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Case Number: 2008-0702-F
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· This is not a textual record. This is used as an
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Folder Title:
China [Folder 1] [1]
Staff Office-Individual:
Speechwriting-Orzulak, Paul
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�Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
SUBJECTrriTLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
00 I. statement
Personal (Partial) (I page)
02/19/2000
P6/b(6)
002a. email
To National Security Advisor from Paul Orzulak. Subject: Revised
SRB China remarks to Business Roundtable .(1 P,age)
02/08/2000
P5
002b. statement
re: Draft National Security Advisor Samuel
Business Roundtable on China (8 pages)
02/08/2000
P5
E.
Berger remarks to the
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Speechwriting (Paul Orzulak)
OA/Box Number: 4022
FOLDER TITLE:
China [Folder I] [I]
2008-0702-F
'm606
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Presidential Records Act- 144 U.S.C. 2204(a)l
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�China PNTR
Q&A
WTO Agreement/PNTR
Why is China joining the WTO in the interests of the global community?
•
US believes China's entry into WTO on sound con:~mercial basis is good for the for China,
· good for the United States, and good for the international trading system.
•
WTO membership will open China's markets and strengthen the forces of reform, improving
the odds that China will continue and even accelerate its gradual progress toward joining the
rules-based community of nations.
•
US-China Accession Agreement has very strong terms. We look forward to China's
completing its agreements with other WTO members and remaining work in Geneva so that
it can enter the WTO as soon as possible.
•
At home, we are working very hard to obtain necessary Congressional support for PNTR for
China. This is one of my highest priorities this year.
•
Granting China PNTR will guarantee that US business, can benefit fully from the provisions
of China's WTO accession. This is in the interest of American business, labor, and
agriculture.
Why is PNTR necessary? Can't the U.S. get the benefits ofthe agreement without PNTR,
as some have suggested?
•
No. The United States must grant China permanent Normal Trade Relations status or risk
losing the full benefits of the agreement we negotiated, including special import protections
and rights to enforce China's commitments through WTO dispute settlement.
•
If Congress were to refuse to allow the United States to grant China permanent NTR, our
Asian, Latin American and European competitors would reap these benefits but American
farmers and businesses could well be left.behind.
Why do we need to grant permanent normal-trade-relation status (PNTR)? Isn't it the
case that we can continue to grant China NTR status on an annual basis and get the
benefits of the agreement?
�2
·•
First, let's recognize that this is a good deal for U.S. exports, workers, and farm interests.
It's also important to understand the one-way nature of the concessions in this agreement.
China has agreed to grant the United States significant new access to its market, while we
would simply maintain the market access policies we already apply to China by granting it
· permanent NTR.
an
•
Second, the answer is no, you can't just grant NTR through
annual review and renewal
· process and ensure we get the full benefits of the WTO agreement. The GATT requires all
WTO members to grant immediate and unconditional NTRIMFN. This requires permanent
NTR.
.
•
We must grant China permanent NTR. Ifwe.do not, we risk losing the full market access
benefits of the agreement we negotiated, special import protections, and of course the rights
to enforce China's commitments through WTO dispute settlement.
•
If Congress were to refuse to grant permanent NTR, our Asian, European and other
competitors will reap the benefits, but American farmers and businesses may well be left
behind.
·
Some have suggested that as long as NTR does not lapse, the United States can, consistent
with our WTO obligations, require annual or ]periodic renewal of China's NTR status,
provided that NTR status is not conditioned upon any "extraneous" factor such as
Jackson-Vanik's freedom-of-emigration-related requirements., Is this right?·,
•
No. A fundamental principle of the WTO is that you treat imports from all WTO members
the same. You can not give special advantages or impose special disadvantages or hardships
on some countries' products and not others.
· ·
•
GATT Article I requires that all WTO members grant each other "any advantage, favor,
privilege or immunity" provided to other countries" immediately and unconditionally".
•
The United States grants NTRIMFN treatment to all countries with whom we share and
enjoy all the benefits of the WTO without the condition of an annual review.
•
Receiving NTR tariff treatment is clearly an "advantage" or "privilege" under the WTO, and
obtaining that treatment without going through an annual review is likewise an advantage or
privilege.
·
•
Subjecting one WTO member to an annual review of its NTR status -- whethertied to
Jackson-Vanik's specific emigration related conditions or not-- is a dear and discriminatory
condition that disadvantages imports from that country,
�3
•
A mandatory annual or periodic review of whether products from China will be treated the
same or differently than products from all other WTO members will inject uncertainty and
unpredictability irito business decisions affecting imports from China. NTR/MFN status
provides non-discriminatory treatment of products both at the U.S. border and after the
products. enter .into commerce within the United States·.
.
•
A mandatory review ofNTRIMFN status is discriminatory and disadvantageous and violates
the fundamental WTO principle that all WTO members must be treated the same, and that all
"advantages" aild "privileges" must be granted "immediately and unconditionally".
•
If we do riot grant China PNTR and continue to condition NTRIMFN status upon mandatory
periodic reviews, we risk losing the full benefits -- to our farmers, workers and companies -of the strong, rules-based and enforceable market opening agreement we just negotiated.
Enforcement/compliance
What assurance do we have thatChina will implement this agreement?
•
The WTO agreement is different from our bilateral agreements in two important respects -the obligations that China has accepted are far more specific and detailed, and it is fully ·
enforceable through the WTO dispute settlement process.
·
•
The Admin~stration is fully committed to ensuring that China fulfills its obligations and will
work with China, other WTO members, our private sector and Congress in monitoring
China's compliance and quickly addressing problems.
•
We will aggressively use the WTO's monitoring mechanisms and the WTO's dispute
settlement process to seek redress. And we will vigorously enforce our domestic trade laws,
w~ich continue to apply to China.
•
Moreover, unlike our bilateral agreements, we will not be alone in our enforcement efforts if
China fails to live up to its commitments. Other countries will be focusing on bringing China
into compliance.
• · Finally, we will try to prevent or reduce problems by working closely with the Chinese,
including through technical assistance where appropriate, to ensure they fully understand
their new obligations. WTO rules will require widespread changes in China's application of
trade rules and policies, and consultation and training can head off problems.
Doesn't China's track record on past trade agreements. mean we can't have any faith it will
·
live up to any new agreement?
•
China's record ofcompliance is mixed. But vigorous enforcement of our bilateral
agreements with China has resulted in significant improvements in both intellectual property
(IP) protection and market access. For example:
�4
•
Before our IP agreements in 1992 and 1995 and the enforcement action in 1996, China was
one of the world's largest IP pirates. Today, China has improved its legal framework-- and
it has virtually shut do~n the illegal production and export of pirated music and video CDs
and CD-ROMs.
•
China is also one of only 12 countries that has followed the example of the US Goyernment
in issuing a government-wide directive that all ministries and other government entities, at
national, provincial and local levels, must ensure the legitimate use of authorized software.
•
As a result of the 1992 Market Access MOU, China has eliminated quotas and licenses on
over a thousand products and laid the foundation for significant improvements in the
transparency of its trade regime.
•
Genenilly, China has implemented its agreements most satisfactorily when its obligations
were concrete, specific, and open to monitoring. Previous bilateral agreements have not ·
adequately dealt with the range of barriers and trade-restrictive practices our exporters face in
China. The November 1999 bilateral agreement has far more specificity in terms ofwelldefined commitments than we were able to achieve in earlier agreements. ·
•
Finally, China's commitments are subject to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism-which will force China to comply with WTO rulings or be subject to trade sanctions. The
Admin.istration is fully committed to ensuring that China fulfils its commitments and will
work with Congress and the private sector in monitoring China's.implementation and in
acting quickly to prevent and address problems.
Completing Work for Accession
What more specifically needs to be done for China to complete its WTO accession? What
is going on now?
•
The WTO accession process for China consists of two elements: completion of bilateral
market access agreements with all WTO members seeking specific commitments (about 15
including the EU remain) and completion of the protocol and working party report, .which
principally cover the commitments China· makes regarding WTO rules.
.
•
China has completed bilateral market access agreements with several countries such as the
United States, Japan, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. China must also reach bilateral
agreements with the European Union, India, Argentina, Chile, and a number of other WTO
members.
•
The second element-- the multilateral process in the Working Party-- will likely make
significant advances once China concludes its bilateral market access agreements. In the
multilateral negotiations in the Working Party, China must reach agreement on a number of
issues, including subsidies, technical standards, and a mechanism to review implementation.
Once both of these elements are concluded, the Working Party forwards the package to the
�.----------------
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------------.
5
WTO General Council for final action. China must then complete the steps required under its
law to become a WTO Member.
'How long will thattake?·
•
We cannot predict this, as it is up to the parties in these bilateral negotiations.
•
However, except for the European Union, these countries normally have far fewer issues to
resolve witli China than we did.
What countries remain for China to complete its bilateral process?
•
We understand that currently about 15 WTO Members are still engaged in bilateral market
access negotiations with China, includingtheBU.
•
Some Members may decide that what we or other Members met their needs and stop
negotiating, and others could make bilateral requests at a later stage.
•
The Working Party will at some point decide that all bilateral negotiations have been
completed·. and will start the process of verifying and rectifying China's market access
schedules.
What more needs to be done with the Protocol?
•
The Protocol and Working Party Report contain provisions that clarify or modify the
standard provisions in the WTO Agreement with respect to China. Examples of special
China-related provisions include: additional commitments and special trans~tion periods and
clarifications ofhowWTO rules will applyto China.
•
The Working Party Report also includes a description of China's trade regime and economy
as of the conclusion of the accession negotiations. This Report also states Members'
concerns about certain aspects of China's economic and trade regime and their expectations
on how these regimes will be modified oroperate when China becomes a WTO member.
.
•
.
The Working Party will be negotiating with China on additional commitments and drafting
· the legal documents that record these commitments, provide the basis for monitoring
implementation and are subject to dispute settlement.
Didn't the. U.S. already finish the protocol?
•
The United States and China have agreed bilaterally on certain commitments that will be
included in the ProtocoL These commitments will now be discussed in the Working Party
and inserted into the Protocol and Working Party Report.
�..----------------------------
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-----------------------
-------------------------------,
6
•
During our bilateral negotiations, we focused on issues that are of particular importance to
U.S. industry and workers and did not attempt to resolve at the bilateral stage all of the many
·
issues involved in a WTO accession.
•
In addition, other Members have issues of particular concern to them that may need to be
addressed.
When will we have a final package?
•
The timing for completion of the accession negotiations has always been up to China.
•
We are fully prepared to engage in'intensive negotiations and complete work on the
accession package quickly.
What happens if other trading partners undercut us on marketaccess or protocol issues?
•
Ultimately, these are commitments that C.hina must make and implement. China is aware of
the importance we (lttach to these commitments. ·
•
We believe that other WTO Members will not object to including the agreed provisions or
even better provisions on market access and rules.
•
The final package must be one we can accept and that Congress believes warrants providing
China with permanent NTR.
Can the U.S. veto China's entry?
•
The Working Party must have a consensus to forward the accession package to the WTO
General Council for action. In the General Council, any WTO Member can request a vote
on the accession package which would require a 2/3's majority of all WTO Members for
adoption.
Human Rights
Why should we grant permanent NTR status to China even though the human rights
situation continues to deteriorate in the PRC?
•
•
•
Provision ofPNTR status to China is not an endorsement of the human rights situation. We
have deep, serious concerns about the human rights situation in China ..
China's accession to the WTO and our corresponding obligation to provide PNTR status will
strengthen forces in China that are likely to move the human rights situation there in the right
direction.
WTO accession will spur market reforms that will result in more individual choice and
diminished government control over economic and social life; encourage China's greater
integration with the global economy and its openness to outside influences; and promote
basic principles that are the foundation for the rule of law and fundamental human rights:
�.
'
7
•
We will continue all other efforts to promote human rights in China. Providing China with
PNTR does not come at the expense of energetic pursuit of these priorities.
Labor
What are you doing to promote labor rights in China?·
•
•
•
•
President Clinton and President Jiang agreed in June of 1998 to begin a labor dialogue to
discuss core labor standards, labor law, and development of social safety nets for workers.
Labor Secretary Herman has begun that dialogue with her counterpart and has facilitated
meetings between the Chinese Minister of Labor and U.S. business and labor representatives.
In 1996, WTO members renewed their commitment to the observance of internationally
recognized core labor standards. On accession, China will take on this commitment.
China's WTO accession will increase investment by U.S.-based multinationals, providing
additional channels for American values and practices to be conveyed to China. American
firms are more committed than their Asian competitors to progressive labor management
practices and protecting the safety of their workers.
What have you done to ensure that Chinese prison labor products don't enter the United
States?
•
•
•
•
WTO agreement does not impair in any way our prohibition on importing products produced
by prison..labor.
1992 and 1994 agreements with the Chinese government commit the Chinese to cooperate,
induding U.S. inspections of Chinese prison facilities.
Dissatisfied with implementation of the agreements.
Since 1997 cooperation has halted. We have repeatedly pressed for revitalization of the
agreements and Ambassador Prueher has made this a priority. Will also raise in our law
enforcement dialogue in Beijing this coming spring.·
�3
foreign companies, which offer better pay and a chance to get ahead based on merit. This
will lift standards for Chinese workers -and their expectations.
·
•
·second, by speeding economic change, the agreement has the potential to encourage China
to ·evolve into a more open society. The Chinese state was once every citizens' employer,
. landlord, shopkeeper, and news provider rolled into one. By advancing the flow of
information, the pace of privatization, and the force of competition, this agreement will
accelerate a process that is removing government from vast areas of people's lives. By
opening China's telecommunications market~ the WTO agreement will help bring the
information revolution to cities and towns across China. China's government may be trying
to control Internet content, but the effort is futile and it simply proves how threatening these
changes are to the status quo.
·
•
Third, this agreement increases the chance that in the new century Chind will be on the
inside of the international system, playing by the rules, instead of on the outside, denying
them. By joining the WTO, China has agreed to subject some of its most important economic
decisions, for the first time, to the review of an international body. As China becomes a
stakeholder in the WTO and other international regimes, it will be more likely to define its
future within the global community. And if China violates its commitments, it will confront
judgments backed by all 135 members of the WTO, rather than being able to chalk up
friction to supposed U.S. bullying.
•
We must also make clear: This agreement is not, by itself, a human rights policy for the
United States. Change in China will only come through a combination of internal pressure
and external validation of those who struggle for a political voice. That's why we are once
again sponsoring a resolution in the UN Human Rights Commission condemning China's
human rights record, and why we have sanctioned China as a "country of particular concern"
under the International Religious Freedom Act. We will also continue to press China to
respect global norms on non-proliferation; to encourage a peaceful resolution of issues with
Taiwan; to urge China to help us solve the problem of global climate change.
•
If we fail to obtain PNTR, we will lose the full benefits of the agreement. In a global
economy, with global markets, your companies will be shut off from one-fifth of the worldwhile your European, Japanese, and other competitors will be the beneficiaries of the very
good deal we neg9tiated. But failure would also send a penatrating signal to the rest of the
world that America truly has turned inward. That would be devastating for our future.
•
At the moment of America's greatest strength and influence, we must be leading the world,
and embracing change, not turning from it. I look forward to working with you to pass
PNTR and take one more step to a more stable, prosperous world.
'
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
00 1. statement
SUBJECTrriTLE
DATE
Personal (Partial) (1 page)
02/19/2000
RESTRICTION
P6/b(6)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Speechwriting (Paul Orzulak)
ONBox Number: 4022
FOLDER TITLE:
China [Folder 1) [I]
2008-0702-F
·m606
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�2/19/00 6:00 p.m.
Orzulak
PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON
TOAST REMARKS AT THE STATE DINNER
FOR THE KING AND QUEEN OF SPAIN
· THE WHITE HOUSE
.·FEBRUARY 23, 2000
Your highnesses; members ofthe Spanish delegation; ladies and gentlemen: agal.n, on behalf of
the American people, I am delighted to welcome the King and Queen back to the United States.
In this house of the people, it is wonderful to welcome a monarch of the people.
Over the past seven years, Hillary and I have had the pleasure of sharing several special
occasions with King Juan Carlos and Queen Sofia.
·Five years ago, I welcomed them to the White House on the occasion of their son's graduation
from my alma mater, Georgetown University. On that day, the King and Queen also received
honorary degrees. The King joked that the reason the University gave him the degree was that if
his son started bragging about his Master's, he could say:· yes, but I am a doctor.
Two years later, they hosted Hillary, Chelsea, and me a few weeks after Chelsea graduated from
high school. For me, it was the fulfillment of a lifelong dream. When I was a graduate student
more than 30 years ago, I took a trip to Alhambra, in Granada. I saw the most beautiful sunset I
had ever seen. I promised myself that one day, I would return. The King and Queen helped
make that return trip possible- in a style slightly better than what I had known as a grad student.
I am forever grateful.
[oot]
Our friendship is just the latest chapter in a long history of friendship between our nations. Five
hundred years ago, Spain was the world's leading power, and the Spanish of that day left a
legacy of courage and vision that will never be forgotten. Today, the only foreign citizen we
celebrate with a national holiday in America is Christopher Columbus. The land on which I was
born was once part of the Spanish empire. For some time now, Spanish has been this country's
unofficial second language. By the middle of this century, almost half of the United States is
expected to be Spanish-speaking.
·-----
�. ?
2/19/00 5:00p.m.
Orzulak
PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON·
REMARKS AT THE STATE ARRIVAL CEREMONY
FOR THE KING AND QUEEN OF SPAIN
THE SOUTH LAWN
FEBRUARY 23, 2000
Your majesties; members of the Spanish delegation; ladies and gentlemen: on behalf of
the people of the United States, I am delighted to welcome the King and Queen of Spain
back to America. A quarter century ago, the very first trip King Juan Carlos made
overseas after his Proclamation as King was to the United States. Your majesty, we are
honored that you decided to celebrate the 25th anniversary of that journey -and the
friendship between our nations - by making America your first stop overseas in a new
century.
In the life ofevery democracy, there is one defining moment that stands.above all the
rest. It is Abraham Lincoln at Gettysburg. It is Lech Walesa raising a fist in a Polish
shipyard. It is students with sledgehammers standing atop the Berlin Wall. It is Nelson
.
.
Mandela raising his right hand and taking the oath of office in South Africa.
Nineteen years ago today, Spain had one of those moments. ln the early evening hours
ofFebruary 23rd, 1981, 200 armed militia in Madrid stormed the Parliament in a coup.
They fired automatic weapons. They took every major elected figure in Spain hostage.
Many feared that Spain's two-year old experiment with democracy was over.
But when angry generals swarmed the royal palace and urged the King to join their
rebellion, the King defiantly replied: "your coup will succeed over my dead body."
Instead, he rallied the people of Spain. He appealed to the military's sense ofhorior. He
stood strong. Less than 24 hours after it began, the coup was over. Freedom was secure .
in Spain and in Europe's west. A few years later, it would be reborp. in Europe's east.
And Europe's newest democracies looked to Spain for their example. When we complete
the task qf building ari undivided, democratic peaceful Europe, we will owe a great debt
to King Juan Carlos.
For more than five centuries, our two nations have been united by a common history.
Today, we· are united hy common values and common responsibilities.
.
.
. Spain has taken a leading role in NATO and the EU. In ~osovo, Spanish pilots, soldiers,
and police have performed with great bravery - and in April, the command of KFOR will
fall to the skilled hands of a Spanish Commander.
�.,..:.
·Spain has also stood with the United States to promote democracy in Latin America.
With its support of hurricane victims in Honduras and Guatemala and floods in
Venezuela, Spain is also one of the leading champions of the human spirit. We look
forward to the conference Spain is hosting in June to promote a better life for the people
of Colombia. Spain has also demonstrated real leadership in advancing the cause of
human rights in Cuba.
Your Majesty, on this same lawn 25 years ago, you said that your greatest wish was that
your visit "would contribute to reinforcing the bonds of friendship between us for the
good· of our two countries and all those who aspire to attain the same ideals of faith,
freedom, and justice." Today, I think it's fair to say: it has. May your wish that day be
our hope and our guide for the 21st Century. You honor us once again with your visit,
and again, we welcome you to America.
�'
..
!.•
217/00 3:30p.m.
Orzulak
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
REMARKS TO
THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE
ON CHINA
WASHINGTON, D.C.
FEBRUARY 8, 2000
It seems hard to believe that it was six years ago when I first met with some of you to discuss the
North American Free Trade Agreement. That was one of the toughest fights that w~ have had
since 1993. But when I wake up in the morning and see that America now has the longest
economic expansion in our history -- and I see both Mexico and Canada enjoying opportunities
.
.
they never had before -- I know that NAFTA and our commitment to open trade had something
to do with that. I'm grateful for all the hard work that you did to get it passed.
But this year, we have a fight on our hands that will make NAFTA look like a walk in the park.
Unlike the battle over NAFTA, this fight involves two issues that- individually and togethermake up the third rail of American politics today: trade and China. The fight over China's entry
into the World Trade Organization going to be unlike anything we've ever seen. Unless we are
· willing to go all-out to get this passed- starting today -we are not going to win .
. There is no question that this agreement will be an absolute home run for America. For years,
China has had open access to our markets, while its markets have been in mariy ways closed to
American products and American services. This agreement requires China to open its market on
everything from agriculture to manufacturing to high tech- while we have agreed only to
\
· maintain the market access we already offer to China. It directly responds to concerns about
unfair trade practices in China. For the first time, US. companies will be able to competitively
sell and distribute in China products made by American workers here at home, rather than· being
forced to open factories there.
�---
2 .
For an industry like autos, for example, the agreement would cut tariffs by nearly 75 percent
American auto makers will no longer have to find a Chinese middle-man to sell through, or to
transfer technology to their Chinese competitors. And American manufacturers, for the first
time, will be free to use parts made in America for assembly in China, to set up their own
distribution centers, to run their own service shops, and to provide their own financing. Take
that example and multiply it across our othef.industries -from manufacturing to agricultureand you begin to get rui idea of what this agreement wouid mean to both of our economies.
All of you already know that You also know that when you talk to Members of Congress, most
are not going to challenge you on economic grounds. Whatthey'll come back to you and say is:
China is a growing th_reat to Taiwan and its neighbors, and we shouldn't strengthen it Or China
is a blight on labor rights and environmental standards, and we shouldn't engage it Or China is
.a dangerous
proliferC~;tor,
and we shouldn't empower it. And many, if not most, of the concerns
they will raise on these issues will be.absolutely legitimate.
But this debate should not be. defined in terms of economic rights versus human rights - or
economic security versus national security- because it is a trap, it's a false choice. To me,
bringing China into the WTO is about so much more than trade. This agreement is just as vital if not more vital- to our national security as it is to our economic sec~rity. If we are going to
win this fight, all of you are going to have to carry the argument that it promotes both. So I
.·
want to talk for a few minutes tonight about how this agreement will advance our nation'!l
interests by encouraging the right kind of change in China.
To understand how, we need to understand the dilemma China finds itself in today. Over the
last 20 years, China has made remarkable progress in building a new economy,lifting more than
200 million people out of absolute poverty. But it still faces daunting economic problems. Its
system is plagued by corruption. Private enterprise still accounts for less than one-third of
China's economy. China's workforce is-increasing by 12 million each year. Millions are
�3
migrating from the countryside, where they see nq future, to the cities, where only some find
work. And economic growth has slowed just when it needs to be rising to create new jobs.
China clearly cannot maintain stability or ensure prosperity by maintaining the status quo.
Hence the dilemma: China's leaders realize that opening China's antiquated markets to global
competition risks unleashing forces beyond their control -- unemployment, social unrest,
increasing domestic pressure for political change. Yet, if they don't move forward, China
cannot make the next critical leap in development, because without competition from the
outside, it will not build world-class industries that can· survive in the global economy.
With this agreement, China has chosen to speed the opening of its economy, despite the political
risks that entails. Opponents of this agreement need to answer the question: do they really want
us to reject that choice? The fact is, our interest lies in encouraging both stability and change in
China by encouraging it to meet, not stifle, the growing demands of its people for openness,
accountability, freedom, and reform. And bringing China into the WTO will help in three ways.
First, it will obligate China to deepen its market reforms. With lower tariffs, and greater
competition, its private sector will expand; its state sector will shrink.
The introduction of competition results in natural pressure for progress. A decade ago, China's
best and brightest college students sought jobs in the government, in large state-owned firms or
state-run research institutions or universities.
Mo~e
and more, the best and brightest either are
starting their own companies or choosing to work for foreign-invested companies -where they
generally get higher pay, a better work environment, and a chance to get ahead based on merit,
not political connections.
U.S. companies are the leaders in China in developing human resources- by emphasizing
teamwork and respect for individual rights. In turn, Chinese firms are increasingly learning that
�4
unless they change their working style and treat employees with respect, they will lose the top ·
talent. This process will only accelerate as China joins the WTO, and we should do all we can to
encourage it, because it will lift the standards for Chinese workers- and their expectations.
Second, by speeding economic change, the agreement we reached has the potential to encourage
China to evolve into a more open society. ·
In the past, the Chinese state was every citizens' employer, landlord, shopkeeper, and news
provider all rolled into one. By advancing the flow of information, the pace of privatization, and
the forces of competition, this agreement will accelerate a process that is removing government
from vast areas of people's lives. By giving investors and property owners predictability and
protection against arbitrary government ~ction, it reinforces the .idea that individuals have rights.
Finally, by opening China's telecommunications market to cutting-edge American technology
and international firms, the WTO agreement will help bring the information revolution to cities
arid towns across China. A year ago, China had two million Internet addresses. Today, it has
nine million. Soon, people in some of the most remote villages in interior China will have access
to CNN. And as theibecome more mobile, more p.rosp~rous,. and more aware of alternative
ways of life, I believe they will seek a stronger voice in shaping their destiny.
Of course, just two weeks ago, Beijing announced thatit was cracking down on the Internet. It's
outrageous-- but it's also.futile. In this information age, cracking down on the Internet is like
King Canute trying to still the waters.· Indeed, that the Chinese government is pushing back
against the increasing flow of information to the Chinese people only proves that the. changes
.
China is undergoing are real and threatening to the status quo. This kind. of repression is not an
argument for slowing down the effort to bring China into the world; it's
accelerating it.
an argument for
�5
In the end, as China opens to the information economy, it can succeed only as it liberates the
minds of its people and empowers the individual. You know all too well: in this age, you
cannot expect people to be creative economically and stifled politically. Bringing China into the
WTO doesn't guarantee it will choose political reform. But by accelerating the process of
economic change, it will force China to confront that choice sooner, and make the imperative for
the right choice far more powerful.
This agreement will advance our national interests in a third way: it increases the chance that 'in
the new century China will be on the inside of the international system, playing by the rules,
instead of on the outside, denying them.
Under the terms ofthis agreements, some of China's most important decisions will be subject,
I
for the first time, to the review of an international-body. Why does that matter? Quite simply, it
applies to China the basic principle at the heart of the concept of the rule of law: that
governments cannot behave arbitrarily·at home or abroad, that their actions are subject to rules
consistently applied. Remember, China is choosing to
embra~e
these obligations. As China
becomes a stakeholder in the WTO and other international regimes, it will be more likely to
accept the legitimacy of international norms, and define its future within the global community,
not outside of it.
We don't underestimate for a second how hard this is going to be. We have a strange coalition
working against us, from labor to the faith-based community to the far right. There are a lot of
reasons why people are against this
Some will say: it doesn't matter what we agree to because China will just break its promises.
Of course, we cannot know for sure. But we do have reasons to believe that it will comply, and
mechanisms to reinforce that. First, China is pledging to open its economy and its markets not
just as a means of getting in the WTO, but because most of China's leaders believe reform is in
�6
China's interest. Second, if China violates its commitments, we're still in a better position,
because it will confront judgments backed by a 135-member body, rather than being able to
chalk it up to supposed U.S. bullying.
Some will say that if we let China into the WTO, it will give China a platform to weaken norms
on labor rights and environmental standards. But the fact is, most members of the WTO already
are developing countries, with the same concerns that trading rules not become an instrument to
restrict their growth. China's membership won't change that equation. And considering the fact
that China is home to one-fifth of the world's people and the source of a rising share of
greenhouse gas emissions, it is hard to imagine an effective global effort to meet those
environmental challenges without China.
Others will argue that granting China permanent normal trade relations status is granting a favor
that China hasn't earned. But it's important to understand what PNTR means: simply that we
will give China the same tariff schedule we have given to 132 of the 134 countries in the WTO,
and China will do likewise for us. It would eliminate the annual vote on China's trade status,
which we do not apply to any other WTO member. Some have said we need the annual vote to
address other concerns we have with China, on human rights, proliferation, or religious freedom.
But Congress always has the authority to address any part of our relationship with any nation,
including China. And the annual China trade vote has not been an effective instrument. It
simply has affirmed our trading relationship with China for 20 years in a row.
Finally, others will argue that we are sacrificing human rights on the altar of trade. In fact,
locking China out of the WTO would be a blow to the very cause they and we support. It would
leave the Chinese people with less access to information, less contact with the democratic world,
and more resistance from their government to outside influence and ideas. And no one could
possibly benefit from that except the most rigid, anti-democratic elements in China itself That's
d
one reason reformers like Martin Lee and dissidents like Ren Wanding support this agreement.
�7
But we also have to make clear: bringing China into the WTO is not, by itself, a human rights
policy for the United States. The reality is that China continues today to 'suppress the voices of
those who challenge the rule of the Communist Party. It will change only by a combination of
internal pressures for change and external validation of its human rights struggle. And we must
maintain our leadership in the latter, even as the WTO agreement contributes to the former.
That's why we sanctioned China as a "country of particular concern" under the International
Religious Freedom Act last year. It is why we are once again sponsoring a resolution in the UN
Human Rights Commission condemning China's human rights record. We will continue to press
China to respect global norms on non-proliferation; to encourage a peaceful resolution of issues
with Taiwan; to urge China to be part of the solution to the problem of global climate change.
In other words, we must not .and we are not relying on the invisible han~ of the market to do all
our heavy lifting with China, and neither should the private sector. What does that mean for
American companies doing business in China? It means recommitting yourselves to the
upholding the environmental standards and labor rights in China to which you adhere in this
country. It means pressing Chinese authorities to move further and faster toward economic
reform, the rule of law, and respect for human rights, for that is the only way China can avoid
instability and realize its growth potential. It also means working with some of the one million
nonprofit and social organizations that have emerged in China and that are working to reform the
system from within, like the U.S.-China Business Council's Legal Cooperation Fund- which
among other things, has an active campaign underway to encourage respect for intellectual
property rights. We have argued that American business can be a force for change in China.
Part of your job is to prove us right.
But first, we have to get this agreement through the United States Congress. I'll promise you
this: we are going to do our part. We already are. But I have to tell you: there's great
skepticism among the people that I talk to on the Hill about whether the business community can
�0
8
deliver on trade. When I talk with Members who support the agreement about whether this is
doable, many people say that the conventional wisdom is that business is a paper tiger. Paper
tigers don't slay dragons.
This is not something you can do through your Washington representatives alone, as capable as
they are. This can only be done if you and your fellow CEOs get personally involved and
engaged in this debate. The other side certainly isn't waiting for us. Labor unions are working
against it. Democratic leaders are warning that it will split the party. Republican leaders are
reporting defections. And the press is nearly united in their belief that this is an uphill fight in
any year, let alone an election year.
[Unless you the business community get involved with a full-court press in this debate today, a
year from npw, we're going to be asking the question: who lost China?] If this agreement fails,
we risk losing the full market access benefits of the agreement. In a global economy, all of you
would.be put at an enormous disadvantage, essentially shut offfroin one fifth of the worldwhile our European, Japanese, and other competitors would be more than willing to fill the void.
Only you can calculate what that failure would mean to your own businesses. But let me tell
you what it would mean for our country. On the heels of last year's defeat of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, it would send a signal to the rest of the world that America
truly has turned inward- which would be devastating. It would mean to all of our allies and
partners that in today's global economy, America's word is not its bond.
We can't afford that. Since President Nixon went to China in 1972, the United States has
worked for the emergence of a China that contributes to peace in Asia. A China with an
economy that is open to American products, farmers, and businesses. A China whose people
have access to ideas and information, that upholds the rule of law at home and adheres to global
rules on everything from non-proliferation to human rights to trade. This agreement is an
�.--------------
..
9
unprecedented opportunity to advance all of those goals. Let us do all we can in the next year to
take advantage of that opportunity and_ turn those goals into reality. Thank you.
�U.S. Security Interests in China's Entry into the World Trade Organization
Samuel R. Berger
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
-trvf·
Today, Congress holds its first hearings on the agreement we reached last fall to bring China into
the World Trade Organization. The discussion will likely focus on the economic benefits,
which are substantial. In a global economy, with global markets, the agreement will
nJ O'f
Yh -i.
wh..:J
s~
dramatically expand our access to one-fifth of the world's population. It requires China to open
its markets on everything from agriculture to manufacturing, while we agree only to maintain the
CoJfj·ufv
market access we already give China. And it will create jobs and expo its for Americans by
1
allowing our companies, for the first time, to competitively sell products in China without having
to open factories in China itself. But bringing China into the WTO is about much more than
trade: it will also advance America's national security by encouraging change' within China.
\~....
To understand why, we need to understand the dilemma China finds itself in today: Over the last
20 years, China has lifted more than 200 million people out of absolute poverty. But its
workforce is increasing by 12 million each year. Millions are migrating from the countryside,
where they see no future, to cities, where only some find work. And economic growth has
slowed just when it needs to be rising to create new jobs.
China's leaders face a dilemma: opening China's antiquated markets to global competition risks
unleashing forces beyond their control -- unemployment, social unrest, increasing domestic
pressure for political change. Yet, if they don't open their economy to outside competition,
China will not build world-class industries that can survive in the global economy.
•l'!lf4f{(
�·2
With this WTO agreement, China has chosen to speed the opening of its economy, despite the
political risks. Do we really want to reject that choice? On the contrary. Our interests lie in
embracing it.
Bringing China into the WTO will promote the change we seek in three ways.
First, it will obligate China to deepen its market reforms. With lower tariffs, and greater
competition, China's private sector will expand; its state sector will shrink. Chinese firms will
learn that unless they treat employees with greater respect, they will lose the top talent to foreign
companies, which offer better pay and a chance to get ahead based on merit. This will lift
standards for Chinese workers- and their expectations.
Second, by speeding economic change, the agreement has the potential to encourage China to
evolve into a more open society. The Chinese state was once every citizens' employer, landlord,
shopkeeper, and news provider rolled into one. By advancing the flow of information, the pace
of privatization, and the force of competition, this agreement will accelerate a process that is
removing government from vast areas of people's lives. By opening China's
telecommunications market, the WTO agreement will help bring the information revolution to
cities and towns across China. China's government may be trying to control Internet content,
but the effort is futile and' it simply proves how threatening these changes are to the status quo.
To continue to grow, China will have to come to terms with the fact that in today's informationdriven economy, people cannot be creative economically and stifled politically. Bringing China
into the WTO will not guarantee it will choose political reform. But by hastening economic
change, it will force China to confront that choice sooner, and make the imperative for the right
choice more powerful.
�-~----------------------------------------,
"'·
3
Third, this agreement will increases the chance that in the new century China will be on the
inside of the international system, playing by the rules, instead of on the outside, denying them.
By joining the WTO, China has agreed to subject some of its most important economic
decisions, for the first time, to the review of an international body. As China becomes a
stakeholder in the WTO and other international regimes, it will be more likely to define its future
within the global community. And if China violates its commitments, it will confront judgments
backed by all 13S.members of the WTO, rather than being able to chalk up friction to supposed
U.S. bullying.
This agreement is not, by itself, a human rights policy for the United States. Change in China
will only come through a combination of internal pressure and external validation of those who
struggle for a political voice. That's why we are once again sponsoring a resolution in the UN
Human Rights Commission condemning China's human rights record, and why we have
sanctioned China as a ''country of particular conc~rn" under the International Religious Fr~edom
Act. We will also continue to press China to respect global norms on non-proliferation; to
encourage a peaceful resolution of issues with Taiwan; to urge China to help us solve the
problem of global climate change.
We will continue to protect our interests with firmness and candor. But we must do so without
isolating the Chinese people from the global forces empowering them to build a better future.
For that would leave them with less access to information, less contact with the democratic
world, and more resistance from their government to outside influence and ideas. No one could
possibly benefit from that except the most rigid, anti-democratic elements in China itself We
must not give them a victory by locking China out of the global trading system.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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AND TYPE
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SUBJECTffiTLE
To National Security Advisor from Paul Orzulak. Subject: Revised
SRB China remarks to Business Roundtable (I page)
02/08/2000
RESTRICTION
P5
COLLECTION:
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National Security Council
Speechwriting (Paul Orzulak)
OA/Box Number: 4022
FOLDER TITLE:
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2008-0702-F
'm606
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act- 144 U.S.C. 2204(a)l
Freedom of Information Act- 15 U.S.C. 552(b)l
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.
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency ](b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute ](b)(3) of the FOIAI
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information ](b)(4) of the FOIAI
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy ](b)(6) of the FOIAI
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
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financial institutions ](b)(8) of the FOIAI
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells ](b)(9) of the FOIA]
National Security Classified Information ](a)(l) of the PRAI
Relating to the appointment to Federal office ](a)(2) of the PRAI
Release would violate a Federal statute l(a)(3) of the PRAI
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information ](a)(4) of the PRA]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors ]a)(S) of the PRAI
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
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DATE
SUBJECTrriTLE
re: Draft National Security Advisor Samuel E. Berger remarks to the
Business Roundtable on China (8 pages)
02/08/2000
RESTRICTION
P5
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Speechwriting (Paul Orzulak)
ONBox Number: 4022
FOLDER TITLE:
China [Folder I] [I]
2008-0702-F
'm606
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act- ]44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act -]5 U.S.C. 552(b)l
National Security Classified Information ](a)(l) of the PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office ](a)(2) of the PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute ](a)(J) of the PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information ](a)(4) of the PRA]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors ]a)(S) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy ](a)(6) of the PRAl
b(l) National security classified information l(b)(l) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency ](b)(2) of the FOIAl
b(J) Release would violate a Federal statute ](b)(J) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information ](b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy l(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes ](b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions ](b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells ](b)(9) of the FOIA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
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�'
02/08/00
\
s
TUE 16:35 FAX
n~·
APNSA
@OOl
Mona K. (N
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Orzulak, PaulK. (SPCHW)
Tuesday, February 08, 2000 1:57PM .
.
@NSA - Natl Security Advisor
@SPEECH - NSC Speechwriters; @PRESS- Public Affairs; @ASIA -Asian Affairs:
@LEGAL - Legal Advisor
Latest SRB China Remarks to the Business Roundtable [UNCLASSIFIED]
For SRB:
With your latest changes, including a new line on what a "strong China~~ could mean.
As for your Internet question, I think King Canute still works better tlhan waving a red·
flag in front of a bull. As much as cracking down on the Internet will goad many
Chinese into additional subversion, the larger issue is the even more subversive fact
that the Internet is really a tool that is ultimately beyond the Communists' ability to stop
or control.
1
�_ _ Q2/0S/OO
TUE 16:35
FAX
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141002
2/8/00 2:00p.m.
Orzulak
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
REMARKS TO
THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE
ON CHINA
WASHINGTON, D.C.
FEBRUARY 8, 2000
Thank you, Bob Burt. Please forgive me if I was a few minutes late. I was trying to leave for
my speech, but members of my staff only wanted to talk about which actor would be playing
them in tomorrow night's episode of"The West Wing." Actually, I have a prob]em with that
show. In the cast, they have actors who portray the President, the Vice President, the Chief of
Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff, the Press Secretary,
~ven the speechwriter.
But despite the
fact that many episodes involve foreign policy decisions - fateful decisions of war and peace -there is no National Security Advisor.
It's probably just as well, considering how Hollywood has portrayed national security advisors
recently. He was a stuffed shirt in "the Peacemaker." An egomaniac killed off in "Air Force
One." A calculating sell-out in "Clear and Present Danger." And just last week on television, as
a zealot with really bad hair in "Murder at 160,0." I can't imagine who was the model for these
characters, but let me stress that each ofthese movies wadn process before I assumed the job.
It seems hard to believe that it was seven years ago when I first met with The Business
Roundtable at the start ofthis Administration. Back then, one of the most popular books in the
nation was entitled "America: What Went Wrong?'! Time Magazine had a story that asked: "is
the U.S. in an irreversible decline as the world's premier power." Seven years later, America is
. th e m1 st of t he 1
'd
.
. m ftJdi~'.f
.1.
.
m
ongest economic expans10n . o~istory. 0 ur m11tary stn:mgtl11s
unchallenged. Our alliances are strong. And our values are ascendant around the world. Today,
if you ask the question: "America: What Went Right," a big part of the answer is that we have a
private sector willing to take risks and do what it takes to succeed in the global economy. I want
�02/0S/00 TUE 16:35 FAX
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2
to thank you all for the role you have played in creating .this unprecedented moment of prosperity
for our nation.
Tonight, I want to talk to you about a decision our country will make this year that is critical not
only for your companies and industries, but for our nation and the world: China's entry into the
World Trade Organization. Last fall, our negotiators completed an historic agreement with the
Chinese. But before America can realize the full market-opening benefits of Chlnese entry into
the WTO, Congress must answer a simple question: will it grant China pennan1;:nt Normal Trade
. Relations, the same arrangement we have given to 132 ofthe 134 countries in the ~TO. Or will
Congress turn its back on the sweeping changes China has agreed to make and risk losing ground
on the issues we all care about?
I don't believe there can be a serious question that this agreement is in America's economic
interest For years, China has had open access to our markets, while its markets have been~
e;-.;::a, close~
American products and American s.;.;ces. This agreement
requir~
~ open its market on everything from agriculture to manufacturing to high tech - while we have
/
agree~ to maintain the market access we already offer to China.
For the ±iLrst time, U.S ..
companies will be able to competitively sell and distribute in China products made by American
workers here at home,
~8i than b~ £gF~o:81:l te e~M faetori@s Hier~d it responds to
concerns about unfair trade practices in China, and about the dangers·ofimport surges.
economic grounds. Critics are m<?re likely to say that: ·china is a growing threat to Taiwan and
its neighbors, and we shouldn't strengthen it. China is a drag on labor rights and environmental
standards) and we shouldn't engage it. China is an offender of human rights, and we shouldn't
reward it. China is a dangerous proliferator, and we shouldn)t empower it.
�02/0B/00
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s--b
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IW~~~~M'liiL.JPrT the concerns they raise on these issues are ~ legitimate. I share
them. But this debate should not be defined as economic rights versu·s human rights - or
0
~
. economic security versus national securi~- boe!!Plse~at is a tra13 ~ fa]se choice. lMiB~i~
-Ghi:Ha iatel!Re vn'O is aeeat fa£ mere tfimt hadt:. This agreement is just as vital - jf not more
vita] - to our national security as it is to our economic security. It is far more likely to move
China in the right direction-
n~t the wrong direction -on all of our other concerns. ~·t
duck these issues by saying that
J~~';;fy interested in talking about economics.
If we are
going to win this debate, we must be persuasive that it promotes both growth and jobs in
America and progress toward change in China I want to talk for a few minutes tonight about
how this agreement will advance our overall national int~rests by encouraging the right kind of
change in China.
To understand how, we need to understand the dilemma China finds itself in today. Over the last
20 years; China has made remarkable progress in building a new economy, lifting more than 200
million people out of absolute poverty. But it still faces daunting economic problems, Its system
is plagued by corruptio'n. Private enterprise still accounts for less than one-third of China's
economy. China's workforce is increasing by 12 million each year. Millions are migrating from
the countryside, where they see no future, to the cities, where oniy some find work. And
economic growth has slowed just when it needs to berisingto create new jobs. China clearly
ca,nnot maintain stabi1ity or ensure prosperity by maintaining the status quo.
Hence the dilemma: China's leaders realize that opening China's antiquated markets to global
competition risks unleashing forces beyond its control -- unemployment, social unrest,
increasing domestic pressure for political change. Yet, if they don't move· fonllard, China cannot
make the next critical leap in development, because without competition from the outside, it will
not build world~class industries that can survive in the global economy.
�02!08/00
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APNSA
4 .
\Vhat does this mean for us? As the President said when Premier Zhu Rongji visited Washington
last year, "if we've learned anything in the last few years from Japan's long rece:ssion and
Russia's current economic troubles, it is that the weaknesses of great nations can pose as big a
· challenge as their strengths." There is a possibility that a strong China will one day emerge as a
threat to peace and stability in Asia, and to our security as welL But as we focus on the potential
challenges of a strong China, let us not forget the risks that could be posed by a weak China,
beset by internal conflicts, social dislocation, criminal activity, and large-scale ~:migration- a
vast zone of instability in Asia.
With this agreement, China has chosen to speed the opening of its economy, despite the political
risks that entails. Opponents of this agreement need to answer the question: de' they really want
us to reject that choice? The fact is, our interest lies in encouraging both stability and change in
China by encouraging it to meet, not stifle, the growing demands of its people for openness,
accountability, freedom, and refori.n. And bringing China into the WTO will hdp in three ways.
First, it will obligate China to deepen its market reforms. With lower tariffs, and greater
competition, its private sector will expand; its state sector will shrink
The introduction of competition results in natUral pressure for progress. A dec:ade ago, China's
best and brightest college students sought jobs in the government, in large state-owned firms or
state-run research institutions or universities. More and more, the best and brightest either are
.starting their own companies or choosing to work for foreign-invested companies - wh~re they
generally get higher pay, a better work envirorunent, and a chance to get ahead based on merit,
not political connections.
U.S. companies are the leaders in China in developing human resources- by emphasizing
teamwork and respect for individual rights. In tum, Chinese firms are increasingly learningand if they haven't, they will-- that unless they change their working style and treat employees
14]005
�• 02/0i!/00
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5
with respect, they will lose the top talent. .This process will only accelerate as China joins the
WTO, and we should do all we can to encourage it, because it will lift the standards for Chinese
workers - and their expectations.
Second, by speeding economic change, the agreement we reached has the potential to encourage
China to evolve into a more open society.
In the past, the Chinese state was every citizens' employer, landlord, shopkeeper, and news
provider all rolled into one. By advancing the flow of infonnation, the pace of privatization, and
. the forces of competition, this agreement will accelerate a process that is removing government
from vast areas of people's lives. And by giving investors and property owners predictability
. and protection against arbitrary government action, it reinforces the idea that individuals have
rights.
By opening China's telecommunications market to cutting-edge American teclmology and
mternational firms, the WTO agreement will help bring the information revolution to cities and
towns across China. A year ago, China had two m1111on Iritemet addresses. Today, it has nine
.million. Soon, people in some of the most remote villages in interior China willl have access to
CNN. And as they become more mobile, more prosperous, and more aware of a1temative ways
of life, I believe they will seek a stronger voice in shaping their destiny.
.
Of course, just two weeks ago, Beijing announced that it was cracking down on the Internet. It's
outrageous -- but it's also futik In this information age, cracking down on th~: Internet is like
King Canute trying to still the waters. Indeed, that t_he Chinese government is pushing back
against the increasing flow of information to the Chinese people only proves that the changes
China is undergoing are real and threatening to the status quo. This kind of repression is not an
argument for slowing down the effort to bring China into the world; it's an argument for
accelerating it.
�-
• 02/0I!/00 TUE 16:37 FAX
..- - . - - · - · · · - - - -
---
-·
APNSA - · - ·
--
6
In the end, as China opens to the information economy, it can succeed only as it liberates the
minds of its people and empowers the individual. You know all too well: creativity is
indivisible. In this age, you cannot expect people to be i1movative ec~nomically and stifled
politically. Bringing China into the WTO doesn't guarantee it will choose political reform. But
by accelerating the process of economic change, it will force China to confTOnt tib.at choice
sooner, and make the imperative for the right choice far more powerful.
This agreement will advance our national interests in a third way: it increases the chance that in
the new century China will be on the inside of the international system, playing by the rules,
instead of on the outside, denying them.
Under the terms of this agreements, some of China's most important decisions will be subject,
for the first time, to the review of an international body. Why does that matter? Quite si111ply, it
applies to China the basic principle at the heart ofthe concept of the rule oflaw: that
goverm11ents cannot behave arbitrarily at home·or abroad, that their actions are subject to rules
consistently applied. Remember, China is choosing to embrace these obligations. As China
becomes a stakeholder in the WTO and other international regimes, it will be more likely to
accept the legitimacy of international norms, and define its future within the global community,
not outside of it.
Opponents of this agreement will counter these arguments by saying it doesn't matter what we
agree to because China will just break jts promises. Of course, we cannot know for sure. But we
I
do have reasons to believe that it will comply, and mechanisms to reinforce that. First, China is
pledging to open its economy and its markets not just as a means of getting in the WTO, but
because most of China's leaders believe reform is in China's interest. Second, if China violates
. its commitments, we're still in a better position, because it will confront judgments backed by a
135-member body, rather than being able to chalk it up to supposed U.S. bullying.
141007
�•
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38
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--· - -
~008
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7
Some will argue that granting China permanent normal trade relations status is granting a favor
that China hasn't earned. But it's important that the public understand what PNTR means:
simply that we will give China the same tariff schedule we apply to almost every other nation in
'
the world, and China will do likewise for us. It would eliminate the annual vote on China's trade
status, which we ·do not apply to any other WTO member. Some argue we heed the annual vote
1k-
.
to addres~ther concerns we have with China, on human rights, proliferation, or religious
freedom. But Congress always has the authority to address any part of our relati
~ lfs.-f
IAl~ . ·
..
.
:if:,!"
natiOn, me1u d"mg China. And the annual Ch. trade vo[\lr:r;;J.p y 18 Ret aft e
ma
Ql
ship with any
Vf.
·
~ affirmed our trading relationship with China for 20 years in a row.
~
Vo~'
Finally, others will argue that we are sacrificing human rights on the altar of trade. In fact,
locking. China out of~e WTO would be a blow to the very cause they and we support. It would
leave the Chinese people with less access to information, less contact with the democratic world,
and more resistance from their government to outside influence and ideas. And no one could
possibly benefit from that except the most rigid, anti-democratic elements in China itself. That's
one reason reformers like Martin Lee and dissidents like Ren
W~~ort fu,)agreement. ·
Let me be clear: bringing China ~nto the WTO is not, by itself, a human rights policy for the
United States. The reality in China today is that Chinese authorities still tolerate no organized
political dissent or opposition. Because the Communist Party's ideology has been discredited in
China, and l:Jecause it lacks the legitimacy that can only come from democratic choice, it seeks to
~.
maintain its grip by suppressing other vo~hange will come only through a combination of
.
internal pressures for change and external validation of its human rights struggle. And we must
maintain our leadership in the latter, even as the WTO agreement contributes lo the former.
That's why we named China as a "country of particular concern" under the International
Religious Freedom Act last year. It is why we are once again sponsoring a resolution in the UN
Human Rights Commission condemning China's human rights record. We will continue to press
�•"-_ -ov--~
. . :li./00
FRI 11: 30 FAX
APNSA
141001
:.....;.:.::
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Malinowski, Tomasz P. (SPCHW)
Thursday, February 10, 2000 4:40PM
@NSA- Natl Security Advisor
@SPEECH - NSC Speechwriters; @ASIA- Asian Affairs; @PRESS - Public
Draft China op-ed [UNCLASSIFIED]
For SRB:
China op-ed. I've cut back to 899 words.
-Tom
-~SRB ChinD PNTR
(fJ__..
~ . . )l-ed- ~
Op-E<~_. doc
tultL
z
~~~
-~ ~~- '11- i1~ ~
FA_ a-~
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~.~
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1
�: . 02/11/00 FRI 11:30 FAX
---===------.---- · - -
141 002
APNSA
U.S. Security Interests
in China's EntrY. into the World Trade Organization
Samuel R. Berger
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Today, Congress holds its first hearings on the agreement we reached last fall to bring China into
.
(!)
.
the World Trade Organization on terms that will dramaticalJy open its market~~M:sa&Hge-for
.PeS'21HeBt "Nemtal TFEtee ~l!HieftS etBltiS. The discussion will likely focus on the economic
-i~~ 4.-U- IJI.fh~fid.
.
benefits of the agreement_at i sood; balQaaie tlie-agreement wil~~ our companies, for the
..
first time, !O compeiiti
se I pro ucts in
Lvu~i'
. -= .
C~de. by A
erican worke s ·
thanbeingforcedtoopenfacli':£~,_sut~a~
more than trade: it will also advan.ce America's national security by
~gewithinChina. ·
·
.
IIAA A..-b&:
~riCa, ra~;;.. ·
o;ytoutmuch
~
enc<i~ lila '!} 'ldad _!:1'/._
·- .
~/r-!fl tt.UIW'/
To understand why, we need to understand the dilemma China finds itself in today. Over the last
20 years, China has !milt"U new eeenvmy,
~re than 20o million people out of absolute
poverty_ But ~rivati eRterpFts~ei:U a.&ougt:a ti.lr less than one-tbjrd ofthat ec.oru~ ...Ghini!Pos
.
.
-Q3'it;FB: is fllagvee
tb· .
e" ee~en
.
.
.
""-workforce is increasing by 12 million each year. Millions
are migrating from the countryside, where they see no future, to cities, where only some find
work And economic growth has slowed just when it needs to be rising to create new jobs.
k~a...~:
· ...
.
China's le~ers~8!li• eaat opening China's antiquated markets to global comp~!tition risks
unleashing forces beyond their control -- unemplo)'II_lel'!-t, social unrest, increasing domestic
.
.
..
.
.
.
~~ e~_'*"/ !'D . .1~h~ I
pressure for poht1cal change. Yet, tfthey dontmgus fervza;Q., Chin;/ w1ll niJt -butl
.
industries that can survive in the global economy:
·
·
u~rldlcla~s
·
e:__~;dlt.
-
.
�··; .;...__02/ll/00
FRI 11:30 FAX
-----~
:
~
•r-
- - ---- ----
APNSA
141003
---·-
2
-
With this WTO agreement, China has chosen to speed the opening ,of its economy, despite the
political risks .. Do we really want to reject that choice? On the contrary, our interests lie in
embracing it,
Bringing China into the WTO will promote the. change we seek in three ways.
First, it will obligate China to deepen its market rejorms. With lower tariffs, and greater
competition, China's private sector will expand; its state sector will shrink. Chinese firms~
W\l.l~
..
..alnaay lis · 1\.that unless they treat employees with greater respect, they will lose the top talent
to foreign companies, which offer better pay, and a chance to get ahead based on merit. This
I
process will._., accelerate as China joins the WTO, and we should do all we can to encourage
it, because it will lift the standards for Chinese workers - and their expectations.
Second, by speeding economic change, the agreement
~e potentiai to encourage
Chinc:z .to evolve into a more .open society.
The Chinese state was . once every citizens' employer, landlord, shopkeeper, and news provider
.
rolled into one. By advancing the flow of information, the pace of privatization, and the force of
competition, this agreement will accelerate a process that is removing govemrru~nt from vast
areas of people's lives.
~_!y_opening China's telecommunications market, the WTO
agreement will help bring the information revolution to cities and towns across China. China's
rod-~·
.
.·
~·~,;.,~ ~
government may be tr)ring t~~~J;a.c;kmg do"lft ea t:h& internet, but ~~just proves
~
how nel tid threatening these changes are. We 9fteald lile ali w8 eaR tc 2'•el$:~ate ~m.
'j,o ~
lo ~·&h\) ")
.
. .
~~tatz·tPt - ~ ~ .
Ukiw~tt);=, China will have to come to terms with the fact that in today'1{conorny, people
cannot be creative economically and stifled politically. Bringing China into the WTO won't
�__
;: ·,~__Q21"11/00
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FRI 11:31 FAX
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- - ---
-·
-··
APNSA
141004
3
guarantee it will choose political reform. But by hastening economic change, it wHl force China
to confront that choice sooner, and rn~e ~e imperative for the right choice more powerful.
Third, this agreement will increases the chance that in the new century China will be on the
inside of the internationalsystem, playing by the ru.les, instead of on the outside, deny~ng them.
I
By joining the WTO, China has agreed to subject some of its most important decisions; for the
first time, to the review of an international body. As China becomes a stakeholder in the WTO
and other international regimes, it will be more likely to aEJEiiptllw
ligil~aQY ~i.at,emaa·ionaJ
-nm s; •8 define its future within the global community. And if China violates its_·.
commitments, it "Will confront judgments backed by all 135 roetp.bers ofthe WTO, ·rather than
being able to chalk up friction to supposed U.S. bullying.
·.
!4LIUil M1J ~ k ~ ~~~~ r1 ~ ~ll/IN
---efttfiilSe~s agreem~t is not, by 1tself, _a human-rights'i/olicy for the United Stales.
_..,., Cloi&a o...U..nes •o
'"''Pf"••llio voi<oe oflkoso wke ol!alliRBO tl>• ,..lo o·
-Party. That's why we are once again sponsoring a resolution in the UN Human Rights
Commission condemning China's human rights record, and why we have sanctioned China a
"country of particular concern" under the International Religious Freedom Act. We will als
~
st~
~
a ~
~
~
continue to press China to respect global norms on non-proliferation; to encoura,ge a peace . 1 AfDic.e_.
resolution of issues with Taiwan; to urge China: to help us solve the problem of global clima
change.
For that would leave them with less access to informatiOn, less contact with the democratic
world, and more resistance from their government to outside influence and ideas. No one could
�·~
· 02/''11/00
-~·.'·-.i-·
.
.
FRI 11:31 FAX
- - - - - - --·-
.;
-
-
APNSA
--
4
po,ssibly benefit fro~ that except the most rigid, anti-democratic elements in China itself. We
must not give them a victory by locking China out of the global trading system.
14]005
�'
/
...
TALKING POINTS ON CHINA/WTO
•
You know that passage ofPNTR is very important to me. It is one of the most important
things we can get done together.
•
As I have said before, we need to have a vote on this soon so that we will have the best
chance of passage.
•
You all have been terrific leaders of this effort in yourrespective caucus.
•
In particular I want to thank _Bob Matsui and Cal Dooley and David Dreier for working with ·
us and the outside community and really running the operation to see this legislation passed.
•
I also want to thank my cabinet, particularly the members here today, Trade Representative
Barshefsky, Secretary Glickman, and Secretary Daley as well as my National Security
Advisor, Sandy Berger and the Chairman of.the National Economic Council, Gene Sperling.
They have also been tireless in their efforts to make sure as many people as humanly possible
are aware of the benefits that this agreement will bring to the United States.
•
You all know by now that my chief of staff, John Podesta and his deputy Steve Richetti are
working with Secretary Daley and Chuck Brain and the entire administration to focus our
efforts and ensure a good vote in the Congress:
•
I plan to do my part.
•
I know that most of you heard me talk about this in the State of the Union, I have also talked
about it in Daves, and last Monday I even talked about it at the Democratic Caucus retreat.
As you know not everyone in the Democratic Caucus agrees with me -- with us -- that PNTR
for China is such a good deal, but this is so important that I do not feel I can miss any
opportunity to stress it.
•
I will continue to talk about China!WTO, and my cabinet will continue to talk about this
every opportunity we get or can make.
•
We had a very good event last week that John Podesta with representatives from the
agriculture community and I know that votes prevented a number of you from joining us in
that effort. We will continue to have opportunities to work together like that and I hope we
will take advantage of them.
•
I plan to deliver a speech on China this month to highlight the benefits that will flow to the
American people if we grant PNTR status to China. I want people to understand that China
is opening its market, that China is making the concessions in this deal. And I want to
underline the national security stakes in our relationship with the Chinese.
�2
•
We will also arrange in the next month an event to shine the spotlight on high-tech
opportunities to expand trade and open new channels for American ideas and values to filter
into China.
•
Finally we'll be organizing a Congressional Delegation visit to China, possibly in April. I
encourage you to think about how we can use this to best effect.
•
I know that you are familiar with the agreement and share my view that it is good for~
America-R ~eg~le and 8QQQ iQr tke i-RterA:a.tigaal tradias gygte~ •
. .........Ld.Q!J' tJ?..~li~Y..~Jh~r~..!;;.~.JL~-~..~eriou.§_QlJyJiJipn th~Uh~§..J!gr~~m~.nu.~...in..Am~.ri~~~§....int.~r.~~.L
!
This agreement requires that China open its market on everything from agriculture to
manufacturing- while we agree only to maintain the market access we already offer to
China. It will create jobs and exports for Americans by allowing our companies, for the first
time, to competitively sell products in China without having to open factories in China
itself. And it responds to unfair trade practices in China, including import surges.
! ..........Ih~..imP9.rt.~.~~..9f...thi~...~g.r~~.!!W.l.l.1.,gQ.~§...f~r...b.~Y.91.l.d....i.t.~ ...~!;;9.!19m.k.b.~n.~fil~., ..@!;L~9.. .d.Q.~.~-..th~.
debate that surrounds it. In our talks with Members of Congress, most do not challenge the
agreement on economic grounds. Critics say: China is a growing threat to Taiwan and its
neighbors, and we shouldn't strengthen it. China is a drag on labor and environmental
standards, and we shouldn't engage it. China is an offender of human rights, and we
shouldn't reward it. But we cannot let this be defined as economic rights versus human
rights- or economic security versus national security. It's a trap, a false choice.
•
This agreement is just as vital- if not more vital -to our national security as it is to our
economic security. To understand how, we need to understand the dilemma China finds
. itself in today. Over the last 20 years, China has lifted more than 200 million people out of
absolute poverty. But its workforce is increasing by 12 million each year. Millions are
migrating from the countryside, where they see no future, to cities, where only some find
work. And economic growth has slowed just when it needs to be rising to create new jobs.
! .........C.h~n.~.~-~--k~d.~.r~...f.~£~...~...d.iJ~mm~.;.....9P~l.l.~ng.,Ch.il.l.~.~.§...~n.t.iqJJ..~t.~d... m.M.k.~t.~...t9.. gl.g_b.~L£9P.JP.~liti9n
risks unleashing forces beyond their control -- unemployment, social unrest, increasing
domestic pressure for political change. Yet, if they don't open their economy to outside
competition, China will not build world-class industries that can survive in the global
economy. With this WTO agreement, China has chosen to speed the opening of its economy,
despite the political risks. Do we really want to reject that choice? On the contrary. Our
interests lie in embracing it.
•
Bringing China into the WTO will promote the change we seek in three ways.
! ........Eir.$..f.•...i.t.. w..t.ll. 9kligqt.?.. . Cb..i.n.rJ...t.9. 4.?.J~P.?..!1...i.t.§. .m.fl:.r..k.?..Lr..?i9.r..m.$..,_ _ _W...it.b.J9w.~r...t~.ri.ff~, . .~.d. gr.~~t~.r
competition, China's private sector will expand; its state sector will shrink. Chinese firms
will learn that unless they treat employees with greater respect, they will lose the top talent to
�3
foreign companies, which offer better pay and a chance to get ahead based on merit. This
will lift standards for Chinese workers- and their expectations .
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to evolve into a more open society. The Chinese state was once every citizens' employer,
landlord, shopkeeper, and news provider rolled into one. By advancing the flow of
information, the pace of privatization, and the force of competition, this agreement will
accelerate a process that is removing government from vast areas of people's lives. By
opening China's telecommunications market, the WTO agreement will help bring the
information revolution to cities and towns across China. China's government may be trying
to control Internet content, but the effort is futile and it simply proves howthreatening these
changes are to the status quo.
! ..........T..h.ir..4....t.h..i$..._qgr_~~.!JJ&IJ.t...i.n£r..~q~~!i...t.h.!i..£.b..f!.!1£~...t.h.qUn.t.h.~..n.~.w....£.?..!1lY.rY..ChinqJyi..l.l..!J..~.. .9n.t.h~.
inside of the international system, playing by the rules, instead of on the outside, denying
them. By joining the WTO; China has agreed to subject some of its most important economic
decisions, for the first time, to the review of an international body. As China becomes a
stakeholder in the WTO and other international regimes, it will be more likely to define its
future within the global community. And if China violates its commitments, it will confront
judgments.backed by all 135 members of the WTO, rather than being able to chalk up
friction to supposed U.S. bullying.
•
We must also make clear: This agreement is not, by itself, a human rights policy for the
·United States. Change in China will only come through a combination of internal-'pressure
and external validation of those who struggle for a political voice. That's why we are once
again sponsoring a resolution in the UN Human Rights Commission condemning China's
human rights record, and why we have sanctioned China as a "country of particular concern"
under the International Religious Freedom Act. We will also continue to press China to
respect global norms on non-proliferation; to encourage a peaceful resolution of issues with
Taiwan; to urge China to help us solve the problem of global climate change .
. .......Jf.:w.~.
!
.fi:!:.ilJ9. .9.b.tf!!n..P.NIR.•..w..~. w.iUJ.9.~.~...t.h.~. fuU . .b.~n.~fit.~. .Qf..t.h.~. i:l:gr.~~.m~nt..Jn.. i:l:..glg.b._i:!:.L
economy, with global markets, your companies will be shut off from one-fifth of the worldwhile your European, Japanese, and other competitors will be the beneficiaries of the very
good deal we negotiated. But failure would also send a penatrating signal to the rest of the
world, particularly after the Senate's rejection' last year of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty, that America truly has turned inward. That would be devastating for our future.
•
At the moment of America's greatest strength and influence, we must be leading the world,
and embracing change, not turning from it. I look forward to working with you to pass
PNTR and take one more step to a more stable, prosperous world.
BTI:le U.S!. Cl:liA:a VlTO agl"eemeA:t is sk9A:g, QQmpl"el:leA:sive, aA:d fwlly eA:tQI"Qe~le, QQYel"iA:g
agl"i•wl;wl"al pl"9dw•ts, iA:dwstl"ial ggggs, aad a bl"9ad l"aA:ge gf seP:'i€es. · It '),rill A:Q',Jl be easiel"
tQI" U.S!. QQmpaA:ies tg eKp91"t pl"9dw•ts tg Cl:liA:a dil"e€tl)', a.ad tg Q9mpete dil"e€tly iA: tl:lis vast
mad<et. Tl:lis 4 gl"eemeA:t ')/ill alsg stl"eA:gtl:leA: QWI" ~ilit)' tg asswl"e fail" kade aad tg dewA:d
�4
�Draft. China op-ed
As the China debate heats up in Congress, discussion will likely focus on the economic impact of
the agreement to permit China's entry into the World Trade Organization. That's good. The
agreement requires China to drastically open its market to American pr?ducts -- everything from
agriculture to manufacturing to high tech --while we have agreed only to maintain the market
access we already offer China. For the first time, U.S. companies will be able to competitively
sell and distribute products in China made by American workers here at home, rather than being
forced to open factories in China. But bringing China into the WTO is about much more than
trade: it will also advance our national security by encouraging the right kind of change in·
China.
To understand why, we need to understand the dilemma China finds itself in today. Over the last ·
20 years, China has made remarkable progress in building a new economy, lifting more than 200
million people out of absolute poverty. But it still faces daunting economic problems. Its system
is plagued by corruption. Private enterprise -which drives global competition - still accounts for
less than one-third of China's economy. China's workforce is increasing by 12 million each
year. Millions are migrating from the countryside, where they see no future, to the city, where
only sorrie find work. And economic. growth has slowed just when it needs to be rising to create
new jobs. China clearly_ cannot maintain stability or ensure prosperity by maintaining the status
quo .
.Hence the dilemma: China's leaders realize that .opening China's antiquated markets to global
competition risks unleashing forces beyond their control -- unemployment, political unrest,
increasing domestic pressure for political change. Yet, if they don't move forward, China cannot
make the next critical leap in development, because without competition from the outside, it will
not build world-class industries that can survive in the global economy.
�2
With this WTO agreement, China has chosen to speed the opening of its economy, despite the
risks. Do we really want to reject that
choic~?
Our interest lies in encouraging both stability and
change in China by encouraging it to meet; not stifle, the growing demands of its people for
·openness, accountability, freedom, and reform. Bringing China into the WTO will help in three
ways.
First, it will obligate China to deepen its market reforms. With lower tariffs, and greater
competition, its private sector will expand; its state sector will shrink.
The introduction of competition results in natural pressure for progress. More and more, the best
and brightest in China either are starting their own companies or choosing to work for foreigninvested companies-- to get higher pay, a better work environment, and a chance to get ahead
I
based on merit, not political connections. In tum, Chinese firms are increasingly learning that
unless they change their working style and treat employees with respect, they will lose the top
talent. This process will only accelerate as China joins the WTO, and we should do all we can to
encourage it, because it will lift the standards for Chinese workers - and their expectations.
Second, by speeding economic change, the agreement we reached has the potential to encourage
China to evolve into a more open society.
In the past, the Chinese state was every citizens' employer, landlord, shopkeeper, and news
provider all rolled into one. By advancing the flow of information, the pace of privatization, and
the force of competition, this agreement will accelerate a process that is removing government
from vast areas of people's lives .. And by opening China's telecommunications market, the
WTO agreement will help bring the information revolution to cities and towns across China.
�3
China's government has·recently been pushing back against the Internet and the increasing flow
of information to its people. But that just proves the changes China .is undergoing are real - and
threatening to the status quo. These repressive actions are not an argument for slowing the effort
to bring China into the world, but for accelerating it.
J
Ultimately, China will have to come to terms with the fact that in today's economy, people
cannot be creative economically and stifled politically. Bringing China into the WTO won't
guarantee it will choose political reform. But by hastening economic change, it will force China
to confront that choice sooner, and make.the imperative for the right choice more powerful.
This agreement will advance our national interests in a third way: it increases the chance that
in the new century China will be on the inside of the international system, playing by the rules,
instead of on the outside, denying them.
It subjects some of China's most important decisions, for the first time, to the review of an
international body. As China becomes a stakeholder in the WTO and 'other international regimes,
it will be more likely to accept the legitimacy of international norms, and define its future within
the global community, not outside of it. And if China violates its commitments, it will confront
judgments backed by all 135 members of the WTO, rather than being able to chalk up friction to
supposed U.S. bullying.
This agreement is not, by itself, a human rights policy for the United States. China continues
today to suppress the voices of those who challenge the rule of the Communist Party. It will
change only by a combination of internal pressures for change and external validation of the
human rights struggle. We must maintain our leadership in the latter, even as the WTO
agreement contribu~es to the former. That's why we sanctioned China as a "country of particular
concern" under the International Religious Freedom Act last year. It is why we are op.ce again
�4
sponsoring a resolution in the.UN Human Rights Commission condemning China's human rights
record. We will c~ntinue to press China to respect g;lobal norms on non-proliferation; to
encourage a peaceful resolution of issues with Taiwan; to urge China to. be part of the sqlution to
the problem of global climate change.
We will continue to protect our interests. with firmness and with candor. But we must do so in a
way that does not isolate the Chinese people from the global forces empowering them to build a
better future. For that would leave them with less access to information, less contact with the
democratic world, and more resistance from their government to outside influence and ideas·. No
\
one could possibly benefit from that except the most rigid, anti-democratic elements in China
itself. We must not give them a victory by locking China out of the global trading system.
�,. "''--'
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For hnmediate Release
February 11, 2000
As Prepared for Release
REMARKS BY SAMUEL R. BERGER
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
ON CHINA
The Business Roundtable
St. Regis Hotel
Washington, DC
February 8, 2000
It seems hard to believe that it was seven years ago when I first met with The Business
Roundtable. Back then, one of the most popular books in the nation was entitled "America:
What Went Wrong?" Time Magazine had a story that asked: "is the U.S. in an irreversible
decline as the world's premier power." Seven years later, America is in the midst of the
longest economic expansion in our nation's history. Our military strength is unchallenged.
Our alliances are strong. And our values are ascendant. Today, if you ask the question:
"America: What Went Right, " a big part of the answer is that we have a private sector willing
· to take risks and do what it takes to succeed in the global economy. I want to thank you all
for the role you have played in creating this unprecedented moment of prosperity for our
nation.
Tonight, I want to talk to you about a decision our country will make this year that is critical
not only for your companies and industries, but for ournation and the world: China's entry
into the World Trade Organization. Last fall, our negotiators completed an historic agreement
with the Chinese. But before America can realize the full market-opening benefits of Chinese
entry into the WTO, Congress must answer a simple question: will it grant China permanent
Normal Trade Relations, the same arrangement we have given to 132 of the 134 countries in
the WTO? Or will Congress turn its back on the sweeping changes China has agreed to make
and risk losi~g ground on the. issues we all care about?
I don't believe there can be a serious question that this agreement is in America's economic
interest. For years, China has had open access to our markets, while its markets have been
closed to American products and services. This agreement requires that China open its market
�2
on everything from agriculture to manufacturing - while we agree only to maintain the market
access we already offer to China. For the first time, U.S. companies will be able to
competitively sell and distribute in China products made by American workers here at home.
And it responds to unfair trade practices in China, including the dangers of import surges.
All of you already know that, of course, and I'm not going to regurgitate the considerable
economic benefits of this agreement tonight. Because the importance of this agreement goes
far beyond it manifest economic benefits. And so does the debate that surrounds it. In our
talks with Members of Congress, most do not challenge the agreement on economic grounds.
Critics are more likely to say that: China is a growing threat to Taiwan and its neighbors, and
we shouldn't strengthen it. China is a drag on labor rights and environmental standards, and ·
we shouldn't engage it. China is an offender of human rights, and we shouldn't reward it.
China is a dangerous proliferator, and we shouldn't empower it.
Most of the concerns they raise on these issues are legitimate. We in the Administration share
them. But this debate should not be defined as economic rights versus human rights -- or
economic security versus national security. That is a trap, a false choice. This agreement is
just as vital "if not more vital" to our national security as it is to our economic security. It is
far more likely to move China in the right direction -- not the wrong direction -- on all of our
other concerns. We can't duck these issues by saying that we're only interested in talking
about economics. If we are going to win this debate, we must be persuasive that it promotes
both growth and jobs in America and progress toward change in China I want to talk tonight
about how this agreement will advance our overall national interests by encouraging the right
kind of change in China.
To understand how, we need to understand the dilemma China finds itself in today. Over the
last 20 years, China has made remarkable progress in building a new economy, lifting more
than 200 million people out of absolute poverty. But it still faces daunting economic problems.
Its system is plagued by corruption. Private enterprise still accounts for less than one-third of
China's economy. China's workforce is increasing by 12 million each year. Millions are
migrating from the countryside, where they see no future, to the cities, where only some find
work. And economic growth has slowed just when it needs to be rising to create new jobs.
China clearly cannot maintain stability or, ensure prosperity by maintaining the status quo.
Hence the dilemma: China's leaders realize that opening China's antiquated markets to global
competition risks unleashing forces beyond its control -- unemployment, social unrest,
increasing domestic pressure for political change. Yet, if they don't move forward, China
cannot make the next critical leap in development, because without competition from the
outside, it will not build world-class industries that can survive in the global economy.
What does this mean for us? As, the President said when Premier Zhu Rongji visited
Washington last year, "if we've learned anything in the last few years from Japan's long
recession and Russia's current economic troubles, it is that the weaknesses of great nation~ can
pose as big a challenge as their strengths." There is a possibility that a strong China will one
�3
day emerge as a threat to peace and stability in Asia, and to our security as well. But as we
focus on the potential challenges of a strong China, let us not forget the risks that could be
posed by a weak China, beset by internal conflicts, social dislocation, criminal activity, and
large-scale emigration -- a vast zone of instability in Asia.
With this agreement, China has chosen to speed the opening of its economy, despite the
political risks that entails. Opponents of this agreement need to answer the question:. do they
really want us to reject that choice? The fact is, our interest lies in encouraging both stability
and change in China by encouraging it to meet, not stifle, the growing demands of its people
for openness, accountability, freedom, and reform. And bringing China into the WTO will
help in three ways.
First, it will obligate China to deepen its market reforms. With lower tariffs, and greater
competition, its private sector will expand; its state sector will shrink.
The introduction of competition results in natural pressure for progress. A decade ago,
China's best and brightest students sought jobs in the government, in large state-owned firms
or state-run research institutions. More and more, the best and brightest either are starting
their own companies or working for foreign-invested companies -- where they generally get
higher pay, a better work environment, and a chance to get ahead based on merit, not political
connections.
U.S. companies are the leaders in China in developing human resources-- by emphasizing
teamwork and respect for individual rights. In tum, Chinese firms are increasingly learning -and if they haven't, they will -- that unless they change their working style and treat employees
with respect, they will lose the top talent. This process will only accelerate as China joins the
WTO, and we should do all we can to encourage it, because it will lift the standards for
Chinese workers -- and their expectations.
Second, by speeding economic change, the agreement we reached has the potential to
encourage China to evolve into a more open society.
In the past, the Chinese state was every citizens' employer, landlord, shopkeeper,· and news
provider all rolled into one. By advancing the flow of information, the pace of privatization,
and the forces of competition, this agreement will accelerate a process that is removing
government from vast areas of people's lives. And by giving investors and property owners
protection against arbitrary government action, it reinforces the idea that individuals have
rights.
By opening China~s telecommunications market to cutting-edge American technology and
international firms, the WTO agreement will help bring the information revolution to cities and
towns across China. A year ago, China had two million Internet addresses. Today, it has nine
million. Soon, people in some of the most remote villages in interior China will have access to
�4
CNN. And as they become more mobile, more prosperous, and more aware of alternative
ways of life, I believe they will seek a stronger voice in shaping their destiny.
Of course, just two weeks ago, Beijing announced that it was cracking down on the Internet.
It's outrageous --but it's also futile. In this information age, cracking down on the Internet is
like King Canute trying to still the waters. Indeed, that the Chinese government is pushing
back against the increasing flow of information to the Chinese people only proves that the
changes China is undergoing are real and threatening to the status quo. This is not an
argument for slowing down the effort to bring China into the world; it's an argument for
accelerating it.
In the end, as China opens to the information economy, it can succeed only as it liberates .the
minds of its people and empowers the individual. You know all too well: creativity is
indivisible. In this age, you cannot expect people to be innovative economically and stifled
politically. Bringing China into the WTO doesn't guarantee it will choose political reform.
But by accelerating the process of economic change, it will force China to confront that choice
sooner, and make the imperative for the right choice far more powerful.
This agreement will advance our national interests in a third way: it increases the chance that
in the new century China will be on the inside of the international system, playing by the rules,
instead of on the outside, denying them.
Under this agreement, some of China's most important decisions will be subject, for the first
time, to the review of an international body. Why does that matter? Quite simply, it applies to
China the basic principle at the heart of the concept of the rule of law: that governments
cannot behave arbitrarily at home or abroad, that their actions are subject to rules consistently
applied. Remember, China is choosing to embrace these obligations. As China becomes a
stakeholder in the WTO and other international regimes, it will be more likely to accept the
legitimacy of international norms, and define its future within the global community, not
outside of it.
Opponents of this agreement will counter these arguments by saying it doesn't matter what we
agree to because China will just break its promises. Of course, we cannot know for sure. But
we do have reasons to believe that it will comply, and mechanisms to reinforce that. First,
China is pledging to open its economy·and its markets not just as a means of getting in the
WTO, but because most of China's leaders believe reform is in China's interest. Second, if
China violates its commitments, we're still in a better position, because it will confront
judgments backed by a 135-member body, rather than being able to chalk it up to supposed
U.S. bullying.
Some will argue that granting China permanent normal trade relations status is granting a
favor that China hasn't earned. But it's important that the public understand what PNTR
1
means: simply that we will give China the same tariff schedule we apply to almost every
other nation in the world, and China, will do likewise for us. It would eliminate the annual
�,,
5
vote on China's trade status, which we do not apply to any other WTO member. Some argue
we need the annual vote to address the other concerns we have with China, on proliferation or
- religious freedom. But Congress has the ability to address any part of our trade relationship
. with any nation, including China. And the annual China trade vote has lost any leverage it was
once thought to have. Congress has affirmed our trading relationship with China for 20 years
in a row.
Finally, others will argue that we are sacrificing human rights on the altar of trade. In fact,
locking China out of the WTO would be a blow to the very cause they and we support. It
would leave the Chinese people with less access to information, less contact with the
democratic world, and more resistance from their government to outside influence and ideas.
And no one could possibly benefit from that except the most rigid, anti-democratic elements in
China itself. That's one reason reformers like Martin Lee and dissidents like Ren Wanding
support this agreement.
Let me be clear: bringing China into the WTO is not, by itself, a human rights policy for the
United States. The reality in China today is that Chinese authorities still tolerate no organized
political dissent or opposition. Because the Communist Party's ideology has been discredited
in China, and because it lacks the legitimacy that can only come from democratic choice, it
seeks to maintain its grip by suppressing other voices. Change will come only through a
combination of internal pressures for change and external validation of its human rights
struggle. And we must maintain our leadership in the latter, even as the WTO agreement
contributes to the former.
That's why we sanctioned China as a "country of particular concern" under the International
Religious Freedom Act last year. It is why we are once again sponsoring a resolution in the
UN Human Rights Commission condemning China's human rights record. We will continue
to press China to respect global norms on non-proliferation; to encourage a peaceful resolution
of issues with Taiwan; to urge China to be part of the solution to the problem of global climate
·
change.
We must not and we are not relying on the hidden hand of the market to do all our heavy
lifting on the issues we care about in China, and neither should the private sector. That's why
it is important for our businesses in China to be agents of change by being good corporate
citizens.
But to make the most of that opportunity, first we must get this agreement through the United
States Congress. And we can't underestimate for a second how hard that is going to be. This
fight involves two issues -- China and trade -- that individually and together have become the
third rail of American politics today. The agreement is opposed by an eclectic coalition, from
labor to the religious right. It creates real splits in both parties.
I'll promise you this: the President and every key person in the Administration will undertake
the most intensive effort possible to succeed. We've already begun. I hope you will also
�...
6
recognize the stakes involved. For if we fail to obtain PNTR, we will lose the full benefits of
the agreement. In a global economy, with global markets, your companies will be shut off
from one-fifth of the world-- while your European, Japanese, and other competitors will be
the beneficiaries of the very good deal we negotiated.
But failure would be bad for our country in other ways. It would send a penetrating signal to
the rest of the world, particularly after the Senate's rejection last year of the Comprehensive
Test Band Treaty, that America truly has turned inward .. That would be devastating to our
future.
At the moment of America's greatest strength and influence, we must be leading the world,
and embracing change, not turning from it. Since President Nixon went to China in 1972, the
United States has worked for the emergence of a China that contributes to peace in Asia. A
China with an economy that is open to American products, farmers, and businesses. A China
whose people have access to ideas and information, that upholds the rule of law at home and
adheres to global rules on everything from non-proliferation to human rights to trade. This
agreement is an unprecedented opportunity to advance all of those goals. I look forward to
working with you in the months to come to turn those worthy and historic goals into a reality.
###
�Draft China op-ed
As the China debate heats up in Congress, discussion will likely focus on the economic impact of
the agreement to permit China's entry into the World Trade Organization. That's good. The
agreement requires China to drastically open its market to American products -- everything from
agriculture to manufacturing to high tech --while we have agreed only to maintain the market
.
-.
.
access we already offer China. For the first time, U.S. companies will be able to competitively
sell and distribute products in China made by American workers here at home, rather than being
forced to open factories in China. But bringing China into the WTO is about much more than
trade: it will also advance our national security by encouraging the ri.ght kind of charige in
Chiria.
To understand why, we need to understand the dilemma China finds itself in today. Over the last
20
ye~s,
China has made remarkable progress in building a new economy, lifting more than 200
million people out of absolute poverty. But it still faces daunting economic problems. Its system
is plagued by corruption. Private enterprise - which drives global competition - still accounts for
less than one-third of China's economy. China's workforce is increasing by .12 million each
year. Millions are migrating from the countryside, where they see no future, to the city, where
only some find work. And economic growth has slowed just when it needs to be rising to create
new jobs. China clearly cannot maintain stability or ensure prosperity by maintaining the status
quo.
Hence the dilemma: China's leaders realize that opening China's antiquated markets. to global
competition risks unleashing forces beyond their control -- unemployment, political unrest,
increasing domestic pressure for political change. Yet, if they don't move forward, China cannot
make the next critical leap in development, because without competition from the outside, it will
not build world-class industries that can survive in the global economy.
�< -
2
With this WTO agreement, China has chosen to speed the opening of its econom·y, despite the
risks. Do we really want to reject that choice? Our interest lies in encouraging both stability and
change in China by encouraging it to meet, not stifle, the growing demands of its people for
openness, accountability, freedom, and reform. Bringing China into the WTO will help in three
ways.
First, it will obligate China to deepen its market reforms. With lower tariffs, and greater .
competition, its private sector will expand,~ its state sector will shrink. .
The introduction of competition results in natural pressure for progress. More and more, the best
and brightest in China either are starting their own companies or choosing to work for foreigninvested companies -- to get higher pay, a better work environment, and a chance to get ahead
based on merit, not political connections. In tum, Chinese firms are increasingly learning that
unless they change their working style and treat employees with respect, they will lose the top
talent. This process will only accelerate as China joins. the WTO, and we should do all we can to
encourage it, because it will lift the standards for Chinese workers- and their expectations.
·,
Second, by speeding economic change, the agreement we. reached has the potential t~ encourage
China to evolve into a more open soCiety.
In the past, the Chinese state was every. citizens' employer, landlord, shopkeeper, and news
provider all rolled into one. By advancing the flow of information, the pace of privatization, and
the force of competition, this agreement will accelerate a process that is removing government
from vast areas of people's lives. And by opening China's telecommunications market,. the
WTO agreement will help bring the information revolution to
~ities
and towns across China.
�3
China's government has recently been pushing back against the Internet and the increasing flow
of information to its people. But that just proves the changes China is undergoing are real - and
threatening to the status 'quo. These repressive actions are riot an argument for slowing the effort
to bring China into the world, but for
acc~lerating
it.
Ultimately, China will have to come to terms with the fact that in today's economy, people
cannot be creative economically and stifled politically. Bringing China into the WTO won't
guarantee it will choose political reform. But by hastening economic change, it will force China
to confront that choice sooner, and make the imperative for the right choice more powerful.
This agreement will advance our national interests in a third wcry: it increases the chance that
in the new century China will be on the inside of the international system, playing by the rules,
instead of on the outside, denying them.
It subjects some of China's most important decisions, for the first time, to the review of an
international body. As China becomes a stakeholder in the WTO and other international regimes,
it will be more likely to accept the legitimacy of international norms, and define its future within
the global community, not outside of it. And if China violates its commitments, it will confront
judgments backed by all 13 5 members of the WTO, rather than being able to chalk up friction to
supposed U.S. bullying.
This agreement is not, by itself, a human rights policy for the United States. China continues
today to suppress the voices of those wh~ challenge.the rule of the Communist Party: It will
change only by a combination of internal pressures for change and extern.al validation of the
human rights struggle. We must maintain our leadership in the latter, even as the WTO
agreement contributes to the former. That's why we sanctioned China as a "country of particular
concern" under the International Religious Freedom Act last year. It is why we are once again
�·~
.-~·
4
sponsoring a resolution in the UN Human Rights Commission condemning China's human rights
reco~d. We will continue to press China to respect global norms on non-proliferation; to
encourage a peaceful resolution of issues with Taiwan; to urge China to be part of the solution to
the problem of global climate change.
We will continue to protect our interests with firmness and with candor. But_, we must do so in a
way that does not isolate the Chinese people from the global forces empowering them to build a
better future. For that would leave them with less access to information, less contact with the
democratic world, and more resistance from their government to outside influence and ideas. No
one could possibly benefit from that except the most rigid, anti-democratic elements in China
itself. We must not give them a victory by locking China out of the global trading system.
�Orzulak, Paul K. (SPCHW)
Subject:
Keith, James R. (ASIA)
Tuesday, February 01, 2000 12:13 PM ·
Lieberthal, Kenneth G. (ASIA)
Orzulak, Paul K. (SPCHW); @ASIA- Asian Affairs
speech factoids [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance:
High
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
--135 countries in WJO (will change in March assuming Georgia's accession proceeds as planned
--we do not provide PNTR to Kyrgystan at present due to Jackson Vanik (i.e. procedural lag pending accession;
legislation to provide PNTR is pending) and we do not provide PNTR to Cuba. Cuba is different. Our exception is based
on national security (Article 21). We and the Cubans have a political agreement not to pursue this through dispute
settlement, but the Cubans have the right to do so if they were to so choose.
--trade deficits:
(in $US billions)
1999: 71.5
1998: 56.9
1997:49.7
1996:39.5
1995: 33.8
1994:29.5
1993:22.8
Non-farm Economy in private sector:
--private sector accounts for about one-third of GDP
13,000 foreign firms employ 60,000 Chinese citizens in China
about 40 percent of industrial output comes from the private sector
Anecdotal Evidence of Improvement:
--per CEA, "some 200 million" lifted out of poverty during reform era
--mobile phones: about 36 million at end of 1999
25 million end of 1998
70 percent growth annually since 1987; industry observes expect 150 million by 2005.
--China added more telephone lines and customers in 1998 than in the 35 years from 1949 to 1994.
--internet users (Chinese stats, reported through Motorola): 9 million users end of 1999 versus· 2 million a year earlier .
• (Counted by user id, probably three-to-four users per id, so this is a significant underestmate.) 3.5 million networked
computers.
Civics/NGOs: 1500 national level
these are quasi-official).
"quasi~NGOs"
and more than 200,000 lower level organizations (problem is that most of
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Speechwriting Office - Paul Orzulak
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Speechwriting Office
Paul Orzulak
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1999-2000
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36267" target="_blank">Collection Finding Aid</a>
<a href="http://catalog.archives.gov/id/7585791" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2008-0702-F
Description
An account of the resource
<p>Orzulak served as speechwriter for President William J. Clinton and National Security Advisor Samuel R. Berger in 1999 and 2000.</p>
<p>Orzulak authored speeches for President Clinton concerning permanent normal trade relations with China; the United States Coast Guard Academy commencement; the role of computer technology in India; the defense of American cyberspace; the Eleanor Roosevelt Human Rights Award; the memorial service for Former Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi of Japan; the Charlemagne Prize in Germany; the presentation of the Medal of Freedom to President James E. Carter and Rosalyn Carter in Atlanta; the Millennium Around the World Celebration in Washington, DC; the Cornerstone of Peace Park in Japan; the role of scientific research and the European Union while in Portugal; sustainable development in India; armed forces training on Vieques Island, Puerto Rico; and the funeral services for Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. in Annapolis. Orzulak’s speechwriting for National Security Advisor Berger concerned Senator Joseph R. Biden, China’s trade status, Kosovo, and challenges facing American foreign policy.</p>
<p>This collection was made available through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/freedom-of-information-act-requests">Freedom of Information Act</a> request. For more information concerning this collection view the complete finding aid.</p>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Extent
The size or duration of the resource.
82 folders in 7 boxes
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
China [Folder 1] [1]
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Speechwriting Office
Paul Orzulak
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2008-0702-F
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Box 1
<a href="http://clintonlibrary.gov/assets/Documents/Finding-Aids/2008/2008-0702-F.pdf" target="_blank">Collection Finding Aid</a>
<a href="http://catalog.archives.gov/id/7585791" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reproduction-Reference
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
5/19/2014
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
42-t-7585791-20080702f-001-004-2014
7585791