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.10/3/00 Draft, Chapter II
"j
.CHAPTER II
I·
HOLOCAUST VICTIMS' ASSETS AND THE
:'~.
UNITED STATES
Introduction
14
I. Nazi Victimization
.
16
I
A.
Racial Ideology,
16
a.
Law, Discrimin~tion, and Looting of Assets
18
C.
Policies of Mass Murder
26
i
II.
United States Engagement
29
i
A.
Overcoming Isolationism
29
B.
The Grand Alliance
32
III. Occupation and Stkbilization
35
A.
Civil Life at the!Nadir
35
B.
American Command Structure in Gennany and Austria
40
1.
40
Gennany
2. Austria
48
Managing Refugees and Displaced Persons
50
The 'lkttea-SiatesAnny and the Discovery of..Assets
56
-~----~
IV. Control of Victims' Assets in the United States .
61
A. .. The United States Treasury Department and Frozen Assets
62
B.
65
@~
V.
The Bureau of Customs, Import
----._----- Prohibitions, and the Post Office
'Policy Vers~Implementation:J
Cold War and the iCreation of Israel
Conclusion
66
70
74
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Strikethrough: ~uggeste~ kill. Underscore: suggested replacement.
Double strikethrough: IlSofer's deletes. Boldface. ALLCAP comments are Sofer's.
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CHAPTER II
VICTIMS' ASSETS: FROM NAZI EXPROPRIATION
,
Tel UNITED STATES CONTROL
i
Reorganized by!DW, edited by Fenyvesi, 9/23/00, reviewed by Sofer
1.
Holocaust ViCtims, Assets, and the United States
,
I
A. Nazi Victimization
15
18
L
Racial Ideology
18
2.
Law, Discrimination, and Looting of Assets
20
3.
Extenni~ationPolicies
32
I
B.
United Statbs Engagement
I
37
].
Overconiing Isolationism
37
2.
The Grand Alliance
40
C. Occupation and Stabilization
L
American Command Structure in Europe
i
43
43
Germ~ny
.'
Austna
2.
43
50
Civil. Life at the Nadir
52
Managing Refugees and Displaced Persons
58
United States Agenciesand Control of Victims' Assets
65
A.
In the United States
65
"
,L
The United-States Treasury Department and Frozen Assets
The Bureau of Customs, ImpOli Prohibitions, and the Post Office
2.
65
68
B. In Europe
70
L
The United States Army and the Discovery of Assets
70
2.
Develop~ng
75
Policy for Assets in Europe
Admi~istrative Differences [need better section title1
,
Cold War
.0
75
79
Creation of Israel
,
82
�III. Conclusion
83
�10/3/00 Draft, Chapter II
CHAPTER II
HOLOCAUST VICTIMS' ASSETS AND THE
I
UNITED STATES
INTRODUCTION
,I
As World War II in Europe neared its end, Allied combat troops on the front lines made a
series of grim discoveries-the concentration camps that, formed an integral component of Adolf
:
.,
,
'
Hitler's attempt to rid Europe ofJews and other "undesirable" peoples, On April 4, 1945, United
States soldiers ~d officer, li~erated a camp at Ohrdruf,near Weimar, Germany, The horrors
that the camp revealed defy easy comprehension-emaciated prisoners suffering from
malnutrition and disease, railroad cars full of corpses, incinerated skeletons, squalid barracks
h'~O ~# k's, Amencan
'
ver th' next lour wee
e
i
'h'l"'.c.
Wit 'Ice-mlested'b edd'mg, an,d an overwh I ' stenc,
e mmg
troops liberated several more ~oncentration camps (and their sub-camps), including Buchenwald,
,
I
Dachau; and Mauthausen, setting free as they advanced some of the surviving victims of the
I
,
reign of terror visited on Europe by Nazi Germany and its many collaborators,l '
,
I
I
,
,
The crassly material dimension of thi:? monstrous treatment of fellow human beings,
whom the Nazis defined as "enemies," became apparent that same spring. As the Allied armies
. !
'
.
,
advanced through the European continent in their battle against Nazi Germany, they found and
seized caches of valuables-gold and other precious metals, artwork, currency from several
i
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14
�10/3/00 Draft, Chapter II
countries, and all manner of personal trt:<tsures and possessions. Soldiers overran these hidden
stores in concentration camps, barns, mi J1es, castles, trains, factories, banks, and other locations.
Such caches constitute a major portion (,)fthe assets expropriated by the Nazis that came under
control of the United States.: The asset1) 1)tolen from the millions of victims of Nazi persecution
were often undistinguishabl~ from
tr~ditional
spoils of war and even from legitimate German
I
property hidden to safeguard it from Allied attacks.
I
,',
To re-evoke the circumstances t1)(1t governed the handling of the Nazi loot recovered by
,
.
..l-.e> f\AS
the United States as a result 'of World War II, five complex Ftetwetrks-of-events need at least
cursory exploration. 2 They are·
, .
1. the methodical e?Cploitation ()fvictims by the Nazi regi
[
. i
2. the background <;>fpolitics and policy that brought the ~
.
..
.
domestic preoccupations and into the war,
3. the organization by the U.S. i\rmy ofthe occupation of Germany and Austria and the
discovery and control of the
~poils
of war,
4. the control ofth~ assets in th~ United States before, during, and after the war and the
federal agencies; that deal~ wHh them,
I Robert H. Abzug, Inside the Vicious Heqrt: Americans and the Liberation ofNazi Concentration Camps
(New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1985),27, 30; Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World At Arms: A Global History of World
War II (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press; 19?4), 834.
.
2The following sections of this chapter an: J:Ileant for a general audience. Those familiar with the writings on
the Holocaust, World War II, and related topic~ may wish to skip to chapter _ _3 [or whatever it becomes).
W;ORKING DRAFT - NOT FOR CIRCULATION
PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION
15
�I
\
�•
10/3/00 Draft,
Chapt~r
II
countries, and all manner of personal treasures and possessions. Soldiers overran these hidden
,
. stores in concentration camps, barns, mines, castles, trains, factories, banks, and other locations.
1
\
Such caches constitute a major portiorl of the assets expropriated by the Nazis that came under
control of the United States. :The asse~s stolen from the millions of victims of Nazi persecution
: '
.
were often undistinguishable: from traditional spoils of war and even from legitimate German
property hidden to safeguard: it from Allied attacks.
To re-evoke the circ~mstances that governed the handling of the Nazi loot recovered by
:
.
.
.
.,l.,e.f\A6
the United States as a result of World ' War II, five complex H:etwer-kS ofcvcnfs need atJeast
,
i
cursory exploration. 2 They are
I
1. the,methodical e~ploitatiqn of victims by the Nazi regime,
2. the background of politics and policy that brought the United States out of its
I
.
I
domestic preocc\fpations and into the war,
3. the organization 'by the U:S. Army of the occupation of Germany and Austria and 'the
discovery and cQntrol of the"
spoils of war,
r
.
!
4. the.control
ofth~
I
assets in the United States before, during, and after the war and the
.
federal agencies:that dealt with them,
I Robert H. Abzug, Inside the Vicious Heart: Americans and the Liberation ofNazi Concentration Camps
(New York: Oxford Univ. Press,: 1985),27,30; Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World At Arms: A Global History of World
War II (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press; 1994), 834.
: ..
2The following sections ofthis chapter are meant for a general audience. Those familiar with the writings on
the Holocaust, World War II, and related topics may wish to skip to chapter_._3 [or whatever it becomes].
WORKING DRAFT ~ NOT FOR CIRCULATION
15
�I .
.,
10/3/00 Draft, Chapter II
5. and finally, two overarching complexes of problems-the Cold War and the creation
of the state of israel-that bore on U.S. policy in dealing with assets after the war.
I
'
These elements fann the context in which individuals and agencies of the United States'
I
"
'
goveinment came into control of assets looted by the Nazis, sought to identify and distinguish
the assets ofHolocailstvictimswit~in the larger pool of assets, and finally disposed ofthos~
,
,
I
,
.
assets;
I.
NAZI VICTIMIZATION
A.
Racial Ideology "
. Control of the instruments of state between January 1933 and May 1945; and the
suspension of most constitutional constraints on executive powers, gave the Nazis an
unpr~cedented
power base which they used to extort and steal the wealth of others. The methods
.
t""
,
,
.
i
used by the Nazis against their inteinal and .external enemies, built upon Nazi politics and racial
,
.
'.
ideology, brought immens'e material devastation and human suffering, victimizing millions of
people across Europe.
political- anti communist a:nd socialists
,
.
I
•
I"
I
Hitler and his foll~\.vers exalted a mythical Aryan master race, of which the Nordic
Gennans were the superior example. This culture-creating race also included the English, I)utch,
and Scandinavians. Culture-bearing races (Asians, Latins, and Slavs) had little to offer. The
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�,
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'CHAPTER II '
('
r\~U'
NA?c*PROPRlATIO~
VICTIMS' ASSETS: FROM
TO U.S. UNITED ST1A",TE CONTROL
I.
HOLOCAUST, VICTIMS, ASSETS, AND THE UNITED STATES
I
•
As '>ledd 'Nar II in Earepe neared its end, Allied cembat keeps on the frent lines made: a
series of grim disce'leries the :concentration camps established as part ofl'.:dolfHitler's
"Final Sollition" to rid 'Earope ~f JeVrS and other "andesirable" peoples ijHld te expropriate
their assets. On April 4, 1945, United States soldiers' and efficers liberated a 'camp at '
Ohrdraf, near Weimar, Germany, 'h'llere they feood emaciated prisoners, saffering frem i
malnatrition and disea~e, railr04d ears full ef corpses, incinerated sksletens, sEJualid
barracks vfith liee infested1
bedding, and an e'leP,Jt'helming odor. Over the' next fear
,
,
weeks, l\meriean treops liberated several more eoneentration camps (and their sab
camps), inclading Bacael¥t¥ald, !Dacaaa, and Maathaasen, setting free as they ad,'anced:
tae sarvi'ling victims of tae reigr of terror visited on Earope by Hitler, members of his '
National Socialist Gerrpan Werkers' Party (Nationalsozialistische Deatsche
. !
.
.
Arbeiterpartei or 'Nazi Party), arid their many collaborators
As the harsh winter of '1944-45 turned to spring, World War II 'drew to a close in
atrocities could have re
piles of incinerated skeletons, and ,emaciated prisoners unable to make their way out of ,
their squalid barracks. Over the next four weeks, other American troops liberated more
concentration camps, parts of a"vast networkbuiltto cleanse Europe of Jews and other
"undesirable races.". "It is not b exa eration to sa that almost eve inmate was
insane with hun er re: orted Ca tain J.D. Pletcher
after his visit to Gunskirschen. aisubcam ofMauthause .! u reme Commander Dwi ht
Eisenhower who entered Buchenwald the da it was liberated later noted: "I never at
an time ex erienced an e ual sense of shock ~
In additien to making these chilling disco'/eries, the il¥t'ading A.:llies seized stores of
valaables, sach as gold, artwork,: and financial assets (carrene)" secarities, and preeioas :
I Robert H. Abzug, inside the Vicious Heart: Americans and the Liberation o/Nazi Concentration
Camps (New York: Oxford Univ. Pres~, 1985),27,30; Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World At Arms: A Global:
History o/World War ll(New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1994),834.
2 Michael Berqnbaull1 (:cdjtor), Witness 10 the f1olocuust (BarpcrCoJJins, .1997), ]08-! 0
J
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Doubleday, 1948),408-9
�metals, for instanee), hidden b~ the Nazis in eoneentration eamps, barns, mines, eastles~
trains, Faetories, banks, and oth,er loeations. These Gashes inellided property stolen From
the millions of yietims of the Nazi reg·ime, assets removed From the eOlintries invaded
\
and slibjligated by Germany, arid legitimate GeFffian property hidden to sategliard it From
Allied attaeks (see Chapter 4, 14ssets in Emope).
On May 8, 1945, with the Gennan government lim30nditionally sliFFendering, the Allies
slipplanted Hitler's l'l"a,zi party ~s governors of Germany and Alistria. Vietoriolis Allies;
gained eontrol oyer the hidden 9aehes ofyalliables, as v,'ell as looted assets in the
i .
possession of the Nazi party, tHe German government and military, and eitizens of the , • (J
Third Reieh.
'.,
A.4.-'~ H-!VI)
dolfHitler's ','Final Solution for the Jewish uestion" had an economic end I ~
as well. llied units advancin :on Ge~n:an territor .came u on lar e stores ~f aluables
suc as gold, artwork, currency', secuntIeS, and precIOUS metals, that the NazIs had stolen
,
and then stashed away in conce'ntration camps, barns, mines, castles, trains, factories, :
banks - wherever they thought they could find them again at an opportune moment later--?
on. Following Germany's uncohditional surrender on May 8, 1945, the Allies banned
Hitler's }Jati@Ral ~€H6iQ:list Gef~aR W@fkefs' Party (}Jati@Rals@zialistiseHe DeHtSGHe
Af@eiteljlartei @f Nazi 'Party, cdnfiscated its assets, and supplanted its authority over
Germany and Austria. The victbrious Allies promptly took control of assets stripped from
'
victims of the Nazi regime and from the countries invaded by Germany, as well as
legitimate German property kept safe from Allied bombers and~on0
The U.S. government had begun to take control offore~nemy assets years
earlier. eontrolled oth~r foreign~and enemy assets even earlier; In 1940, when the United
..
States was still neutral, the United ~tates_TreasJ!ry Department froze foreign-held assetS.
in the ~nited States0'~ mo~itor the wea1t? lfe~re'a'licenses ~or business transactions ~
~ ~@ m@Rlt@f tHe v:ealtH les:f1hey benefit the AXIS war effort. that might haye benefited the
A)(is ';1,'ar eFfort. Dliriflg the wat the u.~. Goyernment After the United States entered the
war in 1941, li seized title to ~ foreign-owned property through the Office of Alien
Property Custodian (s<:(e Chapter 3, Assets in the U.S.). Following Allied victory in 1945,
-,-y,;
meant that the United States ~ was ready to relinquish control of these valuables as'
well as to begin to restitute the Nazi loot then coming into the possession of the U.S.
.(~\'t:'
,
¢''':AJt' .
~
t
~litary:ove::;:
;i:i::Ln
7.
V
':
1.
. :Z.
'>
"The Science of Race" RaeiaI Ide919gy
,
,
'
,////
Total control over efthe instruments of state between January 1933 and May
1945 ga¥e enabled the 'Nazis an!unpreeedented po'>\'er base whieh the)' lised to extort and
steal the properties 'Nealth of those they selected as their enemies. others. The methods.
used by the N azis agai~st their i'nternal and external enemies@ih !m_on~~zi raeial
their racist ideology and broug~t unprecedented immense material 'devastation and human
suffering, victimizing millions <?f people across Europe.
•
.
i
�A fanatic believer in the inequality of the races, Hitler aHd His follo';1,rers e}(alted
invented a mythical Aryan mas~er race, of which the Nordie Germans were the superior
example. This~culture-creating: race also included the English, Dutch, and
Scandinavians. "Culture-bearing~races (Asians, Latins, and Slavs) had little to offer.
The ~culture-destroying: races ,included "Gypsies, Negroes, and Jews," and they were
dubbed considered ~s~bhuman)1YIn tHis ideology, The master race was in a battleg for'
world domination with its chief' primary enemy, the Jews, who, aware of their inferiority,
used every foul means possible: to subdue the Aryan races peoples to tHeir HIIlV Hitler's
doctrine depicted the Jews W8f8 as the Germans' mortal enemies who funded a
~ of
conspiracy they ran together with the Russian Bolsheviks : :
tHe lewisH BolSHevist 'eonspiraby against Germany tHat w
i
~ f
<r 6
'
Other racial, political, and social elements also threatened Aryan purity. Hitler declared
that the master race CQuid not accept the presence of tolerate non-Aryan races in its
"living space" and must exercise its "natural right" to seize ta*e "living space" away from
inferior races, such as the "unc6uth" Slavic Poles and er Russians. 7 Sinti and Roma (then
called Gypsies) and "l~ss valuable" Germans, such as the mentally and physically
handicapped, were early target~ of Nazi persecution. on raeial aHd biologieal grolHlds.
Adherents te of "Jewish" politi4al theories as well as Christian Scientists, Freemasons, ;
Mennonites, Jehovah's Witnessrs, homosexuals, and others were victimized for engaging
in "asocial" activity.8 During the first few weeks after Hitler became chancellor, Nazis
and their sympathizer~ sUbjectefl members of all these groups, but particularly Jews, to, :
"scattered, uncoordinated viole*t acts" and commercial boycotts. On July 30 in
'
Nuremberg for instance, 400 leading Jewish citizens were arrested and some of them
were forced to trim grass with their teeth)~ Because such these actions destroyed property
ana prompted arollsedicriticismi aHimosity abroad, they hurt adversely affeeted the
'
German economy. Nevertheless, because the Nazi regime was determined ]Nanted to
profit materially from disposseSsing tHe perseeution of its enemies, it tHe party needed,
prepared a comprehensive mor~ orgaHized strategy of plunder. 10
:::::8 :::::1
I
.
I
I
4
,
Leon Baradet, Political1deologies, 5th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.r: Prentice Hall, 1994),246.
5
Alan Bullock, Hitle;: A Study i~ Tyranny (New York: Harper, 1964),407.
6
Bullock, Hitler, 365:
7 Lucy S. Dawidowicz, The War against the Jews, 1933-1945 (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston,
' D" ,,"~'· f)~/;,: .. ,,1 1.-J" ... T'Y""
k I
1975), 90 - 91 ,_ .....----'.' ..........." .•.-."/:'~:""B U II oc, H'tler, 399 .
,
8 See Michael Berenb~um, ed., A Mosaic 0/ Victims: Non-Jews Persecuted and Murdered by the Na~is
(New York: New York Univ. Press, 1990); Guenter Lewy, The Nazi Persecution o/the Gypsies (New
York: OxfordUniv. Press, 2000).
') Encyclol)Uedia Juduica (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing HOllse,1972) volume 12, P.12r;2:'
'
\
~.~
Avraham Barkai, From Boyco!t to Annihilation: The Economic Struggle o/German ews, 1933
1943, trans. William Templer (Hanovbr, N.H.: Univ. Press of New England, 1989),56-57; Richard
Breitman, Official Secrets: What the Nazis Planned, What the British and Americans Knew (New York:
Hill & Wang, 1998), 20-21~
to
i
�I.
\~
ILaw, Diserimiaatioa, aad Lootiag of Assets Discrimination a~d
2.
Confiscation as the Law
~f
1
str~tegy
~tJ.i .
The first part that
was the removal of opponents from public life.
ineluded imprisoning opponefTts of the regirae in eoneentration earaps. As earl¥--aSift
March 1933 Nazi officials established a concentration camp at Dach~tr1rrtern theif .
politieal eneraies, sueh as conupunists, social democrats anci;weI'l:'i1Jers of trade unions.
Jews with similar political beli¢fs were aIIiong the firs batch:eff initial prisoners. In later
years the Nazis set up built raote hundreds of concent t' camps and interned Jews
(from Germany and elsewhere); regardless of their politics, as well as Sinti and Roma, i
homosexuals, Jehovah's Witnesses, 5isoners s>fwar, Poles, and others.
:
: th at au ca .rlt/{:.'t~
~Sh\"'h'
f th'IS once fi' ' e
e t e raCIsm 0
nn
One month aft er
group gained its first 100tho d ih the German legal system with the enactment of the
Professional Civil Service Lawiof A ri17 1933 hat barred Jews from state em 10 ment.
Although the law victImized only the 12 percen of Germany's Jews who worked in the
civil service and the profession~,l! Hitler and his party took a symbolic first step toward
"
their goal of a Germany "clean~ed of Jews" Ciudenrein).Jl
}~ax;i raeisra and vietirai:cation 'assuraed a legal diraension in Gerraany with the
enaetraefTt ofthe L(H¥ for the Restoration ofthe Professional Civil gerviee oL'\'pril 7,
1933. The Ia>N disraissed lev/ish eivil servants fFora state eraployraent, v/ith few
e}eeeptions. Corollary laws disbarred lewishjudges and disraissed true advisers. Hitler
. party 'Nere raaking the first steps tov/ard their goal of a Gerraany eleansed of
~).
.
.
Tlffis.; From 1933 on ana well before its foreign adventures, World War II began,
the Nazi regime governmefTt stipplemented unofficial acts of repression with official
policies to expropriate Jewish ~ssets, to deprive Jews of their livelihoods, and to force
them out of Germany., The pr04ess was gradual but also inexorable, provoking the
emigration of from 10,0,000 to 170,000 IS THIS THE TOTAL? CAN'T WE BE
MORE PRECISE? German J~ws between 1933 and 1938, half of whom mightffiaJ" I
have had significanta~sets. As: Jews emigrated, the J~aZ\s also attempted-by whatever
means-to transfer their assets :into nori-Jewish hand~ne mechanism was the
~
.'/
1
II
Junz, "Economics of the Holocaust," A-164.
12 Uwe Adam, Judenpolitik im Britten Reich (DUsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1972),310; Raul Hilberg,
The 0!Sfruction ofthe European Jews (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985),27-28.
/
~we Adam, Judenpolitik im Dritten Reich (DUsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1972),310; Raul Hilberg,
The Destruction ofthe European Jews (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985),27-28; Raul Hilberg,
Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders: The Jewish Catastrophe 1933-1945 (New York: HarperCollins, 199i:
12-13.
14 Helen Junz, "How the EconomiCs of the Holocaust Add" (Appendix S), in Report of the
.
(
Independent Committee of Eminent *ersons (Volcker Commission, 1999), A-171 (hereafter . ed as
?.t"O\" Tt""- .
:~~~c~~,~.o+~.~~_;,~:~~:: ~~~!~:~u.:t.~~'~~::',l~.~~b~~.~::::e:~~~,~.~~~~.~!.t~: ~~:~~.:a.~,:~~:,_?.,~'_ '" ............... .....J .. ' b ' ................. ..
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�Transfer (Ha'avara) Agreement of August 28, 1933, originally negotiated between the
Germany a~ the German ZionIst Federation. eertais Ziosist leaElers. Under that
0......:.
a reemelticized b' man' Jews who ur ed abo cott of German insteadidiStv.:ee--w->
+¥:~~:l-+>,I"i-h, 20,000 Jews eniigrated to Palestine usEler the agreemest between 1933 ,
and 1941, after depositing funds in a German-based account. Once there, they were te-ee
reimbursed from the proceeds dfthe sale of German oods in Palestine" s
Even before the Nazi seizure of ower
law made emi ration difficult and
costly for all , Germans. liiV€!R @@WI€! tR€! l'lazi s€!iz:teu€! @f}§l@W€!I, tR€! G€!HllaR la.w mas€!
I
!migIati@R siffietedt aRS e@stly fBI all G€!HllaRs. Emigratios was geserally Eliffieult aBEl
€
eosH)' for all Germass eves be(ore the 'Nazi seizure ofpovrer. Beginning in 1931, all :
emigrants emigres from Germa:ny had to pay a Reich Flight Tax. The Nazis expanded·
this tax to extract even more assets from the Jews whom they were forcing out, adding a
Capital Flight Tax on any transfers out of Germanyof more than 50,000 Reichsmarks
(1934), and further restricting tpe free export of securities (1936). Whes GermaB)'
invaEleEl PolasEl os ~eptember t 1939, markisg the beginnisg ofWorlEl War II, the
governmest prohibiteEl all eapital traBsfers. The 'Nazis iH:troElueeEl several Other devices
to wrest assets from J~ws fleeirlg Germany is the 1930s, included ffig-blocking accounts,
manipulating exchange rates, c6nfiscating insurance monies, forcing Jews to pay
,
"atonement" fines, taxing them on their "rIght" to sell their property, and making them
pay into a fund to support the emigration of poor Jews. 16 ). When Germany invaded
Poland on September '1, 1939 and, markisg the beginnisg of World War II began, the '
government banned prohiJ?:i.JE!El :all capital transfers. 17
The onslaught~Germhn Jews was relentlessly systematic. The Nazi Party
placed "Jewish experts" in the Reich Interior Ministry to draft legislation to segregate
non-Aryans from Aryans. Folldwing Hitler's orders, in 1935 the Nazi majority in
parliament adopted the CitizenShip Law (which reduced Jews to "subjects of the state" .
and reserved Reich citizenship to persons of "German or related blood,"l!) and the law for
the Protection of German Blood and Honor (which banned marriage and extramarital
relations between Aryans and Jews), and the Flag Law (which forbade Jews to hoist the
.
German flag and to display the :colors of the Reich): Known collectively as the
Nurember Laws the;le islatidn identifie_cL.1ews as the minorit a ainst whom official:
ou addin u Jewish ancestors the laws also i e,..,j
discrimination would be direct~d.12
assessed a person's "degree" of;Jewl
ss that in turn determined the extent to which the
I
0,'
'-"
'./,
_
.... , - ' - _ . . . . . . . ,
)
r... -"o ..... ··, -'-'
~
""' ...... , -
"~'
t"'~
....... .....
~,
-'-" .....
~
- .."
Edwin Black, The 7hmsfCr Agreement: The Un/old StOlT (!f'the Secret'Agreemen/ Bc/ween the .
Third Reich ond Jewish P(l/estine (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1984),231-32,249,256-59,268,
379. Another 40,000 Jews em igrated through indirect aspects of the transfer agreement.
15
16 Christopher Kopper, Zwischen Marktwirtschafl und Dirigismus. Bankenpolitik im "Dritten Reich"
1933-1939 (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1995),266-67.
17
Junz, "Economics of the Holqcaust," A-20 I; Barkai, From Boycott to Annihilation, 100.
18 Reichsbiirgergesetz vom 15. ~eptember 1935: Gesetz zum Schutze des deutschen Blutes und der
deutschen Ehre vom 15. STPtember 1935, Gesetz zum Schutze der Erbgesundheitdes deutschen Volkes vpm
18. Oktober 1935 (Munich: C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1936),31-37.
.
19 Hilberg, Destru~ti6n ofthe El~/ropean Jews, 27-37; Andreas Rethmeier,"Niirnberger Rassegesetze"
und Entrechtung der Juden im Zivilrticht (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Verlag, 1995), 88-100.
'
�•
r
I
Aryan community would sociaily and professionally ostracize a person of "mixed
blood." For instance, individu~ls with two Jewish grandparents were defined as Jews it
they professed the Jewish religion or if they married a Jew, but if neither condition was
met, they were considered "of mixed Jewish blood."~ In accordance with Nazi "race
science," a Jew was defined by bloodline, regardless of conversion to Christianity.
'To further sj'stematiz~ its discriminatory efforts" the Nazi Party relied on so ealled
"le]lt'ish e](perts" ofth8 Reieh Ihterior Ministry to write the Law for theProteetion of
.
I
,
German Blood and Honor and the Reieh Citizenship Law. On geptember 15, 1935, the
'Nazi eontrolled Reiehstag (par\iament) enaeted these laws, known as the Nuremberg
LaVIS. They e](plieitly identified the leVIS as those against vlhom offieial diserimination
·
I .
.
: '
and to designate one's: "degree"; oflewishness. For instanee, the regulation defined
ia8iyidaals with !we iewish g,\*,djlareH!s (half Jews) as Jews if they beleHged~e the
~rved
: ~p
r~eard
?
The. Nuremberg Laws
as th
for further racial persecution of Sinti, Rom ,
others defined as "non-Aryans." fu
I
1939 the Nazis targeted vietimized social and political "undesirables" through more than
lations, and amendments by 1939. 24 Promulgated
400 discriminatoryJa~s, decr I ,
b executive decisions thes rrleas s tended to be couched These e](eeutiv8 deeision~, ,
often promulgated in
, vagu
f crime prevention or public
health. measures Invariably, the measures were
mtive, restrictive, and
confiscatory in nature.and unm~istakably designed intended to segregate "asocial"
elements from the "Aryan" corrtmunity.25 Once the Nazi regime had elearly defined its.
enemies, they those enemies cquld be mere easily identified and their assets targeted fo'r
confiscation.
An especially vulnerable target of Nazi extortion was the Jewish business
proprietor. Although the Civil ~erviee La]i\' of 1933 applied only to the 12 pereent of
I
•
I
Lucy S. Dawidowicz, The War against the Jews, 1933-1945 (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston,
·
,
1975),67.
_
~ ,
,
""""'" JH,
'
21 Andreas Rethmeier, "Nurn e~'ger Rassegesetze" und Entrechtung der Juden im Zivilrecht
(Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Verl~g, 1995), 88-100.
•
~ (
20
'
22 Reichsburgergesetz vom 15. $eptember 1935; Gesetz zum~utze Jes deutschen Blutes und der .
deutschen Ehre vom 15, September /935; Gesetz zum Schutze der Erbgesundheit des deutschen Volkes vom
18. Oktober 1935 (Munich: C. H. Be~k'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1936),31-37; Dawidowicz, War
against the Jews, 6~.~
23 For a"Ct~:ription of Nazi raci~l decrees and attempts to define who was Jewish, see Hilberg,
Destructio'/ojthe Europe~n Jews, 27-37.
--
~24 Arnold Paucker etJiI.;-i)je Juc,len im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland (Ttibingen, Ger.: J. C. B.
Mohr, 1986), 105.
i
25 Michael Burleigh & Wolfgang Wippermann, The Racial State: Germany, 1933-1945 (New York:
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1991),49; Guenter Lewy, "The Travail of the Gypsies" The National fnterest (Fall
1999): 82.
'
1
I
.
-
'
I
�Germany's lews who ~orked i~ the eivi1 serviee and tae proiessions,2(j pri¥ate lewisa
business OVlners did not eS6apt!:perseeution. Constituting a significant category of assets,
Jewish-owned businesses becarpe subject to "Aryanization"-that is, transfer to Aryan
(non Jewisa) control. ,After 1933 many pressures drove Jewish owners to sell their
businesses-German boycotts, 'refusals by Germans to pay. business debts to Jews,
official harassment, the denial qf credit by banks, threats issued to tat! intimidating of
business owners when: taey we:re taken into what the police was called "protective
custody" and imprisoned, and the business owners' desire to raise the necessary cash to '
emigrate. 27 By 1935, as many as a quarter of Jewish businesses, particularly in tae more
.1
rural areas and small towns, mIght ma:y already have closed or been sold before 1935. 28
While the details of many oftaese transactions are no longer available, it is clear that :
Aryanization first targ~ted~1fop~eepers, while the larger Jewish enterprises-textile
firms, department stores, banks heavily involved in export financing-were among the
last to be sold or transformed irj.to limited p~erships or other forms of enterprise. 29 Of
an estimated 100,000 Jewish enterprises of all kinds in 1933, only about 40,000 remained
by November 1938 when the N:azi government prohibited Jewish ownership of retail
businesses. 3o In 1933 an estimated 100,000 Jewisa enterprises 0[a1l kinds were a6th'e,
I
I
::=~:;= =~ ~Fehi9it.Q JoW5I<e....'.vIDag ",tail
.
Promptly and efficientl~, the NazI regime exported its racial policies and their
institutional framework with each expansion of its territory. On March 12, 1938, Nazi
Germany celebrated its first large acquisition enpansion as its army marched into Austria
and annexed it to the Reich. 'N~en it anneKed Pdlstria. The anneKation (Anschluss
absorbed Austria's brougJ:it into tke Reiea nearly 200,000 Jews, whose wealth totaled all
estimated 2.5 billion Reichsmarks.32 Up to the outbreak of the war the following year, the
Nazis offered exit visas to Austrian Jews - but only in exchange for whatever they
owned.~. 7
:
O.fficials. ip_ f}ustria
mtM~",-;;:,,-·~confiscatlO
Jew where: the end of 1938 3500 art members became "commissioners" of
sei:eed Jewish properties~. Ta~ regime~d eJcit visas to Jews before tae outbreak of
.
:
26
L
~~:,..tJ. ~ ",~t" .:re.c.cJ,s..
I
Junz, "Economics ofthe Holqcaust," A-I64.
27 Karl Schleunes, The T~isted ~oad to Auschwitz. Nazi Policy Toward German Jews 1933-1939
(Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1990), 143.
28
Barkai, From Boycott to Annihilation, 70.
I
29
Barkai, From Boycott to Annihilation, 72-77.
•
I
.
Paucker et aL, Die 'Juden im tiationalsozialistischen Deutschland, 156; Barkai, From B0 1Jcott to '
Annihilation, 11 L
i
.. _ .. - - -_ _ _ _--..
30
,
-
.
1
, ....-"
, ---......=--
-'
~
--
-~-~
nekel et aI., uleJuden im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland, 156; Barkai, From Boycott to
Annihilation, Ill.
George Weis, "Report on Je'v\lish Hei;less Assets in Austria," Dec. 4, 1952,9-11, NACP, RG 59,:
Recs. of the Officer in Charge of Itaii,an & Austrian Affairs, Lot File 580223, Entry 1284, Box 8, File 586
[319315-317 of 319306-317]. The Reichsmark figure equates to either $750 million, converted from m~rks
to Austrian schillings to dollars, or ju:st over $1 billion, converted from marks to dollars ($8.8 billion or
$11.8 billion in 1999 values).
.
33 Craig, Germany 1866-1945,636.
.
,
�vlar but only in eJwhange for th~ir possessions. Austrian Nazis surpassed wfiat-the
Germans in looting had done so, far and looted property from Jewish shops and homes,
"
including household goods, lib~aries, and valuable paintings, and "revealed a degree of
vicious anti-Semitism which surprised even the Germans."34 On April 26 the Nazi
Vdlkischer Beobachter newspaper thundered: deelared_"The Jew must go-and his cash
stays here!"3S The newspaper referred to the decree promulgat~d that day requiring all ,
Jews in the Reich to declare .:rnd register all their domestic and foreign property worth '
.
,
more than 5,000 Reichsmarks. 36 Although ostensibly on the surfaee the decree presumed
any valuable assets for in the interest of the Reich, its ,
was to ensure the utili~ation of ,
ultimate sesret purpose was ultimately to exclude Jews from the German economy.37
In November 1938 the INazis assessed the value of all Jewish assets in the Reich,
now including Austria:, at 8.5 billion Reichsmarks, of which RM 1.4 billion were debts'
and other liabilities. The asset~ included business capital, real estate, and financial
assets-including infl~ed pensions, salaries, insurance, bank notes, securities, and other
"vulnerable assets ... readily s~izable. ,,38
Even more assertive after its foreign poliey sueeesses, the l-l'azi regime eontinued its
vietimization of Jevt's,; epitomized by the depredations of KrisF€llhuleht on November 9.39
I
'
On this "l-tight of Broken Glass," after whieh thel-tazis deported over 35,000 Jews to
eoneentration earnps,40 the ven1eer of legality that had eharaeterized at least some
I
•
.
perseeution and Aryanization disappeared. l\Jter 1938 the transfer of property and
enterprises into non Jevlish hands beeame indistinguishable from outright theft and
8J(propriation, a proeess benefiting longtime Nazi Party members. Confiseation was
blatant: in post AJ<lsehlblss Vien~a, home to 90 pereent ofA:ustria's Jews, vt'here, b,' the end
of 1938, 3,500 party members beearne "eommissioners" of seized Je\,,'ish properties.41 '
,
In October 1938 the Reich ha4 expanded its borders again, in Oetober 1938 as a
result of following the agreem¢nt at Munich (among Germany, France, Great Britain, and
Italy) that forced Czechoslovakia to surrender control of the Sudetenland to Germany ..
With their confidence' boosted,:Nazi leaders no longer felt inhibited by German law. They
instructed their supporters to take to the streets on November 9 and burn synagogues, :
break into Jewish apartments, ~nd wreck Jewish-owned shops. During the three days of
the pogrom, ninety-o~e Jews p~rished, including many suicides.£ With the sounds of
"
----------,·---1
.
34 Lynn Nicholas, The Rape of¥uropa. The Fate ofEurope's Treasures in the Third Reich and the
Second World War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994),38-44.
,
3S Cited in Robert Wistrich, Au~trians and Jews in the 20th Century (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1992), 208. ,
.
36 Gordon Craig, Ge~many 186(j-1945 (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1980),635; George Weis, '
"Report on Jewish Heirless Assets in lAustria," Dec. 4, 1952,4,9-10, NACP, RG 59, Recs. of the Officer in
Charge of Italian & Austrian Affairs; Lot File 580223, Entry 1284,Box 8, File 586 [319310-316 of
319306-317].
,
37'Barkai, From Boy¢ott to Ann~hilation, 118.
38 Junz, "Economics'ofthe Hol~caust," A-I66; Barkai, From Boyc'ott to Annihilation, 113.
39 Anthony Read & David
House, 1989).
Fish~r, Kristallnacht:
The Nazi Night of Terror (New York: Random
40 Martin Gilbert, Atlas ofthe Holocaust (New York: William Morrow & CO.,lnc., 1993),28.
t
41 Craig, Germany 1866-1945, 636.
12
Encylopaedia Jud\lica (.Ierusqlern: Keter Publishing IloLlse. 1972), volume] 2, p. 1279
�~:~e
crashin timber and smashed window anes
Ni ht of Broken I
Glass (Kristallnacht) marked a hew era of 0 ciabd.oltmee-a:@inst Jews. Dropping the,
pretensions of Rechtsstaat, the vaunted Germanic concept of "a state ruled by law," the
transfer of ro ert and ente rises into non-Jewish hands became indistin uishable from
.lg£rQ.J?t:iati01'i1ii1clltheft. ov..~
.
The Nazi momentum seemed unstoppable. In March 1939 Czechoslovak"
to exist followinKGen;nany occ:upied German occupation of Bohemia and
ravia and
r Germany
the creation of established the p'uppet state of Slovakia. Th LSepte'
attacked Poland, giving leading IFrance and Great Bri tino 0 tion but t declare war. In
orway, Luxembourg, th~
1940 the Nazi armies went on t~ invade and defeat De
Netherlands, Belgium, and Frarice; they then turned south the next year into Greece and
Yugoslavia, creating the puppet state of Croatia in the process. Germany now controlled
most of Western and Central the-Europe, European continent, with while its allies
Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, and R~omania Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary-holding
hel4 much of the rest. i
.
.
Even more assertive after its fOl~eign policy successes, the l-J"azi regime contim:led its
,
victimization ofJev/s,epitomiz~d by the depredations of Kriskitlbuwht on l-J"ovember 9.43
On this "l-right of Broken Glass;" after vl'hich the Nazis deported over 35,000 Jevl's to
concentration camps,44 the veneer oflegalitythat had characterized at least some
persecution and A:ryanization disappeared. After 193 g the transfer of property and
enterprises into non Je'Nish hands became indistinguishable from outright theft and
I
I
e~cpropriation, a process benefit,ing longtime l-J"azi Party members. Confiscation was
blatant in Vienna, home to 90 p'ercent of Austria's Jews, where, by the end of 1939, 3,500
party members became "commissioners" of seized Je'Nish properties.45
By the summer of 1941, the Reich had thus acquired additional resources and
laborers but also more, "undesirhbles." With varying degrees of success, Nazi Germany,
bullied ~its allies: the puppet states, and the governing agencies in occupied
countries to impose discriminatbry laws to exclude Jews from economic and public life
and, at least initially, to encour4ge them to emigrate abroad, leaving their wealth behind.
Two countries resisted: vlere "~napproachable" Denmark, German-occupied but with
its prewar government in p~ac~d Finland, a future German ally against the Soviet
Union. The others, includinljlpes, wavered between complial\'1~ with and resistance to
German pressure to d~al harshly with their Jewish populations.r~hough For instance, .
although Bulgaria, Hupgary, l3-Gmania, and Slovaki~ere "avid expropriators" of Jewi~h
assets, they often fell short o~e German standar~n dealing with Jews. 46
As soon as they occupied an area, After occupation, Nazi officials began
identifying and confiscating as~ets in conquered territories for the Reich, creating what
scholars have called in effect a ."plundering bureaucracy" for art and cultural property to
.
43 Anthony Read & David
House, 1989).
I
,
Fishe~, Kristallnacht.: The Nazi Night of Terror (New York: Random
44
Martin Gilbert, Atlas ofthe Holocaust (New York: William Morrow & Co., Inc., 1993),28.
45
Craig, Germany 1866-1945, 6.36.
Uwe Adam, Juden~olitik im Dritten Reich (DUsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1972),310; Hilberg,
.
I
Destruction ofthe European Jews, 16;8-69. See especially Hilberg, Perpetrators, 75-86; the quoted
are on pages 76-78.
46
phra~es
\
�I
I
I
I
supplement the organizations aJd laws concerned with expropriating financial holdings. 47
For instance in Poland, the Nazi~ stripped the Catholic Church in PolEffia of most of its
regalia and treasure. In France, ?erp~an embassy staff in FrEffice collected Jewish·
artwork. The occupation author,ities,in the Netherlands required Jews to turn over their
jewels, precious metals, and oth¢r va}uables, while the quasi-commercial Dienststelle
Muhlmann served aeteti as a c1drringhouse for confiscated artwork. Besides Hitler's Linz
Organization and Goering's art staff, one of the key instruments of plunder was the
special party agency Einsatzslab Rid'qhsleiter Rosenberg (ERR) which began looting the
archives and libraries of the "enemies" of National Socialism. Over time, the ERR
expanded its scope and expropri:ate~:fartwork and cultural objects from the occupied
territories in the west, particular~y France, and in the east and the Balkans. On June 22, .
.
1941, Germany invaded the Sov:iet Union. As the Wehrrnacht German army marche~'.
east, the Sonderkommando Ribb'enlr(}.p followed (one unit deployed to North Africa) to
plunder art, cultural objects, and! bo()J<s. 48
But in their search for booty. the Nazis did not limit the",~~J··~~ ~- --_..
~
.
l.~ t e\..::. -.J S.
JanuaI?' 194~ the ERR launchedl ~ts'!vI-Aktion (for Mobel-Aklioi,
operatiOn") m the west, confiscapng...household property from JI
~oc,..t.."
or had been deported to concentration camps) for use by Nazi 0;
(}
A
east. After the Allies launched Jir f'lids on Germany, officials i •
IJ
~
I
'.
other cities pHbliely auctioned off tlwse goods, claiming that tht
what Germans had 10s1'as a result of the bombings. By early Ai .
ed 71 ,619 dwelling~, packed: up materials worth RM 1.5 mii; ..
ILLION? and transported therp-it129,436 railroad cars full c,
marked "Jewish goods"-from tpe western occupied territories,
Aktion also netted RM 11.7 million. in currency and securities fri . - .'--'
!
"..
I
.
__ /"
J
«s.\
~
~
iA
~
r6J'~ .
~
Devices
of i.ftermination Pelieies
.
After September 1939, the brlltal persecution of Jews and other "undesirables"
paralleled Nazi Germany's widehing war of aggression against most of the rest of
j
<'" ••••• ,.,
Europe. the Reich in..tensifiea an,a widened the diseriminatioll against and persecHtion of
,
Jews and other "Hndesirables." tlth(:mgh in 1939 the Nazis still encouraged Jewish
I
I
Jonathan Petropoulos, Art and fol!t;9s in the Third Reich (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina·
Press, 1996),129,141..
I'
48 Petropoulos, Art and Politics, 1~6~ I ~O; Nicholas, Rape 0/ Europa, 64, 98. The Dienststelle
,
(agency) Mi1hlmann was named after I<i.ajetan MUhlmann, a party functionary and assistant to the
Reichskommissar for the Netherlands, Artl1l!r Seyss~Inquart; the ERR after Alfred Rosenberg, the party's '
ideologue; and the Sonderkommando (Jpeci~1 command), as it was informally known, after its leader,
Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbenttop, .
49 Nicholas, Rape o/Europa, 137~14(}. See Tuviah Friedmann, Das Vermogen der ermorderten Juden
Europas (Haifa: Institute of Document~tion: 1997); Wolfgang Dressen, Betriff!: "Aktion 3 "-Deutsche
verwerten ji1dische Nachbarn (Berlin: l;\ufbau-Verlag, 1998), 45-61.
47
I "',
PHOTOCOPY
PRESEAVATlON
.
"
�l.htt'.<. ~S-..
~~\I(.~.
VUS~~
J
�paralleled Nazi Germany's wid6ning war of aggression against most of the rest of
.
:
I·
..
I
Europe. the Reich intensified Jd widened the discrimination against and persecution of
Je,'l'S and other "Ulldesirables." }\lthough in 1939 the Nazis still encouraged Jewish
i
47 Jonathan Petropou16s, Art andIPolitic:,' in the Third Reich (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina
I
Press, 1996),129,141.
48 Petropoulos, Art ana Politics, i26-150; Nicholas, Rape ofEuropa, 64, 98. The Dienststelle
..
,
(agency) Muhlmann was named after Kajetan Mtihlmann, a party funCtionary and assistant to the
Reichskommissar for the Netherlands,!Arthur Seyss-Inquart; the ERR after Alfred Rosenberg, the party's
ideologue; and the Sonderk9mmando (special command), as it was informally known, after its leader,
Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop.
I
I
:
I
Nicholas, Rape ofEuropa, 137t140. See Tuviah Friedmann, Das Vermogen der ermorderten Jud~n
Europas (Haifa: Institute of Documentation, [997); Wolfgang Dressen, Betrifft:: "Aklion 3"-Deutsche
verwerlen judische Nachbarn (Berlin: I'Aufbau-Verlag, 1998), 45-61.
.
49
�I
I
emigration from 'Germany, by 1940 they were instead forcibly deporting victims to
I
occupied Poland and unoccupie~ France. Germans took over the property including the
contents of tens of thousands ofiapartments left behind, as well as the dwellings
themselves. 50 Naei
@f~€lials alsd! eegan t@ €l@n€lentrate Je¥/s in gRett@s
,
Se€lti@Hs €ll@sea aistri€lts (gRt!!tt@S) in P@liSR €litit!!s
I
L@ae ghett@, €!staelisR8a in A~ril 194 Q,
amount of property abdndoned
1
e~dst8a
waIlea €Iff
as a transiti@nal mt!!aSllrt!! (altR@llgR tRt!!
fer @ver f@w years). To maximize the
the confusion and available for confiscation. .§ecret
Nazi plans called for abruptly trlnsferring tHe sl:ldden movement of Jews into ghettos.:.
.
ma}cimi25e ilie amOl:lflt
I
.
~
~fpropeJy alJandofled in ilia eOflfusiofl and ava,ilable for
i
I
eonfiscatiofl. By the end of 194;1 the Nazis had established major Jewish ghettos in
Warsaw, Cracow, Lodz. Lublin,i and L vov; in later years they would establish hundreds·
more throughout eastern Europe. 51 Not only Polish Jews ended up in Polish ghettos: in
October 1941 Heinrich Himmlet sent 20,000 Jews from Germany, Austria, and
,
Luxembourg and 5,000 Sinti an~ Roma to Lodz. 52
.
I
t
The German invasion of!the Soviet Union in June 1941 marked yet another
sinister fl8W phase of the victimIzation policy. Mobile killing units-Einsatzgruppen
accompanied German troops adtancing in the east. Assigned to kill Jews on the spot,
they achieved a rate of) 00,000 month by the end of 1941. 53 Hitler also efleol:lfaged his
k
military to tl:lFfl over eaprnred Communist Party fUflctionaries to tHe Ei11saf:::gruppol'l or to
kill tHem themseh'8s. According to a directive of June 3, 1941, from German Army
Headquarters entitled "Guidelinbs for the Conduct of Troops in Russia," the struggle
.
I
demanded "ruthless and energetic measures against Bolshevik agitators, guerrillas,
.
saboteurs, [and] Jews."S4 In pra4tice, this meant mass executions of Soviet prisoners of :
,
so
'
Hilberg, Destruction 0/ the Eu~opean Jews, 160-162; Hilberg, Perpetrators, 15, 196-97.
Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem (New York: Penguin, 1982),93-95; Barkai, From Boycott
I
to Annihilation, 175; Hilberg, Destruction 0/ the European Jews, 74-84.
,
52 Breitman, Official Secrets,
51
72.1
53
Hilberg, Destruction a/the EU10pean Jews, 99-103, 125.
S4 Falk Pingel, Haftlin'ge unter SS,-Herrschaft (Hamburg: Hoffman und Campe, 1978), 119-22;
Dawidowicz, War Against the Jews, 1?3-25; Richard Breitman, The Architect a/Genocide: Himmler and'
the Final Solution (Hanover, N.H,: Univ. Press of New England, 1991), 149-50.
,
I
I
I
I
!
I
I
.
�I
tb
war and civilians. From 1941
1943 In addition, Heinrich Himmler's Order Police
(Ordnung.5po!izei) deported Pol'cs from annexed territories and shot thousands of Jews .
and partisans 'in the Soviet Uniqn and Poland.' from 1941 to 1943. Some police units
stripped Polish Jews of their valuables before deporting them from Polish ghettos to '
I
newly-established camps at Treblinka and Majdanek.
55
On January 20, 1942, N~zi leaders met in a villa in th os~erlin suburb of
Wannsee to coordinate a "Final ISolution"
ef"the Jewish race in Europe" ~
Jewish question." whi~h they e~timated at more than 11 million. They expressed pride in
the expulsion of Jews from German life and decided on more deportations to the
concentration camps in the east.1Officials there discussed the ongoing e?qJulsion of Je'Ns
from German life thr0l1gh depoilation or evaouation to the east, But they also planned to
r.tt~....ptrt"8.ble-bodied Jews to buil~ ,,<'ork building roads, "in the course of which doubtless
many will be eliminatedbYlai'Jral causes." Those that survived, who would
:
"undoubtedly consist bfthe most resistant portion," would have to be "treated
accordingly" since they "wouldJ if released, act as a seed of a new Jewish revival."56
"Treated accor~inglY" rrleant execution by firing squad or death by gaSsi{t'~ :
!otter
'_~.""'~"'~'i's 8O-cal~.
,
,
In
November 1941 the Nazi regime began building the first extermination centers at
Chelmno and Belzec.
Th.. ~ati." e _ at Belzee opened in March 1942, soon to
I
be followed by those Eli: Sobibor~ Treblinka, Majdanek, and Auschwitz. 57 By this time,
I
I ,
'
emigration was no longer possi~le for neither Jews in GerITlan-occupied Europe nor Jews
I
in Germany, could emIgrate, ana. deportations to the "east"-a euphemism for the killing
;
I
;
centers-intensified. 58 :Before t~e tleath camps ceased operations in 1945, an estimated:
I
,2.7 to 2.9 million people
victim~ of genocide' died at these six locations. 59
!
55 Christopher R. Brow,ning, Ordinary Men: ReservePolice Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in
,
Poland (New York: HarperCollins, 19?2), 9-25, 109, 134.
56 The quotations frorti the protodol appear in D~widowicz, War Against the Jews, 106. For the
I
Wannsee Conference see Christopher flrowning, Nazi Policy, Jewish Workers, German Killers
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, ~OOO), 26-57.
57 Hilberg, Destructi01 ofthe EU~'opean Jews, 228-30; Gudrun Schwartz, Die nationalsozialistischen,
'
Lager (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1990), 210-16. .
58
Uwe Adam, Judenpolitik im DLtten Reich (DUsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1972),310.
I
Hilberg, Destruction ofthe European Jews, 225-228, 239-240; Schwartz, Die
nationalsozialistischen Lager, 212-16.!
I .
59
�I
~'l\.T·
,
.•
rI
I .
.
rHe VlctlfltS Ot:1'"tazl t:teportaHolts Deportees arrived' teat camps b ' " WIth'
m h
rmgmg
'T't.
I'
them only what they CQuid carrr, us,~ally one small suitcase per person. The Nazi officers
I
in charge of the
conce~tration a~d fGlling camps-members of the SS (Schutzstaffel),
Heinrich Himmler's elite policelanc,l guard organization-carefully collected every small
item. sect:lFee tRis property
fro,
tee victims for use by tee Reich. Between April 1942
;
tit'.e.
and December 1943, for examP1!le, tlW Reich expropriated assej
and other currencies
household items.60
~d coins; !the J90t also included precious;
~~ "
ITItta;:;,; ",.
,Iu , " ,_ .. , ....
At'AUSChWi~tz copfiscated valuables included the gold fillings that the
I
.
•
//~-e
i
•
~~
~~ ~t?
'
Nazis had extracted from the mputlls of their victims. 61
/
~1~
~
Between August 26, 1912, Md Janullf
;1945, the SS m6er:!)i-six.)
deliverie~ DOUBlLECHECK
.Jl~
RNI. HITE to t~e Re~chsbank in Berlin of
property It had confiscated from VictIms 0 AuschwItz and Lublm, WIth a total value
estimated between 36 and 50 mlillion Reichsmarks. The bank acted as trustee for some of
the loot and disposed 9f the rest, depositing the proceeds in a Ministry of Finance account
to help fund Germany's war effprt. ,The Reichsbank 12urchased outright the foreign bank
notes, gold, and securities; it erilist~d the services ofthe'Prussian State Mint to smelt
jewelry, broken gold, and dent~l golc:l; and it sold jewelry and other items to the Berlin '\'wu.\I\.\~IO
Pawnbroker Office. The Reichsbankdisposed of 44 shipments of SS loot for an
estimated 24 million Reichsmal-ks.' As the war neared its end, the Reichsbank removed
some of the remaining loot frorh B¢rlin and stashed it in mine shafts near Merkers in
central Germany in western Thhringia. (see Cnapter 4, A.ssets ill Ewrepe)62
flola'iii ca:tR-p officials, Haying confiscated the items the prisoners had on them,
inmates' taA:gible property, camp officials took further advantage of their victims Qy
granting those judged strong doughtbrOHge forcee labor. +hey grantee a temporary
I
tS
"u
"'II
60
Friedman~, Das Verm6gen dJr ermqderten Juden Europas, 9-\3.
I
',"
Hilberg, Destruction o/the Europ~ClnJews, 249.
61 Col. Bernard Bernstein, ,·SS Joot and the Reichsbank," Oct. 30, 1945, Part B-1 1-2, Part B-1! 1-4,
NACP, RG 260, Office of the Adjutaht G~neral, Gen. Corresp. & Other Records "Decimal File," Box 8,
File 004.2 [216036-046]; Monthly Rp,t., f>!J-rt 1lI "Further Evidence on Disposition of S.S, Loot by
,
Reichsbank," May] 945, NACP, RG Q60, FlED, Central Files 1945-50, Box 423, File 940.304 [220381
386]. U.S. officials in 194:S equated fhe 2~.1t million "gold RM" accruing from the 44 shipments to $9.56
million. Other documents report 78 SS deliveries to the Reichsbank, of which the bank processed 43 and
sent 35 to Merkers. See Memo from :Keatjl1/S, OMGUS, to AGWAR for WDSCA, no date [ca. Jui. 1947],
NACP, RG 260, Recs. of the Ofc. of Finance Adviser, FED Recs., Box 160, Currencies Restitution
[329606-608].
61
i
I
PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION
"
£'4~"-['
178,745,960 Reichsmarks. The/majority of the valuables consl
..
��,
1,
!
'The victims o/Nazi deJortatioas Deportees arrived in the at camps bringing with
,
•
,
•
I
I"
~,
',
them o~ly what they cbtild carrY"usually one small
-
•
suitca~e p~r person. The Nazi offic6rs
in charge of the' concehtration Ld killing camps-membe;s of the SS (Schutzstaffel), ;
Heinrich Himmler's ellte pOlicel and
~ard organiZition-:carefuliy collectedevery smJI
Item; secured thIS property from the Vilct!ms for use by the ReIch. Between Apnl 1942
an~ Dec'ember, 1943, for examdle, the Reich expropriated assets with' a total value of
i
"
178,745,960 Reichsmarks. The majority of the valuables consisted otGerman;Polish, '
1
and other currencies ard coins; the loot also included precious metals, jewel~y? and
!
'
/
household items.6o Ati, Auschwitz confiscated valuables included the gold fillings that the
",
I,.
Nazis had extracted frpm the mouths of their victims. 61
.'
i,
I
'
:
. .
//~-e..
',.'
. ~ t..
~ (~
' . / ' _r_'i:V
1<6
r
Between August 26,1912, and Janu~
7:i945, the SS m~ ,
deliverie~ DOUBLECHECK
.p~
R.NI. HITE to t~e Re~cnsD3nk in Berlin !of
property It had confiscated from vIctIms 0 Auschwitz and Lublm, with a total value
estimated between 36 and 50 m'illion Reichsinarks. The bank acted as trustee for some :of
the loot a~d disposed ?f the rest, depositing the proceeds in Ministry of Finance account
to help fund Germany';s war effort. The Reichsbank Eurchased outright the foreign bank
notes, gold, and secur~ties; it erilisted the services of the'Prussian State Mint to smelt '.
jewelry, broken' gold, ~d dendl gold; and it sold jewelry and other items to theBerlin ~",,\~t~
p'awnbroker Office. Tlhe Reichkbank disposed of 44 shipments of SS loot for an
'
estimated 24 million Reichsmatks. As the war neared its end, the Reichsbank removed,
.
some of the 'remainind loot frorh Berlin and 'stashed it in mine shafts near Merkers in
: central Germany in w~stem Thhringia. (s@@ GRllflt€lf 4, Ass@ts ill'!!blf@}3€l)62 . ' .
Na2ii .cat=I1j3 of~cials, Hafing confiscated the items the prisoners had on them,
"
camp officials took further advantage of their victims Qy
g etiough through fomed labor. They graated a temporary
tS
,',
j
'
I
a
~
Fr'edmann. Das V",magen
J
"modaleo Juden Eu,"pas, 9- !3.
.
61 Hilberg, Destruction o/the EJropean Jews, 249.
"
. 62 Col. Bernard Bern~tein, "ss Jootand the ReiChsbank," Oct. 30, 1945, Part B-1 1-2, Part B-IJ 1-4,
NACP, RG 260, Office of;the Adjutaht General, Gen. Corresp. & Other Records "Decimal Fih,;," Box 8, .
File 004.2 [216036-046]; Monthly R~t., Part III "Further Evidence on Disposition ofS.S. Loot by
,
,
Reichsbank," May 1945, NACP, RG f60, FED, Central Files 1945-50, Box 423, File 940.304 [220381
386]. U.S. officials in 194:5 equated the 23.9 million "gold RM" accruing from the 44 shipments to $9.56
million. Other'documents:report 78 ~S deliveries to the Reichsbank,ofwhich the bank processed 43 anq
sent 35 to Merkers. See ~emo from ,Keating, OMGUS, to AGWAR for WDSCA, no date [ca. luI. 1947],
NACP, RG 260, Recs: oft)1e Ofc. of Finance Adviser, FED Recs., Box 160, Currencies Restitution
[329606-608] .
�death~ those!judg~d
..reprieve fl from
to
strong enough to . . . 'ork. A directive of April 30,
1942, instructed concentration CanlP officials to exploit their prisoners without regard to
health and life because the Rei~h needed their slave labor. In September 1942 both .
Heinrich Himmler and Joseph GoelJ,qels decided, according to Justice Minister Otto
Thierack, that I!extermination thrOUgil work would be the best" for Jews, Sinti, and
Roma. 63 In other words, shef.t,lthos~who were spared from gassing were to be worked to
death.
SUMMARY!
,
Nazi Q@fi'llMj"S @ffieial vietiJ'ftizatif:}n @f large segm~nNs If Rw:mMity tR@ pepw:lati@n
€
began with a in 1933 la'.." @x€I~Qing}@\ys fmm tR@ Q@fillaFi Civil S@p/ie@. ,,<li@n Hitler's
J
gS"@fHHl8nt @Ra:Ct8Q tB@ Ci"il ~@r,rrc',~ Lav/; III tae t\v@1,r8 )t@llFS tA-m: f81Io '•{@8, f@ll€l,J,ring
yltlars, ilI@ rltlgimltl ItIxteRaea its aiseril::Binatsry praetiees, first tMS:IglIsW:t G@fillany ooa '
then int@ territ@ries egn§H@rItlB.tnat.~U W:lla@r }Iazi esntreL lay 1941, Ovltlr time tlIltl }Jazi
state ','las @Jl-tltlfillinating t@RS sf tlIeqsMBs sf "W:Ra@sirables." iRtltlRsifieB its p@fs@ew:ti9R:9f
vietims @VItlR t@ tke p~iRt af m~ss i!~(termiRati@R. All If tRItISe Th€! measw:res graQHaUy
€
aQspteQ plaeeQ vast pm Hntsla l€f:uWl~jties If expr9priateQ wealtlI iot9 thltl lIMQS If the
€
€
German state, tllltl }Jazi party, alnG itf!i.Rlembers. AFter Qltlmlan SHmilFlG@r Ii!lFlQ@Q ilI@ 'i'lar'iR
EHr9pe, the Unitea States gaiR~Q e@~r@l ef~ a perti@R @ftkat wealth. after Qefi'llooy's
SilrreRG@r eRGeG W@rl€l \Var II !in E~~fep@.
B.
United States; Engagement
!!J~~A ~ 1('f~\ot.!~~~
~
,
Ove(co~ing Jsolationism
1.
wll.w'-e.,
~ ..... ~~~-\;\4L.k
'\\.{.i~: '~~ ~\o~'~l
. rO\\~LA
The horrors perpetrated by N:izi Germany during t9 1930s drew little .y;;iaespr-ead
attention or call for a~tion in tHe Ulllted States. Domestic'problems-in particular
'
unemployment and the sagging eCQIl9my of the Greav6epression-Ioomed far larger in '
~;;:irr~~~h;utL~%~~:~:ie~a~I~~' ; ( , , , , : ; C : i
~d:' In ·I93~ lmemploYIl}f)pt stood
. ..
13.7 mllh~
isolationist Senator William E.j Borah wrot hat Americai:
interests and devote ourselves to our own eople." 64 This 1
of a strong sense of nativistic riatiop;;lis ,an attitude of"A1l1enca-IOr7\me1icaiis~'" The
attitude overlapped with and oitly tbj disguised anti-immigrant and anti-Semitic
'
. b.m~embers or'
sentiments prevalent in broad ~train .• ·0 . Ameri~ soci . .
mtia~ves to aid Jewish
Congress and the State DepartxPen
. . f'
refugees before and during the!war.6~ Between 1938 and 1941 one third to one half of'
I
•
_.."~>,.,,,,"
,
63 Bernd Klewitz, Die Arbeitss~laven qer Dynamit Nobel (SchalksmUhle, Ger.: Verlag Engelbrecht,
1986), 432-34.
~.
I
64 Thomas Guinsburg, The Pur~uit oflsolationism in the United States Senate from Versailles to Pearl
Harbor (New York: Garland Publish,illg, 1982), 135.
65 On nativistic nationalism and; its re.li,ltionship to anti-Semitism see David S. Wyman, Paper Walls:
America and the Refitgee Crisis, /938-1941 (New York: Pantheon Books; '1968, 1985), 10-14,82-92.
I
..
.
•
,
I
!
I
IPHOTOCO~Y
PRESERVATi@N
I
.~,.,-
�I
�. "reprieve" from death. to thos~ judged strORg BRough to 'Nork. A directive of April 30,
1942, instructed concentration1camp officials to exploit their prisoners without regard to
health and life because the Reiph needed their slave labor. In September 1942 both
.
. Heinrich Himmler and Joseph poebbels decided, according to Justice Minister Otto
Thierack, that "extermination through work would be the best" for Jews, Sinti, and
Roma. 63 In other words, sheft,llthose who were spared from gassing were to be worked: to
death.
.
£Ul\4UARY
I
pTazi G@rmany's @ffi€ial vistimii:lati@n @flarge segments @fhumanity the p@fJlllati@n
{}@gan with Iii in 1933 iav. @pHdJding J@ws fr@m the German Civil £@rvi€@. \\r.llen Witler's.
.
I
I
g@v@rnm@nt @naet@d th@ Civil £@rvie@ Lay,'. III the tv;elve ),@aFS that f@ll@l,veQ, ft3ll@wing
.
I
Y@aFS, th@ regime e~M;eneee its ~iseriminat@ry prasti€@s, first tM@Hgh@llt G@rmany ane
th@n int@ t@ffit@ri@S e@R€)ll@ree.that fell HRQ@r pTazi @ntr@l. Qy 1941, Over time the pr~i
€
state was imt@rminating t@ns @f1th@Hsanes @f"Hne@sira{}les." intensifiee its perseemi@R @f
vi€tims @vtm t@ th@ p@~nt @fma~s Emterminati@R. JAI @fthese The meaSHfes graQHally
ae@ptee pla€eQ vast PHt Hnt€ll€l ~llantities @f @Jipr@pfiat@e wealth int@ the llaRes @ftll@
G@rman stat@, th@ plazl party, ru\e its m@m{}@fs. Aft@r G@rman Sllff@Re@f @Reee th@ ',.;'ar iR
EHf@P@, th@ Unitee £tates gaiRe1e @ntml @f~ a j§I@rti€ln @fthat w@alth. after G@fmany's
€
SHrr@n€iu @nd@e Werle 'Nar II i~ EHF@pe.
€
r
I
B.
,
United States Engagement
.
1.
Overco~ing Isolationism
I
!!I~'l'tA ~ t'''''}\LA~<!e~ ,
~. ~~"-e.. ~~~~~i...Q.
/
·\0~ .. \::,\"Jc;\~l
'
7·\\-b.L~
The horrors perpetrated by Nazi Germany during tb.e 1930s drew little widespread-
attention or call for action in thd United States. Domes)ifproblems-in particular
unemployment and the sagging economy of the GreavDepression-loomed far larger in
-earIY-1930s-than-il1ternation~1 concerns. Many/elt that it was
IS THIS IN. O~ OUT1 to~ofe embroiled a toad ~h~n t~e natIOn ~ strength was so ,
sapp :-In 193~emplqyment stood 13.7 mIllIon m the Umted States, the
isolationist Senator William E. Borah wiot hat Americans should "look after our own
interests and devote ourselves td our own eople."64 This political isolationism g~ew out
of a strong sense of nfltivistic nahonalis ,an attitude of "America for Americans." The'
.
attitude overlapped With. and only t~i disguised anti-immigran.tand anti-Semitic"
sentiments prevalent in broad st~ain;foJ."'\~ri~~~,~}~bm~embers of
Congress and the State Departmen ~d tIC ~I IUltia¥tves to aid Jewish
refugees before and during the Jar. 65 Between 1938 and 1941 one third to one half of :
c:5
I
'
•
63 Bernd Klewitz, Die Arbeitsskldven der Dynamit Nobel (SchalksmUhle, GeL: Verlag Engelbrecht,
1986),432-34.:
.
64 Thomas Guinsburg, The Pursuit ofIsolationism in the United States Senate from Versailles to Peafl
Harbor (New York: Garland Publishing, 1982), 135.
65 On nativistic nationalism and it~ relationship to anti-Semitism see David S. Wyman, Paper Walls:
America and the Refogee Crisis, 1938-1941 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1968, 1985), 10-14,82-92.
,J
�i
I
Americans questioned in public op'inion polls believed that Jews had "too much power in
the United States," especially in "business and commerce" and in "finance.,,66
Furthermore, popular dist~ust of b~nks, big business, and munitions manufacturers, all of ,
which were perceived as profiting from continuing foreign trade (if not actively. . st:
promoting war), supported inwardtlooking attitudes. 67 ""e:c.~1
;~D\.tJ:J~'
In August 1936 President Franklin D. Roosevelt.ce:J:l&ted nationaVsentiment
when he declared, "We shun politifal commitments which might entangl~us in foreign
wars.,,68 Until 1938 Roosevelt's efforts until 1938 focused on ways to undermine
I
aggressor nations by encouraging <disarmament and restricting trade, as well as by
suggesting blockades or other wayk of controlling the seas. His efforts were stymied by
,
I
Congressional passage of the Neutrality Acts (1935-37) that mandated arms embargoes
and prohibited loans to all belliger&nts, making it impossible to favor those considered
allies. It remained possible to supply food, raw materials, and manufactured goods as
long as a country paid fo~ them in fash and carried them away on foreign ships. While
the United States remained officially neutral until 1941, this allowance permitted a
transatlantic trade with Great BritEiin to flourish, one which would subsequently require '
the U.S. Navy to protect ship conv~ys., even though the United £tates remained offieially i
neutral in 1940 and 1941.69
.
Ofeourse, Roosevelt's political astuteness was legendary. was politieally astute.
In 1936 he said, "1 can at least maRe certain that no act of the United States helps to
produce or to promotew~r,"70 impiying that provocative acts by other-riations were a
different matter. During his reeledtion bid in 1940, still under pressure from the political
isolationists, Roosevelt declared tHat American "boys are not going to be sent into any
foreign war." On other occasions,lhowever. he added a key qualifier, "except in case of
ttack... 71
.
,
'
"'~~~tI
By January 1941, with NaZi Germany controlling all of the continental channel
~~t/ ~
P Its and threatening Great Britairl, the United States had.become the "arsenal of
\(J1'
emocracy." The passage of the ~end-Lease bill in March 1941 was a turning point,
permitting the United States to len~ or lease to Great Britain-the only European power
left to oppose Nazi domination-the weapons, munitions, food, or other supplies needed
to fight Hitler without requiring p~yment in return. The measure, Roosevelt said, was
:
72
.
"key to the security of the Wester~ Hemisphere" and to the security of the United States. .
The Japanese attack on Pearl Har~or on December 7, 1941, finally ended American
'
/
political and military isolation, ,.mo three days after declaring war on Japan, the United
I
I
,
,
66 David S. Wyman, The'AbandonnJent ofthe Jews: America and the Holocaust, 1941-1945 (New ,
York: Pantheon Books, 1984), x, 14-15. ISee also Deborah E. Lipstadt, Beyond Belief The American Press
and the Coming ofthe Holocaust, 1933-~945, (New York: The Free Press, 1986).
67 Manfred jonas, isolationism in A~erica 1935-194i (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1966),26.
68 New York Times, Aug. 15, 1936, teprinted in Paul Hoibo, Isolation and Interventionism, 1932-1941 .
(Chicago: Rank McNally & Co., 1967), ~ 7. See also H. Schuyler Foster, Activism Replaces isolationism:
Public Attitudes 1940-1975 (Washington, D.C.: FoxhaH Press, 1983).
u.s.
69 Ronald Powaski, Tow~rd an EntJngling Alliance. America~ isolationism, Internationalism and
Europe, 1901-1950 (New York: Greenwbod Press, 1991),58-88.
70 New York Times, Aug. 15, 1936, ~eprinted in Holbo, isolation and interventionism, 17.
71 Holbo, Isolation and i~terventio~ism, 51 .
. 72
,
Pow~ski, Toward an ~ntang/ing rlliance, 95.
�States was at war not only with Japan, but with Germany and Italy, known collectively as :
the Axis Powers. 73 The United St~tes': entry into the European conflict after Hitler's '
declaration of war on December 1II resulted in the formal alliance with Great Britain and
the Soviet Union that eventually ctushed Nazi Germany.
I
2.
The Grandi Alliance
I
III ilillGsigRt, tSllGS t@ sse viet@ry @vsr tils A}(is P@wsrs 'Nas as flraetieally ,
"
illsvitabls, bHt fur. tl1@ss
I
'
\~111@ liveG! tl1f@Hgl1 tl1s iRitial }JaZii viet@fiss, SHbss€!Hsllt svsllts
I
SHell as e@lltsmfl@rariss tRS libsratl@R @fEHf@fls, tl1s Gsstmeti@ll @f GsrmaR military
I
ill EHf@fls ,stratsgie flrima,eY, @Ht il~ stillilaG t@ ~ balaRe~ tl1at tJri@fity GSeiSi@ll
1
,
I
i
'
agaillsttl1s GSmallGS @ftl1s war ill ~l1s Paeifie, ill whieh tl1s ~@vist Dlli@ll was rslHetallt t@
~ ll@t illV@lvSG. During, World War II both the western powers-the United States and
I
Great Britain-and the Soviet Unibn' worried that the Grand Allianfeth~ they formed to
,
,I
~,
defeat Nazi Germany
mi~ht split, that Hitler might succeed in re~ching making a separate'
I
.
I
I
agreement with one or th~ other. Tn such a scenario, the Germans could have marshaled
I
'
their forces on one front and possi~ly reversed the tide of the war. The success
:
iM,-v'~
sueeessful efforts of the Big Thre~ maintain th~ coalition-in doubt until the last
months of the
war---ensu~ed the jJint victory that gave U.S. forces and ~gencies the
i
~
opportunity to recover ana restitute victims' assets in the territories he occu ied.
¥r@m tl1s @\:ltsst @ftl1s alliabes, R@@ssvslt s@Hght t@ assHags tl1s ~@vists allG t@
allay thsir ~@vist rears that thsl1ritish aRG Amsriealls might attsfRfJt t@ e@lleiHGS a
I
sSflarats flsaeS witl1 Hitler. hi 194:2 PfssiGsllt R@@ssvslt aRG Army Cl1isf @f ~taff GSllsral '
Gs@rgs C. Marsilall b@tl1aGV@eats~ a €lHiekbl@w illll@rthsfll EHf@flS t@ feres GsrmaR~' t@
rsaligll its tf@@fls aRG t@ fslisvs flr~ssHrs ell fF@lltS ill R~ssia.:M \VhSll tl1is fllall flr@VSG
l@gistieally imflraetieal, R@@ssveltiagaill SllGsa\'@rsG t@ m@llify tils ~@vists, GSelarillg
I
I
I
I
I
73 Powaski, Toward an Entangling Alliance, 110.
I
'
Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Gloqalism. American Foreign Policy Since 1938, 8th rev. ed. (New
York: Penguin Books, 1997), 15-17.
'
74
�,jl
I
I
wita ta@ llritisa in Casablanlila in J'aRliary 194~ tliat the Alli@s w€JRld ooeept €Jnly
"unlil€Jnditi€Jnal surrender" iwm G~rman;', Italy, aRd Japan.~
Beginning in ~ 1942 t~e Soviets lTatl pressed the western Allies for a second
front against the Germans in Europe; in June 1944 the sHeeessfl:il Allied invasion of
Normandy made a seconu front a reality. Officials both in the United States and in Great
Britain began considering more clbsely what the map of postwar Europe (and the world,
for that matter) might look like, aqd several had substantial concerns. worried about
Soviet designs in the east. In 1944 the State Department's leading experts on the
Russians, George Kennan, believed it time (la1:e 1944) for a "full-fledged and realistic
political showdown withithe Sovi~t leaders" to discuss their territorial intentions. 76
Ta@ primary task remainedI t€J erusa ptazi GerrnaRY ana taer@aIter t€J €J8tailt ~aviet .
.
I
assistanee in the eampaiglt against JapaR. Mv@n ilt @arl;' 1945, asw@ver, Ameri€aR psliey .
makers 8elievea taey aae ansta@r 'year ta plait fer ta@ pastwar era in Ew.r€Jpe. ':J,J. Presidelit
R:.ssse¥elt aimself sasw@alittl@ i~elinatialt t@ let p@sh;\'ar ealtsidemtisns afte@t ais plans
fer war a.gainst Gerrnany.~ R,@@s@¥elt als@ 8elieved taat ~sviet premier J@sepa ~talin aae
n@ perniei@lis eesiglts apart it@m Jbtainiltg s@@Rrit;, @It the western ~svi@t 8@raer.:o!I~
I
G@aliti@1t r@mailtea intaet, alta G@rmanv's @@llaps@ tae Eurspealt war @aIllIil t@ alt end msre.
rapisl)' tRait e~eeted, as a resw.lt ~f witR Germany iltvaded {mIll tRe east 8y tk@ ~ sviet
tRe R~d Arn1Y's tRrust {[sm tRe e~st and tRe Angl@ AIlleriean invasisn fisn) tRe west, '8Y
tRti) @@Ill8iltti)d fer@es @ftRe United: ~tates ane Gn~at Britain, aieee 8y Fr@@ FreneR F@rees.
Ia@ 8attl@ in the Paeifie still mg~
The final movement of we~tern forces through Germany and into Austria and
Czechoslovakia brought American soldiers into positions to discover and impound caches
of enormous wealth that the Nazis had looted from victims all over Europe. The
endurance ofthe Grand Alliance (br "Strange Alliance," as it has also. been dubbe-&t° that.
linked the.J3oviet Union with the testern powers had created the conditions that placed :
~f t'ittset~r~~~~X1th, induding assets originally owned by victims of the
Holocaust, in American hands. Ohly in the months after the defeat of Germany did the
alliance break down, developing ihto the Cold War and complicating the reconstruction
of Europe and the restitution ofN4i loot to the original owners or their heirs.
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
75
John Keegan, The Secbnd World I
War (London: Hutchinson, 1989),317-319 ..
76
Ambrose, Rise to Globalism, 27-3 I.
....z:z~dlCe
.
ffOmBob Grathwol]:
78
Gaddis, Origins ofth~ Cold War,! 75.
79
Ambrose, Rise to
80
Ambrose, Rise to GlolJalism, 15.!
Glo~alism, 30.!
.
�C.
.
1
Occupation and Stabilization
1.
.American (:ommand Structure in Europe
,
I
Gerk,any
. a)
I
i
The organization.of the Af:nerican military command that assumed control of
I
,
occupation duties and vi~tim assets in Europe after Germany's defeat underwent
I
.
considerable restructuring and reqesignation during and immediately after the war.
•
1
Rather than operating independenhy of one another. during the invasion of the continent,
,
.
the British and American armed fprces in Europe united under one combined command
structure. Out of this effort to c06rdinate military plannirig emerged the Supreme
j
;
Headquarters, Allied Expedition4y Force (SHAEF) in January 1944. SHAEF, staffed by
I
both American and British officeFs, directed combat operations throughout the remainder
;
,
I
,,
u.s.
of the war in Europe tmder the command of General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower.
':
'
/'
,
In 1943 the Alli~d milita~ organization in 1943 had created a command elem~nt .
I
responsible for securing, safegua~ding, and registering victims' assets-G-5 Division of
SHAEF. The U.S. Army had organized G-5 to manage civil affairs/military government:
,
I
'
as an addition to the traditional st~ff divisions serving a commanding general-G-1 for
personnel, G-2 for intelligence,
q-3 for operations, and G-4 for logistics and supply.
The
I
G-5 Division's primary duties we~e to establish property and financial controls, to care
for and repatriate displaced persolns, and to organize military government in occupied
enemy territory. 81
81
Ziemke, Us. Army in the Occuft.atian a/Germany, 164.
.
,
!
:
�Detachments from the G-5 cilvision accompanied Allied tactical troops as they
liberated Europe and overran el1eIllY territory in 1944 and 1945. 82 G-5 personnel relied
on the tactical (i.e., combat) troopsJQ help them make contact with the civilian
population, establish order, and set1J.p the first rudimentary semblance of military
government. 83 Consequently, theyf()llowed close behind the tactical· troops and were
never in one place forvery long. These G-5 detachments were often the first military
units to come into contact with!vic~irl1sf assets and to assume responsibility for them.
Chaos on the ground ha~ its parallel in apparent confusion and overlapping
i
!, .
responsibilities within; the milit~ry §bucture. The United States Group Control Council'
(Germany) (USGCC) Was establisheci as a U.S. organization on August 9, 1944, with a
,
I
""
mission almost identical to that ofth.~ G-5 Division-to make plans for military
government in Germany with all
th,~
associated responsibilities that the mission entailed.
The USGCC, although a completely American element, was subordinate to SHAEF until
the combined command terminflted in mid-July 1945. 84 Originally it included only thre~
I
divisions, responsible for Germ;an gi$armament and demilitarization, the repatriation of
,
,
I
I
Allied prisoners of wa~, intellig:enc~ collection,
gatfte;
and political matters. In Nove~~ber 1944 USGCC w~
including a division fqr Reparation~i Deliveries, and ]
Restitution). The Monuments,
Fin~
Arts, and Archives Subcommission_IS THIS
CORRECT? ISN'T IT ADMINIS'fRATION? (MFA&A), formerly a part ofG-5,
-------------,:---:-:------
SHAEF, became a branch of this ~ew division under USGC~e mission of MP A&A
as it developed was, where possible, to prevent damage to or destruction of monuments,
,
I
buildings, statues, andiartworks: wl!ile warfare still raged in western Europe; to identify,
,
"
I
82 Klaus-Dietmar Henke, Die arnerikClnische Beselzung Deutschlands (Munich: R. Oldenbourg
Verlag, 1996), 240
',','
?
83
Frederiksen, American Military OgCZ/pation a/Germany, 9.
Christoph Weisz, OMGUS-Hqndbyph. Die amerikanische Militarregierung in Deutschland, 1945
1949 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag; 199.4), II.
84
"Z;emke, U.S. Army in the Dccupali.qn a/Germany, 56.
PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION
�l
�I
I
I
I
,
,
Detachments from the
division acc~~p~nied Allied tactical troops as they 1
liberated Europe and bverran dnemy territory in 1944 and 1945. 82 G-5 personnel relied
'
on the tactiCal (i.e., cqmbat) tr~ops to help them make contact with the civilian'·.
I
populati'on".establish brder, and. set up the first rudimentary semblance of military
,
I '
,
government. 83 Consequently, ,they followed close behind the tactical troops and were'I
I
I,
,
never in one place fou very long. These G-5 detachments were often the first military
units to come into co~tact wit~ victims', assets arid, to assume responsibility for them. 'I
b-5
I
'
.
,
Chaos on the ground h~d its parallel in apparent confusion and overlapping
responsibilities
withi~ the military structure.
The United States Group Control Council
,
,
!
(Germany) (USGCC)iwas esta~lished as a u.s. organization on August 9, 1944, with ~'
,
' I'
,
mission almost identi9al to that of the G-5 Division-to make plans for military
~,
I
, government in GermJny with
'
,
:
III the associated responsibilities that the'mission entaileh.
,"
I
ll'
I
The USGCC, although a comp~etely American element, was subordinate to SHAEF u~til
: :
I
,I
I
"
,
'
.
t
the combined commahd termi~ated in mid-July 1945. 84 Originally it included only thr~e
divisions, responsible: for
'
Ge~an disarmament and' de~ilitariz~tion, the repatriation o~
:
I
I
'
:
,
,
.
,
I" '
,
Allied prisoners ofw~r, inte1li~ence collection, gatHering,
.
i
economic matters;
i
and political matters. In Nove~ber 1944 USGC~ was reorganized into twelve
'.
!
'!
..'
divisio~~
.
:
including a: division f9r Reparrltions, Ddiveri~s, and Restitution (see Chapter 5,
l
L'
'
,
. Restitution). The Mo~umentsJ Fine Arts, and Archiv~s
,
I
i
I.
Subcommi~sion IS THIS
,'
CORRECT? ISN'T ~T ADMINISTRATION? (MFA&A), formerly a part ofG-5,
_ _ _ _ --~-·--I--·-:-- '
SHAEF, became a brlnch of
..
.
~
I'
,
"
I
t~iS new division under USGC~he mission of MFA&A
1
I '
'
I
as it developed was,~here po~sible, to prevent damage to or destruction of monuments,
,
.
•
~!
buildIngs; statues, an1 artwork~ while warfare still raged in western Europe; to
,
identif~,
I
i
I
--------~------~----i
I
,I
, 82 Klaus-Dietmar He'nke,Die aJ~erikanische Besetzung Deutschlands (Munich: R. Oldenbourg
Verlag, 1996), 240'
:.;
,
,
83 Frederiksen, Ame~ican MilitJ,y Occupation ofGermany, 9, '
I
I
,
:
Christoph Weisz,' OMGUS-Handbuch. Die amerikanische Militarregierung in Deutschland, 1945
, 1949 (Munich: R. Oldenbburg Verla~, 1994), II.
'
'
"
84
~.
"Ziemke, U.S. A,mr in Ihe OerPaliOn ofGe,mony, 56.
�inventory, and safeguard :cultural
~rtifacts and property coming under United States Army:
I
,
control; and to restitute s~ch item~I in the immediate postwar era (S€l€l CR<lflt€lF 4, Ass€lts ia .
,
<
EHF@fl€l).Thusone class ~f assets-:art and cultural p~operty-Ihad a subsection within
the structure of military commandldevoted exclusively to it. Nothing ~ comparable
,
'
existed for gold or other financial assets.
I
I
As victory over Nazi Gemiany neared, the U.S. Army began to separate itself
from its British counterpart by eXRanding its own responsibilities. On July 1, 1945, the
military established an independerit American command, U.S. Forces, European Theater
(USFET), and soon after SHAEF was dissolved. 86 Eisenhower headed USFET,
headquartered in Frankfurt, until November 11, 1945. General Joseph T. McNarney took'
command on November 26, 1945. Lieutenant General Lucius D. Clay also loomed large
over this period and would play aI1 even greater role later. ClflY had been Deputy
Military Governor, SHAEF, sinceiMarch 1945; he held that position as well as Deputy
Commanding General in USFET. •
.
The commanding general ofUSFET also served as the United States
I
representative to the Allied Control Council (ACC). Although devised at the Yalta
Conference in February 1945 and formed on June 5, the Council did not officially meet
I
until July 30, 1945. The Allied C<?ntrol Council, composed of the commanders in chief
of the Allied armed forces, was a quadripartite commission, after an agreement at Yalta
granted representation to France. Heing granted representation by agreement at Yalta.
The commanders of the four occu~ying armies acted for Germany as a whole, but each
commander exercised complete aJthority within his own occupation zone. The ACC was·
I
,
intended to exercise supreme auth?rity in Germany and had two missions: to'administer
Germany as a single economic uni:t and to establish a subsistence level for German
industrial production, with war reParations taken only from production that exceeded that..
I
,
level. Due to serious unresolved qisagreements over economic policy and the issue of
reparations, however, the Allied C;ontrol Council resembled a: negotiating rather than a
governing body.87 AlthoVgh it cottld enact legislation, it was unable to enforce its
decisions in each separate zone. Governing a prostrate Germany would have been
challenge enough for a single conquering power; coordinating four different approaches '
created myriad possibilities for coinplications and misunderstimding. The four-power
I
.
government of Germany never worked. Each zonal commander became the sole
authority in his zone.
'
Organizations designed to defeat the enemy, like an army, may not be well
prepared or even well disposed to ~eal with civilian economi<;: and political issues.
President Roosevelt reflected this attitude attribute by his espousal of a typically
86 Oliver 1. Frederiksen, The AmeriCian Military Occupation o/Gemiany 1945-1953 (Darmstadt, Ger.:
Historical Div., HQ, U.S. Army, Europe,11953), 23.
87 Earl F. Ziemke, The Us. Army in the Occupation o/Germany, 1944-1946 (Washington, D.C.,
Center of Mil. History, 1975), 344.
�I
American belief that civiJian auth9rities were'better governor~ and should relieve military,
forces of their political control of conquered territories as soon as conditions permitted. 88
President Truman later supported the same approach,@piRi@R.:89 For their part, War
'
Department officials andthe genetals commanding the troops in the field also disliked
the idea ofturning "soldiers into gbvernors."90 Secretary of War Henry Stimson and
Assistant Secretary John J. McCldy both envisioned a "short military occupation with
minimal political respon~ibilities.'j91 In 1943, Army Chief ofStaff General George C.
Marshall instructed the command~r of the Civil Affairs Division, the agency within the
War Department charged with c06rdinating policy for liberated and occupied territories,
to focus on a way to get out of plahning for the occupation, emphasizing that "we have
never regarded it as part of the prdper duty of the military to govern."n
,
These attitudes found their; advocate in OMGUS commander General Lucius
Clay, who, within weeks of the vi¢tory over Germany, began:cutting his ewH-staff and
I
:
hiring civilians to replace military!personnel to administer German affairs. He also
,
,
announced his intention ~o have e1:ections take place in Germany by 1946, clearly
,
:
,
indicating a desire to turn political~ life over to Germans
agai~.93
i
The absence of an alternative for the army's management of the occupation, the
I
I
tendency towards civilianization o'fthe occupation bureaucracy, and overlapping
responsibilities between USGCC and the G-5 Division of SHAEF led to a power struggle
in the months following the surrerider of Germany. This rumiing conflict was not over
,
the content or direction of policy, but rather over which organization would formulate
and which would implement policy. When Lieutenant General Lucius D. Clay succeeded
I
to the command ofUSGCC in April 1945, he began to transform the group from a
planning agency into a P9licy-determining agency. In his capacity as deputy military
I
,
•
88 Ziemke, Us. Army in the Occupation o/Germany, 13.
I
89 Ziemke, "Improvising Stability aIld Change in Postwar Germany," 59.
I
90 Harry L. Coles & Albert K. Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors (Washington,
D.C.: Office of the ChiefofMil. History! Dept. of the Army, 1964).
, 91 Boehling, Question 0/ Priorities,
!18.
91
Cited in Peterson, American Occilpation o/Germany, 33.
I
,
:
�governor for Germany, Clay soon:exerted authority and supe~vision over G-5 staff as
well as over USGCc. 94 He was eager to civilianize the apparatus of military government
as quickly as possible and turn it dver to the Department of State. Clay even
.;1
characterized the civilianization pllocess as his Imission." 95
?~~
i
'7
On :sePtemb~r 29, 1945, the Army rede~ignated~SGCC~S Office
':
,
mergillg their staffs.
I
I
I
I
,
of Military Government (U.S.) (OMGUS). At the same time;G-5, still part of the USFET.
!
I
,
general staff, became
!
Of~ce
I
of Mpitary Government for
I
'
'I
I
I
I
Ger~any,
U.S. Zone
,
'
;
I
(OMGUSZ). MFA&A b:ecame a ~ection of the OMGUS Economics Division,
Restitution Branch.
97
This restrucluring removed the dual system of military government,
I
,
replaced it with an increasingly ce'ntralized operation, and allowed Clay progressively to
,
,
'
"
remove most of the military persopnel from the military government. 98 All of these
shifting alignments complicated the 'conduct of military gove~nment, and thus the
, I
I
handling of victims' assets in the early months of the occupation of Germany.
OMGUS and its three subqrdinate branches at the governmental level of the
German states (Laender) served a$ a de facto government for Germany in the American
,
I
93
94.
John Gimbel, "Governing the An1erican Zone of Germany," in W9lfe, Americans as Proconsuls,
94
Ziemke,
u.s. Army in 'the dccuplion o/Germany, 223-24.
Us. Army in~the OccupJllion o/Germany, 40l.
96 Ziemke, Us. A~my in the Occuphtion ofGerinany, 40 l.
9S
Ziemke,
,
'
I
Artistic and Historic N!onumentslin War Areas, 123-124.
,
98 Ziemke, Us. ArmYin:the OccuP1tion o/Germany, 401-402, 432.' OMGUSZand OMGUS merged'
on April 1, 1946.
,
:
97
I
�I
,
Zone. Rather than inventing a different system for
.,1
•
governi~g' Germany, OMGUS largely:
I
copied the structure of pr:ewar Geiman civil government. Under Clay's direction,
I
OMGUS progressively withdrew from the responsibility for day-to-day operations of
:
!.
!
:
government. Starting at the local ~evel and working its way tip, OMGUS replaced the
positions filled by American soldi~rs and civilians with parallel positions filled by
Germans. Clay allowed ihe
Germ~s to hold elections and operate courts, again starting
at the local level. Although OMGUS retained ultimate authority to intervene, it began to
,
,
playa much more passiv~ role. F~'om J 946 onwards, OMGUS existed to advise and
I
"
I
:
observe the new German civil go~ernment.99 This return of responsibilities progressively:
to the Germans also bore on the disposition of victims' assets.
I
I
Despite Roosevelt's wishe~, the State Department itself was not willing to take
responsibility for the occupation. despite R~oseyelt's wishes, 'nor was it prepared to do so.'
I
' I
Top Yoreignjervice
'
"
offi~ials Thej~tate Department wanted t~ see Germany the Gountry
,
rehabilitated as an "economically
~trong
!
'
bastion of anti-Communism capitalism,'lloo
,
,
suggesting that the department caied primarily about countering the Soviet threat foreign
!
I
'
~ rather than ~ what wodld happen inside Germany.: 's internal affairs.
Moreoyer, State the department also felt it lacked the necessary "operational experience"
' ;
,
to press its position in Germany.IO;1
,
I
However, on September 21, 1949, the Office of the US. High Commission for
Germany (HICOG), a St~te Depa~ment organi~ation, replac~d OMGUS. HICOG's
,
99 Edward N. Peterson, The American Occupation o/Germany: Retreat to Victory (Detroit: Wayne
State Univ. Press, 1977),93. :
,
100 Boehling, Question 0/ Priorities', 19;
101 Gimbel, "Governing the Americian Zone of Germany," 95.
�creation signified the long awaiteq shift of responsibility from the military to a civilian
agency.IOZ Although HICOG
serv~d
nonetheless because its High
Co~missioner
,
I
largely as an advisory office, it was significant
'
represented the position of the .United States
,
and could exercise both 9fficial a~dunofficial influence. Th~ first High Commissioner,
I
I
I
John J. McCloy, played an importknt role in the restitution of assets confiscated during
,
,
the Nazi era. He
e~couraged
I
the qJerman government under Konrad Adenauer to provide
restitution of its own accord and to assist its desperate Jewish community and the Jewish
Restitution Successor Organization (JRSO).103 In his opinion, such gestures were
necessary to bring about , I and "moral, integration" of Germany into postwar
:the political
:
,
i
Europe. l04 Such integrati,on appea:red even more likely in May 1955 when the western
I
Allies restored sovereignty to the Federal Republic.
b)
Ausiria
In Austria the command st:ructure for U.S. forces was'less clear than in Germany.
~
British and U.S. planners initially expected Austria to fall under the Mediterranean
Theater of Operations when it wa~ incorrectly assumed that forces there would reach
Austria before any other ,Allied fighting units and therefore be in the best position to
establish a flHlctional military go~er'nment. Events overtook this plan. arrangement. On '
April 13 Soviet forces took Vielma from the east, while U.S. forces from Germany, under:
the European Theater of Operatio~ls, penetrated Austria from the north and west. Control:
of the U.S. areas in Austria thus p~ssed from the Mediterranean to the European Theater
of Operations, with military government personnel from Italy' joining the staffs of the
I
occupying units from northern Europe. 105
,
For matters concerning mi,litary government and political issues the commander
of U.S. Forces Austria (USF A), General Mark W. Clark, operated directly under the
lV'
®
.
IIIZ Frederiksen, Americ~n Military 'pccupation ofGermany, 149, 198; Boehling, Question of
Priorities,46.
: '
103 Thomas Alan Schwartz, Americh,s Germany: John 1. McCloy and the Federal Republic of
Germany (Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard U:niv. Press, 1991), 177-180.
104 Schwartz, America's Germany: J!ohn 1. McCloy, 176.
,
105 The First Year ofthe Occupation, Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-1946, Vol. 1
(Frankfurt: Office of the Chie'fHistorianEUCOM, 1947),85-87 [122876-880].
�authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington,106 as did his USFET counterpart in
Germany. USFA established he~dqu.arters in Salzburg on August 10,1945, and
depended upon USFET headquarter~ in Frankfurt for supply and administration. The
United States Allied Council for Austria (USACA) played a role similar to the United
States Group Control Council (USGCC) in Germany.
Austria ~r€ls€lfltil(iI art art.,nnaly for the four powers. The country had fought '
the war as a part of the German Reich, and, at war's end, like Germany, Austria was
occupied and divided into four z;ones: On the other hand, by the Allied fiat of ffi the
Moscow Declaration of 1943, A.ustria was the first victim of Nazi aggression. 107 That
meant that Austria was'not a defeat~c.l enemy state. Yet ~ neither was it a liberated state.
Nevertheless, unlike in Germany the four powers in Austria quickly turned political and
economic authority over to the Austrians, who formed an indigenous central government
in Vienna. All four powers retained a military presence bo~h in Vienn::l-u1h,...11" ".!~1.'
the Soviet Zone and divided like Berlin-and in their fOUl
government ended when the occupyi~g powers recognize(
ational government in June 1946. Still, although the peac ,
occupation (with neutrality as a condition was not signed ~
2.
.---
Q¥i.l' ' under the Rubble.
----'
World War II resulted
in callsed unprecedented destruction and caused worldwide
an estimated 60 millioI;1 deaths, milit<rry and civilian, including six million murdered
because they were Je#. In additiQll, Ihe fighting displaced millions of people, and the
postwar settlements displaced ~illiops more. 'fIlere
displac~d
by the poshvar
settlement. H.S With the infrastructU]7e that sustained civilian life paralyzed or destroyed in
much of Europe, the U.S. Army
,
fa<;~Q.
a task tJ:lei:e that called for skills dramatically
,
different from those would tan ~he skill and energy that it had applied to winning the w~r.
Across the continent the land
I
aterial destruction stretched all
'
across the continent. During the la~t months of the war, retreating Germans devastated
northern France and Belgium, firoll'):Jhe coast
of}.~ofHiandy
to the GefHil:m border, and the
106 The First Year ofthe Occupa,tion, Qccupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-1946, Vol. I
.
(Frankfurt: Office of the C/liefHistorjan EUCOM, 1947),87 [122880].
Ill7 Kurt Tweraser, "Von der MiI'itardil):tatur 1945 zur milden Bevormundung des 'Bargaining-Systems'
der filnfziger Jahre" in Alfred Ableitihger,Siegfried Beer, Eduard Staudinger, eds., Osterreich unter
'
alliierter Besatzung 1945-/955 (Vienna: J?qhlau Verlag, 1998),302.
'PH()TOCOPY
PRESERVATION
��authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington,l°6 as did his USFET counterpart in
Germany. USFA estab:lished he~dquarters in Salzburg on August 10,1945, and
depended upon USFET headquarters in Frankfurt for supply and administration. The
United States Allied Council for: Austria (USACA) played a role similar to the United
States Group Control Council (USGCC) in Germany.
Austria was }3rfi!sfi!llh~El an anomaly for the four powers. The country had fought
the war as a part of the ,German Reich, and, at war's end, like Germany, Austria was
occupied and divided into four tones. On the other hand, by the Allied fiat of ffi the
Moscow Declaration of 1943, Austria was the first victim of Nazi aggression. lo7 That
meant that Austria was not a defeated enemy state. Yet em neither was it a liberated state.
, Nevertheless, unlike in: Germany the four powers in Austri q quickly turned political and:
economic authority over to the Austrians, who formed an iqdigenous central government
in Vienna. All four powers retained a military presence both in Vienna-wholly within
the Soviet Zone and diyided lik~ Berlin-and in their four zones, but Allied military
government ended when the occupying powers recognized ,an autonomous Austrian
tional government in June 1946. Still, although the peace' treaty that ended the
occupation (with neutr~lity as aco~itionwas not signed,~gtil ~d in May 1955.
2.
bMI D'
imdertheRu~
.
World War II resulted in caused unprecedented destruction and caused worldwide
an estimated 60 millio~ deaths, military and civilian, inchiqing six million murdered
because they were Je#. In a1dition, Ihe fighting
,
displa~edmillions of people, and t~e
I
,
postwar settlements displaced millions more. '""ere displaced by the postwar
settlement. IOS With the: infrastru'cture that sustained civilian life paralyzed or destroyed i:n
much of Europe, the U.S. Army faced a task there that called for skills dramatically
I
,
.
different from those would t8]( the skill and energy that it had applied to winning the war.
.
"
! '
Across the continent the land
I
.
aterial destruction stretched all
across the continent. puring th~ last months of the war, retreating Germans devastated,
,
,
northern France and Belgium, from the coast of Normandy to the German border, and the
\06 The First Year ofthe Occupation, Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-1946, Vol. 1
(Frankfurt: Office of the Chief Historian EUCOM, 1947), 87 [122880].
\07 Kurt Tweraser, "V'on der Militardiktatur 1945 zur milden Bevormundung d~s 'Ba;gaining-Systems'
der flinfziger Jahre" in Alfred Ableitirlger, Siegfried Beer, Eduard Staudinger, eds., Osterreich unter
alliierter Besatzung 1945-1955 (Vien~a: Bohlau Verlag, 1998),302.
�dikes they broke caused' flooding Iin Broken dikes flooded major sections of the
~
I
Netherlands. Milan and: Turin, trrditional centers of econ0IItic strength ~ lay
prostrate. In central Europe, craters from bombs, a denuded countryside, barren
,
landscapes, piles of debtis,
crater~ from bombs,
and heaps
~f rubble and debris miHs haG:
replaced urban and agricultural c~nters. business and residential communities.109
! .
'
,
In May 1945, U.S. troopsiin the European theater numbered over three million. In
areas of Germany and Austria wHere the U.S. Army exercise.d authority, the population as
,
, ,
I
•
"
of July 1945 stood at about 22 million-19 million in Germany and nearly 3 million in
Austria. That amounts to more dian the population of Belgium, the 'Netherlands, and
LlHcembourg combined~: In Germ:any and Austria the U.S. Army was housing and
feeding two twe-million' of these people
;,..,... ~ tt
prisoners of war.., and U.~.
troop~.110
displaced persons and refugees, as well as
~ ~ ,w.-t,£-LNJ,
A large portion of civilian housing was
,
uninhabitabl~ Destr~Gtion duJing the war' had resulted in :the demoliti~
~~ @(i!mslisR(i!@ about 3.6 million resi~ential units in Gennany.
Although this figure
represented only 20 percent of the housing in Germany, the cities flooded by refugees
bore the brunt of destruction.
was~very unevenly distributed., In the U.S/one, e;f
occupation, 81 percent of alllodg~ng units were either destroyed or severely damaged.
Pressure on housing only il}creas~d when refugees arrived-92,000 in Frankfurt alone
,
,
I
108
Weinberg, World at Arms, 894-?5,
109 For this and subsequent paragraphs describing Europe in 1945 see Walter Laqueur, Europe since
Hitler: The Rebirth of Europe (New York: Penguin Books, 1982), 15-20,' See also Alfred Grosser,
Germany in Our Time: A Political HistoJ,y ofthe Postwar Years (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971),
35ff
'
110 Population figures for Germanyicome from Frederiksen, Americ~n Military Occupation of
Germany, 12,50, 119; for Austria from ','A History of the United States Allied Commission, Austria," no
date [ca, luI. 1945], para, 100, NACP, Rp 260, USACA, Files of the Director, Entry AlBIC, Box 45
[212935 of 2 1 2 8 5 6 - 9 5 7 ] . ,
:
�between May and August 1945. :Over the following ~ year Frankfurt also saw an
.
"
I :
additional thousand for~er
I
soldi~rs and air raid evacuees return each week. 111
The threat of fumine was :eal. FamiHe was a stark reality. The war
hae~
eroded the farm economy as machinery, fertilizers, and seed:I were destroyed and breeding,
, I
i
'
,
livestock killed. Production of fdod grain in France after G~rmany's surrender was less
than half what it had been before 'the war. Because food supplies throughout Europe
were generally smaller than they had ,been during the war itself, rationing was absolutely,
I
;
.
jone
necessary. The military: govemo/' of the U. S
,
Uirile. Slates 6eHe ef ess"I'atieH,
General Clay, remarked after his retirement that "for three years the problem of food was
to color every administrative acti~m" taken in Germany.112 I~ addition, Clothing and
:
i
,
!
I
shoes were as scarce as food; tools and domestic amenities unavailable. ',yere none~(isten.f
The weather eomplieated :the effeets of malnutrition and laek of heating fuel. The
winters of 1945-46 and 1946-4 7 ~ere among the harshest o~ record, and to heat their
i
,
I
homes Germans used anything th~t would burn. to heat their homes. People who
,
I
ventured outside at night risked fi·eezing to death., a factor that.affected the U.S. militarygoverfH.Rent's decisions on postiflg-gttards-at-seflSi.t.ive loeatiqns, including buildings
I
housing loered aSS€lts r€lcoverecL£rorn the~
if
~l
~I
Throughout much of Europe the transportation system had virtually ceased to
operate. In the, America? and
,
Bri~ish zones of Germany the ~ar had destroyed 740 out of
'
I
958 important bridges. !l.lthoughi much of the rail track remmned intact, 4,500 signals
III Rebecca Boehling, A, Question ?fPriorities: Democratic Reforni and Economic Recovery in
Postwar. Germany (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1996), 80-81, 90, 106.,
112
Lucius D. Clay, Decision in GeJ;many(Garden City, N.Y.: DouJleday & Co., Inc:, 1950),263.
:
,
�and 13,000 switches
we~e
inoper4ble. Debris clogged inland waterways and ports,
I
I ,
i
making them unusable.I~3 Roaclcpnditions were no better: 40 percent of Germany's
,
I
•
I
roadways were impassable. For the few citizens who had cars, gasoline was scarce, and
fuel for the few trucks available to transport food and firewo!Jd took precedence. 114
I
I
:
Consequently, It;was near,ly impossible to purchase legitimately such
,
commodities as fabric, soap, electric light bulbs, or window glass, and most shops
remained empty. In Germany about a third of the goods still; being produced at war's end.
found their way.onto the: black mfrket. Although trading on :the black market was a
court-martial offense, few soldierk could resist the temptation to barter with or ~ell their
army-issued cigarettes, the currency of the black market. A lieutenant who sold his entire
I
~ ~~~I~
~~~.
cigarette allowance could pocket $12,000 - .x:ootethan x:.XX times his ~y.-=iB
I
/'
,,_,.j;-:;;;
~:a10llt .f~Q,~OQ in 1999
simply avarice that compelled tIS' of the black market. Tradfng there
fu'" ....RII<" Ik••
not only
ecam, at times,
the only way to arry out milita y assignments. U. . Army engineers, resp
,
!
rebuilding the b sic infrastruct re of civil service such as water, po er, a d
I
I
I''
sible for
:
.
transportation, aced sev~re ritri~tions on what
.
States. As a r snit, theyacqu~ed what they nee \ ed where they conlo, so
resorting to bartering with cigare~es. 116
----
--!~----------:---,------------.:.--:-----~
113 Wolfgang Benz, Die:Geschichte. del' Bundesrepublik DeutschlanrJ (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer
.
Verlag, 1989) 2 : 2 5 1 . '
114
3: 150.
Dietrich Eichholtz, Geschichte iter deutschen Kriegswirtschaft (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1996),
.
I
.
liS A. 1. Ryder, Twentieth-Century permany From Bismarck to Br~ndt (New York: Columbia Univ. '
Press, 1973),467.
'
.
I
,
116 Response of Maj. Gen. Robert J~ Fleming to letter from Karl C. Dod, Oct. 18, 1973, Office of
History, HQ, U.S. Army Corps of Engin~ers, Research Collections, Mil. Files, XI, Box 3, File 3 [122866- '
875].
.
�General Clay, who acknowledged the dominating importance of food during the
I
.
"
occupation, remarked in retrospe~t that the United States "could not hope to develop
democracy on a starvation diet."I? To improve the material situation of the population of:
. ,
,
the U.S. Zone, military commanders decided as early as the summer of 1945 to deploy
I
I
soldiers to distribute seed and fer#lizer. The 12th Army Group released 400,000 German
prisoners of war for emp)oyment ~n farm labor., In June 1945 Supreme Headquarters
r
Allied Expeditionary Forces ordered 650,000 tons of wheat for import into the American
Zone. IIS
Having won the war, the ~.S. Army ha€ke changed its changs ths focus ef#s
activitiss in May 1945. It had to !p.arshal personnel and equipment to revitalize national
1
I
:
civilian infrastructures iri both liberated and occupied countries. Accordingly, army units
shifted their mission fro~ combat: to control and governance.; to occupying and
'
"
administsring conqusrsd snsmy lAnd. The troops had to maintain law and order, disarm
and demilitarize a population ~ they feared might be belligerent, and organize the
,
,
U.S. military governmen! in the d~feated states. All these corcerns competed with the
task of securing and organizing looted assets in preparation for their restitution.
Moreover, the Army hadito pull trpops out of Europe and redeploy them to the war
against Japan-still intense in May 1945---or return them home to the United ~tates for
demobilization. 119
117
Clay, Decision in Germany, 266,
lIS
Ziemke,
,
I
us. Army in the Occup~tion ofGermalJY, 274-75.
,
.
I
For an extensive discussion ofth:e army's shift from combat to demobilization and redeployment,
see Robert P. Grathwol & Donita M. Moorhus, "Building For Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe,
1945-1991," (Office of History, HQ, U.S~ Army Corps of Engineers, 1999), 16-33.
119
;
�The task of redeployment~demanded a prodigious effort in the first months after'
,
:
the war ended in Europe. It mea~t reducing troop strength in Europe by hundreds of
thousands, shipping me~ and mat¢rial to the Pacific, and "readjusting" the total combat
force to allow the soldiers with t~e longest service in combat and with dependent children
to return to the United States. Th:e War Department's origin~l plan called for reducing
I
I
'
troops in the European theater frdm 3 million in May 1945 to about 400,000 in 18
I
months, a target figure
i
t~at
I
'
1
woulq drop even further. This meant shipping out more men,
i
:
,
!
each month than the ma~imum n~mber that had arrived in anyone month during the war.'
The redeployment effo~had to b~ coordinated and accomplished even though the most
experienced personnel were simuJtaneously leaving Europe. Most of the replacements
arriving in Europe were unskilled and poorly trained. 120
Redeployment of Ameriean military personnel hindered the effort to collect,
control, and distribute victims' assets and other valuables. For example, in the summer o£
:
I
,
I
!
1945 the Foreign Exchange Depo;sitory-established that April in Frankfurt as the
1
custodian of some of the: assets, ekpecially gold and financial assets, impounded by Allied
,
I "
,
,
military forces-lost much of its personnel to redeployment.: The diminished and
underqualified staff could do littl~ more than store incoming :items, thereby neglecting
inventory, assessment, and delivery aetivities. The facility failed an army inspection in
November 1945, reduced operations to a minimum for lack of personnel, and did not
resume normal operations until April 1946. 121
120 Grathwol & Moorhus, "Building For Peace," 17; Ziemke, U.S Army in the Occupation of
Germany, 320, 328-29, 334-36, 422-24.1
,
121 "Foreign Exchange Depository,jHistory from V-E. Day, 8 May 1945 to 30 June 1946," no date,
NACP, RG 260, FED Central Files, Box 394, File 900. \0 [3 10 197-203];;Col. William R. Watson, Chief
i
:
�A more immediate, problem:' f.or the military was providing the basic necessities- '
food, lodging, clothing-to the population over which it the United gtates Army·
!
I·
exercised total sovereign control. M;;:tterial conditions improved only slowly. Coping
with these conditions rem~ned the, primary focus of attention for the military government '
for many months.
e
3.
Copint: with ,MllHllgiHg Refugees and Displaced Persons
r',
According to Supreme
H"';~~uarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), tl,e
term "refugee" designated civiliank!emporarily homeless within their national borders
as now the word "u rooted" covered both cate ori
with "/hich the u.g. Army had to :cppe.
6Hl1~~
uprooted included not only those
who had been imprison~d in campsa.,nd worked as slave lab~rers for the forced laborers
working in the Reich and Gennru}. il.1dustries, but also liberated prisoners of war (POWs),
PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION
�I.
�A more immediate problem for the military was providing the basic necessities-. :
I
food, lodging, clothirig-to the population over which i! the Uhited ~tates Army
I
I
exercised total sovereign «ontrol. Material 'conditions improv{(d only
'
I
slo~ly.
Coping
,
with these conditions remained the 'primary focus of attention for the military government
for many moriths.
I'
'
,
3.
@-
Coping withiMaaagiag Refugees. and Displaced Persons
According to SUllreme Head,9uarters. Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). the
term "refugee" designated civilians temporarily homeless' within their national borders
DPs for sh'ort civilians outside their native countries. But then
as now the word "u rooted" coveretl both cate ori
~
~.
"
,
.1
'
--"'"'
=~i=ditionffi
~~~-+n~
leaked
(
tip". 14Ie mRSses "flbe IIp,oo,ted in Geunatty
7,
AH,lfia ..
~
~iallhteal to post'¥lll'-SIal>ility as """'goat W..i, • ~'
.
. (\)<Th·t~di~I~6RS~=~
~,y.[~ lA.S.~,,,.~~
~~
*'f'D$e.d
war's en
...
{as one of the moslsigmfi'sant element!'F€o:Rtn\ju~ing~the posiN/at dlslosatlOn
~.
,
with whish the U.~. Army had to sope. The ~ uprooted:included not only those
I
'
who had been imprisoned in camps apd worked as slave laborers for the forced laBorers
working in the Reich and G~rman ir:4ustries, but also liberated prisoners of war (POWs),
�I
I
evacuees, members of the NazilParty, and many others. 123 Ethnic Germans expelled from
i !
'
eastern Europe and the Baltic r~gion and those fleeing from the Soviet area of occupation
,
I
into the western zones soon adqed to this mix of victims, non-victims, and perpetrators.
Nazi statistics indicatedla total of about 7.5 million' foreign workers and POWs in
,
, I
,
the Reich as of October 1944.124 According to General Clay, Allied armies advancing in
I
'
Germany found almost 6.5 mill~on displaced persons, the vast majority brought into
Germany for fqrced labor. 125 Efup'loying a kind of "hurry-up humanitarianism,"126 the
,
,
U.S. military government repat~iated more than four million of these DPs and refugees by
,
'
the end of July 1945, including at least one million Russians and more than 500,000
,.
I
_
~~!!ffi~~:e
French. 127
--"------
,/
of the population on the move in
Germany in May 1945' at 40 pe~cent; by August approximately p~m~s 25,000 to 30,000
people fleeing eastern Eurppe r~ached Berlil). daily, and by;the end of the year, nearly
one-third of the residents ofBa~aria, Lower Saxony, and Schleswig-Holstein were
refugees or displaced persons. ns: As man); as 11 to 13 million people fled from eastern
.
,1
~o(' LDe.n\'u I iy'=' +\.c...e... t\..rr.... oL-- W. "to-c.~
Europe for ethnic and political reasons. By British estimat~s there wore already-mere
~~.-.; """,J< """",,-Ie.
i'
, )
A.l1ot6;.·
'
than seven million refugees and\displaced persons i.H the:thi:ee:wesrer-H=wt:ms 1 percent
16
:
r
123 According to definitions creat~d by the Displa~ed Persons Branch of the Supreme
I
HEADQUARTERS, Allied Expeditioryary Force (SHAEF), in May 1944, the term, "refugee" designated
civilians temporarily homeless within their own national boundaries, while,"displaced persons" were
civilians who found themseives outside their native countries because cifwartime conditions. See Malcolm
1. Proudfoot, European Refugees: 193R-52 (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1956), 115.
124 Rolf Wagenftihr, Die deutsche Industrie im Kriege 1939-1945 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot,
1954), 139; Eichholtz, Geschichte der 1eutschen KriegswirtschaJt, 3:243 ..
125 Clay, Decision in Germany, 231.
126 Carl Friedrich et al.~ American: Experiences in Military Govern~ent in World War 11 (New York:' r
Rinehard & Co., 1948), 180.
•
127
Harold Zink, Ameri~an Milita)y Government in Germany (New York: Macmillan, 1947), 107.
,
I
128 Horst P6tzsch, Deutsche Gesc'!ichte nach 1945 im Spiegel der Karikatur (Munich: Olzog,.l997),·
22.
�;
1~:
1ift~
,
~#,
If,i
I
'
"
'
ofthdpopulation) by October i94~ the 1950 census ;odicated that-in the newly created
1-',
:~ ~C!.g~~
"
WoI'kA
I
Federal Republic of Germany at( that tiRli, 9.6 million people (around 20 percent,khad
,
I
arrived during or after the war,129 many of them political refugees from eastern Europe.
During the last months o~ the war and the first months of peace, initial and
,
,
primary responsibility for the ugrooted dl:lriHg the last mOHths ofthe 'NaF aHd the first
mOHths ofpeaee, Jell t~ the AlliFd military forces. In Dece~ber 1944 Supreme
Headquarters, Allied Expedition~y Force (SHAEF) directed military commanders to
locate, care for, and control non-'enemy displaced persons, to move the DPs away from
combat areas, to segreg~tethem from enemy or ex-enemy persons, and to provide
adequate humanitarian assistanc~. Furthermore, responsibility for registering all DPs an1
I
'
for their protection from commullicable diseases or bodily violence fell to the military
,
commanders. SHAEF also expected the commanders to cooperate with repatriation
,
!
I
officials for the speedy return of PPs to their country of origin. 130
,
'
Despite the chaotic situation in recently occupied Germany and Austria, Allied
,
forces managed rapid and generapy well-organized implementation of this policy.
Thousands of civilians, speaking ,a variety of languages, required urgent care in bombed-
I
I
,
out villages and cities. They were quickly encamped in former army posts, suburban
:
! '
dwellings, castles, and even form~r Nazi concentration camps. Soldiers supplied food
and clothing, repaired buildings, r:estored water and electricity, constructed latrines,
,
provided medical servic~, and so forth. I3\
,
,
Robert Moeller, ed., West Germpny under Construction (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan, 1997), 54,
130 Proudfoot, European Refugees, :147-48,
'
131 Proudfoot, European Refugees, 17 L
129
�Although the A:llied mintary forces exercised primary responsibility for the DP
:.~-
camps, a civilian entity known as
t~ite~.
tions
R~~d Rehabilitation
Administration (UNRRA) aided effQrts from 943 to 1947. Forty-four nations, including
the United States, Great Britain, ang the Sovie Union, fourided UNRRA in 1943 to
provide care for "victims ofwar:ina,ny area un r the cont\ol of any of the United
:
'
'
Nations [the Allies] through the iprqyision of foo
necessities, medical and other essential services. "13 • By
UNRRA teams aided Allied forces to administer the V,
!
,".
Organization, founded;n 1945, ~st~blished the InternaLJl!:'
t
L';J.ilgt.:e
Urganization (IRQ),
initially as a preparatory commissiml, (PCIRO). The IRO rep ced UNRRA in July 1947,
,
assumed all of its personnel andeqllipment, and inherited total res onsibility for over
~_r-----------
)
-----
The IR0 al
--~- --"~-~---:---.-"'----""--'---'---~~
<
•
7 00, 000 persons displaced by the wax and its aftermath.
:
I
134
Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR), a nonmilitary agency
1938 had assisted in the resettlemeI1t. of stateless persons and DPS. 135 During its lve-year
existence, the IRO
wor~ed prim:;rri~y
i
,.'
to repatriate and resettle displaced persons an
,
I3l From Article [ofthe UNRRA cO/1~titution, cited in George Woodbridge, UNRRA: The History of
the United Nations Reliefand Rehabili~aii9.n Agency (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1950),4. The
• \., ~
term "United Nations" used repeatedly :in tl')js report and in wartime documents refers to the 26 nations
"TX\ <~
(including the United States; Great BritPin', the Soviet Union, China, and most Latin American countries) ~
that pledged in the "Declaration of the ~nited Nations," published on January 1, 1942, to fight "to defend
life, liberty, independence, and religiou's fr~~dom and to preserve human rights and justice in their own
lands as well as in other lands, and that'th~y are now engaged in a common struggle against savage and
brutal forces seeking to subjugate the wodd," These "United Nations" are to be distinguished from the
United Nations Organization founded in San. Francisco in 1945. See Carroll Quigley, The World Since
1939: A History (New York: Macmillan Co" 1968),95-96.
133 The military set up camps and brought in supplies, while the UNRRA provided administrators with
various specialties. See Mar.k Wyman,~DP:v.: Europe's Displaced Persons, 1945-1951 (Ithaca: Cornell
' .
Univ. Press, 1989),46.!
134
Proudfoot, European Refugees: 407,
135
Frederiksen, American MilitarJ, Qq:;upation ofGermclnY, 78-79.
PHOtOCOPY
PRESERVATION
�I
�Although the Allied military forces exercised primary responsibility for the DP
I
'
~'-'
,
camps, a civilian entity! known a~ tEite~~ tions
~eli~d Rehabilitation
Administration (UNRlM.) aided efforts from 943 to 1947. Forty-four nations, including
,
the United States, Great Britain, ,and the Sovie Union, founded UNRRA in 1943 to
provide care for "victims of war lin any area un r the control of any of the United
I.
"
Nations [the Allieslthrbugh the ~rovision offoo
,
,
,
'
fuel, clothing, shelter and other basic
necessities, medical and other essential services." 13 By the ,end of June 1945,322
UNRRA teams aided Allied fOf(~es to administer the D
Organization, founded
CamPS.133
The United Nations
~n 1945, ~stablished the Internation ~ Refugee Organizati6rt (IRO),
,
initially as a preparatory commission (PCIRO). The IRO rep ced UNRRA in July 1947,
I
r
assumed all of its personnel and ,equipment, and inherited total res onsibility for over
--------~---
r--+-------------~.-
700,000 persons displaced by th9 war and its afiermath.IJ4 The IRO al
:
,
Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR), a nonmilitary agency
J
1938 had assisted in the resettlement of stateless persons and DPs. 13s During its lve-year
existence, the IRO
wor~ed
primarily to repatriate and resettle displaced persons an
I'
!
132 From Article I ofth~ UNRRA constitution, cited in George W~odbridge, UNRRA: The History oj
,
,
the United Nations ReliefandRehabilitationAgency~ew York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1950),4. The ~ \.:r~
term "United Nations" used 'repeatedly ,in this report and in wartime documents refers to the 26 nations
\~
(including the United States!; Great Bri~ain, the Soviet Union, China, ~dmost Latin American countries) ~
that pledged in the "Declaration ofthe United Nations," published on January I, 1942, to fight "to defend
life, liberty, ind,ependence, and religio~s freedom and to preserve human rights and justice in their own
lands as well as in other lands, and that they are now engaged in a common struggle against savage and
brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world." These "United Nations" are to be distinguished from the
United Nations Organization founded in San Francisco in 1945. See Carroll Quigley, The World Since
1939: A History ~ew York: Macmillan Co" 1968),95-96.
133 The military set up camps and;brought in supplies, while the U~RRA provided administrators with
various specialties. See Mark Wyman,DPs: Europe's Displaced Persors, 1945-1951 (Ithaca: Cornell
Univ, Press, 1989), 46.
j
I
134 Proudfoot, Europe~n Refugee}, 407.
135 Frederiksen, American Military Occupation ofGermany, 78-79,
�10/3/00 Draft, Chapter II
languages, required urgent care in bpmbed-out villages and cities. They were quickly encamped
in former army posts, suburban dwellings, castles, and even former Nazi concentration camps.
,
.
.
Soldiers supplied food and clothing~ repaired buildings, restored water and electricity,
constructed latrines, provided mediyal service, and so forth. Ito
.
Although the Allied military forces exercised primary responsibility for the DP camps, a
civilian entity known as the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA)
,
aided efforts from 1943 to, 1947.
i
,
~ predat~the creation of the United. Nations
.
\...
~i"
Organization which was establishe~in 1945~r natio~s, including the United States,
Great Britain, and the Soviet
Unio~, founded~o care for "victims of war in any
area under the control of ~ny of theiUnited Nations [the Allies] through the provision of food,
fuel, clothing,' shelter and bther basic necessities, medical and ~theressential services."117 By the
i
.a....\
s~e~~
'
end of June 1945,322 UNRRA teahIs aided Allied forces to administer the DP camps. liS the
.
United Nations Organization established the International Refugee Organization (IRO, preceded
!
;
.
by an initial preparatory commission, the PCIRO) to replace UNRRA. In July 1947 the IRO
"
,
,
assumed all ofUNRRA's.personn~l and equipment, and inherited total responsibility for over
Proudfoot, European f,efugees, 1;47-48.
Proudfoot, European Refugees, 171.
Il7 From Article I of the UNRRA copstitution, cited in George Woodbridge, UNRRA: The History ofthe
United Nations Reliefand Rehabilitation !4gency (New York: Columbia Uniy: Press, 1950),4. The term "United
Nations" used repeatedly in this report anf! in wartime documents refers to the 26 nations (including the Uni~ed
States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, Cpina, and most Latin American countries) that pledged in the "Declaration
of the United Nations," published on January 1, 1942, to fight "to defend life, liberty, independence, and religious
freedom and to preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands, and that they are now
engaged in a common struggle against savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world." These "United
Nations" are to be distinguish~d from the!United Nations Organization founded in San Francisco in 1945. See
Carroll Quigley, The World Since 1939: A History (New York: Macmillan Co., 1968),95-96.
liS The military set up camps and brought in supplies, while the UNRRA provided administrators with various
specialties. See Mark Wyman, DPs: Europe's. Displaced Persons, 1945-1951 (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1989),
,
46.
' .
liS
116
i
WOR.K.ING DRAFT - NOT FOR CIRCULATION
52
�refugees: 71,494 had been repa~riated, 865,230 resettled by 1951. 136 Although Europe's
DP camps still contained several hundred thousand people' by the early 1950s, the IRO
!
t
,
,
disbanded in 1952. 137 !
Of great additional significance to the daily lives of many DPs was the American
,
Jewish Joint Distribut~on Con$ittee (JDC), an organizati6n founded in 1914 that was
,
.
"the embodiment of whatever ~merican Jewry was willin~ to do for its fellow Jews
\
8
overseas," whose soci:;tl originsilay among emigre middle class German Jews. 13 From
i
,
/
_--...;.---.
1946 to 1950 the JDC pent $280 million ($2.143 billion in 1999 values) to help DPs.
,
Initially the JDC provided medical services and helped locate relatives, but eventually the
I
,
I
,
;
organization also supplied food, clothing, and other goods. The JDC also borrowed over
21,000 Jewish books from military authorities, who were storing them as looted victims'
assets, for distributioniby UNRRA in DP camps. Beyond all the material assistance that
.
,
the JDC provided, one' of its more important acts established, in March 1947, a Branch
for the Restitution of J,ewish Pr9perty that cooperated with: OMGUS on policies regarding
,
I
the disposition of victims'
I
•
asset~ in GermmGrhese sev~ral organizations-U1\TRRA,
136 Rene Ristelhueber, "The International Refugee Organization,", International Conciliation 470
(Apr. 1951): 222. Resettlement meanf relocation of DPs in areas other than their native land.
137 Ristelhueber, "lnt~rnational Refugee Organization," 436.
'
138
Yehuda Bauer, Out a/the As~es (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1989), 13.
,
Bauer, Out a/the Ashes, 120-24,203,213-214,256,273; Memo from Lester K. Born to Col. J.H. '
,
Allen, "Loan of Jewish Books from O:ffenbach Archival Depot," Feb. 27,1947, RG 260, Prop. Div., Box
722 [120262-268].
139
.... "'\. •
jI-~'
V¥
�For reasons of administratiy~ efficiency, the U.S. Army categorized a displaced
I
person according to based 8ft natio IlCility.'40 Effeoti¥ely This meant that the army often
grouped Jews with theili fellow natiQnals. Consequently, the army sometimes classified
I
the German Jewish refugees and th~ DPs from Germany's wartime allies-Austria,
Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, and RomCll1ia-as "enemy nationals/' thus depriving
the status
~~nited Naii()~.9 displaoed persons
displaced. 141 Jewish DPs, many of them former camp inmates, shared assembly centers .
with Baits, Poles, and o~her DPs he;;tlthier displaoed persons whose health had not been .
Gd~Y living in concentration camps and many of WhO~ were anti-Semitic or ae!I!aI
Nazi collaborators. '" h\ the U. S?ne, officials counted 36,000 Jewish D Ps in January .
1946, and by October tbe number ha4 climbed to 141,000. 14: As late as May 1948 more
than 124,000 Jews fourid refuge in the u.sfne.'«
The U.S. Military
GoVe111Il1,e~lt's
initial failure to acknowledge the unique
situation of Jewish surv;ivors me;mt that the lower echelons of military persollilel-that is,
those actually responsible for carin~ for the displaced population-were often unapprised
oftheir special needs and problems.. Anti-Semitism in the armed forces was sometimes·
I '
manifested in hostile attitudes arid mistreatment of Jewish DPs in and out of the camps.145
140 Leonard Dinnerstein, "The U.~. Army and the Jews: Policies Toward The Displaced Persons Aft~r
World War II," in Michael R. Marrus, ed.; The End o/the Holocaust, vol. 9 of The Nazi Holocaust:
Historical Articles on the D:'!struction t;'/ E~ropean Jews (London: Meckler, 1989), 513-515.
141
Dinnerstein, "U.S. Army and ~he J~ws," 513-515.; Abzug, Inside the Vicious Heart, 151.
141
Abzug, Inside the Vicious Heart, 151.
.
143 Angelika Konigseder & Julia'1e Wc:tzel, Lebensmut im Wartesaal. Die jiidischen DPs (Displaced
Persons) im Nachkriegsdeutschland (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1994),47.
144 Frederiksen, American Military Occupation o/Germany, 80.
145
Wyman, Abandonment o/theJews, 13-14.
PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATrdN
�1
�51)
,
For reasons of administrative efficiency, the U.S. Arrt;Iy categorized a displaced
person according to
@€lS@,Q QPl
nationality. 140 Effectively This meant that the army often
grouped Jews with their fellow na;tionals. Consequently, the army sometimes cla~sified
.
,
the German Jewish refugees and the DPs from Germany's wartime allies-Austria,
I
Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, and Romania-as "enemy nationals," thus depriving Jews of
the status ~U~i!eEl Nati.... EliSjll...Ell'ers.;',.
M~reover, Allied policy did not:
initially recognize religion as a baSIS to determine the level of care needed by those
displaced. 141 Jewish DPs, many of them former camp inmates, shared assembly centers
with BaIts, Poles, and other DPs healthier displaced perSOH:S 'whose health had not been
@ Y living in coJcentration camps and many of
Nazi collaborators: 42
who~ were anti-Semitic or aeI<!al,
In the u.sfne, official~ counted '36;000 jewish DPs in January
;
1946, and by October the number had climbed to 141,000. 143 As late as May 1948 more :
than 124,000 Jews [oun,d refuge in the u.sfne.'~
I
The U.S. Military Government's initial failure to acknowledge the unique
situation of Jewish survivors meant that the lower echelons of military personnel-that i~,
those actually responsible for caring for the displaced population-were often unapprised
of their special needs and problems. Anti-Semitism in the armed fon::es was sometimes:
I
manifested in hostile attitudes aIid mistreatment of Jewish DPs in and out of the camps.I~5
140 Leonard Dinnerste~n, "The U.S. Army and the Jews: Policies Toward The Displaced Persons After
World War II," in Michael R. Martus, ed., The End ofthe Holocaust, vol. 9 of The Nazi Holocaust:
Historical Articles on the pestruction ofEuropean Jews (London: Meckler, 1989),513-515.
141 Dinnerstein, "U.S. Army and the Jews," 513-515; Abzug, Inside the Vicious Heart, 151.
142
Abzug, Inside the Vicious Heart, 151.
143 Angelika Konigseder & Juliatie Wetzel, Lebensmut im Wartesaal. Die jildischen DPs (Displaceq
Persons) im Nachkriegsdeutschland (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1994),47.
144 Frederiksen, American Military Occupation ofGermany, 80. ,
I~
,
. Wyman, Abandonment ofthe Jews, 13-14.
;,
I,
�Reports of deplorable conditions, for Jews and other concentration camp survivors within
the DP camps led President Harry Truman to ask Earl G. Harrison, dean of the University
of Pennsylvania Law School and formerly the Commissioner on Immigration and
Naturalization under President R,oosevelt, to visit DP centers and to file a report. After
i
an intensive inspection ;of severa~ camps during the summer of 1945, Harrison informed:
I
the President in early
~ugust that, indeed, surviving Nazi persecutees continued to suffe~
i
under American supe-rvision. THese individuals remained
I
c~mfined
.
to areas surrounded
.
by barbed wire and armed guards, often in former concentration camps. In summary,
I
Harrison reported, "As matters now stand, we appear to be treating the Jews as the Nazis
treated them except that we do not exterminate them." 146 As a consequence of the
Harrison report, the U.S. military provided separate DP Camps and superior rations for
I
I
Jews, and the War Department appointed an advisor to the military governor on Jewish
I
affairs, a position that endured to the end of 1949. 147
.._"-..-.. ,.
Jewish repatriates also cqnfronted anti-Semitic attitudes and policies in their
I
native lands. In August and
Sep~ember
1945 The New York Times reported in August and
~8pt8mb8r 1945 that initial efforts undertaken by Jews to recover looted possessions from
local government offici,als in
Sl~vakia
and Austria, and
als~
in Germany, remained
fruitless. 148 Worse yet,:Jews sometimes found themselves subject to overt discrimination
I
1
,
146~f Earl G. Har~ison to pr~sident Harry Truman, Au~. 194~, reprinted in Leonard Dinnerstein;
Holo~aust,~ew York: ColumbIa UnlV. Press, 1982), 300-301; Bertram.
Hulen, "President Orders Eisenhower to End New Abuse of Jews," New York Times, Sept. 30, 1945,
reprinted in Robert Hilliard, Surviving the Americans: The Continued Struggle ofthe Jews After Liberatio'!
(New York: Seven Stories Press, 1997),214-216.
America and the Survivors ofthe
147 Ziemke, u.s. Army.in the Occupation ofGermany, 417; Frederiksen, American Military
Occupation ofGermany, 195, 198.
148 "Anti-SelTIitism Rife in Central Europe," New York Times, Sept. 9,1945; "Jews in U.S. Zone of
Reich Find Conditions Improving," New York Times, Aug. 26, 1945.
�,1
and physical assaults. On Decemb~r 10, 1945, the New York Times described how in
Poland "Jews are receiving thteaten~ng letters warning thi'
t--\A)PY
~"p)..s
W. ~i~
small-scale, individu~l incide~ts, th~re were also reports (,
in Poland. In Cracow "2,000 return~ng Jews were assault,'
I
'
$.te.\-;~~
1
,
.
c
-h :f. ~-1'
siege in the temporary quarters of th~ Jewish community \
I
Government's police looked on. "ISO Even with the end ofl
refugees, DPs, and repatriates contir;med to suffer from di5Cfl1ull1i:111Ul1"i:111U"VlUH;:m;<::";""~:·'-------'--'---';
. .
.
'
I
.
DISAGREEMENTS AMONG ALLIES.
The end of World War II was a time of
riation. Retreatin
I
German forces looted what they could carry with them and blew up much of what they)
I
could not. Invading el~emy territory, individual American soldiers engaged in what the~
~7
--
I
called "cherry-picking," "taking sO~lyenirs," and "liberation," despite orders from
l
Supreme Commander Dwight Eisenhower prohibiting such activities. At the same tirh'
. .~
#
y..~
and for many months io come, Soviet forces routinely looted on a grand scale privah,Y
,
,
~~.IY ~,
public property on the territories they conquered, carrying out state policy-.--.-.-- /' . A;/,-r' ,;. ~~ i
.
--_/~/~rJJ
Potsdam Agreement, which includ~~ ACC agreements, applied to all four occupation
149
"Poles are Accuse~ of Anti-S~rniti~rn," New York Times, Dec. 10, 1945.
ISO
"Pogroms in Pola~d Reported OcclJrring," New York Times, Jul. 21, 1945:
~
pHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATfON
�MAjPy'
fI"P),.$
I
·sJ. tft;~
.
, >u.t;s&f(,
(
+z:, f· ~-t>
�and physical assaults., On December 10, 1945, the New York Timf!s described how in
I
Poland "Jews are rec~iving threatening letters warning the'm to get OUt."149 In addition to
I
in~idents,
small-scale, individual
there were also r,eports of mass assaults on Polish Je\\;'s
I '
,
in Poland. In Cracow; "2,000 returning Jews were assaulted, 500 of them undergoing
siege in the
temporar~
quartersof the Jewish community there while the Provisional
Government's police lboked on."150 Even with the end of the Nazi regime, Jewish
refugees, DPs, and repatriates continued to suffer from discrimination and vio,lence.
I
DISAGREEMENTS AMONG ALLIES.
The end
,/
ofW~rld War II was a time of
1
German forces looted what they could carry with them and blew up much of what they
~.
could not. Invading
\
e~emy territory, individual American soldiers engaged in what thel
I
:
',
'
)
I
called "cherry-picking," "taking souvenirs," and "liberation," despite orders from
Supreme Commander Dwight Eisenhower prohibiting such activities. At the same tim,
I
public property on the
;
~erritories they conquered, carrying out state policv"
Allie differeti:ces on the sub' ect of rivate ro ert
urfaced earl
,
!
Soviet~
u..
Council of Ministe0voiced disa
~, ~ ~
and when
.'
~
tp
.
~¥\,AJ
e 'fundamental." The u.~. re resentative in the Allied
roval of the Soviet refusal to ive t
I
~
~f
came to the issue of reparations and restitutions, the Western Allies recognized that the
.sa reements with the
'
(';
V .
1>.
ACC uthorit :
Potsdam Agreement, which included ACC agreements, aPlilied to all four occupation
.
/
~~o...
.~
.
,
.,
149 "Poles are Accused'of Anti-Semitism," New York Times, Dec. 10, 1945.
) " :50 "~ogroms in Poland Report~d Occurring," Nr!;w York Times, Ju~. 21, 1945; Weinberg,
. 11111.1, 89),~
~
l-rY
,
World (',
:
~
I .
V'
')
1...
�zones. Moreover, the U.S. argued, the ACC could not carry out its responsibilities under
~'whiJh include the liquidation of war potential, reparations, the
the Potsdam Agreement level of industr
and ex arts Jd im
,
tv ·
-,~
,-/
zone is excluded from its
:~ observed the bo~~.~~~~_ b
'urisdiction." The British 60ncuF
~~Y.Dyt\
,t....l #
rts"
the
Of~
Military Government for GermJ.ny; while the French chose "t6 evade the question by
referring to the fuet that they di1
-) Potsdam."
,
ill
I
n~t
participate In [onnulating' the agreement reached at
j ,
'.
/ ~~;!. ~It
1946 atso note
. .
'
appears to h""".b••a
~1945
~Vi~t uni6n's admission that it had not i:m lemented the
I
er
reviousl
agreed-upon principles with res~ect for plants owned by Allied ~~tionals, Foreshadowing
I
:
'
a pattern that later became deprbssingly familiar during the Cold War, the Council of
,
Foreign Ministers of the fbur wkliiine allies could reach no agreements on actions to be
I'
~
taken
t1ie'ir own ACC a
'
thk made no ro ress in resolvin dis utes created b the
.,---- i i '
,
:,
Soviet Union's refusal to comply with agreements it had initially signed,
--,----
----__, ! .
_
_ - - -..-----\\\M,.
In dealing with one fOrn1erenemy, Hungary, Americari consideration and
generosity on the issue of war Jooty contrasted with Soviet highhandedness and greed. In
,
I
----
~-~-:..-=--
the first flush of victory, the U,S, government declared as "war booty" goods that the
Hungarian or the German govJnment transported to the Reich to evade capture by Soviet '
forces. In the list were
ite~s subh as the gold reserves of the Hungarian National Bank,
I
scores of rivercraft used on the Danube, rolling stock. medical supplies of the retreating
, :
_ _ _ _ _ _
I'
1
" t . 1 . i l - \~",s:~J ~ .1J.J~
AA-~J.,
/~
151 Summary of Principal Differences in Quadripartite R
rt for the Council of Foreign Ministers:
Ownership or Control of German or ~ Iliet! Property to F Ign Governments or Nationals, Published by
the Office of Military Governnient for Gebllany (U.S. ARA RG 466. Entry: Extradition Board 1947-53.
File: RepOits on War Crimes and COilmlO!l Crimes. Box 6 [227994-6] ~ A,....J6.1.l.,4.c.fUj~::t~A::ii4~MI~~L--
.... uL~fT;d..;.v~ ,
I
I
:
�s4
Hungarian army, and several hundred pedigreed horses used in a world-famous breeding
program. Noting the collapsed economy and the fragility of an emerging democracy, U.S.
I
diplomats and military officers assigned to Hungary began recommending soon after
IF!: a sa19le t@ tRe
~tate DefJaf'-~€lF!:t
@F!: January S, 194(; U.~. MiF!:ister l\,rtRHr
~@R@eF!:f€lld RigRligRted aN; artisl@ i~ tR@ daily "Kis Ujsag," titled "AwstriaF!: ClearaF!:@€l
~al€'1 @fDisplas@d WI!lF!:garian Pf€lPirty," wl1iSR S}Ulfg@d "systematis tRift lfWI!lF!:gariaF!:
€
I
'
g@€lds stHifld€ld 'NitRiF!: A.u~trifH~ fr@~ti€lrs." IF!: a saFsastis "€lie, tlu! p!:!J2@r sugg@st@d tRat
/
WUF!:gariaes are s@ld to sl!lfviviF!:g )lazis."
1
~
:,
~~*di:
Little by little and item by item, the American government relented kHl.the subiect
~t~m the moment the
communist takeover in 194
entered Hun ar until the
~-;<t'~ J\ ff" \M.~
it emoved entire Bun arian factories archives and art
collections and sent them iw train a,nd truck to the Soviet Union. The first postwar
Hungarian governments, led by anti-Nazi centrists, were powerless to stop the plunder
that the Soviets insisted was their right as victors.
On June IS,
/~ .
1m
~.~
19~he Depamnents of State and War de,cided that "restitution ~ .
olitical statiili
,
t
\
oftlle U.S. relations" with the tountri
-----
so favoredJAs the
he Grand Alliance American olic makers also
-I
reacted to hostile commu~ist propaganda that scored points by claimingthat U.S.
occupation forces in Gemlany were holding back Hungarian goods in order to harm
Hungary. A little more than a year after the European war ended, the U.S. government
'
�line shifted in favor of wholesale restitution ex
,
to Hungary's economic reconstruction and political stability, even though the Soviet-
elections.
~~
·~r
'<(",
.\
insistence o[the-S'Oviet Unio
1
..__-----On December 22 194eneral Geor e Weems U.S. ~e resentative on t ACe
~-for Hungary, was present at udapest's Eastern Railway Station to welcome the return
from Austria "a heated train of car~fully crated fine art," originally from Hungarian
museums. [153] U.S. occupation authorities were also returning 184 Danubian rivercraft
including 12 passenger vessels andi96 barges - 2 out of the three combination river
seagoing vessels and barges; 150 carloads of shipbuilding and repair material. and 200
tons of raw material and semi-finished products to help agricultural reconstruction. On
January 7, 1947,306 breeding horses were returned to Hungary. State Secretary Miklos
~y
Nyarady of the ruling Smallholders:' Party said that the shipment will "raise the level of
the world-famous Hungarian horse~,breeding to its former standing." He pointed out that ' . .A ~
although the horses fell in~o the ha~ds of the U.S. Army as war booty, upon orders from ~~
General Lucius Clay, commander of the occupation forces in Germany, they were
returned to Hungary, which he called "another proof of the goodwill of the Allies." ill.1l
SCfvi@t €Hilewpatieft awtl:1eriti@s ift .wUftgary alse igRer@@ tl:1@ir sigR@@ @BligatiQRS tQ
f@stitl:lt@ tl:1@ pfep@rti@s sf Alli@s ftatieftalS aR@ vietims sf pJa2ii p€!rs€!QwtiQR, QSRfiseatiRg
tl:1iir pf€J:I2@rti@s as War B@@ty iRst@a~. A@e@r@iRg t@ Jam€!s MQCargar, :l2QlitiQal @ffie@r at
tl:1@ U.S. Ligati@R iR Ihuiap@st iR 1949 47, tRi S@vi@t LigatioRitsilfto@k oY€!r a maRSi@R
O')lRllQ 8)' Gladys "aNdem'iIt, a U~£I. sitiz@N:, asG.sat 120ker tac@G alla sil@m "rheA: U.S.
f@:I2r@s@mativ@s at tA@ ACC Br@ugl:1t :U:12 tR@ matt@r. ~ 1ft April 194 § Gil~@ral ',villiam K@y
,t
I
Y'1
,
1.
I
153 Documents ofthe Allie~ Control Commission, Hungary, 1945-47. NARA
RG 334, Stack 290, Box 39
I
D~~
,
Documents of the Allied Control Commission, Hungary, 1945-47. NARA RG 334, Stack 290, Box 39
155 Interview with James McCargar: BATES STAMP COMIN
�@fth@ AlCC n~plilat@€llv PF@tIilStlil€l t@.th@ S@vililt ACC B:RaiFRUUl ·
¥luRgan', It.4aFs:Ral
iR
KJim@Rt V@F@s:Ril@v (latlilt :Rlila€l @ft:R@ S@vi@t state) t:Rat 1:R@ R-tissiaR militaFY ,;:vas
€lismaRtlhig aR€l F@m@viRg, E!:ffaFe~tly t@ :Russia, virtllally the entiFe TYRgsFam plam iR
UjPlilst, aR in€llilstFial suhurh @fBliIdap@st, well kn@'l;!R r@F its Pf@€lllsti@R @f:Rig:R €Juality
@l@etris hlillhs.U(} M@nl tliaR :Ralf@ftR@ plaId \1,'8S U.S. €lWR@€l, K@y aFg\H~€l iR ACC
m@@tiRgs, aR€l tR@ S@vi@t tiHtpF€lpriati@n Fan S@liIRt@F t@ aFRlisti€l@ l\rti€ll@ XIII F@€jliliFiRg
f@st@Fati@n @ftR@ pr@p@rty @fU.pLRati@Rals. V@F@sRil@v nFst F@pli@€l t:Rat lUl'Nas um¥waF@
@f Am@FisaR iRt@F@StS in t:R@ plaRt, {:R@R, :Raving F@s@iv@€l t:R@ pF€l@f @f @WR@FS:Rip :R@
.
F@Ej;liI@St@€l, PF@€l@@€l@€l t@ igR@F@ t:R@ ;U.S. Pf€lhiISt. AR @ll@R m@F@ @gn~gi€lus €las@ €l@R€l@m@€l '
tft@ HwegariaA: Qil e@mpat=iy It.41AZORT, @\VR:@Q b)T the £taadara Oil C@FR12tm,r €lfple,l/
J@FS@j', "V:R€lS@ @ffisials s@mplaiRsQ: t@ A.m@FisaR nlpF@s@Rtativ~s iR ¥ll5lRgerj' tliat th@
S@vi@ts ha€l gni€llilallj' tak@R s€lRtF@1 @fits @il'N@lls. In ApFil 194 () G@n@fal '''illiam K@y @f '
tR@ ACC ",'am@€l U.S. MiRist@F Ss~a@Rf@I€l tRat Am@fieaR "€l@lay iR pfessing tR@ S@viets '
1@ F@liR€!liIisR s@ntF@1 Ras implie€l a~€jlili@ss@Rs@ iR susR saRtfal aR€l @p@fati@R hy tR@m aR€l
at this late €late makes f@m@€lial a€ltiaR all tR@ m@F@ €lim ~l\iIlt t@' ahtaiR." 1~ 7 IR€l@@€l, the
S€wi@ts seeR t@@k @V@F tb:s @peFati~R eRtiFely.
IR l\yguSt 194 () G8R@ml \V~@ms hrsliIgllt liIp t:R@ sas@ @fRiR@ U.S. sitizeRs wR@s@
pf€lp@rti@s iR ¥lYRgaFY :Ra~ h@@R s@~fisBat@€l €llilriRg t:R@ G@FmaR @sslilpati@R aR€l t:R@R
Blaim@€l};)y t:R@ Ss:vi@t .mt:R@Fiti@s as ',liar h@@1y.158 [229~91 2J W@@ms '#£@t@ t@ astiRg
ACC C:RaiFmaR G@Refal V.P. Sviria@v fRat "the pfaetie@ Qf t:Re SQviet oothsfiti@s iR
C@fiR@Sti@R '",ith t:Re €l@t@FRliRati8R ~fth@ i€l@ntity @fG@rmaR Pf@p@rty liIn€lef the Psts€lam ,
D@slarati@R 'Nas having injlilri@liIs F@sliIlts @n Am@risaR iRt@fests iR that the hlilf€l@R @f pf@@f '
@fR@R G@FRlaR @vlR@rship has h@@R f1as@€l @R the ¥llilRgaFioo G@v@FRm@nt." \V:R@R the
U.S. L@gati@R Wf@t@ t@ th@ }alYRgaFlafl R@peuati@RS Orfis@ p@iRting @m that tli@ pr@p@rty
@WR@rs W@f@ U.S. eitiz€!lRs, tR@ W~gaFiaRS F@SP@R€l@€l tllat the S@vi@ts €l@mwl€i@€l
e@rtineat@s att@StiRg t@ the u.s. BitizeRsl1ip @faRY Pf@p@rty @l,"'Tler. Blilt liIRl@ss sl5lsh pf@sf
was pf@seRte€l witl1in a few says, tile ¥lYRgariaa R@)3amti@R O~fiB@ salilti@ReQ, the S@viets
w@Hl€l pf@e@@€l with their take@v@f:
I
'
156 Documents of the Allied Control Commission; Hungary, 1945-47. NARA
RG 334. Stack 290, Box 39
I
157 Documents of the Allit;d Control Commission, Hungary, 1945-47. NARA
I
RG 334. Box 50
158 Do.cuments of the AlIie,d Control Commission, Hungary, 1945-47. NARA
RG 334.
,
�IH tlle HiHe aeHeliH$ eases as well as iH similar eases iHtlle m@Htlls t@ e@me, GeH.
i
:
Weems re€!Mesteel tllat tlle: £@viets ~elay troosrer @f @vl'Hersllifl'villile verifieati@H @f tlle
IH Mav 1947 £ elleeHfelel re'fl@rteel t@ tlle £tate DeflartmeHt aHel t@ tlle AmerieaH
ACC reflreseHtative tllat tlle £@vietls were attematiHg t@ @@taiH' e@Htr@1 @ftlle WMHgariaH
GeHeral Creelit QaHk, iH irlliell AmierieOOs llelel a small HMmeer @f sllares aHel tlle Qritisll
R@tllsellilel eaHkiHg ll@Mse llael a sM'estaHtial iHvestmeHt.[1§9] As tlle u.£. Legati@H'S
researell elise@vereel, tlle £@viet g@verHmeHt llael first gaiHeel aro@tll@lel iH tlle eank ey
elaimiHg, MHeler tlle P@tselam AgresmeHt, a 1@
flereeHt sllare @ftlle eaflital eeeoose @f its
listiHg as "GermaH flr@flerty." Tlle WMHgariaH g@verHmeHt flr@testeel, as tlle Germoos llael
ae€jMireel tllat 1@ flereeHt sllare ey s@iziHg tlle assets @fFreHell sllarell@lelers f@ll@wiHg tlle
GermaH @eeMflati@H @f Fr~lHee. Desflite tlle faet tllat sMell seizu're @f assets was iHvfiliel
aee@reliHg t@ tlle Allies' L@Hel@H D0elarati@H @f laHMary §, 1943, t@ v.rlliell tlle £@viet
UHi@H was a flriHeiflal flarty, tlle WHHgariaH g@vemmeHt "gave way t@ tlle flreSSMre
e}i:ereiseel ey tlle RMssiaH e@Htr@lle€l A:CC aHel ree@gHizeel tlle £@viet elaim." Tlle £@viets
roll@weelMfl tllat ae€j'_lisiti@R ey a sImilar aeti@H, takiHg f)@sSeSSi@H @f a smaller HMmeer @f
GermaH seizeel sllares @ri€;iHally ll~lel ey tlle VieHHese eraHell @ftlle R@tllsellilel eankiHg
family. CitiHg tlleir gr@wiHg Hume~r @fsllares, tlle £@viets elaimeel aHel @€ltaiHeel a large
Hl.lmeer @ffl@siti@HS @H Hie laHk's ig@V€lmiHg l€ @arel aHel maHagemeHt l€ y IMly 194@.
€
Qy early Aflril 1947, £@vlet militaty @ffieers areseHtiHg tllemselves as aetiHg @H eellalf @f
tlle ACC visiteel tll€llegal'aelvis@r @ftlle WMHgarioo GeHeral Creelit Qame aHel @ffieials @f
WMHgariaH e@mf)aHies @wHiHg sllaies iH tllat eook. Tlle£@viets flresseel ror "rights g@iHg
far eeY@Hel tll@se H@rmally e}i:ereis~el l€ y a miH@rity sllarell@leler @\J,'HiHg 1g flereeHt @fa
e@mflaHY'S sllar€ls." IH May, £@viet f)reSSMre eSealateel, witll militan' @ffie€lrs eleliveriHg
"HMmemMs veileel tllreats" t@ min@blty sllarell@lelers relMetoot 1'@ give Mfl tlleir sllar§ls. Tllev '
als@ t@lel tlle lank's geHeral maHagier ooel imfl@rtaHt sllarell@leler, Qar@H Gy@rgy (Ge@rge)
€
UllmaHH @fa well kH@WH QMelaae~t Jewisll family, tllat aetiHe: £@viet ACC ellairmaH
£viriel@v llael a warroot ror llis arrest aHel tllat MHless lIe e@mfllieel witll £@viet elemaHels, lIe
w@Mlel ee arresteel. Tlle @ffieers als@ wameel UllmaHH tllat lIe mMst H@t iHrorm tlle
W:mgariaH g@verHmeHt a€l@Mt tlle £@viet aetivities. Qut lIe eliel, aHel tlle WMHgarioo
g@vemmeRt elMl'!' flr@teste'el t@ tlle g@viets \l;rllile tlle U.£. Legati@H trieelMHsMeeessfMlly t@
llil\'e tlle matter settleel l€ )i Heg@tiatl@H witlliH tlle ACC frame\v@rk. IH a re'N m@re m@Htlls, ,
.
i
tlle ACC el@seel sll@fl. UllmaHH H€ll€ tlle e@MHtry. A Hew e@mmMHist g@vemmeHt S@@H
t@@k e@mfll€lte fl@ssessi@R @f all eaklcs, al@Hg witll @tller flrivate eHterflrises, aHel tlle
£@viets j€ Mi€ltiy l}iflr@f)riateel a large HMm€ler @fl@eal e@mf)aHies.
€
159 Documents of the Alli~d Control Commission, Hungary, 1945-47. NARA
RG 334.
�"Qy tR@ 8afiRg @f 1'947, tR@ f1@w @fAm@fi@aR aRe "Qfiti8R @itiz@R8 8@@kiRg t@ Vi8it
"Qhl@atl@8t 8W@U@@ t@ @@Z@R8 @a@R ~@RtR, maRY ifR@t m@8t @ftR@m J@lN8 v.rH@ Ra@ f1@@
l=IhlRgafY iR tR@ 193 Q8 @f 4Q8.1<3Q TR@Y W@f@ all f@€)hlif@@ t@ a8k fuf fl@fmi88i@R ff@m tR@
ACC t@ @Rt@f aRe t@ 1@a\7@ tR@ @@hlHtfY, WRi@R iR @fw@t m@aRt £@vi@t a@rmi88i@R.
Ff@€j:hl@Rtly, tR@ u.£. f@flf~8@Rtativ~ atlfl@al@@ t@ tR@ £@vi@t ACC @RaifmaR, Mar8Rai
V@f@81~il@v t@ f@@@R8i@@ftR@ f@j@@ti@R @fa vi8a aaali@ati€)fl. "Qhlt f@j@@ti@R8@@am@
iR@f@a8iRgly f@hltiR@, a8 tR@ £@vi@ts W@f@ @1@8iRg l=IhlRgary'8 8@f@@f8. OR@ Vi8it@f R@lfl@@
8y u.£. iRt@fV@Rti@R was"Q@RjarniR "Q@fmaRR, tR@ flf@waf @WH@f @fa @@fw@ R@hl8@ @aU@@
Emk@, @R@ @ftR@ @aflital'8 m@8t fl@flhllar. IR Ri8 aflflli@ati@R Wf @RtfY, "Q@fmaRR li8t@@ tRat
@@ffe@ R@hl8@ a8 Ri8 a@@f@88 iR "Qhl@~@8t. "Qhlt R@R@ @ftR@ Vi8it@f8 g@t aRywR@f@ witR
f@€j:hl@8t8 t@ f@@laim "Nazi @@Rfi8@at~@' flf@fl@rti@8. u.£. aRe "Qfitl8R @ifll@mat8 flf@t@8t@@,
f@@aUiRg iR R@t@8 t@ tR@ £@vi@t aR~ l=IhlRgafiaR g@V@fRm@Rt8 tRat tR@ 194<3 Pafi8 fl@a@8
tf@aty f@€jhlif@@ f@8tituti@R: @f a88@t8: iR l=IhlRgafY @WR@€1 8y U. £. aR€I "Qfiti8R @itiz@R8.[1<3 n
URilat@fal a@ti@R, iR8t@a€l @ftR@ @figiRaUy agf@@€1 hlfl@R atlflf@a@R @f@@R8hlltati@R
I
an€l 8@af@R Wf aR agf@@m@Rt, 8@@aIk@ tR@ 8tan€laf€l @fl@fatiRg flfin@ifll@ @ftR@ £@vi@t URi@R
I
C@hlR@il. IR WRat lat@f 8@@aRl@ a mltt@fR a@f@88 tR@ 8fl@@tfhlm @f 8tat@ t@ 8tat@ f@lati@R8, tR@
II.
UNITED STATES AGENCIES AND CONTROL OF'VICTIMS' ASSETS
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A.
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In the United States
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The invasion and pccupatiqn of Germany and Austria did not represent was not
the United £tates' first American opportunity to take control of Nazi assets. Even before
the United States entered the war ih Europe, it had sought to deny certain assets
potentially available to support the Axis war effort.
160 Documents of the Allied Control Cdmmission, Hungary, 1945-47. NARA RG 334, stack 290, 75/35
161 Documents of the Allied Control Coinmission, Hungary, 1945-47. NARA RG 334, Box 39
:.
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The United States Treasury Department and Frozen Assets
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The Nazi invasion ofD~nmark and Norway ied the. president to take action by
promulgating Executive Order 8389 on April 10, 1940, to protect assets in the United
States belonging to friendly ali~ns and to prevent their use by the Axis Powers. This
"freezing order," issued only two days after the German attacks on Scandinavia,
,
prohibited transactions involvirlg the property of Dehrhark, Norway, and their nationals,
unless permitted unde~, license ~y the Secretary of the Treasury. Blocking or "freezing"
meant that title to a property remained with the private . owner, but U.S. authorities
I
.
controlled transfers and other dealings affecting the ptoperty. Immediately after
Congress ratified the executive order in May, the Treasury set up Foreign Funds Control
government had "frozen" the
(FFC) to administer its provisiohs. 162 By June 1941 the
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assets of twelve other Invaded European countries and their citizens. After the United .
States entered the war,·the scop6 of the FFC's activity widened to include the preventiori
of financial and comm~rcial tra~sactions between the United States and Axis Powers,
Axis-dominated, and neutral countries that benefited the Axis.16J
,
The most important lega} instrument available to the U.S. government for
controlling foreign assets before and during the war was the Trading with the Enemy Act,
first enacted in 1917 and amendbd in 1933. The initial act had established an Alien
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Property Custodian, an agency to take custody of and administer enemy-owned property
during World War I, which was !abo1ished on May 1; 1934. 164 With Executive Order
9095 of March 11, 1942, ~Pr~sident Roosevelt reestablished an Office of Alien
Property Custodian, and by July 6, 1942, (Executive Order;9193), the Custodian was
empowered to "direct, manage, ~upervise, control or vest alien property." "Vesting" and
"seizure" were synonymous und~r law and meant that the LJnited States assumed title to
the property, unlike the "freezing" process of the FFC. The order distinguished between
the authority of the Custodian td seize and profit from business enterprises, patents,
trademarks, and copyrights, and~the Treasury Department's:powers to control or
immobilize financial transactions involving cash, bullion, bank deposits, and securities. loS
The executive order al~o prohib~ted the importation of anything acquired directly or
indirectly from anyone who was: an enemy or the allY of an enemy under penalty of
confiscation and a fine of $50,000 (over $500,000 in 1999 values), or imprisonment, or
both. These executive orders de~lt with a range of ptoperty such as bullion, currency,
deposits, securities, notes, debits, contracts, lading bills, machinery, jewelry, precious
stones, art, property and mortgages, patents, trademarks, copyrights, estates, trusts,
partnerships, insurance:policies,iand safe deposit boxes. However, there was no
.
162 William Reeves, "The Controll of Foreign Funds by the United States Treasury," Law and
Contemporary Problems II, no. I (1945): 22.
163 Federal Records of World Wa~ II, vol. I Civilian Agencies (Washington, D.C.: GSA, National
Archives & Recs. Service, The Natiomll Archives, 1950), 771-72 [335494-495].
.
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164 Reeves, "Control of Foreign Fllnds," 32.
165 Isadore Alk & Irving Moskovi~z, "Removal of United States Controls Over Foreign-Owned
Property," Federal Bar Journal 10, no.' 1 (Oct. 1948): 4; FrederiCk Eisner, "Administrative Machinery and
Steps for the Lawyer," Law and Contelnporary Problems II, no. I (1945): 66; Greg Bradsher, Holocaust
Era Assets: A Finding Aid to Records at the National Archives cit College Park, Maryland (Washington,
D.C.: National Archives & Recs. Admin., 1999), 1056.
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f..~
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distinction in the Trading with th~ Enemy Act between alien perpetr~tors and victims..-aa--
.
I' . . £. t...
rI 1
.tHl:portaffil'R'ffffitt8B-1'@FtJ;dS Stlllety.
,
Before the United States' bntry into the war in Europe, the Treasury Department
conducted a census of foreign-o~ed assets in the United States, which showed a total
value of $13.15 billion as of June11941. More than $7 billion of that total represented
property from those countries whbse assets had been frozen. 166 The Treasury Department,
l
relied on the census to investigate , often through Foreign Funds Control, "the apparent '
widespread efforts of the enemy t? conceal the true ownership of property through
elaborate systems of agreements, loans, options and cloaking devices, such as holding
companies incorporated in neutral! countries.1' 167 Treasury had designated the Federal
Reserve Banks as its field agents for Foreign Funds Control. 168 The major locus for FFC
activity was New York, and the Nbw York district received the majority of reports on
;
foreign-owned assets.169 ,
As the fighting in Europe ~nded, the Treasury Depart~ent faced the challenge of
how to "defrost" the foreign-ownetl funds it had "frozen" before and during the war. A
General License on Deceinber 7, 1\945, removed all contr.ols over current transactions
except for those with neutral coun~ries, Germany, and Japan, ostensibly to prevent release
of camouflaged enemy assets.170 I1he process of returning these assets to legitimate
owners-victims and non-victims~ontinued for many years. (see Chapter §,
I
Restitllti@R:). [lost tnmsition witlli tllis insert)
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,2.
Th: Burea~ of Customs, Import Prohibition's, and the Post
Office
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New-Y..Q.r.k-~~
,
"<pv< L"un pv< ", VU""LV"~
... s-fe.f-
i~nal-i.m:f)·
.• illOnwl e, the U.S. Bureau of Customs and the Post
ffice also ac e as mechanisms tol detect foreign and enemy assets. Both agencies
monitored the import and export of securities, currency, and foreign exchange and
delivered seized securities (and later, currency) to a Federal Reserve Bank.17I In addition,
'I
166 Reeves, "Control of Foreign Fund~," 49-51; U.S. Treas. Dept., Census ofForeign-Owned Assets in
I
the United States (Washington: Govt. Printing Office, 1945); U.S. Treas., FPC, "Administration of the
Wartime Financial and Property Controls dfthe United States Government,:' Jun. 1942,39-40, NACP, RG
131, FFC Subj. Files, Box 367, File "Repohs, TFR-300" [311951-953].
I
167 Paul Myron, "The Work of the Alien Property Custodian," Law and Contemporary Problems no.
, I
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11, 1 (1945): 78-79; Memo from [H. D.] W;hite to Secy. Morgenthau, "The Census of Foreign-Owned
Property," Feb. 24, 1942, NACP, RG 56, FfC, Entry 66A816, Box 20 [108246-248].
168 Federal Records of World War II, Civilian Agencies, 774-75 [335496]; Reeves, "Control of
Foreign Funds," 37.
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169 [Rella Shwartz?], ["History of Foreign Funds Control, 1940-1948"], no date [ca. 1948], Ch. 4, p.
22, NACP, RG 56, Entry 66A816, Box 47 [:331428].
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170 Alk & Moskovitz, "Removal of United States Controls," 5-10.
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171 [Rella Shwartz?], ["Hist?ry of Foreign Funds Control, 1940-1948"], no date [ca. 1948], Ch. 5, p.
13-14, NACP, RG 56, Entry 66A816, Box 47 [331487-488]; Documents Pertaining to Foreign Funds
Control (Washington: U.S. Treas. Dept., OJt. I, 1940), 14.
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the Customs Bureau cooperated with FFC to oversee the importation of gold, diamonds,
postage stamps, and artwork. 172
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In accordance with the Tariff Act of 1930, the U.S. Bureau of Customs regulated
the importation of all works of art idto the United States. Although artwork could be
brought in duty free, the importer hdd to declare the objects and their true value at the
time of entry or risk their forfeiture, I In the course of the war the stringency of Customs'
control increased, at least formally. Thus, Treasury Department Decision 51072 on July
8, 1944, under the authority of the' Wading with the Enemy Act', gave the Customs
Bureau not only the power to detain]anya,rtworks entering the United States, but also
required importers to obtain a license to impo~ (Form TFE-1) and to file a report on the
nature of the work and the CircumstJnces of its acquisition (Form FFC 168). The
definition of what constituted an "art object" was broad, It covered items worth $5,000
v(th.B B€luivalBRt @f€P/Bf $§Q;QQQ iR1999 yaluB~) or,more, and th9se having an artistic,
historic, or scholarly interest regardl¢ss ofvaiue, Twelve categories-which included
paintings and sketches, prints and edgravings, statuary and sculptures, chinaware and
porcelain, rugs and tapestries, jewelfy and metalwork, books arid manuscripts, furniture,
and curios-further identified and oJganized "art objects."173 The Treasury repealed
Decision 51072 only two years later! on June 30, 1946, thereby:easing the importation of
artworks.
:
The Customs Regulations of 1937 authorized the U.S. p'ost Office to investigate
all foreign mail parcels, u.,S. personnel stationed abroad could send (with a required
declaration) gift parcels holding an a,ggregate value of no more ~han $50 (tftB B"lliivalBRt
@f @V@f $§QQ iR 1999 valli@s), but tq:~ Post Office could inspect those parcels lacking a
proper declaration or those :appearillg to surpass the value limit}74 Here, too, seizure and
forfeiture were possible. Stnce U.S.ipersOlmel overseas mailed~valuables to the United
States during and immedia~ely after rhe war, it is likely that some of the difficult issues
for the Bureau of Customs were problematic for the Post Office as well.
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B.
In Europe,
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The U.S. f:j.lli1eEl States Army and the Discovery of Assets
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Death and plunder ~ were ,among the final
racial discrimination,
:
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consequen~es
of Nazi-implemented
Ary~ization, kd exterminati~in Europe. As
~,
Allied tactical troops battled their w4y across Europe.,Jhey encountered the legacy of
·1
172 Harry M. Durning & Gr~gory W. O'Keefe, "Directory of War Time ,
Activities within Collection
.,
District No.1 0, Port of New York," Nov. 1942, 33, Historian's Ok, U.S. Customs Svc. [330859].
173 Treasury Decisions Under Custom} and Other Laws, luI. 1943-Dec:
1944 (Washington: GPO,
1945),247-48.
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:
174 Treasury Decision #49755, Art. 371 (C), in Treasury Decisions Under Customs and Other Laws.
luI. 1938-lun. 1939 (Washingto~: GPO, 1940),283-84.
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National Socialism in the concentratirn camps and treasure hoards _
...<1 the .ili.....<1 vill_ tI••¥
they
di~cove~d.
~.
~ ~~~
"".+s.
~V~
Allied military forces were oJ the lookout for Nazi lootin the surfmer of 1944
the Allied landings in Normandy andl the 'sout -Et; e coincided with the execution of ~
an ambitious Anglo-American prognlm ca d Safehaven, he program's organizers
).n//
hoped to prevent enemy personnel ru1d assets, '
Ig oot, from being shielded from
Al ied 'urisdiction b findin refuge in neutral countries, to shield them from anticipat@d
,
, Safehaven targeted gbld, business enterprises, re,al estate, art objects, and
other valuables as potential assets th~ enemy might conceal. Using these assets, the
~~:::is might finance re~ist~ce moverents agains,t Allied troops: and ~ersonnel du:ing the .. v
InItIal phase of occupatIOn In Germany and AUS~I~ot secure a financIal foothold In
.$t"o(.;'\"
; Y neutral countries from wh,ich they cohld re-arm~lltect the N~zi movement, and pose a '
If renewed threat to internatIOnal peace! Safehave'n Program officIals analyzed data
reported by State Department missiohs in neutral coulltries on thefts of assets and their
movements from the Reich to "safe ~aven."175
.
,American official~ i~te?rated ISafehaven objectiv~s into ~llied military ~nd
Intelhgen~e pl~~ fo: the In:asIOn ofjGe:many and Atistna and mclu.ded financIal and
commercIal entitles In the lIst of targets IdentIfied fot capture and seIzure. The plans
prepared intelligence officers to seardh for caches of looted valuables, including gold,
~ewel.ry, and foreig~ exchange, in fo+ru:~ areas. of military operations. They also
IdentIfied an extensIve array ofpersopahtles to mterrbgate on the fate of looted gold and
other valuables. l76 In July 1944 SHAEF formed T-Fotces T FOR TARGET?-special,il&i
ad hoc military units designed to seizb the individuals~ equipment, or documents deemli
~
'.\ t,.&.S* ... I~.
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The Office of.~tegic Services (OSS) often assigned its agents to T-Forces for
intel1ige~ce ?urp~ses~!-Forces w~re often ~ongthe first troops to enter larger cities
after AllIed InVaSIOn. T-Forcepersonnel also dIscovered and guarded looted assets,
including gold and works of art, in th6 course of theit operations. 177
Because of threats during the :war from Allied air and ground attacks, German
l\ \ officials engaged in a..hurried attempt§ to transport hoards of loot and other valuables to
afety, shipping most of them out of ~ities to southern Germany ,and western Austria
direct~y in the ~ath of the ad.vancing tmerican armies~ It was for this. reason that
Amencan soldIers uncovered such large caches of valuables. The ThIrd Army
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175 Letter from W. L. Clayton, Dept. of!State, to Americatibiplomatic and Consular Officers except
those in the Other American Republics, "Safehaven Project," Jan. 16, 1945, NACP, RG 84, Entry Paris
Embassy, Box 4, File 711.3 [316982-991]. I
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176 Marc J. Masurovsky, "The Safehaven Program: The Allied Response to Nazi Post-Defeat Planning
1944-1 94A\' (master's thesis, American Univ 1990).
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177 Memo from Maj. C. Brooks Peters ' Strategic Services Officer, "T-Forces, Present Position of
OSS Relative To," Jan. 11, 1945, NACP,
226, Entry 115, Box 45, File 582 [219513-517]; SHAEF
Intelligence Directive No. 17 from Lt. Gen. . B. Smith, "'T' Force," Jul. 27'11944, NACP, RG 331, Entry
11, Box 1, File 300-6-3 [313907-908J; M
from Maj. EdwardF. D'Arms to G-5, SHAEF, "Report on
Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives," May ,1945, NACP, RG 331, Entry 55B, Box 335, SHAEF G-5
MFA&A [320197-198].
�discovered one of these deposits hi'dden in the Kaiseroda mines near Merkers. Entering a
vault within the mine on April 8, 1945, the Ame~ican soldiersfound assets as ordinary as
currency and as ,groteSqUe, as teeth I~ith gold fillings. The mil}eshafts also contained
innumerable works of art, jewelry, monetary gold from European banks, and museum
pieces, The Merkers treasure was so enormous that the army needed a convoy of 30 ten
ton trucks to transport it to FrankfJrt for safekeeping,178
While the find at Merkers i~ the most astonishing, it was not the only one ofits
kind. The First Army discovered ih a quarry near the Buchenwald concentration camp a
cache including gold bars, preciou~ stones, currency, silverware, wedding bands, and
gold fillings,179 The Seventh Arm~ found a considerable amount of art and cultural
property in the mines at Heilbronnl At the Neuschwanstein c~stle near Fiissen, American
, and French soldiers disco~ered pa+ of t~ Rothschild art collection and records of the ,
Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg~e"f.l'azi task forcAhat had confiscated European
archives and cultural property,180 Some hoards contained more than victims' assets,
however. The First Army, for exainple, found the crown jew~ls of Prussia and other
artifacts in the Bernterode mine ou1tside of Nord hausen, In Austrian salt mines the Third
,
Army found collections from Vien:na's Kunsthistorisches Museum at Lauffen and an
I
enormous deposit oflooted artwork and furniture at Alt Aussee. In May 1945 the U.S,
3rd Infantry Division captured a holst of assets on trains coming from Hungary, including'
,
I
the so-called Gold Train near Werfen (see CROlflter 7, Case ~tll€lies), In June 1945
I
American troops uncovered depositories and hidden caches almost daily. By July the G
5 section of the lih Army Group CFirst, Third, Ninth, and Fifteenth Armies) had
discovered over 850 eme~gency repositories of lo'oted and German-owned valuables. 181
1 In the end, Monuments, Fi~";rts'land Archives.tTHE NAME IS DIFFERENT ON P45.
L/\ ~
, LET'S GET IT ~TRAIGH~MFf-&A) officer~ Germany identified more than 2,000
-y}~R caches of art, artIfacts, and records.182
Initially, the task of safeguhrding, cataloging, and restituting looted assets fell to
specialized units of the U.S. Unite3 ~tates Army. Personnel from G-5 staffs and more
,
I·
specialized detachments such as MF A&A assumed responsibility to protect these assets
from combat damage and the elem1ents, and also to prevent American soldiers, DPs, and
German civilians from st~aling or Uestroying them,183 In Italy:, well before Germany's'
surrender in May 1945, MF A&A 6fficers returned artwork and archives to their original
V' '
:
'
I
I
I
[
178 Memo from Col. B. Bernstein tol Brig. Gen. F. J. McSherry, "Report of Developments in Removal
of Treasure from Kaiseroda Mine at Merkers, Germany," Apr. 18, 1945, NACP, RG 260, FED, Box 424
[314007-022]; Ziemke, Us. Army in the 'occupation o/Germany, 228-30~
.
I
179 Carolsue Holland & Thomas Rothbart, "The Merkers and Buchel)wald Treasure Troves" After the
Battle 93: 1-28.
,I
.
180 Nicholas, Rape o/Europa, 340-346,
:
'
181 Ziemke, Us. Ar~y in! the Occup~tion o/Germany, 270-271; G-5ISec" 12lh Army Group, "Report
of Operations (Final After Action Report1," no date [ca. Jul. 1945], 120-125, NACP, RG 33 I, Entry 54,
Box 163, File Civil Affairs & Mil. Govt. 18901-906].
,
P
182
Nicholas, Rape o/Europa, 351.1 "
I'
183 Ziemke, Us. Army in the Occup,ation o/Germany, 199,250-251:
I .
'
,
�locations from the temporary repositories used as protective custody during the war. 184
Identification and organization df looted art and cultural property began in earnest
following ce~sation of hostilitiesI. .The U.S. :Umy.was respo~sible for securin~ the assets
and.tr~sportmg them to storage\sltes e~ta~hshed mpr~paratlon ~~r the upcon:n.ng
• H.j
restItutIOn process (!i@@ Cl1llf1t@f ~,VceStltliltl€H'l). In Apnl 1945 mIl
authontIe,.. --~ ~
established the Foreign Exchang~ Depos~tory in Frartkfurl~s~
Ito
gold and
fin.anci~l asse~rincipftll7'. ~hr~~g~out the spring of 19t5 SHAEF established collecting
pomts 111 Gentt?n.y and Austna "llthm the U.S. Zones to serve as depots for other assets .
(see Chapter 4, Assets in Europe). MFA&A officers directed activities at these collecting
points in a number of cities inc1u~ing Marburg, MUllich, Wiesbaden, and Offenbach.
These officials also assisted in t:@loeating \VIIAT DOES 'RELOCATING' MEAN!?
I
....
MOVING
Jl"'j~~p'. materials discovered in ~reas controlled by U.S. forces but falling within the
agreed upon boundaries .of the Sd,viet Zones of occup~tion. These units took possession
of a massive volume of assets that the Nazis had corifiscatedfrom public and private
collections and from individuals kd families. ~
.
I
. . •
Personnel from the G-5 d+ision .,/ore leaiing with victims' assets in frustrating
I
circumstances, which included multiple obstacles te establishing a civil govemment.
.
I
~~.-
Gennans who had served as civilihn .official were .often either members of the Nazi Party
.
I
-
orJat the VCfY least) compromisedlby the fact that thCiNazis had permitted them to hold
I
power. G-S units were officially forbidden to "fraterI1ize" or even to cooperate with
Gw~~
I
.
t17' although they often did so oht of necessity. Frequently-combat had destroyed the
offices that heused lecal civilian
g~vernrnent, and G;;;5 detachments had to cenfiscate .or
I
.
-
I
..
v-e.sW~
requisition public and private buildings te take their place. They also had te VERB
MISSING! utilities and basic services. G-5 detachments repa,ired or arranged for the
i
repair of damaged roads and railrolt tracks to allow for shipments of military equipment,
.
' I · . . ..;
medical supplies, food, and coal to fhe armies. They had to prevent the outbreak of
.
I
.
deadly diseases, feed and provide sl,1elter for displaced persons of various backgrounds,
.
-
...
\
dismiss and appoint civilian officials according to strict denazification guidelines,
-
.
I
I
---·1
.
.:
Report o/The American Commissipn/or the Protectionand Salvage 0/ Artistic and Historic
Monuments in War Areas (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. prinfing Office, 1946),48,60,80-81; Nicholas,
Rape o/Europa, 371-372..
\
184
v..»\)'
~'"
�organize German police to help kebp order, and remoVe all obstacles in the way of the
war effort. In short, G-5
d~tachmLts shouldered awesome military, civil, and
humanitarian responsibilities with Ilittle time in which to carry them out. Highly mobile,
I,
.
severely understaffed with fewer than 500 officers and only slightly more enlisted men,
and overburdened by the range of !heir responsibilitieS, they had to meet immediate needs"
in a chaotic environment. lss
•'\
tW,
t
.
~I!f.
,4J~. . ~"""
aJ
/
i,~~
Developing Policy for Assets In Europe
.f...b""J oJ e;, •
? P''''''
Difftrent U.S.
)
A~encies,
DiJrent Goals [need belter section title]
.
I
.. .
Given the scope of the proOlems that the U.S. government agencies faced,
terican personnel in Germany cLld have profitedfrom
cle~r policy guidelines from
:Washington. Given the differing Joals of various officials in the administration and the
t.~-t.
I
influence of the :mergiRg Cold War and the politics surrounding the creation of Israel, no
r
,
.
clear, unambiguous policy emerge1. The measures U.S. occupying forces undertook
I
from 1944 to 1949 stemmed from
.
lI
wide. array of personalities and agencies. President
.'
Roosevelt, President Truman, the State Department, War Department, and Treasury
Department all held conflicting ViJws of how to admInister deifeated Germany, leading
one scholar to interpret the actions of those years as iiimprovising stability and change,!! 186
185 Ziemke, US Army in the occup4tion ofGermany, 402: The numbers doubled after the surrender
of Japan.
I
186 Earl F. Ziemke, "Improvising Stability and Change in Postwar Germany," in Robert Wolfe, ed.,
Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944-1952
(Carbondale: Southern rtlinois Univ. Pres~, 1984), 52-66.
,
.
'
~
�I
f
,
,
I
Since the White House laidlout no specific policy guidelines; Supreme
Headquarters,
Allie~ ExpeditionJ Force (SHAEF) wrote its!own set of directives fo~
U.S. forces as American troops prkpared to invade and occupy Germany in the summer
.
I
.
. of 1944. This "Handbook for Md [Military Government] in Germany," while providing
.
I
:.
orders for denazification and demilitarization, apparently failed to satisfy those
government officials who sought IboroUgh plll1ishrnent of
G~rmany.'~ Chief among
those criticizing the "Handbook;' Iwas Treasury Secretary He~ry Morgenthau.
I
;
I
.'
Morgenthau drafted a much harsher policy proposal that emdsioned the
I
deindustrialization and "pastoralization" of Germany. The "Morgenthau Plan," as it came
to be known, briefly won RoosJelt'S approval in autumn 1
.
I
.
~44. "We have ,to be tough
I
with Germany," Roosevelt Said,!but other Cabinet officials such as Secretary of War
,
Henry Stimson and Secretary of, State Cordell Hull found the Morgenthau Plan vindictive
and brutal, and
Stimso~ argued L
Roosevelt that it was a "crime against civilization
:
itself."181l Roosevelt backed awly from the Morgenthau Plk, but its spirit nevertheless
"
'
I
I
.
influenced a later short-term directive concerning occupati'on issued in 1945 by the Joint
.
I
I
Chiefs of Staff (JCS).;
:'.
;
I
,
JCS 1067, as this direciive is known, instructed oc~upiers to control the German
I
economy "only to the extent nbcessary to meet the needs bfthe occupation forces or to
.
.
I
I
produce the goods which would prevent disease and unrest, which might. endanger the
f
occupying
forces."18~
occupa{ion officials were to
demilit~rize Germany,dissolve the'
Nazi Party, monitor the press and the educational system, decentralize the German
187 Boehling, Question 0/ Pridrities, 27.
188 Cited in Peterson, Americdn Occupation iJ/Germany, 38-39.
189 Clay, Decision i~ German~, 1 7 , '
,
r
�government, assist with teparations, ~d try war criminals. In the retrospective opinion
of General Lucius Clay, Commander of the Military
GO~1f~rm'n~nt
.in
{iprm<lnu {nl\(fnTT~\ ,
between 1945 and 1949" JCS J067 "!:ipecifically prohibit
,
'
rehabilitate or maintain ~he Germ~n economy except to i
production."19o However, SHAEF could not officially in
British agreement, and that was not immediately forthcol.
,
different versions of this directive, appeared between the:- .....
.
.
~
....... _... ,.._-.
. ... -' .. --.-- ..
--~---'
6
and April 1945 when it ~as issued to Eisenhower. 192 At the Potsdam Conference in the
early summer of 1945, the Allies ·mo9ified ille stringent economic
co~ditions set forth in •
it. The Americans, and General Clay in particular, began to worry about how much
, ~,. (
material they would need to furnish at the expense of the American taxpayer in order to
At both the Yalta and Pot'sdam conferences the three Allies-the United States,
Great Britain, and the Soviet Union=agreed that Germany should retain enough of its
productive capacity to rebuild a viable peacetime economy and to pay reparations. To
address the latter, the Allies began an inventory of industriai plants with an eye not only
to their closure if they had produced war material, but also to their use as partial
reparations payments oD.ce the plants had been dismantled and moved out of Germany.
Initially the United
Sta~es
,
and Great Britain considered expropriating 1,500 to 2,000
,
industrial plants, but by, the end of 1947, only 682 plants (mostly in the British Zone)
.
,
I
were still under consideration as' "surplus and available for reparations." Only 40
,
..
190 Cited in Clay, Decision in Germal1y, 18; Ziemke, u.s. Army in the Occupation o.(Germany, 104.
191 Ziemke, U.S Army in the Occ'f,ipatipn o/Germany, 58-60, 106. See also Boehling, Question 0.( ,
Priorities, 28.
.
.~.~ ~,.'
. '-':
.
PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION
'.J~.
'~
J
�I'
�government; assist withreparatiops, and try war criminals. In the retrospective opinion ",
of General Lucius Clay, Commartder of the Military Government in Germany (OMGUS)
between 1945 and 1949, JCS 1067 "specifically prohibited us from taking any steps to
rehabilitate or maintain :the Gentian economy except to maximize agricultural
I
production."19o Howev~r, SHAEf could not officially impl~ment JCS 1067 without
British agreement, and that was not immediately forthcomirig. 191 Moreover, eight
<
different versions of this directive appeared between the early draft in September 1944
! '
,
6
and April 1945 when it was issued to Eisenhower.192 At the,Potsdam Conference in the
~e Alliei modified the strin,gent economic conditions set forth in
early summer of I 945,
it. The Americans, and. General.clay in particular, began to worry about how much
~,- (
material they would ne~d to fur~ish at the expense of the American taxpayer in order to '
At both the Yalta and Potsdam conferences the three Allies-the United States,
Great Britain, and the Soviet Unio'n-agreed that Germany 'should retain enough of its
productive capacity to rebuild a Iviable peacetime economy and to pay reparations. To
<
'
address the latter, the Allies began an inventory of industrial plants with an eye not only;
to their closure if they had produced war material, but also to their use as partial
reparations payments once the plants had been dismantled and moved out of Germany.
Initially the United States and Qreat Britain considered expropriating 1,500 to 2,000
I
industrial plants, but by the end:of 1947, only 682 plants (mostly in the British Zone)
were still under consideration as "surplus and available for reparations." Only 40
190 Cited in Clay, Decision in Germany, 18; Ziemke, U.S Army ih the Occupation o/Germany, 104..
191 Ziemke, U.S Army in the Octupation o/Germany, 58-60, 106. See also Boehling, Question 0/ :
Priorities, 28.
,,~.
~
J
�.
e~o
:
/~
.
factories had been dismantled and
British Zones. 193 The
-.
n~movea;ythattllne
'/
?t>b~~ t.
V't..~~~.
'
Fre~ch p/ttfd their own policy.
Soviets were rising as weyr'artl y because they were un"U·~.6 00 "_-0
single economic unit
d~ite
~"
the AlIi,ed agreement at Potsdam to
.
regardin
d~iliid-;':tly
over
estittition and reparation
he State Department realized that py 1948 the Soviets had removed and shipped to the
east an unknown amount 9f capital
~quipment from their zone, lowering Germany's
plants to send to the Soviet Union.?4
Even before 1948 lit was eV~gent that the goal of rebuilding the German economy
was at odds with shutting:down and, removing industrial facilities. The State and War
DepaJiments issued a bluJ.1tjoint cQll).munique on August 29, 1947, to this effect: "The
old plan provided for very sharp cut~ in production capacities ... from which the bulk of
reparations were to be obtained. If i~ impossible to provide a self-sustaining economy in
the bizonal [U.S. and British] area;without materially increasihg the levels in these
industries." 195 Quite beyond the intJ:"~asing political difficulties of cooperating with the
Soviets in various four-p6wer decision-making bodies governing Germany, a
fundamental contradiction existed b~tween the desire to limit Germany's capacity to
produce war materials and the desiJ:"<::; to promote future peacetime production, a goal that
,
192
Peterson, American Occupation ofQermany, 42.
193 u.s. State Department, Germany, 413-14; Benz,Die Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,
73-74; Conrad Latour & Thilo Vogelsang, Qkkupation und Wiederaujbau. Die Tatigkeit der
Militarregierung in der amerikanischen B.i!iatzungszone Deutschland~ 1944-1947 (Stuttgart: Deutsche
Verlags-Anstalt, 1973), \59-6\.
'
194
u.s. State Department, Germany, 422.
PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION
1
r'
~
,-Iv
b
~
~
; \'b. -b\
~/(
productive capacity and increasing America's reluctance to dismantle additional industrial.
I
'
~".U_.J ~ -- r7-~--
'~)
thei refusal to abide by their agree.ment
~
9-r:
'l
j,lt \
j(W'
��~'
~.
..
factories had been disma~tled and ,remo
British Zones. 193 The French pur ed their own policy. Cold War tensions with the
Soviets
w~re rising as we~l,
artly because they were unwilling to treat
,q.
/
~,~.
r~their agreement'
Germany~/ V
regard in
nd partly over
estitution and reparations
he State Department realized that by 1948 the Soviets had removed and shipped to the
east an unknown amount of capital equipment from their zone, lowering Geonany's
;/
plants to send to the Soviet Union. 194
Even before 1948 it was evident that the goal of rebuilClirig the German economy
was at odds with shutting ;down ami removing industrial facilities. The State and War
Departments issued a bluritjoint communique on August 29, 1'947, to this effect: "The
old plan provided for very sharp cuts in production capacities: .. from which the bulk of
reparations were to be obtained. It -is impossible to provide a ~elf-sustaining economy in
the bizonal [U.S. and Brit~sh] area without materially increasing the levels in these
industries. ,,195 Quite beyond the increasing political difficulties of cooperating with the
.
"
Soviets in various four-power decision-making bodies governing Germany, a
fundamental contradictionl existed between the desire to limit G'ermany's capacity to
produce war materials and; the desire to promote future peacetime production, a goal that
I
Peterson, American Occupation ofGermany, 42.
193 Us. State Department,:Germany, .413-14; Benz, Die Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,
73-74; Conrad Latour & Thilo Vogelsang, Okkupation und Wiederaujbau. Die Tdtigkeit der
Militdrregierung in der amerikanischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands 1944- J947 (Stuttgart: Deutsche
Verlags-Anstalt, 1973), 159-61.:
'
194
Us. State Department, 'Germany, 422.
,
,
,
_1~
~~V~~L, .
~
pJ)
y ,
tP
productive capacity and increasing America's reluctance to dismantle additional industrial:
192
:.I'
!
single economic unit d spite the A.llied agreement at Potsdam to do so
thei
i~
1
by that time from ,either the American or
~~ -b\
.
�grew out of memories of the tangle<i politics, economics, and psychology that surrounded
reparations issues after World War 1,
Ultimately, the: lack of clear policy lines left much for the U.S. military to
interpret, improvise,
~d implement, fae-t'J1i g iI1S and cleve
)
~ eBtiea¥ers in tlre-imm~dIate postwar era can only tremrder.
'mu<I<lIed polley IIrnktng and execu~gn.
~)
[llIili para noW on.... ,,,.--, r •.
~~...·,·.."~UO
Cold War
Id~nd
Two other major factors impinged on the chaos left by Wo
bore on
the formulation of Am:erican policy towards righting the
azi persecution :
through the restoration of victims' fl~sets. They were th
.
VIOr
leading to beginnings of the Cold War and the declara .
e endent Jewish State
in 1948. leading to the, formatio,:l ofthe Jewish state of Israel in 1948.
!
Between 1945 and 1948 the Grand Alliance that linked the United States and the
Soviet Union during World War II came apart. In his speech in Fulton, Missouri on
March 5, 1946, former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill used the metaphor of an
"iron curtain" descendfng acrosS Europe from the Baltic tothe Adriatic, behind which
reigned oppression and disregard f()r individual freedom. In a book published late in
I
I
1947 the American joUrnalist Walter Lippmann applied an'equally memorable label to •
the struggle between the United
StaJ~s
and the Soviet Union-"Cold WaL"
In this
conflict with another ex ansive ower the United States assumed
only gradually its neW'role as the W6rki leader of what came to be known as the free
world. in this struggle.! only gra~uall,r. The American public had different expectations:
prompt demobilization of its armed forces and a return to a normal, peacetime existenc6.
At the end of the war the country expeeted to demobilize its military forces and return to
a normal, peaeetime 61,tistenee.Bydegrees, however, ~the U.S. government took the
I
195 See "Revised Plan for Level oflQdustry in the Combined U.S.,.U.K. Zones of Germany" in US.
State Department, Germany, 358.
PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION
�\
I
�grew out of memories of the tangled politics, economics, and psychology that surrounded
reparations issues aftet World War I.
I
Ultimately,
r>
,
th~ lack of ~lear policy lines left much for the U.S. military to
interpret, improvise, apd implement. ~ligil1S and
\
dev~lopment ufU.S. restitatiuu--\
I
~1
end€lavors in the immedIate postwar era can only be UIldeI~tood within this context of
ffiYG4led policy making and execution. [this para
; '
now out of place?] YES. IT NEE-BS
I
.
I
~
']:0 BE-MOV ED:
'b)
Cold War
maj~r
:ld~nd
o~
Two other
factors impinged'on the chaos left by ,Wo
bore
the formulation of American policy towards righting the wr
Nazi persecution '
through the restoration of victims' assets. They were th
ve oviet behavior
leading to beginnings ()fthe Cold War and the dec1aratio
mdependent Jewish State
in 1948. leading to the; formation of the Je'Nish state of Israel in 194 g.
Between 1945 and 1948 the Grand Alliance that linked the United States and the
Soviet Union during World Wat II came apart. In his speeth in Fulton, Missouri on
March 5, 1946, former: British Rrime Minister Winston Ch\lrchill used the metaphor of an
I
,
,
"iron curtain" descending across Europe from the.Baltic to the Adriatic, behind which
reigned oppression an1 disregard for individual freedom. In a book published late in
1947 the American journalist Walter Lippmann applied an equally memorable label to
the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union-"Cold War."
In this
conflict with' another ex ansive ower the United States assumed
only gradually its new role as thewerlElleader of what came to be known as the free
world. in this stnlggle. only gra~l:1ally. The American public had different expectations:
prompt demobilization of its armed forces and a return to a normal, peacetime existence.
lIt the end of the war the oOl:1ntr)' e)cpeoted to demobilize its military foroes and rerum to
a normal, peaoetime existenoe. By degrees, however, it-the U.S. government took the
195
See "Revised Plan :for Level of Industry in the Combined U.S.~U.K. Zones of Germany" in
State Department, German~, 358.
u.s.
I
t~
,
�f
,
U;
#
·~·I ... Lj)LlO 'tJ~~~o~~~
~
,~!
~;
i·',
~oncerningcie~~nOlnic
initi live in ?vercoming IhJimpasse
recovery. In the.
'
easte ~edlterranean, ~ Wester;n p~n:aker ~w~m~umst msurrectlOn Ao~threa
the govenunent :of Greec~n90ovlet pre~~Ee tllr"'n+:~- ..-." '
t='"",. ~
Turke,Y .the United States assun:ed r~~}JonsibilitiesATharn~: . ,
i~.st·
by Bntam. In March 1947 PresIdent Truman asked Congress '
, La.~ .
'-) . S~.;~ ~
and economic aid to help G~eece and'Turkey resist internal a1 '
remain "free peoples." In his address, to Congress presenting ;! '
(¥'J'''~
known as the Truman Docntne, the p'r.esident expressed a wilL.,;,.~. t"'~~ ,v"ohLl:'l-Ll!. s~,J...::::::::~.
assistance to any nation that; faced a comparable threar:FbOTN,OTE NEEDED _.~
!
The European Reco~ery Proghun of 1947 mark:edrepreseateaaJ:r01lrerSrepin the
'
American Uaited States' path to world leadership. Outlined by Secretary of State George
C. Marshall, aH4 thus oOl~oaly theprogramtoon dubbed kno',\'i1 as the Marshall PI~
offered American economic: aid to E%pean ountries willing to cooperate in the
)
economic reconstruction of purope as a whole, including the western zones of Germany.
The proposal represented an! invitatiol1 to create a new alignment based on shared
economic principles.
:
,
.
As Communist parti~s took cii,etat@rial control of governments in Eastern Europe
in which they had begun as minority partners in putatively pluralistic coalitions-Poland
in January 1947, Hungary i~ June, anct Czechoslovakia in February-March 1948-Soviet
intentions seemed progressively ffiors to threaten the Western half of the continent as
well. In March 1948 Presid~nt Trum<in sent a special message to: Congress asking for
authorization to reinstitute peacetime'qonscription for military service, affinning
American participation withi West European states in acommon 'military defense. These
steps confirmed a new direction in AIl}erican foreign policy~ resi'stance to and
"containment!! of the 0XiteRsi@R @fSoYlet power in Europe and around the globe.
tJ ~~t.tJ.
I
j
.
.
i?.u,..::"
.
The new policy of a ~ommon 'defense linking ~ith western Europe
._0'
'.-~'-'-'
StflLt;~j'
,
received an was immediate~ tested in. defeated Gennany's histoiic capital., Berlin.
Althou h the cit
ct-c-~,td
i
VI
I
la ; within the Soviet Zone of bccu ation each of the
; ~e.lh\;~ ~
:
four powers ~a secto,r of/eeetl:]mti'0l'l within Berlia and es~blished a military qoV~'("Vl ~
~~
IX
D
;
~. tller0, although th~I city la;'cQffiPletely vt'ithin the Soyiet Zone of occupation.
;
. .
I
I
As postwar tensions increas~d among: the occupying powers over how to
i1!~~~~!!!~~~~~¥£J~!S!~ fJllt
."r-
",'
clp,::ll with
western resolve ffi,
"'
(I June 1948 the Soviets blockaded land access'aoross their l30ne Ti:r BerHiilFonithe' three
~f..S
i
I
.
'
western~~f Germany.j Short ofEonfronting the Red Army. For nearly a year the
I
.
west could only gain access to Berlin ,WitllOut directly confronting the Red AfffiY through
I '
.
PHOTOCOPY
PRe:SEAVA+r~l
,
I
..
'
,
�CtK')~ut - M
U{ ~<''CAA.lr!S.
1
lb~HtU!Jr
�~i4 u~u;;L~~~
'~i
..
~e
~.
~onomic
initi tive in overcoming
impa$se concerning Ger
recovery. In the
.
Western
insurrection
....
easte
threa . the governm~nt of Gn~ec~n9(Soviet pre~~~e threatemg the government of
Turkey the United States assumed re~ponsibilitie~'t1iaTh":a'1fra.itionally been exercised :
by Britain. In March 1947 President Truman asked Congress for $400 million in military
.
and economic aid to help Greece and Turkey resist internal al}d external thre~~o
remain "free peoples." I~ his add~ess to Congress presenting the policy that became ..:
known as the Truman Doctrine, the president expressed a_}Yilling.oos&te-gxtelli.~~----assistance to any nation that faced ,a comparable threa@OTNOTE NEEDED __ ~
:
The European Recovery Program of 1947 marked repfe seITI:eEhm-oth-erstep in the :
American United ~tates' path to world leadership. Outlined by Secretary of State George
C. Marshall, and, thus eommonl)' the program.~oon dubbed knOV,"l1 as the Marshall Pla~!
offered American economic aid to European 20untries willing to cooperate in the
).
economic reconstruction of Europe as a whole, including the western zones of Germany.
The proposal represented :an invitation to create a new alignment based on shared
economic principles.
€
As Communist parties took, lietat@rial control of governments in Eastern Europe
in which they had begun as minority partners in putatively pluralistic coalitions-Poland
in January 1947, Hungary in June, and Czechoslovakia in February-March 1948-Soviet
intentions seemed progres:siyel)' more to threaten the Western half of the continent as
well. In March 1948 PresiClent Truman sent a special message:to Congress asking for
authorization to reinstitute peacetime conscription for military service, affirming
American participation with West European states in a common military defense. These
steps confirmed a new direction in American foreign policy~ resistance to and
"containment" OftR@ @}(t@~8i@R @fSoviet power in Europe andaround the globe.
Mediterranean;-~
p~maker=e~~1.pvttommunist
A.~
I
The new policy of a commop. defense linking t~ith western Europe
reeeived an was immediatelY tested in defeated Germany's historic capital sity, Berlin.
.
.
Althou h the cit
(I~c.~itd
four powers ~-a
nVI on la 'within the Soviet Zone of occu ation each of the
. ~e. lh~~ ~
..
• .,
..
sec~or 0fet'£~Wfi ,:t,'lthm Berlm and establIshed a mIlItary
~~,
~.
'
1oV t.'('\A ~
'
there, although the eit)' lay eompletel)' within th~
,
~oviet
Zone of oeeupation.
I
As postwar tensions increased among the occupying powers over how to.deal with
I
"
"I
defeattGermany-and with one another- in June 1948 the Soviet Union.1.i&lated the
~
.
.
~meflts-i+ha
I '
.
.
- - - - -ellaBen
.
/ .
put western resolve to the test by blocking -ffi
("'~e 194 g the ~~'viets bloe~aded larid access aeross their zone ~o Berlin from the three
~~
.
western~~f Germany. Short of confronting the Red Army, For nearl), a year the
west could only gain access! to Berlin 'Nithout direetly eonfronting the Red Army through
,
�I
established air IIcorridors." Theidaily flights to Berlin, known as "the Berlin Airlift,"
!
. "".'.'
showed western resolve and the Soviets eventually dropped the land blockade. 8¥entually
I
.,'
,
I
>(
breakiag tl'te goyiet blockaae. :
i
bet~een't
The conflict clasees
..S.-Ie
estern allies, led by ilie Uaitea gtates,
and the Soviet Union emerged slowly, attTtwas not foreseen in the plans drawn ilia _ t.&t
fFafRework teat coaaitioaea pl~l1l1iag iorthe occupation of Germany in 1945 O~~wN"
reconstruction of Europe. In devising pl'agmatic solutions to immediate problems,
American olic makers were driven b "r' devastation of war and ;the plight of the
victims of Nazi persecution, ra~er tha~
~gical conflict with the Soviet Union. tlra¥e
Uaitea gtates policy makers to :ae'leloppfagmatic soh:l:tioas to immeaiate problems.
Nonetheless, a deepening ilia mistrust ofCommunism and the Soviet Union came to
dominate iliat prevailea ia m~r leadersilip circles in American society, government, and
business, prompting reiaforoea1tl'te peflclla:ffi of policy makers to dehy any give no
advantage to their Soviet count~rparts their agents who had seized taker!: control of the
countries of eastern Europe. ~us, the Qpld War shaped ana iflteflsifiea attitudes in the
United States that at times worl,<ed again'$t restoration oflooted assets to individuals
whose assets would only restotea 'Nealtlt migHt easily be expropriated once again, this
time by the new Communist re~imes €lFdJ!@ fmB:I2ag€! against :l2rivat@
:l2f€l:l2€!rty. €lfeast€!fR _
: -Ir:".K
EUf€lP@.
; '
,
_.
,,?{"~_~P"V'"
ot
c)
Jr.i'
(ijreation of Israel
i
.
•
A4
~~
~ ~part oftI;etlJ,~~e "Ofilto create :'.
~~~Icr~~
~~~
..
t-\"
()~ \,.('l?~
•
!
:'"
'.
._, ,_
•
,,'
LcJ·', __.: •. ~~~
&a~, ~ere Jews had ea;~ir ?;~kia~~!:t;(le ~fl~
eOflaitiofliflg American attitua:s and pol,ieies. gpecifically, tee eeirless assets restituted
~
~~~~
The aisplacement of tl16usaaaspfJe'\vish SUJ:'riv'ors of \'Vorld War II in Europe
promptea many Jewish eommqnal organi:2latiofls to urge as an immediate goal ifl 1945 46
tile transfer to Palestine of 100;000 Jew~housea in camps for displEwea persons ifl tee
An'l:erican 13oa8. Palestine had not beeRapartieularly Gttraeti'le destiaation, even for most
European Jews fleeing Hitler's: Gfllrman:}lbefore ilia war, but restrictioas on immigration
from DP camps to tee Unite a ~tates (an:(J to a lesser 'aegree to Canaaa, A"ustralia, and
_:
I
~lqllS~J'i~g~~~
~~ ~
.
~
'.
~.
,-
~ ~
'.
A1~~~V..S.~
Pl10Tot6pv
PRE;SERVAt'ON
��established air flcorridors."The daily flights to Berlin, known as "the Berlin Airlift,"
I
,
showed western resolve and the Soviets eventually dropped the land blockade. eventl:lally
breaking tae eO'liet blooka~e.
/'
-x..
tl~~stetn
. The conflict slaslles between
allies, lea by tile Vailea gtales,
and the Soviet Union emerged slowly, an 'Tt was not foreseen in the plans drawn the _
frameJt'!'ork taat oonditioned plar.1l:ing for the occupation of Ger!nany in 1945 O~*wM
reconstruction of Europe. .In devising pragmatic solutions to immediate problems,
American olic makers were driven b ths.~evastation of war and the plight of the
victims of Nazi persecution, rather thaI( tr~l)gical conflict with the Soviet Union. 4re¥e
Unite a etates policy makers to delt'elop pragmatic solutions to immeaiate problems.
Nonetheless, a deepening the mistrust of Communism and the Soviet Union came to
dominate that prevailed in many leadership circles in American society, government, and
business, prompting rainfo,rcea the penchant of policy makers to deny any give no
advantage to their Soviet cbunterparts or their agents who had seized taken control of the
countries of eastern Europe. Thus, the Cold War shaped and intensifiea attitudes in the
United States that at times1worked against restoration oflooted assets to individuals
whose assets would only restorea J.vealth might easily be expropriated once again, this
time by the new CommunIst regimes @n t'ke FaFRFage against Frivate Fr@Ferty. @f eastern
t..w
Elir@fH\~.
c)
$r.~;
.
Creation ofIsrael
.
~~
•
-xk;
~~:::a:~~.j~J,Hl.:r~
~, ~ere Jews aad,ha!=ir ?;/n kin~~:~le ~n ~
60nditiolliag Ameri6an
aU~tl:ldes and poli6ias.
epe6ifically, the aeirless assets restitl:lted
~
t:~g~a::'~~esgo;/e~z~
~to~~~-)~I
. The aisplaoement Of thol:lsanas of Jevt'ish sl:lrvivors of Worla War II in El:lrope
promptea many Je'Nish oommunal organi:cations to urge as an immeaiate goal in 1945 46 ,
the transfer to Palestine of 100,000 Jews housed in camps for displa6ea persons in the
A..m erican :cone. Palestine: haa not ~een a parti61:1larly aUra6th'e aestination, even for most
El:lropean Jews fleeillg Hitler' s G~rlnany before the Vlar, but restri6tions Oil immigration
from DP oamps to the Uni,ted etates (and to a lesser aegree to Canaaa, 1\:l:lstralia, ana
....
~{q4i~/~*g~~~
~~'
o-vt~
.:
,-
~'"
,~.
-1~~~j),,~.~
�Brazil), strengthened the' lure ofPal'estine.1ge Moreover, the United States, its western I
allies, and non governmental organil3ations restituted heirless assets to the IRQ, ",{hich in
turn dispensed a total 0['$10.25 rnillion to the i\rnerican Jewish Joint Distribution
COR1ffiission and the Jel,~'ish AgeRcy FOr Palestine between 1947 and 1953.197
The IRO staunchly refuseE;! to fund irnrnigration of displaced persons to the nevI
state of Israel. It argued:that such imrnigration arnounted not to resettlernent but to
recruitment FOr the Israeli arrn;r then fighting against the Arabs. l'ionetheless, this rnoney
certainly aided the absorPtion of iptrnigrants into the ne'tV le"i/ish state. In a sense, the
!
decision rnakers involvep. in the disposition of heirless assets: both the representatives of
the United States and of\he Jewish cornmooity
rnay have elevated a perceived
..:t6
communal need o'r'er individual deeds in relation ~ vt'hose oVl'Rership was even -~~
,
- ~~ :_~ -I- 7~ ~ _';J" t-. ~ ......
difficHlt to ascertain.
~ '!l(r~T-~,A,t) ~J:lt&2:ff.JaI!_.ht;;q;;~~i!P _
.' .,)
r)~
~~~~
Before World War II
d
.'
alestine was not a magnet ~:-for the ~ajo.rity of Europe~ ~s fleeing H~t1e:'s G.ilman~.T-~t:i-t;i.sft 0J?l'0sition- ~ ... ~
calew.i.s.hit+tl.ux further dlSCOtU;aged PQlentJallmmlgt1Ms~~~~ers deCIded by
early 1944 that anv mass postwar migration would have to be to Palestine, with or
----without British approvaLill The war did not change British visa policies. But restrictions
on emigration from DP camps to the United States (and to a lesser degree to Canada,
Australia, and Brazil) persuaded many uprooted Jew to decide in favor of Palestine. 199
The hornelessness and misery of tens of thousands of Jewish survivors of World War II
in Europe prompted Jewish organizations in the United .States and elsewhere to urge as ari
196 Peter Duignan and L.H. Gann, The Rebirth ofthe West. The Americanization
I
-
'
.
ofthe Democratic World, 1945-1958 (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackledge, 1992),314-15.
i
197 IRO Financial Transactions with Voluntary Agencies, Jan. 13, 1953,
.
I
American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee Archives AR45/64, fil~ 3840. [from
J
~
---------
Edelheit, no bates #s]
193
______
-------~~~--:------_..J
Abn.)halll .I. Ede1heitl The H%{:oilsf omIt .,,.,' .., J{he Siale o/Jsmel: A Reassessment
Reassessed. " (Jewish Politic,11 StlldicsRcvic\<:LioL 11,97-112.
..
199 Peter Duignan and L.H. Gann, The Rebirth ofthe We~t. The Americanization o/the Democratic
World, /945-1958 (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackledge, 1992),314-15.
.
�1
I
..
.
immediate goal in 1945-46 the transfer to Palestine of 100,000 Jews housed in DP camps
d but once the Jewish State declared its
in the Am ican zone. Britain: .
inde endence e
es were flun 0 e and American Jewish or anizations focused on
finding the resou s fora-ina:ss~l:esettlement of European Jews in the safe and permanent
' - -,
haven of Israel.
While scholars have long recog!l!zed the political links between the Holocaust
and the rise of the State of Israel, the importance of economic links has become clear
only recently.!.!!!! Heirless assets looted by"the Nazis but restituted by U.S. government
agencies to Jewish organizations pl~lYed significant though perhaps llQt decislVf~ mlp ;'"
building the Jewish State, helping to facilitate the rapid resettlei
thousands of European refugees unaer~hat otherwise would h~
conditions. For instance, the Internktional Refugee Organizatiof,
$10,250,000 to the Ameriean Jewish Joint Distribution Commil,
I
,'Agency for Palestine (JA) :for transportation and resettlement cd
,____" . __...---.,--------..
between 1947 and 1953.~ Had it nbt been for the funds restitutedlfifoughihe"iRO, the
activities on behalf of DPs' by the IDC, lA, and other organizations would have been
considerably more difficult, if not impossible. This is so despite the fact in 1948~49 the
IRQ finnly refused to fund DP emigration to the nascent State ofIsrael, arguing that such
migration constituted recruitment for Israel's military then engaged in its War of
Independence. ~.1
.
'
While the recise ro ortion of Je . .assets-in-the IRO 0 eratin bud et caml0t
such assets es eciall
be ascertained there are in'dications of ;...---in reports regarding restitution efforts reIatmg to non-monetary gold. In April 1948 - the
month before Israel declared its independence - the IRQ announced that up to 90 percent
of $96,000 LET'S TALK ABOUT' TH~S! looted by the Nazis from death camp victims
',..c..
and redeemed by the Treasury Department would be earmarked for rehabilitating Jewish ~ _
DPs.~
, --' ~",?~\f.,4c"",fV
a
?
III.
CONCLUSION
,
I
As soon as it gaine<;l power in 1933, the Nazi Party began to turn into laws and
olicies "the race science" Adolf Hitler
tkt.. natural law" b
TO
osed in his Mein Kam .
7JU~m:~"A, ""'"
of
other races that must be wiped out, the R.-eich's policies on Jews escalated from forced
emigration to "Aryanization" ofbusines~enterprises to the "Final Solution" of genocide.
PHOTOCORY
PRES'ERVAT!ON
�-~.
\
-~~"'~
V'1-~ ,.~ ~.tkS~~
�immediate goal in 1945-46 the transfer to Palestine of 100,000 Jews housed in DP camps
in the American zone. Britain . eted but once the Jewish State declared its
inde endence e
es were fiun
ns focused on
findin the res our s forarr'i~-:-·-'ean Jews in the safe and ermanent
haven of Israel.
While scholars have lorig recognized the political links between the Holocaust I
and the rise of the State of Israel, the importance of economic links has become clear '
only recent1y.~ Heirless assets:Iooted by the Nazis but restituted by U.S. government
agencies to Jewish organizations played a significant though perhaps not decisive role in
building the Jewish State, helping to facilitate the rapid resettlement of hundreds of
thousands of European' refugees under what otherwise would have been far harsher
conditions. For instance, the International Refugee Organization (IRO) reimbursed
$10,250,000 to the American Jewish Jornt Distribution Committee (JDC) and the Jewish
Agency for Palestine (JA) for transportation and resettlement costs for 120,000 DPs
between 1947 and 1953.~ Hadiit not been for the funds restituted through the IRO, the:
activities on behalf ofDPs by the JDC. JA, and other organizations would have been '
considerably more difficult, if not impossible. This is so despite the fact in 1948-49 the:
IRO firmly refused to fund DP emigration to the nascent State of Israel, arguing that such
migration constituted recruitment for Israel's military then engaged in its War of
Independence. ~.? ~
•
While the recise ro ortion of Je . -assets-in-the IRO 0 eratin bud et cannot
be ascertained, there are indications of /"'"
such assets es eciall
in reports regarding restitution efforts relatmg to non-monetary gold. In April 1948 - the
month before Israel declared its independence - the IRO announced that up to 90 percent
of $96,000 LET'S TALK ABOUT THIS! looted by the Nazis from death camp victims
' ..c..
and redeemed by the Treasury Department would be earmarked for rehabilitating Jewish ~ ~ 7
DPs.~
~
: "i(l:I,.\.f,..~...,.,(l,I
III.
CONCLUSION
As soon as it gained power in 1933, the Nazi Party began to turn into laws and
i
~-t.d. ~
I
olicies "the race science" Adolf Hitler ro osed in his Mein Kam .
t\.~ natural law" b
of
other races that must b~ wiped out, the Reich's policies on Jews escalated from forced
emigration to "Aryanization" of business enterprises to the "Final Solution" of genocide:
I
Abr~ham J. EdeJI1~i:t, The Holo,call~'1 a~d the Rise (d,'the," State (?j'1srael.' A Reassessmel1t
,
' '
Reas'iessed, " (JeWish Political Studies ReView) Vol. J2, 97-112.
2(10
20\ IRO Financial Tran~actions with Voluntary Agencies, January 13, 1953, Americun Jewish Join!
Distribution Committee Archives AR45/64, File 384(}, NO BATES STAMP
201.1TA Daily News Bulletin, April 7, 1948, p.' 4
J'
,
�-I-p
But whether uprooting or exterminating people, Nazi officials also took great careATI. first
-
I
I
them of whatever the' owned.:
THe }-~azi regime l:tndertoolc an l:tnpr!,!eedefttedprogram to,perseel:tte and
exterminate entire eategories of people. The deatH: earnps '<'rere the IHanii'estation of a
)OIig staIiding Nazi eampaign ~f diseriIl'iint¥ion against Je'<'rsand oilier "undesirables. "
After gaining power iIi 1933, Adolf Hitl'er'El party began to irnplemeftt la'<'rs based on anti
8emitism, raeism, aIid tHe }-~azi eoneept ofthe Aryan ideal botH to rid the ReieH of its
enemies and to eJEpropriate tHeir yall:tables~,These polieies esealated from forGed
emigration to "AryaIiization" ofbl:tsiness erl'terprises to tHe "Final 801l:ttioIi" ofgeIioeide.
I
.
'.\Qlile eradiGating "l:tIidesirable" peoples from El:trope, Nazi offiGials took great Gare to
seize anytHing of yall:te from tHeir maIiY Yi.6tims.
For Americans
hard-to-believef[tcts of Nazi tHose in tHe United 8tates, tHe
atrocities~';e . A-
~s soldiers and other officials who toured the camps
:
reported back te-#ie home. front.
)1~'.
By~
' .
ft:!w questIOned why the Umted States h::Jn .
I
been at war with Nazi Germany. In the 19JOs, however, Amer
American public were preoccupied with domestic issues, most'
Great Depression, and)o1! resisted political invol vement i~n;lUIrcIiilt
later -~ailii.t -" "-""--".-.--".
, tHe grovllIig trol:tbles io/Europe. Many supported isolationist
/JUI
.
and the perseverance of an
policies until i\xis atrocities
astute American president Presideftt FrE$kUl): Rooseyelt moved the government to assist
;
,.
AM~~'7~" ~~~
European nations as they fell p~ey to Germl;ln ~essio1·.
~~71~
~V--YL
1=.
p.~~,
~
,
;t
~,
~L~
~~ iA.-- 5
.J-",.... ~
/Lt> ~;,v~,.
.
�[
�.
-W
I
But whether uprooting 'or exterminating people, Nazi officials also took great care;TI first
.
7
i
stri,infthem of what~ver they owned.
.'
I
The l'+azi regime l:mdertook an unprecedented program to persecute and
e1cterminate entire categories of people. The death camps '..,;ere the manifestation of a
long standing l'~azi campaign of discrimination against Jews and other "undesirables. "
After gaining power in 1933, Ad\3lfHitler's party began to implement laws based on anti.
I
£emitism, racism, and the Nazi concept of the Aryan ideal both to rid the Reich of its
enemies and to e1cpropriate their ';'aluables. These policies escalated from forced
emigration to "Aryaniza.tion" of business enterprises to the "final £olution" of genocide..
I
I
While eradicating "undesirable" peoples from Europe, l'~azi officials took great care to
seize anything of value from their many victims.,
I
For Americans
atrocities~~e .
hard-to-believe facts of Nazi those in the United £tates, the
as soldiers and other officials who toured the camps
L
:
reported back te-ths home. front.
)1~
.
few questioned why the United States had
By~
w'··
been at war with Nazi G~rmany. Ip the 1930s, however, American leaders and the
American public were preoccupied with domestic issues, most notably the effects of the
Great Depression, and>4resisted p~litical
involvem~nt i r a t ChurchtIT later caTlet!
~~~~!!!l1t:§~:m;&-t!:~5f€l>Wtng-4rE..ue~Hj Eur~pe.
Many supported isolationist
~g.§.i!!)~:!!!!~~eft6Ul~ast~~*6tgft-e'rref'HS
and the perseverance of an
astute American president Preside$ franklin Roosevelt moved the government to assist
..
European nations as they fell prey to German
~~71~
~ Cc-tA..
1=.lt
~
,
.~
~- '
- ~.;.....; ;..t
,,~,
~ K... ~
4::=:~ u.~.~-
�After the United States en~ered thf! war in late 1941-united with a traditional
~~
friend, Great Britain, and linked t~ a new ¥lpd unexpected ally, the Soviet Union-the
~
~~
government concentrated on upholding the remarkable coalition and defeating the ~
•
v
_
J$oo
~
~,
enemy. The three powers, supported by Fti;!e French Forces,;
(J~ .•
;~'~eJ:s
won the war, and im'aded and occupied a ruined Germany.
~ w.tH ~'l
impose order on a devastated society and economy. In Germany and Austria, the
occupiers had to repair roads, railways ang waterways, housing, and other infrastructure.
Moreover, Allied armies cared for the millions of victims ofNazism and refugees in the
two countries. These victims-Jews and non-Jews, living and dead-and indeed many
victims elsewhere in Europe, had been stripped of their assets for the benefit of the Third
Reich. The United States came i]1to posst!~sion of these assets in a variety of ways, in
part through Treasury Department action .<l~ early as 1940 to freeze foreign assets, in part
,
through discovery and seizure by invading troops. The question of h~w to return
valuables to their rightful owners had to yie. for the attention of occupation officials and
I
policy planners in Washington \\;'ith the problems of providing food, shelter, medicine,
vic~ims
I"tt.t:"
.:r~.
Even while troops were shll fight!9~, the armies and OL~"-vr5UHl:canons-seI-oun6-'
and other necessities to Nazi
,A""
•
and 9ther displaced persons in the former Reich.
During the war officials In Washim~ton had addressed the subject of property
looted by the Nazis as one among the many problems spawned by the conflict. After
achieving victory in Europe theY, confront~d the complicated and challenging tasks of
occupation and restitution. The presidentcmd the Departments of War, State, and
I
Treasury struggled to formulate policies for the military and civilian government of
Germany, including a policy on restitutiQP of victims' assets.
PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION
-,
�~'\hili
I'f..r
tUr
w.
~,t...r
::r~.
�. I
I
.
i
.
i
.
!
After the lJnited Stafes enter9d the war in late 1~41-unfted with a traditional
friend, Great Britain, and liked to a
he~ and unexpectecl ally, the Soviet Union-the
.:
~
~ J5-'
.
gov~nunenf concentrated o~ upholdihg the feffi.d!.l,'e coaiitiori and defeating the Na.i J\~.~
~~~.~,
enemy. The threeyowers,
~upportedi by Free French Forces, maintained their alliance,
Ei :
.
won t he war, an d lll',zaEi 8~ atEi
; d a rume d Germany.
.
occup~e
!
.'
K£·
~.\lI\
i :
.
.
Even while troops were still. fighting, the armiesand other organizations set out to
,
,
.
i
.
i .'.
impose order on a devastate,d societYland economy. In Germany and Austria, the
h~using,:and other infrastructure.
occupiers . to repair' roads,railways and waterways,
had
, '
1
•
,
.
Moreover, Allied armies cated for th~ millions of victims ofNazisp1 and. refugees ip. the
I
,
•
. !
two countries. ,These victims-Jews:and non-Jews, living anddead-.and indeed many
.
,
victims elsewhere in"Europ~, had be~n stripped of their assets for the benefit of the Third
,
'
1
"
'
Reich. The United States c~me into possession of these assets i~ a variety of ways, in
,
i
.
part through TreasuryDepartment ac:tion as early as 1940 to freeze foreign assets, in part
through discovery and seizrtre by inv:ading troops~ The questiori ofhow to. return
,
"l
"
:'
'.
":
valuables to their rightful owners had to vie for the attention of 0ccupation officials (illd
,
.
.
,
i
.
policy planners in:Washington with .the problems ofproyiding food, shelter, medicine,
: !
I'
l
'
•
i
'
and other necessities to Nazi victims;and other displacedperson~ in the former Reich.
!
,
I
I
During the war offi+als in Washington had addressed th~ subject of property'
,
~:
looted by the Nazis as one among the many problems spawned by the conflict. After
i
'i
achieving victory in Europe: they confronted the complicated and challenging tasks of
I
,
.
occupation and restitution: lhe president and the Departments Qf War, State, and
Treasury struggled to forimilate poliCies for the inilitary and 'civilian government of
,
Germany, including a polict on restitution ofvicti~s' assets.
I
. I
.~~ . ~
~.
�Complicating the matter, was the distinction between "e:
,
restitution. External restitution :refers to th~ process whereby l
,
certain categories of materials found in Germany or Austria to '-u'-U"u_.~,~.~,., . :"C_"~-"'.r'---'-"""'_' ___"__ ." ... '
,
wer.e stolen. These categories, defined fir~t l:>Y the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the' autumn of
945 and approved by the Allied Control (::9uncil in January 1946, included artworks,
machinery, heavy agricultural and industri;:tl equipment, locomotives, rolling stock,
barges, transportation equipment (except for sea-going vessels), and communication and
I
,
power equipment. Internal restitution was the process whereby the United States
,
returned property located within Germany ()f Austria stolen from victims. Significantly,
individuals living in countries outside of q~rmany and Austria at the end of the war could
and did claim internal restitution of property. Military Government Law 59, promulgated
on November 10, 1947, regulated internal fc:stitution in Germany. Through a series of
laws known as the First Restit~tion Law, S<j!c;ond Restitution Law, and so forth, the
,
.
Austrian govermnent administered internal restitution in that country.
I
e..\ 'tAr' ~; t\.(,()\(.S
Lacking specific guidelines from Washington, the U.S. United States Army on the
I
'
ground in Germany and Austria, lacking sp~cific guidelines from Washington, issued its
own directives to manage the 9ccupation. The army took the lead to bring order out of
chaos in Germany and Austria, to care for those persecuted by the Nazis, and to begin
returning stolen property. Only later did other govermnental and international agencies
join the army as custodians of victims' ass~ts in Europe. WithIn the United States the
Treasury Department undertook a simi'lar rpJe.
!
,
The Nazi campaign against Jews al1Q other "non-Aryans" began with
,
..
discriminatory legislation in i 933 and endc:,O only when the regime collapsed in defeat in
[PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION
�I
�· Complicating the' matter was the distinction between ','external" and "internal"
I
'
I
restitution. External restitution refers to the process whereby. U.S. authorities returned
,
certain categories of materiais foup.d in Germany or Austria to countries from which they :
wer.e stolen. These categories, defined first by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the autumn of
945 and approved by the Allied. Control Council in January 1946, included artworks,
,
machinery, heavy agriculFural and industrial equipment, locomotives, rolling stock,
barges, transportation equipment (except for sea-going vessel~), and communication and
power equipment. Internal restitution was the process whereby the United States
returned property located within Germany or Austria stolen from victims. Significantly,
individuals living in countries outside of Germany and Austria at the end of the war could
and did claim internal resVtution o~ property. Military Government Law 59, promulgated
I
on November 10, 1947, regulated internal restitution in Germany. Through a series of
laws known as the First Rbtitution: Law, Second Restitution Law, and so forth, the.
Austrian government administered internal restitution in that country.
~\fUY"/~;~\'('l1\(.$
:
Lacking specific guidelines from Washington, the U.S. United £tates Army on the
ground in Germany and Austria, lacking specific guidelines from Washington, issued its
I
own directives to manage t,he occupation. The army took the lead to bring order out of
chaos in Germany and Austria, to care for those persecuted by the Nazis, and to begin
!
returning stolen property. Only later did other governmental and international agencies
join the army as custodians: of victims' assets in Europe. WithIn the United States the
Treasury Department undertook a similar role.
I
I
The Nazi campaign'against Jews and other "non-Aryans" began with
I
discriminatory legislation i~ 1933 and ended only when the regime collapsed in defeat in
I
�,/1
'I'
1945. The extensive material damage, the enormous human suffering, and the
I ,
I
international dislocation at war's end all made the occupation"the reconstruction of civil
society, and the re-creation of a viable international order into daunting tasks for the
,
I t , .
victors. How the United States undertook the arduou~ challe~ges-nearly without
precedent in the histo~y of postwar settlements-to recover looted assets, to attempt to
establish their original o~nership, and to restitute those assets to the victims of the
Holocaust is the focus of subsequent chapters.
end
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets in the United States, formed in 1998, was charged with investigating what happened to the assets of victims of the Holocaust that ended up in the possession of the United States Federal government. The final report of the Commission, <a href="http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/pcha/PlunderRestitution.html/html/Home_Contents.html"> “Plunder and Restitution: Findings and Recommendations of the Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets in the United States and Staff Report"</a> was submitted to President Clinton in December 2000.</p>
<p>Chairman - Edgar Bronfman<br /> Executive Director - Kenneth Klothen</p>
<p>The collection consists of 19 series. The first fifteen series of the collection are composed mostly of photocopied federal records. These records were reproduced at the National Archives and Records Administration by commission members for their research. The records relate to Holocaust assets created between the mid 1930’s and early 1950’s by a variety of U. S. Government agencies and foreign sources.</p>
<p>Subseries:<br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Art+and+Cultural+Property+">Art and Cultural Property</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Gold+">Gold</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Gold+Team+Review+Form+Binders+">Gold Team Review Form Binders</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Art+and+Cultural+Property+and+%E2%80%9COthers%E2%80%9D+Review+Form+Binders">Art and Cultural Property and “Others” Review Form Binders</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Non-Gold+Financial+Assets+Review+Form+Binders">Non-Gold Financial Assets Review Form Binders</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+Associates+Binder+">History Associates Binder</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Non-Gold+Financial+Assets+Review+Form+Binders+%282%29">Non-Gold Financial Assets Review Form Binders (2)</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Financial+Assets+Documents">Financial Assets Documents</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=RG+84%2C+Foreign+Service+Posts+of+the+State+Department%E2%80%94Turkey">RG 84, Foreign Service Posts of the State Department—Turkey</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Financial+Assets+Documents">Financial Assets Documents</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=%5BJewish+Restitution+Successor+Organization+%28JRSO%29%2C+Oral+Histories%5D&range=&collection=20&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">[Jewish Restitution Successor Organization (JRSO), Oral Histories]</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=PCHA+Secondary+Sources">PCHA Secondary Sources</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Researcher+Notes">Researcher Notes</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Unnumbered+Documents+from+Archives+II+and+Various+Notes">Unnumbered Documents from Archives II and Various Notes</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=RG+260%2C+Finance+Inventory+Forms">RG 260, Finance Inventory Forms</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Reparations">Reparations</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Chase+National+Bank">Chase National Bank</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Administrative+Files">Administrative Files</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Art+%26+Cultural+Property+Theft">Art & Cultural Property Theft</a></p>
<p>Topics covered by these records include the recovery of confiscated art and cultural property; the reparation of gold and other financial assets; and the investigation of events surrounding capture of the Hungarian Gold Train at the close of World War II. These files contain memoranda, correspondence, inventories, reports, and secondary source material related to the final disposition of art and cultural property, gold, and other financial assets confiscated during the Holocaust.</p>
<p>For more information concerning this collection consult the<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/35992"> finding aid</a>.</p>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
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Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/35992" target="_blank">Collection Finding Aid</a>
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/1040718" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Extent
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2954 folders
Text
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Original Format
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Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Drafts and Comments - Chapter 2 [1]
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets in the United States
Art & Cultural Property Theft
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Box 169
<a href="http://clintonlibrary.gov/assets/Documents/Finding-Aids/Systematic/Holocaust-Assets.pdf" target="_blank">Collection Finding Aid</a>
<a href="http://catalog.archives.gov/description/6997222" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Format
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Adobe Acrobat Document
Publisher
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Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Medium
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Reproduction-Reference
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
6/24/2013
Source
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6997222-drafts-comments-chapter-2-1
6997222