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U.S. Department of State
Vietnam Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1999
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Released by the Bureau ofDemocracy,-HumanRights~· and-Labor, February 25, 2000. /
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VIETNAM
I
The Socialist Republic of Vietnam is a one-party state ruled and controlled by the.
Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP). The VCP'S constitutionally mandated leading role
and the occupancy of all senior government positions by party members ensure the
primacy of party Politburo guidelines, and enable the party to set the broad parameters of
national policy. During the year, the Party continued to reduce gradually its formal
involvement in government operations and allowed the Government to exercise
significant discretion in implementing policy. The National Assembly remains subject to
party direction; however, the Government made progress in strengthening the capacity of
the National Assembly and in reforming the bureaucracy. The National Assembly,
chosen in elections in which most candidates are approved by the party (not all delegates
· are party members), played an increasingly independent role as a forum for local and
provincial concerns and as a critic of local and national corruption and inefficiency. The
Assembly was more active in revising legislation, screening ministerial and other senior
candidate appointments, and dismissing senior officers. The judiciary remains
subservient to the VCP.
The military services, including the border defense force, are responsible for defense
against external threats. The military forces are assuming a less prominent role as the
ultimate guarantor of internal security, which is primarily the responsibility of the
Ministry of Public Security. However, in some remote areas, the military forces are the
primary government agency, providing infrastructure and all public safety functions,
including maintaining public order in the event of civil unrest. The Government
continued to restrict significantly civil liberties on grounds of national security. The
Government's Ministry of Public Security controls the police, a special national security
investigative agency, and other units that maintain internal security. The Ministry of
Public Security enforces laws and regulations that significantly restrict individual
liberties and violate other human rights. The Ministry of Public Security maintains a
· system of household registration and block wardens to monitor the population,
concentrating on those suspected of engaging, or being likely to engage in, unauthorized
political activities. However, this system has become less obvious and pervasive in its
intrusion into citizens' daily lives. Members of the security forces committed human
rights abuses.
Vietnam is a very poor country undergoing transition from a centrally planned to a
market-oriented economy. Estimated annual gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is
$330, up between 4 and 5 percent from 1998 according to government statistics. The
Asian financial crisis caused a significant slowdown; trade and foreign investment
declined markedly. Agriculture, primarily wet rice cultivation, employs 70 percent of the .
labor force, but accounts for a shrinking part (24 percent) of total output. Industry and
construction contribute 34 percent, while services account for 42 percent. Disbursed
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official development assistance in 1998 was $939million, roughly 4 percent ofGDP.
Particularly in Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi, economic reforms have raised the standard
of living and reduced party and governmental control over, and intrusion into, citizens'
daily lives. Reforms have created a popular expectation in urban areas of continued
social, legal, educational, and physical improvements. For many large rural populations
close to larger cities, this is also true. Many citizens in isolated rural areas, especially
members of ethnic minorities in the northern uplands, central highlands, and the north
central coastal regions, live in extreme poverty. Gains from agricultural reform in recent
years have improved the lot of many farmers, but the rural poverty level is approximately
30 percent.
The Government's human rights record remained poor; although there was some
measurable improvement in a few areas, the situation worsened in others, and serious
problems remain. The Government continued to repress basic political and some
religious freedoms and to commit numerous abuses. Although the VCP continued its
efforts to reform procedures and internal debate and to allow a mechanism for citizens to
petition the Government with complaints, the Government continued to deny citizens the
right to change their government. Prison conditions remain harsh. There were credible
reports that security officials beat detainees. The Government arbitrarily arrested and
detained citizens, including detention for peaceful expression of political and religious
views. For example; geophysicist Nguyen Thanh Giang was detained for 2 months for
writing letters calling for pluralism and respect for human rights. The Government
denied citizens the right to fair and expeditious trials and continued to hold a number of
political prisoners. The Government restricts significantly citizens' privacy rights,
although the trend toward reduced government interference in the daily lives of most
citizens continued. The Government significantly restricts freedom of speech, the press,
assembly, and association. The Government continued its longstanding policy of not
tolerating most types of public dissent, although it made exceptions in some instances.
For example, a number of persons circulated letters that were highly critical of senior
leaders and called for political reform; these authors were. subjected to close surveillance
by public security forces. The Government allowed citizens somewhat greater freedom
of expression and assembly to express grievances, including by delegates in the National
Assembly, citizens in local forums with delegates, and small groups of protesters outside
government offices. The Government prohibited independent political, labor, and social
organizations; such organizations exist only under government control. The Government
restricts freedom of religion and significantly restricts the operation of religious
organizations other than those entities approved by the State. However, in some respects,
conditions. for religious freedom improved during the year. For example, a Hoa Hao
organization was recognized for the first time officially. In July a festival gathering of up
to 500,000 Hoa Hao in An Giang province took place and in August, an estimated
200,000 Roman Catholics attended the annual La Vang pilgrimage. The Government
imposes some liinits on freedom of movement. Societal discrimination and violence
against women remained problems. Trafficking in women and children for the purpose
of prostitution within the country and abroad continued to grow, and there were reports
of the increased trafficking of women to China for forced marriages. The Government
made efforts to combat these problems. Discrimination against ethnic minorities and
child labor are problems. There were some reports of forced child labor and that certain
prisons employed forced labor, sometimes as part of commercial ventures. The
·Government restricts worker rights.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
I
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
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There were no known politically motivated killings. Little information was available on
the extent of deaths in police custody or on official investigations into such incidents.
There were no reports of deaths of inmates due to prison conditions during the year.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
The law prohibits physical abuse; however, police beat persons, including suspects
during arrests, and also beat street children in their attempts to get them off the streets.
There were no known reports of torture of detainees. Little information is available on
the extent of police brutality during interrogations.
I
Prison conditions are harsh. Conditions generally did not threaten the lives of prisoners,
although anecdotal evidence suggests that the death rate among male prisoners was
higher than among female prisoners. Overcrowding, insufficient diet, and poor sanitation
remained serious problems. Conditions in pretrial detention reportedly were particularly
harsh, and there were credible reports that authorities sometimes denied inmates access
to sunlight, exercise, and reading material. Most prisoners had access to basic health care
and, for those with money, to supplemental food and medicine. However, some political
prisoners were denied visitation rights, and there were reports that some prisons
employed the use of forced labor, sometimes as part of commercial ventures (see Section
6.c.). Prisoners sentenced to hard labor complained that their diet and medical care were
insufficient to sustain health, especially in remote, disease-ridden areas. Several political
prisoners with serious medical conditions were held under harsh conditions in remote
prisons, with limited access to medical care. For example, Do Van Thac, sentenced to 14
(reduced to 12) years' imprisonment on charges of attempting to overthrow the
Government, remained imprisoned in remote Nam Ha province, despite reports that he
had suffered a stroke and had heart disease.
The Government did not permit independent monitoring of its prison and detention
system.
d. Arbitrary arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Government continued to arrest and detain citizens arbitrarily, including arrest and
detention for the peaceful expression of their political and religious views. The 1990
Criminal Procedures Code provides for various rights of detainees, including time limits
on pretrial detention and the right of the accused to have a lawyer present during
interrogation; however, in practice the authorities often ignored these legal safeguards;
Moreover, a 1997 directive on administrative detention gives security officials broad
powers to monitor citizens closely and control where they live and work for up to 2 years
if they are believed to be threatening "national security."
I
The Government continued to utilize its 1997 decree on "administrative detention,"
which gives authorities extremely broad powers to place persons under surveillance, and
to monitor citizens closely. However, the regulations define administrative detention as
an administrative penalty imposed on persons who break the law and violate national
security, as determined by the definition of crimes in the Criminal Code, but whose
offenses are not yet at the level that warrants "criminal responsibility." Persons under
administrative detention must live and work in a designated locality and remain subject
to the management and edu((ation of the local authorities and population. These measures
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are used against suspected political dissidents. The time span of administrative detention
ranges from 6 months to 2 years; the regulations apply also to persons under 18 years of
age. The Ministry of Public Security is the lead agency in implementing the decree;
The Supreme People's Procuracy approves the issuance of arrest warrants, but law
enforcement officials appear able to arrest and incarcerate persons without presenting
arrest warrants. Once arrested, detainees often are held for lengthy periods without
formal charges or trial. In general time spent in pretrial detention counts toward time
served upon conviction and sentencing.
Geophysicist Nguyen Thanh Giang was detained for 2 months during the period from
March to May for circulating letters calling for pluralism and respect for human rights.
After his release, he was informed by police in writing that he could not leave Hanoi
without permission. Protestant pastors Tran Dinh "Paul" Ai and LoVan Hen were ·
detained and questioned by police in Hanoi after a religious training course that they.
were leading was raided by local police in May. Ai was forced to remain in a
government-run hotel, at his own expense, and appear for daily questioning by police for
more than 2 weeks regarding his religious activities, and Hen, a member of the Black Tai
ethnic minority, was returned to Dien Bien Phu for further questioning by police. Both
were released in May after paying fines for participating in an illegal religious meeting
(see Section 2.c.). In December Ai and his family obtained Vietnamese passports and
traveled abroad on a religious worker visa.
I
There were credible reports that during the year more than 25 Hmong Protestants were
detained illegally in Lai Chau province. Of these, 15 were released by year's end. Among
those who remained in detention were: Sinh Phay Pao, Va Sinh Giay, Vang Sua Giang,
and Phang A Dong (see Section 2.c.).
Persons arrested for the peaceful expression of views opposed to official policy were
subject to charge under any one of several provisions in the criminal code that outlaw
acts against the state.
No official statistics are available on the percentage of the prison population that consists
of pretrial detainees or the average period of time that such detainees have been held.
It is difficult to determine the exact number of political detainees, in part because the
Government usually does not publicize such arrests and because the Government does
not consider these persons to be detained for political reasons.
I
The Government continued to isolate certain political and religious dissidents by placing
restrictions on the movements of some dissidents and by pressuring the supporters and
family members of others. For the past 5 years, Thich Huyen Quang, the Supreme
Patriarch of the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV), has been at a pagoda in
Quang Ngai province under conditions resembling administrative detention. From 1981
until 1994, he was held at another pagoda in that province. In March he was visited by
senior UBCV leader Thich Quang Do for the first time in 18 years, but after 3 days of
meetings both were held for questioning by police, and Thich Quang Do was escorted by
police to his pagoda in Ho Chi Minh City. Thich Huyen Quang has confirmed that he
must request permission before leaving the pagoda and is not allowed to lead prayers or
participate in worship activities as a monk. He is able to receive visits from sympathetic
monks, sometimes several per week; UBCV monk Thich Khong Thanh visited in
November. After meeting with him, visitors are questioned by police. Thich Huyen
Quang has. called for the Government to recognize the UBCV. He is receiving good
medical care. In December, because of heavy flooding in the province, police
temporarily evacuated him from the pagoda, then returned him there 2 days later, after
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the waters receded.
'
Family members ofNguyen Dan Que in Ho Chi Minh City were questioned by police,
their telephone service was suspended periodically, and the family's Internet account also
was suspended following the publication abroad in May of several of his writings critical ·
of the Government.
Cao Daists Le Kim Bien and Pham Cong Hien in Kien Giang province were sentenced
during the year to 2 years' imprisonment. They had been detained since October 1998.
They had requested to meet with visiting United Nations Special Rapporteur Amor.
An ethnic Hre church leader, Dinh Troi, remained in detention in Quang Ngai province
at year's end; two of his church colleagues, Dinh Bim and Dinh Hay, were released in
July and September, respectively.
In 1998 the Government released two dozen political and religious prisoners. Prior to
their release, long-time political prisoners Doan Viet Hoat and Nguyen Dan Que were
told by public security officials that they would have to leave the country in order to be
released. Hoat agreed and left the country. Que refused to leave the country, but was
released from prison despite his refusal. He now lives in Ho Chi Minh City.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
I
Although the Constitution provides for .the independence of judges and jurors, .in practice
the Party controls the courts closely at all levels, selecting judges primarily for their ·
political reliability. Credible reports indicate that party officials, including top leaders,
instruct courts how to rule on politically important cases. The National Assembly votes
for candidates that are presented by the President for Supreme People's Court president
and Supreme People's procurator. The President appoints all other judge~.
·
The court system consists of the Supreme People's Court in Hanoi, provincial courts,
district courts, and military tribunals. The Supreme People's Court can review cases from
the lower courts or tribunals. Separately, economic courts handle commercial disputes.
Administrative courts deal with complaints by citizens about official abuse and
corruption. The economic and administrative courts have addressed few cases since their
creation in 1994 and 1995, respectively. Local mass organizations, such as those under
the Fatherland Front, are empowered to deal with minor breaches of law or disputes.
The Supreme People's Procuracy has unchecked power to bring charges against the
accused and serves as prosecutor during trials. A judging cobncil, made up of a judge
and one or more people's jurors (lay judges), determines guilt or innocence and also
passes sentence on the convicted. The relevant people's council appoints people's jurors,
who are required to have high moral standards but need not have legal training. 1
I
The Government continued its effort to develop the legal system as part of expanding the
rule of law. In May the National Assembly passed a new enterprise law that broadened
the legal framework supporting private businesses. A 1998 commercial code helps
regulate business transactions. Many judges and other court officials lacked adequate
legal training, and the Government conducted training programs to address this problem.
A number of foreign governments and the U.N. Development Program provided
assistance to the Government to strengthen rule of law and develop a more effective
judiciary. However, the lack of openness in the judicial process and the continuing lack
of independence of the judiciary undermined the Government's efforts to develop a fair,
effective judicial system.
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Trials generally are open to the public, although judicial authorities sometimes closed
trials or strictly limited attendance in sensitive cases. Defendants have the right to be.
present at their trial and to have a lawyer. The defendant or the defense lawyer have the
right to cross-examine witnesses. However, in political cases, there are credible reports
that defendants are not allowed access to government evidence in advance of the trial, to
cross-examine witnesses, or to challenge statements. Little information is available on
the extent to which defendants and their lawyers have time to prepare for trials. Those
convicted have the right to appeal. On December 27, Nguyen Thi Thuy, a Protestant
house church leader in Phu Tho province was sentenced to 1 year in prison for
"interfering with an officer doing his duty." Thuy had been arrested in October when
police raided a house church meeting that she was hosting. Church sources stated that her
defense lawyer provided only a superficial defense at the trial. .
The Government continued to imprison persons for the peaceful expression of dissenting
religious and political views. There are no reliable estimates of the number of political
prisoners, in part because the Government usually does not publicize such arrests and
frequently conducts closed trials and sentencing sessions. In 1998 Amnesty international
listed more than 40 prisoners held for political reasons, but suggested that the total may
be higher. Other sources put the figure at from 100 to 150 persons. The Government
claims that it does not hold any political prisoners and that persons described as political
prisoners were convicted of violating national security laws.
I
Among those believed to be imprisoned at year's end for peaceful political activities are:
Do Van hung, Do Van Thac, Nguyen Dinh Huy, Nguyen Ngoc Tan, Pham Hong Tho,
Pham Quang Tin, and Vo Van Pham. Among those believed to be held at year's end for
religious offenses are: UBCV monks Thich Thien Minh and Thich Hue Dang, and Thich
Thanh Quang, held in administrative detention; Catholic priests Reverends Mai Due
Choung (Mai Huu Nghi), Pham Minh Tri, Nguyen Van De, Pham Ngoc Lien, Nguyen
Thien Phung, and Nguyen Minh Quan; Cao Dai provincial leaders Le Kim Bien, Pham
Cong Hien, Lam Thai The, Do Hoang Giam, and Van Hoa Vui; Hoa Hao leader Le Minh
Triet (Tu Triet); about 10 Hmong Protestant Christians in Lai Chau and Ha Giang
provinces, including Sung Phai Dia, Vu Gian Thao, Vang Gia Chua, Sung Va Tung,
Sung Seo Chinh, Sinh Phay Pao, and Va Sinh Giay. Credible reports from multiple
sources suggest that at the beginning of the year, there were more than 25 Hmong
Protestants imprisoned in Ha Giang province after being charged either with "teaching
religion illegally" or "abusing the rights of a citizen to cause social unrest." By year's
end, Vietnamese church leaders reported that 15 Hmong Protestants had been released,
including Ly A Giang, Giang A To, Giang A Cat, Cha A Cua, Thao A Chinh, Ma
Truong Chinh, and Giang A Vang (see Section 2.c.).
No current information is available concerning imprisoned dissidents Nguyen Van
Thuan and Le Due Vaong who were arrested in 1998.
As part of a national day amnesty on September 2, the Government commuted the prison
sentences of 1,712 prisoners and released them early for good behavior. However, unlike
1998, there apparently were no political or religious prisoners included in this amnesty.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence
I
The Constitution provides for the right to privacy of home and correspondence; however,
the Government restricts this right significantly. It operates a nationwide system of
surveillance and control through household registration and block wardens who use
informants to keep track of individuals' activities. The authorities continued to monitor
citizens, but with less vigor and efficiency than in the past, as they focused on persons
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with what they regarded as dissident views, whom they suspected of involvement in
unauthorized political or religious activities. Citizens formally are required to register
with police when they leave home, remain in another location overnight, or when they
change their residence (see Section 2.d.). However, these requirements rarely are
enforced, since many citizens move around the country to seek work or to visit family
and friends without being monitored closely. However, there were reports that some
families have been unable to obtain household registration or residence permits, causing
serious legal and administrative problems. In urban areas, most citizens were free to
maintain contact and work with foreigners, but police questioned some individual
citizens and families of citizens with extensive or close relations with foreigners. The
Government also exerts control over citizens who work for foreign organizations by
requiring that citizens be vetted and hired through a government service bureau.
However, many foreign organizations hire their own personnel and only "register" them
with the service bureau.
The Government opened and censored targeted persons' mail, confiscated packages, and
monitored telephone, electronic mail, and facsimile transmissions. The Party exerted
little pressure on citizens to belong to one or more mass organizations, which exist for
villages, city districts, schools, workers (trade unions), youth, veterans, and women.
Membership in theVCP remains an aid to advancement in the Government or in state
companies and is vital for promotion to senior levels of the Government. At the same
time, diversification of the economy has made membership in mass organizations and
the VCP less essential to financial and social advancement.
I
The Government continued to implement a family planning policy that urges all families
to have no more than two children; this .policy emphasizes exhortation rather than
coercion. In principle the Government can deny promotions and salary increases to
. government employees with more than two children, and local regulations permit fines
based on the cost of extra social services incurred by a larger family. In practice these
penalties rarely are enforced. For others, there are no penalties for those with more than
two children, but local regulations permit fines based on the cost of extra social services
incurred by the larger family or reductions in state subsidies for those services. These
penalties are not applied uniformly or universally.
Foreign language periodicals are widely available in cities, and the Government only
rarely censors articles about the country that are available for. sale.
'
I
The Government allows access to the Internet and owns and controls the country's only
Internet access provider, Vietnam Data Communications. Four Internet service providers
compete for subscribers. (A fifth provider, Vietel, owned by the military services, is
inactive.) There are roughly 28,000 Internet subscribers and an increasing number of
cyber cafes in major cities. The Government appeared to limit access to those persons
who are allowed to have Internet accounts. However, in their homes and in certain
settings such as universities, students have widespread access to the Internet. The
Government uses firewalls to block access to some sites operated by Vietnamese exile
groups abroad. Vietnam Data Communications is authorized by the Government to
monitor the sites that subscribers access. Ho Chi Minh City police interrupted and
periodically suspended Nguyen Dan Que's Internet service after he circulated articles
critical of the Government (see Section 1.d.). By law access to satellite television was
limited to top officials, foreigners, luxury hotels, and the press. The law was not enforced
uniformly, and some persons in urban and rural areas have access via home satellite
equipment. The Government generally did not limit access to international radio;
however, it jammed Radio Free Asia.
In July Binh Phuoc provincial authorities demolished three Protestant churches.
However, following the intervention of the central Government, the provincial official
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responsible for the destruction of these churches was removed from office. There were
no further church demolitions (see Section 2.c.).
·
I
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and of the press; however, the
Government severely limits these freedoms, especially concerning political and religious
subjects. Reporters and editors practiced self-censorship concerning sensitive subjects. A
new press law, passed by the National Assembly in May, provides for monetary damages
to be paid by journalists to individuals or organizations who are harmed by reporting,
regardless of whether the reports are true or false. The media continued to publish
articles that criticized party and government actions; however, the freedom to criticize
the Communist Party and its leadership continued to be restricted.
Both the Constitution and the criminal code include broad national security and
antidefamation provisions that the Government used to limit such freedoms strictly. The
Party and Government tolerate public discussion and permit somewhat more criticism
than in the past. In December the Government established a mechanism for citizens to
petition the Government with complaints. Citizens could and did complain openly about
inefficient government, administrative procedures, corruption, and economic policy.
However, the Government imposed limits in these areas as well.
The Government requires journalists to obtain approval from the Ministry of Culture and
Information before providing any information to foreign journalists.
Retired General and war hero Tran Do was expelled from the Communist Party in
January after he refused to cease circulating writings critical of the Party and the
Government. In July Tran Do submitted an application to publish an independent
newspaper, but the authorities refused to grant him permission to do so. Foreign
diplomats are not allowed to visit Tran Do.
The Government continued to prohibit free speech that strayed outside narrow limits to
question the role of the Party, criticize individual government leaders, promote pluralism
or multiparty democracy, or questioned the regime's policies on sensitive matters such,as
human rights. The few persons who spoke out on these matters, such as Nguyen Dan
Que and Thich Quang Do, were subjected to questioning and close monitoring by
security officials. There continued to be an ambiguous line between what constituted
private speech about sensitive matters, which the authorities would tolerate, and public
speech in those areas, which they would not. Several authors whose works attracted
official censure in past years continu~d to be denied permission to publish, to speak
publicly, or to travel abroad. Security forces harassed novelist Duong Thu Huong, and
authorities would not issue her a passport. Some persons who express dissident opinions
on religious or political issues are not allowed to travel abroad (see Section 2.d.).
I
The Party, the Government, and party-controlled mass organizations controlled all print
and electronic media. The Government exercises oversight through the Ministry of
Culture and Information, supplemented by pervasive party guidance and national
security legislation sufficiently broad to ensure effective self-censorship in the domestic
media. With apparent party approval, several newspapers published reports on high-level
government corruption and mismanagement as well as sometimes-heated debate on
economic policy. The Government occasionally censors articles about the country in
foreign periodicals that are sold in the country. The Government generally did not limit
access to international radio, except to Radio Free Asia, which it jammed (see Section
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l.f.).
I
,. .
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Foreign journalists must be approved by the Foreign Ministry's Press Center and must be
based in Hanoi. Two Western foreign correspondents were forced to curtail their
assignments in Vietnam. The first, based in Hanoi for several years for a wire service,
was forced to leave after his bureau chief was informed by the Press Center that the
length of his visa· was being shortened because of the critical nature of his reporting. The
second was required to leave before his temporary assignment was completed. The
number of foreign staff allowed each foreign media organization is limited, and most
Viet~amese staff who work for foreign media are provided by the Foreign Ministry. All
foreign correspondents are required to base themselves in Hanoi. The Press Center
monitors journalists' activities and decides on a case-by-case basis whether to approve
their interview, photograph, film, or travel requests, all of which must be submitted 5
days in advance. Foreign Ministry officials no longer accompany foreign journalists on
all interviews. The Government censored television footage and delayed export of
footage by several days.
The Government allowed artists some latitude in choosing the themes of their works.
Many artists received permission to exhibit their works abroad, receiving exit permits to
attend the exhibits and export permits to send their works out of the country. Artists are .
not allowed to exhibit works of art that censors regard as criticizing or ridiculing the
Government or the Party. Authorities required a foreign-produced film, parts of which
had been filmed in Vietnam, to be censored in two places before allowing it to be shown
publicly in the country. However, the Government permitted a more open flow of
information within the country and into the country from abroad, including the university
system. Foreign academic professionals temporarily working at universities stated that
they were able to discuss nonpolitical issues widely and freely in the classroom.
Government monitors regularly attended, without official notification, classes taught by
foreigners and citizens. Academic publications usually reflected the views of the Party
and the Government and exhibited greater freedom for differing views on nonpolitical
subjects than for political ones.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The right of assembly is restricted in law and practice. Persons who wish to gather in a
group are required to apply for a permit, which local authorities can issue or deny
arbitrarily. However, persons routinely gather in informal groups without government
interference. During the year there were a number of small protests (of from 10 to 25
persons) outside government and party office buildings and the National Assembly hall.
These protests usually focused on local grievances, and the authorities generally allowed
them to run their course without interference. Similarly, a group of up to 50 protesters
demonstrated peacefully in public in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City including once
demonstrating in front of a Western diplomatic mission in Ho Chi Minh City. However,
the Government does not permit demonstrations that could be seen as having a political
purpose. Although it was more tolerant than in the past of occasional demonstrations by
citizens about specific grievances against local officials, the Government did not tolerate
extended.demonstrations. The Government allowed large gatherings of Roman Catholic
and Hoa Hao religious believers for preapproved festivals (see Section 2.c.).
I
The Government restricts freedom of association. With a few exceptions, the
Governinerit prohibits the establishment of private, independent organizations, insisting
that persons work within established, party-controlled organizations, often under the
aegis of the Fatherland Front. Citizens are prohibited from establishing independent
organizations such as political parties, labor unions, and religious or veterans'
organizations. Such organizations exist only under government control.
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c. FreedoJ of Religion
'
Both the Constitution and government decrees provide for freedom of worship; however,
the Government continued to restrict significantly those organized activities of religious
groups that it defined as being at variance with state laws and policies. The Government
generally allowed persons to practice individual worship in the religion of their choice,
and participation in religious activities throughout the country continued to grow
significantly. However, government regulations control religious hierarchies and
organized religious activities, in part because the Communist Party fears that organized
religion may weaken its authority and influence by serving as political, social, and
spiritual alternatives to the authority of the central Government.
The Government requires religious groups to be registered and uses this process to ·
control and monitor church organizations. Officially recognized religious organizations
are able to operate openly, and they must consult with the Government about their
religious operations, although not about their religious tenets of faith. In general religious
organizations are confined to dealing specifically with spiritual and organizational
matters. The Government holds conferences to discuss and publicize its religion decrees.
I
Religious organizations must obtain government permission to hold training seminars,
conventions, and celebrations outside the regular religious calendar, to build or remodel
places of worship, to engage in charitable activities or operate religious schools, and to
train, ordain, promote, or transfer clergy. Many of these restrictive powers lie principally
with provincial or city people's committees, and local treatment of religious persons
varied widely. In some areas such as Ho Chi Minh City, local officials allowed religious
persons wide latitude in practicing their faith, including allowing some educational and
humanitarian activities. However, in other areas such as the northwest provinces, local
officials allowed believers little discretion in the practice of their faith. In general
religious groups faced difficulty in obtaining teaching materials, expanding training
facilities, publishing religious materials, and expanding the clergy in training in response
to increased demand from congregations.
The Government officially recognizes Buddhist, Roman Catholic, Protestant, Cao Dai,
. Hoa Hao, and Muslim religious organizations. However, some Buddhists, Protestants,
Cao Dai, and Hoa Hao believers do not recognize or participate in the governmentapproved associations and thus are not considered legal by the authorities.
Among the country's religious communities, Buddhism is the dominant religious belief.
Many believers practice an amalgam of Mahayana Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucian
traditions that sometimes is called Vietnam's "triple religion." Three-fourths of the
population of approximately 80 million persons are at least nominally Buddhist, visit
pagodas on festival days, and have a world view that is shaped in part by Buddhism. One
prominent Buddhist official estimated that 30 percent of Buddhists are devout and
practice their faith regularly. The Government's Office of Religious Affairs uses a much
lower estimate of 7 million practicing Buddhists. Mahayana Buddhists, most of whom·
are part of the ethnic Kinh majority, are found throughout the country, especially in the
populous areas of the northern and southern delta regions. There are proportionately
fewer Buddhists in certain highlands and central lowlands areas, although migration of
Kinh to highland areas is changing the distribution somewhat.
I
A Khmer minority in the south practices Theravada Buddhism. Numbering from perhaps
700,000 to 1 million persons, they live almost exclusively in the Mekong delta.
The Government requires all Buddhist monks to work under a party-controlled umbrella
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organization, the Central Buddhist Church of Vietnam. The Government opposed efforts
by the non-government-sanctioned Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV) to
operate independently, and tension between the Government and t~e UBCV continued.
Several prominent UBCV monks, including Thich Quang Do, were released in wideranging government amnesties in September and October 1998.
· The Government continued to isolate certain political and religious dissidents by placing
restrictions on the movements of some dissidents and by pressuring the supporters and
family members of others. For the past 5 years, Thich Huyen Quang, the Supreme ·
Patriarch of the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV), has been at a pagoda in
Quang Ngai province under conditions resembling administrative detention. From 1981
until 1994, he was held at another pagoda in that province. In March he was visited by
senior UBCV leader Thich Quang Do for the first time in 18 years, but after 3 days of
meetings both were held for questioning by police, and Thich Quang Do was escorted by
police to his pagoda in Ho Chi Minh City. Thich Huyen Quang has confirmed that he
must request permission before leaving the pagoda and is not allowed to lead prayers or
participate in worship activities as a monlc He is able to receive visits from sympathetic
monks, sometimes several per week; UBCV monk Thich Khong Thanh visited in
November. After meeting with him, visitors are questioned by police. Thich Huyen
Quang has called for the Government to recognize the UBCV. He is receiving good
medical care. In December, because of heavy flooding in the province, police
temporarily evacuated him from the pagoda, then returned him there 2 days later, after
the waters receded.
In September Thich Quang Do complained that fellow UBCV monk Thich Khong Tanh
was summoned by police for questioning in Ho Chi Minh City.
I
There are an estimated 6 to 7 million Roman Catholics in the country (about 8 percent of
the population). The largest concentrations are in southern provinces around Ho Chi
Minh City, with other large groups in the northern and central coastal lowlands. In recent
years, the Government eased its efforts to control the Roman Catholic hierarchy by
relaxing the requirements that all clergy belong to the government-controlled Catholic
Patriotic Association. Few clergy actually belonged to this association.
Authorities allowed the Vatican's ordination of a new archbishop in Ho Chi Minh City in
1998, as well as the ordination of five bishops in other dioceses in 1998 and 1999. A
high-level Vatican envoy visited the country in March. A number of bishops traveled to
Rome for a synod of Asian bishops. Up to 200,000 Catholics gathered in August at an ·
annual Marian celebration in La Vang in the central part of the country and celebrated
their faith freely there.
·
The local Catholic Church hierarchy remained frustrated by the Government's
restrictions but has learned to accommodate itself to them for many years. A number of
clergy reported a modest easing of government control over church activities in certain
dioceses. The Government relaxed its outright prohibition on the Catholic Church's
involvement in religious education and charitable activities but still restricted such
activity.
The degree of government control of church activities varied greatly among localities. In
some areas, especially in the south, churches and religious groups operated kindergartens
and engaged in a variety of humanitarian projects. At least six priests belonging to the
Congregation of the Mother Co-redemptrix reportedly remain imprisoned.
I
The Government allowed many bishops and priests to travel freely within their dioceses
and allowed greater, but still restricted, freedom for travel outside these areas,
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particularly in many ethnic areas. The Government discourages priests from entering Son
La and Lai Chau provinces. Upon return from international travel during the year,
citizens, including clergy, officially were required to surrender their passports; this law is
enforced unevenly. Some persons who express dissident opinions on religious or
political issues are not allowed to travel abroad (see Section 2.d.). Seminaries throughout
the country have approximately 500 students enrolled. The Government limits the
Church to operating 6 major seminaries and to recruit new seminarians only every 2
years. All students must be approved by the Government, both upon entering the
seminary and prior to their ordination as priests. The Church believes that the number of
. graduating students is insufficient to support the growing Catholic population.
There are approximately 600,000 Protestants in the country (less than 1 percent of the
population), with more than half these persons belonging to a large number of
unregistered evangelical "house churches" that operate in members' homes or in rural
villages, many of them in ethnic minority areas. Perhaps 150,000 of the followers of ·
house churches are Pentecostals, who celebrate "gifts of the spirit" through charismatic
and ecstatic rites of worship.
The network of Tin Lanh (Good News) churches, originally founded by the Christian
and Missionary Alliance early in the 20th century, generally operated with greater
freedom than did the house churches. The roughly 300 Tin Lanh churches in the country
are concentrated in the major cities, including Ho Chi Minh City, Danang, Hanoi, and in
lowland areas. Some 15 Tin Lanh churche~ in the northern provinces are the only
officially recognized Protestant churches.
I
Reports from believers indicated that Protestant church attendance grew substantially,
especially among the house churches, despite continued government restrictions on
proselytizing activities. The Government restricts Protestant congregations from
cooperating on joint religious observances or other activities, although in some localities
there was greater freedom to do so. There is some ecumenical networking among
Protestants, particularly in Ho Chi Minh City.
Based on believers' estimates, two-thirds of Protestants are members of ethnic minorities,
including ethnic Hmong (some 120,000 followers) in the northwest provinces and some
200,000 members of ethnic minority groups of the central highlands (Ede, Jarai, Bahnar,
and Koho, among others). The house churches in ethnic minority areas have been
growing rapidly in recent years, sparked in part by radio broadcasts in ethnic minority
languages from the Philippines. This growth has led to tensions with local officials in ..
some provinces. There have been crackdowns on leaders of these churches, particularly
among the Hmong iri the northwest. The secretive nature of the house churches,
particularly among ethnic minorities, has contributed to greater repression against these
groups. Provincial officials in certain northwest provinces do not allow churches or
pagodas to operate and have arrested and imprisoned believers for practicing their faith
nonviolently in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
The authorities in the northwest provinces severely restrict the religious freedom of
evangelical Protestants, including ethnic Hmong and ethnic Tai. Credible reports from
multiple sources stated that at the beginning of the year, there were more than 25 Hmong
Protestants imprisoned primarily in Lai Chau province for "teaching religion illegally" or
"abusing the rights of a citizen to cause social unrest."
I
Following protests by church leaders and international attention to the detentions,
Protestant church leaders reported that 15 of the detainees had been released by year's
end. Among the remaining detainees were four Hmong Protestant leaders: Sinh Phay
Pao, Va Sinh Giay, Vang Sua Giang, and Phang A Dong. These persons had been
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arrested in Ha Giang province late in the year. Phang A Dong was charged with illegally
traveling to China without a visa or passport.
I
The Government's repression of the Hmong is complicated by several factors which
include religious practices. Some Hmong citizens fought against the Government in the
past, and they live in sensitive border regions with China and Laos, which together lead
the Government to question their loyalty. Among the Hmong there are two distinct
religious groups: One group's members follow a traditional form of Christianity, and
another group's beliefs are characterized by an element that is cultic in nature. The latter
group's eschatological world view includes a predicted cataclysmic event in 2000.
However, the Government does not differentiate between the two groups; their beliefs
exacerbate the authorities' anxiety about the Hmong.
In December Nguyen Thi Thuy, a Protestant house church leader in Phu Tho province,
was sentenced to 1 year's imprisonment for "interfering with an officer doing his duty."
Thuy was arrested during a police raid on her home, where she was leading a Bible study
group.
An ethnic Hre church leader, Dinh Troi, remained in detention in Quang Ngai province
at year's end; two ofhis church colleagues, Dinh Bim and Dinh Hay, were released in
July and September, respectively.
I
In July Binh Phuoc provincial authorities demolished three Protestant churches. Their
congregations, composed of ethnic Mnong and Stieng Christians, protested to the central
government authorities and the international community. Church officials reported that
the central authorities intervened to prevent the further razing of churches. In December
the provincial official responsible was removed from office. Binh Phuoc province
Christians reported that they were able to celebrate Christmas openly and peacefully.
The Government's Office of Religious Affairs estimates that there are 1.1 million Cao
Dai followers Gust over 1 percent of the population). Some nongovernmental
organization (NGO) sources estimate that there may be from 2 to 3 million followers.
Cao Dai groups are most active in Tay Ninh province, where the Cao Dai holy see is
located, and in Ho Chi Minh City, the Mekong delta, and Hanoi. There are separate sects
within the Cao Dai religion, which is syncretistic, combining elements of many faiths. Its
basic belief system is influenced strongly by Mahayana Buddhism, although it
recognizes a diverse array of persons who have conveyed divine revelation, including
Siddhartha, Jesus, Lao-Tse, Confucius, and Moses.
A government-controlled management committee has been established with full powers
to control the affairs of the Cao Dai faith, thereby managing the church's operations, its
hierarchy, and its clergy. Independent church officials oppose the edicts of this
committee as not being faithful to Cao Dai principles and traditions. Despite the
Government's statement in 1997 that it had recognized the Cao Dai church legally and
encouraged Cao Dai believers to expand their groups and practice their faith, many toplevel clerical positions remain vacant, and some believers were detained arbitrarily. In
October 1998, the authorities detained two Cao Daists in Kien Giang province, Le Kim
Bien and Pham Cong Hien, who sought to meet with U.N .. Special Rapporteur on
Religious Intolerance Abdelfattah Amor. They were sentenced to 2 years' imprisonment.
Three Cao Daists, Lam Thai The, Do Hoang Giam, and Van Hoa Vui, arrested several
years ago, remain imprisoned in Xuan Loc prison in Dong Nai province. Ly Cong
Cuong, a Cao Daist arrested in 1983 in An Giang province, was released in July.
I
Hoa Hao, considered by its followers to be a "reform" branch of Buddhism, was founded
in the southern part of the country in 1939. Hoa Hao is a privatistic faith that does not
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have a priesthood and rejects many of the ceremonial aspects of mainstream Buddhism.
Hoa Hao followers are concentrated in the Mekong delta, particularly in provinces such
as An Giang, where the Hoa Hao were dominant as a political and religious force before
1975. According to the Office onReligious Affairs, there are 1.3 million HoaHao.
believers; church-affiliated expatriate groups suggest that there may be 2 million to 3
million. A government-organized group of 160 Hoa Hao held a congress in May in An
Giang. The congress established an 11-member committee to oversee the administrative
affairs of the religion. Establishment of the committee constituted official governmental
recognition of the religion for the first time in 25 years.
The Hoa Hao have faced restrictions on their religious and political activities since 1975
because of their previous armed opposition to the Communist forces. Since 197 5 all
administrative offices, places of worship, and social and cultural institutions connected
to the faith have been closed, thereby limiting public religious functions. Believers
continue to practice their religion at home. The lack of access to public gathering places
has contributed to the Hoa Hao community's isolation and fragmentation. In July,
following official recognition of a Hoa Hao religious organization, up to 500,000 Hoa
Hao believers gathered for a religious festival in An Giang province in the largest Hoa
Hao gathering since 1975. The authorities continue to restrict the distribution of the
sacred scriptures of the Hoa Hao, and believers say that a number of church leaders
continue to be detained. One prominent Hoa Hao activist, Tran Huu Duyen, was released
in the September 1998 prisoner amnesty.
I
Mosques serving the country's small Muslim population, estimated at 100,000 persons,
operate in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, and several provinces in the southern part of the
country. The Muslim community comprises ethnic Vietnamese, ethnic Cham in the
southern coastal provinces and western Mekong delta, and migrants originally from
Malaysia, Indonesia, and India. Most practice Sunni Islam.
The Muslim Association ofVietnam was banned in 1975 but authorized again in 1992. It
is the only official Muslim organization. Association leaders say that they are able to
practice their faith, includingdaily prayer, fasting during the month of Ramadan, and the
pilgrimage to Mecca, Saudi Arabia. The Government no longer has a policy of restricting
exit permits to prevent Muslims from making the Hajj. About 1 dozen Muslims made the
Hajj to Mecca during 1998.
There are a variety of smaller religious communities. An estimated 8,000 Hindus are
concentrated in the south, including some ethnic Chams on the south central coast who
practice Hinduism.
There are several hundred members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
(Mormons) who are spread throughout the country, primarily in the Ho Chi Minh City
and Hanoi areas.
The prominent position of Buddhism does not affect religious freedom for others
adversely, including those who wish not to practice a religion. The secular government
does not favor a particular religion. Of the country's 80 million citizens, 14 million or
more reportedly do not appear to practice any organized religion. Some sources define
strictly those considered to be practicing Buddhists, excluding those whose activities are
limited to visiting pagodas on ceremonial holidays; using this definition, the number of
nonreligious persons would be much higher--perhaps up to 50 million: persons.
I
In some respects, conditions for religious freedom improved. In many areas, Buddhists,
Catholics, and Protestants reported an increase in religious activity and observance.
However, at the same time, government restrictions remained, and worshipers in several·
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Buddhist, Catholic, and Cao Dai centers of worship reported that they believed that
undercover government observers attended worship services and monitored the activities
of the congregation and the clergy.
The Government released at least eight prominent religious prisoners as part of a wideranging prisoner amnesty in the Fall of 1998. Among these were five UBCV monks,
including two of the most senior-ranking, Thich Quang Do and Thich Tue Sy; Catholic
priests Dinh Viet Hieu and Nguyen Chau Dat; andHoa Hao Buddhist Tran Huu Duyen.
However, operational and organizational restrictions on the hierarchies and clergy of
most religious groups remain in place. While there were releases of religious prisoners,
including others in addition to the eight prominent ones, detention and imprisonment of
other persons for practicing religion illegally continued.
In April the Government issued a new decree on religion that prescribes the rights and
responsibilities of religious believers. Similar to the Government's 1991 decree on
religion, the decree also states for the first time that no religious organization can reclaim
lands or properties taken over by the State following the end of the 1954 war against
French rule and the 1975 Communist victory in the south. The decree also states that
persons formerly detained or imprisoned must obtain special permission from the
authorities before they may resume religious activities.
I
There were credible reports that Hmong Protestant Christians in several northwestern
villages were forced to recant their faith and to drink blood from sacrificed chickens
mixed with rice wine. Hmong church leaders told a North American church official that
one Hmong Christian, Lu Seo Dieu, died in prison in Lao Cai province from
mistreatment and lack of medical care. This report could not be confirmed. Prison
conditions are poor in remote regions, and prison conditions in general are harsh.
Police authorities routinely question persons who hold dissident religious or political
views. In May two prominent pastors of the unsanctioned Assemblies of God, pastors
Tran Dinh "Paul" Ai and LoVan Hen, were detained and questioned by police after a
Bible study session that they were conducting in Hanoi was raided by local police. Ai
was questioned daily for more than 2 weeks regarding his religious activities, and Lo
Van Hen, a member of the Black Tai ethnic minority, was returned to Dien Bien Phu for
further questioning_ by police. Both were released before.the end of May and allowed to
return home. Ai later was issued a passport and allowed to travel abroad with his family
on a religious worker visa.
There were numerous reports that police arbitrarily detained persons based on their
religious beliefs and practice. A 1997 directive on administrative detention gives security
officials broad powers to monitor citizens and control where they live and work for up to
2 years if they are believed to be threatening "national security." In their implementation
of administrative detention, authorities held some persons under conditions resembling
house arrest.
I
The Penal Code, as amended in 1997, established penalties for offenses that are only
vaguely defined, including "attempting to undermine national urtity" by promoting
"division between religious believers and nonbelievers." In some cases, particularly
involving Hmong Protestants, when authorities charge persons with practicing religion
illegally they do so using provisions of the Penal Code that allow for jail terms up to 3
years for "abusing freedom of speech, press, or religion." There were reports that
officials fabricate evidence, and some of the provisions of the law used to convict
religious prisoners contradict international covenants such as the Universal Declaration
on Human Rights.
·
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There are no precise estimates available of the number of religious detainees and
religious prisoners. There reportedly are at least 10 religious detainees, held without
arrest or charge; however, the number may be greater. These persons include: Le Minh
Triet (Tu Triet), a Hoa Hao leader detained at a government house in the south; and a
number of Hmong and other ethnic minority Protestant detainees. The authorities use
administrative detention as a means of controlling persons whom they believe hold
dissident opinions. Anecdotal reports indicate that small groups of Protestants are
detained briefly--sometimes for only a few days, at other times for weeks or months.
Some persons are subject to prolonged detention without charge.
According to rough estimates, there are from 20 to 40 religious prisoners. This number is
difficult to verify with any precision because of the secrecy surrounding the arrest,
detention, and release process. The following persons reportedly continue to be held as
religious prisoners: UBCV monks Thich Thein Minh and Thich Hue Dang; Catholic
priests Mai Due Chuong (Mai Huu Nghi), Pham Minh Tri, Nguyen Van De, Pham Ngoc
Lien, Nguyen Thien Phung, and Nguyen Minh Quan; and Cao Daists Le Kim Bien and
Pham Cong Hi en. About 10 Hmong Protestant Christians in Lai Chau and Ha Giang
provinces remain in detention; they include: Sung Phai Dia, Vu Gian Thao, Vang Gia
Chua, Sung Va Tung, Sung Seo Chinh, Sinh Phay Pao, and Va Sinh Giay.
Officials acknowledge that the following Hmong Christians were sentenced and
imprisoned under the section of the Penal Code that prohibits "abusing the freedom of
religion": Sung Phai Dia, Vu Gian Thao, Ly A Giang, Giang A To, and Giang A Cat.
I
Unconfirmed reports from the central highlands suggest that some local officials have
extorted cattle and money from Protestants in those areas. It is unclear whether their
religious affiliation or other factors were the causes of these alleged crimes. Provincial
officials in Ha Giang and Lai Chau provinces in the north have sought to pressure
Hmong Christians to recant their faith.
The Government bans and actively discourages participation in "illegal" religious
groups, including the UBCV, Protestant house churches, and unapproved Hoa Hao and
Cao Dai groups. The Government restricts the number of clergy that the Buddhist,
Catholic, Protestant, and Cao Dai churches may train. Restrictions are placed on the
numbers of Buddhist monks and Catholic seminarians. Protestants are not allowed to
operate a seminary or to ordain new clergy.
The Government restricts and monitors all forms of public assembly, including assembly
for religious activities. On some occasions, large religious gatherings have been allowed,
such as the 1998 and 1999 celebrations at La Vang. Within the past year, the Hoa Hao
also have been allowed to hold two large public gatherings.
Religious and organizational activities by UBCV monks are illegal, and all UBCV
activities outside private temple worship are proscribed. Protestant groups in central and
southern provinces and some groups of Hoa Hao believers not affiliated with the group
that held the May congress have petitioned the Government to be recognized officially.
They have been unsuccessful thus far. Most evangelical house churches do not attempt to
register because they believe that their applications would be denied, and they want to
avoid government control.
l
I
The Government does not permit religious instruction in public schools. The
Government restricts persons who belong to dissident and unofficial religious groups
from speaking about their beliefs. It officially requires all religious publishing to be done
by government-approved publishing houses. Many Buddhist sacred scriptures, Bibles,
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and other religious texts and publications are printed by these organizations and allowed
to be distributed to believers. The Government allows, and in some cases encourages,
links with coreligionists in other countries when the religious groups are approved by the
Government. The Government actively discourages contacts between the illegal UBCV
and its foreign Buddhist supporters, and between illegal Protestants, such as the house
churches, and their foreign supporters. Contacts between the Vatican and the domestic
Catholic Church are permitted, and the Government maintains a regular, active dialog
with the Vatican on a range of issues, including organizational activities, the prospect of
establishing diplomatic relations, and a possible papal visit. The Government allows
religious travel for some, but not all, religious persons; Muslims are able to undertake the
Hajj, and many Buddhist and Catholic officials also have been able to travel abroad.
Persons who hold dissident religious opinions generally are not approved for foreign
travel.
The Government does not designate persons' religions on passports, although citizens'
"family books," which are household identification books, list religious and ethnic
affiliation.
The law prohibits foreign missionaries from operating in the country. Proselytizing by
citizens is restricted to regularly scheduled religious services in recognized places of
worship. Immigrants and noncitizens must comply with the law when practiCing their
religions. Catholic and Protestant foreigners exercise leadership in worship services that
are reserved for foreigners.·
I
The government Office on Religious Affairs hosts periodic meetings to address religious
issues according to government-approved agendas that bring together leaders of diverse
religious traditions.
Adherence to a religious faith generally does not disadvantage persons in civil,
economic, and secular life, although it likely would prevent advancement to the highest
.government and military ranks. Avowed religious practice bars membership in the
Communist Party, although anecdotal reports indicate that a handful of the 2 million
Communist Party members are religious believers.
The Government remained sensitive about international and nongovernmental
organization investigations. In October 1998, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on
Religious Intolerance, Abdelfattah Amor, visited Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, Hue, and
Tay Ninh province. He met with government officials and representatives of the
·government-sanctioned Central Buddhist Church, the Catholic Church, Cao Dai, a
Protestant church, and the small Muslim community. However, security officials
prevented Amor from meeting several senior representatives of the non-governmentsanctioned UBCV, including Thich Huyen Quang and Thich Quang Do, despite his
repeated requests to do so.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and
Repatriation
I
The Government imposes some limits on freedom of movement. Most citizens enjoyed
freedom of movement within the country; however, some local authorities required
members of ethnic minority groups to obtain permission to travel outside certain
highland areas. Officially, citizens had to obtain permission to change their residence
(see Section l.f.). In practice many persons continued to move without approval,
especially migrant or itinerant laborers moving from rural areas to cities in search of
work. However, moving without permission restricted their ability to obtain legal work
permits. Citizens formally are required to notify police if they intend to be away from ·
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their residence overnight and must register with police anywhere that they stay
overnight; however, these requirements generally are not enforced. Holders of foreign
passports must register to stay in private homes. In practice visitors of Vietnamese origin
from overseas do not appear to have problems with this requirement and are allowed to
stay with family and friends. Other foreigners complain that they are not allowed to do
so.
The Government employs internal isolation to restrict the movement of political and
religious dissidents (see Section 1.d.). The Government continued to use its 1997 decree
on administrative detention to restrict where citizens live and work (see section l.f.).
Foreigners generally are free to travel throughout the country, except in some areas
restricted on grounds of national security. The Government retained the right to approve
travel to border areas, to some areas in the central highlands, and to some islands, but in
practice foreigners can travel to most border areas without prior approval. However, on
several occasions, local police detained and fined foreigners whom police found had
ventured too close to international borders and other sensitive military areas.
Although the Government no longer required citizens traveling abroad to obtain exit or
reentry visas, the Government sometimes prevented persons from traveling by refusing
to issue passports to persons who wished to travel. Persons who depart the country using
passports marked dinh cu or "resettlement" appear to need a reentry permit to return.
Some persons who express dissident opinions on religious or political issues are not
allowed to travel abroad (see Section 2.d.).
·
I
Citizens must demonstrate eligibility to emigrate to another country and show
· sponsorship abroad before the Government issues passports, which are required before a
person is able to emigrate. Persons emigrating under refugee status are required to have a
letter of introduction from the Ministry of Public Security 'before the passport office will
issue them passports. Citizens' access to passports frequently was constrained by factors
outside the law, such as bribery and corruption. Refugee and immigrant visa applicants
sometimes encountered local officials who arbitrarily delayed or denied passports based
on personal animosities or on the officials' perception that an applicant did not meet
program criteria, or in order to extort a bribe.
Because citizens who live overseas are considered a valuable potential source of foreign
exchange and expertise for the country but also a potential security threat, the
Government generally encourages them to visit but monitors many of them carefully.
The United States continued to process for admission and resettlement immigrants and
refugee applicants, including Amerasians, former reeducation camp detainees, and
family reunification cases. There are some concerns that some members of minority
ethnic groups, particularly nonethnic Vietnamese such as the Montagnards, may not have
ready access to these programs. The Government denied passports for emigration to
certain Montagnard applicants.
I
The Government generally permits citizens who emigrate to return to visit, but it
considers them Vietnamese citizens and therefore subject to the obligations of a
Vietnamese citizen under the law, even if they have adopted another country's
citizenship. The Government no longer requires reentry visas for citizens holding regular
passports but who reside in another country. Holders of Vietnamese passports marked
dinh cu or resettlement appear to need a reentry visa. However, emigrants are not
permitted to use Vietnamese passports after they adopt other citizenship.
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Vietnam and the United States continued to work together on the Resettlement
Opportunity for Vietnamese Returnees Program (ROVR) in processing the residual few
hundred ROVR persons who had returned from refugee camps elsewhere in southeast
Asia.
Vietnam cooperated with the international community in implementing the
Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA), which was in effect in Vietnam between 1989 and
June 1997, to resolve the situation of the thousands ofVietnamese who departed the
country illegally. In 1989 as part of the CPA, Vietnam had signed a memorandum of
·understanding with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to accept
voluntary repatriates from camps in countries of first asylum, provided that there was
financial assistance. The agreement included a commitment to waive prosecution and
punitive measures for the illegal departure from Vietnam of persons who return under the.
UNHCR voluntary repatriation program. The UNHCR, which monitored repatriates
reported that they do not face retribution or discrimination.
I
The Constitution allows consideration of asylum under certain circumstances for
foreigners persecuted abroad. Otherwise, the country does not have provisions for the ·
granting of asylum or refugee status in accordance with the standards of the 1951 U.N.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. There were no
reports that any individuals requested asylum. In the 1970's and 1980's, the Government
admitted refugees from Cambodia, most of whom were ethnic Chinese. Between 1993
and 1995, it admitted 30,000 persons from Cambodia, mainly ethnic Vietnamese. The
Government cooperates with the UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations in
assisting refugees. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their
Government
·
Citizens do not have the right to change their government. Party control over the
selection of candidates in elections for the National Assembly, the Presidency, the Prime
Ministership, and local government undermines this right. All authority and political
power is vested in the VCP; political opposition movements and other political parties .
are not tolerated. The VCP Central Committee is the supreme decisionmaking body in
the nation, with the Politburo as the locus of policymaking. A standing board, consisting
of the five most senior members of the Politburo, oversees day-to-day implementation of
leadership directives. Senior advisors to the Party, including the former party general
secretary, President, and Prime Minister, also continue to exert significant influence on
Politburo decisionmaking. The Government limited public debate and criticism to certain
aspects of individual, state, or party performance determined by the VCP itself. No
public challenge to the legitimacy of the one-party state is permitted; however, there
were isolated instances of unsanctioned letters from private citizens critical of the
Government that circulated publicly (see Section 2:a.).
Eligible citizens are required to vote in elections, although there is no penalty for not
voting. Citizens elect the members of the National Assembly, ostensibly the main
.legislative body, but the Party must approve all candidates, most of whom are Party
members. Most National Assembly members belong to the VCP, although 15 percent do
not.
I
The National Assembly, although subject to the control ofthe Party (all of its senior
leaders are party members), played an increasingly independent role, as a forum for the
expression of local and provincial concerns and as a critic of corruption and inefficiency.
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However, the National Assembly generally does not initiate legislation and may not pass
legislation that the Party opposes. Party officials occupied most senior government and
National Assembly positions and continued to have the final say on key issues. During
the year, the National Assembly continued to engage in vigorous debate on economic,
legal, and social issues, including a business enterprise law and a press law. Legislators
questioned and criticized ministers in sessions broadcast live on television.
The law provides the opportunity for equal participation in politics by women and
minority groups, but in practice they are underrepresented. Most of the top leaders are
men. There is one woman in the Politburo. Women are better represented in the National
Assembly, where more than one-fourth ofthe 450 members are women. Women hold a
few important positions. The Vice President is a woman, as are several ministers and
vice ministers.
The president of the National Assembly, who is also a Politburo Standing Committee
member, is a member of an ethnic minority.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental
Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights
The Government does not permit private, local human rights organizations to form or
operate. It generally prohibitsprivate citizens from contacting international human rights
organizations, although some dissidents were able to do so despite opposition from the
Government. The Government permitted the UNHCR and international visitors to
monitor implementation of its repatriation commitments under the CPA and carried on a
limited dialog with foreign human rights organizations based outside Vietnam.
I
The Government generally was willing to discuss human rights problems bilaterally with
other governments if such discussions take place under the rubric of "exchanges of
ideas" rather than as "investigations." Several foreign governments held official talks
during the year concerning human rights.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on gender, ethnicity, religion, or social
class; however, enforcement of these prohibitions was uneven. Persons formerly interned
in reeducation camps on the basis ofpre-1975 association with the government of the
former Republic of South Vietnam continued to report varying levels of discrimination
as they and their families sought access to housing, education, and employment. Some
military veterans of the former Republic of Vietnam remain incarcerated for activities
after 1975. They and their families generally are not allowed employment with the.
Government. This prohibition is less restrictive than in past years because of the growth
in private sector job opportunities.
Women
I
International NGO workers and many women reported that domestic violence against
women was common. The law addresses the problem of domestic violence, but
authorities do not enforce it effectively. Many divorces reportedly are due to domestic
violence, but many women likely remain in abusive marriages rather than confront the
stigma of divorce. ·
Some women are forced to work as prostitutes, and trafficking in women for the purpose
of(orced prostitution, both domestically and internationally, is a serious problem (see
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Section 6.f.). Women and girls are trafficked from southern delta and highlands
provinces to Cambodia, and from northern provinces into China. Women and girls
frequently are misled by promises of well-paying jobs in those countries. Prostitution,
although technically illegal, appears to be widely tolerated. The Ho Chi Minh City
People's Committee recently acknowledged that more than 10,000 women in the city
engaged in prostitution. Hanoi and the port cities of Danang and Haiphong also have
large ni.unbers of women engaged in prostitution. There are reports that some exploiters
in Ho Chi Minh City addicted young girls to heroin and forced them to work as
prostitutes to earn cash for drugs. Many more women are compelled to work as
prostitutes because of poverty, a lack of other employment opportunities, or because they
are victimized by false promises oflucrative work. The Vietnam Women's Union andYouth Union, as well as international and domestic NGO's, are engaged actively in
education and rehabilitation programs to combat these abuses.
While there is no legal discrimination, women face deeply ingrained societal
discrimination. Despite extensive provisions in the Constitution, in legislation, and in
regulations that mandate equal treatment, and although some women occupy high
government posts, few women compete effectively for higher status positions. The
Constitution provides that women and men must receive equal pay for equal work, but
the Government does not enforce this provision. Very poor women, especially in rural
areas but also in cities, perform menial jobs in construction, waste removal, and other
jobs for extremely low wages. Despite the large body of legislation and regulations
devoted to the protection of women's rights in marriage as well as in the workplace, and
Labor Law provisions that call for preferential treatment of women, women do not
always receive equal treatment. Nevertheless, women play an important role in the
economy and are widely engaged in business and in social and educational institutions.
Opportunities for young professional women have increased markedly, with greater
numbers entering the civil service, universities, and the private sector.
The party-controlled Women's Union has a broad agenda to promote women's rights,
including political, economic, and legal equality, and protection from spousal abuse. The
Women's Union operates micro-credit consumer finance programs and other programs to
promote the advancement of women. International NGO's and other international
organizations regard the union as effective, but they and Women's Union representatives
believe that much time is required to overcome societal attitudes that relegate women to
lower status than men. The Governni.ent also has a Committee for the Advancement of
Women, which coordinates intraministerial programs affecting women.
Children
International organizations reported that despite the government's promotion of child
protection and welfare, children incre(:lsingly were at risk of economic exploitation.
While education is compulsory through the age of 14, the authorities did not enforce the
requirement, especially in rural areas where government and family budgets for
education are strained. Thousands of children work in exploitative child labor (see
Sections 6.c. and 6.d.). The Government continued a nationwide immunization
campaign, and the government-controlled press regularly stressed the importance of
health and education for all children. Reports from local sources indicate that responsible
officials generally took these goals seriously but were constrained by severely limited
budgets. According to a recent World Bank report, despite growth in incomes over the
past decade, severe malnutrition remains an entrenched problem; about 45 percent of
children under 5 years of age suffer from stunted growth.
I
Widespread poverty contributed to continued child prostitution, especially of girls, but
also some boys as well, in major cities. Many prostitutes in Ho Chi Minh City are girls
of ages 15 through 17. One NGO advocate stated that some child prostitutes, such as
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those from abusive homes, are forced into prostitution for economic reasons, having few
other choices available to them. There are reports that some exploiters in Ho Chi Minh
City addicted young girls to heroin and forced them to work as prostitutes to earn money
for drugs.
Other children are trafficked domestically, as well as to foreign destinations for the
purpose of forced prostitution. Although statistics are not reliable, children are trafficked
from southern delta and highland provinces to Cambodia, and from northern provinces
into China. Government agencies were engaged in combating these abuses. The Vietnam·
Women's Union and Youth Union are active in drawing attention to them and helping
with education programs to warn vulnerable families of the dangers of deception by
those who would lure young women and children into prostitution. Press reports
documented the conviction and imprisonment of some traffickers (see Section 6.f.).
Street children often are subjected to abuse, including beatings by police (see Section
I.e.).
.
People With Disabilities
I
Government provision of services to the disabled is limited, and the Government
provides little official protection or effective support for the disabled. Government
agencies responsible for services to the disabled worked with domestic and foreign
groups to "identify measures" to provide protection, support, and physical access for the
disabled. Implementation is hampered by limited budgets. The 1995 Labor Law requires
the State to protect the rights and encourage the employment of the disabled. It includes
provisions for preferential treatment for firms that recruit disabled persons for training or
apprenticeship and a special levy on firms that do not employ disabled workers. It is ·
uncertain whether the Government enforces these provisions. The Government permitted
international groups to assist those disabled by war or by subsequent accidents involving
unexploded ordnance and has developed indigenous prosthetics-manufacturing
capabilities. There are no laws mandating physical access to buildings.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
Although the Government states that it is opposed to discrimination against ethnic
minorities, societal discrimination against minorities is widespread. In addition there
continued to be credible reports that local officials sometimes restricted ethnic minority
a9cess to education, employment, and mail services. The Government continued to
implement policies designed to narrow the gap in the standard of living between ethnic ·
groups living in the highlands and richer lowland ethnic Vietnamese by granting
preferential treatment to domestic and foreign companies that invest in highland areas.
The stated goal of government resettlement policy in mountainous provinces is to move
disadvantaged minorities provide incentives for disadvantaged minorities to relocate
-from-inaccessible villages to locations where basic servic'es are easier to provide;
however, the effect of the policy sometimes has been to dilute the political and social
solidarity of these groups. The Government continued to repress some highland
minorities, particularly the Hmong; for practicing their religion without official approval
(see Section 2.c.). Unlike the previous year, there were no reports that the Government
repressed some highland minorities for suspected ties with resistance groups.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Unions are controlled by the Party and have only nominal independence; however, union
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leaders influence some key decisions; such as on health and safety issues and on
minimum wage standards. Workers are not free to join or form unions of their choosing;
such action requires approval·from the local office of the Party-controlled Vietnam
General Confederatiqn of Labor (VGCL). The VGCL is the umbrella organization under
which all local trade unions must operate, and it claims 4 million members in branches in
each ofthe major cities and provinces. VGCL officers report that the VGCL represents
95 percent of public sector workers, 90 percent of workers in state-owned enterprises,
and nearly 70 percent of private sector workers. The Labor Law requires provincial trade
union organizations to establish unions within 6 months at all new enterprises with more
than 10 employees as well as at existing enterprises that operate without trade unions.
Management of those companies is required by law to accept and cooperate with those
unions. In addition, while the Labor Code states that all enterprise level and professional
trade unions are affiliated with the VGCL, in practice hundreds of unaffiliated "labor
associations" have been organized in occupations such as those of taxi, motorcycle and
cyclo drivers, cooks, and market porters. Foreign governments are providing technical
assistance and training to the Ministry of Labor, Invalids, and Social Affairs and to the
VGCL.
The Labor Law provides for the right to strike under certain circumstances. The law
requires that management and labor resolve labor disputes through the enterprise's own
labor conciliation council. In a recent report, the ILO stated that many labor
organizations failed to establish labor conciliation councils, and that without one, or if
one fails to ·resolve the matter, it is referred to the provincial Labor Arbitration Council,
which does not exist in some provinces. If the Council's decision is unsatisfactory to the
union or if the province does not have an arbitration council, unions have the right to
appeal to the Provincial People's Labor Arbitration Council. Labor courts, which were
established in 1996 within the People's Court System, heard approximately 500 cases;
most cited wrongful dismissal and matters oflabor discipline. Since January 1995, the
Labor Ministry has organized 150 training courses on the Labor Code for its staff and for
managers of large enterprises.
The government-controlled labor unions stipulate written procedures for managing labor
disputes that permit unresolved disputes to be arbitrated before a court. Unions have the
right to appeal a council decision to the provincial people's court and the right to strike.
I
There were approximately 60 private and public strikes during the year, primarily against
foreign-owned or joint venture companies, but some also involved state-owned and
private firms. The Government tolerated these strikes, even though most were
spontaneous and supported by organized labor after the fact. Approximately 250 strikes
were reported from January 1995 through September 1999. Of these, some 132 strikes
were in enterprises with foreign investment, about 40 in state-owned enterprises, and 80
in private enterprises. The majority of these strikes took place in Ho Chi Minh City,
Dong Nai province, and other southern provinces. The strikes mainly were caused by
disputes over wages and related problems, including late payment of overtime pay and
inappropriate labor disciple. Although most of the strikes did not follow an authorized
conciliation and arbitration process, and thus were illegal, the Government tolerated the
strikes and did not take action against the strikers. Although the VGCL or its affiliate
unions did not sanction these strikes officially, they were supported unofficially at the
local and provincial levels of the V GCL on an informal basis. The Labor Law prohibits
retribution against strikers, and there were no credible reports of such retribution. In
some cases, the Government disciplined employers for illegal practices that led to
strikes. VGCL officials stated that their general policy was not to use strikes to settle
investment disputes, but only as a last resort .. They stressed the need to educate workers ·
on lawful s~rike procedure.
The Labor Code prohibits strikes at enterprises that serve the public and at those
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considered by the Government to be important to the national economy and defense. A
subsequent decree defined these enterprises to be those involved in: Electrical
production; post and telecommunications; railway, maritime, and air transportation;
banking; public works; and the oil and gas industry. The law also grants the Government
the right to suspend a strike considered detrimental to the national economy or public
safety. Strikes are prohibited in 54 occupational sectors and businesses, including public
services, businesses producing "essential" goods, and businesses serving national defense
under the Ministries of Public Security and National Defense.
Individual unions legally are not free to affiliate with, join, or participate in, international
labor bodies, and they do not do so in practice. However, the VGCL has relations with
95 labor organizations in 70 countries.
· ,
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers must have the approval of the provincial or metropolitan branch of the VGCL
in order to organize unions in their enterprises, but they also can bargain collectively
through the Party-approved unions at their enterprises. During the year, many contracts
were negotiated that ended the practice of annual renewal, as collective bargaining
increased in importance. Multiyear contracts became more common despite initial
resistance from foreign companies. Labor leaders became more active in supporting their
workers by agreeing to place more workplace issues in collective bargaining agreements.
Issues that are not in a contract, such as working on Sundays, have been spelled out so
that companies cannot order workers to work a seventh day. Market forces also play a
much more important role in determining wages. The Labor Law prohibits antiunion
discrimination on the part of employers against employees seeking to organize.
I
There are a number of export processing zones and industrial zones, which are governed
by the same labor laws as the rest of the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor The Labor Law prohibits all forms of
forced and bonded labor, including such labor by children; however, there were reports
that thousands of children work in exploitative child labor. Some women are forced into
prostitution, and trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution is a problem
(see Sections 5 and 6.f.). A study of child labor in Ho Chi Minh City found cases in
which poor families had entered into "verbal agreements" with employers, who put the
families' children to work; their salaries generally are sent to their parents. Officials state
that juveniles in reeducation camps, which function much as reform schools or juvenile
detention centers do elsewhere, are assigned work for educational purposes that does not
generate income. Children were trafficked both domestically and internationally and
forced to work as prostitutes (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
·
During the year,.the Government suspended the practice of required labor in the
construction of national infrastructure projects; however, there is a long local tradition
under which persons living along flood-prone levees voluntarily help to build or repair
their critical flood control system. In 1998 the Government denied the use of prison labor
without compensation, and there were no reports of this practice during the year.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for Employment
I
The Labor Law prohibits most child labor but allows exceptions for certain types of
work. The Labor Law sets the minimum age for employment at 18 years of age, but
enterprises may hire children between the ages of 15 and 18, as long as the firm obtains
special permission from their parents and the Ministry of Labor, Invalids, and Social
Affairs. The firm also must ensure that these young workers do not undertake hazardous
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work or work that would harm their physical or mental development. These occupations
are specified in the Labor Law. Children may work a maximum of 7 hours per day and
42 hours per week and must receive special health care. It is not clear whether authorities
have the resources to enforce these regulations. Children as young as 13 years of age can
register at trade training centers, which are a form of vocational training. There were no
reports that state-owned enterprises or companies with foreign investors used child labor ..
Restrictions on working in hazardous operations apply to persons under the age of 18.
The Labor Code permits the vocational training of children at the age of 13.
In rural areas, children work primarily on family farms and in other agricultural
activities. They often begin working at the age of 6 and are expected to work as adults by
the time they are 15 years of age. In urban areas, children work in family-owned small
businesses. There are compulsory education laws that are not enforced effectively in
rural areas, where children are needed to work in agriculture. However, the culture's
strong emphasis on education leads parents who can afford to send their children to
school to do so rather than allow them to work. Many urban schools operate two
sessions, allowing children to attend classes and to work.
In 1997 the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF) announced that Children below the age of
16 face increased risk of economic exploitation. The Government estimated in 1997 that
approximately 29,000 children below the age of 15 were victims of exploitative labor.
That estimate may have been low, since most of these children are working in the
informal sector. In 1997 UNICEF cited evidence of children working in gold mines and ·
as domestic servants, or working up to 14 hours a day in hazardous conditions for
meager pay or no payment.
I
The Government did not commit sufficient resources to enforce its laws providing for
children's labor safety, especially for children working in coal mines and as domestic
servants. The ILO stated that street children both in Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi usually
participate in night education courses.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Labor Law requires the government to set a minimum wage, which is adjusted for
inflation and other economic changes. The official monthly minimum wage for foreign. investment joint ventures is $45 (621,000 dong) in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, and
$40 (552,000 dong) elsewhere. The Government can exempt temporarily certain joint
ventures from paying the minimum wage during the first months of an enterprise's
operations, or if the enterprise is located in a very remote area, but the minimum wage in
these cases can be no lower than $30 (414,000 dong). These minimum wage rates are
inadequate to provide a worker and family with a decent standard ofliving. However,
many workers receive bonuses and supplement their incomes by engaging in
entrepreneurial activities, and households often include more than one wage earner. A
decreasing number of workers receive government-subsidized housing. The Government
enforces the minimum wage only at foreign and major Vietnamese firms.
In October the Government reduced the length of the workweek for government
employees and employees of companies in the state sector from 48 hours to 40 hours; it
intends to encourage the private business sector and foreign and international
organizations that employ Vietnamese workers to implement a 40-hour week.
I
The Labor Law sets working hours at a maximum of 8 hours per day, with a mandatory
24-hour break each week. Additional hours require overtime pay at 1.5 times the regular
wage and 2 times the regular wage on holidays. The law limits compulsory overtime to 4
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hours per week and 200 days per year. Annual leave with full pay for various types of
work is also prescribed by the law. In a recent report, the ILO pointed out that the limit
of 200 hours a year of overtime work is too low, and that workers and employers should ·
have the right to agree to a greater amount of overtime work. It is uncertain how well the
Government enforces these provisions.
According to the law, a female employee who is to be married, is pregnant, is on
maternity leave, or is raising a child under 1 year of age cannot be dismissed unless the
enterprise is closed. Female employees who are at least 7 months pregnant or are raising
a child under 1 year of age cannot work overtime, at night, or in distant locations.
The Labor Law requires the Government to promulgate rules and regulations that ensure
worker safety. The Ministry of Labor, in coordination with local people's committees and
labor unions, is charged with enforcing the regulations. In practice, enforcement is
inadequate because of the ministry's inadequate funding and a shortage of trained
enforcement personnel. The VGCL reported that there are 300 labor inspectors in the
country but that at least 600 are needed. There is growing evidence that workers, through
labor unions, have been effective in improving working conditions.
Some foreign companies with operations in the country have established independent
monitoring of problems at their factories. In some instances, theyused NGO's and other
nonprofit organizations to monitor workplace conditions and report abuses to the
Ministry ofLabor.
f. Trafficking in Persons
I
The Penal Code prescribes harsh punishment for persons convicted of trafficking in
women and children; however, some women are forced to work as prostitutes, and
trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution, both domestically a:nd
internationally, is a serious problem.
The Government, international NGO's, and the press reported an increase in recent years
. in trafficking in women. Women and girls are trafficked from the southern delta and
highland provinces into Cambodia and from northern provinces into China. Women and
girls frequently are misled by promises of well-paying jobs in those countries.
Prostitution, although officially illegal, appears to be widely tolerated. The Ho Chi Minh
City People's Committee recently acknowledged that more than 10,000 women in the
city engaged in prostitution. Hanoi and the port cities of Danang and Haiphong also have
large numbers of women engaged in prostitution. There are reports that some persons in
Ho Chi Minh City addicted young girls to heroin, then forced them to work as prostitutes
to earn money to support their drug addiction. Many more women are compelled to work
as prostitutes because of poverty, a lack of other employment opportunities, or because
they are victimized by false promises oflucrative work. The Vietnam Women's Union
and Youth Union, as well as international and domestic NGO's, are engaged actively in
education and rehabilitation programs to combat these abuses.
I
The Government is working with international NGO's to supplement law enforcement
measures and is cooperating with other national governments to prevent trafficking.
NGO's reported that the problem appeared to grow during the year. Organized groups
lure poor, often rural, women with promises of jobs or marriage and force them to work
as prostitutes (see Sections 5 and 6.c.). Press and NGO reports noted that some women
were kidnaped and transported to China and other countries against their will, where they
were sold into forced marriages. The Government took measures to address this problem.
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..
I
There is reported trafficking in women.to the Macau Special Administrative Region of
China with the assistance of organizations in China that are ostensibly marriage service
bureaus, international labor organizations, and travel agencies. After arrival, many
women are forced into conditions similar to indentured servitude; some may be forced
into prostitution.
Children also are trafficked domestically and overseas to work as prostitutes.
Government agencies were engaged in efforts to combat this abuse. One NGO advocate
estimated that, among trafficked girl children, the average age was from 15 through 17
years; many were trafficked to Cambodia and China.
Government agencies and mass organizations are engaged to combat this problem. Some
traffickers have been convicted and imprisoned. The Vietnam Women's Union and
Youth Union's programs, as well as state-owned media, publicized the problem.
Women's union advocacy and rehabilitation efforts help women and girls who have been
trafficked.
Return to U.S.-Vietnam Relations.
Return to USIA International Home Page.
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I
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Page 1 of9
>'------··-.
.
TEXT:._SHATTUCK ON.U.S. DEMOCRACY PROMOTION ACTIVITIES IN ASIA
f(U.S~~anpJ~y sig!!tll.caf!t_role i!!_A_sian d_e111ocracy)·
Washington-- The United States can play a significant role in promoting Asian democracy through
diplomatic engagement and the use of a wide range of foreign policy tools, including carefully
tailored democracy assistance programs, according to John Shattuck, assistant secretary of state for
democracy, human rights and labor.
"Democracy in Asia is a reality in some countries and an opportunity in many others," he said.
"In formulating our country strategies, we have many tools at our disposal to support our diplomatic
efforts, ranging from our assistance programs to sanctions," Shattuck said in testimony before the
House International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific September 17. "Although I will
be describing the positive measures we use in democracy assistance programs, we also can and do
use negative measures where necessary, including restricting arms sales, opposing loans from
international financial institutions, and: cutting off bilateral and multilateral assistance."
U.S. democracy assistance programs are carried out by the State Department, the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) and the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), Shattuck said.
"Although USAID implements most of the programs, we work together closely in order to ensure
that our various programs are in harmony with each and in support of our policy goals. We also make
sure that our programs dovetail with the excellent work of the Asia Foundation, the National
Endowment for Democracy, and Radio Free Asia."
·
I
Shattuck pointed out that:U.S._democracy-promotion programs have four main goals:
"--enhancing respect for the rule oflaw and human rights;
"--encouraging the development of a politically active civil society;
"--promoting meaningful political competition through free and fair electoral processes; and
)
"-- fostering transparent and accountable governance."
In ~sia, he said, the United States currently conducts a range of activities in pursuit of each of these
goals.
·
Following is the text of Shattuck's statement to the committee:
(begin text)
STATEMENT OF
THE HONORABLE JOHN SHATTUCK
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR
•
ON "U.S. DEMOCRACY PROMOTION ACTIVITIES IN ASIA"
BEFORE THE
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HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
SEPTEMBER 17, 1997
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I thank you for the opportunity to testify before you
on th~ topic of U.S. democracy promotion in Asia.
·
Mr. Chairman, in Asia as elsewhere, the Clinton Administration views the promotion of human rights
and democracy as one of the fundamental goals of our foreign policy, in addition to preserving
America's security and fostering our prosperity. The spread of democracy is both an end in itself-for it vindicates the values that define our republic-- and a means to out security and prosperity.
History clearly demonstrates that free nations are more reliable. partners, alike in maintaining peace
and in conducting commerce.
At the same time, there have beep some in recent years-- both in Asia and the United States-- who
have warned that the future will be one of inevitable conflict between East and West, a clash of
civilizations, a showdown between different cultures and values. At this summer's annual Association
of South East Asian Nations' Post Ministerial Conference, Malaysia's Prime Minister Mahathir
Mohamad declared that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a western export and called for
its revision. Secretary Albright immediately responded that the concept of human rights reflects the
very principle of civilization itself.
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To those who dismiss our efforts to promote human rights and democracy as an expression of
American imperialism, let us simply point to figures like Mahatma Gandhi, the Dalai Lama, Corazon
Aquino, Aung San Suu Kyi, Wei Jingsheng, Martin Lee and millions of people around Asia and the
rest of the world who have voted, marched, worked, been beaten and sometimes killed for their
devotion to the universality of human rights and democracy.
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Considerable democratic progress has been made in Asia during the past decade. Since 1986, the
Philippines, south Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, Mongolia, Cambodia, Nepal, and Bangladesh have reentered or entered for the first time the community ofdemocratic nations. Moreover, in many of the
remaining authoritarian countries such as Indonesia, Vietnam, and even China, the success of
economic reforms has led to some progress in strengthening the rule of law and in creating space for
a civil society.
Today I would like to discuss with you the diverse ways in which the United States is helping Asia's
new democracies to consolidate their gains as well as how we are supporting progressive forces in the
non-democracies.
Needless to say, Asia is a vast region encompassing a great diversity of cultures, religions, ethnic
groups, and political and economic systems. Nevertheless, the Clinton Administration's strategy for
promoting democracy in Asia is founded on the belief that the legion's spectacular economic growth
of recent decades provides the basis for a democratic future.
I
Simply put, economic development can gradually undermine authoritarianism because it can create
social forces that seek to develop autonomy from the state. As Professor Gerald Curtis has recently
written, "A middle class grows that demands representation, a working class emerges that sooner or
later deman:ds the right to organize and engages in political action, and a business community that
may have been spawned by the state develops its own resources and demands autonomy." In Asia,
the relatively recent democratic transitions in Taiwan, Thailand and South Korea all demonstrate this
basic point.
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Mr. Chairman, let me be clear. I am not endorsing a theory of economic determinism. Economic
development facilitates but does not cause democratization. I am arguing that in Asia the United
States should respond to the opportunities for political reform that have beep created by widespread
economic success. We must stand by those who are struggling for human rights and democracy in
these changing societies. In the end, of course, we must tailor our democracy policies and programs
to the specific circumstances of each country. ·
In formulating our country strategies, we have many tools at our disposal to support our diplomatic
efforts, ranging from our assistance programs to sanctions. Although I will be describing the positive
measures we use in democracy assistance programs, we also can and do use negative measures where
necessary, including restricting arms sales, opposing loans from international financial institutions,
. and cutting offbilateral and multilateral assistance.
Our democracy assistance programs are carried out by the State Department, USAID and USIA.
Although US AID implements most of the programs, we work together closely in order to ensure that
our various programs are in harmony with each and in support of our policy goals. We also make sure
that our programs dovetail with the excellent work of the Asia Foundation, the National Endowment
for Democracy, and Radio Free Asia.
Types of Democracy Assistance
Mr. Chairman, the democracy-promotion programs of the United States have four main goals:
-- enhancing respect for the rule of law and human rights;
I
-- encouraging the development ofa politically active civil society;
-- promoting meaningful political competition through free and fair electoral processes; and
-- fostering transparent and accountable governance.
In Asia, we currently conduct a range of activities in pursuit of each of these goals.
Rule of Law and Human Rights
Rule of law programs form a central part of our democracy promotion strategy in Asia for several
basic reasons. First, a democratic society requires a legal framework that guarantees respect for
human rights and ensures a degree of regularity in public and private affairs. Second, corruption and
abuse of authority have an obvious impact on both economic development and democratic
institutions. Finally, effective public administration is essential to enhancing popular support for
democracy.
In Mongolia, we are beginning new activities to follow up on our earlier assistance to the new
judicial system contained in the 1992 constitution. Our new program will promote the concept of
judicial independence both inside and outside the judiciary. It will educate members of the judiciary
on their role in the protection of civil liberties. It will foster better communication between the
parliament and the judiciary as well as among the vario,us courts of the judiciary. And it will
encourage the formulation and adoption of a judicial code of ethics.
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In Cambodia, we have been assisting since 1993 indigenous NGOs involved in the promotion of
human rights. None of this assistanceis channeled through the government. Despite the major
setback for democracy that occurred this September when Hun Sen seized power, we continue to
support human rights NGOs in Cambodia because they represent the backbone of the democracy
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movement. Through our assistance, we have helped to create a national network of human rights
organizations. Last year the major NGOs that we support reported over 1,000 human rights
violations. More recently, these NGOs have courageously monitored the cases of those killed or
missing as a result of the violence this past July.
In the area of human rights, we are also supporting the Cambodia Genocide Program; Conducted by
Yale University, the program is documenting the mass killings carried out by the Khmer Rouge
between 1975 and 1979. The work of the program will be made available to the public and will be
used by any tribunal or truth commission that might he established to investigate these crimes against
humanity.
The United States has also been instrumental in establishing a nationwide organization of public
defenders, the Cambodian Public Advocates (CPA). Formed in January 1996, the CPA defenders
have provided high-quality representation at all levels of the Cambodian judicial system. Last year a
full one-third of CPA clients received reduced sentences or were acquitted. In the first nine months of
1996, the courts referred 34 percent of all cases to public defenders (up from 20 percent in 1995),
reflecting the courts' increasing recognition of the value of defenders. Similarly, earlier this year the
Minister of Justice approved the installation of public defender desks in all courtrooms. Also through
out assistance, the Cambodian Bar Association has established a Legal Aid Department, with 30
lawyers volunteering time in collaboration with public defender organizations.
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In Indonesia, our democracy assistance has also supported the promotion of human rights and the
expansion oflegal aid. We are assisting the major Indonesian human rights NGOs, which have
increased their monitoring of corruption and abuse of power. In addition, we support the National
Human Rights Commission, a quasi-independent body that has begun to develop the means to expose
. human rights violations. With our support, it opened a field office in East Timor and began a human
rights training program. In the area of legal aid, the Indonesian Legal Aid Institute pursued in 1996
650 cases concerning civil, political, land and labor rights.
In Sri Lanka, our rule of law assistance has targeted two areas: court administration and alternative
dispute resolution. In the former, we have helped to automate the system for tracking cases in the
Court of Appeals, resulting in a dramatic shrinking of its backlog. In the latter, our training has both
increased the efficiency and expanded the clientele of local mediation boards throughout the country.
In 1996, over 200,000 Sri Lankans submitted disputes to these boards, and three-fifths of the cases
were resolved.
Finally, in Vietnam, we are now beginning a program to support the reform of commercial law and
trade policy, essential prerequisites for the development of an open economy, transparency in
government and accountability of officials in economic ministries.
In addition to these country-specific rule of law programs, we have also recently begun assisting the
ASEAN Human Rights Working Group. The concept of the working group originated at the 1993
ASEAN Ministerial Conference, which committed ASEAN to the eventual establishment of a
mechanism for addressing human rights. However, it was not until the 1996 Conference when the
official human rights bodies of Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines formally urged ASEAN to
meet its earner commitment. The goal of the Working Group is to encourage ASEAN member -governments to incorporate human rights on domestic as well as regional agendas.
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We are also supporting two regional initiatives to strengthen women's rights. The first is devoted to
increasing regional cooperation in combating the related problems of trafficking in women and girls
and the spread ofHIV/AIDS. The initiative has brought together government officials, NGO
representatives, doctors, lawyers and human rights activists from countries around the region -including Thailand, India and Nepal, where these problems are the most acute. The second initiative
. is addressing the serious problems experienced by female migrant workers. It is working with
governments and NGOs in both home and host countries to advance reforms that wail protect the
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rights of these Asian women.
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Civil Society
A strong civil society is an essential component of a democracy. The concept of civil society,
however, covers a broad swath. Therefore we have designed our democracy programs in Asia to
focus on support for indigenous organizations that: engage in civic action to promote democracy;
encourage deliberation of public policy; monitor government activities; and educate citizens about
their rights and responsibilities. This formulation includes public advocacy groups, labor unions,
independent media institutions, politically active professional associations, human rights and good
governance organizations, and local associations that aggregate and articulate the needs of their
constituents.
In Mongolia, the United States has supported advocacy NGOs since the beginning of our democracy
assistance program in 1991. These NGOs have played a critical role in Mongolia's successful
democratic transition, having been in the vanguard of civic education, women's empowerment and
elections monitoring. In January of this year, our assistance to civil society culminated in the
parliament's passage of a law protecting NGOs. The law contained the two key provisions that the
NGOs wanted: tax-exempt status ofNGOs and deductibility of donations. Confirming the emergence
ofNGOs as a major force in Mongolian politics, the law will contribute to the long-tern viability of
civil society.
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In Indonesia in recent years, we have also been important supporters the country's increasingly
influential advocacy NGOs. Indonesian civil society has begun to speak out more effectively on a .
variety of issues, and consequently the government has included NGOs in its decision-making
process. In particular, the government now sometimes seeks the views ofNGOs on draft laws,
policies and regulations. Moreover, there occurred in 1996 several important instances ofNGO
influence: the government requested that the National Human Rights Commission investigate the
July 27th riot after the Indonesian Legal Aid Institute investigated missing persons; it made lead-free
gasoline available to the public as a result of lobbying by an environmental advocacy group; and it
. adopted a clearer policy and distributed human rights handbooks to soldiers after abuses in Irian Jaya
were reported by NGOs .
.In the Philippines, we have supported the formation of coalitions of disadvantaged and under. represented groups to increase their participation in the policy arena; This assistance rests on the
belief that a strong, civil society can ensure government policies and policy implementation will
benefit the many, not just the few. The coalition model has shown that it can transform weak groups
into strong alliances and put their interests at the top of the policy agenda.
Indeed, the coalitions that we have assisted are making a considerable impact on the government. The
urban'-poor coalition obtained presidential support to repeal a Marcos-era law criminalizing squatting.
The fisherfolk coalition provided convincing testimony to Congress, based on its independent
evaluation of a $7-6 million government fisheries project funded by the Asian Development Bank.
And while other NGOs walked out of local bearings on the Mining Act, a coalition of indigenous
peoples' groups that we sponsored used data and analysis to influence the Act's implementing rules
and regulations.
Electoral Processes
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The initiation or conduct of an electoral process provides an opportunity for democratic forces to
organize and compete for political power. That is why requests for assistance in support of an
electoral process deserve special consideration.
In Mongolia, we supported indigenous NGOs in conducting widespread civic and voter education in
preparation for the landmark parliamentary elections of 1956. For example, one NGO carried out a
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multifaceted program to inform voters on the differences among the platforms of the political parties
as well as on the background and views of individual candidates. Another provided training to
journalists on media coverage for the elections. These activities complemented the excellent partytraining work undertaken by the international Republican Institute.
In Cambodia, the United States provided substantial support to the UN-sponsored elections in 1993,
both in terms of electoral administration and of training for political parties. Until the suspension of
our electoral assistance in the wake of last July's violence, we bad prepared similar assistance for the
national and local elections planned for 1998. In particular, we assisted the Ministry oflnterior in
drafting electoral laws that met international standards and in planning for an effective voter
registration.
Although our direct electoral assistance to the Cambodian government remains suspended, important
work in support of Cambodia's civil society has not ceased. We continue to assist NGOs engaged in
democracy building and rule of law programs -- including the work of Cambodian NGOs involved in
voter education and the monitoring of registration and elections. We will be looking carefully at the
possibility of providing electoral assistance beyond the modest programs currently in place. Carefully
calibrated assistance can be an important confidence-building mechanism as Cambodia prepares for
free and fair elections. However, we do not intend to support an undemocratic process.
In the Philippines, our assistance recently produced a consensus among the president, legislators, the
electoral commission and NGOs on an electoral modernization bill for the 1998 elections. In
addition, we sponsored a regional workshop on elections that has led to the creation of a regional
center in Manila and to requests for technical assistance from as far away as Mongolia.
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In Bangladesh, we assisted many aspects of the important parliamentary elections of June 1996. We
helped the electoral commission train the local officials responsible for running the polling stations.
We supported a large delegation of foreign electoral observers and provided technical assistance to a
coalition of 180 Bangladeshi NGOs that fielded domestic observers in all 300 constituencies. Voter
education, which we assisted through NGOs, contributed to the largest voter turnout in the country's
history, 74% compared to 55% in the parliamentary elections of 1991. Most of this increase was due
to an almost doubling of the female turnout, another tribute to the efficacy of the voter education
program.
Government Accountability
The promotion of good governance has become a major theme among all donors supporting Asian
democracy. In large measure, this reflects recognition of the fact that corruption, mismanagement and
government inefficiency are inextricably linked with poor performance in development. The
challenge in to design good governance programs that are consistent with the broader goal of
promoting democratic development. In this regard, US. programs focus on supporting executive
branch ministries to plan, execute and monitor budgets in a transparent manner; strengthening
legislative policy making, budget and oversight capabilities; and decentralizing policy making by
working directly with local governments.
In Mongolia, we are starting a new program to build on our earlier assistance to the parliament. We
will help the parliament's majority and minority caucuses professionalize their operations. We will
assist members of parliament in improving communications with their district constituencies. And we
will support each of Mongolia's three major parties in developing a plan for their long-term·
development.
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For the past decade, the United States has assisted the government of the Philippines in formulating
and implementing a revolutionary plan for decentralizing political authority. Today, Manila no longer
monopolizes Philippine politics and government. Instead, provinces, cities, towns and villages have
significantly increased their power. The central government's commitment to decentralization is
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reflected in the growth of central revenues that are allocated to localities. These revenues rose from
$280 million in 1989 to $3 billion in 1996. Moreover, local governments have made much progress
in raising their own funds through credit, bonds and taxation.
In Bangladesh, we are similarly helping to improve. local governance. We are assisting local NGOs to
better identify the needs of their communities and to bettor communicate these needs to the local
governments. In turn, we are helping to increase the capacity of local governments to respond to their
citizens. We are also working with communities to increase the number of women candidates running
for seats on the local councils.
Burma
Mr. Chairman,. authoritarian governments that oppose any political reform obviously pose the
greatest challenge for democracy promotion. Burma is one such. case. Our immediate goal in Burma
is to start a genuine dialogue between the SLORC and the democratic opposition led by Aung San
Suu Kyi and with representatives of the ethnic minorities. Unfortunately, as recently as this week, the
SLORC has rejected dialogue with ASSK and the NLD. We have worked with our friends and allies
to isolate the SLORC internationally until it ends its widespread repression of human rights and
agrees to a meaningful dialogue with the democratic opposition that won the 1990 elections
overturned by the SLORC.
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To that end, we have employed a variety of means -- including the withdrawal of our ambassador
from Rangoon, restrictions on visas, the cessation of assistance to the government, and most
important our opposition to international lending and our ban on new U.S. investment. Many of our
friends and allies have taken similar measures. With the entry of Burma into A SEAN, we have also
made it clear that we expect ASEAN's other member governments to use their influence to convinc~
the SLORC to begin a dialogue with the opposition. Working on multiple tracks, we have made
certain that Burma will not rejoin the international community until it starts respecting the rights and
votes of its people.
In addition, we are conducting a program of humanitarian assistance and support for Burmese prodemocracy activities. In managing earmarked funds for Burma, the State Department has awarded
grants in FY 96 and FY 97 to the National Endowment for Democracy totaling about $2.2 million.
We have also made grants to the International Rescue Committee and World Concern Development
Organization.
The Endowment uses these funds to train the future leaders of a democratic Burma, to disseminate
material supportive of democratic development, to increase international awareness of conditions
inside of Burma, to strengthen the organizational and functional capacity of pro-democratic groups,
and to promote understanding and cooperation among the various ethnic and religious groups of
Burma in their efforts to further the democratic cause.
Our assistance has helped the democratic opposition prepare for eventual talks with the government.
It has enabled Burmese economists to work together on an economic plan for a future democratic
Burma. The Endowment has also facilitated discussions between the National League for Democracy
(NLD) and ethnic groups on constitutional proposals for tabling in eventual talks with the
government. These discussions and other negotiations within the democratic movement have also
given .the opposition experience with democratic practices. Without international assistance, the
voices of opposition leaders forced into exile would be weak and scattered, and pressure on the
government to enter into genuine talks lessened.
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Our program has allowed organizations to document the human rights abuses inside Burma. This
documentation has been the crucially important background for resolutions on Burma taken in UN .
Human Rights Commission, a key element in forging international consensus on Burma.
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Finally, U.S. assistance has kept open the flow of accurate information to Burmese inside the .
country. The SLORC has attempted to control all information available to Burmese, most
significantly by keeping the leader of the democratic opposition under virtual ho_use arrest. Such
outlets for information as Radio Free Asia and the Democratic Voice of Burma help break the
isolation of Burmese from the world and increase their understanding of the possibilities for a
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democratic future.
China
Mr. Chairman,.we are also planning, in consultation with the Congress, to develop a democracy
program in China that would seek to strengthen both civil society and rule of law.
Despite the widespread and massive human rights abuses that we have documented in our annual
human rights report, some positive changes have taken place in China. Chinese society has opened
dramatically in the last 20 years and continues to open. The average Chinese enjoys a higher
disposable income, looser economic controls, greater freedom of movement, dramatically increased
access to outside sources of information, greater room for individual choice, and more diversity in
cultural life. Accordingly, new social groups with economic resources at their disposal have also
arisen and become increasingly vocal, representing the first signs of a Chinese civil society.
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Today, there are 1500 national level NGOs and 200,000 lower level NGOs registered with the ·
Ministry of Civil Affairs, and the number of organizations and the scope of their activities are
growing rapidly. To a significant degree, these organizations are all subject to control by the
government. The best-known of these organizations are those with well-defined professional, relief,
charitable, and educational missions. There are, however, growing numbers of organizations being
initiated at the grass-roots level by individuals, communities, or enterprises interested in addressing
problems of social welfare, consumer or environmental affairs that are often neglected by the ·
government.
Although subject to broad government regulation, these groups are increasingly able to develop their
own agendas and many have support from foreign secular and religions NGOs. Some seek advocacy
roles in public interest areas like women's issues, the environment, and consumer rights. These
organizations provide opportunities for the United States and other countries to support the
development of civil society in China.
China has also made progress in strengthening the rule of law. Since embarking on its policy of
economic reform in the late 1970s, the Chinese government has recognized the need to develop the
country's legal system. At the outset, Chinese leaders were principally motivated by a desire to attract
foreign investment and avoid a repetition of the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. By the mid- to late1980s, authorities were stressing a broader role for law in guiding the actions of economic entities
and state regulators in a market-oriented economy. Most recently, President Jiang Zemin elevated the
concept of "ruling according to law" to the level of one of the Communist Party's "guiding principle"
for managing state and society.
In the late 1970s, in the wake of the Cultural Revolution, China's legal system was nearly
nonexistent. In the late 1970s, China had two law schools, approximately 3,000 lawyers for over one
billion people, no independent law firms, a rudimentary judicial system with poorly trained judges
and a system of outdated and unenforced laws.
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With the help offoreigri legal experts, much progress has been made in recent years. Today in China
there are over 100,000 lawyers and over a hundred law schools. The courts and procuratorate (state
prosecutor) have established centers to provide in-service-training to the expanding ranks of judges
and prosecutors. Lawyers, who previously were generalists serving as employees of state-run law
offices; now often specialize in particular subfields of law and practice in essentially private law
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,
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cooperatives and partnerships. And much new legislation has been passed, including laws in areas
with a direct impact of human rights democracy-- e.g., the Administrative Procedures Law, Lawyers
Law, State Compensation Law, Prison Law, and Criminal Procedure Law.
USIA exchange programs, NED, and NGO programs have already played a role in promoting rule of
law in China. There are, however, countless opportunities for the United States and others to do much
more.
Mr. Chairman, in the coming weeks, we would like to e~plore with you and your colleagues our
preliminary ideas for developing civil society and rule of law programs for China.
Conclusion
Democracy in Asia is a reality insome countries and an opportunity in many others. The United
States can play a significant role in promoting Asian democracy through diplomatic engagement and
the use of a wide range of foreign policy tools, including carefully tailored democracy assistance
programs.
(end text)
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Page 1 of 15
United States Department ofState
The Host Country
Area, Geography, and Climate
Pogulation
.
Pu lie Institutions
. -Arts, Science, and Education
Commerce and Industry
Transportation
Communications
Health and Medicine
Employment for Spouses and Dependents
' United States Embassy
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Hanoi.
The Post and Its Administration
Housing
Food
ClOthing
Su.T:plies and Services
Re tgious Activities
Education
Recreation and Social Life
Official Functions
Special Information
Consulate General Ho Chi Minh City
Ho Chi Minh City
The Post and Its Administration
Housing
Food.
" ClOthing
Suflies and Services
B±!!gious Activities
Education
Recreation and Social Life
Notes for Travelers
I
Getting to Post
Customs, Duties, and Passage
Firearms and Ammunition
Currency, Banking, and Weights and Measures
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Taxes, Excha(fe, and Sale of Property
Recommende Reading
Local Holidays
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THE HOST COUNTRY
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Area, Geography, and Climate
Like a dragon floating in the sea, Vietnam winds its way some 1,030 miles up from the Sout
Vietnam's northern terrain is mostly mountainous or hilly, with some highland areas cover
.
.
The southern part of Vietnam is dominated by the estuary of the Mekong River system and
Vietnam is largely a tropical monsoon country. In the north, a hot rainy season prevails fro
In the south, Ho Chi Minh City and the Mekong Delta experience a year-round tropical eli
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Population
In 1998 Vietnam's rapidly growing population is estimated at nearly 80 million, making itt
Vietnam has one of the most complex ethno-linguistic mixes in all of Asia. Aside from the
Religion
The predomina~lt religion practiced by 90% of the Vietnamese is Mahayana Buddhism, whi
Cultural Characteristics
The Vietnamese family unit (particularly in the rural areas) is patriarchal in nature with str
Observing the following local customs will help keep you from embarrassing yourself with
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Public Institutions
The Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) is a one-party state controlled by the Vietnamese
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Page 3 of 15
Vietnam's administrative bodies are divided into the following four levels: 1) central; 2) pro
There are a number of "mass organizations." The Women's Union (approximately half oft
Vietnam obtained membership in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in
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Arts, Science and Education
The art scene in Vietnam reflects the perception of a people_ surrounded by a rich cultural h
The capital city of Hanoi is sometimes referred to as "Asia's architectural pearl," with its nri
The Opera House is one center of culture in Hanoi. It is the home of the Hanoi Symphony
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Education
Although the quality of education has improved significantly here, Vietnam's reputation as
The National University has many branches, the most prestigious of which is located in Ha
Initiated in Vietnam in 1992, the Fulbright Program enrolls some 30 Vietnamese officials, s
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Commerce and Industry
After a decade of political isolation brought on by its invasion of Cambodia, Vietnam bega
Agriculture, especially wet-rice cultivation, accounts for nearly 30% of overall production a
European and Asian investors came first, and remain among Vietnam's top ten investors ev
Vietnam's reform process had already slowed by 1997, due to a two-year process in which
The initial boom in foreign investment began to create the trappings of modernity in larger
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Negotiation of a bilateral trade agreement has been a priority for the U.S. and Vietnam sine
Another area of mutual interest, which has yet to be realized, is the negotiation of a Civil A
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Page 4 of 15
Transportation
Privately Owned Vehicles. Having your own car or recreational van will add a great deal
Driving in Vietnam is stressful and requires a great deal of care and vigilance to avoid accide
Virtually everyone in HCMC owns a motor scooter and operates it like there's no tomorro
Local. Taxis are plentiful and the taxi drivers usually understand enough English to take yo
Office Shuttle. The Embassy provides a shuttle service to and from the office for a reasona
Regional. Using local buses is not recommended. They are not only crowded and uncomfo
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Communications
Telephone and Telegraph
Local and international telephone service is available and reliable. International Direct Dial
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Residences of all USG personnel are equipped with telephones. Employees are responsible f
Through the International Voice Gateway (IVG) Program, the Embassy has four IVG telep
Mail and Pouch
FPO service is available in the Embassy for all eligible employees and their dependents. Pou
Full Name (for State Dept.)
American Embassy Hanoi
PSC 461 - Box 400
FPO AP 96521-0002
Full Name
American Consulate HCMC
PSC 461 - Box 500
FPO AP 96521-0002
Radio and TV
The Vietnamese Government operates two radio stations, which broadca~t classical music, t
There are four Vietnamese television channels. With the significant increase in the expatriat
In HCMC, the following cable channels can be viewed in all major hotels and service apart
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Locally purchased televisions and VCRs use the NTSC PAL system. Both PAL-system and
Libraries and Print News Sources
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Personnel are advised to bring reading material from home because English language books
The local print and broadcast media are run by the Communist Party and Government of
The Consulate Is pAS library has a small collection of periodicals and books. E-mail and lnt
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Health And Medicine
Medical Facilities. The medical care available in Vietnam does not meet U.S. standards. An
Community Health .
Non-potable Water. Tap water is not considered safe to drink. All Mission employees are iss
Preparation ofFood. The RMO recommends all fruits and vegetables eaten raw be thorough
Sewage. The sewage system is inadequate and in many places within the cities totally nonexi
Sanitation. Shopkeepers and residents place garbage in small piles outside in anticipation of
Preventive Measures. Be aware of both the medical and physical health hazards in country. T
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Employees are advised to limit their purchase of medication to the USG approved medical f
Contact lenses and solutions are available in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, though may be
Pick-pocketing and handbag/ camera snatching are common occurrences (much more so in
.
.
While most people are more concerned with threats of infectious disease, traumatic injuries
The Regional Medical Officers and the Regional Psychiatrists from Bangkok and Singapore
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Employment for Spouses and Dependents
The Em~assy and Consulate currently have a number of positions that are gener~lly filled b
UNITED STATES EMBASSY
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Hanoi
The Embassy staff includes approximately 60 direct-hire American and 140 local employees
The Embassy is located at 7 Lang Ha, Ba Dinh District in a Vietnamese-built, USG-owned
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The Post And Its Administration
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The Post And Its Administration
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HOUSING
· Temporary Quarters. The Embassy makes every effort to move newcomers directly into their pe
Permanent Housing. To the extent possible, most employees will be assigned to an apartment or
Designatecj housing is provided only for the Ambassador, DCM, and the Ma;ine detachment. Ce
(
The Embassy 's housing pool includes service apartments and singlefamily homes. The majority o
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Furnishings. The Embassy provides employees with basic living room, dining room, and bedroo
Only queen and twin beds are available at post, with queen-sized beds provided just for the maste
· The Embassy provides the standard Welcome Kit, which you are expected to return when your ai
U-tilities. Electricity in Hanoi is 220v/50-cycle alternating current (with two round pin electric
FOOD
Local.
Fresh meat and dairy products are not considered safe, as the Vietnamese have no adequate inspec
Most other basic foodstuffs are available in the supermarkets and delicatessens. The limited selecti
There is also a duty free shop operated by the Vietna~ese Government for foreign officials, amply
Bangkok Commissary. Once every three months, the Embassy's American Community Associa
Consumables. Employees posted to Vietnam are authorized to ship 2,500 lbs. of consumable goo
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CLOTHING
By and large, dress in Hanoi is very similar to that of Washington, D. C. for both business and re
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American Embassy Hanoi
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Men. Most Embassy officers wear long-sleeved shirts and coat and tie to the office. Others wear sp
Women. Business suits, pantsuits, and.dresses are all acceptable at the office. There are a number
Children. Nothing out of the ordinary.
SUPPLIES AND SERVICES
Supplies. Stock up on toiletries, particularly sunscreen lotion and mosquito repellant, paper and
Basic Services. Dry cleaning is good and relatively inexpensive. Shoe repairs are fair. You can ge
Domestic Help: The number ofstaffneeded and their salaries differ according to individual hou
Cook/Housekeeper. $120-220 per month. Plans the meals with you; shops for food; supervises a
Maid. $100-120 per month. Cleans the house; washes dishes; irons clothes; may prepare meals on
Nanny. $100-120 per month. Takes care of the children. May kelp with some light cooking and g
Driver. $100-130 per month. Acts as chauffeur. Purchases the gas and oil. Keeps your car in good
•
Day/Night Watchmen. $75-80 per month. Screens visitors and guards your house.
RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES
Hanoi has a large Catholic cathedral, but the regular services are only in Vietnamese and French
EDUCATION
Dependent Education
United Nations International School {UNIS). Most of the Embassy children from kindergarte
Address:
Lower School - 2C Van Phuc, KimMa Road, Hanoi
Tel: (84-4}823-0820 Fax: (84-4} 846-1285
Upper School- Hanoi Amsterdam, Giang Vo, Hanoi
Tel: (84-4} 823-4910 or 823-5782 Fax: (84-4} 846-3635
E-mail: UNIS@netnam. org. vn
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Hanoi International School (HIS}. In its third year of operation, HIS offers an academic progr
Address:
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Local -Lieu Giai Street, Hanoi, Vietnam
Tel: (84-4} 832-7379 Fax: (84-4) 832-7535
In the U.S. -P.O. Box 2876, Reston, Virginia 20195
No E-mail.
Morning Star International Kindergarten (MSIK). Opened in 1995, MSIK is a bilinguallmul
Located in the Thanh Cong area, the campus facility includes a number of large sunlit air-condit
Schedule Options:
2-112 to 5 years old
Full Time Full Day
Full Time Half Day
Monday to Friday 8:00a.m. to 4:00p.m.
Monday to Friday 8:00a.m. to 12:30p.m.
15 months to 2-1/2 years old
Full Time
Monday to Friday
. 9:00a.m. to 12:00p.m.
Part Time
Monday, Wednesday, Friday 9:00a.m: to 12:00p.m.
Address:
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G 6 Thanh Cong, Ba Dinh District, Hanoi, Vietnam
Tel: (84-4} 831-0879 Fax: (84-4) 835-0955
E-mail: mornings@netnam. org. vn
Home page: http:/lwww.destinationvietnam. comlmorningstar.htm
L ycee Francais Alexandre Yersin. Recognized by ihe French Ministry of National Education a
Classes begin in September and finish around June 20.
Address:
Truong Phap Quae Te, Ptth Hanoi Amsterdam, Giang Vo, Hanoi,· Vietnam
Tel: (84-4) 843-6779 Fax: (84-4} 823-2023
E-mail: yersin@netnam. org. vn or /fay@hn. vnn. vn
A way from Post. Schf!ol-aged children ofpersonnel assigned to Vietnam qualify for A way from
Special Educational Opportunities
Studying Vietnamese. Language training is available at the Embassy and Consulate and throug
Art Classes. The Hanoi Fine Arts Institute offers instructions in a variety ofart mediums, inclu
Adult Education. UNIS offers a number of evening courses. You can study art, learn a foreign l
•
Post Orientation Program
You will be met at the airport by your sponsor and accompanied to your living quarters. Your sp
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· The Embassy and Consulate periodically hold an orientation program for all new Mission emplo
RECREATION, SOCIAL LIFE AND INTERNATIONAL CONTACTS
.Sports
Tennis. There are plenty of tennis courts in Hanoi, but the demand still exceeds the supply, unless
Golf. About 35km west ofHanoi is Kings Island-- a scenic 18-hole golf course. The golf club is sit
Swimming. Most of the larger hotels and service apartments have swimming pools. The schools d
Bowling. There are three large bowling centers. One is located in a hotel just across from the Em
Volley Ball. ]TF-FAsponsors a volleyball match at "The Ranch" every weekend. The American
Health Clubs. Virtually every hotel and apartment complex has an exercise room with state-oft
Touring and Outdoor Activities
Several scenic and historic sights, including national parks and pagodas, can be done via a day tr
•
Halong Bay. A five hour drive from Hanoi, Halong Bay is considered by many to be one of the
Sapa. Built originally as a hill station, Sapa now is one of Vietnam's major tourist attractions in
Photography. Vietnam is a photographer's paradise. (;amera shops are everywhere. Film can be
Entertainment
Restaurants. There are enough western restaurants in town to titillate the gourmet's taste buds,
American Club. The American Community Association (A CA) supervises the operations of the
International Organizations
American Chamber of Commerce (Am Cham). The largest business group in Vietnam, AmCh
The Hanoi International Women's Club (HIWC). Open to all foreign women, the Club has a
International Business Women's Club. A fledgling group ofHanoi's working women - expatri
Hash House Harriers (HHH). Both Hash House hares and does (over 60 members) are active an
•
OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS
Nature and Function. Hanoi is a relatively informal post, with few protocol requirements. Onl
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junior officers and staffpersonnel lead an active social life within the international community.
Standards of Social Conduct. Soon after arrival, all personnel are expected to pay courtesy calls
When the Ambassador or DCM entertain officially, invited staff members should arrive 10 min
SPECIAL INFORMATION
Not all sections of the post report will pertain to military personnel assigned to Vietnam. The pos
DAO Personnel. Military uniforms are worn by Defense Attaches to official functions and socia
Marine Security Guards. All members of the MSG detachment are provided with furnished livi
UNITED STATES CONSULATE GENERAL
>
Ho Chi Minh CITY
Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) is Vietnam's largest city and ri.ver port, covering an area of 761 squ
•
. IT aniiFebiiMariiApriiMayiiTuni~IAugiiSepi!OctiiNoviiDeciiAnnual
!Mean Temperature
II?TI~~~~~[g]~~~~~ISO
IAv Daily Max Temp (F)Ijill~i2U~~~Iffi~~~~~]88
IAv Daily Min Temp (F)IITJm~ITJIT]~~ITJI74 lmiTJ~]n
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>
I
The Post and Its Administration
The Consulate General has nearly 30 American personnel (DOS, DOC, DOA, USIA, and INS)
PERMANENT HOUSING
Because of the high level of crime in HCMC, Mission policy requires all USG employees to be hou
Furnishings
All service apartments are fully furnished by the landlord, including dishes, a television, a stereo,
•
Utilities and Equipment
HCMC experiences frequent power outages. Ranges with ovens are not standard issue in service a
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FOOD
The information on food in Hanoi generally applies also to HCMC. There is, however, a wider se
CLOTHING
See Hanoi for general information on clothing, but note that HCMC does not have a cold season.
SUPPLIES AND SERVICES
See Hanoi for general information.
RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES
Houses of worship are available forBuddhists, Catholics, Muslims, and Protestants, but services f
EDUCATION
•
Fundino Kids Club {FKC). Located approximately 15 minutes drive from the Consulate, FKC
Class Schedule
Play & Learn and Mums & Bubs (younger kids attended by a parent or nanny pay a reduced fee)
Play & Learn
. 8:30a.m. - 5:00p.m.
(Age 2-3yrs and 3-Syrs)
Mums & Bubs
8:30a.m. - 11:30a.m.
(Age 1-2yrs)
l:OOp.m.- 4:00p.m.
Address:
11B Nguyen Cia Thieu, Ward 6, District 3, HCMC
Tel: 930-0514-- Fax: 930-0513
E-mail: none.
Saigon South International School {SSIS). This is a pre-kindergarten through 6th grade, coeduc
Address:
Phu My Hung Corp., Saigon South Parkway, Tan Phu Ward, District 7, HCMC
Tel: {84-8) 872-8410-- Fax: {84-8) 872-5580
E-mail: none.
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Class Schedule
Monday through Friday
8:30a.m.- 3:00p.m.
International School Ho Chi Minh 'City {IS). Operating in two locations, the Senior Campus f
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Senior Campus
Address:
·
649A Vo Truong Toan St., An Phu, Thu Due, HCMC
Tel: {84-8) 898-9100 Fax: {84-8) 887-4022
·
E-mail: none.
Junior Campus
Address:
236 his Nam Ky Khoi Nghia St., District 3, HCMC
Tel: {84-8) 822-5858 Fax: {84-8) 823-0000
E-mail: none.
1
RECREATION AND SOCIAL LIFE
Sports
Tennis. All major hotels and service apartments have either hard or carpeted tennis courts. How
Golf There are three excellent golf clubs in the area. Dong Nai (18-hole) is approximately 1-1/2 h
Bowling. There are several bowling centers scattered around the city. Fees are the same as in Han
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Swimming. With year-round temperatures in the mid-80's, swimming and/or lounging around
Jogging and biking. Unfortunately, the city ~s hazardous traffic conditions preclude all but the f
Touring And Outdoor Activities
Hoi An. A 45-minute ride outside ofDanang, Hoi An wa~ once a prosperous trading town frequ
Dalat. Approximately 6 hours by road or one hour by plane from HCMC, Dalat enjoys year rou
Hue. The former capital of Vietnam prior to WWII, Hue is surrounded by a large number ofhis
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Nha Trang. This sleepy little resort town has beautiful sandy white beaches with turquoise water
Restaurants and Entertainment
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American Embassy. Hanoi
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HCMC has a larger variety of restaurants than Hanoi, including fast food chains (KFC and jolli
International Organizations
American Chamber of Commerce (Am Cham). See Hanoi section.
Saigon International Women's Club (SIWC). The Saigon Chapter has approximately 600 me
Hash House Harriers (HHH). Membership is approximately 50. All courses are set about an ho
NOTES FOR TRAVELERS
GETTING TO POST
The most direct route to Vietnam from the U.S. is by air over the Pacific. All official travelers ar
CUSTOMS, DUTIES, PASSAGE AND PETS
Customs and Duties
)
•
Diplomatic and Official passport holders are exempt from paying Vietnamese airport departure t
USG personnel have duty free entry privileges for airfreight and HHE. There are no storage facili
American Embassy
Hanoi, Vietnam
For (Employee's Name)
American Consulate General
Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam
For (Employee's Name)
Passage
Visas. Everyone must have a Vietnamese visa. Diplomatic and official passport holders should o
Citizenship. The SR V considers all Vietnamese to be Vietnamese citizens for life.
Ifyou are assig
No shots are required for entering Vietnam unless you are coming from a country that has had a
Pets
Pets can be brought into Vietnam. All animals must have a certificate of health issued by a veteri
•
Ifyou are assigned to a detached house, there are no restrictions on the size ofpets. Service apartm
FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION
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Post strictly prohibits the importation offirearms to Vietnam by USC personnel. Direct inquirie
CURRENCY, BANKING, WEIGHTS ANI} MEASURES
The monetary unit is the. Vietnamese Dong (VND). There are no coins. Paper notes bear the port
TAXES, EXCHANGE, AND SALE OF PROPERTY
Restrictions
USC personnel are exempt from paying local income and airport departure taxes. We are howev
Banking Facilities
The Embassy operates a cashier's office for obtaining dollars and dong. It is open Monday through
RECOMMENDED READING
The following titles are provided as a general indication of the material published on Vietnam. T
•
Crawford, A1m Caddell. Customs and Culture of Vietnam. Charles E. Tuttle Co., Rutlan
Downie, Sue. Down Highway One. Asia 2000, Hong Kong, 1993.
Kumow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History.
McDonald, Stuart. Vietnam -For Travellers by Travellers. McPhersons Printing Group, A
Nepote, jacques. Vietnam, Land of the Ascending Dragon. Passport Books, Lincolnwood, I
Storey, Robert. Vietnam, A Travel Survival Kit. Lonely Planet Publications, Australia, 1
Timberman, Thomas MF. Vietnam: The No BS Business Guide. LOI, Inc., 1994.
Wintle, justin. Romancing Vietnam. Penguin Books, London, England, 1992.
LOCAL HOLIDAYS
The following Vietnamese holidays, as well as authorized U.S. holidays, are observed by the U.S.
•
New Year's Day*
Dr. Martin Luther King's Birthday'~'~
Lunar New Year Festival'~ (3 days in late January or early February)
George Washington's Birthday**
Liberation of Saigon Day (April30}'~
International Labor Day* (May 1)
Memorial Day'~'~
.
Independence Day·~·~
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American Embassy Hanoi
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Vietnamese National Day·~ (September 2}
Labor Day·~·~
Columbus Day**
Veterans Day·~·~
Thanksgiving Day'~'~
Christmas Day**
* Vietnamese and American Holiday·~
·~American
Holiday**
* Vietnamese Holiday·~·~*
,
The Lunar New Year Festival (TET} is determined by the lunar calendar. According to ancient
•
•
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Jeffrey A. Bader,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Statement before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
House Committee on International Relations
Washington, D.C., June 18, 1997
U.S. Department of State
U.S. Policy Toward Vietnam
Thank you Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to have the opportunity to speak today on United States
policy toward Vietnam. This is an opportune time to review our policy, with Secretary of State
Albright's visit to Vietnam just one week away and the arrival of our first Ambassador to the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam, Pete Peterson, six weeks behind us.
Vietnam is a nation in the midst of significant transformation. After years of self-imposed isolation
from its neighbors and the West because of its occupation of Cambodia, the Vietnamese leadership
changed course beginning in the mid 1980s. Faced with a growing gap between its economic
stagnation and the dynamic growth of its neighbors, Vietnam's leaders made two fundamental
decisions: to withdraw Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, and to embark on a policy of domestic
reform. These two decisions paved the way for Vietnam's reemergence as a partner accepted by its
ASEAN neighbors and by the West. The collapse of the Soviet Union, its former ally, added impetus
to the decisions the leadership had taken.
I
·Domestically, Vietnam embarked on a policy of economic reform, or "Doi Moi." This policy has
reduced the role of central planning and encouraged the development of private businesses, especially
in the agriculturaLand retail sectors. Vietnam has sought to attract foreign investment, both from the
region and from the West. The result has been a surge in Vietnam's growth, which took off in 1991
and has averaged 9.5% since 1995, and a steady stream of foreign investors and traders coming to
Vietnam seeking opportunities in the new more favorable climate.
Vietnam's movement toward a market economy "with socialist characteristics" has, however, been
halting and there are significant barriers and obstacles the leadership has not confronted. The state
sector and state monopolies continue to play a dominant role, and have a privileged place, in the
economy. Vietnam has yet to commit itself to the strategy of export-led growth that has been so
successful for its ASEAN neighbors, pursuing a more cautious and protectionist approach relying on
import substitution policies. Rule of law, the sanctity of contracts, protection of intellectual property,
and.determination to reduce official corruption--all essential to sustaining economic growth and
creating a climate for foreign investment--need considerable strengthening if Vietnam is to compete.
Internationally, Vietnam's reorientation has had at least three major components: 1) improving its
relations with the states of the region, particularly the A SEAN countries; 2) enhancing its relations
with the U.S. and other Western countries; and 3) integrating into the broader international
community. This has led Vietnam to join ASEAN, and with it the ASEAN Regional Forum which
discusses regional security issues with the important states of the Asia-Pacific, including the U.S.,
China, and Japan. It has manifest itself in Vietnam's desire to join APEC and the World Trade
Organization, and of greatest interest to us here, it has meant that Vietnam has sought to make major
strides to develop its relations with the U.S.
I
Vietnam's desire to improve relations with the U.S. has led it to engage us on a number of issues of
concern to us, in many cases flexibly. These include: POW/MIA accounting, establishment of
diplomatic relations, resettlement opportunities abroad for Vietnamese boat people and return of
some of them to Vietnam, economic and commercial cooperation, protection of intellectual property
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rights, repayment of sovereign debt, security dialogue, and law enforcement cooperation. I would
now like to turn to U.S. policy in Vietnam--what we have been doing and some next steps.
Since the early 1990s, the U.S. has been proceeding cautiously in developing relations with Vietnam,
following a road map conceived in the Bush Administration. In 1994, in light of progress in
POW/MIA accounting and the successful implementation of the Paris Peace Accords, the Clinton
Administration lifted the trade embargo on Vietnam. The U.S. opened a Liaison Office in Hanoi later
in 1994. On July 11, 1995, President Clinton announced our establishment of diplomatic relations,
and on May 9, former Congressman Pete Peterson took up his duties as our Ambassador to Vietnam.
Obtaining the fullest possible accotinting of American POW/MIAs from the Vietnam War continues
to be our highest priority with regard to Vietnam. Our expansion of the relationship into other areas
has not lessened the centrality of POW/MIA accounting to our relations with Vietnam. As my
predecessors have previously testified, our policy has been to take carefully phased, incremental steps
forward in the relationship as we achieve tangible progress in reaching our accounting goal. Before
each major step, the President has carefully reviewed the progress that has been achieved and judged
that further progress could best be promoted through these steps.
·
In 1993, the President set out four specific areas in which cooperation by the Vietnamese would be
examined as a basis for further improvement in relations:
•
-- Resolving discrepancy cases and live sightings, as well as conducting field activities. With the
assistance of the SRV, we have been able to confirm the fate of all but 48 of the 196 "last known
. alive" high priority cases; i.e., persons known to have survived their capture or aircraft loss, but who
did not return alive. After evaluating over 1,850 reports that POW/MIAs had been sighted alive since
1975 and over 140 field investigations, we have found "no compelling evidence that any American
remains alive in captivity in Southeast Asia." .
--Recovering and repatriating remains. This month, JTF-FA (Joint Task Force-Full Accounting)
began the 46th JFA (Joint Field Activity) in Vietnam, 26 ofthese since January 1993. These joint
U.S.-Vietnamese operations and unilateral Vietnamese turnovers of remains have produced 211 sets
of remains since 1993. During these activities, Vietnamese and Americans work together under harsh
and dangerous conditions to recover remains of the missing.
-- Accelerating efforts to provide documents that will help lead to the fullest possible
accounting. The Vietnamese creation of teams in 1994 to search nationwide for documents and
records has provided new leads. Joint research teams have reviewed and photographed approximately
28,000 archival items. In 1995 and 1996, Vietnamese officials unilaterally turned over 300
documents totaling 500-600 untranslated pages. We have conducted more than 195 oral history
interviews of Vietnamese veterans and officials.
:-- Providing further assistance in implementing trilateral investigations with Laos. Since the
Vietnamese agreed in December 1994 to cooperate on recovery operations in Laos, 22 Vietnamese
witnesses have assisted in field activities in Laos, providing information that led to the repatriation in
1996 of remains associated with cases of 12 unaccounted-for Americans.
Taking into account all information available to the government, the President signed a Presidential
Determination on December 3, 1996 that Vietnam is cooperating in full faith in all four of these
areas.
I
The arrival of Pete Peterson in Hanoi provides us an invaluable asset as we pursue the goal of fullest
possible accounting. As a former POW, he brings a special, unique commitment and credibility to
this task. At the same time,. he has already demonstrated an extraordinary ability to communicate
with the Vietnamese, enabling him to build a framework of cooperation necessary to further the goal
of accounting for our POW/MIAs.
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Concern for human rights is an important element of our policy with Vietnam. Vietnam's decision to
introduce market mechanisms has not been paralleled by comparable efforts to introduce political
reforms. Vietnam remains a one-party dictatorship in which criticism of the regime is not tolerated
an~ attempts to organize politically outside the Communist Party framework are unacceptable.
We have a formal human rights dialogue with Vietnam and have held five sessions so far, the most
recent iii March of this year. These meetings have enabled us to convey our concerns about human
rights abuses directly to the Vietnam Government. When the Secretary visits Vietnam at the end of
this month, human rights will be among the most important issues she raises with Vietnamese
leaders. Through the dialogue and our regular contacts with the Vietnamese Government, we have
raised broad human rights issues such as freedom of religion, freedom of the press and of expression,
and the right of association, as well as specific cases of imprisoned political and religious dissidents.
We have pressed Vietnamese officials at the highest levels to release political and religious prisoners.
We have also made it clear that Hanoi's improvement in respect for human rights will be a factor
af~ecting the pace of our normalization of relations.
•
In January of this year, we reached agreement with the Vietnamese Government on the Resettlement
Opportunity for Vietnamese Returnees--or ROVR. ROVR was created to encourage Vietnamese in
countries of first asylum, such as Thailand and Hong Kong, who have been found ineligible for
refugee status to return voluntarily to Vietnam. To further offer inducement to their return to
Vietnam, we have agreed to consider those who enrolled in the program one last time under liberal
criteria with a view to determining whether they are eligible for resettlement in the U.S. Although
this program has been slow to get started because of delays in issuance of exit permits by Vietnamese
officials, we hope to begin full-scale interviewing of these applicants in the near future. This will be .
the last chapter in the saga begun in the mid-1970s which has brought about one million Vietnamese
to the U.S. under various resettlement programs .
We are working with Congress to open a Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City. Opening a
Consulate General is very much in our own interest. It will enable us to provide consular and
business services to the 3,000 Americans resident in Ho Chi Minh City and 75,000 American tourists
visiting annually. There is a huge demand for immigrant and non-immigrant visas, which c·urrently
mustbe handled at great expense to the U.S. Government out of Bangkok. When it opens, Ho Chi
Minh City will be one of the biggest visa-issuing posts in East Asia and the Pacific. A presence in Ho
Chi Minh City will enable us to more closely monitor the economic, social, and human rights
situation in the South.
Vietnam and the U.S. have a shared interest in combating the transit of narcotics through Vietnam to
the U.S. We have provided training in demand reduction and counter-narcotics for Vietnamese
customs. In the future we will be looking at increasing cooperation in this area.
With Vietnam's membership in ASEAN and participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum, we now
have fora for discussing regional issues with the Vietnamese leadership. Vietnam's conduct and
influence will be an important element in affecting regional stability. It claims numerous islands,
reefs, and atolls in the Spratly Islands and occupies the largest number of islands of all the claimants.
It has historic interest and influence in Cambodia and Laos. And Vietnam's relationship with China
has long been of consequence to the region--from the time of our own military involvement, through
the PRC invasion in 1979, to the normalization in relations that accompanied Vietnam's withdrawal
from Cambodia. A U.S.-Vietnam dialogue, multilaterally and bilaterally, should contribute to
increasing stability in Southeast Asia.
I
Our two military establishments have bt:gun to develop a modest relationship. Thus far this has
involved exchanges ofvisitsat a relatively low level. We held our first round of military-to-military
talks in Hanoi in October. It was reciprocated by a visit of Vietnamese officers in February. Both
sides intend to proceed cautiously at a pace comfortable to both, and which maintains the
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preeminenceofthe POW/MIA accounting effort.
I
The economic relationship is a high priority for both countries. Growth in trade and investment has
been impressive, but far short of the potential inherent in this dynamic economy. Since we lifted the
embargo in 1994, over 400 U.S. firms have set up operations in Vietnam, and hundreds of others
pursue business from regional and U.S. headquarters. For 1996, U.S. exports to Vietnam were just
over $600 million, doubling the 1995 figure, and U.S. imports from Vietnam totaled over $300
million. Although the U.S. dropped recently among sources of foreign investment in Vietnam from
6th to 9th, we expect our rank to climb back up.
Because of the embargo and the absence of contacts between our two countries for so long, the U.S.Vietnam economic relationship is one of the handful in the world which should experience dramatic
growth in the years to come and create jobs for Americans as exports grow. For this to happen,
Vietnam needs to eliminate trade barriers and continue to develop an institutional and legal
framework meeting the needs of American business.
A comprehensive bilateral trade agreement, which will help increase market access and trarisparency
for U.S. firms in Vietnam, is under negotiation. We recently finished three rounds of talks in Hanoi
during which we presented the draft text of the agreement. We are now awaiting a response from the
Vietnamese. Having developed a better understanding of Vietnam's trade and investment regime and
clarifying for the Vietnamese U.S. objectives and international trade terms and concepts, we are
ready for negotiations in earnest.
·
I
During the last round of trade talks, we also initialed an interim copyright agreement which we
expect to finalize soon. This is an important step. Development of IPR protection will be essential as
. Vietnam seeks to attract foreign investment. Because of our concerns over lack of protection for
copyrighted items, such as CD's, software, books and film, and pharmaceutical patents for American
drug manufacturers, we have placed Vietnam on the Watch List for the first time this year.
Vietnam is one of the half-dozen countries to whom the U.S. does not grant MFN -status, despite
having probably the most dynamic growing economy of them all. A completed trade agreement and a
waiver of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment are prerequisites for MFN. The Administration will consult
with the Congress on the requirements and the timing of decisions to grant MFN. It is in the interest
of the U.S. to provide MFN so that our commercial relationship can achieve its full potential.
U.S. companies have told us they wanftrade and investment support, such as EXIMBank, OPIC and
TDA programs. The Jackson-Vanik waiver also is required for EXIMBank and OPIC to operate in
Vietnam. EXIMBank support, in particular, is essential if U.S. companies are to compete on a level
playing field against foreign competitors. An OPIC delegation visited Vietnam at the end of May to
continue work on its two other requirements--a labor certification and a bilateral OPIC agreement.
TDA has offered some ofits programs in Vietnam and will soon offer its full range of programs. We
have also tabled a civil aviation agreement with Vietnam.
On April 7, Secretary Rubin signed a bilateral debt rescheduling agreement in Hanoi. The agreement
commits Vietnam to repay the former government of South Vietnam's debt of $146 million. The
Vietnamese have already begun payments. The Brooke Amendment bar on assistance to countries in
arrears on official debt repayments will be lifted on June 23 when the debt rescheduling agreement
comes into effect.
I
Current legislation has prohibited most bilateral assistance to Vietnam. USAID has provided
humanitarian assistance through NGOs for prosthetics and rehabilitation services to war victims and
to displaced children and orphans. Assistance is about $3 million a year. USAID also plans to offer
modest assistance with HIVI AIDS prevention and commercial legal reform. USIA has been
providing Fulbright fellowships and grants for Vietnamese to study in and visit the U.S., and the
National Institutes of Health and the Centers of Disease Control have spearheaded efforts to assist
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Vietnam's health sector.
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The U.S. and Vietnam have begun to normalize relations on a wide front. The result is an
increasingly complex relationship. The U.S. and Vietnam have a tragic history. Healing the wounds
of war takes time, effort, and good will. We are moving toward a time when Americans will truly see
Vietnam not as a war but as a country, and the Vietnamese not as former enemies but as a people
with whom Americans can build a relationship based on reconciliation and shared hopes for the
future. We still have much more work ahead of us.
(###)
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r?
•
TEXT: 3/12 PRESIDENTIAL DELEGATION STATEMENT IN HANOI
(Fullest possible accounting for MIAs still chief goal)
Hanoi -- The fullest possible accounting for Americans lost as a result of the war in Southeast Asia
remains the primary goal of U.S. Presidential Delegations visiting Vietnam, according to Hershel
Gober, deputy secretary of the Department ofVeterans Affairs.
The most recent delegation, the first since President Clinton normalized relations with Vietnam in
July 1995, released the following statement March 12 in Hanoi:
(begin official text)
STATEMENT BY HERSHEL GOBER
DEPUTY SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF VETERAN AFFAIRS
HANOI MARCH 12, 1996
This Presidential Delegation's visit to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is the first since the
President normalized relations in July 1995. This delegation, and others from the Department of
Defense and the Department of State, have one clear goal in mind: to achieve the fullest possible
accounting for Americans lost as a result of the war in Southeast Asia.
During ~eetings with representatives of the government of Vietnam, the delegation emphasized that
the fullest possible accounting is a high national priority in our bilateral relationship. We continue to
seek progress in the tour areas earlier identified by President Clinton:.
I
-- Recovery and repatriation of American remains;
-- Resolution of discrepancy cases and live sighting reports;
-- Trilateral operations in Laos;
--Provision of all available POW/MIA-related documents.
The government of Vietnam has demonstrated and sustained its willingness to cooperate in joint
recovery operations. The continuance of their amnesty program has also been an important
contribution. The delegation acknowledged the assistance of the Vietnamese government in the most
recent joint field activity in which the turnover of remains held by individuals was twice expedited.
The delegation emphasized the priority by family and veterans' organizations in confirming the fates
and accounting for individuals on the priority last known alive discrepancy.case list. We also called
for the repatriation of remains of those on the special remains list or information explaining why their
remains are no longer recoverable. The recently completed Comprehensive Review has brought a
more focused, ongoing analytical process, and gives both sides a positive way to bring individual
cases to resolution.
·
We hope to see further exchanges of information and documents. While we have no evidence that the
Vietnamese government is withholding any information, we urged its leaders to continue efforts to
uncover any new information that would aid in the fullest possible accounting of our POW/MIAs.
I
Both governments has exchanged information based on the Comprehensive Review over the past
several months, and we are pleased that the government of Vietnam has already started work on cases
which call for unilateral action. We were very pleased to receive just this morning documents from
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Vice Foreign Minister Le Mai. This response to our request for greater emphasis on unilateral actions
by the Vietnamese government is most appreciated. We will take these documents back to
Washington for analysis.
We place a very high priority on pursuing any live sighting reports. Quick action on such reports is
essential to address humanitarian concerns.
The delegation will continue its work here through discussions with the Vietnam Veterans
Organization and with other government officials. In the days following, meetings are scheduled in
Vientiane, Laos and Phnom Penh, as well as a visit to two joint field operations in Laos.
(end official text)
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TRANSCRIPT: LAKE 7/13 PRESS CONFERENCE IN VIETNAM
(MIA Accounting Remains Most Important Bilateral Issue)
Quang Tri, Vietnam -- Cooperation on the MIA issue has allowed the United States and Vietnam to
move beyond the past and work together on other areas of mutual interest, according to Anthony
Lake, National Security Adviser to the President.
"I have been very pleased with the cooperation that the Vietnamese have been showing ... My talks
here suggest that it will continue to be very good and we will be moving on in our other relationships
with Vietnam, now and in the future," Lake said at a press conference at the Quang Tri MIA
Recovery Site July 13.
The Clinton administration remains committed to achieving the fullest possible accounting of
American MIA's according to Lake. "As I've said many times, this is the most important issue in our
relations ... It is a matter of the most fundamental importance to families all across America".
At the press conference, Lake identified other areas of common interest. These issues include refugee
resettlement and fighting narcotics traffic as well as developing the economic relationship between
the two countries.
Lake said that his talks with Vietnamese officials· were successful. "We talked about very practical
·issues that will allow us to advance what are not just the interest of governments, but the interests of
our peoples," he said.
Following is a trancript of the press conference.
W. ANTHONY LAKE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER
PRESS CONFERENCE AT MIA RECOVERY SITE
INQUANGTRI, VIETNAM JULY 13,1996
OPENING REMARKS
How are we doing? This is Colonel Jonathan Chase, who is in charge of our efforts in Vietnam to
recover as many traces and remains of Americans missing in action as we can. We can see at a site
like this just how much good and hard work has gone into this operation. It is very important to the
President and all Americans that we do this work. As I've said many times, this is the most important
issue in our relations. I have been very pleased with the cooperation that the Vietnamese have been
showing, and also with the way in which Vietnamese leaders have said that they will continue their
cooperation both in joint efforts with us and unilaterally. This is really more than a policy issue
between two nations. This whole effort is an extraordinary human issue. It is a matter of the most
fundamental importance to families all across America. I want to thank, oil behalf of all Americans,
Colonel Chase and everyone out here for their extraordinarily good and hard work in this effort.
I think it's a reflection of American values. As the President said, "America takes care of its own."
We are doing so here.
Q&As
I
QUESTION: We are obviously seeing the difficulties of this very trying and arduous work. Would
you like to see the process moved forward and a speedy decision that the fullest possible accounting
achieved?
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LAKE: Well, we have talked about that. We really shouldn't set an artificial deadline. When the
fullest possible accounting has been achieved, we will know it. I have discussed with Vietnamese
officials about how, increasingly, joint operations like this will have covered most of the leads we
have and we will become increasingly reliant on theVietnamese government, unilaterally, to come
up with further leads. This is an issue that will always be with us. I don't think we need to set an
artificial date when this issue will be closed.
Q: Perhaps after the election things could start to move on?
'
LAKE: Well, after the election, as before it, we will continue to achieve the fullest possible
accounting. This is not a partisan issue in the United States. As I said, the cooperation of the
Vietnamese government has been very good. My talks here suggest that it will continue to be very
good and we will be moving on in our other relationships with Vietnam, now and in the future. We
have important mutual interests economically. We want to work together to resolve the questions of
refugee resettlement, our common fight against narcotics flow, etc. My visit here has been very
encouraging that we will work together in our mutual interests.
'
. Q: So it doesn't worry you then that the relationship is being held up because this fullest possible
accounting requirement is still somewhere in the future?
•
LAKE: Well, the speed with which we normalized was held up in order to make sure that this most
important issue was being addressed fully. That was important not only on the merits, but because we
wanted to make sure that as we build the kind of relationship we want with Vietnam, we are bringing
Americans together rather than having them remain divisive. And the progress we have made on this,
I think, has contributed to building a consensus behind the policies that we are conducting in
Vietnam. Much of the credit for that goes to the Colonel and his colleagues .
Q: Mr. Lake, could you elaborate on the next steps that will take place after the MIA issue?
LAKE: There are many different issues, all of which we can keep making progress on as we make
progress on this. So I have been discussing the next steps in our economic relationship, again, how
we can cooperate on resolving issues of refugee resettlement, the refugees that are outside ofVietnam
and those that have now come back to Vietnam and who wish to go to the United States, how we can
cooperate on building diplomatic ties and creating ways in which Vietnam can become more
integrated into the region. There are lots of issues before us, practical issues. I think we are making
progress on all of them because it is in our mutual interest to put the past behind us as we make this
accounting and move on toward the future.
Q: Tell me how you can speak fluent Vietnamese?
LAKE: Well, I studied Vietnamese in the United States and as a young diplomat, I spent two years
here in Vietnam. I discovered a strong admiration for the culture and the people of Vietnam. And as
you look around at a sad sight like this, you still recognize it as a country of extraordinary beauty.
Q: And when was your actual time in Vietnam before 1975?
LAKE: I was here from 1963 to 1965, many years ago.
I
Q: Both sides view the search for American MIA as a humanitarian issue. At a press conference the
day before you arrived; a Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesman suggested that maybe the United
States was not doing enough to help Vietnam recover from its problems with the war -- things like
Agent Orange, their own MIAs, and "demining", things like that. Has any thought been given to
increasing American help in that regard?
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LAKE: Well, I have discussed that issue with every official I met so far. Our own strong feelings
about our own missing has helped us understand how so many Vietnamese feel about thousands of
missing Vietnamese. As a result, we declassified and gave to the Vietnamese over a million
documents that could help them find their own missing. It has been very important to the Vietnamese.
Many of them have mentioned to me how our veterans organizations have encouraged our veterans
who have mementos that they brought back from Vietnam to try to be helpful with any specific leads
they have about missing Vietnamese.
·
Q: Can I ask you on a personal level, does this bring back memories of your time in Vietnam?
LAKE: Of course.
Q: Like what?
LAKE: Not just personal memories, although I had many as I flew over Hue where I served for a
year. I have many feelings here and not just my own personal memories, feelings about the men who
apparently died on this hillside and the many others who died.
Q: Do you think the cause was worth their sacrifice?
LAKE: The point is that American soldiers in Vietnam fought very bravely. They were sent here. The
policy was not theirs to make. And I, for one, feel extremely strongly that America did not do a
service to them in putting any blame for what happened on the men who died here, or who fought
here and returned.
Q: Can you say that there has been total cooperation on the Vietnamese side, have they overcharged
for the going rate for the cost of helicopter fuel, rental costs, etc.?
LAKE: I really don't feel the cost is the issue in something like this. Again, the President meant it
when he said that "America takes care of its own". We should do whatever we have to do to provide
the fullest possible accounting to the families, and we continue to continue that. We don't put a cost
on the efforts to recover the remains of Americans missing here at a time like this.
Q: Is the President actively considering the political decision to start to use circumstantial evidence to
take names off the missing list? There is no way you will ever find remains.
LAKE: Well, we have been talking about that over the last day or two, to review it, because it is a
very difficult issue that involves not just policy questions but what we can honestly tell the families.
We always err on the side of being sure of whatever it is we are telling them, rather than guessing. ·
But I have been very impressed that in fact we do try, that Col. Chase and his people here, along with
the people in Honolulu, try to tell the families everything we can about the investigation so that they
will have the greatest possible knowledge, whatever the conclusion that we draw from it.
· Q: Before the Vietnamese Party Congress there was a lot of anti-foreign, even anti-American,
. rhetoric, including at the Congress itself. A former party chairman said that there were hostile forces
in the United States and that the CIA was reactivating agents here. First of all, has any event effected
discussions or progress on the relationship that you can see? And please comment on that.
I
LAKE: The truth is that none of that has come up in a single one of my meetings with Vietnamese
officials. I saw those reports also. But the meetings could not have been more straightforward. The
atmosphere allowed for very direct and straightforward exchanges on many different issues,
including, I might note, on human rights. Vietnamese officials agreed that we may continue a dialog
on that. It's a subject important to us and to many people around the world.
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. Q: Could you make some comments on the talks between you and the Vietnamese leaders in Hanoi
and Danang?
LAKE: They were very good. And, again, the point is that they were the kind of talks in which we
were not simply sitting down and reading talking points to each other. They were the kind oftalks in
which, first of all, we could discuss longer term strategic issues; the kind of stability and the progress
we want to see in this region. We talked about very practical issues that will allow us to advance what
are not just the interest of governments, but the interests of our peoples. I was very pleased.
(end transcript)
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Page 1 of 15
Text: State Department Report on Religious Freedom in Vietnam
(Vietnam restricts groups it calls at variance with state)
Following is the text of the 2000 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom in
Vietnam. The report can be accessed on the State Department web site at:
http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/irf/irf_rpt/irf_index.html
(begin text)
2000 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom: Vietnam
Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
U.S. Department of State, September 5, 2000
VIETNAM
I
Both the Constitution and government decrees provide for freedom of worship; however,
the Government continued to restrict significantly those organized activities of religious
groups that it declared to be at variance with state laws and policies. The Government
generally allowed persons to practice individual worship in the religion of their choice,
·
and participation in religious activities throughout the country continued to grow
significantly. However, government restrictions on the hierarchies and clergy of most
religious groups remained in place, and religious groups faced difficulties in training and \..
ordaining clergy, publishing religious materials, and conducting educational and
humanitarian activities. The Government requires religious groups to register and uses
this process to control and monitor church organizations. The Government recognizes six
official religious bodies: One each for Buddhist, Roman Catholic, Protestant, Hoa Hao,
Cao Dai, and Muslim believers.
On balance, conditions for religious freedom remained fundamentally the same during
the period covered by this report compared with the period from mid-1998 to mid-1999.
However, there were improvements in some areas such as the release of more than 1,
dozen ethnic Hmong Protestants and 3 Catholic priests and growth in worship activities.
In addition, in some parts of the country, there was continued gradual expansion of the
parameters for individual believers of officially recognized churches, particularly some
Buddhists and Catholics, to practice their faiths publicly without major interference from
government officials. However, most of the serious restrictions imposed on religious
freedom between mid-1998 and mid-1999 continued.
I
The Government used the lack of official recognition of several groups as a pretext to
harass some believers, in particular certain groups of Buddhists, as well as Protestants,
and Hoa Hao, who lack legal sanction. Police routinely questioned persons who. held
dissident religious views and arbitrarily detained persons based on their religious beliefs
and practices. Many Protestant Christians who worshipped in house churches in ethnic
minority areas were subjected to arbitrary detention by local officials who broke up
unsanctioned religious meetings there. Authorities imprisoned persons for practicing
religion illegally by using provisions of the Penal Code that allow for jail terms of up to
3 years for "abusing freedom of speech, press, or religion." There were at least 15
reported Hoa Hao and Protestant religious detainees held without charge. In addition the
. Supreme Patriarch of the Unified Buddhist Church ofVietnam (UBCV), Thich Huyen
Quang, continued to be held in Quang Ngai in conditions resembling administrative
detention. An unconfirmed report stated that one Hmong Christian, Lu Seo Dieu, died in
prison in 1999 in Lao Cai province from mistreatment and lack of medical care in
detention. There are reportedly 13 religious prisoners. In general there are amicable
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relations among the various religious communities, and there were some modest attempts
at ecumenical cooperation and dialog in Ho Chi Minh City.
The U.S. Embassy in Hanoi and the U.S.' Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City
maintained an active and regular dialog with senior- and working-level government
officials to advocate for greater religious freedom. The U.S. Ambassador and other
embassy officers raised with cabinet ministers, Communist Party officials, and provincial
officials, concerns of the U.S. government and citizens of other countries about the
detention and arrest of religious figures and other restrictions on religious freedom. The
Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom, Robert Seiple, visited the
country in July 1999 for discussions with government officials and leaders of several
religious bodies. In several cases, intervention by the U.S. Government resulted in
improvements such as the release of some prisoners.
Section I. Government Policies on Freedom of Religion
Legal/Policy Framework
I
Both the Constitution and government decrees provide for freedom of worship; however,
the Government continued to restrict significantly those organized activities of religious
groups that it declared to be at variance with state laws and policies. The Government
generally allowed persons to practice individual worship in the religion of their choice,
and participation in religious activities throughout the country continued to grow
significantly. However, the Government uses regulations to control religious hierarchies
and organized religious activities closely, in part because the Communist Party fears that
organized religion may weaken its authority and influence by serving as a political,
so~ial, and spiritual alternative to the authority of the central Government.
The Government requires religious groups to register and uses this process to control and
monitor church organizatio-ns. Under the law, only those activities and organizations
expressly sanctioned by the Government are deemed to be legal. The granting or
withholding of the official recognition of religious bodies is one of the means by which
the Government actively intervenes to restrict religious activities by some believers. In
order for a group to obtain official recognition, it must obtain government approval.ofits
leadership and the overall scope of its activities.
Officially recognized religious organizations are able to operate openly in most parts of
the country, and followers of these religious bodies are able to worship without
government harassment, except in some isolated provinces. Officially recognized
organizations must consult with the Government about their religious and administrative
operations, although not about their religious tenets of faith. In general religious
organizations are confined to dealing specifically with spiritual and with organizational
matters. There has been a trend in the past 5 years to accord much greater latitude to
followers of recognized religious organizations, and the majority· of followers of the
country's Buddhist and Catholic traditions have benefited from this development. The
Government holds conferences to discuss and publicize its religion decrees.
'
I
Religious organizations must obtain government permission to hold training seminars,
conventions, and celebrations outside the regular religious calendar; to build or remodel
places of worship; to engage in charitable activities or operate religious schools; and to
train, ordain, promote, or transfer clergy. Many of these restrictive powers lie principally
with provincial or city people's committees, and local treatment of religious persons
varied widely. Because of the lack of meaningful due process in the legal system, the
actions of religious believers are subject to the discretion of local officials in their
respective jurisdictions.
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National laws that prescribe freedom of belief are enforced unevenly~ In some areas,
such as parts ofHo Chi Minh City, local officials allow relatively wide latitude to
believers; in others, such as isolated provinces of the northwest, central highlands, and
central coast, religious believers are subject to significant harassment because of the lack
of effective legal enforcement. Some provincial leaders, such as those in certain
northwestefll provinces, have claimed that there are no religious believers in their
provinces since the religious believers there are not recognized officially.
In general religious groups faced difficulty in obtaining teaching materials, expanding
training facilities, publishing religious materials, and expanding the number of clergy in
religious training in response to increased demand from congregations.
I
In particular local officials harass a significant minority of religious believers because
they operate without legal sanction. Since 1981leaders of the Unified Buddhist Church
of Vietnam (UBCV) have requested repeatedly that their church be granted official
·recognition, but their requests continue to be rejected in large part because of the strong
criticism of the Communist Party by UBCV leaders and their call for democracy and
improved conditions of human rights in Vietnam. UBCV leaders continue to be harassed,
and their rights severely restricted by the Government. In early 2000, leaders of several
churches belonging to the Evangelical Church of Vietnam (ECV) (the Protestant Tin
Lanh churches) in the southern region engaged in quiet discussions with the Government
on official recognition of their congregations. These discussions, although stalled at midyear, were expected to lead eventually to official recognition of the roughly 300 ECV
churches throughout the country. In early 2000, several leaders of the Hoa Hao
community, including several pre-1975 leaders, openly criticized the Government's 1999
recognition of an official Hoa Hao organization; they claimed that the official group is
subservient to the Government and demanded official recognition of their own leadership
·instead. The Government neither acknowledged the claims of these Hoa Hao believers
nor permitted their independent activities.
In practice there ate no effective remedies under the law for violations of persons' rights
to religious freedom due to the capricious actions of officials. On occasion central
authorities have intervened to curb the worst excesses. of local harassment. For example,
after a district official in Binh Phuoc province ordered the destruction of three Protestant
churches in his province, authorities from Hanoi intervened to prevent further
destruction, then forced the district leader to retire. However, the court system is
subservient to the Communist Party and its political decisions, and in no known case
have the courts acted to interpret laws so as to protect a person's right to religious
freedom.
Religious Demography
•
The Government officially recognizes Buddhist (approximately 50 percent), Roman
Catholic (8 percent), Protestant (0.9 percent), Cao Dai (1 percent), Hoa Hao (2 percent),
and Muslim (0.1 percent) religious organizations. However, some Buddhist, Protestant,
Cao Dai, and Hoa Hao believers do not recognize or participate in the governmentapproved associations. Some organize their own associations, and thus their
organizations are considered illegal by the authorities. Among the country's religious
communities, Buddhism is the dominant religious belief. Many Buddhists practice an
amalgam of Mahayana Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucian traditions that sometimes is
called Vietnam's "triple religion." Some estimates suggest that more than half the
population of approximately 80 million persons are at least nominally Buddhist, visit
pagodas on festival days, and have a world view that is shaped in part by Buddhism,
although in reality these beliefs rely on a very expansive definition of the faith. One
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prominent Buddhist official has estimated thatJO percent ofBuddhists are devout and
practice their faith regularly. The Government's Office of Religious Affairs uses a much
lower estimate of 7 million practicing Buddhists. Mahayana Buddhists, most of whom
are part ofthe ethnic Kinh majority, are found throughout the country, especially in the
populous areas of the northern and southern delta regions. There are proportionately
fewer Buddhists in certain highlands and central lowlands areas, although migration of
Kinh to highland areas is changing the distribution somewhat.
A Khmer minority in the south practices Theravada Buddhism. Numbering from perhaps
700,000 to 1 million persons, they live almost exclusively in the Mekong delta.
There are an estimated 6 million Roman Catholics in the country (about 8 percent of the
population). The largest concentrations are in southern provinces around Ho Chi Minh
City, with other large groups in the northern and central coastal lowlands. In recent
years, the Government has eased its efforts to control the Roman Catholic hierarchy by
relaxing the requirements that all clergy belong to the government-controlled Catholic.
Patriotic Association. Few clergy actually belong to this association, which is a loose
affiliation of clergy that holds conferences and participates in events with the Communist
Party and the Vietnam Fatherland Front.
·
•
Authorities allowed the Vatican's ordination of a new archbishop in Ho Chi Minh City in
1998 as well as the ordination of five bishops in other dioceses in 1998 and 1999. A
high-level Vatican envoy made his annual visit to the country in May 2000, during
which the filling of other vacant bishoprics was discussed. In June 2000, a bishop was
named for Da Nang province, and in August 2000, a bishop was named for Vinh Long
province. In 1998 a number of bishops traveled to Rome, Italy, for a synod of Asian
bishops. Up to 200,000 Catholics gathered in August 1999 at an annual Marian
celebration in La V ang in the central part of the country and celebrated their faith freely
there.
There are approximately 700,000 Protestants in the country (less than 1 percent of the
population), with more than half of these persons belonging to a large number of
unregistered evangelical "house churches" that operate in members' homes or in rural
villages, many of them in ethnic minority areas. Perhaps 150,000 of the followers of
house churches are Pentecostals, who celebrate "gifts of the spirit" through charismatic
and ecstatic rites of worship.
Reports from believers indicated that Protestant church attendance grew substantially
during the period covered by this report, especially among the house churches, despite
continued government restrictions on proselytizing activities.
Based on believers' estimates, two-thirds of Protestants are members of ethnic minorities,
including ethnic Hmong (some 120,000 followers) in the northwest provinces and some
200,000 members of ethnic minority groups of the central highlands (Ede, Jarai, Bahnar,
and Koho, among others). The house churches in ethnic minority areas have been
growing rapidly in recent years, sparked in part by radio broadcasts in ethnic minority
languages from the Philippines.
•
The Office of Religious Affairs estimates that there are 1.1 million Cao Dai followers
Gust over 1 percent of the population). Some nongovernmental organization (NGO)
sources estimate that there may be from 2 to 3 million followers. Cao Dai groups are
most active in Tay Ninh province, where the Cao Dai Holy See is located, and in Ho Chi
Minh City, the Mekong delta, and Hanoi. There are separate groups within the Cao Dai
religion, which is syncretistic, combining elements of many faiths. Its basic belief system
is influenced strongly by Mahayana Buddhism, although it recognizes a diverse array of
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Page 5 of 15
persons who have conveyed divine revelation, including Siddhartha, Jesus, Lao-Tse,
Confucius, and Moses .
Hoa Hao, considered by some of its followers to be a· "reform" branch of Buddhism, was
founded in the southern part of the country in 1939. Hoa Hao is a largely privatistic faith
that does not have a priesthood and rejects many of the ceremonial aspects of
mainstream Buddhism. Hoa Hao followers are concentrated in the Mekong delta,
particularly in provinces such as An Giang, where the Hoa Hao were dominant as a
political and religious force before 1975. According to the Office of Religious Affairs,
there are 1.3 million Hoa Hao followers; church-affiliated expatriate groups suggest that
there may be 2 million to 3 million. A government-organized group of 160 Hoa Hao held
a congress in May 1999 in An Giang. The congress established an 11.:member committee
to oversee the administrative affairs of the religion. Establishment of the committee
· constituted official governmental recognition of the religion for the first time in 25 years,
although a number of the pre-1975 leaders of the Hoa Hao oppose the official group as
subservient to the Government and not faithful to Hoa Hao traditions.
Mosques serving the country's small Muslim population, estimated at 50,000 persons,
operate in western An Giang province, Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, and other provinces in
the southern part of the country. The Muslim community is composed of ethnic Cham in
the southern coastal provinces and western Mekong delta. The Muslim community also
includes some ethnic Vietnamese, and migrants originally from Malaysia, Indonesia, and
· India. Most practice Sunni Islam.
•
The Muslim Association ofVietnam was banned in 1975 but authorized again in 1992. It
is the only official Muslim organization. Association leaders say that they are able to
practice their faith, including daily prayer, fasting during the month of Ramadan, and the
pilgrimage to Mecca, Saudi Arabia. The Government no longer restricts Muslims from
making the Hajj. Roughly 1 dozen Muslims journey to Mecca for the Hajj each year.
There are a variety of smaller religious communities. An estimated 8,000 Hindus are
concentrated in the south, including some ethnic Chams on the south central coast who
practice Hinduism.
There are estimated to be between from several hundred to 2,000 Baha'i believers,
largely concentrated in the south; prior to 1975, there were an estimated 130,000
believers, according to church officials.
.
.
.
There are several hundred members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
(Mormons) who are spread throughout the country but live primarily in the Ho Chi Minh
City and Hanoi areas.
The prominent position of Buddhism does not affect adversely religious freedom for
others, including those who wish not to practice a religion. The secular Government does
not favor a particular religion. The Constitution expressly protects the right of
"nonbelief' as well as "belief." Of the country's approximately 80 million citizens, 14
million or more reportedly do not practice any organized religion. Some sources strictly
define those considered to be practicing Buddhists, excluding those whose activities are
limited to visiting pagodas on ceremonial holidays. Using this definition, the number of
nonreligious persons would be much higher, perhaps as high as 50 million persons.
•
Governmental Restrictions on Religious Freedom
The Goverhment continued to maintain broad legal and policy restrictions on religious
freedom, although in many areas, Buddhists, Catholics, and Protestants reported an
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increase in religious activity and observance. However, worshipers in several Buddhist,
Catholic, and Cao Dai centers of worship reported that they believed that undercover
government observers attended worship services to monitor the activities of the
congregation and the clergy.
Operational and organizational restrictions on the hierarchies and clergy of most
religious groups remained in place. Religious groups faced difficulty in obtaining
teaching materials, expanding training facilities, publishing religious materials, and
expanding the number of clergy in religious training in response to increased demand
from congregations. The Roman Catholic Church, for example, faces many restrictions
on the training and ordination of priests, nuns, and bishops, and this restriction limits
pastoral ministry. Likewise, the Government restricted the number of clergy that the .
Buddhist, Catholic, Protestant, and Cao Dai Churches may train. Restrictions remained
on the numbers of Buddhist monks and Catholic seminarians. Protestants were not
allowed to operate a seminary or to ordain new clergy.
The Government requires all Buddhist monks to work under an officially approved
umbrella organization, the Central Buddhist Church of Vietnam. The Government
opposed efforts by the non-government-sanctioned Unified Buddhist Church ofVietnam
(UBCV) to operate independently, and tension between the Government and the UBCV
continued. Several prominent UBCV monks, including Thich Huyen Quang and Thich
Quang Do, continued to face government restrictions on their civil liberties during the
period covered by this report.
·
•
In April 2000, a local people's committee in Hanoi reportedly pressured the chief abbot
of the historic One-Pillar Pagoda to step down in favor of an abbot with close ties to the
Communist Party but no links to the pagoda. The chief abbot, whose pagoda is affiliated
with the official Buddhist organization, resisted the effort and protested that this violated
·
the state-sponsored church's statutes.
The Evangelical Church ofVietnam (ECV), which comprises the network of Tin Lanh
(Good News) churches and originally was founded by the Christian and Missionary
Alliance early in the 20th century, generally operated with greater freedom than did the
house churches. The roughly 300 Tin Lanh churches in the country are concentrated in
the major cities, including Ho Chi Minh City, Danang, Hanoi, and in lowland areas.
Some 15 ECV churches in the northern provinces are the only officially recognized
Protestant churches. Leaders of several ECV churches in the south discussed with the
Government official recognition of their congregations, and, although stalled at midyear, this process is expected to lead to eventual official recognition of the ECV churches
throughout the country.
One of the pastors of the main ECV church in Hanoi continued to be pressured by local
authorities to step down from the church; government authorities proposed that he be
replaced by a church official from Haiphong who was supported by local authorities. The
pastor received a letter from local police stating that he had violated the law because of
his past support ofunsanctioned religious activities. However, the pastor and the
congregation continued to resist this effort to force him to step down, as they have for
the past year.
•
The Government restricts Protestant congregations from cooperating on joint religious
observances or other activities, although in some localities there was greater freedom to
do so. There is some ecumenical networking among Protestants, particularly in Ho Chi
Minh City.
.
The Government banned and actively discotiraged participation in "illegal" religious
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groups, including the UBCV, Protestant house churches, and the unapproved Hoa Hao
and Cao Dai groups. Religious and organizational activities by UBCV monks are illegal,
and all UBCV activities outside private temple worship are proscribed. Protestant groups
in central and southern provinces and some groups of Hoa Hao believers not affiliated
with the group that held the May 2000 congress petitioned the Government for official
recognition. They were unsuccessful as of mid-2000. Most evangelical house churches
do not attempt to register because they believe that their applications would be denied,
and they want to avoid government control.
Provincial officials in Ha Giang and Lai Chau provinces in the north pressured Hmong
Christians to recant their faith. Local officials in these areas circulated official provincial
documents urging persons to give up illegal "foreign" religion and to practice traditional
animist beliefs and ancestor worsliip. Regional and police newspapers printed articles
documenting howpersons were deceived into following the house church "cults." There
is evidence that some individuals engaged in deceptive practices under the guise of
religious activities.
The local Catholic Church hierarchy remained frustrated by the Government's
restrictions but has.leamed to accommodate itself to theni for many years. A number of
clergy reported a modest easing of government control over church activities in certain
dioceses. In some areas, the Government relaxed its outright prohibition on the Catholic
Church. The Church is able to participate in religious education and charitable activities.
I
The degree of government control of church activities varied greatly among localities. In
some areas, especially in the south, Catholic churches operated kindergartens and
engaged in a variety of humanitarian projects. Buddhist groups engage in humanitarian
acts in many parts of the country.
Roman Catholic seminaries throughout the country have approximately 500 students
enrolled. The Government limits the church to operating six major seminaries and to
recruitment of new seminarians only every 2 years. All students must be approved by the
Government both upon entering the seminary and prior to their ordination as priests. The
Church believes that the number of students being ordained is insufficient to support the
growing Catholic population.
A government-controlled management committee has full powers to control the affairs of
the Cao Dai faith, thereby managing the church's operations, its hierarchy, and its clergy.
Independent church officials oppose the edicts of this committee as unfaithful to Cao Dai
principles and traditions. Despite the Government's statement in 1997 that it had
recognized the Cao Dai Church legally and encouraged Cao Dai believers to expand their
groups and practice their faith, many senior clerical positions remain vacant.
The national authorities continue to restrict the distribution of the sacred scriptures of the
HoaHao.
I
In April 1999, the Government issued a decree on religion that prescribes the rights and
responsibilities of religious believers. The religion decree states that persons formerly
detained or imprisoned must obtain special permission from the authorities before they
may resume religious activities. The decree also states that no religious organization can
reclaim lands orproperties taken over by the State following the end of the 1954 war
·
against French rule and the 1975 Communist victory in the south. Despite this blanket -'
prohibition, the Government has returned some church properties confiscated since 1975.
The Catholic Church in Ho Chi Minh City has received back two properties from the
People's Committee of the city. On one of the properties, in Cholon, the Church is
constructing an HIVIAIDS hospice to be operated by the Daughters of Charity of Saint
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Vincent de Paul. The other property is now a church-operated orphanage. One of the
vice-chairmen of the official Buddhist Sangha said that about 30 percent of Buddhist
properties confiscated in Ho Chi Minh City have been returned since 1975, and from 5 to
10 percent of all Buddhist properties confiscated in the south were returned. By contrast
UBCV leaders stated that their properties were not returned. Information concerning
prominent Protestant properties, such as the former seminary in Nha Trang, is not
available. Most Cao Dai and Hoa Hao properties have not been returned, according to
church leaders.
·
The Government does not permit religious instruction in public schools. The
Government restricts persons who belong to dissident and unofficial religious groups
from speaking publicly about their beliefs. It officially requires all religious publishing to
be done by government-approved publishing houses. Many Buddhist sacred scriptures,
Bibles, and other religious texts and publications are printed by these organizations and
allowed to be distributed.
I
The Government allows, and in some cases encourages, links with coreligionists in other
countries when the religious groups are approved by the Government. The Government
actively discourages contacts between the illegal UBCV and its foreign Buddhist
supporters, and between illegal Protestant organizations such as the house churches and
·their foreign supporters. Contacts between Vatican authorities and the domestic Catholic
Church are permitted, and the Government maintains a regular, active dialog with the
Vatican on a range of issues including organizational activities, the prospect of
establishing diplomatic relations, and a possible papal visit. The Government allows
religious travel for some, but not all, religious persons; Muslims are able to undertake the
Hajj, and many Buddhist and Catholic officials also have been able to travel abroad.
Persons who hold dissident religious opinions generally are not approved for foreign
travel.
The Government does not designate persons' religions on passports, although citizens'
"family books," which are household identification books, list religious and ethnic
·
affiliation.
The Government prohibits proselytizing by foreign missionary groups, although some
missionaries visited the country despite this prohibition. The Government deported some
foreign persons for unauthorized proselytizing, sometimes defining proselytizing very
broadly. A U.S. pastor who worked as a missionary prior to 1975 was questioned by
police and pressured to pay a fine, which he refused to do, after a meeting that he held
with Protestant Vietnamese pastors was raided by police in November 1999. His
passport and Bible were confiscated temporarily; they were returned shortly before his
departure several days later.
Proselytizing by citizens is restricted to regularly scheduled religious services in
recognized places of worship. Immigrants and noncitizens must comply with the law
when practicing their religions. Catholic and Protestant foreigners exercise leadership in
worship services that are reserved for foreigners.
The Office of Religious Affairs hosts periodic meetings to address religious matters
according to government-approved agendas that bring together leaders of diverse
religious traditions.
I
Adherence to a religious faith generally does not disadvantage persons in civil,
economic, and secular life, although it likely would prevent advancement to the highest
government and military ranks. Avowed religious practice is a bar to membership in the
Communist Party, although anecdotal reports indicate that a handful of the 2 million
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Communist Party members are religious believers.
•
Governmental Abuses of Religious Freedom
The Government restricts and monitors all forms of public assembly, including assembly
for religious activities. On some occasions, large religious gatherings have been allowed,
such as the 1998 and 1999 celebrations at La Yang. Since July 1999, the Hoa Hao also
have been allowed to hold two large public gatherings in An Giang province on Hoa Hao
festival days. However, dissident Hoa Hao have been prevented by forcible means from
organizing their own independent commemorations.
The growth of Protestant house churches in ethnic minority areas has led to tensions with
local officials in some provinces. There have been crackdowns on leaders of these
·churches, particularly among the Hmong in the northwest. The secretive nature of the
house churches, particularly among ethnic minorities, has contributed to greater
repression against these groups. Provincial officials in certain northwest provinces do not
allow churches or pagodas to operate and have arrested and imprisoned believers for
practicing their faith nonviolently in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
•
The authorities in the northwest provinces severely restrict the religious freedom of
evangelical Protestants, including ethnic Hmong and ethnic Tai. Credible reports from
multiple sources stated that at the beginning of 1999 there were more than 25 Hmong
Protestants imprisoned primarily in Lai Chau province for "teaching religion illegally" or
"abusing the rights of a citizen to cause social unrest." Following protests by church
leaders and international attention to the detentions, officials and Protestant church
leaders stated that most of the detainees had been released by the end of 1999. Among
those in Lai Chau who were confirmed as rele.ased--several of them before their
sentences were up--were: Ly A Giang, Giang A Ly, Yang Gia Chua, Giang A To, and
Giang A Cat. In addition Hmong leader Vu Gian Thao was released in the April2000
amnesty, and the Ministry ofF oreign Affairs (MFA) reported that Wang Gia Chua, Sung
Seo Chinh, and Sinh Phay Pao also had been released. The sentence of Hmong leader
Sung Phai Dia reportedly was to end in March 2000, but there is no confirmation that he
was released from prison.
Among those Hniong Protestant leaders still believed to be imprisoned are four Hmong
Protestant leaders--Sinh Phay Pao, Va Sinh Giay, Yang Sua Giang, and Phang A Dong-who had been arrested in Ha Giang province late in 1999. Phang A Dong was charged
with illegally traveling to China without a visa or passport.
The Government's repression of the Hmong is complicated by several factors that
include religious practices. Some Hmong citizens fought against the Government in the
past, and they live in sensitive regions that border China and Laos; these factors together
lead the Government to question their civic loyalty. Among the Hmong, there are two
distinct religious groups. One group's members follow a traditional form of Christianity,
and another group's beliefs are characterized by an element that is cultic in nature. The
latter group's eschatological worldview includes a predicted cataclysmic event in 2000.
However, the Government does not differentiate between the two groups; their beliefs
exacerbate the authorities' anxiety about the Hmong.
•
In December 1999, Nguyen Thi Thuy, a Protestant house church leader in Phu Tho
province, was sentenced to 1 year in prison for "interfering with an officer doing his
duty." Thuy was arrested during a police raid on her home, where she was leading a
Bible study group. In March 2000, in what is believed to be the first case of its kind, a
defense lawyer appealed Thuy's conviction by arguing that her arrest in her home while
practicing her faith violated her constitutional right to religious freedom. However, a
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judge dismissed her appeal, and her 1-year sentence was upheld. She is scheduled to be
released in October 2000. An ethnic Hre church leader, Dinh Troi, was detained in
Quang Ngai province in 1999, and it is believed that he was still in detention as of mid2000. Two of his church colleagues, Dinh Bim and Dinh Hay, were released in July and
September 1999, respectively.
In July 1999, district authorities in Binh Phuoc province demolished three Protestant
churches. Their congregations, composed of ethnic Mnong and Stieng Christians,
protested to the central government authorities and the international community. Church
officials reported that the central authorities intervened to prevent the further razing of
churches. ·In December 1999, the district offiCial responsible was removed from office.
Binh Phuoc province Christians reported that they were able to celebrate Christmas
openly and peacefully.
There were reported instances, particularly in isolated provinces in the northwest and
central highlands, in which Protestant house church followers were punished or fined by
local officials for participation in peaceful religious activities such as worship and Bible
study. Unconfirmed reports from the central highlands suggested that some local
officials extorted cattle and money from Protestants in those areas. It is unclear whether
their religious affiliation or other factors led to this extortion.
In recent years, the conditions faced by Baha'is have improved in some localities where
Baha'is have been able to practice their faith quietly with local permission. However, a
Baha'i community in Danang was unable to obtain approval of its recent application for
registration of official religious activities.
I
In mid-1999, the Government sharply criticized adherents of the Taiwan-based group
Thanh Hai Vo Thuong Su in official media. In July 1999, a local police paper
publication criticized the group, stating that more than 100 followers joined the group in
Long An province. Government media portray the group's leader, an ethnic Taiwanese
woman named Thanh Hai, who founded the group in 1989, as a charlatan.
Credible reports from multiple sources stated that Hmong Protestant Christians inseveral
northwestern villages were forced by local officials to recant their faith and to perform
traditional Hmong religious rites such as drinking blood from sacrificed chickens mixed·
with rice wine. Similarly, a group of Catholics in Son La province also reported that they
were forced by local officials to recant their faith publicly in December 1999.
Hmong Protestant Church leaders told a North American church official that one Hmong
Christian, Lu Seo Dieu,.died in prison in 1999 in Lao Cai province from mistreatment
and lack of medical care. This report could not be confirmed.
I
Police authorities routinely question persons who hold dissident religious or political
views. In May 1999, two pastors ofthe unsanctioned Assemblies of God, pastors Tran
Dinh "Paul" Ai and LoVan Hen, were detained and questioned by police after a Bible
study session that they were conducting in Hanoi was raided by local police. Ai was
questioned daily for more than 2 weeks regarding his religious activities, and Lo Van
Hen, a member of the Black Tai ethnic minority, was returned to Dien Bien Phu for
further questioning by police. Both were released before the end of May 1999 and
allowed to return home. In December 1999, Ai was issued a passport and allowed to
travel to the United States with his family on a religious worker visa. Similarly, on two
occasions, UBCV leader Thich Khong Tanh was called in for questioning by police for
what appeared to be purely religious activities.
Credible reports suggest that police arbitrarily detained persons based on their religious
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beliefs and practice. On several occasions, small groups of Protestant Christians
belonging to house churches were subjected to arbitrary detention after local officials
broke up unsanctioned religious meetings. In September 1999, in Quang Nam province,
17 Protestant Christians were handcuffed together and forced to go to a government
office for several hours of questioning about their religious activities. One man who
reportedly was beaten by police required medical treatment. In October 1999, police
raided a church meeting in a hotel in Ha Long Bay town and detained 30 Protestants.
Most were released after questioning, although three were held for several days.
A 1997 directive on administrative detention gives national and local security officials
· broad powers to detain and monitor citizens and control where they live and work for up
to 2 years if they are believed to be threatening "national security." In their
implementation of administrative detention, authorities held some persons under
conditions resembling house arrest. The authorities use administrative detention as a
means of controlling persons whom they believe hold dissident opinions.
'
I
The Government continued to isolate certain political and religious dissidents by
restricting their movements and by pressuring the supporters and family members of
others. For the past 6 years, Thich Huyen Quang, the Supreme Patriarch of the UBCV,
lived at a pagoda in Quang Ngai province under conditions resembling administrative
detention. From 1981 until 1994, he was held at another pagoda in that province. In
· March 1999, he was visited by senior UBCV leader Thich Quang Do for the first time in
18 years, but after 3 days of meetings both were held for questioning by police, and
Thich Quang Do was escorted by police to his pagoda in Ho Chi Minh city. Thich Huyen
Quang confirmed that he must request permission before leaving the pagoda and is not
allowed to lead prayers or participate in worship activities as a monk. He is able to
receive visits from sympathetic monks, sometimes several per week; UBCV monk Thich
Khong Thanh visited in November. After meeting with him, visitors are questioned by
police. Thich Huyen Quang has called for the Government to recognize and sanction the
operations of the UBCV. In December 1999, he told a Western visitor that he was
receiving adequate medical care. Later that month, because of heavy flooding in the
province, police temporarily evacuated him from the pagoda, then returned him there 2
days later, after the waters had receded. Government officials reportedly have proposed
to move Thich Huyen Quang to Hanoi, where medical care for his chronic conditions
would be better, but he has refused.
In September 1999, Thich Duang Do complained that fellow UBCV monk Thich Khong
Tanh, who is head of the church's social affairs board, was summoned by police for
questioning in Ho Chi Minh City. In April2000, Thich Khong Tanh similarly
complained that he was detained for questioning by police after visiting fellow monks in
central Vietnam. Thich Quang Do continued to experience close surveillance by police
around his pagoda, Thanh Minh Zen monastery in Ho Chi Minh City, and police
pressured lay Buddhists at the pagoda in an apparent effort to isolate Thich Quang Do
further.
I
The Government allowed many bishops and priests to travel freely within their dioceses
and allowed greater, but still restricted, freedom .for travel outside these areas,
particularly in many ethnic areas. Local government officials reportedly discourage
priests from entering Son La and Lai Chau provinces. Upon return from international
travel, citizens, including clergy, officially are required to surrender their passports; this
law is enforced unevenly. Some persons who express dissident opinions on religious or
political issues are not allowed to travel abroad. Some Cao Dai believers were detained
arbitrarily. In October 1998, the authorities detained two Cao Daists in Kien Giang
province, Le Kim Bien and Pham Cong Hien, who sought to meet with United Nations
· Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance Abdelfattah Amor. They wer~ sentenced to
2 years' imprisonment and are scheduled to be released in October 2000. Three Cao
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Daists, Lam Thai The, Do Hoang Giam, and Van Hoa Vui, who were arrested several
years ago, reportedly remain imprisoned in Xuan Loc prison in Dong Nai province. Ly
Cong Cuong, a Cao Daist arrested in 1983 in An Giang province, was released in July
1999.
The Hoa Hao have faced severe restrictions on their religious and political activities
since 1975, in part because of their previous armed opposition to the Communist forces.
Since 1975 all administrative offices, places ofworship, and social and cultural
institutions connected to the faith have been closed, thereby limiting public religious
functions. Believers continue to practice their religion at home. The lack of access to
public gathering places contributed to the Hoa Hao community's isolation and
fragmentation. In July 1999, following official recognition of a Hoa Hao religious
organization, an estimated 500,000 Hoa Hao believers gathered for a religious festival in
An Giang province in the largest Hoa Hao gathering since 197 5. Hoa: Hoa believers
stated that a number of church leaders continue to be detained.
I
In March 2000, hundreds of Hoa Hao gathered in An Giang province for a traditional ·
holy day celebration despite reports of police roadblocks and interception of boats on the
river surrounding the island where the celebration was organized. A group of dissident
Hoa Hao followers, including prominent pre-1975 leaders such as Le Quang Liem, were
attempting to organize an unofficial commemoration of the death of the Hoa Hao
founder, but they were blocked by government authorities. In connection with that event,
13 Hoa Hao supporters were detained on March 11, 2000, at Thoai Son in An Giang
province; 8 ofthem were released after being interrogated. Three others--Vo Thanh
Liem, Nguyen Van Dien (Bay Dien), and Vo Van Hai--were tried and sentenced on May
26 to 30 months, 20 months, and 12 months' imprisonment, respectively. Two others-Nguyen Van Hoang arid Nguyen Van Nhuom--still were detained in Thoai Son as of
mid-2000. ·on March 28, 2000, eight other Hoa Hao supporters were arrested at Phu My
(Hoa Hao) village, and five of them still were detained in mid-2000 at the Bang Lang
detention facilities in Long Xuyen. These five are: Truong Van Thuc; Tran Van Be Cao;
TranNguyen Hon; Nguyen Chau Lan; and LeVan Mong (Le Thien Hoa). In addition, in
protest of government restrictions on the Hoa Hao, several Hoa Hao believers reportedly
have threatened to immolate themselves.
The Penal Code establishes penalties for offenses that are defined only vaguely,
including "attempting to undermine national unity" by promoting "division between
religious believers and nonbelievers." In some cases, particularly involving Hmong
Protestants, authorities imprisoned persons for practicing religion illegally. They use
provisions of the Penal Code that allow for jail terms of up to 3 years without trial for
"abusing freedom of speech, press, or religion." Some of the provisions of the law used
to convict religious prisoners contradict the right to freedom of religion in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Convention on Civil and Political
Rights.
I
It is difficult to determine the exact number of religious detainees and religious·
prisoners. There is little transparency in the justice system, and it is very difficult to
obtain confirmation when persons are detained, imprisoned, tried, or released. As of mid2000, there were at least 13 religious detainees who were held without arrest or charge;
however, the number may be greater since sometimes persons are detained for
questioning and held under administrative detention regulations withoutbeing charged or
without their detention being publicized. These persons include: Le Minh Triet (Tu
Triet), a Hoa Hao leader detained at a Government house in the south; four Hmong
Protestants in Ha Giang province, Sinh Phay Pao, Va Sinh Giay, Vang Sua Giang, and
Phang A Dong; Dinh Troi, an ethnic Hre Protestant detained in Quang Ngai in 1999; and
seven Hoa Hao followers who were detained in An Giang province in March. These Hoa
Hao followers are: Nguyen Van Hoang; Nguyen Van Nhuom; Truong Van Thuc; Tran
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Van Be Cao; Tnin Nguyen Huon; Nguyen Chau Lan; and LeVan Mong (Le Thien Hoa).
In addition, others, most prominently Supreme Patriarch Thich Huyen Quang of the
UBCV, are held under conditions that resemble administrative detention. Thich Huyen
Quang is not allowed to leave the pagoda where he lives in Quang Ngai province without
express police permission, and only then for medical appointments in the isolated town
where he stays.
)
There are at least 16 religious prisoners, although the actual number may be higher. This
figure is difficult to verify because of the secrecy surrounding the arrest, detention, and
release process. In a positive development, many of the ethnic Hmong Protestants who
were imprisoned in Lai Chau province at the beginning of 1999 are believed to have
been released. Those persons believed to be religious prisoners as of May include:
UBCV monks Thich Thein Minh and Thich Hue Dang; Catholic priests Pham Minh Tri,
Pham Ngoc Lien, and Nguyen Thien Phung; Protestant house church leader Nguyen Thi
Thuy, scheduled to finish her 1-year sentence in October; Hmong Protestant Va Sinh
Giay; Hoa Hao lay persons LeVan Son, Vo Thanh Liem, Nguyen Van Dien (Bay Dien),
and Vo Van Hai; Cao Daists Le Kim Bien and Pham Cong Hien, who are scheduled to
finish their 2-year sentences in October; and Cao Daists Lam Thai The, To Hoang Giam,
and Van Hoa Vui, who reportedly remain imprisoned in Dong Nai province.
Credible reports suggest that three Roman Catholic priests belonging to the
Congregation of the Mother Co-Redemptrix remain imprisoned. The release in 1999 of .
one priest, Nguyen Minh Quan, was confirmed, and another, Mai Due Chuong (Mai Huu
Nghi), was released in the April2000 prisoner amnesty. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
said that another person, Nguyen Van De, also was released in 1999.
I
Improvements in Respect for Religious Freedom
On balance conditions for religious freedom remained fundamentally the same during the
period covered by this report, compared with the period from mid-1998 to mid-1999.
However, there were improvements in some areas, such as the release of some persons
detained or arrested because of their religious beliefs. In addition, in some parts of the
country, there was continued gradual expansion of the parameters for individual
believers of officially recognized churches to practice their faiths. Many lay believers
who worship in officially recognized churches, especially Buddhists and Catholics in
large cities, are able to practice their faith publicly without interference from government
· officials. This continues a trend of the past few years toward less official interference in
the lives of citizens, such as the diminution of the block warden system, which is now
much less pervasive and intrusive in monitoring persons. On religious celebration days,
churches and pagodas are filled by worshipers. Most of the country's Buddhist and
Catholic lay persons benefit from this development.
During the period covered by this report, many of the ethnic minority Protestant
prisoners in Lai Chau province were released. Although severe restrictions on religious
life remain in the northwest, U.S. and international advocacy on behalf of ethnic
minority Christians in those provinces apparently had a positive impact; many of the 25
Hmong church leaders held at the beginning of 1999 were released by mid-2000.
In addition the April 2000 prisoner amnesty included two religious prisoners, Catholic
priest Mai Due Chuong (Mai Huu Nghi) and Hmong Protestant Vu Gian Thao. The
MFA said that two other Catholic priests of the Congregation of the Mother CoRedemptrix, Nguyen Minh Quan and Nguyen Van De, had been released in.1999.
I
In some provinces where harassment of religious believers has been egregious, local
officials have lost their positions because of religious restrictions. Most prominently, the
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US Dept. of State/liP: US-Vietnam Relations
•
Page 14 of 15
district committee chairman in Bu Bang district of Binh Phuoc province was not
reelected by the local people's council to his position, and he was forced to retire in
November 1999.
Forced Religious Conversion of Minor U.S. Citizens
There were no reports of the forced religious conversion of minor U.S. citizens who had.
been abducted or illegally removed from the United States, or of the Government's
refusal to allow such citizens to be returned to the United States.
SECTION II. Societal Attitudes
In general there are amicable relations among the various religious communities. In Ho
Chi Minh City, there are nascent efforts at informal ecumenical dialog by leaders of
disparate religious communities. In October 1999, four outspoken religious leaders based
in Ho Chi Minh City--UBCV Buddhist leader Thich Quang Do, Redemptorist Catholic
priest Chan Tin, Hoa Hao leader Le Quang Liem, and Cao Dai leader Iran Quang Chau -signed a public ecumenical petition urging the Communist Party to respect religious
freedom and to establish clear separation of church and state.
SECTION III.
•
•
U.s~
Government Policy
The U.S. Embassy in Hanoi and U.S. Consulate in Ho Chi Minh City actively and
regularly raised U.S. concerns about religious freedom with a wide variety of
government officials including the Ministry ofF oreign Affairs, .the Office of Religion,
the Ministry of Public Security, and other government offices in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh
City, and provincial capitals. Embassy and consulate officials also meet and talk with
leaders of all of the major religious groups, recognized as well as unregistered.
,.-
The U.S. Ambassador raised religious freedom issues with senior cabinet ministers
including the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, senior government and Communist
Party advisors, the head of the Government's Office of Religion, Deputy Ministers of
Foreign Affairs and Public Security, and the chairpersons of Provincial People's
Committees around the country, among others. Other embassy and consulate officials
· also raised U.S. concerns on religious freedom with senior officials of the Ministries of
Foreign Affairs and Public Security and with provincial officials. The Embassy and
Consulate maintained regular contact with the key government offices responsible for
respect for human rights. Embassy officers informed government officials that progress
on religious issues and human rights have an impact on the degree of full normalization
of bilateral relations. The Embassy's public affairs officer distributed information about
U.S. concerns about religious freedom to Communist Party and government officials.
In their representations to the Government, the Ambassador and other embassy officers
urged recognition of a broad spectrum of religious groups in accordance with
international standards of religious freedom, including members of the UBCV and the
Protestant house churches. In general representations by the Embassy and Consulate
focused on specific restrictions on religious freedom. These abuses included the
detention and arrest of religious figures and restrictions on church organizational
activities such as training religious leaders, ordination, church building, and foreign
travel of religious figures. Several times the Embassy's and the Consulate's interventions
on problems involving religious freedom resulted in improvements. For example, the
release of several religious prisoners during amnesties in September 1999 and April 2000 ·
followed long-term and direct advocacy on their behalf by the Embassy. The releases of
some 20 Hmong Protestants detained in early 1999 by authorities in Lai Chau province
followed demarches by the Embassy. One foreign nongovernmental organization (NGO)
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Page 15 of 15
first told the U.S. Embassy that officials in Lai Chau had complained that, following the
visit of Ambassador Pete Peterson to the province in the spring of 1999; during which he
had presented a list of Hmong religious prisoners, the provincial officials had been told
by national government authorities to ease up on their treatment of Hmong people.
Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom Robert Seiple visited in July
1999 for discussions with officials and leaders of several religious bodies. He urged that
the parameters for religious freedom be expanded, during meetings with officials of the
Ministry ofF oreign Affairs, the government Committee on Religion, and other
government offices.
I
Representatives of the Embassy and Consulate met on several occasions with leaders of
all the major religious communities, including Buddhists, Catholics, Protestants, Cao
Dai, Hoa Hao, and Muslims. Embassy officials, including the Ambassador, maintain a
regular dialog with NGO's. An embassy officer visited UBCV Supreme Patriarch Thich
Huyen Quang in Quang Ngai province in December, which was the first visit by a
Westerner to the Supreme Patriarch in 18 years. Following the visit, Thich Huyen Quang
was featured on national television for the first time in years, was moved out of his
·pagoda during flooding (unlike the previous year), and received improved medical care.
On several occasions, embassy and consulate officers met with prominent religious
prisoners after their release from prison. Consulate officers maintained an ongoing dialog
with Thich Quang Do and other UBCV monks and with officially recognized Buddhists,
as well as wide contacts within the Catholic, Protestant, Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, and Muslim
communities. A consulate officer attended the first officially recognized Hoa Hao
festival in An Giang in July 1999. Consulate and embassy officials worked closely with
Assemblies of God pastor Tran Dinh "Paul" Ai to obtain a passport from the
Government, then a religious worker's visa to travel to the United States to work in
December, following many months of continuous harassment by local polic~ in several
areas.
The U.S. Department of State in Washington commented publicly on the status of
religious freedom in' Vietnam on several occasions. These comments included statements
on the conditions faced by Thich Huyen Quang; the status of Paul Ai and his eventual
travel to the United States, using a religious worker visa; and gatherings of Hoa Hao
believers in An Giang province.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Office oflnternational Information Programs, U.S. Department of
State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
Return to U.S.-Vietnam Relations.
Return to liP Home Page.
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�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Speechwriting Office - Thomas Rosshirt
Creator
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National Security Council
Speechwriting Office
Thomas Rosshirt
Date
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1999-2001
Is Part Of
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<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36327" target="_blank">Collection Finding Aid</a>
<a href="http://catalog.archives.gov/id/7585792" target="_blank">National Archives Collection Description</a>
Identifier
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2008-0703-F
Description
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<p>Rosshirt prepared speech remarks delivered by President William J. Clinton and National Security Advisor Samuel R. Berger between 1999 and 2001.</p>
<p>Rosshirt’s speechwriting efforts for President Clinton concerned the President’s trip to Vietnam; remarks at the Memorial Day Ceremony in Arlington, Virginia; remarks at Camp Foster Marine Base in Okinawa; remarks at the Council of the Americas 30th Washington Conference; the debt cancellation announcement for Jubilee2000; the Armed Forces Farewell at Fort Myer, Virginia; remarks to the Israeli Policy Forum; and awarding the Medal of Honor to both former President Theodore Roosevelt and to Captain Ed W. Freeman. Rosshirt’s speechwriting efforts also included National Security Advisor Berger’s remarks at Tel Aviv University and an article concerning Saddam Hussein.</p>
<p>This collection was made available through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/freedom-of-information-act-requests">Freedom of Information Act</a> request.</p>
Provenance
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Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
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Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Format
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Adobe Acrobat Document
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51 folders in 5 boxes
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Paper
Dublin Core
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Title
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Vietnam [binder] [6]
Creator
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National Security Council
Speechwriting Office
Thomas Rosshirt
Identifier
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2008-0703-F
Is Part Of
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Box 5
<a href="http://clintonlibrary.gov/assets/Documents/Finding-Aids/2008/2008-0703-F.pdf" target="_blank">Collection Finding Aid</a>
<a href="http://catalog.archives.gov/id/7585792" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
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Adobe Acrobat Document
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Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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Reproduction-Reference
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5/13/2014
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42-t-7585792-20080703f-005-006-2014
7585792