programs, and a major tax cut predicated on supply-side economics. Reagan's political strategies and wide public support resulted in a major policy victory that has been
compared to Roosevelt's early successes during the New
Deal's first one hundred days. Reagan's political support in
. Congress stemmed from the Republican Senate majority,
the Republican minority in the House, and conservative
southern Democrats.
By 1985 Reagan's support level in Congress had
dropped to levels comparable to Nixon's low point. In his
second term Reagan faced increasingly stiff opposition to
several initiatives, including his expensive Strategic Defense Initiative proposal, his advocacy of continued aid to
the Nicaraguan contras, continued efforts to cut social
programs, and efforts to restrict abortion. In 1986 the
Republicans lost control of the Senate. The following year
Reagan lost a bitter fight to have Supreme Court nominees
Robert H. Bork and Douglas H. Ginsburg confirmed by the
Senate. Also in 1972 Congress launched an investigation of
the Iran-contra affair, which involved administration efforts to trade U.S. arms for hostages being held in the
Middle East and to use profits from the arms sales to fund
the Nicaraguan contras. In 1988 grand jury indictments
were handed down against the top White House aides
participating in the affair.
Despite these pitfalls, Reagan continued to maintain a
high level of personal popularity. The enduring appeal of
Reagan's personal qualities provided a constant to an otherwise roller-coaster presidency, and earned him the nickname "the Teflon president" ("nothing bad ever stuck to
him").
Presidential Purposes
and Circumstances
Presidents with ambitious political agendas need the
cooperation of Congress more than those with less ambition. But the determinants of presidential ambition are
partly beyond presidential control. Dire events such as
wars and economic crises impel more active leadership
than times of relative placidity. Similarly, if Congress and
the people have high expectations for executive leadership,
a politically adroit leader will accept the cue.
Political scientist James David Barber proposed a
scheme that categorizes presidents according to their level
and enjoyment of activity, based on assessments of presidential character. According to this scheme, active-positive
presidents exhibit much activity in office and enjoy their
high level of activity. These presidents also demonstrate a
sense of rational mastery and are ambitious about what
they can and will accomplish. This category includes such
activist presidents as Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman,
John Kennedy, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter.
Active-negative presidents also work to accomplish
much in office, but they receive a relatively low emotional
reward for their efforts. These presidents often encounter
crises of their own making because of their inflexibility in
dealing with changing circumstances. Although they are
ambitious, these presidents find politics more a struggle
than a joy. They include Woodrow Wilson, Herbert Hoover, Lyndon Johnson, and Richard Nixon.
Passive-positive presidents are less ambitious and
have a more compliant personality that lacks the assertiveness and drive of the actives. These presidents include William Howard Taft, Warren Harding, and Ronald
Reagan.
Finally, the passive-negative president combines relatively little ambition with a negative orientation toward the
use of power. These presidents would be expected to be the
least ambitious about programs, issues, and goals, and include Calvin Coolidge and Dwight Eisenhower .
Although this scheme has been criticized for oversimplifying complex personality traits, the two dimensions
summarize the interaction between presidential ambition
and action. In the case of Gerald Ford, it illustrates that an
active-positive president is not necessarily a successful
president. The historical circumstances of the Ford presidency helped shape events. Similarly, Calvin Coolidge was
president in a time of peace and relative national prosperity. The Coolidge presidency coincided with the prevailing
political philosophy, which favored minimal government
involvement in people's lives. When the more ambitious
and flexible Franklin Roosevelt became president, the congressional plate was filled with presidential initiatives.
Presidential ambitions thus intersect with the nature
of the times, circumstances, and public expectations. From
the president's point of view, successful leadership is
marked by congressional approval of important presidential initiatives. But from the point of view of Congress,
successful presidential leadership incorporates presidential
actions marked by close consultation with congressional
leaders, flexibility, and respect for congressional procedures and norms.
These general patterns often are shaped by specific
events such as crises, which are endemic to presidential and
congressional cycles. Nonetheless, every president enters
office accompanied by an aura of good feeling. Even in a
close, bitterly contested election, supporters and opponents
alike in Congress and elsewhere traditionally express hopes
for cooperation, respect, and good will. This closing of
ranks is seen in the boost in popularity presidents 'receive
immediately after taking office. Honeymoon periods rarely
last beyond a few months, however, and presidents need to
act quickly after taking office if they are to reap the benefit
of initial congressional and popular good will.
Toward the end of presidential terms a reverse phenomenon takes hold. Presidents seeking reelection usually
find that Congress is less willing and less rapid in its
response to presidential requests as election day nears.
�President and Congress 1143
This slowdown occurs partly because members of Congress
are more preoccupied with their own reelection campaigns
(as is the president), and partly because presidents are
furthest in time from their last electoral mandate. Moreover, Congress is less inclined to respond to presidential
initiatives until the winner of the upcoming presidential
contest is determined. Even in presidential races where the
incumbent seems well ahead, guarantees are rarely issued
before elections.
When presidents near the completion of their final
term (as in the cases of Eisenhower in 1959-1960 and
Reagan in 1987-1988) or announce their intention not to
seek reelection (as did Truman in 1952 and Johnson in
1968), Congress is least likely to respond to presidential
initiatives. During the "lame duck" period at the close of a
term, members of Congress are already looking ahead to
the next administration and their own reelections. Moreover, presidential administrations often have run their
courses by the lame duck period. Presidents who attempt
new initiatives at this late point have great difficulty arousing the interest, much less the resources, necessary to ensure enactment.
Some presidential observers have suggested that· the
president's lame duck status has been exacerbated by the
Twenty-second Amendment, enacted in 1951, which limits
the president to two terms. Even though the two-term limit
had been observed voluntarily before Franklin Roosevelt,
the possibility of a third term, some argue, helped keep
each presidency a more vigorous institution in its final
days. In the modern era, however, presidents are obliged to
announce their election intentions well in advance, thereby
perpetuating the lame duck problem, regardless of whether
a two-term limit exists or not.
Notes
1. For more on the electoral college, see Judith V. Best, The
Case against Direct Election of the President (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1975); Lawrence D. Longley and
Alan G. Braun, The Politics of Electoral College Reform
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1975); Neil R.
Peirce, The People's President: The Electoral College in
American History and the Direct Vote Alternative (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1968).
2. Many have proposed that the electoral cycle be changed so
that there is greater connection between congressional and
presidential races. See, for example, Donald L. Robinson, ed.,
Reforming American Government (Boulder, Colo.: Westview
Press, 1985); Donald L. Robinson, "To the Best of My Ability" (New York: Norton, 1987); James L. Sundquist, Constitutional Reform and Effective Government (Washington,
D.C.: Brookings, 1986).
3. Committee on Responsible Parties, American Political Science Association, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party
System (New York: Rinehart, 1950), 75. See also President's
Commission for a National Agenda for the Eighties, The
Electoral and Democratic Process in the Eighties, Paul G.
Rogers, chairperson (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
1981), 35-36.
4. See Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of
1787, 4 vols. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,
1966), 1:214-215.
5. Sundquist, Constitutional Reform, ll5.
6. See Robinson, "To the Best of My Ability," 270-271; and
Committee on the Constitutional System, A Bicentennial
Analysis.of the American Political Structure (January 1987),
10-11.
7. Quoted in George B. Galloway, History of the Hou.~e of
Rrpresentatives (New York: Crowell, 1961), 236-237.
8. See Robert J. Spitzer, The Presidential Veto (Albany, N.Y.:
SUNY Press, 1988), chap. 2.
9. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
10. For example, see Raoul Berger, Executive Privilege: A Constitutional Myth (New York: Bantam Books, 1984); Robert
G. Dixon, Jr., "Congress, Shared Administration, and Executive Privilege," in Congres.~ against the President, ed. Harvey
C. Mansfield, Sr. (New York: Praeger, 1975), 125-140; Gary J.
Schmitt, "Executive Privilege: Presidential Power to Withhold Information from Congress," in The Presidency in the
Constitutional Order, ed. Joseph M. Bessette and Jeffrey
Tulis (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981),
154-194.
11. Quoted in Thomas E. Cronin, "Rethinking the Vice-Presidency," in Rethinking the Presidency, ed. Thomas E. Cronin
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), 328.
12. James W. Davis, The American Presidency: A New Perspective (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), 396-397; Joel K.
Goldstein, The Modern American Vice Presidency: The
Transformation of a Political Institution (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1981), 4-6.
13. See Michael Dorman, The Second Man (New York: Dell,
1970); Paul C. Light, Vice-Presidential Power: Advice and
Influence in the White House (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1984); Irving G. Williams, The American
Vice-Presidency: A New Look (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday, 1954).
14. Quoted in Louis Fisher, President and Congress (New York:
Free Press, 1972), 60.
15. An excellent discussion of delegation of power is found in
ibid., chap. 3. See also Richard M. Pious, The American
Presidency (New York: Basic Books, 1979), 213-217.
16. This account is taken from Louis Fisher, Presidential Spending Power (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1975), chaps. 1 and 2. For more on budgeting, see Dennis
Ippolito, Congressional Spending (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1981); Lance T. LeLoup, Budgetary Politics
(Brunswick, Ohio: King's Court Communications, 1986);
Howard E. Shuman, Politics and the Budget (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1988); Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979).
17. Wayman v. Southart, 10 Wheat. 1 (1825).
18. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1891).
19. S. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394
(1928).
20. United States v. Curtiss- Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304
(1936).
21. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935).
22. Quoted in Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law (Mineola,
N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1975), 424.
23. See, for example, Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism
(New York: Norton, 1979).
24. Louis Fisher, The Politics of Shared Power: Congress and
the Executive, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1987), 4.
25. See Aaron Wildavsky, "The Two Presidencies," in Perspectives on the Presidency, ed. Aaron Wildavsky (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1975), 448-461. Wildavsky noted: ·~In the realm of
foreign policy there has not been a single major issue on
which Presidents, when they were serious and determined,
have failed" (p. 449). Although Vietnam and subsequent
events altered the truth of this statement, an ever-expanding
role for the president in foreign policy continues to prevail.
For more on the "two presidencies" thesis, see Donald A.
Peppers, "The Two Presidencies: Eight Years Later," in ibid.,
462-471; Lance T. LeLoup and Steven A. Shull, "Congress
versus the Executive: The 'Two Presidencies' Reconsidered," Social Science Quarterly 59 (March 1979): 704-719;
Lee Sigelman, "A Reassessment of the 'Two Presidencies'
Thesis," Journal of Politics 41 (November 1979): ll95-1205;
Harvey G. Zeidenstein, "The 'Two Presidencies' Thesis Is
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131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
System in Congress (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1971); and How Congress Works (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1983), 109-112.
Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1886), 69.
Clarence Cannon, Cannon's Procedure in the House of Representatives (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1963), 221.
For more on the rules and procedures followed by committees
and Congress as a whole, see Lewis A. Froman, The Congressional Process (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967); and Walter J.
Oleszek, Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process
(Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1984).
See Norman J. Ornstein and David W. Rohde, "Political
Parties and Congressional Reform," in Parties and Elections
in an Anti-Party Age, ed. Jeff Fishel (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1978), 280-294.
Barbara Hinckley, Stability and Change in Congress (New
York: Harper and Row, 1988), 123, 138-140.
Ibid., 132.
Randall Ripley, Congress: Process and Policy (New York:
Norton, 1983), 66.
Hinckley, Stability and Change in Congress, 158-163. For
more on the committee and subcommittee system, see Richard F. Fenno, Congressmen in Committees (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1973); Steven S. Smith and Christopher J. Deering,
Committees in Congress (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1984);
How Congress Works, 79-108.
Roger H. Davidson and Walter J. Oleszek, Congress and Its
Members (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1981), chap. 6.
Quoted in ibid., 352; see also 46, 190, 352-355.
Ripley, Congress: process and Policy, 160.
Davidson and Oleszek, Congress and Its Members, 298-300.
Hinckley, Stability and Change in Congress, 204.
Alan R. Gitelson, M. Margaret Conway, and Frank B. Feigert,
American Political Parties (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1984),
270-275.
Fred I. Greenstein and Frank B. Feigert, The American
Party System and the American People (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1985), 133-135.
John H. Kessel, Presidential Parties (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey
Press, 1984), 138.
Ibid., 137-144. See also Wayne, The Legislative Presidency,
chap. 5; and Holtzman, Legislative Liaison.
Edwards, Presidential Influence in Congress, 88-90.
Roger H. Davidson, David M. Kovenock, and Michael K.
O'Leary, Congress in Crisis (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth,
1966), 64.
Edwards, Presidential Influence in Congress, 90-100.
George C. Edwards III, The Public Presidency (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1983), 1-4, 83-88. See also Gary C.
Jacobson, The Politics of Congressional Elections (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1983), 131-137; and Barbara Hinckley, Congressional Elections (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1981),
chap. 7.
For more on the relationship between elections and the econ·
omy, see Edward R. Tufte, Political Control of the Economy
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978).
Hinckley, Congressional Elections, 114-131.
Edwards, The Public Presidency, 25-30.
Neustadt, Presidential Power, 9.
See Theodore Roosevelt, The Autobiography of Theodore
Roosevelt (New York: Scribner's, 1958), 197-200; and William
Howard Taft, The President and His Powers (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1916), 138-145.
157. See Ed~ards, Presidential Influence in Congress, chaps. 5
and 6. See also Light, The President's Agenda, esp. intro. and
chap. 1.
158. Edwards, Presidential Influence in Congress, 202.
159. Samuel Kernell, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1986), 4.
160. Theodore J. Lowi, The Personal President (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1985).
161. These measures are summarized in Steven A. Shull, Presidential Policy Making (Brunswick, Ohio: King's Court Communications, 1979), 326-330.
162. The following assessments of individual presidents are drawn
partly from Berman, The New American Presidency, chaps.
6-8; and Wayne, The Legislative Presidency, 32-59.
163. Neustadt, Presidential Power, 118-119.
164. Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency (New
York: Basic Books, 1982), 57.
165. Barbara Kellerman, The Political Presidency (New York:
Oxford Univerity Press, 1984), 87.
166. Ibid., 155.
167. See Richard P. Nathan, The Administrative Presidency
(New York: Wiley, 1983).
168. See James David Barber, The Presidential Character (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1985). See also Erwin C.
Hargrove, Presidential Leadership (New York: Macmillan,
1966) for an alternative personality-based scheme.
Selected Bibliography
Binkley, Wilfred E. President and Congress. New York: Vintage,
1962.
Crabb, Jr., Cecil V., and Pat M. Holt, eds. Invitation to Struggle:
Congress, the President and Foreign Policy. Washington,
D.C.: CQ Press, 1988.
Edwards III, George C. Presidential Influence in Congress. San
Francisco: Freeman, 1980.
Fisher, Louis. Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and the
President. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985.
--·The Politics of Shared Powers. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press,
1987.
- - · President and Congress. New York: Free Press, 1972.
Holtzman, Abraham. Legislative Liaison. Chicago: Rand McNally,
1970.
Light, Paul C. The President's Agenda. Baltimore, Md.: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1981.
Nathan, Richard P. The Administrative Presidency. New York:
Wiley, 1983.
Polsby, Nelson. Congress and the Presidency. Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1986.
Spanier, John, and Joseph Nogee, eds. Congress, the Presidency
and American Foreign Policy. New York: Pergamon Press,
1981.
Spitzer, Robert J. The Presidency and Public Policy. University,
Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1983.
Spitzer, Robert J. The Presidential Veto. Albany, N.Y.: SUNY
Press, 1988.
Sundquist, James L. The Decline and Resurgence of Congress.
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985.
Wayne, Stephen J. The Legislative Presidency. New York: Harper
and Row, 1978.
l
'
�Chief Executive
president only for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." After his election to office, Roosevelt wrote
Humphrey and requested his resignation from the FTC so
that "the aims and purposes of the administration with
respect to the work of the Commission can be carried out
most effectively with personnel of my own selection." After
Humphrey's initial reluctance to resign, Roosevelt again
wrote him, this time stating: "You will, I know, realize that
I do not feel that your mind and my mind go along together
on either the policies or the administering of the Federal
Trade Commission, and frankly, I think it is best for the
people of the country that I should have full confidence." 88
When Humphrey refused to resign, Roosevelt notified him
tl'
that he had been removed. Humphrey died in 1934, never
having agreed to his removal. The executor of Humphrey's
estate decided to sue for salary he believed was due Humphrey but never paid him.
The court of claims asked the Supreme Court to answer two questions before it could render a judgment. First,
did the Federal Trade Commission Act limit the president's power to remove commissioners except for reasons
stated in the act? Second, if the act did indeed limit the
president's power to remove commissioners, was it constitutional?
Roosevelt had made clear that the removal of Humphrey was for political reasons. Justice George Sutherland
delivered the Court's opinion that the Myers case did not
apply to Humphrey because the FTC was "an administrative body created by Congress to carry into effect legislative policies." Therefore, it could not "in any sense be
characterized as an arm or an eye of the Executive." Sutherland continued:
Whether the power of the president to remove an officer
shall prevail over the authority of Congress to condition
the power by fixing a definite term and precluding the
removal except for cause will depend upon the character
of the office; the Myers decision, affirming the power of
the president alone to make the removal, is confined to
purely executive officers. ••
The Humphrey decision not only invalidated Roosevelt's removal of Humphrey but also generally limited
presidential removal power to officials who could be classified as "purely executive officers." Except for appointees
immediately responsible to the president and those exercising nondiscretionary or ministerial functions, such as
White House aides, the president's power of removal could
be limited by Congress.
The Supreme Court attempted to make a distinction
between "executive" and "administrative" functions within
the federal bureaucracy. Presidents have complete control
over executive functions, or those that deal with the execution of the policy of the administration and are under the
direction of the president, such as members of the EOP
and cabinet members. The Court ruled that presidents do
not, however, have complete control over administrative
functions, or those that have quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative roles, such as those of the independent regulatory
commissions. Only when Congress chooses specifically to
give presidents control over these agencies can they remove
officials for merely political reasons.
In 1958 the Supreme Court further clarified the removal power of presidents. In Wiener v. United States, the
Court held that if officials are engaged in adjudicative
functions presidents may not remove them for political
reasons. In 1950 President Truman had appointed Wiener
to serve on the War Claims Commission. When Eisenhower
415
assumed office, he requested Wiener's resignation. When
Wiener refused, Eisenhower removed him from office. Similar to Roosevelt's removal of Humphrey, Eisenhower's removal of Wiener rested on purely political reasons. Congress had created the War Claims Commission to
adjudicate damage claims resulting from World War II. It
made no provisions for removing commissioners. Wiener
sued for his lost salary.
Noting the similarity between the Wiener and Humphrey cases, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Wiener.
The Court argued that in both cases presidents had removed persons from quasi-judicial agencies for political
purposes. Calling the War Claims Commission a clearly
adjudicative body, Justice Felix Frankfurter concluded for
the Court:
Judging the matter in all the nakedness in which it is
presented, namely, the claim that the President could
remove a member of an adjudicative body like the War
Claims Commission merely because he wanted his own
appointees on such a Commission, we are compelled to
conclude that no such power is given to the President
directly by the Constitution, and none is impliedly conferred upon him by statute simply because Congress said
nothing about it. The philosophy of Humphrey's Executor, in its explicit language as well as it implications,
·
precludes such a claim.••
These cases have defined more clearly the legal and
constitutional authority of presidents over the federal executive branch by addressing their power to remove certain
officers. The Myers case gave presidents considerable authority to fire executive branch officials appointed by the
president and confirmed by the Senate. The Humphrey
and Wiener cases limited presidential removal authority
over agencies that exercise quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions, such as independent regulatory agencies.
Generally, presidents may remove all heads of cabinet
departments and all political executives in the Executive
Office of the President. In addition, they may remove at
any time the directors of the following agencies: ACTION,
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Commission on Civil Rights, the Environmental Protection Agency,
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, the General Services Administration, the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, the Postal Service, and the Small
Business Administration.
The Budgeting Power
The power to control the budget process is one of the most
important administrative prerogatives of the presidency.
The chief executive is an important participant jn the
budget process, for often it is the president who decides
where and how money is spent. As presidential scholar
Richard Pious has noted, "To budget is to govern. In a
system of separated institutions that share power, the
question is which institution, and by what authority, determines spending levels for the departments?" 81 In the last
part of the twentieth century, the presidency has assumed
an increasingly important role in determining federal
spending and thus more responsibility in governing. Although Congress technically controls the purse strings, the
president controls the formulation and development of the
budget.
The Constitution does not clearly establish a budget-
�416
III Powers of the Presidency
ary process or specifically spell out the presidency's role in
such a process. Because of this ambiguity, presidents have
been able to bring much of the process under their control.
Article I of the Constitution gave Congress the powers to
tax and spend. Article II, section 3, gave presidents the
power to recommend to Congress such measures as they
deemed appropriate. ("He shall from time to time give to
the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and
recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he
shall judge necessary and expedient.") Implied in this
power is the idea that presidents may present to Congress a
financial program.
Historically, presidents have not taken part in budget
planning. Even in modern times, presidential involvement
in the process has varied from one administration to another. For many presidents, preparing a budget is a job not
readily cherished because it has proven to be tedious and
time consuming. President Lyndon B. Johnson once wrote,
"The federal budget is a dry, unfathomable maze of figures
and statistics-thicker than a Sears-Roebuck catalogue
and duller than a telephone directory." 92 Some presidents
have been able to maintain consistent interest in the budget's complexities throughout their terms in office; others
have not. Political scientist LanceT. LeLoup examined the
roles that past presidents played in the budget process and
found that shortly after the first year in office, Dwight D.
Eisenhower and Richard Nixon tired of the tedious budget
process. Harry S Truman and Gerald R. Ford, however,
were able to maintain their enthusiasm throughout their
administrations. 93
Budgeting gives the presidency a tremendous amount
of administrative power, and most presidents have recognized the importance of the budget in controlling their
administrations. They usually approach their first budget
optimistically, excited about the potential power to eliminate or cut back programs that they may feel have outlived
their usefulness. Describing his involvement in his first
budget, Lyndon Johnson wrote, "I worked as hard on that
budget as I have ever worked on anything .... Day after
day I went over that budget with the Cabinet officers, my
economic advisers, and the Budget Director. I studied almost every line, nearly every page, until I was dreaming
about the budget at night." 94 Yet, LeLoup found that
often this enthusiasm wanes after presidents are confronted with the recurring difficulty of the whole process.e5
Although their enthusiasm may fade, presidents continue to seek to control the budget process. They see their
participation in the process as a way of doing things that
can benefit the national economy and their own political
fortunes. In the words of President Ford, "The budget is
the president's blueprint for the operation of government
in the year ahead." 98 According to Dennis S. Ippolito in his
study of the budget process, presidents become involved in
the budget process to achieve a means of administrative
management and control: "By affecting the resources available for agencies and programs, the president can seek to
promote better planning of what is done, more effective
supervision of how it is done, and more systematic evaluation of how well various objectives are accomplished." In
addition, Ippolito has pointed out that budget decisions
can affect political support. He has written, "By emphasizing particular programs or criticizing others, by challenging
Congress' spending preferences, by trumpeting the need for
fiscal responsibility, or by reiterating commitments to
greater economy and efficiency, a president can attempt to
dramatize his leadership role and to generate public sup-
port for his economic policies and program preferences." 91
Attempts to control the budget process often force
presidents to play a public relations game. Most presidents
want to be considered fiscal conservatives. The overwhelming majority of Americans want a balanced budget and
want the president to curtail the growth of federal expenditures. Yet presidents must continue to fund existing programs for various groups and for the American public in
general. In addition, presidents are expected to present
new initiatives, some of which benefit groups to whom
presidents have political obligations. The dilemma is one of
holding down public expenditures while trying to solve
public problems. It is not an easy task, and it makes
presidential participation in the budget process much more
demanding and important.
The President's Role in
the Budget Process
In the role of chief administrator, presidents had little
influence in managing executive branch funds before passage of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. Previously,
agency budget requests went to the House of Representatives without much interference from the White House.
There was very little budget coordination by presidents or
their staffs. Congress believed it could handle the budget
without much help from the presidency. By the end of
World War II, however, both the executive and legislative
branches had developed an awaremess that the federal
government needed better management.
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 gave presi. dents important managerial controls over the budgeting
process and made them the dominant force in budgetary
politics. Ironically, this act was passed by Congress in an
attempt to bring order into its own chaotic budget process.
An earlier House committee pointed to the haphazard nature of a budget process that lacked a coherent review of
the executive branch's budget request. But in attempting
to alleviate the problem, the act placed the presidency
squarely in the budgetary process by requiring presidents
to submit to Congress annual estimates of how much
money it will take to run the federal government during the
next fiscal year. (A fiscal year is the twelve-month span in
which financial accounting is made. This period for the
federal government runs from October 1 to September 30.)
The annual budget messages delivered by the president contain recommendations on how much money should
be appropriated by Congress for each department of the
federal government. The White House first evaluates all
agency budget requests and decides which to accept or
reject before submitting the annual budget message. Consequently, presidents become very much involved in the
process. They receive more information about the budget
than most members of Congress, allowing them to initiate
budget discussions on their own terms.
In addition, the Budget and Accounting Act created
the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) and placed it under the
control of the Treasury Department. Its role was to "assemble, correlate, revise, reduce, or increase the estimates
of the several departments or establishments." 98 In 1939,
as a result of a growing need for coordination of New Deal
programs and recommendations from the Committee on
�Chief Executive 417
~
Administrative Management (the Brownlow Commission),
President Roosevelt moved BOB into the Executive Office
of the President (EOP).
BOB began instituting a form of "budget clearance" so
that the departments could not bypass its budget review
process either for authorizations or for appropriations. No
longer were the departments on their own in requesting
funds from Congress. Bureaus and agencies made requests
for funds to their departments, and the departments went
through BOB for consideration by the president. From
1939 to 1969, BOB evolved into a highly influential compoent of the EOP.
f
Office of Management and Budget
In 1970 President Richard Nixon changed the name
and function of BOB. Emphasizing the management functions of the budget agency, Nixon renamed it the Office of
Management and Budgeting (OMB). As the word management implies, new emphasis was placed on providing departments with advice on ways to improve their efficiency
and to reduce the costs of their operations.
Nixon specifically had four major roles for OMB. First,
it was to continue many of BOB's functions, especially
writing the federal budget. Second, it was to serve as a
clearinghouse for programs and new legislation. Third,
Nixon wanted some part of the Executive Office of the
President to have the capability to track legislation as it
moved through Congress. OMB was vested with this capacity. Fourth, OMB was given the specific authority to provide management advice to the various departments and
agencies. Since its inception, OMB has served as the centerpiece of presidential budgeting.
Although the president's budget is not submitted to
Congress until the January before the first day of the new
fiscal year (October 1), the presidential budget process
begins at least nineteen months before the submission of
the finished budget proposal. (See Table 2.) The budget
cycle begins in early spring with OMB informing the departments of the fiscal outlook and the spending priorities
of the president. During the summer, the OMB director
(also called the "budget director") issues specific revenue
projections and imposes specific guidelines for departmental spending. On September 1 agencies submit their
initial budget requests to OMB. OMB then holds formal
hearings on these requests at which departmental officials
justify their proposed budgets before OMB examiners.
OMB's director examines the entire budget from November 1 to December 1. Often the director will invite the
National Security Council (NSC), the Council of Economic
Advisers, and several White House aides to participate in
the review. The OMB director makes final decisions subject to the economic forecast and communicates these decisions to the departments. The departments may appeal the
decisions directly to the president. Usually, however, each
department will revise its formal budget to coincide with
the budget director's wishes, for presidents rarely reverse
their budget director's decisions.
Congress receives the first official hint of what the
president wants in the State of the Union address at the
end of January, and specifics are then spelled out in the
president's budget message in February. Pending approval
by Congress, the budget goes into effect with the new fiscal
year, October 1.
Not all agency requests are treated equally. Until the
Nixon administration, the Defense Department's budget
requests were exempt from control by the president's budgeting organization. During the administrations of John F.
Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, the Pentagon submitted its
budget directly to the president without review by the
Bureau of the Budget. If BOB believed budget items to be
too high, it could appeal to the president. This practice, a
reversal of the traditional procedure, placed the burden of
proof on the budget office rather than on the department.
President Nixon changed the procedure for the Pentagon
by leaving final decisions with the NSC and OMB and
giving the Defense Department the right of appeal. Subsequent presidents have continued to use OMB as a counterbalance to the Pentagon's budget requests.
Current Services Budget
Under the provisions of the 1974 Congressional Budget
and Impoundment Act (PL 93-344), presidents must submit two budget proposals. When they submit their budget
for the upcoming fiscal year, they must also submit,
through the supervision of OMB, a current services budget.
The current services budget provides Congress with an
indication of the cost of existing budget obligations and a
guide for evaluating additional budget proposals. Specifically, the current services budget includes the "proposed
budget authority and estimated outlays that would be included in the budget for the ensuing fiscal year ... if all
programs were carried on at the same level as the fiscal
year in progress ... without policy changes." 88
Although this procedure was intended to provide Congress with a basis for determining the overall size and
direction of existing budget commitments and for assessing
and evaluating the president's budget proposals, it has
never quite lived up to its potential. Political scientist
Howard E. Shuman. has noted that the current services
budget has little significance or meaning: "Only budget
buffs and perennial budget watchers pay much attention to
it. It is, however, a useful document in assessing whether
any or how much fundamental change has been made in
the old budget to produce the new one." 100
Uncontrollable Spending
In any given year, much of OMS's current service
estimates can be classified as uncontrollable spending, expenditures mandated by current law or some previous obligation. (See Table 3.) To change the spending on these
mandated programs would require congressional action. By
1980, 75 percent of the federal budget could be classified as
uncontrollable spending. These expenditures can be broken down into three major categories.
The first category, fixed costs, consists of legal commitments made by the federal government in previous
years. These require the government to spend whatever is
necessary to meet these expenses. The largest and most
important component of this category is interest on the
national debt. Another fixed-cost expenditure is public
housing loans. Fixed costs are virtually "uncontrollable"
because they can be eliminated only by such extreme measures as default.
The second category is large-scale government projects
that require long-term financing. These multiyear contracts and obligations include the building of dams, weapons systems, aircraft, and the space shuttle. Many of these
projects are reviewed annually, and expenditure levels are
occasionally modified. Most, however, are not.
�418 Ill Powers of the Presidency
Table 2 Budget Timetable in the Executive Branch and Congress
Executive branch
Agencies subject to executive branch review
submit initial budget request materials.
Fiscal year begins.
President's initial appropriation order takes
effect (amounts are withheld from obligation
pending issuance of final order).
OMB reports on changes in initial estimates
and determinations resulting from legislation
enacted and regulations promulgated after its
initial report to Congress.
President issues final sequester order, which is
effective immediately, and transmits message
to Congress within 15 days of final order.
Agencies not subject to executive branch review submit budget request materials.
Legislative branch and the judiciary submit
budget request materials.
President transmits the budget to Congress.
OMB sends allowance letters to agencies.
Timing
September 1
October 1
October 1
Fiscal year begins.
October 10
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) issues revised report to Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) and Congress.
October 15
October 15
October 15
November 15
NovemberDecember
1st Monday after
January 3
January-February
February 15
February 25
OMB and the president conduct reviews to
establish presidential policy to guide agencies
in developing the next budget.
April15
May 15
June 10
June 15
June 30
July 15
Congress receives the president's budget.
CBO reports to the budget committees on the
president's budget.
Committees submit views and estimates to
budget committess.
Senate Budget Committee reports concurrent
resolution on the budget.
Congress completes action on concurrent resolution.
House may consider appropriations bills in the
absence of a concurrent resolution on the
budget.
House Appropriations Committee reports last
appropriations bill.
Congress completes action on reconciliation
legislation.
House completes action on annual appropriations bills.
Congress receives mid-session review of the
budget.
July-August
August 25
August 25
Source: Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-ll (1988).
..
,;
August 15
August 20
OMB issues its initial report providing estimates and determinations to the president
and Congress.
President issues initial sequester order and
sends message to Congress within 15 days.
Comptroller general issues compliance report.
April-June
Aprill
President transmits the mid-session review,
updating the budget estimates.
OMB provides agencies with policy guidance
for the upcoming budget.
Date of "snapshot" of projected deficits for the
upcoming fiscal year for initial OMB and CBO
reports.
Congress
CBO issues its initial report to OMB and
Congress.
�Chief Executive 419
The third category of expenditures officially designated as uncontrollable is the largest. These programs,
called "entitlements," commit the federal government to
pay benefits to all eligible individuals. Any attempt at
controlling these expenditures would require changing the
laws that set them up. Entitlements include Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income,
food stamps, public assistance, and federal retirement. In
some cases the federal government will pay individuals
directly; in other cases, the states determine eligibility and
administer the programs. Most of these programs have no
limit on the amount of spending they may entail. As more
i' people become eligible for benefits, expenditures increase.
.·'
From time to time presidents will try to increase or
decrease these so-called uncontrollable expenditures.
Nixon and Ford, for example, attempted to decrease entitlement expenditures by restricting eligibility and establishing a limit on benefit increases on several programs. In
his first full budget year, Reagan proposed an entitlement
cut of $11.7 billion. His budget proposal reflected the frustration that many presidents have felt in attempting to
deal with uncontrollable expenditures. It said in part, "The
explosion of entitlement expenditures has forced a careful
reexamination of the entitlement or automatic spending
programs .... when one looks behind the good intentions of
these programs, one finds tremendous problems of fraud,
waste, and mismanagement. Worse than this, the truly
needy have not been well served." 101
Controllable Spending
The president does have some control over several
categories of expenditures. Sixty percent of expenditures
that can be classified as controllable are used for salaries
and fringe benefits for both civilian and military personnel.
Although these expenses technically fit the category of
controllable expenditures, the practical problems surrounding spending on salaries and fringe benefits make it
difficult for a president to control them completely. Seniority and civil service rules protect so many federal employees that it is futile to attempt real cutbacks in expenditures
going to salaries.
A second category of controllable federal expenditures
is the general operating expenses of the various agencies.
Spending for operating expenses constitutes 22 percent of
the budget. Although economical measures can be undertaken on such things as heating, cooling, electricity, transportation, and supplies, expenses will always continue if
operations continue. And operating expenses usually increase as inflation increases.
The third category of controllable expenditures, research and development of new programs, makes up 18
percent of the controllable portion of the federal budget.
Medical research, weapons research, and grants to state
and local governments encompass a large proportion of this
category. Again, budget cuts can be made in this category,
but only within limits. As a result, even the controllable
categories of the federal budget give the president little
latitude in budget decisions.
Budgeting Theories
One of the most important functions served by the
budget is to increase presidential administrative control
and management of federal agencies and programs. How-
Table 3 Uncontrollable Spending, 1970-1980
(billions of dollars)
Category
Open-ended programs and fixed
costs
Payments to individuals
Social Security and railroad
retirement
Federal employees' retirement
and insurance
Unemployment
Veterans' benefits
Medicare and Medicaid
Housing assistance
Public assistance and related
programs
Interest
Revenue sharing
Farm price supports
Other
Outlays from prior-year contracts
and obligations8
Defense
Civilian
Total
1970
1975
1980
31.3
68.4
120.4
5.6
3.7
6.6
9.9
.5
13.3
14.0
12.4
21.6
2.1
25.7
13.2
13.7
46.2
5.1
4.7
17.1
26.2
14.4
3.8
3.8
23.2
6.1
.6
8.0
46.2
6.9
2.8
9.8
24.1
17.4
22.3
28.4
37.1
50.8
125.8 237.5 404.1
Source: Office of Management and Budget, The Budget of the
United States Government, Fiscal Year 1980 (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1980), 560.
a. Excluding prior year contracts and obligations for activities
shown as "open-ended programs and fixed costs."
ever, the budget process has always been the subject of
criticism aimed at improving the efficiency of government
management. Over the years, critics, both within the presidency and outside it, have complained about the lack of
coordination and centralization in the executive branch's
efforts to control the federal administration. Consequently,
since the early 1960s various presidents have introduced
reforms aimed at making budgeting more efficient, rational, and comprehensive. Rarely, however, have they been
as successful as hoped.
Planning-Programming-Budgeting
In 1961 Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara
introduced a planning-programming-budgeting (PPB) system into the Pentagon. McNamara brought PPB from the
private sector and used it to improve the quality of decision
making and budget planning for national security policy. In
1965 President Johnson announced that PPB would be·
applied to domestic operations as well.
PPB was designed to allow budget decisions to be
made by focusing on program goals and on quantitative
comparisons of costs and benefits. Once budget officials
established priorities among their objectives, they then
determined the best expenditure mix in the annual budget
to achieve the largest future benefits.
Specifically, PPB had several main characteristics.
First, it attempted to improve the planning process before
programs were developed and before budget decisions were
made. Improving the planning process would allow analysis
�420 III Powers of the Presidency
to be used throughout the budget process and future budget decisions to be based on previously formulated plans.
Second, one of the most important features of PPB
was its strong centralization of the budget process. Agencies would base their budget estimates on their objectives
and then send the budgets up the hierarchy. This method
required strong, centralized control over the composition of
executive budget proposals, as well as planning and evaluation of goals.
Third, once each agency identified its goals, it also
would have to specify alternative methods for achieving
those goals.
Fourth, PPB emphasized cost-benefit analysis. In assessing consequences of policy alternatives, quantitative
estimates of costs and benefits were assigned to each alternative. The alternative that produced the greatest benefit
at the least cost would be selected. PPB proved to be
attractive to budget makers because it appeared logical for
the federal government to plan rather than to wander along
blindly and wastefully.
By 1971, however, PPB had come into disfavor with
executive budget makers. Although many people had
looked to PPB to reform budgeting in the executive branch
by making it more rational and less "political," PPB failed
to gain a permanent place in the budget process for a
variety of reasons. It never achieved any great degree of
popularity within the departments and agencies in part
because it required a very formal structure. One fallacy was
the assumption that what worked well in the Defense Department would work well in the entire national government. In reality, comparing alternative defense systems
had little resemblance to policy decisions made in, for
example, the State Department.
In addition, because the budgeting system largely was
forced on BOB from the top down, many BOB staffers
lacked commitment to making PPB work. Finally, PPB
suffered major resistance from Congress. Advocates of PPB
apparently forgot that Congress has an important and jealously guarded role in the budget process. Members of Congress who had spent years building up their contacts and
knowledge of agency budgets resented a new budget system
that disrupted their channels of influence and information
in an effort to make budgeting more ·rational and less
political.
Management by Objective
In the late 1950s, economist Peter Drucker developed a
management technique for business called management by
objective (MBO). In the early 1970s, OMB adopted the
system. Similar to PPB, it was an attempt to make budget
decisions more rational. Not quite as ambitious in its comprehensiveness as PPB, MBO simply stated that agencies
should specify goals and alternative means of achieving
those goals. At each level of the budgeting process objectives would be discussed, agreed upon, and then advanced
up the hierarchy. It was a system much less centralized
than PPB, with less emphasis on long-range planning, but
it still was based on agencies making rational choices about
their policy goals.
Despite its simplification, MBO also had a short life in
the federal government. By the beginning of Jimmy Carter's administration, it had passed from use.
LeLoup pointed out that many of the problems with
PPB remained with MBO. He wrote, "It was difficult to
specify and agree on objectives, and to quantify benefits.
MBO was not supported at middle and lower levels of
agency management because it was still perceived as a
system that increased control at the upper levels." 101
Zero-Base Budgeting
The most recent attempt at presidential control over
the national budgeting process is zero-base budgeting
(ZBB). Developed in the private sector (like PPB and
MBO) by Peter Pyhrr of Texas Instruments, Inc., ZBB was
first applied to state governments.
Under Pyhrr's direction, Jimmy Carter first implemented it in Georgia while he was governor. In 1977, several months after he became president, Carter instructed
OMB to implement ZBB. Carter promised that "by working together under a ZBB system, we can reduce costs and
make the federal government more efficient and effective." 103 ZBB was primarily designed to avoid "incremental" budgeting where some arbitrary percentage is
more or less blindly added to the preceding year's budget.
Pyhrr has argued that its main goal is to "force us to
identify and analyze what we [are] going to do in total, set
goals and objectives, make the necessary operating decision, and evaluate changing responsibilities and work loads
... as an integral part of the [budget] process." 104
, ZBB entails three basic steps within each administrative entity. First, agencies must identify "decision
units," or the lowest-level entities in a bureaucracy for
which budgets are prepared. These may be staffs, branches,
programs, functions, or even individual appropriations
items. Second, budget makers must formulate "decision
packages," a listing of objectives and levels of services and
resources needed to provide those services. Decision packages usually suggest estimates of how much service would
be provided for various amounts of funding (for example,
80, 90, 100, or 110 percent of current amounts). This type
of analysis allows budget makers to evaluate how much an
agency would lose if its budget were cut and how much it
would gain if it were given an increase. Third, at various
stages of the budget process, managers must rank decision
packages in order of preference. These rankings may then
be revised by higher-level agency officials who consider
available funding. The higher-priority packages for which
there is funding are then included in the agency's budget
request, and the others are dropped.
Like PPB and MBO, the appeal of a comprehensive
budgeting program such as ZBB is tremendous, but its
success has been limited. Budget scholar Allen Schick has
concluded that the effect of ZBB on the budgeting activities of the executive branch has been almost negligible.
Most budget items have been funded under ZBB at or
slightly above past current services levels. 105 In their evaluation of the success of ZBB, Frank Draper and Bernard
Pitsvada suggest that the success of ZBB "has been mixed
in the sense that while ZBB involved more people in the
budget process, it has tended to overextend itself and
evolve away from true zero-base reviews .... ZBB as a
process has not had a major impact on reducing spending,
nor did ZBB really change the way agencies budget." 108
Congressional Response to
the President's Budget
Because the presidency traditionally has controlled the
compilation and production of the budget, Congress fre-
�Chief Executive 421
quently complained that it could get only superficial information from the president on technical budget matters
on which it would eventually have to make important decisions. It argued that it did not possess adequate professional staff to evaluate independently the details, proposals, and estimates of the president's budget. Congress had
become dependent on OMB and the presidency for all its
budgetary information.
Congressional Budget Office
fl
To improve its ability to evaluate the budget, Congress
in 1974 created the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
through the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act. CBO was a major innovation for Congress and a
major challenge for the presidency. Designed to provide
congressional budget committees with a variety of budget
and policy information, CBO's professional staff incorporates several functions performed in the executive branch
by OMB.
CBO activities fall into five categories. First, CBO
prepares an annual report on budget alternatives, including
fiscal policy options, levels of tax expenditures, and budget
priorities. Second, it issues five-year budget projections for
spending and taxation. Third, CBO projects the long-term
costs of bills approved by House and Senate committees
and sent to the full Congress for consideration. Fourth,
CBO performs a "scorekeeping" function by comparing
pending and enacted legislation with targets and ceilings
specified by Congress. Fifth, CBO provides Congress with
special reports on economic and budgetary issues.
CBO's independent data base allows Congress to evaluate presidential budget proposals more effectively. In
measuring the success of CBO after its first five years of
operation, political scientist Aaron Wildavsky wrote, "The
Congressional Budget Office has improved the accuracy of
budget numbers by providing a competitive source of .expertise, and it has made competent analysis more widely
available to those that want it." 107
This competition in the budget process, however, has
irritated more than one president. CBO's economic forecasts usually counter OMB's optimistic and more moderate
projections, leading to numerous congressional-presidential
confrontations over budget proposals. Shuman notes that
in the past, CBO "angered President Carter because it
disputed his energy program savings and angered President Reagan by saying that his economic assumptions
about inflation, interest rates, and unemployment were
unrealistic, overly optimistic, wrong." 108
Congress and
Presidential Lobbying
Since an almost adversarial relationship exists between Congress and the president over development of the
budget, presidents must actively lobby Congress for their
budget recommendations to become public policy. This
difficult task is complicated by the dispersal of congressional budget authority between the House and Senate
Appropriations committees and the various standing (ongoing) committees. After the president submits the budget
plan, Congress gives different committees jurisdiction over
different aspects of it. The House Ways and Means and
Senate Finance committees consider revenue proposals.
The various standing committees consider proposals for
changes in laws that affect the uncontrollable expenses.
The Joint Economic Committee studies the fiscal implications of the president's proposals. The House and Senate
Budget committees prepare the budget resolution. The
House and Senate Appropriations committees consider expenditure requests. Presidents must exert influence on
these different committees if their proposals are to become
grants of spending authority for their departments and
agencies.
Probably the most important committees with which
presidents have to deal are the Appropriations committees.
These are also the most difficult for presidents to influence
because they are among the most powerful and the most
isolated from White House control. Appropriations committees have several independent sources of information
from which to work when they consider presidential budget
requests. They have the figures prepared by OMB, estimates from the substantive committees of possible expenditures from programs under their jurisdiction, program
estimates and options prepared by CBO, and tentative
spending guidelines prepared by the various budget committees.
In addition to having sources of information besides
that prepared by OMB, the Appropriations committees
also are free from the political control of the president.
Their members enjoy tremendous electoral freedom, especially those in the House. In 1986 98 percent of House
members were reelected. Although the percentages are not
as large in the Senate, the number of incumbents reelected
has been well above the 60 percent range in recent years.
Pious has written, "Each committee member can maintain
his position in his district through delivery of goods and
services and patronage, from agencies eager to please him.
The president cannot oust these members from his party,
the committee, or the House by purging them if they cross
him." 108
Still, the initiative remains with the president. A determined president, who exerts the full force of the presidency, can overcome many congressional objections. The
president represents one view. Congress often speaks with
many confused and chaotic partisan voices. It is therefore
difficult for Congress to defeat presidential budget initiatives. Consequently, the momentum in the budget proceedings belongs to the presidency, which usually speaks with
unanimity. As Shuman has pointed out, because of this
consensus the White House can control the debate: the
president's "budget and ... views are the subjects of the
lead paragraphs in the early budget stories. Congressional
criticism trails as an afterthought at the end of the article." 110 After introducing his first budget in Congress, for
example, President Reagan went on the offensive by defending his budget before friendly audiences. Before a joint
session of the Iowa legislature, he said, "The budget we
have proposed is a line drawn in the dirt. Those who are
concerned about the deficits will cross it and work with us
on our proposals or their alternatives. Those who are not
... will stay on the other side and simply continue their
theatrics." 111
Presidential Spending
Although Congress has power over the appropriations
process, presidents always have a certain amount of discretionary power over spending, that is, they may spend
certain funds as they please within broad areas of responsibility. Often Congress delegates discretionary power to
�422 III Powers of the Presidency
the president. In a crisis, for example, especially during
wartime, Congress has given the president "lump sum," or
very broadly defined, appropriations so that the president
and executive branch officials who represent presidential
wishes may devote funds as they deem appropriate within
the congressional limit. For example, Congress set up the
Disaster Relief Fund to be administered by the EOP without restrictions. Although the discretionary power does not
give presidents unlimited spending authority, it does give
them some budget flexibility and some latitude in the
actual spending of funds as well as a final opportunity to
make policy. As political scientist Louis Fisher has observed, "What is done by legislators at the appropriations
stage can be undone by administrators during budget execution." 111
Sometimes presidents exercise discretionary spending
power that Congress has not delegated specifically by interpreting spending authorizations and appropriations as permissive rather than mandatory. In 1959, for example, President Eisenhower simply did not establish a food stamp
program that Congress had passed into law. Presidents also
can delay setting up appropriated programs in their efforts
to frustrate congressional initiatives. In 1975, after Congress had developed a summer employment program, the
Ford administration successfully stymied the program by
setting it up so slowly that the appropriated funds could
not be spent during the fiscal year. Similarly, OMB can
delay funding from the Treasury to an agency in an attempt to eliminate the agency or its programs. In 1975 the
Ford administration undermined the Community Services
Administration by delaying the agency's funds until after
the agency's authority expired.U 3
Confidential Funding
Occasionally, Congress grants the president confidential funding for urgent, highly sensitive, or secretive matters. Presidents have complete discretion over such annually funded budget items. For example, during his 1974
visit to Egypt, President Nixon used a presidential contingency fund to give Anwar Sadat a $3 million helicopter as a
gift.
Fisher has reported that several confidential accounts
are a matter of public record but are not audited by Congress, including four in the White House, six diplomatic
agencies, and one each for atomic energy, space, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).m One of the most notorious confidential funds was President Nixon's Special Projects Fund
that was used to finance a massive spying and sabotage
campaign against Nixon's "political enemies."
Secret Funding
In addition to the various confidential funds, presidents may ask Congress for a general appropriation for
secret projects. Secret funds do not require either the
appropriation (the amount of money granted by Congress)
or the expenditure (the amount of money spent by the
executive branch) to be a matter of public record.
Secret funding was used for the Manhattan Project
during World War II. The development of the atomic bomb
required more than $2 billion, which Congress approved
with very little scrutiny of the purpose of the appropriation.
Secret funding also is used for intelligence organiza-
tions, such as the CIA. The CIA's expenditures are drawn
on requests from the agency's director and are not made
public or audited by Congress. CIA activities are financed
by secret transfers of funds from the appropriations accounts of other agencies, primarily the Defense Department. This process keeps the CIA budget hidden not only
from the public, but also from many members of Congress.
In recent years Congress has attempted to restrict the
use of confidential and secret funds and bring existing
funds under greater congressional scrutiny. In 1974, after
revelations of covert operations overseas, Congress prohibited the CIA from funding operations other than activities
intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence.m
More recently, there has been a move to make the funding
of the CIA and other intelligence agencies a matter of
public record. Congress has the power either to control or
to limit this type of discretionary power, but so far it has
chosen to impose only moderate limitations. As Ippolito
has pointed out, "(Congress] can insure, as it has done with
respect to the CIA, that more of its members participate in
the oversight activities. Congress can also provide for review and audit by the Government Accounting Office to
insure that confidential or secret funds are expended in
accordance with legislative intent." 118
Transfers
Another method of bypassing the congressional appropriations process is the transfer and reprogramming of
funds. In these cases, presidents attempt to use appropriated funds for purposes other than what Congress originally intended. Such transfers occur when Congress permits the executive to shift funds from one appropriation
account to another, allowing officials to use appropriated
funds for different purposes. As noted earlier, intelligence
agencies frequently are funded with transfer funds. The
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 allows the CIA to
transfer funds to and from other agencies to perform its
functions.
In 1970, the Nixon administration used transfer authority to finance the Cambodian intervention with a
$108.9 million transfer from military aid accounts for
Greece, Turkey, Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Vietnam. In 1972 Congress prohibited transfers of military
aid from one nation to another unless the president gave
Congress notice. Yet, despite the Nixon administration's
agreements to submit transfers to Congress for approval,
the war in Cambodia in 1972 and 1973 was financed by
more than $750 million in transfer authority already given
the president.
Reprogramming
Presidents may also reprogram funds, that is, move
funds within an appropriation account from one budget
item to another. In some cases, presidents have used reprogramming to frustrate congressional intent by shifting
funds for projects that had been approved to projects that
had not been approved.
Presidents most frequently reprogram funds within
the Defense budget. The Pentagon often reprograms funds
in an attempt to develop new weapons systems after the
House and Senate Appropriations committees have cut the
Defense budget. In the 1960s, for example, as many as one
hundred reprogramming actions moved several billion dollars in a single year. Between 1956 and 1972, average annual reprogramming in the Pentagon totaled $2.6 billion.
�
Dublin Core
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Title
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Carter Wilkie
Creator
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Office of Speechwriting
Carter Wilkie
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-1995
Is Part Of
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<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36420" target="_blank">Collection Finding Aid</a>
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7431955" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Identifier
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2008-0699-F
Description
An account of the resource
Carter Wilkie served as a White House speechwriter for the first two years of the first Clinton Administration. This collection contains materials found within Carter Wilkie’s speechwriting files. These materials, primarily dating to 1993 and 1994, regard quotations from President Clinton’s political career, the First 100 Days of the Clinton Administration, and President Clinton’s 1994 State of the Union Address.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Office of Records Management
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Extent
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41 folders in 3 boxes
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Paper
Dublin Core
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Early Achievements [1]
Creator
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Office of Speechwriting
Carter Wilkie
Identifier
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2008-0699-F
Is Part Of
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Box 2
<a href="http://www.clintonlibrary.gov/assets/Documents/Finding-Aids/2008/2008-0699-F.pdf" target="_blank">Collection Finding Aid</a>
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7431955" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
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Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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Adobe Acrobat Document
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Reproduction-Reference
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12/29/2014
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42-t-7431955-20080699F-002-003-2014
7431955