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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT
AND TYPE
NO.
DATE
SUBJECTfflTLE
RESTRICTION
001. fax cover
sheet
David Scheffer to Mort Halperin & Matt Lorin; reo War Crimes
(partial) (I page)
06/02/1995
b(2)
002. fax cover
sheet
David Scheffer to Mort Halperin & Matt Lorin; reo War Crimes
Proposal (partial) (I page)
OS/22/1995
b(2)
003. fax cover
sheet
David Scheffer to Mort Halperin & Matt Lorin; reo Proposal for
Appointtnent of a Special Adviser to the President on War Crimes
(partial) (I page)
OS/24/1995
b(2)
004. fax cover
sheet
David Scheffer to Mort Halperin & Matt Lorin; reo War Crimes
(partial) (I page)
05/17/1995
b(2)
005. fax cover
sheet
David Scheffer to Mort Halperin & Matt Lorin; reo War Crimes
Proposal (partial) (I page)
OS/22/1995
b(2)
006a. report
reo Intelligence Community Activities in Support of Information
Sharing with the Office of the Prosecutor of the International War
Crimes Tribunal (2 pages)
01/24/1996
Pllb(l)
006b. memo
To War Crimes Working Group: reo Yugoslavia
11/01/1995
Pllb(l)
006c. report
reo Operations
11/01/1995
Pllb(l)
007a. paper
reo The Importance of the "High Representative" to the Clinton
Administration's War Crimes Policy (4 pages) [partial]
12/04/1995
P5
007b. talking
points
reo Bildt Talking Points (2 pages)
12/04/1995
P5
008. paper
reo War Crimes (2 pages)
02/10/1996
Pllb(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Matt Lorin (DemocracylHuman
ONBox Number: 802
(I page)
(9 pages)
(b6)
Ril(hts)
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia: War Crimes [2]
Jimmie Purvis
2006-0647-F
jp2116
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential
PI
P2
P3
P4
National
Relating
Release
Release
financial
PS Release
and his
P6 Release
personal
Records
Act - (44 U.S.C. 2204{a»)
Security Classified Information
[(a)(l) of the PRA]
to the appointment to Federal office (a)(2) of the PRA]
would violate a Federal statute (a)(3) of the PRA]
would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
information (a)(4) ofthe PRA]
would disclose confidential advice between the President
advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRAJ
would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of
privacy (a)(6) of the PRA)
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misrde defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Freedom
of Information
Act - (5 U.S.C. SS2(b»)
bel) National security classified information
(b)(l) of the FOIAJ
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency r(b)(2) of the FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute l(b){3) of the FOIAJ
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information (b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of
personal privacy {(b)(6) of the FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions (b)(8) of the FOIA)
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells l(b)(9) of the FOIA)
�Withdrawal/Redaction
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT
AND TYPE
NO.
Sheet
DATE
SUBJECTITITLE
RESTRICTION
009. fax cover
sheet
Bill Woodward to Tony Lake; re: Albright Speech (partial) (I page)
11/16/1995
b(2)
010. publication
re: Basic Reports - Newsletter on International Security Policy
(partial) (I page)
10/16/1995
P61b(6)
011 a. fax cover
sheet
To Rick Saunders; re: Srebrenica - Background
10/25/1995
Pllb(l)
Ollb. memo
To Rick Saunders; re: Information Paper on Srebrenica (I page)
10/25/1995
Pllb(l)
Ollc. paper
re: Assessment of Information on Srebrenica Massacres (6 pages)
10/06/1995
Pllb(l)
Olld. chronology
re: Balkan Crisis (7 pages)
08/03/1995
Pllb(1)
Olle. cable
American Embassy, The Hague to Secretary of State, Washington,
D.C.; re: Dutch Report on Srebrenica (4 pages)
10/13/1995
Pllb(l)
(I page)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Matt Lorin (DemocracylHuman Rights)
ONBox Number: 802
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia: War Crimes [2]
Jimmie Purvis
2006-0647-F
jp2116
RESTRICTION
Presidential
Records
Act -144 U.S.c. 2204(a)]
Pl
P2
P3
P4
National Security Classified Information (a)(1) of the PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office l(a)(2) of the PRA)
Release would violate a Federal statute l(a)(3) of the PRA)
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information l(a){4) of the PRA]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors (a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of
personal privacy ((a)(6) of the PRAJ
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
CODES
Freedom
of Information
Ad - IS U.S.C. S52(b)]
b(l) National security classified information I(b){l) of the FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIAJ
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute (b){3) of the FOIAJ
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information (b){4) of the FOIAJ
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of
personal privacy ((b)(6) of the FOIAJ
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions ({b)(8) ofthe FOIA}
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells (b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
�The Importance of the ''High Representative"
to the Clinton Administration's War Crimes Policy
Executive Summary
Going into Dayton, the job that became "High Represenative" began as a largely ceremonial
job overseeing aid and reconstruction. What emerged after UNSC Res. 1022 on November 22
makes the High Representative the most powerful civilian in Bosnia. Under UNSC Res. 1022,
paragraph 3, the High Representative can, by himself, pull the trigger on restoring economk
sanctions.
This gives the High Representative
the power to decide If the FRY and the
Bosnian Serbs are complying with their obligations to the War Crimes Tribunal.
The High Representative is the only person who can use the threat of re-imposing sanction;
to help the Tribunal apprehend indicted war criminals. Realistically, the IFOR Commander, beinp,
American, is never going to re-impose sanctions except in response to an attack on IFOR forces.
Being European, the High Representative has the credibility to use the threat of sanctions f(l[
broader purposes.
The Administration has been focusin¥ on the approach of having an American as the High
Representative's deputy. Where the issue IS implementation,
this approach works. Where tbe
issue is policy, this approach fails. The High Representative must share the vision that justi(:~
Is the key to btealdng the cycle of violence In the former Yugoslavia.
(b)(6)
he United States should insist upon an alternative to Carl Bildt from among a number of
excellent European candidates with both human rights stature and practical experience. Foremost
among them is Max van der Stoel, a former Dutch Foreign Minister and U.N. human rights
rapporteur for Iraq. Other good choices include Jose Marfa Mendiluce, who ran the UNHCR aid
program for Bosma and is now a member of the European Parliament, and former British Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher. The right choice for High Representative Is the best opportunil.y
the United States win have to ensure the Tribunal's success .
••
••
1.
Why the Choice of High Representative
and the War Crimes Tribunal
••
Is So Important
to the Clinton Administration
oose
Sanctions. Under Article IX of
The High Representative Has tbe Power to Be-Im
the Framework Agreement, all Parties, including the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and
the Republika Srpska (RS), agreed to "cooperate fully" with the War Crimes Tribunal. The RS
further agreed in Article n(S) of the Constitution to comply "with orders issued pursuant to Artick
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29 of the Statute of the Tribunal." Article 29 is what requires indicted war criminals to be turned
over to The Hague for trial.
The real power of the High Representative comes not from the Dayton Peace Agreement bll1
from U.N. Security Council Resolution 1022 (Nov. 22,1995), paragraph 3:
3.
[I]f at any time, with regard to a matter within the scope of their
respective mandates and after joint consultation if appropriate, either the
High Representative described in the Peace Agreement, or the commander
of the international force to be deployed in accordance with the Peace
Agreement, on the basis of a report transmitted through the appropriate
political authorities, informs the Council via the Secretary-General that the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or the Bosnian Serb authorities are failing
significantly to meet their obligations under the Peace Agreement, the
suspension [of sanctions] referred to in paragraph I above shall terminate on
the fifth day following the Council's receipt of such a report, unless the
Council decides otherwise taking into consideration the nature of the noncompliance;
What this means is that if the High Representative decides that the FRY or the RS are failing
to "cooperate fully" with regard to the Tribunal, the High Representative has the power to decide"
on his or her own, that the FRY, RS or both are "failing significantly to meet their ob)jgation~,
under the Peace Agreement." The High Representative then reports this to the Security CounciL
Sanctions are re-imposed unless the Security Council votes otherwise-which gives the Unite,]:
States a veto.
Thus, the High Representative has the power to "pull the trigger" on economic sanction!;
against the FRY or the RS. With the support of the United States, the High Representative has th,:
power to force compliance with the Tribunal's indictments. This is why the position is so
important to the success of the Tribunal and United States policy of using justice to bring peace.
The High Representative Has the Power to Enforce ComDl!ance with the IDtematlona.J
Police Task Force (IPIF). The IPTF's police powers vis-A-visthe RS can be summed 1.1p as "My
wish is your command,"
Under the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) Annex II, Article III, paragraph I, the lPTF has
the authority for "monjtorjOll. obseryin~ and jnspectin~ law enforcement activities," "lld~
law
enforcement personnel and forces," and "assjstinji!by accompanvinji!the Parties' lawenforcemem
personnel as they carry out their responsibilities, as the IPTF deems appropriate," Under Anne:x
II, Article IV, the RS "shall allow IPIE personnel immediate and complete access to any sire,.
person, activity, proceeding, record, or other item or event ... as requested by the IPTIl." Und,:r
Annex II, Article V, paragraph I, "Any obstruction of or interference with lPIE activities, failur,:
or refusal to comply with an IPTF request. or other failure to meet the Parties' responsibilities 0]"
other obligations in this Agreement, shall constitute a fajlure to coo.perate with the IPI},,'
(emphasis added). Thus, any Callure by the RS to carry out IPTF "requests" to arrest
indicted war ulminals constitutes a Cailure to cooperate with the IPTF.
Under Annex II, Article V, paragraph 2, "[T]he IPTF Commissioner will notify the High
Representative and inform the IFOR Commander of failureSto cooperate with the IPI'F. The IP'I1;
Commissioner may request that the High Representative take appropriate steps upon receiving
such notifications, including calling such failures to the attention of the Parties. convening the
Joint Civilian Commission, and consulting with the United Nations, relevant states, and
international organizations on further responses" (emphasis added).
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Thus, it the IPTF requires "access" to indicted war criminals and the RS police refuse
to cooperate, It Is up to the BiKh Commissioner to decide what to do. if anything. about th.~
(allure to auest Indicted war criminals. The High Commissioner has the authority to do
anything, including re-Imposing sanctions, for failure of the RS police to arrest indicted w:ar
criminals.
Political realities mean that indicted war criminals will be sought out only by the IPT!'.
Because of the experience of Mogadishu, IFOR will nOI uy to hUnIdown indicted war criminals,
although it is expected to arrest any it encounters. Leaving aside the possibility of arranging
"encounters" through intelligence, the only remaining authority with any hope of com))elling the
surrender of indicted suspects is the IPTF. Without power backing up the lPTF, its ability III
compel anyone's surrender is nil.
The High Representative Has General Superyislon over AU Compliance with Huml\!l
Rights and War Crimes Provjslons of the DPA. DPA Annex 10, Article 11,paragraph I gives
the High Representative broad powers 10 "(mJonitor the implementation of the peace settlement,"
promote "full compliance with all civilian aspects of the peace settlement" and "a high level (If
cooperation" between the Panies "and the organizations and agencies panicipating" in the peaCl:
settlement-which includes the War Crimes Tribunal. The High Representative is also required to
"[p]rovide guidance to, and received reports from, the Commissioner of the International Police
Task Force."
Going into the Dayton negotiations, the position of High Representative was diffllrent from
what emerged. During the negotiations, it took a long time for even the tide "High
Representative" to emerge~andidate titles changed frequently. In light of what happened at
DaYlon and afterwards, the United States should re-think the going-in a~sumption that the joh
would go to Carl Bildt.
2.
Carl BUdt Is Likely to Frustrate U.S. Policy on War Crimes
The British and French, and, 10 a lesser extent, the Germans. are backing Carl Bildt for tlw
job of High Representative. As of late last week, smaller European countries were not-...
panicularly The Netherlands, Austria and Sweden (Bildt being the leader of the opposition panY:I.
The United States should work to see that another European candidate emerges who is better
suited for the job as it presently exists.
In fairness to Bildt, the job of mediator is not the same as the job of High Representative as ir.
emerged after Dayton and UNSC Res. 1022. The qualities required are not the same. ForemO!:J:
among the qualities the High Representative needs is a vision for what has to be done in Bosnia 1:"
thaI war does not resume after !POR leaves. The High Representative also has to go in witham
naIvete as to whom he or she will be dealing with.
. An analysis of BiJdt's performance as EU mediator indicates that he is a "trimmer," working
to level out the moral ground by raising some and knocking down others so that all parties can
negotiate together. With respect to the way BUdt would deal with war crImes, there Is reason
to believe BUdt will not pursue war criminals aggressively. This will frustrate United States
policy on the vigorous prosecution of genocide. crimes against humanity and war crimes.
According to Roy Gutman, in early July, Bildt gave instructions that caused there to be D':'
NATO airstrlkes during the fall of Srebrenica. After the capture of 6,000+ Muslim men, Bildt said
that the moral duty was to negotiate. "Military operations ... can start and they call end, bm
politics goes on." On July 16, Bildt, on the basis of a promise without performance, prematurely
announced a deal with the Bosnian Serbs that the ICRC could have access to the pnsf)ners. Of
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course, by that time, the prisoners were already dead. On July 16, after 6.000 ptisoner.; had be<m
killed by the Bosnian Serbs, Reuters reported: ••'I don't think there is a military solution to tbi~
conflict. You may seek a military solution but it's not there,' Bildt commented after talks with
Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade. . .. In Italy Pope John Paul condJ~mnedtil,:
Serb offensive against the U.N. 'safe areas' as crimes against humanity. 'What is being ,:artied Ollt
under the world's gaze is a defeat for civilisation,' he said .... "
Even after it be<:ameclear what had happened at Srebrenica, Bildt made no signifi(:ant public:
condemnation of Srebrenica. His first widely reported public condemnation of Srebrenic:ll
("outrageous") occurred on October 29, 1995. in response to stories in the New York Times and
Washington Post.
In contrast to Bildt's attitude towards Srebrenica. Bildt was quick to condemn TucUmanaft.:r
the attack on the Krajina. This received widespread coverage in the media. particularly Reutel:;.
During August, the Croatians and the Bosnians at times refused to ~al with him.
Bildt's one major peace initiative was his effort to agree to lift sanctions in ex(:hange f,)t
Milosevic agreeing in writing to recognize Bosnia's international boundaries. This was dismissml
by the United States and Germany. The New York Times reported on August 4 that the Clinton
Administration opposed Bildt be<:ausehis plan was ''far too generous to Serbia."
The problem with just having an American deputy. The United States' approach to the
choice of the High Representative has been to focus on getting an American deputy. This is a time
honored American tradition of working behind the scenes when an American should not or cannN
hold the top job. One example where this has worked well has been the United Nations
Compensation Commission in Geneva, which handles claims against Iraq,
Where the issue is Implementation, this approach works. Where the issue is DIdI£!. thi!;
approach fails. The selection of Chief Prosecutor is an example: In August 1993. the Unitf',j
States offered to support Cherif Bassiouni as deputy to John Duncan Lowe. the British ,:andidat(:,
This would not have worked, because, despite Bassiouni's commitment and drive, Lowe would
have had decision-making power whether to bring indictments against Karadzic and Mladic:
Lowe would not have indicted Karadzic and Mladic in July 1995. if at all. A Richard Goldstone
would, and did. The choice of High Representative is as important to the success of the War'
Crimes Tribunal as was the right choice for Chief Prosecutor.
3.
Otlher European Candidates for High Representative Can Make the Admlnlstratlon'~
War Crimes Policy a Success Berore IFOR Leaves
The United States should insist upon an alternative to Carl Bildt from among a number of
excellent European candidates with both human rights stature and practical experience. Foremost
among them is Max van der Stoel, a Dutch Foreign Minister and U.N. human rights rapponellJ"
for Iraq. Not to be overlooked is that it would be politically advantageous for the United States 10
support a Dutch candidate for High Represenative after having rejected former Dur.ch Prime
Minister Ruud Lubbers as Secretary-General for NATO.
Other good choices include Jos6 Marfa Mendiluce. who ran the UNHCR aid pmgram for
Bosnia and is now a member of the European Parliament, and former British Prime Ministc:!'
Margaret Thatcher. The right choice for Hlgb Representative is the best opportunity tbe
United States will have to ensure the Tribunal's success.
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TSW
Bildt Talking Points
1.
Bildt blocked airstrikes that could have prevented the massacre of 6,000 men ;It
Srebrenica: Around July 6, Bildt appears to have told the U.N. not to launch
airstrikes while he was in Belgrade talking to Milosevic. On July 7, the Dub:h, undl!!"
attack from the Bosnian Serbs at Srebrenica, requested NATO airstrikes. This was
rejected by U.N. officers, who said "they did not want to undermine th~~
peacemaking efforts of Carl Bildt." (New York Times, October 29, 1995.)
2.
Massacres start and they can end, but politics goes on forever: After Bosnian Serb
seizure of Srebrenica, Bildt said on July 12, "Military operations ... can start and they
can end, but politics goes on. . .. At the end of the day there will have to be a
negotiated political settlement and I would hope that all of the parties to the conflio:t
recognise that and that they are prepared to sit down and start talking about that a~:
soon as possible." (Reuters).
3.
On July 14-16, Bildt met with Milosevic and Mladic in Belgrade. (Reuters; Roy
Gutman, Newsday.) Bildt announced on July 16 that he had an agreem.ent with
Mladic to allow the ICRC into Srebrenica. "They can go in and have full m*!dom oj'
movement to register people." (Reuters.) This never happened, because by that
time, most of the 6,000Muslim victims were dead.
4.
What's brutal here: Speaking from Belgrade on July 16, after the massacrl! of 6,000
men at Srebrenica, "The brutal fact is that since a couple of months there hits been a
process of military escalation from both sides:' Bildt said (Reuters), referring "to th!!
Bosnian Moslem-led government in Sarajevo and separatist Bosnian Serb forces"
(Reuters.)
5.
The difference between Carl Bildt and Pope John Paul II: Reuters, July 16, " 'I
don't think there is a military solution to this conflict. You may seek a military
solution but it's not there: Bildt commented after talks with Serbian I'resident
Siobodan Milosevic in Belgrade. . .. In Italy Pope John Paul condemned the Serb
offensive against the U.N. 'safe areas' as crimes against humanity. 'What is being
carried out under the world's gaze is a defeat for civilisation: he said ....
6.
Of course, subsequent NATO airstrikes had nothing to do with helping llrive the
Bosnian Serbs to make peace: On July 17, Agence France-Press repom!d "Bildt
warned late Sunday Uuly 16) that tougher western measures against the Bosnian
Serbs could lead to a Balkan war lasting several years. . .. Asked his opinion on the
consequences of taking a stronger stand against the Bosnian Serbs, Bildt replied,
'Such measures would mean that we were heading for war in the Balkans.' "
7.
Bildt's perc:eption of the leveraging power of ec:onomicsanctions against the FRY:
On July 22, Bildt announced he had negotiated a deal with Milosevic in Belgrade
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under which economic sanctions against the FRYwould be lifted in exchaJlge for a
signed agreement to respect Bosnia within its international boundaries. (Reuters.)
8.
The balance of Bildt's negotiated solution: The New York Times reported 011.
August 4 that the Clinton Administration had rejected Bildt's plan to lift economic:
sanctions in exchange for a written agreement to respect Bosnia's international
borders as ufar too generous to Serbia."
9.
Tudjman, in contrast to others, is singled out by name a war criminal: On August
4, Bildt implied Tudjman should be indicted as a war criminal for having tried to re..
take the Krajina and for shelling Knin. Comparing Tudjman to Croatian Sel~b
leader
Milan Martie, who had been indicted for indiscriminate rocket attacks against
Zagreb in May of 1995,Bildt said, "It is difficult to see any difference betwE~ theSE'
actions and the shelling of Knin, which President Tudjman must now be held
responstble for." (Washington Post; Reuters.)
10. Both the Croatians and the Bosnians, at various times, refused to meet with Bildt:
On August 7, Croatia said that Bildt "has lost the credibility needed for the role of it
peace mediator," and that Croatia would cease meeting with Bildt because of his
statements regarding Tudjman. (Reuters.) On August 17, top Bosnian officials
refused to meet with Bildt, saying that he was the mediator of a "procefls that i:;
dead." (Reuters.)
11. Bildt on values: After Croatia criticized Bildt for its one-sided criticism of Tudjma:n
and the attack on the Krajina, Bildt replied, UIam not only a mediator. I aJtI also here
to uphold certain values .... There are moral and European standards to be upheld
and they apply to Serbs, they apply to Croats and they apply to everyone who has
the ambition to be respected in the outside world and it is my duty to make that
abundantly clear to everyone." (Reuters, August 7.)
12. On August 28, Bildt issued his first widely reported criticism against an act by the
Bosnian Serbs, a shelling of Sarajevo in which 37 people were killed. (Reuters.) It
was not until October 29 that Bildt called the atrocities committed at Sl'ebrenica
"outrageous." (upI.)
13. The difference between Carl Bildt and Richard Holbrooke: According to the New
York Times, November 26, "To see Carl Bildt, a former Swedish Prime Minister whl)
this year became the European Union's envoy to Bosnia, beside Ril:hard C.
Holbrooke, America's chief Balkan mediator, was to perceive the gulf between good
intentions and power. Bildt, a lonely figure, paced the streets of Sarajevo with his
briefcase and complained that he needed 'a phone card' to contact a West lluropean
capital. Holbrooke was flanked by generals, whose titles he would readily exalt to
impreas his Balkan interlocutors, and supported by all the high-tech paraphernalia
of U.S. intelligence and milita:rymight."
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�Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT
AND TYPE
NO.
DATE
SUBJECTrrITLE
RESTRICTION
001a. memo
Jonathan Schwartz to Mr. Kornblum; re: Legal Issues Raised by
Proximity Talks in the U.S. (5 pages)
10/06/1995
PIIb(l), P5
001b. draft
re: International Tribunal in Bosnian Peace Settlement (2 pages)
09/29/1995
Pllb(I),
001 c. talking
points
re: International Tribunal in Bosnian Peace Settlement (3 pages)
09/29/1995
Pllb(l)
002. notes
re: Handwritten Notes - George Jamieson (I page)
n.d.
P5
003a. cable
re: Guidance on SOFA's [Status of Forces Agreements] for !FOR (3
pages)
10/20/1995
P11b(1)
003b. note
re: Guidance to USNATO (partial) (I page)
10120/1995
P61b(6)
004a. memo
James Thessin, Acting to The Secretary; re: Bosnian War Crimes
Tribunal- Powers (3 pages)
04121/1993
Pllb(l),
004b. memo
Michael Matheson, Acting to The Secretary; re: Yugoslav War
Crimes (2 pages)
03/31/1993
P11b(1), P5
004c. draft
re: Draft Charter of the International Tribunal for Violations of
International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia [50 USC
403(g), Section 6] (partial) (I page)
03/02/1993
P31b(3)
P5
P5
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Mary DeRosa (LeRal Adviser)
OAIBox Number:
3312
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia - War Crimes, 1993
Jimmie Purvis
2006-0647-F
jp2124
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential
Records Ad - (44 U.S.C. 2204(a»)
PI
P2
P3
P4
National Security Classified Information l(a)(I) of the PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office l(a)(2) of the PRA)
Release would violate a Federal statute (a)(3) of the PRA)
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information l(a)(4) of the PRAJ
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors (a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy (a)(6) of the PRAJ
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.c.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Freedom of Information
Act -15 U.S.c. 552(b»)
b(l) National security classified information (bXI) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency l{b)(2) of the FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute (b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information (bX4) of the FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA}
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA)
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells (bX9) of the FOIAI
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�Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
DATE
SUBJECTrrITLE
RESTRICTION
001. fax cover
sheet
The Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights
to Eric Schwartz; re: No Immunity for Slobodan Milosevic (partial)
(1 page)
10/0612000
P6/b(6)
002. cable
re: Yugoslavia
10/16/2000
PI/b(l)
003. cable
USMission, USNATO to NSC; re: ICTY Chief Prosecutor Del Ponte
Briefs EAPC (5 pages)
10/19/2000
Pl/b(I)
004. cable
reo Guidance for EAPC [Euro-Atlautic Partnership Council]
Discussion with ICTY Prosecutor Del Ponte (2 pages)
10/1712000
Pl/b(I)
005. notes
re: Handwritten Notes - Meeting with Madeleine Albright (1 page)
10/6/2000
Pl/b(l)
006. notes
re: Handwritten Notes - Staff Meeting, Cuba Sanctions (1 page)
10/6/2000
PI/b(l)
007. notes
re: Handwritten Notes - ICC [International Criminal Court] (2 pages)
n.d.
Pl/b(I)
008. notes
re: Handwritten Notes - Phone Call (1 page)
n.d.
P5
009. notes
reo Handwritten Notes - Telcon (1 page)
n.d.
Pl/b(l)
010. draft
reo USUN Reporting Cable Following June PrepCom (3 pages)
10/12/2000
Pl/b(l)
OIl. email
Dorothy Shea to Eric Schwartz; re: ICC Meeting (I page)
10/11/2000
Pl/b(l)
012. letter
Minister Lekota to Secretary Cohen; reo UNIICC Relationship
Agreement (partial) (1 page)
09/29/2000
b(2)
(3 pages)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Dorothy Shea (Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs)
ONBox Number: 3348
FOLDER TITLE:
ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia] - FRY [Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia]
Jimmie Purvis
2006-0647-F
jp2097
RESTRICTION
Presidential
Records Act - (44 V.S.c. 2204(a»)
PI
P2
P3
P4
National Security Classified Information (a)(1) of the PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office (a)(2) of the PRA)
Release would violate a Federal statute (a)(3) of the PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information (a)(4) of the PRA}
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors (a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy (a)(6) of the PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.c.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
CODES
Freedom oflnformation
Act - (5 U.S.c. 552(b)J
b(l) National security classified information (b Xl) of the FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency (b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) ofthe FOIA}
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy (b)(6) of the FOIAJ
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes (b)(7) of the FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions (b)(8) of the FOIA)
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOJA]
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Previously Restricted Documents
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Description
An account of the resource
<p>This collection contains documents that were previously restricted under the <a href="http://www.archives.gov/presidential-libraries/laws/1978-act.html" target="_blank">Presidential Records Act</a> for restrictions P2 (appointment to federal office) and/or P5 (confidential advice between the President and/or his advisors and between those advisors). For more information concerning these collections please see the collection finding aids index. The finding aids detail the scope, content, and provide a box and folder title list for each collection.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.archives.gov/presidential-libraries/laws/1978-act.html" target="_blank">Presidential Records Act (PRA)</a> includes provisions that these types of documents be withheld for twelve years after the end of a president's administration. These documents are now being made available to the public. The documents will be released in batches and will be uploaded here as they become available. The documents will also be available in the Clinton Library’s research room.</p>
<p>Please note the documents in this collection may not contain all the withheld documents listed on the collection's withdrawal sheet index.</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Extent
The size or duration of the resource.
397 folders
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
FOIA 2006-0647-F - Genocide in the Former Yugoslavia
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2006-0647-F
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Previously Restricted Document Release no. 4
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reproduction-Reference
War Crimes