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C06030094
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pproved for Release CIA Historical
Collections Division AR 70-14 10CT201
Seclet
IDCII
National-Intelligence Council
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"----_. . . .
Ending US Compliance With
the Bosnian Arms Embargo:
Military and Political
Impllcationsl
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A unilateral US decision to suspend compliance with the embargo and
arm Bosnian Government forces would intensify the fighting in
Bosnia. It would not make a substantial difference on the battlefield
unless heavy weapons, extensive training. and logistic support were
included. Outside ground and air force intervention would be needed. ..'
to defend vulnerable Bosnian positions until government forces were
prepared to conduct effective multiunit offensive operations. The Bosnian Government's war aims would escalate, leading it to defer diplomatic solutions to the conflict Bosnian Serb forces would strike
quickly after a US decision by launching major attacks to disrupt arms
deliveries and would harass. detain and perhaps attack remaining
UNPROFOR units. Belgrade would resume full support to the
Bosnian Serbs to prevent their defeat. Allied confidence in US leadership could suffer if prior agreements were not reached, especially with
Br,itain and France. Russia would ~ n the decision and violate
existing embargoes against Serbia~
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Secret
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Scope Note
For purposes of this Estimate, we assume
that the United States decides not to
enforce the embargo against the Bosnian
Government (and presumably Croatia),
and that it decides to provide arms and
training to Bosnian Government forces. In
addition, we define success as a Bosnian
Government that canprotect itself without
UNPROFOR, defend isolated Bosnian
enclaves, and seize and control much of
the territory allocated to it in the Contact
Group p l a n O
.
More Arms for the Bosnian Government
Bosnian Government forces have improved
substantially over the last two years and are
now better prepared to absorb additional military equipment. For several months, limited
amounts of small arms and ammunition from
Iran and other Muslim countries have been
reaching government forces, but this aid has
not been enough to enable them to retake and
hold substantial territory now held by the
Bosnian Serbs. Without an increased flow of
arms, government forces probably could
defend only their core areas in northern and
central Bosnia against an all-out Bosnian Serb
Army (BSA) assaultj , I
A US decision unilaterally to cease enforcement of the arms embargo and supply weapons
to Bosnian Government forces would increase
the flow and reduce the costs of equipment for
the government. Soviet-style weapons, readily
available on the world arms market, would be
most easily and rapidly integrated by government forces:
Seeret
A steady flow of light weaponry and munitions would enable Bosnian Government
forces to inflict heavier casualties and regain
modest amounts of territory.D
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Even with additional heavy arms, Bosnian
Government forces would continue to be hampered by a general lack of training and an
inexperienced leadership that has had difficulty
planning and executing large-scale, multiunit,
offensive operations:
• We judge that enough heavy weapons to
equip six to JO brigades with lOO to 200 tanks,
60 to 100 armored personnel carriers, 200 to
300 heavy artillery pieces over lOO mm, and
25 to 40 multiple rocket launchers would be
required to retake significant amounts of territory without weakening current Bosnian Government defenses.
• The Army will require six months to one
year of training and logistic support to make
effective use of.newtypes of weaponry,'
particularly tanks and large-caliber artillery,
in larg~-sc~bined arms, offensive
operatIonsL-J
The Bosnian Government's pursuit of its war
aims is likely to intensify if the United States
begins to supply arms, and it would show
even less interest in a diplomatic solution to
the conflict. Instead, fighting would escalate
as the government sought a military victory
that allowed it to control substantially more
territry thai allocated in the Contact Group's
plan.
Bosnian Serb Responses
The Bosnian Serb Army would strike long
before large-scale deliveries of arms to
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government forces could be effected. The
BSA would attempt to cut off Tuzla and Sarajevo, seize the eastern enclaves, and interdict
Bosnian Government lines of communication.
It would be unable to destroy the Bosnian
Government Army, howeveri
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Serbia would be unlikely to undertake provocative action in Macedonia while fighting escalated in Bosnia. Greater US involvement in
the region, however, could prompt ethnic Albanians in Kosovo to stage an uprisin\g agairt
Serbia and proclaim independence.
Remaining UNPROFOR units, especially
those isolated in enclaves, would almost certainly be detained by BSA elements seeking
huma-n shields against air attacks. Withdrawing
UNPROFOR units-including virtually all
the Europeans-would be harassed and
obstructed. Units opting to continue their mission-primarily the Muslim contingentswould be subject to especially violent attacks:
Croatia would be crucial to any plan to lift the
arms embargo. Croatian support can be had
for a price; it will expect compensation in
weaponry, increased political and economic
assistance from the West, and US help to
regain the Krajina. The Croatian Government
still would attempt to limit the amount and
type of equipment supplied to government
forces that could present a long-term threat to
Bosnian Croats. Over the longer term, lifting
the arms embargo would feed Croat suspicions about Muslim intentions and could further undermine the fragile Croat-Muslim
federation:
• Europeans would hold the United States responsible for the safe evacuation of European
UNPROFOR contingents. US support for
UNPROFOR evacuation would require extensive heavy lift, air tran,port, air cover, and
possibly ground troops
If our judgments on Bosnian Serb reactions are
correct, outside air and ground forces would be
needed to protect eastern enclaves and Sarajevo from BSA attack as well as to secure
vital lines of communication to these areas.
Their participation would be required until
government forces were adequately prepared
to conduct\large-srale combat operations independently.
Regional Spillover
Belgrade probably would not directly intervene simply because the United States lifted
its arms embargo. It would, however, abandon
efforts to blockade the Bosnian Serbs and
allow increased logistic support to them, especially fuel and replacement equipment, to offset improvements in government forces. The
Yugoslav Army would intervene if government
forces began making substantial gainsl
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• In an attempt to prevent or complicate arms
shipments via Croatia, Bosnian Serbs might
coordinate operations with Krajina se1rbs, risl
ing a reopening of the war in Croatia.
Impact on Humanitarian Aid
Although many aid agencies will pull out in the
event of a US decision to end its arms embargo,
enough will remain to service northern and central Bosnia. Aid to that region does rt pasj
through Bosnian Serb-held territory
Delivery of aid to the eastern enclaves and
Sarajevo will be problematic. These areas cannot be reached by road; airdrop risks will
increase, given the virtual certainty that the'
BSA would seek to down aircraft participating in humanitarian relief. Sarajevo would
have enough food to survive the winter,
thanks to efforts by black marketeers, but
would be cut off from electricity and gas:
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• Intensified fighting would increase the number of refugees that required assistance. In a
worst case, if one of the eastern enclaves
falls in winter, thousands of refugees will
die·1
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The Broader Implications
A unilateral US move-without prior agreements, especially with Britain and France, on
the future of UNPROFOR forces-s-could damage allied confidence in Washington's leadership of the NATO alliance. Turkey would be
the only NATO ally to support the action. Other
alliance partners would object and moveirnmediately to withdraw peacekeeping contingents
from Bosnia. Calming Greece's hypernationalism and growing Greco-Turkish tensions would
be even more difficult, and European and
Balkan misgivings over Muslim Bosnia would
become more pronouncedD
Yel'tsin would condemn a US decision to lift
its embargo to preempt hardliners who sought
to exploit this issue. Russia also would openly
and extensively violate the existing embargoes
against Serbia, effectively breaking its pattern
of cooperation with the United States on the
Yugoslav problem:
• Eastern Europe would be reluctant to publicly
support the United States but might use the
move to sell arms in the region while reestablishing corrunercial links to Serbia.
• US actions would legitimize Iran's role in the
region as an arms supplier to the Bosnian
Government.
• Resolutions condemning US unilateral ism
would ensue but are unlikely to pass in either the
Security Council or General Assembly. Existing
UN embargoes and sanction regimes, iTIUdinj
those against Iraq, would be weakened
Seeret
What Could-Affect the Outcome?
• Conditioning arms shipments to the
Bosnian Government by threatening to
cut them off, should its forces go beyond
the Contact Group allocation, might
reassure Western Allies that a diplomatic solution could still be possible.
• Easing economic sanctions on Serbia
might blunt the Russian Government's
criticism and could create an incentive
for Belgrade to keep some distance
from the Bosnian Serbs and agree to
the placement of observers on the
Bosnian-Serb border.
.• A US ground presence in Bosnia might
convince the British and French to
keep some of their UNPROFORforces .
in Bosnia, thereby increasing the
chances of isoLating the Bosnian Serbs
and sustaining the flow of humanitarian reLief
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On the plus side, US unilateral moves will be
welcomed in the Muslim world, especially by
Turkey.
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This Special Estimate was prepared under the auspices of
the National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose
Forces and the National Intelligence Officer for Europe
and was coordinated with the Deputy Director for lntelligence. Central Intelligence Agency: the Director.
Defense Intelligence Agency: the Director. National
Security Agency: and the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research. Department of State: the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Department of the Army:
the Director of Naval Intelligence. Department of the
Navy: and the Assistant Chie,loLS1,aff. Intelligence.
Department of the Air Force.LJ
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Title
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Bosnian Declassified Records
Description
An account of the resource
<p>This collection consists of more than 300 declassified documents related to the Director of Central Intelligence Interagency Balkan Task Force (BTF) and the role of intelligence in supporting policymaking during the 1992-1995 Bosnian War. The compilation contains Summaries of Conclusions from National Security Council meetings where senior officials made decisions on the Bosnian conflict, BTF memoranda pertaining to those meetings, key intelligence assessments, and selected materials from the State Department, the National Security Council, and the Department of Defense. The records center around 1995, the year in which the Dayton Accords ending the Bosnian War were signed.</p>
<p>A symposium was held October 1, 2013 at the Clinton Presidential Library and Museum with President Clinton and former key Administration officials. They discussed intelligence and presidential policy making during the 1992-95 Bosnian War. A booklet, "<a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/international-relations/bosnia-intelligence-and-the-clinton-presidency" target="_blank">Bosnia, Intelligence, and the Clinton Presidency</a>," was created for the conference. <a href="http://vimeo.com/75959093" target="_blank">Video from the conference</a> is made available from the <a href="http://www.clintonfoundation.org/" target="_blank">Bill, Hillary, and Chelsea Clinton Foundation</a>.</p>
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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1994-04, NIE Report re Ending U.S. Compliance with the Bosnian Arms Embargo Military and Political Implications
Format
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Adobe Acrobat Document
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Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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Date Created
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10/1/2013
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4/1/1994
Declassified