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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
RESTRICTION
DATE
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
SUBJECTffiTLE
·OOl.note
Stephen Neuwirth to Jack Quinn; re: Seri:rinole Tiibe Ruling (1 page)
',
ca., April
1996
P5
Jack Qubm to POTUS; re: Supreme Court Ruling on State Sovereign
Immunity (2 pages)
0511996
002. memo
__ 003. memo
Jack Quinn to POTUS; re: Supreme Co]lli Ruling on State Sovereign
05/1996
P5
04/15/1996
D~-
(p\q5
P5
P5
~
Immunity (2 pages)
· 004. memo
Jack Quinn to POTUS; re: Supreme Court Ruling on State Sovereign
ImmunitY (2 pages) ·
,.•.
005. memo
Jack Quinn to POTUS; re: Supreme Court Ruling on State Sovereign
Immunity ( 1 page)
04/1996
P5
006. note
Stephen Neuwirth to Jack Quinn; re: Seminole Tribe Ruling (1 page)
ca~,
April
1996
P5
Jack Quinn to POTUS; re: Supreme Court Ruling on State Sovereign
04/1996
P5
04/1996
P5
007. memo.
(p
195
·Immunity. (2 pages)
008. memo
Jack Quinll to POTUS; re: Supreme Court Rulmg on State Sovereign
Immunity (2 pages)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
Counsel's Office
Stephen R. Neuwirth (Subject File)
ONBox Number: 378
FOLDER TITLE:
Se~ole Tribe [1]
Jimmie Purvis
c - - - - - - - - - - ____________
2Q.06-0197-F
. 199
RESTRICTION CODES .
Presidentia] Records Act: [44 U.S.C. 2204(a))
PI National Security Classified Information ((a)(l) of the PRA)
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office ((a)(2) of the PRA)
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, P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information ((a)(4) of the PRA)
PS Release would disclose confidential advise between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(S) or' the PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of.
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA)
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. OnrnmPnt "'ill hP rP.viP.wert nnnn reoue.d.
Freedom of Information Act- [5 U.S.C. 552(b))
· b(l)National security classified information [(b)(l) of the FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of ,
an agency ((b)(2) of the FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or ~onfidential or financial'
information [(b)(4) ofthe FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of ·
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA)
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· purposes [(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) ofthe FOIA)
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
. concerning wens l(l@:t}ttNif'ONAIL
I BRARY. PHOTOCOPY
�Jack:
I have received your comments about the Seminole Tribe memo, and I understand from
Kathy Wallman that you are still concerned about the relationship between (1) state VS. state
official and (2) monetary damages vs. declaratory or injun~tive relief. Your comments also
ask why the issue of monetary relief is relevant, since the Seminoles' claim was "to enforce
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. "
·. As you may recall from the first draft of the memo I sent you, the Court did more than rule
that Congress does not have authority under the Indian Commerce Clause to create a private
right of action to enforce the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. The Court also expressly
overruled an earlier decision which had held that the Commerce Clause authorized Congress
to create a private right-of action against states for monetary damages under CERCLA .. This
was not dicta. The Court said overruling the earlier cas~ was necessary to its decision here. Thus, the Court inade clear that, in the context of statutes passed under the Commerce Clause
(such as many environmental statutes), states have sovereign immunity from private suits for
any type of relief -:- monetary, declaratory or injunctive.·
At the same time, the Court also made clear· that Congress does have power under the
Commerce Clause to authorize certain ·suits against state officials. The Court has held in the
past that, in the context of Commerce Clause legislation, private parties may sue state
officials for declaratory or injunctive relief to enforce a federal statute .. Such declaratory or.
injunctive relief can include a prospective requirement that a state expend funds. But the law
is also quite dear that a private party may not sue state officials to obtain payment of past
damages.
What does this mean for environmental litigation? I have been advised by DOJ that the
· majority of private suits to cause state enforcement of federal environmental statutes are suits·
· against state officials for declaratory or injunctive relief. Nothing in Seminole Tribe appears
· to restrict such suits. · However, certain statutes, such as CERCLA, do contemplate private
claims directly against states for past monetary damages -- such as clean-up contributions that
a state f~ed to make. Seminole Tribe may effectively preclude such private claims for
monetary damages, because current law suggests that_a state official cannot be sued to obtain
payment of damages by the state. DOJ is currently analyzing how significant an impact this
restriction is likely to have on private enforcement of federal environmental statutes.
I hope that this clarifies these issues. If this explanation seems helpful, I will prepare a new\
draft of the memo that incorporates this approach, as well as the other comments you gave
)7_
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Steve
cc:
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Kathy Wallman
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L~~OTOCOPY
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CLINTON
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�Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
001. memo
DATE
SUBJECTffiTLE
RESTRICTION
. ~·/04[1?96
.
Marcia Hale & Emily.Bromberg to Leon Panetta et al; re: :{ndian
Gaming National Governors' Association (1 page) ('e..\~ f.1._1:?
.\
.
o- ......, . 01-.f": I \
.
/
P5
.
.
N.LM 5 2)...r::::roC(;,- { 22
002.memo
Bruce Babbitt to Leon Panetta; re: ~esponse to Semin'(_le T.~ihf of rv\ ~4/~996 cG5- \ ~ :;;;._, CJ \\
Florida v. Florida (3 pages) ~(a-~b-e....LJ) N L
aCl
003. note
Stephen R.Neuwirth to Jack Quinn; re:
page)
·
~e~ole Tribe Ruling· (1
·
circa., April
1996
P5 . lil I 9 5
.0 uf
·
memo
Jack Quinn to POTUS; re: Supreme Court Ruling on State Soyereign
Immunity (2 pages)
0411996
P5
005. memo
Jack Quinn to POTUS; re: ·Supreme Court Ru1ing on State Sovereign
Immunity (1 page)
04/1996
P5
006:memo
Elena Kagan to Harold Ickes; re: Seminole Tribe v. Florida (3 pages)
03/3111996 - P5
004~
(o \ ~ ~
. : COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
Counsel's office
Kathy Wallman (Subject File)
ONBox Number: 849
FOLDER TITLE:
Indian Gaming
Jimmie Purvis
2006-0197-F
. 202
RESTRICTION CODES
·.
Pre~Jd_ential
Records Act- [44 U.S.C. 2204(a))
. Pt National Security Classified Information [(a){l) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA)
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) ofthe PRA)
p4 Release would disclose trade s.ecrets.·or confidential commercial or
· financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA)
PS Release would disclose confidential advise between the President
and his advisors, or between su~h advisors [a)(S) of the PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) ~f the PRA)
c. o'osed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
RRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
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. RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Freedom of Information Act- [5 U.S.C. 552(b))
b(l}National security classified information [(b)(l) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules arid practices of
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA)
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·
· information [(b)(4) of the FOIA)
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·
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financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA)
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concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA)
CLINTON LIBRARY- PHOTOCOPY
�< '
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 31, · 1996
·MEMORANDUM FOR HAROLD ICKES
FROM:
ELENA KAGAN ''(-
CC:
JACK QUINN, KATHY WALLMAN
SUBJECT:
SEMINOLE TRIBE V. FLORIDA
Kathy Wallman asked'me to give you a brief summary and
analysis of the recent Supreme Court decision in Seminole Tribe
v. 'Florida. In that .case, the Court invalidated, as an incursion
on state so~erei~nty, a ~revision of the Indi~n-Gaming-Regulatory
'Act ( IGRA) permitting tr-ibes to sue States in federal court for .
failirig to negotiate in good faith toward the foimation of gamirig
compacts. The practical significanceof the decision for Indian
gaming is very uncertain. Also ·uncertain is the effect of thedecision on other kinds of enforcement actions brought against
the States.
Background and holding
'
IGRA provides that an Indian tribe may conduct certain
gaming activities only in conformance with a valid compact
b~tween the tribe and the State in which the gaming activities
are located. The Act imposes·on the States a duty to negotiate
in good faith with an Indian tribe toward the formation of a
compact and authorizes a tribe to bring suit in federal cou.J;t
against a State in order to compel performance of that duty~
In accordance with the Act, the Seminole Tribe sued the
State of Florida for refusing to engage in good-faith ·
'negotiations over a gaming compact. The State argued that the
suit violated its Eleventh Amendment right to sovereign immunity
from suit in federal court.
The Court accepted th~ State's argument, reversing a recent
decision to hold that neither the Commerce Clause nor the Indian
Commerce Clause grants-congress the authority to abrogate the
sovereign immunity of the States. Thus, Congress cannot subject
a ·State to private suit in federal court for violating a statute
(like IGRA) enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause or Indian
- Commerce Clause.
1 -
Implications for Indian Gaming
As a preliminary 'matter, it should be noted that Seminole
Tribe has no effect at all on already existing gaming compacts.·
Nor does it prevent willing States from entering into compacts in
the future. The decision makes a difference only when a State
and tribe have reached impasse regarding a compact.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�· It is unclear, however, exactly wh~t difference the de~ision
makes. One possibility is that the ~ribe now has no recourse .at.
all when a State refuses to negotiat~ in good faith; on this
understanding, the State's obligation to engage in good-faith
·negotiations, which-is at the very heart of IGRA, becomes wholly
unenfor~eable. ·A second, very different possibility is that the
tribs now ha~ the ability to·go straight to the Secretary of the
Interior for a remedy; with the federal courts :out of the
picture, the Secretary himself determines whether a State has
acted in bad faith and, if so, what remedy (up to and including
·the imposition of compact terms) is appropriate. Doubtless _there
are other possibilities in between these two~
·
The Department of Inteiior is cutrently considering ~hat
view to adopt ori this issue. Interioi believes-that in the next~
few months, several tribes will allege bad faith on ~he part of
.States and petiti6~ the S~cretary for relief. Interior intends
to present art options paper to the White House this week on what
to do in ~uch cases: whether to set up a remedial mechanism
within the Departme~t to handles allegations of this kind, and,
if so,_ how that m~chanis~ would operate. ·
·
Broader Implications
The Court's holding pOtentially affects any private suit
brought against ~ St~te in federal court that alleges a violation
of a statute enacted under Congress's. Commerce Clause power. For
example, the decision may bar an' individual from suing a State in
federal court for violating environmental laws, antitrust laws,
or copyright and patent laws. Some·of these laws will remain
enforceable by individuals in state court, subject to whatever
sovereign immunity defenses the state court .chooses to recognize.
But ~o~e of these laws give exclusive jurisdiction to the federal
courts, so that no alternative forum is available.
·
·.In many cases, 'however, there will be ways around the
Court's ruling. First, Congress can condition the receipt of
federal monies on a State's :Submission to suit in federal court.
At least arguably, ~orne current statutes authorizing 6itizen
· ~uit~ do so through exactly this mecihanism; private suits brought
in federal court under these statutes thus 2ould go· forward.
Second, an individual usually can bring suit .for injunctive
relief against officials ac~ing on the State's behalf, even if
not against the State itself. The Court ruled that this option
was not available in Seminole because by pr-escribing a detailed
remedial scheme in IGRA, Congress implicitly had disallowed suits
against state officials. But when a law does not create such a
detailed remedial scheme -- and certainly ~h~n a law explicitly
authorizes suits against state officials -- such suits provide a
way to escape the Court's new understanding of the Eleventh
Amendment. ·
Moreover~ the Court's holding does not apply at all to
actions against a State alleging a violation of the Fourteenth
-CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�. Amendment or civil rights stat~tes enacted to enforce ;i. t. The
Court reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment,- in any cases in
·which it applied, effectively overrode the Eleventh Amendment.
The Court's d~cision nonetheless has broad significance.
The decision will d9ubtless stand in the way of at least some
citizen suits brought to ~nforce federal la~ (a~.it barred the
Seminoles' own lawsuit). And the decision,· especially when ·
viewed together with the holding last year that Congress lacked
authority to prohibit gun~ near schools, indicates a serio~s
effort by a -bare majority·of the Court to reorient the balance of
power between the federal government and the States. It is
highly unlikely that this case will be the last one to pursue
that states'-rights.agenda.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DATE
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE
OO}a. fax cover
··sheet
Michael Schattman to Lynn Cutler; re: Legal Opinion (1 page)
OOib. memo
06/24/1999
RESTRICTION
·ps
,.
.r_;;,q 7
.
Michael Schattman Richard Hayes; re: HuB Zone Eligibility-.
Concerns Owned by Native American Indian Tribes or Community
Development Corporations [2 pages missmgj (14 pages)
06/04/1999
PS
L>
1Li8 . DL!f.
.
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
Intergovernmental Affairs
Lynn Cutler (Subject File)
ONBox Number: 17083
FOLDER TITLE:
5/12/99 Meeting w/POTUS and Tribal Leaders [2]
Jimmie Purvis
2006-0197-F
. 616
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a))
Ft·eedom of Information Act -IS U.S.C. 552(b))
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information [(b)(l) of the FOIAI
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency ((b)(2) of the FOIA)
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b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or ·confidential or financial
.
·
information [(b)(4) of the FOIAI
b(6) Release would_ constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
.
purposes l(b)(7) of th(! FOIA)
b(S) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
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··
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'
· PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
. and his advisors, or between such advisors la)(S) of the PRAJ
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
CUNTON -ueRARY
PHOTOCOPY
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CLINTON UBRARV
PHOTOCOPY
�Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library.
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
001. memo
002a. fax cover
sheet
·002b. memo
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Michael Schattman to Richard Hayes; re: HUBZone Eligibility Concerns Owned by Native America!f Indian Tribes or Community
De~eloj:>metit Corporations (16 pages)
Mike Schattman to Lynn Cutler; re: Legal Opinion from SBA (1
·page) ·
Michael Schattman to Richard Hayes; re: HUB Zone Eligibility-.
Concerns Owned by Native American Indian Tribes or Community
Development Corporations (16 pages)
·
RESTRICTION
06/04/1999
PS
(olq8
06/24/1999
PS
~\~7
Dlf
06/04/1999
PS
Col q8
Dup
.~COLLECTION:
Glinton Presidential Records
Domestic Policy Council
Mary Smith (Subject File)
ONBox Number: 16170
FOLDER TITLE:
.Native American Demonstration Projects [4]
·Jimmie PurVis
2006-0197-F .
. 661
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act- [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act- [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
PI National Security Classified Information [(a)(l) of the PRA]
·pz Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the P·resident
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(S) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
. personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRAI
b(l) National security classified information [(b)(l) of the FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose ·internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA)
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information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(S) Release w·ouid disclose information concerning the regulation of .
financial institutions [(b)(S) of the FOIA[
b(9) Release wouid disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA)
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
CLINTON Ll BRARY
PHOTOCOPY
�•
.t\U!'..
;J,
1000
.
.
u.s.
SM~L.L.. SU51NS:SS ,ll..DMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON,
O.C;
.40416
'
OFFICE OF GENERAl COUNSEL
.MEJ10RAJVDUM
DATE:
June4. 1999
TO:
Richard L. Hayes
Associate Deputy Administrator for
Government Contracting and Minority Enterprise Development
.FROM:
:vlichael D. Schattman
General Counsel
. (/{).;
RE:-
Hu'BZone Eligibility: Concerns Owned b~ ~ative Americ~ Indian Tribes or
Community Development Corporations.
A,/kl.
'·
Your staff has requested our views on whether business concerns owned or ·controlled by a.
Community Development Corporation r'CDC'') or a Native· American Indian Tribe ("Tribe")
qualify as HUBZorte smaU eu.siness concerns under the HUBZone Act of 1997 ( 11 HUBZone Act"
or ''Act"), Pub. L. No. 105-135, § 601 ~seq. (codified at lS U.S.C. § 6S7a). We conclude that a·
small business concern owned or controlled by a CDC is .not ari eligible HUBZ.one small
busmess concern. We conclude, however, that a small business concern owned or·controlled by
a Tribe is ail eligible HUBZone small business concern.
can
In addition, we have considered the p·rovisions for Alaskan ~ative Corporations ("ANCs") in our
_regulations to ensure appropriate treaunent. since confusion exists as to why ANC-owned small
busmess concerns are eligible linder our regulations. We conclude that our existing regulations
tor A?IJCs are legally correct.
The reasoning for our conclusions is set forrh below._
, A.
.-\re Small Business Concerns Owned o_r Controlled by CDCs Eligible for the
HUBZone Program?
The HUBZone Act was enacted · to provide "Federal contracting assistance to qualified
*
HUBZone small business concems~''.inter alia. 15 U.S.C. 657a(a). A HUBZone small business
concern is one "£hat is ow11ed alld controlled by 1 or more persoils. each of whom is a United
Swces cici=en" Td. § 632(p)(3) (emphasis added). ·
·
The HUB Zone -~ct does not define the term ··person." Section l.of Tide L entitled "Rules of
Construction," does-detine the term "person." That section states that when "determining the
�'"". "r v .......
meanmg of an:' Act of Congress, unless rhe context lndicares otherv.·ise,'' the word person
"tncludes corporat1ons, companies. associanons, Iirms, pannerships, societies. and joint stock
l.:ompames. Js well as individuals.'' l L-.S.C. ~ L A CDC is a "corporation. Thus. for federal
::>tatutory purposes. inciuding the HlJBZone Act. :t CDC is a ··person."'
_-\ccording to the HCBZone Act, however, .:ach ··person·· that "owns ·and controls" a HlJBZone
concern must also be a ~·United States citizen." 15 U.S.C. § 632(p)(3). The HUBZone Act does
. noi define the term ··United States titizen:' There is nothing in 1 U.S.C. § 1 definin!:} eitherthe
remi '"citizen'" or. -~United States citizen:· Therefore, it is unclear from the text whether a
· corporation such as a CDC can be deemed a U.S. citizen for purposes of the HUBZone Act. To
help determine whei:her ·a statutory term has a particular meaning. Ule auempt to discern.
congressional intent from the legislative history of the statute. 2A Sutherland Sta.tutOtY
·Construction§ 47.27 (5th ed. 1992).
According .to Sutherland, supr;b both the committee report and conference report represent the
· , inost persua.Sive indicia of congressional intent in enacting a statute. Is!:. §§ 48.06, 48.08.
· UnfortUnately~ there is nothing in either report addressing this issue. Iri fac:t, the legislative
history is span;e wirh respect to the meaning of the tenn U.S. citizen as applicable to the
HUBZone ·Act. There are. however, a few statementS made during introductory remarks by
Senator Christopher S~ Bond (R-MO), the HUBZone Act's sponsor. Couns generally give
consideration to statements made by a bill's sponsor, but do so cautiously. Id. § 48.15. With
these premises in mind, we review the statements made by Senator Bond about the HUBZone
Act.
Senator Bond introduced the Hl.:JBZorie AGt of 1997 as Senate Bill208 ("S. 208"). s_ 208, l05th
Cong.. 1st Sess. ( 1997). The bill, as introdu.c:ed and enacted, required that a HUB Zone smaH
business concern beowned and controlled by persons, each of whom is a U.S. citizen. In one
instance. during Senator Bond's introductory remarks on this bill, he spoke about tWO companies
called ~.villages and Edgewood Technology Services, lnc. ('"ETS"). Senator Bond described
ETS as his prototype HUBZone small business. 143 Cong. Rec. 5730 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1997).
To learn more about the Senator's HUBZone protor.ype. we riow tum to the history of S. 1574,
"which was the precursor bill to S. 208_ 1
. ·
,
.
.
.
.
.
On March 21. l996, the L".S. Senate Committee on Small Business held hearings on.S~ 1574.
Senator Bond presided over the hearings. Employees o'f ETS testified at that hearing. All of
ETS's employees were residents of the Northwest Washington. D.C. community where the
business was located. The Senator stated at the hearing that:
[o}ur goat here.~n this Committee is to make sure companjes like ETS have the
incentives to locate in HUBZones and to hire local residents
order to become
digible for Government c:onq-act set-asides. With this approach. I think our
in
: S. lSi-+ was never enacted into law. However, likeS. 108 that eventually wa.S enacted, S. 1574
required that a HUBZone small business concern .be owned
controllti!d ·by one or more ·
persons. t:ach of whom is a U.S. citizen. S. 1574. 104th Cong., :!nd Sess. ( 1996).
and
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-· ,,.....,..."""DV
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·
..
�w • • ...,.. .......
.
--~·--·---
:--.!arion can rece1ve a direct "·alue added from these small businesses in return for
receiving valuable government contract preferences.
S. 15"'~.1,-The HL~BZone _-\ct of 1.996, Revitalizing [nner Cities and Rural America: Hearing on
S. 1574 Before the Committee on Small Business U.S. Senate~ 104th Cong., 2nd Sess. 3 (March
21, 1996).
.
The co-foWlder.of a company c~lled e.~illages also testified at that hearing. e.villages owned
and conrrolled. in part. ETS. [d. e. villages was a commercial. for-profit. data servicing company .
fonned by Adelson Entertainment and the Hamilton Securities Group. e. villages brought
computer-based learning, job training. and entrepreneurship opportunities to poor communities.
!f!. . e.villages had established a pilot training center and data management enterprise at .
Edgewood Terrace, an assisted multi-family housing complex in Wa.Shington, D.C. Several
graduates of the training program were hired by e. villages to start the new enterprise, ETS. ETS ·
~.mployees \vere ellgible to earn equity in e.villages's Employee Stock Ownership Plan. I:n
addition, it appears that ETS employees also owned part of ETS. 14. at -16. Thus, Senator
·Bond's HUBZone prototype was a company owned and controlled iri part by another company,
and two other companies owned the parent company. The HUBZone prototype was not 100°fo
owned and controlled by Li.S. citizens, if that term includes only individual~. ·
·
.
.
.
In addition to Senator Bond's comments, we have discovered only one more piece of relevant
legislat~ve history concerning this specific issue. It is from a committee hearing on s. 208 (the
bill that was enacted into law), at which Senator John Keiry (D-MA) posed certain questions to
·the SBA Administrator.. We review this legislative history with the understanding that courts ate ·
often hesitant
rely on statements made by committee members or other persons at the
corruninee's hearings.
Sutherland Statutory Construction § 48.10.
In fact, "[g]enerally
statements made by others at the committee hearings concerning the nature and effect of a bill
:1re not accorded any weight." Id.
·
to
:--.iot\Vithstanding the above. we- note that at the hearing Senator Kerry asked the Administrator
·~ow many· CDC$ were located in HUBZones. The SBA Administrator submitted wrinen.
responses to the Senator. :1fier th~ committee hearing. These responses ~·ere printed in Ihe
committee report. The Administrator had responded that the majority of the then current CDCs
were located in HUBZones. The Ht]BZone Act of 1997: Hearing on S. 208 Before the.
· Committee on Small Business U.S. Senate, I 05th Cong., lst Sess. 93 (February 27, 1997)
(""Hearing on S. 208").
~one of this scant legislative history is clear or persuasive as to whether corporations such as
CDCs were intended by Congress ro be'deemed U.S. citizens for purposes of the HUBZone Act.
One could speculate thar the legislative histocy, sparse as it is. evidences
intention to include·
· corporate~owned small businesses within the ambit of the HUBZone Act The same legislative
history, however. could be interpreted in other ways. ETS very well may have been labeled a
HUBZone prototype by Senator Bond only because it was a small business located in a
disadvantaged neighborhood. and hired only employees from that neighborhood. with no
consideration given to its ownership technicaliries The little testimony on CDCs is also of no·
help. It is not clear that either Senator Kerry or the Administrator believed that small businesses
an
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owned by CDC$ could be 4ualified HL"BZone smalf buSiness concerns. Rarher. the testimqny
concerning CDCs located in HUB Zones is ·merely evidence that certain. disadvantaged areas may
recei\·e aid from both CDCs and HUBZone small busmess concerns. Finally, none of the
· legislative history directly addresses the issue ~f whether artificial entities are to be d~emed U.S.
citizens under the HUBZone Act, and none of it comes from a committee or conference report, a·
source representing the most persuasive indicia of congressional intem. See Sutherland Statuton,
Construction ~~ 48.06. ~8.08.
In surri, the legislative history is <Unbiguoils. inconclusive and calls for speculation. When
.Congress provides little material with which to determine the proper legislative history, ·
speculation is improper. · ~ iSL. § 48.0-2; ~ Mm Western Air Lines .. -Inc. v. Bd. of EqualiZation ·
of South Dakot~ 480 U.S. 123 (1987). Because the legislative history here does not aid in
deciding whether to define a CDc-a US. citizen under the HUBZone Act, we most look to other.
sources for guidance.
The first additional source we considered is the FouneenrhAm.endment of the U.S. Constirution.
The Fourteenth Amendmetl[ uses the term ·•citizens of the United States." It states, in part:
All persons bom or naruralized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and.ofthe State wherein they reside~ No
Sune shall make or enforce any .law which shall abridge the privileges or
·immunities of citizens of the United States ....
When interpreting this dause, the U.S. Supreme Coun has held that "citizens of the United
States'' must be natural and not artificial persons. See Hague v, Comm. fqr Indus. Org.., 307 U.S.
496, 514 (1939); see also Hamilton v. Lokuta, 803 F. Supp. 82, 86 (E. D. Mich. 1992).
Furthermore. the Supreme Coun has held that_ corporations are not citizens of the United States
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Grosjean v. Arrieris:an PTess Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936)~
Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648. 656 (1981). A
CDC. therefore, would nor be considered a C'.S. citizen under the Fourteenth Amendment. See
id.
Several Federal statutes also use the tenn ''citizen of the United States." The Indian Depredation
Act (26 Stat. at L. 851, chap. 538) also included the term, but did not define ir. The issue of
whether a corporation is a ''citizen of the United States" for purposes of thiu statute was
addressed in United St::ites v. Northwestern Express. Stage & Transportation Co., 164 U.S. 686
( 1897). In that case~ a !=Orporation incorporated under the laws of Minnesota sued the Sioux
~ation.
The corporation alleged that the Sioux tribal members took or destroyed the
corporation's four horses and the horses' harnesses. The trial court ruled in favor of the
corporation and awarded it $750. The court had decided rhar the corporation was a U.S. citizen
t~r purposes of that statute because it was incorporated by a state of the Union. ·
·
.
.
'
On appeal. the Supreme Coun held rhat_ a cardinal rule commands that- rhe Cotin seek.out and.
apply rhe evident purpose intended to be accomplished by the lawmaking power. Northwestern
Exoress .. Stage & Transpomirion Co., 164 U.S. at 688. The Court found that •he statute at issue
was meant to make citiiens whole for the losses they might have sustained by Indians and that
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�"cases m1ghl arise. \.Vhere. m ordt:r to make rt::s.munon to ctuzens ofthe Cnited State$, the ter:m in
- question \vould require a construction embracing Federal and state corporations," because the
title to property would be in the name of the corporation and the claims for darnages to such
property could not be presented in the names of the stockholders. Id. at .690. Thus, the Court
concluded that corporations are U.S. citizens for purposes of this ''remedial" statute. In the case
of Ramsey v. Tacoma Land Co., l96 U.s.· 360. 362 (1905), the Coun again held that the term
citizens of the United States. as w;ed in a "remedial statute'' should be considered as including
Slate corporations. The statute in question gave citizens the right [0 remedy imperfect land titles
.on land purchased from railroad companies by purchasing the land from the Government.
.
.
Turning to more modem statutes, the Fed~ral Aviation Act defines the tenn ·and states that:
'citizen of the United States' means(A)
individual who is a citizen ofthe United States;
(B) a partnership each of whose partners is an individual who is a citizen ofthe
United States; or
.
. ·
.
(C) a coq)oration or association organized under the laws ofthe United States or a·
Sta[e, the Distnct of Columbia, or a territory
possession of the Uruted
. States. of which the pres1dentand at least two-thirds of the board of directors
and other managing officers are citizens of the United States, and
which at
least 75 percent of the voting interest is owned or controlled by persons that ·
are citizens ofthe United States. 49 U.S.C. § 40102(15) (1994),
an
or
in
This starute specifically provides that certain corporations owned and controlled by U.S. citizens
shall b~ deemed U.S. citizens for purposes ofthat legislation.- See· also 10 U.S.C. § 9511 (1994)
(U.S. citizen has the same meaning given the term in 49 U.S.C. § 40102(15)). Likewise, the
Shipping Act states that tor purposes of that Act, ··no corporation, pannership, or association
shall be deemed a citizen of the United States unless the controlling interest therein is owned by
citizens of the United States. and. in the case of a corporation, unless its president or other chief
executive officer and the chairman ofits'board of directors are citizens of the United States." ~
L'.S.C. Appx ~ 802(a) ( 1994 & Supp. 1998); ~ also 9 US.C. § 102 (1994) (stating that for
. p·urposes of that statute section ··a corporation is a citizen of the United States if it is incorporated .
· or has its principal place of business in the United States'') ..-\gain. the statute expressly provides
that certain corporations shall be deemed U.S. citizens for purposes of that legislation.:! .. ·
,
- Incomparison . .28 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), eriacted pursuant to the above-quoted privileges and
immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that every person who ·•subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen afthe United States or other person within the jurisdic;tion
... thereof to the deprivation C!f.atiy rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constirution and
laws. shaH be liable .to the pany injured.'' (Emphasis added). That statute does not define the
tenn ~'citizen of the United States or other person.'' Courts have deemed corporations to be an
··other per-Son" for ~. 1983 purposes and thus have not had. 10 reach the issue of whether a
corporatiOn IS a ··citizen of the United States:' · See South Macomb Disoosal Authority v.
Washington, 790 F.2d 500, 503 (6th Cir. 1986); Des Vergnes v. Seekonk Water Dist., 601 F.2d 9
(1st Cir. 1979).
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�..~s.part of our analysis. \Ve have.n:!vlewed \\·ith care rhe case law that has ~volved\\dth respect to
the Lanham Act. Supertl~;ially, that line of c:l.Ses could be read to deem corporalions as "U.S.
~itizens ... We do not believe a thorough review suppons that condusion.
·-The Lanham Act. 15 Li.S.C. § 1051 ~~,makes liable ··::my person who shall, in conunerce.~·
infringe _a: trademark. IS U.S.C. § 1114 ( 1994). The Lanham Act defines the term ··person'' to·
include a ··juristic person as well as a natural person." Id. § 1127. A "juristic person" includes a
'"firm. corporation, union, association. or other organization capable of suing and being sued in a
· court of law." !!!.. Thus. specific provisions ofthe Lanham Act permit corporations, as well as
individuals, to be sued for trademark infringement. _
One of the leading cases on the jurisdictional application of the Lanham Act is V anitV Fair Mills
T. Eaton Co .. 234 F.2d 633 (2nd Cir.),· £!:!.t denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956). In that case, Vanity
Fair Mills, a corporation located iri the United States, sued T. Eaton Co., a corporation located in
Canada,. in a U.S. district court for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act. The alleged
· -· trademark infringement occurred in Canada. Nonetheless, Vanicy Fair Mills assened thatits ·claims against T. Eaton Co. arose under the laws of the United States. and should therefore be
governed by those laws. In other words. Vanity Fairs Mills sought the extraterritorial application
of the Lanham Act. :1 United St?tes statute. ro acts that occurred in another country.
·
v.
ln deciding whether to grant. this extraterritcrial application, the Second Circuit reviewed the
Supreme Court's earlier decision in Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. l&O (1952). In that
case, the Supreme Court had held that if a person infringes a trademark while in a fordgn
country, a l:J:S. federal coun ·may have jW'isdiction to heat the action and apply U.S. law.
Specifically, the Court held that "a United States district court has jurisdiction to award relief to
an American corporation against acts of trademark infringem.ent~and- unfair competition
consummated in a foreign country by [Mr. Steele] a citizen and resident of the United States,''
under the Lanham Act. B.ulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. at 281.
The Vanity Fair Mills Couil believed that the Bulova Coun stressed the following three factors
·as relevant to a determination of the extraterritorial reach of the Lanham Act: ( 1) wherher the
defendanc was a liS. cicizen, (2) whether the defendant's conduct had a substantial effect on
United States commerce. and (3) whether there was a conflict with trademark rights established
under foreign law. Applying that tesr, the Second Circuit, in Vaniw Fair Mills, held. that the
remedies provided by the Lanham Act could not be given an extraterritorial application because,
·
for one. the_ defendant T. Eatori Co. was a Canadian and not a US cirizen.
Subsequent· circuit and district courts have followed the Second Circuit's three factor test and
·have. without disc~ssion: summarily stated that American co-rporations are U.S. citizens, thereby.
meeting one prong of the test. ~ ~. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Arco Globus Inr'l Co., 150
· · F.3d 189 (2nd Cir.· 1998) (affinning trial court's finding that the defendant corporation was a
U.S. citizen); Aerogroup Jntemat'l. Inc. v. Marlboro Footworks. Ltd .. 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS
'7733 (Fed. Cir.. April 13, 1998) (affirming trial court's finding that ·'being incorporated and ·
headquanered in Massachusetts. Marlboro [a corporation] is a United States citizen'' subject to
rhe court's ::unhonty); Calvin Klein lndus. v. BFK Hong Kong. Ltd., 714 F. Supp. 78. SO
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tS.D.N.Y. 1989) (both cor,)oration and irs director were ··rreated as L'nited States citizens for the
. purposes of' e:xtraterritorial reach of the Lanham Act).
We think the coun decisions interpreting the extraterritorial reach of the Lanham Act. and
characterizing corporations as U.S. citizens should not be read as establishing that corporations
are. United States citizens generally or even necessarily tor purposes of the Lanham Act.· The
Lanham Act itself ma.lc:es liable non-natural persons, such as corporations, that are capable of
· being sued in a court oflaw; it makes no mention of citizens. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127. The use of
t::e temi U.S. citizen when discussing the extrater:ritorial reach of rhe Lanham Act on defendants
is simply a paraphrase, and that paraphrased tenn has been repeated by later COUrtS WithoUt
discussion of the issue. In addition. the Lanham Act is a remedial statute -- it allows a person to
seek redress against another for trr.:....emark infringement. In essence, it has never been necessary
for a court to reach the question of whether a state corporation 1s also a United States citizen.
There is one last legal source, to address. Section 1332 of Title 28, dealing with diversity
jUrisdiction, discusses the citizenship of corporations. That starute states that "a corporation shall
be deemed to be a citizen ofa"y state by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it
has its principal place of business.'' 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(l) (1994) ·(emphasis added). Thus,
although this statute does not state rhat a corporation is a U.S. citizen, it does treat corporarions
as .state citizens for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.
.
.
From the above. we conclude that a U.S. citizen 'generally must be a natural, not ari. anificial,
person. 3 Although the Supreme Court has interpreted the terni "citizen of the United States" as
including corporations for cenain federal statutes, this has only been done in the context of ·
federal "remedial" statutes a century ago. The HUBZone Act is not a remedial statute in the
same sense as, for example. the Indian Depredition Act. The HUBZone Act does nor authorize a
claim against the Government for compensation; rather, it establishes a federal procurement
program and uses the tenn U.S. citizen to detennine eligibility for that program. In addition.
Congress does not now generally treat corporations as U.S. citizens. In fact, Congress'
awareness of the need to make a clear statement that a corporation is a U.S. citizen is amply
liemonstrated by the four occasions on which ir has expressly done so. See 9 U.S.C. · § 202; l 0
C.S.C. ~ 9511: 46 U.S.C. Appx ~ 802(a) (a corporation may be deemed a U.S. citizen for
purposes ofthaL statute); 49 U.S_.C. ~ "'-0102(15) ..
a
. Finally, although 28 U.S. C. § 1332(c)( l) states that corporation is deemed a citizen of any state
which it has been incorporated, the ·HUBZone Act specifically requires each owner to be a
··united StateS,.fitizen;~ not a citizen of a state. Simply because an entity is a citizen of a state
does not ipso facto mean that lt is also a U.S. citizen. guaranteed all the rights and privileges
.·afforded U.S. citizens. See Grosjean, supra (corporations are not U.S. citizens under the
Fourteenth Amendment); Jones v. Temmer, 829 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Colo. 1993); OJ2inion vacated
on .ather grounds, remanded, 57 F.3d 921 (1Oth Cir. 1995) (privileges and immunities clause of
rhe Fourteenth Amendment protec[S only those nghts peculiar to being a u~s. citizen; ir' does not
protect those rights which relate to state citizenship).
oy
As an exception t6 this conclusion. we believe that tribally-owned enterprises can qualify under
. the U.S. citizenship requirement. Our reas~ms for this exception are explained bel.ow.
·
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�. ·.I
ln suin~ based on the specific statutory language in question and on Supreme Court precede~t~we ·
conclude that CDCs should no.t be'treated as Li.S. citizens under the HlTBZone Act. Therefore. a .
small business concern owned and controlled in whole or in part by a CDC will not be eligible
. tor the HUBZone program. This conclusion is consistent wirh our regulations. Our existing
regulations define a person as a ."natural person'· and a citizen as a -~person born or naturalized in
the United States." 13 C.F.R. § 126.103. That regulation, as worded, is a legally pennissible
implementation of the statute~ Our conclusion here does not change that implementation. Each
person that owns and· comro ls a HUB Zone· small business concern must be a "natural" person
because that person must be a U.S. citizen.
B.
Are Small Business Concerns Owned or Controlled by Tribes Eligible for the
HVBZoae Program?
.
.
The next question presented is whether a Tribe. is a person who is a United States citizen under
· the HUBZone Act. · In pan, this analysis is similar to the one discussed above. We first look to 1
U.S.C. § 1 for the definition ·of "person" as "includ[ing] corporations, companies~ assoCiations,·'
tirins, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies. as well as individuals."
This defirution does not specifically reference Tribes. It has been held, however, that pwsuant to
the Indian Reauthorization Act of 1934 ( 11IRA").
an Indian Tribe may organize simultaneously in two ways: first; it may organize
as a ·ttibal governmental entity governed by a constitution and bylaws pursuant to
25 U.S.C. § 476 (a so~c:alled Section 16 organization); second, it may incorporate
as a federal corporation governed hy the tenns of its charter pursuant to 25 U.S.C.
~ 477 (a so~called Section f7 corporation). Veeder v. Ornaha Tribe. 864 F. Supp .
. 889. 898 (N.D. Iowa 1994).
.'\n indian Tribe organized pursuant to § ·16 of IRA can be deemed an association or a society. A
···societ::-'"' is a group of persons broadly distinguished frorn other groups by murual interestS.
participation in charactenstic relationships. shared institutions. ;md a common. culture. World
Evangelistic Enter. Com. v. Tracy. 644 N.E.2d 678. 681. An ··associ'ation" is the net of a nwnber :
of persons uniting together for some special purpose or business. Roberts v. Schaefer Co. v,
San-Con, Inc .. 898 F. Supp. 356, 360 (S.D. W.Va.. 1995). An Indian Tribe organized pursuant
to § 17 of IRA is a corporation. Thus, a Tribe organized pursuant to either§ 16 or§ 17 of IRA·
may be deemed a ··person" for federal statutory purposes, including the HUBZone Act, because·.
it tails within the definition of the tenn person under I U.S.C. § 1.
This is further confirmed by case law addressing a Tribe's abiliry to bring suit under 28 U.S.C.
~ 1983. That starute. discussed above. was enacted pursuant ro the privileges and immunities
clause of the Founeenth Amendment. It provides that every person who ·•subjects. or causes to
be subjected. r.m."· c/ll=en of the United Sraces ar other person within rhe jurisdiction thereof to
. the deprivation of any· rights, privileges. or immunities secured by the Constiwtion and laws,
shi!ll be liable to the party injured." 28 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). Although r.he Supreme
Court has not addressed rhis issue. many circuit couns and district couns have deemed Tribes an
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8.
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t... • "r VJ. .a.u.
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.. uther person" ror ~ 198.3 purposes. For example. the court in .Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa
lndians \i. \ltinnesora Dep 't of ~atural Resources held that Tribes Were ..persons'' under ~ 1983
because ··ir furthers rhe broad intent· of Congress:· 853 F. Supp.' 1118. 1127 (D. Min. 1994)
l'-)Uoting Lac Courte Oretlles Bank of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 663 F.
Supp. 682~ 691 (W.O. Wis.), a12peal dismissed, 829 f:2d 601 (7th Cir. 1987) (.. Defendants have
not cited any authority, and I cannot find any, to support the proposition that. as federal rights
holders. the plaintiff tribes should be excluded from the class of legal 'other persons' entitled. to
sue under g 1983")). Other courr.s havesimply allowed Tribes to bring § 1983 actions without
addressing the issue of whether a Tnbe is an ··other person'' under the statute. See Kiowa Indian
Tribe v. Hoover, 150 F.Jd 1163 (lOth Cir. 1998); Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, 42 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 1994).
Interestingly, one court expressing a minority opinion has held that a ·•tribe may not bring a ·
Section 1983 action because it is not a 'citizen of the United States or .other person' for purposes
· of Section 1983." Coeur D'Alene Tribe v. Idaho, 798 F. Supp. 1443, 1452 (D. Idaho 1992),
affd in pan, rev'd in part, remanded, 42 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1994). In that case, the district
court had also dismissed the § 1983 claims brought by the individual tribal members because it
did. not believe they wete deprived of any rights. privileges or immunities granted by ·the
Constitution. On appeal to Lhe -Nimh Circuit, the Tribe only argued the § 1983 issue wiih respect
to the individual tribal member-S. Coeur D'Alene Tribe v. Idaho, 42 F.3d 1244, 1255 (9th Cir.
1994), rev'd in part, wnanded, 521 U.S. 261 (1997) (''Tribe argue(d] the individual plaintiffs
have permissible section 1983 claims against the officials acting in their individual capacities.").
The Ninth Circuit, therefore. did not address the issue of whether a Tribe is 'a citizen of the
Unite.d States or other perso~under § 1983 in that case.
a
It appears. however. the ).J'imh Circuit effectively overruled the district court in later case.· In
N'ative Village ofVenctie IRA Council v, Alaska, 155 F.3d 1150, 1152 n.l (9th Cir. 1998), the
court stated in a tootnote that the U.S. Supreme Court. has liberally construed the term .. other
persons" to include labor unions. corporatiorts. and non-profit organizations. In addirion. ~inth
Circuit authority supporr.ed the conclusiOn rhar a Tribe is an "other person" under § 1983. Id.,
·citing Chemehuevi Tndian Tribe v. California Srme Bd. of Egualization, 757 F.:!d 1047. 1054-55
(9th Cir. ), rev'd on o[her grounds, -1-7-t t".S. 9 ( 1985) (holding that Tribe is "person:' for purposes
of state tax statute).
·
·
Based upon I ·L'.S.C. ~ 1 and the cases construing 28 u.S.C. § 1983. \ve believe a Tribe should
be deemed a ··person'" for r'ederal statutory purposes. Therefore. a Tribe is deemed a "person"
under the HUBZone Act. The next question. then. is whether a Tribe is a U.S. citizen, since
under the HL'BZone Act to be ~ligible for the program a small business concern must be owned
and comroUed by persons. each of whom is a U.S. citizen. As discussed in our analysis above,,
nei[her the HliBZone Act nor 1 U.S.C. § 1 defines the term.
-
'.
The legislative history with respect to this issue is rtie same as Ihar already discussed, with some
J.dditional material that peri:ains specitically ro Indian businesses. During a commircee hearing
on S. 208 (the HL'BZone bill that was· enacted imo law), Senator Conrad Bums (R·MT), a co·sponsor of S. 208. spoke bridly and Sllbmitted a prepared starement on ·lhe issue of including
Indian reservations as a qualified HUBZone. Hearing 'on S. 208, at 15. ln addition to this,
me
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Senator noted m his prepared sratemt:nr that lookmg Eagle \-1anur'acruring ( .. Looking· Elgie··\,
··an lndian business m Wolf Pomt. Yfontana on rhe Fort Peck Reservation. would benefit from
this bill." Id. Looking Eagle is an 8( a) company that Senator Bums believed woutd benefit from
the HUBZone program because .. it is located in an economically depressed area." Id; The
.
Senator said little else about this company.
We have considered the basic facts pertaining to Looking Eagle. The Wolf Point Coinmuniry
Organization (··Wolf Point'') owns Looking Eagle. Wolf Point is
non-profii entity that is
designed to promote education and assistance ro the Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes, rhe two
-Tribes that chanered Wolf Point. Therefore, Looking Eagle is a tribally-owned small bUsiness,
albeit through an intermediary non-protit corporation chartered by the two Tribes. It is not clear
from the legislative history that Senator Bums was aware that Looking Eagle lribally-owned,
as opposed to being owned and controlled by individual Indian Tribe members.
a
is
During rhat same hearing Mr. Pete Horner, CEO o( the National Indian B~siness Association,
testified. The following is some of the discourse that occurred between Mr. Homer and Senator
Bond:
Chairman Bond. :yfr. Homer. you worked at the SBA as a Native American
advocate, I believe, in the past, have you nor?
Mr. Homer. Yes, sir. · ·
.Chairman Bood. Did you find that Native American-owned businesses had ·
difficulty gaining access to the 8(a) Program?
Mr. 'Bonier. Yes. sir:·
Chairman Bood. Whv?
)1r. Homer. Tribal g~vernments had a very difficult time because of the simpie
fact [h;:u they could not be eligible under the processes that were there. SBA or
Congress needs· to modify ponions of the rules and the regulations in order to
qualify lnditm rribes for inclusion into SBA programs. l think you have
something like \7 tribal governments out of 561 Inbes. There are an estimated
150 SBA 8(a) certified companies off reservations. · Th~ difficulty of Native
American communities accessing the 8(a) program is: there are no outreach
effortsthat provide training and technical assistance ro these communities.
Chairman Bond. So you. feel that the. HUBZone program could be tailored to
bring the jobs and overc·ome the statutory problems or regulatory problems. or
just the practical problems that make it difficult to get 8(a) jobs onto the
reservations'?
:Vlr. Homer. I think both. I rhink if -..ve sit around the table with whoever the
agency is that is responsible for the labor force statistics or the implementation of
the program, that we could guide that through and· make at least some of those
. mbes more successtul . In getting eligible for this type of program. or both
programs.
. ·
Chairman Bond. Any thoughts on what specific kinds of !.ovemrnent contracts
would be appropriate for a reservation'? What do you see as the best opponunity?
~lr. Homer. Light manufacturing, circuit boarding, \vire harnessing, those kinds
· o{ operations ""hich are similar to existing businesses that Choctaw Industries
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located in Mississippi, Llguna Indusmes located tn ~ew :vlex:ico, and Uniband:
· Corporation located in North Dakota have successtully managed. Every Indian ·
reservation that is ncar il metropoiitan area could be mvolved: that is over 100
Indian mba/ goverttmenrs. rd. at 73-7 ..J. (emphasis added) .. ·
. Later in the hearing Senator Michael B. Enzi (R- WY) asked Mr. Homer about any loopholes or.
problems with the HUBZone legislation. ~r. Homer's response was a recommendation that the
commiuee s-pecifically include Indian reservations as a HUBZone. Id. at 74:
Although it is clear from the testimony q110ted above that Mr. Homer believed tribally-owned
enterprises could be HUBZone small business concerns, it is not clear t!?-at either Senarors Bond..
or Bums focused on r.har point. In addition, these statements by Mi. Homer should be accorded
little weight. See Sutherland Statutory Construction § 48.10 ("Generally statements made by
orhers a[ commiuee hearings conceming the nature and effect of a bill are not accorded any
~eight"). In addition, most of the testimony and statements concerning Indian Tribes and the
HUBZone bill relate to the sole issue of Indian reservations becoming designated HUBZones. In .
· fact. after the last hearing on S. 208. the bill was amended to include Indian reservations as
designated HUBZon_es. Thus. the legislative history tor the issue addressed in rhis memorandwrt
is only marginally more useful than that for corporate entities generally.
While the HUBZone Ac~ does not create a new judicial remedy like the Indian-Depredation Act,
Irs authors did establish a new development program to assist defined areas of long-tenn endemic
economic underutilization. This demonstrates a broad Congressional purpose to assist areas of ·
the country,· including Indian reservations~ that suffered historically from severe economic
adversity. We cannot be blind to rhe curative purpose of the Congressional authors. We note
· rhat the Supreme Court has stated that ..it is a settled principle of statutory construction that
statutes passed for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes are to. be liberally consnued, with
doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the Indians." Three Affiliated Tribes of the Ft.
Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, P.C., ~67 tr.S. 138, 149 (1984); ~cClanahan v.
.-\nzona State Tax Comm'n, ~li U.S. 1?4.·17-J. (1973). This ··purposive" approach is
.1ppropnate. pamcularly in light of the Supreme Court's reson· to ..purpose'' in rhe ~onhwestem
~xpress case. ~. \vhere it ~.vas used ro .the detnment of the Indian Tribes. With this in mind.
we rum to case law ~hich will_ aid in interpretation.
Unforrunately, there are no federal statutes or coun decisions deeming Indian Tribes "citizens of
· the United States." As noted in. rhe above discussion on corporations. a state-chanered
corporation is deemed a citizen of a state tor purposes of diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.
~ 13.3~(c)( 1). [ndian Tribes .that have incorporated under ~ 17 of IRA have also been deemed
citizens of the state where they have their principal·place of business. for diversity jurisdiction
purposes. Gaines v. Ski Apache, 8 F .3d 726 (1Oth Cir. 1993 ); d Whiteco Metrocom Div. v,
Yankton Si2ux. Tribe, 902 F. Supp. 199 (O.S.D. 1995) {a Tribe organized pursuant ro § 16 of
IRA "is not a citizen of any state for purposes of diversity jurisdiction''):
.
Nevertheless, this statute and the case law do nor resolve the issue. The case law and diversity
jurisdiction stat.ute provide that a corporation is deemed a citizen of any state by which it has
·bee~ incorporated. whereas the HUB Zone Act. specifkally requires each owner to be a ..United
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States cnizen_ .. not a citizen
a state. :\snoted above. simply ~ecause an entity 1s a citizen of a
state does not ipso tbcro mean rhar it is also a C.S. citizen. guaranteed all the rights and
privileges atTordcd L'.S. citizens. See Grosjean, supra:
.
Tribes have not been deemed C.S. citizens under any legal authority. Rather. they have been .
.
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treated as sovereigns pursuant to 916 of IRA. corporations pursuant to § 17 of IRA, or persons,
~ Mllle Lacs Band ·of Chippewa lndians, supra (Tribe is "other person'' for purposes of
· ~ 1983 ). There are. however. numerous federal col!rt decisions and rulings holding that a Tribe
3.0d a wholly-owned tnbal enuty orgamzed pursuant to tnbal law, and sometimes state law, are
to be treated as one and the same for purposes of sovereign immunity, for purposes of 25 U.S.C.
~ 81, and for purposes of federal tax law, This is cruc::ial to our analysis because if the Tribe and
irs tribally-owned business concerns are one and the same, and the Tribe's members are all U.S.
citizens," then a tribally·owned, business can be eligible ·as a HUBZone small business concern
(assuming all other eligibility requirements are met).
[n Thomas v. Dugan, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20850 (D.N.C.), affd,.l998 U.S. 4th.Cir. LEXIS
· 32675, the plaintiffs. employees at a tribal casino, brought suit against the Chief of the Eastern
·.Band o t' Cherokee [ndians, th.e Tribe. the Tribal Casino Gaming Enterprise Board (''Board"), the
members of the Board. and the Cherokee Tribal Casino (''Casino.') for alleged violations of 42
· U.S.C. § 2000e (''Title VIT") and the Indian Civil Rights Act. The Casino was an unincorporated
tribal venture. Title VII, which prohibits racial discrimination by employers, defines
employer for purposes of the Act as excluding Tribes. Thus, plaintiffs daims for violations of
Title Vll agamst the Tribe and the individual defendants sued in rheir official capacities were
dismissed.·
an .
Plaintiffs argued that the claims against the Board and Casino, however, should not be dismissed
because those two concerns are not e)(tensions of the Tribe, but are independent business entities
that may be sued under Title VII. The court disagreed and stated that the Board conducted irs
business pursuant to the "rules and regulations promulgated by (the) Tribal Courtdl" and the
Casino is a ..tribally own~d business:· Thomas, 1997 U.S. Dist. l:.EXIS at *7. Because tribal·
.... councils :1re exempt under Title VII and are granted sovereign immunity, the court found "no
reason to distinguish among tnbal councils. gaming boards. and businesses own~d and operated
by rhe Tribe:· Id.; see ~lso Barker v. \1engminee Nation CasinQ, 897 F. Supp . .389, 393 {E.D.
Wis. 1995). (an action against a tribal enterprise, which was issued a corporate c:hanet"through a
Tribal ordinance :md pursuant [O the Tribal Constitution. is in essence an action against the Tribe
itself); Local IV-302 Int'l Woodworkers Union v. Menominee Tribal Enter., 595 F. Supp. 859,
862 (E.D. Wis. 1984). In other words. the rribally-ch.anered corporation was one and the same
as rhe Tribe.
Another district court ruled si::nilarly. In Giedosh v. Little Wound School Bd.. Inc., 995 F. Supp.
1051 (D.S.D. 1997). tne court held that the Little Wound School Board ("Board") fils-within [he '
detinilion of "Indian Tribe'' under Tide Vll. The Board. was a non·profit corporation"··.
incorporated under the laws &.1f South Dakota. It was democratic~lly-elected. and its members
According to 8 l'.S.C. ·~ 1-1-01 ( 1994) .. members of an Indian Tribe shall be nationals and
citi~ens of the United Stares at birth.
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�\lyt!re sotdy Ogiala StOU;K Tnoe rnt:rnbers. in ~Lidiuon. che Board was tribally-chartered and
provided a variety.. of educational services primanly to the tnbally-enroLled members of rhe
Indian commumty. The coun held that the Jact that the Board was incorporated under the Jaws
of South Dakom did not ···abolish the relationship between the Board and the Tribe." Giedosh, .
995 F. Supp. ar 1055. The coun. relying on Dille v. Council of Energy Resource Tribes, 801.
F.2d 373 (lOth Cit. 1986), believed that fndian Tribes. like other sovereigns, exercise some of
their sovereign power through delegauons ro various agencies. Those tribal agencies would be
. exempt from Title VII. Thus. rhe court in Giedosh took this into consideration when issuing its
Jecision. and it appears, likened the Board.to a tribal agency. ~at 1058.
[n another case, Altheimer & Gray v. Sioux Mfg. Corp., 983 F.2d 803 (7th Cir.), cert. depied.
510 U:S. 1019 (1993), plaintiffbrought suit against Sioux ManufacruringCorporation (""SMC'),
a wholly-owned tribal corporation and governmental subdivision of the Sioux, organized under
the Tribe's Law and Order Code. The plaintiff and SMC had entered into a contract According
to 25 U.S. C. § 81, the Secretary of the Interior must approve all contracts with Indian Tribes
concerning Indian lands. The contract here between the plaintiff and SMC was never approved
.by the Secretary of the lnrerior. The district court had· heid that the Secretary was required to
..Lppro' ~ the contract pursuant to ~ Sl. because the comract was really berween the plaintiff and
the Tribe, not S\1C. The Seventh Circuit agreed.
The same result occurred in Penobscot Indian. Nation v. Key Bank. 112 F.3d 538 (lst Cir.), c;ert.
denied, ~ U.S. - , 118 S. Ct. 297 (1997). There, the court held rhat a settlement agreement
entered into between Key Bank and Schiavi Homes was really betw'een Key Bank and rhe
Penobscon lndian Nation ('-'PIN'), not Schiavi Homes. ·PIN was a limited partner in Schiavi
Homes. a Ylaine limited partnership. ~onetheless. the First Circuit reasoned that ''courts look
beyond the mere fonnality of corporate structure in construing the identity of parties with regard
ro ~81." Penobscot [ndian Nation, 112 F.3d at 545, QUoting Penobscot Indian Nation v. Key
Bank, ')06 F. Supp. 13. 19 (D. Me. 1995). Thus, the agreement was within the purview of§ 81
requiring approval by the Secretary.
·
.Likewise. inPueblo ofSant:a Ana v. Hodel, 663 F. Supp. 1300 (D.D.C. 1987), the coun.held that
the tribally-owned entet"prise was one and the· same n.s the Tribe. and thus the Secretary's
approval tor a contract between the defendant :md the tribally-owned enterprise· was required
pursuant to § 81. The court based irs decision on the fact that the tribally-owned enterprise could
bind indirectly the Tribe's money and its lands. The court believed this was the sort of thing
0ver which Congress \.vanted to give the Secretary a role utider § 81. ·
[n [nee on Agricomoration v. Tribal Farms, [nc., 656 F.2d 498. 501 (9th Cir. 1981 ), however, the
court found that Tribal Farms. a wholly-owned corporation of the Fort Mojave rndian Trib~
incorporated pursuant to the laws of Arizona.. did not fall ~within the protected class of ''tribe of •
Indians or .individual Indians'' covered by 25 U.S.C § 81. There is no .other discussion on this
issue. lnimerpreting the Tribal Farms case, one court stated that the holding is premised on the
·fact that the Fort Mojave £ndian Tribe played a limited role in Tribal Farms' conrracts. See
Altheimer' & Grav, 983 F.1d at 8l0. :-\.nether court stated that Tribal Farms was a separate entity
rrom the Tribe because it was a valid Arizona corporation ..·· See Pueblo of Santa Ana, 663 F.
Supp. ~H 1306.
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fn addition to the. above case law. die Internal Revenue Service (''IRS") addressed how tO treat
Tribes and t.ribally-owned enterprises for tax purposes. Although no constitutional or starutory
provision expressly t!Xempts Indian Tribes trom federal income raxat:ion, the ··political entity
embodied in the concept of an Indian .tribe has been recognized and no tax liability has been
assened against a tribe with respect to tribal income from activities carried on within the
boundaries of the reservation." Rev. Rul. 81-1.95. 1981-2 C.B. 15. Because Tribes aie not
taXable entities. for the most part. the ·rRS has stated that tribal income nor otherwise exempt
from Federal income· taX is includible in the gross income of the Indian tribal member when
distributed or constructively received by him. Rev. Rul. 67-284, 1967-2 C.B. 55; ~ also
Choteau v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 691 ( 1931 ). The IRS treats Tribes that incf?rporate under § 17 of
[RA. and Tribes that are sovereigns pursuant to § 16 of IRA the same -- th-·/ are not taxable
entities. Rev. Rul. 81-295, ·1981-2 C.B. 15. In other words, a§ 17 IRA ·federally-chanered
Indian tribal corporation shares the same tax status as the Indian Tribe itsel( lsi..
The IRS has issued several rulings on the taxation of a Tribe's business activities. For example,
the IRS has ruled that a federally-,recognized Tribe conducting commercial business both on and
otf its reservation is riot subject to federal income tax. Rev. Rul. 94-16, 1994-1 C.B. 19. The
£RS has also ruled that a·§ 17 IRA.tribal corporation is not subject to federal income tax on the
income earned in the conduct of coinmercial business on or off the Tribe's reservation. !d; s
also Rev. RuL 94-65, 1994-2 C.B. 14 (a tribal corporation organized under the Oklahoma
Welfare Acr. 25 U.S.C. § 503, is not subject m federal income tax on income earned in the
conduct of commercial business on or off the Tribe's reservation). In contrast, an entity
organized by an Indian Tribe under stale law is subject to federal income tax on its income.
regardless of the leGation of the activities that produced the income. Id. The IRS has yet to
issue a ruling on the tax treatment of entities incorporated pursuant to tribal law.
This analysis leads to three conclusions about tribal enterprises: ··
The toregoing .cases strongly support the view that tribally-owned enterprises whether
. incorporated or organized pursuant ro tribal law or § 17 of IRA should be considere~ to be one
,wd rhe same as the Tribe. · Cenainly. tribal members o-N-n and control the Tribe. Thus. a
tribally-owned entity considered to be one and the same as Lhe Tribe irsetfcari be deemed to be ·
"owned and controlled" by U.S. citizens~ and thus eligible for the HUBZone program.s ·
( l)
l2) .The case law concerning tribally-owned entities incorporated or organized under state law,
, however, is inconsistem with respect to whether those entities are considered one and the same
as rhe Tribe. We note that in each of the South Dakota District Coun and Coun of Appeals for·
the First Circuit ca5es discussed above, rhe tribal entity was organized under state taw, yet the
courts treated the tribal entity. as if it were the Tribe. The Ninth Circuit case is contrary. Given
this unsettled state of the law, we invoke the Supreme Court admo'nition to liberally construe an
ambiguity in statutes designed to benetit Indian Tribes, which was discussed above. There is no
~ Of course.
as has always been the position of SBA. if individual tribal members. who a1·e U.S.
citizens own and control such a ·business entity, then the entity is deemed owned and controlled
·
·
by C.S. Cl[izens.
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"iliestion thai Congress. by specifically adding indian reservauon iands as qualifying HL"BZone
locations. meant to..:benefit Indian Tribes. ."\ccordingly, we tind that with this congressional
directive small businesses owned by a Tribe; and incorporated under state law, are eligible for
the HlJBZone program. ·
l)) As stated in our analysis on corporations, our existing regulations d~t1ne person as a.''narural
person" and a citizen as a ·'person born or naturalized in. the United States." 13 C.F.R.
§ 126.103. That regulation, as worded, is a legally permissible implementation of the Statute.
Our conclusion here does not change .that implementation. Each person that owns and controls a
HUBZone firm rnust be a ·'natural" person because that person must be a U.S. citiZen. We have
determined that tribally-owned entities are considered to be one and the same as the Tribe itself,
and therefore are deemed to be ''owned and controlled" by tribal members, i.e .. persons who are
citizens.
u:s.
C.
Are Alaska Native Corporations United States Citizens under the HUBZooe Act?
SBA's HUBZone regulations define a ''HUBZone small business concern" asa ·•concern that is ·
small as defined by § 126.203. IS e:r:clusi\lely owned and conttolled by persons who are Unired '
Suites citizens, and has its· principal office located in a HLTBZone.''
13 C.F.R. § 126.103
(emphasis added). The regulations define a "person" as follows:
P~rson means a natural person. Pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement
Act, 43 U.S.C. § l626(e), Alaska Native Corporations and any direct or indirect
·subsidiary corporations, joint ventures, and partnerships of a Native Corporation
are deemed to be owned an controlled by Natives, and are th1.1s persons."
This regulatory exception for ANC's is based upon 43 _U.S.C. § 1626, which is part of~he Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act. Specifically,§ 1626 states:
(e) Minority status
( 1) For ail purposes of Federal law. a Nanve Corporacion shall be considered to
be Ll corporanon owned and coirrrolled by Nacrves and a minority and
· . ¢conomically Jisadvamaged business enterprise if the Settlement Common
Stock of the corporation and other stock of the corporation held by holders of
Sertlemc:nt Common Stock and 'by. Natives and descendants of Natives,
represents a majority of both the total equity of the corporation and.the total·
voting power of the corporation for the purposes of electing ·directors.
(2) For a./1 purposes ofFederallaw. direct and in,direcr subsidiary corporazions.
joinr ._;enrures. and partnerships of a Narive Corpo;arion qualif.ving pursuant
Io paragraph (I) sha/l be considered to be entiiie.s owned and conrrolled by
Natil·es and a minority and economically disadvantaged business enterprise if
the shares of stock or other units of ownership interest in any such entity held
by such Native Corporation and by the holders of its Settlement Common
Stock represent a majority of both-·
tA) the totat equity o( the subsidiary corporation. joint venrure, or
-partnership; and
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PHOTOCOPY
�(B) rhe _toral voting power of the subsidiary corpora.uon, joint venture, or
parmership for rhe purpose of electing directors. the general partner, or
principal officers.
· (Emphasis added). Thus. an ..1\NC :md its direct or indirect subsidiaries statutorily must be
deemed entities .. owned and conrroUed by Narives." [d. A small business concern owned by an
ANC is its subsidiary. Therefore. by law, it is ··owned and controlled by Natives." See !4.
Because of _rhis statute. a small business o~ned and controlled by an ANC is owned and.
controlled by· Natives. A "'Native'' ':means a cinten. of the United Stares who is a person .that is
Of one~founh or more Alaska Indian ... Eskimo, or Aleut blood, or combination thereof.'' ML ·
§ 1602(b) (emphasis added). Consequently, a small business concern owned by an ANC meetS
· · r.he requirement that it be "o\lltled and comrolled by 1 or more persons, each of whom is a United
States Citizen." 15 U.S.C. § 632(p)(3).
·
.· Thus. our existing regulation for ANCs is legally correct.
D.
Summary
CDCs may not be owners of otherwise eligible HUBZone enterprises either under the clear
language of the statute or any interprewion based on case law or legislative history. Conversely,
Alaska Native Corporations are :clearly eligible owners of such enterprises. A closer question
arises in considering applications by enterprises owned by Indian Tribes. Unlike ANCs,
eligibility is not conferred upon them by. cleat statutory language. However, when the
underlying purpose of the HUBZone statute is considered together with the duty of the United
States to the Tribes and relevant case law. we can conclude that tribally-owned enterprises are
. eligible tor HUBZone treatment because of the historic identity betWeen individual members and
the Tribe itself which is recognized in our jurisprudence. Nevenheless, this conclusion should in
no way impede etTons to clarify the starute in this regard; panicularly, as there may be both
extensions and limitations Congress may wish to provide ·which cannot be done with a legal
opinion.''
·
o..:c: .~ida A.ivarez. ·Administrator
E.g., \~hether any restriction should be pla~ed on the sovereign immunity PJ:'Otection from suits
on ~ontt·acl given to Tribes in their governmental or commercial activities. see Kiowa Tribe of
Oklahoma v. ~fg. Technologies, [nc .• 523 U.S. 751 (1998); whether Congress would expand the
concept of ''reservations" explicitly to include state reservation lands or native lands not within a
reservation~
I)
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PHOTOCOPY
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NAVATO-HOPI SETTLEMENT
At issue is the proposed settlement ·of. ·several lawsuits
involving the Hopi and Navajo Indian Tribes and the United States
Department of the Interior. . USDA and Fares t Service are not
invOlved in the lawsuits, but National Forest lands are proposed as
·part of the resolution of the lawsuits.
BACKGROUND:
For decades, the Navajo arid Hopi Indians have claimed title to
the same land in northeastern Arizona. In 1958 the.Congress passed
a law vesting title to the . disputed land in both tribes and
authorized them to litigate their respective rights and interests.
In 1962 an :Arizona ~district court determined that five-sixths of
the disputed area (the Joint Use A·rea) belonged to both Tribes. IIi
1974
the Congress passed. the Navajo- Hopi ·Relocation Act,
authorizing the district court to partition the Joint Use Area and
relocate tribal members to their respective areas. To date., the
relocation effort has requfred expenditure of over $350 million by
the Bureau of Indian Affairs and· the re1ocation of thousands of
Indians, but approximately 150 Navajo families have refused to
leave the Hopi Partitioned Land (the HPL) bqcause of ancestral and
religious ties.
At least 8 lawsuits are. pending, with the United States'
liability estimated at $30 million. This liability arises.in part
due to the alleged fu.ilure of the Secretary of the Int.er.i.or to
relocate the Navajos who are living in trespass on Hopi lands. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered negotiations to settle
several of these claims.
· On October 30, 1992, t::.he Navajo Nation, the Hopi Tribe, the
. Manybeads plaintiffs, and the United States ne·partrnents of Justice ·
and the .Interior entered into an "Agreement in Principle· for·
Resolving Issues in Connection with the Navajo-Hopi Settlement Act"
.(Principles oC Agreement).
No· one in USDA was a party to the
negotiations despite the fact. that National Forest lands were
involved. Nonetheless~ the Principles of Agreement were ratified
by Secretaries·Lujan and Madigan on November 25, 1992, subject to
clarification o! certain issues, lncluding.protection of existing
~ights and access and finality of .the settlement .. Fonner Secretary
Madi.gan signed the Principles of Agreement · over the strong
objections of the Forest Service and the Office of General Counsel.
Under the Principles_ of Agreement, the Hopi Tribe would
receive approximately 200,000 acres of land in the Coconino and
Kaibab National Forests, 8,000 acres of public domain land, 165,000
" i lr..ITr\11.1
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acres of state land, 35, 000 acres of private land and a $15 million
cash settlement. Eligible Navajos would be allowed to remain on
the HPL for 75 years pursuant to the terms of a lease that was to
be negotiated and agreed upon by the Hopi Tribe, the affected
Navajo families and the Navajo Nation.
Congress would have to
ratify the settlement to effect these terms.
In. December 1992, the settlement negotiators briefed numerous
Congressional .meml?ers in ·an attempt to gain support for: the
agreement. Senators McCain and DeConcini·held public hearings in
. Arizona in January and February 1993.
At that time public
sentiment was strongly against giving up National Forest System
lands as part of the settlement.
After the public hearings,
Senator DeConcini stated publicly that the settlement would not
pass the. Congress in its current form.
I
The Navajo Nation rejected a draft lease prt?sented :by the
Hopis orl _August 6, 1993.
On September 16, 1993, the Federal
Magistrate ordered t.he parties to cont.inuc ncgot.l,ations. On June
61 1994 .a representative of the Department of Justice informed the
Department that, on June .3, 1994 83% of the Navajo families on the
HPL ratified what is now being called an accommodation agreement
betweei1 the. Hopi Tribe and the Navajo Nation. Thls accommodation
agreement is a substitute for the lease required by the Principles
of Agreement.
I
1
·We have requested but to date have not _been provided a copy of
the accommodation agreement. We are informed that it contains a 75
year lease · prov:i.s:i.on and gives the Navajo Na.t.:fon t.he right. to
request renewal of thelease at its expiration. The lease still
has to be approved by the Navajo Nation Council,· but we are told
chat. is a matter of formality ..
. CtiR&ENT ACTIVITIES:
The Department of Justice is scheduling .
meetings among affected Federal agencies sometime before July7th
(that being the.date that DOJ plans to meet with the·Hopi Tribe to
present a . Federal position) .
We are not sure Wllot will . be
discussed at the meeting, and also we have not been provided a copy
of the proposed accommodation agreement.
One possible topic to be discussed at the meeting is
alternatives to transfer outright of the National Forest larids to
the Hopis. ori alternative that has been mentioned is to rnaint.ain
National Forest status of the 200 ooo acres but grant to the Hopis
the grazing, timber, and concession rights to· the land. Under such
a scenario, the Forest Service would still retain responslbiliLles
.for land management a·nd associated costs.
1
I
CLINTON LIBRARY
PHOTOCOPY
�USDA POLICY.CONCERNS:
this proposal:
There are many serious policy concerns over
1 .. The Hopi-Navajo Dispute ha.s nothing to do with the National
Forests or USDA programs.
·
of
This proposed settlement calls for the transfer
subs.tantial
National Forest land resources in settlement of a claiin totally
unrelated to USDA programs or the lands involved.
The liability
for these lawsuits arose . from ·the actions or nonacLlons .· of the
. Secretary <.)f the· Interior. Therefore, a solution should come from
the lands and programs administered by the Department of the
Int~iior.
·
2.
. . ·~, ...·
It is inappropriate to use National Forest lands to settle
Indian claims as Congress has provided other remedies .
Congress enacted the Navaj o-Hopi Relocation Act to resolve the
Hopl-Navajo dispute but. the Secrec.ary of the Interior did. not
implement the law to the full extent. The. United States is faced
with liability in a number of lawsuits due to the nonfeasance or
malfeasance of the Secretary of the Interior and the Bureau of
Indian At fairs. There is no precedent for the transfer of National
Forest lands to settle these kinds of Indian claims.
3. This transfer will be precedent for the use of National Porest
lands to resolve a myriad of other Indian claims.
·
Over throe-quarters of the Nation constituted adjudicated
aboriginal title areas for Native Americans, or were covered by
treaties.
.In many cases, tribal claims to such lands are
unresolved.
·If the Government can use National Forest land to
sat.isfy unrelated claims, then how can it deal with t:he issue of
claims directly involving the National Forests?
.For example, the Sioux have refused monetary compensation for
the Black Hills National Forest and want it returned to Indian
·trust status.
The Hopi-Navajo accouunodation will make it: more
difficult ·to refuse similar accommodations to pther tribal groups .
••agreement a to transfer National Forest lands was done in
secret without any pUblic involvement.
.4. The
The Forest Service expends considerable time and expensP. in
land management planning for the Coconino and Kaibab ·National
Forests involving the public in all stages of the decision making
process. The public feels it has a sta:k.e 111 tht!8e lands. Yet 1 t.he
agreement to transfer them was made by lawyers in other agencies
negotiating in secret.
Under the agreement, the public will be
potentially denied use and access to the affected lands which they·
rightly consider as open and available to all citizens.
CLINTON LIBRARY
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iJ ·':tOrt'!· ,
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5. The proposed settlement is not "finaliV.
Despite all the discussions and good intention$, the proposed
settlement does not resolve the conflict of Navajos living on Hopi
land; it merely postpones the resolution for the duration of a 75
yE:ia.r lease. It is quite probable that.at the end of 75 years, the
Government will be in the samP. position that it. is in today.
6. The value of the National ·Forest· lands to go to the Hopis
probably far exceeds the potential liability of the United States
in the lawsuit.
The Department of Justice has varied its estimat"e · of .the
potential liability of the United States from $30 million to over
$300 million. The value Lhey ascribe to.the Nat~onal Forest lands
is based on valuation of the Hopi reservation lands_which are not
comparable. In fact, the value ofthe National Forest lands could
far exceed the potential liability of the government in.the event
it lost all aspects of the pending cases.
·
The Department of Justice has estimated the value of the
involved National Forest, Bureau of Land Management and private
lands at $11, 27.2, 500.
Besides the erroneous method used to
calculate this figure, we note that the precise lands which are to
be conveyed have not been identified yet. ·.The private land has to
be either acquired or condemned.
Thus, the total cost to the
United States is unknown at this time.
7.
.There is no offset for loss of the National Forest lands.
There is nothing requiring· the loss of the National Forest
lands to be offset by the transfer to the Department of Agriculture
of administrative .jurisdiction ot Bureau of Land Management or
other lands under the· jurisdiction of the Department of the
Interior of equal or great.er value.
Allowing the Secretary of
Agriculture to select replacement lands anywhere_ in the country
probably would lessen the prospect of similar situations occurring
in the future.
grazing and
concessions will establish a very undesirable precedent and will be
very difficult to manage.
8.
Giving the Hop is usufructuary rights to timber,
·Experience with reserved treaty usufructuary rights on
National Forest lands elsewhere in the nation has shown that it is
extremely difficult to manage National Forests for multiple uses by
the public and accommodate Indian usufructuary right~:>.
In this
CLINTON LIBRARY
PHOTOCOPY
�...,JL.t•a
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,.
5
case, we would be creating such rights without consideration of Lhe
demonstrated difficulties we have encountered elsewhere.
Further,
in this case, there is no connection between the creation of suchrights and any existing treaty involving ·the affected national
forest lands. · ·
·
9. The state and local governments ·will be . affected by this
transfer due to impacts on revenues ~hey received under the Twenty
Five Percent Fund (16 U.S.C. SSOO) •
The State ·currently receives . 25% ·of ·the gross revenues
generat·ed from the all the National· Forests in Arizona. ' Transfer
of the lands to Indian trust status will reduce the acreage and
revenues by which rights under the 25% Fund are determined .
. CLINTON LIBRARY
PHOT()~()PV
�Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
-
- DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
-Clinton Library
DATE
SUBJECTrfiTLE
RESTRICTION
001. memo
Joel Klein & Stephen R. Neuwirth to John Podesta; re: Indian Land &
Water Clai:ins Corrections Act (1 page)
05/31/1994
P5
002. letter
Leslie M. Turner to Leon E. Panetta; re: S. 1654 -Technical
Corrections to Six Laws Concerning Indian Tribes (4 pages)
05/26/1994
(o
?.,oO
P5
\e. \e.~0~dJ NLMS ~~:~oCb~\:2~
J
on A/~t~
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
Counsel's Office
Stephen R. Neuwirth (Subject File)
_OA!Box Number: 386
FOLDER TITLE:
Indian Corrections Act
Pre-sidential Records A~t- [44 U.S.C. 2204(a))
Jimmie Purvis
2006~0 197-F
200
-RESTRICTION CODES
PI
P2
P3
P4
National Security Classified Information [(a)(l) of the PRA)
Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a}(2} of the PRA)
Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA)
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information ((a)(4) o(the PRA)
PS Release would disclose confidential advise between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(S) of the PRA)
P6 Release' would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal priva~y ((a)(6) of the PRA)
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM.-Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
be reviewed upon request.
- .RR. Document
will
Freedom of Information Act- [5 U;S.C. SS2(b))
b(l} National security classified information [(b)(l) of the FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA)
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the_ FOIA)
b(4} Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(S) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b}(S) of the FOIA)
b(9) Release would disclose geological or 'geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) ofthe FOIA)
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�Co9-00 .
WASHINGTON.
May 31, 1994
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN PODESTA
FROM:
9/{·
JOEL' KLEIN
DEPUTY co~&mL TO THE PRES I DENT
. STEPHEN R. NEUWIRTH./JU
ASSOCIATE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: ..
INDIAN LAND AND WATER CLAIMS
CORRECTIONS ACT
The Counsel's Office has reviewed the materials .delivered by
you concerning the Indian Land and Water Claims Corrections Act,
s. 1654. The Counsel's·Office has determined that there is no
legal basis for the President not to'approve the bill .
. We do note, however, that the Interior Department is
planning to_interpret narrowly one provision of the Act, an
·amendment to the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.
-Specifically, as set forth in Director Panetta's memorandum to
the President, Interior will construe that amendment to have been
intended only to reverse a 1936 opinion of the Inte~ior Solicitor
-- an opinion that interpreted the 1934 Act and attributed
different levels of sovereignty to 11 historic 11 and · 11 non-historic 11
tribes. . (Historic tribes have existed since time immemorial as a
unique group of Native Americans; non-historic tribes.are
communities of adult Native Americans who reside together on·
reservations.)
Interior recognizes that the actual language of the new
Corrections Act is susceptible (inappropriately) to a broader
interpretation that, in Interioris view, .does not atcurately
reflect Congressional intent. The new Act provides, among other
.things, . that departments and agencies of the federal government
may not promulgate any regulation or decision under the 1934 Act
that draws any distinction between federally recognized tribes as·
to the 11 privileges and immunities 11 available to them.
There is thus some risk that a court dould construe the
statute more broadly than the Interior Department, a result that
Interior belie~es could lead to 11 unintended problems in the
.future."
We have consulted with the Inteiior Department and were
advised that neither the Department nor OMB believes a signing
statement by the President is necessary or appropriate under
these circumstances. We agree with that conclusion.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�
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Previously Restricted Documents
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FOIA 2006-0197-F - Native Americans
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Previously Restricted Document Release no. 5
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