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Folder Title:
[Kosovo] [ 1]
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Speechwriting-Orzulak, Paul
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
001. memo
SUBJECTrfiTLE
DATE
Tina Kaidanow to Samuel R. Berger. Subject: Request for Balkans
update (5 pages)
05/16/2000
RESTRICTION
Pllb(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Speechwriting (Paul Orzulak)
ONBox Number: 4023
FOLDER TITLE:
[Kosovo] [ 1]
2008-0702-F
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Blackburn, John (WHSR)
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Anderson, Brooke D. (NSCCOMM)
Thursday, June 08, 2000 1:30PM
@WHSR - WH Situation Room; @COMM - WHSR Comm Officers
please send to paul orzulak on air force one [UNCLASSIFIED]
Paul --any luck in pulling together a paragraph on Kosovo for potus commencement speech?
Brooke
.'
�617100 3:00p.m. Orzulak
·Draft SRB Kosovo op-ed
June 7, 2000
It's hard to imagine what last week's suminit between President Clinton and the
leadership of the European Union would have been like ifNATO had not stopped the
forces of Slobodan Milosevic in Kosovo. A million refugees would be searching for new
homes. Mass graves would lie undiscovered. War crimes would go unanswered. The
.
'
''
world would wonder how, in the middle of Europe, at the end of our bloodiest century,
people could ·be driven from their homes, loaded on train cars, and have their history
erased- and the world would not hear, see, or act.
Instead, as Eli Wiesel has said, "this time, the world·was not silent. A year ago today,
Serbian forces began their withdrawal from Kosovo. NATO's American-led 79-day air
campaign was victorious.
As thePresident said that day, having prevailed in war, we would have to work hard to
secure the peace, One year later, Kosovo is not a picture of perfection, but it is a picture
.
.
·of progress. It's not as good as we'd like it to be, but it is moving in the right direction.
More than 47,000 troops from 20 countries. are keeping the peace through the NATO-led
Kosovo force (KFOR). They have created an environment stable enough to allow over
900,000 refugees to return home. More than 3,000 homes have been rebuilt, and 20,000
are expected to be completed by the end of the year. For the first time since the fighting
ended, the power system is providing enough energy to meet demand.
The two major trouble spots, Mitrovica and Preservo, are under control for now, thanks in
part to the very real addition of military resources just as events threatened to slip out of
control in March. The Kosovo Liberation Army, the source of so much violence in the·
'·'
�months that followed the war's end, has been demilitarized, and its members are being reintegrated into reconstruction efforts.
More than 3,000 international police officers are already in Kosovo, and their work is
showing results: the murder rate is now lower in Kosovo than in many American cities.
By next fall, and perhaps sooner, 4,000 newly-trained local police officers will patrol the ·
streets and prov~nces of Kosovo. As in Bosnia, capable police will allow us to draw
down peacekeeping troops as time goes on.
Under UN leadership, a Joint Interim Administrative Council has been established in
which Kosovo' s competing factions can share responsibility for governing, laying the
groundwork for local autonomy. Kosovo.'s political scene has been energized by new
parties, new players; and a sense that there 'is a real competition for the votes of the
people. This OCtober, residents will participate in local elections for the first time in
history- a far cry from where Kosovowas just one year ago.
But we are under no illusion about the work that remains. This is a place, after all, in
which no living resident has ever seen a genuine democracy. For more than a century, it
has been dominated by one repressive regime after another. The brutal reforms instituted
by Milosevic a decade ago stripped Kosovar Albanians of their autonomy, their jobs, and
their language. In most post-conflict situations; people face the challenge of rebuilding.
In Kosovo, the challenge is to build something completely new: a free society, with
democratic institutions, fully integrated into the rest of Europe.
The results ~re far from guarc:tnteed. Kosovo is at peace today, but it is Still an ethnic
tinderbox. This w<;:ek's vicious grenade attack in a Grcinica.ffiarket- in which five Serbs
were injured- i~ just the latest incident in ~n ongoing campaign of ethnic violence .
.
.:;,.\
"
�Ending the cycle of hate and revenge will require a vigorous commitment to see that
justice is done. Part of that commitment will mean contiiming our efforts to ensure that
.
'
'
war criminals are brought to justice. Part will mean answering the call of Bishop
Artemije and others to ensure that ethnic minorities are protected. If the people of
Kosovo see that there can be justice through law, they will be less likely to seek justice
through vengeance.
The vacuum of basic law and order is major challenge. Local judges and prosecutors are .
in place around Kosovo, and there are laws on the books that allow for extended
detentions. We are working to provide judges with the basic equipment that they need to
do the job. But the syst.em is not working now. Albanian judges reportedly routinely
give Serb defendants stiff sentences on weak evidence, while letting Albanians go free.
Kosovo's long-term economic future continues to be held back by an antiquated system
of state and socially-owned property. Its largely agricultural system has.done little to lift
people out of poverty. As in Bosnia, this situation has led to the emergence of a criminal
class, with deeply disturbing reports of trafficking in women.
.
'
Meanwhile, Milosevic and his allies are working to undermine the fall elections,
Milosevic realizes that if Serbs participate in the election, it will be a vote of no
confidence in him. He and his allies are doing all they can today to pressure Serbs into
boycotting the fall elections - refusing to permit voter registration among Serbs living in
exile, and threatening retaliation among Serbs living in Kosovo. Two weeks ago, we saw
an encouraging sign in the central Kosovo town of Orahovac when local Serbs.
courageously defied Milosevic and registered to vote. It is one more reason we must, be
unrelenting in our .support for a democratic transition in Serbia.
�Some see these ongoing challenges and want to give up. They argue that Europe isn't
carrying its fair share of the load, that we should just bring our troops home. But
Europeans are providing more than 80 percent of the troops in Kosovo, and 75 percent of
the funding for local administration and reconstruction. Meanwhile, our contribution
stands at 15 percent for troops and 10 percent for reconstruction. I would bet that few
Americans know that in our own backyard, Europeans paid more than 60 percent of all
'
'
'
'
aid to Central America when it was ravaged by Hurricane Mitch, and one-third of all
support for peace in Guatemala.
..
.
Others argue that this is a European problem. If history has taught us anything, it has
taught us that for America to be secure, Europe must be secure. True security will not
. come until Kosovo and Southeast Europe are so tightly integrated into the rest of Europe
that another war is inconceivable. Our involvement in Kosovo has both risks and costs.
But escaping our responsib.ility in Kosovo would be to invite a far greater set of risks and
costs. If we turn ow; backs now, it will encourage the rest of the world to pull away too,
and will invite violence back in. That would be a terrible mistake.
In the 20'" Century, 104,000 Americans gave their lives fightil}g for a free and democratic
Europe. If we are able to bring lasting peace to the Balkans, itreduces the chance that
American men and women will ever be asked to fight another war on European soil. If
that's not in our interest, nothing is.
�Draft SRB Kosovo op-ed
June 6, 2000
It's not hard to imagine what last week's summit between President Clinton and the
leadership ofthe European Union wouldhave been like had NATO not acted in Kosovo.
For the second time in a decade, Americans and Europeans would have been pointing
fingers following a failure to confront genocide in the Balkans. Instead of fine tuning our
effort to integrate the stable democracies of southeast Europe, we would have been
struggling to meet the needs of a region overwhelmed by refugees and threatened by the
prospect -- or reality -- of a wider war. Instead of supporting the Serbian democratic
opposition against an increasingly isolated Slobodan Milosevic, we would have been·
confronted by a dictator newly convinced that aggression pays. Instead of celebrating the
progress of a peaceful, democratic, undivided Europe, we would have had to explain how
in the heart of Europe we could allow a whole people to be expelled from their homes
simply because of who they are.
:n81~Gl. as Eli Wiesell:ia'S said, "this time the world was not silent." 'A year ago today,
'
Serbian orces began their withdrawal from Kosovo. As the President said that day,
having prevailed in war, we would.have to work hard to secure the peace. ~
W"Jlr, we have..m.ade more progress than Imost-AmefiGans-tealize,. ~
.
-
J~
More than 47,000 troops from 20 countries are keeping the peace through the NATO-led
Kosovo force (KFOR). They have created an environment stable enough to allow over
900,000 refugees to return home. More than 3,000 homes have been rebuilt, and 20,000
are expected to be completed by the end of the year. .For the first time since the fighting
ended, the power system is providing enough energy to meet demand.
The two major trouble spots, Mitrovica and Preservo, are under control for now, thanks in
part to the very real addition of military resources just as events threatened to slip out of
control in March. The Kosovo Liberation Army, the source of so much violence in the
months that followed the war's end, has been demilitarized, and its members are being reintegrated into reconstruc~ion efforts.
More than 3,000 international police officers are already in Kosovo, and their work is
showing results: the murder rate is now lower in Kosovo than in many American cities.
By next fall, and perhaps sooner, 4,000 newly-trained local police officers will patrol the
streets and provinces of Kosovo. As in Bosnia, capable police will allow us to draw
down peacekeeping troops as. time goes on.
Under UN leadership, a Joint Interim Administrative Council has been established in
which Kosovo' s competing factions can share responsibility for governing, laying the
groundwork for local autonomy. Kosovo's political scene has been energized by new
parties, new players, and a sense that there is a real competition for the votes of the
people. This October, residents will participate in local elections for the firsttime in
history- a far cry from where Kosovo was just one year ago.
�But we are under no illusion about the work that remains. This is a place, after all, in
which no living resident has ever seen a genuine democracy. For more than a century, it
has been dominated by one repressive regime after another. The brutal reforms instituted
by Milosevic a decade ago stripped Kosovar Albanians of their autonomy; their jobs, and
their language. In most post-conflict situations; people face the challenge ofn~building.
In Kosovo, the. challenge is to build something completely new: a free society, with
democratic institutions, fully integrated.into the rest of Europe.
The results are far from guaranteed. Kosovo is at peace today, but it is still an etlmic
tinderbox. This week's vicious grenade attack in a Grcinica market- in which five Serbs
were injured- is just the latest incident in an ongoing campaign of e~hnic violence.
Ending the cycle of hate and revenge will require a vigorous commitment to see that
justice is done. Part of that commitment will mean continuing our efforts to ensure that
war criminals are brought to justice. Part will mean answering the call of Bishop
Artemije and others to ensure that ethnic minorities are protected. If the people of
Kosovo see that there can be justice through law, they will be less likely to seek justice
through vengeance.
The ongoing vacuum ofbasic law and order is major challenge. Local judges and
prosecutors are in place around Kosovo, and there are laws on the books that allow for
extended detentions. We are workirig to provide judges with the basic equipment that
they need to do the job. But the system is not working now. Albanian judges reportedly
routinely give Serb defendants stiff sentences on weak evidence.
Kosovo's long-term economic·future continues to be held back by an antiquated system
of state and socially~owned property. Its largely agricultural system has done little to lift
people out of poverty. As in Bosnia, this situation has led to the emergence of a criminal
class, with deeply disturbing reports oftraffick~ng in women.
Meanwhile, Milosevic and his allies are working to undermine the fall elections.
Milosevic realizes that if Serbs participate in the election, it will be a vote of no
confidence in him. He and his allies are doing all they can today to pressure Serbs into
boycotting the fall elections- refusing to permit voter registration among Serbs living in
exile, and threatening retaliation among Serbs living in Kosovo. Two weeks ago, we saw
an encouraging sign in the central Kosovo town of Orahovac when local Serbs
courageously defied Milosevic and registered to vote. It is one more reaso~ we. must be
umelenting in our support for a democratic transition in Serbia.
One year later, Kosovo is not a picture of perfection, but it is a picture of progress. It's
not as good as we'd like it to be, but it is moving in the right direction.
Yet, some see. these ongoing challenges and want to give up. They argue that Europe isn't
carrying their fair share of the load, that we should just bring our troops home. But
Europeans are providing more than 80 percent ofthe troops in Kosovo, and 75 percent of
the funding for local administration and reconstruction. Meanwhile, our contribution
�.
stands at 15 percent for troops and 10 percent for reconstruction. I would bet that few
Americans know that in our own backyard, Europeans paid more than 60 percent of all
aid to Central America when it was ravaged by Hurricane Mitch, and one-third of all
support for peace in Gutemala.
Others argue thatthis is a European problem. If history has taught us anything, it has
taught us that for America to be secure, Europe must be secure. True security will not
come until Kosovo and Southeast Europe are so tightly integrated into the rest of Europe
that another war is inconceivable. Our involvement in Kosovo has both risks and costs.
But escaping our responsibility inKosovo would be to invite a far greater set of risks and
costs. Ifwe turn our backs now, it will encourage the rest of the world to pull away too,
and will invite violence back in. That would be a terrible mistake.
In the 20111 Century, i04,000 Americans:gave their lives fighting for a free and democratic
Europe. If we are able to bring lasting peace to the Balkans, it will iRercttse the
...possibility that RO American will cvef
figbt another war on European soil. If
that's not in our interest, nothing is.
00-a&1kl
{1EOu c.£5
.-rr\t
I(NsQ~
�.Draft SRB Kosovo op~ed
Jirne 6, 2000
It's not hard to imagine what last week's summit between President Clinton and the
leadership of the European Union would have been like had NATO not acted in Kosovo.
For the second time in a decade, Americans and Europeans would have been pointing
fingers following a.failure to confront genocidein the Balkans. Instead of fine tuning our
effort to integrate the stable democracies of southeast Europe, we would have been
struggling to meet the needs of a region overwhelmed by refugees and threatened by the
prospect-- or reality-- of a wider war. Instead of working to strengthen Europe's role in
NATO, we would have been asking whether NATO still had a role in Europe. Instead of
supporting the Serbian democratic opposition against an increasingly isolated Slobodan
Milosevic, we would have beeri confronted by ,a dictator newly convinced that agression .
pays. Instead of celebrating the progress of a peaceful, democratic, undivided El.rrope, we
would have had to explain how in the heart of Europe we could allow a whole people to
be expelled from their homes simply because ofwho they are.
.
.
Instead, as Eli Wiesel has said, "this time, the world was not silent." A year ago today,
Serbian forces began their withdrawal from Kosovo. NATO's three objectives·-- "Serbian
forces out, refugees back, NATO forces in" were met, with the alliance united and its
partnership with Russia intact.
As the President said that day, having prevailed in war, we would have to work hard to
secure the peace. The Kosovo that existed one year ago today was littered with the
debris, living and dead, of a crime against humanity. In the past year, we have made
more progress than most Americans realize.
More than 47,000 troops from 20 countries, including Russia, are keeping the peace
through the NATO-led Kosovo force (KFOR). There have been occasional
confrontations between its troops and Kosovo re'sidents, but security has significantly
improved and KFOR has the cooperation arid respect of the great majority ofKosovo's ·
people.
·
·
Over 900,000 refugees- more than 9.in 10- forced out during the conflict have returned
home. International assistance- including 75,000 shelter kits- helped local residents
repair and con~truct adequate shelter, averting a humanitarian crisis this past winter. Of
more than 50,000 houses which were damaged beyond repair, 3,000 have been rebuilt,
and 20,000 are expected to be completed by the end of the year. For the first time since
the ·fighting ended, the power system is working again, providing enough energy to meet
demand.
The Kosovo Liberation Army, the source of so much violence in the months that
followed the war's end; has been demilitarized, and its members are being re-integrated
into society. Over orte million square acres ofland has been cleared of 15,000 mines.
�More than 3,000 international police officers are already in Kosovo, and their work is·
showing results: the murder rate is now lower in Kosovo than in many American cities.
By next fall, and perhaps sooner, 4,000 newly-trained local police officers will patrol the .
streets and provinces of Kosovo. As in Bosnia, capable police will allow us to draw
down peacekeeping troops as time goes on.
Under United Nations leadership, a Join~ Interim Administrative Council has been ·
established in which Kosovo's competing factions can share joint responsibility for
governing, laying the groundwork for local autonomy. A working draft of a new Kosovo
constitution is making the rounds. A local court system is being built, with appointments
expected soon of 250 judges and 50 prosecutors. This October, residents will participate ·
in local elections for the first time in history - a far cry from where Kosovo was just one
year ago.
But we are under no illusion about the work that remains. This is a place, after all, in
·which no living resident has ever seen a genuine democracy. For more than a century, it
has been dominated by one repressive regime after another. Its largely agricultural
economy has done little to lift people from poverty. The brutal reforms instituted by
Milosevic a decade ago stripped Kosovo of its autonomy, Kosovar Albanians oftheir
jobs, and Kosovar children the right to study their own language. In most post-conflict
situations, people face the challenge of rebuilding. In Kosovo, the challenge is to build
something completely new: a free society, with democratic institutions, fully integrated
into the rest of Europe.
If history has taught us anything, it has taught us that for America to be secure, Europe
must be secure. True security will not come until Kosovo and Southeast Europe are so
tightly integrated into the rest of Europe that another war is inconceivable.
Those ready to give up on Kosovo point to continuing incidents of ethnic violence there.
Some ethnic Albanians, still burning with anger over the atrocities committed by Serb
forces, have engaged in deplorable acts. Many Serbs continue to flee Kosovo. Ending
the cycle of hate and revenge will require a vigorous commitment to see that justice is
done. Part of that commitment will mean continuing our efforts to ensure that war
criminals are brought to justice. Part will mean making a stronger effort to encourage
Serbs to participate in voter registration. Part will mean building on the work we have
already begun. If the people ofKosovo see that there can be justice through law, they
will be less likely to seekjustice through vengeance.·
More challenges
Some see the challenges and want to give up. Don't like the fact that this involves risk
and cost. To escape this responsibility would be to escape to a far greater set of risks and
costs. The possibility that conflict will resume and spread. The danger that Europe
would conclude that America was abandoning its responsibilities as a NATO ally.
�Others suggest that this is a European problem and that Europe isn't carrying its fair share
of the load.
Building democratic institutions in Kosovo and laying the groundwork for selfgovernment has proven difficult. Moving from dictatorship to democracy is not
something that happens in one year. Some in Congress have suggested that we should
bring our resources and our troops home. There is a perception among some that Europe
isn't carrying its fair share of the load. But Europeans are providing more than 80
percentofthe troops keeping the peace in Kosovo, while the United States has provided ·
under .15 percent. While Europe has contributed nearly three-quarters of the funding for
local administration and economic reconstruction, America has provided just over 13
percent. Few Americans tmow that if it comes to problems in our own back yards . . . If
we tum our backs now, it will encourage the rest of the world to pull away too, and will
invite violence back in. That would be a terrible mistake;
(End with security)
End on us-europe partnership ·
not without cost or risk, no guarantee of ultimate success. but to escape this
responsibility would be to escape to a far greater set of dangers.
In the 20th Century, l04,000 Americans gave th.eir lives fighting .for a free and
democratic Europe. We are closer today than we have ever been to achieving that goal.
If we are able to bring peace to the Balkans and integrate it into the rest of Europe, it will.
increase the possibility that no American will ever be asked to fight another war on
European soil. That's an investment worth making.
America made the right choice a year ago. We are doing the right thing today. Let's not
tum our backs now.
�Draft SRB Kosovo op-ed
June 6, 2000
It's not hard to imagine what last week's summit between President Clinton and the
leadership ofthe European Union would have been like had NATO not acted in Kosovo.
For the second time in a decade, Americans and Europeans would have been pointing
fingers following a failure to confront genocide in the Balkans. Instead of fine tuning our
effort to integrate the stable democracies of southeast Europe, we would have been
struggling to meet the needs of a region overwhelmed by refugees and threatened by the
prospect -- or reality -- of a wider war. Instead of supporting the Serbian democratic
opposition against an increasingly isolated .Slobodan Milosevic, we would have been
confronted by·a dictator newly convinced that aggression pays. Instead of celebrating the
progress of a peaceful, democratic, undivided Europe, we would have had to explain how
in the heart of Europe we could allow a whole people to be expelled from their homes
simply because of who they are.
Instead, as Eli Wiesel has said, "this time, the world was not silent." A year ago today,
Serbian forces began their withdrawal from Kosovo. ·NATO's three objectives-- "Serbian
forces out; refugees back, NATO forces in" were· met, with the alliance united and its
partnership with Russia intact.
As the President said that day, having prevailed in war, we would have to work hard to
secure the peace. The Kosovo that existed one year ago today was littered with the
debris, living and dead, of a crime against humanity. In the past year, we have made
more progress than most Americans realize.
More than 47,000 troops from 20 countries are keeping the peace through the NATO-led
Kosovo force (KFOR). They have created an environment stable enough to allow over
900,000 refugees forced out during the conflict to return home. More than 3,000 homes
have been rebuilt, and 20,000 are expected to be completed by the end of the year.
International assistance helped local residents get through a tough winter. For the first
time since the fighting ended, the power system is working again, providing enough
energy to meet demand.
Over one million square acres ofland has been cleared of 15,000 mines. More than 3,000
international police officers are already in Kosovo, and their work is showing results: the
murder rate is now lower in Kosovo than in many American cities. By next fall, and
perhaps sooner, 4,000 newly-trained local police officers will patrol the streets and
provinces ofKosovo. As in Bosnia, capable police will allow us to draw down
peacekeeping troops as time goes on.
Under UN leadership, a Joint Interim Administrative Council has been established in
which Kosovo' s competing factions can share responsibility for governing, laying the
groundwork for local autonomy. A working draft of a new Kosovo constitution is
�making the rounds. A local court system is being built; with appointments expected soon
of 250 judges and 50 prosecutors. This October, residents will participate in local ·
elections for the first time in history - a far cry from where Kosovo was just one year ago.
But we are under no illusion about the work that remains. This is a place, after all, in
which no living resident has ever seen a genuine democracy. For more than a century, it
has been dominated by one repressive regime after another. The brutal reforms instituted
by Milosevic a decade ago stripped Kosovo of its autonomy, Kosovar Albanians of their
jobs, and Kosovar children of their language. In most post-conflict situations, people face
the challenge of rebuilding. In Kosovo, the challenge is to build something completely
new: a free society, with democratic institutions, fully integrated into the rest of Europe.
The results are far from guaranteed. Kosovo is at peace today, but it is still an ethnic
tinderbox. This week's vicious grenade attack in a G~cinica market:___ in which five Serbs
were injured - is just the latest incident in an ongoing campaign of ethnic violence.
Ending the cycle of hate and revenge will require a vigorous commitment to see that
justice is done. Part ofthat commitment will mean continuing our.efforts to ensure that
war criminals are brought to justice. Part will mean answering the call of Bishop
Artemije and others to ensure that ethnic minorities are protected. Part will mean
building on the work we have already begun to build a legal system. If the people of
Kosovo see that there can be justice through law, they will be less likely to seek justice
through vengeance.
Meeting needs is an ongoing challenge. The Kosovo Liberation Army, which was the
source of so much violence in the months that followed the war's end, has been
demilitarized. Under a unique program, its members are being re-integrated into society
- building bridges, rebuilding homes, and keeping the peace. But funding for the
program runs out in August. If paychecks stop,
In all these efforts, the fall elections will be crucial -not for who wins, but for who votes.
Milosevic realizes that if Serbs participate in the election, it will be a vote of no
confidence in him. He and his allies are doing all they can today to pressure Serbs into
boycotting the fall elections -:--refusing to permit voter registration among Serbs living in
exile, and threatening retaliation among Serbs living in Kosovo. The outcome is by no
means certain. But two weeks ago, in the central Kosovo town of Orahovac, local Serbs
courageously defied Milosevic and registered to vote. Now, they are looking to us to
help make their vote count.
Yet, some think w~ should turn our backs. They argue that this is just a European
problem, and we should bring our troops and our resources home. They argue that
Europe isn't carrying their fair share of the load. But Europeans are providing more than·
80 percent of the troops keeping the peace in Kosovo, while the United States has
provided under 15 percent. While Europe has contributed nearly three-quarters of the
�funding for local administration and economic reconstruction, America has provided just
over 13 percent.
I would bet that few Americans know that in our own backyard, Europeans paid more
than 60 percent of all aid to Central America when it was ravaged by Hurricane Mitch,
and one-third of all support for peace in Gutemala.
Our involvement in Kosovo has b.oth risks and costs. But escaping our responsibility in
Kosovo would be to invite a' far greater set of risks and costs. If we turn our ba~ks now, it
will. encourage the rest of the world to pull away too, and will invite violence back in.
That would be a terrible mistake. If history has taught us anything, it has taught us that
for America to be secure, Europe must be secure. True security will no come until
Kosovo and Southeast El1fope are so tightly integrated into the rest of Europe that another
war is inconceivable.
In the 20 1h Century, 104,000 Americans gave their lives fighting for a free and democratic
Europe: We are closer today than we have ever been to achieving that goal. If we are
able to bring lasting peace to the Balkans, it will increase the possibility that no American
will ever be asked to fight another war on European soil. That's an investment worth
making.
�Draft SRB Kosovo op-ed
June 6, 2000
It's not hard to imagine what last week's summit between President Clinton and the
leadership ofthe European Union would have been like had NATO not acted in Kosovo.
For the second time in a decade, Americans and Europeans would have been pointing
fingers following a failure to confront genocide in the Balkans. Instead of fine tuning our
effort to integrate the stable democracies of southeast Europe, we would have been
struggling to meet the needs of a region overwhelmed by refugees and threatened by the
prospect -- or reality -- of a wider war. Instead of working to strengthen Europe's role in .
NATO, we would have been asking whether NATO still had a role in Europe. Instead of
supporting the Serbian democratic opposition against an increasingly isolated Slobodan
Milosevic, we would have been confronted by a dictator newly convinced that agression
pays. Instead of celebrating the progress of a peaceful; democratic, undivided Europe, we
would have had to explain how in the heart of Europe we could allow a whole people to
be expelled from their homes simply because of who they are.
Instead, as Eli Wiesel has said, "this time, the world was not silent." A year ago today,
Serbian forces began their withdrawal from Kosovo. NA':t;'O's three objectives-- "Serbian
forces out, refugees back, NATO forces in" were met, with th~ alliance united and its
partnership with Russia intact.
As the President said that day, having prevailed in war, we would have to work hard to
secure the peace. The Kosovo that existed one year ago today was littered with the
debris, living and dead, of a crime against humanity. In the past year, we have made
more progress than most Americans realize.
More than 47,000 troops from 20 countries, including Russia, are keeping the peace
through the NATO-led Kosovo force (KFOR). There have been occasional
confrontations between its troops and Kosovo residents, but security has significantly
improved and KFOR has the cooperation and respect of the great majority ofKosovo's
people.
Over 900,000 refugees - more than 9 in 10 - forced out during the conflict have returned
home. International assistance -.including 75,000 shelter kits -helped local residents
repair and construct adequate shelter, averting a humanitarian crisis this past winter. Of
more than 50,000 houses whichwere damaged beyond repair, 3,000 have been rebuilt,
and 20,000 are expected to be completed by the end of the year. For the first time since
the fighting ended, the power system is working again, providing enough energy t~ meet
demand.
The Kosovo Liberation Army, the source of so much violence in the months that
followed the war's end, has been demilitarized, and its members are being re-integrated
into society. Over one million square acres of land has been cleared of 15,000 mines.
�,,
More than 3,000 international police officers are already in Kosovo, and their work is
showing results: the murder rate is now lower in Kosovo than in many American cities.
By next fall, and perhaps sooner, 4,000 newly-trained local police officers will patrol the
streets and provinces ofKosovo. As in Bosnia, capable police will allow us to draw
down peacekeeping troops as time goes on.
Under United Nations leadership, a Joint Interim Administrative Council has been
established in which Kosovo's competing factions can share joint responsibility for
governing, laying the groundwork for local autonomy. A working draft of a new Kosovo
constitution is making the rounds. A local.court system is being built, with appointments
. expected soon of 250 judges and 50 prosecutors. This October, residents will participate
in local elections for the first time in history - a far cry from where Kosovo. was just one
year ago.
But we are under no illusion about the work that remains. This is a place, after all, in
which no living resident has ever seen a genuine democracy. For more than a century, it
has been dominated by one repressive regime after another. Its largely agricultural
economy has done little to lift people from poverty. The brutal reforms instituted by
Milosevic a decade ago stripped Kosovo of its autonomy, Kosovar Albanians of their
jobs, and Kosovar children the right to study their own language. In most post-conflict
situations, people face the challenge of rebuilding. In Kosovo, the challenge is to build
something completely new: a free society, with democratic institutions, fully integrated
into the rest of Europe.
·
If history has taught us anything, it has taught us that for America to be secure, Europe
must be secure. True security will not come until Kosovo and Southeast Europe are so
tightly integrated into the rest of Europe that another war is inconceivable.
Those ready to give up on Kosovo point to continuing incidents of ethnic violence there.
Some ethnic Albanians, still burning .with anger over the atrocities committed by Serb
forces, have engaged in deplorable acts .. Many Serbs continue to flee Kosovo. Ending
the cycle of hate and revenge will require a vigorous commitment to see that justice is
done. Part of that commitment will mean continuing our efforts to ensure that war
criminals are brought to justice. Part will mean making a stronger effort to encourage
Serbs to participate in voter registration. Part will mean building on the work we have
already begun. If the people ofKosovo see that there dm be justice through law, they
will beless likely to seek justice through·vengeance.
Tomorrow, bernard kushner comes back- from kosovo tony is Bishop Artemia, who is
leading the delegation of kosovar serbs - express frustration that violence against serbs
continues -just this week, 2 grenades thrown into a market in gracinica- 5 serbs injuredalso a monastary- big serb community- calling for an end to violence, int'l guarantees
of protection of minority rights in kosovo - it's legitimate, committed to protection of
ethnic minorities- over half ofKf'OR was providing protection to ethnic minorities,
�religious and ethnic sites- most ofKFOR has been doing this- can't stop violenceacknowledge they have legit concerns - extremists on both sides - need to make sure that
we establish int'l support to defuse the tension and keep w= artemje- extremists in check
so they don't undermine the fragile pellce we have built- he is a serb orthodox bishop,
the voice of leadership and'morality _:_a powerful voice of moderation and rationalitycan't cause extremists to cause somebody like himto walk away- if you can't get the
clergy to try to get along and work with the int'l community - if you undermine him, then
you've gone a long way toward losing the multiethnic cooperation we went into kosovo
to preserve in the first place - went in to protect people because of their ethnicity - ·
artemje has tried to encourage serbs to remain in kosovo, to participate in council, plays a
leadership role that we are supporting
Another serb leader in Milosevic's pocket who is trying to undermine things- Oliver
Ivanovich- in milo's pocket, trying to fuel dissent- artemje is trying to find ways to
bring people back- he's trying to run up the score, incite violence, bring people back to
place where they won't be accepted- facilitating the return of ethnic minorities to kosovo
- some serb leadres are trying to undermine and hijack by forcing a less than secure
e~vionrnent for their return - have to go into the neighborh - still a tinderbox - sort of
like arizona
Serb registration is a belgrade problem- trying to register serbs in serbia--- kosovar
serbs who have been displaced, but have been unable to do so because milo is not
allowing them to set up registraiton, and through his network is twisting the arms in
kosovo- trying to delijitimze the process by undermingin it- it's in the interest of ethnic
minorities to participate in those elections so they can be represented - the international
community will - need to play a role in its - there are a few who have signed up ,._:_
Put in a plug for continued attention to kosovo- a lot of people are pointing fingers,
contining to second-guess- it's too late t~ second=guess ---because people are tired of
discussing it, we run into the risk of not .fully meeting requirements of police and money.
Administratros- in some places in kosovor, un got only 40 percent of its staffing goal for
municipaltities -have been there a year, that number are now looking for replac~ments
if you can't recruit to 100 percent- we run the fisk of having a really hollow lin
administratiove mission in kosovo, bad for us because there has neot been a civil society
functining in kosovo for years- having an int'lpresence brings int'l values to provides an
example - by forgetting about it, we are dangerous - spending (kosovo is not crisis of the
year, run risk of undercutting mission- kosovo protection corps, we went to great lengths
to get the kla to disband, transitiioned it into a civilian protection course -like civil
defense force- suppo_sed to provide civil preparedness- suffering from funding, problem
we have is that if we insist it is a repackaged kla, that is exactly what we are going to get
-we're funding them to rebuild homes, clean rivers, need for labor intensive civil works
in kosovo, because of continued skepticism, it's woefully underfunded, un will run out of
money to pay salaries in auguest- if we do, they'll have to find money elsewhere,
through black market and elsewhere, and could go back to violence - by underfunding,
we are creating a self-fulfilling prophecy, because we will drive them back to violence.
a
�.
More challenges
Some see the challenges and want to give up. Don't like the fact that this involves risk
and cost To escape this responsibility would be to escape to a far greater set of risks and
costs. The possibility that conflict will resume and spread. The danger that Europe
would conclude that America was abandoning its responsibilities as a NATO ally.
Others suggest that this is a European problem and that Europe isn't carrying its fair share
of the load.
·.
Building democratic institutions in Kosovo and laying the groundwork for selfgovernment has proven difficult. Moving from dictatorship to democracy is not
something that happens in one year. So111e in Congress have suggested that we should
bring our resources and our troops home. There is a perception among some that Europe
isn't carrying its fair share of the load. But Europeans are providing more than 80'
percent of the troops keeping the peace in Kosovo, while the United States has provided
under 15 percent. While Europe has contributed nearly three-quarters ofthe funding for
. local administration and economic reconstruction, America has provided just over 13
percent. Few Americans know that if it comes to problems in our own back yards ... If
we turn our backs now, it will encourage the rest of the world to pull away .too, and will
invite violence back in.· That would be a terrible mistake.
(End with security)
End on us-europe partnership
not without cost or risk, no guarantee of ultimate success. but to escape this
responsibility would be to escape to a far greater set of dangers.
In the 20th Century, 104,000 Americans gave their lives fighting for a free and
democratic Europe. We are closer today than we have ever been to achieving that goal.
If we are able to bring peace to the Balkans and integrate it into the rest of Europe, it will
increase the possibility that no American will ever be asked to fight another war on
European soil. That's an investment worth mak.ing.
America made the right choice a year ago. We aredoing the right thing today. Let's not
turn our backs now.
�Page 1 of7
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
September 30, 1999
As Prepared for Delivery
REMARKS BY SAMUEL R. BERGER
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL-SECURITY AFFAIRS
ON THE CHALLENGES IN KOSOVO
The U.S. Institute of Peace
Washington, DC
September 30, 1999
Thank you, very much, Dick. Solomon.
I am grateful to you and to the
U.S. Institute' of Peace for having me here today.
p'lease forgive me if
I was a few minutes late.
I was trying to leave for the speech, but
members of my staff only wanted to talk about which actor played them in
last night's episode of "The West Wing." No one played me, apparently,
, despite the fact that, as I understand it, the episode involved a
foreign terrorist act. Maybe that's just as well, considering how
Hollywood has presented national security advisers recently: A stuffed
shirt in "The Peacemaker." An egomaniac killed off in "Air Force One."
A self-promoter in "Contact." A zealot in "Murder at 1600." I can't
imagine who the model was for these characters, but let me stress that
each of these movies was in process before I assumed this job.
Let me congratulate the Institute on your 15th anniversary and for all
the valuable work you have done to strengthen peace around the world.
Just a few weeks ago, you hosted a remarkable discussion, bringing
together a diverse group of Kosovar Albanian leaders, skillfully
assisting as they fashioned a declaration of principles for a democratic
society.
Today I want to talk to you about the effort to build peace in Kosovo,
how we're doing, and why.
Kosovo is mostly out of the headlines now -but it must not be out of our thoughts.
On the morning of June lOth, President Clinton received word that Serb
forces had begun their withdrawal from Kosovo.
Soon after, he announced
that NATO had suspended the air campaign against Serbia.
He thanked our
troops for their skill and bravery.
He expressed pride that we had
achieved our goals -- Serb forces out, a .NATO-led force in, refugees to
return-- and that we did so in a way that advanced.other important·
national interests: maintaining NATO unity; preventing the collapse of
new democracies in southeast Europe;. keeping Russia engaged in reaching
peace.
But the President made clear that it.was not time to rest. "W~
have a moment of hope," he said. "Now ... we have to finish the job and
build the peace."
As the President recognized, it is no simple task to cr.eate security
from the ashes of violent tyranny ... to build self-government where for
so long there had been repression ... to foster tolerance after
unspeakable intolerance. And we have seen ail of those obstacles since
the end of the conflict.
Some ethnic Albanians, still burning with
anger over the atrocities committed by Serb forc~s, have engaged in
deplorable acts of violence, such as the grenade attack two days ago at
an outdoor market crowded with Serbs. Many Serbs have fled Kosovo, some
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with exiting Serb forces and others since. ·There have been some armed
confrontations between Kosovars and KFOR, the int~rnation~l security
force.
And the effort to transform the Kosovb Liberation Army into a
positive component of a new democratic society has been painstaking.
But, in the face of these challenges, we already have come a great
distance.
Kosovo now is engaged in a struggle of rebirth, no longer a
struggle with death.
The people ha*e ~ future again. We have an
opportunity to move from success on the battlefield to lasting victory
in meeting the goals. for which we .fought, in Kosovo and in southeast
Europe as a whole.
Having won the war; we must not now lose the peace.
Protecting our
national interests requires us not only to act in a crisis, but to take
advantage of the opportunity our military .success created to prevent . .
future crises. Victory will not come until Kosovo and southeast Europe·
are so tightly integrat~d into~the rest of Europe that another war is
inconceivable.
Let me try to capture the dimensions of this challenge by briefly·
describing Kosovo's troubled past.
Keep in mind that no living resident
of Kosovo has ever seen genuine democracy or broad prosperity in the
province.
In this century, Kosovo has been dominated by one repressive
regime after another, and a mainly agricultural economy has· done little
to lift people'from poverty.
Kosovo has experienced extended periods of
peace in modern times, but there has been no tradition of strong
integration among Kosovo's ethnic groups ~- at best, there was uneasy
coexistence.
Conditions greatly worsened a decade ago, when Milosevic stripped Kosovo
of its autonomy; stripped the Kosovar Albanians of·their jobs; stripped
their children of· the right to study in their own language.
Then, in
early 1998, after a decade of non-violent resistance to Serb _oppression
gave way to the KLA' s armed resistance, Serb. forces sharply intensified
their violence, murdering civilians, driving Kosovars from their homes.
Finally, early this year, as we and the Europeans strug~led to obtain
peace, Belgrade systematically planned for all-out war -- and th~n
launched its campaign to rid the land of its ethnic Albanians, dead or
alive.
The Kosovo that existed
living nightmare -- the
humanity; Having ended
since to meet the clear
future.:
before KFOR troops arrived on June 12 was a
debris, living and dead, of a crime against
this nightmare, we have been working every day
goals of the international community for the
First~ a fully deployed KFOR must establish a secure environment across
the province.
Second, all of the Kosovo residents displaced by the conflict who wish
to return should be able to do so, including, over time, the ethnic
Serbs who have left.
Third, there must be sufficient humanitarian aid to sustain the people
and help them,rebuild their homes and resume productive lives.
Fourth, the United Nations must establish an effective ci*il
administration. to carry_ out government functions.for a transition
period.
Fifth, we must aid the people of Kosovo in establishing self-government
and building a democratic society where the rights of minority group
members are protected.
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Finally, Kosovo's ultimate status must be decided peacefully, with the
participation of its people.
How is it going? There are problems, but a little over 100 days_into
this effort, there has been considerably more progress than most
Americans realize.
KFOR is fully deployed, with some 41,000 troops from more than 20
countries.
There have been occasional confrontations between its troop·s
and Kosovo residents, but security has ·significantly improved -and KFOR
has the cooperation. and respect of the. great majority of Kosovo's
people.
Russian troops have played a constiuctive role, helping to keep
the peace, standing up to violence, including from Serbs, maintaining
impartiality.
KFOR's success in creating stability has allowed the return of over
800,000 Kosovar Albanian refugees-- more than 8 in 10 --and allowed
hundreds of thousands more who had been hiding in Kosovo's hills to come
home to their villages .. But they have returned to a shatt~red land.
They have had to fac~ the agony of loved.ones lost.· Many found·their
homes and businesses destroyed, their wells polluted, their schools and
hospitals razed by Milosevic's attacks.
The UN and relief agencies are working with the people of Kosovo to
rebuild homes·.
Some· 50, 000 houses are beyond repair,· another 50, 000
severely damaged.
The strategy now underway will give each family at
least one warm, dry room through the spring.
The UN is also
revitalizing Kosovo's energy sector, so residents will be ensured
electricity and heat this winter.
Rehabilitation of hospitals and clinics is moving forward.
The UN and
the World Health Organization are .working with local.officials to
immunize"240,000 children against disease.
International teams already
have cleared more than a·million square meters of land. for mines,
including 3000 homes and500 schools.
350 Kosovo residents are
undergoing training to join demining efforts.
·
Kosovo's children·~re back at school. Mail service has been r~stored.
Farmlands are alive -with tractors and livestock.
Factories and stores
are bac~ in business.
Radio-Television Kosovo will resume broadcasting
this month, with participation by Serbs as well as ethnic Albanians.
If
you walked down the streets of Pristina or Pee or Prizren today, you
would hear the sounds of hammers, building and repairing, and people
gathered in the cafes ~nd squares.
There are many ways in which life in Kosovo remains far from normal, but
in all these ways, life for the vast majority of Kosovo's people
actually is more normal than before the war. At last, children are
learning in their own language; parents are going back to their jobs;
citizens are shaping their own future.
This is not a return to the
frightening twilight of the past, but the birth of something new in
Kosovo: it is £reedom.
The ON's civil administration, under France's Bernard Kouchner, formerly
head of Doctors Without. Borders, and America's Jock Covey·, has deployed
far more quickly than previous missions, such as Bosnia or Cambodia.
Nearly 300 UN professional st'aff are in place, and the UN Mission is in
every part of Kosovo.
Already, it has laid the groundwork for institutions of self-government.
It has begun to build a. local court system,· with some 50 Kosovo
residents, including Serbs, serving as justice officials . . courts are
functioning in Pristina and Prizren, ~nd two mobile courts hear
emergency cases. More t'han 1000 international police officers are
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already in Kosovo, with 2000 more expected soon.
Their work is showing
results: Crime, particularly arson; has steadily declined, though
violence continues.
Kosovo's p6lice academy ~ill graduate its first
class of 168 cadets next month, the start of a local force that we hope
will have 3000 officers by next September. As in Bosnia, capable police
will allow us to draw down peacekeeping troops as time goes on.
Kosovo residents are drafting the legal framework for Kosovo's economy.
UN authorities are collecting salei and excise taxes and customs duties,
a first step toward building banking and fiscal systems.
Kosovo's political and civic. leaders have been meeting in a Kosovo
Transitional Council, which will lay the groundwork for local autonomy.
Regrettably, its Serb members resigned last week, and we must work to
bring them back to this important body soon. Meanwhile, the UN begins
registering citizens.tomorrow, as a step toward free elections, likely
to be next year.
·
All-in-all, we are on track in.rebuilding physical structures and
building new political structures. But that. won't guarantee a stable
Kosovo. We must also address three fundamental, interconnected, and
·difficult challenges: channeling the energy of former KLA members into
building a just society; protecting the safety of all groups in Kosovo;
and encouraging a democratic Serbia that will allow Serbs and Kosovars
alike to determine their future peacefully.
The three challenges
embrace a. single one: keeping a brutal past from engulfing a hopeful·!
future.
First, we must see that ex-.KLA members work with us in building a
strong, democratic Kosovo.
The task of integrating former rebels into
the poli~ical process is not, of course, unique to Kosovo. We have seen
it accomplished successfully in places like El Salvador and Nicaragua.
But here the challenge is different, for the old order has been swept
away, and some former KLA may think they are better off without the
international community.
That is why the agreement reached last week to end the KLA and form the
Kosovo Protection Corps is an important step, critical to preventing
formation of an active, obstructionist rebel underground.
The new corps
will work on reconstruction and humanitarian assistance, not armed
resistance.
The agreement sharply limits the number of self-defense
weapons available to them and caps their full-time membership.
Most former KLA now appear ready to assume roles in a democratic Kosovo
-- as part of the new corps, or in the new local police, as members of
political parties, or seizing opportunities to study and work that they
were long denied.
This will isolate those who, hardened by life under a
brutal and corrupt tyranny, would prefer a ~uture where violence and
intolerance carry the day.
·
Fostering such a climate is essential if we are to address the second
challenge I noted: protecting the security of all Kosovo's people,
including the Serbs and other minorities, so those who have left will
see the possibility of returning.
Today, most Kosovar Albanians can
enjoy their lives after ten years of oppression, though there continue
to be·Kosovar victims of violence by Serbs. At the same time· the Serb
minority is suffering. About half of the 200,000 Kosovo Serbs have
fled.
Many who h~ve stayed.live in fear.
Serbs have been harassed and
assaulted and murdered.
We must be clear: NATO did not fight in Kosovo for one ethnic group over
another. We fought for a stable, peaceful Europe -- and for the
.principle that no people should be destroyed or driven out because of
their ethnicity or faith.
The.violente and terror we have seen against
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Kosovo's Serbs does not match the scale of Milosevic's rampage.
But it
is no ~ess contemptible. And we have told Kosovar Albanian leaders that
if they fail to oppose it, they will lose the support of the
international community.
Ending the cycles of hate and revenge also will require, I believe, a
vigorous commitment to seeing justice done. More than 200 atrocity
sites have been identified.
In the short-term, focusing on war crimes
may create some more polarization. But if the people of Kosovo see that
there can be justice through law, they will be less likely to seek ·
justice through vengeance.
·
Still, in the end, despite all of the work we are doing in Kosovo, a
stable and enduring peace in the Balkans is impossible without a
transition to democracy in Serbia.
Milosevic continues to stoke conflict. Serb paramilitary violence in
Kosovo has persisted, particularly in areas bordering the rest of
Serbia.
There has been continued Serb pressure on Montenegro.
And Milosevic continues to violently suppress the Serb people.
Yesterday's contemptible attacks on peaceful demonstrators in Belgrade
shows Milosevic's desperation, his fear that .forces of democracy will
turn the tide. After all the suffering Milosevic has caused the Serb
people~ he can no ionger beat them into submission.
His brutality is
helping to unite opposition forces.
They are meeting today in Belgrade
to try to forge a common strategy.
Only by uniting can they bring change. We are seeking to promote unity
aiding democratic opposition parties, civic and student groups,
unions and independent media ... broadcasting hone~t news into Serbia
... targeting economic sanctions. at Milosevic and his corrupt cronies.
And we will continue the war crimes investigations until there is
justice.
Our efforts to promote democracy in Serbia and Kosovo are part of a
larger effort to strengthen democracy, opportunity.and integration
across southeast Europe. We advanced this work over the summer when
President Clinton and leaders from more than 35 other nations came
together in Sarajevo -- a city once firmly in the grip of war and
atrocities -~ to launch the Stability Pact, a framework for a better
future for the region.
There are those who say the only solution to the region's ethnic
problems is to redraw its borders around ethnically-based states.
Some
want to partition Kosovo into separate zones. W~ rejected that.soluti6n
in Bosnia. And we reject it in Kosovo.
Partition would be a disaster,
uprooting people into ethnic cantons, causing more bloodshed, suffering,
and anger.
·
·
The people of Kosovo should never again be ruled by Milosevic or his
ilk.
But as the President has said, the last thing the Balkans needs is
more Balkanization. That is w~y we do not support independence.
But that is ~ot a decision to be made now.
Inde~d, trying to force
resolution would only disrupt and endanger the difficult and fundamenta~
work we now face: Helping the people of Kosovo live in safety and
· .
dignity ... build democratic institutions that are inclusive and protect
..
minorities ... and create an economy that can sustain their people.
In
the future, Kosovo's status will be decided with the participation of
its residents and the international community: We should not assume
what the oufcom~ of that process will be, because it will depend in part
on events we cannot predict t~day, including Serbia's progres~ t6ward
democracy and Southeast E~iope's progress toward integration.
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Ultimately, Kosovo's future depends on the people who live there.
I
have talked today about our responsibilities, but let me say something
more about theirs.
The international community expects the Kosovar Albanians to do
everything possible to encourage Serbs to return to the Kosovo
Transitional Council,· to participate in the police force, .the courts,
and <;>ther institutions of government.
Public statements to this effect
would be good, but concrete actions are also necessary.
Kosovo's Albknians must accept that Russian troops are an integral part
of KFOR and have proved themselves able and impartial in fulfilling
their duties. We expect the blockade of the city of Orahovac -- which
ethnic Albanians have maintained since August to keep Russian troops
from entering -- to be lifted. And the Kosovar ·Protection Corps must
serve all Kosovo's communities, including Serbs.
'
I
.
.
Meanwhile, Kosovo's Serbs must understand that partition is riot in the
cards.
Threats to create a parallel government or armed. forces must
cease.
They must work to resolve the stand-off in Mitrovica, where
Serbs and ethnic Albanians repeatedly have clashed.
The people of Kosovo -- Serbs, Albanians, and others -- must struggle
against the cycles of hate.
They must stop occupying each other's
houses, confronting each other in the street, destroying e~ch other's
property, and inflicting on each other brutal acts of ethnic violence.
We cannot expect Kosovo to ac~ieve a state of multiethnic harmony any
time soon.
But Kosovo should be a place where people of every ethnic·
group can live their lives without fear.
The people of Kosovo must take responsibility. And as Kosovo.and the
international community continue on the path of progress, 'it is
essentiil that the United States walk with them.
Some in Congress question why our country should.participate in this
work.
I think the reason is clear: Building democracy, opportunity and
stability in Kosovo and the region is strongly in America's national
interest.
We have a historic opportunity to finish the work we have
been doing over the past decade: building a peaceful, undivided,
~emocratic Europe.
Integrating the Balkans and southeast Europe into
Europe's mainstream-- just as we did with Central Europe over the last
decade -- will make it far less likely that our troops will be asked to
fight another, costlier European war down. the road.. We must not settle
for a victory in combat but let the larger· prize of a safer,. better
Europe slip away.
·
This effort will require funding.
The European Union has committed to
provide the lion's. share for Kosovo's reconstruction and for southeist
Europe.
It must meet that commitment; .But the United States must meet
our responsibilitie~ as well.
For the people of Kosovo, for people of
the region, the United States is a powerful symbol of hope and resolve.
We want to work with the Congress, with members in both parties who· see
that our prosperity and security at home depends in.great.measure on our
·ability to solve critical problems overseas --and that' a wise
investment now can save money -- and lives -- down the road.
Americans should be proud of what we stood for and what we achieved in
the Kosovo conflict. We and our allies reversed a campaign of ethnic
terror -- and created an enormous opportunity to make a safer world.
It
would be· tragic if we squandered this hard-won opportunity. We owe it
to the troops who fought so courageously -- and to our children -- to
f~nish the job and build a lasting peace.
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THE WHITE HOUSE
Office· of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
July 26, 1999
As Prepared.for Delivery
REMARKS BY SAMUEL R. BERGER
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC
.
JULY 26, 1999.
"Winning the Peace in Kosovo"
I am· grateful for the opportunity to speak with you today about the
challenges America has faced in Kosovo -- and the important tasks still
ahead.
To look back, and to lo~k forward.
All across Kosovo, we see reminders that America and our allies did the
right thing in taking a stand against ethnic cleansing. We see it in
the heart-rending returns of the living -- and in the stark and silent
testimony of the dead.
The Serb forces responsible for the violence are gone.
Already, more
than 720,000 of .the roughly 1 million refugees have returned.
But there
i.s also tremendous sadness -- from the pain of remembering and the
devastation left behind by Milosevic's 'campaign of hate. And in many
victims there is rage, a desire for justice, and sometimes revenge.
As we face these. challenges, we cannot forget why we acted.
In Bella Crkva, where Serb forces murdered scores of villagers, a man
. who survived by pretending to be dead returned and helped bury the
victims.
"All of my best friends were killed," he said.
"They killed
12 children.
I had two buses.
They burned them.
I had a home,
The~
destroyed it."
Returning residents of. Mi trovica say that beginning last September t:he
smell of burning flesh rose from the chimneys at the Trep~a mine.
NATO
soldiers found around the mine piles of clothing, shoes, and identity
cards belonging to Kosovars.
In the town of Orahovac, a. family returned to find unmistakable evidence
that their house had been turned into a center for sexual assault
·
pornography, torn and blood-stained clothing, restraints.
In the city of Pee, those returning came across an elderly Kosovar woman
whom Serb forces had ordered to remain in her home.· It was the same
home where Serb paramilitaries cut her son's throat.
His blood still
stained her carpet.
They had stolen her television and washing machine.
T6ey had taken her wedding ring from her finger.
In a landscape dotted with mass graves, NATO troops found, near the
village of Ljubenic, the largest mass grave site discovered so far from
this conflict, with as many as 350 bodies.
Ret~rning Kosovars r~called
how Serb forces lined up villagers and fired with machine guns,
continuing to shoot long after every victim had fallen to the ground.
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In the hills outside of Lubizhde, a man in his sixties stood by a pile
of rocks and dirt, under which was visible a black jacket and the
remains of a young man.
"This is my son," he said.
We cannot forget the atrocities, the assault on humanity that prompted
America and our. allies to act in Kosovo.
During the conflict, Elie
Wiesel, at the request of the President, visited refugees in the camps.·
He reported back: "What I s~~ and heard there was often unbearable to
the survivor that still lives in my memory.
I never thought that I
would hear such tai~s· of cruelty again."
I am proud that our country did the .right thing in Kosovo.
It was not happenstance that NATO prevailed .. · bur cause was just. Our
goals ~ere clear.
Our strategy was right; And our rnili~ary forces
performed with enormous skill.
Could Milosevic have won? I believe the ans0er is yes - not by
defeating NATO militarily, but by splitting the alliance politically.
That was his strategy for· success; as he put it when the conflict began,
"I ~rn ready to w~lk on 6orpses and the ~est is not ~- th~t is why I
shall win." That is why it was not enough for us simply to concentrate
on winning a military victory. At the.heart of our strategy had to be
building and sustaining the unity of our allian6e.
More than once, Milosevic made conciliatory gestures, even as his ~orces
continued their brutality.
He offered a phony cease-fire.
He released
prisoners.
He purported tG accept the G-B's g~neral principles -- but
not the crucial details -- for ending the conflict. Through it all,
NATO, which in its 50 years had never been tested by protracted
conflict, did not crack.
Even during the bad moments that Milosevic sought to exploit -~ strikes
against rniiitary target& that resulted in collateral civilians
casualties, and, of course, the mistaken bombing of China's embassy in
Belgrade --NATO stood together.
Frorn'Gerrnany, engaged in its first
post-war military action, to Greece and Italy, with historic or ecoriornic
ties to Serbia, to our three new NATO allies finding themselves at arms
just 12 days after joining NATO, our 19 democracies stayed on course -until it became clear that Milosevic'could not undermine our unity and
purpose.
Undeniably, there were costs'to operating as an alliance.· In the
beginning, o.ur rnili tary .leaders did not have all the authority, for
example in terms -of targeting,. that we would have had if we were acting
alone.
But day by day we work~d to raise the level of ~llied consensus.
.
.
The critical moment carne,· I believe, at the 50th anniversary NATO summit
in Washin'gton, four weeks into the air campaign.
The leaders arrived
each having made their own choice to go forward in Kosovo.
They left
with a firm collective will.
·
Maintaining that essential unity required carefully handling the issue
of ground forces, much discussed here during the conflict. NATO did
develop· and update ground force options. And, if necessary,· the
President was prepared-to seek allied and congressional support.for a
ground operation, because he was determined that NATO prevail.
Bu't a
premature debate over a ground invasion would have been ·divisiv~ and
counterproductive, weakening, not strengthening, our essential
solidarity against. Milosevic, perh~ps even giving him an opportunity to
achieve a dishonorable compromise.
There were, moreover, good reasons to be cautious about deploying ground
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forces.
In addition to testing allied unity, it risked our support from
Serbia's neighbors and our chances for working with Russia· to end the
conflict. And pre~ailing on the gr6und would have come at substantial
cost, military and civilian.
·
I profoundly disagree with those who said that not putting forces on the
ground, and instead relying on our own overwhelming air advantage, ·
somehow undermined America's moral position. Morality in. a military
conflict,, I would submit, derives fundamentally fr.om the justness of .the
cause and the care taken to minimize civilian casualties.
In combat, it
is a good thirig to achieve your objectives with minimum loss to your
side. We gain no moral elevation from needless loss of lives.
From the beginning and until the end, we strongly beli~ved NATO could
prevail with an air campaign. .As we expected, we achieved essential
domination from the air once we neutralized Serbia's air defenses. We
took advantage of precision munitions, stealth bombers and other
advances that allow military operations with an accuracy and
effectiveness far beyond what was possibl~ just a few jears ago.
Our
strong airlift and tanker capabilities, and staging support from nations
in the region, allowed us to sustain the campaign virtually 24 hours a
day, with debilitating effect on Serbia's leadership.
Above all, we.had the skill, training and courage of our·men and women
in uniform, and those of our allies.
NATO flew more than 37,000 strike
and support sorties over 78 days.
0~~ air crews faced many dangers,
including hundreds of surface-to-air missile attacks.
In the end, NATO
lost only two aircraft and not a single crew member, a remarkable
performance.
We will never know exactly why Milosevic ~ltimately capitulated. · But I
believe there were several reasons. As I noted, he failed to split our
alliance as he thought he could.
Particularly in the final weeks of the
campaign, our strikes were doing severe damage to Serbia's ground forces
in Kbsovo and other assets supporting its military machine. And
Serbia's assault on Kosovo, far from eliminating the Kosovo Liberation
Army, had energized and strengthened it ..
We knew the power to change Serbia's course was concentrated in
Milosevic's hands. And .we knew he was not immune to pressure from
within.
By raising t·he alliance consensus, we were able to strike
harder and wider at Serbia's military-related assets.
And we employed other means -- enforcing tough economic sanctions;
tightening travel restrictions; freezing financial holdings; making it
difficult for Serbia's privileged clasi to go abroad, move money around,
or plan their exits.
In one case, a Milosevic crony, with family in tow
and suitcases bulging, found himself denied entry to a nearby country.
Such developments raised the level of anxiety and discontent within
Belgrade's power circles.
The reverberations from NATO's action spread, from the military, where.
defections and dissent mounted, to Milosevic's economic patrons, whose
losses were growing.
The initial public mood in Serbia -- defiant
support for Milosevic's stance -- turned sour as the impact of our
efforts came home.
Many around Milosevic came to see the futility -- and the risks -- of
.his intransigence. And I believe his indibtment by the international
war crimes tribunal also helped persuade his most powerful supporters
that he was a falling star.
Last but not least, there was our continuous effort to engage Russia in
diplomacy.
Russia, of course, strongly opposed our air campaign.
But
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it was prepared t~ work with us in an effort to end the conflict.
The
Russians agreed that the refugees should return, that Serb forces should
leave, and that some form of international security'force was needed to
protect the people. When Finnish President Ahtisaari and Russian
Special Envoy Chernomyrdin sat down with Milosevic in Belgrade and spoke
with one voice, he had no place to go.
He accepted our conditions the
next day.
I want to make one more point about NATO's military campaign.
I believe
we acted not only in the right way, but at the right time -- when
intensive peace efforts had failed and Milosevic's intent was
·
·unmistakable.
Having gone through the agonizing experience of Bosnia,
where it took far too long to refocus on stopping that war rather than
simply aiding. the victims, we: ·were determined to gain an alliance
decision to act swiftly.
·
Some have claimed that NATO's .air campaign caused the Serb campaign of
ethnic cleansing in the first place.
That is plainly wrong. When NATO
strikes began, Serb forces already were implementing a carefully-planned
campaign to rid Kosovo of its ethnic Albanian population, dead.or alive,
in short order. We hoped that initiating military action would.stop
them.
But we knew.that it was equally possible that it would not and
that a sustained campaign might.b.e necessary. We were determined to do
the best we could to halt and, if necessary, reverse a massive ethnic
cleansing.
Sadly, we could not prevent the tragedy that occurred.
But had America
and our allies done nothing, an entire people would have been erased, an
entire region would have been dangerously destabilized. And, at the end
of this bloodiest of centuries, we would have faced history's judgment
that the world's most powerful alliance was unwilling to act when
confronted with crimes against humanity·on its own doorstep.
But standing against such evil is only half the battle.
Now we have the
opportunity -- the responsibility -- to stand for a positive vision and
work to bring it about. We won the war, but it will be a hollow victory
if we lose the peace.
That is why the President and other allied
leaders have ~rticulated a vision for Kosovo and for all of southeast
Europe: nations coming together to build stronger democracies and
economies as they join the mainstream of Europe.
,Despite 10 years of turmoil i~ the Balkans, many of southeast Europe's
nations are already on a path of political and economic reform and
regional cooperation.
But there is far to go.
Our victory is not ·
complete when hundreds of thousands of Kosovars are returning to
shattered lives. Our work is not done when Serbia is still ruled by the
same leaders who .have caused such suffering. for their people and the
region.
Our job is not finished when the people of this promising .but
troubled region are still threatened by dangerous instability.
So we
will work with our allies and partners to rebuild Kosovo, to promote
democracy in Serbia, and to advance freedom, tolerance, prosperity and
integration all across Southeast Europe.
·
In Kosovo, there are tremendous challenges ahead in creating a future
from the total devastation left by the Serb assault.
First, we must create a secure environment, where people of all groups
are safe and rebuilding can go forward.
Already, some 35,250 troops,
mostly from NATO nations but joined by forces from Russia and other
countries, have deployed to Kosovo to constitute the international
security force, or KFOR.
The total force will be 50,000, with about
7000 American troops.
For obvious reasons, there a great deal bf anger in Kosovo right now.
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Last month, I could hear· it in the voices of the refugees I met with the
President in Mace~ortia. Sinqe the conflict ended, we have seen it in
burning of 'houses,, scapegoating of gypsies, and most 'chilling of all,. in
the murder leJ.st week of 14 ·Serb c:i vilians i.n tl:le village of Gracko; To
be sure, this act. of violence is 'not the same as: the massive, systematic
campaign that was unleashed by Milosevic. But it is profoundly wrong
and unacceptable. We will work against it. And those in the region who
wish to be our partners must work actively against it as well.
··
Over the weekend, Ko:Sovar leader Thaqi strong;Ly, condemned the killings
in Gracko . . NATO, the UN and the War Crimes Tribunal are investigating
them. We must be clear: America did not fight in Kosovo for one ethnic
group over another.. We· fought for' a stable, peaceful Europe -- ·and for
the principle that n6 people should be.singied out for destruction
because of their ethnicity or faith. Unfortunately,\most Serbs have
left Kosovo, ·at least for now. · But we must work to create 'an
environment where those Serbs who want to return and remairi can do so in
safety·.
Second, we must help meet th,e humanitarian .needs of Kosovo' s people. . In
parts of Kosovo, entire neighborhoods and villages have been·completely
destroyed. Forty percent of the water supply in yillages is ~f poor
quality; in many places, polluted by corpses. Serb forces·destroyed
schools and clinics, stores and bakeries, farms and livestock. Already,
more than 90 relief agencies and organizations from around the world,
inchiding ou.r own USAID, are on the grourid distributing food, water,
te'nts, building materials and health care supplies..
·,
·
Thi-s Wednesday in Brussels, nations and international institutions will
hold a donors conference, focused on firtancing immediate.humanita,rian
needs in Kosovo. The European Union and i,ts member states will be the
principal contributors for humanitarian aid and for reconstruction in
Kosovo. But fair burden sharing cannot be an excuse. :for us to abdicate
our responsibilities. So I am pleased to.anriounce today that at the
conference the United States ~- through AID -~ ~ill be prepared to
commit up to $500'million in additional humanitarian aid for Kosovo,
subject to a clear assessme'nt of needs and confirinatibn ·that other
donors w.ill also do their part. In the fa,ll; ·after· a more comprehensive
damage assessment is completed, another conference. will.mobilize aid for
longer-term reconstruc~ion.
Third, to bring closure, to bring accountability~ .to ensure
reconciliation triumphs over revenge, justice must be done. KFOR. has·
identified·more than 200 sites of atrocities. Scores of FBI personnel
have been working with investigators from .six other'countries. Their
tasks have included, of course, obtaini.ng · evide.nce ·related to the
indictment Df Slobodan Milcisevic.
·Fourth, an effective international administration must be'established,
:to pave the way for self-government down the road. The United Nations.
{s ~oving to get this done.
The newly-appointed Special·UN
repres~ntative for Kosovo is Bernard Kouchner, founder of the
highly-regarded humanitarian group · Docto.rs w'i th6ut Borders. and until
recently the French Health minis'j:'er. His deputy is American Jock Covey,
a seasoned.Balkans veteran aqd a superb organi~er and diplomat who,
until recently, was a Special Assistant t~ the President ~t the .NSC~·
''
.
Over 700 UN and other i~ternational personnel already ar~ in Kosovo.
The UN ~ission so far has appointed 19 judicial officials and is working
to establish an effec:tive cour't system. 18 nati,ons have committed '
officers for the projected 3100-officer UN civil. police force; 160 are
now on the ground, ~ith bundreds more expected in the next few weeks.
.
\
Fourth, we must help build local institutions of.self-government that
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are responsive, effective, and will further ethnic and religious
tolerance.
UN officials are already working to build a local police
force, with ~fficer training to begin next month.
They are addressing
difficult questions regarding the selection of mayors and the
apportionment of jobs among ethnic groups.
They are working with
officials of Pristina University to create mixed ethnic classes where
there had been segregation. They are supporting efforts to revive and
bolster local television and radio services and other independent media.
And ten days ago leaders of Kosovo's political groups, Serbs as well as
ethnic Albanians, held the first meeting of the Kosovo Transitional
Council, which will lay.the groundwork for local autonomy.
There are, of course, unresolved questions about Kosovo's long-term
future.
It is understandable that the people of Kosovo do not wish to
be governed by Slobodan Milosevic's Serbia any more. As a practical
matter, they will riot be.
In time, when the people of Kosovo and Serbia
have democracy, when, in all of southeast Europe, human rights are
respected, minorities have a voice, and national boundaries are less qnd
less important, a just future for Kosovo can be determined peacefully.
For now, the international community will protect Kosovo, and we will
encourage efforts by the people of Serbia to bring democratic change, so
the region can develop in peace.
It is ·increasingly clear that Serbs
from all walks of life have had enough of the brutal and hateful
policies that have brought so inuch suffering to the Balkans. And let me
stress this point: We wili not provide a penny for reconstr~ction -- and
we will not work to bring Serbia into Europe, as we will do with the
rest of ~he region -- so long as an indicted war criminal rules in
Belgrade'.
As we rebuild Kosovo, we must seize this historic opportunity to make
southeast Europe, at last, a vital and integral_part of a peaceful,
united continent.
We have traveled similat roads before.
From the rubble·Df World War II,
the Marshall Plan, NATO, and other efforts helped build a prosperous,
democratic and united Western Europe that has been the cornerstone of
our security for 50 years. With the collapse of the Berlin Wall, we and
others helped the nations of Central Europe, and in a remarkable ten
years they have overcome the harsh legacy of communism to build
democracy and growing market economies, to become our securi.ty partners
and even our NATO allies. Now we must help put the last pieces of. the
puzzle in place in southeast Europe -- and realiz~ the vision the
President has pursued since early in his presidency: a Europe undivided,
democratic and at peace for the first time in history.
'
This Friday in Sarajevo, President Clinton and leaders from more than
35 other nations ·will gather to launch the Balkan Stability Pact, a
framework for promoting democracy, prosperity and security across the
region. As was the case with our earlier efforts for Europe, we will
look to the leaders of the region to define their own plans for
political and economic reform at home and cooperation across borders.
At Sarajevo, southeast Europe's ieaders will reaffirm their intent to
improve the climate for trade and·investment. We and our allies will
undertake to help with reforms, ~peed their integration into the world
trading ~ystem, and encourage our private sectors to play a s~rong ro~e
in their development.
The nations of the region will commit to deepen
cooperation among themselves, for economic growth and for greater
security. We will reaffirm our commitment to helping these nations, who
courageously bore a heavy burden in the. Kosovo conflict, to strengthen
their ties to Europe.
The conference participants will also .endorse
democratic change in Serbia and reaffirm support for leaders who stand
up for democracy, like President Djukanovic of Montenegro and Bosnian
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Serb Prime Minister Dodik.
And to hold this meeting in a peaceful Sarajevo, in a struggling but
'slowly healing Bosnia is, itself, remarkable.
Near the start of the
20th Century, violence in Sarajevo triggered the First World War.
More
recently, Sarajevo was the site of some of the worst atrocities since
the Second World War.
Now we have the chanc~ to end this century in.
Sarajevo,· with a gathering of .internation-al leaders engaged in building
a future of tolerance, peace and progress in ·the reg'ion.
As in Kosovo, the European Uhion will.provide ~ost.of the fun4ing.for
development across the region.
But our participation is very much
needed.
For many people in southeast Europe, as in so many other places
around the world, America is a symbol of hope and resolve.
And helping
the region is strongly in our national interest.
It will make it far
less likely that our troops will be called upon to risk their lives in
another, perhaps far costlier European conflict in the future.
It will
help make th~ whole of Europe a stronger partner for advancing our
interests and values.
So we need a st.rong U.S. commitment, and that means a strong bipartisan
commitment.
For t-hat, we, look to work with Members of Congress who
recognize that we cannot ensure our prosperity and security at home
unless we continue to ~ngage and address critical problems abroad.
There was bipartisan support in the Congress for helping the Ko~ovar
refugees in. their' t_ents.
I hope there will be bipartisan support for
helping them in their·homes.
Let me end as I began, with a tale of return.
Fehmi Agani was a prominent Kosovar professor who led with courage and
dignity in the struggle to restore peace and human rights to Kosovo.
Last month, his wife and son returned to the family home near Pristina.
They found it ransacked.
Serb forces had torn it apart on the same day
that they took Agani off a bus full of Kosovars.
His body was found on
a roadside, three bullet holes in his head. After the conflict ended,
Agani's widow and son considered an offer to come to America.
But, like
hundreds of thousands of others, they went home to Kosovo.
They went
home to help re.alize Fehmi Agani' s dream -- of a democratic Kosovo, in a
democratic southeast Europe where people build a peaceful and prosperous
future together.
In the name of Fehmi Agani ~nd_others who perished, for the sake of
their survivors, and in our own profound nati6nal interest, we must help
make that dream a reality.
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�• 5/18/00 Albright Statement on Byrd-Warner Amendment
Page 1 of 1
Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright
Statementon Byrd-WarnerAmendmenfFails to Pass Senate·
·
·washington, D.C., May 18,2000
As released by the Office of the Spokesman
U.S. Department of State
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: I am very pleased and grateful that the Senate, by a
bipartisan vote of 53-47, today removed the Byrd-Warner provision from the
Military Construction Appropriations Bill. The Senate has acted in the best interests
of the United States in moving ahead on our efforts to achieve peace and stability in
Kosovo, and in maintaining the vital relationship between the United States and its
NATO allies.
· I understand and agree with the Senate's concern about adequate burden sharing in
Kosovo and the Balkans. The U.S. has worked closely with our European allies, who
are doing the lion's share in the reconstruction of Kosovo, to ensure they fulfill their
very substantial commitments, with measurable success. European troops, for
example, comprise nearly 80 percent ofKFOR forces.
Today's welcome Senate vote sends the right signal to our Allies and to the
Milosevic regime that the United States intends to fulfill its commitm~nts and stay
the course in Kosovo.
[End of Document]
Secretary's Home Page I State Department Home Page
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· ·~3/28/00: Albright New York Times Op-Ed
·Page 1 of2
Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright
Op-Ed printed in "The New York Times'', March 28,2000
U.S. Department of State
·
·Our Stake in Kosovo
A year ago this week, s·lobodan Milosevic rejected an international peace plan and
intensified a campaign of terror that had already killed hundreds of Kosovo
Albanians and driven more than 200,000 from their homes. His new offensive,
begun with peace·talks still underway, ultimately caused more thari 1 million
Kosovars to seek refuge and was marked by burned villages, rapes, murders and
ethnic cleansing. ·
President Clinton and his NATO counterparts responded forcefully and, through
persistence, successfully. Most of the displaced h~ve since returned to their homes.
Communities are rebuilding. Children are in school. With international help, most of ·
Kosovo is secure and preparing for its first democratic elections ever.
Having prevailed in war, our challenge now is to secure the peace. This is proving,·
as expected, costly and hard. The journey from conflict to cooperation is not made
overnight. Impatient, some in Congress suggest we give up, put away our wallets
and call our troops home. But the cqsts and risks of quitting far exceed those of
maintaining a stable Ko~ovo.
·
History teaches us that America cannot be secure if Europe is not secure, and events
have reminded us repeatedly that Europe cannot be secure when conflict engulfs the
Balkans. With Mr. Milosevic still present, the region remains a tinderbox. If we
check out, wide-scale bloodshed will almost surely check back .in.
Moreover, the price of perseverance is affordable and the obstacles to success can be
overcome.
During the cold war, we stationed nearly 400,000 troops in Europe. Today we have
roughly 100,000. Of these, about 6,000 are in Kosovo. Surely, this deployment is
not disproportionate to ·America's stake in the region.
Further, Europe is committed to shouldering the majority ofburdens in Kosovo.
European Union members have contributed 64 percent of the international troops
and provided hundreds of millions of dollars in humanitarian and reconstruction aid.
We are contributing fewer than 15 percenfoftotal troops and less than 15 percent of
the nonmilitary costs of helping Kosovo recover from war and build stability. There
are proposals in Congress to make a 15 percent share of these· costs a legal cap. But
suc;h a restriction would harm, not help, our ability to leverage contributions from
Europe. It would reduce our flexibility in responding to future events.
And it would underestimate America's stake in our partnership with.Europe, which
extends beyond Europe itself. After Hurricane Mitch struck in our hemisphere, more
than 60 percent of the bilateral aid pledged came from Europe. And Europe assumed
a 33 percent share of the -cost of establishing peace in El Salvador and 34 percent in
Guatemala.
http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/2000l000328.html
05/31/2000
�·• 3/28/00: Albright New York Times Op-Ed
Page 2 of2
. Those ready to give up on Kosovo point to recent incidents of ethnic violen~e there. ·
We share these concerns, and international authorities are addressing them by
beefing up resources, tightening security, and marginalizing and disarming
extremists.
But the problems should not obscure overall progress. With United Nations
leadership, a Joint Interim Administrative Council has been established in which
Kosovo's factions can begin to share responsibility for governing their region. The
ethnic Albanian militia has met its commitment to demobilize. The murder rate is
now lower in Kosovo than in many American cities. In much of the region, morale is
high.and people are focused squarely on building a better life. .
··
.
.
The depth of estrangement between factions in Kosovo is profound. Urgent needs
for police, prosecutors and courts have not yet been met. And the risk that angry
individuals will generate disturbances remains significant. But if our reaction to
every setback is to pull back, a dangerous world will grow rapidly more dangerous.
I
We are not asking anyone in Kosovo to abandon legitimate interests. We are asking
the people there to pursue their interests through cooperation with the international
community and by participating in the joint governing structures being created. With
time and sufficient support, the cooler heads on all sides will prevail. A sense of
inter-ethnic community may or may not develop; but pragmatic coexistence is
. clearly possible.
The day may come ·when a Kosovo-scale operation can be managed without the help
of the United States,but it has not come yet. If we are forced by ill-conceived
legislation to depart Kosovo or to slash our commitment of resources, others will
.mimic our weaknessJ and the flames of renewed conflict will surely and quickly
ignite.
The American people should be proud that we did the right thing a year ago and
confident that by working with our partners to consolidate the peace, we are doing
the right and smart thing now.
·
[End of Document]
Secretary's Home Page I State Department Home Page
http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/2000/000328.html
05/31/2000
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
001. memo
SUBJECTffiTLE
DATE
Tina Kaidanow to Samuel R. Berger. Subject: Request for Balkans
update ( 5 pages)
05/16/2000
RESTRICTION
P1/b(1)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Speechwriting (Paul Orzulak)
OA/Box Number: 4023
FOLDER TITLE:
[Kosovo] [ 1]
2008-0702-F
"m215
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act- 144 U.S.C. 2204(a)l
Freedom of Information Act -IS U.S.C. 552(b)l
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information l(b)(l) of the FOIAI
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency l(b)(2) of the FOIAJ
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute l(b)(3) of the FOIAJ
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information l(b)(4) of the FOIAI
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy l(b)(6) of the FOIAJ
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes j(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions ](b)(S) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells l(b)(9) of the FOIAJ
National Security Classified Information l(a)(l) of the PRAI
Relating to the appointment to Federal office l(a)(2) of the PRAI
Release would violate a Federal statute l(a)(3) of the PRAI
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information j(a)(4) of the PRAI
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors la)(S) of the PRAI
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy j(a)(6) of the PRAI
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be 'reviewed upon request.
�July 1999
President Clinton travels to Sarajevo to address the Stability Pact Summit
and begin a new era of regional cooperation in Southeast Europe and
enhan~ed efforts to integrate the region into the rest ofEurope.
July 1999
At the first Kosovo Donor's Conference in Brussels, donor countries
commit over $2.082 billion (with the U.S. pledging $556 million) for
Kosovo's immediate reconstruction needs. Following extensive U.S.
lobbying, donor countries pledge $1.058 billion at a second Kosovo
Donors Conference in Brussels in November to fund longer term
requirements.
November 1999
President Clinton travels to Kosovo, delivering a message of reconciliation
and ethnic tolerance to Kosovo's ethnic communities.
AGENDA FOR ACTION
Although the situation in Kosovo has improved dramatically over the past six months, significant
challenges remain before the hard-won NATO victory can be transformed into a stable, durable
peace. The Administration will continue to use all diplomatic, military and economic resources
at its disposal to win the peace in Kosovo. Key tasks include:
•
Continued reconstruction of private homes and communal properties, and the revitalization
of the Kosovo economy as a whole, including steps to attract significant foreign investment.
•
Strengthening the UNMIK civil administration and developing effective institutions for
meaningful autonomy and democratic self-government by the Kosovar people.
•
Providing a safe and secure environment for all ethnic groups, including the establishment of
a functioning police and judicial system as the cornerstones of society based on respect for
·
the rule oflaw.
•
Fostering a mature and democratic political culture respectful of a plurality of parties,
candidates and viewpoints, and tolerant of ethnic diversity and the rights ofminoritie_§..
'I
•
Working with the OSCE, UN and other international organizations to foster political
.development, promote participation in the political process and assist the growth of a
responsible, independent media.
•
Holding free and fair elections as soon as feasible.
�THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
. (Lisbon, Portugal)
May31, 2000
For Immediate Release
FACT SHEET
Working for Greater Stability in Southeast Europe
The United States and the European Union are working closely
together to support the transformation of Southeast Europe into
a more stable region.
The U~S. and'the EU are fully engaged in
both the Stability Pact for Southeast ~urope and the
peacekeeping missions there. While the U.S. contribution to
these efforts is substantial and critical to their success,
Europe has ~roperly assumed its ·role as the largest provider of
resources in these efforts.
Stability Pact for Southeast Europe
Since the Stability Pact'.s launch last summer, it has forged a
strong partnership between the international community and the
states of Southeast Europe to advance our shared commitment to
political and economic reform, accelerate the region's
integration with the rest·of Europe and promote greater
stability throughout the area.
(
The Pact has developed a number of
initiatives t6 strengthen democracy, economic development and
security, including specific commitments. and actions by the
states of the region to improve their investment climate and
combat corruption.
In each country, the government has formed
teams with representatives of major donors and multilateral
institutions to support these ref6rms.
Regional Refor.ms.
Dono~
At the Regional Funding Conference for
Southeast Europe in Brussels on March 29-30, the international
community committed $2.3 billion to fund a wide range of "Quick
Start" projects, including one to improve the region's
infrastructure and strengthen the rule of law.
The European
Union has shouldered the lion's share of funding for these
projects, with the combined contribution of the European
Commission, EU Member States, the European Investment Bank and
the Council of Europe Development Bank equaling approximately
Assistance.
�2
two-thirds of the total.
The U.S. pledged $77.65 million in
assistance., just over three percent. of the. total.
Other
bilateral donors, multilateral institutions and organizations
contributed the balance.
Work on several important· "Quick Start'~ pr?j ect's has already
begun, including on 26 of the 53 projects involving u.s.
funding.
Among those·projects underway are the Milot River
bridge project in Albania, the Blace border crossing in
Macedonia, the power grid upgrade project in Romania; the World
Bank's regional Trade and Transport Facilitation program, and
the regional Teaching of History project. Others are planned to
start soon, {ncluding a transportation infrastructure upgrade
and expansion project in Montenegro and the Danube bridge
construction project between Bulgaria and Romania.
Integrating Southeast Europe into the rest of Europe.
Since the
Stability Pact began last summer,. Croatia has joined NATO's
Partnership for Peace, the European Union has opened accession
negotiations with Romania and B·ulgaria, and the EU has expressed
its intention to negotiate Stabilization and Association
Agreements with several other countries of the region.
Winning the Peace in Kosovo
The combined ·efforts of KFOR, the United Nations and donors such
as the United States and the European Union have made a critical·
difference on the ground in Kosovo.
Over 900, 000 refugees
forced out during the conflict have returned home.
Serb
security forces and the KLA have either withdrawn or disbanded.
The level of violence has dropped sharply since· last summer.
International assistance including 75,000 shelter kits helped
local resident~ repair and construct adequate shelter, averting
a humanitarian crisis this pas~ winter. UNMIK has rebuilt
nearly 3,000 houses, primarily with European funding~ and aims
to build far more by the end of t~is year.
Reconstruction.of
the power system means that, for the first time since the
fighting ended, internally generated power is adequate for
demand.
The food situation is improving. ·over one million
square meters of land has been cleared of 15,000 mines.
Both the United States and Europe have made significant
contributions to the success of KFOR and UNMIK.
EU member
states have contributed 63 percent: of th~ troops in KFOR, with
contributions from other European cquntries (including Russia)
bringing that proportion up to 80 pe.rcent.
The United States
.
provides under 15 percent of total KFOR. troops.
,'
�3
Similarly, the EU has ~rovided nearly three-quarters of
international funding for UNMIK's local budget, from which UNMIK
covers the costs of running the local administration in Kosovo,
while the United States has provided just over 13 percent. At
the two World Bank-led donors' conferences held in 19~9 to
respond to needs in:Kosovo, the United States pledged about onefifth of the_ total contribution, with the European Union
pledging approximately three-fifths, and other donors providing
the remainder.
###
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Speechwriting Office - Paul Orzulak
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Speechwriting Office
Paul Orzulak
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1999-2000
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36267" target="_blank">Collection Finding Aid</a>
<a href="http://catalog.archives.gov/id/7585791" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Identifier
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2008-0702-F
Description
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<p>Orzulak served as speechwriter for President William J. Clinton and National Security Advisor Samuel R. Berger in 1999 and 2000.</p>
<p>Orzulak authored speeches for President Clinton concerning permanent normal trade relations with China; the United States Coast Guard Academy commencement; the role of computer technology in India; the defense of American cyberspace; the Eleanor Roosevelt Human Rights Award; the memorial service for Former Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi of Japan; the Charlemagne Prize in Germany; the presentation of the Medal of Freedom to President James E. Carter and Rosalyn Carter in Atlanta; the Millennium Around the World Celebration in Washington, DC; the Cornerstone of Peace Park in Japan; the role of scientific research and the European Union while in Portugal; sustainable development in India; armed forces training on Vieques Island, Puerto Rico; and the funeral services for Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. in Annapolis. Orzulak’s speechwriting for National Security Advisor Berger concerned Senator Joseph R. Biden, China’s trade status, Kosovo, and challenges facing American foreign policy.</p>
<p>This collection was made available through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/freedom-of-information-act-requests">Freedom of Information Act</a> request. For more information concerning this collection view the complete finding aid.</p>
Provenance
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Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
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Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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Adobe Acrobat Document
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82 folders in 7 boxes
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Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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[Kosovo] [1]
Creator
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National Security Council
Speechwriting Office
Paul Orzulak
Identifier
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2008-0702-F
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Box 5
<a href="http://clintonlibrary.gov/assets/Documents/Finding-Aids/2008/2008-0702-F.pdf" target="_blank">Collection Finding Aid</a>
<a href="http://catalog.archives.gov/id/7585791" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
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Adobe Acrobat Document
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Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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Reproduction-Reference
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5/19/2014
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42-t-7585791-20080702f-005-011-2014
7585791