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Clinton PresidentialI Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
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This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Pre~idential Library Staff.
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The document from this Mandatory DeJlassification Review was
released in part[
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The document released with redactions has been restricted under
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Sections 1.4 (c) and (g) ofE.O. 13526.
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON f
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Ma¥ 22, 1998
PRES.IDENTIAL DEC IS ION DIRECTIVE/NSC:-62
Declassified Under the
Authority of the Interagency
Security Classification Appeals Panel,
.E.O. 13526, section 5.3 (b) (3)
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-003, No. 1
Declassification Date: Match 18, 2014
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
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ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
DIRECTOR, OFFICE. OF MAN~GEMENT AND BUDGET
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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
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·DIRECTOR, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
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ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
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ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY'
DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES jiNFORMATION AGENCY
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
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DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
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SUBJECT:
Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the
Homeland and Americans Overs·~as (U}
In 1995, I reaffirmed and elaborated udited States counterterrorism pol y in PDD-39. That polidy directive rem~ins
valid. (U}
Because of our military superiority, potential enemies, be they
nations, terrorist groups, or ~riminal jorganizationsj are
increasingly likely to attack us in unGonventional ways.
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Adversaries will be tempted to exploit/vulnerabilities in our
critical infrastructure, impede continuity of government
operations, use weapons of. mass
struJtion against civilians in
our cities, disrupt our transportati~njsystems, attack us when
we gather as a conununity at special events, and prey on our
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citizens overseas. (U)
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As this c
ter of threats matures in the coming century, I am
determined that we will be prepared to ~eter them, prevent them,
or, if necessary, limit the damage theyJcan inflict. Success
requires that we recognize t_he common nfl.ture of these threats,
the need for an integrated ~esponse, an~, in the case of
critical infrastructure protection, the importance of a publicprivate partnership. (U)
Successes and Remaining Challenges (U)
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Current policy has led to substantial shccess:
an increased rate of renditionsl apprehensions and
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convictions of terrorists;
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-- a significant expansion of counterterron.sm legislative
authorities;
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-~ a large increase in counterterrbrism funding with
consequent improvement in capabilities kt FAA, FBI, and CIA;
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-- 1mpor t an t progress 1n coun t er t error1sm p ann1ng,
particularly in the areas of consequenc~ management (FEMA, EPA
and PHS) and WMD preparedness;.
-- elevating the place of terrorism as an important item on
the diplomatic agenda~ especially as it! affects other countries'·
relations with Iran, Libya, and Sudan; I
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improved anti-terrorism force protection within DOD;
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expansion of assistance to~ andicooperation with, other
democracies threatened by terrorism, including Israel; and
-- routinizing the management of clunterterrorism through
PDD-39 and the creation of a professionkl, trained and
coordinated interagency cadre. (U)
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Yet the threats posed by potential adveksaries in the twentyfirst century are changing, in nature afd scope:
-- States and state-sponsored groups, knowing that they
cannot defeat us in a conventional mili~ary confrontation, may
seek to engage in asymmetrical assaults! on our vulnerabiliti-es
at home and abroad through terrorism, u~e of weapons of mass
destruction and cyber warfare.
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~em6nstrated
-- The attack on the Tokyo subway
that
terrorists seek and have used weapons o~ mass destruction
(chemical, biological, or radio-logical ~evices) to increase the
destructiveness of their act,s.
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-- Civil defense and continuity of[ gove~nment programs
developed during the Cold War have been! largely dismantled
or downsized.
Few American cities are·prepared to deal with an
incident involving weapons of mass destruction, or even largescale conventional attacks such as the World Trade Center or
Oklahoma City bombings.
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-- Advances in encryption technology threaten the ability
of law enforcement agencies to detect ~bd prevent terrorist
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acts.
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-- our critical infrastructure is becoming more reliant
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upon information and computer-based technologies that are
vulnerable to covert. attack by terroris~s ot other hostile
groups. (U)
Meanwhile, the bombings of U.S. militar1y facilities in Saudi
Arabia and the murders in Karachi remin1d us that Americans
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remain the target of capable terrorists; and signal the urgent
need to reduce our vulnerabilities to s uch "tiaditional"
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threats. (U)
Program Objectives and Responsibilities (U)
To address these chan~es in the contin~ing danger from
unconventional"threats, I hereby dir~c~ an integrated program to
increase our effectiveness in counteri~g these threats and to
prepare to manage the consequences 6f ~ttacks against U.S.
citizens or infrastructur~. All of th~se progra~s will be
carried out in full compliance with app1licable law and existing
procedures governing the activities of the agencies
involved. (U)
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Lead Agencies responsibie for programs supporting our security
and counter-terrorism policy should designate a .senior Program
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Coordinator who will be responsible fo~ coordinating these
programs within the U.S. Government, add identifying goals and
milestones. (U)
Apprehension, Extradition, Rendit,'i'on and Prosecution:
Foreign terrorists who violate U.S. la~s will be apprehended-and
tried, no matter where they hide and nd matter how long it
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takes. The Justice Department is the lead agency for this
program. In pursuing extradition and tendition, the Justice
Department will act in coordination wi~h the State
Department. (U)
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-- Other departments will make asJistance to these Justice
Department efforts a top priority and Jill budget and structure
priorities accordingly. The Intelligedce Community will
maintain collection and capabilities td support ·apprehensions.
The Defense Department will, if requested, provide
nonreimbursable transportation in suppdrt of renditions to the
extent permitted by law. The State De~artment will ensure that
at the top of our bilateral agenda witn other governments,
especially those that harboF terrorist~, is action against those
that threaten or have attacked U.S. interests and cooperation on
apprehension, prosecution, extradi tion 1 1 or rendition. ~
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-- The Justice Department will idJntify the highest
priority pending foreign terrorist apprlehensions and the FBI
in coordination with CIA and the State Department will develop
plans for their rendition. ~
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2.
ion: Foreign terrorists
pose a credible threat
to
Pn ted States and its citizens will be subject to
preemption and disruption abroad, consilstent with U.s. laws.
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CIA is the lead agency for this progra~. ~
-- Disruption program plans and sp;ecific actions will be
developed and coordinated for interagenpy approval in accordance
with existing procedures.~
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-- Other departments with relevant\ capabilities (such as
Treasury on financirtg) will contribute expertise and assets to
this program. ~
3. International Cooperation: The goa[ of zero tolerance for
international terrorism will guide bilateral and multilateral
efforts to elimihate sa~ctuaries, penal~ze
s that sponsor
terrorism, and assist friendly states v~ctimized .by terrorism.
The State Department is the lead agency[ for this program, which
will combine the following elements:
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-- Support for e
s to obtain the extradition or other
rendition of indicted terrorists. Al) ~rograms and activities
conducted abroad will be implemented inj full compliance with
existing Chief of Mission authorities. ,
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-- Adoption and implementation of fhe eleven major
international conventions on t~rrorism rill be a major foreign
policy priority.~·
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The State Department shall be responsible for coordinating with
relevant agencies all assistance relate~ to international
terrorism. The State Department shall klso maintain, in
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coordination with the Interagency Intelligence Committee on
Terrorism (IICT) and the Office 6f Scie~ce and Technology Policy·
through the National Science and Technology Council, a robust
international research, development, an~ procurement effort for
counter..:.terrorism technologies. ~
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4. Prevertting
Acquisition ofj Weapons of Mass
Destruction: To reflect the importance! of efforts to prevent
terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD), I
reiterate PODs 39 and 41, which require~
-- The U.S. Government will work through interagency
efforts with other nations to reduce orl eliminate WMD; to
safeguard such weapons, their components, and precursors; to
prevent further WMD proliferation and tb ensure that such
weapons, their components and k.ey precutsors, do not come into
the possession of terrorists. We will kaintain a robust
capability to respond to crisis situatibns involving the threat
or use of WMD by terrorists. With NSC boordination, State, DOD,
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DOE, Treasury, Commerce, HHS, FBI, and ~IA will continue to
direct components of this overall effort and to provide the
necessary programmatic support. I reit~rate the importance of
ensuring support to HHS and DOJ and othkr agencies, to implement
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and enforce safeguards and procedures to assure that se 1 ect
infectious agents and to~ins are acquir~d, stored, transferred,
or used only for legitimate scientific purposes and not for
other non-approved purposes nor by terrprists as WMD. ~
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5. Consequence Management for T~rrorist Incidents: If, despite
our efforts, a terrorist incident occurs in the United States,
the Federal Government will respond rapkdly, working with stite
and local governments, to restore order!
deliver emergency
assistance. The Department of Justice, acting through the FBI,
will be the lead agency for operational! response to a weapon. of
mass destruction incident. FEMA is responsible .for preparing ·
for or responding to the consequences 9:f a WMD incident, w.ith
participation by PHS· (health/medical l, EPA (hazmat/
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environmental) and DOE (radiological), ~s necessary. When the
Attorney General, acting on the advice bf the Director, FBI, and
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in coordination with the Director, FEMAI, determines that the
incident or threat of an incident has s~bsided, _lead agency
responsibility may be transferred to FEMA. (U)
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For consequence management of terroristj.incidents outside of the
United States, initial . U.S. efforts will. be coordinated. through
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the Foreign Emergency Support Team (FES!T) · led by the State
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Department, and with its Consequence Mapagement Response Team
(CMR T ) . (u)
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Our domestic goal is to build a capability in 120 major cities ·
for first responders to be able to deal! with incidents involving
weapons of mass destruction by 2002. Toward th~t end, several
departments will participate in a coord~rrated program in
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conjunction with local and state respon;se authorities. 'K:..l
-- DOD, in coordination with -the nbJ/FBI, FEMA, PHS, DOE,
and EPA, will provide training to metrobolitan emergency
responders and will maintain military upits (active and reserve
components) to serve as augmentation fo:rces for weapons of mass
destruction consequence management and ~o help maintain
proficiency of local emergency respondeil:"s through training. "t'Sl.
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-- DOE will plan for and provide etnergency responder
training for nuclear, radiological incil:ients; EPA will plan for
and provide emergency responder traininb for hazardous materials
and
e::i:::m::::~ ::::d::t:~e:ad agel to plan and to prepare
for a national response to medical emerbencies arising from the
terrorist use of weapons of mc:1ss destrul:tion. HHS, with the
support of other Federal agencies, willj provide enhanced local
response capabilities through the develppment of Metropolitan
Medical Strike Teams· systElJ:fi.s; will deve~op and maintain the
National Disaster· Medical System (NDMS) 1, including the National
Medical Response Teams; will w_ork with bon to ensure
deployability of NDMS response teams, shpplies and equipment;
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and, ~orking with the Department 9f Veterans
rs 1 ensure
adequate stockpiles of antidote and othbr necessary
pharmaceuticals nationwide and the traihing of medical personnel
in NDMS hospitals. (U)
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DOJ, in coordination with DOD, FEMA, EPA, and DOE, ·will
provide personal protective equipmenh~· • ~etection and diagnostic
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instruments, on a selective basis, to State and local law
en-forcement agencies. ~
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Coordination of this overall effort will be effected through an
interagency WMD Protection Group. (U) 1
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6. Transportation Securi tz,i. I accepteld and expect the full
implementation of the recommendations elf the White House.
Commission on Aviation Safety and Secur1i ty, The Department of
Transportation is the lead agency for t1his program. (U)
-- Funding for the timely implemenltation of the White House
Commission on Aviation Safety and Securlity recommendations will
be reflected in Administration budget r 1equests. (U)
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-- As technology advances and the ~hreat evolves, DOT will
ensure that our technologies and proced;ures keep pace. Toward
that end, the DOT will coordinate, in cboperation with NSTC, an
interagency research and development prbgram on transportation
security. With respect to aviation secrrity, DOT will
periodically review whether additional measures beyond those in
the Commission Report are required. Asj a first step,. the FAA
will develop and implement a more rigoreus system for air cargo
inspection, to include use of private v~ri cation and
inspection firms. Parallel measures wi~l be researched,
developed, and deployed to improve the 1
security of ground and
maritime transportation. ~
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-- In addition, the Department of fransportation is
responsible for dissemination of aviatifn security information,
in coordination with State, as appropriate. (UJ
7. Protection of Critical Infrastructulre and Cyber Systems:
We will ciinimize the risk from attacks bn our critical
infrastructure and cyber systems, whethbr the attackers are
nations, groups, or individu~l~. We wi~l also be prepared to
deal with the consequence§ of such atta~ks. (U)
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There
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presidential Commission on Crit
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I am issuing a complementary dir.ecti ve bn our· policy toward
protection of our critical infrastructu~re. (U)
8. Continuity of Government OperationJ Attacks by nation_s or
groups will not be permitted to disruptj the functioning o'f
either the constitutionally mandated functions of the Federal
Government/ nor the operation of its .~,c.rli tical components. ~
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-- As outlined in Executive Order 112656, every department
and agency will be able to rapidly and ~ffectively transition
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from routine operation to emergency operations of vital
functions followina an attack that inckpacitates its
headquarters, key facilities, or leadetship. (U)
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-- In particular, agen~ies will e~sure that key couNter'""
terrorism staff can operate in .low to mid-level WMD
contingencies by proviqingprotective ~quipment and
transportation to a rapidly accessiblejrelocation site. ~
-- The National Security Advisor Will submit for my review
and approval a draft of an updated andj comprehensive ·
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Presidential Decision Directive on End~ring Constitutional
Government that takes into account the\terrorist and .
unconventional threats, and requires continuity of operations
capabilities by all departcients and ag~ncies as a foundation for
continuity of government for the futur~. ~·
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9. Countering the Foreign Terrorist T~reat in the U.S.:
Foreign terrorists will not be allowedlto enter the United
States and the full force of legal aut~orities will beused to
remove foreign terrorists from the U.S~ and to prevent
fundraising within the u.s. to support [foreign terrorists. The
Justice Department will be the lead agency for this program.~
applican~s
-- Visa
that pose a tejrorist threat will be
identified and denied entry into the udited States. The State
Department, Justice Department (FBI and INS), and CIA will
ensure that information about such per~ons, 'including their
aliases, is collected and disseminated lin a timely manner to
deny them entry into the United States.; ~
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-- The State Department will work jclosely with other
governments to adopt and implement standards for travel
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documentation. Such documents should ~e computer readable,
tamper resistant/ and difficult to counterfeit. ~
-- Justice (INS and FBI) and State! will develop a strategy,
to be implemented by DOJ (INS and FB~) ,j to limit the duration of
stay of students from terrorism list co untries, to track ..them
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while they are in the U.S. and to know rhen they depart. In
addition, State and DOJ, together with 1
the Commerce Department
and Defense Department, will determine how best.to prevent
foreign students whose studies are spon~ored by terrorist -.list
countries from acquiring WMD-related .knowledge in the United
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-- Justice will ensure that, in accordance with PDD-9,
alien smuggling rings are disrupted and disbanded, and will, in
particular, thwart attempts to smuggle potential terrorists into
the United States. ~
-- Justice, using removal procedures, including the Alien
Terrorist Removal Court, will seek to swiftly remove alien
terrorists from the United states and will detain them awaiting
removal proceedings. The Administration will again seek
legislation clarifying the definition of ~engaging in terrorist
activity" to better facilitate exclusion and removal of alien
terrorists under the immigration laws. ~
-- The Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Attorney General and Secretary of the Treasury, will designate
foreign terrorist organizations that are prohibited by law from
raising funds in the United States. In addition Justice and
Treasur will work to revent such activities.
--.. E.O. 13526, 1.4(c)
-- The DCI will work to support the Secretary of the
Treasury in developing usable information for the designation by
Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney General and
Secretary of State, of entities and individuals of foreign
terrorist organizations that are located in foreign
jurisdictions, particularly in those countries that are not
state sponsors of terrorism. (U)
10. Protection of Americans Overseas: The first duty of
government is the protection of its citizens. That duty extends
to Americans abroad, whether they are traveling in an official
or private capacity. (U)
-- The State Department, through its chiefs of mission,
will be responsible for ensuring the security of personnel
associated with diplomatic and consular posts abroad, inc-luding
DOD personnel subject to the force protection responsibilities
of the chiefs of mission pursuant to the DOD/State Universal
MOU, and for programs to preserve the safety of private U.S.
citizens abroad. U.S. citizens should be adequately warned of
the danger of terrorist attack, advised regarding precautionary
measures and afforded appropriate assistance and protection. (U)
-- The Secretary of Defense, throu9h geographic CINes, will
be responsible for force protection of CINe-assigned forces and
those DOD personnel for whom the Secretary of state has
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delegated force protection responsibility to DOD under the
Memorandum of Understanding betw.een the Departments of State and
Dejense on Security of DOD Elements ahd P~rsonnel in Foreign
Areas (the Universal MOU). ,JU}
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ADDITIONAL CAPABILITIES
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In addition to the programs described above, the national
counter-terrorism effort requires thelfollowing elaboration to
the guidance in l?DD-39.
(U)
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1. National
Security Events: Scores of special events
receive Federal protection annually. jSome of these, such as
Presidential nominating conventions, Presidential Inaugurations,
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Presidential Summits, State of the Un~on addresses and Olympic
games have a national significance and could attract
unconventional attacks. ~
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The interagency Counter-Terrorism and!Security Group (CSG} shall
notify the Attorney General and Secretary of the Treasury of
events when it believes they should designated a "National
Special Security Event." The Attorne~ General and Secretary of
the Treasury are required to agree on \the designation. ~
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I have decided that for such National ~pecial Security Events,
the full protective and consequence management capabilities of
the Federal Government shall be availa'ble as necessary,
including those of both the FBI and tde Secret Service. ~
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Lead Agency responsibilities shall be
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FBI. The FBI will be the lead agency Iter intelligence, crisis
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management, hostage rescue, counter-te~rorlsm {except as noted
below regarding Secret Service protect~ve anti-terr6rism
measures and counter-terrorism assets}! and its statutory Federal
criminal investigations. The FBI will identify and coordinate
appropriate anti-terrorism measures ani:i FBI counter-terrorism
asset~ {including, w~en necessaiy, DoPj assets) that will be
needed to perform its lead agency resppnsibilit s. The USSS
will coordinate its activities regardihg security
design/planning and implementation witp the FBI. The FBI will
also identify and coordinate.its measut~s and assets to.effect
consequence management planning, coord~nation, and~ransi~ion
from the crisis ma~agement phase to cphsequence management • by
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FEMA. FEMA shall be the lead agency for consequence management
planning and coordination. Transition from the crisis
management phase to the consequence management phase shall be as
agreed by the Attorney General, the FBI Director and the FEMA
Director, or their designees. ~
The U.S. Secret Service. The Secret Service shall be the lead
agency for security design/planning and implementation, and will
identify and coordinate the appropriate Secret Service antiterrorism measures and counterterrorism assets (and, if
necessary, the assets of other agencies in mutual agreement with
those agencies) that will be needed to effect the overall
securit re uirements (includin
The FEMA Director, U.S. Secret Service Director, and FBI
Director shall ensure that their respective lead agency
responsibilities are fully coordinated and effectively
implemented. Unless mutually agreed upon between the Directors
or their designees, the Secret Service and the FBI will maintain
full command and control of their respective agency assets in
all circumstances and incidents.
Defense, State, Energy, HHS, Transportation and EPA shall,
consistent with their authorities and appropriations, make
available specialized units in support of security operations,
crisis management, and consequence management. ~
The Attorney General and Secretary of the Treasury, in
cooperation with other concerned Principals including the
Director/OMB, should within 120 days submit for my approval a
plan to implement this decision. T~e plan should, inter alia,
cover:
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-- Command/control arrangements of the FBI, Secret Service,
FEMA, DOD and other relevant agencies; ~
-- how to achieve quickly an air space security capability
centered on the enforcement arms of the Treasury (U.S. Secret
Service and u.s. Customs Service); +G+
any required changes in funding and/or legislative
authorities. (U)
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2. National Capital Area Rapid Response Capability for a WMD
Terrorist Incident: The most inviting domestic target for a
terrorist employing WMD is downtown Washington and the national
security headquarters nearby in Virginia . Yet there is no
specialized explosive ordnance disposal team in the Washington
area trained or equipped to deal with WMD; or any detection and
alerting system to identify when WMD move into the metropolitan
area on main approach routes. Accordingly, we must be able to
detect and safely deal with any WMD within or approaching
Washington, DC. ~
-- The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the
Secretary of Energy, shall ensure that there is a robust
capability to render safe a nuclear, biological, or chemical
device in the National Capital area and that such a capability
be deployable in the shortest time possible. ~
-- DOE will lead a technology research and demonstration
project to examine the feasibility of installing covert WMD
detection systems on approaches to the metropolitan area. ~
E.O. 13526, 1.4(g)
4. Statutory Authority and Funding for Combating Terrorism
Operations: The burden for finding the statutory authority to
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use resources during combating terrorism operations is unfairly
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left to each agency. Therefore,· the Secretary of Defense and
the Attorney General, in coordination ~ith the OMB Director,
will develop comprehensive proposals fclr statutory authority for
funding to combat terrorism .operations.! These proposals shall
be submitted to the APNSA within 120 d~ys. (U)
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5. Exerci
: There shall be at leasti one annual exercise
involving the participation of Agency ~rincipals to validate
policies, procedures, and capabilities \for the resolution of
unconventional attacks against the U.S ·I and its citizens. ts+
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Implementation
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National Coordinator for S~curity, InfJastructure Protection, and
Counter-Terrorism: Program coordination in support of this
Directive will be under the auspices of; the National Coordinator.
for Security, Infrastructure Protectiori and Counter-Terrorism.
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While not directing the activities of ~gencies, the National
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Coordinator will integrate the Governme nt' s policies and programs
on unconventional threats to the homela!nd.and Americans abroad:
attacks on our infrastructure~ cyber sij~tems, and government
operations, terrorism, and defenses against covert delivery of
weapons of mass destruction. Reportin~ to the APNSA shall be an
NSC staff Senidr Director for Infrastru~ture Protection and a
Senior Director for Counter-Terroris~. I In the context of the
established annual budget process the National Coordinator will
provide advice regarding the budgets fo~ counter-terrorism. (U)
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For these purposes, the National Coordinator will chair
assistant secretary/flag rank groups, r~porting to the Deputies
Committee (or, at the call of its chair'r, the Principals
. Committee) including: ·
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-- The Counter-Terroris~ Sec~rity ~roup (CSG) to coordinate
counter-terrorism issues and review ongbing crisis operations/
activities concerning foreign terrorism[ and domestic terrorism
with significant foreign involvement; -ts+
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-- Critical Infrastructure Coordinktion Group (CICG) to
coordinate the implementation of the Pr~sidential Decision
Direc ve ·on Critical Infrastructure; ~
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--The Weapons of Mass Destruction!I Preparedness (WMDP),
.. ,,,.
Consequence Management and Protection Gf:'OUP to coordinate
polici~s and programs relating to Weapohs of Mass Destruction.
(WMD) emergency preparedness, tr.aining, equipping and organizing
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WMD consequence managers, j_nterdiction [of Wiv!D and associ a ted
components beihg introduced into the United States and security
of WMD-related facilities in the United States. +e+
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Coordin~tor
The National
will also be jesponsible foi ensuring
program coordihation between these thrde groups (CSGi CICG and
WMDP) ~ahd.the existing, interagency working group 6n Enduring
.
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Constitut.ional Government (IWG/ECG, chaired by the Counselor to
the APNSA)) '; -"Whfch coordinate developm~rit and implementation of
policy and progracis reiated to gbvernm~nt-wide continuity of
. ...
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. operations and continuity of government.
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The National Coordinator may call thesJ groups to. meet jbintly
or form joint sub-groups to address inter-disciplinary issues.
The Counter-terrorism Security Group add the N~tional
Coordinator will conduct their reviews jof intelligence programs
and activities consistent with existing procedures and
authorities and in coordination with t~e DCI and/or the Chair of
the Intelligence IWG, as appropriate.
r
The National Coordinator shall report ~egularly to the
Principals and annually to me in a SecJrity Preparedness Report
(this report supercedes the PDD-39 repJiting requirements)
The National Coordinator will also partlicipate as a full member
of Deputies or Principals Corrunittee meejtings when they meet to
consider counter-terrorism, security, WMD defense, or
infrastructure issues.
In addition, wh~le not directing the
actions of agencies, the National CoorJinator shall coordinate
the development of interagency agreed g:Uidelines .for crisis
management and the procedures for authdrizing deployment and
employment of specialized crisis assetsj. *1-
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PHOTOCOPY
WJG HANDWRITING
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents concerning Presidential Decision Directive 62 (PDD-62)
Description
An account of the resource
Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas (5/22/1998).
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reproduction-Reference
Declassified
Foreign Policy
Presidential Decision Directive
Terrorism