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https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/45d09ba255623744b37fbb1cf40e9577.pdf
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
001. email
002. email
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Marcia G. Norman to William C. Danvers, re: First Draft of memo (2
pages)
·0211611996
Pl/b(l)
0411111996
Pl/b(l)
. Richard Clarke to Rand Beers, et al., re: Priorities (2 pages)
RESTRICTION
003. email
Judith Miscik to Jane Baker,
Report Memo (6 pages)
et al., re: Revised (shortened) Brovro
04/18/1996
P5
004. email
Marcia Norman to Richard Wilhelm, re: Brovro Memos (7 pages)
04/23/1996
P5
005. email
Ardenia Hawkins to William Davis, re: concurrences, please (4 pages)
07/03/1996
P5
006. email
Richard Clarke to James Eisenhower, re: PC Meeting (2 pages)
07/11/1996
,Pl/b(l)
7,o3\
"i"
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail-Non-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) (f Asp in Brovro Commission1)
ONBox Number: 605000
FOLDER TITLE:
[02/1611996- 0711111996]
Kara Ellis
2006-1023-F
ke793
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a))
Freedom of Information Act- [5 U.S.C. 552(b)J
Pl
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information [(b)(l) of the FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information ((b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIAJ
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
,purposes [(b)(7) ofthe FOIAJ
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions ((b)(S) of the FOIAJ
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
[(b)(9) of the FOIAJ
Na tiona! Security Classified Information [(a)(l) of the PRA)
Relating to the appointment to Federal office {(aX2) of the PRAJ
Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA)
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA)
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors fa)(S) of the PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy ((aX6) of the PRA)
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed·
.
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR Document will be reviewed upon request.
�3I.DACIBE.FIN
Page I of 4
MSMail
DATE-TIME
03 July 96II:53
FROM
Hawkins, Ardenia R.
CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT
FW: concurrences, please [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO
Davis, William K.
CARBON_COPY
NO CC's onTHIS MESSAGE
TEXT BODY
_thanks,
From: Hawkins, Ardenia R.
To: Burrell, Christina L.;.Danvers, William C.
CC: IN, NonRecord at AI
Subject: FW: concurrences, please [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Wednesday, July 03, I996 08:39AM
[[ PECKHAM.DOC : 2824 iii PECKHAM.DOC ]]
Sorry, but I can't remember whether we have received concurrence from you.
If possible can we get your clearance by noon today?
From: Hawkins, Ardenia R.
To: Kreczko, Alan J.; Danvers, William C.; Leary, William H.
CC: IN, NonRecord at AI; Beers, Rand R
Subject: concurrences, please [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Monday, June 24, I996 05:46PM
Please review/comment on the attached and respond to @INTEL by noon
tomorrow,
June 25. thanks, Dee
ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE
24 June 96 I7:40
ATTACHMENT
FILENAME
PECKHAM.DOC
COPY
�31DACIBE.FIN
Page 2 of4
isi.o'~~;,
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Memo forTL
t~ 1u3\
from beers
subject: Peckham Request for Access to PDD 35
-~
Gardner Peckham, Foreign Policy Advisor to Speaker Gingrich, has
requested the opportunity to read PDD 35 on Intelligence ·
Priorities
(Tab A). The request originally arose during the Speaker's visit
to
CIA last December when Deutch raised the subject with Gingrich.
Deutch assured Peckham that he could read the document and then
told
··his Congressional Affairs office to take care of it.
Fortunately,
through Mike Andricos' involvement, the issue was referred to the
NSC
as the agency responsible for providing access to such documents.·
As a matter of course, the NSC does not allow access to PDDs
other
than routine PDDs (such as PDD 2 on NSC organization which was
released publicly) or unclassified PDDs. We and previous
Administrations have, however, released PDDs upon the written
request
by the Leadership or the Chairman or ranking minority member of a
committee or subcommittee with appropriate jurisdiction.
··
Decisions
to grant access are made on a case by case basis. Access has
been
granted only for the personal review of Members of Congress and
senior committee staff.
Documents are then provided for review in the presence of an NSC
staff member. Copies are-not allowed, but notes may be taken.
Any
.
notes taken must be reviewed for classification by the NSC and
returned by Classified document receipt io the originator after
·
appropriate classification.
·'
As a matter of law, the President is constitutionally empowered
to
assert an absolute executive privilege to protect information the
production or disclosure of which could adversely affect the
Nation's
security. In addition, the President can assert a qualified
privilege with respect to deliberative presidential
communications or
simply communications that he intends to be confidential.
COPY
·· · --.,....-<?
OJ
J
�.
Page 3 of4
31DAC lBE.FIN
Information covered by a qualified privilege may be withheld
unless
outweighed by a legitimate legislative need for the documents.
Itis difficult to assert a State secrets privilege for PDD-35
when
most ofits contents have been discussed publicly, including by
the
President during his speech at CIA last summer. The President,
however, might still assert a qualified privilege on the grounds
that
PDD-35 is a· confidential communication to his advisors. Because
the
document in question is post decisional and the contents known,
this ·
is primarily a question of principle.
The arguments against disclosure:
D Legislative need for access.to the document is limited. Its
contents are essentially public. Access will yield little
.substantive benefit. The Speaker's interest was sparked simply
by
.
'
· a remark by John Deutch during his visitto CIA.
D Providing the document will be cited as the basis for other
requests for PDD-35 or other Presidential directives and will
increase pressure on us to comply.
The arguments for disclosure:
D PDD-35 is a document written to convey our intelligence
priorities. It has been briefed to relevant members of Congress,
to
the Aspin-Brown Commission and others. Its substance has been
the
basis for public discussion regarding the workings of the
Intelligence Community. It has generated no controversy. Hiding
the specific document from the Speaker's Foreign Policy Advisor
gains no benefit and suggests that we have something to hide.
D The President can waive the privilege with respect to cine PDD
without necessarily waiving it with respect to others, especially
in a case like this where the substance has been released
publicly.
D We have a good story to tell. We have set real priorities for
the
Intelligence Community for the first time. We have modified our
process based on a critique by the Aspin-Brown Commission by
COPY
�Page 4 of 4
3IDACIBE.FIN
creating the Consumers Committee (a renamed DC) and the Committee
on Foreign Intelligence (a renamed PC). We are in the midst of
"""'"·"">..
10
. our first annual review of priorities demonstrating that this is
<(l~E.S Etv )/-1'-'
a
.
~
~
dynamic process. That represents more systematic attention to
~
~
priorities for the Intelligence Community than by any previous
?;
Administration.
::o
'\
U3 \
Concurrences by: Alan Kreczko, William Leary and Bill Danvers
RECOMMENDATION
~
That we seek White House Counsel concurrence to show Peckham the
document under existing procedures.
Approve _ _ _ Disapprove _ __
.
. .·
COPY
�Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
RESTRICTION
001. memo
Anthony Lake to the President, re: Response to the Aspin-Brown
Commission Report (4 pages)
04/22/1996
P5
002a. memo
R. Rand Beers and Jamie Miscik to Anthony Lake, re: Response to the
Aspin-Brown Commission Report ( 1 page)
04/14/1996
P5
Anthony Lake to the President, re: Response to the Aspin-Brown
Commission Report (4 pages)
ca. 04/1996
P5
John Deutch to the President, re: Intelligence Community Response to
the Aspin-Brown Commission and Recommendations for an
Administration Initiative (6 pages)
04/05/1996
P5
002d.list .
Informal Summary of Individual Brown Proposals (6 pages)
ca. 04/1996
P5
002e. talking
points
Talking Points (I page)
ca. 04/1996 .
D"f. ~ w'Lb
P5
,~.memo.,.,
;,·"~~a:t...:"'''
~ji~.lf'
Lt l Ys~\LtC,
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Affairs - Eisenhower
ONBox Number: 750
FOLDER TITLE:
Brown Commission
Kara Ellis
~006-l 023-F
kel453
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act- (44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Pl National Security Classified Information [(a)(l) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
PJ Release would vi~late a Federal statute [(a)(J) of the PRA]
P4 Release . would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his. advisors, or between such advisors [a)(S) ofthe PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
. personal privacy [(a)(6) ofthe PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed .
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in acc'!rdance with 44 U.S.C.
:2~01(3).
'
RR: pocu'inent will be reviewed upon requ:est.
('
Freedom of Information Act- [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
b(l) National security classified information [(b)(l) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(J) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(J) ofthe FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute·a dearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcen;tent
purposes [(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9).!!_e~~se..would-~close ·geological or geophysical information
--. -- concerning wells i~)(9)of the FOIA]
y
r
::t
c·opy
�THE PRESlOENT HAS SEEN 2599
'--i/2.:, J'lk
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 22, l~~iPR
Z2
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ANTHONY
SUBC"ECT:
Response
L~
~o
the AspiL-Brown Commission Report
Purpose:
To determine the Administration's respons.e to the
Aspin-Brown Report and to approve a broader Administration
in~elligence initiative.
Background:
You met with Harold Brown on March 1 to receive his
Report on the Roles an0 Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence
Community (IC).
You asked John Deutch to prepare the
Administration response.
John's response is at Tab A.
He adopts most of the major Brown
recommendations but modifies several to strengthen them or to
recognize work completed during or after the report ,was prepared.
He also recommends a major personnel initiative, which goes beyond
the Aspin-Brown recommendations.
We c·an accomplish most of the
proposals by agency or Presidential directive.
Some will require
legislation.
John's key recommendations are recapped below with
NSC staff modifications where appropriate.
John concurs in this
app~oach.
Establish a Committee on Foreign Intelligence: A Principals
Committee chaired· by the National Security Advisor,· including
State, Defense, Justice, the DCI and JCS to meet semi-annually
.on intellig.ence issues and long-term priorities.
(Executive
Order/PDD)
Establish a Consumers Committee: A Deputies Committee chaired by
the Deputy National Security Advisor, with the above agencies and
representatives of key IC producers and consumers, meeting monthly·
on customer requireiP.ents and produr-t quality. . (:Executive
Orde::::-/PDD)
Establish a Global Crime Committee:
John originally proposed
a State-Justice co-ch2ir, but he and I now agree that we should
retain the PDD-42 structure which you approved on·October 21,·
1995, which coincides. with Brown's recommendc.. :ion.
This involves
cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff
!'
COPY
�-----------
NSC-chaired principals and deputies committees and
erves the
delicate balance between Justice a~d Treasury.
{No add
action necessary, already established.by PDD-42)
Global Crime Spokesper. on:
John':: memo to you recommends that
you designate the Attorney General as t
principal Executive
Branch spokesperson on global crime.
Secretary of State
disagrees and would pre r to he designated co-spokesperson or
have none designated.
In deference to Chris, John now withdraws
hjs recommendation and
es to having no designated
spokesperson.
I concur.
(Executive Order/PDD)
Intelligence Relationship with Law Enforcement:
The existing
CIA:Justice co-chaired Intelligence and Law.Enforcement Policy
Board would resolve the k .... otty issues which Brown raised.
(In
process)
Increase the Number of DCI Deputie3: Upgrade the Executive
Directors for CIA and Intelligence Community Affairs to
confirmation positions ;s DCI Deputies in additio~ to the exi~ting
Principal Deputy. Brown recommended only a Principal Deputy for
the Int ligence Commu~ity portfolio and a second Deputy for CIA.
I agree with ~ohn. We need both positions upgraded; otherwise the
Principal Deputy will be constantly shifting roles between Ac~ing
DCI and line manager for IC affairs.
(Legislation)
John also wishes to create an Associate Director for International
Support
issues concerning diplomacy and international
cooperation.
(Agency Directive)
DCI Consultation or Concurrence in IC Appointments:
This issue
represents the only major disagreement within the Intelligence
Community. Brown proposed DCI concurrence in the Secretary of·
Defense's recommendation to you on the Directors of the National
Security Agency (NSA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) .
and the Central Imagery
fice (CIO} or its successor, the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA); and consultation in
the appointments of the DOD Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIAl, the State Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and
Research (INR} and the FBI Assistant Director for National
Sec.ur i ty (NS} . John believes he should have' concurrence authority
for all the appointments, but all other agency heads disagree.
(The one exceptiun is that
ll Perry agrees to DCI concurrence.on
the NIMA appointment.}
Consequently he recommended the status quo
to keep
peace:
I believe, .however, .that John's origtnal instinct is correct.
All these positions are part of your national Intelligence
Community.
If it is to be a national community, then the DCI
·needs an integral role in creating the team.
If we wish to
COPY
�,·
emphasize John's role as the Director of Central Intelli nee
rather than·simply the head of CIA, then John needs a stro
.
relationship with the entire community.
Should you choose t -·~~
course of action, I will need to confer with Bill, Chris, Janet
and Louis Freeh before ~ny annou~cernent, since we will need their
full support.
(Executive Order/Leg~slation)
Rightsizing the Workforce: Br0wn recommended a one-time
"rightsizing" of intelligence agencies if any desire to cut their
workforce by ten percent.
John feels the Brown proposal is too
inflexible, focusing only on a larqe one-time reduction and not
the broader skill mix problem. .He and DOD prefer a flexible
authority for selective downsizing.
-
.
The above authorities would be coupled with a major IC personnel
reform:
recruitment, training, rotational assignments and easier
personnel movement between agencies.
The associated legislation
and agency directives are nearing completion.
John sees this as
his most significant recommendation, recognizing the legislative
elements are unlikely this year.
(Legislation and Agency
Directives)
·
Military Intelligence:
Transfer DIA's clandestine recruitment
of human sources to CIA, with the details still to be completed.
(Secretary of Defense and DCI action)
Budget Disclosure: Make public the total appropriation for
intelligence. No more than the bottom line figure should be
disclosed.
(Legislation)
The DCI's memo does not address two major Brown proposals.
I.
Dual-hatting the DOD Directors of NSA and NIMA as Associate
Directors of Central Intelligence:
John believes his concurrence
in appointing these two Directors is more important, There are
also serious problems in placing individuals in two separate
chains of command.
(No action)
·
Instituting a two-year fixed term for the proposed Depu _
for CIA, renewable up to three time~:
Brown intended to provide
continuity in CIA leadership and to suggest the possibility of
a career CIA incumbent, as with the JCS Chairman. Without ruling
out career.appointments, John believes that a ne~ President 1nd a
new DCI should be able to choose a new team.
I agree.
(No
action)
Other topics were also studied by Brown.
(A summary of the
IC response to the entire Report is at Tab B.)
They include
jmproving intelligence analysis, c~eating a better budget
analysis capability and establishing clear guidelines for
COPY
�4
Following you approval of the above program, we will prepar~~~--~
Presidential announcemer·t and +:he appropriate documents for your
signature. We will then complete t~e necessary legislative
proposals and submit them to the Bill. John will ensure that
those actions "CC' be carried out W.Lthin the Intelligence Corrununity
are completed. In addition, John and others in the Intelligence
Corrununity will be called to testify on the Hill on the AspinBrown Report and other Congressional proposals on intelligence
leg" slat ion. This Administration .usi tion will form the basis
of our. respo_nse.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you approve the abo-;e response to the 'Aspin-Brown Corrunission
Report and our br~e: Administration intelligence initiative.
Approve
-'
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab A
Memo from John Deutch
Tab B
Summary of the IC Response to the Brown Report
\,
COPY
�THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL .INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
5 April 19
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT:
Intelligence Community Response to the Aspin-Brown
Commission and Recommendations for an Administration Initiative
At your instruction, I have considered the Aspin-Brown
Commission report on "The Roles and Capabilities of the US
Intelligl=nce Community," and I am proposing -in this_
memorandum a suggested Administration course of action. What
follows is based closely on the advice of a working group
composed of Department of Defense, Central Intelligence
Agency, and National Security Council representatives for
this purpose and my close consultation with the Departments
of State and Justice on how best to proceed.
In general, there is considerable support for the
Commission's findings and recommendations although, in most
instances, the Intelligence Community suggests modified
versions of the implementing actions.
I have discussed these
differences with Harold Brown, who does not view them as
central and (even though he would choose the Commission's
version in some cases} supports the conclusions presented
below.
I propose that you take initiatives, based on the AspinBrown report, to strengthen US intelligence during the next
decade.
The initiatives include both legislative changes and
changes which can be accomplished by executive order. .I·
outline below the principal elements of this initiative.
There are two important reasons for undertaking this
initiative now.
First, it responds to many, but not all, of
the sensible recommendations of the Aspin-Brown Commission
that we all agree will strengthen the efficiency and focus of
the Intelligence Community. Second, an Administration
position likely will influence greatly the course of, or stop
the-progress on much more dramatic, reorganization
legislation under pr¢paration by the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intell.igence.
For example, the House Committee
proposes to establish a new agency for ·all technical
intelligence collection, a new technology development office,
and a new agency for clandestine human collection. ·. We all
· agree these proposals do not address current needs and indeed
would not improve performance of the Intelligence Community
in the near teJ:11ri.
;A;,r::,
,. -··
.
...
.
~J>ITON LffiRARY PHOTOCOPY
(:-""'-
-~:-~·
- .
--- - .-...
COPY
�Here are the principal elements of the proposed
initiative:
Need for improved policv auidance:
1.
Establish a Committee on Foreign Intellicrence, as
recommended by the Commission, chaired by the National
Security Advisor, including the Director ..of Central
Intelligence, the.Secretaries of Defense and State (The
Commission had recommended the Deputy Secretaries of these
departments.), the Attorney G~neral, and the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to meet semi- annually to
discuss key intelligence issues and long-term priorities.
(by executive order)
2:
Establish a Consumers Committee, as reco~ended by the
Commission, that would take over the responsibilities
currently performed by the PDD-35 interagency working
group. The Consumers Committee, chaired by the Deputy
Assistant National Security Advisor, would include
deputies of the Comm~=tee on Foreign Intelligence members
plus representatives o: other principal intelligence
producers and consumers, and would meet monthly to
provide guidance to the Intelligence Community·on
customer requirements and product quality. (by executive
order)
Need for a coordi~~ted resconse to glob~l crime:
3.
Principal Spokesperson.
We agree with the Commission
recommendation that the Attorney General should be the
principal spokesman on law enforcement issues and global
criminal matters. (by Presidential designation)
4. Establish a Global Crime Committee, as recommended by the
Commission, co-chaired by the Deputy Secretary of State
and Deputy Attorney General (not· the National Securfty
Advisor, as the Commission suggested), who share the
formal responsibility and control the resources directed
at this problem, reporting to the National Security
Council on needs, priorities, and activities in the areas
of international crime, counter narcotics, and
international terrorism. (by executive order)
5. Intelligence Relationship with Law Enforcement.
The
already existing Intelligence and Law Enforcement Policy
Board, co-chaired by the Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence and the Deputy Attorney General, would be
responsible for considering the changes in the
relationship between the law enforcement and inbelligence
communities proposed by the Aspin-Brown Commission.
Much
progress has already been made. (no additional action)
t;~::~RAR; P~oT~PY -~"
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.
2,
___::::::..:.::__::__::____:::=.:_~··
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.....
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�Organizational Arrangement of the Intelligence Cormnunity:
6. Increase the number of DCI Deputies.
I believe that
better structure than the Commission's suggestion of
deputies iri place of one is to maintain the current
structure with a single principal deputy and to .create
additional deputies, one fulfilling the duties now
performed by the Executive Director of the CIA and the
other those now performed by· the Executive Director for
Intelligence Community Affairs. Both would be
Presidential appointees and require Senate confirmation.
This meets the Commission's recommendation to elevate the
status of both positions. (by legislation)
At tbe same time, I propose to establish an Associate
Director for International Support. This position would
address the Aspin-Brown Commission's wise recommendation
that the Intelligence Community pay closer attention to a
range of diplornatic.support and other international
cooperation matters.
This position would be a senior
point of contact for the Department of State parallel to
the position of Associate Director for Military Support
which Vice Admiral 'Denny Blair currently fills for liaison
with the Pentagon. (by DCI directive)
7.
DCI Consultation or Concurrence in appointments of
Intelligence Community.
In order to strengthen DCI
authorities, the Commission recommended that the DCI
concur in the Secretary of Defense's appointment of the
Directors of the National Security Agency, the National
Reconnaissance Office, and the Central Imagery Office ('or
a successor National Imagery and Mapping Agency) . The
Commission recommends that the DCI be consulted in the
appointment of the Director of the Defense Intelligence.
Agency, ·the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence
and Research, and· the Assistant Director of the FBI for
National Security.
., ·
This is the only issue where disagreement exists.
I believe that the DCI should concur in the appointments
of all these senior intelligence officers. Not
surprisingly, the Secretary of Defense,
the Secretary of.
State, the Attorney General and the Director of the FBI
offer arguments, many cogent, against broadening the
DCI's authority over appointments.
I believe that the best way to proceed is not to go
through a lengthy and acrimonious process to reach an
Administration position on this matter. The net result
is that the status quo likely will remain unchanged. My
colleagues will be satisfied with this outcome. (no
action)
'
! '
COPY
�8.
'li
knowledgeable observers agree that one of the princip ~ l.
1~ _ ~
challenges for the Intelligence Community is to downsi- ~ ~-~ ~
the workforce and at· the same time change and improve
e
skill mix.· The Commission made a tactical judgment th ~
the best chance for obtaining special personnel authority~;
for the Intelligence Community was to seek one-time
authority to downsize the civilian work force.
DOD and CIA believe, alternatively, that the
Administration should initiate comprehensive Intelligence
Community personnel reform combining continuing authority
for selective .downsizing as well as new opportunities for.
career development.
This is a preferred option from the
point of .view of what is needed for the long term.
We
are well along in drafting such comprehensive personnel
reform legislation.
·
Because the chances of passage of. such authority this
year are remote, we should also submit a request for
waiver of the 2% recu::-::ion in annuities for early
retirements at NSA o~:y.
This legislation already has
OMB approval.
(by legislation)
9.
Militarv Intelligence The Commission makes a number of
recommendations for changes in the management of military
intelligence.
Of most importance is the proposal that
DOD's clandest.l.ne rec:::-uitment of human sources, now
carried out by the Defense Humint Service, be transferred
to CIA.
I believe this recommendation should be
accepted.
I continue to work with the Secretary of
Defense to craft a final proposal.
(Secretary of Defense
and DCI action)
Another Commission suggestion was the reassignment of the
J-2 from DIA to the Joint Staff.
The-DOD suggests - and
I agree- that this-be accomplished by a Memorandu:m of
Agreement, which has already been executed.
(by
Memorandum of Agreement)
10.
Space Reconnaissance and Management of Technical
Collection - The Commission endorses the continued
existence of the National Reconnaissance Office and
suggests a comprehensive review of the technological
health of the National Security Agency. Most
importantly, the Commission endorses the proposal made
by Bill Percy,· john Shalikashvili, and myself to
establish a National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA)
to· establish a single agency in the DOD to provide, more
efficiently, timely imagery products to both national
level and military commanders.
We propose to include
enabling legislation for NIMA (now in the final drafting
phase) in !the A~inistrc3._t~_C)n pa.~Js_e,g§t\ Jby legislation)
~~TON
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LIDRARY PHOTOCOPY
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�11.
Resource Management - The Commission makes a nurnbe
recommendations concerning the level of resources
intelligence and for a new budgeting system along
lines of intelligence disciplines.
In this area, t e
Intelligence Community and DOD during the past year
'• been making progress Oil a system of programming
planning/ budgeting and execution that takes into
account the Commission's concerns and additional
factors.
This system will improve reso.urce allocation
and trade-off decisions by intelligence users and we
believe it is more useful than "discipline based" budget
execution. Nonetheless, the views of the Commission
will influence on-going efforts to improve the programplanning-budgeting process of the Intelligence
Communi~y.
(no action)
1
12.
.
Budget Disclosure - The Commission recommends the public
disclosure of the annual amount appropriated for
intelligence purposes. While we believe that this
figure would 'not in itself cause harm, we believe that
no more than the bottom line should be disclosed.
Accordingly, we suggest that the Congress, not the
President, make public· the total appropriation for
intelligence at the time the appropriations conference
report is approved in the Congress. (by legislation)
These recommendations cover the central conclusions of
the Aspin-Brown Commission. Other topics are also covered in
the report, e.g. international cooperation, improving
intelligence analysis.
These matters deserve and will
receive attention from appropriate elements of the
Intelligence Community.
Our proposal is to submit Administration legislation to
the Congress that covers:
Intelligence Community organization (DCI deputies};·
Personnel Reform;
Establishment of NIMA; and
Budget Disclosure.
We suggest issuance of an executive order or other
Presidential directive· to establish the NSC level Committees
on Foreign Intelligence and Global Crime, and the
Intelligence Consufuer (PDD-35) Committee, and to designate
the Attorney General as principal spokesperson on global
c::-iminal matters.
These actions are an appropriate response
to the Aspin-Brown Commission and an aggressive le~islative
agenda for this shortened legislative year.
The remainder of
our recornmendations can be implemented at a lower level.
'.
~lNTONLffi~YP~OTO~OPY
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�I urge you to announce these proposals publicly
direct their expeditious implementation~
4l Y.Co
-.
Deutch
cc:
The Vice President
Secretary of State
Secretaz;y of Defense
Attorney General
Director, Office of Management & Budget
Chief of Staff to the President
National Security Advisor
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
' '~:
,I.
COPY
�Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
RESTRICTION
Todd Stern to the President (1 page)
04/2311996
P5
Anthony Lake to the President, re: Response to the Aspin-Brown
Commission (4 pages) .
04/22/1996
P5
OOlc. memo
John Deutch to the President, re: Intelligence Community Response to
the Aspin-Brown Commission and Recommendations for an
Administration Initiative (6 pages)
04/05/1996
001d.list
Informal Summary of Individual Brown Proposals (6 pages)
ca. 04/1996
PS
001e. memo
R. Rand Beers apd Jami Miscik to Anthony Lake, re: Response to the
Aspi.n-Brown Commission Report (1 page)
04/1411996
"-\·~ ~+
PS
001b. memo
~\,u-~-t.
'i.&.\~":>.CAl\
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Legal Adviser - Derosa
OA/Box Number: 3113
FOLDER TITLE:
Roles & Missions Commission (Aspin)- Alan Kreczko, NSC Staff (1]
Kara Ellis
2006-1 023-F
ke1456
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act- [44 U.S.C. 2204(a))
Freedom of Information Act- [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
PI National Security Classified Information [(a)(l) of the PRA)
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA)
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA)
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information ((a)(4) ofthe PRA]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(S) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) ofthe PRA]
b(l) National security classified information [(b )(1) of the FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIAJ
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
frnancial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA)
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information .
con£~r.I!W..g,wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record rnisfLie defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon::' request.
-... ./";:::-::·,,.,_.,:
·-·-- -~
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COPY
�COPY
�
Dublin Core
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Title
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Previously Restricted Documents
Date
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1993-2001
Description
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<p>This collection contains documents that were previously restricted under the <a href="http://www.archives.gov/presidential-libraries/laws/1978-act.html" target="_blank">Presidential Records Act</a> for restrictions P2 (appointment to federal office) and/or P5 (confidential advice between the President and/or his advisors and between those advisors). For more information concerning these collections please see the collection finding aids index. The finding aids detail the scope, content, and provide a box and folder title list for each collection.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.archives.gov/presidential-libraries/laws/1978-act.html" target="_blank">Presidential Records Act (PRA)</a> includes provisions that these types of documents be withheld for twelve years after the end of a president's administration. These documents are now being made available to the public. The documents will be released in batches and will be uploaded here as they become available. The documents will also be available in the Clinton Library’s research room.</p>
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Publisher
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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397 folders
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Dublin Core
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2006-1023-F - Aspin Brown Commission
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2006-1023-F
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Previously Restricted Document Release no. 7
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Adobe Acrobat Document
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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Reproduction-Reference