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US RESTITUTION POLICY TOWAR.I)S HOLOCAUST VICTIMS' ASSETS .'
: 1.
From the outbreak ofWWTI to the Allied defeat of the Axis powers; the U.S.
gove~ent
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deepened its commitment to some form of policy that would direct the restitution of '
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property that had been looted by the Axis and which then lay under U.S. control. US restitution
policy was shaped within the framework of existing principles of international and domestic law
as well as the geopolitical environment that emerged at the end of the Second World War. Its
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implementation, oli the other hand, was often influenced by the realities of war-torn Europe and a
defeated Ge~any under the military occupation of the four Allied powers-the United States,
the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union. Domestically,.inter-governmental rivalries
and competing agendas for shaping post-war Europe informed the course of the US policy
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governing restitution of assets to victims of the Holocaust, as in the case of the US zone of
occupat~on
in Austria where the restitution policy was amended several times as a result of
Soviet actions ~nd the cost of the restitution progr~.1
1a.
Restitution, reparations, restoration, return-;-Arnerican officials used these
words interchangeably during and after the Second World War 1'0 denote a series of acts aimed at
fostering an equitable <:lnd fair policy towards victims of the Holocaust and their families who
had lost some, if not all, of their belongings and valuables between 1933-1945.2
Ib.
Restoration is the act of "restitution for loss, damage, etc. ,,3 Moreover, to return
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somethi~g lost or missing is similar to restoring that item, hence, a policy of return is '
synonymous with a policy of restitution. However, while restitution "implies return to the
/
See infra,:the section on US Restitution Policy in Austria.
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2 The tenn ~'restitution" has 1::leen used throughout the historical record to refer vanously to monetary reparations paid
to.AlIied governments or to victims' organizations; to reparations of industrial and capital equipment taken 'from Allied
governments, to the restoration of looted assets to countries whence these assets originated, without due consideration
for the rightful owners; and, finally, to the return of assets to the individual victims from whom they were taken
between 1933-1945.
3 Webster's New World Dictionary, Third College Edition, p. 1144. ,
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�rightful owner of something that has been taken away ... reparation refers to the making of
amends, sp~cificallY the paying of comp,ensation, for some wrong or injury, i.e., war
reparat~ons ... ,,4 Hence, for the purpose of this discussion, restitution will mean returning or
restoring to the rightful owner an item that has been taken away during an act of forcible removal
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for racial, political, or religious reasons, between 1933-1945, as distinct from repairing a wrong,
or making amends through some form of compensation.
,2.
U.S. r,estitution policy developed along several dimensions from the pre-WWII
years t? the mid-l 960s. First,. it had both an international and a domestic dimension. Its
international dimension encompassed several internation~l treaties to which the United States
was a'signatory and concerned itself mainly with assets abroad that ended up under the control of
the u.S government. The bulk ofthese assets consisted of an enormous amollnt of property
seized by the U.S. Armed Forces in the European theatre at the end of the war. The Allied
Control 'Council (ACC), which comprised the four occupying powers; and the United States ,
Military Government (OMGUS) were the principal instruments of policy formulation and
implenientation. Domestically, restitution policy was embodied principally in the Trading With
the Enemy Act (TWEA), its amendments, and the Foreign Funds Control, Division (FFC). The
implementation of restitution policy was channeled through the several pertinent government
agen~i~s including the Alien Property Custodian and its successor, the Office of Alien Property.
, 3.
Two other dimensions ofth~ policy development conc~rned the type of
property-art and cultural property versus gold and other financial assets-and whether or not
the property was identifiable or unidentifiable. U.S. restitution policy provided for a return of
property to victims through their national governments if the origir:a1 owners of the property
were identifiable. U~identifiable property was restituted to para-statal international
4
Webster's New World Dictionary, Third College Edition, p. 1137
2
�organizations such as the International Refugee Organization (IRO) or victim representative
organizations such a~ the Jewish Restitution Successor Organization (JRSO).
4.
Finally, there existed a disti~ction between restitution and war reparations. The
former involved restitution of assets looted by the Axis from occupied cOlmtries including .
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monetary gold, rolling stock, etc. War reparations irrvolved restitution as a form of P£1yment to
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the Allies and other United Nations (UN) countries for war damages and included assets such as '
industrial plants and equipment. There was a commingling of restitution and reparation language
in the formative period of Allied post-war policy (1943-1945) where the two words were used
. interchangeably. ' It was not until the Paris Reparations Conference of November-December 1945
~hat the issue of restitution was,broached at the multilateral level and segregated from
reparations.
:5.
This ,paper is a ~ork in progress. It is a first draft offering a chronological
overview of the most relevant treaties, laws, and policy directives concerned with the r~stitution
of property to victims of Nazi persecution. Greater attention is devoted to the policies affecting
restitution of property in occupied Europe.
,6.
Two aspects of policy analysis yet to be addressed are the following: first, the'
historic,al context that surrounded and influenced the poiicy development' and its application,
including specific cases of restitution; and second, as a consequence, the efficacy of the
implementation of policy decisions and directives: This first draft does not contain an
evaluative approach ofthe policies in question.
7.
The paper is divided into three main parts. The first part anchors U.S. restitution
policy in an historical context by introducing three major treaties to which the U.S. was
,
signatory-.the Hague Conventions, the Treaty ofV~rsailles and 'the Treaty 9f St. Germain.
These treaties laid out the legal principles later adoptedi:t;l the formulation of U.S. and
international restitu~ion policy.
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�'8.
The second part covers the Nazi period from 1933 to the surrender of the Third
Reich on May 9, 1945. This section addresses international agreements such as the 1943
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Declaration of London and,the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference, among others; U.S. domestic
restitution laws such the Trading With Enemy Act and the directives issued by the Foreign Funds
Control Division of the US Treasury Department; and, finally, U.S. policy toward the liberated
territories including Germany, Austria, and Italy.
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9.
The 'third part enumerates the twists and turns of American restitution policy in
the postwar period from 1945 to 1955. On the international level, it looks at international
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agreements such as the July 1945 Potsdam Protocols, the December 1945 Paris Agreement on
Repara~ions;
it covers the main U.S. restitution policy initiatives dealing with the occupied
countri,es, particularly Military Government Laws 52,
~3,
and 59. There are detailed looks at US
restitution policies governing looted securities, gold, and cultural property. Also, this paper
provides an overview of the unique aspects of the US government's restitution policy towards
Austria. 5
I
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES
9a.
Since the ultimate goal of a complete ,"restitution" policy is the material return of
the looted asset to the victim or the victim's heirs, i.e., the policy ofretum, any other form of
"restitution" necessarily falls short. International conventions and agreements dealing with
property rights stated that looting in general was u~acceptable and equal to ,an act of war
ag~inst the civilian population ofthe country under conquest and occupation. Similarly,
AlthDugh annexed tD the Third Reich during the Anschluss .of March 1938, Austria became the symbDI .of the "Nazi
victim" as enunciated at the MDSCDW CDnference .of 1943. SeniDr State Depamnent .officials (GeDrge Kennan, first and
fDremDst) relied .on a pDst-war Austria tD'be strDng, pro-Western, which wDuld serve as a Central European buffer,
between West and East, and as an .overseer .of smaller CathDlic cDuntries in the Balkans, SDutheast Europe, in dDse
cDDperatiDn with italy and the Vatican. The extremes tD which American .officials went tD appease pDst-war Austrian
gDvernment .officials belie the US gDvernment's D~sessiDn with Austria as a crossroads .of influences and a nexus .of
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�these conventions and agreements also recognized a right to "restitution," without defining
exactly howto apply this right. The United States incorporated these principles in
formulating its policies after the Second World War to deal with the question of.property
looted in war.
•
. THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS
: 10.
The Hague Convention is a series of agreements dealing with the conduct of
belligerents during periods of warfare. 6 It was adopted at the t~ of the Twentieth Century over
a period of several years and ratified by the United States, one of the many signatory ~ountries to
this groundbreaking agreement.
11.
The Hague Convention forbids any kind of "pillage"? In the case of cultural
property, for instance, it is the first attempt by the international community to codify the idea that
the cultural property of each nation must be granted special protections, especially in times of
.war. 8 . These provisions protect virtually every kind of cultural property from looting and
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destruction during wartime.
12.
Although the. Convention failed to prevent the pillage and destruction of property
during World War I, the victorious Allied and Associated Powers .·effected the return of
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plundered cultural property and restitution of other kinds of property confiscated or destroyed.
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The principles of the Hague Convention were incorporated with the treaties signed after World
War I. '
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power plays between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. This approach led to major deviations in restitution
policy that contrasted sharply with directives implemented in the US zone of occupation of Germany.
6 Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899,32 Stat. J 803 (1903) and the
Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on land, Oct. 18, 1967,36 Stat. 2277 (1911), T.S. No. 539
[hereinafter Hague Convention]. The text of the Hague Convention of 1907 is attached as Appendix 1.
7 Pillage :is the act of looting or plundering at war. See Merriam-Webster's Collegeiate Dictionary, Tenth Edition,
J 993, p. ,882.
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.8 The key protections afforded to cultural property are set forth in Article 56, which provides that "[t]he property of
municipalities, that of institutions dedicated to religion; charity and education, the arts and sciences, even when State
property; ~hall be treated as private property." ArtiCle 56 also expressly forbids any "seizure, destruction or willful
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, ,:13.
TREATY OF VERSAILLES 1919
The Treaty of Versailles is a post-WWI treaty between a defeated Germany, on
the one !hand, the United States, Britain, France and twenty-five other nations, on the other. 9 It
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provided remedies for the loss and theft of cultural property. In addition to
addressin~
the return
of looted objects to their countries of origin and compensation for objects that had been'
destroyed, the Treaty also included a novel method of replacing lost objects with objects of
comparable nature and value. 1O
3.
; 14.
TREATY OF ST. GERMAIN OF 1919
Similary, the Treaty of Peace, or "Treaty of St. Germain," was signed on
September 10, 1919, by the Allied and Associated Powers, on the one hand, and Austria, on the
other. 1r Although it reflected the ~estitution principles embodied ?y the Hague Convention, this
Treaty also included other types of property including securities, currencies and rolling stock. 12
Furthermore, it established the right .to reparatIons as recognized by the Permanent Court Of
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Internation~l Justice (PCIJ), which was established under the League of Nations. 13
damage" of or to "institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, [or] the arts and sciences, as well as "historic
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monuments, [and] works of art and science,"
9 To
be a d d e d , . .
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This issue of "reparations in kind" was to become a major stumbling block among the Allies following World War
11. For example, given the destruction of the Louvain Library by the Germans, the terms of the Treaty required
Gennany "to furnish to the University. of Louvain, ... , manuscripts, incunabula, printed books, maps, and objects of
collection corresponding in number imd value to those destroyed in the burning by Germany of the Library of Louvain,
Moreover, no statute of limitations was recognized in the Treaty, which addressed not only claims arising from World
War 1, but also some claims involving Austria and Czechoslovakia that went as far back as the Seventeenth Century
and GeT"inany was forced to retu~ to France all "trophies, archives, historical souvenirs or works of art carried away
from Fqmce by the German authorities in the course of the war of 1870-71, See article 245,
.10
II The Allied Powers were the United States, Britain, France and Japan, There were twelve nations referred to as the
Associated Powers,
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12 Article 184 provided: " , , , Austria shall effect, in accordance with the procedure laid down by the Reparation
Commission, restitution in cash of cash taken away, seized or sequestrated, and also restitution of animals, objectsof
every nature and' securities taken away, seized or sequestrated in the cases in which it proves possible to identify them
on territory belonging to, or during the execution of the present Treaty in the possession of, Austria or her allies:"
13 In the;; Chorzow Factory Case, a landmark ca~e involving P~lish expropriation ofGe~an-owned industrial property
inside ~oland, the court stated: "[R]eparation must, as. far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act
and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed, Germany
v, Poland, 1928 PCIJ (Ser. A) No, 17 (Judgment of Sept. 13, 1928),' Also, claims brought before the PCIJ could only
be claims between states,'
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�B. PRE~WAR DOMESTIC LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1938-1941
: 14a.
In the years following the rise to power of Adolf Hitler in 1933, the United
States government was less interested in the fate of Gennany's Jewish community than it was in
protecting private American investments in the newly-formed Third Reich. Few laws existed in
the United States which addressed in any straightforward manner the likelihood that personal
property belonging to persecuted members of Gennan society and forcibly removed from them
by Nazi officials, would find their way into the American marketplace without being seized or
impounded as stolen items by Customs or another American agency.14
1.
TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT (TWEA)
14b.
The Trade with the Enemy Act (TWEA), enacted in 1917, was the only major
piece of legislation available to the lawmaker if he wanted to prevent illicit transactions
involving looted asset,s from taking place in the United States. Also, the National Stolen
Property Act of 1934 was the bellwether law against the reselling of stolen property within the
borders of the United States. The question, however, was to recognize that property was being
looted ~nd forcibly removed from persecutes in Nazi Gennany and that these same goods were
likely to enter the American marketplace.
29.
TWEA was intended to ensure that domestic assets would not be available to the
eriemyand that enemy assets in the United States could not be used to benefit the enemy.
TWEAestablished the Office of the Alien Property Custodian (APC), which was empowered to
take custody of the property of anyone labeled as an enemy or ally of an enemy. It commingled
14 In the ,case of cultural property, for instance, so-called forced sales of Jewish art collections increased in frequency
after the passage of the notorious Nuremberg Laws in 1935. Auction houses, private collectors, German museums,
benefite~ from these sales and, owing to the close ties between American and German art dealers, these works-either
stolen outright or forcibly sold to non~Jewish owners-could likely end up in the American marketplace. However, no
mechanism existed in the United States to thwart these importations of works of art lind other fonns of cultural pr6perty
from Germany to the United States, or by way of a third country, since the American art world did not recognize the
severity ofthe situation in Germany as having anything to do with thesatisfaction of American art clierits.
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�enemy assets and those belonging to victims of the Nazis, 'focusing instead on the nationality of
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the hOlder of the asset and on its point of origination. IS
,29a.
During World War I, the APC had limited itself to taking custody of enemy
property. Later, however, it deCided that confiscation and sale of such property for use on
account of war claims ~ould be more beneficial to ~erican ipterests. 16 In 1934 the APC was'
abolished as a separate agency and its functions were transferred to the Department 'of Justice. 17
However, following the September 1939 outbreak of the Second World War on the European
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coritinept, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued a series of Executive Orders (E.o.s) and
Amenchnents to the Act, for the purpose of reinvigorating the TWEA and extending its reach
during the war years. IS Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau oversaw their enforcement.
30a.
As a reaction to the German invasion of Denmark and Norway in March 1940,
Roosevelt issued the first E.O.s, designed as "freezing controls" to 'prevent the Nazis from
utilizing the financial resources of foreign countries or of their nationals in the United States to
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finance,their military campaigns and occupation, costs~ E.O. 8389 established the For~ign Funds
Control Division of the Treasury (FFC) and froze Danish and Norwegian assets in the United
States ip 1940,19
15 The Trading With the Enemy Act,Oct'6, 1917, 50U.S.C App. § 2. The w~rd "enemy" was liberally interpreted
since it included enemy governments and individuals, partnerships and corporations of any natiqnality "resident within
the territory (including that occupied by the military and naval, forces) of any nation with which the United States is at
war, or r~sident without the United States and doing business within such territory ..." Moreover, many Jews with
German-sounding surnames fell prey to the enforcement of the TWEA, one of the more unfortunate consequences of
, the wartime use ofthis legal deterrent
16 The Trading With the Enemy Act, Oct 6, 1917,50 U.S.c. App. at § 12, as amended March 28,1918; 8eealso
Malcolm S. Mason, Relationship ofVested Assets to War Claims, 17 Law and Contemporary Problems 395 (1951),
Most of the custodial property was returned to its owners after the war. See Report No. 1982 of the Committee on the
Judiciary to accompany the bill S.3423 to amend the Trading With the Enemy Act, 83 rd Congress, Second Session, July
24, 1954, at 6.
17
Executive Order No. 6694 (hereinafter "E.O."), 50 U.S.C. App. §6, History, Ancillary Laws and Directives.
18
See generally p'aul V, Myron, The Work ofthe Alien Property Custodian, II Law and Contemporary Problems 76
, (1945).
19
5 P,R.1400 (1940).
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�30b.
These freezing controls were designed in spirit to protect the assets of
individuals resident of countries being overtaken by Nazi military forces. Hence, their enaCtment
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constituted a tacit acknowledgment by the US government that the potential existed for a foreign
individUal's property to be stolen by another governnient and the likelihood that hislher asset
might well be manipulated for subversive pUrposes by the governrrien~ of the occupying power,
in this case, Nazi Germany, in the, country where the asset is' located,namely, the United States.
30c.
As other nations came under the domination of the ~is Powers, freezing control
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orders were extended to cover virtually'every country in Europe, as well as China and Japa ll .
Under the Foreign Funds Control program monetary transactions in foreign exchange and
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property dealings in which any foreign party had an interest were strictly controlled. Regulations
issued ~der E.O. No. 8389 provided thai neutral countries (Sweden, Spain, Portugal arid
Switzer;land) could apply tc? the Treasury Depart.ment for licenses to engage in financial
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transactions involving frozen assets.zo Next, B.O. 8493 prohibited the acquisition, disposition, or
transfer of foreign securities and authorized the Secretary of'the Treasury to investigate, regulate
or prohibit the sending, mailing or importing of securities from any foreign country into 'the
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United States.21 General Ruling 5 provided that Custo~s officers and postal workers were to
deliver .'all securities brought into the United States, or mailed here from a foreign country, to a
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Federa~
Reserve Bank, which could release them orily upon proof that no national of any country
named in the freezing cOntrol orders had any interest in them. 22
E.O. No. 8389, § 130.1 as amended June 14,1941; reprinted in Domke"Appendix D at 439. Attached as Appendix
. This Regulation further provided that anyone in the United States having "title to, or custody, control or possession"
of any property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to which any foreign country or foreign national had any
interest in property valued at $ 1,000 or more h~d to file an annual report (Form TFR-300) with the Federal Reserve
'Bank; § i30A.
20
21
RO. No. 8389, § 130 at l3(b).
22
See Mimin Domke, Trading With the Enemy in World War Two (New York: Central ~ook Co., 1943),323-24
[hereinafter Domke].
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�·30d.
All of these preventive measures broadened the United States' understanding of
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the typ~s of assets subject to looting in countries occupied by the Nazis' military forces. Until
the out~reak of the Second World War, the main concern of the United States lay in preventing
looted liquid assets and various financial instruments from serving the interests of the occupying
power at the expense of the rightful owner and, by extension, of the American entity where the
asset was located at the time of its mishandling.
2.
OFFICE OF THE ALIEN PROPERTY CUSTODIAN(APC)
31.
The First War Powers Act of 1941 amended the TWEA, granting expanded
powers to Roosevelt, in order to "take, administer, control, lise and liquidate foreign owned
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property,,23 Roosevelt ~e-~stablished the Office of the Alien Property Custodian in the Office for
. Emergency Management and extended the powers of that office to inClude the abilit'y to "direct,
manage, supervise, control or vest" any assets that he deemed necessary. Less than six months
later E.O. 9095 further defined the powers of the Alien Property Custodian, who was
empowered, under judicial supervision, to "vest or otherwise controi business enterprises,
patents, ,copyrights and trademarks, ships and property" owned or controlled by an enemy
country or national thereof. 24 E.O. 9095 excepted "cash, bullion; moneys, currencies, deposits,
credits, credit instruments, foreign exchanges and securities" unless these assets were critical to
the security of the country.25
3la.
E. O. 9095 broadened eyen more than previous executive orders the range of
assets subject to looting or to forcible transfers of ownership which the United States wished to
control on its territory. Now, patents, trademarks, copyrights, vessels, business enterprises, and,
in general, any property owned by the national of an enemy country or the government of that ,.
23
50
u.s.C. App. §5(b). Domke; 430.
E.O. No. 9095, effective March II, 1942,7 F.R. 1971 (1942), furtheramen"ded by E.O. No. 9193, July 6, 1942,7
F.R. 5205 (1942).
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country. Although American officials 'still paid no heed. to the right of rightful owners to seek a
return of their sei:zed property, they knew which categories of assets were under assault in ~azi
occupied territories?6 .
II
,THE WAR YEARS, 1941-1945
.A. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
1. Inter-Allied Declaration Against ACts of Dispossession Committeclin Territories
Under Enemy Occupation or Control
•15.
The Inter-Allied Declaration Against Acts of Dispossession Committed in
Territories Under Enemy Occupation or Control,27 better known as the Declaration ofLondon (or
London Declaration), was adopted on January 5, 1943, by the United States, sixteen member ,
states o,fthe United Nations and the French National Committee. Although it was never ~ormally
adopted into United States law through enabling legislation, it is the document most frequently
cited as the basis for restitution in the post-WWII era. The initial impetus for the Declaration
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came from British officials who expressed their concern, as reflected in the Declaration itself,28
about the systematic spoliation of countries occupied or controlled. by the Nazis. 29
E.O. No. 9567, issl!ed on June 8,1945, 10 F.R. 6917 (June 12, 1945)..
There ,was more infonnation coming from Western and Central Europe than from Poland, owing to the higher
percentage of American investments and economic intercourse with Western and Central European countries before the
outbreak of hostilities in September 1939.
2S
26
27 Inter-Allied Declaration Against Acts of Dispossession Committed in Territories Under Enemy Occupation or
Control,S January 1943, 8 Departme~t of State Bulletin 21 (1943), see also U.S. Dept. Of State Foreign Relations of
the United States. vol.l General (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government printing Office, 1943), 439-459 [hereinafter
FRUS].'
.'
28 The Declaration of London provided that: "the Governments making this Declaration and the French National
Committee reserve all their rights to declare invalid any transfers of, or dealings with, property, rights and interests of
any description whatsoever which are, or have been, situated in the territories which have come under the occupation
or control, direct or indirect, of the Governments with which they are at war, or which belong, or have belonged, to
persons (including juridical persons) resident in such territories. This warning applies whether such transfers or
dealings have taken the form of open looting or plunder, or of transactions apparently legal in form, even when they
purport to be voluntarily effected.':
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29 Numerous policy statements issued during the immediate post-war period by the United States authorities and the
Allies confirm that the London Declaration was given the force of international law. Moreover, the language adopted
11
�16.
The Allied powers disagreed over how best to apply the tenets of the London
Declaration. The us Treasury Department, with little help from the State Department, explored
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different avenues by which to carrY its, message about outflows of looted assets reaching the,
neutral ~ountries and ultimately the Western Hemisphere. In particular, Treasury offiCials were
concerned that looted monetary gold was flowing unimpeded into and through the international
gold market. These officials' efforts led to the formulation of a declaration against Nazi
spoliations of monetary gold in occupied territories, warning neutral countries to beware that the
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Nazis were scheming to sell this gold where the demarid was high, i.e., in the neutral countries.
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2. FEBRUARY 22,1944, GOLD DECLARATION
17.
US Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau declared on February 22, 1944, that
the Unit~d States would not recognize the title of the Axis powers tq any gold that they held or
had disposed of in world markets. Accordingly; it became the policy of the Un~ted States
Treasury "not to buy any gold presently located outside of the territorial limits of the United
States from any country which has not broken relations with the Axis, or from any country which
after the date of this announcement acquires gold from any country which has not broken
relatio~s with the Axis.,,3o The London Declaration was cited as the basis for this poli~y?l
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: 3. COMBINED DIRECTNE FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN GERMANY
PRlOR:TO DEFEAT OR SURRENDER, APRIL 28, 1944
,18.
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This directive was approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS), the chiefs
of staff Of the United States and Britain, and sent to the Supreme Commander, Allied
Expeditionary Force. The directive gave GeneraL Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander
in the Declaration makes it clear that it'is to be read retroactively, as it applies to all tr~nsfers from the date of,
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occupation or control by the Germans.
NACP; RG 59; Lot File 62D115, File 91C, Box 4, Treasury Department, Gold DeclaratioriofFebruary 22, 1944.
Morgenthau cited as the basis for this policy the London Declaration, stating that: "[O]n January 5, 1943, the United
States and certain others of the United Nations issued'a warning to all concerned, and particuhirly to persons in neutral
countries, that they intend to do their utmost to defeat the methods of dispossession practiced by the governments with
which they are at war..."
30
12,
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of SHAEF, full legislative, executive, andjlidicial,.power over areas occupied. by his forces (3, a).
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Concerning property, it gave directives only regarding property of the United Nations, inchiding
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that of the United 'States and the United Kingdom. Properties in five categories were to be
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blocked which included "gold, foreign currencies, foreign securities, accounts in financial
instituti'ons, credits, valuable papers and all similar assets:" The directivernade no reference to
individ\lal Nazi vjctim property or to "duress" p~operty"32.
, 1 4. BRETTON WOODS CONFERENCE July 1944
19.
The principles embodied in the Declaration of London were confirmed by the
Final Att ofthe United Nations International Monetary and Financial Conference, better known
as the arettori Woods Conference, held at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire,in July 1944 .
. Resolutjon No. VIon "EnemyAssets and Looted Property" pertained to as~ets loot~d by the
Axis powers'in Nazi-occupied countries and subsequently transferred through innumerable
subterfuges to neutral countries where they. wer,e then concealed. The participating nations .'
I.
'
.
,
~.,
,
'
enacted,this Resoluti~nto warn the governments of all neutral countries "to take immediate'
measures to prevent ,the fraudulent concealment or disposition of any assets that belonged to any
occupied country, and to prevent the transfer within their territories, of any "looted gold,
,
.
.
currency, art objects, securities, other evidence of ownership in financial or business enterprises,
..
'
and of any other asset~ looted by the enemy.',3~ "
,
j
1
5. Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy(ECEFP)
'20.
I
I
The ECEFP was an interdepartmental comrruttee chaired by Assistanf Secretary
of State Dean Ache~on, the purpose of whicQ was to help shape ,the formulation of American
i
'
-
•
32 A purchase or sal~ of property under eitti~r "compulsion by threat," "unlawful constraint,'; or "forcible restraint." In"
other words, a transaction that does not reflect the realities of the prevaili~g market and is brought about as a result of a
despera~e'search by the victim of this circumstance (the seller or rightful owner) for liquid assets used' to es,<ape certain
,. •doom in Nazi-occupied Europe, for racial, political and/or religious reasons. Proof of duress was sufficient in many
. '
. '
.
t,
circumsta,nces to justify full or partial restitution to the despoiled party or hislher heirs 'ordesignated representatives ..
33
Recommendation VLCite to be added.
'
13
"., .'
'
�foreign economic policy in the post-war era. This Committee consisted of the Federal agencies,
civil and military, involved directly and indirectly in th~ war effort. It made the following '.
recornriiendations in August 1944 with respect to property' looted by the Nazis and captured by
. ,
American forces in the various theaters of operation:
• Unlimited obligation to restore identifiable looted property
• Restitution is restricted to identifiable' property in existence prior to occupation and
:restored by the existing government of the territories where the property had its sites and
,not the former owners.
• Looted property will be returned in the condition it was.found and will not constitute a
credit towards Germany's reparations 9bligation.
• All property transferred to Germany during the period of occupation (except for current
. output) will be presumed transferred under duress and treated as ~ooted property:
• The right of restitution is not absolute. Allied authorities retain discretionary powers to
.
.
. prevent or postpone restitution of vital equipment (e.g., rolling stock) deemed essential to
the "revival of a seriously disorganized country."
• ,Replacement means the ~quivalence of property for property lost. This notion is limited
1
to gold, works C?f art and cultural property.
• . Replacement of gold means the stock of monetary gold found by the Allies and pro-rated
: in proportion to gold losses among the Allied countries whose gold was looted.
fu no
, case should an excess o~er the loss be transferred. 34
6. HANDBOOK FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT, DECEMBER 20, 1944
21.
docum~nts
Military Government Handbooks, or guides for military government,are
containing key information for military officers in the field. The Handbook was
14
�i
drafted ~y the Gennan Country Unit, a unit of the Supreme Headquarters Allied European Forces
(SHAE~)
in charge of the civil affairs responsibilities for Germany. The document, however,
was later substantially revised by the President and the Secretaries of State; Treasury, and War
~ "
I
(see below).
22.
The Hand,book acknowledged the category of duress property.
Specifica~ly,
Military Government Officers(MGOs) 'Yere directed "at all times [to] gather and forward to the
DeputyChiefPtoperty Control Officer all local infonnation relevant tothe classes of property , '
subject to Property Control." The document added that H[of] particular interest will be reports of
cloaking aCtivities used to disguise ,property acquired through duress or wrongful acts of
,
.
'
dispossession or spoliation, or to conceal holdings of the Nazi Party and prominent members and
supporters thereof" (Sectipn 387). The directive dealt with the passing on of infonnation and did
!
"
.
not prescribe any specific action with regard to the infonmition gathered~
; 7. THE YALTA CONFERENCE
i
23.
FE~RUARY1945
'
The Yalta Conference embodied the basic agreements among the US, Great
. Britain; and the Soviet Union that set the founda~ions for the Allied Control Council (ACC) and
the three zones of occupation in Gennany. This conference set forth:the goal of destroying'
"
Gennah militarism, Nazism and Germany' s capacit~ to wage war. COl)cem was also raised about
remedies for war damages, focusing on:'damage caused by Germany to the Allied nations." FN" '
1
,
'
,
28 April 1945: Directive to Connnander-in-Chief of United States Forces of Occupation
'regar~ing
Military Government of Germany (JCS 1067)
"
: 24.
•
",.I
Directive JCS 1067 rep~esents the first official statement of restitution policy for
'the los's of personal property under the Nazi regime. The Commanding General of the US Forces
NACP, Records of the Executive Committee for Economic Foreign Policy (ECEFP), RG 84, E 192, B 45, Folder
"5:19B ;ECEFP Meetings 3. Documen'ts 31/44-40/44","Sum!TIary.: Report on Rep~rations, Restitution and Property
34
15
! •
�of Occupation in Gennany was directed to "impound or block all gold, silver, currencies,
securities, accounts in fimtncial institutions, credits, valuable papers and all other assets" falling
\Vithin several categories of property, inCluding "property which has ~een the subject of transfer
under duress or wrongful acts of confiscation, disposition or spoliation, whether pursuant to
legislat~on or by procedure t6 follow fonns of laws or otherwise." (48,:e; 2). Furthermore, the
Commander was instructed to ~'institute measures for prompt. restitution ... subject to appropriate
safeguatds to prevent the cloaking of Nazi and militaristic influence.';
;25,.', ... Restitution was required to confonn to the basic objectivesofthe Military
,"
Governinent of Gennany: (1) Germans were to take responsibility for "what they [had] brought
uponth~mselves;" (2) the occupying forces needed tobe "jusffinn and aloof;"(3) Germany was
to be prevented "from ever again becoming a threat to the peace of the world;" (4) the Allied
objectives of reparations and restitution were to be supported; and (5) POWs arid Displaced
Persons (DPs) of the UN were to be "cared for and repatriated."
126.
Although this passage represented the strongest official statement to date about
the property of individual Nazi victims, it was subordinated to the broader aims of Allied
I,'
:
.
.'
",."
.
'
,
occupation policy, including the transfer of authority and responsibility back to the Gennans.
1'27. " Finally, concemi~g the specific treatmentbfNazi victim propeity, Genera'!
. Lucius Clay, deputy military commander of the Occupied Military Governor United States
(OMGUS) had a textual analysis and comparison done of JCS 1067 versus what he considered
to be his superseding directives-Potsdam,and JCS ,1779. Whereas the J~S
,.
l06~
contained
specific provisions as to the treatm~nt of duress' property, the latter two--Potsdam and JCS
1779---uid not. 35
Rights -Germany, 0-37/44, August 12, 1944., October 26, 1999.
NACP, RG 260, Records of the Executive Office, Chief of Staff:. Records Maintained for General Clay, Box 24,
B~sic U.S. Policy Directives in Germany file, "Comparative Readiilgs in Basic U.S. Policy Directives on Germany, pp.
33-34.
.'
.
35
16
�; 8~ Directive of the United Sf at es Forces European Theater (USFET) to
Commanding Generals, July 7,1945, "Blocking and Control of Property".
28.
This Directive instructed Commanding Generals to "continue to enforce
. .
.
measur6s previously taken to prevent [subject to license]any transaction or other dealing in
property "which has been the subject of transfer under duress, wrongful act ()f confiscation,
.
,
dispossession or spoliation, whether pursuant to legislation, or by pro~edures purporting to follow
fonns of law or otherwis~," (1 , b) as \veIl as "works of art or cultural material of value or
importance" regardless of ownership. (1; c).
.
9. UNITED STATES LAW
a. The Trading With the Enemy. Act.36
·32.
in October
.
. The office of the APC in the Office for Emergency Management was terminated
19~6
and all the powers,
d~ties and' functions of the office were transferred to the'
.
.
Attorney General and the Department of Justice. 37 As o(OcL I, 1946 the Alien Property
.
.
C~stodian had vested property with an estimated value of $247,000,000 and in~luded; among
I
.
. other a,ssets, patents, copyrights, trademarks, trusts and estates, bank accounts, businesses,
securities, and real and personal property.38 By this. time, nearly 1,000 title claims had been filed
i
with the Alien Property.Custodian, and it was estimated that 4,000 more claims would be filed?9
The claimants included both American ci~izens and residents asserting debt claims against the .
fonner owners of the property and American citizens and "friendly foreign nationals" claiming.
,
,
<"
'
title to vested as~ets. Under section 9(a) of the TWEA claimants who were dissatisfied with the
36
The Trading With the Enemy Act, Oct. 6, 1917: 50 U.S.C. App. § 1 et seq., P.L. No. 91,40 Stat. 411.
37
11 F.R.11981.
38
Terminal Report; Office of Alien Property Custodian, Oct. 1946 (Washington;, D.C.)
39
Terniinal Report, Office of Alien Property Custodian, Oct. 1946 (Washington, D.C.) at 13.
17
�administrative determination of the claim could appeal for ~ review by the District.CourHor the
District of Columbia. 4o
.: b. Preveriting Imports oflooted cultural property into the United States: The Roberts
Commission (1942-1946)
33.
The American Commission for the Protection and Salvage ofArtistic and
Historic Monuments in Europe, better known as the Roberts Commission, was established in
1942 for "taking steps to protect and conserve works 'ohrt and artIstic or historical monuments
and rec6rdsin Europe and to ~id in salvaging and retuming.to the lawful owners such objects as
have been appropriated by the AXis powers or by individuals acting under their authority or
consent.,,,41 The Roberts Commission, 'fearing a flood ofloo~ed art would find its way into the
international art trade at the end ofhostilith~s'in Europe, reCommended that the United States
Customs Service be given the power to detain any' artworks entering the United States.
42
Thus.
on July8, 1944 Treasury Decision 51072 wa$ enacted unqer sections 3(a) and 5(b) of the
,
,
Trading,With the Enemr Act and provided for a procedure for the release of art objects imported
in to the United States after March 12, 1938.43 '. Under T.D. 51072 anyone seeking to import any
.
.
art object into the U.S. from any country other than those of the United Kingdom and its
dominions was obliged to obtain a license to do so by submitti?g an application and a report on
the nature of the work and the circumst~mce~ of its acquisition. 44
34.
Under T.D. 51072 art objects were broadly defined and included any object
worth $5,000 or more, or of artistic, historic, or scholarly interest irrespective of monetary value.
40
Ttmninal Report, Office of Alien Property Custodian, Oct 1946 (Washington, q.C}at 13
Secretary of State [Cordell Hull] to the Ambassador in the U~ited Kingdom [Winant], Oct. 8, 1943, FRUS 1943, vol.
I at 480-82. Attached as Appendix '.
41
NACP, RG 59, Lot File 620-4, Entry 3104A, Records Maintained by the Fin~ Arts and Monuments Adviser [sic]
1945-61 ~ Ardelia Hall Collection, Box 54, Minutes of the Meeting of the Roberts Commissi'on, Feb 3, 1944.
42
79 Treasury Decisions Under Customs and Other La~vs July 1943 - December 1944 (Washington, D.C, U.S .
. Governme~t Printing Office: 1945) 247-48. Attached as Appendix'
.
43
18.
�By adva'nce agreement between the treasury department and the Roberts ConniIission, u.s.
consuls abroad sent advance notices of shipments of art objects to Foreign Funds Control and to
the Roberts Commission. All applications for licenses under T.D. 51072 were submitted to the
1~.0 berts "commission' for ap~roval·.
35.
The Roberts Commission closed its doors on June 30, 1946 and, on that same
day, theTreasury Department repealed T.D. 51072, following a final recommendation to that
effect from the members ofthe Roberts Commission. 45
I
c. The United States Post Office
36.
The United States Post Office ~as also authorized to investi~ate all foreign mail
parcels.!U.S.' armed forces personnel stationed outside the contim!ntal United States were entitled
to free entry of gift parcels of an aggregate valu~ of $ 50 when accompanied by ther~quired
declaration. The Postal authorities were authonzed to inspect parcels that were not accompanied
,
.
",
by a proper declaration or where the appearance of the parcel indicated it might be valued at
I
I O. LIBERATED TERRITORIES .
.37.
While US officials focused their attention in Washin~on, DC on post-war
planning and on measures to take against Germany for
instigat~ng
a world war, an Anglo
American force la~ched.its ca~paign of liberation from North Africa to Sicily ~d Italy, thereby
opening a southern front against the Axis forces. At each slep of the way, with' no specific
template in mind, Allied officials scrambled and oftentimes improvised as they established the
. infrastructure of a military gove~ent aimed at restoring order, enforcing the peace and paving
the way for a resumption of economic, political, social, and cuIturallife under the guise of
44
168 attached as Appendix
45r~
46
Treasury Decisions Under Customs and ot~er Laws, July I ?38 - June 1939, vol. 74, T.D. 497~5 at 283.
19
'. :
�·
.:"
.'
newly-~ormed
democratic institutions. When it came to captured enemy assets, American
military' offi~ials, in consultation, with the departments of State, Treasury and War, issued
numerous decrees
and directives; which paved the way for the post-war US policy of restitution
of assets looted by the Nazis and their Axis partners to their right~l owners.
Ita)y
-38.'
During the Italian campaign, the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) issued
directive 311 on August 17, 1943, which, amQng other things, ordered that all "holdings of gold,
foreign currencies and foreign securities, all national funds and the funds of Fascist political
organizations shall be taken into custody as quickly as possible, and shall be deposited with the
A. M. [Allied Military] Financial Agency or banks designated by the military government.
39.
47
The banking sector in Allied Military Government Occupied Territory
(AM GOT) was placed under the direct supervision,ofthe Chief Financial Officer of the Civil
, Affairs Division of the US Army. Initially, the banks remained closed to prevent funds,
valuables and records from being dissipated. The Americans were concerned that prolonged
closure of financial institutions in liberated territories would disrupt the local economy. Hence,
AMGOT officials took steps to reopen these banks in a gradual and selective basis.48
40.
As the Anglo-American campaign pushed the German forces further up north
towards Bologna and Milan, a new front opened up in June 1944 on the beaches of Normandy
and, with it rolled in the newly-established Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force
(SHAEF) under the leadership of its Supreme Commander (SCAEF), US General Dwight D.
Eisenhower.
47 NACP" RG 165, Entry 467, Box 544, Combined Chiefs of Staff, Italian Peace Feelers, Directive on Military
government of Continental,ltaly and Sardinia, Section 1. Political and Miscellaneous, par. 10, CCS 311, 17 August
1943, p, 9. See also CCS 247/5/D, Directive, Organization and operation of Military Government for "Husky", Secret,
'
28 June 1943, p, 8, It is the forerunner of CCS 311.
48 NACP, RG 165, Entry 467, Box 549, Allied Military Government Occupied Territory, Index to Plan for Military
Government, 28 May 1943, p. ' 1 8 ; '
,
20
�41.
;' The supreme military authority was the Cor.nbined Chiefs' of Staff(CCS), to
whom were subordinated the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The American military governmeni
,
(MG) in the field was under War Department authority. Both the CCS and MG developed their
own institution~ to cope with ,problems in the newly-liberated territories. In,the financial ar~na,
!
...,
'
the CCS' gave instructions to the Combined Administrative Liqu'idating Agency (CALA) with
regaId~ to the disposition of captured enemy assets, while MG established its own currency
section to cope with similar prob~ems in the field.
I
4.2.
•
.
•
Pursuant to Administrative MemorandumNo. 11 ofMay4, 1944, the Currency
Section for Germany, SHAEF, was created on September 7, 1944 to receive, hold and supply
currency:. to pay -Allied military forces and support Military Government (MG) operations in the
,
',"
liberated sections of'France. 49 After the Allied 'forces crossed into Germany and discovered
numerous caches of valuables, SHAEF officials issued Administrative Memorandum No. 49 on
,
,
March 7, 1945, to address the fate of currency and other financial assets seized from enemy
forces
ot found abandoned i~ the theater of operations. 5o It identified Germany and Austria as
enemy territory and included the following items in the general category of financial assets
subject to capture: stamps" checkS, securities, foreign exchange assets, gold (in b~11ion or coin),
silvet bullion, pbitinumbullion,warehouse receipts, bills oflading, commercial paper, bank '
,~ooks, postal, giro or other money orders, letters of credit and jewels. If these assets were found
on the person of an agent or suspect, they would be treated pursuant to the provisions of the
;
,
Inteliigebce Branch of SHAEF, ~own as G-2, dated AugUst 24, 1944, entitled "Disposition of
Personal' Effects of Agents or Suspects d~tained by the AEF." In the case of financial assets that
NACP, RG 260 FED B 394, E. C. Boehnke toHQ, 21 s1 AG and'CG, Ith AG, 7September 1944; H. D. Cragon to G
5, 12th AG~ 4 May 1945.
"
,.
,
50 AS.a typical example of how policies, once enacted in the ETO, changed in the face of conflicting and, oftentimes,
confusing local conditions, Colonel Bernstein ofG-5 instructed Cragon to "accept items brought in even ifin conflict
with Adm,: Memo No. 49 except for RM [Reichsmarks] which are to be deposited with the Reichsbank." Bernstein
took the in,itiative to broaden policy pertaining to the treatment of enemy property because he perceived that the
49
21
�"are adeguately protected", ina private or public facility, their existence would be notified "to the,
,
"
nearest Military Government Officer.,,51
43.
The mandate of the Currency Section was broadened on April!l, 1'945 to act as'
a depository of assets seized or impounded by Allied military forces. 52 'The Currency Secti~n
answered directly to the Deputy Chief of G-5 [Economic Division], at SRAEF.53
44.
On July 12,1945, a new directive, <?OV 406, laid out the structure and
responsibilities of the newly-created Financial Division of the Coml?ined Administrative
.'
Liquidating Agen~y (CAiA) which answered to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS). As part of
its mandate, the Financial Division was the custodian of "gold, foreign currencies, foreiWl
,
,
securities, valuable papers, and similar assets" that it held as of that date, "pending determination
,
'
'
of future dispositioh of such assets." It receIved all the records of the Economic Division, G-5 of
SRAEF, after the dissolution of SRAEF. It also helped to establish the "Financial Div[ision] in
connection termination of Financhll Division of Aliied Military Government in AUSTRIA."s4
On July, 15, 1945, Clay protested against the apparent turn-()ver of SRAEF repords dealing with
.
,
'
.
. .
assets in the custody of the Currency Section to CALA., In hIS view, CALA "has Ileither the
personnel, experience or faCilities to deal with this matter.,,55
045.
Accor~ing to
the War Department, CALA answered to the CCS "for control,
matters;.; pending Combined Agreement a~ to allocation bet~een Com Gens [Commanding
Gep.erals] United States and British Zones of Occupation Germany and Austria of assets referred
to ..." There could be "unilateral control" and custody of captured enemy assets only after the
facilities at his disposal in theJield were inadequate "to properly h~dle the ,items" being sei~ed by American troops.
NACP, RG260 FEDB 394, Cragon and Jesser, 19 May 1945.
.
51 NACP, RG 260 FED B 394, SHAEF Administrative Memorandum No. 49, entitled "Disposition of Currency and
Other Financial Assets Seized from Enemy Forces or Found Abandoned," 7 March 1945.
52 NACP, RG 260 FED B 394, E. C: Boehnke to HQ, 21 st AG and CG, 12th AG, 7 September 1944; H. D. Cragon to G
5, 12th AG, 4 May 1945.
.
,
, '
"
53 NACP; RG 260 FED B 394, H. D. Cragon to CO, European Civil Affairs Division, US Army, 8 May 1945.
54NACP,'RG 260 FED B 394, AGWAR to SHAEF MAIN, AFHQ, UK BASE, 12 July' 1945.
, 55NACP,'RG 260 FED B 394, Clay, USGCC, to AGWAR, 15 Jldy 1945.
22
�·'
,
.
,
[M~sc0'r"-based] Reparations Commission nilecl~on "matters of resthutionand reparation:,,56
,
,
One of CALA's many responsibilities was to handle "the assets and liabilities of the currency
sections of SHAEF missions in liberated areas." As American military forces were responsible
for the safeguarding of gold ,and other financial assets at the Reichsbank Building in Frankfurt,
,
,
these assets continued to be held under the authority of the Commanding Gene~l (CG) of
USFET'. Henceforth, control and'custody meant one and the same thi~g~57
46.
At an USFETmeeting on August 10,,194,5 with members of the Accounting and
C~rrency Sections, Colonel Bernard B~rnstein, chief ofG-5, reiterated that GOV406, which
called for the creation of a combined agency to take over assets and liabilities of SHAEF, should
not be taken into consider~tion by them. There ,would be 110 distinctions made between USFET
,
•
'
,"
"
•
"
'<
'
and the US Army Branch Currency Sections. 58
47.
.
"
'.
~,'
,
,
USFET orderedthe shutdown ofCALA's operations on September 15, 1945 and
affirmed its responsibility for the gold and other assets.stored at the For~ign Exchange
Depository (F~D) in 'Frankfurt. 59 The Combined Civil Affairs C~nunitte~ (CCAC) of CCS
required American troops which ,hac! seized and controlled "gold, foreign currencies, foreign
securities, valuable papers and other assets uncovered in Germany anet Austria" to assert
authority over these assets, in this instance, th~se h~ldin storage at the FED.6o
'48.
As of October 1, ·1945, the US Group Control Council (USGcq became the
Occupation Military Government (OMG) for Geqnany. G-5 ofUSFET became the Occupation,
Military Government! United States (OIyIGIUS).61
56NACP, RG 260 FED B 394, Civil Affair~ Division, War Dept. to USGCC',22 July 1945.
57NACP, RG 260 FED B 394, From Bemard Bernstein/Clay/Fi;a,nce Division;USGCC to AGWAR, 28 July 1945.
Hilldring backed Bernstein.
, "
'
.
58NACP"RG 260 FED B 394, Minutes of Meeting, 10 August 1945.
"
59NACP, RG 260 FED B 394, USFET MAIN/Eisenhowerto AGWAR, 25 August 1945.
6<NACP, 'RG 260 FED B 394, From Combined Civil Affairs Committee to Combined CALA, 10 September 1945.
6INACP, RG 260'FED B 394, From HQ, USFET to Commanding Generals, USGCC, Eastern MD, Western MD, BD,
. I October 1945. The regional military government of the Eastern Military di'strict and G-5 ofAimy Staff became Office
'
"
23 .
,
'
�"
Foreign! Exchange Depository Gtoup (FED)
49.
The FED began operating in earnest in April 1945 when Colonel H. D. Cragon
" L
"
.
came to Frankfurt to establish in the former Reichsbank Building in Frankfurt alMain, a
,
,
"deposit~ry of assets seized by~erican troops in salt rmnes and other caches in Eastern and
Central Germany. The FED',s CUrrency Branch answered to a dual chain of command under the
European Civil Affairs Division, as
asub-division ofG-5 at SHAEF, and as the Currency
Branch of the Finance Divisi()n of the Allied Group Control Council (GCC) until it became the
.'
.
,
Currency Branch of OMGUS. 62
49a.
The FED held "the largest si~gle collection of wealth in the world with the
possible exception of that heIdat Ft. Knox, KY. The gold holdings alone are second only to
those ofFt. Knox." In 1945 alone, the FED received more than seventy-six shipments of
.
.
.
.
valuablfs, including gold bullion, from the Greater Ge.n.n~mReich,
in~luding the
of Bohemia and Moravia, as well as from other areas in which US
ArmY elements had,
Czech provinces
penetrated. 63 Colonel Bernard Bernstein, a former US Treasuiy'Department official, is ~idely
credited with the creaticm ofthe FED, in his capacity as chief of Finance Division (G-5) at
1
,
•
•
•
•
,
SHAEF, then OMGUS.
of Military Government/Bavaria. In the Western Zone, G-5 of Army Staff became Regional OMG/Bade-Wurtemb~g,
Greater Hessen, Bremen. G-5 of Commanding General staff in Berlin District becomes OMG/Berlin District.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, :USFET, became Director, OMG (US zone).
62 NACP, RG 260 FED B 394, 24 January 1946, Capt. McCarroll' to Executive Officer, Finance Division.
63 NACP, RG 260 FED B 394,.24 January 1946, Capt. McCarroll to Executive Officer, Finance Division. "In the main
vault, through the wire netting which divides it into compartments, may be seen ro~ms filled with gold bars stacked '
three deep from wall to wall. Bars average a weight of about 25 pounds, and the value of about $12,500 each. In one
cage is a nugget approximately the size of a grapefruit and said to be the largest nugget in the world. In another is the
'gold of the Gennan Foreign Office; called the Ribbentrop gold. In another is virtually'the entire Hungarian gold
reserve. Still another compartme~t houses boxes of diamonds of all sizes and speCially processed metals ....There are
also some 600 pounds of gold tooth-fillings said to have been extracted from the mouths of murder camp victims ....
No attempt has been made as yet to evaluate the SS loot but from a cursory inspection of the contents of a few
,
containers, it is apparent that the total value is a very large figure ... the SS loot is incapable of restitution because its
origins ~ere "loot" in the manner orits acquisition'by the Nazis ... Much of the gold bullion cannot be traced, it having
been deliberately melted and recast into new bars by its captors. Proposal has been made that this gold be thrown into
hotchpotch and divided among the nations (whose gold was seized by the Germans) in proportion,to their un recovered
" losses of national gold ..."
, 24'
�50.
On April 26, 1945, the JCS approved a landmark directive for the administration.
of poshwar Gennany entitled JeS 1067. In its amended version as 1067/6, the. directive called
for the establishment of a "special agency" that would take possession" Of all Gennan foreign
exchange and external assets. FED officials disagreed whether that statement inferred that the
.
' . .
',.
,
. .
.
FED was the designated "special agencY.,,64 Some officials believed that the directive gave the
Finance,Division control of cert~in foreign exchange assets that were currently ~der the control
of its branches. Both the FED and Currency Branch should constitute two distinct and separate
entities because the FED was D:lore closely allied with "Investigation of External Assets, Property
.'
Control,:' Foreign Exchange and Blocking, and Restitutions,' Deliveri~s and Reparations" at
USGCC/QMGUS. 65
51..
It was eventually decided that the Currency SeCtion of the FED would act "if so
required, asa special agency for the deposit of foreign exchange assets such a's gold and silver
. bullion and ~oins, foreign' securities, foreign currencies and other like valuables.,,66 With regard
to looted ass~ts "tendered" to the Currency SeCtion and placed in the custody of the FED, A. U.
.
,
.
, Fox; Acting Deputy Chief of the Finance ,Division at OMGUS, asked the Currency Section,to
"receive for safeguarding and custody valuables such as gold and silver bullion and coin, foreign
currencies, foreign securities, precious ston~s and jewels, jewelry, gold teeth, and other similar
valuables." Fox supported the notion that a single agency should collect these items and be
64 NACP~ RG 260 FED B 3941fr~J€S1WO~i71§.2~~RnlIf~45;,.~¥t1ll1i~:2. All Foreign E,xchange transactions,
including, those arising out of exports and imports, shall be controlled with the aim of preventing Germany from
developing a war potential and of achieving the otli~ objectives set forth in this directive. To effectuate these purposes
the Control Council should seek out and reduce to the possession and control of a special agency all German (public
and private) foreign exchange and external assets of every kind and description located within or outside Germany."
65 NACP, RG 260, FED B 394, 8 February 1946, Kurt Walitschek to Acting Deputy Director of the Finance Division,
OMGUS.
.
,
66 NACP, RG 260, FED 8394, Outline of functions of Currency Section, 12 Octob~ 1945.
25
�responsible for their safekeeping and distributi~n.67 On March 7, 1946, General Order 51 placed
responsibility for the FED under the authority ofthe Commanding General, OMGUS. 68 ,
52.
r
The FED was simply a custodial entity and acted on instructions that it received
from higher authorities on how to di~burse these assets. : It. was up to the 9aims Sectio~ t<,) stay , ,
informed and up to the minute on the restitution policy of the American government. However,.
.
.
. '
as late as Jlme 1946, the FED was Unaware of any restitution: policy that affected the assets that it
held. 69
53.
~y 1947', the Depository Section onhe FED had receivedasse~s collected by US
Army detachme~ts,
fo~nd in Reichsbankbranches, offices and other non-baclc depots, as well as
from the Property Control Branch and other branches of the Military Government. This
a~tivity
was rooted in Military Governmet:J,t (MG) Laws 52 and 53 as well as MG Regulations. The FED
was obligated to deliver to the Inter-Governmental Committ~e'oILRefugees (lGCR) "shipments
clas'sified as Nazi loot", as differentiated from "restitutable and identifiable assets." 70
.
. .
.
.
.
,54.
The Claims Section of the FED distingUished three types of claims: "monetary
gold for restitution to the Gold Pot of the Tripartite Gold Commission (TGC);
non~monetary
gold
for reparation through IGCR; identifiable restitutable assets subject to possible claims." These '
categories were based on principles enunciated in the Paris Reparation Conference of Dec:ember
.
.
~.
1945 as well as in War Department cables dated December 1945 and November 1946. The
Claims :Section was also required to correspond and undertake field 'trips in order to ascertain the
true owners and origin of items recovered by "military detachments" an~ those claimed by
governinents. Another important function of the. Claims Section was ,to compile "major gold
\
,
NACP, RG 260, FED records B 432 and' B 394, A. U. Fox, Acting Deputy Chief, Financial Branch, OMGUS;
USFET Hq, to Lt. Col. N. D. Cragon, Chief, Currency Section, FED, 9 November 1945.
68 NACP, RG 260, FED B 394, Robert F. Shearer, Major, AGD, to CG, OMGUS, 19 March 1946.
,
'
69 NACP, RG 260, FED Records B393, Memo No. 16, Frank C. Gabell to Miss Geib, Claims Section, FED, 14 June,
1946.
67
,"
.
26.
�transactions of the Reichsbank since,January .1, 1938." Thatrequirement was spelled out in a
'I
,
.'
War Department cable of October 1945 and in a Treasury Department memo from Orvis
Schmidt~ head of Foreign Funds Control (FFC) , on October Ii, 1946. Moreover? the Claims
Section had discretion to interrogate and utilize former Reichsbank officials for this task.
Finally, the Claims Section had to "ascertain amourits of non-monetary gold held elsewhere in
.
'
American z~ne" as instructed by the Directofofthe Finance Division. onSeptemher 25, 1946. 71
55.
On December 5, 1950, the US High Commissioner for Germany authorized the
Finance Advisor to the High Co~issioner to dispose of the remaining assets'heldat the FED,
Finance,Division,HICOG. Hence, all the remaining property: held at the FED could be removed
'
pursuant to approval in writing from the Chief of the Finance Division, Office of Economic
Affairs, ,HICOG: 72
Definiti'ons of Gold For. Purposes of Restitution
The Department o~the Army asked OMGUS to use the 1945 definition of
,56.
monetary gold put forth by Jaines Angell before and during the Paris Reparations Conference for
purpose,s of restitution. Angell's definition of monetary gold was:
monetary gold ... [isJ all gold which, at time of its looting or wrongful removal, was carried as part
:of the claimant country's monetary reserve, eith~ in the !lccounts of the claimant government itself
or in the accounts ofthe claimant country's central bank or other monetary authority at home or
''
'
abroad. 73
57.
Hence, it did not suffice that gold was in the form of bullion and coin to fall
,
,
under this definition. What mattered was whether the gold "was held by German government or
L
.
•
Reichsbank or German monetary auth[ority] as part of German monetary reserve, or if looted
from some otnercountry, it was held by [thelrespecti~~ government's central bank or monetary
70The FED identified the following shipments as of mid~ 1947 as explicitly c'onsisting ofJooted assets: 1,3, \6, 18A,
l8F, 21 A, 23B, 26B, 27E, 32B,52C, 52E. Shipments solely consisting of securities were: 34C, 35-39; 41-44, 46,47,
51,54,57,58,62.
71 NACP, RG 260, FED B 394, 1 July 1947, Functional Program/Depository Section, FED, Period I January 1947 to
30 June 1947.
, ' , '
'
72 NACP, RG 260, FED Records B 394, Jean Cattier to R. C. Leonard;S December 1950.
, 27
�Authority as part ofthat country's monetary reserve." If gold was "melted concentration camp
loot," it was nonwmonetary pursuantto WX w
85682 "and turned over to PCIRO.,,74
57a.
Restitution to a claimant country was based solely on "identifiable property" .
removed by force, based on the definition provided by the Allied Control Council. . The idea of
"national origin" also mattered in order to determine restitution to a claimant country or to the
PCIRO.. InCieed, if the items came from a concentration camp, the Army believed that national
. origin did not intervene in the equation because the "location of particular concentration
.
.
camp... ot regarded as bearing on 'national' source.,,75
n
57b.
In April 1948, the War Department informed the State Department that its
'.
,
.
~
definition of "monetary gold" did not pertain to the origin ofthe.gold, but rather to its "form,
'
,
,
shape, mint markings, and/or.assay certificates ..." The War Department made it clear that the
State Department had asked it to use its definition of~'ri1onetary gold." However,. the Tripartite
Commission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold (TGC) narrowed its definition of monetary
gold to include a "criterion of source" which" in the view of War Department officials, contrasted
,
,
sharply with the broad view expounded by the State Department ("gold in such' form as to be a
medium'of exchange"). Worried that it would hold gold that fit n~ither the monetary nor the
non-monetary category, the War Department informed the State Department that it held monetary
gold, according to its definition, but the source of which "is either unknown ?r which' at the'time ,
of its looting'or wrongful removal' ... was not 'held by respective government's central bank or
monetary authority as part of that country's monetary reserve. "" 76
73NACP, RG 260, FED Records B 421, From CSCAD/Deparbnent of the Army to OMGUS, S~cret, 20 November
19.47. '
1
74 If it came from Czech sources, no action was taken until all the details were known about the origin of the captured
gold.'
"
..
7S NACP, RG 260, FED RecordsB 421, From CSCAD/Department ofthe Army to OMGUS, Secret, 20 November
1947.
'
76 NACP, RG 260, FED Records B 422, War to State, CC-3894, 16 April 1948.
28
"
�57c.
The War Department illustrated this qtiandaryby referringto "64 gold bars ... '
claimed'to be the property ofDollfus-Mieg ... contain~d in boxes b~ring seals of [SBC], Le
Locle. 63 of the bars,bear ~ussianmint marking 'Mockba'
~ut
lack assay certificates and·
. remaining bar is Swiss goOd delivery bar." War pepartment officials decided that this gold was
not monetary because of its source. It did not fit the category of non-monetary gold because,
according to the official statutory definition, it did not meet .the test of "unidentifiability as to
national and individUal 'origin, heirlessness, loot from vIctim of Nazi persecution" and it did it
.j
'meet standards put forth by the State Department. 77
, .
57d.
Finally, the War Depaitmerit could not reconcIle the State Department's notion
that the monetary gold was assigned to the gold pot with the TGC's idea, '~it is not possible for
monetary gold as defined by.TGC to be at the same time Nazi victim loot as defined by WX- .
85682,,:78 . In sum, the War D,epartment could not restitute trus ~biguous gold to the IRO. It
recommended ceding, this gold to.a German agency, the Precious Metals Control Office of the
,
Econorruc Administration fro~ where it wouldbe funneled into the German economy.79 ..
Looted Securities
'60,
On-February 21, 1946, the Allied Control Authority (ACA) for Germany,
consisting of the United States, 'Great Britain, 'France, and the Sovi~t Union, rhad~ it
"compulsory that all foreign securities in Germany be deposited at such offices as the
l
.
"
"
Occupation Authorities shall direct."so In May 1946, the ACA, ref1~ting a serious division
withi~ its ranks, required all foreign securities in the western zones of Germa~y only, which
----------.:..--;---.
"
The same situation applied to Law 53 gold: it was neither monetary nor non-monetary, because it clearly was
identifiable, as belonging to residents of Germany at the time of the Allied victory, but it was not monetary because its
degree of fineness was too low for it to be integrated into the reserves of a central bank.
' ' ,'. '
78 NACP, RG 260, FED Records B 422, War to State, CC-3894; 16 April 1948
79 NACP, RG 260, FED Records B 422, War to State, CC-3894, 16 April 1948.
80 NACP, RG 260, U,S.Element, ACC, Box 42, File: Foreign Securities - Investment, "GEPC/Memo[46] 11 [Final],
Allied Control Authority, German External Property Commission, Delivery of Foreign SecuritieS in Germany,"
' .
February 21, 1946. '
77
29
�were "owned or controlled by Germim nationals' in Germany.;. to be deposited with the
Reichsbank in terms of Law 53."SI
. 61.
' On August 30, 1946, 'U.S. offic~als opined that "s~curities represent rights, ,
"
interests, claims or shares ... and should therefore be included in the concept 'property subjectto
'restituti~n,'"
in ac~ordance with the L~ndo~ Declaration of 1943 82 . Also, securities
.
shall in principle be subject torestitutiori to the Governments of countries in
which they were acquired or 'from whose residents they were acquired.
Exemptions should be, authorized only in cases where existing holders of said
securities ,can rebut, to the satisfactIon of appropriate authority, the presumption
that such securities or other evidences of ownership were 100ted. 83 [All]
identifiable looted securities should be returned at the earliest practicable date to
.the Governments of countries from which they were acquired... All non
identifiable looted securities should be held in safekeeping pending agreement
by the G()vernments concerned as to how they shall be allocated among claimant
nations whose claims have not been met by restitution of identifiable securities. 84
62.
Foreign securities found in Germany "must be regarded as German external assets
and mJst be subject to
C~ntrol Coundl Law N~.5."S5
On May 25, 1946, the OMGUS Office of '
Political Affairs informed its 'Finance Division that the eventual restitution of securities would
.
,
'
81 NACP, RG 260,U.S. Element, ACC, Box 42, File: Foreign Securities - Investment, GEPCfP[46]28, Allied Control
, Authority, Gennan External Property Commission, Foreign Securities deposited with the Reichsbank, May 17, 1946.
82 NACP,RG 260, U,S. Element, ACC, Box 42, File: Foreign,Securities - Investments, DFINfP[46]223, Allied Control
Authority, Directorate of Finance, Disposition of Foreign Securities Uncovered in Germany, December II, 1946.
"[S]ecurities ... acquired directly or indirectly by persons resident in Germany from countries which were occupied or
effectively controlled by Germany" during that period "should be regarded prima facie as having been looted." NACP,
RG 260, U.S. Element, ACC, Box 42, File: Foreign Securities,~ Investments, DFIN/P[46]223, Allied Control
Authority, Directorate of Finance, Disposition of Foreign Securities Uncovered in Germany, December II, 1946.
83NACP, RG260, U.S. Element, ACC, Box 42, File: Foreign Securities -Investments, DFIN/P[46]223, Allied Control
Authority, Directorate of Finance, Disposition of Foreign Securities Uncovered in Germany, December II, 1946.
8~ NACP, RG 260, U.S. Element, ACC, Box 42~File: Foreign Securities -Investments, DFIN/P[46]223, Allied Control
Authority, Directorate of Finance; Disposition of Foreign Securities Uncovered in Germany, December II, 1946.
General Gailey summed up the U.S. position sucCinctly: "German-oWned foreign securities and currencies, wherever
they might 'be found, were 'rights, titles and interests in 'respect of property outside Germany" and were vested in the
Gennan External Property Commission,for ultimate disposition in accordance with the potsdam provisions." NACP,
RG 260, U.S. Element, ACC, Box' 42, File: Foreign Securities - Investments, Cable CC-5679, October 16, 1946. '
85 NACP, RG 260, U.S. Element, ACC, Box 42, File: Foreign 'Securities - Investments, CORC/P[ 46]383, Allied
Control Authority, Coordinating Committee, Foreign Currency and Foreign Securities found in Germany, November
26, 1946~
.
.
30
�be done with countries, "si~ce the government in question will no doubt take 'measures to
Ptotect the legitimate owner, ,,86
63.
In January 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed OMGUS to:
a) seek agreement through the Control Council regarding their
disposition;
,
b) establish inventories;
c) regard as loot tho'se securities removed to Germany from other
countries which were occupied or controlled;
d) allow the present owner to rebut the presumption that such securities
were looted;
,
'
e) have IARA ~ountries report any German interest established in
securities that have been restituted to them;
,
t) return securit~es removed to Gennany for safekeeping to the
,government of the country from which they were removed;
,
g) deliver securities falling within CableWX-85682 to the Inter'
.
Governmental Committee on Refugees [IGCR].87
64.
The Econorriics Division of OMGUS ordered its Restitution Control Branch on
September 5, 1947 to "accept and process claims for the restitution of securities and, upon
proper identification and proof of removal from the territory of a country eligible for restitution,
,
,
'
make restitution in the nonnal way to the claimant natiori, except that, "for the time being," the
following classes of securities shall not be released 'for restitution:
a) Securities issued by Gennan corporations or the German Government
, ["Gennan securities"]
b) Securities issued by non-German corporations or Governments
["Foreign securities"] which are shown to have been Gennan-owned prior to the
occupation of the country concemed.,,88
,65.
On April 14, 1948, OMGUS unveiled the following four-phase plan to dispose
of securities:
86NACP, RG 260, External Assets, Box 650, File: Policy - Gennan External Assets, May 25, 1946.
87NACP, RG 260, Finance, Box 161, File: Disposition of Valuables, "Disposition ofValuables'\ January 28, 1947.
,88 NACP', RG 260, External Assets, Box 677, File: Restitutions, Memorandum No. 10, "Restitution of Securities",
October 3, 1947. Restitution of securities to their rightful owners was complicated by the fact 'that someofthe'
securities in question were "bearer securities and offer no evidence as to rightful oWnership, some of the securities in
question 'are of Gennan issue and special proced~res are, required to trace their prior ownership and location, some of
the securities in question were.original\y owned by persons who have been exterminated and claimant countries would
not necessarily have any record on which to base a claim for restitution, it is deemed almost impossible
31
�Phas~ 1 - External restitution with recommended cut-off date of
December 31, 1948, after which no further claims would be accepted.
.
Phase 2 - Internal restitution which could be cut-off shortly after
-December 31, 1948, the date which all petitions under MG Law 59 must be filed.
Phase 3 - Screening of claims for release to owners of securities which
had not been found to be subject to external or internal restitution, with cut-off
date after December 31, 1948.
Phase 4 - All securities which have been found not to he subject to
external or internal restitution, nor returnable to·claimants ~der the third phase,
,
to be disposed 'of after December 31,' 1948. 89 .
66.
According to OMGUS policy, all foreign restitution missions seeking return of
.
;
securities had to submit their claims with a statement whereby the claimed securities were not
securities of German issue and were not German-owned during the German occupation of the
country.. In the event of conflicting claims, "the burden would be 'pla~ed on all claimants for the
.
.
particular security to substantiate their claims and no delivery would be made until the dispute
was settled.,,9o
67.
The United States differentiated between restitution claims and applications by
the individual owners for the return of their securities ,in Germany: .Owners of se.curities had to
file an 'individual claim. Applications were recei-ved from the individuals and the securities
were returned directly to the individuals. These individuals were to be taken out of official
chanhe1s. 91 However, government restitution took precedence over any individual claims.92
.
68.
..
.
.
In developing a set of restitution rules; the term "otherwise" as used in the
London Declaration regarding removal of securities, was interpreted restrictively by OMGUS to .
include only such property which was acquired in a transaction not esse'ntiallyeommercial in
character, i.e., a transaction which, in fair appreciation of all .factors, would not likely have been
,
"
administratively to differentiate between cases oflooting of securities and legitimate acquisition," NACP, RG 260,'
Reparations and Restitution Branch, Box 27, File: Misc. Restitution, Cable CC-7533, January 24, 1949.
.
89 NACP, RG 260, Property Division, Box 5, File: Disposition of Property of War. Criminals, Cable CC-3852, April
'.
.
14,1948.
.
.
90 NACP, RG 260, Property Division, Box 5', File: Disposition of Property of War Criminals, Cable CC-3852, April
14,1948.
'
.
91 NACP, RG 260, Economics Division, Box 359, Dutch Claims.
92 NACP, RG 260, Economics Division,.Box 348, French Claims.
32
"
"
�entered intoby'the parties, if it had riot b~en for the sp~cialco~ditions cr:eated by the
bc~upation.930MqUS policy held thatthe chlimallt nation had 'to prove that securities had been
removed by force or duress in a specific 6aset The U.S~ believe~ that the conf1icting interests
of the parties concerned had to be adjusted inthe>proper'courts and 'authorities, of t4e, ~o~ntry in
I
"
•
,
•.•
which Aryaniiation haa'occurred,95
',6'9.
'In July 1948, the United States did,not consider the issuance Of th~ London
"
,"
'
" ,
'
, ,I
, Declaration on January 5, 1943 as the cut-off date for the, restitution ofsecurities. , The key dat~
for owne~ship of securities' . 'external r~stit~iion [to co:uritries] was the begillllirig of
with regard:to
.
.
" , '
,
,
the, Second W arid War on 'September, 1, 1939: 96 ,The key date for
own~rslup of se~urities 'in the'
~
" .'
,
case ofinternal restitution [to individuals] w:~s the date of Adolf Hitler;sappointment ~s
I.
'
ChanceIior ofthe
,
"
-
,
"
"
'
G~rmari Rei~h on January 30,.19'33.97 '
'OMGUSoffic'ials s¢t December 31; 1948 as the' de~dline. for the filing ofclairris
•
'
. ;.
.
.
.
•
.
..
t.
.
•
.
1 ' .
'
..
.
for securitie~ and other property items. 98 However, they left the door open for external
rest,itutidn cl~inis to be
flied after the deadline ift4e claims were "substantiaL,;?9They held fast
to the D~cember 1948 deadline fOr'internal restitution, everi persuading the B~tishand French to
moveth~ir deadlines .
forWard to that date. 1000MGUS re~iewed the clainis and adua1.restitution
'
began in' Jan~ary '1949,' "with the init,iai releases being' issued, for the return of securities to
.
I'
.)
....
,
,
,
'
,
NACP, RG260, Econo~i~s Division, B!Jx353, Czech ,Claims. '
" , '
NACP, RG 260, Economics Division, Boxes 353-354, File: Czech Claims: The general allegation that the sale took'
place as a ~onsequence ~r under the pressure of occupation was not sufficient to e~t'ablish restitutability.
'
'''Aryanization'' in the formofa purchas~ and sale was not by its~lf sufficient to prove removal by force or dures's
,NACP, RG 260; Economics Division: Box 361; Austrian Claims. As a matter ofrestituticinlaw and procedure the
general assertion.of economic penetrati~n was notsufficie~t to pro~~'removiby force or duress. NACP, RG 260,
", ,
,
Economics DiviSion, Box 353, Czech' Claims. , ' ,
95 NACP, RG260, Economics bivi~ion, Box351, French Claims.'
, ,"
96 NACP,: Finance, Box 130"File: Claims-Restitution, "Draft Press Rei~ase"; July 17, 1948.
,
97 NACP, Finail~,e, !3ox 130:File: Claims~Restitution, "Draft Press Release/' July 17,1948. ' , '
" '
,98 NACP, RG 260, Property Divisi!Jn; Box 'IS, File: Reparations and Restitution, "External RestitUtion'." ,
99 NACP, RG 260, Finance, Box 130, File: Claims-Restitution, August.?, 1948.
, 100 NACP, RG 260, Finance, Box 130, File: Claims~Resti~tioniAugu~t 7,'1948:,
,93
94
.".
':
33,
�Netherlands and Beigium."lol Czech claims included securities of Jewish-owned plants that were
I,
aryanized and the securities removed t9 Gerrnany.102
US ReStitution Policy in Aus~ria'
71.
The case of Austria is difficult at best. Wartime declarations that nullified her
Nazi connections gave her the dual role of both victim and victimiz~r. Furthermore, the politics
,
,
of the Cold War play~d a great role into how policy for Austria was developed and the changes
,
:.'
that occurred throughout the course of occupation. In some cases, later policy was the polar
opposite of earlier policy.
. ,
In contrast to the relative hard line taken by the Americans towards restitution in
72.
Germany was the restitution policy towards Austria. The cornerstone of United States restitution
policy in Austria derived from the Moscow Declaration of November 1943 whereby the Allied
powers nulliftedHitler's March 1938 annexation of his homeland [the Anschluss]. Though the
, Anschluss was nullified and Austria was considered a "iiberated" nation 103, her role .as a
perpetr~tor in the Nazi war machine was still taken ihto accoun( therefore classifying het as of
and "ex-enemy"
. both "liberated" , . 'nation.
73.
There is seemingly no declaration of United States restitution policy before
November 1945 at least at the govemrnentallevel, ilhistrated by the lack of the term "restitution"
in the Potsdam Communique. The assumption was made that
... from the beginning the intent of the Allied Nations to restore to the lawful
owner nations as can be clearly identified and is capable of restitution;
, furthermore, that steps for such restitution should be undertaken as promptly as
circumstances permit. 104
101 NACP, RG
102NACP, RG
103 NACP, RG
104 NACP, RG
29.
260,
260,
260,
260,
Finance, Box 130, File: Claims-Restitution, August 7, 1948. '
Economics Division, Box 353, Czech Claims, January 3 i, 1948.
United States Allied Council Austria, Office of the Director, Decimal Files 1945-1951, Box 3.
United States Allied Council Austria, Office of the Director, Files ofihe Director 1945-1951, Box
'
",
34
�74.
. The assumption was indeed correct on the position taken in 'regard to restitution
from the US Zone of Austria, obviously with specific conditions that would regulate subsequent
restitution.. Furthermore, in the later years of Americat1 occilpation, the actual policy would be
amended numerous times to accommodate such factors as' Soviet actions and restitution costs so
that by the end of the occupation the restitution policy governing the US Zone had undulated,
from one pole to the opposite pole.
75.
As stated in the above 'paragraph, the policy on restitution of property within the.
US Zone of occupation followed the general principle it did in Germany- return'the identifiable
property to its respective nation as soon as p~~sible .. It is important' to note here that the word
"nation" is used; the term "individual" is found nowhere in the text. 105 The cables that established
the basis for restitution policy in Austria, WARX 85965 (30 November 1945) and WARX 99226
,
~
(5 March. 1946), covered the specific types bfproperty to be restituted.
Th~y
further clarified the
requirements for restitution to Allied nations and those applicable to ex-enemy nations. 106
Procedure for the logistics of property return were also outlined in these cables.
76.
The property to be returned to Allied nations was separated into the following
categories:
.
.
'
1. Cultural, religious and artistic works including museum c'olleciion~,
. libraries and archives. These assets needed only be identified as
having been looted or acquired (by any means) during occupation by
the Nazis.
2. Heavy industrial machinery, rolling sto'ck, locomotives, barges (with
, the exception ofoceari faringvesseIs), and communication and power
equipment.
"
3. Other" ...goods, valuables (excluding gold, secooties 107, and foreign
.
"
As yet, i.ve have see~ n~ documents that' contain policy ~n restituti~n to individuals b~t that it not to say that it is not
discussed- the rest of the material pertaining to Austria needs to be viewed before a definitive statement about
individual restitution policy in the US Zone can be made,
. ,
106 NACP, RG 260, United States Allied Council Austria (USACA), Office of the Director, Files of the Director
1945-1951; Box 29. The Allied nations were as follows: Britain, United States, France, Soviet Union, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Luxemburg, Poland, Norway, Greece,.Czechoslovakia and Denmark: The ex-enemy nations were
Austria, Romania, Finland, Italy, Hungary, and Yugoslavia; though there was a push to grant Austria and Italy special
, ' . , .
"
restitution status,
105
35
�currencies), materials, equipment, livestock and other property found
in storage or otherwise in ·bulk form. lOS .:
.
The only ~xception for return of this property related to the latter two categories
77.
whereby the only criterion be the identification of it as looted or acquir~d by any means from the
.United Nation .by the Germans (the exception being 'material produced during the occupation).
The acq~isition~f the goods by force also' needed to be substantiated. 109
78.
. The substantiation of force and lists of property claims were then submitted by
'.'
".
'
•
I
•
"
'
" claimant nations through diplomatic channels to the United S~ates 'and the RD & R division who
would in tum examine the claim, as well as iocate and identify the property. After American
examination,
missi~ns'from the claimant nations were invited to further prove the claims, collect
information on the' location of the property, identify and receive the property so long as proper
. ,
.
,
proof of ownership was .provided. The imminent return of this property to Allied nations took
precedence over both tile needs ofthe occupati()n forces and Austrian population. I10
79.
The criteria for ex-enemy nations were the same asthose for Allied nations with
the exception of currencies, which were not included. These nations further need to prove,that
the property in question was removed into the Reich (Germany or Austria) either by force or
without compensation. This removal of p~operty had to have' occured between the date of
German occupation until May 15 <1945. 111 Procedure for rerum was,' ag~in, the same as for'
"
Allied na~ions, however, restitution oftransport¥ltion equipment and rolling stock could be
deferred for use during the military occupation. Furthermore, property which fell into the third
,
'.
"
.
categ()ry ("other" property found in bulk .or storage) did not have to be returned if 'the
, .
'
NACP; RG260, United States Allied Council Austria (YSACA), Office of the Director; Files ofthe Director
1945-1951, Box 29.
:09 NACP, RG 260; United States Allied Council Austria (USACA), Office of the Director, Files of the Director
1945-1951, Box 29. The dates of occupation for ex-enemy nations are as follows: Austria-I 2 March 1938; Hungary
20 January ,1945; ltaly-3September 1943;,
Romania-12 September 1944; Finland-I 9, September 1944.
110 NACP, RG 260,' United States Allied Council Austria (USACA), Office of the Director, Files of the Director
1945-1951, Box 29.,
,108
36
�CommaildingGeneral felt thatrestitutionwould endanger. the "...minimum requirements of
.
',.".
"
,
Austrian economy or require additional US assistance or expenditures. II 112 This is one ofthe
cases where "special" provisions for Austria, as a liberated from nation It ••• comparable in status
to other liberated countrie~ .. ~,1! was given. 113
80.
Just as property was put into catego~ies so was type of restitution. Property fell
under the headings of German assets inAustria, Internal Restitution and External Restitution and
.
,
,
,
each was handled differently according to the type and nation to be restituted to. The following ,
, ,is a brief summary of the process by which each of the above-named categories of restitution was
handled.
a. German assets in Austria
8 I.
Businesses were the primary type of German assets to be found in Austria due to
the large free-trade area that the Anschluss provided. These businesses fell into the following
three categories: '
1. German firms who had established branches or'subsidiaries in Austria. These
had in general established their businesses through legal measures without
duress I 14, although some took advantage of "aryarused" property.
2. German enterprises who established separate enterprises as part qfthe war
effort. IG Farben's subsidiary Stickstoffwerke falls into this category.
NACP, RG 260, United States Allied Council Austria (USACA), Office of the Director, Files of the Director
1945-1951, Box 29,
112 NACP, RG 260, United States Allied. Council Austria (USACA), Office of the Director, Files of the Director,
1945-1951, Box 29.
.
113 NACP, RG 260, USACA, Office ofthe Director, Decimal Files 1945-1951, Box 3.
114 NACP, RG 260 USACA, Office of the Director, Files of the Director, Decimal Files 1945-51 Report of the US High
Commissioner for Austria: Final Report Volume II-I October 1950, Box 23. The definition of "duress" being II ... the
III
application of actual physical force, thereby disrega,rding all threats, inadequate payment, and economic and social
.
pressure..."
31
�3. German firms who relocated to Austria for industrial dispersal and protection
against war and bombdainage. Many, including BMW's Eugen Grill Werke at
Hallein, used "blind" names to cloak.their help inthe war effort. I15
82.
Restitution policy for German assets in Austria was set forth by a number of
agreement including the London Agreement. of 4 July 1945, the Postdam Agreement of 2 August
1945 and the Control Agreement'of 28 June 1946, all of whlch called for the s~paration of
, Austria from Gernianyas the primary task. Jt was first necessary to establish the bona fide' ,
,
, c
. '
I
.
German ownership of the company 13 hi the view-of the United States ownership was only
through legal contracts without fraud or duress and then to eliminate such ownership from the
Austrian economy. A secondary task was to establish the nature of these German investments in
the Austrian economy in order to ascertain whether or not they could be used as reparations,
especially true in the case of the Soviets.
83.
a
Due to the hick of foUr-power agreement on the actual dispersement of these ,
properties (mostly stemming from Soviet interest in acquiring as many of the German assets as
possible), each Allied zone had,in effect, its own policy. The American position on German
assets w~s to release them as soon as possible to the Austrian g~vernment who in turn acted.
trustee in the coritrol and managemeht oftne property. By 1949 the United States ha,d succeeded
in effecting policy that transferred conti-oland responsibility for German assets to the Austrian '
government. I 16
b. Internal Restitution
84.
Though internal restitution was governed ultimateiy by the American occupation
forces, it was the position of the United States to allow Aus,triari adjudication of such restitution
claims, even though these claims were filed against property owned by the Germans. At first this
38
�was done on a case-by-case basis but by March of 1949 adjudication on,all internal restitution
~.
,
'
cases in Austria were'the responsibility of the Austrian Restitution Commissions. 117 US policy
dictated that the Austrian government be pennit~ed the maximum amount of control and
.
.
responsibility on such claims ..
c. External Restitution
85.
The initial post~war policy on restitution from the US Zone I 18 was broad in scope
and included all types of property to the extent that the return of looted property was to take
place without regard for civilian or military need. The only exception to this was transport
material, which was restituted only after the needs of the occupations were met. I19 The majority
'of the property restituted was art and cultural property valued at approximately 188 million
dollars; it went to the Soviet Union and her former1; German occupied satellites. 120
86.
After this irutial deluge of restitUtion United States policy began to fluctuate.
There were numerous factors that influenced this ranging from changes in US foreign policy
(most likely counter-actions to the. Soviets) to the jeopardy placed on the Austrian economy by
the end of 1947 from restitlltion, especially of industrial equipment. 121 The problem was'
alleviated by a 1948 decision to turn over all unsettled ex-enemy claims in the US Zone to the
Austrian government~an extreme shift in policy asearlier the us had not pennitted Au~trian
adjudication of ex-enemy assets for fear that they would not be restituted to the claimant,
116 NAcr; RG 260, USACA Office ~fthe Director, Files of the Director-Decimal File;'J1945-1951, Report of the US
,
High Commissioner for Austria: Final Report Volume II, I OCtober 1950, Box 23.
117 NACP, RG 260, USACA Office of the Director, Files of the Director-Decimal Files 1.945-1951, Report of the US
High Commissioner for Austria: Final Report Volume II, I October 1950, Box 23. Execution ofjudgment waii
.delayed, however, until approval was given by the United States. It must be kept in mind as well that these cases fell
under Austrian restitution laws, laws that the United StateS had a great deal of influence implementing as well as
accepting Austrian restitution laws, '
,
118 As was the case with both Gennan assets and internal restitution individual policies were pursued in each Allied
zone. The French, British and American policies were similar in natur!! with the Soviet zone deviating from this shared
view. Again, this prevented a common 'policy between zones on restitution.
.
119 NACP, RG 260 USACA, Office of the Director Dcl:imal Files1945-195 1 Report of the US High Commissioner for
'
Austria: Volume II, 1 October 1950, Box 23.
120 NACP, RG 260 USACA, Office of the Director Decimal Files 1945-1951 Report of the US High Commissioner for
Austria: Volume II, 1 October 1950,. Box 23.
39
�nation. '22 This 'shift in policy affected a large mimher'ofclaims, particUlarly those from H~gary
,
,
and Austria. Furthermore, the cutoff date of 19 January 1949 was set by USFA for, accepting' .
,
'
. !
t
'
,
new claims in order, to ".. ~ffiinini1ze other harmful and disturbing effects of restitutions on
.
.
Austria... II l2J
87.
Restitution of property from Austria was largely completed by October of 1949
with a small number of lingering cases that were !' ... a particularly delicate matter in view of the
nature of the property and in view of the political and economic effects of either restitution or
denial of the claim." '24
ill. 1945-1955
88.
Following World War II, the United States government was.committed to take
any measures feasible to discover, apprehend and restitute property looted or illegally seized by
the Axis governments or personnel, or by other persons, including members of the Armed Forces
of the United States. The policies formulated to carry out this program were defined by existing
international and d~mestic-law, as well as laws promulgated following the war by the Allied
Control Council and the United State Military Government ("OMGUS") .
.. A. INTERNATIONAL
.
1. POTSDAM AGREEMENT OF AUGUST 2 1945
89.
The Potsdam Agreement was the main policy document for the four-power
occupation of Germany. The Allied Control Council (ACC) for Germany - USSR, Great Britain,
France and the United States - considered itself to be both the de facto and de jure government of
It is necessary to keep in mind that the economic rehabilitation was one of the priorities of US policy in Austria.
NACP, RG 260, USACA Office of the Director, Decimal Files 1945-51, "Questions on Restitution which may
Arise", Box 2 . .
.
123 NACP: RG 260 USACA Office of the Director, Files of the Director 1945-1951, Report of the United States High
Commissioner for Austria: Final Report.volume IT, I October 1950, Box 23. .
124 NAcp, RG 260 USACAOffice of the Director, Files of the Director 1945-1951, Box 23, RePort of the United .
States High Commissioner for A~stria: Final Report Volume II, I October 1950.
121
122
40
�Genn~ny. The Potsdam A~eement carried out previous agreements made at Yalta and
(
.
emphasized anew the eradication of Gennan ~litarism and Nazism as well as the reconstruction
I I . '
.
'
•
of Gemiany' and the need for Germany to 'compensate the United Nations for their losses, without
;
.
mentioning other victims.
90.
With respect to restitution, the Potsdam Agreement provided that unilateral·
action by anyone Zone Commander would be coUnter to the principles of Potsdam if the quantity
and/or value of the seizure, confiscation and removal of materials from Gennany, other than for
reparations or restitution adversely affected 'the German econ<;>my.
91.
Based on the PotsdamA1P'eerhent, both Great Britain and the United States
renounced all ~laims to securities fou~d i~ Bulgaria, F'inland, Hungary, Romania,and the Soviet
controlled zone of eastern Austria. 125 The Soviet Union also renounced claims in all other
countries. 126 However, when holding German shares.ofbusinesses located elsewhere. in Europe
the Soviets used those assets as reparations under the Potsdam decisions. m The U.S. was
.
.
opposed to this Soviet interpretation, dryly noting that "it was certainly not the intention of the
I·
•
signers of the Potsdam Agreement to award to the Soviet G~~emment all Gernlan owned foreign
securities found in the Soviet Zone of occupation~ irrespective of the physical location of the
property.,,128
Whil~ the Sbviet Union agreed that looted securities were subje~t to restitution and
reportedly returned many securities, the U.S.-U.K.-French position asserted that all securities
acquired byGermany in occupied countries were presumed to.be looted unless proven otherwise,
.
,
•
•
I
'
Moreover, the Western Allies suggested the pooling of unidentifiable loo~ed securities in order to
NACP, RG 260, U.S. Element, ACC, Box 42, File: Foreign Securities - Investments, Cable CC-5679, October 16,
1946.
,
126 NACP~ RG 260, U.S. Element, ACC, Bo~42, File: Foreign Securities - In~estments, Cable CC-5679, O~tober 16, .
1946.
'
127 NACP, RG 260, AG Decimal File, Box 95, File: German Assets, April 2, 1946.
128 NACP, RG 260, U.S. Element, ACC, Box 42, File: Foreign Securities - Investments, CORC/P[ 46]383, Foreign
Currency and Foreign Securities Found in Germany, December 3, 1946.
125
41
�satisfy any outstanding claims after having completed the restitution of identifiable looted'
securities. 129
2. ALLIED CONTROL COUNCIL (ACC)
, 92.
From early March 1945 through mid-1946, the ACCfocused on the restitution of
identifiable property forcibly removed from countries under Nazi occupation. It also linked
restitution with reparation by weighing restitution decisions within the larger context of
, reparations decisions. In this way, restitution was considered as a part of the more important
agenda, that of teparations. 130
93.
,
' These decisions were not intended for ~'victims" in the sense of individuals
,
'
.
whose personal property had been confiscated by the Germans. Their purpose aimed at
compensating the victorious
Allied nations for their wartime (industrial, defense) costs. This
.
. -.
interpretation of"restitution" was also echoed at the US leve1. 131 ' By equating restitution with
,
,
'
the wartime costs of the All1.ed nations, the Allies were the victims, and their governments were
the entities needing compensat~on.
96.
'The Allied Control Council (ACC) at its meeting in January 19,1946 confirmed
the pririciples of the London Declaration as the basis for post-war restitution policy: "[t]he
question of restitution of property removed by the Germans from Allied countries must be
examined, in'all cases, in light 'of the' Declarati~n of 5 January 1943.,,132
fu April194~, the
Allied Control Authority ,Coordinating Committee defined the "claimant nation" as any of the '
"
'
NACP, RG 260, Property Division, Box 16, File: Securities, September 25, 1947.
NACP, RG 260, Records ofthe'Rep~rations and Restitution Branch, Box 13, "A Short History of External
Restitution--Non-Cultural," 24,March 1949, pp. 6-7.
.
131 See for instance, "Memorandum Regarding American Policy for the Treatment of Germany," 23 March 1945.
129
130
132 The United States Political Adviser for Germany (Murphy) to the Acting Secretary of St'ate; Jan. 19, 1946, reprinted
.
, in FRUS, vol.V, 1946 at 488.
42
�nations "which participated in the Declaration of 5 January 1943," whereas other nations under
Nazi occupation "may hereafter be speCified by the. Allied Control Council.,,133
97.
In the case of cultural property, one method for effecting restitution was set forth.
ina tripartite agreement concluded among the United States, the United Kingd~~ and France on
July 8, 1946, which recommended that the governments 9f all liberated countries compile lists of
"spoliated articles" and that the lists be circulated to art dealers, museum authorities and
"specialized people who will be under the same obligation of vigilance as the customs authorities
,
•
t •
and compelled t6 refer s~spicious cases to the central.administrations."~34
a.. ALLIED CONTROL COUNCIL PROCLAMATION NO.2
98.
This Proclamation addressed the Allies' control of the German military, foreign
affairs, communications systems, finance, agriculture, production and mining, public utilities;
industry, "and economy generally.'" Ailied representatives were required to take control of gold,
.
.
silver, platinum, foreign notes and coins; and all propertY'of any individual or company of a
country that had been at war with the United Nations. With regard t~,.the prop~rty of Nazi
victims, the proClamation put forth that "[t]heGerman authorities will carry out, for the. benefit
of the United Nations,' such measures of restitution, reinstatement, restoration, reparation,
reconstruction, relief and rehabilitation as'the Allied representatives may prescribe" (VI, 19, [aD.
and "the German authorities will comply with such directions as the Allied representatives may
issue regarding the property', assets, rights, titles and' interests of persons affected by legislation
.
'
.
involving discrimination on grounds of race, color, creed, language or political opinions" (IX, 42,
[b D. Although the Proclamation instructed Germany to comply with future directives concerning
133 NACP, RG 260 .. Entry Reparations & Restitution, File Policy Matters, Box 23, Allied Control Authority
.
Coordinating Committee, Quadripartite Procedur~s for RestihJtion, Part I; April 17, 1946.
NACP, RG 59, Lot File 620-4, Entry 31 04A, Records Maintained by the Fine Arts and Monuments Adviser [sic]
1945-61' ("Ardelia Hall Co1!ection"), Box 1, Department of State, Incoming Telegram, Tripartite Agreement
Documents.
.
134
43
�the latter category of those discriminated against on the grounds ~f creed, etc. no such directives
were forthcoming. NO FOOTNOTES
b. ALLIED CONTROL COUJ'l"CIL LAW NO.5
99.
ACC Law No.5, the '.'Vesting and Marshalling Decree,~' dated October 30, 1945,
vested title to all German external assets except those subject to the jurisdiction of the four allIed
powers in the ACe. It also created the German External Property Commission in which such
. title was vested. With regard to Nazi victim property,
~'no
provision was made for exceptions in
the case of property owned by persecutees." NO FOOTNOTES
3. PARIS CONFERENCE ON REPARATIONS (November-December 1945)
100.
On January 14, 1946, eighteen nations including the United States, France, Great Britain,
.
. .
\
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia signed the final act of the Paris Conference on Reparations. 116.
On J~ne 15, 1946, the U.S., Great Britain, France, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia,
"worked out" a plan with the inter-Goverrnnentalcorrimittee on refugees whereby that
,
, i.
organization would re~eive $25 million from the "proceeds of the liquidation
of German assets
in neutral countries. ,,135 The five countries stated "that in light of paragraph H of Article 8 of the
Paris Agreement on reparation, the assets becoming available should not be used for the
compensation of individual victims but for the rehabilitation and resettlement of persons in
eligible classes .... ,,136 Eligible persons are victims of Nazi persecution for religious, racial, or
political reasons who were a) resident in Germany or Austria and phm toerri.i~ate; or b)
nationals of occupied countries. 137 In addition to the $25 ~llion "s,um the Inter-Governmental
committee on refugees or its su~cessor organization is hereby authorized to take title from the
appropriate authorities to all 'non-lTIonetary gold' found by the Allies in Germany and to take
NACP, RG 260, Finance Division, Box 50, File: Gold and Silver [Hungarian Restitutib'n], Telegram 228, June 15,
1946.
136 NACP, RG 260, Finance Divisi~n, Box 50, File: Gold and Silver [Hungarian Restitution], Telegram 228, June 15,
1946.
135
44
�,
,
such steps as may be needed to liquidate these assets as promptly as possible; due consideration
being given to secure the highest possible realizable value.,,138 Meanwhile tli~ agreement stated
that "the 'heirless funds' to be used for the'rehabilitation and resettlement of Jewish victims of
Nazi action should be made available to appropriate field organizations," while the 'heirless
funds' to be used for the non-Jewish victims '~should be made available to the InterGovernmental Committee on Refugees or its successor' organization for distribution to
appropriate public and private field organizations. 139 The five nations then called upon the
,
"
neutral countries to assist in collecting, identifying; and distributing these assets. 140 Because "the
overwhelming group of eligible victims were Jewish," the Paris Confere~ce
qri ~eparations
"allocated $22.5 milliori out of Gennan assets in neutral countries, 90 percent of the non-'
monetary gold and 95 percent of the 'heirless funds' for therehabilitation and ~esettlement of
Jews.,,141
4. Establishment ofthe Inter-Allied Reparations Agency (iARA)
103.
The lARA defined a victim of Nazi persecution as someone who had been
deprived of liberty between 1 September 1939 and 8 May 1945 as a result of racial, religious or
political persecution, and ~ho was rio. longer resident in an ex-enemy country.
104.
Under stringent conditions laid down by theIARA no assets could be released to
individuals still resident in Gennany if such a release benefited the German economy at a time
when strict Allied controls were in place:
.
.
'
. '
:
5. Tripartite Commission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold (TGC)
137NACP, RG 260, Finance Division, Box 50, File: Gold and Silver [Hungarian Restitution], Telegram 228, June IS,
1946.
"
138NACP, RG 260, Finance Division, Box 50, File: Gold and Silver [Hungarian Restitution], Te1egram228, June IS,
1~6.'
"
139 NACP, RG 260, Financ'e Division, Box 50, File: Gold and Silver [Hungarian Restitution], Telegram 228, June IS,
1946.'
,
,,140 NACP, RG 260, Fimince Division, Box 50, File: Gold and,Silver [Hungarian Restitution], Telegram 228, June 15,
1946.
45
�105.
The Allies established at the Paris Reparations Conference of December 1945 a
. pool for monetary gold that they had recovered or were in the process of recovering from their
respective zones of occupation. Part ,ill of the Paris Agreement on Reparations mandated: "All
,
.
".
the monetary gold found in Germany by the Allied forces ... shall be pooled for distribution as
restitution among the countries participating in the pool in proportion to their respective losses of
gold through looting'or by wrongful removal to Germany." Monetary gold transferred by
Germany to a third country was also to be included in"the pool. Participating countries were
expected to accept as full· satisfaction of their claim, the portion of monetary gold that had
•
<"
" .
accrued in the pooL Each country would 'receive a proportiona:Hhare of the monetary gold that
had been looted from them by Gerinany after March 12, 1938, based on a detailed and verifiable
..
.
.
"
'.
'
accounting of the loss. The participation by countries hot represented at the Paris Conference
such as Austria and Italy, would be determined at later,date; in the interim ~ share would be set
aside for these countries. Claims would be submitted to the go~ernnients' of the United States,
the United Kingdom and Fnmce who 'would hold and distribute the pool in accordance with the
Paris Agreement. 142 .
106. .
James
W. Angell, the US Representative to the Allied .commission on
Reparation had clarified that "'monetary gold' as used in Part ill of the Paris Reparations
'Agreement referred to gold bullion and gold coins. He had distinguis~ed between gold
acceptable as a medium of exchange and gold used for "dental, artistic and adornment
purposes.,,143 By July 1948, the Ailies had retrieved 9-,849,169 ounc,es of moneta!), gold for the
141 NACP, RG 260, Fin~nce Division, Box 50, File: Gold and Silver [Hungarian Restitution], Telegram 228, June 15,
1946.'
'
142 NACP, RG 84, E~try 2113T, lARA Classified Subject File, 1945-1961 , B 3, Part III, Fin~1 Act Paris Conference on
Reparations No~ember 9~December 21, 1945, p. 19.
.
143 NACP, RG-260, Box 420; Final Report of the Paris Conference on Reparation, November 9 to December 21 ,1945, ,
submitted to the Secretary of State by James W. Angell, United States Representative, Allied Commission on
'
Reparation--':'Germany, February 18, 1946, p.1 06.
46 .
�pool.I44 The gove'tnrrients of the United States, Great Britain and France took responsibility. for
this gold.
,
107.
'
In order to implement 'Part III, the Governments of the United States, the United
Kingdom and France established the Tripartite Commission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold
(TGC) on September 27, 1946. The three governments published the "Terms of Reference" that
.
'
governed the ~peration of the TGC as it determined and administered the distribution of the pool
,
•
•
To_
ofmonetary gold retrieved by the Allies from Germany or from third countries which had
transferred from Germany. The TGC would request and receive claims from governments
seeking restitution of monetary gold looted or.. wr~ngfull y removed by Germany. The TGC
would adjudicate the claims and detei1ni.ne the share of the ·pool to be distributed to cla.imant
governments. The TGC would annoUnce the total value of the pool of monetary, gold and, after
all claims have been receiv,ed and judged, would announce the shares 'in the pool to which each
claimant country was entitled. These actions··and the administrative functio~s necessary to carry
.
.
"
'.
.
them out were to be achieved through unanimous agreement of the three Commissioners, one
representing each ofthe three Governments.
108.
The TGC held its first meeting on December 8, 1946. It prepared a
questionnaire, which it sent on March 13, 1947 to twenty-one countries-the eighteen countries
that participated in the Paris Conference plus Austria, Italy and Poland. 14,5 The questionnaire
provideq a uniform basis for filing claims and submitting evidence to support them. It included a
narrower definition of monetary gold than that discussed at the Paris Conference on Reparations:
All gold which, at the time ofits looting or wrongful removal, was 'carried as a
part of the claimant country's monetary reserve, either in the accounts of the
144 NACP, RG-59, Entry 5382, Box 4, The Final Report. Tripartite Commission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold.
"
, Brussels, 9/3/98, p. 2. '
145 The eighteen countries were Albania, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmar,k, Egypt, France,
Greece, India, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States,
Yugoslavia. Tripartite Commission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold Final Report, Brussels, 9/3/98. RG-59, Entry
5382, Box 4, p., 19.
47
�claimant Government itself or in the' accounts of the claimant country's central
,bank or other monetary authority at home or abroad. 146
.'
,
109.
Ten countries submitted claims to the TGC: Albania, Austria, Belgium,
Czechoslovakia, . Gieece,Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands; Poland and Yugoslavia. Claimant
,
countries were askedto provide information about gold movements during the period March 12,
1938 though June 30, 1945. Therequired information included detailed lists of the quantities of
monetary gold involved in each act of looti~g or 'wrongful rerrio~al by Germany and
substantiating documentatioiL
llO.
,With the European economy shattered by war, formerly occupied countries had
great need for the monetary gold that had been stolen from thdr reserves. Therefore, the TGC
,
'
proceed with an initial distribution of the mOlletary gold which lasted one entire year, from
October 1947 to ~he following October 1948. That first distribution amounted to nearly two
thirds of the gold placed in the pool. By November 1950, nearly 80% of the pool was disbursed
.
.
. .
.
to claimant countries. The recipients of the first distribution were the goveriunents ofBelgium,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands (October 1947), A~stria and Italy (December 1947), and
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia (1948).
Ill.
After the completion of these dIstributions, the TGC grappled with the
complexity of numerous country claims. At a c~nfe~ence in Brusseis on Looted Monetary Gold
Matte~s from January 5 through January 10, 1950, the, commisisoners hammered out a
TGC's
. , '
"
number ofguidelines to apply to these difficult claims. They also presented another definition of
monetary gold, aimed at disposing of so-called Law 53 gold. For recovery, "monetary gold
should be held t~ include ~old which under Germa~ L~w and regulati~ns was monetarygold.,,]47
146 N'ACP, RG 84, Re~ords of the U.S. Embassy in' Brussels, Belgium,.Files of the U.S. Delegation 'to the 'Inter-Allied
Reparations Agency (lARA), Tripartite Gold Commission, 1946-1954, Classified General Records, Entry 2l13M, Box
I, Tripartite Commission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold, Questionnaire on Gold, February 1947.
147 NACP, RG 59, Records of the Office of Financial Operations, Records relating to the Tripartite Commission for the
Restitution of Monetary Gold. Lot 62D115, Box 4, Conference in Brussels on Looted Monetary Gold Matters. ,
48
�Accordingly, gold, "in the form of fine gold bars, gold alloy bars, or gold coins (except those of
numismatic or historical value);,148---':'including thatsurrendered under Law 53 in Germany
Sllould be added to the gold pool. For distributiolf, the Conference recommended consistency
with past TGC principles "to take into account the law of the cla,imant country in making its,
'decisions whether gold claimed as looted was monetary gold.,,149
6. FIVE POWER AGREEMENT FOR NON-REPATRIABLE VICTIMS OF "
GERMANY JUNE 14, 1946
114.
The United States, France, Great Britain, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, set
.
"
'
.
'
,
forth a practica1.plan for allocating reparations as en,:,isaged in Article 8, part Iofthe Final
Agreement oftlie Paris Conference on Reparations. This Five-Power Agreement specified that
. .
~
the assets becoming available under Article 8 "should be used not for Jhe compensation of
individual victims but for the rehabilitation and resettlement of persons in eligible classes". As
"all available siati~ticsindicate[d] beyond any reasonable doubt that the overwhelming'majority: :
..
.
'
.'
.
"
of eligible persons" per Article' 8 [were] Jewish," a small portion ofJunds (10% of the nonmonetary gold and 5% of "heirless funds") were set aside for non-Jewish victims. Children were
given priority. ?xceptional cases aside" costs of resettlement were not to exceed $1,000 per adult
and $2,500 per child under
12~
The IGCR was'authorized to takditle to all non-monetary gold
found by the Allie$ in Germany "and to take such steps as may be needed to liquidate these assets
as' promptly as possible, due consideration being given to secure' the highest possible realizable
value". The French Governinent was charged with approaching the neutral countries to "make
avrulable all assets of victims of Nazi action who died without heirs." These "heirless funds'"
were to bemade available to "appropriate field organizalions"in on:ler to rehabilitate and resettle
,
.
NACP, RG'59, Records of the Office of Financial Operations, Records relating to the Tripartite Commission for'the
,Restitution of Monetary Gold. Lot 62D 115, Box 4, ,Conference in Brussels on Looted Monetary Gold Matters.
149 NACP, RG 59, Records of the Office of Financial Operations, Records relating to the Tripartite Commission fo'r the
Restitution of Monetary Gold. Lot 62Dl15, Box 4, Conference in Brussels on Looted Monetary Gold Matters. '
148
,49
�Jewish victims of Nazi Germany. On this last point, the Agreement acknowl~dged that these
assets arose "out of a unique condition in international law a~d morality."
-B. US Occupation policy
1. Gennany-Military Government Laws
a. ML 52
117.
A key policy relating.to duress property w~sMilitaiy Government Law 52. It
stated that all prop~rty in the occupied territory "owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, in
whole or in part" by a number of persons and organizations was "hereby declared to be subject to
seizure of possession or title, direction,mana~ement, supervision or otherwise being taken into
control by Military Government." One such category of property was "Property which has been
the subject of dure~s, wrongful acts 'of confiscation, dispossessiori or spo'liation from territories
outside Germany, whether pursuant to legislation or by procedures purporting to follow forms of
law or otherwise."
118.
Law 52 was promuigated and put into .effect as the U.S. Armies advanced
through Germany beginning in September 1944. On December 7, 1944, an American military
.
" .
or
~
directive ordered that along with the posting of Law 52 in newly occupied territories, certain
categories of properties were to be taken under immediate control. The duress property category
was not on this list; however, one proyision was that "all other property specifically (emphasis in
original) ordered taken under control ", should in fact be,takeri under control. I50 Thus duress
property may have been seized urider this catch-all category although the category per 'se was not
'
.
"
•
I
•
singled out,. for control. ' .
The same phrasing and instruction appeared, on a G~5 directive dated
.
.
, . '
150 NACP, RG 260, Records of the Executive Office, The Control Office, Historical Division, Directives and
Regulations, 1945, Box 268, Administration of Military Government in Germany-Finance file, G-5 Financial
Instructions No.4, Instructions to Ocs of Kreis Detachments, December 7, 1944, pp, 1-2.
50
�January 31, 1945. 151 , However, a December 20, 1944, directive from G-5 had slightly different
instructions. Finance Officers were ,to "make spot checks to ensure that property ...1isted in Law
No. 52" had been seized. 152
119.
With r~gard to cultural property, ML 52 initially provided that "no person shall
import, acquire of receive, deal in, sell, lease, transfer, export; hypothecate or oth~r wise dispose
of, destroy or surrender possession, custody or control
~f any property: ...[w]hich is a work of
art or cultural material of value or importance, regardless of the ownership or controlthereof.,,153
This law was revised in 1946 to allow con,nnerce in art objects, except that objects valued at
10,000 Reichsmarksormore had to be reported. When it announced the issuance ofML 52, the
Public relations office of OMGUS stated that ML 52 was a translation into action of the policy
'
.
'
.
implicit in the London Declaration. 154 M.L 52 'also applied to U.S. personnel and any purchase
,
"
" over the amount of $50' had to be approved by an officer of the Monuments, Fine Arts and
Archives Section (MFA&A).155
b. Military Law 53
120.
On May 31, '1945, the'~hief ofthe Currency Section 'at SHAEF, H. D. Cragon,
informed the'Commanding Generals of3rdU~ 'Army rear,
ih
US Army, 9th Army, 15 th Army that
henceforth all gold and silver bullion and coin, paper currency or any other than German issue,
and foreign exchange assets falling under MG Law 53 would be deposited at the Currency
151 NACP, RG 260, Records of the Executive Office, The Control Offic~, Historical Division, Directives and
Regulations, 1945, Box 268, Administration of Military Government in Germany-Finance file, G-5 Financial
.
Instructions No, 4, Instructions to Ocs of Kreis Detachments, January 31 ,: 1945, pp. 1-2. '
152 NARA RG 260, Records of the Executive Office, The Control Office, Historical Division, Directives and
Regulations, 1945, Box 268, Administration of Military Government in Germany-Finance file, Check List for Financial
Officers during Mobile Phase of Military Government," December 20, 1944, p. 2.
153 NACP, RG 59, Lot File 620-4, Entry 31 04A, Ardelia Hall Collection, Military Government - Germany, United
'
States Zone, Law No. 52, Amended, Blocking and Contr91 of Property, Art II Prohibited Transactions.
154 OMGUS, Public Relations Office, APO 742, Berlin, Germany, Dec. 10, 1946, Lot File 620:4, Entry 31 04A,
Record Group 59, Records Maintained by the Fine Arts and Monuments Adviser (sic] 1945-61 ("Ardelia Hall
Collection"), Box 24.
'
'
155 (-:~~·~C:':':~~'~~\r<~~
iI9.&~ii@flSQ~
51
�Section for Gennany at the Re~chsbank in Frankfurt, together with a certificate of ownership and
status "where available.,,156 .
121. .
Paragraph 16-624.1 of Military Law 53 defined commercial gold and silver as
"gold and silver whereof less than eighty (80) per cent of the value denves from the value of the
gold or silver content, as distinguished from the value of other materials or workmanship
.,
,
involved. Metal in this form is considered as not in·bullion form, and hence as not failing under
Article Vll, 11 d, v. of Military .Government Law No. 53." Paragraph 16-625 referred to Property
of Stateless and Displaced Persons in Germany. These individuals were obligated under Law 53
to hand over to MG authorities their "foreign exchailge.assets.,,'57 .
c. Military Law 59
'122.
The principal purpose of Military Law 59, "Restitution ofIdentifiable Property"
was to effect restitution cif identifiable property to persons who were wrongfully depnved of
such property between January~O, 1933 and May 8,'1945 because of their race, religion,
nationality, ideology or opposition to the National Socialist regime. In order to make out a prima
,
.
'
facie case, a person belonging to the class of persecutees had to show only two facts: (1) that he
.
'
,
,r
belonged to a class of persecuted persons; and (2) that he transferred or otherwise ~urrendered
identifiable property within the designated time period~ Such allegations were sufficient to raise
a reb~ttable presumption that he acted under duress apd th~t the transaction was invalid. ISS
156 NACP, RG 260, FED B 394, H. D. Cragon to'Commanding Generals, 31 May 1945. Although the FED was .
supposed to receive all Law 53 deposits, as a result of the redeployment of personnel in late 1945, early 1946, that task
was reduced to the receipt of specific classes of Law 53 assets., pursuant to instructions from the Foreign Exchange and
Blocking Control branch ofthe Office of Finance, OMGUS.ln one case, a deposit of securities found at the Dresdner
BankofMunich was not qualified as a La~ 53 asset because its owner was clearly a Nazi institution-the NSDAP.
Brey points out that most of these assets nave not been inventoried. Among these assets are gold coins, gold bars, and
gold powder from Reichsbank branches in the Russian zone of Occupation. ,NAcp, RG 260 FED B 395, William Brey
to Deputy Director of Finance, OMGUS, 9 October 1947.
!57 NACP, R6FjtQJ§£:p~Ei,1Il~§, Revision ofTitle 16 MG Regulations governing Finance.
ISS NACP, RG 260, Records of the U.S. Occupation Headquarters, World War II, Entry I, Box 67, Summary of certain
provisions of U.S. Military Government Law 59, "Restitution of Identifiable Property," Nov. 10, 1947.
52
�123.
After fruitless attempts to achieve a restitution a!p"eement (for duress properties)
at the quadripartite, tripartite, and bipartite levels, t~e U.S. finally p~rsued' a Unilatenil policy for
the U.S. Zone only:n instructed the Laenderrat (the German local government in the three
regions within the U.S. Zone of Occupation: Bavaria; Wuerttemberg-Baden, and Bremen) to
draft such a law. However, the Laenderrat could not agree internally with the provisions of this
Law. ,So OMG officials modified the draft in order to ensure the law's passage.
124.
ML 59 required the' submission of reports by present owners of duress properties
or by persons or financial institutions having information concerning these properties. The intent
of the law was to reach amicable settlements with all the involved parti~s. Crucial issues
concerned the scope of properties included in the Law (e.g., the German civil authorities charged
with implementing the Law were authorized to decide if the property values were sufficiently
., ,
.
,
,
.'
"significant" to be covered under the Law). The deadline ~or submitting claims was
contr~versial
protested.
(90% of clai.ms were filed in the last month, December, 1948) and was vehemently
Admini~trative
breakdowns included the misclassification of properties (e.g., duress
properties classified as U.N. properties, thereby altogether escaping the special treatment
accorded to the former categ0r;:-); the involvement of insufficiently, de-nazified individuals in the
property control and restitution process; and misunderstanding ,of the Law itself.
CONCLUSION
125.
ThIs paper provided an overview of the historical developments surrounding the
. .
"
fo~ulation of U.S. and international restitution policy. This represents a necessary'exercise
before moving onto the next stage of our research on restitution policy-that of analysis and '
evaluation.
126.
"The next step involves an'analysis of the historical context within which,U.S.
and international restitution policy was shaped., The following questions require greater, scrutiny:
53
�to what extellt did the geopolitical environment affect the fonnulation and implementation of
•
.
.;'
I.
American restitution policy? What did American lawmakers know during the war about the
types of assets being looted by the Nazis in'Europe? What measures did they take, if any, to
countera~t these activities?159 'How did domestic politics shape'post-war American restitution
policy? How did they affect restitution of assetsto victims of the Holocaust? For' example, the
US government ~ppearedsplit evenly along advocates of a hard peace towards ,Germany and, a
"soft" approach that favored rapid reindustrialization and resumption of international trade with
the fortner Reich.
Moreov~: the desire of many Americ~n' politicians to "get out of the'
, :,"
'~
,~
restitution business" as quickly,a~ possible influenced in part the unfolding drama of post-war
.'
.
.'.
"restitution in the European theater.
.
127.'
,
,
"
,
Moreover, the tide of empathy in American government circles towards ,the
..
victims of the Holocaust quickly gave way to concerns about non-Jewish refugees from countries
controlled or dominated by the Soviet Union. An1erican policymakers were less willing to
I
.
' .
translate good will into concrete actions fo'r persecutees and other victims of Nazi policies.
Henc~, the thousands of Jewish individuals who sui-vived the war and Nazi resettlement policies
found fewer advocates after the Paris Reparations Conference of 1945 which had codified
material restitution for them.
128.
Gennany, Austria, and Italy became hotbeds of anti-Soviet activity wher~"US
occupation authorities did their utmost to reduce the presence ofJewish refugees in their
jurisdictions. The only spokespersons left for thes~ di~placed persons were humanitarian
organizations and Jewish relief groups., .
159The Safehaven progra~ comes to mind, an Anglo-American project aiined at preventing the outtlow of looted assets
from the Third Reich to the neutral countries. As of 1944, the economic warfare departments of several US
government agencies had developed detailed lists of~sets which the neutral countries should watch out fo·r. In the
view of these American officials, the items that they tlagged ,were suspected of having been looted from Jews and other
victims of the Nazis and Fascists. .
..
.
.
/H. • •
54
�129.
OurgoaUs to provide an evaluation on the effectiveness ofD.S. restitution
policy. This requires a clear understanding ofthe historical context, the debates, issues, and of
the phiyers themselves which contributed to the development in the formulation and
implementation of the policy.
55
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets in the United States, formed in 1998, was charged with investigating what happened to the assets of victims of the Holocaust that ended up in the possession of the United States Federal government. The final report of the Commission, <a href="http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/pcha/PlunderRestitution.html/html/Home_Contents.html"> “Plunder and Restitution: Findings and Recommendations of the Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets in the United States and Staff Report"</a> was submitted to President Clinton in December 2000.</p>
<p>Chairman - Edgar Bronfman<br /> Executive Director - Kenneth Klothen</p>
<p>The collection consists of 19 series. The first fifteen series of the collection are composed mostly of photocopied federal records. These records were reproduced at the National Archives and Records Administration by commission members for their research. The records relate to Holocaust assets created between the mid 1930’s and early 1950’s by a variety of U. S. Government agencies and foreign sources.</p>
<p>Subseries:<br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Art+and+Cultural+Property+">Art and Cultural Property</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Gold+">Gold</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Gold+Team+Review+Form+Binders+">Gold Team Review Form Binders</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Art+and+Cultural+Property+and+%E2%80%9COthers%E2%80%9D+Review+Form+Binders">Art and Cultural Property and “Others” Review Form Binders</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Non-Gold+Financial+Assets+Review+Form+Binders">Non-Gold Financial Assets Review Form Binders</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+Associates+Binder+">History Associates Binder</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Non-Gold+Financial+Assets+Review+Form+Binders+%282%29">Non-Gold Financial Assets Review Form Binders (2)</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Financial+Assets+Documents">Financial Assets Documents</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=RG+84%2C+Foreign+Service+Posts+of+the+State+Department%E2%80%94Turkey">RG 84, Foreign Service Posts of the State Department—Turkey</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Financial+Assets+Documents">Financial Assets Documents</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=%5BJewish+Restitution+Successor+Organization+%28JRSO%29%2C+Oral+Histories%5D&range=&collection=20&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">[Jewish Restitution Successor Organization (JRSO), Oral Histories]</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=PCHA+Secondary+Sources">PCHA Secondary Sources</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Researcher+Notes">Researcher Notes</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Unnumbered+Documents+from+Archives+II+and+Various+Notes">Unnumbered Documents from Archives II and Various Notes</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=RG+260%2C+Finance+Inventory+Forms">RG 260, Finance Inventory Forms</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Reparations">Reparations</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Chase+National+Bank">Chase National Bank</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Administrative+Files">Administrative Files</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Art+%26+Cultural+Property+Theft">Art & Cultural Property Theft</a></p>
<p>Topics covered by these records include the recovery of confiscated art and cultural property; the reparation of gold and other financial assets; and the investigation of events surrounding capture of the Hungarian Gold Train at the close of World War II. These files contain memoranda, correspondence, inventories, reports, and secondary source material related to the final disposition of art and cultural property, gold, and other financial assets confiscated during the Holocaust.</p>
<p>For more information concerning this collection consult the<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/35992"> finding aid</a>.</p>
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Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
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Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/35992" target="_blank">Collection Finding Aid</a>
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/1040718" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
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2954 folders
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[U. S. Restitution Policy and Holocaust Victims Assets] [1]
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Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets in the United States
Art & Cultural Property Theft
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Box 226
<a href="http://clintonlibrary.gov/assets/Documents/Finding-Aids/Systematic/Holocaust-Assets.pdf" target="_blank">Collection Finding Aid</a>
<a href="http://catalog.archives.gov/description/6997222" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
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Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
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6997222-us-restitution-policy-holocaust-victims-assets-1
6997222