-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/966505e61ed2f9b8ee93015c86b7c0c0.pdf
716514957b727c73ea0749156ac0564b
PDF Text
Text
-'
I
UtGLASSIHED
.
RC:,
\
.AuthorltylW/S.-'&o~'-""""'T
I
Byf&...
• I
\
'\
\
1DENl'IAL
5<
l Cf t{ ~ - Iq
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
4a
6t) 'I-
Document corresponds with footnote number 66
of draft amended complaint of March 12, 1997
GERMAN GOWADVEMENrS (ESTIMATE)
,
' I
'
From April, 1~38 to ~y, 1945 (In Millions of U. S. Dollars).
' \
0
'\
,
1
I
\
Germany started the lJ8.r w1~h
estimated gold reserves Of\about
(Published gold reserves
were only 29.)
\
Sold to Swiss National Bank
1
I
•
•
4h
•
•
Danzig
It
Lt
•
Poland • • • : • • • • \
It
Holland • • •
•
B elgit.1Dl
..
Yugoslavia.
•
Luxembourg. • • • • '\
\
..
0
It
u
..
,..
It
.
I
II
Rumnia • •
12
\
• • • 1
164, Sweden
\
• •••••• 223
..
Italy (earm.)
"
o
0
•
• • • •
•
• • •
•
•
o
0
o
o
•
•
•
•
0
o
•
•
0
Z16
20
• • • • • • •
o
64
138
32.5
• • • • • • 293
0
Sold to or used in Balkan
countries and Middle East-
mainly Turkey • • • • • • • • • • • • •
5
I
.0
• •
0..
Found in Germany (inoluding
e6.rmnrked fCYr Italy and
)2 earmarked for Hungary) •
25
• • • •
n
It
• • • •
0
eventually re-exported to
Portugal and Spain (lare:er
part by far to Portugal)
4
• • \ • • • •\
.
•
o
Washed through Swiss National
Bank depot aooount and
J 33
• • Czeohoslovakia. •
•
• •
Possibly sold to Swiss Com
merioal banks before 1942 • • • • • • ••
Taken over from Austria. • • • • (n)
0
0
120
Hungary (earm.l)
.. Franoe*
••
I
~
\ 53
• •
OJ
~
. \64
• •
{~
• • l.JZ...
,,781
- (SWISS
~S
o
SWISS GOID I '
OFFICIAL STATEMENr)
From January 1, 1939 to!June 30, 1945 (In Millions of Uo So Dollars)
o
0
\
10
0
..
\
II
0..\..
Portugal
,
\
Sold to Germany • • • • • • • • • • • •
i
12 07
" Portugal
I
• • • •
•
0
•
at
Sweden
0
I
"
It
I
It
Spain • • • • • • • •
\
\
It
II
Turkey
•••••
,
'
,
I
I '
2~.9
Purohased from Germany • • • • ••
o
0
0
1,7.0
• • • •
•
o
•
• •
•••• • • • • • • • •
305
Conclusions: (1) All gold that Ge~ sold after a oertain date, probably from early 1943
on, was looted gold, sinoe her \om reserves r inoluding hidden reserves with whioh she start
ed the war, were exhausted by ~hat tim~J ,(2) out of $276,000,OOO-worth of gold that Switzer
land purohased from Germny, the larget part was looted goldJ in additi()D, Switzerland hAs
taken $138,000,000 looted gold lin depo~it, which later on was reexported to Spain and
Port,~ fCYr German aoooUIrtj, (3.) part ~f the gold that tbe S1d.ss Bold during the war to
r o.u, Spain, and Turkey, oo;w.d hav~ been looted GerJllan gold, (4) the gold that Switzer"
,1/l.anU bought, trom Sweden during ~he war Icould theoretically be German looted goldj (5)
monetary eXperts all over the 1J~rld (S"'rltzerland has monetary experts at her disposal) knew,
,CYr ought to bave known, roughly! the fig';ures and movements as contained in the above esti.mate
'--certainly tho;r knew the gold ~oldingei and gold reserves of the German ReichBbank. Switzer4
land therefore 1188 laoking good\faith. \ In addition, she was warned that all Ge~ts emIl
pre-..ar gold stooks had been, used up byl mid-1943 at the latest and therefore all the gold
then tlBed up by mid-1943 at the !latelSt aFd therefore all the gold then in the pcBsession or
Germany must be presumed to be looted g~ldo
0
0
ES,OFFletcherljd
2/5/46 \ .
\
iff'aken from private boldings--nd Centrall Bank gold was taken o
1
I
S800436
223882
�:"Z G- ';" '::'G
<;:::,(,"; '.
I'
,!.....
l)cCLASSlfiED
.
't/~?:,·,:..--:;·d-:~( !;·':::.!",.r0."REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVE5'I~4!
Prt"t:.>...J ,'!.'j {,.)It"." :l'~.: d
I . II'~ " .
.. .
.
I
I •
r
:
,.'
Aut~oniy...l-:-ol~;.......j"."...:.....t+"""""'"
057'
j
~Oy·t:Lf,
,.
-
VtY5"-X-l-R'C-2
-
~,.
..A:L. NARA Date
4J.L.,.I.Jt..JL!I;
I
'
,~-
By
Document corresponds with footnote number 62
of draft amended complaint of March 12, 1997
..t
......... ...::.,.:e
'! lOP SEeRf.1
. .' t)SS
•
• F~ 69 (RevIsed)
- ...
"
OFFICE <OF S;TRATEG1C 'SERVICES'
,
.....
I
~ OFFICIAL DISPATCH
I
I
DATE
I
FROM
BERN
· .. TO.
OFFlCE OF
UTION
(FOR. ACTION).
. ". ~."'
"
a'~ ... .o• .:...... T "I"'~".
•
I::
. '.
.
. '. "::'..: ::;".. .
! .
.'
. '
" ....... ' REC
!VED 'N CODE' ORCIPHE'R
... pili~Sg .
• RllIDtEAS" 'lOP .sP.CRE!·!O!....... ..-1o•.fiII.......
::'
OftI'IU :
l~
:. '.' ~;l~.:''''.' .~.
~~P0JDDCJ
'.wi AND
PER .
5'3A, .AR3~~!.;:,:::<· .•..
··;~\.,ej.~9~c~1.T >ri1 DBIl_I .' .'. ' '.f> ,>,<:'.:l.;U>!
.
~ 1. HAVE. COft1'ActED BIGHJ tBV&L SWISS· Wlro UlCOVERED mAIL'
'.< .·TRUCK LOADS· GERMAN GOLDBARS:SENT FROM 511ISSE. to fSPAIll.AND·'n1"t'r)ftW'!I"
·~·~.:"'.:.UTWEElLMAY '''·S.AND n$mARl'·44.TOTAL.V.lLUE ES1IKATED
·":'7·.;:'1tOOO'.a.?O~.?O.O'a~d ;.2,OO~,OOO,090 ,SWISS ~~. : '(':'~3':::',
.
.:" '.. ' ,·;··,,·v,,·,.;···:~
.
2.' SOURCE' WILLDrG: Om I roLL DETAILS. It:Alf.ES. TRANSPORt
".
·".,....ctftA·
:WHo:::r!!~~~"':'~'~""""''''
: ' .... STOMEr OP'FICIALS
. GERllAti OFFIC1ALS ANI> OFFICERS OCCUPIED
' 0 : . , .... FBONTIER. OFFICilU. SPAIN PORTQGAL, SWIS6:-'NATIOJUl,S
:'" ...',. :.. MENTS".:tNc ,SPAIH ,CON&IGlfEE. BAN~ .IN
JaADRnt::~ . L~~~9J1~:\~ '.
t·· '.,' . " .i:.::':-;': ~ ':'.':"" ;::' ,,", '.: ({:,';,.:;:::1.(.::;, .
../'.. ::, ..' 3'~ .. GOl..D·. WAS . Sm~PED'.l'OR· AC~OUtr.r ,'OF.··REICBSB4lUt.:: ....~~:~~
;.' ..VAULlfS· OF SWISS BATIONA;LB4NX'::eEBlf'A!ID ·CBECKED·B!·:,~.
.A~.".-.4A'._
.' :. DRIVERS. STATE ANOTHER'- LIKE. AKOON'.r· GOLD. B1WU:NG .GEl:UIAR: MARKS "
'~~lNS VAULTS.' SWISS NAl'IONALEJlBLEY APPEAf.ED O1( EVERY··TRUCK•..
i.'.' ::.: '.:'
":.;/' .::':'. : ':':.';
';'.~'
;•.".•... :;.:'
:.'. '.::...:<.,:".;.<::.:~
:: ':
. . ,-'., ',4~' DRIVERS
,>.;.j':';.. ...;.,;.::,~.;.,:::.'.~''';': 1. ~.>";!_T .:;; . '.
.WILLIllG MAnr:8TA~S ,:EVBNTESTIn.: .~''',,::~~=~.J
..... PEeT:.LOSE JO'BOR WOBBE' I ARE ASKINO'lO 000 SWISS PBABCS
NEW.JOB~:SWISS AT FRoi+rER AW DlBPAiN. WSTALSO BE PAID GEiii'~~~I~jjiI1
.'
:. 60UBCE,:AHDORIGlNAL COf4orO~. nTIlIATED.. Tl1EY ~OO'i~NTED REWARD
. TrIESE :tARGE OBLIGATIOIlS
I' WILL NOT ACCEP'l',COKPLEtE STORY·
"AUTHOltlzt ME BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS. IF INTERESTED. SUGGEST'.YOU'
.
. "ALLAMOutrrFOR:THIS OPERATIO}l.',!O BE CALLED ~EAnBR:,~PER.~TI~~; ...IlU.t1IA,,
·
.' ..,.,:.' .... >. .....
.,
.: I
.',,'. '.
.': .. >-.'
" ',':'.:-' ; ...... :.:..•../~;. ~;'.. ';..:;: ",.
,..' .:. :·,.WORKING CLoSELY.WITij US' TaEASOltY: REPl:\ESENTATIVE BERB~.·
DEEPLY INTERESTED DUE
GREAT PB!SSURENOWBEU!G PUT·ON '.SWISS :RE:··....
.
ASSET.S~ OPERATION. T~FORE VERYIUPORTAN'l'.AJID TD'iELY ~.BE· m1r'Rm:t'l'A~
Y7D1I:• •
, YOO'CONTACT
ORVIS' SCHMIDT ·AND·';;rOE ··FRIEDJUN .OF . TREASURY' .DE1p.A119m'~~~
. W~HI:~;pTO~ .• BOTH
DIS~l1~ET AND \KNOW BACKGRO~ STORY~ '. .
.....
,". .
.
. . I
..,;....
.
'
., .
IT IS FORBIDDENT<Ift'i~A-RRODUCE THIS CABLE
'. '. _.
WITHOUT AUTHcjlttPI~nf-iJiEi SECRETARIAT
. . ·..:;·:·3~:~:.><.;__ .:,~.;.~.:._.; ... ~... _'"
.I
:. '.
.
..
S820991
223883.
�. ......... .'. - •. --"'-'Vi
..
088
Fonn 6911.
.VfI AR DEPART~ENT
OFFICIAL DISPATCH
/
WAR DEPARTMENT - STRATEGIC SERVICES UNIT
I
I
.
..
'.
;
I
FROM
..
I
I
,~.
;?~?~}i:~'l;S;_,.~: .....•. .
.i.
I·
":\~::~': ~POitTIOi',IIlSSING sV< IRSQUESTED
....... ; .
::.),
,.'
,
. .
I.
" ",i
I
'.J'
,I
·1
k·:i';:'/,;':.'·.·· ......•... " .1' .' . . )..
~
.'
,~~,'
:. '
.
'.~
.
..
,,"
. .'.. .
:
:,: '..:
:'..
....', f'P' . .
, . ,. .' ~
I
'
"0.'
\,
_
.'
'-'."
:~-
.
;
..
'#,'
.!
.
',"
~
,
.
..
. ····1
*,
t,
1
.'
.~. ~:.
:
.:
.
; .t.:";:
."
< • •,
•
.'.
I.
"
.
'... ..,
'
,
,
.
:
',~
... ;, . .
,'.
,
..
I . .
.:~
, . t':
\
I.
'''~''
..
: .
'
,V':,'"
TOP SECRET
IT IS
I
FIORB!DDE~
.
TO COpy OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE
WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT
i
I
.
II
I
.•f
S820992
,
I
223884
.',
�~ &-
-
...,'
" ...... ":',r
:-.:-i.o
'
t::7': ; "'f
,',
I·
,;
I <.~ :.;r
I
'.
'
:15:7 ':Wo.?;..:,~r.yJ.\ ftf'~' :~.l'>/r; . ' REPRODUC~D AT THE
P (t" I:N ; \ 'i t,J, '. " 1'... }
I
.j
jO;'<·~t.t
VA5r+~X-2.-F-.'(-2.'
NATI~NAL
ARCHIVE?'"I'" ...
I .;
i
.
I
. .. . --
-~
- ..._. "- .
:!
.1
I
f
I
.--.--- •.. --.......
--
.
.' ., .,' OSS
•.. .
.' Form 69 \Revised)
.
.....;~
,TOP SECRET
-,
I
WAR DEPA'RTM~NT
OFrICIAL. DISPATCH
STRATEGIC SERVI~ES UNIT'··
: >~
DATE
FROM
TO
BERN
WAR
.STRATEGIC SERVICES lINIT
.
'"
,
.
. .IN.. 31124.
. I
'..
IBUTION
(FOR I
,6
.~
I
.. J.,.
DIREC'l'(R
(3), OPBRATIoBs
(~)
TOP SECRET.
PARAPHRASE NOT REQlJIRED. HANDLE AS TOP SECRET
. CORRESPONDENCE PER! P~AS 44G AND 5'3.1, AR 380-5'0
..
'.
I
I
IB~N 0339., SA.INT. FRpU DB/ll.
. ; I'
. : ..
: ' '.' .' ; . . ..
/:;;i'';'.'~
·1. HAVE CONTACTED HIGH LEVEL SWISS WHO ' UNCOVERED TRAIL 280';'.::
,
:rRUClC LOADS GEm/AN GOLD BARS I SENT FROl{ SUISSE TO SPAIN AND PORTUGAL·
• .
, BE'l'\lEEN .MAY 0'43 AND FEBRUARYj'44. TOTAL VAWE ESTIMATED BE1'?EEH .' ; ....
. 1,000,000,000 and 2,opo,OOO'looo. S'IIBS),1lANCa. : ~
.•
. . . . : '.<.~,,~::.
2. SOURCE WILLbm GIVE FULL DE'l'AILSI 1'iAUs TRANSPORT CO:KPA.-~~·•. >~·::·-.:.~',I.i-..
BTOMS OFFICIALS GEImAN OFFI,CIALS AND OFFICERS OCCUPIED FRANCE,"':" .'.; ..... ~I:' .
FRONTIER OFFICIALS SP~IN POR,TUGAL, snss NATIONALS WHO HANDLED SBlP- '.. ";:a,~~.
JSftTS IN· BPAIN, CONSlPNEE BA,NKS IN KADRID AND LISBON.
." ' .. ; :.'..::::~.
.
.'
3. GOLD
I
,.
.
:'"
.',
.. '"
.,,'.
WAS BHiIPPED_J:0R ACCOUNT OF REICBSBANK. 'WAS TAKEl'l nOli.
?:;,
VAULTS OF SWISS NATIONAL BANK BERN .AND CHECKED BY BAlIK OFFICIALS •. ~", .. :..,.......
DlllVEBS STATE ANOTHER' LIKE AMOUNT GOLD BEARIBG GERJWi JtARXS STILL' , . ".:: ..'
:~~S VADLTS •. SWISS/ NATIOiAL E:mLEM APPEAf.ED ON EVERY TRUCK. '. ..:.... .':: .
:>1[ •. , .
. ,.4. DRIVERS WILLING J&jKE STA!l.'ElEJTB, EVEN TESTIFY. HOWEVER IX.'·)··"'" o;"'~,'I!
PEe!. LOBE JOB OR WORSE ARE lAS KING 10 000 SWISS FRANCS EACH AND.'
.'
m; JOB. SWISS AT FRONTIER AND II SPAiN )lUST ALSO :BE PAID GDEROOSLY.'·......"'~''''
Sotr.RCE AJID ORIGINAL CPT-O:JT !IJ;TIJlATED, THEY TOO WANTED ~EWARD. VIII., !:;'-:<
'!lmS! LARGE OBLIGATIONS I W1LL NOT ACCEPT COI!PLETE STORy·tJl9TIL· tOO'::··~,)::"·",,~."....;,
AtmIORIZE ME BEGIN NEGOTIATllONS. IF Ilr.rEBESTED SUGGEST YOU AU.Ol:ORB":'
ALL AJIOURT FOR THIS OPERATION TO BE cALLED lfEREAFTER OPERATIOB LAtfRA ~
,
!,
",'
~;
":.;;"~
~'·;·;..·,~>;::.! ...'--'!i'I:..·.:z
B:,·:'·::
;. WORKING CLOsELY wiTH US .rimASUIIY REPRESEliTATIVE BBRB••
DEEPLY INTERESTED DUE GREAT .~PRESSURE t;QW BEING PUT ON SWISS DB GEBJIAtr
ASSETS. OPERATION. TH$EFORE IVERY IflPORTANT AND TIDLY•.BE SUGGESts
.'
YOU.CONTACT ORVIS SCHMIDT AND .IOE FRIEDkAN OF TREASURY DEPA.:R1'J£nr, .' '
WASHINGTON... BOTH DIS9REET A~D KNOW BACKGROU~ STORY..
. . ..
FO~BIDDEN
I'?P~E
IT IS
TOff\'fi C{\
THIS CABLE
WITHOqT AUTHO~k1JjN ~u.w1T.litJ SECRETARIAT
I
I
CL
\.\).
.
1·1
I
I
SB 20993
�,
,
'S~ ~
I'
.:\REPRODUCjED AT THE NATI~NAL ARCHIVE_ I
R6-
2-1-Cc 6:tr j \ '1 '?
£157'/ vV()\ ?k:.'1~.,y. Dfra.. ~~+'Ir£,
p((,.. ;~,l'i
w,t""~~(d:
VIt.5\1~ X-Z-p..&:;C-2
Q,o x' 4Lf"--'-'-",
,
,#
I •
I
,
r
'I
.
~
...~ ..'.
"I· . '
TOP SECRET
:....,
..... s-. . . . ,
....
i
..
OSS Foan
"
,'.
:.
'.
"---.,,. ,;"--_._-,--":
, PAGE_----:._
.'
. PAGE 2',
"
'BERN' WAR
FROM
I
I
WAR DEPARTMENT
,I
'
'OFFICIAL DISPATCH
'
'
STRATEGIC SERVICES
DEP~RTMENt· STRATEGIC SERVICES
.~::
.
,;
.... ::: ,.'
',:. -::"'.
'
'
',', ,
',.'. ,',
;"""
','."
;.
"",.".
.
.
,: ', ".• . C,,~.',:·(~~;~.j:,
.
I
II
,
.
'".', '
,
!
• f,
"
"""
;.'
. , '.. '
','
"
.. ,:'.;,': ;,";;:::~:'1{ .c·,,',".".'"''
i
·PORTION lIlSSINGrVlt:R REQUESTED '
"
,
.
' : , . ' ", ",
'.' . . ,
,',I..'
,I , •
" ,
.. : .... ' . ,
,',
'.'
,..
I
:
l'
I
.
..,'
"
'.,'
j
"
<to
•
.
I
" TOR: ~1 ?15l2' JAN 46
i ,
I
I'
i
t
'j
'
-
,
. "!
-/,
"
"
........:.
I .•
,
.
.
~
-'
"
.
.
"
"',
• '. ',~ <
..
'" . 1 ','..
.
""'."
;~~~33'9:"~,:.,
UNIT
. ....
.
'
UNrr',,~>,:
.
~
:.
,
.
.
'.,
.
I
\ TOP, SECRET
,
rr IS FORBIDDEN TO COpy OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE
i
,I
wrrH0UT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECREl'ARIAT
\
"
58209 94
223886
'
,
�\
IJcCLA~SlfIEO
I '
:
,
'.
AulMrily IV/V {j
". ....
.,.. 4#
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHlVESi
1<.6-
l,1.-Co
077' W,,~,~
p(t. J"~:"i
~o/ .)~
--.--
I,J
C,,-(·,
,.' .'
.'
~(
.,.)~ ..... ~.>';
\
.~
,
&j
qTJJ 1t .
....AI:. NAPA Date •0-
. it
j
'J~~,
I
'rI"5~'X-l-R~(~2
..
, 1UP SECRET .
i
1
OFFICE! OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
1
OFFICIA1.. DISPATCH
DATE'
.~
-
.~
I
FROM
. TO
.
I
,
PRIORITY
I''
i
"
\
ROUTINE
II
I
I
I
PISTRIBUTION
I
I
j
11 . .
•
CP'OR INFORMATION)
I
"
I
\
..... 0),.
i
I
..
""
1
W·Q.e)
1.....-.
.
I
I
CFOR ACTt9N)
._A_
DIIFER"ED .
!
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
i
III• • (II)
.....1
\
RECEIVE": IN CODE OR. CIPH~R
.,.
f./ \. .. ·::~1.iii~i- .....,NI..... ,.t:t..;~1
..................
.1
..... ... ....,..,..:;
~ ·i~" .~"
.
'.'
. : ·"·U" 2 ' !~{i:
. :.:;,. '·r '.'~ ;. "'j' _. \'
. ' , ..
(Jt.""M·"'~J
~. ~"4~.~ oS':
........ De . . . . JzS... tiIt.atl~ ... W1UMt·. . .rte. . .IID·· .
..
. ~~"
I '
.
.
..
~~.:~
.~
.
. ....'. .:
.
..
'1ItW·
j
.
I ·
•
...·. . . . . ea:1~ml·~~_ t . . . .~
:.(~
.' ".'
.
I
.
.
.
-;'. "
.
.
.
,,:;..'
I
, :'f" ,', .. ,1\ .. :
..
l.
'
.-;', ;' .........,..
.,..
"
!
aD '"
~.",
. ....
• ,"..' .
_I
• ..1. '.'
~.'. ~
: t -=:
'•. '1
,,:'.
4.
"
..'
..
.'
..........
.
.
,'
,
.;
.. ".
I'
..: ..1 ... ".:.':~.::·SEC8lr,.,
o
•
~
,I'·
..... ·l~:·\··.'·r··t.:':. ·.'-·':.
.
..
<II,:>::' ',:. . • ' " ..
,
.' , ,'".' "',".1 .., ;.... ;.: . '." . . :,.:'
i• • •
-
.t;~~"."'
~.
I
I .
.
.., .
' .
-1Id.er ~·~ttCbll1 lSMk' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
•••••.-.«
<-m·.....·.,.'.... ~\i"·'~·'
.' .
'........ te''''''
•. ",
i
.
:~:.
,
,.... .
".;,'<',"
.
,~"
IT IS FORBIDDEN TC:) COPY OR. REPRODUCE 'nUS CABLE .
I
WITHOUT AUTHORlZATlON ,FROM. THE SECRETAlUAT
I
I
I
\1
i
I
SB 20995
223887
�"f" .
i
..
~
i
REPRODUCED AT THE ~ATIm;'\L ARCHl\I::S'i ..
, J
UtCLA~~lfIE[)
AuL~ority i\!lk l:J qTJJ 11:
fly
.
I
I
.
..AI:. NAPA Date .
r)..
:
f
Vt'l.5tl-X-H-f (-2
I
,I
I
SECRET
11./717
I
Accession No.
.!-..r;( .. ~.?!. 1: 3
Date Rec'd SA
... f~.B. A2J~4Q.
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
I
I
I
Room
No.
To
Officer's
Ini tlals
Comments
1.
R
2.
G
W-3
G -J
W-I
..
'
,;
,
.
, I
,
4.
7.;J
5.
T-I
I
h~:.
~ ...
9.
Each comment should be
correspond with num~er in To column.
A'line should be drawn ac 0ss S
,under each comment.
1
Officer Designations shoul'd be useCl. in To cOlumn,.
"
Each Officer should in1ti~l (check:I mark insufficient) before further routin"'.
' ,
I
15
Action desired or action ~aken should be indicated in Comments column.
Routing sheet should alway,s be returned to Registry.
,
I
I
For Officer Designations see separate sheet.
(206'0)
it
I
I
SEC, RET
5820996
I
I
I
223888
..
�LJtCLA::i:';irlf:O
i
,.
t
",
REPRODUCED AT THE
.'\
05 ~
,//. t'. ~
.~'
··rJ: : ... "., . J
.....
p ( {', .),,:," .,'
r;6>
.. '
1._
•
AuL~oriiy JVt!;/~ if. 7]; !l.17
~
.
By.1:L.. NAAA Date~i
'1'
_
~1/15H·X-2-RD(·2
-?!...:..
NATIO~AL AKCHIV~~i ~ •
'"
I
I
I
4vlsed)
I
WAR DEPARTMENT
'. .
DATE
I'
t.~
.....
S~RVICES
STRATEGIC
OF,FICIAL DISPATCH
UNIT.,
I
.11 FEBRUARY 19tio
I
PRIORITY'·' .
ROUTINE'
TO
DEFERRED,
~_ ,...'. (~A5'ON"i
'.
i .
. REC:EIVEoI.lN
,
I
PARAPHIMSE . NOt
. '
1717.
COD~
REQllJ I RED. . ~ANOLE
I
··FhOM.D~~'.:'
, .
. . " ~. ' " ..
' " :""!
~
I '
IACT 'Ot~:
SA nrr.
.,. ".,'·~> . >;::·!i<:t:::!~f;
.......,..... ,"'},;l.
co~·~.>: .:':. '.':' .···>··>::~··:·~·t~/ti
AS ScCRET
44G 53A AR-~80-5.
'
.
,'.
,> ..::·'·;S
;
'. :', '..; .. .",')7"
' . . .
l
'REFERENCE,' LAURA.
' . »,:~ :'~:::::~:':':
'. ,'.
\'iASH rr~TON FORJJ-1.
.' i·
.
'1,
.
.:"
.;,~ ~t:'.':'0))~
. " '. . '.. ,';
OR CIPHER··:SEORE:T....~:
.
RESPONDENCE PER IPARAS
.#BERN
;264; ....
"DIRECTO~:o;~;~:~~;~~~'i;.. . . . . .;\;~j i
.:
I
,
'IN
'DISTRIBUTION
.
;'"
"::~~~:l~~'
: - . ,
'.
i'
1
";:w.
·;/"':/:::;;·jf.i,lf4~
,'
1;.' COLLECTOR FIRENCH' CUSTOMS .AT BElLEGARDE .HAS SUPPLIED FAOM ·..·.c·.yt~=\
.
' . . '.
.
r'
I .,...
..
OFFI-CI.AL·RECORDS LIST Of· COLD SHIPtJENTS
FAOM
i."
OD'lA'!~BE~~EE~:'~'ANU~~Y,19Lk' AND .F~BRlJAR"Y1944"
. ........ , ,,:. . . .
-t··
, . . . ' ,'.,
":.~
'~-'" ',~.
SI-{ I PU~NTS ;.' ~ECORO~ A~ BELt-E;GARD.E ~'. TOTAL WE I GHT
VAL~E .. 6.;/4 BIL~roN F~ErJCH FRA~~CS.
t.1ATE
..'
2.
."
1
\.
";".
.
., .: : .':. {': ... <:t-~
.' . . .."
DB LA~TO BClANO~ANO"::j~~
IN
J
Tf'HS·P~·Rfoh?~;·9·'~.<>,c,;;
'.'," . " '~",
'j';."-:'..;'>:
;':>-:::~:·.~1,:.7;~}·~·:~~~~
170 , Tor~s ~, ~,,~;pp~o~.r; ~.~:·.:·;:i~~:
'.
'.'
.
"':'.
",
'"
·;·~:>,~,.·>-ir2~
. , . . •:.:.
~
;:.-.
;:(i
··'....
FR(Y.~i ,IUlY1942 TO IJ~lY194; SHIPPEn Q~VE~J AS SOCIE:rE·\,DES:·::'.?~i~~~
: ' . " .. '
.I
.I
.
..
, ...." ".
:~.:'
I
. .,.':'.' :':::2.(\:
·~ANQUES.SU-.lSSES. eE~Ni•. AT .OtHER TUr.ES SHIPP.EH ALWAYS eANQUENAl'iO~AL~::>t;'~f :
. ;'"
I
I :
• .
.
,...., ' .. -:: .. : :.. '~.:! ~"i!~:
}: SUI·SS(.GERN.
'
.. j
• ..
·':".'::"·L.~·.f~::t1: '
. 3.
ABOUT ONE. TklRD
TO
Ll~B~N •.'·.C?N'" :.":t.j;Xig :
AS BANQUE .NATlo~.JALED ESPAGNEOR EsPAm.JOtE<,:,':·Y?si~i~;
I .
. . '
. '..;.:"
'. AND r NST I TUTO' ESPAGNOL DE ~/~ONEDA E%TR·ANJERA. CONS '·GNEES 'IN LISBON· ..:'.":,.:~ .
SIGNEE:, IN i.:AORtD
.
Gl~E~'J
.I
ASBANQUE PORT6GAISE bR DU
TUGAISE
·4.
TOR:
Gl~EN
W~:NtllADRio,· }\'Iri' THIROS
9R
OU
PORTUG~L:
I· ,'.
SAVE POUCHEID 1I S1 01
1915 11
~~~TU~~~"'~;-,:o
"
.
OA:·:QUE
~'JAT,or-JALE
SF r 0ch:rL
t"J
1
"
•
POR-:·'·· ..
•
.•
...
f
IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COpy OR REPRODtlCE""rIl"rJ
Ff1~T AUTHO~IZA'rION FROM THE SECRETARIAT'
'j
.
I
':
~.
.,',' . ~.,::'
.,.,.... ~ ;
,
','
"
i
·~
.~
... ,.,.-
..:
I
~
j
S8209 97
223889
�'.
':~
REPRODUCED AT THE
!
\
n.)
\1'
.
;-';XrIO~li\L ARCHl 'd::~i ~
UcCLA~SlFIEO
..
'I 77: !lL"! .
gy.J:I.... NAAA Date w-J Ci~
Aut'10rity ;1;,;, 'Ii lJ
..
~
..
"
. ......_
>
'.
'.
•
... OS!- for"
2202
FROK:~
... '.'1"t..
SEC RET
.
:l /il. 1./
IROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
.
\
.~.. a.3./J,.-i~
Accession No.
Date Rec'd SA
Officer's
Ini tials
.:; idv_
................
Comments
11
He.-
.,.S· ..11
b J',-/-1.S·
7fi./4'C'-e<J
.:J
J-.;l. -
C-/
oq{ - c:...
·-fM -?/..t</.}. -".........:,
~
"
~'" BDIt - ~pt4M.~
..(A..
~ .l,.GII>.... k)a.AJ..'~'; .
IT"", . -
·........""k..,.u·.)
~ Co ~. 4('.
j
1.
6.
"".
7•
.Each comment should be n~ red
correspond with number J.n To coluim•
. ' A . line should be drawn acrbos sheet W1de~ each cOlllJllent •
1
i
,Officer Designations shoul~ be used in To colUlllD •
..• ' Each Officer should initiall (checkilllark insufficient) before further routing.
Action desired or action t1aken :
.
.
.
I should be indicated in Comments colUlllD.
. Routing she~t should alway1s be ret';lrned to Registry.
ForOfficer.Designations see separate sheet;
.
I
•
:.
, •• ,<
(206/10)
!
.
I
SEC RET
SB 20998
223890
�r' . . . ....
I
I
'l
RG-
:.. "U
-'
.'
-""~''''''--''-- .~
......
"'-'~-
.-.~.,.
.
!
I
•
~
I
1 .
.i.~EPRODUCII,.ED AT ,~'HE NA~I~N'\L
.
~.~.
Di:GLA::5SlfIED
Auu~~rity ;\1J k' fj
q?7: Er .
ARCHl V!:::{i \
By
D
V"/" ~,>
Pn.,. J}':',
05 '7'
Q;o j
,. •.
;:~~:.
J
.,.» ..... ~
I
{
I
'rIA-5~·.x'-2-F- (:"2
.):...:..
...ttL. NARA Oate '~-
.0:.
:,
",
'"
!
t
I,
I
1
OSS
FOnD 69 (Revised)
WAR DEPARTtAENT
DATE
"
22 "[8 ~
STRATEGIC SERVICES UNIT
tOFFICIAL DISPATCH
I
I
:' : ' .
I
.. , I'
,
FROM
.•
I
.
2:5
.,
"
13
,~
:.'
'RI(~iW1'
·f. ,".'
)
IERNE.
I
!
WAR DEPA~TMENT ~ STRATEGIC SERVICES UNIT
TO
I
(FOR
i
alAUDD . a Lunm
I
I&-~
sauUt
I
I
\
" . . . foO¥D •• '." 'IUt"•• CWPlC&
DEFERRED
IN 33223
I DISTRIBUTION
I
I
,', ,
ROUTINE'
I
I
ACTION)
.,'
r
(FOR, INFORMATION)
,tUBa, (SSUDD ~
I
I
1
RECEIVE.D IN CODE· OR CIPHER SEORET CONTROl.
PARAPKRASE NOT AEQUIIRED.
44G 5.lA AR-3ED-~.
'HANDlE AS SEORET COMESPONDEttCE PER PA RA8
I.
ACTI~
IBERN 2217.
SAINT.I
laADfUD,
REFE""NC£ LAURA.
I
I
'ROU DB '.
I.r~lt
INfO WASHUIGTON.
,
r. SEE OUR 8x-&3S AND 854.
INnIlllOflATlO~
.
~uiaR"'
A;:~
2:
HANS
1I0fUIER TlIIICICnRIV£R FOR
TRAilS IT AI, CALLE BUENO, SA;I RtS t 81 L.8AO, CONF' I R\I8 .~ STORY •
PERSOfIALLY HANDlED ABOUT 20 8" IPY£NTS QOUJ FRO;" FA[
R TO
YADRID AND PORTUGUESE '''OO1'.ER. GiVES FOLLOIINQ CONTACTS •
•1
I
•
.
_.Jc, ..
3. AT"CA!,,,,,"Ct:J~E'NHA9i' NOT GEBHARDT, AUTOTR"ISIT AEPRE
SEH1'AT'''E'::{~R'AMO PROPftIE,
HOTEL t.lARCO
ELIX AZQiJSPAN'SR
CUSTO,.. A&ENT t LAGA~TAt RI'AL CUSTOMS AG£~T. bHYtN ·V'ILLA. ALIQ
SAl GOLD.
J.' ,t
I
.
.
". I"
I
,,L :I
-
4.
;
I
r.
.
FRtTz ..IVE,ll ~_ .'SS:, PRESENT ADDRESS' AVEN IDA DEL CAUDILLO 1.-"
~~~J:f ~~:"::''''F=~~~~~~A ~~~t~ ~~~lL=E~.:':: TRAN8-
SCRUPtLous.
.APPftOACHED.
"AS SlJUQQl.ED ARMS MONEY.
'
I
_ () .
CAN 8E BOUGHT I' OAREFULLY
.
,
1'1
~
AT PORTUQUESE 'RONTIER,PUEBLE8 SPANISH CUSTO~JS AlENT FRO\I
AE
BADAJOS AND CONSTANT'NO t P~RTUQUESE A NT AT ELVAS KNOW· ABOUT GOLD
SK IPMENTS.
I
:
-r\,~
-0. EUOSTER SAYS I GOLD WAS DEL I'ERED TO ...8ANC(LDE.-E.SPA,.!i IWJR ID .
OR SH I PPED TO BANCO i DE L IS80A~ II SOON. L • SBON ADORE SS CONTRAD
TRUSTWOi\THY I NFORMAT ION ~Ro.\C rRENCH CUSTOf,IS AT 8ElLEGARDE.
.11
5.
"-.L
Ie",
.
1.
.
1
'
I.
.
PLEASE INVESTIGATE.: WHEN INTERROGATING ATTRIBUTE YOUR INFORMAllON IF POSSIBLE, TO GERMAN SOURCES. WE l.4UST PROTECT OUR SWISS
FRIENDS.
TOR,
IT 16
I
I
,
IT IS F?RBIDDENITO COPY OR REPRODUCE1'JP~~JI'?t
FROM THB
'l
22 'fteIQWr...,AUTH?RIZATION
i
1·
I
SEetfrI'XR~~~
•
f;' ~
•. ' ..' ,
cn~
I
\
.\
'
. '
u~~,
SB 20999
~23891
!;
l~
;~
I
�\
\
\'
~
\
.1
I
1
I
,
'
Jewish Gold and otJer PreciJus Metals, Precious Stones, and Objects made of such
1
..
Materials - ritua!iOnjin the Czech Lands in the Years 1939 to 1945
,
Unlawful Infringemept of Property Rights and its Scope; Subsequent Fate of the Jewish
Assets affected by this Infringement
!
,
Report by a Team
of~xperts c~eated by the Joint Task Force based on Decision No. 773
of the Czech Government ofNovember 25, 1998.
I
I
Prague, September 1999
I
I
223892
,
t,
�I.
Introduction
Gold, silver, platinum, precfous stones, pearls, and other valuables enumerated in the Order
of the Reich Protector ~egarding Jewish Property of June ~1, 1939 represented assets liable to
unrestricted expropriatio~ from Je~ish individuals and legal entities. Such expropriation based on·
racial criteria was carrieo out on the territory of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia in the
years 1939-1945. The pe~secution ~rocess of restricting ownership right~ of Jewish individuals and
entities, as well as the s~bsequent ~xpropriation of valuables owned by Jews was executed on the
basis of complex and oft~n overlapping laws and regulations which, in addition, allowed ambiguous
interpretation. The varidus institutions involved in the expropriation process - its administration,
supervision, and practicdl executioA - often employed the same individuals. These institutions were
complex and subject t? constant: change (both on the level of the Gennan Reich and the
Protectorate). Each of th~m was equipped with special powers. However, the extent and content of
such powers varied in individual time periods of the existence of the Protectorate Bohemia and
I
I
Moravia, and the respective institutions sometimes engaged incompetence disputes.
I
I
,
I
'
,
i
i
.
It is important to state that confiscations, forced sales and subsequent transfers of gold,
silver, platinum, and otHer valuablbs were carried out separately from the confiscations of the gold
belonging to the pre-wJr Czechoslovak state and/or to the Czechoslovak National Bank (i.e. the
I .
I
'
central bank of issue of ~he Czechorlovak Republic).
,
'1
'.
.
Given the total1volume o~ the so called Aryanized property, the value of precious metals,
precious stones, and valuables mai:le of such materials certainly represented only a small fraction.
Nevertheless, they werJ important for the Gennan war economy: they served as an irreplaceable
means of payment in foreign trade with the neutral states and permitted Gennany to purchase
various strategically im~rtant raw: materials. The above named materials were also used in industry,
medical applications, etc., and serv:ed as bank reserves.
i
I
I
j
The process of curtailing Jewish property rights and other' proprietary rights and the
subsequent illegal confiscations Of the aforementioned assets qccurred in several stages. These
l
stages can be delimited las follows:
I
I
'
l
:
I
I
I
Stage 1: March 15, 11939 - January 29, 1940. Verification of the. extent of Jewish property;
restrictions of disposal hghts; first confiscations carried out by the Gestapo.
I
i
'
l
I
Stage 2: January 29, 1940 - Octbber 12, 1941. Forced deposits in exchange banks of the above
mentioned assets; sub~equent fofced sales of the deposits under conspicuously disadvantageous
conditions. concurrently, further ~onfiscations were carried out by the Gestapo.
.
I
'
.I i '
Stage 3: October 12, 1[941 - war's end. Forfeiture of Jewish property in favor of the Gennan Reich
(carried out in conne~tion with ,the mass deportations of the Jewish population to concentration
camps). During the ini;tial period lof this stage culmin~ted the process of expropriation of the above
mentioned category ofJewish assets.
'
I
!
223893
2
�1
I
'
The distinctive features of the individual stages and the state of the surviving and/or
accessible sources available to the team of experts have conditioned the following structure of the
present report:
I
I
1.
Introduction
i
I
1
n.
Legal and InstitJtional Framework
I
!
l
I
m.
The Role of the,•Protectorate Bank of Issue in the Process of Dispositions of Jewish Gold,
I
Platinum, and Silver
'I
.
N.
Sales of nIegally Seized Gold, Platinum, Silver, and Precious Stones on the Internal
I
Markets (Protectorate, Gerinan Reich) and Abroad
.
1) Internal MarJets
I
(protec~orate German Reich)
i
2) Foreign Markets
f
I
I
l
I
I
Scope of the n~egal1y Sei;zed Assets Consisting of Gold, Platinum, and Precious Stones
(Reconstruction)
i
.
V.
VI.
Fate of the Jewish-owned Gold Purchased by the Protectorate Bank ofIssue; Post-War Fate
of Jewish Mov~bles unso11 by the Germans until the End of World War n
.
I
vn.
Summary
Jcons~ctiJn
A thorough
of the legal and instilutional frameworl< was a necessary
prerequisite for the acfual analysi's of the process which lead to restrictions of Jewish ownership
rights and expropriatidns of thelabove mentioned category of Jewish assets. Subsequently, the
authors of the present' study ev~luated the role played by various specialized branches of the
Protectorate administnition in hapdling the assets seized from Jews (i.e. sales of the assets to
prospective buyers and Iappropriation of the proceeds by the German Reich). The lowest link in the
sales procedure were several privileged private entrepreneurs.
I
I·
.
I
[
Another objective ofthe present study was to establish the total volume of the seized Jewish
assets consisting of gold, silvet!, platinum, precious stones, pearls' and objects made of such
materials. Intentional1~, we refer 6nly to quantities expressed, whenever possible, by weight rather
than by their money value which ~aried due to many factors.
.
.
f
I
I
!
.
J
'
!
Finally, we provide an in~ight into the previously unexplored subject of assets consisting of
gold, silver, Platinum'I' and preCi?uS stones unsold by the German institutions until the end of the
.'
3 . '
223894
�war; we also provide nJ info;""t!on regarding the fate of the monetary gold reserves held by the
National Bank for Boherhia and Mdravia where a certain portion of the iIDpoundedJewish gold was
deposited.'
. 1 '
.
.
.
I
,I
I
I
223895
4
�1
I
II.
Legal and Institutional Ftamework
I
j
n.l.
General principals implerJented in our evaluation of the illegal interventions in Jewish
property rights undertakenIin the years 1939-1945 with respect to gold and other precious
metals, preciousl stones an4 valuables made of such materials.
I
I
I :
The evaluation of any legal issues involving the problem area of World War n necessarily
reflect the following basic legal fac~s:
0
I
I
I
1. After the proclamati~n of the ~ormally independent Slovak state and the simultaneous military
occupation of the truncated Czech Lands which resulted in the creation of the Protectorate Bohemia
16, oI93?), the entire territory of the pre-Munich Czechoslovak Republic
and Moravia (March
came, in one way or an6ther, under the direct or indirect administration of the neighboring countries:
Germany (areas separat~d after M~nich), Poland (the region of TesinlCieszyn and certain areas in
,
I
Northern Slovakia), and Hungary (territory ceded after the so called Viennese Arbitration). Each of
these parts of Czechosl~vakia exp~'rienced a different legal development during World War n.
14 -
I
I
.'
Czechoslova~;state
2. According to tlte c.khOSlovaI!judiCial opinion, tlte
did not cease to exist
after the conclusion of the Munich! Agreement orthe developments of March 14-16, 1939. A factual
expression of the unint6rrupted legal existence of the Czechoslovak Republic became the so called
Provisional Governmerit System established in London. The Provisional Government System was
represented by the Czec'hoslovak Eresident Dr. Edvard Benes; and further by the Czechoslovak exile
government, and the g6vernment'~advisory body, the State Council. In the years 1940-1943, this
fact was gradually actepted by ,Iall important allied states who de jure recogrlized the exile
I
government of Czechoslovakia an~ Mr. Edvard BeneS as the Czechoslovak president.
I
'I
I
I
I
j
0
0
0
0
0
0
3. Through its exile organs (and, Jfter World War n, also through its government and its provisional
National Assembly), tHe Czechoslovak state declared the period between September 30, 1938 and
May 4, 1945 to be a tirhe of depehdance. Any laws enacted during this time (with certain precisely
specified exceptions w~ich did not effect confiscations and other ways of illegal expropriation) were
not included in the Czechoslovak0\legal system. For this reason, any laws and0 regulations enacted by
I
the government of the Second Republic (1938-1939) headed by its Prime Minister Rudolf Beran or
by the successive govdmments of the Protectorate or the Slovak Republic (1939-1945), as well as
,
I
any laws and regulatifms eriact~d by the German Reich or the German administration in the
Protectorate of Boh~mia and Moravia are, in view of the Czechoslovak law, invalid. We refer to
such laws and regulatibns only a~ to certain realities which, under the specific historical situation
existing during World }\far n, authorized the persecution of the Jewish population on the territory of
Pre-Munich Czechoslovakia: and/ provided a normative basis for the violation of property rights
perpetrated for the beJefit of th~ German Reich. The persecution of the Jewish population in the
Protectorate of Bohe~ia and ¥oravia (the' situation existing in the regions separated from
Czechoslovakia after the conclusion of the Munich agreement is described below; the Slovak State
I
,
is mentioned only with respecti to trade relations between the war-time Slovak State and the
Protectorate of Boherdia and Moravia) was based upon certain Czechoslovak laws and regulations
issued during the time of the sOl called Second Republic, i.e. before March 15, 1939, regulations
issued by the Protectorate govenpnent after March 15, 1939 as well as the laws and regulations of
the German Reich. However, th~ validity of the individual laws and regulations was derived from
the Decree ofthe Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor creating the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia of
0
o
0
:
5
223896
�,
I
.
March J6, 1939 ~d frorp Hitler's ?rder of the Statute Law i~ the Protectorate of June 7, 1939"
Therefore, there IS no doubt that the laws of the German ReIch had precedence over laws of the
Protectorate: the Reich hotector ~as authorized to issue orders and could affect the validity of
Protectorate laws, alter tHem orrescind them. In many cases, the laws and regulations of the German
Reich were applied directly on th~ territory of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. In the
same light appears the Iposition ~f the "autonomous" Protectorate organs vis-a-vis the Reich
authorities since the entire administration of the formany autonomous Protectorate Bohemia and·
Moravia was perforce derived fro~ the needs of Nazi Germany in the sense of "assuming the
protective role by the IGerman Reich". While accomplishing their: administrative tasks, all
Protectorate authorities Had to obeYlthe instructions of the German occupation administration which
.
1
'
.
'
had a binding character. I
4. The key significance in view of the purpose of the present report has the legal categorization and
the status of the population of thd Protectorate of Bohemia, and Moravia. In fact, the following
categories of citizens existed in thd Protectorate: Reich citizens; Protectorate citizens; Protectorate
citizens subject to spec1ial racial tegulations. The racial regulations ~esulting in restrictions of
property rights and illegJI expropriJtions applied to individuals as wen as legal entities. Speaking of
individuals, it becomes ~ecessary to explain who was affected by the racial legislation introduced in,
the protectorate ofBoherpiaand M6ravia. The first Protectorate regulation specifYing 'rho was to be
considered Jewish was the Order!of the Reich Protector regarding Jewish Property of June 2/,
/939. This Order was Based on the concept introduced by the Nuremberg Laws (i.e. Law of the
Reich Flag, Law of the IReich Cit~zenship, and the Law of the Protection of German Blood and
German Honor, Reichsgesetzblatt [1'Jmperial Gazette" - "RGBI", I. 1935). According to Section 6 of
the aforementioned OrdJr, every descendent of at least three fully Jewish grandparents was deemed'
to be a Jew. Fully Jewi~h was conkidered, without any othe; presumption, every grandparent who
had belonged or still belbnged to tHe Jewish religious communitY. Under the aforesaid Order, the so
called Jewish half-bredsl- descendapts of two fully Jewish grandparents '- were considered Jewish if
they had been members of the Jewish religious community as· of September 15, 1935 or became
l
members of such a comrpunity after the above specified date; those who ,were married toa Jew as of
September 15, 1935 or entered int~ matrimony with a Jew after the above specified date; further
those who were born in! Jewish w~dlock entered after September IS, 1935; and finally those who
were born out of wedlopk after Ju\ly 31, 1936 and "came from an extramarital connection with a
Jew".
I
~
I
. With respect to legal entities, Section 7 of the Order regarding Jewish property defined the
notion of a Jewish firm ~s follows: la firm was considered Jewish if its owner was a Jew in the sense
of the aforementioned Sbction 6. P~blic trading partnerships or limited partnership companies were
considered Jewish if bne or sevhal personally liable partners were Jewish. Other legal entities
•
were considered Jewish I
I
.,
,
I
,
,
a) if one or several indi'1duals autHorized by law to represent a firm or one or several members of its
,
'
board of directors or board of trusttes were Jewish;
I
,
fi~
b) if any Jewish individuals had thi controlling interest in the given
due to their capital share or
voting right. The presutnption of the controlling interest based on capital share was confirmed if
more than one quarter dfthe capit~l belonged to Jewish subjects; the presumption of the controlling
. interest according to th~ voting right was confirmed whenever the Jewish votes reached at least one
half of the total number of votes.
I·
223897
I
j
6
�. However, the Otider provid~ the possibility to declare Jewish any legal entity which was
"effectively under the debisive influence of Jews". The same rules applied to Jewish associations of
individuals or legal entiti~s.
f
I
I
I
I
I
I
Similar definitions containJd the Order ofthe Protectorate Government No. 13611940 Sb. z.
a n. [,Collection ofLawl and Regz)/ationsj of June 4, 1940 regarding the Legal Status ofJews in
the Public Life and oth~r regulatiohs issued by the Protectorate government. Instrumental for the
I
I
implementation of illegall interventions in property rights (examined by the present report) was the
..
definition given by the Reich Prote~tor.
I
I
I
.
:
5. From the very beginning, the Cz~choslovak exile governinent in London took an active part in the
preparation of a joint dehlaration adopted by the Allies on January 5, 1943 regarding expropriations
on the territory occupied or contiolled by the enemy? Its signatories including Czechoslovakia
reserved the right to pa~s a decision regarding the validity of any transactions affecting property
rights and property tra4sfers on the. occupied territories or territories· controlled by the enemy
inclusive of "seemingl~" legal n-apsactions. In addition, the Czechoslovak exile government had
already decided on Octpber 17, 1?41 to issue its Government-Declaration on Property Transfers
effected under the Constraints of Enemy Occupation. ,,3 In it; the government declared that it "has
never acknowledged ana will never acknowledge any transfers or disposal of funds and properties
.
I
concluded after September 27, 193:8 under the constraints of enemy occupation or under exceptional
political circumstances~ It was hisignificant whether the respective property was transferred to
citizens of Czechoslovakia or citiiens of foreign states or whether it had belonged to the central or
local governments or p~vate subj~cts. Such disposals of property, inchlding "seemingly voluntary"
transfers, were declared null and v.oid; the government reserved the right to stipulate "more specific
.conditions governing rbdress and/or modification of legal: claims". This principle also applied,
. beyond any doubt, to Jll forms df illegal expropriations and disposals of Jewish property on the
territory of Pre-MunicH Czechosl6vakia. Article 6 of the Constitutional Decree of the President of
the Republic No. 11119!)4 (Official Czechoslovak Gazette) regarding the Renewal ofLegal Order of
August 3, 1944 stipulat~d the prin~iple that any court decision and/or decision passed by any organs
of public administration during the time of dependence could be abrogated or altered upon the
parties' motion whene~er the laWs and regulations on which such decisions were based were in
breach of the democmtic principlds of the Czechoslovak Constitution or had a purpose prohibited by
the Czechoslovak law.jArticle 1210f the said Constitutional Decree enacted the so called 'exception
of special regulations' to ensure "reparation of damages ensued due to exceptional conditions"; the
'exception of special re~lations' ~lso applied to cases precluding reversion. This concept was based
on the Decree of the! President! of the Republic regarding the Nullity of certain· Transactions
affecting Property Rights conclud,ed at the Time ofDependence enacting National Administration of
Property. be!onging to! Germans,! Hungarians, Traitors, Collflborators and c~rtain Organizatio~s
·and InstliutlOns No. 5f965 Sb. ~f May 19, 1945 and the Decree of the PreSident of the Repubbc
regarding Confiscations of Enemy Property and Funds of National Renewal No. 10811965 Sb. of
October 25, 1945, adcording td which the funds and properties of the German Reich; of the
Hungarian Kingdom; lof public !corporations; of the German National Socialist Workers' Party
(NSDAP); of "other formations,lorganizations, enterprises, institutions, interest groups, funds, and
endowments owned ~y the aforesaid regimes or connected with them; and of other German or
Hungarian legal entities"; as wJll as individuals of German and Hungarian nationality, with the
exceptions defined in Article I o:f the latter Decree, became the property of the Czechoslovak state.
To resolve the above rhentioned ~ssue of illegal property transfers during the time of dependence, the
method of assertion df individm,d restitution claims was adopted. Its principle was applied in the
aforementioned presidential Dec}ee regarding the Nullity ofcertain Transactions affecting Property
Rights concluded in Ithe Time bf Dependence introducing National Administration of Property
i
I
I
7
223898
�belonging to Germans, Hungaridns, Traitors, Collaborators and certain Organizations and.
I
,
Institutions which, in the year 1946, was replaced by the Act of Parliament {"National Assembly"}
No. 12811946 Sb, ofMay 16, 1946 regarding the nullity ofcertain property transfers effected during
the time of dependence and other/interferences effecting property rights. The process itself, its
actual extent and, in particular, the ~ctual settlement of individual restitution claims is not described
in the present report.
!
,
n.2
'
1
Legal regulationJ and institttions of the German and Protectorate administrations connected
with the illegal ehcroachm~nt upon property rights ofJewish subjects with respect to gold,
other precious metals, preci6us stones, and objects made thereof
I
I
M~Ch
Soon after
16, Ib39, the German occupation authorities introduced certain
regulations to sequester J,ewish property and funds. Besides orders issued by the civil administration
heads and commanders pf German military groups stationed in Bohemia (March 29, 1939) and
Moravia (March 20, 1939), these r~gulations included a circular issued on March 2S, 1939 by the
Audit Department of the Proteitorate Ministry of Finance. The circular introduced several
measures designed to prbtect the Protectorate currency; on its basis, the right of access to safety
deposit boxes and deposAories mai1tained by financial instituti,ons was restricted.
I
I
'
,
The key regulation govern~ng the disposal of Jewish property in the Protectorate was the
Order of the Reich Prot~ctor of Jttne 21, 1939 regarding Jewish Property (Verordnungsblatt des
Reichsprotektors in Bohlnen und Mahren - "VOBl" -. RP, 1939, p. 4S); this Order was used to
enforce wide-scale confikcations, r~strictions of property rights, and unlawful transfers of property.
The Order was officially published in the daily newspaper Der Neue Tag on June 22, 1939 and
superseded the above mentioned nieasures previously enacted by the civil administration heads in
Bohemia and Moravia. Pursuant t~ Section S of the aforesaid Order, Jews, Jewish enterprises and
Jewish associations wete required to register, by July 31, '1939, with the National Bank for'
Bohemia and Moravia,lor with other organizations indicated by the occupation administration, any
individually or jointly owned objects made of gold, platinum, silver" precious stones or pearls.
Jewish individuals, Jewish enterprises, and Jewish associations were forbidden, as of the effective
I
I
day of the Order, to acquire, to sell or to pledge such objects Without a special permit issued by the
Exchange Department IOf the Pr~tectorate Ministry of Finance; this stipUlation applied equally
'
to all other jewels or works ofart whose value exceeded 10,000.00 Czechoslovak crowns..
r
'
~
j
.
,
i
I
In addition, the Reich Pr~tector appointed 'treuhanders' (trustees) to all individual Jewish
enterprises; the treuhanders acted upon the Protector's orders and under his supervision. Instrumental
for the ensuing confisc~tions of Jewish property including precious metals and valuables were the
of the aforementioned. Order authorizing "confiscations of
provisions contained iri Section
property" in cases of adts contrary to the said Order or its implementing provisions (see below).
Punishable by law was ~lso any attempted contravention of the Act or its implementing provisions
•
I
and the property involved could· be confiscated even if such acts did not warrant criminal
prosecution against the tespective person. All the above named provisions came into effect on June
. 22, 1939. In addition, these provisions applied retroactively, as of Match IS, 1939, to immovable
i
property and securities. I
10
I
.t.
.
.
.
.
I
, , ' 223899
The ImplementatIOn ofth~ Order ofthe Reich Protector ofJune 21.1939 regarding Jewish
Property was governed by the so 'called implementing ordinances. Dispositions of precious metals
8
�implem~nting
Sec~nd
were regulated by several
ordinances: the
Implementing Ordinance of the
Reich Protector ofDece~ber 8, 1939 to the Order regarding Jewish Property (VOBI. RP, 1939, p.
318) stated in Section 5 that as of t6e effective date of the said implementing ordinance, no objects
made of gold, platinum, silver, predous stones or pearls could 'be sold in auctions. On the contrary,
Section 6 gave the specified Protecforate authorities the right to impound such objects, specifically
in accordance with the apblicable tat regulations and fee schedules, and to dispose of them.
I
I
i
I
On January 26, 1940, the Reich Protector issued the Third Implementing Ordinance of the
Reich Protector to the ~rder rega~ding Jewish Property (VOBI. RP, 1940, p. 44), regulating the
prohibition of sales involving objects made of gold, platinuin and silver, and the prohibition to
alienate precious stones knd pearlsl From the date of issue of the above named Ordinance, such
I
I
'
effects could only be sold to a specific legal entity entrusted with their liquidation. This legal entity
(collection point) beca~e the limi~ed-liabi1ity company called Hadega - (Handelsgesellschaft,
Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Hartung Prag).
,
1
I
The Fourth Implementing 'ordinance of the Reich Protector of February 7, 1940 to the
Order regarding Jewish property (YOBl. RP, 1940, p. 45) required all Jewish enterprises to register
with the appropriate authorities their entire domestic and foreign operation assets, real estate, stocks
and bonds and/or shares i~ proporticlnate ownership. '
'
' '
i
1, '
Specific econo~ic persecJtion was made possible primarily by the Fifth Implementing
Ordinance ofthe Reich lirotector t~ the Order regarding Jewish Property (VOBI. RP, 1940, p. 81),
of March 2, 1940. According to this Ordinance, Jewish individuals, Jewish enterprises, and Jewish
associations (with the exbeption of foreign nationals) were obliged to deposit gold, platinum, silver,
precious stones, and peatIs (together with stocks, mine shares, fixed-interest assets, and securities)
as a forced deposit in ani exchange bank (as specified by the Notice of the Ministry of the Finance
No. 16011939 Sb. of J~Iy 8, 193~). The same obligation also applied to "non-Jewish holders"
holding the values specified in the Fifth Implementing Ordinance (providing that such values were
owned or co-owned by IJewish individuals, Jewish enterprises or Jewish associations) as estate
administrators, pawnees'l custodian~ or plenipotentiaries.4 The deadline'set to deposit such values
was fourteen days from the effedtive date of the Implementing Ordinance; this deadline was
subsequently extended artd expired bn April 30, 1940. Within the same deadline, authorized persons
had the obligation to designate as J~wish any current deposits covered by the provisions of the Fifth
Implementing Ordinancl The deposits had to be expressly designated as Jewish (consequently, no
anonymous deposits wer¢ allowed)! any release of such deposits had to be authorized by the Office
ofthe Reich Protector. jrhe same dutyappIied to any future acquisitions of the above named items,
particularly by inheritance; gerierall~, Jews were excluded from acquiring such items. The deposit of
such assets was to be eSfublished iIiI form of an open or closed safety-deposit box visibly marked by
.
the letter "N". The creation and maintenance of the deposit was covered by a deposit fee; in case of
default payments, the bxchange ~ank could recover the loss incurred by a partial sale of the
valuables deposited. An~ sale of tHe above mentioned items was subject to approval by the Reich
Protector. According tol an interptetation of the Fifth Implementing Ordinance prepared by W.
Utermohle and Schmerling "the int¢nded withdrawals will be approved if the owner of the deposit
intends to sell the asset~ deposited".5 Exceptions from the provisions of the Ordinance could be
granted by the Reich ptotector, i~ particular to treuhiinders of Jewish firms. The Office of the
Reich Protector could also grant exceptions from the rule of forced deposit if the assets involved
were of "negligible valu~" and thei~ legal regime was equal to that of items excepted from obligatory
forced deposits in accordance with fhe Notice ofthe Reich Protector ofMarch 2, 1940 (see below).6
,
223900
9
�preci~us
The buy-out of
mbtals, jewels, and other vaiuables representing Jewish property
was conducted in the following in~er: the owner(s) offered such items, "voluntarily" or under
pressure, to the Hadega/Company.l Through Hadega, the oWner(s) simultaneously applied to the
Office of the Reich Pr~tector for ithe above mentioned authorization of the sale. When the sales
permit was granted, the Foreign-Exchange Division of the Office of the Reich Protector notified
the owner(s) of the respbctive itetris and the banks where the respective items were deposited for
I
mandatory safekeeping. Ifhe hand..over of the valuables from the. banks to the Hadega Company
I
was, in most cases, duly irecorded, and the banks conveyed their hand-over reports to the Office of
the Reich Protector. After the conbluded sale of precious metals or jewels to Hadega, the original
owners received the salek proceeds hess cost incurred by all the institutions involved in the process
providing that the amouryt payable aid not exceed 500.00 Protectorate c~owns. Amounts exceeding
such limit had to be rem~tted to thej sellers' accounts which were maintained as blocked accounts in
accordance with the notife of the J\.udit Department of the Protectorate Ministry of Finance of
January 23, 1940 as published in the Gazette of the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia No. 22 of
;
I
January 27, 1940, .
:
I
I
.
1
.
I
The Notice ofthe Reich Prbtector of March 2, 1940(VOBl. RP; 1940, p. 82) governing the
implementation ofthe a~ve menti6ned Fifth1mplementing Ordinance ofthe.Reich Protector to the
Order regarding Jewish Propertyi enumerated the following objects exempted from the rule of
compulsory deposit: wetldingrings belonging to the respective individuals and/or their deceased
spouses; silver wristlpoc~et watch~s; used silver cutlery (two four-piece sets consisting of one fork,
one knife, one tablespoon and on~ teaspoon per person); other silver objects not exceeding the
weight of 40 grams per bbject' up a total weight' of 200 grams per person; personally used dental
. '
replacements ri:lade from' precious ~etals.
tb
1
I
On September 13, 1940, aIlother Notice ofthe Protectorate Ministry ofFinance was issued
regulating further implefnentation details of the provisions of the Fifth Implementing Ordinance of
the Reich Protector rigarding Jrwish Property. No later than on October 15, 1940, Jewish
individuals, Jewish entetprises, and Jewish associations had to register with the Audit Department
of the Ministry of Fin~nce any objects made of gold, silver, platinum, precious stones and pearls
I
i
valued at more 10,000.00 Czechoslovak crowns. Exceptions from this compulsory registration were
analogous to those spec~fied in th~ Notice of the Reich Protector 'of March 2, 1940. To implement
this Notice, special fon-rts were issued; the valuation of the items involved could be performed only
by appraisers officially Jpproved bY the Ministry.
1
i
I
~ewish
To a certain cJtegory of
individuals - former Czechoslovak nationals who were
residents of a communi~ located ~thin the borders of the "former Lands Bohemia and Moravia"
and currently lived onlthe territopr of the German Reich outside the Protectorate - applied the
provisions of the Order implemen~ing the third Order on the basis of the Order on Registration of
Jewish Property of Detember 23,~ 1940 (RGBl., 1941, p. 2) according to which such individuals
were required to offer apy objectsirnade of gold, platinum, and silver as well as precious stones and
pearls in their possession to a public trading organization.
;
I
,
l
I
The Seventh ImplemeJting Ordihance to the Order of the Reich Protector regarding Jewish
Property (VOBI. RP, 1:940, p. 299) issued on July 10, 1940 made the trust administration of any
Jewish property of thel total valub exceeding 100,000.00 Protectorate: crowns subject to a special
permit (license); this p'ermit waslentered in a public list maintained by the Office of the Reich
Protector.
Ii'
;
. I
1
1
.
.
223901
�I
!
On January 26, 1940 . 1
the Order ofthe Reich Protector regarding the Removal ofJews from
1
.
the Protectorate Economy (VOBI. RP, 1940, p. 41) was adopted. The Order was directed chiefly .
against "Jewish enterprtses" in thb sense of the Order of the Reich Protector regarding Jewish
Property of June 21, 1939. Such erlterprises were to be prevented from conducting business in the
field of manufacture or any other Iarea of the national economy; they had to be dissolved and
liquidated. According to ,Section 6 6fthe said Order, "any stock ~xisting on the effective date of this
prohibition, ... [was to be] offered tJ an agency to be specified later, according to whose dispositions
it will be proceeded."
I
I
I
. ,
'
In early 1941, tlee implerltenting ordinances were issued to complement this Order; these
ordinances specified the iYPes ofbu~iness activities forbidden ~o Jewish enterprises.
I
1
, .
I
,
,I
In view of the aforesaid Order of the Reich Protector of June 21, 1939 regarding Jewish
Property as elaborated by the respe~tive implementing ordinances, the most important competencies
in the process of expropnation of precious metals and other valuables were entrusted specifically to
the Office of the ReicH Protecto~ (Amt des Reichsprotektors) as the highest authori~ of the
I
German occupation administration in the Protectorate. Regardless of whether the individual acts of
expropriation were carri~d out direJt1y by the Office of the Reich Protector or by other authorities
of the occupation administrati6ri, t~e precious metals and other valuables confiscated in the process
were, considered Reich Iproperty. iConsequently, all other segments of the political occupation
administration were obliged, pursuant to the Decree ofthe Fahrer and Reich Chancellor regarding
the Creation of the Prdtectorate 40hemia and Moravia ofMarch f6,i 1939, to comply with the
instructions issued by thb Office of the Reich Protector. Individual departments of the repressive
police force answered tolthe approphate central securi~ agencies of the Reich.
,
I
,I
For the expropnatlon and subsequent disposition. 'of this prop~ answered the 2nd
I ,
,
Department of the Omce of the, Reich Protector, specifically its Group One (Economic Affairs)
,
I
.
,
and, within its strucun;e, the n/l-3F Division (Foreign-Exchange Affairs). During the entire
occupation period, this branch was headed by the imperial bank-councillor Walther Utennohle, b.
Juiy 1, 1895.
!
j,
!
j
,
From August 1~39, the Foreign-ExchangeDivision operated:directly at the Protectorate
Ministry of Finance where it adrr{inistered and supervised the activities of the Audit Department
, of the Ministry authori*d to comfuission transfers of precious metals and valuables. Through the
Ministry, the Foreign-Exchange Jiivision of the Office of the Reich Protector issued instructions
to Protectorate authoritibs and bank institutions concerning the execution of the above mentioned
implementing provision$ to the Ofder of the Reich Protector of June 21, 1939 regarding Jewish
Property or any additional implementing directives issued in fonn of Notices by the Protectorate
Ministry of Finance.
i
.
I
The Foreign-Exchange Division filed reports on objects made of gold,precious metals,
precious stones etc. w~ich were Jubject to compulsory registration with the National Bank for
Bohemia and Moravia'I by the resbective individuals and organizations in accordance with Section
5 of the aforesaid Order regarding Jewish Property. In addition, the Foreign-Exchange Division
regulated the mandatory buy-outsl of precious metals and other valuables in accordance with the
,
223902
1
�:
I
I
,
I
I
'
,
.
economic needs of the Reich; its idate inclUded the power to use coercive measures. The Branch
regularly consulted and Icbordinat~d its operations with Group 6 (Banking) of the Economic
Department of the Office of the Rtich Protector headed by friedrich Muller who simultaneously
acted as special emissary, ofthe Reifh Bank (Sonderbeauftragter der Deutschen Reichsbank fUr
Bohmen und Mahren ('Special Emissary of the German Imperial Bank for Bohemia and
Moravia')) to the Natiohal Bank for Bohemia and Moravia. The special emissary conveyed to
the National Bank ins~ctions ofIthe Reich Bank and the Office of the Reich Protector (from
1943 German State Mi~istry forlBohemia and Moravia). The Branch's lower units represented
the decisive element in the process! of Aryanization of Jewish property; in this context, they were
charged with supervising other goJ.ernment agencies in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.
Relevant information and registrati~m tasks (e.g. filing officialreports and collecting information on
Jewish property) were ~erformed by the clerical staff of the National Bank for Bohemia and
Moravia and other banking institutions. "
1
.
I
.
of
I
Another string interVent~ons in Jewish property rights represented summary confiscations
of Jewish property handled directly by the Gestapo.7 Among all Nazi organs, the Gestapo offices
were the first to enter tHe process of confiscating precious metals and valuables. From March 29,
,
I
1939 until the creation lof the Zentralstelle fur jiidische Auswanderung ('Central Office for
Jewish Emigration'] (see below») the Gestapo offices ensured that 'all emigrants delivered their
property in trust of a bahk The G~stapo issued exit visa only to those ,prospective emigrants who
had complied with this r~quirement. At the same time, Gestapo offices began confiscating the entire
property of all "illegal ehrigrants" i~cluding Jews. Finally, the third group of provisions authorizing
\ garnishments and subsJquent confiscations of property was based upon the above mentioned
Section 10 of the Or~er oj th~ Reich Protector regarding Jewish Property and included
confiscatioris of propertY belonging to individuals who had committed crimes against the German
Reich in the sense of tHe its crimihal law. Nationals of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia
accused of committing ~erious cri~inal offenses were equal in law to Reich citizens; in addition,
their criminal liability wks determined in accordance with the LawJor the Protection ojthe Republic
No. 131/1936 Sb. z.a n.lin the wo~ding of the Order of the Reich Protector No. 39 (Gazette of the
,
I
Reich Protector, 1939);
ii
1
,
I
On May 24, 1939, all banks in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia were ordered to
report any assets of Jew~sh emigrahts exceeding the value of 100,000.00 Protectorate crowns and to
enter a confiscation notice in fa~or of the Gestapo in the respective bank records. Starting in
December 1939, the police began bonfiscating (retroactively,' as of March 16, 1939) the property of
all other Jews who had!emigrated;between January 1,1939 and July 10,1939 including their bank
accounts and contents of their of s*fety-deposit boxes. 8 The confiscated assets were administered by
the economic, departments of the executive offices of the Gestapo. Any relevant information
regarding the individuais whose aksets had been confiscated was sent by these departments to the
Protectorate Ministry of-Finance, ittention ofW. Utermohle whose agency kept central records. The
organizational pattern of the infonPation flow corresponded with the corporative mode of operation
of the Nazi administrat~on. Information about Jewish valuables was obtained through the banking
system existing in the I,>rotectorat~ of Bohemia and Moravia. Technically, the Gestapo sent names
and dates of birth of t*e respecti~e Jewish' individuals to the Association of Czech Banks which
conveyed these personal data by tirculars to the headquarters of the individual banking institutions;
they in h;lrn passed thein on to th~ir branches" The individual banks had the obligation to report to
the Gestapo any accoun'ts or storages of valuables belonging to Jewish individuals and legal entities.
!
.
.
22390-3
i.
1
Besides, the Gestapo confIscated the entire property of individuals and legal entities whose
activities were, for polibcal, ideological or economic reasons, considered hostile towards the Reich.
,
,
I
I
'
j
1
/
�I
"
Precious metals and valuables corlfiscated in the course of arrestations and house searches were
I
'
deposited in Gestapo safes. On May 13, 1941, in concert with the Reich Ministry of Finance, the
Acting Reich Protector iri Bohemia "hnd Moravia Reinhard Heydrich issued an order to the executive
offices of the Gestapo to Itransfer sJch assets and valuables to the Reichshauptkasse - Beutestelle
('Central Reich TreasulTY - Booty ~dministration') in Berlin.
I
:1
.
I
,
From the fall },941, confiscated jewels and other valuables were handed over to the
Vermogensamt beim R~ichsprotektor in Bohmen und Mahren (,Property Office of the Reich
Protector of Bohemia abd MoravIa' - C'Vermogensamt") created by "the Ordinance ofthe Reich
I !
Protector of September
1941 ~nd charged with the administration of enemy property. The
Vermogensamt contin,,/-ously co~lected such property at the Bohmische Escompte-Bank
"
['Discount Bank for Bo~emiaIJ'l
12,
.
I,
i"
I
1
"
Precious metals and valuables represented only a small fraction of the property confiscated "
by the Gestapo and sUbs6quently d~livered in trust of the Vermogensamt ; therefore, its extent and
value was not even incluaed in the :balance statement of December 1942 prepared by the executive
I .
,
office ofthe Gestapo in Prague. Fufthermore, it must be stressed that the: Gestapo did not confiscate
only Jewish property but also that bf other protectorate nationals; for this very reason, it would be
very difficult to quantitY the individual fractions of the seized assets since a certain part thereof
consisted of valuables belonging to the persecuted non-Jewish Czech citizens.
The third level of the opbressive legislation represe~ted the 'statutes regulating Jewish
emigration and subsequently also deportati,ons of Jewish citizens to concentration camps. These
statutes were connected tth furthe~ infringements of propet;tY rights of the Jewish population.
R~Ch
By the OrdinanJe of the
Proteclor of July 15. :1939. the Central Office for Jewish
Emigration "(Zentralstelle fur j,iidische Auswanderung - "Zentralstelle") was established9,
initially only for the ca~ital Prague; in February 1940, its competence was extended to the entire
territory of the Protect6rate of Bbhemia and Moravia. In August 1941, the Zentralstelle was
renamed Central Officelfor the S~.IUtiOn of the Jewish Question - Zentralamt fUr die Regelung
der Judenfrage.
:
.
,
.'
l
.
I
j
,
,
'
I
I
i
The role of the Zentralstelle in the illegal infringement of' property rights of Jewish
individuals and legal entities falls t into two stages. From its inception until October I, 1941, the
Zentralstelle administer¢d the ass~ts of illegal emigrants from the Protectorate of Bohemia and
Moravia. By the Order ofthe Reich Protector regarding the Care ofJews and Jewish Organizations
of March 5, 1940 (VbBl. RP, 11940, p. 77) the Zentralstelle was also charged with the
administration of assets lof dissolvJd Jewish legal entities - ~atemities,endowments, communities,
etc. By Section 5 of the hbove na~ed Order, the Reich Protector created the Auswanderungsfonds
fur Bohmen und IMahren j (,Emigration Fund for Bohemia and Moravia'
"Auswanderungsfonds,"), a spec,al legal entity (pub1ic fund) based in Prague to accumulate the
assets of the Zentralstelle. The Auswanderungsfonds was subordinated to the commander of the
security police of the Rfich Prote~tor; it was exempted from capital le:vies, and as a party to civil
actions, it was subject ~o the exclpsive jurisdiction of the German courts. In addition, this Order
required the Jewish Religious Coinmunities to assist all Jews in emigration matters. The Jewish
Religious Community iri Prague w~s directing all other Jewish communities in the Pr~tectorate; thex
!
!
!
.
1
'
2239u4
�I
instruc~ons. Ho~ever,
had to follow its
by further instructions.issued by the Reich Protector, all
Jewish Religious CommJnities were supervised by the Zentralstelle.
i i '
I
1
From July 28, 1939, the J;>rotectorate Jews were allowed to emigrate only through the
Zentralstelle. To exportJ of precio~s metals,and valuables applied the following regulations which
represented a considerable restriction of the property rights with respect to this category of
Protectorate nationals:
'I
I
,
'
i
'
,
Already the Regulation Nd. 3611939 Sb. of February 16, 1939 regarding the exports of
valuables issued by the II govemmept of the so called Second Republic had banned exports of
valuables, i. e. objects made, of ,.gold, silver, and platinul11, precious stones, pearls, jewels,
collections or individualrobjects of, collector value, paintings, antiques, furs, fur coats, as well as
other objects of substantial value. An exception could be grapted by the Audit Department of the
Ministry of Finance for ~ fee up t6 20,000.00 Protectorate crowns. The Notice of the Minister of
Finance No. 3711939 Sq. z. an. df February 17. 1939 partially relieved the export restrictions
regarding certain gold, silver Qr pbhinum objects of personal character (for example three gold or
platinum rings per persorl, one gold1chain, one pair of earrings or one kilogram of silver per person).
The Government Order No.1 5511939 Sb. ofJune 23. 1939 introduced an exchange control system.
Pursuant the said order, I exports of precious metals (i.e. gold, platinum, and silver, processed or
unprocessed - Section 6) were subject to a, special permit by the National Bank. The regulations
governing legal dispositibns of the aforementioned precious metals in tlie Protectorate of Bohemia
and Moravia were tightehed and th~ rule of compulsory sales offer was introduced with respect to
such objects. Accordingl to Section 20 of the respective government order, the above mentioned
restrictions applied fully to the so dlled emigrants. The Government Order No.1 5611 939 Sb. ofJuly
4. 1939 enacted the obligation of inventory and compulsory sales offers regarding foreign currencies
and precious metals, as \veIl as secllrities and receivables/claims abroad. Each individual emigrant
was allowed to take out lof the co~try only hislher wedding ring and the wedding ring of hislher
deceased spouse, one sil\('er watch, two sets of silver cutlery, other silver objects ofa total weight not
exceeding 200 grams, an~ personal1~ used dental replacements from precious metals. Official export
permits regarding the above narrted objects were issued by the Audit Department of the
Protectorate Ministry of Finan~e supervised by the Exchange Division of the Economic ,
"
I
Department of the Office of the Reich Protector. Other valuables had to be deposited in exchange
banks; the proof ofdepott had to subinitted to the Zentralstelle.
.
I
1
I
;
I
. I
A part of the valuables belonging to Jewish emigrants to which the Zentralstelle had the
right of disposal was trartsferred, a6cording the previous agreement with the Exchange Division of
the Economic Depart.rlent of th~ Office of the Reich Protector, to; the Hadega Company for
evaluation and sale. Hidega's pro'fit share from the sale of such objects was transferred to the
I
account of the Auswanderungsfonds, Sonderkonto [special account] H 1116 at the Bohmische
'
Union-Bank, a subsidiafy of the D~utsche Bankfrom 1939. :
.
.
Charged with tJe supervision of the foreign-exchange and customs regulations described
the so called concealed property were the so called
below and with the Itracing
Devisenschutzkomman~os and tpe Zollfahndungsstelle acting in concert with the Gestapo
offices. The above ment,ionedage*ies were authorized to perform seizures of concealed property
and its subsequent confiscations. Rersons who committed offenses against customs and exchange
regulations had to surrertder their v:aluables, depending on the total volume of the garnished assets,
either in proceedings at l~w before fhe competent ~ourts ofjustice or directly to the Gestapo. Jewish-
of
I
'
1
223905
�I
'owned valuables and Jecious metals confiscated by .the above mentioned agencies of the
occupation administratiorl were handed over to the Hadega Company which in turn transferred their
profit share to their accoJnts.
I
j
The second stag¢ of Zentdllstelle's activities, lasted from October I, 1941 until the end of
the war in Europe. In October 1941 ;began the mass deportations of Jewish citizens to concentration
camps. In. connection Jith the dep'ortations,· the Zentralstelle was authorized to liquidate the
I
.
property belonging to the deporteesJ At the assembly camp, every adult assigned to a transport was
required to surrender to ithe Zentr~lstelle employees those objects of precious metals which the
Jews were still entitled Ito hold j~ accordance the Fifth Implementing Ordinance of the Reich
Protector regarding Jewish Property (see above). Once at the assembly camp, persons assigned to a
deportation transport were forced I to issue a general power' of attorney to the Zentralstelle
authorizing it to take ovet any othe~ assets including the above named deposits in blocked accounts
and/or any other assetslptoperty unknown or concealed at the time of the transport. This issue was
I
.
regulated' by the Second: Order ofl the Reich Protector regarding the Care .of Jews and Jewish
Organizations ofOctobe~ 12,1941 0'OBI. RP, 1941, p. 555). The Order! was issued on October 14,
1941, and it came into force on the promulgation date. The Reich Protector reserved the right to
.
I
I '
.
introduce further measures necessary to execute this Order. On November 27, 1941, the Gazette of
I
,
the Reich Protector publjshed the Third Order of the Reich Protector regarding the Care of Jews
and Jewish Organizations of Novefnber 12, 1941 (YOBl. RP, 1941, p. 642). The Order applied to
I
I
claims of creditors and other entitlep persons against the assets of the dissolved Jewish entities and
Jewi~h emigrants taken lover by t~e Ze~tralsteUe for liquid~tion in accordance with the ab~ve
mentIoned Second Order of the Impenal Protector regardmg the Care of Jews' and Jewlsh
Organizations ofOctober 12, 1941.[The claims of such third parties were forfeited ex lege; instead,
it was possible to apply for compen~ation from the funds of the Auswanderungsfonds.
I
. ' I
After the modified Eleventh Order to the Law ofReich Citizenship ofNovember 25, 1941
came into effect, the spefial Order!regulating the Loss of Protectorate Citizenship of November 2,
1942 (YOBI. RP, 1942, p. 301) applied to the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, and stripped
the deportees of the Prbtectorate btizenship; c~nsequently, it became superfluous to issue any
powers of attorney. The ~ntire pro~erty of the deportees was forfeited ex lege in favor of the Reich
I
I
.
and its liquidation remained within the scope of responsibilities of the Zentralstelle since the
respective assets were to!"support all objectives linked with the splution of the Jewish question".
After the dispatch of eacW, individual Jewish transport, the Zentralstelle, in cooperation
I
with the Office of tbe Reich Protector, issued an instruction to withdraw the valuables kept in
banks and to transfer tHem either ;to the Bohmische Escompte-Bank or directly to the Hadega
Company for immediatd appraisal!and sale. The remaining unsold valJ.lables administered by the
Zentralstelle were laterIfound at tre Bohmische Escompte-Bank in suitcases confiscated by the
Soviet organs in 1945 (see Chapter lVD. The share in the profit from the sales of valuables belonging
I
.
to the deportees was transferred! to the so called Resettlement Account No. 1003 of the
Auswanderungsfonds (;Umsiedln~gskonto 1003), maintained at the Bohmische Escompte - Bank
at the time a division of the Dresdner Bank. Funds from this account and other accounts of the
Auswanderungsfonds kere, amo~g others, used to cover the cost of the "final solution" of the
Jewish question in Bohetnia and Mbravia including the operation of the Theresienstadt ghetto.
,
.
.
I
223906
I
I
Its part in confiscations ofj Jewish property after the start of the deportations took also the
Gestapo on the basis ofIan agreement with the Zentralstelle. Through its anti-Jewish departments,
I
!
1
.
�i
!investigati~ns
the Gestapo conducted
of individual cases of the so called illegally transferred or
concealed Jewish propef:ty. Any pr~perty impounded due to such investigations was entrusted to the
Zentralstelle, more pretisely to its Auswanderungsfonds. The Gestapo could also transfer to the
Zentralstelle assets narhed in a dower of attorney that had been given by the deportees to the
Zentralstelle. The Ver.i.ogensamt was empowered to proceed in the same manner.
.
I.
I·.
.
·
On the Czechoslovak territbry directly annexed by Germany in 1938, confiscations of gold,
silver, platinum, diamorlds and objects made thereof were executed on the basis of the laws and
regulations of the Germhn Reich. The assets were confiscated on the b~sis of the following Reich
laws and regulations: L~w regarding the Confiscation of the Property of an Enemy State on the
Territory incorporated ik the Bavdrian Ostmark, Order regarding the Confiscation of Property of
an Enemy State in Austria of Noyember' 18, 1938 (Czechoslovak territories incorporated in the
administrative districts oI-Upper ano Lower Danube [designation of Upper and Lower Austria under
the Nazi regime]), and Ithe Orde~ regarding Property CoriflScations of an Enemy State in the
Sudeten German Regionf ofMay 14, 1939.
,
'
I
I
~ss
deportations in the fall of the year 1941, the Eleventh
Implementing Ordinance to the Citizenship Law of the German Reich according to which
individuals of Jewish e*-traction '-Yere deprived of their citizenship if their usual residence was
abroad, i.e. stayed abroaa under ci*umstances indicating that their stay abroad was not temporary.
The loss of citIzenship eritailed· the forfeiture of property in favor of the German Reich.
After the start of the
j
I,
i
,
"
•
'j
The trusteeship Iand appriisal of the confiscated Jewish property was entrusted to the
Ministry of Finance whi~h in turn ~e1egated this task to the Offices of Senior Finance Presidents.
The property confiscated by the local offices of the Gestapo was taken over by Offices of Senior
,
I
'
Finance Presidents.
I
With the, apprai~ls and sales of the confiscated objects made of precious metals was
charged, in accordance with the tespective instructions of the Reich: Ministry of Finance, the
Zentralstelle bei der IStadtisch~n Pfandleihanstalt ['Cen~ral Agency at the Municipal
Pawnbroker's Institution'] in Bedin which transferred the sales proceeds to the accounts of the
I
I '
.
Semor F'
mance PreSl'dents.
i
i
I
It may be infeqed from tre contemporary sources that the objects of precious ,metals
confiscated from Jews living on the territory annexed by Germany before 1938 represented an
I
I
insignificant fraction of the total volume of assets confiscated from Czechoslovak citizens of Jewish
:
"
extraction: according to the official statistics, only 612, persons ;were deported from the
Czechoslovak territories ~nnexed b~ Germany before March 15; 1939.
'
,
1
The reason was that the v*st majority of Jewish citizens left the German-occupied areas
immediately after September 30, 19'38 and took their assets inland. If they had not transferred these
assets abroad before Mirch 15, 1939, it was later gradually expropriated on the territory of the
Protectorate ofBohemia imd Moravia.
I
'
223907
1
�.
i
I
.
Already at the eM of the xear 1938, police divisions .and organs of state administration in
the Sudeten area incorp~rated in t~e German Reich received the order to report any confiscated
Jewish jewels in their custody. However, according to their reports of January 1939, no such assets
existed. The Jewish cultic objects tvere destroyed or stolen during the so called Crystal Night on
November 9-10, 1938 (arl organized1 pogrom during which most synagogues on the territory ceded to
Germany were burned or tom down).
I
i
I
Chapter II - Footnotes
I
Appendix 1 - The Decree of th~ Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor regarding the Creation of the
Protectorate of Bohemial and Morara was published in the Reich Law Gazette, Year 1939, Part I
("RGB1" 1939, I). It was also published in the Collection of Law's and Regulations of the
I
,
Czechoslovak Republic f'Sb.z.n.") ~der No. 75. The Order of the Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor of
June 7, 1939 regarding ~e Legislat~ve Law in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia see RGBl.,
I
.
Year 1939, Part I, p. 1039.
1
. ·1
j
I
i
.
.
2 The Czechoslovak exile government approved this declaration .issued by the Allies by an act
I
,
'
adopted at its session wHich took place on October 9, 1942. See the "Results of the 69th Session of
the Ministerial Council ,I sent to Jhn Masaryk by the Presidium of the Council of Ministers on
l
October 10, 1942; Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, collection
'London Archives' markdd confiderltial, Box No. 208. The text of the d~claration was'published in
the Official Czechoslovak Gazette, year IV, No.1, London 1943 ..
I
'
I
;
, Gov";"""", declaratiL of
Oc,lber
17, 1941 regarding property iransfers effected under the
constraints of enemy occ~pation. Official Czechoslovak Gazette, year ill, No.2, London 1942.
I
!
I
Sequestra~on Jew~Sh
4 Appendix 5.
of
Property. Interpretation and instructions concerning the Fifth'
Implementing Ordinanc~ of the Re;ch Protector to the Order regarding Jewish Property of June 21,
1939, Prague 1940, SUJA ['Central State Archives'], Prague, Archive Collection 'Ministry of
Finance', Box No. 310. I
i
j.
5 Ibid.
!
6 Ibid.
I
I
I
7 To the participation Jf the Geslapo in confiscations of Jewish Property see Bencht uber die
Tatigkeit der Staatspblizeileitst911e Prag beziiglich der. Beschagnahme und Einziehung
reichsfeindichen Vermogens und Zusammenstellung der bis zum 1. Juli 1942 beschlagnahmten und
eingezogenen Vermogertswerte. Pr~g, am 1. Dezember 1942 [Report on the Activities of the State
.
,
,
Police Headquarters in ~rague with respect to the Seizure and Confiscation of Property belonging to
the Enemies of the Reich and Sutiey of the Property Values seized and confiscated before July 1,
1942. Prague, Decembet 1, 1942] 'SUA, Archive Collection 'State Sec~etary of the Protectorate K.
H. Frank', 1094-1346.
.
22 39 08
1
�8 Ibid.
1
, Copy of the (ftdinance lfthe ReJ Protector by
Prague (Zentralstelle
ftfr
1
whi~h
the Central Office for Jewish Emibation in
jiidische Auswanderung Prag) was established, see SUA, Archive
Collection 'Prague Gestar' 10 1-66 -4.
1
,
,
I
I
I
1
,
j
,I
,I
I
223909
I
1
�.. . I i · .
III.
...
The Role of the Protectotatc Bank of Issue in the, Process of Dispositions of Jewish
l
Gold, Platinum'land SilveJ.
I .
j
I
In the overall· prbcess of confiscation, processing, and distribution of valuables made of
1
,
.
precious metals belonging to individuals of Jewish origin, Jewish enterprises and Jewish
associations residing on the territory of the Protectorate was, by the decision of the Nazi authorities,
. involved the National B~nk for Bo~emia and Moravia acting as the Protectorate's central bank of
issue. Though the Germat,l Reich and the occupation authorities formally respected its independence,
in reality, the National Bank becamia division of the German Reich Ba~k (Deutsche Reichsbank)
in Berlin. From the ons~t of the Berman occupation, the National Bank was placed under the
I
I
supervision of the Reich Bank carried out by its special emissary Dr. Friedrich Muller: In addition,
any independent decisionLmaking the National Bank was paralyzed by co-opting the emissary of
I ,
.
the Office of the Reich Protector Dr. Herbert Winkler to one of the key positions in the bank (he
headed its foreign-excharlge branch). This created a double-track management of the bank of issue:
the agenda of the Gentian emissaHes was the decisive (and limiting) factor in the operational
activities of the Nation~1 Bank. Its statutory organs and business management were forced to
execute instructions of th~ German ~uthorities. Personal decisions regarding managerial positions in
.
I
.
.
the bank were influenced1by the emissary of the Reich Bank and the emissary of the Office of the
Reich Protector. The main motivk of their activities represented Ifth~ interests of the Gerinan .
Reich", including the total submis~ion of the Protectorate to the economic needs of the German
I
Reich.
I
oi
I
.,
I
I
At the same time, further st~ps were taken by the German occupation authorities which, in
. the final effect, weakened the r~le of the National Bank in the economic system of the Protectorate
of Bohemia and Moravial Immediatbly after the creation of the Protectorate, the German authorities
took stock of the gold arid fo~eign ~xchange reserves belonging to the financial institutions of the
Protectorate, above all t~ the National Bank. Already on March 18, 1939, the National Bank was
forced to transfer its golq deposited: in London, England to the Reich Bank by transferring it to the
Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland. Other transfers followed; consequently,
the Germans obtained, dbng the Period of occupation, the trusteeship of 42,899.00 kilograms of
pure monetary gold.'
It·
..
, .
After the introduction of a Lstoms union between the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia
and the German Reich irl October 1940, the status of the National Bank changed, as the until then
independent external paYment contacts of the truncated Czech Lands' had been abolished. This
measure affected above I' all the dternal economic autonomy of the Protectorate: this German
creation ceased to be an independept subject of international relations. Beginning in the fall 1940,
the Protectorate was no ~onger allo~ed to negotiate any international clearing/payment agreements
or other international trade agreements. Any export claims held by the Protectorate in third countries
wt',!re assumed by the G~rman Rei~h and the Czech side was credited with their countervalue in
reichsmarks deposited at! the Deutsche Verrechnungskasse in Berlin. The customs union undercut
the economic autonomy of the NJtional Bank which had lost the opportunity to obtain foreign
exchange and use it in the Protectotate economy. The Protectorate crown was not accepted abroad.
Consequently, the Czech Lands mhtilated by the loss of their border areas suffered an immense
economic loss?
i
I
l
:
'
. .
. j
.;
~?3910
The German administration used the subordinate status of the National Bank for-n.;y.emia
and Moravia in the prdcess of cohfiscating property belonging to Jewish individuals, enterprises
I
1
�I
j
,
.I
,
'
I
and associations, particu~arly whilelconfiscating objects made from precious metals, gold, silver,
platinum, precious stone~, and pea~ls. Under the supervision of the German managerial staff co
other financial institutions of the Protectorate, the German
opted to the National ~ank and
occupation administration wasabl6 to gather exact information regarding the valuables still in
possession of jewish indi~duals livi~g on the territory of the Protectorate.
to
j
I
Based on the Order of the Reich Ptolector for Bohemia and Moravia ofJune 21, 1939 regarding
I
'
Jewish Property, the banks were obliged to submit to the above mention~d German managers name
lists containing a compl~te catalotWe of a11 objects made of precious m~tals and precious stones;
they had to indicate the ~oss weig~t, purity and approximate value of such objects in Protectorate
crowns. 3 In case of conc~aling such' valuables, their Jewish owners ran the risk of severe sanctions
imposed by the Gestapo; lequal sanctions applied to individuals of the so called Aryan descent who
had accepted such Jewisll-owned o~jects for safekeeping.
I
'
f
,
The National Bank for I Bohemia and Moravia' was hand-picked by the German
I
occupation authorities and the Reich Bank as a suitable location to handle precious metals obtained
from Jews because of itslwe11-quali~ed staff and safe storage facilities (vaults). The precious metals
obtained from Jews were handled by the National Bank in accordance with the orders and
directives issued by the ~espective ~rgans of the German political and economic administration both
in the German Reich an~ the Protec~orate of Bohemia and Moravia. In Berlin, it was particularly the
Reich Bank and the Reichsstelle {ur Edelmetalle ['Reich 'Office for Precious Metals'], in Prague
the Economic Groupl, at the I:Office of the Reich Protector ' and the Devisenschutz
.
Sonderkommando ('S~cial Unit for the Protection of Foreign Exchange).
I
. I,
,
' '
.
I
Under the pressfu-e applied! by the occupation authorities; the National Bank ~as forced to
assume the role of a c1eahng office fused for purchases of gold from the Hadega Company in Prague
and, from 1942, also frob theCeniral Office for the Solution 'of the Jewish Question - Zentralamt
fur die Regelung der! Judenfr~ge, Auswanderungsfonds fUr Bohmen und Mihren. The
activities of the Hadegai Company pentered upon purchases and resales of precious metals, precious
stones and pearls from Jews, Jewi~h enterprises and Jewish associations . .At the time of the mass
deportations of Jews to boncentrat~on camps, gold ingots from recast Jewish jewels confiscated by
. the Hadega Company abd/or by me Auswanderungsfonds were deposited at the National Bank.
The right of disposal oflthiS gold Had the Uberwachungsstelle beim Ministerium fur Wirtschaft
und Arbeit in Pragu,e ('Inspection Department at the Ministry of Economy and Labor'
"Uberwachungsstelle created in 1942. In name, the Uberwachungsstelle was a German inspection
unit, in reality, it was the governitig body of the Protectorate Ministry of Economy and Labor (the
Ministry was administ~ed exc1us}vely by Germans). The National Bank was further obliged to
accept for safekeeping (from Hadega and the Auswanderungsfonds) any confiscated and recast
•
1
Jewish silver; the disposal rights of this silver had the Reichsstelle fUr Edelmetalle in Berlin.4 Any
I
I
'
,
gold purchased by the National Bank from the Auswanderungsfonds became part of the funds
.
d
I
I
5
Item calle 'monetary gqld acquire1 by purchase.
'
tl
)
,
I
Chapter III - Footnotes
I
v
'
223911
Main Accounting Department (Presidium), Archiv Ceske riarodni banky Praha ('Archives of the
Czech National Bank I in Pragu~' - "ACNB"), Czechoslovak- National Bank ~ ("NBIt), P XVII
103/18,23, Box No. 337; Central Accounting Department of the National Bank, ACNB, NB-P XVII
1
,
I
2
�I,
I
I
334, Box No. 425. comp~e: Jifi No~otny, Narodni banka Ceskoslovenslci ['Czechoslovak National
Bank'] (1919-1950), in: ~eskosloverske bankovky,statovky a mince ['Czechoslovak :t;3ank Notes,
Government Notes, and Cpins'] 1919-1992, Prague 1993, p. 24-25.
I
I
2
Jifi Novotny, Nirrodni
f
I
binka Ceskorovenska ['Czechoslovak National Bank'] (1919-1950), p. 25.
v
Application No. 79 38~ of July 2~, 1939 submitted by Dr. V.Spiegler to the National Bank for
Bohemia and Moravia and registered with its foreign-exchange,branch on July 31, 1939.
3
.
I
I
Memo from the special emissary ~f the Reich Bank F. Muller to the National Bank management
(June 18, 1942), ACNB praha, NB-~ XXV-257 (123-II), Box No. 787.
4
I
I
F.
5 Memo from the NationJI Bank to
Muller (Reich Banks' special emissary to the National Bank)
1
'
(April 15, 1943), ACNB Praha, NB-f XXV-258 (l23a), Box No. 787. For details see Chapter V.
..,
I
I
223912
2
�IV.
,
i
Sales of Illegally Seized Gold, Platinum, Silver, and, Precious Stones on the Internal
Markets (prote~torate, Girman Reich) and Abroad
I
'
1) Internal Markets (Prot~ctorate and German Reich)
.
I
I
'
i
2) Foreign Markets
I
!
IVII. Internal Markets (Protectorateland Gennan Reich)
I
l'
Acquisitions anq sales of hbjects made from gold, platinum, silver, and precious stones
were restricted to a small number df privileged business establishments and specialized agencies of
the Reich and Protectorate adminisfration. Central banks, i.e. both the Reich Bank in Berlin and the
I '
,
National Bank for' Bohemia an~ Moravia in Prague coulo not be directly involved in the
procuring or resales of J~wish jewels and other objects made of precious metals and .precious stones.
Naturally, the Reich-Getban occu~ation authorities were anxious to prevent any infonnation leaks
to the "Czech circles"; ail transactibns involving Jewish-owned jewels and similar valuables had to
be kept secret. Therefo~e, the Gerluan authorities had searched for a dependable Gennan-owned
finn operating in the Protectorate that would purchase and resell such objects (analogically to the
Central Pawnshop for th~ City ofgerlin - Zentralpfandleihal,lstalt der Stadt Berlin). Their choice
fen on Hadega which Jas transfoimed into the Hakoma Company in the course of the year 1943.
While it was true that Hadega bJcame engaged in exporting Jewish-owned valuables to foreign
markets (both directly. Jnd through intennediaries), it conducted most of its business inside the
Protectorate and the Geiman Reic1{. In the Protectorate, precious metals offered sale by the Hadega
Company were purchas~d mostly by the National Bank; the principal buyer based in the Gennan
Reich was the Degussa, Company.)
,
j
i
I
In 1938, the Prague-baseQ Hadega Company became part of the syndicate Kreditanstalt
der Deutschen in Prague I in th~ course of Kreditsanstalt's fusion with a minor Gennan-owned
fina~cial institution. At.!that time, jHadeg~'s principal business activity wa~ supposedly trading ,in
preCIOUS metals and obJ;ects made !of preCIOUS metals. However, the finn faIled to fully develop Its
intended business activities andf began experiencing financial difficulties; at this point, the
Kreditanstalt decided to liquidate it. In the late months of the year 1939 and in early 1940, the
German occupation authorities b~gan looking for a wholesaler to deal with jewels and other
valuables to be obtaineU by forcei:l purchases from the Jewish population, and decided to use the
Hadega Company. Aciing on a rbcommendation by the Devisenschutz-Sondernkommando, the
special emissary of thel Reich Ba~k to the National Bank for Bohemia and Moravia Friedrich
Muller approached the managemept of the Kreditanstalt der Deutschen with the request to select
Hadega to manage tI1e acquisit,iions and resales of objects still held by Jewish individuals,
companies, and associktions. Between the Hadega Co. and the Kreditanstalt der Deutschen
existed close personal telations since many chief executives of this nationalist-Gennan bank were
also members of Hadega's supervisory board and board of directors. With the technical management
of the Hadega Company and with appraisals and/or processing of Jewish valuables was charged
Friedrich Griinfeld, th~ co-owner of the goldsmith finn Heinrich Griinfeld of Karlova Street in
Prague. Based on an a'greement kth the Special Emissary of the Reich Bank to the National
Bank for Bohemia arid Moravi~, Hadega obtained the right to keep 5% of the sales price; the
initial estimate ofthe tJrnover amounted to twenty minion crowns. 2
'
I
I
I
:
.
I
' . 223913
Based on Section 1 ofthe! Third Implementing Ordinance ofthe Reich Protector ofBohemia
and Moravia regarding Jewish Rroperty of June 1939 issued on January 26, 1940, Hadega was
granted license to purchase valuables from Jewish individuals, finns, and associations who had been
granted a written sale~ pennit f¥m the Office of the Reich Protector. During the first month,
j
!
2
�Hadega's activities did not bring t~e expected results - to the dismay of the Economic Group at the
Office of the Reich Prdtector; only about thirty Jewish individuals approached Hadega and sold it
I
I
petty jewels valued at 320 to 850 p:rotectorate crowns each.3 The situation began changing after the
occupation administrati6n,~ncreased its repressive approach, especially after the issue of the Fifth
Implementing OrdinanJe of the Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia regarding Jewish
Property of June 21, h39 issued on March 2, 1940 ordering individuals of Jewish descent to
deposit their jewels an~ other 06jects made of precious metals in one of several specifically
authorized banks; the objects depo'sited could then be sold only with the express permission of the
Office of the Reich Pr6tector. nie opinion began spreading' among the Jews that they would lose
I
their assets at any rate; therefore, they were trying to salvage at least some of the value by selling off
their valuables to Had~a. For jewels made from gold, silver, platinum, diamonds, and pearls,
Hadega paid according Ito the pric:e level of the year 1938 which was much lower then in the war
years. By mid-October 1,940, five thousand Jews applied for the permission to hand over their jewels
I
I
to the Hadega Company for resale. Hadega paid out a total amount of 1.7 million Protectorate
crowns but the real valu~ of the purchased jewels was much higher.
I
I
,
i
,
j
'.
In the period between February 15 and October 15, :1940 Hadega purchased a total of
47.112 kilograms of gold objects (~oss weight after recasting); another 10 kilograms of gold objects
were prepared for proce~sing. Had~ga further purchased 1724.145 kilograms of silver objects (total
gross weight). This gold and silver: was submitted to the National Bank which, in its capacity as a
bank of issue, was the bnly instihltion in the Protectorate authorized to handle gold reserves and
.
other valuables significaht for the rhonetary system.4
I
.
;
I
I
!
In its report of IDecemberi 12, 1940 released two months after the inception of the mass
deportations of Jewish citizens to boncentration camps, Hadega specified the amount of precious
metals conveyed to 'the National B~nk as follows: 56.815 kilograms of gold; 0.16 kilograms of gold
coins; 1720,243 kilograms of silver rods; 5.296 kilograms ofsilver coins. Another 50 kilograms of
silver objects were still Ito be recast. "On the open market", Hadega sold only a small amount of
precious metals previously obtained from Jewish owners: 0.3826 kilograms of gold and 6.870
:
kilograms of silver. s
\ 1
I
!
Until October 1f41, when the Auswanderungsfonds obtained the authorization to liquidate
the property of the deported Jews, ~adega was also approached by offices of the Gestapo with the
requests to sell valuabl¢s made ofl precious metals and precious stones belonging to those Jewish
residents of the Protecto~ate who h&d fled the country or emigrated. In rrtid-December,Hadega sold
a large collection of obj~cts from ~recious metals studded with precious: stones for the total price of
2,019,304.00 crowns. The net proceeds of the sale less 5 per cent overhead expenses (1,918,339.00
l
crowns) were remitted (based on a directive of the Zentralstelle fiir jiidische Auswanderung) to
the account of the Jewish Religiou~ Community in Prague reserved for the emigration fund. 6
I
Hadega sent the purchased diamonds (brilliant cut) to the Reich-German company
Diamant-Kontor in Bdlin. Diam~nt-Kontor sold them abroad for foreign currencies and remitted
the proceeds to Hadeg~ in reichsinarks. Diamant-Kontor was not interested in stones of lesser
value like diamond bits,! precious Jtones other than diamonds or semi-precious stones. Such stones
could be sOl,d only on thf domesticl ~arke; (i.e inside the' Protectorate and in the Gem:an Reich) but
there was httle demandI for these Items. The approval by the Office of the Reich Protector
regarding sales of Jewish jewels in;the domestic market was obtained by Hadega in March 1941 on
the condition that no potl:ntial bUY!, for such jewels could be [oWld abroad.
' 223914
I
2
�,
i
Protectorat~
, The jewels procured frol Jewish residents of the
often found new owners in
quite unconventional *ays. For hample W. Utermohle purchased scores of such objects from
Hadega for a strangel~ low price of 11,437.00 reichsmarks. After an audit, he maintained that he
had not purchased the bbjects fori himself but for two acquaintances from abroad who had visited
Prague at the end of the year 1940: Marschhausen, a US citizen, and Hans Zieger, an "exchange
foreigner" who acted as a interinediaries for exports of Jewish je~els to Portugal. Since the
merchandise selected by Marschbausen and Zieger was not ready for sale during their stay in
Prague, and since the nieasures taI{:en by the United States after it had entered the war made foreignexchange transfers im~ossible, the payments supposedly had to be made in reichsmarks covering
1110 of the real price. ~oth Marschhausen and Zieger indeed deposit~d the amount of 13,000.00
marks in Untermohle~s private account at the Bohmische Escompte-Bank and instructed
Untermohle to settle with Hadega;9
,
I
,
I
I
Hadega's status was enhahced by the Fifth Implementing Ordinance ofthe Reich Protector
of Bohemia and Mora~ia of Makch June 21, 1939 to the Order regarding Jewish Property of
February 1941 orderirtg the resPective banks to "surrender Jewish-owned objects from gold,
platinum, and silver, as rell as prefious stones and pearls deposited with them or kept in the safes of
the Hadega Company ~n behalf of the Jewish owners." 10 Since the transfer of such objects from the
bank depots or safety-cleposit bo~es was not legally impeccable, the banks feared possible future
disputes with the Jewish principal's. Therefore, the Bankers! Union approached the Office of the
Reich Protector with the reques~to ensure the presence of the Jewish owner(s) arid a Hadega
representative at each iddividualluind-over of such objects. In its effort to obtain the largest possible
volume of the most val~able objeCts made from precious metals and precious stones within a short
time period, the Econo~ic Group; at the Office of the Reic~ Protector drafted a list of Jews who
held the most valuable ~ank deposits and requested "certain Jewish individuals to sell their jewels to
the trading company H~dega" .11 In other cases, the banks themselves' were to request the Jewish
principals to hand over jo Hadega ~heir jewels committed to the, respective banks for safekeeping. 12
if
.
The logical cJsequence
the Fifth Implementing Ordinance, was the order of the Reich
Protector ofSeptembe~ 30, 1942 i~troducing the "general" transfer of all Jewish valuables made of
gold, silver, platinum, lind precious stones kept in safety-deposit boxes of various banks and/or
deposited with such ba~ks in seal~d packages to a newly opened depository account of Hadega
("Sammeldepot jiidischer Schnluckgegenstiinde" [Collecting Depository of Jewish-owned
Jewelry].13 The Office 6f the Reith Protector ordered that incases of personal attendance of the
Jewish owners at the opening of th~ safety-deposit boxes (or if these owpers surrendered the keys to
their safety-deposit boxb to the bknk before their placement in the Jewish transport) their jewels
had to be handed over to Hadeg~. If the Jews did not comply with this regulation prior to their
transfer to a concentratiJn camp, tHeir valuables were assumed by the Zentralamt fUr die Regelung
der Judenfrage in Boh~en und *ahren: 4 There was no change in handling gold coins - Hadega
was not authorized to sell them; as before, gold coins had to be transferred to the National Bank ls
I
,
' .
The order of "general" transfer of Jewish-owned jewels and similar valuables to Hadega
apparently lead to fricti~ns with thJ competing Auswanderungsfonds. Due to an intervention of the
Sicherheitsdienst, the Office of thJ Reich Protector repealed its decision (by a memo of December
1, 1942) and halted the iWhole opebtion. It even revoked all accomplished transfers. The deposits
belonging to Jewish owpers had to remain at the respective banks; as before, such deposits could
only be surrendered to ~adega on \the basis of individual orders issued by the Office of the Reich
6
Protectorconceming specific individuals. I
I
I
2-23915
2
....
�I
The volume of Jewish-owned objects made of gold, silver and precious stones is indicated
,
by the following numbersjbased on t~e balance of Hadega's business activities:
Proceeds from sales of valuables:
, . '
,
11
in the year 1940, .... ,. 15,000~000.00 crowns l7
. the year 1941 ........-12,449,569.05 crowns
I
f
In
, I
I
'
18
.
in the year 1942.!.. ....44,823 1
,385.05 crowns l9
"
I
:
I
I
No balance of the Hadeka Company (later renamed Hakoma) is available for the
remaining war years. In f942 chang~d the rules applying to jewels and similar valuables. From June
1942, diamonds were hahdled separately from precious metals. Objects made from precious metals
(with the exception of g6ld coins) lwere recast. 20 Nevertheless, a considerable number of Jewish
owned jewels valued at ~,575,478.45 protectorate crowns remained in Hadega's possession (as of
December 31,1942).21 ; 1
\
I
I
I
The proceeds from sales of precious m<;tals and precious stones- obtained in the years 1941
and 1942 (in terms ofPr6tectorate ~rowns) can be derived from the following figures:
I
I
I
.
Gold
Gold Coins
Silver
Precious Stones
1942
3,012,421.10
46,906.20
3,782,817.85
37,969,266.80
: 267,531.20
I 20,217.50
1 312,073,85
~,281,652.55
I
j
I
'
.
Hadega transferred a consi'derable portion of the sales proceeds to the Sonderkonto ['special
account'] H 1116 of the uswaud~rungsfonds maintained at the Bobiniscbe Escompte-Bank.
J\,'
I
1
I
I
'
A large amouni of silver briginating from silver objects confiscatoofrom Jews or sold by
Jews to Hadega (mostly under pr~ssure), was purchased from Hadega by the National Bank for
,
Bobemia and Moravia' which stored it in its vaults. The bank did not have any power of disposal to
this Jewish silver; it co~ld only be'disposed of by the Reicbsstelle fUr Edelmetalle in Berlin. This
Reich-German instituti~m issued orders to the National Bank to c:onsign this silver to well
established firms, e.g. chemical plants to be processed for industrial purposes, above all to cover the
needs of the arms indu~try. A profuinent status among those firms had :the Reich-German company
I
I
Deutscbe Gold- und Silber-Scbeidenanstalt vormals Rossler at Frankfurt on tbe Main known
under its acronym De~ussa. ;ThejDegussa Company was not the only buyer of Jewish silver, In
December 1941, the National B~nk received a very unprofitable price for 942.038 ki10grams of
silver rods. Therefore) it approached (acting upon a recommendation' of the Reicbsstelle fUr
Edelmetalle in Berlin)' another Rbich-based German company: Staatliche Sacbsische Hiitten- und
Blaufarbenwerke in freiburg. iSubsequently, the National' Bank obtained a better PJlc;; wr9a16'
consignment of 8579.598 kilogra~s of pure silver sold to this company?2 .
" " J
I
'I·
-
I
I
2
'
;
' .
�i
I
I
•
I
I
'
I
'
docu~enting
betwee~
The surviving records
the business contacts
the National Bank and
the Degussa Company a~e incomplete; however, it may be assumed tAat Degussa remained the
major trade partner of the National Bank (though it later came to frequent frictions between the two
and the bank conducted business~lso with other Reich-based German firms). For example in
January 1943, the National Bank;offered 6098.5 grams of platinum from its reserves (obtained
mostly from Jewish indiliduals and institutions) to one of Degussa's subsidiaries, the Deutsche
Gold-und Silber-Scheid~nanstalt i,~ Hanau, PlatinschmeIze 'G. Siebert. However, this subsidiary
ofDegussa requested pla~inumdeliveries in rods and refused to accept the metal in granulated form.
For this.. reason, the deal fell througli, and the National Bank approached (upon the recommendation
I .
of the Uberwachungsstelle beim \yirtschaftsministerium in Prague responsible for transactions
involving platinum) thel Staatliche Gold- und Silberscheidenanstalt in Halsbriicke willing to
purchase platinum in granulated forin.
, I
' ,
,
I
I
With the onset' of the dePortations of Jewish citizens to concentration camps in 1941,
Hadega was faced with the combetition from the Auswanderungsfonds whose competencies
included the liquidation br assets belonging to the Jewish deportees including valuables made from
precious metals and prJcious stories left in the vacated apartments and/or deposited in sealed
packages or safety-d~sit boxes lof financial institutions; the Auswanderungsfonds' was also
authorized to conduct s~arches fot. third parties who had secretly accepted Jewish valuables for
safekeeping. Through sUfh activities, the Auswanderungsfonds amassed a considerable amount of
gold, platinum, silver and precious $tones for subsequent resale.
I
'
I
i
,
'
At the end of the year 1942, the Auswanderungsfonds sold to the National Bank 467 rods
of pure silver in total feight of ~911 kilograms. 23 Since the National Bank asked the Special
Emissary of the Reich IBank to the National Bank for Bohemia and Moravia whether to treat
this silver in the same mimner as th~t purchased from Hadega, it may be inferred that it was the first
delivery made by the ~uswanderbngsfonds. Another delivery followed in April 1943 when the
National Bank purch~sed' 575 !rods of silver (total weight of 1040.132 kilograms). The
Auswanderungsfonds obtained the same status as Hadega vis-a-vis the National Bank. The silver
confiscated from the Je~s deporte4 to Theresienstadt was rec~st and sold to the National Bank; as
before, it was handled by the Reichsstelle fUr Edelmetalle in Berlin. To the National Bank was to
be sold also the platinwp handled by the Uberwachungsstelle beim :Ministerium fUr Wirtschaft
und Arbeit in'Prague.!Through spbstantial changes went the operations involving gold purchased
from the Auswanderungsfonds; ~his gold could now be incorporated, in the gold reserves of the
National Bank. Its gold Icould be disposed of only by a special ,permission obtained from the board
of directors of the Reihh Bank br by the permission of Hermann GOring in his capacity as
I
24
commissioner for the four-year plan.
'
, ' ,
I
I
,
'.
In his effort t~ 'widen t~e potential market for jewels obtained from Jews, the State
Secretary at the 'Offic~ of the RJich Protector Karl Hermann Frank asked (at the end of the year
1942) the managing di~ctor of th~ DorotIieum Company in Vienna Dr. Jennewein to submit his
recommendations for the reorg~nization of the trade with, Jewish valuables. Dr. Jennewein
immediately offered D;orothe~m1s se~~e~ arguing that its auct~ons were well-known .~11 over
Europe. He was eager to estabhsh subsldIanes of the Dorotheum m Prague and Brno (Brunn) and
I
I .
. . , '
'
suggested to concentr~te there all the Jewels stored m dIfferent places (from the Gestapo to
Hadega).25 The Doroth'eum was ~ecommended to Frank by the Austrian Nazi bosses. They argued
that this institution pos~essed many foreign contacts and "already had many of offers from various
interested parties abrodd to purer-se the jeWelS: quite naturally, the :foreigners preferred dealing
�1
I
i
with a private company rather than the official Reich authorities. 26 The r~ason for this intervention
of the Austrian Nazi boss~s was the :desire to participate in the sales of the contents of thousands of
sealed Jewish apartrnents!and ten wirehouses containing the assets of the deported Jews, particularly
in the sales of Jewish jewels administered by the Auswanderungsfonds which were valued at
, approximately two mi11io~ reichsmarks.27 Various sections of the German occupation administration
debated what to do with the jewels but until the end of the year 1943 (the records are available only
.
until then), their fate rem~ined unde9ided.
I
.
'
i
.
fr~mthe
The surviving ddcuments
archives of K. H. Frank only attest to the interest of the
.
I .
Dorotheum in Vienna (which had already gathered experience - and profits - from the sales of
valuables belon~ng to ,thf Austrian jJe~s) to ac~ a~ an !ntermediary for sales of jew~lry confiscat~d
from Jews, JewIsh busmesses and JeWIsh assocIatIOns III the Protectorate of BohemIa and MoravIa.
It seems that the differe~t opinion~ and interests of the Reich Protector who was convinced that
assets gained in the PrJtectorate (including' Jewish assets) should be used for the purpose of
"furthering the Germani element": on the Protectorate territory, and. the SS-Wirtschafts- und
Verwaltungshauptamt wl1ich pusheq for sales of the property through the Viennese Dorotheum lead
to the result that the Jewi~h jewels ih possession of the Auswanderungsamt remained in the vaults
of the Bohmische Esco.rlpte-Bank;or the Bohmische Union-Bank which managed the accounts of
the Auswanderungsamt. ~t is certain that these Jewish jewels,. their parts, and other jewels of the
same origin remained at t,heBohmi~che Escompte-Bank untilthe liberation of Czechoslovakia. An
open issue remains their quantification and further fate in the context of the Soviet war-trophy
..1
.
;
.
campaign.28 .
I
'
1.
Whereas the jewels as such or the gold originating from purchases or confiscations of
jewelry belonging to JeJish ciHzen~ was handled by Hadega, 'a different procedure applied to gold
coins. Based on a decisibn of the Reich Bank, all gold coins obtained from Jewish individuals,
Jewish enterprises, and J~wish asso~iations had to be submitted to the National Bank for Bohemia
and Moravia. This dec~sion was hot always respected. In January 1942, at the time of a rapid
increase of the number of Jewish tJnsports to concentration camps, the Protector had to remind all
1
individuals and institutions involved of the necessity to comply with the. above mentioned decision
ofthe Reich Bank. 29
i
~
l
1
I
I
.
I
.
Gold coins werelobtained ~y the Nat;onal Bank - not only from Jewish citizens but also in
the course of official o~enings. of bank safety-deposit boxes of non-Jews in accordance with the
I·
I
Government Order No. J 56/39 Sb. pertaining to the inventory, compulsory offer and surrender of
foreign currency, precio~ metals, iecurities and receivables/claims abroad or according to Section
J J ofthe current exchan~e-control system. The coins (and other explicitly named assets) confiscated
in accordance with the above name~ regulation were sold. The sales proceeds w~re deposited in the
owners' accounts at the Irespective! bank. 30 The confiscated coins could also be included in the
. ' .
numismatic collection ofithe Natiorlal Bank. .
!
!
'j.
.
"
.
.
Gold (silver and !other) coiris of collector value had to be offered to the Reich Bank (or they
were selected by the Reich Bank) lfor its Geldmuseum in BerJin. The first consignment of gold
coins was received in B6rlin in July 1940; unfortunately, it is now impossible to establish the kind
and quantity of these boins?' Nhertheless, it seems that the Geldmuseum der Deutschen
I
.
.
Reichsbank was not in,erested in ithe gold coins offered. For example: when the coin collection
belonging to the Petschek Co. was confiscated, the museum showed no interest in any of the coins.
The collection was later sold for 1,327.60 Protectorate crowns and the proceeds were deposited in
I
2
Q:)
~
0')
C"")
C\J
C\l
�I
j
!
I
the budget account of J.Petschek (Treuhander ['trustee administering a non-Aryan firm']) in Bmo
kept at the Prague Loah Bank.32 : .
.
.
I
I
I
I
I
i
1
j
1
I
I
i
I
I
i
223919
2
�IV12. Foreign Markets
Diamonds repre~ented a s~ecial item within the group of assets obtained by confiscations.
At the beginning of the year 1941,: the value of all confiscated stones was estimated at about one
33
million reichsmarks. Diamonds a~d other precious stones and jewels were used to purchase scarce
foreign currencies needJd by the German war economy. Foreign exchange for Jewish valuables
from the Protectorate wa~ obtained in several ways. A certain part of the valuables was sold directly
in Germany, in the do~estic jewelry market (see chapter VII); more. often, the valuables were
exported, above all to the so calleo neutral countries. The exports were effected through certain
institutions or individual~ holding pbrmits issued by the competent institutions of the German Reich.
Diamonds and other precious stol1es and jewels were sold to prospective buyers abroad either
directly, for foreign curr~ncies, or through clearing payments. The quantity of the precious stones
and jewels used in the blearing trade was regulated in accordance with the development of the
balance of payments be+een Gerrriany and the respective state. Wheneyer an active credit balance
was reached, the payments for the "merchandise" were deferred, and further sales of the valuables
were restricted or halted.1 The forei~ currencies obtained through the clearing trade were conveyed
to the Reich Bank whicn in tum transferred some of them to the National Bank for Bohemia and
Moravia?4
I
I
I
When the valuables obtairled were sold directly for free foreign currencies, the process
depended on the given citcumstancds. The decisive factor was whether the sale was effected through
a person or a fmn authorized by the: Reich-German government or immediately by the Office of the
Reich Protector in coo~eration With the Hadega Company. If the sale was effected through a
,
I
person or firm, the foreign currenc,ies were conveyed t~ the Reich Bank; the Protectorate sellers
then obtained reichsmarkS; such paYments were remitted to the account "No. 3140 maintained by the
Hadega Company at thJ Kreditarlstalt der Deutschen. Hadega then 'transferred the funds (less
cost) to accounts of the dccupation llUthorities from which. it had obtained the valuables; in cases of
forced sales, the proceed4 were also transferred to the blocked accounts of the Jewish oWners.
From the spring iOf the yea~ 1940, sales of diamonds and other precious stones and jewels
obtained in the Protectorate effectedI in the domestic German market and iabroad were managed by a
I
,
company called Diamau~-Kontor. Ifhis company was based in Berlin aad later in Frankfurt .on the
Main. It maintained a subsidiary iIi Idar-Oberstein which received the valuables directly from the
Hadega Company. Di~mant,:,Koritor was established by the Reichswirtschaftsministerium
('Reich Ministry of the ~conomy') ;Which was responsible for the trade' in diamonds and precious
stones. The Diamant-Kontor's role was to sell diamonds and other precious stones abroad for
foreign currencies and rdmit all the! proceeds to the aforesaid ministry; in return, it received funds
3
from the ministry to cover its cost. Sj
I
i
,
The cooperation I with the piamant-Kontor Co. exporting valuables to Switzerland, was
considered inadequate by the Office of the Reich Protector and the Hadega Company - for two
reasons. The first reason Iwas the lor- foreign-exchange yield from the sales of jewels and precious
stones, the second reasonl was the o~ligationto remit the proceeds in foreign currencies to the Reich
Bank. Economically, direct trade coptacts with foreign partners were considered more attractive.
I
,
223920
Already at the end of theI year 1940, the Office of the Reich Protector'expJored the possibility of
.
direct sales of the requisitioned diamonds and jewels to customers in Switzerland, more precisely to
I.
I
2'
�I
I
1
I
the Meersmann Company contacted through Dr. Knitter from Berlin. The reasons were obvious.
For 207.95 carats of dia~onds, th~ Diamant-Kontor obtain~d foreign currency equivalent to
12,450.00reichsmarks (1940).36 M~ersmann offered to pay twice as much in foreign currency for
the same amount of valuables. 37
I'
I
.
The occupation authorities! in the Protectorate could only perform direct sales of the
requisitioned jewels, dia40nds, andi precious stones to foreign customers with the consent of the
competent Reich authorities. The :Office of the Reich Protector. applied for the respective
permission on Decerl,ber 30,; 1940 when it filed its application with the
Reichswirtschaftsminist~rium:and the management of the Reich Bank.38 On January 11, 194 I, the
Reichswirtschaftsministerium infohrled the Office of the Reich Protector that if the direct sales
I
brought a higher foreign-exchange yjeld (as compared with the sales presently effected through the
Diamant-Kontor Compahy), the Ministry would raise no objection to them. 39 Only on the basis of
this permit, the Office o~ the ReicH Protector could, in cooperation with the Badega Company,
commence direct sales of the requisiiioned valuables to foreign customers.
i
I
,
'
Apart from higher forei~-exchange' proceeds, the Office: of the Reich Protector
considered direct contactk with for¢ign buyers of Jewish valuables an opportunity to transfer the
foreign currencies direct1~ to the National Bank for Bohemia and Moravia (as opposed to sales
through middlemen whert the forei~ exchange obtained had to be remitted to the Reich Bank).
I ,
'
Naturally, this change of procedure had to be approved by Berlin, more exactly by the management
of the Reich Bank. The Office of the Reich Protector applied for this approval through the
,
I
Special Emissary of the Reh;h Bflnk to the National Bank for Bohemia and Moravia Dr.
Friedrich Muller on M~y 26,.1941. On June 3, Dr. MOller received a communication from the
Board ofDirectors of the ~eich Ba~k stating that the bank was ready to l~ave to the National Bank
the free foreign currency lobtained oy sales of diamonds and other precious stones.40 This decision
also applied to foreign exchange acquired through the Diamant-KontorCompany which had been
commissioned to sell a cebin volu~e of valuables also in the year 1942. .
"
I
I
The reason whYi the Offic'e of the Reich Protector tried so hard to have the foreign
exchange obtained by sales of valuaples remitted to the National Bank for Bohemia and Moravia,
was primarily fiscaL Th~ National' Bank for Bohemia and Moravia could not handle foreign
exchange ever since the dustoms union between the Protectorate and the Reich had been introduced.
At the same time, it wa~ necessaTYi to retain some foreign exchange in the Protectorate (with the
approval of the Reich authorities) tOjkeep the local economy running.
I
I
During the occupation period, diamonds, precious stones, and jewels requisitioned from
Jews living in the Protectorate J.ere sold (or intended for. sale) in the following states (in
I
r
"
alphabetical order):
I
Portugal
I
I!
.
establiSh~d,
223921
P~rtugal
It has been firml¥
that some Jewish valuables were brought into
in the
year 1941 through Germany where f.the sales had been arranged. The GeFlllan occupation authorities
I
in the Protectorate - the Exchange 'Division of the Office of the Reich ;Protector and the customs
administration - granted their permi~sion to transfer the valuables from Badega to Berlin where they
were received by ,a middleman (H~ns Zieger). With the approval of the Reich authorities, Zieger
I
. ,
I
i
3
�j
i
I
I
exported them to PortUgal where! they were sold for foreign currencies.41 Since the profit share from
the sales of jewels wJs remitted ito the Protectorate in reichsmarks, the foreign currencies obtained
I
I
.
from the buyers were apparently surrendered to the Reich Bank.
.
\.
.. i .
.
:
.
1
The volume bf the val babies exported to PortUgal and sold there was indicated only
summarily in a letter of June 6, 1941 sent by the head of the foreign-exchange branch W. Utennohle
to Kurt Ziemke, repre~entative clf the Auswartiges Amt ('Foreign Office' - Gennan Ministry of
Foreign Affairs) at the bffice oft~e Reich Protector. By that time, according to Untennohle, a larger
part of the jewels Ongirating fron) Jewish sources bad already been sold, among others in Portugal."
.
I
Slovakia
\
.
in the year 1941, a small~r quantity of the requisitioned diamonds (38.29 carats) was sold in
Slovakia, namely to thd finn Eug~n Reisinger in Bratislava.43 In the swmmer of 1942, a suggestion
was ma~e to se!l an +specifiedj quantity of jewe~s to the Bratislava finn Otto K~be~le .which
showed Interest In the~. The rnan~gement of the Reich Bank approved of the transactIon In View of
the debit balance in the
trade. ~
rnnan-Srvak
i
Sweden
I
A proposal to sell one ,I consignment of valuables to Sweden was submitted by W.
Untennohle on November 26, 1942. However, the special emissary of the Reich Bank Dr.
Friedrich Milller made His recommbndation conditional; the valuables c~uld only be sold directly, in
1
exchange for free foreigb currencie s. 45
:
I
1
.
I
.
.
In the context: of the post-war search for the displaced property, the National
Administration of Pro~erties infdnned the Ministry of Labor Protection and Welfare (February 8,
46
i946) that in one case,\ jewels w~re presumably exported Sweden. Nevertheless, it cannot be
excluded that the information was based on the above mentioned minutes. A direct proof that some
I
\
.
of the valuables were in fact export9d to Sweden has not been not discovered.
I
I
I
Switzerland
j
,
Diamonds and otherpreciots stones as well as Jewels obtained from Jewish individuals and'
legal entities were sold irl Switzerla~d in the years 1940-1942 either through clearing or directly for
foreign currencies (Swiss\franks or US dollars).
I
\
.
\
.
.
.
For the clearing ~les of pre~ious stones and jewels in Switzerland, the overall development
of the mutual balance or payments had to be taken into account. Clearing sales were used in
combination with sales f9r foreign ~urrencies until the second half of the year 1941. According to
the infonnation provided Py the Ball,king Group to the Office of the Reieh Protector (October 14,
1941), two Protectorate *counts m~intained within the framework of German trade contacts with C'\l
Switzerland were active -; a commodity account (balance of 104 million crown) and a Swiss-frank C'\l
account (balance equivaleht to 24,1 Ihillion crowns). Therefore,:the Foreign-Exchange Branch of the ~
Office of the Reich Prot~ctor did n~t recommend any further clearing transactions involving the C\!
47
requisitioned Jewish jewels. In 1942, clearing sales of jewels in Switzerland were recommended C\!
only if the foreign-exch~ngeyieldl reached 11 %. This approach of the Office of the Reich
I
j
3
�Protector was based upon the fact t~at wheneveran active balance in favor of the Protectorate was
shown, the bills were long-dated. Besides, the occupation authorities in the Protectorate as well as
the Reich authorities preferred, in vibw of the needs of the German war economy, to conduct any
sales ofjewels in Switzerl~nd directl~ for free foreign currencies.
I
j
J
Such sales were rhediated al~eady from the year i 940 by the Diamant-Kontor Co. which
continued acting as an i~tennediarY through 1942; they were conducted mainly through direct
contacts between the reprbsentatived of the occupation administration, the Hadega Company, and
the Swiss dealers.
I.
.
'.
The interest shown by both Jides in such deals evidently lead to an increased pressure of the'
I
I
occupation authorities exerted upon the original owners who were forced to quickly sell their jewels
to the Hadega Company./This press~re was supposed to increase the needed quantities and quality
of diamonds and jewels offered.for sale. 48 Also involved in the dealings was the Zentralstelle fUr
jiidische Auswanderung! which relhased, upon the request or'the Office of the Reich .Protector,
I
some of the diamonds in its custody that had belonged to those Jewish citizens who official1y
emigrated from the Protec~orate. 49 The first positively identifiabh! Swiss finn known to have bought
jewels and precious stone~ obtained from the Protectorate resid~nts of Jewish origin belonged to the
Swiss citizen Bernhard:Meersma~n, born on January 1, 1883 in Vevey where he established
himself as a jeweller. 50 bn Januar(y 16, 1941, Meersmann visited Prague where he conducted
negotiations with represbntatives df the occupation administration and the Hadega Company
regarding various modalities of di~mond sales to his Swiss finn. Due to the Swiss exchange
regulations, the Swiss N~tional B~nk did not to al10w purchases of diamonds in exchange for
foreign currencies and ttiandated c'learing sales. Meersmann thus recommended to transfer the
diamonds to the German dmbassy in iZurich; there, he intended to accept them in exchange for Swiss
51
franks. The Foreign-E~change Branch of the Office of the Reich Protector did not even
exclude the possibility of an agree'ment between Hadega and Meersmann; for this purpose, it
intended to put pressure Lpon the ~riginal owners and obtain, within approximately six weeks, at
least one thousand carats' worth of diamonds. According to. the infonnation from the Foreign
Exchange Branch of thelI Office ofI the Reich Protector of June 6, 1941, Meersmann indeed
purchased a larger amount of valuables from the Hadega Company.52
I
.
I
I
j
I
I
.
Business contacts with the Meersmann Company were maintained only in the first half of
the year 1941. Then they ~ere inte~pted following a denouncement by the finn Diamant-Kontor;
this finn had, undoubtedly for competitive reasons, infonnedthe Foreign-Exchange Branch of the
Office of the Reich P~otector aBout Meersmann's activities in Gennany and accused him of
"unfair" business practices. At tpe same time, it infonned the authorities that Bernhard
Meersmann's real namb was in fact Bernhard Leusing, born on January 8, 1883 at Laer
?
(Westphalia), of Jewish parentage. 5 Since the whole matter had to be officia11y investigated, any
further deals with theM~ersmann <tompany were suspended. 54 As an important n;tiddleman in sales
of jewels and precious Jtones in Sritzerland acted the Swiss citizen Alexander Brero, born on
January 22, 1886 at Winterthur, re~ident of Zurich and Ipsach near'BieL 55 Brero who maintained
personal contacts with Gb'rman offi9ials often travelled to the Protectorate to negotiate jJurchases of
valuables whose origin Jas known ro him or to take such valuables with him. He mediated contacts
between the occupation ~dministration and a diamond-cutting finn based in Biel.56 Its representative
Hans Vogeli, b. 1893 ~t Grafewi~d, resident of Berne, visited the Protectorate in August 1941
together with A. Brero.T During h~s stay, he negotiated the pUI:chase of a larger amount of jewels
from the Hadega Company and agreed to pay for them in Swiss franks. On September 11, 1941 W.
;
,
Utennohle gave A.Brer? a receipt for 117 625 Swiss franks remitted ~y the firm Vogeli & Wirz
for four packages of preCious stonbs and jewels purchased from the Hadega Company.58 Dealing
I
1
i
3
�with Vogeli & Wirz was consideJd most advantageous; thetefore, this firm was recommended
directly to the Reichswirt~chaftsmi~isterinm.
.
..
I
.
j
,
Direct sales of Jewish jewels, diamonds and other precious stones to Swiss firms can be
documented on the basis ~f archive Imaterials only for the yea~ 1941. In view. of a memo from the
Foreign Exchange Branchl of the OrQ.ce of the Reich Protector of September 20, 1941, it cannot be
excluded that diamohds continued to be sold to Switzerland through the
Reichswirtschftsministetinm. A. Brero presumably travelled; the Protectorate at the beginning
of the year 1942 to coIledt Jewish j~welry. It is established beyond any doubt that in March 1942,
Brero bought 4.97 kilograb of silver from the Hadega company.59
to
I
t
I
.
Since the valuables procured in the Protectorate were sold to Switzerland both directly and
through intermediaries, it is impossible to verify the exact overall amount and value of such objects,
also in view of the fact Ithat only :few of the original documents have surviveQ. However, the
available information allows us to sfute that, within the framework of all international transactions,
the largest amount of jewfls, diamo~ds, and other precious stones procured from Jews was sold in
Switzerland between 1940 and 1942' f
I
Chapter IV - Footnotes
I
j
The Kreditanstalt der rleutschen Las founded already in 1911; it became the largest financial
institutions serving ethnic IGermans in the Czech Lands. It was closely linked with the development
and fate of the local German minoritY.
I
.
I,
1
2 Draft letter from the Kr~ditanstalt ~er Deutschento the Reich Protector, undated, ACNB Prague,
I .
NB-P XXV-295 (163), Box No. 797.i
I
I
r
I i ·
3
Memo from the Economic Group Ilat the Office of the Reich Protector of March 1, 1940 to the
I
Devizenschutzkommando
lin Prague,
y
CNB Prague, NB-P XXV-295 (163), Box No. 797.
Report by W. Utermohl~ and A. S~hmer1ing regarding the audit of Hadega's activities in Prague
conducted on October 16, 1940, ACNE Praha, NB-P XXV-295 (163), Box No. 797.
4
5 Hadega's memo of December 12, 1940 to the Economic Group at the Office of the Reich Protector,
I ;
ACNB Prague, NB-P XXV -295 (163!), Box No. 797.
~
I
. 6 Ibid.
1
i
I
I
I
lI
.
i
.
223924
Hadega's memo of March 12, 194i to the Economic Group at the Office ofthe Reich 'Protector,
SUA Prague, NSMP, Box No. 777. I
.
7
I
3
�i
Memo of March 20, 1941 from the Economic Group at the Office of the Reich Protector to
,
I
I
Hadega, SUA Prague, NSf\1P, Box No. 777.
;
8
I '
I
,
J
, Position paper by W. Utlrrn5h1e , January 14, 1942 with regard to the report on findings made at
I
Hadega, ACNB, NB-P XXV-295 (1j3), Box No. 797.
'
v
I
10
'j
v
v
Circular of the Bankers; Union No. 131 of March 3, 1941, ACNB Prague, ZB-S VWg-l, Box No.
1149.
I
.
banL
I
'
" Circular of the zivnosLslci
[Zivnobanka - 'Small Businessmen's Bank1 from the spring
I
1941 (unnumbered, undated), ACNB Prague, ZB-S VWg-l, Box No. 1150.
v
.'
v
~
. I
Circular of the Zivnostenska Banka (administration of the 'Nt assets) No. 528 of December 20,
I
I
.
1941, ACNB Prague, ZB-1'S VWg-l, Box No. 1150.
'
12
W
'"
,
I
'.
j
Circular of the zivnoslenska BaJka (administration of the
I
!
1942, ACNB Prague, ZB-,'S VWg-l,:Sox No. 1153.
t3
Y
\of
N' assets) No. 420 of November 20,
I .
:
Zivnos~enska
Circular of the
BaJa (administration of the 'Nt assets) No. 36511942 of October 9,
'.
.
1942, ACNB Prague, ZBis VWg-l,lBox No. 1153.
14
!
I
I
Circular of the Zivnostenska banka No. 13 of January 8, 1942, ACNB Prague, ZB-S Vll/g-l, Box
1
;
No. 1152.
15
v
v
I
v
'
I'
16
•
I
'.,;
v
Circular of the Zivnostenska banka No. 441 of December 4, 1942, ACNB Prague, ZB-S VWg-l,
Box No. 1153.
I' j .
.
I
I
' I '
.
'
Based on the informa~on that H~dega was allotted 5 per cent of the sale price. In 1940, Hadega's
share of the proceeds from sales ofljewelry amounted to 750,000.00 Protectorate crowns. Report of
December 1942 on Hadbga's busiqess activities, ACNB Prague~ NB-P XXV-295 (163), Box No.
797.
17
I i ,
I
I
.
Balance of the trade aptivities ofithe Hadega Company as of December 31, 1941, ACNB Prague,
.'
NB-P XXV-295 (163), Box No. 791.
18
I
i
I
I
'223925
Balance of the trade activities o'f the Hadega Company in the year 1942, ACNB Prague, NB-P
XXV-295 (163), Box N6. 797.
19
.
i,
I
!
I
3
�j,
I
2°9uidelines governing the purchas~s of diamonds, gold, silver, and platinum of June 12, 1942,
ACNB Prague, NB-P XXV-295 (163), Box No. 797.
,
I
I
I
0
.
,
00
List of valuables kept iniHadega's ~afes as of December 31, 1942, ACNB Prague, NB-P XXV-295
I
(163), Box No..797.
i
21
I
i
I
Letters from the National Bank to Degussa of December 13, 1941 and December 13, 1944.
ACNB, NB-P XXV-257(l23-II.), Box No. 787; cf. Letter fromP. Muller to W. Utermohle (July 10,
I
1942), ACNB, NB-P XXV-295 (163), Box No. 797.
22
y
t
I
I
'
0
Memo from the Mairi ~ranch of tpe National Bank to the special emissary of the Reich Bank to
the National Bank of December 28, 1942, ACNB Prague, NB-PXXV-268,(123a), Box No. 787.
23
I
0:
.
speLl E~
" Memo from the
of the Reich Bank at the National Bank MOller to the
Zentralamt fUr die Regeluhg der Judbnfrage of December 29, 1942, ACNB Prague, NB-P XXV-258
,
(123a), Box No. 787.
iI
i
I.
0
Letter ~om the managi?g director :of the Dorotheum Dr. Jennewein to K. H. Frank (December 11,
1942), SUA Prague, State Secretary K. H. Frank, 109-4-1116.
25
I
I
26 Letter from the Gauleiter (head ot a Nazi administrative district) Dr. H. Jura of Vienna to K. H.
I ,
I
Frank (March 18, 1943), SUA Prague, State Secretary K. H. Frank, 109-4+1 116.
!
I
I
r
.
I
Der Befehlshaber der Sicherheits~olizei und des SD ['Commander of the Security Police and the
Security Service'], Minutbs taken bY;, E. Weimann on April 2, 1943, cf. Letter by the Reich Protector
I
.
K., Daluege of April 13, ~943 to W1 Pohl (head of the SS-Wirtschafts- und Verwaltungshauptamt),
SUA Prague, State Secretary K. H. Frank, 109-4-116.
27
0
I
i
28
For more detail see Chapter
VI.
•
j
I
29
~
!
y
Circular No. 13142 of January 8, 1942, ACNB Prague, ZB, s ,VWg-l, Box No. 1152.
·
Internal instruction se'1t by the N~tional Bank to other financiai institutions ( September 5, 1941).
ACNB Prague, NB-P XXV-257 (123-1I), Box No. 787.
30
0
o
I·
•
31
0
•
1
0 . .
I
•
'
.
'
y
? 23926
Memo from the Mam Branch of the National Bank to F. Muller (March 18, 1942), ACNE Prague,
NB.p XXV-257 (123-1I)! Box No. 787.
.
.
I
I
3
�I
I
I
32 Memo
'
from the National Bank, Ref.No. 431142-h1.u. of March 18, 1942'to Muller, ACNB Prague,
I
I
.
NB-P XXV-257 (123-ll), BoxNo. 787.
I
I
I
rega~ding
Minutes of January' 17, 1941
the preparation of diamond sales in Switzerland, ACNB
Prague, NB-P XXV -256 (123 - I), Bqx No. 787.
.
33
i
34 Letter from F. MUller to W. Ute~ohle of July 7, 1941, SUA Prague, NationalAdministration of
Properties (Narodni spnlvk majetko~ch podstat - nNSMP n), Box No. 777:
.I
/ I
.
.
Letter from the Chief Of the Devisenschutzkomando (,Foreign-Exchange Protection Unit') to the
Public Prosecutor at the Gennan LaAd Court of Justice in Prague of April 19, 1940, ACNB Prague,
NB-P XXV-295 (163), B6x No. 797]
35
i
I
I
Report of the Hadega Company td the Office of the Reich Protector (December 12, 1940), ACNB
Prague, NBC, P XXV-295(163), B~x No. 797. Cf. Letter from W. Utennohle to the representative
of the Auswfu1:iges Amt ~t the Reich Protector's Office K. Zie~e (January 6, 1941,) SUA Prague,
I
.
'
NSMP, Box No. 777.
.
36
i
.
EXC~ge!
Minutes of the Foreil!l\Branch prepared for the Head of the Economic Department of .
the Office of the Reich PlIotector W.,Bertsch (January 18, 1941), SUA Prague, NSMP, Box No. 778 .
31
.I
.
.
I
I
.
.
.
Letter from the Head of the Foreign-Exchange Branch W. l)tennohle to the Special Emissary of
I
the Reich Bank at the National Bank F. Muller (December 30, 1941), ACNB Prague, NB - P XXV
256 (l23-I), Box No. 787~
1
.
.'
.
38
j
I
' . J .
I
"Letter from the Reich Minisby ofle Economy to w. Uterm6hle (January II, 1941 ), SUA Prague,
NSMP, Box No. 777.
t
.
.1
I
.
i
I '
.
Letter from the Board of Directbrs of the Reich Bank to the Special Emissary Muller, ACNB
I
j
Prague, NB-PXXV-257 QI23-II), Box No. 787.
.
. 40
I
i
I
I
.
Memos from the Office of the Reich Protector to the Hadega Company of March 28, 1941 and
July 4, 1941 regarding tHe preparatIon of jewels for sale in Portugal, SUA Prague, NSMP, Box No.
j
" .
777.
.
. 41
I'.
,
I
42
Letter by W. Utermohle of June q, 1941 for K; Ziemke, SUA Prague, NSMP, Box N(). 777.
I
!
223927
3
�i
t
43
I
Annual balance sheet of the diamond trade (1942), ACNB Prague, NB-P XXV-295 (163), Box
'
I
,
No. 797.
i
I
44 Letter from the Board of Directors bfthe Reich Bank to Dr. F: Muller dated Ju1y 17, 1942, ACNB
Prague, NBC, P XXV-258!(123 A), Box No. 787.
.
I
~ecember
" Record of a conversatiL held on
26, 1942 between Dr. F. Muller and W. Utennohle,
v
v ! ,
ACNB Prague, NBC, P XXV-295 (163), Box No. 797.
I
.
I
46 Letter from the National AdminisJation of Properties of February 8, 1946 to Dr. Gordon from the
I
. I ,
.
Ministry of Labor Protectibn and Welfare, SUA Prague, Archive Collection of the Ministry of Labor
I
'I
Protection and Welfare - Repatriation, Box No. 428.
I
1
I
i
Minutes prepared?y Dr:. F. Mullerifor the Head of the Foreign-Exchange Branch W. Utermohle of
October 14, 1941, SUAPFague, NSMP, Box No. 777.
47
I
, !
I i , :;
,.
Proposal by W. Utermohle submitted to the Head of the Economic Department of the Office of
the Reich Protector w. Bertsch; ptoposed procedure for the expropriation of Jewish valuables,
•
I
'
January 18, 1941, SUA Prague, NSMP, Box No. 777.
48
,
I
I
Letter from the Head of the Zentt.alstelle fUr judische Auswanderung iI. Gilnther to the Head of
.
I
I
•
the Foreign-Exchange Branch W. Utemohle, February 8, 1941, SUA Prague, NSMP, Box No. 778.
49
I
I
I·
j
"
,'
,
I
"
so Report about B. Meersmann's,stay in Prague from January 16 to January 19,1941, SUA Prague,
'
Police Headquarters in Prague (tlPP";), 421M-81 11.
I
Record of talks lead by B. Meersmann with W. Utermohle and F. Muller on January 16, 1941,
ACNB Prague, NB-P XXiV -256 (r23-I), Box No. 787.
51
I
Letter from W. Uterrnohle to tJe representative of the Auswartiges Amt Kurt Ziemke, SUA'
Prague, NSMP, Box No. T177.'
I
, , '
52
I
53
I '
I
'
.
Letter from the Diamant-Kontor <company to the Hadega Company dated October 22, 1941, SUA
,
1
Prague, NSMP, Box No. 1777 .
1
I
54 Letter from the Head o! the Fo~eign:'Exchange Branch W. Utermohie to the Hadega Company
dated October 31,1941, SUA Pra~e, NSMP, Box No. 777.
I
I
:
223928
!
3
�I
I
I
I
I
,i
55
...
Reports about A. Brero·J visits to Pi-ague in the year 1941, SUA Prague, PP, 42/B-76/2.
I
Letters by A. Brero o~ March 2~ and May 10, 1941 containing his offers to arrange sales of
I
56
)
confiscated jewels in Switzerland, SlJJA Prague, NSMP, Box No. 777.
j
Report about H.
122/12.
57
".
'
I i
.
Vogeli'~ stay in P~ague from August 5 to August 7, 194·1, SUA Prague, PP, 42N
1
1
I
I
Sales receipt re sale of confiscated jewels to the Vogeli & Wirz Company, September 11, 1941,
. ,
,:,
SUA Prague, NSMP, Box No, 777. 1
58
I
59
I
Silver balance for the year 1942, A'CNB Prague, NBC, P-XXV 295 (161), Box No. 797.
I
.
3
�I
V.
Scope of the lIlegrlly
(Reconstruction) .
Seize~
.
Assets Consisting of Gold, Platinum, and Precious Stones
•
t
,
quantifi~ation
The final
of the gold obtained by confiscations from Jewish individuals,
enterprises, and associatiotts is based/ on several material sources compiled by various authors, both
Germans and Czechs. On~ of the mo~t important sources is the cash journal of a special account at
the Main Branch of tb~ National Bank for Bohemia and Moravia containing records of
purchases and sales of g~ld obtain~d by Hadega (Hakoma) from Jewish individuals and legal
entities. The oldest surviving recordsigo back to January 29, 1941;starting from the aforementioned
date, the said cash journal !contains complete data covering the entire time period until the post-war
era. According to this cas~ journal, the gold deposits at the National Bank amounted, as of April
30, 1945, to 255.85365 kilograms ofI gold. According to our computation . based on an extract from
I
the cash journal re special ,account o~the National Bank, we have determined that during theperiod
from January 29, 1941 to April 30, 1945 the Narodni banka purchased a total of 482.35365
kilograms of gold from the HadegJ (Hakoma) Company. During the same period, the Nirodni
banka sold 226.5 kilograrits ofthis grId to various domestic metal refineries.! _
I
We have attempted to reco~struct the amount 'of gold originating from Jewish property on
,the basis of the documentktion surv~yed. Shortly after the liberation of Czechoslovakia in the year
1945, the Central Accou~ting .Dep1artment of the National Bank prepared a survey of the gold
I
I
.
reserves as of January 1, 1938, March 15, 1939 and April 30 (or May 7), ·1945. Both the balance of
October 1, 1938 and ofiMarch 15,11939 contained only three account statements: IIBalance of
Monetary Gold in Prague,", "Balanc~ of Monetary Gold Abroad" a "Gold Balance Abroad in other
Accounts" while the balance of Apr41 30 (or May 7), 1945 documents another - fourth - account
"Balance in Prague in othbr Accounts", containing 281.5 kilograms of pure gold. 2 This entry shows
~he current accounting ~alance or; gold originating from Jewish property sold by the Hadega
(Hakoma) Company to the Nation,IBank. This is proven by a document drafted on May 9, 1945
entitled "Detailed SurveYiof the De'ielopment of Gold Reserves of the Czechoslovak National Bank
in Prague during the German Occupation, i.e from March 15, 1939 to May 9, 1945" equally
I
indicating the amount oqhe "receivflble gold" to be 281.45474 kilograms. 3 The figures contained in
the document .conform - until April 30, 1945 - with the figures entered in the cash journal re special
account of the Nation~ Bank; t~erefore, we consider this "receivable gold" to be Jewish gold
'
procured by Hadega (Hakoma). i
I
•
!
!
As the government of the (Czechoslovak Republic prepared its memorandum regarding the
Czechoslovak reparation!c1aims ag~inst Germany, it established on the basis of the then available
(today most probably lost) book of ~ccounts of Hadega,4 that 416,847 kilograms of gold belonging
to Jewish owners was pUrchased tHrough this company.s While comparing this indication with the
aforementioned extract from the c~h journal of the special account at the National Bank kept on
behalfof Hadega, we discovered a' discrepancy of more than .65 kilograms of gold. Due to the fact
that Hadega's books are !no longer ~vailable, it is unclear which date was chosen in the government
memorandum as the fin~l date for! the purpose of determining the amQunt of gold procured from
Jewish owners. We consider the fi~res contained in the cash journal of the special account of the
National Bank to be more conclusive.
.
I
j
.
"
.~
!
. ..'
?
23'9 3 0
From April 1943, sales ofl,JewiSh gold to the National Bank were also conductea'by the
Auswanderungsfonds. The gold, purchased by the National Bank was incorporated In the
l
t
3
�I
reserve~
iss~ed
monetary gold
... These I purchases are confinned by rf""'ipts
to the
Auswauderungsfonds bYlthe Main Branch of the National Bank with respect to the quantities of
the gold purchased by it; by SeptemBer 1, 1944 the amount of this gold reached 134.84 kilograms. 6
The reconstruction of the . amourlt of gold purchased by ,the National Bank from the
,
I
Auswanderungsfonds aSlofMay 9, 1945 is based on the above mentioned document "Detailed
Survey of the Developmeht of Gold iReserves" found in the Archives of the Czech National Bank,
namely from the indicatioh of the total reserve of monetary gold of 775.64587 kilograms remaining
in the vaults of the National Barlk as of the above named date. After subtracting the item
"remaining gold" of the cJ:zechosJov~k National Ba.,k amounting to 643.17944 kilograms, a total
of 132.172 kilograms is o~tained; w~ consider this total to be the actual amount of gold acquired by
the National Bank from the Auswa~derungsfopds as of the given date.
,
j
I
r
Another figure important f6r the establishment of the total amount of the confiscated
Jewish gold appears in c~nnection irith the request of the Czechoslovak government to return the
gold garnished by the Rea Army in' 1945 and later transported to the former Soviet Union. In the
reference records office 6f the currJmcy circulation department of the Czech National Bank was
discovered a document erititled "Detailed Survey of the Development of the Gold Reserves during
the Period of the GernJn Occupation, i.e. from March 15, 1939 to May 9, 1945 11 which was
obviously prepared in c06peration w!ith the Soviet authorities to meet their needs. 7 In this document,
281.45474 kilograms of p,ure gold Was referred to as "receivable gold"; this quantity corresponded
roughly to the amount bf gold administered by the National Bank as that obtained through
Hadega's (Hakoma's) cdnfiscation~ of Jewish valuables. s
I
'
fr~m
The sum of the "receivable lOld" (i.e. gold purchased
the Jiadega Company), and the
I
,
monetary gold purchased by the .i':lational Bank from the Auswanderungsfonds produced the
I
closing balance of 413 .63017 kilogfarns of gold - approximately the quantity of gold garnished by
the Soviet Union as bootY, after World War n.9
.
I
)
For handling platinum obkined from Jewish individuals and legal entities, the German
occupation administratio~ introduced rules similar to those applicable to handling silver; the only
. difference was, that for platinum coining from Jewish valuables deposited at the National Bank, the
I
•• '
rights ~f disposal w:re ~ven ~he .q>~rwac~ungsstell~ beim Wirtschaftsministerium in Prag~e.
The pnmary collectIOn and dlstnb~tlon pomt of\platmum was Hadega (Hakoma). The sources
documenting the movembnt and disiribution of this precious metal are also incomplete. Nonetheless,
they corroborate the figJres contaiAed in the government memorandum prepared (probably during
the first few months aftet Liberatioh) for the anticipated reparation negotiations. In Annex 1-9-a+b,
this memorandum indic~tes that th~ amount of platinum originating from Jewish jewelry procured
until the end of the war reached'5.251 kilograms. JO
.
I
I
The data regar4ing the g!unished amount of platinum quoted from the memorandum
correspond with the supriving inventory records of the platinum account kept by' the Hadega
Company for the years 1941-42. ~ ofDecember 31, 1941, this account contained 1.3528 kilograms
of platinum. In the year 11942, another 3.0688 kilograms of platinum were collected. These figures
refer only to the so called "accourlt-processed" platinum; in fact, all platinum was stored in scrap
I
,
form. By the end of t~e year 1~42, the total quantity of such platinum amounted to 5.4939
kilograms. In 1942, the ~hemical Metal Refineries in Prague: purchased 0.0458 kilograms from the
stock of "account-processed" platirium; the National Bank itself purchased 0.7741 kilograms. ll The
National Bank also obthined platihum from Hadega during later periods: this is confirmed by the
only surviving invoice 6f August 944 regarding the purchase of 0.397 kilograms of platinum for
t
I
I
I
4
2:2'3;931
.
",
/
�I
I
I
12,704.00 Protectorate crowns; ihis Jum was deposited in Hadega's current account No. 5000/61 at
.
. . .
.
the Kreditanstalt der De~tschen.12 1
I
I
'
'
•
In view of the cdmparison of the data from the government memorandum on restitutions
with the balance of Had~ga's plati~um reserves existing at the end of the year 1942 (after the
conclusion of main wave bf deportations of Jews to concentration camps when most of the platinum·
objects were collected), the post-wa'r estimate of 5.251 kilograms appears to be conservative and
plausible.
.
I
.
I'
. .
.
I
I
I
,
.
The overall development ofIthe silver stock procured from Jewish individuals, enterprises,
I
'
and associations through lHadega QIakoma) and purchased by the National Bank for Bohemia
and Moravia is documehted by sereral summarizing statements· kept at the archives of the said
bank. Though the Natio~al Bank ras charged with collecting silver,· the exclusive right of its
disposal (as it was the cas6 re gold and'platinum) had the Reichsstelle fiirEdebnetalle in Berlin.
I
'
I
.
.
.
i
The first statem<rnt prepar9d by the Central Accounting Department of the National
Bank indicates the quant~ty of silver purchased from the Hadega Company during the period from
April 13, 1940 (when tHe first consignment of 190.131 kilograms of luncoined pure silver was
received by the bank) un~l Nove~b¢r 11, 1941. This first consignment was closely connected with
the Fifth Implementing Ofdinance ojthe Reich Protector ofBohemia and Moravia regarding Jewish
Property of June 21, 1939 issued Ion March 2, 1940 regarding compulsory deposits of Jewish
valuables in depots of exhange banks. Jewish citizens were trying to recover at least some of the
value by quick sales of th~ir valuables including silver objects. This silver was collected by Hadega;
the National Bank pur6hased it ~m as-needed basis in weekly or bi-weekly intervals. As of
December 28, 1940, the bank had ptirchased 1452.70 kilograms of pure silver and 7.367 kilograms
13
of coined silver. As for Ithe year ·1 ~41, data regarding silver are available only for the period from
January 10 to October 1!0. In the yaults of the National Bank were deposited another 596.679
kilograms of uncoined ptire silver (i.e. recast silver) and 4.453 kilograms of coined silver. Between
April 13, 1940 (when tHe Fifth Implementing Ordinance came into fOfce) and October 10, 1941
(shortly before the first ~nsports 9f Jews were dispatched), Hadega sold 2049.387 kilograms of
uncoined silver and 11.8~ kilograms of coined silver to the National Bank.14 .
I
j
Another usable ~ummarizi~g statement was prepared, directly by the Hadega Company. It
corroborates that as of December 31, 1941 the Company's had stockpile of 1877.374 kilograms
(gross weight) of coinedl and uncoihed silver (this means that its net weight amounted to 1486.80
kilograms). In the coursd of the ye* 1942, Hadega acquired another 12,794.2668 kilograms (gross
weight) of coined and Jncoined siilver from Jewish sources. This amount corresponded to a net
weight 8646.179 kilograt?s. Conse~uent1y, the aggregate quantity of Jewish silver which had passed
through Hadega from 1941 to 19~2 amounted to 13,562.00 kilograms of coined and uncoined
metal. Hadega sold ne~rly the et;ttire amount of silver it obtained to the National Bank for
Bohemia and Moravia. [Only 24.4?6 kilograms (gross weight) of silver coins were submitted to the
Reich Bank in Berlin. ill the year 1942, negligible quantities of silver were sold to two companies:
Alexander Brero Co. I in Biel (4.96 kilograms) and the Otto Sauter Co. in Berlin (0.12
kilograms).15
I
I
I
. .
·
223932
I·
No further summarizing lccounts documenting the movement of the Jewish silver are
available for the remainin/!g years the German occupation. There is n~ .doubt that the confiscations
.
01
i
4
' .
�~
I
1
I
I
.
and purchases of Jewish silver coritinued also in this period but its yield declined in direct
proportion to the decrease of the Jewi~h population disappearing in the concentration camps. This is
confirmed by one of the dre survividg documents of September 1944 in which the Reich Bank in
Berlin confirmed receipt bf a consi~ment 3.4 kilogi-ams (gross weight) of silver coins from the
Hakoma Company.IG
I
I
i
.
1~42'
Until the end of the year
Hadega had obtained '13.5 metric tons of silver (gross
weight) from Jewish ihdividualsJ enterprises, and . associations. The post-war restitution
I ,
memorandum of the Czechoslovak government indicates that Hadega obtained a total of 16.7 tons
of silver. The difference between ~hese two figures (3.2 metric tons). was probably caused by
including an additional amount of silver accumulated by Hadega in the remaining years of World
War n. This means that the data coritained in the memorandum can be accepted as adequate also
with respect to Jewish silJer.17
I
I
I
I
. i
I
Unlike gold, silver or platirium, the diamonds confiscated from Jewish subjects were not
passed on to the Nation~1 Bank fot further handling; the entire process of collection and sales of
diamonds was conducte~ directly by Hadega. In this area, Hadega maintained business relations
with the Reich-German iristitution Diamant-Kontor in Berlin. '
,
I
Co
.
d
. mcomp1ete. I 'IS
The sUfV1~ng so~rces ~egard"mg t,hielate 0 f JeWlsh d'lam?n.s ar~ a.I'so. qUIte .
. .
t
therefore ImpractIcable to elaborate a more exact summanzatIOn mdicatmg the total amount of
diamonds procured froci1 Jewish irldividuals, enterprises, and associations in the Protectorate of
I
Bohemia and Moravia. l'ievertheles's, it is possible to reach certain conclusions on the basis of the
.'
..
surviving documents of the Hadegai Company.
I
.
I,
While drawing ~n analogylwith silver, it may be inferred that the vast majority of Jewish~
owned diamonds was ol;>tained in the years 1941 and 1942. As of December 31, 1941 Hadega's
inventory contained 416ft 1 carats ?f diamonds (including brilliant cuts) and 23.21 carats of rosette
cuts. A document of Jurie 12, 1942 prepared by the Economic Group at the Office of the Reich
Protector confirms that/as 'of Apri11, 1941,6393 diamonds (totil weight of 533.63 carats) and, as
of August 12,1941 another 3610 diamonds (total weight. of 339.60 carats) from the Protectorate had
been sold abroad; no tar~et country; is specified. ls
.
j
I
During the year 1942, Hadega took possession of 3839.464 carats of diamonds (brilliant
cut) and 239.745 carats bf diamond rosettes. A small portion thereof, only 38.29 carats of diamonds,
was sold in Slovakia. The vast m~jority of diamonds (brilliant cut) totalling to 2872.30 carats was
sold in the domestic nJrket; the same applies to diamond rosettes (3811.846 carats sold to domestic
customers). The sales bf diamon3 rosettes exceeded their book value; therefore, in the volume
. designated for sale hadito be'incl~ded a portion of the yet unregistered stock of diamonds. By the
end of the year 1942, the sales vo'umeshad reached 2348.66 carats of diamonds (brilliaqt cut) and
513.15 carats of diambnd rosettes. According to the survIving stock record, 5128,80 carats of
diamonds (brilliant cut) and 582,q41 carats of diamond rosettes passed through Hadega's books in
the years 1941 - 1942;la part of tris volume had been stored as Hadega'~ company deposit at the
Bohmische EscompteJBank'in Prague.20
.
,I
223933
Chapter V. - Footnotes
4
�Cash journals of th~ Nationall Bank containing records of gold purchases from the Hadega
Company (later renam~d Hakoma~ and sales of its gold to individual metal refineries in the years
I
'
1941-1945, ACNB Prague, NB-P XVIl-332/8, Box No. 430a.,
I.
v
I i ·
Gold inventory at the National Bank as of October 1,1938, March 15, 1939, and April 30,1945,
v
"
ACNB Prague, NB-P XVll-1 Q3/23 Central Accounting Department Box No. 337.
2
r
I
.
l
I
i
3 Annex 10 to the Report by S. Racak, LLD, prepared for the Chairman of the Czechoslovak State
Bank J. Tosovsk)!, PrJf.Eng. (September 15, 1990), Reference No. i 19/10-90, ACNB Prague,
Czechoslovak State Blank (Statni banka ceskoslovenslci. - "SBCS"), Currency Circulation
I
.
,
.
Management - Reference Records Office.
I
4
The archives contain no record ofIi any authorized destruction or relocation ofHadega's books.
...I :I
.
S Undated
.
.
memorandum Iregarding testitutions, ACNE Prague, NB-P XVII-330, Box No. 424.
.
.
I
.
j
I
Bookkeeping certificate of September 1, 1944 documenting the sale of 55.53 kilograms of gold for
I
I
the total amount 1,545,941.30 Protectorate crowns, whereby the volume of such sales reached
I
I
134.84 kilograms of gold and yielded a total of 3,281 ,989.60 Protectorate crowns; the National Bank
paid out this amount to t~e Auswa~derungsfonds in Prague. ACNB Prague, NB-P XVII-332/8, Box
I
No. 430..
6
7
For mor~ detail see Ch~pter VI.
i
I i ·:
v
Report by S. Racak, LLD, prepared for the Chairman of the Czechoslovak State Bank J. Tosovsk)!,
Prof.Eng. (September 15,11990), Ref.No. i 19/10-90, ACNE Prague, SBCS.
I
I
8
I
I
9
I
.
'
I .
For more detail see Chapter VI.
I
I
No~
10 Memorandum on restitutions (uhaated), ACNE Prague, NB-P XVll-330, Box
424. This
memorandum refers to I Annex li5 dealing exclusively with· Jewish-owned jewelry is still
.
unaccounted for in spite Qf a considerable effort to locate it
.
11
.
Annua
No. 797.
Ib I
i i '
1.1
v , · ·
a ance sheet of the platmum trade (1942), ACNBPrague, NB-P XXV-295 (163), Box
I ' · '
223934
4
�I
I
12
I'
,
' , : '
,
'
Letter from the National Bank f~r Bohemia and Moravia to Hakoma (August 14, 1944), Archives
of the Capital Prague (Mchiv hlaliho mesta Prahy - "AMP"): FNO, Box No. 14.
13 Statement of the Central Accou~ting Department of the National Bank re silver purchased from
I
•
•
, the Hadega Company (Nlovember 111, 1941), ACNB Prague, NB~P XXV-295 (163), Box No. 797.
I
I
14 Ibid.
j
,
I
,
I.
'
Hadega's SlIver statement for the year 1942, ACNB Prague, NB-:-P XXV -295 (163), Box No. 797.
15·
·
I
l'
"
,
16 Communication from I he Reich Bank to Hakoma (September 8, 1944), SUA Prague, National
t
Administration ofPtopeTes (Naroii spnflva majetkov)'ch podstat - "NSMP"), Box No. 777.
I
ii,
1 7 :
v
Undated memorandum issued by! the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic, ACNB Prague,
I
NB-P XVTI-330, Box Nol424.
I
I
..
.
18 Letter by the Economic Group at the Office of the Reich Protector Ref.No. 2/29-42 WI-3 F of
June 12, 1942, Vorprufungsstelle! Edelstein- und Diarnant-Industrie" Idar-Oberstein 2, ACNB
Prague, NB-P XXV-295 (163), BoxlNo. 797.
'
I
•
i
I
Annual balance sheet b{the diarhond trade (1942), ACNBPrague, NB-P XXV-295 (163), Box'
No. 797.
' \
!
'
.
I
19
A~unt
J)
y~rs
j 941-42, extroct from
Hadega documentation kept at the National Bank, ACNB Prague, NB-P XXV-295 (163), Box No.
797.
20
'Diamonds Llliant
' I ,
and diamond rosettes' for the
v
4
�I
VI.
,
I
'
'
Fate of the Jewish-Owned GQld Purchased by the Protectorate Bank of Issue; PostWar Fate of Jewi~h Movablbs unsold by the Germans until the 'End of World War II
I
I
'-
"
j
Is extremely difficult to trac~I the movables belonging to the persecuted Jewish population
I
from the Czech Lands after the end of World War ll; tracking gold, precious metals, precious stones
and jewels made of such rrlaterials is {,jrtually impossible. To m¥e matters worse, only few sources
have survived, and the exi~ting docurhents are kept in many different places. In addition (as shown
below), the information c~ntent of th'e existing documents is very limited'. The Czech Protectorate
administration, and, after the war, th~ Czechoslovak state administration was never provided with
access to more accurate IcompreheAsive data. During the war, the information blackout was
consistently maintained by the Genbn occupation administration. Paradoxically, the liberating
power - the Soviet Union - introducedI a very similar restrictive policy after the Wilf.
I
!
I
. ,
The preceding chapter (Y.) ~hows that a portion of the Jewish gold stolen by the Nazis
(413.6 kilograms) was i~corporatea in the gold reserves of the central bank of issue of the
Protectorate as a result of the activitibs of the Foreign-Exchange Department of the National Bank
for Bohemia and Moravia (Main Bbnch) which was directly administered by German executives
appointed by the Reich. ~e total in~rease of the gold reserves 'which was also coming from many
other sources can be spec:ified very bxactly. Between March 15, 1939 and May 9, 1945 the gold
reserves grew by a total of 417 kilo~ams.l The main objective of Chapter VI is to trace the fate of
this increment after the wir.
j
I
When the war wa$ over, sJe of the stolen Jewish gold and other precious metals, precious
stones and other movable Igoods re~ained unsold (though the bulk of such assets was sold, in one
way or another, for the benefit of the Third ,Reich). By the end of the war, certain assets (now
I
!
unfortunately untraceable) were still :in trust of the Vermogensamt and the Auswanderungsfonds;
both institutions had dePosited thdse assets in the vaults of the Bijhmische Escompte-Bank
a Bijhmische Union-Bank The larg~st financial institutions in the Protectorate, exclusively (ethnic)
German - Bohmische Es~ompte-Bahk, Bohmische Union-Ba~k, and above aU Kreditanstalt der
Deutschen - still held !financial fueans seized from the persecuted I Jewish population? An
investigation of the post-,'war fate qf these Jewish assets represents the second objective of the
present chapter.
I
)
I
,
***
I
. I
:
"
Like in March 1939 when! the occupying German force was accompanied by a host of
banking specialists lead by the qeneral Manager ofthe Reich Bank MUller, eager to fidfil their task
at the Czechoslovak Nati¢nal Bank, the liberating Red Army was also accompanied by a specialized
group - employees of thei Soviet StJte Bank (GQsbank) taking care (in the course of the liberating
military operations) to secure certairi bank assets as a booty in favour ofthe victorious power. Their
I
activities were very extensive but they lacked central coordination and were not regulated by any
legal provisions; they used hit-or-n1iss approaches, lacked administrative skills, were inconsistent,
and quite often simply incompeterit The soviet booty "specialists" worked in German financial
institutions but also in p~rely Czec~ or Slovak banks. At times, they were only interested in cash, in
other instances, they even destroyed, strongboxes containing deposits; some of these specialists were
after securities, typewrit~rs etc. If tpe bank officers sometimes managed to prepare documentation
about hand-over of asset~ and register the assets garnished by the Soviet authorities, in other cases,
summary requisitions were conduct~d and no exact infornmtion about the confiscated property could
" .
be obtained in the post-Jar period. 3 1
I
I
.
�I
!
"
,
Crucial for the fuJther 'fate of the Jewish property were the Soviet booty actions in Prague,
namely at the headquarters of thb above named German financial ' .institutions (Bohmische
t
Escompte-Bank, Bohmische Union-Bank, Kreditanstalt der Deutschen), as well as at the
National Bank for Bohetnia and Moravia. The Soviet procedure was supposed to conform with
the general rules of the iriternational' law and the specific Treaty about the Mode of Utilization of
Booty on the Czechoslovak Terhtory concluded between the Czechoslovak and Soviet
;
1
j
I
governments.'
I
>
(
The treaty defin~d the prop~rty to be considered German as that .created on the territory of
Czechoslovakia during the war or brought to this territory during the war period. The provisions of
the treaty specifically sdted that iny pre-war property belonging to Czechoslovak citizens of
German ethnic origin waslnot to be ~onsidered German property. The Soviet partner was to limit its
booty claims to enterprisek and prop9rty "which had a substantial military significance" and could be
used in any future military operations. The Soviet embassy had the obligation to provide the
Czechoslovak govemmen~ with, the names of businesses and specify any equipment, raw materials,
semi-products or finished products ltaken out of the country. By adopting this treaty, the Soviet
partner gave up most of the bootY! claims it might have had on the Czechoslovak territory. In
practice, the Soviet authotities acted contrary to the generally applicable international laws and the
above named bilateral treaty which! both exclude the property of private citizens from any booty
claims. The agents of Go~bank imrriediately confiscated the preperty belonging to the Czechoslovak
state, its citizens and ]eg~l entities. bong others, they assumed exclusive control of the vaults of
the above named four fin1ncial institutions in Prague.
I I
.
!
'
The Soviet seizJre of the Hank of issue (National Ban'k) and four other important banks
owned by the local ethnic Germank (all of those financial institutions had already existed before
World War I) became oQe of the ciain contentious issuesbetween Czechoslovakia and the Soviet
Union. The Czechoslovaf, diplomacy was striving to solve this problem froin early May of the year
1945 and tried to obtain the return dr, release of the property involved. Already a'document prepared
on May IS, 1945 for t~e Stat~ Sebretary V. Clementis before his planned talks with the Soviet
Ambassador to Prague V. Zonn defined as one of the priorities to "negotiate the issue of how to
interpret of the booty agreement: ~ven in the Czech Lands, the Red Army confiscates vehicles,
factories, and farm properties pre{,jously administered by Germans and mistakenly considers it
German property even th6ugh it is crzech property previously expropriated by the Germans in course
of their persecution of 1he CzechJ".5 The following day, Clementis indeed asked the Soviets to
. release the "garnished safes and de~sits". 6 The Soviet reply of May 22 seemed promising. In it, the
Soviets informed the <czechoslov~k side that the impounded strongboxes would be released
providing that they beloAged to Czbch banks; it was true that the German safes had been sealed but
if they contained Czechdslovak pro~erty, the Czech side should make the respective claims.1
I
I
I'
In practice, it became clear.' that the Soviet side'did not intend to redress the situation. While
I
it is true that the negotia~ions cond~cted between the Czechosloyak Prime Minister Z. Fierlinger and
the Red Army Marshal Konev on June 7 lead to the release of some industrial enterprises, it is also
true that the provisions ~f the Czebhoslovak-Soviet intergovernmental treaty of March 31 were not
applied. The "R" department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs specializing in this problem area
I '
.
stated that the treaty of1March 31 regulating booty claims was never followed by the Soviet booty
I
22.3.937
�I
I
troops; on the contrary! these troops "were always lead by completely opposing principles and
applied their booty clai:ms to an~ movable or demountable property considered 'Gennan' in the
widest sense of the terln". Following an intervention, the Soviet authorities sometimes granted
exceptions in favour df the Cz~hoslovak side. In other instances, they did not hesitate to
commandeer Jewish pr~perty that] had been "Aryanized" by the Gennans or seize the assets of
Czechoslovak finns forcefully' subjected to Geiman administration etc. 'The military importance of
the objects confiscated by theSovlets was not even considered. In June 1945, during the visit of a
Czechoslovak governmtbt delegaiion to Moscow, Fierlinger managed to obtain an unspecified
infonnal promise from Stalin to serld a special commission to Prague to settle the problem of banks.
However, this promise
T
never ftfilledo'
pro~lem
o.
c~used
The gravest
was
by the obstruction of the vaults of the National Bank. On
May 17, the vaults werJ placed urtder the direct control of the Read Anny, and the bank had no
access to its money sup~lies. TherJfore, on July 17, 1945, eight memoranda regarding the retained
. or garnished property (including Jekish property) were prepared for V. Zorin.9 An abstract of these
memoranda was prepare~ for Clerrientis. The abstract inferred that significant problems lied ahead
since the Soviet military authori6esimpounded assets of some financial institutions without
preparing any inventory. The govJrnment convened on August 21, 1945 and asked the Defence
Minister L. Svoboda to g~t in touch!with the Soviets. Besides military issues, Svoboda was supposed
to negotiate "all unresolved legal problems and issues concerning booty".10 The minutes of the
negotiations conducted Jith marsh~l Konev in Baden near Vienna on September 10 by the 'Minister
of Defence Svoboda, t)1~ Chief of Staff General Boeek:, and the State Secretary Clementis indicate
that Konev "could do rlothing but re~uest a decision from Moscow".. 1l Unsuccessful was also
Clementis' new request t6 solve the!situation of bank vaults presentedin'negotiations with Zorin on
October 8 or the written bemorandum submitted two weeks later in connection with an incident at
the Bohmische Escom~te-Bank. The executives of the Prague Credit Bank (praiska uverni
banka) charged with the dissolutioh of the Bohmische Escompte-Bank broke the seals placed on
the safe by an officer'oflthe booty ~epartment of the CGV (1izentralnaya Gruppa Voysk - 'Central
Anny Group') and openea the safe. :After the Ministry of Finance had learned about the incident, it
resealed the safe and disdatched an apology to Moscow.1'2 Prague did not wish to resolve the dispute
!
,
by creating a fait accompli; instead it was striving to reach a satisfactory arrangement to prevent
repercussions in mutual ~olitical relftions between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union ..
,
t
1
.:
i
i
.
The above ment~oned inciqent brought a positive result: Moscow finally decided to act.
Prague was infonned tha't the Soviet military authorities had been instructed (after more than six
. I
'
months) to reopen the vaylts of the JiTague banks. The representatives of the War Department of the
State Bank of the USSR and the representatives of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Finance began a
joint inspection of the vdults' contehts. On November 2, the vaults of the Czechoslovak Natiopal
Bank were opened, and ~n the follo{ving day those of the Bohliti~che Union-Bank. Precisely at that
moment, a new problem emerged. F.rom the main vault, the Soviet officers released only the safes
I
I
clearly belonging to Czec,h principals. They sealed all controversial safes and began preparing their
transfer to the USSR. 13 They were ~ot willing to discuss the bilateral treaty or points international
law. This development re?ulted in a ;Czechoslovak protest memorandum submitted to the Soviets on
November 8, 1945. In it, the CzechQslovak government explained its legill opinion, namely that the
bank assets and deposits \couldnot ~e subject to booty claims; on the contrary: the Czechoslovak
government claimed all bank assets and deposits placed under the Czechoslovak national
223938
�I
I
i
I .
administration by the decree of the !czechoslovak President ofMay 19, 1945 and subsequently
confiscated by the presidehtial decre6 of October 25, 1945 for the benefit of the Czechoslovak state.
This memorandum once a~ain referr~d to the wording of the intergovernmental treaty of March 31
and argued that any fund~, valuables or accounts belonging to individuals or legal entities were
absolutely excluded from the booty ciaims (in accordance with the Laws and Customs ofthe Ground
War, Annex to the Final14ct of the IISecond Peace Conference of 1907).. Finally, it insist that the
I
Czechoslovak state needed these assets to heal - at least partially - the heavy wounds inflicted to it
l
by the German occupation ; moreover!, the Germans had obtained most of these assets by theft, use of
force, and fictitious legal rictS. 14 .
I
I
I
.
.
This protest memorandum idid not bring any results; the.openirtg of the vault of the
Bohmische Escompte-B~nk on No~ember 12 followed the same old Soviet scenario, and a new
l
controversy regarding the securitiesldeposited in the bank flared up (the value of these securities
exceeded seven million ICzechoslqvak crowns). Dr. Rejholec wrote in his account for the
Czechoslovak embassy in Moscow: 'iThe Soviet representatives, probably.directed by Zorin himself,
have applied strong pres~ure and iqdicated that in case of any disagreement, they could remove
everything from the Unio~ Bank and the Bohemian Discount Bank [Bohmische Escornpte-Bank] ...
They drew our attention to the fact that there were more German deposits in other banks, and that
the Soviets could claim s4ch dePositk retroactively."ls At the same time, a new problem surfaced at
the National Bank as "theiRussian d~legates were trying to find in the vaults anything to justify their
guarding the vault for half a year prevent us from entering .it". "Anything" referred to two gold
bars bearing the Soviet h~l1mark. The Soviets considered them stolen property. Prague argued that
the bars were acquired tiy the Sko~a Company in Switzerland before World War II for foreign
currency earned by its dports. 16 Next came the Czechoslovak request to release 417 kilograms of
gold considered to be a~ accretion of the gold reserves accumulated by the National Bank for
Bohemia and Moravia from March: 1939 to May 1945.
td
I
j.
I
During the dispute over the ~au1t of the Kreditanstalt. der Deutschen on November 15, the
Czech side argued that ii contain~ no German property and. that its substantial part consisted of
"stolen Czech and Jewish property,!.17 The procedure of opening bank vaults always followed the
same scenario. Each tim~, the Sovi~ts released only the safes and property belonging to individuals
bearing distinctly Czech parnes andi refused to talk even to principals of Czech parentage who had
German names; those principals received nothing. The Soviets declared that those principals could
assert their claims at a later point, iry writing, through the Czechoslova,k diplomatic channels, if they
produced an official proM of their Czech ethnicity. By a note of January 23, 1946 Czechoslovakia
. asked the Soviets to ~freeze the! accounts and safes at the Bohmische Escompte-Bank and
the Bohmische Union-:Bank re~stered in· the name of the Vermogensamt or the
Ausawanderungsfonds.,8 After the first inventory in November 1945, the vault of the
Czechoslovak National Bank was resealed and continued to be guarded. by a Soviet military guard.
The representative of the IStateBank ofthe USSR had even left Prague. 19
I
j
I
On January 30,i 1946, thJ Soviet government presented the Czechoslovak embassy in
Moscow with a "comprobise" propbsaL Prague considered this proposal :virtually unacceptable. The
Soviets held that the CZfchoslova~ claim t6 417 kilograms of gold was unsubstantiated; since the
Czechoslovak gold reser;ves were running low, the refusal to release this gold would have hit the
National Bank rather badly. Una~ceptable was also the refusal to release all cash holdings in
1
I
.
223939
�Gennan marks: there would be no Imeans to pay for the transfer of the Gennanpopulation; in
addition, according to the ISoviet proposal, the USSR was to receive all Jewish bank deposits. The
National Bank stressed that the gold! accretion was completely legitimate since the bank acted as a
bank of issue, purchased gold and allocated it for dental applications, industrial purposes etc. 20
!.
. I
. .
befor~
So~et
On February 15, Len
the official text of the
memorandum arrived in Prague,
and before the Czechoslmiak authorities could react to it, the representatives of the War Department
of the State Bank of th,e USSR
the CGV (Central Army Group) visited the Cze~hoslovak
Ministry of Finance. They acted upbn an order to hand over to the Czechoslovak government aU
assets unclaimed by the Soviet gojvernment and, on the other hand, definitely appropriate all
remaining assets as booty. A Czechoslovak note of the same day asked the Soviets to halt the order
issued to the War Departfuent of thJ State Bank on the grounds that the document of January 30
I
I
contained certain unclear: points. At the same time, Czechoslovakia intimated its intention to
dispatch to the USSR a s~cial deleg~tion of experts to discuss the issue?1 However, the Soviet side
tried to prevent the visit of a Czechoslovak delegation to Moscow since the SoViets basically viewed
the whole issue as settled i this assu~ption is.confinned by the comportment of the Soviets and their
attempts to take over t~e disputeq assets. No sooner than in ten days, on February 26, the
Czechoslovak ambassador; to the US~R Horak was infonned, that it was unnecessary to dispatch any
Czechoslovak bank specialists to Moscow - nobody there had sufficient knowledge about the
dispute or any authorizati6n to decid6 it; by that time, the Soviet ambassador to Prague Zorin and the
representative of the State Bank iA Prague had already received instructions to solve the issue
22
there.
dt
I
j.
I
I
.
. In the meantime, IPrague ha~ lost patience. In the opinion of the Czechoslovak authorities,
the procrastination surrounding the issue of the Prague banks involving "resources in the order of
billions" had to be concl~ded speebily. Apart from the difficulties experienced by the National
23
Bank , there were serioJs legal im~1ications: holders of securities which were held in the sealed
safes could not meet the legal regis~ation deadlines set by presidential decrees and other restitution
regulations?4 At its medting held Ion February 26, the government directed the Czechoslovak
Foreign Minister J. Masaryk to solve the vault issue with Zorin within twenty-four hours. Masaryk
subsequently asked Prim~ Minister Fierlinger to extend the deadline by another twenty-four hours.
The following day, an inter-ministeHal meeting chaired byMasaryk was held?5 According to the
infonnation presented at tpis' meeting, the list of the contested a$sets included eighty-nine boxes kept .
at the Bohmische Union-Bank and four hundred and sixty boxes kept at the Bohmiscbe Escompte
Bank (of this number) 259 bo~es contained deposits Qf the Vermogensamt and/or the
Ausawanderungsfonds)J In view bf the political character of the issue, J. Masaryk requested
.
explicit government insWctions ho~ to proceed.
I
.
I
.
I
I
.
Meanwhile in Moscow,' tJe Ambassador Jiei Horak negotiated about the Bobmiscbe
Escompte-Bank and the IiBohmiscb1e Union-Bank during an audience with the Deputy Minister of
,
Foreign Affairs Vyshinski. However, Vyshinski declared that a Soviet delegation consisting of
major I.E. Gimme1farb arid captain Malich was already in Prague; the truth was that Gimmelfarb and
26
Malich stayed in Prague Ias represehtatives of the Soviet State Bank. The attempt to reach an
acceptable solution was made alrecidy the following day - on February 28. On the Czechoslovak
side, the negotiations wete conductJd by the Minister of Foreign Affairs'Jan Masaryk, the Minister
of Finance Srobar, anothJr representative ofthe Ministry of Finance Dr. Prokop a the representative
I
I
I
I
I
1
.
223940
�of the National Bank Dr. Milos Hofna, the Soviet side was represented by Ambassador Zorin and
the above named representatives oftlie Soviet State Bank. 27
)
The Czechoslovak side explkined .its position regarding the issue of gold, cash, and Jewish
pro~e~ and aga~~ arguedltha: these rsset~ were not subject to ~ny b~o~ claims .si~ce the~ belonged
to VlctIms ofpohtIcal and racIal' persecutIon. It proposed formmg a Jomt commISSIon to Inspect the
contents of the suitcases.
his conpluding statement, Masaryk assured the Soviet representatives
that "the Czechoslovak government; though it was lead by its desire that the Soviet government
respected the explanationk and wish'es presented in this meeting and contained in the government
minutes, it was always rehdy to acc~pt new decision's made by the Soviet government; should the
Soviets still insist, notwithstanding the explanations presented in the present meeting, that all the
instances involved constifuted bootyt the Czechoslovak government woul'daccept this decision ... ,,28
I
'
These formulations reflected the complicated international status of Czechoslovakia and contained a
political calculation. It did not resultl from any personal initiative on the part of the Foreign Minister
Masaryk - it was based
a previous government decision. The Soviet partner subsequently used
the offer without any scrubles (see bblow). its substantial passages, the memorandum submitted to
the Soviets on this occasion quoted :the government decision including the promise to comply with
the Soviet decision and Istated the I express wish of the government "to form a commission to
determine the content of all suitcases and packages since it was not impossible that they contained
valuable objects of historical value; the whole situation would clarify if bOth sides knew the content
of these suitcases." ? 9 1 1
lIn
dn
In
I
I
,
During these negotiations, IZorin behaved very arrogantlyOa, and the Czechoslovak side
came to the conclusion tHat Zorin whs intentionally misinformipg Moscow. It was therefore decided
to relay a very detailed aJcount of t~e negotiations to the Ambassador Horak in Moscow to provide
parallel information to th'e Soviet authorities. At the same time, the government decided (again for
obvious political reason~) to infortn the Soviet embassy (this was done on March 4) that the
government had instructbd all its igencies, in order to facilitate the implementation of the order
received by the represehtatives of the State Bank of the, USSR in the sense of the Soviet
memorandum of Januaryl30, 1946, ito take over the assets which the Soviet government decided to '
release without preventing the execution of the remaining part of the Soviet ,order. It was stressed
I
I
'
that this decision applieq merely and exclusively to the four banking institutions based in Prague.
Dr. Rejholec expressed his disappbintment in the entry following in the department log: "If, by
today's decision, we are ~iving up the gold reserves of the Nati~mal Bank or the property belonging
to the victims of Germari persecuti6n, we are surrendering the most easily defendable positions. By
doing so, we shaH worseri our positi'on in all remaining, less convincing cases, in spite of voicing our
j
,
present reservations.,,31
II
, ,
,
I
'
n~gotiat~ons:
The difficult
were concluded by handing over Zorin's note of March 20
addressed to J. Masaryk.l The note confirmed the readiness of the Soviet booty organs to release the
I
assets demonstrably belonging to Czechoslovak citizens but the assets of the Vermogensamt and
the Ausawanderungsfonds were ~ubject to confiscation except for any parts proven to belong to
I
I
,
concrete persecuted individuals. From the total claim of 417 kilograms of gold, the Soviet
authorities released 20 !kilograms Ito the Czechoslovak side. At the same time, they released a
collection of historic gold coins. The consent to this final decision contained in Jan Masaryk's note
i'
223941
�I
I
I
I
.
of March 28, 1946 to V. Zorin rheant that the substantial, 'qualitati~e1y and q':lantitatively
unidentifiable part of the J~wish asset~ was in fact surrendered to, the Soviet Union.32
I
I
·
I,'
.'
It is quite clear t~at Masaryk considered this solution unsatisfactory. This confirms his
encoded message addresseQ to the Czfchoslovak Ambassador to'Moscow Dr. Jiai Horak which was
dispatched the following day; the message ended with the following words: "Though we have
accepted the decision of ithe Soviet government, try to ask the NKID [Narodny Komissariat
Inostrannych Del - 'People's Commi'ssariat of Foreign Affairs'] ;to re~examine the issue of gold
legally obtained by the Na~ional Ban~ since this gold was owned by Czechoslovakia already before
the German occupation". 3 Another form of protest expressed. the Czecqoslovak approach to. the
handover of the gold in question andl of other objects. In its memo to the Ministry of Finance, the
Ministry of Foreign Affair~ reminded that "it would not be appropriate tO,state in the record of the
handover that it constituted an act of implementation of an agreement between both governments or
that the scope of the So~iet booty ihad been determined by mutual agreement; essentially, the
handover is based on an in~ependent decision made by the Soviet gov~rnment and we merely chose
not to raise any further objections to it,,34
.
1
I
I
consequ~nces
The possibly beJ deSCriPtiL of the background and
of the negotiations
contains the comprehensiv,e account aispatched by messenger to the Moscow embassy. It includes
the follOWing statement: "Most perplJxing in the whole matter is the fact that the Soviet government
did not in the least react t%ur legal ~rguments and did not even attempt to refute any of them". The
account adds that the National BanI{ protested against the results of the negotiations, reserved the
right to claim damages and directly ~efused to cooperate while its property was taken to the Soviet
Union. The Ministry ofFi~ance feared further difficulties in implementing the decision of the Soviet
government. It referred to ~ts pniviou1s experience with the representatives of the State Bank of the
USSR. In particular, it arlticipated 4ifficulties in providing proof of citizenship and documenting
ownership of cases and v~luables. 1J1e author of the account added that the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs was well aware of!.such difficulties but tried to avoid that its reply to Zorin's note of March
,'
20 was "burdened by reservations". It passed on the whole responsibility ~o the Ministry of Finance
which was to defend the I principle lthat the cases were to be released to Czechoslovak citizens
regardless of their ethnicity; the proof of ownership was supposed to be based on the respective
I
bank records?5
,
The malevolence, inflexibility and arroga~ce of Moscow confirming the worst fears of the
Czechoslovak government was oncei again demonstrated by Vyshinski during his meeting with the
Czechoslovak Ambassadqr Horak on April 4. Vyshinski declared that the decision taken by the
Soviet government was based on t~e reports of its experts working in ,Prague. He declared that
Czechoslovakia could not:prove that:the disputed gold was of Czechoslovak provenance and that the
reichsmarks were obtained for Czechoslovak crowns. Horak's objection that the respective proof had
,
I
been submitted was ignored. Vyshinski repeated that the Soviet government would not claim a
single kilogram of gold lof Czech6slovak origin. The Soviets would not refuse to reopen the
negotiations providing that "exact aocuments" regarding the case were submitted.36 The direct
opposite was true. The S~}Viet "exp~rts" in Prague increased their activity to take away the booty.
Major Gimmelfarb lodged complaintI after complaint and the highest government offices were trying
to solve the problem of empo;werihg an official to attend the booty's; handover from the bank
I
vaults. 3?
.
:
,
I
I
/
I
I
�t
The choice fell oJ Dr.Prokdp from the Ministry of Finance but the minister Srobar refused
to sign the proposed fu~l powers i though the document intenti~nally contained very narrow
formulations to enable Pr~kop to refuse to sign the handover report. Srobar requested a government
discussion. At 11 :00
Gimmelfarb complained by telephone to Zorin. Finally, at 4:00 PM, the
problem was solved by the Prime Minister Fierlinger immediately after he received Zorin's protest
I
I
letter. Fierlinger personally signed tpe respective full powers and verbally explained his point to
Prokop: " .... we have no choice but to do what we have promised; we can justify it quite easily since
the Soviet Union has mkde valua~le concessions in the matter of border adjustment between
Slovakia and the Ukrainb (the villAge of Lekard and several acres of woods)." Therefore, the
handover procedure coul9 begin alrd,ady on the following day, April 4 (incidentally, it was the date
of Horak's audience with Vyshinski).:38
AM'I
I
'
The handover of the vaults Helonging to the three above mentioned ethnic Geima~ financial
institutions took place b~tween April 4 - 15. It was quite remarkable. 39 At first, nothing went
smoothly. Gimmelfarb refused to open the cases before they were carried away and mistook
Czechoslovak Germans f?r citizens ;of the German Reich. Acco~ding to the first report, only eight
from a total of eighty-nine suitcases and packages kept at the Bohmische Union-Bank could be
. I
t
. "salvaged". In the ne?'t few days, l,Ipon Prokop's wish, Gimmelfarb finally agreed to open some
suitcases, above all the h~avy ones. ilt was supposedly discovered that their content "was indeed of
little value: clothing, lineh, worthle~s paintings, etc.". Allegedly, a more substantial value had only
the suitcases belonging tol Count Nostitz. The number of the suitcases released to the Czechoslovaks
rose from eight to thirtyiseven. Mbst of the lighter suitcase~ referred ,to as "airplane suitcases"
remained unopened.
I
j
..
., .
.
I i .
In the following Idays, the ~hole process was accelerated. The handover procedure at the
Bohmische Escompte-B~lDk was ~ccomplished in two days (April 10 and 11). Prokop called the
result "fair", since all Jewish suitcaSes, packages and boxes had been released providing they had a
name tag. Among the o~jects requiSitioned by the Soviets were forty-four boxes containing e.g.
assorted silver spoons, forks, old ba~knotes, and divers~ "objects of lesser value" with no name tags
attached. "Salvaged" bYI the Czechoslovaks were various things, among others five suitcases
belonging to the Micke company dontaining "expensive silverware". From a total number of 460
items, 290 was released from the: Soviet custody. On Saturday April 13 the handover at the
Kreditanstalt der Deut~chen was: completed. In the end, the Soviet representatives showed no
interest in securities. Dr. Prokop'S fihal report on the handover of vaults of German banks expressed
satisfaction. It spoke of a!, great.succbss then from 549 items 329 were released and "only" 220 were
I
.
forfeited. Nonetheless, riot all suitcases taken away by the Soviets had been opened for inspection.
Colonel Stepanov who sppervised the takeover together with Major Giinmelfarb promised that "if
any subject associated with the Czechoslovak Republic was discovered in the suitcases taken away
I
I
by the Soviets, it would be returned". At the same time, the gold from the National Bank was made
ready for transportation to the Sovi~t Union. Stepanov promised, to leave the gold on the side to be
released if the objections raised by the National Bank were sustained.
.
i
!
A detailed gold Iflow state~ent for the period between March IS, 1939 and May 9, 1945'
prepared by the Czechoslovak National Bank was handed over to lorin on April 29, 1946. 40 The
Czechoslovak side still donsidered ~he issue of the monetary gold open. In June 1946, it was finally
I
\
223943
�I
settled on the highest 'lev~1 during a! visit to Moscow of the Czechoslovak government delegation
lead by the Prime Ministet K. GottWald. To solve the existing problem of liquidating the economic
consequences ofthe war, kspecial efpert commission ~as created on July 22; Czechoslovakia was
represented by the chief executive of the National Bank L. Chmela, the fonner Minister of Finance
Outrata, and the Ambass~dor Z, Au~enthaler. The commission was given the task to prepare until
.
the next day its proposal f6r a definite solution. 41
I
.
I
The commission ~ad indeedlprepared and submitted its proposal; it was then discussed and
a solution was reached. The whole matter was Settled in a very unconventional manner. Though the
dispute involved assets bf considebble value, no detailed official record was taken and the
negotiations were not cbncluded by a written agreement.' The official communique merely
mentioned that the USSR ~ave up its! booty claims to the Chemical Plants ,in Most (then named after
Joseph Stalin) and that the Soviet government 'considered the property of individuals and legal
entities, irrespective of th~ir ethnic opgin, to be Czechoslovak property; in other words, the assets of
the Gennan transferees were also !considered Czechoslovak. property. From the preceding text
,
'
follows that the Soviet booty offiCials did not adhere to the principles of the communique:
otheIWise, they would no~ have clai4ed three Prague-based Gennan banks and impound their assets
whose value had remained, for the largest part, unknown to the Czechoslovak authorities.
I
i
(
I
Since the agreement was ~oncluded only in verbal form, the respective ministry had
difficulties to establish it~ content ~fter the return of the negotiators from Moscow. All of them
prepared their own persorlal recprds ibutthese records are not mutually compatible in all points. The
most extensive record Was prepared by Augenthaler. The .results of the negotiations can be
summarized as follows: "
.
I
1. The Soviet representatires refuse1 to accept any Czechoslovak:claims
2. The Soviets declared that it would be difficult to return the securities taken out of the country and
suggested the Czechoslohk.side t~I cancel them and replace them by new securities; the USSR
I
,
.
would then present none the old secyrities for c o l l e c t i o n . .
.
t~at
3. The Soviets declared
the sUitJases taken from the Prague-based banks did not contain the lost
university insignia or othJr objects dfhistoric value.
'
,
~onsidered
4. The Soviets declared Ithat they
the goid issue closed and asked the Czechoslovak
government not to return Ito it since ~t had accepted the Soviet decision. It turned out that none of the
statements regarding th~ gold movements prepared by the ,Czechoslovak National Bank and
handed to the Soviet emBassy in PrAgue was sent to Moscow. In view of the respective government
decision, the delegation! abandonJd the issue of return of gold. 42 (The remaining economic
agreements under discus~ion did no~ involve the issue scrutinized by the present report).
I
,
prolo~ged
According to A'4genthaler,lthe negotiations were
and complicated; the problem
itself was dealt with on tlie highest lbvel. Even Stalin took part in the discussions. He allegedly joked
that the extensive Czechdslovak claims must have been fabricated ad hoc: given that just the value of
the commodities taken obt of the cduntry amounted to five billion crowns. Subsequently, the origin
of the claims was discus~ed. Stalin teportedly did not deny that "behind the military units of the Red
I'
' , '
'
2:2~3944
,
"
,,,,
~
- '"
,
�i
Army stalked the 'trofeichiks' [booty officers] who seized anything they could put their hands on".
Thanks to this insight, the Czechoslbvak claims tilted the scales, and the final result of the talks was
considered fair.
. I
I
.
.
.
I
·
I •• '
.
.
.
A paper summaJ,1zmg'the entire problem area 0 f th' b'ooty agreement sub mltted by the
e
Ministry of Foreign Affa~rs to the ¥inistry of Finance provided an interPretation of the agreement
reached by the government delegation on July 26, 1946. The paper stated that whereas it became
I
,
possible to acknowledge Ithe claims: of the wronged parties with respect to the securities seized by
the Soviets, "any other property muSt be considered lost due to the war actions" (underlined by the
authors of the paper).43 I
!
i
I
The seemingly I quite ill~gical compliance of the Czechoslovak .side vis~a-vis the
authoritative comportmet;lt of the ~oviet partner in a situation where the legal evaluation of the
economic issues spoke plearIy and unmistakeably in Czechoslovakia's favour had a distinctly
political background co*erning thb solution of several issues which had crucial importance for
Czechoslovakia: the USSR promisbd its support in these issues and, for the most part, indeed
provided it in the internktional ardna. Let us name at least the transfer of Germans which was
,
.
already under way at that point, t~e issue of the Slovak Hungarians then debated at the Peace
Conference in Paris, the! dispute with Poland regardi.ng the Tisin Region and the Czechoslovak
claims to the Kladsko Region or tHe Czechoslovak territorial claims. against Germany. The Soviet
diplomacy was well awaie.that this ~ontext would prompt Prague's compliance. The gold belonging
.to the Czechoslovak Natibnal Bank land assets of individuals and legal entities did not represent the
primary concern of the Czechoslovak diplomacy. The fight for their exemption from the Soviet
booty, though legally su~stantiated'lwas not brought to a successful conclusion. Less advantageous
"compromises" in this field were considered a tribute to much more important issues.
I
i
Cbapter VI - Footnotes
I
to the bank balanc~ of March 15, 1939, the vaults of the National Bank contained 7011
kilograms of gold ingots] According to a fiscal statement of October 12, 1940, 6371 kilograms of
gold were taken to BerIih by the Germans; therefore, in the opinion of the Soviet authorities, the
Czechoslovak holdings ainounted ohl y to 640 kilograms. In October 1945, the vault of the National
Bank contained a stockpi;le of 10571kilograms of gold; the Soviet representatives stated a surplus of .
417 kilograms of gold. Cf. Record of several still unresolved issues of economic nature between the
USSR and Czechoslovakia concetning the Czechoslovak National Bank of February 9, 1946,
Archives of the Czech National BJnk ( Archiv Eeske Narodni Banky - "AENB"), Call Number
NIA. Annex to the mihutes of a! meeting of the interim administration of the National Bank
(February 9, 1946), Box 73, sin'e.
1 According
I
I
~
I
.
2 For example
the KreditJnstaltder peutschen(KdD) maintained a "Sonderkonto" ['special account']
of the Gestapo where cdnfiscated financial means were deposited from the very beginning of the
German occupation; In tHe account R 780 maintained'on behalf of the Office of the Reich Protector,
.
,
'
administrative fees levied on f~rcedfsales of Jewish property were deposited; these fees amounted to
20 per cent of the sales ~rice. The ~dD Group of Companies included the Hadega Company (from
I
I
223945
.
~,,~.
".
�1943 called Hakoma) w~ich ~osse~sed the sole right to sell Jewish property, precious metals, ,
precious stones etc. Hadega (which ~as located on the premises of the KdD) naturally used the safes
of the Kreditanstalt to sto~e the assetb consigned to it for resale.
I
I
3
An incomplete list comdiled by the Ministry of Finance (which was based on the data available to
113
items (referring to 113 financial institutions and/or their
it as of May 2, 1946) khowed
subsidiaries). According Ito these 1ists referring only to the above mentioned institutions, the'
following assets had been confiscated: a total of221,117,032,00 Protectorate crowns, 2,511,506.00
reichsmarks, 8,723.00 Hdngarian p~ngos, securities representing a value of 7,499,414.00 crowns;
deposits in suitcases, pac~ges etc. ~ere taken away; also removed were more than 1,500 unopened
safes. Archives of the Ministry M Foreign Affairs (Archiv ministerstva zahraniimich vici
I
!
"AMZV"), Legal Depart:p1ent 1945;-1954, Box 12, o. Booty Agreement - Banks and Valuables,
Ref.No. 76993/46.
I
.
I
I
'
Agreement between the governments of the Czechoslovak Republic and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republic regul~ting the niodalities of booty applications on the Czechoslovak territory,
Moscow, March 31, 1~45. The document was marked "confidential" and has still remained
confidential. AMZV, Archive Collettion of International Treaties, Call Number L 1517.
4
.
!
I
tall
, Points prepared for
between lithe State Secretary Clementis and the Ambassador Zorin (May
15, 1945, AMZV, A-GS 1945-1954, Box 38, o. Talks - USSR - Zorin, Ref.No. 119801N45.
I
I
Record of talks between the State Secretary Dr. Clementis and the Ambassador Zorin (May 16,
1945, ibid; Ref.No. 11978/N45.
j
.
6
.
I
I
I
I
"
'.
'.
Record of talks between the Stat~ Secretary Dr. Clementis and the Ambassador Zorin (May 22,
1945, ibid, Ref.No. 1198~/N45,
7
I
,
I
.
. . :
I
I
.
8 Record of the "R" Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic
entitled Booty AgreemeAt - Imple~entation Record (August 2, 1945, ibid, Reg. No. 159021R145. A
verbatim record of Stali~ls promise lis non-existent; it was merely repeatedly rephrased in condensed
form. It was most closely recounted in the report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Embassy
in Moscow of March 5, 11946: "n;e question to what degree the booty c, laims of the USSR should
apply to Czechoslovak banks anq assets deposited in those banks is complicated and will be
negotiated in Prague with a team of Soviet experts dispatched to Prague for this purpose", - AMZV,
!
I
A-GS 1945-1954, Box 90, o. Propetty - Booty Claims.
,
Memorandum 1 (re access to the ICzechoslovak National Bank); Memorandum 2 (re requisition of
property of four Bratisla~a-based banks); Memorandum 3 (re release of pension funds of the K4.iz!p<.
Company); Memorandu~ 4 (re rel~ase of buildings belonging to the Catholic congregation in Bmo);
Memoranda 5-6 re Cze¢hoslovak iewish property wrongly considered German by the Red Army);
9
I
.
j
I
I
223946
�I
'
,
Memorandum 7 (re Telephone and Electricity Company); Memorandum 8 (re Norma Company).
I
'
'
AMZV, Legal Department 1945-1954, Box 12, o. Booty Agreement - Banks and Valuables, sine.
~
' I
'
.
,'
I
10
:
'
Record of talks between the State ~ecretary Dr. Clementis and the Ambassador Zorin (August 22,
1945), ibid, Ref.No. 24123VAl45.
I
'
I
I
II Record of talks between the Minisler L. Svoboda and Marshal Konev (October 9, 1945, AMZV,
A-GS 1945-1954, Box 38,b. Talks - OSSR - Zorin, Ref.No. 443721A145.
i i '
,
I .
I
f
'
Record of talks between the State Secretary Dr. Clementis and the Ambassador Zorin (October 8
23, 1945), ibid, Ref.No. :443781A1~5 a 51567/Al45, Attached is a memorandum of October 23,
1945.
I
.
12
I
'
'
.,
13 Minutes prepared by trye Head of the "R" Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Dr.
Vaclav Rejholec (Novemper 3, 194~), AMZV, Legal Department 1945-1954, Box ,12, o. Booty
Agreement - Banks and Valuables, Ref.No. 57891145.
I
I
I
'
'
Minutes prepared by the Head of the "R" Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Dr.
Vaclav Rejholec (Noverhber 5, 1945), Memorandum' of November' 8, 1945, ibid, Reg.No.
14
I
I
I
578921R145.
I'
~e
" ,
15 Minutes prepared by
Head of the "R" Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Dr.
Vaclav Rejholec (Novemlkr 13, 194~), ibid, Reg.No. 608741Ri45.
'
I
I
I
16
Dispatch to the Embassy in Mosc~w of November 13, 1945, ibid, Ref.No. 608761R145.
I
~
For several months, a special Soviet commission worked in the vault of the National Bank.
The commission checked, item by/ item, every asset deposited there. To fulfil this task, it was
provided access to all barlk documents including the books of accounts. Cf. Report on several most
urgent problems that are still open ih communication with the Soviet Army. Annex to minutes of a
meeting of the interim aBministratihn of the National Bank of April 1 '1, 1946, AENB, Call No.
NBES - IV/A, Box No. 7~.
i
I
17
Dispat9h to the Embassy in Mosc~w of November 15, 1945, ibid, Reg.No. 623741R145
'" Czechoslovak note
ofJ~nuary 23,1
•
1946, ibid, Reg.No. I I 681/R/46 .
1
I
'
223947
�I
j
I
1
!
Report for the Embassy in MOscoy.. of January 30, 1946, AMZV, A-GS 1945-1954, Box 90, o.
Property - Booty Claims, Reg.No. 17~82IRJ46.
19
j
,
20 Minutes prepared by the Head o~ the "R" Department of the 'Ministry of Foreign Affairs Dr.
Vaclav Rejholec (Februaty 3, 1946j AMZV, Legal Department 1945-1954, Box 12, o. Booty
Agreement - Banks and ~aluables, Reg. No. 22611145, Soviet memorandum of January 30, 1946,
ibid, Reg.No. 272691RJ46.·
'
I
'
I
I
:
Note of February 15, 1946 hande4 over to the Soviet Embassy in Prague, AMZV, A-GS 1945
'.
'
1954, Box 90, o. Property LBooty Claims, Reg.No. 272661RJ46.'
21
I'
.
Telegram from J. Horak to the Midistry of Foreign Affairs in:Prague of March 26, 1946, AMZV,
.
Telegrams received, Mosc6w 1946, No. 668/46.
22
23 National Bank's request to expedi~e the solution of the problem regarding its vault and an urgent
protest against the hando~er of its gold was sent by messenger-to the Office of the Prime Minister,
Office of the State Presid6tt, as.wenlas to the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Foreign Mfairs, and
Ministry of Defence (Marph 25, 194?, AENB, NB - P xvm - 243/2, US~R - Diverse Matters 1928
1950, Box No. 590, Reg.1'i0' 18080npr.H.IP.
I
I
.
For more informationI cf. K. K~plan - K. Jech, Dekrety prezidenta republiky ['Presidential
Decrees'], I and n, Brno 1995.
24
.
.
II
.'
,
25
.
.
.
.
Minutes ofa meeting (February 2i, 1946, AMZV; SM-T 1945-63, Masaryk, Box 1, sine:
!
. ,I
I'
I
. .
,
'
.
Telegram from 1. Horlif to the M~nistry of Foreign Affairs in Prague of March 2u, 1946, AMZV,
Telegrams received, Moscow 1946, No. 942/46.
26
I i ,
I .
I
•
,
27 The unreliability of the Soviet approach was stressed by the fact that the negotiations were
conducted by the Arnb~ssador ZoHn who repeatedly declared to have no understanding 9f the
subject matter, and by
I
'.','
twh
acti~g
confid~ntial
would-be specialists
withoutlany full powers. A
report on the issue prepared by
the "RI! department reads as follows: "Noteworthy is among others the circumstance how the
commission of specialist~ mentione~ by Vyshinski was formed. MaJich is a political commissar and
his obvious intention wJs not to ~iss anything that could be confiscated as booty. Gimmelfarb is
just a bookkeeper obviobsly anxious to achieve the highest possible economic effect Neither of
them knows anything ab6ut law in Igeneral, let alone international law. I! Report by Dr. Rejholec on
I
I
i
I
22.39 48
",
�the preparation of the ~egotiation~; AMZV, Legal Department 1945-54, Box 12, o. Booty
Agreement - Banks and Vfuables, :~g.NO. 539321R/46.
Minutes of negotiationl betweenithe representatives of the Czech and Soviet governments of
February 28, 1946, ibid, Reg.No. 1374741R146. Russian version of the minutes, ibid, Reg.No.
28
374761R146.
I
.
I
Government decision of February 28, 1946 and Czechoslovak memorandum, memorandum, ibid,
.
Reg.No. 353741R146.
29
I
I
.
Zorin wrapped up the/ negoiiatiJn as follows: "that means that the Czechoslovak government
disputes all points"; he remarked to the Soviet officers who were present at the talks that they could
have carried away everytliing withodt much ado and the matter would have been solved. Account by
Dr. Rejholec of March 4J, 1946 surrimarizing the reports prepared by Dr. Horna from the National
I
Bank and by Dr. Prokop from the Ministry of Finance; both aforesaid officials took direct part in the
negotiations. Ibid, Reg.N6. 374711R146..
. 30
.
. " The text of a
f
I
.
memoran~m
.
ofM.Lh 4 and a report by Dr. Rejholec, ibid.
! I
.
" The text of a Soviet Lte of MLh 20 and a Czechoslovak note of March 28, ibid, Reg.No.
I
I
I
.
1
!
504811R146.
I
Telegram from J. Masaryk to the Embassy in Moscow (March 29, 1946, AMZV, Telegrams
I
I
Dispatched, Moscow 1946, No. 987/46. As we explained in the preceding text, the quoted
,subordinate clause did n4t completdly match reality. It concerned the increase of the gold reserves in
the vaults of the National Bank w~ich accumulated due to the Bank's business activities conducted
during the war.
I
33
34 Memo from the Ministry of Flreign Affairs to the Ministry of Finance of March 29, 1946,
I
I
,
AMZV, LegaI Department 1945-54, Box 12, o. Booty Agreement - Banks and Valuables; Reg.No.
53931146.
I
i
I
.!
.
.
Report prepared by the Ministry 'of Foreign Affairs for the Embassy in Moscow, March 29, 1946,
I
'
ibid,Reg.No. 53933/46; re protest of the National Bank addressed to the Office of the Prime
Minister and the Ministry of FinaJce cf. Minutes of a meeting of the interim administration of the
National Bank (April Ill, 1946), AENB, Call No. NBES-W/A, Box 73.
35
I
'
I
'
I
I
\
~.
22,3949
�I
I
I
36 Telegram from the Ambassador H6rak to the Ministry ofForeign Affairs (April 4, 1946) AMZV,
I
'
telegrams received, Moscow 1946, No. 1039/46.
I
I
I
!
.
.
.
.
Internal communicatiori from Dr( Rojieek .("R" Department) to the Legal Department of the
Ministry of Foreign Afffirs (Aprili 4, 1946), Legal Department 1945-1954, Box 12,0. Booty
Agreement - Banks and Valuables, R:eg.No. 59032/46.
,
.
I
37
..
38
. I
,. .
Ibid, Rojieek's addenda of APrilS,! 1946.
,
I
Internal communication prepared ~y Dr. Rojieek (April 10, 1946) and continuously updated on the
basis ofthe curr~nt infontiation prov;ided by Dr. Prokop, ibid, Reg.No. 63215/46.
39
1
I
s~tement
Detailed gold flow
for/the period between March 15, 1939 and May 9, 1945, AENB,
.
Call No. NB-P XVID-45/ff, Box 457!.
40
.'
·
r
I
,I
'
,
"
:
,
Record ,of a conversati?n lead by jthe Prime Minister Klement ,Gottwald, the ministers J. Masaryk
and Dr. Clementis, and the Amba~sador Dr. Horak with Molotov, Vyshinski, Mikoyan, Pavlov,
Zorin, and Lavrivchev o~ July 22, ~946, AMZV, Dep't a - GS 1945-54, Box 38, o. Talks - USSRZorin, sine.
i
41
I
Record of the Mosco~ negotiat~ons, cf. AMZV, Dep't a - GS 1945-1954, Box 188, o. Soviet
Union, Ref.No. 163181146; i~id, ~egal Department 1945-1954, Box 12, o. Booty Agreement
Banks and Valuables, Reg.No. 140001146.
'
'
42
I i :
'
Memo from the Ministry of FJeign Affairs to the Ministry of Finance of December 2, 1946,
AMZV, Dep't a - GS 1945-54, Box[188, o. Soviet Union, Ref.No. 230 346/46.
43
.
j
I
I
I
I
I
I
�VII. Summary
The present report is the fir~t comprehensive study to documenfthe legal and institutional
implications of the proce~s of Aryariization of gold, silver, platinum, pre~ious stones, and pearls in
the Czech Lands in the ydars 1939-1:945, and of its implementation. The report is based on primary
(i.e. archival) sources, f~r the most part previously unexplored. Each chapter represents a self
contained analysis of the i'ssues defiried in the introduction.
I ·
.
I
I
The persecutory [process o~ restricting ownership rights of Jewish individuals and legal
entities and the subsequent exproptiation of Jewish-owned gold, silver, platinum, precious stones,
pearls and objects made 'of such materials . was accomplished through several procedures. These
,
I
procedures included: res¥ctions o~ the right of disposal effected through forced deposits; export
bans; forced sales under clearly disa~vantageous conditions; above all, di~ect confiscations governed
by an array of criminali and other laws and regulations. This infringement of property rights
culminated in the period when thel mass deportations of the Jewish population to concentration
camps were initiated. Thb objectiv~I of all the above mentioned methods of economic persecution
I
was to reach the final objective of the German occupation administration in this field, i.e. the total
expropriation of gold anfl other pr~cious metals, ,precious stones, and other valuables owned by
Jewish individuals, enterp'rises, and 1ssociations.
,
I
I
I
i
The economic persecution was regulated, conducted, and enforced by various political and
I
,
security branches of the German administration which in tum purposefully involved in this process
the so called autonomou~ Protectorate authorities. The process of Aryanization of Jewish property
was fully controlled by t~e German ~uthorities, the role of the Protectorate institutions was restricted
to secondary, mostly clerical tasks (registration, record-keeping etc.)
!
I
.
The role of the National BLk for Bohemia and Moravia was delimited by its subordinate
position vis-a-vis the Re~ch Bank J,hich regarded the National Bank as its subsidiary. The National
I
,
Bank was also subordinate to the Office of the Reich Protector; between the Office and the National
Ballk existed a direct p6rsonal link since the Office co-opted German executives into the Bank's
Management.
TIlegally procured Jewish! valuables· were conected by Hadega, a German company.
specifically commissioned by the Reich Protector to perform this task. An important part in the
Aryanizatiori of the given category pf Jewish property took the following two specialized institutions
of the occupation adrltinistrationi created by the Reich Protector: Zentralstelle flir jiidische
Auswanderung (l942! renamed I Zentralamt fUr die Rege1ung der, Judenfrage) and the
Auswanderungsfonds
fi
Bohmen
r
Miihren.
. ..
.
After a thorough evaluation of the surviving archive materials, the team of experts came to
the conclusion that the Itotal amo~nt of gold provably confiscated from Jewish individuals, firms,
I
I
I
221951
�!
i
I
.
and associations amounted to 614.62 kilograms. This amount represents the most conservative
I
1
estimate of this category of Aryanized property (lower limit), given that the records of direct sales to
the Hadega Company arel no longer; available; in addition, it isnow impossib1eto document the
confiscated by the German customs authorities from Jewish emigrants
quantity of gold objects I
.
I
.
crossing the Reich borders. As of May 9, 1945, the amount of gold iProcured from· Jews and
deposited in the vaults ofithe Nation~l Bank by the Hadega Company and the Auswanderungsfonds
totalled 413.6 kilograms. certain p6rtion of this gold remained in .form o,fjewels and was stored as
a bank deposit of the Auswanderubgsfonds, above all at the Bohmische Escompte-Bank. The
following numbers were establishep by the Commission with respect: to silver, platinum, and
diamonds (brilliant cut): 6.49 kilogfams of platinum and 16,744.594 kilograms of silver (these
precious metals were iU6gally confiscated from Jewish individuals and legal entities and were
,
I
subsequently used for the Ineeds of tre German war industry); 5,128.8 carats of diamonds (brilliant
cut) and 582.1 carats of diamond rosettes. (Hadega's registered intake, 1941 - 1944).
t
I
I ·
.
.
I
The concluding ?ha~ter of Ithe present report describes the fate ~f the Jewish property
unsold by the Germans kept In the vaults of several Prague-based banks untt! the end of World War
II . Until then, the Jewish assets forbing the deposit (today, these assets are virtually untraceable)
were administered by two! institution~: the so called Vermogensamt and the Auswanderungsfonds. In
addition, the concluding :chaPter explains the fate of the Jewish gold which had become, by the
decision of the Gennan-a'dministere;:I Foreign-Exchange Branch of the National Bank for Bohemia
and Moravia, an integral ~art of the 'gold reserves registered with this banking institution during the
war. As late as 1995, the renowned researcher Karel Sommer had to admit that the final fate· of
National Bank's gold was/unknown.) The conclusion of the Expert Commission is unambiguous: the
entire amount of the Jewish gold committed to the National Bank and some of the above mentioned
anonymous Jewish assetJ unsold b~ the end of the war were taken to the Soviet Union as Soviet
booty. Some of the asse~ found in the vaults (i.e. nominal assets of the 'Jewish victims of German
persecution) were exempted from Hooty and set aside for future restitution to the original owners.
The scope of this restitu~on could tie possibly verified by the Czech National Bank.2 In spite of its
,
I
.
legally impeccable, straightforward ibasis for negotiations, the Czechoslovak diplomacy was forced
to give up its effort to have the above mentioned assets exempted from the Soviet booty claimed; the
Czechoslovak side yieldJd to Sovidt pressure after relatively long and complicated negotiations; it
.
;
1
.
must be added that the I Soviet side did not conduct these negotiations completely fairly. The
Czechoslovak decision to surrenderjthe claims was influenced by purely political reasons: it gave up
the assets in question inl return forI the Soviet support on the international scene to obtain certain
results important for the Czechoslovak state.
.
I
I
.
.
I
Chapter vn - Footnotes
I
Karel Sommer, Sovitska valeemi. koeist a Eeskoslovensko ['The Soviet Booty and
Czechoslovakia'], in: 0 Isovitske i~perialni politice ['Soviet Imperial Policies'], Acta Universitatis
Palackianae olomucenlT Facultas lpaedagogica, Civilia i 1995, p. 19.
2 The issue ofrestitutio~s exceeds ~he confines of this report, cf.: letter from the Czech Vice-Premier
Egon T. LanskY to the 1j>resident of the Czech National Bank 1. TosovskY, Prof.Eng. of March 17,
1999, Ref.No. 3766/99~MZ and TbsovskY's reply of Aprill, 1999, Ref.No. 2/4-99-V.
!
I
I
J
I
I.
I
22-3.952
�I
I
I
I
I
I
'
,.
.
The present report was concluded anp signed at Prague, this 29th day of September, 1999
I
doc. PhDr. Drahomir JaneI:k, esc.
doc. PhDr. Eduard KUbu,lesc ..
I,
doc. JUDr. Jan KukUk, Dr.
PhDr, Jaroslava Milotoval esc.
Jie! Novotny, esc., Dr.
,
w.
I
I
doc. PhDr. Jie! Sousa, esc.
223953
�f
'
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK
I
NEV'{YORK, NY. 10045-0001
I
i
jAREA CODE 212-720-5000
I
,
November 3, 1997
Dr. William Slany . I
The Historian
United States Department of State
Columbia
aza Office BuilBing
2401 E Street
I
'
Room L-409
Washington, DC 20522-0104
I
Dear Bill,
In responbe to cln inquiry
the World Jewish
Congress, we have rJcentlyl reviewed all of our records concerning
the gold custody acdount o~ the Bank of Portugal ("Portugal") at
the New York Fed duting the Second World War.
I thought I would
share with you what Iwe havF found from this review.
The inqUik y was /based on an American Embassy Dispatch
dated February 13, t946 (";Dispatch") which suggested that
Portugal's gold holdings at the New York Fed had substantially
increased from 1939+44, an8 that this
ease was the result of
foreign shipments of gold ~o New York. A copy of the Dispatch is
enclosed.
I
i
~or
Whi
we do notlhave complete records
Portugal for
I
.
the period, our rec~rds d~ generally confirm the data contained
in the Dispatch; th~t is, nike the Dispatch, our records show a
substantial increasa in Poktugal's holdings from 1939-46, and
indicate that some bf thi~ increase came from
ipments of gold
to New York from abtoad.
.
recor~s
a~ditional
Our
als0 provide some
information
about this increase~ such jas when it occurred and from whom the
gold was received. i From our available records,
appears that
the bulk of the increase ~ccurred in 1939 and 1940; that mo~t of
the gold received ihto Po~tugal's account during those years was
I
I
shipped to New Yorkl
10rtugal and the Bank of England; that
from 1941-46 there were nq foreign shipments of gold received in
to Portugal's accouht; and that during this latter
riod most of
l
the increase came fr om pu~chases of gold from the United States
Treasury.
l
223954
�~
i
1-"2=--__
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK_ _
I
I
I
I
I
I
Dr. William Slany
November 3, 1997
I
j
Our findi~gs ar~ based on two primary sources from
our archives.
The Dirst i~ a detailed gold ledger, recording
all transactions fo~
Yfars 1940 and 194~ ("Ledger").
Regrettably, this i~
only ledger we have from the War era.
Moreover, while the ,iLedgerj contains summary information on
transactions, it do~s not include details concerning the types
of bars, fineness, ~ssay (tefinery source), etc., of the gold
recei~e~ into Portugal's ;bcount. The second soutce consists
of personal files add notes of Allan Sproul,
First Vice
President of the NeJ York ~ed at the time ("Notes"). Both of
se sources are pJblicl Y,: available to scholars and others at
our archives.
I·
l
,
From the Ledger land the Notes we have attempted,
to the best of our ~bility, to develop an account history for
I
,
Portugal for 1939-4~, whic~ I discuss below.
I must emphasiza
that, because our records are incomplete,
development of
s account history
s n1kcessaril Y involved certain assumptions
and deductions.
I enclose, a copy of the account history, a
transcription of thJ Ledge~, the information contained in the
I
I
Notes, and a comparison beltween the New York Fed's records and
spatch, for y6ur furrher review and study.
Account History
I
The DispaFch sh6ws a beginning balance in Portugal's
account at the New York Feld of zero on 1/1/39. The Ledger shows
a
osing balance, ih the ~ccount as of 12/31/39 of approximately
7,333 kgs. The Notes do n~ot record actual balances, but reflect
"ave
daily goldl balanc,es," which for Portugal in 1939 was 440
kgs. The Notes als? show Iportugal' s average daily gold balances
were zero in 1934-35 and 13 kgs during 1936-38,
1 relatively
small amounts. Thetefore,I it is not unreasonable for the
Dispatch to show a kero balance in 1939.
I
·
The account bec!me very active in 1940, after the
outbreak of the Warl The ILedger shows that during that year
Portugal shipped 11~427 kgs of gold to New York from London (with
the Bank of Englandl acting as shipping agent) and 57,518 kgs of
gold from Lisbon (with Po~tugal as the shipping agent).
In
addition, the Ledge~ shows gold purchases from, and one sale to,
United States Tteasury.
,
I
223955
�.
'.
Dr. William Slany
November 3, 1997
FEDERAL. RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK_---i-""-____
I
[
After 1940, ther;e were no further'foreign imports of
gold into or export~I of go~d from Portugal's account.
The Ledger
I
for 1941 records additiona~ purchases and sales invol ng the
United States Treasury, an? a transfer of 4,554 kgs of gold from
the Bank for Intern~tionali Settlements ("BIS").
The BIS transfer
would have involved Ian internal transfer of gold already stored
in the vaults at the New ybrk Fed.
,
I
I
'
From 19411 through 1945, the Notes show that Portugal
purchased 108,080 kgs of gpld from the United States Treasury.
The Notes for this period also show trans rs of 8,603 kgs
I
I
gold into Portugal'~ account from other accounts at the New York
Whi
the Notes do nbt indicate who the counterparties were
in these transactiorls, the; Dispatch suggests that they may have
included the centra~ bankslof Argentina and Sweden.
As above,
these transactions would have involved the transfer' of ownership
of gold already phy~iCallYi present in the vaults of the New York
Fed.
The
osing b~lance for 1945 recorded in the Notes is
approximately equal to tha~ shown in the Dispatch, 262,429 kgs
and 257,693 kgs, reIPectiv~lY.
Overall, the acdount history we have been able to
construct indicateslthat the increase in Portugal's gold holdings
came from the following so~rces and at the following times: 23.4%
from Lisbon from 1939-40; 6% from London in 1940; 63.3% from the
United States TreasJry frob 1940-46; 5% from theBIS and other
I
'
accounts at the New IYork Fled from 1940-46; and 3~2% from
unaccounted for sou~ces~
.
1944 Transaction
I
'
,I
.
Finally, [ would like to again discuss the alleged
transaction involvi*g port~gal and the N~w York Fed described on
page 27 of the draf~ Suppl~ment to the E~ze~stat report.
In my
letter to you of October 9" 1997, I stated that we had no record
of such a transacti~n. and ;doubted that it occurred.
Our compre
hensive review of all of Portugal's records has borne out this
conclusion.
Nothin~ in t~e Di~patch, Ledger, or Notes provides
any support for thelsugges/tion that the Government of Portugal
transferred 16 tons of gold to the account of the Bank of
I
Portugal at the NewlYork 8ed in 1944. This kind of transaction
seems all the more unlike~y if one considers the United States
Treasury licensing tequire'ments governing all gold transactions
I
I
I
223956
�Dr. William Slany
November 3, 1997
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK,_----'c-:4"--_ _
i
in the United States at thk time.
For these reasons, I again
!
t
recommend that any :r:eference to .the alleged transaction be
I
I
deleted from the Supplement.
.1
I
.
.
appreCl? t e .yo~r conSl d era on In th'
lS ma tt er an d
hope that the information we have provided will be helpful to
you.
.
I
Very truly yours,
CZ::R.n~en~
Counsel
Enclosures
cc:
Peter Bakstansky
Terry Checki I
Timothy Fogart
Michael Silva
223957
�TRANSCRIPTION OF LEDGER 1940 AND 1941
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
October 27.1997
ACCOUNT:
BANCO DE PORTUGAL
I(in kilograms of fine gold)
3958
�I
r
INFORMATION FROM NOTES OF ALLAN SPROUL
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
October 27, 1997
I
ACCOUNT: BANCO DE PORTUGAL
I
, ,I
Average daily gold balances
Approximate
Year
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
U.S. $ Value
I
I
Kilograms of
FineGold
Fine Tro Ounces
I
$593,000
$183,000
$100,000
$0
$0
$15,000
$15,000
$15,000
$495,000
$44,635,000
$123,363,000
$150,587,000
$173,636,000
$221,735,000
$274,935,000
16,943
15 ,229
12,857
527
163
89
0
0
o
o
429
. 429
429
14,143
1,2t5,286
3,524,657
4,392,486
4,961,029
6,335,286
7,855,286
13
13
13
440
39,665
109,627
133,820
154,303
197,046
244,323
i
I
I
!
I
I
Gold imports (remittances from abroad)
I
I
1939
1940
178,343
2,609,829
5,547
81,173
59,629
67,600
p,200
$6,242,000
$91,344,000
1,855
2,103
535
Gold exports (shipped outside country)
1931
1932
1933
$2,087,000
$2,366,000
$602,000
I
I
I
Purchases (from the U.S. Treasury)
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
$1,995,000
$16,957,000' .
$17,955,000. i
$29,925,000
$10,898,000
$62,843,000
$47,880,000
!
I
57,000
484,486
.)
5j13,000
.855,000
3~ 1,371
.
1,7~5,514
1,368,000
1,773
15.069
15.956
26,593
9,685
55.846
42,549
. I
Earmarked (deposited to account) by trarlsfer from a:nother account at FRBNY
I
,
I
1943
1944
~945
$3,426,000
$1,004,000
$5,251,000
:97,886
·28,686
150,029
1
3,045
892
4,666
Foreign exchange sold
,
U.S. $ Equivalent Foreign Currency/Amount
1942
$350,000 I Swiss fr~ncs
1942
$400,000 Portugese Escudos
i
:
I
!
1,502,146
9,820,000
223959
�!
I
ACCOUNT HISTORY FO~
:
BANCO DE PORTUGAL GOLD AqCOUNT
1939-1940
C,..in&
Federal Reserve Bank ofNew York
October 27, 1997
I
~a'••", 1938 £[rom Dispatch) .
I
I .'
I
1939 transactions
Shipped to Portugal's account at FRBNY from ,BoE
I
t
Shipped to Portugal's account at FRBNY (from ?)
Net Purchases by Portugal from thelu'S. Treas~
Unaccounted for
r
I
Closina balance 1939 (from Ledaer)
I
I .
1940 ',aosa<lioo, (from Ledge,)
Shipped to Portugal's account at F~NY fromlBoE
.
Shipped to Portugal's account at Fl}BNY fromlPortugal .
Net Purchases by Portugal from the U.S. Treasury
I
'.
11,427 kg's + (from. Ledger)
57,718 kgs + (from Ledger)
13,690 kgs + (from Ledger)
8,475 kgs +
I
Closine balance 1940 (from Ledeer)
1941 transactions (from Ledger)
7.333 kKS'
I- .
I
Unaccounted for
1,851 kgs + (from Ledger)
3,696 kgs + (from Notes: 5,547-1,851)
1,773 kgs + (from Notes)
.
13 kgs +
98.643 kes
j
okgs
okgs
Shipped to Portugal's account at FIp3NY from BoE
Shipped to Portugal's account at FRBNY fromlPortugal
Net Purchases by Portugal from th~ U.S. Treashry
Transfers from the BIS Account at FRBNY
(from Ledger)
(from Ledger)
15,956 kgs + (from Ledger)
4,554 kgs+ (from Ledger)
Closine balance 1941 (from Ledgier)
119.153 kes
I
1942 transactions (from the
Note~)
.
okgs
okgs
Imports
Exports
Purchases from the U.S. Treasury
Closine balance 1942 (inferred)
.
(from Notes)
(from Notes)
26,593 kgs + (from Notes)
I
145,746 kes
1943 tran~actions (from the Not~~)
Imports
.
Exports
I
Purchases from the U.S. Treasury
Transfers from another account at FRBNY
Okgs
Okgs
9,685 kgs +
3,045 kgs +
Closine balance 1943 (inferred)
(from Notes)
(from Notes)
(from Notes)
(from Notes)
158.476 kes
I
.
I
1944 transactions (from the Notes)
okgs
Imports .
.
,I
Exports
.
Purchases from the U.S. Treasury I
Transfers from another account at IFRBNY
Closine balance 1944 <inferred)
.
I
I
1945 transactions (from the Notes)
Imports
Exports
Purchases from the U.S. Treasury
Tnmsfers from another account at/FRBNY
Closing balance 1945 (inferred)
(from Notes)
(from Notes)
55,846 kgs + (from Notes)
892 kgs + (from Notes)
okgs
I
215,214kgs
!
f
I
Okgs
Okgs
42,549 kgs+
4,666 kgs+
262.429 kes
(from Notes)
(from Notes)
(from Notes).
(from Notes)
223960
�I
i
COMPARISON OF DISPATCH AND FRBNY RECORDS
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
October 27, 1997
Dispatch
FRBNY LedgerlNotes
69,076
93,964
(1,379)
167,471
I. PURCHASES AND SALES
i
FROMffO U.S. TREASURY
Purchases
Sales
1
163.040
Net Purchases
(L379)
i66.092
II. REMITTANCES
Remitted by BoE
16,973
13,278
Remitted by Pbrtugal
66,194
61,414
.
I
I
I
,
Unaccounted for
i
(assumed to bJ remittanbes)
.I·
8,488
.
83.167
Total Remittances
83.180
4,555
4,554
i
I
III. TRANSFERS AT FRBNY
I
Transferred b~ BIS
·
Transferred
I
I
b1 Argentil"
t
i
I
I
I
3,045
3,064
6,109
I
Transferred by Sweden:
2,201
I
.
I
Transfers, ordering party
unknownl.
I
Total Transfers
892
3,045
4,666
;
I
12.865
13.157
259.072
262,429
I
TOTAL INCREASE
DURING PERIOD
I
I
I
223961
�t_
I
,,:;x.. tl1blt B to
1~46,
dated February 13,
Embat;;l)y t . LisboLl .
l'rom
Date: October 31. 1940
Reo t
d:
1
I~
.
eost~to,
':iQ. :Jilt 14?, ton.
I
. Ootober
. I·
JI-821,
rerere~oe
31 •
.ii th
to IDepartment t t:I A-836, Se,Ptam.ber 19,
oO.C1oerning J'ortugue:.ae Bold hold1ll8s. ertoJ;'tG haYe be4ll
mtHle to obtain t.til mat.:ria1 requeatld 14 the Departru.nt' 8
'te1egrfl.L'i 129:5, At4>Uflt .1, .1945, . thrOug.hil1rol'mlll approach
to the portuguese authorities D,.. 1'1.nano1&1 Attaohe In the
hope tUlQ ~ell.t that th;1a m-etlL04 m1&b.t be raore immedlntely
produotive than ~ tarma~ approaoh to the 7brai&n Ott108.
Theae a, tte.mpta Mv. bean oOlltl..a.u.4b,oH.UJ5e at ona t.1.mI
the), o.p.peared to :g1ye
'ot
The)" haTe now,
ho.,4ivtfr ;-ra.il.d ud w. have aocor41 n W lladetomal
.
8'pp11oetiOll through
sought. Tho matter
promptly.
Sent
I
I
*OlIdee
.,ucQiaa.
the I J'ore1s.n ot11oe tor thl In:tormation
will, or oours., be followed up
.
I
.
~ptlrt~8nt.
J
Copy to London by
pouo~.·
"};(AlI-1m BY POOCH"
00
-
LODdoLl
, 'f0 " . 1 t
"
\.
\
194~
�I
.. YU~L'~ ..~l!"V~\)- . - -."
. - .,
I)HIt,;1,
o
')
\
I ': ~ ' / ""
.
\
0
'.J ':'-
il· ... )ll-'-~\-- 'll'
I . . .
II·
.
-1-1L..;""""T\-1...1.-,---"I-I-12'1\
1
L-[-I-,
...1..,- \
COPYRIG~T - HOT \0 BE REPPOOUCEO PHOTOGUPHICALlY 'WITHOUT PER!oiISSIO"
I
\
7xhiblt C to Despatoh NO. 729. dated February 13, 1945
\ from 'i\!Derl0en l'mbessy, Llsbon.
copy of FflbassY',8 Note Verbale No. 562 to Ministry ot
For~lgn 4tairs, dated January 18, H~46.
The lbaes Y or the united
\
1 ts oomplilrr.enta to the Ministry
"
bo. the
ho~or
sta~es
or }JIlerloa presents
ot Foreign Affairs, and
to\rsr.r to lts Note No. 377 dated Oatober 3D,
1945 I in wi.: loh oertain informa tion perta ining to portuguese
hOldi~gS
Gold
is 1\;eqUested.
.
.
\
The Embassy appreoiates the oooperation it is reoeiv
ing and
tu~lY
realizes that' information of the nature re- .
\
\
quested may! toke iome time to assemble., In the light,
bowever, Of\tbi ldstructloDs lt bas recelved from Washlngton,
und wblch .ere
se~ forth
ln It. Not. NO. 377 rarerred to,
the F.mbassy Ivan tur,e s to hope that the Ministry oan at. this
.
\.
.
time give it an indioation ot the 'appro~~ate date ...men a
rep17 to theit )lotal may b,e expeoted.
.
The. r:mb1oSsy desires likewise to express to the 'Ministry
1\
!
.
i,to thanks
\
\
:
.ontl11patlon of thIs oourtesJ'.
Lisbon, Junurlry 18,\ 1946.
\
I;
I
\
I
,.
,
C;I\D/JDH/ Jek
1J
\
\
\
�CCP~RI':;HT
or
-
TO
BE REPROOUCEO\PHOTOGRAPHICALLY
.
\
\
.\
.
E:x:hi b1 t D to Deop~tOh No. ~ E9, dB tad hbru.nry 1.3 ,. 194.6 ,
from ~erioan Embassy, L1sbon
\
TI'aLlDlat1oLl of reply t"rom Uinistry of P'ore1g.n Affairs,
dated danu~ry 28, 1946.
Iruo.
No.
o
~8
(1)
2
T~le Uin1str,7 0f Fore,ic,.n AtfairD present6 ita
rr.o!l t
\
\
\
\
.
ot the
co urtoou5 oomplliten ts to the !mba BSY
.
United ::tl:1tec; ot A.rrlerioa and, 1n reply to the
lattor'
I.i
Note No. 51
62/ at JUllun.ry 18, has tho
hOLlor to ste tethn t
\~
\
8 tter 001Jsul t1ng on the.
I
:Jubj eo twlth the oQmpstent Portuauas. au thor! ties,
\
\.
it aipeots to be &b~a to 1eP11 within & few dall
to Note No'. 377,
ot \ Ootobe~
I
30, 1945 J sinoe the
\ .
lLlvest1gu tioD .ceo~I8Bary for thla reply 18 beillg
l
made prOGlptly and Wl th 811\ p0881ble 8peed.
\
Lisbon, lanuary 28, 19'6.
(~'.
\
\
223964
�'\
(
.
.
1
.'
,
MOT TO
I COPYRI CHT
_I : , )
-";'
,'r~
, .... ,;
"
.
__ .
~
.
REPRODUCED PHOTOCR"PHI CALLY WI THOUT PE~I SSIOM
BE
1
I
i:,'xhi bl t E to IDespatoh No. 729, dated February 13,
from Amerioo..o bboDay, Liabon.
I
\
.
Tranala ti 011 lqote from Ministry ,ot Foreign Aftairs, dated
I
February 6,194.8
t
MINISTRY OF 70llliIGN AP'FAIR3
General Bureau or Eoonomia
ao~ Consular Attllirs.
File No
No. "
The }l.iniatry ot foreign Affairs preee..o ta ita moot
I
oourteoun oO!l'lp:llmentD to the limbaaay ot the united states
I
I
,
of Amer~oa nnd, with reterc.ooeto thl lotterts Note
'Verbals
.
INa.
,
a62,
I
at Jnnuary 18, last, haa the honor to
transmit herewith the lntorma'ion in respeot ot the gold
I
o~erations
!
..
. the Bank
ot i
I
0t
Portugn 1 su b seqQent t 0
""
t~e
deoltlratioos of the U.a.1 ted Jlationa ot lebruary 22, 1944.
I
I
I. .
'
I
- TLte da tn' will be tl'1loami tted indue oourse whioh rl!rer to
..
.
the.Ohar\6otc.rirtio8 or the gold
the
Bank! ot
0.0..
1.n the pos.eaaion at
I Giue and whioh, in Tiew ot the mi.nuteneSB ot
tho roqu!irSl:l8nts, it will take muoh tilts to turnish.
t:nclo5UrL
I
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
~.
?.
8..
~..
liS
1'0110'08:
.
Banoo de !portugal - Lisbon
Fedoral &aaerTe Bank- New York
I
Bank ot E~gland - London
I
Balik o.t Ola.nnda - ottawa
223965
I
Ba400 CBn\tral de 1e. Repub,lloa. A~rgentina
BI:l.qqueNa!tionale Suisse - Berne
1
~
"
1\
"
"
i
"
"
,
"A"
"~B"
""0"
- BUeJlO8 Ayres
AOOOUllt
"
If
. tt
""D"
10. Bank for international Settlements - Basle
11. Bonoo de Portugal - Lisbon
Gold in Burs
,i
.'
\. "
..
0-0 J'"
r. ~ ~ ... "
I ' ,
'n
�,_ .• .,Ct:
o
/\
I
COPYRI GHT -
\
)
_J
.10
.J
.\
HOTI TO
·,
I
t;oDeGP~toh'No. 729, dated Pebruary l~.
flrom A.m~iob.n Embassy, Lisbon.
Encloau.re No. 1
li,u,
I
f
BAliCO DB POR'lUGAl. - USBOU
,~
IN KlLOG~A1r1Ll:t!S lINl, AT nr,r DATES AS 8PEOI:rI!D:
I
GOLD UOl,DlOO:"'; I
I
I
,
1 - GOLD BAllS:
at the lederal RoserTa Bank, New York
at the Bank ot England, London •••••• :13.7152
at
the Bank
ot 6anada,
4.020
Ott8wfl
at tho Bnnoo Cektral de la Republica
I
I
Argentina, Bueno!l .A.1T;'ee •••••••••.•••
I
l
I
I
at ilaflqua Nationale Suiss8, Barn:,
" .....
"
.'
2.106
"'8" Aooou.o.t.l ••• '••.•••••••••••••••
.. C" .A 0 0 ou..n t
.1. '..•'. ......... ·" ·,
· · ·. · •
I
I
"D" AOOOUJlt •••· •• ~ .l .. .... · · · · .. · · ·
I
'
I
'
at the Bank tor I International Sett1,
%tents, Basla (laOl~ Deposit AeOO\l..Qt).:,
5.814
7.02~
AOOOu.nt. ~ ••.- .... • • • • • • • •. • • • • • • •
.
:
-,
2
e5
at Balleo de Portugal. Uebon••••••••• :61.1«
120.Ui
106.923
Oold Aocount of the pOrtuguao8
GOTernm.eJ1t
I
I
'
II -' GOLD IN COIN!3:
at Btinc 0 d 8 jJortugal, Li shone • • • • • • • •
1. 2M
I
223966
I
�,
.
(
-
~",.: ~
~
0
"
f'
\
~1
" l
.)
0,
-
I I I \ I I I
III THOUT.
I
I
\
1
II
R(P~OUCEO PHOTOC.R1PHrC1LL~
"
10 B£.
HO T
\
"
_, ,.. J
-'
i
COPT~I(.IIT
[
.
.,
I
\
--.l
2
I 1 I \ I ! I
lJJ
p£.~ISSIO~
i
\
\
.
.
Nl.
NO.
enclosure
2 to\' deep. toll
729. February 13.
from ~er loan. F.mbasBY. Lisbon'.
I
.
1·
\
FEDER.'i.L RESERVE BANK
SUl:~;:;.nY,
IN iCILOGh/..MHF.S
\
IFD:w.,
NEW YORK
OF TRF. HE]'ATIVE GOLD
rmALIN~:
BJance at 1-1-H 39
Gold earmarked by \the FJ1eral Reserve
Bank for aooount of B~noo de portu
gal as a result of purohase etteoted
in Now york _.
Gdld remitted to the Federal Reserve
I
I
Bank for aoooun~ of Banoo de portu
I
gnl by the Bank! of EnS;land, London •
-I- --, . "-f "-· · . ··· · . ·· · ·
Kgs.
NIL
69.076'
\
\
GOld earmarkod by .the Federal Reserve
Bank for acoount of Benoo de Portu
gal at tho requ~st of \the Bank for
International s~ttleme~ts, Basle •••
,
19~.
i
4.555
\
Gold earmarked by t;he Federal Reserve '
Bank for aooount of Banoo de portu
gal a t the reque~st of Banoo cent;-a:l, de'
la Republioa Jl.rg.entine ~ Buenos AYres •• 3.045
\
\
,
Gold earmarked by the Federal Reserve
Bank for, aooount\ otBa~oo de portu
gal 89 a result of remittances made
by this letter .~ •••• "~._ ••••••••••
\
56.194
t...........
r,old sold to the Federal neserve Bank,
new York •••••••
1
.....
", .
159.843
\
'
1.379 Kgs.158.464
\BaJ.anoi at 22-2-1944
Kgs.158.4.64.
Gold earmarked by t~e Federal Reserve
!,
I
Bonk foraacount \01' BOnao de portu
gal u.s D result o;.fpurohases effeoted
93.964
ot New York •••••
l .......... .
!\• . • . • •
'\'
.
'
Gold eurmllrked by thp,Fedelin1 Reserve
Bank for aacount of Banao de portu
,
I
gal Gt the request of BBllOO Contral
, ' de 10 Republioa /,rgen ti.do. •. Buenos
,\yres ••••••••••• ~ •••." ••\••• ,••••••••
.
..
I
Gold oarnlf:!rked by theI Federal Reserve
,
I
Banlc f,or eccoa.ut ,of Bunao de portuI
'
,
gal tit ,tho request of sveriges
[i iksbank J stookhob •••• L•••• " •••••
i
\
\
2.201
KgS. 99.229
\
\
B.olanoe \ at 31-10-1945
~23961
�--.,.
\ I
COPYRIGHTI -
HOT
TOI BE REPROOUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY,WITHOUT PE~IS$IOM
f.nclosure 'No.3 Fo desputch No. 729, February 13, 1948,
from ,'.merican F.mbassy, Lisbon.
I
B:\lnc OF EtrGLtlm - LormoN
I
I
,
:;t.J1.'1: ,".RY , IN KILOGTVJfMFS FINE, OF THE RELATIVE GOLD DEALINGS:
_/"""
Balanoe at 1-1-lg39
Gold eurcarked by theI Bank of
r:nglund for a'ccourit of Banco
de portugal aa 8 ~esUlt of
purchases effeoted in London
KgS.
KgB.
3.227
13.75::
3.227
KgS.'
18.979
KgB.
16.979
I
Gold remitted by the Bank of
F~gland to the Federal Reserve
I
[
Bank, New york, for aooount of
B~nco de Portugal..........
18.973
I
[
\
,
I
GOld sold to tne BaM 'of England.
,
I
I
I
B'alanoe at 22-2-1944
.... .
I
No furthe~
gold rrans8ot1ons
efreote~
up to
31-10-i9~.
I
223968
�1
.--....
~-'
':_'' ' {'
I
_.. .
'. '\') ,)'-'":-~.-'/ '.~. --' ~ --..~ -'I ... [
\ -' I /,--' ,'. '~')'l-'
-'.~;
. .. )
0,:
•
'j -- T
----[ . I
..
'-'
1
1
2
\
.
.
I I I I I I 11 I 1 1 I I
~i~-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-~-_-_-_-_r._CO~p:y:RI~G:H~T~~=~:O~T=T:O=tBE~~R~EP~~~O:U~C~EO~~P=HO~T:O:GR~A~PH=I=C=.L~L~Y=W='~TtHO~uiT=P~E:~~,jS~S'~Oi~=::~=~~~=~~~
- ----'-'- -- ..... -._---
No,,4
::-nclosuro/to desI{atoh !Io. 729, February 13, 1946,
from :,,,;ner1oqn F.mbaE;lsYJ Lisbon.
·
r
DfJiK OF O/.N't\DA -
SU1~,j'\RY l
OTTAWA
TIl KILOGR:U.~L'l.S FINF., OF Tm~, TIELATIVF: GOLD DE-ALmGS:
I
I
Ba1aijoe at 1-1-1939
KgB.
NIL
I
I
IBank or .conada
for account bf Banoo de Portugal
at tho reaue~t of 'anque Nationale
suisse :
~ I
G)ld earmarked by the
Transfer from
I
"f" Account
••••
2.018
Transfor ,from "B" Acoount ••••
:
2.000'
I
sold aga~lnst' swiss Franoe. ••••
2
I
·
.4.020
Kgs. 4.020
I
ga1apoe at 22-2-1944
Kgs. 4.020
Gold eormarked by the Bank of canada
fer'acoount lor Banpo de Portugal
at the requJ9t of aanque Natlone.le
5ulBsel
.
,
Transfer from "A" AO\lount • • • •
I
Sold 8goinst·
I
~lss
Franoa ••••
2.001
2.
----
Kgs. 2.003
2.003
Kgs. 5.023
Gold sold to sveriges Riksbnnk.
stockholm
. l ....-. J•••.•• · ••••••••
'I
I
·
I
Ba1~noe
Kge. 2.504
2.504 .
KgS. 3.519
at 31-10-1945
!
-,
\
223969
�...
... .,,-: " ....
,
-"
0
I
COPYRI GHT
-
'. ..,.,; ...;
,
'\
,
,
\
...,'
I
i
I
,
I
/
I
"':.')-l r
I"'! '
I --
-,.;
;'
0
I
I 1 I
I
1
1 I I
I 1 1
wO T TO ,B £ REPR'QD~CEO PHOTOGRAPHI CAHY WITHOUT P ER?11 SSI OM
I
I 1 12 \ 1 I I
----
g;L\olOGu.r~ Nv.
I
6 tOI DGSpo.~oh No. 72'W, dated February
f,OUl Am.fi~liIl Emb.!1ssy, Lisbon.
a",
,1J Ii NAr ONAL;;
nureSl, -
13, 1946,
'
BERNlI
i"A" - AOOO!lAt
I
.~r~rk~d
~rtugal
ocno.rning gold
tor aooount ot Banco da
bl
Banque Nntiono.le $uisstl land on the1r initiative, aga1.tl.Dt Esoudos
plaoed at their dlDpoeal in Liabon by Banoo d. Portu£al,
the trnnsport ot the gold to Lisbon beins
,a t thei expenSe e.rid rick at BanQua 5at1ona.le
Suisse,.
I
,
I
I
DU')..Il;!j\RY I IN KlLOOR.i\M.! E,si n~ I
Pl. ',l'ij! REU TIVE GOLD DEALING-OS:
BJanoe a t
1-1-1~Z9
Kg8. '
ii,
GolC! ef.l.rclUkod by OAnqUe No tiona1e
0ui95e ag~inst ~Boudol •....•.....
,
'
I
Gold transtorredl to the Bltnk ot Ca.na
do., ' Ottawa •• ~ •• /•••••. i. . . .. .. ....
2. Ole
I
,
'
,i l l
17.108 19. U
Gold rooltted to Lisbon...........
I
' Kgs.
7.028
I
,
Bai1anoe at 2::-2-194-4
..
Kge.
'1.026
Kga.
~.g12
K.g.B.
3.814.
Ie'
Gold't-rsD..5ferraa to the Se.nk ot ana
da, ottawa •••• I
•••••• .1 ••••••••••• '.
2.001
Gold
801 c1
to
/
I l'onale
BanqUQ 116 t
;
I
I
I
I
l!>l'
SU1 S88 ....!.-"f.::.::L
Balanoe at 51-10-1g.3
I
1
I
223970
�-r.. -
-
,
,
•
)
COP'OIlGHT
.:
4
_, : )
.,-,1
t
'.. ":"1
I
~
..
" I
1/
I
.)
v
III \ I I \ t \ I I I
I
I I ,2 \ I I \
HOp TO BE R~PRODUCEO PHOTOGU!!HI CALLY WI THOUT PERt11 SSIOH
i
_J
.
x
"
I
I
'
I
'
720. dated Febru8.T"'J 13, 1946,
trom Amerioan Embassy, Lisbon.
Ellclo.8UIO No. 8 to DeSipatoh No.
I
I
BAN:~UE ,~TI OlU.LB
SUISSB - BERN!
"0" - Aooount
\
,oonosrning gold &armnr~.d. tor aocount ot Banco d. par~l,
by Banq.ue National. Suiae. a ttll. rtlQ.UA8t at RelchJ5ba.nk. h1:..liP.
t..nIe tra.n.,port or tu 8014 to Llabo.c
beling at I the expense and riO: ot
this latter.
'
----- ........
I
.-
i
SUMMARY, IN KILOORA!lME-C:: TINE! 01 TIm RELAfiVR GOLD DlALINGS:
l
II
,Balance at 1-1-1930
!
'I
' I
NIL
"
Gold earcarked by B~ue NBtlona1e
':;uissa at tho reQ.uoetlot Rei oh.bank ,
Ber11n••••••••. l·····l······~·······
Go14 ramitted to Liabon. •••••••••••••
Gold sold to RalhhabanJ, B.rl1n•••.
~.
~.861
'2.809
'
Balanoe at 22-2-1944
Us.
-
-
Kgs.
~,601
NIL
I,
I
,I'
~
aold eartarkad by Banque
Kationa1e
Sulse. at tho riqueet at R41ohabank,
Ber11,n•••.••••• 1•••.•••••••••.••••••
I
Goldaold to ,Reiohsba...a.k, nor1 1 n........
I
IS. 017
,2. ••
tJu2
I
, Gold sold to Benquo Nationale •... .•
Sulose •..••••••••••• ·1· . .. •.•.
I
~aQOe
at
1,600
0.017
3l-l0-1g4~
-mIL
'.
223971
�,l
,
i
I
_.-,.--;":'!!
it
\
COpy III GH T
,
,
'
_.'
j
i
-
-'
HOT TO
'
,
,
""1
' '
I
/'
.I
,-'
:'1 '. )-
0
I
II
II
BE REP ROOUC EO PHOTOGRAPH I'CALL Y WITHOUT
I
I
1
I I I
I I I
PE~ISSIO"
I
I
I
1
2
I I J
I I I
I.,
, "
~nQlosure No. g to Deapato.h No. 72g, dated Jebru.ary 13, lG4.6.
tTom
~merioan
Embassy, Lisbon.
oonoernin.s 80ld earmarked tor aOCCUJ1t otBanoo 48 Portu,&Al
Banque National. suiBse a' the requent ot the Bank tor
International Settlemanta again8t Escudos plaoed in Liabon
Qt
the ir di sponl by 'Banco de Por'b1gal.
by
the transport ot the gold to Lisbon being
at th.8 up.nsB e.nd rl.sk ot tha.Bank tor
International SettlameDts •
..._..------......
Balance at 1-1-lg3\l
Kgs •
•
KIL
Gold earmarked by Ba.D.qu.e 5a t1 ODal.
Buls•• at the nquest ot the ~aDlr:
tor Internati onal Settlements,
Baals ••••••••••••••••••••••••.•••'
1.6Z3
Ll~bon •••••••••••
1.633
:Kgs.
Balance at 22-2-1944
Kgs.
Gold remitted to
,
,
.
No turther gold transaotions etreot8(!' up to
NIL
~1-lO-19.f.!5.
223972
,tt'''''
�..
"
,
'
,
~-
/
I
.-'
,
'
~
.
:::; j
-
/
COPYRIGHT
-
,
I
I I
II
t
J
2
1
I I I
t
I
I
i II I I
I I I
HO T TO BE REPROOUCED ,PHOTOCUPHI CALL Y WITHOUT PE~ISSIOM
__ - . . . . . . . _ -
•
...
,.
. . . . . .u .. ,
10.-'"
- - , - - -"
1946, f:ror:l t'Jl1orican Embassy, 'UBbon.
BM1CO DI PORTUGAL - LISBOn
•
I
r.OLD Dr COINS
KgB. 1.254
Balanoe at 1-1-1939
effeoted over the oounter •••
467
'.trchased in Lisbon tram Instl tuto
Fspanol de goneds 1=":xtranjera,
~adrld •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
1.505
u:rchuscs
1.972
r.:changf.:d for Q.old bore on our market,
453 ,Kgs.l.509
in Usbon •••••••••••••••••.••••••••
Kgs.2.763
Balanoe at 22-2-1944
..
,
No furthAr transaotions effeotedup to 31-10-1<d45.
,
223973
�LISBON
GOLD IN BA.'qS
2slnnoe at 1-1-1939
.....
1n Lisbon from Banque
...............................
e f f (; C t €) do'; e r the
';'.- :; i. [l fl 0 S
C0
un t e r
61.144
12.093
de
.;';'c::b.5fJd
380
1.n LiCiton 1::-cr.::: the Ear:.k .1'or
;~'::-.Gsed
:::t.eroc.':.!.onC:lsettiq::-,ents· ••••••• ;....
':0!~ed
Kgs.
313
in exchango fer gold caine 6n
ln Liston ••••••••••••••••
463
:;,;81 ved in Li.s'uUD from Bunque Nntiona1e
:; '..:.1 sse I I! .:~ ., I~ C C 0 un t ..............; ••••
17.108
')ce1ved in Lisbon from Banque Na.tiona1e
:::; L: iss e,
., B" }\ coo un t ••••••••••••• ......
66.488
au:;:, ITiRr}:et,
":::cived 1n Li9bon frc::: Banque Netionele
.-:~i9Set
~:f'
~:O'....:.:-.:
••••••••••••• ~ ••••
'1:81ved in Lisbon t'ro:::l Banque riet-iona1e
('I'iSS'6
.. -", ·ooou,..... • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
.
.
J
.LJ."
,!)}\
U
42.209
1.633
,
.
.,
.' .' I
~livered by the portuguese Govern.:nent for
credit. of their Gol(L Acoount ••••••••••
7
Kgs. 140.874
Kgs. 201.818
::.:i tted t.O toe Federnl RAtJe:rve BflIllc,
~~ciw· .. york
.••••. ••••••• •••••• ••••••••• •••
':'J 1:1 Li!lbon ::'0 loccl Banks
~ ~
66.230
to- • • • • • • • • • •
6.515
in L13bon for industrial purposes • • •
.4.025
:::1..8.' in Lisbon to Instituto Espanol de
/,:oneda "i\XtrRnjera. Hs'drid •••••••••••••
i
4.273
~odrawn
by the Portugueso Government frcm
the ir Gold. /lOOOun t
t
....................... .
408
81.549,
.Kgs. 120.269
Balanoe at 22-2-1944
Jld in Liobonto looal Banks • • • • • • • • • • • • •
4.85e
):d in Lisbon for industrial purposes • • • •
5.893
,
~ld
in Lisbon to Instituto Espono1 de
Monede. 'SXtrenjcra, uadrid ••••••••••••••
Ba1anoe at 31-l0-1Q45
l~.
I
KgB.
"2.998
Kgs.
13.346
Kgs. 106.92:'
8. - From the golcLapeo1tiec1 in the above summery, and prior
to 22-2-1Cjl44, kge. 4..381 ",-ere or.edited by Bf'.l"Inn "00\
portugal ,to, tho portuguese. GOvernment, on their gold
I\ccount.
223974
�..
/
~OT
COPyRICHT -
\ I I I
TO BE HPRQOUCEO PUOTOGRAPHIOLlY 'WI
• ______-
ow
..
n~OuT
"I
I "I
P (R!-II 551 OH
I
I I I'
, T » . . . . . «tJ
%0,
.-
1
__
,0_"
1946, fron tJ]lerlcan Embassy, 'Lisbon.
B.\!':CC
:;,:~
;;OWfUGflL ... LISBO?i
r·CLD TIr COINS
IiI ;"IL0GRAtln:S FINE, OF 'l'RK RELATIVE DEll-LnIGS
h
'.i:~:~,.j~Y,
3alonceat
:~c~uecs
1-1-193~
Kga. 1.254
467
effected over the counter
10 Lisbon rrom In9tituto
-,spanol de ,:oneda ':'xtranjera,
:~cha8ed
:~: ~ d r 1 d
•••••••••••.••••••••••••••••••
~:"nne;{,;d
:"or cold burs on ourm.arket'l,
i:"'.. Li 9 b t) fl
••••••••••••••••••••••••
Balanoe at 22-2-1944
;Jo
furth~r
I
•
'".
1. 505
1 • 9 72
453, Kgs .1. 509
Kgs.2.763
transaotions, effeoted up to 31-10-1945.
223975
�_ _.. "
........
·,
-.
I
FEDERALRE$ER~'BANK OF NEw YORK
NEW YORK. N.Y. 10045
,I
'
LegJiI Group
Banking Services Division
/0 -i-97
Date:
To:
From:
James· R.
Henn~ssy
I
Tel:, 212-720-8195
Fax: 212-720-1530
f
. ' l
i
Message:
, E-mail:
James;~
Hennessylilny. frb .org
WJC.~
This transmission' has
:.l.!1
pages (including this cover sh.eet) .
The information contained in this l'KSimile transmission is confidential and may be legally
privileged. It is intended only fer the use of the individual or entity to whom It is addressed and
others authorized to receive it. If yOu are not the intended recipient, dlsetosure, copying. or
taking action on the basis of this information is prohibited. If you received this ,In error, please
immediately notify us by telephone and retum the original message to us at the above address.
,I
223976
�·_1 ..: __ , .
.i'
,
~
,
'
"
MOVEMENTS OF NAZI GOLD
'j
By'Sidney Zabludoff
. I
!.
J.
"
, ~ HIGHLIGHTS
-The Nazis looted at least $850 million in gold from 1933 to 1945. In today·s·
prices (shown in parentheses b~low) that amounts to.$8.5 billion.
-Of that sum:
-$590 million ($5.9 billirin) was monetary gold held in the vaults of the
central bank$ of occupied countries on the day the Nazis invaded.
' 1
'
-$260 million ($2.6 billiQn) was non monetary 'gold taken from
individuals and private b~sinesses. This includes:
,
'-$100 million ($1: billion) seized from German citizens from
1933-1939 under:regulations in which the maximum penalty for
'.
....
,
noncompliance was death.
i
' .
.
--$80 million ($800 million) coerced from individuals by the Nazi
controlled 'central, banks in occupied countries. The same stiff
penalties were iniposed as in Germany.'
'
, '
' .!
-$80 million ($800.million) taken from individuals by the
Wehrmacht, 55, etc. in occupied territories .
.:...switzerland was the first stop for 85 percent of the $520 million ($5.2 billion) in '
gold which the Nazis expendea mainly on buying strategic goads and services
from foreign countries during t~e war years.
'
,
,
'
:I...nu'"\..Y"''i
'J
-Switzerland still owes at least $200 million ($2 billio~nd more likely $300
million ($3biIJi6n) if it is to conform with the r,lsi"SLj 1943 Allied declaration
that all looted gold handled by neutrals must be retumed after the war.
-At war's end, the Allies found more than $300 million ($3 billion) in gold in
Germany and Austria or more Ithan a third of the looted gold.
..
!.
:i
223977
l'
�"
",
,
i
DISCUSSION
, A wealtf1 ()f reliable and detail~ infomaation has been mlleded on the gold the
Nazis looted during the World War It It started with the British early in the war.
Once the United States entered the picture. several military units and civilian '
agencies began churning out estimates. 'In both caseS'the objective was to
prevent the Nazis from uSing tt:leir iII..gottengold to buy strategic materials. In
",*, a8 y 1943, the Allies warned the neutral countries that they would be taken
,
, I
to task for acceptance of the I()ot~ gold once the war ended.
'
of
In 1945, Allied oCQJpation fo~s set upon the task finding the 'gold remaining
in Germany. determining its source and retuming it to its proper'owners. The
bulk of the unspent gold was fOund along with the records of the Reichsbank, the
central bank charged with handling gold. Three key ReiChsbank officials helped
interpret these records'and provided the insider information needed to track the
bank's gold flows. They were ,the very knowledgeable Albert Thoms who for , '
many years headed up ~e ba~k's gold department; Emil Puhl, vice president'
and member of the bank's directorate; and Karl Graupner, head of the GoldAffairs Branch of the Foreign ~change Department.
'
Starting soon thereafter, the is~ue was intensively examined for more than a
decade by the Tripartite Gold Commission (TGC). ari organization formed to, '
determine the validity of the claims of the European governments from which the
gold was stolen. The accumulated material was so minute that, for example. an
individual stolen gold bar could be traced by its bar number as it moved from
country to country. Finally, a number of books have been published since 1980
desCribing the Nazi plundering of gOld.
'
,
!
Based on this rich data base, this study provides a full accounting'of Nazi gold
movements. Although a number of preliminary estimates of ,the floW were'
prepared during the war and Partial ones thereafter, there has never been a full
accounting. Moreover, no attempt has been made to estimate the .vast amount
of gold the Nazi regime stole ,
individuals throughout Europe
.
,
tram
THE FRAMEWORK
A simple accounting floW model is used to ensure that all elernerits of the gold
movements are considered ar;td to provide a 'framework for judging the reliability'
of the weakest components, It shows where the gold came from and where it
went. More precisely. the mo~el has two segments that must equal each other.
The amount of gold held byttie Nazis on March 12,1938 (Austrian "Anschluss"),
plus the gold looted or purchased from outside of Germany must equal the gold
1
2
223978
�•
,~
....... \ 1,
'-...... ~l-,L-
.'
...... ....:.1
••
"
i '
!'
,
"
,
,
i
shipped from' Ge(rnanyto other ~untries. plus n~idomestic 'usag~ and the staCk
of gold remaining in Gerrnanyon June' 1945.
30.
'
' ,','
'
, '
I ,
,
' .
,
'
.
'I
,
.1
•
'
'
"
"
Th~ study diStinguishes be~n two sources of, th~'looted gold. The vast ,
majority came from central bariks(so called ,monetary gold) throughout Europe.
Most of this gold was sitting. in ltheir vaults when the Nazis invaded. All '
exception ~s gold from Belgium and LUxembourg which had been entrusted to
, the pre-war French monetary ~Uthorities and moved to Dakar in French West
'
, Africa: Under pressure from u-,e Nazis, the Vichy. ~vemment allowed the gt;)ld'
. to be shipped to Berlin, ',i:.
,,', , . : "
In addition; the allies oOnside~d as monetary gold those bars and coins forcibly
~urchased from individuals by' genti'a1 banks in oc:::aipied countries. Immediately
, after the 'Nazis Occupied a natipn, they instituted·reg4lations requiring all citizens'
, to tum their gold into thec::entral bank in exchange for currency that onlY,Could
be. spent domestiCally. A separate estimate 'is made for such gold obtained from,
individuals even though it was :classffied, as "monetary' gold by the TGC.' ,
.
.
.
.
~
,
,
,
" . ',
'i
'
The remainder of the loot~ gqld (called non monetary) resulted from seizures
institUted by the Army, SS and:other police units in Germany and 'the nations
captured by the Nazis. It includes b~rs and coins asweU as gold contained ,in
. jewelry, art objects andderital Work that was taken as war booty and from '
,concentration camp vidims. ,Although this non mone~ry category lacks' .
sufficient information to make a reasoned estimate; its size can be gauged by
, allowing it to be the residual ali balancing amount after considering all other
elements. The estimated numbers in all other categories are considered highly
reliable. reasonably aCcurate or tab small to, have a significant impact on this
study's co~clusions..
'f;
•
.
I
.
:,
,
I , . . .
"
Unofficial looting of gold and gold laden articles unquestionable took place by'
, indiVidual soldiers and polieerrian as well as high govemment officials, Both
0
Germans and their eollaborat6rs throughout th~' pied territories'were
involved. The collaborators likely actounted for thelarge~t share of this •
. pilfering, as they possessed ,the best knowledg of where individuals in their
locality stored gold and Often I~cked supervision. "Gpld looted by Germaf')
soldiers seemed to have been: minimized' by the strict discipline imposed on
them and the considerable erriphasis pla(:f3d by the regime 9n ensuring the
"
' . ' i"
'
,
central, collection of sllgold. ; ,..
•
,
.
,.
I
I
of
Most the,gold was kept by lhelooters and rarely ~nteredgovemment coffers.·
Since the total of these many ~fTIall scale thefts are extremely difficult to gauge
no estimatE? is made of gold s~i,zedfrom r.ndividuals arid keptby private l~oters.
As the war was ending. howe~er, Nazi leaders, escaping from Germany dId take
some g~ld with them and. , this ~mount is estimated.. , .
.
,
,
I
,
:
3·
223979
�"
,
,
A• separate estimate is made for' non monetary gold the Nazis took for German
•
I
citazens between, 1933 and 1939. Under Nazi regulations, gold as well as other
liquid assets that could be sold abroad-such as foreign QJrrencies, stocks and
bonds-had to be turned into the Reichsbank for reichsmark, a QJrTency that
could not be spent or invested 'abroad. The maximum penalty for
noncompliance was death. Although these regulations originally were
introduced to help overcome Germany's foreign financial crisis. they soon
became a means of confiscati'1g assets. This was especially true fer Jews and
others who wanted to leave Germany or protect their liquid assets by depositing
them abroad.'
", ~
,
' '
"
" ,1
'
"
"
Gold is valued at S35 an ounce (fine) throughout this study. ,It was the offiCial
1930s and aU of the 194Os. Gold is now s,et at a
price used through much 'of
daily market value. A rough aRProximation of todays value can be derived by
multiplying the study's numbers by 10. For example, $100 million at the historic
value amounts to about one bil,lion dollars in today's prices.
the
,
I
The dollar amounts in this disQJssion ,are rounded to the nearest ten million
dollars for major categories and million dollars for sub categories even though
the table rounds .to the nearest hundred thousand dollars. Although most of the
gold estimates shown here are considered highly reliable. as wjth similar
estimates there are a number of minor problems: for example, using various
exchange rates (Swiss franc
reichsmark) to obtain a dollar ~alue. Rounding
the estimates in such a manner has no impact on the relative magnitude of the
numbers and or on the conclusions.
'
or
GOLD AND THE NAZIS
i
During the intrawar years, golq traditionally was used by· governments to back
their domestic currencies 'and as a means for buying and selling goods, serVices
and financial assets in international markets. Most often. this' precious metal
. was the major component of a 'country's foreign exchange holdings which also
included currenCies-such as the US dollar and the Swiss franc-that were
I
considered sound and were freely convertible into gold or'other currencies. ,,'
Gold enjoyed a reverent aura 'and the stock held by a nation was a key measure
of its economic prowess.
',
In 1930, Germany held a respectable $1 billion in gold reserves. But by mid
'1934 they plummeted to $55 million as result of a financial and economic crises,
To rectify the situation, the NaZi government required all Germans to turn in their
gold and foreign liquid assets to the Reichsbank in exchange for reichsmark. As
a result of the gold collected a,nd the liquid assets exchanged ,for gold in foreign
markets, the Reichsbank's gold holdings bega.n to rise slowly during the 19305.
. The rise reflected newly confi~cated gold increasing somewhat faster than the
amounts spent on imports to ~upport economic recovery and an arms buildup.
i
"
4
�,
"."->W
Immediately before the Nazi topk over Austria on March 12. 1938. gold reserves
amounted to only about $150 million. By any measure these hOldings were
paltry. For example, France held $2.564 million in gold, the UK 52.689 million
and the much smaller countrie!? of Holland and Swit:z.er1and had $1,089 million
and $648 million respectively_· iThe inadequacy of the German gold holdings can
best be gauged by how many months of imports they can buy. French gold was
equivalent to 18 months imports, the UK 7 months; the Dutch 13 months and the
Swiss 19 months. The eompar:able German figure was .less than one month.
Partly as a result of its foreign exchange constraints, the Nazi govemment in the
1930s denounced the ex.istinggold standard. Gold no.longer was used to back
the reichsmark. In the international. sphere, trade was conducted mainly through
bilateral trade dearing arrangements. Payments via gold or convertible foreign
exchange were made only as last resort.. Indeed, in the late 1930s Germany
asked Switzerland and other cOuntries to payoff any trade imbalances in
commodities rather than financial assets.
a
Before the outbreak of World War II, major gold markets were operating in New
York, london,. Amsterdam and .Zurich. The Gennans used Zunch mainly to buy
and London to sell the relatively small amounts of gold they transacted in
international markets. In 1937:. for example, about hatt its gold imports were
from Switzer1and and less than five percent of its foreign sales were to that
country. From the. Swiss perspective, less than ten percent ot'the gold that .
moved in and .out of the country was from Germany.
,
German foreign gold movements' were small and reflected special transadions
during these pre-war years. Facing foreign exchange constraints in late 1936,
·the Nazi government declared an amnesty allowing German citizens who failed .
fa tum in all their' gold and foreign exchange under previous regulations an
opportunity to do so without penalty. About one-third of the considerable foreign
exchange colleded was sold, in Switzerland for gold in the first hatt of 1937
which in turn was shipped to Germany. In the last h~1f of the year. most of the
l
acquired gold was sold in the ;London market to pay for emergency imports of
grain needed to overcome a drought. For the year as a whole, foreign gold
sales just about equaled purq,ases.
Germany continued to acquire gold mainly via Switzerland. Major boosts came
in 1938. and 1939 from gold held by the Austrian and Czechoslovakian central
'. banks in Switzerland which was turned over to Germany and shipped to the
Reithsbank in Berlin. Czechbslovakian gold also reached c;ermany via Bank of
International Settlements (8IS) accounts in London and Amsterdam as
.
described later in the looted gold section. Other German gold inflows during
these two years about matched outflOWS.
.
I
5
,
!
. 2'23981
�.....
'
-
- -
,
-..:..,
--_. T -_...
S~rting in 1940, G~rmany used Switzerland almost exclusively for handling its
gold. and other fOreign financial transactions with neutral countries. The Nazis of .
course would not use London ~r" New York and occupied Amsterdam fell into the .
reichsmark area. About 510 mimon in gold received from the Soviet Union in the
first quartet, for example. was deposited by the Reichsbank in its account at the
Swiss National Bank (SNB), the country's central bank.
ESTIMATING THE COMPONENTS
Initial holdings
The monetary gold held by the Nazis prior to the Austrian l'Anschluss" amounted
to neany $150 million. See Table 1 which provides a summary of all
components of the gold movements_ The number comes from a study prepared '
by the Office of Military Government for Germany (OMGUS) dated November 14,
1945. It is based upon the re¢:ords of the Precious Metals Department' of
Reichsbank and interviews of Thorns, Graupner and Puhl.
.
The actual monetary gold reserve number is from January 1', 1938, since
available data are semi-annuaL Changes in these stocks during the next two
and half months likely did not :amount to mora than $5 million, according to
Gennan and Swiss trade data; Thus, the possible error rate for the $150 million
figure is not more than three percent.
. A further breakdown of the $150 million reveals that it consists of $29 million in
published reserves and $121 .million in hidden reserves. These hidden reserves
were further subdivided into t~ree accOunts. .
. -Trehand ($75 million) According to Albert Thoms,this hidden account
was known to officials of the ~ank as the unewJuliusstunn", a phrase \"Ihich, they
explained, refers to the gold reserve built up by the Reichsbank for World War I
and stored in the Julius tower in Spandau: From its inception in November 1935
until wafs end, the amount this account changed little.
in:
. --Asservat "Der" ($19 tnillion) This account was established on March 25,
1937 and was the most active. Much of the looted gold and foreign shipments
were handled via this account. Although it was never entirely clear, the
,
movements in and' out of this: account seemed to have been directed by Herman
,
,
Goering for use in the countrys Four Year Plan.. .
-Gold Ankauf ($27 mi,llion) This was a suspense acrount which took in
gold from the German citizens under the exchange control laws adopted in 1933
and latedrom gold looted fr~m captured countries. Although much of gold
" remained in this suspense aCcount for longer than usual; it eventually was
credited to other gold accounts.
'
6
223982
�'I
Table 1
MOVEMENTS OF NAZI GOLD
March 12, 1938-June 30, 1945
(millions of doJlarst
,
1
,
Initial holdings
Looted'
.Monetary
of Which
, Belgium
Nethertands
Austria
Italy
.Czechoslovakia
Hungary
Greece
Poland
Luxembourg
Danzig
Yugoslavia
,Albania
Non monetary
of which
SS "Melmer"
Other tooted
149.1·
I·
753.5
'I
222.,9 (a)
163.8 (a) .
. 102.6 (a)
78.0 (b)
42:6 (a)
32.2
8A(a)
7.3 (a)
I,
.4.8 (a)
1
4.3
3.8 (a)
0.1 ,
82.1
4.0
78.7
,
I·
1
' .
Foreign purchases
US5R·(prior to 6/41) 23.0 .
Japan
4.2
,
I
27.2
r
,I
Total
;' 929.8
.---------
307.8
Foreign shipments
Switzerland
438.0
Of which
SNB 4140--6/44
378.0
SNB1/40-3/4Q
10.0
Banks 4/40-12/41
20.0
From Italy' 944
30.0
Other of which
79.6
.Rumania
53.8
Greece
8.0
Turkey
5.5
Japan
3.6
Slovakia
2.0
Sweden
1.7
Other' countries
5.0
517.6
Other uses
Organizations
. Industriall artistic
Individual
670.8
End of period balance
Reichsbank monetary 256.0
of which
In Merkers mine
238.5
Found elsewhere
14.0
Missing
3.5
Other monetary
322
Hungary
32.2
. Non-monetary
19.6·
of which
55 tlMelmer-'
2.0
Other looted
7.0
Foreign Office
10.6
104.4
34.4
60.0·,
10.0'
1
929.8
* calculated at $1,125.275 per kilo of fine gold.
.
.
. (a) Includes monetary and forced purchasesof private hOldings in exchange for
reichsmar1<: Greece, Poland pnd Yugoslavia mainly private holdings.
.
(b) Includes $9.4 from Yugoslavia and $7.4 from France which Italy looted.
·223983.
I.
�Only 'a small share of the Reicnsbank'sS1S0 million in gold reserves was held
, outside of Gennany. DUring 1~38 and prior to the outbreak of war September
1939, neany all these limited ~ounts were withdrawn from New York and
London. As of September 1, 1939, a small (but unknown) quantity was
deposited with Swiss banks including S2.1 in the Reichsbank's aa:ount at the
BIS at the SNB. Because these extemal holdings a~ already included under"
reserves and ~re relatively inSignificant, they have no impad on the findings of
this study:
'
in
'I
Gold experts, including those i~ SwitZ.erland, in the late 19305 clearly knew
-about the small size of the German reserves. Knowledgeable estimates at the
time of gold held by the G~ns in eanyMarch 1938 tended to be less than the
$1 SO million adual amount. For example. the Federal Reserve Board figure was'
$113 million while Paul Einzig indicated in his book Economic Warfare that the
reserve number for 1939 is 50 imillion pound sterling or 5250 million. This,
however, includes $145 million in gold taken from Austria and Czechoslovakia.
The comparable number for M~ 1938 is $105 million.
Looted
Monetary
At a minimum, the Nazis looted $750 million in gold from the territories they
occupied in ,Europe. Of that a[1lount, the bulk-$670million-came via the
monetary authorities of these Countries. The situation could have been much
. worse. Before the war most ~uropean states moved nearly all their monetary
gold to safehavens, ~ainlY ~~. United states.
'.
../
'
s4a
the Nazis had
The looting started with Austria in March 1938, and .by 1
snatched nearly ninety percent of the total monetarY gold rakenduring the war
Three countries-Belgium. Netherlands and Austria-accounted,for three
quarters of the looted monetary gold. The only large seizure in the latter years
of the war was $78 million in Italian gold Which the Nazis moved to north em Italy
after the Mussolini government collapsed. In 1944. it was shipped to Germany.
The Italian gold included nearty $17 million of the metalthat the Mussolini
'
regime had previousl~ looted:from Yugoslavia and France. '
,
,
The stolen gold provided a more than adequate supply to meet .war time needs.
Indeed, Gennanys gold reserve at wars end was double that of early 1938. The
abil ity to utilize the gold to b~y imports from countries outside of Europe was
severely limited during the war as a result of the Allied naval blockade. Nearly
all the captured gold was spent in neutral European countries for goods they
produced themselves or obtained by clandestine means from other countries.
Within the Nazi domain gold was rarely used to pay Tor imports. The major.
exception was Rumania Which received $54 million'in gold, mainly for Qil.
223994
�__'-",-:L
~I......
,.
y
The monetary gold numbers ate highi accurate reflecting detailed rec()rds of
the Reichsbank and of the European central banks that were looted. The TGC
spent years combing thr~ugh lhese figures and validating their reliability.· Those
controversies fhat did arise ~re not about the numbers. but mainly from
determing whether gold taken:from citizens via central banks after the Nazi
invasion was monetary gqld under the charter given the Commission. For most
countries the answer was yes; but for relatively small quantities of gold seized
from Greece, Poland and Yugoslavia the claims were tumed down. For
estimating the overall flow of Nazi gold. the distindion rOakss no difference. All
of the loot was shipped back l,b the Reichsbank in Gennany. In total. the amount
of gold seized from citizens vifl central banks exceeded $80 million (see table 2).
Special note needs t6 be made about the $12 million in Czechoslovakian gold
originally held by the Bank of England in 1939. Under an order from officials of
the new Nazi-<iominated National Bank for Bohemia-Moravia. the Bank of
England was asked to move the gold from the aa:ount of the old National Bank
of Czechoslovakia at the Ban~ of England to that of the BIS. The BIS then on its
own books debited the amount it held in the Bank of England and aedited its
account at the National Bank;of Amsterdam and then had gold $hipped from
Amsterdam to Benin. Thus ~out physically moving, gold out of England, the
Nazis were able to acquire th~ gold owned by Czechoslovakia.
I
In March 1939. an additional '$15 million in gold was physically moved from the
BIS account at the SNB to th~ Reichsbank in Germany. These fundS had been
held by the SIS for the National Bank of Czechoslovakia. After occupying the
Sudetenland. the Nazis insisted that Prague transfer the gold to them. The BIS
. / ' accepted the view of its German representative who indicated the BIS should not
.~ take political considerations into account in deciding how to deal with its
..
,
interests in areas absorbed cy'Germany.
,
'!
~.-,
Non monetary
,
~
'I.
.
•
' J .
The amount of looted non monetary gold can not be estimated directly because
only fragmentary infonnatiori exists, .A reasonable approximation of its size, ,
however, can be derived by ~lIowing this category to be a residual. All other
categories are either well documented or can be estimated with a high degree of
. reliability: Thus, if the accounting process is to be balanced, the nonmonetary
. looted account would have to be aHeast S80 million. The number probably is
higher because the 'estimat~ of industrial gold usage (which is the least reliable
category) is very conservative (see pages 15-16), A larger industrial use
number would raise the non; monetary gold number (the residual) by a similar
amount. It is surely within the realm of possibility that both industrial use and
thus the non monetary gold figure are some $50 million higher.
,
I
,
8
223985
�I
.- i"\....:..
,-L:.t....nL ....cr
1 I
,
I
•
.
"
I
'Table2
,NAZI CONFISCATION OF GOLD FROM INOMDUALS
VIA CENTRAL BANKS',
, IN OCCUPIED COUNTRiES
March 12. 1938-June 30, 1945
(millions of dolfars)
i
t
Nether1ands
, 39.9
I'
,:
Austria
14.6
8.4
Greece'
Poland
Belgium
Yugoslavia
Czechoslovakia'
Luxembourg
7.3 '
7.2
3.8
1.1
0.1
Total
84.2
'" Based 'on documented qaims submitted by governments to the Trilateral Gold
Commission; excludes seizuresof gold by the Nazi military, 55 and other police
units,'
-..k. -calculated at $1,125.275 per I.ilo of fine gold.'
'
"
,
'1{' -These amounts included a~ mo~etary gold as defined by the L-.... Gold
, Commission.
'!,
"
'· ......
'fC1 A i'te
.!
!
, i
223986
'I '
�What is known: .
/.
!.
.
,
.
-Wehnnacht booty was turned into the Reich Treasury which sorted and
disposed of it and. received all ireceipts from its sale. Most goods with an artistic
value, such as diamonds and jewelry. were sent by the Treasury to Municipal'
Pawn Shops, mail!ly for sale a,broad. Smaller items with a high precious metal
cantent, such as rings, were shipped to the Pruss ian S~ Mint and larger
articles to Degussa, the major:,Gennan precious metal smelting finn. Gold was '
extraded and the resulting bars sent to the Reici1sbank. Seized gold bars and
coins, other precious metals, c;:urrencies and stock certificates were delivered .
diredly from the Treasury totJ:1e Reichsbank.
"
,
,
-SS booty from CXlncentration camps and elsewhere was delivered to the
Reichsbank for inventorying and was dispersed in the same way as the
Wehrmacht booty. Gold teeth and bridges were melted down by the Prussian
State Mint, refined into gold barS and retumed to the Reichsbank. Some 76
shipments frOm the S5 were ~ived by the Reichsbank from 1942 to 1944 with'
an estimated value of $20 million. Its gold content was valued at some $4-.5
million. All receipts were depOsited to a seaet 55 account at the Tre~sury.
under the name Max Heiliger~ alJd referred to as the "Melmer" aCcount after the
SS officer who delivered the Stolen items to the Reichsbank. '
-Non-monetary gold qbtained by the Reichsbank, in most instances
became a part of its monetarY holdings. For example, the value of the gold
, . looted by the 55 gIJdL0'lQht to the Reichsbank would be credited to the
~a~D-.J' ~,accounfTh"a Te1Efi~quivalent. If the SS wanted gold for an
'.r'"y overseas operatio"', its account wo~ld be reduced by an equivalent amount of
reichsmark. The gold it received would not necessarily be the same bars or
coins it originally deposited. I
-SS and other loot.al50 was found scatterSd throughout the former Nazi
occupied areas of Europe by the Allies after the war. This was spoils that had
not reached the Treasury or,Reichsbank for sorting and valuing. , Many bags. for
example, were .found at or near concentration camps.
.
"
.1
~Safety deposit box~sin France These boxes were sealed and che,*ed
for gOld, currency and other foreign assets soon after the Nazis occupied non
. .. Vichy France. The assets in the boxes were exchanged for local currency and
the gold removed to Germany. The Nazi Custom Service was In charge of this
operation and was backed b,y the, SS and other police iunits.
Foreign purchases
I
"
Germany received $23 milli,on in gold from the USSR. These shipments to the
Reichsbank took place.betWeen the September 1939 implementation of the
,f .
9
,.
223987
�Hitler-Stalin pact which.divided'Poland a~d the Baltic states. between their two
,
countries and the June 1941 Nazi invasion of the USSR The gold received by
Gennany was for payment of rt;lilitary'equipment the Nazis delivered to the
i '
,
Russians.
In 1941, Japan delivered $4 mimon in goid to Germany t~ repay foreign
.exchange advances by Germany_ This transaction is confinned in reports
indicating the Reichsbank had, to smelt Japanese gold bars because they did not
meet int,mational standards set by the Bank of England..
End of war balance'
When the Allies took over Germany; they found more than $300 million in gold, .
an amOunt equi~alent to 40 percent of the gold looted by the Nazis from
occupiedCXJuntries. Some 95 ;percent of the gold remaining was held by the .
Reichsbank. The non monetary portion oonsisted of S8 gold possessed by the
Reic::hsbank but not yet sorted: or valued, looted gold found by allies throughout
Europe and that held by the German Foreign Office.
Monetary
The records of the monetary inventory are well documented. Captured
Reichsbank records .shaw tha~ it held nearly 5260 million in monetary gold.
Under the direction of Colonel Bemard Bernstein, Director of the Finance
Division of the OMGUS Control Council. bars and coins were checked against
the Reichsbankinventory .. This process indicated that 9a.percent 'of the
monetary gold had been reco~ered. Most was found in the Kaiserode Salt Mine,
near the town of Merkers by US troops on April? 1945.. This large cache had
been.evacuated from Berlin irrt February. In addition, Reichsbank records
.showed some gold remained 'at its branches throughout Germany. As a·result
US teams were sent out to the branches and most was recovered by June 1945;
Most Of the nearly. $4 million never found likely was stolen from the branches. A
third of that missing was in Berlin and probably taken by Soviet troops.
In addition, $32 million in monetary gold from the National Bank of Hungary was·
discovered by US forces in Spital am Pyhm. Austria. It had been removed from
Budapest by the Nazis in mid-November •1944 and was on its way back to .
1
Germany.
I
.
I
'I
There was also about $5 million remaining in Reichsbank accounts in
Switzerland. ThIS amount is! not shown, in the gol9 movements table because it
already is accounted for in foreign shipments. .
10 .
.1
223988
�.1)
i
Non-monetary
I}
I
I
Some $9 millon In looted gold, that was not part of the Relc:hsbank's official
monetary holdings, was found throughout Germany and Austria at war's end. In
· this arnoc.lnt was $2 mUDon in $S "Malme(' gold or gold-laden articles th.t had
been discovered among the Rfi'Ic::hsbank's holdings that were stashecl In the
Merkers mine. This gold was being stored on behaH of the SS urdnlt CQulc;l be
melted dD\AlT1 intD bs.ts. Much of the ",maining $7 mOnon was gold found near
.concentraUon camps or in. raute to the Rslc:hsbank and other gold. prcx:essors..
.
I ·
.
.
,
The Nazi Forel;n omce under: Rlbbentrop had an accOunt at the Relchsbank
(stipulated in reichsmark) from :which it withdraw an equivalent amount at foreign
currency or gold to meet the oUtlays of Its embassies and consulates abroad. It
also kept gold in its avm vaults. in Germany for similar uses. Same came from'
tne bags of coins Iocted from Italy I'; , 944. Reports indicate that Foreign
Minister Ribbentrap had a special fund but this reserve likely was equivalent to
· the ~inistry's holdings in its own vaults.. Some 511 million or1ginating from the
Foreign office was found after ~he war. Of that amount, about $7 milliCill"l WilS
discovered by us and UK fOrcas in Germany and Austria and $4 mUOonat
·.foreign locations. This included $1.8 malion in Switzenand, $1 million In Sweden.
$0.5 million in Portugal, and $OA million in Turkey.'
.
Another $0.8 million ingold was brought over to Bern Switzerland from the L.ake
Constance area in Germany d~ring the closing days r::rfthe war. This shipment
was undertaken in the presen~e afthe san of the former German Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Von Neurath. who, according to newSpaper aecounts, arrived
soon thereafter in Argentina. This amount is not counted in the gold flow table
· because It is not known whether it is part 01 the gold found at the German
Consulate in Sam or a separate batch that might haw been moved to Argentina,
It Is liKelY that another one or tWo million dollars of Foreign OffIce funds ended
· up' in the hands of Nazi official~ fleeing Germany.' No figure is included for any
of this leaked gald beeause estimating the exact. amount Is dlmcult and the
amounts are too small (although large for a"individual) to have a slg~ificant
impact on the conclusions of tJ;'IlS study.
Foreign shipments
Switzerland
,
'.
Swiss banking institutions .played the pivotal role in handling the I_ted gold sold
by the Nazis. They were the l':1itlal recipient of $438 million or 85 percent of all
gold Germanyilhipped to foreil;ln locations from March 1938 to June 1945. In
most cases, this precious metal first was shipped from the Reichsbank to its
depotacCQunt at. Swiss Natiof1al Bank (SNB)I with tn,e heaviest flow occurring
from the fourth quarter' 1941 f';' the first quarter of '944.
page 11
.,,
!
I
".
'.
22.3-989
�,.
,"
i·
;
Data on these movements are,his;Jhly reliable.' Reichsbank records captured by
the Allies in 1945 indicate a f19w of $378 million bet:Yleen ·Apri11940 and the end
of the war, Although the Swis~ Government never opened up its books, it did
co!1fjrm that the overall Reid1sbarlk figure was correct. ' In addition, the
Reichsbank records show that $20 million in gold was shipped to Swiss
commercial banks between April 1940 and December 1941. This included
. Swiss Banking Corporation. Leu Bank and the Basler Handelsbank. Beginning'
in 1942, Bern said all gold entering and leaving Switzerland must go through the
I
SNB.
: '
.
There are no Reichsbank recbrds on gold movements to Swifzerhand before
April 1940. Other reporting, however, does indicate a first quarter of 1940
shipment amounting to 510 million. As diSQJssed earlier for the 1938 and 1939
period (see page 5), there was a net flow ,of gold from Switzerland to Germany' .
as the Nazis bought gold in the Zurich market in exchange for foreign assets
they forcibly acquired from their citizens. This gold Was then moved to Gennany .
to build the reserves of the Reic:hsbank. Most of the gold sold abroad by the
Reichsbank Was through rion'Swiss markets.. Since the net German foreign gold
rnovel'l1ents for 1938 and 1939 were minor, no number is included in. Table' for
that period.
.
In addition, the swiss receivect $30 million in looted gold indirectly via the Nazi
controlled regime in nortnem Italy. When the German troops retreated from
Rome in Decemb~r 1943, they took with them all,
the Italian monetary gold. It
,.
was held in Milan until ,1944 When the decision was made to move the gold to
Berlin to keep it out the hands of the advancing Allied forces. The Swiss
knowledgeable about the situation asked the Nazi regime to send $30 million in
this looted gold to them. 'Tw~lve million dollars Worth of gold was used to repay
.Swiss banks for loans made :to Italy and $18 million went to meet German
obligations to the BIS ioBasle.
A more complex issue is the: gold supposedly shipped to Switzerland in April
1945. Immediately after the Allied-sponsored Currie Mission left Switzerland in
early March. 1945 with an agreement that restricted gold purchases from
Germany to the amount n~ed to pay for diplomatic services and to meet its
obligations to the BIS, Emil Puhl came to Bern to secure Swiss agreement for
shipment of $6.8 million in gold to from the Reichsbankto the SNB. On April 6.
he sucCeeded in an arrangEiment allowing gold valued at $3.5 million be moved
to the SNB and exchanged for Swiss francs which were deposited in special
. giro account for the Reichsbank.
a
Puhl bragged about his a~ievemenls in an infamous letter to Walther Funk.
President of the Reichsbank, that was latter found in captured Reichsbank files,
He said. 'The pra~ical resylt (of the negotiations), was to free the Reichsbank
accounts for payments desired by us," The Swiss, however, did not allow the
, '
12
'I,
.
223990'
�gold'to be shipped from Ge~ny but insisted it be taken out of the remaining ,
metal in the Reichsbani(s depot account. This transfer means is substantiated
by a April 13,1945 message between the SNB in Bern and the Reichsbank in
Bertin that was intercepted by the British Ministry of Ea.momic Warfare. In the
case of Gennan payments to the BIS, they were met by a transfer of gold from
Bertin to the BIS acccunt at a Reichsbank branch in Constance (a German town
near the Swiss border). Neither the Swiss nor.the BIS tranSaction added to the
gold flow from Germany to Switzerland.
'
.
The Reichsbank used its depOt account at SNB as the central distribution point'
in moving gold outside' ofGermany. About 60 percent of this gold was sold to
the SNB in exchange for Swiss franc deposits and the remainder was transferred
to the als and central banks df neutral countries, mainly Portugal, Spain and
Sweden.
'
. Depot accounts are common· in international financial centerS, such as
Switzerland, and playa useful role in expediting gold movements amOng
countries. Because gold is expensive to ship, transfers between countries are
made by simply moving the gold from the depot account of one 'country to
another at the same central bank. Physicall'y, this normally means moving the
gold (referred to as "earmarkedU ) a few yards from the locker of the country that
originally owned the gold to that of the recipient coUntry. Thus, for example, '
when Germany bought goods 'from Portugal, the Reichsbank often paid for them
by instructing the SNB· to tran~fer gold from its depot account to that of the
National Bank of Portugal.
i.
,<
In those instances when a neutral country wanted actual possession, the
Reichsbank asked the SNB tQ transport gold from its depot account to the
recipient country. ~in and P~I were the main destination of these
shipments. According to a State Department report, from January 1942 to
February 1944, 282 truckloads of German gold bars were sent from Switzerland
to the two Iberian countries. For the war as a whole, the two received some $8'~
million in direct shipments from the Reichsbank depot at the SNB.
,
,
.
,
.
,
J
The Reichsbank also sold gold in its depot account to the SNB for an equivalent
amount of Swiss francs depOSited into a "giro" account. From this account, the
ReichsbanK was able to pay for goods and services bought in Switzerland as
well as other countries. ' With the Swiss franc being freely convertible into any
currency, the money could easily be transferred elsewhere. When, for example,
, Germany wanted to transfer funds to Spain, the Reichsbank instructed the SNB
by telegram to reduce its gir~ account by so many Swiss francs and add the
same amount to the giro account of the Banco de Espana at the SNB. The
Spanish ban~ could then spend these Swiss francs anywhere or it could ask the
SNB to convert the Swiss francs into pesos and deposit them in the Banco de
Espana in Madrid. Spain an~ Portugal acquired nearly $100 million from the
13
�Reichsbank via giro acCounts at the SNB. whatever its final destination the
Swiss were the first recipient of the gold looted by the Nazjs.
I
I
·
,
,
Of the total Swiss intake of gold. at least $260 million must be considered looted.
This assumes the Swiss received all the so called "legitimate" gold held by the
Reicllsbank before March 1938. A more reasonable assumption is that other
recipient countries received ~ proportional share <15 percent) of the "legitimate"
gold. This would in~ase the amount of looted gold handled by the Swiss to
$275 million. If gold forcibly purchased from German dtizens during the 1930s
is classified as looted, then the Swiss would have taken in scme.S375 million in
looted gold~ All these figureS' are much greater than the $58 million in gold the ' .
. Swiss tumed over to
Allies after the war. To understand these numbers in
today's prices, they must be multiplied by about 10. Thus. aftersubtract:ing out
its modest post war payment,lSWitzertand would now have to pay some $2 to $3
billion to compensate for taking in looted gold. '
.
the
Other countrie~ .
Besides the large gold shipments to Rumania mainly to pay for oil (already
discussed), there were small movemen~ by the Reichsbank to other countries
as follows:
to
-Greece: ·In attempt stem inflation, the Nazi rulers in Greece sold'
some $8 million in gold coin to the public between 1942 and 1944. The amount
approximates ,the value of th~ gold already looted from this country.
--Turkey: The Germans sold more than $5 million in gold for foreign
currencies on the Turkish free gold market. As this market paid a higher price in
foreign currencies, the Reichsbank occasional sold gold there.' Much greater
use of the Turkish market was inhibited by its smallness and its long distance
from Germany.
.
.
-Japan One sale in 1941 amounting to $3.6 million.
--Slovakia' The Reictisbank tumed over $2 million worth of gold in
November 1943 to reduce the German trade clearing deficit .it had with Slovakia .
. ,
' ;
-Sweden Direct shipments of gold to that country amounted to less than
$2 million. The other categ9ry includes the relatively small amounts of gold
shipped directly frolJl Germl\tny to Spain, Portugal, the Middle East and North'
Africa.
'
All gold transactions between the BIS and Reichsbank from September 1939 to
May 1945 were handled via earmarked (or depot) accounts held by both'
.
organizations at the SNB. Since these flows are already.counted in the
. 14
.223992
�,
Reichsbank shipments to its earmarked account at SNB, they can not and are
not induded in Tablet. Durindthe above war period $13.5 million in gold was
moved from the Reichsbank to the BIS account at the SNB. This money was
used to pay interest payments on BIS loans secured in the early 1930$ and for
international pOstal payments. :The nearly $2 million in gold deposited in the BIS
acx::ount at the Constance branfh (in Germany) of the Reichsbank is not included
in the ~a:ounting of Nazi gold flows to Switzerland.
Other distribution and usage.
.
.
Deliveries to government agencies and select private banks and firms
.under special licenses issued by the Reich's Ministry of Economics
i..
. .
.
Special licenses amounted to same $45 million during the war were granted to
the Supreme Commands of military units, the Foreign Office. the Gestapo,
private banks such 8S Deutsche Bank and· Dresdner Bank, and a few private \
.foreign exchange dealers working for government agencies. These
organizations in tum used the gold to pay for their operations, mainly in neutral
countries. For example. the Foreign Office maintained a $8 million·revolving
gold fund and the Deutsche Bank received $1.8 million in gold from the'
Reichsbank. About $5 million was given to foreign exchange dealers Helmuth
Maurer and Otto Wotff. The biggest such transactions-S2.4 million-was with
Wolff in mid-1944. The gold y,(as sold in Spain and the proceeds were deiivered
to the Reichsbank in the form of Swiss francs and Spanish pesetas. For this
arrangement; Wolff was paid a three percent .cOmmission.
To avoid double counting, this category has to be reduced by the $10.6 million in
Foreign office gold found in apd outside. of Germany at war's end. Thus, the
estima~e is that $34.4 million in gold remained with the various official and.
private organizations and was not found by the Allies, or more likely was sold by
these organizations to others in Gennany and elsewhere. Although a lauge
share probably,transited or was deposited in Switzerland, the only known
information relates toth~ $2.~ million ~olff shipment to Spain ..
Domestic Industrial and artistic applications'
The most difficult category to :estimate is the net amount of gold Germany used
in industry and artistic endeavors. This includes gold needed in manufacturing
.precision devices, photography. chemical processing, in dentistry and in making
jewelry. According to Albert Thoms. until ,August 1944, the Reichsbankprovided
200 kilograms Of gold per month to Oegussa. which was the nation's largest
precious metal smelter and .supplier to ind~strial users. For the period March
1938 to August 1944, such an allocation would be worth $17 million. For the
rest of the war Degussa probably drew down the large gold stocks it was allowed
maintain-2,OOO kilos--according to Thoms.
.. to
15
223993
�,
,
This industrial usage amount ~~~ms low according to experts in the field. For
example, US net gold consumption was more than 15 times that of Germany
during the same period, while its economy was only three times larger.
Switzerland used some $19 million even though its economy is only a tenth of
Gennany. Moreover, German;usage included an unknown amount of gold used
for industrial purposes in ,
'
. the ocaJpied countries.
,
A number of explanations are possible. There were other preclous metal
smelters like Oegussa, although it was the biggest. Whether they received
, allocations from the Reichsbank or had to depend on smelting scrap gold is
unknown. Degussa also could have been highly dependent on scrap. Saap
gold is derived from the many discarded produds'that contain gold and on the
bits and pieces lett over in manufacturing new items~: Since gold is valuable and
can nOt be destroyed.' scrap a~ys plays an important role in the industrial
market
"
Given the Nazi penchant to build their stock of gold: there likely was .
considerable emphasis an utilizing scrap. Public calls by the Nazis to donate
gold laden jewelry to the war effort were constantly being made and large
amounts of similar items were; confiscated from concentration camp and other
vic;:tims. Degussa is known to have paid higher prices for gold laden items than
the Prussian Mint In order to attract suffident metal to meet market demands.
Some of these items could have been smelted and sold for industrial use.
If the gold used for industrial purposes came from normal domestic sa-ap, there
would be no ehange in net domestic use since the inputs and usage would offset
each other. But net use would rise, if smelters were obtaining scrap from items
looted outside of Germany and/or the Reichsbank was allocating gold for
industrial use to more than Degussa. A very conservative estimate for net gold
use is $60 miilion or less than $10 rnillion a year during the war. This would be
less than a fifth of the comparable US figure. '
.
Shipments by individu~ls .
,
At a bare minimum. individua! Germans 6n their own account likely sold $10
million in gold in foreign markets. This would involve gold they seized from
others, received from other looters or removed from government holdings. Much
was probably sold through SWitzerland or deposited there. Considerable
reporting indicates a,'large number of high ranking Nazi officials and
industrialists took gold with them as they tried to flee to South America and other
locations in the last year of the war or during the turmoil of the immediate post.,.
war period.
16
�I,
:
'
THE NON MONETARY GOLD ISSUE
,
'
I"
of
Determining the total amount non monetary gold looted by the Nazis has
remained e difficult and illusive issue and more recently an important and
controversial one. There has rnever been any estimate of the amount The'
definition of non monetary gold has varied with the needs of the entity dealing
with the problem. In general. the TGC and other post-war organizations defined
monetary gold as all gold in the possession of a central bank and non monetary
as all other. This was done to make the task of the organization easier. For
example, gold obtained by the Nazis from concentration camp victims was '
classified as monetary if it was melted down into bars and held in the inventory
of the Reictisbank., If a sack of gold teeth had been found near a concentration
c:amp-before it Was smeltec;J into bars and sent t6 the Reichsbank-it would be
considered non monetary. "
1
•
"
I
".
,
"
'
,
'
.
A more appropriate non monetary definition would be all gold taken from
individuals in Germany and the captured territories from 1933 to war's end.
Such a category amounts to more than $260 million and ,Includes gold:
-Taken from' German citizens from 1933-1939 ($100 million).
•
'
I
~
,
'
This estimate, is based on the buildup of German gold reserves (including
.
hidden) from mid-1934 to the' end of 1937 of some $95 million. Nearly all these
increased gold holdings cam~ from domestic confiscations 'since the net gold
inflow into Germany was small, Moreover, as discussed ,earlier the inflow largely
resulted from liquid foreign assets being seized at home and sold in foreign
'
markets for' gold that was shipped to the Reichsbank In addition, most certainly
an additional $5 million was taken from Jews and others during 1938 and 1939.
'assets remaining in Jewish hands .were seized,
This a period when nearly
..
.
is
'all
,
~.
,
I,
.
,
,
.
--Coerced from individuals by central banks ,in occupied territories (S80 .
, million). See page 8.
' ;
-Seized by the Wehrfnacht. 55, etc, ($80 million). See page 8
Looted monetary gold is bet~er defined as the amount in the Coff~rs of the central
banks the day the Nazistook over a country, This involv.es excluding from the
study's monetary gold category of $670 million (see table 1) the $80 million the
NaZis forced the c~ntral banks to collect once they occupied a country. The
,
remainder is $590 million which can be considered tl1e amount of gold earned by
central banks through their normal balance of payments operation~.
is S850 million,
The total of all looted gold
,
I,
I,
17
223995""
�SOURCES
i'
I
GOLD AND THE NAZIS
Germany's gold and devisen position, Staff Memo, Federal Reserve Bank Of
New York. September 30.1937 I. '
'
,27 German gold movements for:1937. Staff Memo, Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, February 23. 1938; ;
,
3. German gold movements for'1938. Staff Memo, . Federal Reserve Bank of
I,
•
New York. March 27. 1939.
: '
4. German gold movements fori 1939. Staff Memo, Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, July 20. 193'9.
'
5. Swiss gold movements for 1938, .Staff Memo, Federal Reserve Bank of New'
York, March 1. 1939
"
5 .. Swiss gold movements for 1939. Staff Memo, Federal Reserve Bank of New
York~ February 7.1940,.
7. Swiss gold shipments to Ge~many. Staff Memo, Federal' Reserve Bank of .
New York. April 18, 1939.
8. ReCen~ European gold dev~lopments. Staff Memo, Federal Reserve Bank of
New York. August27. 1940. ,~
,
US Treasury Department. Division of Monetary
9. Switzerland and the Axis,
'Research. February 1, ,1943.
'
ESTIMATED COMPONENTS,
, Initial holdings
,
I'
,
"
10.' The Hidden Gold-Reserve Program Initiated by the German Reichsbank
During Schachts Second Term of Office.. Office of Military Govemment for.
Germany- US (OMGUS), Divi$ion of Investigation of Cartels and External
Assets, November 14,1945; NA RG250, Records of Foreign Exchange .
Depository Group, Central Files 1945-1950, Box 440, File 940.63 (location
390/46/8-10/5-1) .
'
.
,
,
11. Estimated Unreported Official Gold Holdings. Staff Memo, Federal Reserve
Board, December 30, ,'940.
.
!
,I,
18
223996
�I
12. Einzig, Paul, EcOnomic Waltare, MacMillan and Cp., London, 1940
Looted gold: monetary
13. Tripartite Commission for thb RestituUon on Monetary Gold-Tabulation of
Provisional Decisions,From U5'Commissioner, Trilateral Gold Commission.
American Embassy-Brus,sets to Department of State (271), July 5, 1951;
NA RG 56 Treasury Department.. OAISA,. Box 62, File lARA Looted Gold
Restitution and Claims (location 450180132101 )
14. NARG 43, Records related, to the Pans Conference on Reparations, Files
of Jacques J. Reinstein, 1945-1951,8ox257 (location 250110120/05)
.
,.
15. NA RG 59, Department of ~tate. Office atFinancial Operations. Records
relating to the Tripartite Commission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold, 1942
1962, Boxes 1-29 (location 631/A104106)
.
16. NA RG 84, Records of US J:mbassy in Brussels, Files of US Delegation to
the lARA, Tripartite Gold Commission, 194:6..1956; Country flies, Boxes 1-7
(location 631/191631(6)
,
17. Italy: Istcambi gold excluded fnlm Italian looted gold because it was
originally lent to Italy by Gennany during the war as part of a trade credit
package. NA RG 84, Records ~f US Embassy in Brussels, Files of US
Delegation to the lARA. Tripartite Gold Commission. 1946-1956; Country files,
.
Box 7 (location 631/19/63/06) :
,
"
18.. Czechoslovakia: see, Investigation conceming case: Reic.nsbankrat Karl
Graupner, August 15/16/1946,'p 11; NA RG 260, ReCords of Foreign Exchange
Depository Grc,:-!p, Central Fil~ 1945-1950. Box 439, File 940'~5602 (location
390/4618-10/5-1) .
I
I,
Looted gold: non-monetary
.
f
.
.
19.. S5 Loot and·the Reichsbank, Supreme Headquarters. Allied Expeditionary
ForCe; G-:? Division, 8 May 1945: NA RG260, Records of Foreign Exchange
DepOSitory Group, Central Files 1945-1950, Box 422, File 940.1551 (location
390/46/8-10/5-1 )
,
20.. Draft Tab:... Evaluation of the Loot, no date; NA RG 260. Records of Foreign.
Exchange Depository Group, Central Files 1945·1950, Box 423, File 940.304.
(location 390/46/8-10/5-1 )
19
I .
�21. Further Evidence on Disposition of 55 Loot by Reichsbank. Monthly Report
May 1945; NA RG 260, Records of Foreign Exchange Depository Group, Central
Files 1945-1950, Box 423, File 940.304 (location 390/~/8-1 oiS-1 )
22. Data Re 5S Loot. no date; NA RG 260, Records of Foreign Exchange
Depository Group, Central Files 1945-1950, Box 423, File 940.304 (location
390/46&10/5-1)'
"
.
23. International Military Tribunal; Blue Series, Volume 13, pages 559-C19; Red
Series, Supplement A. 3944-PS, 3947-PS, 3949-PS, 3951-PS, pages 670-682.
.
.
I
Fbteign puteh~ses
24. Russia: Table 2. no date; NA RG 56, Department of the Treasury, Special
subject files, Box 1, File: LooteqQord: location and recovery: (location'
.450180119/01)'
.
. ,,
:
. . ,,
,
25. Russia: Allied Claim against Swiss for Return of Looted Gold. page 2, no
date; NA RG 43. Realrds of the US· Delegation to the Conference on German
External Assets and Looted Gold,. Washington, January 6-21. 1953, Box 201,
File: Swedish negotiations (IOC'.2ltion 250/10/19/04)
.
,
,
26. Japan: Investigation concerning case: Reichsbankrat Karl Graupner,
August 15/16/1946, p 15; NA RG 260, Records of Foreign Exchange DepOSitary
Group, Central Files 1945-1950. Bdx439. File 940.5602 (location 390/46/8-"
10/5-1)
i · '
27. Japan: Report prepared by Karl Jahnke, November 17,1946, page 4; NA
RG 260, Records of Foreign Exc:hartge Depositary GrouP. Central Files 1945
1950, Box 439, File 940.5602 (location 390/46/8-10/5-1)'
End of period balance monetary
28. Report on Recovery of Reichsbank Precious Metals, Headquarters US
Group, Control CounCil (Germany)(Main) Finance Division, September 6, 1945;
NA RG 59 Department of State, Office of Financial Operations, Records relating
to the Tripartite Commission for the Restitution of Monetary GOld, 1942-1962,
.
Box 25, File:.German gold holdings (location 6311A104/06)
29. Incoming Ciassified Message" from: .Supreme Headquarters Allied
Expeditionary Forces Main Versailles France. to War Department, May 6, 1945;.
NA RG 218 Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Geographic file.:1942-1945. Box
72,' File: CCS 3a6-Germany (3-21-45), Control o.f German property and assets,
.
1945-1949 (location 190/1/13/02) . '
"'!/" ,
20
.'
.
'
223998
�".
o·
!,
, End t;'f period balance non-Monetary ,
i
30. Extrad from "Decision in Germany" by General Lucius D. Clay, p308,
Depar1n'lent of State, Embassy London, message 2496, November 20, 1950; NA '
RG 59, pepartment of State. 1950-1954 Decimal system, Box 867. File:
'
200.6241, goldl11-2450 (location 631114123101 )
31. Office of Chief Counsel for War Crimes, December 28, 1948; NA RG 260.
, Records of Foreign Exchange Depository GrouP. Central Files 1945-1950, Box
440, File 940.65 (location 3901461~10/5-1)
.
,
I
32. '·From: US High Commissiorier.fo,r Germany to Department of State (A-1082),
July 13, 1950; NA RG 59, Department of State. 1950-1954 Decimal System, Box
, 867, File: 200.6241, goldl11-2450 (loeation 631/14/23/01)
, Foreign shipments
Switzerland
33., Swiss Gold Traffic with Germany 1939-1945, no date; NA RG 43, Records
of the US Delegation to the C~nference on German External Assets and Looted
GOld, Washington, January 6-2:1, 1953. Box 201 ,File: Swedish negotiations
(location 250/10/19/04)
,
34. Quarterly Value of Gold Shipments from German Reichsbank to Swiss
National Bank 1940-1945. no date; NA RG 43, Records of the US Delegation to
the Conference on German External Assets and Looted Gold, Washington,
January 6-21; 1953,' Box 201, File: Swedish negotiations (location 250/10/19/04)
"
I
• ,
,
.35, First Quarter 1940 Gold Shipments from Germany to Switzerland,
Department of the US Treasury; NA RG 56, Records of the Office of the
Technical Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, Stabilization Records,
Subject Files, Box 74, Fih3: Gold Jan-June'1940 (location 450/80/22/02)
36. Summary of Shipments ofjGold: Berlin to Bern. no date; NA RG 59
Department of State, Office of Financial Operations, Records relating to the
Tripartite Commission for the Restitution of Mon!3tary Gold, 1942-1962, Box 25,
File: Gennan gold holdings (Io.cation 6311AJ04/(6)
,
I
37, Meeting ~ith Tre~sury Re'looted Gold-New DOOJmentary Evidence,
February 14, 1946; NA RG 43~ ReCords of the US Delegation to the Conferen~
on German External Assets 'and looted Gold, Wash'ington, January 6-21, 1953,
'80x 201, File: Swiss negotiations-volume l.(location~59/10/19/04}
.
,
,
,
21
, i
....
,<
22'399'9
�• . I
,
.
"
38, Statement by Emil PUhl. Nqvember 17, 1945;. NA RG .153. Records of the
Office of the Judge Advocate ~neral. Safehaven Reports 1944-1945, Box 13
(IGCation 270/1/5104).
.
39. MinIstry Of Economic Warfare, Telegram Uni~ April 13, 1945; NA RG 43,
Records of the US Delegation to the Conference on Gennan Extemal Assets
and Looted Gold, Washington, January 6-21, 1953, Box 203, File: SwHzer1and
safehaven gold tranSactions (location 250110/19/04)
40. Enclosure 1, explanation of the Statement 'Total Gold Stocks of the
Reichsban~', Investigat.ion conceming case: Reid1sbankrat Kart Graupner,
August 15116/1946; NA RG 260, Records of Foreign Exchange Depository
Group, ,Central Fil~s 1945-1950, Box 439, File 940.5602 (location 39()/46/8
1015-1)
41. Comments on cable re: SWiss gold movements, Staff Memo, Federal
Reserve Bank of New York. June 3; 1940.
~2,
For Italian gold:. NA RG 43, Records related to the Paris Conference on
Reparations, Files of Jacques:J. Reinstein, 1945-1951, Box 257 (location
250/1 (/20/05)
.
43. Shipments to Spain: State Department message from American Legation,
Bern to Washington, August 12. 1946; NA RG 56. Treasury Department,
Country and Area Records 1934-1952, Box 27, File: 'Switzerland gOld-silver
,~
"
(location 450/80/35/04)
44. Shipments to Portugal: Report Relating to Negotiations for the Restitution of
'Looted Gold, Lisbon, September 1946; NA RG 56 ,Miscellaneous Committee
R~rds, Box 62, File:.IARA-~ootEld Gold-Restitution and Claims Volume 1
(location450/80/30/02)
Other countries'
I'
I'
'
.
,
.
45. Gold Held in Germany by Hans J. Dornburg, Division of .Research and'
StatistiCS, Board of Govemo~s of the Federal Reserve System, April 1945; NA
RG 43. Records of the US Delegation to the Conference on German External
Assets and Looted Gold, Wcishington; January 6-21, 1953. Box 198, File: .'
external assets (location 250/10/19/04)
46. Rumania: Gold Receiv~d by the National Bank of Rumania, Bucharest,
From the Reichsbank, Berlin During the War, From William G. Brey, Chief
Foreign Exchange DepOSitory to Director Finance Division, OMGUS, July 23,
1946; NA RG 43, Records of the US Delegation to the Conference. on German
External Assets and Looted i Gold I JanuarY 6..,21 1953, Box 199;. File: Rumania
22
224000
�.
,
"
J
r
'1egotiations. (Note: The Reichsbank is supposed to have deposited $11.7
.
.million in the NationalBahk of Rumania's aa:ount at the Swiss bank, Union des
Banques Suisses. There is no confirmation.)'
.
47., BIS:' Minute, June 14,1946; NA RG 43, Records of the US Delegation to
the Conference on German External Assets and Looted Gold, January 6-21
1953, Box 199, File: French re~ort-~IS material. .),
'
,
48. Exhibit 1, Note on gold o~rations involving the Bank of International
Settlements and the ~erman Reid1~bankt 1939-1945, October 10, 1996.
49. Sweden: Memorandum on Swedish-German Goid Transactions from
January 1939 to December 1945, May 27, 1946; RG NA 59. Department of
State, Division of Economic Security Controls, 1945-1947. Safehaven subject
.
. file, Box 3 (location 250145135/07)
50, Turkey: V. An External
no date, page V. 23,
S~c:urity Program,
German Dealings in Looted Gold,
,.
51. Japan: Annex 2, Remari<S Conceming Gold Deliveries of the Reichsbank,
Investigation concerning case: Reidlsbank.rat Kan Graupner, August
1511611946, p 2; NA RG, Records of Foreign Exchange Depository Group, '
Central Files 1945-1950, Box ~39, File 940.5602 (location 390/46/8-10/5-1)
, .
52. Slovakia: NA RG59, Department of State, 1950-1954 Decimal system, Box
870, File: 200.6241' (location 631/14123/01)
.
I
Other distribution and usage ! '
53. SS Loot and the Reichsb~nki Su'preme Headquarte~s, Allied Expeditionary
Force, G-S Division, 8 May 1945; NA RG 260, ReCords of Foreign Exchange
Depository Group, Central Files 1945-1950, Box 422, File 940.1551 (location
390/46/&1 0/5-1 ) .
54. Annex 2, Remarks Concerning Gold Deliveries of the Reichsbank,
Investigation 'concerning case: Reichsbankrat Karl Graupner, August
15/16/1946, p 2; NA RG, Records;of Foreign Exchange Depository Group.
Central Files 1945-1950, Bo~ 439. File 940.5602 (location 390/46/8-10/5-1)
. 5. Durrer, Marco, Die Schv.Jeizeisch-Amerikan;s ChenFinarzbeziehugen im'
5
Zweiten Weltkreig, no 'date.
22'4001 .
'.
"
"
f, .
23
TOTRL P.26
�(~JUN-10-1997
FRBNY LEGAL DEPT.
05: 17
P.01
FEDERAL ReSERVE BANK OF NEW YORK
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10045
Legal Group
Banking Services Division
Date:
June 10. 1997
Deliver to:
Judy Liberson 202-482-4821
Bill Slaney 2.02-663-1289
From:
James R. Hennessy
Tel: 212-720-8195
Fax: 212-720-1530
Dear Judy and Bill:
I received a call from Cindy Sprunger of the House
Banking Committee today about the June 25 hearing.
She asked me
about a 1940 New York Times article (attached) which stated that
much of Switzerland's reserves were stored at the Bank during the
War and, more generally, what we knew about swiss gold
transactions. Because I thought this might come up on June 25, I
thought you should know that I made. the following points to her:
(1) The Bank did not systematically retain ledgers for the BNS
(Swiss National Bank) account. As our submission to the National
Archives indicated (attached), we only have ledgers for 1932-34,
1936, and 1940-41
Consequently, the ENS account history could
not be fully reconstructed from our records.
(2) So~e transfers
listed in the existing BNS ledgers do give some indications as to
where some of the gold deppsited into the ENS account may have
corne from, e.g., what steamship such gold arrived on.
(3) The
BNS ledgers are large, fragile, hand-written books.
They would
not survive photocopying.
(4) We understand that there is an
effort already underway by the BNS to reconstruct their account
histories based on their o'wn records and the records of others; I
assume that they will be cooperating ~ith the State Department
Historian in this endeavor..
(5) Representatives from the Federal
Reserve Board have recently discussed the question of records
with the BNS and will short~y be offering to the BNS the use of
our ledgers for their review.
Please feel free to call me if you have any questions.
This transmission has~ pages (including this cover sheet) .
224002
�i.r..~AY.
KAY (.
I
JIJI'l-09-1':F5?
l~~!l
I'
231 1i'
224003
�--l JUN-1I::J-1997
135: 19
FRBNY LEGAL DEPT.
P.el3
The table below lists gold transaction summary ledgers for the
periods 1932-3' and 1940-41 for the central banks of Argentina l
Germany, Portugal sweden, Switzerland and the Bank for
International Settlemencs. These ledgers reflect gold custody
transactions (deposits and withdrawals in aggregace) I but do not
necessarily reflect the purpose of the transaccion, rthe
counterparties, nor details of the gold iceelf (e.g .• "refiner,
etc.). These ledgers c~ot be photocopied. They are available
for review upon request at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
I
Blank
.
1932 1133
,/
Gennany
Sweden
I'JO ledger entries
1935 1936 1940
,/
1941
,/
c
"
,/
"
[]
,/
,/
"
,/
,/
Argentina
Portugal
1934
=
,/
"
Switzerland
"
,/
,/
,/
,/
,/
Bank for International Settlements
,/
"
"
,/
,/
"
"
"
224004
TOTAL
P.el3
�MAY-08-1997
P.01
FRBNY LEGAL DEPT.
23:38
t .
l
FEDERAL RESERVE BANKOF NEW YORK
NEW YORK. N.Y. 10045
J
Legal Group
Banking Services Division
Date:
.) -
1-1'7
B;t.< J~
Deliver to:
:;;".1- 6t"3 - /~ j
From:
CJ
James R. Hennessy
Tel: 212-720-8195
Fax: 212-720-1530
E-mail: james.hennessy@frbny.sprint.com
Message:
F", :t""~~/ ~ ~ ~ ~.~
~
~ ~
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
/,a
f
~ ~
j.
~.
fd
1
1tJ~~..,
C> ~ -4
~,.tJI ~~~ 14 ~~)
'r-
This transmission has ~. pages (including this cover sheet) .
,
The information oontained in this facsimile trammission is confidential and may be legally
privileged. It is intended only for the use of the individual or enti~ to whom it ill add.reaaed and
others authorized to receive it. If you are not the iDtended recipient, discloS'Utl!l, copying, or
taking action on the basis of thill :infannation is prohibited. If you received. this iD error, please
immediately notify us by telephone and retum the original message to us at the above address.
224005
�MRY-08-1997
FRBNY LEGRL DEPT.
23:38
P.02
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK
NEW YORK. N.Y.10045-OOO1
I' AlU!A~ODE 112-720-5000
I
April 30, lSl97
Mr. Greg Bradsher
Supervisory Archivist
Room 2400
.. Archives II, Textual
Reference Branch, NWDT2
National Archives and
Records Administration
8601 Adelphi Road
College Park, MD 20740-6001
Dear Mr. Bradsher:
with this letter, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
("FRBNY") is transferring to the National Archives and Records
Administration (I1National Archives ll ) copies of approximately
2400 pages of documents from FRBNY files from the early 1930's
through the late 1950's that may relate to the handling and
disposition of Nazi asse~s. As we have discussed, these
documents will be publicly available without restriction at
the National Archives as non-record reference materials.
I have enclosed an "Index of FRBNY Documents Related
to Nazi Assets.11 which identifies the documents according to their
FRBNY department and file name.
Each page of the document
collection is also assigned a number.
I have also enclosed a
list of "FRBNY Ledgers Related to Nazi Assets"
This lists
available account ledger hooks from the World War Two period that
may relate to Nazi gold. Because of their. age, fragility and
awkward size, we were unahle to include copies of these ledgers
in our submission to the National Archives. However. they are
available for review upon reqUest at the FRBNY. The collection
also_does not include any documents related to the Tripartite
Commission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold. at the request
oi'that organization.
224006
�MRY-08-1997
23:39
P.03
FRBNY LEGRL DEPT.
Mr. Bradsher
April 30, 1997
If you have any questions, please call me at 2l2-720
8l95.
Very truly yours,
James R. Hennessy
Attorney
Enclosures
cc:
Messrs. Adams
Siciliano
Board
Board
224007
�MAY-08-1997
23:39
P.04
FRBNY LEGAL DEPT.
INDEX OP PUNY DOC'tlMENTS RELATED TO NAZI ASSBTS
PRBNY Depa.rtment and. Pil.el Name
Page Humber
Records Management and Archives
Bank for International
Settlements File·
1-447
country Files;
Argentina
Belgium
Bolivia
Canada, Bank of
Czechoslovakia
England
France
Germany
Italy, Danca d'Italia
Morocco
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Rumania
South Africa
Spain
Sweden, Sveriges Riksbank
Sweden. Government
Switzerland, Banque
Nationale Suisse
Switzerland, Credit swiss
Switzerland, Government
Switzerland, swiss Bank Corp.
Switzerland, Misc.
USSR
Yugosla.via
448-45.2,
2424-2428,
453-478
479-517
518-530
531-541
541-546
547-549
550-594
595-5.98
599-600
601-603
604-619
6.20-635
636-645
646-657
658 660
661-677
678-715,
2429-2439
716-739
740-1119
1119-1122
1123-1143
1144-1154
1155
1156
2414-2423,
1157-1166
Alien Property Custodian File
Emergency Gold Controls Pile
1203 1213
Foreign Exchange File
1214-1226
Foreign Exchange Control File
1227-1278
Foreign, Policy and
Procedures File .
1279-1301
224008
�MAY-08-1997
23:39
FRBNY LEGAL DEPT.
P.05
2
Foreign Exchange, Purchase
and Sale File
130:2-1644
Gold File
1.645-1671
I
International Moneta,ry
:
~und
File
1672-1704
I
Research Memoranda F;ile'
1705-1759
,
Legal Department
1760-1974
Various Files
Bank Supervisign
1975-2085
Various Files
.r'
Central Bank Servives
Bank for International
Settlements File
2086-2152
country Files:
Argentina
Chile
Germany
Netherlands
Portugal
Sweden
Switzerland
Uruguay
2153-2241
2~42-2:246
'
2247-2274
2275-2291
2292-2298
2299-2305
2306-2326
2327-2332
Terms and Conditions - Revision
- Part I - 1936-1949 File
2333-2340
Gold Reserve Act of 1934 File
2341-2344
Gold Pool - General ,File
2345-2378
Gold Pool - Part I I File
2379-2384
Gold Pool (Part I) File
2385-2395
Gold Account - Earmarking and
Custody - Part I 1928-1952 File
2396-2400
Gold Regulations - Licenses, Authority
to Operate Part I 1933-1949 File
2401-2404
Gold: Miscellaneous Memoranda
Part I File
2405-2411
,
,
224009
�,
MAY-08-1997
FRBNY LEGAL DEPT.
23:40
P.06
PRBNY LEDGERS RELATED TO NAZI ASSETS
The table below lists gold transaction summary ledgers for the
periods 1932~36 and 1940-41 for the central banks of Argentina,
Germany, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the Bank for
International Settlements~ These ledgers reflect gold custody
transactions (deposits and withdrawals in aggregate), but do not
necessarily reflect the , purpose of the transaction, the
counterparties, nor details of the gold itself (e.g., refiner,
etc.) - These ledgers ca.n.:not .be photocopied. They are available
for review upon request at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
./=account activity
0= no adivity
Blank
1932 1933
1934
=no ledger entries
1935 1936 1940
.I
.I
./
.I
.I
.I
.I
./
.I
,/
.I
./
.I
Switzerland
.I
./
.I
.I
.I
CI
[J
./
Bank for International Settlements
./
.I
./
.I
.I
Portugal
Sweden
,,'
.I
Argentina
Germany
,[
1941
.I
224010
TOTAL P.06
�JUL-15-1997
20:51
FRBNY LEGAL DEPT.
P.01
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10045
; Legal Group
Banking Services Division
Date:
To:
From:
James R. Hennessy
Tel; 212-720 8195
Fax: 212-720 1530
E-mail; Jamea.Hennessy@ny.frb.org
Message:
This t.ransmission has
) " pages (including this cover sheet),.
The information contained in this facsimile transmission is confidential and may be legally
privileged. It is intended only for the u~e of the individual or entity to whom it is addressed and
others authoriZed to receive it. If you are not the intended recipient, disclosure, copying, or
taking action on the basis of this information is prohibited. If you received this in error, please
immediately notify Uti by telephone and return the original message to us at the above address.
224011
�JUL-15-1997
I/UlUU: -
20:52
FRBNY LEGRL DEPT.
rurrug8J rec;elvea U,13. gOla ror .NazJ. loot-aocument
P.03
hltp:l/blZ.yahoo.c:omlfinanceJ97/07/10/yO004yOO_'_html
REUTERS ••
[ Yahoo I Write Us I Search I HeadliDes I I.afR )
[B:u,siuscs~
- Company - Indus1IY - Finance - PR Newswirc,.. Busjness Wire - QJloteS]
Thursday July 10 9:36 PM EDT
Portugal received U.S. gold, for Nazi loot-document
By Arthur Spiegelman
NEW YORK." July 10 (Reuter) - At the height ofthe Second World War. Portugal used the Swiss
National Bank to swap 20 tons oflooted Nazi gold for gold held in the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank and
the Bank of Canada, according to a U-S. intelligence document released on Thursday.
The swap was made to eliminate evidence that Portugal was receiving gold stolen by the Nazis. the
document said. The Allies had warned Portugal and other neutral nations they would face reprisals if
they bought looted Gennan gold.
The Sept. 10, 1944, document details" a classic money-laundering operation." said World Jewish
Congress Vice President Kalman Sultanik, whose organization released the previously classified report.
The docwnent.. described as coming from "a very confidential source." said that in 1942 the Bank of
Portugal deposited about four tons of gold it had bought from Nazi Germany in its account with the
Swiss National Bank.
The Swiss transferred the same amount of gold it had in a Bank of Canada account to the Portuguese,
who, in tum, transferred title to the gold in its Swiss account.
In 1944" the Swiss and Portuguese swapped another 15 tons of looted Nazi for gold held in the U.S.
r
.
Federal Reserve Bank in New York.
The document said the Bank of Portugal's objective "is to get rid of gold purchased from the
Reichsbank through the Banque Nationale Suisse".
"The bad guys win all around_ The Nazis have sold their gold. The Portuguese have swapped their
looted gold for clean gold and the Swiss National Bank earns commissions on each transaction:'
Sultanik said. "All it took was a few strokes ofthe pen."
The 20 tons of gold was worth $24 million in the 19408 and would be valued al about $220 million
today.
.
Sultanik said the transactions might have been legal because the swIss had the right to transfer gold to
other accounts and there was no evidence that the U.s. and Canadian banks were aware ofwhat was
happening.
"Wittingly Of not, the U.S."and Canadian banks were disguising the movement oflooted Nazi g?ld and
this helps explain one of the mysteries of World War II -- why the war started with Portugal havmg.no
gold reserves in New York and ends with it having 258 tons of gold in the Federal Reserve," Sultanik:
said.
<
He said it was now apparent that a significant percentage, ifnot most. of the 258 tons came from
Portugal's purchase of looted Nazi gold.
224012
t of2
07/15/97 14:37:26
�JUL-15-1997
20:53
FRBNY LEGRL DEPT.
P.04
The WJC said present-day Portugal had cooperated with its efforts to trace Nazi gold movements and an
investigating commission headed by fonner prime minister Mario Soares was making rapid progress.
After the war, the Allies demanded that Portugal return an estimated 139 tons of looted Nazi gold that it
bought but the country only gave back four tons of Dutch gold that it had in its banks, in its original
wrappers.
A 1949 letter ofprotest delivered to Portugal by the British Embassy in Lisbon on behalf ofthe Allies
said: ., Gold once looted remains loot and the Allies maintain that the thief has no title (and) cannot
transmit a title."
More news for related categories and industries: banking, minjng, stock capsules.
= .._=_ _._=__.=_._=m.=
_= _= .. ..,...,...____'u"'u::;,.;.,-::;:
____,.................. __
._b.....'..,,,.
r ______~____~__~~----------~~
I[ Search News 1
~L
-r=
...T\
'=........-- _____.__...____....,.,..
___."...... . ..... _
~,,_
,~
..
~..
__ ............ _m........
,~
_,~....
_
~"'".
e
Copyright 1997 Reuters Limited. All rights reserved. Republication 01" redistribution of Reuters content is expressly
proh.ibited without the prior written consent of Reuters. Reuters $hall not be liable for ally errol'S or delays in the content, or
for any actions taken in reliance thertlon
Important Djsclaimers andL;&allnfonDoJjQD
Questions gt Commems?
224013
2of2
0711519714:37:26
TDTRL P.04
�JUL-15-1997
20:52
U •.::>., \"iW~Wi:I.D DIf.WUi LlD.Ili.C'Q
FRBNY LEGAL DEPT.
to ~wappmg OJ
Nazi \.JOIQ
!'
11
• 11'1111••111111111.11*."11111111==.
_'rn
___
P.02
nUp:IIWWW.nymneS.Com/Yr/mO/ClaY/news/woridlus-canada_nazigold.htmI
,_
_
:Ms
Jnly 16, 1997
u.s., Canadian Banks Linked to Swapping of Nazi
Gold
• Related Articles
Nazi Gold and POftlJ&aJ's Murlc;y Role (Jan. 10)
: Swiss SAY They Profited From Nazi Geld Deals (Dec. 14, 1996)
Furor Rising Over Swiss Banks! Dealines With Nazis (Sept. 21. 1996)
By ANTHONY DePALMA
ORONTO -documents for the first time
T implicate the Newly declassified Americanthe Nazis lootedBank of CanadaWar
Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the
in
Ottawa in attempts to launder tons of gold that
during World
IT.
While the Federal Reserve Bank would not comment on the disclosures made on
Monday by the World Jewish Congress, the Bank of Canada, Canada's central bank.
has already begun an investigation.
Bank officials are searching for evidence that the Nazis used the bank. to disguise the
origin of gold confiscated from the countries they occupied during the war. The
bullion may also have contained gold taken from individual victims of the
Holocaust.
Documents from the National Archives in Washington examined by the World
Jewish Congress had exposed Swiss c.ollaboration with the Nazis. But this is the fitst
time the trail has been followed to North America, raising both legal and moral
questions about the involvement.of Canada and the United States in the Nazi
plundering of Europe.
"It is inconceivable to me that their gold experts weren't aware of what was behind
these transactions," Elan Steinberg, e)(ecutive director of the World Jewish
Congress, said in reference to American and Canadian bank officials. "We have
moved beyond legalisms and whether by the strict sense the law it was
appropriate. to a moral and human dimension ofwhether it was proper. If
of
The World Jewish Congress in New York has examined more than 14 million
documents and has worked with Stuart Eizenstat, the undersecretary of commerce
who directed a recent stwly oftbe Swiss handling of Nazi assets.
Dr. William Slany, chief historian working with Eizenstat on the study, said he was
not aware of the newly declassified documents concerning North American banks.
But he said that after the Ames warned neutral countries like Portugal not to deal
with the Nazis. there were attempts to disguise such transactions_
According to a Sept. 10, 1944, document from the American Overseas Special
224014
10f2
07116/9708:19:27
�,~
~OOl
.
EUR PRESS GUIDANCE
JUNE 16, 1997
MElLI ASYLUM REOUEST
Q: What is the U.S. Government's position regarding
declassified government documents released by the World Jewish
Congress that implicate the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
and the Bank of Canada in laundering gold looted by the Nazis
during World War II?
.
A:
WE UNDERSTAND FROM PRESS REPORT$ THAT THE WORLD JEWISH
CONGRESS FOUND DOCUMENTS IN THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
IMPLICATING THE FEDERAL RESERVE 'BANK OF NEW YORK AND
THE BANK OF CANADA IN LAUNDERING GOLD LOOTED BY THE
NAZIS DURING WORLD WAR II.
WE HAVE NOT SEEN THE DOCUMENTS IN QUES'I'IOl.'J AND CAliJ" NOT
COMMENT ON THEM.
WE UNDERSTAND THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK IS AGGRESSIVELY
LOOKING INTO THIS. THE BANK HAS ADVOCATED COMPLETE
OPENESS ON THIS ISSUE.
THE ADMINSTRATION HOPES THAT ALL COUNTRIES WILL
ACCELERATE THEIR OWN INVESTIGATIONS INTO THIS PAINFU~
PERIOD SO THAT THE TRUTH CAN FINALLY BE UNDERSTOOD AND
JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION BE ACHIEVED.
-._-'--_.,._ -----. - OPTIONAl. FORM 99 (7-90)
- - - _. --
--~--
-
-- -
-
- -
FAX
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
224015
�State EUR/AGS
Drafted:EUR/AGS:MFry
SECEGOLD 319, 7-2622, 7/.16/97
Cleared: EUR/CAN:
. E: BFreedman
HO:
EUR/PPA:LCorwin
EUR:EAWayne
224016
' ... '
•• If'
�12127207797 ERNK SERVICES
517 P02
MRR 14 '97 11:18
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK
33 LIBERTY STREET
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10045-0001
I
TELEPHONE: 212 720-SI$0
FACSIMILE: 212 7ao-aaSI
WILLIAM...J. MeOONOUGH
PIOe;SIDIONT
. October ll, 1996
SENT VLA FACSIMILE
The Honorable Alfonee M. D'Arnato
Chairman, Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510 -6075:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
I am writing in response to your letter of October 2,
1996, requesting information on the disposition of gold seized by
Germany during the Second World War and the' role of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York ("New York Fed ll ) in any disposition of
such gold by the Tripartite Commission for the Restitution of
Monetary Gold ("TripartiteCommission") following the War.
As you know, the 'New York Fed maintains accounts for
many foreign central banks, foreign governments and international
organizations. As a general matter, we are not in a position to
respond to inquiries concerning the identity of our account
holders or the nature of their holdings. We follow this
confidentiality policy in order to promote confidence in the
united States as a depository for monetary reserves. However, in
this instance, the Tripartite Commission has authorized us to
confirm to you that it maintains a gold custody account at the
New York Fed and to respond to several of your inquiries about
its gold holdings. In addition, we have provided answers below
to your questions which we 'believe are responsive with regard to
our general gold account p~actices.
l.
Is it possible to deter.=ine the origin of the gold
obtained from the Tripartite Commission, through
scientific processes?
We do not know the answer to this question. We operate a
gold custody service only, which is essentially limited to
receiving, safekeeping and delivering gold. We do not
. conduct scientific tests on the gold received and held in
gold custody accounts and we have no expertise concerning
the possibility of such testing_
.224017
�617 P03
BRNK SERVICES
TOJiIC _ _
2_ __
12127207797
F'J;:'.".-:::;"... ~ FUI:sCRVE: ElANI< 01'" New
.
2.
Bow much gold remains at the
Tripartite Commis'sion?
'MRR 14 '97 11:19
,
,
,
New~ork
Fed from the
The Tripartite commiss:ion, has authorized us to inform you
that its current gold holdings at the New York Fed consist
?f ~62 bars said to contain 65,283.098' fine troy ounces of
gold (approximately ,two metric. tons). 'At current market
price the value is approximately $24.9; million.
3 and 4. Can we obtain a cbmprehensivelistingof the shipments
to New York framthe.Tripartite cOmmission since its
inception? C~'we obtain a comprehensive listing of
the shipments of gold out of New York from the
commission since its 'inception, specifically, to what
countries, how 'much was sent, and when it was sent?
I
"
.
I
The Tripartite Commission has not authorized us to release
detailed information on its gold account activity. We
understand that you have ~equested such information from the
Tripartite Commission and :that it willi be responding to you
directly.
5.
Are ehere any markings such as stamps made into the
gold (perhaps sh~ing previous o~ership by another
nation) present i~ this gold? Werereeords kept as to
the existence of markings on gold· that had been .sent
back out of the New York ,Fed?
.
In general, gold bars have markings indicating the orig'inal
refiner, a bar number assigned by that'refiner, and the
degree of'purity. The'New York Fed has generally maintained
a record of all of these markings. However, such markings
do ,not reveal ownership.
.
I
'
,
We hope the above; information will be helpful. to the
Committee. If we can be ofrfurther assistance in this matter,
please feel free to contact l Peter Bakstansky, "Senior Vice
President, at 212-720-6136. i
Sincerely,
bc:
Chairman Greenspan
Mr. Coyne
Mr. Truman
Mr. Winn'
. ·
Mr. Patrikis
Mr. Baxter
Ms. Cutler
Ms. O'Neil
Mr. 'rozer
Mr .. Silva
~1.r. Hennessy
"
I
.1
224018
�Gold Problem, 1938
F.F. 4433
�. "FEDERAL RESERVE BAN
"
r,
,: OF
N·EWYORK'·\\f.:,'~,:·
..
,{
'
"OFFICE CORRESPONDENCE
.'
-.,
"
",,;';'
Mr. SproUl
"To
C. P. Kindleberger
FROM
, t..
,r
... <::~);;:~i~~f
".:.
AJiierican international traQ.eand finance policy in a' European war' Will,
,"
"',"
" ~ .' ".:-."', :'~ :~:>~"/~~":~;~iii;~~~~~~J l'~ '.~~ ~
presumably be governed by the Neutrality Act of 1957. If' the Neutrality Act" is:·"::.~:,'., '
"
,
('
'~
•
.' ";', •
~
' ••:
1," ",
,'.-'l;>
, ,proclaimed operative, as it was in the' Ethiopian-Italian War of 1955-36 and
•
."
,
.•..
',
'
'.
I
.
'
.
. : '
o:·.~:. [~,:,::',-
", '."'f,:~
.
:tMSpanish civil war, American exPorts of' arms, ammunition, and implBments of ,,'>"
.
" ' , . :, ~': ~}'::':~~~::'I' ~,
war to belligerents, as defined by proclamation, will be prohibited, and' credits :'"
,
.
' .
.'
. "<.: .' ,"
~·:~;:!~~~~~:·ii/):;·< :,
to belligerents will.. be restricted to ordinary short term commercial operations
.~:
. '.:.... , .
of a peace-time character.
Nevertheless, a European
wa: would raise several
.... :
.~~' ,.: ':
,4
questions of monetary policy for the United states which are notcavered by the
I
Neutrality Acts.
'
.
Important among them are:
'
Will the United states buy
.
gold
freelT directly or indirectly from belligerents? ' Should foreign belligerents,
be
~wed
to sell American securities freely in New York?
, In' a localized conflict ,such as that in the Far East it m::1uld have
to have
been futile, of course, even' if' the Neutrality Act had been enforced,
embargoed belligerent bullion
since the
Lo~~n
shipments~d
sales to the United States
Trea~~,
gold and silver markets are nearly as accessible as 'San Francisco,
'and since the United states might well have found itself', after having imposed
such an Elmbargo, called upon to bI.iy Japanese gold and Chinese silver in London
to the same extent that it is now buying them
directly~
In a generalized European
war, however, the American Treasury would probably provide the only bid for un
limited quantities of' gold;
and, unless steps were taken to limit its import"
the United states would probablT find itself' called upon to buy $1,250,000,000,
annuaJ.ly of world new gold prOduction as well as 'large amounts from European
"war chests. n
SUch purchases, which might well in all run over $2,500,000,000
i
a year, would present important monetary problems.
224020
.
�'I
'-,': -',
. ': "~;
, , , r ' ,;,:"
",'I, .'; l'
~:~z; ~,,~~{:; ~~·:"":1.::~~l,~'-:¢ .:~~,j~·~·l~'.t-<f:i!, ~.;~",
;
','.
,Mil"::: 3B-1 !50o-3~lI6
",:-:' :'~ ;I'·~~· ::: 'f~ ::~~'';;':~. ,~,<
,-,
"
~"'
.
,:"
OFFICE CORRESPONDENCE
:'
To
',' :~.
)".i~)<',::::'~?l~:~>~:~:~· , ' '~~'k'.-'~ i::::;~~'._.~,~;,~. "~;:J~~~;~\~!~~5~:~~.~~~:1/~r1t~~~~~!~:t~' ,,.:" ',,",'',,;,":<i:;~,;"lo':
",
Mr. Sproul
SUBJECT
American Gold Policy
FROM __~~C~._P~,~.~Kin~·~d~l~e_be_r~g~e~r _________
_
2
to a deflation which might well exceed th8 previous rise
1il ~oney' income. '
.
•• t'
(The weight of. this factor would depend importantly upon 'how the "neuirillty
proclamation defined nlmplementsof war. a
If cotton, copper, ~chine tools:,
steel and oil were contraband, the export boom generated
by Ii 'Eur~p~an
',-": ~ .'. : ".
~'
.. '
.'
war'
would be greatly reduced, even if gold were freely bought by the United States
and foreigners bought dollars with which to
purchase of these goods elsewhere.
~,foreign
,
currencies for the
Direct purchases of'goods by belligerents
in the United States would increase the national income far faster
than
if
these purchases were made abroad and only affected United States exports to
neutrals after national incomes in neutral. .countries bad been significantly
increased. )
Secondly, the effect of large gold imports on the excess-reserve
positions of domestic banks would have to be considered.
increasing prosperity in this country, imports of say
annually would probably
Given a period of
12,000,000,000
in gold
cali for,a resumption of gold sterilization to limit
the rise in national. income generated by increased exports.
If this transpired,
the United States would in effect be borrowing to enable belligerents to pay
for war materials (in,violation ,0£ the Neutrall,ty Act) and the addition to the
national debt' would be in the nature of a permanent one.
This would be the .
224021
�Mr. Sproul
'To
C. P. Kindleberger
FROM
."·';li~~tl;:
C
c·. c
case because its counterpart would be exports for consUmption;
•
the countries
.
.
buying the goods would never deflate to the point necessary to repurchase 'th~
.. :'. .:..
. gold;~d it no restrictions were imposed upon Capital impo~ts ~'the "Uzrlttld
:'"
,
,
states;
'.
it is doubtful that this country" could lose gold simp17 by increasing
<
",,";
:
)
the national. income to 'the point where the merchandise trade balance was
....
','
strongly adverse.
If the United states were in a period of depression at the
.~."J ~.~. ;':
~,:'
time of the outbreak of war in Europe, it would not be necessary to. sterilize
..
'
the gold immediately upon its importation, but in any subsequent period of
.
,
,
recovery, the cyclical excess reserve problem which will in any event face us'
in 1959 or i940 would be increased.
If the United states, as seems probable, does not really desire
.
.
.
'
.
neutrality in the next European war but would prefer say England, France, and
Czechoslovakia to win over say Germany and Italy, then it is idle to discuss
the monetary problems which a European war would raise for the United states.
In fact, any steps which the Uni~ed states might take to l1m1t sales of gold
or domestic securiii;es in this country by bell.1gerents might, on pragmatic
grounds, be considered unfriendly to nations possessing such assets and friendly
to the Hhave-nots." Despite this, the monetary effects of such restrictions are
discussed below.
c
In discussing the effects of' possible gold sales to the United States
in time of
w8r
in Europe, it is necessarY to take. domestic securities owned by
foreigners' into account too, since both types of foreign assets are quickly
exchangeable for dollars, and hence can quickly' affect the volume of American
exports in time of war.
While heavy sales of do~estic securities b.Y foreigners
224022
�, OFFICE CORRESPONDENC,E
To
Mr. Sproul
c.
FROM.
P. Kind1eberger
in time of war would not create an excess reserve problem for our monetary ,
authorities, the political implications of such ~es would be similar totbose,',; ..:
"
"
','
:
. 1 •
.'.
'.',
~'
<, ,'. ",.". "·~~:';,~.\.'~;::f'2:~i~~~!~~~.~~--:.~:.
of gold as would be their direct effects on the national income, 1£ the 'proceeds "'::'
,"
i,
.
"
';.
",: \, .
.
..
.' .: :< "~:~ -' '" ~
were used, to buy American gOods.
...
~~:
.
.(
....
The alternatives open to the United states should she desire to avoid
.
.
,
so far as possible the monetary repercussions of a European
(1)
to embargo imports of gold, from
~ ;:,,(
war 'are:
to embargo all imports of gold;
(2)
,
~ll1gerents;
(3) to buy a proportion of new world gold
(say 50 per cent);
,
produc~ion
(4) to restrict sales of domestic securities in this
market by belligerent foreigners and possiblY
by n e u t r a l s ; '
,
(5)
to maintain open markets for gold and securities.
It is assumed in the follOwing discussion (1) that the politi~al con
oequences of all these policies are realized and, do not conflict with American
foreign policy;
effect;
(2) that the Neutrality Act of 1937 has been proclaimed in .
and (5) that raw materials are not included among contrabanded articles,
so that there is a demand for cotton, steel, copper, etc., by belligerents"who
pay "cash and carry."
1.
A complete embargo against the im~rt of gold into the United
states in time of war would result in a serious blow to gold as a monetary
standard, an appreciation of the dollar in the foreign exchange market and a
decline in American exports perhaps onlY to neutral countries.
American ex
ports to belligerents would be paid for, for a time, with foreign dollar balances
in this country and thereafter by bidding the doiiar up to the point where
':
:
�," ':':':'i' .':,:'
.... :,\y.• ,',;»-,.
'11V'
',,""
":; , ,,'·,::;·OFFICE CORRESPONDENCE
" :: ':':~~' :'~':':'~;~,1': "::""', ,',"', "
FROM
"',
O. P. Kindleberger
.','.f
'::> . . ,:.•>.::' . :...".
5
..~::-':::tf~",Jil1~
,::?t:?/\';;'::,:':~}\f~~~l{::" '
exports to the United states' increased and made more dollars available for :im-"J>.~:":"',
, ports, from this countr;y.
,
,
t~rks'~d f:~:\~l~~~,":. '
," ';'~<:'" '" '::":':);:'::~"::::~;~~~;},~:,,
increased markedly by reason of,
:;:?:6
Since the demand for American raw
,stllf'fs on the part of belligerents would have
•
IDa
,
, ' . '.,,:.
-
'.
~.~ >:, .;:"
• ~~' '
'the war, ~{is doubtf'ul whether the dollar vol.umeof exports to these "oOuntries
* ;,,,,',;:"
,
would decreaseidespite the dollar appreciation.
,';-.
'."
,
,
. .
'.
,
.
.
.
,~;;.",
How far the dollar appreciation would go and what effects it would
have upon the course of business in the United s~tes would depend on the
: ,.
.~
..!;,
duration and scale of hostilities, upon the volume of foreign funds in the
United states at the outset of the war, upon the, degree of access to American
ports enjoyed by belligerents, and upon the exchange controls set up abroad.
, It may be postulated, first, that belligerent countries now free ot. exchange
contr01 would quickly institute it
dollars.
~d
requisition their nation8l.s' holdings of
This might tend to slow, down the rate of dollar appreciation, although
nationals of neutral countries, such as Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland
would probably bid heavil.:y' for dollars for hoarding purposes, and exchange con
trols in belligerent countries might endeavor to bid dollars away from neutrals.
GOld earmarked in the United states would present something of a
problem.
It is likely, however, that the Tl-easul-y' s refusal to buy imported
gold would have to be followed by a similar refusal to buy gold now located in
the United states and belonging
charges of discrimination.
to
foreign central banks in order to avoid
The possibility of buying earmarked gold in this
country from neutrals is discussed under 'number 2 below.
2.
An embargp of imports of gold only from be1ligerent countries in
time of War would be subject to evasion i f the belligerents were to sell gold'
224024
.~ ~
"
�. ;.
:~ ~~~;~;iJ.:·:;·~~~~·'i~~2:··:.A?'.::.~\'.,':.! ·~·:)\:~~:J.·l~:~F :~~~~Z;· ~-r:~·;.~ ~ ;';:"':::1 :.'.'" ";~:";~'&;;;:;'\il~W:~~}~i,~~i'(;;~;:\'~t~ '~iH'''''i.~' :;':.,,'1 JR,; ":':%;.~'Ji;
.
.
. '. ,. ,'·." •. ~MISC. 3B-l!50o-3-38
'"
:., . .
~""""'.;> " .,,,,'
i' "'. , ,. .' ..
.E~~~
RESERVE BAN
OF NE'W YORK
: i
,
.
'.
.~.
~
,"
OFFICE CORRESPONDENCE
'
To
... :...
;
:'~""
.... ,.
Mr. Sproul
FROM _ _
,,:~,:,,:;,
.'"
\'
"
. ,.,.
:;.
~
" . ' DATE~~~~:!::..I---=~~--..:;:..,.·:
"
:::. :."
: ~,
~.' ~:' ': :-,.~::~:.};:.~ '~'::~:'.
.' :!'.~ .~~~ ;J~:' ·.:.'t!~,'·?:~ifi<~;!:~~~·-~·~~ ,;. '~~;;':'.' ' ,'""."""",,,;:"1,
.
American Gold Policy in ,the
SUBJECT
, j,
-"C""".'---.!!P.. . ,.--=K""'in""'dl=e::..:b::..:e::,:r:.J;g;L;:e:.:_ _ _ __
r
6
.. '.,
'.
to neutral countries and the neutrals ,in turn were to sell that gold to the
United states and make dollars available to the warring countries. While it )"~;:'~;;:i.J
"
.' '.
.
. "~' .'.. . " .,
.~,. :.:. '. ~:~ ·:'.;;,!~,1~:'~·'·~~·;·.g;~;.:·:::
.would seem unfair, to neutral countries to extend the gold embargo to them, <','X>'::;~}:j,<: ,"
.
. . . . '..
-,
.......".. -:
~·;:!':-t.
'.'
yet i f it were possible to use such coUntries for purposes of ,transshipment
I
.
of gold to the United States by belligerents, it 'would be imPossible to
'u
make:': .
. ':
a limited embargo effective and the United states would be called upon to buy
~. ~
"',
"<' ....
"
belligerent gold in large quantities.
.~
Since, moreover, it woUld be difficult
to draft legislation which would prevent foreign countries from selling'
belligerent gold to this country as well as their own, or from making dollars
available to belligerents against their own gold in exchange for gold sent to
them by belligerents, it might be wise not to buy neutral gold imported from
abro8.d but to make loans on it.
The proceeds of such loans could be surrounded
with restrictions against their finding their
could be earmarked for hoarding purposes;
way
into belligerent hands:
some
some could be permitted to be drawn
upon only for the import of goods for consumption in the neutral country.
In
addition, the earmarked gold of neutral countries could be put up as collateral
,
,
for loans circumscribed with similar restrictions.
While the question isa
legal one and hence reB.lly lies outside the present memorandum, it would seem
offhand that more effective control over amounts of dollars available to
belligerents could be
es~blished
with an embargo on imports of gold from
belligerents and limitation of purchase by the Treasury of gold from neutrals,
.
.
with facilities extended to these neutrals for borrowing in this market (direct
from the Treasury?) on gold collateraI under such restrictions as seem advisable
at the time.
A system of lending against gold without being required to pur
chase unl i m; ted supplies would enable the United States effectively to restrict
224025
�7
..
i
1'.
·qua.ntit~es of' d~llars made available to f'oreigners
:::limitthe'appreciation of the:\dollar.
,- ~,
." .
': '. ,'.
• t.! " ,
':':: ,;',~:;,j:t 'a,b.;u1d
be mentio~ed,of' course,
,
,'.I
tba t
if, other
desired to" , the United states in an embargo oti belligerent gold ,o!!D,d ..
join
re
.
.
, :
,.' .
"
,
.
_,.~.
,'"
,.....';: ,~:.;'}·5~,: :",A:'" '."
.
tions, on the Purchase of' gold f'rom other neutral ~ountrieswhich in~'
.
'
••
"
I·
to the dollar during a war on: the continent, and,' provided her market
~s
restricted so that belligerents could not obtain kroner in unlimit~ quantities
either in stockholm or e1sewh~re , -it would be desirable to allow Sweden to ob- , • ..
,
'
tain dollars f'reely against both gold and securities. , In f'act, it might be "
,
,
possible f'or the U. S. Treasury to reorganize the: Tripartite Agreement to include
I.·
!
the neutraicountries of' northern Europe (Belgium~ Holland, Luxemburg, Denmark,
Norway, Fin1and, and Sweden)
,
and sWitzerland, whese currencies would all remain
I
.
'
,
stable in terms of' one another, but would rise ~ga.inst those :~f' the belligerent
,
countries.
I,
>
Tbesame arrangements could also be' made with Latin American countries.
,:0',
5.
A guaranty by the United States to buy a proportion, 'say one-hal.f,
,
of' the worldls new gold ,
. . production in case of' a European war would .involve .this
country in a delicate problem~'
QUotas would have. to be ,established f'or Various
producing area~ and presumably these areas would have to arrange' f'or quotas f'or .
.
.
individual producing companies;.
I~
addition,
som~
dif'f'iculty might arise
becaus~
..
of' the f'act that comparatively large supplies of' 40llars would become aYailable
to f'oreigners at the beginning of' the quota period, a year or a month, and be
224026
�'OFFICE CORRESPONDENCE
To
'!4r. Sproul
FROM ____~C~.~P~.~K~i~n~d~l~e=b~er~g~e~r~~~____
8
.. .
._-;;~~~~,
..
exhausted toward the end of ~he period., Assuming'tbat the United states' 'con-··-·;;:~<f.',;t>~-,
tracted to
~ ,$50,000,000 of gold amonth,which, is appro~~~~iie~~,:"~~"~~lDl'~~;",
. .
,'.'
"
. •
, : ',': .'.: :ri, " ",,': '::,~: ~'::::',~~~':~.:.~~:,:
",'
< '"
,
:
i~~~7.':~:~~~;·~~~~~·,~~:J;t~~;.
,world production" it is likely tluit this amount of doJ.J.a:rs 'IIould bEl' Imide "va~~,~~~?:':~"
'able in the early part of the month with no more coming into fore.ign ~s '~tii ", '
~.:,
"
the subsequent month.
In this way,
disc~ncerting nuctuatio~s wou:w.
.
'"..: ~
be' int;~":':".
.'
\
"'",
Numerous other technical problems of more' 'dr"l~ss '
'duced in the exchange market.
.
. ..
'
,
seriousness would be encountered in putting any such scheme into operation, but
•
an
"
,";
'w
',:.
.
'
-
~,
important political one would revolve about the question of whether', new' gold
,
production shouid be bought from belligerents or only neutrals.
'
In the event
tha t England is 'involved in a European war, it is likely that her dominions and
",r'
crown colonies would be subsequently embroiled and, since, they produce more' than
50 per cent~ wonld gold production, the qllestion is a serious one.
4.
Much the same problems exist in, restricting sales of domestic
securities by foreigners in wartime concerning whether
thes~
restrictions should
be applied to belligerents and neutrals alike and whether they should be subject
to some quantitative limitation. Should the Dutch, for example, be allowed to
sell American securities here, freely-and the English not be so allowed, English
,
sales could take place in Amsterdam against doll.a.rs which the Dutch could obtain
in reselling the securities here.' In simil.a.r fashion, the English might purchase
American securities in Amsterdam with gold i f securities could be sold' agaipst
dollars by belligerent coUntries while gold could not.
In my view, it would be.
desirable to refuse to allow foreigners to sell domestic securities in this
market in time of war, and to allow foreign-owned securities to fall in price
.
,
in comparison with American-owned securities, at the. same time permitting neutral
224027
,.'
.
�<'OFFICE CORRESPONDENCE
.~
..
Mr. Sproul
To
C.P. Kindleberger
FROM
, event of European
ware
,,>' : / ' /;~:].:J~Ji~f:'.
'. 9
countries to borrow dollars against their securities under the same restrictions , ,
,
,
,
"
" , ',' , ':'~':, ~"'·;;;::;~:~\f,;;L:,,~:.·
regarding the disposalof these dollars as applied in the case of loans of .gold~ '::'1':(
:~'. '~,':.~ ;~\;:·:;,~~~~?:~:{:!iJitI··:~· .:,.
, This restriction would be comparatively easy to enforce- silice it would 'onIY<~:j:;,:t.f1~~lft;·;
,
','
'
.
.
'.
'!"
.
.
,"::
.
•
'. _ " ".' ,~. -.
~::.(
.' '." .'.::·:~,::·~'r~:~';·~·fr, .~. "
,'..
"
require tbat the broker for the seller of the se~uri ties in New York should' ~.:;> ::"
....• ,
I.,
certify that the beneficial owner is an American citizen.
have to be made in the case of maturing bond issues or ,bonds called for 'rede~p: ;':',,'
tion under Sinking FUnd arrangements.
5.
The maintenance of open markets for gold and securities in this
country has been discussed by indirection in the four sections above.
In my
view, it would create a maximum of disturbance to the American economy in the
event ofa European war.
No account has been taken in the foregoing discussion of the eventual
results of the suggested wartime financial policy for the United states ,since
the Wartime problem itself would be so serious and since the United states
would hardly find it possible to remain neutral in its sympathies in the next
European war even though it should manage to keep its armed forces at home.
Nevertheless, a word on the subject would not be 'inappropriate here.
Should
the United states embargo .imports of gold from belligerent countries and refuse
to buy gold earmarked for the account of their central banks;
lend dollars
under rigid exchange restrictions to neutral countries, and buy gold freely
only from neutral countries which in turn refuse 'to buy gold directly or in
directly from belligerent countries;
and simjlarly isolate security markets
in New York from the effect of sales of domestic securities by foreign
belligerent powers; - should the United states follow such a policy, large
problems would loom for our monetary authorities upon the close of an extensive
�.. --';': OFFICE CORRESPONDENCE'" ..(. ,
...~ 1~; ::'.
\;~"..;.' ..;
To
'Mr.
.' .'>.:;:.~:: ,::
_:-> .. :. , .
FROM,____=C~.~P~.-=C=n=dl==eb~e=r=ge~r_·____~--
,J.
.
10
~..
. ". ". .
Quotations.tordomest!c se,curities owned by ....,"'.
',
European war.
' .
.
.
'"
would have to be brought in line with the
~: ~.'
"
." .
~
.... ;",
'. l
;
~otations
~
':'
/;;:j;~:",~;~~,~..
'.
for the,
. ,.: :'. ,~";','" :".,',",:.,:- .:,~.;:::~::.:-:~';'~"'<~'~":;~~:>'.".:':~:~~,::\:~:J:d'~ ,
this market, With,the result of serioUsly- deF,essing
.
"'.,
, ,
marke~",
......
-,'
'
"
",
,'
·.... (.~UX".L
,
would have to be made available to previously belligerent coun-b.-i~·s·
.
'
. . . ' . '"
'.
them to 'buy American goods for the reconstruction of their
.
. "
to .....
", :.:;:'~;~~~"~'~'{:~.~~«~ft r~.
citi~s,
'.
,','
. -., "'.'.' ~.; ~ .::~ ~~,;. ~:~.:.::~:~[:",~:} ~;~." .; ;:t~i.·~·~:: '
,If' the United states bought gold freely- at such a time, 'the re~tB"wh.ich"
.. :. " "
.;' : '~.' :·~7~:i::.:~<: .~::;~ ~?~,!:::;~:,~..
Wt;1rtime policy- was intended to avoid would be quickly realized and this .'
.' .:.,
,
..":
next world war might include the reconstruction of the ~rld m~ne~ B~dard
on adif'ferent basis than gold, it would probab4find itself' forced for' .'
,
""..,
.
lnunani tarian reasons, to repeal the Johnson Act, make huge advances of dollars "
to Europe, pl8.ce the world on a dollar standard, and acquire a new indebtedness
,
.
as uncollectable as the war debts. The results of these loans on American ex
ports and the national income would be simUar to lmlimited purchases of gold:
they would involve the United' states in a period of high FQsperity which would
.,
"
result in little improvement in the standard of living of the United states or
.
'
.
. '" --c.
its capital equipment and leave this country with' inutile assets of gold or
..
claims on foreign treasuries •
Despite the pessimistic reSults foreseea,ble in the event of a EuropeaD.
.
"
war for, a neutral. United states, it might be hoped that strict neutrality- on the '
part of the United states and some, such monetary program as that outlined above
would aid in shortening the duration of the war by limiting the raw materials
available to belligerent countries.
224029
�F.F. 4432
Problem, 1,937
\
{.
=-::~:'::=~~~~~~~~
_"·_··_·__·-c-;:-c,·.,. ,-,-,
.--.'~-:;..- --~..
._~~
•.. ':._.
t_
.
.•.
-----_._---
_.'
.
~
..
.-.-.~
.'---"-~
-,,,-_.--:
~
..
-'.'
�,
.'
~ :_ :
.:
I
';
~"
'"\ , '
"
.
•
OFFICE. CORRESPONDENCE
Mr. Sproul
To
FROM'
;
.
'~"::"
.,'
."
',',::
: ....... ':' .. '
:.";r.~~.~~ .',':., ~"
";~:"';'.'_""':"'I'i"";',,-",
,tvu.I.c.u
towards the application of immediate remedies:to provide a' backgroUnd from'
the problem may be more
cle~IY
serious business unsettlemen:t.
"'~:
,
perceived and
':
"
' , '
,
',; ~ ,:
, .;
..
,,.
'
','
action~en ;ntb.'i~~~'·rlsk
r-.
There is as yet ino general' agr~eme~t conc~rriing
,
-
' , . !....
.
.,.', .:: '...::'.r,~'.',,.';"l:\,·':::'.:'
",' .: ... ' '.
,,! ";. ~ "
.
"'-;
"','
the best methods for meeting the: gold problem, dr eV61that it is sufficieiii1y'~""
"
deepseated to require special measures.
;
, .;:.
f
. , .
" .:
:"
.
:.::~ :',
' ':- " .: "
'.'
According to one view the situ«tion
",
~.'.
appears much blacker than it: really is:
.
:'"
throu~ a ,
cessation of private dis- ,,
.
,~,
.
i,
,", .
",
~.
"
.;.
'·,.··';t;
hoarding, a repatriation of French capital,. an eventual increase in, the gold:,;
.
.
" I
.'
'"
.
",
reserves of Germany, Italy, and the outlying, raw material producing countries,
,
end' a gradual but steady
will eventually take c:?re
for the best.
;
,
rfs~ in. the price level, the problem, it is 'argued,
or; itself,
and we shoUld therefore sit tight and hope
A growing number, however, believe that the facts of the present
situation cannot be so easily dismissed, and ha~e suggested a. variety of possible
remedies, including forced r~striction of gold production, an upward revaluation
of currenCies in terms of gold,8Ild establishm~t of a new gold standard und~r
which ,central b2D.ks would ce,ase to purchase bullion ,;in the open market
bUt .would
continue to use gold among themselves asa means for settling intel~ational pay~
I
I
'
,
ments, or a complete demoneti:zation of gold and; the substit:ution of an 'international
,
managed standard.
.
!
"
Tb.eattitude of the financial authorities in the various coun
tries is, unavoidably at the present stage, one: of perplexity, and it w()uld be
most unfortunate if hasty decisions were forced :upon them by the pr~~t)<11
.
�To
Mr. Sproul
,
I
the withholding tax on interest, dividends and other income received by non-resident
I
,
I
aliens. This should be p.one, not because . .bu;ring of American securities is a
foreign
.
I
.
serious problem currently, but in order to diminish the likelihood
a possible
resumption of the buying I movement.
.
of
�OFFICE, CORRESPO
,j
To
i
Mr. Sproul
..
..
,
financial, authorities of countries now engage.d
,
'.
.
,...
in
~.
.
'
, ' , ,j~,
.
"~ ,"
,
shifting their reserve,s fi:~~
, . ' ",
'
. ": '
"
i' :
\:,:.~
,~'Il;'
. " ' , :'
,I'
""
r
<
gOld into dollars would probably be the most effective method of halting these'
.
. '
,
.
-ion
.
,"'..
'.
operations with a minimum of publicity. ,Our objec-V to such operations' . .
should be
.
' .
based upon the gr01.md that ~ey are contrary to :the spirit of the TriparUte
Agreement, that they help
to: intenalf.y
th~ gene~al feeling of Uneasiness about
gold, arid that if the practi~e became widespread, our gold 'policy would have to
be reconsidered.
It should be made clear that we have no desire to interfere
,
.
.
~
with the maintenance of reasonable working' balances in this market by foreign
,
central bank,S.
,
Moreover, iri. order to make it less costly for foreign central
"
banks to use gold for current settlements with ,lis and consequently to diminish
the need for holding large working
ba1ance~
in dollars, it would be desirable
_.' .. _-;
~',
for the, Tr~asury to 'remove the 1/2" per cent spread between its buying and .selling
,
•
j
~
"
prices for gold, at least in transactions with the central banks and moneta:ry
224033
authorities of the Tripartit:e coUntries.
\
Regarding the Londpn, market, we have, Iittle information' concerning the
I
extent to which the central banks 'of non-sterling countries have shifted their
,
.
reserves from gold into sterling exchange •. It has been reported that, among :the
I
�;,CO'RRESPONDENCE
e"''"'''~'''' """\,''': \,.;:",.. . '
.>
•
• •
.'
'
'
,
, I.
Despres
" , - 4 --
.
,.~·-.~:i::~{~~1~~1
,sterling countries" the Dominion central banks have been asked·to convert -into" ":;".:: '
.:. ,:;:>~,~... .
"
.. '. .,', '."'~:.: )~~~-::.. '
.._gold' a portion of their London. balances, while Argentina has recently enterect :~:f'"
''''/~::~:~Y;:;,'~~:' ".;':
.
,...,
. . ' , ' . ' . , : . . . ' :',~<}t~~t;~Z:;::~':,.
".the ~ket as a purchaser o~ gold•. If the step recommended above~ ':thatofclis:::'4j'~~i7'
, .couraging the acClimulation of large dollar balances by foreign central ,bws,'-' :"
'.: .' . .
,
is ,put into effect, we should so ,inform the B~..of England or the British
Treasury in order that 'they may take. such similar measures as they think desir
able.
Step 3.
. '"
Remove the forces currently responsible for'the movement of privat,e
'funds into dollars and sterling.
The recent movement of private funds to New York and London has been
due
to a widespread feeling of uncertainty about gold and to persistent uneasi-'
"ness among the investing and business classes in France concerning domestic. poli t
ical and finanCial conditions.
The former factor - uncertainty about gold - has
.
caused, first, a marked acceleration of pri;ate dishoarding and, secondly, a heavy
speculative demand for dollars'" and perhaps some speculative demand for sterling,
against foreign currencies.· Since the dishoarding movement is now largely be
hind us, it is primarily the, second effect, namely, the flow of private funds
out of foreign currencies and into dollars, to which attention should be directed.
,~
These transfers ate taking place not merely because holders of foreigncurrenci~
,.
.
'.
are uneasy about gold, but, more particularly, because they anticipate
,
"
0
unilater~
, N
action.by the United States,: resulting in an appreciation of the dollar against
other c:rurrencies.
In order, words, the feeling of uncertainty about gold has impaired
confidence in the stability of the general structure of exchange relationships.'
This weakening of confidence: in exchange relationships could be repaired 'through
�OFFICE CORRESPONDENCE
.. ,
To
"'.:'
-
','
"
,
;>'
'"1'
Mr. Sproul
..SUBJ ECT_ _........>o<..-........................................._-'----'-;.........:.,...--:;~,.;;:;..;..;.__.
. ''I. ":Immediate ReJIiedies·
FROM _ _----,-E_._.D-=.e=.SP:::.;r=-·e::.;s=- _ _ _ _ _ _ __
a joint statement
5
-- .
-- -
--;-,,-).i~~~~;:~~,
bY the six governments participating in the Tripartite.arrange-.•.
• l'ents, containing the followmg points. _ . : : / , . ,',,;:..
_/:.;
.:~\1~0tij~!V-
1. 'In the opinion of these governments,no action with ":.,"
respect"'to gold is necessary at thistime.
.'
~;::,;::;:~t;~\"\F7;':'"
-::
:
2. These gove~rnments will conferrith e~~h other from
time to time with a view to determilling whether
.' .. ~.
'.,
'.
:', .
such action may be necessarY in the future.'
.~:
....
..
"
..
5. If action with respect to gold is later: deemed
desirable, a joint program will be developed in ,.
order that such· action may involve no· disturbance·
of international currency relationships and to
avoid serious interference with the' progress ·of ., ..... . .....
world recovery.
A joint declaration along these lines would involve no
to maintain fixed exchange
of gold.
p~rities
I
or to maintain indefinitely
co~tment
- .. ,....
either
thepresen~:st~tus
Its purpose would be merely to provide assurance that if action with
respect to gold becomes necessary in the future, such action will be taken multi
1ateral.l.y - rather than unilaterally, thus preventing any. abrupt .change
relationships.
~n.currency
The propose.:l, however, may be obj ected to on two gr{:>nnrls;
first,
that other countries might be reluctant to join in a declaration of this sort;
and, second, that such a declaration would,constitute_an official admission_.. that
,." .
a gold problem exists.
Regarding the first point, it is unlikely that the British
would refuse to participate.
They are doubUess eager to relieve the nerVousness
in British speculative markets which the gold rumors have aroused, and a joint
statement excluding the possibility of early action with respect to gold would surely
be considered helpful.
Moreover, in view of the Empire's position as the principal
gold producer, the British are naturally eager to have any readjustment which may
in the future be deemed necessary carried out in as orderly a fashion as possible.
..
224035··
�,
.".
",
n,
.
OFFICE CORRESPONDENCE
~: ,
: ::.,.' ~·.',,>l~1~1"~I,~·?_~·.:".~',:~:::·t"::
To
.', '<
~~,.:- ..:.,::
' ,".
'.~
.;:"
.'
Mr. Sproul
SUBJECT__~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
FROM __~E~.~~~e~s~p~re~s~__~____~_______
,-
1.
6
Immediate: '~Remedie';" ..~~~:.<t~~:
: ...
'~"., t~'::' ~~~~;:'.\'. ~.'
.".
'
.
."t:'~~, "
,t.~.~,~,.'
.
"
! ; ... : ....
,I,
•
If they rej ected our suggestion that they join in a statement. of ,the ..'s'?rt ~~.r:~.."£;,~,,
..,.
. proposed, O'lll" obligation to consult with them before taking measures' aJ'fecting'··':;~~·, .
.'. '" ."~ . . .
.'.
.,-';~~:.::,;:;;: :?f :;' ,\;:"::~{~;';;~i;;\'
gold wenild be grea:-Uy weakened, and the chances of' orderly rea:djustmeiltcorres7~":'>:i'~::'
.
.
pondingly reduced.
......
It is hard to believe that they would be Willihg to, :run this
•
•
'.
.'
'. . . . . : . ,
. '1,',,;
¥,',
With the United states and Great Britain' in accord'regarding this proposed
risk.
:.,"
step~
'
. ::~,
:.,. ....: .
would;~
it is strongly improbable that the remaining Tripartite countries
withhoid their consent.
.
,
, Regarding the second obj ection, that' a joint declaration along the lines
"
here suggested would constitute an officialadmlssion of the existence ofa gold
problem, it is difficult to see what'. disadvantl.3.ges such
an
admission'would involve.
Three months ago it would have been possible to argue that private· dishoarding of
gold wOuld be greatly hastened in consequence, but with the bulk of the dishoarding
now behind us, we no longer have much to fear on this score.
.
.
.
Similarly, it might
'
until recently have beEm contended that gold production would be accelerated through
a concerted effort on the part of mining enterprises to turn their ore reserves
into cash in the Shortest possible time.
This argument no longer has much force,
since the declarations of South African officials and the recent speeches by' chair
.men of goldmining
companie~at
annual stockhold 7rs f meetings have left little room
to doubt that those responsible for conducting mining enterprises are fully aware
,
,
of the dangers inherent in present conditions. ,The rumors about go~d have already
taken hqld to such an extent that an
officia~
declaration by the principal govern
ments acknowledging the existence of a gold problem would no longer have adverse
effects, and the accompanying statement that early action is not contemplated would
be definitely reassuring.
224036
�. 'OF NEW YORK
'OFFICE, CORRESPONDENCE
I
.
To
Mr. Sproul
FROM _ _.=E..:.......;D~e so;;&,!pl-"'rue::u;s"- _ _ _ _ _ _ __
• .....
I.
7
·The second major cause of the movem~t of pri~~te
.
,
.
'
'
the period since the downward
.
' , . . . '
.
,'.
~"~
reva1~ation ,of 'the· franc 'la~t Sept~n;be; 'th~:ru~t,
" . . .' -', .. ..', "':' ..~(?~~~~>~~~,. .
,~
of French capital has continued in large volume, although at a spmewhat slower ::L.
,
. '
rate than in the previous eighteen months.
.
;'-
,',
,.. "
'."'' ,,
.;,:~r<~J:/::~
to· tb~":"~d: .
..
·Fro~. the 'end 'of MUCh 19'35
'
:"'.'
..
. •
.
I
,':.'
'
-
"'~""'. :~ h~:.~~~:~~7,'~:·;:.~
"
of Septl3mber 1936 the gold reserves of the B,ank: of France declined $2,157,000,000;
:
1'.
;:.,
since last September French official gold holdings have sh~wn·a ri.trtll(~r)'~ciine' ..:..,
.: ;'.
of approxi1!l.ately $500,000,000, but a portion of this loss has ·been
• • ,,.' ' I
'attri~ta~i'~"
to 1:.he recent heavy deficit in France's balance of current payments andrec'~ipts~
and only the remainder has been due to continued night of capital.
An ex.:unination of' the figures for note, circulation and savings deposits
in Fr~ceindicates that the,export of capital has been largely confined
,
to
the
relatively well-to-do classes, and that, the small savers, by and large, have been
conte.nt to keep their funds at home either in the form of banknotes or of savings
deposits.
Since
co~~ercia1deposits
have been drawn down virtually to a Working
minil!IU!ll, and since the market for rentes ,~~ very narrow even at the· low: quo'tations .
now prevailing, the existL~g amount of cash res~rvesand of resources convertible
into, cash which are availabie for capital export is extremely limited,'uniess ' .•.
s!JIall·" savers either join !!lore extimsively in th:e export movement or' a'how gre~ ter
readiness to relieve the well-to-do classes of their holdings· of rente~ than'thei"':
M
"
have so far displayed.
If this were the whole story the prospects of 8Jl·early ~.
cessation. of capita.l export would be, quite good.
C\l
Account must be. taken, howeverC\1
0f the steady stream of new money being poured into the French economy through
,
�OF NEW YORK
~;
1 '.
, ;i;:::>"::::i';S':::;i")::>FF..19~,' C()RRESPONDENCE
"
,
•
,.i,.
To,__~Ir='~.~Sp~ro~ul~____~__~____~___
FROM~___
".E_.~D~e~~~~es~
______~_____
I.
8
public expenditures.
~
.,.
'~f~:::\;,':;'
A portion of these fonds is f1nally utilized to pay for
I
'add!tiona! raw material imports required by the armament program,'
"
';;;r.ir~"";;,3~~i
.•.
~i' ~:r' ,tli~::~,.'. ,·;· (~Y
•
:.
. ; . . ' " ·:. :~:~/:·~7~:r::::.~:)ti~,:' -~
remainder a considerable part .finds its way into the hands of the capital ei...·, '. "
.
.
.
.'.
~..'.~
-
,
porting groups, thus providing the ~asis for a: further outfiow of' fonds. '
',
"'1">' .~. "
",' "
.
:
'~'.
....
', •
....
;".,~,:'.
'
The basic obstacle to an improvement in the French position is . that the
.
,
~
-,
.; "
present Lett government, while retajnjng its strong popular support,is:trlghten
ing to the well-to-do cl~sses.
These groups, tearing either a fUrther depi.~,
ciation ot the franc or the imposition of excW1lige restrictions, are c~ntinuing
'to transfer' their resources abroad as rapidly as they are able to' turn th~mhtio
caSh, while public expen~ tures are making a steady stream of new cash a-va.:u.able
,for this purpose •. By keeping interest rates high and by minimizing the effecti veness of public spending in generating increased bUsiness activity, this ex
.port ot capital seriously obstructs economic recovery and the restoration of
budgeta.r7 equilibrium.
Moreover, it results ina further depletion of French
gold reserves and increases the amount of gold which the countries already sur-,
feited are called upon to absorb.
It is possible, ot course, to overestimate the permanency of these
,
difficulties, since in the long run they may:
aid.
will
be surmounted without outside
The underlying forces of recovery TJJB:3' eventua1l.y be surficient.l:y strong
to overcome present psychological obstacles and to generate a return fiow ot
capital for investment within France; or, alternatively, if recovery does not
make substantial progress" the Left government TJJB:3'
fin~
lose popular support
and give way to a government more acceptable to the business and investing classes.
Since quick improvement appears strongly impropable, however, tmlees outside
'
�....
,
'
OFFICE. CORRESPONDENCE
Mr. Sproul
.To
FROM ____~E~,~~.~D~e~~~r~e~sL-------~-----
-
'. !.
9
,.<
assistance is forthcoming,it is suggested,
divert the moVement of gold away tram'those ootmtries·WhiCh are~ead.y
.
'
'..
..' .
' : : " . : ' , '. " '
':<'~:~"~':~ .:' ;':~
",<
~'~!':~~~~~;.~"!,~;'.~, ::'.:~~:·;L:3~:;:~t~:.: ~.:~.\<'>:/(::~j~~~;~('~~'1t,:·~~-. '.""
:{".
.feited, that the United states and British' Treasaries should' jointly announce,'
~'t~i'~'; ,w'""} ;.
,
\ their intention to use the' resources of their stabilizaUon<"funds'tothe
.
,,:"';::}?,~'~i}';~~';:
' . ' , ' : ' . ;','. ." ,:':
t,
extent necessary f'or' preventing a further depreciation of' f'ioanc' exchange.', This
.
'. . .
,.' ; '.' : ..,' . ,:,':." ',,:
':
,.t1i.Y:.":,:~,j;;;' :~'I;;~;::':;::~t,Y. ~
,;q,~'~(r per
, step iDight perhaps be preceded by a' further de:ruuation ~f' the fr~cA
.
' :
,,
.'1
.
'.','
,,'
:
,;! '::::~;:·jA~::::r·U,. ' ,
'i,,'
.
"
"
iveness of' th.e proposed action.
.~
!
,
,
"i
totbe'. eff'ect::-.'. T.'
..,:.
cent, although such devalUEltion probably would, not be essential
. . :.'
I .' , '
.
.
"
,".
"'c. •, ' ,
. ......
Un!ted .States and British" ~eaSUr.i.es
i
':' , ..
'
," i:'~':'
. An. announcement of' this sort by the
': '
~
.
!"
would almost unquestionably begin the repatriation of' the $2,500,000,000 of'... French
,
' ;
.,,'
capital which has been transf'erred abroad durihg recent' years. . The' tide~'f' capital
'
movements would doubtless
~e
so promptly
I
.
rever~ed
'~.'"
that the American and 'B;itish
1 "
,
,
"
:
",
Funds, in the beginning atileast, .would f'ind it unnecessary'to undertake actual
I
supporting operations.
A large open short position in FrenCh f'rancs is now' being
I
I
•
'
.
,maintained at considerable cost to speculators, and the covering of' these positions
would provide all the sup~rt which the franc would in!tia.lly' require.
'
I
Looking
-
,
I
f'arther shead, this movement of' f'tmds would probably be reinf'orced by a more
,
"
'
sustained return !'low of' French capital., Most of' this capital is ear.n.ing little.
I
or :t;lo return in .the markets in which it has ~tlgb.t refuge, and if' stability-of'
,::::;')
0")
o
the franc became def'initely assured, these resources should be quickly: brouftht '''''d' '
N.
home to take advantage of'tbe abnormally high :returns pre~ing in French
i
vestment markets.
.
.
.
In-
N
'
Since the amount of' French Icapital abroad is ro~ equivalent
,
to two years' production of' gold, it is clear !that once a vigorous repatriation
.
.
"
I
.
'
,
.. movement got underway the' countriessurf'eited with gold wood be largely relieved
of' the burden of' absorbing new supplies.
�.....' ...~.IO
,
.'
,
.
',' .,' str11d.:ng v.i.D:dicationcf the Popular Front foreign polley.
.
.
.
,
,
,
,
.
.
The
"-AjQ1".l'l,"-ft't:1
I
.
"
~
-
.'
..
,
.
.
"
prosperity and the subsidence of internalpolitlcal turbulence ill.
,
",'
' .
-"i~'"'
•
" .
,
. '
:
-
"",'
"
.-..,
,,,,,·,:~~"~~~f~·)~~~:~~;;,:;~'~,~"i>:,>;.~;.~~~,",.,':.:;:;.
,particularly at a time when. the deterioration of the European poli ti~al fabric
,\
"
.........:
.
....
.'.
.
\/~~:". .
.'
:..~:';:.~.~.,,).~:";;:.:::...:;
seems to :IDS.DT to be approaching the danger poitit, would surely be welcomed' by' " ,..
>:
<',
•
' ;
.
:
' .... :"';:,., .• ' .• .:.:'"
•• ; : . ' . : - . ; . :
the British, and United states governments, and :British and American action" de- .. :
signed to assist this result· would demonstrate impressivel,. the ultimate' solidarity
'of the democratic countries~
.
'
.
The adoption of the step here proposed would be oriticised .by . some on
I
the ground that the
assuran~e
of e.xchange rate :stabillt;r will not be .sufficient
. to. bring about a rapid and 'substantial repatriation of French capital so long as'
a Lett government remains in power, and that a ,commitment to support the franc
'
.
'
,
I.
'
.'
at any levelllOuld therefore be both dangerous :and fIltile under present conditions.
.
I
~
"
"
•,','
',' ,r,
llth~Ugb. these risks cannot be entirely dismissed, this view is, in J'Jt:f judgment,'
. much too pessimistic. The 9.angers involved in 'permitting the present currents
.
'.
of gold movements to persis:t are much more· ser~ous than the risks which we and
~:d
o
"~
'0
"~
,;
'C\l
C\l.
the British would assume in making a commitment to support the traDc.
.
,
Both here and in Great Britain the proposal to form a rescue party for
'
:
,
1
,
.
�, :: ':, /~;'~' \ ' >,,;~ " ",~;:", ','
,:
~,':"
.~
.
"\,',' "
"'.~',' ~::
: ',: .
'" .OFFICE CORRESPONDENCE'
"'.' ··'i.:;.:~··-"··:~~";7;:'~,
To 'Mr.
:;~;.f:'~"'J:;'>:,~.:;;.~:.;,,,:<}:;"\~)(~~~'::',: . '!':~'.. :~i l:\?",::';,'!.·
Sproul
'j
'~E~.~,De~~~re~s__~______~____
, FROM, __
" ~',ll'-':
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
the French f'ranc would doubtle~s be subject· to a
"",J.t.0<&.1.I.1lJ•
.L'lI,".L1lJ ..."'g."'......
, ".......;.
ar~ed that~' eommi tment ,p.y' 'the '
:
. . . ".
, " . ',. p .·t· . . ". ·.~;·~:>i: :~:>'-~, ··::~\~:-~~:~:!~~~:~l~~:!(:."~~~r"·~:q·"'_~·::; ~ . .
,Ftmd to purchase £'rancs f'Ul.£illed the P'md!;1'- s~ted purpose,~t, detending , '
"
,
,".:,'
, , ; ..... ,':'?:::.;;;;:'., "',, ':, !~:);;i~!t~~;*~;~{~7:l;;~t:,f:·':·. .' .
dollar, it it defended the ,dollar only trom gold. In cOi1S8rvative British
"
:
;.' ',.. ,'/ , :',,,,;,:J~i~~;':~ ,:;~·t,~:.::< :.r~, : '
circles this propC)sal would perhaps produce' a rather sharp, '~ea~ge ot Vj,I..o.u...'u",.
-;>- :-::, ' ..' .:',' ~ :~,
One group would doubtless hold that it would, be both tutUe and dangerouS to'
'.
.
".
.
" . , ':*."'1: ,,', .·.~;,\·)';·::~·.;M·
:' ,;::. ;.' ":':::"'~';~".'
try to save the franc while a Lett government remains in Power. :lrIoreover, 'the· ,
quarter, it could be trtlthf'ul:q
•
'<
'.
"~~ ~
.
. ' \'.
'..' '7
.
;~.'·~.~r>",
'. :
general question ot toreign policy- would be inwlved,since an important section, :':1' .
.
.
.
.'.
.....
"
'.
~
..
.
.
-.~
.,'
~~
ot conservative British opinion, viewing Englimdl s role ,in European Sffairs ,as
~t of .' : mediator between France and Ger:ma.ny, is reluctant to take any, step " ,;: ,
),;:<: .;\
which smacks even slightly.of an alignment
.
amoJ;lg
the principal democracies.
Al though the division of opinion wi thin official circles on these
,
be too marked to permit a
d~ te
qu.esti~ns
.
;'.
7!.lIq
decision by the British government to take
the initiative in providing fina:ilcial aid to France, there is a ta.:ir chaDcethat
, an affirmative re~nse would be given by the British.,it 'we assu.m8d the initia4ve
in proposing such action.
The Longer Term Problem
The program proposed in this memorandum. is not designed to meet the
~onger'
term gold problem. 'Its aim is the much, simpler one of providing a
breathing ~ellduring whiCh a clearer p~rspective on the long range problem
7!.lIq
be obtained and a joint policy- formulated. ' This aim, it has been suggested,
may be, achieved by means of the following measares:
224041
,
�.' . ~
~
"
(a) a' state~t by th~ 'Sb:~'g;,vermnent~' ,',
icipating in the Tripartite arrangements , ,
'. ", ,_, . !
, to the ef'f'ect that, 1£ action with respect >~,:;",.'~::::;.. ;:,,-:}~~;::""
to gold is d.eemed necessar,r in the~~Ure, ';:";:c'~:,t ," :;. , .' ,
a joint program will be developed' in 'Or<Ier' .::, , , ,
,that such action ~ involve no disturbance "",'
of' international ~ency relationShips, and '-<"
. .
I '
"',
''', ';1
.: 7
'<
(b) a pledge ~ the United States and BritiSh, ,(
Treasuries to uSe the resources o'f'their"
'
stabilization f'tm.ds to maintain the stabillty'
of' the French f'ranc.
' ,
'
"
'
"
The effect of' the:se measures, it is believed, would be to alter the
currents of' gold movements.
theburd~n
It would relieve the United States and' England ,of'
of' absorbing and sterilizing the large 'quantities of' gold which the
international flow of' ftmdsis now f'orcing upon
them;
,
,
and it would enable Fran,ce
2
""
.'
::~:"'.
to enter the bullion' market as the principaI taker of' the new supplies coJJliDgf'rom
,
the mines.
.
''\'
.
This process, however, could not contiuueindef'initely', since ,the 'r~
patriation of' French capital must come to
an~d
sooner or later.
Moreover, in the
event of' a heav,r return of f'tm.ds, which, would doubtless be accompanied by an ,in-' '
creased inclination to invest on the part of' the small savers who are' now holding
their resources :tdle iii the f'orm of' banknotes, France, atter recovery WIlS
well '
lDlder wq, would soon be f'aced with the same dif'ficult problem of' a redlDJ.dancy of
gold as that which the United States and Great Britain are now
experienCing~ 24 0 42
�FFICE ·.CORRESPONDENC
. ;,:~:~,:~~~.-;~".: 3;;';i!:';;'f~~(~~~::~'~~~'S~;/7~.i: ,:' ~'~i~f
.;' ....:To " Mr. ·8.proul
" .' . ".
'FR~~
','
",
,I. ri~~~es" .
,... ,;. :,
. I·
1
•
,
,;
. ' . " , . It is at this stage tbatthe J..OD.rzer
.
.
, ;:',.' 'it~~f~"
'.
: '.... ~.
'1"'"
-
'
,
.'
,
"c.. ;.
.'
" ...
. ' ; ' , :{:;r;(}~~'r.'~1:t::·i~i',i'~";tt;.:;;.¥,.ijZ~
'Will', the' ,mpre~~~~ and . ">.....,~...
'
'1i:I~.l.Ug
,.w.,z, """" .....
'. -, "..
"', .~ "., "\.,,,'. "
•
~~
n·. _
!
"
:';
market in those countries mose present
..
•
"j
...
IIltJl.la.lu..L...
~:. ::'<':."
,t
'"
res.~"re8
\~~'~C:/":~":}'\:' ~~~;;':~:' ~:,"
c10ntinue to be pressed upon the countries burdened by
:.1..'
A good deal
..
'.'" ':
". ,~"'''''''',;JN~''''''''
~'%'eClutl,C1alo.cy
.
depen~s upon'whether w~ are. ~~~1ng
----.
',. "
. . ~,_... .,.:'.:. :'Tr~~.z'.:·~·~:". ,~~.~::;:.~~.,,?'"
about gold which will subside sooner or later,or",ra
~
,
.'.
:,'
.',~<~" ;l~: "~', ~,
<T:._...:~;. \~.:~ ;.~:,~.):r?~"",,
JI',"",,'
",,;,:-w~.jl;r1;1;,4;t:"':··'
",,-y~,~,~;J.?'";~Jjl~\f~!,t(:,.;~;:i:~l~~;~~';;,
the ~tti tude of financial authorities generally' re~~d1lu;!
.'"
that, historical.ly, the major countries and the important
':
.' .'
~:'.
finrui~ai'
""
.: -" " ,:-;, \'/ ;:~~:'_/-~'~ . ~~_;~,;~l;·f,,~~~}~,,:,~~,~\,;,/~~,~-;.\> .
have invariably' held the bulk of the world's metallic reserves, whUe, the
,
.'
,"
. .:
,',", ,:':.',:', ':':0,: ";:,,';':;;Y>f;::f-5f~i~i:;'·,·
and finanCially' less important countries haVe preferred' to hold a major portion' "'''!~'~''
Q,WO.J..I,.I:J.I,'
\
'
"
.'
or their reserves in the rorm of foreign exchange.
'.
'
. . ", ,':
This question, and the methods of ,dealing in a f'un.damental. fashion
with the problem created by the redundanq-of gold cannot conveniently' be cc.n'.:- .
sidered within the scope or this memorandum. They will be dealt with in a sub
sequent study.
"
,~",
�1
1
\
.
'
,
1
I
1
1
,
.
i.
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
.
1
1
.
1
1
1
1
1
, I
.
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
I
�Ill.
8llZ'11l~l"Y of Gold SterU.i~tioll Operation£ by the
.Un1 ted
f!t~te8
,.
\
224044
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets in the United States, formed in 1998, was charged with investigating what happened to the assets of victims of the Holocaust that ended up in the possession of the United States Federal government. The final report of the Commission, <a href="http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/pcha/PlunderRestitution.html/html/Home_Contents.html"> “Plunder and Restitution: Findings and Recommendations of the Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets in the United States and Staff Report"</a> was submitted to President Clinton in December 2000.</p>
<p>Chairman - Edgar Bronfman<br /> Executive Director - Kenneth Klothen</p>
<p>The collection consists of 19 series. The first fifteen series of the collection are composed mostly of photocopied federal records. These records were reproduced at the National Archives and Records Administration by commission members for their research. The records relate to Holocaust assets created between the mid 1930’s and early 1950’s by a variety of U. S. Government agencies and foreign sources.</p>
<p>Subseries:<br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Art+and+Cultural+Property+">Art and Cultural Property</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Gold+">Gold</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Gold+Team+Review+Form+Binders+">Gold Team Review Form Binders</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Art+and+Cultural+Property+and+%E2%80%9COthers%E2%80%9D+Review+Form+Binders">Art and Cultural Property and “Others” Review Form Binders</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Non-Gold+Financial+Assets+Review+Form+Binders">Non-Gold Financial Assets Review Form Binders</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=History+Associates+Binder+">History Associates Binder</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Non-Gold+Financial+Assets+Review+Form+Binders+%282%29">Non-Gold Financial Assets Review Form Binders (2)</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Financial+Assets+Documents">Financial Assets Documents</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=RG+84%2C+Foreign+Service+Posts+of+the+State+Department%E2%80%94Turkey">RG 84, Foreign Service Posts of the State Department—Turkey</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Financial+Assets+Documents">Financial Assets Documents</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?search=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=%5BJewish+Restitution+Successor+Organization+%28JRSO%29%2C+Oral+Histories%5D&range=&collection=20&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&submit_search=Search+for+items">[Jewish Restitution Successor Organization (JRSO), Oral Histories]</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=PCHA+Secondary+Sources">PCHA Secondary Sources</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Researcher+Notes">Researcher Notes</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Unnumbered+Documents+from+Archives+II+and+Various+Notes">Unnumbered Documents from Archives II and Various Notes</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=RG+260%2C+Finance+Inventory+Forms">RG 260, Finance Inventory Forms</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Reparations">Reparations</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Chase+National+Bank">Chase National Bank</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Administrative+Files">Administrative Files</a><br /><a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=is+exactly&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=Art+%26+Cultural+Property+Theft">Art & Cultural Property Theft</a></p>
<p>Topics covered by these records include the recovery of confiscated art and cultural property; the reparation of gold and other financial assets; and the investigation of events surrounding capture of the Hungarian Gold Train at the close of World War II. These files contain memoranda, correspondence, inventories, reports, and secondary source material related to the final disposition of art and cultural property, gold, and other financial assets confiscated during the Holocaust.</p>
<p>For more information concerning this collection consult the<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/35992"> finding aid</a>.</p>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/35992" target="_blank">Collection Finding Aid</a>
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/1040718" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Extent
The size or duration of the resource.
2954 folders
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Master Set, Folder 47 223882-224044 [1]
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets in the United States
Gold
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Box 46
<a href="http://clintonlibrary.gov/assets/Documents/Finding-Aids/Systematic/Holocaust-Assets.pdf" target="_blank">Collection Finding Aid</a>
<a href="http://catalog.archives.gov/description/902534" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reproduction-Reference
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
5/29/2012
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
902534-master-set-folder-47-223882-224044-1
902534