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Clinton PresidentialI Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
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This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Pre~idential Library Staff.
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The document from this Mandatory DeJlassification Review was
released in part[
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The document released with redactions has been restricted under
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Sections 1.4 (c) and (g) ofE.O. 13526.
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON f
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Ma¥ 22, 1998
PRES.IDENTIAL DEC IS ION DIRECTIVE/NSC:-62
Declassified Under the
Authority of the Interagency
Security Classification Appeals Panel,
.E.O. 13526, section 5.3 (b) (3)
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-003, No. 1
Declassification Date: Match 18, 2014
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
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ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
DIRECTOR, OFFICE. OF MAN~GEMENT AND BUDGET
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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
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·DIRECTOR, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
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ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
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ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY'
DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES jiNFORMATION AGENCY
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
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DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
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SUBJECT:
Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the
Homeland and Americans Overs·~as (U}
In 1995, I reaffirmed and elaborated udited States counterterrorism pol y in PDD-39. That polidy directive rem~ins
valid. (U}
Because of our military superiority, potential enemies, be they
nations, terrorist groups, or ~riminal jorganizationsj are
increasingly likely to attack us in unGonventional ways.
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Adversaries will be tempted to exploit/vulnerabilities in our
critical infrastructure, impede continuity of government
operations, use weapons of. mass
struJtion against civilians in
our cities, disrupt our transportati~njsystems, attack us when
we gather as a conununity at special events, and prey on our
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citizens overseas. (U)
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As this c
ter of threats matures in the coming century, I am
determined that we will be prepared to ~eter them, prevent them,
or, if necessary, limit the damage theyJcan inflict. Success
requires that we recognize t_he common nfl.ture of these threats,
the need for an integrated ~esponse, an~, in the case of
critical infrastructure protection, the importance of a publicprivate partnership. (U)
Successes and Remaining Challenges (U)
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Current policy has led to substantial shccess:
an increased rate of renditionsl apprehensions and
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convictions of terrorists;
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-- a significant expansion of counterterron.sm legislative
authorities;
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-~ a large increase in counterterrbrism funding with
consequent improvement in capabilities kt FAA, FBI, and CIA;
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-- 1mpor t an t progress 1n coun t er t error1sm p ann1ng,
particularly in the areas of consequenc~ management (FEMA, EPA
and PHS) and WMD preparedness;.
-- elevating the place of terrorism as an important item on
the diplomatic agenda~ especially as it! affects other countries'·
relations with Iran, Libya, and Sudan; I
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improved anti-terrorism force protection within DOD;
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expansion of assistance to~ andicooperation with, other
democracies threatened by terrorism, including Israel; and
-- routinizing the management of clunterterrorism through
PDD-39 and the creation of a professionkl, trained and
coordinated interagency cadre. (U)
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Yet the threats posed by potential adveksaries in the twentyfirst century are changing, in nature afd scope:
-- States and state-sponsored groups, knowing that they
cannot defeat us in a conventional mili~ary confrontation, may
seek to engage in asymmetrical assaults! on our vulnerabiliti-es
at home and abroad through terrorism, u~e of weapons of mass
destruction and cyber warfare.
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~em6nstrated
-- The attack on the Tokyo subway
that
terrorists seek and have used weapons o~ mass destruction
(chemical, biological, or radio-logical ~evices) to increase the
destructiveness of their act,s.
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-- Civil defense and continuity of[ gove~nment programs
developed during the Cold War have been! largely dismantled
or downsized.
Few American cities are·prepared to deal with an
incident involving weapons of mass destruction, or even largescale conventional attacks such as the World Trade Center or
Oklahoma City bombings.
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-- Advances in encryption technology threaten the ability
of law enforcement agencies to detect ~bd prevent terrorist
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acts.
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-- our critical infrastructure is becoming more reliant
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upon information and computer-based technologies that are
vulnerable to covert. attack by terroris~s ot other hostile
groups. (U)
Meanwhile, the bombings of U.S. militar1y facilities in Saudi
Arabia and the murders in Karachi remin1d us that Americans
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remain the target of capable terrorists; and signal the urgent
need to reduce our vulnerabilities to s uch "tiaditional"
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threats. (U)
Program Objectives and Responsibilities (U)
To address these chan~es in the contin~ing danger from
unconventional"threats, I hereby dir~c~ an integrated program to
increase our effectiveness in counteri~g these threats and to
prepare to manage the consequences 6f ~ttacks against U.S.
citizens or infrastructur~. All of th~se progra~s will be
carried out in full compliance with app1licable law and existing
procedures governing the activities of the agencies
involved. (U)
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Lead Agencies responsibie for programs supporting our security
and counter-terrorism policy should designate a .senior Program
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Coordinator who will be responsible fo~ coordinating these
programs within the U.S. Government, add identifying goals and
milestones. (U)
Apprehension, Extradition, Rendit,'i'on and Prosecution:
Foreign terrorists who violate U.S. la~s will be apprehended-and
tried, no matter where they hide and nd matter how long it
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takes. The Justice Department is the lead agency for this
program. In pursuing extradition and tendition, the Justice
Department will act in coordination wi~h the State
Department. (U)
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-- Other departments will make asJistance to these Justice
Department efforts a top priority and Jill budget and structure
priorities accordingly. The Intelligedce Community will
maintain collection and capabilities td support ·apprehensions.
The Defense Department will, if requested, provide
nonreimbursable transportation in suppdrt of renditions to the
extent permitted by law. The State De~artment will ensure that
at the top of our bilateral agenda witn other governments,
especially those that harboF terrorist~, is action against those
that threaten or have attacked U.S. interests and cooperation on
apprehension, prosecution, extradi tion 1 1 or rendition. ~
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-- The Justice Department will idJntify the highest
priority pending foreign terrorist apprlehensions and the FBI
in coordination with CIA and the State Department will develop
plans for their rendition. ~
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2.
ion: Foreign terrorists
pose a credible threat
to
Pn ted States and its citizens will be subject to
preemption and disruption abroad, consilstent with U.s. laws.
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CIA is the lead agency for this progra~. ~
-- Disruption program plans and sp;ecific actions will be
developed and coordinated for interagenpy approval in accordance
with existing procedures.~
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-- Other departments with relevant\ capabilities (such as
Treasury on financirtg) will contribute expertise and assets to
this program. ~
3. International Cooperation: The goa[ of zero tolerance for
international terrorism will guide bilateral and multilateral
efforts to elimihate sa~ctuaries, penal~ze
s that sponsor
terrorism, and assist friendly states v~ctimized .by terrorism.
The State Department is the lead agency[ for this program, which
will combine the following elements:
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-- Support for e
s to obtain the extradition or other
rendition of indicted terrorists. Al) ~rograms and activities
conducted abroad will be implemented inj full compliance with
existing Chief of Mission authorities. ,
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-- Adoption and implementation of fhe eleven major
international conventions on t~rrorism rill be a major foreign
policy priority.~·
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The State Department shall be responsible for coordinating with
relevant agencies all assistance relate~ to international
terrorism. The State Department shall klso maintain, in
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coordination with the Interagency Intelligence Committee on
Terrorism (IICT) and the Office 6f Scie~ce and Technology Policy·
through the National Science and Technology Council, a robust
international research, development, an~ procurement effort for
counter..:.terrorism technologies. ~
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4. Prevertting
Acquisition ofj Weapons of Mass
Destruction: To reflect the importance! of efforts to prevent
terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD), I
reiterate PODs 39 and 41, which require~
-- The U.S. Government will work through interagency
efforts with other nations to reduce orl eliminate WMD; to
safeguard such weapons, their components, and precursors; to
prevent further WMD proliferation and tb ensure that such
weapons, their components and k.ey precutsors, do not come into
the possession of terrorists. We will kaintain a robust
capability to respond to crisis situatibns involving the threat
or use of WMD by terrorists. With NSC boordination, State, DOD,
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DOE, Treasury, Commerce, HHS, FBI, and ~IA will continue to
direct components of this overall effort and to provide the
necessary programmatic support. I reit~rate the importance of
ensuring support to HHS and DOJ and othkr agencies, to implement
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and enforce safeguards and procedures to assure that se 1 ect
infectious agents and to~ins are acquir~d, stored, transferred,
or used only for legitimate scientific purposes and not for
other non-approved purposes nor by terrprists as WMD. ~
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5. Consequence Management for T~rrorist Incidents: If, despite
our efforts, a terrorist incident occurs in the United States,
the Federal Government will respond rapkdly, working with stite
and local governments, to restore order!
deliver emergency
assistance. The Department of Justice, acting through the FBI,
will be the lead agency for operational! response to a weapon. of
mass destruction incident. FEMA is responsible .for preparing ·
for or responding to the consequences 9:f a WMD incident, w.ith
participation by PHS· (health/medical l, EPA (hazmat/
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environmental) and DOE (radiological), ~s necessary. When the
Attorney General, acting on the advice bf the Director, FBI, and
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in coordination with the Director, FEMAI, determines that the
incident or threat of an incident has s~bsided, _lead agency
responsibility may be transferred to FEMA. (U)
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For consequence management of terroristj.incidents outside of the
United States, initial . U.S. efforts will. be coordinated. through
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the Foreign Emergency Support Team (FES!T) · led by the State
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(CMR T ) . (u)
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Our domestic goal is to build a capability in 120 major cities ·
for first responders to be able to deal! with incidents involving
weapons of mass destruction by 2002. Toward th~t end, several
departments will participate in a coord~rrated program in
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conjunction with local and state respon;se authorities. 'K:..l
-- DOD, in coordination with -the nbJ/FBI, FEMA, PHS, DOE,
and EPA, will provide training to metrobolitan emergency
responders and will maintain military upits (active and reserve
components) to serve as augmentation fo:rces for weapons of mass
destruction consequence management and ~o help maintain
proficiency of local emergency respondeil:"s through training. "t'Sl.
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-- DOE will plan for and provide etnergency responder
training for nuclear, radiological incil:ients; EPA will plan for
and provide emergency responder traininb for hazardous materials
and
e::i:::m::::~ ::::d::t:~e:ad agel to plan and to prepare
for a national response to medical emerbencies arising from the
terrorist use of weapons of mc:1ss destrul:tion. HHS, with the
support of other Federal agencies, willj provide enhanced local
response capabilities through the develppment of Metropolitan
Medical Strike Teams· systElJ:fi.s; will deve~op and maintain the
National Disaster· Medical System (NDMS) 1, including the National
Medical Response Teams; will w_ork with bon to ensure
deployability of NDMS response teams, shpplies and equipment;
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and, ~orking with the Department 9f Veterans
rs 1 ensure
adequate stockpiles of antidote and othbr necessary
pharmaceuticals nationwide and the traihing of medical personnel
in NDMS hospitals. (U)
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DOJ, in coordination with DOD, FEMA, EPA, and DOE, ·will
provide personal protective equipmenh~· • ~etection and diagnostic
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instruments, on a selective basis, to State and local law
en-forcement agencies. ~
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Coordination of this overall effort will be effected through an
interagency WMD Protection Group. (U) 1
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6. Transportation Securi tz,i. I accepteld and expect the full
implementation of the recommendations elf the White House.
Commission on Aviation Safety and Secur1i ty, The Department of
Transportation is the lead agency for t1his program. (U)
-- Funding for the timely implemenltation of the White House
Commission on Aviation Safety and Securlity recommendations will
be reflected in Administration budget r 1equests. (U)
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-- As technology advances and the ~hreat evolves, DOT will
ensure that our technologies and proced;ures keep pace. Toward
that end, the DOT will coordinate, in cboperation with NSTC, an
interagency research and development prbgram on transportation
security. With respect to aviation secrrity, DOT will
periodically review whether additional measures beyond those in
the Commission Report are required. Asj a first step,. the FAA
will develop and implement a more rigoreus system for air cargo
inspection, to include use of private v~ri cation and
inspection firms. Parallel measures wi~l be researched,
developed, and deployed to improve the 1
security of ground and
maritime transportation. ~
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-- In addition, the Department of fransportation is
responsible for dissemination of aviatifn security information,
in coordination with State, as appropriate. (UJ
7. Protection of Critical Infrastructulre and Cyber Systems:
We will ciinimize the risk from attacks bn our critical
infrastructure and cyber systems, whethbr the attackers are
nations, groups, or individu~l~. We wi~l also be prepared to
deal with the consequence§ of such atta~ks. (U)
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There
, having reviewed the recommen ctations of the
presidential Commission on Crit
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I am issuing a complementary dir.ecti ve bn our· policy toward
protection of our critical infrastructu~re. (U)
8. Continuity of Government OperationJ Attacks by nation_s or
groups will not be permitted to disruptj the functioning o'f
either the constitutionally mandated functions of the Federal
Government/ nor the operation of its .~,c.rli tical components. ~
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-- As outlined in Executive Order 112656, every department
and agency will be able to rapidly and ~ffectively transition
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from routine operation to emergency operations of vital
functions followina an attack that inckpacitates its
headquarters, key facilities, or leadetship. (U)
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-- In particular, agen~ies will e~sure that key couNter'""
terrorism staff can operate in .low to mid-level WMD
contingencies by proviqingprotective ~quipment and
transportation to a rapidly accessiblejrelocation site. ~
-- The National Security Advisor Will submit for my review
and approval a draft of an updated andj comprehensive ·
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Presidential Decision Directive on End~ring Constitutional
Government that takes into account the\terrorist and .
unconventional threats, and requires continuity of operations
capabilities by all departcients and ag~ncies as a foundation for
continuity of government for the futur~. ~·
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9. Countering the Foreign Terrorist T~reat in the U.S.:
Foreign terrorists will not be allowedlto enter the United
States and the full force of legal aut~orities will beused to
remove foreign terrorists from the U.S~ and to prevent
fundraising within the u.s. to support [foreign terrorists. The
Justice Department will be the lead agency for this program.~
applican~s
-- Visa
that pose a tejrorist threat will be
identified and denied entry into the udited States. The State
Department, Justice Department (FBI and INS), and CIA will
ensure that information about such per~ons, 'including their
aliases, is collected and disseminated lin a timely manner to
deny them entry into the United States.; ~
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-- The State Department will work jclosely with other
governments to adopt and implement standards for travel
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documentation. Such documents should ~e computer readable,
tamper resistant/ and difficult to counterfeit. ~
-- Justice (INS and FBI) and State! will develop a strategy,
to be implemented by DOJ (INS and FB~) ,j to limit the duration of
stay of students from terrorism list co untries, to track ..them
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while they are in the U.S. and to know rhen they depart. In
addition, State and DOJ, together with 1
the Commerce Department
and Defense Department, will determine how best.to prevent
foreign students whose studies are spon~ored by terrorist -.list
countries from acquiring WMD-related .knowledge in the United
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-- Justice will ensure that, in accordance with PDD-9,
alien smuggling rings are disrupted and disbanded, and will, in
particular, thwart attempts to smuggle potential terrorists into
the United States. ~
-- Justice, using removal procedures, including the Alien
Terrorist Removal Court, will seek to swiftly remove alien
terrorists from the United states and will detain them awaiting
removal proceedings. The Administration will again seek
legislation clarifying the definition of ~engaging in terrorist
activity" to better facilitate exclusion and removal of alien
terrorists under the immigration laws. ~
-- The Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Attorney General and Secretary of the Treasury, will designate
foreign terrorist organizations that are prohibited by law from
raising funds in the United States. In addition Justice and
Treasur will work to revent such activities.
--.. E.O. 13526, 1.4(c)
-- The DCI will work to support the Secretary of the
Treasury in developing usable information for the designation by
Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney General and
Secretary of State, of entities and individuals of foreign
terrorist organizations that are located in foreign
jurisdictions, particularly in those countries that are not
state sponsors of terrorism. (U)
10. Protection of Americans Overseas: The first duty of
government is the protection of its citizens. That duty extends
to Americans abroad, whether they are traveling in an official
or private capacity. (U)
-- The State Department, through its chiefs of mission,
will be responsible for ensuring the security of personnel
associated with diplomatic and consular posts abroad, inc-luding
DOD personnel subject to the force protection responsibilities
of the chiefs of mission pursuant to the DOD/State Universal
MOU, and for programs to preserve the safety of private U.S.
citizens abroad. U.S. citizens should be adequately warned of
the danger of terrorist attack, advised regarding precautionary
measures and afforded appropriate assistance and protection. (U)
-- The Secretary of Defense, throu9h geographic CINes, will
be responsible for force protection of CINe-assigned forces and
those DOD personnel for whom the Secretary of state has
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delegated force protection responsibility to DOD under the
Memorandum of Understanding betw.een the Departments of State and
Dejense on Security of DOD Elements ahd P~rsonnel in Foreign
Areas (the Universal MOU). ,JU}
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ADDITIONAL CAPABILITIES
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In addition to the programs described above, the national
counter-terrorism effort requires thelfollowing elaboration to
the guidance in l?DD-39.
(U)
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1. National
Security Events: Scores of special events
receive Federal protection annually. jSome of these, such as
Presidential nominating conventions, Presidential Inaugurations,
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Presidential Summits, State of the Un~on addresses and Olympic
games have a national significance and could attract
unconventional attacks. ~
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The interagency Counter-Terrorism and!Security Group (CSG} shall
notify the Attorney General and Secretary of the Treasury of
events when it believes they should designated a "National
Special Security Event." The Attorne~ General and Secretary of
the Treasury are required to agree on \the designation. ~
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I have decided that for such National ~pecial Security Events,
the full protective and consequence management capabilities of
the Federal Government shall be availa'ble as necessary,
including those of both the FBI and tde Secret Service. ~
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Lead Agency responsibilities shall be
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FBI. The FBI will be the lead agency Iter intelligence, crisis
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management, hostage rescue, counter-te~rorlsm {except as noted
below regarding Secret Service protect~ve anti-terr6rism
measures and counter-terrorism assets}! and its statutory Federal
criminal investigations. The FBI will identify and coordinate
appropriate anti-terrorism measures ani:i FBI counter-terrorism
asset~ {including, w~en necessaiy, DoPj assets) that will be
needed to perform its lead agency resppnsibilit s. The USSS
will coordinate its activities regardihg security
design/planning and implementation witp the FBI. The FBI will
also identify and coordinate.its measut~s and assets to.effect
consequence management planning, coord~nation, and~ransi~ion
from the crisis ma~agement phase to cphsequence management • by
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FEMA. FEMA shall be the lead agency for consequence management
planning and coordination. Transition from the crisis
management phase to the consequence management phase shall be as
agreed by the Attorney General, the FBI Director and the FEMA
Director, or their designees. ~
The U.S. Secret Service. The Secret Service shall be the lead
agency for security design/planning and implementation, and will
identify and coordinate the appropriate Secret Service antiterrorism measures and counterterrorism assets (and, if
necessary, the assets of other agencies in mutual agreement with
those agencies) that will be needed to effect the overall
securit re uirements (includin
The FEMA Director, U.S. Secret Service Director, and FBI
Director shall ensure that their respective lead agency
responsibilities are fully coordinated and effectively
implemented. Unless mutually agreed upon between the Directors
or their designees, the Secret Service and the FBI will maintain
full command and control of their respective agency assets in
all circumstances and incidents.
Defense, State, Energy, HHS, Transportation and EPA shall,
consistent with their authorities and appropriations, make
available specialized units in support of security operations,
crisis management, and consequence management. ~
The Attorney General and Secretary of the Treasury, in
cooperation with other concerned Principals including the
Director/OMB, should within 120 days submit for my approval a
plan to implement this decision. T~e plan should, inter alia,
cover:
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-- Command/control arrangements of the FBI, Secret Service,
FEMA, DOD and other relevant agencies; ~
-- how to achieve quickly an air space security capability
centered on the enforcement arms of the Treasury (U.S. Secret
Service and u.s. Customs Service); +G+
any required changes in funding and/or legislative
authorities. (U)
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2. National Capital Area Rapid Response Capability for a WMD
Terrorist Incident: The most inviting domestic target for a
terrorist employing WMD is downtown Washington and the national
security headquarters nearby in Virginia . Yet there is no
specialized explosive ordnance disposal team in the Washington
area trained or equipped to deal with WMD; or any detection and
alerting system to identify when WMD move into the metropolitan
area on main approach routes. Accordingly, we must be able to
detect and safely deal with any WMD within or approaching
Washington, DC. ~
-- The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the
Secretary of Energy, shall ensure that there is a robust
capability to render safe a nuclear, biological, or chemical
device in the National Capital area and that such a capability
be deployable in the shortest time possible. ~
-- DOE will lead a technology research and demonstration
project to examine the feasibility of installing covert WMD
detection systems on approaches to the metropolitan area. ~
E.O. 13526, 1.4(g)
4. Statutory Authority and Funding for Combating Terrorism
Operations: The burden for finding the statutory authority to
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use resources during combating terrorism operations is unfairly
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left to each agency. Therefore,· the Secretary of Defense and
the Attorney General, in coordination ~ith the OMB Director,
will develop comprehensive proposals fclr statutory authority for
funding to combat terrorism .operations.! These proposals shall
be submitted to the APNSA within 120 d~ys. (U)
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5. Exerci
: There shall be at leasti one annual exercise
involving the participation of Agency ~rincipals to validate
policies, procedures, and capabilities \for the resolution of
unconventional attacks against the U.S ·I and its citizens. ts+
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Implementation
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National Coordinator for S~curity, InfJastructure Protection, and
Counter-Terrorism: Program coordination in support of this
Directive will be under the auspices of; the National Coordinator.
for Security, Infrastructure Protectiori and Counter-Terrorism.
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While not directing the activities of ~gencies, the National
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Coordinator will integrate the Governme nt' s policies and programs
on unconventional threats to the homela!nd.and Americans abroad:
attacks on our infrastructure~ cyber sij~tems, and government
operations, terrorism, and defenses against covert delivery of
weapons of mass destruction. Reportin~ to the APNSA shall be an
NSC staff Senidr Director for Infrastru~ture Protection and a
Senior Director for Counter-Terroris~. I In the context of the
established annual budget process the National Coordinator will
provide advice regarding the budgets fo~ counter-terrorism. (U)
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For these purposes, the National Coordinator will chair
assistant secretary/flag rank groups, r~porting to the Deputies
Committee (or, at the call of its chair'r, the Principals
. Committee) including: ·
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-- The Counter-Terroris~ Sec~rity ~roup (CSG) to coordinate
counter-terrorism issues and review ongbing crisis operations/
activities concerning foreign terrorism[ and domestic terrorism
with significant foreign involvement; -ts+
I
'
-- Critical Infrastructure Coordinktion Group (CICG) to
coordinate the implementation of the Pr~sidential Decision
Direc ve ·on Critical Infrastructure; ~
I
--The Weapons of Mass Destruction!I Preparedness (WMDP),
.. ,,,.
Consequence Management and Protection Gf:'OUP to coordinate
polici~s and programs relating to Weapohs of Mass Destruction.
(WMD) emergency preparedness, tr.aining, equipping and organizing
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will also be jesponsible foi ensuring
program coordihation between these thrde groups (CSGi CICG and
WMDP) ~ahd.the existing, interagency working group 6n Enduring
.
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Constitut.ional Government (IWG/ECG, chaired by the Counselor to
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policy and progracis reiated to gbvernm~nt-wide continuity of
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The National Coordinator may call thesJ groups to. meet jbintly
or form joint sub-groups to address inter-disciplinary issues.
The Counter-terrorism Security Group add the N~tional
Coordinator will conduct their reviews jof intelligence programs
and activities consistent with existing procedures and
authorities and in coordination with t~e DCI and/or the Chair of
the Intelligence IWG, as appropriate.
r
The National Coordinator shall report ~egularly to the
Principals and annually to me in a SecJrity Preparedness Report
(this report supercedes the PDD-39 repJiting requirements)
The National Coordinator will also partlicipate as a full member
of Deputies or Principals Corrunittee meejtings when they meet to
consider counter-terrorism, security, WMD defense, or
infrastructure issues.
In addition, wh~le not directing the
actions of agencies, the National CoorJinator shall coordinate
the development of interagency agreed g:Uidelines .for crisis
management and the procedures for authdrizing deployment and
employment of specialized crisis assetsj. *1-
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Declassified Documents concerning Presidential Decision Directive 62 (PDD-62)
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Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas (5/22/1998).
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Foreign Policy
Presidential Decision Directive
Terrorism
-
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39734f76b9433338a109b09ed25b2bef
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<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
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Foreign Policy Telephone Calls
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David Scull
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President Clinton talks on the Oval Office telephone with world leaders during the day regarding the Middle East Peace Process and the terrorist bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen.
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Bill Clinton
Middle East Peace
Oval Office
Telephone
Terrorism
-
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9d8726811a646d696967f73924e3f940
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Text
I
I
Clinton PresidentialI Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
.
.
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.
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Pre~idential Library Staff.
1
The document from this Mandatory DeJlassification Review was
released in part[
. I
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The document released with redactions has been restricted under
I
Sections 1.4 (c) and (g) ofE.O. 13526.
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON f
I
Ma¥ 22, 1998
PRES.IDENTIAL DEC IS ION DIRECTIVE/NSC:-62
Declassified Under the
Authority of the Interagency
Security Classification Appeals Panel,
.E.O. 13526, section 5.3 (b) (3)
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-003, No. 1
Declassification Date: Match 18, 2014
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
I
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
I
ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
DIRECTOR, OFFICE. OF MAN~GEMENT AND BUDGET
.
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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
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·DIRECTOR, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
.
.
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ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
t
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY'
DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES jiNFORMATION AGENCY
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
I
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
I
SUBJECT:
Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the
Homeland and Americans Overs·~as (U}
In 1995, I reaffirmed and elaborated udited States counterterrorism pol y in PDD-39. That polidy directive rem~ins
valid. (U}
Because of our military superiority, potential enemies, be they
nations, terrorist groups, or ~riminal jorganizationsj are
increasingly likely to attack us in unGonventional ways.
.
Adversaries will be tempted to exploit/vulnerabilities in our
critical infrastructure, impede continuity of government
operations, use weapons of. mass
struJtion against civilians in
our cities, disrupt our transportati~njsystems, attack us when
we gather as a conununity at special events, and prey on our
1
citizens overseas. (U)
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As this c
ter of threats matures in the coming century, I am
determined that we will be prepared to ~eter them, prevent them,
or, if necessary, limit the damage theyJcan inflict. Success
requires that we recognize t_he common nfl.ture of these threats,
the need for an integrated ~esponse, an~, in the case of
critical infrastructure protection, the importance of a publicprivate partnership. (U)
Successes and Remaining Challenges (U)
1
I
Current policy has led to substantial shccess:
an increased rate of renditionsl apprehensions and
I
convictions of terrorists;
f
.
-- a significant expansion of counterterron.sm legislative
authorities;
I
-~ a large increase in counterterrbrism funding with
consequent improvement in capabilities kt FAA, FBI, and CIA;
·
·.
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·
·1
·
··
-- 1mpor t an t progress 1n coun t er t error1sm p ann1ng,
particularly in the areas of consequenc~ management (FEMA, EPA
and PHS) and WMD preparedness;.
-- elevating the place of terrorism as an important item on
the diplomatic agenda~ especially as it! affects other countries'·
relations with Iran, Libya, and Sudan; I
.
I
.
improved anti-terrorism force protection within DOD;
I
.
expansion of assistance to~ andicooperation with, other
democracies threatened by terrorism, including Israel; and
-- routinizing the management of clunterterrorism through
PDD-39 and the creation of a professionkl, trained and
coordinated interagency cadre. (U)
I
Yet the threats posed by potential adveksaries in the twentyfirst century are changing, in nature afd scope:
-- States and state-sponsored groups, knowing that they
cannot defeat us in a conventional mili~ary confrontation, may
seek to engage in asymmetrical assaults! on our vulnerabiliti-es
at home and abroad through terrorism, u~e of weapons of mass
destruction and cyber warfare.
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~em6nstrated
-- The attack on the Tokyo subway
that
terrorists seek and have used weapons o~ mass destruction
(chemical, biological, or radio-logical ~evices) to increase the
destructiveness of their act,s.
j
·
-- Civil defense and continuity of[ gove~nment programs
developed during the Cold War have been! largely dismantled
or downsized.
Few American cities are·prepared to deal with an
incident involving weapons of mass destruction, or even largescale conventional attacks such as the World Trade Center or
Oklahoma City bombings.
1
-- Advances in encryption technology threaten the ability
of law enforcement agencies to detect ~bd prevent terrorist
I
acts.
I
I
-- our critical infrastructure is becoming more reliant
I
upon information and computer-based technologies that are
vulnerable to covert. attack by terroris~s ot other hostile
groups. (U)
Meanwhile, the bombings of U.S. militar1y facilities in Saudi
Arabia and the murders in Karachi remin1d us that Americans
.
I
remain the target of capable terrorists; and signal the urgent
need to reduce our vulnerabilities to s uch "tiaditional"
1
threats. (U)
Program Objectives and Responsibilities (U)
To address these chan~es in the contin~ing danger from
unconventional"threats, I hereby dir~c~ an integrated program to
increase our effectiveness in counteri~g these threats and to
prepare to manage the consequences 6f ~ttacks against U.S.
citizens or infrastructur~. All of th~se progra~s will be
carried out in full compliance with app1licable law and existing
procedures governing the activities of the agencies
involved. (U)
.
Lead Agencies responsibie for programs supporting our security
and counter-terrorism policy should designate a .senior Program
.
I
Coordinator who will be responsible fo~ coordinating these
programs within the U.S. Government, add identifying goals and
milestones. (U)
Apprehension, Extradition, Rendit,'i'on and Prosecution:
Foreign terrorists who violate U.S. la~s will be apprehended-and
tried, no matter where they hide and nd matter how long it
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takes. The Justice Department is the lead agency for this
program. In pursuing extradition and tendition, the Justice
Department will act in coordination wi~h the State
Department. (U)
I
-- Other departments will make asJistance to these Justice
Department efforts a top priority and Jill budget and structure
priorities accordingly. The Intelligedce Community will
maintain collection and capabilities td support ·apprehensions.
The Defense Department will, if requested, provide
nonreimbursable transportation in suppdrt of renditions to the
extent permitted by law. The State De~artment will ensure that
at the top of our bilateral agenda witn other governments,
especially those that harboF terrorist~, is action against those
that threaten or have attacked U.S. interests and cooperation on
apprehension, prosecution, extradi tion 1 1 or rendition. ~
I
-- The Justice Department will idJntify the highest
priority pending foreign terrorist apprlehensions and the FBI
in coordination with CIA and the State Department will develop
plans for their rendition. ~
1
1
wh~
2.
ion: Foreign terrorists
pose a credible threat
to
Pn ted States and its citizens will be subject to
preemption and disruption abroad, consilstent with U.s. laws.
I
CIA is the lead agency for this progra~. ~
-- Disruption program plans and sp;ecific actions will be
developed and coordinated for interagenpy approval in accordance
with existing procedures.~
1
-- Other departments with relevant\ capabilities (such as
Treasury on financirtg) will contribute expertise and assets to
this program. ~
3. International Cooperation: The goa[ of zero tolerance for
international terrorism will guide bilateral and multilateral
efforts to elimihate sa~ctuaries, penal~ze
s that sponsor
terrorism, and assist friendly states v~ctimized .by terrorism.
The State Department is the lead agency[ for this program, which
will combine the following elements:
1
I
I
-- Support for e
s to obtain the extradition or other
rendition of indicted terrorists. Al) ~rograms and activities
conducted abroad will be implemented inj full compliance with
existing Chief of Mission authorities. ,
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-- Adoption and implementation of fhe eleven major
international conventions on t~rrorism rill be a major foreign
policy priority.~·
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.
The State Department shall be responsible for coordinating with
relevant agencies all assistance relate~ to international
terrorism. The State Department shall klso maintain, in
I
coordination with the Interagency Intelligence Committee on
Terrorism (IICT) and the Office 6f Scie~ce and Technology Policy·
through the National Science and Technology Council, a robust
international research, development, an~ procurement effort for
counter..:.terrorism technologies. ~
I
.· · . .
Terrori~t
4. Prevertting
Acquisition ofj Weapons of Mass
Destruction: To reflect the importance! of efforts to prevent
terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD), I
reiterate PODs 39 and 41, which require~
-- The U.S. Government will work through interagency
efforts with other nations to reduce orl eliminate WMD; to
safeguard such weapons, their components, and precursors; to
prevent further WMD proliferation and tb ensure that such
weapons, their components and k.ey precutsors, do not come into
the possession of terrorists. We will kaintain a robust
capability to respond to crisis situatibns involving the threat
or use of WMD by terrorists. With NSC boordination, State, DOD,
.
I
DOE, Treasury, Commerce, HHS, FBI, and ~IA will continue to
direct components of this overall effort and to provide the
necessary programmatic support. I reit~rate the importance of
ensuring support to HHS and DOJ and othkr agencies, to implement
.
I
and enforce safeguards and procedures to assure that se 1 ect
infectious agents and to~ins are acquir~d, stored, transferred,
or used only for legitimate scientific purposes and not for
other non-approved purposes nor by terrprists as WMD. ~
I
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5. Consequence Management for T~rrorist Incidents: If, despite
our efforts, a terrorist incident occurs in the United States,
the Federal Government will respond rapkdly, working with stite
and local governments, to restore order!
deliver emergency
assistance. The Department of Justice, acting through the FBI,
will be the lead agency for operational! response to a weapon. of
mass destruction incident. FEMA is responsible .for preparing ·
for or responding to the consequences 9:f a WMD incident, w.ith
participation by PHS· (health/medical l, EPA (hazmat/
·
environmental) and DOE (radiological), ~s necessary. When the
Attorney General, acting on the advice bf the Director, FBI, and
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in coordination with the Director, FEMAI, determines that the
incident or threat of an incident has s~bsided, _lead agency
responsibility may be transferred to FEMA. (U)
I
For consequence management of terroristj.incidents outside of the
United States, initial . U.S. efforts will. be coordinated. through
.
.
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.
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the Foreign Emergency Support Team (FES!T) · led by the State
·
Department, and with its Consequence Mapagement Response Team
(CMR T ) . (u)
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.
Our domestic goal is to build a capability in 120 major cities ·
for first responders to be able to deal! with incidents involving
weapons of mass destruction by 2002. Toward th~t end, several
departments will participate in a coord~rrated program in
.
conjunction with local and state respon;se authorities. 'K:..l
-- DOD, in coordination with -the nbJ/FBI, FEMA, PHS, DOE,
and EPA, will provide training to metrobolitan emergency
responders and will maintain military upits (active and reserve
components) to serve as augmentation fo:rces for weapons of mass
destruction consequence management and ~o help maintain
proficiency of local emergency respondeil:"s through training. "t'Sl.
I
-- DOE will plan for and provide etnergency responder
training for nuclear, radiological incil:ients; EPA will plan for
and provide emergency responder traininb for hazardous materials
and
e::i:::m::::~ ::::d::t:~e:ad agel to plan and to prepare
for a national response to medical emerbencies arising from the
terrorist use of weapons of mc:1ss destrul:tion. HHS, with the
support of other Federal agencies, willj provide enhanced local
response capabilities through the develppment of Metropolitan
Medical Strike Teams· systElJ:fi.s; will deve~op and maintain the
National Disaster· Medical System (NDMS) 1, including the National
Medical Response Teams; will w_ork with bon to ensure
deployability of NDMS response teams, shpplies and equipment;
I ...
and, ~orking with the Department 9f Veterans
rs 1 ensure
adequate stockpiles of antidote and othbr necessary
pharmaceuticals nationwide and the traihing of medical personnel
in NDMS hospitals. (U)
I
DOJ, in coordination with DOD, FEMA, EPA, and DOE, ·will
provide personal protective equipmenh~· • ~etection and diagnostic
.
I
instruments, on a selective basis, to State and local law
en-forcement agencies. ~
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Coordination of this overall effort will be effected through an
interagency WMD Protection Group. (U) 1
I
6. Transportation Securi tz,i. I accepteld and expect the full
implementation of the recommendations elf the White House.
Commission on Aviation Safety and Secur1i ty, The Department of
Transportation is the lead agency for t1his program. (U)
-- Funding for the timely implemenltation of the White House
Commission on Aviation Safety and Securlity recommendations will
be reflected in Administration budget r 1equests. (U)
I
-- As technology advances and the ~hreat evolves, DOT will
ensure that our technologies and proced;ures keep pace. Toward
that end, the DOT will coordinate, in cboperation with NSTC, an
interagency research and development prbgram on transportation
security. With respect to aviation secrrity, DOT will
periodically review whether additional measures beyond those in
the Commission Report are required. Asj a first step,. the FAA
will develop and implement a more rigoreus system for air cargo
inspection, to include use of private v~ri cation and
inspection firms. Parallel measures wi~l be researched,
developed, and deployed to improve the 1
security of ground and
maritime transportation. ~
I
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-- In addition, the Department of fransportation is
responsible for dissemination of aviatifn security information,
in coordination with State, as appropriate. (UJ
7. Protection of Critical Infrastructulre and Cyber Systems:
We will ciinimize the risk from attacks bn our critical
infrastructure and cyber systems, whethbr the attackers are
nations, groups, or individu~l~. We wi~l also be prepared to
deal with the consequence§ of such atta~ks. (U)
I
1
There
, having reviewed the recommen ctations of the
presidential Commission on Crit
1 Inf1rastructure Protection,
I am issuing a complementary dir.ecti ve bn our· policy toward
protection of our critical infrastructu~re. (U)
8. Continuity of Government OperationJ Attacks by nation_s or
groups will not be permitted to disruptj the functioning o'f
either the constitutionally mandated functions of the Federal
Government/ nor the operation of its .~,c.rli tical components. ~
. I
I
-- As outlined in Executive Order 112656, every department
and agency will be able to rapidly and ~ffectively transition
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from routine operation to emergency operations of vital
functions followina an attack that inckpacitates its
headquarters, key facilities, or leadetship. (U)
.
I
-- In particular, agen~ies will e~sure that key couNter'""
terrorism staff can operate in .low to mid-level WMD
contingencies by proviqingprotective ~quipment and
transportation to a rapidly accessiblejrelocation site. ~
-- The National Security Advisor Will submit for my review
and approval a draft of an updated andj comprehensive ·
·
Presidential Decision Directive on End~ring Constitutional
Government that takes into account the\terrorist and .
unconventional threats, and requires continuity of operations
capabilities by all departcients and ag~ncies as a foundation for
continuity of government for the futur~. ~·
I
9. Countering the Foreign Terrorist T~reat in the U.S.:
Foreign terrorists will not be allowedlto enter the United
States and the full force of legal aut~orities will beused to
remove foreign terrorists from the U.S~ and to prevent
fundraising within the u.s. to support [foreign terrorists. The
Justice Department will be the lead agency for this program.~
applican~s
-- Visa
that pose a tejrorist threat will be
identified and denied entry into the udited States. The State
Department, Justice Department (FBI and INS), and CIA will
ensure that information about such per~ons, 'including their
aliases, is collected and disseminated lin a timely manner to
deny them entry into the United States.; ~
·
I
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-- The State Department will work jclosely with other
governments to adopt and implement standards for travel
..
documentation. Such documents should ~e computer readable,
tamper resistant/ and difficult to counterfeit. ~
-- Justice (INS and FBI) and State! will develop a strategy,
to be implemented by DOJ (INS and FB~) ,j to limit the duration of
stay of students from terrorism list co untries, to track ..them
1
while they are in the U.S. and to know rhen they depart. In
addition, State and DOJ, together with 1
the Commerce Department
and Defense Department, will determine how best.to prevent
foreign students whose studies are spon~ored by terrorist -.list
countries from acquiring WMD-related .knowledge in the United
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-- Justice will ensure that, in accordance with PDD-9,
alien smuggling rings are disrupted and disbanded, and will, in
particular, thwart attempts to smuggle potential terrorists into
the United States. ~
-- Justice, using removal procedures, including the Alien
Terrorist Removal Court, will seek to swiftly remove alien
terrorists from the United states and will detain them awaiting
removal proceedings. The Administration will again seek
legislation clarifying the definition of ~engaging in terrorist
activity" to better facilitate exclusion and removal of alien
terrorists under the immigration laws. ~
-- The Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Attorney General and Secretary of the Treasury, will designate
foreign terrorist organizations that are prohibited by law from
raising funds in the United States. In addition Justice and
Treasur will work to revent such activities.
--.. E.O. 13526, 1.4(c)
-- The DCI will work to support the Secretary of the
Treasury in developing usable information for the designation by
Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney General and
Secretary of State, of entities and individuals of foreign
terrorist organizations that are located in foreign
jurisdictions, particularly in those countries that are not
state sponsors of terrorism. (U)
10. Protection of Americans Overseas: The first duty of
government is the protection of its citizens. That duty extends
to Americans abroad, whether they are traveling in an official
or private capacity. (U)
-- The State Department, through its chiefs of mission,
will be responsible for ensuring the security of personnel
associated with diplomatic and consular posts abroad, inc-luding
DOD personnel subject to the force protection responsibilities
of the chiefs of mission pursuant to the DOD/State Universal
MOU, and for programs to preserve the safety of private U.S.
citizens abroad. U.S. citizens should be adequately warned of
the danger of terrorist attack, advised regarding precautionary
measures and afforded appropriate assistance and protection. (U)
-- The Secretary of Defense, throu9h geographic CINes, will
be responsible for force protection of CINe-assigned forces and
those DOD personnel for whom the Secretary of state has
SE!€RB'P
SE6RET
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.
1
I
I
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I
delegated force protection responsibility to DOD under the
Memorandum of Understanding betw.een the Departments of State and
Dejense on Security of DOD Elements ahd P~rsonnel in Foreign
Areas (the Universal MOU). ,JU}
I
I
ADDITIONAL CAPABILITIES
l
In addition to the programs described above, the national
counter-terrorism effort requires thelfollowing elaboration to
the guidance in l?DD-39.
(U)
·i
Sp~c~al
I
1. National
Security Events: Scores of special events
receive Federal protection annually. jSome of these, such as
Presidential nominating conventions, Presidential Inaugurations,
,
I
.
Presidential Summits, State of the Un~on addresses and Olympic
games have a national significance and could attract
unconventional attacks. ~
l
The interagency Counter-Terrorism and!Security Group (CSG} shall
notify the Attorney General and Secretary of the Treasury of
events when it believes they should designated a "National
Special Security Event." The Attorne~ General and Secretary of
the Treasury are required to agree on \the designation. ~
I
I
I have decided that for such National ~pecial Security Events,
the full protective and consequence management capabilities of
the Federal Government shall be availa'ble as necessary,
including those of both the FBI and tde Secret Service. ~
I
Lead Agency responsibilities shall be
l
~s
follows:
FBI. The FBI will be the lead agency Iter intelligence, crisis
,
.
I
.
management, hostage rescue, counter-te~rorlsm {except as noted
below regarding Secret Service protect~ve anti-terr6rism
measures and counter-terrorism assets}! and its statutory Federal
criminal investigations. The FBI will identify and coordinate
appropriate anti-terrorism measures ani:i FBI counter-terrorism
asset~ {including, w~en necessaiy, DoPj assets) that will be
needed to perform its lead agency resppnsibilit s. The USSS
will coordinate its activities regardihg security
design/planning and implementation witp the FBI. The FBI will
also identify and coordinate.its measut~s and assets to.effect
consequence management planning, coord~nation, and~ransi~ion
from the crisis ma~agement phase to cphsequence management • by
.t
FEMA. ~
I
I
I
I
!SEGRI!:T
.
�SE6RET
11
!fB€RJ3'1'
FEMA. FEMA shall be the lead agency for consequence management
planning and coordination. Transition from the crisis
management phase to the consequence management phase shall be as
agreed by the Attorney General, the FBI Director and the FEMA
Director, or their designees. ~
The U.S. Secret Service. The Secret Service shall be the lead
agency for security design/planning and implementation, and will
identify and coordinate the appropriate Secret Service antiterrorism measures and counterterrorism assets (and, if
necessary, the assets of other agencies in mutual agreement with
those agencies) that will be needed to effect the overall
securit re uirements (includin
The FEMA Director, U.S. Secret Service Director, and FBI
Director shall ensure that their respective lead agency
responsibilities are fully coordinated and effectively
implemented. Unless mutually agreed upon between the Directors
or their designees, the Secret Service and the FBI will maintain
full command and control of their respective agency assets in
all circumstances and incidents.
Defense, State, Energy, HHS, Transportation and EPA shall,
consistent with their authorities and appropriations, make
available specialized units in support of security operations,
crisis management, and consequence management. ~
The Attorney General and Secretary of the Treasury, in
cooperation with other concerned Principals including the
Director/OMB, should within 120 days submit for my approval a
plan to implement this decision. T~e plan should, inter alia,
cover:
~
-- Command/control arrangements of the FBI, Secret Service,
FEMA, DOD and other relevant agencies; ~
-- how to achieve quickly an air space security capability
centered on the enforcement arms of the Treasury (U.S. Secret
Service and u.s. Customs Service); +G+
any required changes in funding and/or legislative
authorities. (U)
e'SGRB'i'
SE6REI
�SEQ RET
2. National Capital Area Rapid Response Capability for a WMD
Terrorist Incident: The most inviting domestic target for a
terrorist employing WMD is downtown Washington and the national
security headquarters nearby in Virginia . Yet there is no
specialized explosive ordnance disposal team in the Washington
area trained or equipped to deal with WMD; or any detection and
alerting system to identify when WMD move into the metropolitan
area on main approach routes. Accordingly, we must be able to
detect and safely deal with any WMD within or approaching
Washington, DC. ~
-- The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the
Secretary of Energy, shall ensure that there is a robust
capability to render safe a nuclear, biological, or chemical
device in the National Capital area and that such a capability
be deployable in the shortest time possible. ~
-- DOE will lead a technology research and demonstration
project to examine the feasibility of installing covert WMD
detection systems on approaches to the metropolitan area. ~
E.O. 13526, 1.4(g)
4. Statutory Authority and Funding for Combating Terrorism
Operations: The burden for finding the statutory authority to
SESREl
�if""\
rr-" n. r'i"" -r
\...} C ~, 1\
I
if I
I
use resources during combating terrorism operations is unfairly
I
left to each agency. Therefore,· the Secretary of Defense and
the Attorney General, in coordination ~ith the OMB Director,
will develop comprehensive proposals fclr statutory authority for
funding to combat terrorism .operations.! These proposals shall
be submitted to the APNSA within 120 d~ys. (U)
I
.
I
5. Exerci
: There shall be at leasti one annual exercise
involving the participation of Agency ~rincipals to validate
policies, procedures, and capabilities \for the resolution of
unconventional attacks against the U.S ·I and its citizens. ts+
I
Implementation
I
National Coordinator for S~curity, InfJastructure Protection, and
Counter-Terrorism: Program coordination in support of this
Directive will be under the auspices of; the National Coordinator.
for Security, Infrastructure Protectiori and Counter-Terrorism.
'
While not directing the activities of ~gencies, the National
1
Coordinator will integrate the Governme nt' s policies and programs
on unconventional threats to the homela!nd.and Americans abroad:
attacks on our infrastructure~ cyber sij~tems, and government
operations, terrorism, and defenses against covert delivery of
weapons of mass destruction. Reportin~ to the APNSA shall be an
NSC staff Senidr Director for Infrastru~ture Protection and a
Senior Director for Counter-Terroris~. I In the context of the
established annual budget process the National Coordinator will
provide advice regarding the budgets fo~ counter-terrorism. (U)
.
I
.
!
For these purposes, the National Coordinator will chair
assistant secretary/flag rank groups, r~porting to the Deputies
Committee (or, at the call of its chair'r, the Principals
. Committee) including: ·
'
-- The Counter-Terroris~ Sec~rity ~roup (CSG) to coordinate
counter-terrorism issues and review ongbing crisis operations/
activities concerning foreign terrorism[ and domestic terrorism
with significant foreign involvement; -ts+
I
'
-- Critical Infrastructure Coordinktion Group (CICG) to
coordinate the implementation of the Pr~sidential Decision
Direc ve ·on Critical Infrastructure; ~
I
--The Weapons of Mass Destruction!I Preparedness (WMDP),
.. ,,,.
Consequence Management and Protection Gf:'OUP to coordinate
polici~s and programs relating to Weapohs of Mass Destruction.
(WMD) emergency preparedness, tr.aining, equipping and organizing
eEG!dtET
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WMD consequence managers, j_nterdiction [of Wiv!D and associ a ted
components beihg introduced into the United States and security
of WMD-related facilities in the United States. +e+
I
'
Coordin~tor
The National
will also be jesponsible foi ensuring
program coordihation between these thrde groups (CSGi CICG and
WMDP) ~ahd.the existing, interagency working group 6n Enduring
.
,
I
.
.
Constitut.ional Government (IWG/ECG, chaired by the Counselor to
the APNSA)) '; -"Whfch coordinate developm~rit and implementation of
policy and progracis reiated to gbvernm~nt-wide continuity of
. ...
,
. operations and continuity of government.
~
~
m
~.
The National Coordinator may call thesJ groups to. meet jbintly
or form joint sub-groups to address inter-disciplinary issues.
The Counter-terrorism Security Group add the N~tional
Coordinator will conduct their reviews jof intelligence programs
and activities consistent with existing procedures and
authorities and in coordination with t~e DCI and/or the Chair of
the Intelligence IWG, as appropriate.
r
The National Coordinator shall report ~egularly to the
Principals and annually to me in a SecJrity Preparedness Report
(this report supercedes the PDD-39 repJiting requirements)
The National Coordinator will also partlicipate as a full member
of Deputies or Principals Corrunittee meejtings when they meet to
consider counter-terrorism, security, WMD defense, or
infrastructure issues.
In addition, wh~le not directing the
actions of agencies, the National CoorJinator shall coordinate
the development of interagency agreed g:Uidelines .for crisis
management and the procedures for authdrizing deployment and
employment of specialized crisis assetsj. *1-
~
i
:.
·,.
~..,.__4
~ IMI' ~
...........
I
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I
PHOTOCOPY
WJG HANDWRITING
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
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Office of Records Management - Presidential Decision Directives
Creator
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National Security Council
National Security Council Records Management Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
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<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7585718" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>Presidential Decision Directives communicate Presidential decisions concerning national security and U.S. foreign policy.</p>
<p>Presidential directives are signed or authorized by the President on issues of foreign policy and national security. The National Security Council gathers facts and views of appropriate government agencies, conducts analyses, determines alternatives, and presents policy choices to the President for decision. The President's decisions are announced by decision directives.</p>
Provenance
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National Security Council Records Management Office
Publisher
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Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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Paper
Dublin Core
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Title
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PDD-62 - Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas, 5/22/1998
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
National Security Council Records Management Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
5/22/1998
Is Part Of
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<a href="http://catalog.archives.gov/id/7585718" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Publisher
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Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Medium
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Reproduction-Reference
Source
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PDD-62
7585718
Declassified
Foreign Policy
Presidential Decision Directive
Terrorism
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/5da7d9058d6f3a9a6a7fe805b0b75975.pdf
c94646e67c5920b4e454c7cd4c53c976
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documentsfromthis Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full.
�-SEeRET
Agency:
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Bureau:
PROCUREMENT
Heading:
Other Procurement, Air Force
FY 2001 Budget
Appendix Page:
284
FY 2001
$7,699,127,000
Pending Request:
$20,000,000
Proposed Amendment:
$7,719,127,000
Revised Request:
This amendment would increase the pending FY 2001 request for Other Procurement, Air
Force by $20 million as part of the Administration's overall request for increased resources for
intelligence community counterterrorism activities. These activities are explained in greater
detail in the accompanying classified annex.
The Department of Defense will also realign $67.1 million within this procurement
account tofinanceincreased activities against high-priority terrorist threats in FY 2001. Source
funds are available as a result of program repricing and reductions to lower priority programs.
Taken together with reductions proposed in accompanying budget amendments, this
amendment would not increase the proposed budget totals.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.(X 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
—SECRET"
�
Dublin Core
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Title
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<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
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Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
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Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Dublin Core
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Title
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Declassified Documents concerning the Millenium After Action Review
Identifier
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2014-0219-M
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on the Millenium After Action Review. A Department of Defense memo regarding an Air Force request for additional procurements for FY 2001 is included.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Roger Cressey
NSC Transnational Threats Office (1998-2001) Office
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reproduction-Reference
Is Part Of
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<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7585797" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
2/6/2015
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2014-0219-M
7585797
Declassified
Foreign Policy
Terrorism
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/f63d7fb54c9cbec21b3000db3c4f9d39.pdf
2e5ad3c005119fc066dee6c4236b9ac4
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Section 1.4 (c) of E.O. 13526.
�Clarke, Richard A. (TNT)
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:
ActionAddees:
WHSR
Friday, October 27, 2000 8:19 AM
Bolan, Christopher J. (VP); Cables; Camp, Donald A. (NESA); Clarke, Richard A. (TNT);
Cressey, Roger W. (TNT); Fenzel, Michael R. (TNT); Gordon-Hagerty, Lisa E. (TNT); Kurtz,
Paul B. (TNT); McCarthy, Mary O. (INTEL); Riedel, Bruce O. (NESA)
TERRORISM: USAMA BIN LADIN-RELATED ACTIVITIES IN KONDOZ PROVINCE,
AFGHANISTAN
RUEAIJU/NIMA NAVY YARD WASHINGTON DC
RUETIAA/DIRNSA
RUETDAA/ANCHORY FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC//INR/DSITA/SCT//
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEADWD/DA WASHINGTON DC
RUEPWDC/DA AMHS WASHINGTON DC
RUCXONI/ONI WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUCXNIS/DIRNAVCRIMINVSERV WASHINGTON DC//ATAC/0022//
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RHEFJWC/JWAC DAHLGREN VA//J2//
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY
RHEBAAA/DOEHQ//IN//
RHEHWSR/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
RUCNFB/FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
PAGE 2 RUEAIIA 3318 S E C R E T
RUCNSE/SECRET SERVICE//ID//
RUEAWJA/DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WASH DC//OIPR//
RUEABND/DEA WASHDC//OI//
RHFJUSC/US CUSTOMS SERVICE W
RUCXGRD/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
RUEAWJF/IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
RULSDMK/DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION//S-60//
RUEANHA/FAA NATIONAL HQ
RUEANFA/US NRC WDC
RUFGAID/USCINCEUR INTEL VAIHINGEN GE//J-2//
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK//DOA//
RUFGSHE/US SURVEY DIV SHAPE BE
RUKAINT/CDRUSAREUR DCSINT HEIDELBERG GE//AEAGB-IAD//
RHFPAAA/UTAIS RAMSTEIN AB GE//INO//
RHDLCNE/COMUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//N2/N22//
RUMICEA/USCINCCENT INTELCEN MACDILL AFB FU/CCJ2-JIW/CCJ2//
RHRMDAB/COMUSNAVCENT//N2//
RUEASRA/COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GA//AFRD-DS//
RUCJICL/COMUSMARCENT HQ MACDILL AFB FL//G2//
RUHEHMS/COMUSMARCENT
PAGE 3 RUEAIIA 3318 S E C R E T
RUCJICS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEOBBA/USCENTAF SHAW AFB SC//A2//
RUEOEEE/CJTF SWA//J2//
RUMIKAA/COMUSARCENT KU INTEL CAMP DOHA KU
RUCBACM/USCINCJFCOM NORFOLK VA
RUCBAIC/JFIC NORFOLK VA
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. 0. 13526
�ActionAddees:
RUCBCLF/CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
RUCBLFB/COMMARFORLANT
RUWSMXI/USCINCTRANS INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB
RUEPVAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//
SECRET
Classification:
271157Z OCT 00
DateTime:
Distribution:
SIT: BOLAN NSC Camp CLARKER CRESSEY FENZEL GORDON-HAGERTY KURTZ
MCCARTHY
RIEDEL
Identifier:
M4701494
InfoAddees:
////
Linel:
PATSZYUW RUEAIIA3318 3011157-SSSS--RHEHWSR.
ZNY SSSSS
Line2:
Line3:
P271157ZOCT 00
Line4:
FM CIA
CIA
Originator:
PRIORITY
Precedence:
BOLANC
Profiles:
CABLES
CAMPD
CLARKER
CRESS EYR
FENZELM
GORDONHL
KURTZP
MCCARTHM
RIEDELB
StationRoutinglndicator: RUEAIIA
StatlonSerlalNumber:
3318
10/27/2000 08:18:24 ET
TimeOfReceipt:
S E C R E T NOFORN
CITE CIA 232228
SERIAL:
PASS:
EO 13526 1.4c
DIA FOR TERRORISM.
EO 13526 1.4c
PAGE 4 RUEAIIA 3318 S E C R E T
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
REPORT CLASS S E C R E T NOFORN
DIST:
27 OCTOBER 2000
COUNTRY: AFGHANISTAN/CENTRAL ASIA
SUBJ:
DOI:
TERRORISM: USAMA BIN LADIN-RELATED ACTIVITIES IN KONDOZ
PROVINCE, AFGHANISTAN
EO 13526 1.4c
EO 13526 1.4c
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SUMMARY: NONE
PAGE 5 RUEAIIA 3318 S E C R E T
TEXT: 1. IN EARLY TO MID-SEPTEMBER 2000, INDIVIDUALS DIRECTED BY
USAMA ((BIN LADIN)), AND POSSIBLY BIN LADIN HIMSELF, TRAVELED TO
AREAS IN KONDOZ PROVINCE, AFGHANISTAN TO INSPECT NUMEROUS FACILITIES
IN KONDOZ AND SEVERAL RURAL ISOLATED AREAS FOR POTENTIAL USE AS CAMPS
AND LIVING QUARTERS. MUCH ATTENTION WAS GIVEN TO A DISTRICT IN
KONDOZ KNOWN AS "CHAR PARA." THE VISITORS ALSO TOURED THE KONDOZ
AIRPORT.I EO 13526 1.4c QOMMENT: WE DO NOT BELIEVE BIN LADIN WAS IN
FACT TRAVELING WITH THESE VISITORS.)
2. THE TALIBAN LEADERSHIP IN KONDOZ HAD RECEIVED ORDERS FROM
QANDAHAR PRIOR TO THE VISITORS' ARRIVAL TO PROVIDE THE BIN LADIN
PERSONNEL WITH UNLIMITED ACCESS AND ANY INFORMATION THEY NEEDED.
DURING THE TOUR OF THE KONDOZ AIRPORT, THE VISITORS STATED THAT A NEW
INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE COMING "SOON" TO ASSIST IN OVERSEEING AIRPORT
OPERATIONS.!
1 dr. ICOMMENT: THE NEW "AIRPORT DEPUTY" WAS TO BE AN
ARAB, WHO WOULD REPORT DIRECTLY TO THE BIN LADIN LEADERSHIP. ONE OF
HIS FUNCTIONS WOULD LIKELY BE FACILITATION OF NARCOTICS TRANSPORTION
OPERATIONS).
3. ONE OF THE REASONS FOR THE VISIT WAS CONNECTED TO BIN
PAGE 6 RUEAIIA 3318 S E C R E T
LADIN'S ORDERS, AND TALIBAN AGREEMENT, TO HAVE THE BIN LADIN
ORGANIZATION PLAY A GREATER ROLE IN KONDOZ PROVINCE SO THAT BIN LADIN
COULD ASSIST AND BETTER CONTROL OPERATIONS DESIGNED TO DESTABILIZE
CENTRAL ASIAN GOVERNMENTS. THE PLAN ENTAILED CLOSER COOPERATION IN
KONDOZ BETWEEN BIN LADIN OFFICIALS AND THE LEADERSHIP OF THE ISLAMIC
MOVEMENT OF UZBEKISTAN (IMU) AND OFFICIALS IN CHARGE OF THE CHECHEN
FIGHTERS LOCATED IN AFGHANISTAN.
TEAR LINE
-TEAR LINEEO 13526 1.4c
ACQ:
EO 13526 1.4c
EO 13526 1.4c
PAGE 7 RUEAIIA 3318 S-E-G-R-^T
EO 13526 1.4c
JRSO'S
EXTANT), ALMATY (FOR PASSAGE TO US AMBASSADOR TO TAJIKISTAN), USUN,
USCINCEUR, EUCOM JAC, US SURVEY DIVISION SHAPE, CINCUSAREUR,
CINCUSNAVEUR, CINCUSAFE, USCINCCENT, COMUSNAVCENT, COMUSARCENT,
COMUSMARCENT, COMSOCCENT, USCENTAF, JTF/SWA, CJTF KUWAIT,
USCINCJFCOM, JFIC, CINCLANTFLT, COMMARFORLANT, USCINCSOC, JSOC,
USCINCTRANS.
WARNING: REPORT CLASS S E C R E T NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS.
3
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�EO 13526 1.4c
t)mCHR77\TrPT)WOTTS^^
DOCUMENT.
END OF MESSAGE
SECRET.
CABLETYPE: IRIS MILITARY 5.0.4.
CLINTON UBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
RECORDED REPORTING
AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
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Clinton Presidential Records
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Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
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Declassified Documents concerning Counterterrorism
Identifier
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2014-0798-M
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on counterterrorism. Included is an October 2000 cable describing Usama bin Ladin-related activities in a province in Afghanistan.
Creator
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National Security Council
Richard Clarke
NSC Transnational Threats Office (1998-2001) Office
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Adobe Acrobat Document
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Reproduction-Reference
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<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7585795" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
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2/6/2015
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2014-0798-M
7585795
Afghanistan
Declassified
Foreign Policy
Taliban
Terrorism
Usama bin Ladin
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/f6df54db8eb6ac51413f4deb62c5e1d9.pdf
f7e8f37c9cdf25e6d0cd73adda63fbb9
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Sections 1.4 (c) and (d) of E.O. 13526.
�377B6E05.FIN
Page 1 of2
Exchange Mai
DATE-TIME
6/8/99 1:31:13PM
FROM
Clarke, Richard A.
CLASSIFICATION
TOP SECRET
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(a)(c)(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
06/08/1999
DECLASSIFYON
06/08/2009
SUBJECT
RE: PAKISTAN AND UBL [TOP SECRET]
TO
Riedel, Bruce O.
Sutphen, Mona K.
CARBON COPY
Sutphen, Mona K..
TEXT BODY
^jb^'"^ ^"3
Bruce and I are in complete accord on this. - rac
Original
Message
From: Riedel, Bruce O.
Sent: Tuesday, June 08, 1999
1:32 PM
To: Sutphen, Mona K.
Cc: Sutphen, Mona K.; Riedel, Bruce
O.; Clarke, Richard A.
Subject: PAKISTAN AND UBL [TOP SECRET]
MONA--PLS
PASS TO SRB
[601 L 3
>
SANDY YOU ASKED DICK AND I FOR VIEWS ON HOW TO
PROCEED
WITH UBL. WE AGREE THE CORE OF THE UBL/TALIBAN ISSUE
IS HOW TO PRESS
PAKISTAN TO TAKE ACTION TO FORCE TALIBAN TO ACT ON
UBL. STATE STRATEGY
EO 13526 1.4d
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
�377B6E05.FIN
Page 2 of2
•t
EO 13526 1.4d
THE PAKISTAN PROBLEM IS NOW GREATLY COMPLICATED
BECAUSE OF THE KASHMIR ISSUE.
�18S4A21F.FIN
Exchange
Page 1 of 14
Mail
DATE-TIME
12/2/99 10:53:49 AM
FROM
Benjamin, Daniel (TNT)
CLASSIFICATION
TOP SECRET
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(c)(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
12/02/1999
DECLASSIFYON
12/02/2009
SUBJECT
UBL Small Group [TOP SECRET]
TO
Sutphen, Mona K. (NSA)
CARBON_COPY
TEXT BODY
Co io-«.
MonaThe second document is the paper SRB asked for from Dick
for tomorrow's small group. The two flanking memos are grist for
a future PC. They are 1) the memo Bruce did at SRB's request on
the big picture in Afghanistan/Pakistan and 2) a discussion paper
that was tasked in the CSG and coordinated among the agencies. The
papers are somewhat complementary in that the first is longer term,
the second shorter term.
TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 8717srb
.doc
November 30, 1999
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
FROM: BRUCE RIEDEL
SUBJECT: Taliban - Next Steps
C 1 bj
O0
You asked for my views on a Taliban strategy post-sanctions
imposition. The
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
2.007 - 1D<O3- n
-7/|(P/I5K6M
�J864A21F.FIN
Page 2 of 14
confluence of sanctions, the winter lull in the civil war and the coup in
Pakistan may offer us a window of opportunity to achieve our
objectives in
Afghanistan. A major U.S. diplomatic effort to seek (1) an end to the
war, (2) a
new government in Kabul and (3) Afghan compliance with the UN
resolutions will be
required. Its chances for success are a long shot but in my judgement
worth the
effort especially as we have few other options to achieve our goals.
Afghanistan has become a cancer in Asia, exporting terror and drugs.
It is also
remarkably invulnerable to outside influence. It has virtually no
modem economy
and has been so ravaged by two decades of war that there is nothing
worth
bombing. Normal economic or military pressures will not succeed. It
is time to
try a comprehensive approach.
The Opportunity: The UN sanctions have gotten the Taliban's
attention.
Combined with a wheat shortage and a cold start to winter there is
some grumbling
in Afghanistan about Taliban's decision not to comply with UNSCR
1267. This is
not regime threatening, however, and will not compel compliance.
More worrisome
for the Taliban leadership was the failure of their 1999 offensives
against the
Northern Alliance which have left them vulnerable to counter attacks
this spring
when the weather improves. Again the Taliban is not in any danger of
losing the
war but they could see some of their 1998 gains lost. Most alarming
for Mullah
Omar and his lieutenants is the regime change in Pakistan. Pakistani
support
(food, oil, advisors, recruits, etc.) remains the single most essential
outside
leverage over Taliban. The Afghan policy of the Musharraf
government remains
unclear. At least some in'Islamabad
EO 13526 1.4d
have
Snarcaxed they want to move away from close alliance with the
Taliban.
This opportunity will not be open-ended. Sanctions' impact will be
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�3854A21F.FIN
Page 3 of 14
stronger
now than later as the Afghans adapt. Once spring comes the war will
resume in
earnest. Musharraf will
develop an Afghan approach soon and the default position will be the
status quo.
U.S. Diplomatic Offensive: We should consider launching a major
diplomatic
effort to secure both compliance with the UNSCRs (i.e. an end to
Taliban support
for terrorism in general and UBL in particular) and an end to the civil
war.
Indeed the two issues are inextricably linked. Mullah Omar supports
Mujahedin
like UBL because of their role in fighting the Russians and now the
Northern
Alliance, and in securing popular support for the regime in the war.
Only a
settlement that seeks to resolve the larger Afghan picture will succeed
in
resolving the sub-problem of Taliban's role in terrorism.
What we should offer is a package deal which includes a negotiated
end of the war
through the creation of a Taliban dominated unity government. All
factions would
be represented but the Taliban would have the upper hand, a reflection
of their
superior position and control of 80% of the country. EO 13526 1.4d
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�38B4A21F.FIN
Page 4 o f M
EO 13526 1.4d
To sell such a deal to the Afghan parties and their outside supporters
will
require a fiill court press with a great number of countries. This should
be a
U.S.-led effort and will replace the now moribund 6+2 effort the UN
led for the
last several years.
Pakistan is the most important actor. We should run our ideas past
them first
Iran is also a critical player as the Northern Alliance chief supporter.
Tehran
Russia and Iran are partners
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�3g'64A21F.FrN
Page 5 of 14
sunnortine the Nnrthem Alliance
Saudi Arabia and the UAE can be critica
China can also be a help
Finally we need to bring the Indians on board as well
The Afghan diaspora,
should be mobilized to bring its talents to bear on reconstruction.
A major public diplomacy campaign will also be essential. We should
kick off our
effort with a major speech by you on our policy toward Afghanistan in
this
Administration. This would review our many efforts to get a peace
process moving
including Bill Richardson's trip in 1997, our support for the UN 6+2
effort and
our considerable aid to Afghan NGOs (we are Afghanistan's largest
aid donor in
the '90s). We would then propose the way forward to end the war and
try to
appeal directly to the Afghan people. We would make clear we have
no quarrel
with their brand of Islam but do have an interest in ending support for
terror.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�38&4A21F.FIN
Page 6 of 14
This effort will encounter some domestic criticism from human rights
advocates
who want us to have no dealings with the Taliban. Our best response
to their
concerns is that the most immediate human rights help we can give
the Afghan
people is to end the war. We can also still press our concerns about
women's
rights with a new government. But we should have no illusions
~ in my view, pressing the human rights issue aggressively during
these
negotiations will doom them to failure.
If this effort fails we will still have all other options to explore. If fact
we
will be better placed to seek additional sanctions against Taliban if we
have
tried to resolve the war and they rejected our effort.
2
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET LIMITED ACCESS 8717
SECRET
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 11/30/09
TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT
S
R
B
JJBL Small Group.doc
TOP SECRET DELENDA
UBL Review 3 December 1999
There are two broad areas of concern. The first is the regional context
- our
policy on Afghanistan and Pakistan. You may want to hold a full PC
on this
issue. Attached is discussion paper that has been coordinated with the
agencies
and could be the basis of a PC. To tee that up, you may want to
discuss briefly
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�3864A21F.FrN
Page 7 of 14
the outstanding issues in the small group.
The second area is UBL himself - what he is up to, what is the state
of our
intelligence, what operations are under way.
The Region:
1. US Policy on Taliban: Given the Taliban's refusal to comply with
the UNSC
call for an end to terrorist support and their attitude in the attempted
peace
talks, should we review our policy of neutrality in the afghan conflict?
Do we
want to state our support for non-Taliban alternatives?
2. How do we maximize the sanctions?
EO 13526 1.4d
Bin Ladin:
1. What is he up to? Where has he been? Is there any reality to the talk
of
his leaving Afghanistan? What role has al Qida played in Chechnya?
What do you
expect him to do next?
EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d
�3864A21F.FIN
Page 8 of 14
EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d
2
TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT
T a ] i b a n
D i s c u s s i o n
Paper.doc
Discussion Paper: Next Steps on Bin Ladin,
the Taliban and Pakistan
[pjo d J
Background: The passage of UNSCR 1267 and the November 14
imposition of
sanctions appear to have shaken the Taliban leadership. In the weeks
since the
vote, they have soufiht to intensify their talks with uJ FO 13576 i Ad
They also tried two different stratagems for dealing with Bin Ladin.
The first
was to declare that Bin Ladin had asked the Taliban leadership for
permission to
leave Afghanistan and for assistance in securing safe passage. This
effort
appears to havefizzledout, possibly because we made clear that such
an outcome
was not in accordance with UNSCR 1267 and would not get the
Taliban off the hook.
The Taliban may have tried this ploy as the first step in a ruse they
have
attempted before: Declaring that Bin Ladin had departed when he had
not. In
retrospect, it is not clear that Bin Ladin ever offered to leave. If he did
not,
he may be rattled by the Taliban's public discussion of the matter.
The Taliban's other maneuver has been to float what they consider
different
'offers' to us, including the idea of convening a religious council, or
ulema, to
decide Bin Ladin's fate - specifically whether he should be expelled to
a country
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�3g64A21F.FIN
Page 9 of 14
that can try him under Sharia law. The members of the ulema would
likely come
from Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan and a third country. The Taliban has
also spoken
about putting Bin Ladin under house arrest in Afghanistan, where he
would be
monitored by an organization such as the OIC.
EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�38f64A21F.FIN
Page 10 of 14
EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d
Discussion:
UNSCR Sanctions: Ensure Implentation/lncrease the Pressure?
It will take some time for sanctions to bite. The UNSC has to set up a
sanctions
|
committee, and we are working to ensure its effectiveness
While time is
passing, we
should underscore to the Taliban that the current sanctions are not our
only - or
last - shot. UNSCR 1267 holds out the promise of further action, and
we should
let the Taliban know that we will consider additional sanctions,
including
ftirther travel restrictions and/or a trade embargo EO 13526 1.4d
�3g64A21F.FIN
Page 11 of 14
However we proceed, we need to ensure that the Taliban recognize
that they can
get out of the box they are in. Some among them may believe that
handing over
Bin Ladin will not lead to sanctions relief. We need to convince them
that their
choices will indeed make a difference. We should also continue to
emphasize that
sanctions were unanimously voted by the Security Council ~ that they
express the
will of the international community, not just the US ~ and that this
effort is
directed against Bin Ladin and not the Afghan people or Islam.
Engaging the Taliban: Should We Persist or Enlist the UN? Although
the Taliban's
intentions are not clear, we have heard from some contacts that they
want to send
a team here to discuss sanctions and other issues. We have repeatedly
said that
we would welcome such a discussion but have not received a
definiuvg rgsponsg,
�38'64A21F.FIN
Page 12 of 14
EO 13526 l.4d
Intelligence
EQ 13526 1.4c. EQ 13526 1.4d
�3864A21F.FIN
Page 13 of 14
EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d
EO 13526 1.4d
EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�Page 14 of 14
3&64A21F.FIN
EO 13526 1.4d
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
Classified by: Daniel Benjamin
Reason: 1.5 (c) (d),xl
Declassify On: exempt
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�
Dublin Core
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Title
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<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Declassified documents concerning the 9/11 Commission Report
Identifier
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2007-1063-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
9/21/2015
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on documents referenced in Chapter 4 of the 9/11 Commission Report. Included are emails from National Security Council staffers regarding Usama bin Ladin.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Emails
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
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Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
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Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/2/2015
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2007-1063-M
9/11 Commission
Declassified
Foreign Policy
Terrorism
Usama bin Ladin
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/12def68b859e9b11140d177fe5b6b30c.pdf
eab02403bae8e63eacceaca2cd7e9621
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Sections 1.4 (c) and (d) of E.O. 13526.
�Page 1 of 5
387D106B.FIN
Exchange
Mail
DATE-TIME
12/20/1999 11:38:17 PM
FROM
Scon-Perez, Marilyn L. (NSA)
CLASSIFICATION
TOP SECRET
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(c)(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
12/20/1999
DECLASSIFYON
12/20/2009
SUBJECT
FW: revised talking points for Zinni's use [TOP SECRET]
TO
Riedel, Bruce O. (NESA)
Malley, Robert (NESA)
Baker, James E. (LEGAL)
Cressey, Roger W. (TNT)
Camp, Donald A. (NESA)
Crocker, Bathsheba N. (NSA)
Moretz, Sheila K. (NSA)
Patterson, Pamela L. (NSA)
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L. (NSA)
Storey, Sharon V. (NSA)
Sutphen, Mona K. (NSA)
CARBON_COPY
TEXT BODY
As cleared by SRB and sent to principals.
Original Message
From: Sutphen,
Mona K. (NSA)
Sent: Monday, December 20, 1999 10:33 PM
To: @APNSA
Subject: FW:
revised talking points for Zinni's use [TOP SECRET]
zinni points
Original
Message
From: Camp, Donald A. (NESA)
Sent: Monday, December
20, 1999 8:16 PM
To: Sutphen, Mona K. (NSA); Crocker, Bathsheba
N. (NSA)
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
7/2A/IS KBU
�387D106B.FIN
Page 2 of 5
Cc: Baker, James E. (LEGAL); Krass, Caroline D. (LEGAL);
Cressey, Roger W. (TNT); Clarke, Richard A. (TNT)
Subject: revised
talking points for Zinni's use [TOP SECRET]
The following points
have been cleared through LEGAL and TNT.
Jamie has told us
that these points must be cleared through principals, as a matter
of law.
EO 13526 1.4d
A revised POTUS memo, making it consonant
with the talking points, is forthcoming shortly.
TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT
1 2 1 7
z i n n i
p o i n t s
.
W
I
T
H
EDITS.doc
Points for Zinni
The President is very concerned about plans of Usama bin Laden and
his
organization to carry out terrorist acts against Americans.
We have strong reason to believe that there is a heightened risk of
such attacks
from bin Laden's organization during the holiday season of Christmas,
the new
year and through the end of Ramadan.
the evidence of
specific
terrorist plans to coincide with the Millennium is compelling. This is a
very
real danger that we face.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�387D106B.FIN
Page 3 of 5
EO 13526 1.4d
The President would like to find ways to establish a stronger
foundation for our
relationship with Pakistan, and to make that relationship more
beneficial to both
sides. He would like in particular to find ways to work together to face
the
threat bin Laden poses to all of us.
The President has asked me to undertake this special mission to make
a serious
proposal on his behalf that responds to both our immediate concerns
and our hope
for a better relationship with Pakistan.
Bin Laden and the Al-Qaida organization are a major and immediate
threat to the
security of the United States and other nations. By unanimous vote of
the UN
Security Council, we attempted to get the Taliban's assistance on this
matter.
There is no indication that the Taliban is willing to help. We have told
them we
will hold them responsible if Al-Qaida kills innocent people, but it is
not at
—
EO 13526 1.4d
all clear that they understand this reality.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�Page 4 of 5
J87D106B.FrN
EO 13526 1.4d
OPT
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOC
�Page 5 of 5
?87D106B.FIN
EO 13526 1.4d
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�389AE69E.FIN
Exchange
Page 1 of2
Mail
DATE-TIME
01/11/2000 2:48:48 PM
FROM
Clarke, Richard A. (TNT)
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(c)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
01/11/2000
DECLASSIFYON
01/11/2010
SUBJECT
FOR SANDY [SECRET]
TO
Sutphen, Mona K. (NSA)
CARBON COPY
McCarthy, Mary O. (INTEL)
Kurtz, Paul B. (TNT)
Cressey, Roger W. (TNT)
TEXT BODY
To: SRB
Fm: RAC
Re: CSG
We have had some soul searching in the
CSG following the events of December. We (CIA, FBI, DOJ, and NSC)
have come to two conclusions:
1) Our efforts to date to disrupt
the al Qida and affiliates network have not put too much of a dent
in the global activities of bin Ladin'sfriends.To begin "roll
back," we need to take our own disruption activities to a markedly
different tempo. This can not be episodic or spasmodic. It can not
be just in the places where it is easy for us to operate. It must
be pro-active, constant, and ubiquitous.
2) Within the US,
we have let a variety of terrorist groups take root. While they have
not committed terrorism in the US (except for World Trade Center
and the UN/Tunnel plot), they could at any time. These groups form
"sleeper cells" that do planning and can then support attacks or
conduct attacks on order. In the meantime, they often engage in
credit cardfraud,cellphone cloning, and black marketeering. Most
are "out of status" with INS. They have all been left relatively
alone, not prosecuted for INS violation, not prosecuted for fimd
raising for terrorist groups.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. 0.13526
2.007-
�Page 2 of2
389AE69E.FIN
We believe that we need to change
things]
EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.46
Second,
it means more JTTFs around this country (joint terrorism task forces),
with greater participation by INS and Treasury (Customs, FINCEN,
and Secret Service). It will mean more FISAs and technology!
Third, it will mean actually monitoring the Canadian
border. While we do not envision anything like the Mexican border
coverage, we do believe that it would be nice to have at least one
person at every border crossing at all times. Even better would be
Working with Mary
McCarthy and OMB, we will develop a policy paper and a fiscal analysis
for PC consideration sometime in February. - rac
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�3A1D1188.FIN
Page 1 of 4
Exchange M a i l
DATE-TIME
10/25/2000 10:43:41 AM
FROM
Clarke, Richard A. (TNT)
CLASSIFICATION
TOP SECRET
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(c)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
10/25/2000
DECLASSIFYON
10/26/2010
SUBJECT
considerations [TOP SECRET]
TO
Cressey, Roger W. (TNT)
CARBON_COPY
TEXT BODY
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT considerations.doc
TOP SECRET DELENDA
102500
Considerations in the Design of a Response to the Attack on Cole
While we do not know at the time of this writing which grci-p
attacked the USS
Cole, there are certain issues about responding to the attack 'hat
should be
considered.
1. Law Enforcement Case v. Intelligence Case In many terrorist
attacks on the
US, law enforcement authorities took longer to come to a conclusion
about
culpability than did US intelligence. The difference in speed of
determination
is not. because there is a lower standard for an intelligence
determination, but
rather there is a different standard. The intelligence case is no less
valuable
than the law enforcement case, it is simply designed to produce a
different
result. The intelligence case is meant to inform policy makers so that
they can
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
ai
•7/ /»5- K8H
�3A1D1188.FIN
Page 2 of 4
take appropriate response measures. The law enforcement case is
designed to
focus on individual culpability with the goal being criminal court
trials.
As the intelligence community begins to build toward a determination
about
culpability, it is important that it is fully aware of all of the evidence
developed by the law enforcement investigation. The two teams of
investigators
need to interact (while observing the legal standard about sharing of
certain
kinds of intelligence with some of the investigators) to determine if
there is a
significant prospect of the two investigations eventually diverging in
their
conclusions.
In some instances our ability to render a terrorist suspect overseas to a
criminal court is severely constrained. Criminal prosecution is one of
several
response options to terrorism, which can be used in parallel. Because
US
criminal investigations of terrorism in other countries can be lengthy,
a
President is not constrained to await the results of a criminal
investigation
prior to determining responses to the terrorist act. Presidents have
chosen to
accept an intelligence determination of culpability as a basis for
executing
responses.
~ Potential perceptions problems can be created by simultaneous
criminal and
intelligence investigations. US law enforcement personnel may be
asked if they
agree with the conclusion on an intelligence case and have to respond
that the
law enforcement investigation has not concluded. This kind of
response could
give rise to charges that the Administration had acted before final
culpability
had been determined.
—Thus, if the intelligence case does conclude before the criminal
process has
CLINTON LIBRARY PtlOTOCOPY
�Page 3 of 4
3A1D1188.FIN
resulted in Grand Jury presentments, it would be important that all
Administration officials have a similar and clear public explanation of
the
difference between a law enforcement investigation and an
intelligence
investigation.
2. Time Separation between Culpability Determination and Responses
When a
determination of culpability is made by either or both the intelligence
community
and the law enforcement investigators, it is essential that such a
determination
not become public until the President has made a determination about
response
options and their timing. Thus, it may be necessary to respond to
inquires that
the investigation is on going.
Factors effecting the timing of a response may include:
EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d
3. In the Contingency that Culpability were to focus on al Qida: We
do not know
which group or groups committed the attack on the USS Cole. We do,
however, need
to consider what special factors come into play if various specific
groups are
determined to have perpetrated the attack. A group frequently
mentioned as a
suspect is the al Qida network. Were al Qida to be determined
culpable, three
considerations in the design of a response are:
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�3AJD1188.FIN
Page 4 of 4
V
EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d
-Taliban Responsibility: should the US extend culpability to the
Taliban, as
the US said many times publicly and privately that it would? A US
response
against the Taliban might be crafted in such a way that it focuses on
Taliban
military and communications capability, rather than hurting the people
of
Afghanistan. The goal of US action could be to change the Taliban
policy of
providing safe have for terrorists, not to overthrow the Taliban. Thus,
US
actions should not be those that create long standing anti-American
animosity.
-UNSC: should the US seek UN responses against the Taliban prior
to,
subsequent to, or simultaneously with unilateral US actions? The US
has been
pressing form months to extend the existing UNSC sanctions against
the Taliban
for their support of terrorist groups. Unilateral US action might
diminish
support in the UNSC for further sanctions.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�3A3F7E84.FIN
Exchange
Page 1 of 6
Mail
DATE-TIME
11/25/2000 3:28:01 PM
FROM
Clarke, Richard A. (TNT)
CLASSIFICATION
•¥OP SECRET
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(a)(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
11/25/2000
DECLASSIFYON
11/26/2010
SUBJECT
pass eyes only to mike & edmund for comment [TOP SECRET]
TO
Cressey, Roger W. (TNT)
CARBON_COPY
TEXTBODY
TRANSLATEDATTACHMENT Ultimatum 1 .doc
TOP 0ECRDT DELENDA
Ultimatum Strategy with the Taliban
1. Background: This paper assumes for the sake of planning that the
attack on
the USS Cole and other attempted terrorist acts were the work of the
al Qida
terrorist group lead by Usama bin Ladin and headquartered in
Afghanistan.
Following the 1998 attacks on US embassies in East Africa and
consistently since
then, the US has told the Taliban and others that we would hold the
Taliban
responsible for any further al Qida attacks on the US.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
The Taliban have denied contended that they have controls in effect
hat prevent
bin Ladin and others from engaging in terrorismfromAfghanistan.
Although there
are reports that the Taliban have occasionally placed some restrictions
on the al
Qida, these reports appear to be largely disinformation. Al Qida has an
extensive network of offices, bases, and units in Afghanistan. Al Qida
receives
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�3A3F7E84.FIN
Page 2 of6
regular and extensive support from the Taliban and is in many ways
integrated
into the Taliban structure. Al Qida, along with the Pakistani military,
have
been key to the successes the Taliban have had fighting the Northern
Alliance.
2. Elements of an Ultimatum Approach: If the US were to give the
Taliban an
ultimatum, we would need to decide on at least these nine
components:
-demand: what specifically do we seek? bin Ladin alone or the
closure of
terrorist facilities and expulsion of terrorists?
—venue and participants: how would we vary the location and the US
players
from past meetings to send a message of increased gravity?
-date certain; would we include explicit reference to a date by which
they
must act or face the consequences?
-face saver: do we suggest some new approach that might make it
easier for the
Taliban to comply? do we offer incentives for compliance?
-description of consequences: do we provide any description of what
will
happen if the Taliban are not compliant?
—do not retaliate message: do we tell them in advance that if the
Taliban do
not cooperate and we are forced to act, that any terrorist response to
our
actions will result in an even greater US act of retaliation?
-publicity: how, if at all, do we publicly characterize the meeting?
what do
we tell other governments?
3. The Demand: The US has in the past demanded variously that bin
Ladin be
extradited for trial somewhere, that other terrorist leaders be included,
and
that Afghanistan cease being a safe have for terrorists by closing the
camps and
expelling the terrorists. The first UNSC resolution narrowly focused
on bin
Ladin. The resolution we now seek calls for an end to the safe haven.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�3A3F7E84.FrN
Page 3 of 6
Proposal: The US should seek the immediate extradition of bin Ladin
and a list
of other terrorist leaders (Shihata, Zawahiri, Zubayda, Abu Hafs,
Marwan),
followed by a series of observable steps that result in the closure of all
terrorist facilities and the expulsion of all terrorists over 90 days.
4. Venue and Participants: Amb. Sheehan and Amb. Inderfurth have
met with
Taliban officials often in New York and Islamabad, although their
deputies
carried out the latest fruitless exchange in Frankfurt. Amb. Pickering
held a
trilateral meeting with Taliban and Pakistani officials in Islamabad
earlier this
year.
Proposal: Either the DCI or a senior US military official should meet
with the
Taliban representatives. The selection of the DCI or a military officer
would
convey that the meeting was not a discussion and that the issue had
become one
where the CIA or DOD was now involved in implementing our
policy. The meeting
could be in Islamabad, so that the Pakistanis would clearly hear what
was being
said. Alternatively, it could be in Dubai, whose ruler has maintained
ties with
the Taliban. The host country could arrange with the Taliban for an
appropriate,
senior level official from Afghanistan to attend.
5. Date certain: Providing a specific date by which compliance must
occur
telegraphs a timeframe for possible US military action. Such a
message might
place US forces at greater risk and might also cause al Qida and the
Taliban to
relocate personnel and take other measures. Nonetheless, the US has
used
specific ultimatum dates in past crises with other countries. The new
UNSCR will
probably pass in early December and give the Taliban a month to
comply before
sanctions kick in.
Proposal: The US should refer to the UNSCR timetable and note that
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 4 of 6
3A3F7E84.FIN
actions must
be taken by the Taliban before the 30 days waiting period of that
resolution
expires, i.e. during Rammadan (which ends around 27 December).
6. Face Savers: Some within the Taliban have talked about face saving
approaches, such as a bin Ladin trial in Afghanistan or by an
international
Islamic panel. These suggestions do not appear to have had the
approval of
Taliban leader Mullah Omar, who has opposed a trial or extradition of
bin Ladin.
Some have suggested that Omar is not only personally tied to bin
Ladin, but would
face domestic political threats if he turned bin Ladin over for trial.
Taliban
officials have noted that even after bin Ladin were turned over, the US
would
have other demands (e.g. the status of women) before normalizing
relations.
Proposal: The US should make clear that the terrorist leaders must be
turned
over to a legitimate government which will try them and punish them.
If that
happens and the terrorist safe haven is eliminated over 90 days, the
US would
improve relations and would lift sanctions. Relations would further
improve
later if other problems were addressed. If, however, the terrorist safe
haven is
not terminated the United States would insure that the Taliban would
never defeat
the Northern Alliance.
7. Description of Consequences: The previous US attack on
Afghanistan was
limited to a few terrorist camps and did little lasting damage. The
Taliban may
believe that would occur again. Or they may fear the opposite, that the
US
attack would be directed at the Afghan people. The Taliban leaders
are all
survivors of the Soviet War and may believe that Afghanistan can
survive anything
a first world military can send their way.
Proposal: The US should make clear that failure to comply will result
in US
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�3A3F7E84.FIN
Page 5 of 6
force directed at the Taliban itself. The US should describe the results
as
being extremely costly, but should note that the US has no conflict
with the
Afghan people. We should describe the potential consequences as
undermining the
Taliban's ability to govern and to defeat the Northern Alliance.
8. Do not Retaliate Message: There is a significant likelihood that US
action
directed at Afghanistan will trigger further terrorist attacks in the near
term.
Over time, however, the US response may contribute to a weakening
of the al Qida
organization. Nonetheless, the Taliban may be able to restrict some
actions by
al Qida if they choose to do so.
Proposal: The US should make clear that if we are forced to act, we
would like
it all to end with that. If, however, the Taliban continue to sponsor
terrorism,
there will be continuing consequences. If there is a further terrorist
response
to our actions, there is more we can and will do. The Taliban should
not think
of their problem with the US as one that will cease in the absence of a
change in
Taliban policy on safe haven. Nor is it one that will change with a
new US
Administration.
9. Publicity and Informing Other Governments: The fact of a US
meeting with the
Taliban is likely to become known. The decision for the US is
whether to
characterize it publicly as an ultimatum giving session. Additionally,
we must
decide what to say to concerned governments.
Proposal: The US would not announce the fact of a meeting, but
would confirm
that one occurred. The US would characterize the meeting as a stem
warning to
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 6 of 6
3A3F7E84.FIN
the Taliban consistent with past US meetings. What we say to
concerned
governments will depend upon tailored country plans for Pakistan,
Uzbekistan,
Russia, the UK, the UAE and perhaps others.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�
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Declassified documents concerning the 9/11 Commission Report
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2007-1064-M
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Description
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2007-1064-M
9/11 Commission
Declassified
Foreign Policy
Terrorism
Usama bin Ladin
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/69401fae1052cb58a590a218a641efd4.pdf
cec8604ddcf9f077c89039f6c138a6cb
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Sections 1.4 (b), (c), (d), and (g) of E.O. 13526.
�397C93FF.FIN
Page 1 of2
Exchange Mail
DATE-TIME
06/30/2000 7:07:42 PM
FROM
Kurtz, Paul B. (TNT)
CLASSIFICATION
TOP SECRET
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(c)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
06/30/2000
DECLASSIFYON
07/01/2010
SUBJECT
Threat Update [TOP SECRET]
TO
Crocker, Bathsheba N. (NSA)
Gray, Wendy E. (NSA)
Kale, Dora A. (NSA)
Moretz, Sheila K. (NSA)
Rudman, Mara E. (NSA)
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L. (NSA)
Siberell, Justin H. (NSA)
Storey, Sharon V. (NSA)
CARBON COPY
Clarke, Richard A. (TNT)
Cressey, Roger W. (TNT)
TEXT BODY
Please pass to Sandy, Jim, and Mara
Border/Port Security
As
requested during the Small Group yesterday, we met with INS, Customs
and FBI today to review the status of border/port security. We gave
them a "heads up" on the recent reporting concerning UBL threats
overseas. We noted while there was no information regarding potential
attacks in the U.S. they should inform their officers to remain vigilant.
INS and Customs will step up monitoring and inspection activities
wifhnnt exnendine additional resources] EO 13526 1.4c. EO 13526 1.4a
UBL
DECLASSIFIED I N PART
PER E. O. 13526
We received no new
threat reporting today. As vou know. Embassy Brussels has cancelled
its 4th of July party]
EO 13526 l.4d
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�397C93FF.FIN
Page 2 of 2
Brussels has requested permission to share additional information
about the threat and would like to recommend that others in the American
community cancel large 4th of July gatherings. Brussels plans to
hold another EAC tomorrow afternoon to review the situation and decide
whether further security measures are necessary, including whether
to close the bilateral and EU embassies on July 3.
State plans to let Brussels decide whether to recommend
that others cancel their celebrationsl
EO 13526 1.4c. EO 13526~1.4q
Abu Zubaida
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d
Sheik Rahman
Finally, we understand that Louis
Farrakhan has asked to meet with Sheik Rahman. Justice and FBI have
informed us that they do not have the legal means to stop such a
meeting from taking place.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�
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2007-1065-M
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2007-1065-M
9/11 Commission
Declassified
Foreign Policy
Terrorism
Usama bin Ladin
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/eac5818c79dcc6da9fe0b1ab8b9621be.pdf
492885f301c9adf154166ac5df3147b1
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Section 1.4 (c) and Section 3.5(c) of E.O. 13526.
�CECRET
Current Claims of Responsibility f o r USS COLE Attack
O
o Egyptian I s l a m i c Jihad
%0 13526 1.4'jreport o f senior E U o f f i c i a l d e s c r i b i n g p l a n
proposed by Asbat al-Ansar t o be implemented by E U t o
a t t a c k S i x t h Fleet warships
o Libyan I s l a m i c F i g h t i n g Group
t h a t t h e LIFG, who i s a f f i l i a t e d
w i t h al-Qida, c a r r i e d out t h e a t t a c k w i t h support from E U
•
•
Islamic Army of Aden-Abyan:
• Fax t o B r i t i s h Islamic Center c l a i m i n g c r e d i t . (Press
Reports), October 12.
r e p o r t on PIJ O f f i c i a l -speculating IAA was c u l p r i t
] October 16 .
•
al-Qida o p e r a t i v e s from Jordan:
r e p o r t o f 2 members from 5 member al-Qida c e l l i n
Jordan t r a v e l l i n g t o Yemen t o a t t a c k U.S. warship
•
o
Egyptian E x t r e m i s t Yusef a l - B a d r i
al-Qida o p e r a t i v e s from A f g h a n i s t a n :
of 2
EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c
UBL t r a i n e d operatives who went t o Yemen(NSA r e p o r t ) ,
October 18.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. 0. 13526
O
GECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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USS Cole
-
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This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning Usama bin Ladin
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2014-0845-M
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material referenced in Chapter 4 of The 9/11 Commission Report, "Responses to Al Qaeda's Initial Assaults". Materials include a memorandum to the President and two National Security Council emails regarding Usama bin Ladin.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/35984">2006-0191-F</a>
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/24194021">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7585795">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Emails
Richard Clarke
NSC Transnational Threats Office (1998-2001) Office
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files; Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
05/23/2017
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2014-0845-M.pdf
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
09/08/2017
Terrorism
Usama bin Ladin
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/4516986c5541a1a4f2c6d81835691642.pdf
fcb73ade99e8dc37ceeb6fbc5a814b46
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning Usama bin Ladin
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2014-0978-M
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on Usama bin Ladin. Materials include a paper entitled "Comments on New York Times Article on Usama bin Ladin", April 27, 1999.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36015">2006-0228-F</a>
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/26457815">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Records Management System
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
05/23/2017
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2014-0978-M.pdf
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
09/08/2017
Terrorism
Usama bin Ladin
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/d4e05cf1908be53f484edce952ad81c9.pdf
275b28ff341cd0ac73c7457cd93f1e34
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified documents concerning the 9/11 Commission Report
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2007-1064-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
10/24/2019
Description
An account of the resource
These Clinton Presidential Records were declassified in response to a Mandatory Declassification Review request for documents referenced in Chapter 6, “From Threat to Threat”, The 9/11 Commission Report. Included in this release are previously unreleased administrative documents and cover letters.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Office of National Security Advisor
NSC Emails
NSC Transnational Threats Office (1998-2001)
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/20/2019
9/11 Commission
Terrorism
Usama bin Laden
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/4f668601b6b18549484296e33fe470d0.pdf
ae93a95fe35f12f41efdccff31e946bc
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents concerning the Millennium Alert After Action Review
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2014-0219-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
9/28/22
Description
An account of the resource
These Clinton Presidential Records were declassified in response to a Mandatory Declassification Review request for materials concerning the Millennium Alert After Action Review. Records proposed for opening include a note to Wendy Patton, the Summary of Conclusion for a Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee, and a memo from Richard Clarke to Sandy Berger. Also included are administrative papers related to records management. These documents are from National Security Council Staff and Office Files and NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System. Records to be opened include four pages of declassified materials and twenty-six pages of additional materials.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Wendy Patton
NSC Records Management System
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
08/02/22
Millenium Alert
Terrorism
Usama bin Laden
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/6cddc24ed108eac6377bb420bf4be406.pdf
0d8072eba14696ce02d06d3178622517
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Document Regarding U.S. Military Strikes Against Terrorist Targets in Afghanistan and Sudan
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2017-0702-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
4/6/2023
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains the talking points for an August 1998 phone call between Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan. The topic of discussion was U.S. military strikes against terrorist targets in Afghanistan and Sudan.
<a href="https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36094">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
National Security Advisor
James Steinberg
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
3/13/2023
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Afghanistan
Kofi Annan
Madeleine Albright
Sudan
Terrorism
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/d255d25dedbcbdbc04f5c6841f2fce83.pdf
16e757cbe2b215fa766fd23e37cba656
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified documents concerning FOIA Case 2006-0191-F
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2015-0041-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
9/21/2023
Description
An account of the resource
These Clinton Presidential Records were declassified in response to a Mandatory Declassification Review request for specific documents in Freedom of Information Act Case 2006-0191-F: Selected records referenced in Chapter 4, The 9/11 Commission Report “Responses to Al Qaeda’s Initial Assaults.” Records to be opened include briefing papers, memos, reports, emails, and talking points. The records discuss 1998 meetings with Italian Prime Minister Prodi, telephone conversations with British Prime Minister Blair, Iraq, military coalition building in Iraq, the Taliban, Usama bin Laden, counterterrorism policy, and the International Public Information Interagency Working Group.
<a href="https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/35984">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
National Security Advisor
Samuel Berger
NSC Transnational Threats Office
Richard Clark
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
8/2/2023
Al Qaeda
Iraq
Taliban
Terrorism