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DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
00 I. email
SUBJECTffiTLE
DATE
Robert Tyrer to John Podesta and Dawn Smalls re: no subject (partial)
(2 pages)
07/08/1999
RESTRICTION
P5, b(6)
COLLECTION:
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Automated Records Management System
WHO ([General Wesley Clark])
OA/BoxNumber: 500000
FOLDER TITLE:
[06/29/1999 - 0711 8/1999]
2006-0325-F
ds359
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)l
Freedom of Information Act- IS U.S.C. 552(b)l
PI
P2
P3
P4
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b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency j(b)(2) of the FOIAI
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information j(b)(4) of the FOIAI
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy l(b)(6) of the FOIAI
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes l(b)(7) of tlie FOIAI
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions j(b)(8) of the FOIAI
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells j(b)(9) of the FOIAI
National Security Classified Information l(a)(l) of the PRAI
Relating to the appointment to Federal office i(a)(2) of the PRAI
Release would violate a Federal statute l(a)(3) of the PRAI
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information i(a)(4) of the PRAI
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors la)(S) of the PRAI
J>6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy l(a)(6) of the PRAI
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�'? ~· .•
L.: ...) I.; '
RECORD TYPE: PRESIDENTIAL
(NOTES MAIL)
CREATOR: Robert.Tyrer@osd.pentagon.mil®INET®LNGTWY ( Robert.Tyrer@osd.pentagon.mil®I
CREATION DATE/TIME: 8-JUL-1999 23:11:56.00
SUBJECT:
- no subject (01JDC7VDQF4Y002SFK)
TO: John Podesta®eop
READ:UNKNOWN
John Podesta@eop [ WHO
TO: Dawn L. Smalls®eop ( Dawn L. Smalls®eop [ WHO ]
READ: UNKNOWN
TEXT:
Thursday - Copenhagen
John:
sandy Berger may or may not have mentioned this to you, but I
wanted
to make sure you are up to speed.
The issue of Wes Clark's replacement is upon us, and the Secretary
will· recommend Joe Ralston to the ·President. This has been informally
di'scussed in recent days between Cohen and Sandy.
Joe had been planning to
~etire, but we prevailed upon him to accept a nomination .if the President
agrees with.our recommendation.
I think you have had enough exposure to
Joe
to see his sterling qualities - we feel he would be the strongest choice
for
CINCEUR/SACEUR.
This idea raises a couple of sensitive points, and I wanted to
outline them for you to get your thoughts.
1. Though there has been one Air Force officer in the position, it
has otherwise been held by the Army. When we receive the President's go
ahead, we will n~ed to work with Caldera and Shinseki to make sure the Army
grousing is kept to a minimum. The·air war has shown us that having an Air
Force background is relevant and, more importantly, Joe is a sufficiently
"joint" officer that I believe he can break this paradigm with ease.
While
the Army has several solid officers it could nominate for the slot, none
are
remotely in Joe's league.
2. Wes's term was due to end this month and we extended him ·for up
to a year .. Given the timing of Joe's departure as Vice Chairman
(statutorily set at March 1, .2000), we would .probably need to have the
handover from Wes to Joe take place in May, 2000, which will be a month or
two earlier than wes had been planning on.
I do not forsee this as a
problem with.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND-TYPE
SUBJECTffiTLE
DATE
WHF
RESTRICTION
08/06/1999
P6/b(6)
08/11/1999
P6/b(6)
001. email
Janet Abrams to Robert Johnson et al., re
002. email
Gaynor McCown to Patricia Davies et al., re WHF Legacy (3 pages)
003. email
Patricia Davis to Janet B. Abrams et al., re
WHF
Legacy (3 pages)
08/11/1999
P6/b(6)
004. email
Patricia Davis to Janet B. Abrams et al., re
WHF
Legacy (3 pages)
08/11/1999
P6/b(6)
005. email
Patricia Davis to Robert Johnson et al., re WHF Legacy (2 pages)
08/11/1999
P6/b(6)
006. erriail
Bruce Lindsey to Maria Echaveste re: release march (I page)
08/30/1999
P5
Legacy (3 pages)
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Freedom of Information Act- IS U.S.C. 552(b))
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information l(b)(l) of the FOIAI
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency l(b)(2) of the FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute l(b)(3) of the FOIAI
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purposes )(b)(7) of the FOIA)
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concerning wells l(b)(9) of the FOIAI
National Security Classified Information )(a)(l) of the PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office )(a)(2) of the .PRA)
Release would violate a Federal statute l(a)(3) of the PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information ](a)(4) of the PRAI
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors la)(S) of the PRA)
P6 Release. would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy l(a)(6) of the PRAI
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift. .
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�AKIVI~
t:.mall
t-'age
~ystem
RECORD TYPE: PRESIDENTIAL
·1. m.·1
(NOTES MAIL)
CREATOR: Bruce R. Lindsey ( CN=Bruce R. Lindsey/OU=WHO/O=EOP [ WHO ] )
CREATION DATE/TIME:30-AUG-1999 17:11:24.00
SUBJECT:
Re: Guiliani in Release March
TO:· Maria Echaveste ( CN=Maria Echaveste/OU=WHO/O=EOP©EOP [ WHO ] )
READ:UNKNOWN
TEXT:
Yes, I am currently planning to go to New Zealand. Jeff has been
forwarding the press on the Puerto Rican prisoners to me.
If we are
lucky, the prisoners will turn doWn our offer. The President indicated to
former President Carter that he was inclined to stop .the bombing on
Vieques, but that was before General Clark made his comment that it would
affect readiness.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�-
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
·
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
Clinton Library.
SUBJECTffiTLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
001. email
Miriam Sapiroto Antony Blinken re: FW: NATO SYG Rob-ertson
meeting with SRB (4 pages)
04/03/2000
p 1/b(l)
002. email
James Baker to Hoyt Yee re: ICTY memo for SRB (2 pages)
04/03/2000
Plib(l)
003. email
James Baker to Hoyt Yee et al. re: NATO SYG Robertson meeting
with SRB (3pages)
04/03/2000
Pl/b( I)
004. email
Hoyt Yee to Roderick vonLipsey re: ICTY memo for SRB (4 pages)
04/04/2000
Pl/b(J)
005. email
James Baker to Hoyt Yee re: ICTY memo for SRB (6 pages)
04/04/2000
PJ/b(J)
006. email
Hoyt Yee to Roderick vonLipsey re: ICTY memo for SRB (6 pages)
04/05/2000
PI/b(l)
007. email.
James Baker to Charles Allen re: Assessment (6 pages)
04/19/2000
P5
008. email
Thomas Greenwood to Gregory Schulte re: Kasich (2 pages)
08/09/2000
Pllb(l)
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P2
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financial information J(a)(4) of the PRAJ · .
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, o.r between such advisors Ja)(S) of the PRAJ
P6 Rel_ease would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
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C. Closed in accordance·with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. ·
2201(3).
RR: Document will be reviewed upon request.
Freedom of Information Act- IS U.S.C. 552(b)J
b(l) National security classified information J(b)(l) of the FOIAJ
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency J(b)(2) of the FOIAJ
·
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute J(b)(3) of the FOIAJ
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial ·
information J(b)(4) of the FOIAJ
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarra.nted invasion of
personal privacy J(b)(6) of the FOIAJ
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes J(b)(7) of the FOIAJ .
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions J(b)(8) of the FOIAJ
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells J(b)(9) of the FOIAJ
�"'
.
Exchange Ma i 1
·DATE-TIME
. FROM
04119/2000 2:30:33 PM
Baker, James E. (LEGAL)'
CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT
FW: ICTY/NATO Assessment- ABC Lunch [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO
Allen, Charles A. (LEGAL)
CARBON COPY
TEXT_BODY
. ----:-Original Message----From: Baker, James E. (LEGAL)
Sent: Monday,
·
February 14, 200010:18 AM
To: @APNSA
Cc: Schwartz,Eric P. (MULTI);
Hill, Christopher R. (SEE); Blinken, Antony J. (EUR); Malinowski,
Tomasz P. (SPCHW); @LEGAL- Legal Advisor; Leavy, David C.
. (PRESS);
. Lackey, Miles M. (LEGIS)
Subject: ICTY/NATO Assessment- ABC Lunch
.
[UNCLASSIFIED] .
DELIBERATIVE/PRIVILEGED
Sandy:
You asked
. for a firm letter that rejects the ICTY's assessment of NATO air··
·operations. The attached letter does so. The letter has not been
shared with our counterparts or Principals.
The letter includes
four building blocks: (1) A clear' statementthat NATO assiduously
observ~d the law of armed conflict, no more so than in the area of
collateral casualties-- this should give the. ICTY a basis to stand
down in much the manner that Louise Arbotrr stated that in the
absence
of evidence she was satisfied with an assurance from NATO; (2)
notation
·
- that the Tribunal's competence and a state's duty to assist the Tribunal
extends (only) to serious violations of international humanitarian
law; (3) appreciation that just motive is not license for indiscriminate
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY .
�operational conduct, but there is no factual basis to proceed with
an assessment; and (4) recognition of the irony that NATO now finds ·
itself the subj~ct of an ICTY assessment having stopped crimes
against
.
hundreds of thousands of civilians and the effect this may have on
the willingness of states to stop such crimes in the future.
·
Principals
will want to consider and agree on: ·
1. The Tone of the Letter
The letter accurately portrays U~S. views, but it is a strong
letter with additional rhetoric, which risks provoking the ICTY,
at the same time that it seeks to give the ICTY a basis to "conclude"
its "assessment." We recommend that you ask the· Secretary of State
··for her view on the tone ofthe letter~- in terms of the likelihood
it will provide the ICTY the necessary "out" to end its a·ssessment.
Too strong a letter might force the ICTY to hold its ground and
we may find ourselves in a: stalemate. Eric and I are also cautious
about overstating (or· perhaps even making explicit) the last point
in the letter: An ICTY thatloses perspective will deter future
· efforts to end humanitarian crisis, but we should avoid letting this
concern sound like a threat. In short, we are recommending a letter
with the same content and building blocks identified above, but with
less rhetoric .
. 2. Whether to offer a briefing
Clearly,
our first goal is to reject the premise of the ICTY's inquiry. However,
to the extent our second objective is an immediate conclusion of
the ICTY's assessment, PrinCipals should consider whether the letter
should also offer a staff level briefing, while making it clear we
are not going to answer interrogatories. Again, the goal would be
to offer the ICTY just enough engagement to facilitate a decision
on their part not to proceed. (Military staff are reviewing public
statements as well as the recent Defense report to see if we might
hot be responsive by answering the mail using open source
documents.
I would not count on this.) A more realistic alternative, if Principals
are inclined to this approach, is a general briefing by a mid-level
official who. was not himself in the chain of operational decision,
which would raise concerns about witness statements. The EUCOM
JAG
Vince Fagialli (sp.) would be a candidate.
3. Who signs the
�letter
One option is Gen. Clark, on behalf QfRobertson: Clark
is best situated to address the questions and more importantly to
provide theiCTY an authoritative statement that NATO did not
intentionally
·
target civilians and sought to minimize collateral casualties_ to
· the fullest extent feasible both in the cockpit as well as in NATO
capitals. A Clark letter would also ~urely he reflective of U.S.
views; we cannot be assure that Robertson would respond in the same
manner (particularly since he appears to have encouraged this line
ofquestions in the first instance.) On the other hand, there are·
some_legal advantages to having the response come back from
someone
who was not in the decisional chain of command, i.e., a potential
witness (although my non-lawyer instinct is not to let legal tactics
drive a fundamentally policy response.) To be clear, we do not have
interagency views on this point. '
4. Process
With guidance
from Principals on content and tone of a letter, we would recommend
.
.
circulating a draft to agencies up through staff to Principals .
. We.would send the draft to Gen.Clark and Sandy Vershbow' for
· clearance
.
as well. With letter in hand, Tony, Chris, Gen. Clark and Sandy
V. would thenwork within NATO for concurrence on our response.·
Concurrence: Eric Schwartz; Chris Hill, Tony Blinken, Tom
Malinowski
TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT ICTYletter.doc
Dear:
You asked about NATO's ·conduct of the air _campaign during
Operation Allied Force.
NATO's objective was to end the campaign of ethnic Cleansing in
Kosovo and to
prevent a wider conflict by striking military targets, incl~ding
command and
control mechanisms, military.and paramilitary forces, and the
infrastructure that
supported Serbia's activities in Kosovo. In doing so, NATO fully
followed the
laws of armed conflict in training, targeting and operational decisions.
·CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�.
In no area of operational decision was more effort taken than in
minimizing the
possibility of collateral casualties and damage to civilians and civilian
objects. In no case, did NATO intentionally target civilians or civilian
property. Each target was carefully assessed to determine whether it
was a valid
military object or whether it was being used for military purposes. I
knowofno
·
example in the history of human warfare in which a combatant, in this
case an
entire alliance, more assiduously observed the law of armed conflict
and the
·
.
.
protections it affords to noncombatants.
While understanding that collateral casualties would occur in time of
. armed
conflict, NATO an:d all its members were nonetheless dismayed by
even the small
·
numbers of civilians killed or injured as they reversed Milosevic's
campaign of
ethnic cleansing -·and they publicly acknowledged their responsibility
for those
collateral casualties they did inadvertently cause. NATO regrets more
the acts
of the Miiosevic regime to bent. on cleansing Kosovo of its nearly two
million
Albanian,s.
The Tribunal's competence covers the investigation and prosecution of
serious··
violations of international humanitarian law: grave breaches of the
Geneva
Conventions, the laws of customs of war (such as the wanton
··destruction of
.
cities, towns, or villages), genocide, and crimes against humanity. The
obligation of states to cooperate with the ICTY also extends to serious
violations of international humanitarian law. There have been no such '
allegations, let alone evidence, of serious violations of international
humanitarian law by NATO. Entertaining spurious allegations
demeans the
importance of the ICTY's work.
Therefore, it is with great dismay that NATO ironically now finds·
itselfthe
·
subject of an ICTY "assessment" regarding actions it took to stop
crimes against
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�hundreds of thousands of civilians in Kosovo. NATO accepts and
indeed· supports
.
ICTY territorial jurisdiction over events in Kosovo. Moreover, there is
no
question that a just motive is not license to violate international
humanitarian
law. However, in the absence of evidence, there is no basis t6 proceed
withan.
assessment ofNATO air operations. Spurious allegations are not ·
evidence. In
those few incidents where weapons missed their intended military
objective, NATO
·
·
carefully and clearly reported the event and, consistent with its duty to
provide
·
for the safety of the pilots who were risking their lives to protect
civilians in
Kosovo, publicly indicated why the event occurred.
This is in sharp contrast ~o the conduct of Serbia's military and
·
paramilitary
forces, for which Slobodan Milosevic now stands indicted for war
crimes and
crimes against humanity. They used tactics specifically designed to
inflict
suffering and death on as many civilians as they could reach - in
effect, their
·
war aim was to commit war crimes. This was a conflict between an
armed force
that intentionally caused harm to innocent people and an alliance that
took
extraordinary measUres to avoid such harm. Any war crimes tribunal
that loses
sight of that distinction will not be worthy of its name.
The ICTY should not permit its good offices to. be used to detract
from its ·
investigation of serious violations of international humanitarian law. It
would.
.
. .
. .
be tragic if such a use of the ICTY process were to dissuade states
· from acting ·
..·
(
. .·
in the future to prevent the kinds of widespread and.systemic crimes
committed in
Kosovo by the Milosevic regime. After all, the ICTY should deter
atrocities,· not
deter those who seek to end them. I trust this. responds to your questions.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�2
DRAFT/DELIBERATIVE
DRAFT/DELIBERATIVE 2111 1530 g:ICTYletter
CLINTON LIBRARy PHOTOCOPY
�Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
SUBJECTffiTLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
001. email
Roderick von Lipsey toM. Kay Joshi et al. re: Conference with
CINC's (10 pages)
09/10/1998
Pl!b(I)
002. email
Roderick von Lipsey to Antony Blinken et al. re: POTUS Meeting
with CINC's (10 pages)
09/1111998
P1/b(I)
003. email
Roderick von Lipsey to Elaine Wasseiman re: Item 1 of3 (5 pages)
09/11/1998
Pl/b(I)
004. email
Roderick von Lipsey to L. June Bartlett et al. re: Package 6034 ( 11
pages)
09/11/1998
Pl~(l)
Roderick von Lipsey to Steven Andreasen et al. re: C1NCs
Conference (24 pages)
11/03/1998
Pllb(1)
006. email
Charles Allen to James Baker re: Skaggs on Kosovo (2 pages)
11/12/1998
P5
007. email
Miriam Sapriro to Susan Braden and Stephen Flanagan re: Target
Date (4 pages)
12/07/1998
PI/b(I), P5
008. email
Gregory Schulte to Susan Braden re: Target Date (4 pages)
12/08/1998
Pl/b(I)
· 005. email
COLLECTION:
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. PI
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PJ
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Relating to the appointment to Federal office l(a)(2) of the PRAI
Release would violate a Federal statute l(a)(J) of the PRAI
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information l(a)(4) of the PRAI
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors ja)(S) of the"PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy l(a)(6) of the PRAI
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Freedom of Information Act- IS U.S.C. 552(b)l
b(l) National security classified information l(b)(l) of the FOIAI
b(i) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency j(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(J) Release would violate a Federal statute j(b)(J) of the FOIAI
b(4) Release would disclos·e trade secrets or confidential or financial
information j(b)(4) of the FOIAI
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy l(b)(6) of the FOIAI
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes j(b)(7) of the FOIAI
b(S) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions j(b)(8) of the FOIAI
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells j(b)(9)"of the FOIAI
�Exchange Mail
DATE-TIME
11/12/9810:41:47 AM
FROM
Allen, Charles A.
CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT
FW: Skaggs on Kosovo [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO
Baker, James E.
CARBON_COPY
Allen, Charles A.
Baker, James E.
DeRosa, Mary B. .
Highsmith, Newell L.
Hunerwadel, Joan S.
TEXT- BODY
.
Jamie, I have the folder on this item. Mike Hurley gave itto me
late last week for an input. I'll work with Mike on the latest policy
material he wants in the letter, to go along with your input.
·
~.
--~--Original
Message----From: Baker, James E.
Sent: Wednesday, November 11,
1998 3:23PM ·
To: Rudman, Mara E.; @BOSNIA- Bosnian Affairs
· Cc: @LEGAL
- Legal Advisor
Subject: Skaggs on Kosovo [UNCLASSIFIED]
Mara/Nick:
This is what I would propose for the legal section of the response
to Skaggs .et al on Kosovq. !'defer to Bosnia on how much of the
policy stuffto insert after the 2d and 3d paras. on constitUtional
authority. If we are to respond specifically on the legal challenge,
I recommend that Sandy, and not the President sign the letter. (I
am confident Chuck Ruff would agree.) The President should not be
put in a position of defining the scope of his authority to act,
since any future context may be different from that at issue. Moreover,
the question is now a hypothetical one, and it strikes me as
unPresidential
·
for the President to engage with Members on whether he could have
done something.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�If you concur, I will ql!ickly rllil this letter
by Chuck Ruff.
. TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT KosovoSkaggs.doc
Dear Representative Campbell: ·
Thank you for your letter about Kosovo. I share your concern about
the
continuing violence and human suffering, as well as the risks
Milosevic's
policies poseto regional stability. However, we do not agree on the
~~e~
.
the President's constitutional authority. to authorize use of force.
This Administration, like previous administrations, takes the view that
the
.·
.
President has broad authority, as Commander-in-Chief and under his
.
.
authority to
conduct foreign relations, to. authorize the use of force in the national
interest. There is ample constitutional precedent for the type of action
contemplated in October, including air operations in Bosnia in 1995
that involved
over 2300 U.S. sorties, and the deployment of ground forces to
Somalia to prevent
·
a humanitarian catastrophe. Previous administrations have taken the
position
that military actions of greater scope could be conducted without
congressional
authorization.
Nor were the actions contemplated "offensive" in nature. Our
objective was, and
remains, prevention of a humanitarian catastrophe, a negotiated and
peaceful
settlement, and prevention of a regional conflict. NATO's willingness
to
threaten the use of force did just that. The threat of force was
instri.nnental in
·
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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AND TYPE
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DATE
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[All Declassified] (0 page)
n.d.
#Error
002. note
To Nancy (I page)
ca: 9/1994
PS
Margie Sullivan to Nancy Soderberg re: Lieutenant General Wesley
Clark (I page)
09/15/1994
PS
(Q3?;)
To President Clinton from Deputy Secretary of Defense (3 pages)
ca. 9/1994
PS
~37*-3
-· 003.-·memo
004. draft
&__
3~1
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Wesley Clark])
ONBox Number: 212 ·
FOLDER TITLE:
9407198
2006-0325-F
kh754
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act- 144 U.S. C. 2204(a)l
Freedom of Information Act- 15 U.S.C. 552(b))
PI
P2
P3
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b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency l(b)(2) of the FOIAI
.
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information l(b)(4) of the FOIAI
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
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purposes l(b)(7) of the FOIAI
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and his advisors, or between such advisors la)(S) of the PRAI
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy l(a)(6) of the PRAI
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift..
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�. &>371
Nancy,
As you know, John< Deutch and General Shalikashvilihave very strong feelings about
how they want General Wes Clark to be defended by the Administration.
As John mentioned, the JCS prepared the attached packet. Deutch and Perry would like
.the White House to go with the brief response to Hoyer and DeConcini signed by the
President (not Deutch) which is Tab #3. In spite of John's strong preference, he wanted
me to show you the entire packet-- not to confuse you-- but to give you additional
background inforriuition.
·
Tab #1 is a proposed letter from Deutch to the President defending Clark. John has no
intention of signing this -- he just wants you to see it.
Tab #2 is a long response to Hoyer and DeConcini detailing the eyynts surrounding
Clark's meeting with Mladic.
Because John and Shali care so much about the handling of this matter, if you or Tony
have problems or are going to make changes to the proposed response, could you please
let me know.
Thanks.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1 OOODEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000
THE SPECIAL
ASSISTANT
September 15, 1994
MEMORANDUM FOR NANCY SODERBERG, STAFF DIRECTOR, NSC
FROM:.
Margie Sullivan .
SUBJECT:
· Lieutenant General Wesley Clark
As you know, John Deutch and General Shalikashvili have very strong feelings about.
how they want General Wes Clark to be defended by the Administration. ·
As John mentioned, the JCS prepared the attached packet. Deutch and Perry would
like the White House to go with the brief response to Hoyer and DeConcini signed by the
President (not Deutch) which is Tab #3. In spite of John's strong preference, he wanted
me to show you the entire packet-- not to confuse you-- but to give you additional
background information.
Tab #1 is a proposed letter from o·eutch to the President defending Clark. John has no
intention ofsigning this·-- he just wants you to see it.
·Tab #2 is a long response to Hoyer and DeConcini detailing the events surrounding
Clark's meeting with Mladic.
Because John and Shali care so much about the handling of this matter, if you or Tony
have problems or are going to make changes to the proposed response, could you
please let me know.
·
Thanks.
Attach merit
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�GJ313
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1000
()LJl) S '\.'-"' &,-A.~ ~1
· ·i
The President
r"A:t.---1
the White Honse
- cL~J~
Washington, DC 20500
s~.t&f
1\r-
v"ir.t-1 ·
Dear Mr. President,
Press repot.ts and a letter to youfrom Senator DeConcini ant! Representntive Hoyer
regarding Lieutenant General Wesley Clark's recent meetii1g ,~ilth General Ratko rvlladic in
· lhnja Luka have expressed concem that the t'.vent dari1aged bot..l, Ge.neral Clurk's credibility
and United States foreign policy towards the Bosnian Serbs. The congressrnt~n recommend
you "take necessary ai1d approprinte action" against General Clark.
·
· · Ot.u inquiry into this mfttter conv;nces me that no 3uch action is necessary. General
Clark acted reasonably and honorably in a difficult situation--a situation that evo1ved as a
result of an lll1fottunate sequence of events beyond his knowledge or control. In the interest .
of faimess and in defense of your Administration's foreign policy objectives, I offer the
·following facts and attach a propos,~d reply to the congressmen.
The prima1y pu1vose ofGeneraJ Chu·k's trip ro Europe from August 2G tc 27 vv"as to
[XUticipate in lJS-Rnssian joint staJf tal.ks in .Moscow. It also provided him an opportunity on
his wa.y hack to 'Nashington to observe first-·liand Operations Sharp Gmu·d, Deny Flight, and
Provide Promise. As the new1y-arrlv,ed senior US DJilitary planner for these UN dfo.rts 10
achieve a peace settlement i11 Bosnja .. Herzegovina, it was entirely appropriate that he visit
botb the NATO headquarters in Naples and the UN headquart(.~rs in Sarajevo. (Jenera! Clark
believed this side trip wou.td also p:rovide helpfnl insight for a Bo~mia option~; paper the NSC
had tasked him to write. The State Department accordingly granted him country· clearance
into (loth Italy and Bosnia-Jierzegov}na.
Immediately after his arrived in Sarajevo on 26 August, and upon the recommendations
of both the US Ambassador and Lieutenant General Sir JVIichaeJ. Rose, the comrnancler of the
UN forces in Bosnia., General Clark rnet successively with General Delic, cc.rru11811der of the
Bosnian Muslim forces; Qenerals Roso and MuslmnoviC, cornmnndei w1d deputy ~omm:.mder
of the federation forces; and Bo!>nian. President Iz.etbegovic. Early the \le:xt day, General
Clmk toured the Bo:.->nian ·rviusiun fronrlines in s~u::ajevo and had discussions wjth Ho~;ni:m
Ivluslint field command.er:>.
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�~---------------~----~------------------
------
....
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.
~As <;Jener~ Clarv{'staffpreparedto travel t<? Banja Luka, the US Defense Attache and
two members of the Joint Task Force confirmed to the general's special assistant that all
necessary steps had/been taken to clear and coordinate the trip. Assuming that the defense
attache had cons~yed the embassy, the special assistant understood his confirmation to mean
.~
the tr~p had also l,~en ap~r~ved. by the State. Department: In. fact, th~ US Charg~ d'Affaires .
had disapproyed such a visit pnor to General Clark's arnval m Bosrua-Herzegovma.
~ u5·'1"
Importantly, however, this fact was never communicated to;2-erieral Clark or his staff.
<
On 27 August, General Clark, his staff, and General Rose traveled by helicopter to
Banja Luka to meet General Mladic. During their meeting, General Clark clearly and
forcefully expressed United States concerns about t:Iie Bosnian Serbs' lack of cooperation in
the peace process, .and pressed Mladic to make a significant overture of peace such as to
demilitarize Sarajevo or one of the other safe zones~ Mladic continued to hold fiim .that the
Serbs would only support an immediate ceasefire in current positions and the initiation of
negotiations.
-~
When the meeting ended, Generals Clark and Mladic and their staffs departed the room
jnto an awaiting press ambush. General Mladic presented General Clark his field cap as a
gesture of goodwill. General Clark reciprocated··and the two were then photographed.
General Clark then gave the press a professional account of his Bosnia-Herzegovina trip and
stressed that he was in Banja Luka on a fact-finding mission and nothing more.
At lunch just before his departure, General. Clark again pressed General Mladic topffer
a tangible gesture of peace. At· that pomt, Mladic presented General Clark his personal
. weapon as an expression of his desire to end the fighting.· The oniy personal gifts offered to
General Clark wete Mladic's hat and a bottle of brandy. In keeping with common and
accepted practice, General Clark accepted the pistol and gifts. All three items have been - . turned. in to the Department for appropriate disposition.
.
.
Understandably upset by what they perceived to be his blatant disregard for their advice,
·State Department officials immediately denounced General Clark's visit. Unfortunately, their
anger fueled the· already-considerable press hyperbole. General Clark was in fact a victim of
conimunication failure and a ·skillful Bosnian Serb mailipulation of the media.
The facts as General Clark saw them during his visit to Sarajevo convinced him that
meeting General Mladic was the right thing to do. After establishing what actually happened, .
.
it is the Department's and my position that his actions were reasonable under the
circumstances. While General Clark and I .agree that the meeting would not have taken place .
. _had the State Department's concerns been c9mmunicated to him, we do not concur in the
senators' view that meeting General Mladic was so obviously a bad idea that common sense
alone should have prevented it. As. the senior military planner for US pruticipation in Bosnia
operations, General Clark was tasked. by the NSC to write a Bosnia options paper and may
someday be asked to develop a strategy for the employment of United States forces in the
Balkans. To the extent this visit enhanced his understanding of Mladic's motives, personality,
and military thinking, General Clark and our Nation have been well served.
~
'
'
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
.
�~My confidence in General Wesley. Clark's intelligence, competence, and integrity
remains uilshaken. · I hope you will join me in expressing support for this fine officer. ,
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
I
�Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
SUBJECTrriTLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
00 I a. Jetter
Address (Partial) (I page)
09/23/1999
00 Ib. Jetter
~mbassador
07/3011999
00 Ic. letter
Address (Partial) (I page)
ca. 1999
P6/b(6)
oo 1d. letter
Address (Partial) (I page)
ca. 1999
P6/b(6)
OO!e. fax
Address (Partial) Phone Nci. (Partial) (I page)
08/0211999
P6/b(6)
001 f. Ietter
Address (Partial) (I page)
ca. 1999
P6/b(6)
00 I g. letter
Address (Partial) (I page)
ca. 1999
P6/b(6)
00 I h. letter
'Address (Partial) (I page)
ca. 1999
P6/b(6)
00 I i. letter
Address (Partial) (I page)
ca. 1999
P6/b(6)
00 Ij. letter
Address (Partial) (I page)
. ca. 1999
P61b(6)
00 I k. Jetter
Address (Partial) (I page)
ca. 1999
P6/b(6)
00 II. letter
Address (Partial) (I page)
ca. 1999
P6/b(6)
Swanee Huntto President Clinton (partial) (2 pages)
P6/b(6)
. P5, P6/b.(6)
~3~1
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management·
([We~ley Clark])
OA!Box Number: 2744
FOLDER TITLE: ·
9905915
2006-0325-F
. kh753
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act- 144 U.S.C. 2204(a)J
PI Natiomil Security Classified lnformaiion i(a)(l) of the PRAJ
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office i(a)(2) of the PRA)
·
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute i(a)(3) of the PRA)
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
- financial information )(a)(4) of the PRAI
· PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President.
and his advisors, or between such advisors la)(S) of the PRAI
P6 Release would constitute a· clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy j(a)(6) of the PRAI
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Freedom of Information Act- IS U.S.C. 552(b)J
b(l) National security classified information l(b)(l) of the FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency l(b)(2) of the FOIAJ
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute l(b)(3) of the FOIAJ
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information l(b)(4) of the FOJAI
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy l(b)(6) of the FOIAI
b(7) Release would disclos~ information compiled for law enforcement
purposes l(b)(7) of the. FOIAI
b(S) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions l(b)(S) of the FOIAI
·
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells l(b)(9) of the FOIAI
�------------
Ambassador Swanee Hunt
[ oo\b]
...
"·
'-1-::--
5crl ~ ·_
July 30, 1999
.,
President Clinton
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20500
Dear Mr. President,
The International Herald Tribune (front page, above 1he fold) and Boston Globe have,
· yery sadly, cairied several stories of your administration publicly slapping General Wes
· Clark." following his successful leadership of the Kosovo campaign. I am, of course, not
privY to the inside story, and I have not been in touch with Wes, but, after the
indescribable effort he spent getting action where .others wanted only to delay, I am so, so
.sorry that this· is how he is being repaid, according to the press. The timing appears to
_allow only an interpretation that this is a punitive act.
can
turn this around, and l respectftllly ask that you make amends for this
I believe you
public disgracing of one of your rnost courageous advocates. W es Clark should serve out
. his full term. as NATO commander. He has been a robust champion for you inwinning
· the war in Kosovo, and he has earned the respect of our NATO allies. I have been told
(perhaps incorrectly) that Wes' desire to send in ground troops conflicted with your NSC
leadership's opinion, and that is why he is now being punished. If that is the case, let's
remember that as many as 200,000 Kosovar Albanians may have died as we bombed and
rebombed and rebombed targets rather tha,n sending in troops. Maybe only bombing was
the best approach. Maybe it wasn't. But clearlythere was strong reason to take the
position W es did~ (Again, my information is not from Wes, but from a. high-ranking
fotmer military leader who is plugged into the network)
The unfortunate and possibly unintended consequence of the Pentagon leaking the news
of General Clark;s premature relinquishing of his position has had the effect ofnot oilly
publicly tarnishing his reputation, but more ir.nportantly severely diminishing his
effectiveness for the next 9 months. From what I read, he now appears to retain his
command without the support ofkey players in the Pentagon, and, most important
without your backing. As a direct result, he will be unable to speak convincingly for us or
for NATO.
Recently a former senior commander in the NATO structure (different from the one I
mentioned above) gave me his explanation of why our US military did such a miserable
job vis a vis war criminals in Bosnia (leading, I believe to the Kosovo conflict). He beard
that "Washington" had told the top US commander in Bosnia that ifthere was. one ·
AUG 417:33
Tel
~~{~~-~f.(~.~~~
,
_fax:&~®@~~ Emctil:s11J~nee_bunt@btZrDm'd.edu WJ6~~~~~~+IN(
rt'tLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~LINTON LIBRARY rHorocorv
�"mistake," his career was over. Perhaps that's why our military allowed the situation to
·simply fester, which has resulted in Dayton not being fulfilled. (By the way, this is not
simply allegation. I had fi.rst~hand knowledge of our first US commander in Sarajevo
declaring "If Mladic walks into a cafe where I'm sitting, we're just going to walk out the
back door.")
·
How on earth can a military leader face a Milosovic with that sort of apprehension about
his career? Should he look at the enemy in front him, or over his shoulder? Wes
leaned forward, and thank God he did. He should not be punished now by those who
disagreed. History will show he was one of the only right-thinking military leaders in this
whole Balkan mess. If he is now disgraced, that lesson will become precedent in futUre
military .situations.
of
Forgive rne iflatn completely offtargetin this ..Perhaps this is naive, but I'm assuming
you were not informed of the full implications ofthis 'rotation decision. Nor is the
military bureaucracy a field I know; I'm simply telling you how the papers are
·interpreting fujs .latest anrtounc.emen,t. As you well know, their interpretation is as close to
reality as the public will get. My military friends have told me the excuses coming from
the Pentagon about how this is a nonnal rotation issue are disingenuous. The precedent is
for tenns of four, five, even eight years for the SACEURs, ever sinceEisenhower. The
Pentagon's false explanations are a discredit to that institution.
You have displayed exceptional leadership in U1is recent conflict. Please don't let a
· . passionate advocate for your values and vision of a multi-cultural world, in which tyrants
are courageously confronted, be publicly demeaned because of internal disgreements
within your administration. Your leadership is needed now.
Sincerely,
?5
Swanee
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Email: swanee_bllm@haroard;edu
�
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