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90
VII. Value of the Gold Train
Several different estimations set forth by different Hungarian and foreign
governmental and Jewish organizations have been published in connection with the
total value of the freight of the Gold Train in the past decades:
-Istvan Mingovits, one of the financial clerks of the train estimated the total value at
100 million dollars. 375
-Uiszl6 Varvasovszky, head of the Hungarian Restitution Committee situated
In
Vienna, heard that the fright was worth 600 thousand dollars. 376
-The Hungarian Jewish organizations rated the value of the Gold Train at about 10
million dollars. 377
-According to another statistical summary the value of the train was about 300-350
million dollars. 378
-In May 1946 Viktor S~hwartz, the Vienna delegate of the National Committee
Attending Deportees (DEGOB) and the Budapest office of the Joint, believed that a
committee consisting of international jewel experts established the total value of the
properties at 200 million dollars. (No evidence of the committee's existence could be
found in the American documents). Schwartz was later informed by American officers
that the "Salzburg cache is worth only 70 million dollars".379
-In 1966 the Hungarian financial department estimated the value of the Gold Train at 6
million dollars. l80
375
376
Testimony of Istvan Mingovits. 27 October, 1945. BMTH V-38.734.
Laszlo Varvasovszky's Report to the PM KVMJU. 24 January, 1948. MOL XXIX-L-2-r pile 73, file 36-40
12.
Memo from the Ministry of Finance. 7 December, 1951. MOL XXIX-L-2-r pile 73, file36-40-11.
The statistics of the Hungarian Jewry in numbers. Conunentary to the "Statistical Tables". MZSML 1171.96.
379 Interrogation ofViktor Schwartz, 8 May, 1946. MOL XXI.X-L-2-r pile 73, file 36-40-12.
380 Letter of the Department of State Legal Advisor to the Department of Defense. 12 September ,1966. Alford
Collection pp. 895-896.
.
377
378
�91
In summary we may conclude that the estimations .
concerning the value of the Gold
.
I
Train at the end of the war (1945) are
at the present value (2000) - between 6 mililion
and 3.5 billion dollars. The more than 500 fold difference between the minimum and
the maximum estimation shows how difficult it is to give a proper answer to the
question.
Below, we are trying to reconstruct the total value of the Gold Train's freight witli the
help of the sporadic data at our disposal. Owing to the fragmented nature of the
information our result shall be regarded as a rough and minimized estimation.
i
1. Gold valuables and precious stones
I'
.
At Brennbergbanya Arpad Toldy's subordinates filled 105 cases and 2 boxes with gold
valuables (bracelets, necklaces, watches, other jewels, coins), precious stones and
jewels encrusted with precious stones in the course of the sorting of the valuables (see
Chapter V). The distribution of the cases was as follows: 381
Case markings
No. of cases
41
Ar.
Average weight (kg)
45
Contents
gold objects, bracelets, cigarette
I
cases, chains, etc.
35
Ar. o.
45
men's and women's gold
wristwatches, gold pocket watches
Ar. eksz.
18
3S
gold jewels ornamented with.
semi-precious stones and gems
Br.
Ar.p.
Casket
8
3
2
.38
jewels with diamonds, gems
100
without settings, genuine pearls
.
.
mlscelIaneous gold COInS, gotId
4
I
bars
assorted brilliants, jewels and
genuine pearls
I
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------;-------
Total 105 cases and 2 caskets
When marking the cases, the following abbreviations were used: ,,AT." stood for gold,
~
,,0. " lor
' sz. ~.
~
.
watch es, "e k " lor JeweIs, "p. " lor COInS and ,,B r. "~d'lamonds.
lor
I
)81 The data are based on the notes and recollections of the fmandal clerks conducting and supervising the
sorting and the loading, so they are more or less accurate.
�92
The total weight of the cases and their content was 4662 kilograms gross. If we
. estimate the average empty weight of the storage devices (cases and caskets) at 10
kilograms, we may conclude that the net weight of the valuables was (4662-1070=)
3592 kilograms.382 In April 1948 most of the valuables seized by the French - 1778
. kilogra.II?-s (gross) of gold jewels and precious stones - were returned. (This delivery
contained mostly
'although not exclusively
Jewish valuables found on the Gold
Train.) The net weight ofthe delivery was 1275 kilograms and 344,7 grams, i.e. 1275
kilograms. Out of the mass of valuables smuggled from the country by Toldy and not
seized by the French army 12.5 kilograms of gold bars and coins were returned to
Hungary in the summer of 1948 ("Ercse-treasure", see in Chapter VI). The aggregate
value of the two deliveries (1287.5 kilograms) was estimated at 22,538,124 forints by
the experts of the Hungarian National Bank and the Ministry of Finance. 383 This sum
equaled approximately 2 million dollars. 384 The net total weight of the returned
valuables amounts to 36 percent of the net weight of the original freight.
Consequently, we estimate the value of the gold valuables and the precious stones
loaded into the cases at Brennbergbanya (i.e. 100 percent of the freight) at S,S
million US dollars, which equals approximately S5 million dollars at the present
(2000) exchange rate.
2. Silver valuables
The Gold Train carried 1560 cases of silver valuables and one case of silver bars. Since
the silver objects were assorted at Brennbergbanya .the same way as gold and precious
stones, we may suppose that the silver valuables were loaded into similar ,,miners'
cases" as the content of the 107 cases and caskets of outstanding importance. On the
basis of the .average weight of the cases and caskets containing gold valuables, the
average gross weight of the cases containing silver may be estimated at 30 kilograms.
Therefore, .the 1561 cases of silver must have been weighted at least 46,830 kilograms
(gross). If we deduct the empty weight 'of the cases (10 kilograms per case) we may
establish the weight of the silver valuables loaded onto the Gold Train at
With respect to the weight of the cases see the Austrian newspaper article reporting about the French seizure
ofa part of the Toldy-delivery ("Ein Goldschatz in Tirol gefunden" Oberosterreichische Nachrichten 9 July
1946") and the photographs entitled "Ein Goldschatz in acht Kisten gefunden" and "Ringe und Kasette aus dem
Goldschatz" Tiroler Tageszeitung 8 and 9 July 1946.
383 Protocol of the session of the reception committee established in accordance with Article 2 of Decree
24390/1946 of the Prime Minister. 23 October, 1948. MOL XXIX-L-2-r pile 7, file .36-40-12.
382
�93
appr.oximately net 31,220 kil.ograms. Calculating with a price .of 0,5 USD/.oz,38S this
means a value .of 16 USD/kg. Consequently, the total value of the silver valuables
must have been around 499,520 US dollars, which equals 4,995,220 dollars at the
present exchange rate.
3. Glass and p.o~celain .objects, carpets, furs and paintings
Apart fr.om the g.old and silver valuables and preci.ous st.ones, the train als.o carried
glass and p.orcelain .objects, carpets, furs and paintings .of .outstanding value. We have
very little t.o rely .on when trying t.oestimate this value.
The c.ollecti.on .of 300 Persian carpets - which c.onstituted a part .of the s.o called ,,Keleti .
I
treasure" and was taken by f.orce in 1944 - was w.orth 500,000 pengos. 386 This equaled
approximately 100,000 d.ollars, Whi9h means that an especially valuable Persian carpet
was w.orth 333 d.ollars. .on average in 1944.387 It is alm.ost certain that .other pieces .of
similar value were put .on the train (since 'carpets were transp.orted here fr.om all .over
Hungary), h.owever, it is sure that less valuable textiles c.onstituted the bulk .of the
JOOO-piece delivery. H.owever, if .only .one fifth .of the c.ollecti.on c.onsisted .of similar
carpets, a value .of at least 199,800 d.ollars was represented by the special (Persian)
carpets. If we add t.o this the carpets .of w.orse quality, the furs, the glass and p.orcelain
.objects and the paintings, we may c.onclude that the value of these items must have
been around 400,000 dollars, which means 4,000,000 dollars at the present
exchange rate.
4. Paper currency
When the G.old Train was seized, Laszl6 A var submitted t.o the American auth.orities a
suitcase, which c.ontained 44,639 d.ollars, 52,360 Swiss francs (= appr.ox. USD
12,177388 ), 84 British p.ounds, 10 Palestinian p.ounds, 66 Canadian d.ollars, 5 Swedish
Memo from the Ministry of Finance about the story of the Gold Train. MOL XXIX-L-2-r pile 73, file 36-40
12.
385 In 1946-49 the price of silver was around USD 0,5 per ounce. With the exception of the silver bars filling a
whole case, the silver valuables of the Gold Train were not made of pure silver, however, they were of high
artistic value, which is hard to valorize. To overcome this problem we calculated with the price of pure silver for
the whole delivery.
386 Dr. Geza Feher's letter to the Financial Directorate of Budapest. 9 August 1946. MOL XXIX-L-2-r pile 73,
file 30-40-13.
387 According to the last official exchange rate (March 1941) Pengo 100 = USD 19,77. Jurgen Schneider - Oskar
Scwarczer- Markus A. Denzel: Wiihrnngen der Welt II. Europiiische und nordamerikanische Devisenkurse
1941-1951. (In Kommission bei Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 1997; hereinafter referred to as: Devisenkurse)
p.503
m Between February and December 1946 100 Swiss francs = USD 23,37. Devisenkurse, p. 488.
384
�94
crowns, 15 German marks and 20,484 Hungarian pengos (= approx. USD 52,000 389).
The total value of the mass of currency that was later turned over to the refugee
organization was approximately 108,816 dollars, which equals 1,088,160 dollars at
the 2000 exchange rate.
usn
Items
value
in
I usn value in 2000
1944-1946
valuables,
5,500,000
55,000,000
Silver valuables.
499,520
.4,995,200
Glass and porcelain
400,000
Gold
precious stones
objects,
4,000,000 .
carpets,
furs, paintings
Paper currency
Total
108,816
1,088,160
6,508,336'
65,083,360
Beginning with the spring of 1947 the employees .of the refugee organization and the
representatives of the army evaluated the valuables put at the disposal of the PCIRO.
The final sum was 1,032,408 dollars. 390 The joint committee examined, inventoried and
evaluated much fewer objects than those, whose value is estimated above. While we
are trying to establish the value of the whole train, the refugee organization did not
receive the objects claimed by senior officers, .the paintings returned to Hungary, the
Jewish and Catholic liturgical objects and it may not have received the gold bars either.
Of course the valuables seized by the French, i.e. over one third of the cases containing
gold, were left out of the committee's inventory. However, this is not the only reason
for which the final result of hardly over 1 million dollars is so much less than our result
or the estimations ofMingovits, Schwartz or the Hungarian Jewish organizations.
As we pointed out in May 1947 Captain Mackenzie and the representatives of the
refugee organization agreed to appraise the objects en mass, according to weight and/or
number, "since a detailed examination, description and appraisal of each item would
require a staff of three or four experts performing endless months of work". and. to pay
Rough estimation for 1944, the year of looting.
Covering letter about the turning over of the currency to the PCIRO. 3 October, 1949. NACP RG 260, Entry
113, Box 21. File C-9-2 "Located Gold and Foreign Currency".
389
390
�95
attention only to the especially valuable pieces. 391 Accordingly they appraised one
carpet at 10 dollars (which is only 3 percent of the real value in the case of a valuable
Persian carpet, for instance), good quality pieces of silver tableware were appraised at
1 dollar, while pieces of less excellent quality were estimated at 75 cents. Silver
cigarette cases were also estimated at 1 dollar (regardless oftheir weight and state of,
repair), but a spoon or a silver decanter could easily be worth the same amount. The
value of glass and porcelain objects (including Dresden, Herend or Rosenthal pieces)
was established 1 USD/piece, while all the furs together were appraised at 800
dollars. 392
We must also take into consideration the fact that when estimating the value of 30
percent of the mass of gold and precious stones at 2 million dollars in 1948, the
r
Hungarian financial experts calculated the dollar value of the forint sum on the basis of
the artificially high dollar exchange rate of the new Hungariancurrency.
Therefore, it is obvious that the appraisal estimating the total value of q4 percent of the ,
special values (gold and precious stones) and the bulk of the silver, glass and porcelain
objects, and the furs and carpets at hardly over 1 million dollars was an
underestimation of significant degree. Our opinion is supported by the fact that at the
14 November 1950 session of the American Joint Distribution Committee the refugee
'organization's income originating from the Hungarian Gold Train was established at
1,867,017 dollars, which meant almost two thirds of the total income realized until that
point (2,963,385 dollars).393 What is more the realization was protracted until the end
of 1951 and the bulk of the approximately l.million .dollar'income that was realized
subsequently probably also came from the Gold Train. 394 The pictures published in the
catalogues prepared for the New York auctions may also convince the viewer about the
artistic value of the pieces received at a piece-price and about the exclusivity and value
of the precious stone and diamond inlets of the jewels.
No reliable data are available on the individual value of the jewels and other valuables
(weight and carat number of the precious st<:mes, features of the artistic realization,
artistic value exceeding the weight of the object, etc.), but we believe that, these
Letter of the PCO to the USFA USACA Section Reparations, Deliveries and Restitution Division. 22 May,
1947. NACP RG 260, Entry 1 13, Box 21, C-9-1 "Gold found in Austria",
J92 Letter of the AGD Ex. Officer to the USACA Reparation, Deliveries and Restitution Division. 18 August,
1947. NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box 20, File S4 8007 Vol. 3.
193 Minutes of Meeting of the Administration of the Joint Distribution Committee. 14 November, 1950. MOL
XXIX~L-2-r pile 73, file 36-40-12.Also see: Statement of US Delegation Regarding the Gold Train. April 1967.
MOL XXIX-L-2-r pile 85.
391
�96
unknown factors could also have increased the total value of the freight 'of the Gold
Train.
To summarize these factors, we believe that at a 1945 value the Gold Train was
worth between 6,5 and 15 million dollars. The final sum of 10-13 million dollars
,
seems to be the most plausible. This equals 100-130 million dollars at the present
rate of exchange.
394
Ihid.
�PART III
,
\
EVACUATION AND RESTITUTION
�97
VIII. Removal of the Hungarian Industrial and Manufacturing Base to the Reich
1944-1945
1. Reasons of the removal and circumstances of implementation
After the war in 1945 and 1946, when assessment of the damages started, the
Hungarian Government instructed the ministries to prepare damage lists. After
summarizing the lists, it became clear that approximately 40 per cent of the national'
assets were lost during World War III Most of the damage occurred during a period of
slightly more than six months between late September 1944 and early April 1945. The
extraordinarily wide
r~ge
of damages could be chiefly attributed to two reasons: war
damages including looting by. alien armies (Gennan, Russian, Romanian), and
resettlement. A brief description of the stages and features of the second series' of
events follows.
From the second half of the 1930's, Hungary became more and more economically
dependent on the Reich, and this dependence became even more deep during the war. 2
As in the Eastern Front the Gennans could not very much rely on the very poor
Hungarian Anuy (especially after January 1943, when the 200,000-strong 2nd
Hungarian Anuy collapsed at Voronezh), the Gennans demanded a more pronounced .
Hungarian economic contribution to their war effort. Gennany became deeply indebted
towards Hungary: their debts grew from 140 million Reichsmark in 1941 to 1,035
million in 1944.3 After the invasion of.the Wehnnacht, economic dependence was
. replaced by total economic subordination, sealed by' the financial agreement concluded
on June 2, 1944, which was plainly deleterious to Hungary.4 According to the
agreement, all expenses of the Gennan occupational army (Wehnnacht, SS, Luftwaffe'
and other corps) were to be borne by Hungary. In addition, Hungary had to finance a
War Fund aimed at the construction of airports, roads and bridges. The Hungarian war
industry was to step up production of antiaircraft guns, machineguns and aircraft - for
I War Damages of Hungary - Statistical sununary. Undated. MOL KDM Bekeelokeszito scroll 12.415 Title 17
p.178.
.
.
2 See more: Imre Ligeti: Hungarian Government in Function of the War Economy and its Consequences 1938
1944 in: Hungary 1944 - German Occupation (Nemet megszallas; NernzetiTankonykiad6 - Pro Homine 1944
Memorial Committee, Budapest, 1994; hereinafter: German Occupation) pp. 147-154.; German Economic
Cooperation and Expansion in Certain Danube States. MOL KUM Bekeelokeszito 12.465 Title 148 pp. 1-88.
1 Gyorgy Ranki: March 19, 1944 The German Occupation of Hungary (1944 Marcius 19; Kossuth, Budapest,
1968; hereinafter: Ranki) p. 155.
4 Agreement wording see MOL XXIX-L-2-r pile 51.
�98
exports to Germany.s Apart of the contractual obligations, Hungary started to lose
many assets through illegal looting. All German occupational bodies practiced looting,
but they could not vie with the SS and its different organs; Looting mainly affected the
property of Jews who were first confined'to ghettos then summarily deported to the
Reich.
As a result of the almost formal Hungarian military role in the war, the Hungarian war
industry was left almost untouched by the Allied air forces until the German invasion.
In early April 1944, however, aerial bombings started in earnest, destroying Hungarian
industrial base with an ever increasing deadly effect. Still, in comparison with other
European countries suffering from aerial attacks since 1943, Hungarian industry
suffered only slight damages until the autumn of 1944.
The' sacrifice of the economic potential of Hungary culniinated in the systematic
looting of the country starting on October 1944. As contrary to the repeated German
promises, the Red Army could not be stopped in the Carpathian Mountains and entered
Hungary in September 1944, serious fighting started for the first time during the war
on Hungarian soil. A few weeks' fighting made it absolutely clear that the
outnumbered and exhausted Germans and their poor-quality local allies were unable to
stop the Red Army unless they withdraw to the western bank of the Danube and take
up a defensive position there. This tactics equaled with the certain surrender of the
country east ·of the Danube (and did not exclude the possible retreat from the western
part of the country). The Wehnnacht; which had been familiar with the practice of
withdrawals in the Eastern Front since 1943, used the tactics of scorched earth.
Consequently, in full agreement with the Hungarian Government (the so called 'Arrow
Cross' regime), they decided on the wholesale evacuation of the industrial .and
economic base of the areas' to get under "temporary" Russian occupation and the
transport of the hardware. to the western part of the country and to the Ostmark (the
eastern part of the Reich, today Austria).
Although the systematic looting of Hungary started immediately after the German
occupation, but took astounding dimensions after October 15. The Arrow Cross regime
was willing. to lend a helping hand to implement the Germans' evacuation policy:
almost no objections were heard about the Hungarian assets transported westward.
Based on the decision of the Hungarian-German Joint Committee of October 20, the
s 'R ~nld nn. 1 ~2-1 54.
�99
evacuation was to be directed by SS-Oberstunnbannfiihrer Kurt Becher with the help
of Omnipol, an enterprise of the SS. During the evacuation, on paper, the Hungarian
(Arrow Cross) Government also .had some competence,6 but in practice, the entire
control of the operation was in German hands. This control, however, was by far not
\
concentrated. Due to the rapidly deteriorating military situation, the evacuation process
became a total confusion, especially from the second half of November.
As mentioned above, the person in charge of the evacuation was, on German part,
according to the decision of the Hungarian-German Joint Committee of October 20,'
Kurt Becher,7 the head of the Reit- und Fahrwesenamt (Horse. Supply and Transport
Office} in Hungary. This organization belonged to the SS AusrUstungsstab (SS Supply
Staff), which in turn belonged to the SS Fuhrungshauptamt (SS Leading Main Office).8
Becher, however, had excellent personal contacts with Himmler and actually acted as
the special economic envoy of the Reichsflihrer-SS. His original task was to procure of
horse supplies for the Waffen SS in Hungary. But very soon, he became involved in
"busines~es"
of much larger dimension than just buying horses. His most important
transaction was the acquisition of the largest non-German industrial conglomerate in
central Europe, the Weiss Manfred Works (WMW) for the SS (see more below). The
result of this strictly confidential action was huge revenue· for the SS (almost
unprecedented during the war) and SS control over the flagship of the Hungarian war
industry. After the transaction became known, a serious conflict evolved between the
German Foreign Ministry and the. Hungarian Government, which duly resulted in a
reshuffle of the latter. The Minister of Economy; Bela Imredy - a longtime acolyte of
. the Germans - had to resign and left the Szt6jay Government together with his party
(Party of Hungarian Renewal).9 In January 1945, Becher was promoted SS
Standartenfiihrer.
On October 23, the German Ambassador and plenipotentiary envoy in Budapest,
Veesenmayer, entrusted Becher on behalf of the Reich to act as the German Special
According to the Gennan-Hungarian Agreement signed on November 17 "All evacuations need the approval of
the Royal Hungarian Government represented by the Royal Hungarian Minister of Industry". Jeno Levai: White
Lamb of the Black SS (A fekete SS feher baninya; Kossuth Publishers, Budapest, 1966; hereinafter: Levai) p.
76. On the· part of the Hungarians, the Evacuation and Allocation Government Commissioner was Ferenc
Kisbamaki Farkas, the "Plenipotentiary Evacuation Executioner" was Endre Rajk, but neither had significant
influence on the events in: Eva Teleki: Arrow Cross Rule in Hungary (Nyilas uralom Magyarorszagon; Kossuth,
Budapest, 1974; hereinafter: Teleki) pp. 182-183.
7 Levai p. 73
8Xurt Becher's personal file. NACP, roll 046, SS Officers Files.
9 On the political facets of the Manfred Weiss affair see: Peter and Andras Sipos (ed.): Bela Imredy in the Dock
(Jrnredv Bela a vadlo.ttak padian; Osiris-Budapest Municipal Archives, Budapest, 1999) pp. 61-62.
6
�100
Commissioner of the evacuation measures within Hungary.1O In his letter of
appointment, Veesenmayer instructed Becher to "implement, in agreement with the
.Hungarian Special Commissioner appointed by the Hungarian Government and vested
with similar powers, the measures which are suitable for the assessment and seizure of
all kinds of military assets and foodstuffs in and the zones endangered by the war, and
the transport of same westward within Hungary".11 The chaos ofthe evacuation and the
German confusion of competencies are well illustrated by Veesenmayer's letter of
appointment stressing that Becher must consult with a Dr. Boden acting as
Wirtschaftsbeauftragte (Economic Commissioner) on behalf of Germany during the
evacuation. 12
On November 14, 1944 the German and Hungarian organs concluded a Vereinbarung
(agreement) on the evacuation. The document was signed by dr. Boden and on the
Hungarian side, by Emil Szakvary (Minister of Industry) and Vilmos Hellenbronth
(Minister without portfolio).13 (Hellenbronth was .charged with the "continuous
management of production" and - as already described in Chapter V - fled westwards
in March 1945 on the Gold Train.) Section 1 of the agreement stipulated that "for any
evacuation, the decision of the Royal Hungarian Government is needed, represented by
the Minister of Industry".14 So on paper, the Hungarian Government was entitled to
control every aspect of the evacuation, while in practice it could not do so. The
document also stipulated that the costs of evacuation would be equally borne by the
Hungarian and German Governments (Section 8), and that the evacuated assets would
continue to constitute the property of Hungary .(Section 2).A:lthough the agreement
was signed by the Minister of Industry and Hellenbronth, according to Szalasi, it was
the Minister of Interior, Gabor Vajna who was "in charge of the office dealing with the
evacuation".15 It must be added that according to other sources, the evacuation on the
Hungarian side was supervised from December 1944 by the Foreign Trade Office
belonging
on paper - to the Ministry of Transport and Commerce. All these clashing
competencies also indicate the great anarchy that reigned in the administration and
diplomacy in connection with the evacuation. The head of the Foreign Trade Office,
See the copy of the original text. MOL XXIX-L-2-r pile 74.
Ibid.
12 Ibid.
.
Il See the full text of the Hungarian-German Agreement. BFL Sztojay Case Material of Emil Szakvliry, Minister
of Industry 968/1.946 pp. 762-764.
14 Ibid.
IS Interrogation of Ferenc Szlilasi. December 15, 1945. BFL Szlilasi Case 293/1946 scroll 134.
10
II
�101
Gyula Szilvay l6 managed 'to collect altogether nine agreements on the evacuation that
were not only totally unconnected, but also totally in conflict with each other in any
given issue. 17
Due to
~he
incessantly deteriorating military situation, the evacuation process got more.
and more under German control from the second half of November. In theory, the
Hungarian-German Joint Committees started to operate on November 4 in the seven
official exit points (Losonc, Gahinta, Uszor, Hegyeshalom, Sopron, Szentgotthard,
Cs8ktornya).· These were to control the transports leaving the country. In connection
with the lack of coordination in the work ofthe Committees, Szilvay could justifiably
note that " ... lacking central control, they could only operate following their individual
initiatives. This opportunity was used by the Germans to steal entire trains" ,IS The
transports leaving the country were absorbed by the German war industry in nine
distribution points (Hohensalza, Gotenhafen, Brockau, Wesseli aIM" Simbach, Bruck
aIL" Leoben, Pragerhof),19
In early February 1945, minister Szakvary decided to set up an organization with
headquarters in Vienna, with the task to receive the evacuated industrial equipment,
raw materials and· finished goods and start reorganizing production, this time in the
territory of the Reich. 20 This organization (called the Hungarian Industrial
Commission), however, never made any sizable effect on the fate of Hungarian assets
heaped up in Austria. In early 1945, Szakvary already named the "obere SS-FUhrung"
(supreme SS leadership) as the organization. actually directing the evacuations. He
complained. that "the industrial part ofHungarian:national·assets is gradually removed
from the country and becomes a dependency of the agreements concluded with
Germany and their enforceability",21
16 Szilvay's two-volume memoirs consisting of six parts (Teil) and his documentation on the evacuation: Institut
flir Zeitgesichte Fb 109 I-II.
17 Teil2 p. 24.
18 Szilvay: Documentation: Memorandum for the Hungarian Restitution Mission. March 9, 1947.
19 Memorandum on the Evacuatiort. March 12, 1946. MOL KOM Bekeel6keszito scroll 12.415. Title 17 p. 219.
20 Annex No.4. BFL Szt6jay Case Material of Emil Szakvciry, minister of industry 968/1946 p, 732-734.
21 Report titled "The operation of the Ministry of Industry in January 1945". BFL Szt6jay Case Material of Emil
Szakvary, minister of industry 968/1946 p. 715.
�102
2. Evacuated Hungarian assets in the U.S. occupation zones
According to calculations based on the registration of the Foreign Trade Office, in the
period between March 19, 1944 and March 28, 1945 1,567 shipments left Hunga.I'f2
including goods of 55,000 railway cars23 (equipment, war materials, finished goods,
artifacts, gold, silver etc.), on trucks, in ships and in barges. 24 In addition to ~his
quantity, tens of thousands of tons of goods were transported westwards in the period
between March 28 and May 3?S
During evacuation, the Hungarian national assets were first transported to the western
area of the country, then to the southern or· southeastern parts of the Reich, using at
least 268 locomotives, 11,000 railway cars. and 25.0 barges in the process. 26 The total
weight. of the goods registered by the Hungarian-German Joint Committees was
373,530 tons. 27 It is assumed that at least the same amount left the country without
registration. 28 Consequently, the total weight of all the evacuated goods must be put at
600,000-700,000 tons.
In addition to' goods, cash totaling 8.2 billion pengo was also transported by the
Hungarian and German authorities to the western border or to the Reich. 29
The goods registered by the Joint Committees were transported to the following
destinations: 3O
Austria
120,680 tons
32.0%
Germany
128,950 tons
34.5%
Poland
.65,385 tons
17.5 %
Czechoslovakia
55,745 tons
15.0%
2,770 tons
1.0%
373,530 tons
100.0 %
Other states
Total
Prosecutor's speech.- BFL Szalasi Case 293/1946 scroll 134.
Machines, vehicles, semi-fInished and finished goods, raw materials, food, medicine, livestock etc. Szilvay:
Tei12 p. 26.
24 In detail ibid.
2S Memorandum on the Evacuation. March 12, 1946. MOL KUM Bekeelokeszito scroll 12.415, title 17 p. 220.
26 Memorandum on the Evacuation. February 23, 1946. MOL KUM Bekeelokeszito scroll 12.415, title 17 p. 216
27 Ibid.
2! Memorandum on the Evacuation. March 11, 1946. MOL KUM B6keel3k6szito scroll 12.415, title 17 p. 217.
29 Of this, the Hungarian Government put 1.1 billion in circulation in Sopron, paid 0.6 billion into the
Reichsbank (this amount became destroyed), deposited and then spent 2.3 billion in Vienna. Similarly to the
HNB gold, 4.2 billion pengo got to Spital am Phym, and thus under U.S. control. MOL KUM B6keelok6szito
scro1112.415 title 17 p. 42.
)0 Memorandum on the Evacuation. February 23, 1946. MOL KUM B6keelokeszito scroll 12.415 title 17 p. 216.
22
23
�103
As the statistics use postwar geographical tenns (neither Poland nor Czechoslovakia
existed during the war), it is clear that 99 percent of evacuated Hungarian goods ended
up in the Reich, which then included not only Austria, but also the Sudetenland,
western Poland and the puppet states under Gennan control: the Protektorat Bohmen
und Maehren (protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia) and the Generalgouvernement
(Gennan-occupied central Poland). In 1945, the liberated areas in Czechoslovakia and
Poland came under Soviet control, while Gennany and Austria were divided in four
occupation zones (British, U.S., French, Soviet). Two thirds (32+34.5=66.5 %) of the
evacuated Hungarian assets weighing 249,630 tons ended up in Gennany and Austria.
In Gennany and Austria, the evacuated Hungarian assets were distributed among the
occupation zones as follows: 31
117,025 tons
·46.9%
Soviet zones
66,635 tons
26.7%
British zones
39,060 tons
15.6%
Four-power zones (Vienna, Berlin)
25,450 tons
10.2%
French zones
920 tons
0.4%
Unknown
540 tons
0.2%
249,630 tons
100.0 %
U.S. zones
Total
In other words: of the assets and goods transported from Hungary with registration.
(337.530), 31.3 per cent (117,025 tons) ended up in the U.S. occupation zones of
Gennany and Austria, that is under U.S. contro1. 32 As it is assumed that at least the
same amount left Hungary towards the Reich without registration
and the same
geographical distribution is assumed - 234,000 tons of Hungarian national assets must
have been transported to areas of the Reich which became U.S. occupation zones after
the war. Reckoning with the unknown percentage of damages caused by the fighting, it
can be assumed that the bulk of these goods, weighing 150,000-200,000 tons got under
the control of the U.S. forces undamaged.
The registered Hungarian assets transported to the U.S. zones were composed of the
following kinds of goods: 33
Ibid.
Ibid.
33 Ibid.
31
32
�104
Food and animal fodder
22,605 tons
19.3 %
Consumer goods
25,645 tons
21.9 %
Capital goods and raw materials
57,750 tons
49.3%
War materials
1,910 tons
1.6%
Miscellaneous and unknown
9 3 115 tons
7.8%
117,025 tons
99.9%
Total
3. Evacuated assets of Jews from Hungary in the U.S. occupation zones
An important part of the total looting of the country was the evacuation of the huge
quantity of assets confiscated from the Jews by the Hungarian: Government in the
spring and summer of 1944. Goods stored in thousands of Aryanized and confiscated
plants, shops and hundreds of warehouses were added to the assets to be evacuated. To
(
illustrate the size of the enterprise, it is enough to consider only certain machine tools
of the Weiss Manfred Works Gust a minuscule part of industrial equipment of the
company), evacuated by 79 barges. 34 Nothing escaped the Germans' attention: if it was
Jewish property, everything had to be gobbled up by the Reich, from machine tools to
artifacts.
Taking into view the market positions of the Jews in the industry of Hungary (see
Chapter II) and the focus of the evacuations on sectors important for the war effort (the
share of Jewish control was 49.8% in the iron and metal industry and 42.7% in the
machine industry, averaging 46.25%), the following can be safely assumed: the half
. (46.25 %) of the 49.3 % (57,750-76,908 tons) of the 150,000-200,000 tons of
Hungarian capital goods and raw materials that got under the control of the U.S. forces
undamaged were Jewish property. This means capital goods and raw materials
weighing at least 26,709 tons only in the case of the mentioned branches of industry.
As the property of the Jews became easy prey, their assets were more prone to
evacuation than the assets bfthe Gentile population. Based on this and taking into view
the ratio and economic power of the Jews of Hungary, it is assumed that at least 20-25
per cent of the Hungarian assets under U.S. control had been the property of Jews.
34 Szilvay: Teil 2 p. 26. Of the evacuation of the MW properties also
Metalworks Limited. June 10, 1948. MOL XXIX-L-2-r pile 45.
~ee:
Letter of the Manfred Weiss Steel and
�105
According to our estimates, at least 30,000-50,000 tons of assets owned by the Jews of
Hungary got under U.S. control. In addition, tens of thousands tons of assets owned by
the Jews of Hungary got under the control of other Allied forces.
�106
IX. Postwar Restitution of Hunearian Assets 1945-1946
As soon as the fights abated in Hungary, the new Government started to assess was
damages. Already the first statistical summaries suggested astounding destruction.
Hungary lost almost 40 per cent of its national assets. The sum total of damages at
1938 prices (which was the last peace year) reached 22 billion pengo (more exactly
21.9508 billion pengo), equaling USD 4.3295 billion. 35 Manufacturing, agricultural
and transport damages made up 43 percent of the total. As these sectors suffered most
of the evacuation policy of the'Arrow Cross' Government, it could be assumed that at
least a significant part of the damages in these sectors amounting to alrrlost USD 2
billion (more exactly USD 1.8826 billion) meant evacuation. The bulk of this damage
consisted of the capital goods and raw materials, which· survived the war and were
stored somewhere in the former territory of the Reich. 36 (This assumption was
confirmed by the fact that damages in buildings amounted to only 12 percent in the
manufacturing sector, 6 per cent in agriculture and 13 per cent in transportation,
amounting to 245.672, 217.583 and 491.872 million pengo respectively, totaling
955.127 million pengo.)37 In the sectors mentioned above, other damages (88, 94 and
87 per cent of the total) usually occurred during the evacuation and could be measured
in hundreds of millions of dollars. 38
Jewish owners suffered an outstanding percentage of the war damages m the
manufacturing sector (amounting to 2 billion pengo, i.e. USD 400 million):39
War Damages of Hungary Statistical summary. Undated. MOL KOM Bekeelokeszito scroll 12.415 Title 17
p.2.
. .
.
36 Industrial damages 2.0424, agricultural damages 3.6823, transport damages 3.6893 billion pengo. These items
made up almost 43 per cent of total damages (9.3 + 16.8 + 16.8 42.9 per cent). War Damages of Hungary
Statistical summary (attached table) Undated. MOL KOM Bekeelokeszito scroll 12.415 title 17. See ibid. the
summary titled "The qestruction".
.
37 Ibid.
.
38 The parts of the table titled "Damages caused by the destruction and looting of the Germans and the Arrow
Cross" show industrial damages worth 448.398, agricultural damages worth 446.31, transport damages
2,459.942 million pengo, totaling 3,355.65 million pengo. Even after deducting the building damages
(altogether worth 302.8 million pengo in this category), because these were obviously not caused by evacuation,
but the "scorched earth" tactics of the Germans, more than 3 billion pengo remains, equaling USD 600 million.
MOL KUM Bekeelokeszito scroll 12.415 title 17. p. 4.
39 As to the proportion of Jewish owners in the given sectors, see data in Chapter II. Percentage data of war
damages in: Chapter titled "The destruction" of War Damages of Hungary- Statistical summary. ·Undated.
MOL KDM Bekeelokeszito, fascicle 12.425 title 17 p. 4.
35
�107
r-----------------------------------------------------------~
I
I
.
I
Sector
.
Percentage of
:
1Mach'me mdustry
.
I
Jewish property 119351
42 .7 %
Textile industry
Percentage of damages
:
in the given sector 119451
:
I
I
I
69.6 %40
15 %
:
49.8%
11.8 %
Food industry
38;7 %
10.5 %
Chemical industry
I
37.5 %
Iron and metal industry
I
54.3 %
9.6%
!
!
I
I
!
!
!
!
16.9%
I
I
I
I
I
I
.
Average total:
51 %
~----------------------------------------------------- -------,
As new assessments were made, the value and final sum of war damages in - ~tate and
private, Jewish and non-Jewish - property kept on increasing. 41 These machines, raw
materials, capital goods, vehicles and products - now in Allied hands - were badly
needed for the reconstruction of the country, the restarting of production and the
organization of sUI?ply for the needy popUlation. It was no coincidence that the new
Hungarian Government did everything to get back the Hungarian assets piled up in
Austria and Germany. This is why they started the establishment of the Restitution
Missions that were to operate in the various occupation zones and organize the
restitution of Hungarian assets then under foreign control. Such missions were set up in
Vienna, Frankfurt: Linz and Innsbruck, then later in Berlin, Baden-Baden, Bad
Salzuflen and Karlsruhe. 42
On January 5, 1943, when the war was still raging, the representatives of the Allied
governments issued a joint declaration in London, stating that they will prevent by all
available means any predatory policies shown by the Axis powers. The declaration
simultaneously warned the neutral countries not to help any Axis power in the
safeguarding ofthe looted assets in their territory.43 Hungary was not a signatory of the
declaration.· One year later, however, due to the German occupation, it became the
subject of Axis looting.
The war was still raging in Europe when the U.S. authorities, realizing the importance
of the issue of assets already under their control in the oc,?upied Austrian-Gennan
40 The data for the textile industry was calculated as. the average of the weaving sector (66.4 %) and the apparel
sector (72.8 %), see Chapter II.
41 This was referred to by the subtitle of the cited statistical t.able: "Preliminary re.sults".
42 Reports of the Banking and Trust Co. on the restitution administration 1947-1956. MOL XXIX-L-2-r pile 53.
�108
areas, started to solve the problem. On May 6, 1945, the Military Government of
Austria (MGA) in Linz issued its Decree No. 3 blocking all assets in the territory of
Austria qualified as "enemy property", simultaneously taking over control of such
property. The Decree, which entered into force one week later on May 13, covered not
only the Austrian Government, agencies, organizations and companies, but according
to its Paragraph lib, also the property of "governments, nations or citizens'" of
countries that had been on a war footing anytime after September 1, 1939 with the
United Nations. 44 Consequently in the Austrian U.S. zones, all assets of Hungarian
origin (including, of course, the property of the Jews of Hungary) got under U.S.
(
control and the further fate of these assets depended on the decision of the U.S.
agencies.
In connection with the same subject, the MGA issued its Decree No. 39 on October 9,
1945 stipulating that the seizing and blocking of all gold, silver, foreign currency, bank
account, credit and security should be the jurisdiction of the Property Control Officers
(PCO). Hungarian assets were put into the same category as the assets of the Germans,
their other allies in"Europe and Japan. 4S
In the summer of 1945, the new Hungarian Government made efforts to get into.
contact with the U.S. authorities in connection with the Hungarian assets abroad. At
first, these efforts proved to be futile. In September 1945, the State Department
referring to the fact that the matter of Hungarian restitution needs joint Allied decision,
thus excluding any U.S. unilateral action
instructed the authorities of the U.S. zones
in Austria and Germany that "it is not desirable to permit Hungarian missions to go to
United States occupied areas for investigation or other related purposes".46 The
rejection of the res~itution claims meant serious consequences to the different kinds of
Hungarian assets: to supply the needy population of occupied areas in Austria and
Germany, the U.S. agencies started to deplete the warehouses containing food, clothing
and other consumer goods of Hungarian origin, while unable' to ensure the efficient .
guarding and proper protection of the other assets including plant equipment, machines
and raw materials. A Smallholders' Party (FKGP) politician, Bela Andahazy Kasnya
Inter-Allied Declaration against Acts of Dispossession committed in Territories under Enemy Occupation or
Control. London, January 5, 1943. Alford Collection pp. 853-856
.
44 Summary report of Louis D. Caplane and William G. Magee to the Chief of PCB (Property Control Branch)
Undated. NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box 23, File "Wehrmacht Funds 1945-1949".
45 Military Government instructions. Property Control- no. 39. October 9, 1945. NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box
21, File "Gold found in Austria".
43
�109
who headed the Department of Hungarian Properties Taken Abroad (DHPTA) of the
Ministry of Finance (MOF) as Government's High Commissioner for Hungarian
Properties Taken Abroad - turned to the U.S. Ambassador in Budapest, Arthur
Schoenfeld in the matter. Andahazy told the Ambassador that the Hungarian
Government would accept the temporary decision of the Americans, while he
expressed his grievance that non-official delegations and persons were pennitted to
enter the US. zones without trouble. In addition, hewarned Schoenfeld that the Decree
-hindered the reconstruction of the country
-makes the supply of the needy Hungarian population impossible
-fails to protect the assets in question, that are exposed to nature's forces
-allows that Hungarian property be distributed among the Austrians and the Gennans
even if it was well known that the property in question was owned by a victim of the
. Gennans ..
The Hungarian official asked that, in view of the approaching winter, at least the
restitution of machines needed for flood control, hospital equipment, perishable
medicines and food be authorized "on humanitarian grounds". Schoenfeld who was
as he wrote to the Secretary of State - "impressed with the forcefulness o(
Commissioner's arguments" and proposed to meet the Hungarian requests by allowing
"a small Hungarian commission" to enter the U.S. zones, thus "preventing the
deterioration of these properties".47
The State Department sent Schoenfeld's letter to the HQ USFA for further scrutiny,
from where the letter was sent on December 3, 1945 to the MGA in Linz. 48 During the
subsequent weeks, the U.S. authorities in Austria carned out a thorough investigation
in the matter, which covered not only the concrete cases cited in' Schoenfeld's letter
(who had learned on them from Andahazy and included the sale of 10,000 military
coats, the distribution of 100,000 pairs of shoes, 20,000 pairs of boots, lots of fabric
and 150 railway carsof sugar and lard, the auctioning off of the animal stock, the
negligent handling of manufacturing equipment), but also reviewed the general
Letter of U.S. Ambassador in Budapest, Schoenfeld to SECSTATE. October 31, 1945. NACP RG 260, Entry
113, Box 20, File "Hungarian Properties in Austria".
41 Ibid .
. 48 Letter of AGD Asst. Adj. General to the Cdr. of the Military Government in Linz. December 3, 1945. NACP
RG 260. Entrv 113, Box 20, File "Hungarian Properties in Austria".
46
�110
condition of Hungarian assets stored in the U.S. zones in Austria. According to the
investigation report, the assets claimed by the Hungarians belonged to two categories: 49
-,,Movable properties declared to be captured enemy material and disposed of as such."
-"Properties, including real estate business enterprises and movable properties owned
by Hungarian nationals now under control of Military Government awaiting
disposition. "
The investigation of major items of Hungarian origin under U:S. control was closed
with the following results: so
-a shipment consisting of pharmaceuticals that had been transported by the Hungarians
before the end of the war to Austria (a major quantity of partly processed barbiturates
and pain-killing narcotics, the property of the Hungarian ALKALOIDA Company).
Th~ shipment was recently turned over to the MGA Public Health Office, which would
continue to process the raw materials in the future jointly with the employees of
ALKALOIDA, then provide of distribution in Austria, thus meeting local medical
needs (pCO Heller in Salzburg filled in a 1945 Property Registration Form, evaluating
on it the ALKALOIDA shipment
which was. later duly distributed in Austria - as
worth 1 millidn Swiss francs)SI
-a large number of pieces of machinery. and factory equipment of Hurigarian origin
under the control of the competent PCO or the USF A Ordnance;· in order to provide for
suitable protection, the they tried to retain the original Hungarian staff together with
the assets
-the equipment of4 Hungarian factories (MOM Ungarische Optische Werke Budapest,
. EMAG Landwirtschaftliche Maschinenfabrik A.G., 1.Z. Metallwarenfabrik A.G.,
DANUVIA Waffen- und Munitionenfabrik A.G.) was already in place and production
was started. Other equipment was· transported elsewhere for storage or put into
operation, but all equipment and warehouses were under suitable protection
Among the investigation documents, four were preserved: two written to the WARCOS and the JCS. This are
almost similar summaries, one with a handwritten date (December 28, 1945), another written to the USPOLAD
office in Vienna January 18, 1946 and'another, a report to the Secretary of State .titled "Paraphrase of Telegram"
bearing the same date. All four documents NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box 20, File "Hungarian Properties in
Austria".
50 Ibid.
49
�111
-supplies not serving military pwposes would be turned over to MGA representatives.
Factory equipment under the control of the USF A Ordnance would be handled in
harmony with Phase II of the disarmament process
. -155 Hungarian commercial and 27 other Hungarian vessels were anchored in Danube
ports and could not be moved until spring
-horses seized together with captured Hungarian soldiers would be handled as "enemy
property" to be seized. Many animals have already returned home together with their
owners set meanwhile free
-the large quantity of sundry goods found by the 65 th Division in railway cars and
warehouses - except for goods serving military pwposes - were turned over to the
civil authorities of Upper Austria, which provided for storage and later distribution
among the local population, as everything was qualified as "enemy property" to be
seized, except the property of the Austrians; a part
~f
the shoes, boots, clothing and
foot was distributed among prisoners of war and displaced persons (i.e. the liberated
inmates of conceiltration camps), another part was distributed among the Austrian
population. Individual items were inevitably sold, but the authorities were nor aware of
any auctions held in an official manner
-it was clear that a part of all these assets were of Hungarian origin
-trains transporting assets of Hungarian origin were subject of repeated pilferage prior
to the arrival of the U.S. troops.
Although without mentioning concrete details, the U.S. investigation reports
unequivocally proved that the apprehensions of the Hungarian official bodies were
justified: in many cas.es, the suitable protection of a part of the Hungarian assets could
only be ensured with the help of the Hungarian staff accompanying the given
shipment; food and consumer goods of Hungarian origin were distributed among the
needy and the Austrian (or Geiman) population; a few evacuated Hungarian factories \
were put again into operation and the products were used to meet the requirements of
the Austrian (or German) population and the occupation forces. According to the
reports, in August 1945 a Hungarian committee arrived in Salzburg ,,requesting official
recognition and authority to seek out and inventory Hungarian property in the U.S.
Zone". The request was rejected, but the Hungarian committee, which probably tried to
SI
Property Register,ALKALOIDA Chemische Fabrik A.G. - Hungarian, Budapest Vaci street 37. Date.control
�112
find the traces of the Gold Train (the investigation reports referred to a train consisting
of 29 cars transporting various valuables looted by Hungarians, which were taken to
the Salzburg warehouse) was asked to prepare a summary list on the Hungarian
claims.52
,
The investigation report prepared for the Secretary of State summarized that' "some
property on barges in the Danube was unloaded by various tactical units and some of
this was taken for military purposes", while as to the other parts ofthe shipments ofthe
barges, "suitable records have been kept by the RDR Div., USACA". Below the
paragraph, somebody - probably from the State Department - wrote with large letters:
"Not correct. Exec. Div. has been notified ofthis."s3
On November 30, 1945, while the investigation relating to the Hungarian complaints
was stillion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) sent detailed restitution instructions - based
on the directives of the State, War and Navy Departments - to the head of MGA. In
harmony with these instructions numbered WX 85965, due to the worsening U.S.
Soviet relations, the U.S. representative of Allied Control for Austria (ACA) was now
authorized to conclude a tripartite (Le. U.S.-French-British) restitution agreement
instead of the originally planned quadripartite (i.e. U.S.-Soviet-French-British) one. As
interim measure, "without prejudice to the formulation of a definitive restitution
program", one should be prepared for the restitution of the following property
categories: S4
A. All local currencies.
B. . Works of art, cultural works of either religious,artistic, documentary, scholastic or
historic v~lue.
C. Heavy and power-driven industrial and agricultural machinery and equipment, rolling
stock, locomotives, barges.
D. Other goods, valuables excluding gold, securities and foreign currencies; materials,
equipment, livestock and other properties found in storage.
i
taken: August 25,1945. NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box 20, File S4-8008 Sa.
S2 Two summaries sent to WARCOS and JCS, one dated December 28, 1945, the other undated. NACP RG 260,
Entry 113, Box 20, File "Hungarian Properties in Austria". .
S) Letter of USPOLAD Vienna to the SECSTATE. January 18, 1946. NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box 20, File
"Hungarian Properties in Austria".
S4 JCS instructions WX 85965 to Clark. November 30, 1945. NACPRG 260, Entry 113, Box 21, File "Gold
found in Austria".
�'113
However, the listed categories and the restitution procedure described in detail below
only applied to UNO member states, and the defeated countries (like Germany and its
allies including Hungary) were not UNO member states in that period. Simultaneously
the U.S. zone commander was instructed to uncover, secure and keep a complete'
record on the assets of the UNO member states and to submit monthly reports on the
progress of their restitution to the Government. 55 In harmony with these instructions,
property found in Austria and transported on to Germany should be considered as
property found in Germany. According to the last paragraph of the instructions
(paragraph 11), ,,After final determination of the amount and. character of reparations
removals, to be made the latest by February 2, 1946 there should be no restitution on
any items of equipment of key importance to plants retained in Germany as essential to
minimum peace time economy"56
Sci it seemed that the satisfaction of claims of allied states were given an
understandable priority, although with a strict deadline attached.' That time, not only
states later turned communist belonged to this category (Czechoslovakia, Poland and
Yugoslavia), but also the Soviet Union itself. Similarly to those of Italy, Finland or
Romania, the case of Hungary remained an issue pending.
Whether notified about the results of the 1945-1946 restitution investigation or not, the
Hungarian Government could not acquiesce in the rejection. On January 15, 1946, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) sent a repeated note to the U.S. Government
relating to the ,,Hungarian property transported. abroad dUring the so called 'Arrow
Cross' regime". As no answer arrived, theMOFA submitted a protest note on February
20 to the U.S. Ambassador in Budapest, complaining that the Allies, simultaneously
with their. recognizing of the new Austrian Government, took a decision on the
consolidation of the Austrian economy. The background of the protest was that a
decision was also made "to place at the disposal of Austria, in form of lease, all raw
material, stocks and productive factors which are lying fallow without regard to their
national origin". At the same time, the Hungarian Government also requested a change
of the decision. 57
Prior to submitting the note, the Hungarian premier, Ferenc Nagy wrote a letter to the
Chairman' of the Allied Control' Commission for Hungary (ACCH), Marshal
SS Ibid.
S6lbid.
57
See the protest note NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box 20, File "Hungarian Properties in Austria;'.
�114
Voroshilov, estimating the value of Hungarian property piled up in the U.S. zones at 2
3 billion dollars (which was plainly an exaggeration).s8 On February 22, 1946, as a
continuation of the diplomatic offensive, the Hungarian premier sent another letter to
the Marshal. Nagy decided to write the second letter because rumor had it that the
authorities of the
u.s. zones intended to
tum over another Hungarian property to the
Austrian Government. The Hungarian premier drew the attention of the Marshal to the
Hungarian reparation obligations - amounting originally to USD 300 million as laid
down in the Armistice Agreement signed in Moscow on January 20, 1945, but
meanwhile almost trebled due to exchange rate cortectionsS9
-
and the misery of the
. Hungarian population, and qualified the U,S. practice to use Hungarian property for the
improvement of the economic situation of Austria, "the nation which supported the
mad aspirations of Fascist Germany" as unfair. In his letter Nagy asked the Marshal to
submit his protest and request relating to the recognition of Hungarian property rights,
the termination of the distribution and the appropriate protection of Hungarian property
"to the proper [meaning first of all U.S. - K. G.-V. Z.] governments within the shortest
possible time". The Marshal met the main request of the Hungarian Government60 and
sent the letters of the Hungarian premier to the U.S. representative of the ACCH in
. Hungary, General Key. In his answer, the General assured the Marshal that the
"ultimate disposition is subject to governmental decision in consultation with our
Allies, including the Soviet Union".61
Less than a week later, on March 1,· 1946 Ambassador Schoenfeld reported that the
Hungarian premier anIJ.ounced on a confidential press conference, that he had well
based information on a meeting of U.S. military leaders on February 19, where it was
decided that certain Hungarian assets would be ceded to Austria. In his report,
Schoenfeld demanded urgent information "since the disposition of Hungarian property
in Austria is at present. a major issue here [in Budapest - K.G.-V.z.]".62
~8 Letter o(Ferenc Nagy. February 9, 1946. NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box 20, File "Hungarian Properties in
Austria".
.
~9Ferenc Poioskei, Jeno Gergely, Lajos Izsfik (ed.): 20. Century Hungarian History 1900-1994 (Huszadik
szazadi magyar tortenelem; Korona, Budapest, 1997; hereinafter: 20. Century) p. 275.
60 See the English translation of the letter NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box 20, File "Hungarian Properties in
Austria".
.
61 Letter of USFA-RDR Chief Col. Theodore S. Paul to the ADC (Assistant to Deputy Commissioner). March
IS, 1946. NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box 20, File "Hungarian Properties in Austria".
62 Letter of Schoenfeld to USPOLAD Vienna and the SECSTATE. March 1, 19467 P.M. NACP RG 260, Entry
.
113. Box 20. File ..Hungarian Properties in Austria".
�115
Within a few days,' Schoenfeld received information from the U.S. bodies in Vienna on
the content of WX 99226, which constituted the basis of the U.S. policy relating to the
further fate of Hungarian property piled up in Austria. (WX 85965 had been issued on
November 30, 1945 63 , laying down the tasks relating to the assets of allied UNO
member states;64 WX 99226 was issued by JCS on March 5, 1946 as a supplement of
WX 85965.) The new instructions confirmed anew that the commanders of the U.S.
zones must make efforts to cooperate first of all with the western Allies. This. time,
however, the futuie of the assets of the defeated countries were at stake. Apart from the
currencies of the individual states, the new instructions repeated the categorization of
the earlier ones: cultural goods, industrial and agricultural machines, equipment, and
other goods excepting gold, foreign currency and stocks. 65 The restitution of the last
two asset type was made dependent on the claimant government's submitting
satisfactory proof and in case of vanquished countries, the different periods the assets
had been removed from the given country. In case of Hungary, only assets transported
to the Reich during the period between January20 and May 15, 1945 forcefully and
without compensation could eventually be restituted. 66 Consequently, the preliminary
armistice agreement signed in Moscow on October 11, 1944 as a result.·of the
negotiations initiated by the Horthy Government with the Soviet Union was ignored by
WX 99226 - in spite of the fact that four days later, the fmding out of these very
negotiations led the Germans to storm the Buda Castle, assign Skorzeny to kidnap
Horthy's son, blackmail Horthy to resign, arrest him and help extremist' Arrow Cross'
movement to grab power. Without these radical changes"without the agreement of the
new Hungarian Government willingly, serving German interests, the massive
evacuation of Hungarian and Jewish assets already starting in October 1944 could not
have happened.
In harmony with Paragraph 7 of the instructions, the restitution of vehicles was to be
postponed and subordinated to occupation goals, restitution towards allied UN member
countries and the demands of the Austrian (German) economy.67
As to the
furth~r'
fate of other goods transported to the Reich from the territory of
erstwhile allie$ of the Reich during the war forcefully or without compensation (Item
Probably issued on November 29 and received by the European addressees the next day. on November 30.
JCS instructions WX 99226 to Clark and Mcnamey. March 5, 1946. NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box 21, File
"Gold found in Austria".
6S Ibid.
66 Ibid.
63
64
�116
C), the JCS ordered that ,,restitution ...need not be made if, in your judgement,
restitution would jeopardize satisfaction of the minimum requirements of the Austrian
(German) economy".68 This last Paragraph 8 of the instructions unequivocally proved
that the desperate efforts of the Hungarian Government relating to restitution was not
induced by any groundless rumors, a Soviet-Hungarian conspiracy organized with an
anti-U.S. edge or a simple lie.
In harmony with the instructions, protection of assets in U.S. hands. in Austria must
have been reinforced, taking better care of their actual condition. 69 (Meaning that the
Hungarian proposals of 1945-1946 were well based and referred to an unsolved
problem.) Of course, WX 99226 had to be applied not only to Austrian, Finnish,
Romanian and Italian assets but also to ex Hungarian property. Relating to Hungarian
restitution claims, the instructions meant in practice the following:
-"WX 99226 permits only limited restitution to Hungary and defers Hungarian
restitution to needs of Austrian economy ...,,70
-Until the announcement of a new decision mentioned in the instructions, ,,no return of
property to Hungary had been authorized,,7!
-"... no restoration of Hungarian property can be made until an official list is received
from the Hungarian Government. To date no such list has been received by this
headquarters:,n
Based .on Items I and 2 it was obvious that the anxiety of the Hungarian Government
was not unfounded when they objected to the turning over of Hungarian property
(together with the property of the Jews of Hungary) to the new Austrian Government.
. By that time, an obvious paradox had gained official status:. Austria, in spite of its
sinister role in the history of the Reich and its being the birthplace of the FUhrer, was
now declared the first victim of Adolf Hitler and thus the restoration of its economy
Ibid.
JCS instructions WX 99226 to Clark and Mcnarney. March 5, 1946 NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box 21, File
"Gold found in Austria". The same statement in the letter of PCB Chief Walker to the Military Government
Commanding Officer in Salzburg. March 14, 1946 NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box 20, File S4-8007 Sa.
69 Ibid. By the way;;the letter also contained important instructions relating to the further handling of the .
valuables of the Gold Train.
70 Letter ofUSFA-RDR Chief Theodore S. Paul to th.e ACC-Hungary. March 14, 1946. NACP RG 260, Entry
113, Box 21, File C-OO-I0 "Cables and Policy".
71 Ibid.
72 Letter ofUSFA-RDR Chief Theodore S. Paul to ACC-Hungary. April 12, 1946. NACP RG 260, Entry 113,
O"V 'HI ~i1" r _Oo_! 0 .. r.ahle~ and Policv".
67
68
\
�117
was gIven priority before other Germany's other ex-allies, even by ignoring. the
unquestionable ownership rights of the citizens of these ex-allies. This paradox was
clearly the result of a political decision. This decision could well be explained by the
,
,
actual political situation - an escalating Cold War, the mutual estrangement of and the'
growing tension among the Allies -, but its moral inconsistency was absolutely
evident: of Germany's ex.;allies, Italy changed sides and joined the Allies already in
the summer of1943, followed by Romania in August 1944, Finland in September 1944
and Hungary in October 1944, even if the latter move was half-baked and
unsuccessful, while the Ostmark remained true to its FUhrer to the bitter end. Still, the
greatest injustice of WX 99226 was that it put (first on paper, then - as it is described
below - in practice) the needs of the Austrian population and the requirements of the
Austrian economy before the inalienable ownership rights of wretched Jewish
survivors who had been looted and deported by the German (and Austrian) invaders
and their local henchmen.
The statement in Item 3 - alleging that the Hungarian Government failed to hand over
an "official list" of claims to help restitution until the spring of 1946 - was simply
untrue. In his letter written to the Commanding General of USF A on March 5, 1946,
the U.S. representative of the ACCH in Hungary, Gen. Key wrote that ,,My letter of
Oct. 45 enclosed a list furnished by the Hungarian Government of its properties alleged
to be in U.S. Occupied Areas.'m In his answer dated March 14, the Chief of USFA
RDRD sent the following answer to'Budapest in connection with the letter containing
Hungarian claims: "This headquarters has no knowledge of Schoenfeld's letter or lists
ofOctoberl2, 1945.,,74
In each zone, the implementation of restitution raised serious definition problems. In
order to introduce a uniform restitution ruling, the representatives of U.S., Soviet,
British and French authorities made a joint decision on April 17, 1946. In harmony
with the decision of the' Allied Control Authority Control Council (ACACC), the
essential elements of the new ruling were the following: 75
Letter of ACC-Hungary (signed by Gen. Key) to CG USFA. March 5, 1946. NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box
20, File ,,Hungarian Properties in Austria". In this connection see also Schoenfeld's letter on his talks with
Andahazy, dated October 1945 and already cited in this chapter. The two letters written by Premier Fe~enc Nagy
in February to Voroshilov are also mentioned in this letter dated March 5, 1946 as letters already sent to
Washington, D.C.
'
74 Letter ofRDR Chief Theodore S. Paul to ACC-Hungary. March 14, 1946. NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box 21,
.
.
File C-OO-l "Cables and Policy".
7S d 11, .. ,.1 rrmfT"l A"thnntv rnntrn1 rnund1 Annenclix .. A" I-IV. Amil 17. 1946. Alford Collection DO. 326-329.
13
°
�118
1. In connection with the tenn 'restitution'
2.11. ,,Restitution will be limited, in the first instance, to identifiable goods, which
)
existed at the time of occupationof the country concerned and which have been taken
by the enemy by force from the territory of the country."
2.12. "Also falling under measures of restitution are identifiable goods, produced
during the period of occupation..."
2.13. ,,All other property removed by the enemy is eligible for restitution to the extent
consistent with reparations."
3. In case the restitution of goods of a unique character is impossible, such goods will
be replaced by similar ones to be selected on the basis of special instructions.
5. "The Control Council will deal on all questions of restitution with the government of
the Country from which such objects were looted."
II. In connection with the interpretation of the definition of restitution
3.11. "Ifproperty claimed on account of restitution is indispensable for the operation of
a ,whole factory allocated for reparations, this property, may be retained and not
restituted."
(
3.13. "If restitution of the object itself is not granted, the right of the claimant nation is
satisfied by means of compensation to be taken from Gennanproperty in objects of
equivalent value, as far as possible by equipment, manufactured goods and raw
materials."
III. In connection with the claim process
1.1b. Claimant nations have the right to set up a mission dealing with restitution
matters.
IV. Data to be sent to Zone Commanders
1.12. The value of the claims is to be set in 1938 Reichsmark.
Briefly summarizing the effect of the decision on Hungarian restitution, it can be stated
that:
-based on Item U2.1l., restitution of the valuables transported by the Gold Train,
which was qualified "unidentifiable" not by coincidence, was not a priority of "the first
instance" ,
�119
• consequently, based on Item 1.12.13., the restitution of the Gold Train would only be
implemented "to the extent consistent with reparations", i.e. after the extent of the
reparations has been determined in the framework of the Peace Agreement,
. restitution of factories identifiable on the basis of Items 1.12.11·2 could be rejected on
the basis ofItem 11.13.11.,
- namely in theory, based on Item 11.13.13., self-restitution was possible from German
property; the bulk of this, however, had been evacuated in 1944-1945 to the Reich. In
addition, the ownership rights of certain German assets owned by Austria or Austrians
prior to the Anschluss reverted to the Austrian Government, not to speak about the fact
that German property that remained in Hungary were seized by the Soviet occupation
authorities as soon as possible and in many cases, transported to the Soviet Union right
away.
�120
x. Main Issues of Restitution (1946-1947) from Austria and the Fate of the Weiss
Manfred Works
It is not clear how and when the Hungarian Government was officially notified on WX
99226, but as shown above, the Hungarian Government led by Ferenc Nagy was more
or less aware (maybe informed by Austrian connections) of the practical effects of the
U.S. policy change in spite of the fact, that a visit of a Hungarian official delegation to
the U.S. zone was impossible at that time. 76 At any rate, in early April the MOFA
repeatedly asked the stopping of using Hungarian assets for the reconstruction of
Austria. The Hungarian diplomacy even called the CUlprit by name: " ...all Hungarian
goods for this purpose considered as War booty shall be controlled by the Department
V of USFA Staff in Salzburg under Colonel Hyde.,,77
In mid-April, the Hungarian Ambassador in Washington, D.C. filed a protest at the
State Department after learning that the U.S. authorities intended to organize an
auction in Pocking, Austria to sell 800 tons of block aluminum, the property of the
MW in Budapest. 78 On April 12, the State Department instructed the MGA·to call off
the auction if restitution is possible - as stipulated by WX 99226. That is, if the
Austrian economy does not need these 800 tons of block aluminum, no sales are
permitted, because the metal can be restituted to Hungary.79 The letter of the State
Department well illustrated the hypocritical nature ofWX 99226: as it was evident that
any country in war-ravaged Europe, including Austria, badly needed 800 tons of block
aluminum
and almost anything else - for reconstruction, restitution to Hungary
remained but a theoretical option. This time, however, the Hungarians seemed to be
misinformed: the Chief of the RDRD, Theodore S. Paul answered that no auctions
were planned anywhere, and in addition, the alleged venue, Pocking was in Bavaria
and not in Austria. so To avoid any future misunderstanding, Col. Paul also wrote that'
"best information to date indicates no block aluminum in Austria which qualifies for
The U.S. authorities also were notified of the repeated efforts of the Hungarian agents. Ibid.
Letter of ACC-Hungary to WARCOS OPD. April 4, 1946. NACP RG 260, Entry 113. Box 20, File
"Hungarian Properties in Austria".
78 Message of WAR to USFA. April 17, 1946. NACp·RG 260, Entry 113, Box 20, File "Hungarian Properties in
Austria".
79 Telegram of SECSTATE to USPOLAD Vienna. April 12, i946 7 P.M. NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box 20,
File ,.Hungarian Properties in Austria".
80 Letter ofRDR Chief Theodore S. Paul to AGWAR. April 19, 1946. NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box 20,File
..Hungarian Properties in Austria".
76
77
�121
restitution to Hungary under WX 99226."SI Of course, this could also be understood
othelWise: that there really was block aluminum of Hungarian origin in the U.S. zone
in Austria - but it was intended to remain and be used in Austria.
The new freedom to act did not escape the notice of the Austrian Government. In June,
they started to compile their own restitution list, containing assets to be claimed from .
Germany. According to the first estimates of the new Austrian Government, German
occupation caused damages worth USD 4.2 billion to Austria, broken down as follows:
-gold reserves moved to Germany after the Anschluss: USD 90 million
-cultural goods, industrial and Sigricultural equipment transported to Germany
forcefully or without compensation: USD 100 million
-gold and foreign currency turned over to the Reichsbank under duress, forced Austrian
investments and purchases of German stocks, forced lending of Austrian banks,
services and supplies to the German Army (!): more thanUSD 4 billion. 82
According to U.S. opinion, "some of these claims can undoubtedly be substantiated,
but figures so far submitted too unreliable and indefinite to serVe as basis for
discussion." As to the USD 100 million demanded in exchange of cultural goods,
industrial and agricultural equipment, the U.S. administrator preparing the report added
that "this appears highly exaggerated" and only a quarter of that sum, USD 25 million
should be acknowledged. s3
Still, the Austrian Government was highly successful in drawing attention to its plight
and that of Austria. In late June,·the State and War Departments "taking into account
possible future developments [.;.] reviews U.S. policy and operations in Austria". For
this end, departmental commissions were set up to revive the Austrian economy and
foreign trade, to increase the reconstruction assistance of the U.S. occupation
apparatus, to carryon negotiations with the Soviets, the French and the British, to help
Austria join the GP and meet its import requirements, and to influence the German
Austrian restitution-related conflicts to the benefit of Austria. 84
Ibid.
Message of USFA to the WBS and the Paris Embassy to Gen. Lincoln. Dated June, probably 1946. NACP RG
260, Entry 113, Box 21, File C-00-1 0 "Cables and Policy".
'
83 Ibid.
84 Letter of WAR and WDSCA to USFA with the proposals. June 27, 1946. See.also the agenda items of the
talk~ held on June 29. NACP RG 260. Entry 113. Box 20, File "Hungarian properties in Austria".
81
82
�122
With the improvement of Austrian positions, Hungarian-Austrian restitution-related
conflicts multiplied. A serious problem arose: in April 1946 the Soviets, treating
Hungary as en exclusive Soviet occupation zone, started to seize the assets of Austrian
companies located in fIungary; including the Gas Works and Electric Works in
Budapest, the Creditanstalt and 11 other companies partly owned by the bank. The
Soviets seized the property as "German assets", because after the Anschluss, the shares
and assets in most case had reverted to the Reichsbank or other German entities. 8s The
situation was made more complicated by the fact that the Soviets acted in conformity
with the law: as war reparations, they were entitled to seize any German property, as
the Austrian National Bank (ANB) was wound up on March 17, 1938 and reverted to
the Reichsbank. This status ceased to exist on July 4, 1945, when the ACA issued a
decree stipulating that the ownership, management and thus the possibility of
restitution of the assets seized by the Reichsbank would revert again to the ANB.86 By
the way, Section 24 of the Peace Treaty obliged
t~e
Hungarian Government to assist
reparation of German assets by the Soviet Union. 57
The Hungarian party continued to have difficulties in getting Austrian entry permits for
the representatives of the Hungarian Restitution Mission (RM) in Vienna. The same
problems arose when Hungarian representatives traveling to or from Germany wanted
to cross the U.S. zone of Austria. 88
The bearing of restitution costs led to an almost permanent Hungarian-Austrian
conflict. The head of the HRM in Vienna, Laszlo Varvasovszky already in the summer
of 1946 asked the decision of the U.S: authorities in.the matter. In August, the USACA
informed Varvasovszky that ACA Decision-No.
4: made on March 7, 1946 (two days
after WX 99226 was issued) apply to the restitution costs. The Decision stated that
"the cost of transportation within the frontiers of Austria, as well as the cost of
.. necessary repairs to transport itself, including property removed from countries
occupied by the German Army and which has been recovered in Austria, must be
borne by Austria. Expenses outside of A~stria, with the exception of Germany, must be
Letter of USFA to ACC~Hungary April 5, 1946. See also summary of USF A sent to ACC-Hungary. May 4,
1946 NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box 21, File C-OO-IO "Cables and Policy" and NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box
20, File "Hungarian properties in Austria".
86 Letter of US FA to ACC-Hungary. April 5, 1946. NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box 21, File C-OO-I0 "Cables
and Policy".
87 The Americans also knew this. See the telegrams of USF A sent to ACC, OMGUS and RDRB sealed with date
.
December 11, 1946. NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box 21, File C-OO-IO "Cables and Policy";
88 An example to the complicated authorization process: telegram of USF A to ACC-Hungary. August 22, 1946
NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box 21, File C-OO-I0 "Cables and Policy".
.
85
�123
borne by the recipient countries."89 According to the Decision, cost invoices had to be
submitted to the Austrian Ministry of Finance, which had to pay the invoices within
the shortest possible time.90
In spite of the fact, that the very unequivocal Decision was not only supported by the
western Allies, but - as an e;xception- also by the Soviets, its practical implementation
was imperfect. In February 1947, the transport costs of the restituted EMAG factory
and on March II, the transport costs of the' Marx and Philips factories restituted from
Obenniihl to Hungary were submitted to the Austrian party, which refused payment.
Both parties lodged complaints to the ACA.91
WX 91471 issued on June 15, 1946 finally allowed also individual refugees to claim
restitution of their property, independently of governments.92 Although this was an
important chance for Jews who survived the Holocaust, but the instructions were
referring to the category of ,,household goods, valuables, art objects and other personal
property owned and removed from a country by refugees who left ,that country for
religious or racial reasons ... ".93 In case the refugee did not wish to return to his or her
country of origin, restitution of such property to that country was prohibited. The
instructions failed to make clear whether claiming of property removed from a country
not "by refugees" but by the Gennans was possible or not by the persecuted Jews.
Almost all survivors from Hungary belonged to the latter category.
In 1945, in addition to the shipments containing machines and goods, two special'
trains also left Hungary. One of them transported the valuables of the Hungarian
National Bank (HNB) and a part ot the artifacts of the ,Hungarian Government and
public collections to Austria. In early May, 1945, the train was seized by the U.S.
Anny near Spital am Pyhrn, east of Salzburg. In harmony with the deCision of the U.S.
Government, a significant part of this shipment was restituted in 1946-1947. (See
below the detailed description of the process.) Without doubt, the restitution of a great
../
part of this shipment - and that of the state-owned silver reserves - were the most
positive events of the U.S. restitution policy relating to Hungary. By giving back the
Letter of Col. Ernest T. Owen (USFAlUSACA Section) to the Chief of Hungarian Restitution Mission
Vienna. August 19, 1946. See also the annex of the letter, the bilingual text of the decision in: ACA Official
Bulletin March 7, 1946. NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box 20, File "Hungarian Properties in Austria".
90 Ibid.
91 Letter of the MOF-RM (Restitution Mission) to the ACA. April 29,,1947. NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box 21,
File "Hungarian Properties in Austria".
92 See the chapter titled "Extension of restitution to Austria and satellite countries" of the 19 page summary
report on the restitution of cultural goods. NACP RG 59, Lot 62D-4, Box 28 p. 9.
93 Ibid.
89
�.124
precious metals, the United States· indisputably played a significant part in the
economic recovery of Hungary. The restitution of cultural goods and the valuables of
public collections was another important step that should not be left unmentioned. It
must be stressed that only a part of the HNB shipment was restituted at that time: the
U.S. authorities turned over more than 100 cases containing securities and other
va.luables to the Austrian Government (See Chapter XII). The willingness to restitute
induded almost exclusively state-owned precious metals and cultural goods: capital
assets were excluded.
In the summer of 1946, the U.S. authorities refused to restitute the Weiss Manfred
Works (WMW) and the MOM. The refusal was justified by a need of further scrutiny
of claims'. At the same time, the U.S. authorities were expecting an official Hungarian
claim for the Di6sgyor MAVAG and the equipment of the Philips plants. Restitution
continued, including the final part of the HNB shipment (all valuables except stocks
and some other deposits), the archives of the Ministry of Agriculture, 90 cases
household goods left behind by Hungarian· refugees and 33 cases agricultural
equipment. Negotiations were started in connection with the 60 railway cars containing
the machinery of the EMAG 60. The EMAG machines were restituted in February
1947, the Philips assets were returned to Hungary in March. 94
,
Simultaneously the international positions of Hungary were weakened further. As the
I
Peace Talks approached in June 1946, a delegation of the Hungarian Government led
by Premier Ferenc Nagy set offto Paris,London and Washington, D.C. for a two-week
.. lobbying tour - which did not achieve anything. The Paris Peace Talks started late July
with the participation of the 21 victors. On their plenary meeting held on September 5,
the victors rejected Hungary's only territorial claim (for one fifth of Romanian
Transylvania), reinstating the prewar borders prevailing in 1937. This decision equaled
the total failure of the efforts of Hungarian foreign policy. To make things worse, the
!
Balkan Economic Committee dominated by the Soviet Union rejected the proposal of
the U.S. to lower Hungarian reparation obligations from 300 to 200 million dollars. In
his speech, the Soviet representative told the AmericaIJs that if they really wanted to
\
help a Hungary in dire straits, they should start restituting Hung:irian assets piled up in
the U.S. zones in Austria and Germany. At the same time, the Committee also rejected
all - by the way, fully justified - Hungarian claims against Germany amounting to
�125
hundreds of millions of dollars. 9s As to the legal side of the Peace Agreement, its
..
important decisions can be summarized as follows: 96 .
Section 30
Item 1: ,,Property in Germany of Hungary and of Hungarian nationals shall no longer
be treated as enemy property and all restrictions based on such treatment shall be
removed."
Item 2: "Identifiable property of Hungary and Hungarian nationals removed by force or
duress from Hungarian territory to Germany by German forces or authorities after
January 20, 1945, shall be eligible for restitution."
Item 3: "The restoration and restitution of Hungarian property in Germany shall be
effected in accordance with measures which will be determined by the Powers in
occupation of Germany"
Item 4: "...HungarY waives on its o~ behalf and the behalf of Hungarian ?ationals all
claims against Germany and German nationals outstanding on May 8·, 1945, except
those arising out of contracts and other obligations entered into, and rights acquired,
before September, 1, 1939. The waiver shall be deemed to include debts, all
intergovernmental claims in respect of arrangements entered into in the course of the
war and all claims for loss or damage arising during the war."
.J
Soon after the defeat of the Hungarian -foreign and economic policies in Paris, Austria
managed to reap another victory on the same front. After Jengthy preparatory talks, the
State Department on October 25, 1946 issued its instructions No. 83893 stipulating
that of the gold turned over by the employees of ANB to the PCO in Salzburg, after
proving the rightfulness of the Austrian claim, gold bullion and gold coins worth USD
5 million should be returned to Austria, because these were ANB property prior to the
Anschluss. 97 On November 8, 1946 the ANB filed an official claim to bank gold found
by the Americans ~n Austria. 9s On February 19, 1947
after preliminary consultations
and authorization No. 89757 issued by the State Department in January -, an official
9~
Message of US FA to ACC-Hungary. Dated September, probably 1946. NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box 21,
File C-OO-I0.
95
20. Century pp, 289-291.
96 Treaty of Peace with Hungary, Article 3. Alford Collection p. 857.
91 See summary report on the handover of gold. Undated, probably spring 1947. NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box
20, File C~9-9.
98 The ANH declaration. November 8. 1946. NACP RG 260. Entry 113. Box 20. File C-9-9.
�126
ceremony was held in Vienna, where Gen. Geoffrey Keyes turned over gold worth
USD 4,743,507 to Austrian Chancellor Leopold Fig1.99 A part of the gold turned over
originated form the Gold Train - i.e. was the property of Jews from Hungary.tOO
2. Restitution of the securities
The Allied armies seized a huge quantity of looted bonds and securities in Germany
and Austria, but more than a year passed after the end of the armed conflict, when in
June 1946 the U.S. authorities made their first "tentative proposal" in connection with
the comprehensive handling and restitution of the looted securities. 101 The U.S. idea
was to restitute looted securities to the country of origin in case the past of the
securities could be clarified. The second category comprised securities whose owner
was identifiable: in this case restitution was due to the owner's country. The third
category consisted of unidentifiable securities: here the U.S. authorities proposed the·
establishment of a joint fund - similar to the Gold Pool for banK gold -, to be used for
allocation of funds among the affected countries according to an agreed percentage.
This proposal had never been turned into reality. At any rate, on July 25, 1946 the U.S.
occupation authorities issued Military Government Decree No~ 12 freezing the
securities deposited in the Linz and Salzburg branches of the ANB (both in the U.S.
zones of Austria), prohibiting to do anything with the securities without the written
authorization of the Military Government. 102
Apparently, in line with the general tendency seen in case,.ofnon-monetary gold, joint
Allied securities restitution was taken from the agenda and the U.S. authorities decided
that the fate of securities ,under their control would be determined by themselves. This
is confirmed by the fact that on June 20, 1947 the Command of US. Forces in Austria
(USFA) asked the Department of Army to lift the interdiction relating to the looted
securities in the U.S. zone. 103 In its answer sent in September, the Department
explained that ~t would co~sider the request after receipt of the detailed list of
See summary report on the handover of gold. Undated, probably spring 1947. NACP RG 260, Entry 113. Box
20, File C-9-9. Agreement text and handover minutes NACP RG 260, Entry .113, Box 20, File C-9-9.
100 See Chapter VI. and summary report relating to the handover of gold. NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box 20,
File C-9-9.
101 Telegram of WARCAD to USFA June 7, 1946. NACP RG 260,Entry 113, Box 21" File C-9-1 "Gold Found
in Austria" .
102 Letter of USACA-Economic-Finance Division to USACA leadership. July I, 1948. NACP RG 260, Entry
113, Box 21" File C-9-1 "Gold Found in Austria"
10J Ibid.
99
�127
securities deposited in the Linz and Salzburg branches of the legal successor of the
erstwhile Reichsbank in Austria, the ANB. 104 It is not surprising that the U.S. financial
authorities (and their superior bodies in Washington, D.C.) had practically no idea on
the nature of the assets over which they had had control for so many years - similarly
\
.
to the other assets under U.S. control, including the entire shipment of the Gold Train.
The Finance Division sent the requested list in November 1947. In its letter
accompanying the list, the USF A explained that in accordance with the decision of the
Allied reconciliatory body, the foreign exchange resources were put at the disposal of
ANB, and securities were to be considered as such according to the USF A. lOS Thus,
U.S. policy was getting into conflict with measures already agreed with U.S. allies.
A telegram sent to the USFA in September 1947 shed light to the actual standpoint of
the supreme U.S. leadership stating that "foreign securities in Austria which were
looted from other countries cannot legitimately regarded as Austrian foreign exchange
resources". 106
In July 1948, the securities were still frozen. The Chief ofRDRD informed the Finance
Division that Washington would decide on the restitution of the securities only after
the receipt of the list ofclaims relating to the securities. 107
On September 22, 1948 the superior bodies informed the USFA leadership on their
final decision: securities of German ownership or interest would remain frozen also in
the future. 108 Securities originating from non-UN member countries (Hungary was not
a member of the UNO that time) were turned over to the Austrian Government. The
International Refugee Organization (IRO) also had a share. in the .securities, in such a
manner, that it received those which were ,,meeting conditions of WX-85682". This'
code number concealed an order, the so called "Non Monetary Gold Directive".
Securities. turned over to IRO were those
- which had been taken by violent means from the political, racial or religious victims
of Germany,
- whos~ original owners were unknow,n or had deceased without heirs, and
- whose national origin was unidentifiable.
Ibid.
Memo of US FA. Undated. NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box 21, File C-9-1 "Gold found in Austria".
106 Telegram ofCSCAD ECON to USFA. September 19,1947. NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box 21, File C-9-9.
107 Letter ofChiefUSACA-RDRD J. A. Garrison to USACA Finance Division. July 23, 1948. NACP RG 260,
EntrY 113, Box 21, File C-9-1 "Gold found in Austria".
108 Telegram of CSCAD to USFA. September 21, 1948. NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box 21, File C-9-1 "Gold
found in Austria".
104
10~
�128
In compliance with the instructions, the U.S. authorities finally lifted the interdiction in
March 1949. 109
Without doubt, a significant quantity and value of Hungarian Jewish-owned securities
got under the control
of the U.S. authorities, most probably the same way as other
assets described above, i.e. in the course of individual escape attempts of German and
Hungarian war criminals. This is confirmed by the fact that in many cases, the U.S.
authorities impounded securities denominated in pengo, korona, Reichsmark and U.S.
dollars ofHungarian and Hungarian Jewish origin: l1O
- U.S. company stocks worth USD 150,000 seized together with the Ministry of
Finance foreign exchange reserves
- 88 Hungarian stocks of different nominal value, from German agents transferred from
the Abwehr to the SD
- German stocks, from SD agents
- several thousand pieces of Government bonds, securities, gold bonds of different type
and denomination, among them 1,000 pieces 500-dollar gold bonds, from the inmates
of the Erpfendorfijungarian refugee camp.
Hungarian Jewish-.owned securities seized by the U.S. Forces faced a fate similar to
that of the shipment of the Gold Train .and other minor groups of valuables: the U.S.
authorities decided that their origin and. owners were ;,practically unidentifiable" and
the securities were turned over to theIROor its legal successors, or the Austrian
Government. The last phase ofthe handling and storage process occurred in May 1950,
when with a single act, the U.S. authorities turned over simultaneously41 security
items (21 Polish, 17 H:ungarian and 3 German) to the Austrian Ministry of Finance~lll
Whatever happened with .the securities of the Hungarian Jews, a significant part of
,
them, denominated in pengo, were worthless. Stocks of a Hungarian company could
lose its value in many ways:
- if in 1944-1945 the company was evacuated by the Hungarian authorities to Germany
(then including Austria)
Letter of USFA to the Austrian Federal Ministry for Property Control and Economic Planning. March 8,
1949. NACP RG 260, 'Entry 113, Box 21, File C-9-1 "Gold found in Austria".
110 Of these cases see more in parts titled "Gold in the Danube" and "The Abwehr package".
III Ibid. and in: General payment voucher titled "Polish, Hungarian and German miscellaneous securities" signed
by Eleonora Krause. May 11-12, 1950. NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box 27, File S7. 3010-3011 Sa.
109
�129
- if the company was partially or entirely destroyed due to acts of war
- if the registered capital of the company lost its value
- if the company was nationalized in the late 1940s.
By the time the U.S. decision was made (September 1948) and the interdiction was
lifted (March 1949), the nationalization frenzy in Hungary already abated, leaving
behind the state as the sole owner of all companies and businesses. On the other hand,
company stocks were denominated in pengo. After unprecedented inflation, the pengo
was abolished and a new currency was introduced in its stead in 1946, the forint As a
result of these changes, all company stocks became worthless.
The only company securities that still had value were those of foreign companies
bought against foreign exchange. Without doubt, Jewish industrialists controlling
almost half of Hungarian industry had possessed such securities, similarly to a great
part of the thousands of small- and medium-size Jewish businesses. The first group had
purchased foreign stocks in great quantity for investment purposes, while the second
group had done so in smaller quantities to have emergency reserves for the uncertain
future. Most of the proprietors had been murdered, their heirs and the survivors became
almost penniless. Irrespective of their individual sufferings, their fate was common: .
whoever had taken their securities, the Gendannes, the police or the Hungarian or
German Gestapo, whether they survived the war or not, whatever had not been
successfully hidden became lost forever.
Had the securities been returned to their rightful owners, Decree.8400/1946 of the
Prime Minister made sure these must had been deposited anew.
All these things, however, do not mitigate the responsibility of the U.S. authorities and
their. politician superiors, as more often than not, their asset management practice was
characterized - as a common effect of objective circumstances and subjective
nonchalance - by negligent handling and the total disregard of the interests of the
original owners. This also happened in this case. Frequent personnel transfer and lack
of skilled people made the proper categorization of the huge quantity of securities of
totally different quality very difficult. Up to November 1947, no detailed list of the
securities under U.S. control had been made (compare this with the Gold Train, where
a detailed list had never been made). It is highly probable that the intention to search
for and restitute the original owners had not even. been contemplated as a realistic
alternative. It can be assumed that the U.S. authorities were motivated here by the same
�130
driving force that directed their restitution policy: the political decision to return as
little as possible to any country under Soviet influence, including Hungary.
3. Restitution of the Weiss Mafred Works (WMW)
One of the most important elements ofthe Hungarian industrial assets - and in general,
of all Hungarian,assets - evacuated in 1944-1945 to Germany was the WMW., During
the war, the ReichsfUhrer-SS hardly veiled his goal to turn his coveted SS into an a11
powerful mini-state within Nazi Germany. For this end, he needed an important
economic potential, especially if he wanted to compete with Hermann Goring's
industrial juggernaut, the Hermann Goring-Werke encompassing the whole continent.
The WMW, which was owned by the Weiss, Chorin, Mauthner and Kornfeld families
(the largest machine and armament factory of central Europe still not under German
control in 1944) seemed highly suitable to be incorporated into the industrial empire of
the ReichsfUhrer-SS and increase the economic power of his SS. Although the person
chiefly responsible for the EndlOsung der Judenfrage, Adolf Eichmann usually tried to
sabotage any negotiations with the Jews, but Himmler'sstance was' firm this time. So
on the German side, a tough negotiator was needed who would not stand in the way of
Himmler's economic, but mainly political ideas. This was SS-Obersturmbannfiihrer
Kurt Becher, who gradually gained total control of the project aimed at the acquisition
of the assets of the Jews in Hungary. Becher's first step was to play the ,iargest
Hungarian war concern, the WMW into the hands of the SS.
Since the first days of the invasion, most top SS men serving in Budapest had lived in
"
plush villas owned by arrested rich Jews. Becher occupied the abode of Ferenc Chorin
(the head of the WMW empire of companies) and Eichmann moved into the villa of
,
,
,Lipot Aschner (the General Director of the ,United Light Bulb Factory, the Deputy
Chairman of the National Association of Industrial Employers). II~
Himmler's special economic envoy gave orders to bring back Chorin from the
internment camp to Budapest and the two started negotiating in April.
The agreement was concluded in the middle of May 1944. The blackmailed families
agreed to sign the four agreements (Plus a supplement and an authorization) stipUlating
that all WMW units, and all lands are real estate owned by the group would form a
�131
"Treuhand" ("trust handling") of the SS for 25 years. I 13 The Gennans acted with utter
circumspection. On paper, the transaction was perfectly in compliance with all
prevailing Hungarian laws. For example, to be entitled to sign the agreement, Becher
was made a Budapest resident. To the Beirat (Board) of the new company the
following Germans were delegated: Becher and one of his confidants, Goring's deputy
Field Marshal Erhard Milch, the chief of the SS-Fiihrungshauptamt (SS-FHA Leading
Main Office) SS-Obergruppenfiilirer Hans Jiittner and the chief of the SS-Wirtschafts
Verwaltungshauptamt (SS-WVHA, Economic and Administrative Main Office) SS
Obergruppenftihrer Oswald POhl.114
In exchange of the agreement, most members of the families could leave the country
and emigrate to Portugal and Switzerland. A few family members had to be left behind
as hostages. Agreement· IV (never recovered) stipulated that the emigrating families
could recover - from their own assets - USD 600,000 and 250,000 Reichsmark upon
their departure. lIS The families could duly set offin late June, but finally they received
only USD 200,000 and 250,000 Reichsmark. 1I6 As Becher arranged this business with
the involvement of the SS-WVHA (contrary to his other transactions, e.g. the so called
Kasztner Action), the missing 400,000 dollars were duly transferred to the SS-WVHA,
which collected foreign currency from the Germans' victims and transferred same to
Swiss banks to cover needs of the German war industry. To all probability, these
400,000 dollars followed the same route.
The "Evacuation staff" headed by Becher devoted special attention to loot artifacts
I
from the Jews. As all movable and··real assets .of .the Weiss; Chorin, Kornfeld and
Mauthner families now belonged to. the "Treuhand", Becher gave orders to assemble
all their paintings and other artifacts in the summer villas of the Mauthners under Nos.
76. and 79 Budakeszi Road.1I7 A part of the valuables were later transported to
112 As to the Budapest villas of Jewish industrialists .seized by SS leaders, see: Hmos Almasi: "The Historical
Topography of Budapest during the Gennan Occupation" p. 136. in: Gennan Occupation pp. 123-146.
II) The details and the full text of the three agreements and the authorization are cited by Elek Karsai
Miklos
Szinai: History of the Gennan seizing of the Manfred Weiss properties. (A Weiss Manfred Muvek nemet kezbe
keriilesenek tOrtenete) Szazadok 95 1961/4-5 sz. pp. 680-719. (hereinafter: Karsai- Szinai) pp. 143-144.
114 Minutes of the Council of Ministers on the Manfred Weiss affair August 17, 1944 in: Ilona Benoschofsky
Elek Karsai (ed.): Indicting Nazism 2. (Vadirat a nacizmus ellen 2; Magyar Izraelitak Orszagos Kepviseleteenk
Kiadasa, Budapest, 1960) pp. 143-144.
115 Karsai - Szinai p. 685.
116 Kurt Becher's confession. November 28, 1945. Karsai - Szinai pp. 711-715
117 Levai p. 101.
�132
Gennany. Whatever remained.was either destroyed during the siege of Budapest in
1944-1945, or disappeared. \18
The restitution 'pf evacuated WMW properties became a focal point for the negotiating
partners after the war. None of the more than 70 companies under U.S. control was
more the focus of disputes and political games than the MW groUp.119 Not t:eally
because of the quantity and value of its assets - although most probably these
constituted the largest industrial, item among those evacuated during the war-, but
rather due to the high level of its armament capacity. The WMW properties included
state-of-the-art machinery, suitable for the manufacture of huge quantities of weapons
and other goods of military use. After the ravages of war, control over such high-value
machinery was of great importance, even from a strategic point of view. Of course, the
WMW properties were also suitable to churn out vehicles and goods usable in
peacetime. Still, for the western powers and the Soviet Union - erstwhile Allies who
inexorably became the enemies of each other ~ the possibility of using the armament
potential of the WMW was the most important issue.
In September 1945, the Weiss family requested authorization to lease, against a
suitable lease fee, a part of the WMW properties to be able to start work until the
Allies made their final decision in the matter. 120 In October, the State Department
infonned the U.S. Ambassador in Budapest that "consideration not be given to" issues
relating to the WMW properties. It was explained that the assets had been transported
to Austria (areas near Salzburg and Linz) by Weiss and not the Gennans, and in
addition, according to the experts of MGA, the,WMW properties got mixed up with
the equipment of a plant in Styria and their separation was not possible at the
moment. 121 The explanation clearly lacked sincerity, as
-Weiss was unable to decide on the evacuation of his company in 1944-1945, as he had
died many' years before,
-the head of the company group, Ferenc Chorin was also unable to make such decision,
as he could leave Hungary in the summer of 1944 only in exchange of turning over his
comparues,
118 In July 1948, the artifacts bore the U.S. inventory number 302, Hungarian claim No. 293. Budapest MOL
XXIX -L-2-r pile 45, file 14. On the evacuation of .the artifacts of the Weiss family see: Report of dr. Erik
Fugedi. MOL XXIX-L-2-r pile 79, file 4.
119 As to the list of companies in the U.S. zones, see Annex 2.
120 Telegram of Schoenfeld to SECSTATE. October 13, 19454 P.M. NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box 20, File
..Hungarian Properties in Austria".
�133
- as the "Treuhand" - thanks to Becher and his close attention to legal details - was
finnly in the hands of the SS, any evacuation could only be decided by the Gerinans
(even if they fonnally had to ask for the authorization oftheJIungarians).
Based on the words of the State Department, the U.S. authoritieswere entitled to reject
restitution, as restitution obligations only applied to assets evacuated by the Gennans
forcefully.122 Any mix-up of the WMW properties with similar equipment of another
company was conceivable, but could rather be just a pretext to reject the restitution
claims of the rightful owner. The essence of the rejection letter is that the leaders of the
Military Government in Austria ".;.have expressed their unwillingness to return
machinery on any basis as it is considered captured enemy equipment."123
As mentioned above, the U.S. authorities also rejected the claim of the Hungarian
Government to restitute the WMW properties, as the ,,matter is still being investigated
and studied.,,124 In 1947, rumors had it that the WMW properties were distributed in
Austria. The rumors were not denied by the Chief of RDRD, Garrison,. either:
"Occasional isolated sale of individual machines and lease of other machines under
ninety day recapture clause found necessary to provide minimum funds for continued
maintenance of Weiss equipment".12S As soon as the Hungarian restitution organs
. learned of the sales, they immediately offered a sum to the Americans that could have
covered the ,,minimum funds". This offer was rejected by the U.S. party because ,; .. .it
would commit United States to restitute Weiss equipment to Hungary." And such·
commitment would have been "premature asper,WX 86247-'dated September 1947."126
I
In the meantime, the political situation started to change in Hungary. With the support
of the Soviet occupation forces, the communists launched a political offensive. In late
I
February 1947, the General Secretary of the Independent Smallholders' Party (FGKP),
Bela Varga was charged with conspiracy. The Soviet authorities arrested the
anticommunist leader of the largest political party within the Government and
121 Letter of SECSTATE to U.S. Representative Hungary. October 18, 1945. NACP RG260, Entry 113, Box 20,
File "Hungarian Properties in Austria".
122 See the document already analyzed: JCS instructions WX 99226 to Clark and Mcnamey. March 5, 1946.
NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box 21, File "Gold found in Austria".
III Letter of the Secretary of State to the U.S .. Representative in Hungary. Octob~r 18, 1945. NACP RG 260,
Entry 113, Box 20, File ,,Hungarian Properties in Austria".
124 Letter of USFA to ACC-Budapest. Dated September, probably 1946. NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box 21, File
C-OO·lO "Cables and Policy".
m Letter of RDRD Chief James A. Garrison to the OSCAD ECON. October 1947. NACP RG 260, Entry 113,
Box 21, File C-OO-lO"Cables and Policy".
126
Thin.
�134
transported him to the Soviet Union. (The FGKP had won the 1945 elections with 57
per cent of the votes; upon Soviet pressure, however, it had to form a coalition
Government with the communists.) In late May, while the FGKP Premier, Ferenc
Nagy was on holiday in Switzerland, the Soviets submitted a file containing
"incriminating evidence" about Nagy to his deputy, the strong man of the Government,
the head of the Communist Party, Matyas Rakosi. Hearing about the absurd charges,
the Premier chose to stay in Switzerland. This event was followed by new arrests- and
resignations. The FKGP became cut up as a salami and soon started to show the signs
of disintegration. In July, the communists' pressured the Parliament to enact a new
election law, containing a number of restrictions. The new elections were held on
August 31. Not unexpectedly, the Communist Party became the largest political party
of the country with - in spite of rigged elections
only 22.3 per cent of the votes. In
the meanwhile, upon the insistence of the Soviets, Hungary was left out of the
European Reconstruction Program (ERP, the so called ,,Marshall Plan") announced by
the Americans. The "salami tactics" of the communists. continued and they assumed
power in 1948.
At the same time, the political methods were also changed. The repeated Hungarian
restitution claims relating to the MW properties became rejected by the U.S. authorities
- which monitored ,the events in Hungary with growing apprehension - with increasing
vehemence. On April 13, 1948 the USA officially conferred all Hungarian restitution
matters to Austria (see next chapter). Even before this decision, the possibility arose
that the WMW. properties could get: under Austrian control. iOn March 28, the JCS
instructed the USFA to turn over the right of disposal over the WMW properties to the
Austrian Government, unless an official claim was tiled to tum said properties into
. "Govemment property".127 (Formally, due to the peculiar legal status of the company
and thanks to the cautious Becher, who had meticulously observed the prevailing laws
of Hungary, even Germany could have filed such a claim. Another rightful claimant
could have been the Soviet Union, which was entitled to acquire certain Germany
'.
owned assets as reparation in compliance with the Peace Agreement.) To ensure
success, the Hungarian Government (which was now controlled almost entirely by the
communists and operated following then instructions of the Soviet occupants acting
from the background) resorted to a new method. The Hungarian authorities informed a
�135
family member, Baron Maurice Kornfeld - who represented the Weiss family in
Switzerland and the U.S. -, that in case the Americans turnover the disputed
equipment to the Austrian authorities, there would be reprisals against the Weiss
family members still living in Hungary. The Hungarian authorities demanded from the
Baron that " .. .the Weiss family commit itself on the disposition of these properties,
preferably to the Hungarian Government, or the Weiss relatives in Hungary will
suffer."128
Exactly four years after Becher's irresistible offer, the heads of the Weiss family were
blackmailed again; this time, however, the offer came from the communists. The Baron
informed the U.S. authorities of Austria on the dangerous situation and gave the advice'
to the representative of the USACA-RDRD that as soon as the Weiss family ceded to
the pressure and waived its rights to Hungary, the USA should interfere, stop the
transaction and thus help the family to remain "clean" in the eyes of the Hungarians. 129
After pondering the awkward situation, the RDRD proposed that the WMW properties
should be left under U.S. control, "leasing" a part or all of them to the Austrian .
Government " ...so that full utilization can be made and economic benefits realized
from these properties while they are in Austria."13o
A few weeks later Col. Edwin L. Johnson, who reported the visit of the Baron,
prepared a detailed ,report after making a thorough investigation of the matter, stating
that the fact that theWMW properties were not turned over to the Austrians did not
,
mean any change in the U.S. restitution _
policy and should rather be regarded as an
'exception. To stress the importance oHhe issue, he-mentioned,that the ,,Manfred Weiss
.properties include 800 of the finest machine tools in Central Europe".131 Against the
earlier plans to turnover the WMW properties to Austria, he enumerated the following
arguments: 132
"If the Austrian Government elected to return these machines to Hungary it will
constitute handing over direct war potential to a Soviet satellite with the possibility that
these machines will eventually go to Russia."
127 Letter of JCS to CG USFA. March 26, 1948. NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box 21, File C-9-1 "Gold found in
Austria",
.
.
128 Report of Col. Edwiri L. Johnson (USACA-RDRD). April 1948. NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box 21, File C
OO-lO"Cables and Policy",
!29Ibid.
130 Ibid.
III Report of Col. EdwiD. L. Johnson (USACA-RDRD) to the OSCAD CITE ECON. May 1948. NACP RG 260,
Entry 113, Bc:>x 21, File C-OO-IO "Cables and Policy".
Il2lbid.
�136
"If these machines are transferred for disposition to 'the Austrian Government, the
Austrians would not be justified in putting them to use while attempting restitution
I
negotiations with the Hungarians."
,,However, if the Austrian Government should elect to manage the machines
themselves, there is no guarantee that these machines would remain in the Western
Zone of Austria."
"Under U.S. control these machines are being leased for use in the Austrian economy
with income being derived therefrom."
In connection with the further lease claims arriving from the Austrians, it was noted
that certain machines were claimed by companies located in the Soviet zone of Austria.
Had the machines been leased to these companies, the danger loomed that the Soviets
would confiscate the machines without much ado.
,,By retaining these machines under U.S. control, the assets will be better preserved;
but if they turned over to the Austrian Government, they may not be preserved and can
be irrevocably lost."
Based on these arguments, Col. Johnson suggested not to turn over the machines to the
Austrians, who c?uld only lease them and use them in such a manner, that the products
and the benefits should be used for the reconstruction of·the Austrian economy. The
most important argument of the colonel was, however, the following: "Irrespective of
how the Weiss Manfred machines were remove4 from Hungary, they represent the
property of religious and political refugees':·from Hungary who do not desire to return
to their country of origin. Certain members of the Weiss family are now U.S. citizens
and other members are departing shortly for the U.S. to acquire
ci~izenship,
so U.S.
interests are involved in the disposition of Manfred Weiss properties.,,133
One month later Col. Johnson sent another report repeating his arguments, this time
supported by new rumors and information: 134
-According to the sources of the Office of Director Intelligence (ODI) the Gyor WMW
plant manufactured six 12-cylinder aircraft engines and three or four 10 cmself
. propelled guns each day.
-All products except the civilian cars are exported to the Soviet Union.
Ibid.
Report of Col. Edwin L. Johnson (USACA-RDRD) to the OSCAD CITE ECON. June 1948. NACP RG260,
Entry 113. Box 21, File C-OO-IO"Cables and Policy".
133
134
�137
~A
Hungarian clerk reported that the Hungarians did everything for the success of the
cause and repeated their claim to tum over the MW properties to the Austrians each
week. The background of this
about~face
was, according to an Austrian source, a
Hungarian plan to swap Austrian property seized or nationalized in Hungary for the
MW properties. According to the Austrian source, the Austrian Government would be
highly interested in the HUngarian proposal.
-The same Austrian source added that the Soviet Union had promised 20,000,000
Swiss francs to the Hungarians in exchange of their ceding the MW properties found in
the U.S. zone in Austria.
Col. Johnson deemed necessary to add that the Austrian economy would need the
WMW products - bicycle and car parts, electric equipment - the same way as the U.S.
authorities would need. the lease fee, which compensates for administration costs and
wear and tear. 135
According to an undated U.S. list of Hungarian assets
prepared most probably in
1946-1947, i.e. one or two years prior to the events described here -, at least seven
different WMW shipments were under U.S. control. As the list orily referred to the
U.S. zone in Austria, it must be regarded as highly incomplete. Nevertheless; it can be
stated that WMW properties had been stored in Austria in at least seven locations: in
Kaltenhausen near HaUein, in Bruck Fusch near Salzburg, in Upper Austria at Ebensee,
Wels, Ramingdorf, Letten and in the Danube ports. The U.S. authorities evaluated
these assets as being worth approx. 10,000;000 Reichsmark (USD 4 million).136 .
It is absolutely sure that until AugusC1948, the U.S. authorities did not turn over these
assets - and other WMW industrial equipment and machinery, together with two
dozens of other property groups of Hungarian origin - to the Austrian Go¥ernment. 137
In spite of this, thanks to the lease construction, the properties of the Weiss family
looted by the SS were to playa very important role.in the economiC reconstruction of
Austria.
In 1944, the SS and the collaborating Hungarian Government competed for the WMW
properties. After the war, the game continued with different antagonists. The heritage
of a talented Jewish industrialist became simultaneously the coveted prize of the - first
1Hlbid. .
136 Hungarian Properties under U.S. Property Control. Undated. NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box 20, File
"Hungarian Properties in Austria".
137 Report of RDR to the OSCAD CITE ECON August 1948 NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box 21, File C-OO-I0
(""I"-hl.c:1O('I
o]T'I~
'l"\n1;,..'1:/'"
�138
democratic Government of Hungary, later the communist
successor of the Hungarian
Quisling Government, the new Government of an Austria relieved of the joint
.
responsibility and .suddenly turned to the first victim of Nazism, Stalin's Soviet Union
and the Truman Administration embroiled in the Cold War. Although it was clear that
the political views and moral responsibility of the individual claimants were not to be
compared, a common treat was still to be discovered in all: they wanted to lay their
hands on and control assets whose owners were among the few Jews who survived the
genocide. The members of the Weiss, Chorin, Mauthner and Kornfeld families owed
their lives to their assets, but finally these assets caused their never-ending misery as
well. One thing was sure: whether the claimants were Hungarians, Austrians, Russians
or Americans, democrats, Nazis or communists, anti-Semitic or true friends of the
Jews, any share taken by them in the WMW properties was absolutely unlawful.
Although most of the fate of the WMW properties is stili unknown, we may state that
the rightful owners must have suffered very high losses.
�139
XI. The Last Phase of the Restitution Process (in 1948 and aJterward)
In early 1948, when the Cold War was already raging, the borders of the political and
economic influence of the erstwhile allies became crystallized and the areas controlled
by them politically and economically were more or less the same as they had
conquered by the end of the war. At the borders of the Central-Eastern European
countries occupied by the Red Army the Iron Curtain had fallen.
In the spring of 1948, after the conquests of communism, a decisive change occurred in
the restitution policy of the U.S. authorities. In line of the important changes that had
occurred in the political life of the region and Hungary, the provisions of WX 99226
issued two years before - which had already ensured important freedom of action to
the leaders of the U.S. military administration when evaluating individual restitution.
claims - underwent a thorough reassessment.
The essentials of the new restitution policy were described by the execution order
(WX-98298) of the instructions of the JCS sent to the Commanding General of the
US FA on March 26, 1948: ,,1 authorize you terminate immediately restitution program
to ex-enemies under WX 99226 amended with exception of final action on claims
already allowed. You should notify Austrian Government and transmit to appropriate
Austrian agency all relevant data in your possession on properties claimed for
restitution on which you are terminatingaction."138
This time - referring to the joint decision taken by the U.S., Great Britain and the
Soviet Union on October 13, 1943 - Italy, which was acknowledged as co-belligerent,
was excepted from the fprce of the instructions~ So in the case ofItaly, restitution could
continue. 139
Simultaneously the JCS instructed the HQ USFA to "advise respective missions of
foregoing, pointing out restitution questions hereafter for negotiation between those
countries and Austria."14o
Thus, the U.S. practically completed its withdrawal from the restitution issue and a
process was terminated during which a strategically positioned Austria was given more
and more restitution rights and gained growing importance in restitution issues. On
us Letter of JCS toCG USFA. March 26, 1948. NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box 21, File C-9-1 "Gold found in
Austria".
139 Ibid.
�140
April 13, 1948, the U.s. officially notified the Austrian Government that restitution
matters relating to ex-enemy nations would come under Austrian jurisdiction. 141 With
this decision, "...responsibility of restitution to Hungary was officially transferred to
the Austrian Government .. ,,142
Without doubt, the transfer of restitution to Austria was an integrated part of the
anticommunist policy of the U.S. Government. This logical statement is supported by
unequivocal proofs. The above cited restitution documents - written in the spring and
summer of 1948 - often dealt with the dispute among the various U.S. authorities
relating to the future fate of Italian restitution. As the date of first postwar elections
.
(April 18, 1948) approached, the "Italian question" became more and more acute.
During the tense pre-election period, the U.S. Government had to make emergency
plans for the case if the .western-oriented Christian Democrat-Social Democrat
Republican coalition had been beaten by the communist-socialist Popular Democratic
Front. This emergency plan also envisaged an immediate ,,retaliation" in the form of a
transfer of Italian restitution to Austria. Due to territorial issues, Italian-Austrian
relations were very tense anyway. In this situation, the Americans had two options:
" .. .lithe Italian elections were substantially anticommunist, the U.S. would continue
to handle restitution to Italy. However, if the Italian elections were substantially
communist, the restitution program to Italy would be handed over to the Austrian
Government in the same manner as expressed in WX 98298 for Hungary and
Rumania. ,,143
The U.S. Government was very well.aware of the fact that in practice, 'turning over
restitution to Austria would have meant the full suspension of restitution. Col. Johnson
made an accurate assessment on the status of restitution to Italy:
"The case may be simply summarized in these alternatives:
- If U.S .. desires that restitution to Italy should cease entirely, then turnover of
restitution program to Austrian Government is advisable; but
Ibid.
Report ofRDRD to the OSCAD CITE ECON. August 1948. NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box 21, File C-OO
10 "Cables and Policy".
142 Report of Col. Edwin L. Johnson (USACA-RDRD) to the OSCAD CITE ECON. May 1948. NACP RG 260,
Entry 113, Box 21, File C-00-I0 "Cables and Policy".
143 Ibid.
140
141
�141
- As long as U.S. has reasons to desire that restitution to Italy be continued in all
categories; the U.S. Element should execute the restitution program, and function
should not, repeat not, be handed over to the Austrian Government."I44
In connection with the handling of restitution talks and actions with communist
countries, the U.S. Government was consequent - just to a certain extent. While in
April 1948 the restitution program of erstwhile enemies (Hungary, Rumania) was put
under the control of the Austrian Government, the U.S. authorities continued the
restitution of certain assets to erstwhile allies (Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia)
which in the spring of 1948 already belonged to the Soviet block. Colonel Johnson did
not fail to notice the strange situation: " ... the U.S: still handles restitution under
certain conditions to Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia. It would be a strange
paradox to continue restitution to Soviet satellite countries, yet cease restitution to a
country [Italy - K.G.-V.Z.] participating in the ERP [the official name of the Marshall
Plan - K.G._V.Z.]"145
After April 13, 1948 (the issuance ofWX 98298), restitution to Hungary ceased for
months, as the Austrians "were reluctant
Hungary" until June. 146 .
~o
assure custody of property removed from
Finally on June 16; altogether 693 - or according to other lists more than 700 - assets
claimed by Hungarians came under the jurisdiction of the Austrian. Government,
together with the pertaining documentation. 147
With this act, Hungarian restitution, which went 'on after 1946 with only reduced speed
and became. temporarily stopped in April 1948, was for all practical purposes
terminated. 148 For the U.S. authorities, all this was not a surprising development at all. \
They were very well aware of the fact that during the 24 months after the Austrian
authorities' taking over the restitution program of Hungarian assets in the British zone
of Austria in July 1946, only a single shipment (15 tons of historical documents) was
144 Report of Col. Edwin L. Johnson (USACA-RDRD) to the OSCAD CITE ECON. June 1948. NACP RG 260,
Entry 113, Box 21, File C-OO-IO "Cables and Policy".
145 Report of Col. Edwin L. Johnson (USACA-RDRD) to the OSCAD CITE ECON. May 1948. NACP RG 260,
Entry 113, Box 21, File C-OO-lO "Cables and Policy".
146 Report ofRDRD to the OSCAD CITE ECON. August 1948. NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box 21, File C-OO
10 "Cables and Policy".
147 Ibid. The figure "more than 700'" in: Report of Col. Edwin L. Johrlson (USACA-RDRD) to the OS CAD
CITE ECON. June 1948. NACP RG260, Entry 113, Box 21, File C-00-10 "Cables and Policy".
148 For example, the last artifact package arrived in Hungary from the Vienna Ethnographical Museum in May.
During the preceding 8 months, altogether 55 paintings and 20 statues had been restituted. The loading list of
goods sent from Linz to Hungary between September 1947 and May 1948. MOL XXIX-L-2-r pile 38.
�. \
142
restituted to the Hungarian authorities. I49. In June 1948, there were 400 caSes relating to
Hungarian assets (including the property of the Jews ofHungary) in the British zone of
Austria: these were all pending, as the Austrian authorities simply refused to make a
decision on them. So in that zone, restitution already stopped as early as the summer of
I
1946.150 Another 700 cases - those of Hungarian assets in the U.S. zOnes in Austria
were added in the summer of 1948, making the total number of cases under Austrian
jurisdiction 1,100. (Of course, much more Hungarian assets might have been in
Austrian hands, but on the basis of our available infonnation, the Hungarian authorities
submitted only 1,100 claims relating to concrete property not restituted prior to that
date.)
The U.S. expert monitoring the restitution program in the month after the
announcement made in April stated that " ...the only result ofthis transfer to date has
been the cessation of restitution to Hungary by U.S. authorities. The Austrians have
made no restitution agreement with the Hungarians and.have privately indicated that
they are in no hurry to do SO."ISI
One month later, c$nost simultaneously with the Austrian takeover in June, Colonel
Johnson infonned his superiors that ,,responsible Austrian Ministry officials have
stated on several occasions that no Hungarian property will be .restituted from Austria
but that it will be used as a barter instrument to secure the return of Austrian property
from Hungary."152
By the sUmmer of 1948, only 20 Hungarian asset groups - of different nature and size
- remained under the control of the U.S. authorities in Austria due to strategic or
security reasons. Such assets were:'SJ
1.The HNB stocks.
2. 10.844 kilograms of gold and 119.818 kilograms of silver belonging to the
HUNGARIA Chemical Works.
3. Foreign currency accounts worth 220,000 and 26,477 Reichsmark and 260 pengo .
See footnote 147.
Ibid.
m Report of Col. Edwin L. Johnson (USACA-RDRD) to the OSCAD CITE ECON. May 1948. NACP RG 260,
Entry 113. Box 21, File C-00-I0 "Cables and Policy".
1~2 Report of Col. Edwin LJohnson (USACA-RDRD) to the OSCAD CITE ECON. June 1948. NACP RG 260,
Entry 113. Box 21, File C-OO-I0"Cables and Policy".
I~l Report ofRDRD to the 9SCAD CITE ECON. August 1948. NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box 21, File C-OO
10 "Cables and Policy"
.
. 149
IS/)
�j
143
4: The WMW properties.
5. The LZ. Metallwarenfabrik A.G., one third of which was owned by the Manfred
Weiss Company.
6. The Hungarian Ammunition Factory
7. The Ford Motor Co. in Budapest
8. The MOM Ungarische Optische Werke Budapest.
9. The International Machine Trade Company
10. Three motorboats owned by the Hungarian State.
11. A miscellaneous painting collection of unknown origin.
12. Four carpets of unknown origin.
13. Property ofthe Hungarian Consulate in Vienna.
14. Four paintings and two carpets of unknown origin ..
15. The coronation cloak of King Saint Stephen 1.
16. A case full of documents of Hungarian clerk/officers.
17. The (Ma?)glya Timber Company.
18. The Jones Frim and Sons Timber Company.
19. The.Csurg6 Timber Company..
20. The DANlNIA Waffen- und Munitionenfabrik A.G.
The U.S. 'authorities decided to treat the 20 Hungarian asset groups as follows.
-The first five assets (the HNB stocks, the precious metals of the HUNGARIA, the
foreign currency accounts, the WMW properties and the LZ. Wor\cs) would
temporarily remain under U.S. control. The same treatment was anticipated for the
paintings and carpets (most probably in part from the Gold Train), the motor boats, the
property of the Consulate and assumedly also for the International Machine Trade Co.,
which were deemed necessary for the use of the U.S. occupation forces.
-Five asset groups (the Hungarian Ammunition Factory without its armament capacity,
the three timber companies and the DANUVIA) were to be turned over to the Austrian
Government.
-As the Ford equipment had also aroused German interest, these were to be used in the
Salzburg plant ofFord until the final decision was made.
-The MOM, which was 50 per cent German property, was to r~main under Austrian
control.
�144
The Chief of the USFA turned over the more than 1,000 paintings, mostly confiscated
from the Jews of Hungary (or the last item of this collection) only in January 1949 to
the Austrian authorities. 154 This was followed, in the same year, by the turning over of
the equipment of the MOM and the DANUVIA, worth almost 2 million dollars, ISS the
HNB stocks and the precious metals of the HUNGARIA. The latter two items were
given to the Linz branch of the ANB. 1S6 According to the documents, however, a
significant number of additional Hungarian assets (first of all the property of the Jews
of Hungary) remained under the control of various U.S. authorities. On October 7,
1955, on the order of the USF A Quartermaster, a shipment consisting of silver objects,
carpets and paintings was put together for transport overseas. The shipment included
almost 80 inventory items. Belonging to these items, there were more than 300 objects
markedWT(Werfen Train} in the bill of loading. Another 12 inventory items in the
shipment contained almost 20 objects of German origin marked CEM (captured enemy
material). The shipment arrived in the Richmond warehouse in January 1956.1S7 As the
origin ofthe silver objects marked WT - and in many cases, bearing the monograms of
the original owner - were unequivocally determined by experts, the collection being
.
.
.
.
.
part of the shipment of the Gold Train was returned in 1957 to Austria and turned over
to the Bundesdenkmalamt (The Federal Monuments Office of Austria)}S8 The full
weight of the valuables was almost a ton, 1,859 pounds. The shipment had a volume of
118 cubic feet and filled up 5 cases. In addition to the paintings and the almost 3 tons
of Jewish ritual objects turned over earlier, this was the third collection turned over to
the Austrians that was the property of the Jews of Hungary and originated partly from
the Gold Train.
,s9
Takeover - handover declaration. January 5, 1949. NACP RG 260, Entry "USACA General Records", Box
100 and Memo of U.s. Foreign Service to Department of State. January 12, 1951. NACP RG 59, Entry 3104 A,
box 16, File Lot 62 D-4.
ISS See "Conclusions" in the same chapter.
156 See: files relating to various assets evacuat~d from Hungary to Austria (capital goods, blocked (consumer)
goods, cultural goods, different kinds of securities, jewels, other miscellaneous goods), also containing vouchers.
(1 to 430) 1953. Documentation relating to items 172 and 250. MOL XXIX-L-2-r piles 68. and 69.
IS1 Report of Ardelia Hall to the Chief of Quartermaster General-Storage Branch. June 13, 1956. Alford
Collection pp. 826-827. Detailed inventory of the valuables. Alford Collection pp. 842-844. and 828·832.
IS8 Letter of the U.S. Embassy in Vienna to SECSTA TE. July 31, 1957. Alford Collection (unnumbered). The
takeover inventory signed by the Austrian dr. Dobauer (?) on July 30, 1957. Alford Collection pp. 842-844. As
to the markings identifying the owners of the objects (,,M", "BJ" and "KJein.M. Budapest VII. Sip") see:
Undated report titled "Notes on Property at Richmond Quartermaster Depot". Alford Collection pp. 837·838.
)
.
IS9 Statement of the US Delegation Regarding the Gold Train. April 1967. MOL XXIX-T _, ... _;1~ 0"
154
�145
By the turning over of jurisdiction over the restitution program to the Austrians, the
restitution of Hungarian assets was; with the exception of a few cases, for all practical
purposes tenninated. l60 The deadline for submitting restitution claims of business and
cultural assets expired on March 31, 1950: 61 On May 11, 1950 the Americans turned
over jurisdiction over another five items to the Austrian federal financial authorities.
The items included more than 400,000 pengo, 953 US-dollars, 34,461.05 Reichsmark
and other foreign currencies of the Hungarian embassies and the Hungarian Consulate .
in Vienna and the 10.844 kilograms of gold and 119.823 kilograms of silver of the
HUNGARIA Chemical Works. 162
In the first six months of 1951, additional shipments worth more than HUF (Hungarian
Forint) 50 million were restituted to Hungary from the Soviet zone in Austria and
Soviet-occupied East-Gennany, including 55 railway cars and 81 milligrams of radium
worth HUF 3.85 and 1.1 million, respectively. Other Soviet restitution shipments,
however, mostly contained goods without serious value. 163 Although the Austro
Hungarian bilateral restitution negotiations were dragged on for another two decades,
these mostly dealt with the restitution of or compensation for Austrian property
nationalized by the Hungarian Government. During the negotiations relating to issues
of negligible importance - at least in comparison with the value of Hungarian assets .
evacuated to Austria and Germany in 1944-1945 -, the restitution of the property of the
Jews stolen by Nazi Gennany was a subject arising rarely and at most on a theoretic
level. The goal of the Hungarians was to pay as little compensation as possible for
nationalized Austrian property, while the goal of the Austrians was to retain as many
Hungarian property and get back as many nationalized Austrian property as possible.
For a long time, the focus of the Austro-Hungarian bilateral consultations was - in
addition to other issues (Austrian real property in Hungary, Hungarian real property in
160 For example, in 1950 several machines. owned by Odon Mautner were returned to Hungary. Files with
vouchers relating to assets evacuated from Hungary to Austria. MOL XXIX-L-2-r pile 70, item 384.
161 See the chapter titled "No time for recovery of cultural property" of the 19 page sUmmary report on the
restitution of cultural goods. NACP RG 59, Lot 62D-4, Box 28 p. 12. For UNO member countries, the last
deadline was - according toa U.S. report - January 19, 1949, but this deadline did not affect Hungary, as it
joined the UNO only in December, 1955. See: Report of Col. Edwin L. Johnson to the Department of the Anny.
January 194.9 NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box 21, File C-OO-IO "Cables and Policy".
162 Letter ofRDRD Chief James A. Garrison to the Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance - Vennogenssicherung
Section, and the Summary titled "Items of foreign exchange released from U.S. control to the control of Austrian
Federal Ministry of Finance". May 11, 1950. NACP RG 260, Entry 113, Box 19, File "S4. 3005 Sa". The
numbers of the inventory items turned over were: S4. 3006, S4.3005-S9. 3016, S4.3001, S4. 3003.
16) Summary report to the MOF. July 3, 1951. MOL XXIX-L-2-r pile 73. Ofthe 4 vehicles restituted on June 8,
1951, two were registered as scrap, but the other two must have been in,a bad shape, because all 4 vehicles were,
appraised by the Hungarian flilancial authorities as being worth together HUF 12,000 only.
�146
Austria, company shareholdings, the problems of "dual owners", etc.) - the restitution
of HNB stocks and paintings under Austrian control. As for the paintings, the talks
were [mally concluded in late 1968 and the valuables were duly restituted to
l
Hungary.l64 During the talks, the issue to pay compensation for j ewels, cUrrencies, real
estate, stocks and company assets worth millions of dollars confiscated by the German
authorities from Jews of Hungarian origin during the Aryanization of Austria after the
Anschluss most probably did not even emerge.
'\
I
,.
i
Conclusion·
l
In 1944-1945 approximately 600,000-700,000 tons of assets left Hungary. Less than
\
half of these is estimated to have been restituted to Hungary. According to a summary
i
I
made in January 1948, the following assets were returned to Hungary from abroad
\:
including all Austria, Gennany and .other areas Wider Gennan DccupatiDn during the
1:
war - to date (in addition to cultural goods and the HNB gold):16S
i
- 164 railway cars and 19 tons of factory equipment of 13 companies, and· 98 precision
1
l
!
machines of the WMW
-158 railway cars of bridge and railway construction material
-158 railway cars of hospital equipment and 2 milligrams of radium
-2,043 horses, 45 oxen, 137 sheep
-of the property of Government Institutions, 750 harnesses and 8,221· items from the
stud-farms, 36,652 items of miscellaneous military equipment, 60 typewriters, 2
telegraphs, 42 calculators, 116 telephone sets, 6 wagonloads and 16 cases of
°
instruments, 5 cases and 20 wagonloads of educational equipment, 1 pots, 8 cases of
office equipment, 7 railway cars of railway equipment
-50 railway cars of ship inventories of goods evacuated on waterways
.-ofthe finished products, 3,018 dozens of knives, 580,000 meters of fabric, 15 tons of·
.processed textiles; 15 tons of paper goods, 8 railway cars of wooden hut parts
-of the raw materials, 295 tons of metal, paper and iron, 98,000 meters of fabric, 8
wagonloads of planks, 2,270 furs and skins,.
-212 water craft and 1,108 motor and other vehiCles
See for example: The list of paintings returned on November 23,1968. MOL XXIX-L-2-r pile 79, file 2.
List of assets evacuated from and returned to Hungary until Januaiy 28, 1948. January 28, 1948. MOL
XXIX-L-2-r pile 73.
164
16S
�I'
147
So restitution until January 1948 included altogether 565 railway cars, 344 tons, 29
cases and 14 wagon loads of capital goods, raw materials, factory-office-educational
health equipment and finished products, 45,951 items of miscellaneous objects, 1,320
vehicles, 2,270 skins, 3018 dozens of knives, 678,000 meters of textiles, 2,225 heads
of livestock and 2 milligrams of radium. Although restitution continued after January
1948, the data shown above make it clear that only a fraction of the evacuated
valuables (transported by 55',000 railway cars) were restituted.
The postwar restitution policy of the U.S. was more favorable than that in the area of
cultural goods and the precious metal reserves of the Hungarian Government. (Mainly
in connection with the restitution of valuables evacuated in the HNB Train.) A large
number of vehicles (cars, trucks, .boats) were also restituted from the U.S. zone to
Hungary. On the other hand, only a tiny fraction of the evacuated capital goods and
factory equipment were restituted by the U.S. authorities.
While in 1946-1948, the value of restituted vehicles, health equipment, artifacts and
gold amounted to HUF 1,443,337,000 (HUF 629,737,000 in 1946,
HUF
742,800,000
in 1947 and, HUF 7,800,000 in 1948); the value of restituted factory equipment was
only HUF 4 million during the same three-year period,166 equaling less than 0.28 per·
cent ofrestituted Hungarian assets.
In April 1948, ~e U.S. - following the example of the British - turned over all non
. restituted Hungarian assets found in the U.S. zone in Austria to the jurisdiction of the
Austrian Government, thus making the issue of restitution an Austro-Hungarian .
issue. 167 So a part of the factory units operating in the U.S. zone got under the control
of the Austrian Government, but the U.S. authorities retained a few manufactUring
facilities deemed important in the jurisdiction of their own "Property Control";
Within a year, some of these facilities were also turned over to Austria, e.g. MOM
equipment worth HUF. 10,000,000168 or DAA1JVIA equipment worth, HUF
15,000,000 169 .
I
In 1949, the following major factories were still under U.S. control: '70
;
I
J
r
~
1
List of assets evacuated fro~ Hungary to the U.S. zone of Gennany. MOL" XXlX-L-2-r pile 51.
pile 55.
'68lbid.
169 Files relating to various assets evacuated from Hungary to Austria (capital goods, blocked (consumer) goods,
cultural goods, different kinds of securities, jewels, other miscellaneous goods), also containing vouchers, (l to
430) 1953. Documentation relating to item 255. MOL XXIX-L-2-rpile 66.
166
167
PilM KVMJO Memo. October 22,1953. MOL XXIX-L-2-r
�148
Machines (No.)
Plant
MW
Weight (tons)
Aggro2!;. value (mHUF)
600.
1,500
50.0
Ford Co.
78
200
8.5
Csurg6 Timber
10
60
0.6
1. Frim Timber
10
50
0.3
With this series of measures, Austria - of political reasons, exonerated from the burden
of its Nazi past - became the true winner of the postwar era both from the economic
and political aspects.
As to. the further fate of the equipment, very little is known. In the light of the total
value of the factory complexes shown above (HUF 59.4 million) and the total number
of factories under U.S. control (76, see Annex 2), the restituted capital assets (HUF 4
.. million) was practically niL In most cases, the machines, factories and equipment of .
Jewish industrialists were neither restituted to the Hungarian Government, nor the
original owners or their rightful heirs.
By 1948, after the gradual deterioration of the U.S.-Soviet relations, a situation
evolved which had to be deemed as extreme: the new Austrian administration was
given more and more rights to decide which assets can be restituted to the rightful
owners, the Jews - who had been persecuted and looted by a Nazi Germany that had
included the erstwhile eastern territory of the Reich, the Ostmark, the very territory
where the new Austrian administration was now being established.
Although the
ra~icalchange
in the restitution policy of the U.S. Government of early
1948 intended to "punish" the communist Governments and a Soviet Union, the real
victims of this policy were the surviving Jews of Hungary (and the other areas under
Hungarian control between 1941 and 1944), who were methodically looted within a
few months' time and whose mobile assets were transported to the Reich between
March 1944 and April 1945 in tens of thousands of railway cars. The unalienable
property rights of the surviving Jews living behind the Iron Curtain fell victim to the
antipathy felt towards the new Hungarian Qovernment controlled by the Soviet Union.
These Jews were plunged into misery in two ways: first, they lost any chance to regain
170 MOL KVMJO Memo. January 29,1949. MOL XXIX-L-2-r pile 55. A part of the WMW properties (cylinder
blocks, castings, a lathe) were loaded by the SS-Sonderstabon October 28. 1944 on DDSG barge No. 65205.
Letter of the Manfred Weiss Ltd. June 18, 1948.MOL XXIX-L-r pile 45.
�•
149
their property stolen by the Germans and their Hungarian henchmen, and second, they
looked. forward to long decades of oppression and destitution under communist rule
and in many cases, a second round of institutionalized robbery called nationalization.
"
i
�150
XII. The Successful Restitution: Assets Given Back (Restitution of Certain
Government and Private Property)
1. Jewish-owned property in the shipment of valuables of the Hungarian National
Bank (HNB)
HNB was an important player in the economic life of the country in the Inter-War
(1./
Period and during the war. So it was not a coincidence that soon after the Gennan
invasion the retired chainnan of HNB was arrested by the Gestapo. The evacuation of
the bank's assets towards the western border started already in the spring, the gold
reserves and the securities were moved to Veszprem in late September-early
October. 171 A new chainnan, Laszlo Temesvary -'- a far right journalist - was appointed
immediately after the Szalasi coup. The threatening approach of the Red Anny forced
the new Hungarian administration to start evacuating all HNB assets to the west. The
final act began on November 4, 1944, the Board left Budapest on December 24.172
During December, the assets were transported from Veszprem to the western border,
then the different trains became unified into a single one, called "theHNB Train". In
January 1945, the Gennan Foreign Ministry instructed the Hungarian authorities to
separate the assets to fonn three parts and transport the parts to three different branches
of the Reichsbank. 173 These instructions were only partly met: the Government-owned '
silver reserves attached to the HNi3 Train were separated from the unified train and
transported to Magdeburg. The HNB Train - which also carried, apart fr()m the HNB
assets, other Government property (e.g. the valuable books of the National Szechenyi
Library and the gold treasure of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences),
~e
gold
reserves of the Pesti Magyar Kereskedelmi Bank (PMKB -Hungarian Commercial
Bank of Pest), more than 200 bank employees and their family members, and a part of
the bank archives, - crossed the border in two parts in January 1945 and continued its
journey towards Austria. The planned destination was Spital am Pyhm. 174 On May 7,
1945, the HNB shipment was seized by the U.S. Anny here, 90 kilometers east of
111 Janos Botos: History of the Hungarian National Bank II. (A Magyar Nernzeti Bank tortenete II.; Presscon,
Budapest, 1999; hereinafter: History of HNB) p. 268. During the interrogation and trial of minister of fmance
Lajos Remenyi-Schneller,' the, details of the evacuation of the HNB assets were dealt with several times.
Remenyi was indicted in the litigation against ex-Premier Dome Szt6jay and his associates. See his testimony in:
BFL 62811946. Szt6jay Case. ,
172 History ofHNB pp. 271-272.
I1l History ofHNB p. 279.
'
11. History of HNB p. 280.
�151
Salzburg. 17S (The HNB Train was often called "gold train" and due to this and other
reasons, this why the history ofthe "Jewish" Gold Train and the HNB Train was and is
mixed up.) In addition to Government property and public collection pieces, the HNB
Train also transported assets of Jewish origin, being the following:
1.' Jewish property under the bank's own control
2. Jewish deposits at the Budapest Municipal Custodians' Court
.'-.-'
3. Criminal deposits
4. Other deposits of Jewish origin
Jewish property under the bank's own control
In harmony with Sectiens 4 and 5 of Decree No. 1600/1944 of the Prime Minister of
, April 14, 1944 stipUlating the reporting and seizure of all property of the Jews, owners
qualified as Jews had to register and deposit their objects made of precious metals and
gems (pure metals,jewels) with a financial institution being one of the members of the
Penzintezeti Kozpont ,(PK - Financial Institute Center).116 As HNB was not a PK
membet institution, it was also obliged to turn over all Jewish-owned assets deposited
at it to the PK. So HNB turned to the Council of Ministers with the request that
,.HNB
should be released of the obligation to deposit Jewish-owned securities, gold, platinum,
jewels and treasures with a PK-member financial institution, and HNB should be
authorized to keep the deposited in its own vaults as frozen deposits".177 On its meeting
held on April 26, 1944 the Council of Ministers approved of the request. 178 Most of
these deposits had been seized by the Hung;ui.an authorities in connection with foreign
exchange-related offenses (officially: "because of abuses committed with means of
payment") as evidence, then deposited with the HNB. 179 Foreign exchange-related
offenses had surfaced as a byproduct of th~ global recession between 1931 and 1936.
During those years, in order to avoid the financial" bankruptcy of the country, a new
foreign exchange system was introduced, making the legal transfer of serious
quantities of foreign exchange, securities and precious metals abroad almost
impossible for individuals. As in the end of the decade, Jews got into a precarious
Memo ofHNB managers to the U.S. Military Authorities. May 29, 1945. Alford Collection pp. 349-357.
Vertes pp. 285-286.
.
.
177 Ilona Benoschofsky and Elek Karsai (ed.): Indicting Nazism 1. (Vadirat a nacizmus ellen 1.; Publication of
the National Association of Hungarian Israelites, Budapest, 1958; hereinafter: Indicting 1.) p. 239.
178 Ibid.
'
17S
176
�152
situation due to anti-Jewish legislation, they did everything to transfer a part of their
assets abroad. These special circumstances led to a situation where the bulk of the
valuables seized in foreign exchange-related offenses were Jewish property. Although
Decree No. 160011944 of the Prime Minister ordered all Jews to deposit their foreign
exchange, securities and jewels with PK, some of these valuables. as seen above,
'remained with HNB and thus ended up in Austria later:
Secret Decree No. 616311944. (res:) of the Minister of Interior on the establishment of
ghettos for the Jews living in the countryside instructed the Hungarian authorities that
valuables collected in the course of the "concentration of the Jews" must be transported
by the "local prefectures to the HNB branch located in the center of the given region
within three days.,.lso The Decree was signed by MOl Secretary of State Laszlo Baky
on April 7. 1944. one week before the date of Decree No 160011944 of the Prime
'Minister. Establishment of ghettos in the Carp'atho-Ruthenia started on the very day
(April 16) the latter Decree entered into force. Maybe due to the decrees contradicting
each other and the confusion created by the local situation. a part of the HNB branches
refused to take over the Jewish property flooding in. 1SI Two concrete cases are known
when the HNB branches complied with the decrees: those in Nyiregyhaza and
Szatmarnemeti did take over the property seized from the Jews confined in the
ghettos.l 82 Most probably they sent the Jewish property to Budapest, but one thing is
sure: these assets ,had never been loaded onto the HNB Train. which (probably)
transported the property of the Jews of the regions of Kassa. Sopron, Eger. Gyongyos,
Gyor, Szekesfehervar and Veszprem. 183
Jewish deposits at the Budapest Municipal Custodians' Court'
On April 10, 1944 the Minister of Interior issued a decree ..in the subject of handling
the property of absent Jews".184 The decree instructed the orphans' courts to assign
custodians to handle the property of Jews who were absent for more than one year,
dwelled in an unknown place and were prevented to return home and handle their own
assets. The minister authorized the relevant authorities to make .,the steps relating to
179 It is known from the inventory taken up in July 1946 in Austria that HNB kept such valuables marked as
"own deposits", quite often dated 1937-1939. Records on valuables stored in Spital am Pyhm. July 15, 1946.
MOL XXIX-L-2-r pile 73, file 36-40-12.
180 Vertes p. 326.
;
181 Memo ofHNB Legal department. October 19, 1946. MAZs6K Collection pp. 17-21.
181 History ofHNB pp. 269-270.'
,
183 Records on valuables stored in Spital am Pyhm. July 15. 1946. MOL XXIX-IA-r nilp. 7~ fil,., ~';_d.(\_I"
�153
the upkeep and handling of the property, in urgent cases also prior to the lapse of the
stipulated year".
On May 12, 1944 the Budapest Municipal Custodians' Court decided to execute the
decree of the Minister of InteriorlSS and assigned a custodian to supervise the property
of certain "absent" Jews of Budapest. In the countryside, the tenn "absent" clearly
referred to deportees. The Jewish population of Budapest was never deported, apart
~omthe November ~"
and those arrested during the roundups and due to
the reports to the police. Therefore in Budapest, mainly the property of people arrested
by the Gennan and/or Hungarian security organs and that of bachelors drafted to Labor
. Service could have been taken into custody.
The precious metal and jewel deposits of the Municipal Custodians' Court were loaded
in 27 cases onto the HNB Train evacuated to Austria. 186 As the list of depositors
contained a number of Jewish names, it is sure that a part of this was Jewish
property. 187
Criminal deposits
Valuables seized in criminal cases occurred not only among HNB deposits, but also as
"foreign deposits", as the inventory cited above makes clear. This is how 20 envelopes
of the Prosecutor's Office registered as "criminal evidence" got on the train, finally
ending up in Spital am Pyhrn. (Assumedly, the envelopes also contained Jewish
property~)
.
Other deposits of Jewish origin
Laszlo Temesv8ry, the chainnan of HNB appointed by the Arrow Cross took over
"
valuables while still in Hungary, which had been unequivocally part of assets looted
from Jews. On November 18, 1944 silverware and saving books were deposited with
HNB. 1S8 According to the documents, these should have been turned over to the "Jew
property supervision authority" (most probably the Government Commissioner's
Office belonging to Dept. XI. of MOl), but deposit Item No. 806 - a package marked
Indicting 1. pp. 141-142.
Indicting 1. pp. 144-145 ..
186 Report of SOIh CIC Det. to HQ SOthe Infantry Div. May 9, 1945. Alford Collection p. 3S0. Letter of Chief
Military Government Finance Officer Maj. L. C. Perera to SOIh Infantry Div. Finance Officer Lt. Col. B. Jeffrey.
May 14, 1945. Alford Collection.p. 3S3.
187 List of depositors of Budapest Municipal Custodians' Court. MAZS6K..Collection pp. 9S-1 05.
188 Memo ofHNB on assets restitUted. MAzs6K Collection pp. SO-SS.
.
184
ISS
�154
"property of Nation Leader Brother Ferenc Szalasi" - finally remained with HNB. The
gold put into two sealed envelopes must also have contained Jewish property: the
envelopes were surrendered to HNB already he~dquartered in Spital am Pyhm in early
1945 by an' Arrow Cross unit. 189 (We will return to the further fate of the objects.)
According to the experts of HNB, deposit Item No. 809 - surrendered by Cadet Sgt.
Istvan Feher at an unknown date - was assumedly also of Jewish origin. 190
It is almost sure that the content of deposit marked "Evacuation case, Budapest Deposit
Cashdesk LL." (300 dollars, gold and silver jewels, objects with stones) was originally
the property of Jews. 19.1
It is worth while to mention the matter of PMKB deposits. The new Hungarian
Government appointed dr. J6zsef Berauer as the head of PMKB. Szalasi personally
. instructed Berauer to deposit all PMKB valuables withHNB.192 On December 12, 1944
the gold coins and gold bullion of PMKB were taken into HNB Headquarters still
located in Budapest. 193 The Jewish deposits were turned over probably prior to that to
the representatives of the Government Commissioner's Office to Handle the Material
and..Financial Affairs of the Jews,194 so assumedly these were loaded onto the Gold
Train. The HNB experts, however, when listing the returned assets of possibly Jewish
origin in 1947, also included the assets ofPMKB in the liSt. 19S Therefore it is assumed
that the PMKB gold deposit turned over to HNB included a part of the Jewish deposits
held by the fmancial institution.
On May 7, 1945 the HNB Train got .under the control of the U.S. Anny and Temesvary
~as arrested by the CIC. On May 14 and 15 19? the U.S. authorities trans~orted to
Frankfurt the 29 tons of gold bullion and wire gold of HNB,19;. the gold reserves of
PMKB weighing approx. 150 kilograms,198 its gold coins weighing a ton,l99 its foreign
Report of MOFA Dept. IV. MOL XIX-J-l-j KOhl TOK 1954-1964 box 46123/g Document No. 00930/2.
Memo ofHNB on assets restituted. MAZSOK Collection pp. 80-88.
.
191 Ibid.
191 Interrogation of dr. J6zsefBerauer. July 24, 1945. BFL Nb.506/1946.
193 Memo ofKVMJO on the evacuated assets ofPMKB. May 2, 1946. MOL XXIX-L-2-rpile 73, file 36-40-12.
194 Letter ofPMKB to KVMJO. MOL XXIX-L-2-r pile 73, file 36-40-13.
195 Memo ofHNB on assets restituted. MAZSOK Collection pp. 80-88.
196 Memo ofHNB managers to the U.S. Military Authorities. May 29,1945. Alford Collection pp. 349-357.
th
191 Letter of Chief Military Government Finance Officer Maj. L. C. Perera to 80 Infantry Div. Finance Officer
Lt. Col. B. Jeffrey. May 14, ·1945. Alford Collection p. 383. Records on valuables stored in Spital am Pyhrn.
July 15,1946. MOL XXIX-k2-r pile 73, file 36-40-12.
th
198 Letter of Chief Military GOvernment Finance Officer Maj. L. C. Perera to 80 Infantry Div. Finance Officer
Lt. Col. B. Jeffrey. May 14, :1945. Alford Collection p. 383. MemorllI1dum on the war damages suffered by
Hungarian national economy. MOL KUM Bekee15keszit5 scroll 12.415 title 17.
.
.189
tOO
.
I
.
�155
exchange reserves, the material of the Municipal Custodians' Court,2oo and a part of the
"external" and "internal~' criminal deposits. ,.One case said to contain sealed envelopes
regarding Jewish properties" appears in the U.S. inventory.2ol This case was probably
the same as the deposit marked "Evacuation case" mentioned above. It cannot be
excluued,. however, that one of the HNB branches (Kassa, Sopron, Eger, Gyongyos,
Gyor, Szekesfehervar and Veszprem) on the HNB Train took over - contrary to the
general practice of HNB - the valuables collected during deportation and stored and·
registered these separated from the other groups of valuables.
,..... '
The other valuables were left in Spital am Pyhm, together with the HNB employees,
their family members and the bank archives.
In early June 1945, the Temporary Government turned to the U.S. Administration
through the Allied Control Commission in Hungary (ACCH) with the request that the
U.S. should restitute HNB gold reserves to Hungary.202 This was finally done outside
of the framework of the pan European bank gold restitution. Although an international
Gold Pool was established to collect gold under long-term Allied control for restitution
purposes in September 1946, but only those bank gold deposits could be put into the
Pool which:
-had been wrongfully removed from the given country and
-were found by the Allied troops in the territory of Germany, or found in a third
country to where transferred by the Germans during the war.
The.HNB gold was, however, removed from Hungary by the bank employees and
found by the U.S. troops not in the territory of Germany, but in Austria. Therefore the
Paris Restitution Conference did not integrate Hungarian bank gold into the common
pool.203 This was why the first large-scale postwar gold restitution was the return of the
gold reserves ofHNB.
Assets evacuated by the HNB Train westwards were returned to Hungary by the U.S.
authorities in several installments:
Letter of Chief Military Government Finance Officer Maj. L. C. Perera to 80 th Infantry Div. Finance Officer
Lt. Col. B. Jeffrey. May 14, 1945. Alford Collection p. 383. Records on valuables stored in Spital am Pyhrn.
july 15, 1946. MOL XXIX-L-2-r pile 73, file 3640-12.
th
200 Letter of Chief Military Government Finance Officer Maj. L. C. Perera to 80 Infantry Div. Finance Officer
Lt. Col. B. Jeffrey. May 14, 1945. Alford Collection p. 383.
201 Ibid.
.
202 Letter of US Representati6n Allied Control Conumssion to Allied Force Headquarters. June 10, 1945. Alford
.
Collection pp. 437-438.
203 Theoretical material on bank gold restitution. NACP RG 260, Entry;,Finance, FED", Box 166.
199
�156
-On August 6, 1946, the bulk of the HNB gold reserves were returned in altogether
1,222 bags, of which 1,184 contained~gold bullion and 38 contained gold coins. 204
I
I.
i
-A few weeks later the next shipment arrived, containing valuable deposits of
ministries and public collections (Academy of Sciences, National Szechenyi Library,
,Municipal Archives, Central Office of Weights and Measures, Postal Stamp Museum,
1
,
Ministry of Agriculture).
I
,
-On September 2, 1947 other HNB gold objects and other miscellaneous (the valuables
t
of the Custodians' '. Courts, qualified as "foreign" and "criminal") deposits were
'I
;
returned to H;ungary.20S
The so called Silver Train arrived in Budapest on April 22, 1947, carrying the silver
reserves of the Government: 6,783 silver bars and 38 cases of silverware, weighing
altogether 96 tons. 206 This huge quantity of precious metal was originally under MOF
control and was also evacuated from Budapest, but not by the
HN!3 Train. The silver
. was transported in December 1944 to Veszprem and merged into the HNB shipment.
Later on, however, the routes of the gold and the silver parted from each other and the
Silver Train was directed to Germany, arriving to Magdeburg on January 29, 1945. It
got under the control of the U.S. 9th Army on April 28. Nothing was missing. 207
I
t
Originally, the U.S. authorities wanted to return the deposits on the HNB.Train - the
,
valuables of the Custodians' Courts and one case of property said to be of Jewish
origin - together with the silver reserves. 208 From unknown reasons, however, these
\
were not loaded onto the Silver Train departing to Hungary in April 1946 and were
\'
returned only in September 1947, attached to the HNB shipment.
Hungary did not receive all Hungarian property that had fallen into Allied hands. In
April 1948, the U.S. Army turned over restitution matters and all competence related to
them to the Austrian Government. Individual groups of assets, however,' deemed
important due to unknown strategic considerations, were kept under U.S. control.
According to the documents, such assets were the stocks and a part of the coin
collection of the HNB, which had been evacuated from but never restituted to
Report on the restitution ofHNB gold. Alford Collection pp. 372-375.
List of assets restituted on September 2, 1947. MOL XXIX-L-2-r pile 73, file 36-40-12.
206 Telegram of EUCOM to ACCH. April 21, 1947. Alford Collection p. 464.
201 Memorandum on the restitution of Hungarian silver reserves. Alford Collection pp. 504-509.
208 List of assets to be surrendered to the Hungarian Government. NACP RG 260, Entry ..FED", Box 164.
204
\
20S
�157
Hungary.209 This is sure that these were, together with a minor part of the HNB
archives, still under U.S. control in November 1949.210 Following the general U.S.
policy, later all retained groups of assets were turned over .to be controlled by the
Austrian Government.
The problem of HNB deposits retained in Austria reemerged in the course of Austro
,
Hungariall talks on property rights held in 1960. The Hungarian party claimed back the
deposits, but the Austrians only went as far as giving authorization to Hungarian
experts to have access to the deposits for assessment purposes. The MOF A employees
found altogether 116 cases and 2 envelopes. 2I1 As mentioned before, the envelopes
were given to the HNB by an Arrow Cross unit. The cases contained bonds,
debentures, stocks and criminal deposits of the Prosecutor's Office (gold objects, gold
coins, foreign exchange). It is assumed that a part of this was Jewish property.
The MOF A experts also investigated the contents of the two envelopes that had got
under the control of the Linz branch of the Austrian National Bank (ANB) in October
1945. 212 The Hungarian authorities made inquiries in this respect already as early as
1953, but to no avail. 213 In 1960, the Hungarian experts assessing the HNB stocks in
Linz could finally have access to the gold. objects worth altogether 300,000
Schillings.214 The further fate of the 116 cases and the 2 envelopes is, for the time
being, unknown.
The HNB experts were well aware of the fact that at least a part of the restituted assets
must have been of Jewish origin. They warned that "of the foreign deposits, special
attention should be paid to deposits whose origin was the so called Jew-assets and that
had got under the control of the persons depositing them at the Bank by unlawful
appropriation".215
Within a few weeks of their restitution, the HNB turned over the 27 cases of valuables
of the Custodians' Courts to the Budapest Municipal Custodians' COurt. 216 It is not
known whether the Court made efforts to look for the rightful owners and the further
fate ofthe objects is also unknown.
Memo on the Austro-Hungarian restitution talks. November 11, 1949. MOL XXIX-L-2-r pile 46.
Ibid.
211 Report of MOFA Dept. IV. MOL XIX-J-l-j KOhl TOK. 1954-1964 box 46/23/g document No. 0093012
212 Ibid.
.
213 Restitution claims against the Austrian Government. January 1963. MOL XXIX-L-2-r pile 68.
214 Ibid.
2U Memo ofHNB on assets restituted. MAZSOK Collection p. 80.
216 Ibid.
.
209
210
�,,;:,1
,
!
158
i
I
Similarly, no infonnation is available on the further fate of the HNB deposits whose
origin was certainly or assumedly Jewish. Whether the HNB just kept them, or turned
them over to a Government body, one thing seems sure: the original owners received
'(
either nothing or just a trifle.
\
2. The valuables of Bezdan, Tatabanya, Nagykoriis, Felsogalla and Buchenwald,
the valuable objects of Pecsand Miskolc
Bezdan, annexed to Hungary in April 1941 together with other northern areas of
Yugoslavia, belonged to Gendarme. District V. In the course of the implementation of
the Eichmann Plan, this area was a part of deportation zone IV. The Jewish population
of the zone was deported between Jurie 25 and 28, 1944. After the Gennan invasion;
the Gendarmes of Bezdan collected a great quantity of personal belongings from the
local Jews,217 seizing valuables as "criminal evidence", most probably in the course of
the Jews being herded into the local ghetto. The loot of the Gendarmes was the usual
hodgepodge of valuables; from worthless key-holders' to jewels studded with
diamonds. Due to the quick progress of the Yugoslav partisan army and the Red Army.
the Hungarian authorities were unable to evacuate the case containing the valuables of
the Bezdan Jews, which was later, after the war, transported to the evidence chamber
of the Prosecutor's Office in Szombathely. On May 12, 1948, the ~ase was opened and
an inventory was taken up.2J8 Referring to the prevailing legal regulations (see Chapter
VI.), the Prosecutor's Office in Szombathely sent the following statement to the HNB •
branch in Szombathely: "Objects of artistic value have to be tuned over to the local'
County Museum, while gold objects have to be sold to HNB. All other objects and the
proceeds of the gold sale have to be turned over [... J to the National Jewish
Rehabilitation Fund [ ... J in exchange of a written declaration stipulating that if persons
shown on the list or their heirs claim their property, such property or its fair value must
be turned over to such persons or their heirs, taking into view the statutory
limitation.,,219 '
In the next three years, nothing happened with the valuables and on July 12, 1951, the
case was transported to HNB headquarters in Budapest. The HNB was at a loss and
Minutes on the opening of the cases of Bezdan. May 12, 1948. MAZSOK Collection pp. 6-11.
Ibid.
219 Letter ofllNB Szombathely branch to HNB HQ Budapest. January 13, 1949. MAZSOK Collection p. 5,
lIi
218
�159
turned to MOF for guidance,22o which is unknown. Finally on July 24, 1951 the head of
the HNB Legal Department, Lajos Rac ordered the sorting out of the contents of the
case221 . This could mean that MOF complied with the original idea and had the
valuables sorted out so that a part of these could be turned over to the National Jewish
Rehabilitation Fund (NJRF). But more plausibly, the Government handled the assets
the same way as those of the Gold Train returned in 1948 from France, that is, not a
penny was given back to the rightful owners or their heirs, or given to the Jewish
organizations.
The personal belongings of 150 Jews from Tatabanya222 , Felsogalla and 99 Jews of .
Nagykoros223 were' transported from and returned to Hungary under unclear
circumstances. Some assume that the group of valuables weighing 30 kilograms 224 was
taken to the west by Peter Hain, the head of the ,,Hungarian Gestapo".22S Afterwards
the objects were taken to the Hungarian Consulate in Vienna226 and finally returned to
Hungary. The personal objects of 81 Hungarian Jews killed in Buchenwald were
returned to Hungary through the Hungarian Embassy in pariS.227
In late 1948, a commission opened the deposits and took up an inventory. The
commission was made up of the representatives of MOF, the Main Customs Office,
HNB and NJRF. 228 The deposits consisted of envelopes bearing names. The envelopes
held gold and silver. objects and jewels set with stones.229 In this case the Hungarian
authorities - deviating from their usage applied to the valuables on the Gold Train
seemed willing to settle the issue in compliance with the prevailing laws and taking
into consideration the interests of the rightful owners or their heirs., Up to September
1949, the relevant Hungarian authorities found the whereabouts of 29 affected people,
either the survivors of the Jews of Tatabanya, Nagykoros and Felsogalla, or the heirs of
those murdered. 23o The legal act of restitution occurred, but the objects were not
LetterofHNB Legal department to MOF Department V. b. July 14, 1951. MAZSOK Collection p. 3.
Instruction of head ofHNB Legal department. July 24, 1951. MAZSOK Collection p. 4.
m MOF memo. October 25, 1946. MOL XXIX-L-2-r pile 73, file 36-40-11.
m PM KVMJO memo. September 17,1949. MOL XXIX-L-2-r file 73, pile 36-40-11. Of the objects in detail
see: MOL XIX-J-l-k KUM Vegyes Adminisztracio box 130 and MOL XXIX-L-2-o box 35.
224 List of assets evacuated and restituted until. January 28, 1948. MOL XXIX-I-2-r pile 73.
m MOF summary tilted "To the History of the Gold Train". MOL XXIX-L-2~r pile 73, file 36-40-11.
226 Annex 21. MOLXXIX-L-2-r pile 73, file 36-40-11.
227 Case opening minutes .November 29, 1948: MAZSOK Collection pp. 65-76.
228 Case opening minutes. November 29 and December 3, 1948. MAZSOK Collection pp. 65-76.
229 Ibid.
230 PM KVMJO Memo. September 17, 1949. MOL XXIX-L-2-r pile 1.3, file 36-40-11.
220
221
�160
returned to the survivors or the heirs- at least up to September 1949.231 A few
beneficiaries later received some cash.232 In their case, HNB most probably asserted its
preemption right to buy precious metals and payout the value in cash to the owner.
(The: earlier rigid regulations had not been changed very much after the war, so
individuals could only hold precious metals controlled by very stringent rules.)
Heirless valuables probably remained under HNB control. The share ·of HJRF in these
valuables, if any, is unknown.
In many cases, Financial Directorates storing seized Jewish assets in compliance with
Decree No. 160011944 of the Prime Minister turned over these deposits to the local
branch of the Postatakarekpenztar (pTP - Post Savings Bank). The deposits were
controlled by the Government Commissioner to Handle the Material and Financial
Affairs of the Jews. In November 1944, Jewish property held by the PTP were
transported to western Hungary by the employees of the Government Commissioner's
Office. 233 (See Chapter IV-V in detail.)
The Miskolc and Pecs pawnshops ofPTP held both Jewish and non Jewish property.
These deposits were not turned over to the Government Commissioner's Office. Upon
MOF orders, .all property (of Jewish and non Jewish origin) was transported to Sopron
in the autumn of 1944. On March 27, 1945 the operative staff took the deposits to Zell
an der Pram (Upper Austria, 50 kilometers'west of Linz).234 The deposits consisted of
1,403 items ofjewels and'the like,m 167 items of furs and fur pieces236 and 45 items
of other objects.237 The so called "borrowing value" of the deposits was 146,117
pengos.
On November 13. 1945 the U.S. authorities. ordered the Hungarian staff guarding the
deposits to leave. the area - without the deposits. The PTP staff turned over the deposits
to a Hungarian authority (the Hungarian Material Commission competent for the
region).238 The deposits were handed over without a detailed inventory being taken up
- according to the minutes, the U.S. troops supervising the action did not leave time to
Ibid.
m AB (Constitutional Court)Resolution 16/1993 (III. 12). Magyar Kozlony 1993/29.
233 PTP memo. August 2, 1946. MOL XXIX-L-2-r pile 33.
234 Ibid.
23S 867 gold jewels set with diamonds; 432 silver objects (jewels, casket); 104 objects made of non-precious
metals (watches, etc.) Records on valuables transported to Zell an der Pram. September 27, 1945. MOL XXIX
L-2-r pile 33.
236 101 fur coats, boa. Ibid ..'
m 5 typewriters, 33 cameras, 1 calculator,4 telescopes, 2 unknown objects. Ibid.
238 PTP memo. August 2, 1946. MOL XXIX-L-2-r pile 33.
231
I'
'
,"
�161
do SO.239 Five rugs were taken by PTP chief officer Kornel Telekes240 and brought back
. to Hungary.241 When the Hungarian Material Commission staff returned to Hungary.
they could not take the deposits with them - with the exception of 27 items of furs and
fabrics 242 -, therefore these objects got under the control of the U.S. authorities.243
On June 30, 1947 the Hungarian restitution authorities submitted their claim to the
deposit~ of the Pecs and Miskolc pawnshops.244 Up to January 1948, the Restitution
Mission in Vienna had submitted another four claims, trying to achieve the restitution.
of the deposits. 245
This time, the
repeat~
claims proved successful. Within a few months' time, on
March 12, 1948 the deposits were returned to Hungary.246 The takeover committee
taking up the inventory found 1,581 objects.247 As the first inventory had shown 1,615
objects, the difference between the two inventories was 34 items. Five rugs were
picked up by Kornel Telekes during the 1945 handover, while 27 rugs and fabrics were
taken back by the.Hungarian Material Committee staff upon their return to Hungary.
,
The missing items (3 rugs) disappeared during the restitution process: they were listed
in the U.S. inventory, but never arrived to Hungary.248 Responsibility lay with either
the U.S. or the Hungarian staff. (The Hungarian authorities investigated the matter but
nothing was found. 249) So instead ofthe 1,615 items taken up in the fIrst inventory,
there were 1,616 objects. The difference was either due to an extra object added to the
shipment in Austria, or an administrative error of one of the authorities committed
during the taking up of the inventories. One thing is sure: in this casc;;, the U.S Army
cannot be blamed for the negligent handling of property under· its control, unless
involved in the disappearance ofthe 3 rugs.
The takeover committee assessed the restituted property as worth 298,346 forints and
turned them over to the PTP. 2SO The committee justifIed its decision by the fact that the
Handover-takeover minutes. November 14, 1945. MOL XXIX-L-2-r pile 33.
Ibid.
241 Voucher for Komel Telekes. December 7,1945. MOL XXIX-L-2-r pile 33.
242 Records on valuables restituted. February 16, 1946. MOL XXIX-L-2-r pile 33.
243 PTP memo. August 2, 1946. MOL XXIX-L-2-r pile 33.
244 Letter of J6zsefHamvas to PM KVMIO. August 7,1947. MOL XXIX-L-2-r pile 33.
245 September 16, October 27, November 5, .1947 and January 22, 1948. Letter of Las;d6 Varvasovszky to PM
KVMIO. January 22, 1948. MOL XXIX-L-2-r pile 33.
246 Minutes on the meeting of the takeover committee. May 21, 1948. MOL XXIX-L-2-r pile 33.
w~
.
239
240
i
j
[
248 Letter of the head of the transport home, Elemer Banky to Laszlo Varvasovszky. May 3,1948. MOL XXIX
L-2-r pile 33.
249 Ibid.
250 Minutes on the meetirig of the takeover committee. May 21, 1948. MOL XXIX-L-2-r 33. pile.
�162
only entity to claim the property was the PTP.2S1 This justification, however, was
wrong. In
1946~1947,
at least two claims were made - both supported by pawnshop
certificates - for deposits previously evacuated to the west. and later returned to
Hungary.2s2
Valuables deposited in the Miskolc and Pecs pawnshops of PTP evacuated to the west
and later returned to Hungary had never been given back to the rightful owners or their
heirs. Apparently, owners were treated alike, irrespective of their religion or race:
neither received a penny.
The restituted assets (HNB, Silver Train) were unquestionably the property of the
Hungarian Government without any doubt, their restitution was not a matter of dispute.
fu~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
restituted - and the flexible attitude shown in the course of the process - must be
attributed to the positive side of the U.S. restitution policy. These acts both justified the
hopes of the wartime Hungarian Government and the rightful expectations of posterity.
On the other hand, this restitution was not complete,
as not the entire ~ treasure
had been restituted to Hungary: the U.S. authorities turned over more than 100 cases of
HNB stocks to the Austrian Government. It ,might be useful to raise a hypothetical
question. How could U.S. policy have served. its own goals - i.e. containment of
communist expansion - better: by restituting unquestionable property to the new
Hungarian Government formed with the participation of communists under Soviet
influence, or by not restituting unquestionable property to Jews, who had been stricken
most by war? What proved, what could have proved more. beneficial to the
anticommunist commitment of the western alliance: satisfying the claims of
communist-dominated governments, or the protection of private property and its
owners?
Ibid.
.
m August 8, 1946: M. K., 5 items (gold objects), Pecs; September 10, 1947: M.T., 20 items (gold and silver
objects, Persian rugs), Misk'olc. MOL XXIX-L-Z-r pile 3 3 , '
2S1
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets in the United States, formed in 1998, was charged with investigating what happened to the assets of victims of the Holocaust that ended up in the possession of the United States Federal government. The final report of the Commission, <a href="http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/pcha/PlunderRestitution.html/html/Home_Contents.html"> “Plunder and Restitution: Findings and Recommendations of the Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets in the United States and Staff Report"</a> was submitted to President Clinton in December 2000.</p>
<p>Chairman - Edgar Bronfman<br /> Executive Director - Kenneth Klothen</p>
<p>The collection consists of 19 series. The first fifteen series of the collection are composed mostly of photocopied federal records. These records were reproduced at the National Archives and Records Administration by commission members for their research. The records relate to Holocaust assets created between the mid 1930’s and early 1950’s by a variety of U. S. Government agencies and foreign sources.</p>
<p>Subseries:<br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Art+and+Cultural+Property+">Art and Cultural Property</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Gold+">Gold</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Gold+Team+Review+Form+Binders+">Gold Team Review Form Binders</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Art+and+Cultural+Property+and+%E2%80%9COthers%E2%80%9D+Review+Form+Binders">Art and Cultural Property and “Others” Review Form Binders</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Non-Gold+Financial+Assets+Review+Form+Binders">Non-Gold Financial Assets Review Form Binders</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+Associates+Binder+">History Associates Binder</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Non-Gold+Financial+Assets+Review+Form+Binders+%282%29">Non-Gold Financial Assets Review Form Binders (2)</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Financial+Assets+Documents">Financial Assets Documents</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=RG+84%2C+Foreign+Service+Posts+of+the+State+Department%E2%80%94Turkey">RG 84, Foreign Service Posts of the State Department—Turkey</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Financial+Assets+Documents">Financial Assets Documents</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=%5BJewish+Restitution+Successor+Organization+%28JRSO%29%2C+Oral+Histories%5D&range=&collection=20&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">[Jewish Restitution Successor Organization (JRSO), Oral Histories]</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=PCHA+Secondary+Sources">PCHA Secondary Sources</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Researcher+Notes">Researcher Notes</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Unnumbered+Documents+from+Archives+II+and+Various+Notes">Unnumbered Documents from Archives II and Various Notes</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=RG+260%2C+Finance+Inventory+Forms">RG 260, Finance Inventory Forms</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Reparations">Reparations</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Chase+National+Bank">Chase National Bank</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Administrative+Files">Administrative Files</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Art+%26+Cultural+Property+Theft">Art & Cultural Property Theft</a></p>
<p>Topics covered by these records include the recovery of confiscated art and cultural property; the reparation of gold and other financial assets; and the investigation of events surrounding capture of the Hungarian Gold Train at the close of World War II. These files contain memoranda, correspondence, inventories, reports, and secondary source material related to the final disposition of art and cultural property, gold, and other financial assets confiscated during the Holocaust.</p>
<p>For more information concerning this collection consult the<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/35992"> finding aid</a>.</p>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/35992" target="_blank">Collection Finding Aid</a>
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/1040718" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Extent
The size or duration of the resource.
2954 folders
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
[Looted Assets of Hungarian Jewry] [2]
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets in the United States
Art & Cultural Property Theft
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Box 218
<a href="http://clintonlibrary.gov/assets/Documents/Finding-Aids/Systematic/Holocaust-Assets.pdf" target="_blank">Collection Finding Aid</a>
<a href="http://catalog.archives.gov/description/6997222" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reproduction-Reference
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
6/24/2013
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
6997222-looted-assets-of-hungarian-jewry-2
6997222