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This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
12-Jul-1993 13:18 EDT
OQ»iriDDHTIftl
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Norma D. S c h i l l a c i
FROM:
J e n n i f e r C. Ward
(WARD)
SUBJECT:
( SCHILLACI
i n f o memo t o lake
I n f o Memo t o Lake
A f r i c a n Issues Update as o f 7/12/93
1.
In Brief:
An agreement was reached between t h e Togolese o p p o s i t i o n
and t h e Eyadema Government t o h o l d e l e c t i o n s i n l a t e August;
Rwanda's peace pact i s t o be signed J u l y 15, a c c o r d i n g t o
a press r e p o r t ;
-- S t a t e i s c o n s i d e r i n g whether t o r e c e i v e an envoy from
P r e s i d e n t Mobutu, f o l l o w i n g A/S Moose's r e c e n t c o n v e r s a t i o n s ;
-- The s i t u a t i o n i n Congo remains a t an impasse between t h e
Government and t h e o p p o s i t i o n ; t h e army has not y e t
intervened.
-- An agreeemnt was reached i n Angola between t h e GRA and
UNITA t o d e l i v e r h u m a n i t a r i a n a s s i s t a n c e by a i r .
No progress on t h e n e g o t i a t i n g f r o n t . A n IWG has been c a l l e d
on Angola next week. You have Wisner memorandum on Angola.
2.
NIGERIA
F u r t h e r t o my memo t o you l a s t week, t h e s i t u a t i o n s t i l l
remains u n c l e a r a l t h o u g h an FMG (IBB) announcement on an
i n t e r i m government, p o s s i b l y a government o f n a t i o n a l u n i t y ,
i s due today.
Dissension w i t h i n t h e SDP, between A b i o l a
and h i s . p a r t y , w i t h i n t h e m i l i t a r y over t h e •
n a t u r e / c o m p o s i t i o n / l e n g t h o f t e n u r e o f t h e proposed i n t e r i m
government.
S t a t e p r e p a r i n g a suggested "next s t e p s " t o show
d i s p l e a s u r e w i t h IBB's machinations.
We need t o keep t h e
L i b e r i a dimension i n mind. EC p o l i t i c a l committee meeting
today on s u b j e c t o f N i g e r i a . Jesse Jackson has c a l l e d f o r
P r e s i d e n t C l i n t o n t o mediate and has o f f e r e d h i s
assistance.
0 D r a f t proposed White House Statement f o r your a p p r o v a l i n
works which would r e i t e r a t e our p o s i t i o n r e June 12
e l e c t i o n s , focus on our goals i n / f o r N i g e r i a r a t h e r than th,
c u r r e n t p r o c e d u r a l manoeuvres, condemn FMG-aetions w i t h
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respect t o human r i g h t s groups, newspapers, e t c . W i l l l i k e l y
a l s o suggest response t o Babangida l e t t e r by t h e P r e s i d e n t
along s i m i l a r l i n e s , a p p e a l i n g t o N i g e r i a n ego, as example
for Africa, e t c .
CC: Records
( RECORDS )
A d d i t i o n a l Header I n f o r m a t i o n Follows
Date Created: 12-Jul-1993 11:49
D e l e t a b l e Flag: Y
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AI Folder: JUL93
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�COMF1DSHTIAL
mmm
5715
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C.
20506
Nstf Sec Advisor
has seen
August 2, 1993
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
THROUGH:
R. RAN^§3EERS, A c t i n g
FROM:
SUSAN E. jg02E
SUBJECT:
F i v e Imminent New U.N. Peacekeeping
Operations
W i t h i n t h e n e x t two o r t h r e e weeks, t h e UN S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l w i l l
c o n s i d e r e s t a b l i s h i n g f i v e new peacekeeping o p e r a t i o n s : i n H a i t i ,
L i b e r i a , Abkhazia, Rwanda, and Cambodia. The U.S. has some
i n t e r e s t i n r e s o l v i n g each o f these c o n f l i c t s ; however, we do n o t
have t h e funds t o pay f o r them.
By t h e end o f FY 94, t h e U.S. i s expected t o be over $1 b i l l i o n
i n debt t o t h e UN f o r peacekeeping. T h i s i s b e f o r e t h e
e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f any new o r expanded m i s s i o n s . Thus, we have two
c h o i c e s : v o t i n g f o r m i s s i o n s f o r which we cannot pay, o r ; v e t o i n g
r e s o l u t i o n s because we l a c k s u f f i c i e n t funds. The f i r s t course
i s i r r e s p o n s i b l e and e v e n t u a l l y w i l l c r i p p l e t h e UN's
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e so t h a t o p e r a t i o n s w i l l s u f f e r o r s h u t down. The
l a t t e r course may r e s u l t i n a "snowball e f f e c t " s i n c e some o t h e r
P-5 c o u n t r i e s are i n an equal o r worse f i n a n c i a l s i t u a t i o n .
The r e a l i t y i s t h a t t h e U.S. must b e g i n immediately t o make tough
choices among new as w e l l as e x i s t i n g o p e r a t i o n s , w h i l e we f i g h t
s t r e n u o u s l y t o o b t a i n s u f f i c i e n t funds from Congress and s u p p o r t
from t h e American p u b l i c .
Haiti
The UNSC i s expected t o v o t e t h i s week t o e s t a b l i s h t h e p o l i c e
and m i l i t a r y presence i n H a i t i . Very rough U.S. e s t i m a t e s p u t
the c o s t o f t h e H a i t i o p e r a t i o n a t l e a s t $50-60 m i l l i o n a n n u a l l y .
I f t h e o p e r a t i o n i s assessed, which i s p r o b a b l y t h e most
economical o p t i o n f o r t h e U.S., our share would be r o u g h l y $20
m i l l i o n . We w i l l , however, be a b l e t o reduce our o v e r a l l c o s t s
by r e c e i v i n g reimbursement f o r our m i l i t a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n . No
o f f s e t s have been i d e n t i f i e d t o cover our assessed c o s t s .
Liberia
W i t h i n two o r t h r e e weeks t h e UNSC w i l l be asked t o send 250
m i l i t a r y observers t o L i b e r i a t o guarantee t h e n e u t r a l i t y o f
ECOMOG. Very rough (and p r o b a b l y i n f l a t e d ) e s t i m a t e s p u t t h e
-GOHriDDHTIAL
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annual c o s t o f t h e UN m i s s i o n a t $42 m i l l i o n .
been i d e n t i f i e d f o r our assessed c o s t s .
No o f f s e t s have
I n a d d i t i o n , t h e UN i s a s k i n g t h e US v o l u n t a r i l y t o l i f t and
equip t h e f i v e a d d i t i o n a l ECOMOG b a t t a l i o n s c a l l e d f o r under t h e
Gordon-Somers p l a n . Much o f t h i s c o s t c o u l d be o f f s e t by
reprogramming a l r e a d y i d e n t i f i e d ESF funds.
In informal
c o n s u l t a t i o n s i n Washington, Gordon-Somers a l s o asked t h e U.S. t o
pay t h e l i o n ' s share o f t h e s t i p e n d s f o r t h e a n t i c i p a t e d 16,000
ECOMOG t r o o p s . State/AF's e s t i m a t e o f t h e c o s t o f t h i s
a d d i t i o n a l s u p p o r t i s $104 m i l l i o n .
Much of t h e d r a f t Gordon-Somers p l a n needs c l a r i f i c a t i o n and
r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n before i t i s r i p e f o r Security Council
c o n s i d e r a t i o n . As c u r r e n t l y c o n s t r u c t e d , t h e s i z e o f t h e f o r c e
may be excessive and t h e c o s t s e x o r b i t a n t . Moreover, these c o s t s
do n o t i n c l u d e those f o r UN-sponsored e l e c t i o n s due i n seven
months o r f o r p o s t - c o n f l i c t r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . U n t i l J T t h e p l a n has
been f u r t h e r v e t t e d and r e f i n e d , i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o e s t i m a t e t h e
u l t i m a t e c o s t o f t h e e n t i r e UN/ECOWAS o p e r a t i o n , much o f which
may f a l l t o t h e U.S.
Abkhazia
As a r e s u l t o f t h e s i g n i n g o f a c e a s e f i r e l a s t week, t h e UNSC
faces an immediate d e c i s i o n as t o whether t o send 50 m i l i t a r y
observers t o Abkhazia. A t t h e G-7 Conference, P r e s i d e n t C l i n t o n
and S e c r e t a r y C h r i s t o p h e r pledged U.S. s u p p o r t f o r UN a c t i o n i n
t h e event o f a c e a s e f i r e . Now P r e s i d e n t Shevardnadze and l e a d e r s
of t h e Russian F e d e r a t i o n are p u t t i n g s u b s t a n t i a l p r e s s u r e on t h e
U.S. t o s u p p o r t t h e r a p i d d i s p a t c h of o b s e r v e r s .
F a i l u r e t o do
so w i t h i n a week's t i m e c o u l d undo t h e f r a g i l e c e a s e f i r e , which
i n t u r n c o u l d l e a d t o Shevardnadze's o u s t e r .
The UN e s t i m a t e s t h e annual c o s t o f t h e proposed observer m i s s i o n
t o be $18 m i l l i o n per year.
No o f f s e t s have been i d e n t i f i e d .
Rwanda
I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e r e c e n t l y approved s m a l l observer m i s s i o n on
t h e Uganda-Rwanda b o r d e r , t h e UNSC w i l l soon be asked t o
a u t h o r i z e a j o i n t UN-OAU N e u t r a l I n t e r p o s i t o r y Force as p a r t o f
t h e a n t i c i p a t e d s e t t l e m e n t o f t h e Rwandan c i v i l war on August 4.
France i s pushing hard t o secure UNSC s u p p o r t f o r ending t h i s
c o n f l i c t , which has had s e r i o u s h u m a n i t a r i a n consequences. The
f o r c e i s l i k e l y t o be 500 s t r o n g , b u t t h e s i z e o f i t s UN
component remains t o be determined.
I t s l i k e l y c o s t i s unknown.
No o f f s e t s been i d e n t i f i e d thus f a r f o r e i t h e r Rwandan
peacekeeping o p e r a t i o n .
Cambodia
UNTAC's mandate e x p i r e s on August 28. UNSC and Core Group
c o u n t r i e s are c o n s i d e r i n g t h e o p t i m a l UN successor presence i n
Cambodia. I f asked by t h e new Cambodian government, t h e UN w i l l
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l i k e l y supplement i t s planned human r i g h t s , development, and dem i n i n g presence w i t h a SYG's S p e c i a l R e p r e s e n t a t i v e (SRSG), a
modest i n t e r i m UN l i a i s o n o f f i c e , and some q u a n t i t y o f m i l i t a r y
o b s e r v e r s . The r o l e o f t h e o b s e r v e r s c o u l d range from l i a i s o n
and r e p o r t i n g t o b o r d e r m o n i t o r i n g o r m i l i t a r y t r a i n i n g .
Their
numbers c o u l d v a r y from 20 t o 500.
A s m a l l m i l i t a r y observer presence (20-30) coupled w i t h a UN
c o o r d i n a t i n g o f f i c e and SRSG c o u l d c o s t a p p r o x i m a t e l y $25 m i l l i o n
a year. A r g u a b l y , o n l y t h e observer m i s s i o n would be an assessed
peacekeeping o p e r a t i o n . The r e s t s h o u l d be p a i d f o r t h r o u g h t h e
UN's r e g u l a r budget o r t h r o u g h v o l u n t a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o UNa f f i l i a t e d o r g a n i z a t i o n s l i k e UNDP, UNESCO, and UNICEF. No U.S.
funds have been i d e n t i f i e d t o o f f s e t t h e USG's p o t e n t i a l
peacekeeping assessment.
Additional
Complications
C l e a r l y , one i m p o r t a n t aspect o f t a c k l i n g t h i s broad problem i s
f i n d i n g o f f s e t s t o pay f o r new o p e r a t i o n s s i n c e o b t a i n i n g brand
new money i s o b v i o u s l y u n l i k e l y i n t h e near term. U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,
making use o f o f f s e t s t o pay f o r assessed peacekeeping o p e r a t i o n s
i s n o t as s i m p l e as t r a n s f e r r i n g funds f r o m ESF or FMF t o another
150 account.
The arcane C o n g r e s s i o n a l committee s t r u c t u r e and
l e g a l r e s t r i c t i o n s on t h e CIPA account ( f r o m which assessed
peacekeeping o p e r a t i o n s are p a i d ) r e q u i r e t h a t Congress pass a
budget amendment t o enable such a t r a n s f e r o f funds. Given t h e
c u r r e n t h o s t i l i t y among C o n g r e s s i o n a l a p p r o p r i a t o r s t o
peacekeeping, o b t a i n i n g a budget amendment f o r new o p e r a t i o n s i n
r e g i o n s o f l i t t l e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t c o u l d be d i f f i c u l t and r e q u i r e ,
a t a minimum, h i g h - l e v e l A d m i n i s t r a t i o n l o b b y i n g .
Concurrences by:
-eONFIDEMil.LAL
^ / K o s e m a j r i e F o r s i ^ t h e , JRichaur'cl F e i n b e r g ,
x r e n n i ' f e r Ward, F e r \ i ^ l Saeed
/• i^v . , ,. ., ., , , , . ^
PbLINTON LIBTCARV PHOTOCOPY
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
RUEHC
132138Z OCT 93
SECSTATE WASHDC
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE 0000
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NDADAYE WORKING VISIT TO WASHINGTON AND MEETING WITH A/S
SUBJ:
MOOSE
TEXT:
1
T I A L STATE 312767
• O U VI DD
C
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL PREF PGOV OVIP BY US CG R SO
W
SUBJECT: NDADAYE WORKING VISIT TO WASHINGTON AND MEETING WITH A/S
MOOSE
1.
"feOWrlDhN 117£L - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. PRESIDENT MELCHIOR NDADAYE MADE A PRIVATE
WORKING VISIT TO WASHINGTON OCTOBER 5-8 TO DESCRIBE THE
DEMOCRATIC CHANGES IN BURUNDI AND TO SEEK CONTINUED
SUPPORT FOR THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS, REFUGEE
REPATRIATION, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. NDADAYE MET WITH
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY (SEPTEL), AF A/S MOOSE, RP DAS
OAKLEY (SEPTEL), NSC SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR WARD, AND
USAID ACTING DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR MICHEL (SEPTEL). THE
PRESIDENT RECEIVED A WARM WELCOME FROM HIS U.S.
INTERLOCUTORS, WHO CONGRATULATED BURUNDI FOR ITS
DEMOCRATIC SUCCESS AND REAFFIRMED OUR INTENTION TO
CONTINUE OUR SUPPORT. IN HIS MEETING WITH NDADYE, A/S
MOOSE CITED BURUNDI AS AN EXAMPLE FOR OTHER NASCENT
DEMOCRACIES AND EXPRESSED OUR CONFIDENCE THAT THE
PRESIDENT WAS COMMITTED TO PROTECTING MINORITY RIGHTS.
NDADYE REVIEWED THE MANY CHALLENGES FACING BURUNDI AND
STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF DEBT RELIEF. A/S MOOSE
ASSURED HIM THAT THE U.S. AND OTHER DONOR COUNTRIES WERE
ACTIVELY ADDRESSING THIS PROBLEM. THE TWO SIDES ALSO
REVIEWED THE SITUATION IN NEIGHBORING ZAIRE AND RWANDA.
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WHILE IN WASHINGTON, THE PRESIDENT ALSO HELD MEETINGS
WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, THE WORLD BANK, THE IMF,
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY, THE NATIONAL
GEOGRAPHIC SOCIETY, AND THE MEDIA. END SUMMARY
A/S HAILS BURUNDI DEMOCRACY; NDADYE OUTLINES CHALLENGES
3. A/S MOOSE MET WITH NDADAYE ON OCTOBER 8 AT THE
PRESIDENT'S HOTEL. ALSO ATTENDING WERE FORNMIN
NTIBANTUNGANYA, PRESIDENTIAL ADVISERS NTAMOBWA AND
SINZOBAHAMVYA, AND BURUNDI DESKOFF AISTON. A/S MOOSE
CONGRATULATED NDADAYE FOR BURUNDI'S SUCCESSFUL TRANSITION
TO DEMOCRACY AND EXPRESSED OUR PRIDE AT HAVING BEEN ABLE
TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS. HE
NOTED THAT WE HAVE OFTEN CITED BURUNDI AS AN EXCELLENT
EXAMPLE FOR FLEDGLING DEMOCRACIES AND WELCOMED THE RECENT
AMNESTY AS AN IMPORTANT STEP IN ENSURING HARMONY IN THE
COUNTRY. A/S MOOSE EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF
SAFEGUARDING MINORITY RIGHTS IN A DEMOCRACY AND EXPRESSED
OUR CONFIDENCE THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS COMMITTED TO THAT
IMPORTANT PRINCIPLE. HE ASSURED NDADAYE THAT WE WOULD
REMAIN ENGAGED IN THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS AND THAT
BURUNDI COULD COUNT ON OUR CONTINUED SUPPORT.
4. NDADAYE REPLIED THAT HE HAD BEEN STRUCK BY THE GREAT
SYMPATHY BURUNDI ENJOYED IN THE U.S. AND SAID THAT IT
GAVE HIM ADDED STRENGTH TO FACE THE MANY CHALLENGES
AHEAD, INCLUDING RESETTLING OF TENS OF THOUSANDS OFS
REFUGEES, DEVELOPING THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR, AND
INCREASING PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN THE COUNTRY. ON THE
LAST POINT, NDADAYE NOTED THAT THE GRB HAS SOUGHT TO
ATTRACT INVESTORS THROUGH ESTABLISHMENT OF A FREE TRADE
ZONE AND PROMULGATION OF AN INVESTMENT CODE FAVORABLE TO
BUSINESS. HE ADDED THAT HE HAD MET NUMEROUS
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS COMMUNITY ON HIS
CURRENT TRIP AND FOUND A GREAT DEAL OF INTEREST IN
INVESTING IN BURUNDI. A/S MOOSE WELCOMED THE GRB'S
EFFORTS TO PROMOTE INVESTMENT AND NOTED THAT THE PRIVATE
SECTOR IS THE BIGGEST CONTRIBUTOR TO ECONOMIC GROWTH.
5. THE PRESIDENT POINTED OUT THAT AS MANY AS 300,000
RWANDAN REFUGEES LIVE IN BURUNDI AND THAT 200,000 BURUNDI
REFUGEES LIVE IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. WITH DEMOCRACY
IN BURUNDI AND A PEACE. SETTLEMENT IN RWANDA, THE REGION
N W FACES THE REAL POSSIBILITY OF HAVING TO REPATRIATE AS
O
MANY AS HALF A MILLION PEOPLE. NDADAYE NOTED THAT MANY
RWANDAN REFUGEES HAD BEEN IN BURUNDI OVER THIRTY YEARS
AND WOULD PROBABLY CHOOSE TO STAY FOR ECONOMIC REASONS.
HOWEVER, THE GRB WANTS TO MAKE SURE THAT THEY ARE
DOCUMENTED AS RWANDAN CITIZENS SO THAT THEY CAN MOVE
FREELY BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES AND TRAVEL UNHINDERED.
6. A/S MOOSE ASSURED NDADAYE THAT THE U.S. INTENDED TO
CONTRIBUTE TO THE REPATRIATION EFFORT AND NOTED THAT HE
HAD RECENTLY SPOKEN AT LENGTH ABOUT THIS PROBLEM WITH THE
UNHCR OFFICIAL RESPONSIBLE FOR AFRICA. HE SUGGESTED THAT
THE GRB MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACT AS WELL. THE PRESIDENT
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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AGREED, ADDING THAT HE HAD SENT HIS MINISTER IN CHARGE OF
REPATRIATION TO UNHCR HEADQUARTERS IN GENEVA TO DISCUSS
THE MASSIVE REPATRIATION EFFORT.
MOOSE/NDADAYE DISCUSS DEBT RELIEF
7. A/S MOOSE NOTED THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY NDADAYE IN
HIS OCTOBER 7 MEETING WITH DEPUTY SECRETARY WHARTON
(SEPTEL) AND ASSURED THE PRESIDENT THAT THE G-7 AND OTHER
DONOR COUNTRIES HAD MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS ON THE
QUESTION OF DEBT RELIEF. HE POINTED OUT THAT THIS YEAR
THE U.S. HAD UNDERTAKEN A MODEST INITIATIVE TO ALLEVIATE
THE DEBT BURDEN OF THE POOREST COUNTRIES AND THAT,
WORKING WITH OUR PARTNERS IN THE PARIS CLUB, WE HOPED TO
PROVIDE ADDITIONAL RELIEF IN THE FUTURE.
8. NDADAYE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE U.S. EFFORT
BUT NOTED THAT EIGHTY-ONE PERCENT OF BURUNDI'S DEBT IS
MULTILATERAL AND WOULD NOT BENEFIT FROM BILATERAL U.S.
DEBT CANCELLATION PROGRAMS. HE SAID THAT THE DONOR
COUNTRIES SHOULD W R TO ALLEVIATE THE MULTILATERAL DEBT
OK
BURDEN OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. A/S MOOSE ASSURED THE
PRESIDENT THAT THIS ISSUE WAS DISCUSSED IN TOKYO AND THAT
THE DONORS WERE SENSITIVE TO THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY
THE PRESIDENT. NDADAYE NOTED THAT OUR AID PROGRAM
INCLUDED FUNDING FOR A PORTION OF BURUNDI'S DEBT PAYMENTS
UNDER ITS STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM. HE SAID THAT
THE COUNTRY WAS GRATEFUL FOR THIS ASSISTANCE, WHICH WAS
ANOTHER WAY OF ALLEVIATING BURUNDI'S ONE BILLION DEBT
BURDEN.
RWANDA, ZAIRE, SOMALIA DISCUSSED
9. RWANDA: NDADAYE SAID THAT HE HAD MET THE PREVIOUS
NIGHT WITH PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA, WHO IS ALSO ON A
PRIVATE WORKING VISIT TO WASHINGTON. HABYARIMANA BRIEFED
NDADYE ON THE UN VOTE AND BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT THE
PEACEKEEPERS APPROVED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD BE
DEPLOYED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. NDADAYE SAID HE THOUGHT
THAT THE DEMOBILIZATION AND FORCE INTEGRATION PROCESS
WOULD BE DIFFICULT AND HE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT A UN
FORCE OF 2500 MIGHT NOT BE LARGE ENOUGH TO OVERSEE
DEMOBILIZATION OF 30,000 RWANDAN SOLDIERS. A/S MOOSE
REPLIED THAT MUCH DEPENDED ON THE WILL OF THE TWO SIDES.
HE ADDED THAT HE WAS FULLY BRIEFED BY GENERAL DALLAIRE,
WHO LED THE UN RECONNAISSANCE MISSION, AND WAS VERY
IMPRESSED WITH THE TEAM'S W R AND THE REPORT THEY
OK
PRODUCED.
10. ZAIRE: A/S MOOSE SAID THAT THE PARTIES MAY BE
NEARING AN ACCORD AND THAT WE HAD JUST SEEN A DRAFT TEXT,
WHICH WAS RATHER LONG AND COMPLICATED. NDADAYE STRESSED
THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY NEEDED TO HELP ZAIRE -NOT THROUGH TROOP DEPLOYMENTS BUT PERHAPS THROUGH SENDING
A UN DELEGATION TO MEDIATE THE TALKS. HE THOUGHT THAT A
NEUTRAL PARTY WAS NEEDED AND EMPHASIZED THE NEED TO ACT
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N W BEFORE THE SITUATION DETERIORATES AND ARMED CONFLICT
O
BREAKS OUT, WHICH COULD DESTABILIZE THE WHOLE REGION.
A/S MOOSE AGREED AND POINTED OUT THAT WE HAD SUPPORTED
THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S APPOINTMENT OF LACKDAR BRAHIMI
AS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. NDADYE SUGGESTED THAT A
MISSION COMPOSED OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM SEVERAL
COUNTRIES MIGHT BE MORE EFFECTIVE THAN USING JUST ONE
PERSON AS MEDIATOR. A/S MOOSE REPLIED THAT HE HAD HEARD
THAT SEVERAL AFRICAN LEADERS MIGHT GO TO KINSHASA TO TRY
TO HELP RESOLVE THE IMPASSE, WHICH HE THOUGHT COULD HAVE
POSITIVE RESULTS.
11. SOMALIA: A/S MOOSE BRIEFED NDADAYE ON THE U.S
DECISION TO INCREASE OUR FORCES TO STABILIZE THE
SITUATION WHILE WORKING WITH THE UN AND AFRICAN LEADERS
TO PURSUE A POLITICAL SOLUTION. NDADYE EXPRESSED HIS
VIEW THAT THE WARRING FACTIONS NEEDED TO BE DISARMED
BEFORE A POLITICAL TRANSITION COULD BE NEGOTIATED. A/S
MOOSE REPLIED THAT THE PARTIES THEMSELVES HAD ACCEPTED
THE PRINCIPLE OF DISARMAMENT IN ADDIS AND THIS AGREEMENT
NEEDED TO BE REINFORCED. HE REITERATED OUR POSITION THAT
WE NEEDED TO W R ON THE POLITICAL AND PEACEKEEPING
OK
TRACKS SIMULTANEOUSLY.
NDADAYE MEETS WITH NSC SR. DIRECTOR FOR AFRICA AFFAIRS
SECT
SSN
TOR
DIST
12. JUST PRIOR TO HIS MEETING WITH A/S MOOSE, THE
PRESIDENT MET WITH NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR AFRICAN
AFFAIRS JENNIFER WARD, WHO CONGRATULATED NDADAYE FOR THE
COUNTRY'S SUCCESSFUL DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION. SHE STRESSED
THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING THE SPIRIT OF NATIONAL
RECONCILIATION -- A PRINCIPAL PRIORITY OF THE NDADYE
ADMINISTRATION. NDADAYE AND WARD ALSO DISCUSSED THE
IMPORTANT ROLE THAT AN INDEPENDENT PRESS PLAYS IN A
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY. WARD URGED THAT THE COUNTRY'S
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON COMMUNICATIONS BECOME THE KIND OF
INDEPENDENT COMMISSION WHICH COULD MEDIATE PROBLEMS
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE MEDIA. NDADAYE REVIEWED
THE CHALLENGES FACING HIS COUNTRY, AND WARD ASSURED THE
PRESIDENT OF OUR CONTINUED SUPPORT.
CHRISTOPHER
BT
ft2767
NNNN
SECTION: 01 OF 01
2767
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SIT: GEORGEL VAX
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
0 9 - N o v - 1 9 9 3 1 2 : 3 9 EDT
UUUL IDLIUIT^L "
MEMORANDUM FOR:
E r i c P. Schwartz
FROM:
J e n n i f e r C. Ward
(WARD)
SUBJECT:
Burundi
SCHWARTZ )
refugees
Background: As you know, elements o f the Burundi m i l i t a r y
launched r e c e n t l y an attempted coup d ' e t a t a g a i n s t the
d e m o c r a t i c a l l y - e l e c t e d government o f P r e s i d e n t Ndadaye,
r e s u l t i n g i n the death o f the P r e s i d e n t and s e v e r a l members
of h i s Cabinet, as w e l l as i n t e r - e t h n i c v i o l e n c e p r i m a r i l y i n
the c o u n t r y s i d e . We have no e s t i m a t e s o f the number k i l l e d .
Some 650,000 new refugees have f l e d t o n e i g h b o r i n g s t a t e s ,
p r i m a r i l y Rwanda, Tanzania and Z a i r e . As a r e s u l t
appeal f o r $17 m i l l i o n t o meet the needs o f the refugees over
the next t h r e e months
State R/P .... f o r the P r e s i d e n t
f o r $20 m i l l i o n o f which $4.25 m i l l i o n would go t o the UNHCR
f o r Burundian refugees.
We want t o be as h e l p f u l as p o s s i b l e i n t h i s h u m a n i t a r i a n
c r i s i s and encourage UNHCR's e f f o r t s as w e l l as those o f the
ICRC and WFP;
AID's O f f i c e o f D i s a s t e r Assistance has a l r e a d y approved
c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f $50,000 as a r e s u l t o f our Ambassadors'
having d e c l a r e d d i s a s t e r s i n Rwanda and Burundi;
We are working on a drawdown o f monies from t h e
P r e s i d e n t ' s emergency fund t o p r o v i d e s u b s t a n t i a l f u n d i n g f o r
your appeal.
CC
CC
CC
Records
Pat A. B a t t e n f i e l d
L l o y d R. George
RECORDS )
BATTENFIELD )
GEORGEL )
A d d i t i o n a l Header I n f o r m a t i o n Follows
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DOCNUM: 020039
VMS Filename: OA$SHARE25:ZUYFI3JDS . WPL
AI Folder: NOV93
Message Format:
Message S t a t u s : READ
Date M o d i f i e d : 09-Nov-1993 12:39
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
D e l i v e r y - R e c e i p t Requested: NO
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
2 0 - D e c - 1 9 9 3 11:25
EDT
i)M FT DliiMTI Air*
MEMORANDUM
FOR:
Pat A.
Battenfield
FROM:
J e n n i f e r C. Ward
(WARD)
SUBJECT:
( BATTENFIELD
Africa
Over t h e past year, we have made progress on key aspects o f
our A f r i c a p o l i c y -- d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n and c o n f l i c t r e s o l u t i o n .
We have focused on support f o r South A f r i c a ' s t r a n s i t i o n t o
democracy and resumption of the peace process i n Angola. I n
a d d i t i o n , we have made s t r a t e g i c i n p u t s t o f a c i l i t a t e
peacekeeping e f f o r t s i n s e v e r a l c o u n t r i e s .
Strong progress
on d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n has been r e g i s t e r e d i n a number of
c o u n t r i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y the s m a l l e r ones, where U.S.
a s s i s t a n c e i n support of e l e c t i o n s and c i v i c e d u c a t i o n has
been c r i t i c a l .
N e v e r t h e l e s s , developments i n c e r t a i n keyc o u n t r i e s , t o i n c l u d e N i g e r i a , Z a i r e , Kenya and Sudan are
disturbing.
Major
Accomplishments:
o South A f r i c a :
P r e s i d e n t C l i n t o n met i n June w i t h South
A f r i c a ' s S t a t e P r e s i d e n t De K l e r k and ANC P r e s i d e n t Mandela,
h i g h l i g h t i n g t h i s A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s support f o r change i n
South A f r i c a .
Last month the P r e s i d e n t signed t h e South
A f r i c a Democratic T r a n s i t i o n Support Act, l i f t i n g remaining
f e d e r a l s n a c t i o n s a g a i n s t South A f r i c a and sent Commerce
S e c r e t a r y Ron Brown t o South A f r i c a w i t h a h i g h - l e v e l p r i v a t e
s e c t o r d e l e g a t i o n . We are c u r r e n t l y working on a s e r i e s of
i n i t i a t i v e s t o support South A f r i c a ' s t r a n s i t i o n t o a
m u l t i r a c i a l democracy, both b e f o r e and a f t e r the A p r i l 27
elections.
P r o s p e c t i v e U.S.- South A f r i c a m i l i t a r y
r e l a t i o n s are c u r r e n t l y being examined.
o Angola: F o l l o w i n g e s t a b l i s h m e n t of d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s
w i t h Angola i n June, the U.S. p l a y e d a major r o l e i n h e l p i n g
arrange a c e a s e - f i r e and resumption of t a l k s between the
Government and UNITA. We have a p p o i n t e d Ambassador Paul Hare
as t h e U.S. s p e c i a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o t h e peace process t o
a s s i s t the e f f o r t s of the UN S p e c i a l R e p r e s e n t a t i v e .
At
p r e s e n t , the t a l k s have produced agreement on a number of key
i t e m s . We are h o p e f u l t h a t a peace agreement which can be
s u p p o r t e d by t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community w i l l be reached
e a r l y i n the new year.
DoD has been tasked t o l o o k a t
o p t i o n s f o r a p o s s i b l e UN peacekeeping presence i n Angola.
o Regional peacekeeping: The P r e s i d e n t r e c e n t l y approved a
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y PERE.O.13526
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package o f $30 m i l l i o n t o support t h e deployment o f
a d d i t i o n a l A f r i c a n peacekeeping f o r c e s t o L i b e r i a , f o l l o w i n g
the J u l y peace accords brokered by t h e Economic Community o f
West A f r i c a n States (ECOWAS), the O r g a n i z a t i o n o f A f r i c a n
U n i t y (OAU) and t h e U n i t e d Nations.
Agreement has been
reached between t h e t h r e e f a c t i o n s t o seat a t r a n s i t i o n a l
government on December 22. DoD w i l l a s s i s t t h e UN and t h e
r e g i o n a l f o r c e s t o prepare a comprehensive l o g i s t i c s and
f i n a n c i a l p l a n and c i v i l i a n s under c o n t r a c t t o DoD have been
a u t h o r i z e d t o p r o v i d e support f o r t h e new peacekeeping
forces .
In order t o b u i l d t h e peacekeeping c a p a c i t y o f r e g i o n a l
o r g a n i z a t i o n s , we have p r o v i d e d a s s i s t a n c e d i r e c t l y t o t h e
OAU i n support o f a border m o n i t o r i n g f o r c e i n Rwanda. Some
of these funds w i l l a l s o f i n a n c e equipment f o r a small OAU
m i s s i o n t o Burundi, where a d e m o c r a t i c a l l y - e l e c t e d regime was
r e c e n t l y overthrown and e t h n i c t e n s i o n s r e s u l t e d i n
widespread v i o l e n c e and k i l l i n g .
The U.S. a l s o p l a y e d an
e a r l y r o l e i n h e l p i n g g e t e s t a b l i s h e d t h e UN peacekeeping
m i s s i o n i n Mozambique. P r e s i d e n t C l i n t o n met w i t h P r e s i d e n t
Chissano o f Mozambique i n October and we agreed t o p r o v i d e
a d d i t i o n a l s h i p v i s i t s as w e l l as excess defense a r t i c l e s .
S i g n f i c a n t Upcoming Events and Issues
We w i l l be reexamining e a r l y i n 1994 our p o l i c y i n key
c o u n t r i e s , Sudan and Z a i r e :
o The decades-old c i v i l war i n Sudan has a l r e a d y taken
hundreds o f thousands o f l i v e s , w i t h no end i n s i g h t .
Regional peace-making e f f o r t s have not produced
results.
Sudan has been placed on t h e T e r r o r i s m L i s t .
A DC
meeting w i l l look a t t h e value o f our c o n t i n u e d presence i n
Khartoum i n l i g h t o f Sudanese t h r e a t s t o U.S. i n t e r e s t s ,
p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r s h a r i n g i n t e l l i g e n c e i n f o r m a t i o n w i t h key
Western and Arab p a r t n e r s , as w e l l as s t r o n g e r U.S. demarches
t o handle Sudan's h u m a n i t a r i a n c r i s i s .
o We w i l l a l s o be examining s t r o n g e r U.S. responses t o
Z a i r e ' s c o n t i n u i n g s l i d e i n t o chaos and anarchy.
Diplomatic
e f f o r t s i n c o n c e r t w i t h Belgium and France have shown l i t t l e
success a t moving e i t h e r P r e s i d e n t Mobutu o r t h e o p p o s i t i o n
towards implementing agreements i n support o f a democratic
transition.
Meanwhile, b i l a t e r a l and m u l t i l a t e r a l donors
have a l m o s t l y c o m p l e t e l y abandoned t h i s n a t i o n o f almost 40
m i l l i o n persons.
o Because o f i t s f a i l u r e t o cooperate on a n t i - n a r c o t i c s
e f f o r t s , we may no longer be able t o p r o v i d e a s s i s t a n c e t o or
support f o r N i g e r i a i n t h e I F I s come next month.
We are
c u r r e n t l y implementing v i s a r e s t r i c t i o n s a g a i n s t o f f i c i a l s o f
the new m i l i t a r y regime and OPIC has withdrawn t h e i r
f a c i l i t i e s f o r p r o j e c t s i n N i g e r i a . A d d i t i o n a l measures are
l i k e l y t o await t h e outcome o f a proposed c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
conference scheduled f o r March.
Significant
Dates:
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March -- N i g e r i a n C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Conference
A p r i l 27 -- South A f r i c a n
elections
November - Mozambique e l e c t i o n s
CC: Records
( RECORDS )
A d d i t i o n a l Header I n f o r m a t i o n Follows
Date Created: 18-Dec-1993 11:23
D e l e t a b l e Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 023792
VMS Filename: OA$SHARE37:ZUZUGBGSF.WPL
AI Folder: DEC93
Message Format:
Message S t a t u s : READ
Date M o d i f i e d : 20-Dec-1993 11:24
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
D e l i v e r y - R e c e i p t Requested: NO
Message P r i o r i t y : FIRST_CLASS
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Cable
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0 071754Z JAN 94
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUCNDT
071754Z JAN 94
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3547
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0267
INFO: RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI PRIORITY 0151
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
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RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
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RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0700
SUBJ:
RWANDA: SECURITY COUNCIL ADOPTS RESOLUTION 893
AUTHORIZING DEPLOYMENT OF SECOND BATTALION
TEXT:
• I A-fe SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000069
DEPT FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C AND L/AF;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR JENNIFER WARD;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, MARR, PGOV, KDEM, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA: SECURITY COUNCIL ADOPTS RESOLUTION 893
AUTHORIZING DEPLOYMENT OF SECOND BATTALION
1. -{C) THE SECURITY COUNCIL JANUARY 6 ADOPTED
UNANIMOUSLY RESOLUTION 893 AUTHORIZING DEPLOYMENT OF A
SECOND BATTALION TO RWANDA. THE COUNCIL ALSO AGREED TO
THE TEXT OF A LETTER FROM THE SC PRESIDENT TO
BOUTROS-GHALI, INFORMING HIM THAT THE 90-DAY REVIEW
CALLED FOR IN RESOLUTION 872 HAD BEEN COMPLETED. SOME
COUNCIL MEMBERS QUESTIONED THE NECESSITY OF TWO SEPARATE
ACTIONS. THE FRENCH AND U.S. DELEGATIONS CONVINCED THE
OTHERS THAT A LETTER WAS NEEDED TO MAINTAIN THE
PROCEDURE ESTABLISHED IN THE CASES OF HAITI AND LIBERIA
OF ACKNOWLEDGING THE COMPLETION OF A 90-DAY REVIEW WITH
A LETTER. SINCE REQUIREMENTS FOR 90-DAY REVIEWS SEEM TO
BE BECOMING STANDARD PRACTICE FOR THE COUNCIL, THERE IS
A DESIRE TO DEVISE A SIMPLE MECHANISM FOR MEETING SUCH
REQUIREMENTS, NAMELY, A LETTER. THE FRENCH AND U.S.
ALSO CONVINCED THE OTHERS THAT A RESOLUTION WOULD HELP
PER E.0.13526
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TO CLARIFY THAT THE COUNCIL AUTHORIZED THE DEPLOYMENT OF
THE SECOND BATTALION, A CONCLUSION THAT MIGHT BE
QUESTIONED BY SOME INTERPRETATIONS OF RES 872. THE
RWANDA CASE DIFFERS FROM THOSE OF HAITI AND LIBERIA IN
THAT THE SIZE OF THE FORCE IS TO BE SIGNIFICANTLY
INCREASED. ALTHOUGH THIS INCREASE WAS CLEARLY FORETOLD
IN THE SYG'S PREVIOUS REPORT OF SEPTEMBER 13, THE USG
THOUGHT IT BEST TO RETAIN THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S
EXPLICIT CONTROL OVER THE DISPATCH OF ADDITIONAL
PEACEKEEPING FORCES.
2.
(U) BEGIN TEXT OF RESOLUTION:
THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTION 872 (1993) OF 5 OCTOBER
(1993) ESTABLISHING THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE
MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR),
RECALLING ITS RESOLUTIONS 812 (1993) OF 12 MARCH 1993,
846 (1993) OF 22 JUNE 1993 AND 891 (1993) OF 20 DECEMBER
1993,
HAVING EXAMINED THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF
30 DECEMBER 1993 (S/26927), IN THE CONTEXT OF THE REVIEW
CALLED FOR IN ITS RESOLUTION 872 (1993), AS WELL AS HIS
PREVIOUS REPORT OF 24 SEPTEMBER 1993 (S/26488 AND
ADD. 1 ) ,
WELCOMING THE CONCLUSION, ON 5 NOVEMBER 1993, OF THE
AGREEMENT ON THE STATUS OF UNAMIR AND ITS PERSONNEL IN
RWANDA,
TAKING NOTE OF THE PROGRESS DESCRIBED IN THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT OF 30 DECEMBER 1993 IN
IMPLEMENTING THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT,
WELCOMING FURTHER THE VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE IN
RWANDA MADE BY UNBAMIR,
NOTING WITH CONCERN THE INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE IN RWANDA
AND THE CONSEQUENCES FOR RWANDA OF THE SITUATION IN
BURUNDI, AND URGING ALL CONCERNED TO REAFFIRM THEIR
COMMITMENT TO PEACE,
WELCOMING ALSO THE JOINT STATEMENT MADE BY THE PARTIES
IN KINIHIRA ON 10 DECEMBER 1993 CONCERNING THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT AND, IN
PARTICULAR, THE PROMPT ESTABLISHMENT OF A BROAD-BASED
TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT,
-- 1. REAFFIRMS ITS APPROVAL OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S
PROPOSAL CONCERNING THE DEPLOYMENT OF UNAMIR AS OUTLINED
IN HIS REPORT OF 24 SEPTEMBER 1993, INCLUDING THE EARLY
DEPLOYMENT OF THE SECOND BATTALION TO THE DEMILITARIZED
ZONE AS INDICATED IM PARAGRAPH 30 OF HIS REPORT OF 30
DECEMBER 1993;
-- 2. STRONGLY URGES THE PARTIES TO COOPERATE FULLY IN
FURTHERING THE PEACE PROCESS, TO COMPLY FULLY WITH THE
ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT, ON WHICH THE SCHEDULE CONTAINED
r-.. n M r T . n c M T T n. T SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000069
DEPT FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C AND L/AF;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR JENNIFER WARD;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, MARR, PGOV, KDEM, R , UNSC
W
SUBJECT: RWANDA: SECURITY COUNCIL ADOPTS RESOLUTION 893
AUTHORIZING DEPLOYMENT OF SECOND BATTALION
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IN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL S REPORT OF 24 SEPTEMBER 1993
IS BASED, AND IN PARTICULAR TO ESTABLISH A BROAD-BASED
TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THIS AGREEMENT;
-- 3. STRESSES THAT CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR UNAMIR WILL
DEPEND UPON THE FULL AND PROMPT IMPLEMENTATION BY THE
PARTIES OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT;
-- 4. WELCOMES THE CONTINUED EFFORTS BY THE SECRETARY-GENE
AND HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO HELP PROMOTE AND ENHANCE
DIALOGUE AMONG ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED;
-- 5. COMMENDS THE EFFORTS OF MEMBER STATES, UNITED NATION
AGENCIES AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS WHICH HAVE PROV
HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER ASSISTANCE AND URGES OTHERS TO PROV
SUCH ASSISTANCE;
-- 6. COMMENDS IN PARTICULAR THE EFFORTS OF THE ORGANIZAT
OF AFRICAN UNITY, ITS MEMBER STATES AND AGENCIES IN PROVIDI
DIPLOMATIC, POLITICAL, HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER SUPPORT FOR T
IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 872 (1992);
7. REITERATES ITS REQUEST TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO
CONTINUE TO MONITOR THE SIZE AND COST OF UNAMIR TO SEEK
ECONOMIES;
-- 8. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.
END TEXT.
3.
(U) BEGIN TEXT OF SC PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO SYG.
THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAVE TAKEN NOTE OF YOUR
REPORT ON THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA
(UNAMIR) OF 30 DECEMBER 1993 (S/26927), ON THE BASIS OF W
H
THEY HAVE COMPLETED THEIR REVIEW PROVIDED FOR IN PARAGRAPH
RESOLUTION 872 (1993).
END TEXT.
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DALLAIRE PLNNED A VERQ AGRESSIVE DEMARCHE TO THE
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Dublin Core
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Title
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<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
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Clinton Presidential Records
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Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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Title
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Declassified Documents concerning Rwanda
Identifier
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2011-0261-M
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on Rwanda from the files of NSC African Affairs director, Jennifer Ward, from 1993. Emails from Ward to various NSC staffers, regarding Rwanda and peacekeeping efforts in 1993, are included. Also included is a memo from Susan Rice to the National Security Advisor, describing five new U.N. peacekeeping operations in 1993.
Creator
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National Security Council
Jennifer Ward
NSC African Affairs Office
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<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7585413" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
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Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
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2/6/2015
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2011-0261-M
7585413
Declassified
Foreign Policy
Peacekeeping
Rwanda
Susan Rice
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/a2e861fac3cea1f93c1a0b0d58ab8c31.pdf
906e84d3915e7a00a41f9e7c115be1b8
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in fiill or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Sections 1.4 (b), (c), (d), and 3.5 (c) of E.O. 13526 or (b)(3)
of the FOIA.
�F:\Email\Data_Source\Al\Record\CD001\aug93\013978.html
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
24-Aug-1993 18:58 EDT
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
Richard A. Clarke
(CLARKER)
SUBJECT:
CAL LUNCH: GLOBAL'S ITEMS
1. Funding UN Peacekeeping Operations
Issue: State has refused t o supply the d r a f t r u l e s f o r
interagency clearance f o r UN votes on peacekeeping.
EO 13526 1.4d
This issue takes on increased importance i n l i g h t of four new
PKO now under c o n s i d e r a t i o n (Rwanda, L i b e r i a , Abkhazia, and
Haiti).
2. Sudan: D e t e r r i n g and Responding t o T e r r o r i s m
EO 13526 1.4d
3. Somalia:
Issue:
The Next Phase
Who should give a major speech on Somalia?
Background: Both State and Defense are working on speeches
on Somalia f o r t h e i r S e c r e t a r i e s . You may want t o suggest
t h a t both of them give such speeches. I n a d d i t i o n t o n o t i n g
the progress we have made i n Somalia, the speeches could t a l k
about peacekeeping more g e n e r a l l y as p a r t o f the Funding
Peacekeeping Strategy.
DECLASSIFIED I N PART
PER E. 0. 13526
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4. A i r l i f t i n g
Musicians
from Bosnia:
Wilson/Schwartz p r o v i d i n g s e p a r a t e l y
5. DOD's G l o b a l I n i t i a t i v e Money:
Global w i l l p r o v i d e a separate memo w i t h Rosner.
Distribution:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
CC
CC
CC
CC
CC
CC
CC
CC
CC
CC
CC
Mary C. Emery
Wilma G. H a l l
K r i s t e n K. C i c i o
K a t h e r i n e M. V e i t
James W Reed
.
W i l l i a m H. I t o h
K r i s t i e A. Kenney
M. Brooke Darby
Records
Richard A. C l a r k e
Richard L. Canas
Wanda D. Lindsey
Rand R. Beers
E r i c P. Schwartz
Ernest J. Wilson I I I
Slusan E. Rice
Marcia G. Norman
0. Ruth S t a l c u p
Sean J. Darragh
(
(
(
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(
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(
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Date M o d i f i e d : 24-Aug-1993 18:44
Forward Flag: YES
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
27-Sep-1993 16:55
EDT
-eOHriDDNTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SEE BELOW
FROM:
N i c h o l a s J. Rasmussen
(RASMUSSEN)
SUBJECT:
Rwanda Peacekeeping O p e r a t i o n
Mr.
Lake/Mr. Berger
--
Susan Rice asked t h a t I b r i n g t o your a t t e n t i o n the f a c t t h a t
the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l appears t o be moving v e r y q u i c k l y toward
a v o t e on a r e s o l u t i o n e s t a b l i s h i n g a UN peacekeeping
o p e r a t i o n i n Rwanda. I n f o r m a l c o n s u l t a t i o n s have a l r e a d y
begun on the SYG's r e p o r t ( r e l e a s e d Monday).
I n keeping w i t h our d e s i r e t o precede more d e l i b e r a t e l y
b e f o r e v o t i n g yea or nay on new UN o p e r a t i o n s , S t a t e i s
a s k i n g USUN t o slow the process so t h a t we can take a c l o s e
l o o k a t the SYG's r e p o r t , as w e l l as a t the c o s t a n a l y s i s
( s t i l l pending) from the UN budget people.
Nonetheless, we
w i l l p r o b a b l y need t o have a USG p o s i t i o n by the b e g i n n i n g of
next week.
We recommend t h a t a Deputies Committee meeting be scheduled
on Thursday or F r i d a y t o c o n s i d e r the i s s u e . A number of
issues should be discussed by Deputies, i n c l u d i n g f u n d i n g of
the U.S. share of an o p e r a t i o n , French a t t e m p t s t o l i n k the
o p e r a t i o n w i t h a L i b e r i a PKO, and how the o p e r a t i o n stacks up
a g a i n s t the PRD-13 c r i t e r i a .
State/AF i s p r o v i d i n g us w i t h
i n p u t which we w i l l t u r n i n t o a DC d i s c u s s i o n paper. We can
have a paper ready by mid-week. I f a DC can be scheduled, we
w i l l c o o r d i n a t e the paper and agenda w i t h J e n n i f e r Ward.
A l t e r n a t i v e l y , we can prepare a d e c i s i o n memorandum f o r Mr.
Lake.
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James W.-Reed
W i l l i a m H. I t o h
K r i s t i e A. Kenney
M. Brooke Darby
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R i c h a r d L. Canas
Wanda D. Lindsey
Rand R. Beers
E r i c P. Schwartz
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Ernest J. W i l s o n I I I
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Marcia G. Norman
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N i c h o l a s J. Rasmussen
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
02-Oct-1993 13:17 EDT
coNn DDNTIAITMEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
Susan E. Rice
(RICE)
SUBJECT:
RWANDA UPDATE
Sandy-I have sent up t o you a r e v i s e d v e r s i o n o f the P r e s i d e n t ' s
l e t t e r t o M i t t e r a n d t a k i n g i n t o account t h e concerns t h a t I
u n d e r s t a n d you expressed t o Dick.
I am assuming t h a t
mission, despite a
a f t e r l o o k i n g more
Please l e t us know
we s t i l l p l a n t o support the Rwanda
rumor t h a t Frank Wisner was r e c o n s i d e r i n g
c l o s e l y a t the l a t e s t French r e s o l u t i o n .
i f our p o s i t i o n has changed.
Late y e s t e r d a y a f t e r n o o n we had a working l e v e l i n t e r a g e n c y
v i d e o c o n f e r e n c e t o t r y t o respond t o widespread concerns
about the m i l i t a r y concept o f o p e r a t i o n s f o r the Rwanda
m i s s i o n and t o reach consensus on a U.S. p o s i t i o n on the
draft resolution.
While much common ground was found on the
o u t l i n e o f the r e s o l u t i o n , you should know t h a t JCS and t o a
somewhat l e s s e r e x t e n t OSD have v e r y s e r i o u s concerns about
the m i s s i o n as c u r r e n t l y conceived.
I n p a r t i c u l a r , they b e l i e v e t h a t s i n c e the m i s s i o n i s a
t r a d i t i o n a l CH. V I i n a supposedly c o m p l e t e l y p e r m i s s i v e
environment, the o p e r a t i o n s h o u l d be conducted by unarmed
m i l i t a r y observers (or a t most v e r y l i g h t l y armed observers)
r a t h e r t h a n the planned 2 i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n s . As the
m i s s i o n now stands, they "non-concur", and remain adamantly
opposed f o r t h i s reason.
S t a t e supports the 2 i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n s .
I tend t o agree
w i t h JCS t h a t t h e r e i s c o n s i d e r a b l e dissonance between the
concept o f o p e r a t i o n s and the supposed p e r m i s s i v e
environment.
We ought t o be a b l e t o achieve the same goals
w i t h observers i f the p a r t i e s t r u l y want peace. However, i t
w i l l be d i f f i c u l t t o move the French, t h e UN and the Rwandan
p a r t i e s i n the s h o r t time we have b e f o r e a v o t e . JCS and/or
OSD may r a i s e t h i s a t your l e v e l .
I t h i n k we ought t o t a l k t o the French and the UN i n New York
t o address these i s s u e s , p r e f e r a b l y b e f o r e a v o t e , i f JCS
insists.
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Richard A. Clarke
Mary C. Emery
Wilma G. H a l l
K r i s t e n K. C i c i o
K a t h e r i n e M. V e i t
James W Reed
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W i l l i a m H. I t o h
K r i s t i e A. Kenney
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
0 4 - O c t - 1 9 9 3 1 4 : 3 4 EDT
-COHriDCNTI/tt
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
Susan E. Rice
(RICE)
SUBJECT:
RWANDA
Sandy-I t seems t h a t S t a t e and DOD/JCS have managed t o come t o
agreement on i n s t r u c t i o n s t o USUN t o support the Rwanda
resolution.
I n s h o r t , JCS walked back from the c l i f f and
agreed t o more open-ended language about the c o m p o s i t i o n o f
the f o r c e (armed b a t t a l i o n s vs. unarmed m i l i t a r y observers)
i n exchange f o r a b s o l u t e c l a r i t y t h a t t h i s i s meant t o be a
t r a d i t i o n a l ( p a c i f i c ) Chapter VI o p e r a t i o n .
T h i s i s a good compromise. We are l o o k i n g f o r w a r d t o r a p i d l y
c l e a r i n g the x-hatched i n s t r u c t i o n c a b l e .
I have t r i e d t o t r a c k down the message from the President t o
M i t t e r r a n d . As f a r as we can t e l l , the package went t o the
P r e s i d e n t on Saturday evening, b u t has not y e t been signed
out.
Kathy M i l l i s o n i s checking f u r t h e r f o r us.
Susan
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K a t h e r i n e M. V e i t
James W Reed
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W i l l i a m H. I t o h
K r i s t i e A. Kenney
M. Brooke Darby
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Randy R. Beers
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
09-Nov-1993 12:57 EDT
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
E r i c P. Schwartz
(SCHWARTZ)
SUBJECT:
Meeting With Sadako Ogata, UNHCR, Tues. a t 6:30 pm
Memorandum
November 9, 1993
To:
Samuel Berger
Through: Richard Clarke
Fr:
E r i c Schwartz
Concurrences by: Jane H o l l , J e n n i f e r Ward, L a r r y Rossin
Subject:
Meeting t h i s evening w i t h Mrs. Sadako Ogata o f UNHCR
We expect Mrs. Ogata w i l l r a i s e UNHCR a c t i v i t i e s i n Bosnia, t h e
s i t u a t i o n i n H a i t i and, p o s s i b l y , the s i t u a t i o n i n Burundi.
I n a d d i t i o n t o d i s c u s s i n g these issues w i t h her, you w i l l want t o
c o n g r a t u l a t e her on her recent r e e l e c t i o n t o a f i v e year term and
express strong U.S. support f o r her l e a d e r s h i p at UNHCR.
I.
BOSNIA
Background: Mrs. Ogata's v i s i t comes a t an i n c r e a s i n g l y
d i f f i c u l t time f o r agency operations i n Bosnia.
Security
c o n d i t i o n s continue t o d e t e r i o r a t e f o r humanitarian r e l i e f
workers!
EO 13526 1.4d
EO 13526 1.4d
POINTS TO MAKE/QUESTIONS TO RAISE:
UNHCR i n Bosnia: Express a p p r e c i a t i o n f o r continued UNHCR
e f f o r t s i n the r e g i o n .
W i n t e r i z a t i o n Plans: What i s Mrs. Ogata view o f
p r e p a r a t i o n s and c o o r d i n a t i o n between agencies?
EC I n i t i a t i v e t o Encourage P a r t i e s t o Guarantee Supply
Routes: How does Mrs. Ogata assess the prospects f o r t h i s
initiative?
Tuzla: Reports i n d i c a t e serious shortages i n the Tuzla
area. What are Mrs. Ogata's views on the opening o f Tuzla
a i r p o r t and under what scenario does she t h i n k t h i s might be
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accomplished?
[Note: UNHCR continues t o b e l i e v e the opening of the
airport i sv i t a l .
Before the a i r p o r t were opened, Bosnian
forces would probably have t o abandon many o f the b u i l d i n g s
at the a i r p o r t , which they have thus f a r refused t o do.
State suggests t h a t the Europeans could handle the t e c h n i c a l
aspects o f opening the a i r p o r t . I
EO 13526 1.4d
EO 13526 1.4d
Other issues t h a t might come up:
•
UNHCR APPEAL FOR BOSNIA: we are now p r e p a r i n g a response,
which should be ready w i t h i n the next seven days.
PERMITTING UNHCR TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO
REFUGEES IN SERBIA: The refugee p o p u l a t i o n i n Serbia i s
d i s t r e s s e d , and the Serbs are using t h i s p u b l i c l y as claimed
evidence of d i s c r i m i n a t o r y treatment o f refugees. UNHCR
urges a i d t o these p o p u l a t i o n s , as w e l l as t o other
v u l n e r a b l e groups i n Serbia. We have not taken a formal
p o s i t i o n , though Warren Zimmerman a t State supports a
c a r e f u l l y monitored and c o n t r o l l e d a i d program. Jane and I
agree w i t h Warren.
II.
HAITI -- ISSUES MRS. OGATA MAY RAISE
Background: As you know, UNHCR opposes d i r e c t r e t u r n . With
other c o u n t r i e s s u p p o r t i n g the embargo w i t h t h e i r own ships, t h e
question o f t h e i r p o l i c i e s on r e t u r n may a r i s e . As a r e s u l t , t h e
UNHCR Americas D i r e c t o r a t e has requested a t e c h n i c a l meeting i n
Geneva t o discuss t h e treatment of H a i t i a n boat people by ships
of c o u n t r i e s e n f o r c i n g t h e embargo.
EO 13526 1.4d
EO 13526 1.4d
I f r a i s e d , you may want t o p o i n t out t h a t -Based on our own experience, we are very d o u b t f u l t h a t a
UNHCR meeting w i l l come up w i t h v i a b l e t h i r d country
options.
We continue t o monitor the s i t u a t i o n i n H a i t i and see no
signs o f a imminent exodus o f large numbers.
Our three refugee processing centers are o p e r a t i n g i n H a i t i
and U.S. o f f i c i a l s continue t o meet r e t u r n i n g H a i t i a n s t o
a s s i s t those who wish t o apply f o r refugee s t a t u s .
III.
BURUNDI
Background: As you know, elements of the Burundi m i l i t a r y
r e c e n t l y launched an attempted coup d'etat against the
d e m o c r a t i c a l l y - e l e c t e d government o f President Ndadaye, r e s u l t i n g
i n t h e death o f the President and several members o f h i s Cabinet,
as w e l l as i n t e r - e t h n i c violence p r i m a r i l y i n the c o u n t r y s i d e .
We have no estimates o f the number k i l l e d . Some 650,000 new
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refugees have f l e d to- n e i g h b o r i n g s t a t e s , p r i m a r i l y Rwanda,
Tanzania and Z a i r e . As a r e s u l t o f t h i s c r i s i s , UNHCR has
d e p l e t e d i t s emergency fund and has now borrowed $5 m i l l i o n from
the UN's C e n t r a l Emergency Revolving Fund. UNHCR has made an
appeal f o r $17 m i l l i o n t o meet the needs o f the refugees over the
next t h r e e months. S t a t e R/P i s p r e p a r i n g an ERMA ( A f r i c a )
drawdown p r o p o s a l f o r the P r e s i d e n t f o r $20 m i l l i o n , o f which
$4.25 m i l l i o n would go t o the UNHCR f o r Burundian refugees.
POINTS TO MAKE:
We want t o be as h e l p f u l as p o s s i b l e i n t h i s h u m a n i t a r i a n
c r i s i s and encourage UNHCR's e f f o r t s as w e l l as those o f the
ICRC and WFP;
•
AID's O f f i c e o f D i s a s t e r A s s i s t a n c e has a l r e a d y approved
c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f $50,000 as a r e s u l t o f our Ambassadors'
having d e c l a r e d d i s a s t e r s i n Rwanda and B u r u n d i ;
We are working on a drawdown o f monies from the P r e s i d e n t ' s
emergency fund t o p r o v i d e s u b s t a n t i a l f u n d i n g f o r your
appeal.
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Jenonne R. Walker
Richard A. C l a r k e
Richard L. Canas
Wanda D. Lindsey
Rand R. Beers
E r i c P. Schwartz
Ernest J. Wilson I I I
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Marcia G. Norman
0. Ruth S t a l c u p
Sean J. Darragh
N i c h o l a s J. Rasmussen
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
13-Dec-1993 22:01 EDT
CQWTIDEMTIAti
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
Susan E. Rice
(RICE)
SUBJECT:
Upcoming Issues i n UNSC
OMNIBUS PEACEKEEPING E-Mail
INFORMATION:
The S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l i s expected w i t h i n the next week t o
renew r o u t i n e l y a number o f peacekeeping mandates:
Cyprus
The UNSC w i l l vote t h i s week another 6 month renewal o f
UNFICYP. The l a s t renewal came i n the summer as the
Canadians were l e a v i n g and a f t e r the Russians i n i t i a l l y
vetoed the r e s o l u t i o n f o r p r o c e d u r a l reasons.
Today, t h e
A r g e n t i n e s have r e p l a c e d the Canadians, and the Russians seem
s a t i s f i e d on the i s s u e . The U.S. and a l l i e s have a l s o
succeeded i n g e t t i n g Greece and Cyprus t o p i c k up over 50% o f
the cost o f the o p e r a t i o n , thus r e d u c i n g the U.S. share t o
r o u g h l y $7 m i l l i o n / p a .
This week's vote should be an easy, pro forma e x t e n s i o n . The
d r a f t r e s o l u t i o n i s a good one, s t a t i n g t h a t the s t a t u s quo
i s unacceptable and c a l l s f o r a thorough review o f the f u t u r e
r o l e o f the UN i n Cyprus i n February.
Angola
The UNSC w i l l vote by the 15th t o extend UNAVEM's mandate a t
c u r r e n t s t r e n g t h f o r 3 months. As J e n n i f e r has informed you,
the U.S t a b l e d a d r a f t r e s o l u t i o n t h a t has been c o n s i d e r e d by
the P-5. USUN i s t r y i n g t o ensure t h a t i t remains balanced
to put a p p r o p r i a t e p o l i t i c a l pressure on b o t h s i d e s .
Liberia
We are a t the 3 month stage when the UNSC must decide t o
c o n t i n u e the m i s s i o n i n L i b e r i a f o r the d u r a t i o n o f i t s seven
month mandate. This i s v e r y s i m i l a r .to the p r o c e d u r a l issue
we faced l a s t week on H a i t i .
Again, t h i s c o n t i n u a t i o n can be
achieved w i t h o u t any f o r m a l r e s o l u t i o n , o n l y a l e t t e r from
UNSC Pres. t o SYG or a statement. Not expected t o be a b i g
deal.
Rwanda
There are 2 Rwanda m i s s i o n s - - 80 border m o n i t o r s l o o k i n g f o r
arms t r a f f i c on the Rwanda/Uganda border and-a.^larger
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peacekeeping f o r c e i n K i g a l i .
The upcoming renewal ( r e q u i r e d
by the 22nd) w i l l g i v e the Ugandan border m i s s i o n i t s second
6-month mandate. H a p p i l y , t h e two m i s s i o n s , w h i l e f o r m a l l y
separate f o r p o l i t i c a l reasons, are w e l l - i n t e g r a t e d i n terms
of command. B e t t e r y e t , a f t e r Dec. 22 they w i l l have a
s i n g l e budget, a l l o w i n g us t o c a p t u r e a l l p o s s i b l e economies
of s c a l e .
ACTION:
South A f r i c a : How t o a u t h o r i z e and fund t h e a n t i c i p a t e d UN
e l e c t i o n monitoring mission.
Normally, s t r a i g h t e l e c t i o n m o n i t o r i n g (w/o peacekeepers) i s
a UNGA a c t i v i t y p a i d f o r on the r e g u l a r budget, f o r which US
pays 25%. But a c c o r d i n g t o USUN, the South A f r i c a n p a r t i e s ,
the F r o n t l i n e S t a t e s and many o t h e r s want the UNSC t o mandate
the South A f r i c a m i s s i o n , because the UNGA can't move q u i c k l y
and doesn't c a r r y the same p o l i t i c a l w e i g h t .
The problem i s t h a t i f the UNSC mandates i t , the UNGA (which
c o n t r o l s the UN purse s t r i n g s ) i s l i k e l y t o i n s i s t t h a t i t be
p a i d f o r on the peacekeeping budget (we pay 31.7%). Funding
non-peacekeeping on the Peacekeeping budget would set a
t e r r i b l e precedent.
ISSUE: I f you agree, J e n n i f e r and I w i l l ask S t a t e t o d r a f t
a cable t o USUN, i n s t r u c t i n g them t o submit q u i c k l y a
s t r a t e g y f o r speedy UN a c t i o n on South A f r i c a p a i d f o r on the
r e g u l a r budget. We propose t o g i v e them a r e l a t i v e l y s h o r t
time frame i n which t o implement t h a t s t r a t e g y .
I f USUN f a i l s , I t h i n k we w i l l need a DC i n e a r l y Jan. t o
decide whether the U.S. wants t o work t h r o u g h the UNGA, which
may be opposed by the p a r t i e s and slow down deployment, o r ;
whether we want t o pay f o r t h i s on the peacekeeping budget,
which c o u l d r a i s e s e r i o u s q u e s t i o n s on t h e H i l l and would set
a dangerous precedent.
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�E:\Email\Data_Source\A 1 \Record\CDOO 1 \apr94\03 5415 .html
Page 1 of2
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
08-Apr-1994
1 0 : 2 4 EDT
- I J U I I L ' I U L N I IJ'iL
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
E r i c P. Schwartz
(SCHWARTZ)
SUBJECT:
MONIQUE MUJAWAMARIYA OF RWANDA
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PRESS OR
DISCUSSED PUBLICLY AT THIS POINT.
I r e p o r t e d t o you yesterday t h a t Monique Mujawamariya, t h e
Rwandan human r i g h t s a c t i v i s t who met t h e P r e s i d e n t , appeared t o
have been k i l l e d .
I c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h e r e p o r t as unconfirmed.
(The r e p o r t was based on t h e f a c t t h a t Monique had been t a l k i n g
by phone w i t h a f r i e n d i n t h e U.S. when s o l d i e r s who were k i l l i n g
her neighbors approached her home. The phone went dead and
f u r t h e r a t t e m p t s t o reach Monique were u n s u c c e s s f u l , w i t h men
answering t h e phone and hanging up.
[There i s a Washington Post
account o f these events on today's Op Ed page.])
T h a n k f u l l y , Monique appears not t o have been k i l l e d . She
a p p a r e n t l y f l e d her home and h i d i n t h e bush. She i s now back a t
her home and our Embassy i f t r y i n g t o f i g u r e out how we might
h e l p i n g e t t i n g her t o a safe p l a c e .
THIS NEW INFORMATION IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PRESS OR
DISCUSSED PUBLICLY AT THIS POINT.
Our Embassy's Task Force i n K i g a l i b e l i e v e s s t r o n g l y t h a t
Monique's chances o f s u r v i v a l w i l l be i n c r e a s e d i f she i s
b e l i e v e d t o be dead, as Rwandan s o l d i e r s c o n t i n u e t o l o o k f o r
her.
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Rand R. Beers
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
09-Apr-1994 16:38 EDT
•OECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FO"
RM:
Richard A. Clarke
(CLARKER)
SUBJECT:
RWANDA: NEXT STEPS, FOR SUNDAY AND BEYOND
With dawn.on Sunday, convoys two and t h r e e w i l l leave t h e
Danish M i s s i o n 2 kms from the border and d r i v e i n t o Burundi.
During t h e n i t e t h e USMC f o r c e i n Buj w i l l r u n h o u r l y r a d i o
checks on t h e s t a t u s o f t h e convoys. That w i l l leave us w i t h
the f o l l o w i n g q u e s t i o n s :
— h o w do we g e t t h e remaining Americans out?
--do we h e l p the Belgians get i n ? ( n o t e : The Rwandan
r e b e l s are r e p o r t e d l y r p t r e p o r t e d l y moving toward K i g a l i . )
--do
1.
we p u l l t h e UN f o r c e out?
G e t t i n g the Americans o u t
The embassy may p u t t o g e t h e r another convoy or may p u t t h e
Americans o u t t h e French f l i g h t s o u t . The f i r s t French f l i g h t
out l e f t l a t e on Saturday.
2. G e t t i n g t h e Belgians i n
There a r e 2000 B e l g i a n c i t i z e n s s t i l l a t r i s k . F i g h t i n g i s
l i k e l y t o e s c a l a t e . Thus, once we know t h a t our c i t i z e n s are
safe, we should work w i t h the French t o see i f t h e y can
insure the safety of f l i g h t s i n t o K i g a l i .
I f t h e French do
secure t h e a i r b a s e area, we p r o b a b l y s h o u l d f l y the Belgians
in.
3. T e r m i n a t i n g t h e UN Force
We make a l o t o f noise about t e r m i n a t i n g UN f o r c e s t h a t
a r e n ' t w o r k i n g . W e l l , few c o u l d be as c l e a r l y n o t w o r k i n g .
We should work w i t h t h e Frecnh t o g a i n a consensus t o
t e r m i n a t e t h e UN m i s s i o n .
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Page 1 of2
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
11-Apr-1994 14:41 EDT
-OOlfTIDDNTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
E r i c P. Schwartz
(SCHWARTZ)
SUBJECT:
MONIQUE MUJAWAMARIYA OF RWANDA
According t o H o l l y B u r k h a l t e r o f Human Rights Watch, Monique Mujawamariya -- t h e
Rwandan human r i g h t s a c t i v i s t who met t h e P r e s i d e n t -- i s now safe and i n
Nairobi.
More d e t a i l s t o come as I r e c e i v e them.
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James W Reed
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Neal S. Wolin
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
l l - A p r - 1 9 9 4 12:45 EDT
r r n n IT T
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
Richard A. C l a r k e
(CLARKER)
SUBJECT:
RWANDA: DECISION MAY BE REQUIRED
T ' TL/S.RB
O:
FM: RAC
RE: RWANDA
The UN i s p l a n n i n g t o p u l l o u t t h e UN peacekeeping f o r c e ,
a c c o r d i n g t o USUN.
The UN may r p t may ask f o r US a i r l i f t
fast.
t o get the force out
Meanwhile, t h e French are b e g i n n i n g t o p u l l t h e i r f o r c e o u t
and t h e Belgians a r e c o n t i n u i n g t o i n s e r t t r o o p s .
I f t h e UN asks f o r h e l p g e t t i n g o u t , USAF t r a n s p o r t s s t a n d i n g
by i n Kenya c o u l d be a v a i l a b l e .
ACTION REQUESTED:
Do you have any guidance f o r us on how we should respond t o a
UN request?
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
l l - A p r - 1 9 9 4 15:03 EDT
GOHFIDEMTIAb
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
E r i c P. Schwartz
(SCHWARTZ)
SUBJECT:
MONIQUE MUJAWAMARIYA: FOLLOW-UP MESSAGE
3^
Regarding t h e a t t a c h e d E m a i l on Monique Mujawamariya (which you should have
already received):
PLEASE DO NOT REVEAL THE NEW INFORMATION ABOUT MONIQUE TO THE PRESS OR TO THE
PUBLIC AT THIS POINT.
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W i l l i a m H. I t o h
K r i s t i e A. Kenney
M. Brooke Darby
Cathy M i l l i s o n
James W Reed
.
Neal S. Wolin
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Richard L. Canas
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
l l - A p r - 1 9 9 4 14:41 EDT
CQMFIDEMTIMJ
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
E r i c P. Schwartz
(SCHWARTZ)
SUBJECT:
MONIQUE MUJAWAMARIYA OF RWANDA
a
According t o H o l l y B u r k h a l t e r o f Human Rights Watch, Monique Mujawamariya - Rwandan human r i g h t s a c t i v i s t who met t h e P r e s i d e n t -- i s now safe and i n
Nairobi.
More d e t a i l s t o come as I r e c e i v e them.
Distribution:
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Morton H. H a l p e r i n
Donald K. S t e i n b e r g
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Wilma G. H a l l
K r i s t e n K. C i c i o
K a t h e r i n e M. V e i t
W i l l i a m H. I t o h
K r i s t i e A. Kenney
M. Brooke Darby
Cathy M i l l i s o n
James W Reed
.
Neal S. Wolin
Richard A. C l a r k e
Richard L. Canas
Wanda D. Lindsey
Rand R. Beers
E r i c P. Schwartz
Ernest J. W i l s o n I I I
Susan E. Rice
Marcia G. Norman
0. Ruth S t a l c u p
Sean J. Darragh
( LAKE )
( RECORDS )
( RECORDS )
( HALPERIN )
( STEINBERG )
( EMERY )
( HALL )
( CICIO )
( VEIT )
( ITOH )
( KENNEY )
( DARBY )
( MILLISON )
( REED )
( WOLIN )
( CLARKER )
( CANAS )
( LINDSEY )
( BEERS )
( SCHWARTZ )
( WILSON )
( RICE )
( NORMAN )
( STALCUP )
( DARRAGH )
INTON LIBRARY PHOTOCORY . :
the
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
l l - A p r - 1 9 9 4 17:22 EDT
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
Mary C. Emery
(EMERY)
SUBJECT:
RE: RWANDA: DECISION MAY BE REQUIRED
Tony Lake has read e-mail and responded as f o l l o w s :
Next t o A c t i o n Requested:
. should go t o P r i n c i p a l s . "
" I n c l i n e d t o help.
But d e c i s i o n
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Sean J. Darragh
0. Ruth S t a l c u p
Marcia G. Norman
Susan E. Rice
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Rand R. Beers
Wanda D. Lindsey
Richard L. Canas
Richard A. C l a r k e
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James W Reed
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Cathy M i l l i s o n
M. Brooke Darby
K r i s t i e A. Kenney
W i l l i a m H. I t o h
K a t h e r i n e M. V e i t
K r i s t e n K. C i c i o
Wilma G. H a l l
MacArthur DeShazer
Donald K. S t e i n b e r g
Records
( CLARKER )
( DARRAGH )
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( NORMAN )
( RICE )
( WILSON )
( SCHWARTZ )
( BEERS )
( LINDSEY )
( CANAS )
( CLARKER )
( RECORDS )
( WOLIN )
( REED )
( MILLISON )
( DARBY )
( KENNEY )
( ITOH )
( VEIT )
( CICIO )
( HALL )
( DESHAZER )
( STEINBERG )
( RECORDS )
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�RWANDA:
Tutsi Military Poised To Attack
The Rwandan military and Tutsi forces from the Rwandan Patriotic Front
apparently are adhering to a cease-fire as the evacuation of foreign nationals
proceeds, but at least 4,000 heavily armed RPF rebels continue to advance
on the capital. Leaders of the RPF say they will let French and Belgian
forces assist in removing their nationals but have threatened to attack the
French forces if they intervene for the government's side. Rebel leaders also
rejected talks with the new Hutu interim government, which they accuse of
killing Tutsis and undermining ethnic reconciliation.
— The RPF almost certainly intends to seize Kigali but is holding
back until most expatriates are evacuated. It would be hard
pressed to control the city, however, because armed militias and
Hutu hardliners there vehemently oppose any sharing of power
with Tutsis. (€ NP)
The Hutu-dominated security forces are divided regionally between
southerners and northerners, and clashes have been reported between Army
and Gendarmerie forces, according to a foreign government service. Armed
Hutu militias continue to rampage throughout the city and to threaten
Belgian and French citizens. Neither Paris nor Brussels wants to be drawn
into Rwanda's civil war, and they probably will withdraw their troops as
soon as the evacuation is complete.
— A senior UN official privately has told Belgian, French, and US
officials that the Secretary General believes the lightly armed UN
force of 2,500, which already has suffered 16 killed, must be
evacuated unless there is an effective cease-fire. It probably will
continue to be attacked if it remains in Kigali after the evacuation.
(S-NF)
A revived civil war in Rwanda could intensify the volatility of Burundi,
where up to 150,000 people reportedly were killed after the Hutu president
was assassinated last fall. In a move to support Tutsis in Rwanda, the
Tutsi military could try to take over the Hutu-dominated government.
(€-NF) -CM6.0.13526.Iia)
DOWNGRADED FROM
TOP SECRET TO SECRET
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
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<p Secret
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11 April 1994
�Top Secret
[EQjl52ejLSc]
Balance of Military Forces in Rwanda
Rwandan Security Forces
Army: 31,000 troops . .. about 4,000 in Kigali. . . troubled by low morale, poor combat
record, has depended on French forces and logistics.
EO 13526 1.4c
Interim Armv Chief of Staff: Colonel Gatsinzi. . . commander of noncommissioned
officers training school.
Gendarmerie (paramilitary police): 7,200 . . . 2,000 in Kigali.
II
EO 13526 1.4c
Rwandan Patriotic Front
Forces: 20,000 nationwide .. . has controlled northern territory since 1990 invasion
from Uganda . . . UN escorted 600-man RPF security force to Kigali in December . .
highly motivated . . . effectively uses artillery, heavy mortars, recoilless rifles.
EO 13526 1.4c
EO 13526 3.5c
Top Secret
SC 01677/04
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
12-Apr-1994 09:10 EDT
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
( HOLL )
Jane E. H o l l
FROM:
James W Reed
.
(REED)
SUBJECT:
S t r i k e Two
This i s t h e second erroneous r e p o r t on t h i s (TL was PO'd when he
passed t h e f i r s t r e p o r t t o t h e Pres, o n l y t o f i n d o u t i t was
wrong) . . .
CC: Records
( RECORDS )
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•
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
l l - A p r - 1 9 9 4 20:26 EDT
CONFIDCNTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
E r i c P. Schwartz
(SCHWARTZ)
SUBJECT:
MONIQUE MUJAWAMARIA:
CORRECTED INFORMATION
I r e p o r t e d t o you today t h a t Human Rights Watch had been i n f o r m e d t h a t
Monique was safe and i n N a i r o b i . State had a l s o r e c e i v e d t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n
from Human R i g h t s Watch, which was based on a r e p o r t p r o v i d e d i n f o r m a l l y by
a UN o f f i c i a l i n New York.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y PERM.
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U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h e i n f o r m a t i o n was i n a c c u r a t e -- t h e UN o f f i c i a l a p p a r e n t l y
confused Monique w i t h another Rwandan.
We do n o t have c u r r e n t i n f o r m a t i o n about Monique. We b e l i e v e our Embassy's
l a s t c o n t a c t w i t h her was e a r l y Sunday morning i n Rwanda. According t o
S t a t e , our DCM gave i n f o r m a t i o n on Monique's whereabouts t o t h e ICRC and
asked t h a t t h e y c o o r d i n a t e w i t h UNAMIR i n t r y i n g t o g e t her t o a p l a c e o f
safety.
I'm t e r r i b l y s o r r y f o r t h e c o n f u s i o n on t h i s .
with State.
I w i l l c o n t i n u e t o f o l l o w up
Under these circumstances, Monique's s a f e t y i n Rwanda i s again enhanced by
the p e r c e p t i o n t h a t she has been k i l l e d (as t h i s p e r c e p t i o n w i l l discourage
s o l d i e r s from l o o k i n g f o r h e r ) . Thus news o f her b e i n g a l i v e should not be
d i s c u s s e d p u b l i c l y o r w i t h t h e press.
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W i l l i a m H. I t o h
K r i s t i e A. Kenney
M. Brooke Darby
Cathy M i l l i s o n
James W Reed
.
Neal S. Wolin
Richard A. C l a r k e
Richard L. Canas
Wanda D. Lindsey
Rand R. Beers
E r i c P. Schwartz
Ernest J. Wilson I I I
Susan E. Rice
Marcia G. Norman
0. Ruth S t a l c u p
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RECORDS )
DESHAZER )
STEINBERG )
EMERY )
HALL )
CICIO )
VEIT )
ITOH )
KENNEY )
DARBY )
MILLISON )
REED )
WOLIN )
CLARKER )
CANAS )
LINDSEY )
BEERS )
SCHWARTZ )
WILSON )
RICE )
NORMAN )
STALCUP )
DARRAGH )
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
12-Apr-1994 18:48 EDT
•6DCRET
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
Neal S. Wolin
(WOLIN)
SUBJECT:
C-P-L
l u n c h agenda —
13 A p r i l
Below i s a t e n t a t i v e agenda f o r tomorrow's C-P-L l u n c h . Where
i n d i c a t e d , please p r o v i d e me, by not l a t e r than 10:15 a.m.
Wednesday., a s h o r t background paper ( v i a e-mail) f o r Tony's use.
Lake:
o Update on E f f o r t s t o Defeat Exon-Grassley -- w i l l discuss next
steps on s t r a t e g y f o r FY 95 budget conference.
(Jeremy Rosner/Bob
B e l l please p r o v i d e background.)
o Bosnia A u t h o r i z a t i o n R e s o l u t i o n -- w i l l d i s c u s s a d v i s a b i l i t y o f
seeking c o n g r e s s i o n a l a u t h o r i z a t i o n f o r use o f f o r c e i n Bosnia.
(Alan Kreczko/Jeremy Rosner please p r o v i d e background.)
Christopher:
o R e v i t a l i z i n g Nunn-Lugar -- w i l l ask S e c r e t a r y Perry t o become
more engaged i n seeking a d d i t i o n a l Nunn-Lugar funds.
(Rose
G o t t e m o e l l e r please p r o v i d e background.)
o Bosnia Update -- w i l l c o n s u l t on where we are on Gorazde,
d i s c u s s i o n s i n Sarajevo, e t c . (Jenonne Walker/Jane H o l l please
p r o v i d e background.)
o Skrunda -- w i l l answer some o f S e c r e t a r y Perry's q u e s t i o n s from
l a s t week's lunch r e g a r d i n g a v a i l a b i l i t y o f S t a t e funds f o r
Skrunda dismantlement.
(John B e y r l e please p r o v i d e background.)
Perry:
o Peacekeeping Funding -- w i l l d i s c u s s next steps on d e a l i n g w i t h
a r r e a r a g e s and PDD-13 f u n d i n g issues a f t e r Monday's meeting w i t h
the P r e s i d e n t . (Dick Clarke/Susan Rice please p r o v i d e background
as a p p r o p r i a t e . )
o U.S. Support f o r Evacuation o f A l l i e s ' N a t i o n a l s from Rwanda -w i l l ask what support the USG ought t o g i v e the French and
Belgians i n e v a c u a t i n g t h e i r n a t i o n a l s from Rwanda. (Dick
Clarke/Don S t e i n b e r g please p r o v i d e background.)
o North Korea — w i l l discuss plans f o r h i s impending t r i p t o
Asia.
(Dan Poneman/Stanley Roth please p r o v i d e background.)
Distribution:
FEM M . 13526
_ JINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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Daniel F r i e d
MacArthur DeShazer
Rose E. G o t t e m o e l l e r
Randy R. Beers
Susan E. Rice
John R. B e y r l e
Robert G. B e l l
Richard E. Feinberg
R. Nicholas Burns
M a r t i n S. Indyk
George J. Tenet
Jenonne R. Walker
E i l e e n B. Claussen
Richard A. C l a r k e
Kent M. Wiedemann
J e n n i f e r C. Ward
Alan J. Kreczko
Jeremy D. Rosner
Donald K. S t e i n b e r g
Daniel B. Poneman
Richard S c h i f t e r
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Nancy Soderberg
W i l l i a m H. I t o h
K r i s t i e A. Kenney
James W Reed
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HOLL )
FRIED )
DESHAZER )
GOTTEMOELLER
BEERS )
RICE )
BEYRLE )
BELL )
FEINBERG )
BURNS )
INDYK )
TENET )
WALKER )
CLAUSSEN )
CLARKER )
WIEDEMANN )
WARD )
KRECZKO )
ROSNER )
STEINBERG )
PONEMAN )
SCHIFTER )
RECORDS )
SODERBERG )
ITOH )
KENNEY )
REED )
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
19-Apr-1994 13:27 EDT
-GONFI.&ENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
( RICE )
( STEINBERG )
Susan E. Rice
Donald K. S t e i n b e r g
FROM:
E r i c P. Schwartz
(SCHWARTZ)
SUBJECT:
PULL-OUT OF UNAMIR
I j u s t heard from Human Rights Watch, p l e a d i n g t h a t we oppose a q u i c k UNAMIR
p u l l - o u t from Rwanda. Human Rights Watch seemed t o i n d i c a t e t h a t UNAMIR i s
p r o t e c t i n g thousands (25,000?) Rwandans and i f t h e y p u l l o u t , t h e Rwandans w i l l
q u i c k l y become v i c t i m s o f genocide.
Is t h i s t r u e ? I f so, s h o u l d n ' t i t be a major f a c t o r i n f o r m i n g h i g h - l e v e l
decision-making on t h i s issue?
Has i t been?
I am e x p e c t i n g t o r e c e i v e a f a x on t h i s s h o r t l y and w i l l
see t h a t you g e t i t .
Eric
CC: Records
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
25-Apr-1994 10:51 EDT
oonriDCMTinr
M M R N U FOR: SEE BELOW
EOADM
FROM:
Donald K. S t e i n b e r g
(STEINBERG)
SUBJECT:
USG A c t i o n s on Rwanda
S t o r i e s t h r o u g h o u t t h e weekend seem t o suggest t h a t we are s i t t i n g
on our hands w h i l e t h e b l o o d - l e t t i n g i n Rwanda rages.
I t i s true
t h a t our c a p a c i t y t o end t h e k i l l i n g i s p a i n f u l l y l i m i t e d , b u t we
are: u n d e r t a k i n g a s e r i e s o f measures.
I t was our i n i t i a t i v e t o ask r e g i o n a l l e a d e r s i n Tanzania and
Uganda (now supported by t h e UN and OAU S e c r e t a r y General
Salim Salim) t o draw t o g e t h e r t h e l e a d e r s o f t h e Rwandan army
and t h e RPF t o seek a cease f i r e and r e - a s s e r t t h e Arusha
process.
Our Ambassadors i n Tanzania (De Vos) and Uganda
(Carson) have been deeply i n v o l v e d i n these s o - f a r l a r g e l y
u n s u c c e s s f u l e f f o r t s . We expect t o send Ambassador Rawson
back o u t t o t h e r e g i o n s h o r t l y t o f a c i l i t a t e t h i s process.
Whereas we s t r o n g l y supported e f f o r t s t o safeguard t h e l i v e s
of t h e U.N. peacekeepers, we a l s o i n s i s t e d t h a t t h e draw-down
o f t h e peacekeepers n o t be accomplished i n a way t h a t p u t a t
r i s k t h e l i v e s o f Rwandans under t h e i r p r o t e c t i o n .
F o l l o w i n g Tony's meeting on F r i d a y w i t h Rwandan human r i g h t s
m o n i t o r Monique Mujawamarija, we i s s u e d a tough statement
( a t t a c h e d ) condemning t h e c o n t i n u e d v i o l e n c e and c a l l i n g on
b o t h s i d e s t o stop t h e k i l l i n g , w i t h t h e s p e c i f i c mention o f
names o f t h e leaders o f Rwandan armed f o r c e s ( t o p u t them on
n o t i c e t h a t we are watching them).
We i n s t r u c t e d our envoy t o
the Arusha t a l k s t o read t h e statement t o t h e Government and
RPF r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s t h e r e . He says t h a t when he read t h e
statement, t h e RPF r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s s m i l e d , t h e Government
representatives "blinked."
We are about t o announce new h u m a n i t a r i a n a s s i s t a n c e
($15 m i l l i o n ) f o r Burundi and Rwanda.
funds
We have c o n t a c t e d DOD t o see i f any o f t h e U.S. m i l i t a r y
t r a i n e r s who worked w i t h Rwandan government f o r c e s i n t h e past
b e l i e v e t h e y have c o n t a c t s w i t h i n Rwanda t h a t may be o f use.
These e f f o r t s , o f course, are n o t enough. I hope t o s i t down today
w i t h Ambassador Rawson t o discuss o t h e r p o s s i b l e a c t i o n s ,
e s p e c i a l l y i n terms o f g r e a t e r involvement f o r o t h e r A f r i c a n
l e a d e r s i n t h e process.
We w i l l a l s o d i s c u s s what we might do i n
Burundi t o keep i t from going t h e same r o u t e , e s p e c i a l l y i n l i g h t
of t h i s morning's f a i l e d coup. State i s h o l d i n g a working group on
Rwanda/Burundi tomorrow a f t e r n o o n . I ' l l keep you posted.
•
M S N LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY -I
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
26-Apr-1994 18:10 EDT
•DCRCT
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
Richard A. Clarke
(CLARKER)
SUBJECT:
RWANDA AND THE UN
We f l o a t e d t h e f o l l o w i n g idea w i t h S t r o b , Peter T a r n o f f ,
. Madeleine A l b r i g h t and some S t a t e bureaus (AF, 10) :
- - t h e P r e s i d e n t announces a $15m ERMA drawdown
— w e have t h e UNSC c a l l upon t h e UNSYG t o d i r e c t UNHCR
t o arrange cross border a s s i s t a n c e t o t h e 500,000 i n c o u n t r y
r e f u g e s s c o n c e n t r a t e d along t h e borders w i t h Tanzania,
Uganda, Burundi, and Z a i r e
- - t h e UNSC c a l l s upon those border c o u n t r i e s t o take
steps i m m e d i a t e l y t o engage i n cross border
feeding/assistance
--we a u t h o r i z e UNAMIR t o s t a t i o n UN C i v P o l ( p o l i c e )
i n t h e UNHCR camps t o p r o v i d e s e c u r i t y .
So f a r everyone l i k e s t h e idea. USUN i s e x p l o r i n g how t o p u t
i t into a draft.
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Donald K. S t e i n b e r g
MacArthur DeShazer
Mary C. Emery
Wilma G. H a l l
K r i s t e n K. C i c i o
K a t h e r i n e M. V e i t
W i l l i a m H. I t o h
K r i s t i e A. Kenney
M. Brooke Darby
Cathy M i l l i s o n
James W Reed
.
Neal S. Wolin
Richard A. C l a r k e
Richard L. Canas
Wanda D. Lindsey
Rand R. Beers
E r i c P. Schwartz
Ernest J. Wilson I I I
Susan E. Rice
Marcia G. Norman
0. Ruth S t a l c u p
( STEINBERG
{ DESHAZER )
( EMERY )
( HALL )
( CICIO )
( VEIT )
( ITOH )
( KENNEY )
( DARBY )
( MILLISON )
( REED )
( WOLIN )
( CLARKER )
( CANAS )
( LINDSEY )
( BEERS )
( SCHWARTZ )
( WILSON )
( RICE )
( NORMAN )
( STALCUP ..).._
INTON LIBRARY PHOTOCORY :
•(3NJ^B.R^RY PHOTOCORY.
. _
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
27-Apr-1994 14:19 EDT
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
R i c h a r d A. Clarke
(CLARKER)
SUBJECT:
FOR BERGER: ADD RWANDA TO SOMALIA DC?
Sandy,
There i s h i g h l e v e l i n t e r e s t i n S t a t e and here on Rwanda.
I recommend t h a t you add a 15 minute s e c t i o n t o t h e Somalia
DC on F r i d a y t o here from S t a t e , AID, and USUN on what we are
doing on Rwanda.
Dick
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W i l l i a m H. I t o h
K r i s t i e A. Kenney
M. Brooke Darby
Cathy M i l l i s o n
James W Reed
.
Neal S. Wolin
Richard A. C l a r k e
Richard L. Canas
Wanda D. Lindsey
Rand R. Beers
E r i c P. Schwartz
Ernest J. Wilson I I I
Susan E. Rice
Marcia G. Norman
0. Ruth S t a l c u p
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STEINBERG [
EMERY )
HALL )
CICIO )
VEIT )
ITOH )
KENNEY )
DARBY )
MILLISON )
REED )
WOLIN )
CLARKER )
CANAS )
LINDSEY )
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
28-Apr-1994 17:52 EDT
— OECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
R i c h a r d A. Clarke
(CLARKER)
SUBJECT:
***FOR CLEARANCE: RWANDA DC PAPER
Deputies Committee D i s c u s s i o n Paper
RWANDA
Background
The UN r e p o r t s t h a t i n excess o f 100,000 Rwandans have been
killed.
F i g h t i n g between the government and r e b e l f o r c e s
c o n t i n u e s . M i l i t i a l e d massacres are a l s o c o n t i n u i n g , urged on
by r a d i o s t a t i o n s c a l l i n g f o r more k i l l i n g .
UNAMIR has drawndown t o 270 t r o o p s and i s a t t e m p t i n g t o
arrange f o r the s a f e t y of Rwandans under i t s p r o t e c t i o n a t the
K i g a l i Amahoro stadium.
About 500,000 i n - c o u n t r y refugees have f l e d t o the border
areas w i t h Tanzania, Uganda, and Z a i r e . They are b e i n g prevented
from c r o s s i n g the borders and are i n need of h u m a n i t a r i a n
assistance.
The White House issued a statement l a s t F r i d a y , m e n t i o n i n g
s p e c i f i c m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s who human r i g h t s groups b e l i e v e have
been i m p l i c a t e d i n the s l a u g h t e r s ( t a b 1 ) .
Objectives
The
IWG has i d e n t i f i e d s i x s h o r t - t e r m p o l i c y
objectives:
1.
t o stop the on-going massacres as q u i c k l y as p o s s i b l e
through c o n t a c t s w i t h GOR and RPF l e a d e r s and demarches f o r
s i m i l a r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s w i t h n e i g h b o r i n g s t a t e s , France, Belgium,
and o t h e r s .
2. t o support the UN and o t h e r s i n a t t e m p t s t o achieve a
ceasefire.
3. t o encourage Tanzanian and o t h e r a t t e m p t s t o resume
n e g o t i a t i o n s under the Arusha Framework.
4.
t o seek t o prevent the v i o l e n c e from spreading o u t s i d e
Rwanda t h r o u g h c o n t a c t s w^Ltl^ n e i g h b p r v i a g l s l t a t ^ . . .
_ mmmmsmH'
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5. t o push i n t h e UN t o launch an immediate expanded
humanitarian assistance e f f o r t .
6. t o p r e v e n t a s i m i l a r round o f s l a u g h t e r and d i s o r d e r i n
Burundi by c l o s e l y m o n i t o r i n g t h e s i t u a t i o n t h e r e and s t a y i n g i n
touch w i t h t h e v a r i o u s elements i n t h e c o u n t r y t o dissuade.
•
- 2-
Issues f o r D i s c u s s i o n
The Deputies should p r o v i d e d i r e c t i o n t o t h e IWG on t h e
degree o f a c t i v i s m t h a t they wish t o encourage on f u r t h e r
i n t e r n a t i o n a l steps aimed a t addressing t h e s l a u g h t e r and
a s s i s t i n g refugees.
A new UNSC r e s o l u t i o n i s being c o - d r a f t e d by the Czechs and
A r g e n t i n e s . Among t h e p o s s i b l e elements i n t h e r e s o l u t i o n c o u l d
be a genocide i n v e s t i g a t i o n , a c a l l f o r UNHCR and border
c o u n t r i e s t o engage i n cross border a s s i s t a n c e t o t h e t r a p p e d i n
c o u n t r y refugees, l i m i t e d p r o t e c t i o n f o r t h e refugees, and an
arms embargo. I n t h e new UNSCR debate, s h o u l d the US s u p p o r t :
1. Genocide i n v e s t i g a t i o n : language t h a t c a l l s f o r an
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f human r i g h t s abuses and p o s s i b l e
v i o l a t i o n s o f t h e genocide convention?
2. I n Country P r o t e c t i o n o f Refugees: language t h a t
a u t h o r i z e s t h e use o f UNAMIR m i l i t a r y o r c i v i l i a n p o l i c e t o
p r o t e c t i n - c o u n t r y refugee camps r e c i e v i n g UNHCR o r ICRC r e l i e f ?
3. Arms embargo: language banning arms e x p o r t s t o Rwanda and
would, i n t e r a l i a , s a n c t i o n the on going Ugandan a i d t o t h e
rebels?
I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e UNSCR, are t h e r e a d d i t i o n a l a c t i o n s t h a t
should be e x p l o r e d aimed a t s t o p p i n g t h e k i l l i n g , o r p u n i s h i n g
those who may have planned i t , o r a t l e a s t be seen t o be
p r e s s u r i n g t h e Rwandan government t o have i t punish them.
4. Counter-propaganda: should the US engage i n a d d i t i o n a l
propaganda a c t i v i t i e s t o g e t a message i n t o Rwanda t o counter t h e
radio s t a t i o n s that are urging k i l l i n g ?
�F:\Email\Data_Source\A 1 \Record\CDOO 1 \apr94\03 8113 .html
5.
Pressure t o Punish Organizers o f K i l l i n g : should the US
work w i t h o t h e r n a t i o n s t o e x p l o r e d i r e c t e d s a n c t i o n s (no
admission on t r a v e l s t a t u s , assets s e i z u r e s , e t c . ) aimed a t those
who may have engineered t h e s l a u g h t e r ? and/or d i p l o m a t i c
s a n c t i o n s (down g r a d i n g r e l a t i o n s , t e r m i n a t i o n o f non-emergency
a s s i s t a n c e ) a g a i n s t Rwanda u n t i l those r e s p o n s i b l e are t r i e d ?
-GECRDf"
•
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
29-Apr-1994 16:36 EDT
DDCRfif
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
Richard A. Clarke
(CLARKER)
SUBJECT:
FOR SANDY'S APPROVAL: DRAFT DC SUMMARY
format:
DC Summary
S u b j e c t : Somalia and Rwanda
The
Deputies Committee decided
that:
1. C o n s i d e r a t i o n o f T e r m i n a t i n g UNOSOM: The US should n o t
be seen as t a k i n g t h e l e a d t o t h r e a t e n t e r m i n a t i o n o f UNOSOM, b u t
should make c l e a r t o the Somalis t h a t donor and t r o o p
c o n t r i b u t o r s may w e l l decide t o t e r m i n a t e o p e r a t i o n s soon because
of t h e c o n t i n u e d v i o l e n c e and f a i l u r e t o achieve a p o l i t i c a l
solution.
Donors/Troop C o n t r i b u t o r s : S t a t e , AID, and DOD should
c o n s u l t w i t h t h e donors and major t r o o p c o n t r i b u t o r s about t h e i r
views on c o n t i n u i n g the o p e r a t i o n . We should urge them t o make
the r i s k o f t e r m i n a t i o n c l e a r t o the Somalis.
S p e c i a l Envoy: S t a t e should c o n s u l t w i t h t h e UN
( s p e c i f i c a l l y the a c t i n g SRSG) and r e g i o n a l s t a t e s ( E t h i o p i a ,
E r i t r e a , Uganda) t o determine whether and when a t r i p t o t h e
r e g i o n by a s p e c i a l US envoy would be h e l p f u l i n r e d u c i n g
f a c t i o n a l f i g h t i n g and promoting a p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t . I f
t h e r e i s a consensus t h a t such a t r i p should occur, then Amb.
Oakley o r some o t h e r envoy should head a team t o the r e g i o n .
Mandate Review Guidance: When t h e UNSC c o n s i d e r s t h e
UNOSOM mandate e x t e n s i o n , USUN w i l l support a 30 o r 45 day
e x t e n s i o n o n l y . I t w i l l support C o u n c i l a c t i o n t o i n s u r e t h a t
t h e r e i s a review toward the end o f t h a t p e r i o d o f t h e
p o s s i b i l i t y o f t e r m i n a t i n g o r s i g n i f i c a n t l y r e d u c i n g the mandate
and UN presence, unless f a c t i o n a l f i g h t i n g has stopped and t h e r e
has been s i g n i f i c a n t progress toward a p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t .
2. P r o t e c t i o n o f USLO: The c u r r e n t US Marine F l e e t Area
S e c u r i t y Team (FAST) i s scheduled t o d e p a r t Mogadishu on June 30.
Senior S t a t e and Defense o f f i c i a l s should c o n s u l t immediately
about S t a t e ' s plans f o r s e c u r i t y o f USLO a f t e r t h a t date. I f t h e
departments have not reached consensus, t h e i s s u e w i l l be decided
at h i g h e r l e v e l s no l 3 t e r ^ t h a n _ 15 . May . j . : ; . ^ . ^ : ^ " ^ •
[:
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3. Contingency Evacuation o f UNOSOM: JCS and CINCENT s h o u l d
e v a l u a t e the UN p l a n f o r p e r m i s s i v e and emergency e v a c u a t i o n .
They s h o u l d determine t o what degree the UN i s p l a n n i n g t o r e l y
upon t h e US, what US c a p a b i l i t i e s would be r e q u i r e d , and what
would be necessary t o have those c a p a b i l i t i e s a v a i l a b l e i n a
t i m e l y manner. The Deputies decided t o d e f e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f
the p r o p o s a l t o c o n s u l t w i t h Congress on t h i s c o n t i n g e n c y pending
review o f t h e JCS e v a l u a t i o n .
•
4. UNOSOM Personnel:
Agencies w i l l r e p o r t immediately on
candidates t o f i l l p o s i t i o n s on the UNOSOM s t a f f : Development
O f f i c e (AID), J u d i c i a l s e c t i o n (State/INM and J u s t i c e ) , p o l i t i c a l
o f f i c e ( S t a t e ) , and Demining/Disarmament/and D e m o b i l i z a t i o n (OSD
and ACDA).
RWANDA
S t a t e w i l l prepare a d r a f t a c t i o n p l a n f o r review Monday 3
May. I t w i l l be a v i g o r o u s program and i n c l u d e approaches t o the
UNSYG, the OAU l e a d e r s h i p , concerned European s t a t e s , and
r e g i o n a l l e a d e r s . Among the ideas t h a t we w i l l s o l i c i t r e a c t i o n
to w i l l be an OAU a u t h o r i z e d peacekeeping f o r c e f o r Rwanda, a
p r e v e n t i v e d i p l o m a c y / d e t e r r e n t f o r c e i n Burundi, an arms embargo,
a human r i g h t s / g e n o c i d e i n v e s t i g a t i o n , and a UN p r o t e c t i v e
o p e r a t i o n f o r Rwandan refugees.
The Deputies w i l l review t h e p l a n and t h e s t a t u s o f the
issue a t a t e l c o n f e r e n c e e a r l y i n the week.
USUN w i l l support S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l a c t i o n t o endorse an arms
embargo, a genocide i n v e s t i g a t i o n , and a s s i s t a n c e ( i n c l u d i n g
UNHCR) f o r the refugees.
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M. Brooke Darby
Cathy M i l l i s o n
James W Reed
.
Neal S. Wolin
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Richard L. Canas
Wanda D. Lindsey /
( STEINBERG )
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BEERS )
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•
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Ol-May-1994 18:31 EDT
GOUriDDtmAL—
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
Donald K. S t e i n b e r g
(STEINBERG)
SUBJECT:
A d d i t i o n a l A c t i o n s on Rwanda
Tony/Sandy:
J- hope we can meet w i t h Dick e a r l y on Monday t o review where we
are and where we're going w i t h respect t o Rwanda. I n p a r t i c u l a r ,
we need t o review our p o t e n t i a l support f o r OAU and r e g i o n a l
e f f o r t s if/when they act t o p r o t e c t refugees on b o t h sides o f t h e
border o r take more aggressive a c t i o n t o end t h e massacre. I n
a d d i t i o n t o t h e new i n s t r u c t i o n s (State 114636) t o t h e USUN on
a c t i o n s t o pursue w i t h respect t o a r e s o l u t i o n on Rwanda (based
on Dick's s u g g e s t i o n s ) , t h e f o l l o w i n g a c t i o n s are being t a k e n :
The P r e s i d e n t ' s message yesterday i s being pumped i n t o
Rwanda through VOA, BBC, Radio France and Radio Beige.
We've a l r e a d y r e c e i v e d i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t i t i s being heard,
i f n o t heeded, by t h e government and RPF l e a d e r s h i p . I t
a l s o r e c e i v e d very heavy press p l a y i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s .
We are c o n t i n u i n g t o work w i t h t h e r e g i o n a l l e a d e r s ,
e s p e c i a l l y P r e s i d e n t s Mwinyi o f Tanzania and Museveni o f
Uganda, t o shore up t h e i r e f f o r t s a t r e s o l v i n g t h e c r i s i s .
New t a l k s are scheduled f o r Tuesday i n Arusha, a l t h o u g h i t
i s u n c e r t a i n whether t h e RPF ( t h i s time) w i l l show up. Our
Ambassador t o Tanzania, Peter De Vos, w i l l a t t e n d and h e l p
f a c i l i t a t e the discussions.
AS John Shattuck and Ambassador Rawson w i l l leave tomorrow
(Monday) n i g h t t o t r a v e l t o the r e g i o n , i n c l u d i n g Uganda,
Burundi and Tanzania t o shore up t h e r e g i o n a l l e a d e r s '
e f f o r t s t o achieve peace and p r o t e c t refugees i n Rwanda.
The UN Commission f o r Human Rights i s sending a team t o t h e
r e g i o n t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e c u r r e n t abuses.
Senior USG o f f i c i a l s have been c o n t a c t i n g Government and RPF
l e a d e r s on a d a i l y b a s i s t o urge a c e a s e f i r e and renewal o f
negotiations.
For example, DAS Bushnell t a l k e d w i t h General
Bizimungo (RGF) and General Kagame (RPF) today t o r e l a t e t h e
P r e s i d e n t ' s message from yesterday. She a l s o t o l d t h e RPF
t h a t t h e r e are r e p o r t s t h e RPF i s impeding t h e f l o w o f
refugees t o Tanzania, which he s t r o n g l y denied.
S t a t e i s assembling a r e v i s e d package o f $15 m i l l i o n i n
emergency r e l i e f a s s i s t a n c e f o r t h e r e g i o n . A team o f
refugee o f f i c i a l s from our Embassy i n Tanzania i s going t o
the border w i t h Rwanda t o assess t h e c u r r e n t s i t u a t i o n and
make recommendations f o r new a s s i s t a n c e .
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�SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
May 2, 1994
MEMORANDUM FOR PEACEKEEPING CORE GROUP MEMBERS
FROM:
RICHARD A. CLARKE
SUBJECT:
Summary and Conclusions o f 2 May 94
Meeting
GEORGIA
1.
S t a t e (NIS) w i l l engage i n a v a r i e t y o f d i p l o m a t i c
c o n t a c t s w i t h t h e Russians and Georgians t h i s week t o probe
f u r t h e r t h e reasons f o r t h e May 10th " d e a d l i n e " f o r a d e c i s i o n on
peacekeeping.
EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d
3. S t a t e (10) w i l l prepare an a n a l y s i s o f t h e v a r y i n g
l e v e l s o f UNSC a c t i o n t h a t might be taken w i t h regard t o a CIS
peacekeeping f o r c e (e.g. acknowledgement, endorsement) and what
" p r i c e " o r c o n d i t i o n s might be sought o f t h e CIS i n r e t u r n (e.g.
r e p o r t i n g , m o n i t o r i n g , mandate). The paper should be a v a i l a b l e
t o members o f t h e Core Group by 6 May.
RWANDA
1.
USUN w i l l c i r c u l a t e t o o t h e r concerned d e l e g a t i o n s t h e
elements o f a new r e s o l u t i o n based on t h e guidance t h a t was
agreed on by t h e i n t e r a g e n c y community on A p r i l 30, w i t h a view
t o a p p r o v a l o f such a r e s o l u t i o n l a t e r t h i s week.
2. S t a t e w i l l examine what f u n d i n g a u t h o r i t i e s are
a v a i l a b l e f o r US s u p p o r t t o h u m a n i t a r i a n and peacekeeping
o p e r a t i o n s ( V o l u n t a r y PKO account; FAA s e c t i o n s 506A, 522; ERMA)
NSC w i l l seek a White House announcement o f $15 m i l l i o n i n
emergency refugee a s s i s t a n c e .
EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d
4. S t a t e (AF) w i l l host a d a i l y (M-F) video conference on
Rwanda a t noon, u n t i l f u r t h e r n o t i c e .
fffSsifyoCLWON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�2
SECRET
GENERAL
There was agreement t h a t USAID should be r o u t i n e l y i n v i t e d
t o a l l f u t u r e meetings o f t h e Core Group.
Additional Distribution:
State/NIS - Amb. C o l l i n s
State/AF - Asst Sec Moose
CECRET
CLINTON LI
CP
OY
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Page 1 of 4
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
03-May-1994 10:04 EDT
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
Susan E. Rice
(RICE)
SUBJECT:
K o f i Annan B r i e f i n g Memo
May 3, 1994
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
THROUGH:
RICHARD A. CLARKE
FROM:
SUSAN E. RICE
SUBJECT:
Your Meeting w i t h K o f i Annan, Tuesday, May 3,
1994, a t 12:15 pm.
K o f i Annan, UN Undersecretary General f o r Peacekeeping, i s i n
Washington f o r meetings w i t h Members of Congress, i n c l u d i n g a
hearing yesterday before the Senate A f r i c a Subcommittee on
peacekeeping i n A f r i c a . Annan i s l i k e l y t o wish t o cover a range
of issues w i t h you i n c l u d i n g : Bosnia, Rwanda, and p o s s i b l y
Somalia, the s t a t u s o f our PDD and peacekeeping funding.
Update on Peacekeeping Reform a t the UN
The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), which Annan
heads, has made s i g n i f i c a n t progress i n the past year i n
improving i t s c a p a c i t y t o manage peace o p e r a t i o n s . I n a d d i t i o n
t o a s u b s t a n t i a l r e o r g a n i z a t i o n and increase i n i t s s t a f f , DPKO
now has a 24-hour s i t u a t i o n room and a stand-by forces planning
team. The l a t t e r i s a the r e s u l t o f a year-long p r o j e c t t o
s o l i c i t v o l u n t a r y , but non-binding commitments o f troops,
equipment, and services from member s t a t e s . This e f f o r t has
y i e l d e d pledges o f over 50,000 troops, which should improve the
UN's force planning and r a p i d deployment c a p a b i l i t i e s measurably.
Consistent w i t h the PDD, the U.S. has not made any such pledges,
but once the PDD i s signed we w i l l o f f e r the UN i n f o r m a t i o n on
p o t e n t i a l l y a v a i l a b l e U.S. forces or c a p a b i l i t i e s . We w i l l , o f
course, make no commitments t o provide such forces when they are
requested.
Suggested T a l k i n g Points
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PH0T0C(&P¥
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Page 2 of 4
Bosnia
I appreciate the Secretary-General's expressed concern about
c r i t i c i s m of U.S. p o l i c y by UNPROFOR o f f i c i a l s . These statements
have not been h e l p f u l t o our shared goal o f improved c o o r d i n a t i o n
between the UN and NATO.
•
-- This p u b l i c s n i p i n g has t o stop. What can we do, i n your
view t o improve UN-NATO r e l a t i o n s both on the ground and i n the
press?
We are very concerned t h a t the Serbs continue t o v i o l a t e the
Gorazde and Sarajevo e x c l u s i o n zones,
EO 13526 1.4d
EO 13526 1.4d
Rwanda
We are very concerned about the grave s i t u a t i o n i n Rwanda.
We are hopeful t h a t A f r i c a n nations w i l l respond f a v o r a b l y t o the
SYG's request f o r t r o o p s . What i s your expectation? What r o l e
do you t h i n k peacekeepers could u s e f u l l y play? How many do you
expect are needed?
I f adequate troops are a v a i l a b l e , we w i l l do what we can t o
make v o l u n t a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o deploy and s u s t a i n them. We do
not t h i n k i t would be wise, however, t o fund a non-UN mission
through UN assessments. This would set a bad precedent.
-- We are also planning t o make a v a i l a b l e $15 m i l l i o n t o support
the refugee and emergency r e l i e f e f f o r t and have dispatched
Ambassador Rawson and John Shattuck t o the region t o t r y t o
r e i n v i g o r a t e the peace process.
Somalia
-- We have threatened t o d i s c o n t i n u e support f o r UNOSOM I I i f
the p a r t i e s f a i l t o make s u b s t a n t i a l p o l i t i c a l progress. We are
c o n s i d e r i n g how t o respond i f t h i s t h r e a t does not b r i n g r e s u l t s .
Do you t h i n k , i f the UNSC threatens t o withdraw the f o r c e and
donors t h r e a t e n t o c u t assistance, t h i s w i l l y i e l d any u s e f u l
r e s u l t ? Do you t h i n k there i s any c o l l e c t i v e w i l l t o c a r r y out
such a t h r e a t ?
How c o n f i d e n t are you t h a t the major troops c o n t r i b u t o r s w i l l
stay beyond May/June? I f they are not l i k e l y t o stay, wouldn't
i t be p r e f e r a b l e f o r the UN t o be seen t o withdraw because the
p a r t i e s have f a i l e d t o cooperate r a t h e r than because the UN
mission crumbled?
Haiti
Do you have any sense of what r o l e a r e c o n f i g u r e d , more
robust UNMIH might play, i n the event t h a t sanctions s o f t e n the
m i l i t a r y regime? Do you t h i n k there would be any a p p e t i t e i n the
UN f o r a peace enforcement mission i n H a i t i ?
Georgia
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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Page 3 of 4
The Russians a r e p r e s s i n g f o r t h e immediate d i s p a t c h o f a UN
m i s s i o n t o Georgia. T h i s seems premature g i v e n t h e f a i l u r e o f
the p a r t i e s t o reach any form o f s e t t l e m e n t . Do you see any r o l e
f o r UN peacekeepers a t t h i s stage? What r o l e might t h e UN p l a y
i f t h e Russians decide t o go i n u n i l a t e r a l l y w i t h a CIS f o r c e ?
Peacekeeping
Funding
(FYI:
A NSC/State/OMB team t r a v e l l e d t o t h e UN l a s t week t o t r y
t o o b t a i n a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e UN's cash f l o w p i c t u r e
f o r p r e s e n t a t i o n t o Congress.
Yesterday, and OMB-NSC team met
w i t h House and Senate a p p r o p r i a t o r s . While t h e g e n e r a l mood was
more o r l e s s c o o p e r a t i v e and u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e s e v e r i t y o f t h e
problem, s t a f f expressed s e r i o u s doubt t h a t Congress w i l l be a b l e
t o a c t b e f o r e t h e August recess (when t h e cash f l o w c r i s i s i s
l i k e l y t o become severe) and concern t h a t t h e House Republicans
w i l l t r y t o e x t r a c t a d d i t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s o r h o l d up t h e
supplemental over UN r e f o r m .
Another t h i n g t h a t was c l e a r from these meetings i s t h e
importance o f s c h e d u l i n g a P r e s i d e n t i a l meeting w i t h t h e Defense
a u t h o r i z e r s / a p p r o p r i a t o r s i m m e d i a t e l y . Many a r e f e e l i n g l e f t o u t
and i n c r e a s i n g l y angry.)
Thank you f o r your h e l p i n p r o v i d i n g f i n a n c i a l i n f o r m a t i o n t o
our team t h a t v i s i t e d t h e UN l a s t week. We are w o r k i n g hard w i t h
Congress t o t r y t o f i n d a s o l u t i o n t o t h e f u n d i n g problem. The
P r e s i d e n t i s p e r s o n a l l y committed t o t h i s e f f o r t .
We are hoping t o be a b l e t o have some funds t o t h e UN i n
August, b u t t h i s w i l l be d i f f i c u l t g i v e n t h e c o m p l e x i t y o f t h e
a p p r o p r i a t i o n s process t h i s year.
—
One t h i n g i s c l e a r :
I t i s a b s o l u t e l y c r u c i a l t h a t we o b t a i n
an e f f e c t i v e i n s p e c t o r g e n e r a l . Otherwise, we w i l l never be a b l e
t o pay o f f our debts i n f u l l .
What do you t h i n k we can do t o
press our case more e f f e c t i v e l y b o t h w i t h t h e SYG and t h e
membership?
C o n t a i n i n g UN Peacekeeping
the
Costs
We a p p r e c i a t e t h e e f f o r t s t h e UN has made t o t r y t o reduce
c o s t s o f on-going peacekeeping o p e r a t i o n s .
-- We would l i k e t o work w i t h your s t a f f i n a low-key and q u i e t
ways t o t r y t o i d e n t i f y a d d i t i o n a l , r e a d i l y implementable c o s t savings measures.
We would l i k e t o send a s m a l l team t o New York t o work w i t h
DPKO i n t h e same cooperate s p i r i t t h a t our l o g i s t i c s teams d i d
last Fall.
How do you view t h i s p r o p o s a l ?
Concurrences by:
Jenonne Walker
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CC:
Samuel R. Berger
Mary C. Emery
Wilma G. H a l l
K r i s t e n K. C i c i o
K a t h e r i n e M. V e i t
W i l l i a m H. I t o h
K r i s t i e A. Kenney
M. Brooke Darby
Cathy M i l l i s o n
James W Reed
.
Neal S. Wolin
Ardenia R. Hawkins
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EMERY )
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ITOH )
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DARBY )
MILLISON )
REED )
WOLIN )
HAWKINS )
RECORDS )
A d d i t i o n a l Header I n f o r m a t i o n Follows
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D e l e t a b l e Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 038578
VMS Filename: OA$SHARE45:ZVEYEEEUK.WPL
A l Folder: MAY94
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�F:\Email\Data_Source\Al\Record\CD001\may94\038581.html
Page 1 of4
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
03-May-1994 10:08 EDT
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
Susan E. Rice
(RICE)
SUBJECT:
S l i g h t l y Revised K o f i Annan Memo
May 3, 1994
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
THROUGH:
RICHARD A. CLARKE
FROM:
SUSAN E. RICE
SUBJECT:
Your Meeting w i t h K o f i Annan, Tuesday, May 3,
1994, a t 12:15 pm.
K o f i Annan, UN Undersecretary General f o r Peacekeeping, i s i n
Washington f o r meetings w i t h Members o f Congress, i n c l u d i n g a
hearing yesterday before the Senate A f r i c a Subcommittee on
peacekeeping i n A f r i c a . Annan i s l i k e l y t o wish t o cover a range
of issues w i t h you i n c l u d i n g : Bosnia, Rwanda, and p o s s i b l y
Somalia, t h e status o f our PDD and peacekeeping funding.
Update on Peacekeeping Reform a t t h e UN
The UN Department o f Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) , which Annan
heads, has made s i g n i f i c a n t progress i n the past year i n
improving i t s capacity t o manage peace o p e r a t i o n s . I n a d d i t i o n
to a s u b s t a n t i a l r e o r g a n i z a t i o n and increase i n i t s s t a f f , DPKO
now has a 24-hour s i t u a t i o n room and a stand-by f o r c e s planning
team. The l a t t e r i s a the r e s u l t o f a year-long p r o j e c t t o
s o l i c i t v o l u n t a r y , but non-binding commitments o f troops,
equipment, and services from member s t a t e s . This e f f o r t has
y i e l d e d pledges o f over 50,000 troops, which should improve the
UN's f o r c e planning and r a p i d deployment c a p a b i l i t i e s measurably.
Consistent w i t h the PDD, the U.S. has not made any such pledges,
but once the PDD i s signed we w i l l o f f e r the UN i n f o r m a t i o n on
p o t e n t i a l l y a v a i l a b l e U.S. forces or c a p a b i l i t i e s . W w i l l , o f
e
course, make no commitments t o provide such forces when they are.
requested.
Suggested T a l k i n g Points
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. 0.13526
�F:\Email\Data_Source\Al\Record\CD001\may94\038581.html
Page 2 of 4
Bosnia
I a p p r e c i a t e the Secretary-General's expressed concern about
c r i t i c i s m o f U.S. p o l i c y by UNPROFOR o f f i c i a l s .
These statements
have not been h e l p f u l t o our shared goal o f improved c o o r d i n a t i o n
between the UN and NATO.
•
-- This p u b l i c s n i p i n g has t o stop. What can we do, i n your
view t o improve UN-NATO r e l a t i o n s both on t h e ground and i n the
press?
-- We are very concerned t h a t the Serbs continue t o v i o l a t e the
Gorazde and Sarajevo exclusion zones.
E,P..13526. 1.4(d)
Rwanda
W are very concerned about the grave s i t u a t i o n i n Rwanda.
e
W are hopeful t h a t A f r i c a n nations w i l l respond f a v o r a b l y t o the
e
SYG's request f o r troops. What i s your expectation? What r o l e
do you t h i n k peacekeepers could u s e f u l l y play? How many do you
expect are needed?
I f adequate troops are a v a i l a b l e , we w i l l do what we can t o
make v o l u n t a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o deploy and s u s t a i n them. We do
not t h i n k i t would be wise, however, t o fund a non-UN mission
through UN assessments. This would set a bad precedent.
W are also planning t o make a v a i l a b l e $15 m i l l i o n t o support
e
the refugee and emergency r e l i e f e f f o r t and have dispatched
Ambassador Rawson and John Shattuck t o the r e g i o n t o t r y t o
r e i n v i g o r a t e the peace process.
Somalia
We have threatened t o d i s c o n t i n u e support f o r UNOSOM I I i f
the p a r t i e s f a i l t o make s u b s t a n t i a l p o l i t i c a l progress. We are
c o n s i d e r i n g how t o respond i f t h i s t h r e a t does not b r i n g r e s u l t s .
Do you t h i n k , i f the UNSC threatens t o withdraw the f o r c e and
donors t h r e a t e n t o cut assistance, t h i s w i l l y i e l d any u s e f u l
r e s u l t ? Do you t h i n k there i s any c o l l e c t i v e w i l l t o c a r r y out
such a t h r e a t ?
How c o n f i d e n t are you t h a t the major troops c o n t r i b u t o r s w i l l
stay beyond May/June? I f they are not l i k e l y t o stay, wouldn't
i t be p r e f e r a b l e f o r the UN t o be seen t o withdraw because the
p a r t i e s have f a i l e d t o cooperate r a t h e r than because the UN
mission crumbled?
Haiti
Do you have any sense of what r o l e a r e c o n f i g u r e d , more
robust UNMIH might play, i n the event t h a t sanctions s o f t e n the •
m i l i t a r y regime? Do you t h i n k there would be any a p p e t i t e i n the
UN f o r a peace enforcement mission i n H a i t i ?
Georgia
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Page 3 of 4
The Russians are pressing f o r the immediate d i s p a t c h of a UN
mission t o Georgia. This seems premature g i v e n the f a i l u r e of
the p a r t i e s t o reach any form of s e t t l e m e n t . Do you see any r o l e
for UN peacekeepers at t h i s stage? What r o l e might the UN play
i f the Russians decide t o go i n u n i l a t e r a l l y w i t h a CIS force?
Peacekeeping
Funding
(FYI:
A NSC/State/OMB team t r a v e l l e d t o the UN l a s t week t o t r y
to o b t a i n a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n on the UN's cash flow p i c t u r e
for p r e s e n t a t i o n t o Congress.
Yesterday, and OMB-NSC team met
w i t h House and Senate a p p r o p r i a t o r s . While the general mood was
more o r less c o o p e r a t i v e and understanding o f the s e v e r i t y o f the
problem, s t a f f expressed serious doubt t h a t Congress w i l l be able
to a c t before the August recess (when the cash flow c r i s i s i s
l i k e l y t o become severe) and concern t h a t the House Republicans
w i l l t r y t o e x t r a c t a d d i t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s or hold up the
supplemental over UN reform.
Another t h i n g t h a t was clear from these meetings i s the
importance o f scheduling a P r e s i d e n t i a l meeting w i t h the Defense
a u t h o r i z e r s / a p p r o p r i a t o r s immediately. Many are f e e l i n g l e f t out
and i n c r e a s i n g l y angry.)
Thank you f o r your help i n p r o v i d i n g f i n a n c i a l i n f o r m a t i o n t o
our team t h a t v i s i t e d the UN l a s t week. We are working hard w i t h
Congress t o t r y t o f i n d a s o l u t i o n t o the funding problem. The
President i s p e r s o n a l l y committed t o t h i s e f f o r t .
We are hoping t o be able t o have some funds t o the UN i n
August, but t h i s w i l l be d i f f i c u l t given the complexity of the
a p p r o p r i a t i o n s process t h i s year.
-- One t h i n g i s c l e a r : I t i s a b s o l u t e l y c r u c i a l t h a t we o b t a i n
3n e f f e c t i v e i n s p e c t o r general. Otherwise, we w i l l never be able
to pay o f f our debts i n f u l l . What do you t h i n k we can do t o
press our case more e f f e c t i v e l y both w i t h the SYG and the
membe rship?
Containing UN Peacekeeping
-the
Costs
We appreciate the e f f o r t s the UN has made t o t r y t o reduce
costs o f on-going peacekeeping o p e r a t i o n s .
We would l i k e t o work w i t h your s t a f f i n a low-key and q u i e t
way t o t r y t o i d e n t i f y a d d i t i o n a l , r e a d i l y implementable costsavings measures.
We would l i k e t o send a small team t o New York t o work w i t h
DPKO i n the same cooperate s p i r i t t h a t our l o g i s t i c s team d i d
l a s t F a l l . How do you view t h i s proposal?
Concurrences by:
Distribution:
Jenonne Walker
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FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
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FOR:
CC:
Samuel R. Berger
M.ary C. Emery
Wilma G. H a l l
K r i s t e n K. C i c i o
Katherine M. V e i t
W i l l i a m H. I t o h
K r i s t i e A, Kenney
M. Brooke Darby
Cathy M i l l i s o n
James W Reed
.
Neal S. Wolin
Ardenia R. Hawkins
Records
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( BERGER )
( EMERY )
( HALL )
( CICIO )
( VEIT )
( ITOH )
( KENNEY )
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( RECORDS )
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
05-May-1994 13:28
EDT
SECRBTMEMORANDUM FOR:
Susan E. Rice
Randy R. Beers
Richard A. Clarke
FROM:
Sean J. Darragh
(DARRAGH)
SUBJECT:
( RICE )
( BEERS )
( CLARKER )
RWANDA WORKING GROUP
FALLOUT FROM RWANDA MEETING
RPF IS MAKING A FINAL PUSH TO TAKE KIGALI.
WILL LIKELY SUCCEED.
SHATTUCK MET WITH SALIM SALIM.
POSITION.
THEY
HE IS IN SYNC WITH OUR
GEN'L DALIR (sp?) IS ASKING FOR 16 THOUSAND TROOPS.
USUN HAS ASKED WHETHER WE ARE WILLING TO HELP OUTFIT SOME OF
THEM. OUTFITTING MEANS EVERYTHING FROM WEB GEAR TO APCS.
IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER THIS REQUEST IS FOR AN ACCESSED
OPERATION OR NOT. SUSAN ZELLE THINKS THE UN WILL PAY.
BELGIUM'S AMB. TOLD MOOSE THEY WANT US TO TAKE THE
LEAD. EVERYONE ACCEPT THE FRENCH SEEM TO AGREE THAT SOME
TYPE OF HUMANITARIAN OPERATION SHOULD BE ASSEMBLED SOON.
FRENCH WANT TWO SIDES TO AGREE TO AN OPERATION BEFORE THEY
JUMP ON BOARD FOR SUCH A VENTURE.
ALTHOUGH EVERYONE SEEMS TO BE SHYING AWAY FROM A
FORMAL PK OPERATION BECAUSE THE DISPUTANTS SEEM ADVERSE TO I T
AS YET, GEN'L DALIR'S PLAN SEEMS LIKE A PK OPERATION UNDER A
NON-PKO GUISE.
AMB ALBRIGHT WILL GET GUIDANCE TO FIND OUT MORE FROM
BBG BEFORE WE EXPOSE OUR POSITION. THE FACT THAT WE DON'T
HAVE ONE YET HAS A LOT TO DO WITH THAT. STATE IS CALLING FOR
A DEPUTIES COMMITTEE.
STATE IS DRAFTING A PAPER FOR A POTENTIAL DC IN CASE
IT IS NEEDED. EVERYONE AGREES DICK'S CORE GROUP TONIGHT
MIGHT MAKE A DC UNNECESSARYYY
THAT I S ALL
SEAN
PER E.O. 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
06-May-1994 17:27 EDT
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Donald K. Steinberg
Richard A. Clarke
Randy R. Beers
FROM:
Susan E. Rice
(RICE)
SUBJECT:
( STEINBERG
( CLARKER )
( BEERS )
VP t a l k e r s on Rwanda
T a l k i n g Points f o r Vice President's Meeting
w i t h Boutros-Ghali, Salim Salim e t . a l on Rwanda
We remain extremely concerned about the on-going tragedy i n
Rwanda. This i s a problem t h a t demands prompt i n t e r n a t i o n a l
action.
The United States wants t o play a c o n s t r u c t i v e r o l e i n
a l l e v i a t i n g t h e s u f f e r i n g i n Rwanda and s u p p o r t i n g e f f o r t s t o
achieve a l a s t i n g p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n .
—
There have been a number of proposed responses t o t h e tragedy
i n Rwanda. We would l i k e t o explore these ideas w i t h you
f u r t h e r , as w e l l as w i t h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f concerned A f r i c a n
s t a t e s and our colleagues i n the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l .
The U.S. has not c a t e g o r i c a l l y r u l e d i n or out any p a r t i c u l a r
response.
-- We do, however, have serious r e s e r v a t i o n s about proposals t o
e s t a b l i s h a l a r g e peace enforcement mission, which would operate
throughout Rwanda w i t h a mandate t o end t h e f i g h t i n g , r e s t o r e law
and order and p a c i f y t h e p o p u l a t i o n .
I n our view, t h e r e are several problems w i t h t h i s approach:
EO 13526 1.4d
This m i s s i o n would be p a r t i c u l a r l y complex, perhaps
even more so than Somalia.
I t remains very unclear whether t h e p a r t i e s t o the
c o n f l i c t would use f o r c e t o oppose such a mission.
Thus f a r , no country has committed t o send troops,
and i t appears u n l i k e l y t h a t there w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t
pledges t o mount t h e large force r e q u i r e d .
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L o g i s t i c a l l y , i t would be d i f f i c u l t t o stage a
s i z e a b l e f o r c e o u t o f K i g a l i , because a l l movement o f
t r o o p s and s u p p l i e s would have t o be done by a i r .
I t i s u n c l e a r p r e c i s e l y what t h e peace enforcement
m i s s i o n would be o r when i t would end.
F i n a l l y , t h e chances o f success appear s l i m ,
p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h o u t the p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f a major
m i l i t a r y power.
There may, however, be a more l i m i t e d b u t v i t a l l y i m p o r t a n t
h u m a n i t a r i a n m i s s i o n t h a t t h e UN and/or OAU c o u l d p e r f o r m .
—
We would be i n t e r e s t e d i n e x p l o r i n g t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f an
i n t e r n a t i o n a l f o r c e t o p r o t e c t those refugees and d i s p l a c e d
persons t h a t a r e i n t h e most immediate d a n g e r — t h a t i s those i n
t h e s o u t h e r n p o r t i o n o f Rwanda.
Such a f o r c e c o u l d n o t o n l y p r o v i d e p r o t e c t i o n ,
a s s i s t i n refugee r e p a t r i a t i o n and i n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n
of h u m a n i t a r i a n a s s i s t a n c e b u t a l s o serve i n a
p r e v e n t i v e c a p a c i t y t o d e t e r t h e spread o f v i o l e n c e t o
Burundi.
•
This m i s s i o n would r e q u i r e fewer t r o o p s and be l e s s
complex l o g i s t i c a l l y .
I t would a l s o r e q u i r e t h e a c t i v e support o f t h e
Burundi government and, p r e f e r a b l y , t h e assent o f t h e
Rwandan p a r t i e s .
I f t h e t r o o p s were a v a i l a b l e f o r such a m i s s i o n , t h e U.S.
would endeavor t o h e l p by p r o v i d i n g f i n a n c i a l resources,
equipment and l i f t as w e l l as h u m a n i t a r i a n a s s i s t a n c e .
I f t h e m i s s i o n were mounted i n d e p e n d e n t l y by t h e OAU o r by a
c o l l e c t i o n o f concerned s t a t e s w i t h the b l e s s i n g o f t h e UN
S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , t h e U.S. would o f f e r some a s s i s t a n c e on a
voluntary basis.
I f t h e m i s s i o n were funded t h r o u g h UN assessments, t h e U.S.
would pay more than 30% o f t h e c o s t and seek t h e normal
reimbursement f o r any a d d i t i o n a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f equipment o r
services.
I hope t h a t we can work t o g e t h e r t o t r y t o c r a f t a v i a b l e
d i p l o m a t i c s o l u t i o n t o t h i s t r a g e d y and p r o v i d e r e l i e f t o t h e
hundreds o f thousands who are s u f f e r i n g as r e s u l t o f t h i s t r a g i c
conflict.
( RECORDS )
CC: Records
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
06-May-1994 21:49 EDT
CONriDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Donald K. Steinberg
Richard A. Clarke
Randy R. Beers
( STEINBERG )
( CLARKER )
( BEERS )
FROM:
Susan E. Rice
(RICE)
SUBJECT:
Revised TPs f o r VP's Meeting on Rwanda
Suggested T a l k i n g Points f o r Vice President's Meeting
w i t h Boutros-Ghali, Salim Salim e t . a l . on Rwanda
—
We remain extremely concerned about t h e on-going tragedy i n
Rwanda. This i s a problem t h a t demands prompt i n t e r n a t i o n a l
action.
—
The United States wants t o play a c o n s t r u c t i v e r o l e i n
a l l e v i a t i n g the s u f f e r i n g i n Rwanda and supporting e f f o r t s t o
achieve a l a s t i n g p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n .
There have been a number of proposed responses t o t h i s
tragedy. We would l i k e t o explore these ideas w i t h you f u r t h e r ,
as w e l l as w i t h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of concerned A f r i c a n s t a t e s and
our colleagues i n the S e c u r i t y Council.
We have already taken some important steps. We w i l l continue
t o support the d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t s now underway by the UN and
r e g i o n a l leaders t o reach a c e a s e f i r e and r e t u r n t o the Arusha
peace process. We want t o consider how t o support the UN e f f o r t
t o work w i t h the OAU t o ensure the s a f e t y of refugees on both
sides o f the border.
We are committed t o provide humanitarian r e l i e f , t o implement
the arms embargo and t o have the UN Human Rights Commission f u l l y
i n v e s t i g a t e the s i t u a t i o n i n Rwanda.
In a d d i t i o n , t h e r e may be another v i t a l l y important
humanitarian mission t h a t the UN and/or OAU could perform.
We would be i n t e r e s t e d i n e x p l o r i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y of
c r e a t i n g a p r o t e c t i v e zone w i t h an i n t e r n a t i o n a l f o r c e t o provide
s e c u r i t y t o populations i n the southern p o r t i o n of Rwanda, where
refugees and d i s p l a c e d persons are i n the most immediate danger.
Such a f o r c e could not only provide s e c u r i t y f o r the
p r o t e c t i v e zone and the d i s t r i b u t i o n of humanitarian
assistance but also a s s i s t i n refugee r e p a t r i a t i o n and
serve i n a p r e v e n t i v e c a p a c i t y t o deter the spread of
v i o l e n c e t o Burundi. The o p e r a t i o n would r e q u i r e
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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robust r u l e s of engagement.
This mission may r e q u i r e fewer troops and be less
complex l o g i s t i c a l l y than some other proposals now
being discussed.
I t would, however, need the a c t i v e support of the
Burundi government and, p r e f e r a b l y , the assent of the
Rwandan p a r t i e s .
I f capable troops were a v a i l a b l e and the mission considered
v i a b l e , the U.S. would endeavor t o help by p r o v i d i n g f i n a n c i a l
resources, equipment and l i f t as w e l l as humanitarian assistance.
We would expect t o be j o i n e d i n t h i s e f f o r t by other
concerned n a t i o n s .
•
I f the mission were mounted independently by the OAU or by a
c o l l e c t i o n of concerned s t a t e s w i t h the b l e s s i n g of the UN
S e c u r i t y Council, the U.S. would o f f e r some assistance on a
voluntary basis.
I f the mission were funded through UN assessments, the U.S.
would pay more than 30% of the cost and seek the normal
reimbursement f o r any a d d i t i o n a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s of equipment or
services.
At the same time, we
proposals t o e s t a b l i s h a
would operate throughout
f i g h t i n g , r e s t o r e law and
have serious r e s e r v a t i o n s about
l a r g e peace enforcement mission, which
Rwanda w i t h a mandate t o end the
order and p a c i f y the p o p u l a t i o n .
While we have not d e f i n i t i v e l y r u l e d i n or out any p a r t i c u l a r
response, i n our view, there are several problems w i t h t h i s
approach:
EO 13526 1.4d
This mission would be p a r t i c u l a r l y complex, perhaps
even more so than Somalia.
I t remains very unclear whether the p a r t i e s t o the
c o n f l i c t would use f o r c e t o oppose such a mission.
Thus f a r , no country has committed t o send troops,
and i t appears u n l i k e l y t h a t there w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t
pledges t o mount the l a r g e f o r c e r e q u i r e d .
L o g i s t i c a l l y , i t would be d i f f i c u l t t o stage a
s i z e a b l e force out of K i g a l i , because a l l movement of
troops and supplies would have t o be done by a i r .
I t i s unclear p r e c i s e l y what the peace enforcement
mission would be or when i t would end.
F i n a l l y , the chances of success appear s l i m ,
p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h o u t the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of a major
m i l i t a r y power.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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Again, l e t me say t h a t we hope we can work t o g e t h e r t o t r y t o
c r a f t a v i a b l e d i p l o m a t i c s o l u t i o n and p r o v i d e r e l i e f t o t h e
hundreds o f thousands who are s u f f e r i n g as r e s u l t o f t h i s t r a g i c
conflict.
RECORDS )
CC: Records
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
06-May-1994 21:58 EDT
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
Susan E. Rice
(RICE)
SUBJECT:
Suggested T a l k i n g Points f o r VP's Meeting on Rwanda
Sandy,
Attached are suggested t a l k i n g p o i n t s f o r the Vice
President's meeting w i t h Boutros-Ghali e t a l . on Rwanda.
They have been i n f o r m a l l y c l e a r e d by JCS, State and OSD. Don
Steinberg concurs as w e l l .
Once you and your c o u n t e r p a r t s have cleared/commented, I w i l l
forward f o r m a l l y t o the Vice President's o f f i c e .
I w i l l also provide the Vice President's o f f i c e w i t h a c h a r t
being prepared by State t h a t summarizes the FY 94 resources
t h a t may s t i l l be a v a i l a b l e t o support v o l u n t a r y
c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o a p o t e n t i a l Rwanda mission.
Distribution:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
CC:
CC:
CC:
CC:
Samuel R. Berger
W Anthony K. Lake
.
Mary C. Emery
Wilma G. H a l l
K r i s t e n K. C i c i o
Katherine M. V e i t
W i l l i a m H. I t o h
K r i s t i e A. Kenney
M. Brooke Darby
Cathy M i l l i s o n
James W Reed
.
Neal S. Wolin
Ardenia R. Hawkins
Records
Records
James A. Carman
Donald K. Steinberg
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
BERGER )
LAKE )
EMERY )
HALL )
CICIO )
VEIT )
ITOH )
KENNEY )
DARBY )
MILLISON )
REED )
WOLIN )
HAWKINS )
RECORDS )
RECORDS )
CARMAN )
STEINBERG
A d d i t i o n a l Header I n f o r m a t i o n Follows
Date Created: 06-May-1994 21:49
Deletable Flag: Y
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O
HTC
.
J V
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
�F:\Email\Data_Source\A l\Record\CDOO 1 \may94\039284.htm]
Page 2 of4
DOCNUM: 03 9284
VMS Filename: OA$SHARE53:ZVFBVE8H0.WPL
Al Folder: MAY94
Message Format:
Message S t a t u s : READ
Date M o d i f i e d : 06-May-1994 21:58
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message P r i o r i t y : FIRST_CLASS
•
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
06-May-1994 21:49 EDT
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Donald K. Steinberg
Richard A. Clarke
Randy R. Beers
( STEINBERG )
( CLARKER )
( BEERS )
FROM:
Susan E. Rice
(RICE)
SUBJECT:
Revised TPs f o r VP's Meeting on Rwanda
CC: Records
( RECORDS )
Suggested T a l k i n g Points f o r Vice President's Meeting
w i t h Boutros-Ghali, Salim Salim e t . a l . on Rwanda
—
We remain extremely concerned about the on-going tragedy i n
Rwanda. This i s a problem t h a t demands prompt i n t e r n a t i o n a l
action.
—
The United States wants t o play a c o n s t r u c t i v e r o l e i n
a l l e v i a t i n g the s u f f e r i n g i n Rwanda and s u p p o r t i n g e f f o r t s t o
achieve a l a s t i n g p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n .
-- There have been a number of proposed responses t o t h i s
tragedy. We would l i k e t o explore these ideas w i t h you f u r t h e r ,
as w e l l as w i t h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of concerned A f r i c a n s t a t e s and
our colleagues i n the S e c u r i t y Council.
We have already taken some important steps. We w i l l continue
t o support the d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t s now underway by the UN and
r e g i o n a l leaders t o reach a c e a s e f i r e and r e t u r n t o the Arusha
peace process. We want t o consider how t o support the UN e f f o r t
t o work w i t h the OAU t o ensure the s a f e t y of refugees on both
sides of the border.
We are committed t o provide humanitarian r e l i e f , t o implement
the arms embargo and t o have the UN Human Rights Commission f u l l y
i n v e s t i g a t e the s i t u a t i o n i n Rwanda.
LINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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Page 3 of 4
I n a d d i t i o n , t h e r e may be another v i t a l l y important
humanitarian mission t h a t the UN and/or OAU could perform.
We would be i n t e r e s t e d i n e x p l o r i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y of
c r e a t i n g a p r o t e c t i v e zone w i t h an i n t e r n a t i o n a l f o r c e t o provide
s e c u r i t y t o p o p u l a t i o n s i n the southern p o r t i o n o f Rwanda, where
refugees and d i s p l a c e d persons are i n the most immediate danger.
Such a f o r c e could not only provide s e c u r i t y f o r the
p r o t e c t i v e zone and the d i s t r i b u t i o n of humanitarian
assistance b u t also a s s i s t i n refugee r e p a t r i a t i o n and
serve i n a p r e v e n t i v e c a p a c i t y t o deter t h e spread of
v i o l e n c e t o Burundi. The o p e r a t i o n would r e q u i r e
robust r u l e s of engagement.
This mission may r e q u i r e fewer troops and be less
complex l o g i s t i c a l l y than some other proposals now
being discussed.
I t would, however, need the a c t i v e support of t h e
Burundi government and, p r e f e r a b l y , the assent of the
Rwandan p a r t i e s .
I f capable troops were a v a i l a b l e and the mission considered
v i a b l e , t h e U.S. would endeavor t o help by p r o v i d i n g f i n a n c i a l
resources, equipment and l i f t as w e l l as humanitarian assistance.
We would expect t o be j o i n e d i n t h i s e f f o r t by other
concerned n a t i o n s .
I f the mission were mounted independently by the OAU or by a
c o l l e c t i o n of concerned s t a t e s w i t h the b l e s s i n g of t h e UN
S e c u r i t y Council, t h e U.S. would o f f e r some assistance on a
v o l u n t a r y basis.
I f the mission were funded through UN assessments, t h e U.S.
would pay more than 30% of the cost and seek the normal
reimbursement f o r any a d d i t i o n a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f equipment or
services.
At the same time, we have serious r e s e r v a t i o n s about
proposals t o e s t a b l i s h a l a r g e peace enforcement mission, which
would operate throughout Rwanda w i t h a mandate t o end t h e
f i g h t i n g , r e s t o r e law and order and p a c i f y the p o p u l a t i o n .
While we have not d e f i n i t i v e l y r u l e d i n or out any p a r t i c u l a r
response, i n our view, there are several problems w i t h t h i s
approach:
EO 13526 1.4d
This mission would be p a r t i c u l a r l y complex, perhaps
even more so than Somalia.
I t remains very unclear whether the p a r t i e s t o the
c o n f l i c t would use force t o oppose such a mission.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�F:\Email\Data_Source\Al\Record\CD001\may94\039284.html
Page 4 of 4
Thus f a r , no c o u n t r y has committed t o send t r o o p s ,
and i t appears u n l i k e l y t h a t t h e r e w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t
pledges t o mount t h e l a r g e f o r c e r e q u i r e d .
L o g i s t i c a l l y , i t would be d i f f i c u l t t o stage a
s i z e a b l e f o r c e o u t o f K i g a l i , because a l l movement o f
t r o o p s and s u p p l i e s would have t o be done by a i r .
I t i s u n c l e a r p r e c i s e l y what t h e peace enforcement
m i s s i o n would be o r when i t would end.
F i n a l l y , t h e chances o f success appear s l i m ,
p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h o u t t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f a major
m i l i t a r y power.
Again, l e t me say t h a t we hope we can work t o g e t h e r t o t r y t o
c r a f t a v i a b l e d i p l o m a t i c s o l u t i o n and p r o v i d e r e l i e f t o t h e
hundreds o f thousands who are s u f f e r i n g as r e s u l t o f t h i s t r a g i c
conf1ict.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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Page 1 of3
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
07-May-1994 11:46 EDT
CONFIDENTIAL
M M R N D M FOR: SEE BELOW
EOA-U
FROM:
Susan E. Rice
(RICE)
SUBJECT:
Updated T a l k i n g Points on Rwanda
Suggested T a l k i n g Points f o r Vice President's Meeting
w i t h Boutros-Ghali, Salim Salim e t . a l . on Rwanda
W remain extremely concerned about t h e on-going tragedy i n
e
Rwanda. This i s a problem t h a t demands prompt i n t e r n a t i o n a l
act i o n .
-- The United States wants t o play a c o n s t r u c t i v e r o l e i n
a l l e v i a t i n g the s u f f e r i n g i n Rwanda and s u p p o r t i n g e f f o r t s t o
achieve a l a s t i n g p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n .
There have been a number o f proposed responses t o t h i s
tragedy. We would l i k e t o explore these ideas w i t h you f u r t h e r ,
as w e l l as w i t h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of concerned A f r i c a n s t a t e s and
our colleagues i n the S e c u r i t y Council.
W have already taken some important steps. We w i l l continue
e
t o support the d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t s now underway by the UN and
r e g i o n a l leaders t o reach a c e a s e f i r e and r e t u r n t o the Arusha
peace process.
We want t o consider how t o support the UN e f f o r t
to work w i t h the OAU t o ensure the s a f e t y o f refugees on both
sides of t h e border.
W are committed t o provide humanitarian r e l i e f , t o implement
e
the arms embargo and t o have the UN Human Rights Commission f u l l y
i n v e s t i g a t e t h e s i t u a t i o n i n Rwanda.
In a d d i t i o n , there may be another v i t a l l y important
humanitarian mission t h a t the UN and/or OAU could perform.
We would be i n t e r e s t e d i n e x p l o r i n g t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of
c r e a t i n g a p r o t e c t i v e zone w i t h an i n t e r n a t i o n a l f o r c e t o provide
s e c u r i t y t o populations i n the southern p o r t i o n o f Rwanda, where
refugees and d i s p l a c e d persons are i n the most immediate danger.
Such a mission could not only provide s e c u r i t y f o r
the p r o t e c t i v e zone and the d i s t r i b u t i o n of
humanitarian assistance but also a s s i s t i n refugee
r e p a t r i a t i o n and serve i n a p r e v e n t i v e c a p a c i t y t o
deter the spread of violence t o Burundi. The o p e r a t i o n
would r e q u i r e robust r u l e s of engagement.
This mission may r e q u i r e fewer troops and be less
complex l o g i s t i c a l l y than some other proposals now
being discussed
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
�F:\Email\Data_Source\Al\Record\CD001\may94\039286.html
I t would, however, need the a c t i v e support of the
Burundi and/or Tanzanian government and the assent o f
the Rwandan p a r t i e s .
In c o n s i d e r i n g the a c t u a l humanitarian/peacekeeping
mission i n Rwanda, we must be mindful not t o upset the
d e l i c a t e p o l i t i c a l balance t h a t p r e s e n t l y e x i s t s i n
Burundi.
We must also work together t o d e f i n e c l e a r l y
achievable o b j e c t i v e s and an end-state such as
r e s e t t l e m e n t o f the displaced persons and refugees
and/or a sunset p r o v i s i o n r e q u i r i n g r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f
the o p e r a t i o n i n s i x months t o preclude the mission
becoming an open-ended one.
'-- I f capable troops were a v a i l a b l e and the mission considered
v i a b l e , the U.S. would endeavor t o help by p r o v i d i n g f i n a n c i a l
resources, equipment and l i f t as w e l l as humanitarian assistance,
upon agreement o f a c l e a r concept of operations.
We would expect t o be j o i n e d i n t h i s e f f o r t by other
concerned n a t i o n s .
I f the mission were mounted independently by the OAU or by a
c o l l e c t i o n of concerned states w i t h the b l e s s i n g of the UN
S e c u r i t y Council, the U.S. would o f f e r some assistance on a
v o l u n t a r y basis.
I f the mission were funded through UN assessments, the U.S.
would pay more than 30% of the cost and seek the normal
reimbursement f o r c o n t r i b u t i o n s of equipment or s e r v i c e s .
-- At the same time, we have serious r e s e r v a t i o n s about
proposals t o e s t a b l i s h a large peace enforcement mission, which
would operate throughout Rwanda w i t h a mandate t o end the
f i g h t i n g , r e s t o r e law and order and p a c i f y the p o p u l a t i o n .
While we have not d e f i n i t i v e l y r u l e d i n or out any p a r t i c u l a r
response, i n our view, there are several problems w i t h t h i s
approach:
E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)
This mission would be p a r t i c u l a r l y complex, perhaps
even more so than Somalia.
I t remains very unclear whether the p a r t i e s t o the
c o n f l i c t would use force t o oppose such a mission.
Thus f a r , no country has committed t o send troops,
and i t appears u n l i k e l y t h a t there w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t
pledges t o mount the large force r e q u i r e d .
L o g i s t i c a l l y , i t would be d i f f i c u l t t o stage a
sizeable force out of K i g a l i , because a l l movement o f
troops and supplies would have t o be done .by a i r .
Page 2 of 3
�Page 3 of 3
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I t i s unclear p r e c i s e l y what the peace enforcement
mission would be or when i t would end.
F i n a l l y , the chances of success appear s l i m ,
p a r t i c u l a r l y without the p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f a major
m i l i t a r y power,
Again, l e t me say t h a t we hope we can work together t o t r y t o
c r a f t a v i a b l e d i p l o m a t i c s o l u t i o n and provide r e l i e f t o the
hundreds of thousands who are s u f f e r i n g as r e s u l t of t h i s t r a g i c
conflict.
Dist r i b u t i o n :
FRO:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
CC:
CC:
CC:
CC;
CC:
W Anthony K. Lake
.
Samuel R. Berger
Mary C. Emery
Wilma G. H a l l
K r i s t e n K. C i c i o
Katherine M. Veit
W i l l i a m H. I t o h
K r i s t i e A. Kenney
M. Brooke Darby
Cathy M i l l i s o n
James W Reed
.
Neal S. Wolin
Ardenia R. Hawkins
Records
Donald K. Steinberg
James A. Carman
W i l l i a m M. Wise
Richard A. Clarke
(
(
(
(
(
{
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
LAKE )
BERGER )
EMERY )
HALL )
CICIO )
VEIT )
ITOH )
KENNEY )
DARBY )
MILLISON )
REED )
WOLIN )
HAWKINS )
RECORDS )
STEINBERG )
CARMAN )
WISE )
CLARKER )
A d d i t i o n a l Header I n f o r m a t i o n Follows
Date Created: 07-May-1994 11:45
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 039286
VMS Filename: OA$SHARE51:ZVFCGTKC8.WPL
Al Folder: MAY94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 07-May-1994 11:45
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message P r i o r i t y : FIRST_CLASS
Y
:
�Page 1 of 3
F :\Email\Data_Source\A 1 \Recorcl\CDOO 1 \may 94\03 92 87 .html
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
07-May-1994 13:00 EDT
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
James A. Carman
W i l l i a m M. Wise
( CARMAN )
( WISE )
FROM:
Susan E. Rice
(RICE)
SUBJECT:
Rwanda TP's as agreed by State and JCS
Suggested T a l k i n g Points f o r Vice President's Meeting
w i t h Boutros-Ghali, Salim Salim e t a l . on Rwanda
We remain extremely concerned about the on-going tragedy i n
Rwanda. This i s a problem t h a t demands immediate i n t e r n a t i o n a l
action.
-- The United States wants t o play a c o n s t r u c t i v e r o l e i n
a l l e v i a t i n g t h e s u f f e r i n g i n Rwanda and supporting e f f o r t s t o
achieve a l a s t i n g p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n .
There have been a number of proposed responses t o t h i s
tragedy. We would l i k e t o explore these ideas w i t h you f u r t h e r ,
as w e l l as w i t h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of concerned A f r i c a n s t a t e s and
our colleagues i n t h e S e c u r i t y Council.
We have already taken some important steps. We w i l l continue
t o support t h e d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t s now underway by the UN, OAU,
the Tanzanian government and r e g i o n a l leaders t o reach a
c e a s e f i r e and r e t u r n t o the Arusha peace process.
We want t o
consider how t o support the UN e f f o r t t o work w i t h the OAU t o
ensure the s a f e t y o f displaced persons on both sides o f the
border.
-- We are committed t o provide humanitarian r e l i e f , t o implement
the arms embargo and t o have the UN Human Rights Commission f u l l y
i n v e s t i g a t e the s i t u a t i o n i n Rwanda.
In a d d i t i o n , there may be another v i t a l l y important
humanitarian mission t h a t the UN and/or OAU could perform.
We would be i n t e r e s t e d i n e x p l o r i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y o f
c r e a t i n g a p r o t e c t i v e zone along the Rwandan border w i t h an
i n t e r n a t i o n a l f o r c e t o provide s e c u r i t y t o p o p u l a t i o n s , where
refugees and d i s p l a c e d persons are i n the most immediate danger.
Such a mission could not only provide s e c u r i t y f o r
the p r o t e c t i v e zone and the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f
humanitarian assistance but could also a s s i s t i n
refugee r e p a t r i a t i o n and serve i n a p r e v e n t i v e c a p a c i t y
t o deter the spread of violence t o Burundi. The
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PERE. O.13526
�F:\Email\Data_Source\Al\Record\CD001\may94\039287.html
o p e r a t i o n would r e q u i r e robust r u l e s o f engagement.
This mission may r e q u i r e fewer troops and be less
complex l o g i s t i c a l l y than some other proposals now
being discussed.
I t would, however, need the a c t i v e support of
neighboring c o u n t r i e s , such as Burundi and Tanzania,
and the assent of the Rwandan p a r t i e s .
In c o n s i d e r i n g the a c t u a l humanitarian/peacekeeping
mission i n Rwanda, we must be m i n d f u l not t o upset the
d e l i c a t e p o l i t i c a l balance t h a t p r e s e n t l y e x i s t s i n
Burundi.
We must also work together t o d e f i n e c l e a r l y
achievable o b j e c t i v e s and an end-state such as
r e s e t t l e m e n t o f the d i s p l a c e d persons and refugees
and/or a sunset p r o v i s i o n r e q u i r i n g r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of
the o p e r a t i o n i n s i x months t o preclude the mission
becoming an open-ended one.
I f capable troops were a v a i l a b l e and t h e mission considered
v i a b l e , the U.S. would f u l l y support t h e o p e r a t i o n p o l i t i c a l l y
and d i p l o m a t i c a l l y and endeavor t o help by p r o v i d i n g f i n a n c i a l
resources, some l i f t , equipment and humanitarian assistance, upon
agreement o f a c l e a r concept of o p e r a t i o n s .
We would expect t o be j o i n e d i n t h i s e f f o r t by other
concerned n a t i o n s .
I f the mission were mounted independently by the OAU or by a
c o l l e c t i o n of concerned s t a t e s w i t h the b l e s s i n g of the UN
S e c u r i t y Council, the U.S. would o f f e r some assistance on a
voluntary basis.
I f the mission were funded through UN assessments, the U.S.
would pay more than 30% of the cost and seek the normal
reimbursement f o r c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f equipment or s e r v i c e s .
-- At the same time, we have serious r e s e r v a t i o n s about
proposals t o e s t a b l i s h a l a r g e peace enforcement mission, which
would operate throughout Rwanda w i t h a mandate t o end the
f i g h t i n g , r e s t o r e law and order and p a c i f y the p o p u l a t i o n .
-- While we have not d e f i n i t i v e l y r u l e d i n or out any p a r t i c u l a r
response, i n our view, there are s e v e r a l problems w i t h t h i s
approach:
EO 13526 1.4d
This mission would be p a r t i c u l a r l y complex, perhaps
even more so than Somalia.
I t remains very unclear whether the p a r t i e s t o the
c o n f l i c t would use force t o oppose such a mission.
Thus f a r , i t i s unclear t h a t any country has
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�F:\Email\Data_Source\A 1 \Record\CDOO 1 \may94\039287.html
Page 3 of 3
committed t o send t r o o p s , and i t appears u n l i k e l y t h a t
t h e r e w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t pledges t o mount t h e l a r g e
force required.
L o g i s t i c a l l y , i t would be d i f f i c u l t t o stage a
s i z e a b l e f o r c e o u t o f K i g a l i , because a l l movement o f
t r o o p s and s u p p l i e s would have t o be done through an
a i r p o r t a t t h e e p i c e n t e r o f a c i v i l war.
I t i s u n c l e a r p r e c i s e l y what t h e peace enforcement
m i s s i o n would be o r when i t would end.
F i n a l l y , t h e chances o f success appear s l i m .
Again, l e t me say t h a t we hope we can work t o g e t h e r t o t r y t o
c r a f t a v i a b l e d i p l o m a t i c s o l u t i o n and p r o v i d e r e l i e f t o t h e
hundreds o f thousands who a r e s u f f e r i n g as r e s u l t o f t h i s t r a g i c
conflict.
•
CC: Records
RECORDS )
A d d i t i o n a l Header I n f o r m a t i o n Follows
Date Created: 07-May-1994 13:00
D e l e t a b l e Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 039287
VMS Filename: OA$SHARE18:ZVFCILOJN.WPL
Al Folder: MAY94
Message Format:
Message S t a t u s : READ
Date M o d i f i e d : 07-May-1994 13:00
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
D e l i v e r y - R e c e i p t Requested: NO
Message P r i o r i t y : FIRST_CLASS
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
07-May-1994 15:26 EDT
CONFIDENTIAL '
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Donald K. Steinberg
Richard A. Clarke
FROM:
Susan E. Rice
(RICE)
SUBJECT:
( STEINBERG )
( CLARKER )
F i n a l Rwanda T a l k i n g Points
Suggested T a l k i n g Points f o r Vice President's Meeting
w i t h Boutros-Ghali, Salim Salim e t a l . on Rwanda
We remain extremely concerned about t h e on-going tragedy i n
Rwanda. This i s a problem t h a t demands immediate i n t e r n a t i o n a l
action.
The United States wants t o play a c o n s t r u c t i v e r o l e i n
a l l e v i a t i n g the s u f f e r i n g i n Rwanda and supporting e f f o r t s t o
achieve a l a s t i n g p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n .
There have been a number of proposed responses t o t h i s
tragedy. We would l i k e t o explore these ideas w i t h you f u r t h e r ,
as w e l l as w i t h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of concerned A f r i c a n s t a t e s and
our colleagues i n t h e S e c u r i t y Council.
-- We have already taken some important steps. We w i l l continue
t o support the d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t s now underway by the UN, OAU,
the Tanzanian government and r e g i o n a l leaders t o reach a
c e a s e f i r e and r e t u r n t o the Arusha peace process.
We want t o
consider how t o support the UN e f f o r t t o work w i t h the OAU t o
ensure the s a f e t y o f d i s p l a c e d persons on both sides o f the
border.
We are committed t o provide humanitarian r e l i e f , t o implement
the arms embargo and t o have the UN Human Rights Commission f u l l y
i n v e s t i g a t e the s i t u a t i o n i n Rwanda.
In a d d i t i o n , there may be another v i t a l l y important
humanitarian mission t h a t the UN and/or OAU could perform.
We would be i n t e r e s t e d i n e x p l o r i n g t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of
c r e a t i n g a p r o t e c t i v e zone along t h e Rwandan border w i t h an
i n t e r n a t i o n a l f o r c e t o provide s e c u r i t y t o p o p u l a t i o n s , where
refugees and d i s p l a c e d persons are i n the most immediate danger.
Such a mission could not only provide s e c u r i t y f o r
the p r o t e c t i v e zone and the d i s t r i b u t i o n of
humanitarian assistance b u t could a l s o a s s i s t i n
refugee r e p a t r i a t i o n and serve i n a p r e v e n t i v e c a p a c i t y
t o deter the spread of v i o l e n c e t o Burundi. The
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. 0. 13526
�F:\Email\Data_Source\Al\Record\CD001\may94\039291.html
o p e r a t i o n would r e q u i r e robust r u l e s of engagement.
This mission may r e q u i r e fewer troops and be less
complex l o g i s t i c a l l y than some other proposals now
being discussed.
I t would, however, need the a c t i v e support o f
neighboring c o u n t r i e s , such as Burundi and Tanzania,
and the assent of the Rwandan p a r t i e s .
In c o n s i d e r i n g the a c t u a l
humanitarian/peacekeeping
mission i n Rwanda, we must be m i n d f u l not t o upset the
d e l i c a t e p o l i t i c a l balance t h a t p r e s e n t l y e x i s t s i n
Burundi.
We must a l s o work together t o d e f i n e c l e a r l y
achievable o b j e c t i v e s and an end-state such as
r e s e t t l e m e n t of the d i s p l a c e d persons and refugees
and/or a sunset p r o v i s i o n r e q u i r i n g r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of
the o p e r a t i o n i n s i x months t o preclude the mission
becoming an open-ended one.
I f capable troops were a v a i l a b l e and the mission considered
v i a b l e , the U.S. would f u l l y support the o p e r a t i o n p o l i t i c a l l y
and d i p l o m a t i c a l l y and endeavor t o help by p r o v i d i n g f i n a n c i a l
resources, some l i f t , equipment and humanitarian assistance, upon
agreement of a c l e a r concept of operations.
We would expect t o be j o i n e d i n t h i s e f f o r t by other
concerned n a t i o n s .
[ I F ASKED what d i r e c t support U.S. could provide:
I f the mission were mounted independently by the OAU
or by a c o l l e c t i o n of concerned s t a t e s w i t h the
b l e s s i n g of the UN S e c u r i t y Council, the U.S. would
o f f e r some assistance on a v o l u n t a r y basis.
I f the mission were funded through UN assessments,
the U.S. would seek the normal reimbursement f o r
c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f equipment or s e r v i c e s . ]
—
At the same time, we have serious r e s e r v a t i o n s about
proposals t o e s t a b l i s h a l a r g e peace enforcement mission, which
would operate throughout Rwanda w i t h a mandate t o end the
f i g h t i n g , r e s t o r e law and order and p a c i f y the p o p u l a t i o n .
While we have not d e f i n i t i v e l y r u l e d i n or out any p a r t i c u l a r
response, i n our view, there are several problems w i t h t h i s
approach:
EO 13526 1.4d
This mission would be p a r t i c u l a r l y complex, perhaps
even more so than Somalia.
I t remains very unclear whether the p a r t i e s t o the
c o n f l i c t would use force t o oppose such a mission.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�F:\Email\Data_Source\Al\Record\CD001\may94\039291.html
Page 3 of3
Thus f a r , i t i s u n c l e a r t h a t any c o u n t r y has
committed t o send t r o o p s , and i t appears u n l i k e l y t h a t
t h e r e w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t pledges t o mount t h e l a r g e
force required.
L o g i s t i c a l l y , i t would be d i f f i c u l t t o stage a
s i z e a b l e f o r c e o u t o f K i g a l i , because a l l movement o f
t r o o p s and s u p p l i e s would have t o be done through an
a i r p o r t a t t h e e p i c e n t e r o f a c i v i l war.
I t i s u n c l e a r p r e c i s e l y what t h e peace enforcement
m i s s i o n would be o r when i t would end.
F i n a l l y , t h e chances o f success appear s l i m .
•
Again, l e t me say t h a t we hope we can work t o g e t h e r t o t r y t o
c r a f t a v i a b l e d i p l o m a t i c s o l u t i o n and p r o v i d e r e l i e f t o t h e
hundreds o f thousands who are s u f f e r i n g as r e s u l t o f t h i s t r a g i c
conflict.
RECORDS )
CC: Records
A d d i t i o n a l Header I n f o r m a t i o n Follows
Date Created: 07-May-1994 15:25
D e l e t a b l e Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 039291
VMS Filename: OA$SHARE35:ZVFCM26S7.WPL
Al Folder: MAY94
Message Format:
Message S t a t u s : READ
Date M o d i f i e d : 07-May-1994 15:25
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
D e l i v e r y - R e c e i p t Requested: NO
Message P r i o r i t y : FIRST_CLASS
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
07-May-1994 16:18 EDT
CONriDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Ernest J. Wilson I I I
FROM :
Susan E. Rice
(RICE)
SUBJECT:
WILSON )
rwanda t a l k i n g p o i n t s
Ernie-Rwanda p o i n t s FYI. Have a great t r i p (and b r i n g me back an
ANC e l e c t i o n or inauguaral T - s h i r t ) ! !
Susan
( RECORDS )
CC: Records
A d d i t i o n a l Header I n f o r m a t i o n Follows
Date Created: 07-May-1994 16:17
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 039294
VMS Filename: OA$SHAREl3:ZVFCNARRL.WPL
Al Folder: MAY94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date M o d i f i e d : 07-May-1994 16:17
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message P r i o r i t y : FIRST_CLASS
[:
'
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
07-May-1994 15:54 EDT
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
Susan E. Rice
(RICE)
SUBJECT:
F i n a l D r a f t Rwanda T a l k i n g
Points
Attached are f i n a l d r a f t t a l k i n g p o i n t s on Rwanda f o r
p o s s i b l e use by the Vice President.
CLINTON LIBRARY P
H
^
r n
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
j v PERE.0.13526
�F:\Emai]\Data_Source\A l\Record\CD001\may94\039294.html
Page 2 of4
They have the f u l l support o f Mr. Lake and Mr. Berger as w e l l
as NSC s t a f f , State, JCS, USUN. OSD has c l e a r e d at t h e DAS
l e v e l and we expect senior l e v e l concurrence s h o r t l y .
OMB recommends against the Vice President meeting w i t h
Boutros-Ghali and Salim Salim on t h i s s u b j e c t , because OMB
opposes any peacekeeping e f f o r t i n s i d e Rwanda and b e l i e v e s
f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n should be given t o a l t e r n a t i v e o p t i o n s .
However, i f the meeting does take place and t h e r e i s
d i s c u s s i o n o f options f o r p r o v i d i n g s e c u r i t y t o persons
i n s i d e Rwanda, OMB would not o b j e c t t o the f i n a l v e r s i o n of
the t a l k i n g p o i n t s as d r a f t e d .
Distribution:
FOR:
FOR:
CC
CC
CC
CC
CC
CC
CC
CC
CC
CC
CC
CC
CC
W i l l i a m M. Wise
James A. Carman
Records
Donald K. Steinberg
Mary C. Emery
Wilma G. H a l l
K r i s t e n K. C i c i o
Katherine M. V e i t
W i l l i a m H. I t o h
K r i s t i e A. Kenney
M. Brooke Darby
Cathy M i l l i s o n
James W Reed
.
Neal S. Wolin
Ardenia R. Hawkins
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
WISE )
CARMAN )
RECORDS )
STEINBERG
EMERY )
HALL )
CICIO )
VEIT )
ITOH )
KENNEY )
DARBY )
MILLISON
REED )
WOLIN )
HAWKINS )
•
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
07-May-199'5 15:26 EDT
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
( STEINBERG )
( CLARKER )
Donald K. Steinberg
Richard A. Clarke
FROM:
Susan E. Rice
(RICE)
SUBJECT:
F i n a l Rwanda T a l k i n g Points
CC: Records
( RECORDS )
Suggested T a l k i n g Points f o r Vice President's Meeting
w i t h Boutros-Ghali, Salim Salim e t a l . on Rwanda
We remain extremely concerned about t h e on-going tragedy i n
Rwanda. This i s a problem t h a t demands immediate i n t e r n a t i o n a l
action.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�F:\Email\Data_Source\Al\Record\CD001\may94\039294.html
The United States wants t o play a c o n s t r u c t i v e r o l e i n
a l l e v i a t i n g the s u f f e r i n g i n Rwanda and s u p p o r t i n g e f f o r t s t o
achieve a l a s t i n g p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n .
There have been a number of proposed responses t o t h i s
tragedy. We would l i k e t o explore these ideas w i t h you f u r t h e r ,
as w e l l as w i t h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of concerned A f r i c a n s t a t e s and
our colleagues i n the S e c u r i t y Council.
We have already taken some important steps. We w i l l continue
t o support the d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t s now underway by the UN, OAU,
the Tanzanian government and r e g i o n a l leaders t o reach a
c e a s e f i r e and r e t u r n t o the Arusha peace process.
We want t o
consider how t o support the UN e f f o r t t o work w i t h the OAU t o
ensure the s a f e t y of d i s p l a c e d persons on both sides of the
border.
We are committed t o provide humanitarian r e l i e f , t o implement
the arms embargo and t o have the UN Human Rights Commission f u l l y
i n v e s t i g a t e the s i t u a t i o n i n Rwanda.
In a d d i t i o n , t h e r e may be another v i t a l l y important
humanitarian mission t h a t the UN and/or OAU could perform.
We would be i n t e r e s t e d i n e x p l o r i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y of
c r e a t i n g a p r o t e c t i v e zone along the Rwandan border w i t h an
i n t e r n a t i o n a l f o r c e t o provide s e c u r i t y t o p o p u l a t i o n s , where
refugees and d i s p l a c e d persons are i n the most immediate danger.
Such a mission could not only provide s e c u r i t y f o r
the p r o t e c t i v e zone and the d i s t r i b u t i o n of
humanitarian assistance but could a l s o a s s i s t i n
refugee r e p a t r i a t i o n and serve i n a p r e v e n t i v e capacity
t o deter the spread of violence t o Burundi. The
o p e r a t i o n would r e q u i r e robust r u l e s o f engagement.
This mission may r e q u i r e fewer troops and be less
complex l o g i s t i c a l l y than some other proposals now
being discussed.
I t would, however, need the a c t i v e support o f
neighboring c o u n t r i e s , such as Burundi and Tanzania,
and the assent of the Rwandan p a r t i e s .
In c o n s i d e r i n g the a c t u a l
humanitarian/peacekeeping
mission i n Rwanda, we must be m i n d f u l not t o upset the
d e l i c a t e p o l i t i c a l balance t h a t p r e s e n t l y e x i s t s i n
Burundi.
We must also work together t o d e f i n e c l e a r l y
achievable o b j e c t i v e s and an end-state such as
r e s e t t l e m e n t of the displaced persons and refugees
and/or a sunset p r o v i s i o n r e q u i r i n g r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of
the o p e r a t i o n i n s i x months t o preclude the mission
becoming an open-ended one.
I f capable troops were a v a i l a b l e and the mission considered
v i a b l e , the U.S. would f u l l y support the o p e r a t i o n p o l i t i c a l l y
and d i p l o m a t i c a l l y and endeavor t o help by p r o v i d i n g f i n a n c i a l
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
Page 3 of 4
�F:\Email\Data_Source\Al\Record\CD001\may94\039294.htm]
Page 4 of 4
resources, some l i f t , equipment and humanitarian assistance, upon
agreement o f a c l e a r concept of o p e r a t i o n s .
We would expect t o be j o i n e d i n t h i s e f f o r t by other
concerned n a t i o n s .
[IF ASKED what d i r e c t support U.S. could p r o v i d e :
I f the mission were mounted independently by the OAU
or by a c o l l e c t i o n o f concerned s t a t e s w i t h the
b l e s s i n g o f the UN S e c u r i t y Council, the U.S. would
o f f e r some assistance on a v o l u n t a r y b a s i s .
I f the mission were funded through UN assessments,
the U.S. would seek the normal reimbursement f o r
c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f equipment or s e r v i c e s . ]
At the same time, we have serious r e s e r v a t i o n s about
proposals t o e s t a b l i s h a l a r g e peace enforcement mission, which
would operate throughout Rwanda w i t h a mandate t o end t h e
f i g h t i n g , r e s t o r e law and order and p a c i f y the p o p u l a t i o n .
While we have not d e f i n i t i v e l y r u l e d i n or out any p a r t i c u l a r
response, i n our view, there are several problems w i t h t h i s
approach:
EO 13526 1.4d
This mission would be p a r t i c u l a r l y complex,
even more so than Somalia.
perhaps
I t remains very unclear whether the p a r t i e s t o the
c o n f l i c t would use force t o oppose such a mission.
Thus f a r , i t i s unclear t h a t any country has
committed t o send troops, and i t appears u n l i k e l y t h a t
there w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t pledges t o mount the l a r g e
force r e q u i r e d .
L o g i s t i c a l l y , i t would be d i f f i c u l t t o stage a
s i z e a b l e f o r c e out o f K i g a l i , because a l l movement of
troops and s u p p l i e s would have t o be done through an
a i r p o r t a t the e p i c e n t e r o f a c i v i l war.
I t i s unclear p r e c i s e l y what the peace enforcement
mission would be or when i t would end.
F i n a l l y , the chances o f success appear s l i m .
Again, l e t me say t h a t we hope we can work together t o t r y t o
c r a f t a v i a b l e d i p l o m a t i c s o l u t i o n and provide r e l i e f t o the
hundreds of thousands who are s u f f e r i n g as r e s u l t o f t h i s t r a g i c
conflict.
LINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
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•
HOLD FOR NORMAL DUTY HOURS/ROUTINE
(XI IMMEDIATELY/URGENT
NOTE; FURNISH AFTER DUTY HOUR CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER
FOR EACH ADDEE REQUIRING AFTER DUTY HOUR DELIVERY
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REMARKS:
WASHFAX COVER SHEET
WASHFAX OPERATOR (703) 482-7680
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EO 13526 3.5c
8 May 1994
Rwanda:
Comments on State/10 PKO Options Paper
1.
The CIA does not c l e a r p o l i c y papers,
observations on the paper f o l l o w :
That s a i d , a few
The c a p a b i l i t i e s and i n t e n t i o n s of the FAR, RPF and
m i l i t i a f o r c e s are o m i t t e d from 10's d r a f t paper.
Attached t o t h i s memo i s a b r i e f assessment of the
p o t e n t i a l s e c u r i t y t h r e a t s t o peacekeepers.
The d r a f t options paper understates D a l l a i r e ' s proposal.
He c a l l s f o r a f o r c e t o insure the d e l i v e r y of
humanitarian a i d and " t o prevent c o n t i n u i n g massacres and
to permit the f r e e movement o f people". This mission i s ,
considerably more complex and dangerous than the v e r s i o n
described i n the 10 paper.
The o b j e c t i v e of a PKO o p e r a t i o n , " b r i n g i n g humanitarian
assistance t o the v i c t i m s o f the c o n f l i c t " w i l l almost
c e r t a i n l y be viewed i n Rwanda as a p r o - T u t s i o p e r a t i o n .
"Enclaves" would be l a r g e l y populated by T u t s i s w h i l e the
"hoodlums and r o v i n g gangs" are the Hutu m i l i t i a s who we
b e l i e v e are d i r e c t e d and s u p p l i e d by elements o f the FAR
and Hutu h a r d l i n e o f f i c i a l s . The PKO would t h e r e f o r e be
c o n f r o n t i n g a semi-organized f o r c e t h a t i s backed by key
elements of t h e m i l i t a r y and government. H o s t i l i t y toward
the PKO by many members of the Hutu m a j o r i t y p o p u l a t i o n
could be considerable, e s p e c i a l l y i f the PKO began
disarming Hutu m i l i t i a s . The m i l i t i a s can e a s i l y hide
t h e i r weapons ( AK-47S, grenades and pangas) from the PKO
only t o take them out a t n i g h t t o k i l l c i v i l i a n s or ambush
peacekeepers. House-to-house searches f o r weapons w i l l
t u r n the Hutu p o p u l a t i o n against the PKO, produce very few
weapons, and subject PKO forces t o considerable danger.
The Rwandan m i l i t a r y and Hutu m i l i t i a s have already
demonstrated t h a t they w i l l not h e s i t a t e t o k i l l UN forces
who stand i n t h e i r way.
With so many moderate Hutu p o l i t i c i a n s and Hutu c i v i l
servants who might have been w i l l i n g t o work w i t h T u t s i s
EO 13526 3.5c
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EO 13526 3.5c
k i l l e d by the m i l i t i a s , Rwandan p o l i t i c s i s l i k e l y t o
become t h e p o l i t i c s o f extremism. A PKO can h a r d l y expect
t o remain n e u t r a l i n an environment o f extremism where
each side w i l l attempt t o t u r n the PKO against the o t h e r
or blame the PKO w i t h t a k i n g s i d e s . For example, what
does the PKO do about the Hutu e x t r e m i s t r a d i o broadcasts?
Does the PKo attempt t o stop arms from c r o s s i n g the
border?.
One lesson from Somalia i s t h a t d e l i v e r i n g humanitarian
a i d i n a v i o l e n t environment i s v e r y "troop i n t e n s i v e " and
i s only the f i r s t step i n a l a r g e r mission. Securing
enclaves and d e l i v e r i n g a i d merely freezes the l a r g e r
p o l i t i c a l and e t h n i c problem i n place. When the troops
e v e n t u a l l y depart--or are f o r c e d t o withdraw as combat
c a s u a l t i e s mount, as i n Somalia--the T u t s i s i n Rwanda w i l l
again be a t r i s k and the refugees w i l l s t i l l be refugees.
What are the e x i t c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e PKO? No massacres
today, no massacres next week, o r no massacres next month?
What p o l i t i c a l steps i n Rwanda need t o be taken before
such e x i t c o n d i t i o n s are met? I s r e c o n c i l i a t i o n l i k e l y
given the p o l a r i z e d p o l i t i c s and c u r r e n t e t h n i c slaughter?
(S NF)
EO 13526 3.5c
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EO 13526 3.5c I
7 May
1994
Rwanda: Threats to Peacekeeping Forces
l. Rwanda could easily become a dangerous environment f o r
international peacekeepers.
Government and RPF forces, equipped and p r o f i c i e n t i n the
use of l i g h t arms and small a r t i l l e r y , could become deadly
opponents of a peacekeeping force. I n addition, the Hutu
m i l i t i a s armed with automatic weapons and grenades could
attack peacekeepers.
-- The Rwandan m i l i t a r y and Hutu m i l i t i a s have already
demonstrated that they w i l l not hesitate to k i l l UN forces
who stand i n t h e i r way. [ 3.5c
2. Peacekeeping forces i n Rwanda would depend on vulnerable lines
of communication and supply. K i g a l i i s landlocked. Supplies
would need to pass on roads that could easily be closed by h o s t i l e
forces. K i g a l i a i r p o r t i s vulnerable to attack; i t has repeatedly
been closed several times during the l a s t month by mortar f i r e .
The RPF and Rwandan m i l i t a r y posses a n t i - a i r c r a f t weapons and i n
early A p r i l elements of government security forces probably f i r e d
the a n t i - a i r c r a f t missiles that downed President Habyarimana's
airplane. This week a Canadian r e l i e f plane was h i t by small arms
f i r e . I 3.5c 1
M i l i t a r y Capabilities:
3. Government m i l i t a r y (FAR). The army has about 25
infantry battalions t o t a l l i n g between 15,000 and 20,000 men.
After a month of f i g h t i n g , DIA estimates that about 10,000
e f f e c t i v e troops remain under government control. Most Western
m i l i t a r y observers believe the FAR performed poorly i n recent
years, but i t s a b i l i t y to withstand the RPF's assault on K i g a l i
suggests that at least some units remain e f f e c t i v e l y organized and
moderately p r o f i c i e n t . I
EO 13526 1 4
.c
|FAR weaponry includes 82
mm mortars and 122 mm howitzers, SA-7 a n t i - a i r c r a f t missiles, 75
mm r e c o i l l e s s r i f l e s and panhard armored cars.
3.5c
4. Gendarmerie. Before 6 A p r i l the paramilitary force
t o t a l l e d 7,200 men arrayed i n 10 t e r r i t o r i a l groups. Their
EO 13526 3.5c
EO 13526 3.5c
EO 13526 3.5c
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SUBJECT:
Rwanda:
Threats t o Peacekeeping Forces
c u r r e n t s t r e n g t h i s unknown. They probably are only l i g h t l y
armed, but some u n i t s may have mortars and machine guns. | 3 5
.c
5. M i l i t i a s . The m i l i t i a of former President Habyarimana's
MRND, the "Interahamwe"--or "Those who a t t a c k together"--was found
i n 1992. The MRND's a l l y , the C o a l i t i o n f o r the Defense of the
Republic (CDR)--which has long c a l l e d f o r the e x t e r m i n a t i o n of
Tutsis--has i t s own m i l i t i a , the "Impuzamugamhi" o r "Those who
have the same g o a l " . We b e l i e v e t h a t the m i l i t i a s were organized,
t r a i n e d , and d i r e c t e d by senior m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s and Hutu
h a r d l i n e p o l i t i c i a n s . Almost c e r t a i n l y numbering i n the
thousands, t h e l o c a l l y - b a s e d m i l i t i a s have been accused by a i d
workers o f s y s t e m a t i c a l l y k i l l i n g T u t s i s and moderate Hutus under
the d i r e c t i o n of l o c a l o f f i c i a l s and i n cooperation w i t h the
m i l i t a r y . E a r l i e r t h i s year, 1
EO 13526 1 4
.c
Ithe m i l i t i a s
were being t r a i n e d by t h e m i l i t a r y and were r e c e i v i n g modern
weapons, i n c l u d i n g AK-47S and G-3s. M i l i t i a arms caches were
r e p o r t e d l y e s t a b l i s h e d around the country. |
EO 13526 1 4
.c
r e p o r t e d m i l i t i a s working together w i t h the m i l i t a r y i n manning
checkpoints. I 3 5
.c
6. Rwandan P a t r i o t i c Front (RPF).]
EO 13526 1 4
.c
|the
RPF has 13,000 e f f e c t i v e combat troops out of a f o r c e t h a t had
been estimated as h i g h as 20,000. Although p r i m a r i l y a l i g h t
i n f a n t r y f o r c e , the RPF has 107 m towed rocket launchers, 120 m
m
m
mortars, and SA-7 a n t i - a i r c r a f t m i s s i l e s . Highly mobile and
s k i l l e d i n g u e r r i l l a t a c t i c s , the RPF i s g e n e r a l l y considered t o
be w e l l d i s c i p l i n e d . I EO 13526 1 4 Isay the RPF has not conducted
.c
mass k i l l i n g s i n t e r r i t o r y i t c o n t r o l s , but the rebels have
executed Hutu m i l i t a r y and m i l i t i a b e l i e v e d t o be responsible f o r
ethnic k i l l i n g s . 1 3 5
.c I
Intentions:
7. RPF. Although the RPF has g e n e r a l l y cooperated w i t h
UNAMIR f o r c e s , i t could t a r g e t peacekeeping forces t h a t i t
b e l i e v e d were s i d i n g w i t h government f o r c e s , were p r o t e c t i n g those
responsible f o r mass k i l l i n g s , o r were t h r e a t e n i n g RPF c o n t r o l l e d
territory. \ 35
.c
8. FAR. FAR f o r c e s , e s p e c i a l l y t h e P r e s i d e n t i a l Guard, have
already attacked and k i l l e d UN troops. Ten Belgians and several
Ghanaian and Pakistan s o l d i e r s were k i l l e d and wounded by FAR
forces i n e a r l y A p r i l . E a r l i e r t h i s month, several Ghanaians were
s e r i o u s l y wounded i n what the UN described as a d e l i b e r a t e a t t a c k
on UNAMIR f o r c e s , almost c e r t a i n l y by FAR f o r c e s .
3.5c
EO 13526 3.5c
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SUBJECT:
Rwanda:
Threats t o Peacekeeping Forces
9. The M i l i t i a s . Bands of m i l i t i a s , armed w i t h AK-47's and
roaming the countryside, would pose a serious r i s k t o small
peacekeeping u n i t s posted t o i s o l a t e d towns o r p a t r o l l i n g roads.
The m i l i t i a could evolve i n t o a Hutu-extremist g u e r r i l l a f o r c e .
I f so, t h e r i s k of ambush, sniper a t t a c k s , and d r i v e - b y shooting
would be h i g h . Probably o p e r a t i n g close t o home v i l l a g e s , t h e
m i l i t i a s would have the advantage of knowing the t e r r a i n , e a s i l y
o b t a i n i n g l o c a l i n t e l l i g e n c e on peacekeeping forces, and enjoying
p r o t e c t i o n and resupply from t h e i r f r i e n d s and r e l a t i v e s .
3.5c
10.
Other Risks t o Peacekeeping Forces
-- Vulnerable Line? o f Communication. Rwanda's h i l l y t e r r a i n
o f f e r s numerous o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o ambush supply convoys or
p a t r o l s . Landmines are common weapons; over 50,000
landmines a r e s t i l l uncleared i n n o r t h e r n Rwanda. The RPF
and FAR have mortars and SA-7s t h a t could shut down n e a r l y
.anv a i r p o r t o r l a n d i n g s t r i p . For example, by m i d - A p r i l ,
EO 13526 1.4c
the roads out of K i g a l i so dangerous
t h a t forces were evacuated by a i r r a t h e r t h a t overland. '
-- Armed C i t i z e n s . The m i l i t i a s , u n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from
unarmed c i v i l i a n s , could e a s i l y stage t e r r o r i s t h i t - a n d run a t t a c k s against i s o l a t e d m i l i t a r y outposts o r o f f - d u t y
soldiers.
-- Cross F i r e . Even i f peacekeepers were not d i r e c t l y
t a r g e t e d by m i l i t a r y forces o r m i l i t i a , resumed f i g h t i n g
between the FAR and RPF would s u b j e c t the peacekeepers t o
the r i s k o f s t r a y rounds. K i g a l i a i r p o r t and other
s t r a t e g i c l o c a t i o n s occupied by peacekeeping forces would
almost c e r t a i n l y be fought over by the two m i l i t a r i e s ,
endangering peacekeepers and t h r e a t e n i n g t h e i r escape
routes. Several UNAMIR s o l d i e r s have already been k i l l e d
by s t r a y g u n f i r e . | 3 5 I
.c
EO 13526 3.5c
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EO 13526 3.5c
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Richard i Clarke*
Director for Global Issues and
Multilateral Affairs
National Security Council
Room 302, OEOB
National
I n t e 11 i g e n c e C o u n c i 1 M e m o r a n d u m
Rwanda and Burundi: Societies in Crisis
Key After the slaughter of an estimated 200,000 Rwandans, the tempo of
Points ethnic bloodletting is slowing. Nonetheless, the massacres—of an even
greater magnitude than the killings in Burundi last year—are creating
an enormous and longlasting humanitarian crisis. In both countries,
extremists with access to military power are using ethnic fears to derail
democratic elections and power-sharing negotiations. Continued unrest
has taken a heavy toll on moderates in both ethnic communities.| 3.5c
In Rwanda, the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) controls about
half the country; it is contesting the capital and moving toward success.
Should the rebels triumph, they will probably be able to co-opt other
groups into an RPF-controlled regime. The only other way to end the
bloodshed might be a Cyprus-type partition, entailing enormous
population movements given the intermingling of majority Hutus and
minority Tutsis. 3.5c
The disorder in one country feeds unrest in the other. Moreover,
financingfromthe large Rwandan and to a lesser extent Burundian
exile communities keeps revanchist movements going. | 3.5c
We expect the number of Rwandans who have fled or have been
displaced within the country to grow into the millions. Tanzania,
Uganda, Zaire, and Burundi fear that the refugee influx will bring
violence and that the human waves will include military forces. | 3.5c
At the same time, aid donors are fatigued. Given their limited mandate,
UN peacekeepers in Rwanda could not slow the bloodbath, and ethnic
unrest has swept away whatever gains were achieved by the large flows
of economic aid to both countries. 3.5c
This memorandum was prepared by the National Intelligence Officer for Africa. It is based on
discussions among intelligence community analysts at a teleconference held on 10 May 1994.
It way coordinated with representatives of CIA, DIA, State/INR, NSA, and Army.
NIC 00270/94
13 May 1994
EO 13526 3.5c
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Rwanda and Burundi: Societies in Crisis
Never before in its 131-year history has the International
Committee of the Red Cross seen at first hand such
unmitigated hatred leading to the extermination of a
significant part of the civilian population.
ICRC Aide-Memoire to Governments on the Rwanda
Crisis, 29 April 1994
In both Rwanda and Burundi, the traditional enmity between the
Hutus, who comprise 80-90 percent of the populations, and the
Tutsis, who comprise the minority, will continue to fuel ethnic
conflict—derailing efforts toward peaceful power sharing. Although
the tempo of ethnic bloodletting in Rwanda is slowing, the massacres
are creating an enormous and longlasting humanitarian crisis.] 3.5"c~
Brutal slaughter of
hundreds of thousands
causes even more
Rwandans to flee
their homes
Following the death of the Rwandan and Burundian presidents in a
plane crash on 6 April, hardline Rwandan Hutus, using their control of
the army, unleashed massacres of Tutsis and moderate Hutus to scuttle
the Arusha Accord that was to have given Tutsis greater political
power. Aid agencies fear that more than 200,000 Rwandans—mainly
Tutsis and Hutu moderates—have died and more than 300,000 from
both groups have fled the country. At least 500,000 have been
displaced within Rwanda, a number that couldriseas high as 3
million. 1 iTic
1
Burundi couldfollow The death of the Burundian president has not sparked significant
Rwanda's bloody lead unrest, but renewed violence could erupt in Burundi at any time.
Democratic presidential elections in June 1993—in which Melchior
Ndadaye became the country's first Hutu president—have been
followed by three attempted coups by the Tutsi-controlled military and
the murder of Ndadaye and other leaders. The coup attempt last
October set off ethnic bloodletting that killed as many as 50,000 and
drove another 600,000 or so Burundians into neighboring countries.
Recent developments—including the latest failed coup, disarmament
of Hutu militias and civilians, and a Tutsi-inspired constitutional
1
Out of the 8.4 million population of Rwanda, about 1.3 million, or 15 percent, are
estimated to be Tutsi. The International Committee of the Red Cross says between
100,000 and 500,000 people have been killed. Several international humanitarian
agencies have characterized the situation in Rwanda as genocide, considering that
between 8 percent to a possible 40 percent of the Tutsi population may have been
slaughtered. Burundi's population is 6.1 million, with Tutsis comprising over 15
percent, or some 900,000 people. (U)
2
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EO 13526 3.5c
challenge to President Ntibantunganya's legitimacy-have added to
tensions. | 3,5c I
. • Rwanda and Burundi to 1993
:
:
"0 C^
Unlike most African states, Rwanda and Burundi were not artificial
creations of colonial rule; their existence as political entities goes back
several centuries. Between the 15th and 17th centuries, Tutsi herders
moved into the areafromEthiopia and established dominance over ;
Hutu farmers. Hutus traditionally were the social inferiors of the Tutsi
nobility, who exchanged cattle for personal services. Both groups
share social structures and the related Kirundi and Kinyarwanda
languages. (U) •.
Rwanda's Tutsi monarchy traditionally was more centralized and
authoritarian than in Burundi, where the king's power rested on a
shifting set of factional alliances. Rwanda also was marked by sharper
social distinctions between Tutsis and Hutus. German and Belgian
rule in the 20th century highlighted ethnic differences in both
countries, as colonial authorities gave Tutsis disproportionate access to
education and government jobs. (U)
Even before Rwanda gained independence in 1962, the Hutus had
gained political power in civil strife marked by widespread ethnic [ \;
•.
violence and theflightof hundreds of thousands of Tutsis into exile.
Two presidents—the southerner Gr^goire Kayibanda (1962-1973) and
the northerner Juvenal Habyarimana (1973-1994)—ruled over singleparty regimes. The country enjoyed relative stability and ethnic peace
until Tutsi exiles of the Rwandan Patriotic Front invadedfromUganda
in 1990. The Rwandan peace pact in August 1993 (Arusha Accord)
that ended the civil war between the Hutu-led government and the
mainly Tutsi rebels was derailed by Hutu extremists, f 3.5c
In Burundi, Tutsis remained in control until last year. The contrast
between Hutu rule in Rwanda and the group's oppression in Burundi
led to Hutu uprisings—in 1965, 1969,1972, and 1988—that resulted
in hundreds of thousands of deaths. Each Hutu attack fueled Tutsi :
fears of extermination, and each bloody repression reinforced the
Hutus' desire for revenge. Periodic ethnic unrest resulted in three
successful coups d'itat and many failed attempts. The last Tutsi
president, Pierre Buyoya, judged the situation was untenable and
orchestrated last year's election and transfer of power to a Hutu
successor. 3.5c
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EO 13526 3.5c
Forces For Instability
The traditional enmity between Tutsis and Hutus continues to drive
events in Rwanda and Burundi. Since independence, hardliners—from
both groups and in both countries—have led coups and fueled
massacres to block political and military power sharing and quash their
ethnic rivals. 3.5c
In both countries, political and social institutions are too poorly
developed and too tied to ethnic power bases to allow a peacefiil
transition to multi-ethnic power sharing. The forces for instability
Too many obstacles to have repeatedly overwhelmed efforts at democratic elections, powerreconciliation sharing accords, and ethnic reconciliation: 3.5c
Ethnic Intermingling. Hutus and Tutsis live interspersed across
the two countries. This intensifies episodes of tribal violence,
because ethnically motivated killers manipulated by political elites
frequently know victims and can incite their kinsmen to
participate. Moreover, this demographic pattern makes it difficult
to impose peace by separating the warring groups. 3.5c
Spillover Effects. Disorder in one country feeds unrest in the
other. The most concrete effect is the inter-flow of refugees, who
strain the countries' limited resources and spread ethnic horror
stories among their kinsmen. The cycle of violence strengthens the
perception of duplicity on both sides and convinces each side that
it cannot risk sharing power with the other. 3.5c
Financing the
Tutsi minority
Exile Resources. Many Rwandan Tutsi exiles work as
professionals and businessmen in neighboring states, as well as in
Europe and North America. Contributionsfromthis community
have been an important resource for the RPF and are likely to
continue to be available to support armed Tutsi movements in
Rwanda and perhaps in Burundi. 3.5c
Poverty. With annual per capita GNP of less than $300, Rwanda
and Burundi are among the world's poorest countries; they are also
the two most densely populated countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Since 1990, moreover, Rwanda's economy has shrunk by more
than 10 percent and Burundi's by about 5 percent, while their
populations have grown about 10 percent. Recent violence has
kept farmersfromtending the coffee crop—the main export of
both countries—further battering rural incomes. In Rwanda, the
RPF's demand for land for returning Tutsi exiles has been a
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EO 13526 3.5c
sticking point. A lasting solution in Burundi would have to
include a role in the economy for Tutsi soldiers and civil servants
replaced by Hutus. | 3 5
C
Forces Inhibiting Reconciliation
The recent violence has strengthened those elements in the social and
political structure of Rwanda—and to a lesser extent in Burundi—that
tend to block peaceful resolution of ethnic conflict: [ 3.5c
Few moderates left
on either side
Splits within each •
group also growing
Middle Ground Eroded Much of the recent violence has targeted
leaders seeking a common ground between Hutus and Tutsis. In
Rwanda, most moderate Hutu leaders appear to have been
murdered or to have fled, leaving the interim government under the
control of hardliners. The RPF's public statements indicate the
group views all surviving government leaders as complicit in the
slaughter. Until the violence ends, Rwandan moderates will be
unwilling to come forward. In Burundi, the coup attempts and
efforts to disarm civilians appear to be polarizing the political
leadership of both ethnic groups. 3.5c
Factionalism. Continued unrest is increasing the number of
factional fault lines in both countries and is undermining the ability
of local leaders to convince their followers to adhere to a
settlement. In Rwanda, government forces are divided between
northern and southern elements. The rebels seem more unified, but
divisions may develop between the Tutsi military leadership and
Hutus serving as political window dressing or between Tutsis
seeking revenge for the massacre of their kinsmen and others more
disposed to reconciliation with the Hutu majority.[ 3.5c
Similar factionalism is rife in Burundi. Tutsi soldiers' political
loyalties and support for coup attempts derivefromtheir
membership in rival clans. The Hutu community is split between
PALIPEHUTU—which says only a violent uprising can earn
Hutus equality with Tutsis—and the ruling FRODEBU party,
which in tum is split between moderates and radicals. 3 5c
Obstacles to Outside Help. In both countries, manipulation by
contending factions of outside mediators and peacekeepers has
made it much harder for disinterested parties—such as the UN,
OAU, and Western powers—to help find or implement peaceful
solutions. Rwandan government forces, after attacking UN
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EO 13526 3.5c
peacekeeping troops in early April and accusing the Belgian
contingent of complicity in President Habyarimana's death, now
say they want an expanded multilateral military presence, probably
to block new RPF gains. The RPF has hedged statements that it
would welcome a multilateral force to protect aid deliveries,
probably because the rebels believe they will win in the weeks
needed to deploy such a force. In Burundi, opposition by the
Army's Tutsi hierarchy has sharply restricted the mission and
size—from 200 to 31—of an OAU military observer force that is
intended to build confidence between the regime and the troops.
3.5c
Neighboring states
promoting their
own interests
Meddling Neighbors. Uganda and Zaire will continue to support
their allies in Rwanda and Burundi. Uganda is likely to keep
giving the RPF weaponry, logistical support, and sanctuary, and
could provide some troop support. For Ugandan President
Museveni, this aid repays his debt to the Rwandan rebels' military
cadre, who were his comrades-in-arms during his fight for power.
Museveni probably also judges that only an RPF victory would
induce the estimated 200,000 Tutsi exiles in Uganda—where they
have drawn native Ugandans' resentment—to return to Rwanda. If
asked, Museveni might also aid any Burundian Tutsi group that
allied with the RPF. 3.5c
Zaire's President Mobutu views the crises in Rwanda and Burundi
as a chance to remind Western donors that his regime cannot be
ignored and to burnish his regional and international image by
mediating among the rival factions. At the same time, Mobutu
probably will provide limited support to Rwandan and Burundian
Hutus. The Zairian military intervened against the RPF in 1990
and sent Rwandan government forces some weapons last month.
Kinshasa has not meddled as much in Burundi, but we believe that
Mobutu would seriously consider a request by either an embattled
Hutu government or radical Hutu militias for military help.| 3.5c~
Prospects and Implications for the United States
Rwandan peace Conflict Resolution Mechanisms Disintegrating. The onset of civil
accords not war and massive ethnic slaughter in Rwanda last month sounded the
salvageable death knell for the Arusha accords of August 1993 that promised
power sharing, transition to electoral democracy, and military
demobilization. Renewed fighting and widespread butchery have
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EO 13526 3.5c
dissipated the limited trust developed between the government and
RPF during a year of negotiations. 3.5c
What if the The RPF controls about half the country, can isolate the capital at will,
rebels win... and is moving toward defeating government forces. Should the rebels
triumph, they will try to co-opt other groups into an RPF-controlled
regime. The rebels have already spoken of a "national conference" as
a forum for establishing the legitimacy of a new government. 3.5c
Could the RPF Govern? • ' L i ^ ^ s ^ ^ ^ ^ .
We believe the RPF, based on its negotiating history, realizes that a
minority Tutsi government would not be viable.- Should the rebels
defeat the interim government, their ability to establish political
control over Rwanda will depend on their ability to co-opt the
surviving moderate Hutu leaders. The RPF's record suggests it
probably would be able to do so if it wins quickly. The group has
installed Hutus in visible political positions—such as RPF Chairman
Kanyarengwe—and worked well with moderate Hutu representatives
during the peace negotiations last year. Another factor in the RPFs
favor is that rebel troops have refrainedfromretaliating on a massive
scale for anti-Tutsi atrocities; their strong discipline leads us to judge
that RPF troops will continue doing so. 3.5c
The ability of the rebels to establish a functioning government would
decline, however, if the war dragged on. Hutus amenable to
cooperation with the RPF would be hunted down by the interim
government's security forces and hardline militias, and continued: i
massacres of Tutsis could reduce the RPF's willingness to cooperate
across ethnic lines. 3.5c
...or could a stalemate On the other hand, if a military stalemate develops, continued fighting
result in a Cyprus-like probably will deepen mistrust even further and preclude a negotiated
partition? political settlement for some time. In this case, a more radical
solution—for example, a de facto, Cyprus-like partition between a
mainly Tutsi, RPF-held sector and a mainly Hutu, governmentcontrolled zone—may be the only way to end the bloodletting.
Partition would require massive shifts of population and would impose
enormous humanitarian and financial costs. The final extent of the
massacres probably would determine whether the RPF would even
consider this option. Such a step would have significant long-term
risks. 3.5c
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EO 13526 3.5c
In Burundi, the process that led to last year's democratic election and
the transfer of political power to the Hutu majority is under extreme
pressure. We believe the most immediate challenge is that of ensuring
the physical security of each ethnic group. The deaths of two Hutu
presidents within six months highlight the vulnerability of Burundi's
politicians, and extremists could try to massacre moderate leaders in a
power grab. On the other hand, Tutsis suspect that efforts to protect
the political leadership, such as the creation of a separate Presidential
Guard, are steps designed to impose Hutu military dominance over the
minority group and could leave them defenseless against Hutu mobs
and militias. 3.5c
Regional Refugee Situation
Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, and Burundi fear that the influx of more than
300,000 Rwandan refugees will be economically costly, lead to
violence, and that the human waves will include military forces: ;
•
At least 250,000 Rwandans have crossed into remote western i
Tanzania and have been moved to an area some 18 kilometers
from the border. International agencies are scrambling for funds,
workers, and relief goods to avert a health catastrophe from
cholera, measles, and other diseases.
•
More than 50,000 Rwandan Tutsis havefledto Burundi, along
with about 200,000 Burundian Hutu refugees who had fled last
fall to escape violence and are now returning. Thefragileethnic
balance in Burundi could easily be upset if local people believe
the recent arrivals are monopolizing relief supplies. Some 60,000
Burundian Hutu refugees remain in Rwanda.
Zaire claims it has received some 8,500 Rwandanrefugees,and
; : another 5,500 Rwandans are in Uganda. Some 22,000 Burundians
have fled into Zairefromrefugeecamps in Rwanda. Although Ae
numbers are relatively small, the remoteness of the border camps
and poor transport systems are straining thereliefeffort. I 3.5c
Massive humanitarian Chronic Humanitarian Crisis. Continued political instability and
crisis will continue ethnic violence will exact a heavy human price. We expect the
number of Rwandans who havefledor have been displaced within the
country—we estimate 800,000—to rise into the millions. Similarly,
the 200,000 Burundians who recently returned from camps in Rwanda
may remain displaced within Burundi. These population
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EO 13526 3.5c
displacements also have disrupted food production; Rwandan farmers
probably have drastically reduced planting during the current long
rainy season, and last year Burundi lost an estimated two-thirds of the
food crops planted during the short rains. 3.5c
Another blow to UN Donor Fatigue. Rwanda and Burundi's cycle of violence has spun out
peacekeeping efforts... of control despite considerable political and economic aidfromthe
outside. Some donors are reassessing assistance to Africa, especially
for peacekeeping operations. The limited mandate of the 2,500-man
UN contingent in Rwanda prevented it from intervening to halt or slow
the bloodbath:
•
Belgium—which had 10 peacekeepers murdered—is reevaluating
its participation in any future UN military operations.
•
Because of their experiences in other operations, Nigeria and other
African countries say they will participate in a proposed
multilateral force to protect aid deliveries only if they have prior
commitments of logistical and transport support from the United
States and other Western powers. 3.5c
...and to economic The experience of Rwanda and Burundi may also cause donors to
assistance to Africa reconsider economic assistance. Donors disbursed $1.3 billion to
Rwanda and $1.0 billion to Burundi—representing about 20 percent of
their GDPs—between 1986 and 1990, when the World Bank said they
were generally pursuing therighteconomic course. But since then,
ethnic violence has swept away the gains achieved by these resource
transfers. I 3.5c
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EO 13526 3.5c
Rwanda and Burundi: Societies in Crisis
Annex: Military Forces in Rwanda and Burundi
Rwanda
Rwandan Armed Forces (Government):
Combat Effective manpower nationwide:
Combat Effective manpower in Kigali:
Major weapons systems:
Armored cars:
Mortars (60 mm, 80 mm, 120 mm)
122 mm howitzers
Air defense machine guns
SA-7 air defense missiles
75 mm recoilless rifles
Helicopters
Hutu Militias (Pro-Government):
Combat Effective manpower nationwide:
Weapons: AK-47 assault rifles, hand grenades
10,000
2,500
62
250
6
35
unk
50
6
well over 10,000
Rwandan Patriotic Army (Rebels):
Combat Effective manpower nationwide:
Combat Effective manpower in Kigali:
Major weapons systems (quantities unknown):
107 mm towed multiple rocket launchers
60 mm, 80 mm, 120 mm mortars
Towed air defense guns
SA-7 man-portable missiles
13,000
4,500
United Nations Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR):
50 military observers in Kigali; authorized strength of 270.
3.5c
10
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Ji$26_3_$cJ
Burundi
Burundian Armed Forces
Estimated manpower nationwide:
(includes Army, Gendarmerie, Security Service)
Major weapons systems:
Armored cars:
122-mm howitzers and rocket-launchers
3-inch, 82-mm, 120-mm mortars
75-mm recoilless rifles
40-mm antitank grenade launchers
Air defense artillery
Helicopters (operational)
C-47 Transport (operational)
Trainers (operational)
Light fixed-wing (operational)
13,500
85
22
109
13
69
188
10
2
2
2
Hutu Party Militias
Unknown number of militiamen armed with various light infantry
weapons, possibly including rocket-propelled grenade launchers.
OAU Inter-African Observer Mission in Burundi (MIOB)
31 military observers; authorized strength of 47.
3.5c
11
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�Concentrations of Displaced Rwandans Attempting to Flee Country, Late April 1994
Zaire
Zaire
L_E.O_13.52-6_3.,.5_c.
731911 (H01317) 4-94
�Challenges to Proposed UN Forces
••-.1 Concentration of displaced persons
RPF rebel-controlled area
aOKilomclm
Lake
Tanganyika/,.
732102 (R01317) 5-W
EO 13526 3.5c
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Military Situation, Early May 1994
EO 13526 3.5c
731980 (R01317) 5-94
�Rwanda: Concentrations Of Displaced Persons And Refugees, 11 May 1994
CONCENTRATIONS OF DISPLACED
PERSONS
[ -/
I
30 MILES
UGANDA
RPF REBEL-DOMINATED AREA
^
REFUGEE FLOW
X
REFUGEE CAMP
M
• /
' L-
y
ZAIRE
800,000 RWANDANS
DISPLACED ACROSS COUNTRY
65,000 STRANDED
BURUNDIAN REFUGEES
iWs^
:•-••
-
TANZANIA
BURUNDI
ZAIRE
Confidential EO 13526 3.5c
PREPARED 11 MAY 94
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�CECRET
EO 13526 3.5c
24 May 1994
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT:
Risks t o an Expanded UN Force i n Rwanda
1. The expansion o f UNAMIR--the UN peacekeeping f o r c e
i n Rwanda--to a s t r e n g t h o f 5,500 men i s l i k e l y t o occur
before the c i v i l war between Rwanda's i n t e r i m government
and t h e rebels of the Rwandan P a t r i o t i c Front (RPF) abates
or a f i r m c e a s e - f i r e i s i n place. The two sides have
r a d i c a l l y d i v e r g e n t expectations of t h e mission o f a
m u l t i l a t e r a l f o r c e , and e i t h e r side could q u i c k l y come t o
b e l i e v e t h a t UN troops were n o t n e u t r a l and were f a i r game
f o r a t t a c k . I n any case, supply l i n e s i n mountainous and
landlocked Rwanda w i l l be h i g h l y v u l n e r a b l e t o a t t a c k by
l o c a l forces and t o the p o l i t i c a l s e n s i t i v i t i e s and
inadequate i n f r a s t r u c t u r e of neighboring s t a t e s . 1 3 5
.c
D i f f e r e n c e s Over Expanded UNAMIR Mandate
2.
EO 13526 1.4c say n e i t h e r side has given
u n c o n d i t i o n a l consent t o t h e c o n d i t i o n s t h a t t h e S e c u r i t y
Council has s e t f o r deploying an expanded contingent t o
Rwanda. Rwanda's Ambassador t o the UN--a member of t h e
S e c u r i t y Council--voted i n f a v o r of expanding UNAMIR, a f t e r
pushing f o r a l a r g e r f o r c e t h a t would enforce a c e a s e - f i r e
and back up a p o l i t i c a l settlement. Beleaguered by the
RPF's capture o f K i g a l i ' s a i r p o r t t h i s week, t h e Hutuc o n t r o l l e d i n t e r i m government probably hopes a UN f o r c e
w i l l freeze c u r r e n t b a t t l e l i n e s , block f u r t h e r r e b e l
advances, and r e i n f o r c e i t s domestic and i n t e r n a t i o n a l
l e g i t i m a c y . Leaders o f t h e Tutsi-dominated RPF, however,
say they w i l l n o t be bound by a r e s o l u t i o n t h a t t h e
government voted f o r , and they have demanded " b i l a t e r a l
agreements" w i t h c o u n t r i e s p r o v i d i n g UNAMIR c o n t i n g e n t s .
The RPF wants t h e UN f o r c e t o have no more than 2,500
s o l d i e r s and a mission l i m i t e d t o p r o t e c t i n g c i v i l i a n s - i n c l u d i n g disarmament of suspected mass murderers --and
humanitarian r e l i e f . RPF leaders have r e j e c t e d n e g o t i a t i o n
of a c e a s e - f i r e w i t h regime leaders, c l a i m i n g t h i s would
give p o l i t i c a l l e g i t i m a c y t o the regime w i t h o u t ending the
s l a u g h t e r o f t h e r e b e l s ' e t h n i c T u t s i kinsmen i n areas
s t i l l under government c o n t r o l . | 3 5
.c
EO 13526 3.5c
EO 13526 3.5c
EO 13526 3.5c
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PER E. O. 13526
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EO 13526 3.5c
Risks From the Factions
3. Any enhanced UNAMIR f o r c e w i l l face considerable
r i s k s from the Rwandan combatants, whether the peacekeepers
are based i n K i g a l i or i n p r o t e c t e d zones along the
borders. Each side suspects the UN of s u p p o r t i n g the
other.
3.5c
4. From the government... S e c u r i t y f o r c e s and
progovernment m i l i t i a s - - r e s p o n s i b l e f o r UNAMIR's 11 combat
deaths since l a s t month, as w e l l as f o r most of the e t h n i c
s l a u g h t e r - - p r o b a b l y would r e s i s t an a c t i v e UN e f f o r t t o
prevent f u r t h e r k i l l i n g s or t o i n v e s t i g a t e past murders.
The Army r e t a i n s a core of some 10,000 c o m b a t - e f f e c t i v e
troops, who are equipped w i t h armored v e h i c l e s , a i r defense
m i s s i l e s and machineguns, RPGs, and o t h e r heavy weapons.
The P r e s i d e n t i a l Guard B a t t a l i o n probably i s the g r e a t e s t
r i s k t o UN f o r c e s . E a r l y l a s t month PGB troops murdered
o p p o s i t i o n leaders-- i n c l u d i n g the Prime M i n i s t e r - - a n d
B e l g i a n peacekeepers t r y i n g t o p r o t e c t them, and
eyewitnesses have t o l d |~EO 13526 1 Ac |that they organized the
onset of e t h n i c butchery m southern Rwanda.
3.5c
5. There are a l s o a t l e a s t 10,000 members of r a d i c a l
Hutu p a r t y m i l i t i a s , who e a r l i e r t h i s year were t r a i n e d and
given r i f l e s by the s e c u r i t y f o r c e s . These i r r e g u l a r s - r e s p o n s i b l e f o r s l a u g h t e r i n g c i v i l i a n s and harassing
f o r e i g n a i d workers, according t o press)
EO 13526 1.4c
r e p o r t s - - c o u l d evolve i n t o a g u e r r i l l a f o r c e capable off
t a k i n g on UN t r o o p s . The regime says i t i s r e c r u i t i n g
50,000 new t r o o p s , who probably w i l l r e c e i v e the same
r a d i c a l i n d o c t r i n a t i o n , cursory t r a i n i n g , and l i g h t weapons
as the m i l i t i a s .
3.5c
6. The absence of command-and-control c a l l s i n t o
serious q u e s t i o n the government's a b i l i t y t o implement any
agreement i t s commanders or p o l i t i c a l leaders might make
w i t h UN f o r c e s . According t o press]
EO 13526 1.4c
[reports,
Rwandan diplomats o u t s i d e the country and Army commanders
reached by telephone i n K i g a l i say they have no way t o
contact the i n t e r i m government, and they deny having any
c o n t r o l over the m i l i t i a s . Although regime leaders may be
exaggerating communications problems t o d e f l e c t blame f o r
e t h n i c massacres, t h e i r a b i l i t y and w i l l i n g n e s s t o prevent
i s o l a t e d , renegade f o r c e s from a t t a c k i n g UN peacekeepers
w i l l remain problematic f o r the foreseeable f u t u r e . | 3.5c
EO 13526 3.5c
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EO 13526 3.5c
7.
...From the r e b e l s . RPF forces t o date have been
more cooperative than government troops w i t h the UN
c o n t i n g e n t and w i t h a i d groups. We estimate t h a t the
r e b e l s have some 13,000 combat-effective t r o o p s , who are
f a r b e t t e r l e d and d i s c i p l i n e d than t h e i r government
c o u n t e r p a r t s . Although mainly a l i g h t i n f a n t r y f o r c e , t h e
RPF has SA-7 a i r defense m i s s i l e s , 107 mm towed rocket
launchers, and 120 mm mortars.
35
.c
8. Although we b e l i e v e the r e b e l s are l e s s l i k e l y t o
seek an open c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h UN f o r c e s !
EO 13526 1.4c
says the RPF would engage any UN f o r c e t h a t , i n i t s
view, was t a k i n g an a c t i v e r o l e i n the c i v i l war. I n
p a r t i c u l a r , a p e r c e p t i o n t h a t UN troops were p r o t e c t i n g
those r e s p o n s i b l e f o r mass k i l l i n g s o r were t h r e a t e n i n g the
r e b e l s ' c o n t r o l o f t h e i r t e r r i t o r y could provoke an RPF
a t t a c k . Moreover, the extended heavy f i g h t i n g and evidence
of the s l a u g h t e r o f RPF f i g h t e r s ' e t h n i c kinsmen appear t o
be f r a y i n g the r e b e l troops' d i s c i p l i n e and i n c r e a s i n g the
r i s k o f i n c i d e n t s w i t h UN peacekeepers.
-
-- The RPF has admitted t h a t i t s troops f i r e d on a convoy
t r a n s p o r t i n g a French a i d o f f i c i a l from Gitarama t o
K i g a l i , blaming the i n c i d e n t on confusion i n a combat
zone.
EO 13526 1.4c
|says r e b e l s
began k i l l i n g c i v i l i a n s when they r e a l i z e d how many of
t h e i r supporters had been k i l l e d , and UN o f f i c i a l s
accuse RPF troops of murdering c i v i l i a n s along the
Tanzanian border.
3.5c
L o g i s t i c Problems i n Rwanda
9. The supply l i n e s of an enhanced UN contingent
based w i t h i n Rwanda would be v u l n e r a b l e t o i n t e r r u p t i o n .
K i g a l i ' s a i r p o r t - - t h e only one i n the country capable o f
r e c e i v i n g l a r g e t r a n s p o r t a i r c r a f t - - h a s been on the f r o n t
l i n e between government and r e b e l f o r c e s , and UN resupply
f l i g h t s have r e g u l a r l y been prevented from l a n d i n g t h e r e .
Both sides have weapons capable of s h u t t i n g down any
a i r f i e l d i n the country.
35
.c
10. Surface t r a n s p o r t a t i o n a l s o presents a number o f
hazards and r i s k s . Only about 1 percent of Rwanda's 4,885km road network i s paved, and the f i g h t i n g almost c e r t a i n l y
has prevented r e p a i r of c u l v e r t s and shoulders eroder" i n
EO 13526 3.5c
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EO 13526 3.5c
the c u r r e n t season of heavy r a i n s . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e
country's h i l l y t e r r a i n o f f e r s numerous o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o
ambush supply convoys o r p a t r o l s .
R e t r e a t i n g government forces are blowing up highway
b r i d g e s , i n c l u d i n g one about 10 kms west of K i g a l i on
the main road t o Burundi, according t o press r e p o r t s .
-- There are more than 50,000 uncleared mines i n the
north.
3.5c
Problems Along the Borders
11. UNAMIR w i l l a l s o face p o t e n t i a l l y t h r e a t e n i n g
l o g i s t i c and p o l i t i c a l problems i f i t deploys along
Rwanda's borders t o p r o t e c t refugees and d i s p l a c e d persons
or t o guard the supply l i n e s of a contingent i n Rwanda. A
f o r c e based i n Burundi t o p r o t e c t v u l n e r a b l e c i v i l i a n
p o p u l a t i o n s i n southern Rwanda r i s k s u p s e t t i n g the already
unstable balance between the Hutu-led government and the
Tutsi-dominated m i l i t a r y . |
EO 13526 1.4c
| the
m i l i t a r y - - e l e m e n t s of which have launched three a b o r t i v e
coup attempts since June 1993--are chary o f any f o r e i g n
m i l i t a r y presence, probably i n p a r t because the s e c u r i t y
forces f e a r t h i s would encourage unrest among the Hutu
m a j o r i t y . Hutu m i l i t a n t s , f o r t h e i r p a r t , could see a UN
f o r c e as a s h i e l d from r e p r i s a l s i f they rose up against
the Army.
-- Unrest has f l a r e d several times i n Bujumbura--which
has Burundi's only a i r f i e l d capable of handling l a r g e
t r a n s p o r t a i r c r a f t - - a s s e c u r i t y forces have moved t o
disarm Hutu c i v i l i a n s and a n t i - T u t s i m i l i t i a s .
EO 13526 1.4c
(in n o r t h e r n Burundi c o m p e t i t i o n
f o r r e l i e f s u p p l i e s i s sparking unrest between some
60,000 mostly T u t s i Rwandan refugees and an estimated
600,000 Burundian Hutus there who were d i s p l a c e d by
e t h n i c unrest l a t e l a s t year.
I n the Rwandan p r e f e c t u r e s along the Burundi border,
hundreds o f thousands of c i v i l i a n s remain a t r i s k o f
a t t a c k from government forces and p a r t y m i l i t i a s .
Food a i d shipments r e p o r t e d l y are s t r a i n i n g
Bujumbura's p o r t on Lake Tanganyika and, t o a l e s s e r
e x t e n t , i t s a i r p o r t , and s o l d i e r s have harassed t r u c k s
c a r r y i n g r e l i e f supplies t o Rwanda. \ 3 5
.c
EO 13526 3.5c
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EO 13526 3.5c
12. Any a c t i v i t i e s by a UN f o r c e i n Uganda-- through
which Rwanda's most d i r e c t l i n k t o a seaport passes--would
r e q u i r e the f u l l cooperation o f President Museveni, who has
longstanding t i e s t o the RPF. Although Museveni probably
would make a pretense o f cooperating w i t h UNAMIR t o p r o t e c t
h i s i n t e r n a t i o n a l image, he i s l i k e l y t o continue c o v e r t l y
g i v i n g the Rwandan r e b e l s s u p p l i e s and sanctuary.
EO 13526 1.4c
most
s e n i o r o f f i c e r s i n the Ugandan Army--undoubtedly r e f l e c t i n g
Museveni's views--oppose expanding UNAMIR's r o l e and
b e l i e v e the RPF should be allowed t o gain a m i l i t a r y
victory.
About 10,000 Rwandans have f l e d t o Uganda. N e i t h e r
they nor p o p u l a t i o n s on the Rwandan side of the border
face any immediate s e c u r i t y t h r e a t .
3.5c
13. Z a i r i a n i n t e r e s t s i n the c o n f l i c t a l s o are l i k e l y
t o impede e f f o r t s t o support a UN f o r c e from along Rwanda's
western border. |
EO 13526 1.4c
Although two Z a i r i a n border towns have a i r f i e l d s
capable o f r e c e i v i n g C-130-size a i r c r a f t , eastern
Zaire's road network i s rudimentary, and the
mountainous r e g i o n i s s u b j e c t t o chronic shortages o f
f u e l and o t h e r s u p p l i e s .
We judge t h e r e i s l i t t l e s e c u r i t y r i s k t o the
estimated 10,000 Rwandans and 91,000 Burundian Hutu
refugees from Rwanda who have f l e d t o eastern Z a i r e
since e a r l y A p r i l . Rwandan government troops along
the f r o n t i e r , however, have detained thousands o f
mostly T u t s i c i v i l i a n s , who are s u b j e c t t o a r b i t r a r y
beatings and execution. [ 3 5
.c
14. Tanzania's government i s l i k e l y t o remain
s u p p o r t i v e of a UN e f f o r t anclT
EO 13526 1.4c
b e l i e v e s i t i s the only neighbor i n t e r e s t e d i n
i m p a r t i a l mediation o f the Rwandan c r i s i s . Dar Es Salaam
might even send t r o o p s . The a r r i v a l o f an estimated
340,000 Rwandan refugees i n remote northwestern Tanzania,
however, has severely s t r a i n e d the country's
infrastructure. |
EO 13526 1.4c
Ithe heavy
t r a f f i c o f humanitarian r e l i e f f l i g h t s has stressed the
r
EO 13526 3.5c
CECRET
�SECRET
EO 13526 3.5c
runways a t Mwanza's a i r f i e l d and exhausted f u e l stocks
t h e r e . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e region's road network i s
dilapidated.
-- We assess the s e c u r i t y t h r e a t t o t h e Rwandan refugees
i n northwestern Tanzania t o be f a i r l y low. Reports of
RPF k i l l i n g s i n rebel-occupied southeastern Rwanda,
however, i n d i c a t e the r i s k s t o c i v i l i a n s a r e r i s i n g
there.
35
.c
I m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the United States
15. Many p o t e n t i a l c o n t r i b u t o r s t o UNAMIR are l i k e l y
t o remain r e l u c t a n t t o provide troops f o r t h e f o r c e u n t i l
they are convinced Washington w i l l t a k i n g a l e a d i n g r o l e .
Ghana, f o r example, says an augmentation of the 200 troops
which i t has a l r e a d y deployed t o K i g a l i w i l l depend on t h e
w i l l i n g n e s s o f t h e United States and other Western s t a t e s
t o provide m i l i t a r y s u p p l i e s and p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s h i p . A
survey of press|
EO 13526 1.4c
[reporting i n d i c a t e s t h a t
many o t h e r A f r i c a n and non r e g i o n a l s t a t e s share t h i s view.
Although n e i t h e r side i s anti-American, US f o r c e s p r o v i d i n g
l o g i s t i c support would face the same r i s k s as o t h e r UNAMIR
contingents. I 3 5 I
.c
EO 13526 3.5c
GECRET
CLINTON LIBRAitY PHOTOCOPY
�Regional Dimensions Of The Rwandan Crisis, May 1994
LAKE
EDWARD
CONCENTRATIONS OF DISPLACED
AND AT RISK RWANDANS
CONCENTRATIONS OF RWANDAN
REFUGEES AND DISPLACED
RPF-REBEL DOMINATED AREA
C-5A GALAXY CAPABLE
C-130 CAPABLE
ACCESSIBLE ROADS
Unclassified
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�Situation Update, 12 June 1994
RPF rebel-controlled area
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�F:\Email\Data_Source\Al\Record\CD001\jun94\043928.html
Page 1 o f 2
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
15-Jun-1994 20:21 EDT
-CQUriDCNTIAIT
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Susan E. Rice
MacArthur DeShazer
FROM:
Donald K. S t e i n b e r g
(STEINBERG)
SUBJECT:
( RICE )
( DESHAZER )
E-Mail t o Tony on Rwanda
Tony:
Thank you f o r your r a i s i n g t h e Rwandan i s
sue a t t h e CPL l u n c h ,
We worked o u t today a schedule f o r t h e itn o d u c t i o n o f APCs i n t o
r
Rwanda t h a t i n v o l v e s shipment o f t h e f i r s t APCs t h i s Sunday i n t o
Kampala, w i t h t h e shipment o f t h e e n t i r e 50 c o n t i n g e n t t o be
completed by next F r i d a y . This t i m e t a b l e i n v o l v e s shipment by
two C-S's making a t o t a l o f nine runs i n t o Rwanda (each can c a r r y
6 APCs per load) . I t would be p o s s i b l e t o f i n i s h t h e deployment
a few days q u i c k e r i f t h e P r e s i d e n t d e c l a red t h i s our t o p
m i l i t a r y p r i o r i t y , b u t s i n c e t h e U.N. hass a i d they cannot use
them b e f o r e next F r i d a y i n any case, and g i v e n t h e c u r r e n t
s i t u a t i o n s i n N o r t h Korea, H a i t i , Bosnia, etc., we t h i n k i t makes
sense t o s t i c k t o t h i s schedule.
I n a d d i t i o n , t e n more APCs from Somalia are b e i n g shipped today
or tomorrow t o Rwanda, making a t o t a l o f 15 which have been
t r a n s f e r r e d from t h e r e . The UN i s proceeding apace on t h e issues
of t r a i n i n g f o r t h e Ghanaians on t h e APCs (which w i l l l i k e l y
occur i n Somalia).
We are moving r a p i d l y on p r o v i d i n g a d d i t i o n a l
equipment f o r t h i s u n i t .
I n c i d e n t a l l y , our f i g u r e f o r h u m a n i t a r i a n a s s i s t a n c e approved f o r
Rwanda/Burundi t h i s f i s c a l year has now reached more than $115
m i l l i o n , i n c l u d i n g $94 m i l l i o n s i n c e t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e c u r r e n t
c r i s i s i n early A p r i l .
Tomorrow, we've g o t a background s e s s i o n w i t h j o u r n a l i s t s and a
c l o s e d - p r e s s r o u n d t a b l e on t h e H i l l where we w i l l walk people
t h r o u g h a l l o f our h u m a n i t a r i a n , peacekeeping and o t h e r a c t i o n s
on Rwanda.
Don/Susan/Mac
CC: Records
RECORDS )
A d d i t i o n a l Header I n f o r m a t i o n Follows
Date Created:
15-Jun-1994 20:19
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A l Folder: JUN94
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�CLINTON LIBRARY PW$£l
23 June 1994
Zaire's Goma Airfields Base for Frencli
Operations i n Rwanda
The French m i l i t a r y has selected Goma a i r f i e l d as the
operational and l o g i s t i c hub f o r i t s i n t e r v e n t i o n i n Rwanda
EO 13526 1.4c
FO 13526 1 4c
rits~9T84"3 - foot - long runway~is~xn gen-erany
good condition, and the f a c i l i t y i s frequently used by IL-76 and
B-707 air-craftt the French plan to operate C-160'B and C-130's to
EO 13526 1.4c
EO 13526 1.4c
Nonetheless, f l i g h t operations i n Goma w i l l face a number of
difficulties:
-- Rwandan Government forces and t h e i r Z a i r i a n a l l i e s have
used the f a c i l i t y f o r weapons shipments and might t r y t o
i n t e r f e r e w i t h a c t i v i t y impeding t h i s a c t i v i t y .
Moreover, these arms d e l i v e r i e s may lead the Rwandan
P a t r i o t i c Front rebels t o consider Goma a l e g i t i m a t e
target.
EO 13526 1 4
.c
Provision of other support services w i l l be problematic,
r e f l e c t i n g the region's scant land t r a n s p o r t a t i o n l i n k s
t o the rest of Zaire. Most goods and services are i n
short supply, and vendors t y p i c a l l y demand payment i n
hard currency cash--preferably 1990 series US d o l l a r
banknotes.
M i l i t a r y f l i g h t s w i l l compete f o r landing s l o t s w i t h the
s i x or so humanitarian a i d f l i g h t s that have been
a r r i v i n g each day i n Goma since the Rwanda c r i s i s erupted
in early A p r i l .
3.5c
EO 13526 3.5c
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
3.5c
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
Regional Airfields Supporting French Deployment To Rwanda
1
Confidential EQ 13526 3.5c
PREPARED 23 JUNE 94
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
�Transport Aircraft
Country
USA
Model
Payload (in
tons)
C-5
Range (In
thousand
miles)
Ramp for
Loading/
Unloading
Aer
Rel
6.5
Yes
Yes
C-130
19.5
4.9
Yes
Yes
C-141
45.4
2.9
Yes
Yes
DC-8
22.8
7.2
No
No
A-310-300
France
130.5
37.5
5.1
No
No
7.8
3.1
Yes
Yes
45.7
4.3
No
No
165.3
2.8
Yes
No
:OPY
C-160*
B-707
Russia/Ukraine
AN-124
•
o
Q_ internal dimensions as well as weight limitations preclude moving all but France's smallest helicopters and lightest armored vehicles
by C-160 aircraft.
<£
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�0 ONFIDENTfAL
July 27, 1994
Memorandum to: The President
From: Anthony Lake
Subject: Rwandan Relief Operations - An Update
The A i r l i f t : USAF aircraft flew into Goma in Zaire, Kigali in Rwanda,
Entebbe in Uganda, Harare in Zimbabwe, and Nairobi in Kenya today as part of a
multipronged relief effort. The first US water purification machines began
pumping potable water into trucks and storage bladders in Goma. One C-5 flew
non-stop from near San Francisco, refuelled in the air three times, and landed at
Goma 22 hours later carrying water purification devices.
The airlift is hampered by the small size of the airports at Goma and
especially at Bukavu. Strenuous utilization has cracked the apron at Goma,
thereby further limiting flights. As a result, General Joulwan is looking at
increasing flights into other locations and estabhshing road convoys into the
effected area. Another limiting factor may be the availability of aviation fuel in the
few airports that we are using. The solution to that may be to aerial refuel USAF
cargo aircraft with tankers stationed nearby.
On the ground: Although one estimate suggests that 50,000 refugees have
returned into Rwanda, most are settling in to the makeshift camps. Cholera
continues to claim high fatalities, but it is apparently not of the communicable
strain. Thus, the water purification plan and the rehydration program should be
gain the upper hand over the disease in the days ahead. For now, however, dealing
with the dead is a high priority. Burial is difficult in the volcanic soil. A US Armry
Engineer unit with heavy equipment to assist in this task will begin arriving
tomorrow. A US Army Green Beret battalion will begin arriving soon to provide
Special Forces who have paramedic and camp organizaing skills.
Our Plans: Although the press began running the story that we were going
to put 2000 US troops into Rwanda, we were able to correct that impression with
backgrounding and a Bill Perry press conference. The truth is that the Pentagon is
developing options for refugee repatriation programs and an airhead in Rwanda, for
review by the Principals Committee late in the week. The UN and the charitable
groups may be able to do much of what is needed inside Rwanda. A US military
survey team is in Kigali, Rwanda now. Bill Perry and Gen. Joulwan will further
assess these requirements on the ground over the weekend.
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
"CP
OOY
�-eONFflDENTIAL
Others' Donations: The Israeli Army is opening a field hospital, flown in
on eight of their C-130s. We Eire flying in German water purification trucks. The
United Kingdom today offered a Royal Engineer battalion to the UN peacekeeping
force in Rwanda, following offers by Canada and Australia to send small technical
units to support that group. Overall, however, the response to the UN's appeals
has been limited. Of the eight "service packages" that the UN asked nations
assume, we have assumed four and no other nation has come forward to accept the
others (such as sanitation, road repair).
Funding: OMB is pulling together a small emergency supplemental for
Defense, State, and AID to cover some of their Rwanda related costs. There is
substantial sympathy among most concerned Members, although it may require
some special work with one or two.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�SECRET
EO 13526 3.5c
Tanzaniat Dealing With Rwandan Refugees
I n our judgement, t h e Tanzanian government l a c k s t h e resources,
manpower and p o l i t i c a l w i l l t o meet t h e s e c u r i t y t h r e a t s from
refugee camps i n the Ngara and Karagwe areas where up t o 440,000
Rwandan refugees have f l e d since l a t e A p r i l . I n p a r t i c u l a r , Dar
Es Salaam i s probably l e e r y of provoking an armed c o n f l i c t w i t h
former Rwandan Army (FAR) troopsl
EO 13526 l!4c
EO 13526 1 4
.c
jby u s i n g t h e Tanzanian
Peoples Defense Force (TPDF) t o prevent FAR troops from r a i d i n g
Rwanda. The Tanzanians are a l s o r e l u c t a n t t o t a c k l e t h e task of
a r r e s t i n g Hutu m i l i t i a members w i t h o u t c l e a r evidence o f
wrongdoing on Tanzanian s o i l . [ 3 5
.c
So f a r , s e c u r i t y w i t h i n the camps--which DAR t r e a t s as a p o l i c e
r a t h e r than m i l i t a r y issue--has not been a s i g n i f i c a n t problem.
- - V i o l e n t i n c i d e n t s i n the camps are not a t the l e v e l o r
frequency o f those r e p o r t e d i n the Z a i r e camps, according t o
a v a r i e t y of reports.
_Benaco camp--which holds 238,000
EO 13526 1 4
.c
refugees- - has only abouE^one murder a n i g h t and numerous
r e p o r t s of t h e f t .
35
.c
flefugrees Continue to Take
Flight
Reports o f Rwandan P a t r i o t i c Front (RPF) revenge k i l l i n g s i n
southeastern Rwanda have l e d some 100,000 Hutus t o f l e e t o
Tanzania since mid-July, however, d i s c o u r a g i n g a l l b u t a few
Hutus from r e p a t r i a t i n g t o Rwanda.
new a r r i v a l s say t h e RPF i s
EO 13526 1 4
.c
b u r n i n g Hutu homes and k i l l i n g v i l l a g e r s . Such r e p r i s a l s
are d r i v i n g some 10-12,000 Rwandans per week t o t h e Ngara
camps and another 500 per week t o the Karagwe r e g i o n .
Hutu e x t r e m i s t s r e t a i n c o n t r o l
EO 13526 1 4
.c
over the refugee p o p u l a t i o n , using food d i s t r i b u t i o n and
i n t i m i d a t i o n t a c t i c s t o undermine r e p a t r i a t i o n e f f o r t s .
3.5c
Caflips Remain a Threat
Hutu m i l i t a n t s r e t a i n the c a p a b i l i t y and d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o mount
r a i d s i n t o Rwanda t h a t could t r i g g e r e s c a l a t i n g c o n f l i c t w i t h the
RPF.
Hutu refugees s t i l l r e t a i n
EO 13526 1 4
.c
weapons--probably small arms and machetes--and have
continued t h e i r campaign of t e r r o r a g a i n s t T u t s i refugees.
EO 13526 3 5
.c
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. 0. 13526
�GECRET
EO 13526 3 5
.c
some r e c r u i t i n g by FAR s o l d i e r s
Moreover,
EO 13526 1 4
.c
i s t a k i n g place i n the Benaco camp.
-I
the FAR has
EO 13526 1 4
.c
launched r a i d s from the Karagwe r e g i o n i n t o Rwanda over the
past few weeks, which r i s k s provoking RPF troops t o a t t a c k
FAR f o r c e s i n Tanzania.
|
35
.c
"
Dar Es Salaam T r y i n g t o B o l s t e r S e c u r i t y
The Tanzanian Government i s aware of t h e u n r e s t Hutu m i l i t i a s and
FAR troops can b r i n g t o the camps--in June, t h e d e t e n t i o n of Hutu
h a r d l i n e r and former commune leader Gatete provoked Rwandan
refugees t o r i o t and f o r c e d a i d workers t o withdraw t e m p o r a r i l y
from t h e Benaco camp i n Ngara--and i s t r y i n g t o o b t a i n
i n f o r m a t i o n and b o l s t e r s e c u r i t y . Dar Es Salaam probably w i l l
a l s o t r y t o convince t h e RPF t h a t i t i s not p r o v i d i n g the Hutus
w i t h a base o f o p e r a t i o n s f o r i n c u r s i o n s i n t o Rwanda.
EO 13526 1 4
.c
--Tanzanian p o l i c e f i e l d f o r c e s have been deployed t o help the
TPDF c o n t r o l border crossings i n the Karagwe area, where FAR
forces have conducted raids
EO 13526 1.4c
DAR also promised
EO 13526 1.4c
m i l i t i a members and t o i d e n t i f y those suspected o f war
crimes, but t h e Tanzanians susequently i n d i c a t e d they could
not deploy s i g n i f i c a n t numbers of p o l i c e w i t h o u t o u t s i d e
f i n a n c i a l help. I
35
.c
I
But Lacfcs Commitment and A b i l i t y
Despite these measures, the Karagwe and Ngara areas remain
unsafe, w i t h r i s i n g v i o l e n c e and murders o f suspected T u t s i
sympathizers causing some r e l i e f workers and l o c a l r e s i d e n t s t o
fear f o r t h e i r safety.
--To address s e c u r i t y concerns, t h i s month the UNHCR t r i e d t o
move camps 100-200 k i l o m e t e r s away from t h e border; however
the idea was r e j e c t e d by the Tanzanian government a f t e r the
UN spent. $450, 000 p r e p a r i n g a new s i t e [ _
EO 13526 1 4
.c
o n l y 56 p o l i c e
EO 13526 1 4
.c
o f f i c e r s have been deployed t o t h e camps, d e s p i t e Dar Es
Salaam's mid-June agreement w i t h the UNHCR t o send an
a d d i t i o n a l 300 o f f i c e r s . I
3^
'
FiECRET
EO 13526 3.5c
�SECRET
EO 13526 3.5c
Moreover, w h i l e Dar Es Salaam's p l a n t o disarm t h e m i l i t i a s and
prevent FAR r a i d s i s ambitious, i t s a b i l i t y and w i l l i n g n e s s t o do
so i s open to doubt. I n our view, exea_i£_addi.ti.onal_B.e.c.ur.i.ty:
f o r c e s are sent t o t h e border area'
EO 13526 1.4c
EO 13526 1.4c
they w i l l be outmanned and outgunned by armed Hutu troops and
militiamen.
--To deploy a s u b s t a n t i a l TPDF f o r c e t o monitor t h e Rwandan
border and prevent RPF-FAR clashes, DAR would a t a minimum
probably r e q u i r e l o g i s t i c and m a t e r i e l a s s i s t a n c e . | 3 5
.c
SECRET
EO 13526 3.5c
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANJWRITWQ
THE
WHITE
HOUSE
PHOT /VJCHAKu
ING
WASHINGTON
July 29, 1994
MR. PK&IDENT:
The attached memo contains a daily report on the
situation in Rwanda.
Water production and distribution is up to 100,000
gallons per day. Additional production units should
arrive on Thursday, but we remain short of the objective
of 3.4 million gallons per day. Additional water supplies
will begin arriving by ship in Mombassa, Kenya on
Saturday and will be trucked or helcoptered to Goma.
Aircraft sorties have increased, but remain limited by
runway capacity at Goma.
925 US Special Forces troops will arrive over the
weekend, and a US engineering battalion will arrive on
Friday to assist with burials.
Yesterday's briefing with non-governmental organizations
went well, and Tony plans to repeat the briefing today in
the press room.
R. Paul Richard
PER EXL 13526
w
CLINTON LIBRARY P
i . CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CP
OY
�C ND N I L
O r E TA
i
CONriDENTIAL
m
^ ^ ^
THE WHITE H O U S E
WASHINGTON
INFORMATION
July 29, 1994
fi
Q4 JUL 29 l0 • 53
Oiouu.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ANTHONY L/
SUBJECT:
Rwanda: Daily Report
Situation in Goma
- Water production and distribution was up again today to 100,000 gallons per day.
Trucks for distribution of water remain in short supply, but more vehicles are due to arrive in the
region on the weekend. Additional water production units should arrive Thursday, but we are still
far from the overall objective of 3.4 million gallons per day.
- Aircraft sorties are up, but the runway capacity at Goma continues to be a limiting
factor. We are awaiting the recommendation of the Kigali survey team before making a final
decision on opening that airport to the relief effort. Aviation fuel in theater may also become a
problem. Rapid turn-around of aircraft at forward bases requires forward deployed fuel and
therefore additional aircraft and fuel bladders. EUCOM is working on this problem.
- Additional Water Supplies will also start arriving by ship on Saturday in Mombassa,
Kenya. These supplies include water purification equipment, water pipes, tanker trucks and
general purpose trucks. This equipment will then either be trucked or, possibly, helicopter-lifted
to Goma and elsewhere to avoid taking up valuable runway space.
U.S. Deployment
- 925 U.S. Special Forces Troops will begin arriving in Goma over the weekend to
provide medical, communications and other support as well as to help control refugee flows.
- A full U.S. Engineering Battalion should begin arriving on Friday with bulldozers and
other heavy equipment to assist with burials.
Efforts to Galvanize Support for UNHCR's 8 Requirements
Following your letter last weekend, we have continued to press in foreign capitals for
contributions to fulfill UNHCR's other 4 requirements - those that the U.S. is not addressing.
UNHCR is holding a pledging and coordination meeting in Geneva on Friday.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
Chief of Staff
�CONriDCN'ffAL
Political Efforts
Assistant Secretary George Moose will travel with Secretary Perry to Zaire and then continue
on to Kigali to meet with representatives of the new government. He will stress four themes:
— The importance of government support for the humanitarian relief effort;
-- The need to expand the government's political base to ensure that it is adequately
representative;
— The need to respect the rule of law and refrain from reprisals against adversaries;
— The importance of creating a secure and stable environment for the return of refugees.
The NGO Briefing
— Thursday's briefing for NGOs was a great success. Shali's presentation was
excellent. He was applauded by the NGOs. They also had some good ideas about better
coordination, encouraging the UN to do more, etc. We will continue the dialogue here and with
the UN in New York.
— The NGOs went out to the press afterward and praised our effort. Even Lionel
Rosenblatt who has been a frequent critic expressed his support for our efforts. With some
breathing space from some of our critics, we should now have time to produce even more results.
— Given the response to Shali's briefing, we will replicate it today in the White House
Press Room.
-CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTOMHiill P O O O Y
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"3
�Refugees and Displaced Persons, 2 August 1994
230,ooo Number of refugees
^
Refugee camp
iHi
Refugee concentration
Displaced persons Over 50,000
f
Entebbe
Uganda
Total: 10,500
In Karagwe:
93,000
Zaire
Total: 1.7 million
In Goma: W&rtiba
1.2 million Mg*
Iota/ displaced In east: \
over 700,000
Tanz
ania
In Bukavu:
312,000,4
m Benaco
Lumasi
t A.
, n
Mia™
274,000
Tanzania
Total: 367,000
Zaire
In Kamonyo/a:li'i%
230,000
lif
ToUvir^m
*0Utm
732940 tHOlSlT) a 94
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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EO 13526 3.5c
SITE A
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M 5 5 Ml '94
3
ROM
:
3.5c
MSG NBR
OFFICE/DESK:
N I 0
/Africa
ass
TIME RECEIVED (LOCAL)
3.5c
PHONF. NUMBER
Paper f o r Friday's 0945 Ad Hoc Mseting on Rwanda
UBJECT:
DELIVER Y INSTR UCTIONS:
PAGES:
(INCLUDING COVER)
•
HOLD FOR NORMAL DUTY HOURS/ROUTINE
NOTE: FURNISH AFTER DUTY HOUR CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER
FOR EACH ADDEE REQUIRING AFTER DUTY HOUR DELIVERY
AGENCY
INDIVIDUAL (NAME)
Jite N/OSD . Kathleen Hicks
TRANSMIT To:
OFFICE
ROOM NBR
(for John Tv>n+v^) QSDyAfrica
703-697-9753
JCS
JCS
State
John Shpehan
Timothy Wirth
AID
Brian Atwood
NSC
Richard Clarke or Eric Schwartz
O B
M
(/Pres.
PHONE NBR
703-697-3702
. '• .
202-647-6240
202-647-9434
Gordon Adams
SA/Glohal
BB
Nat'1 Security 238, O C
202-395-4657
Leon' Panetta
Chief of Staff West Wino.WH
202-456-6797
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\EMARKS:
U, D, B, c
WASHFAX COVER SHEET
DECLASSIFIED I N PART
PERE. O. 13526
CLINTON LI
TOP SECRBF
EO 13526 3.5c
trrottrpy
�,TH
TOP SECRET
4 August
J
5.
EO 13526 3.5c
1994
Threats to. Returning Rwandan Refugees
Forces of the victorious Rwandan Patriotic Front--motivated by
desire for unchallenged control over Rwanda and for revenge
against mass k i l l e r s of Tutsis--are the greatest threat to
returning Hutu refugees.
EO 13526 1 4
.c
RPF soldiers and other Tutsis have been executing
s u s p e c t e d Hutu mass murderers i n both c e n t r a l
and
northwestern Rwanda. [
EO 13526 1 4
.c
[the RPF i s
sytematically screening refugees returning from Zaire for
"troublemakers.•
EO 13526 1.4c
|RPF
troops
have k i l l e d Hutus and looted property in Butare--Rwanda's
second city--and relief workers have told our Embassy in
Kigali that the RPF has blocked access to the countryside
east of Butare.
-- Relief workers also say that thousands of Hutus continue to
arrive Tanzania from eastern Rwanda; we believe many of
these new refugees may be fleeing RPF violence.
35
.c
We doubt that the RPF attacks on returnees and other Hutus w i l l
reach the genocidal proportions of those carried out by the
ousted Hutu regime. Much of the violence probably stems from
fraying discipline within RPF ranks, which has heavily recruited
to swell i t s early April" strength of some 20,000, and to a lesser
extent, from a calculated effort to quash resistance.
-- The RPF regime's Prime M i n i s t e r — a Hutu--yesterday told a
French newspaper that h i s government wanted to punish some
30,000 suspected mass murderers.
Hutu extremists pose another threat to refugees who may want to
return. |
EO 13526 1 4
.c
Ithe
ousted Hutu leadership views the refugee population as xts power
base.
We cannot rule out the possibility that soldiers or
militiamen w i l l attack returnees, either within or outside
of Rwanda—possibly in the hope their kinsmen and the
international community w i l l blame the RPF.
-- The odds of such intra-Hutu violence w i l l increase over
time, in our view, as wretched conditions for some refugees
make return increasingly attractive.
35
.c
N O LIBRARY PH0TOPY
TN
�3.5c
IT^LUIUKAO'I
3.5c
.WTIIfTBL
4 A u g u s t 1994
ZAIRE: Weapons, Location, and Capabilities of the Former
Rwandan Army
3.5c
Background. I n l a t e July, some 10,000 s o l d i e r s of the
Hutu-dominated Rwandan Army (FAR) and another 10,000 Hutu
militiamen crossed i n t o Zaire along w i t h some 1.7 m i l l i o n
Rwandan refugees. The suddenness of the Rwandan exodus and
Zaire's porous and poorly monitored border allowed a large
number of these soldiers to enter Zaire w i t h t h e i r weapons.
While some of these arms--especially l a r g e r crew serviced
weapons--have been confiscated by Z a i r i a n a u t h o r i t i e s , we
believe that a number of small arms remain i n FAR hapds and
that the heavier weapons may not be secure. 1 3 5
.c
EO 13526 1.4c
2. fflip confcgplg fchegg w^ppnfl? We judge that troops
from the Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ) probably c o n t r o l these
depots, although we have no specific r e p o r t i n g to confirm
this.
o
There has been no reported FAR presence i n the area
100 km north of Goma where the FAZ m i l i t a r y camp i s
located.
o • I n addition, FAR forces are reportedly camped several
km away from the other two depots on the o u t s k i r t s of
Goma and Bukavu.
3.5c
3. I n our view, Zairian President Mobutu and h i s
senior m i l i t a r y commanders i n Kinshasa probably exert l i t t l e
control over confiscated FAR weapons, which l o c a l commanders
SECRET
RY P
H
�SECRET
3.5c
, IfOCOMTRACT | 3.5c iMUlt'l'Ub
and individual FAZ soldiers are probably tempted to s e l l to
survive, especially smaller, portable weapons.
o The 2,000-2,500 Zairian troops in Kivu-- including as
many as 1,000 of Mobutu's relatively more reliable
security forces--are stretched thin, lack rudimentary
military dis.c.iD.line, and suffer severe economic
hardship.
3.5c
4. Can Mobutu gain control of the heavy weapons?
Mobutu i s anxious to garner additional Western goodwill and
he would l i k e l y respond favorably to a Western request that
he confiscate and dispose of heavy FAR weapons. Mobutu
l i k e l y would have to deploy additional units of his more
reliable security units to the Kivu area along with a number
of senior officers to gain control of the weapons, however.
He would probably request that the West pay the salaries and
l o g i s t i c a l fees associated with such a deployment to ensure
troop discipline. Once in his control, Mobutu would l i k e l y
be w i l l i n g to tum the weapons over to Western hands, but he
probably would demand some diplomatic or financial quid pro
quo.
3.5c '
5. How much are the confiscated FAR weapons worth? We
estimate that the FAR's helicopters and armored cars could
probably fetch several hundred thousand dollars on the gray
arms market, depending on their condition. The a r t i l l e r y
and mortar pieces, could also be worth a few hundred thousand
dollars. [~ 3.5c
6. What weapons do the FAR forces in Zaire have? In
both Goma and Bukavu, we judge that there may be 5,000 to
7,000 armed FAR troops who pose a security threat to US
forces and Western r e l i e f workers, and who--although their
ammunition i s in short supply-- threaten to restart
h o s t i l i t i e s inside Rwanda.
EO 13526 1 4
.c
In Gojna, there are numerous reports that as many as
5,000 FAR troops may be armed. The defense attache
reported e a r l i e r this week that he observed FAR troops
in company and battalion size formations in their camps
northwest of Goma. FAR forces had a 37 mm antia i r c r a f t grun, as well as numerous buses, 2.5 ton
trucks, and two command jeeps. Most of the FAR senior
leadership i s reportedly in Goma.
\\\
DAL
_3.5c-
R PO
Y H
�TH.
SECRBT
3.5c
J
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3.5c
WHIirrDIi
FAR forces may have access to a d d i t i o n a l weapons i n
Zaire. A cache of FAR explosives was discovered near
Bukavu l a s t week and the attache reports that p i l e s of
confiscated weapons remain uncruarded i n Goma.
EO 13526 1.4c
3.5c
i_ x
HOGOti
3.5c
Y PHOTOC^
�Secret
EO 13526 3.5c
Intelligence Report
Office of African and Latin American Analysis
4 August 1994
Burundi: Ethnic Tensions Reaching Boiling Point
3.5c
Tensions in Burundi, where the ethnic composition mirrors Rwanda's, could boil
over with little warning, and recent developments are raising the temperature. Both
Burundi's coup-prone, Tutsi-dominated, military and the civilian Tutsi opposition—
emboldened by events in Rwanda—appear more opposed than ever to Hutu majority
EO 13526 1.4c
The Hutu-dominated
rule£
government is virtually powerless in the face of Tutsi intransigence. This, in turn, is
strengthening hardline Burundian Hutu leaders, who are increasingly willing to see
conflict as their only means to consolidate their shaky hold on power.
EO 13526 1.4c
(hardline Hutus are rearming and expanding
their militias; they apparendy are trying to recruit Zairians and Rwandan Hutu
refugees in Zaire, as well as local Hutus.
These Hutus' nascent military capabilities may tempt them to provoke
conflict with the Tutsi military in the hope that international peacekeepers
will intervene.
3.5c
These developments are raising the odds of an ethnic explosion in Burundi that
could trigger massive new flows of refugees, overwhelm international
humanitarian capabilities, and add to instability in the region. Fearful of
Rwanda's new Tutsi-dominated government, Burundian Hutu refugees probably
would head instead for Tanzania or Zaire, f 3.5c
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
ALA 94-40008
EO 13526 3.5c
EO 13526 3.5c
CLINTON LIBRARY
DU
•CP
Q OY
�Secret
EO 13526 3.5c
Rwandan Developments Polarizing Burundian Hutus and Tutsis
Although the recent wave of ethnic violence in Rwanda has not yet spread into
Burundi-which shares its neighbor's demographic makeup-the massive bloodletting
and population movements in Rwanda are raising the level of mutual distrust between
Burundian Hutus and Tutsis. Each side is increasingly convinced that it cannot risk
sharing power with the other, which is undercutting the influence of the few
remaining moderates who favor peaceful power sharing. | 3.5c
History of Bloodletting
Recent events in Burundi reflect longstanding tensions. Previous episodes of
massive ethnic violence in Burundi-in 1965, 1969, 1972, and 1988-began as
Hutu uprisings against oppression by the Tutsi minority. Centuries of Tutsi
dominance seemed to be coming to an end with the democratic presidential
election in June 1993, which Melchior Ndadaye's pro-Hutu FRODEBU party
swept with more than 60 percent of the vote. The election results, however, have
been subverted by the Tutsi-controlled military. A coup attempt last October
resulted in the murder of President Ndadaye-as well as his constitutionally
designated direct successors-and set off ethnic bloodletting that killed as many as
50,000, drove another 600,000 into neighboring countries, and displaced about 1
million within the country. This year, Ndadaye's appointed Hutu successor died in
the plane crash that also killed Rwandan Hutu President Habyarimana, the Tutsi
Army launched another abortive coup, and the Tutsi opposition has blocked
Acting President Ntibantunganya's efforts to gain legitimacy and control the
government. 3.5c
Tutsis Digging In. Burundian Tutsi fears of sharing power with the Hutu majority
have deepened since the massacres of nearly two-thirds of Rwanda's Tutsis between
early April and mid-July, and the group's desire to regain full control of the
the mainly
EO 13526 1.4c
government appears stronger than ever.
Tutsi UPRONA party and other opposition groups fiolcflittle stock in the democratic
process, saying it has been subverted by deep-seated ethnic mistrust and would bring
to power a Hutu majority government that would by definition be repressive.
In early August, UPRONA pulled out of power-sharing talks with
FRODEBU, claiming recent appointments of security and local officials
violated the negotiations' ground rules]
EO 13526 1.4c
iThe
Tutsi opposition has demanded near parity in government jobs and the
creation of the office of vice president, to be filled by a Tutsi. | 3.5c
The 13,000-strong mostly Tutsi security forces remain the Tutsis' insurance policy.
Both officers and rank and file appear as opposed as the Tutsi political opposition to
Hutu majority rule.
EO 13526 1.4c
the current
This report was prepared by
3 5c
|Office of Africa and Latin American Analysis, with
_^LA. Comments and queries are welcome and may be
contributions from
3.5c
directed to the Chief,|
3 5
3.5c
JALA, on'
C
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O
HT
D
Y
Secret
�i>.c.c.r_e.L
EO 13526 3.5c
Army Chief, the Defense Minister, and other Tutsi military leaders, who were among
the instigators of the bloody coup attempt last October, all adamantly reject the idea
of sharing power with Hutus. Their willingness to revolt and ability to do so with
impunity have highlighted the helplessness of Acting President Ntibantuganya and
intimidated many other Hutu politicians, further emboldening the Tutsis-led
opposition.
• Much of Burundi's recent ethnic violence-in which about 1,000 civilians have
been killed since April-has stemmed from the Tutsi Army's "cleansing"
operations in areas where it suspected Hutus of harboring weapons and party
militiasl
EO 13526 1.4c
Hutus Edging Toward Conflict. Developments in Rwanda have also diminished the
commitment of Burundi's Hutu leaders to finding a peaceful outcome to their
country's crisis. Some Hutu officials view UPRONA's negotiating strategy as the
first step toward a bloodless coup d'etat that would restore Tutsi dominance,
EO 13526 1.4c
|these officials probably are correct.
The widespread Hutu suspicion that the Tutsi Burundian military helped the Tutsi-led
Rwandan Patriotic Front oust the Hutu regime in Kigali, and the weakness of the
Hutu-controlled government in the face of Tutsi intransigence, appear to be making
an armed conflict increasingly attractive to Hutu hardliners.
EO 13526 1.4c
As Burundi's radical Hutus, including Interior Minister Nyangoma, acquire more
military capabilities, they may provoke the Tutsi military into conflict in the hope
that international peacekeepers would deploy to Burundi and disarm the Tutsi
military.
3.5c
Another Humanitarian Disaster Looming
The hardening attitudes of both Hutus and Tutsis appear to be propelling Burundi
toward large-scale ethnic clashes that could spark another humanitarian disaster.
More than 1.3 million displaced persons and former Burundian refugees who have
returned from neighboring countries are already receiving humanitarian assistance.
In addition, nearly 220,000 Burundian refugees remain in Zaire, Tanzania, and
Rwanda. If bloodletting erupts in Burundi, international aid workers in the region
would be overwhelmed by another mass exodus.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Seeret
EO 13526 3.5c
Burundian Hutus would be likely to stay away from their traditional
safehaven in Rwanda, fearing crackdowns by the new Tutsi-dominated
government in Kigali. Fear of the rebels who now control that government
has prompted many of the 300,000 Burundian refugees who fled to Rwanda
last October to return to Burundi; the 53,000 who remain in Rwanda are
mostly in the French-designated safehaven.
New waves of Burundian Hutu refugees probably would head for Tanzania or
Zaire; some 20,000 fled to Zaire last October alone.
Tanzania and Zaire-which already host 60,000 and 106,000 Burundian
refugees, respectively-would be under even more pressure if they had to cope
with a new influx. Both countries face serious security threats as a result of
Hutu irredentist activity in the Rwandan refugees camps. 3.5c
Meanwhile, the arrival of more Rwandan Hutu refugees could overwhelm Burundi's
infrastructure and further aggravate Hutu-Tutsi tensions. Some 373,000 Rwandansmostly Hutus-have already arrived; aid workers say 1 million or more displaced
Rwandans along the border face growing threats from malnutrition and disease, and
they may move with little notice. | 3.5c ~'
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
Secret
�Ad Hoc Group on Hwandan Relief
1
Chaired by Mr. Lake
5 August 1994
AGENDA
1.
Introduction
Mr. Lake
2.
Sitreps
CIA/JCS
Status of the four r e l i e f "packages"
A d d i t i o n a l needs
3. Consideration of Phase 2
OSD/JCS
4 . Expanding UNAMIR
OSD
5 . Burundi
State
6.
The Hutu Army i n Zaire/Moroccan troops
7.
...State
Promoting Repatriation
P r i n c i p l e s t o Guide Repatriation E f f o r t
Information Campaign
Promoting Reconciliation i n Rwanda
8. Other business
State
OSD/JCS
State
Mr. Lake
DECLASSIFIED
E.0.13526
White Hoiue Gnidelines, September U, 2 0
06
ByiLi_ NARA, DatelZLMl
CLINTON LffiWn*110T0C0PY
�SECRET
EO 13526 3.5c
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
|
0
10 August 1994
/J.Vtl
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT:
Burundi:
Background t o C r i s i s
Summary
• Recent developments make an e t h n i c e x p l o s i o n i n Burundi l i k e l y
i n the next s i x months. The c r i s i s could begin w i t h l i t t l e
a d d i t i o n a l warning. This would t r i g g e r massive new flows o f
refugees, overwhelm i n t e r n a t i o n a l humanitarian c a p a b i l i t i e s , and
add t o i n s t a b i l i t y i n the r e g i o n . F e a r f u l o f Rwanda's new
Tutsi-dominated government, Burundian Hutu refugees probably
would head i n s t e a d f o r Tanzania o r Z a i r e .
-15c.
Both Burundi's coup-prone, Tutsi-dominated, m i l i t a r y and the
c i v i l i a n T u t s i o p p o s i t i o n appear more opposed than ever t o Hutu
m a j o r i t y r u l e . The Hutu-dominated government i s v i r t u a l l y
powerless i n the face of T u t s i i n t r a n s i g e n c e . This, i n t u r n , i s
s t r e n g t h e n i n g h a r d l i n e Burundian Hutu leaders, who i n c r e a s i n g l y
see c o n f l i c t as t h e i r only means t o c o n s o l i d a t e t h e i r shaky hold
on power. | 3 5 '
.c
Rwandan Developments P o l a r i z i n g Burundian Hutus and T u t s i s .
The massive b l o o d l e t t i n g i n Rwanda has r a i s e d t h e l e v e l of mutual
d i s t r u s t between Burundian Hutus and T u t s i s . Each side i s
convinced t h a t i t cannot r i s k s h a r i n g power w i t h t h e other, which
i s u n d e r c u t t i n g the i n f l u e n c e o f t h e few remaining moderates who
f a v o r power sharing.
3.5c
Burundian T u t s i fears o f s h a r i n g power w i t h the Hutu m a j o r i t y
have deepened since the massacres o f n e a r l y t w o - t h i r d s of Rwanda's
T u t s i s between e a r l y A p r i l and mid-July, and t h e group's d e s i r e t o
r e g a i n f u l l c o n t r o l o f the government appears stronger than ever.
The mainly T u t s i UPRONA p a r t y and other o p p o s i t i o n groups place
l i t t l e stock i n the democratic process, saying i t would b r i n g t o
power a Hutu m a j o r i t y government t h a t would by d e f i n i t i o n be
repressive.
•
I n e a r l y August, UPRONA p u l l e d out o f power-sharing t a l k s w i t h
the " r u l i n g " Hutu FRODEBU p a r t y , c l a i m i n g recent appointments
of s e c u r i t y and l o c a l o f f i c i a l s v i o l a t e d t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s '
ground r u l e s . The T u t s i o p p o s i t i o n has demanded near p a r i t y
i n government jobs and t h e c r e a t i o n of t h e o f f i c e of v i c e
p r e s i d e n t , t o be f i l l e d by a T u t s i . | 3 5
,c
\
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
SECRET
_E.QJ.3.526_3..5.c_
EO 13526 3.5c
�SECRBT I
SUBJECT:
Burundi:
EO 13526 3.5c
Background t o C r i s i s
The 13,000-strong mostly T u t s i s e c u r i t y f o r c e s remain the
T u t s i s insurance p o l i c y . The c u r r e n t Army Chief, the Defense
M i n i s t e r , and other T u t s i m i l i t a r y leaders, who were among the
i n s t i g a t o r s of the bloody coup attempt l a s t October, a l l adamantly
r e j e c t the idea o f sharing power w i t h Hutus. T h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s t o
r e v o l t and a b i l i t y t o do so w i t h i m p u n i t y have h i g h l i g h t e d the
helplessness of A c t i n g President Ntibantuganya and i n t i m i d a t e d many
o t h e r Hutu p o l i t i c i a n s .
1
•
Much of Burundi's recent e t h n i c v i o l e n c e - - i n which about 1,000
c i v i l i a n s have been k i l l e d since A p r i l - - h a s stemmed from the
T u t s i Army's "cleansing" operations i n areas where i t
suspected Hutu p a r t y m i l i t i a s o f h a r b o r i n g weapons. | 3 5
.c
Hutus Edging Toward C o n f l i c t . Developments i n Rwanda have
a l s o diminished the commitment o f Burundi's Hutu l e a d e r s t o f i n d i n g
a p e a c e f u l outcome t o t h e i r country's c r i s i s . Some Hutu o f f i c i a l s
view UPRONA's n e g o t i a t i n g s t r a t e g y as the f i r s t s t e p toward a
b l o o d l e s s coup d'etat t h a t would r e s t o r e T u t s i dominance; these
o f f i c i a l s probably are c o r r e c t . Consequently, armed c o n f l i c t i s
i n c r e a s i n g l y a t t r a c t i v e t o Hutu h a r d l i n e r s .
•
The r a d i c a l Hutu PALIPEHUTU movement has been r e o r g a n i z i n g and
rearming i t s 5,000 f i g h t e r s since A p r i l .
•
Burundian government o f f i c i a l s have been r e c r u i t i n g Z a i r i a n
n a t i o n a l s and Hutu refugees i n Zaire's South Kivu Region t o
f i g h t the Burundian Army.
35
.c
Another Humanitarian D i s a s t e r Looming. The hardening
a t t i t u d e s o f both Hutus and T u t s i s are p r o p e l l i n g Burundi toward
l a r g e - s c a l e e t h n i c clashes t h a t w i l l create another h u m a n i t a r i a n
d i s a s t e r . More than 1.3 m i l l i o n d i s p l a c e d persons and former
Burundian refugees who have r e t u r n e d from n e i g h b o r i n g c o u n t r i e s are
a l r e a d y r e c e i v i n g humanitarian assistance. I n a d d i t i o n , n e a r l y
220,000 Burundian refugees remain i n Zaire, Tanzania, and Rwanda.
•
Burundian Hutus would l i k e l y stay away from t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l
safehaven i n Rwanda, f e a r i n g the new Tutsi-dominated
government i n K i g a l i . Fear o f the T u t s i has prompted many o f
the 300,000 Burundian refugees who f l e d t o Rwanda l a s t October
t o r e t u r n t o Burundi; the 53,000 who remain i n Rwanda are
mostly i n the French-designated safehaven.
•
New waves o f Burundian Hutu refugees probably would head f o r
Tanzania o r Z a i r e . | 3 5 1
.c
GECRET
EO 13526 3.5c
�CECRET
EO 13526 3.5c
APPENDIX
Burundi:
A " C l i f f Notes" History
Unlike most A f r i c a n s t a t e s , Rwanda and Burundi were not
a r t i f i c i a l creations o f c o l o n i a l r u l e ; t h e i r existence as
p o l i t i c a l e n t i t i e s goes back several c e n t u r i e s . Between the 15th
and 17th c e n t u r i e s , T u t s i herders moved i n t o the area from
Ethiopia and e s t a b l i s h e d dominance over Hutu farmers. Hutus
t r a d i t i o n a l l y were the s o c i a l i n f e r i o r s o f the T u t s i n o b i l i t y ,
who exchanged c a t t l e f o r personal s e r v i c e s . Both groups share
s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e s and the r e l a t e d K i r u n d i and Kinyarwanda
languages.
3.5c
Rwanda's T u t s i monarchy t r a d i t i o n a l l y was more c e n t r a l i z e d
and a u t h o r i t a r i a n than i n Burundi, where the king's power rested
on a s h i f t i n g set of f a c t i o n a l a l l i a n c e s . Rwanda a l s o was marked
by sharper s o c i a l d i s t i n c t i o n s between T u t s i s and Hutus. German
and Belgian r u l e i n the 20th century h i g h l i g h t e d e t h n i c
d i f f e r e n c e s i n both c o u n t r i e s , as c o l o n i a l a u t h o r i t i e s gave
T u t s i s d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e access t o e d u c a t i o n and government jobs.
3.5c
I n Burundi, T u t s i s remained i n c o n t r o l u n t i l l a s t year. The
contrast between Hutu r u l e i n Rwanda and the group's oppression
i n Burundi l e d t o Hutu u p r i s i n g s — i n 1965, 1969, 1972, and 1988 —
t h a t r e s u l t e d i n hundreds of thousands o f deaths. Each Hutu
a t t a c k fueled T u t s i f e a r s of e x t e r m i n a t i o n , and each bloody
repression r e i n f o r c e d the Hutus' d e s i r e f o r revenge.
Periodic
ethnic unrest r e s u l t e d i n three successful coups d ' e t a t and many
f a i l e d attempts.
The l a s t T u t s i p r e s i d e n t , P i e r r e Buyoya, judged
the s i t u a t i o n was untenable and o r c h e s t r a t e d l a s t year's e l e c t i o n
and t r a n s f e r of power.
3.5c
In the June 1993 e l e c t i o n , Melchoir Ndadaye's pro-Hutu
FRODEBU p a r t y won w i t h more than 60 percent o f the v o t e . The
e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s , however, have been subverted by the T u t s i c o n t r o l l e d m i l i t a r y . A coup attempt l a s t October r e s u l t e d i n the
murder of President Ndadaye--as w e l l as h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y
designated d i r e c t successors--and set o f f e t h n i c b l o o d l e t t i n g
t h a t k i l l e d as many as 50,000, drove another 600,000 i n t o
neighboring c o u n t r i e s , and displaced about 1 m i l l i o n w i t h i n the
country.
This year, Ndadaye's appointed Hutu successor d i e d i n
the plane crash t h a t also k i l l e d Rwandan Hutu President
Habyarimana, the T u t s i Army launched another a b o r t i v e coup, and
the T u t s i o p p o s i t i o n has blocked A c t i n g President
Ntibantunganya's e f f o r t s t o gain l e g i t i m a c y and c o n t r o l t h e
government.
3.5c
CECRET
EO 13526 3.5c
�Rice, Susan E.
From:
To:
Subject:
Date:
Priority:
Clarke, Richard A.
Affairs; @GLOBAL - Global Affairs
,
._
' POTUS for your clearance!
'-'flwsbay, August 11,1994 5:17PM
High
Package as Info Memo to Pres Covered by a Note from me to Lake
TO: Lake
FM: RAC
RE: Rwanda
Attached is the memorandum to the President you requested.
TO: POTUS
FM: LAKE
RE: Rwanda
While we have made progress of the emergency relief situation in and around Goma, three problems
threaten the success of the Rwandan relief operation.
First, the volcano near Goma is emitting ash and may soon erupt with lava that could threaten the
refugees. The US Geological Survey's expert believes that the current activity is an indicator that a major lava
eruption could occur within four weeks. We are providing the UN with all of the information we have on the
volcano's status and are urgently consulting with them, the French, and the Rwandan government about what
should be done with the refugees near the volcano. We may be able to use the volcanic activity as a catalyst to
begin large scale refugee repatriation. Before such repatriation occurs, however, we need to have a relief and
security system in place in Rwanda. The Rwandan government and the UN (both the peacekeepers and the
refugee programs) would have to coooperate quickly and effectively to begin a major repatriation effort soon.
Second, the Hutu dominated former Rwandan army is disrupting relief operations in Zaire and is
intimidating refugees who may want to return. The Zaire Army is not very capable of dealing with security
problems in this remote part of the country. We are consulting with the French and Zaire about what can be done
to insure the disarmament and control of this force. While the solution is likely to require the introduction of some
non-American peacekeeping force in the Goma area, we are examining whether there are things that the US
could do to help address this problem.
CLINTON LIBf&fcY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Third, ethnic tensions in Burundi are increasing. A Hutu/Tutsi massacre there could rival what
happened in Rwanda. We are taking steps to encourage mediation and conciliation. The Organization of African
Unity has deployed human rights observers. Several Deputy Representatives to the UN Security Council will visit
Burundi as a team in the next few days. We are trying to assemble a team of prominent Americans to visit there
soon. Finally, at the UNSYG Boutros-Ghali's request, we have offered to have some US Air Force relief cargo
flights for the Rwandan refugees land in Burundi as a reminder that the international community is watching. We
have declined for now to place a US Air Force airport team there, however, because a larger presence of US
military might be counterproductive and destabilizing.
CLINTON L l M W P O O O Y
HTCP
�SECRET
Rwanda Relief Ad Hoc Group
Summary & Conclusions
12 Aug 94 Meeting
1. Volcano: USGC experts will be dispatched to the area around Goma
immediately to do an assessment of the risk of a lava flow or gaseous spread on
Lake Kivu.
EO 13526 1.4d
3. UNAMIR: State will work with USUN to insure that the remaining problems
holding up the Ethiopian deployment are resolved ASAP. State and USUN will
insure that the UN issues an LOI indicating intention to pay for USAF flights
supporting the Tunisian deployment.
State will request Secretary Christopher to send a letter to Secretary Perry
requesting support for UNAMIR under the legal arrangements o£ the United
Rations Participation Act. This formal request will permit DOD to act prior to the
completion of UN contracts to repay DOD.
EO 13526 1.4d
5. Burundi: The US will support Salem-Salem (OAU) in his call for a summit in
Bujumbura. EUCOM will work with UNHCR to identify loads that USAF can fly
in to Bujumbura, to create a periodic USAF presence there. State and NSC will
work to create a high level US Delegation that will visit Burundi soon as a
stabilizing measure.
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
�C I T N L B A Y POOOY
L N O I R R HTCP
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�GECRET EO 13526 3.5c
25 August 1994
Zaire-Rwanda: Moving FAR Units North to Bunia
3.5c
1. What i s the status of the Former Rwandan Army (FAR) i n
eastern Zaire? We believe that there are some 10,000-12,000
soldiers of the FAR i n eastern Zaire who r e t a i n t h e i r personal
weapons. About 10,000 are near Goma i n b a t t a l i o n s i z e camps;
they have retained m i l i t a r y d i s c i p l i n e , t r a i n each morning, and
respond to senior command and c o n t r o l . While most of the FAR's
heavy equipment was siezed when they crossed the border l a s t
month, they continue to control a 37-mm a n t i - a i r c r a f t gun and a
few truck mounted mortars. Most of the 7,000-8,000 FAR troops
near Bukavu do not appear to have retained t h e i r weapons and they
are reportedly less disciplined, more disorganized, and less
l o y a l to their o f f i c e r s than t h e i r comrades near Goma. EO 13526 3^5c
2. Can the FAR be persuaded to move? Most of the armed FAR
troops i n Goma probably are committed to remaining an organized
force near the Rwandan border i n order to more e a s i l y resume
h o s t i l i t i e s against the new Rwandan P a t r i o t i c Front (RPF)
government. They reportedly have received four months of salary
i n advance, are receiving (partly through t h e f t of r e l i e f
assistance) adequate food, water, and medical supplies, and l i v e
i n m i l i t a r y - s t y l e tents. FAR u n i t s near Bukavu probably would
also resist moving, but many soldiers i n t h i s area are reportedly
s e l l i n g t h e i r weapons to buy food, suggesting that some might be
w i l l i n g to move to new camps that offered b e t t e r l i v i n g
conditions. I 3^5c '
3.
What i s
P r e s i d e n t Mobutu's view?
EO 13526 1.4c
EO 13526 1.4c
Mobutu has
EO 13526 1.4c
publicly
stated
that he w i l l prevent the FAR from resuming h o s t i l i t i e s , but we
have no specific evidence that he i s a c t i v e l y pursuing such an
objective. Mobutu has long-standing p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y t i e s
to the former Hutu regime. | 3.5c
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. 0. 13526
EO 13526 3.5c
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�L._35635J
EQ1.2_.c
4. Can Mobutu's m i l i t a r y forces f o r c i b l y move the FAR?
Probably n o t . Even i f Mobutu openly supported such a p o l i c y ,
there a r e o n l y about 2,500 Z a i r i a n troops--perhaps as many as
1,000 from Mobutu's Special P r e s i d e n t i a l D i v i s i o n (DSP)--in Kivu.
Z a i r i a n t r o o p s are deployed p r i m a r i l y i n Goma and Bukavu and
r a r e l y t r a v e l t o FAR camps l o c a t e d outside o f town. These troops
are i l l - d i s c i p l i n e d , p o o r l y t r a i n e d and l e d , and r e c e i v e l i t t l e
l o g i s t i c a l support; Z a i r i a n troops are l i k e l y responsible f o r a t
l e a s t h a l f o f a l l s e c u r i t y i n c i d e n t s near Goma. Z a i r i a n troops
would almost be c e r t a i n l y r e l u c t a n t t o f o r c i b l y attempt t o
redeploy t h e FAR, f e a r i n g - - c o r r e c t l y i n our v i e w - - t h a t they would
be outmanned, outgunned, and outclassed. The FAR senjpc
l e a d e r s h i p does spend considerable time i n Goma and Bukavu.
however, and Z a i r i a n forces would l i k g l y stand a b e t t e r chance of
detaining individual officers.
3.5c
5. Would moving the FAS. t o Bunia s i g n i f i c a n t l y undermine
i t s c a p a b i l i t i e s t o renew h o s t i l i t i e s ? Yes. Bunia i s over 400
km n o r t h o f Goma on the Ugandan border, s h a r p l y l i m i t i n g t h e i r
a b i l i t y t o conduct operations i n Rwanda. The roads i n the area
are v e r y p o o r - - e s p e c i a l l y during the c u r r e n t r a i n y season--and
the town's a i r p o r t probably cannot handle s i z a b l e t r a n s p o r t
a i r c r a f t . There are few Hutus among the indigenous p o p u l a t i o n ,
denying t h e FAR a n a t u r a l base of support.
3.5c
6. What a r e the i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r Zaire? P u t t i n g the FAR i n
Bunia would probably have l i t t l e immediate impact on Zaire's
p o l i t i c a l dynamics. Kinshasa would l i k e l y demand t h a t
i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l i e f agencies provide f o r FAR t r o o p w e l f a r e i n
order t o minimize t h e i r t h r e a t t o the l o c a l community. Mobutu
has s c a t t e r e d thousands of i l l - d i s c i p l i n e d , d i s l o y a l r e g u l a r Army
s o l d i e r s throughout Zaire's i n t e r i o r w i t h no obvious means o f
l o g i s t i c support. Although these troops o c c a s i o n a l l y engage i n
v i o l e n t l o o t i n g t o s u r v i v e , the unrest i s u s u a l l y contained t o
the i n d i v i d u a l town and has had no p o l i t i c a l impact.
3.5c
7. The deployment, however, could p o t e n t i a l l y complicate
Zaire's r e l a t i o n s w i t h Uganda, which have o f t e n been tense. The
border area has long hosted numerous armed groups t h a t engage i n
cross-border u n r e s t . The FAR, which views Uganda as an enemy f o r
s u p p o r t i n g t h e RPF, could t r y t o d e s t a b i l i z e President Musevini
as w e l l as l o o k i n g f o r o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o launch a t t a c k s against
Rwanda. Under such circumstances, Uganda might r e t a l i a t e w i t h
cross border a t t a c k s or support t o a n t i - Z a i r i a n groups.
3.5c
EO 13526 3.5c
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�.CECaEI.
EO 13526 3.5c
26 August
1994
Human Rights Abuses by the Rwandan P a t r i o t i c Front
Reports from a range of sources says t h a t forces l o y a l t o
the Rwandan P a t r i o t i c Front are k i l l i n g e t h n i c Hutus, s e i z i n g
p r o p e r t y , and committing other abuses throughout Rwanda. These
r e p o r t s appear p l a u s i b l e t o us. They r e f l e c t both conscious
p o l i c y by the RPF, which dominates the new regime i n K i g a l i , and
serious problems of d i s c i p l i n e and command-and-control among RPF
troops. We estimate t h a t at most s e v e r a l thousand Hutus have
been k i l l e d by RPF troops and s u p p o r t e r s - - f a r short of the
genocide p e r p e t r a t e d by the ousted Hutu regime against e t h n i c
T u t s i s . Nonetheless, whatever the m o t i v a t i o n , the abuses are
aggravating the r e g i o n a l refugee c r i s i s by d r i v i n g more Hutus out
of Rwanda and by b o l s t e r i n g r a d i c a l Hutu leaders' claims t h a t ,
because returnees face slaughter at thq RPF's hands, they should
remain o u t s i d e the country's borders.
3.5c
Evidence of P o l i c i e a Encouraging Abuses
-- Continued f l i g h t o f refugees i n t o Tanzania--some 40,000 have
l e f t t h i s month--suggests a systematic RPF crackdown on the
Hutu p o p u l a t i o n of Kibungo P r e f e c t u r e , which the Front has
c o n t r o l l e d f o r f o u r months.|
EQ 13526 1.4c
EO 13526 1.4c
[Hutu
refugees' d e s c r i p t i o n s of harsh RPF measures; Tanzanian
a u t h o r i t i e s have been p u l l i n g 20 t o 30 bodies each week from
the Kagera River on the border. Since mid-May we have
JLJLY_
received a steady stream of s i m i l a r r e p o r t s of RPF
EO 13526 1.4c
We b e l i e v e t h i s behavior represents scorched-earth t a c t i c s by
the RPF i n response t o an ongoing armed t h r e a t . f r o m Hutu
elements i n Kibungo. I
E_-..._iC
O13526L.-
-- We believe that s i m i l a r crackdowns--meant to encourage Tutsis
return as w e l l as to punish Hutus—have taken place elsewhere
~~~
Irelief
in Rwanda.
EO 13526 1.4c
agencies were not allowed i n t o "the eastern p o r t i o n s of Butare
and Gitarama Prefectures d u r i n g most of July--a p e r i o d when
d e s t r u c t i o n or s e i z u r e of Hutu p r o p e r t y
EO 13526 1.4c
i n the towns of Butare and Gitarama. This suggests the RPF
wanted no o u t s i d e witnesses of a v i o l e n t r o o t i n g out of
suspected enemies.
3.5c
EO 13526 3.5c
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
CLINTON
A
in
RY PHOTOCOPY
�_GEC.REJC_
EO 13526 3.5c
I n K i g a l i , according t o press r e p o r t s , T u t s i e x i l e s r e t u r n i n g
from Uganda say the RPF has given them houses and businesses
seized from Hutus. We view t h i s as evidence t h a t the Front i s
a c t i v e l y working t o t i l t the c a p i t a l ' s e t h n i c balance i n i t s
favor.
3.5c
The above a c t i o n s would be c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the RPF's p r a c t i c e
d u r i n g the c i v i l war o f not l e t t i n g c i v i l i a n o r h u m a n i t a r i a n
concerns keep i t from o b t a i n i n g m i l i t a r y o b j e c t i v e s .
The
RPF's remorseless s h e l l i n g of Hutu p o s i t i o n s i n K i g a l i between
May and J u l y i n f l i c t e d heavy c o l l a t e r a l losses, i n c l u d i n g
barrages t h a t damaged Red Cross h o s p i t a l s and UN f a c i l i t i e s .
S i m i l a r l y , an RPF mortar a t t a c k on f l e e i n g Hutu t r o o p s i n
Goma, Zaire, i n mid-July set o f f a deadly panicked stampede
among c i v i l i a n refugees i n the t a r g e t zone.
3.5c
RPF leaders have created an atmosphere conducive to abuses
with public pronouncements on the need for " j u s t i c e " on a
massive s c a l e against the authors of the a n t i - T u t s i genocide.
Some have spoken of the need t o a r r e s t , t r y , and punish up to
40,000 mass murderers, and the RPF has c i r c u l a t e d l i s t s w i t h
hundreds o f names of suspected r i n g l e a d e r s . | 3.5c
'
Evidence of Uncontrollable Armed Groups
the Rwandan
EO 13526 1.4c
P a t r i o t i c Army's control over i t s troops has shrunk as i t s
strength has swollen past 25,000 from an ear y A p r i l l e v e l of
RPF t r o o p s went
10,000.
EO 13526 1.4c
on a spree of r a p i n e and summary executions a f t e r they
captured K i g a l i on 4 J u l y . The RPF regime's announcement t h i s
week of the execution of two s o l d i e r s f o r a t r o c i t i e s and the
a r r e s t of 60 o t h e r s i n d i c a t e s t h a t i t i s aware i n d i s c i p l i n e i s
a problem.
Prime M i n i s t e r Twagiramungu--not an RPF member-says t h a t the m i l i t a r y ' s d i s c i p l i n e has evaporated and t h a t
Defense M i n i s t e r Kagame may have l o s t c o n t r o l of the f o r c e ,
EO 13526 1.4c
the RPF
has armed r e t u r n i n g T u t s i refugees and g i v e n m i l i t a r y t r a i n i n g
to n e a r l y every able-bodied T u t s i t o defend a g a i n s t Hutu
r a i d s . These v i g i l a n t e groups have k i l l e d Hutus who have
f a l l e n under s u s p i c i o n due t o t h e i r education, p u r p o r t e d
p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s , or coveted possessions.
3.5c
Outside of "hot" zones such as Kibungo, we b e l i e v e these
v i g i l a n t e s and undisciplined, vengeful soldiers--operating on
t h e i r own-- have been r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the a t r o c i t i e s . This was
almost c e r t a i n l y the case i n the murder of the C a t h o l i c
Archbishop of K i g a l i and other clergymen i n e a r l y June. I t
probably ha a l s o been t r u e of r e p o r t e d massacres of Hutu
v i l l a g e r s a long the edge of the former French s e c u r i t y zone i n
southwester n Rwanda and apparent k i l l i n g s of some r e t u r n i n g
refugees i n Gisenyi P r e f e c t u r e . [ 3.5c
EO 13526 3.5c
mNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�GDCnBT
EO 13526 3.5c
The RPF may l a c k t h e muscle and t h e p o l i t i c a l w i l l to r e i n i n
|the dispersal
freelance T u t s i k i l l e r s . |
EO 13526 1 4
.c
of RPF troops across Rwanda has g r e a t l y d i l u t e d the commandand-control exercised by commanders. At t h e same time, as
long as t h e regime f e e l s under t h r e a t o f a t t a c k , i t i s l i k e l y
to be r e l u c t a n t t o r e i n in--much less p u n i s h - - i t s e n t h u s i a s t i c
supporters among the v i g i l a n t e bands and newly r e c r u i t e d
troops. | 3 5 ^
.c
EO 13526 3.5c
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�SECRET
Ad Hoc Meeting on Rwanda
Wednesday, September 7, 1994
10:30 a.m. - 11:30 a.m.
White House S i t u a t i o n Room
AGENDA
1.
S i t u a t i o n Report
2.
CIA
O p e r a t i o n Support Hope
JCS
--Timetable for U.S. Withdrawal
--Additional USG Contributors
....State/AID
3.
Security in Refugee Camps in
Zaire....State/OSD
4.
UNAMIR Deployment
5.
Radios
OSD
6.
Burundi
State
OSD
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CLI NTONdrfBRAftY-^HOTOCOPY
�F:\Email\Data_Source\Al\Record\CD001\sep94\052054.html
Page 1 of 1
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
14-Sep-1994 15:58 EDT
MEMORANDUM FOR:
RECORDS
( RECORDS@Al@OEOB )
FROM:
Rice, Susan E.
(rices@NSCSTF@OEOB@MSGATE@VAXB)
SUBJECT:
- [COMF1 DSNTlAL'j- Ad Hoc Meeting on Rwanda
Message C r e a t i o n Date was a t 14-SEP-1994 15:36:00
Tony/Nancy—
We had proposed h o l d i n g an Ad Hoc Meeting on Rwanda on Thursday. Since t h a t
t i m e , S t a t e and DOD have s u b s t a n t i a l l y narrowed t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s on t h e key
i s s u e o f t h e e x t e n t o f c o n t i n u e d USG support f o r UNHCR e f f o r t s i n t h e
region.
Given t h i s , and t h e e x c e p t i o n a l l y p r e s s i n g demands on your time t h i s week,
we recommend NOT h o l d i n g an Ad Hoc Meeting t h i s week. I n s t e a d , we w i l l
f o r w a r d t o you a memo t o t h e P r e s i d e n t recommending t h a t he approve t h e JCS
w i t h d r a w a l p l a n and t h e p r o v i s i o n o f s p e c i f i c a d d i t i o n a l goods and s e r v i c e s
t o UNHCR. We w i l l a l s o update you on o t h e r developments r e : Rwanda/Burundi.
We w i l l l e t you know when we t h i n k t h e time i s r i p e f o r another Ad Hoc
meeting.
A d d i t i o n a l Header I n f o r m a t i o n Follows
Date Created: 14-Sep-1994 15:36
D e l e t a b l e Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 052054
VMS Filename: OA$SHARA21:ZVKCMTCYM.TXT
A l F o l d e r : SEP94
Message Format:
Message S t a t u s : READ
Date M o d i f i e d : 14-Sep-1994 15:36
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
D e l i v e r y - R e c e i p t Requested: NO
Message P r i o r i t y : FIRST_CLASS
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�Page 1 of2
2E8759B2.FIN
MSMail
DATE-TIME
26 September 94 16:27
FROM
Rice, Susan E.
CLASSIFICATION -CONriDENTIAL
SUBJECT
Subject: RE: [CONriDCNTIAL]
TO
Richardson, Craig
CARBON_COPY
NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT BODY
Sounds good. Why don't you run with this. Ask eric for the appropriate
contact person at DOD. It's likely to be someone in Pat Irvin's office, if
not her. She's DAS for humanitarian. I don't know who the JS person would
be. Again try Eric.
We survived the speech. The POTUS plugged Menem by name. All in all,
considering, it's gone well. The BBG meeting was a success, and POTUS had a
nice brief visit to the UN Situation Center, which was rewarding from my
perspective. We had customary speech hell, but in the end, I think it was
ok.
Thanks again for all your tremendous help. Your memo on White HELL is
becoming the gospel on the subject. Congrats.
From: Richardson, Craig V.
To: Clarke, Richard A.; Rice, Susan E.
CC: /N, NonRecord at A l
Subject: [UNCLASSIFIED] More White Helmets
Date: Monday, September 26, 1994 03:38 PM
I just spoke to Chat Blakeman -- really nice guy. He mentioned the line in
the POTUS UNGA speech and suggested that "Looks like we are headed more
toward your guys' view of White Helmets than the Peace Corp-type view." I
agreed.
On Wednesday, Frijiero (Menem's envoy) is essentially meeting with the same
crew that met last Friday at State. Chat proposes that we (1) arrange for a
crisis response person from DOD to show up at that meeting or (2) arrange
for a separate Frijiero visit to the DOD element that does - say - the
Rwanda ops or (3) both. I said I thought this was a good idea, since it
really doesn't make sense to have a Peace Corps type as interlocutor, in
light of the POTUS speech.
Reactions? Suggestions? Who should be call at DOD?
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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DECLASSIFIED)
PER E„0„ 13526
�Page 1 of 3
2E8E544E.FIN
MSMail
DATE-TIME
01 October 94 23:37
FROM
Steinberg, Donald K.
CLASSIFICATION
CONriDENTIAL
SUBJECT
Subject: [CONFIDENTIAL] Update on Mandela
TO
Cicio, Kristen K.
Darby, Melanie B.
Emery, Mary C.
Hall, Wilma G.
Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Millison, Cathy L.
Reed, James W.
Sens, Andrew D.
Veit, Katherine M.
Wolin, NealS.
Wright, Allison M.
CARBON COPY
Anderson, Marjorie
Atkin, Timothy J.
Battenfield, Pat
Beers, Rand R.
Blakeman, Earle C.
Brown, Dallas
Clarke, Richard A.
Darragh, Sean J.
Deshazer, Macarthur X.
Feinberg, Richard E.
Harris, Elisa D.
Jensen-Moran, Jeri L.
Kreczko, Alan J.
Lindsey, Wanda
Mazzuchi, Anthony D.
Norman, Marcia G.
Owen, Elisa J.
Rice, Susan E.
Richardson, Craig
Rocha, Victor M.
Rossin, Larry
Roundtree, Beverly J.
Sartor, Cyril
Schwartz, Eric P.
Simon, Steven N.
Steinberg, Donald K.
Teraji, Barbara
Marcel T. Thomas
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O )PY
HTC
!
�2E8E544E.FIN
Page 2 of 3
Cathryn, Thorup L.
Turner, Veronica B.
TEXT BODY
Nancy, Will and Others:
I spoke this evening with Hennie de Klerk, the Americas director for the
South African Department of Foreign Affairs and honcho of the Mandela State
Visit. He said that the President, Foreign Minister and others will be
discussing various aspects of the visit tomorrow (Sunday) afternoon in New
York, including the question of the radio address and the walk at the
Lincoln Memorial. He said that the plan is now for Mandela to depart from
Washington on Friday night after the S.A. Embassy's reception, which could
complicate the radio address planning. He stressed there were no hard
feelings over the change in Mandela's overnight plans on Tuesday, although
he implied that Mandela had warmed up to the idea of staying at the White
House and was actually looking forward to it....
We discussed the substance of the visit, including the 14 separate
initiatives we plan to pursue, and he thought all of them were reasonable.
He wanted to look at the language we planned to use and I faxed him a
non-paper describing the initiatives. I
EO 13526 1.4b. EO 13526 1
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
left open the possibility of issuing a joint communique on behalf of the two
governments or presidents describing some or all of the new initiatives.
Hennie affirmed that it would be good for the two Presidents to talk about
Africa-wide issues, not just the bilateral relationship. He appreciated
that President Clinton plans to thank Mandela for his initiatives in
Lesotho, Mozambique and Angola. I mentioned some of our new initiatives
vis-a-vis conflict resolution, demobilization of oversized African armies
and debt relief ~ he agreed that these might be good topics for the
Presidents to discuss and to which they could publicly reaffirm their
commitment.!
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d"
We talked about the Southern Africa Enterprise Development Fund. We agreed
that the best way to handle the announcement of this Southern Africa-wide
program is to have President Clinton announce it at the press availability
on Wednesday with Andy Young (the new board director), Brian Atwood and the
Ambassadors from the Southern African nations present.
(Dick/Larry) I asked about Haiti. He said that he does not yet have an
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�Page 3 of 3
2E8E544E.FIN
answer as to what President Mandela will say.| EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
(Elisa) I asked about MTCR. Hennie said he expected the agreement to be
signed in Pretoria on Monday and that a quiet release would be issued there.
He wasn't certain how the South Africans wanted the issue to be address
publicly during the visit -- that is, whether they wanted to be
congratulated on this step. He said he would get back to us on the issue.
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
I'll be talking with Hennie again tomorrow afternoon if there's anything
anyone would like me to raise with him.
Don
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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Page 1 of 1
MSMail
DATE-TIME
06 October 94 16:16
FROM
Rice, Susan E.
CLASSIFICATION
-CONnDCNTIAt
SUBJECT
Subject: [COfrJriDENTfrtiTTtJpdate on Funding for Rwanda's IFI Arrears
TO
Cicio, Kristen K.
Emery, Mary C.
Hall, Wilma G.
Veit, Katherine M.
Wolin, Neal S.
CARBON COPY
Atkin, Timothy J.
Battenfield, Pat
Beers, Rand R.
Brown, Dallas
Clarke, Richard A.
Darragh, Sean J.
Deshazer, Macarthur X.
Lindsey, Wanda
Norman, Marcia G.
Owen, Elisa J.
Rice, Susan E.
Richardson, Craig
Roundtree, Beverly J.
Sartor, Cyril
Schwartz, Eric P.
Simon, Steven N.
Steinberg, Donald K.
TEXT BODY
NOTE FOR LAKE
State has agreed to provide $2 mill, of the $7.2 mill, required to pay off
Rwanda's IFI arrears. State is demarching Germany and Belgium to make
generous contributions as well. State hopes for responses by mid-late next
week.
At this time, we will need to determine the amount of the remaining
requirement, if any, and State may need to provide the balance. Depending
on the size of the shortfall, State/AID may have to be "encouraged" to find
the funds.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
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Page 1 of 1
MSMai
DATE-TIME
11 October 94 17:13
FROM
Atkin, Timothy J.
CLASSIFICATION
CONriDENTIAL
SUBJECT
Subject: [CONFIDENTIAfc]-
TO
Deshazer, Macarthur X.
CARBON_COPY
Rice, Susan E.
TEXTBODY
Mac:
At the Rwanda SVTS, not much new info today - FYI, there is drawdown
authority for $25M this fiscal year (95) specified for warcrimes tribunals
but not country specific, so. . . the Rwanda portion can be funded from that
too.
Arrears: State has identified $2.5M and is prepping demarches to go out
(maybe tomorrow) to seek other donors. OMB is confirming w/Treas that the
total World Bank arrears is $4.4M and not linked to the African Devt Bank
arrears.
Security issues/UNAMIR mandate will be addressed by the peacekeeping core
group later this week.
No SVTS on friday - next meeting will be next Tues at 1:00 pm.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
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MSMai
DATE-TIME
15 October 94 10:18
FROM
Atkin, Timothy J.
CLASSIFICATION -CONriDENTIAL
SUBJECT
Subject: [CONTIDENTIAL-f Rwanda War Crimes Tribunal
TO
Simon, Steven N.
CARBON_COPY
Rice, Susan E.
TEXT BODY
hi steve: the war crimes tribunal working group is focusing on putting
together a $3M voluntary contribution to jump start the establishment of the
Rwanda portion of the Yugoslav war crimes tribunal. So far, they have
identified $1M within the DOS budget that can (and is willing to be)
reprogrammed for this function. Still trying to think of where $2M more can
come from!!???
Once the budget needs are id'd at the UN and approved in december, we will
make our assessment contribution out of the $25M of drawdown funds for war
crimes tribunals.
Any thoughts about the start up contribution????????????????????????
PER E„<a 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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'94
lij:2bPH
US-rHSSIOrMf.
U N I T E D STATES M I S S I O N
DATE :
P. 1 • 3
TO T H E U N I T E D
^Cdr^tf
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CLASSIFICATION
FROM
(Phone Number)
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SUBJECT
PHONE i
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REMARKS!
•ffic«
P o l i t i c a l Military Affairs
us Mission t« the United Natiens
799 UN Plaza
New Yerk, NY
l»tl7
Phoned (212) 415-4333
UnclaasFAX* (212) 415-4154
ClassFax# (212) 1 (b)f7)c
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
�OCT
'94
P.I
liZi:Z"PM IJS-I'HSSIC'N-NY
z
•CQUVIVURTLAL
UNITED
STATES
M I S S I O N TO T H E U N I T E D
799 UNITED NATIONS PLAZA
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017
NATIONS
25 October 1994
TO:
Interagency Group on Rwanda
FROM:
-r
hi
Susan Varisco£j\
i /K->Ti|w---v--«^--^
SUBJECT: Rwanda: UN Options for Security i n the Camps
DPKO has received several reporta i n the last week from the
UN-Zaire Joint Working Group (led by the Deputy Force Commander
of UNAMIR) and from SRSG Khan. USUN has not received copies of
the reports, but has been briefed on t h e i r conclusions.
J t . Working Group Conclusions:
i
UN Report
The initial report submitted by the UN participants concludes
that a 10,000-12,000 size force is required to separate and move /M
the militia, leaders, and the army and contain them thereafter.
It also concludes that the only force capable of accomplishing
this mandate is a strong national force or multinational force
consisting mainly of one strong state.
fert^cih
Z ^ ^ J i
0)
The report also stresses the need t o s t a r t a p o l i t i c a l
dialogue between refugee leaders and the Government of Rwanda as
well as i n i t i a t e s i g n i f i c a n t social and economic reconstruction
inside the country.
The formal report includes Zairian input, but contains a less
substantive discussion of the options, i t proposes three options:
5)^
o
A purely diplomatic approach t o removing m i l i t a r y , m i l i t i a
and leaders from the camps.
r
o
Joint Zairian/UN and Tanzania/UN Ch V I I operations. Zaire
and Tanzania would have the leading role and the UN would
provide l o g i s t i c a l and other support.
The recommended option i s a Ch V I I national operation as
described i n the UN report above.
N
CLIN O LIBW^OTOCOPY
�:
O T 25 '94 10 29PM US-MISSION-NY
C
P. 3.- 3
OONPIDEMTIAL
SRSG Recommendation:
In his i n i t i a l submission the SRSG recommended a smaller U
N
force (size undefined). The force would provide security for
humanitarian operations and attempt to "suppress" the militia
through presence. Ch VII authority was recommended.
J/poUi
Khan also emphasized p o l i t i c a l dialogue and socioeconomic
reconstruction as integral components of the operation.
The S S submitted a second recommendation after DPKO
RG
^•requestecL-acih VI option. He suggested a UN operation that would
g- t r a i n (Zairiari and^Tahzania^ forces t o police the refugee camps
<
2^
and w?ot*ct~humanitarian workers. This option would presumably
include material assistancef as well.
f SYG Report:
•< ^
After t h i s week's interagency meeting, DPKO w i l l develop i t s
own report t o submit t o the Council. I t w i l l probably present a
range of options based on the submissions of the J t . Working .
Group and the SRSG and U G input.
S
'
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J
�Secret
Intelligence Report
Office of African and Latin American Analysis
Rwanda: Reassessing the Demographic Balance
28 October 1994
3.5c
Since the systematic genocide between April and June 1994 of hundreds of thousands
of Tutsis in Rwanda, a large influx of Tutsi exiles from neighboring states and the
massive flight of Hutus appear to have boosted the Tutsi share of the population. We
estimate that about 5.3 million people are now living within Rwanda's borders,
approximately 11 percent of whom are Tutsis.
• More than 2 million Rwandans, mostly Hutus, have become refugees in
neighboring states this year. Nearly as many are displaced within Rwanda,
and Rwandan Patriotic Front threats to forcibly close displaced person
camps could drive many of these Hutus into exile as well.
• The slaughter of an estimated 375,000 Tutsis earlier this year has been largely
offset by the return of some 340,000 longtime Tutsi exiles, mainly from
Burundi and Uganda. Most of Rwanda's surviving Tutsis are settling around
Kigali and in the eastern part of thd country, according to| EO 13526 1.4c
press reports. | 3.5c
We expect this pattern to persist for the next year or two. The RPF, which
dominates the new regime in Kigali, is based in the Tutsi diaspora and undoubtedly
views the new demographic balance as tightening its grip on power and as
protective of Tutsi ethnic interests. Top RPF leaders have publicly stated, for
instance, that they could wait "50 years for the Hutu refugees to return.
• Most Hutu refugees appear unwilling to return home as long as the RPF is
in charge.[^_
EO 13526 1.4C
[individual Hutus
fear retribution by Tutsis, and Hutuleaders want to keep refugees in the
camps, where they form the political base for a self-styled Hutu govemmentin-exile. 3.5c
Over the longer run, however, Hutu refugees are likely to return, restoring a
demographic balance similar to that of early 1994. All the neighboring states say
that the refugees are an unacceptable burden and must be repatriated as soon as
possible, according to EO 13526 1.4c pressi reports.
In particular Zaire-'Which is under the heaviest refugee burden and had
close ties to the ousted Hutu regime—may eventually be tempted to support
an anti-RPF insurgency by the Hutus at least partly as a way of inducing
them to return home. Uganda's President Museveni supported the REEs^
insurgency in part to rid his country of unwanted Rwandan Tutsis. 3.5c
ALA 94-40021
EO 13526 3.5c
EO 13526 3.5c
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
i
�EO 13526 3.5c
"Dead are the dogs and the rats, making way for the cows and the
drum."
-Legend of the Tutsis' arrival in Rwanda, referring to symbols
of wealth and sovereignty
A Look at the Key Variables
Overall Trends. Since the ethnic civil war resumed on 6 April 1994, we calculate
from the admittedly incomplete and at times contradictory information available to us
that the population living within Rwanda has dropped to 5.3 million, or by about
30 percent,fromthe 7.7 million inhabitants estimated by the US Census Bureau on
1 April. This drop is the net effect of three main factors:
1
EO 13526 1.4c
Flight by "new" refugees. According to
US Government agencies, some 2.2 million Rwandans have left the country
since April. Nearly all are ethnic Hutus who fled the Tutsi-dominated RPF as
it gained control and formed a new government Although an estimated
75,000 Tutsis left the country in April aind May, relief agencies report that at
least 60,000 of them have since returned.
Deaths. In June, we estimated that 500,000 Rwandans had died in the
fighdng-about three-quarters of them Tutsis killed in a campaign of genocide
orchestrated by_the_s.u.6!S5fluettUtjoustedregime. Based on information
available from! EO 13526 1.4c press reports, we calculate that since June
another 80,000 or so Rwandans have died; most appear to be Hums-victims
of disease in refugee camps and, to a lesser extent, of Tutsis avenging the
deaths of their kin.
2
Return of "old" refugees. Somewhat offsetting the demographic impact of
deaths and refugeeflight,around 60 percent or the 545,000 longtime
Rw.andan_TutsLrefuKeesresidingin neighboring states have repatriated.
EO 13526 1.4c
]200.000 Tutsis have returned from Burundi alone.
EO 13526 1.4c
Ithcre has also been
iIntelligence Report ALA 9440002 (Confidential! 3.5c [of 23 June 1994.Rwanda: Establishing t
Demographic Baseline, evaluated changes in the country's population between 6 April and 1 June
1994, with a particular focus on the Tutsi minority. W estimated (hen that 125,000 Hutus and
e
375,000 Tutsis-about 60 percent of the 628,000 Tutsis believed to have been in Rwanda on
1 April 1994"had been killed and that another 418,000 Rwandans hadfledto neighboring states.
2
3.5c
In areportissued on 28 June 1994, the Special Rapporteur for Rwanda of the UN Commission o
n
H m n Rights found on the basis of available evidence that "h t r ' e o i e should henceforth b
u a
t e e m g n cd *
e
used as regards the Tutsi." | 3.5c
This report was prepared by|
3 5c
|Office of African and Latin American Antfyiit, with a contribution
fromj 3.5c
ALA. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, 3,5c
-
L.3.5.C- lALA.1
1
EO 13526 3.5c
�EO 13526 3.5c
large-scale movement from Uganda and smaller flows from Tanzania and
Zaire. These refugeesfledethnic clashes in Rwanda between 1959 and 1964,
as Hutus ousted Tutsis from their traditional dominance; they and ^heii
children form the core of the RPF's leadership and military forces. 3.5c
Likely Effects on Fertility and Mortality Rates
The massive demographic disruptions this year probably have reversed Rwanda's
progress in reducing fertility rates since the early 1980s. The US Bureau of the
Census says there was a declinefrom8.5 children per woman in 1983 to about 6.2
children in 1994, reflecting both increased use of contraception and arisein the
average age of marriage. |
EO 13526 1.4c
[however, the fighting,
genocide, and refugee flight destroyed most of the country's social infrastructurealmost certainly including the family planning network, whose restoration
probably is not a high priority for the new RPFregime.In the Hutu refugee
camps, contraception is almost completely unavailable, and I
EO 13526 1.4c
up to 90 percent of refugee women of childbearing age are pregnant; this
may also reflect_wjdespread prostitution and rape in the camps' unsettled
conditions. [ 3.5c ]
The mortality rate among Rwandan populations probably also has increased,
reflecting poor nutrition, illness, and other stresses associated with the mass
migrations, as well as the destruction of health care facilities. In addition, these
factors probably have boosted the rate of AIDS infection, which, according to the
Census Bureau, accounted for therisein the crude death rate increased from
almost 17 per 1,000 in 1985 to an estimated 20 or more per 1,000 this year.
3.5c
In combination, these demographic changes, according to our calculations, have
increased the proportion of Tutsis in Rwandafromaround 8 percent to 11 percentdespite Hutu extremists' efforts last spring and summer to eliminate the group.
Various sources report that most of the Tutsi returnees and survivors of the massacres
in Rwanda are concentrating in a sort ofJITutsi;and" around Kigali and in the eastern
prefectures of Kibungo and Byumba. [ 3.5c
3
Tbe Ethnic Angle
Rwanda's new demographic balance reflects deliberate policy choices by the RPF
regime's leaders. L
EO 13526 1.4c
[RPF leaders have
encouraged therepatriationof longtime Tutsi refugeesfromneighboring states-the
constituency that has been the hardest core of the RPFs support-because of fear that
Tutsis were spread too thin within Rwanda.
EO 13526 1.4c
the RPF is encouraging Tutsi repatriates to occupy the houses and"
f T.._.
c
j
. .
.i«
j
.
other property _ofr Huturefugees,despitei the government's public _
denunciatione of such
3
Until this year, according to Rwandan Government census data, the heaviest concentration of Tutsis
was in the four southwestern prefectures, where the g o p accounted for about M percent of (he
ru
population. This was the lastregioncaptured b the RPF, and we believe these Tutsli suffered
y
particularly heavy losses. 3.5c
�EO 13526 3.5c
expropriations. The RPF probably views in a similar light the concentrated
resettlement of Tutsis around Kigali and in the east, which bolsters the minority's
ability to protect itself against future genocide attempts. [ 3.5c "
'
The Hutu exodus appears to be a result of both political manipulation by leaders of
the ousted Hutu regime and the security concerns of Hutu individuals and
communities. Hutu government leaders who had orchestrated the massacre of Tutsis
encouraged the massive flight of Hutusfromthe country-some 460,000 to Tanzania
in April and more than 1 million to Zaire in July--in an apparent effort to deny
legitimacy to the RPF, various reports say. Since mid-July, according to a variety of
reporting, harsh crackdowns and Hutu fears of reprisals by RPF troops and Tutsi
vigilantes-as well as possible threatsfromradical Hutu militiamen-have driven at
least 80,000 into Tanzania, as well as smaller numbers who joined the refugees
already in Zaire. | 3.5c
4
UN agencies estimate that another 2 million Hutus are displaced within Rwanda, with
the largest concentration in the southwest, where they fled to a humanitarian safe
zone established during the French military deployment between July and September
1994. Like the refugees, these displaced persons fear RPF reprisals should they
return home, and aid workers report that they appear resigned to remain in internal
exile indefinitely.
EO 13526 1.4c
_ _ jthe RPF has threatened to close down
camps sheltering some 800;000 displaced Hutus in the southwest because it
views the displaced persons camps as safehavens for radical Hutu militiamen.
Although UN pressure has led the RPF to back downfromthis threat for now,
we judge that even the rumor of an RPF move against the camps CQiUd_Djinic
this skittish population into a mass exodus to Zaiire and Burundi. [ 3.5c '
Victims of a Lesser Genocide
Rwanda's smallest ethnic group-the pygmoid Twa, marginalized hunters and
gatherers who made up only about 0.4 percent of the population in April-appears
to have suffered even greater losses in the fighting than the Tutsis and Hutus.
EO 13526 1.4c [speculates that as many as three-quarters of the Twa population
may have been murdered, and press reports indicate that Hutu refugees in Zaire
are preventing their Twa countrymenfromreceiving food aid. This undoubtedly
reflects Hutus" longstanding disdain for the Twa, who served Rwanda's traditional
^utsLQM3lQrcls_asjfourt jesters, spies, and assassins,!
EO 13526 1.4c
EO 13526 1.4c
EO 13526 1.4c
�v ^ ^ i
v»;
EO 13526 3.5c
Prospects and Implications
Trends Likely to Continue for Now... The RPF-dominated regime in Kigali has little
incentive to change its ethnically driven policies. Even after the RPF is satisfied that
all willing Rwandan Tutsis have taken advantage of their newrightto return, the
Front is not likely to encourage a large-scale repatriation of Hutus. Kigali says tens
of thousands of Hutus are guilty of war crimes--which, taking into consideration their
families, casts suspicions on hundreds of thousands of the refugees-and many Tutsis
undoubtedly welcome a chance to give Hutus a taste of exile.
• Vice President iCagame-the regime's apparent strongman-has puhlicly-said
/ j his-govenuTient could wait "50 years" to seek justice againstmasskillers and
/ settle the refugee issue; he says there is no need for ha^eufresoTving the
issue becausg^ftheinternational community's willingness to feed the
refugees.
3.5c
In any case, there are signs that many Hutus will remain unwilling to return to their
homes in Rwanda as long as the RPF controls the government Individual Hutus
probably will continue to fear for their security because of widespread reports of RPF
and Tutsi retribution, as evidenced by the fact that only a trickle have left refugee and
displaced persons camps. Hutu leaders probably will persist in fostering these fearscontinuing to use such tactics as physical threats and propaganda-in order to retain a
political base for a self-styled govemment-in-exile.
^radical Hutu militias control the
EO 13526 1.4c
largest camps LrTZaire and"TanzaniI7wfiichthey use for military training and
as bases for raids into Rwanda.
J
Hutu leaders and rank and file hope to eventually return in force to Rwanda to
oust the RPF, butl
EO 13526 1.4c
•military commanders
recognize that their troops will not be able to do so for some time. | 3.5c
...But Are Unsustainable in the Longer Run. Although the international community
is likely to continue providing enough food aid and other necessities to keep the Hutu
refugees alive, we doubt that so many angry, dispossessed people can be kept in
refugee camps indefinitely. Harsh conditions in the camps undoubtedly will lead
some to overcome their fear of the RPF-and their own Hutu leaders-to repatriate
spontaneously. I 3.5c
Moreover, host governments in the region will become increasingly insistent that the
Rwandans repatriate. The refugees represent an enormous strain on the limited
resources anafragileenvironments of all the host states, and their presence has
worsened chronic ethnic conflicts in Zaire and Burundi.
Kinshasa and Dar Es Salaam have both said they want the refugees gone as
soon as possible, according to press EO 13526 i 4c reports.
EO 13526 1.4c
JBurundi's Tutsi military commanders have
identified the Rwandan Hutu refugees there as the greatest security threat to
the coalition government in Bujumbura.
P
�EO 13526 3.5c
The longer this huge refugee population burdens Rwanda's neighbors, the
greater the chance in our view that at least one of them-particularly Zaire,
which has received the largest group and had closetiesto the ousted Hutu
regime-would support an anti-RPF insurgency at least partly as a way to send
the refugees home. Uganda's President Museveni supported the RPF's
insurgency in part toridhis country of unwanted Rwandan Tutsis. I 3.5c
LTVVI
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�EQJ352SJL5S
ANNEX 1
I
Rwanda: Tne Demographic Score Card, 1 ApriM October 1994
(Thousands)
Tutsi
Total
Hutu
7,657
100.0%
6,998
91.4%
Less:
Deaths
Deaths through 6/94
Refugee deaths since 7/94
RPF revenge killings
585
510
65
10
195
125
60
10
15
10
5
0
Outflows of "New Refugees"
to: Tanzania
Zaire
Burundi
Uganda
2,155
542
1,332
270
11
2,135
537
1,317
270
11
5
0
5
0
0
339
200
100
19
20
0
0
0
0
0
339
200
100
19
20
0
0
0
0
0
5,256
100.0%
4,668
88.8%
577
11.0%
11
0.2%
2,000
0
0
0
0
0
0
206
45
Population on 1 April 94
Numbers
Percentage
Plus:
Return of "Old" Refugees
from: Burundi
Uganda
Tanzania
Zaire
Population on 1 October 94
Numbers
Percentage
Memorandum Items:
-Internally displaced
•-"Old" Refugees In Other Countries
-Burundi
-Uganda
-Tanzania
-Zaire
EO 13526 3.5c
628
8.2%
100
31
30
Twa
31
0.4%
�ANNEX 2
Changes in Population Inside Rwanda
1 April -1 October 1994
(in Millions)
10
Twa
Hutu
8 -
6
TutBl
-
4 -
2 -
I
1 April 94
EO 13526 3.5c
I
1 Octob«r94
�Rwandan Population Movements, April-October 1994
ZAIRE
Total: 13 million "new" refugees;
30,000 "old" refugees
UGANDA
148,000 new refugees.
Total; 10,5000 "new" refugees;
100,000 "old" refugees
850,000 new refugees.
(94,000 new refugees. |
Total: 542,000 "new"
refugees; 31,000 "old"
]refugees
ZAIRE
Kamonyola
^ 0 0 0 new refugees.
PREPARED 23 OCTOBER M
EO 13526 3.5c
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CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�Page 1 of 1
REB7D63B.FIN
MSMail
DATE-TIME
02 November 94 09:13
FROM
Clarke, Richard A.
CLASSIFICATION
-CONriDCNTIAL
SUBJECT
Subject: How I spent my day in New York [CONriDENTIAL] •
TO
Emery, Mary C.
Wolin, Neal S.
CARBON COPY
Atkin, Timothy J.
Beers, Rand R.
Brown, Dallas
Clarke, Richard A.
Darragh, Sean J.
Lindsey, Wanda
Norman, Marcia G.
Rice, Susan E.
Richardson, Craig
Rossin, Larry
Roundtree, Beverly J.
Schwartz, Eric P.
Simon, Steven N.
TEXT BODY
FOR BERGER
Readout of meetings with Kofi Annan et al on Tuesday.
1. On Haiti: Kofi can;t get BBG to focus on the Schroeder appointment while
BBG is travelling. He will return around 11 November. Suggest we recommend
to JCS getting Schroeder over here as a TDY advisor to Shali.
They are thinking of a hand over date in early February. USACOM is also
recommending that date to Shali.
They like the idea of an all day conference on the US/UN transition, which
we would host on or about the 14th.
2. On Somlia: They are pleased with the work being done by the three US
planners. The Council should pass the withdrawal resolution this week. They
NEED a decision soon on the US role in the withdrawal.
3. On Rwanda: I'll submit a detailed report to Tony. Bottom line: they
will propose several options to the Council, while we and they together
recruit someone to send a highly capable battalion plus into the Zaire area
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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PERETK
�9202
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D C. 20506
November 16, 19 94
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
^ ^ — ^ ^ ^
THROUGH:
RICHARD CLPM^^I
FROM:
TIMOTHY J. ATKIN
SUBJECT:
B r i e f i n g by Former UNAMIR Commander
Canadian General Romeo D a l l a i r e , Commander o f UNAMIR f o r c e s u n t i l
l a s t month, gave a b r i e f i n g yesterday a t t h e Canadian Embassy.
He discussed p o t e n t i a l UN reforms and t h e f u t u r e o f Rwanda.
Proposed UN Reforms
1. E s t a b l i s h a S e c r e t a r y General's contingency fund f o r r a p i d
f u n d i n g and procurement i n c r i s e s and r e f o r m t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
and l o g i s t i c s system t o be able t o respond t o emergencies.
2. Develop a course t o t r a i n a m u l t i - d i s c i p l i n a r y s e n i o r c r i s i s
management s t a f f ( f o r c e commanders, c h i e f s - o f - s t a f f , e t c ) . He
p r o j e c t s t h a t t h e r e w i l l be a need t o i n t e g r a t e peacekeeping and
humanitarian a s s i s t a n c e f u n c t i o n s i n almost a l l f u t u r e UN
missions.
3. E s t a b l i s h a standby, emergency response m i l i t a r y f o r c e (U.S.
should NOT/NOT be a p a r t o f t h i s f o r c e ) w i t h a d e p l o y a b l e HQ
u n i t . He b e l i e v e s t h e superpowers should n o t be a p a r t o f t h i s
f o r c e but t h e i r i n v o l v e m e n t would be a f i n a l threat/hammer should
i t be necessary.
4. Improve i n f o r m a t i o n and i n t e l l i g e n c e c a p a b i l i t i e s . He
r e l a y e d he r e c e i v e d v i r t u a l l y none from t h e UN, i n any c a p a c i t y ,
d u r i n g h i s o p e r a t i o n s i n Rwanda.
5. Have an u m b r e l l a h u m a n i t a r i a n agency c o o r d i n a t e NGOs and
military relief capabilities.
He t a l k e d o f t h e CNN f a c t o r i n
Goma l e a d i n g t o a deluge o f NGO a c t i v i t y u l t i m a t e l y becoming a
resource c e n t e r f o r ex-government o f f i c i a l s .
Meanwhile, o t h e r
camps were n e g l e c t e d l e a d i n g t o worse c o n d i t i o n s i n camps i n s i d e
Rv/anda . Some medical m i l i t a r y support e f f o r t s were shunned by
NGOs t o a v o i d a s s o c i a t i o n .
LINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�6. Develop an i n t e r n a t i o n a l media agency and be p r o a c t i v e i n t h e
propaganda war. He c r e d i t s t h e r a d i o propaganda e f f o r t by t h e
Hutus as t h e s i n g l e l a r g e s t c o n t r i b u t o r t o t h e r e s u l t i n g
genocide.
These c o u n t r i e s l i v e by t h e r a d i o and t h e message was
never countered. The Hutus c o n t i n u e t o e f f e c t i v e l y c o n t r o l a l l
communications w i t h t h e i r r a d i o broadcasts.
7. Give and use t h e a u t h o r i t y and c a p a b i l i t y t o conduct
" o f f e n s i v e " o r d e t e r r e n t m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s . He noted t h i s can
be done under Chapter V I w i t h p r o p e r l y c o n s t r u c t e d r u l e s o f
engagement. Chapter V I I should be reserved f o r a c t i o n a g a i n s t an
aggressor.
As an example o f a d e t e r r e n t a c t i o n , he b e l i e v e s
f o r c i b l y d e s t r o y i n g t h e r a d i o s t a t i o n s p r o p a g a t i n g messages o f
genocide a t t h e b e g i n n i n g would have helped d r a m a t i c a l l y .
[Items 1, 4, 5 and 6 a r e being addressed,
through PDD 25 i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . ]
w i t h some v a r i a t i o n ,
Rwanda's Future
General D a l l a i r e i s s t i l l o p t i m i s t i c a c o a l i t i o n government i s
p o s s i b l e but o n l y AFTER l e a d e r s o f t h e genocide begin t o end up
in j a i l .
He's concerned t h a t , w o r s t case s c e n a r i o , t h e GOR c o u l d shut i t s
borders a t some p o i n t , l o c k i n g o u t refugees who have n o t
r e t u r n e d , and then t h e r e would be a w a i t i n g game t o see when
Hutus attempt t o r e t a k e a l l o r p a r t o f Rwanda.
He argued s t r o n g l y t h a t t h e GOR needs t h e f i n a n c i a l resources t o
f u n c t i o n as a government. P r o p o r t i o n a t e l y , t o o much a i d i s going
o u t s i d e t h e c o u n t r y , and t h i s i s causing deep resentment.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�C I T N L B A Y POOOY
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�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O Q Y
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D C. 20506
December 9, 1994
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
THROUGH:
RICH^D CLARKE
DONALD STEINBERG " *
V-
FROM:
SUSAN^TCE/TIMOT^J" J.
SUBJECT:
Update on t h e S i t u a t i o n i n Rwanda and B r i e f i n g f o r
Your Meeting w i t h Rwandan Vice P r e s i d e n t and
Defense M i n i s t e r Paul Kagame
ATKIN
SITUATION UPDATE:
Prime M i n i s t e r Twagiramungu v i s i t e d Washington l a s t week f o r
World Bank meetings. He a l s o met w i t h U/S T a r n o f f , A/S Moose,
A/S Bennet, AID A d m i n i s t r a t o r Atwood, and Don S t e i n b e r g . The GOR
has e s t a b l i s h e d a human r i g h t s d i v i s i o n i n t h e J u s t i c e o f
M i n i s t r y and Twagiramungu i n d i c a t e d a p o i n t person would be named
s h o r t l y t o head t h i s d i v i s i o n . Twagiramungu a l s o s a i d t h e GOR
would c o o p e r a t e w i t h t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r i b u n a l , g i v e f r e e access
t o UNAMIR and t h e human r i g h t s m o n i t o r s , and g r a n t b r o a d c a s t
a u t h o r i t y t o UNAMIR r a d i o .
I n p r i v a t e c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h DAS B u s h n e l l , she s a i d Twagiramungu
t a l k e d o f H u t u / T u t s i t e n s i o n s w i t h i n t h e GOR and t h e need f o r a
more genuine i n c l u s i o n o f Hutus i n d e c i s i o n making and power
sharing.
UNITED NATIONS ACTIONS
Last week t h e UN S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l extended UNAMIR's mandate Ja*/
t h r o u g h June 9, 1995. The r e s o l u t i o n i n c l u d e d two "new" t a s k s
which, i n f a c t , UNAMIR has been c o n d u c t i n g f o r some months: (1)
p r o v i s i o n o f s e c u r i t y f o r war crimes i n v e s t i g a t o r s and human
r i g h t s m o n i t o r s ; and, (2) a s s i s t a n c e i n e s t a b l i s h i n g and t r a i n i n g
a new, i n t e g r a t e d n a t i o n a l p o l i c e f o r c e .
The S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l a l s o v o t e d p o s i t i v e l y on a P r e s i d e n t i a l
Statement r e q u e s t i n g more i n f o r m a t i o n from t h e S e c r e t a r y General
on r e f u g e e camp s e c u r i t y . The focus o f camp s e c u r i t y would be t o
c r e a t e an environment f r o m which refugees c o u l d r e p a t r i a t e .
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EFFORTS
Kagame t o l d UNHCR t h e RPA w i l l not use c o e r c i o n t o c l o s e IDP
camps as l o n g as t h e UN works toward camp c l o s u r e .
Recent
r e p o r t s suggest t h e GOR i s now working w i t h t h e UN t o c o o r d i n a t e
and encourage t h e c l o s u r e o f these camps.
While t h e RPA has g r a n t e d UNAMIR/UNHRC m o n i t o r s access i n most
areas, t h e r e are s t i l l l o c a l l e v e l c o n f r o n t a t i o n s from t i m e t o
time.
Human R i g h t s Watch notes t h a t w h i l e p r i s o n c o n d i t i o n s i n Rwanda
are g r i m , t h e r e i s no evidence t h a t d e t a i n e e s are b e i n g t o r t u r e d
o r abused.
Embassy K i g a l i p o i n t s o u t t h a t t h e f i r s t group o f ex-FAR o f f i c e r s
t o have i n d o c t r i n a t i o n and p o l i t i c a l t r a i n i n g i s scheduled t o be
i n t e g r a t e d i n t o t h e RPA t h i s month. There i s a l s o a GOR/UNICEF
i n i t i a t i v e t o d e m o b i l i z e " c h i l d " s o l d i e r s and e n r o l l them i n
schools.
MEETING WITH VICE PRESIDENT KAGAME
On Tuesday, December 13, you w i l l meet w i t h Rwandan V i c e
P r e s i d e n t and Defense M i n i s t e r Paul Kagame a t 2:00 p.m. i n your
office.
The Rwandan d e l e g a t i o n , e s c o r t e d by Vince Kern from OSD,
w i l l i n c l u d e Kagame and two a d v i s o r s . Attendees from t h e NSC
w i l l i n c l u d e Nancy Soderberg, Richard C l a r k e , Donald S t e i n b e r g
and Susan Rice. T a l k i n g p o i n t s are summarized a t Tab I and a
t a b l e o f USG support f o r Rwanda i s a t Tab I I .
Your goal during t h i s meeting i s t o obtain a pledge from
V i c e P r e s i d e n t Kagame t o move forward on s e v e r a l f r o n t s while
pledging U.S. support (as i n d i c a t e d i n b r a c k e t s ) :
1. Name a point person t o head human r i g h t s d i v i s i o n of Ministry
of J u s t i c e and allow UNAMIR/UNCHR monitors complete and unimpeded
access i n s i d e Rwanda. [$2.5M t o the World Bank t o c l e a r a r r e a r s ,
which would produce approximately $50M for governance. Continued
support of n u t r i t i o n , water, seed and s h e l t e r programs -- s e v e r a l
million.]
2. Authorize UNAMIR radio t o operate, cooperate with the
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Tribunal, e s t a b l i s h more e f f e c t i v e d i s c i p l i n e among
RPF troops and mechanisms for dealing with land d i s p u t e s .
[ P r o v i s i o n of equipment, t e c h n i c a l s e r v i c e s and r e b u i l d i n g of
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e for the M i n i s t r y of J u s t i c e . Approximately $600K.]
3.
P e r s o n a l l y advocate and i n s t i l l t h r o u g h o u t a l l elements o f
t h e government t h e fundamental p r i n c i p l e o f c i v i l i a n c o n t r o l o f
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the m i l i t a r y . [ P r o v i s i o n of t e c h n i c a l m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e , i . e . a
demining program.]
4. Continue e f f o r t s t o r e i n t e g r a t e moderate Hutus i n t o the
m i l i t a r y and government and work with the UN t o r e l o c a t e ^ - S
i n t e r n a l l y displaced Rwandans. [ P r o v i s i o n of equipment, t e c h n i c a l
s e r v i c e s and r e b u i l d i n g of i n f r a s t r u c t u r e for the M i n i s t r y of
A g r i c u l t u r e , Health, Finance, and Plans/Environment.
Approximately $50OK per m i n i s t r y . ]
5. Encourage and respect the r i g h t s of refugees r e p a t r i a t i n g t o
Rwanda. [ P r o v i s i o n of community based support for n u t r i t i o n ,
water, s h e l t e r and community s e r v i c e s -- r e b u i l d i n g of schools
and c l i n i c s w i t h i n communities t o which refugees r e t u r n . Unable
to f i g u r e d o l l a r amount r i g h t now but e a s i l y w i l l be i n t h e
millions.]
VICE PRESIDENT KAGAME'S AGENDA
There i s p o t e n t i a l f o r Kagame t o seek an end t o t h e UN ban on
e x p o r t i n g arms and m i l i t a r y equipment t o Rwanda. He w i l l l i k e l y
argue t h a t c o n t i n u e d s u p p o r t o f t h e ban i n d i c a t e s t h e U.S.
s u p p o r t s t h e Hutus i n Z a i r e .
I F ASKED: Rwanda has s u f f e r e d enough from war and more arms
are c e r t a i n l y not the answer. The proper focus should be on
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n with moderates and r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of government
services.
W h i l e c u r r e n t law p r o h i b i t s t h e U.S. from p r o v i d i n g m i l i t a r y
a s s i s t a n c e t o Rwanda t h i s year, we c o u l d c o n s i d e r f u t u r e a i d
focused on f o s t e r i n g good c i v i l / m i l i t a r y r e l a t i o n s ( i . e . a
demining program).
Kagame i s l i k e l y t o r e q u e s t a meeting w i t h V i c e P r e s i d e n t Gore as
a t e s t o f the p o l i t i c a l waters.
P r e s i d e n t Bizimungu met w i t h you
and d i d n o t meet w i t h t h e P r e s i d e n t d u r i n g h i s v i s i t i n October.
I F ASKED: Not p o s s i b l e i n the Vice President's
during a t t h i s time.
schedule
Kagame hopes t o generate p o s i t i v e media coverage o f h i s t r i p ,
e x p l a i n i n g t h a t t h e GOR i s d i s c o u r a g i n g r e t r i b u t i o n f o r r e c e n t
genocide and Rwanda i s open t o f o r e i g n business.
Attachments
Tab I T a l k i n g P o i n t s
Tab I I U.S. A s s i s t a n c e t o Rwanda Chart
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�Meeting with Rwandan Vice President Kagame
December 13, 1994
2:00
p.m.
SHARED GOALS:
•
I had t h e p l e a s u r e o f meeting w i t h P r e s i d e n t Bizimungu when he
came t o Washington i n October.
•
I t i s c l e a r from my c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h him t h a t our governments
share t h e same o b j e c t i v e s o f peace and r e c o n c i l i a t i o n f o r
Rwanda.
•
I t i s a l s o c l e a r t h a t many c h a l l e n g e s c o n f r o n t us: e n s u r i n g
a c c o u n t a b i l i t y f o r t h e genccide and o t h e r a t r o c i t i e s , c r e a t i n g
a sense of s e c u r i t y i n and around Rwanda, c r e a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s
f a v o r a b l e f o r refugee r e t u r n , e s t a b l i s h i n g a p o l i t i c a l
d i a l o g u e , and a s s u r i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i v e government.
U.S.
ASSISTANCE TO RWANDA:
•
We are committed t o a s s i s t i n g you w i t h each o f
challenges.
these
•
As you know, we have i d e n t i f i e d $2.5M t o pay o f f your
government's World Bank a r r e a r s . Through an i n f o r m a l
" f r i e n d s " group we have o r g a n i z e d , we a r e encouraging and
c o o r d i n a t i n g o t h e r donor's a s s i s t a n c e .
•
I n a d d i t i o n t o a tremendous amount o f work t h r o u g h
m u l t i l a t e r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and w i t h o t h e r donors, we are
p l a n n i n g how t o most e x p e d i t i o u s l y implement a b i l a t e r a l
development a s s i s t a n c e package o f $9M.
This package w i l l h e l p
i n t h e r e f u r b i s h i n g o f key m i n i s t r i e s , i n c l u d i n g equipment,
t e c h n i c a l s e r v i c e s and t h e r e b u i l d i n g o f b a s i c i n f r a s t r u c t u r e .
•
Much of t h e money t h e U.S. has spent INSIDE Rwanda s i n c e t h e
war ( t e n s o f m i l l i o n s ) has gone t o meet b a s i c human needs as
f o o d , water and s h e l t e r , i n a d d i t i o n t o seeds and t o o l s f o r
your people t o s u s t a i n themselves. As more people l e a v e
d i s p l a c e d and refugee camps, our a s s i s t a n c e w i l l s h i f t t o
h e l p i n g them redevelop t h e ^ r communities (community b u i l d i n g s
and s e r v i c e s ) .
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�•
Our a s s i s t a n c e people on t h e ground i n Rwanda are w o r k i n g
c l o s e l y w i t h your M i n i s t r y o f J u s t i c e t o r e - e s t a b l i s h your
domestic j u d i c i a l system.
NEXT STEPS FOR
THE
GOR
•
Our a b i l i t y t o h e l p Rwanda meet i t s c h a l l e n g e s i s l i m i t e d ;
yours i s more i m p o r t a n t and, a c c o r d i n g l y , e x p e c t a t i o n s are
high.
•
I t i s necessary t o c r e a t e a c l i m a t e o f s e c u r i t y and r e s p e c t
f o r t h e r u l e o f law i n s i d e Rwanda. This i n c l u d e s naming a
p o i n t person as t h e head o f t h e human r i g h t s d i v i s i o n i n t h e
M i n i s t r y o f J u s t i c e , f i n d i n g e f f e c t i v e mechanisms t o r e s o l v e
p r o p e r t y d i s p u t e s , and m a i n t a i n i n g d i s c i p l i n e among your
troops.
•
I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o i n s t i l l t h r o u g h o u t a l l elements o f t h e
government t h e fundamental p r i n c i p l e o f c i v i l i a n c o n t r o l o f
the m i l i t a r y .
You are i n a unique p o s i t i o n t o see t h a t t h i s
message i s heard and f o l l o w e d .
•
We welcome c o n t i n u e d c o o p e r a t i o n between your government and
t h e UN t o develop a coherent p l a n f o r t h e v o l u n t a r y r e t u r n o f
d i s p l a c e d people from i n t e r n a l camps. F o r c i b l e c l o s u r e of t h e
camps and t h e a s s o c i a t e d v i o l e n c e n e g a t i v e l y a f f e c t s
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n e f f o r t s and s u p p o r t from t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l
community. P a r t of communicating these e f f o r t s c o u l d be t h e
use o f UNAMIR r a d i o ; you need t o a u t h o r i z e i t s broadcasts and
i d e n t i f y a frequency immediately.
•
The unimpeded access of UNAMIR and human r i g h t s m o n i t o r s i s
v i t a l l y i m p o r t a n t t o t h e r e c o n c i l i a t i o n process and t h e
c o n t i n u e d s u p p o r t of t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community as w e l l .
AREAS OF COOPERATION:
•
As we work t o g e t h e r on t h e c h a l l e n g e s f a c i n g your government
we must a l s o d e a l w i t h t h e v e r y r e a l problem of c o n t i n u i n g
v i o l e n c e and i n t i m i d a t i o n i n t h e r e f u g e e camps o u t s i d e Rwanda.
•
We agree some a c t i o n must be t a k e n and are d i s c u s s i n g t h e
i s s u e a t l e n g t h w i t h t h e UN and t h e Rwanda o p e r a t i o n a l s u p p o r t
group. We hope t o have a UN s t r a t e g y soon, one t h a t s u p p o r t s
repatriation.
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�We urge continued cooperation w i t h your neighbors and strong
support f o r convening a r e g i o n a l refugee conference t o address
camp s e c u r i t y and other issues.
We are also committed t o ensuring t h a t those responsible f o r
the genocide are brought t o j u s t i c e and welcome your
government's cooperation w i t h the I n t e r n a t i o n a l T r i b u n a l . We
have committed $1M t o help speed up the t r i b u n a l e f f o r t s and
w i l l have 18 USG experts on the ground i n Rwanda very soon.
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�OOMFIDBHTIMy
Action Items
APNSA T r i p To Rwanda Dec 94
1. Ensure prompt d e l i v e r y o f $2.5M t o c l e a r World Bank a r r e a r s
and urge r a p i d o b l i g a t i o n o f $50M i n World Bank r e c o n s t r u c t i o n
funds;
2. O b l i g a t e funds t o s u p p o r t Rwandan Government, i n c l u d i n g
f o r N a t i o n a l Assembly, water supply, e l e c t r i c i t y , demining
education;
help
3. Continue t o urge r e c o n c i l i a t i o n and i n t e g r a t i o n between
Government and moderate ex-government m i n i s t e r s (who have
standing w i t h refugees);
4. Continue U.S. s u p p o r t f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l War Crimes T r i b u n a l ,
urge appointment o f o t h e r j u s t i c e s ;
5.
Ensure deployment o f 14 7 UN Human R i g h t s M o n i t o r s ;
6. Continue c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f o p t i o n s f o r i m p r o v i n g s e c u r i t y i n
refugee camps, i n c l u d i n g w o r k i n g more c l o s e l y w i t h Z a i r e and
Tanzania, and p o s s i b l y p r o v i d e f o r e i g n t r a i n e r s f o r l o c a l
gendarmerie; e x p l o r e approach t o Z a i r e w i t h , t h r o u g h o r supported
by I s r a e l i s ;
7. Encourage UN and Rwandan government e f f o r t s t o p r o v i d e f o r
s e c u r i t y f o r d i s p l a c e d persons r e t u r n i n g t o t h e i r v i l l a g e s ;
8. Continue t o ensure human r i g h t s observers
country-wide,•
have f r e e access
9. F i n d more ways t o p u b l i c i z e r e c o n c i l i a t i o n p r o g r e s s , i n camps
and i n Washington;. UNAMIR r a d i o ;
10.
Continue t o press government t o p r o v i d e f o r s a f e r e t u r n and
p r o t e c t r i g h t s o f refugees;
11.
S t a t u s o f Mr. Gacombitsi.
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�C NI E T L
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0583
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
January 29,
1995
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
THROUGH:
RICHARD CLARKg/Aiy
^
STEINBERG ' > r — ^
FROM:
TIMOTHY J. A T K I N / S U S A N RICE
SUBJECT:
Rwanda Update
UN Report on Camp S e c u r i t y
The S e c r e t a r y General r e l e a s e d h i s Second Report on S e c u r i t y i n
the Rwandan Refugee Camps January 27, 1995. I n c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h
Mrs. Ogata, t h e S e c r e t a r y General decided t h e q u i c k e s t way t o
improve camp s e c u r i t y would be f o r UNHCR t o make a p p r o p r i a t e
arrangements w i t h Z a i r e .
The r e p o r t notes i t has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been host c o u n t r y
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o provide s e c u r i t y f o r refugees.
On January 27,
UNHCR and Z a i r i a n government r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s s i g n e d a s e c u r i t y
agreement. The agreement covers f i v e months w i t h t h e o p t i o n f o r
t h r e e month renewals u n t i l December 1995. UNHCR w i l l pay
s o l d i e r s a s a l a r y complement and p r o v i d e u n i f o r m s and equipment
at an e s t i m a t e d c o s t o f $13M ( r a i s e d by v o l u n t a r y d o n a t i o n ) .
UNHCR w i l l a l s o e s t a b l i s h a l i a i s o n group t o p r o v i d e t r a i n i n g and
l o g i s t i c a l s u p p o r t . The p a c t c a l l s f o r 1500 Z a i r i a n t r o o p s t o :
•
m a i n t a i n law and o r d e r i n t h e camps;
•
p r e v e n t i n t i m i d a t i o n o f refugees who wish t o r e t u r n home and
e s c o r t r e t u r n i n g refugees as f a r as t h e Rwandan b o r d e r ; and,
•
p r o t e c t h u m a n i t a r i a n agency i n s t a l l a t i o n s and p e r s o n n e l .
UNHCR i s r e l y i n g on USG b a c k i n g f o r and f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t o f t h i s
p r o p o s a l . I t would be h e l p f u l , a t an Ad Hoc l e v e l , t o e s t a b l i s h
t h e l e v e l o f USG a s s i s t a n c e .
The S e c r e t a r y General r u l e d o u t peacekeeping, c o n t r a c t e d t r a i n i n g
and m o n i t o r s , and i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i c e m o n i t o r s / m i l i t a r y
o b s e r v e r s because o f a l a c k o f c o n t r i b u t i n g c o u n t r i e s and/or '
costs.
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Refugee R e p a t r i a t i o n and the Volcanoes
The l i k e l i h o o d o f a v o l c a n i c e r u p t i o n near Goma p r o v i d e s an
o p p o r t u n i t y t o press r e f u g e e r e p a t r i a t i o n .
The p r e s e n t l e v e l o f
a c t i v i t y seen i n one volcano has been experienced f i v e t i m e s i n
the l a s t 10 y e a r s ; t h e volcano has e r u p t e d each t i m e .
Our new Rwanda c o o r d i n a t o r , Ambassador Townsend Freidman, met
l a s t week w i t h Mrs. Ogata. UNHCR, a c u t e l y aware o f t h e p o t e n t i a l
danger, has stepped up m o n i t o r i n g o f the volcanoes' a c t i v i t i e s
and i s d r a w i n g up e v a c u a t i o n c o n t i n g e n c y p l a n s . A t the' same
t i m e , UNHCR i s e x p l o r i n g t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f moving t h e camps 30
m i l e s n o r t h i n Z a i r e . Friedman urged UNHCR t o use t h e v o l c a n o
t h r e a t t o encourage r e p a t r i a t i o n . While he found some
r e c e p t i v i t y among m i d - l e v e l UNHCR o f f i c i a l s , t h e r e seems t o be
l i t t l e enthusiasm a t h i g h l e v e l s f o r induced r e p a t r i a t i o n .
We c o n t i n u e t o s t r e s s t o Friedman the importance o f r e p a t r i a t i o n
as opposed t o camp r e l o c a t i o n . He and o t h e r s i n S t a t e are
focused on t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community w i l l
be c u l p a b l e i f the volcano e r u p t s and masses o f Rwandans and
r e l i e f workers are k i l l e d .
Thus, S t a t e i s more concerned w i t h
moving t h e refugees away from Goma i n g e n e r a l r a t h e r t h a n back
i n t o Rwanda i n p a r t i c u l a r .
S t a t e i s d r a f t i n g an o p t i o n s paper f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n b y t h e Ad
Hoc Group. The bureaucracy needs a s t r o n g push on t h i s one. I f
you approve an Ad Hoc Meeting, we w i l l add t h i s t o t h e agenda.
UNAMIR
The E t h i o p i a n s have i n d i c a t e d t h e y may p u l l t h e i r b a t t a l i o n out
of UNAMIR. They are f r u s t r a t e d w i t h the absence o f v i s i o n and
d i r e c t i o n f o r UNAMIR (measured i n p a r t by a l a c k o f r e f u g e e s
r e t u r n i n g ) , and w i t h slow payment by the UN. We have p r e s s e d the
UN and t h e U/SYG Annan has p e r s o n a l l y overseen payment t o t h e
E t h i o p i a n s . We and the UN are s t r e s s i n g t o the E t h i o p i a n s t h e
importance o f t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n and s t r o n g l y u r g i n g t r o o p
r o t a t i o n i n mid-February r a t h e r than w i t h d r a w a l .
I n t e r n a t i o n a l War Crimes Tribunal
J u s t i c e Goldstone has a f o u r member team i n K i g a l i t o f i n a l i z e
arrangements.
We a n t i c i p a t e the permanent seat t o be up and
r u n n i n g around the end o f February i n Arusha w i t h a s m a l l
contingent i n K i g a l i .
The USG has a l r e a d y o r d e r e d computer
equipment f o r the t r i b u n a l h e a d q u a r t e r s .
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To h e l p o f f s e t USG agency resource demands o f t h e Rwandan
t r i b u n a l , S t a t e has been p r e s s i n g t h e UN t o reimburse t h e U.S.
f o r some Yugoslav t r i b u n a l d e t a i l e e s and b e l i e v e s we are c l o s e t o
s e c u r i n g t h a t commitment. A t t h i s p o i n t DOJ and FBI have
r e s i s t e d p r o v i d i n g any i n v e s t i g a t o r s f o r t h e Rwandan T r i b u n a l .
I f t h e t r i b u n a l i s t o b e g i n o p e r a t i n g n e x t month we need t o
i d e n t i f y i n v e s t i g a t o r s q u i c k l y . I t would be p r o b l e m a t i c i f t h e
USG were seen as l e s s committed t o i n v e s t i g a t i n g a t r o c i t i e s i n an
A f r i c a n c o u n t r y than i n t h e former Y u g o s l a v i a .
State believes a
c a l l by you t o A t t o r n e y General Reno i s necessary t o achieve
DOJ/FBI s u p p o r t .
Proposed t a l k i n g p o i n t s a r e a t Tab I .
AID
Efforts
AID i n d i c a t e s t h e K i g a l i m i s s i o n w i l l be o p e r a t i n g t h i s week and
s h o u l d a c c e l e r a t e t h e i r e f f o r t s . AID has been r e l u c t a n t t o
t a c k l e t h e most c r i t i c a l need i n Rwanda's j u s t i c e system:
•
f u n d i n g f o r e i g n j u r i s t s t o a d j u d i c a t e c r i m i n a l cases; and,
•
t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e t o t h e N a t i o n a l Commission charged w i t h
making a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d e t e r m i n a t i o n s about t h e a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s
of d e t a i n i n g t h e 10,000+ c r i m i n a l s i n overcrowded p r i s o n s .
AID b e l i e v e s U.S. a s s i s t a n c e i n r e s o l v i n g c r i m i n a l cases i s
p r o b l e m a t i c and c o u l d be a l o s e - l o s e p r o p o s i t i o n . I f t h e
c r i t e r i a f o r r e l e a s e a r e i n t e r p r e t e d t o o s t r i n g e n t l y we c o u l d be
blamed f o r s t a l l i n g r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , and i f those r e l e a s e d a r e
p u b l i c i z e d as l e g i t i m a t e c r i m i n a l s we c o u l d be blamed f o r
w a t e r i n g down t h e j u s t i c e system.
Furthermore, AID b e l i e v e s t h e r e may be a l e g i s l a t i v e p r o h i b i t i o n
on h e l p i n g t h e N a t i o n a l Commission ( i f i t ' s deemed as law
enforcement a s s i s t a n c e ) . I f so, we c o u l d use a l e g i s l a t i v e
e x c e p t i o n o r p r e s i d e n t i a l waiver t o p r o v i d e t h e a s s i s t a n c e .
The d e c i s i o n r e g a r d i n g a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s o f USG support f o r these
elements o f Rwanda's j u d i c i a l program i s r e p o r t e d l y w i t h B r i a n
Atwood and may need t o be d i s c u s s e d a t an Ad Hoc meeting.
M i l i t a r y Equipment and T r a i n i n g
S t a t e and DOD i n d i c a t e d t h e y a r e moving f o r w a r d on p r o v i d i n g some
i n i t i a l IMET t r a i n i n g i n FY95.
DOD has proposed r e d r a f t i n g t h e UNSC arms embargo t o a u t h o r i z e
t h e p r o v i s i o n o f n o n - l e t h a l support f o r t h e Rwandan m i l i t a r y
(communications and l o g i s t i c s equipment).
S t a t e i s d r a f t i n g an
i s s u e s paper. This w i l l need t o be r e s o l v e d a t t h e Ad Hoc l e v e l .
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4
I n t e l l i g e n c e i n d i c a t e s around a dozen APCs m i s s i n g from Z a i r i a n
c o n t a i n m e n t areas a r e l i k e l y i n ex-FAR c o n t r o l .
S t a t e has moved
s l o w l y t o have t h e UN press Z a i r e t o c o n t r o l t h e v e h i c l e s , r e t u r n
them t o Rwanda o r d e s t r o y them ( w i t h GOR a p p r o v a l ) . S t a t e i s
d e v e l o p i n g a r e v i e w o f t h e o p t i o n s and t h e impact o f t h e arms
embargo and i n t e r n a t i o n a l law.
The DATT i n K i g a l i i s scheduled t o d e p a r t n e x t month and no
replacement i s i d e n t i f i e d o r a n t i c i p a t e d . We must have a DATT i n
Kigali.
OSD i s w o r k i n g c l o s e l y w i t h DIA b u t may r e q u i r e h i g h
l e v e l a t t e n t i o n t o break the b u r e a u c r a t i c r o a d b l o c k s .
Next Steps
The l a s t Ad Hoc m e e t i n g was November 29, 1994. An Ad Hoc m e e t i n g
t h i s week would h e l p r e j u v e n a t e t h e i n t e r a g e n c y process and
c l a r i f y d i r e c t i o n on USG a s s i s t a n c e f o r t h e Z a i r i a n s e c u r i t y
f o r c e , r e f u g e e r e p a t r i a t i o n , c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e system s u p p o r t and
arms embargo s t a t u s . A U.S. d e l e g a t i o n d e p a r t s February 10th f o r
the r e g i o n a l r e f u g e e conference i n Bujumbura.
RECOMMENDATION
That you c o n t a c t t h e A t t o r n e y General and encourage
the War Crimes T r i b u n a l .
Approve
support f o r
Disapprove
That you agree t o an Ad Hoc Meeting t h i s Thursday o r F r i d a y w i t h
the agenda a t Tab I I .
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I T a l k i n g P o i n t s f o r C a l l t o A t t o r n e y General
Tab I I Agenda f o r Proposed Ad Hoc Meeting
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Proposed Agenda
Ad Hoc M e e t i n g on Rwanda
I.
S i t u a t i o n Update
II.
Camp S e c u r i t y
- l e v e l o f USG a s s i s t a n c e
I I I . Refugee R e p a t r i a t i o n
- volcano contingency plans
- camp r e l o c a t i o n v s . r e p a t r i a t i o n
IV. A d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f J u s t i c e
- s t a t u s o f equipment, m i n i s t r y rehab
- c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e issues
V.
M i l i t a r y Weapons/Training
- IMET s t a t u s
- Arms embargo changes
- Z a i r i a n c o n t r o l l e d APCs
V I . Conclusions
CIA
State
State
AID
State/DOD
NSC
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY -
�0583REDO
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON D.C. 20506
January 3 1 , 1995
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
THROUGH:
RICHARD
DON STEINBERG/jfT
FROM:
TIMOTHY J.^TKIN/SUSAN^^etf
SUBJECT:
Rwanda Update
UN Report on Camp S e c u r i t y
The S e c r e t a r y General r e l e a s e d h i s Second Report on S e c u r i t y i n
the Rwandan Refugee Camps January 27, 1995. I n c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h
Mrs. Ogata, t h e S e c r e t a r y General decided t h e q u i c k e s t way t o
..^-araprove camp s e c u r i t y would be f o r UNHCR t o make a p p r o p r i a t e
rearrangements w i t h Z a i r e .
The r e p o r t notes i t has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been host c o u n t r y
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o provide s e c u r i t y f o r refugees.
On January 27,
UNHCR and Z a i r i a n government r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s s i g n e d a s e c u r i t y
agreement. The agreement covers f i v e months w i t h t h e o p t i o n f o r
t h r e e month renewals u n t i l December 1995.
UNHCR w i l l pay
s o l d i e r s a s a l a r y complement and p r o v i d e u n i f o r m s and equipment
at an e s t i m a t e d c o s t o f $13M ( r a i s e d by v o l u n t a r y d o n a t i o n ) .
UNHCR w i l l a l s o e s t a b l i s h a l i a i s o n group t o p r o v i d e t r a i n i n g and
l o g i s t i c a l support.
The pact c a l l s f o r 1500 Z a i r i a n t r o o p s t o :
•
m a i n t a i n law and o r d e r i n t h e camps;
•
p r e v e n t i n t i m i d a t i o n o f refugees who wish t o r e t u r n home and
e s c o r t r e t u r n i n g refugees as f a r as t h e Rwandan b o r d e r ; and,
•
p r o t e c t h u m a n i t a r i a n agency i n s t a l l a t i o n s and p e r s o n n e l .
UNHCR i s r e l y i n g on USG backing f o r and f i n a n c i a l support o f t h i s
p r o p o s a l . I t would be h e l p f u l , a t an Ad Hoc l e v e l , t o e s t a b l i s h
t h e l e v e l o f USG a s s i s t a n c e .
The S e c r e t a r y General r u l e d o u t peacekeeping, c o n t r a c t e d t r a i n i n g
and m o n i t o r s , and i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i c e m o n i t o r s / m i l i t a r y
o b s e r v e r s because o f a l a c k o f c o n t r i b u t i n g c o u n t r i e s and/or
costs.
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Operation Retour
As o f January 26, over 22,000 i n t e r n a l l y d i s p l a c e d persons (IDPs)
have r e t u r n e d t o t h e i r home communes v i a t r a n s p o r t and u n o f f i c i a l
r e p o r t s e s t i m a t e another 20,000 have r e t u r n e d on f o o t .
Open
R e l i e f Centers (ORCs) are s e t up i n t h e communes t o p r o v i d e
temporary a s s i s t a n c e and, i n t h e case o f l a n d t e n u r e d i s p u t e s ,
s h e l t e r . Most ORCs are r e c e i v i n g l i t t l e use as people r e t u r n
home d i r e c t l y and t h e m a j o r i t y o f l a n d t e n u r e cases a r e b e i n g
r e s o l v e d i n a few days.
Refugee R e p a t r i a t i o n
and the Volcanoes
The l i k e l i h o o d o f a v o l c a n i c e r u p t i o n near Goma i n February o r
March p r o v i d e s an o p p o r t u n i t y t o press refugee r e p a t r i a t i o n . The
p r e s e n t l e v e l o f a c t i v i t y seen i n one volcano has been
e x p e r i e n c e d f i v e times i n t h e l a s t 10 years; t h e volcano has
e r u p t e d each t i m e .
Our new Rwanda c o o r d i n a t o r , Ambassador Townsend Fr/^dman, met
l a s t week w i t h Mrs. Ogata. UNHCR, a c u t e l y aware o f t h e p o t e n t i a l
danger, has stepped up m o n i t o r i n g o f t h e volcanoes' a c t i v i t i e s
and i s d r a w i n g up e v a c u a t i o n contingency p l a n s . A t t h e same
t i m e , UNHCR i s e x p l o r i n g t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f moving t h e camps 30
m i l e s n o r t h i n Z a i r e . Friedman urged UNHCR t o use t h e v o l c a n o
t h r e a t t o encourage r e p a t r i a t i o n . While he found some
r e c e p t i v i t y among m i d - l e v e l UNHCR o f f i c i a l s , t h e r e seems t o be
l i t t l e enthusiasm a t h i g h l e v e l s f o r induced r e p a t r i a t i o n .
We c o n t i n u e t o s t r e s s t o Friedman t h e importance o f r e p a t r i a t i o n
as opposed t o camp r e l o c a t i o n . He and o t h e r s i n S t a t e a r e
focused on t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community w i l l
be c u l p a b l e i f t h e volcano e r u p t s and masses o f Rwandans and
r e l i e f workers a r e k i l l e d .
Thus, S t a t e i s more concerned w i t h
moving t h e r e f u g e e s away from Goma i n g e n e r a l r a t h e r than back
i n t o Rwanda i n p a r t i c u l a r .
S t a t e w i l l f i n i s h an o p t i o n s paper by noon Thursday f o r
c o n s i d e r a t i o n by t h e Ad Hoc Group. The bureaucracy needs a
s t r o n g push on t h i s one.
UNAMIR
The E t h i o p i a n s i n d i c a t e d they may p u l l t h e i r b a t t a l i o n o u t o f
UNAMIR. They a r e f r u s t r a t e d w i t h t h e absence o f v i s i o n and
d i r e c t i o n f o r UNAMIR (measured i n p a r t by a l a c k o f refugees
r e t u r n i n g ) , and w i t h slow payment by t h e UN. We have pressed t h e
UN and t h e U/SYG Annan has p e r s o n a l l y overseen payment t o t h e
Ethiopians.
We and t h e UN are s t r e s s i n g t o t h e E t h i o p i a n s t h e
-coHriDmTiMfi TNTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�COMF1DENTIAL
importance o f t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n and s t r o n g l y u r g i n g t r o o p
r o t a t i o n i n mid-February r a t h e r than w i t h d r a w a l .
I n t e r n a t i o n a l War Crimes
Tribunal
J u s t i c e Goldstone has a f o u r member team i n K i g a l i t o f i n a l i z e
arrangements. We a n t i c i p a t e t h e permanent seat t o be up and
r u n n i n g around t h e end o f February i n Arusha w i t h a s m a l l
contingent i n K i g a l i .
The USG has a l r e a d y o r d e r e d computer
equipment f o r t h e t r i b u n a l h e a d q u a r t e r s .
While DOJ and FBI have n o t y e t p r o v i d e d any i n v e s t i g a t o r s f o r t h e
Rwandan T r i b u n a l , w h i l e t a l k i n g w i t h Nancy, Jamie G o r e l i c k
assured us DOJ i s s u p p o r t i v e . To address DOJ concerns and h e l p
o f f s e t USG agency resource demands o f t h e Rwandan t r i b u n a l , S t a t e
has been p r e s s i n g t h e UN t o reimburse t h e U.S. f o r some Yugoslav
t r i b u n a l d e t a i l e e s and b e l i e v e s we are c l o s e t o s e c u r i n g t h a t
commitment. A t DOJ's request i n November, we ensured t h a t
s e c u r i t y f o r i n v e s t i g a t o r s was added i n UNAMIR's mandate.
AID
Efforts
AID i n d i c a t e s t h e K i g a l i m i s s i o n w i l l be o p e r a t i n g t h i s week and
s h o u l d a c c e l e r a t e t h e i r e f f o r t s . AID has been r e l u c t a n t t o
t a c k l e t h e most c r i t i c a l need i n Rwanda's j u s t i c e system:
•
f u n d i n g f o r e i g n j u r i s t s t o a d j u d i c a t e c r i m i n a l cases; and,
•
t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e t o t h e N a t i o n a l Commission charged w i t h
making a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d e t e r m i n a t i o n s about t h e a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s
of d e t a i n i n g t h e 10,000+ c r i m i n a l s i n overcrowded p r i s o n s .
AID b e l i e v e s U.S. a s s i s t a n c e i n r e s o l v i n g c r i m i n a l cases i s
p r o b l e m a t i c and c o u l d be a l o s e - l o s e p r o p o s i t i o n . I f t h e
c r i t e r i a f o r r e l e a s e are i n t e r p r e t e d t o o s t r i n g e n t l y we c o u l d be
blamed f o r s t a l l i n g r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , and i f those r e l e a s e d a r e
p u b l i c i z e d as l e g i t i m a t e c r i m i n a l s we c o u l d be blamed f o r
w a t e r i n g down t h e j u s t i c e system.
Furthermore, AID b e l i e v e s t h e r e may be a l e g i s l a t i v e p r o h i b i t i o n
on h e l p i n g t h e N a t i o n a l Commission ( i f i t ' s deemed law
enforcement a s s i s t a n c e ) . I f so, we c o u l d use a l e g i s l a t i v e
e x c e p t i o n o r p r e s i d e n t i a l waiver t o p r o v i d e t h e a s s i s t a n c e .
The d e c i s i o n r e g a r d i n g a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s o f USG support f o r these
elements o f Rwanda's j u d i c i a l program i s r e p o r t e d l y w i t h B r i a n
Atwood and may need t o be discussed a t an Ad Hoc meeting.
GOMriDc»TiAiri TNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�COMFIDEHTIMT
M i l i t a r y Equipment and T r a i n i n g
S t a t e and OSD a r e r e s e a r c h i n g i f amended l e g i s l a t i o n f o r IMET
t r a i n i n g w i l l g e t t h r o u g h Congress o r whether a P r e s i d e n t i a l
w a i v e r may be r e q u i r e d .
OSD has proposed r e d r a f t i n g the UNSC arms embargo t o a u t h o r i z e
the p r o v i s i o n o f n o n - l e t h a l support f o r the Rwandan m i l i t a r y
(communications and l o g i s t i c s equipment).
S t a t e i s d r a f t i n g an
i s s u e s paper. This w i l l need t o be r e s o l v e d a t the Ad Hoc l e v e l .
I n t e l l i g e n c e i n d i c a t e s around a dozen APCs m i s s i n g from Z a i r i a n
containment areas a r e l i k e l y i n ex-FAR c o n t r o l . S t a t e has moved
s l o w l y t o have the UN press Z a i r e t o c o n t r o l the v e h i c l e s , r e t u r n
them t o Rwanda o r d e s t r o y them ( w i t h GOR a p p r o v a l ) . S t a t e i s
d e v e l o p i n g a r e v i e w o f the o p t i o n s and the impact o f t h e arms
embargo and i n t e r n a t i o n a l law.
The DATT i n K i g a l i i s scheduled t o depart next month and no
replacement i s i d e n t i f i e d o r a n t i c i p a t e d . Walt Slocombe and t h e
DIA A d m i n i s t r a t o r hope t o r e s o l v e t h i s i s s u e Wednesday.
Next Steps
The l a s t Ad Hoc meeting was November 29, 1994. An Ad Hoc m e e t i n g
t h i s week would h e l p r e j u v e n a t e t h e i n t e r a g e n c y process and
c l a r i f y USG d i r e c t i o n r e g a r d i n g a s s i s t a n c e f o r the Z a i r i a n
s e c u r i t y f o r c e , refugee r e p a t r i a t i o n , c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e system
s u p p o r t and t h e arms embargo.
A U.S. d e l e g a t i o n d e p a r t s February 10th f o r the r e g i o n a l r e f u g e e
conference i n Bujumbura.
RECOMMENDATION
That you agree t o an Ad Hoc Meeting t h i s F r i d a y w i t h the agenda
at Tab I .
Approve
<
\ ^ ^
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I Agenda f o r Proposed Ad Hoc Meeting
^CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
CONFIDEMTIA,
�Secret
EQ 13526 3.5c
DCI
I
National Intelligence Council
SPECIAL ESTIMATE
Rwanda-Burundi: Still on the
Brink
3.5c
Summary
More widespread violence between Hutus and the Tutsi minority could
engulf Rwanda and Burundi at any time in the next year. Growing miliancy among Hutus in Zairian and Tanzanian refugee camps poses a security threat to the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), relief
workers, and the host countries. Most Hutu refugees are unlikely to return
to Rwanda because they believe that the RPF is killing returnees. The Tutsis view the military as their only protection from another round of Hutuled genocide and will probably continue to use tough security measures
that risk widening the humanitarian crisis and conflict.f 3.5c
In Burundi, hundreds have died in ethnic clashes in the past few months,
while maneuvers by the Hutu ruling party and the Tutsi-led opposition
strain a UN-brokered power-sharing accord. Several incendiary issues
could spark a coup or ignite an ethnic conflagration. 3.5c
International mediators have had some effect in moderating conflict, but
Hutus
Hutu and Tutsis alike still believe that they are in a zero-sum game of ethsurvival. Policing the Rwandan refugee camps and negotiating a Hutusettlement enjoy the broadest support from the international commuity, but many Hutus and Tutsis find even these solutions contentious. No
option can succeed if strongly opposed by either the RPF or Hutu leaders.
3.5c
1
gL'j^L-t-'. ...
Secret
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
SE 9S-5
January 1995
Cp
oy
OOB
SPECIAL ESTIMATE
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�Secret
Rwandan Refugees and Displaced Persons, Late 1994
210,000 Number of refugees
^
Refugee camp
Refugee concentration
HH
Displaced Rwandan Tutsis
The approximately
2 million
internally
displaced Rwandan Hutus are
distributed
throughout
the country.
r-j^q:
rota/-ri-
Bukavu
Cyangugu
/n Bukavu area:_
357,000
Zaire
/n L/v/'ra area:
48,000
^
-
,Lake ••
Tanganyika
'Rwandan Hutu refugees amveO since April 1994.
. Numbera are based on Unried Nations High Commission (or
Refugaes (UNHCR) Infonratton. Country totals may include
refugees tn camps off the map and refugees not in camps.
734J91 lR013::>1-95
EO 13526 3.5c
Secret
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�Secret
Rwanda: Hutus and the RPF
Digging In Deeper
Hutus Going Nowhere for Now. Most of the
estimated 2 million Hutu refugees in Zaire and
Tanzania are not likely to return to Rwanda
soon, unless compelled to leave the camps by
force or because of major food shortages. At
the same time, they are prevented by force from
moving farther into their host countries. Most
refugees appear to remain loyal to the ousted
Hutu government, which orchestrated the genocide of at least 500,000 Tutsis and moderate
Hutus. This de facto government-in-exile controls the refugee camps and the distribution of
most relief aid and has convinced most Hutus
that the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) will kill
them if they return home. 3.5c
Growing Hutu militancy in the camps is a
threat to aid workers and host countries. Some
35,000 Hutu soldiers from the defeated
regime's army and 20,000 militiamen operate
in or near the refugee camps and occasionally
skirmish with Zairian and Tanzanian security
forces. Some conduct cross-border raids, in
hope of provoking an anti-RPF uprising in
Rwanda. The militias also use the displaced
person (DP) camps in Rwanda as bases for
attacks on the RPF and sympathizers. 3.5c
RPF Hanging Tough. The RPF is more concerned about security and seeking justice
against Hutu mass murderers than bringing
Hutu refugees home. RPF troops and Tutsi
civilians have committed some revenge killings
against Hutu civilians accused of murdering
Tutsis, and the regime has jailed some 20,000
suspected participants in the genocide. 3.5c
n
2 million Hutus inside Rwanda. This could trigger a new mass exodus of refunees. Kigali is
also threatening to strike against the Hutu
camps in eastern Zaire if Zairian and international authorities fail to halt Hutu military
operations there. 3.5c
Burundi: Another Flashpoint
Deep-seated differences between the Hutu
ruling party and the Tutsi-led opposition are
increasing the likelihood of a major ethnic
flareup in Burundi, as both test a UN-brokered
power-sharing agreement. More than 350
Burundians have died in ethnic clashes since
October 1994, with the incidents spreading into
Bujumbura from the northern border region.
Tutsi extremists are plotting to murder dozens
more prominent moderate Hutus, and Hutu radicals have targeted President Ntibantunganya—
a Hutu—and other government leaders they
consider traitors. I 3.5c
Powersharing Falters. Despite a power-sharing agreement awarding them virtual veto
power, the Tutsi-led army and opposition hardliners have mounted coup attempts and legal
challenges against the government. Meanwhile,
radical Hutus have demanded an immediate
transfer of all power to the majority. In December, political maneuvering threatened to splinter the multiparty government. Tutsi pressure
forced a Hutu activist to step down as National
Assembly Speaker. The President described
this as an assault on the Hutus' hold on power
and feared that Tutsi hardliners would launch a
civil disorder campaign.f^sc
The RPF has no qualms about deploying its
50,000 troops to quash potential threats. It is
^hutting down the DP camps, which shelter
Secret
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�Secret
Scope Note
This Special Estimate assesses the continuing political crisis in Rwanda and
Burundi and the.regional impact. It . ...
assumes that, oyer the next year; the inter-;,
national community will continue to
donate current levels of relief aid but will
not provide the enormous additional mill-.:
tary and economic resources necessary to
stabilize the ethnic conflict or to induce
the refugees to return home. It also '
assumes! that despite 'populationmove.r^jr
ments within and between the affected
countries, local parties are not ready to
consider permanent ethnic partition as a
long-term solution. It does not examine ;
the.ihternationai^coinmunity's response toT
a worsening humanitarian crisis.in the . •
event of widespread violence in Burundi.;
Some agencies believe that recent patterns
of ethnic segregation—especially in
Burundi—will at least dampen any new
outbreak of violence. 3.5c
:
Rwandan refugees. Burundi's Tutsi military
leaders claim that the 200,000 Rwandan Hutu
refugees camped in Burundi who arrived last
year are their country's greatest security
threat. A possible influx of up to 300,000
more—responding to the RPF's threats to
close DP camps in southwestern Rwanda—
would heighten the Tutsi fears. The military
and Tutsi vigilantes are already raiding refugee camps and Burundian Hutu settlements.
Military integration. Ntibantunganya has
publicly stated that the military—now at least
three-fourths Tutsi—must mirror Burundi's
population mix—about 85-percent Hutu. Tutsis, however, view the security forces as their
guarantor of survival and will veto any program to change their ethnic composition. A
program to redress the military's ethnic
imbalance was the proximate cause of the
October 1993 coup attempt.
:
Outstanding Tensions. Even if the current
political crisis cools off, other incendiary issues
remain:
• Coup investigation. A UN proposal to
release its report on the October 1993 coup
attempt—which led to the murder of elected
Hutu President Ndadaye and massive bloodletting—would likely exacerbate tensions if
accepted. This report probably echoes the
conclusion of human rights groups that senior
Tutsi officers and opposition political leaders
instigated the failed coup. If implicated by
the report, these officials may launch another
coup to safeguard their interests.
Secret
Hutu insurrection. The Tutsis' continued
reliance on brute force to suppress Hutus is
strengthening the appeal of Hutu radicals
calling for a violent uprising. Several thousand Hutu militants—some with light infantry weapons—have established contacts with
Rwandan Hutufightersbased in Zaire and are
most active in northwestern Burundi. A Hutu
revolt would spark a brutal response from the
Tutsi-controlled army.[ 3.5c
Regional Impact and Response
Although countries in the region want a quick
resolution to the crisis in Rwanda and Burundi,
none has much leverage or influence over the
warring factions. Zaire and Tanzania are reeling from the massive refugeeflows.In remote
�Secret
EO 13526 1.4c
border regions of both countries, militant refugee communities challenge and at times supplant the national government. Refugee
violence frequently spills into local villages—
particularly in Zaire, where refugees are backing ethnic Hutu Zairians infightingwith the
Bahunde ethnic group. The refugee influx has
ruined forests and topsoil and depleted water
supplies. Meanwhile, prices of essential goods
in the affected areas have skyrocketed with the
presence of the refugees, relief agencies, and
foreign workers.| 3.5c
Officials in Zaire are weighing the benefits of
increased aidflowsand their desire to enhance
their international image against the cost of refugee induced instability. President Mobutu has
strong links to the former Hutu regime and has
on occasion supported Hutu refugee leaders.
Nonetheless, Zaire's security forces—which
have a limited ability to maintain order in the
refugee affected areas—have recently attacked
several refugee camps. Tanzania has essentially
remained neutral throughout the crisis. Uganda
is probably continuing military and political
support to the RPF—many of whose leaders
helped President Museveni fight his way to
power. 3.5c
Limited Opportunity for Outside Influence
Proposals from regional and Western governments, international organizations, and voluntary agencies to defuse the regional crisis by
deploying a force to police the camps face
intense resistance from Hutus and Tutsis, who
have little confidence in international security
measures:
• UNAMIR peacekeepers in Rwanda did not
halt the slaughter of Tutsis last spring. Their
deployment after the RPF's victory has not
convinced Hutu refugees and DPs that they
can safely return home.
Secret
�Scci-ct
Hutu leaders feel threatened by the UN international crimes tribunal and probably view
UN peacekeepers' deployment alongside
RPF troops in recent security sweeps of DP
camps as proof of a UN bias.
A proposal to send an international police
force to maintain security in the Zairian and
Tanzanian refugee camps is foundering on
UN member states' refusal to commit forces.
Moreover, Hutu militants in the camps are
adamantly opposed to disarming or relocating.
The RPF believes a policing operation would
fail to defang the Hutu military.
Burundi's military opposes any international
force, and uncooperative Tutsi soldiers have
sidelined the Organization of African Unity
military observer mission. 3.5c
Outside pressure is not likely to change the
conviction of most Hutus and Tutsis that they
are engaged in a zero-sum game of ethnic survival. The RPF will not even consider negotiations until Rwanda's exiled Hutu leadership
admits to some culpability and regret for the
slaughter. Meanwhile, the Hutus in both countries fear that the RPF's victory will embolden
the Tutsis to reassert their precolonial overlordship. 3.5c
Nonetheless, the attention of international
mediators and Western aid donors may have
some success in reinforcing political moderates
in both countries. In Rwanda, the presence of
human rights monitors undoubtedly has slowed
the pace of retribution against suspected Hutu
murderers. Swifter action and resource commitments by the international community for
Secret
the international crimes tribunal could encourage more RPF restraint against suspected genocide criminals and lessen the Hutu fear of
vigilante justice. Furthermore, Museveni—a
trusted mentor and confidant to Vice President
and Defense Minister Kagame—could help
argue that Rwanda will remain unstable unless
Hutus are given a greater role in governing, but
his influence should not be overestimated.
3.5c
In Burundi, if ethnic violence remains at current levels or subsides, then political moderates
from both the Hutu-majority and Tutsi opposition parties may have an opportunity to salvage
a national consensus. Such mainstream leaders—who have worked closely with the local
UN representative to negotiate the power-sharing accord—have been sidelined but not
removed by extremist elements. The international community can continue to work closely
with such moderates as they try to consolidate a
political middle ground. The longer run negotiating trade-offs in both countries will involve a
complex web of minority political rights guarantees, land-tenure issues, and physical security protections that include representation in
and control of security forces.| 3.5c~
This Special Estimate was prepared under the auspices of the
National Imelligence Officer for Africa and was coordinated
with (he Deputy Director for Imelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency; the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Director, National Security Agency, and the Assistanl Secretary for
Imelligence and Research, Departmenl of Sla(e; the Depuly
Chief of Staff for Imelligence, Departmenl of the Army; (he
Direclor of Naval Intelligence, Department of (he Navy; (he
Assis(am Chief of S(aff, Intelligence, Department of (he Air
Force; and Headquarters, Marine Corps. 3 5
C
�REVISED
Agenda
Ad Hoc Meeting on Rwanda
DATE:
Wednesday, February 8, 1995
TIME:
3:00 P.M. - 4:30 P.M.
PLACE:
White House S i t u a t i o n Room
I.
Introduction
NSC
II.
S i t u a t i o n Update
CIA
III.
USG Support f o r UNHCR Camp S e c u r i t y Program...
State
IV.
Volcano Contingency Plans
State
V.
J u s t i c e Issues
- s t a t u s o f U.S. c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f equipment,
support f o r m i n i s t r y r e h a b i l i t a t i o n - c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e issues
- USG c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f p e r s o n n e l t o War Crimes
AID
Tribunal
VI.
0
M i l i t a r y Weapons
- Arms embargo
- Z a i r i a n c o n t r o l l e d APCs
- I MET
{L. - K i g a l i DATT
VII.
ALL
Burundi
State
V I I I . Conclusion
NSC
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
Declassify onl^Lo^pk U N
P OO O Y
HTCP
�MA""©**.
v
P
�C-^/
— ^
- ^ ' " ' ^
X
C I T N L B A Y POOOY
L N O I R R HTCP
�
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2011-0263-M
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This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on Rwanda from 1993 thru 1995, from the files of Susan Rice, Director for NSC Global Affairs. Included are handwritten notes by Rice during various Rwanda Ad Hoc Group and Peacekeeping Core Group meetings, memos from National Security Advisor Anthony Lake to President Clinton on Rwandan relief operations, emails on Rwandan peacekeeping operations, and various maps, charts, and reports on Rwanda and Burundi.
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Foreign Policy
Genocide
Peacekeeping
Rwanda
Susan Rice
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/ee9092762250bb43b90e80d06780c323.pdf
69c704c7a04f5c82729201f5addc8d6d
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Sections 1.4 (b), (c), and (d) ofE.O. 13526 or (b)(3) and
(b)(6) of the FOIA.
�GGNFIDEN'PIAL
0583REDO
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
January 31, 1995
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR
THROUGH:
ANTHONY LAK; JL.. /
RICHARD c1¥JPif;;'
DON STEINBER~
FROM:
TIMOTHY
SUBJECT:
Rwanda Update
D'eclas.Sified.Undef'A:uil}onti'ofth~-
,
Interagency SeryrltY De<:las~fieation 'A.ppeais Pan~i,
E'.'0~:1_35~6;$ection·_::~;3(b~(S)
.
J.~TKIN/SUS~
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040
Document No.1
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
UN Report on Camp Security
The Secretary General released his Second Report on Security in
the Rwandan Refugee _Camps January 27, 1995.
In consultation with
Mrs. Ogata, the Secretary General decided the quickest way to
improve camp security would be for UNHCR to make appropriate
arrangements with Zaire.
The report notes it has traditionally been host country
responsibility to provide security for refugees. On January 27,
UNHCRand Zairian government representatives signed a security
agreement.
The agreement covers five months with the option for
three month renewals until December 1995. UNHCR will pay
soldiers a salary complement and provide uniforms and equipment
at an estimated cost of $13M (raised by voluntary donation).
UNHCR will also establish a liaison group to provide training~and
logistical suppOrt. The pact calls for 1500 Zairian troops to:
•
maintain law and order in the camps;
•
prevent intimidation of refugees who wish to return home and
escort returning refugees as far as the Rwandan border; and,
•
protect humanitarian agency installations and personnel.
UNHCR is relying on USG backing for and financial support of this
proposal. It would be helpful, at an Ad Hoc level, to establish
the level of USG assistance.
The Secretary General ruled out peacekeeping, contracted training
and monitors, and international police monitors/military
observers because of a lack of contributing countries and/or
costs.
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on:
OADR
�CONFIDENTIAL
2
Operation Retour
As of January 26, over 22,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs)
have returned to their home communes via transport and unofficial
reports estimate another 20,000 have returned on foot. Open
Relief Centers (ORCs) are set up in the communes to provide
temporary assistance and, in the case of land tenure disputes,
shelter. Most ORCs are receiving little use as people return
home directly and the majority of land tenure cases are being
resolved in a few days.
Refugee Repatriation and the Volcanoes
The likelihood of a volcanic eruption near Goma in February or
March provides an opportunity to press refugee repatriation. The
present level of ~ctivity seen in one volcano has been
experienced five times in the last 10 years; the .volcano has
erupted each time.
Our new Rwanda coordinator, Ambassador Townsend F~dman, met
last week with Mrs. Ogata. UNHCR, acutely aware of the potential
danger, has stepped up monitoring of the volcanoes' activities
ahd is drawing up evacuation contingency plans. At the same
time, UNHCR is exploring the possibility of moving the camps 30
miles north in Zaire. Friedman urged UNHCR to use the volcano
threat to encourage repatriation. While he found some
receptivity among mid-level UNHCR officials, there seems to be
little enthusiasm at high levels for induced repatriation.
We continue to stress to Friedman the importance of repatriation
as opposed to camp relocation. He and others in State are
focused on the possibility that the international community will
be culpable if th~ volcano erupts and masses 6f Rwandans and
relief workers are killed. Thus, State is more concerned with
moving the refugees away from.Goma in .general rather than back
into Rwanda in particula~.
State will finish an options paper by noon Thursday for
consideration by the Ad Hoc Group. The bureaucracy needs a
strong push on this one.
UNAMIR
The Ethiopians indicated they may pull their battalion out of
UNAMIR. They are frustrated with the absence of vision and
direction for UNAMIR (measured in part by a lack of refugees
returning), and with slow payment by the UN. We have pressed the
UN and the U/SYG Annan has personally overseen payment to the
Ethiopians. We and the UN are stressing to the Ethiopians the
CONFIDENTIAL
�3
importance of their participation and strongly urging troop
rotation in mid-February rather than withdrawal.
International War Crimes Tribunal
Justice Goldstone has a four member team in Kigali to finalize
arrangements. We anticipate the permanent seat to be up and
running around the end of February in Arusha with a small
contingent in Kigali.
The USG has already ordered computer
equipment for the tribunal headquarters.
While DOJ and FBI have not yet provided any investigators for the
Rwandan Tribunal, while talking with Nancy, Jamie Gorelick
assured us DOJ is supportive. To address DOJ concerns and help
offset USG agency resource demands of the Rwandan tribunal, State
has been pressing the UN to reimburse the U.S. for some Yugoslav
tribunal detailees ~nd believes we are close to securing that
commitment. At DOJ's request in November, we ensured that
security for investigators was added in UNAMIR's mandate.
AID Efforts
AID indicates the Kigali mission will be operating this week and
should accelerate their efforts. AID has been reluctant to
tackle the most critical need in Rwanda's justice system:
•
funding foreign jurists to adjudicate criminal cases; and,
•
technical assistance to the National Commission charged with
making administrative determinations.about the appropriateness
of detaining the 10,000+ criminals in overcrowded prisons.
AID believes U.S. assistance in resolving criminal cases is
problematic and could be a lose-lose proposition.
If the
criteria for release are interpreted too stringently we could be
blamed for stalling reconciliation, and if those released are
publicized as legitimate criminals we could be blamed for
watering down the justice system.
Furthermore, AID believes there may be a legislative prohibition
on helping the National Commission (if it's deemed law
enforcement assistance) . If io, we could use a legislative
exception or presidential waiver to provide the assistance.
The decision regarding appropriateness of USG support for these
elements of Rwanda's.judicial program is reportedly with Brian
Atwood and may need to be discussed at an Ad Hoc meeting.
CONFIDENTIAL
�4
Gml"FIDEHT IAL
Military Equipment and Training
State and OSD are researching if amended legislation for !MET
training will get through Congress or whether a Presidential
waiver may be required~
OSD has proposed redrafting the UNSC arms embargo to authorize
the provision of non-lethal support for the Rwandan military
(communications and logistics equipment). State is drafting an
issues paper.
This will need to be resolved at the Ad Hoc level.
Intelligence indicates around a dozen APCs missing from Zairian
containment areas are likely in ex-FAR control. State has moved
slowly to have the UN press Zaire to control the vehicles, return
them to Rwanda or destroy them (with GOR approval).
State is
developing a review of the options and the impact of the arms
embargo and international. law.
The DATT in Kigali is scheduled to depart next month and no
replacement is identified or anticipated. Walt Slocombe and the
DIA Administrator hope to resolve this issue Wednesday.
Next Steps
The last Ad Hoc meeting was November 29, 1994 .. An Ad Hoc meeting
this week would help rejuvenate the interagency process and
clarify USG direction regarding assistance for the Zairian
security force, refugee repatriation, criminal justice system
support and the arms embargo.
A U.S. delegation departs February lOth for the regional refugee
conference in Bujumbura.
RECOMMENDATION
t,/t /.
That you agree to an Ad Hoc Meeting tQie ~riday with the agenda
at Tab I.
Approve ~
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
Agenda for Proposed Ad Hoc Meeting
CONFIDENTIAL
�5700
CONFIDENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
July 21, 1995
ACTION
Declassified Under'A.uthontV ofthe
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
I 11teragency·SectiritY Declassification. Appeals· Panel,
E.'0.·1352~;,section•s-3Cb)(3)
'
E~CE
'
~
.
.
'
.
.
'.
l ,.
•
• "'.
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no.
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
THROUGH:
SUSAN
FROM:
SHAWN H.·
SUBJECT:
Lifting of the Arms Embargo on Rwanda
McCORMI~
BACKGROUND
Rwanda has formally requested that the UNSC lift the arms embargo
on Rwanda. Action will likely occur during the week of July 24.
Resolution 918 of May 17, 1994, barred the sale or supply oL arms
or other military material (including non-lethal equipment) to
Rwanda.
The embargo was aimed primarily at the former Rwandan
government during the height of the genocide and civil war.
Resolution 997 of June 9, 1995, affirms the arms embargo applies
to the sale and transfer of arms to persons in neighboring
states, if the arms are for use in Rwanda.
Nine votes with no Perm-S vetoes are required to pass a UNSC
resolution. We estimate Rwanda can count on NAM support (6
votes, including Rwanda), China (7) and possibly Russia and
Argentina (9).
USUN anticipates that France and UK will not
veto, but likely abstain. However, we would not discount the
possibility of a French veto. The Czech Republic, German and
Italian positions aie not known. Our vote may be piyotal.
OPTIONS
1)
Support Lifting - The ex-FAR is actively rearming in
neighboring states and possibly planning an August offensive.
The GOR claims that it needs arms to exercise its right to selfdefense (Article 51).
The existing embargo clearly works in
favor of the ex-FAR and militias.
The GOR remains the main
defense against renewed genocide.
Lifting the embargo will allow badly needed logistics,
communications and transport equipment to enter the country.
Lifting will also facilitate our IMET program and allow countries
to train Rwandan troops in huma~rights and non-violent crowd
control.
DIA (Tab A) estimates ~a lift will not result in a
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on:
OADR
2
�cmlFIDENTIAL
2
substantial amount of additional w.eapons entering the country,
because the GOR already has them in supply.
If.war resumes, some may label the UN and U.S. as complicitous.
Several countries in the region are likely to oppose lifting the
embargo. A vote to lift, however, may be exploited by those who
argue for lifting the Bosnia embargo.
2) Oppose Lifting Arms Embargo - The GOR already violates the
embargo and receives arms from Uganda and elsewhere. Lifting
could enable the GOR to funnel surplus weapons to the Burundi
army or associated Tutsi gangs. Repdrts of GOR-GOB military
links are worrisome since the GOB military has been conducting
genocide in northern Burundi. Lifting the embargo may also cau.$e
a diversion of funds from reconstruction and development
programs. Finally, even if unenforceable, the embargo has
significant symbolic value in conununicating international concern
about stopping weapons flows into the region.
3) Support Lifting for Non-Lethal Goods Only - Permit GOR to
purchase trucks, conununications gear, uniforms, etc. This had
been the USG position because the UNSC would not endorse a full
lift. While France and others may s~pport this step, it does not
address the full needs of the GOR, and would be interpreted as
indicative of our lack of support for the GOR.
4) Support Lifting With Conditions - Lifting could be
accompanied by conditions. These would include reaffirmation of
the prohibition on arms transfers to persons in neighboring.
states (i.e. ex-FAR, Burundi military and militias) for use in
Rwanda and the requirement that weapons be marked with the
country of destination and registered in some fashiori. Finally,
UNAMIR should be mandated to monitor the Burundi border and, if
feasible, increased in size to accomplish this additional task.
This move could increase our leverage to press the GOR to
announce its intention to prosecute only those 400-plus people
accused of war crimes - NOT the myriad of other suspects. This
announcement should be coupled with a general amnesty for others
to help allay Hutu refugees' fear of persecution. For its part,
the international community must demonstrate its commitment to
a~rest and prosecute the key 400-plus war criminals.
AGENCY POSITIONS
All agencies (at the deputies level or above) support Option 4.
Thei agree the resolution must include language prohibiting
Rwanda from trans rring arms to other countries as well as the
other conditions described above.
GOHFIDE~1TIAL
�3
CmfFIDEnTL'\L
The GOR will likely support UN conditions that ban transfer/sale
of weapons to other countries and that mandate end-user
certificates or markings. Kagame, however, is unlikely to accept
any increase in UNAMIR to monitor the Burundi border.
Ambassador Krueger is likely to oppose Option 4, because of the
potential effects of any lift on Burundi.
If we decide to
support lift, we.must take care to put our spin on the decision
rather than allow potential detractors to do so. We could
accomplish some of this press backgrounders. We would also work
with Legislative Affairs to apprise the Hill of our plans.
Concurrence by:
N;l~~£~o, Richa~e
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve option 4.
expected crosshatch) .
Approve
~
Attachment
Tab A
DIA analysis
COUFIDENTIAL
(If you approve, we will clear
Disapprove
�DIA/PAW-3
18 Jul 95
Backqround Paper for the Senior Africa Director, HSC
SUBJECT:
Possible Consequences of Lifting the Arms Embargo against Rwanda (U)
1. -ret PVBPQSB: fo provide information to Ms. Susan Rica, the Senior Africa
Director, HSC concerning possible consequences of lifting the OH arms embargo
against the government of Rwanda.
2.
(U)
PQINTS OF MAJOR INTBUST:
a. (8/NP) lffact pn Regipnal Arm' Plows: Lifting the embargo against
Kigali while maintaining it against the Rwanda Hutu insurgents would do little
to change the current flow of arms into central Africa. DIA believes that the
Rwandesa Patriotic Army (RPA) receives intermittent shipments of arms and
munitions, ranging from small arms to artillery from various sources via Uganda
which is sufficient to sustain its current laval of operations. However, large
and more sophisticated pieces of equipment have bean difficult to obtain •. The
Hutu insurgents continua to receive small arms, machine guns, mortars, and
explosives in sufficient quantities to sustain their insurgent operations
despite increased international attention and the currant arms embargo.
(0/NP) The RPA apparently has problems procuring various non-lethal
military assistance such as communications equipment, trucks, night vision
devices and conventional military training support essential for a conventional
military because of the arms embargo. This hinders ita ability to transition
from an insurgent to a conventional army batter able to combat the on going
insurgency and thus improve security in Rwanda.
( 0/NP) If the embargo were lifted the RPA would likely purchase
light armored vehicles and military patrol boats. It would probably like to
obtain helicopters, however, at present they are too expansive for the
government. These weapons systems would increase the army's capability to
interdict and respgnd to insurgent attacks through increased fire power and
mobility. These systems are difficult to obtain clandestinely.
(0/NP) Currently, the majority of the RPA's weapons are either
Eastern Bloc (China and North ltoraa) or captured from the former Rwanda Armed
Porcas (PAR) (p~imarily French). These sources ware out of necessity rather
than desire. The army seems to favor the wast and would probably seek western
sources for their needs. Again, they probably would not seek to replace small
arms and"artillary, but purchase equipment to meet its transition to a
conventional force. To sustain its fleet of French built armored cars, the RPA
needs repair parts. Prance is an unlikely source, however, South Africa's Eland
armored car is similar to the French AML 90, thus a likely supplier of repair
parts and light armored vehicles.
Declassified Under Authoritj.~ of the.
InteragencySecurit); Dedassificati~n :~ppeals Panel,
CLASSIPIBB B¥ B~/PAW 3
BBOWSIP¥ ON OADR
E.O. q526, Section 5:3(h)(j)
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 54
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
SBGRB'!·
NO'l' ru!ILl!IASAmdil 'PO PORBIGN NATIONALS
�SBORB'R
(C/NF) Foreign military training and not high priced
to be Kigali • a moat important need. Purtherm6re, the government
massive quantities or high priced weapons. MG Kagame has proven
shrewd and pragmatic leader who recognizes the constraints faced
government.
DIA/PAW-3
18 Jul 95
weapons appear
cannot afford
himself as a
by the Rwanda
b. ( C/NP) Imoact on Arlpa flows to the Burundi Ar1ned Forces l FAB l
While
the RPA and the FAB have increased official·meetings and appear to be prepared
to conduct joint operations, especially along the southwestern
Rwanda/northwestern Burundi. border, it is unlikely that the RPA would provide E.O. 135 2 6
substantial materiel support direct!
o the PAB. Although both forces are
1.4(c)
dominated by Tutais, recent
·~~-~1
·"(( ndicate that the RPA high command has
contem t for their Burundi counterparts and the latter's force as a whole.
Recent
indicates that the RPA baa taken extensive defensive measures to
protect
bases while the FAB has not.
(G/NF) The RPA'a main motivating factor for cooperation with the PAB
probably stems from the increasing threat from northwestern Burundi by Rwanda
Butu insurgents operating with Burundi Butu insurgents. Kigali would rather
ignore Burundi, although clearly events in either country impact on the other.
~ The Rwandasa Patriotic Front (RPF) political program
officially atrasaaa a Rwandase identity over maintaining separate Butu and Tutai
identities. This policy stems from many of the key RPP leaders havi~g grown up
in Uganda. Their Uganda experience, unlike that in Butu dominated Rwanda and
Tutai dominated Burundi did not reenforce severe ethnic cleavages. That said,
if the increasing Butu insurgency threatens the security of Rwanda's southern
border and it appeared that the Burundi Tutai faced an all out ethnic conflict
·the RPA would likely assist the PAB with materiel support.·
3. (C/NF) EXPECTED PEYELOPHEHTSa The RPA has demonstrated that it is the moat
capable, disciplined and. battle-hardened force in Central Africa. Therefore,
little impact would occur to upset the current military balance with regard to
conventional forces (Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi). What would likely occur is an
increase in regional instability over the short term. The RPA with foreign
assistance would accelerate ita conversion to a professional conventional force
batter able to contain the regional insurgency. Insurgency in all likelihood
will never go away, however, ita daatablizing affect on Rwanda and the region as
whole would diminish in the long term aa reaul't.
~) The moat significant threat to regional stability comes from
the Rwandan Butu insurgents because not only do they destabilize Rwanda, but
eastern Zaire and Burundi and possibly western Tanzania. Given the RPA'a increased capability it would probably aggressively contain the insurgents through
interdiction and cross-border strikes. The likelihood of the latter is great
regardless of the status of the arms embargo. . The difference would be a more
professional and highly trained force batter able to control itself unlike ~t
2
Sl!lORl!l'R
NOT FtB:LI!IASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIQNM.S
�SBGRB'l'
DIA/PAW-3
18 Jul 95
Kibeho and one leas likely to generate massive panic amongst the Rutu refugee
population. The profeaaionalization and conventionalization of the RPA is just
a small portion of an overall counter.i naurgency plan involving all aspects of
the Rwanda government.
(X)()RDINATIONa
DIO/AFRICA.
[10
3
&B&N!I!I1
ROT D:tzftSid!H IO POM1!81f tWf!8tiMJ&
u.s.c ..424]
�DEPARTMENT OF STATE
(MO)
07, 24.
' 95
12: I 7
NO,
1460120842 PAGE
Di!classinoo .Under AuthoritY. of the
Interage~cy Security Deda~ficarlon'Appeals.PaneJ;
E.O. 13,526,;'Section S~3(b)(3)
·.
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no.
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
039
BE€ftEl"
DECL:7/21/05
TO:
G - Mr. Wirth
FROM:
AF - George E. Moose
SUBJECT:
Your Meeting on Burundi with NGOs, White House,
July 25, 1630
I.
PURPOSE;
o
Inform NGOs of USG policy objectives, accomplishments
to date and challenges ahead.
o
Engage NGOs in discussion of initiatives they and USG
can take.
o
Convince NGOs Rwanda/Burundi is receiving both the
high level attention and resources necessary to meet
our policy objectives.
II. KEY POINTS
State of £lay
o
Security has been steadily declining· over the last
.two months, as Tutsi extremists have moved to push
Hutus out of parts of the capital, Bujumbura.
Meanwhile, the Hutu opposition has reportedly formed a
government in exile and threatened military
reprisals. The Hutu-majority government has become
increasingly marginalized and essentially reduced to a
near-impotent facade. Some.observers predict a descent
into massacres on the Rwandan scale. Others expect
that the current level of violence and insecurity will
cont·inue or increase (but not to Rwanda levels) for
months. NGOs, like many players in the international
community, are becoming frustrated by the lack of
visible forward progress in Burundi. The~ sometimes
express this frustration by criticizing the USG for a
perceived lack of high level attention and activity.
BECRi':C
2
�DEPARTMENT OF STATE
<MO)
07, 24,
' 95
12: I 7
NO,
1460120842 PAGE
Sf!CRB'f
-
2 -
Format and NGO Participants
...
0
A tentative list of NGO participants is attached. The
tentative schedule is that NSC Advisor Tony Lake will
give welcoming remarks, introduce yourself, Brian
Atwood and DOD Undersecretary Walter Slocum, and then
give a short overview of USG policy in the region and
USG leadership in organizing the international
community. You will then be asked to speak for three
minutes, followed by three minute presentations by
Atwood and Slocum. Afterwards, Lake will open the·
floor and moderate 40 ~inutes of discussion before
making concluding remarks. Though the subject is
Burundi, questions might be asked about Rwanda.
Everything said is off the record.
TALKING POINTS
I I I.
0
Emphasize the high degree of attention which you are
giving to Burundi and Rwanda~
0
State that, from the beginning, we have. followed a
deliberate strategy focused on preventing the kind of
explosion in Burundi which we saw in Rwanda. That
strategy has been to provide as much support as we can
to the Secretary-General's representative, and to make
the Burundians aware that they are an object of
international attention by sending high level visitors
and messages, and through the good work of Amb.
Krueger in highlighting reality as we see it. In some
aspects, that strategy has worked. We still have a
Hutu President and a National Assembly. But, we are
not fooling ourselves into thinking that things are
going well. In fact, everybody in this room knows
that things are further deteriorating. And, for our
part, we have seen the need to take increasingly
vigorous measures, but always·with the adage in mind
"This above all, do no harm."
0
Hand out copies of the attached fact sheet on
preventive diplomacy and other USG initiatives.
0
Briefly discuss some of these preventive diplomacy
initiatives.
3
�DEPARTMENT OF STATE
(MO)
07. 24.
' 95
12: I 7
NO.
1460120842 PAGE
- 3 -
------Give the status of the Burundi Commission of
Inquiry. We applaud UN Secretary-General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali's July 17 annountement that he is
setting up a Commission of Inquiry into the October,
1993 coup attempt in Burundi and its aftermath. We
are proud to say that this announcement is a direct
result of our discussions with the UN in the days
leading up to his speech.
with the OAU and other members of the
international community, we are pushing hard for an
all-party regional political conference. We are
disappointed that. politicfans in Bujumbura rejected a·
call for all-Burundi conference in Addis Ababa for
July 24, but will continue to apply pressure on·this
issue.
---~--Along
------We understand that, in response to the rejection
of the July 24 conference, the OAU will be convening a
conference of regional African foreign ministers and
the OAU Central Organ to seek an African solution to
the Burundi situation, a move which we ~pplaud and
support.
0
Discuss military intervention. State that we have
been experiencing concern about the security situation
in Burundi since early March, and started contingency
planning at that time. We shared this plan with a
number of our allies, saying that we would do lift and
other limited ~upport, and we have gotten no takers.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
IV.
0
How will the US vote on Rwanda's request to lift
the arms embargo against its government?
Q,
A. We will vote for it, with certain conditions. The
most important of these is that the arms not be passed
on to third parties, i.e., to Burundi. This was a
tough call, and I know it won't be universally
popular. However, you have to remember that the
government of Rwanda is one which we support. They
are trying to defend themselves against armed
genocidists. To continue the embargo denies them the
tools to do that.
0
Is consideration being given to an arms embargo
against Burundi and Burundians?
Q.
8BOfU3'f
4
�DEPARTMENT OF STATE
(MO)
07, 24,
' 95
12: 1 7
NO,
1460120842 PAGE
8EORS'f
- 4 -
A. Yes, it is being considered. Many observers
believe that implementing an embargo on Burundi will
lead the military to undertake a coup. We believe
that an embargo is the right step, and are proceeding
cautiously, due to these concerns.
o
What is the
sub-region?
Q.
us
doing to halt arms flows into the
A. We are pushing hard to get observers put into the
airports in the r~gion, especi~lly in Eastern Zaire,
and think that we are very clo~e to achieving this,
We are also supporting calls for a Commission of
Inquiry into arms flows in the area.
o
Aren't the French and others supplying arms to the
rebel Hutus?
Q.
A. Since this allegation was first made by Human
Rights Watch and others, we have asked the
intelligence community to look hard for any foreign
government involvement, including the French, and they
haven't found any. The French categorically deny any
involvement. We are pushing for a Commission of
Inquiry to look into the whole question of arms flows.
o
What is. the status of human rights observers for
Burundi?
Q.
A. The plan to put civilian human rights monitors on
the ground in Burundi has necessarily been revised to
include only Bujumbura. Due to security concerns, it
appears that observers will not be put in the
countryside for now.
o
Is it true that the OAU is pulling its military
observers out of Burundi?
Q.
A. We too have heard rum.ors, and have recently
learned.that the OAU Ambassador has·asked to withdraw
the observers. We are checking this with OAU
Secretary General Salim Salim, and will ask him to
leave them in.
o
Why doesn't the US bar Burundian extremists from
coming here?
Q,
5
�DEPARTMENT OF STATE
(MO)
07,24,
'95
12:17
NO,
1460120842 PAGE
SBCR'S'f
- 5 -
o
A. We. do. We have placed a number of extremists in
our look-out system. They and their families are
barred from receiving visas~ Other nations are doing
the same. Given our concerns for the security of
personnel on the ground, we have not publicized our
actions.
o
Q.
What is the status of a UN regional special envoy
for Rwanda and Burundi?
A. This is an idea we have given full support to. We
·are hopeful that the Secretary-General will make an
announcement soon. It has been suggested that
statesmen such as Brian Mulroney of Canada or Julius
Nyerere of Tanzania would be good carididates. I would
be interested in hearing any suggestions from this
group as to who would be a good candidate for this job.
o
What is the status of the War Crimes Tribunal in
Rwanda?
Q.
A. Justice Goldstone i~ meeting with
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali tomorrow to try to
straighten out some of the administrative and
bureauc~atic issues.· The Tribunal already has a
budget of $10 million, a staff of 10 and two shipments
of supplies on the ground in Kigali. There will be
21 more investigators in August.
The Tribunal plans
to have· some i~dictments before the end of 1995. The
slow progress on setting up this Tribunal is a source
of frustration to everybody,. but it • s beginning to
look like it will work.
Why don't Western countries freeze the assets of
extremists?
Q.
A. We're taking a hard look at effective ways of
doing this, and will be working on it.
Attachments&.
Tab 1 - Preventive Diplomacy in Burundi (copies to be.
handed out)
Tab 2 - Preventive Diplomacy in Rwanda (copies to be handed
·out)
Tab 3 - Tentative List of Attendees
6
�DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Drafted: AF/C:DHeflin
7-3139
SEALLAF 6376
Cleared:
AF:PBushnell
P:SSyrnington
AF/C:ARender
PM:RWharton
IO/UNP:GStanton
DRL/MLA:JRosenblatt
PRM/AAA:MMcKelvey
(MO)
07. 24.
' 95
12: 17
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7
�750<1
S/S 9518985
United States Department of State
Washington, D. C.
~tfl"If'EN'fiAh
20520
October 11, 1995
DECL:l0/02/05
MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Subject:
Request for a meeting between National Security
Advisor Lake and Rwandan President Pasteur
Bizimungu
The State Department requests that National Security
Advisor Lake meet with Rwandan President Pasteur Bizimungu.
President Bizimungu will be at UNGA october 22 through 24.
The
Rwandan Embassy has indicated that President Bizimungu will
come to Washington October 17 through 21 for meetings and the
African~ dinner.
The purpose of the meeting would be to reaffirm our general
support for the Government of Rwanda and its goals of
repatriation, r~conciliation, reconstructibn and bringing those
~uilty of genocide to justice.
In addition, it would provide
an opportunity to press the Rwandans to reform their prisons.
The United States provides significant amounts of
humanitarian and bilateral aid to the sub-region. The
Government of Rwanda contains both Tutsis and moderate
and has brought some stability to the c6untry. We are
pressihg them to create conditions within Rwanda which
encourage voluntary repatriation of exiles, given that
threatening involuntary repatriation in January.
current
Hutus,
now
will
Zaire is
Executive Secretary
Attachment:
Biographic Information
Declassified Under Authority of the
Interagency Securitjr. Declassification Appeals Panel.
E.O. 13526,Sectiori 5;3(b)(3)
.
.
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 040
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
�Declassified. Under Authoiicy Of the
_Interagency Sec:urity D~dassification Appeals Panei;.
E.0.:13526,,Section 5:3(b)(3)
eetfPI:B:BN''fiAL
..
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 41
Declassification Date: rnarch.18, 2014
MEETING WITH RWANDAN PRESIDENT PASTEUR BIZIMUNGU
CONTEXT OF MEETING
President Pasteur Bizimungu, a moderate Hutu and member of the
(mainly Tutsi} RPF has been in power since the then-guerrilla
RPA took Kigali in July, 1994. His family and political
supporters suffered at the hands of extremist Hutus during the
events of April, 1994. The RPF-led coalition government has
brought a large measure of stability to the country. The USG
has supported the ·current government. We have given over $600
million in emergency and humanitarian aid to the sub-region;
AID has given substantial sums in development aid, DOD has
provided humanitarian assistance and IMET training; various
agencies have contributed money and personnel to efforts to
ready the International Tribunal and Rwandan court system to
try those suspected of crimes against humanity, including
genocide. We have also supported the Rwaridari governmerit::: ·at the
UN, including support for lifting the arms embargo'against
Rwanda. European governments believe that the USG is
especially credible with the GOR.
Despite considerable progress under very difficult
circumstances, President Bizimungu's government has encountered
several significant problems since taking power. The judicial
system was.decimated in 1994. There are over 55,000 prisoners
in Rwandan jails in horrific conditions, most arrested since
Bizimungu took office. Members·of Congress, NGOs and the
i~ternational community are concerned about this problem, and
the GOR S apparent lack of response to it. Zaire has given
Rwanda and the UNHCR until December 31 to show substantial
progress on repatriating the one million Rwandans in Zaire/ at
which time Zaire threatens to repatriate them involuntarily/ as
they started to do in August. Rwandan troops have committed
atrocities in April at Kibeho and again in September near
Gisenyi, resulting in the deaths of several hundreds. Both
incidents were promptly investigated with the full
.Participation of the government (the investigation into the
September incidents is not yet complete} .
1
The Government of Rwanda .is keenly interested in receiving
further development aid and diplomatic/political support from
the USG. They have indicated an interest in obtaining
non-lethal military equipment from DOD stocks. President
Bizimungu has met with Defense Secretary Perry, AID
Administrator Atwood, and Assistant Secretary of State George
�CONFIBElf'fiAb
-2Moose during his visit, and also met Secretary Christopher,
Vice President Gore and President Clinton as one of the six
Africare honorees.
OBJECTIVES
o
To assure President Bizimungu that the USG supports the
Government of Rwanda and its goals of repatriation,
reconciliation, reconstruction and bringing those guilty of
genocide to justice.
o
To discuss the future direction of U.S./Rwanda relations
with President Bizimungu.
o
To reaffirm to the President that we are very interested in
seeing a successful repatriation of Rwanda refugees, and
note that a key step towards this goal would be reducing
the prison ·population so that refugees feel less of a
threat ·Of arrest and imprisonment.
TALKING POINTS
o
We wish to reaffirm our support for your government. The
situation in Rwanda has not been easy. Despite the very
difficult problems you have had to face, you have brought a
measure of stability to your country, and we wish to
continue to work with you.
o
What do you see as the future direction o{ U.S./Rwand~
relations? We would like a relationship where we can be
candid and honest with each other like true friends; where
we can support and criticize each other as necessary, but
always with the purpose of helping each other.
o
It is very important that there be a successful and timely
voluntary repatriation of Rwandan refugees in Zaire. An
involuntary repatriation; as threatened by the Zairians if
they do not see progress before January 1, would be chaotic
and potentially destabilizing to the region.
We will
continue to work with you and UNHCR to see that this does
not happen.
o
In order to encourage voluntary repatriation, it is
essential that conditions be created inside Rwanda which
will encourage refugees to return.
There has been
progress, but it is particularly important that measurable
progress be taken towards reducing the prison population ..
This is of growing concern to the human rights community.
cen:fiBEU'fiAn
�-3-
The large numbers of prisoners in Rwanda, and their
conditions, are being used by the extremist Hutus to make
refugees fear for their safety upon return.
If Asked:
o
Military Equipment: We will consider requests for
acquisition of non-lethal U.S. military equipment by Rwanda
on a case-by-case basis. However, we note that public
concern about prisons, especially on Capitol Hill, could
limit our ability to act.
o
UNAMIR: We note that UNAMIR's mandate comes up for renewal
on December 8. What does your government consider to be
the best way to provide for s~curity of returning refugees,
security for the International Tribunal, military observers
and human rights monitors?
COUFIBEU'I'IltL
�6E6RE=r
SECRET
Rwanda-Burundi Paper: Prerequisites for Success
One key les~on of successful peacekeeping operations is the vital
role of consensus among interested major powers, regional
countries and border states. This lesson is particularly
applicable in the case of Rwanda and Burundi. The chQnce of
success in this troubled region even with French arlCf British
cooperation will be small. However, without a common
understanding among the interested players, especially France,
long-term success will be very difficult to achieve.
Recent efforts to deal with the conflict have been hampered by
the perception that the major powers (the U.S., France and
Britain) tacitly or overtly support opposite sides in the
conflict. Differences among regional players, notably Zaire and
Uganda, reflect the preferences of France and Britain. Lack of
consensus contributes to the poor showing of the international
community: little of the $700 million pledged has been
disbursed; support for UNAMIR has dwindled; the flow of arms to
ex-FAR forces has increased; few refugees have been repatriated;
and political turmoil, especially in Burundi, remains rampant.
Whatever the specific option, therefore, an effective strategy
for dealing with Rwanda and Burundi must have three elements:
(1) Agreement among the major powers (the U.S., France and
Britain) on a common approach. Private bilateral meetings (at
the principal or deputy level) with Britain and France will be
necessary to develop a common understanding. Once achieved, a
high-level, private channel should be established t6 discuss
sensitive political issues such as arms flows, hate radios or
indictments of high-level leaders for war crimes.
(2) A concerted effort by the major powers to persuade key
neighboring states, especially Zaire, Tanzania and Uganda, to
accept and implement an integrated strategy for Rwanda/Burundi.
Working together, the major powers can persuade their regional
allies to support a strategy that will promote political
reconciliation, control the flow of arms, bring to justice those
responsible for war crimes and repatriate refugees.
(3) A key coordinating role for the .United Nations. Our limited
humanitarian interests and constrained resources preclude a lead
role outside the-UN framework. To date, the UN has taken the
lead in Rwanda and Burundi, and it should continue to do so. ·The
available UN instruments are peacekeepers, human rights monitors,
war crimes tribunals, political good offices and coordination
mechanisms for emergency and development assistance.
SECRET
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I ni:'!!ragency Sec:';lritY Deda~fication -Appeils Panel,
E:b; 135!!6; Section s:J(b)(3)
..
..
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OADR
6E6R.E+
· ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 3
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
�Declassified U nde1' AutnontY of the
Interagency Security Declassification Appeals Panel;
E.O. 13526,Section 5:3(b)(3)
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 42
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
CeUFIBEJNq?L'U!5
MEETING WITH JUSTICE RICHARD GOLDSTONE
CONTEXT OF MEETING
Justice Richard Goldstone, Chief Prosecutor for the Rwanda
War Crimes Tribunal, has had a distinguished career on the
South African bench with a key role in his native country's
reconciliation process. He is concerned with issues (e.g.,
information sharing) which are relevant to the Rwanda
Tribunal. The USG has supported the Rwanda Tribunal both
politically and financially, giving $3.5 million thus far. The
Tribunal has had some administrative growing pains, which are
being addressed. It had been expected that the Rwanda Tribunal
would issue indictments in November, but it's now clear that
won't happen until December. Our own draft legislation to
authorize surrender to the Tribunal of alleged offenders found
in the u.s. is stalled on the Hill. Goldstone is very
concerned about security for the Tribunal, and wants to see
that the UNAMIR_ peacekeeping force is kept in Rwanda to guard
the Tribunal, should the GOR agree to a continuation of
UNAMIR. The USG peacekeeping core group has decided to go
along with the emerging Security Council tonsensus to renew
UNAMIR with its current size and mandate for six months beyond
its expiry on December 8.
OBJECTIVES
o
To reiterate U.S. political and financial support for the
Tribunal.
o
To assure Justice Goldstone that the USG is concerned about
security for the Tribunal, and to seek his views.
o
To discuss our position on UNAMIR renewal.
o
To convey our concern over the long time it is taking the
Tribunal to return indictments.
o
To remind Justice Goldstone that we are concerned that
there may be one or two alleged violators in the U.S. and
ask how the Tribunal staff is progressing on their cases.
CON¥ I Ql9Piq:' L\L
�-2-
o
To bring up the fact that Zambia has performed admirably in
apprehending several alleged offenders, but that there are
concerns that any delays in removing them from Zambia may
result in their release (we understand that Goldstone may
go to Zambia).
TALKING POINTS
o
We wish to reaffirm our support, both political and
financial, for the Rwanda Tribunal. Thus far, our
government has committed $3.5 million, including
secondments of experts, and we have been glad to support
the creation and funding of the Tribunal at the UN.
o
We regret that the International Tribunal for Rwanda will
not issue indictments until December. Early action by the
Tribunal. is crucial to maintaining the credibility of the
international community with the GOR and our ability to
press the Rwandans to take appropriate judicial and
non-judicial action themselves.
o
As you know, discussions are going on at the UN now
regarding a renewal of UNAMIR, whose mandate expires
December 8. While we generally support the Security
Council consensus that the mandate should be renewed for
six months, the outcome is far from certain at this point.
o
We are committed to seeing that the International Tribunal
for Rwanda has adeq~ate and appropriate security. It
strikes ~s that some, though not all, of the security could
be provided by the Government of Rwanda. What are the
specific security needs you foresee that will require a
UNAMIR or other international presence? Could these needs
·be fulfilled some other way? •
o
Members of various agencies of our government have been
working with the Rwanda Tribunal staff regarding the case
of a B.wandan, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, who has immigrated
to Texas and has. now been accused by Rwandan human rights
activists of involvement in massacres in 1994. It now
appears that his son may have joined him in Texas over the
summer. What progress has your staff made on these cases?
o
Zambia has done an admirable j6b in detaining several
alleged offenders. Observers there are concerned that
delays in removing the suspects· from Zambia could result in
their being freed by the Zambian court system. What could
be done to address this problem?
:QQH:EIBEJH'Y'IAb
�DeClassified U nder.,Aut:hoi:ity of"the
Interage~cy SecurltyHeclassl.fication Appeals 'i>anei,
E.0.13526;Sect:ion:5;3(b)(3)
,
. ..
.,.
,.
C9NPIDEN':FIAL
Action Items
APNSA Trip To Rwanda Dec 94
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040
Document no. 4
Declassification Date: March
1.
Ensure prompt delivery of $2.5M to clear World Bank arrears
and urge rapid obligation of $50M in World Bank reconstruction
funds;
2.
Obligate funds to support Rwandan Government, including help
for National Assembly, water supply, electricity, demining
education;
3. Continue to ur~e reconciliation and integration between
Government and moderate ex-government ministers (who have
standing with refugees);
4.
Continue u.s. support for International War Crimes Tribunal,
urge appointment of other justices;
5.
Ensure deployment of 147 UN Human Rights Monitors;
6. Continue consideration of options for improving security in
refugee camps, including working more closely with Zaire and
Tanzania, and possibly provide foreign trainers for local
gendarmerie; explore approach to Zaire with, through or supported
by Israelis;
7.
Encourage UN and Rwandan government efforts to provide for
security for displaced persons returning to their villages;
8.
Continue to ensure human rights observers have free access
country-wide;
9.
Find more ways to publicize reconciliation progress, in camps
and in washington; UNAMIR radio;
10. Continue to press government to provide for safe return and
protect rights of refugees;
11.
Status of Mr. Gacombitsi.
CONFIDEN'l'IAL
18, 2014
�SEC~ET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
Surrunary of Conclusions of
Ad Hoc Meeting onRwanda
DATE:
Wednesday, February 8., 1995
LOCATION:
White House Sitbation Room
TIME:
3:00p.m.- 4:-00p.m.
Declassified Under the Authority of
the Interagency Declassification
Appeals Panel, E.O. 13526, Section
5.3(b )(3)
Surrunary of Conclusions of the Ad Hoc Meeting
on Rwanda f:&t
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040
Document No. 5
Declassification: March 18, 2014
PARTICIPANTS:
SUBJECT:
Office of the Vice President
Leon Fuerth
Mark Thomas
STATE
George Moose
Townsend Friedman
Phyllis Oakley
JCS
David Mcilvoy
Wayne Young
AID
Brian Atwood
JUSTICE
Jamie Gorelick
OSD
Walter S.locombe
Vincent Kern
The White House
Anthony Lake
Nancy Soderberg
USUN
David Scheffer
NSC
Don Steinberg
Susan Rice
Mac DeShazer
OMB
Gordon Adams
Summary of Conclusions
It was agreed that:
Camp Security
State/RPM will provide at least $3.5-5 million to the UNHCR
security program for the Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire. 4-61
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Threat from Volcanoes
During the refugee conference next week in Bujumbura, State
will press UNHCR to prepare concrete, viable contingency plans to
respond to the potential eruption of one or both volcanoes. (-€-1
-- Beginning immediately, senior State Department officials will
use our substantial leverage with UNHCR to urge Mrs. Ogata to
take the opportunity of the threat from the volcanoes to
encourage refugees to return home to Rwanda.
If necessary, State
will apply earmarks to UNHCR funds to ensure that it$ efforts in
Zaire are focused primarily on repatriatiorL t-E-1
-- By COB February 15 1 State will prepare cost estimates of the
various optioris for movibg the refugees to new camps outside the
Goma area, including to locations further north in Zaire. (U)
Assistance to Rwandan Government and.War Crimes
Trib~nal
-- AID will continue disbursement of progratnmed funds to Rwanda
as swiftly as possible, particularly the $4 million in the
pipeline to support government ministries. (U)
-- AID will take immediate steps to ensure that funds are made
available to support the National Triag.e Commission. t-€-1
The Department of Justice will provid~ four experts (possibly
retirees) to assist the Rwandan Wars Crimes Tribunal.
USUN will
ensure that the Prosecutor's Office of the Rwandan War Crimes
Tribunal promptly fulfills its commitment, t.o reimburse the USG
for the cost of providing four indiViduals (two prosecutors and
two investigators) for a year. (U)
USUN will provide DOJ with an analysis of the January 12
Mansfield field report by Febr:uary 13. (U)
USUN will explore with Treasury the possibility of securing
several detailees for the Rwanda War Crimes Tribunal from its law
enforcement divisions. (U)
Military Issues
USUN will initiate consultations·in New York to build the
case for a partial lift of the UN arms embargo against Rwanda in
order to enable provision to the GOR of nob-lethal military
equipment (e.g. vehicles, parts., communications equipment, etc.)
t-£-1
State will instruct Embassy Kigali to approach the GOR to .ask
if the GOR wants USG assistance to try to convince the Government
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3u11a.
of Zaire to destroy in place the remaining APCs in Z~irian.
custody so they cannot be used for future military activities.
Embassy Kigali will ensure the GOR understands we can by no tneans
guarantee the success of such .efforts; t-E-1
Starting the week of February 13, State will consult with key
members of Congress and relevant committees on the
Administration's intention to resume the IMET program for Rwanda
in FY95.
State will solicit congr~ssional views as to how to
remove the existing legal barriers, while st~essing our
preference for ~sing a Presidential waiver to speed resumption of
the program. Based on cbngressional reaction, State will proceed
either with the waiver or with legislation. (U) ·
Burundi
-- State will continue its efforts to promote stability in
Burundi.
The White House will pursue the possibility of taping a
one minute Presidential radio address urging calm. (U)
�SECRB~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
February 7, 1995
INFORMATION
Deciassifje:d: Under Alitholi~<ofthe
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
Interagency Securit}· Deci~ssification Appeals Paneli
E.0:>13526,.Section s~3(hJ(3)
..
.
,.
..
'
FROM:
DON STEINBER~
SUSAN RI~
SUBJECT:
'
Rwanda-Burundi Ad Hoc Meeting, 3 p.m.,
Wednesday, February 8
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 6
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
This meeting is held against the backdrop of increasingly gloomy
projections by the intelligence agencies on the prospects for
peace and national reconciliation in Rwanda and for avoiding an
ethnic blow-:-up in Burundi. While our support programs for these
countries are proceeding, there are numerous specific issues that
need impetus at the senior level.
ISSUE I: To what extent should the USG provide support for UNHCR
camp security program?
Background: UNHCR plans to use Zairian troops to provide security
in the Zairian refugee camps .. UNHCR will pay salary supplements
for up to 1500 Zairian troops who will be supported by a UNHCR
trainers and logisticians. We anticipate the cost to UNHCR will
be $13-15 million, raised through voluntary contributions.
Absent willing troop contributors, this unorthodox method of
providing security remains the only game in town. Private
contractors were considered but.deemed prohibitively expensive.
State previously indicated its intention to provide as much as $5
million for this effort, but has recently indicated they may
instead provide 25 percent of whatever the total cost will be.
Goal
Nail down State's commitment to contribute at least 25%
percent of the cost of the UNHCR mission.
ISSUE II: How should the u.s. respond to the threat to the
refugee population posed by the potential eruption of the
volcanos?
Background: There is a body of convincing evidence that one or
both of the two volcanos near Goma will soon erupt. Experts
estimate one may well blow in next couple months; the other may
likely within six months. State conveyed its concerns for safety
of refugees to UNHCR. UNHCR is conducting a public information
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campaign, preparing contingency plans to evacuate refugees and
considering moving refugees to a site 30 miles north in Zaire.
We have urged State to press UNHCR to use the threat posed by the
volcanos to encourage substantial refugee repatriation. We have
sought to discourage notions of moving camps as costly and
ultimately counterproductive. State has done little so far as it
seems torn between the customary reluctance tb pressure refugees
to return and the various problems posed by a permanent refugee
population.
State's draft paper, proposing another approach to
Mrs. Ogata, is at Tab II.
Goal:
-- Instruct State to press Ogata next week at regional refugee
conference in Bujumbura to pursue activist repatriation campaign,
using volcanoes as impetus.
ISSUE III:
Assistance/Justice Programs
a) Is AID moving'sufficiently quickly to provide agreed
assistance to the GOR for rehabilitation of ministries,
administration of justice programs, and the National Triage
Commission?
b) Will DOJ/FBI Provide Personnel to support the Rwandan War
Crimes Tribunal?
Background:
AID Programs: AID's project grant agreement for $3.4 million for
assistance to ministries (other than Justice) was signed January
11. The project procurement of vehicles, computers, other office
equipment and technical assistance has begun, but is going
slowly.
Separately, on January 31, the World Bank made available
the $50 million line of credit to the GOR.
We remain concerned about the slow pace of the National Triage
Commission (NTC) in reviewing the files of some 20,000 persons
arrested (including 10,000 held in overcrowded prisons) to
determine if there are grounds to hold them. Brian Atwood is
still reviewing the appropriateness and legality of direct U.S.
assistance to the GOR for this purpose. Some in AID are
concerned there may be a legal prohibition against using AID
funds for what may be construed as law enforcement purposes. At
present, AID is providing $600,000 in supplies to the Ministry of
Justice, which oversees the NTC, and is preparing a longer-term
$4 million MOJ support project.
In addition, State will provide
$1.4 million for the War CrimesTribunal once the 15-day
notification period expires the week of February 20.
SECRE'P
�SECRE'i'
3
DOJ/FBI Personnel: DOJ and FBI have not provided any of the 13
investigators requested from them for the War Crimes Tribuna~
Jamie Gorelick assures us DOJ is supportive but the problem is
funding.
State has none for this purpose and believes either DOJ
or the Tribunal itself should identify the resources. Goldstone
is willing to pay for four DOJ investigators for Yugoslavia,
which may relieve some constraints on DOJ support for Rwanda, but
he may not be able to deliver the UN bureaucracy. Gorelick has
tasked DOJ to determine the maximum support it can provide. USUN
is pressing the UN to help with funding.
Goals
Ask AID for update on assist provided/planned; Direct AID to
move asap to provide assistance for the rehabilitation of
ministries.
Within legal constraints, instruct AID to provide as much
assistance as possible directly to NTC or through Ministry of
Justice for the rapid processing of cases, especially those of
individuals held in overcrowded prisons. Request status from AID
report to NBC by COB Monday.
Obtain commitment from DOJ directly and on behalf of FBI for
commitment a minimum of 5 investigators; ask USUN to continue
pressing UN agreement to some USG investigators and provide
status report by COB Monday.
<
ISSUE VI:
<
-
Military Issues
a} Should the u.s. seek a partial lifting of the UN arms embargo
against Rwanda to enable the provision of non-lethal aid to GOR?
b) Should the USG seek GOR agreement to destruction by GOZ of
ex-FAR APCs in Zaire?
c)
Should the Administration use Presidential waiver authorities
to lift legal restrictions on providing IMET to Rwanda in FY 95?
Background:
Arms Embargo:
At our urging, the UNSC imposed a sweeping
·arms/related materiel embargo on Rwanda last May.
Kagame wants
the embargo lifted so the RPA may receive non-lethal equipment,
including communications gear and vehicles. He argues this
equipment will help stabilize the security situation and improve
command and control, thereby reducing RPA indiscipline. DOD
supports modifying the embargo to allow provision of non-lethal
assistance (trucks, commo gear etc.). We agree with DOD that
SECRET
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.4
partial lift and possible prov1s1on of non-lethal aid is fully
consistent with our policy of bolstering GOR. St~te believes
even partial lift would be a mistake, sending signal that a
military solution is possible in Rwanda.
.
.
.
Obtaining agreement even to partial lift in UNSC would be
difficult . . French and UK at minimum are likely to resist.
Intelligence indicates about a dozen of the 20
ex-FAR APCs, known to have been in GOZ custody, are missing. The
presumption is they are in ex-FAR hands. The remainder. are in
GOZ cantonment sites. we would like to prevent ex-FAR from
obtaining remaining APCs for use .in counter-offensives. The UN
arms embargo against Rwanda prevents return of APCs to GOR.
State is resisting an alternative approach of urging GOR to ask
GOZ t.o destroy the vehicles in place. State thinks such an
approach places us in an awkward position. While we think this
less than a top-priority issue, we·believe we should try to
prevent ex-FAR from acquiring the remaining APCs.
APCs in Zaire:
IMET:
The FY95 Foreign Operations Act prohibits provision of
IMET to GOR. in FY95. The legislation was enac.ted in the wake of
the genocide last year and was not directed at the present
government. While the law does .not prohibit IMETin FY96, the
prohibition could be rolled over into the next FY. State has
agreed to work with Congress to ensure that the prohibition is
not extended.
·
Kagame requested IMET in December. All agencies agree we should
resume IMET immediately to promote professionalism and respect
for civilian authority and human rights, and we have $50,000
still available in FY 95. The issue is under what legal
authorities do we resume the program .. There are two options:
getting legislative relief, or; using a Presidential waiver
authority (e.g. 614). Legislative relief is uncertain and would
not come for months until there is an appropriate legislative
vehicle, which may be too iate in the FY. State is resisting
using a waiver, arguing we have used such waivers too frequently
in the past and risk angering Congress if we use this tool.
Initial Hill consultations reveal no resistance to lifting the
FY-95 IMET prohibition.
.
Earlier issue of whether DOD would. extend tour of
US DATT in Kigali has been resolved at least temporarily.
Current DATT will stay six more months. We may have to revisit
issue at end of that period;
Kigali DATT:
Goals
SECRB'P
�SBCRBT
5
Obtain agreement that State will begin consultations in New
. York and regional capitals on potential resolution lifting arms
embargo partially to allow provision of non-lethal aid.
Encourage State to approach GOR to urge that it request GOZ
to destroy APCs in place.
/
/
Instruct State to sound out key Members of Congress on how
best to provide IMET to GOR in FY95. State should stress
Administration's preference for using waiver due to slow pace of
legislation. If no significant negative reaction, State should
proceed with w~iver. State should report to NSC by Feb. 1?·
ISSUE V: What more can/should USG do to prevent major, new
outbreak of violence in Burundi?
Background:
Burundi seems to lurch from crisis to crisis, playing an
increasingly dangerous game of "chicken" with ethnic warfare.
While it is up to the FRODEBU and UPRONA leadership to take the
tough steps needed for national reconciliation, we have
undertaken a number of activities to build up the core of
moderates, ease the external pressures and keep the country ~n
the spotlight.
These ac.tions include: enhanced assistance focused largely on
\
national reconciliation; ensuring steady streqm of visitors, most
recently a UN Security Council team that leaves NY February 8 i
.
supporting a regional refugee conference in B~jumbura next week;
supporting OAU and other human rights monitorsi and issuing
strong statements from Embassy Kigali and State. We are now
considering additional steps, including a statement by POTUS to
the refugee conference and a taped VOA message.
Goals
Press Ad Hoc Group for ideas to expand efforts to prevent a
major blow-up in Burundi.
Urge State to prepare a public affairs strategy highlighting
Administration efforts to address this potential crisis,
including letter from A/S Moose to either New York Times or
Washington Post.
Attachments
Tab I
Agenda
Tab II
State Paper on Volcanos
SBCRBT
l
.
�Deda:Ssified Under 'Authority of the
lp,te.ragency Securit}·Declassification Appeals. Panel,
E.G .. 13526,, Section· 5:3Q'J(3)
Hall, Wilma G.
From:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Date:
Priority:
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 7
DeclassificatiOn Date: March 18, 2014
Steinberg, Donald K.
@UP- APNSA Special Assistants
.
/R, Record at A 1; @GLOBAL - Global Affairs; @AFRICA • African Affairs;
@DEMOCRACY - Democracy Affairs
Efforts to Ease Tensions in Burundi [GONFIDENTIAll
Friday, February 03, 1995 10:27AM
High
Tony/Nancy:
To follow-up on Burundi: Our efforts to keep ethnic tensions in check in Burundi have intensified since the
outbreak of killings in Rwanda. We have sought to build up the core of moderates, ease the external
pressures and keep the country in the spotlight~ We have enhanced our aid program focussed largely on
national reconciliation, maintained a steady stream of visitors {including the Presidential mission in
September and your visit in December), encouraged Ambassador Krueger to be a visible presence and urged
the UN, OAU and private groups to support these efforts. Given the history of ethnic violence and the
pressure that society is under, the absence of a major blow-up in the past year is an achievement. At
present, in addition to your letter to Ntibantunganya, the strong press statement from State and Krueger's
powerful speech, we have the following activities in train:
o We are helping fund the regional refugee conference in Bujumbura from February 1 5-1 7, in part to have
the positive effects of the presence of 750 international experts in the country. This is a joint UNHCR/OAU
activity that will address the issues of Rwandan and Burundian refugees. A/S Phyllis Oakley will head a
large American delegation. In addition, we are scheduling a meeting of the major donors to Burundi on the
· margins of this conference to consider additional efforts.
o The Western ambassadors in Bujumbura are working together to call on all the senior leaders of the
Government and opposition to urge restraint. Today, for example, they are doing a joint demarche on the
defense minister. The UN Special Representative Abdullah has been equally active.
o The 45 OAU human rights monitors have been moving more actively throughout the country to
demonstrate a more visible presence. As you know, their mandate has been renewed until at least June.
o We are supporting a conference, now taking place this week in London, where key Burundians have
been drawn together from across the political spectrum by the International Alert (an NGO with expertise .in
conflict management), with the goal of creating a core group of moderates.
o I met with the Carter Center Africa director yesterday, in part to discuss the Center sending out another
mission to Burundi, as they did last year when Obassanjo, Deng and others went out on a democracy
mission. They are considering the request. AF/C officer director Arlene Render has also been meeting with
· a wide variety of NGO's to see if there are other activities they can undertake.
If you think it appropriate, additional steps could go to the Presidential level. A letter or brief phone call to
Ntibantunganya; a taped message of reconciliation like the one we did for Rwanda for broadcast by VOA
into Burundi; a letter to the delegates to the refugee conference or at least a strong White ·
House/Presidential statement-- any of these would seem appropriate. What do you think?
Page 1
�CmJFIDEJHTIAL
20933
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
Summary of Conclusions of
Ad Hoc Meeting on Rwanda/Burundi
DATE:
Wednesday, August 9, 1995
LOCATION:
White House Situation Room
1:00-3:30 p.m.
TIME:
\
SUBJECT:
Summary of Conclusions of Ad Hoc Meeting on
Rwanda/Burundi
PARTICIPANTS:
Office of the Vice President
Bill Wise
State
Dick Bogosian
Pru Bushnell
Phyllis Oakley
Defense
Bernd McConnell
Greg Saunders
USUN
Rick Inderfurth
Lori Shestack
JCS
Dave Mcilvoy
Orrin Young
AID
Dick McCall
Declassified Under the Authority of the
Interagency Security Classification
Appeals Panel, E.O. 13526, Section
5.3(b)(3)
IS CAP Appeal No. 2013-040
Document No. 8
Declassification: March 18,2014
White House
Nancy Soderbe.;r-g
NSC
MacArthur DeShazer
Shawn McCormick
Mike Sheehan
Summary of Conclusions
It was agreed that the following actions would be completed by
COB on Tuesday, August 15 unless otherwise stated:
Arms Embargo:
Following the expected lifting of the arms embargo, we would
consider provisions of non-lethal equipment (communications,
trucks) if requested.
DOD agreed to review what might be
available in the near term. Any decision on provision of lethal
aid was deferred.
State will work up ideas to press for progress
in prison conditions/release as we consider aid requests.
COHFIDEHTIAL
Declassify
on:e-;-~~~~~~;~~~~~~,?:,~l
i8;;~ :. <1,1 '~-~~t{N~off'·L~[l-~f{V :?i{9:f6C_~~tv<:~~ ·.~~~~
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�COHFIDEH'!'IAL
2
Prison Conditions:
By Friday, August 11, State will provide NSC a report on
availability of funds to assist with construction of
prisons, prefabricated housing and tents (work w/ICRC).
t-€-1
War Crimes Tribunal:
By Friday, August 11, AID will work with State on a plan of
action to remove obstacles to assist with getting the
Tribunal up and running. As part of the plan, AID will work
to resolve issues involving UN reimbursements. for personnel
in Bosnia to free up funds to support DOJ personnel for
Rwanda.
t-€-1
Also, State will send to Justice the plan regarding security
for DOJ officials working with the Tribunal.
t-€-1
International Mediation:
State will report on a plan of forming a Bosnia-style
contact group as well as a possible regional conference on
Burundi and Rwanda.
Indicate plans for regional travel.
t-€-1
IMET Funds:
State, with DOD assistance, will determine whether and when
there might be an additional $50,000 in IMET funds for
Rwanda.
t-€-1
Refugees:
State/PRM in consultation with the Belgians will push UNHCR
to implement a plan to relocate UNHCR camps from Rwandan
border.
t-€-1 .
State will develop a prospective plan for engaging Mobutu on
Rwandan issues.
t-€-1
Burundi:
All agencies will review the situation in Burundi and
whether current efforts are adequate to stem ethnic
violence.
We will also review possibilities relating to an
ICITAP program. t-€-1
COHFIDEN'!'IAL
�\
iC~€r r~r")~~~
NATIJ~.~?r ~NCIL
COHFIDEHTIAL
20983
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
August 18, 1995
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR NANCY E. SODERBERG
THROUGH:
SUSAN E.
RI~
FROM:
SHAWN H.
McCO~~
SUBJECT:
Rwanda/Burundi Ad Hoc Meeting Taskings Update
We have received most but not all of the taskings from the
August 9 Ad Hoc Meeting on Rwanda/Burundi.
Those that remain
include Bogosian's big think piece on.the contact group and
substantive policy proposal, IMET (which is being debated inside
State), and Mobutu (which will come as soon as Moose returns and
reviews it on Monday) .
At Tab I are the original taskings and status report.
are the responses received to date.
At Tab II
Attachments
Tab I
Taskings from August 9 Meeting and Status Report
Tab II Responses to Taskings
cc:
Michael Sheehan
Declassified ,U nd.erAuthont)' otthe,
Interagency· Security Decl~ificabon Appeals. Panel,
E.O. 13526; Section s::3Cb)C3)
ISCAP Appeal no. 2013-040, document no. 9
. Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
COHFIDEHTIAL
Declassify on:
OADR
�~~~ {l£h~·u~ruu:( t6\I(Jf} -.s. . ,3s~w- fMf'(. J5
.tl.:i:
.
.;:~,.~
Ft>t...U)-1)
DRAFT - CIRCULATED FOR COMMENT:
'
.
INTRODUCTION: At the August 9 White House meeting on Rwanda
and Burundi, we briefly considered our overall diplomatic
strategy and agreed to discuss this matter in more detail at
the next meeting which has been set for Thursday, August 17.
At the August 9 meeting we distributed an uncleared draft
strategy paper {wGreat Lakes Political Conference: Objectives
and Methods),ti This paper outlines the strategy behind a
comprehensive regional ·political conference. Two other
uncleared, internal State/AF memos provide additional
information and describe the operational context in which we
will implement our diplomatic strategy, One is an undated
draft regional strategy paper which was prepared in late July
and can serve as a good overall current action checklist. The
other is the August 2 Bogosian~Wirth memo that divides the many
specific issues and actions into five priority policy areas.
Copies of all three memos are enclosed under cover of this
memorandum.
,.·~··
..
,..·:
..,.;.,.~
....
OBJECTIVES: Our diplomacy is aimed at restoring stability to
the Great Lakes region. With stability, the international
community, together with local governments and inhabitants can
turn their attention to the more enduring challenges of
development and governance. To get to that point, it is
imperati~e to resolve the refugee crisis and achieve
reconciliation within Rwanda and Burundi. This will require
judicial and other reforms including of the military and the
police.
We have other diplomatic objectives as well including the
success of the Rwanda Tribunal given tbe implications of
genocide in Rwanda. Achieving our objectives requires that the·
USG maximize its influence.and "diplomatic reach" at~ time of
reduced resources and urgent problems clamoring for attention
in other parts of the world We, therefore, need the support of
the other key players in the Great Lakes area, and we need to
minimize conflicts with such key players as the French.
CONTACT GROUPS: As noted at last Wednesday's meeting, the
relationship with France could be crucial; therefore, we will
play particularly close attention to the French, largely
through the US-France-Belgium contact group that we have
initiated. There will also be a larger contact group of key
donors including the Germans, British, Dutch and Canadians who
may occasionally play helpful political roles and have been
among the most active donors in the region. The European
governments will assure that the EU continues to make a
positive contribution in the region.
DECL: OADR
�C6Hf'IBfJI~'fiA:h
-
2 -- '
In addition, we need to maintain active contact with the
key African players, i.e., Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, Ethiopia
and the OAU. In New York and Geneva important multilateral
officials comprise the third contact group. Of. course, we
will have continuing diplomatic contact with the governments
of Rwanda and Burundi.
As we move toward a regional conference, the diplomatic
pace is likely to intensify. Our Embassies and Missions will
carry out the majority of contacts, but the Rwanda/Burundi
Coordinator should take the lead in developing and
implementing our strategy, and he should establish personal
contact with key decisionmakers in the relevant capitals. He
will .work closely with the French and Belgian Embassies in
Washington and will travel as necessary to New York, Europe
and Africa. In early September he will make an extensive trip
to Europe (Brussels, Paris, Geneva, London, The Hague, Bonn,
and Rome) and to Africa (Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Dar es Salaam,
Kampala, Kinshasa, Bujumbura, and Kigali) and will follow-up
as feasible. 'His prinicipal focus during the trip will be to
lay the groundwork for a comprehensive regional conference,
but inevitably the other issues will have to be addressed as
well.
Attachments:
1. Great Lakes Political Conference Memorandum dated Aug.
71 1995
2,
Rwanda/Burundi/Eastern Zaire/Western Tanzanian Regional
Strategy paper
3. Rwanda/Burundi Priorities Memorandum dated August 2, 1995
Distribution:
AF/FO:P/DAS Bushnell
AF/C:ARender
AID:RMcCall
NSC:SRice
G:AJoyce
IO-Gward
PRM:POakley
DRL:JShattuck
Drafted by:AF/FO:Rwanda/Burundi Coordinator:Amb.RBogosian
SERWB 5
x7-1818
�D.edas!;ifled Under Authont)r:of the
Interagency Secm1~· Decl~sification .~ppeaJs Panel,
E.O. 13526, Section 5-3cb)C3)
·
1 ..
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 44
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
eeUF I B§U'fV\t.
MEMORANDUM
(revised)
August 7, 1995
TO:
AF - George E. Moose
THRU:
AF - Prudence Bushnell
FROM:
AF/C - Arlene Render
SUBJECT:
Great Lakes Politfcal
Methods
Conferenc~:
Objectives and
CONCEPT
A fundamental component of our African Great Lakes regional
strategy -- probably essential to breaking the downward spiral
of violence emanating from. unresolved conflicts in Rwanda and
Burundi Which threatens to destabilize the entire region -- is
the urgent convening of an international conference to deal
with the central issues confronting those countries. Key
Western countries, including France, Belgium, Germany and the
UK support the conference concept and the Spanish Presidency of
the EU has prepared a preliminary draft position paper
regarding the scops and goals for such a conference. In
addition, following the interna~ional conference, all-parties
conferences could be organized for Burundi and Rwanda, if
n.eces sa ry.
There is general agreement that the international
conference should be convened jointly by the UN and OAU,
probably with the respective organizations' Secretaries-General
chairing at least the initial sessions. In addition to the
immediately affected regional countries (Rwanda, Burundi,
Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, and probably Kenya), important
neighbors need to be invited, at least in observer capacity.
In awareness of the anglophone/francophone cleavage, an
equitable number of invitations to African observers should be
given to a influential Arab and francophone observers as well
as anglophones. Most importantly, major dono~s including,
France, Belgium, UK, Japan, Netherlands, and the U.S. among
others need to be present as observers and to lend impetus to
�GONFIQEU'fli'>ch
- 2 -
the process. To enhance the African sense of importance of the
international conference, it should, if possible, be held in
Europe; Addis ~baba, as both OAU headquarters and seat of the
current OAU president would also be suitable but might diminish
the importance Africans attach to the conference. An
alternative site might be South Africa. Given deteriorating
security conditions in Burundi and fears of an imminent clash
between the ex-FAR and RPA, the conference should be convened
as soon as possible on the understanding that it be carefully
prepared .and that the internationa 1 communi t:Y is in agreement
on the goals.
ORGANIZATION
The conference should be viewed as two parallel tracks.
The first track would be an interlocking set of international
understandings and agreements between Great Lakes states
dealing with repatriation of refugees, security, and economic
development. The second track would focus on internal
reconciliation which would require the presence of all key
factions and political parties, both civilian and military from
Rwanda and Burundi. A crucial issue which would need to be
resolved if this track has any hope of success would be
agreement that acceptable (non-criminal or genocidally
responsible) exile representatives, particularly of the Hutu
communities of Burundi and Rwanda, would have to be present.
There could be no unilateral vetoes by one group of another.
Both the RPA and extremist Tutsi factions in Burundi would have
to be convinced to participate with these groups, however great
their reluctance. To assist in .the internal reconciliation
track, considerable reliance could be placed on experienced
NGOs such as South Africa's ACCORD or the Vatican's San Egidio
order.
Given the probable lack of time on the part of the UN and
OAU to prepare the organization of the conference, we should
consider soliciting an outside group such as the Global
Coalition for Africa (GCA),
(Since the GCA is part of the
World Bank and both.the UN &nd all African states are members
of the GCA, it should be an acceptable entity to provide both
conference services and to assist in the political spadework of
persuading the various possibly recalcitrant parties to attend
and be forthcoming.) The u.s. should be prepared, in concert
with the donor community, to help get participa'nts to the table
CQUFIBEU'iPIAb
�....\,.:,.rrr
.....0
·-
COlU ID!!:I4'fiA!b
- 3 -
and to assist in funding conference preparations. To maximize
the chances of success of the international conference, a
preliminary meeting should be held to go over conference
logistics and more importantly pre-agree on goals, and, if
possible, tactics.
The conference agenda could follow the Spanish EU draft
paper (attached) whose main agenda items are~
I.
II.
Political and Security
A. Political Dialogue/Protection of Minority
Rights
B. Legal Security (respect for human rights,
establishment of rule of law)
C. Military Security
Economic Rehabilitation and Development
III. Refugees and the Human Dimension
The goals of the conference would be as follows (some are
more properly defined as tactics encapsulating overall goals):
Track I: POLITICAL REQQNCILIATION
an end to internal violence, external incursions and armed
irregular militias;
progressive installation (in carefully phased stages) of
majority democratic rule (as registered in a free, fair,
and transparent elction process), tightly bound to
guarantees for minority rights;
an end to impunity and the cycles of violence through
establishment of a professional, neutral multiethnic
judiciary;
·
·
·
creation of a multiethnic, professional army obediant to
democratically elected civilian authority and respectful of
human rights;
repatriation and/or resettlement of refugees;
creation Of a follow-up mechanism to assure rigorous
enforcement of agreements;
99!iF I BStl'f V•h
�~~:..:
····'\.£::./
CeUF I BEU'f IA'd5
- 4 -
carefully structured regional economic
development/rehabilitation program with adequate infusion
of donor assistance. Emphasis should be given.to: maximum
employment strategies, especially for male youth; family
planning; improved agricultural practices; regional
economic integration focusing on comparative advantage.
careful preparation of educational, cultural and media
programs designed to promote inter-ethnic reconciliation
while pointing out the moral, physical and national costs
of hate, genocide and community strife.
Following the conference, some working groups could meet
from time to time to follow-up on agreed actions. A second
track could'be an all-parties internal conference, particularly
for Burundi.
U.S. ROLE
The U.S. would have overlapping, reinforcing roles in both
the international and all-parties conferences, if necessary.
Its principal roles would be.both facilitative and active.
Among them are:
·
providing behind-the-scenes organizational expertise'for
the conferences;
funding significant aspects of the.conferences including
transportation, accommodation and s~curity;
acting effectively, where necessary, to break deadlocks and
generally to serve as honest broker~ To be most effective,
such a role would ~ave to be performed "off camera";
galvanizing donor community to fund directly and i.n-kind
~ervices of activities deemed essenti~l to break the cycle
of violence i.e. alternative employment generation,
professionalizing military to serve democratically elected
civilian government; establishing media and cultural
programs designed to counter ethnic hatred propaganda.
To engender the necessary atmosphere conducive to obtaining
assent to participate from reluctant parties, the U.S. should
consider the following steps:
COl!FIBEU'f!Ab
�C011l' IBE!U'fL'\15
- 5 -
having the President personally and publicly appeal to all
regional governments to participate; -' private warnings of
aid -- both development and humanitarian -freeze/r~duction/cutoffs could be made to recalcitrant
parties;
getting key Western donors heads of government and NGOs to
make similar appeals;
France has strongly supported the concept of an
international regional political conference. Nevertheless,
France had been a staunch sup~orter of the Habyarimana
Attachments:
As stated
Approved:RCS:RWBogosian
8/3/95, X7-2080
W-SECB 6754
Drafted:AF/C:RJFendrick
Cleared:AF/C:DLHeflin
AF/RA:SFisher
IO/UNP:GStanton
�Declassified .Under Authority of the .
..
.
Interagency Security De-classification Appe-.a]s Panel,
E.O~ 13526, Section 5·3(b)(j)
L:
{;·
•. r·
•
-:.
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 45
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
'''l[;'
···~)
C6ltf I fU!!U'f Utb
Rwanda/Burundi/Eastern Zaire/ Western
Tanzanian Regional Strategy
The situation. in the sub-region requires a united long-term
strategy to deal with the complex, multifaceted issues.
Demographics, ethnicity and poverty ~re the· underlying causes
of the problems we now face. These problems are exacerbated by
lack of sufficient land within the two countries of Burundi and
Rwanda and poverty. A short-term solution may be the
separation of the two groups but it i~ not likely to succeed
given their strong ties to their respective countries. We must
continue to work for reconciliation underscoring clearly that
we support majority rule but with protection of minority
·
rights, the cornerstones of democracy. ·we should c~ntinue·to
take advantage of opportunities to explain our policy with a
view to continue building a broad consensus for it in
Washington and abroad.
Principles Governing Our Policy
o
We support a democratic process in both Rwanda and
Burundi. This means governments that practice genuine
powersharing and protection of minority rights.
o
We will ctintinue to highlight human rights abuses within
both countries and push for punishment for abusers.
o
Above all, do no harm.
U. S. Interests
Rwanda/.Burundi
a. Regional Stability. Promotion of strong internal
institutions, particularly through effective judicial
administration and a multi-ethnic military.
b. Establishment of a climate conducive to trading
opportunities and the establishment of businesses.
c.
Avoiding future large-scale humanitarian crisis.
d. Stopping the cycles of impunity in Africa and of
genocide.
Regional Stability
Assumptions:
COPIF I BEiWfh'\b
�.- ··rqtir·
·--··"lj;~
CONFIQKN'FH•h
- 2 -
o
Tutsi hegemony is growing in the sub-region. Cooperation
between the militaries of Rwanda and Burundi exists and
will grown as Hutus rearm themselves and cross border
violence increases. Given Tutsi minority status, this is
an inherently unstable development and conducive to state
disintegration/failure.
o
The militaries in both countries do not necessarily share
our sub-regional vision of powersharing in the two
countries.
o
The majority of Hutu refugees will not return to Rwanda for
many years. Therefore, we must relocate refugees to
minimize economic costs to the international community.
o
Continued presence of refugees in eastern Zaire and western
Tanzania will continue to h~ve a destabilizing effect not
only on the two countries but the region.
o
Zaire and Tanzania wili tire of refugees on their soil and
perhaps resort to closing bord~rs, aiding Hutus against
GOR, invading Rwanda, Burundi or both, etc.( Tanzania has
already closed its borders to refugees.)
o
The RPA may stage preemptive strikes .into Zaire to get at
the EX-FAR. Rwanda Hutus will use an insurgency to force
·political settlement with the RPA.
Goals and Objectives.
1. Push for.genuine powersharing in Rwanda.
strengthen the civilian government.
Our actions must
·Internal Rwanda .Elements:
Provide IMET.
Push donors on contributing to re-establishment of a
judicial system. Begin at provincial level.
Push ·International Tribunal to begin indictments and
prosecution of genocide cases before end of the year.
Push GOR to begin trials of military accused of human
rights abuses.
Push GOR to announce its list of war criminals. This will
have a positive effect on Hutus living in refugee camps.
Push GOR to relieve prison conditions by releasing
detainees and issuing warinings to population not to engage
in individual retribution.
�.·z. .e>
..
Q9lifiBEJif'f'IAh
- 3 -
Human Rights Training for all groups across the political
spectrum. Get Gov't to make it a required course for all
government employees including military personnel.
Push GOR to establish benchmarks for broadening political
base.
Demobilize children in RPA.
Broaden base of military.
Encourage aid ptograms in areas of education and
devel6p~ent ( for demobilize youth) of job training. skills
in areas which will encourage outside investments.
I
IMET to Rwanda. Stress role of a military in a civilian
government as well as provide other courses.
o
Internal Burundi Elements:
In Burundi, support peace and reconciliation programs
underway with appropriate human rights safeguards and plans
for a national debate.
IMET program should stress role of a military in a civilian
government and provide courses.
Work with political parties to combat ethnic hatred;
provide IV grants to study party process in the U.S.
Encourage aid programs in areas of education and
development of job training skills in. areas which will
encourage outside investments.
Create work programs for youth, thus marginalizing
Bagaza's/Nyangoma•s influence on them.
Get churches more active in reconciliation efforts/ Work
with Catholic Dioceses and others to take lead;
Create a multi-et~nic police force.
Increase OAU/Human Rights monitors.
Create a non-government peace radio.
2. Support an international political conference of countries
in the dreat Lakes region with five perm reps of UNSC as
observers. Conference and follow-up sessions should be
organized along Middle East talks format.
eeUl'If'!!:MTIAtl
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0
CONF I BE!i'f H'd3
- 4 -
o
Refugees
Resettle refugees away f~om borders and
tools/ etc. to begin new lives.
pro~ide
them with
Explore with Tanzania/Zaire possibilities for relocating
those refugees on its soil in Tan~ania/Zaire for the
medium-term.
Explore possibility with Tribunal officials of setting up
shop on edge of camps to inform inhabitants whether or not
they can expect to face prosecution upon return to Rwanda.
This may speed up voluntary repatriation of those who are
skeptical about their future.
Decrease rations to refugees. This will decrease funds
available to refugees to buy weapons, etc.
Explore possibility of further separating military from
civilians in cam~s.
Explore placing Zairian/Tanzanian monitors in non-UNHCR
camps to monitor activities of ex~Far.
Track II Diplomacy:
Working with NGOs. interested in Burundi._ A number of U.S. and
international NGOs are active in Burundi. We should continue
to work with them and pursue the follwing:
Solict highly respected US NGOs to form the corps of a
friends of the Great Lakes group.
Objectives:
- Support "formal diplomatic track" with insights, ·
contacts, people to people reconciliation (they can put
Hutus together with Tutsis in patterns that USG can't for
"reasons of State" ole/ "bad" old government guys and
others).
- Provide "live" feedback on human rights efforts -- what's
working, what isn't, where are the gaps -- people, money.
- Strenthen international "NGO loop.
and others see and say.?
frQUPIBDti'f!Ab
(What do the French
�..
"'·
~U!::IBf!N'fiAti
- 5- Designate a person (FSO 1 or 2) to specifically work with
these groups.
- Build a media campaign around "peace and reconciliation"
-- regional solution for regional problems.
- VOA campaign but reset beyond to French, Belgian and
British.
- "PsyOps" campaign in local press and media.·
- Find hi-profile u.s. and other pop artists to deliver
-- "We Are The World."
m~ssage
- Host conference or provide NGO "seed" money to host
conference on "land-pressure" problems -- other solutions
elsewhere.
Short-Term Actions to Reinvigorate Preventive Diplomacy Efforts
in Burundi.
A. ·Current U.S. and international community efforts underway.
These attempts help to bolster moderates and deter extremists
and should continue.
High-level visits and public statements.
Promote dialogue.
[We have devoted USD 5 million to a
democracy/governance program that helps promote peaceful
conflict resolution.]
Move forward on the UN commission of inquiry.
Move forward on aid to the Burundi judiciary.
[The U.S.
has USD 400,000 in ESF to make available for this; the
Belgians are taking the lead.]
Move forward with deployment of human rights monitors,
provided they.have adequate training, a clear mandate, and
adequate security arrangements, and they· coordinate their
efforts with the Secretary General's special representative.
continue visa sanctions. The U.S. has entered the names of
47 extremists in our look-out system, and will try to
exclude them if they apply.
B.
The
u.s.
proposed the following additional measures:
Encourage more meetings between regional leaders to address
regional security and refugee issues.
Encourage an African elder statesman such as Mugabe or
Nyerere to become engaged over the long term to facilitate
dialogue between the two comm~nities.
COlU'I"BM'fllsib
�Declassified Under Authority .of the
Interagency·Security Declassification Appeals Panel, ·
E.O. 13526, Section 5.3(b)(j)
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 46
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
United States Department of State
·. ~..:.f~~.; ...
.
...
Washington.. D.C.
.
.· ...~
20520
August 2, 1995
/0
QeHf:l.B rllf'i" Its fJ
MEMORANDUM
TO:
G - . .Timothy E. Wirth
THROUGH;
AF - George E._ Moo.~~~(
FROM:
Rwanda/Burundi Coordinator - R.W.
SUBJECT:
v
Rwanda/Burundi Priorities
Bogosian~
Over the near teim, five sets.of.activities or
priority issues will dominate my agenda ·as Rwanda/Burundi
Coordinator. They are:
A Regional Conference
Human Rights/AdministratiDn o-f JusticeRefugees
Support of Government of Rwanda/Burundi Centrists
EmergensY.-Pl-ann ing
___.
---
The following is an annotated outline of some of the most
important or delicate aspects of each set of is~ues and
actions:
8~~lQNAL
CONFERENCE: There is a fairly· broad consensus
that the time is ripe for a comprehensive regional
conference. We will provide our views on how best to
organize and prepare for such a conference in a separate
memorandum. Over the near term, we will consult closely
with several important constituencies, viz., the UN and
OAU; · key European governments including, perhaps, the
Vatican; Rwanda and Burund~ neighbors, which could touch on
sensitive bilateral issues, notably with Zaire; and with
the Hill, the NGOs and the press. In addition to basic
political issues, many of the specific points noted ·below
wo11ld have to be considered at the Regional Conference or
follow-on meetings.
COttfiBBU'fiUz
DECL: OADR
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COMl'IBEUCfH'd5
- 2 -
HUMAN RIGHTS/ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: Past or present
human rights abuses are central concerns for us in both
Rwanda and Burundi. In both countries it is essential to
make progress in improving very weak, virtually moribund,
systems of Justice. It seems that at last we are making
progress with the Rwanda tribunal and the Burundi
Commission
Inquiry, but much more remains to be done. In
addition, prison overcrowding in Rwarida, administration of
justice legislation, the issue of foreign magistrates and
related issues all require priority attention if there is
to be progress on the human rights front and if w$ are to
succeed in encouraging repatriation of refugees.
Tactically, we have opportunities to exert leverage as we
support Rwanda's request to have the arms embargo lifted.
of
REFUGEES: The whole range of refugee issues will.continue
to require urgent attention, including issues aiising out
of the actua,l return of refugees such as reconciliation at
the local level. Current concerns include the presence~.
arms among Rwandan refugees in Zaire. There are logistical
problems related to managing the refugee camps and moving
them. We are also concerned about the possibility of fresh
refugee movements out of Burundi and the possible closure
of Tanzania's border with Burundi.
SUPPORT FOR THE GOR AND BURUNDI CENTRISTS: This is a
shorthand way of referring to the several efforts underway
to shore-up moderates in both countries. As you know,
there are several AID, USIS and IMET programs already being
implemented and others being requested and/or considered.
In addition, there is the UNDP Roundtable process where
disbursements have been very disappointing, especially
compared to pledges. SRSG Abdallah informally has proposed
having a UNDP Roundtable for Burundi. One aspect of this
set of issues is the military element. We need to consider
what military assistance, if any, we or our allies should
consider providing either country. We are talking of
lifting the arms embargo on Rwanda while looking into
whether one should be imposed on Burundi. Related to the
need to improve. the administration of justice is the need
to professionalize local police capabilities. What role,
if any, should the u.s. play in this regard?
COllE I BEU'f IAL
�COMP: I%'JEN IIBL
- 3 -
EMERGENCY PLANNING: Even as we plan specific programs with
their staffing implications, we have to plan for
contingencies. These.include OFDA-type planning for
sudd~n, massive re~uge~ flows. Such thorny problems as
being able to provide adequate water remain to be
resolved. We also have continually to review the safety of
Americans in Rwanda and Burundi. The latter situation,
should it deteriprate precipitously, may require an
emergency evacuation or further reduction in staff at the
Embassy in Bujumbura. As long as the security situation in
Burundi remains potentially hazardous, we will have to
review other normally routine staffing and management
issues through the security filter.
Cleared by:
AF/FO:OAS Bushner~.
· AF /C: Arlene Rende~
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�SECRET
20987
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
August 21, 1995
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR NANCY E. SODERBERG
Deda.Ssifi8dt.rn~er Auilioilt{ofthe
interagency SecuritY.-f>eclassification Appeals
·
THROUGH:
SUSAN E.
R~
FROM:
SHAWN H.
McCORMICK~
SUBJECT:
Briefing Memo for Ad Hoc Meeting on
Rwanda/Burundi, August 22, 1995, ~-
E.O; 1J526;:~ction:s:p(b)C3)
·'~
ISC~ Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 10
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
II
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ISSUES FOR DECISION
SITREP:
You should ask the CIA to provide an update covering
intensification of war in Burundi, Rwanda after the lifting of
the arms embargo and Mobutu's decision to forcibly repatriate
refugees to both countries.
JOE NYE:
Just returned from a visit to the region.
He is fired
up to do more on Rwanda/Burundi.
This is a posture we should
encourage. Ask him to'briefly summarize his conclusions from his
trip.
Nye will likely argue for pursuing the notion of an all
Afri~an intervention force for Burundi as originally proposed by
Tanzania (see Tab III). Welcome his thinking and task the IWG to
continue reviewing. DO NOT allow this to become topic oj
conversation in this meeting. Agenda is too full.
TASKINGS: Acknowledge positive response to taskings in previous
meeting. Mandate the Working Group to continue implementing
these items under Bogosian's leadeiship.
IS$Ue 1: .Should the U.S. Lead a Diplomatic Effort to Promote
Long-term Solutions to the Problems in Rwanda and Burundi?
Achieving our objective of restoring stability to the Great Lakes
region requires that the U.S. exert maximum influence and
"diplomatic reach" at a time of reduced resources and urgent
problems in other parts of the world. We therefore need to
decide whether the·U.S. is prepared to make sfich an investment,
particularly with respect to Burundi - the problem that will be
more costly and difficult to restore.
SECRET
Declassify on:
OADR
Pan ei, ·
�SECRET
2
Rwanda: Zairian troops expelled more than 2,000 refugees by
dumping them on the border Monday prompting at least 26,000
oth~rs to flee to the hills to escape.
The situation remains
unclear but remains d~ngerous while also pres~nting an
opportunity to pursue long-term solutions.
Burundi: State has produced only threads of a political
framework. More work needs to be done to put meat on the bones
of a political framework (see paper at Tab V). We need a
decision in principle to continue thinking/planning on these
lines in preparation for Principals concurrence. If we are to
move fo~watd, we need: 1) ·principals sign-off given the required
high expenditure of money and diplomatic capital.
Your Goal: A) Rwanda -Ask State to report on situation in
general. and efforts taken to date to respond to forced
repatriation of refugees. Ask AID to brief on UNHCR's
preparedness to deal .with this potential humanitarian crisis.
Seek agreement to pursue immediately long-term Rwanda strategy at
Tab IV. This is similar to Option 1 in original NSC paper.
B) Burundi - Gain agreement that State should continue its
efforts to add detail to a draft political framework that would
serve as the basis of negotiations with a contact group and for
an eventual regional conference. The proposed political
framework should cull from relevant elements of the Convention of
Government and the Arusha Peace Accords as well as from U.S.
government experts on Burundi. Ask State to provide a paper by
c.o.b. Friday (8/25). Authorize Bogosian in principle to consult
_with European allies and countries on basis of paper at Tab V.
Flag need for Principals concurrence. Lead discussions on
whether USG should make investment of resources and political
capital to try to achieve lasting Burundi solution.
Issue 2:
Should the U.S. Support an Arms Embargo on Burundi?
Burundi risks spiraling downward into widespread violence, as
occurred in October 1993. Government military forces have
actively pursued a policy of ethnic cleansing through terror and
reported massacres. As of late, however, Burundian Hutu forces
have combined efforts with Rwandan extremists in their ethnic
battle against the Burundian army and possibly against a
vulnerable southern Rwandan border. A classic African guerrilla
war is developing. See pros/cons at Tab VI. _See CIA assessment
at Tab VII.
.n
Your Goal: To gain agreement on terms of an arms embargo but
hold-off introducing any such resolution.
SECRET
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Issue 3: Should the U.S. Support a Freeze of Assets Belonging to
Burundian Extremists?
There are approximately 40 Burundian extremist leaders, both Hutu
and Tutsi, to whom the United States and European countries deny
visas. These individuals have limited ·if any holdings in the
U.S. but larger amounts in Europe. A UN resolution calling on
countries to freeze assets of these leaders will send an
important signal that we want to isolate extremists, bolster
moderates and end the cycle of impunity. Such a move could also
limit funds available to purchase wea~ons. Although Treasury and
State EB are traditionally reluctant to implement asset freezes,
State AF supports such a move. We agree. If we proce~d, we
should expect resist.ance from other UNSC members, particularly
several of the Europeans who resist such sanctions as a matter of
policy. See pros/cons at Tab VIII.
Your Goal:
To gain agreement that the U.S. support a UN
res.olution freezing the assets of specific Burundian extremists.
Attachment
Agenda
Tab I
List of Participants
Tab II
OSD Considerations on All-African Force
Tab III
Long-term Rwanda Strategy
Tab IV
Long-term Burundi Strategy
Tab V
Burundi Arms Embargo Pros/Cons
Tab VI
CIA Report on Implications·of Burundi Arms Embargo
Tab VII
Tab VIII Burundi Asset Freeze Pros/Cons
SECRET
�SECRET
Considerations on All-African Force
for Burundi Crisis Response
(A~F)
BACKGROUND: While there are some highly qualified Chapter VI peace!«<pin2
forces in Africa, the Chapter
military capabilities of mB:Ily of the proposed
intervention force participants are generally poor, necessitating an almost ground-up
approach to equipping, training, deploying and sustaining. PDD-25 and the. Joint Staffs
Concept for a Multinational Force intervention serve as the basis for this analysis.
vn
PEACEKEEPING POLICY CONSIDERATIONS: At this preliminary stage, many of
the PDD-25 considerations have not yet been adequately addressed. Key issues include
the lack of an analysis of mandate. provisions and clearly defined peacekeeping and
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humanitarian objectives, Nonetheless, here is a rough analysis of the utility of an AAF
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based on the options for peace operations:
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Chapter VI Option: The A.AF would have potential as a Chapter VI force,
subject to the consent of the parties involved and the establishment of realistic
objectives. Given the force size of 6,000 troops, with substantial training, the AAF
would have limited capability to monitor and supervise the implementation of peace
settlement However, the AAF could only be deployed after all major parties agree to
forego fighting.
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Chapter Vll Options: By itself, the AAF would not have viable capabilities as ]C~o13
Chapter Vll force. As an ad hoc military coalition of 6,000 troops, the AAF would be ~ al z ~
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entirely too small, poorly trained, ill-led, and ill-equipped to .be successful petforming
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required military operations. If the AAF were to fail as a Chapter Vll force in Burundi, o ...... w~o
the U.S, could be called upon to assist and protect the AAF during its extraction.
Clearly, some other Chapter vn option is preferable. For instance, should a Western
power such as France decide to lead a UN coalition inclucijng some 6,000 -10,000
French troops, the AAF could augment this force with 6,000 troops and perform less .
demanding support missions. Another possibility would be to use the AAF as follow-on
Chapter VI force, once a Chapter Vll mission, performed·~under the direction of a major
power, is complete.
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FORCE CONSIDERATIONS
Ethiopia: Requested lift, NVGs, flak jacketS for UNAMIR deployment, a Chapter
VI operation, not Chapter vn. Our contribution would have to be sweetened
considerably as CIA paper notes.
·· ·· ·
Francophone units: Battalion in UNAMIR was pushed by French, who want no
part of this operation.
.
.
South Africa: As the continent's most capable foree, the SANDF could be an
important participant, even if they were only to provide logistical support. However,
money is a major factor for even our richest partner in Africa.- Further, our general policy·
is that we not press the South Africans to participate in PK./PE operations, allowing them
time to stabilize their internal situation.
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Tanzania: The Tanzanian military's perfonnance.during the 1~78 intervention in
Uganda was poor (their anned forces today are even worse). Also, there are grave
doubts about their neutrality if involved in Burundi.
Francophone v. Anglophone: Most of the proposed forces are Anglophone.
Not only does this raise suspicions with Francophone Africans and France, but it creates
major communications problems for AAF interaction with the local population.
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
U.S. Troop Participation: U.S. support troops would be involved in d1e crisis
area if TALCEs (and security teams) deployed to facilitate·air movement of the AAF.
Should the AAF fail, U.S. could be called upon to extract the AAF.
.
Equipment and logistical support required (for ~!.'forces currently named save
South Africa, Ethiopia partial): CommWtications gear, anununition, armored vehicles,
helicopters (we have excess helos, but who will train, mainW-n and sustain), some
personal weapons and uniforms, and equipment main~nance capacity. Intra-theater
airlift would be provided for outsized/oversized equipment and then some. Inter-theater
lift could be provided by many other countries.
··
Command and Control: With different levels of capability, no experience in
working together in a combat environment, and probably incompatible communications
structure, the AAF would be severely hamstrung in· its ability to deploy across northern
Burundi.
...
Operational security: Word of interventio~iprep will be impossible to contain as
the AAF will ~uire marrying up African troops· with equipment and training prior to
deployment. nus may doom the operation before it gets off the ground and, worse,
cause the very explosion we are hoping to avoid.
Time requirement: Deployment of African•forces for other peace operations has
almost never been done quickly. The force concept requires the force be ready at a
moment's notice to deploy to deter ethnic violence and help prevent an explosion .
.
....
Troops Available: The Joint Staff plan calls for a Western-led force of at least
6.000 to accomplish the mission - a less capable force would require larger numbers of
troops, not necessarily available from potential contributors;· this would drive up
transportation costs. The intervention force also requires airmobile assets which the
AAF (without South Africa) would not have.
Change of Mission: A whole host of proble.ms ensues if the Burundian military
becomes hostile to AAF presence and the Mrican ·forc~s are forced to fight. While
recent reports suggest the Burundian military has only a~limited capability to counter an
.intervention force's actions. the Burundi Ambassaoor warned that an intervention force
"would wind up fighting Tutsi guerrillas for years."
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SECRET
FINANCIAL SUPPORT CON SIDERATIONS
.
State and Joint Staff Legal papers list the applicable authorities. Much of the
support f~r this force, if not mitigated by State monies [FAA Sections 551, 552(c)(l) and
(2)], would .probably come out of DoD funds. An international trust fund would be a
potential s.ource of funds but might be neady impossible to put together in advance of a
· . .
·
crisis. Some additional notes: ·
• Drawdown only allows us to provide stocked items and services - no
procurement is allowed and usually there is some readiness degradation.
·
• There is no FMF for Sub-Saharan Africa · · ·
• Procurement authorized if done on a reimbur~able basis.
• OAU FMF account for PKO?
·' ·· · ·
• There is no known authority for loaning.tf}..is equipment
• Assumption: EDA is not a viable means helping equip the A.AF because of
maintenance and availability drawbacks.
...
.
• Training on any new equipment will place an additional burden on available
funds and time considerations.
.
• Leasing is a means to provide much of the equipment needed on a low cost
basis.
of
CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATIONS Congressional support to equip, train,
deploy and maintain part of this force will be problematic ..
Bottom Line: Even if funding for the AAF is found, there'ls· no reasonable expectation
it could deter ethnic violence in Burundi successfu_lly •. even with several months of
equipping and training by Western forces. The burden of equipping, training, moving
and maintaining the AAF will be tremendous. This effort helps to underline the need to
develop the OAU's peacekeeping mechanism. The AAF option may have utility as a
Chapter VI force, should the conditions in Burundi permit However, the AAF could not
be successful as a stand-alone Chapter VII force in Buru.rtdi.
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Declassified Under. Authority ofthe
Inl:eragene!y·Security,Declassifieaiion Appe;m.:Panel,
E,O, ~3,526, Section 5·3(b)(J)
,
lSCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 11
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
Proposed Elements of USG Strategy for Bringing Long-Term Stability to Rwanda
The Need for a Long-Term Strategy: At the August 9, interagency Ad Hoc Meeting on Rwanda
and Burundi chaired by the NSC, participants briefly discussed elements of a long-term strategy
for enhancing political stability in Rwanda and the region. This strategy would supplement, not
replace, the important diplomatic and development efforts the USG has already taken in
Rwanda, which include but are not limited to support for the War Crimes Tribunal, assistance to
the GOR, particularly for administration of justice activities, support for UNAMIR, lJumanitarian
assistance, military training, etc.
In addition to these efforts, however, it is necessary for the international community and the.
Rwandan government to agree on an over-arching strategy to bring lasting peace/stability to
Rwanda and the region. Doing so entails active support for the GOR so long as it pursues
policies of peace and national reconciliation as well as pro-active efforts to address the
destabilizing refugee problem bycreating.a climate conducive to refugee return and energizing the
international community to prosecute swiftly the several hundred ring-leaders oflast year's
genocide.
Key elements of a long-term strategy are summarized below.
Recent Developments --A Window of Opportunity?:.
In the time that has elapsed since the
August 9 meeting, there have been a number of important developments. The first element ofthe
strategy below -- lifting the Rwandan arms embargo -- has been accomplished. More recently,
Zaire has begun to implement its threat to forcibly return all Rwandan and Burundian refugees as
a consequence of the UNSC decision to suspend the arms embargo. Already, we have reports
that thousancis of refugees are fleeing or being forced both towards the Rwandan border and
further into the interior of Zaire. lfnot stemmed quickly or managed effectively, this situation
has the potential to become extremely violent and result in a humanitarian crisis culminating in
significant loss of life. ·
Most elements of the strategy outlined below have not yet been pursued by the USG, although we
appear to have a unique window of opportunity to do so, given the USG' s enhanced credibility
with the GOR following our leadership role in lifting the arms embargo and the dangers inherent
in forced repatriation of Rwandan refugees from Zaire.
LONG-TERM STRATEGY
It is proposed that the U.S. begin immediately to lobby the Government of Rwanda, other
countries in the region and concerned donors as appropriate with the aim of implementing
the strategy outlined below:
a) Lift Arms Embargo with Conditions to deter arms transfers to Burundi.· [Status:
AccomplishedAugust 16, 1995.]
SE6RE=r
�2
b) Create a Climate in Rwanda Conducive to Safe Refugee Repatriation.
-- Urge GOR to issue swiftly a blanket amnesty for all those except known military/militia
leaders and key alleged war criminals. (NB: Any future Rwandan amnesty would not affect the
jurisdiction of the War Crimes Tribunal established by the Security Council nor our obligation to
·
deport alleged war criminals to stand trial before the Tribunal.)
•
Urge GOR to work with UNHCRIICRC to screen returning refugees in orderly
process at the border. UNHCR should provide repatriation package.
•
GOR, with UNAMIR support, should guarantee safe passage for refugees as they
return to their communes.
•
International assistance should be directed in part to building additional housing for ·
returning refugees and adjudicating property disputes. U.S .. assistance would continue
to be directed primarily to capacity-building and administration of justice activities.
In pursuing a general amnesty, the GOR will have taken an important step toward solving the·
refugee problem. While repatriation is certain to be slow and partial, by announcing an amnesty,
the GOR can assume the moral high-ground, reduce tensions with neighboring countries and
demonstrate clearly to international donors that it is serious about reconciliation.
-- Encourage GOR to name 400+ most heinous genocide perpetrators and issue warrants for
their arrest. If the GOR and the international community are ever to prosecute war criminals
effectively and move forward with national reconciliation, we must focus our prosecutorial efforts
on the ringleaders and allow a return to normalcy for the remaining refugees/prisoners. The GOR
has a list of approximately 400 ringleaders. The War Crimes Tribunal reportedly has a similar list.
These individuals should be the focus of international efforts. To pursue this approach credibly
and effectively, the international community must demonstrate swiftly and surely its readiness to
bring the ringleaders to justice. This will require:
-- The U.S. and other countries making a concerted effort worldwide to apprehend
perpetrators by surprise.
--The U.S. and others reiterating their commitment to capture, deport/detain all400+ and
begin by widely publicizing names and suspected whereabouts of key genocide
perpetrators. This must be part ofan aggressive international campaign (w/newspaper
ads, etc.) to shame countries harboring war criminals to turn them over. For our part, the
U.S. would deport suspected criminals in U.S. to the Hague or Rwanda as appropriate.
-- International community/UN must do all possible to expedite work of War Crimes
Tribunal.
SEGRE.T
�3
e) Press UNBCR to Endorse Efforts by GOR to Encourage Refugee Return (assuming this
occurs) and Announce that Within Six Months UNBCR will Close Existing Refugee Camps
Zaire, Burundi and Tanzania.
in
-- Refugees would be encouraged but not compelled to return underUN or other
international escort.
-- Those that wish to remain would have two options: 1) resettlement on a more
permanent basis inside the country of first asylum, or; 2) move to new, presumably smaller
UNHCR camps constructed further away from the Rwandan border. Both these steps will require
t,tle consent of the asylum countries, which will be difficult to obtain. However, if coupled with a
GOR general amnesty and serious efforts to encourage refugee return, host governments may be
persuaded to assent.
-- These steps would be taken in conjunction with efforts to create a climate conducive to
repatriation to Rwanda. ·
d) Improve Prison Conditions. The USG has made plain to the GOR our strong concern about
the horrid prison conditions in which more than 50,000 poople are being held. While providing
tents to ease prison crowding, the USG must increase pressure on the GOR to release from prison
all but the key suspected genocide perpetrators and improve living conditions for those that
remain. The USG approach should include the elements outlined in the State paper (attached).
e) Intensify Support for Current Government Via "Tough Love" Campaign.
The international community needs to make plain both the benefits of cooperation on the elements
above and the consequences of failure to move forward. If Rwanda pursues the steps above, the
U.S. ought to push its allies to recognize these accomplishments in a tangible way and reward the.
Rwandan leadership directly. Rewards might include the following, in addition to rapid release of
pledged assistance and other direct support to the GOR:
--France initiates bilateral assistance to the GOR
-- Europeans invite senior GOR leaders for official visits
--U.S. receives Rwandan leaders at the White House
On the other hand, we have to make plain to Rwandan 'leaders that ifthe GOR fails to move
forward on the key issues above, we will to have reassess of policy of continued strong support
for the GOR
f) Consider Enlisting Help from Mobutu. [Status: State is preparing paper on possible role
for Mobutu in resolving the regional crisis.]
Mobutu might be enlisted to take immediate steps to halt involuntary refugee repatriation, curtail
arms flows in Zaire, allow stationing of monitors at key airports in eastern Zaire and movement of
refugee camps inland, use his forces to disarm/close ex-FAR camps in Zaire, put forces on border
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to prevent/deter ex-FAR incursions. In exchange, we may have to agree to help fund Zairian
forces through UNHCR and provide Mobutu with a degree of international recognition. These
efforts should not be divorced from our principal goal of pushing Mobutu towards a serious
democratic transition in Zaire.
President Carter has initiated a dialogue with Mobutu on his own. The USG must decide whether
we believe it worthwhile to engage Mobutu at all on these issues and, if so, whether we want to
do so directly or work in conjunction with Carter.
Progress on the above items need not be stalled while the USG resolves the broader issue of
whether and how to engage Mobutu.
�·Revised 8/18/95
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Prison Reduction Strategy
G.Q..a.l: To dramatically reduce the pr.ison population in
Rwanda and start trials of the most serious offenders in
national custody.
Background: Although the GOR has made some noises about
reducing the prison capacity and appears willing to form a
Presidential Commission on the issue, hardliners within the
government have shown little interest in· reducing the prison
population, making the jails more humane or beginning trials.
Indeed, the prison population has surged from 30,000 in May to
50,000 at present.
Although the USG ha~ made various
demarches to the Rwandan Government, greater political pressure
is needed to gain a reduction in the prison population.
Pressure is timely given the lifting of the arms embargo. We
may wish to underscore the importance we place on the prison
issue by a visit to Rwanda from a senior State Department
official to lay out our position. We should also seek support
from the ROSG. khen appropriate, President Clinton could
follow with a call or letter to President Bizimungu and Vice
President Kagame.
Message:
To pressure the GOR, we should tell them that we must see
tangible progress within one month in the areas enumerated
below or the USG will have to review its assistance to.the
GOR. Given the level of concern within the Congress and the
USG about prison conditions, we will tell the GOR that it will
be extremely difficult for the US to maintain the level of
support we have (e.g., aid to government ministries). It will
be difficult to authorize new support (e.g., lethal or
non-lethal arms equipment) until! we see tangible improvements
in the prison situation.
To ensure continued USG assistance, the GOR must show
progress in the following areas within the next month:
1. Work with international humanitarian organizations to
increase the capacity of its prisons and spread out the
population. (We have given $625,000 to the ICRC to expand
prison capacity but could give more money or equipment for
this purpose).
2. Release the young (over 400 under age 14), the elderly
(over 3,200 age 55 and over), the pregnant and the infirm
on humanitarian grounds.
3. Dramatically reduce the number of arrests (currently at
500 a week) by only making arrests where there is
sufficient evidence of guilt.
DeClassified Under Authority .Of the.
Interagency Secunty Declassification Appeals-P~nei;
E.O.: 13526; S.ection S-3(b)(3)
·
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 47
Declassification Date: march 18, 2014
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4. Take steps necessary to appoint Rwandan judges and begin
trials in Rwanda.
5. Provide for the security of released prisoners and make
clear that repris~l killings will not be tolerated.
6. Give high-level support to a Presidential Commission to
develop a political strategy for reducing the prison
population, triaging prisoneis and re-integrating Hutus.
(AID will provide $300,000 out of the $4 million rule of
law assistance to the Commission, as suggested by post);
Drafted: DRL: CNix
8/15/95 SENIX 211
Cleared: DRL:NEly-Raphel(subs); AF:RBogosian(subs);
G:AJoyce(subs) AF/C:ARender
�Declassified Under Authority of the
SECRE'l'
Interagency SecuritY Dec]assification A:ppeais Panei,
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 12
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
E.O. 13526, Section 5.3(b)(3)
Elements of a Regional Solution to the Crisis in Burundi
As tasked at the August 9 interagency meeting on Burundi, State has drafted several papers
outlining a potential diplomatic process for building a Bosnia-style.Contact Group to prepare for a
regional peace conference on Burundi (and possibly Rwanda). State has also begun considering
the elements of a political framework that would serve as the basis for discussions with our allies.
Once refined with allies' input and that of countries/players in the region, this framework could
form the basis for negotiations at a regional conference.
This paper summarizes key elements of the State-prepared papers and outlines in general terms
the substance of a potential USG proposal to reach a long-term solution to the problems in
Burundi. Finally and most importantly, it poses a central policy question: is the USG prepared to
invest the resources and diplomatic capitaln:ecessary to make a serious attempt at finding a
long-term solution to the problem in Burundi on the basis of the proposal below?
I. Outlines of Proposed USG Initiative for Burundi
Proposed Political Framework: The current crisis in Burundi, like those in its past, is rooted in a
· fundamental struggle between rival ethnic groups for power and scarce resources. Hence, any
long-term solution to this problem must take into account both the need for a political solution to
the. power struggle, while seeking to contain the struggle for resources by demonstrating that
'
there are economic benefits to peace and a high price for continued warfare.
Burundi is a long way from Jeffersonian democracy, which should not be the immediate goal of
U.S. policy. Our immediate goal must be to end the killings and achieve relative stability in
Burundi and the region. Once these conditions are achieved, restoration of genuine democracy in
Burundi is a reasonable objective.
Any near-term and lasting political solution in Burundi must entail genuine power-sharing among
the ethnic groups. The details of a power-sharing agreement must ultimately be worked out
among the Burundians themselves, but the international community can and should assist by
suggesting a starting point for their discussions. Towards this end, the USG should work to
refine a proposal for power-sharing based on the following elements: decentralized governmental
authority/greater regional autonomy (localities are increasingly ethnically homogenous, so local
authorities would likely be run by representatives of one or the other ethnic group) and; loose
federal structure bound together by a multi-ethnic civilian central government that has genuine
control of the military and provides key services to all parts of the country.
The above elements of a proposed political framework are overly general and need amplification.
While our final proposal should not be too specific, it should be sufficiently qeveloped to serve as
the basis for renewed discussions with our allies and fresh negotiations among the parties to the
conflict. A more detailed political framework should cull froin relevant elements of the Burundi
Convention of Government agreed last year, the Arusha Accords,. and the perspectives ofUSG
· experts on Burundi. State will develop a more detailed political framework as soon as possible.
SECRET
�SECRET
2
Essential Societal Reforms: To be viable, any political framework must be buttressed by essential
reforms including integration of the military, eradication of widespread human rights abuses in the
military, police training and judicial reform. In addition, Burundi must embark on a concerted
long-term program to ensure equal opportunity for members of each ethnic group in education,
government, the military, judiciary and other key segments of civil society.
International Assistance Required: Burundi has proved itself incapable of implementing such
sweeping social reforms alone. It will need the active support of the international community in
the form of substantial development assistance and help in keeping the peace and building key
institutions. One method of providing this support is to establish a broad UN presence -- a Ia the
temporary UN interim administration in Cambodia (or West Irian in the early 1960s). The UN
would assist in implementing the agreed political· settlement, help run key ministries as they
embark on reform programs, deploy peacekeepers to deter acts of violence, and help with police
training and military integration.
Such a proposal may be the best solution but would require substantial resources. (The UN
mission in Cambodia-- significantly larger country than Burundi-- required 20,000
peacekeepers and cost approximately $1 billion.) Today, the UN faces a serious funding crisis, in
large part due to U.S. arrearages. Without a new injection offunds, the UN does not have the
ability to embark on such a mission in Burundi. U.S. financial support to the UN could not be
forthcoming without large appropriations from Congress, which almost certainly will not be
available. In addition, given the UN' s recent track record in peacekeeping, it is highly
questionable whether another ambitious UN mission could succeed. While a UN mission is by no
means the orily method of providing sustained international support, other methods are likely also
to be costly. The U.S. should consult with our allies on alternative means of providing
international support following any negotiated settlement in Burundi.
a
Carrots and Sticks: The parties to the conflict in Burundi have exhibited little, if any, interest in
reaching a negotiated 'political solution to their problems. Both sides are poised for war and have
rejected OAU-proposed peace talks. Any serious international effort to negotiate a lasting
solution to Burundi's problems must be coupled with tempting carrots and heavy sticks.
The international community, led by key donors and countries in the region, would seek the
parties' agreement to a political settlement. If successful, the international community will
commit to provide substantial economic assistance and political and security assistance to a
reconstituted Burundian federal government.
If the parties refuse to work toward or reach agreement, the international community would cut
all· development assistance to Burundi, seek to try the extremists for crimes against humanity and
impose an economic as well as arms embargo. These tough steps would be aimed at weakening
the extremists, taking away the resources for which they compete, and stimulating the population
to recommit themselves and their leaders to the establishment of a viable national entity.
SBCRB':F
�SECRS'l'
3
PROS
•
•
•
•
Threat of harsh, concerted international action along with risks of continued ethnic
conflict, may be sufficient to bring parties to a viable, lasting settlement.
May be achievable in the relative short term.
If implemented swiftly, could forestalUprevent widespread genocide.
Allows international community to try one last step short ofthe use of force to resolve
the current crisis.
CONS
~
•
•
•
International community must reach agreement on outlines of settlement and tough
measures to be imposed if settlement fails. Thus far, donors have been able to agree
on little with respect to Burundi.
Chances of success are limited.
Costly. Would require substantial political/diplomatic, economic and military
investment in Burundi. International involvement should be expected to last at least
five years.
Burundi leaders may divide and conquer international community by neither rejecting
agreement outright nor negotiating in good faith.
II. Building a Contact Group and Preparing a Regional Conference
To negotiate a comprehensive political settlement in Burundi, the United States needs the active
support and assistance of key donors (who must be equal partners in this endeavor) and the
constructive support of countries in the region. These factors are key to any successful approach
to the conflicting parties in Burundi.
STEP 1: Contact Group. An important first step would be the establishment of an
international Bosnia-style 'contact group' consisting at least of the United States, France,
Belgium, UK, Germany, Canada and the Netherlands. An essential prerequisite to any diplomatic
initiative is gaining the agreement of the French and Belgians. The U.S. must start with these two
countries in building an international negotiating team. Anlbassador Bogosian should initiate this
effort by conducting intense consultations with the French and Belgians in early September on the
modalities of a lasting political solution in Burundi and seek their agreement to participate actively
in an international contact group. Bogosian's efforts must be back-stopped by active
interventions, when necessary, by top officials at State and the White House. Once constructive
French and Belgian participation is assured, the contact group should be broadened to include the
other countries listed above.
In approaching key donors, the U.S. should seek support for a political solution along the broad
lines described· above. However, we should be flexible and welcome any helpful modifications to
the U.S. proposal.
STEP 2: Regional Conference. Following agreement among members ofthe contact group,
we would seek support for a regional conference from countries in the region, the UN and the
OAU. If obtained, we would support a joint UN/OAU effort to convene a regional conference.
(For details of conference process/modalities, see attached State memo.) Ambassador Bogosian
SECRE'l'
�SECRET
4
would lead consultations with countries in the region and the UN and OAU. However, most of
the day-to-day spade work would be done by our missions in the field. Bogosian plans a trip to
the region in mid-September, which provides an important opportunity to solicit support for a
contact group plan and lay the foundation for a regional conference. The contact group would
provide financial and diplomatic support to the conference by working in conjunction with the UN
and OAU to put forward a proposed political framework, offer good offices and serve as honest
brokers .. Key countries in the region would join us as full partners in these efforts and participate
with us in an observer capacity at the conference.
If successful, the regional conference would result in tangible progress towards a long-term
political solution in Burundi. If other countries insist that Rwanda also be on the agenda, the U.S.
should not object but focus its own energies on solving the more difficult conceptual problem -Burundi. The regional conference should be viewed not as an end in itself but the substantive
launching ofwhat must-- by necessity-- be an extended negotiation process.
ill. Is It Worth The Investment?
· As noted above, pursuit of the above diplomatic strategy to achieve a long-term political solution
to the crisis in Burundi will require a substantial investment of scarce U.S. financial resources
·(possibly tens of millions of dollars), political capital, and the time and attention of the most senior
members of the Administration's foreign policy team. Before we embark on this effort, we must
obtain the commitment of senior leaders in the relevant agencies to devote the substantial priority,
time and resources that this effort requires. Moreover, there is a substantial risk of failure and
hence, embarrassment. In the worst case, by proving the futility of the best efforts of the
international community, failure could also conceivably hasten intensified conflict and
humanitarian crisis.
a
On the other hand, failure to act now to try to achieve a political solution leaves a festering
regional crisis unattended. No other countries are offering the leadership required to find a lasting
solution. In the absence of a lasting solution, the odds of a massive and even more costly
humanitarian crisis ate greatest. The Administration.could be open to charges yet again of not
taking adequate steps to prevent a potential genocide-- this time one for which. we have had
ample warning. Finally, the fact of recurrent genocide in Central Africa, on top of that in the
former Yugoslavia, would seriously erode the already frayed normative fabric that binds the
international community and could undermine, possibly irreparably, the international instruments
o~ collective security.
Before the U.S. embarks on the strategy outlined above, the principals must agree to invest their
own time, resources and political capital, which are necessary, but far from sufficient for success.
SECRET
�..
. Declassified Under. AuthontY of the
Interage.ncy Security Declassification Appeals. Panel,
E.O. 13526, Section 5·3'(b)(3)
C8!1PIBEl!l'fiA:b
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document number 48
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
1.
Options Regarding an Arms Embargo Against Burundi
A.
Introduce Embargo Now
o
Aimed at arms flows to extremist Hutus, who are launching
frequent armed attacks in the countryside.
o
Aimed at arms flows to the Tutsi-dominated Army and Tutsi
extremists, both of whom are launching reprisals, often
against civilian populations.
o
No cost.
0 .
Sends a signal that ·the international conununity is appalled
by the continuing violence in Burundi, and wishes to do
s6mething about it .
;
..
.~
o
Given the recent suspension/lifting of the embargo against
Rwandans, which some persons worried would lead to more
arms finding their way to Burundi, the timing is bad.
o
An embargo against Burundi, with none against Rwanda, would
not be effective.
o
Difficult to enforce.
o
Over time, likely to.affect the Army's ability to fight
insurgencies, while not affecting the insurgents or ethnic
cleansing operations as much.
B.
Holding an Arms Embargo in Reserve
o
As it represents no outward change in status quo, is less
likely to have destabilizing effect or prompt Tutsi
hardliner action.
�08Hf'IBBU'f!llf.!
o
We retain the leverage which a threat to impose an embargo
gives us.
o
We avoid the possibility.of floating the idea, only to see
it go nowhere at the UN, due to possible European
opposition.
o
If/when we do call for an embargo, it could be used in a
broader context, as part of a concerte.d series of actions.
o
The status quo, which is not acceptable as far as the
security situation is concerned, continues.
o
We miss, for now, the opportunity to send a strong signal
about violence in Burundi.
o
Arms continue to flow to the Army and to extremists of both
ethnic groups, fuelling the cycle of extremist attack and
reprisal, as well as providing the materiel for any coup
attempt.
�2.
Options Regarding an Assets Freeze Against Burundians
A.
Introduce Freeze Resolution
o
Bolsters the work of the moderates.
o
Cuts off funds which are being used to purchase weapons by
extremists on both sides.
o
Sends strong signal that we want to isolate extremists and
break the cycle of impunity.
o
Low cost.
o
More surgical than a sweeping arms embargo---more
calculated to affect only extremists.
o
Gives Europeans political cover for something they may wish.
to do. ·
~
o
May prcvoke panic response by extremists.
o
Difficult to enforce~--mainly symbolic.
GQHf I96N'fi.'U5
o
Europeans are sometimes reluctant about assets freezes.
The relevant bank accounts are more likely to be in Europe
than in the u.s., so Eur.opean cooperation is key.
o
Because of above considerations, may be difficult to obtain
enough votes on the Security Council.
o
Treasury traditionally is reluctant about assets freezes,
for policy, legal and technical reasons.
�B.
Hold Off on Assets Freeze
o
Leaves us with the leverage to threaten an .assets freeze,
e.g. to help force extremists to the conference table.
o
As it represents no outward change in status quo, is less
likely to prompt extremist reaction.
o
We avoid the possibility of floating the idea, only to see
it go nowhere at the UN~
o
we· would cease to commit to already agreed upon preventitve
measure.
o
The cycle of impunity continues.
o
We miss, for now, the opportunity to send a strong signal
about extremists in Burundi.
0
We miss, for now, the opportunity to send such a message
in what would be a basically low cost, symbolic manner for
us, there being few such bank accounts here.
o
Extremists will use the money to buy arms and pay fighters.
emtPIBE!t'fiAfl
�CONFIDEiN'l'IAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
21001
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
Summary of Conclusions of
Ad Hoc Meeting on Rwanda/Burundi
DATE: Tuesday, August 22, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME ; 11 : 0 0 a • m. -12 : 40 p . m •
SUBJECT:
Summary of Conclusions of Ad Hoc Meeting on
Rwanda/Burundi
PARTICIPANTS:
Office of the Vice President
Marc Thomas
State
Tim Wirth
George Moose
Richard. Bogosian
Phyllis Oakley
JCS
Dave Mcilvoy
Orrin Young
AID
Dick McCall
Douglas Stafford
Treasury
_
Richard Newcomb
White House
Nancy Soderberg
Defense
Joseph Nye
Vince Kern
NSC
Susan Rice
Mike Sheehan
Eric Schwartz
Shawn McCormick
USUN
Laurie Shestack
OMB
Jeff Ashford
Summary of Conclusions
It was agreed that:
Taskings .from 8/9 Meeting:
The interagency working group chaired by the Rwanda-Burundi
Coordinator will ensure swift implementation of taskings from the
August 9 Ad Hoc Group meeting.
(-€-}
cm+FIDEiN'l'IAL
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�GONFI DEP.lT L'\L
2
Refugee Repatriation:
USUN will work to assure swift passage of ·a UN Security
Council statement demanding a halt to Zaire's forced repatriation
of refugees, while acknowledging the substantial burdens borne by
asylum countries in Central Africa.
(U)
State will issue a press release condemning forced
repatriation.
(U)
State will contact Kengo and Mobutu to make clear to Zairian
leaders the risks inherent in forced repatriation and the
negative ramifications for Zaire's international standing. State
will also stress we have no indications of any offensive military
build-up by the Rwandan government across the border and our
intention to continue urging the GOR to exercise restraint.
~
USUN will ask Boutros-Ghali to telephone Mobutu to encourage
him to walk Zaire back from the brink.
~
State will urge Belgium and France to take actions similar
to our own.
~
The Administration will pursue the policy steps outlined in
Rwanda paper agreed in this meeting. Specifically, these steps
include but are not limited to: encouraging the GOR to grant
broad amnesty and create a climate conducive to safe refugee
repatriation; pressing UNHCR to encourage refugee return and
announce within six months the closure of existing refugee camps
and movement of any remaining camps away from the borders in
Zaire, Burundi and Tanzania; pressuring the GOR to improve prison
conditions; and considering enlisting help from Mobutu.
~
Joseph Nye Trip:
The interagency working group will generate options for
providing material assistance to an All-African military force
for potential deployment to Burundi.
~
Humanitarian Assistance:
NSC, OMB and State/PRM will identify options for use of rema1n1ng
FY 95 refugee/humanitarian funds for the Rwanda crisis area with
the a.im of making funds available to support the regional refugee
population.
(U)
Burundi:
NSC will bring together a group of experts to flesh out a
notional political framework for resolution of the crisis in
GmlFIDEHTIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
3
Burundi. The framework would serve as the starting point for
discussions with our allies and countries in the region in
preparation for a regional conference. Separate groups will
generate options for international support for a peace
settlement, should one occur, as.well as the costs and funding
sources for such support. State will produce a paper on these
issues by Monday (August 28) in preparation for Principals-level
consideration of whether the USG should lead pursuit of a longterm strategy to resolve the crisis in Burundi.
~
The U.S. will not move forward on a UNSC resolution imposing
an arms embargo on Burundi as this time. However, NSC and State
will collaborate on a paper que Monday (August 28) on
alternatives for freezing the assets of Burundi extremists.
~
Next Meeting:
The Ad Hoc group may reconvene after Labor Day to discuss
outstanding issues.
(U)
GO't-lFIDENTIAL
�Declassified Under Authority of the.
Interagency Security Declassification Appeals. Panel,
E.O. 13526, Section 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 14
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 15, 1996
Dear Mr. President:
As the new year begins, I extend my best wishes and those of the
American people to you and the people of Rwanda.
These remain difficult times for Rwanda, and I want you to know I
follow events in your country closely. Rwanda needs peace and
its people need security to enable political and economic
development to flourish. Ambassador Albright's visit.at this
time is a reflection of the United States' interest in ensuring
lasting peace and security in your country.
Be assured the United States is ready to continue its strong
support for reconstruction and development in Rwanda as long as
Rwanda moves steadily forward toward achieving peace and
~tability!
The greatest challenge in this regard is to nourish
the healing process in the aftermath of the genocide, to bring
justice through the International War Crimes Tribunal, to make
every effort to bring together the peoples of Rwanda and to lay
the groundwork so there will never again be a repetition of those
horrific events.
We continue to believe that as a crucial part of this process,
your government must fulfill its pledge to take all necessary
steps to enable the early repatriation of Rwandan refugees in
neighboring countries. In addition, and in accordance with the
commitments your government made in Bujumbura, Cairo and Geneva,
Rwanda .should take immediate measures to alleviate the inhumane
overcrowding in Rwanda's prisons. We also think it essential to
ensure adequate security for the War Crimes Tribunal and other
international personnel after UNAMIR's mandate expires in March.
W~
remain prepared to play an energetic diplomatic role to
achieve those ends. we.recognize that they represent a major
challenge. However; as I know you agree, the alternative ~- more
suffering for the people of Rwanda -- is unacceptable.
�2
I welcome your thoughts on how the United States and the
international community, including the United Nations and its
specialized agencies, can assist you and your government in
achieving these goals.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Pasteur Bizimungu
President of the Republic of.Rwanda
Kigali
�Declassified Under Authority of the
Interagency Security Declas-sification Appeals,Panel,
E.O. 13526, Section 5,3(b)(3)
'ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no.
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
15
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 15, 1996
Dear Mr. President:
As the new year begins, I extend to you and the people of Burundi·
the best wishes of the American people as well as my personal
regards.
I know these are difficult times for Burundi, and I
want you to know I follow developments in your country closely.
I have asked Ambassador Albright to visit Burundi to reiterate
the importance we attach to ending·the cycle of violence and the
culture of impunity, without which Burundi cannot achieve the
economic development that is so urgently required.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to achieve development in the
absence of security, particularly when the targets of violence
include those who have come to help the people of Burundi.· The
United States alan~ with Burundi's many other friends in the
international community, is deeply concerned about the escalating
violence, rampant killings and other human right~ abuses that
have become daily occurrences in recent months.
It is imperative
that Burundi's leaders work vigorously to stop the violence,
isolate extremists and seek a lasting peace.
I know that you have pledged to combat the violence that plagues
Burundi.
The United States fully supports you in that endeavor.
Like you, we view the Convention of Government and a spirit of
compromise and conciliation as the basis upon which to build a
lasting peace in Burundi. My government will continue to support
international efforts to facilitate political reconciliation in
Burundi including those of neighboring governments, the United
Nations and its agencies, President Carter, and other private
groups working to that end. We also remain prepared to help
sttengthen Burundi's political, judicial, social and economic
institutions so that peaceful development can resume.
However, the United States will provide no political recognition
or economic assistance to any government in Burundi that comes to
power by force.
�2
I know you share our views and I would welcome your ideas on how
the international community, including the United Nations and its
agencies, can further help Burundi.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Sylvestre Ntibantunganya
President of the Republic of Burundi
Bujumbura
�0161
COl'lFI DEN'!' IAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 15, 1996
96JhN 15
r~ lO
• 33
FOR THE PRESIDENT
ANTHONY
L~
Letters for Ambassaqor Albright to Deliver to
Angolan President dos Santos, Rwandan President
Bizimungu and Burundian President Ntibantunganya
To provide Ambassador Albright with letters that she can deliver
to Angolan President dos Santos, Rwandan President Bizimungu and
Burundian President Ntibantunganya during her visit to Africa
·
next week.
Ba~kground
Angola:
President dos Santos has carried out several of the
commitments he made to you during his visit to Washington last
month to push the peace process forward;
To date, UNITA has not
reciprocated despite indications that they would_.
The most
pressing concern is the quartering of UNITA troops, which is
several months behind schedule.
President dos Santos must remain
patient as we apply continued pressure on UNITA to adhere to
their commitments under the peace accord.
Rwanda:
Donor patience with the government continues to be
tested as little has been done to address the two most pressing
problems facing the country: more than two million refugees
remain outside the country, and the government has.done little to
alleviate serious overcrowding in its prisons.
In addition, more
than 40 NGOs were recently forced to cease operations because
they had failed to provide the government with the requisite
documentation.
The political· leadership in Kigali must take more
forceful action to promote reconciliation among its people to
enable political and economic development to occur.
Burundi:
The situation has degenerated significantly over the
last 30 days as political murders, violence against civilians and
attacks against Westerners increase.
Several embassies
(including ours) are drawing down staff and many NGOs have scaled
back or suspended operations. Extremist elements are gaining
strength as the position of the moderate president and his
government becomes more precarious.
CONFIDEN'I'IAL
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1. 5 (d)
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1.6, X6
cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff
�CONFIDEH'PIAL
2
Ambassador Albright's trip is important and timely because each
of these three countries is currently facing critical transition
periods in which American influence could be an important
determining factor.
She will also travel to Liberia.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the letters to Angolan President dos Santos (Tab
A), Rwandan President Bizimungu (Tab B) and Burundian President
Ntibantunganya (Tab C) .
Attachments
Tab A
Letter to President dos Santos
Tab B . Letter to President Bizimungu
Tab C
Letter to President Ntibantunganya
COHFIDEHTIAL
�COHFI DE~J'l' Il\L
0547
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504
January 30, 1996
NOTED
SUSAN E. ~E
Report on Trip to Liberia, Angola, Burundi and
Rwanda with Ambassador Albright, January 16-23,
1996
Ambassador Albright will forward separately a memo to the
President. oh her trip to Africa.
I endorse her general
conclusions.
Below are my personal impre.ssions, conclusions and
a summary of action items (Tab A) jointly drafted with USUN.
Albright's delegation included staff from USUN, State/AF PDAS
Prudence Bushnell, BG Doc Fogelsong (J-5, Mid East/Africa/Asia/UN
Director), Col. Mike Turner (J-5 Africa), NYT Columnist Tom
Friedman, a CNN crew and various other journalists for portions
.of the trip.
Overview
The purpose of the trip was to advance the peace processes at
critical stages in Liberia and Angola, to seek to deter
widespread conflict in Burundi and enhance prospects for lasting
peace in Rwanda.
Given these lofty objectives, success can only
be measured with certainty over the longer run.
However, in each
place, I believe Albright's visit made a positive contribution
and, in Angola in particular, may have had a direct bearing on
the success of the peace process.
Liberia
Key Meetings/Events: ~ SRSG Nyakyi; ECOMOG Commander Ineinger
and top staff along with ECOWAS Special Representative Victor
Gbeho; The Council of State (Wilton Sankowolo -- chair, Oscar
Quiah, Chief Tamba Tailor, Charles Taylor, Alhaji Kromah, George
Boley); Roosevelt Johnson; Telcon with President Rawlings of
Ghana; Lunch with UN agency reps; Visit to WFP-funded job
training center for ex-combatants; Visit to UNHCR refugee center.
Impressions:
We were struck by how devastated Monrovia is -- no
electricity, bombed out buildings, key ministries are squatter
camps.
Yet, the population was active, the markets were bustling
and there· was no evidence in Monrovia of the sense of despair the
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em·! t:
Reason:
1.5 (a), (d)
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;
4•
~
r.i
�CONFIDENTIJ\L
2
surroundings might indicate. As one who has always rejected as
simplistic and patronizing the notion that the U.S. has some
special obligation to Liberia, I was nevertheless moved by the
mess that is Liberia.
I noted witb some shame the contrast
between Cote d'Ivoire (where the.French had comparative success)
and Liberia -- potentially a very rich country run amok.
It is difficult to tell whether the 13th accord will be the lucky
one for Liberia or whether it too will pass. There is good news
and bad news.
The good news is that the mixed civilian-faction
leader Council of State (CoS) seems to.be working well together.
There were no signs of animosity, and many indications its
members are cooperating rather effectively. All on the CoS
profess commitment to peace. All also look to the. U.S. for
support.
We stressed that Liberians made the war; they must make
the peace.
Some understood that message well (i.e., Taylor and
the other faction leaders); the civilians, in particular, seemed
to look to the U.S. as a crutch.
The bad news is it app~ars the faction leaders on the CoS cannot
maintain full control of their respective factions as well as of
factions not represented on the Council, such as Roosevelt
.Johnson's ULIMO-J. ULIMO-J has not only been fighting in recent
weeks with ULIMO-K but also with ECOMOG, undermining the fragile
Abuja Accords.
In addition, some are concerned that the CoS may
assume powers beyond those granted in the Abuja Accord.
Elections are slated for August, although no one expects them to
occur so soon.
ECOMOG is managing pretty well, despite its recent losses.
The
Nigerian commander appears sensible, competent and determined to
proceed with deployment and disarmament. ECOMOG deployed without
adequate logistical support (ai our urging) and took a beating.
It will be reluctant to deploy further to outlying areas until it
has more trucks and improved communications. The U.S. is the
only country that is providing any meaningful support to ECOMOG.
We pleoged $10 million in late October for logistical support -trucks, helicopters. U.S. support has been slow in arriving due
to the normal, glacial process of disbursing compounded by the
USG shutdown. Only 20 U.S.-leased trucks are in use.
Helicopters have been due for the past couple of weeks.
The
remaining 80+ trucks will be leased locally or from the Dutch who
have trucks in Cote d'Ivoire.
They are not expected in Liberia
until next month.
Special Envoy Dane Smith is now traveling in
Europe and West Africa to try to remove some remaining ·
roadblocks.
Disarmament and demobilization have not yet commenced, and the
factions may be losing control over hungry soldiers.
The Council
of State is seeking to alter the disarmament plan so that ECOMOG
CONFIDENTIAL
�COHFIDEHTIAL
3
goes to soldiers in the field and disarms them in place rather
than soldiers gathering at designated assembly areas.
The new
plan may be better for faction leaders who may have difficulty
persuading their soldiers to go to assembly areas, but it is all
but impossible for ECOMOG and the UN to fulfill.
The UN and
ECOMOG are coordinating -- at least superficially -- but it is
unclear whether the relevant UN agencies have an effective and
viable disarmament/demobilization plan. Without one, the whole
process could fall apart even if the factions try to do the right
thing.
This is also a key issue for Dane Smith.
Conclusions: lhis peace accord may fail for reasons beyond the
control of the key faction leaders. One important factor will be
whether ECOMOG can mobilize quickly to begin the disarmament/
demobilization process and whether the international community
will fashion a sufficiently attractive and efficient disarmament/
demobilization program to attract and retain ex-combatants.
Resources are a real problem. There is not enough for ECOMOG to
do its job.
In contrast to Mozambique, there is not an
attractive demobilization package for ex-combatants in Liberia.
I am convinced (for the first time) that the U.S. can and should
do more in Liberia. We have made a number of mistakes there in
the past. While it is not our responsibility to make the peace,
our assistance -- or lack thereof -- can make or break the peace
process, even if sufficient political will exists on all sides.
We ought to try to provide additional assistance to ECOMOG
directly or through other means. We ought to revisit the issue
of whether or not we could partially support ECOMOG on the UN
peacekeeping budget in a post-UNPROFOR world. AID also should be
pressed to do more on demobilization. Above all,· since we cannot.
carry this ball alone, we must press other Western countries to
share the financial burden with us on Liberia. Thus far, our
appeals -- issued at a relatively low level -- have fallen on
deaf ears.
Angola
Key Meetings/Events:
President dos Santos, Dr. Savimbi (in
Bailundo), President of the Parliament Moco, SRSG Beye, the Joint
Commission, FM de Moura, Visit to Vila Nova Assembly Area, Visit
to Kuito.
Impressions:
In Angola, the United States is playing a crucial
role in shepherding the peace process. We ·should relish that
role and use it to the greatest advantage. Years of hard work
are paying off, as both sides now clearly see the U.S. as a fair
and honest broker. As one party leader said, "the U.S. is the
only country in the world that really matters to us." In several
places on our trip, our interlocutors were keen to remind us how
CONTIDEHTIAL
�cmlFI DENT IAL
4
powerful the U.S. is and lamented that others appear to
appreciate our power more than we ourselves do. Well, in Angola,
the peace process is obviously the Angolans to use or lose, but
our influence is palpable and we must use it to the maximum
extent possible.
Dos Santos evinced a surprising comfort in his relationship with
the U.S. in the wake of his visit to Washington. He clearly
wants to be given credit for largely fulfilling the pledges he
made at the White
On the whole, dos Santos seems intent
his
UNITA is the real stumbling block at the moment.
We arrived at
Bailundo in the middle of UNITA's annual conference, which
Savimbi claimed he called-to build political support for the
difficult decision to quarter his troops. Having secured that
support, he is prepared, he says, (finally) to start quartering.
At our request, Savimbi pledged to Albright and to the press to
quarter 16,500 men by February 8 (when the UNAVEM mandate comes
up ior renewal). We told him that international patience is
wearing thin, and we would not look kindly on a broken pledge.
As President of the UNSC in February, we have great influence
over whether or not UNAVEM III's mandate is renewed and for how
long. Now, we are watching and waiting. According to Embassy
Luanda, UNITA forces·are gathering near 2 of the 4 open
quartering areas but have yet to enter.
If they try to enter en
masse, there could be a logistical difficulties.
UNAVEM III is an impressive peacekeeping mission that seems to be
working. The UNAVEM-run quartering site we visited was an
impressive, if relatively empty, place. The UN seems well
prepared to handle the UNITA troops -~ at least at the one site
we ~aw. All the essentials -- water, food, kit, shelter, medical
supplies, in-processing mechanisms, recreation, training
programs, etc. -- seem to be in place. A family site is located
just down the road.
The challenge will be to occupy the UNITA
forces productively while they are in the camps and to get them
out into the new army or civilian life promptly. The former
requires completion of the.military integration talks and the GRA
getting
s act together. The latter requires international
resources, which may prove to be lacking.
Kuito is both the same and much better than when we were there.
The buildings remain bombed out, but some are starting to be
repaired.
The squatter camp/orphanage/WFP feeding site we
visited is gone.
Far fewer people are starving. The hospital
COHFIDENTIAL
�COHFI DEJ:H'l' L"rL
5
still has many malnourished babies but not as mahy or as
emaciated as when we were there. Halo Trust continues its
demining efforts -- clearing fields.
The population is right on
its heels planting every new square foot the deminers clear.
Don Steinberg seems to be doing very well. He's clearly happy
and in his element. He seems to have won the respect of both
sides and is playing an energetic, effective role.
He put on a
great stop for Albright and crew.
Conclusions: I am hopeful but not sanguine about Angola.
I'd
give it just better than even chances of success.
I think dos
Santos is committed.
The danger he faces is a hard-line coup.
This he can guard against if UNITA shows solid commitment. At
the moment, dos Santos is vulnerable because he has taken some
bold steps and UNITA has not. come with him.
The hard-liners will
pounce shortly, if Savimbi does not make good on his pledge.
Savimbi remains an enigma. My hunch is he wants peace, but I
would not bet on it. We will learn a lot in the next 10 days.
If UNITA fails to start quartering in earnest (the precise number
is less important than momentum), we will have to conclude they
are not serious.
The FAA may then try to push dos Santos to
finish UNITA off, and it would be hard to blame them --' twice
burned.
If UNITA does. quarter, there is real hope. We pressed
dos Santos to keep his nose clean while we pressured UNITA and
not to react with force, if UNITA fails to quarter. He demurred
on the latter but promised to consult with us before acting, if
UNITA reneges.
Burundi
Key Meetings/Events: President Ntibantunganya; PM Nduwayo.; Chief
of the Army and Chief of the Gendarme; Speaker of the Parliament;
UN Commission of Inquiry; Visit to Orphanage; Lunch with Human
Rights activists and Parliamentarians; Drop-by Burundian Women's
conference on peace and reconciliation.
Impressions: Bujumbura is one of the creepiest places I've ever
been. Beautiful, lush city with people quietly going about their
daily business. No overt signs of hostility or tension on the
day .we were there; yet fear pervades the place. As one person
said to a member of our delegation: "we are all buying guns."
Bujumbura is now virtually ethnically cleansed. Only Tutsis on
the streets.
We delivered a very tough message to the military directly and to
extremists via the press:
"Stop the killing or you will pay a
high price. We have just seen your future (Liberia, Angola).
Civil war stinks. Don't go there. We will totally isolate a
COHFI DE~J'l' IAL
�COHFIDEN'l'I:A:L
6
regime that comes to power by force. We know the military is
responsible for the bulk of the killing, and we hold the
leadership responsible.u We were heard.
I think we even shook
them up a bit, but I doubt we will be heeded.
All of the leadership blamed someone else -- the Hutu insurgency,
the political leaders, the military leaders, the "hate radio,"
the international community. As Albright noted, it was "the dog
ate my homework.u In addition, it is clear this is a power
struggle among elites. The people do not share the hatred~ Hutu
and Tutsi women can share a crowded ballroom in a downtown hotel
in a common quest for peace, but the orchestrated killing
continues.
At the same time, I was struck by the sense that the people with
whom we met do not feel the same sense of urgency as we do about
Burundi.
Perhaps, the killing is far away or they are used to
it.
No one we met advocated (or even understood the logic of)
foreign intervention, including the President. They all want
help in silencing the "hate radio." They also want constructive,
sustained international assistance· (resources) . And a ''superenvoy,u some say. They are clearly sick of being buzzed by highlevel delegations who do not understand.and leave as quickly as
they come. They are as frustrated with us as we are with them.
It is uncertain that the worst case scenario is another Rwandastyle genocide.
It may be, but it may also be continued daily
killing~
In seeking to avert a genocide, we cannot forget the
daily killings are adding up-- into the tens of thousands.
Conclusions: We must continue to exert all the pressure we can
to keep the lid on things and shine the light. Warnings of the
type we've recently issued, possible UNSC sanctions, preventive
planning -- all must continue. If we can reach a plateau in the
crisis, we then need to throw all our energies behind finding a
lasting solution to the problem in Burundi -- a negotiated powersharing formula that works. We have talked about this before but
not acted. We will need a high-level, sustained effort. The risk
of failure is real, but the costs of inaction are greater.
I
think we must try.
To do so, we must
ear the decks of all t~e miscellaneous, halfhearted initiatives out there (Carter, Ogata, OAU, French Great
Lakes Conference) and, with the rest of the international
community, back one horse fully. Nyerere may be that horse. We
then need to support him.with a top-rate U.S. envoy who spends
lots of time on the round in Burundi -- a
Paul Hare in
Angola.
'tS:"·:e
If Nyerere won't
step up to the plate, we may have to do
ourselves. Other~ise,
it won't get done.
CONFIDBN'l'I:A:L
�CmlFIDEN'l' IAL
7
-- po ar oppos1te of Krueger (perhaps by
reduced staff for security reasons, which may be short-sighted.
Burundi needs more U.S. involvemerit, not less; We urgently need
to get Krueger back briefly so we are not perceived as cutting
and running. We then need to get a new ambassador out asap. One
is chosen --Rusty Hughes. He has got a good reputation. He must
still go through D-Committee and then we ought to consider
getting both he and Krueger out through recess appointments this
coming month.
Rwanda
Key Meetings/Events: President Bizimungu and Vice President
Kagame; Lunch with UN o
cials; Visit to Kibuye near Zaire
border (War Crimes exhumation site, killing stadium, discussions
with recently return~d refugees); Kigali Women's Prison;
Orphanage in Kigali.
Impressions:
Rwanda is coming back to life.
It is quite
amazing.
Infrastructure is being repaired. The roads are fixed,
buildings rehabilitated. There is a good quality hotel in the
city. The President lives in a decent place. The electricity
works. Ministries are being repaired. The city is clean,
flowers in the city center. The bodies are gone from the
churches and the stench is all but gone. This Government is
determined to rebuild the country, and is doing so.
At the same time, the burden of psychological reconstruction
seems incredibly daunting. How do you forgive? How can you
bring justice to tens of thousands and~do justice to hundreds of
thousand mo~e? How can people kill their own family members and
neighbors? How do you begin?
The GOR has made great strides and yet is severely lacking in
certain respects. There is a sense of pride, stubbornness and
determination that reminds me of the Eritreans.
It gives me hope
that these people will at least try to reconstruct their country
-- mentally and physically. Yet, they also do stupid things that
drive us crazy
the prisons, the NGO expulsions, etc. The risk
is either that hard-liners gain ascehdancy or that our patience
runs out before the current leadership can persuade us they
really want to do the right thing.
I come away from Rwanda more hopeful than cynical. Yet so much
depends on the justice system. The War Crimes Tribunal is just
getting started, and its method of work appears impressive. ·They
need our sustained support. The men's jail (although not the
CmlFI DENT IAL
�COHFIDEH'3?IAL
8
women's) is by all accounts abysmal.
The GOR needs to stop
messing around and do something real. We hit them hard on this.
They want our political and technical support for a domestic
Tribunal to triage and try those of the 60,000+ prisoners who
must be punished.
They are frustr~ted by the refugee issue.
While we pressed them for innovative solutions, the reality is
there is nothing they are doing deliberately to dissuade refugees
from returning. UNHCR also needs to be pressed to drop its rigid
opposition to anything other than purely voluntary repatriation
(i~e., ordered camp closings).
Conclusions:
We need to do all we can to support the War Crimes
Tribunal, UN human rights monitors, etc. A post-UNAMIR UN
presence will remain.
The GOR is amenable to UN police to
protect the Tribunal. The biggest threat to the internatitinal
presence may be lack of coordination ~nd lack of funds.
We plan
to make available an additional $1 million for the human rights
monitors.
However, both the Tribunal and the HR monitors need to
be put on a firmer financial footing.
We ought to consider
funding the post-UNAMIR UN presence on the UN regular budget
rather than through voluntary contributions, which are
unpredictab~e and often inadequate.
We also need to continue impressing upon the GOR that our support
is not unconditional. While we should laud the progress made, we
must be firm in conditioning continued support on specific
judicial reforms and genuine adherence to a policy of
reconciliation.
Attachment
Tab A
Action Items
cc:
Richard Clarke
CO'NFIDE'N'fiAL
�FEB- 1-96 THU 14:16
Declassified Undei· Authority of the
Inter~ge~cy Security Declassification .4.ppeals Panel,
E.O. 13526, Section 5·3(1))(3)
·
P. 02.
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 49
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
RECOHHENDATIONS
Burundi and Rwanda:
Appoint a distinguished, high-profile individual as the
President's "Special Envoy to Burundi" to help end genocidal
violence and help build a democratic and stable government in
Burundi. It may be useful to expand his or her duties to cover
Rwanda, namely to facilitate the return of Hutu refugees to
Rwanda peacgfully, the resettlement of Rwanda in a manner
conducive to a peaceful.and stable society, and the
administration of justice within Rwanda fairly and efficiently.
The Special Envoy must have direct access to government leaders
and freedom to move among competing factions. He or she also
must deal directly and frequently with international and
non-governmental organizations operating in the region. The
Special 'Envoy's personal safety probably would be at risk much of
fhe.time, and the m~asure of success largely not within our
control. But he or she wotild serve as th~. catalyst for peace and
reconciliation that is now lacking.
.
.
Burundi:
•
Encourage President Chirac during his forthcoming
visit to coordinate with us for a more activist role in
Burundi, including what diplomatic and military steps may
be required to prevent genocide.
Use diplomatic intervention to convene a roundtable of
key political and military leaders, moderates and
extremists, in Burundi, to discuss means to resolve
differences and restore peace and security within the
country.
Launch a major planning effort with the United Nations
to prepare for, and hopefully deter, accelerated genocide
in Burundi:
(1.) Two contingencies should be immediately addressed by
Pentagon and State planners: deployment of an
international force (perhaps stationed in Zaire) to
intervene in Burundi and stop genocidal violence;
deployment of a U.N. peacekeeping operation with the
consent of the Government of Burundi to create safety zones
or otherwise establish a more peaceful environment.
(The
Pentagon has already undertaken sorne of this contingency
planning.)
(2) With our own plans informing our request, we should
press hard to activate the U.N.'s "Standby Arrangements for
Peacekeeping Operations" which the United States has been
instrumental in supporting pursuant to PDD-25. This is a
�FEB- 1-96 THU 14:17
P. 03
data base of forces and logistical support that 47 nations
have voluntarily notified the United Nations could be made
available for peacekeeping operations. For example, the
United·states has identified a range of logistical
resources that could be tapped to support U.N.-mandated
operations.
(3) Determine which type of deployment, if any, should and
can be undertaken and within what time frame~
(4) Demarche potential contributors and move within the
Security Council to create such a military presence near or
in Burundi.
·
Take necessary action to ailence Radio Democracy
(located in Zaire) if we confirm that its broadcasts are
aimed at violence and genocide within Burundi.
Increase our diplomatic presence at Embassy Bujumbura,
including the immediate assignment of a "hands-on"
ambassador.
As proposed by the Burundian Prime Minister, send a
special envoy (of the type described above) for an extended
assessment of the situation throughout the country.
Arrange for assignm~nt of additional U.N. Human Rights
Monitors to Burundi, including adequate funding.
Follow through on the Burundi Government's willingness
to permit U.N. security" guards for members of the
International Commission of Inquiry examining the 1993
massacres.
•
Condition provision of humani~arian aid on Burundi
Government approval of adequate U.N. or other international
security fcir aid worker~.
Use Burundi as a test case for active implementation
of the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative.
Rwanda:
Establish a post-UNAMIR presence in Rwanda {after
March 8) that maintains U.N. humanitarian, judicial, and
development operations with adequate transportation and
security. Explore funding through regular (not
peacekeeping) O.N. assessemnts.
•
.Use diplomatic intervention to resolve apparent
differences between the U.N. High Commissioner of Refugees
and the Government of Rwanda on strategy for repatriation
of refugees.
·
Respond to Rwanda's appeal for expert assistance on
administration of justice and assign Department of Justice
and legal experts to work closely with the Government of
Rwanda to establish a "Special Tribunal(s)" to adjudicate
expeditiously (and with due process) the tens of thousands
of Rwandan citizens (about 64,000) jailed in Rwandan ·
prisons.
�FEB- 1-98 THU 14:17
P. 04
• ·
Urgently assist the ·Governme~t of Rwanda to find a
solution to the prison problem at all of the prison
facilities in Rwanda.
·
•
Fulfill our pledge to contribute up to $1 million to
the U.N. Human Rights Field Operation before the end of
1996.
•
Provide further personnel and logistical assistance to
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
Liberia:
•
Issue a Presidential statement or let'ter praising t.he
peace process but emphasizing the need for all parties to·
adhere .strictly to the Abuja Peace Accord.
•
Initiate a new and more stable funding scheme for
ECOMOG, the Nigerian-led and dominated regional
peacekeeping force in Liberia and currently funded entirely
by voluntary contributions. Consider funding at least some
of ECOMOG on an assessed basis at the United Nations, ·
either on the regular or peacekeeping budget.
•
Help create more incentives for soldiers to disarm and
demobilize.
• .
Use. U.S. expertise t.o formulate job-training and
public works programs for soldiers being demobilized under
the Abuja Peace Accord.
.
•
Explore urgently a strategy to forgive Liberia's U.N.
arrears, which are hampering access to international
financing.
Explore how to assist in re-opening Roberts
International Airport. (Senator Kassebaum has expressed her
interest in this project.)
Angola:.
Press Savimbi directly to fulfill his pledge to me at
Bail undo to quarter 16,500 UNITA soldi'ers by February 8.
(Though it may not be realistic now to expect such a large
number by Feb. 8, we should keep the heat on Savimbi to
perform.)
Press Savimbi on his other commitments, including
cessation of propaganda broadcasts, release of prisoners,
ending cease-fire violations, submission of names of
officials pursuant to the Lusaka Peace Agreement, permit
free circulation of goods and people, and end the
ha'rassment of UNAV'EM troops.
Plan for contingency of Savimbi reneging on quartering
pledge.
•
Discuss UNITA violations of arms embargo in the U.N.
Sanctions Committee.
�FEB- 1-96 THU 14:18
P. 05
•
Press the Government of Angola to take more
affirmative steps to integrate UNITA politically into
political institutions and militarily into the Angolan
Army. Press Government to follow through generally on its
commitments under the Lusaka Peace Agreement and
commitments President Des Santos made in Washington in
December. ·Also engage in private discussions with Angolan
officials about continued arms flows into the country.
Follow through on U.S. commitments at the Brussels
Donors Conference ($190 million of reconstruction and
humanitarian aid), and press other governments to do their
share.
·
Assist UNAVEM and the Government of Angola to provide
transitional training to tJNITA soldiers in the quartering
areas, and means to integrate into civilian life those not
joining the Angolan Army.
Undertake high-visibility u.s. missiona to bolster the
quartering process, such as a U.S. medical mission into a
quartering site, and a JCET (Joint Comoined Exercise
Training) to help build a quartering camp (including
medical. facility) .
·
Send in more medical supplies for local hospitals, and
more tents for quartering areas.
•
Provide rnor~ U.S. de-mining expertise and equipment.
�3463
· SBCRE'!'
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Declassified UnderAuthorit)rofthe.
Interagency Secmiij· De(ll¥sificationAppeals Panel,
INFORMATIO:tf
E:o. ~3.5.26;,Sect1<m.;S·3(b){3)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040ydocument no. 18
Declassification Date: Mar~h 18, 2014
FROM:
ANTHONY LAKE
SUBJECT:
Recent U.S. Initiative on Burundi
I
/
'
/
~nt
Tce U.S.
1
This memorandum provides you with an update· on r
efforts to help resolve the crisis in Burundi .
The situation in Burund~~ontinues to
deteriorate. Hundreds of people are dying 1~eekly. Analysts
predict that a high-level assassinati~·oup attempt or
n,
insu7gent. at~ack on the capital Buj·umbu·r. could precipitate
mass1ve k1ll1ng and refugee flows, pos bly on a scale
·
approaching that of Rwanda in 1994. ·
Current Situation:
T~ip:
To launch a n
U.S. strategy to prevent a
humanitarian disaster in Burundi. Our strategy has three
components: 1) shoring up the f agile "moderate'; Hutu-Tutsi
coalition government; 2) urging the Tutsi moderates to rein in
Tutsi extremists responsible f r much of the killing; and 3)
curbing the deadly and destab lizing extremist Hutu insurgency
based in Zaire. We will al
strengthen the negotiating efforts
of former Tanzanian Presid t Julius Nyerere by appointing a
special· envoy to·assist h' .
Purpose of My
Ou message was well-received. I believe my
trip advanced the
rs two elements of our ~trategy by
encouraging Burundia moderates to remain in positions of
influence. Their d arture would cause a dangerous power vacuum
that the extremist would eagerly fill. Whil~ we_continue to try
to influence Tuts' extremists by threatening to isolate any
government that .ames to power by force, our actual leverage with
them is limited
Those with greatest influence are Tutsi
moderates in t e Government and Army. In the past, they have
curbed extrem'st activity by arresting perpetrators and appealing
to the popul tion to exercise restraint. I pushed them to do so
again.
Results of My Trip:
They aske
activity
for our assistance, in return, to curb Hutu extremist
We pledged to do all we could in that regard.
Reas n: 1.5 (d)
Dec assify On: 5/20/06
Derived From: Multiple Sources
cc: Vice. President
Chief of Staff
·
�SECRET
2
The Need to Engage Mobutu:
Fulfilling this pledge require
prevailing upon the Hutu insurgents and their Zairian sp sors to
halt the civil war and commit to power-sharing negotia ·ons under
Nyerere's auspices. President Mobutu of Zaire can do uch to
rein in the Hutu insurgents and durb arms flows to
e region.
At present, Zaire serves as a base for the Hutu i surgency as
well as their main source of arms. Zaire also
lows
inflammatory radio broadcasts into Burundi fro Zaire. Mobutu
has failed, moreover, to arrest Rwandan war
iminals resident in
Zqire and allow UN monitors at airports use for arms shipments.
To pressure Mobutu o play a more
constructive role, we sent a high-level team to Zaire from May
20-21 to press Mobutu to take specifi steps to curb the violence
in Burundi. While our team made no
mmit;:ments regarding u.s.
support, they indicated we would be repared to reciprocate in
some fashion if Mobutu first took oncrete, positive action.
U.S. "carrots" might include ens ing that Mobutu receives full
credit internationally for his
le in a peace agreement,
reconsidering providing him a isa to participate in the Atlanta
Great Lakes conference, looki g at ways to enhance our support ·
for the upcoming elections i Zaire and supporting
reestablishment of the Econ mic Community of Great Lakes States.
Meeting With Mobutu:
Mobutu assured
ion of his control over the Hutu ·
insurgents and
obtain a cease-fire declaration from
them in return
se-fire from the Burundi government and
the start of negotiat' ns. Mobutu asked us to engage the Burundi
government on a poss· le cease-fire date. After a cease-fire,
Mobutu pledged to s p arms flows through Zaire.
1-known for his grand promises and lack of
While Mobutu is
action, we have ~ rious indications that.he may be taking some of
the steps he pl ged. We must be cautious, however, to judge
· Mobutu on what e actually does and not on what pe promises.
To this end, George Moose and an interagency team
returned to he region this week. Their goal is to try to broker
a cease-fir and the start of all-party negotiations under
President yerere's auspices.
Moose Missio .
Finally, the United States
continu s to press for joint military planning to enable the
intern ional community tq respond rapidly to a humanitarian
crisis should preventive diplomacy fail. We have reiterated our
pledg made over a year ago to provide airlift and related
supp rt for an emergency humanitarian force, while making clear
no .s. ground troops will deploy to Burundi.
Military Contingency .Planning:
�---- · · · · - · - · · · · · · - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - · - · · · - · · · - · · - - - - - · - · · ·-----------·-----
SECRET
3
The UK, Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Canada, Germany, Fra
the UN have recently ag~eed to join in planning efforts.
everal
African countries have indicated a willingness to partie' ate in
a Burundi force, if provided equipment, logistical and inancial
support. However, at present the international commu ty is far
from ready to deploy such a force.
�. SECRST
3463
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
INFORMATION
Declassi!ied UngerA\.1thorit):. of.th'!'
Interagency Security Declassincatii:m.i?ppeals Panei,
E.O: 13526; Section 5·30>)(3)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
13-040, document no. 19
FROH:
1\NTHONY LJU<E
.SUBJECT:
Recent U.S. Initiat
ate: March 18, 2014
Purpose
To provide an update on our recent effor s to help resolve the
crisis in Burundi~
~
Background
Curreht Situation:
The situation n Burundi continues to
deteriorate.
Estimates aree #und eqs of people are dying weekly,
Analysts predict a high-level a sassination, coup attempt or
insurgent attack on the capita Bujumbura '(all serious
possibilities) could precipi te massive killing and refugee
flows, possibly on a scale
aChing that·of Rwanda in 1994.
Purpose of My Trip:
- derw .all il reaso
an
in Burundi.
...---
Our strategy has th/ee components: ·
1) shoring up
e "modera·te" :-eenter in Buru~g;i,b~,'hich lead3 Ure~
-fr:agt:le- Hutu-T tsi coal i tiori gove:rnment·i 2) urging the Tutsi
moderates to ein
Tutsi extretnists responsible for much of the
killing; 3)
urbing the deadly an(i destabilizing extremist Hutu
insurgency ased in
re.
In aclaition 7 'We will increase support
to the ne tiating eff·or.ts. o·f former Tanzanian P~esident Julius.
Nyerere
appo
ing a spe9ial envoy to assist iffiA:in th9
+J--:--f;...,.--s-1'..,..-::rh::srroo-nnlhnnrmi±'-.
•r>egi~
. ~
.
Cl~ll.r~
Our message, of eent:inued.
:::IECP.i:'L
Reason:
1. 5 (d)
Declassify On:
5/20/06
cc: ViGe President
Chief of Staff.
�SECRET
2
-=~
,±eackrs thafll<ed us for oor pt esence, 3t.r.at:
is impossible
to~:ur~ ~
success
r:~
crete
terms, I believe my trip · · · eo . o. adva,ncecL~ first wo elenents
of our~Burund~ strategy. fn the past,
. . visitS-R..r¥ti'1!"' helpeJ.e_
quell violence and encourageK Burundian m era
· -elers ~ho fear
-:for Lheir lives to
positions
infl
-'fhis is
't:h .
\
WhileJh';i~t~Sd StatesCGan eont:inuo
extremists by threa-tening to isolate
to
power by force, our leverage is limi
influence -ever Tutsi ext1 e:mists.. are utsi mot;ierates in the
Government a~ Army.
In the past,
. ·.
, they have ·-been
~ curb extremist a.ctivity
arresting perpetrators and
appealing to
population to
restraint.
I pushed them
to do so again.
for our· assistance J V.
-and ,.rould Eio their best. -J~~-¥-e~
to qurb Hutu extremist
do all ~ we
could in ~ regar~
...-strat:e~y.
tr-r
.
~-~1
plt_~,)~
.
.' .
~a.:.:,.~.(... ~
The Need to Engage Mobu.
third element o.f ou£"
-st:t:ate.gy requires prey iling upon the Hutu insurgents and th.eir
Zairian sponsors to h lt the civil war and cornniit to powersharing negotiation unde
· ·
±an
-J;l.J:;esident Jt1l±~rer~ ~ey to resolvin13
in BJJrundi
~s persuad~ Pres dent M butu of Zaire)t? rein
Hut.u
lhsurgents and cu b arm flows to the rlg1on.
~ementiL§fJ.:he
M ~~--
. 's ~rlLO-.
~~
·
.
u~
c).,
Zaire
~~~8~::.Q'.l:i~~H+t;.;i,..1~~--G-;t.....ia..t:J:as-~e--oe-tlfe::-Httffi-:rttStt-:fr'€!g:.ee:TJnrt:-:t:~ trcLI..l ~
broadcasts into Burundi from
to irnplemi!Snt pledges t9 arrest
.
wandan war crimina s .re dent in
ire and
low UN J,.A\-~
. airports used f:::>F_ ~rms shipments.
·
"d-o!...a-1;1-~~,.y.,:>J:!.'<?
·
·
o.l--
~~~
t~v-J--
Meeting With Mobutu: ~-:E-fe-:E:J; ·1o pressure Mobut · to play a
more c nstructive rolel\with .~;esp~ct to EIO:t:ond:i(, wit your
appro al, we ..:&eoX: the ~HFJf:eeedented step of •Sendin-g a high-level
team to Zaire May 20-21.
DDCI Georg~ Tenet, Assistant Secretary
e Moose and NSC Directoi Shawn McCormick pressed Mobutu to
specific steps to curb the violence in Burundi.
~hbs~
�SECRET
3
/
unconditionally negotJ.£ions t;mder Nyer~re~pices,; 2)
stopping weapons ~ments to the Hutu i
urgents; 3) perm·
UN observers a
ey boarder airports
monitor arms fl
halting extr ,ist Hutu radio broa
sts emanating fr
aire;
5) contin ng to detain intimi
ors
the Rwanga r fugee
camps/nd 6) arresting su~ cted Rwar:dan war etimi ls in Zaire.
in
While the U.S. team made ho commitment's regardin u.S. ·suppo
y indicated we would be prepared to reciproc te in some
fashion i f Mobutu first took c6ncret~, positi,e
ion. U.S.
'.'carrots'.' might incl~~~~ring
'Mobut
full cre.dit
1nternat1onally for br:1ng:u1g about a peace
r e considering providing .him a vis a to ¥4'-s-;i'LF---fo-i""""-f':rrr+t::rr-fPT1"'h:n---;-,:-rAtlanta. to participate
a Great Lakes · Oriference, looking at
ways to enhance. our support for the up oming elections in Zaire
and perhaps assisting in support
t e re~establishment of an
Economic Community of Great Lakes S tes (CEPGL).
~~eftse
to U.S. request:B"(' Mob
assured our delegation of
his control over the Hutu insur nts and offered to obtain a
cease-fire declaration from th
in return for a cease-fire from
the Burundian government and
e beginning of negotiations.
_
Mobutu asked our side to eng ge the Burundi government o~~ "
possible date for a cease-f' re.
He also sai~~ ~e-fire) t...t. ~Ld
-wOlJld include a
arms flows through Zaire.
~
While Mobutu d1·
· ree to stationing UN o
at key airports,
e di agree to re iew the issue. Moreov r, his
National Security dv'sor privately
omised DDCI Tenet that he
would push Mobutu h d on·this point.
·obutu promised to d al
with extrem~st radi
roadcasts· emanatin from zaire, if w could
pinpoint exactly were the.transmissions
re coming from.
We
agreed to do so. Unfort::: nately, Mobutu mad no .commitmen s to
continue detaini g intimi tors in the Rwanda refugee ca ps or
to arrest war c
�SSG RET
SECRET
4
�CONFIDEN'PIAL
with ~ECI\E'f ATTACHME!ttTIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
5426
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504
August 8, 1996
INFORMATION
~
1
ci
~
~
~
<U
"1"
"):l
0
8 g
~
..c::
~SUBJECT:
&, ::E
~QC'?,... ..
.,r, !:· l/) ~ ~
o'1je
.. ·c ~'~
~ i3 ·~
:5 Ji.::;.
.1:!
11 6
THROUGH:
E8
~ ~
.~· ~
~
§ "! FROM :
"' .g
0
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
~
'Of
NatJ Sec Advisor
has seen
/
MACARTHUR DeSHAZER
SHAWN
.
McCORMI~
NOTED
Your Meeting with Rwandan Vice President Paul
Kagame, 11:15 a.m., Friday, August 9
o· ;::,
z ~
0
] ·.;:: Recen t Deve 1 opmen t s .
~~r;,§::~
i i ~· ~ ·~Rwanda -- of stability toRPF-led coalition government has brought
Internal: The
a measure
the country, but has both adopted and
0
!l>A u ]
'-----'~
0
The judicial system and
administrative state were decimated in 1994. At least 75,000
peopl~ suspected of genocide but as yet uncharged live in squalid
prisons with more being added daily. The Parliament has
repeatedly delayed passage of a draft genocide law which would
categorize crimes, allow charges to be brought and permit limited
amnesty. Members of Congress, NGOs and the international
community are concerned about these' ongoing problems. Guerrillas
linked to the former genocidist regime now launch attacks into
western Rwanda, and have committed hundreds of assassinations
throughout the country. This fuels the RPF's feeling of
insecurity, which in turn makes it unwilling to act on the draft
genocide law. It also raises the spectre of retaliatory raids
into Zaire. Rwandan troops have also committed atrocities since
Kagame took office.
created several formidable problems.
Refugees: There are 1.7 million Rwandan refugees living in camps
under the care of international organizations 11 million iri
eastern Zaire and 700,000 in Tanzania). Reconstituted elements
of the former
gime, their army and militias which were
responsible for the 1994 genocide largely control the camps and
have prevented any substantive efforts at repatriation. The
presence· of these camps has become a serious destabilizing
element in the region. The international community is spending
approximately $1 million on these camps of which the United
states provides 30 percent.
CONFIDEN'PIAL
with SECRET ATTACHMENT
Classified by: Derivative
Reason: 1. 5 (d)
Declassify On: 8/5/06
Derived From: 8/5/96 Burns Memo to Sens
�CONFIDENTIAL
2
BACKGROUND
Vice President, Minister of Defense and pre-eminent RPF military
tactician and politician Paul Kagame, is here on a private visit
at the invitation of the Council ·on Foreign Relations where he is
scheduled to speak on August 8. His itinerary includes events at
CSIS, the Holocaust Museum, U.S. Committee for Refugees, IMF,
World Bank and the Corporate Council on Africa. He has already
met with Tim Wirth, George Moose and Secretary Perry during this
visit. You last met with Kagame in your office in December 1994
and again during your ten-day trip to the continent the same
month.
·
U.S. is a strong supporter of the GOR. AID has provided
transition assistance, DOD humanitarian assistance and IMET, and
various agencies have contributed money and personnel to assist
the International-War Crimes Tribunal and Rwandan court system.
We have also supported Rwanda at the UN, including support for
lifting the_ arms embargo. European governments believe the U.S.
has a heighten~d degree of credibility with the GOR.
Th~
Vice President Kagame's Agenda
Kagame will want to discuss continued cross border attacks from
elements of the former reg~me based among the camps in eastern
Zaire. He may also raise. the larger security threat posed by the
continued existence of the camps and the unwillingness of camp
leaders to permit repatriation. He can be expected to seek
further development aid and diplomatic/political support. Kagame
has indicated an interest in obtaining non-lethal military
equipment from DOD stocks.
OBJECTIVES
You should emphasize your commitment to a strong U.S.-Rwandan
relationship. Stress need to attain GOR goals of repatriation,
reconcil
ion, reconstruction and bringing those guilty of
genocide to justice.
General Kagame has expressed concern about general security
situation and cross-border incursions into Rwanda·. You should
inform him that the United States is preparing to take the lead
in developing a plan with the international community to
stimulate voluntary repatriation and camp relocation away from
the Rwanda border. Kagame will likely be very supportive of such
measures but may express concern about how best to separate the
ex-FAR from the returning refugees. You should highlight
important GOR role in protecting and welcoming refugees home and
stress need for Rwandan Parliament to pass draft genocide law.
CONFIDEnTIAL
'~
�COHFIDBN'PIAL
3
Burundi:
The GOR has supported small-scale transfers of weapons
to the Burundi military over the last two years. While it is
willing to support sanctions against the Buypya regime, the GOR
felt deceived by other regional states which moved last week to
implement sanctions immediately rather than using~th~ }preat as
5
leverage for beginning talks with Hutu insurgents.~ ~~press
interest in working to end arms flows to Burundi and press, with
the regional leadership, for talks between the Burundi government
and Hutu ins~rgents.
~
Concurrence by:
Eric Schwartz (
Attachments
Tab I
Talking Points
Tab II Bio
COHFIDBN'PIAL
�DeclasSified Under Auihoi:itx of tn(i
.
I nter·agency Securit',\'· Declassification Appeals Panel.
E.:o. 1~26, Sectlon5..3(b)(3)
.
.
CONFIDENTIAL
TALKING POINTS
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 21
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
Bilateral Relationship:
•
Despite difficult problems, you have brought meas~re of
stability to Rwanda and we wish to continue working with you.
Want to reaffirm support for your government's objectives of
repatriation, reconciliation, reconstruction and justice.
•
Only long-term solution for Rwanda is power-sharing in which
all non-genocidist elements can participate~ Rwandans must
develop this system since no amount of outside assistance can
replace consensus among the Rwandan people.
Refugees:
•
Continued presence of 1.7 million Rwandan refugees in Zaire
and Tanzania is destabilizing and untenable.
•
Recognize the security problems camps pose and are preparing
to lead an effort with the international community to
stimulate voluntary repatriation and camp relocation. This
will include moving humani
an supplies to within Rwanda.
•
Will require cooperation of GOR to receive large numbers of
returnees. Hope your government will take all necessary steps
to protect and welcome them home.
•
Large numbers of prisoners in Rwanda, and their conditions,
are being used by the extremist Hutus to make refugees fear
for safety upon return. Understand your Parliament has yet to
pass its draft genocide law. When do you expect this will
happen?
•
Share concern Tribunal has not 'moved as quickly as we would
like. Hope GOR will cooperate to the fullest extent with the
Tribunal, including providing access to.witness~s and
documents. It is in all our interest to see perpetrators
brought to justice.
Burundi:
•
Your visit follows Buyoya coup and Arusha II summit of
regional leaders that called for extensive .sanctions as a
"shock therapy" for Bujumbura regime. As sanctions come into
CONFI DE~JT IJ'rL
Declassify on: 8/7/06
Reason: 1.5(d)
�GO:HFIDENTIAL
2
force, we count on your government's key role in enforcing
them. I am interested in your views about the situation.
•
Hope you can use ties to Burundian authorities to press need
for talks with Hutu insurgehts.
If Asked:
•
Military Equipment: We will consider requests for acquisition
of non~lethal U~S. military equipment by Rwanda on a case-bycase basis. ~owever, we note that our concern about prisons,
especially on Capitol Hill, will limit our ability to act.
•
IMET: Rwanda is eligible for expanded IMET, but not regular
IMET. Serious concerns on Capitol Hill about human rights
violations and prison overcrowding. Must pass genocide law.
GO'NFIDENTIAL
�Decllliified Under A,~thoritY ?hl;le
Interagency'Secwity-D,ecJ.assificabori Appeals Panel,
E.0; 1~526, Section 5;3(b)(3)
,
.
COUPIDE!i'fi:AL
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 50
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
MEETING WITH RWANDAN VICE PRESIDENT PAUL KAGAME
CONTEXT OF MEETING
Vice President, Minister of Defense and pre-eminent Rwanda
politician f'aul Kagame, a Tut
and member of the (mainly
Tutsi} RPF has been in office since the then-guerrilla RPA took
Kigali in July, 1994. Kagame is one of the "59ers" who grew up
as a refugee in Uganda and served in Museveni's army.
He led
the RPA to victory, but ceded the top spot to PreBident Pasteur
Bizimuhgu, a moderate Hutu.
Kagame can be expected to seek further development aid and
diplomatic/political support from the USG. He has indicated an
interest in obtaining non-lethal military equipment from DOD
stocks. Vice President Kagame will have met with
Undersecretary of State Tim Wirth and As stant Secretary of
State George Moose on August 6, and Defense Secretary Perry on
August 7.
The RPF-led coalition government has brought a large measure of
stability to the country, while also encountering several
formidable problems since taking power~ The judicial system
and administrative state were decimated in 1994. There are
over 75,000 prisoners in Rwandan jails in horrific conditions,
most arrested since Kagame took office. Members of Congress,
NGOs and the international community are concerned about this
problem, and the GOR's apparent lack of response to it. ·There
are delays in putting a new law in place to handle this huge
case load. There are 1.7 million Rwandan refugees, most of
them in eastern Zaire and some of them armed. Most of the
refugees receive international assistance and are under the
control of the government and milit
responsible for the
genocide. Armed attacks back int<) Rwanda from this population
have increased.
Rwandan troops have committed atrocities since
Kagame took office. There is a sense that guerrillas linked to
the former genocidist regime now launch attacks in western
Rwanda, as well as assassinations throughout the country, at
will.
This fuels the RPF's feeling of insecurity, which in
turn makes it_ unwilling to release prisoners.
·
The USG has supported the current government. We have given
over $750 million in emergency and humanitarian aid to the
sub-region (much more than development aid for Rwanda, a sore
eenFIDEN'fiAL
�88NFII3fllf'i'Hs::C
-2point with Kagame); AID has given substantial sums in
development aid, DOD has provided humanitarian assistance and
IMET training; various agencies have contributed money and
personnel to efforts to ready the International Tribunal and
Rwandan court system to try those suspected of crimes against
humanity, including genocide. We have also supported the
Rwandan government at the UN, including support for lifting the
arms embargo against Rwanda.
European governments believe that
the USG is especially credible with the GOR.
OBJECTIVES
o
To assure Vice President Kagame that the USG supports the
Government of Rwanda and its goals of repatriation,
reconciliation, reconstruction and bringing those guilty of
genocide to justice.
o
To reaffirm to the President that we are very interested in
seeing a successful voluntary repatriation of Rwanda
refugees, and note that a key step towards this goal would
be reducing the prison population so that refugees feel
less of a threat of arrest and imprisonment. The genocide
bill currently before Rwanda's Parliament is a good first
step.
o
To impress upon the Vice President the u.s. interest in
working with Rwanda to end arms flows to Burundi and press,
with the regional leadership, for talks between the Burundi
government and Hutu insurgents.
TALKING POINTS
o
We wish to reaffirm our support for your government's
objectives. The situation in Rwanda has not been easy.
Despite the very difficult problems you have had to face,
you have brought a measure of stability to your country,
and we wish to continue to work with you.
o
We feel that the only long-term solution for Rwanda will be
a power-sharing arrangement in which all non-genocidist
elements of Rwanda can participate.
It must be up to
Rwandans to develop thi~ arrangement, si~ce no amount of
outside assistance can replace consensus among the Rwandan
people. This may be your government's biggest challenge.
o
The continued presence of 1.7 million Rwandan refugees in
Zaire and Tanzania is destabilizing and unt~nable.
It is
in neither the Rwandan government's nor the international
community's interest to continue with the status quo.
It
CQ'WFIB:Stl''ii?Ilxl5
�CONTI flBU'f H!tL
-3-
is critical that there be an expeditious and successful
voluntary repatriation of Rwandan refugees in Zaire. The
USG is discussing with the international community
relocation of camps away from the border and resulting
closure of those that have qeen most problematic, and
taking steps to encourage voluntary repatriation. Rwanda
would have serious responsibilities if such a strategy is
adopted, including being prepared to receive large numbers
of returnees and moving the Petit Barriere camp deeper into
Rwanda.
o
At the same time, we are deeply concerned by the actions
taken several weeks ago by Burundi authorities in expelling
thousands of Rwandans from refugee camps against their
will. We were equally disturbed by reports that this
action, which contavenes Burundi_,s obligations under the
Refugee Convention and established international practice,
may have enjoyed the support of your government.
o
In order to encourage voluntary repatriation, it is
essential that conditions be created inside Rwanda which
will encourage refugees to return. There has been
progress, but it is particularly important that the prison
population be reduced significantly, that there be security
for those who repatriate to their homes, and that abuses at
the hands of security forces be minimized.
This is of
grave concern to us all.
o
The large numbers of prisoners in Rwanda, and their
conditions, are being used by the extremist Hutus to make
refugees fear for the
safety upon return. The same is
true of reports of killings of military-age Hutu men and
other civilians.
o
We share your concern that the Rwanda Tribunal has not
moved as quickly as we all would like. We hope your
government will cooperate to the fullest extent with the
Tribunal, including by providing access to witnesses and
documents.
It is in all of our interest to see
perpetrators brought to justice.
o
We were pleased that your government ceased its
participation in the recent forced repatriation of Rwandan
refugees from Burundi.
Ignoring internationally accepted
humanitarian principles not only leads to further regional
instability, but also undermines the credibility of the
GOR's policy of welcoming refugees home in safety and
dignity.
�COM!iTEH!lff'fV:tL
-4-
o
Your visit comes in the wake of the Buyoya coup and the
Arusha II summit of regional leaders, including Rwanda,
that called for extensive sanctions as a "shock therapy"
for the Bujumbura regime. We would be very interested in
your views. As sanctions come into force, we will count
very much on your government's key role in enforcing them.
If Asked:
o
Military Equipment: We will consider requests for
acquisition of non-lethal U.S. military equipment by Rwanda
on a case-by-case basis. However, we note that our concern
about prisons, especially on Capitol Hill, could limit our
ability to act.
·
CON~ I
l9EU'il? Iil\..J:s
�SECRET
7576
THE PRESIDENT HAS S£EN
'"'1.-1~-q"
DeClassified UnderAutnoiit:Y .of the.
Interage~cy Securlty·D-~classificaiion Appeals Panel,
E.O. 1.3526, Section 5.3(b)(3)
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE~ESIDENT
FROM:
ANTHONY LAKE
SUBJECT:
Eastern Zaire:
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 22
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
Update and Next Steps
,Situation on the Ground: More than 500,000 refugees have
returned to Rwanda from North Kivu, Zaire since Friday. An
estim~ted 30,D00-8D,OOO more remain in that area --many of whom
are former soldiers and their-families who will.not return to
Rwanda. The rest mai wish to return but require assistance.
Still .unaccounted for are several hundred thousand ref~gees in
South Kivu. Imagery reveals no large population masses. Hence,
we speculate these refugees may have moved deeper into Zaire or
north to join the flow back to Rwanda. Another possibility is
that UNHCR's original estimate of 1.2 million refugees may be
inflated.
Re-Defining the Mission: I had productive meetings today in
Ottawa with senior Canadian defense and foreign affairs officials
as well as with PM Chretien. We agreed the mass refugee return
necessitated a different, more limited mission focused on
assisting the Rwandan Gover:nment (GOR) to absorb and reintegrate
returnees. If the GOR agrees, we propose to establish an airbridge immediately through Entebbe, Uganda, to Kigali, Rwanda, to
transport any needed relief assistance. JCS estimates the total
international personnel required would be about 500 in Entebbe
and 200 in Kigali (including the Canadian headquarters, U.S. air
control element, civil affairs and psy-ops teams and a civilmilitary relations cell). This presence would also enable us to
respond quickly, if necessary, to any humanitarian requirements
in Eastern Zaire. We will continue to monitor population flows
in South Kivu to try to determine if there are large numbers of
people at risk. We believe no foreign military presence is
necessary at this time in Goma.
Incidentally, we detected less enthusiasm among Canadian
Gove·rnment officials for a large mission to Rwanda/Zaire than PM
SECRET
Classified by: Susan E. Rice
Reason: x4
Declassify On: ll/18/21
Derived From: Multiple Sources
cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff
PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING
�SECRET
2
Chretien has expressed. Undoubtedly, the PM has been personally
inspired by Amb. Raymond Chretien's direct pleas for action.
Next Steps: The U.S. pledged $140 mill. today to assist
international agen~ies and the GOR with refugee relief,
reintegration and reconstruction. We have pre-positioned air
assets.in Europe tri respond to any airlift requests, ~nd U.s.
personnel are en route to the region to prepare for air lift
operations. Before deployment of any multinational force, we
must obtain the consent of the GOR, which is likely to accept
this limited mission provided there are no French troops in
Rwanda. We must also work with Canada to ensure broad
international agr~ement to the redefined mission. A Canadian-led
multinational military planning session is still scheduled for
Thursday in Stuttgart.
We have agreed with Canada on the designation of an African
deputy commander who will be subordinate effectively, if not
·nominally, to the U.S. Deputy. We hope this position coupled
with the inclusion of a significant Afri~an presence in the force
will allay African ~oncerns.
Finally,
evolving
underway
with NGO
SECRET
we are working to keep the press informed of the
mission requirements and the specific U.S. actions
tb address these new requirements. We will also consult
leaders November 19 at the White House.
�7743
/;, .. :16,yu_.~'(;:?""' ·
... /(;,,,r:rlfu/ r/f-,. ;z,;-,.,.
5be .-:!/).,r:.;,.r/e"''/ r6
Cape Martin, France, November 6th 1996.
To His Excellency
Mr. William J~fferson Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
1600, Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.c. 20500
of
America
UNITED STATES OF· AMERICA
Dear Mr. President,
I would like to hasten and congratulate
you for your recent reelection victory. I know you
must be very happy about this new four years term that
enables you to lead the .United States of America. The
american people are satisfied with your strong leader.,..
ship. I share in your joy.
As you know it, the situation that prevails
in the Great J Lakes Region 'of Central Africa is worry.,..
some.
Zaire is suffering on its eastern boundaries
from a dramatic situation and once again, we are victims
of our hospitality. Indeed, after we suddenly opened
up in 1994 our borders to more than one million refugees'
for humanitarian reasons, we ar~ actually facing an
unfair warfare imposed to us by some neighboring states.
The current conflicts in several countries
bordering Zaire are of ethnical intensity. They are
at the same time complex; we ought to solve them through
politically concerned means. That is why I strongly
urge the United States to use his strong leadership
to help reach the global, political and concerted solu.,..
tions to the present conflicts in the Great Lakes Region .
.. /.
�"Z~ ,.:j').,:,;.,;k/1/ ...h
fi, ./itj~rrlti?m'
./#6u,ecAa/r/tr Jiru;/-1'!
2
Such a positive implication of the United
States in this approach will of course help as it did
in the former Yugoslavia case, and put an end to the
ethnic and unjustified warfare that Zairean neighboring
states have imposed upon him. Finally, I would like
to sease this opportunity and let you know that the
democratic process in my "country is going on quite
well. As it has been agreed on by all the Zairean
political
leaders
and
other
international
partners,
the free,
transparent and democratic elections will
be held next year.
I thank you in advance for your benevolent
attention to my request and for the reply you intend
to give to it. My best wishes and highest regards.
HOBUTU SESE SEKO KUKU NGBENDU WA ZA BANGA
�SEGRET
SS6~S!J:
THE PRESIDENT HAS Sfl~
~ -~
1
~~ ~
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 26, 1996
ACTION
ou 26 ~s~o'l
~96~
\c._
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
- ~r.ocr{
~
FROM:
ANTHONY~
SUBJECT:
Eastern Zaire/Rwanda: Response to Canadian
Proposal for Deployment of Multinational Force to
Central Africa
Purpose
To decide whether or not to support the Canadian proposal for
deployment of a multinational force (MNFl to Central Africa.
:Background
Following the Stuttgart planning session, the Government of
Canada (GOC) today presented a specific proposal for a
multinational humanitarian mission in Central ~frica and
requested a formal response from potential troop contributors
within 36 hours.
The Canadian Proposal
Canada is proposing the immediate establishment of a
multinational force (MNF) with the mission of facilitating the
delivery of humanitarian assistance and facilitating voluntary
refugee repatriation~ The MNF would perform the following tasks:
• Establish MNF Headquarters (HQ) in Entebbe, Uganda and Kigali,
Rwanda. There would be no HQ in Zaire. Any decision to
deploy the HQ to Zaire must be taken subsequently by consensus
of key troop contributors represented on the planned
multinational Steering Board.
•
Place existing national forces in the theater (airlift control
elements, psyops, aerial reconnaissance etc.) under Canadian
operational control.
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•
2
·Deploy 350-person Canadian military Disaster Assistance team
(DART) to Entebbe and possibly to Rwanda.
The DART would not
deploy to Zaire unless there is a subsequent consensus among
key troop contributors to do so.
•
Plan, prepare and execute air-drops of supplies in Zaire, if
necessary, to assist populations in need. The airdrop
operation would be conducted from Entebbe. While aware of the
drawbacks of airdrops, Canada seeks our agreement now to give
the Force Commander (FC) authority to decide whether to
execute airdrops in Zaire. The GOC would like the U.S. and
·others to participate in the airdrop operation.
Unresolved Issues: Canada has not defined the force structure,
although we estimate it would consist of 1000-2000 persons. Nor
has it defined the role for African countries. We continue to
stress the importance of .significant African participation in the
force. Canada has not yet secured the consent of the Governments
of Rwanda and Uganda for this operation. Finally, Canada is
soiiciting at least 2,000 troops to participate in a potential
convoy security operation in Eastern Zaire but does not have
sufficient pledges to date. canada agrees any decision to
conduct convoy security operations in Zaire must be taken
subsequentl~ by consensus of key troop contributors.
Proposed
u.s.
Res,ponse
State, OSD, JCS, OVP and NSC recommend the U.S. convey to Canada
our willingness to participate in the following MNF activities:
•
•
•
Establish,Multinational Headquarters.
Place. existing national forces in the theater under Canadian
operational control.
Plan for airdrops, issue alert order and take other necessary
steps to enable execution within 48 hours.
The .decision to
execute must be made subsequently by the Steering Board.
•
Support deployment of the Canadian DART team to Entebbe or
Rwanda, provided any decision to deploy to Zaire must be taken
subsequently by the Steering Board.
U.S. agreement to and participation in the MNF should be
predicated, however, on fulfillment of the following conditions;
Establishment of a Steering Board -- the composition, mandate
and voting procedures of which are acceptable to the USG.
Formal agreement of the Governments of Rwanda and Uganda to
the deployment, including status of forces agreements.
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Significant African participation in the mission.
Agreement on appropriate rules of engagement.
Confirmation of the command and control arrangements agreed
bilaterally with Canada.
l
\
J
J
~
AID, OMB and USUN support the above proposal as well. However,
AID is concerned that, by deferring any decision to deploy assets
for airdrops at this time, we may look irresponsible if later we
learn there is a dire need and our response is delayed 48 hours.
OMB notes the U.S. costs of this operation are likely to be
substantially below the estimates made for the original MNF
proposal. U.S. forces currently on the ground (approximately
4301 could cost $25 mill. or less; potential U.S. participation
in an expanded mission would increase this estimate. As planning
proceeds, we would need to address those costs and review
potential ways of offsetting them. USUN recommends the U.S. not
object to other countri~s' p~e-positioning asset~ in the region
for air~r~ps; however, 1t th1nks the U.S. should ~ot do so and
any dec1s~on to execute must be made by the Steer~ng Board.
Other Countries' Perspectives
We anticipate that Canada will not be satisfied with the proposed
U.S. response and will continue to insist on immediate authority
to conduct airdrops. The GOC feels under substantial political
pressure to 'do something' in Zaire. DOD thinks advance
authorization of airdrops is imprudent and strongly recommends we
not cede this point. We do not know whether Canada will accede
to the U.S. positio~ or decide to proceed without us. Several
other countries have expressed in New York a preliminary
readiness to support the Canadian proposal, including France,
Belgium, Ireland, Uganda, Denmark, Senegal and Portugal.
(They
do not yet have final positions from capitals.) Key UN agencies
also support the Canadian proposal as the best means of getting
an operation launched. However, UNHCR and the UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations note that airdrops are potentially
dangerous and the least desirable method of delivering
assistance.
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve the proposed U.S. position outlined above for
transmission to Canada as soon as possibl~.
Approve
Disapprove
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�SE:GRE+
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
20740
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504
Summary of Conclusions of
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee
DATE: August 6, 1996
LO.CATION: Situation Room
TIME: 3:20-4:15 p.m.
SUBJECT:
Summary of Conclusions of the Principals Committee
Meeting on Burundi and Rwandan Refugee Camps f-&1
PARTICIPANTS:
The Vice President's Office
William Wise
State
Warren Christopher
Peter Tarnoff
Richard Bogosian
Defense
John White
Walter Slocombe
USUN
Madeleine Albright
Rick Inderfurth
Chief of Staff
Leon Panetta
OMB
Jack Lew
Gordon Adams
CIA
John Deutch
George Tenet
William Foltz
AID
Richard McCall
Nan Borton
JCS
John Shalikashvali
Michael Byron
White House
Anthony Lake
Nancy Soderberg
NSC
MacArthur DeShazer
Eric Schwartz
Mike Sheehan
Summary of Conclusions
It was agreed that:
Neither an ultimatum nor deadlines will be set for Major
Buyoya's regime. Sanctions implemented by regional states will
be supported.
f-&1
EUCOM/JCS will provide a detailed contingency plan for a
possible humanitarian operation in Burundi by Wednesday, August 7.
(-8.1
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As a matter of urgency, NSC will coordinate an interagency
effort to formulate and implement a plan to recruit, support and
train African and other forces to participate in a potential
humanitarian intervention in Burundi. This plan will draw
heavily on the concept of an African Crisis Response Force, which
State and DOD will seek to implement as soon as possible.
~·
OMB will provide detailed options for funding the
establishment of a Burundi contingency force, modeled on the
concept of the African Crisis Response Force, as well as for
funding the U.S. contribution to a Burundi intervention force
established under UN auspices.
~
The interagency proposal for closure of refugee camps near
the Rwandan border is approved. The U.S. will seek to lead an
international effort to stimulate voluntary return of Rwandan
refugees and camp relocation, as necessary. The United States
proposal entails phasing out international assistance to existing
refugee camps over a 180 day period, beginning with those camps
·which pose the greatest immediate regional security threat.
Those refugees who choose not to return to Rwanda would be
relocated to camps away from the border.· ~
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504
August 5, 1996
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
~
FROM:
MACARTHUR DESHAZER ~
SUBJECT:
Briefing Memo for Principals Committee Meeting on
Burundi and Rwanda, August 6, 2:30-3:15 p.m.
Burundi
1. Situation Report: Ask CIA to provide an update on recent
developments and an assessment of the likelihood of a
humanitarian cris
in the next six months.
For your information, there is
that Hutu rebels are planning insu gent operat1on
this weekend
imilarly, Bu
a preliminary strategy
Forces are repor
ave
renewed counterinsurgency efforts against Hutu rebels. It is
also expected to begin before the end of August.
2. Revised Options: Following your instructions during the JCS
briefing on Saturday, we have revised the options to include
alternatives that do not involve the U.S. leading the
intervention force. We have added two sub~options (2a&b) to
Option 2. Essentially, Option 2a calls for the U.S. to provide
requisite force cohesion and direction by underwriting the
operation now in terms of support and organizational skill. We
would pursue an intense diplomatic effort to identify a third
world country to lead the force and mount an all-out effort to
train, equip and support the selected country to lead the
intervention force. Option 2b is a variation of direct U.S.
participation outlined in the original paper.
You should discuss with General Shali how he wants to present to
the Principals .the JCS plan for.a humanitarian contingency force.
Ideally, he ·would give a short briefing on the safe area concept
briefed to you on Saturday and likely force size and composition
(by unit or function} required to perform the mission.
SECRET
Classified by: Derivative
Reason: 1.5 (a} (d)
Declassify On: 7/2/06
Derived From: Multiple Sou~ces
Declassified Under Authont~r o(th(!.
Interagency Security Declassific.ation Appeals Panel,
E.O. 1352( Section 5,3(1>)(3)
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 025
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
�-----------
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3.
2
Options for U.S. Participation
If we are to be in a position to react effectively to the
impending crisis in Burundi, the only practical alternative to
doing nothing or doing it all ourselves is to marry the most
competent African forces with a competent lead nation and provide.
the Africans with substantial amounts of equipment, resources,
logistics support and (time.permitting) training.· In any case,
the u.s. should be prepared to play the role of lead nation i·f a
sis erupts before this plan can be implemented. You should
try to gain agreement that the U.S. should:
-- Take immediate steps to identify a third world nation in order
to obtain a commitment to lead a multinational intervention force
for Burundi.
-- Agree to provide requisite force cohesion and direction to the
selected third world country to lead a multinational in1:;.ervention
force by underwriting the operation now in terms of support and
organizational skill.
-- Pledge to commence accelerated training and logistics support
designed to prepare the force for mission requirements.
-- Actively recruit targeted African, western and other troop
contributors to perform specific mission tasks 'along the lines of
the proposed action plan at Tab B(l).
-- Gain agreement for direct U.S. participation (Option 2b) in
the event a crisis erupts before an intervention force can be
assembled and prepared. If a crisis occurs within the next few
months, only the U.S. or France is capable of mounting a highly
e
ive humanitarian intervention. France
unlikely to do
so.
You should also task JCS and OSD to finalize the force template
and identify capable countries to target for recruitment. In
addition, you should task OMB with NSC to lead an interagency
effort to estimate the total cost of creating and sustaining this
force and the appropriate form and funding sources for the U.S.
con@buti.gn (vlce""-that of all1es). We will have great
~aifficultif"inding the required funds and may even have to
consider a supplemental.
4.
African Crisis Response Force
.You .should gain agreement in principle that DOD's proposal to
establish an African Crisis Response Force (ACRF) should be
implemented by the U.S. Task NSC to coordinate·implementation
effort. Task State to craft a diplomatic strategy to sell the
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3
proposal to selected African nations. Task OMB to work with
State and DOD to produce cost estimates and options for funding
to the proposal in FY 97 and FY 98.
Rwandan Refugee Camps
Eric Schwartz and I have led an interagency effort to formulate
options for dealing with the security threat posed by the
continued presence of refugee camps on Rwanda's borders. NSC
produced a detailed options paper that was reviewed by all
concerned agencies and bureaus at the Assistant Secretary level.
While the details of implementation must still be finalized,
there was consensus that the U.S. should urge other donors, UNHCR
and countries in the region to agree to phase out assistance to
Rwandan refugee camps over a period of 180 days, starting with
those camps that pose the greatest immediate security threat.
Those who choose·not to return would be relocated inside Zaire
and Tanzania.
While there is interagency consensus on the plan {which Dan
Spiegal ~upports), agencies may argue that the plan is unworkable
{and highly risky) without -~
•
a beefed up security presence in the camps, a determination to
neutralize ex-FAR leaders in the camps and the cooperation of
Mobutu (whose acquiescence we would need in any resettlement
plan) ;
•
a willingness on the part of the Rwandan government to improve
the climate for return, by providing a semblance of due
process for the 80,000 detainees in Rwanda, ending reprisal
killings, etc.
You should indicate that you share these concerns, and that our
efforts on the refugee issue need to be coordinated closely with
what we are doing on the political/security side. ·
You should confirm that the Principals endorse this plan and ask
State to work with NSC to consult with ~llies and UNHCR to
implement the plan.
.
~ ,4,.,...,~
Concurrences by:
r-----~--~~~---------
Richard Clarke, Eric Schwarfz
Attachments
Tab A . Agenda
Tab B Discussion Paper on Burundi
Tab 1 Proposed Action Plan for Implementation of
Option 2
Tab 2 African Crisis Response Force
Tab C Discussion Paper on Rwanda Refugee Camps
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�Declassified Under AuthoritY of the
Interage~cy SecuritYDeela;sification Appeals Panel,
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E:o .. 1~526, Secrloq S:3Cb)C3)
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 58
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
Burundi: Preparations for Possible Humanitarian Contingency Operation
Principals·Committee Discussion Paper
Purpose: To review the status of preparations for a possible humanitarian
contingency operation in Burundi and consider whether additional steps by the
USG are warranted. ~
Recent Developments: The recent coup in Burundi, effective suspension of the
Arusha I "security assistance" plan, continuing Hutu insurgency and the impending
imposition of economic sanctions against Burundi by the countries in the region
combine to increase the ·possibility that Burundi could become more unstable. In
the worst case, communal violence could escalate and spread culminating in a
genocide on the scale of October 1993 in Burundi or even Rwanda in 1994. ~
Background: While the United States, countries in the region and the: ·
international community at large are alert to this possibility, few concrete steps ·
have been taken to ready the international community for an effective response
should a worst case scenario ensue. ~
Chapter VII humanitarian contingency planning at the UN is in the early stages.
UN DPKO envisions a force mandated to protect innocent civilians and provide
support to humanitarian assistance efforts. ~
Thus far, UN estimates of troop requirements for such a mission appear so
ambitious as to be unrealistic. While a few less capable African countries have
indicated a willingness in principle to participate in a humanitarian intervention
(Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Malawi, Chad), none is capable of launching an
effective mission without map.y months of intense training, substantial equipment,
logistical and financial support. No western or other nation has agreed to provide
ground forces for such a mission. Most critically lacking is any competent country
willing to organize, command and control the force. ~
In May, agencies participated in a political-military-humanitarian planning
exercise in Carlisle, P A. That session produced a mission statement and concept for
the establishment of safe areal) to provide security to civilians at risk and for
supporting" delivery of humanitarian relief supplies. This concept remains the basis
for U.S. planning to date. The Carlisle report has recently been shared with the
UN and key allies. However, it does not (and was not intended to) provide a precise
force template necessary to recruit specific troop contributions. (B)
EUCOM has been tasked to produce a detailed plan, which is due shortly
and which will represent the next step in the planning process. From these
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analyses, we hope to derive notional force structures for a basic plan and excursions
(i.e., with reduced mission and attendant force reductions). Excursions might
include one single or two safe areas. With notional force structures available, the
USG would be able, if desired, to try to recruit capable troops from targeted African,
western and other countries to perform specific functions. (81
At this stage, we face the question of whether or not the United States should move
beyond our planning to date and intensify our efforts to recruit and organize a
humanitarian intervention force capable of responding swiftly to a near-term crisis
in Burundi. fS1
Assumptions
•
H a humanitarian disaster occurs, there will be substantial pressure for the
international community to respond, particularly since there has been
substantial media attention to the potential for crisis in Burundi. (81
•
H a crisis occurs within the next three months, only the United States or France
is capable of mounting a highly effective humanitarian intervention. France is
unlikely to do so. (81
•
If a crisis occurs in the next few months, the only practical alternative to doing
nothing or doing it ourselves is to marry the most competent African and other
foreign forces with a competent lead nation (or nations). This would entail
providing the African countries with substantial amounts of equipment, logistics
support, sustainment funds and (time-permitting) training. ~
•
No humanitarian intervention force can succeed without a '1ead" nation
providing, at a minimum, command, control and communications (C3). (81
•
The African countri~s most willing to participate in a Chapter VII force (e.g.,
Tanzania, ·uganda) ar.e least capable of performing effectively unless their
troops have been fully trained and equipped, which will take at least six months.
(81
•
.
The cost to the United States of helping equip, sustain and support Mrican
troops in a humanitarian mission in Burundi would be substantial. (Sj
Options:
1) Current Approach
To date, the United States has done more diplomatically to avert a humanitarian
crisis in Burundi and pledged more concrete military assistance to enable a swift
international response than any other outside power. For more than a year, we
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have urged the UN and others to prepare for a humanitarian crisis in Burundi. We
have pledged and provided detailed planning assistance both to the UN and to the
Arusha process in Dar es Salaam. Further, the United States has pledged strategic
airlift and an air control element to assist others to deploy. We have also pledged in
principle equipment and other forms of assistance to a Chapter VI consensual
regional peacekeeping effort as contemplated at Arusha I. We have made very clear
to other countries that the U.S. contribution would be limited to the above and not
involve U.S. combat forces or other troops stationed in Burundi. (81
However, another. genocide remains all too possible. In th~ worst case, a wider
regional war could also ensue. As media attention to the ~risis builds, the United
States and others would likely face considerable criticism in some circles for not
doing more to try to stop the killing. (81
In the event of a crisis, the United States can maintain with considerable credibility
that we did our best -- within the limits of our prior commitments -- to avert
genocide and enable an effective international response. Moreover, we would stress
yet again that Burundians themselves are responsible for their own fate. Most.
importantly, our current course would enable us to avoid placing U.S. forces at risk
and contributing scarce resources to support a humanitarian intervention.
Ultimately, however, we would still incur major costs to provide assistance (food,
shelter; water) to refugees and displaced persons. (81
2) Enhanced International Donor Involvement
Alternatively, the United States could immediately take the lead in organizing one
of two hybrid Mrican/Western to respond quickly to a major crisis: (81
2 a) Robust Arusha Model
The Concept: The robust Arusha model would require the U.S. Government,
possibly in tandem with other key western donor nations, to commit to play a
greater role than previously planned in the provision of incentives for participation.
In sum, the United States would provide requisite force cohesion and direction by
underwriting the operation now in terms of support and organizational skill. An
intense diplomatic effort would focus on a short list of most-capable Mrican nations
in order to obtain a commitment by one to lead the force. The short list would, at
best, include South Mrica, Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Tanzania
and Zimbabwe. Once selected, an all-out effort would be made to train and support
selected country to lead the intervention force. To leverage other participation, the
United States would consider a full range of tools including economic offsets and
military incentives. Similar but tailored approaches would be made to the most
capable donor nations to flush out headquarters, combat support and brigade
structures. The immediate recruiting goals would be, in priority, a force
headquarters, support elements and sufficient troops to secure two safe areas
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(approximately 13,000). Once commitment to participation is obtained, the United
States (and hopefully other western nations) would commence accelerated training
and logistics support designed to prepare the force for mission requirements. Once
the operations commence, operational and sustainment support could be phased in
through a combined U.S. and/or western and MNF support group located in an
offset location(s) outside of Burundi; ~
Pros:
•
•
•
•
•
•
No U.S. troop involvement in Burundi beyond the modest support committed by
the President;
Limited direct U.S. military and political liabilities;
Positive and proactive U.S. leadership and support for the force;
Allows the United States to shape the force (and therefore the outcome);
Builds for interagency regional peacekeeping; ·
Positive sign (domestic/international) of U.S. interest and engagement. ~
Cons:
•
•
•
Gap between U.S. decision and operational readiness of force;
High cost/limited resources (however, this must be weighed relative to the cost of
doing nothing or committing U.S. forces);
Will require a major interagency effort to orchestrate legislative, fiscal, and
diplomatic activities. ~
2 b) Direct U.S. Participation:
The Concept: This model would involve a substantial U.S. troop commitment in
Burundi beyond that pledged by the President but would rely on African forces to
actually conduct the majority of operations in the contested areas, thereby reducing
the risk ofU.S. casualties. Even with American military and political leadership,
there is no guarantee other countries will join us, although experience has shown
American leadership often spurs others to follow suit.~
The United States would command the MNF in Burundi, provide logistics and
specialized headquarters support, a capability for country-wide Quick Reaction
Force operations, airport security, medical support, and aviation support. Other
Mrican donor nations would provide brigade headquarters and battalions "as is,
where is" to support an MNF structure similar to the one currently envisioned. The
United States would airlift these battalions into Burundi at which time they would
come under U.S. command and control. Costs would remain high as the United
States would still undertake to train and sustain African operational forces in
addition to absorbing operational and maintenance costs related.to U.S. forces.
Costs related to headquarters and support training would be reduced, however. ~
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Pros:
•
•
Tangible sign of U.S. commitment beyond logistics and training; could attract
other donor nations;
Enhanced efficiency in headquarters and C3I; could lower requirement for some
specialized equipment. ~
·
Cons:
•
Raises a myriad of problems related to PDD-25, command of U.S. forces and
force protection;
• Will raise war power issues;
• Increased likelihood of U.S. casualties, particularly if the United States provides
rotary wing aviation support;
• Saddles United States with potential for major operational failure since
combatant elements are not U.S.;
• Unknown level of opposition/resistance on the ground. (Sj
NB: Training costs would initially be less than the option above because the
United States would be drawing on existing battalions and would not be required to
substantially increase the capabilities of the African donor battalions. On the other
hand, training would take much longer since more units would have to be trained,
and costs would skyrocket at execution due to the greatly increased U.S.
involvement. ~
3) U.S. Intervention.
This is the only option which will provide an effective, immediate response to a
genocide in Burundi until some type of African force is trained. It is also the option
with the greatest chance for success assuming success is stopping the genocide.
Concomitantly, it is the option with the greatest likelihood of U.S. casualties. Such
an intervention would have a major downside in terms of domestic reaction. The
United States might be able to conduct this operation in tandem with other western
partners to temper criticism. ~
Pros:
•
•
Provides the quickest response to a genocide in Burundi;
Provides maximum operational efficiency (Sj
Cons:
•
•
Will trigger significant domestic reaction;
War powers issues will surface;
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•
•
•
•
6
Great likelihood of U.S. casualties;
Far beyond stated Presidential support;
Unknown resistance on the ground;
High potential for sustained U.S. commitment in Burundi.
~
Duration/Exit Strategy: A time limit would be placed on any intervention. The
duration of such a mission must still be determined. It could be set arbitrarily (e.g.,
three moriths) as the French did in Rwanda or it could be tied to a political outcome
--such as a negotiated power-sharing agreement. Should technical or operational
support beyond the regional force's capability be required in country, it could be
provided by contract personnel.· The "adopt-a-battalion" concept tried in Rwanda
could also provide a means to share the cost burden. In any case, after closure of
the safe areas, a smaller UN or regional follow-on peacekeeping force is likely to be
required to perlorm more traditional functions-- either to enhance security and
deter further killings (as in UNAMIR II in Rwanda) or to implement a peace
agreement (as in Angola or Mozambique). The duration of the follow-on force is
also uncertain but should be tied to the effective re-establishment by the
government of general security throughout the country. ~
Political Oversight: A body and process to provide political oversight to the
multinational force must be designated (UN, OAU, NATO?) or developed (Arusha
heads of state?). Identification or development of this body is an absolutely critical
first step to building, funding, supporting and ultimately commanding the force.
Most western states appear to prefer that the UN Security Council sanction for a
regional body (the Arusha heads of state), along the lines of ECOWAS in Liberia.
Attention and effort will have to be devoted to resolving this issue early. (U)
U.S. Recruitment Effort: The United States would have to invest equipment,
money and diplomatic capital_to recruit and establish an effective force. We would
have to appro~ch capable African arid other troop contributors at the highest levels
and urge their participation in specific roles, primarily infantry but also certain
combat support functions. Those African countries most capable of participating
quickly and effectively in such a force include: Zimbabwe, South Africa, Ghana,
Kenya, Botswana, Senegal and Ethiopia. We must also be prepared to welcome
limited numbers of less capable but politically important African troops such as
those from Tanzania and possibly Uganda. Other traditional troop contributors
such as Pakistan and India should also be asked to participate. ~
U.S. and western partners would have to pledge substantial assistance to equip,
sustain, fund and train these troops. These non-western troops could be funded
through the UN peacekeeping budget, provided the UNSC authorized the mission
and maintained political oversight of the mission. While this arrangement ~ould
be unorthodox and costly (particularly given U.S. budgetary constraints), it may be
preferable to ad hoc funding mechanisms, which we have great difficulty sustaining
over time. ~
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7
Western Support: The United States would also have to work to attract competent
logistics support elements (e.g., transportation, engineering, signals, POL, water,
etc.), primarily from other capable western countries. Among those countries that
have performed similar roles elsewhere in Africa are the UK in Rwanda and
Angola, Germany in Somalia, and Belgium and Canada in Rwanda. NATO/WEU
countries might also contribute joint logistics/support elements. While previous
efforts to solicit allied participation have failed, an enhanced U.S. contribution may
well suffice to persuade some western partners to play a greater role. France, for
instance, has recently said it will do no more and no less than others. To obtain
such support, we would need a sustained high-level approach to our allies. ~
Garnering Public' Support: It would be difficult but not impossible to persuade our
public of the wisdom of an enhanced U.S. role in Burundi along the lines suggested
above. To do so, we might stress that the U.S. contribution is relatively little but
enables others to do a lot. This is U.S.leadership as well as burden-sharing at its
best. Moreover, as a global leader, we are in some way diminished, if we do not act
to help avert another genocide when we can do so at acceptable risk and cost. ~
Action Plan: At Tab 1 is a proposed action plan for implementing Option 2 above.
Long-Term Alternatives
If we are fortunate to avoid a near-term crisis in Burundi, we can takes steps now
to enhance our readiness and flexibility to respond to future crises in Burundi or
elsewhere in Africa with minimal U.S. involvement. DOD is refining a concept
called the African Crisis Response Force (ACRF) -- (Summary at Tab 2). This
concept calls for the United States and possibly others to identify, recruit, train and
equip capable African troops for potential peacekeeping and humanitarian
contingencies in Africa. If implemented, this proposal would enhance the quality of
African troops available for peace operations and may eventually obviate the need
for western ''lead" country involvement. Over the long term, we might also be able
to train and equip less capable African troops (i.e., Tanzania and Uganda) so they
could augment a force led by more experienced African forces. ~
Implementation would require sustained diplomatic efforts and resources -- such as
FMF and/or voluntary peacekeeping funds. If this is deemed an initiative worth
pursuing, we might launch the recruitment effort and incorporate the proposal into
the Administration's FY 98 budget request. ~
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Interagency Security Declassification Appeals Panel,
E.O. 13526, Section 5:3{b)(3)
SECRET
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 56
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
Proposed Action Plan for Implementation of Option 2
1) Define Precise Mission and Force Requirements; Determine U.S.
contribution. (Action: JCS/EUCOM; Principals Recommendation/POTUS
decision)
2) Identify Attractive Target Countries to Provide Specific Military
Capabilities. (Action: OSD/JCS)
3) Identify Resources/Method of Funding U.S. contribution of equipment,
training, and financial support. (Action: 01\ffi with State, DOD and NSC)
4) Brief UN, allies, OAU, Arusha Participants on U.S. plan and proposed
contribution; Request UN assistance in Recruitment. (Action: State!USUN)
5) Launch recruitment effort in conjunction w/ UN. Determine Support
Requirements for Participating Countries. (Action: State with substantial
support from OSD, JCS, NSC)
.
Phase I: Africa and Others
·· POTUS letters
·· Send joint USG team (State/JCS/OSD/NSC .;. Assistant Secretary level) to key
African and other nations to brief operational plan, force reqUirements, U.S. role
and requested contribution.
-- Follow-up.calls from Principals to counterparts as needed.
Phase IL· Western Partners (troops and resources)
·· POTUS letters
·· Send joint US.G team (State/JCS/OSD/NSC -- Assistant Secretary level) to key
Western nations to brief operational plan, force requirements, U.S~ role and
requested troop and financial contributions.
·
··Follow-up calls from Principals to counterparts as needed.
(With regard to both Phase I and II, JCS notes that the joint USG team must
include USEUCOM military planners and the discussions should be about the
operational concept not the operational plan. Once a firm donor commitment is
made, USEUCOM planners would establish mil-to-mil contacts with all donor
nations to coordinate the details of the plan as necessary. Security at this stage
will be vitai.)
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2
6) Align Force Contributions to Mission requirements/Adjust Mission, if
necessary. (Action: JCS/EUCOM with direction from Principals, if necessary)
7) Identify Tripwires/Obtain quiet commitment from UNSC Members to
authorize mission, if circumstances warrant. (Action: State/USUN)
8) Provide equipment, training, funding as required. (Action: State and
DOD)
9) PrepQsition equipment or troops as required; (Action: DOD)
10) Identify political structure under which the force will be built, funded
and controlled. (Action: State) ·
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Declassi~ed Und_er Atitlioritj.·ofthe
Interagency Security. Declassification Appeals Panel,
E:o. 13526, Section 5·3(b)C3)
CONFIDENTIAL
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 026
Declassification Date: march 18, 2014
August 2, 1996
Rwandan Refugee Camps in Zaire
To decide whether to pursue a strategy to obtain the
closure of refugee camps near the Rwandan border.
Purpose:
In July 1994, more than two million Rwandans
ed
ahead of the victorious Tutsi-dominated rebel army into eastern
Zaire and northwestern Tanzania. The United States led Operation
Support Hope in an effort to stabilize the humanitarian situation
and, today, more than 1.7 million refugees remain in Zaire and
Tanzania. The current cost of maintaining the camps is about one
million dollars per day, of which the United States provides more
than 30%.
Background:
While at least 300,000 of those whofled have
returned to Rwanda voluntarily, the remainder (about one million
in Zaire and 700,000 in Tanzania) live largely under the
authority of the former government, its military forces (the exFAR) and militia {Interahamwe). Many of those in the camps
participated in the genocide and would likely never return to
Rwanda voluntarily. Many others who might return are forceq (by
threat and intimidation) to remain in the camps by the leadership
of the former governm~nt. We believe that many would go home if
they could make that decision freely; conditions in Rwanda are
far from ideal, but the situation has stabilized sufficiently to
permit large scale voluntary return.
Status quo:
The camps pose a security threat
for the Government of Rwanda and for the countries in which they
are located. Most of the camps in Zaire and Tanzania are near
the border, and ex-FAR and Interahamwe use the camps in Zaire as
bases of operation from which to launch attacks into western
Rwanda. In fact, the political/military structures in the camps
appear to be forming a nascent ethnic parastate, mobilizing the
Rwandan Hutu population through an ethnic nationalist creed. The
risks to'U.S. objectives are many: increasing attacks into
Rwanda from the camps as the ex-FAR strengthen their position,
retaliation by. the Government of Rwanda in the form of attacks on
the camps, increasing collaboration between ex-FAR and Hutu
extremists in Burundi, and neighboring states being drawn into
increased conflict.
Problems. with the status quo:
u.s. Proposal: As a result of these concerns, U.S.
Rwanda/Burundi Special Coordinator Richard Bogosian broached the
concept of selected camp closure during the June Rwanda
CmlFIDBNTIAL
Classified by: Eric Schwartz
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 1.6X6
�COHFIDENTIAL.
2
Operational Support Group Meeting in Geneva.
Our allies are
awaiting a formal proposal from us on this issue.
Interagency agreement on this issue: At an Assistant Secretarylevel meeting held at the National Security Council last month,
agencies reached a general consensus on the following points:
•
The United States should seek to lead an international effort
to stimulate voluntary return and relocation of remaining
displaced persons;
•
The plan should envision a phase out of assistance to the
camps over a 180 day period, beginning with those camps which
pose the greatest immediate regional security threat;
•
That those individuals who choose not to return to Rwanda
should be relocated in camps further from the border.
Factors to Consider:
It is important to recognize that such a
strategy will be difficult to implement -- if that were not the
case, it would have already been effected.
In particular, a
detailed strategy and operations plan will have to take account
of the following factors, all of.which concern political and
security issues:
Coordination with the EU and with UNHCR: while the U.S. is the
largest donor, this is an international effort, and decisionmaking on camp strategy will have to be collective.
Security concerns in the camps: we can expect vigorous efforts
by ex-FAR and Interahamwe to thwart any relocation/repatriation
plan.
If there is no effort to neutralize this threat, the plan
will, at best, fail and, at worst, result in chaos and violence.
Actions by the Government of Rwanda: we will
actions by the GOR to improve the climate for
providing at least a semblance of due process
detainees in Rwanda, ending reprisal killings,
COHFIDENTIAL
need to encourage
return, by
for the 80,000
etc.
�20729
SECRET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504
August 2, 1996
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
NOTED
Na~! Sec fl.dv!sor
has set:Ji1
Ydi CE
FROM:
susAN E .
SUBJECT:
Briefing Memo for Principals Committee Meeting on
Burundi and Rwanda, August 6, 2:30-3:15 pm.
Burundi
1. Situation Report: Ask CIA to provide'an update on recent
developments and an assessment of the likelihood of a
humanitarian crisis in the next six months.
2. JCS Briefing: Following your briefing by JCS on Saturday,
you should discuss with Shali how he wants to present to the
Principals the JCS plan for a humanitarian contingency force.
Ideally, he would give a short briefing on the safe area concept
and likely force size and composition (by unit or function)
required to perform the mission on different scales -- small (one
safe area), medium (two areas) and large (three plus).
~--~3.
Options for U.S. Participation
You should try to gain agreement that the U.S. should:
-- Take immediate steps to serve as the Lead Nation in organizing
a multinational intervention force for Burundi.
-- Privately pledge to contribute the headquarters unit and
airport security battalion for a force.
-- Actively recruit targeted African, western and other troop
contributors to perform specific mission tasks along the lines of
the proposed action plan at Tab B(1).
You should also task JCS and OSD to finalize the force template
and identify capable countries to target for recruitment. In
addition, you should task OMB with NSC to lead an interagency
effort'to estimate the total cost of creating and sustaining this
force and the appropriate form and funding sources for the U.S.
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2
contribution (vice that of allies).
We will have great
difficulty finding the required funds and may even have to
consider a supplemental.
4.
African Crisis Response Force
You should gain agreement in principle that DOD's proposal to
establish an African Crisis Response Force (ACRF) should be
implemented by the U.S.
Task NSC to coordinate implementation
effort. Task State to craft a diplomatic strategy to sell the
proposal to selected African nations. Task OMB to work with
State and DOD to produce cost estimates and options for funding
to the proposal in FY 97 and FY 98.
Rwandan Refugee Camps
Eric Schwartz and I have led an interagency effort to formulate
options for
ling.with ~he security t~reat posed by the
continued presence of refugee camps on Rwanda's borders. NSC
produced a detailed options paper that was reviewed by all
concerned agencies and bureaus at the Assistant Secretary level.
While the details of implementation must still be finalized,
there was consensus that the U.S. should urge other donors, UNHCR
and countries in the region to agree to phase out assistance to
Rwandan refugee camps over a period of 180 days, starting with
those camps that pose the greatest immediate security threat.
Those who choose not to return would be relocated inside Zaire
and Tanzania.
While there is interagency consensus on the plan (which Dan
Spiega~ supports), agencies may argue that the plan is unworkable
(and highly risky) without -•
a beefed up security presence in the campsi a determination to
neutralize ex-FAR leaders in the camps and the cooperation of
Mobutu (whose acquiescence we would need in any resettlement
plan) ;
•
a willingness on the part of the Rwandan government to improve
the climate for return, by providing a semblance of due
process for the 80,000 detainees in Rwanda, ending reprisal
killings, etc.
You should indica~e that you share these concerns, and that our
efforts on the refugee issue need to be coordinated closely with
what we are doing on the political/security side.
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3
You should confirm that the Principals endorse this plan and ask
State to work with NSC to consult with allies and UNHCR to
im~lement the plan.
nbt A \I cr.~ 141./.e
\its-~"'
Richard Clarke, Eri~ Schwartz
Concurrences by:
Attachments
Tab A Agenda
Tab B Discussion Paper on Burundi
Tab 1
Proposed Action Plan for Implementation of
Option 2
Tab 2
African Crisis Response Force
Tab C Discussion Paper on Rwanda Refugee Camps
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�Declassified Under Authority of the .
interagency SeCurity. Declassification •
.<\ppeals. Panei,
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E.O. 13526.,Section 5,j(b)(3)
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 57
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
Burundi: Preparations for Possible Humanitarian Contingency Operation
Principals Committee Di.scussion Paper
Purpose: To review the status of preparations for a possible humanitarian
contingency operation' in Burundi and consider whether additional steps by the
USG are warranted. (81
Recent Developments: The recent coup in Burundi, effective suspension of the
Arusha I "security assistance" plan, continuing Hutu insurgency and the impending
· imposition of economic sanctions against Burundi by the countries in the region
combine to increase the possibility that Burundi could become more unstable. In
the worst case, communal violence could escalate and spread culminating in a
genocide on the scale of October 1993 in Burundi or even Rwanda in 1994. ~
Background: While the United States, countries in the region and the
international community at large are alert to this possibility, few concrete· steps
have been taken to ready the international community for an effective response
should a worst case scenario ensue .. (81
· Chapter VII humanitarian contingency planning at the UN is in the early stages. ·
UN DPKO envisions a force mandated to protect innocent civilians and provide
support to humanitarian assistance efforts. ~
Thus far, UN estimates of troop requirements for such a mission appear so
ambitious as to be unrealistic. While a few less capable African countries have
indicated a willingness in principle to participate in a humanitarian intervention
(Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Malawi, Chad), none is capable of launching an
effective mission without many months of intense training, substantial equipment,
logistical and financial support. No western or other nation has agreed to provide
ground forces for such a mission. Most critically lacking is any competent country
willing to organize, command and control the force. ~
In May, agencies participated in a political-military-humanitarian planning
exercise in Carlisle, P A. That session produced a mission statement and concept
for the establishment of safe areas to provide security to civilians at risk and for
supporting delivery of humanitarian relief supplies. This concept remains the basis
for U.S~ planning to date. The Carlisle report has recently been shared with the UN
and key allies. However, it does not (and was not intended to) provide a precise
force template necessary to recruit specific troop contributions. ~
The Joint Staff has made some preliminary estimates of the requirements for a
U.S.-led humanitarian mission. EUCOM has been tasked to produce a
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2
detailed plan, which is due shortly and which will represent the next step
in the planning process. From these analyses, we hope to derive notional force
structures for a basic plan and excursions (i.e., with reduced mi~sion and attendant
force reductions). Excursions might include one single or two safe areas. With
notional force structures available, the USG would be able, if desired, to try to
recruit capable troops from targeted African, western and other countries to
perform specific functions. (81
·
At this stage, we face the question of whether or not the United States.should move
beyond our planning to date and intensify our efforts to recruit and organize a
humanitarian intervention force capable of responding swiftly to a near term crisis in
Burundi. (8j
Assumptions
will
•
If a humanitarian disaster occurs, there
be substantial pressure for the
international community to respond, particularly since there has been
substantial media attention to the potential for crisis in Burundi. (81
•
If a crisis occurs within the next three months, only the United States or France
is capable of mounting a highly effective humanitarian intervention. France is
unlikely to do so. ~
•
If a crisis occurs in the next few months, the only practical alternative to doing
nothing or doing it ourselves is to marry the most competent African and other
foreign forces with a competent lead nation (or nations). This would entail
providing the African countries with substantial amounts of equipment, logistics
support, sustainment funds and (time-permitting) training. (81
•
No humanitarian intervention force can succeed without a "lead" nation
providing, at a minimum, command, control and communications (C3).
~
•
The African countries most willing to participate in a Chapter VII force (e.g.,
Tanzania, Uganda) are least capable of performing effectively unless their troops
have been fully trained and equipped, which will take at least six months. ~
•
The cost to the United Sstates of helping equip, sustain and support African
troops in a humanitarian mission in Burundi would be substantial. ~
Options:
1) C.urrent Approach
To date, the United Sstates has done more diplomatically to avert a humanitarian
crisis in Burundi and pledged more concrete military assistance to enable a swift
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international response than any other outside power. For more than a year, we
have urged the UN and others to prepare for a humanitarian crisis in Burundi. We
have pledged and provided detailed planning assistance both to the UN and to the
Arusha process in Dares Salaam. Further, the United States has pledged strategic
airlift and an air control element to assist others to deploy. We have also pledged in ·
principle equipment and other forms of assistance to a Chapter VI consensual
regional peacekeeping effort as contemplated at Arusha I. We have made very clear
to other countries that the U.S. contribution would be limited to the above and not
involve U.S. combat forces or other troops stationed in Burundi. ~
However, another genocide remains all too possible. In the worst case, a wider
regional war could also ensue. As media attention to the crisis builds, the U.S. and
others would likely face considerable criticism in some circles for not doing more to
try to stop the killing. ~
In the event of a crisis, the United Statescan maintain with considerable credibility
that we did our best -· within the limits of our prior commitments -· to avert
genocide and enable an effective international response. Moreover, we would
stress yet again that Burundians themselves are responsible for their own fate.
Most importantly, our current course would enable us to avoid placing U.S. forces at
risk and contributing scarce resources to support a humanitarian intervention.
Ultimately, however, we would still incur major costs to provide assistance (food,
shelter, water) to refugees and displaced persons. ~
2) Enhanced U.S. Role- Lead Nation in Assembling Capable Multinational
Force
Alternatively, the United States could immediately take the lead in organizing a
hybrid African/Western force to establish one or more humanitarian safe areas in
the event of a widespread crisis. ~
The Concept: JCS estimates roughly 20,000 troops would be needed to man three
safe areas (approximately 2,500 square kilometers- the size of the French zone in
Operation Turquoise in Rwanda). With fewer troops, the notional mission would
require modification to reflect limits in terms of capability and geographic area of
responsibilities. The force would require peace enforcement capabilities and
Chapter VII UNSC authority. ~
While a hybrid force would not be as effective as a U.S.· or French-only operation, it
could still save thousands of lives at least in a limited area. Such a force would
take several months to recruit and equip. Moreover, unless forces and equipment
are pre-positioned in advance, it would take several additional weeks before any
large force could be fully deployed. ~
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Duration/Exit Strategy: The duration of such a mission must still be determined.
It could be set arbitrarily (e.g., three months) as the French did in Rwanda or it
could be tied to a political outcome ·· such as a negotiated power-sharing
agreement. In the latter case, the force might remain in Burundi for an extended
period of time. In any case, after closure of the safe areas, a smaller UN or regional
follow-on peacekeeping force is likely to be required to perform more traditional
functions.·· either to enhance security and deter further killings (as in UNAMIR II
in Rwanda) or to implement a peace agreement (as in Angola or Mozambique). The
duration of the follow-on force is also uncertain.but should be tied to the effective
re-establishment by the Government of general security throughout the country.
~
There is considerable risk the establishment of safe areas could result in the quasipermanent separation of Hutu and Tutsi populations either through refugee flows
or the de facto partition of the country. Further consideration must be given to
ways to dissolve safe areas in a manner that reduces the possibility of either
partition or additional refugee flows.~
Political Guidance: A body and process to provide political oversight to the
multinational force must be designated (UN, OAU, NATO?) or developed (Arusha
heads of state?). Identification or development of this body is an absolutely critical
first step to building, funding, supporting and ultimately commanding the force.
Most western states appear to prefer that the UN Security Council sanction for a
regional body (the Arusha heads of state), along the lines of ECOWAS in Liberia.
Attention and effort will have to be devoted to resolving this issue early. AA
U.S. Military Role: Given the reluctance to date of other countries to participate in
a multinational humanitarian intervention force, the U.S. would have to commit to
play a greater military role than previously planned to attract other capable forces
to join such a force. The U.S. role could be limited but must be meaningful and
provide an important new degree of leadership and force cohesion that has been
lacking. Even with American military and political leadership, there is no
guarantee other countries will join us, although experience has shown American
leadership often spurs others to follow suit.~
The U.S. military role could be expanded to include one or more command or
support capabilities, in addition to our previous pledge to provide airlift and an air
control element. Such capabilities could include but are not limited to:
•
Headguarters/C3 element. The headquarters could be based at Bujumbura
airport where U.S. forces would be positioned to support airlift operations. U.S.
personnel might include planners, logisticians, communicators, liaison
personnel, administrative support, command elements, plus other support. ·They
could be joined by African, NATO or other officers, if desired. The headquarters
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5
function is essential to provide the command, control and communications (C3),
necessary for any force to function. ~
•
Airport security battalion to provide security at Bujumbura airfield.
•
Aviation Battalion to provide air mobility to the force.
• ,Surgical Hospital.
~
~
~
Western donor nations could also provide some or all of these capabilities. ~
U.S. Recruitment Effort: In addition.to a greater military contribution, the United
States would have to invest equipment, money and diplomatic capital to recruit and
establish an ~ffective force. We would have to approach capable African and other
troop contributors at the highest levels and urge their participation in specific roles,
primarily infantry but also certain combat support functions. Those Mrican
countries most-capable of participating quickly and effectively in such a force
include: Zimbabwe, South Mrica, Ghana, Kenya, Botswana, Senegal and Ethiopia.
We must also be prepared to welcome limited numbers ofless capable but politically
important African troops such as those from Tanzania and possibly Uganda. Other
traditional troop contributors such as Pakistan and India should also be asked to
participate. ~
U.S. and western partners would have to pledge substantial assistance to equip,
sustain, fund and train these troops. These non-western troops could be funded
through the UN peacekeeping budget, provided.the UNSC authorized the mission
and maintained political oversight of the mission. While this arrangement would
·be unorthodox and costly (particularly given U.S. budgetary constraints), it may be
preferable to ad hoc funding mechanisms, which we have great difficulty sustaining
over time. ~
Western Sunnort: The United States would also have to work to attract competent .
logistics support elements (e.g. transportation, engineering, signals, POL, water,
etc.), primarily from other capable western countries. Among those countries that
have performed similar roles elsewhere in Africa are the UK in Rwanda and·
Angola, Germany in Somalia, and Belgium and Canada in Rwanda. NATO/WEU
countries might also contribute joint logistics/support elements. While previous
efforts to solicit allied participation have failed, an enhanced U.S. contribution may
well suffice to persuade some western partners to play a greater role. France, for
instance, has recently said it will do no more and no less than others. To obtain
such support, we would need a sustained high-level approach to our allies. ~
Garnering Public Support: It would be difficult but not impossible to persuade our
public of the wisdom ofan enhanced U.S. role in Burundi along the lines suggested
above. To do so, we might stress that the U.S. contribution is relatively little but
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6
enables others to do a lot. This is U.S. leadership as well as burden-sharing at its
best. Moreover, as a global leader, we are in some way diminished, ifwe do not act
to help avert another genocide when we can do so at acceptable risk and cost. ts1
Action Plan: At Tab 1 is a proposed action plan for implementing Option 2 above.
Long-Term Alternatives
If we are fortunate to avoid a near-term crisis in Burundi, we can takes steps now
to enhance our readiness and flexibility to respond to future crises in Burundi or
elsewhere in Mrica with minimal U.S. involvement. DOD is refining a concept
called the African Crisis Response Force (ACRF) ·· (Summary at Tab 2). This
concept calls for the U.S. arid possibly others to identify, recruit, train and equip
capable African troops for potential peacekeeping and humanitarian contingencies
in Mrica. If implemented, this proposal would enhance the quality of Mrican
troops available for peace operations and may eventually obviate the need for
western "lead" country involvement. Over the long term, we might also be able to
train and equip less capable African troops (i.e. Tanzania and Uganda) so they
could augment a force led by more experienced African forces. ts1
Implementation would require sustained diplomatic efforts and resources ·· such as
FMF and/~:~r voluntary peacekeeping funds. If this is deemed an initiative worth
pursuing, we might launch the recruitment effort and incorporate the proposal into·
the Administration's FY 98 budget request. ts1
SECRET
�SECRET
5053
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504
July 26, 1996
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
~;_
THROUGH:
SUSAN E. o••c
~~CE/ERIC SCHWARTZ. .
~
FROM:
SHAWN H.
SUBJECT:
Rwanda Refugee Strategy
M~ICK/RICHARD
RAGAN
an A/S-level interagency meeting last Wednesday1 it was
agreed that the United States should become actively involved in
resolving the Rwanda refugee crisis. The preferred course of
action calls for gaining donor support to phase out assistance to
all Rwandan refugee camps over 180-days, starting with those
camps which pose the greatest immediate regional security threat
. and relocating those who choose not to return. This ftpush-p~ll
option" is conditional. on our allies agreeing to the same
approach and African government agreeing to relocate those who
choose not to return. UNHCR would be the lead agency interacting
with African governments on this matter.
D~ring
It was agreed that each A/S would gain support of their Deputy or
Principal for this course of action and ascertain whether they
thought a DC or PC is necessary. In the meantime, State is
drafting an instruction cable to European and African capitals.
At Tab I is a copy of the paper being circulated for
Deputies/Principals, along with CIA analysis, maps of the region
and OMB memo on funding.
DeClassified Under Ahthorit);.ofthe .
.
.
· Interagen~;y.Securit5•.DeclassificationAppeals Panel,
E.b. tJS26;.section.s.J(b)C3J
·
Attachments
Tab I
Rwanda
Tab A
Tab B
Tab C
Refugee Paper
OMB Memo on Funding
CIA Analysis
Maps
·
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 028
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
Sus~~~~
t-
~ c.J. +e (I' C.. f\'(_ ~
ki-H,
~
"tnJ'
~ ~,-!l,..VOO"i1.... "
')
ltb \--~
SECRET
Classified by: McCormick, Shawn H.
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 1.6,X6
�Declassified Under Authority of tJ:le
. .
Interagency Security·. Declassification Appeals Panel,
E.O. 13526, Section S-3Cb)(j)
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no.
Delassification Date: March 18, 2014
029
Ad Hoc Interagency/Deputies Committee Meeting
on Rwandan Refugee Camps
To decide what steps, if any, the United States should
take to resolve the Rwandan refugee crisis in an effort to
achieve greater stability in the Great Lakes region.
PURPOSE:
Background
Mass Exodus: In July 1994, more than two million Rwandans heeded
the call of the sitting Hutu-dorninated government, which was
responsible for the genocide of more than 500,000 Tutsis and
moderate Hutus, and fled ahead of the victorious Tutsi-dorninated
rebel army into eastern Zaire and northwestern Tanzania. This
was the largest movement of people in the shprtest period ever
recorded and posed an overwhelming humanitarian dilemma. The
United States led Operation Support Hope in an effort to
stabiliz~ the health/food/housing situation.
Today, more than
1.7 million refugees remain in Zaire and Tanzania and enjoy the
highest living standards and the highest birth rate on the
continent, appreciably higher for than those living inside
Rwanda.
Since 1994 the United States has spent approximately $540 million
on its initial operation and subsequent measures to sustain the
camps. During that same period, we have only provided
approximately $110 million to assist with the situation inside
Rwanda. The current cost to the international community to
maintain the camps is approximately $1 million per day, of which
the U.S. provides more than 30-percent.
Current Situation: There are numerous problems with the status
quo. While at least 300,000 of the 1994 refugees have returned
to Rwanda of their own volition, the remainder (one million in
Zaire, 700,000 in Tanzania) live largely under the authority of
the former government, its military forces (the ex-FAR) and
militia (Interaharnwe). Estimates are that as many as 200,000
people in the camps may have been implicated in the genocide and
therefore would likely never return to Rwanda peacefully. Many
of those who might repatriate voluntarily stay because they are
ordered to do so by the leadership of the former government which
has reconstituted itself in the camps. This former leadership
tells the displaced that they will be killed by the new Tutsidorninated government if they return horne. In an unprecedented
move, ten international humanitarian organizations withdrew ·
GECRE'f
Classified by: Shawn McCormick
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 1.6 X6
�OEGRI!;;
2
services in the camps last year due to the aggressive authority
of the former government leaders over the refugees. Only one
American NGO continues to operate in the eastern Zaire camps.
The fear of persecution or death for most potential repatriating
refugees had initially been generally accepted as plausible but
is increasingly specious as time passes. The Rwandan government
does have 75,000 people suspected of genocide in make-shift jails
in deplorable conditions; however, at least 300,000 Hutu
returnees across the country have resumed normal lives without
fear of persecution (one million Tutsi refugees who fled Rwanda
in 1959 have also returned to Rwanda). In fact, the situation
inside Rwanda is largely stable and non-threatening except for
those directly if!lplicated in the genocide. ·The international
community maintains efforts to promote reforms by the new Rwandan
government and has met with considerable success outside of the
judicial sphere. Under pressure from families of survivors, the
GOR finds it extremely difficult to move forward on judicial
reform until some degree of justice is meted out to the
leadership of the former government which is living in camps
sustained by the international community just across its borders.
Security Threat: The refugee camps also pose a significant
security threat not only for the GOR, but for the countries in
which they are located. Most of the 55 camps in Zaire and
Tanzania are within five miles of the border with Rwanda (none is
more 25 miles), with those in Zaire sitting on a strip of land
150-miles long. The ex-FAR and Interahamwe use the camps in
Zaire as bases of operation from which they launch.attacks into
western Rwanda. The camps and their internal political/military
structures appear increasingly to resemble a nascent ethnic
parastate which mobilizes the Rwandan Hutu population through an
ethnic nationalist cree~. Inherently, the interests 6f this Hutu
parastate are hostile to Zaire, Burundi and Rwanda.
Attacks by the ex-FAR into Rwanda have increased recently with
dozens of genocide survivors (who represent potential witnesses
in war crimes proceedings) being massacred on a regular basis
before the fighters cross back to the safety of Zaire. The GOR
has sent military reinforcements to its western border which
heightens tensions, stunts the trickling level of voluntary
repatriation and raises the specter of the GOR launching attacks
across the border to pursue th~ invaders and risking a·wider war
with Zaire. The ex-FAR also attack Rwanda from staging points in
northwestern Burundi. Credible reports indicate collaboration
between the ex-FAR and extremist Burundian Hutu rebels which
could explain the increased effectiveness of forces seeking to
topple the fragile moderate coalition government in Bujumbura.
There are significant fears that with the same ethnic composition
SEGRE~
�~l!lCRE'%'
3
and explosive atmosphere, Burundi could replay events of Rwanda
in 1994 if the situation further degenerate~.
Eastern Zaire - A Tinder Box: The presence of one million
Rw~ndans in eastern Zaire has also resulted in violence and tense
relations with the local population they have displaced. Ethnic
clashes caused by the influx of Rwandan refugees in the Masisi
region of 1 Zaire have caused 250,000 indigenous people to flee, in
some cases, into Rwanda. The refugees have also caused a major
ecological disaster destroying more than 20,000 acres of the now
threatened Virunga National Forest~ As the Zairian government
moves toward national elections next year, the crisis caused by
Rwandan refugees becomes an increasingly important issue.
·
International Efforts· to Date: There have been numerous efforts
since 1994 to ~nd the refugee crisis. UNHCR has promoted cross
border visits by refugee elders to assess the situation in
Rwanda, and trips to the camps by GOR officials attempting to
convince refugees they would be safe upon returning home. In
addition, the UNHCR has operated a daily mass information
campaign since March encouraging voluntary repatriation with
virtually no impact. Former President Carter produced a
videotape shown regularly in the c.amps of himself and various
regional heads of state, including President Bizimungu of Rwanda
and President Mobutu of Zaire, urging voluntary repatriation.
The Government of Zaire attempted refoulement initiatives last
ye~r which were initially effective, but eventually stalled in
the face of international opposition. Leaders of the. former
government in the camps quickly applied pressure to prevent mass
repatriation by the refugees and a sta-lemate resumed.
Since Rwanda/Burundi Special Coordinator Ambassador Richard
Bogosian first broached the concept of selected camp closure
during the June Rwanda Operational Support Group Meeting in
Geneva, our allies have been awaiting a formal proposal from us.
Embassy Geneva is requesting policy-level approval and a strategy
urgently to lead discussions toward developing a common approach
to this issue. It is important that any refugee strategy be
agreed upon by major donors, those international organizations
involved with Rwandan refugees and regional governments.
Key Assumptions.
•
The camps pose a significant and growing threat to regional
peace and security because they have displaced local
populations, serve as a base for ex-FAR and Interahamwe
collaboration with extremist Burundian Hutu rebels and attacks
against Rwanda, and invite cross border retaliatory raids by
the government of Rwanda.
�4
• Many Rwandans {perhaps as many as 200,000) will never return
to Rwanda because of their involvement in genocide, or to a
lesser extent, their fea~s of being-~ccused 6f such
involvement.
•
The remainder are unable to return primarily because extremist
camp leaders do not permit them to do so.
•
The situation in Rwanda can be improved still further with
international help and could enhance the attractiveness of
return to refugees. The GOR has the capacity to cope with
refugees in a ste~dy stream but not all en masse.
•
The cost to the international community of maintaining the
camps is unsustainable over the long term.
• ·Unless the international community takes.direct and prompt
action to deal with the refugee problem, the regional security
situation will steadily worsen.
Issues for Decision
A)
Should the United States try to lead an international effort
to stimulate voluntary repatriation and relocate remaining
displaced persons?
It is important that as many refugees as possible return to their
homes in Rwanda and reintegrate into the society. Those
remaining should be withdrawn from the border and away from bases
operated by the ex-FAR and Interahamwe. This will be
constructive for regional security, decrease prospects of
retaliatory raids by the GOR into Zaire, calm tensions in Masisi
and diminish ties between ·the ex-FAR and extremist Burundi Htitu
rebels.
An internationally coordinated effort to stimulate repatriation
and refugee relocation could include an agreement by all donor
nations and the UNHCR that food, medical and other supplies to
the existing camps near the border would end within a specific
time period. Countries currently hosting the camps would also
have to agree to relocation of a smaller number of camps several
hundred kilometers away from.the Rwandantiorder. Res,tdents of
the camps would be given the choice of repatriating or
relocating. The international community would agree to a
corresponding shift of resources to within Rwanda to assist in
the resettlement of returnees.
�5
Analysis: Maintaining current assistance levels of $1 million
per day to the camps upholds a two-year old approach coordinated
with European and other donors.· It also deflects potential ·
criticisms from human rights groups, refugee advocates and others
who may claim that terminating assistance violates international
agreements on refugee treatment. Moving people risks the
possibility of resistance or conflict from ex-FAR and Interahamwe
elements in the camps who, some analysts believe, would use
civilians as a human shield to occupy western Rwanda if forced to
return. Any new strategy will be dependent on the Rwandan
government's ability to honor their commitments to welcome these
refugees home and the commitment of Great Lakes leaders to
provide security and land to those whowant to be relocated.
Strictly voluntary, not stimulated repatriation remains the
humanitarian/refugee community's preferred durable solution to
the Rwandan refugee situation.
The alternative is to encourage refugees to return to Rwanda or
move them to camps a significant distance from the border.
Noting the control of former government officials, the ex-FAR and
Interahamwe over the population and a standard of living higher
than in Rwanda itself, there is virtually no likelihood that an
end to the status quo will materialize unless provoked.
Continued international support to the refugee camps has diverted
scarce resources from efforts to provide adequate levels of
assistance inside Rwanda where it is most needed and has the
greatest impact. It also raises the moral question of providing
for the care and feeding of possibly 200,000 genocide
perpetrators and other active combatants who have no intention of
returning except through force. Those within the camps, with the
exception of genocide perpetrators and their families, have
little ground to suspect persecution if they return to Rwanda.
Those who did participate in the murder of at least 500,000
people over a three month period in 1994 would in all likelihood
be excluded from all protections contained in the Refugee
Conventions. Our allies and UNHCR Mrs. Ogata share our concerns
and have begun to.question the rationale for continuing
humanitarian assistance under existing terms and conditions.
The leadership of the former government, ex-FAR and Interahamwe
will continue to act with impunity destabilizing the region.
Attacks by these armed elements into Rwanda have steadily
increased and will continue to do so, heightening fears of GOR
retaliatory attacks into Zaire and raising co~cerns of a larger
regional war. Conflicts between camp residents and the local
Zairian population have also risen dramatically and are expected
to increase. Voluntaryrepatriation has proved a failed endeavor
013CRE'f
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6
because it does not address the reality that camp residents have
few incentives and many disincentives to return.
B)
If the United States is to support programs aimed at
stimulating voluntary repatriation and refugee relocation, in
what fashion should these measures occur?
Rwandan refugee camps are located in three principal areas;
Tanzania, and both North and South Kivu in eastern Zaire. To
stimulate voluntary repatriation or camp relocation for .those who
will not return voluntarily, international assistance (food,
medicine~ supplies) could be phased out within specific
timeframes. It is imperative, however, that while this
international assistance is phased out in the·camps, it be
shifted for use within Rwanda by returnees. For those who choose
to return home, the distance to the border in virtually all cases
is less than five miles, permitting them to walk or await
transportation by buses that can be provided by the international
community. The refugees could be notified in advance they can
either return to Rwanda or, if they fear persecution, relocate to
UNHCR-run camps that would be smaller, less attractive and offer
only the minimum internationally accepted levels of service·s
several hundred kilofueters away from the border.
Relocation costs per camp at their current size is estimated at
$1 million, however with some portion of the refugees returning
the to:tal amount would be less than $55 million for relocating
all camps. Relocation, and thus the following options, are
dependent on Zaire and Tanzania agreeing to permit such camps to
be established several hundred kilometers from the Rwandan
border. If other donors agree to this approach, a concerted
effort must be undertaken at senior levels to convince both Zaire
and Tanzania of the need.to undertake this step.
Tanzania appears willing to relocate refugees unwilling to return
several hundred miles away near the Mozambican border. While
Zaire has said it may be willing to consider a similar relocation
scheme, there is the likelihood they may not. In such a case,
the international community must encourage Tanzania to proceed
and consider approaching other states (possibly Uganda, Central
African Republic or Kenya) to accept the establishment of such
camps on their territories. However, each of these examples ·pose
tremendous logistical difficulties noting the very limited
infrastructure in the region. Efforts to close the camps in
Zaire could be slowed while international pressure is applied to
the Zairian government urging officials to adopt a position
similar to that of Tanzania. UNHCR must lead this and all other
efforts to engage Zairian President Mobutu on measures related to
this initiative.
�.----------------------------------------
.GECREJ'f
7
In pursuit of stimulating refugee repatriation and relocation,
additional security measures will be required. Initial reports
·indicate that Tanzania is prepared to use its military forces to
provide needed security to cope with camps on its territory. In
Zaire, however, the Zairian Camp Security Contingent organized
and funded under UNHCR must be augmented to provide added
protection for international relief workers, convoy movements and
to prevent refugees moving from closed camps to ones at least
temporarily remaining open. While details of such augmentation
and its costs should be left to UNHCR, this must not include
either a regional. or international peaCekeeping mission.
Concurrent with any option to stimulate voluntary repatriation
and relocation must be an effort to gain the agreement of the
Rwandan government to a series of measures aimed at building the
confidence of returning refugees and promoting longterm
stability. Among these the GOR parliament must pass its long
awaited judicial reform bill, establish additional mechanisms to
process potentially large numbers of returning refugees and
guarantee basic safeties and freedoms from prosecution f6r
returnees. It is important that the GOR also agree to a
comprehensive plan of action in coordination with the UNHCR and
other organizations to support returning refugees with increased
international aid, reiterate is assurances on land tenure and
cooperate in cross border visits to be arranged by UNHCR.
Another important issue is the risk of violence. Fomented by
former government leaders, the ex-FAR or Interahamwe, any attempt
by the international community to change the status quo could
prompt a violent response directed at UNHCR officials in the
camps, international relief workers, local populations and
others. It is also possible that armed members of the former
government could attempt to use refugees as a human shield to
enter Rwanda en masse. In the face of such possibilities, it is
imperative that the international community maintain its
resoluteness of action once the announc~ment to move forward
occurs.
There are several options for st~ulating voluntary repatriation
or relocation.
(OMB paper on funding options forthcoming)
1. Gain donor agreement to stop all assistance to all camps
simultaneously within 90-days and relocate those individuals who
choose not to return. In coordination with donors, UNHCR would
choose a specific date to end assistance to all existing refugee
camps simultaneously, shifting those supplies to within Rwanda.
This impending action would be conveyed to the refugees along
with information regarding repatriation or the option for those
who fe~r persecution to relocate to new, smaller and more sparse
camps several hundred kilometers away from the Rwandan border.
GECRE'f
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. BEC:RE'f
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8.
The 90-day timeframe to end all assistance to all camps
simultaneously and shift those supplies to within Rwanda would
begin when refugees are first informed of the impending action.
A universal approach ending all assistance to all camps
simultaneously would be the swiftest way to address the immediate
regional security threat posed by the refugee camps. It would
permit the international community swiftly to direct its
resources to within Rwanda to entice returnees back and limit the
ability of the leadership of the former government, the ex-FAR
and Interahamwe to prepare strategies to oppose any alteration to
the status quo. It would also have the most immediate positive
impact on environmental conditions in areas around the camps.
However, such a measure might well prompt the ex-FAR to use large
numbers of returning civilians as a human shield to return and
attempt to occupy large portions of Rwanda. Additionally, such
potentially significant numbers returnees in this·brief timeframe
could severely overwhelm the capacity of the Rwanda government to
absorb them even with substantial international assistance.
2. Gain donor support to phase out assistance to camps gradually
over 180-days, starting with those camps which pose the least
immediate regional security threat, and relocate those
individuals who choose not to return. In coordination with
donors, UNHCR would choose a specific date to phase out all
assistance over 180-days (shifting those supplies to within
Rwanda), starting in the initial 90-days with those refugee camps
that pose the least immediate regional security threat first.
This impending action would be conveyed to the refugees along
with information regarding the reality of repatriation and the
option - - for those who fear persecution - - to relocate to new,
smaller and more sparse camps several hundred kilometers away
from the Rwandan border. Residents in the remaining camps would
be informed at the same. time that after this first phase was
complete, all assistance to their camps would end over a
subsequent 90-day period and they too would have the option of
relocation. The initial 90~day timeframe would begin when
refugees are first informed of the impending action. Action to
end all assistance in the remaining camps would begin immediately
after the first 90-day period expires.
An approach to ending assistance to those camps posing the least
immediate regional security threat (over the first 90-days) could
possibly bring the greatest initial success, thereby building
momentum toward dealing with most contentious camps at a later
stage (second 90-day phase) . It is likely that under this option
those refugees in the least problematic camps who are most likely
to return home would do so without much convincing. A phased
approach of this nature also permits UNHCR the opportunity to
SE!CFl:E'f
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�.SEGRE~
9
learn from mistakes during the first phase which can be applied
in the latter.
While this approach could bring initial success, it could create
the opportunity for the leadership of the former government, exFAR and Interahamwe to implement well organized resistance to
these efforts. These leaders could use refugees in the remaining
camps as virtual hostages to prevent the ending of international
assistance. Another possibility is that these forces could
organize a well coordinated plan to use the refugees as a human
shield to occupy portions of Rwanda. It also fails to address
the pressing problems posed by those camps posing the greatest
immediate regional security threat.
3. Gain donor support to phase out assistance over 180-days,
starting with those camps which pose the greatest immediate
regional security threat, and relocate those individuals who
choose not to return. In coordination with donors, UNHCR would
choose a specif1c date to phase out all assistance over 180-days
(shifting those supplies to within Rwanda) starting in the first
90-days with those refugee camps that pose the greatest immediate
regional security threat. This impending action would be
conveyed to the refugees along with information regarding the
reality of repatriation and the option - - for those who fear
persecution - - to relocate to new, smaller and more sparse camps
several hundred kilometers away from the Rwandan border.
Residents in the remaining camps would be informed at the same
time that after this first phase was complete, all assistance to
their camps would end over a subsequent 90-day period and they
too would have the option 6f relocation. The initial 90-day
timeframe to end all assistance in those camps which pose the
greatest immediate regional security threat would begin when
refugees are first informed of the impending action. Action to
end all assistance in the remaining camps would begin immediately
after the first 90-day period expires.
By first closing the camps that pose the greatest immediate
regional security threat, the resistance of camp leaders might be
minimized because they would have little time to prepare. Those
who remain behind would be more clearly identifiable as members
of the former government, ex-FAR or Interahamwe and could be
taken to camps several hundred kilometers away from the border
with haste. This method would also provide the quickest solution
to the immediate regional security threat posed by the presence
of the camps. Success with these camps in the early stages could
reflect relative ease in repatriating or relocating refugees from
those camps that pose the least immediate regional security.
threat.
SSCRET
�.SEGRfl'!'
10
However, if camp leaders offer stiff resistance, the initial
phase of stimulating voluntary repatriation could be stunted with
unclear consequences for the second portion. As in option two,
this approach might prompt the ex-FAR and Interahamwe to use
large numbers of returning civilians as a human shield to return
and attempt to occupy portions of Rwanda.
::!ElCRE'f
�De(!lassified Under .~uthont).· of the.
. .
Interagency,Security Declassification Appeals Panel,
E.O. 13526, Section 5·3(b)(J)
SECRE'f
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 030
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
Prospective Diplomatic Strategy
A} What diplomatic strategy should we pursue to implement a
policy of stimulating voluntary repatriation and camp relocation?
There are two groups that need to be convinced that this course
of action is the most appropriate: other key donors (OECD
countries, EU, UNHCR, 'NGOs) and states in-the Great Lakes region.
1.
Key Allies
Feedback from the June meeting of the Rwanda Operational Support
Group (ROSG) in Geneva along with follow-up reporting indicates
support for creative ideas to stimulate voluntary repatriation
and camp relocation. It is critical to obta1n the agreement of
these actors to coordinate their contributions to achieve these
objectives.
USG should take the following steps to build donor consensus:
A.
Senior Administration official write a letter to OECD and EU
counterparts to rethink and seek agreement to a plan to stimulate
voluntary repatriation and camp relocation.
B.
Senior Administration official meet with UNHCR Ogata to
explain position and solicit support.
c.
Dispatch Special Coordinator Bogosian to UNHCR headquarters
and OECD and EU capitals to press points in senior· Administration
official letter.
2.
Great Lakes States
Stimulating voluntary repatriation and camp relocation cannot
occur without the cooperation and participation of affected
governments in the region (Rwanda, Tanzania and Zaire) . All have
made commitments in international fora to promote regional
security and refugee return, but have taken little action to
follow through. We should inform these states of the strategic
importance of promoting voluntary repatriation and camp
relocation. The message must be clear, future contributions to
UNHCR, IOs and NGOs will be linked to actions by effected
governments toward the achievement of voluntary repatriation and
camp relocation. Despite such a strong message, the African
governments, Rwanda in particular, must be assured the U.S. and
our partners will shift resources from the camps to provide the
necessary support for an increased population.
Of3CRI3'!'
Classified by Shawn McCormick
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 1.6 X6
�2
Steps USG might take include:
A.
Senior Administration official write a letter to African
counterparts to seek agreement on plan to stimulate voluntary
repatriation and. camp relocation.
B.
Dispatch Special Coordinator Bogosian to African capitals to
press points in Christopher letter.
B)
If the United States is to support programs aimed at
st.imulating voluntary repatriation and refugee relocation, what
measures should be taken to provide for adequate security?
UNHCR is currently funding a special contingent of 1,500 Zairian
soldiers (Zairian Camp Security Contingent) to provide basic
levels of security in several of the refugee camps. While the
troops have curtailed crime, they have been unsuccessful in
eliminating the influence of the extremists. UNHCR, however,
considers them indispensable·. If an effort were undertaken to
stimulate voluntary repatriation and refugee relocation, some
degree of additional security presence might be required to
assist in Zaire. No security mechanisms should be required to
assist with refugees returning from Tanzania.
1.
In a demarche to allies, request they provide funds to
support an additional contingent of Zairian forces to augment the
cur~ent size of the zcsc~
2.
In a demarche to Mobutu, request that he detail those
additional forces needed to the command of UNHCR to conduct
required duties.
C)
If the United States is to support programs aimed at
stimulating voluntary repatriation and refugee relocation, what
measures should be taken to lay the proper psychological
groundwork among the refugees to ensure these efforts are
successful?
To be successful, there must be a well coordinated public
relations campaign from international media, states in the region
and UNHCR.
1.
Daily messages, statements and interviews by various
officials from the United States, European countries and UNHCR
must be broadcast via international radio to instill in the minds
of the refugees that this effort at repatriation and refugee .
relocation will shortly begin and there is no alternative.
�3
2.
The Rwandan, Zairian and Tanzanian governments should make
regular statements on the impending initiatives before they are
undertaken and additional daily comments when they are underway
to local and international radio.
3. UNHCR should begin rotating its expatriate directors from the
camps and replace them with new staff whose mandate is to
stimulate repatriation and refugee relocation. UNHCR should also
initiate cross boarder visits with or without ministerial
activity. The buses and logistics support required should also
be staged and ready to provide transportation to those unable to
walk the short distance back into Rwanda.
�------------------------·----
("'' f"'""/
SECRET
(,. k- ···'
,-c,
·., .. ,
\~ ~ \ l....
t .
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-------------- -----,
Declassified .Under Authont:V ofthe.
Interagency Security ·Deda.;sific~ti~n Appeals-Panel,
J=..O.-t3S2~;;section·s.3(b)(j).
.
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-
..
..
'
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.
,.
:·"
~
'::'
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 031
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
Ad Hoc Interagency Meeting on Eastern Zaire
Issues Paper
November 2. 1996
Purpose
•
To decide what strategy for repatriation of Rwandan refugees the U.S. should
urge UNHCR to pursue. (81
•
To consider additional steps the USG might take to prepare to assist
international aid agencies to respond to a potential wider humanitarian disaster
in Eastern Zaire. (81
•
To decide what further diplomatic steps the USG might take to achieve an
immediate ceasefire and spur resolution of the crisis on the Zaire-Rwanda
border. (81
.
·
•
To decide whether to give consideration to a series of additional
over the longer
(81
Recent Developments/Potential Scenarios (See Tab C)
POLICY GOALS
U.S. policy objectives in Central Africa remain regional stability, prevention of a
wider humanitarian crisis, finding a negotiated solution to the conflict in Burundi,
and the repatriation of Rwandan refugees whose presence on the border is a
proximate cause of the current instability. 6S1
To achieve these goals, over the past several months we have engaged in aggressive
regional diplomacy, supported humanitarian aid efforts and pressed a strategy to
encourage refugee repatriation. In the current context, however, further and
perhaps more radical steps rriay be necessary to secure an end to the fighting,
return refugees and respond to a wider humanitarian crisis. (81
ISSUES FOR DECISION
1)
Refugee Repatriation Strategy?
UNHCR agrees with U.S. officials that refugees should not return to reconstituted
camps on the Rwandan border. Re-establishment of these camps would merely
replicate the circumstances that sparked the latest round of violence -- at great ·
expense to the international communi~y. UNHCR also realizes that Zaire will
oppose the establisliment of new camps further inside the country. (81
SECRET
~-
.... ''
~:.
·: .
�SECRET
2 ·
Moreover, new camps further west.in Zaire would be difficult, if not impossible, to
provide with adequate food and water. Neither the dispersal ofthe refugees
further west into Zaire nor the re-establishment of the refugee camps on the
Rwandan border is desirable. Hence, UNHCR recognizes that repatriation is the
only way to avert a larger humanitarian disaster and reduce instability in the
region. ~
To work through these issues with UNHCR and try to arrive at a viable, aggressive
repatriation plan, it may be necessary to send a policy team to UNHCR Geneva and
·to consult in key European capitals. The U.S. team should be armed with an
agreed U.S. strategy to promote repatriation in the current unsettled environment.
That strategy might draw upon all or some of the "imll" and "push" elements
outlined below: ~
SECRET
( .,..
.......
.:~
I .
. \
�SECR"B'f
3
PULL ELEMENTS
•
Aggressive public information campaign in Mugunga camp to
encourage repatriation. Leaflet drops, air-borne loud-speaker messages,
statements by the GOR and UNHCR, radio broadcasts, in-person testimonials
by safely returned refugees and other means could be used to try to convince
refugees it is safe to return to Rwanda, the old camps on the border will not reopen, and no relief supplies can be provided to those refugees that move west
into Zaire. ~
•
Establishment by UNHCR of humanitarian corridors inside Zaire and
Rwanda to protect returnees. ZCSC and RPF forces would have to form this
corridor from Goma to Gisenyi. To give refugees further confidence, there must
be a substantial complement of international observers-- civilian or military,·
official or non-official. UNHCR has maintained that only international
peacekeepers can perform this role adequately. However, such a force cannot be
constituted quickly, if at all. The only practical, immediate alternative might be
to ask all foreign embassies and NGOs in the region to' dispatch all potentially
available personnel to observe repatriation through the corridors. The U.S.
might activate former Peace Corps volunteers with local language capability.
The OAU should also be asked to provide observers (military or civilian) and the
UN might supply UN volunteers or other officials on TDY basis. Ethiopia
(which served admirably in Rwanda, has a capable military and indicated a
· potential Willingness to respond to another Great Lakes crisis) might be asked to
provide a battalion or two to assist the ZCSC with security.*
•
Significantly increase UNHCR and other international resources and
personnel inside Rwanda: establishment of reception centers, resettlement
packages, positioning of food, water, medicines and other supplies inside ·
Rwanda, augmentation of human rights monitors group with other international
observers, safe transit to home communes. ts+-
•
Urge the Rwandan Government to take further steps to encourage
refugee return. Such steps should include public announcements that the
GOR will: start genocide trials immediately and issue a timetable for trials;
ensure returning refugees are processed fairly and swiftly with international
supervision and their cases monitored over the long-term at the communal level;
prosecute in military court all military personnel accused of attacking civilians;
establish a mechanism for adjudicating property disputes.~
PUSH ELEMENTS
•
Urge the GOR to press Zairian Tutsi forces to deploy in a fashion that
spurs repatriation. Fear is what motivates the refugees; .The refugees are
almost certain not to return to Rwanda unless fear of staying in Zaire exceeds
fear of return to Rwanda. Zairian Tutsi forces may be the only indigenous force
S:ECR"E'f.
�------····--
SECRET
~~~~~~~~~~-------------
4
capable of spurring refugee movement back to Rwanda in the near term. The
refugees have fled the Zairian Tutsi forces in fear in recent days and may move
again in the opposite direction, if prompted. While, thus far, reports indicate the
Zairian Tutsi forces have demonstrated discipline, tactical capability and have
treated refugees with civility, their ability and will to spur repatriation without
significant bloodshed operation is uncertain. Lives could be lost, particularly if
Zairian Army andlor ex-FAR forces to resist this operation. If the mission is
fails and is perceived as a U.S. idea, the political fall-out could be significant.
However, the alternative to spurred refugee return ~- the death of thousands of
displaced in the interior of Zaire-- is an even worse scenario. t81
•
Urge the Zairian Government to use its forces to spur repatriation.
Rather than using Tutsi rebels to spur repatriation, some consideration has
been given to suggesting that Zairian forces do so. This approach would enable
Zairian forces to preserve control over significant portions of its own territory
and may be less politically problematic. However, given their incompetence,
corruption and indiscipline, FAZ forces-- even elite forces, paid by the
international community and deployed from Kinshasa to the region-- probably
could not conduct this operation effectively in the near term, if at all. To date,
F AZ forces have abandoned virtually all contested areas and resorted to looting
rather than face the small, but well armed, trained and equipped Tutsi
opposition. ts1
Alternatively, Ethiopia might be asked to assist the F AZ in this operation.
While Ethiopia is unlikely to accept and Zaire may resist inviting in Ethiopian
forces, this option may be both viable and more desirable than using F AZ alone
or the Zairian Tutsi forces.
•
Employ sophisticated PsyOps campaign to convince refugees at
Mugunga that Zairian Tutsi forces are approaching from the West.
UNHCR would have to lead the campaign, possibly with U.S. assistance. The
threat alone of approaching Tutsi forces may be sufficient to cause mass
movement east back in the direction of Rwanda. Many refugees left their camps
in the last few weeks out of fear rather than under actual attack. ~
2) USG preparations for wider humanitarian disaster
DOD has already issued a general planning order in anticipation of a worst case
contingency and potential international organization requests. These requests
might involve assistance with water delivery/supply, building pit latrines and
sanitary systems, opening airheads to relief supplies, airlifting supplies, evacuating
humanitar~an workers.~.
In order for the U.S. to be prepared to respond swiftiy and effectively to potential
requests to provide uniqu~ capabilities or other critical services, we could take any
or all of the following steps: ts1
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�SECRET
5
•
Dispatch technical team (humanitarian experts plus military planners and
logisticians) to Geneva for intensive consultations with UNHCR to identify
likely gaps and facilitate USG planning.
•
Send CDC water expert to region; pre-position water bladders and
other critical equipment in the region ..
•
Issue warning order/deploy evacuation team to Entebbe.
•
Establish 24-hour interagency Task Force at State to track U.S. citizens,
monitor developments, liaise with NGO community, coordinate U.S. relief
efforts.
•
Dispatch an experienced U.S. humanitarian coordinator with strong
diplomatic skills to work with a representative from a leading U.S. NGO,
UNHCR and the GORin Kigali to help coordinate the international response to
the impending humanitarian crisis.
·
•
Urge Embassy Kinshasa to allow the DART team in Kigali access to
Eastern Zaire through Rwanda. AID has just decided that it needs to
dispatch the DART team to Eastern Zaire. AID seeks clearance from Embassy
Kinshasa to send this team over as needed and as security conditions permit.
Once clearance is granted in principle, the DART team would notify Embassy
Kinshasa prior to crossing the border from Rwanda to Zaire. ·
It is important to note that even in the best of circumstances -- large-scale refugee
repatriation-- a substantial international humanitarian relief operation will be
necessary. t£1
3) Diplomacy
· The most urgent diplomatic objective is to achieve a ceasefire in eastern Zaire,
which would facilitate the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies and diminish the
potential for a wider conflict. This is the top priority of UN Special Representative
Raymond Chretien, who will depart the U.S. Wednesday for consultations with
Mobutu in Switzerland and then proceed to the region. The U.S. is lending full
support to Chretien, including intelligence-sharing and expert briefings in
Washington. In addition, the U.S. could consider offering to second a senior
diplomat and a representative from EUCOM to his staff to assist in any way he
might find helpful. t£1
Equally urgent is the need for the top political and military leaders of Rwanda and
Zaire to agree on concrete steps aimed at defusing the crisis. These steps should
include: t£1
-- immediate ceasefire.
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(''" ·.
�SECRET
6
-· withdrawal of all foreign forces from Zafre and Rwanda.
·· affirmation by the GOZ that all Banyamalenge and other Zairian Tutsis
are Zairian citizens, need not leave the country and will not be
persecuted or harassed by GOZ officials.
--public commitment by Rwanda (as well as by Uganda) not to provide
further direct or indirect support to any elements in Eastern Zaire.
-- reciprocal commitment by Zaire not to provide support or sanctuary to ExFAR and Rwandan Hutu militias in Zaire.
-·joint GOZ-GOR border monitoring mechanism with UN assistance.
-· refugee repatriation/camp closure plan.
Thus far, Zairian Prime Minister Kengo has refused such a meeting until all
foreign forces are out of Zaire. VP Kagame ofRwanda has conditioned Rwandan
participation on guarantees by Zaire that the Banyamalenge will be accorded the
full rights and protections of Zairian citizens and that remaining camps will be
moved away from the border. (8j
NEXT STEPS
a) Nrurobi Summit
Kenyan President Moi has invited regional leaders to attend a summit in Nairobi
on Tuesday, November 5 to discuss the situation in central Mrica. OAU Secretary
General Salim Salim and most key regional leaders (except Kengo) plan to attend.
This summit affords a potentially important opportunity for regional leaders to
discuss the regional crisis and for Zaire and Rwanda to reach agreement on the
steps above. To facilitate a successful outcome at Nairobi, the USG could: tSj
-- Join with European countries to take all possible steps to push key regional
leaders to attend the Nairobi Summit, especially Kengo plus his top military aides
and Kagame. (This should include demarches, phone calls by senior U.S. officials -e.g. Moose, Tenet -- to appropriate leaders, as necessary.)
-- Dispatch senior U.S. official to Nairobi to work on the margins of the summit to
gain agreement to the steps above.
b) Threat to Zairian Tutsis
In addition, to try to prevent reprisals or possible genocide against Zairian Tutsis,
the U.S. could use its influence to:~
-- persuade Zairian officials and military leaders to take all necessary action to
prevent incendiary rhetoric and protect ethnic Tutsis.
SECRET
r: :..
.,: ,_,: ::.
�.I
SECRET
:7 ·
·· stress publicly and privately we will rwt tolerate ethnic cleansing of Tutsis, hold
the GOZ and its officials personally accountable, and sanction those guilty of such
action.
·· urge European partners to reinforce this message.
c) Rwandan Government
The GOR could be pressed to allow humanitarian relief supplies to cross Rwanda
into Zaire and to avoid attacks at or near Mugunga refugee camp, which would
cause a humanitarian catastrophe. ~
4) Additional Issues
There are five additional actions the USG might take aimed at promoting regional
stability over the longer term and improving olir intelligence collection capabilities.
Each of these possible steps have significant policy and resource implications and
require substantial further study before decisions can be taken. To facilitate ·
further study of these issues, appropriate action agencies are suggested below. ~
A) Provide financial incentives to separate intimidators. The International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) released a list of more than 400 individuals
who were suspected leaders in the 1994 genocide. To date, fewer thail 50 have been
apprehended around the world. Most are suspected to reside among the refugee
populations in Eastern Zaire and Tanzania. The governments of Zaire and
Tanzania have been unwilling to arrest any of these suspects, even in cases when
the ICTR has issued international arrest warrants. Offering a bounty for the arrest
of each of these individuals could increase the likelihood they are apprehended.
(Action agency: State/DRL) ~ ·
B) Increase USG funding for the ICTR. The international community has provided
limited funding to the Tribunal which has been tasked with bringing to justice the
leaders of the genocide~ No investigations of genocide have been conducted in the
entire eastern portion of the country due to lack of resources and personnel. The
first trial has been delayed repeatedly in part due to insufficient detention facilities
and limited prosecutorial staff. Additional U.S. financial support, technical
assistance and leadership to secure additional funding is necessary, if the ICTR is
to become an effective instrument in the struggle to bring lasting justice to Rwanda.
At the same time, however, there are serious allegations of illismanagement at the
ICTR under investigation by the UN inspector general. (Action agency: State/DRL
andiO) ~
�SECRET
SECRET
8
�Declassified Under :~uthoi:ity of the
lnteragencySecurity'Declassification AppealsPanel,
E.O.:l3526, Section 5;3(b)(;j)
.
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no.
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
Recent Developments/Potential Scenarios
As of Friday, there were more than 100 international aid workers and ex-patriates,
including seven Americans, trapped in Goma awaiting evacuation. Rwandan forces
(RPF) took control of the main UNHCR headquarters, according to some sources "in
the nick of time" as ex-FAR and interhamwe we approaching. All ex-pats were
reported sBfe, and the RPF reportedly plans to escort them safely to Rwanda. ~
Attacks by Banyamulenge and other forces threatened with expulsion or genocide
in eastern Zaire have resulted in relatively few casualties but displaced more than
500,000 refugees and Zairois. Resistance from Zairian government forces and
armed elements of the former Rwandan government has been minimal as the rebel
troops, supported directly and indirectly by Rwanda and possibly by Uganda and
Burundi, have captured Uvira, Bukavu and most areas north or.Goma. Refugees
are fleeing mainly West and South into surrounding areas where there is no
international assistance or infrastructure to support them as well as to already
crowded refugee camps. ~
·
As many as 700,000 refugees may soon converge at Mugunga refugee camp west of
Goma. Mugunga previously held only 200,000 and cann()t possibly accommodate
the more than 500,000 already there. Sanitation is a major problem. Lack of water
is another potential problem that could result in cholera. · Relief workers in the
Goma area are hoping to be evacuated as soon as possible. Humanitarian re-supply
efforts have been halted due to fighting around key airports and closure of
remaining roads. As a result, food supplies will run out in the Goma area late next
week due, although sufficient food stocks are available in the region.~
·The whereabouts of several hundred thousand refugees that fled camps in South
Kivu (Uvira and Bukavu) are unknown. Many of these refugees (Barundi
outnumber Rwandans 2:1) have fled into the bush or are believed to be moving
south towards Fizi, Zaire, an inaccessible town 75 miles south of Bujumbura.~
Refugee agencies agree conditions in Rwanda are suitable for repatriation.
However, only approximately 700 Rwandan refugees have recently crossed into
Rwanda along with 3,000-4,000 new Zairian refugees; several thousand Burundian
Hutus have returned to Burundi. The movement westward of Rwandan refugees
will result not only in .a certain humanitarian crisis, since aid agencies will be
unable to support them, but also risks further destabilizing Eastern Zaire where
the local populations have previously attacked persons of Rwandan origin. ~
There is also a significant risk that the demonstration effect of turmoil in Eastern
Zaire, the ineffectual response of Zairian forces (F AZ) and Mobutu's incapacitation
will encourage separatist and violent elements in other unstable parts of Zaire, .
including potentially Kasai, Katanga and even Kinshasa. The fragmentation
of
032
�2
Zaire, which borders nine other countries, would be catastrophic and destabilize
much of the rest of Africa, including Angola and southern Africa. ~
Graver still is the possibility that the current instability will lead to a wider
regional war. Several NGOs reported to U.S. officials yesterday that Zairian
authorities have drawn up mass lists of Tutsis resident in Zaire. This action was a
precursor to the genocide in Rwanda. On October 31, the Zairian Transitional
Parliament voted overwhelmingly to recommend that Zaire sever diplomatic
relations with Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda and that Zairian Tutsis be removed
from all government and quasi-government positions. On November 1, the
Rwandan ambassador in Kinshasa was reportedly abducted. The act or even the
threat of genocide against Tutsis in Zaire could spark a war pitting Rwanda,
·Burundi and Uganda against Zaire (supported by arms supplied by France and
Libya). Sudan, already effectively at war with Uganda and funneling arms to
Zaire, is likely to work in concert with Zaire. In this case, Ethiopia and Eritrea
(already sympathetic to Rwanda and Burundi and allied with Uganda) may join the
war against Sudan. Other regional actors hostile to the Tutsi governments in
Rwanda and Burundi, such as Tanzania and Kenya, might also take sides by
imposing an economic blockade against Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi or even by
taking military action. ~
�SECRE'f
21001
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504
November 1, 1996
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
RIC~
THROUGH:
SUSAN E.
FROM:
SHAWN
SUBJECT:
Briefing Memo for Ad Hoc Interagency on Eastern
Zaire, Saturday, November 2, 1996, 9:30 a.m.
McCORMIC~
READING TIME
Since most people will only receive the meeting package Saturday
morning, you may want to provide ten minutes at the start of the
meeting for people to read the Issues Paper at Tab B.
SITREP
Ask CIA to provide· assessment of the military/humanitarian
situation in eastern Zaire, likely humanitarian requirements,
status of Americans and other ex-patriots in Goma and Bukavu, and
future prospects.
ISSUES FOR DECISION
1.
Approval of Push-Pull Strategy
UNHCR now accepts that closed camps should not be reconstituted
and a policy of ~ggressive repatriation must begin.
Zaire
refuses to allow new camps to be established further inland and
conditions in Rwanda do permit the refugees to return home.
Only
repatriation can avert a larger humanitarian disaster and promote
long-term stability.
Ogata is focusing on "pull" factors such as prepositioning food
and supplies in· Rwanda, utilizing testimonials,· leaflet airdrops
and other mea~ures to convince refugees to repatriate.
We have
tried. much of this for the last two years with virtually no
success.
Under her concept, the refugees would .transit a
humanitarian corridor manned by Zairian troops or 5,000
international troops that do not and will not exist.
What is
missing is an effective pull strategy, possibly including the use
SECRE'f
Classified by: McCormick, Shawn
Reason:
1.5 (d)
Declassify On:
1.6, X6
�SECRET
2
of armed elements, to encourage repatriation through this
humanitarian corridor.
NSC staff unanimously support the "pullu elements, including an
aggressive public information campaign in Mugunga camp to
encourage repatriation, establishment by UNHCR of humanitarian
corridors insiqe Zaire and Rwanda to protect refugees,
significantly increasing UNHCR and other international resources
and personnel inside Rwanda, and urging Rwanda to take its own
steps to encourage repatriation.
On the "pushu side, all concerned NSC staff agree on a psyops
campaign, but we are split whether to use Zairian government
troops, Zairian Tutsi forces or outside.troops, perhaps from
Ethiopia.
Soderberg, Schwartz and McCormick favor, in the first
instance, using Zairian forces to lead a "pushu strategy.
Rice
favors using Zairian Tutsi forces, or as a fallback position also
supported by Soderberg and McCormick outside forces, possibly
from Ethiopia to effect the "push.u Rice feels strongly that to
use undisciplined and corrupt Zairian troops would certainly
result in people being killed.
Schwartz is also concerned that, while we do not want to reestablish camps at the border, we will need an assistance
strategy for Zaire - even if repatriation works.
This is because
repatriation is not likely to occur as quickly as we would like.
We face the specter of tens of thousands of women and childien
suffering badly as they await fruition of our "strategy."
Schwartz would avoid public statements of our bottom line until
after we have consulted with UNHCR.
Doing so would risk us
assuming responsibilities (and blames for failures) that should
be those of the international community..
Finally, Schwartz urges
dispatch of a team to Geneva this weekend and elements onward to.
Kigali.
Goal:
Gain approval of the psyops campaign and "pull" elements
as central tenets of a·U.S. strategy to promote repatriation.
Discuss "pushu options of using Zairian government forces,
Zairian Tutsis, or an outside force, possibly Ethiopia in a
"push" strategy.
Gait:l approval to dispatch Eric Schwartz and
State official to Geneva this evening to work with UNHCR in
Geneva and key European capitals beginning Monday to arrive at an
aggressive repatriation plan.
2.
Take Steps-to Prepare for Humanitarian Crisis
With only 500,000 or so· refugees in camps, more than 500,000
others are in transit to unknown destinations. Both groups will
be in need of significarit humanitarian assistance within a m~tter
of days.
Food and water needs are acute, and sanitation could
SECRET
�SECRET
3
become an even more pressing problem as large numbers of refugees
congregate at Mugunga camp west of Goma.
International relief
agencies can provide some of the needs, but the U.S. and others
will likely be called upon to fill the gaps.
Our problem is that
neither we nor UNHCR know what those gaps are and no effective
planning is taking place.
Goal:
Gain agreement to dispatch a technical team this weekend
(humanitarian experts, military planner/logistician) to Geneva to
assess likely gaps in humanitarian crisis planning.
Gain
agreement to send a CDC water expert to the region, issue a
warning order/consider deploying evacuation team to Entebbe,
establish 24-hour interagency Task Force at State, dispatch an
experienced US humanitarian coordinator to Kigali .to work with
UNHCR, and press State to allow the DART team now in Rwanda
access to Eastern Zaire.
3.
Approve Diplomatic Strategy
Regional leaders will hold their first summit since the latest
crisis in Eastern Zaire next Tuesday in Nairobi.
This is an
important opportunity to press leaders toward a cease-fire and
other necessary agreements. However, it is unclear if Zairian
Prime Minister Kengo, his Defense Minister along with Rwanda
VP/Defense Minister Kagame will attend.
It is important the U;S.
push for all of them to attend and to send a high-level official
(Moose) to help broker an agreement. State opposes this and
wants to send its Central Africa division directdr (too l6w
level) .
Efforts by Zairians to deny Zairian Tutsis their citizens, rights
and property is an important reason for the current instability
in Eastern Zaire. Affirmation of their rights and assurances df
no persecution is critical if the conflict and Rwandan support to
the Tutsis is to cease.
Adequate supplies of international humanitarian assistance are in
the region, but it cannot be transshipped due to fighting which
has closed road access from Uganda and the airports in Goma and
Bukavu.
The only available route is overland via Rwanda, but the
Kigali government is not allowing supplies to pass.
Goal:
Gain agreement to work with European allied to encourage
Zairian Prime Minister Kengo, his Defense Minister and Rwandan
Vice President/Defense Minister Kagame to attend regional summit
in Nairobi on November 5. Gain agreement to dispatch A/S Moose
from Paris to work the margins of the summit. Gain agreement to
press Zairian officials to halt incendiary rhetoric against Tutsi
and stress the need to protect them from reprisals across the
SECRET
�SECRET
4
country.
Stress publicly and privately we will not tolerate
ethnic cleansing of Tutsi and will hold the GOZ accountable if it
occurs (we must not consider specific sanctions before engaging
the economic agencies). Lastly, gain agreement to press the
Rwandan government to permit humanitarian relief supplies to
cross its territory into Zaire, and to avoid attacks on the
Mugunga cru:np.
4.
Task Additional Issues
There are a set of additional steps which if implemented might
assist in promoting long-term st~bility in the region and expand
our intelligence base in Eastern Zaire. Various agencies should
be tasked to analyze each of these five proposals,
Goal:
Gain agreement to task out: 1) State/DRL prepare
assessment of how offering bounties for those leaders implicated
in the genocide could lessen their control over refugees and how
such a program could be funded; 2) State/DRL and IO prepare
analysis of how Rwandan War Crimes Tribunal could
additional
resources and where they could come from and· 3
the benefits and risks
ITEM NOT IN INTERAGENCY ISSUES PAPER
We omitted the following additional from the paper for further
study due to its sensitivity. You can decide whether or not to
raise.
Concurrences by: .
Eric Schwartz, Richard Clarke/Rand Beers
(info)
Attachments
Tab A Agenda
Tab B
Issue Paper
Tab C
Recent Developments
SECRET
�··-·······-···---- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . .
SECRE'l'
20410
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCI .L
WASHINGTON, D.C . 20504
May 6, 1998
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES E. STEINBERG
WILSONr~
THROUGH:
JOSEPH C.
FROM:
JOHN P.
SUBJECT:
~tf~~p~~~;~~i~!!e!y~~~!hy:~~;~nt~~ilt~!?l[!'t~t~m
PRENDERGAST7)f
.
.
Th6us-ands: ·of :t'he. -soTdier:s :·.anCl
.
rtt'i1i'.t~ia .
.
.
~
.
.
who. carrie.d'.,.out the -1.994
~=~-~i-~:~~ : ·: f~!i;~_ - -,&: =.:~·8-t:~£i-.•~·-~;d~~8t~:~;,.:~·:~dt·~=,~k~;~!.~;~Z~f~z;~~i:~:--£!.O.n,
Tut:_si-s ·and .inoder:,ate H.utu.;s. · ·t n recent m~nths, " the -g~'i-JocJ.i:i~i'fes
have expanded their atta.cks ··· against Tutsi and selected ·. Hutu
civilians beyond their northwest stronghold. They aim their .
attacks primarily at schools,. hospi.t als, prisons and other
undefended, "softu targets. Well over 1,000 Tutsis and dozens of
Hutu moderates have been killed in the last six months alone.
~Z'~il~;~~~fjt~'~ii:(~~~1~f~1~J~;~~iklJ~f~{~:tf$;lf~~i~t~;~~;ir;rtp~.ove
its inadequate· arid
.
non~t-ra~hspa,r:ent ; ·mi-J:Jtaiyj: ;J.u_~:(~ c.¢.·~ ir!~..~li~n:i~fni:f.
.
.
. . . ... .
.. . . ' . . .
~
Th. se ..· ac.t :~ .V;it~es,~:grea·tl• y llndetrnihe·
e
)
· -:~
~
our·::.e~ffor.bs . ta ·,' pr0mote· . a. m0re
· !~lfl~~~f~~ei~l~!~~~!iilf!;Wl,l1~~~~~~i~ilJi(~~,:,g;:;~~ss··.
ki·-l ..t'ihg : ih .< e :;.;:Great- L.:ikes·.;; To this end, we a-re s.ignificantly
t:h:·
enha~cing , o{;_'~ · dlp·l~~ati~ arid. dev-elopment strategies (see
Discussion . Paper section on . "U.S. Policy," p . _ l) . o'~I?ut1~s•!,will~'{'·
c~~.~-Yref":.~~p. gtn,.~: · _: ~7 •. ~-r~j~~~P~~· ~a·.:.t·<? f9:~r=:P7T~ A¥,f'i' · ~-~<r:~f~j~M:.· :· . ~:
i·:,
.. en·gagemE:m'-li as. an . eiemen:t of·. · a'::,•l:>roader•;,:genocide••preyeh';t;i·on>.~~
•
,
•...·. .
·
·" E!:t~.$;f~;~C~~~~;·.;~;!J;t:~ . ;Q~·~:;~a;~b1%~.;..~~·0 uiJY~~!~~~'· ·
~Iff'
devE?lopmerit ;.of
.
_·a. c~rrtRJ;e'r),e_n~(v e~-;p\ib.r:i_i: :~ffa~.r:9 : ?:ricl:. A~· g_i'sJa~ive
strategy to expfa'ir{·o·u r' poT.fc·y. 'c§_·fict/ i:fc.t:i'ons ;>and ·:·2 l' ~ the'· · . ··
'
iden't ff icat {on, :.6{_ -~pe c·i ,t,ib: ~~o.~tc:~~,-.: dt:." 1~h4i'~g.:' ~r~~q.q{rJ~d,; . .for ; ...
exparid'ed ac·t i.vi t'ies . e~ 'g.~: : · FMF, .··E
:SF, ~ H1E:T~ : · DA -~hd : ··q;r._awct6wn~ .
E
ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION
Declassified,Under:Authontv
of the
Interage~cy Securlty-DeCla;sificati~n Appeals Panel, .
E.O. 13526, Section 5.3(b)(3)
·
SECRE'l'
Classified by.
Jolm Prendergast
Reason: 1.5 (c) (d)
Declassify On: 5/2/08
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013~040 , document no. 034
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
�S£CRET
2
·-:"';
ISSUE ONE: What should be the policy objective and scope of
additional USG mili ~ary aid and training for Rwanda?
~~· .~:r~..~;~ ;~.i·~~~~ri~i£:i~~:fh~r;~~t~J!~~in!tt.£:et.~~W'~~k\~~f~~ff%~;~~1··
sta.ls'ie{'in"st:It\it?L:br{~;· 0·~:.8"');;, tb ,'CJ.,frect'l.Y''contr'ibute 'to the GOR'':S .
effort\ t~:' hli1.~·t~rily <:i~;&e·:r:~: .'·26i#:~i'n·~· (:)'~· ri~''i:i~i~:l''ize tfie'tr .· ''j
geh'oci(Jai:i:es·: ·;~;; A decis-ion' by Dep.uties w.ould- then provide the
par~meters f~i a DOD assessment team to determine the
appropriate mix of activitie~, subject to re~uirements described
below.
!~pt:riEl:t~'~~~~~~f~,~~:t~~~t~~~j~~~~z~,:~~~~~·~~~~~~J~t~~~\~9 s~. ·
the }·e:gi6n'.3!.' Th:~"te·a~ ·c·o~ld .. th~-~-re.co~end what specific
· .,
. military activities we migh~ undertake to most effectively
counter the genocidaires, The parameters should allow for
1 e tha 1 assistance and c;ount e r~ ins1,1r9~n..1= y tF a il}i!'l,g··:, .'Tin~~·§;: :9I?.t,~on
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co0ntE;;'iJng:g,e'J1p,c:'f¢:!'i:ll.,:!.a,c:t.i~v}tyr,i:s. a'
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prof'es~:ional··G.OR'' :q:ourit.~:r~i'hsprgency·ope·ra'tj,(on.
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our direct support for an anti-genocide ca~paign ~auld likely
improve our leverage to increase GOR commitment to political
liberalization and respect for human rights .
-;,;,~
.There, . a't e . hO.weV'er. ~ ::s etic)·u::S ., cohc~tns;<:about ..' abu~e s ·in the.:
:~~.~~:~~:£~i~~~~~:~~;~1~:ft.t~;t~.:~~~~t~~~ c~:~::.i~~5·~:~W~~~~. ·9~1
civilian's .have J)een· forcibly ·disp:laced, :probably .. as a ,r.esul t of <:1
4·'.·
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RPA cou.nt~r-iri~urgenc:y., operation·s, c:L·...Thus,. we would hp.ve': to
condition Option _B a;ss_i~~:ans~. ::pp ~R.~C:ific .!?.·.S.t,~.sl1s. PYJh_e.: GOR,
·s~:h }:~ "·~·~~c~~~;~J:·:~s ,'~.:~;~,~pgJ,;t,Q~,~;~):;:1,.,,¥·9·'~.6p.~~:.rv$~:::hl.Vn?.n.::E:.}. .9hJ,~: 1, .. · . .
ccm.ditions·,; ... a1:,;code,.-:6f;:~tonduct·:.to ·ensure ·that· aid .a:nd t.rp,in:lng
are not. ·.u~:ect'. ~,ga:.f~~t·: ·i.'n~~.~~nt:~.:ci:vi-1 ip.ns.; · increased. pros e.i:;u t.ion
rights/•;Jt0:s~:r-l~:,;:rYd ···a:.~$·yst:effi··
inoni'tO'r ·actions '6£
.i:ro~p~ ..t.hat :ie~~Jrve ;s';·:.. t'ra:;J.hi:n;~_;}; Moreover, w.e would seek to
help the GOR meet these requirements as part of our·Great Lakes
Justice Initiative.
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Gain agreement that the objective of our security
engagement with the Rwandan Government should be to directly
contribute to efforts to deter, contain or neutralize the
genocidaires and that the scope of our potential assistance
should include lethal aid. and training.
S£CRET
�3
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:~;ISSUE ,TJYO: Should we also pursue a regional strategy that might
include m'ili tary aid, training and contingency support to better
prepare the region to counter future .genocidal activity?
Given the limitations of ACRI (which is training for
peacekeeping, not· peace enforcement-in the context of genocide
or mass killing) and lack of desire for direct intervention, we
n~ed t9 ....9.~9: i,.l1 ,.9.-· J?.?99.~.~.9;•.;fdcr.~:.q.~t ~(rri;1:n:~l)9~,·-t:f:.·a·I1i:l:~):9:: .w~.~-~;,· ~.~:.~~~·~'\t·· We
are ptepC[.r.$.Ei :t:O .. w.ork~wi·th re'g'idhal ·s'Utte:s' to.: :·i'nbr:ea~e . :';qll4c,kly ·
their. p~pac~ty,, .t.R·.:.f~.S,p~ri<d, ,·'~~ the event :of ~:e.su~gen t gerioc'ict~<\?,'r
mass . killing. ,,. : D,e,l:>v,t:i,ies;·:.w~j,+i~ .. J:'e. yi. e."Y,,,w_pe,i;:qe.F th.~C:P .~ s, :,,. . ,~,hO,';Ild
·
C~~~ t e _ an . I~G.. tit a~. ~quld, ·.•~h~lyz,e. ,c,9x~t~r:g.enc~.es';ji;fi.<:i:.·,p·pt i.'oi)•s:
regaF:ctA~,g;::R~~,~·~:P~~·.i·~t::H~-·sl>:,.. ?i¥J?pqtt:·::,tor\)SuLidfDg::.re:g"io'~~r. 'c~p~t~·tY
for ~pe'ace' enf0fCemen:t.•. ,i~.After doing the appropriate internal ...
an~iysis, it· is···our ·vie0,·.tnat the· ..USG•should:,erribark di-1 . ·
consul.~a t kirr'·:~:hd'·.~:s:~:~:~~fit.~·fl~~~:, p~.q.ce§·~~~ ,\;;{,th :r.~g.i'6·n·a'l states~ and
dono:!:' counti'ies.aimed Cit determining·how we might .comtribute to
buildfng ·that .capacity. t
1
be
We also believe that we r:, should explore h.ow w.e ~.i;ght·
p:tE:ipared
"
... , '
•'·
, ..
to offer aitl,ift and .. logistical ...~_uppoit· to forces:. u);lcl,e,:r:;ta,K:i:I19'. a
peace~ e'nfoic,e'ment. op'eratioi'l or hu~anitariali intervention, such
a:s the i9~5 oif~r to provide airlift sUpport in a Burundi
interVention. We believe that the only willing volunteet~ to
counter a rapidly unfolding resurgence in genocide or mass
killing would be neighboring states. Therefore, ~e should
c_ons}der: ,h().F'·proyiding,.r,e:J,¢.:lan.t, t£q~flil}g a,~ci _eqtlipmenf. WC?pld
· enhant'e "d{~·ir' ahii i.ty ··t:'b~''ci.i:;i.i'ht~!f ·':sJ2h':.:'a2'tJ.Vitie:~. we need' a
,; reliable ~apict resp~nS~ ~ystem. t~ ~ddreSS WOr~t-case SCenariOS
in one of the most crisis-p~one regions of the world .
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. GOAL:.
Gain agreement to embark on an assessment process with
regional actors about iupporting appropriate regional
intervention capacity, and seek agreement to pledge airlift and
logistical support for an intervention in a strictly defined
crisis .
.iss6E·;}t'HREE: Should the.· ri. s. equip and train the Rwandan anny to
locate and suppres·s hate radio broadcasts?
Given the potential hate radio broadcasts can have in feeding
genocidal activity, it i~s· 9l:ir ,V.i.eR::tha,t. ~.e sl!p)l);d :trai11 ... and
equip th~ RwB;:nda!'l~:·a,'t:¥.if<J9,.A~bd~t~~;~.~:n·~:,'iu'pp~·e:~s: :~_oiJ:Lte> ractA<?',, .: ...
trah's:rititte'rs< We also,~ ,< ~<~' '·• ...·
b"E\l·feve. .::.··:: .,--.• '~:.' DO·D~ shouid .develop on-:':'the- :~
'bh:'i:l't:
.·.·,, ; ' ·:·:,.·,f:·~·. :·.:: :· ,1··;:t·"<·.· ;,;·~·
~-1.'
shelf plaf!.s ,:,fqr a· \.-fOrst-case> coitt,ipg~.DCY·, w)1ich · m~ght ·r.eq1lire use
of .. Y.?t; . _.~s~i(s.;.. 19. . •jaf11:.:;g~l1?<;:AdE!l,,hate~r.ad~p... !Jrq~9c;:a.s~~'s:;i:.~·i?iov~d\ng
equiptn.erit and training·t'6 the. GORwill certainly minimize the
l. •
SECRET
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necessity for ··l1s:irj.g. out ov.,rn .assets· to supptes':S· transmissiof1s. in.
a ci isis si t)-lafipn'.. It. ·"··~:,~·\; -:'~"1
0J:ii. ~ ~'•'-'' :.:f:/t:Oii.l,cie ·those ·>wi'tn·' .t'hEt' greatest
~.·~
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1ricentive -to halt such br.oadcasfs with· the .means of doing· so. · ·
Provisi:on:·,or · t.tai~Inc;J.arid/d~· ~gu'ipfr\~nt,wi11 lqe·aC:comp.aniect·· by
guidelines to define the· kind d't '1's.uppt,essioh~: ·fh,'at: ·i?s;·oi~·.-is
not· app.toprh1te .i ·ba·t·n:·:rn :tEir~s ·'of 'the.
tGre 6.f the ·b~oactcasts
that' will be suppr·~~;ed·.:and .·the ~ethods of s'~ppresshm. . .
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GOAL:
Gain agreement to seek funcjing for the provision of
training and equipment to enable the GOR to locate and suppress
hate radio broadcasts.
Gain agreement that DOD will develop-onthe-shelf contingency plans for jamming broadcasts ourselves.
Concurrences by:
Mary McCarthy, Rithard Ragan, Leonard
Hawley, ·Gina Abracromie-Winstal)Jey
~_
--------~
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20408
·.... ····~·
DISCUSSION PAPER FOR
NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON
COUNTERING GENOCIDE IN THE GREAT LAKES f&t
BACKGROUND
Thousands of
soldiers of the former Rwandan Army (ex-FAR) and their extremist
Irlterahamwe militia allies who carried out the 1994 genocide
continue to sow t~rror in the Great Lakes region. They retain
·their genocidal ideology and aim to exterminate Tutsis and
target moderate Hutus. In recent months, the genocidaires have
intensified their attacks against Tutsi and selected Hutu
civilians and expanded their area of operation. Their
destabilizing activities undermine reconstruction and
reconciliation efforts. Since mid~l997, the genocidaires are
conducting larger, better-coordinated operations aimed at
schools, hospitals and other undefended targets. Over 1,000
Tutsis and dozens of Hutu moderates have been killed in the last
six months alone. Analysts do not believe these forces
represent a direct threat to the Rwandan Government (GOR) .
Despite efforts to mobilize along ethnic lines, the genocidaires
have not been successful in generating mass popular support.
t-&1
The Threat of Resurgent Genocide Persists:
As the force which stopped the
genocide, the GOR held the moral high ground upon taking power
in 1994. But a number of its actions have eroded that position.
Its counter-insurgency campaign has contributed to hundreds of
civilian deaths, and there are continuing reports of collateral
civilian damage. GOR le~ders acknowledge human rights abuses
and say they do not condone reprisal acts and are taking steps
to improve less-than-effective and non-transparent military
justice mechanisms.
t-&1
Rwandan Government Response:
U.S. efforts to support reconstruction and
democratic transitions in Rwanda and the wider Great Lakes
region are threatened by the genocidaires and ~heir cooperation
with other armed insurgents in DROC, Uganda an~ Burundi, as well
as with the regime in Sudan. In order to fulfill the
President's commitment to do everything possible to prevent a
recurrence of genocide or mass killing in the Great Lakes, we
are pursuing several elements of an effective strategy,
including: implementing the Great Lakes Justice Initiative to
help break the cycle of impunity; dispatching two highly
U.S. Policy:
r-----------------------------~
Decla5sified Under Autnorit~· Of the.
SECRET
C1 ass i fie d by ; G1 yn Davies
Reason: 1. 5 (d)
Declassify on: April 17, 2008
6EGR6l
Interagency SecuritY Declassification Appeals Panel,
E.O: 13526, ·section 5·3(b)(J)
ISCAPAppeaiNo.2013-040,documentno.o3s
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
�SE;GR~
2
SECRET
qualified American lawyers to help accelerate and bring due
process to the genocide trials in Rwanda; supporting local
elections in Rwanda scheduled for later this year, which will
expand opportunities for participation for the Hutu majority;
exploring possible avenues for expanding dialogue between the
GOR and untainted elements of the former government and
opposition that might credi91Y represent other constituencies
within Rwanda; discussing with the GOR the establishment of
regional development offices patterned after those in DROC;
working to enhance reconciliation radio programming in Rwanda
and the GOR's efforts to counter hate propaganda; consulting in
the region about'the possible establishment of an international
Coalition Against Genocide; and revitalizing the UN Arms Flow
Commission. This Deputies meeting will address military
elements. of an enhanced strategy.
~
ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION
Deputies will consider whether we are prepared to deepen our
security engagement as one element of a broader genocide
prevention strategy. A separate discussion later will identify
specificfunding sources, if necessary.
~
ISSUE ONE:
What should be tbe policy objective and scope of
additional U.S. military aid and training for Rwanda?
Given the expanded activity of the genocidaires, Deputies are
asked to review whether the objective of our military assistance
should be to expand 6ur current efforts to help professionalize
the Rwandan military and make it a more stable institution, or
to directly contribute to the GOR's efforts to militarily deter,
contain or neutralize the genocidaires. A decision is necessary
to provide the parameters for a DOD assessment team to determine
the appropriate mix of activities. We do not expect that either
option would spark demands from other regional states for
similar aid. On the contrary, more serious engagement would be
positively received by most Eas~ and Central African states.
to-}
OPTION A:
EXPAND EFFORTS TO PROFESSIONALIZE. THE RWANDAN ARMY
This option would expand our current efforts to enable the
Rwandan army to professionalize its senior and junior
operational leadership, strengthen its military justice
institutions and facilitate its transition to a national
military, without introducing lethality into our assistance.
The DOD assessment team would examine how to expand our efforts
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�SECRE.!il
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3
at leader development through command and staff training.
Illustrative activities might include: training of officers and
staff in planning, command and control, management systems and
military justice; supporting an NCO and officer academy;
expanding human rights training in the rules of war; developing
the command and staff of their nascent air force; and providing
further equipment such as uniforms, communication and loadbearing equipment. This could require additional IMET
resources, dispatching U.S. personnel for enhanced training
activiti~s and making additional slots open to Rwandans for the
Command General Staff CoL!.ege in Fort Leavenworth.
r&-1
PROS: This option would strengthen a critical GOR institution
and assist in the long-term goal of facilitating a transition to
a more professional military. Supporting the creation of and
training trainers for a training academy would assist the GOR to
lower costs, integrate disparate efforts and enhance
sustainability of inputs. This option would increase our
leverage to promote reforms of and the rule cif law within the
Rwandan military. The Ministry of Defense recently finished its
own ~ssessment of military justice and we could build on the
w~ndow of opport~nity tb ensure greater internal accountability
and protection of civilians.
r&+
CONS: This option will not in the short run contribute greatly
to the GOR's ability to deter or prevent a resurgence of mass
killings or to defeat the genocidaires because it would not
involve operational and tactical training. It only addresses
long-term improvements in the Rwandan army's. capabilities, not
lethal aid to deal with the immediate threat.
r&-1·
OPTION B: . SUPPORT GOR EFFORTS TO CONTAIN THE GENOCIDAIRES
This option would establish our policy objective to more
directly contribute to Rwanda's military efforts to deter,
contain or neutralize the genocidaires. We would commit to
enhancing the GOR's internal defensive or offensive capabilities
through the provision of lethal and non-lethal training and
equipment. The DOD assessment team would consider a scope of ·
activities that would build on Option A but also include
counterinsurgency training, intelligence sharing and logistical
support to internal defense.
r&-1
PROS: ·This option would help enable the GOR to more effectively
counter the activitie~ of the genocidaires and provide it with
adequate capacity to deter, prevent or neutralize a resurgence
of mass killing. Critical to countering genocidal activity is a
SECRE'I'
SEGR~T
�SECRET
more efficient, targeted and professional GOR counter-insurgency
operation. Demonstrating our direct support for an antigenocide campaign would improve our leverage to increase GOR
commitment to political liberalization and respect fOr human
rights. Specific performance criteria resulting from
consultations with human rights groups would be attached to this
option, such as a code of conduct to ensure that aid and
training are not used against innocent civilians.
rei
CONS: Because of publicized human rights abuses within the
context of its counter-insurgency operation, providing lethal
military aid to the RPA would be highly controversial with human
rights groups and certain Members of Congress. This approach
would require a change in policy to support lethality and would
require a concerted public affairs campaign and consultation
effort in Congress. It also requires additional resources.
Opposition to lethal support for.the Rwandan military might
obstruct our efforts to make non-military policy enhancements.
(-8-t
ISSUE TWO: Should we also consider a regional strategy that
might include military aid, training and contingency support to
better prepare the region to counter future genocidal activity?
The African Cr.isis Response Initiative (ACRI) in its current
form is years away from creating a capacity for Africa to do
peacekeeping operations by itself and does not address some of
the particular requirements of peace enforcement operations.
Regional states by themselves lack the current capacity to
intervene succ~ssfully to stop a genocide or situation of mass
killing. Some regional leaders have spoken about the
possibility of. intervening unilaterally or as a regional
coalition against the genocidaires if the situation markedly
deteriorates. We need to determine if and to what extent we are
prepared to work with these states to increase quickly their
capacity to respond to resurgent genocide. · rei
Deputies are asked to review whether the United States should
task the IWG to analyze contingencies and options regarding
potential U.S. support for building regional capaqity for peace
enforcement. The IWG would address the following questions:
What do we need to do now to support regional capacities to
undertake peace enforcement in strictly defined circumstances?
What should we be prepared to do ourselves (unilaterally and to
support an intervening force) in the event.of an intervention to
counter genocide? What should we do to develop an apprOpriate
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SE:GRE;T
5
multilateral political framework for intervention contingencies?
{-8-t
The range of options could include the following:
•
•
•
•
specialized training and/or equipment through additional
JCETs, IMET, EDA, FMF or emergency drawdown to support
regional logistical and peace enforcement capacities;
modi cation of the Program of Instruction (POI) for some ACRI
training and equipment transfers to address requirements
unique to peace enforcement operations;
modi cation of Frontline States equipment transfers;
contingency planning for providing airlift and(or logistical
support to intervening forces, such as the 1995 offer to
provide airlift support for humanitarian operations in the
event of an internationally sanctioned regional intervention
in Burundi . (-&t
PROS: It' is possible that the only willing volunteers to
counter a rapidly unfolding resurgence in genocide or mass
killing .would be neighboring states. Therefore, providing
relevant training and equipment would enhance their ability to
counter such activities. We don't want to find ourselves in a
position of having to choose to either stand by and do nothing
or intervene unilaterally in the face of another mass killing.
We need a reliable alternative response system. This approach
promotes regional solutions to regional problems. It may
minimize Congressional concerns if presented as a way to both
reduce future military or humanitarian commitments and promote
regional solutions to regional problems.
f-&t
CONS: This option requires support for regional deterrent
action and may be misinterpreted as endorsing regional
intervention more broadly. Regional states deploying ACRItrained units for a non-UN sanctioned operation would engender
resistance from the Hill, UN and elsewhere. Assistance could be
used for military purposes other than those we intend, given
that regional states have been instrumental in revolutions in
Zaire and Sudan. This option would require additional funding
for participating countries. A commitment to provide airlift
~nd logistical support might raise false ~xpectations that the
United States would back a regional intervention that would not
be endorsed by the UNSC. We need to clarify the conditions
under which we would be prepared to support such an
intervention.
(-&t
SECRET
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SEGRE+
6
ISSUE. THREE: Sbou~d the. United States equip and train the
Rwandan army to locate and SUpPress bate radio broadcasts?
The 1994 genocide demonstrated the potential hate radio
broadcasts can have in feeding genocidal activity. Although
most of the hate propaganda currently being disseminated is
written, hate radio has the_potential to reemerge as a tool of
the genocidaires. Deputies are asked to decide what we are
prepared to do to address the possibility of an intense hate
propaganda campaign in a rapidly deteriorating crisis situation.
We are already taking a number of steps to counter hate
propaganda in the Great Lakes through the positive use of
information. But countering a potential upsurge in inflammatory
hate radio broadcasts would require training and equipping the
Rwandan army to locate and suppress mobile radio transmitters.
The GOR currently can monitor and sometimes jam broadcasts, but
lacks the direction-finding capabilities which would be required
to locate and suppress mobile transmitters. Providing this
equipment and training to the GOR could be carried ·out either by
U.-S. military personnel or by contractors. Deputies should also
consider .whether to develop on-the-shelf plans for a worst-case
contingency which might require use of USG assets to.jam
genocidal hate radio broadcasts.
~PROS: Providing equipment and training to the GOR will
forestall future pressure on us to use our own assets to
suppress such transmissions in a crisis situation. It will also
provide those with the greatest incentive to halt such
broadcasts with the means of doing so.
~
CONS: On the other hand, once this equipment and training have
been provided, it may be difficult for us to control how these
capabilities might be used. Human rights groups and some
Members of Congress may criticize any provision of this type of.
equipment to governments which themselves have imperfect human
rights records. To counter such concerns, an agreement that
provides for a monitoring regime on the use of the equipment
should be negotiated as part of the package.
~
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sEsr~E-r
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SECRE'f
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
20546
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504
Summary .of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: May 28, 1998
LOCATION: Cordell Hull Conference Room
TIME:
2;00-3:30 P.M.
SUBJECT:
Summary of Conclusions of NSC Deputies Committee
Meeting on Countering Genocide in the Great Lakes
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
Chair
Jim Steinberg
Chief of Staff
John Podesta
OVP
Leon Fuerth
J~im Babbitt
CIA
Roderick Isler
State
Wendy Sherman
Susan Rice
AID
Richard McCall
JCS
Joseph Ralston
George Casey
Defense
Walter Slocombe
Vincent Kern
NSC
Joseph Wilson
John Prendergast
Richard Ragan
Len Hawley
Mary McCarthy
OMB
Phil DuSault
USUN
David Goldwyn
Summary of Conclusions
It was agreed that:
•
In light of the continuing attacks on civilians by the forces
that perpetrated the Rwandan genocide, and in response to the
President's pledges to do everything possible to prevent a
recurrence of genocide or mass killing in the Great Lakes,
Deputies agreed to deepen our security engagement with the
Government of Rwanda as an element of a broader genocide
prevention strategy.
~
DeClassified Undei•Authority ofth'e
_Interagency Security Declassific~tion Appeals Panel,
E.O. 13526".Sect:lon S;j(b)(3)
.
.
SECRE'f
Reason:
1.5(d)
5/28/08
Declassify on:
SE:GRE;T
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 36
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
�8BCRBT
2
•
A DOD assessment team with State Department participation will
travel to Rwanda and complete within 90 days an assessment of
the appropriate mix of additional military training activities
and equipment aimed at contributing to Rwandan efforts to
deter, contain or minimize the effect of the genocidaires.
The DOD plan will also include specific cost estimates for
proposed activities.
(Action: DOD, State)
(-&1
•
The parameters of the assessment will include lethal and nonlethal aid requirements. However, no commitment will be made
to the GOR concerning lethal aid. State Department members of
the team will seek agreement with the GOR on enhanced human
rights safeguards necessary for the provision of lethal
military assistance should Deputies authorize aid. Deputies
will re-convene at the a~propriate time to decide whether to
provide lethal aid.
(Action: State)
(-&1
•
The issue of whether the United States should equip and train
the Rwandan army to locate and suppress hate radio broadcasts
will be integrated into the assessment team's mandate. If the
assessment team recommends .any lethal activity associated with
countering hate radio, it will also be subject to Deputies
decision.
(-Si
•
DOD will produce within ninety days a plan to give neighboring
countries the military capacity to respond to gen6cidal
activity on a timeline much shorter than ACRI. DOD's plan
will also address airlift and logistical gaps.
(Action: DOD)
(-&1
•
In tandem with the DOD planning process, NSC will convene an
IWG to analyze contingencies and develop options for the
provision of U.S. political support for building regional
capacity to respond quickly to genocide or mass killing.
The·
IWG should also develop a diplomatic strategy to maximize
multilateral buy-in and African regional leadershi~ to avoid a
backlash from Africans and a perception that this might be a
U.S.-led initiative.
(Action:· NSC)
(-&1
•
The DOD plan and the results of the IWG process will be
presented to Deputies for their consideration.
f-€-1
•
Any enhancement of our security relationship with the
Government of Rwanda will require the development of a
comprehensive public affairs and legislative strategy to
explain our policy and actions.
f-€-1
8BCRBT
�SECRET
•
3
Following the DOD assessment and cost estimates, OMB, State,
and DOD will identify appropriate sources of funding required
for any enhancement of our security ~ssistance relationship.
(Action: OMB, State, DOD)
t€-1
SECRET
�Detr Mr. President,
l'hank
you
for Your kir.d letter delivered to Me fn New York
on OCtober ~· by Ambas.ador Mad4tleJne Albright with regard to the
utrildJtion of Rwandan Colonel Bagoeore. I ~tee fully with You that it
Is in the intervst of all of us that this lndivldul, ac;c;.used of genocide,
be judged by the lnternatlonll Crh11inal Tribunal fur R•anda. There he
a-n answer for his allegld crla" sgalnst humanity.
I
au11
pleased to Inform Vou, acoordingly, that all tegal
\
impediments within the Republic or C.•roon to the extradition of Colonel
Bagosora af'ld th,... oth•r• have b.en c1ear.cl away and that I have today
authorl~atlon.
I hope that thete c:ase& c;an be
handled expedftlousfy by the TrlbutNtl In Arusha In order to dtaonatrate
to the world that crimes of that nature •Ill not be to1enated, regardleas
signed the extradition
of whet"& they IIAIJ occur In the world.
I ua looking forward tQ continued cooperation
betwt~~~n
uur two
Governmenu In the New Year. P11111e accept. Mr. PAsldent, the renaw.s
assurances of My highest con151deratlon./-
n. ...._... -
CIJIITOII
Pltlldlll . . ... Unllal
trNSIII_.TOII, D.C.
s....
v
�- CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Mar_ch 7, 1998
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR
DENT
BERGER~~
FROM:
SAMUEL
SYLVIA MATHEW~~~l
STEPHANIE STREET~6·
SUBJECT:
Possible Stop in Rwanda on Your Trip to Africa
Purpose
To .decide whether you will make a tarmac stop in Rwanda.
Background
The Rwandan Government has invited you to stop in Rwanda for a
brief event to. underscore our condemnation of genocide no matter
where it occurs.
Given the centrality of this issue for
Rwandans, President Bizimungu and Vice President Kagame b~lieve
that without an airport stop by you iri Rwanda, it would be
impossible for them to attend the regional meeting in Uganda.
Rwandan participation in the Kampala summit is clearly important
achievinq DUr objectives for the meeting.
But there are
other compelling reasons for stopping· in Rwanda, as well.
Remembering the victims of genocide in the country where the
atrocities occurred sends a powerful message that the United
States and the international community are as concerned with
genocide in Africa as we are 0ith genocide in other parts of the
world-- a message that would resonate.both in Africa and in the
United States.
The stop would also more vividly highlight the
importance of the regional discussions we will be having in
Uganda on ending the cycle of impunity.
Finally, we should be
able to announce ~everal additional alements of support for
Rwanda (like!~ candidates include a contribution to the newly
establi~hed genocide survivors fund, assistahce in the area of
democratization an~ hate radio) ,
~o
We can accommodate this event by making a bri.ef trip to the
Kigali airport in lieu of the roundtable di.scussion with women
emerging from conflict scheduled for the second day in Kampala.
cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason:
l.S(d)
Declassify On:
3/3/08
�2
CmJFI DEH'l' IPx:L
The new schedule - resulting in a long day - would be:
depart
Kampala for Kigali at approximately 8:00a.m.; about one hour
flight time; conduct the airport stop at Kigali; return early
afternoon for the Regional Summit; and depart. Kampala that
evening, arriving at your hotel in Cape Town at approximately
2:00 a.m.
You are down the following day until early afternoon.
The Secret Service believes that concerns about security
associated with a visjt to Rwanda while real can .be managed so
long as the activities in Kigali are limited to the airport, are
small'in scope, and are kept logistically simple.
We are also
working with the Secret Service and our military to heighten
security for the advance team that will prepare the stop.
RECOMMENDATION
That you make a
ta~stop
Approve
in Rwanda.
~----·----
Disapprove
Attachment
Tab A
Letter from President Bizimungu
COHFIDEH'l'IAL
�Declassified Under Authorlty.Of
the
JnteragencySecurity Declassification Appeals Panel,
GONFIDEH'PIAL
E.0.13526,: S.ection 5.3(b)(3)
1567
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 038
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION
.
. ...
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT:
.c
\
i ']
,~ r-.'1_\:·\~s
·.
~1.·
.yI
\
\,AS\ '...-------_.
BERGER .-r~\V\}\~ .
•
FROM:
-~'·'· . ..
//
1
SAMUEL
STEPHANIE STREE'Fr
\
Possible Stop in
· ..:::::.._.. ,
\\w~
/
on Your Trip to Africa
Purpose
To decide whether you will make i tarmac stop in Rwanda .
.\.1
/1.. ~.·
Background
The Governmeht of Rwanda .has ifivited you to make a short tarmac
stop at Kigali International Air~ort ~o that you might make an
historic gesture _..,; condemnation ·of genocide wherever it occurs
"'/..,
-- to Africa and to the wor~d. ~ft:er a week of careful
Ji
deliberations, the Rwandan Gover:\ment has decided that -- absent
·'}'
your visiting Rwanda. itself .,-.- a~,t~nding the Kampala Summit and
"(~·-.£) discussing the genocide there is~poli t
lly and symbolically
L"\~ w_)
_. •
,0
-,
too problematic. The Rwandans f;§~l it is essential that
-:)
5\ American condemnation o.f the· RwaJ{qan genocide be articulated on
0
\/ .::,"<..·J:~/.::.Y Rwandan ~oil. We h~ve indicc:.tiu:{l;~. that othe~ :egion~l leaders
<: ~ · c}--}, share th1s perspect1 v~ and v1:e~v i:h1s as a cr1 t1cal s1gnal of a
~JP -:::·c,
new U.S. policy toward Africa, b;J1,:lding on Madeleine.' s pledge
"< l l
that the United states would star1.a against the resurgence of
i-1'
genocide in Africa.
In addi tion;j:a. Kigali tarmac· stop would
ensure Rwandan Government .Partic)'pation in the Regional Summit.
.J<
i-
~.
..
.x
r::~....,r
tJ
~
r~\.
K.
<.l
There are important moral, symbc
and political reasons for ~J i ,ti.(i.\~ \.
you to consider making this stop., •. It. would allow you to
--~:; ~...z"").'I....'C/
dramatically commemorate ... victims &.f genocide, as you have in
.V\ 1~0 ~_p
•
.
.
. ., ·'·
.
'I
\.·
. Bosnia and Germany. You·could h~~hlight our recent efforts to
p-~~
help break the cycle of impunity :and restore the rule of law to
.<'.~
the region. More importantly, yc\u· could send a powerful message
,S"'·\'-l" ):.~
to the continent -- and the. worl,:~";:-- that genocide in Africa is
\-v
f~r0
no di·fferent than genocide in Eu::-:ppe. You could also strengthen
":) '-it/'
our message about the internatio":,j:l' community's responsibility
1-:;'l
in the 1994 genocide, s
sing 6u:t; commitment to work with
\ty!..
other countries and alone if nece:~·sary to check genocide .and·
address impending mass human rigr~'ts abuses. This mE:;ssage would
:v·
·'
COHFIBEH':FI:P:cL
Reason:· 1. 5 (d)
Declassify On:
3/3/08
..
cc: Vice Piesident
Chief of Staff
�r---------------~----------------------------------
---------------
2
COHFIDEltTL"m
rebound throughout the continent, the world, and back to the
United States, where key constituencies -- particularly AfricanAmerican and human rights activists -- believe that African
lives are not viewed as being as important to Americans or
American policy-makers as those from other continents.
As you have pointed out, a stop in Rwanda would indeed raise the
ghosts of our inaction in April-June 1994. Nevertheless, this
perception might be better addressed by focusing on what we are.
now doing in the region and making the case for lessons learned
from the 1994 experience. This approach received uniformly
positive media coverage during H·adeleine' s visit. Addi tiolially,
relations with Rwanda have progre§~ed far beyond recriminations
over past mistakes.
President Bizimungu made clear in his
personal invitation to you that the people of Rwanda view
continued U.S. engagement, as well as Madeleine's words, as
important indications of America's strong resolve on the issue of
gen~cide.
All signs ~ndicate that ~he Rwandans want to look _ . -\.}\'(N\, __
towards the future wh1le cornrnemorat1ng the past,.
..
c~d~Q. ·'svi. c ··\\D. .-~c. . .~ISSUE FOR DECISION:
\\Jt2 QrV-fO\~ii:._. <V.;..) ~G
Cx'-K'
\l
0
_ __v-,~,.-.
.\v
e-~c·
.
A TARMAC STOP IN RJTANDf\? ',L.~,...,:-\"U
o..ci\Sc.:..,.S'S\c...:;r _/
'\[..,...\ ()-. b,\C.)..*'(-1'-·
SHOULD YOU
~
.VVl.
. ·..+-;--..
./
r---' ')(
.
.
.
~-~-..:..~
T~.e.~t"'-Se-rvi--s-e-sl!l.e..~.JH~L-J3·r00.1-em....._w.J...t-l:l-..a---sn or L. ~--O·r:l-th e
r-
0
0 Q)'
t.a-:nma-e~~. A.'lc;er-..e~..::e>-F--.event involving genocide '-,...)// J
survivors and a short speech are ~11 that would be required. ·
(!)
The Rwandans have indicated a bilat in Rwanda would not be
necessary, The impact of your stop would resonate throughout
the continent and the world, and more than any other stop. on the
~
trip would truly underscore that we are cornrni tted to a new
. \-iL
. l'..,.
partnership with a new Africa.
..--("\,~ vV\ 0
~ ~(.,.._, 0
-J'I .
'\.~ J
•/
To accommodate this stop in your .schedule, we propose- cancelling ·'\.O,{C''·f''E
the roundtable discussion with women em~rging fromjconfl_~_ct,
'\yQ~
prese~Jy. scheduled for the seco~d day 1n Kampa~a. IR;S~~d, . CJ!""- _c . ·0'·
that rrro-:J?-r-rr-~\_ypu would travel to ·Rwanda, approx1mately one hour -\)D iY
fn:ght time, ahd return early that afternoon for the Summit.
~-
-1\' \/\
J
s/
--~-2~EN;~;:~~~'v'-(f
tar~ac
\ ...\..:'<:__
'-N~-J\c~ -§~\".\ \
1\\. \::~v··, ':'{~·'\
. E···v'cs"·('' c,y
That you make a
~
O<" '-\\:) C.."'\ .
stop in Rwanda.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachment
Tab A
Letter from Presiderit Bizimungu
COHFIE3EHTilrL
-
cr--. '-C\(\ V\. '-.r~
C}..
\.
~-~
r
.:~::...'?--! . ,
\.(\ (,) 1 ......_. \. l-." '._ ). (' {) '\ / ~- r--...
\~-"" ' X ,,.--., \ \.)
""'<, . •..•
..,.:'-.,.
, •.
't··~
I
�----------------------------
SENT BY:
3- 2-SS ;lO:lSAM ;
. AF/FQ-t
2023955673;# 3/ 4
•
lat March, 1991
DeclasSified-·u ndelAuth6ntviofth~
I nteragen17y Security. D~cl~ification Appeals Panel,
E.0.13526, Section 5;3(b)(3)
.
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 53
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
Mr. William Jefferson Clh.non.
President ortho Unitod StatCI
The White House
Wnahinaton. D.C
Dear Mr. Prealdent.
I am writing to lhank you for your invitation to attend a regional summit in
Kampala on 24th and 25th. March i 998. I also wish to \Ike this opportunil)' to
welcome you to Afiica and to the region. This willglvo you and Afril:an lcadors an ••
opportunity to work out principle' that would auide the new partnership.
Mr. PresJdenl, J am keenly aware of your strong s~nthnonta aaainsl gunoc;ido
as is evident from our frequent correspondence and mouages from you through some
of your moat notable omclals. Secre\8ry State Madeleine Albright , fonncr
Secretary of Defense William Perry. Anthony Lake, Susan Ri!i:c have all conveyed
your measagoa on 11veral QQCIIiona. It Ia with thia in mind that Jexpressed our strong
wish that you include Rwanda on your forthcomlna tour of Aftlca.
or
'
A ttop.over In Rwanda, however brief. would give you a unique and historical
opponunlty to re-amnn your personal condemnation of genocide on one of the sites
whcro h took pl-" only recently. An opponunity to repeat the call to ..NEVER
AGAIN"; to denounce the heinous crimes: to show solidarity with the survivors. and
to lead the intemallonaJ community In a rododlcation to doter gonocJde.
1'
.
�SENT BY:
3- 2-88
:10:15~~
;
AF/f(}-t
2023355673; # 4/ 4
Unfortunately, yaur vlait to Africa which does not include Rwanda will
be judpd, fairly or unrairly. as diminilhlna the tnaic events that occurred In
our counU')'.Indeed, ~me caun1riu and indlvlduale havo attempted to dismiss
pnoc:ide In Rwanda u inaianit1cant, thus complicating the management of its
aftermath. Thase who deny. or minimize its significonc;e give contforl to ita
pcrpatratc-r~, hence the continuation of acts of genocide In Rwanda and in the
region. To our peopto who suffered and still suffer tho trauma of the genocide,
and who so gallantly fought to atop it, 08NOC1DE hu a moaning.
Besides the fact thal that would be in swrk contnst to your usual position,
both on domestic and intema&io.nal luucs, this Interpretation would be
agravaatod by sny aoing to Kampala lo di~uss. among other things, the
eontinuins acts of senocide. The confusion and embarraument this would Q&UIO
In Rwanda put$ me in a rather diMcult position with regard 10 attending the
meotlns,. in the event that the stop-over doos not occ,•r.
The issue here is not a visit Eo Rwanda, It is the unique and historical
opportunity for the US to rc•affirm Its moral leadership.
Mr. Prcsidenl,l still hope, against all odds. thot you wilJ make the slop-o\lor.
In the even• th•& this Is not so. and boca usc or tho importance we attach
to our relationship and our tupport for your vision ofUS ..Affica partnership, I
propote to meet you in Waahinaton, DC after your African taur. This will
onable me to discuss bilateral isau.es and lo inform you on our ahared etTons to
reconstruct our country and to create an environment Jn. which ·national
reconciliation can bo nunu~d.
Slnceroly,
"
�
Dublin Core
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Title
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<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
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Clinton Presidential Records
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Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
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The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Declassified Documents concerning Rwanda
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Identifier
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2012-0316-M
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on Rwanda from 1995 thru 1998. The records include trip reports, discussion papers, memos, NSC Deputies Committee and Ad Hoc Summaries of Conclusions, and head of state correspondence.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reproduction-Reference
Declassified
Foreign Policy
Rwanda
Susan Rice
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/3aa21bb6d495e912227212d9f45b633f.pdf
756e5858bddc1563d2d550813368f8aa
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Sections 1.4 (b), (c), and (d) of E.O. 13526 or (b)(6) of the
FOIA.
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD003\SEP93\MSGS\M0624435.html
Page 1 of 4
Cable
PREC
CLASS
LINE1
LINE2
LINE3
LINE 4
OSRI
DTG
ORIG
TO
INFO
SUBJ:
TEXT:
IMMEDIATE
COHFIDDNTIAJ.
OAACZYUW RUCNDTA4 690 2672325-CCCC—RUEADWW.
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
0 242325Z SEP 93
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUCNDT
242325Z SEP 93
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9913
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1455
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE 0086
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 094 4
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0092
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 007 6
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0533
RUFHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 0173
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0196
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0474
DRAFT SC RESOLUTION FOR RWANDA PKO
• C O M r i D D H T I A l SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 004690
STATE FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C, AF/RA, AND L/UNA;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR SUSAN RICE;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J5
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREL, MOPS, UN, UNSC, R
W
SUBJECT: DRAFT SC RESOLUTION FOR RWANDA PKO
REF: USUN 4653
1. COMF1DENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: ALTHOUGH SYG'S REPORT ON RWANDA (DESCRIBED
REFTEL) WILL NOT BE PUBLISHED UNTIL SEPTEMBER 25, FRENCH
MISSION HAS CIRCULATED TO THE P-5 SEPTEMBER 24 A DRAFT
TEXT OF A RESOLUTION ESTABLISHING A PKO THERE. SC WILL
HOLD INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS MONDAY AFTERNOON, SEPTEMBER
27. USUN REQUESTS PRELIMINARY GUIDANCE ON DRAFT
RESOLUTION BY OOB TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 28. AMB. WALKER
MET WITH U/SYG ANNAN SEPTEMBER 23 TO URGE THAT I F THE UN
BECOMES INVOLVED IN RWANDA, THEY MUST HAVE A POLITICAL
ROLE TO PLAY, RATHER THAN BEING RELEGATED TO A STRICTLY
MILITARY ENFORCEMENT FUNCTION. END SUMMARY.
3. THE FRENCH CONVENED A P-5 MEETING FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER
24 TO DISTRIBUTE THEIR DRAFT TEXT OF A RESOLUTION ON
RWANDA (SEE BELOW). THEY DESCRIBED THE GENERAL OUTLINES
OF THE ANTICIPATED REPORT (ALONG THE LINES OF REFTEL),
AND ADVISED THAT THE REPORT WOULD COME OUT ON SATURDAY.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
Xow- 050*3- H
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD003\SEP93\MSGS\M0624435.html
(MISSION WILL ATTEMPT TO CONVEY REPORT TO DEPARTMENT AS
SOON AS POSSIBLE). INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS TO DISCUSS
THE REPORT AND FOR THE FRENCH TO CIRCULATE THEIR DRAFT
TO THE OTHER MEMBERS ARE SCHEDULED FOR MONDAY
AFTERNOON. THE DRAFT TEXT WILL THEN BE TAKEN UP BY ALL
ON TUESDAY.
4. UK AMBASSADOR HANNAY NOTED THAT HE NEEDED TO SEE THE
REPORT BEFORE HE COULD RESPOND, AND THEN GAVE SOME
PRELIMINARY REACTIONS: A LARGER ROLE FOR THE OAU, AND
THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO THE UN OPERATION, SHOULD BE
SPELLED OUT IN THE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS. TWO PKO'S (ONE
IN UGANDA AND ONE IN RWANDA) ARE NOT NEEDED. THE
RESOLUTION SHOULD EITHER ROLL THEM INTO ONE, OR SPECIFY
THAT THEY WILL BE TERMINATED SIMULTANEOUSLY. HE
QUESTIONED THE WORDING OF SUB-PARAGRAPHS C, D, F, AND G
DEFINING THE MANDATE.
5. U.S. AMBASSADOR HICKS POINTED OUT THAT WASHINGTON
HAS BUDGET CONSTRAINTS THAT WILL SHAPE OUR POSITION ON
RWANDA. HE FURTHER NOTED THAT I T WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR
THE UN TO BE GIVEN SOME ROLE IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS.
THIS WOULD, FIRST, ALLOW THE UN TO ASSIST THE RWANDAN
PARTIES TO GET BEYOND THEIR DIFFICULTIES I F THEY BECAME
LOGJAMMED ON DETAILS OF GOVERNING. SECOND, I T WOULD
AVOID THE PERCEPTION PROBLEM FACING THE UN IN SOMALIA,
WHERE THE UN HAS BEEN CRITICIZED FOR PLAYING A POLICE
ENFORCER ROLE RATHER THAN A PEACEMAKING ROLE.
APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WOULD ASSURE THE
PROPER LEVEL OF ATTENTION TO THE POLITICAL PROCESS.
FRANCE AGREED THAT A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WOULD BE
ACCEPTABLE, I F THAT WOULD HELP GET A RESOLUTION THROUGH
QUICKLY.
6. CHINA EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR HELPING THE PEOPLE OF
RWANDA IMPLEMENT THE ARUSHA ACCORDS. RUSSIA STRESSED
THE NEED TO SEE THE REPORT BEFORE BEGINNING
DELIBERATIONS.
7. USUN DEPUTY PERMREP AMB WALKER MET LATE SEPTEMBER 23
WITH U/SYG FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATION KOFI ANNAN AND
GENERAL DELAIRE ON RWANDA. THE UN OFFICIALS STRESSED
THAT THIS OPERATION COULD BE A SUCCESS STORY FOR THE UN,
GIVEN THE EAGER ATTITUDE OF BOTH PARTIES TO MAKE PEACE.
WORK. WALKER MADE THE POINT THAT I T WILL BE DIFFICULT
FOR US TO APPROVE SUCH A LARGE OPERATION IN RWANDA, IN
VIEW OF OUR BUDGET CONSTRAINTS. HE URGED THE UN TO
THINK CREATIVELY ABOUT WHERE IT CAN CUT COSTS AND FIND
OFFSETS FOR NEW EXPENDITURES. HE UN
DERSCORED THE
IMPORTANCE OF THINKING OUT A PUBLIC RELATIONS PLAN, IN
ORDER TO PORTRAY THIS OPERATION POSITIVELY. HE VOICED
CONCERN THAT THE UN APPEARED TO BE CUT OUT OF THE PEACE
PROCESS, AND RELEGATED TO A MERELY MILITARY ROLE. ANNAN
• 0 M F I D D"» T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 004690
C
STATE FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C, AF/RA, AND L/UNA;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR SUSAN RICE;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J5
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREL, MOPS, UN, UNSC, R
W
SUBJECT: DRAFT SC RESOLUTION FOR RWANDA PKO
POINTED OUT THAT THE ARUSHA ACCORDS ONLY ASKED THE UN TO
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Page 2 of 4
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD003\SEP93\MSGS\M0624435.html
PERFORM MILITARY FUNCTIONS, AND THAT A SENIOR POLITICAL
ADVISER COULD BE SENT TO RWANDA LATER I F NEEDED. WALKER
ARGUED THAT THE UN NEEDED TO PLAY A ROLE IN THE
POLITICAL PROCESS, POINTING TO SOMALIA TO WARN ABOUT THE
OPTICS OF PLAYING ENFORCER.
8. BEGIN TEXT OF FRENCH DRAFT RESOLUTION:
22 SEPTEMBER 1993-2230
THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTIONS 812 (1993) OF 12 MARCH 1993
AND 846 (1993) OF 22 JUNE 1993,
HAVING CONSIDERED THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
DATED
SEPTEMBER 1993 (S/ ) ,
WELCOMING THE SIGNING OF THE ARUSHA AGREEMENTS ON 4
AUGUST 1993 AND URGING THE PARTIES TO CONTRIBUTE
OBSERVING THEM TO THE FULL,
PAYING TRIBUTE TO THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE ORGANIZATION OF
AFRICAN UNITY AND BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA IN THE CONCLUSION OF THE ARUSHA
AGREEMENTS,
RESOLVED THAT THE UNITED NATIONS SHOULD, AT THE REQUEST
OF THE PARTIES, MAKE ITS FULL CONTRIBUTION TO THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA AGREEMENTS,
1. WELCOMES THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL DATED
SEPTEMBER 1993 (S/ ) ;
2. APPROVES, FOR AN INITIAL PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS, IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION
TO RWANDA (UNAMIR) WHOSE MANDATE WOULD BE TO:
-CONTRIBUTE TO THE SECURITY OF THE TOWN OF KIGALI;
-SUPERVISE THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT, INCLUDING THE
DEFINING OF AN EXTENSIVE DEMILITARIZED ZONE AND
DEMOBILIZATION PROCEDURES;
-GUARANTEE THE OVERALL SECURITY OF THE COUNTRY DURING
THE FINAL STAGE OF THE MANDATE OF THE TRANSNATIONAL
GOVERNMENT UNTIL THE ELECTIONS;
-CONTRIBUTE TO MINE CLEARING, IN PARTICULAR, BY MEANS OF
TRAINING PROGRAMMES;
-CONDUCT, AT THE REQUEST OF THE PARTIES OR ON ITS OWN
INITIATIVE, INQUIRIES INTO INSTANCES OF
NON-IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROTOCOL OF AGREEMENT ON THE
INTEGRATION OF THE ARMED FORCES;
-GUARANTEE THE SECURITY OF THE PROCESS OF REPATRIATION
OF RWANDESE REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS;
-SUPERVISE THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CONSTABULARY AND POLICE;
3. ALSO APPROVES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PROPOSAL THAT
THE CHAIN OF COMMAND AND LOGISTICS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
OBSERVER MISSION UGANDA-RWANDA (UNAMIR) SHOULD BE
CARRIED OUT IN STAGES;
4. FURTHER APPROVES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PROPOSAL
THAT THE DEPLOYMENT AND WITHDRAW OF UNAMIR, WHOSE
MANDATE WILL END, IN PRINCIPLE, IN OCTOBER 1995, SHOULD
BE CARRIED OUT IN STAGES;
5. AUTHORIZES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, IN THIS CONTEXT,
TO DEPLOY A FIRST CONTINGENT OF 800 MEN TO KIGALI, IN
C ^ M r i D E H T I A I r
SECTION 03 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 004690
STATE FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C, AF/RA, AND L/UNA;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR SUSAN RICE;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J5
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Page 3 of 4
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD003\SEP93\MSGS\M0624435.html
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREL, MOPS, UN, UNSC, R
W
SUBJECT: DRAFT SC RESOLUTION FOR RWANDA PKO
THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME, WHICH, WHEN FULLY IN PLACE,
WILL PERMIT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TRANSNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OTHER RELEVANT
PROVISIONS OF THE ARUSHA AGREEMENTS;
6. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO INFORM THE COUNCIL
PRIOR TO FURTHER SCHEDULED DEPLOYMENTS OF UNAMIR;
7. INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONSIDER WAYS OF
REDUCING THE TOTAL MAXIMUM STRENGTH OF UNAMIR WITHOUT
THEREBY AFFECTING THE CAPACITY OF THE FORCE TO CARRY OUT
ITS MANDATE;
8. URGES THE PARTIES TO IMPLEMENT THE ARUSHA AGREEMENTS
IN GOOD FAITH;
9. ALSO INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONCLUDE
FORTHWITH A STATUS OF MISSION AGREEMENT FOR UNAMIR WITH
THE RWANDESE AUTHORITIES;
10. DEMANDS THAT THE PARTIES RESPECT THE SAFETY OF
UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL IN RWANDA;
11. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.
9. END-TEXT OF FRENCH DRAFT RESOLUTION
ALBRIGHT
BT
#4690
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< SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03
< SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03
A
A
SSN: 4690
A
< SSN>4690
OSSN>4690
TOR:
930924194316 M0624435
<' TOR>930924194418 M0624438
< TOR>930924194419 M0624439
>
A
DIST:
SIT: GEORGEL RAGLE RICE VAX
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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Page 1 of 2
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OSRI
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IMMEDIATE
•eONr-IDON'HAL
OAACZYUW RUCNDTA4720 2702313-CCCC--RUEADWW.
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
0 272313Z SEP 93
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUCNDT
272313Z SEP 93
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9973
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1464
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE 0089
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0477
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0947
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0095
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 007 9
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0536
RUFHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 0176
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0199
RWANDA: MOST SC MEMBERS SUPPORT PKO
€ O N F I D E N T I ' A L USUN NEW YORK 004720
STATE FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C, AF/RA, AND L/UNA;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR SUSAN RICE;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J5
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREL, MOPS, UN, UNSC, R
W
SUBJECT: RWANDA: MOST SC MEMBERS SUPPORT PKO
REF: USUN 4653
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THE SC HELD INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON RWANDA
SEPTEMBER 27 IN CONNECTION WITH THE SYG'S REPORT AND THE
FRENCH DRAFT RESOLUTION (REFTEL). FRANCE, PAKISTAN (ON
BEHALF OF THE NON-ALIGNED CAUCUS -- CAPE VERDE, MOROCCO,
VENEZUELA, DJIBOUTI AND PAKISTAN), NEW ZEALAND, JAPAN,
CHINA, AND HUNGARY ALL VOICED SUPPORT FOR THE SYG'S
PROPOSALS TO DEPLOY A PKO TO RWANDA. BRAZIL EXPRESSED
SYMPATHY FOR THE CONCEPT, BUT NEEDED TO STUDY THE
DETAILS, PARTICULARLY THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
CURRENT PKO ON THE UGANDA BORDER AND THE PROPOSED PKO
WITHIN RWANDA. CHINA HOPED THE OAU ROLE WOULD BE
SPELLED OUT MORE COMPLETELY IN THE RESOLUTION. THE UK
QUESTIONED WHETHER THE RESOURCES EXISTED FOR THIS
OPERATION, REGRETTED THAT THE OAU MANDATE WOULD EXPIRE
AT THE END OF OCTOBER, QUESTIONED THE NEED FOR A
SEPARATE OPERATION ON THE UGANDA BORDER, AND ASKED WHY A
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD003\SEP93\MSGS\M0628072.html
SECT
SSN
TOR
DIST
BATTALION (RATHER THAN SOME OBSERVERS) WERE NEEDED FOR
ENCAMPMENT IN THE DMZ.
3. USUN AMBASSADOR WALKER NOTED WE WERE STUDYING THE
REPORT AND DRAFT RESOLUTION AND NEEDED TO SEE THE
FINANCIAL ANNEX TO THE SYG'S REPORT. HE REMARKED
PRELIMINARILY THAT THE LANGUAGE OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION
SEEMED TO GO BEYOND WHAT THE MANDATE SHOULD BE. HE
OBSERVED THAT THE MILITARY OPERATION NEEDED TO BE LINKED
MORE CLOSELY TO PROGRESS ON THE POLITICAL FRONT. HE
PROMISED TO RELAY SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT
RESOLUTION TO THE FRENCH DELEGATION LATER.
4. COMMENT: I T LOOKS AS I F THERE WOULD BE AT LEAST TEN
VOTES IN FAVOR OF A RWANDA PKO, ONE MORE THAN NEEDED TO
PASS IN THE ABSENCE OF A VETO.
ALBRIGHT
BT
#4720
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SECTION: 01 OF 01
4720
930927193158 M0628072
PRT: SIT
SIT: GEORGEL RAGLE RICE SUM2 VAX
< DIST>
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A
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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ORIG
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SUBJ:
TEXT:
IMMEDIATE
C0HP-IDBHTIA4,
OAACZYUW RUCNDTA4766 2722340-CCCC--RUEADWW.
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
0 292340Z SEP 93
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUCNDT
292340Z SEP 93
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0034
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE 0092
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1468
RUFHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 0177
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0538
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0200
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0478
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 094 9
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0080
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0096
SC PRESSURE BUILDING TO APPROVE RWANDA PKO
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 004766
STATE FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C, AF/RA, AND L/UNA;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR SUSAN RICE;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3,
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PGOV, PREL, KDEM, AO, UNSC
SUBJECT: SC PRESSURE BUILDING TO APPROVE RWANDA PKO
REF: USUN 4735 (NOTAL)
1. GOUriDCHTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: AS REPORTED REFTEL, THE FRENCH LED A
DISCUSSION IN SC INFORMALS SEPTEMBER 29 ON THEIR DRAFT
RESOLUTION ON A PKO FOR RWANDA.
THEY WOULD LIKE TO
FINALIZE THE TEXT THURSDAY NIGHT AND VOTE FRIDAY,
OCTOBER 1. SUPPORT IN THE COUNCIL IS STRONG FOR MOVING
QUICKLY. THE UK AND RUSSIANS HAVE RESERVATIONS, BUT ARE
HAPPY TO HIDE BEHIND US THIS TIME. IF A VOTE IS HELD
THIS WEEK WE BELIEVE THE RESOLUTION AS IT STANDS WOULD
RECEIVE AT LEAST 13 YES VOTES. FRENCH FONMIN JUPPE WILL
RAISE RWANDA WITH SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER IN THEIR
MEETING SEPTEMBER 29. USUN REQUESTS GUIDANCE ON
LANGUAGE OF DRAFT RESOLUTION BY OOB THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER
30. END SUMMARY.
3. IN INFORMAL SC CONSULTATIONS SEPTEMBER 2 9, THE
PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (VENEZUELA), FRANCE, CAPE
VERDE, PAKISTAN ON BEHALF OF THE NAM CAUCUS, AND SPAIN
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD003\SEP93\MSGS\M0632815.html
ALL SPOKE IN SUPPORT OF THE FRENCH DRAFT RESOLUTION
ESTABLISHING A NEW PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN RWANDA AND
UNDERLINED THE URGENCY OF VOTING THIS WEEK. SEVERAL
NOTED THE ENCOURAGING PRECEDENT F BEING LOBBIED BY A
JOINT DELEGATION FROM RWANDA WHICH INCLUDED
REPRESENTATIVES OF BOTH PARTIES, WORKING WELL TOGETHER.
CAPE VERDE ACKNOWLEDGED THE DIFFICULTIES SOME
DELEGATIONS, PARTICULARLY THE U.S., HAD WITH THE TIMING,
REMARKING, HOWEVER, THAT THEY WOULD "FIND I T
UNFORTUNATE" I F DELAYS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WERE TO
DISRUPT THE PEACE PROCESS IN RWANDA.
4. USUN DPR AMB WALKER NOTED THAT THE FINANCIAL
ADDENDUM WAS NOT YET AVAILABLE, LEAVING THE COUNCIL WITH
NO IDEA OF WHAT THIS OPERATION MIGHT COST. FRANCE
AGREED, AND PROMISED TO PRESS THE SECRETARIAT TO PRODUCE
THE FINANCIAL ADDENDUM QUICKLY. IN RESPONSE TO
SUGGESTIONS FROM THE RWANDA JOINT DELEGATION, THE FRENCH
PROPOSED SOME AMENDMENTS TO THEIR PREVIOUS DRAFT (SEE
BELOW, PARTICULARLY NEW FOURTH PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH, AND
NEW LANGUAGE IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS 2, 2(G), 3, 4, 5, 7
AND 1 2 ) . FRANCE ENDED THE DISCUSSION BY NOTING THEY
WOULD CONTINUE TO CONSULT BILATERALLY, AND THEN IN A
WORKING GROUP OF THE WOLE, WITH A VIEW TOWARDS AGREEING
ON A FINAL TEXT THURSDAY NIGHT AND VOTING FRIDAY.
5. BEGIN TEXT OF REVISED FRENCH DRAFT RESOLUTION:
28 SEPTEMBER 1993-2230
THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
-REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTIONS 812 (1993) OF 12 MARCH 1993
AND 846 (1993) OF 22 JUNE 1993,
-HAVING CONSIDERED THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
DATED 24 SEPTEMBER 1993 (S/26488),
-WELCOMING THE SIGNING OF THE ARUSHA AGREEMENTS ON 4
AUGUST 1993 AND URGING THE PARTIES TO CONTINUE OBSERVING
THEM TO THE FULL,
-RECOGNIZING THE URGENCY OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF AN
INTERNATIONAL NEUTRAL FORCE IN RWANDA, AS UNDERLINED
BOTH BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA AND BY
THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND AS REAFFIRMED BY THEIR
JOINT DELEGATION IN NEW YORK.
-PAYING TRIBUTE TO THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE ORGANIZATION
OF AFRICAN UNITY AND BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA IN THE CONCLUSION OF THE ARUSHA
AGREEMENTS,
-RESOLVED THAT THE UNITED NATIONS SHOULD, AT THE REQUEST
O 0 N~F I D E H T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 004766
STATE FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C, AF/RA, AND L/UNA;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR SUSAN RICE;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3,
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PGOV, PREL, KDEM, AO, UNSC
SUBJECT: SC PRESSURE BUILDING TO APPROVE RWANDA PKO
OF THE PARTIES, MAKE ITS FULL CONTRIBUTION TO THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA AGREEMENTS,
- 1 . WELCOMES THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL DATE
D
24 SEPTEMBER 1993 (S/26488);
-2. APPROVES, FOR AN INITIAL PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS, IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, THE
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Page 2 of 4
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD003\SEP93\MSGS\M0632815.html
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION
TO RWANDA (UNAMIR) AS SET OUT IN PARAGRAPHS 21 TO 26,
WHOSE MANDATE WOULD BE TO IN PARTICULAR TO:
-A) CONTRIBUTE TO THE SECURITY OF THE TOWN OF KIGALI;
-B) SUPERVISE THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT, INCLUDING THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF CANTONMENT AND ASSEMBLY ZONES AND THE
DEFINING OF DEMOBILIZATION PROCEDURES;
-C) CONTINUE TO GUARANTEE THE OVERALL SECURITY OF THE
COUNTRY DURING THE FINAL STAGE OF THE MANDATE OF THE
TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNMENT UNTIL THE ELECTIONS;
-D) CONTRIBUTE TO MINE CLEARING, IN PARTICULAR, BY MEANS
OF TRAINING PROGRAMMES;
-E) EXAMINE, AT THE REQUEST OF THE PARTIES OR ON ITS OWN
INITIATIVE, INSTANCES OF NON-IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
PROTOCOL OF AGREEMENT ON THE INTEGRATION OF THE ARMED
FORCES AND DETERMINE THOSE WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE;
-F) GUARANTEE THE SECURITY OF THE PROCESS OF
REPATRIATION OF RWANDESE REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS;
-G) ENSURE THE SECURITY OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF
HUMANITARIAN AID;
-H) SUPERVISE THE ACTIVITIES OF THE GENDARMERIE AND
POLICE;
-3. ALSO APPROVES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PROPOSAL THAT
THE CHAIN OF COMMAND AND LOGISTICS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
OBSERVER MISSION UGANDA-RWANDA (UNOMUR) SHOULD BE
INTEGRATED WITHIN UNAMIR WHOSE MANDATE DEFINED IN
RESOLUTION 84 6 (1992) REMAINS UNCHANGED;
-4. WELCOMES THE COOPERATION OF THE OAU AND IN
PARTICULAR THE INTEGRATION OF ELEMENTS OF THE NEUTRAL
MILITARY OBSERVERS GROUP (NMOG I I ) IN UNAMIR;
-5. FURTHER APPROVES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PROPOSAL
THAT THE DEPLOYMENT AND WITHDRAWAL OF UNAMIR, WHOSE
MANDATE WILL END 22 MONTHS AFTER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT, I.E. IN PRINCIPLE, IN
OCTOBER 1995, SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN STAGES;
-6. AUTHORIZES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, IN THIS CONTEXT,
TO DEPLOY A FIRST CONTINGENT OF A BATTALION TO KIGALI,
IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME, WHICH, WHEN FULLY IN
PLACE, WILL PERMIT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TRANSITIONAL
INSTITUTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OTHER RELEVANT
PROVISIONS OF THE ARUSHA AGREEMENTS;
-7. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO INFORM THE
COUNCIL PRIOR TO FURTHER SCHEDULED DEPLOYMENTS OF UNAMIR
WHICH SHOULD BE PROCEEDED IN TIME; (SIC)
-8. INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONSIDER WAYS OF
REDUCING THE TOTAL MAXIMUM.STRENGTH OF UNAMIR WITHOUT
THEREBY AFFECTING THE CAPACITY OF THE FORCE TO CARRY OUT
ITS MANDATE;
-9. URGES THE PARTIES TO IMPLEMENT THE ARUSHA
AGREEMENTS IN GOOD FAITH;
C O N F I D G N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 004766
STATE FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C, AF/RA, AND L/UNA;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR SUSAN RICE;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3,
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PGOV, PREL, KDEM, AO, UNSC
SUBJECT: SC PRESSURE BUILDING TO APPROVE RWANDA PKO
-10. ALSO INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONCLUDE
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Page 3 of 4
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FORTHWITH A STATUS OF MISSION AGREEMENT FOR UNAMIR WITH
THE RWANDESE AUTHORITIES;
-11. DEMANDS THAT THE PARTIES RESPECT THE SAFETY OF
UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL IN RWANDA;
-12. URGENTLY CALLS UPON MEMBER STATES, UNITED NATIONS
SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
TO CONTINUE AND INTENSIFY THEIR ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL,
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN FAVOR OF THE RWANDESE
POPULATION AND OF THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS IN RWANDA;
-13. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.
END-TEXT OF REVISED FRENCH DRAFT RESOLUTION
ALBRIGHT
BT
#4766
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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03
< SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03
< SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03
SSN: 4766
< SSN>4766
< SSN>4766
TOR: 930929200024 M0632815
< TOR>930929200115 M0632816
< TOR>930929200117 M0632817
A
A
/v
A
A
A
DIST:
PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG
SIT: BURGOS CLARKER DARRAGH FILE GEORGEL RAGLE RICE SUM2 VAX WARD
•
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
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Cable
PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: COHriDENTIAL
LINE1: OAACZYUW RUCNDTA4824 2742209-CCCC--RUEADWW.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: 0 012209Z OCT 93
LINE4: FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
OSRI: RUCNDT
DTG: 012209Z OCT 93
ORIG: USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0128
INFO: RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1488
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE 0095
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0 961
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0100
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0083
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0545
RUFHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 0180
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0204
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 04 82
SUBJ:
RWANDA: TEXT OF PROPOSED SC RES FROM 9/30
WORKING GROUP
TEXT:
1
C O N F I D E N T I " L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 004824
A
5-53 !94 89/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C, AF/RA, AND L/UNA;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR SUSAN RICE;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3,
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PGOV, PREL, KDEM, AO, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA: TEXT OF PROPOSED SC RES FROM 9/30
WORKING GROUP
REF: USUN 4766
1. -CONFIDENTIJVfc - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. AT WORKING GROUP CALLED BY THE FRENCH ON 30
SEPTEMBER, REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE UK, RUSSIA AND NEW
ZEALAND SUGGESTED SEVERAL TEXTUAL CHANGES WHICH WOULD
BRING THE PROPOSED LANGUAGE MORE IN LINE WITH RECENTLY
ADOPTED RESOLUTIONS ON PKOS IN LIBERIA, MOZAMBIQUE AND
HAITI. THE RUSSIANS WERE PRIMARILY CONCERNED THAT THE
RESOLUTION CONTAIN EXPLICIT LANGUAGE CALLING FOR A
PROGRESS REVIEW, PHASED DEPLOYMENT AND COST SAVINGS.
LIKE THE RECENTLY ADOPTED RESOLUTION ON HAITI, THE
LANGUAGE SUGGESTED BY THE RUSSIANS APPROVES THE MISSION
FOR SIX MONTHS "SUBJECT TO THE PROVISO THAT I T WILL BE
EXTENDED BEYOND 90 DAYS ONLY UPON" SATISFACTORY SC
REVIEW (NEW OP. PARA 2 ) . I T WAS CLEAR FROM THE
DISCUSSION ON THIS POINT THAT THIS WAS A REVIEW
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD004\OCT93\MSGS\M0637773.html
PROVISION, NOT A HARD AND FAST CONTINGENCY. THIS
ALLAYED FRENCH FEARS THAT THE PROVISION WAS TO
RESTRICTIVE.
3. THE UK AND NEW ZEALAND BOTH NOTED THAT, LIKE THE
GEORGIA AND LIBERIA RESOLUTIONS PASSED THIS SUMMER, THE
RWANDA PKO SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO A "NORMAL REVIEW
FORMULA." THE FRENCH AGAIN VOICED CONCERNS OVER THIS
RESTRICTION, BUT SEEMED PARTIALLY SWAYED BY THE ARGUMENT
THAT SUCH REVIEW HAD BECOME AN ELEMENT OF ALL RECENT PKO
RESOLUTIONS. THE UK STRESSED THE NEED FOR LANGUAGE
WHICH PROVIDED FOR "REPORTING AND RENEWAL" OF MISSIONS.
THEY ADMITTED THAT, DUE TO THE PHASE-BY-PHASE APPROACH
CALLED FOR BY THE SYG IN HIS REPORT, LONDON HAD
INSTRUCTED THEM TO SEEK A SECOND RESOLUTION FOR
DEPLOYMENT AT D-DAY PLUS 90. HOWEVER, THE UK
REPRESENTATIVE SAID HE WAS PREPARED TO GIVE THAT UP IN
RETURN FOR STRONGER LANGUAGE ON REPORTING AND RENEWAL.
THE WORKING GROUP AGREED TO LET THE UK DRAFT LANGUAGE TO
THIS EFFECT.
4.
THE RUSSIANS WERE CONCERNED ABOUT A FRENCH
SUGGESTION THAT THE MISSION'S MANDATE WOULD END "22
MONTHS AFTER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TRANSITIONAL
GOVERNMENT-" THE GROUP AGREED, WITH VERY GRUDGING
FRENCH ACQUIESCENCE, TO SAY THE MANDATE WOULD END "IN
PRINCIPLE, IN OCTOBER 1995." THE RUSSIANS, WITH STRONG
SUPPORT FROM THE UK, RAISED THE ISSUE ON SECURITY FOR UN
PERSONNEL. I T WAS DECIDED THAT THE RWANDA RESOLUTION
SHOULD CONTAIN LANGUAGE IN BOTH PREAMBULAR AND OPERATIVE
SECTIONS WHICH REFERRED TO UNSC RES. 868, ADOPTED ON 29
SEPTEMBER, DEALING WITH SECURITY FOR UN PERSONNEL.
FINALLY, THE RUSSIANS SUGGESTED LANGUAGE WELCOMING THE
SYG'S INTENTION TO APPOINT A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE.
5. THE FRENCH MISSION CIRCULATED A REVISED DRAFT ON
OCTOBER 1. WE UNDERSTAND THEY HAVE ASKED THAT I T BE PUT
IN "BLUE." WE EXPECT THE COUNCIL TO RESUME DISCUSSION
OF THE DRAFT EARLY IN THE WEEK OF OCTOBER 4.
6. TEXT OF FRENCH DRAFT RESOLUTION:
BEGIN TEXT:
THE SECURITY COUNCIL
REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTIONS 812 (1993) OF 12 MARCH 1993
AND 846 (1993) OF 22 JUNE 1993,
REAFFIRMING ALSO ITS RESOLUTION 868 (1993) OF 29
SEPTEMBER 1993 CONCERNING THE SECURITY OF UNITED NATIONS
PERSONNEL,
HAVING CONSIDERED THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF
24 SEPTEMBER 1993 (S/26488 AND ADD. 1 ) ,
C e n r i D E H T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 004824
STATE FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C, AF/RA, AND L/UNA;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR SUSAN RICE;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3,
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PGOV, PREL, KDEM, AO, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA: TEXT OF PROPOSED SC RES FROM 9/30
WORKING GROUP
WELCOMING THE SIGNING OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT ON 4
AUGUST 1993 AND URGING THE PARTIES TO CONTINUE TO COMPLY
FULLY WITH THEM,
STRESSING THE URGE
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD004\OCT93\MSGS\M0637773.html
NCY OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF AN
INTERNATIONAL NEUTRAL FORCE IN RWANDA, AS UNDERLINED
BOTH BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF R A D AND BY
WNA
THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT, AND AS AFFIRMED BY THE
JOINT DELEGATION IN N W YORK,
E
PAYING TRIBUTE TO THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE ORGANIZATION OF
AFRICAN UNITY AND BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA IN THE CONCLUSION OF THE ARUSHA
AGREEMENTS,
RESOLVED THAT THE UNITED NATIONS SHOULD, AT THE REQUEST
OF THE PARTIES, MAKE ITS FULL CONTRIBUTION TO THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT,
1. WELCOMES THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
(S/26488 AND ADD. 1);
2. DECIDES TO ESTABLISH THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE
MISSION FOR R A D (UNAMIR) FOR A PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS
WNA
SUBJECT TO THE PROVISO THAT IT WILL BE EXTENDED BEYOND
THE INITIAL NINETY DAYS ONLY UPON A REVIEW BY THE
COUNCIL BASED O A REPORT F O THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AS
N
RM
TO WHETHER O NOT SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE
R
TOWARDS IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT;
3. DECIDES THAT UNAMIR SHALL HAVE THE MANDATE AS SET
OUT IN PARAGRAPHS 21 TO 26 AND 39 TO 43 OF THE REPORT OF
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, WHICH INCLUDE IN PARTICULAR TO:
A) ASSIST IN ENSURING THE SECURITY OF THE CITY OF
KIGALI INTER ALIA THROUGH A WEAPONS-SECURE AREA IN AND
AROUND THE CITY;
B) MONITOR OBSERVANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT,
INCLUDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CANTONMENT AND ASSEMBLY
ZONES AND THE DEMARCATION OF THE N W DEMILITARIZED ZONES
E
AND OTHER DEMILITARIZATION PROCEDURES;
C) MONITOR THE SECURITY SITUATION DURING THE FINAL
PERIOD OF THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT'S MANDATE, LEADING
UP TO THE ELECTIONS;
D) ASSIST WITH MINE CLEARANCE, INCLUDING TRAINING
PROGRAMS;
E) INVESTIGATE AT THE REQUEST OF THE PARTIES O ON ITS
R
O N INITIATIVE INSTANCES OF ALLEGED NON-COMPLIANCE WITH
W
THE PROVISIONS OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT RELATING TO
THE INTEGRATION OF THE ARMED FORCES, AND PURSUE ANY SUCH
INSTANCES WITH THE RESPONSIBLE PARTIES AND TO REPORT
THEIR THEREON AS APPROPRIATE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL;
F) ASSIST IN PROVIDING SECURITY FOR THE REPATRIATION OF
RWANDESE REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS;
G) ENSURE APPROPRIATE ESCORT AND PROTECTION FOR
HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES UNTIL RELIEVED BY THE N W
E
RWANDESE DEFENCE FORCES AND GENDARMERIE;
H) MONITOR THE ACTIVITIES OF THE GENDARMERIE AND POLICE;
4. ALSO APPROVES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PROPOSAL THAT
THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION UGANDA-RWANDA
(UNOMUR) AS ESTABLISHED IN RESOLUTION 84 6 (1992) SHOULD
BE INTEGRATED WITHIN UNAMIR
5. WELCOMES THE EFFORTS AND THE COOPERATION OF THE OAU
IN HELPING TO IMPLEMENT THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT, IN
PARTICULAR THE INTEGRATION OF THE NEUTRAL MILITARY
• 0 H F I D • H S I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 USUN N W YORK 004824
C
E
STATE FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C, AF/RA, AND L/UNA;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR SUSAN RICE;
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Page 3 of 5
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD004\OCT93\MSGS\M0637773.html
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3,
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PGOV, PREL, KDEM, AO, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA: TEXT OF PROPOSED SC RES FROM 9/30
WORKING GROUP
OBSERVERS GROUP (NMOG I I ) IN UNAMIR;
6.
FURTHER APPROVES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PROPOSAL
THAT THE DEPLOYMENT AND WITHDRAWAL OF UNAMIR, WHOSE
MANDATE WILL END, I.E. IN PRINCIPLE, IN OCTOBER 1995
SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN STAGES;
7. AUTHORIZES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, IN THIS CONTEXT,
TO DEPLOY A FIRST BATTALION TO KIGALI FOR AN INITIAL
PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS, IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME,
WHICH, WHEN FULLY IN PLACE, WILL PERMIT THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TRANSITIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OTHER RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE
ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT;
8.
INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE
REPORT REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE, ALSO TO REPORT
ON THE PROGRESS OF THE MISSION FOLLOWING ITS INITIAL
DEPLOYMENT, AND RESOLVES TO REVIEW AS APPROPRIATE, ON
THE BASIS OF THAT REPORT AND AS PART OF THE REVIEW
REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE, THE REQUIREMENT FOR
FURTHER DEPLOYMENTS IN THE SCALE AND COMPOSITION
RECOMMENDED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS REPORT
(S/26488);
9.
INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONSIDER WAYS OF
REDUCING THE TOTAL MAXIMUM STRENGTH OF UNAMIR, IN
PARTICULAR, THROUGH PHASED DEPLOYMENT WITHOUT THEREBY
AFFECTING THE CAPACITY OF THE FORCE TO CARRY OUT ITS
MANDATE AND REQUESTS THE SECRETA
RY-GENERAL IN PLANNING
AND EXECUTING THE PHASED DEPLOYMENT OF UNAMIR TO SEEK
ECONOMIES AND TO REPORT REGULARLY ON WHAT IS ACHIEVED IN
THIS REGARD.
10. WELCOMES THE INTENTION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO
APPOINT HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WHO WOULD LEAD THE
MISSION IN THE FIELD AND EXERCISE AUTHORITY OVER ALL ITS
ELEMENTS.
11. URGES THE PARTIES TO IMPLEMENT THE ARUSHA
AGREEMENTS IN GOOD FAITH;
12. ALSO INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONCLUDE
FORTHWITH EXPEDITIOUSLY, AND NO LATER THAN 60 DAYS AFTER
ITS INSTALLATION, A STATUS OF MISSION AGREEMENT FOR
UNAMIR WITH THE RWANDESE AUTHORITIES;
13.
DEMANDS THAT THE PARTIES TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE STEPS
TO ENSURE THE SECURITY AND SAFETY OF THE OPERATION AND
PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN THE OPERATION;
14. URGES MEMBER STATES, UNITED NATIONS SPECIALISED
AGENCIES AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS TO PROVIDE
AND INTENSIFY THEIR ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL, HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE IN FAVOR OF THE RWANDESE POPULATION AND OF
THE DEMOCRATISATION PROCESS IN RWANDA;
15.
DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.
END TEXT.
ALBRIGHT
BT
#4824
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD004\OCT93\MSGS\M0637773.html
NNNN
SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03
< SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03
< SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03
A
A
SSN: 4824
OSSN>4824
<' SSN>4824
TOR: 931001182948 M0637773
< TOR>931001183052 M0637775
< TOR>931001183055 M0637777
V
A
A
DIST:
SIT: RICE VAX
•
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPl
Page 5 of 5
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD004\OCT93\MSGS\M0641943.html
Page 1 of 5
Cable
PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: CONn DGNT IAL
LINE1: OAACZYUW RUCNDTA4871 2780128-CCCC--RUEADWW.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: 0 050128Z OCT 93
LINE4: FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
OSRI: RUCNDT
DTG: 050128Z OCT 93
ORIG: USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0218
INFO: RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1500
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE 0098
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0 97 4
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0103
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0086
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0553
RUFHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 0183
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0207
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0485
SUBJ:
TEXT:
FINAL LANGUAGE ON RWANDA SC RESOLUTION
• 0 N-P I D D N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 004871
C
STATE FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C, AF/RA, AND L/UNA;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR SUSAN RICE;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3,
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PGOV, PREL, KDEM, AO, UNSC
SUBJECT: FINAL LANGUAGE ON RWANDA SC RESOLUTION
REF: A) WARD/WALKER TELCON 10/4, B) USUN 4824, C) USUN
4735
1. OOHFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THIS IS AN ACTION CABLE. GUIDANCE IS REQUIRED BY
NOON, OCTOBER 5.' SEE PARA
BELOW.
3. SUMMARY: THE SECURITY COUNCIL AGREED TO AN AMENDED
TEXT OF A DRAFT RESOLUTION ON RWANDA, BASED ON U.S.
CHANGES, PER REF A. A VOTE IS SCHEDULED FOR TUESDAY
AFTERNOON, OCTOBER 5, PRIOR TO RWANDAN PRESIDENT
HABYARIMANA'S ADDRESS TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. TEXT OF
CHANGES, AND THE POSITIONS OF OTHER MEMBERS IS SET FORTH
BELOW. END SUMMARY.
4. PER REFTELCON, THE U.S. DELEGATION INSISTED ON
REOPENING THE AGREED TEXT OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION ON
RWANDA (REF B ) . OTHER MEMBERS ARGUED VIGOROUSLY AGAINST
SOME OF OUR PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, BUT WE BELIEVE
DEPARTMENT'S OBJECTIVES HAVE BEEN MET IN ALL CASES.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD004\OCT93\MSGS\M0641943.html
5. OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2 N W READS: DECIDES TO
O
ESTABLISH A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION NAMED THE UNITED
NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR) FOR A
PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS SUBJECT TO THE PROVISION THAT I T
WILL BE EXTENDED BEYOND THE INITIAL 90 DAYS ONLY UPON A
REVIEW BY THE COUNCIL BASED ON A REPORT FROM THE SG AS
TO WHETHER OR NOT SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE
TOWARDS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT.
6. WE PROPOSED INSERTING AN EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO
CHAPTER V I OF THE UN CHARTER, BUT WERE OPPOSED BY THE
UK, FRANCE, PAKISTAN, CAPE VERDE, JAPAN, MOROCCO AND
BRAZIL. THE UK POINTED OUT THAT THERE IS NO ARTICLE
UNDER CHAPTER SIX WHICH AUTHORIZES THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION. TO AVOID A LEGAL CHALLENGE TO
THE COUNCIL'S AUTHORITY TO MANDATE PKO'S, THE COUNCIL
FOR THE PAST 4 0 YEARS HAS DELIBERATELY AVOIDED
MENTIONING CHAPTER SIX EXPLICITLY. FRANCE REMINDED THE
U.S. DELEGATION THAT WE HAD ALREADY BEEN THROUGH THIS
POINT IN RELATION TO RESOLUTIONS ON HAITI AND LIBERIA,
AND THAT LAWYERS HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT MENTIONING
CHAPTER SIX. JAPAN POINTED OUT THAT SINCE CHAPTER SEVEN
WAS NOT MENTIONED, I T WAS ASSUMED THIS OPERATION FELL
UNDER CHAPTER SIX. I F THE COUNCIL REFERED SPECIFICALLY
TO CHAPTER SIX IN THE CASE OF RWANDA, I T WOULD GIVE THE
IMPRESSION THAT ALL THE OTHER PKO'S (WHICH HAD NO
MENTION OF CHAPTER 6 IN THEIR MANDATES) MIGHT INVOLVE
CHAPTER 7. PAKISTAN, CAPE VERDE, MOROCCO AND BRAZIL ALL
AGREED THAT MENTION OF CHAPTER SIX WAS INAPPROPRIATE. A
COMPROMISE WAS REACHED WHEREBY UNAMIR IS REFERED TO AS
"A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION", REMOVING ANY DOUBT THAT I T
MIGHT BE A PEACE ENFORCEMENT ACTION.
7. OPERATIVE PARA 3 N W READS: "DECIDES THAT PURSUANT
O
TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S RECOMMENDATIONS, UNAMIR SHALL
HAVE THE FOLLOWING MANDATE:"
8. WHILE AGREEING TO DELETE SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO
PARAGRAPHS 21-26 AND 39-43 OF THE SYG'S REPORT, FRANCE
INSISTED THAT SOME MORE GENERAL MENTION OF THE REPORT BE
MADE. AFTER CONSIDERING SEVERAL POSSIBILITIES, SUCH AS
"IN ACCORDANCE WITH, IN LIGHT OF, FOLLOWING, IN LINE
WITH", ETC., THE COUNCIL DECIDED "PURSUANT TO THE SYG'S
RECOMMENDATIONS" DID NOT TIE THE COUNCIL TO ENDORSING
ALL PARTICULARS OF THE SYG'S REPORT.
9. OPERATIVE PARA 3(A) N W READS: "TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE
O
SECURITY OF THE CITY OF KIGALI, INTER ALIA WITHIN A
WEAPONS SECURE AREA IN AND AROUND THE C
ITY; "
10. THE U.S. SUGGESTED DELETING REFERENCE TO A WEAPONS
C O H r i D C H T Irt-L"SECTION 02 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 004871
STATE FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C, AF/RA, AND L/UNA;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR SUSAN RICE;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3,
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PGOV, PREL, KDEM, AO, UNSC
SUBJECT: FINAL LANGUAGE ON RWANDA SC RESOLUTION
SECURE AREA. THIS SUGGESTION WAS STRONGLY OPPOSED BY
NEW ZEALAND, FRANCE, UK, AND CAPE VERDE, ALL OF W O
HM
NOTED THAT THE DELETION WOULD MAKE THE MANDATE LESS
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Page 2 of 5
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD004\OCT93\MSGS\M0641943.html
PRECISE, RATHER THAN M R PRECISE. N W ZEALAND, CAPE
OE
E
VERDE AND FRANCE ARGUED THAT THE WEAPONS SECURE AREA W S
A
AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF THE SYG'S PLAN, AND NEEDED TO BE
INCLUDED IN THE RESOLUTION. ACKNOWLEDGING THE U.S. VIEW
THAT UNAMIR SHOULD NOT HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF
ESTABLISHING THIS AREA, FRANCE SUGGESTED THAT THE
RESOLUTION AT LEAST ALLOW THE PKO TO OPERATE "WITHIN"
THE WEAPONS SECURE AREA, AS WELL AS WITHIN THE ACTUAL
CITY ITSELF.
11. OPERATIVE PARA 3(B) N W READS: "TO MONITOR
O
OBSERVANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT, WHICH CALLS FOR
ESTABLISHMENT OF CANTONMENT AND ASSEMBLY ZONES AND THE
DEMARCATION OF THE N W DEMILITARIZED ZONE AND OTHER
E
DEMILITAIZATIONS PROCEDURES;"
12. OPERATIVE PARA 3(D) N W READS: "TO ASSIST WITH MINE
O
CLEARANCE, PRIMARILY THROUGH TRAINING PROGRAMMES;"
13. THE U.S. ARGUED THAT ASSISTANCE IN MINE CLEARANCE
SHOULD ONLY BE THROUGH TRAINING PROGRAMS. HOWEVER,
FRANCE POINTED OUT THAT UNTAC ENGAGED IN MINE CLEARING
OPERATIONS IN CAMBODIA, AND THAT UN TROOPS W U D NEED TO
OL
CLEAR MINES BLOCKING THEIR O N PATHS. BRAZIL NOTED THE
W
UN MINECLEARERS MIGHT HAVE TO CLEAR S M MINES
OE
THEMSELVES IN THE COURSE OF TEACHING THE LOCALS H W IT
O
W S DONE.
A
14. OPERATIVE PARA 3(F) N W READS: "TO MONITOR THE
O
PROCESS OF REPATRIATION OF RWANDESE REFUGEES AND
RESETTLEMENT OF DISPLACED PERSONS TO VERIFY THAT THEY
ARE CARRIED OUT IN A SAFE AND ORDERLY MANNER;"
15. OPERATIVE PARA 3(G) N W READS: "TO ASSIST IN THE
O
COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES IN
CONJUNCTION WITH RELIEF OEPRATIONS;"
16. OPERATIVE PARA 3(H) N W READS: "TO REPORT ON AND
O
INVESTIGATE INCIDENTS REGARDING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
GENDARMERIE AND POLICE;"
17. ALTHOUGH THE U.S. DELEGATION SUGGESTED CHANGING THE
W R "GENDARMERIE" TO "CONSTABULARY", THE FRENCH AND UK
OD
DELEGATIONS INSISTED TO D SO W U D BE INACCURATE. THE
O
OL
TERMS CONSTABULARY AND POLICE ARE SYNONYMS. THE
GENDARMERIE IS A BRANCH OF THE MILITARY.
18. OPERATIVE PARA 6 N W READS: "FURTHER APPROVES THE
O
SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PROPOSAL THAT THE DEPLOYMENT AND
WITHDRAWAL OF UNAMIR SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN STAGES,
AND NOTES THAT UNAMIR'S MANDATE, IF EXTENDED, IS
EXPECTED TO TERMINATE FOLLOWING NATIONAL ELECTIONS AND
THE INSTALLATION OF A N W GOVERNMENT IN RWANDA, EVENTS
E
WHICH ARE SCHEDULED TO OCCUR BY OCTOBER 1995, BUT N
O
LATER THAN DECEMBER 1995;"
19. SEVERAL DELEGATIONS WISHED TO RETAIN THE REFERENCE
TO STAGED DEPLOYMENT AND WITHDRAWAL OF UNAMIR. NONE
OBJECTED TO OUR SUGGESTION TO SPELL OUT THE DATES FOR
THE ELECTIONS AND N W GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, THE UK
E
POINTED OUT THAT IF THE COUNCIL FOLLOWED THE U.S.
SUGGESTION OF MENTIONING THE INITIAL MANDATE PERIOD OF 6
MONTHS, THE IMPLICATION W U D BE THAT UNAMIR WOULD THEN
OL
BE OPEN-ENDED UNTIL ELECTIONS. W AGREED WITH THE UK
E
THAT OUR INTENTION W S TO SUBJECT THIS MISSION TO
A
PERIODIC REVIEW AT EACH STAGE, WITH THE COUNCIL NEEDING
TO MAKE A DECISION TO R N W THE MANDATE AT EACH N W
EE
E
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Page 3 of 5
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD004\OCT93\MSGS\M0641943.html
STAGE.
20. OPERATIVE PARA 7 N W READS: "AUTHORIZES THE SYG, IN
O
THIS CONTEXT, TO DEPLOY THE FIRST CONTINGENT, AS
DESCRIBED IN THE SYG'S REPORT, TO KIGALI FOR AN INITIAL
• C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 004871
STATE FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C, AF/RA, AND L/UNA;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR SUSAN RICE;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3,
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PGOV, PREL, KDEM, AO, UNSC
SUBJECT: FINAL LANGUAGE ON RWANDA SC RESOLUTION
PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS, IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME,
WHICH, WHEN FULLY IN PLACE, WILL PERMIT THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TRANSITIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF THA OTHER RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE
ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT;"
21. FRANCE AGREED TO OUR PROPOSAL TO SUBSTITUTE THE
WORD "CONTINGENT" FOR "BATTALION" ONLY I F WE SPECIFIED
ELIPTICALLY WHAT THAT "CONTINGENT" WOULD BE.
22. OPERATIVE PARA 12 N W READS: "REQUESTS THE SYG TO
O
CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT ON THE STATUS OF THE OPERATION AND
ALL PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN THE OPERATION EXPEDITIOUSLY, TO
COME INTO FORCE AS NEAR AS POSSIBLE TO THE OUTSET OF THE
RESOLUTION, AND NO LATER THAN 4 5 DAYS AFTER THE ADOPTION
OF THIS RESOLUTION;"
23. FRANCE OBJECTED STRENUOUSLY TO THE U.S. SUGGESTION
THAT THE DEPLOYMENT OF "ANY TROOPS" HAD TO WAIT UNTIL
CONCLUSION OF A STATUS OF MISSION AGREEMENT. THEY COULD
NOT ACCEPT SUCH A DELAY. ON THE OTHER HAND, REQUIRING A
SOMA BEFORE "FULL DEPLOYMENT" GAVE THE UN TOO MUCH
LATITUDE TO DEPLOY HUNDREDS OF TROOPS BEFORE REACHING AN
AGREEMENT. THE UK AGREED AND POINTED OUT THAT ON SOME
OCCASIONS THE UN WOULD WANT TO DEPLOY RAPIDLY, CITING
GEORGIA AS SUCH A CASE. CALLING FOR A SOMA PRIOR TO ANY
DEPLOYMENT WOULD SET A PRECEDENT FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS
WHICH WOULD TIE THE UN'S HANDS. UK SUGGESTED DRAWING
FROM LANGUAGE ADOPTED LAST WEEK IN THE RESOLUTION ON THE
SAFETY OF UN PERSONNEL, AND SHORTENING THE DEADLINE FOR
CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT.
24. THE DRAFT RESOLUTION, WITH THE AMENDMENTS SPELLED
OUT ABOVE, WILL BE CIRCULATED TUESDAY, WITH A VIEW
TOWARDS ADOPTION TUESDAY AFTERNOON, OCTOBER 5. USUN
REQUESTS GUIDANCE ON WHETHER OR NOT TO VOTE FOR THIS
RESOLUTION BY NOON TUESDAY. ALSO, USUN REQUESTS A
CLEARED EXPLANATION OF VOTE (EOV) BY NOON TUESDAY, I F
DEPARTMENT WISHES AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT TO MAKE ONE.
MISSION WOULD LIKE TO POINT OUT THAT UPON ESTABLISHING A
NEW PKO, I T IS THE USUAL PRACTICE TO MAKE A SHORT
STATEMENT OUTLINING OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE MISSION'S
OBJECTIVES, AS WELL AS THE NEED TO KEEP COSTS DOWN.
ALBRIGHT
BT
#4871
NNNN
SECT:
SECTION: 01 OF 03
< SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03
< SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03
/v
A
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD004\OCT93\MSGS\M0641943.html
SSN: 4871
< SSN>4871
< SSN>4871
TOR: 931004215256 M0641943
< TOR>931004215359 M0641947
< TOR>931004215400 M0641948
DIST:
SIT: GEORGEL RAGLE RICE VAX WARD
A
A
A
A
•
CLINTON LIBRARV PHOTOCOPY
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�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cab!es\CD004\OCT93\MSGS\M0642031 .html
Page 1 of2
Cable
PREC
CLASS
LINE1
LINE 2
LINE3
LINE4
OSRI
DTG
ORIG
TO
IMMEDIATE
COHFIDDHTTPAL
OAACZYUW RUEHCAA3702 2780322-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
0 P 050322Z OCT 93
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
RUEHC
050322Z OCT 93
SECSTATE WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 8299
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 2996
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI PRIORITY 1278
INFO:
RUEHMG/USLO MOGADISHU PRIORITY 4298
SUBJ:
CONTINGENCY DEMARCHE TO THE FRENCH
TEXT:
• C O - M F I D C M T I A L STATE 303702
NSC FOR JENNIFER WARD AND SUSAN RICE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, UNSC
SUBJECT: CONTINGENCY DEMARCHE TO THE FRENCH
1. -CONriDDHTIA'L - ENTIRE TEXT.
2.
THIS IS AN ACTION CABLE.
3. DEPARTMENT ANTICIPATES THAT THE USG FOSITION ON THE UN
SECURITY COUNCIL (UNSC) RESOLUTION TO ESTABLISH A
PEACEKEEPING MISSION IN RWANDA (UNAMIR) WILL BE REACHED
AND COMMUNICATED TO USUN AND PARIS EARLY ON OCTOBER 4.
4. IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING NOTIFICATION THAT THE USG WILL
SUPPORT A UNSC RESOLUTION ESTABLISHING UNAMIR, USUN SHOULD
MEET WITH FRENCH PERMREP MERIMEE AND AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN
IN PARIS SHOULD MEET WITH SENIOR FRENCH MFA OFFICIALS AND
PRESENT THE FOLLOWING POINTS:
5.
BEGIN TALKING POINTS:
- THE USG HAS DECIDED TO VOTE IN FAVOR OF THE RESOLUTION
TO ESTABLISH A PEACEKEEPING MISSION IN RWANDA.
-- WE ARE PLEASED THAT WE WERE ABLE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT
WITH YOU ON THE MANDATE, COMPOSITION AND DURATION OF THIS
MISSION.
-- IN VIEW OF THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED SEPTEMBER 27 BY
PRESIDENT CLINTON IN HIS ADDRESS TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
WE WANT TO WORK CLOSELY WITH YOU AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL
IN MONITORING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION TO
ENSURE THAT ITS COSTS ARE CAREFULLY CONTROLLED AND THAT
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
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B
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UNAMIR OPERATES AS EFFICIENTLY AS POSSIBLE IN CARRYING OUT
ITS MANDATE.
-- AS WE INITIATE A NEW PEACEKEEFING MISSION I T IS
CRITICALLY IMPORTANT THAT WE WORK TOGETHER TO ENSURE THE
SUCCESS OF OTHER PEACEKEEFING MISSIONS IN AFRICA,
PARTICULARLY IN SOMALIA WHERE UNOSOM I I HAS BEEN
CHALLENGED.
-- WE URGE YOU TO MAINTAIN YOUR CURRENT COMMITMENT TO
UNOSOM I I AND TO RESCIND YOUR DECISION TO WITHDRAW YOUR
FORCES IN SOMALIA. REDUCTION IN FRENCH PARTICIPATION
THERE WOULD CAST INTO DOUBT OUR ABILITY TO SUPPORT OTHER
PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS IN AFRICA, NOTABLY THE ONE THAT YOU
SO STRONGLY SUPPORT IN RWANDA.
CHRISTOPHER
BT
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•
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TEXT:
IMMEDIATE
COHriDGH'PI-AL
OAACZYUW RUCNDTA4 919 2790125-CCCC—RUEADWW.
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
0 060125Z OCT 93
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUCNDT
060125Z OCT 93
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 027 6
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE 0101
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0210
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 04 91
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0983
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0108
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0089
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0560
RUFHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 0186
RWANDA:
RESOLUTION ADOPTED 10/5
C-0 N F I D E M T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 004919
STATE FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C, AF/RA, AND L/UNA;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR SUSAN RICE;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3,
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PGOV, PREL, KDEM, AO, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA: RESOLUTION ADOPTED 10/5
REF: USUN 4766 AND PREVIOUS
1.
(U) SUMMARY: THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADOPTED
RESOLUTION 872 ESTABLISHING A PEACEKEEPING MISSION FOR
RWANDA (UNAMIR) ON OCTOBER 5. TEXTS OF THE RESOLUTION
AND U.S. EOV ARE BELOW. THE RWANDAN FONMIN SPOKE ON
BEHALF OF THE JOINT DELEGATION OF THE GOR AND RPF,
THANKING THE UN. END SUMMARY.
2. (£T PRIOR TO THE VOTE, AMB. WALKER CONVEYED THE
FOLLOWING POINTS TO FRENCH PERM REP AMB. MERIMEE:
THE USG HAS DECIDED TO VOTE IN FAVOR OF THE
RESOLUTION TO ESTABLISH A PEACEKEEPING MISSION IN RWANDA.
WE ARE PLEASED THAT WE WERE ABLE TO REACH AN
AGREEMENT WITH YOU ON THE MANDATE, COMPOSITION AND
DURATION OF THIS MISSION.
-- IN VIEW OF THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED SEPTEMBER 27 BY
PRESIDENT CLINTON IN HIS ADDRESS TO THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY, WE WANT TO WORK CLOSELY WITH YOU AND THE
SECRETARY GENERAL IN MONITORING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE RESOLUTION TO ENSURE THAT ITS COSTS ARE CAREFULLY
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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CONTROLLED AND THAT UNAMIR OPERATES AS EFFICIENTLY AS
POSSIBLE IN CARRYING OUT ITS MANDATE.
-- AS WE INITIATE A NEW PEACEKEEPING MISSION IT IS
CRITICALLY IMPORTANT THAT WE WORK TOGETHER TO ENSURE THE
SUCCESS OF OTHER PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS IN AFRICA,
PARTICULARLY IN SOMALIA WHERE UNOSOM I I HAS BEEN
CHALLENGED.
— WE URGE YOU TO MAINTAIN YOUR CURRENT COMMITMENT TO
UNOSOM I I AND TO RESCIND YOUR DECISION TO WITHDRAW YOUR
FORCES IN SOMALIA. REDUCTION IN FRENCH PARTICIPATION
THERE WOULD CAST INTO DOUBT OUR ABILITY TO SUPPORT
OTHER PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS IN AFRICA, NOTABLY THE ONE
THAT YOU SO STRONGLY SUPPORT IN RWANDA.
3.
(U) BEGIN TEXT OF RESOLUTION 872:
28 SEPTEMBER 1993-2230
THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
-REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTIONS 812 (1993) OF 12 MARCH 1993
AND 846 (1993) OF 22 JUNE 1993,
-REAFFIRMING ALSO ITS RESOLUTION 868 (1993) OF 29
SEPTEMBER 1993 ON THE SECURITY OF UNITED NATIONS
OPERATIONS,
-HAVING CONSIDERED THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
OF 24 SEPTEMBER 1993 (S/26488 AND ADD.L),
-WELCOMING THE SIGNING OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT
(INCLUDING ITS PROTOCOLS) ON 4 AUGUST 1993 AND URGING
THE PARTIES TO CONTINUE TO COMPLY FULLY WITH I T ,
-NOTING THE CONCLUSION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT IN
ORDER TO ENABLE THE UNITED NATIONS TO CARRY OUT ITS
MANDATE SUCCESSFULLY AND EFFECTIVELY, THE FULL
COOPERATION OF THE PARTIES WITH ONE ANOTHER AND WITH THE
ORGANIZATION IS REQUIRED,
-STRESSING THE URGENCY OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF AN
INTERNATIONAL NEUTRAL FORCE IN RWANDA, AS UNDERLINED
BOTH BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA AND BY
THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND AS REAFFIRMED BY THEIR
JOINT DELEGATION IN NEW YORK.
-PAYING TRIBUTE TO THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE ORGANIZATION
OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) AND BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA IN THE CONCLUSION OF THE
ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT,
C O M - F I D E U T I f t L SECTION 02 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 004919
STATE FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C, AF/RA, AND L/UNA;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR SUSAN RICE;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3,
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PGOV, PREL, KDEM, AO, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA: RESOLUTION ADOPTED 10/5
-RESOLVED THAT THE UNITED NATIONS SHOULD, AT THE REQUEST
OF THE PATIES, AND UNDER PEACEFUL CONDITIONS WITH THE
FULL COOPERATION OF ALL THE PARTIES, MAKE ITS FULL
CONTRIBUTION TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA PEACE
AGREEMENT,
- 1 . WELCOMES THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
(S/26488);
-2. DECIDES TO ESTABLISH A PEACE-KEEPING OPERATION UNDER
THE NAME "UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA"
(UNAMIR) FOR A PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS, SUBJECT TO THE
PROVISION THAT IT WILL BE EXTENDED BEYOND THE INITIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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NINETY DAYS ONLY UPON A REVIEW BY THE COUNCIL BASED ON A
REPORT FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AS TO WHETHER OR NOT
SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE TOWARDS THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT;
3. DECIDES THAT DRAWING FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S
RECOMMENDATIONS UNAMIR SHALL HAVE THE FOLLOWING MANDATE:
-A) TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE SECURITY OF THE CITY OF KIGALI
INTER ALIA WITHIN A WEAPONS SECURE AREA ESTABLISHED BY
THE PARTIES IN AND AROUND THE CITY;
-B) TO MONITOR OBSERVANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT,
WHICH CALLS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CANTONMENT AND
ASSEMBLY ZONES AND THE DEMARCATION OF THE NEW
DEMILITARIZED ZONE AND OTHER DEMILITARIZATION PROCEDURES;
-C) TO MONITOR THE SECURITY SITUATION DURING THE FINAL
PERIOD OF THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT'S MANDATE, LEADING
UP TO THE ELECTIONS;
-D) TO ASSIST WITH MINE CLEARING, PRIMARILY THROUGH
TRAINING PROGRAMMES;
-E) TO INVESTIGATE AT THE REQUEST OF THE PARTIES OR ON
ITS OWN INITIATIVE INSTANCES OF ALLEGED NON-COMPLIANCE
WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT
RELATING TO THE INTEGRATION OF THE ARMED FORCES, AND
PURSUE ANY SUCH INSTANCES WITH THE PARTIES RESPONSIBLE
AND REPORT THEREON AS APPROPRIATE TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL;
-F) TO MONITOR THE PROCESS OF REPATRIATION OF RWANDESE
REFUGEES AND RESETTLEMENT OF DISPLACED PERSONS TO VERIFY
THAT IT IS CARRIED OUT IN A SAFE AND ORDERLY MANNER;
-G) TO ASSIST IN THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES IN CONJUNCTION WITH RELIEF
OPERATIONS;
-H) TO INVESTIGATE AND REPORT ON INCIDENTS REGARDING THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE GENDARMERIE AND POLICE;
-4. APPROVES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PROPOSAL THAT THE
UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION UGANDA-RWANDA (UNOMUR)
ESTABLISHED BY RESOLUTION 846 (1993) SHOULD BE
INTEGRATED WITHIN UNAMIR;
-5. WELCOMES THE EFFORTS AND THE COOPERATION OF THE OAU
IN HELPING TO IMPLEMENT THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT, IN
PARTICULAR THE INTEGRATION OF THE NEUTRAL MILITARY
OBSERVER GROUP (NMOG I I ) IN UNAMIR;
-6. FURTHER APPROVES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PROPOSAL
THAT THE DEPLOYMENT AND WITHDRAWAL OF UNAMIR, SHOULD BE
CARRIED OUT IN STAGES AND NOTES IN THIS CONNECTION THAT
UNAMIR'S MANDATE, I F EXTENDED, IS EXPECTED TO TERMINATE
FOLLOWING NATIONAL ELECTIONS AND THE INSTALLATION OF A
NEW GOVERNMENT IN RWANDA, EVENTS WHICH ARE SCHEDULED TO
OCCUR BY OCTOBER 1995, BUT NO LATER THAN DECEMBER 1995;
-7. AUTHORIZES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, IN THIS CONTEXT,
TO DEPLOY THE FIRST CONTINGENT AT THE LEVEL SPECIFIED BY
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT, TO KIGALI FOR AN INITIAL
• 0 »• F I D C H T I A IT- SECTION 03 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 004919
C
STATE FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C, AF/RA, AND L/UNA;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR SUSAN RICE;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3,
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PGOV, PREL, KDEM, AO, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA: RESOLUTION ADOPTED 10/5
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS, IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME,
WHICH, WHEN FULLY IN PLACE, WILL PERMIT THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TRANSITIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OTHER RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE
ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT;
-8. INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, IN THE CONTEXT OF
THE REPORT REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE, ALSO TO
REPORT ON THE PROCESS OF UNAMIR FOLLOWING ITS INITIAL
DEPLOYMENT, AND RESOLVES TO REVIEW AS APPROPRIATE, ON
THE BASIS OF THAT REPORT AND AS PART OF THE REVIEW
REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE, THE REQUIRED FOR
FURTHER DEPLOYMENTS IN THE SCALE AD COMPOSITION
RECOMMENDED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS REPORT
(S/26488);
-9. INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONSIDER WAYS OF
REDUCING THE TOTAL MAXIMUM STRENGTH OF UNAMIR, IN
PARTICULAR, THROUGH PHASED DEPLOYMENT WITHOUT THEREBY
AFFECTING THE CAPACITY OF UNAMIR TO CARRY OUT ITS
MANDATE AND REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN PLANNING
AND EXECUTING THE PHASED DEPLOYMENT OF UNAMIR TO SEEK
ECONOMIES AND TO REPORT REGULARLY ON WHAT IS ACHIEVED IN
THIS REGARD;
-10. WELCOMES THE INTENTION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO
APPOINT A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WHO WOULD LEAD UNAMIR
IN THE FIELD AND EXERCISE AUTHORITY OVER ALL ITS
ELEMENTS;
-11. URGES THE PARTIES TO IMPLEMENT THE ARUSHA PEACE
AGREEMENT IN GOOD FAITH;
-12. ALSO REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONCLUDE
EXPEDITIOUSLY AN AGREEMENT ON THE STATUS OF THE
OPERATION, ALL PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN THE OPERATION IN
RWANDA, TO COME INTO FORCE AS NEAR AS POSSIBLE TO THE
OUTSET OF THE OPERATION AND NO LATER THAN THIRTY DAYS
AFTER THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION;
-13. DEMANDS THAT THE PARTIES ALL APPROPRIATE STEPS TO
ENSURE THE SECURITY AND SAFETY OF THE OPERATION AND
PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN THE OPERATION;
-14. URGES MEMBER STATES, UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES AND
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS TO PROVIDE AND INTENSIFY
THEIR ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN
FAVOR OF THE RWANDESE POPULATION AND OF THE
DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS IN RWANDA;
-13. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.
END-TEXT OF RESOLUTION.
4. (U) BEGIN TEXT OF U.S. EOV:
--LET ME TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO CONGRATULATE BOTH THE
GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA AND THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT
FOR THEIR SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE A PEACE
ACCORD, WHICH RESULTED IN THE SIGNING OF THE ARUSHA
PEACE AGREEMENT ON AUGUST 4, 1993. I CONGRATULATE THE
FARSIGHTED LEADERS OF BOTH PARTIES WHO HAD THE COURAGE
TO PUT ASIDE THEIR DIFFERENCES AND OPT FOR PEACE OVER
WAR. ALSO, I SHOULD COMMEND BOTH THE ORGANIZATION OF
AFRICAN UNITY AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC
OF TANZANIA FOR THEIR ROLES IN BRINGING THE TWO PARTIES
TOGETHER.
--THE RESOLUTION JUST ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS
ANOTHER MAJOR STEP IN RESOLVING THE CONFLICT IN RWANDA.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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I HAVE EVERY HOPE THAT OUR ACTION TODAY WILL REINFORCE
PEACE—A CRUCIAL PREREQUISITE WHICH ALLOWS BOTH PARTIES
TO BUILD ON THE TRUST THEY HAVE CREATED. WE SUPPORT THE
DEPLOYMENT OF THIS FORCE BECAUSE I T WILL ADVANCE THE
GOALS OF PEACEFUL CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND
DEMOCRATIZATION, AND ALLOW THE RETURN OF HUNDREDS OF
THOUSANDS OF THOSE WHO HAVE FLED THEIR HOMES. I T IS N W
O
- 0 N F I D G N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 004 919
C
STATE FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C, AF/RA, AND L/UNA;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR SUSAN RICE;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3,
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PGOV, PREL, KDEM, AO, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA: RESOLUTION ADOPTED 10/5
UP TO THE RWANDANS THEMSELVES TO ENSURE THAT THE
TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY MOVES FORWARD.
—AS YOU KNOW, MY GOVERNMENT IS DEEPLY CONCERNED WITH
THE INCREASING BURDEN—BOTH IN TERMS OF MANPOWER AND
FINANCIAL RESOURCES--WHICH THE UNITED NATIONS IS BEING
ASKED TO SHOULDER. FOR THAT REASON, WE ARE PLEASED TO
NOTE THAT THIS RESOLUTION HAS A TIGHTLY FOCUSED
MANDATE. THIS BODY'S CONTINUED SUPPORT WILL DEPEND, IN
LARGE MEASURE, ON THE DEMONSTRATION OF SUBSTANTIVE
PROGRESS TOWARDS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE
AGREEMENT AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TRANSITIONAL
INSTITUTIONS IN ADVANCE OF NATIONAL ELECTIONS. MY
GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR AND WORK TO REDUCE
COSTS AND PERSONNEL LEVELS THROUGHOUT THIS PEACEKEEPING
OPERATION, AND WE LOOK FORWARD TO THE REPORT BY THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL CALLED FOR IN THE RESOLUTION ON WAYS
TO REDUCE UNAMIR'S LEVELS AND TO CONTAIN COSTS.
- N W THAT THIS RESOLUTION HAS PASSED, LET ME STRESS THE
-O
NEED FOR THE UNITED NATIONS AND ALL MEMBER STATES TO
TAKE PROMPT ACTION TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE PRESENT
CLIMATE OF COOPERATIN. LET US HELP RWANDA BEGIN THE
PROCESS OF DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION IN ORDER TO
ALLOW RWANDANS TO REBUILD THEIR COUNTRY AND THEIR
LIVELIHOODS.
ALBRIGHT
BT
#4919
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< SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 04
< SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 04
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< SSN>4919
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< SSN>4919
TOR: 931005214652 M0644328
<'-TOR>931005215311 M0644341
< TOR>931005214755 M0644330
< TOR>931005214758 M0644332
A
A
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP*
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IMMEDIATE
OAASZYUW RUCNDTA5061 2851608-SSSS--RUEADWW.
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
0 121608Z OCT 93
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUCNDT
121608Z OCT 93
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0501
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC
RUDKLD/AMEMBASSY LUANDA 0010
ANGOLA: JUST SAY NO?
SUBJ:
TEXT:
• C C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 005061
Q
STATE FOR AF-A/S MOOSE, IO-A/S BENNET, IO-WARD,
AF/S-HANKINS, IO/UNP-ZELLE, IO/PHO-LOFTIS
WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS NSC - SUSAN RICE
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, AO
SUBJECT: ANGOLA: JUST SAY NO?
1. •OECftGT- - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: THE PERM FIVE WILL MEET OCTOBER 13 TO
DISCUSS THE NEXT STEP FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO TAKE
IN ANGOLA. USUN INTENDS TO SOUND OUT THE OTHER
PARTICIPANTS, AND WOULD APPRECIATE ANY PRELIMINARY
THINKING ON THE USG POSITION. I T APPEARS THE ANGOLA PKO
DOES NOT MEET THE CRITERIA FOR VIABLE UN MISSIONS
SPELLED OUT BY PRESIDENT CLINTON IN HIS SEPTEMBER 27
SPEECH TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. END SUMMARY.
3. PRESIDENT CLINTON ENUMERATED SEVERAL CRITERIA FOR
EVALUATING UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS IN HIS ADDRESS TO
THE UNGA. AMONG THEM WERE: "DOES THE PROPOSED MISSION
HAVE CLEAR OBJECTIVES? CAN AN END POINT TO UN
PARTICIPATION BE IDENTIFIED?" AT THIS POINT, THE
ANSWERS APPEAR TO BE "NO" ON THESE POINTS. THE NEXT
DATE FOR RENEWAL OF UNAVEM I I ' S MANDATE IS DECEMBER 15,
1993. ALTHOUGH THIS DEADLINE IS STILL TWO MONTHS AWAY,
IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE TO START WORKING THE ISSUE SOON,
SINCE POWERFUL INTERESTS ARE INVOLVED. THE PEACEKEEPING
OBSERVERS IN ANGOLA HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO FULFILL THEIR
FUNCTIONS DUE TO THE FIGHTING AND THE LACK OF
WILLINGNESS ON BOTH SIDES SERIOUSLY TO NEGOTIATE A
CEASEFIRE. I F ANY PEACEKEEPING OPERATION SEEMS A
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE FOR BEING TERMINATED, UNAVEM I I MOST
CLOSELY FITS THE BILL. WE WILL BE DISCUSSING ANGOLA AND
THE FUTURE OF THE PKO WITH THE SC PERM FIVE ON
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 13 TO SOUND OUT THE VIEWS OF THE
OTHERS. HOWEVER, THE PROS AND CONS OF CONTINUED UN
INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA WILL HAVE TO BE EXAMINED CLOSELY.
PROBLEMS WITH UNAVEM
r
CLINTON LIBRARY mOTOLU i
DECLASSIFIED
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4. FIGHTING BETWEEN UNITA AND THE GFA RESUMED AFTER THE
SEPTEMBER 1992 ELECTIONS, REACHING WORSE PROPORTIONS
THAN DURING MOST OF THE 16-YEAR CIVIL WAR. ATTEMPTS BY
SRSG'S MARGARET ANSTEE AND THEN ALOUINE BEYE TO GET THE
PARTIES TO RETURN TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE AND AGREE TO
A CEASEFIRE HAVE REPEATEDLY BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL. ATTEMPTS
BY AFRICAN LEADERS SUCH AS COTE D'lVOIRE PRESIDENT
HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY, MOROCCAN KING HASSAN, SAO TOMEAN
PRESIDENT TROVOARE AND OTHERS TO INFLUENCE UNITA LEADER
SAVIMBI TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE GRA HAVE REPEATEDLY BEEN
UNSUCCESSFUL.
5. SINCE THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST UNITA ON
SEPTEMBER 25, THE GRA'S POSITION ON RETURNING TO THE
NEGOTIATING TABLE HAS HARDENED. THE GRA HAS EKUMERATED
SEVERAL NEW CONDITIONS THAT MUST BE MET BY UNITA BEFORE
THE GRA WILL SIT D W TO TALK.
ON
6. SINCE THE RESUMPTION OF FIGHTING, THE SECURITY
COUNCIL HAS PASSED 8 RESOLUTIONS (785, 793, 804, 811,
823, 834, 851 AND 864) CONDEMNING THE VIOLENCE, CALLING
FOR A RETURN TO THE BICESSE ACCORDS, AND URGING BOTH
PARTIES TO NEGOTIATE A CEASEFIRE. THESE RESOLUTIONS
HAVE HAD NO EFFECT ON THE PARTIES, WHO ARE BOTH BENT ON
WINNING MILITARILY. NEITHER SIDE HAS SHOWN A WILLINGNESS
TO TRY SERIOUSLY TO STOP FIGHTING OR TO COMPLY WITH
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. HOWEVER, IN THE RUN-UP TO
EACH RESOLUTION, THE PARTIES HAVE DISPLAYED A
(SHORT-LIVED) WILLINGNESS IN PRINCIPLE TO NEGOTIATE,
WHICH EVAPORATES AFTER THE COUNCIL'S ACTION IS COMPLETED.
7. THE UN SUBSTANTIALLY CUT D W THE SIZE OF ITS
ON
OPERATION IN JANUARY 1993, SHORTLY AFTER FIGHTING
RESUMED. THEY LIMITED THEIR SPHERE OF OPERATIONS TO
CERTAIN SAFE AREAS OF THE COUNTRY. THE NUMBER OF THEIR
OUTPOSTS HAS SHRUNK FURTHER SINCE THAT TIME, AS MORE
AREAS OF THE COUNTRY BECAME TOO DANGEROUS FOR THE
OBSERVERS. THE UN OBSERVERS, WHO WERE ORIGINALLY SENT
TO ANGOLA TO MONITOR THE CEASEFIRE, ARE UNABLE TO
MONITOR OR VERIFY ANYTHING OUTSIDE LUANDA.
8. THE MANDATE GIVEN TO UNAVEM I I ON 2
0 MAY 1991 BY
RESOLUTION 696, REFERS BACK TO THE SYG'S REPORT
S/22627. I T INCLUDES: (A) VERIFICATION OF THE
ARRANGEMENTS AGREED BY THE ANGOLAN PARTIES FOR THE
MONITORING OF THE CEASE-FIRE, AS SET OUT IN THE
CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT, WHICH FORMS PART OF THE PEACE
ACCORDS FOR ANGOLA; (B) VERIFICATION OF THE ARRANGEMENTS
AGREED BY THE ANGOLAN PARTIES FOR THE MONITORING OF THE
ANGOLAN POLICE DURING THE CEASE-FIRE PERIOD, AS SET OUT
IN SECTION I I I OF THE ESTORIL PROTOCOL, WHICH FORMS PART
OF THE PEACE ACCORDS FOR ANGOLA, SUBJECT TO THE
PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 17 BELOW.
• E 0 R D—T SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 005061
0
STATE FOR AF-A/S MOOSE, IO-A/S BENNET, IO-WARD,
AF/S-HANKINS, IO/UNP-ZELLE, IO/PHO-LOFTIS
WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS NSC - SUSAN RICE
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, AO
SUBJECT: ANGOLA: JUST SAY NO?
9. UNAVEM CANNOT CARRY OUT THE MANDATE GIVEN IT BY THE
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD004\OCT93\MSGS\M0655126.html
COUNCIL IN MAY 1991, SINCE THE PEACE ACCORDS HAVE BEEN
TOTALLY ABROGATED. THE SYG'S PERIODIC UPDATES ON
CONDITIONS IN ANGOLA ARE BASED ON PRESS ACCOUNTS AND
COMMUNIQUES FROM THE TWO SIDES. THE SYG OPENLY ADMITS
IN THESE UPDATES THAT THE UNAVEM OBSERVERS ARE UNABLE TO
VERIFY THESE REPORTS OF FIGHTING, OR OF CEASEFIRES
HOLDING.
10. THE MAY 1991 MANDATE GIVEN TO UNAVEM I I WAS TO LAST
"UNTIL THE DAY FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION OF PRESIDENTIAL
AND LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS IN ANGOLA, WHICH ARE TO BE
HELD IN THE PERIOD BETWEEN 1 SEPTEMBER AND 30 NOVEMBER
1992." I T HAS ALREADY RUN TEN MONTHS PAST ITS PROJECTED
END. MUCH OF UNAVEM I I ' S EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN SHIPPED
OVER TO MOZAMBIQUE FOR THE USE OF ONUMOZ, SINCE MOST OF
UNAVEM'S PERSONNEL WERE SENT HOME.
11. BOTH PARTIES ARE ASKING FOR A MUCH LARGER UN
PRESENCE. SRSG BEYE REPORTEDLY HAS ASKED THE UN
SECRETARIAT TO PREPARE CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR A FORCE OF
UP TO FIFTEEN BATTALIONS. NEEDLESS TO SAY, A FORCE OF
THAT MAGNITUDE WOULD BE EXPENSIVE.
REASONS TO KEEP UNAVEM:
12. I F WE DO TRY TO PULL THE PLUG ON UNAVEM I I , I T
WOULD NOT BE EASY. THE AFRICAN MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL,
AS WELL AS BRAZIL, COULD READ THIS AS A SIGN THAT THE
USG WISHES TO WASH ITS HANDS AND AFRICA AND AFRICAN
PROBLEMS. WE HAVE STRONG ARGUMENTS AGAINST THIS CHARGE,
HOWEVER, BASED ON LIBERIA, RWANDA, MOZAMBIQUE AND
SOMALIA. BOTH UNITA AND THE GRA, FOR DIFFERING REASONS,
WANT TO SEE A VASTLY INCREASED UN FORCE IN ANGOLA, AND
WOULD COMPLAIN BITTERLY TO THEIR CONGRESSIONAL
SUPPORTERS ABOUT A PULL-OUT. ARETURN TO FULL-SCALE
CIVIL WAR WOULD BE LIKELY I F THE UN WITHDREW.
CONTINUATION OF THE UN'S MEDIATION EFFORTS MAY
EVENTUALLY RESULT IN A LASTING PEACE, BUT THESE EFFORTS
COULD CONTINUE REGARDLESS OF THE FATE OF UNAVEM I I .
SOME GAINS IN THIS DIRECTION MAY HAVE BEEN MADE IN
RECENT DAYS, I F THE PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THE PARTIES
ARE TO BE BELIEVED THIS TIME. IN ADDITION, U.S. OIL
COMPANIES IN ANGOLA MAY HAVE A STRONG INTEREST IN HAVING
THE UN FORCE REMAIN.
CONCLUSION
12. ALTHOUGH ACTION ON UNAVEM I I IS STILL TWO MONTHS
AWAY, I T WILL BE A TOUGH BATTLE IN THE COUNCIL I F THE
USG DECIDES TO VOTE NOT TO RENEW THE MANDATE. WE ARE
BRINGING I T UP AT THIS TIME, HOWEVER, BECAUSE WE REALIZE
THAT WASHINGTON WILL NEED TIME TO MAKE SUCH A
CONTROVERSIAL DECISION, AND USUN WILL THEN NEED TIME TO
GET OTHERS IN THE COUNCIL ON OUR SIDE.
ALBRIGHT
BT
#5061
NNNN
SECT:
SSN:
SECTION: 01 OF 02
<'-SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
5061
V
<' SSN>5061
TOR: 931012123019 M0655126
<' TOR>931012123021 M0655127
V
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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DIST:
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SIT: CLARKER FILE GEORGEL RAGLE RICE SUM2 VAX W R
AD
•
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Page 4 of 4
�ITU)
02. 08.
'Ol
ic::56
NO.
MoUUduiiu
PAGc
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C.
20520
February 7, 1994
-CQNFlDCNTijsfc
MEMORANDUM
TO:
To the
Files
FROM:
IO/PHO - David Jensen
SUBJECT:
My V i s i t t o Rwanda, February 1-4, 1994
The f o l l o w i n g are surnmary notes from my v i s i t t o Rwanda l a s t
week t o consult on the operations of the UN Assistance Mission
for Rwanda (UNAMIR). A copy of my f u l l schedule i s also
attached. Copies of materials provided by UNAMIR b r i e f e r s are
also a v a i l a b l e i f you would l i k e t o read them i n d e t a i l .
Mv General Impressions
My v i s i t t o Rwanda generally r e i n f o r c e d my previous impression,
gained from UN, embassy, and other r e p o r t i n g , that the
implementation of UNAMIR's peacekeeping mandate (as expressed
i n UNSCRs 872 and 893) i s proceeding reasonably w e l l . UNAMIR
is under excellent leadership and has s a t i s f a c t o r i l y completed
Phase I of i t s mission — i . e . , the K i g a l i Weapons Secure Area
has been established; the RPF b a t t a l i o n has a r r i v e d safely i n
K i g a l i ; the ceasefire remains i n place throughout the country;
and preparations have been completed f o r the formation of the
t r a n s i t i o n a l government, as c a l l e d f o r i n the Arusha peace
accords. Phase I I of the mission, which includes deployment of
a second b a t t a l i o n to the DMZ and preparation of assembly
points f o r the government and RPF forces, was scheduled to
begin as soon as the t r a n s i t i o n a l government was established.
However, UNAMIR has decided t o begin deployment of the second
b a t t a l i o n (from Ghana) to the DMZ during the second week of
February, even i f the government has not yet been formed.
•COHriDEMKM,
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
^ - o i 1.3 n
�- 2 -
Two major problem areas, however, have become more apparent to
me as a r e s u l t of my v i s i t .
The f i r s t one i s t h a t the
p o l i t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s i n implementing the Arusha agreement are
more troublesome than I had p r e v i o u s l y t h o u g h t . The f o r m a t i o n
of the t r a n s i t i o n a l government has a l r e a d y been s t a l l e d more
than one month, and many Rwandans on both sides have grown more
p e s s i m i s t i c about f i n d i n g a l a s t i n g s o l u t i o n anytime soon.
These u n c e r t a i n t i e s have a l r e a d y delayed UNAMIR's
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n t i m e t a b l e and have a l s o made i t more d i f f i c u l t
f o r UNAMIR t o c a r r y on i t s present t a s k of h e l p i n g t o ensure
s e c u r i t y i n the K i g a l i area.
The second major problem area i s the l a c k of adeguate
l o g i s t i c a l support f o r the UNAMIR peacekeepers and s t a f f .
UNAMIR i s e s p e c i a l l y e x p e r i e n c i n g c o n s i d e r a b l e d i f f i c u l t i e s i n
o b t a i n i n g UN budgetary a u t h o r i t y t o procure the t r a n s p o r t a t i o n
and communications eguipment needed t o f u l f i l l i t s m i s s i o n .
This shortage of equipment i s c l e a r l y harming UNAMIR's morale
and hampering i t s o v e r a l l e f f e c t i v e n e s s . While some
improvements have o c c u r r e d r e c e n t l y i n the p r o v i s i o n of
l o g i s t i c a l s u p p o r t , UNAMIR expects t h a t these shortage problems
w i l l c o n t i n u e f o r s e v e r a l more months. They w i l l l i k e l y be
exacerbated i n the near term by the imminent a r r i v a l o f the
second b a t t a l i o n from Ghana.
D e s p i t e these two major problem areas, prospects f o r the
success of the UNAMIR m i s s i o n are s t i l l good, p r i m a r i l y because
the support o f the Rwandan people f o r the peace process and the
UNAMIR m i s s i o n remains s t r o n g . N e v e r t h e l e s s , p a t i e n c e on a l l
sides i s c l e a r l y wearing t h i n .
UNAMIR's e f f e c t i v e n e s s w i l l
g r a d u a l l y d i m i n i s h unless the p o l i t i c a l stalemate over the
t r a n s i t i o n a l government i s ended soon. Many of t h e p o l i t i c a l
p a r t i e s i n Rwanda have extreme elements which are opposed t o
the peace process, and these groups are u s i n g the p r e s e n t
s t a l e m a t e t o step up t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s t o make the s i t u a t i o n
even more d i f f i c u l t .
S i g n i f i c a n t amounts o f arms remain
o u t s i d e the c o n t r o l of UNAMIR.
Additional
(1)
Impressions
UNAMIR i s o p e r a t i n g w e l l , d e s p i t e the p o l i t i c a l and
l o g i s t i c a l problems i t i s f a c i n g . I t s l e a d e r s h i p i s
i n t e l l i g e n t , e n e r g e t i c , d i p l o m a t i c a l l y s e n s i t i v e , and
w e l l respected by both the government and r e b e l f o r c e s ,
as w e l l as o u t s i d e o b e r v e r s .
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CeNFIDEWTTMr
- 3-
(2)
Neither of the two major forces ( i . e . , RGF and RPF) had
any complaints f o r me about UNAMIR's general plan of
action, i t s commitment t o the peace process, or i t s
neutrality.
(3)
Only two complaints were raised by the Rwandans about
UNAMIR: (a) i t has i n s u f f i c i e n t l o g i s t i c a l support to
f u l f i l l i t s mandate as w e l l as hoped; and (b) i t has an
inadequate mandate to act "aggressively" to gain c o n t r o l
over the many bandit groups and scattered supplies of
weapons i n Rwanda, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n K i g a l i .
(4)
UNAMIR Force Commander D a l l a i r e has sought greater
a u t h o r i t y from UN headquarters to be more pro-active,
but has been t o l d t o hold back.
(5)
Most observers I met, i n c l u d i n g many i n the government,
believe the main cause of the present stalemate i n
creating the t r a n s i t i o n a l government i s the Rwandan
,
President's reluctance t o give up some of his powers to
the t r a n s i t i o n a l Cabinet and Assembly; some believe he
p a r t i c u l a r l y fears an i n v e s t i g a t i o n by a t r a n s i t i o n a l
government i n t o alleged past crimes and abuses of human
r i g h t s by his government.
(6)
A large number of Rwandans expressed t h e i r hopes to me
that the U.S. government would undertake i n i t i a t i v e s to
bring about somehow a s o l u t i o n t o t h i s impasse.
(7)
A l l sides are s t i l l generally expressing hope and
patience about the peace process, but these p o s i t i v e
f e e l i n g s are diminishing while suspicion and d i s t r u s t
are growing.
(8)
I t appears that increased actions from outsiders are
needed to break the present stalemate; perhaps through a
combination of inputs from U.S., Belgian, French, and
A f r i c a n sources (note: the OAU and/or former Tanzanian
President Nyerere were mentioned t o me as p o s s i b i l i t i e s
on the A f r i c a n s i d e ) .
(9)
A f t e r a reportedly slow s t a r t , SRSYG Booh-Booh i s
playing an i n c r e a s i n g l y important r o l e i n b r i n g i n g the
main p a r t i e s together t o discuss possible s o l u t i o n s to
the present p o l i t i c a l impasse.
CUNTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�k'iuj
02. 08.
'01
12:38
NO.
14600^0210
CQNFIDBHTafr
-
4
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Specific Impressiops on UNAMIR
(1)
UNAMIR has e x c e l l e n t l e a d e r s h i p a t t h e t o p and g e n e r a l l y
e n t h u s i a s t i c support at t h e lower l e v e l s , a l t h o u g h
morale i s a d v e r s e l y impacted by l o g i s t i c a l problems.
(2)
B e l g i a n u n i t s are c l e a r l y b e t t e r equipped than t h e
Banglashi u n i t s ; t h e Belgians have been g i v e n
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e s e c u r i t y o f t h e most c r i t i c a l
areas i n K i g a l i .
(3)
UNAMIR deployment i n t h e DMZ i s very sparse, b u t
f o r t u n a t e l y no s e r i o u s v i o l a t i o n s o f t h e c e a s e f i r e have
thus f a r o c c u r r e d i n t h a t area.
(4)
Due t o a l a c k o f housing arrangements thus f a r o u t s i d e
of K i g a l i , most UNAMIR peacekeepers based i n t h e DMZ and
RPF s e c t o r s t r a v e l back and f o r t h from K i g a l i every day,
p l a c i n g an even g r e a t e r burden on UNAMIR's l i m i t e d
•
supply o f v e h i c l e s .
(5)
I t i s n o t y e t known i f t h e Ghanian b a t t a l i o n w i l l b r i n g
s i g n i f i c a n t amounts o f equipment and/or v e h i c l e s w i t h
i t ; even i f . t h e y have v e h i c l e s t o send, i t w i l l take
months b e f o r e they a r r i v e i n Dar es Salaam, Tanzania by
sea f o r onward t r a n s p o r t by land t o Rwanda.
(6)
There have been some r e p o r t s o f f i g h t i n g , p a r t i c u l a r l y
by B e l g i a n peacekeepers, i n l o c a l bars, b u t these have
r e p o r t e d l y thus f a r been o n l y i s o l a t e d i n c i d e n t s which
have been d e a l t w i t h e x p e d i t i o u s l y w i t h o u t s i g n i f i c a n t l y
harming t h e Rwandans o v e r a l l h i g h regard f o r UNAMIR.
(7)
Our embassy has, however, heard rumours o f d r u g - d e a l i n g
by some o f t h e Bangladeshi f o r c e s , which, i f t r u e , c o u l d
prove troublesome.
(8)
UNAMIR i s p a r t i c u l a r l y hampered by t h e l a c k o f a
t r a n s i t i o n a l government because i t i s never e n t i r e l y
c e r t a i n w i t h which groups i t should work.
(9)
UNAMIR o f f i c e r s t o l d me t h a t t h e government f o r c e s have
c l e a r l y been l e s s c o o p e r a t i v e than t h e RPF u n i t s ; we
c e r t a i n l y n o t i c e d a l e s s - t h a n - p o s i t i v e a t t i t u d e toward
our UNAMIR e s c o r t from t h e government f o r c e s manning
check p o i n t s d u r i n g our t r a v e l s o u t s i d e o f K i g a l i .
-CONFIDENT I AT,
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�NL;.
I 4 0<_i Lt - o n . :
- 5-
(10) UNAMIR has stationed some of i t s observers south of K i g a l i
i n Butare to monitor any possible movements of people or
troops out of Burundi, e s p e c i a l l y i f the p o l i t i c a l
s i t u a t i o n i n that country remains unresolved.
Attachment: a/s
Copies sent t o :
State - AF/C, AF/RA, IO/UNP
JCS/J-5/UN, JCS/J-5/MEAF
OSD/RSA/AFR
OSD/PK/PE
NSC - Rice
USUN
CONF I DENT HA
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP
-<DIST>PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT{C2} SODERBERG WOLIN
SIT: BEERS CLARKER DARRAGH DESHAZER FILE MITCHELL RICE SCHWARTZ
STEINBERG SUM SUM2 VAX
<PREC>IMMEDIATE<CLAS>CONFIDENTIAL<OSRI>RUCNDT<DTG>090140Z APR 94
<ORIG>USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
<TO>RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5575
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0339
INFO RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI PRIORITY 0178
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 1675
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0413
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0150
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 1082
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 0 308
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0857
<SUBJ> PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED FOR SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION ON EVACUATING FOREIGN NATIONALS AND UNAMIR FROM
RWANDA
<TEXT>
C O N F I D E N T I A L
SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 00147 3
DEPT FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C AND L/AF;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR SRICE, DMOZENA
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J 3 ;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, MARR, PGOV, KDEM, RW, UNSC, CG
SUBJECT: PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED FOR SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION ON EVACUATING FOREIGN NATIONALS AND UNAMIR FROM
RWANDA
1. •CONFIDENE^ftfc - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: ON APRIL 8 UN, BELGIAN, FRENCH, AND US
REPRESENTATIVES DISCUSSED A POSSIBLE FOUR-STAGE
PROCEDURE FOR OBTAINING SECURITY COUNCIL "BLESSING" OF
EVACUATION OF FOREIGN NATIONALS AND UNAMIR I F THERE IS
NO SOLID CEASE-FIRE WITHIN TWENTY-FOUR HOURS: MEMBER
STATES NOTIFY THE SYG OF THEIR CONCERN FOR THEIR
CITIZENS I N RWANDA; THE SYG NOTIFIES THE SECURITY
COUNCIL OF THE MEMBER STATES' CONCERNS AND RECOMMENDS
THAT UNAMIR ALSO BE EVACUATED; THE SECURITY COUNCIL
MEETS; THE SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVES THE SYG'S
RECOMMENDATION THAT UNAMIR AND FOREIGN NATIONALS BE
EVACUATED WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF MEMBER STATES. END
SUMMARY.
3. ON APRIL 8 UN OFFICIALS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF
FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND THE US MET TO DISCUSS CONTINGENCY
PLANS AND PROCEDURES FOR OBTAINING SECURITY COUNCIL
"BLESSING" FOR EVACUATING FOREIGN NATIONALS FROM RWANDA
SHOULD THE SITUATION NOT IMPROVE WITHIN THE NEXT 24
HOURS. PRESENT FROM USUN WERE AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH,
MILAD COL. CLONTZ, AND POLOFF MICHAEL BARNETT; AMONG
THOSE FROM UNDPKO WERE U/SYG KOFI ANNAN, DIMITRY TITOV,
AND ISEL RIVERO.
4. UNDERSECRETARY FOR PEACEKEEPING ANNAN OPENED THE
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
S/^/iS KBH
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
MEETING BY OUTLINING A DIRE SITUATION I N RWANDA: MANY
PEACEKEEPERS EITHER KILLED OR INJURED; POSSIBLY TWO
ADDITIONAL BELGIANS KILLED TODAY; ONLY FOUR DAYS OF
SUPPLIES REMAINING FOR UNAMIR TROOPS (WHICH MEANS THAT
THERE ARE PROBABLY LESS FOR FOREIGN NATIONALS); AND SO
FAR FC DAILLARE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO ARRANGE A
CEASE-FIRE OR ACCESS TO THE AIRPORT.
5. ANNAN UNDERSTANDS THE LIKELIHOOD OF MEMBER STATES
EVACUATING THEIR NATIONALS FROM RWANDA, AND UNAMIR I S
READY TO ASSIST I N THAT EVACUATION. THERE ARE ROUGHLY
3,000 TO 4,000 FOREIGN NATIONALS THAT WILL NEED TO BE
EVACUATED, WHICH INCLUDES APPROXIMATELY 1500 BELGIANS,
300 FRENCH, 300 GERMANS, AND 200 AMERICANS.
6. THEN ANNAN ANNOUNCED THAT UNAMIR MUST BE EVACUATED
WITH FOREIGN NATIONALS I F THERE IS NO EFFECTIVE
CEASE-FIRE SOON. UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS I F UNAMIR
REMAINS WHILE FOREIGN NATIONALS DEPART, HE CONTINUED, I T
WILL BECOME A TARGET FOR RWANDANS SEEKING REVENGE. ANNAN
SAID THAT HE WAS SPEAKING FOR THE SYG.
7. THE FRENCH SAID THAT THEY HAD SPOKEN TO THE CHINESE
ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF HAVING THE SECURITY COUNCIL
APPROVE A FRENCH EVACUATION EFFORT THAT WOULD INVOLVE
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, OPENING THE AIRPORT, EVACUATING
FOREIGN NATIONALS, AND HAVING UNAMIR BECOME A CHAPTER
V I I OPERATION. THE CHINESE SAID THAT THEY WOULD NOT
OPPOSE SUCH A MOVE SO LONG AS I T WAS FOR HUMANITARIAN
PURPOSES AND FOR A VERY LIMITED PERIOD. THE FRENCH GAVE
EVERY INDICATION THAT THEY WERE READY TO MOVE VERY SOON,
AND THAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL
AUTHORITY. PERHAPS SOMETHING STRONGER THAN YESTERDAY'S
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THE
FRENCH DEPPERMREP SAID.
8. THE GROUP THEN DISCUSSED A POSSIBLE FOUR-STAGE
PROCESS FOR AUTHORIZING THE EVACUATION OF BOTH FOREIGN
NATIONALS AND UNAMIR I N THE NEXT DAY OR TWO I F THERE IS
NO CEASE FIRE. FIRST, THE MEMBER STATES INFORM THE SYG
THAT THEY ARE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SAFETY OF THEIR
FOREIGN NATIONALS, THAT THEY WILL TAKE WHATEVER ACTIONS
ARE NECESSARY TO PROTECT THEIR NATIONALS, AND THAT THEY
SEEK UNAMIR'S ASSISTANCE I N THIS EVACUATION EFFORT.
ANNAN ADDED THAT I T WAS VERY IMPORTANT THAT THE MEMBER
STATES, AND NOT THE SYG, INITIATE THE REQUEST;
C O N F I D E N T I A L .
SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 00147 3
DEPT FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C AND L/AF;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR SRICE, DMOZENA
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, MARR, PGOV, KDEM, RW, UNSC, CG
SUBJECT: PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED FOR SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION ON EVACUATING FOREIGN NATIONALS AND UNAMIR FROM
RWANDA
OTHERWISE, I T MIGHT APPEAR THAT THE SYG WAS ABANDONING
RWANDA.
9. SECOND, THE SYG WOULD USE THIS LETTER FROM THE MEMBER
STATES TO APPROACH THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND RECOMMEND
THAT UNAMIR ALSO BE EVACUATED BECAUSE OF THE THREAT TO
THE LIVES OF THE PEACEKEEPERS AND BECAUSE THE ORIGINAL
CONDITIONS FOR HAVING THE MANDATE NO LONGER EXIST.
ANNAN MADE I T CLEAR THAT UNAMIR SHOULD NOT BE LEFT
�CLINTON LIBRAKY PHOTOCOPY
BEHIND, AND THAT THOSE STATES WHO ARE DIRECTLY INVOLVED
IN THE EVACUATION EFFORT ALSO MAKE PLANS TO EVACUATE THE
2500 UNAMIR TROOPS.
10. THIRD, THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONVENES TO DISCUSS THE
EVACUATION OF FOREIGN NATIONALS AND UNAMIR BY MEMBER
STATES. FINALLY, THE SECURITY COUNCIL AUTHORIZES THE
AFOREMENTIONED REQUESTS, EITHER BY A RESPONDING LETTER
TO THE SYG, A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT, OR, POSSIBLY, A
RESOLUTION.
11. ANNAN URGED THAT THOSE THINKING ABOUT EVACUATING
THEIR NATIONALS SEEK THE APPROVAL OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL; THIS I S A PRECEDENT-SETTING MOVE, HE
EMPHASIZED, AND WE MUST BE VERY CAREFUL TO ENSURE THAT
WE SET THE RIGHT PRECEDENT THAT GIVES THIS ACTION REAL
LEGITIMACY: " E KNOW WHAT WE WANT TO DO, BUT WE MUST DO
W
I T CORRECTLY."
12. BUJUMBURA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
ALBRIGHT
NNNN
<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02<SSN>1473<STOR>940408224614 M0983623
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02<SSN>1473<STOR>940408224617 M0983625
<TOR>940408215405
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
SI.
United States Department of State
{Washington, D.C.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
Operations Center
TFRW01
SITUATION REPORT NO. 31
SITUATION AS OF 1100 EDT, 04/11/94
'RWOl
S-0(2)
S-S
5(3)
'S-IRM
'S-O/CMS
'S-EX
)ITOR
JL STATE
3UREAUS &
)FFICES
20520
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
The s i t u a t i o n i n Bujumbura remains calm.
Dependents began t o depart the evening of A p r i l 11.
M i l i t a r y assets are scheduled t o depart Bujumbura f o r
Mombasa during the d a y l i g h t hours of the 12th.
•
(LOU) A T o t a l of 232 Americans ( o f f i c i a l and
p r i v a t e ) have reportedly departed Rwanda and 39 Americans
remain. Based on the best information a v a i l a b l e , the
s t a t i s t i c s on the evacuation are as f o l l p w s :
)DITIONAL:
/DGP
Departed v i a USG Convoys
Departed v i a other means
105 Amcits
127 Amcits
/FLO
Total
232 Amcits
h/HO
Remaining temporarily
w i t h I n t ' l Organizations
(UNAMIR and ICRC)
Choosing t o stay
On the Zaire Border
Scheduled t o evacuate w i t h
an I t a l i a n group
13 Amcits
18 Amcits
6 Amcits
Total
39 Amcits
THER
AGENCIES:
ID
SIA (LDX)
IA (LDX)
NERGY (LDX)
BIS (LDX)
CS (LDX)
MCC (LDX)
MIC (LDX)
SA (LDX)
iSC (LDX)
ISOC (LDX)
;ECDEF
(LDX)
"REAS (LDX)
IHSR (LDX)
2 Amcits
•
(U) The President and Mrs. C l i n t o n and the Secretary
and Mrs. Christopher v i s i t e d the Task Force the evening
of A p r i l 11. The President o f f e r e d his sincere thanks t o
everyone who had helped t o evacuate Americans from
Rwanda. We understand that t h i s i s only the second time
a President has v i s i t e d the Ops Center.
•
The Belgian Government has shown a w i l l i n g n e s s
to use i t s contingent t o UNAMIR t o e x t r a c t the 11 German
Deutsche Welle technicians trapped at Mt. Kininya. The
Belgian MFA has asked us f o r coordinates f o r the
Germans. We have asked the Germans t o get i n d i r e c t
contact w i t h the Belgian Ops Center.
Arlene Render
Coordinator
Mark Kennon
Senior Watch O f f i c e r
CONFIDENTIAL
DECL:OADR
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
51.
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C.
20520
eOMFIDEWTIAL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
O p e r a t i o n s Center
TFRW01
SITUATION REPORT NO. 3 2
SITUATION AS OF 1100 EDT, 04/11/94
RWOl
S-0(2)
S-S
S(3)
S-IRM
S-O/CMS
S-EX
I TOR
(5)
•It STATE
IUREAUS &
JFFICES
>DITIONAL:
5
'DGP
4P
FLO
A
/
\/HO
•
(U) The B e l g i a n Government has d i s p a t c h e d t h r e e
Sabena c h a r t e r s f o r e v a c u a t i o n f l i g h t s from K i g a l i a t
l e a s t one o f which r e t u r n e d t o Brussels on t h e 11th.
•
The French and Belgians a r e c o n s i d e r i n g c l o s i n g
t h e i r m i s s i o n s and w i t h d r a w i n g t h e i r t r o o p c o n t r i b u t i o n s
to UNAMIR w h i l e t h e UN S e c r e t a r i a t i s a d v o c a t i n g t h e
w i t h d r a w a l o f UNAMIR f o r c e s . Decisions a r e expected from
a l l t h r e e w i t h i n t h e n e x t two days. A UN w i t h d r a w a l
would remove t h e v e r y l i m i t e d moderating e f f e c t o f t h e UN
presence and p l a c e a t immediate r i s k some 5,000 Rwandans
who have taken r e f u g e on t h e UNAMIR compound.
•
(U) DOD/OSD has approved a UN request t o t r a n s f e r 6
US p r o v i d e d Armored Personnel C a r r i e r s from UNOSOM I I t o
UNAMIR t o s u p p o r t e v a c u a t i o n . APCs had been p r o v i d e d on
lease and w i l l be t r a n s f e r e d on non US a i r c r a f t .
No US
personnel w i l l be i n v o l v e d i n t h e t r a n s f e r .
THER
?VGENCIES:
ID
SIA (LDX)
IA (LDX)
NERGY (LDX)
BIS (LDX)
CS (LDX)
MCC (LDX)
MIC (LDX)
SA (LDX)
SC (LDX)
ISOC (LDX)
lECDEF (LDX)
"REAS (LDX)
IHSR (LDX)
Arlenj« Render
Coordinator
^eter P e t r i h o s
Senior Watch O f f i c e r
DECL:OADR
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
<DIST>PRT: SIT{C2}
SIT: CLARKER DESHAZER RICE STEINBERG SUM SUM2 VAX
<PREC>IMMEDIATE<CLAS>CONFIDENTIALOSRI>RUCNDT<DTG>150141Z APR 94
<ORIG>USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
<TO>RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 57 21
INFO RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0358
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY 0170
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 1104
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 04 35
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 0327
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0879
M-nuiAjri
<SUBJ>TFRWOL: UN RECOMMENDATIONS TO BE ACTED UPON 4/15
<TEXT>
C O N F I D E N T I A L
SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 001581
DEPT FOR IO-DAS WARD, ALSO RWANDA TASK FORCE;
WHITEHOUSE PASS NSC FOR D. CLARK, S. RICE AND D.STEINBERG;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J 3 ;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, RW
SUBJECT: TFRWOL: UN RECOMMENDATIONS TO BE ACTED UPON 4/15
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: THE UN SYG PRESENTED TWO OPTIONS FOR THE
FUTURE OF UNAMIR. THE COUNCIL HOPES TO DECIDE BETWEEN
THOSE TWO OPTIONS AND ADOPT A RESOLUTION FRIDAY
AFTERNOON, APRIL 15. MISSION SEEKS URGENT GUIDANCE.
END SUMMARY.
3. THE UN SECRETARIAT PRESENTED RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE
SECURITY COUNCIL APRIL 14 ON POSSIBLE WAYS TO PROCEED I N
RWANDA. THE SECRETARIAT CLARIFIED THAT THE SYG WAS NOT
RPT NOT RECOMMENDING TOTAL PULLOUT OF UNAMIR. THEY
TERMED THAT AN INCORRECT INTERPRETATION OF THE SYG'S
LETTER OF 4/13.
FORCE COMMANDER GENERAL DALLAIRE HAS
REPORTED THAT BOTH THE PARTIES HAVE CONVEYED A DESIRE TO
SEE UNAMIR STAY I N RWANDA. GEN. DALLAIRE WISHES TO USE
THIS DESIRE AS LEVERAGE OVER THE PARTIES TO FORCE THEM
TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. ALSO, I T I S NOT LOGISTICALLY
POSSIBLE TO PULL UNAMIR'S TROOPS OVERNIGHT.
4. PRECONDITION: GEN. DALLAIRE WOULD PRESENT AN
ULTIMATUM TO THE PARTIES. THEY WOULD HAVE 5 DAYS TO ONE
WEEK TO WORK OUT A CEASE-FIRE. GEN DALLAIRE WOULD LET
THE PARTIES KNOW THAT DURING THAT TIME, HE AND UNHQ
WOULD BE PREPARING A PLAN FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNAMIR.
ALSO DURING THOSE 5 DAYS, DALLAIRE WOULD STRENGTHEN
UNAMIR'S PRESENCE AT THE AIRPORT. I F THE PARTIES DID
AGREE ON A CEASE-FIRE WITHIN 5 DAYS, ONE OF TWO OPTIONS
COULD KICK IN.
5. OPTION ONE: ALL OF UNAMIR, MINUS THE BELGIAN
CONTINGENT, WOULD STAY I N RWANDA, BUT MOVE OUT OF THE
DMZ AND REDEPLOY TO KIGALI. DALLAIRE WOULD SET ANOTHER
DEADLINE FOR THE PARTIES: THEY WOULD HAVE 3 WEEKS TO
RETURN TO THE PEACE PROCESS. THE PARTIES WOULD HAVE TO
DECLASSIFIED
P E R E O ITOfi
' J.
^ ~ O^toi- \ \
3/n/)5" K B H
a
O U
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
MEET CERTAIN CONDITIONS — BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
SECURITY OF UNAMIR PERSONNEL, GUARANTEE FREEDOM OF
MOVEMENT, KEEP THE AIRPORT NEUTRAL. AT FIVE OR SIX DAYS
BEFORE THE EXPIRATION OF THE 3 WEEKS, DALLAIRE WOULD
WARN THE PARTIES THAT THEIR TIME WAS RUNNING OUT, AND
THAT UNAMIR WAS PLANNING FOR COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL. I F
NEGOTIATIONS HAD NOT RESUMED WITHIN 3 WEEKS, UNAMIR
WOULD WITHDRAW.
6. OPTION TWO: ONCE A CEASE-FIRE WAS REACHED WITHIN 5
DAYS, REDUCE UNAMIR TO A MINIMAL POLITICAL PRESENCE (THE
SRSG, SUPPORT STAFF AND A SECURITY DETAIL OF AT LEAST
150 MEN) FOR AN UNSPECIFIED TIME. THIS WOULD PRESUPPOSE
THAT THE PARTIES WERE NOT HEADED BACK TOWARDS THE ARUSHA
FRAMEWORK QUICKLY.
7. POSSIBLE OPTION THREE: ALTHOUGH NOT FORMALLY
PRESENTED AS ONE OF THE SYG'S OPTIONS, THE SECRETARIAT
SUGGESTED THAT OPTION ONE AND TWO MIGHT BE COMBINED.
NAMELY, AFTER 3 WEEKS HAD PASSED I F NEGOTIATIONS HAD NOT
STARTED THE FORCE WOULD BE REDUCED TO THE SIZE OF OPTION
TWO.
8. THE SYG PREFERS OPTION ONE. FRANCE ALSO PREFERS
OPTION ONE. NIGERIA ASKED FOR TIME TO CONVENE A MEETING
OF THE NON-ALIGNED CAUCUS TO WORK OUT THEIR POSITION.
OTHERS ASKED FOR TIME TO GET INSTRUCTIONS FROM
CAPITALS. ONE THING WHICH I S UNCLEAR, AND WHICH MANY
MEMBERS OF THE SC, INCLUDING AMB ALBRIGHT, QUERIED WAS
WHAT WOULD HAPPEN I F NO CF WAS REACHED WITHIN 5 DAYS.
UK POINTED OUT THAT THE COUNCIL NEEDS TO EXPLICITLY
SPELL OUT WHAT THE MANDATE OF UNAMIR UNDER OPTION 1 OR 2
WOULD BE. ALL AGREED THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION ON
THE GROUND DEMANDS THAT THE COUNCIL MAKE A DECISION AND
ADOPT A RESOLUTION BY TOMORROW, FRIDAY, 15 APRIL.
9. THROUGHOUT THE DAY, A WORKING GROUP OF THE COUNCIL
HAMMERED OUT LANGUAGE FOR A RESOLUTION, LEAVING ASIDE
THE MOST-CONTENTIOUS ISSUE OF THE FUTURE MANDATE AND
SIZE OF UNAMIR. A FEW BRACKETED ALTERNATIVES REMAIN I N
THE TEXT, WHICH WILL BE SORTED OUT TOMORROW AT THE
AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL.
10. SUBSEQUENT TO THE SC INFORMALS, THE PRESIDENT OF
• - N F I- D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 001581
CQ
DEPT FOR IO-DAS WARD, ALSO RWANDA TASK FORCE;
WHITEHOUSE PASS NSC FOR D. CLARK, S. RICE AND D.STEINBERG;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J 3 ;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, RW
SUBJECT: TFRWOL: UN RECOMMENDATIONS TO BE ACTED UPON 4/15
THE COUNCIL, I N CONSULTATION WITH FRANCE AND NIGERIA,
WORKED OUT AN ADDITION TO THE DRAFT TEXT WHICH THEY
HOPED WOULD MEET AMERICAN CONCERNS. THE TEXT WOULD
CLEARLY LAY OUT THE 5-DAY ULTIMATUM, AND PUT OFF ANY
DECISION ON THE TWO OPTIONS UNTIL LATER.
11. BEGIN TEXT OF NEW, KEY OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS:
— DEMANDS THAT THE PARTIES AGREE TO AN IMMEDIATE
CEASEFIRE THROUGHOUT RWANDA.
— DECIDES THAT, I F WITHIN FIVE DAYS OF THE ADOPTION OF
THIS RESOLUTION, THERE IS AN EFFECTIVE CEASEFIRE I N
PLACE, THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL REVIEW THE MANDATE AND
COMPOSITION OF UNAMIR WITH A VIEW TO ASSISTING THE
PARTIES I N A RESUMPTION OF THE PEACE PROCESS I N RWANDA
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
ON THE BASIS OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT.
— FURTHER DECIDES THAT, I F WITHIN FIVE DAYS OF THE
ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION, THERE I S NO EFFECTIVE
CEASEFIRE I N PLACE, THE COUNCIL WILL RECONSIDER THE
CONTINUED PRESENCE OF UNAMIR I N RWANDA.
END TEXT.
12. COMMENT: THESE PARAGRAPHS WILL NOT ACTUALLY COMMIT
THE USG TO MUCH, SINCE "ASSISTING THE PARTIES I N
RESUMPTION OF THE PEACE PROCESS" MIGHT BE ACCOMPLISHED
WITH A SMALL POLITICAL PRESENCE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE
THREAT OF PULLING OUT IS IMPLIED BY "RECONSIDERTHE
CONTINUED PRESENCE OF UNAMIR". THIS SEEMS A GOOD
COMPROMISE FOR NOW. THE FRENCH, OF COURSE, WILL EXERT
PRESSURE, I F THERE I S A CEASE-FIRE I N 5 DAYS, TO ACCEPT
A LARGE UNAMIR PRESENCE. END COMMENT.
13. BEGIN TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION:
(NON-AGREED
LANGUAGE WITHIN DOUBLE PARENTHESES):
THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
REAFFIRMING ALL ITS PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS ON THE
SITUATION I N RWANDA, I N PARTICULAR ITS RESOLUTION 872
(1993) OF 5 OCTOBER 1993 BY WHICH I T ESTABLISHED THE
UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR),
NOTING ITS RESOLUTION 909 (1994) OF 5 APRIL 1994 WHICH
EXTENDED THE MANDATE OF UNAMIR UNTIL 29 JULY 1994 WITH A
SIX-WEEK REVIEW PROVISION ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT
PROGRESS WOULD BE MADE I N ESTABLISHING THE TRANSITIONAL
INSTITUTIONS PROVIDED FOR UNDER THE ARUSHA PEACE
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA AND THE
RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT.
RECALLING ITS STATEMENT OF 7 APRIL 1994 (S/PRST/1994/16)
WHICH, INTER ALIA, REAFFIRMED ITS COMMITMENT TO THE
ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT AND URGED ALL PARTIES TO
IMPLEMENT I T FULLY,
STRESSING THAT THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT REMAINS
CENTRAL TO THE PEACE PROCESS I N RWANDA,
EXPRESSING DEEP REGRET AT THE FAILURE OF THE PARTIES TO
IMPLEMENT FULLY THE PROVISIONS OF THE ARUSHA PEACE
AGREEMENT, PARTICULARLY THOSE PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE
CEASE-FIRE,
WELCOMING THE INITIATIVES OF THE LATE PRESIDENTS OF
RWANDA AND BURUNDI TO WORK TOWARDS RESOLVING THE
PROBLEMS I N THEIR COUNTRIES THROUGH PEACEFUL MEANS AND
IN COLLABORATION WITH REGIONAL LEADERS.
SHOCKED AT THE TRAGIC INCIDENT THAT RESULTED I N THE
DEATHS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI ON 6
APRIL 1994,
APPALLED AT THE ENSUING LARGE SCALE VIOLENCE I N RWANDA
WHICH HAS RESULTED I N THE DEATH OF THOUSANDS OF INNOCENT
CIVILIANS, INCLUDING WOMEN AND CHILDREN, THE
DISPLACEMENT OP A SIGNIFICANT NUNBER OF THE RWANDESE
C 0 N F I D E N T I A L- SECTION 03 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 001581
DEPT FOR IO-DAS WARD, ALSO RWANDA TASK FORCE;
WHITEHOUSE PASS NSC FOR D. CLARK, S. RICE AND D.STEINBERG;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, RW
SUBJECT: TFRWOL: UN RECOMMENDATIONS TO BE ACTED UPON 4/15
POPULATION, AND THE SIGNIFICANT INCREASE I N REFUGEES TO
NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES,
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DEEPLY CONCERNED BY CONTINUING FIGHTING, LOOTING,
BANDITRY AND THE BREAKDOWN OF LAW AND ORDER PARTICULARLY
IN KIGALI,
EXPRESSING ITS DEEP CONCERN ALSO FOR THE SAFETY AND
SECURITY OF UNAMIR AND OTHER UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL,
AND PERSONNEL OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, WHO ARE
ASSISTING I N IMPLEMENTING THE PEACE PROCESS AND I N
DISTRIBUTING HUMANITARIAN RELIEF.
((DETERMINING THAT THE SITUATION I N RWANDA CONSTITUTES A
THREAT TO PEACE AND SECURITY,))
— 1 . EXPRESSES REGRET AT THE TRAGIC INCIDENT I N WHICH
THE PRESIDENTS OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI LOST THEIR LIVES,
AND REITERATES ITS INVITATION TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL AS REQUESTED I N ITS STATEMENT
OF 7 APRIL 1994;
-- 2. EXPRESSES REGRET ALSO AT THE ENSUING VIOLENCE
WHICH HAS CLAIMED THE LIVES OF THE PRIME MINISTER,
CABINET MINISTERS, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND THOUSANDS OF
OTHER CIVILIANS;
— 3. CONDEMNS THE ONGOING VIOLENCE I N RWANDA,
PARTICULARLY I N KIGALI, WHICH ENDANGERS THE LIVES AND
SAFETY OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION;
— 4. STRONGLY CONDEMNS THE ATTACKS AGAINST UNAMIR AND
OTHER UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL LEADING TO THE DEATHS OF
AND INJURY TO SEVERAL UNAMIR PERSONNEL AND CALLS UPON
ALL CONCERNED TO PUT AN END TO THESE ACTS OF VIOLENCE
AND TO RESPECT FULLY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW;
— 5. CALLS FOR AN IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES
AND AN END TO THE MINDLESS VIOLENCE AND CARNAGE WHICH
ARE ENGULFING RWANDA, AND I N THIS CONNECTION, ((DEMANDS
THAT THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) AGREE WITHOUT
DELAY TO AN EFFECTIVE CEASE-FIRE)) AND THAT BOTH PARTIES
RETURN TO THE POSITIONS HELD BY THEM BEFORE THE PRESENT
HOSTILITIES;
— 6. COMMENDS THE ACTIVE ROLE OF THE SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND OF THE FORCE
COMMANDER TO BRING ABOUT A CEASE-FIRE AND TO MEDIATE
BETWEEN THE PARTIES I N ORDER TO BRING ABOUT THE EARLIEST
RESOLUTION OF THE RWANDAN CRISIS;
— 7. ((DECIDES, I N THE LIGHT OF THE CURRENT SECURITY
SITUATION I N RWANDA, TO INCREASE THE STRENGTH OF UNAMIR
AND TO REVISE ITS MANDATE TO ENABLE I T TO CONTRIBUTE TO
THE RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER AND THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF THE TRANSITIONAL INSTITUTIONS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF
THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT;))
(COMMENT: THE THREE NEW
PARAGRAPHS WORKED OUT BETWEEN FRANCE, NIGERIA AND NEW
ZEALAND WOULD APPEAR HERE. END CONMENT)
-- 8. REITERATES THE CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE OF THE FULL
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT TO THE
SETTLEMENT OF THE RWANDAN CONFLICT AND INVITES THE
ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) TO CONTINUE TO
COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE UNITED NATIONS I N THIS REGARD;
— ( ( 9 . URGES ALL COUNTRIES, I N PARTICULAR THOSE OF OHE
REGION, TO REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTION THAT WOULD FURTHER
EXACERBATE THE SITUATION I N RWANDA;))
— ( ( 9 ALTERNATIVE. CALLS ON ALL MEMBER STATES, I N
PARTICULAR NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES, ACTING INDIVIDUALLY
OR THROUGH REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, TO COOPERATE FULLY
WITH THE EFFORTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE OAU TO
BRING ABOUT AN END TO THE CRISIS I N RWANDA;))
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
— 10. CALLS UPON THE PARTIES I N RWANDA ( ( I N PARTICULAR
THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT)) TO RENEW THEIR COMMITMENT
TO ((THE PEACE PROCESS I N RWANDA ON THE BASIS OF)) THE
• 0 N F - l D E N 1 I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 001581
C
DEPT FOR IO-DAS WARD, ALSO RWANDA TASK FORCE;
WHITEHOUSE PASS NSC FOR D. CLARK, S. RICE AND D.STEINBERG;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J 3 ;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, RW
SUBJECT: TFRWOL: UN RECOMMENDATIONS TO BE ACTED UPON 4/15
ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT, AND TO ACCEPT THE FUTILITY OF A
MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE POLITICAL PROBLEM;
-- 1 1 . CALLS ALSO UPON THE PARTIES TO COOPERATE FULLY
IN ENSURING THE UNIMPEDED DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE TO ALL I N NEED THROUGHOUT RWANDA AND I N THIS
REGARD, APPEALS TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO
PROVIDE INCREASED HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE COMMENSURATE
WITH THE SCALE OF THE HUMAN TRAGEDY I N RWANDA;
— 12. AFFIRMS ITS COMMITMENT TO PRESERVING THE UNITY
AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF RWANDA;
—13.
INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONTINUE TO
MONITOR THE EVENTS I N RWANDA AND TO REPORT FULLY TO THE
COUNCIL ON THE EVOLVING SITUATION AND AT LEAST NOT LATER
THAN FIFTEEN DAYS AFTER THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION;
-- 14. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.
END TEXT.
11. ACTION REQUESTED: DEPARTMENT PLEASE PROVIDE
GUIDANCE ON ABOVE TEXT BEFORE 11:30 AM APRIL 15.
ALBRIGHT
NNNN
<SECT>SECTION: 01
<SECT>SECTION: 02
<SECT>SECTION: 03
<SECT>SECTION: 04
<TOR>940414215251
OF
OF
OF
OF
04<SSN>1581<STOR>940414214840
04<SSN>1581<STOR>940414214941
04<SSN>1581<STOR>940414214942
04<SSN>1581<STOR>940414214944
M0994545
M0994546
M0994547
M0994548
�NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
21-Apr-1994 00:01 EDT
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
VAX_MAIL@OEOB
RICE@Al@OEOB
MOZENA@Al@OEOB
FROM:
White House S i t u a t i o n Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)
SUBJECT:
^WANDA^IS'CiJ§SEJ?_IN SECURITY COUNCIL, APRIL 20
-
y
<DIST>
PRT: SIT{C2}
SIT: MOZENA RICE SUM SUM2 VAX
<PREC>
IMMEDIATE
<CLAS>
CONFIDENTIAL
<OSRI>
RUCNDT
<DTG>
210129Z APR 94
<ORIG>
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
<TO>
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5858
INFO RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE 0185
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 1137
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0376
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0192
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0455
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 0356
PER E. O. 13526
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0910
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1573
i » nil •
i
> m
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0172
-lOH " 03.1*3- ' I
<SUBJ>
8/n/i5
'
RWANDA DISCUSSED I N SECURITY COUNCIL, APRIL 20
<TEXT>
C O N F I D B N T I A-L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001682
DEPT FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AND AF/C;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND MOZENA;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
V<B,
f
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA DISCUSSED I N SECURITY COUNCIL, APRIL 20
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: THE SYG DID NOT HAVE A REPORT WITH
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE COUNCIL. U/SYG GHAREKHAN
BRIEFED THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE SITUATION I N
RWANDA. HE SAID THAT FIGHTING CONTINUES, THAT 264
NON-ESSENTIAL UNAMIR TROOPS WERE EVACUATED TO NAIROBI.
ALSO 237 GHANAIANS WERE MOVED FROM THE DMZ TO KIGALI AND
THAT THE REST WOULD MOVE TODAY. NIGERIA REPORTED ON
EFFORTS BY UGANDA AND THE OAU TO SEEK A CEASEFIRE. I N
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS GHAREKHAN REPORTED THE AIRPORT WAS
OPERATIONAL BUT NO CIVILIAN FLIGHTS WERE OPERATING AND
THAT THERE WAS NO NEW SHELLING OR PROPAGANDA AGAINST
UNAMIR TROOPS. GHAREKHAN HOPED THE SYG REPORT WOULD BE
AVAILABLE TOMORROW BUT WOULD NOT PROMISE. A NUMBER OF
NEMBERS STRESSED THAT THE COUNCIL HAD TO TAKE ACTION ON
RWANDA BEFORE THE WEEKEND. END SUMMARY.
WHEN I S A REPORT NOT A REPORT
3. AT INFORMALS ON APRIL 20 THE COUNCIL DISCUSSED
RWANDA. U/SYG GHAREKHAN BEGAN BY ANNOUNCING THAT
CONTRARY TO HIS STATENENT TO THE COUNCIL THE DAY BEFORE,
THE SECRETARIAT DID NOT HAVE A REPORT FRON THE SYG ON
FUTURE OPTIONS. HE THEN GAVE AN ORAL BRIEFING ON THE
SITUATION. GHAREKHAN SAID THAT FIGHTING HAD BEEN
INTENSE ON TUESDAY BUT SLACKED OFF I N THE AFTERNOON.
THIS ALLOWED THE ICRC TO EVACUATE THE WOUNDED FROM THE
STADIUM TO THE HOSPITAL. THE NUMBER OF DEAD AT THE
STADIUN WAS N W PLACED AT 40. THERE WAS ALSO FIGHTING
O
AROUND THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL NORTHWEST OF KIGALI.
GHAREKHAN REPORTED THAT THE BELGIANS HAD LEFT AND AN
ADDITIONAL 264 NON-ESSENTIAL UNANIR TROOPS HAD BEEN
EVACUATED TO NAIROBI LEAVING A FORCE LEVEL OF 1707. 237
GHANAIAN TROOPS OF UNAMIR HAD BEEN NOVED FROM THE DMZ TO
KIGALI ON TUESDAY AND THE REMAINING 87 WERE EXPECTED TO
GO TO KIGALI WEDNESDAY.
4. NIGERIA PERM REP GAMBARI GAVE THE COUNCIL SOME
INFORMATION ON THE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS. HE SAID THERE
WAS A NEETING I N KANPALA WHERE UGANDA'S PRESIDENT TRIED
TO PERSUADE BOTH SIDES TO AGREE TO A CEASEFIRE AND THERE
WAS TO BE ANOTHER NEETING TONORROW; ALSO THAT LEADERS OF
THE REGION HAD AGREED TO MEET IN ARUSHA ON SATURDAY.
THE SYG OF THE OAU HAD CONTACTED REGIONAL LEADERS TO
COOPERATE ON A COMMUNICATION TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL. GANBARI CONCLUDED BY SAYING HE HOPED
THAT THE COUNCIL COULD RETURN QUICKLY TO THE DRAFT
RESOLUTION ON RWANDA AFTER THE SYG'S REPORT WAS RECEIVED.
MORE QUESTIONS AND CONCERNS
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�5. SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL QUESTIONED GHAREKHAN
SEEKING MORE INFORMATION. BRAZIL ASKED I F THE 264
NON-ESSENTIAL WERE ALL OR MIGHT MORE LEAVE, SAYING THEY
HAD HEARD REPORTS THAT 500 UNAMIR TROOPS WERE LEAVING.
GHAREKHAN SAID THE REPORT OF 500 WAS NOT TRUE, BUT MORE
TROOPS MIGHT LEAVE DEPENDING ON THE DECISIONS OF TROOP
CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES AND WHAT DECISIONS THE COUNCIL
TOOK. ARGENTINA EXPRESSED SERIOUS QUESTION ABOUT THE
SAFETY OF UN PERSONNEL AND ASKED FOR INFORMATION ON
CONDITIONS AT THE AIRPORT, ANY SHELLING OF UN FORCES AND
ANY REPORTS ON THE ATTITUDE OF BOTH SIDES TOWARDS THE UN
TROOPS PARTICULARLY ANY HOSTILE PROPAGANDA. GHAREKHAN
RESPONDED THAT UNAMIR TROOPS WERE AT THE AIRPORT WHICH
WAS STILL OPERATIONAL ALTHOUGH NO CIVILIAN FLIGHTS WERE
OPERATING NOW. UNAMIR DID NOT BELIEVE THEY COULD
ARRANGE FOR THE AIRPORT TO BE CONSIDERED NEUTRAL. ALSO
THERE HAD BEEN NO FURTHER ATTACKS ON UNAMIR AND NO
DELIBERATE HOSTILITY OR PROPAGANDA TOWARDS THEM.
G 0 N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001682
DEPT FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AND AF/C;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND MOZENA;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA DISCUSSED I N SECURITY COUNCIL, APRIL 20
ACTION BY FRIDAY, THE CALL
6. I N RESPONSE TO A QUESTION BY SPAIN GHAREKHAN SAID HE
"HOPED" THE REPORT WOULD BE AVAILABLE ON THURSDAY BUT
COULD NOT PROMISE THAT. THIS REVELATION PRODDED MEMBERS
OF THE COUNCIL TO STRESS THE NEED NOT TO GO INTO THE
WEEKEND WITHOUT ACTING. UK AMB HANNAY SAID THAT WHILE
TROOP CONTRIBUTORS HOLD THE ULTIMATE P W R TO DECIDE I F
OE
TROOPS WOULD REMAIN, THE COUNCIL SHOULD TRY TO STAY ONE
JUMP AHEAD OF THEM. HE SAID IT WAS BETTER TO RATIONALLY
DECIDE TO DOWNSIZE THE MISSION THAN HAVE TROOP
CONTRIBUTORS DO IT FOR THE COUNCIL. HANNAY CONCLUDED
THE COUNCIL NEEDED TO DECIDE SOON, WE "CAN'T RETIRE FOR
THE WEEKEND WITHOUT TAKING ACTION."
EO 13526 1 4 , EO 13526 1 4
.b
.d
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�EO 13526 1 4 , EO 13526 1 4
.b
.d
9. THE PRESIDENT SAID I F THE SYG REPORT ON RWANDA CAME
OUT ON THURSDAY HE WOULD TRY TO ADJUST THE SCHEDULE OF
W R TO ALLOW AN INITIAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. I F NOT HE
OK
WOULD EXPECT TO DISCUSS RWANDA ON FRIDAY.
ALBRIGHT
BT
#1682
NNNN
<SECT>
SECTION: 01 OF 02
<SSN>
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<TOR>
940420233659 M1005731
<SECT>
SECTION: 02 OF 02
<SSN>
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<TOR>
940420233714 M1005734
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
21-Apr-1994 00:02 EDT
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
VAX_MAIL@OEOB
STEINBERG@Al@OEOB
RICE@Al@OEOB
DESHAZER@Al@OEOB
CLARKER@A1@OEOB
FROM:
White House S i t u a t i o n Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)
SUBJECT:
" SYG RELUCTANT TO WITHDRAW FROM RWANDA
<DIST>
PRT: SIT{C2)
SIT: CLARKER DESHAZER RICE STEINBERG SUM SUM2 VAX
<PREC>
IMMEDIATE
<CLAS>
CONFIDENTIAL
<OSRI>
RUCNDT
<DTG>
210133Z APR 94
<ORIG>
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
<TO>
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5861
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 0194
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0378
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY 0187
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 1139
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0174
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0457
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 0358
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0912
<SUBJ>
SYG RELUCTANT TO WITHDRAW FROM RWANDA
<TEXT>
C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 001684
WHITEHOUSE PASS NSC FOR D. CLARK, S. RICE AND D.STEINBERG;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J 3 ;
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
3/» ^115" KBV1
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, R
W
SUBJECT: SYG RELUCTANT TO WITHDRAW FROM RWANDA
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. USUN AMB ALBRIGHT MET WITH SYG BOUTROS-GHALI ON A
RANGE OF SUBJECTS (SEPTEL) APRIL 20. INCLUDING RWANDA.
BBG TOLD ALBRIGHT OF HIS DILEMMA:
UN TROOPS MAY HELP TO DEFUSE TENSIONS.
ALSO, I F A CEASE-FIRE IS AGREED, THE RWANDANS WILL NEED
TROOPS I N PLACE TO ENSURE THE CEASE-FIRE'S
IMPLEMENTATION. THE OAU IS TRYING TO STAGE TALKS
BETWEEN THE PARTIES. BBG DOES NOT BELIEVE THERE WILL BE
A MASSACRE OF UN TROOPS, ALTHOUGH THE RISKS TO THE
FORCES MAY INCREASE IF THE AIRPORT IS CLOSED. BBG WOULD
LIKE TO GIVE THE OPERATION I N RWANDA ONE LAST TRY. I T
WOULD BE AN EASY THING FOR HIM TO DECIDE TO PULL OUT,
BUT HE WOULD THEN HAVE TO TAKE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
FIFTY THOUSAND ADDITIONAL DEATHS IN RWANDA.
3. AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT REMARKED THAT THE USG IS
CONCERNED FOR THE SAFETY OF THE UN TROOPS. SHE
ACKNOWLEDGED BBG'S DILEMMA, AND PROMISED TO REPORT HIS
REMARKS TO WASHINGTON.
ALBRIGHT
BT
#1684
NNNN
<SECT>
SECTION: 01 OF 01
<SSN>
1684
<TOR>
940420233741 M1005739
9
�LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
g e r & C e
A S S e S S e f i e r S l
United States Department of State
^—m^^—^^—^—m—m^—^^—Bureau of Intelligence and Research
INR foreign affairs brief
Roots of the Violence in Rwanda and Burundi
Social and political domination of Rwanda and Burundi by the Tutsi ethnic
group—which historically constituted 14 percent of the population in
Rwanda and Burundi—appears not to have been questioned or effectively
challenged by the Hutu majority until shortly before independence in 1962.
The Tutsis lost control of Rwanda to the Hutu majority before independence,
but they continued to hold all political and military power in Burundi until
the election last year of a Hutu government. Ethnic competition for state
power in both countries has stimulated several surges of intense ethnic
violence since 1959, but there is no cogent thesis to explain the sheer
savagery that characterizes the ongoing massacres.
* **
The ethnic dimension
Tutsi pastoralists more than 500 years ago settled among, and came to
dominate, Hutu agriculturalists inhabiting the region. By the time Europeans
arrived in the late 19th century, Rwanda was a centralized Tutsi-led kingdom
while Burundi was a state of loosely linked principalities led by a Tutsi
subcaste. In both countries, Hutus and Tutsis had come to share a culture
and language, and ethnicity was often synonymous with caste. Also in both
states, Tutsi cattle owners generally had more power and wealth and
dominated their Hutu peasant clients. But intermarriage sometimes
occurred, and a process even existed by which rich Hutus could be
recognized as Tutsis. Tutsi rule was most accepted where it was strongest, in
southern and central Rwanda and in most of Burundi. The Rwandan Tutsi
monarchy was most resented in northern Rwanda—where its rule was
weakest and local people divided themselves into coequal functional castes
of Hutu farmers and Tutsi herders.
CLINTON lilDKARl PHOTOCOPY
ULll\ 1U1\ IIRRAKY P m r n r n D v
L I M I T E D 0 F F I C I A L U S E
Decontrol: July 29,1994
A p r i l
2 9
(rev.) '
1 9 9 4
�LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
/NR.
Colonial experience
Germany in 1899 imposed a joint protectorate over Rwanda and
Burundi. Germany and later Belgium reinforced Tutsi dominance—and
Hutu consciousness of social inferiority. Tutsis, who were seen as
"superior," were favored with educational and job opportunities. All
Rwandans and Burundians carried identity cards stating their ethnicity,
heightening ethnic awareness and limiting social mobility.
Rwanda's Hutu revolution
In 1959, Hutu-Tutsi strife in Rwanda prompted Belgian concessions to
nascent pro-Hutu political parties. Hutu victories in local elections and
anti-Tutsi violence caused the king to flee into exile in 1960. From 1959 to
1964, 20,000 people, mostly Tutsis, were killed and more than
150,000—perhaps 40 percent of Rwandan Tutsis—went into exile.
Following Rwanda's independence in 1962, the Hutu government
increasingly became dominated by southerners. Massacres of Hutus in 1972
in Tutsi-led Burundi heightened ethnic tensions in Rwanda. In 1973
Maj. Juvenal Habyarimana, a northern Hutu, seized power in Rwanda and
established a one-party state. Despite close links to anti-Tutsi northern
Hutus, Habyarimana took a fairly moderate stand on ethnic relations. He
presided over a period of relative social peace and economic development,
though opponents accused him of favoring the north and murdering his
enemies. In 1990, Habyarimana initiated reforms leading to political
pluralism and agreed to a gradual return of Tutsi refugees.
RPF invasion
The Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded from Uganda in October
1990. Led by Tutsi refugees who had fled to Uganda and served with
President Museveni in Uganda's 1980-86 civil war, the RPF could not force
an Army collapse or a popular revolt. But neither could Habyarimana defeat
the RPF. Encouraged by the international community, by early 1992
Habyarimana included in his government increasingly vocal political
opponents who shared with the RPF a desire to limit his power. They took
the lead in negotiating the August 1993 Arusha accords, where Habyarimana
agreed reluctantly to end the civil war by ceding substantial power to the
RPF and internal opposition parties.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP*
L
j
U
r
i
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
�LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
INR-
As the RPF and other parties increased their strength, northern Hutus
with close ties to Habyarimana organized militias to defend the President
and their privileges. Their fears of a return of Tutsi domination increased
after the October 1993 assassination by Tutsi soldiers of Burundi's first
popularly elected President, a Hutu,, and tensions continued to rise when
party maneuverings in early 1994 delayed installation of the transitional
government called for in the Arusha accords.
Rwanda's collapse
Rwanda's Hutu militias and some Army units, including the
Presidential Guard, appeared to lead the organized murders of moderate
Hutu politicians (thought to be insufficiently anti-RPF) and of Tutsis in the
first hours after the April 6 plane crash in which Habyarimana and Burundi
President Ntyaramira were killed. The plan appears to have been to wipe
out any RPF ally or potential ally, and thus raise the costs and limit the
possibility of an RPF/Tutsi takeover. The killings instead stimulated the
April 8 RPF invasion out of its northern enclave, which, in turn, stimulated
more killings in subsequent days as Hutus—incited by militiamen and
fearing that the RPF would kill them—massacred Tutsis. Apparently
encouraged by northern Hutus, the anti-Tutsi killing has since spread
southward into areas historically characterized by relatively peaceful ethnic
relations. No end to the unprecedented bloodshed is yet in sight.
Burundi
In Burundi, by contrast, Tutsis have kept control since independence.
After toppling the monarchy in a 1966 coup, a succession of Tutsi military
leaders headed the government. They presided over the massacre of perhaps
200,000 Hutus in 1972 and 10,000 more in 1988, but later launched reforms
allowing multiparty elections that brought a Hutu President and Hutumajority parliament into office in July 1993. But Tutsis continued to
dominate the military after the election—and some staged an October 1993
coup attempt that killed the newly elected President and sparked a cycle of
violence that killed 30,000-100,000 Hutus and Tutsis. The Tutsi military has
since demonstrated that it retains effective veto power over Burundi politics,
but Tutsi officers and Hutu politicians are trying to work out mutually
satisfactory governing arrangements to avoid new bloodshed.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP
*
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
3
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
<DIST>PRT: SIT
SIT: CLARKER DESHAZER RICE STEINBERG SUM SUM2 VAX
<PREC>IMMEDIATE<CLAS>CONFIDENTIAL<OSRI>RUCNDT<DTG>3 00130Z APR 94
<ORIG>USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
<TO>RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 606 3
INFO RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE 0202
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 0206
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0480
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0 395
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 1156
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0186
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 0 377
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 09 3 3
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 4891
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
<SUBJ>NEXT STEPS ON RWANDA - APRIL 29
<TEXT>
C O N F I
D E N T I A L .SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 001817
WHITEHOUSE PASS NSC FOR D. CLARK, S. RICE AND D.STEINBERG;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J 3 ;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
PARIS FOR PERLOW
E.O.12 356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PHUM, EAID, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, RW
SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS ON RWANDA - APRIL 29
REF: A) USUN/DEPT FAX 4/28, B) USUN/DEPT FAX 4/29, C)
STATE 112362, D) STATE 112320
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. ACTION REQUEST: SEE PARA 14 FOR A LIST OF THE
SPECIFIC QUESTIONS WASHINGTON MUST ADDRESS MOST URGENTLY.
3. SUMMARY: THE SECURITY COUNCIL MET APRIL 28 AND 29
TO DISCUSS WHAT TO DO ABOUT RWANDA. THE CZECHS PUT
FORWARD A DRAFT STATEMENT BLAMING THE GOR FOR GENOCIDE
(REF A ) . THIS WAS SUBSTANTIALLY TONED DOWN, AND OTHER
ELEMENTS WERE ADDED (REF B ) . DISCUSSION WILL CONTINUE
AT 4 PM APRIL 29 ON THAT TEXT. SOME MEMBERS (FRANCE,
DJIBOUTI, CHINA) ARE OPPOSED TO A STATEMENT AND TO
POINTING THE FINGER AT THE GOR. THE COUNCIL PRESIDENT
WANTS TO ISSUE THE STATEMENT APRIL 29, AS THE PRESIDENCY
OF THE COUNCIL PASSES FROM NEW ZEALAND TO NIGERIA ON MAY
1, AND MOMENTUM WILL BE LOST DURING THE SWITCH.
4. SUMMARY CONTINUED: THE AFRICAN GROUP AT THE UN I S
SETTING UP A "CONTACT GROUP" TO EXPLORE POSSIBLE
ACTIONS. THEY HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE OAU MIGHT SEND A
CONTINGENT OF POLICE AND TROOPS TO RWANDA, I F THEY COULD
GET FINANCIAL AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT. THEY ALSO SUGGEST A
PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT TO BURUNDI. THE IDEA OF AN ARMS
DECLASSIFIED
EMBARGO AGAINST RWANDA RECEIVED A GOOD DEAL OF SUPPORT,
PER E.O. 13526
BUT QUESTIONS OF HOW TO ENFORCE I T AROSE. END SUMMARY.
low- oaus- n
DRAFT STATEMENT
5. THE COUNCIL HELD DISCUSSIONS THURSDAY AFTERNOON AND
FRIDAY MORNING ON A DRAFT STATEMENT FOR RWANDA, AND WILL
CONTINUE FRIDAY AFTERNOON. THE FIRST TWO DRAFTS WERE
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
FAXED TO IO/UNP, IO/PHO AND AF/C (REFS A AND B ) .
SUBSEQUENT DRAFTS WILL BE FAXED TO DEPT, AND FINAL TEXT
( I F ANY) WILL BE CABLED TO ALL ADDRESSEES. THERE I S A
GOOD DEAL OF CONTROVERSY ABOUT WHETHER, AND TO WHAT
EXTENT, TO ATTRIBUTE BLAME TO RWANDAN GOVERNMENT FORCES
FOR THE MASSACRES AGAINST CIVILIANS. I F A COMPROMISE ON
THIS POINT CANNOT BE REACHED, THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MIGHT
BE SCUTTLED. SOME DELEGATIONS HAVE SUGGESTED REWORKING
THE STATEMENT INTO A RESOLUTION. (COMMENT: STATEMENTS
CAN ONLY BE ISSUED WITH THE CONSENSUS OF THE COUNCIL.
RWANDA, AS A MEMBER OF THE COUNCIL, ALONG WITH FRANCE,
ITS PATRON, CAN BLOCK CONSENSUS. A RESOLUTION REQUIRES
A VOTE. RWANDA WOULD HAVE TO VOTE AGAINST OR ABSTAIN,
REVEALING ITS DIPLOMATIC ISOLATION. FRANCE WOULD LIKELY
BE SHAMED INTO VOTING I N FAVOR OF A RESOLUTION. END
COMMENT.) THE ARMS EMBARGO PARAGRAPH WILL PROBABLY BE
STRENGTHENED TO INCLUDE AN IMMEDIATE CALL ON ALL PARTIES
TO REFRAIN FROM ARMS TRANSFERS TO RWANDA. THE RWANDAN
PERMREP, AMB BIZIMANA, SPOKE UP I N APRIL 29
CONSULTATIONS FOR THE FIRST TIME I N DAYS, TO ARGUE
AGAINST BLAMING THE RGF FOR CIVILIAN MASSACRES AND
AGAINST AN ARMS EMBARGO.
AFRICAN IDEAS
6. I N APRIL 28 INFORMALS, NIGERIAN AMB. GAMBARI RELAYED
THAT THE REGIONAL AFRICA GROUP AT THE UN HELD A MEETING
THAT MORNING, AND SUPPORTED SEVERAL STEPS THAT COULD BE
TAKEN ON RWANDA. A) THEY WILL RECOMMEND TO THE OAU
DEPLOYMENT OF A MIXED CONTINGENT OF POLICE AND TROOPS.
NIGERIA POINTED OUT THAT ANY SUCH OAU DEPLOYMENT WOULD
REQUIRE OUTSIDE SUPPORT, SINCE THE OAU HAS FEW
RESOURCES. B) BURUNDI I S TENSE, AND THEY RECOMMEND A
PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT, AS WAS DONE I N MACEDONIA. C)
THEY RECOMMEND AN EMERGENCY MEETING OF THE OAU CENTRAL
MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION (CMCR) AT THE FONMIN
LEVEL. D) THEY SUGGEST THE OAU CMCR COORDINATE THE
PEACEMAKING EFFORTS OF REGIONAL LEADERS. E) THEY AGREE
A CEASEFIRE I S THE HIGHEST PRIORITY, SINCE I T WOULD
CREATE THE NECESSARY ATMOSPHERE FOR A HALT TO THE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 001817
WHITEHOUSE PASS NSC FOR D. CLARK, S. RICE AND D.STEINBERG;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J 3 ;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
PARIS FOR PERLOW
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PHUM, EAID, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, RW
SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS ON RWANDA - APRIL 29
SLAUGHTER AND A RETURN TO LAW AND ORDER. F) THEY WILL
SET UP A SMALL "CONTACT GROUP" I N NEW YORK TO EXPLORE
FURTHER ISSUES.
7. GAMBARI ALSO STRESSED THAT THERE WERE TWO DIFFERENT
LEVELS OF FIGHTING I N RWANDA. ONE WAS THE MILITARY
HOSTILITIES BETWEEN THE RGF AND THE RPF, WHICH COULD BE
ADDRESSED THROUGH AN EVENTUAL CEASEFIRE. THE OTHER WAS
THE SLAUGHTER OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS, WHICH WOULD NOT BE
AFFECTED BY A CEASEFIRE. THE SECOND LEVEL OF VIOLENCE
ALSO NEEDED COUNCIL ATTENTION. ALTHOUGH NOT MENTIONED
DURING THE COUNCIL CONSULTATIONS, NIGERIAN COUNSELOR
INFORMED USUN POLOFF THAT THEY WOULD LIKE A FULL-SCALE,
FORMAL SC DEBATE INVOLVING AFRICAN AND OTHER FOREIGN
MINISTERS, ON THE ISSUE OF RWANDA, SIMILAR TO THE RECENT
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
EXTENDED DEBATE ON BOSNIA.
REACTIONS
8. USUN DEPUTY PERMREP WALKER FOLLOWED UP ON SOME OF
THESE IDEAS APRIL 29. WALKER INQUIRED WHETHER A
PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT I N BURUNDI WOULD BE AN EXPANSION
OF THE EXISTING OAU FORCE OF 47 MEN, OR WHETHER I T WOULD
BE A SEPARATE UN FORCE. HE ALSO ASKED WHETHER THE GOB'S
OBJECTION TO A LARGER FORCE HAS BEEN REMOVED. NIGERIAN
AMB. GAMBARI IMPLIED THAT THE "CONTACT GROUP" MEETING
LATER APRIL 29 WOULD LOOK INTO THAT QUESTION. FOLLOWING
THE MEETING, NIGERIAN COUNSELOR INDICATED THAT THEY HAD
NOT/NOT YET BEEN I N TOUCH WITH THE GOB TO SEE I F
PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE, BUT THAT THEY
WOULD PURSUE THIS QUESTION IMMEDIATELY. HE ALSO
CLARIFIED THAT AN AFRICAN DEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS AND
POLICE TO RWANDA TO PROTECT POCKETS OF CIVILIANS AND
HELP RESTORE LAW AND ORDER WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE UNDER
UNAMIR AUSPICES. THEREFORE NO REDEFINITION OF UNAMIR'S
MANDATE WOULD BE REQUIRED.
9. RUSSIAN AMB. VORONTSOV STRONGLY CRITICIZED THE
"TIMID LITTLE STEPS" THE COUNCIL HAS TAKEN SO FAR. HE
POINTEDLY MENTIONED THAT THE COUNCIL WAS PREPARED TO GO
SO FAR AS TO USE AIR POWER TO PROTECT CIVILIANS I N ONE
REGION, WHEREAS I T DID NOTHING I N ANOTHER. HE LAMENTED
THAT NO COLLECTIVE OR INDIVIDUAL ACTION TO STOP THE
SLAUGHTER WAS BEING CONTEMPLATED. SPANISH AMB. BAR
NUEVO SUGGESTED THE SECRETARIAT SHOULD BE COMPILING
INFORMATION SYSTEMATICALLY ON WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR
VIOLATIONS OF HUMANITARIAN LAW. CZECH PERMREP SAID HE
SPOKE WITH UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHT AYALA
LASSO APRIL 28, AND THAT HCHR WAS FOCUSSING ON RWANDA.
OMAN RECOMMENDED SETTING UP SAFE AREAS FOR CIVILIANS.
THERE WAS VIRTUAL UNANIMITY THAT WHATEVER EFFORTS WERE
MADE BY THE UN, THE OAU, AND VARIOUS REGIONAL LEADERS
NEEDED TO BE BETTER COORDINATED.
ARMS SHIPMENTS
10. POLOFF MENTIONED THE POINTS I N REF C TO UN DPKO
OFFICIALS AND FRENCH POLOFF. 1!3(9 9!!8:8-) 48;349 -8$
#3 297)$ 3,34Ec8"3 7,9.74, ON THE UGANDA BORDER, TO
INVESTIGATE. FRENCH POLOFF SAID FRENCH AMBASSADOR
MERIMEE HAD QUERIED PARIS ABOUT ALLEGATIONS OF FRENCH
ARMS SALES TO RWANDA. PARIS UNEQUIVOCALLY DENIED HAVING
SOLD "A SINGLE BULLET" TO RWANDA DURING THE PAST FOUR
YEARS, SINCE 1990.
MEETING WITH RPF
11. AMB WALKER MET APRIL 28 WITH RPF NEW YORK
REPRESENTATIVE CLAUDE DUSAIDI, AT THE LATTER'S REQUEST.
DUSAIDI THANKED THE USG FOR ALL THE ASSISTANCE I T HAS
GIVEN SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE CONFLICT. HE NOTED
THAT THE CURRENT CONFLICT HAS TWO DIMENSIONS: A) THE
MILITARY CONFLICT BETWEEN THE RGF AND RPF WHICH HAS
RESULTED I N INSIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF CASUALTIES, AND B)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 001817
WHITEHOUSE PASS NSC FOR D. CLARK, S. RICE AND D.STEINBERG;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J 3 ;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
PARIS FOR PERLOW
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PHUM, EAID, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, RW
SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS ON RWANDA - APRIL 29
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
THE RGF MASSACRES OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS. THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS CALLED FOR A CEASEFIRE,
FOCUSING ONLY ON THE FIRST DIMENSION, SINCE INNOCENT
CIVILIANS WOULD NOT BE SAVED BY A CEASEFIRE. HE TERMED
THE KILLINGS "GENOCIDE", AND INDICATED THAT THE RPF KNEW
THE IDENTITY OF THE PERSONS RESPONSIBLE. (COMMENT: THE
RPF HAS ALREADY CONVEYED THAT INFORMATION TO UN HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AYALA LASSO. END COMMENT)
DUSAIDI ASKED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SET UP AN
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL TO CONDEMN THE RESPONSIBLE
PARTIES BY NAME AND TAKE PUNITIVE ACTION. HE REALIZED
THIS COULD BE TIME-CONSUMING AND DIFFICULT, BUT STRESSED
THAT GENOCIDE SHOULD NOT BE COMMITTED WITH IMPUNITY.
12. DUSAIDI RELAYED THAT THE RPF SUPPORTS AN ARMS
EMBARGO AGAINST RWANDA, ALTHOUGH I T WOULD NOT KEEP
MACHETES OUT, AND MIGHT NOT BE VERY EFFECTIVE AGAINST
OTHER WEAPONS EITHER. NEVERTHELESS, AN ARMS EMBARGO I S
LONG OVERDUE. AREAS SUCH AS THE STADIUMS, HOTELS AND
CHURCHES WERE CIVILIANS WERE HIDING SHOULD BE DECLARED
UN SAFE AREAS, AND THOSE CIVILIANS PROTECTED. FINALLY,
THE RPF WOULD PREFER A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION TO A
STATEMENT. AMB WALKER INFORMED DUSAIDI THAT THE USG WAS
CALLING ON GOR OFFICIALS TO BRING AN END TO MASSACRES OF
CIVILIANS, AND REITERATED THE IMPORTANCE OF A
CEASEFIRE. DUSAIDI EXPLAINED THAT I T WAS DIFFICULT FOR
THE RPF, AFTER DECLARING A UNILATERAL CEASEFIRE I N
ARUSHA EVEN THOUGH THEIR INTERLOCUTORS DID NOT SHOW UP,
TO DECLARE ANOTHER CEASEFIRE. ON APRIL 30, DUSAIDI
ADVISED POLOFF THAT THE RPF WOULD CALL FOR SRSG
BOOH-BOOH'S RECALL. THEY FIND BOOH-BOOH TO BE PARTIAL
TO THE GOR. HOWEVER, THEY ARE PLEASED WITH FORCE
COMMANDER GEN. DALLAIRE.
13. REF D CONTAINED TALKING POINTS TO BE USED WITH GOR
OFFICIALS VISITING PARIS. USUN COULD MAKE THE SAME
POINTS TO RWANDA PERMREP BIZIMANA I N NEW YORK, WHO
APPEARS TO BE PARROTING THE EXTREMIST HUTU POSITION, BUT
WHO ACTS AS THOUGH HE I S REMOVED FROM THE EVENTS I N HIS
COUNTRY.
ISSUES FOR FOLLOW-UP
14. THE DEPARTMENT AND INTERAGENCY GROUP MIGHT WISH TO
FOCUS SOME OF ITS DISCUSSIONS ON THE FOLLOWING
QUESTIONS, WHICH WILL EVENTUALLY NEED ANSWERS I N NEW
YORK:
— DOES THE POLITICAL WILL EXIST I N WASHINGTON TO
PROVIDE RESOURCES FOR AFRICAN TROOPS WHICH THE OAU MIGHT
DEPLOY TO RWANDA?
— SHOULD SAFE AREAS BE DECLARED FOR THE PROTECTION OF
CIVILIANS? I F SO, DO WE APPROVE OF AN OAU FORCE
PROTECTING THOSE SAFE AREAS?
— DOES THE POLITICAL WILL EXIST TO PUT SOME TEETH INTO
AN ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST RWANDA (E.G. AUTHORIZING
OAU-PROVIDED BOATS, I F SUCH MIGHT BE MADE AVAILABLE, TO
PATROL LAKE KIVU AND INTERDICT SUSPECTED ARMS SHIPMENTS,
OR AUTHORIZING OAU PATROLS OF THE ZAIRE-RWANDA BORDER)?
— I S THE USG I N FAVOR OF A PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT OF
100-200 TROOPS TO BURUNDI? DOES THE USG PREFER
EXPANDING THE OAU FORCE TO ESTABLISHING A UN FORCE?
— HOW FAR DOES THE USG WISH TO GO I N ADVOCATING THAT
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY/UN IDENTIFY AND PUNISH THOSE
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ATROCITIES?
�<. fid. I
A
uO.
-.
GOHFIDENTIAIi
DECL:OADR
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
RWANDA/BURUNDI SITREP, MAY 4
SITUATION ON THE GROUND
^o\\- oau 3- n
3/iyi5 V6
<M
o
There was very heavy f i g h t i n g i n K i g a l i yesterday, buti t
is calmer t o n i g h t . One UN s o l d i e r was i n j u r e d at the
a i r p o r t by mortar f i r e . Yesterday's M i l l e C o l l i n e convoy
was blocked a f t e r radio RTLM t o l d the people to go out on
the s t r e e t and prevent i t from leaving. 350 orphans
yesterday were evacuated t o Goma from Gysenyi. There are
s t i l l 5,000 refugees i n Cyangugu stadium; l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s
are blocking ICRC e f f o r t s t o reach them from Bukavu.
(TelCon AFC/GOR Gen R u s a t i r a ) ^
o
According to UNAMIR, the UN-escorted refugee convoy from
the M i l l e s C o l l i n e s h o t e l yesterday returned to the hotel
a f t e r a standoff w i t h GOR forces. Five people i n the
convoy were i n j u r e d . No f u r t h e r attempts t o leave w i l l be
made f o r a day or two. (Telcon AFC/UNForce commander's
office-Kigali)(LOU)
o
The GOR today said the M i l l e s C o l l i n e s convoy had not been
allowed to pass because of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e problems and
because the people would not allow i t t o pass. A f t e r the
K i g a l i Prefet and the Rwandan m i l i t a r y intervened, the
convoy was allowed to r e t u r n t o the h o t e l . The Chief of '
S t a f f of the Rwandan Army said the convoy could t r y again
today. (GOR FAX)
o
A Rwandan today t o l d h i s AmCit spouse the market i n K i g a l i
was open and he was able t o move f r e e l y . Potatoes are
a v a i l a b l e , suggesting the road to the n o r t h i s open.
(AFC/AmCit Telcon)(LOU)
DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS
o
The Rwandan I n t e r i m Government and the RPF are i n Arusha.
Proximity discussions have been held, but d i r e c t t a l k s have
not yet begun. The GOT tabled a c e a s e f i r e proposal;
neither side has responded. Some of the observers are
planning t o leave Arusha. (AFC/De Vos TelCon)(LOU)
o
Boutros-Ghali, f o l l o w i n g t a l k s w i t h several A f r i c a n heads
of s t a t e , yesterday t o l d Ambassador A l b r i g h t there i s not a
l o t of i n t e r e s t i n an ECOMOG s t y l e UN/OAU peacekeeping
operation i n Rwanda and, i f i t lacked support, he would
t u r n back to the s e c u r i t y c o u n c i l . (USUN 01880)0^
o
The Security Council yesterday discussed Rwanda. Sentiment
ran i n favor of an arms embargo and humanitarian a c t i o n ,
but no action w i l l be taken u n t i l a f t e r r e s u l t s from the
Arusha t a l k s are known.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�DEPARTMENT OF' i T A T E
o
W E )0
5.
94
18:53
NO.
1 4 6 0 1 2 0 7 - u PAGE
French Ambassador t o Rwanda Marlaud w i l l meet w i t h
Tanzanian President Mwinyi, then visit other countries in
the region. The GOF has little faith in the OAU and only
slightly more in the UN to find rapid, durable solutions
leading to a ceasefire and resumed negotiations; therefore,
Marlaud is to encourage, prod, and assist the neighboring
states to develop a regional solution to the crisis.
(Paris
o
^
12191)(Jt)
RPF Commander Kagame on May 1 t o l d DAS Bushnell the
impending UNHCR v i s i t may be the most e f f e c t i v e mechanism
to h a l t the massacres he says are c o n t i n u i n g i n G R
O
c o n t r o l l e d t e r r i t o r y , suggesting the I n t e r n a t i o n a l
Community send a strong message t o the G R leadership that
O
they cannot continue to " k i l l w i t h impunity". He said a
UN/OAU or OAU i n t e r v e n t i o n force t o p r o t e c t refugees was
also acceptable. He confirmed f i g h t i n g continued i n
K i g a l i , r e i t e r a t e d the RPF was keeping the Tanzania border
open, and pledged t o safeguard the l i v e s of Rwandans and
r e l i e f workers i n RPF c o n t r o l l e d areas.
(SecState
115709) 0^5
o
The RPF on May 3 c a l l e d f o r UNSER Booh-Booh to be replaced,
blaming h i s presence f o r jeopardizing the establishment of
and decisions made by the "Crisis Committee set up i n
K i g a l i on A p r i l 6. The RPF rejected UN i n t e r v e n t i o n , which
"would do nothing more than enable the members of the
P r e s i d e n t i a l guard and...FAR to go unpunished f o r t h e i r
crimes". (Radio Muhabura FBIS BR030532)(U)
o
Murigande, RPF representative i n Washington, confirmed
today that a UN/OAU i n t e r p o s t i o n force t o impose a
ceasefire and i n s t r u c t the RPF t o negotiate w i t h k i l l e r s i s
unacceptable, but i f the force was used t o stop the murders
that would be acceptable., The RPF wants the i n t e r n a t i o n a l
community t o hold GOR " k i l l e r s " responsible. i f a force
would give them a way out or a f u t u r e r o l e i n Rwandan
p o l i t i c s , the RPF w i l l oppose.
HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS
o
France's i n i t i a l humanitarian e f f o r t includes 40 tons of
m a t e r i a l flown t o Bujumbura. The GOF intends to purchase
f o o d s t u f f s i n the region and keep one plane i n the region
for use of UN and French NGO's. (Paris 12197)020 lan
o
The UNHCR yesterday asked USMission Geneva i f the United
States can provide an i n - k i n d c o n t r i b u t i o n f o r the a i r l i f t
of p l a s t i c sheeting and blankets from Turkey to Tanzania.
Canadian C-130 f l i g h t s i n t o K i g a l i have been extended u n t i l
May 8. (Geneva 04175)(U)
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�The ICRC yesterday said 21 c h i l d r e n and 13 Rwandese Red
Cross Volunteers on May 1 were k i l l e d i n an attack on an
orphanage i n Butare. The Rwanda/Burundi emergency u n i t of
the UNHCR estimates there are 304,000 Rwandan refugees from
the c u r r e n t c o n f l i c t and 208,000 Burundi refugees. 188,000
Burundian refugees have returned t o Burundi since l a s t
January.
(USMission Geneva 04176)(U)
BURUNDI
Bujumbura and surrounding areas remain relatively calm.
Kamenge residents are returning to their residences, but
Kinama is said to be relatively empty; many of its
residents reportedly moved to other neighborhoods or went
as far as Uvira, Zaire. The number of Rwandan refugees in
Burundi has reportedly jumped since last weekend from
37,000 to about 50,000. (Burundi SitRep 16, Bujumbura
1523)(tf
I n t e r i m President Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, i n an interview
w i t h "La L i b r e Belgique", said reform of Burundi's army, as
w e l l as the p o l i c e and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , should not be dealt
w i t h s o l e l y i n terms of "ethnic quotas", but rather on the
basis of i d e o l o g i c a l , r e g i o n a l , and ethnic c r i t e r i a so that
they are representative, l e g a l , and respectful of human
r i g h t s . He also said the United Nations has abdicated i t s .
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , " s e t t i n g up a human r i g h t s commission and
at the same time showiing that i t i s incapable of
guaranteeing even the very f i r s t of these r i g h t s , the r i g h t
to l i v e " . He c a l l e d f o r the presence i n Burundi of UN
c i v i l a u t h o r i t i e s to serve as a base from which the
democratic process could be observed and monitored.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�INITIAL HERE
OUTGOING TELEGRAM
AUTH
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
5.1
DRAFT
CLEAR 1
3
b
4
7
2
5
a
-COHriDCMTIAL
IO/PHO:DEJENSEN:DEJ
U5/05/T4 ^-7^37
SEPKA 44b
10 : DBENNET
SPC : JDOBBINS
JCS:AMACKE
PM/ISP:TGRANT
NSC :
10:GUARD
IO/UNPISZELLE
AF:PBUSHNELL
OSD:FldISNER
AF, 10, PM, HA, INR. P
IHMEDIATE
USUN NEW YORK
ROUTINE
SECDEF UASHDC, CJCS WASHDC- UN SE- BRUSSELS,
BUJUMBURA, DAR ES SALAAM, KAMPALA, KINSHASA, NAIROBI, ADDIS ABABA,
YAOUNDE
DAK SHOULD PASS TO A/S SHATTUCK AND AMB. RAUSON
YAOUNDE FOR DATT
F.O. 1535b:
TAGS:
MARR, PINS, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RU, UNSC
SUBJECT:
REF:
1.
DECL : OADK
RUANDA : REQUESTS FOR IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE
USUN IfiTfi
-eWPf-DENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
4^*
/=>i<a
\ .('•
?. TN RESPONSE TO REgllKT REFTEL, USUN SHOULD ADVISE THE
UN SECRETARIAT THAT UTE CONTINUE TO FEEL THAT A MORE
LIMITED MISSION FOR A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION, WHETHER UN
O OAU O A COMBINATION OF THE TUO, MAKES MORE SENSE THAN
K
R
THE ONE THE UN APPEARS TO HAVE IN MIND. THE UN SEEMS TO
ENVISION A KIGALI-BASED OPERATION, WHICH WOULD REQUIRE
CONTROL OF KIGALI, CONTROL OF COMMUNICATION LINKS OUT OF
KIGALI, AND MOVEMENTS ACROSS BATTLE LINES. I T APPEARS TO
US THAT SUCH AN EXTENSIVE OPERATION IS BEYOND THE LIKELY
(APABILITY OF SUCH A FORCE TO HANDLE•
3. IN OUR VIEW, A UN AND/OR OAU FORCE OPERATING OUT OF
NEIGHBORING AFRICAN COUNTRIES INTO BORDER AREAS TO PROTECT
REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS WOULD BE MORE FEASIBLE . W
E
HU. IEVE THAT THIS SHOULD BE DONE WITH THE ACQUIESCENCE OF
CONFIDENTI-AL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
8/iyi5 KBH
�INITIAL HERE
OUTGOING TELEGRAM
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AUTH
CLEAR 1
5.1
DRAFT.
2
3
4
5
b
7
6
CONFIDENTIAL
IO/PHO:DEJENSEN:DEJ
• S/DS/IH 1,-7^37
SEPKA 44b
10 : DBENNET
IO:GUARD
IO/UNP:SZELLE
AF:PBUSHNELL
OSD:FUISNER
SPC : J DOBBINS
JCS:AMACKE
PM/ISP:TGRANT
NSC :
AF, 10, PM, HA, INR, P
IMMEDIATE
USUN N W YORK
E
ROUTINE
SECDEF IdASHDC, CJCS UASHDC, UN SE, BRUSSELS,
BUJUMBURA, DAR ES SALAAM, KAMPALA, KINSHASA, NAIROBI, ADDIS ABABA,
YAOUNDE
DAR SHOULD PASS TO A/S SHATTUCK AND AMB. RAUSON
YAOUNDE FOR DATT
E.O. 1235b:
TAGS:
1.
OADR
MARR, PINS, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RU, UNSC
SUBJECT:
REF:
DECL:
RUANDA: REQUESTS FOR IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE
USUN 15^6
CONriDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. IN RESPONSE TO REQUEST REFTEL, USUN SHOULD ADVISE THE
UN SECRETARIAT THAT W CONTINUE TO FEEL THAT A MORE
E
LIMITED MISSION FOR A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION, WHETHER UN
O OAU O A COMBINATION OF THE TUO, MAKES MORE SENSE THAN
R
R
THE ONE THE UN APPEARS TO HAVE IN MIND. THE UN SEEMS TO
ENVISION A KIGALI-BASED OPERATION, UHICH WOULD REQUIRE
CONTROL OF KIGALI, CONTROL OF COMMUNICATION LINKS OUT OF
KIGALI, AND MOVEMENTS ACROSS BATTLE LINES. I T APPEARS TO
US THAT SUCH AN EXTENSIVE OPERATION IS BEYOND THE LIKELY
CAPABILITY OF SUCH A FORCE TO HANDLE.
3. IN OUR VIEW, A UN AND/OR OAU FORCE OPERATING OUT OF
NEIGHBORING AFRICAN COUNTRIES INTO BORDER AREAS TO PROTECT
REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS UOULD BE MORE FEASIBLE. W
E
BELIEVE THAT THIS SHOULD BE DONE WITH THE ACQUIESCENCE OF
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
�•CONPIDENTI Al
BOTH FORCES. EVEN IF DONE WITHOUT AGREEMENT OF THE
(JARRING PARTIES, HOWEVER, SUCH AN OPERATION UOULD BE LESS
LIKELY TO BE SERIOUSLY CHALLENGED THAN A FORCE BASED IN
THE CAPITAL. THE NEEDED FORCE IN OUR JUDGMENT COULD
THEREFORE BE CONSIDERABLY SMALLER THAN THE ONE ENVISIONED
BY THE UN.
'). O THE QUESTION OF U.S. ASSISTANCE-. W WILL NOT BE
N
E
ABLE TO RESPOND IN DETAIL UNTIL A CLEARER CONCEPT OF
OPERATION IS DEVELOPED. UE ARE PREPARED, IN PRINCIPLE, TO
JOIN OTHERS IN SUPPORTING A HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN
RUANDA. I F IT IS AN ASSESSED UN OPERATION, THE PROCESS OF
REQUESTING U.S. ASSISTANCE IS STRAIGHT FORWARD: THE UN
UOULD REQUEST SERVICES FROM US FOR UHICH UE UOULD BE
REIMBURSED AND UE UOULD PAY OUR SHARE OF ASSESSED COSTS.
IN THIS REGARD, UE UOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER PROVIDING
AIRLIFT AND SOME EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING APCS. I F THE FORCE
UERE TO BE ORGANIZED BY THE OAU O OTHERWISE DEPENDENT
R
UPON VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS, THE NEED FOR A CLEAR AND
AGREED CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS UOULD BE EVEN MORE
ESSENTIAL. VV
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
COHriDCNTIU.
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
05-May-1994 21:55 EDT
CONFIDENTIALMEMORANDUM FOR:
VAX_MAIL@OEOB
SCHWARTZ@A1@OEOB
RICE@Al@OEOB
CLARKER@Al@OEOB
BEERS@Al@OEOB
FROM:
SUBJECT:
White House S i t u a t i o n Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)
RWANDA: SC PRESIDENT WILL WRITE TO SYG
<DIST>
PRT: STEINBERG SIT
SIT: BEERS CLARKER RICE SCHWARTZ SUM SUM2 VAX
<PREC>
IMMEDIATE
<CLAS>
CONFIDENTIftfj
<OSRI>
RUCNDT
<DTG>
060129Z MAY 94
<ORIG>
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
<TO>
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6245
INFO RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0507
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY 0 394
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0955
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1666
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0418
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 1176
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 4961
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY 0221
DECLASSIFIED
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
PER E.0.13526
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0201
%0\\- 030,3-H
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0220
<SUBJ>
3 / l ^ / l S " t<6V1
RWANDA: SC PRESIDENT WILL WRITE TO SYG
<TEXT>
C O N P I D E N T I
A-fe SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001926
�C I T N L B A Y POOOY
L N O I R R HTCP
WHITEHOUSE PASS NSC FOR D. CLARK, S. RICE AND D.STEINBERG
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
PARIS FOR PERLOW
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PHUM, EAID, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, R
W
SUBJECT: RWANDA: SC PRESIDENT WILL WRITE TO SYG
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. COUNCIL ACTION: THE SC DISCUSSED RWANDA AGAIN
THUSSDAY, MAY 5. THE COUNCIL WANTS TO ATTEMPT TO BREAK
OUT OF THE "CHICKEN AND EGG" CYCLE OF SHIFTING
RESPONSIBILITY FROM THE SYG TO THE COUNCIL AND BACK
AGAIN, AND TO MOVE TOWARDS DECISIVE ACTION. THE SC
PRESIDENT WILL WRITE TO THE SYG, ASKING THE SYG TO SET
OUT IN AN INFORMAL NON-PAPER A POSSIBLE CONCEPT OF
OPERATIONS, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO WHATEVER DECISION THE
SC MIGHT TAKE. A DRAFT LETTER WILL BE CIRCULATED FOR
DISCUSSION FRIDAY. ALSO, THE NON-ALIGNED ARE WORKING ON
A DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH THEY HOPE TO TABLE EITHER
FRIDAY OR MONDAY. US AND UK AMBASSADORS NOTED THAT IT
MIGHT BE PREMATURE TO W R ON A RESOLUTION BEFORE WE
OK
KNEW WHAT THE SYG HAD IN MIND. MANY DELEGATIONS
EMPHASIZED THAT HUMANITARIAN QUESTIONS SHOULD BE THE
PRIORITY AT THIS TIME.
3. SECRETARIAT UPDATE: U/SYG GHAREKHAN GAVE AN UPDATE
ON THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND. UNAMIR HAS C M UNDER
OE
DELIBERATE ATTACK. ON MAY 3, THREE GHANAIANS WERE
WOUNDED, TWO SERIOUSLY. ON MAY 4, ANOTHER GHANAIAN WAS
SERIOUSLY WOUNDED. THERE HAS BEEN HEAVY FIGHTING AND
SHELLING IN AND AROUND KIGALI, INCLUDING AROUND THE
AIRPORT, UNAMIR HQ, AND THE STADIUM. THE RPF IS
ADVANCING, ALTHOUGH MEETING SOME RESISTANCE. IN THE
MORNING OF MAY 5 A UN AIRCRAFT CAME UNDER HEAVY MACHINE
GUN FIR AFTER LANDING, CAUSING IT TO DEPART WITHOUT
UNLOADING. IMMEDIATELY AFTER LEAVING, A MORTAR FELL
INTO THE LOADING AREA. GEN- DALLAIRE BELIEVES THE UN IS
BEING DELIBERATELY TARGETED, ALTHOUGH THE SOURCE OF THE
ATTACKS IS NOT CLEAR.
4. GHAREKHAN REPORTED THAT THE GOR WERE READY TO SIGN A
CEASEFIRE IN ARUSHA, BUT THE RPF REFUSED. THE RPF
CLAIMED THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAD BEEN OF NO HELP
DURING THE MASSACRES, AND THAT THE REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE OAU, THE SRSG, AND TANZANIA WERE NO LONGER
IMPARTIAL. THE RPF ACCUSED TANZANIA OF ALLOWING ARMS TO
COME ACROSS ITS BORDERS FOR THE RGF. THE RPF DOES NOT
WANTED TO BE ROBBED OF ITS VICTORY, WHICH IT SAYS IS
VERY CLOSE, AT ARUSHA. AMB GAMBARI AMPLIFIED, ON THE
BASIS OF HIS CONTACTS WITH ARUSHA. BOTH PARTIES HAD
SEPARATELY COMMITED TO SIGNING A CF DOCUMENT. HOWEVER,
WHEN THE RPF LEARNED THAT THE GOR WOULD SIGN A DOCUMENT
SIMILAR TO THEIRS, THEY CHANGED THEIR MIND AT THE LAST
MINUTE. THE RPF DID NOT WANT TO LEND LEGITIMACY TO THE
GOR BY SIGNING SIMILAR DOCUMENTS.
5. GHAREKHAN CONVEYED THAT ON THE HUMANITARIAN FRONT,
�C I T N L B A Y POOOY
L N O I R R HTCP
ICRC HAD DELIVERED FOOD AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES TO THE HOLY
FAMILY CHURCH, THE ZAIRE EMBASSY, AND THE KING FAISAL
HOSPITAL. 60,000 DISPLACED ARE I N A CAMP NEAR
TANZANIA. DHA I S ATTEMPTING TO REMOVE SOME ORPHANS FROM
A GRF-CONTROLLED AREA. THE ICRC HAS BEEN UNABLE TO GET
ITS FOOD OUT OF ITS KIGALI WAREHOUSE. RED CROSS
EMPLOYEES AND A NUMBER OF ORPHANS WERE BRUTALLY KILLED
I N BUTARE ON MAY 3. SOME FOOD I S AVAILABLE FROM UGANDA
FOR THE DISPLACED. WHILE THE MAIN ROADS ARE GOOD, THE
SECONDARY ROADS CANNOT ACCOMODATE TRUCKS. UNHCR
ESTIMATES OF REFUGEES ARE: 250,000 I N TANZANIA; 40,000
I N BURUNDI; 5,500 I N UGANDA; AND 8,300 I N ZAIRE. UNHCR
WILL NEED USD 38.5 MILLION FOR
3 MONTHS FOR TANZANIA
ALONE, AND WILL ISSUE AN APPEAL SOON.
6. NUNS I N DANGER: USUN HAS BEEN CONTACTED ABOUT A
NUMBER OF CATHOLIC NUNS AND FRIARS TRAPPED I N RWANDA.
THE RPF REP ALSO APPROACHED USUN ON THEIR BEHALF. HE
SUGGESTED THAT THE USG AND THE VATICAN CONTACT THE
FRENCH GOVERNMENT AT A HIGH LEVEL, TO URGE THE GOF TO
USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH RWANDAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS NOW
C O N-F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001926
WHITEHOUSE PASS NSC FOR D. CLARK, S. RICE AND D.STEINBERG
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J 3 ;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
PARIS FOR PERLOW
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PHUM, EAID, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, RW
SUBJECT: RWANDA: SC PRESIDENT WILL WRITE TO SYG
I N PARIS TO PERSUADE THEM TO ALLOW THE SAFE DEPARTURE OF
THE NUNS. HE NOTED THAT SINCE THE GOF HAD RECEIVED AND
RECOGNIZED THESE RWANDAN OFFICIALS, THE CONTACT MIGHT AS
WELL BE PUT TO SOME USE.
ALBRIGHT
BT
#1926
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<SECT>
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<SSN>
1926
<TOR>
940505214147 M1031933
<SECT>
SECTION: 02 OF 02
<SSN>
1926
<TOR>
940505214154 M1031935
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
06-May-1994 04:47 EDT
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
VAX_MAIL@OEOB
STEINBERG@Al@OEOB
RICE@Al@OEOB
DESHAZER@Al@OEOB
FROM:
SUBJECT:
White House S i t u a t i o n Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)
UNSYG AND OAUSYG LETTERS RE RWANDA
<DIST>
SIT: DESHAZER RICE STEINBERG VAX
<PREC>
IMMEDIATE
<CLAS>
CONFIDENTIAL
<OSRI>
RUEHDS
<DTG>
060801Z MAY 94
<ORIG>
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
<TO>
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2188
INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 7 380
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1130
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE 3777
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE 0108
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE 314 3
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0102
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0072
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 27 82
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 880 3
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0044
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 2515
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 77 3 3
RUEIBS/AMEMBASSY ASMARA 176 3
RUSNDNB/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
<SUBJ>
UNSYG AND OAUSYG LETTERS RE RWANDA
<TEXT>
€ 0 N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 003325
DAR ES SALAAM, BUJUMBURA, KAMPALA, GENEVA FOR A/S
SHATTUCK
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
aou- o2.io3- n
S/iq/l?-
KBVA
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
GENEVA ALSO FOR RMA
LONDON FOR MCKINLEY
PARIS FOR PERLOW
MOSCOW FOR NIBLOCK
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, AORC, ET, RW
SUBJECT: UNSYG AND OAUSYG LETTERS RE RWANDA
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. OAU SECRETARY GENERAL PROVIDED AMBASSADOR WITH THE
FOLLOWING EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN HIMSELF AND UNSYG
BOUTROS GHALI. I T I S CLEAR FROM THIS EXCHANGE THAT HE
IS FOLLOWING UP ON HIS PROMISE TO A/S SHATTUCK TO
CONTACT AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS ABOUT PROVIDING TROOPS FOR
AN EXPANDED UN FORCE I N RWANDA. WHAT I S ALSO CLEAR I S
THAT THE TWO SECRETARY GENERAAS ARE NOT I N AGREEMENT
ABOUT WHO SHOULD LEAD THE EFFORT, WITH BBG TALKING ABOUT
REGIONAL EFFORTS, AND SALIM INSISTING ON THE UN
RETAINING THE LEAD AND BUILDING ON THE EXISTING UN
FORCE. (NOTE. SOMEONE HAD UNDERLINED THE NAMES OF THE
FOLLOWING COUNTRIES I N THE BOUTROS LETTER; WE SUSPECT
THIS WAS DONE AT THE OAU, PROBABLY BY SALIM HIMSELF, AND
PROBABLY INDICATES WHICH COUNTRIES HE WILL BE CONTACTING
AND/OR WHICH HE BELIEVES ARE MOST LIKELY TO SAY YES:
GHANA, NAMIBIA, SENEGAL, TANZANIA, ZAMBIA, ZIMBABWE).
3. FOLLOWING I S THE TEXT OF THE LETTER FROM BOUTROS
BOUTROS-GHALI TO SALIM SALIM:
2 MAY 1994
HIS EXCELLENCY
MR. SALIM AHMED SALRM
SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE
ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY
ADDIS ABABA
DEAR MR. SECRETARY-GENERAL,
AS INDICATED I N MY LETTER OF 29 APRIL 1994 TO THE
PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, A COPY OF WHICH I S
ATTACHED FOR YOUR ATTENTION, THE SITUATION I N RWANDA HAS
DETERIORATED OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS TO THE POINT THAT
URGENT ACTION I S REQUIRED.
I T I S I N THAT CONTEXT THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL
UNANIMOUSLY AUTHORIZED ITS PRESIDENT TO ISSUE THE
ATTACHED STATEMENT WHICH REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
OF THE UNITED NATIONS, INTER ALIA, "IN CONSULTATION WITH
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE OAU, TO REPORT FURTHER ON
ACTION WHICH MAY BE UNDERTAKEN WITH A VIEW TO ASSISTING
I N THE RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER I N RWANDA AND I N
PROVIDING SECURITY FOR DISPLACED PERSONS."
I N ORDER FOR ME TO MAKE THE APPROPRIATE RECOMMENDATION
TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, I HAVE WRITTEN TO THE
PRESIDENTS OF BOTSWANA, CAMEROON, CAPE VERDE, COTE
D'lVOIRE, EGYPT, ETHIOPIA, GHANA, GUINEA, GUINEA-BISSAU,
KENYA, MALAWI, MAURITANIA, MOROCCO, NAMIBIA, NIGERIA,
SENEGAL, TANZANIA, TUNISIA, ZAMBIA AND ZIMBABWE TO
APPEAL FOR THEIR SUPPORT I N THIS REGARD INCLUDING, I N
PARTICULAR, AN INDICATION OF WHETHER THEIR COUNTRIES
�C I T N L B A Y POOOY
L N O I R R HTCP
COULD CONTRIBUTE TROOPS TO A REGIONAL EFFORT TO RESTORE
LAW AND ORDER I N RWANDA, PROVIDE SECURITY FOR DISPLACED
PERSONS AND FACILITATE THE DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE TO THEM.
I HAVE ALSO SAID I N MY LETTERS THAT WHEN I HAVE RECEIVED
REPLIES FROM THE LEADERS TO W O I HAVE WRITTEN I SHALL
HM
BE READY TO RECOMMEND TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL THAT I T
CONSIDER WAYS THROUGH WHICH THE UNITED NATIONS COULD
ASSIST SUCH A REGIONAL EFFORT.
I LOOK FORWARD TO COOPERATING WITH YOU, MR. SECRETARYGENERAL, I N THIS MATTER AND I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL I F YOU
€ 0 N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 003325
DAR ES SALAAM, BUJUMBURA, KAMPALA, GENEVA FOR A/S
SHATTUCK
GENEVA ALSO FOR RMA
LONDON FOR MCKINLEY
PARIS FOR PERLOW
MOSCOW FOR NIBLOCK
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, AORC, ET, RW
SUBJECT: UNSYG AND OAUSYG LETTERS RE RWANDA
COULD UNDERTAKE SUCH FOLLOW-UP ACTION AS YOU DEEM
APPROPRIATE.
PLEASE ACCEPT, MR. SECRETARY-GENERAL, THE ASSURANCES OF
MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.
BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI
END TEXT.
4. FOLLOWING I S THE TEXT OF THE LETTER FROM SALIM SALIM
TO BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI:
CAB/RWANDA/200.94
MAY 5, 1994
HIS EXCELLENCY
DR. BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI
SECRETARY GENERAL
UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION
NEW
YORK, N.Y. 10017
USA
DEAR MR. SECRETARY GENERAL,
I WISH TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF 2ND MAY 1994 I N
WHICH YOU INFORMED ME OF THE EFFORTS YOU HAVE DEPLOYED
WITH A VIEW TO ASSISTING I N THE RESTORATION OF LAW AND
ORDER I N RWANDA, PROVIDING SECURITY FOR DISPLACED
PERSONS AND FACILITATING THE DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE TO THEM.
AS YOU RIGHTLY POINTED OUT, THE SITUATION I N RWANDA,
ESPECIALLY SECURITY AND THE HUMANITARIAN CATASTROPHE
WHICH IS UNFOLDING THERE, REQUIRE VERY URGENT ACTION.
THIS I S WHY I NOTE WITH APPRECIATION THE MEASURES YOU
HAVE TAKEN TO SEIZE THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITH THE MATTER
AND TO UNDERTAKE CONSULTATIONS WITH A NUMBER OF AFRICAN
COUNTRIES ON THEIR POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTION OF TROOPS TO AN
INTERNATIONAL EFFORT TO ASSIST I N THE COUNTRY. THE
ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY REMAINS READY AND FULLY
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
DISPOSED TO COOPERATE WITH THE UNITED NATIONS I N ANY
EFFORT AIMED AT ARRESTING THE TRAGEDY THERE.
IN MY MEETING TODAY WITH THE AMERICAN ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, MR. JOHN
SHATTUCK, I UNDERLINED THE NEED FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY TO MOVE WITH SPEED TO PROTECT THE INNOCENT
PEOPLE AND DELIVER HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. I HAVE MADE
I T VERY CLEAR TO HIM THAT THIS TASK CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED
MOST EFFECTIVELY I F I T I S UNDERTAKEN WITHIN THE CONTEXT
OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND NOT OTHERWISE.
IN THE INTEREST OF SPEEDY ACTION AND SINCE THERE I S
ALREADY A UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE I N RWANDA I N THE FORM
OF UNAMIR, I T WILL NOT, I N MY VIEW, BE NECESSARY TO
ENVISAGE THE SETTING UP OF NEW FORCE ALTOGETHER. WHAT
IS NEEDED I S TO BUILD ON WHAT I S ON THE GROUND, WITH AN
ADJUSTED MANDATE TO COPE WITH THE EXPANDED TASKS OF
PROVIDING SECURITY TO THE DISPLACED PERSONS WHERE NEEDED
AND DELIVERING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. YOU WILL AGREE
WITH ME THAT SINCE THE UNITED NATIONS I S ALREADY ENGAGED
I N RWANDA, THE ACCENT SHOULD BE PUT ON STRENGTHENING AND
EXPANDING THAT ENGAGEMENT INSTEAD OF TRANSFERING
RESPONSIBILITY ELSEWHERE. BESIDES, THE MAGNITUDE OF THE
TRAGEDY I N THAT COUNTRY REQUIRES THE KIND OF
COORDINATION AND RESOURCES WHICH CAN EFFECTIVELY BE
F I D E N TT I rA L SECTION 0 3 OF 0 3 ADDIS ABABA 00 3 325
I D E N
DAR ES SALAAM, BUJUMBURA, KAMPALA, GENEVA FOR A/S
SHATTUCK
GENEVA ALSO FOR RMA
LONDON FOR MCKINLEY
PARIS FOR PERLOW
MOSCOW FOR NIBLOCK
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, AORC, ET, RW
SUBJECT: UNSYG AND OAUSYG LETTERS RE RWANDA
SUSTAINED THROUGH A GLOBAL NETWORK SUCH AS COULD BE
SUCCESSFULLY MANAGED ONLY BY AN ORGANIZATION LIKE THE
UNITED NATIONS. THIS HAS BEEN THE PRACTICE I N OTHER
SITUATIONS OF DIRE NEED ELSEWHERE I N THE WORLD. I T MUST
NOT BE SET ASIDE I N THE CASE OF AFRICA.
WITH THIS BACKGROUND, I T I S MY UNDERSTANDING, THEREFORE,
THAT THE OPERATION I N RWANDA WILL CONTINUE TO BE A
UNITED NATIONS UNDERTAKING WITH ALL THAT I T IMPLIES I N
TERMS OF POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT AND RESOURCE COMMITMENT.
AFRICA AS A REGION WILL THEN SEE HOW I T CAN BRING
PRACTICAL AND EFFECTIVE SUPPORT TO THIS UNITED NATIONS
UNDERTAKING. I T I S I N THIS CONTEXT THAT I AM PROCEEDING
TO UNDERTAKE FOLLOW-UP ACTION TO WHAT YOU HAVE DONE SO
FAR INCLUDING EXPANDING ON THE CONSULTATIONS YOU HAVE
HAD WITH SOME AFRICAN COUNTRIES YOU INDICATED.
ONCE MORE I WISH TO THANK YOU FOR WHAT YOU ARE DOING AND
TO URGE YOU TO PERSIST I N YOUR EFFORTS AT ENSURING THAT
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE UNITED NATIONS I N
PARTICULAR CONTINUES TO HELP I N RWANDA.
PLEASE ACCEPT, MR. SECRETARY GENERAL, THE ASSURANCES OF
�C I T N L B A Y POOOY
L N O I R R HTCP
MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.
SALIM AHMED SALIM
END TEXT.
5. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. BAAS
BT
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<SECT>
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9
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
06-May-1994 10:01 EDT
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
VAX_MAIL(aOEOB
SCHWARTZ@Al@OEOB
RICE@Al@OEOB
DESHAZER@Al@OEOB
FROM:
SUBJECT:
White House S i t u a t i o n Room
(WHSR@Al(aWHSR)
TANZANIAN NEWS REPORTS OF A CEASEFIRE
<DIST>
PRT: SIT
SIT: DESHAZER RICE SCHWARTZ SUM SUM2 VAX
<PREC>
IMMEDIATE
<CLAS>
•CONFIDENTIAL
<OSRI>
RUEHDR
<DTG>
061246Z MAY 94
<ORIG>
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
<TO>
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA NIACT IMMEDIATE 4549
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 46 34
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0275
RUSNTCA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0168
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE 0422
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE 1080
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 1015
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE IMMEDIATE 0550
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 8715
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 47 69
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0101
DECLASSIFIED
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE 1677
PER E.0.13526
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 1314
<SUBJ>
TANZANIAN NEWS REPORTS OF A CEASEFIRE
DECLARATION CREATE CONFUSION
<TEXT>
C O N F I D E N T I A L ' SECTION 01 OF 02 DAR ES SALAAM 002841
KAMPALA FOR A/S SHATTUCK
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
�C I T N L B A Y POOOY
L N O I R R HTCP
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, RW, TZ
SUBJECT: TANZANIAN NEWS REPORTS OF A CEASEFIRE
DECLARATION CREATE CONFUSION
1.
(^1 SUMMARY: TODAY'S LOCAL PRESS CARRIED A
REPORT OF A UNILATERAL COMMITMENT TO A CEASEFIRE MADE
BY THE GOR I N ARUSHA. ACCORDING TO RADIO TANZANIA
BROADCASTS, WHICH HAVE GONE FURTHER THAN THE PRINT
MEDIA, THE RPF HAS AGREED TO IMPLEMENT THE CEASEFIRE
STARTING MAY 7 (ALTHOUGH I T DID NOT SIGN THE
AGREEMENT). AN MFA OFFICIAL CONFIRMED TO US
"UNOFFICIALLY" THAT THE RPF HAD MADE AN "UNDERTAKING"
TO THE FACILITATOR THAT I T WOULD OBSERVE A CEASEFIRE
COMMENCING MAY 10. TO ADD TO THE CONFUSION, WE HAVE
OBTAINED COPIES OF SEPARATE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENTS
SIGNED I N GBADOLITE BY THE GOR (GATSINZI AND COL
ALOYA) ON APRIL 23, AND BY THE RPF (TITO RUTAREMARA
AND JEAN-BOSCO BUTERA) ON MAY 5. THE DATE GIVEN FOR
THE CEASEFIRE ON THE RPF'S GBADOLITE DOCUMENT IS MAY
8. END SUMMARY.
2. (U) TODAY'S GOT-CONTROLLED NEWSPAPER CARRIED A
REPORT THAT THE GOR SIGNED, UNILATERALLY, A CEASEFIRE
DECLARATION BEFORE LEAVING ARUSHA LATE THURSDAY, MAY
5.
BEGIN QUOTE OF "DAILY NEWS" ARTICLE:
ARUSHA PEACE TALKS COLLAPSE.
THE TWO-DAY RWANDA PEACE TALKS ENDED I N A DEADLOCK
HERE YESTERDAY AS THE RWANDA PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF)
DISAGREED WITH THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FACILITATOR
THAT BOTH WARRING PARTIES SHOULD SEPARATELY SIGN THE
CEASEFIRE DECLARATION.
HOWEVER, THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, NDUGU JOSEPH RWEGASIRA TOLD
NEWSMEN HERE THAT THE RWANDA INTERIM GOVERNMENT SIGNED
THE DECLARATION OF A COMMITMENT TO A CEASEFIRE.
THE PRIME MINISTER AND FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT, NDUGU
JOSH MALECELA, SIGNED THE DECLARATION ON BEHALF OF THE
FACILITATOR, PRESIDENT A L I HASSAN MWINYI, WHILE THE
MINISTER FOR TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATION, NDUGU ANDRE
NTAGERURA ON BEHALF (SIC) OF THE RWANDESE INTERIM
GOVERNMENT.
NDUGU RWEGASIRA SAID THAT THE OAU SECRETARY GENERAL
(POLITICAL), DR. M.T. MAPURANGA, SIGNED ON BEHALF OF
THE ORGANISATION.
THE SIGNED COMMUNIQUE STIPULATED THAT THE CEASEFIRE
WAS SET ON MAY 10 AND THAT FOUR DAYS LATER, COMMANDERS
OF THE RWANDA GOVERNMENT AND THOSE OF THE RPF WOULD
MEET I N KIGALI UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE COMMANDER
OF UNAMIR.
THE MINISTER SAID THE RPF COMMUNIQUE, WHICH WAS NOT
SIGNED, CALLED ON THE RPF TO CEASE FIRE AND STOP
MASSACRES AND HOSTILITIES ON MAY 7 MIDNIGHT AND, SEVEN
DAYS LATER, A MEETING OF COMMANDERS TO BE CONVENED
(SIC) I N KIGALI BY THE UNAMIR.
ASKED WHAT ASSURANCES THE FACILITATOR HAS OF THE RPF
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
COMMITMENT TO THE CEASEFIRE DECLARATION, THE MINISTER
SAID "TANZANIA BANKS ON THE HOPE THAT RPF WILL KEEP TO
ITS WORD OF BEING COMMITTED TO THE TOTAL CEASEFIRE AS
WE DISCUSSED HERE."
"EVEN I F THE RPF SIGNED THE DECLARATION BUT CONTINUED
TO COMMIT ATROCITIES, THERE I S VERY LITTLE THAT THE
FACILITATOR CAN DO. WE ARE NOT ARBITRATORS BUT
FACILITATORS," HE SAID.
HE SAID ALL HAD BEEN SET FOR THE TWO WARRING PARTIES
TO SIGN THE COMMITMENT OF DECLARATION SEPARATELY BUT
THE RPF DEMANDED THAT THE FACILITATOR SHOULD NOT SIGN
THE RWANDA GOVERNMENT DOCUMENT, ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE I T
WAS AN ILLEGAL ONE BUT SHOULD ONLY SIGN THAT OF THE
RPF.
"THIS DEMAND WAS NOT ACCEPTED BY NDUGU MALECELA HENCE
THE RPF REFUSAL
C O N F I D E N T I A L
SECTION 02 OF 02 DAR ES SALAAM 002841
KAMPALA FOR A/S SHATTUCK
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, RW, TZ
SUBJECT: TANZANIAN NEWS REPORTS OF A CEASEFIRE
DECLARATION CREATE CONFUSION
TO SIGN A JOINT DECLARATION, THE
MINISTER SAID.
END QUOTE
MFA CONFIRMS "UNOFFICIALLY"
3. HZ} I N ITS RECENT BROADCASTS, RADIO TANZANIA HAS
REPORTED THAT THE RPF AGREED TO IMPLEMENT A CEASEFIRE
ON MAY 7 (ALTHOUGH I T DID NOT SIGN THE CEASEFIRE
DOCUMENT). AN OFFICIAL I N THE MFA'S AFRICA
DEPARTMENT, ADMITTING THAT THE INFORMATION WAS
CONFLICTING, CONFIRMED THAT THE GOR HAD SIGNED A
CEASEFIRE DECLARATION I N ARUSHA. HE ADDED THAT THE
RPF HAD "MADE AN UNDERTAKING" TO THE FACILITATOR THAT
I T WOULD OBSERVE A CEASEFIRE BEGINNING MAY 10, EVEN I F
I T DID NOT SIGN A PAPER TO THAT EFFECT. WHEN ASKED
ABOUT THE DIFFERENT CEASEFIRE DATES, THE OFFICIAL
NOTED THAT THESE DATES SHOULD BE REGARDED AS STILL I N
FLUX. HE ALSO REQUESTED THAT HIS INFORMATION BE
CONSIDERED "UNOFFICIAL" UNTIL THERE I S AN OFFICIAL GOT
ANNOUNCEMENT.
GBADOLITE CEASEFIRES
4. ( t f ADDING TO THE CONFUSION ARE COPIES WE
OBTAINED FROM THE FRENCH EMBASSY OF SEPARATE CEASEFIRE
AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BY THE RPF AND GOR I N GBADOLITE,
ZAIRE. THE AGREEMENTS, ALMOST IDENTICAL I N TEXT, WERE
SIGNED, ON THE GOR SIDE, BY GENERAL MARCEL GATSINZI
AND COL. ALOYA ON APRIL 23; AND ON THE RPF SIDE, BY
TITO RUTAREMARA AND JEAN-BOSCO BUTERA ON MAY 5. WE
NOTE THAT AT THE BOTTOM OF THE RPF'S CEASEFIRE
DOCUMENT, THE COLUMN FOR THE GOR'S SIGNATURE I S
ENTITLED "POUR LES FORCES RWANDAISES." ON THE GOR'S
COPY, HOWEVER, THIS SPACE I S ENTITLED "POUR LE
GOVERNMENT RWANDAIS." ALSO THE DATE FOR THE CEASEFIRE
�C I T N L B A Y POOOY
L N O I R R HTCP
ON THE RPF PAPER I S SUNDAY, MAY 8. WE ARE FAXING
COPIES TO KAMPALA, BUJUMBURA AND AF/C.
5. BUJUMBURA, MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
DEVOS
BT
#2841
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<SECT>
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<TOR>
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9
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
06-May-1994 21:23 EDT
'CQUriBliiNTlAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
VAX_MAIL@OEOB
STEINBERG@Al@OEOB
RICE@Al@OEOB
DESHAZER@Al@OEOB
CLARKER@A1@OEOB
FROM:
SUBJECT:
White House S i t u a t i o n Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)
SECURITY COUNCIL AGREES ON LETTER TO SYG ON
<DIST>
SIT: CLARKER DESHAZER RICE STEINBERG VAX
<PREC>
IMMEDIATE
<CLAS>
CONFIDENTIAL
<OSRI>
RUCNDT
<DTG>
070038Z MAY 94
<ORIG>
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
<TO>
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6 306
INFO RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE 0224
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 022 3
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0515
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0421
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 1179
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0204
DECLASSIFIED
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 0403
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0958
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 498 3
PFR F O W2f«
o x n \ I ^ -Vv
XO\\- OX!** >
<SUBJ>
SECURITY
RWANDA MAY
<TEXT>
C O N F I D
WHITEHOUSE
3/1^/15- KBH
COUNCIL AGREES ON LETTER TO SYG ON
6.
E N T I A L - SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001959
PASS NSC FOR D. CLARK, S. RICE AND D.STEINBERG
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J 3 ,
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
PARIS FOR PERLOW
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PHUM, EAID, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, RW
SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL AGREES ON LETTER TO SYG ON
RWANDA MAY 6.
1. ( f t ] SUMMARY. THE SECURITY COUNCIL AGREED ON THE TEXT
OF A LETTER THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD SEND TO THE SYG
ASKING FOR CONTINGENCY PLANNING ON DELIVERY OF
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT TO DISPLACED PERSONS
IN RWANDA. THE COUNCIL AGREED TO HOLD OFF ON
DISCUSSIONS OF ANY DRAFT RESOLUTION UNTIL THE SYG SENDS
HIS RESPONSE. USUN DEMARCHED RWANDA AND FRANCE ON
PROTECTION OF THE NUNS AND FRIARS TRAPPED NEAR BUTARE AS
WELL AS THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR
STOPPING THE MASSACRES GENERALLY. END SUMMARY.
2. (£Q AT INFORMALS ON MAY 6, THE SECURITY COUNCIL
AGREED TO THE TEXT OF A LETTER TO BE SENT BY THE
PRESIDENT TO THE SYG ASKING HIM TO REPORT ON CONTINGENCY
PLANNING FOR UN OR INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE TO PROVIDE
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT TO DISPLACED PERSONS
IN RWANDA. AMB WALKER TOLD THE COUNCIL THAT USG COULD
NOT ACCEPT INDICATIONS I N THE LETTER OF A FUTURE CHAPTER
V I I OPERATION, SO REFERENCES TO RESTORING LAW AND ORDER
WERE REMOVED. THE TEXT OF THE LETTER FOLLOWS AT PARA 5.
3. O"} TWO DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (SEPARATELY FAXED TO 10)
WERE DISTRIBUTED. ONE FROM THE NAM CALLS FOR A CHAPTER
V I I ACTION TO RESTORE LAW AND ORDER. THE OTHER, FROM NEW
ZEALAND, CALLS FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND CREATION
OF WEAPONS FREE ZONES I N WHICH UN WOULD PROTECT
CIVILIANS. THE COUNCIL AGREED THAT THEY WOULD NOT
DISCUSS THE "DRAFTS UNTIL THE SECRETARIAT PRODUCED THE
CONTINGENCY PLANNING REQUESTED I N THE LETTER. MEANWHILE
THE PRESIDENT SAID HIS DELEGATION WOULD ATTEMPT TO
AMALGAMATE THE TWO DRAFTS, A TASK THAT THE ARGENTINE
AMBASSADOR NOTED WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT. THE
SECRETARIAT HAS AGREED TO PRODUCE THE CONTINGENCY
PLANNING PAPER BY THE MIDDLE OF NEXT WEEK AT WHICH TIME
FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE DRAFTS I S EXPECTED.
4. (£0 ON THE MARGINS OF THE INFORMALS, USUN DEMARCHED
THE FRENCH AND RWANDA AMBASSADORS ON THE NEED FOR THE
INTERIM GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA TO PROTECT THE FRANCISCAN.
NUNS AND FRIARS TRAPPED NEAR BUTARE. ADDITIONALLY THE
RWANDA AMBASSADOR WAS FIRMLY DEMARCHED ON THE
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT TO HALT THE
MASSACRES AND THAT THEY WOULD BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE I F
THIS: DID NOT:. HAPPEN.
5. (U) BEGIN TEXT OF PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO SYG:
6 MAY 1994
DEAR MR. SECRETARY GENERAL,
THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAVE CONSIDERED YOUR
TWO LETTERS OF 29 APRIL 1994 (S/1994/518) AND 3 MAY 1994
(S/1994/530) ON THE SITUATION I N RWANDA
2
M
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL COMMEND YOU, YOUR SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE, THE FORCE COMMANDER AND THE PERSONNEL OF
THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE I N RWANDA (UNAMIR) FOR THE
EXEMPLARY MANNER I N WHICH YOU HAVE ALL CONTINUED TO
CARRY OUT YOUR RESPECTIVE TASKS, UNDER VERY DIFFICULT
CIRCUMSTANCES.
THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL HAVE AGREED THAT I N VIEW OF
THE UNABATED HOSTILITIES AND KILLINGS, URGENT AND
EFFECTIVE MEANS OF ACTION BE, -CONSIDERED. I N ORDER TO DO
SO, THEY HAVE ASKED ME TO REQUEST YOU TO PROVIDE I N THE
FIRST INSTANCE INDICATIVE CONTINGENCY PLANNING WITH
REGARD TO THE DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AS
WELL AS SUPPORT TO THE DISPLACED PERSONS I N RWANDA.
THE COUNCIL MAY, AT A LATER STAGE AND AS SITUATION
DEVELOPS, REQ
UEST FROM YOU A FURTHER INDICATION AS TO
WHAT WOULD BE REQUIRED I N TERMS OF LOGISTICS AND
FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF AN EXPANDED UNITED NATIONS OR
G 0 N F I-D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001959
WHITEHOUSE PASS NSC FOR D. CLARK, S. RICE AND D.STEINBERG
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J 3 ,
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
PARIS FOR PERLOW
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PHUM, EAID, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, RW
SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL AGREES ON LETTER TO SYG ON
RWANDA MAY 6.
INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE I N RWANDA AND/OR NEIGHBORING
COUNTRIES CAPABLE OF ASSISTING THE PARTIES I N RWANDA,
MONITORING OF A CEASE-FIRE AND CONTRIBUTING TO THE
RESUMPTION OF THE PEACE PROCESS UNDER THE ARUSHA PEACE
AGREEMENT.
THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL DO NOT EXPECT AT THIS STAGE
ANY FIRM OR DEFINITIVE RECOMMENDATIONS FROM YOUR OFFICE,
SINCE, AS WE UNDERSTAND, CONSULTATIONS WITH REGARD TO
FUTURE UNITED NATIONS COURSES OF ACTION ARE ON-GOING.
PLEASE ACCEPT, MR. SECRETARY GENERAL, THE ASSURANCES OF
MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATIONS.
PROF. IBRAHIM GAMBARI
PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
END TEXT.
ALBRIGHT
BT
#1959
NNNN
<SECT>
SECTION: 01 OF 02
<SSN>
1959
<TOR>
940506205140 M1034669
<SECT>
SECTION: 02 OF 02
<SSN>
1
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
1959
<TOR>
940506205142 M1034670
9
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
06-May-1994 20:53 EDT
1
CON1 lUlLNTlAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
VAX_MAIL<aOEOB
STEINBERG@Al@OEOB
RICE@Al@OEOB
DESHAZER@Al@OEOB
FROM:
SUBJECT:
White House S i t u a t i o n Room
(WHSR@Al(aWHSR)
USG REPLY TO DHA REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE WITH
<DIST>
SIT: DESHAZER RICE STEINBERG VAX
<PREC>
IMMEDIATE
<CLAS>
CONFIDENTIA&
<OSRI>
RUCNDT
<DTG>
070028Z MAY 94
<ORIG>
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
<TO>
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6 300
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
<SUBJ>
USG REPLY TO DHA REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE WITH
RWANDA AIRLIFT
<TEXT>
C O N F I D E N T I A L
USUN NEW YORK 001954
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO AID/BHR/OFDA
WH PLEASE PASS NSC FOR RICE AND STEINBURG
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J 3 , J 5 , SECDEF FOR
OSD/ISA-GA
E.O. 12356, DECL: CONFIDENTIAL
TAGS: PREF, EAID, UN, RW, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, PHUM
SUBJECT: USG REPLY TO DHA REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE WITH
RWANDA AIRLIFT
REF: LOW-GARVELINK TELCON 5/5/94
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. PER REFTELCON USUN INFORMED UN DEPARTMENT OF
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (DHA) OF USG RESPONSE TO
DHA'S REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE I N CONTINUING THE
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
aon- 00.1*3-n
�.LNO L B A Y POOOY
CITN I R R HTCP
KIGALI/NAIROBI AIRLIFT CURRENTLY RUN BY THE CANADIAN
AIR FORCE AND SCHEDULED TO TERMINATE MAY 8. USUN
RELAYED INFORMATION TO KAZ KURODA, RWANDA DESK
OFFICER AT DHA.
3. USUN TOLD DHA THAT WERE A UN AGENCY TO CHARTER A
PLANE TO CONTINUE THE AIRLIFT AND REQUEST DONOR
COUNTRIES TO PAY FOR THAT CHARTER, THE USG WOULD
CONSIDER CONTRIBUTING.
4. DHA WAS APPRECIATIVE OF THE USG RESPONSE. DHA
MADE SIMILAR REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE WITH THE AIRLIFT
TO SEVERAL DONOR COUNTRIES. I T WILL CONSIDER USG'S
SUGGESTION TO CHARTER A PLANE I N LIGHT OF WHAT OTHER
COUNTRIES ARE PREPARED TO DO.
5. COMMENT. WE RECOMMEND THAT OFDA ASSIST THE UN BY
URGING A UN AGENCY (SUCH AS WFP) TO LEASE A C-130 AND
PICK UP THIS MISSION. WE ALSO SUGGEST THAT STATE/AID
HELP DHA BY FINDING OTHER DONOR SOURCES SUCH AS
FRANCE OR BELGIUM. END COMMENT.
ALBRIGHT
BT
#1954
NNNN
<SECT>
SECTION: 01 OF 01
<SSN>
1954
<TOR>
940506204044 M1034638
9
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP
<DIST>PRT: SIT
SIT: DESHAZER STEINBERG SUM SUM2 VAX
<PREC>IMMEDIATE<CLAS>CONFIDENTIAL<OSRI>RUEHC<DTG>062340Z MAY 94
<ORIG>SECSTATE WASHDC
<TO>RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 0000
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE 0000
<SUBJ>RWANDA SITREP MAY 6, INFORMATION FOR GENEVA PRESS REMARKS
<TEXT>
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
G O N—F-• D E N T I A L STATE 121075
2
PER E. O. 13526
FOR A/S SHATTUCK
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
;LO\\- oil*-a TAGS: PGOV PREL R
W
3/n/'5" KSH
SUBJECT: RWANDA SITREP MAY 6, INFORMATION FOR GENEVA PRESS REMARKS
R!: (A) 94 GENEVA 4318
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS CURRENT AS OF MAY 6 AND
MIGHT PROVIDE ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR A/S SHATTUCK'S
BRIEFING OF GENEVA-BASED MEDIA CITED I N REFTEL
(LOU) UNAMIR WILL REOPEN THE KIGALI AIRPORT ON SATURDAY.
fG-) UNSYGSR BOOH BOOH WILL RETURN TO KIGALI ON SATURDAY.
(U) AUSTRALIA HAS OFFERED TO PROVIDE 1200 TO 1500 TROOPS
TO A UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE.
CANADA HAS OFFERED A 200 MAN COMMUNICATIONS GROUP
AND EQUIPMENT TO A UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE.
THE RWANDA/BURUNDI MAY 6 SITREP FOLLOWS:
SITUATION ON THE GROUND
(LOU) UNAMIR REPORTS THAT KIGALI IS RELATIVELY QUIET
THIS AFTERNOON. (AF/C UNAMIR TELCON)
(U) ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, HEAVY MORTAR AND MACHINE
GUN FIRE CONTINUED I N KIGALI'S CITY CENTER THIS MORNING,
BUT THE RPF APPEARS TO HAVE GAINED GROUND AFTER
YESTERDAY'S HEAVY FIGHTING. SHELLS WERE FALLING I N THE
CITY CENTER AND NEAR THE MILLES COLLINES HOTEL WHERE 300
REFUGEES ARE AWAITING EVACUATION. AID WORKERS ALSO
REPORTED RPF FORCES HAVE ENCIRCLED RUHENGARI AND WERE
ATTEMPTING TO CAPTURE I T . THE AIRPORT REMAINS CLOSED
AFTER A CANADIAN C-130 WAS SHOT AT YESTERDAY WHILE
UNLOADING SUPPLIES. (REUTERS, API)
(U) HUNDREDS OF RWANDANS DAILY ARE SWIMMING THE KAGERA
RIVER TO REACH THE BENACO REFUGEE CAMP IN TANZANIA,
fREUTERS\
-
(U) TANZANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER RWEGASIRA TODAY ANNOWCED
IN DAR ES SALAAM THAT RWANDA'S INTERIM GOVERNMENT HAD
SIGNED A DOCUMENT CALLING FOR A CEASEFIRE STARTING
TOMORROW. HE SAID THE RPF DID NOT SIGN, BUT HAD PROMISED
TO OBSERVE THE CEASEFIRE. PRESS ALSO REPORTS THAT A
CEASEFIRE WAS SIGNED I N GABADOLITE, BROKERED BY MOBUTU.
(REUTERS)
(LOU) BELGIAN OFFICIALS HAVE CONFIRMED WITH THE RPF THAT
THEY SIGNED A CEASEFIRE I N GABADOLITE, BUT IT WAS
CONDITIONED ON THE END OF MASSACRES AND GOR ACCEPTANCE OR
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
v.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBLITY FOR THE KILLINGS. (AF/C
EMBASSY BRUSSELS TELCON)
(U) A/S SHATTUCK AND TANZANIAN PM MALACELA TODAY AGREED
ON A PRESS STATEMENT TO BE ISSUED IN DAR ES SALAAM
TOMORROW: THE TWO FULLY AGREED ON THE NEED FOR A
CEASEFIRE, THAT THE UNAMIR COMMANDER SHOULD CONVENE A
MEETING I N KIGALI OF HIGH RANKING MILITARY COMMANDERS OF
BOTH SIDES TO DISCUSS A CEASEFIRE, THAT ONCE A CEASEFIRE
IS AGREED, AN EXPANDED INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE WOULD BE
IMMEDIATELY DEPLOYED, AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION CREATED
TO INVESTIGATE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, AND THE ARUSHA
PROCESS RELAUNCHED. (BUJUMBURA 01578)
fG^ EU OFFICIALS SEE RWANDA AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR U.S EU COOPERATION. THEY WANT TO W R CLOSELY WITH THE
OK
UNITED STATES TO JOINTLY ENCOURAGE AN OAU PEACEKEEPING
FORCE UNDER UN AUSPICES, FOLLOWED BY PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY
TO KEEP THE SITUATION FROM SPREADING - ESPECIALLY TO
BURUNDI. THE EU IS ALREADY PROVIDING SOME HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES, BUT IS GEARING UP TO PROVIDE MORE
AID ONCE THE SITUATION STABILIZES. (BRUSSELS 05050)
e&) OAU/SSG SALIM AND UN/SYG BOUTROS GHALI DISAGREE
ABOUT WHO SHOULD LEAD THE EFFORT TO PROVIDE TROOPS FOR AN
EXPANDED FORCE I N RWANDA. IN AN EXCHANGE OF LETTERS
DATED MAY 2 AND 5, BOUTROS GALI SUGGESTED THE UN MIGHT BE
ABLE TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO ANY REGIONAL EFFORTS THAT
MIGHT BE MADE, WHILE SALIM INSISTED THE UN SHOULD RETAIN
THE LEAD AND BUILD ON THE EXISTING UN FORCE. (ADDIS
ABABA 03325)
OAU SYG SALIM, MET ON MAY 5 WITH A/S SHATTUCK IN DAR
ES SALAAM. SALIM FULLY SUPPORTS RECONSTITUTING UNAMIR TO
PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, PROTECT REFUGEES AND
CIVILIANS, AND MONITOR A CEASEFIRE WHEN ONE IS ACHIEVED.
HE STRONGLY BELIEVES UN INTERVENTION SHOULD INCLUDE A
HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING COMPONENT, INCLUDING AN
INVESTIGATION INTO THE KILLING AND MASSACRES. SALIM IS
NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT JOINT OAU/UN LEADERSHIP, SAYING
THAT WHERE THE OAU CAN "MAKE A DIFFERENCE" IS IN SECURING
FIRM AND CONCRETE COMMITMENTS FROM AFRICAN COUNTRIES TO
PROVIDE TROOPS. (DAR ES SALAAM 02806)
e&) THE UNSC YESTERDAY AGAIN DISCUSSED RWANDA, HOPING TO
MOVE AWAY FROM SHIFTING RESPONSIBILITY FROM THE COUNCIL
TO SYG BOUTROS GHALI AND BACK AGAIN. IN AN EFFORT TO
MOVE TOWARDS DECISIVE ACTION, THE SC IS TODAY CIRCULATING
A DRAFT LETTER ASKING THE SYG TO PROVIDE AN INFORMAL
NON-PAPER PRESENTING A POSSIBLE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO WHATEVER DECISION THE SC MIGHT
TAKE. MANY DELEGATIONS EMPHASIZED THAT HUMANITARIAN
QUESTIONS SHOULD BE THE CURRENT PRIORITY. THE
NON-ALIGNED ARE ALSO WORKING ON A DRAFT RESOLUTION TO BE
TABLED TODAY OR MONDAY.
(USUN 01926)
(U) NIGERIA IS CONSIDERING A UN REQUEST TO SEND TROOPS
TO PARTICIPATE I N THE UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN
RWANDA, ACCORDING TO KADUNA RADIO NIGERIA.
{Gj MONIQUE MUJAWAMIRA AND ALISON DES FORGES YESTERDAY
CALLED ON AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH TO ARGUE FOR GREATER US
INVOLVEMENT I N RWANDA. THEY URGE A US INITIATIVE TO
ORGANIZE DONORS TO PROCLAIM THEY WILL NEVER SUPPORT THE
CURRENT MILITARY LEADERSHIP AND CALLING FOR BRINGING THE
KILLERS TO JUSTICE, RESUMPTION OF THE ARUSHA TALKS EXCEPT
FOR SOME MILITARY LEADERS AND AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOFli
KILLINGS. USUN WAS PARTICULARILY STRUCK BY THEIR
INSISTANCE THAT ENOUGH MODERATES HAVE SURVIVED TO FORM A
VIABLE NEGOTIATING PRESENCE AND EVENTUALLY TAKE PART I N A
COALITION GOVERNMENT. (USUN 01922)
HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS
(U) THE UN YESTERDAY APPEALED FOR 38.8 MILLION I N AID
TO COMBAT THE CRISIS. UN SOURCES SAID MILITARY TRANSPORT
PLANES WOULD START FERRYING SUPPLIES INTO TANZANIA TODAY
FOR RWANDAN REFUGEES, ALTHOUGH HEAVY RAIN WOULD DELAY
ROAD TRANSPORT. (REUTERS)
CHRISTOPHER
NNNN
<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01<SSN>1075<STOR>940506195138 M1034530
<TOR>940506201027
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
09-May-1994 20:15 EDT
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
VAX_MAIL<aOEOB
STEINBERG@A1@OEOB
RICE@Al(aOEOB
DESHAZER@Al@OEOB
CLARKER@A1@OEOB
FROM:
SUBJECT:
White House S i t u a t i o n Room
(WHSR@Al(aWHSR)
RWANDA UPDATE
<DIST>
PRT: SIT
SIT: CLARKER DESHAZER RICE STEINBERG SUM SUM2 VAX
<PREC>
IMMEDIATE
<CLAS>
CONFIDENTIAL
<OSRI>
RUEHC
<DTG>
092348Z MAY 94
<ORIG>
SECSTATE WASHDC
<TO>
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHBG/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0000
RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 0000
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0000
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY 0000
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0000
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0000
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY 0000
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0000
<SUBJ>
RWANDA UPDATE
<TEXT>
- C O N F I D E N T I A L '
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 122713
PRETORIA/JOH FOR A/S MOOSE
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL TZ
SUBJECT: RWANDA UPDATE
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
a.on- 01 0 - r\
:13
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
REF:
(A) 94 STATE 121277
CEASEFIRE ACTIVITY
L. THERE I S NO CEASEFIRE-. UNAMIR COMMANDER DALLAIRE MET
WITH BOTH GOR MINISTER OF 'DEFENSE BIZIMANA AND RPF
COMMANDER KAGAME ON SATURDAY.
HE SENT A DELEGATION TO
GITARAMA SUNDAY, AND HAD PLANNED TO MEET AGAIN WITH RPF
COMMANDER KAGAME AND THE GOVERNMENT TODAY, MONDAY. BUT
HE COULD NOT MOVE TODAY AS A RESULT OF A SUBSTANTIAL RPF
OFFENSIVE TOWARD THE CENTER OF TOWN, ACCOMPANIED BY HEAVY
SHELLING. PERHAPS TOMORROW...THE RPF TOLD DALLAIRE THAT
A CEASEFIRE MUST BE NEGOTIATED ON THE GROUND. THE
GOVERNMENT SAID I T HAS AGREED TO A CEASEFIRE AND I S READY
TO DISCUSS THE DETAILS. BUT DALLAIRE CAME AWAY FROM HIS
SATURDAY MEETINGS WITH THE .IMPRESSION THAT-'NEITHER SIDE
IS VERY INTERESTED I N A CEASEFIRE. HE STILL HOPES TO GET
THE TWO CHIEFS OF STAFF I N THE SAME ROOM BY THE END OF
THE WEEK, BUT OFFERS NOT GUARANTEES.
5
2. MEANTIME, THE GOR DELEGATION TO THE ARUSHA TALKS
SPENT A COUPLE OF DAYS I N NAIROBI AND WAS EXPECTED TO
DEPART FOR KINSHASA ON SUNDAY, THUS REOPENING THE
POSSIBILITY OF A RETURN OF THE ACTION TO MOBUTU. WE ARE
UNAWARE WHETHER AN RPF DELEGATION REMAINS I N ZAIRE.
AIRPORT SECURITY
3. DALLAIRE HAS PROPOSED TO BOTH THE GOR AND THE RPF
;THAT THE AIRPORT BE MADE A NEUTRAL ZONE. HE SET A
DEADlilNE THIS WEEK F O AGREEMENT BY THE PARTIES, AND
'R
THREATENED TO PULL UNAMIR OUT OF KIGALI I F THE SIDES DO
NOT AGREE. DALLAIRE HAS IDENTIFIED AN AIRSTRIP I N THE
NORTH WHICH WILL ACCOMMODATE A C-130, AND HAS TENTATIVELY
PLANNED TO USE ENTEBBE FOR LARGE SHIPMENTS TO BE TRUCKED
TO RWANDA. HE HAS NOT RAISED THIS PLAN WITH RWANDANS OR
NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES.
4. DALLAIRE BELIEVES I T I S PREMATURE TO GIVE UP ON
KIGALI,' EVEN THOUGH HE HAD TO TURN BACK HIS SUPPORT
FLIGHT TODAY. THE RPF WILL AGREE TO A NEUTRAL AIRPORT;
THE GOVERNMENT, BEING CLOSER AND THEREFORE REQUIRED TO
MOVE BACK FARTHER I S STILL HESITATING, BUT DALLAIRE
BELIEVES THERE I S STILL A GOOD CHANCE THE GOR WILL AGREE,
AND DO THE NECESSARY. THEY HAVE ALREADY WITHDRAWN ABOUT
HALF OF THEIR ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSES FROM THE AIRPORT TO
USE I N THE BATTLE FOR KANOMBE CAMP. DALLAIRE IMPLIED
THAT THE GOR MAY HAVE ITS OWN INTERESTS I N BEING ABLE TO
REMOVE TROOPS FROM THE AIRPORT AREA, AND HE I S WORKING ON
THEM TO FINALLY AGREE.
�C I T N L B A Y POOOY
L N O I R R HTCP
UNAMIR EXPANSION
5. DALLAIRE HAS REFINED HIS PROPOSAL TO .REQUEST A TOTAL .
OF 5500 TROOPS. DALLAIRE SAYS HE HAS RECEIVED A POSITIVE
RESPONSE FROM THE UN SECRETARIAT TO HIS PROPOSAL AND HAS
BEEN AUTHORIZED TO DISCUSS I T WITH THE GOR AND THE RPF.
UNAMIR ALSO HAS CONTINGENCY PLANS TO BRING I N EQUIPMENT
AND RELIEF SUPPLIES FROM BURUNDI AND TANZANIA I F
NECESSARY. A MEMBER OF DALLLAIRE'S STAFF I S CURRENTLY I N
BUJUMBURA STUDYING THE POSSIBILITIES.
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
6. THERE CONTINUE TO BE BARRIERS BOTH I N TOWN AND . N
O
RURAL ROADS. KIGALI HAS BEEN PRACTICALLY DEPOPULATED,
PERHAPS ONLY 50,000 PERSONS REMAINING (FROM FORMER
400,000).'; STILL, SOME OF THE SURVIVORS ARE STILL BEING
ABDUCTED FROM THEIR HOMES AND ARE PRESUMED DEAD.
DALLAIRE I S RECEIVING MORE AND MORE DATA ON ENCLAVES ON
THREATENED PERSONS WHO NEED URGENTLY TO BE PROTECTED OR
ESCORTED TO MORE SECURE AREAS. HE CANNOT OFFER THIS
PROTECTION WITH THE PERSONNEL ON BOARD.
7. THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE HAS AGREED WITH DALLAIRE ON
HIS CONCEPT OF PROTECTING HUMANITARIAN SHIPMENTS WITH AN
EXPANDED UNAMIR, BUT HAS SUGGESTED THAT RWANDANS SHOULD
BE INVOLVED I N THE PROCESS OF PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO
OTHER RWANDANS. ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, THE HARDLINE RADIO
STATION AND THE PRESIDENT'S PARTY YOUTH GROUP HAVE
STARTED TO COOPERATE WITH UNAMIR AND ARE PUBLICLY CALLING
ON THEIR SUPPORTERS TO PERMIT UNAMIR THROUGH THEIR
ROADBLOCKS.
8. BUJUMBURA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
TALBOTT
BT
#2713
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�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP i
P.02
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ie:lS
0212 223 4032
FRENCH MISSION
A
AIDE'MPiQIRE
mm
i.
Th«fcttachadnon-paper i in r « o f f to the Utt«r
»
tpnit
addrasscd to th* Sacrttary-Oinaral on 6 Nay 1904 by th« Prtsl^
of tho security Counail. Tho paptr outlines a possible nandati
and forca struotura (or an expanded U A I , capabla of providing
NMR
support for diisplaaftd pareons and assisting In th© da l i vary of
humanitarian asaiatanca to thoee in naad.
2. UNAMIR has broached tho poaaiblllty of such an operatioflj
both partial, but furthar elaboration night be required and
explloit comtoitnenta obtained to pre-empt possible diffioultitjp
3. The members of the Council should be aware that the fighting
in and around Kigali has intensified. U A I KQc and the Airport
NMR
have been hit, and humanitarian assiatance flights have been
halted, one U A I soldiar has been killed by mortar fire tdd|
NMR
The Force Cotoaander again has stressed that U A I cannot
NMR
continua to cope with the situation indefinitely with its
resources.
9 Kay 1 9
84
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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9 May
1994
1. UNAMIR's ultimate objactivi in Rwanda, as provided in^
tnandaca approved by the Security council under reaolutio'n
(1993), is to facilitate the implementation of the Ameha
Agreement. This procees tragically broke down on fi April 191
and a l l atcetnpts to put i t back on track have so far been
uneuccesaful. The first step in_bringing the part legiJbaok_tqi theVy
Arusha peace progess is to address the humanitarian crisig, and
to ftBaist in re-establishing a stable and secure environment in
the.country, i t is hoped that this will ease the teneion betwi
the warring factions and possibly lead to a ceasefire.
t
2. At present, the situation in Rwanda remains extremely
serious. Indeed, more than l._5 million civiliems have been
displaced or have sought refuge in neighbouring countries.
Combat between Rwandese Government Forces (RGF) and the Rwandese
Patriotic Front (RPF) continues. The RGF controls.the west and.
southwestern parts of Rwanda, while the RPF i s in control of.,
northern and eastern parts of the country, as well as areas.r
the southeaet. The capital city is divided between the ROF.i
RPF. The front line is, however, fluid and changing as millti
actions continue. Militia and other unruly elements continue to
operate, although less frequently than at the beginning of the
conflict, killing and terrorizing innocent civilians. M^reov^r, jjjj
although both the RGF and RPF have separately expre8secL.their
readiness to enter into a ceasefire, the fighting has so far^
continued unabated.
3, Given the security situation, i t has not been possible to
access accurately the humanitarian situation. It is estimated
that at least 1.2 million people have been internally displaced
and are in need of aesietance. Rwanda is also suffering from a
serious drought with an estimated 1.5 million people in need of
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
My 10,94 18:5b
a
0J/10/C4 16:16
i.
.»
. WJI. U M t
0212 2 3 4 9
2 02
J>
•
. . . .
F E C MS I N •»-" A
R N H I SO
• 3 food aflflistance. Tha current refugee population in neighbouring
countries (Tanzania/ Burundi, Uganda and Zaire) la eat ima ted at
wore^than 300,000. in addition, approximately «0,90_0 refugees
from Burundi are in Rwanda. D A in cooperation with UNANIR*
H
the operational organizations of the united Nations syatam
eet&blished a Rwanda Bmergancy Office in Nairobi and has fi<
an Advance Humanitarian Team in Kigali which has also vieited
other parts of the country. However, humanitarian operations in
Rwanda have been severely limited by problems of access and
security.
4.
It is itnperative^that.ajEu^
this
cataaitrophic situation is prevented and that tha basic
humanitarian ^neede of the huge numbers of Rwandese civilians
haye been displaced or otherwise affected by the fighting be
addressed. It la also eesentlal that the igfua off their safety
be addressed on an urgent baajj. The Security Council may
therefore wifh to considar the amendment of UNAMIR's mandate to
include support to those in need and assistance in the provisitf
of humanitarian aid. UNAMIR'a efforts would be coordinated W
,
those of the humanitarian agencies operating in Rwanda or e
in assisting Rwandese refugees in neighbouring countries
including UNHCR. (For convenience, the miaaion as it would
function under this amended mandate is referred to as UNAMIR-A.)
Mmte.te
5.
The mandate of UNAMIR-A would be to/aupport displaced
persons and other groups in Rwanda who nav^Jafln affected by
hostilities, and to assist in the provision of assistance by
humanitarian agenciesX^
;^,^^-^-
' Afigumptiona
6.
This concept of operations for UNAMIR-A is based on the
following assumptionsi
P.04
�CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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F E C MISSION
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-«» A
»-
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f,
In accordanca.wich. rasolucipn
(1994), all medlat
efiforte would ba continued with the objective of
reaching a ceaaefira agreement and raatoring tha
proceee.
At the time ot deployment of U A I - an agreed ceil
NMRA
fire would not be in place.
The revised mandate of U A I - would not envisage
NMRA
enforcement actions.
Because of"the need to stabilise Che security aitua]
in Rwanda as quickly as possible, deployment of
U A I - would have to be rapidly effected.
NMRA
Kigali airport, which ie critical to the deploy
•T!l
sustainnjent, of the mission, would be established aa
yieutral lone'-'^with the consent of the parties. Hit
Security Council should, therefore, call on tha partiej
to declare Kigali airport a ".neutral ..zone" under the.
exclusive control of the United Nations.
Lines of communication through neighbouring count!
would remain open and available to support U A I *
NMR
throughout the mandate of the mission.
It is expected that U A I ^ . yould undertake ita taskii
HMRA
i
• — — — — — —
for a period of four months Crom the data of initial
deployment, on the understanding that U A I ' mandate
NMRa
would be reviewed by tha Council as necessary and, in,
particular, following an agreement on a ceasefire.
•1W
Cancapt of operations
.7. The task of UNAMIR-^Cmder an expanded mandate would be to .
provide support andfenaure. safety for displaced and other
affected persons ana"for the safe delivery of humanitarian
assistance. U A I - would depend primarily on deterrence to
NMRA
carry out ita tasks and would resort to force only in self
defence.
�May
10,94 1 8 : 5 7
05/10/«4
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CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
P.06
FEC M S I N
RNH I S O
A
O l l t H i 4031
4 Aaalatancot UNAMIR-A would aaslet
^ Humaniurifln
humanitarian aganciea in thalr programoaa for
diatribution of relief supplies and other forma^
aaaiatanoe.
ftaf.arrant f^aaauraai Military unite would ba dapl<
to areas where displaced and other affected pareons ai
concentrated and where humanitarian relief aaaiatanafL
would be delivered. These areas would be patrolled,
monitored by U A I - , in conjunction with authoi
NMRA
security forces.
c.
5
U A I - m y be required to enter into aelf-defenl
NMRA a
actions against persons or groupa who threaten theec
areas and the meana of delivery and diatribution of
humanitarian relief supplies and other aaatatanc*.
6. m ordar to execute its mandate, U A I - muat ba cotnpi
NMRA
of a strong, highly mobile force, capable of aelf•defenoa.,
size of the force would be determined also by the aire a|
terrain of the area of operation which is land-locked, diffi
and mountainous with very liiuited infrastructure, with theaa
criteria, it is estimated that a minimum viable force of
approximately s.qoo troppa^Uncludinq five infantry bactaliona)
would be required. ^ CDr^f
?7
9. The composition of the force would be as followst
a.
five battalion^ (approx. 4000 personnel) two of
are mechanized and three of which are motorized with"
one mechanized company in each.
b.
A force support battalion (approx. 721 personnel)
providing logiatic, maintenance, medical service, anjjtj
including an engineer company capable of undertaking;
�CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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09/10/94 16:17
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F E C MISSION
RNH
A
tasks such aai daminlng; b m disposal/ road, br
ob
and other infraatruccurs repair.
C.
^jieiieopter Bouadron (approx. no personnel)
consisting oft
(1) a troop/support flight with a minimum 1/2 coopaity
lift poaaibly based on 8 x Bell 212 type
helicoptera. Medical evacuation, logistic
and night vision capability would be requi
(2) Recce/armed flight 6f up to 8 light helie
with light armament and night operations
capability.
d. A force ,hga<3gumej.fl (approx. 219 pereonnel) which
,
includes a supporting military signals/communication
squadron. This would be built around the nucleus of,
present headquarters and would continue to opera!
Kigali.
e.
X military police fp^g (approx. 50 pereonnel) of a
small company for internal force security.
f.
A roilitarv ohegrvftr group of 320 officers to conduct
the humanitarian security monitoring and to provit
liaison and escort duties throughout the counts
also along the border areas.
g.
A-forca of 9 IMCIVPOL deployed in a similar fashii
0
the umos but dedicated to maintaining liaison with
local, civilian authorities on matters relating to
public security.
10. The deployment of the force would be conducted in thrai
phases. "D^fiay" referred to below is the date on which the
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP •
May
10,94
P.08
18:58
- 6 -
Security council raaolutlon ia adopted authorising the e
>
mandate ot U A I - .
NMRA
Phaam i (p-pay • ?)» The Ohanian battalion would be
>
•
to ita full strength ofl 800 peraormel and equipped with
APCa. Thia unit would ensure the protection of Kigali
International Airport; the Amahoro complex where 4,000
displaced persona are presently housed and would also aqc,
the Porce Reserve.
fhPSQ , (P-Dfly * H) t Deployment of two battallonl
2
mechanized and one motorized), some advance elemantST
support battalion and all ol the Force H and signal
Q
squadron. These troops would be deployed in_the Kigali
Sector and in Prefectures where the security situation is 6{
greatest concern and where there is the highest
concentration of displaced persons.
Phaaa 3 (P-Pay • 31); Induction of the rest of the"
support battalion and two cither--in^fttry_battaXi£ayi.
rest of the support battalion wou^^tablijfe^ogistic
engineer advancajjasea in the(1*^ngeriT7i^m^^
Prefectures in order "to better serve the Afield force. T m
h
two infantry battalions would be deployed principally it
Westelra'and Northern portions of the country in order tT
provide the necessary support and assistance to"peopl]
need in these areas.
n:.
The Tasks of the UNAMIR-A force would be the following i
a. aecurlty
{
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
May 10,94 18:59
05/10/04
16:18
P.09
ftSlt
(X)
(3)
(3)
(4)
(S)
(6)
(7)
b.
129 40)2
F E C MISSION
RN B
A
-7
Aagure aaf• conditions Cor displaced and oti
ptraona in need, Including refugees (mostly ^1
Burundi) w o have sought asylum in Rwanda
h
Provide security to humanitarian aaaistanoa
activitiea
Provide escore to convoya
Provide security to U installations
N
Assure control ot vital geographic featurii
Monitor border crossing pointa as operatioz
Ml
required
Monitor deployment of the parties in conflict iti"
order to assure effective conduct of U A I NMRA
operations.
Bumaniuriftn Aaaiacflnca
(1) Assiet in the establishment and mainteni
secure areas for the safe support of those
(2)
Establish accasa to those in need
(3)
Provide support for the provision of food, water?
medical services, shelter and other relief to
those in need
(4)
Provide assistance with damming
(5)
Provide assistance for the rehabilitation
essential facilities and services
c.
Li&iA&n
(1) Strengthen liaison between UNAMIR-A and a l l
parties
(2) Support liaison arrangementa with humanitarian
agencies
frpgistlc SUPPQKC
12. The deployment and logistic support of a force of 5500 wt
be an ambitious undertaking. Rwanda is a land-locked country
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
P.10
Nay 10,94 19:00
oa/iom i«:ift ttiit m 4on
F E C MS I N «-M A
R N H I SO
- 8 -
with only ona major airport (Kigali). Und movament hat
eaaports (Mombaaaa, Dar-ea-Salaam) and Rwanda regulraa tava
daya in tha baat of conditlona. I t ia tharafora esaantial to
daploy aglf-jntf flciant military ^continganta capabla of oparat
Indapendantly, while logiatic support ia put in place by tha
United Kationa. The concept of operations calla for the fira
three unita to be moved by air, requiring military and c
etretegic a i r l i f t , i.e., up to 10 passenger flights and 4
flights (CSA alrcrafta). The remainder of the force and
material would be transported by sea and air aa soon as
technically possible.
sonwnfl and Concrol
l i . UNAMIR-A would be headed by the Special Representativi
the Secretary-General who would have overall authority foi
the activities of tha mission. As regards tha military c
<
of the miasion, tha present UNAMIR Force Headquarters would
expanded as indicated in para 8.d above and would remain locat*
in Kigali. Battalions would be deployed to designated regions pi
sectors with assigned reeponeibilities for the tasks describe^
earlier. Battalion commanders would act as Sector Commandej
within their assigned regions under the direction of the
Commander. Tha military signal unit would establish
coircmmicatlons between the Force Headquarters, Battalion
Keadquartera and other designated sites as necessary.
conclusion
14. The prospects of success in achieving the aims of U A 3
NM
depend upon the earlieat deployment of the proposed force^
longer the delay in the deployment of the force from the tH
a Security Council decision, the greater the prospect of the
mission not achieving its purpose in operational terma. The moat
�14:19
OllI 11J 4 9
01
FRENCH MISSION
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CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP'
• 9-
rapid daploymant would be ^chiave^ with the deployment of two
formed infantry brigadaa with chair integral logiatic lupporc.
xf formed brigades cannot be made available i t would be
isary to draw on the recent U Stand-by arrangements,
N
rer, specific contributions for thia particular mission must
111 be negotiated. It is estimated that this process would
|raquire one to two months. Simultaneously with Stand-by
arrangements, tha traditional method of requesting govamment
U,itary forces would ba used. Experience showa that it^ would
at least two to three months to achieve full deployment of
If forces are accepted without adequate equipment,
rlence shows that a further delay of several months would be
Jrred in providing the necessary equipment for those forces,
fever, these delays could be significantly decreased if Member
States agree to make the necessary arrangements on a bilateral
basis to provide the troops, equipment and a i r l i f t required for
;e mission.
[jThe U A I Force Commander has had discussiona with both the
N MR
nd RPF on the concept of operations and general deployment
described above and has encountered no strong objections so
X. He intends to have further discussiona with the parties to
avoid possible mieunderstanding and difficulties.
In considering the elements outlines above, its should be
in mind that resolution 912 (1994) stressed that the Arusha
^Agreement remains central co the peace process.
Singly, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
continue his efforts, in cooperation with the Organization
the African Unity ( A ) and regional leaders, to end the
OU
fighting and to conclude an effective cease-fire agreement to be
monitored by UNAMIR, in order co build confidence and facilitate
rogress on other aspects of the peace process in accordance with
Arusha agreements.
�INQUIRE=DOC29D
ITEM NO=00526397
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP i
DTG: 101703ZMAY94
FROM: FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
DQCNO: PRETORIA 006682
TAGS: PREL, RW. OAU, US
COMBINE: COMPLETE
SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT MEETING WITH UN SECGEN, QAH SECGEN AND
TANZANIAN PRESIDENT ON RWANDA
1. SUMMARY: IN HIS MEETING WITH UN SECGEN BOUTROS GHALI.flA!,) SECGEN
SALIM SALIM AND TANZANIAN
PRESIDENT MWINYI, VICE PRESIDENT GORE SAID THE U.S.
WANTED TO EXPLORE THE POfiSIRII ITY ARRANGING AN
INTERNATIONAL FORCE TO PROTECT RWANDAN REFUGEES ON
THE BORDERS OF TANZANIA AND BURUNDI. HE SAID THAT
•ACfflOUGH WE ARE NOT RULING OUT ANY OPTION. THIS
APPROACH WAS PREFERABLE IN OUR VIEW TO AJ£I£ALL
BASED EFFORT THAT WOULD INVOLVE CONFRONTING AN ONGOING CIVIL WAR. ALL THREE INTERLOCUTORS AGREED
THAT THIS PROPOSAL REPRESENTED A POSSIBLE IMPORTANT
EMERGENCY MEASURE AND SHOULD BE DISCUSSED FURTHER.
THEY ALL SOUGHT TO CLARIFY THE MANDATE AND COMMAND
STRUCTURES OF SUCH AN OPERATION. SALIM SALIM SAID
THAT SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS OF TROOPS WOULD BE
AVAILABLE FROM AFRICAN COUNTRIES IF THIS WERE A
"NORMAL" UN MISSION. THE PARTIES AGREED TO MORE
INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS IN NEW YORK. END SUMMARY
2. VICE PRESIDENT GORE MET WITH UN SECRETARY
GENERAL BOUTROS GHALI. OAU SECRETARY GENERAL SALIM
SALIM AND TANZANIAN PRESIDENT MWINYI TO DISCUSS
POSSIBLE ACTIONS WITH REGARD TO RWANDA. THE VICE
PRESIDENT WAS ACCOMPANIED FOR THE 30-MINUTE MEETING
BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE, AMBASSADOR LYMAN, VP
CHIEF OF STAFF QUINN. VP NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER
FUERTH AND NSC AFRICA SENIOR DIRECTOR STEINBERG.
THE VICE PRESIDENT PRAISED THE EFFORTS OF PRESIDENT
MWINYI AND THE OTHERS IN THEIR EFFORTS TO GET THE
ARUSHA ACCORDS BACK ON TRACK AND ADDRESS THE
HUMANITARIAN DISASTER. HE SAID THERE WERE A NUMBER
OF PROPOSALS BEING CONSIDERED BY THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY TO RESPOND. ONE PROPOSAL THAT THE U.S.
THOUGHT HAD A POSSIBILITY OF EASING THE CRISIS WAS
TO CREATE AN AREA OF SAFETY FOR REFUGEES ON THE
BORDERS WITH TANZANIA AND BURUNDI. HE SAID THE U.S.
WAS PREPARED TO PROVIDE SOME SUPPORT FOR SUCH AN
EFFORT TO ENSURE A PERIMETER OF SAFETY AND TO SUPPLY
HUMANITARIAN RELIEF. AT THE SAME TIME. HE NOTED. WE
HAVE TO BE RESPECTFUL OF THE DELICATE BALANCE THAT
NOW EXISTS IN BURUNDI.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
3/)1/i5
H(BH
�3. HE SAID THAT THIS APPROACH DID NOT ADDRESS
REFUGEES ON THE UGANDA BORDER. BUT SAID THAT THE
INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US INDICATES THAT THE RISKS
BEHIND THE BEE LINES ARE MUCH LESS. HE ADDED THAT
WE RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE ENCLAVES ELSEWHERE IN
THE COUNTRY WHERE INDIVIDUALS ARE AT RISK, BUT ENTRY
THERE IS DIFFICULT AS LONG AS THE CIVIL WAR
CONTINUES TO RAGE.
4. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID THIS WAS NOT AN
EXCLUSIVE ALTERNATIVE AND WE HAD NOT RULED OUT ANY
OPTION. HOWEVER, THIS APPROACH SEEMED TO HAVE
ADVANTAGES OVER PROPOSALS THAT FOCUS ON KIGALI.
INSOFAR AS KIGALI IS NOW AT THE EPICENTER OF THE
CIVIL WAR AND ENTRY INTO THEKISAU AIRPORT HAD BEEN
MADE DIFFICULT BY FACTIONS THAT DO NOT WANT TO SEE
RELIEF ENTER. HE ADDED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY MAY BE RELUCTANT TO ENTER INTO A COMBAT
SITUATION. WHILE DISCUSSIONS OF OTHER ALTERNATIVES
GO ON, WE CAN MOVE EXPEDITIOUSLY TO SAFEGUARD LIVES.
5. PRESIDENT MWINYI RESPONDED FIRST. HE SAID THAT
TANZANIA WAS WILLING TO CONSIDER OUR APPROACH AS A
TEMPORARY EMERGENCY MEASURE. HE SAID THAT THE KEY
CHALLENGE FACING TANZANIA WAS COPING WITH THE 400500.000 REFUGEES WHO HAVE FLOODED INTO TANZANIA.
THE ONLY LONG-TERM SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS WAS TO REESTABLISH STABILITY AND GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES IN
RWANDA IN ORDER TO FACILITATE THE FLOW OF
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.
6. BOUTROS GHALI DID NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESS THE
VICE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL. HE NOTED THAT HE HAD
RECEIVED A REPORT YESTERDAY FROM NEW YORK SAYING
THAT A U.N. PEACEKEEPING MISSION IN KIGALI WOULD
REQUIRE 5.500 TROOPS TO PROTECT THE AIRPORT, SECURE
ENCLAVES WITHIN THE CITY AND ENSURE THE SUPPLY OF
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. HE SAID. HOWEVER. THIS
WOULD HAVE TO BE A CHAPTER VI OPERATION - THUS. HE
STRESSED THE NEED FOR A CEASEFIRE PRIOR TO TROOPS
ENGAGEMENT. HE THOUGHT THAT THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY SHOULD ALREADY FOCUS ON HOW TO SECURE THE
PEACEFUL RETURN OF REFUGEES. HE SAID HE SENT
LETTERS TO THE 30 OR SO AFRICAN COUNTRIES THAT HAVE
PARTICIPATED IN PAST PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS TO
INQUIRE ON THE AVAILABILITY OF TROOPS FOR A RWANDAN
MISSION.
7. THE VICE PRESIDENT STRESSED THAT WE WERE NOT
NECESSARILY RULING OUT PROCEEDING WITH ACTION IN
KIGALI. HE SAID THAT IF WE COULD ACHIEVE
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT TO PROCEED WITH THE APPROACH
TOWARD THOSE REFUGEES AT GREATEST RISK. IT COULD
BUILD MOMENTUM FOR ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS SHOULD THEY
BECOME FEASIBLE. A/S MOOSE OUTLINED OUR PERCEPTION
.nr>Mrinr».iTiAi
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�OF THE POPULATION AT GREATEST RISK. INCLUDING
DISPLACED PERSONS IN THE SOUTH. REFUGEES WHO HAD NOT
BEEN PERMITTED TO ENTER TANZANIA AND BURUNDI AND
THOSE IN ENCLAVES THROUGHOUTBWAtUik
8. SALIM SALIM SAID THAT AFRICAN COUNTRIES WERE
ANXIOUS TO MOVE AHEAD ON A MISSION IN RWANDA. BUT
WANTED TO ENSURE THAT IT WAS A "NORMAL UN MISSION."
HE SAID THAT IF THIS WERE THE CASE, THERE WOULD BE
NO DIFFICULTY ASSEMBLING 5500 TROOPS; IN FACT, HE
HAD TALKED THAT MORNING AT MANDELA'S INAUGURATION
BREAKFAST WITH LEADERS FROM THREE AFRICAN COUNTRIES
WHO CONFIRMED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO CONTRIBUTE
TROOPS. (HE LATER INFORMED A/S MOOSE THAT THESE HAD
BEEN FROM NIGERIA. ZIMBABWE AND GHANA. IN ADDITION
TO TANZANIA) HE SAID THE PROPOSAL PUT FORTH BY THE
VICE PRESIDENT HAD TO BE VIEWED AS AN INTERIM
ARRANGEMENT, AND STRESSED THE NEED TO CAREFULLY
STUDY THE NUMBER OF TROOPS, COMMAND STRUCTURES AND
RELATIONSHIP TO THE U.N. BEFORE PROCEEDING.
9. BOUTROS GHALI WANTED TO BE CERTAIN THAT WHAT THE
VICE PRESIDENT WAS DISCUSSING WAS A PEACEKEEPING
MISSION, NO MERELY A HUMANITARIAN RELIEF EFFORT.
THE LATER HE SUGGESTED. WOULD NO PROVIDE THE NEEDED
PROTECTION TO THOSE AT RISK. THE VICE PRESIDENT
CONFIRMED THAT THIS WAS THE CASE.
10. THE VICE PRESIDENT ASKED WHETHER THE OTHERS HAD
SUFFICIENT INTEREST IN THE U.S. PROPOSAL TO
INTENSIFY DISCUSSIONS. ALL THREE INTERLOCUTORS
AGREED TO FURTHER TALKS. SALIM SALIM SAID THE
PROPOSAL WOULD LIKELY MET NO OBJECTION FROM THE RPF
OR THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT FORCE, WHICH BOTH ACCEPTED
THE INVOLVEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL FORCES TO
FACILITATE HUMANITARIAN RELIEF. HE STRESSED AGAIN
CONCERNS OVER THE DELICACY OF THE BURUNDIAN
SITUATION. A/S SUGGESTED THAT THESE DISCUSSIONS
SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN NEW YORK.
11. COMMENT: BOUTROS GHALI, SALIM SALIM, AND
PRESIDENT MWINYI ALL SEEMED TO SINCERELY APPRECIATE
THE VICE PRESIDENT'S ENGAGEMENT IN THE QUESTION OF
PROVIDING RELIEF FOR RWANDA. WHICH HAS CLEARLY VEXED
ALL THREE MEN. THE VICE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL WAS
RECEIVED BY HIS THREE INTERLOCUTORS WITH INTEREST.
BUT EACH WANTED TO HOLD HIS REACTION UNTIL THEY
COULD CONSIDER THE DETAILS. THEY ALL SEEMED TO VIEW
THE PROPOSAL AS AN INTERIM MEASURE THAT COULD SAVE
LIVES, BUT NOT THE SINGLE SOLUTION. BOUTROS GHALI
WANTED TO ENSURE THAT THIS PROPOSAL DID NOT PRECLUDE
AKISAU-BASED OPTION; SALIM SALIM STRESSED THE NEED
FOR THE U.N. TO TAKE UNDER ITS CONTROL WHATEVER
MISSION WAS AGREED TO; AND MWINYI WAS CLEARLY
STRAINED BY THE FLOOD OF WHAT HE CALLED UP TO A HALF
MILLION REFUGEES ON HIS BORDER. NONETHELESS. THIS
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP]
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP
MEETING LAID THE GROUNDWORK FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS
IN NEW YORK.
LYMAN
COUNTRY: Zone not in message
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
12-May-1994 20:04 EDT
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
VAX_MAIL@OEOB
STEINBERG@Al@OEOB
SCHWARTZ@Al@OEOB
RICE@Al@OEOB
DESHAZER@Al@OEOB
FROM:
SUBJECT:
White House S i t u a t i o n Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)
RWANDA: MAY 12 COUNCIL INFORMALS
<DIST>
PRT: SIT
SIT: DESHAZER RICE SCHWARTZ STEINBERG SUM SUM2 VAX
<PREC>
IMMEDIATE
<CLAS>
•CONFIDENTIAL
<OSRI>
RUCNDT
<DTG>
122340Z MAY 94
<ORIG>
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
<TO>
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 64 3 3
INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 50 37
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 05 3 3
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY 0412
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0213
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 02 3 3
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 097 2
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1640
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 04 31
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 02 3 3
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 1191
<SUBJ>
RWANDA: MAY 12 COUNCIL INFORMALS
<TEXT>
- C O N F I D E N T I A L -
SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 0020 37
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
8/iyi5"
�C I T N L B A Y POOOY
L N O I R R HTCP
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J 3 ;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA: MAY 12 COUNCIL INFORMALS
REF: USUN 2015
1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT
2. SUMMARY: ON MAY 12 THE COUNCIL FOCUSED ON THE DRAFT
RESOLUTION CONTAINED I N REFTEL. DISCUSSION CENTERED ON
THE MANDATE OF AN EXPANDED UN PRESENCE, WITH MOST
MEMBERS FAVORING A STRICTLY HUMANITARIAN OPERATION. A
WORKING GROUP WAS ESTABLISHED TO CONTINUE REVISING THE
RESOLUTION. COUNCIL PRESIDENT GAMBARI SAID HE HOPED TO
VOTE ON A RESOLUTION FRIDAY, MAY 13; I F THE COUNCIL I S
NOT READY, HE ANTICIPATES HOLDING A SATURDAY SESSION.
END SUMMARY.
3. USYG GHAREKHAN BRIEFED THE COUNCIL ON RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS. HE SAID RPF TROOPS I N THE SOUTH HAD
ADVANCED WESTWARD, RESTRICTING UNAMIR'S MOVEMENTS. UN
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES AYALA-LASSO APPEALED FOR
A CEASEFIRE ON RWANDAN RADIO, PRESSED THE HEAD OF THE
RWANDAN ARMED FORCES TO RELEASE HOSTAGES I N KIGALI.S
STADIUM, AND HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE I N NAIROBI. HE
SAID THE SYG HAD FIRM OFFERS OF TROOPS FROM TANZANIA,
GHANA AND NIGERIA, PLUS A TENTATIVE OFFER FROM A FOURTH
COUNTRY (PROBABLY SENEGAL OR UGANDA), BUT DID NOT YET
KNOW THE NUMBERS OFFERED.
4. COUNCIL PRESIDENT GAMBARI REPORTED ON HIS MEETINGS
WITH RPF AND GOR REPRESENTATIVES- BOTH WANT AN EXPANDED
UN PRESENCE; THE GOVERNMENT WANTS A BIGGER OPERATION
WITH A WIDER MANDATE, WHILE THE RPF WANTS A SMALLER
FORCE WITH A NARROWER MANDATE CONFINED TO HUMANITARIAN
SUPPORT.
5. FRANCE, UK, RUSSIA, CHINA, NEW ZEALAND, ARGENTINA,
SPAIN AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC SPOKE I N FAVOR OF A FOCUSED
HUMANITARIAN MANDATE ALONG THE LINES OF THE NEW ZEALAND
DRAFT RESOLUTION, WHICH INCLUDED THE PROTECTION OF
CIVILIANS I N SAFE AREAS AND THE PROTECTED DELIVERY OF
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. THE OMANI AND RWANDAN
DELEGATES SPOKE I N FAVOR OF AN EXPANDED POLITICAL
COMPONENT, STATING THAT WITHOUT A CEASEFIRE, NO UN
ASSISTANCE WOULD BE POSSIBLE.
6. AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH PRESSED THE SECRETARIAT FOR
INFORMATION ABOUT THE RESOURCES TO BE USED TO CARRY OUT
THE MANDATE. HE ASKED FOR INFORMATION ON TROOP
STRENGTH, CAPABILITIES AND EQUIPMENT, AND HOW QUICKLY
THEY COULD BE DEPLOYED. HE ALSO URGED CONSIDERATION OF
WHICH COUNTRIES COULD PROVIDE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR THE
TROOPS DEPLOYED. USYG GHAREKHAN SAID THE SECRETARIAT
WOULD PROVIDE A FORMAL REPORT WITH A PRELIMINARY BUDGET
TOMORROW, MAY 13.
7. FRANCE, THE UK, RUSSIA, NEW ZEALAND AND ARGENTINA
SAID THE COUNCIL SHOULD EITHER ADOPT A RESOLUTION
�C I T N L B A Y POOOY
L N O I R R HTCP
ESTABLISHING AN ARMS EMBARGO, WHICH THEY FAVOR, OR I F
UNABLE, STICK WITH THE CURRENT UNSC STATEMENT ON THE
SUBJECT.
8. REFERRING TO PARAGRAPH 14 OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION,
THE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE SAID THE COUNCIL WAS NOT YET
PREPARED TO LAUNCH AN EFFORT TO PROSECUTE THOSE
RESPONSIBLE FOR GENOCIDE, AND WOULD NEED A SPECIFIC PLAN
SUCH AS THAT ADOPTED FOR THE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL FOR
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. THE RWANDAN REPRESENTATIVE SAID THAT
I F AN INQUIRY WERE TO BE CONDUCTED, I T SHOULD COVER THE
ENTIRE CONFLICT, SINCE OCTOBER 1 , 1990, INSTEAD OF
BEGINNING WITH THE RECENT OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES.
9. THE NEW ZEALAND PERMREP SAID THAT A UN OPERATION
COULD NOT FEASIBLY CARRY OUT ITS MANDATE I F I T HAS TO
SEEK THE CONSENT OF THE PARTIES AT EVERY TURN. THE
OPERATION SHOULD BE AUTHORIZED UNDER CHAPTER V I I . THE
CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE SAID THAT WHILE THE OPERATION
CANNOT RELY ON TOTAL CONSENT, I T MUST SEEK COOPERATION
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 0020 37
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J 3 ;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA: MAY 12 COUNCIL INFORMALS
FROM THE PARTIES AND SHOULD BE A CHAPTER V I OPERATION10. THE UK PERMREP STATED THAT UNAMIR, ITS FORCE
COMMANDER AND UN HEADQUARTERS SHOULD BE GIVEN MAXIMUM
OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY, I.E. THEY SHOULD DETERMINE
WHETHER THE TROOPS START I N KIGALI AND WORK OUTWARDS OR
START AT THE BORDER AND WORK TOWARD KIGALI. "DON'T PUT
THEM I N A STRAIT JACKET, HE SAID. THE SPANISH PERMREP
SAID HIS GOVERNMENT FAVORED A PHASED FORCE DEPLOYMENT.
ALBRIGHT
BT
#2037
NNNN
<SECT>
SECTION: 01 OF 02
<SSN>
2037
<TOR>
940512195721 M1044379
<SECT>
SECTION: 02 OF 02
<SSN>
2037
<TOR>
940512195723 M1044380
11
9
�^<DIST>PRT: SIT
Pi SIT: DESHAZER RICE STEINBERG SUM SUM2 VAX
S ~ < PREOIMMEDI ATE < CLAS >O0NFI DENT IAL < OSRI >RUCNDT<DTG>12 0116 Z MAY 94
~^
^<ORIG>USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
O<T0>RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6 3 99
I INFO RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
I—RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0962
^—^RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
•ZRUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1671
n RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 052 3
•-^UTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0424
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
>—RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY 0226
fY'RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY 04 05
'-'-RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 1184
IUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 5022
IUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
IUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0206
IUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
_KSUBJ>RWANDA: SC WANTS PROTECTION FOR DISPLACED
PERSONS
•<TEXT>
O C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 002015
I WHITEHOUSE PASS NSC FOR D. CLARK, S. RICE AND D.STEINBERG;
L^JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J 3 ;
^SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
i E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
AGS: MARR, PREF, PHUM, EAID, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, RW
UBJECT: RWANDA: SC WANTS PROTECTION FOR DISPLACED
ERSONS
REF: A) NSC/USUN FAX 5/10, B) PRETORIA 6682
1. CONriDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: SC WILL DISCUSS A DRAFT RESOLUTION
STRENGTHENING THE UN PRESENCE I N RWANDA MAY 12. TEXT I S
BELOW. ALL AGREE THE EMPHASIS SHOULD BE ON HUMANITARIAN
ACTIVITIES. MANY COUNCIL MEMBERS ARE INTERESTED I N THE
U.S. IDEA OF SETTING UP PROTECTIVE ZONES ALONG THE
RWANDAN BORDER. UN SECRETARIAT POINTED OUT THAT THE
LARGEST NUMBER OF DISPLACED AT GREATEST RISK ARE I N
KIGALI. A SECRETARIAT NON-PAPER WAS CIRCULATED MAY 10
SPELLING OUT A PLAN TO SEND 5,500 TROOPS TO RWANDA. END
SUMMARY.
3. THE SYG HAS RESPONDED TO THE SC PRESIDENT'S LETTER
OF FRIDAY, MAY 6, AND PRODUCED A NON-PAPER WITH A
CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR RWANDA MAY 10 (FAXED TO DEPT). THE
PLAN CALLS FOR 5,500 TROOPS, TO BE DEPLOYED I N KIGALI
AND I N OTHER AREAS WHERE DISPLACED ARE AT RISK. THE
TASKS WOULD BE LARGELY HUMANITARIAN, INCLUDING ENSURING
THE SAFETY OF DISPLACED PERSONS AND HUMANITARIAN
CONVOYS. THE SYG SPECIFIES THE MANDATE WOULD NOT
ENVISAGE ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS. THE MISSION WOULD GET
UNDER WAY EVEN BEFORE A CEASEFIRE WAS I N PLACE, AND THE
AIRPORT WOULD BE A "NEUTRAL ZONE".
4. WHILE THIS PLAN HAS MUCH IN COMMON WITH THE IDEA
PRESENTED BY VP GORE TO BOUTROS-GHALI (THE SO-CALLED
"OPTION 2" BEING DISCUSSED IN WASHINGTON), THE SYG'S
PLAN HAS SEVERAL FLAWS. THERE ARE NOT ENOUGH
f
» ^r™-^™
DECLASSIFIED
TOITIJ "IT (TI iWfi
rlLK IL.U.
8/\y\5 K V
61
�^WELL-EQUIPPED TROOPS I N AFRICA TO MEET THE NEED FOR 2.
Q—MECHANIZED BATTALIONS AND 3 MOTORIZED BATTALIONS. THE
OLOGISTICS OF FLYING NOT ONLY THE TROOPS, BUT ALSO THE
^APPROXIMATELY 150 APCS THEY WOULD REQUIRE, INTO THE
><AREA I S A DAUNTING TASK. RWANDA I S LAND-LOCKED. WE
OUNDERSTAND THAT THIS EQUIPMENT COULD NOT BE CARRIED ON
I C-l-30'S, BUT LARGER C-5'S WOULD BE NEEDED. SINCE ONLY
^-VTHE U.S. COULD PROVIDE THIS SCALE OF AIRLIFT, I T WOULD
iBE HELPFUL TO KNOW .IF THE USG WOULD AGREE TO SUCH A
HZLARGE UNDERTAKING. ADDITIONALLY', THE RPF HAVE SAID THEY
n WILL NOT ACCEPT SUCH A LARGE FORCE (SEE SEPTEL).
4.
I N THE COUNCIL'S MAY 11 DISCUSSION OF THE SYG'S
^ CONTINGENCY PLAN, AMB ALBRIGHT USED TALKING POINTS
^ I D E N T I C A L TO THOSE USED BY VICE PRESIDENT GORE (REFS A
n^AND B) I N HIS DISCUSSIONS OF RWANDA WITH THE UN SYG AND
3POAU SYG I N SOUTH AFRICA. THERE WAS A GOOD DEAL OF
"^POSITIVE INTEREST I N THE IDEA OF SETTING UP PROTECTIVE
Q^ZONES ALONG THE RWANDAN BORDERS. THE RUSSIANS AND UK
m H A D BEEN INSTRUCTED TO TAKE VERY SIMILAR POSITIONS TO
, OURS. THE FRENCH AGREE WITH THE SYG'S PROPOSAL, BUT ARE
'PREPARED TO CONSIDER THE U.S. IDEA AS THE START OF A
IPHASED OPERATION.
5.
I N RESPONSE TO AMB. ALBRIGHT'S EXPLANATION OF THE
•RESERVATIONS WE HAVE ABOUT USING KIGALI AIRPORT, UN
MILITARY ADVISER GENERAL BARIL MAINTAINED THAT THE
000 STILL
GEN"
;
1
^ X ^ ^ X ,
^
^
^ W X ^ - L
XXXX^U,
..X^X, ^
THE
-DISPLACED ALONG THE BORDERS. GEN. BARIL INDICATED THAT
l IGEN. DALLAIRE I S EXPLORING WHETHER OTHER AIRSTRIPS I N
|RWANDA MIGHT BE SUITABLE FOR DEPLOYMENT. HE I S ALSO
^CONSIDERING BRINGING RESUPPLIES FROM KAMPALA, UGANDA,
^—'SINCE THE ROADS ARE GOOD.
6.
GEN. BARIL ALSO REPLIED TO AMB. ALBRIGHT'S
SUGGESTION
THAT THE OPERATION WOULD NEED "ROBUST RULES
OF ENGAGEMENT". HE EXPLAINED THAT THERE COULD BE- NO
FLEXIBILITY CjN THE RULES REGARDING "MINIMUM USE_OF~
FnRC:E" . KfTWffVWK. THREW nnnr.p. Rfl FTi^XIBlLlTi UfQlHE
TflTggPRF-TATTnN OF " SELF-DEFENSE " I /THE CONCEPT OF
"SEEF-DEFENSE" CAN INCLUDE DEFENSE OF THE OPERATION'S
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 002015
WHITEHOUSE PASS NSC FOR D. CLARK, S. RICE AND D.STEINBERG;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J 3 ;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PHUM, EAID, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, RW
SUBJECT: RWANDA: SC WANTS PROTECTION FOR DISPLACED
PERSONS
MANDATE, I N THE FACE OF A THREAT. BARIL MADE THE POINT
THAT THE SOLDIER OUTSIDE THE HOTEL MILLES COLLINES I N
KIGALI WAS INSTRUCTED ALONG THOSE LINES.
7.
SC PRESIDENT GAMBARI CIRCULATED A NEW DRAFT,
COMBINING THE ELEMENTS OF BOTH THE NEW ZEALAND DRAFT AND
THE NAM DRAFT OF 5/6.
COUNCIL WILL MEET AGAIN THURSDAY
AFTERNOON, MAY 12 FOR MORE DISCUSSIONS. A WORKING GROUP
WILL CONVENE FRIDAY MORNING, MAY 13, TO REFINE THE
LANGUAGE OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION.
8.
BEGIN TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION:
THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
c
�^ R E A F F I R M I N G
ALL
I T S PREVIOUS
RESOLUTIONS
ON
THE
Q _ S I T U A T I O N I N RWANDA, I N PARTICULAR I T S RESOLUTION 87 2
R - ) ( 1 9 9 3 ) OF 5 OCTOBER 199 3 BY WHICH I T ESTABLISHED THE
>—^UNITED
NATIONS
ASSISTANCE
MISSION
FOR
RWANDA
(UNAMIR),
> ^ T T S RESOLUTION 9 0 9 ( 1 9 9 4 ) OF 5 A P R I L 1 9 9 4 WHICH EXTENDED
O L H E MANDATE OF UNAMIR U N T I L 29 JULY. 1 9 9 4 , AND I T S
I RESOLUTION 9 1 2 ( 1 9 9 4 ) OF 2 1 A P R I L 1 § 9 4 BY WHICH I T
L—^ADJUSTED
THE
MANDATE
OF
UNAMIR;
R E C A L L I N G I T S STATEMENT OF I A P R I L 199&
(S/PRST/1994/16J
Z C W H I C H I N T E R A L I A , REAFFIRMED THE IMPORTANCE OF
THE
N
ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT TO T H E PEACEFUL R E S O L U T I O N OF
THE
C O N F L I C T I N RWANDA, A N D T H E N E C E S S I T Y FOR A L L P A R T I E S TO
^
RE-COMMIT THEMSELVES TO I T S F U L L IMPLEMENTATION;
^ - R E C A L L I N G ALSO I T S STATEMENT OF 3 0 A P R I L 1 9 9 4
Q ^ ( S / P R S T / 1 9 9 4 / 1 6 ) BY WHICH I T STRONGLY CONDEMNED THE
3PONGOING VIOLENCE I N RWANDA AND DEMANDED AN IMMEDIATE END
5 ^ T 0 THE MINDLESS CARNAGE;
Q^-CONCERNED T H A T T H E S I T U A T I O N I N RWANDA W H I C H
HAS
PTIRESULTED I N T H E DEATH OF THOUSANDS OF
INNOCENT
.
C I V I L I A N S , I N C L U D I N G WOMEN A N D C H I L D R E N ,
THE
INTERNATIONAL DISPLACEMENT
OF A S I G N I F I C A N T NUMBER OF
ITHE RWANDAN P O P U L A T I O N , A N D T H E M A S S I V E E X O D U S OF
REFUGEES TO N E I G H B O U R I N G COUNTRIES, CONSTITUTES
A
— ^ H U M A N I T A R I A N C R I S I S OF ENORMOUS P R O P O R T I O N ;
^EXPRESSING
ONCE A G A I N I T S ALARM AT C O N T I N U I N G REPORTS
C W I D E S P R E A D AND FLAGRANT V I O L A T I O N S OF I N T E R N A T I O N A L
|
H U M A N I T A R I A N LAW
I N RWANDA;
M I N D F U L OF I T S ABHORRENCE OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE
1
OF
•PUNISHABLE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
UNDERLING THE URGENT NEED FOR COORDINATED INTERNATIONAL
[ACTION TO HELP RESTORE PEACE IN RWANDA, AND ALLEVIATE
} ^THE SUFFERING OF THE RWANDAN PEOPLE, AND IN THIS
^CONNECTION WELCOMING COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED
NATIONS AND THE ORGANIZATIONS OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) AS
WELL AS WITH LEADERS OF THE REGION, ESPECIALLY THE
FACILITATOR OF THE ARUSHA PEACE PROCESS;
HAVING CONSIDERED THE LETTERS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
DATED 29 APRIL 1994 (S/1994/518), AND 3 MAY 1994
(S/1994/530);
DETERMINING THAT THE SITUATION IN RWANDA CONSTITUTES A
THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE REGION;
RECOGNIZING THAT THE PEOPLE OF RWANDA BEAR ULTIMATE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION OF THEIR OWN COUNTRY;
—
1. STRONGLY URGES ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT TO
IMMEDIATELY CEASE HOSTILITIES AND AGREE TO A CEASE-FIRE;
—
2.
REAFFIRMS ITS COMMITMENT TO PRESERVE THE UNITY
AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF RWANDA;
-- 3.
STRESSES ITS CONVICTION THAT THE ARUSHA PEACE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 0 3 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 002015
WHITEHOUSE PASS NSC FOR D. CLARK, S. RICE AND D.STEINBERG;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PHUM, EAID, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, R
W
SUBJECT: RWANDA: SC WANTS PROTECTION FOR DISPLACED
PERSONS
AGREEMENT CONSTITUTES A VIABLE FRAMEWORK FOR THE
RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT IN RWANDA, AND IN THIS
CONNECTION URGES ALL PARTIES TO COMMENCE POLITICAL
�>-DIAILOGUE ;
^l*l*><*tfrtU»*C
CL.— 4.
DECIDES THAT UNAMLR.S MANDATE UNDER RESOLUTION
C^)912(1994) SHALL BE /ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS:
><—
A.
TO ACT. AS I INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN THE PARTIES I N
^ A N ATTEMPT TO SECURE THEIR AGREEMENT TO A CEASE-FIRE';'
0 —
B.
TO MONITOR OBSERVANCE OF ANY CEASE-FIRE
1 AGREEMENT;
r - V ~ C.
TO ASSIST I N ADVANCING THE PEACE PROCESS WITHIN
—'THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT;
HZ—
D.
TO MONITOR AND REPORT ON DEVELOPMENTS I N RWANDA;
n —
5.
ALSO DECIDES THAT UNAMIR.S MANDATE SHALL ALSO
INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING RESPONSIBILITIES
A. /SECURITY
CR'— 1- ASSURE SAFE CONDITIONS FOR DISPLACED AND OTHER
EPPERSONS I N NEED, INCLUDING REFUGEES (MOSTLY FROM
" ^ B U R U N D I ) WHO H A V E S O U G H T A S Y L U M I N R W A N D A ;
C£—
2.
PROVIDE SECURITY TO HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
(
v
^
,X
•
.
v>
A /
^ / j?
^
cf
£
^
\
S'
PQACTIVITIES;
.
1
.—
'—
I —
—
3.
4.
5.
6.
P R O V I D E ESCORT TO CONVOYS;
P R O V I D E S E C U R I T Y TO UN I N S T A L L A T I O N S ;
AGSORE CONTROL OF V I T A L GEOGRAPHIC FEATURES;
MONITOR BORDER C R O S S I N G P O I N T S AS O P E R A T I O N A L L Y
—^REQUIRED;
_
7.
MONITOR DEPLOYMENT OF THE PARTIES I N CONFLICT / P
/
O l N ORDER TO ENSURE EFFECTIVE CONDUCT OF UNAMIR-A
•
I OPERA-TIONf
B.
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE^
1.
ASSIST I N THE ESTABLISHMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF
HSECURE AREAS FOR THE SAFE SUPPORT OF THOSE I N NEED;
j—
2.
ESTABLISH ACCESS TO THOSE I N NEED;
3.
PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR THE PROVISION OF FOOD,
^--^WATER, MEDICAL SERVICES, SHELTER AND OTHER RELIEF TO
THOSE I N NEED;
—
4.
PROVIDE ASSISTANCE WITH DEMINING;
—
5.
PROVIDE ASSISTANCE FOR THE REHABILITATION OF
ESSENTIAL FACILITIES AND SERVICES.
-- C.
LIAISON
—
1 . STRENGTHEN LIAISON BETWEEN UNAMIR-A AND ALL
PARTIES;
—
2.
SUPPORT LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS WITH HUMANITARIAN
AGENCIES;
—
3.
ASSIST I N THE COLLATION OF INFORMATION RELATING
TO VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAI, HUMANITARIAN LAW.
—
6.
AUTHORIZES AN EXPANSION OF THE UNAMIR FORCE
LEVEL TO 5500 TROOPS AND URGES THE DEPLOYMENT OF THAT
FORCE I N THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME;
—
7.
ENCOURAGES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ACCELERATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 002015
WHITEHOUSE PASS NSC FOR D. CLARK, S. RICE AND D.STEINBERG;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J 3 ;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PHUM, EAID, PREL, MOPS, UNSC. RW
SUBJECT: RWANDA: SC WANTS PROTECTION FOR DISPLACED
PERSONS
HIS EFFORTS, I N CONJUNCTION WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY MEMBER STATES AND
OTHER MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS FOR THE NECESSARY
PERSONNEL TO ACCOMPLISH THE URGENT DEPLOYMENT OF THE
x
v
�•EXPANDED UNAMIR;
Q_—
8.
REQUESTS MEMBER STATES TO OFFER THE
(—^SECRETARY-GENERAL URGENTLY, LOGISTICAL SUPPORT
>-<CAPABILITY FOR QUICK DEPLOYMENT OF THE UNAMIR EXPANDED
^FORCE LEVEL AND ITS SUPPORT I N THE FIELD;
0 - - 9COMMENDS THE EFFORTS OF STATES, UNITED NATIONS
I AGENCIES AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS WHICH HAVE
CZPROVIDED HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER ASSISTANCE, ENCOURAGES
CJTHEM TO CONTINUE AND INCREASE SUCH ASSISTANCE, AND URGES
MOTHERS TO PROVIDE SUCH ASSISTANCE;
n —
10. ALSO COMMENDS THE EFFORTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
' ' O AFRICAN UNITY AND ITS AGENCIES, AS WELL AS THOSE OF
--F
THE TANZANIAN FACILITATOR, I N PROVIDING DIPLOMATIC,
^ P O L I T I C A L , HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION
r y O F THE RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE COUNCIL;
•dp—
1 1 . CALLS UPON ALL STATES TO REFRAIN FROM PROVIDING
<LARMS OR ANY MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE PARTIES I N
C£CONFLICT, AND STATES ITS WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER
PPlPROMPTLY THE APPLICATION OF AN ARMS EMBARGO ON RWANDA /NTD
' ' ' N DECIDES THAT ALL STATES SHALL IMMEDIATELY TAKE
--AD
'MEASURES WITH A VIEW TO PROHIBITING THE SUPPLY OF ARMS
I AND RELATED MATERIAL TO ANY OF THE PARTIES I N RWANDA;
THAT ALL STATES SHALL PREVENT THE SALE OR SUPPLY TO
^RWANDA BY THEIR NATIONALS OR FROM THEIR TERRITORIES OR
-USING THE FLAG VESSELS OR AIRCRAFTS, OF ARMS AND RELATED
OMATERIAL OF ALL TYPES, INCLUDING WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION,
I MILITARY VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT, PARAMILITARY POLICE
CZEQUIPMENT AND SPARE PARTS;
—
12.FURTHER CALLS UPON ALL STATES, AND INTERNATIONAL
HORGANIZATIONS, TO ACT STRICTLY I N ACCORDANCE WITH THE
iPROVISIONS OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION, NOTWITHSTANDING
,THE EXISTENCE OF ANY RIGHTS OR OBLIGATIONS CONFERRED OR
C-JlMPOSED BY ANY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT OR ANY CONTRACT
ENTERED INTO OR ANY LICENSE OR PERMIT GRANTED PRIOR TO
THE DATE OF THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION;
-- 13. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO PRESENT A
REPORT, NOT LATER THAN 31 JULY 1994, ON POSSIBLE OPTIONS
FOR INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION OF PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR
GENOCIDE OR OTHER SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW COMMITTED I N RWANDA SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF CURRENT
HOSTILITIES;
—
15. INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HIS SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE, I N COORDINATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION OF
AFRICAN UNITY AND COUNTRIES I N THE REGION, TO CONTINUE
THE
IR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT I N
RWANDA WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ARUSHA PEACE
AGREEMENT;
—
16. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER;
END TEXT.
ALBRIGHT
NNNN
1
<SECT>SECTION: 01
<SECT>SECTION: 02
<SECT>SECTION: 03
<SECT>SECTION: 04
<TOR>940511213525
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M1042445
M1042446
M1042447
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�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
12-May-1994 20:04 EDT
GONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
VAX_MAIL<aOEOB
STEINBERG@Al@OEOB
SCHWARTZ@Al@OEOB
RICE@Al(aOEOB
DESHAZER@Al@OEOB
FROM:
SUBJECT:
White House S i t u a t i o n Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)
RWANDA : MAY 12 INDERFURTH-RIZA MEETING
<DIST>
PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG WOLIN
SIT: DESHAZER FILE RICE SCHWARTZ STEINBERG SUM SUM2 VAX
<PREC>
IMMEDIATE
<CLAS>
CONFIDENTIAL
<OSRI>
RUCNDT
<DTG>
122334Z MAY 94
<ORIG>
USMISSION USUN N W YORK
E
<TO>
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6428
INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 50 35
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0528
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY 0410
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0211
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0231
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0967
Tkr^T ACCTUTim
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 16 35
D L C L A a M r 1LLP
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0429
PER E.O. 13526
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0231
XOU- 0^1*3-01
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 1189
8/i y/5" K8H
<SUBJ>
RWANDA : MAY 12 INDERFURTH-RIZA MEETING
<TEXT>
- C O N F I D E N T I A L -
SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 002035
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J 3 ;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.O.12356: DECL;OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA : MAY 12 INDERFURTH-RIZA MEETING
1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT
2. SUMMARY: UNDPKO WAS CLEARLY NOT ENTHUSED ABOUT USG
CONCERNS ABOUT THEIR NON-PAPER AND WERE RECEPTIVE TO THE
USG PROPOSAL BUT ONLY AS PART OF THEIR KIGALI-BASED
MISSION. SYG MILITARY ADVISOR BARIL REPORTED THAT THE
FORCE COMMANDER COULD ONLY HOLD OUT FOR ANOTHER WEEK I N
KIGALI AT CURRENT STRENGTH. AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH
REQUESTED THAT THE UN INCLUDE ANOTHER OPTION I N THE
SYG'S REPORT AS OUTLINED I N OUR PROPOSAL. END SUMMARY.
3. AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH BRIEFED ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS RIZA ON USG CONCERNS WITH THE
SECRETARIAT'S NON-PAPER ON A PROPOSED RWANDA MISSION.
HE ALSO REVIEWED THE CONCEPT OF A USG PROPOSAL FOR A
HUMANITARIAN MISSION I N REFUGEE AREAS ALONG THE RWANDAN
BORDER.
4. RIZA AND THE SYG'S MILITARY ADVISOR BARIL
ACKNOWLEDGED THERE WAS SIMILARITY BETWEEN OUR TWO
APPROACHES BUT WERE CLEARLY NOT ENTHUSED ABOUT SOME
ELEMENTS OF THE USG PROPOSAL AND MADE THE FOLLOWING
POINTS:
- THE PEOPLE MOST THREATENED RIGHT NOW I N RWANDA WERE I N
KIGALI; MANY THOUSANDS OF WHICH ARE UNDER CURRENT UN
CONTROL. THE UN WAS STILL PROTECTING PEOPLE I N THREE
LOCATIONS I N KIGALI — THE STADIUM, THE MILLES COLLINES
HOTEL AND KING FAISEL HOSPITAL.
- THE FORCE COMMANDER COULD ONLY HOLD OUT WITH HIS
CURRENT FORCE LEVELS FOR ABOUT ANOTHER WEEK - THEN HE
WOULD HAVE TO WITHDRAW.
- THE UN WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT LOSING TOTAL PRESENCE
I N RWANDA.
- THE UN INSISTS THAT ITS PROPOSAL I S CONTINGENT UPON
THE CONSENT OF THE TWO PARTIES, THAT THEY HAVE RECEIVED
UNOFFICIAL CONSENT FROM BOTH SIDES TO ACCEPT THE MISSION
AS BRIEFED, AND THAT A CHAPTER V I I MISSION WAS NOT
PLANNED OR REQUIRED. THE RPF I S ABLE TO CONTROL THE
ACTIONS OF ITS FORCES, BUT THE UN WARNED THAT THE
GOVERNMENT DOES NOT HAVE CONTROL OF THE MILITIAS.
- THE UN ARGUED THAT THE SAFE AREAS NEAR THE TANZANIAN
AND UGANDAN BORDERS DID NOT NEED FORCES BUT COULD BE
OVERSEEN BY OBSERVERS. THEY ADDED THAT THEIR PLAN ALSO
ENVISIONED A BORDER OPERATION SIMILAR TO OUR PROPOSAL,
PERHAPS I N THE ZAIRE OR BURUNDI BORDER AREAS.
- THE UN CONFIRMED THAT KIGALI'S POPULATION MIGHT HAVE
PLUMMETED TO ABOUT 60,000 BUT NOBODY WAS CERTAIN EXACTLY
HOW MANY PEOPLE WERE AT RISK I N KIGALI. THEY BELIEVE
MORE THAN 14,000 NEED PROTECTION.
-- DEPLOYING ONLY TO THE BORDERS AND LEAVING THE
INTERIOR TO BE DEALT WITH AT A LATER STAGE MIGHT MAKE
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
THE SITUATION WORSE.
5. BARIL MADE A FEW ADDITIONAL POINTS DURING THE MEETING
AS WELL:
- HE SAID THAT THE GHANIANS AND PERHAPS THE NIGERIANS
WERE READY TO PROVIDE A BATTALION BUT THE TANZANIANS AND
SENEGALESE WERE LESS CERTAIN ABOUT A COMMITMENT.
- BARIL NOTED THAT THE UN WOULD NEED A BATTALION'S WORTH
OF PROTECTED VEHICLES (Ml13 VARIETY) TO OUTFIT ONE OF
THE AFRICAN UNITS. (HE ALSO MENTIONED HIS UNOFFICIAL
REQUEST TO THE USG FOR APCS.)
- BARIL SAID THAT THE UN FORCE COMMANDER WOULD LIKE TO
HAVE A BATTALION-SIZED REACTION FORCE ON A SHORT NOTICE
TO BE AVAILABLE FOR IMMEDIATE REINFORCEMENT (PRESUMABLY
TO ASSIST I N A WITHDRAWAL), BUT WAS NOT MORE SPECIFIC ON
THIS POINT.
C O N F I D E N T I A-fc SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 0020 35
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J 3 ;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.O.12356: DECL;OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA : MAY 12 INDERFURTH-RIZA MEETING
6. THE UN ALSO NOTED THAT THE BORDER WITH BURUNDI HAD
BEEN CLOSED TWO DAYS AGO, AND THAT THE FORCE COMMANDER
HAD BEEN PREVENTED FROM GOING TO GITAR
AMA SINCE THE RGF
COULD NOT GUARANTEE HIS SAFETY.
7. AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH TOLD RIZA THAT THE P-5 AGREED
YESTERDAY THAT THE FOCUS OF A NEW RWANDA MISSION SHOULD
BE HUMANITARIAN AND THAT THE US GOVERNMENT WOULD LIKE TO
SEE ANOTHER OPTION I N THE SYG'S REPORT ALONG THE LINES
OUTLINED I N OUR TALKING POINTS. RIZA NODDED BUT DID NOT
COMMIT TO ADDING OUR PROPOSAL TO THE REPORT. AMB.
INDERFURTH PROVIDED A LIST OF DETAILED QUESTIONS TO
RIZA. USUN WILL REPORT ON THE UN'S FURTHER REPLY AS
SOON AS I T I S RECEIVED.
ALBRIGHT
BT
#2035
NNNN
<SECT>
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<SECT>
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<SSN>
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<TOR>
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9
�MHV 13 '34 07: HPf'l
OUTGOING TELEGRAM
DEPARTMENT O STATE
F
INITIAL P-RC
AUTH
CLEAR 1
3
4
t.
7
5.1
DRAFT.
2_
S.
&
CONFIDENTIAL
IO/PHO:DEJENSEN:DEJ
05/19/^4 1,-7=13?
SEPKA 477
10: DBENNET
10 : GUARD
IO/PHO:JBRIMS
IO/UNP:SZELLE
USUN/lij:DSCHEFFER
JCS'.PBALTIMORE
SPC:JDOBBINS
AF/C:ARENDER
OSD:MGREENSPON
NSC:SRICE
AF n 10, HA, INRi P, P
M
IMMEDIATE
USUN N W YORK
E
ROUTINE
SECDEF WASHDCCJCS WASHDC
E.O. Ig35b:
TAGS:
MARR, PINSi PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RU, UNSC
SUBJECT:
REF.'
1.
DECL: O D
AR
RWANDA:
PROPOSED CONCEPT F R U FORCE
O N
STATE 15721,2
CONriDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. USUN IS REQUESTED T SHARE THE FOLLOWING WITH THE U
O
N
SECRETARIAT AND SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE.
3. W CONTINUE T HAVE SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITH THE
E
O
KIGALI-BASED U FORCE BEING PROPOSED BY THE U
N
N
SECRETARIAT. THE FOLLOWING IS A M R DETAILED OUTLINE O
OE
F
O R PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE• W PLAN T SEND A TEAM T N W
U
E
O
O E
YORK O MONDAY T EXPLAIN O R PROPOSAL IN GREATER DETAIL
N
O
U
AND REPLY T QUESTIONS.
O
4. MISSION STATEMENT. THE U FORCE W U D ESTABLISH A
N
OL
SECURE ZONE INSIDE R A D ALONG THE BORDER WITH BURUNDI T
WNA
O
PROTECT REFUGEES/DISPLACED PERSONS IN MOST IMMEDIATE
DANGER AND PROVIDE SECURITY F R THE DELIVERY O
O
F
HUMANITARIAN RELIEF T THOSE PERSONNEL. THE FORCE W U D
O
OL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
AOU- oXloS- n
�P. 3
CONFIDENTIAL
DEPLOY T BURUNDIi ESTABLISH A BASE O OPERATIONS IN
O
F
BURUNDI AT KAYANBAi C N U T C O S B R E OPERATIONS T
ODC RS-ODR
O
S C R A D ESTABLISH DISPLACED P R O S C M S WITHIN
EUE N
ESN AP
RWANDAi A D PROVIDE CONTINUOUS SECURITY F R THE OPERATION
N
O
OF THOSE CAMPS. THE F R E W U D ESTABLISH SECURITY F R
OC OL
O
U H R R N C M S BUT N T TRANSPORT DISPLACED P R O S T THE
NC-U
AP
O
ESN O
CAMPS. THE F R E W U D ALSO SECURE LINES O COMMUNICATION
OC OL
F
A D RELIEF C N O S IN THE ZONE.
N
OVY
S RULES O ENGAGEMENT. RULES O E G G M N W U D
.
F
F NAEET OL
CLEARLY SPELL O T THE AUTHORITY O THE U F R E C M A D R
U
F
N OC
OMNE
T U E ALL M A S NECESSARY T DEFEND U FORCES, C M S A D
O S
EN
O
N
AP N
DISPLACED PERSONS BEING PROTECTED.
b. ASSUMPTIONS. -CAl THE CURRENT UNAMIR F R E W U D
OC
OL
REMAIN IN KIGALI T HELP NEGOTIATE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT
O
A D PROVIDE THE OVERALL F R E C M A D R i {B> WELL TRAINED,
N
OC OMNE
DISCIPLINED TROOPS WILL BE AVAILABLE F R THE MISSION ^ - O
O
C
THE U H S RPF/RGF PERMISSION T ESTABLISH THE Z N IN
N A
O
OE
R A D , A D BURUNDI PERMISSION T ESTABLISH BASE
WNA N
O
OPERATIONS IN, A D A L W LOGISTIC SUPPORT O SECURE Z N
N LO
F
OE
THROUGH, BURUNDIi {D> U H R W U D R N THE CAMPS, A D THE
NC OL U
N
U F R E W U D O L PROVIDE SECURITY; A D i t } THE U A D
N OC OL NY
N
N N
THE N O W U D B RESPONSIBLE F R TRANSPORTATION A D
GS OL E
O
N
DISTRIBUTION O HUMANITARIAN SUPPLIES INTO R A D , WHILE
F
WNA
THE U F R E W U D PROVIDE ITS O N LOGISTIC SUPPORT.
N OC OL
W
7. CONCEPT O OPERATIONS. U F R E W U D DEBARK IN
F
N OC OL
BURUNDI, ESTABLISH A F R A D SUPPORT BASE N A THE R A D N
OWR
ER
WNA
BORDER, A D C N U T OPERATIONS T ESTABLISH A SECURE Z N
N ODC
O
OE
F R THE DISPLACED PERSONS CAMPS.
O
a. F R E STRUCTURE. ABOUT b,24D U F R E PERSONNEL P R
OC
N OC
E
100,000 REFUGEES/DISPLACED PERSONS, B O E D W A
R K N ON S
FOLLOWS: 3,5H0 U PERSONNEL F R C M SECURITY, INCLUDING
N
O AP
20 C M S O 177 MILITARY/CIVILIAN POLICE O LIGHT INFANTRY
AP F
R
E C " A 1,200 P R O (JUICK REACTION F R E -CINCLUDES fiQD
AH,
ESN
OC
PERSON MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALION? * A 1,000 P R O
ESN
SUPPORT ELEMENT', A 100 P R O TACTICAL AIR LOGISTICS
ESN
CONTROL ELEMENTAND A 400 P R O AVIATION BATTALION,
ESN
INCLUDING APPROXIMATELY 20 HELICOPTERS.
T. E D POINT. RESETTLEMENT O REFUGEES/DISPLACED PERSONS
N
F
O U S DECISION T E D MANDATE AFTER SIX MONTHS. V
R NC
O N
V
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
•CQNriPENTIAt
�'(
May 13, 1994
M E M Q R A N D U.M
TO:
Ambassador A l b r i g h t
THRU:
Ambassador I n d e r f u r t h
FROM:
POLMIL - Michael Barnett and Michael Sheehan
SUBJECT:
SYG's nonpaper on UNAMIR-A
BACKGROUMP.
The SYG's r e p o r t on Rwanda Calls t o address many o f t h e
c o n d i t i o n s e s t a b l i s h e d by the S e c u r i t y Council f o r approving an
o p e r a t i o n . Tab A i s an analysis of how the report compares t o
the nine s p e c i f i c issues t h a t must be s a t i s f a c t o r i l y addressed
before the approval of an operation. Simply put, w h i l e the
S e c u r i t y Council s t i p u l a t e s t h a t each category should be
answered "yes," i n f a c t only three of nine merit such
accreditation.
Recommendation
o
Use analysis of the SYG's r e p o r t i n Tab A t o guide the SC
and the SYG t o develop a v i a b l e o p t i o n f o r Rwanda t h a t we
can support.
o
Tab B i s the USG's proposal f o r a border mission t h a t was
communicated t o Sheehan by a JCS verbal b r i e f and i s
c o n s i s t e n t w i t h VP Gore's b r i e f i n South A f r i c a .
o
Tab C i s a new proposal developed by USUN P o l M i l , and now
c i r c u l a t i n g i n Washington, t h a t describes a discrete>
v i a b l e , humanitarian mission w i t h an e x i t s t r a t e g y i n
K i g a l i - and that b e t t e r meets the conditions formulated by
the SC and PDD-25 f o r approving an operation.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�1U
•^IZ.'^l-'MJ.w'M
h n t l y s i s Pf SYG'.a. Report on..Rwanda
Threat to Peace and Security
Yes. There i s consensus in the SC that the c i v i l war and
subsequent massive refugee movements constitute a threat to
regional peace and security.
Assistance of Regional and-.Subregional Organizations
Yes, but selected- While Tanzania has sponsored the
c e a s e - f i r e t a l k s , and some OAU countries have made offers of
m i l i t a r y troops, the OAU has been r e l a t i v e l y tepid in i t s
response and proposed assistance.
No. Although the Security Council stipulates that a
cease-fire should be in place, in fact the cease-fire i s no
closer today than i t was three weeks ago. indeed, some
consideration must be given to the p o s s i b i l i t y that the
proposed peacekeeping operation might provide a disincentive to
the parties to reach a cease-fire and move on the p o l i t i c a l
front. There should be some discussion of how t h i s proposed
operation might affect both the attempt to achieve a cease-fire
and p o l i t i c a l negotiations.
Coffimitynent to the.. Peage Process
No. While there i s some mention of the continued relevance
of the Arusha Accords as the framework for p o l i t i c a l
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , for a l l intent and purpose neither party has
demonstrated a strong and genuine commitment to the Accords,
and appear to be using any possible b a t t l e f i e l d v i c t o r i e s to
secure advantages for any subsequent p o l i t i c a l dialogue.
Clegr Politacal. G . a . E f
oes_£;
indat.e
No. The p o l i t i c a l goals move from the precise - protect
the delivery of the humanitarian assistance - to the imprecise
- a s s i s t and protect displaced persons throughout Rwanda.
-1-
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�-2-
Ei^iiijs.e..Jyiandete Foxmulated
No.
in addition to the above considerations, the four
month mandate does not have any sunset clause or consideration
of how this operation might come to a logical conclusion.
Safety^of U Personael
N
Perhaps, though highly dependent on whether the mandate i s
given a l i b e r a l interpretation to include assistance of
c i v i l i a n s i n jeopardy whereever they are in Rwanda.
Additionally, the SYG's proposal to place regional UN military
headquarters i s various c i t i e s might place the UN within war
zones and m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t i e s .
No. The SYG has not yet submitted a budget (though
expected today).
A Y a i l a b i l i t y of ResourCes
No. The UN plan cannot guarantee the required men, money
or the material. Men: The nonpaper c a l l s for a three-step
process to begin immediately, yet a major caveat i s the
nonpaer's admission that a more r e a l i s t i c time frame i s 2-3
months at the least given that the UN has not yet identified
the requisite troops.
Money: Possibly do-able once a budget
i s presented. Material: Even i f the UN i d e n t i f i e s troop
contributors, i t appears that they w i l l need to be transported
to Rwanda and equipped once they get there; the US says that i t
w i l l not provide such assistance, and no other country has
offered to a s s i s t . In short, the proposal does not rest on a
r e a l i s t i c foundation; in this respect, the SC and the SYG,
rather than the US, are jeopardizing the l i v e s of innocents in
Rwanda by forwarding groundless proposals.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�m 8
US (JCS) Draft Concept of Operation for Rwanda Border Operation
Assumptions:
A v a i l a b i l i t y of well-trained and d i s c i p l i n e d troops
Government of Burundi accepts the operation
Consent of Rwanda Government and RPF
Planning Assumptions:
Need about 6,000 troops (+ or -) for about 100,000 refugees
Forces would need very robust r u l e s of engagement
The Tanzanian and Ugandan border areas do not need forces
Zaire border i s too hard to do at t h i s point
Concept:
Operation w i l l operate out of Bujumbara and north on a 70 km
road that w i l l be severely tested by heavy military,
humanitarian, and normal c i v i l i a n t r a f f i c .
A forward HQ w i l l operate out of Kiyanza ( j u s t south of the
Rwandan border) to project the operation north into Rwanda.
The HQ would have a Mechanized Infantry Bn (+) with an Air
Cavalry Sqn (-) as the mobile protective force for the Area of
Operations.
The protective zone w i l l be an area adjacent to the road
leading north to Batari with a s e r i e s of protected camps.
Based on a v a i l a b i l i t y of troops and f e a s i b i l i t y of the
operations, about 20 camps w i l l be established to handle about
5,000 refugees per camp.
I f the operation i s extended successfully to B a t a r i , the camps
w i l l then extend to the northwest, with the same estimated
c r i t e r i a of 6,000 troops per 100,000 refugees.
Each camp w i l l
infantry; about
troops plus 1600
and about 1,000
troops.
have assigned one company of MPs or light
177 troops per company x 20 units = 3,500
for the Infantry-Cavalry Headquarters forces
support troops for a t o t a l of about 6,000
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�m c
USUN Proposal for a Discrete Operation in Kigali
Assumptions:
Availability of well-trained troops
Use of Kigali airport
Political/humanitarian imperative to operate in Kigali
Cease-fire i s not in place
Planning Assumptions/Design
Criteria:
Restricted to a humanitarian mission
Built-in exit strategy
Review of a peacekeeping mission only when a cease-fire i s in
place and a p o l i t i c a l process i s on track.
Would not be approved without budget estimate, l i f t , forces,
and equipment identified.
Concept:
A i r l i f t two mechanized Battalions into Kigali airport.
1st Bn: Secure airport and protect the UNAMIR civilian
component
2nd Bn: Assist NGOs and agencies move personnel currently
under U protection to refugee camps that are in relatively
N
secure areas (in the Kigali v i c i n i t y ) .
Forces would not establish permanent sites in or around
Kigali.
Forces w i l l withdraw in 30 days (or however long the mission
i s designated)—whether the mission i s accomplished or not. A
new resolution would be required in order to change the
schedule for withdrawal.
A small stay behind force could be maintained to accomplish
the mission designed for the current group in Kigali —
protect the c i v i l i a n component so they can continue the
p o l i t i c a l process; the force would not have an extended or
open ended humanitarian or protection mission in Kigali.
As the peace process progressed, the Council would consider
under i t s normal procedures a renewed UNAMIR Chapter VI
peacekeeping operation.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�INITIAL HERE
VUTfaOlNCj TELEGRAH
5.1
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OIIA
RGN L
•CONriDCNTIAL
.
IO/PHO:DEdENSEN:DEJ
OS/IB/TH ^-7^37
SEPKA 477
IO:GUARD
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S/S-0 :
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AF:ERENDER
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NSC:
AFi 10, HA, INR, P, P
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USUN N W YORK
E
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SECDEF WASHDC CJCS W S D
AHC
E.O. 1235b:
TAGS:
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SUBJECT:
REF:
1.
DECL: O D
AR
RWANDA:
PROPOSED CONCEPT F R U FORCE
O N
STATE 127SbE
CfrNriDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. USUN IS REQUESTED T SHARE THE FOLLOWING WITH THE U
O
N
SECRETARIAT AND SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS AS S O A
ON S
POSSIBLE.
»
3. U CONTINUE T HAVE SERIOUS PROBLEMS UITH A
E
O
KIGALI-BASED U FORCE AS PROPOSED B THE U SECRETARIAT.
N
Y
N
THE FOLLOWING IS A M R DETAILED OUTLINE O A ALTERNATE
OE
F N
PROPOSAL. W PLAN T SEND A TEAM T N W Y R O MONDAY,
E
O
O E
OK N
M Y l b T EXPLAIN THE PROPOSAL IN GREATER DETAIL A D REPLY
A
O
N
TO (3UESTI0NS.
4. MISSION STATEMENT. THE U FORCE W U D ESTABLISH A
N
OL
SECURE ZONE INSIDE R A D ALONG THE BORDER WITH BURUNDI T
WNA
O
PROTECT REFUGEES/DISPLACED PERSONS IN MOST IMMEDIATE
DANGER A D PROVIDE SECURITY F R THE DELIVERY O
N
O
F
HUMANITARIAN RELIEF T THOSE PERSONNEL. THE FORCE W U D
O
OL
CLINTON LIBRARt MOiUtUr
•CONriDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
7S>\\- OCU*3>- W
S/n/15" KBM
�-CONriDCNTIAL
DEPLOY T BURUNDI, ESTABLISH A BASE O OPERATIONS IN
O
F
BURUNDI NEAR THE RUANDAN BORDER, CONDUCT CROSS-BORDER
OPERATIONS T SECURE A D ESTABLISH DISPLACED PERSONS CAMPS
O
N
WITHIN RWANDA, A D PROVIDE CONTINUOUS SECURITY F R THE
N
O
OPERATION O THOSE CAMPS• THE FORCE W U D ESTABLISH
F
OL
SECURITY F R UNHCR-RUN CAMPS BUT NOT TRANSPORT DISPLACED
O
PERSONS T THE CAMPS. THE FORCE W U D ALSO SECURE LINES'
O
OL
O COMMUNICATION A D RELIEF CONVOYS IN THE ZONE.
F
N
5. RULES O ENGAGEMENT. RULES O ENGAGEMENT UOULD
F
F
CLEARLY SPELL OUT THE AUTHORITY O THE U FORCE C M A D R
F
N
OMNE
T DEFEND THE HUMANITARIAN MISSION T INCLUDE U FORCES,
O
O
N
CAMPS AND DISPLACED PERSONS BEING PROTECTED.
b. ASSUMPTIONS. -CAl THE CURRENT UNAMIR FORCE UOULD
REMAIN IN KIGALI T HELP NEGOTIATE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT
O
A D PROVIDE THE OVERALL FORCE C M A D R , -tB> WELL TRAINED,
N
OMNE'
DISCIPLINED TROOPS WILL BE AVAILABLE F R THE MISSION", - O
O
C
THE U HAS RPF/RGF PERMISSION T ESTABLISH THE ZONE IN
N
O
RUANDA, AND BURUNDI PERMISSION T ESTABLISH BASE
O
OPERATIONS IN, AND ALLOW LOGISTIC SUPPORT O SECURE ZONE
F
THROUGH, BURUNDI; {D} UNHCR UOULD RUN THE CAMPS, A D THE
N
U FORCE UOULD ONLY PROVIDE SECURITY; A D <€} THE U A D
N
N
N N
THE N O UOULD BE RESPONSIBLE F R TRANSPORTATION A D
GS
O
N
DISTRIBUTION O HUMANITARIAN SUPPLIES INTO RWANDA, WHILE
F
THE U FORCE UOULD PROVIDE ITS O N LOGISTIC SUPPORT.
N
W
7. CONCEPT O OPERATIONS. U FORCE W U D DEBARK IN
F
N
OL
BURUNDI, ESTABLISH A F R A D SUPPORT BASE NEAR THE RWANDAN
OWR
BORDER, A D CONDUCT OPERATIONS T ESTABLISH A SECURE ZONE
N
O
F R THE DISPLACED PERSONS CAMPS.
O
fi. FORCE STRUCTURE. ABOUT b,OOO-b,SOO U FORCE PERSONNEL
N
PER 100,000 REFUGEES/DISPLACED PERSONS.
1. E D POINT. RESETTLEMENT O REFUGEES/DISPLACED PERSONS
N
F
O UNSC DECISION T E D MANDATE AFTER SIX MONTHS. V
R
O N
V
•CpNFIDENTIAU
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
13-May-1994 22:12 EDT
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
VAX_MAIL@OEOB
STEINBERG@A1@OEOB
RICE@A1@OEOB
DESHAZ ER@A1@OEOB
FROM:
SUBJECT:
White House S i t u a t i o n Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)
RWANDA: MAY 13 SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMALS
<DIST>
PRT: SIT
SIT: DESHAZER RICE STEINBERG SUM SUM2 VAX
<PREC>
IMMEDIATE
<CLAS>
CONFIDENTIAL'
<OSRI>
RUCNDT
<DTG>
140133Z MAY 94
<ORIG>
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
<TO>
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6462
INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 5045
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 05 38
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY 0415
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0216
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 02 38
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0976
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1644
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 04 36
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
DECLASSIFIED
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 02 37
PER E.0.13526
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 1194
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
HOW - 0*1*3<SUBJ>
8/\y\5 KBH
RWANDA: MAY 13 SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMALS
<TEXT>
O O N F I D E N T I A T, SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 002059
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
�C I T N L B A Y POOOY
L N O I R R HTCP
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J 3 ;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA: MAY 13 SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMALS
REF: (A) USUN 2035, (B) USUN 2037
1. CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT
2. THE SECURITY COUNCIL I N INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS MAY
13 AGREED AD REF TO A TEXT ON A RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD
GIVE UNAMIR A HUMANITARIAN AND PROTECTIVE MANDATE AND
EXPAND ITS AUTHORIZED FORCE TO 5,500 PERSONS. THIS WAS
THE RESULT OF TWO EXTENDED SESSIONS BY A COUNCIL WORKING
GROUP FOLLOWED BY DELIBERATIONS OF THE FULL COUNCIL.
3. MOST OF THE DISCUSSION CENTERED ON OPERATIVE PARAS
TWO AND THREE. I N OPERATIVE PARA TWO, THE COUNCIL
ATTEMPTED TO STRIKE A BALANCE BETWEEN PROTECTION OF
REFUGEES AND OTHERS I N SECURE AREAS AND SECURITY FOR
THOSE AT RISK THROUGHOUT RWANDA. I N OPERATIVE THREE,
THE COUNCIL TRIED TO GIVE A CLEAR INDICATION THAT UNAMIR
WOULD TAKE ROBUST ACTION TO CARRY OUT ITS PROTECTIVE
MANDATE, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME NOT CALLING INTO
QUESTION THE RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE I N OTHER CHAPTER V I
OPERATIONS. THE TEXT FOLLOWS BELOW I N PARA 6.
4. COUNCIL PRESIDENT GAMBARI (NIGERIA) INDICATED THAT
HE WANTED TO PUT THE RESOLUTION "IN BLUE" THAT EVENING
AND PROCEED TO A VOTE ON MONDAY, MAY 16. (THE US
DELEGATION HAD EARLIER INFORMED GAMBARI THAT WE WOULD
NOT BE I N A POSITION TO VOTE ON THIS RESOLUTION MAY
13.)
AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH CAUTIONED THAT WE STILL HAD
MANY QUESTIONS REGARDING THE REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL WHICH HAD JUST BEEN RELEASED THAT
AFTERNOON, I N PARTICULAR REGARDING THE CONCEPT OF
OPERATIONS. WE HAD MADE GOOD PROGRESS I N PRODUCING THE
TEXT OF A RESOLUTION WHICH COULD SERVE AS A FRAMEWORK.
HOWEVER, THIS I N MANY RESPECTS WAS THE EASY PART OF THE
JOB.
WE HAD SERIOUS CONCERNS TO DISCUSS WITH THE
SECRETARIAT AND WOULD NEED TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A FIRM
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS BEFORE VOTING.
5. GAMBARI INDICATED THAT HE INTENDED TO GO AHEAD AND
PUT THE RESOLUTION I N BLUE, BUT THAT I T WAS OPEN TO
FURTHER DISCUSSION AND CHANGE. HE SAID HE INTENDED TO
SCHEDULE FURTHER CONSULTATIONS ON MONDAY AFTERNOON, WITH
THE HOPE OF VOTING ON THE RESOLUTION THAT EVENING.
6. BEGIN TEXT:
THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
REAFFIRMING ALL ITS PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS ON THE
SITUATION I N RWANDA, I N PARTICULAR ITS RESOLUTION 872
(1993) OF 5 OCTOBER 1993 BY WHICH I T ESTABLISHED THE
UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR),
ITS RESOLUTION 909 (1994) OF 5 APRIL 1994 WHICH EXTENDED
THE MANDATE OF UNAMIR UNTIL 29 JULY 1994, AND ITS
RESOLUTION 912 (1994) OF 21 APRIL 1994 BY WHICH I T
ADJUSTED THE MANDATE OF UNAMIR,
RECALLING THE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE
�CLINTON LIBg&R^fflOTOCOPY
COUNCIL ON ITS BEHALF ON 7 APRIL 1994 (S/PRST/1994/16)
AND 30 APRIL 1994 (S/PRST/1994/21),
HAVING CONSIDERED THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
DATED 13 MAY 1994 (S/1994/...),
REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTION 868 (1993) OF 29 SEPTEMBER
199 3 ON THE SECURITY OF UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS,
STRONGLY CONDEMNING THE ONGOING VIOLENCE I N RWANDA AND/^>.
PARTICULARLY CONDEMNING THE VERY NUMEROUS KILLINGS OF \ z J
CIVILIANS WHICH HAVE|TAKEN PLACE I N RWANDA AND THE
IMPUNITY WITH WHICH ARMED INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO
OPERATE AND CONTINUE OPERATING THEREIN,
STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT
TO THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT I N RWANDA AND
THE NECESSITY FOR ALL PARTIES TO RECOMMIT THEMSELVES TO
• C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 002059
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J 3 ;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA: MAY 13 SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMALS
ITS FULL IMPLEMENTATION,
COMMENDING THE EFFORTS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN
UNITY (OAU) AND ITS ORGANS I N PROVIDING DIPLOMATIC,
POLITICAL, AND HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE
COUNCIL, AS WELL AS THOSE OF THE TANZANIAN FACILITATOR,
DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT THE SITUATION I N RWANDA, WHICH HAS
RESULTED I N THE DEATH OF TENS OF THOUSANDS OF INNOCENT
4W*
CIVILIANS, INCLUDING WOMEN AND CHILDREN, THE "INTERNAL
DISPLACEMENT OF A SIGNIFICANT PERCENTAGE OF THE RWANDAN
POPULATION, AND THE MASSIVE EXODUS OF REFUGEES TO
NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES, CONSTITUTES A HUMANITARIAN
CRISIS OF ENORMOUS PROPORTIONS,
EXPRESSING CNCE AGAIN ITS ALARM AT CONTINUING REPORTS OF
SYSTEMATIC, WIDESPREAD AND FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW I N RWANDA, AS WELL AS
OTHER VIOLATIONS OF THE RIGHTS TO LIFE AND PROPERTY,
RECALLING I N THIS CONTEXT THAT THE KILLING OF MEMBERS OF
AN ETHNIC GROUP WITH THE INTENTION OF DESTROYING SUCH A
GROUP I N WHOLE OR I N PART CONSTITUTES A CRIME PUNISHABLE
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,
URGINGnALL PARTIES TO CEASE FORTHWITH ANY INCITEMENT,
ESPECIALLY THROUGH THE MASS MEDIA, TO VIOLENCE OR ETHNIC
HATRED, ^D€»*4WM«^tWM'
RECALLING ALSO THAT I T HAD REQUESTED THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL TO MAKE PROPOSALS FOR THE
INVESTIGATION OF REPORTS OF SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW DURING THE CONFLICT,
UNDERLINING THE URGENT NEED FOR COORDINATED
INTERNATIONAL ACTION TO ALLEVIATE THE SUFFERING OF THE
RWANDAN PEOPLE AND TO HELP RESTORE PEACE I N RWANDA, AND
IN THIS CONNECTION WELCOMING COOPERATION BETWEEN THE
UNITED NATIONS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY
1
1
W
, .
^ ^
7
'
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
(OAU) AS WELL AS WITH COUNTRIES OF THE REGION,
ESPECIALLY THE FACILITATOR OF THE ARUSHA PEACE PROCESS,
REAFFIRMING ITS COMMITMENT TO THE UNITY AND TERRITORIAL
INTEGRITY OF RWANDA,
RECOGNIZING THAT THE PEOPLE OF RWANDA BEAR ULTIMATE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION OF THEIR COUNTRY,
-- 1. DEMANDS THAT ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT
IMMEDIATELY CEASE HOSTILITIES, AGREE TO A CEASE-FIRE,
AND BRING AN END TO THE MINDLESS VIOLENCE AND CARNAGE
ENGULFING RWANDA;
— 2. DECIDES TO EXPAND UNAMIR.S MANDATE UNDER
RESOLUTION 912 (1994) TO INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING
ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES, WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE
RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO I T :
—"
"
— A l TU (UUNTRIBUTEJ TQ-THE SECURITY AND PROTECTION OF
PIS PLACED PERSONS,, REFUGEES AND CIVILIANS AT RISK I N
RWANDA INCLUDING THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT AND
MAINTENANCE, (AS APPROPRIATE,) OF SECURE HUMANITARIAN
AREAS, '
— B) TO PROVIDE SECURITY AND SUPPORT FOR THE
DISTRIBUTION OF RELIEELSUPPLIES AND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF
OPERATIONS;
.
.
—
RPinnnNTTTifiS THAT UNAMIR MAY BE REQUIRED TO TAKE Vlfr-gftCuJ/ f n ^
ACTION I N SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST PERSONS OR GROUPS WHO
THREATEN PprvrTTHmyn m'l'H!S_fflro POPULATIONS, nWTTTCn -MATThMS
AND OTHER HUMANITARIAN PERSONNELY OR THE MEANS OF
DELIVERY AND DISTRIBUTION OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF;
- C O N F I
D~E N T I A-fc SECTION 03 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 002059
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J 3 ;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA: MAY 13 SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMALS
— 4. AUTHORIZES I N THIS CONTEXT AN EXPANSION OF THE
UNAMIR FORCE LEVEL UP TO 5,500 TROOPS;
— 5. URGES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO COMMENCE THE
DEPLOYMENT OF THE EXPANDED FORCE, I N PHASES AS •
•
APPROPRIATE, .IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME ;
— 6. ENCOURAGES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ACCELERATE
HIS EFFORTS, I N CONJUNCTION WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, TO OBTAIN FROM"
MEMBER STATES THE NECESSARY PERSONNEL TO ENABLE
DEPLOYMENT OF THE EXPANDED UNAMIR TO PROCEED URGENTLY;
— 7. INVITES MEMBER STATES TO RESPOND PROMPTLY TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR LOGISTICAL SUPPORT
-CAPABILITY FOR RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF THE UNAMIR EXPANDED
FORCE LEVEL AND ITS SUPPORT" I N THE FIELD;
— 8. STRONGLY URGES ALL PARTIES I N RWANDA TO COOPERATE
FULLY WITH UNAMIR I N THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS MANDATE
AND I N PARTICULAR I N ENSURING THE UNIMPEDED DELIVERY OF
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE;
— 9. COMMENDS THE EFFORTS OF STATES, UNITED NATIONS
-
�C I T N L B A Y POOOY
L N O I R R HTCP
AGENCIES AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS WHICH HAVE
PROVIDED HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER ASSISTANCE, ENCOURAGES
THEM TO CONTINUE AND INCREASE SUCH ASSISTANCE, AND URGES
OTHERS TO PROVIDE SUCH ASSISTANCE;
—B
DETERMINING THAT THE SITUATION IN RWANDA CONSTITUTES A
THREAT TO PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE REGION,
ACTING UNDER CHAPTER V I I OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS,
— 1 0 . DECIDES THAT ALL STATES SHALL PREVENT THE SALE OC
SUPPLY TO RWANDA BY THEIR NATIONALS OR FROM THEIR
TERRITORIES OR USING THEIR FLAG VESSELS OR AIRCRAFT OF
ARMS AND RELATED MATERIEL OF ALL TYPES, INCLUDING
WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION, MILITARY VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT,
PARAMILITARY POLICE EQUIPMENT AND SPARE PARTS;
— 1 1 . DECIDES ALSO TO ESTABLISH, IN ACCORDANCE WITH
RULE 28 OF THE PROVISIONAL RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL, A COMMITTEE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
CONSISTING OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, TO
UNDERTAKE THE FOLLOWING TASKS AND TO REPORT ON ITS W R
OK
TO THE COUNCIL WITH ITS OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS;
— ( A ) TO SEEK FROM ALL STATES INFORMATION REGARDING THE
ACTION TAKEN BY THEM CONCERNING THE EFFECTIVE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EMBARGO IMPOSED BY PARAGRAPH 10
ABOVE;
— ( B ) TO CONSIDER ANY INFORMATION BROUGHT TO ITS
ATTENTION BY STATES CONCERNING VIOLATIONS OF THE
EMBARGO, AND IN THAT CONTEXT TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO
THE COUNCIL ON WAYS OF INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
THE EMBARGO;
— ( C ) TO RECOMMEND APPROPRIATE MEASURES IN RESPONSE TO
VIOLATIONS OF THE EMBARGO IMPOSED BY PARAGRAPH 10 ABOVE
AND PROVIDE INFORMATION ON A REGULAR BASIS TO THE
SECRETARY GENERAL FOR GENERAL DISTRIBUTION TO MEMBER
STATES;
— 1 2 . CALLS UPON ALL STATES, INCLUDING STATES NOT
MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS, TO ACT STRICTLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
PROVISIONS OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION, NOTWITHSTANDING
THE EXISTENCE OF ANY RIGHTS OR OBLIGATIONS CONFERRED OR
IMPOSED BY ANY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT OR ANY CONTRACT
ENTERED INTO OR ANY LICENCE OR PERMIT GRANTED PRIOR TO
THE DATE OF THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION);
C O N F I D E N T I A C SECTION 04 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 002059
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA: MAY 13 SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMALS
—C
— 1 3 . REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO PRESENT A
REPORT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON THE INCIDENTS OF SERIOUS
VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW COMMITTED
�L N O L B A Y POOOY
I T N I R R HTCP
I N RWANDA DURING THE CONFLICT;
— 1 4 . INVITES THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND HIS SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE, I N COORDINATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION OF
AFRICAN UNITY AND COUNTRIES TN THE REGION, TO CONTINUE
THEIR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT I N
RWANDA WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ARUSHA PEACE
AGREEMENT;
— 1 5 . DECIDES TO KEEP THE SITUATION I N RWANDA UNDER
CONSTANT REVIEW AND REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO
REPORT FURTHER, INCLUDING ON THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION,
WITHIN FIVE WEEKS OF THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION AND
AGAIN I N GOOD TIME BEFORE THE EXPIRATION OF THE CURRENT
MANDATE OF UNAMIR;
— 1 6 . DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.
END TEXT.
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED
ALBRIGHT
BT
#2059
NNNN
<SECT>
SECTION: 01 OF 04
<SSN>
2059
<TOR>
940513215200 M1046829
<SECT>
SECTION: 02 OF 04
<SSN>
2059
<TOR>
940513215201 M1046830
<SECT>
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<SSN>
2059
<TOR>
940513215304 M1046832
<SECT>
SECTION: 04 OF 04
<SSN>
2059
<TOR>
940513215305 M1046833
9
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP*
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
15-May-1994 00:50 EDT
€8NFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
VAX_MAIL<aOEOB
RICE@Al@OEOB
DESHAZER@A1@OEOB
FROM:
SUBJECT:
White House S i t u a t i o n Room
(WHSR@Al<aWHSR)
RWANDA:
PROPOSED CONCEPT FOR UN FORCE
<DIST>
PRT: SIT
SIT: DESHAZER RICE SUM SUM2 VAX
<PREC>
IMMEDIATE
<CLAS>
CONFIDENTIAL<OSRI>
RUEHC
<DTG>
150434Z MAY 94
<ORIG>
SECSTATE WASHDC
<TO>
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN N W YORK IMMEDIATE 8879
E
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 042 3
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC 444 3
<SUBJ>
RWANDA:
PROPOSED CONCEPT FOR UN FORCE
<TEXT>
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 129527
E . O . 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA: PROPOSED CONCEPT FOR UN FORCE
REF: STATE 127262
1.
-CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
DECLASSIFIED
2. USUN IS REQUESTED TO SHARE THE FOLLOWING WITH THE UN
SECRETARIAT AND SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE.
3. W CONTINUE TO HAVE SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITH A
E
KIGALI-BASED UN FORCE AS PROPOSED BY THE UN SECRETARIAT.
PER E.O. 13526
^OH- 02.1*3- f*\
S/tyis- KBH
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP*
THE FOLLOWING I S A MORE DETAILED OUTLINE OF AN ALTERNATE
FROFOSAL. WE PLAN TO SEND A TEAM TO NEW YORK ON MONDAY
MAY 16 TO EXPLAIN THE PROPOSAL I N GREATER DETAIL AND REPLY
TO QUESTIONS.
4. MISSION STATEMENT. THE UN FORCE WOULD ESTABLISH A
SECURE ZONE INSIDE RWANDA ALONG THE BORDER WITH BURUNDI TO
PROTECT REFUGEES/DISPLACED PERSONS I N MOST IMMEDIATE
DANGER AND PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE DELIVERY OF
HUMANITARIAN RELIEF TO THOSE PERSONNEL. THE FORCE WOULD
DEPLOY TO BURUNDI, ESTABLISH A BASE OF OPERATIONS I N
BURUNDI NEAR THE RWANDAN BORDER, CONDUCT CROSS-BORDER
OPERATIONS TO SECURE AND ESTABLISH DISPLACED PERSONS CAMPS
WITHIN RWANDA, AND PROVIDE CONTINUOUS SECURITY FOR THE
OPERATION OF THOSE CAMPS. THE FORCE WOULD ESTABLISH
SECURITY FOR UNQCR-RUN CAMPS BUT NOT TRANSPORT DISPLACED
PERSONS TO THE CAMPS. THE FORCE WOULD ALSO SECURE LINES
OF COMMUNICATION AND RELIEF CONVOYS I N THE ZONE.
5. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WOULD
CLEARLY SPELL OUT THE AUTHORITY OF THE UN FORCE COMMANDER
TO DEFEND THE HUMANITARIAN MISSION TO INCLUDE UN FORCES,
CAMPS AND DISPLACED PERSONS BEING PROTECTED.
6. ASSUMPTIONS. (A) THE CURRENT UNAMIR FORCE WOULD
REMAIN I N KIGALI TO HELP NEGOTIATE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT
AND PROVIDE THE OVERALL FORCE COMMANDER; (B) WELL TRAINED,
DISCIPLINED TROOPS WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR THE MISSION; (C)
THE UN HAS RPF/RGF PERMISSION TO ESTABLISH THE ZONE I N
RWANDA, AND BURUNDI PERMISSION TO ESTABLISH BASE
OPERATIONS I N , AND ALLOW LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF SECURE ZONE
THROUGH, BURUNDI; (D) UNHCR WOULD RUN THE CAMPS, AND THE
UN FORCE WOULD ONLY PROVIDE SECURITY; AND (E) THE UN AND
THE NGOS WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR TRANSPORTATION AND
DISTRIBUTION OF HUMANITARIAN SUPPLIES INTO RWANDA, WHILE
THE UN FORCE WOULD PROVIDE ITS OWN LOGISTIC SUPPORT.
7. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. UN FORCE WOULD DEBARK I N
BURUNDI, ESTABLISH A FORWARD SUPPORT BASE NEAR THE RWANDAN
BORDER, AND CONDUCT OPERATIONS TO ESTABLISH A SECURE ZONE
FOR THE DISPLACED PERSONS CAMPS.
8. FORCE STRUCTURE. ABOUT 6,000-6,500 UN FORCE PERSONNEL
PER 100,000 REFUGEES/DISPLACED PERSONS.
9. END POINT. RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES/DISPLACED PERSONS
OR UNSC DECISION TO END MANDATE AFTER SIX MONTHS.
TALBOTT
BT
#9527
NNNN
<SECT>
SECTION: 01 OF 01
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
17-May-1994 22:34 EDT
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
VAX_MAIL@OEOB
STEINBERG@Al@OEOB
RICE@Al@OEOB
DESHAZER@Al@OEOB
CLARKER@A1@OEOB
FROM:
SUBJECT:
White House S i t u a t i o n Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)
SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVES PHASED UNAMIR
<DIST>
PRT: SIT
SIT: CLARKER DESHAZER RICE STEINBERG SUM SUM2 VAX
<PREC>
IMMEDIATE
<CLAS>
•GONFIDENTIAL
<OSRI>
RUCNDT
<DTG>
180052Z MAY 94
<ORIG>
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
<TO>
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6511
INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 5057
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 054 3
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY 0420
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0242
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0980
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1649
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0440
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0241
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 1198
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0220
<SUBJ>
SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVES PHASED UNAMIR
EXPANSION
<TEXT>
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
8/13/15 rtBH
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
B-Q N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 USUN NEW YORK 00209 3
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVES PHASED UNAMIR
EXPANSION
REFS: A) USUN 2059; B) 5/16 ALBRIGHT-TARNOFF TELECON
. (U) SUMMARY: AFTER TEN HOURS OF DEBATE, MACHINATIONS
AND SOME THEATRICS, THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADOPTED
RESOLUTION 918 ALTERING UNAMIR'S MANDATE, AUTHORIZING
ITS EXPANSION TO 5500 TROOPS, DEPLOYING THOSE TROOPS IN
PHASES WITH A COUNCIL REVIEW AFTER THE FIRST PHASE, AND
ESTABLISHING AN ARMS EMBARGO. AFTER REQUESTING A
SEPARATE VOTE ON PART B OF THE RESOLUTION, THE RWANDAN
FOREIGN MINISTER VOTED AGAINST ITS EMBARGO PROVISIONS
AND DELIVERED A LENGTHY DIATRIBE AGAINST TUTSIS AND
NEIGHBORING UGANDA. TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION FOLLOWS IN
PARA 9; US EOV CONTAINED IN PARA 10. THE REMAINING
PORTIONS OF THE RESOLUTION WERE ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY AND
THE RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE ADOPTED WITHOUT A VOTE. END
SUMMARY.
2. ^ef) THE MOST CONTENTIOUS DEBATE CENTERED ON US
CHANGES TO THE EARLIER DRAFT (REF A). AFTER DETAILED
DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE.UN SECRETARIAT AND A
VISITING US TEAM (SEPTEL), THE US PROPOSED A PHASED
DEPLOYMENT, STARTING WITH UNAMIR MILITARY OBSERVERS
CURRENTLY IN NAIROBI AND BRINGING TO FULL STRENGTH ONE
MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALION IN KIGALI. THE COUNCIL
WILL REVIEW THE MISSION, AND I F NECESSARY TAKE FURTHER
ACTION, PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT OF THE SECOND PHASE AND
REVISION OF THE UN SECRETARIAT'S CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.
3. (JZ? FRANCE, SPAIN, NEW ZEALAND AND NON-ALIGNED
DELEGATIONS VOICED STRONG OBJECTIONS TO THE US
PROPOSAL. WITH UK AND ARGENTINE SUPPORT, A COMPROMISE
WAS PROPOSED WHICH RETAINED THE SUBSTANCE OF US CHANGES,
IF NOT THEIR ORIGINAL FORM. AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT CLEARED
COMPROMISE LANGUAGE WITH U/S TARNOFF (REF B). WHILE NEW
ZEALAND ULTIMATELY SUPPORTED THE COMPROMISE, PERMREP
KEATING VOICED DISSATISFACTION WITH WHAT HE SAID WOULD
APPEAR TO BE A RETURN OF THE SAME FORCES THAT WERE
REMOVED FROM KIGALI IN APRIL. AFTER SEVERAL MORE HOURS
OF DEBATE, THE COUNCIL FINALLY ACCEPTED THE COMPROMISE
LANGUAGE.
4. ( t f THE COUNCIL ALSO DEBATED THE ISSUE OF THE
PARTIES' CONSENT AND COOPERATION WITH UNAMIR. USYG
GHAREKHAN REPORTED THAT THE UN HAS NOT RECEIVED THE
CONSENT OF THE RGF OR RPF TO ITS CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.
NEW ZEALAND SAID THAT THE BEST THE COUNCIL COULD HOPE
FOR IS "ACQUIESCENCE, ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE CHAOTIC
COMMAND AND CONTROL SITUATION." UK PERMREP HANNAY SAID
THE COUNCIL IS UNDER NO ILLUSION THAT 5500 TROOPS COULD
OPERATE WITHOUT THE COOPERATION OF THE PARTIES. THE
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
COUNCIL SETTLED ON A PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH CALLING FOR
THE "SUPPORT AND COOPERATION OF THE PARTIES FOR THE
SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL ASPECTS OF (UNAMIR'S)
MANDATE."
5. (U) THE COUNCIL CONVENED I N FORMAL SESSION AFTER
MIDNIGHT, FOLLOWING A PROCEDURAL WRANGLE ARISING FROM
THE RWANDAN DELEGATION'S REFUSAL TO SUPPORT SECTION B OF
THE RESOLUTION ESTABLISHING AN ARMS EMBARGO. I N HIS
DETAILED A HISTORY OF TUTSI DOMINATION OVER THE HUTUS
AND BLAMED THE RPF FOR THE EVIL THAT HAS BEFALLEN
RWANDA. HE DESCRIBED THE RPF AS "THIRSTY FOR
VENGEANCE," STATING THAT RPF FIGHTERS "EAT THE HEARTS OF
THE MEN THEY HAVE KILLED." HE SAID THE RPF WAS ENGAGED
IN A "CAREFULLY PREPARED PLAN" TO OBTAIN POWER WHICH
INVOLVED "DRIVING THE PEOPLE OF RWANDA INTO EXODUS" FOR
HIRTY YEARS. HE SIMILARLY CONDEMNED THE UGANDAN
GOVERNMENT FOR ITS SUPPORT OF THE RPF.
6. (U) RPF DIRECTOR OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS CLAUDE
DUSAIDI ISSUED A WRITTEN STATEMENT WELCOMING THE COUNCIL
ACTION WHILE RESTATING THE RPF'S POSITION THAT A FORCE
OF 5500 IS TOO LARGE. THE STATEMENT COMMITS THE RPF TO
THE PRINCIPLE OF THE NEUTRALITY OF KIGALI AIRPORT
C O N F I D E N T I A L - SECTION 02 OF 06 USUN NEW YORK 002093
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J 3 ;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVES PHASED UNAMIR
EXPANSION
(REFERRING TO A SPANISH-SPONSORED AMENDMENT I N PARA 10
OF THE RESOLUTION BELOW). THE STATEMENT REJECTS "ANY
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION VOTED FOR BY REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE SO-CALLED INTERIM GOVERNMENT" AND CALLS FOR THE
WITHDRAWAL OF SRSG FOR RWANDA JEAN ROGER BOOH-BOOH.
7. (U) I N THEIR EOVS, THE UK, SPAIN, NEW ZEALAND AND
CZECH PERMREPS SHARPLY CRITICIZED THE RWANDAN FOREIGN
MINISTER FOR THE TONE AND CONTENT OF HIS STATEMENT.
PERMREP KEATING SAID THE RWANDAN "DOES NOT REPRESENT A
STATE; HE I S A MOUTHPIECE OF A FACTION," AND REGRETTED
HIS "SHAMEFUL DISTORTION OF THE TRUTH." THE CZECH
PERMREP LAID BLAME FOR THE MASSACRE OF "20 PERCENT OF
ALL TUTSIS I N RWANDA" ON THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD AND
ELEMENTS OF THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT FORCES.
8. (U) SPEAKING I N HIS NATIONAL CAPACITY, NIGERIAN
PERMREP GAMBARI EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT WITH HOW THE
COUNCIL TREATS AFRICAN ISSUES I N GENERAL, AND EXPRESSED
SPECIFIC DISAPPOINTMENT OVER THE CONDITIONALITIES OF
PARAGRAPH 7 OF THE RESOLUTION.
9. (U) TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION FOLLOWS:
BEGIN TEXT RESOLUTION S/RES/918:
THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
REAFFIRMING ALL ITS PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS ON THE
SITUATION I N RWANDA, I N PARTICULAR ITS RESOLUTION 872
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
(199 3) OF 5 OCTOBER 199 3 BY WHICH I T ESTABLISHED THE
UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR),
ITS RESOLUTION 909 (1994) OF 5 APRIL 1994 WHICH EXTENDED
THE MANDATE OF UNAMIR UNTIL 29 JULY 1994, AND ITS
RESOLUTION 912 (1994) OF 21 APRIL 1994 BY WHICH I T
ADJUSTED THE MANDATE OF UNAMIR;
RECALLING THE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE
COUNCIL ON 7 APRIL 1994 (S/PRST/16) AND 30 APRIL 1994
(S/PRST/21),
HAVING CONSIDERED THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
DATED 13 MAY 1994 (S/1994/565),
REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTION 868 (1993) OF 29 SEPTEMBER
199 3 ON THE SECURITY OF UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS,
STRONGLY CONDEMNING THE ONGOING VIOLENCE I N RWANDA AND
PARTICULARLY CONDEMNING THE VERY NUMEROUS KILLINGS OF
CIVILIANS WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE I N RWANDA AND THE
IMPUNITY WITH WHICH ARMED INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO
OPERATE AND CONTINUE OPERATING THEREIN,
STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT
TO THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT I N RWANDA AND
THE NECESSITY FOR ALL PARTIES TO RECOMMIT THEMSELVES TO
ITS FULL IMPLEMENTATION,
COMMENDING THE EFFORTS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN
UNITY (OAU) AND ITS ORGANS, AS WELL AS THE EFFORTS OF
THE TANZANIAN FACILITATOR, I N PROVIDING DIPLOMATIC,
POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE
COUNCIL,
DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT THE SITUATION I N RWANDA, WHICH HAS
RESULTED I N THE DEATH OF MANY THOUSANDS OF INNOCENT
CIVILIANS, INCLUDING WOMEN AND CHILDREN, THE INTERNAL
DISPLACEMENT OF A SIGNIFICANT PERCENTAGE OF THE RWANDAN
POPULATION, AND THE MASSIVE EXODUS OF REFUGEES TO
NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES, CONSTITUTES A HUMANITARIAN
CRISIS OF ENORMOUS PROPORTIONS,
EXPRESSING ONCE AGAIN ITS ALARM AT CONTINUING REPORTS OF
• C O N F I D E N T I A I r SECTION 03 OF 06 USUN NEW YORK 00209 3
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J 3 ;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVES PHASED UNAMIR
EXPANSION
WIDESPREAD AND FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW I N RWANDA, AS WELL AS OTHER VIOLATIONS
OF THE RIGHTS TO LIFE AND PROPERTY,
RECALLING I N THIS CONTEXT THAT THE KILLING OF MEMBERS OF
AN ETHNIC GROUP WITH THE INTENTION OF DESTROYING SUCH A
GROUP, I N WHOLE OR I N PART, CONSTITUTES A CRIME
PUNISHABLE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,
STRONGLY URGING ALL PARTIES TO CEASE FORTHWITH ANY
INCITEMENT, ESPECIALLY THROUGH THE MASS MEDIA, TO
VIOLENCE OR ETHNIC HATRED,
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
RECALLING ALSO ITS REQUEST TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO
COLLECT INFORMATION ON THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE TRAGIC
INCIDENT THAT RESULTED I N THE DEATH OF THE PRESIDENTS OF
RWANDA AND BURUNDI,
RECALLING FURTHER THAT I T HAD REQUESTED THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL TO MAKE PROPOSALS FOR THE
INVESTIGATION OF REPORTS OF SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW DURING THE CONFLICT,
UNDERLING THE URGENT NEED FOR COORDINATED INTERNATIONAL
ACTION TO ALLEVIATE THE SUFFERING OF THE RWANDAN PEOPLE
AND TO HELP RESTORE PEACE I N RWANDA, AND I N THIS
CONNECTION WELCOMING COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED
NATIONS AND THE OAU AS WELL AS WITH COUNTRIES OF THE
REGION, ESPECIALLY THE FACILITATOR OF THE ARUSHA PEACE
PROCESS,
DESIRING I N THIS CONTEXT TO EXPAND THE MANDATE OF UNAMIR
FOR HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES, AND STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE
I T ATTACHES TO THE SUPPORT AND COOPERATION OF THE
PARTIES FOR THE SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL ASPECTS
OF THAT MANDATE,
REAFFIRMING ITS COMMITMENT TO THE UNITY AND TERRITORIAL
INTEGRITY OF RWANDA,
RECOGNIZING THAT THE PEOPLE OF RWANDA BEAR ULTIMATE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION OF THEIR COUNTRY,
DEEPLY DISTURBED BY THE MAGNITUDE OF THE HUMAN SUFFERING
CAUSED BY THE CONFLICT AND CONCERNED THAT THE
CONTINUATION OF THE SITUATION I N RWANDA CONSTITUTES A
THREAT TO PEACE AND SECURITY I N THE REGION,
A
— 1 . DEMANDS THAT ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT
IMMEDIATELY CEASE HOSTILITIES, AGREE TO A CEASE-FIRE,
AND BRING AN END TO THE MINDLESS VIOLENCE AND CARNAGE
ENGULFING RWANDA;
— 2. WELCOMES THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL DATED
13 MAY 1994 (S/1994/565);
— 3. DECIDES TO EXPAND UNAMIR'S MANDATE UNDER
RESOLUTION 912 (1994) TO INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING
ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE
RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO I T :
— A. TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE SECURITY AND PROTECTION OF
DISPLACED PERSONS, REFUGEES AND CIVILIANS AT RISK I N
RWANDA, INCLUDING THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT AND
MAINTENANCE, WHERE FEASIBLE, OF SECURE HUMANITARIAN
AREAS;
— B. TO PROVIDE SECURITY AND SUPPORT FOR THE
DISTRIBUTIONS OF RELIEF SUPPLIES AND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF
OPERATIONS;
C O N F I D E N T f — f f T ? SECTION 04 OF 06 USUN NEW YORK 00209 3
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J 3 ;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVES PHASED UNAMIR
EXPANSION
— 4. RECOGNIZES THAT UNAMIR MAY BE REQUIRED TO TAKE
ACTION IN SELF-DEFENCE AGAINST PERSONS OR GROUPS WHO
THREATEN PROTECTED SITES AND POPULATIONS, UNITED NATIONS
AND OTHER HUMANITARIAN PERSONNEL OR THE MEANS OF
DELIVERY AND DISTRIBUTION OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF;
-- 5. AUTHORIZES IN THIS CONTEXT AN EXPANSION OF THE
UNAMIR FORCE LEVEL UP TO 5,500 TROOPS;
— 6. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, AS RECOMMENDED IN
HIS REPORT, AND AS A FIRST PHASE, IMMEDIATELY TO
REDEPLOY TO RWANDA THE UNAMIR MILITARY OBSERVERS
CURRENTLY IN NAIROBI AND TO BRING UP TO FULL STRENGTH
THE ELEMENTS OF THE MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALION
CURRENTLY IN RWANDA;
— 7. FURTHER REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON THE NEXT PHASE OF UNAMIR'S
DEPLOYMENT INCLUDING, INTER ALIA, ON THE COOPERATION OF
THE PARTIES, PROGRESS TOWARDS A CEASE-FIRE, AVAILABILITY
OF RESOURCES AND THE PROPOSED DURATION OF THE MANDATE
FOR FURTHER REVIEW AND ACTION, AS REQUIRED, BY THE
COUNCIL;
— 8.
ENCOURAGES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ACCELERATE
HIS EFFORTS, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE OAU, TO OBTAIN FROM MEMBER
STATES THE NECESSARY PERSONNEL TO ENABLE DEPLOYMENT OF
THE EXPANDED UNAMIR TO PROCEED URGENTLY;
— 9. INVITES MEMBER STATES TO RESPOND PROMPTLY TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR THE RESOURCES REQUIRED,
INCLUDING LOGISTICAL SUPPORT CAPABILITY FOR RAPID
DEPLOYMENT OF THE UNAMIR EXPANDED FORCE LEVEL AND ITS
SUPPORT IN THE FIELD;
— 10. STRONGLY URGES ALL PARTIES IN RWANDA TO
COOPERATE FULLY WITH UNAMIR IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS
MANDATE AND IN PARTICULAR IN ENSURING ITS FREEDOM OF
MOVEMENT AND THE UNIMPEDED DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE, AND FURTHER CALLS UPON THEM TO TREAT KIGALI
AIRPORT AS A NEUTRAL ZONE UNDER THE CONTROL OF UNAMIR;
— 11. DEMANDS THAT ALL PARTIES IN RWANDA STRICTLY
RESPECT THE PERSONS AND PREMISES OF THE UNITED NATIONS
AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS SERVING IN RWANDA, AND REFRAIN
FROM ANY ACTS OF INTIMIDATION OR VIOLENCE AGAINST
PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN HUMANITARIAN AND PEACE-KEEPING WORK;
— 12. COMMENDS THE EFFORTS OF STATES, UNITED NATIONS
AGENCIES AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS WHICH HAVE
PROVIDED HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER ASSISTANCE, ENCOURAGES
THEM TO CONTINUE AND INCREASE SUCH ASSISTANCE, AND URGES
OTHERS TO PROVIDE SUCH ASSISTANCE;
B
DETERMINING THAT THE SITUATION IN RWANDA CONSTITUTES A
THREAT TO PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE REGION,
ACTING UNDER CHAPTER V I I OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
NATIONS,
13. DECIDES THAT ALL STATES SHALL PREVENT THE SALE OR
SUPPLY TO RWANDA BY THEIR NATIONALS OR FROM THEIR
TERRITORIES OR USING THEIR FLAG VESSELS OR AIRCRAFT OF
ARMS AND RELATED MATERIEL OF ALL TYPES, INCLUDING
WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION, MILITARY VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT,
PARAMILITARY POLICE EQUIPMENT AND SPARE PARTS;
14. DECIDES ALSO TO ESTABLISH, IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE
28 OF THE PROVISIONAL RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL, A COMMITTEE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONSISTING
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 06 USUN NEW YORK 00209 3
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVES PHASED UNAMIR
EXPANSION
OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, TO UNDERTAKE THE
FOLLOWING TASKS AND TO REPORT ON ITS W R TO THE COUNCIL
OK
WITH ITS OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
— A) TO SEEK FROM ALL STATES INFORMATION REGARDING THE
ACTION TAKEN BY THEM CONCERNING THE EFFECTIVE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EMBARGO IMPOSED BY PARAGRAPH 13
ABOVE;
— B) TO CONSIDER ANY INFORMATION BROUGHT TO ITS
ATTENTION BY STATES CONCERNING VIOLATIONS OF THE
EMBARGO, AND IN THAT CONTEXT TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO
THE COUNCIL ON WAYS OF INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
THE EMBARGO;
— C) TO RECOMMEND APPROPRIATE MEASURES IN RESPONSE TO
VIOLATIONS OF THE EMBARGO IMPOSED BY PARAGRAPH 13 ABOVE
AND PROVIDE INFORMATION ON A REGULAR BASIS TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR GENERAL DISTRIBUTION TO MEMBER
STATES;
—
15. CALLS UPON ALL STATES, INCLUDING STATES NOT
MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS TO ACT STRICTLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
PROVISIONS OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION, NOTWITHSTANDING
THE EXISTENCE OF ANY RIGHTS OR OBLIGATIONS CONFERRED OR
IMPOSED BY ANY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT OR ANY CONTRACT
ENTERED INTO OR ANY LICENSE OR PERMIT GRANTED PRIOR TO
THE DATE OF THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION;
—
16. DECIDES THAT THE PROVISIONS SET FORTH IN
PARAGRAPHS 13 AND 15 ABOVE DO NOT APPLY TO ACTIVITIES
RELATED TO UNAMIR AND UNOMUR;
— 17. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO PROVIDE ALL
NECESSARY ASSISTANCE TO THE COMMITTEE AND TO MAKE THE
NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE SECRETARIAT FOR THIS
PURPOSE;
C
— 18. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO PRESENT A
REPORT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF
�CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
COMMITTED I N RWANDA DURING THE CONFLICT;
— 19. INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HIS SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE, I N COORDINATION WITH THE OAU AND
COUNTRIES I N THE REGION, TO CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS TO
ACHIEVE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT I N RWANDA WITHIN THE
FRAMEWORK OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT;
— 20. DECIDES TO KEEP THE SITUATION I N RWANDA UNDER
CONSTANT REVIEW AND REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO
REPORT FURTHER, INCLUDING ON THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION,
WITHIN FIVE WEEKS OF THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION AND
AGAIN I N GOOD TIME BEFORE THE EXPIRATION OF THE CURRENT
MANDATE OF UNAMIR;
— 21. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.
END TEXT.
10. US EOV, DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR KARL F. INDERFURTH,
FOLLOWS:
BEGIN TEXT OF EOV:
THE CRIES OF THE VICTIMS I N RWANDA HAVE BEEN HEARD,
CALLING UPON THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ACT. THE SHEER
MAGNITUDE OF THE HUMANITARIAN DISASTER I N THAT TRAGIC
COUNTRY DEMANDS ACTION. THIS COUNCIL HAS STRUGGLED TO
FORMULATE A RESPONSE THAT I S BOTH APPROPRIATE AND
C O N F I D E N T I A B SECTION 06 OF 06 USUN NEW YORK 00209 3
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J 3 ;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVES PHASED UNAMIR
EXPANSION
EFFECTIVE. TO DO SO WE WENT TO EXTRAORDINARY LENGTHS
TODAY FOR TWO REASONS:
FIRST—THE UNITED STATES WANTS THE UNITED NATIONS TO
SUCCEED I N RWANDA, AND ALL ITS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.
TO ENSURE ITS SUCCESS, WE WANT TO BRING THE ENDS AND
MEANS OF THE COUNCIL"S RESOLUTIONS INTO BALANCE.
SECOND—WE BELIEVE THAT THE GUIDELINES OUTLINED I N THIS
COUNCIL'S PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT OF MAY 3 ARE THE RIGHT
WAY TO EVALUATE THE VIABILITY OF A MISSION, AND WE WANT
TO MAKE SURE THAT, TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, WE FOLLOW
THAT PROCESS I N OUR DELIBERATIONS
THAT IS WHY I N THE NEXT REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL
ON RWANDA, I WOULD EXPECT THE FOLLOWING FACTORS TO BE
CLOSELY EXAMINED
- A WELL DEFINED CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
- AVAILABILITY OF RESOURCES
- CONSENT OF THE PARTIES
- PROGRESS TOWARDS A CEASEFIRE, AND
- THE DURATION OF THE MANDATE
WITH THIS RESOLUTION MY GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THE COUNCIL
HAS TAKEN THE RIGHT STEPS TO BEGIN TO BRING AID AND HOPE
TO THE INNOCENT VICTIMS. BUT WHATEVER EFFORTS THE
UNITED NATIONS MAY UNDERTAKE, THE TRUE KEY TO THE
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
PROBLEMS I N RWANDA I S I N THE HANDS OF THE RWANDESE
PEOPLE. THE KILLING MUST STOP, NOT ONLY BETWEEN ARMED
COMBATANTS BUT ESPECIALLY THE MASSACRES OF UNARMED
CIVILIANS WHICH ALREADY HAVE KILLED HUNDREDS OF
THOUSANDS. FURTHER, THE PARTIES MUST CONSENT TO
UNIMPEDED UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS PROVIDING
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO AND PROTECTION OF DISPLACED
PERSONS, AND REFUGEES.
IN THIS REGARD, MR. PRESIDENT, I T I S CRITICAL THAT ALL
PARTIES RESPECT ABSOLUTELY THE INVIOLABILITY OF UN
PERSONNEL AND PEACEKEEPERS. I F THE PARTIES CAN
DEMONSTRATE THEIR WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY TO MEET THESE
SIMPLE BUT VITAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ANY EFFECTIVE UNITED
NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATION, THAN THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY WILL BE WILLING AND ABLE TO HELP.
MR. PRESIDENT, THE SITUATION I N RWANDA IS HORRIFYING,
DIFFICULT AND STILL VERY MUCH I N FLUX. THE RESOLUTION
WE HAVE ADOPTED TODAY RECOGNIZES THE NECESSITY FOR BOTH
A RAPID AND CONTINUALLY REFINED RESPONSE TO BEST DEAL
WITH THE SITUATION I N THE COUNTRY. WE HOPE THE
COUNCIL'S ACTION WILL BE THE IMPETUS TO CONVINCE THE
PARTIES TO END THE BLOODSHED IMMEDIATELY. I F NOT, WE
WILL LOOK TO FURTHER REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON
HOW BEST TO CARRY OUT TODAY'S DECISION. I N THIS SPIRIT
OF HOPE MEASURED WITH CONCERN, THE UNITED STATES
SUPPORTS TODAY'S ACTIONS OF THE COUNCIL.
THANK YOU MR. PRESIDENT.
END TEXT OF EOV.
ALBRIGHT
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�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
18-May-1994 08:08 EDT
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
VAX_MAIL@OEOB
SCHWARTZ@Al@OEOB
RICE@Al@OEOB
DESHAZER@A1OOEOB
FROM:
SUBJECT:
White House S i t u a t i o n Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)
RWANDA CRISIS:
THE NEXT STEP
<DIST>
SIT: DESHAZER RICE SCHWARTZ VAX
<PREC>
IMMEDIATE
<CLAS>
CONFIDENTIAL
<OSRI>
RUEHDR
<DTG>
181143Z MAY 94
<ORIG>
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
<TO>
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 47 56
INFO RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE 170 3
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0105
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE 4580
RUEHLS/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA IMMEDIATE 0700
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0176
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE IMMEDIATE 0552
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 87 28
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 47 78
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 1325
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE 0426
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE 1136
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0280
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 1019
<SUBJ>
RWANDA CRISIS: THE NEXT STEP
<TEXT>
C O N F I D E N T I A L DAR ES SALAAM 003106
STATE FOR AF/C AND AF/E
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, PINS, RW, TZ
SUBJECT: RWANDA CRISIS: THE NEXT STEP
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
^
20\\- 03X>3 • I I
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP*
1. CONriDENTIAL — ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THE GOT PLANS ANOTHER EFFORT TO BRING ABOUT AN END
TO THE KILLING I N RWANDA. I T INTENDS TO CONVENE
ANOTHER ARUSHA SESSION MAY 27-29. HOWEVER, I N
ADDITION TO THE RPF AND GOR, I T HOPES TO BRING
TOGETHER THE REGIONAL PRESIDENTS (KENYA, UGANDA,
ZAIRE, ZAMBIA AND TANZANIA) AS WELL AS RWANDAN
MILITARY AND POLITICAL PARTY LEADERS, UN AND OAU KEY
OFFICIALS AND, OF COURSE, THE NEW BROADER "OBSERVER"
GROUP. (BURUNDI WILL BE INVOLVED BUT NOT, APPARENTLY,
I N THE PERSON OF ITS CHIEF OF STATE). FONMIN
RWEGASIRA DEPARTED TODAY FOR KAMPALA, KINSHASA, LUSAKA
AND NAIROBI TO COORDINATE THE INITIATIVE.
3. I N A DEPARTURE FROM PREVIOUS ARUSHA EFFORTS, I T I S
SIGNIFICANT THAT THE GOT I S BRINGING REPRESENTATIVES
FROM THE RWANDAN MILITARY AND POLITICAL PARTIES (MDR,
PL, ETC) AND OTHERS WITH A POTENTIAL ROLE I N A
LONG-TERM SOLUTION SUCH AS CHURCH LEADERS. THE
PRESENCE OF THE FIVE REGIONAL PRESIDENTS, ASSUMING
THAT MOBUTU SHOWS, WOULD ALSO HAVE A MAJOR IMPACT I N
MOVING THE RWANDAN ANTAGONISTS TO END THE VIOLENCE.
4. THE ARUSHA MEETING WILL HAVE FOUR BASIC OBJECTIVES:
A. ) THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE
B. ) A COMMITMENT FROM THE WARRING PARTIES TO STOP THE
KILLINGS AND MASSACRES
C. ) A COMMITMENT FROM ALL PARTIES TO IMPLEMENT THE
ARUSHA ACCORDS
D. ) THE SETTING UP OF INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION TO
INVESTIGATE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
5. COMMENT: THE GOT HAS ONCE AGAIN UNDERTAKEN TO
MOVE TO BRING AN END TO THE SENSELESS MAYHEM I N
RWANDA. THIS EFFORT I S MORE THAN JUST SUMMONING THE
RPF AND GOR TO SIGN A PIECE OF PAPER—AND HAS A FAR
GREATER CHANCE OF SUCCESS TO MOVE THE PROCESS FORWARD
THAN EARLIER ARUSHA MEETINGS THIS YEAR. BECAUSE OF
THIS POSSIBILITY, I T I S EMMINENTLY SENSIBLE THAT
AMBASSADOR DAVID RAWSON, WITH HIS UNIQUE BACKGROUND
AND INTIMATE INVOLVEMENT WITH ALL THE PLAYERS, ENGAGE
DIRECTLY ONCE AGAIN I N THE ARUSHA PROCESS AS THE U.S.
OBSERVER.
6. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
DEVOS
BT
#3106
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�OUTGOING TELEGRAM
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INITIAL
AUTH
CLEAR 1
3
4
b
7
ntrct
3 • Ji
DRAFT
2
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10:GUARD
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IO/UNP:SZELLE
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JCS:
PM/ISP:TGRANT
AF/C:KAISTON
OSD:
NSC:
AF, 10, INR, P, P
M
IMMEDIATE
USUN N W YORK
E
ROUTINE
SECDEF UASHDC, CJCS WASHDC
E.O. 123Sb:
TAGS:
MARR, PINS, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT:
REF:
DECL: O D
AR
RWANDA: UN REQUEST FOR APC DATA
UN REiJUEST OF 5/12/^4 TO USUN
1. -e»NHl>LNIlAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. USUN IS REflUESTED TO PROVIDE THE TALKING POINTS IN
PARA 3 BELOU TO THE UN SECRETARIAT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE•
THESE TALKING POINTS ARE IN RESPONSE TO THE REQUEST MADE
TO US BY THE UN EARLIER THIS M N H FOR PRICE AND
OT
AVAILABILITY DATA FOR THE SALE O LEASE OF 50 TRACKED
R
ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS {APCS} FOR UNAMIR TROOPS
AUTHORIZED UNDER UNSCR TIB FOR DEPLOYMENT TO R A D TO
WNA
ASSIST UITH HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS• THE USG TEAM OF EXPERTS
WILL BRING A MORE DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF OUR PRICE AND
AVAILABILITY DATA W E THEY MEET UITH THE SECRETARIAT O
HN
N
FRIDAY, MAY 27.
3.
BEGIN TALKING POINTS:
-- THE USG WANTS TO REMAIN SUPPORTIVE OF THE UN EFFORTS
IN RUANDA.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CONriDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
aovd 6 e i 0 2 i 0 9 f i
-ON
SE : P I r6 .
'58 -SO
(3M)
3XVXS JO J.N3NJ.aVd3a
�'CONriDENTIAL-
-- IT IS O R MILITARY JUDGMENT, HObJEVER, THAT F R THE
U
O
MISSION THAT THE U IS UNDERTAKING, IT UOULD BE BETTER
N
SERVED B USING UHEELED APCS.
Y
UHEELED VEHICLES ARE LESS EXPENSIVE T PURCHASE, UOULD
O
REDUCE THE COST O TRANSPORT, AND ARE LESS EXPENSIVE AND
F
EASIER T OPERATE AND MAINTAIN THAN TRACKED VEHICLES.
O
-- THEY ARE FASTER AND PROVIDE THE SAME LEVEL O
F
PROTECTION AGAINST THE LIGHTLY ARMED FORCES THAT THEY
UOULD ENCOUNTER IN RUANDA.
-- UITH UHEELED VEHICLES, THERE UOULD BE A DECREASE IN
THE NECESSARY TRAINING PERIOD F R THE GHANAIANS,
O
NIGERIANS, AND SENEGALESE, U O ARE ALL EXPERIENCED UITH
H
UHEELED APCS.
-- UHEELED VEHICLES, AS OPPOSED T TRACKED, UOULD ALSO
O
NOT DESTROY THE RUANDAN ROAD SYSTEM.
-- IF YOU DECIDE TO REQUEST THE UHEELED VEHICLES, THERE
ARE M N SOURCES. BESIDES THE COUNTRIES {AT LEAST 3b> U O
AY
H
USE UHEELED APCS, THERE ARE ALSO A NUMBER OF COMPANIES IN
THE UNITED STATES U O COULD PROVIDE THE APCS. THIS UOULD
H
PROBABLY COST SIGNIFICANTLY LESS THAN UHAT UE UOULD ASK
F R TRACKED APCS.
O
-- NEVERTHELESS, IF YOU REiJUEST TO PURCHASE THE 50
TRACKED APCS, UE ARE PROVIDING YOU UITH THE COST DATA
NECESSARY TO MAKE Y U DECISION.
OR
-- THE USG UOULD GREATLY PREFER T SELL THE APCS AS
O
OPPOSED T LEASING THEM T YOU.
O
O
-- FURTHERMORE, IF YOU ARE TO RECEIVE THE TRACKED APCS
F O THE USG, UE MUST INSIST THAT YOU PURCHASE, UP FRONT,
RM
THE SPARE PARTS PACKAGE NECESSARY T KEEP THE VEHICLES
O
RUNNING FOR THE MINIMUM OF THE TEN MONTHS THAT THE MISSION
IS EXPECTED TO TAKE.
AS YOU CAN SEE, PURCHASING THE 50 TRACKED APCS F O
RM
THE USG UILL COST ABOUT 20 MILLION US DOLLARS. THE COST
ESTIMATE INCLUDES NOT ONLY THE REQUIRED SPARE PARTS BUT
ALSO TRANSPORT AND TRAINING. THE PACKAGE UOULD COST LESS
IF YOU CONTRACT OUT O HAVE ANOTHER NATION PROVIDE THE
R
NECESSARY TRAINING AND TRANSPORT.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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UOULD COST APPROXIMATELY IS MILLION US DOLLARS F R TEN
O
MONTHS• THE SPARE PARTS PACKAGE IS A REQUIRED PURCHASE
REGARDLESS OF LEASE O PURCHASE.}
R
-- T PREPARE THE VEHICLES FOR USE B THE UN AND
O
Y
TRANSPORT THEM T RUANDA, IT UOULD TAKE THE USG A MINIMUM
O
O FIVE UEEKS F O UHEN UE SIGN AN AGREEMENT UITH YOU.
F
RM
THIS TIME FRAME DOES NOT INCLUDE TRAINING UHICH, AS UE
ALREADY SAID, UOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER F R TROOPS
O
UNFAMILIAR UITH TRACKED M113S. VV
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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�CONriDENTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: DESHAZER, RICE, SUET, VAX
PREC: PRIORITY
CLASS. OONriDCNTIAL
DTG:250631Z MAY 94
FM: AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4451
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0598
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0009
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0050
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0014
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 3204
RUEHPM/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY 5469
RUEHWUAMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 4239
RUHQHQB/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA/J5//
RUEHBN/AMCONSUL MELBOURNE 7379
RUEHDN/AMCONSUL SYDNEY 8113
ZEN/AMCONSUL BRISBANE
ZEN/AMCONSUL PERTH
INCOMPLETE MESSAGE
C-OK-E-t D E N T I A L CANBERRA 02866
E.O. 12356: DECLOADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, UN, RW, AS
SUBJECT: RWANDA PEACEKEEPING - AUSTRALIAN DEFMIN RAISES
MORE DOUBTS
REF: A) CANBERRA 2812, B) CANBERRA 2654, C) CANBERRA 2592
D) FBIS BK2405070894 (NOTAL)
1. (U) SUMMARY: AUSTRALIAN DEFMIN RAY TOLD A SENATE
COMMITTEE MAY 24 THAT THE GOA WILL NOT SEND TROOPS TO
RWANDA IF A U.N. PROPOSAL FOR THEIR DEPLOYMENT FAILS TO
ADDRESS KEY CRITERIA, NOTABLY THEIR SECURITY AND A CLEAR
MISSION AND TIMETABLE. UNDER CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES, RAY
SAID, SIGNS ARE NOT ENCOURAGING. END SUMMARY.
2. (U) SENATOR ROBERT RAY, MINISTER FOR DEFENSE, TOLD AN
AUSTRALIAN SENATE ESTIMATES COMMITTEE ON MAY 24 THAT
U.N. PROGRESS TOWARD MEETING PRECONDITIONS FOR A TROOP
DEPLOYMENT TO RWANDA WAS "NOT...VERY ENCOURAGING...."
IN PARTICULAR, RAY SAID, THE GOA IS STILL WAITING FOR
THE U.N. TO SET A CLEAR MISSION, DETAIL A TIMETABLE WITH
A COMPLETION DATE, AND ESTABLISH "POLITICAL PROCESSES
...FOR A POSSIBLE RESOLUTION" TO THE CONFLICT.
3. (U) THE DEFMIN ADDED THAT HE WANTED TO MAKE IT "VERY
CLEAR" THAT, OTHER REPORTS TO THE CONTRARY, THE GOA HAD
DECLASSIFIED
^
^ l
^
P
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONriDENTIAL'
R
^
E
5
2
^
�OONriDDJTIAL-
MADE NO COMMITMENT TO SEND TROOPS TO RWANDA. IN THAT
CONTEXT, HE SAID, SECURITY REMAINS CRUCIAL: "IF I
CANNOT BE ASSURED OF PROTECTING THEIR SECURITY, WE DO
NOT COMMIT."
4. (U) SEN. RAY SAID THAT THE U.N. HAD ASKED AUSTRALIA
TO CONTRIBUTE SOME 300 TROOPS, INCLUDING MOVEMENT CONTROL
OFFICERS, COMMUNICATORS, ENGINEERS, AND MEDICAL
PERSONNEL. THE DEFMIN PROJECTED THAT AN AUSTRALIAN
FORCE OF 180 ENGINEERS WOULD HAVE TO BE PROTECTED BY A
AN ACCOMPANYING RIFLE COMPANY.
5. (LOU) COMMENT: FOREIGN MINISTER GARETH EVANS HAS
ALWAYS PREDICATED A SYMPATHETIC RESPONSE (REFS A-C) ON
THE U.N. MOUNTING A MILITARILY ROBUST AND POLITICALLY
AMBITIOUS OPERATION - SOMETHING THE AUSSIES APPEAR TO
HAVE CONCLUDED THE U.N. IS INCAPABLE OF ACHIEVING AT
THIS TIME. IN THE DEFMIN'S WORDS, "THERE WERE PROBABLY
TWO BROAD PLANS PUT TO THE UNITED NATIONS AND THEY HAVE
CHOSEN A MIDDLE COURSE PROBABLY TAKING THE WORST ASPECTS
OF BOTH PLANS....THERE IS NO POINT GOING IN FOR
SUPPOSEDLY HUMANITARIAN REASONS AND THINKING YOU CAN DO
A BIT OF PEACE ENFORCEMENT ON THE SIDE. YOU CANNOT."
6. i t f THE AUSTRALIAN ARMED FORCES OPERATE UNDER
GUIDELINES THAT, ORDINARILY, NO MORE THAN 200 MEN SHOULD
BE DEPLOYED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AT ANY ONE TIME.
WITH AUSTRALIANS IN SOMALIA, MOZAMBIQUE, CYPRUS AND
ELSEWHERE, THIS LIMIT WOULD IMMEDIATELY BRING INTO DOUBT
AN OPERATION IN RWANDA OF THE SCALE REQUESTED BY THE
U.N. MORE IMPORTANTLY, WE UNDERSTAND THAT RAY'S MILITARY
EXPERTS HAVE ADVISED HIM THAT THE RWANDAN OPERATION IS
NOT SOUND AS CONFIGURED AND, AS SUCH, THE GOA SHOULD NOT
TAKE PART. PERKINS
BT
#2866
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< SSN>2866
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A
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FROM:
SITREPRT
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONriDENTIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: DESHAZER, RICE, VAX
PREC: PRIORITY
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
DTG:251225Z MAY 94
FM: AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4828
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 0116
RUEHSB/AMEMBASSY HARARE 6048
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0293
RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN 1232
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1334
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0270
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 4594
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 8737
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 4789
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 1168
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0116
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0437
RUEHTO/AMEMBASSY MAPUTO 6662
RUEHLS/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 0705
RUEHLG/AMEMBASSY LILONGWE 4522
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0006
G 0 N F I D E N T I A L DAR ES SALAAM 003285
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS:
PREL, PGOV. TZ. RW
SUBJECT: RWANDA CRISIS: HAZY NEXT STEP
REF: DAR ES SALAAM 3246
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. IN THE AMBASSADOR'S FAREWELL CALLS WITH PRESIDENT
MWINYI AND FOREIGN MINISTER RWEGASIRA, THE PRINCIPAL
SUBSTANCE OF CONVERSATION WAS RWANDA. BOTH MEN WERE
DISAPPOINTED AT THE RECENT TURN OF EVENTS, THE
CONTINUED WARFARE AND MASSACRES, AND THE PERSONALITY
CONFLICTS AMONG REGIONAL LEADERS. NEVERTHELESS, THEY
PLEDGED. TANZANIA WOULD PERSEVERE IN ITS EFFORTS TO
FORGE A LASTING PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.
3. THE LATEST TANZANIAN THINKING APPEARS TO BE THAT
WHATEVER EVOLVES ON THE GROUND MILITARILY IN RWANDA, A
CONTINUED NEED EXISTS TO ARRANGE A REGIONAL SUMMIT TO
BRING ABOUT CONDITIONS FOR A LASTING SOLUTION. BOTH
ZAIRE'S MOBUTU \
EO 13526 1.4d
r
_
THE730nS"READYTO"CEDETO"MOBUTU S
"REQUESTTHATTHE ZAIREAN PRESIDENT PRESIDE IN ZAIRE
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAL
low- ox\>3 - n
s / i y i r K6H
�CONFIDENTIAL
(KINSHASA, KISANGANI OR GBADOLITE, BUT DEFINITELY NOT
GOMA) OVFR THF SI IMMIT 7AMRIA'S HHII I IRA IS Al SO
ABOARD]
EO 13526 1.4d
| KENYA'S
MOI IS ALSO QUESTIONABLE. THE TANZANIAN LEADERS HAVE
ASKED THE U.S. TO APPLY ADDITIONAL PRESSURE
THEY HOPED THE SUMMIT COULD OCCUR JUNE 5, AND HAD
ENCOURAGED MOBUTU TO ISSUE THE INVITATIONS. THEY
THOUGHT MOI MIGHT AGREE, BUT DID NOT SEEM PARTICULARLY
CONCERNED IF HE DID NOT.
4. THE TANZANIAN LEADERS ACKNOWLEDGED THE AMBASSADOR'S
POINT THAT A SUMMIT WOULD NOT BY ITSELF STOP THE
MAYHEM, BUT THEY ARGUED THAT EVEN IF THE RPF WERE TO
DOMINATE MILITARILY IT COULD NOT GOVERN FOR LONG IF
THERE WERE NO REGIONAL UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT FOR
THE OUTCOME. OTHERWISE. EITHER MOBUTU'S AID FOR THE
GOF$
frA/OULD
SPOIL ANY ATTEMPTS
FOR LASTING PEACE.
5. IN A SHIFT OF POSITION, THE TANZANIANS ALSO
ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ALL OF THE ARUSHA ACCORD WAS NO
LONGER APPLICABLE, AND CERTAIN PARTS WOULD HAVE TO BE
RENEGOTIATED BASED ON THE UPHEAVALS IN RWANDA SINCE
APRIL 6. THIS RESPONSIBILITY TO NEGOTIATE A NEW
PACKAGE WOULD BE HANDED TO THE FACILITATOR (MWINYI) TO
ACCOMPLISH.
6. COMMENT: THE TANZANIANS UNDERSTAND THE FRAILTY OF
THE SUCCESS FOR THEIR QUEST FOR A RWANDA SETTLEMENT.
NEVERTHELESS, THEY ARE UNABLE TO INFLUENCE DIRECTLY
EVENTS ON THE GROUND. THUS LEAVING CEASE-FIRE FOR THE
MGJTHEIR BEST EFFORTS FORWARD
UN TO ARRANGE
TOWARDS REGIONAL
TO PUSH MOBUTL
COOPERATION.
7. BUJUMBURA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. DEVOS
BT
#3285
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CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAL
�CONriDENTIAL
CONElDENTtAlz
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP^
�DEPARTMENT Of b l A . t
OUTGOING TELEGRAM
INITIAL HERE S.l
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AUTH _
CLEAR 1
3
H
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7
DRAFT.
2.
: S
fl
CONFIDENTIAL
PM/ISP:AMARGULIES:AHM
05/30/^4 Xb?74h
SEISOAM 553
I0:GUARD
AF/C:RFENDRICK
PM:FC00K
OSD:VKERN
EUR/CE:CTRIBBLE
NSC:
IMMEDIATE
USUN NEU YORK
I0/PH0:DJENSEN
P: EBRIMMER
JCSlPBALTIMORE
S/S:
S/S-0
ROUTINE
CAIRO-. ACCRA, SECDEF UASHDC, JOINT STAFF UASHDC,
RUSNNOA/UNCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
E.O. 1235b:
TAGS:
DECL: OADR
PARM, PREL, MOPS, MASS, RU, 6H, EG
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR U TO ASK EGYPT TO PROVIDE APC
N
TRAINING FOR GHANAIAN REINFORCEMENTS TO UNAMIR
REF:
1.
{A> USUN NEU YORK 22bfi, {B> BONN
THIS I S AN ACTION REfiUEST•
2..
MISSION IS REQUESTED TO APPROACH APPROPRIATE UN
OFFICIALS AND SUGGEST THAT THE UNITED NATIONS ASK EGYPT TO
PROVIDE OPERATIONAL AND MAINTENANCE TRAINING O - O D O
N CS R
JCS FILL IN THE NAME/NUMBER OF APC IN dUESTION> TRACKED
ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS {APC'Sl TO GHANAIAN FORCES
PRIOR TO THE LATTER'S DEPLOYMENT TO UNAMIR IN RUANDA.
3.
THE POSSIBILITY SUCH TRAINING OF GHANAIANS IN
EGYPT UAS FIRST RAISED O THE MARGINS OF MAY 2b
N
DISCUSSIONS O RUANDA UITH UN OFFICIALS -CREFTEL>.
N
TRAINING IN EGYPT UOULD BE PREFERABLE DUE TO ITS RELATIVE
PROXIMITY TO RUANDA', EflYPT'S EXPERIENCE OPERATING AND
MAINTAINING SIMILAR APC'S; AND EGYPT'S STATUS AS A LEADING
MEMBER OF THE OAU. I
FO 13526 1.4ri
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. 0. 13526
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CONFIDCNTIAL
SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS ARE PROVIDED
TKTPTRAGRAPH 3.
3. {U> BEGIN SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS:
AT THE M Y Eb MEETING O R A D BETWEEN A U.S.
A
N UNA
INTERAGENCY TEAM A D U OFFICIALS-, UE DISCUSSED OPTIONS
N N
FOR PROVIDING OPERATIONAL A D MAINTENANCE TRAINING O
N
N
ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIES FOR GHANAIAN TROOPS SERVING UITH
UNAMIR.
AS YOU KNOU, UE ESTIMATE IT COULD TAKE F O S-b UEEKS
RM
TO IDENTIFY, REFURBISH A D SHIP THE APCS T RUANDA ONCE A
N
O
SALE O LEASE AGREEMENT IS SIGNED.
R
UHILE UE UILL TRY T ACCELERATE THIS DELIVERY
O
SCHEDULE, THE FACT REMAINS THAT THERE UILL BE A
SIGNIFICANT DELAY IN DEPLOYMENT OF THE APCS T UNAMIR.
O
IN ORDER T MINIMIZE THE EFFECT THIS DELAY HAS O
O
N
UNAMIR'S MILITARY CAPABILITIES, IT IS VITAL THAT THE
GHANAIAN TROOPS RECEIVE THE REQUISITE OPEATIONAL A D
N
MAINTENANCE TRAINING N U S THAT THEY CAN USE THE APCS AS
O O
S O AS THEY ARRIVE IN R A D .
ON
UNA
O R ESTIMATE IS THAT OPERATIONAL TRAINING UILL TAKE
U
7-10 DAYS, A D MAINTENANCE TRAINING UILL TAKE 25-30 DAYS.
N
-- UE SUGGEST THAT THE UNITED NATIONS CONTACT THE
GOVERNMENT OF EflYPT A D REQUEST THAT THE LATTER PROVIDE
N
THIS TRAINING T THE GHANAIAN TROOPS.O
-- EGYPT IS THE PREFERABLE TRAINING VENUE BECAUSE OF ITS
RELATIVE PROXIMITY T BOTH G A A A D RUANDA A D ITS
O
HN N
N
EXPERIENCE IN OPERATING A D MAINTAINING THE
N
APC
-- IN ADDITION, EGYPT IS O E OF THE LARGEST MEMBERS OF
N
THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, A D IT IS IMPORTANT
N
THAT AFRICAN NATIONS TAKE THE LEAD IN DEALING UITH THE
RUANDA CRISIS.
CONFIDCNTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP*
�'
DEPARtMENT
OF
STATC
vfuj
ua. o..
y4
u j . u a
.-VJ.
I4OUI<:U30O
r^uc
CONFIDCNTIAL
-- UE ARE PREPARED T MAKE A FOLLOU-UP DEMARCHE T EGYPT
O
O
IN SUPPORT OF A U REQUEST, IF YOU THINK THAT THIS (JOULD
N
BE HELPFUL.
END SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS. VV
CONFIDCNTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DTG:
311502Z M * 94
A
FROM:
F A E 8 S Y NAIROBI
M M KA S
OOCNO:
1
NAIROBI 0955*
BODY:
TAGS: EAID, MASS, PGOV, RW, KE, PHUM, M P
OS
CCMBIHE: COMPLETE
SUBJ: U AHIR C M A D R DALLAIRE PLEADS FOR IMMEDIATE US
N
O MNE
HILIMM SUPPORT IN MEETING WITH AID ADMINISTRATOR A W O
T OD
1. S H A ': IN A M Y 31 MEETING WITH AID ADMINISTRATOR
U M Rf
A
AW O A D MEMBERS OF HIS DELEGATION, UNAMIR C M A D R
T OD N
O MNE
DflLUTRE REQUESTED GREATER U.S. SUPPORT FOR HIS
PEACEXEEPIHG OPERATION IN THE FORM OF IMMEDI'ATE'
E UP E T A D AIRLIFT SUPPORT. HE CAUTIONED THAT
Q IM H M
REBUILDING RWANDA W S N T A "SHORT-TERM CRUSADE" BUT
A O
T A T KN ACTION N W CAN HELP STABILIZE THE SITUATION
HT A IG
O
A D P E E T EVEN FURTHER DETERIORATION A D LOSS OF
N RVN
N
LIFE, nffi fiPC rOflTTNHTNn TQ MAKE PROGRESS O THE
N
JATTLEEISLD. HAS N INCLINATION TO AGREE TO A
O
CEASEFIRE. DALLAIRE DOESN'T THINK KENYA PRESIDENT MOI'S
RECEMTLI A N U C D PEACE INITIATIVE WILL G ANYWHERE.
NONE
O
HE REJECTED THE TDEfl DF "SflPE HAWBMS" O A THAPTRR SEVEN
R
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
JLH. OPERATION.
END S M A Y
U MR
2. O H Y 31, AID ADMINISTRATOR BRIAN A W O MET WITH
N A
T OD
U A I C M A D R MAJOR-GENERAL DALLAIRE AT THE LATTER*S
N MR O M N E
U G N REQUEST IN THE VIP LOUNGE OF THE NAIROBI AIRPORT
RET
T DISCUSS THE MILITARY A D HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN
O
N
RWANDA. DALLAIRE, W O HAS C M A D D THE UNAMIR
H
O MNE
C N I G N IN RWANDA SINCE JUST AFTER THE APRIL 6
O TN E T
N
A
ASSASSINATION OF THE RWANDA A D BURUNDI PRESIDENTS, W S
T R T R T RWANDA IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE MEETING.
O EU N O
AW O W S ACCOMPANIED BY AF/E DIRECTOR SHINN, JFDA
T OD A
DR C O BORTON, NSC REPRESENTATIVE M C DESHAZER, CHARGE
IETR
A
S U H I K ACTING KUSLO CHIEF HAYES, A D POLOFF CASSIDY.
O T WC .
N
DALLAIRE CALLS FOR US ACTION
3. DALLAIRE MADE CLEAR THROUGHOUT THE MEETING HIS
DESIRE F R A GREATER U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN RWANDA A D HIS
O
N
F U T A I N WITH THE SLOW PACE OF AMERICAN
R S R TO
DECISION-MAKING. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE U.S.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
Paee 1
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
MW W R E UNDER "DOCUMENT 25" IN ASSIGNING PEACEKEEPING
O O KD
FORCES T THE UNITED NATIONS, BUT THAT THERE W S N
O
A O
SUBSTITUTE FOR U.S. LOGISTICAL CAPACITY OR DOMINANCE IN
THE SECURITY COUNCIL. DALLAIRE W S PLEASED WITH HIS
A
G A AA TROOPS, W O H D PREVIOUSLY SERVED IN (AND BEEN
HNIN
H A
F R E T FIGHT THEIR W Y INTO) LIBERIA. TROOP
OCD O
A
CONTRIBUTIONS FROM SENEGAL, BANGLADESH OR ZIMBABWE W U D
OL
BE HELPFUL BUT DALLAIRE W R E THAT HE W U D NOT ACCEPT
AND
OL
T O P WT O T PROPER EQUIPMENT. HE URGED THAT THE USG
R OS I H U
PROVIDE EQUIPMENT OR AT LEAST AIRLIFT CAPABILITY TO THE
MW FORCE.
E
SPECIFIC REQUESTS
4. DALLAIRE SAID THAT INTERNATIONAL TROOPS W U D BE
OL
N E E T IMPLEMENT AND MONITOR AN EVENTUAL CEASEFIRE,
EDD O
W I H MG T HAPPEN W E THE RPF "RAN OUT OF STEAM."
HC
IH
HN
T O P W UD ALSO BE NEEDED IN CONJUNCTION WITH A
R O S OL
H M NT RA RELIEF EFFORT. THE INCREASED VOLUME OF
U A IA I N
R A D N IN GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED AREAS, PARTICULARLY IN
WNAS
THE S U H ET AREA OF THE COUNTRY, W U D INCREASE
O T WS
OL
C M E I I N FOR RELIEF FOOD A D POSSIBLY IGNITE MORE
O P TTO
N
M S A R S O A MASSIVE SCALE. INTERNATIONAL TROOPS
AS C E N
W UD H V T W R WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES TO ENSURE
OL A E O O K
PEACE A DISTRIBUTION CENTERS. DALLAIRE SAID THAT THE
T
RED C O S IS THE ONLY N O IN CONTROL OF ITS DISTRIBUTION
RS
G
S S E ALL THE W Y TO THE RECIPIENTS, A D RELATED A
YT M
A
N
S O Y W E E ANOTHER N O LEFT 4000 GALLONS OF DIESEL
T R HR
G
FUEL, WT OBVIOUS MILITARY APPLICATIONS, UNSUPERVISED.
IH
5.
^
^
C
nflnarRE HAS REQUESTED 5500 TROOPS AS HIS.^MINItiyM
fljHiim HIJMiffP
^
v
UMWV VUU U'MUPP UYiT RE COMPRISED
A W Y B E WELCOMED BY BOTH SIDES IN RWANDA.
L AS E N
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
THE CANADIAN
GOVERNMENT IS CONTEMPLATING SENDING A COMMUNICATIONS
UNIT. DALLAIRE ALSO CAUTIONED AGAINST USING "LOCAL"
T O P LIKE KENYANS A D ETHIOPIANS, W O E COUNTRIES
R OS
N
HS
C
W UD LIKELY BE INVOLVED IN A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. HE
OL
W S PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE USE OF ETHIOPIAN
A
TROOPS, WO ARE NILOTIC LIKE THE TUTSIS. HE PREDICTED
H
H W UD N T HAVE TROOPS IN RWANDA FOR T O MONTHS,
E OL O
W
i v
P R L D E T USG "STALLING."
ATY U O
_j '-^
I '
6. DALLAIRE REJECTED THE IDEA OF "SAFE H^ENS" GIVEN
RWANDA'S HIXED-UP ETHNIC MAP, SAYING THAT "SffLT THfi BAD
G Y - T O E INVOLVED IN CIVILIAN MASSACRES — COULD
US
HS
I
v
umimuHUiini
*
Paee 2
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
R A H S C HAVENS, JUST AS M N RESPONSIBLE FOR CIVILIAN
EC U H
AY
M S A R S EARLY IN THE FIGHTING FLED TO TANZANIA W E
AS C E
HN
T E RPF A V N E SOUTHWARD TOWARDS RUSUMU. IN RESPONSE
H
DACD
TO A AW O QUESTION ABOUT TERMS OF REFERENCE, DALLAIRE
N T OD
SAID T A A U CHAPTER SEVEN "PEACEMAKING" PROVISION
HT
N
W UD N T BE NECESSARY. A CHAPTER SIX OPERATION W U D
OL O
OL
A T O I E TROOPS TO DEFEND THEMSELVES A D U
U H RZ
N
N
INSTALLATIONS LIKE CAMPS FOR THE DISPLACED. THE
PROVISION O "CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY" COULD BE USED TO
N
H L GAIN ACCESS TO AREAS CUT OFF BY ROADBLOCKS.
EP
DALLAIRE RELATED H W EVEN N W HIS RECONNAISSANCE UNITS
O
O
H V TRAVELED WIDELY THROUGHOUT RWANDA, IN ONE INSTANCE
AE
M VN SUCCESSFULLY THROUGH 13 GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED
OIG
R A B O K O THE ROAD FROM BUTARE TO CYANGUGU.
O DL C S N
REFUGEES A D DISPLACED
N
7. DALLAIRE SAID THAT W E THE FIGHTING STARTED IN
HN
EARLY APRIL, THERE WERE ALREADY 273,000 REFUGEES IN
S U H R RWANDA (MAINLY HUTUS FROM BURUNDI) A D 500,000
OTEN
N
DISPLACED B THE LAST W R STILL IN NORTHERN RWANDA SOUTH
Y
A
O T E D Z TENSION HAD BEEN RISING DUE TO BAD CROP
F H M.
CONDITIONS A D THE COMPETITION FOR RELIEF SUPPLIES. j A _
N
M J R P O L M N W IS THE W V OF DISPLACED HUTUS FLEEING
AO R B E O
AE
^ T H E RPF ADVANCE, pgouftPfl A<! MAMV
1flfT.t.TOMACCORDING
V.Jjn iwmwr. CAUSEtPTN LARGE PART BY A GOVERNMENT
P OA A D CAMPAIGN WHICH W R S HUTUS THAT THEY WILL BE
R PGNA
AN
S A G T R D BY THE RPF, A D BY WIDELY HELD HUTU VIEWS OF
L U HE E
N
^ T E SUPERIOR QUALITIES OF TUTSIS.
H
8. T E 3 MILLION PEOPLE W O LIVE IN GOVERNMENTH
H
C N R L E SOUTHWEST RWANDA ARE BEING "SQUEEZED" BY THE
O T OLD
RPF A V N E ASKED BY A W O WHETHER THESE DISPLACED
DAC.
T OD
C U D SPILL OVER INTO BURUNDI O ZAIRE, DALLAIRE
OL
R
A MT E T A IT W S A POSSIBILITY BUT THAT A RIVER
D ITD H T
A
P E E T D EASY ENTRY INTO BURUNDI. A D A LARGE FOREST
RVNE
N
B R E T E WY INTO ZAIRE."
A RD H A
^5%
it
MILITARY FORCE STRUCTURE
9. SINCE B T SIDES ARE STILL RECRUITING A D THE
OH
N
G V R M N TROOPS IN PARTICULAR HAVE EXPERIENCED
OEN ET
DESERTIONS. IT IS DIFFICULT TO MAKES ESTIMATES OF TROOP
STRENGTH. GIVEN THAT CAVEAT, DALLAIRE THINKS THAT THE
RPF K Y NW HAVE 30,000 TO 35,000 TROOPS IN THE FIELD,
A O
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
WT ITS BEST SOLDIERS AT THE FRONT. IN CONTRAST, THE
IH
G V R H N A D ALLIED FORCES HAVE SOME 34,000 TROOPS,
OEH ET N
T O G S M OF THESE ARE RECENT RECRUITS ONLY GIVEN T O
HUH O E
W
W E S TRAINING PRIOR TO BEING T R W INTO BATTLE.
EK
HO N
DALLAIRE BELIEVES BIZIMUNGU, THE CURRENT RWANDA A M
R Y
CHIEF O STAFF, IS BECOMING MORE MODERATE AS THE RPF
F
A V N E , A D IS PROVIDING THE GITARAMA-BASED INTERIM
DACS N
G V R M N WITH SOME BADLY-NEEDED HONEST INFORMATION
OEN ET
F O T E BATTLEFIELD. THE HUTU MILITIAS A D
RM H
N
SELF-DEFENSE FORCES ARE STILL "OUT OF CONTROL" IN M N
AY
A E S B T A E PART OF THE GOVERNMENT DEFENSE PLAN A D
RA U R
N
A E C U T D ALONG WITH GOVERNMENT REGULARS, AS IS THE
R O NE
6 0 - A GENDARMERIE, WHICH DALLAIRE THINKS IS A
0 0M N
S MW A DIFFERENT KIND OF FORCE SINCE IT ORIGINALLY
O E HT
I C U E M N TUTSI.
N L D D AY
(o ^
pN
r>t>^
T E R FU A D CONNECTION
H P- G N A
10. U A I CONTINUES TO MONITOR THE U A D BORDER BY
N MR
GNA
HELICOPTER FOR EVIDENCE THAT THE RPF IS RECEIVING
SUPPLIES F O UGANDA. SO FAR, THERE HAS BEEN N SIGN OF
RM
O
SIGNIFICANT A M OR MATERIEL SHIPMENTS ACROSS THE
R S
B R E . DALLAIRE ADMITTED THAT MUSSEVENI W N S THE RPF
ODR
AT
O T O U A D SINCE THEY ARE A POLITICAL PROBLEM FOR
U F GNA
HIM, B T W S DOUBTFUL THAT THE U A D GOVERNMENT W S
U A
GNA
A
PROVISIONING RPF TROOPS IN A Y SIGNIFICANT WAY. WHILE
N
RPF CERTAINLY HAS SYMPATHIZERS IN THE U A D MILITARY
GNA
A D U A I HAS SEEN INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS CROSSING THE
N K MR
B R E O A OCCASIONAL TRUCK OF SUPPLIES, THERE IS N
O DR R N
O
EVIDENCE O SUBSTANTIAL CROSS-BORDER SHIPMENTS.
F
11. DALLAIRE THINKS THAT THE RPF GETS M C OF ITS
UH
MATERIEL F O FLEEING GOVERNMENT TROOPS. ASKED BY
RM
A B SA O SHINN WHETHER UNAMIR W S ABLE TO TRACK
M AS D R
A
S I M N S F O UGANDA, DALLAIRE SAID THAT UNAMIR
HP E T R M
HELICOPTERS W U D NOTICE SIGNIFICANT SHIPMENTS, AS THEY
OL
H D PRIOR T THE WAR. DALLAIRE COULD N T SAY WHETHER
A
O
O
T E RPF W S GETTING WEAPONS FROM THE BURUNDIAN
H
A
MILITARY. ASKED WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT W S GETTING
A
MATERIEL F O ABROAD, DALLAIRE CONFIRMED THAT THE
RM
G V R M N TROOPS WERE VERY SHORT OF AMMUNITION BUT
OEN ET
C U D N T S Y WHETHER THEY RECEIVED A Y SHIPMENTS FROM
OL O A
N
OUTSIDE.
BATTLEFIELD ACTIVITY
12. T E RPF HAVE SO FAR M N G D TO TAKE THE EASTERN
H
AAE
H L O T E COUNTRY INCLUDING HALF OF THE CAPITAL CITY,
AF F H
ftftNEinciUTiAL
Paee 4
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP*
T E ENTIRE TANZANIAN BORDER A D MOST OF THE COUNTRY'S
H
N
B R E S WT U A D A D BURUNDI. RWANDA GOVERNMENT
O D R IH G N A N
FORCES m ALLIED MILITIAS MAINTAIN SOME CONTROL OVER
O H R PARTS. THE RPF IS PUTTING FURTHER PRESSURE ON
TE
G V R M N A D ALLlfF FORCES FROM THE EAST IN KIGALI A D
OEN ET N
N
F O T E S U H IN GITARAMA.
RM H O T
THE RPF HAS JUST CUT THE
M I R A BETWEEN GITARAMA A D BUTARE. THERE ARE STILL
AN O D
N
S R N POCKETS OF GOVERNMENT SUPPORT, PARTICULARLY
TOG
A O N GISENYI A D RUHENGERI IN THE NORTHWEST A D IN THE
R UD
N
N
C A G G A E OF SOUTHWEST RWANDA. THESE AREAS,
YN U U RA
A C R I G T DALLAIRE, CONTAIN SOME OF THE MOST
C O DN O
EXTREMIST HUTU FORCES, WHILE M R MODERATE HUTUS CONTROL
OE
T E R GO A O N BUTARE TO THE BURUNDI BORDER.
H EIN RUD
13. DALLAIRE STRESSED THAT THE FIGHT FOR KIGALI W S NOT
A
OVER, SINCE THE HEART OF D W T W A D SIGNIFICANT
O NO N N
P C E S W R HELD BY GOVERNMENT FORCES A D HUTU MILITIAS
O K T EE
N
C N R L E TRACTS OF THE CITY'S SOUTHWEST. THE ONLY
O T OLD
PLACE A T U E APPEARED TO APPLY W S ALONG THE ROAD
RC
A
T R U H KIGALI. THE RPF ASSAULT THREATENING THE MAIN
HOG
R A B T E N KIGALI A D GITARAMA W S A WORRY, DALLAIRE
OD EWE
N
A
SAID; C T OFF FROM THEIR LINE OF ESCAPE TO THE CAPITAL
U
O T E INTERIM GOVERNMENT IN GITARAMA, SURROUNDED
F H
G V R M N A D MILITIA TROOPS MIGHT DECIDE TO FIGHT TO
OEN ET N
T E LAST IN THE CITY.
H
ATROCITIES A D RPF REPRISALS
N
14. RPF LEADER KAGEME TOLD DALLAIRE THAT HE W N S TO
AT
GET T O E RESPONSIBLE FOR ATROCITIES "IN HIS SIGHTS OR
HS
IN C U T ACCORDING TO DALLAIRE. THE SOUTHERN RWANDA
OR"
T W O B T R IS A G O EXAMPLE, SAID DALLAIRE. THE
O N F UAE
OD
A E W S LARGELY QUIET UNTIL THE GOVERNMENT CHANGED THE
RA A
L C L C M A D R AFTER WHICH UNAMIR STARTED RECEIVING
O A O MNE,
R P R S O MASSACRES. DALLAIRE CAUTIONED THAT THE RPF
EO T F
W R N T SAINTS BUT WERE M R "SMOOTH" THAN THE
EE O
OE
G V R M N . A O G M N FOREIGNERS THERE IS A BIT OF
OEN ET MN
AY
NAIVETE A O T THE RPF, DALLAIRE SAID, A D M N NGO'S
BU
N
AY
MG T BE ACCUSED OF ASSISTING THEM. THE RPF EVEN BLOCKS
IH
HIS RECONNAISANCE TROOPS ON OCCASION, A D ADMITS FRANKLY
N
ITS POLICY OF EXECUTING THOSE IT SAYS ARE RESPONSIBLE
F R ATROCITIES, WHICH DALLAIRE CALLED "TRIAGE."
O
C A C S F R A CEASEFIRE
HNE O
15. T E G V R M N SIDE HAS W N E A CEASEFIRE SINCE
H OEN ET
ATD
APRIL 15 B T THE RPF IS MAKING TOO M C PROGRESS ON THE
U
UH
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
BATTLEFIELD HOW. NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE AT THE STAFF
LEVEL (DALLAIRE SAID THE LAST SESSION W S M Y 30) BUT
A A
T E RPF CONTINUES TO D M N PROOF OF PROGRESS ON THREE
H
E AD
FRONTS-- A END TO THE MASSACRES OF CIVILIANS, AN END
N
10 INCITEFUL GOVERNMENT RADIO BROADCASTS, AND THE FREE
H V H N O DISPLACED CIVILIANS ACROSS BATTLE LINES.
OE ET F
PRESSED O THE POINT BY SHINN, DALLAIRE ADMITTED THAT
N
T E RPF H D LITTLE INCENTIVE TO AGREE TO A CEASEFIRE
H
A
NW
O.
-
16. T E UPCOMING JUNE 6 MEETING OF REGIONAL AFRICAN
H
LEADERS IN NAIROBI CALLED BY PRESIDENT MOI WILL ONLY
RESULT IN "POSTURING" ACCORDING TO DALLAIRE (NOTE:
PRESIDENT M I TOLD A W O DELEGATION EARLIER M Y 31 THAT
O
T OD
A
S F R H H D NOT/NOT RECEIVED CONFIRMATION THAT M B T
O A E A
OUU
W UD ATTEND). THE GOVERNMENT IS CONTROLLED BY HUTU
OL
EXTREMISTS A D REJECTS RPF CONTROL OF 50 PERCENT OF THE
N
C U T Y THE RPF FIGHTS ON, REFUSING TO TALK WITH THE
O NR .
INTERIM GOVERNMENT. FOR GENUINE PEACE TALKS TO OCCUR,
DALLAIRE OPINED, A N W GROUP OF HUTU MODERATES MUST
E
E E G F O THE REMAINING HUTU CIVILIAN MODERATES ( O
MR E R M
NW
M S L A R A IN PARIS O BRUSSELS), A D HUTU MODERATES
OT Y B O D
R
N
IN T E MILITARY. IN PRIVATE, DALLAIRE W S TOLD THAT THE
H
A
C U T YS CATHOLIC BISHOPS MIGHT BE WILLING TO CALL FOR
ONR'
T E INTERIM GOVERNMENT TO STEP D W , BUT HE CAUTIONED US
H
O N
T KEEP T A INFORMATION CONFIDENTIAL (PLEASE PROTECT).
O
HT
17. W E ASKED BY SHINN FOR HIS B T O LINE MESSAGE TO
HN
OT M
T E USG, DALLAIRE REPLIED "SEND THE EQUIPMENT TO PUT THE
H
PEACEKEEPING TROOPS ON THE G O N LAST (SIC) WEEK."
RUD
WT O T U EQUIPMENT, UNAMIR CAN D VIRTUALLY NOTHING.
IH U S
O
U A I A S NEEDS STRATEGIC LIFT F O THE U.S.
N M LO
R
RM
S UH IK
O T WC H
SUBJECT:
SUBJ: U A I C M A D R DALLAIRE PLEADS FOR IMMEDIATE US
N MR O M N E
MILITARY SUPPORT IN MEETING WITH AID ADMINISTRATOR A W O
T OD
�r
«
1
CONFIDENTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: SIT, DESHAZER, NSC, RICE. SUM, SUM2, TT1, VAX
PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
DTG:311502Z MAY 94
FM: AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9795
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 2492
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 1355
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 1561
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0452
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1519
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0931
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 2218
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0119
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 0028
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0442
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC 1590
RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0443
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0788
G O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 NAIROBI 09554
C O R R E C T E D COPY (ADDRESSEES AND PASSING INSTR. ADDED)
ROME AND GENEVA FOR AID AMINSTRATOR ATWOOD AND AF/E DIRECTOR SHINN
LONDON FOR MCKINLEY
PARIS FOR PERLOW
E.O. 12356: DECLOADR
TAGS: EAID, MASS. PGOV, RW. KE, PHUM, MOPS
SUBJ: UNAMIR COMMANDER DALLAIRE PLEADS FOR IMMEDIATE US
MILITARY SUPPORT IN MEETING WITH AID ADMINISTRATOR ATWOOD
1. SUMMARY: IN A MAY 31 MEETING WITH AID ADMINISTRATOR
ATWOOD AND MEMBERS OF HIS DELEGATION, UNAMIR COMMANDER
DALLAIRE REQUESTED GREATER U.S. SUPPORT FOR HIS
PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN THE FORM OF IMMEDIATE
EQUIPMENT AND AIRLIFT SUPPORT. HE CAUTIONED THAT
REBUILDING RWANDA WAS NOT A "SHORT-TERM CRUSADE" BUT
THAT TAKING ACTION NOW CAN HELP STABILIZE THE SITUATION
AND PREVENT EVEN FURTHER DETERIORATION AND LOSS OF
LIFE. THE RPF, CONTINUING TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THE
BATTLEFIELD, HAS NO INCLINATION TO AGREE TO A
CEASEFIRE. DALLAIRE DOESN'T THINK KENYA PRESIDENT MOI'S
RECENTLY ANNOUNCED PEACE INITIATIVE WILL GO ANYWHERE.
HE REJECTED THE IDEA OF "SAFE HAVENS" OR A CHAPTER SEVEN
U.N. OPERATION.
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
END SUMMARY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
c N Dm L
oRc w
aon-MAVH
8/1
15" KBH
�CONFIDENTIAL
2. ON MAY 31, AID ADMINISTRATOR BRIAN ATWOOD MET WITH
UNAMIR COMMANDER MAJOR-GENERAL DALLAIRE AT THE LATTER'S
URGENT REQUEST IN THE VIP LOUNGE OF THE NAIROBI AIRPORT
TO DISCUSS THE MILITARY AND HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN
RWANDA. DALLAIRE, WHO HAS COMMANDED THE UNAMIR
CONTINGENT IN RWANDA SINCE JUST AFTER THE APRIL 6
ASSASSINATION OF THE RWANDA AND BURUNDI PRESIDENTS, WAS
TO RETURN TO RWANDA IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE MEETING.
ATWOOD WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AF/E DIRECTOR SHINN. OFDA
DIRECTOR BORTON, NSC REPRESENTATIVE MAC DESHAZER, CHARGE
SOUTHWICK, ACTING KUSLO CHIEF HAYES. AND POLOFF CASSIDY.
DALLAIRE CALLS FOR US ACTION
3. DALLAIRE MADE CLEAR THROUGHOUT THE MEETING HIS
DESIRE FOR A GREATER U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN RWANDA AND HIS
FRUSTRATION WITH THE SLOW PACE OF AMERICAN
DECISION-MAKING. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE U.S.
NOW WORKED UNDER "DOCUMENT 25" IN ASSIGNING PEACEKEEPING
FORCES TO THE UNITED NATIONS, BUT THAT THERE WAS NO
SUBSTITUTE FOR U.S. LOGISTICAL CAPACITY OR DOMINANCE IN
THE SECURITY COUNCIL. DALLAIRE WAS PLEASED WITH HIS
GHANAIAN TROOPS. WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY SERVED IN (AND BEEN
FORCED TO FIGHT THEIR WAY INTO) LIBERIA. TROOP
CONTRIBUTIONS FROM SENEGAL, BANGLADESH OR ZIMBABWE WOULD
BE HELPFUL BUT DALLAIRE WARNED THAT HE WOULD NOT ACCEPT
TROOPS WITHOUT PROPER EQUIPMENT. HE URGED THAT THE USG
PROVIDE EQUIPMENT OR AT LEAST AIRLIFT CAPABILITY TO THE
NEW FORCE.
SPECIFIC REQUESTS
4. DALLAIRE SAID THAT INTERNATIONAL TROOPS WOULD BE
NEEDED TO IMPLEMENT AND MONITOR AN EVENTUAL CEASEFIRE,
WHICH MIGHT HAPPEN WHEN THE RPF "RAN OUT OF STEAM."
TROOPS WOULD ALSO BE NEEDED IN CONJUNCTION WITH A
HUMANITARIAN RELIEF EFFORT. THE INCREASED VOLUME OF
RWANDANS IN GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED AREAS. PARTICULARLY IN
THE SOUTHWEST AREA OF THE COUNTRY. WOULD INCREASE
COMPETITION FOR RELIEF FOOD AND POSSIBLY IGNITE MORE
MASSACRES ON A MASSIVE SCALE. INTERNATIONAL TROOPS
WOULD HAVE TO WORK WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES TO ENSURE
PEACE AT DISTRIBUTION CENTERS.
DALLAIRE SAIDTCXXCQGQFIQHE ONLY NGO IN CONTROL
OF ITS DISTRIBUTION
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 05 NAIROBI 09554
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LONDON FOR MCKINLEY
PARIS FOR PERLOW
E.0.12356: DECLOADR
TAGS: EAID. MASS. PGOV. RW, KE, PHUM. MOPS
SUBJ: UNAMIR COMMANDER DALLAIRE PLEADS FOR IMMEDIATE US
MILITARY SUPPORT IN MEETING WITH AID ADMINISTRATOR ATWOOD
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CONFIDENTIAL
SYSTEM ALL THE WAY TO THE RECIPIENTS, AND RELATED A
STORY WHERE ANOTHER NGO LEFT 4000 GALLONS OF DIESEL
FUEL, WITH OBVIOUS MILITARY APPLICATIONS, UNSUPERVISED.
5. DALLAIRE HAS REQUESTED 5500 TROOPS AS HIS "MINIMUM
VIABLE" NUMBER. HE HOPES THE FORCE WILL BE COMPRISED
PRIMARILY OF AFRICANS BUT SAID NORTH AMERICANS HAVE
ALWAYS BEEN WELCOMED BY BOTH SIDES IN RWANDA.
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
THE CANADIAN
GOVERNMENT IS CONTEMPLATING SENDING A COMMUNICATIONS
UNIT. D A L L A I R E A L S O C A U T I O N E D A G A I N S T U S I N G " L O C A L "
TROOPS LIKE KENYANS AND ETHIOPIANS, WHOSE COUNTRIES
WOULD LIKELY BE INVOLVED IN A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. HE
WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE USE OF ETHIOPIAN
TROOPS, WHO ARE NILOTIC LIKE THE TUTSIS. HE PREDICTED
HE WOULD NOT HAVE TROOPS IN RWANDA FOR TWO MONTHS,
PARTLY DUE TO USG "STALLING."
6. DALLAIRE REJECTED THE IDEA OF "SAFE HAVENS" GIVEN
RWANDA'S MIXED-UP ETHNIC MAP, SAYING THAT ONLY THE BAD
GUYS - THOSE INVOLVED IN CIVILIAN MASSACRES - COULD
REACH SUCH HAVENS, JUST AS MANY RESPONSIBLE FOR CIVILIAN
MASSACRES EARLY IN THE FIGHTING FLED TO TANZANIA WHEN
THE RPF ADVANCED SOUTHWARD TOWARDS RUSUMU. IN RESPONSE
TO AN ATWOOD QUESTION ABOUT TERMS OF REFERENCE, DALLAIRE
SAID THAT A UN CHAPTER SEVEN "PEACEMAKING" PROVISION
WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY. A CHAPTER SIX OPERATION WOULD
AUTHORIZE TROOPS TO DEFEND THEMSELVES AND UN
INSTALLATIONS LIKE CAMPS FOR THE DISPLACED. THE
PROVISION ON "CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY" COULD BE USED TO
HELP GAIN ACCESS TO AREAS CUT OFF BY ROADBLOCKS.
DALLAIRE RELATED HOW EVEN NOW HIS RECONNAISSANCE UNITS
HAVE TRAVELED WIDELY THROUGHOUT RWANDA, IN ONE INSTANCE
MOVING SUCCESSFULLY THROUGH 13 GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED
ROADBLOCKS ON THE ROAD FROM BUTARE TO CYANGUGU.
REFUGEES AND DISPLACED
7. DALLAIRE SAID THAT WHEN THE FIGHTING STARTED IN
EARLY APRIL, THERE WERE ALREADY 273,000 REFUGEES IN
SOUTHERN RWANDA (MAINLY HUTUS FROM BURUNDI) AND 500.000
DISPLACED BY THE LAST WAR STILL IN NORTHERN RWANDA SOUTH
OF THE DMZ. TENSION HAD BEEN RISING DUE TO BAD CROP
CONDITIONS AND THE COMPETITION FOR RELIEF SUPPLIES. A
MAJOR PROBLEM NOW IS THE WAVE OF DISPLACED HUTUS FLEEING
THE RPF ADVANCE, PERHAPS AS MANY AS 1 MILLION ACCORDING
TO DALLAIRE, CAUSED IN LARGE PART BY A GOVERNMENT
PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN WHICH WARNS HUTUS THAT THEY WILL BE
SLAUGHTERED BY THE RPF, AND BY WIDELY HELD HUTU VIEWS OF
THE SUPERIOR QUALITIES OF TUTSIS.
8. THE 3 MILLION PEOPLE WHO LIVE IN GOVERNMENTCONTROLLED SOUTHWEST RWANDA ARE BEING "SQUEEZED" BY THE
RPF ADVANCE. ASKED BY ATWOOD WHETHER THESE DISPLACED
COULD SPILL OVER INTO BURUNDI OR ZAIRE, DALLAIRE
CONFIDENTIAL
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CONFIDENTIAL
ADMITTED THAT IT WAS A POSSIBILITY BUT THAT A RIVER
PREVENTED EASY ENTRY INTO RURIJNini A N n A I A R f i F FDRFST
BARRED THE WAY INTO 7A1RF
EO 13526 1.4b. EO 13526 1.4d
G O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 05 NAIROBI 09554
CORRECTEDCOPY
(ADDRESSEES AND PASSING INSTR. ADDED)
LONDON FOR MCKINLEY
PARIS FOR PERLOW
E.0.12356: DECLOADR
TAGS: EAID, MASS, PGOV. RW, KE, PHUM. MOPS
SUBJ: UNAMIR COMMANDER DALLAIRE PLEADS FOR IMMEDIATE US
MILITARY SUPPORT IN MEETING WITH AID ADMINISTRATOR ATWOOD
MILITARY FORCE STRUCTURE
9. SINCE BOTH SIDES ARE STILL RECRUITING AND THE
GOVERNMENT TROOPS IN PARTICULAR HAVE EXPERIENCED
DESERTIONS, IT IS DIFFICULT TO MAKES ESTIMATES OF TROOP
STRENGTH. GIVEN THAT CAVEAT. DALLAIRE THINKS THAT THE
RPF MAY NOW HAVE 30,000 TO 35,000 TROOPS IN THE FIELD,
WITH ITS BEST SOLDIERS AT THE FRONT. IN CONTRAST, THE
GOVERNMENT AND ALLIED FORCES HAVE SOME 34,000 TROOPS,
THOUGH SOME OF THESE ARE RECENT RECRUITS ONLY GIVEN TWO
WEEKS TRAINING PRIOR TO BEING THROWN INTO BATTLE.
DALLAIRE BELIEVES BIZIMUNGU. THE CURRENT RWANDA ARMY
CHIEF OF STAFF, IS BECOMING MORE MODERATE AS THE RPF
ADVANCES, AND IS PROVIDING THE GITARAMA-BASED INTERIM
GOVERNMENT WITH SOME BADLY-NEEDED HONEST INFORMATION
FROM THE BATTLEFIELD. THE HUTU MILITIAS AND
SELF-DEFENSE FORCES ARE STILL "OUT OF CONTROL" IN MANY
AREAS BUT ARE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT DEFENSE PLAN AND
ARE COUNTED ALONG WITH GOVERNMENT REGULARS. AS IS THE
6000-MAN GENDARMERIE. WHICH DALLAIRE THINKS IS A
SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT KIND OF FORCE SINCE IT ORIGINALLY
INCLUDED MANY TUTSI.
THE RPF-UGANDA CONNECTION
10. UNAMIR CONTINUES TO MONITOR THE UGANDA BORDER BY
HELICOPTER FOR EVIDENCE THAT THE RPF IS RECEIVING
SUPPLIES FROM UGANDA. SO FAR, THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGN OF
SIGNIFICANT ARMS OR MATERIEL SHIPMENTS ACROSS THE
BORDER. DALLAIRE ADMITTED THAT MUSSEVENI WANTS THE RPF
OUT OF UGANDA SINCE THEY ARE A POLITICAL PROBLEM FOR
HIM, BUT WAS DOUBTFUL THAT THE UGANDA GOVERNMENT WAS
PROVISIONING RPF TROOPS IN ANY SIGNIFICANT WAY. WHILE
RPF CERTAINLY HAS SYMPATHIZERS IN THE UGANDA MILITARY
AND UNAMIR HAS SEEN INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS CROSSING THE
BORDER OR AN OCCASIONAL TRUCK OF SUPPLIES, THERE IS NO
EVIDENCE OF SUBSTANTIAL CROSS-BORDER SHIPMENTS.
11. DALLAIRE THINKS THAT THE RPF GETS MUCH OF ITS
MATERIEL FROM FLEEING GOVERNMENT TROOPS. ASKED BY
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
AMBASSADOR SHINN WHETHER UNAMIR WAS ABLE TO TRACK
SHIPMENTS FROM UGANDA, DALLAIRE SAID THAT UNAMIR
HELICOPTERS WOULD NOTICE SIGNIFICANT SHIPMENTS, AS THEY
HAD PRIOR TO THE WAR. DALLAIRE COULD NOT SAY WHETHER
THE RPF WAS GETTING WEAPONS FROM THE BURUNDIAN
MILITARY. ASKED WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT WAS GETTING
MATERIEL FROM ABROAD, DALLAIRE CONFIRMED THAT THE
GOVERNMENT TROOPS WERE VERY SHORT OF AMMUNITION BUT
COULD NOT SAY WHETHER THEY RECEIVED ANY SHIPMENTS FROM
OUTSIDE.
BATTLEFIELD ACTIVITY
12. THE RPF HAVE SO FAR MANAGED TO TAKE THE EASTERN
HALF OF THE COUNTRY INCLUDING HALF OF THE CAPITAL CITY,
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 05 NAIROBI 09554
CORRECTEDCOPY
(ADDRESSEES AND PASSING INSTR. ADDED)
LONDON FOR MCKINLEY
PARIS FOR PERLOW
E.0.12356: DECLOADR
TAGS: EAID, MASS, PGOV, RW, KE. PHUM, MOPS
SUBJ: UNAMIR COMMANDER DALLAIRE PLEADS FOR IMMEDIATE US
MILITARY SUPPORT IN MEETING WITH AID ADMINISTRATOR ATWOOD
THE ENTIRE TANZANIAN BORDER AND MOST OF THE COUNTRY'S
BORDERS WITH UGANDA AND BURUNDI. RWANDA GOVERNMENT
FORCES AND ALLIED MILITIAS MAINTAIN SOME CONTROL OVER
OTHER PARTS. THE RPF IS PUTTING FURTHER PRESSURE ON
GOVERNMENT AND ALLIED FORCES FROM THE EAST IN KIGALI AND
FROM THE SOUTH IN GITARAMA. THE RPF HAS JUST CUT THE
MAIN ROAD BETWEEN GITARAMA AND BUTARE. THERE ARE STILL
STRONG POCKETS OF GOVERNMENT SUPPORT, PARTICULARLY
AROUND GISENYI AND RUHENGERI IN THE NORTHWEST AND IN THE
CYANGUGU AREA OF SOUTHWEST RWANDA. THESE AREAS,
ACCORDING TO DALLAIRE, CONTAIN SOME OF THE MOST
EXTREMIST HUTU FORCES. WHILE MORE MODERATE HUTUS CONTROL
THE REGION AROUND BUTARE TO THE BURUNDI BORDER.
13. DALLAIRE STRESSED THAT THE FIGHT FOR KIGALI WAS NOT
OVER. SINCE THE HEART OF DOWNTOWN AND SIGNIFICANT
POCKETS WERE HELD BY GOVERNMENT FORCES AND HUTU MILITIAS
CONTROLLED TRACTS OF THE CITY'S SOUTHWEST. THE ONLY
PLACE A TRUCE APPEARED TO APPLY WAS ALONG THE ROAD
THROUGH KIGALI. THE RPF ASSAULT THREATENING THE MAIN
ROAD BETWEEN KIGALI AND GITARAMA WAS A WORRY. DALLAIRE
SAID; CUT OFF FROM THEIR LINE OF ESCAPE TO THE CAPITAL
OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT IN GITARAMA. SURROUNDED
GOVERNMENT AND MILITIA TROOPS MIGHT DECIDE TO FIGHT TO
THE LAST IN THE CITY.
ATROCITIESTND RPF REPRISALS
14. RPF LEADER KAGEME TOLD DALLAIRE THAT HE WANTS TO
GET THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR ATROCITIES "IN HIS SIGHTS OR
IN COURT' ACCORDING TO DALLAIRE. THE SOUTHERN RWANDA
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPi
CONFIDENTIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
TOWN OF BUTARE IS A GOOD EXAMPLE, SAID DALLAIRE. THE
AREA WAS LARGELY QUIET UNTIL THE GOVERNMENT CHANGED THE
LOCAL COMMANDER, AFTER WHICH UNAMIR STARTED RECEIVING
REPORTS OF MASSACRES. DALLAIRE CAUTIONED THAT THE RPF
WERE NOT SAINTS BUT WERE MORE "SMOOTH" THAN THE
GOVERNMENT. AMONG MANY FOREIGNERS THERE IS A BIT OF
NAIVETE ABOUT THE RPF, DALLAIRE SAID. AND MANY NGO'S
MIGHT BE ACCUSED OF ASSISTING THEM. THE RPF EVEN BLOCKS
HIS RECONNAISANCE TROOPS ON OCCASION. AND ADMITS FRANKLY
ITS POLICY OF EXECUTING THOSE IT SAYS ARE RESPONSIBLE
FOR ATROCITIES, WHICH DALLAIRE CALLED 'TRIAGE."
CHANCES FOR A CEASEFIRE
15. THE GOVERNMENT SIDE HAS WANTED A CEASEFIRE SINCE
APRIL 15 BUT THE RPF IS MAKING TOO MUCH PROGRESS ON THE
BATTLEFIELD NOW. NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE AT THE STAFF
LEVEL (DALLAIRE SAID THE LAST SESSION WAS MAY 30) BUT
THE RPF CONTINUES TO DEMAND PROOF OF PROGRESS ON THREE
FRONTS - AN END TO THE MASSACRES OF CIVILIANS. AN END
TO INCITEFUL GOVERNMENT RADIO BROADCASTS, AND THE FREE
MOVEMENT OF DISPLACED CIVILIANS ACROSS BATTLE LINES.
PRESSED ON THE POINT BY SHINN, DALLAIRE ADMITTED THAT
THE RPF HAD LITTLE INCENTIVE TO AGREE TO A CEASEFIRE
NOW.
16. THE UPCOMING JUNE 6 MEETING OF REGIONAL AFRICAN
LEADERS IN NAIROBI CALLED BY PRESIDENT MOI WILL ONLY
G O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 05 NAIROBI 09554
CORRECTEDCOPY
(ADDRESSEES AND PASSING INSTR. ADDED)
LONDON FOR MCKINLEY
PARIS FOR PERLOW
E.O. 12356: DECLOADR
TAGS: EAID, MASS, PGOV, RW. KE. PHUM, MOPS
SUBJ: UNAMIR COMMANDER DALLAIRE PLEADS FOR IMMEDIATE US
MILITARY SUPPORT IN MEETING WITH AID ADMINISTRATOR ATWOOD
RESULT IN "POSTURING" ACCORDING TO DALLAIRE (NOTE:
PRESIDENT MOI TOLD ATWOOD DELEGATION EARLIER MAY 31 THAT
SO FAR HE HAD NOT/NOT RECEIVED CONFIRMATION THAT MOBUTU
WOULD ATTEND). THE GOVERNMENT IS CONTROLLED BY HUTU
EXTREMISTS AND REJECTS RPF CONTROL OF 50 PERCENT OF THE
COUNTRY. THE RPF FIGHTS ON. REFUSING TO TALK WITH THE
INTERIM GOVERNMENT. FOR GENUINE PEACE TALKS TO OCCUR,
DALLAIRE OPINED, A NEW GROUP OF HUTU MODERATES MUST
EMERGE FROM THE REMAINING HUTU CIVILIAN MODERATES (NOW
MOSTLY ABROAD IN PARIS OR BRUSSELS), AND HUTU MODERATES
IN THE MILITARY. IN PRIVATE, DALLAIRE WAS TOLD THAT THE
COUNTRY'S CATHOLIC BISHOPS MIGHT BE WILLING TO CALL FOR
THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT TO STEP DOWN. BUT HE CAUTIONED US
TO KEEP THAT INFORMATION CONFIDENTIAL (PLEASE PROTECT).
17. WHEN ASKED BY SHINN FOR HIS BOTTOM LINE MESSAGE TO
THE USG. DALLAIRE REPLIED "SEND THE EQUIPMENT TO PUT THE
PEACEKEEPING TROOPS ON THE GROUND LAST (SIC) WEEK."
WITHOUT US EQUIPMENT, UNAMIR CAN DO VIRTUALLY NOTHING.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
UNAMIR ALSO NEEDS STRATEGIC LIFT FROM THE U.S.
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FROM:
SITREPRT
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CONFIDENTIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: SIT, DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, SUM, SUM2, TTI, VAX
PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
DTG:020101Z JUN 94
FM: USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6857
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 1021
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY 0456
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 5139
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1719
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 1212
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0471
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0587
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY 0270
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0236
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 002316
DEPT FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AND AF/C;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE
JOINT STAFF FOR DIR J5, J3;
SECDEF FOR SEWALL
E.0.12356: DECLOADR
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, MARR, RW, UN
SUBJECT: USG MEETINGS WITH KOFI ANNAN ON RWANDA
REF: STATE 144262
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT
2. SUMMARY. ON 31 MAY AND 1 JUNE REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE USG MET WITH KOFI ANNAN THREE TIMES TO DISCUSS THE
SYG'S REPORT ON RWANDA AND NEXT STEPS. AMBASSADOR
INDERFURTH MET WITH ANNAN ON THE 31 ST, UNDERSECRETARY
TARNOFF IN THE MORNING OF THE LST, AND AN INTERAGENCY
TEAM IN THE AFTERNOON OF THE LST. IN EACH OF THE
MEETINGS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL FOR PEACEKEEPING
RIZA AND SYG MILITARY ADVISOR BARIL GAVE PREVIEWS OF THE
SECRETARY GENERAL'S NEXT REPORT. RIZA STATED
OPTIMISTICALLY THAT A CEASEFIRE MAY BE ARRANGED VERY
SOON. BARIL BRIEFED GENERAL DALLAIRE'S NEW CONCEPT THAT
HAS THE FOLLOWING KEY ELEMENTS: THE COMBINING OF PHASE I
AND II (DUE TO THE LATE ARRIVAL OF APCS FOR GHANAIAN
TROOPS), TWO ENTRY POINTS INTO RWANDA FROM KIGALI AND
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAL
0
3
^ " ^
3/iq/i5"
KBH
�CONFIDEI^fTIAL
EITHER UGANDA OR BURUNDI, AND A FLEXIBLE CONCEPT WHERE
THE FORCE COMMANDER "PUSHES THROUGH" TO PROTECT THE MOST
VULNERABLE POPULATION CONCENTRATIONS IN THE INTERIOR OF
RWANDA. END SUMMARY.
INDERFURTH MEETING - 31 MAY
3. AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH MET WITH UNDERSECRETARY GENERAL
FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS ANNAN AND MEMBERS OF HIS
STAFF TO DISCUSS RWANDA. ASSISTANT SECRETARY RIZA AND
SYG MILITARY ADVISOR BARIL BRIEFED USUN ON THE NEW
CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION BASED ON GENERAL DALLAIRE'S
LATEST PLAN. SINCE APCS FOR THE GHANAIAN BATTALION HAVE
NOT ARRIVED AND THEREBY DELAYED PHASE I OF THE
OPERATION, THE UN PROPOSED THAT PHASE I AND PHASE II BE
COMBINED AND EXECUTED AS SOON AS TROOPS ARE AVAILABLE.
THE MODIFIED UN CONCEPT
4. THE NEW CONCEPT CALLS FOR TWO ENTRY POINTS INTO
RWANDA, ONE THROUGH RPF CONTROLLED KIGALI AIRPORT AND
THE OTHER THROUGH KAMPALA OR BUJUMBURA (THE UN LOGISTICS
STAFF PREFERS KAMPALA) AND OVERLAND TO KIGALI. ALTHOUGH
SIMILAR TO THE USG CONCEPT IN ARRIVING IN RWANDA FROM AN
EXTERNAL LOG BASE. THE UN CONCEPT ENVISIONS THE FORCE
COMMANDER TO "PUSH HIS WAY THROUGH" ALL THE WAY TO THE
CENTRAL TOWN OF GITARAMA, WHICH ACCORDING TO UNAMIR, IS
THE CURRENT AREA WITH THE MOST THREATENED POPULATION.
IN AREAS SUCH AS GITARAMA, THE UN MISSION WOULD BE TO
"PROTECT THREATENED POPULATIONS" AND "HELP MOVE THEM TO
SAFE AREAS." GENERAL BARIL STRESSED THAT EVEN THOUGH
THE FORCE WOULD "PUSH ITS WAY THROUGH" TO THE MOST AT
RISK POPULATIONS, THE FORCE COMMANDER WOULD STILL BE
OPERATING UNDER CHAP
R VI AND WITH THE FULL CONSENT AND
ACTIVE COOPERATION OF THE PARTIES.
5. BARIL SAID THAT THE UN PREFERS TO OPERATE OUT OF TWO
ENTRY POINTS SO THAT THEY WILL NOT BE BEHOLDEN TO JUST
ONE OF THE FACTIONS.!
EO 13526 1.4b. EO 13526 1.4d
"USUN CONCERNS"
6. AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH PRESSED BARIL FOR MORE DETAILS
ON THE NEW CONCEPT INCLUDING THE NATURE OF THE MANDATE
TO "PUSH THROUGH TO THREATENED AREAS." INDERFURTH ALSO
ASKED IF THE UN CONCEPT MIGHT CREATE A SERIES OF
"GORAZDE'S" IN THE INTERIOR OF RWANDA. BARIL REMAINED
VAGUE, SAYING THAT THE SITUATION IS VERY FLUID AND THE
COMMANDER MUST BE GIVEN FLEXIBILITY. BARIL, NOTING THE
DOWN SIDES OF HIS CONCEPT, SAID THAT IN EFFECT, AS
PEOPLE MOVED TO AREAS WHERE THEY WERE MORE SAFE, A
G O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 002316
DEPT FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AND AF/C;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONriDENTIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
JOINT STAFF FOR DIR J5, J3;
SECDEF FOR SEWALL
E.0.12356: DECLOADR
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, MARR, RW. UN
SUBJECT: USG MEETINGS WITH KOFI ANNAN ON RWANDA
DE-FACTO DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY WAS UNFOLDING. HE WAS
CLEARLY CONCERNED THAT THE UN WAS INADVERTANTLY
ASSISTING IN A "CLEANSING" OF THE RESPECTIVE RPF AND
GOVERNMENT ZONES.
UNDERSECRETARY TARNOFF MEETING
7. ON THE MORNING OF THE LST OF JUNE, KOFI ANNAN ALSO
BRIEFED UNDERSECRETARY TARNOFF ON THE UN'S PENDING
REPORT. THE BRIEFING WAS VERY SIMILAR TO THE PREVIOUS
DAY WITH RIZA FURTHER ELABORATING ON THE POLITICAL
SITUATION. RIZA ASSURED UNDERSECRETARY TARNOFF THAT THE
RPF AND THE GOVERNMENT FORCES HAD AGREED TO COOPERATE
WITH UN FORCES IN THE CONDUCT OF THEIR HUMANITARIAN
MISSION. RIZA ADDED THAT THERE WERE TWO RPF
PRECONDITIONS FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE
GOVERNMENT: THE MASSACRES WOULD HAVE TO STOP AND THAT NO
KNOWN LEADERS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ATROCITIES WOULD BE
PART OF THE GOVERNMENT'S DELEGATION. AMBASSADOR
INDERFURTH REVIEWED THE TIMING OF THE NEXT STEPS AND THE
NEED TO MOVE QUICKLY ON APCS AND STRATEGIC LIFT INTO THE
REGION.
THE INTERAGENCY TEAM MEETING - 1 JUNE
8. AN INTERAGENCY TEAM INCLUDING ADMIRAL BOWMAN FROM
JCS. SUSAN RICE FROM NSC, AMBASSADOR DAVID RAWSON AND
JOHN BRIMS FROM STATE, MET WITH ANNAN AND RECEIVED A
SIMILAR BRIEF FROM RIZA AND BARIL. ONE CHANGE NOTED BY
BARIL WAS THE UN'S CLEAR PREFERENCE TO GET TO KIGALI
THROUGH KAMPALA, WHERE THERE WAS MORE INFRASTRUCTURE.
SUPPORT CAPABILITY (SUCH AS TftUOKS TQ MOVE APCSL AND_
THE PRESENCE OF A UN MISSION
EO 13526 1.4b. EO 13526 1.4d
[AND RhlTbRATEDniSTPESIHh TO OPERATE"
FROM TWO ENTRY POINTS TO REMAIN UNBEHOLDEN TO ONE
PART1CUI AR GROUP.
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
12. ON EQUIPMENT, THE US TEAM INFORMED THE UN THAT THEY
WOULD HAVE LEASING DATA FORWARDED BY FRIDAY FOR THE APCS
AND THAT WE WOULD SEEK TO DEUVERY THE VEHICLES IN
INSTALLMENTS BUT WITH A COMPLETE SPARES PACKAGE. BARIL
REPLIED THAT IN THE INTERIM THAT THEY WERE TRYING TO GET
APCS FROM SOUTH AFRICA AND EXPECTED A RESPONSE SOON. IN
ADDITION, THEY WERE CONSIDERING EXPANDING THE MOVEMENT
OF APCS FROM UNOSOM TO RWANDA (5 ARE ALREADY IN KIGALI
FROM UNOSOM). THEY PLANNED IMMEDIATE CONSULTATIONS WITH
UNOSOM FORCE COMMANDER ABOO ON THIS ISSUE.
DEMARCHE ON JOINT APPROACH TO UGANDA AND BURUNDI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 002316
DEPT FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AND AF/C;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE
JOINT STAFF FOR DIR J5. J3;
SECDEF FOR SEWALL
E.0.12356: DECLOADR
TAGS: MOPS, PREL MARR, RW, UN
SUBJECT: USG MEETINGS WITH KOFI ANNAN ON RWANDA
13. PER REFTEL. AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH BRIEFED ANNAN ON
THE USG PLAN FOR JOINT DEMARCHES TO KAMPALA AND
BUJUMBURA TO ALLOW THE USE OF THEIR TERRITORY IN SUPPORT
OF AN EXPANDED OPERATION IN RWANDA. COMMENT:
SUBSEQUENT TO THE MEETING, DPKO OFFICIAL ANNABI AGREED
IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO DEMARCHE THE GOB AND GOU BEFORE
THE END OF THE WEEK. SRSG OULD ABDALLAH WAS THE LOGICAL
PERSON TO MAKE THE GOB DEMARCHE, ALTHOUGH HE MAY BE IN
NAIROBI FOR A DEMOCRACY CONFERENCE THIS WEEK. THEUN
DID NOT HAVE A STRONG OPINION ON WHETHER HE SHOULD MAKE
THAT DEMARCHE JOINTLY WITH THE WESTERNERS OR
SEPARATELY. FOR THE GOU DEMARCHE, ANNABI SUGGESTED THAT
THE UNOMUR ACTING CMO COULD GO UP TO KAMPALA FROM
KABALE. USUN POLOFF NOTED THAT SINCE HE WOULD NOT HAVE
THE STATURE OF SRSG OULD ABDALLAH. IT MIGHT BE BEST TO
MAKE THAT DEMARCHE JOINTLY. FOR THE NEW YORK DEMARCHES.
THE UN WOULD LIKE TO CALL IN THE UGANDA AND BURUNDI PERM
REPS ON THEIR OWN. IN ORDER TO AVOID ANY SUSPICIONS OR
CONTRADICTORY MESSAGES. USUN PROPOSES MAKING PARALLEL
DEMARCHES ON THE UGANDA AND BURUNDI PERMREPS JOINTLY
WITH FRANCE, BELGIUM, GERMANY AND THE OAU. WE WILL
COORDINATE THOSE DEMARCHES WITH THE INVOLVED MISSIONS ON
THE BASIS OF REFTEL TALKING POINTS. END COMMENT.
14. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
ALBRIGHT
BT
#2316
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL
OAACZYUW RUCNDTA231 6 1530101-CCCC~RUEADWW .
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
0 020101Z JUN 94
FM USMISSION USUN N W YORK
E
RUCNDT
020101Z JUN 94
USMISSION USUN N W YORK
E
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6857
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO: RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 1021
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY 0456
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 5139
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1719
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 1212
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0471
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0587
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY 0270
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0236
USG MEETINGS WITH KOFI ANNAN ON RWANDA
SUBJ:
TEXT:
G O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN N W YORK 002316
E
DEPT FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AND AF/C;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE
JOINT STAFF FOR DIR J5, J3;
SECDEF FOR SEWALL
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, MARR, R , UN
W
SUBJECT: USG MEETINGS WITH KOFI ANNAN ON RWANDA
REF: STATE 144262
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT
2. SUMMARY. ON 31 MAY AND 1 JUNE REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE USG MET WITH KOFI ANNAN THREE TIMES TO DISCUSS THE
SYG'S REPORT ON RWANDA AND NEXT STEPS. AMBASSADOR
INDERFURTH MET WITH ANNAN ON THE 31ST, UNDERSECRETARY
TARNOFF IN THE MORNING OF THE LST, AND AN INTERAGENCY
TEAM IN THE AFTERNOON OF THE LST.
IN EACH OF THE
MEETINGS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL FOR PEACEKEEPING
RIZA AND SYG MILITARY ADVISOR BARIL GAVE PREVIEWS OF THE
SECRETARY GENERAL'S NEXT REPORT. RIZA STATED
OPTIMISTICALLY THAT A CEASEFIRE MAY BE ARRANGED VERY
SOON. BARIL BRIEFED GENERAL DALLAIRE'S N W CONCEPT THAT
E
HAS THE FOLLOWING KEY ELEMENTS: THE COMBINING OF PHASE I
AND I I (DUE TO THE LATE ARRIVAL OF APCS FOR GHANAIAN
TROOPS), TWO ENTRY POINTS INTO RWANDA FROM KIGALI AND
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
EITHER UGANDA OR BURUNDI, AND A FLEXIBLE CONCEPT WHERE
PER E O. 13526
.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�F:\Cable\Data Sowce\Cables\CD007\JUN94\MSGS\M1077250.html
THE FORCE COMMANDER "PUSHES THROUGH" TO PROTECT THE MOST
VULNERABLE POPULATION CONCENTRATIONS IN THE INTERIOR OF
RWANDA. END SUMMARY.
INDERFURTH MEETING — 31 MAY
3. AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH MET WITH UNDERSECRETARY GENERAL
FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS ANNAN AND MEMBERS OF HIS
STAFF TO DISCUSS RWANDA. ASSISTANT SECRETARY RIZA AND
SYG MILITARY ADVISOR BARIL BRIEFED USUN ON THE NEW
CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION BASED ON GENERAL DALLAIRE'S
LATEST PLAN. SINCE APCS FOR THE GHANAIAN BATTALION HAVE
NOT ARRIVED AND THEREBY DELAYED PHASE I OF THE
OPERATION, THE UN PROPOSED THAT PHASE I AND PHASE I I BE
COMBINED AND EXECUTED AS SOON AS TROOPS ARE AVAILABLE.
THE MODIFIED UN CONCEPT
4. THE N W CONCEPT CALLS FOR TWO ENTRY POINTS INTO
E
RWANDA, ONE THROUGH RPF CONTROLLED KIGALI AIRPORT AND
THE OTHER THROUGH KAMPALA OR BUJUMBURA (THE UN LOGISTICS
STAFF PREFERS KAMPALA) AND OVERLAND TO KIGALI. ALTHOUGH
SIMILAR TO THE USG CONCEPT IN ARRIVING IN RWANDA FROM AN
EXTERNAL LOG BASE, THE UN CONCEPT ENVISIONS THE FORCE
COMMANDER TO "PUSH HIS WAY THROUGH" ALL THE WAY TO THE
CENTRAL TOWN OF GITARAMA, WHICH ACCORDING TO UNAMIR, IS
THE CURRENT AREA WITH THE MOST THREATENED POPULATION.
IN AREAS SUCH AS GITARAMA, THE UN MISSION WOULD BE TO
"PROTECT THREATENED POPULATIONS" AND "HELP MOVE THEM TO
SAFE AREAS." GENERAL BARIL STRESSED THAT EVEN THOUGH
THE FORCE WOULD "PUSH ITS WAY THROUGH" TO THE MOST AT
RISK POPULATIONS, THE FORCE COMMANDER WOULD STILL BE
OPERATING UNDER CHAP
R VI AND WITH THE FULL CONSENT AND
ACTIVE COOPERATION OF THE PARTIES.
5. BARIL SAID THAT THE UN PREFERS TO OPERATE OUT OF TWO
ENTRY POINTS SO THAT THEY WILL NOT BE BEHOLDEN TO JUST
ONE OF THE FACTIONS. |
EO 13526 1.4b. EO 13526 1.4d
USUN CONCERNS
6. AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH PRESSED BARIL FOR MORE DETAILS
ON THE N W CONCEPT INCLUDING THE NATURE OF THE MANDATE
E
TO "PUSH THROUGH TO THREATENED AREAS." INDERFURTH ALSO
ASKED IF THE UN CONCEPT MIGHT CREATE A SERIES OF
"GORAZDE'S" IN THE INTERIOR OF RWANDA. BARIL REMAINED
VAGUE, SAYING THAT THE SITUATION IS VERY FLUID AND THE
COMMANDER MUST BE GIVEN FLEXIBILITY. BARIL, NOTING THE
D W SIDES OF HIS CONCEPT, SAID THAT IN EFFECT, AS
ON
PEOPLE MOVED TO AREAS WHERE THEY WERE MORE SAFE, A
e O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 USUN N W YORK 002316
E
DEPT FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AND AF/C;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE
JOINT STAFF FOR DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR SEWALL
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, MARR, R , UN
W
SUBJECT: USG MEETINGS WITH KOFI ANNAN ON RWANDA
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
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DE-FACTO DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY WAS UNFOLDING. HE WAS
CLEARLY CONCERNED THAT THE UN WAS INADVERTANTLY
ASSISTING IN A "CLEANSING" OF THE RESPECTIVE RPF AND
GOVERNMENT ZONES.
UNDERSECRETARY TARNOFF MEETING
1 . ON THE MORNING OF THE LST OF JUNE, KOFI ANNAN ALSO
BRIEFED UNDERSECRETARY TARNOFF ON THE UN'S PENDING
REPORT. THE BRIEFING WAS VERY SIMILAR TO THE PREVIOUS
DAY WITH RIZA FURTHER ELABORATING ON THE POLITICAL
SITUATION. RIZA ASSURED UNDERSECRETARY TARNOFF THAT THE
RPF AND THE GOVERNMENT FORCES HAD AGREED TO COOPERATE
WITH UN FORCES IN THE CONDUCT OF THEIR HUMANITARIAN
MISSION. RIZA ADDED THAT THERE WERE TWO RPF
PRECONDITIONS FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE
GOVERNMENT: THE MASSACRES WOULD HAVE TO STOP AND THAT NO
KNOWN LEADERS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ATROCITIES WOULD BE
PART OF THE GOVERNMENT'S DELEGATION. AMBASSADOR
INDERFURTH REVIEWED THE TIMING OF THE NEXT STEPS AND THE
NEED TO MOVE QUICKLY ON APCS AND STRATEGIC LIFT INTO THE
REGION.
THE INTERAGENCY TEAM MEETING -- 1 JUNE
8. AN INTERAGENCY TEAM INCLUDING ADMIRAL B W A FROM
OMN
JCS, SUSAN RICE FROM NSC, AMBASSADOR DAVID RAWSON AND
JOHN BRIMS FROM STATE, MET WITH ANNAN AND RECEIVED A
SIMILAR BRIEF FROM RIZA AND BARIL. ONE CHANGE NOTED BY
BARIL WAS THE UN'S CLEAR PREFERENCE TO GET TO KIGALI
THROUGH KAMPALA, WHERE THERE WAS MORE INFRASTRUCTURE,
SUPPORT CAPABILITY (SUCH AS TRUCKS TO MOVE APCS). AND
THE PRESENCE OF A UN MISSION. ] EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
J AND REITERATED HIS DESIRE TO OPERATE
FROM TWO ENTRY POINTS TO REMAIN UNBEHOLDEN TO ONE
PARTICULAR GROUP.
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
12. ON EQUIPMENT, THE US TEAM INFORMED THE UN THAT THEY
WOULD HAVE LEASING DATA FORWARDED BY FRIDAY FOR THE APCS
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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AND THAT W WOULD SEEK TO DELIVERY THE VEHICLES IN
E
INSTALLMENTS BUT WITH A COMPLETE SPARES PACKAGE. BARIL
REPLIED THAT IN THE INTERIM THAT THEY WERE TRYING TO GET
APCS FROM SOUTH AFRICA AND EXPECTED A RESPONSE SOON. IN
ADDITION, THEY WERE CONSIDERING EXPANDING THE MOVEMENT
OF APCS FROM UNOSOM TO RWANDA (5 ARE ALREADY IN KIGALI
FROM UNOSOM). THEY PLANNED IMMEDIATE CONSULTATIONS WITH
UNOSOM FORCE COMMANDER ABOO ON THIS ISSUE.
DEMARCHE ON JOINT APPROACH TO UGANDA AND BURUNDI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 USUN N W YORK 002316
E
DEPT FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AND AF/C;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE
JOINT STAFF FOR DIR Jb, J3;
SECDEF FOR SEWALL
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, MARR, R , UN
W
SUBJECT: USG MEETINGS WITH KOFI ANNAN ON RWANDA
13. PER REFTEL, AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH BRIEFED ANNAN ON '
THE USG PLAN FOR JOINT DEMARCHES TO KAMPALA AND
BUJUMBURA TO ALLOW THE USE OF THEIR TERRITORY IN SUPPORT
OF AN EXPANDED OPERATION IN RWANDA. COMMENT:
SUBSEQUENT TO THE MEETING, DPKO OFFICIAL ANNABI AGREED
IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO DEMARCHE THE GOB AND GOU BEFORE
THE END OF THE WEEK. SRSG OULD ABDALLAH WAS THE LOGICAL
PERSON TO MAKE THE GOB DEMARCHE, ALTHOUGH HE MAY BE IN
NAIROBI FOR A DEMOCRACY CONFERENCE THIS WEEK. THEUN
DID NOT HAVE A STRONG OPINION ON WHETHER HE SHOULD MAKE
THAT DEMARCHE JOINTLY WITH THE WESTERNERS OR
SEPARATELY. FOR THE GOU DEMARCHE, ANNABI SUGGESTED THAT
THE UNOMUR ACTING CMO COULD GO UP TO KAMPALA FROM
KABALE. USUN POLOFF NOTED THAT SINCE HE WOULD NOT HAVE
THE STATURE OF SRSG OULD ABDALLAH, IT MIGHT BE BEST TO
MAKE THAT DEMARCHE JOINTLY. FOR THE N W YORK DEMARCHES,
E
THE UN WOULD LIKE TO CALL IN THE UGANDA AND BURUNDI PERM
REPS ON THEIR OWN. IN ORDER TO AVOID ANY SUSPICIONS OR
CONTRADICTORY MESSAGES, USUN PROPOSES MAKING PARALLEL
DEMARCHES ON THE UGANDA AND BURUNDI PERMREP S JOINTLY
WITH FRANCE, BELGIUM, GERMANY AND THE OAU. WE WILL
COORDINATE THOSE DEMARCHES WITH THE INVOLVED MISSIONS ON
THE BASTS OF REFTEL TALKING POINTS. END COMMENT.
14. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
ALBRIGHT
BT
#2316
NNNN
SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03
<*SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03
< SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03
SSN: 2316
<''SSN>2316
< SSN>2316
TOR: 940601213202 M1077250
<*TOR>940601213204 M1077251
<"TOR>940601213305 M1077252
1
A
A
DIST:
PRT: SIT
SIT: DESHAZER NSC RICE SUM SUM2 TTI VAX
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Page 5 of 5
�OUTGOING TELEGRAM
^
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
•CONriDCNTIAL'
b. 1" .
INITIAL HERE
AUTH _^
CLEAR 1
3
H
b
7
erf
1
DRAFTJ&C *
B^A ^
ORIGINAL
IO/UNP:SUZELLE:SliJZ
Ob/02/T4 753^2
SEUNPA
P:PTARNOFF
10 :UARD/SNYDER/JENSEN ;DRL: P W R
O E S P : BRIUMER L/UNA : EBLOOM
PM:MARGULIES;AF/C:RENDER
RP:MMCKELVEY;S/RPP:RBECKHAM
JCS:RCMACKE^OSD:EUIARNER
USUN/b): DSCHEFFER ;NSC :
AID:GARVELINK-CINFO> ; S/S :
S/S-0:
IMMEDIATE
USUN NEU YORK
IMMEDIATE
BUJUMBURA, DAR ES SALAAM, KINSHASA, KAMPALA, PARIS
BRUSSELS, NAIROBI, ADDIS ABABA, YAOUNDE
E.O. IBBSb:
TAGS:
DECL: O D
AR
PREL, PREF, M P - RU, UN
OS,
SUBJECT:
DRAFT RESOLUTION O RUANDA
N
1. -CONriDCNTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. USUN IS INSTRUCTED TO SHARE THE FOLLOWING DRAFT
RESOLUTION UITH MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL• TEXT
CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 3 BELOU. UITH N CEASE FIRE IN
O
EFFECT AND N COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT A O G THE PARTIES
O
MN
INVOLVED IN THE RUANDA CONFLICT O UITH THE UN, THE
R
ACTIVITIES DESCRIBED IN THE SYG REPORT OF 31 MAY MIGHT BE
CONSIDERED TO INVOLVE ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS. TROOP
CONTRIBUTORS MUST BE MADE FULLY AUARE OF THE MILITARY
MISSION AND THE ANTICIPATED ENVIRONMENT. FURTHER, UNAMIR
MILITARY MUST BE PROVIDED UITH THE EQUIPMENT AND RULES OF
ENGAGEMENT TO EXECUTE SUCCESSFULLY THE ASSIGNED MISSION T
O
DEFEND THEMSELVES AND TO PROVIDE BASIC PROTECTION FOR
THREATENED PERSONS AND SECURITY FOR THE DELIVERY OF
HUMANITARIAN RELIEF. THESE POINTS SHOULD BE INCORPORATED
INTO THE EXPLANATION OF VOTE.
3.
BEGIN TEXT.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
ilDU-oaL>3-^
S/iy 15 K M
B
�CONriDCNTIAL
REAFFIRniNG ALL ITS PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS O THE SITUATION
N
IN RUANDA, IN PARTICULAR ITS RESOLUTION H f i m i H } OF 17
MAY m H WHICH EXPANDED THE MANDATE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR R A D {UNAMIR? AND AUTHORIZED AN
WNA
EXPANSION IN UNAMIR'S FORCE LEVEL,
RECALLING THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE
COUNCIL O 3 MAY I'm <S/PRST/mM/22> WHICH DEALT WITH
N
IMPROVING THE CAPACITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS FOR
PEACE-KEEPING, AND BEARING IN MIND THE FACTORS ENUMERATED
THEREIN,
HAVING CONSIDERED THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
DATED 31 MAY l ^ H {S/mH/kMQ},
NOTING WITH CONCERN THAT TO DATE, THE PARTIES HAVE NOT
CEASED HOSTILITIES, AGREED TO A CEASEFIRE O BROUGHT AN
R
END TO THE VIOLENCE AND CARNAGE ENGULFING RWANDA,
REITERATING ITS CONDEMNATION OF THE SYSTEMATIC KILLING OF
THOUSANDS OF CIVILIANS IN RWANDA,
EXPRESSING ITS OUTRAGE THAT THE PERPETRATORS OF THESE
KILLINGS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO OPERATE AND CONTINUE OPERATING
WITHIN R A D WITH IMPUNITY,
WNA
UNDERSCORING THAT THE INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT OF S M 1.5
OE
MILLION RWANDANS FACING STARVATION AND DISEASE AND THE
MASSIVE EXODUS OF REFUGEES TO NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES
CONSTITUTE A HUMANITARIAN CRISIS OF ENORMOUS PROPORTIONS,
RECALLING IN THIS CONTEXT THAT THE KILLING OF MEMBERS OF
AN ETHNIC GROUP UITH THE INTENTION OF DESTROYING SUCH A
GROUP, IN WHOLE O IN PART, CONSTITUTES A CRIME PUNISHABLE
R
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,
STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT TO
THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT IN R A D AND THE
WNA
NECESSITY FOR ALL PARTIES TO RECOMMIT THEMSELVES TO ITS
FULL IMPLEMENTATION,
COMMENDING THE EFFORTS OF NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES FOR THE
HOSPITALITY THEY HAVE S O N TO REFUGEES FLEEING RWANDA,
HW
COMMENDING ALSO THOSE COUNTRIES UHICH HAVE MADE EMERGENCY
AID AVAILABLE TO HELP ALLEVIATE THE SUFFERING OF THE
RWANDAN PEOPLE AND THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE CONTRIBUTED
TROOPS AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO UNAMIR, AND REITERATING
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
COHPIDENTO*
�•CONriDCNTIAL
THE URGENT NEED F R COORDINATED INTERNATIONAL ACTION T
O
O
CONTINUE SUCH EFFORTS A D T HELP RESTORE PEACE IN RUANDA,
N O
WELCOMING THE COOPERATION BETUEEN THE UNITED NATIONS A D
N
THE ORGANIZATION O AFRICAN UNITY <OAU> AS UELL AS WITH
F
COUNTRIES OF THE REGION, ESPECIALLY THE FACILITATOR OF THE
ARUSHA PEACE PROCESS,
WELCOMING THE VISIT OF THE UN HIGH COMMISSIONER F R HUMAN
O
RIGHTS T R A D AND T THE REGION;
O WNA
O
WELCOMING ALSO RESOLUTION S/S/mM/1 OF M Y ES ADOPTED BY
A
THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION O HUMAN RIGHTS SITTING IN
N
SPECIAL SESSION, WHICH REQUESTED THE APPOINTMENT OF A
SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR T INVESTIGATE THE H M N RIGHTS
O
UA
SITUATION IN R A D AND CALLED FOR THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR,
WNA
ASSISTED BY A TEAM OF HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD OFFICERS, T ACT
O
IN CLOSE COOPERATION WITH UNAMIR AND OTHER UNITED NATIONS
AGENCIES AND PROGRAMMES OPERATING IN R A D ^
WNA
REAFFIRMING ITS COMMITMENT T THE UNITY AND TERRITORIAL
O
INTEGRITY OF RWANDA,
STRESSING THAT THE PEOPLE OF RUANDA BEAR THE PRIMARY
RESPONSIBILITY F R NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND
O
RECONSTRUCTION OF THEIR COUNTRY,
1. ENDORSES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PROPOSAL, CONTAINED
IN PARAGRAPHS n-Sfc OF HIS REPORT OF 31 M Y I'm, T
A
O
DEPLOY THE FIRST A D SECOND PHASES OF UNAMIR IN CLOSE
N
SYNCHRONIZATION',
E.. DECIDES TO EXTEND THE MANDATE OF UNAMIR UMtlL h
DECEMBER I'm, WITH THE PROVISO THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL
UILL SUBMIT A REPORT BYflAUGUST FOR SECURITY COUNCIL
REVIEW OF THE PROGRESS OF UNAMIR'S MILITARY MISSION,
PROGRESS T W R A CEASEFIRE AND POLITICAl/ RECONCILIATION,
OAD
THE SAFETY OF THOSE POPULATIONS AT RISK^r'THE HUMANITARIAN
SITUATION^AND COST CONTAINMENT MEASURESQ
3. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO REPORT ALSO O
N
VARIOUS DEVELOPMENTS AS DETAILED IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF THIS
RESOLUTION IN G O TIME BEFORE THE EXPIRATION OF UNAMIR'S
OD
CURRENT MANDATE',
H. RECALLING PARAGRAPH 3 OF RESOLUTION l l f l •Cl m> AND
PARAGRAPH 16 O THE THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT OF 31
F
M Y I'm, DECIDES THAT, WITHIN THE LIMITS OF AVAILABLE
A
c
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
coNriDCNTiAL
�-CONf IDENTIAL
RESOURCES•. THE MANDATE OF THE MILITARY COMPONENT O UNAMIR
F
UILL BE A> T CONTRIBUTE T THE SECURITY AND PROTECTION OF
O
O
DISPLACED PERSONS, REFUGEES AND CIVILIANS AT RISK IN
RUANDA, INCLUDING THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT AND
MAINTENANCE, UHERE FEASIBLE, OF SECURE HUMANITARIAN AREAS
AND B> T PROVIDE SECURITY F R THE DISTRIBUTION O RELIEF
O
O
F
SUPPLIES AND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS',
5. REAFFIRMS THE CONTINUING MANDATE OF THE POLITICAL
COMPONENT OF UNAMIR T ACT AS AN INTERMEDIARY BETUEEN THE
O
PARTIES IN AN ATTEMPT TO SECURE THEIR AGREEMENT T A
O
CEASE-FIRE.
t . UELCOMES THE ASSURANCES OF BOTH PARTIES TO COOPERATE
UITH UNAMIR IN CARRYING OUT ITS MANDATE, RECOGNIZES THAT
THOSE ASSURANCES ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE MANDATE'S
IMPLEMENTATIONS, AND DEMANDS THAT BOTH PARTIES ADHERE T
O
THOSE ASSURANCES
7. REAFFIRMS THAT, CONSISTENT UITH PARAGRAPH 4 OF
RESOLUTION Tlfi m w , UNAMIR M Y BE REQUIRED T TAKE
A
O
ACTION IN SELF-DEFENSE INCLUDING RESISTING ATTEMPTS B
Y
FORCEFUL MEANS T PREVENT IT FROM DISCHARGING DUTIES SUCH
O
AS CONTRIBUTING TO THE SECURITY OF DISPLACED PERSONS,
REFUGEES AND CIVILIANS IN PROTECTED SITES, UNITED NATIONS
AND OTHER HUMANITARIAN PERSONNEL, AND HELPING PROTECT THE
MEANS OF DELIVERY A D DISTRIBUTION OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF,
N
AND THUS BE ADEQUATELY EQUIPPED AND PROVIDED THE RULES OF
ENGAGEMENT TO D S '
O O,
fl. NOTES THAT THERE IS N INTENTION TO HAVE UNAMIR ASSUME
O
THE ROLE OF A BUFFER FORCE BETUEEN THE TUO PARTIES O T
R O
TAKE MILITARY ACTION T COMPEL THE TUO PARTIES T END
O
O
THEIR FIGHTING',
NOTES THAT UNAMIR'S EXPANDED MILITARY COMPONENT UILL
REMAIN IN RUANDA ONLY AS LONG AS IT IS NEEDED TO PROVIDE
BASIC SECURITY T POPULATIONS AT RISK AND SECURITY F R THE
O
O
DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF TO THEM IN RUANDfrlyAfl^g.
AFFIRMS THE COUNCIL'S EXPECTATION THAT, FOLLOWING THE
ITHDRAUAL OF THE UN MILITARY COMPONENT, THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY UILL MAINTAIN ITS COMMITMENT TO ASSIST THE
RUANDAN PEOPLE THROUGH THE U R OF THE UN AGENCII
OK
NONGOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES AND OTHER ENTITIES^ AWb
ID. DEMANDS THAT ALL PARTIES T THE CONFLICT CEASE
O
HOSTILITIES, AGREE T A CEASEFIRE AND IMMEDIATELY TAKE
O
STEPS T BRING A END T SYSTEMATIC KILLINGS IN AREAS
O
N
O
CLINTON LIBRARV PHOTOCOPY
•CONriDENTIAL
�-C OtiriDCMTIAL
UNDER THEIR CONTROL;
11. DEMANDS FURTHER THAT ALL PARTIES CEASE FORTHWITH ANY
INCITEMENT-. ESPECIALLY THROUGH THE MASS MEDIA, TO VIOLENCE
O ETHNIC HATRED;
R
12. REAFFIRMS THE OBLIGATION OF ALL STATES TO IMPLEMENT
FULLY THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 13 OF._RESOLUTION Tlfi
a m y O THE SALE T R A D OF A M RELATED MATERIEL;
N
O WNA
RS
13. URGES M M E STATES TO RESPOND PROMPTLY TO THE
EBR
SECRETARY GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR RESOURCES, INCLUDING
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT CAPABILITY, FOR RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF
ADDITIONAL UNAMIR FORCES;
14. REQUESTS UNAMIR TO FACILITATE, W E E POSSIBLE, THE
HR
ACTIVITIES OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR AND THE TEAM OF HUMAN
RIGHTS FIELD OFFICERS REQUESTED BY THE UN COMMISSION O
N
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR OF THE COMMISSION
IN THE FURTHERANCE OF THEIR MANDATES AND T ENLIST THE
O
COOPERATION OF THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT WITH THE
SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR AND HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD OFFICERS;
15. REQUESTS ALSO THAT^UNAMIR DESIGNATE AN OFFICER TO
SERVE AS LIAISON WITH THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENSURING COORDINATION BETUEEN
UNAMIR AND THE HIGH COMMISSIONER AND THE SPECIAL
RAPPORTEUR FOR R A D ESTABLISHED BY THE COMMISSION O
WNA
N
HUMAN RIGHTS, INCLUDING THE SHARING OF INFORMATION FROM
GOVERNMENTS, INDIVIDUALS, INTERGOVERNMENTAL AND
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND UNAMIR ITSELF , O
N
POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND BREACHES OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW,
l b . DEMANDS THAT ALL PARTIES IN R A D STRICTLY RESPECT
WNA
THE PERSONS AND PREMISES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER
ORGANIZATIONS SERVING IN RUANDA, AND REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTS
O INTIMIDATION O VIOLENCE AGAINST PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN
F
R
HUMANITARIAN AND PEACE-KEEPING W R ;
OK
17. DECIDES THAT UNAMIR AND OTHER UN PERSONNEL SHALL
UNDER N CIRCUMSTANCES BE DETAINED WHILE PERFORMING THEIR
O
MANDATE IN RUANDA, AND DECIDES FURTHER THAT IF SUCH
PERSONS SHOULD BE DETAINED, THEY SHALL BE RELEASED
IMMEDIATELY, AND THAT WHILE IN THE CUSTODY OF ANY PARTY TO
THE CONFLICT SUCH PERSONS SHALL BE PROVIDED ALL
PROTECTIONS EQUIVALENT T THOSE CONTAINED IN THE GENEVA
O
CONVENTION RELATED TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR,
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONriDCNTIAL-
�PENDING THEIR IMMEDIATE RELEASE AND REPATRIATION TO UN
AUTHORITIES
I f l . C M E D THE EFFORTS OF STATES, UNITED NATIONS
OMNS
AGENCIES, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS UHICH HAVE PROVIDED
HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER ASSISTANCE, ENCOURAGES THEM TO
CONTINUE AND INCREASE SUCH ASSISTANCE, AND URGES OTHERS TO
PROVIDE SUCH ASSISTANCE",
IT. COMMENDS THE TIRELESS EFFORTS OF THE UNAMIR FORCE
C M A D R TO PREVENT M R INNOCENT LIVES FROM BEING LOST,
OMNE
OE
AND TO BRING ABOUT A CEASE FIRE BETUEEN THE PARTIES;
20. INVITES THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND HIS SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE, IN COORDINATION UITH THE OAU AND COUNTRIES
IN THE REGION, TO CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A
POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN RUANDA UITHIN THE FRAMEUORK OF THE
ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT AND URGES THE PARTIES TO INTENSIFY
THEIR EFFORTS FOR POLITICAL RECONCILIATION;
21.
DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
VV
CLINTON LiUKARY PHOTOCOPY
-e^^tw^k
�CONriDCNTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, VAX
PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS.-CONriDENTIAL
DTG:031406Z JUN 94
FM: AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2609
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1179
RUEHZO/OAU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
C O N r i D E N T I A L ADDIS ABABA 004114
E.O. 12356:DECL: OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREL, PHUM, UNSC, OAU, RW, ET
SUBJECT: RWANDA: REQUEST FOR UN TROOP CONTRIBUTIONS
REF: STATE 144263
1. .CONriDCNTIAtr- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. AMBASSADOR BRIEFED OAU SYG SALIM 3 JUNE ON USG
EFFORTS IN SUPPORT OF UN TROOP CONTRIBUTIONS FOR RWANDA,
AS REQUESTED REFTEL. SALIM TOOK THE MESSAGE ON BOARD,
BUT NOTED THAT, BY HIS COUNT, THE UN WAS CLOSE TO
GETTING THE NUMBER IT NEEDED (5500). SALIM PROVIDED THE
FOLLOWING BREAKDOWN:
COUNTRY
TROOP COMMITMENT
ETHIOPIA
GHANA
SENEGAL
ZIMBABWE
ZAMBIA
CONGO
800 (1 BTN)
800 (1 BTN
850 (1 BTN)
800 (1 BTN)
800 (1 BTN)
N/A (1 COMPANY)
TOTAL
4550 PLUS ONE COMPANY
NOTES:
- SALIM HAS RECEIVED A "PERSONAL COMMITMENT" FROM
ZAMBIA FOR ITS CONTRIBUTION WHICH HE COMMUNICATED
TO UNSYG BOUTROS GHALI. HE DOES NOT UNDERSTAND WHY
ZAMBIA HAS NOT BEEN REFLECTED IN UN LISTS.
- THE COMMITMENT FROM CONGO IS NOT FIRM.
- NAMIBIA HAS PLEDGED TO PROVIDE ONE-HALF MILLION
USD, BUT NO TROOPS.
3. SALIM REQUESTED CLARIFICATION OF THE PURPOSE OF
CONTINUED USG EFFORTS TO RECRUIT TROOPS FOR RWANDA PKO
WHEN THE UN ALREADY HAD CLOSE TO THE NUMBER IT NEEDS.
BAAS
BT
#14
41
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONriDCNTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
^ jLl?
8/11/'
5
KBH
�•eeNFIPENTIAL"
NNNN
< SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
< SSN>4114
< TOR>940603101024 Ml 080481
A
A
A
FROM:
SITREPRT
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
OONriDCNTIAL-
�CONriDENTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, VAX
PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: CONriDENTIAL
DTG:031406Z JUN 94
FM: AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2609
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1179
RUEHZO/OAU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
S O N r i D C N T I A L ADDIS ABABA 004114
E.O. 12356:DECL: OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREL, PHUM, UNSC, OAU, RW, ET
SUBJECT: RWANDA: REQUEST FOR UN TROOP CONTRIBUTIONS
REF: STATE 144263
1. •CONriDCNTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. AMBASSADOR BRIEFED OAU SYG SALIM 3 JUNE ON USG
EFFORTS IN SUPPORT OF UN TROOP CONTRIBUTIONS FOR RWANDA,
AS REQUESTED REFTEL. SALIM TOOK THE MESSAGE ON BOARD,
BUT NOTED THAT, BY HIS COUNT„5#3 7, 2- :)93 59
&3558,& 5#3 ,7.?34 85 ,33$3$ (5500). SALIM PROVIDED THE
FOLLOWING BREAKDOWN:
COUNTRY
TROOP COMMITMENT
ETHIOPIA
GHANA
SENEGAL
ZIMBABWE
ZAMBIA
CONGO
800 (1 BTN)
800 (1 BTN)
850 (1 BTN)
800 (1 BTN)
800 (1 BTN)
N/A (1 COMPANY)
TOTAL
4550 PLUS ONE COMPANY
NOTES:
- SALIM HAS RECEIVED A "PERSONAL COMMITMENT" FROM
ZAMBIA FOR ITS CONTRIBUTION WHICH HE COMMUNICATED
TO UNSYG BOUTROS GHALI. HE DOES NOT UNDERSTAND WHY
ZAMBIA HAS NOT BEEN REFLECTED IN UN LISTS.
- THE COMMITMENT FROM CONGO IS NOT FIRM.
- NAMIBIA HAS PLEDGED TO PROVIDE ONE-HALF MILLION
USD, BUT NO TROOPS.
3. SALIM REQUESTED CLARIFICATION OF THE PURPOSE OF
CONTINUED USG EFFORTS TO RECRUIT TROOPS FOR RWANDA PKO
WHEN THE UN ALREADY HAD CLOSE TO THE NUMBER IT NEEDS.
BAAS
?y
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
i14
^on- 030*3-
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
S/iq/iS" KBH
-CONFIDCNTIAL-
'
/
�CONriDCNTIAL
NNNN
< SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
< SSN>4114
< TOR>940620081448 M1108508
A
A
A
FROM:
SITREPRT
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
OONriDCNTIAL.
�CONFIDENTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, VAX
PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
DTG:061706ZJUN 94
FM: AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3807
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 0789
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1116
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 1753
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0570
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0444
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 1202
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 1058
RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 0217
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0056
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0686
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 1073
G O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUJUMBURA 001947
E.0.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR. PGOV, UNSC, BY
SUBJECT: RWANDA: JOINT DEMARCHE TO BURUNDI
IN SUPPORT OF UN PEACEKEEPING DEPLOYMENT IN RWANDA
REF: (A) STATE 147720 (B) BUJUMBURA 1764
1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.
SUMMARY: CHARGE CALLED ON[
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
MORNING JUNE 3 TO INITIATE COORDINATION OF
DEMARCHE TO BURUNDIANS ON SUPPORT FOR UN PKO TO
RWANDA. | (b)(6)
[INFORMED THAT HE HAD BEEN CALLED
TO GENEVA ON THE WEEKEND TO MEET UNSYG BOUTROUS
GHAU AND WOULD RETURN JUNE 9. HE HAD NOT YET
RECEIVED UN SECRETARIAT INSTRUCTIONS. THE UNSGSR,
HOWEVER, PREFERRED THAT HE APPROACH THE BURUNDIANS
FIRST AND THAT WESTERN COMS FOLLOW UP. WE AGREED TO
REFINE AND DEVELOP AN APPROACH ON HIS RETURN. JUST
PRIOR TO HIS SUNDAY DEPARTURE]
(b)(6) |TOLD CHARGE
THAT THE PRIME MINISTER OVER THE WEEKEND HAD
REPEATED HIS OBJECTION TO THE TRANSIT OF PKO FORCES
AND EQUIPMENT, THOUGH BURUNDI COULD ACCOMMODATE
HUMANITARIAN GOODS. NONETHELESS, AN UNDAUNTED
UNSGSR ASSURED WE WOULD PURSUE THIS CHALLENGE IN
EARNEST IMMEDIATELY UPON HIS RETURN. END SUMMARY.
3. CHARGE CONTACTED 1
(b)(6)
[MORNING JUNE 3
CONCERNING COORDINATION OF DEMARCHE TO BURUNDI ON
USE OF THEIR TERRITORY TO SUPPORT EXPANDED UN
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
2.D\\- 02L(*S-
H
�CONFIDENTIAL
PEACEKEEPING INITIATIVE IN RWANDA. AT THAT POINT
(b)(6)
| HAD NOT RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE UN
"SECRETARIAT BUT SUGGESTED THAT HE WOULD PREFER TO
MAKE THE DEMARCHE AND TO HA^EJfitESIERN MISSIONS
FOLLOW UP WITH THEIR OWN.
(b)(6) IBELIEVED THIS
WOULD BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE APPROACH AT PRESENT
GIVEN BURUNDIAN SENSITIVITIES TO THE RWANDAN
SITUATION AND THEIR PREOCCUPATION WITH PRESIDENTIAL
SUCCESSION DISCUSSIONS.1
EO 13526 1.4b. EO 13526 1.4d
I CHARGE SAID WE WOULD LOOK TO
J O CALL COORDINATION SESSION SOONEST. THE
UNSGSR INFORMED THAT HE HAD BEEN CALLED TO GENEVA TO
MEET WITH BOUTROS GHALI.l
(b)(6)
[WOULD LEAVE JUNE
5 AND RETURN ON THE 9TH; HE RECOMMENDED COORDINATION
ON HIS RETURN.
4. JUST PRIOR TO HIS SUNDAY MORNING DEPARTURE,
TOLD CHARGE THAT HE HAD RAISED GRB SUPPORT
(b)(6)
FOR THE PKO WITH PM KANYENKIKO THE PREVIOUS DAY.
THE PM, HE SAID, VOWED THAT BURUNDI COULD HELP THE
UN EFFORTS TO MOVE HUMANITARIAN RELIEF SUPPLIES BUT
NOT/NOT TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT]
(b)(6)
[SAID HE
WAS NOT PUT OFF BY THE PM'S REACTION, HE DID ADMIT
THAT GETTING BURUNDI TO SERIOUSLY CONSIDER THE
REQUEST WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT. HE MENTIONED THAT
HE HAD RECEIVED ANOTHER INDICATION OF THAT
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
DIFFICULTY FRQMi
WHO VOLUNTEERED HIS OPPOSITION TO ANY
TTOH-im IHE JN MIGHT HAVE IN THAT DIRECTION.
(b)(6)
ECALLED TO CHARGE THAT HE HAD GOTTEN A
MORE PROMISING REACTION EARLIER FROM DARADANGWE'S
SUPERIORS. THE DEFENSE MINISTER AND ARMY CHIEF OF
STAFF, ALBEIT A CONDITIONED RESPONSE (REF B).
HINTS TO BELGIANS
5.
(b)(6)
]REPORTED TO WESTERN
VISIT EARLY LAST WEEK, THE SUBJECT OF
BURUNDI SUPPORT FOR A POSSIBLE UN INITIATIVE WAS
]WAS TRAVELLING THROUGH
(b)(6)
RAISED.
THE REGION AND STOPPED TO ENCOURAGE AND REASSURE THE
GRB ON BELGIUM'S CONTINUED SUPPORT. ACCORDING TO
(b)(6) [INTERIM PRESIDENT NTIBANTUNGANYA WAS
PREOCCUPIED WITH THE ISSUE OF PRESIDENTIAL
SUCCESSION; HE TOLD (b)(6) n" T BURUNDI'S SUPPORT
FOR THE UN WOULD HAVE TO BE STUDIED CAREFULLY. ON
HA
(b)(6)
BROUGHT UP THE
OTHER HAND
(b)(6)
WHO HAD
TOPIC HIMSELF. INTERESTINGLY,
PREVIOUSLY BEEN A STRONG PROPONENT OF A FOREIGN
FORCE FOR BURUNDI LAST OCTOBER TOLD
(b)(6)
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CONFIDENTIAL
CATEGORICALLY THAT BURUNDI COULD NOT/NOT SERVE AS A
TRANSIT POINT FOR PKO TROOPS. THE FORMIN DECLARED
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 BUJUMBURA 001947
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, PGOV, UNSC, BY
SUBJECT: RWANDA: JOINT DEMARCHE TO BURUNDI
IN SUPPORT OF UN PEACEKEEPING DEPLOYMENT IN RWANDA
THAT BURUNDI MILITARY SENSITIVITIES DID NOT PERMIT
T H I S K I N D O F fil I P P O R T MOW
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
LANGE
BT
#1947
NNNN
< SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02
^SSN>1947
<TOR>940606131941 M1084079
<*SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
<*SSNfc>1947
< TOR>940606131943 Ml 084080
A
A
FROM:
SITREPRT
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAL
�OONriDCNTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
*
6
DIST: SIT, DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, SUM, SUM2, VAX
PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
*
/UMX^^
DTG:070042Z JUN 94
FM: USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6944
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 5163
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0602
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY 0466
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0477
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0281
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 1218
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 1027
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1716
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0242
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0265
• C O N r i D C N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 002373
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.0.12356: DECL;OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: COUNCIL REACTIONS TO DRAFT RESOLUTION ON RWANDA
1. OONriDCNTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2- THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS A WHOLE WILL BEGIN
DELIBERATIONS ON A DRAFT RESOLUTION ON RWANDA, IN
RESPONSE TO THE SYG'S 31 MAY REPORT. USUN HAS RECEIVED
COMMENTS FROM PERM FIVE COUNCIL MEMBERS AND NEW ZEALAND
ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION FAXED FROM THE DEPARTMENT 6/6.
COMMENTS ARE KEYED TO PARAGRAPH NUMBERS IN DRAFT
RESOLUTION CONTAINED IN PARA 5 BELOW. UK AND NEW
ZEALAND WISH TO DELETE OP PARA 7 ON SELF-DEFENSE. THEY
ARGUE THAT BY MENTIONING THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT IN THE
CASE OF RWANDA, THE COUNCIL IMPLIES THAT DIFFERENT OR
DEFICIENT RULES OF ENGAGEMENT APPLY IN ALL OTHER PKO'S.
THEY PARTICULARLY OBJECT TO THE MORE DETAILED LANGUAGE
IN THIS PARAGRAPH, AS OPPOSED TO OP PARA 4 OF RESOLUTION
918. USUN EXPLAINED THAT THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT CONCEPT
FOR US. UK AND NZ ALSO WISH TO DELETE THE PARAGRAPH
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
^
™
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAL
S/H/tf
�•eONriDCNTIAL
NOTING THAT UNAMIR WILL NOT ACT AS A BUFFER FORCE.
BARRING THIS, THEY WOULD LIKE TO SEE IT MOVED TO THE
PREAMBLE. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TO MOVE
THIS PARAGRAPH.
3. SEVERAL DELEGATIONS HAVE QUESTIONED THE WISDOM OF
INCLUDING OP PARA 16 AND WOULD LIKE IT TO BE DELETED.
ALL ARE AGREED THAT THE OPERATIVE VERB "DECIDES" IS
INAPPROPRIATE. IN LIGHT OF USUN'S EXPLANATION THAT
WASHINGTON STRONGLY WANTS TO SEE THIS IDEA REFLECTED IN
THE DRAFT, THE UK WILL TRY TO FIND MORE PALATABLE
WORDING FOR THIS PARAGRAPH. NEW ZEALAND SEES NO REASON
WHY THE MANDATE EXTENSION SHOULD BE DEPENDENT UPON
RECEIVING A REPORT FROM THE SYG. IF THE SC REQUESTS A
REPORT, IT WILL CERTAINLY GET ONE, AND MAKING THE
EXTENSION CONDITIONAL SENDS A SIGNAL THAT THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S COMMITMENT IS QUESTIONABLE.
NEW ZEALAND ALSO WANTS TO HAVE ONE PARAGRAPH DEALING
WITH THE ENTIRE MANDATE, RATHER THAN ONE PARA ON THE
MILITARY COMPONENT AND ANOTHER PARA ON THE POLITICAL
COMPONENT. THEY POINT OUT THAT SUCH A SEPARATION HAS
NEVER APPEARED IN AN SC RESOLUTION BEFORE.
4. CHINA WISHES TO DELETE PARAS 13 AND 14 DEALING WITH
THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. FRANCE SUGGESTED TO CHINA
THAT WE FIND AN ALTERNATIVE FORMULATION, RATHER THAN
DELETE THE ENTIRE REFERENCE. THE RPF WOULD LIKE TO SEE
A SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO GENOCIDE, WOULD LIKE THE COUNCIL
TO CREATE A JUDICIAL BODY TO TRY THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR
THE KILLINGS, WOULD LIKE THE COUNCIL TO AUTHORIZE THE
JAMMING OR DESTRUCTION OF RADIO MILLES COLLINES, WOULD
LIKE TO OMIT REFERENCE TO THE SRSG, AND WOULD LIKE THE
COUNCIL TO TAKE ACTION TO SUSPEND THE REPESENTATIVE OF
RWANDA FROM THE COUNCIL5. BEGIN TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION:
THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
-REAFFIRMING ALL ITS PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS ON THE
SITUATION IN RWANDA, IN PARTICULAR ITS RESOLUTION 918
(1994) OF 17 MAY 1994 WHICH EXPANDED THE MANDATE OF THE
UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR)
AND AUTHORIZED AN EXPANSION IN UNAMIR.S FORCE LEVEL,
-RECALLING THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE
COUNCIL ON 3 MAY 1994 (S/PRST/1994/22) WHICH DEALT WITH
IMPROVING THE CAPACITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS FOR
PEACE-KEEPING, AND BEARING IN MIND THE FACTORS
ENUMERATED THEREIN,
-HAVING CONSIDERED THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
DATED 31 MAY 1994 (S/1994/640),
-NOTING WITH CONCERN THAT, TO DATE, THE PARTIES HAVE NOT
CEASED HOSTI
•TIES, AGREED TO A CEASE-FIRE, OR BROUGHT
AN END TO THE VIOLENCE AND CARNAGE ENGULFING RWANDA,
6- 0 N F I D E N T I A-L SECTION 02 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 002373
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
OONriDCNTIAL
�•OONriDCNTIAL
E.0.12356: DECL;OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: COUNCIL REACTIONS TO DRAFT RESOLUTION ON RWANDA
-REITERATING ITS CONDEMNATION OF THE SYSTEMATIC KILLING
OF THOUSANDS OF CIVILIANS IN RWANDA,
-EXPRESSING ITS OUTRAGE THAT THE PERPETRATORS OF THESE
KILLINGS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO OPERATE AND CONTINUE
OPERATING WITHIN RWANDA WITH IMPUNITY,
-UNDERSCORING THAT THE INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT OF SOME 1.5
MILLION RWANDANS FACING STARVATION AND DISEASE AND THE
MASSIVE EXODUS OF REFUGEES TO NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES
CONSTITUTE A HUMANITARIAN CRISIS OF ENORMOUS PROPORTIONS,
-RECALLING IN THIS CONTEXT THAT THE KILLING OF MEMBERS
OF AN ETHNIC GROUP WITH THE INTENTION OF DESTROYING SUCH
A GROUP, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, CONSTITUTES A CRIME
PUNISHABLE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,
-STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT
TO THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT IN RWANDA AND
THE NECESSITY FOR ALL PARTIES TO RECOMMIT THEMSELVES TO
ITS FULL IMPLEMENTATION,
-COMMENDING THE EFFORTS OF NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES FOR THE
HOSPITALITY THEY HAVE SHOWN TO REFUGEES FLEEING RWANDA,
-COMMENDING ALSO THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE MADE
EMERGENCY AID AVAILABLE TO HELP ALLEVIATE THE SUFFERING
OF THE RWANDAN PEOPLE AND THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE
CONTRIBUTED TROOPS AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO UNAMIR, AND
REITERATING THE URGENT NEED FOR COORDINATED
INTERNATIONAL ACTION TO CONTINUE SUCH EFFORTS AND TO
HELP RESTORE PEACE IN RWANDA,
-WELCOMING THE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS
AND THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) AS WELL AS
WITH COUNTRIES OF THE REGION, ESPECIALLY THE FACILITATOR
OF THE ARUSHA PEACE PROCESS,
-WELCOMING THE VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS TO RWANDA AND TO THE
REGION;
-WELCOMING ALSO RESOLUTION S-3/1 OF MAY 25 ADOPTED BY
THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS SITTING IN
SPECIAL SESSION, WHICH REQUESTED THE APPOINTMENT OF A
SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR TO INVESTIGATE THE HUMAN RIGHTS
SITUATION IN RWANDA AND CALLED FOR THE SPECIAL
RAPPORTEUR, ASSISTED BY A TEAM OF HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD
OFXICERS, TO ACT IN CLOSE COOPERATION WITH UNAMIR AND
OTHER UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES AND PROGRAMMES OPERATING
IN RWANDA;
-REAFFIRMING ITS COMMITMENT TO THE UNITY AND TEFiRITORIAL
INTEGRITY OF RWANDA,
-STRESSING THAT THE PEOPLE OF RWANDA BEAR THE PRIMARY
RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION OF THEIR COUNTRY,
-NOTING THAT THERE IS NO INTENTION TO HAVE UNAMIR ASSUME
THE ROLE OF A BUFFER FORCE BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES, OR
TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION TO COMPEL THE TWO PARTIES TO END
THEIR FIGHTING;
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
e
6
H
m
e
l
m
c
�SONriDCNTIAL
-1. ENDORSES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PROPOSAL,
CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPHS 19-26 OF HIS REPORT OF 31 MAY
1994 (S/1994/640), TO DEPLOY THE FIRST AND SECOND PHASES
OF UNAMIR IN CLOSE SYNCHRONIZATION;
-2. DECIDES TO EXTEND THE MANDATE OF UNAMIR UNTIL 6
DECEMBER 1994, WITH THE PROVISO THAT THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL WILL SUBMIT A REPORT BY 8 AUGUST FOR
SECURITY COUNCIL REVIEW OF THE PROGRESS OF UNAMIR.S
MILITARY MISSION, PROGRESS TOWARD A CEA&E-FIRE AND
POLITICAL RECONCILIATION, THE CONTINUING THREAT TO THE
G O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 002373
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.0.12356: DECLOADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: COUNCIL REACTIONS TO DRAFT RESOLUTION ON RWANDA
CIVILIAN POPULATION, AND THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION;
-3. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT ALSO ON
VARIOUS DEVELOPMENTS AS DETAILED IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF THIS
RESOLUTION IN GOOD TIME BEFORE THE EXPIRATION OF
UNAMIR'S CURRENT MANDATE;
-4. DECIDES THAT, IN LIGHT OF PARAGRAPH 3 OF RESOLUTION
918 (1994 AND PARAGRAPH 18 OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S
REPORT OF 31 MAY 1994, AND WITHIN THE LIMITS OF
AVAILABLE RESOURCES, THE MANDATE OF THE MILITARY
COMPONENT OF UNAMIR WILL BE:
-(A) TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE SECURITY END PROTECTION OF
DISPLACED PERSONS, REFUGEES AND CIVILIANS AT RISK IN
RWANDA, INCLUDING THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT AND
MAINTENANCE, WHERE FEASIBLE, OF SECURE HUMANITARIAN
AREAS; AND
-(B) TO PROVIDE SECURITY AND SUPPORT FOR THE
DISTRIBUTION OF RELIEF SUPPLIES AND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF
OPERATIONS;
-5. REAFFIRMS THE CONTINUING MANDATE OF THE POLITICAL
COMPONENT OF UNAMIR TO ACT AS AN INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN
THE PARTIES IN AN ATTEMPT TO SECURE THEIR AGREEMENT TO A
CEASE-FIRE,
-6. WELCOMES THE ASSURANCES OF BOTH PARTIES TO
COOPERATE WITH UNAMIR IN CARRYING OUT ITS MANDATE,
RECOGNIZES THAT THOSE ASSURANCES ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE
MANDATE.S IMPLEMENTATION, AND DEMANDS THAT BOTH PARTIES
ADHERE TO THOSE ASSURANCES,
-7. REAFFIRMS THAT, CONSISTENT WITH PARAGRAPH 4 OF
RESOLUTION 918 (1994), UNAMIR MAY BE REQUIRED TO TAKE
ACTION IN SELF-DEFENCE INCLUDING RESISTING ATTEMPTS BY
FORCEFUL MEANS TO PREVENT IT FROM DISCHARGING DUTIES
SUCH AS CONTRIBUTING TO THE SECURITY OF DISPLACED
PERSONS, REFUGEES AND CIVILIANS AT RISK IN RWANDA,
UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER HUMANITARIAN PERSONNEL AND
HELPING PROTECT THE MEANS OF DELIVERY AND DISTRIBUTION
OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF, AND THUS BE ADEQUATELY EQUIPPED
AND PROVIDED THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT TO DO SO;
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFiDENTIAL •
�OONriDCNTIAL
-8. AFFIRMS THE COUNCIL'S EXPECTATION THAT, FOLLOWING
THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS MILITARY COMPONENT,
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL MAINTAIN ITS COMMITMENT
TO ASSIST THE RWANDAN PEOPLE THROUGH THE WORK OF THE
UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES, NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
AND OTHER ENTITIES, AND NOTES FURTHER THAT UNAMIR'S
EXPANDED MILITARY COMPONENT WILL REMAIN IN RWANDA ONLY
AS LONG AS IT IS NEEDED TO PROVIDE BASIC SECURITY TO
POPULATIONS AT RISK AND SECURITY FOR THE DELIVERY OF
HUMANITARIAN RELIEF TO THEM IN RWANDA;
-9. DEMANDS THAT ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT CEASE
HOSTILITIES, AGREE TO A CEASE-FIRE AND IMMEDIATELY TAKE
STEPS TO BRING AN END TO SYSTEMATIC KILLINGS IN AREAS
UNDER THEIR CONTROL;
-10. DEMANDS FURTHER THAT ALL PARTIES CEASE FORTHWITH
ANY INCITEMENT, ESPECIALLY THROUGH THE MASS MEDIA, TO
VIOLENCE OR ETHNIC HATRED;
-11. REAFFIRMS THE OBLIGATION OF ALL STATES TO
IMPLEMENT FULLY THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 13 OF
RESOLUTION 918 (1994) ON THE SALE TO RWANDA OF ARMS
RELATED MATERIEL;
-12. URGES MEMBER STATES TO RESPOND PROMPTLY TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR RESOURCES, INCLUDING
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT CAPABILITY FOR RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF
ADDITIONAL UNAMIR FORCES;
C O N r i D C N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 002373
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.0.12356: DECL;OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: COUNCIL REACTIONS TO DRAFT RESOLUTION ON RWANDA
-13. REQUESTS UNAMIR TO FACILITATE, WHERE POSSIBLE, THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR AND THE TEAM OF
HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD OFFICERS REQUESTED BY THE UNITED
NATIONS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SPECIAL
RAPPORTEUR OF THE COMMISSION IN THE FURTHERANCE OF THEIR
MANDATES AND TO ENLIST THE COOPERATION OF THE PARTIES TO
THE CONFLICT WITH THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR AND HUMAN
RIGHTS FIELD OFFICERS,
-14- REQUESTS ALSO THAT UNAMIR DESIGNATE AN OFFICER TO
SERVE AS LIAISON WITH THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENSURING COORDINATION BETWEEN
UNAMIR AND THE HIGH COMMISSIONER AND THE SPECIAL
RAPPORTEUR FOR RWANDA ESTABLISHED BY THE COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, INCLUDING THE SHARING OF INFORMATION FROM
GOVERNMENTS, INDIVIDUALS, INTERGOVERNMENTAL AND
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND UNAMIR ITSELF, ON
POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND BREACHES OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW,
-15. DEMANDS THAT ALL PARTIES IN RWANDA STRICTLY
RESPECT THE PERSONS AND PREMISES OF THE UNITED NATIONS
AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS SERVING IN RWANDA, AND REFRAIN
FROM ANY ACTS OF INTIMIDATION OR VIOLENCE AGAINST
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAL
�—CQNROENTIAL
PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN HUMANITARIAN AND PEACE-KEEPING WORK;
-16. DECIDES THAT UNAMIR AND OTHER UNITED NATIONS
PERSONNEL SHALL UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES BE DETAINED WHILE
PERFORMING THEIR MANDATE IN RWANDA.AND DECIDES FURTHER
THAT IF SUCH PERSONS SHOULD BE DETAINED, THEY SHALL BE
RELEASED IMMEDIATELY, AND THAT WHILE IN THE CUSTODY OF
ANY PARTY TO THE CONFLICT SUCH PERSONS SHALL BE PROVIDED
ALL PROTECTIONS EQUIVALENT TO THOSE CONTAINED IN THE
GENEVA CONVENTION RELATED TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS
OF WAR, PENDING THEIR IMMEDIATE RELEASE AND REPATRIATION
TO UNITED NATIONS AUTHORITIES;
-17. COMMENDS THE EFFORTS OF STATES, UNITED NATIONS
AGENCIES, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND
NON-GOVERNMENTAL OR
GANIZATIONS WHICH HAVE PROVIDED
HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER ASSISTANCE, ENCOURAGES THEM TO
CONTINUE AND INCREASE SUCH ASSISTANCE, AND URGES OTHERS
TO PROVIDE SUCH ASSISTANCE;
-18. COMMENDS THE TIRELESS EFFORTS OF THE UNAMIR FORCE
COMMANDER TO PREVENT MORE INNOCENT LIVES FROM BEING
LOST, AND TO BRING ABOUT A CEASE-FIRE BETWEEN THE
PARTIES,
-19. INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HIS SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE, IN COORDINATION WITH THE OAU AND
COUNTRIES IN THE REGION, TO CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS TO
ACHIEVE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN RWANDA WITHIN THE
FRAMEWORK OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT AND DEMANDS THAT
THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE SERIOUS EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT
POLITICAL RECONCILIATION,
-20. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
ALBRIGHT
BT
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FROM:
SITREPRT
CLINTON LIBRARV PHOTOCOPY
CONriDENTIAL
�CON PI DENTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: SIT, CLARKER, DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, STEINBERG, SUM, SUM2, VAX
PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
DTG:080937Z JUN 94
FM: USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6976
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 5177
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0609
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY 0472
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0486
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0251
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0290
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 1222
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0272
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 1033
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1721
G O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 002390
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.0.12356: DECL;OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: COUNCIL DISCUSSES RWANDA RESOLUTION, 6/7
REF: A) STATE 150911, B) USUN 2373
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: AFTER A MARATHON SESSION OF 7 HOURS, THE
SECURITY COUNCIL WORKING GROUP FINISHED REVISING THE
TEXT OF THE RWANDA RESOLUTION (REFTELS). AS PREDICTED
BY USUN, SEVERAL PARAGRAPHS PROPOSED IN REF A, WHICH
DEVIATED EITHER FROM THE TEXT OF RESOLUTION 918 OR FROM
THE REPORT, RAN INTO WIDESPREAD AND STAUNCH OPPOSITION.
CLEAN TEXT WILL BE FAXED TO WASHINGTON. REFERENCES TO
THE SUNSET CLAUSE, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE, THE
SPECIFIC MANDATE, AND THAT UNAMIR WILL NOT BE A BUFFER
FORCE REMAIN, BUT IN SHORTENED FORM. PARAGRAPH NUMBERS
IN REMARKS BELOW ARE KEYED TO PARAGRAPH NUMBERS IN REF
B. END SUMMARY.
OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS
3. THE UNANIMOUS VIEW OF THE COUNCIL ON OP PARA 1 WAS
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAL
a o n
_
o X U
3. ^
�CONFIDENTIAL
THAT THE SYG'S REPORT MUST BE WELCOMED. THERE WAS A
DEBATE ON WHETHER ENDORSEMENT OF THE SYG'S PROPOSALS
SHOULD BE IN GENERAL OR VERY SPECIFIC TERMS.
ENDORSEMENT OF THE PROPOSALS BECAME NEW OP PARA 2. AT
1.4b, 1.4dllNSISTANCE, SPECIFIC LANGUAGE WAS PUT INTO
BRACKETS SPELLING OUT THE SYG'S CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.
4. ON OP PARA 2, THERE WAS NO SUPPORT IN THE COUNCIL
FOR MAKING THE EXTENSION OF THE MANDATE PROVISIONAL ON
RECEIPT OF A REPORT. THIS COULD GIVE THE INCORRECT
IMPRESSION THAT THE SC.S SUPPORT FOR UNAMIR WAS
UNSTEADY- THE REQUEST FOR A REPORT WAS SEPARATED OUT,
AND MOVED TO ITS USUAL PLACE AT THE END OF THE
RESOLUTION^JEWQREPORTS ARE ASKED FOR, ON 9 AUGUST AND
ARGUED FOR A 3 MONTH, RATHER THAN A 6
9 OCTOBER.
MONTH EXTENSION, BUT RECEIVED NO SUPPORT FROM THE REST
OF THE COUNCIL THEY SEEM TO HAVE BEEN SWAYED BY THE
ARGUMENT THAT A 3 MONTH MANDATE WOULD EXPIRE IN
SEPTEMBER, AT WHICH TIME RWANDA WOULD PRESIDE OVER THE
COUNCIL, MAKING IT UNWISE TO SCHEDULE ACTION DURING THAT
MONTH.
5. OP PARA 3 WAS SUBSUMED IN THE REQUEST FOR A REPORT,
NOW APPEARING IN NEW PARA 16. OP PARAS 4 AND 5 WERE
COMBINED, IN ORDER TO STATE THE COMPLETE MANDATE IN ONE
PARAGRAPH AND AVOID CONFUSION.
6. OP PARA 6 WAS REWORDED SLIGHTLY TO TALK ABOUT THE
"EFFECTIVE" IMPLEMENTATIQN-OEJDJEJWIANDATF AS A
nQMeRQMlSE-BETWEEN THE
POSITIONSDOES NOT WANT THE COOPERATION OF THE PARTIES
TO BE A PRECONDITION; THE U.S. INSISTED SUCH COOPERATION
WAS ESSENTIALf
HMAY RE-OPEN THIS PARA AGAIN
TO TRY TO CHANGE THE WORD "ESSENTIAL" TO "IMPORTANT".
USUN BELIEVES, HOWEVER, THAT THE NEW COMPROMISE WORDING
WILL PREVAIL.
7. OP PARA 7 RAN INTO UNREMITTING OPPOSITION.
^LL ARGUED STRENUOUSLYTO
DELETE THE PARAGRAPH IN ITS ENTIRETY, SINCE A SIMILAR
kBBEABEDJNJ3ESO.LUTION 918.
ALL INSISTED THAT IT
WAS IMPORTANT TO RETAIN THE PARAGRAPH, BUT THAT ANY
DEVIATION FROM THE 918 LANGUAGE WOULD LEAD TO CONFUSION
AND MISINTERPRETATION OF WHAT THE COUNCIL HAD IN MIND.
THE U.S. DELEGATION FOUND NO ONE IN SUPPORT OF THE
LANGUAGE AS PROPOSED IN REF A. IN ORDER TO PREVENT
COMPLETE DELETION OF THIS IMPORTANT PARAGRAPH, THE TEXT
USED IN RESOLUTION 918 WAS REITERATED.
8. THE PORTION OF OP PARA 8 DEALING WITH THE
CONTINUATION OF UN AGENCY ACTIVITIES IN RWANDA AFTER THE
WITHDRAWAL OF UNAMIR'S MILITARY CONTINGENI_WAS_THaUGH."i;
TO BE UNNECESSARY AND INAPPROPRIATE BM
G O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 002390
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
E.0.12356: DECL;OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
^SUBJECT: COUNC1LDISCUSSES RWANDA RESOLUTION. 6/7
1.4b, 1.4d
[AT LEAST FOUR DELEGATIONS ARGUED TO
DELETE THE ENTIRE PARAGRAPH, WITH USDEL MAKING THE POINT
THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR US TO RETAIN SOME
JEOBESiHADOWING OF THE END OF THIS OPERATION.
SUGGESTED THE COMPROMISE THAT THE SUNSET CLAUSE
BE MOVED TO THE PREAMBLE. AND REFORMULATED- THE NEW
WORDING IS: "NOTING FURTHER THAT UNAMIR WILL CONTINUE
ONLY AS LONG AS REQUIRED TO CARRY OUT THE TASKS FOR
WHICH IT WAS ESTABLISHED." SEVERAL DELEGATIONS
GRUDGINGLY AGREED TO ALLOW THAT LANGUAGE TO REMAIN.
WHILE INDICATING THAT THIS FORMULATION WAS AS FAR AS
THEY WERE PREPARED TO GO. ANY ATTEMPTS TO EXPAND ON
THIS COMPROMISE LANGUAGE IS LIKELY TO REKINDLE THE
EFFORT TO DELETE IT IN ITS ENTIRETY.
9. OP 9 AND 10 REMAINED UNCHANGED- OP 11 WAS DROPPED
AS REDUNDANT, SINCE THE ARMS EMBARGO WAS PUT IN PLACE
LESS THAN ONE MONTH AGO. AND THE COUNCIL SAW NO REASON
TO REAFFIRM IT SO SOON AFTER ITS ADOPTION. IN OTHER
CASES (SUCH AS ANGOLA OR SOMALIA) WHERE THE SC
REAFFIRMED AN ARMS EMBARGO, IT DID SO A YEAR OR MORE
AFTER IT WAS PUT INTO EFFECT. THE COUNCIL WOULD NOT
LIKE TO PROMOTE THE EXPECTATION THAT EVERY RESOLUTION,
IN EVERY SITUATION WHERE THERE IS AN EMBARGO, WILL
REAFFIRM IT.
10. OP 12 REMAINS THE SAME_QES_1.3-AND 14 WERE
STRONGLY OPPOSED BY
IN AN ATTEMPT TO MEET
THEIR CONCERNS THAT THE HUMAN RIGHTS WORKERS NOT BE
SINGLED OUT FOR PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT, OPS 13 AND 14
WERE COMBINED AND SHORTENED TO ASK UNAMIR TO GIVE THE
HUMAN RIGHTS SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR THE SAME COOPERATION IT
GIVES TO DHA AND HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES.
11. OP 15 REMAINS THE SAME. OP 16, AS FORMULATED IN
REF A, HAD NO SUPPORT FROM ANY MEMBER OF THE COUNCIL.
US DEL EXPLAINED THAT THE USG WAS EAGER TO TAKE UN
PEACEKEEPERS OUT OF "LEGAL LIMBO", AND EXTEND THE
PROTECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO THEM IN-ADVANCE-QF A
TREATY ON THEIR SECURITY BEING CONCLUDED.!
SUGGESTED THAT APPROPRIATE LANGUAGE FROM
"HESOnjnONTBBB BE INSERTED INTO THE TEXT TO COVER THIS
POINT. NEW COMPROMISE LANGUAGE DRAWS FROM PARA 6 OF
RESOLUTION 868 ON THE SAFETY OF UN PERSONNEL.
12. OP 17 REMAINS THE SAME. OP 18 WAS SURPRISINGLY
CONTROVERSIAL, AS
[ARGUED THAT THE
SRSG SHOULD ALSO P T T C O M M E N D E D ^ H E ' O P I N I Q N Qfj
PREVAILED, AND THE FORCE COMMANDER WAS SINGTEinTUUTFOR
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT PRAISE. WHILE THE SG AND SRSG WERE
COMMENDED IN OP 19.
PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS
13. THERE WAS MUCH RE-ORDERING AND CONSOLIDATING OF
PARAGRAPHS. |
[PREFERED TO
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
DELETE ANY REFERENCE TO THE PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT OF
MAY 3.1994, AND IN ANY CASE DID NOT WISH TO CONDENSE
THE FOUR PAGE STATEMENT INTO A ONE-SENTENCE SYNOPSIS.
DESPITE INTENSE OPPOSITION, US DEL CONVINCED THE COUNCIL
TO RETAIN A SHORTENED VERSION OF PREAMB PARA B.
14. A PREAMB PABA.QbLGENaCJDE_WASJiD.DECLArT.HEINSISTENCE OR
1.4b, 1.4d
AS FOLLOWS: "NOTING WITH THE GRAVEST CONCERN THE
REPORTS THAT GENOCIDE HAS OCCURRED IN RWANDA AND
RECALLING IN THIS CONTEXT THAT GENOCIDE CONSTITUTES A
CRIME PUNISHABLE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW." THIS
LANGUAGE WAS ACCEPTED AFTER A PROLONGED DEBATE OVER
WHETHER IT WAS BEST TOREFER TO REPORTS OF "ACTS OF
GENOCIDE^OR "GENOCIDE".
15.1
bBJECTED TO THE PREAMB PARA ON THE UN
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS. THE PARA WAS SHORTENED.
G-0 N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 002390
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN. DIR JS. J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.0.12356: DECLOADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL. PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW. UNSC
SUBJECT: COUNCIL DISCUSSES RWANDA RESOLUTION, 6/7
SEVERAL DELEGATIONS NOTED THAT THE PREAMB PARA ON THE
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE RWANDAN PEOPLE NO LONGER MENTIONED
THE "ULTIMATE" RESPONSIBILITY, BUT NOW SPOKE OF THE
"PRIMARY" RESPONSIBILITY. THIS OPENED THE DOOR TO A
LENGTHY DEBATE ON WHAT PURPOSE WAS SERVED BY INCLUDING
THIS PARAGRAPH AT ALL, SINCE IT HAD ALREADY BEEN
INCLUDED IN PREVIOUS PARAS- DESPITE US DELS
EXPLANATIONS OF THE SUBTLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN "PRIMARY"
AND "ULTIMATE" RESPONSIBILITY, AND AN EVENTUAL
ACQUIESCENCE IN REVERTING TO LANGUAGE FROM RESOLUILON
918. THE PARA WAS DROPPED AT THE INSISTENCE OF
_ NO ONE SUPPORTED THE US
DESIRE TO RETAIN THE PARA.
16. SIMILARLY. THERE WAS A STRONG PUSH TO DELETE THE
PARA NOTING THAT UNAMIR WOULD NOT BE A BUFFER FORCE. US
DEL CONVEYED THAT IT WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE USG T$
DROP THAT PARA. |__
[SUPPORTED RETAINING THIS PARA.
| POINTED OUT THAT BY SAYING UNAMIR HAD NO
INTENTION OF "TAKING MILITARY ACTION TO COMPEL AN END TO
FIGHTING", THE ROBUST RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WHICH GAVE
UNAMIR THE RIGHT TO DEFEND ITS MANDATE IN SELF-DEFENSE
COULD BE CALLED INTO QUESTION. FOR THE SAKE OF NOT
COMPROMISING THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE. OR CREATING
CONFUSION, SEVERAL DELEGATIONS SUGGESTED THAT THE SECOND
HALF OF THE PARA BE DROPPED, RETAININGJDislLYJTHE WORDING
DERIVED FROM THE SYG'S REPORT. I
|PROPOSED
PUTTING THE PARA MORE IN THE PRESENT TENSE. AND
DISPENSING WITH "INTENTIONS" ABOUT THE FUTURE. NEW
COMPROMISE WORDING READS: "NOTING THAT UNAMIR IS NOT TO
HAVE THE ROLE OF A BUFFER FORCE BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES."
17. COUNCIL HOPES TO ADOPT THE RESOLUTION WEDNESDAY OR
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
THURSDAY. COMPLETE TEXT BEING FAXED.
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED
ALBRIGHT
BT
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FROM:
SITREPRT
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAL
�J.UN 15 '94
02:01PM
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
�JUN-15 '94 02:O9Pr'|
OUTGOING TELEGKAn
--T
P.
AUTH
DRAFT.
CLEAR 1
. 2.
S .
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4
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CONriDENTIAL-
IO/UNP:SSELLERS:SDS
Db/lS/TH 7-DD3fl
SEUNPT 32S
P: PTARNOFF
10 . DBENNET
'
L/UNA:EBLOOM
IO/E:ROLSEN
USUN/U:DSCHEFFER
OSD:
NSC:
IMMEDIATE
E.O. ISBSt:
TAGS:
IO/UNP:JSNYDER
AF/C:KAISTON
DRL:MMARTINEZ
JCS:
S/S:
S/S-0:
USUN N W YORK
E
DECL: OADR
PREL, USUN
SUBJECT: DRAFT SPANISH RESOLUTION O COMMISSION OF
N
EXPERTS FOR RUANDA: U.S. RESPONSE
REF:
1.
USUNfa/13FAX
-CONriDCNTIAL- - ENTIRE TEXT •
2. DEPARTMENT HAS CONSIDERED THE SPANISH DRAFT SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION O A COMMISSION OF EXPERTS O
N
N
ATROCITIES IN RUANDA. IT IS IMPORTANT TO SUPPORT THE
SPANISH INITIATIVE AND TO DEMONSTRATE OUR COMMITMENT TO
INVESTIGATE THE GROSS VIOLATIONS OF H M N RIGHTS IN
UA
RUANDA, HOUEVER, UE D NOT UANT TO RESTRICT FUTURE ACTION
O
BY DICTATING AT THIS TIME UHAT FORM IT MUST TAKE O
R
THROUGH UHICH FORA IT MIGHT BE IMPLEMENTED.
3. IN PRESENTING U.S. MODIFICATIONS TO THE SPANISH,
MISSION SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT UE APPRECIATE THE ROLE THE
SPANISH HAVE TAKEN IN INTRODUCING THIS RESOLUTION AND THAT
UE ARE INTERESTED IN CONTINUING TO UORK UITH THEM AND
OTHER INTERESTED COUNCIL MEMBERS TO SHAPE THE UN'S ONGOING
RESPONSE TO CONDITIONS IN RUANDA.
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
aon- ox\*3- n
3/1 y/5" KBH
�JUN 15 '94 02:10PM
P.2
-€QNFIDENTIAL
H. THE DEPARTMENT INSTRUCTS THE MISSION, THEREFORE, T O
SUPPORT THE TEXT O THE SPANISH DRAFT RESOLUTION CONTAINED
F
REF UITH THE FOLLOWING'CHANGES:
INCLUDE A ADDITIONAL PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH THAT UILL READ:
N
BEGIN TEXT!
NOTING THE IMPORTANCE O THE ENFORCEMENT O INTERNATIONAL
F
F
HUMANITARIAN LAU IN THE EXECUTION O THE SECURITY
F
COUNCIL'S PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY U D R THE CHARTER O THE
NE
F
UNITED NATIONS T MAINTAIN INTERNATIONAL PEACE A D
O
N
SECURITY,
END TEXT.
ADD A OPENING OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH -COP'n UHICH READS:
N
BEGIN TEXT:
AFFIRMS THAT ALL PERSONS U O COMMIT O AUTHORIZE
H
R
VIOLATIONS O INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAU ARE
F
INDIVIDUALLY RESPONSIBLE F R THOSE VIOLATIONS;
O
END TEXT.
ADD A N U OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH AFTER CURRENT O 4 UHICH
N E
P
READS:
BEGIN.TEXT!
REQUESTS THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR APPOINTED B THE UNITED
Y
NATIONS COMMISSION O H M N RIGHTS T INVESTIGATE THE
N UA
O
H M N RIGHTS SITUATION IN R A D T COORDINATE HIS EFFORTS
UA
UNA O
UITH THOSE O THE COMMISSION O EXPERTS:
F
F
END TEXT.
END CURRENT O FOUR AFTER THE U R "EXPERTS" S THAT IT
P
OD
O
UILL READ:
BEGIN TEXT:
FURTHER REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL T REPORT TO THE
O
COUNCIL O THE CONCLUSIONS O THE COMMISSION O EXPERTS;
N
F
F
END TEXT.
5. THE SPANISH TEXT UITH THE U.S. MODIFICATIONS UOULD
THEN READ:
BEGIN TEXT: .
CONriDCNTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�JUN 15 '94 02:12PM
P. 3
•CONFIDCNTIAL
THE SECURITY COUNCIL
REAFFIRMING ALL ITS PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS ON THE SITUATION
IN RUANDA •
;
RECALLING THE STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL OF 30 APRIL I ' m -CS/PRST/^H/Sl} IN UHICH THE
SECURITY COUNCIL INTER ALIA CONDEMNED ALL BREACHES OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAU IN RUANDA, PARTICULARLY
THOSE PERPATRATED AGAINST THE CIVILIAN POPULATION, AND
RECALLED THAT PERSONS UHO INSTIGATE O PARTICIPATE IN SUCH
R
ACTS ARE INDIVIDUALLY RESPONSIBLE.
RECALLING ALSO THE REQUESTS IT ADDRESSED TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL, IN THE STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF 30 APRIL I W AND IN RESOLUTION
Tlfl { I ' m } , CONCERNING THE INVESTIGATION OF SERIOUS
VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAU COMMITTED IN
RUANDA DURING THE CONFLICT.
HAVING CONSIDERED THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF
31 MAY I W •CS/l'm/bHO}, IN UHICH ' E NOTED THAT MASSACRES
H
AND KILLINGS HAVE CONTINUED IN A SYSTEMATIC MANNER
THROUGHOUT RUANDA AND ALSO NOTED THAT ONLY A PROPER
INVESTIGATION CAN ESTABLISH THE FACTS AND DEFINITE
CULPABILITY.
EXPRESSING ONCE AGAIN ITS GRAVEST CONCERN AT THE
CONTINUING REPORTS INDICATING THAT SYSTEMATIC, UIDESPREAD
AND FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAU,
INCLUDING ACTS OF GENOCIDE, HAVE BEEN COMMITTED IN RUANDA.
NOTING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ENFORCEMENT OR INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAU IN THE EXECUTION OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL'S PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS TO MAINTAIN INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND
SECURITYi
OP 1. AFFIRMS THAT ALL PERSONS U O COMMIT O AUTHORIZE
H
R
VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAU ARE
INDIVIDUALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THOSE VIOLATIONS;
OP 2. CALLS UPON STATES AND, AS APPROPRIATE,
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS TO COLLATE
SUBSTANTIATED INFORMATION IN THEIR POSSESSION O SUBMITTED
R
TO THEM RELATING TO GRAVE VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAU, INCLUDING BREACHES OF THE CONVENTION ON
CONriDENTIA'b
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�JUN 15 '94 02:13PM'
P.4
•CONriDENTIAL
THE PREVENTION A D PUNISHMENT O THE CRIME O GENOCIDE
N
F
F
BEING COMMITTED IN THE TERRITORY O R A D , A D REQUESTS
F WNA N
STATES, RELEVANT UNITED NATIONS BODIES, A D RELEVANT
N
ORGANIZATIONS T M K THIS INFORMATION AVAILABLE WITHIN
O AE
THIRTY DAYS O THE ADOPTION O THE PRESENT RESOLUTION A D
F
F
N
AS APPROPRIATE THEREAFTER, A D T PROVIDE OTHER
N O
APPROPRIATE ASSISTANCE T THE COMMISSION O EXPERTS
O
F
REFERRED T IN PARAGRAPH 3 B L W ,
O
EO'
O 3- REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL T ESTABLISH A A
P
O
S
MATTER O URGENCY, A IMPARTIAL COMMISSION O EXPERTS T
F
N
F
O
EXAMINE A D ANALYSE THE INFORMATION SUBMITTED PURSANT T
N
O
THE PRESENT RESOLUTION, TOGETHER WITH SUCH FURTHER
INFORMATION AS THE COMMISSION O EXPERTS M Y OBTAIN
F
A
T R U H ITS O N INVESTIGATIONS O EFFORTS, O OTHER
HOG
W
R
F
PERSONS O BODIES, UITH A VIEU T PROVIDING THE
R
O
SECRETARY-GENERAL UITH ITS CONCLUSIONS O THE EVIDENCE O
N
F
BREACHES O THE CONVENTION O GENOCIDE A D OTHER GRAVE
F
N
N
VIOLATIONS O INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAU COMMITTED IN
F
THE TERRITORY O R A D '
F WNA,
O 4. ALSO REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL T REPORT T
P
O
O
THE COUNCIL O THE ESTABLISHMENT O THE COMMISSION O
N
F
F
EXPERTS,
OP 5. FURTHER REQUESTS THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR APPOINTED
BY THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS TO
INVESTIGATE THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN RWANDA TO
COORDINATE HIS EFFORTS WITH THOSE OF THE COMMISSION OF
EXPERTS \
OP t. REQUESTS THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR APPOINTED B THE
Y
UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION O H M N RIGHTS T INVESTIGATE
N UA
O
THE H M N RIGHTS SITUATION IN R A D T COORDINATE HIS
UA
WNA O
EFFORTS UITH THOSE O THE COMMISSION O EXPERTS',
F
F
OP L. DECIDES T REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED O THE MATTER.
O
F
END TEXT.
VV
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFI-^ENTIAU-
�WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, VAX
PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS. 68NPIDE!N I IAL
DTG:161221Z JUN 94
FM: AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3913
RUEHMG/USLO MOGADISHU IMMEDIATE 0011
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 0278
RUEHNRIAMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE 1813
RUTAKMIAMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE 1112
RUEHKIIAMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0476
RUEHDRIAMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE 1238
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0830
RUEHFRIAMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1152
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0602
RUCNDTIUSMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0722
RUSNNOG/USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASH DC PRIORITY
-e 6 14'P' I 0 E M I I A l
SECTION 01 OF 03 BUJUMBURA 002092
STATE FOR AF/C, PASS USAID FOR BHRIOFDA; GENEVA
FOR RMA; LONDON FOR MCKINLEY; PARIS FOR PERLOW;
NAIROBI FOR USAID/REDSO FOR DART/RWANDA
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PINS, EAID, MASS, KA, RW, BY, XA
SUBJECT: DALLAIRE URGES RAPID RESPONSE TO UNAMIR
REQUESTS}
REF: NAIROBI 9554
1.)t'- ENTIRE TEXT.
SUMMARY
2. ON JUNE 15 WHILE IN TRANSIT TO BURUNDI,
AMBASSADOR RAWSON, SCOTI FISHER (AF/RA), COL. MIKE
BERAUD (OSD/ISA) AND KATE FARNSWORTH (USAID/OFDA)
MET FOR HALF AN HOUR WITH GENERAL DALLAIRE,
COMMANDER OF UNAMIR FORCES IN RWANDA AT UN
HEADQUARTERS IN NAIROBI. ALSO ATIENDING THE
MEETING WAS CHARLES PETRIE, UNDP DEPUTY RESIDENT
REPRESENTATIVE FOR RWANDA AND COORDINATOR OF THE
UN EMERGENCY OFFICE FOR RWANDA (UN/REO). DALLAIRE
MADE THREE REQUESTS OF THE US DELEGATION: RAPID
DEPLOYMENT OF EQUIPMENT FOR THE GHANAIAN AND
SENEGALESE UNAMIR TROOPS; A MOVEMENT CONTROL UNIT
- - - - - - - -
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. 0. 13526
GOt~FI Ol!rf'f'IAI:
~ll"' Ott~..,""
"I,~,,~ lliJJ.l
�CONFIDENTIAL
FOR LOGISTICS BACK-UP AT-UP ENTEBBE, NAIROBI AND
KIGALI FOR THE UNAMIR EXPANDED DEPLOYMENT, AND USG
ASSISTANCE WITH SATELLITE IMAGERY TO FIND THE
WHEREABOUTS OF DISPLACED PEOPLE MOVING IN RGF
CONTROLLED AREAS. HE DOUBTED THAT BURUNDI WOULD
ACCEPT BUJUMBURA AS A STAGING POINT FOR UNAMIR
TROOPS BUT URGED THE USG DELEGATION TO PURSUE THE
ISSUE WITH THE GOB. THE GENERAL ALSO EXPRESSED
OPTIMISM ABOUT PEACE EFFORTS BEING MADE BY UNAMIR,
SAYING "WE HAVE THEM TALKING NUTS AND BOLTS."
END SUMMARY.
MOBILIZATION OF GHANAIAN AND SENEGALESE
CONTINGENTS
3. THE AMBASSADOR OPENED THE MEETING WITH WORDS
OF CONGRATULATION AND ADMIRATION FOR THE WORK THAT
UNAMIR IS DOING UNDER MOST DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES
IN KIGALI. HE ALSO OFFERED HIS CONDOLENCES FOR
THE LOSSES UNAMIR HAS SUSTAINED IN CARRYING OUT
ITS MISSION.
4. TURNING TO TECHNICAL ISSUES, THE AMBASSADOR
ACKNOWLEDGED RECEIPT OF THE EQUIPMENT REQUESTS FOR
THE GHANAIAN AND SENEGALESE CONTINGENTS. IN VIEW
OF THE EXTENSIVE LIST OF EQUIPMENT REQUESTED, HE
INFORMED THE GENERAL THAT THE DEPARTMENT HAD
REQUESTED THE UN REVIEW AND "SCRUB" THE LISTS.
THE GENERAL AGREED THAT THE ORIGINAL EQUIPMENT
LISTS SUBMITTED BY THE GHANAIANS WERE UNREASONABLE
AND THAT HE HAD MODIFIED AND REDUCED THE REQUEST.
5. THE AMBASSADOR INFORMED DALLAIRE THAT THE
CONTRACT FOR THE ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS
(APCS) FROM GERMANY HAD BEEN SIGNED. HE
EXPRESSED HIS HOPE THAT DEPLOYMENT OF THESE ASSETS
COULD BE ACCELERATED IN THE NEXT WEEKS. DALLAIRE
NOTED THAT SOMALIA-BASED APCS SHOULD BE ARRIVING
IN KIGALI THIS WEEK. HE ADDED THAT AN ADDITIONAL
150 GHANAIANS WERE ON THEIR WAY TO KIGALI;
MOREOVER CANADA HAD TALKED ABOUT SENDING MECHANICS
IN THE SHORT TERM TO MAINTAIN THE INCOMING FLEET
UNTIL THE GHANAIANS ARE TRAINED. ASKED ABOUT
TRAINING VENUES FOR APC MECHANICS, DALLAIRE PUT
HIS STRONG POSITION THAT EGYPT WOULD NOT BE
APPROPRIATE, GIVEN REPORTS OF POSSIBLE EGYPTIAN
ARMS SALES TO THE RGF. HE WAS NOT AWARE OF
POTENTIAL TRAINING IN SOMALIA. DALLAIRE ALSO
URGED THAT SPARE PARTS FOR SOMALI APCS BE HURRIED
ON THEIR WAY TO MOGADISHU SO AS TO LEVERAGE RAPID
MOVEMENT OF APCS FROM UNOSOM TO UNAMIR.
APCS CAN'T RUN WITHOUT FUEL AND BACKUP
- O O N r i D C N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 BUJUMBURA 002092
STATE FOR AF/C, PASS USAID FOR BHR/OFDA; GENEVA
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAL
�00t4FIDEtfFIAL
FOR RMA; LONDON FOR MCKINLEY; PARIS FOR PERLOW;
NAIROBI FOR USAID/REDSO FOR DART/RWANDA
E.0.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PINS, EAID, MASS, KA, RW, BY, XA
SUBJECT: DALLAIRE URGES RAPID RESPONSE TO UNAMIR
REQUESTS
6. DALLAIRE EXPRESSED HIS GRATITUDE THAT APC'S
WERE ON THE MOVE BUT EMPHASIZED THAT APC'S ALONE
WERE INSUFFI
CIENT TO EQUIP THE UNAMIR BATTALIONS
AND MAKE THEM EFFECTIVE. HE NEEDS TENTS, WATER
TRUCKS, RADIOS, FUEL TANKERS- ALL THE OTHER ITEMS
THAT MAKE UP THE "KITS" TO OUTFIT MILITARY UNITS.
7. MOREOVER, HE EXPRESSED GRAVE CONCERN ABOUT
UNAMIR'S ABILITIES TO PROVIDE THE LOGISTICS
SUPPORT NEEDED TO HANDLE THE INCOMING EQUIPMENT
AND SAJD HIS ''GREAT FEARn WAS THAT THE UN WOULD
HAVE TO ASK THAT THE LONG AWAITED DEPLOYMENT BE
SLOWED DUE TO LOGISTICS OFFLOADING BOTTLENECKS.
HE ASKED FOR SOME COUNTRY TO PROVIDE A MOVEMENT
CONTROL UNIT TO MANAGE INCOMING FLIGHTS AND TO
CONTROL GROUND DISPATCH AND TRANSPORTATION FROM
THREE HUBS: KIGALI, ENTEBBE, AND NAIROBI. IN
RESPONSE TO AN INQUIRY FROM THE AMBASSADOR
REGARDING THE ROLE BURUNDI COULD/WOULD PLAY AS A
STAGING POINT FOR THE DEPLOYMENT, DALLAIRE SAID HE
FAVORED USING BUJUMBURA SINCE IT WOULD GIVE READY
ACCESS TO SOUTHERN RWANDA, BUT THE BURUNDIANS WERE
LESS THAN RECEPTIVE. HE NONETHELESS URGED THE USG
DELEGATION TO RAISE THE ISSUE WITH BURUNDIAN
AUTHORITIES DURING ITS VISIT TO BUJUMBURA.
WHERE HAVE ALL THE PEOPLE GONE
8. FINALLY, DALLAIRE RAISED HIS WORRY THAT THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WAS FALLING BEHIND THE
HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN RWANDA. HE EXPRESSED
HIS FRUSTRATION AT NOT BEING ABLE TO FIND THE
ESTIMATED TWO MILLION PEOPLE BELIEVED TO BE MOVING
SOMEWHERE IN THE SOUTH WESTERN PARTS OF THE
IS
E
EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d
9. IN CLOSING HIS REMARKS, GE ERAL DALLAIRE
SUMMARIZED HIS THREE REQUESTS TO THE USG: MOBILIZE
THE REQUIRED EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES, HE~P WITH
,G.EtO.l.JINDJ..OG.lSiiJ.('.S..AT THE MAJOR HUBS, ANDL
TO ASSIST WITH HUMANITAL:-:R=IA-:-:N:-::-------'
'"=R=E=sPO=NS-:-::::-:E=-.-=-A=s-=-A-=F~INAL ASIDE DALLAIRE EXPRESSED HIS
OPTIMISM THAT PEACE EFFORTS BEING BROKERED BY
UNAMIR MAY EVENTUALLY BEAR FRUIT, 'WE HAVE THEM
TALKING NUTS AND BOLTS," HE SAID.
001'4fiiDEI'4'fiAL
�GONriDCNTIAL
HUMANITARIAN UPDATE
10. WHILE WAITING FOR THE ARRIVAL OF GENERAL
DALLAIRE, THE USG DELEGATION WAS BRIEFED BY THE
EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE UN COORDINATION UNIT FOR
RWANDA, CHARLES PETRIE. PETRIE EXPLAINED THAT UN
HUMANITARIAN COORDINATION STRATEGY WAS DESIGNED
NOT TO DIRECT HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE EFFORTS BUT
TO PROVIDE A POINT OF INFORMATION AND
COORDINATION. THE UNIT HAS SATELLITE OFFICES IN
KABALE, BUJUMBURA, KIGALI, AND ITS HEADQUARTERS IN
NAIROBI. HE NOTED THAT UN/NGO COORDINATION AND
COLLABORATION WAS EXCELLENT IN KIGALI WHERE
DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES PERHAPS HAVE FACILITATED
RELATIONSHIPS THAT NORMALLY MIGHT BE DIFFICULT.
HE CHARACTERIZED COORDINATION IN BURUNDI AS NONEXISTENT, COMMENTING "NOBODY IS AT HOME,"
CONFIRMING THE USG DELEGATION'S CONCERNS THAT THE
RELIEF COMMUNITY IN BUJUMBURA IS ILL-PREPARED FOR
POTENTIAL LARGE REFUGEE INFLOWS FROM RWANDA, OR A
POTENTIAL DESTABILIZATION OF THE SITUATION IN
BURUNDI ITSELF. PREPAREDNESS IS ALSO SCANT IN
- C O N r i D C N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 BUJUMBURA 002092
STATE FOR AF/C, PASS USAID FOR BHR/OFDA; GENEVA
FOR RMA; LONDON FOR MCKINLEY; PARIS FOR PERLOW;
NAIROBI FOR USAID/REDSO FOR DART/RWANDA
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PINS, EAID, MASS, KA, RW, BY, XA
SUBJECT: DALLAIRE URGES RAPID RESPONSE TO UNAMIR
REQUESTS
BUKAVU, PETRIE SAID, WITH LITTLE OR NO NGO/UN
PRESENCE AND A LESS THAN COOPERATIVE ZAIRE
AUTHORITY.
11. PETRIE BRIEFLY DESCRIBED A FORTHCOMING SERIES
OF ASSESSMENTS PLANNED FOR BOTH RPF AND RGF AREAS
TO BE JOINTLY COORDINATED AND EXECUTED BY THE
UN/ICRC/NGO COMMUNITY. THE FIRST ASSESSMENTS IN
THE RPF ZONES WILL TAKE PLACE BETWEEN JUNE 19-22
FOLLOWING A PREPARATORY TECHNICAL WORKSHOP IN
KABALE, UGANDA ON JUNE 17. THE TEAMS WILL FOCUS
THEIR SURVEY IN AREAS NEWLY CAPTURED BY THE RPF IN
THE SOUTH AND SOUTHWEST OF THE COUNTRY. SURVEYS
IN THE RGF ZONES ARE UNDER NEGOTIATION WITH GOR
OFFICIALS BUT TENTATIVELY TWO TEAMS WILL BE
DEPLOYED, ONE TO ASSESS AREAS FROM BUTARE-CYANGUGU
AND ONE TO SURVEY THE GISENYI-KIBUYE SECTOR.
12. PETRIE ALSO REPORTED THAT FOLLOWING PROTESTS
OVER THE MINING OF UNICEF'S BUILDING
IN KIGALI,
GENERAL KAGAME PROMISED FULL COOPERATION WITH UN'S
HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS, INCLUDING ALLOWING CROSSLINE CONVOYS. THE UN PLANS TO TEST THIS EXPRESSED
GOOD WILL WITH A MIXED UN/PVO CONVOY FROM RPF
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
V,Lii\
wi^
• OONriDCNTIAL
�-GONriDCNTIAL
TERRITORY INTO THE RGF ZONE IN THE NEAR FUTURE.
LANGE
BT
#2092
NNNN
< SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 03
< SSN>2092
< TOR>940616082720 M1102656
< SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03
< SSN>2092
< TOR>940616082721 M1102657
< SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03
< SSN>2092
< TOR>940616082927 M1102661
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
FROM:
SITREPRT
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
OONriDCNTIAt
�<DIST>SIT: DESHAZER LEBOURGEOIS NSC VAX
<PREC>IMMEDIATE<CLAS>C0NFIDENTIAL<0SRI>RUEHC<DTG>172 355Z JUN 94
<ORIG>SECSTATE WASHDC
<TO>RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0000
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE 0000
(?
f
W
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE 0000
UvO**-^
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO ALL AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 0000
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATUN SE 0000
PERE. O. 13526
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0000
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0000
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 0000
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0000
<SUBJ> SUPPORT FOR FRENCH INITIATIVE ON RWANDA
<TEXT>
. .
.
G-G N F I D E N T I A L STATE 163237
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL MOPS, RW, FR
SUBJECT: SUPPORT FOR FRENCH INITIATIVE ON RWANDA
REF: USUN NEW YORK 2513
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST. REFTEL OUTLINES FRENCH
PROPOSAL FOR A MULTINATIONAL FRENCH-LED FORCE TO INTERVENE
IN RWANDA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO PROTECT THREATENED
CIVILIANS UNTIL THE REGULAR UNAMIR CONTINGENTS CAN
ARRIVE. POST SHOULD INFORM THE GOF THAT THE USG SUPPORTS
THIS INITIATIVE BUT HAS SOME CONCERNS THAT WE WOULD LIKE
THE FRENCH TO ADDRESS AND THAT WE ARE WILLING TO HELP THEM
WITH.
END SUMMARY.
3. THE USG'S MAIN OBJECTIVE IN RWANDA IS TO STOP THE
KILLINGS NOW. THE FRENCH PROPOSAL WOULD PUT TROOFS ON THE
GROUND TO HELP ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE AND THEY COULD
ARRIVE MUCH MORE QUICKLY THAN THE EXPANDED UNAMIR FORCES.
FOR THIS REASON, WE SUPPORT THE FRENCH INITIATIVE. WE
RECOGNIZE, HOWEVER, THAT THE RPF WILL CONS RUE THIS AS A
FRENCH ATTEMPT TO RESCUE THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT AND MAY
EVEN RESIST ANY DEPLOYMENT ON THE GROUND.
4. I N ORDER TO MAXIMIZE THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS FOR THE
OPERATION, MINIMIZE THE RISKS TO THE TROOPS BEING
DEPLOYED, AND AVOID UNDERCUTTING THE UN'S EFFORT TO DEPLOY
UNAMIR — WHICH REMAINS THE LONGER-TERM ANSWER TO
PROTECTING POPULATIONS — THE FRENCH SHOULD:
—
COORDINATE THEIR EFFORTS CLOSELY WITH THE UN AND
OBTAIN UN BLESSING FOR THE MISSION. I N OUR VIEW, A
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE OPERATION
WOULD BE DESIRABLE, BUT SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO DELAY AN
URGENT MISSION.
EO 13526 1.4d
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�EO 13526 1 4
.d
5. FOR PARIS: POST SHOULD INFORM THE GOF OF OUR DECISION
TO SUPPORT THE OPERATION, DRAWING ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS:
--WE AGREE THAT THERE I S AN IMMEDIATE NEED TO STOP THE
KILLINGS IN RWANDA AND THAT THIS MUST BE OUR FIRST
PRIORITY.
— FOR THIS REASON, WE SUPPORT YOUR PROFOSED PLAN FOR A
MULTINATIONAL FRENCH-LED FORCE TO INTERVENE NOW, AND
CONGRATULATE YOU ON THIS HUMANITARIAN INITIATIVE. WE ALSO
SUPPORT YOUR PLAN TO "BRIDGE" THE GAP UNTIL THE REGULAR
UNAMIR CONTINGENTS CAN ARRIVE.
— IN ORDER TO ASSURE THE SUCCESS OF THE MISSION AND THE
FULL SUPPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, WE RECOMMEND
YOU ADDRESS THE FOLLOWING ISSUES
•
-- THE MISSION SHOULD HAVE THE SANCTION OF THE UN AND
SHOULD BE FULLY COORDINATED WITH UNAMIR. WE WOULD PREFER
A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE MISSION, BUT
THAT SHOULD NOT DELAY THE MISSION.
— WE AGREE THAT OTHER COUNTRIES SNOULD CONTRIBUTE TROOPS
TO THIS INITIATIVE. WE ARE ENCOURAGED TO HEAR THAT THE
SENEGALESE AND PERHAPS OTHERS HAVE AGREED TO JOIN.
— I N ORDER TO ADDRESS THE PERCEPTION THAT YOUR ACTIONS
WILL LEND LEGITIMACY TO THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT, YOU SHOULD
CONTINUE TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THIS INITIATIVE I S NOT
INTENDED IN ANY WAY TO INTERVENE IN THE FIGHTING BETWEEN
GOVERNMENT FORCES AND THE RPF OR TO SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT
OR ITS FORCES. WE WILL MAKE THE SAME POINT.
-, IN THE MEANTIME, WE NEED TO ACCELERATE EFFORTS TO
DEPLOY AN EXPANDED UNAMIR. WE ARE WORKING HARD TO HELP
EXPEDITE DEPLOYMENT. WE HAVE COMPLETED THE LEASE WITH THE
UN FOR 50 ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS (APCS) AND HOPE TO
START DELIVERY NEXT WEEK.
— WE ARE LOOKING AT EQUIPMENT NEEDS, PARTICULARLY FOR THE
GHANAIAN BATTALION, WHICH WE ARE TRYING TO GET ON THE
GROUND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE WILL DO OUR BEST TO HELP
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�EQUIP THEM AND HOPE YOU CAN DO THE SAME WITH OTHER
CONTINGENTS.
— THE U.S. HAS NO INTENTION OF SENDING TROOPS INTO RWANDA.
6. FOR BUJUMBURA, DAR ES SALAAM, KAMPALA, ADDIS ABABA
(FOR OAU): POSTS SHOULD INFORM HOST GOVERNMENTS/OAU OF
THE USG DECISION, DRAWING ON BACKGROUND ABOVE AND POINTS
BELOW:
— THERE I S AN IMMEDIATE NEED TO STOP THE KILLINGS IN
RWANDA AND THIS MUST BE OUR FIRST PRIORITY.
— FOR THIS REASON, WE SUPPORT THE FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR A
MULTINATIONAL FORCE TO INTERVENE N W UNDER UN AUSPICES,
O,
AND "BRIDGE" THE GAP UNTIL THE REGULAR UNAMIR CONTINGENTS
CAN ARRIVE.
— WE WANT THE MISSION TO HAVE THE SANCTION OF THE UN AND
TO BE FULLY COORDINATED WITH UNAMIR.
— WE ARE AWARE OF THE RPF'S CONCERNS OVER FRENCH
INTERVENTION. HOWEVER, THIS I S A MULTILATERAL EFFORT AND
THE PURPOSE I S TO PROTECT CIVILIANS AND SAVE LIVES, NOT TO
INTERVENE IN THE FIGHTING BETWEEN GOVERNMENT FORCES AND
THE RPF OR TO SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT OR ITS FORCES.
-- IN THE MEANTIME, WE ARE WORKING WITH THE UN TO
ACCELERATE DEPLOYMENT OF EXPANDED UNAMIR. WE HAVE
COMPLETED A LEASE WITH THE UN FOR 50 ARMORED PERSONNEL
CARRIERS (APCS) AND HOPE TO START DELIVERY VERY SOON
(FYI: WEEK OF JUNE 20).
~ WE ARE WORKING ON OTHER EQUIPMENT REQUESTS N W AND ARE
O
WILLING TO PROVIDE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT AS WELL.
7. BUJUMBURA - MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. TALBOTT
NNNN
<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01<SSN>3237<STOR>9406I7200252 M1106760
<TOR>940617205404
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP\
�JljN721-94 WD 08:11
E
IO/UNP
F X N , 202 646 4179
A O
P. 02
PHOTOCOPY
IO/UNPJSSELLERSJSDS
Db/eO/^H
I0:6UARD
7-0036
SEUNPA EObt
IO/UNP:JSNYDER
NSC:
IO/PHO :RLOFTIS
S/S:
P:EBRIMdER
S/S-O:
OSD:BSCHUTZ
USUN/U:UUOODWARD
IMMEDIATE
AF:PBUSHNELL
L:EBLOO(1
PM:RUHARTON/TCRANT
JCS:
USUN N W YORK
E
IMMEDIATE
PARIS, BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE, KAMPALA IMMEDIATE•,
KINSHASA IMMEDIATE, DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE
E.O. lB3Sb:
TAGS:
DECL: O D
AR
UNS£, MARR, PREL, R
W
SUBJECT: RWANDA: FRENCH RESOLUTION O PROVIDING TROOPS:
N
U.S. RESPONSE
REF:
1.
A. USUN b/a0/10:13 EDT FAX, B. STATE 1L2453
CONriDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
E. THE ONGOING HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN R A D PRESENTS THE
WNA
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WITH A SITUATION THAT MUST BE
ADDRESSED IMMEDIATELY. THE FRENCH PROPOSAL - R F A> T
CE
O
SEND IN TROOPS T PROTECT REFUGEES A D RELIEF PERSONNEL
O
N
AND SUPPLIES, WHILE NOT AN IDEAL SOLUTION, DESERVES U.S,
SUPPORT. THE PEACEKEEPING CORE G O P AGREED JUNE E T
RU
O O
SUPPORT THE FRENCH DRAFT RESOLUTION, BUT UITH CERTAIN
MODIFICATIONS. FOREMOST A O G THESE ARE THE NEED TO SET A
MN
FIXED LIMIT T THE DURATION OF THE FRENCH PRESENCE IN
O
R A D {AND T U R T REPLACE IT QUICKLY B THE
WNA
O OK O
Y
DEPLOYMENT OF A EXPANDED UNAMIR}, T IMPROVE CHANNELS O
N
O
F
COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE FRENCH A D THE U SECRETARIAT,
N
N
AND TO ENSURE THE FRENCH PLAN T PAY F R THEIR
O
O
DEPLOYMENT.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
\\
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
S / t f / J S KSW
�JiJN-21-94 WD 08:11
E
IO/UNP
F X N , 202 646 4179
A O
p
RESER¥ATjO;
3. HISSION IS INSTRUCTED, THEREFORE-! T SUPPORT THE
O
FRENCH DRAFT CONTAINED REF, BUT WITH THE FOLLOWING
MODIFICATIONS:
IN THE PREAMBULAR SECTION, MISSION SHOULD INSERT A
PARAGRAPH THAT FORESHADOWS THE FACT THAT THIS IS A CHAPTER
V I I OPERATION:
BEGIN TEXT:
DETERMINING THAT THE SITUATION IN R A D CONSTITUTES A
WNA
THREAT TO PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE REGION,
E D TEXT•
N
O 3: MISSION SHOULD SEEK TO INCLUDE LANGUAGE LIMITING
P
THE FRENCH DEPLOYMENT TO LO DAYS AND LIMITING ITS
OBJECTIVES T THOSE CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH FOUR OF
O
RESOLUTION TES•
BEGIN TEXT:
ACTING UNDER CHAPTER V I I OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, AUTHORIZES THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND M M E
EBR
STATES COOPERATING T IMPLEMENT F R A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD
O
O
NOT TO EXCEED SIXTY DAYS THE OFFER REFERRED TO IN
PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE AND T USE ALL NECESSARY MEANS T
O
O
ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVES"SET FORTH IN PARAGRAPH FOUR OF
RESOLUTION ^55 t l T l H H
E D TEXT.
N
O 4: MISSION SHOULD PROVIDE LANGUAGE THAT PROVIDES THE
P
SECRETARY GENERAL WITH THE ABILITY T DETERMINE W E
O
HN
UNAMIR IS OPERATING EFFECTIVELY, AND THUS UHEN THE FRENCH
FORCE CAN BE WITHDRAWN ^
BEGIN TEXT:
DECIDES THAT THE MISSION OF M M E STATES COOPERATING WITH
EBR
THE SECRETARY GENERAL UILL BE LIMITED T THE SIXTY DAY
O
TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, PROVIDED THAT THIS TRANSITIONAL
PERIOD CAN BE TERMINATED EARLIER UPON DETERMINATION BY THE
SECRETARY GENERAL THAT UNAMIR IS ABLE T CARRY OUT ITS
O
MANDATE,
E D TEXT.
N
O S: MISSION SHOULD INSERT LANGUAGE ENCOURAGING M M E
P
EBR
STATES T SUPPORT THE "ADOPT-A-BATTALION" PROGRAM OUTLINED
O
REF B:
i CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
'is
P, 03
�JUN-21-94 WD 08:12
E
t.
IO/UNP
F X N . 202 646 4179
A O
PHOTOCOP/
•PRESERVATION
BESIN TEXT:
CALLS UPON THE SECRETARY GENERAL T IDENTIFY AND
O
COORDINATE THE SUPPLY OF THE ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT REQUIRED
BY TROOPS COMMITTED T UNAMIRAND CALLS UPON ALL M M E
O
EBR
STATES TO RESPOND URGENTLY TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S
REQUEST, IN ORDER TO ENABLE UNAMIR TO FULFILL ITS MANDATE
EFFECTIVELY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE• IN THIS LIGHT THE
SECURITY COUNCIL UELCOMES THE OFFER OF THE UNITED STATES
T CONSIDER SUPPORT F R THE GHANAIAN BATTALION AND CALLS
O
O
O OTHER MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY T
N
O
LIKEUISE SPONSOR SPECIFIC TROOP CONTRIBUTORS T SPEED
O
UNAMIR'S EXPANDED FORCE DEPLOYMENT
E D TEXT.
N
O b: MISSION SHOULD REUORK THE DRAFT ALONG THE LINES OF
P
THE UNITAF RESOLUTION -CS/RES/TW OF Ig/E/iS TO ENSURE
VIABLE TUO-UAY COMMUNICATION BETUEEN THE SECRETARIAT AND
THE FRENCH FORCE. THE DRAFT SHOULD READ:
BEGIN TEXT:
REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND THE M M E STATES
EBR
OPERATING UNDER PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE T ESTABLISH APPROPRIATE
O
MECHANISMS F R COORDINATION BETUEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND
O
THEIR MILITARY FORCES =
1
E D TEXT.
N
MISSION SHOULD INTRODUCE ANOTHER OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH, ALSO
IN LINE UITH RES 7^4, THAT ENSURES VOLUNTARY FUNDING F R
O
THE DEPLOYMENT:
BEGIN TEXT:
CALLS UPON ALL M M E STATES UHICH ARE IN A POSITION T D
EBR
O O
S T PROVIDE MILITARY FORCES AND TO MAKE ADDITIONAL
O O
CONTRIBUTIONS, IN CASH O IN KIND, IN ACCORDANCE UITH
R
PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE',
END TEXT.
O fl: THE MISSION SHOULD ADD LANGUAGE REQUIRING A REPORT
P
F O THE SYG TO THE COUNCIL BY AUGUST 20 O THE STATUS OF
RM
N
THE DEPLOYMENT OF UNAMIR AND THE SITUATION O THE G O N
N
RUD
IN RUANDA. THE SYG SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED T R C M E D THAT
O EOMN
UNAMIR ASSUME ITS ROLE AS DEFINED B RESOLUTION =125.
Y
BEGIN TEXT:
i ! CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
P 04
,
�J N 2 - 4 WD 08:13
U-19 E
I/N
OUP
F X N, 202 646 4179
A O
•PHOTOCOPY
REQUESTS M M E STATES COOPERATING UITH THE SECRETARY
EBR
GENERAL T KEEP THE COUNCIL REGULARLY INFORMED OF THEIR
O
ACTIONS IN RUANDA THROUGH THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND
REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL T PRESENT A REPORT TO THE
O
COUNCIL B AUGUST 12 O THE COMPLETED DEPLOYMENT OF UNAMIR
Y
N
AND THE SITUATION O THE G O N IN R A D ' ,
N
RUD
UNAEND TEXT•
4. FINALLY • IN THE E V THE MISSION SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT
.
O
THE U.S. SEES THE FRENCH DEPLOYMENT AS A TEMPORARY
M A U E , AND THAT THE U SHOULD U R TO ESTABLISH UNAMIR
ESRN
OK
IN RUANDA AS S O AS POSSIBLE-, THUS OBVIATING THE NEED F R
ON
O
A FRENCH PRESENCE. THE MISSION SHOULD ALSO REITERATE THE
NEED F R OTHER STATES TO SUPPORT UNAMIR. VV
O
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
P 05
,
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
JOINT STAFF
INFO SERVICE CENTER
IMMEDIATE
Z U RUCNDTA2600 1742139
YW
0 232139Z JUN 94
F USMISSION USUN N W YORK
M
E
TO
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 2581 SECSTATE W S D IMMEDIATE 72B8
AHC
INFO AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0298
SECDEF W S D IMMEDIATE
AHC
JOINT STAFF W S D IMMEDIATE
AHC
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0651
WHITEHOUSE W S D
AHC
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0312
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0514
-€-9-»i-r I D E N T I A L
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE USUN N W YORK 002600
E
PARIS FOR PERLOW
WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS NSC
E.0.12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL. M R , MOPS. UN. R , FR
AR
W
SUBJECT: FRENCH ACTION TO STOP R A D N RAOTQ BROADCASTS
WNA
U H HAS ASKED THE FRENCH, ONCE THEIR OPERATION IS
NQ
UNDERWAY, TO BRING AN END TO THE INFLAMMATORY RADIO
BROADCASTS BY HUTU EXTREMISTS INSIDE R A D . THEY
WNA
ESPECIALLY W N TO SEE DISCONTINUED CRITICISMS OF AND
AT
THREATS TO GENERAL DALLAIRE AND CANADIAN U OBSERVERS.
N
AND INSTIGATIONS TO KILL CIVILIANS. THE U HAS ASKED IF
N
THE USG W U D REINFORCE THIS REQUEST TO THE FRENCH.
OL
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED
ALBRIGHT BT
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
8/iyi5~
JOINT STAFF VI
ACTION
(U.8)
INFO
SJS-N{1) CMAS(l) SJS-C(l) NIDS(l) J4(5)
J5(l} SHAPE LNO(l) J5:NUC-J 1) J5:AFRICA-J(1)
J5:WCEURNATO-J(l) J8:PBAD-J(1) J5:WTCNP-J(1)
+NACEMEAF
16
SECDEF V2
ACTION
(U.6.8)
INFO
SECDEF-N(l) SECDEF-C(l) ATSD:PA(1)
—
lEURI
USDP:IA(1) USDP:AP(2) USDP:DASDEURf1 USDP:AFR(1)
USDP:DSAA(1) USDP:PK/PEm USDP:FMRA 1) USDP:NSS(1)
U$PP:NIB{1) USDP:CP(1) USDP:AFR POL(1
3D'
USOP:EUR POL(l) USDP:NATOPOL(1) USDP: SA(1)
+USDP.:DTSA
+USDP:CCC
+SAFE
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HCN=94174/14074
TOR=94174/2252Z
TAO»94174/2332Z
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PAGE 1 OF 1
•> i •> i in» nm o A
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D E P A R T M E N T
R E C E I P T
OF
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STATE
> 4 J N 24 A 8'.25
9 U
S/S #
ISS144
MESSAGE
(Officer name)
/
CLASSIFICATION
(Office symbol)
.No. Pages.
(Extension)
(Room number)
MESSAGE DES^SIPTTON
TO: (Agency)
FOR:
REMARKS:
OtLIVER TO:
CLEARANCE
/^Mrtr
Extension
INFORMATION
/^-(//e-*^
^oo/ze-rr
Room No.
PER REQUEST
COMMENT
•- Tf/is
A/T*f//r
S/S Officer.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
/
JZA-FT
�OUTGOING TELEGRAM
DEPARTMENT O STATE
F
IN nLALJiIRE
5 .1
AUTH TED. DRAFT R U
M
CLEAR 1 K
A
5 DJ
3 DB_ 4 EB
5 VK
CONflDENTIAL
PM/ISP:RUHARTON:RMU
QL/SS/TM Xb7743
SEAISPRU 227
PM:TMCNAMARA
NSC:
S/S-O:
OSD:MBITTRICH <SUBS>
JCS:JUAHL • S B > +
CUS
AF/C:KAISTON
IO/PHO:DJENSEN
P:EBRIMMER
S/S:
DRAFT
IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS, DAKAR IMMEDIATE +
ROUTINE
KAMPALA, USMISSION USUN NEU YORK, KINSHASA
E.O. 1235L:
TAGS:
DECL: O D
AR
PREL, MOPS, MASS, RU, FR, S
G
SUBJECT: U.S. EQUIPMENT SUPPORT T FRENCH HUMANITARIAN
O
INTERVENTION IN RUANDA
REF: A. DAKAR SaSb B. USDAO PARIS F I L , ? ^
R
C. PARIS lb7HQ D USUN 24^6
.
1. -€^fW£*FPf*tr - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THIS CABLE SEEKS CLARIFICATION AS T
O
UHAT SPECIFIC AIRLIFT SUPPORT THE FRENCH AND SENEGALESE
GOVERNMENTS ARE SEEKING REGARDING SENEGALESE PARTICIPATION
IN THE HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN RUANDA. END S M A Y
UMR
4. EMBASSIES DAKAR AND PARIS ARE ASKED T CLARIFY UHAT
O
AIRLIFT REGARDING SENEGALESE PARTICIPATION IN THE
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN RUANDA. REF A FROM DAKAR
INDICATES, A} THAT THE SENEGALESE UILL LIKELY BE PROVIDING
EQUIPMENT LISTS AT THE LAST MINUTE, AND BI THAT THE
SENEGALESE BELIEVE THE FRENCH UILL PROVIDE THEM UITH
AIRLIFT TO GOMA, ZAIRE. REFS. B AND C FROM PARIS RELAY
VERBAL FRENCH REQUESTS F R U.S. AIRLIFT SUPPORT FOR THE
O
^ •CONFIDCNTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O Y
H CP
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
8 / i y i 5 KBH
�CONFIDENTIALSENEGALESE CONTINGENT.
S. POSTS SHOULD BE AUARE THAT UHILE THE U.S. HAS PROVIDED
DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT T THE FRENCH HUMANITARIAN
O
INTERVENTION, A DECISION HAS YET TO BE TAKEN THROUGH THE
INTERAGENCY PROCESS ON-^LOGISTICS O TRANSPORTATION
R
SUPPORT, AND O REPAYMENT.
N
C T*F- NAIutef O
F
h. F R DAKAR: POST SHOULD CLARIFY WHETHER THE FRENCH ARE
O
PROVIDING THE AIRLIFT SUPPORT INDICATED IN REF A. IF THE
SENEGALESE ARE NOU SEEKING SUCH SUPPORT FROM THE U.S.,
THEN UE NEED INFORMATION SOONEST AS T THE NUMBERS OF
O
TROOPS INVOLVED, TYPES OF EQUIPMENT THEY UILL BE CARRYING,
DATES OF AIRLIFT, DESTINATION, AND OTHER PERTINENT
DETAILS, BEFORE ANY DECISION CAN BE MADE. CONCERNING
OTHER EQUIPMENT: EMBASSY IS CORRECT THAT IF THE SENEGALESE
ARE SEEKING EQUIPMENT F R THEIR PLANNED UNAMIR CONTINGENT,
O
THEY SHOULD DIRECT THAT REQUEST TO THE UN. {FYI: UE ARE
AUARE FROM REF C THAT THE FRENCH HAD PREVIOUSLY OFFERED T
O
EXTEND UP T SUM FRENCH FRANCS, APPROXIMATELY USD 1QM, IN
O
CREDITS AND EQUIPMENT O A BILATERAL BASIS TO SENEGAL FOR
N
THIS PURPOSE. END FYI}
7. F R PARIS: EMBASSY PARIS SHOULD ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE
O
UHAT SUPPORT FRANCE UILL BE PROVIDING THE SENEGALESE F R
O
THEIR HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION A D UHAT SPECIFIC SUPPORT
N
IS BEING SOUGHT FROM THE U.S. {FYI: THE UNSC RESOLUTION
UELCOMING THE FRENCH OPERATION STIPULATED THAT THE COSTS
UILL BE BORNE BY THE M M E STATES CONCERNED. END FYI}
EBR
fl. FOR DAKAR AND PARIS: POSTS' ABILITY TO DETERMINE
EXPEDITIOUSLY UHAT IS NEEDED UILL GREATLY ASSIST THE
DECISION PROCESS. T AVOID CONFUSION, SUCH REQUESTS
O
SHOULD BE MADE FORMALLY.
VV
IO/UNP: SZELLE
EUR/UE: ACARSON
AF/U: GBBROUN
PM/ISP: TGRANT
PM/P: JCPERRY
PN/DRSA: JSCOTT
PM/ISP:DBOLTON
CONriDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�• CONFIDCNTIALUSCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ-5/ECJ-4// HlflEDIATE
V
-CONriDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�OONriDCNTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: BEERS, CLARKER, DESHAZER, HAHN, NSC, RICE, STEINBERG, VAX
PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: OONFIDENTIAL •
DTG:250029Z JUN 94
FM: SECSTATE WASHDC
TO:
RUEHMPI/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 6288 IMMEDIATE
ZEN/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0884
ZEN/AMEMBASSY PARIS 8025
ZEN/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 2116
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 6458 IMMEDIATE
RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ4-SA//PRIORITY
ZEN/USDAO ABIDJAN PRIORITY
ZEN/JCS WAS H DC//J5-M E A F//P RIO R ITY
ZEN/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 3832
•60 N F I D E N T I A L STATE 170060
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MOPS, MASS, PREL, PHUM, UNSC, RW GH, FR
SUBJECT: GHANAIAN TROOP CONTINGENT IN RWANDA
REF: A.) ACCRA 05339 (NOTAL). B.) ACCRA 05289 (NOTAL),
C.) STATE 168777
1. -OONFIDENTIAL- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THIS IS A PRELIMINARY REPLY TO QUESTIONS RAISED IN
REFS A AND B. USUN SEE PARA 6. BROADER ASPECTS OF THE
RWANDA SITUATION WILL BE DISCUSSED SEPTELS.
3. GHANAIAN REQUEST FOR U.S. MILITARY AIR TRANSPORT FOR A
TEAM OF GAF SENIOR OFFICERS (REF A): BECAUSE THERE ARE NO
U.S. MILITARY FLIGHTS INTO KIGALI, DEPARTMENT BELIEVES THE
GHANAIAN TEAM SHOULD FLY COMMERCIAL TO THE REGION AND
TRAVEL INTO RWANDA WITH UN ASSISTANCE.
4. EQUIPMENT FOR GHANAIAN FORCES (REF B): SCOPE OF THE
GHANAIAN REQUEST, WHICH NOW INCLUDES THREE HELICOPTER
GUNSHIPS, HAS PROVOKED SPECULATION THE GOG MIGHT USE
NONFULFILLMENT OF THE EQUIPMENT REQUEST AS A REASON FOR
WITHDRAWING THE GAF CONTINGENT.
5. ON THE BASIS OF THE ABOVE WE RECOMMEND CHARGE MAKE
FOLLOWING POINTS TO THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE:
A. WE APPRECIATE GHANAIAN COMMITMENT TO CONTINUED
aiNTONUBRARYPHOTOCOPV
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
^yT^M
�1
CONriDENTIAL
PARTICIPATION IN UNAMIR AND REJECTION OF UNILATERAL
WITHDRAWAL (REF A).
B. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY NEEDS TO MOVE FORWARD AS
QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE TO DEPLOY THE EXPANDED UNAMIR (REF C).
C. WE ARE IN CONSTANT TOUCH WITH THE UN ON THE RWANDA
SITUATION. NEVERTHELESS, ON QUESTIONS OF COMMAND
RELATIONSHIPS, SECURITY, AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT, A GOOD
FIRST RULE FOR THE GOG IS TO ASK THE UN DIRECTLY.
D. WE HAVE EXAMINED THE GAF LIST OF EQUIPMENT REQUESTED
IN CONNECTION WITH DEPLOYMENT OF ADDITIONAL FORCES TO
RWANDA. KEEPING IN MIND THAT THE UN, NOT THE U.S., IS THE
IMMEDIATE PROVIDER OF EQUIPMENT FOR UNAMIR, AND THAT
THEREFORE THE UN SHOULD BE THE GHANAIANS' FIRST POINT OF
CONTACT, DATT ABIDJAN IS PREPARED TO VISIT ACCRA TO GO
OVER WITH GAF THE SPECIFICS OF THEIR REQUEST.
E. EIGHT APCS ARE NOW ON THE GROUND AT ENTEBBE AIRPORT.
THEY WILL BEGIN ARRIVING AT THE RATE OF EIGHT PER DAY AS
OF JUNE 24.
F. ON TRANSPORTATION FOR A TEAM OF SENIOR GHANAIAN
OFFICERS, THE U.S. IS NOT FLYING INTO RWANDA. WE BELIEVE
THE GHANAIAN TEAM SHOULD PROCEED VIA COMMERCIAL AIR TO
EITHER NAIROBI OR KAMPALA. FROM NAIROBI THEY COULD TAKE A
UNAMIR FLIGHT INTO RWANDA. FROM KAMPALA THEY COULD TRAVEL
BY LAND WITH UNAMIR CONVOYS.
6. FOR USUN: PLEASE INFORM UNDPKO ON POINTS 5.C., D. AND
F. ABOVE. CHRISTOPHER
BT
#0060
NNNN
< SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
< SSN>0060
< TOR>940626102507 M1119338
A
A
A
FROM:
SITREPRT
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
"CONFIDENTIAL
�DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CROSSHATCH
AUTH
CLEAR 1
3
4
h
7
DRAFT.
_ 2 .
5 .
6.
•CONriDENTIAL
AF/C:KAISTON:KCA
Ob/SD/TM ^47-313^
AF:PBUSHNELL
MlSECC 443D
AF/C:RFENDRICK PrESUICKER
EUR:RPE:GBERRY
EAP/RSP:BMALKIN
ARA/BR:JCASUELL EUR/UE:CKELLY
S/S-O:
IO/PHO:DJENSEN PM/ISP:RUHARTON
AF/S:S<EOCH-FISHER
NSC:
S/S:
IMMEDIATE
ALLEU, PRETORIA, OTTAWA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON,
PRAGUE, M S O , BRASILIA, BEIJING, TOKYO, ADDIS ABABA
OCW
PRIORITY
USUN N W YORK, BUJUMBURA, KAMPALA
E
KINSHASA, DAR ES SALAAM, NAIROBI, HARARE, TUNIS, DAKAR, ACCRA +
YAOUNDE FOR DATT
E.O. 123Sb:
TAGS:
MOPS, PREL, PHUM, MARR, UNSC, R
U
SUBJECT:
REF:
DECL: O D
AR
SUPPORT F R EXPANDED UNAMIR
O
USUN NEU YORK 2bb7 {NOTAL}
1. -CONriDENTIAL- - ENTIRE TEXT. THIS IS AN URGENT ACTION
REQUEST. EU POSTS SEE PARAS b - 7. PRETORIA SEE PARA 8.
OTTAUA AND CANBERRA SEE PARA T. UELLINGTON, PRAGUE,
MOSCOU, BRASILIA, BEIJING, AND TOKYO SEE PARA ID. ADDIS
SEE PARA 11.
BACKGROUND
2. IN RESOLUTIONS Tlfl AND =125 OF M Y 17 AND JUNE B,
A
RESPECTIVELY, THE U SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVED EXPANSION
N
OF UNAMIR, THE U PEACEKEEPING MISSION IN RUANDA, FROM 45U
N
TO 5,500 TROOPS, UITH A NEU HUMANITARIAN MANDATE TO HELP
PROVIDE PROTECTION TO THREATENED CIVILIAN POPULATIONS AND
FACILITATE RELIEF EFFORTS. DEPLOYMENT OF THIS FORCE UILL
ADDRESS O R NUMBER ONE PRIORITY -- STOPPING THE KILLINGS
U
•CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
LINTON IBRARY P O O O Y l / ^ r ^
HTCP
�-GONriDCNTIAL
OF CIVILIANS. ONCE THE KILLINGS HAVE STOPPED-, A
CEASE-FIRE IN THE CIVIL 1 A BETUEEN HUTU-DOMINATED INTERIM
1 R
1
GOVERNMENT FORCES AND THE TUTSI-LED RUANDAN PATRIOTIC
FRONT {RPF} UILL BE EASIER T ACHIEVE. AS THE CRISIS IN
O
RUANDA ENTERS ITS THIRD MONTH, IT IS CRUCIAL THAT
DEPLOYMENT OF EXPANDED UNAMIR M V FORUARD AS QUICKLY AS
OE
POSSIBLE.
3. THE FRENCH-LED OPERATION, APPROVED O JUNE 22 IN UNSC
N
RESOLUTION =12^, IS ONLY A TEMPORARY MEASURE TO PROVIDE
PROTECTION UNTIL EXPANDED UNAMIR IS DEPLOYED- THE MANDATE
F R THIS OPERATION IS LIMITED T TUO MONTHS, AND THE
O
O
FRENCH HAVE INDICATED THEY UOULD LIKE TO BE OUT OF RUANDA
BY THE END OF JULY. EACH DAY THEY STAY IN RUANDA, THE
CHANCE FOR AN UNINTENTIONAL CLASH UITH THE ANTI-FRENCH RPF
INCREASES. MOREOVER, AS THE FRENCH CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS
TO SAVE MINORITY TUTSIS, THE CHANCES INCREASE THAT HUTU
EXTREMISTS MILITIAS AND INTERIM GOVERNMENT SUPPORTERS M Y
A
TURN O THE FRENCH, U O THEY HAVE HERETOFORE VIEUED AS
N
HM
THEIR PROTECTORS. IT IS THEREFORE VITAL THAT THE
FRENCH-LED FORCES BE REPLACED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BY BLUE
HELMETS OF EXPANDED UNAMIR.
4. THE U APPEARS TO HAVE ENOUGH TROOP OFFERS TO FIELD
N
THE NECESSARY 5,5D0-PERS0N FORCE. TROOP CONTRIBUTORS
INCLUDE: GHANA, SENEGAL, ETHIOPIA, ZAMBIA, ZIMBABUE,
TUNISIA, CONGO, MALAUI, MALI, AND NIGERIA. HOUEVER, THESE
CONTINGENTS NEED EQUIPMENT AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT IN ORDER ^
TO DEPLOY. IN A JUNE 26 MEETING O TROOP CONTRIBUTORS AND
F
DONORS, THE OFFERS F O THE D N R COMMUNITY FOR EQUIPMENT
RM
OO
FELL FAR SHORT OF UNAMIR'S NEEDS, AND THE UN PEACEKEEPING
OFFICE EXPRESSED SERIOUS CONCERN ABOUT THE UN'S ABILITY TO
FIELD AND DEPLOY EXPANDED UNAMIR IN A TIMELY MANNER.
5. A O G POTENTIAL DONORS, THE U.S. HAS TAKEN THE LEAD _IN
MN
MEETING UNAMIR'S JJEEDS.. UE HAVE PROPOSED THE IDEA OF
HAVING COUNTRIES UITH LOGISTICAL AND EQUIPMENT
CAPABILITIES "ADOPT" UNAMIR CONTINGENTS AND PROVIDE F R
O
THEIR NEEDS, THROUGH THE UN. CONSISTENT UITH THIS
PROPOSAL, THE U.S. HAS DECIDED T "ADOPT" THE GHANAIAN
O
BATTALION, UHICH IS THE FIRST CONTINGENT TO BE DEPLOYED.
THE U.S. HAS ALREADY PROVIDED 50 ARMORED PERSONNEL
CARRIERS {APCS} T UNAMIR F R USE BY THE GHANAIANS- UE "
O
O
ARE ALSO UORKING CLOSELY UITH THE UN T MEET THE
O
niSSION-ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT NEEDS OF THE GHANAIAN
BATTALION. S FAR N OTHER D N R HAS STEPPED FORUARD TO
O
O
OO
D LIKEUISE UITH ANY OTHER CONTINGENT.
O
•CONFIDENTIAL
LINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONriDCNTIAL
ACTION REQUESTS
L. FOR EU POSTS: THE JULY b/7 DISCUSSIONS OF THE EU
AFRICA CROUP PRESENT AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS
RUANDA AND THE URGENT NEED T PROVIDE SUPPORT F R EXPANDED
O
O
UNAMIR. POSTS SHOULD APPROACH -APPROPRIATE HOST GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS TO UNDERLINE THE IMPORTANCE OF SPEEDING UP
DEPLOYMENT OF EXPANDED UNAMIR, BRIEF THEM O THE EFFORTS
N
THE U.S. HAS MADE IN THIS REGARD, AND URGE THEM T PROVIDE
O
AS M C ASSISTANCE AS POSSIBLE T EXPANDED UNAMIR
UH
O
INCLUDING ADOPTING AN AFRICAN BATTALION. YOU M Y DRAU O
A
N
THE FOLLOUING POINTS IN Y U DISCUSSIONS:
OR
-- THE CRISIS IN RUANDA IS NOU MOVING INTO ITS THIRD
MONTH, UITH LARGE SEGMENTS OF THE RUANDAN POPULATION STILL
UNDER SERIOUS THREAT FROM CONTINUED FIGHTING AND COMMUNAL
VIOLENCE.
THE FRENCH-LED OPERATION IS IN THE PROCESS OF
PROVIDING IMPORTANT PROTECTION TO THREATENED POPULATIONS',
HOUEVER, THE OPERATION IS ONLY A TEMPORARY ONE, UNTIL
ADDITIONAL UNAMIR TROOPS CAN BE DEPLOYED.
-- THE FRENCH ARE PROVIDING A VITAL BRIDGE UNTIL UNAMIR
CAN ARRIVE, BUT THEY ARE IN A DIFFICULT POSITION, DUE T
O
THE RPF'S OBJECTION T THEIR DEPLOYMENT. EACH DAY THE
O
FRENCH STAY IN RUANDA, THE RISK OF A UNINTENDED CLASH
N
GROUS.
-- RPF OPPOSITION HAS LIMITED THE FRENCH OPERATION T
O
GOVERNMENT-HELD TERRITORY IN AREAS AUAY FROM THE BATTLE
LINES. HOUEVER, LARGE NUMBERS OF RUANDANS ARE THREATENED
IN KIGALI AND OTHER AREAS NOT UITHIN THE RANGE OF THE
FRENCH-LED DEPLOYMENT.
-- IT IS CRUCIAL T GET EXPANDED UNAMIR O THE G O N AS
O
N
RUD
QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, T RELIEVE THE FRENCH-LED FORCES AND
O
BRING LONGER-TERM PROTECTION TO RUANDAN CIVILIANS IN AS
BROAD AN AREA AS IS FEASIBLE F R UNAMIR FORCES.
O
-- UE HAVE BEEN UORKING CLOSELY UITH THE UN AND OTHERS T
O
TRY TO SPEED UP DEPLOYMENT. THE U HAS LINED UP THE
N
NECESSARY TROOP CONTRIBUTORS, BUT LOGISTICAL DIFFICULTIES
THREATEN . O DELAY THE PROCESS .
T
[ONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONFIDCNTIAb
-- TO HELP ACCELERATE DEPLOYMENT, THE U.S. HAS AGREED TO
PROVIDE THE UN UITH NECESSARY EQUIPMENT FOR THE GHANAIAN
BATTALION, UHICH IS TO BE THE FIRST CONTINGENT DEPLOYED.
UE HAVE ALREADY PROVIDED 50 ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS
-CAPC'S} TO UNAMIR; DELIVERY UAS COMPLETED LAST UEEK. UE
ARE NOU UORKING UITH THE UN T MEET THE ADDITIONAL
O
EQUIPMENT NEEDS OF THE GHANAIAN CONTINGENT.
-- UE ENCOURAGE THE EU AND ITS M M E STATES TO PROVIDE
EBR
ALL POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE TO EXPANDED UNAMIR TO HELP
ACCELERATE DEPLOYMENT. IN O D R TO FACILITATE MATCHING UP
RE
AVAILABLE LOGISTICS UITH TROOP CONTRIBUTORS' NEEDS,
INDIVIDUAL EU STATES M Y UISH TO FOLLOU THE U.S. APPROACH
A
OF AGREEING TO MEET THE NEEDS OF A PARTICULAR UNAMIR
CONTINGENT.
-- UE BELIEVE THAT THE EU AFRICA G O P MEETING PLANNED
RU
FOR JULY b/7 UOULD BE AN EXCELLENT FORUM FOR RAISING THE
URGENT ISSUE OF EXPANDING UNAMIR. UE HOPE THAT YOU UILL
DISCUSS THIS ISSUE UITH Y U COUNTERPARTS IN THE EU IN
OR
ORDER TO HELP LINE UP AND COORDINATE SUPPORT T UNAMIR.
O
7. FOR PARIS: ABOVE DEMARCHE IS INTENDED FOR EU POSTS
OTHER THAN FRANCE. HOUEVER, POST SHOULD INFORM GOF OF O R
U
DEMARCHE AND ENCOURAGE APPROPRIATE GOF OFFICIALS TO MAKE
SURE UNAMIR IS O THE AGENDA AT THE EU MEETING AND THAT
N
GOF REPRESENTATIVES MAKE A STRONG CASE IN FAVOR OF EU
SUPPORT TO EXPANDED UNAMIR.
fl. FOR PRETORIA: REFTEL REPORTS THAT THE SAG HAS AGREED
T PROVIDE 50 APCS {LIGHTLY ARMORED TRUCKS} TO UNAMIR AND
O
HAS INDICATED A STRONG INCLINATION TO SUPPORT THE MAJORITY
OF THE ZIMBABUEAN CONTINGENT'S NEEDS. POST SHOULD SEEK TO
CONFIRM/SOLIDIFY THESE SUPPORT PLANS AND SHOULD DRAU O
N
FOLLOUING POINTS:
-- THE CRISIS IN RUANDA IS NOU MOVING INTO ITS THIRD
MONTH, UITH LARGE SEGMENTS OF THE RUANDAN POPULATION STILL
UNDER SERIOUS THREAT F O CONTINUED FIGHTING AND COMMUNAL
RM
VIOLENCE.
-- THE FRENCH-LED OPERATION IS IN THE PROCESS OF
PROVIDING IMPORTANT PROTECTION TO THREATENED POPULATIONS',
HOUEVER, THE OPERATION IS ONLY A TEMPORARY ONE, UNTIL
ADDITIONAL UNAMIR TROOPS CAN BE DEPLOYED.
.--
THE FRENCH ARE PROVIDING A VITAL BRIDGE UNTIL UNAMIR
CONriDCNTIAL
LINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONriDCNTIAL
CAN ARRIVE•» BUT THEY ARE IN A DIFFICULT POSITION, DUE TO
THE RPF'S OBJECTION TO THEIR DEPLOYMENT. EACH DAY THE
FRENCH STAY IN RUANDA, THE RISK OF AN UNINTENDED CLASH
GROUS.
-- RPF OPPOSITION HAS LIMITED THE FRENCH OPERATION TO
GOVERNMENT-HELD TERRITORY IN AREAS AUAY FROM THE BATTLE
LINES. HOUEVER, LARGE NUMBERS OF RUANDANS ARE THREATENED
IN KIGALI AND OTHER AREAS NOT UITHIN THE RANGE OF THE
FRENCH-LED DEPLOYMENT.
-- IT IS CRUCIAL T GET EXPANDED UNAMIR O THE G O N AS
O
N
RUD
QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, T RELIEVE THE FRENCH-LED FORCES AND
O
BRING LONGER-TERM PROTECTION TO RUANDAN CIVILIANS IN AS
BROAD AN AREA AS IS FEASIBLE F R UNAMIR FORCES.
O
-- UE HAVE BEEN UORKING CLOSELY UITH THE U AND OTHERS TO
N
TRY TO SPEED UP DEPLOYMENT. THE U HAS LINED UP THE
N
NECESSARY TROOP CONTRIBUTORS, BUT LOGISTICAL DIFFICULTIES
THREATEN TO DELAY THE PROCESS.
-- T HELP ACCELERATE DEPLOYMENT, THE U.S. HAS AGREED TO
O
PROVIDE THE U UITH NECESSARY EQUIPMENT F R THE GHANAIAN
N
O
BATTALION, UHICH IS T BE THE FIRST CONTINGENT DEPLOYEDO
-- UE HAVE ALREADY PROVIDED S ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS
O
{APCS} T UNAMIR; DELIVERY UAS COMPLETED LAST UEEK. UE
O
ARE N U UORKING UITH THE U T MEET THE ADDITIONAL
O
N O
EQUIPMENT NEEDS OF THE GHANAIAN CONTINGENT.
--. UE UNDERSTAND YOU ARE UILLING T PROVIDE SIMILAR
O
SUPPORT TO UNAMIR. UE UELCOME YOUR GOVERNMENT'S
UILLINGNESS T HELP AND UOULD BE INTERESTED TO KNOU YOUR
O
SPECIFIC PLANS F R SUPPORTING UNAMIR.
O
-- IN ORDER T FACILITATE MATCHING UP AVAILABLE LOGISTICS
O
UITH TROOP CONTRIBUTORS' NEEDS, YOU M Y UISH T FOLLOU THE
A
O
U.S. APPROACH OF AGREEING T MEET THE NEEDS OF A
O
PARTICULAR UNAMIR CONTINGENT. UE UNDERSTAND YOU M Y
A
ALREADY BE CONSIDERING ASSISTING T ZIMBABUEAN BATTALION.
O
UE UOULD UELCOME SUCH A MOVE.
1. F R OTTAUA AND CANBERRA: THE G C IS CONSIDERING
O
O
PROVIDING A SELF-CONTAINED COMMUNICATION COMPANY {UP TO
350 PERSONNEL}, AND THE G A M Y PROVIDE ONE MEDICAL
O
A
COMPANY. POST SHOULD DETERMINE STATUS OF THESE PLANNED •
CONTRIBUTIONS.AND ENCOURAGE UHATEVER CONTRIBUTIONS HOST
GOVERNMENTS CAN MAKE T UNAMIR. POSTS M Y DRAU O
O
A
N
CONflDENTIAb
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONFIDCNTIAL
FOLLOWING POINTS:
THE CRISIS IN RUANDA IS N U MOVING INTO ITS THIRD
O
MONTH, UITH LARGE SEGMENTS OF THE RUANDAN POPULATION STILL
UNDER SERIOUS THREAT FROM CONTINUED FIGHTING AND COMMUNAL
VIOLENCE.
THE FRENCH-LED OPERATION IS IN THE PROCESS OF
PROVIDING IMPORTANT PROTECTION T THREATENED POPULATIONS;
O
HOUEVER, THE OPERATION IS ONLY A TEMPORARY ONE, UNTIL
ADDITIONAL UNAMIR TROOPS CAN BE DEPLOYED.
-- THE FRENCH ARE PROVIDING A VITAL BRIDGE UNTIL UNAMIR
CAN ARRIVE, BUT THEY ARE IN A DIFFICULT POSITION, DUE TO
THE RPF'S OBJECTION T THEIR DEPLOYMENT. EACH DAY THE
O
FRENCH STAY IN RUANDA, THE RISK OF AN UNINTENDED CLASH
GROUS.
RPF OPPOSITION HAS LIMITED THE FRENCH OPERATION T
O
GOVERNMENT-HELD TERRITORY IN AREAS AUAY FROM THE BATTLE
LINES. HOUEVER, LARGE NUMBERS OF RUANDANS ARE THREATENED
IN KIGALI AND OTHER AREAS NOT UITHIN THE RANGE OF THE
FRENCH-LED DEPLOYMENT.
-- IT IS CRUCIAL T GET EXPANDED UNAMIR O THE G O N AS
O
N
RUD
QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, T RELIEVE THE FRENCH-LED FORCES AND
O
BRING LONGER-TERM PROTECTION TO RUANDAN CIVILIANS IN AS
BROAD AN AREA AS IS FEASIBLE F R UNAMIR FORCES.
O
-- UE HAVE BEEN UORKING CLOSELY UITH THE UN AND OTHERS TO
TRY TO SPEED UP DEPLOYMENT. THE U HAS LINED UP THE
N
NECESSARY TROOP CONTRIBUTORS, BUT LOGISTICAL DIFFICULTIES
THREATEN T DELAY THE PROCESS.
O
-- TO HELP ACCELERATE DEPLOYMENT, THE U.S. HAS AGREED TO
PROVIDE THE UN UITH NECESSARY EQUIPMENT F R THE GHANAIAN
O
BATTALION, UHICH IS TO BE THE FIRST CONTINGENT DEPLOYED.
-- UE HAVE ALREADY PROVIDED 50 ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS
{APCS} TO UNAMIR; DELIVERY UAS COMPLETED LAST UEEK. UE
ARE NOU UORKING UITH THE U T MEET THE ADDITIONAL
N O
EQUIPMENT NEEDS OF THE GHANAIAN CONTINGENT.
-- UE UNDERSTAND YOU ARE CONSIDERING IMPORTANT
CONTRIBUTIONS T UNAMIR, AS UELL. UE UELCOME YOUR
O
GOVERNMENT'S UILLINGNESS TO HELP AND UOULD BE INTERESTED
T KNOU YOUR SPECIFIC PLANS F R SUPPORTING UNAMIR.
O
O
CONFIDENTIAL
C I T N L B A Y POOOY
L N O I R R HTCP
�•CONflDENTIAL
10. FOR WELLINGTON, PRAGUE, M S O , BRASILIA, BEIJING,
OCW
AND TOKYO: HOST COUNTRIES HAVE EITHER EXPRESSED STRONG
SUPPORT F R UNAMIR IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL BUT HAVE YET TO
O
OFFER SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS - N U ZEALAND,
CE
CZECHOSLAVAKIAJ O M Y BE IN A POSITION T PROVIDE
R A
O
MATERIAL O FINANCIAL SUPPORT BUT HAVE NOT YET DONE S
R
O
{RUSSIA, BRAZIL, CHINA, JAPAN}. POSTS SHOULD STRESS THE
URGENT NEED T ACCELERATE DEPLOYMENT OF EXPANDED UNAMIR,
O
HIGHLIGHT U.S. EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE THAT GOAL, AND URGE
SIMILAR COMMITMENTS F O HOST GOVERNMENTS, DRAWING O
RM
N
FOLLOWING POINTS:
-- THE CRISIS IN R A D IS N W MOVING INTO ITS THIRD
WNA
O
MONTH, WITH LARGE SEGMENTS OF THE RWANDAN POPULATION STILL
UNDER SERIOUS THREAT FROM CONTINUED FIGHTING AND COMMUNAL
VIOLENCE.
-- THE FRENCH-LED OPERATION IS IN THE PROCESS OF
PROVIDING IMPORTANT PROTECTION TO THREATENED POPULATIONS;
HOWEVER, THE OPERATION IS ONLY A TEMPORARY ONE, UNTIL
ADDITIONAL UNAMIR TROOPS CAN BE DEPLOYED.
-- "THE FRENCH ARE PROVIDING A VITAL BRIDGE UNTIL UNAMIR
CAN ARRIVE, BUT THEY ARE IN A DIFFICULT POSITION, DUE T
O
THE RPF'S OBJECTION T THEIR DEPLOYMENT. EACH DAY THE
O
FRENCH STAY IN RWANDA, THE RISK OF AN UNINTENDED CLASH
GOS
RW.
-- RPF OPPOSITION HAS LIMITED THE FRENCH OPERATION T
O
GOVERNMENT-HELD TERRITORY IN AREAS A A FROM THE BATTLE
WY
LINES. HOWEVER, LARGE NUMBERS OF RWANDANS ARE THREATENED
IN KIGALI AND OTHER AREAS NOT WITHIN THE RANGE OF THE
FRENCH-LED DEPLOYMENT,
-- IT IS CRUCIAL TO GET EXPANDED UNAMIR O THE G O N AS
N
RUD
QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, T RELIEVE THE FRENCH-LED FORCES AND
O
BRING LONGER-TERM PROTECTION TO RUANDAN CIVILIANS IN AS
BROAD AN AREA AS IS FEASIBLE F R UNAMIR FORCES.
O
-- W HAVE BEEN WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE U AND OTHERS TO
E
N
TRY T SPEED UP DEPLOYMENT. THE U HAS LINED UP THE
O
N
NECESSARY TROOP CONTRIBUTORS, BUT LOGISTICAL DIFFICULTIES
THREATEN T DELAY THE PROCESS.
O
-- T HELP ACCELERATE DEPLOYMENT, THE U.S. HAS AGREED T
O
O
PROVIDE THE U WITH NECESSARY EQUIPMENT F R THE GHANAIAN
N
O
BATTALION, UHICH IS T BE THE FIRST CONTINGENT DEPLOYED.
O
CONriDENTIAL'
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONriDCNTIAL
-- UE HAVE ALREADY PROVIDED 50 ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS
{APCS} TO UNAMIR; DELIVERY UAS COMPLETED LAST UEEK. UE
ARE NOU UORKING UITH THE U TO MEET THE ADDITIONAL
N
EQUIPMENT NEEDS OF THE GHANAIAN CONTINGENT.
-- UE ENCOURAGE YOU TO PROVIDE ALL POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE TO
EXPANDED UNAMIR TO HELP ACCELERATE DEPLOYMENT. IN ORDER
TO FACILITATE MATCHING UP AVAILABLE LOGISTICS UITH TROOP
CONTRIBUTORS' NEEDS, YOU MAY UISH TO FOLLOU THE U.S.
APPROACH OF AGREEING T MEET THE NEEDS OF A PARTICULAR
O
UNAMIR CONTINGENT.
11. FOR ADDIS: PLEASE INFORM OAU OF THIS DEMARCHE AND
SHARE APPROPRIATE POINTS.
12.
BUJUMBURA - MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. VV
YAOUNDE .
.
LUSAKA
BRAZZAVILLE
LILONGWE
BAMAKO
LAGOS
SECDEF UASHDC
CJCS UASHDC
V
CONriDCNTIAL
LINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CROSSHATCH
AUTH'1
DRAFlJ^
CLEAR i ^ )
b
CONFIDENTIAL
AF/C:KAISTON:KCA
07/15/=^ bH7-313T
P:PTARNOFF
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7
SECC 4533
AF:GEMOOSE
P:ESUICKER
EUR/RPM:EADLER AF/S:SKEOUGH-FISH
JCS:CROBERTSON OSD:VKERN
S/S-0 :
I0/PHO:JWOOD PM/ISP!RUHARTON
EUR/UE:ACARSON NEA/IAI:RROTH
NSC:
S/S:
IMMEDIATE
THE HAGUE, R M IMMEDIATE, BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE,
OE
B N IMMEDIATE, M S O IMMEDIATE, PARIS IMMEDIATE +
ON
OCU
PRIORITY
BUJUMBURA, DAR ES SALAAM, KINSHASA, KAMPALA,
NAIROBI, DAKAR, ACCRA, LUSAKA, HARARE, TUNIS, ADDIS ABABA +
E.O. ia3Sb:
TAGS:
DECL: O D
AR
M P , PREL, P U , M R , UNSC, RU
OS
HM AR
SUBJECT:
FOLLOU-UP O SUPPORT FOR EXPANDED UNAMIR
N
REF: A STATE 177t,lb
>
C> USEU BRUSSELS 7b2H
B> STATE lB62b4
1. -CONriDENTIAL - ENTIRE' TEXT.
2.
THIS IS A ACTION REQUEST.
N
3. AS OUTLINED IN REF {A>, O R KEY OBJECTIVE REMAINS
U
SEEING THAT EXPANDED UNAMIR IS DEPLOYED IN R A D AS
UNA
QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE TO PERMIT UNAMIR T CARRY OUT ITS
O
M N A E A D T REPLACE THE TEMPORARY FRENCH DEPLOYMENT.
ADT N O
UE HAVE RECEIVED GENERAL STATEMENTS OF SUPPORT FOR O R
U
CONCEPT T HAVE D N R COUNTRIES "ADOPT" A BATTALION A D
O
OO
N
RECOGNITION OF THE CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE OF FAST ACTION {REF
C>; HOWEVER, S FAR, SUPPORT T HELP THE U EQUIP A D M V
O
O
N
N OE
POTENTIAL UNAMIR BATTALIONS TO R A D HAS BEEN LESS T A
UNA
HN
ADEQUATE.
4. IN ORDER T ACHIEVE THE M S RAPID POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT
O
OT
OF EXPANDED UNAMIR, UE NEED T FOCUS O COUNTRIES THAT ARE
O
N
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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.O
'N
9 i : e S fr6 .
-ZZ-LO (yd)
-CONriDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
3XVXS JO XN3WXaVd3a
�CONriDENTIAL'
LIKELY T PROVIDE ASSISTANCE. UHERE APPROPRIATE, UE
O
SHOULD RECOMNEND CONTINGENTS THAT LIKELY D N R COUNTRIES
OO
SHOULD CONSIDER ADOPTING, O AT LEAST SERVING AS ONE OF
R
THE CONTINGENT'S "CORNERSTONE" EQUIPMENT SUPPLIERS.
DEPARTMENT BELIEVES THAT ACTION ADDRESSEES' HOST COUNTRIES
ARE EITHER SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING ASSISTANCE TO UNAMIR O
R
ARE IN A POSITION TO D SO. ACTION ADDRESSEES SHOULD
O
APPROACH HOST GOVERNMENTS T URGE T E TO JOIN THE U.S. IN
O
HM
A ALL OUT EFFORT TO GET UNAMIR CONTINGENTS EQUIPPED A D
N
N
DEPLOYED. THE DEMARCHE SHOULD BE M D BY THE AMBASSADOR
AE
O C M TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER O EQUIVALENT, U O SHOULD
R O
R
H
BE INFORMED THAT THIS IS A PERSONAL MESSAGE F O ACTING
RM
SECRETARY TALBOTT. POSTS SHOULD DRAU O REF - A A D USE
N
C} N
THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC TALKING POINTS PROVIDED BELOU.
S. POINTS FOR ALL ACTION ADDRESSEES EXCEPT PARIS A D
N
PRETORIA:
O R KEY OBJECTIVE IS TO SEE THAT EXPANDED UNAMIR IS
U
DEPLOYED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE S THAT THE U FORCE CAN
O
N
REPLACE THE TEMPORARY FRENCH OPERATION AND TAKE UP ITS
MISSION OF PROVIDING PROTECTION TO THREATENED POPULATIONS
A D FACILITATING RELIEF EFFORTS.
N
.
-- T ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
O
M S ASSIST UNAMIR TROOP CONTRIBUTORS UITH THEIR
UT
DEPLOYMENT, IN PARTICULAR T R U H PROVIDING
HOG
MISSION-ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT TO UNAMIR.
-- UE HAVE ALREADY LEASED A D DELIVERED SO A M R D
N
ROE
PERSONNEL CARRIERS CAPOS) TO UNAMIR. UE ARE N W UORKING
O
UITH THE U TO MEET ADDITIONAL MISSION-ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT
N
NEEDS OF THE GHANAIAN CONTINGENT.
—
HELPING TO EQUIP UNAMIR REQUIRES HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL
COMMITMENT AND CONTINUOUS CLOSE UORKING LEVEL COOPERATION
BETUEEN THE UN, TROOP CONTRIBUTORS, A D COUNTRIES UILLING
N
TO OFFER LOGISTICAL SUPPORT.
THE PROCUREMENT PROCESS TAKES TIME, A D IT IS
N
ESSENTIAL THAT COMMITMENTS BE QUICKLY FORTHCOMING A D
N
CLOSELY FOLLOWED A D PUSHED THROUGHOUT THE PROCESS.
N
— UE K O YOU SHARE O R DESIRE TO SEE UNAMIR DEPLOYED AS
NU
U
QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. UE BELIEVE YOU CAN PLAY A KEY ROLE
IN REACHING THIS GOAL T R U H JOINING THE U.S. IN
HOG
PROVIDING MISSION-ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT T PARTICULAR UNAMIR
O
CONTINGENTS.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
coririBcriTiAL
�CONriDCNTIAL
— UE URGE YOU T ENGAGE ALL RELEVANT ELEMENTS OF Y U
O
OR
GOVERNMENT IN DISCUSSIONS O THIS CRUCIAL ISSUE TO
N
DETERMINE UHAT SUPPORT YOU COULD PROVIDE A D UlTHIN W A
N
HT
TIME-FRAME, AND TO COMMUNICATE Y U DECISION TO THE U AS
OR
N
S O AS POSSIBLE.
ON
.
b. ADDITIONAL POINT FOR MOSCOU:
-- UE HOPE THAT YOU CAN PROVIDE MISSION-ESSENTIAL
EQUIPMENT FOR ONE UNAMIR CONTINGENT, AS THE U.S. HAS D N
OE
FOR G A A UE UNDERSTAND THAT THE ETHIOPIANS,
HN.
ZIMBABWEANS, AND ZAMBIANS ALREADY HAVE SIGNIFICANT
SUPPLIES OF RUSSIAN EQUIPMENT. FOR THIS REASON, YOU MAY
UISH TO FOCUS O THE EQUIPMENT NEEDS OF ONE OF THESE
N
CONTINGENTS.
?. ADDITIONAL POINT FOR BRUSSELS, THE HAGUE, ROME, B N ,
ONKIEV, AND TEL AVIV {FOR KIEV A D TEL AVIV: UE ARE
N
REPEATING REF {A> FOR Y U BACKGROUND. YOU M Y UISH TO
OR
A
DRAU O POINTS IN REF {A> AS PART OF Y U DEMARCHE}:
N
OR
UE URGE YOU TO IDENTIFY ONE CONTINGENT O UHICH YOU
N
COULD FOCUS Y U ASSISTANCE, UHICH COULD SERVE AS THE
OR
CORNERSTONE T A LARGER EFFORT TO MEET THAT CONTINGENT'S
O
NEEDS. YOU COULD THEN APPROACH OTHER UILLING D N R TO
OOS
SEEK THEIR ASSISTANCE IN MEETING THE REMAINING NEEDS OF
THE CONTINGENT.
{FOR BRUSSELS}: -- UE K O YOU LEFT EQUIPMENT IN R A D
NU
UNA
FOR UNAMIR'S USE AFTER Y U WITHDRAWAL, UHICH UAS A
OR
UELCOME CONTRIBUTION. GIVEN Y U SPECIAL TIES TO RUANDA,
OR
UE HOPE YOU CAN PROVIDE ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT. UE
UNDERSTAND THE TUNISIANS MAY BE ONE OF THE FIRST
CONTINGENTS READY TO DEPLOY. YOU M Y UISH TO FOCUS Y U
A
OR
EFFORTS O THEM, BRINGING ALONG ONE O M R OF Y U EU
N
R OE
OR
ALLIES TO HANDLE THE BALANCE OF THE TUNISIANS' NEEDS.
{FOR TEL AVIV}:
-- YOU MAY UISH TO FOCUS Y U EFFORTS O
OR
N
THE ETHIOPIAN CONTINGENT, GIVEN YOUR COOPERATIVE
RELATIONSHIP UITH ETHIOPIA.
6.
ADDITIONAL POINT FOR OTTAUA:
— UE UELCOME Y U UILLINGNESS TO CONTRIBUTE A
OR
COMMUNICATIONS CONTINGENT TO UNAMIR. W K O H U
E NU O
COMMITTED YOU ARE TO THE SUCCESS OF THIS OPERATION AND
HOPE YOU COULD M K MISSION-ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE
AE
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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CONTINGENTS.
' FOR PRETORIA:
UE UNDERSTAND THAT THE SAG I S NOT
INTERESTED IN PURSUING THE "ADOPT A BATTALION" PROPOSAL.
POST SHOULD FIRM UP SOUTH AFRICA'S PRE-EXISTING COMMITMENT
TO RUANDA, USING THE FOLLOUING POINT:
UE VALUE SOUTH AFRICA'S QUICK ENGAGEMENT IN SEVERAL
DIFFERENT I N I T I A T I V E S ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT, INCLUDING
IN PARTICULAR YOUR DECISION TO PROVIDE A P C S AND
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR THE RUANDAN C R I S I S .
UE
B E L I E V E SOUTH AFRICAN A P C S ARE PARTICULARLY SUITED TO
UNAMIR'S NEEDS.
UE ENCOURAGE RAPID CLOSING OF THE APC
DEAL UITH THE UN AND ACCELERATION OF R E L I E F AID, GIVEN THE
UNPRECEDENTED HUMANITARIAN C R I S I S NOU FACING THE SUBREGION.
10.
FOR PARIS:
YOU UILL RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS SEPTEL
REQUESTING THE GOF TO LEAVE EQUIPMENT IN RUANDA FOR USE BY
THE SENEGALESE CONTINGENT TO UNAMIR.
PLEASE SHARE
CONTENTS OF THIS CABLE UITH THE GOF AND ASK THAT THEY MAKE
PARALLEL DEMARCHES.
11.
BUJUMBURA
- MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
VV
PRETORIA IMMEDIATE
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Page 1 of 4
Cable
PREC:
CLASS:
LINE1:
LINE2:
LINE3:
LINE4:
OSRI:
DTG:
ORIG:
TO:
INFO:
IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL
OAACZYUW RUCNDTA2973 2010043-CCCC—RUEADWW.
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
0 200043Z JUL 94
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUCNDT
200043Z JUL 94
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7825
RUEHMG/USLO MOGADISHU IMMEDIATE 0821
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SUBJ: DISPATCH OF SPECIAL UN MISSION TO SOMALIA
TEXT:
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 002973
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR BERGER, CLARKE, RICE;
STATE FOR AF/E, 10/UNP-STANTON, IO/PHO-LOFTIS
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, UNSC, SO, R
W
SUBJECT: DISPATCH OF SPECIAL UN MISSION TO SOMALIA
REF: (A) USUN 2954 (B) USUN 2957
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT
2. SUMMARY. AMB INDERFURTH, ACCOMPANIED BY SUSAN
RICE OF THE NSC, MET WITH U/SYG ANNAN TO GET
DETAILS ON THE SYG'S INTENTION TO DISPATCH A
SPECIAL UN MISSION TO SOMALIA. THE MISSION WILL
LEAVE AFTER THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S JULY 29 REVIEW
TO LOOK AT UNOSOM IN TWO WAYS: WHAT PARTS OF THE
MANDATE THE FORCE IS NOT PERFORMING AND RESULTANT
POSSIBLE REDUCTIONS, AND WHAT TASKS WOULD NEED TO
BE ELIMINATED I F THE FORCE WAS REDUCED TO CERTAIN
LEVELS. EVEN AS THE SPECIAL MISSION PREPARES TO
LEAVE, THE UN IS WORKING TO WITHDRAW A BATTALION
TO SEND TO RWANDA. THE MISSION WILL MEET WITH THE
SRSG, THE FORCE COMMANDER, USLO, AND WITH THE
CONTINGENT COMMANDERSTXL_GEl_JHE_T&aQE
EO 13526 1.4b. EO 13526 1.4d
CONTRIBUTORS' VIEWS.
| THE UN WILL BE ASKIflgTgR
ASSETS FROM THE US TO ASSIST IN UNOSOM'S
WITHDRAWAL AS WE AND THE UN WERE THE ONES WHO
CONVINCED MANY TO GO THERE. END SUMMARY.
VISIT TO SOMALIA BY UN SPECIAL MISSION
3. ON TUESDAY, JULY 19, AMB INDERFURTH MET WITH
U/SYG ANNAN TO DISCUSS THE DETAILS OF THE SYG'S
PLAN (REFTEL A) TO SEND A SPECIAL MISSION TO
SOMALIA FOR AN ASSESSMENT OF UNOSOM. AMB
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD008\JUL94\MSGS\Ml 159023.html
INDERFURTH WAS ACCOMPANIED BY SUSAN RICE OF THE
NSC. PRESENT WITH ANNAN WERE A/SYG RIZA, GEN
BARIL AND DESK OFFICER LINDENMAYER. LINDENMAYER
PROVIDED A COPY OF THE SYG'S REPORT ON SOMALIA
(SEPARATELY FAXED TO 10) WHICH SHOULD BE RELEASED
WEDNESDAY.
4. PARAGRAPH 57 OF THE REPORT ADDRESSES THE
SPECIAL MISSION. IN IT THE SYG STATES " I AM
INCLINED THEREFORE TO THINK THAT IT MAY BE
FEASIBLE TO COMMENCE A REDUCTION IN THE LEVEL OF
TROOPS AT PRESENT ASSIGNED TO UNOSOM I I . I
ACCORDINGLY INTEND TO DISPATCH SHORTLY A SPECIAL
MISSION FROM HEADQUARTERS TO DISCUSS THE EXTENT OF
SUCH REDUCTION WITH MY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND
THE FORCE COMMANDER AND TO PRESENT SPECIFIC
RECOMMENDATIONS TO ME."
5. AMB INDERFURTH SAID U.S. MILITARY AND
INTELLIGENCE ARE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT SECURITY.
USG VIEW IS THAT UNOSOM IS NOT PERFORMING ITS
MISSION AND IT IS COSTING A GREAT DEAL OF MONEY,
NOT ONLY FROM THE USG. IT IS HARD TO SAY THIS IS
THE BEST USE OF RESOURCES. THEREFORE THE USG IS
TAKING THE JULY 29 REVIEW VERY SERIOUSLY. USG
BELIEVES UNOSOM IS IN ITS FINAL PHASES. ALTHOUGH
THE MARCH 1995 DATE IS OUT THERE, IF THE SECURITY
SITUATION GETS WORSE THE END WILL BE ACCELERATED,
AND IF THERE IS NO POLITICAL PROGRESS BY SEPTEMBER
THE END SHOULD BE ACCELERATED. AMB INDERFURTH
NOTED THAT PARA 57 MIRRORED MANY OF OUR CONCERNS.
6. ANNAN EXPLAINED THE SPECIAL MISSION IN MORE
DETAIL. THEY SHOULD LEAVE AT THE END OF NEXT
WEEK. THE COUNCIL'S DELIBERATION FOR THE 29TH
REVIEW WILL FORM PART OF THE BASIS OF THE TERMS OF
REFERENCE OF THE MISSION, SO THEY WILL WAIT FOR
THE COUNCIL'S REVIEW. HOWEVER, THEY D NOT HAVE
O
TO WAIT FOR THE FINAL PASSAGE OF A RESOLUTION ONCE
THEY HAVE THE SENSE OF THE COUNCIL'S APPROACH.
7. THE SPECIAL MISSION WILL LOOK AT UNOSOM FROM
TWO DIRECTIONS. FIRST, WHAT ARE THE TASKS GIVEN BY
THE COUNCIL THAT UNOSOM IS NOT OR CAN NOT PERFORM
AND WHAT REDUCTIONS SHOULD RESULT. SECOND, WHAT
TASKS CAN BE PERFORMED, OR IF NOT, NEED TO BE
ELIMINATED, I F THE FORCE IS REDUCED TO 12,000 OR
10,000 OR LESS. THE MISSION WILL MAKE SPECIFIC
RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH WILL RESULT IN REDUCTIONS IN
THE FORCE. THE MISSION WILL LOOK AT THE CIVILIAN
SIDE AS WELL AND RECOMMEND REDUCTIONS THERE,
ALTHOUGH THERE MAY BE A SMALL INCREASE IN THE
NUMBER OF PERSONNEL DEDICATED TO THE POLITICAL
MISSION.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 002973
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR BERGER, CLARKE, RICE;
STATE FOR AF/E, 10/UNP-STANTON, IO/PHO-LOFTIS
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, UNSC, SO, R
W
SUBJECT: DISPATCH OF SPECIAL UN MISSION TO SOMALIA
8. ANNAN SAID THAT GEN BARIL WAS WORKING WITH THE
FORCE COMMANDER N W TO SEE IF A BATTALION COULD BE
O
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP*
Page 2 of 4
�F:\CabIe\Data Source\Cables\CD008\JUL94\MSGS\Ml 159023.html
WITHDRAWN FROM UNOSOM AND SENT TO RWANDA. THIS IS
BEING WORKED ON EVEN BEFORE THE SPECIAL MISSION
GOES TO SOMALIA AND THEY EXPECT AN ANSWER NEXT
WEEK.
9. ANNAN SPOKE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE POLICE.
IF TROOPS ARE WITHDRAWN THE POLICE MUST REMAIN
BEHIND.
EQ 1353$ 1.4I?.EQ 135261 del
AMB INDERFURTH POINTED OUT THAT
IT W HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT ICITAP WAS IN NAIROBI
S
AND THAT A DECISION HAD NOT YET BEEN MADE BY THE
USG TO CEASE THE TRAINING PROGRAM. HE ALSO SAID,
HOWEVER, THAT I T WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE UN TO MAKE
A REALISTIC ASSESSMENT OF WHETHER THE SOMALI
POLICE FORCE IS CAPABLE OF BEING STOOD UP. ANNAN
SAID THE TEAM WOULD LOOK AT THAT.
10. AMB INDERFURTH SAID IT WOULD BE HELPFUL I F
THE SPECIAL MISSION WOULD MEET WITH USLO WHEN IN
MOGADISHU. ANNAN SAID THEY WOULD. THE
COMPOSITION OF THE MISSION WILL BE RIZA, BARIL AND
LINDENMAYER. THEY WOULD BE WORKING WITH SRSG
GBEHO AND THE FORCE COMMANDER. ANNAN DID NOT
THINK REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TROOP CONTRIBUTORS
SHOULD BE MADE PART OF THE MISSION, BUT SAID THEY
WOULD MEET WITH THE CONTINGENT COMMANDERS IN
SOMALIA, WHICH WOULD GIVE THE TROOP CONTRIBUTORS
INPUT. THERE WILL ALSO BE A TROOP CONTRIBUTOR'S
MEETING NEXT WEEK BEFORE THE MISSION DEPARTS.
11. AMB INDERFURTH OFFERED TO PROVIDE THE USG'S
IDEAS ON THE AREAS OF UNOSOM, BOTH MILITARY AND
CIVILIAN, W BELIEVE CAN BE CUT. RIZA SAID THEY
E
WOULD HAPPY TO RECEIVE THIS BUT THEY INTENDED TO
GO WITHOUT PREDETERMINED BIASES.
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
ASSISTANCE WITH THE WITHDRAWAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP*
Page 3 of4
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD008\JUL94\MSGS\Ml 159023.html
13. BOTH RIZA AND BARIL STRESSED THEIR BELIEF
THAT THE SOMALIS WOULD RESIST THE WITHDRAWAL AND
IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS. BARIL POINTED OUT THAT THE
UN HAD NEVER DONE A WITHDRAWAL IN SUCH
CIRCUMSTANCES. CAMBODIA WAS MUCH MORE SECURE AND
THEY ONLY LOST A COUPLE HUNDRED VEHICLES. BARIL
WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED WITH THE COMMAND AND
CONTROL OVER TROOP CONTINGENTS AS THE WITHDRAWAL
BECAME MORE RISKY. HE LIKENED IT TO WHEN THE
UNOSOM TROOPS BEGAN TO INCREASE OFFENSIVE
OPERATIONS LAST YEAR AND THE PROBLEMS THEY HAD
WITH CONTINGENTS TAKING ORDERS FROM THEIR
CAPITALS. ANNAN SAID THAT THE UN WOULD BE ASKING
FOR ASSETS TO HELP WITH THE WITHDRAWAL - AND THAT
THE U.S. WOULD BE HIGH ON THAT LIST, ALONG WITH
WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. SUSAN RICE AND AMB
INDERFURTH BOTH NOTED THAT THE USG FACES LEGAL
CONSTRAINTS, ESPECIALLY THE BYRD AMMENDMENT.
ANNAN POINTED OUT THAT BETWEEN THE USG AND THE UN
WE HAD TALKED MANY COUNTRIES INTO GOING TO
SOMALIA. NEITHER THE USG'S, NOR THE UN'S,
e 9 N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 002973
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR BERGER, CLARKE, RICE;
STATE FOR AF/E, 10/UNP-STANTON, IO/PHO-LOFTIS
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, UNSC, SO, R
W
SUBJECT: DISPATCH OF SPECIAL UN MISSION TO SOMALIA
CREDIBILITY COULD AFFORD TO LEAVE THESE COUNTRIES
HANGING AT THE TIME
OF GREATEST RISK DURING THE
WITHDRAWAL.
ALBRIGHT
BT
#2973
NNNN
SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03
<"SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03
< SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03
SSN: 2973
<'-SSN>2973
<' SSN>2973
TOR: 94071921C131 M1159023
< TOR>94C719212215 M1159040
<"TOR>940719210535 MU59026
DIST:
SIT: CLARKER DESHAZER NSC RICE STEINBERG VAX
A
,
A
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Page 4 of 4
�OUTGOING TELEGRAM
DEPARTMENT O STATE
F
3•
AUTH
CLEAR 1
3
4
b
7
-GONriDENTIAL-
IO/PHO: R6L0FTIS:RGL
07/20/^4 b47-270fl
SEPKA 755
10: GUARD
PM/ISP: RUHARTON
JCS :
S/S:
AF: G O S
MOE
OSD:
NSC:
S/S-O:
IMMEDIATE
USUN NEU YORK
IMMEDIATE
SECDEF UASHDC, CJCS UASHDC IMMEDIATE
E.O. 1235b:
TAGS:
DECL: OADR
PREL, UN, MARR, RU, UNAMIR
SUBJECT:
RUANDA: ADAPTING UNAMIR T CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES
O
1. -CONriDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST. SEE PARA 4.'
3. THE BATTLEFIELD VICTORIES OF THE RPF, THE COLLAPSE OF
THE INTERIM HUTU GOVERNMENT, THE MASSIVE REFUGEE OUTFLOUS
AND THE RPF'S DECLARATION OF A NEU GOVERNMENT O JULY Ifl
N
HAVE DRAMATICALLY CHANGED THE SITUATION O THE GROUND.
N
THE U.S. IS PREPARED T DEPLOY MILITARY ASSETS T ZAIRE T
O
O
O
HELP MEET THE URGENT HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OF RUANDAN
REFUGEES. THE RETURN H M OF RUANDAN REFUGEES AND
OE
DISPLACED PERSONS, HOUEVER, REMAINS THE BEST AND MOST
EFFECTIVE MEANS OF MEETING THIS HUMANITARIAN CRISIS.
WITHOUT CHANGING ITS MANDATE, UNAMIR SHOULD REFOCUS ITS
EFFORTS O ENSURING THE CONDITIONS F R THE SAFE RETURN O
N
O
F
RUANDANS. THIS UILL REQUIRE A DIFFERENT TROOP MIX AND
CAPABILITIES THAN CURRENTLY ENVISIONED.
4. USUN IS REQUESTED T USE ITS MEETING UITH DPKO U/SYG
O
KOFI ANNAN O 7/20 TO MAKE THE FOLLOUING POINTS.
N
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
low- 02.1*3- n
5
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K 8
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CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DRAFT.
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�•CONriDCNTIAL
THE UNITED STATES PLANS TO SEND MILITARY ASSETS T
O
ZAIRE T HELP MEET THE URGENT HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OF RUANDA
O
REFUGEES.
-- AN ASSESSMENT TEAM UILL ARRIVE IN G M O 7/21. UE
OA N
ANTICIPATE THAT O R LIKELY CONTRIBUTION UILL CONSIST OF
U
LOGISTICS PERSONNEL, MILITARY MEDICAL TEAMS, AIRPORT
CONTROL TEAMS AND THE LIKE.
-- THE U.S. CONTINGENT UILL U R CLOSELY UITH THE FRENCH
OK
AND UNHCR IN ZAIRE.
-- IN ADDITION T MEETING URGENT NEEDS, THE M S IMMEDIATE
O
OT
TASK IS T HELP THESE RUANDANS RETURN TO THEIR H M S AND
O
OE
FARMS.
-- UNAMIR CAN AND SHOULD BE INSTRUMENTAL' IN THAT TASK.
-- UITHOUT CHANGING ITS MANDATE, UNAMIR SHOULD FOCUS ITS
EFFORTS O CREATING THE CONDITIONS F R THE SAFE RETURN
N
O
H M OF THE REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS.
OE
-- THE UNITED STATES UILL CONTINUE TO U R UITH GHANA T
OK
O
EQUIP ITS CONTINGENT IN RUANDA. MOREOVER, UE REMAIN
PREPARED T PROVIDE LOGISTICS SUPPORT TO GET UNAMIR FORCES
O
IN PLACE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HOUEVER, UE BELIEVE
UNAMIR'S MISSION REQUIRES M R SELF-SUSTAINING AND MOBILE
OE
FORCES THAN ARE CURRENTLY CONTEMPLATED AND COMMITTED.
-- THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO JOIN UITH THE UNITED
NATIONS IN HIGH-LEVEL DEMARCHES T SEEK M R CAPABLE AND
O
OE
RAPIDLY DEPLOYABLE FORCES FOR UNAMIR. UE UOULD SUGGEST
APPROACHING SUCH NATIONS AS GERMANY, JAPAN, RUSSIA,
AUSTRALIA AND ITALY. CANADA COULD BE REQUESTED T ADD T
O
O
ITS CONTRIBUTION OF COMMUNICATORS AND LOGISTICAL TROOPS.
-- UE UOULD LEAVE IT T THE UN T DECIDE THE SPECIFIC
O
O
CAPABILITIES IT UISHES TO REQUEST OF THESE AND OTHER TROOP
CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES. VV
CONriDCNTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
«
2
�ickage Subject:
fern' T i t l e :
Rwanda Demarche Cable
cover note
:OHFIDEHTIAL) The attached cable comes out of Friday's peacekeeping core
oup meeting. Ambassador Albright wants to c a l l BBG on Saturday. Please
i l l your comments and clearances by noon Saturday to John Brims i n IO/PHO at
16-7732 or by e-mail. Thanks.
Bob
—-
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
s/\<\/\5 K S
H
�.DEPARTMENT
OF
(FR).
STATE
GT. 2 2 .
'9-1 2 2 : 1 3
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
NO.
1460120030
AT
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CLEAR 1
3 _ H
b
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PAGE
DRAFT.
2
S.
_ a
-CONriDCNTIAL
IO/PHO: RGLOFTIS/USUN:MSHEEHAN:RGL
07/22/^4 73b-7732
SEPKA 772
10: G A D
UR
AF:
P:
JCS:
S/S:
PM: FCOOK
OSD:
NSC:
S/S-O:
IMMEDIATE
USUN NEU YORK
IMMEDIATE
MOGADISHU, SECDEF UASHDC IMMEDIATE, CJCS-UASHDC
IMMEDIATE
E.O. 1235k: DECL: O D
AR
TAGS: PREL, UN, M R , RU, SO, UNAMIR, U O O
AR
NSM
SUBJECT: RUANDA: GETTING UNAMIR MOVING
REF:
A) STATE llbOlb - D G 2202M7Z JUL T3>
CT
1. -CONriDCNTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THIS IS A ACTION REQUEST FOR AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT.
N
PLEASE SEE PARA 5.
3. ALTHOUGH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS MOVING T
O
ADDRESS THE IMMEDIATE NEEDS OF THE R A D N REFUGEES A D
WNA
N
DISPLACED PERSONS, THE ONLY REALISTIC SOLUTION TO THE
TRAGEDY IS THE RAPID RETURN H M OF THESE PEOPLE. IN
OE
LIGHT OF THE INFLAMMATORY RADIO BROADCASTS BY THE FORMER
INTERIM GOVERNMENT, HOUEVER, FEU HUTUS WILL BE UILLING T
O
RISK RETRIBUTION BY THE RPF DESPITE ASSURANCES F O THE
RM
NEULY INSTALLED GOVERNMENT. THEREFORE, THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY, T R U H UNAMIR, NEEDS TO DEPLOY A VISIBLE
HOG
PRESENCE THAT UILL ASSURE THE HUTUS THAT THEY CAN RETURN
T THEIR H M S IN SAFETY A D REASSURE THE TUTSIS A D HUTUS
O
OE
N
N
U O REMAINED IN R A D THAT THEY UILL N T BE THREATENED. BY
H
UNA
O
THE RETURNEES.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
-CONriDCHTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
8/14/15" KBH
3
�DEPARTMENT OF STATE
(FR) 0 7 . 2 2 .
'94 22:13
NO.
1460120030
PAGE
•COHriDCNTIAL
4. THE DEPLOYMENT O A . EXPANDED UNAMIR, DEPENDENT U O
F N
PN
ILL-EQUIPPED FORCES, HAS G N T O SLOULY. THE U SHOULD
OE O
N
TURN T O H R M R DEVELOPED O CAPABLE COUNTRIES T M V
O TE OE
R
O OE
M R QUICKLY T FILL IN UNAMIR'S GAPS. AT THE S M TIME,
OE
O
AE
THE U SHOULD ALSO D A O ITS ASSETS IN SOMALIA T HELP
N
RU N
O
MEET THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN ZAIRE A D RUANDA. N T
N
O
O L C U D EQUIPMENT A D VEHICLES BE MOVED, BUT, UITH
NY OL
N
THEIR GOVERNMENTS' PERMISSION, S M T O P CONTINGENTS
OE RO
C U D ALSO BE DEPLOYED QUICKLY.
OL
5. AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT IS REQUESTED T SEEK A MEETING UITH
O
THE SECRETARY GENERAL A S O AS POSSIBLE T M K THE
S ON
O AE
FOLLOUING POINTS.
— ALTHOUGH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS MOVING T
O
ADDRESS THE IMMEDIATE NEEDS O THE RUANDAN REFUGEES A D
F
N
DISPLACED PERSONS, THE O L REALISTIC SOLUTION T THE
NY
O
TRAGEDY IS THE RAPID RETURN H M O THESE PEOPLE.
OE F
— FEU HUTUS, HOUEVER, ARE UILLING T RISK RETRIBUTION B
O
Y
THE RPF DESPITE ASSURANCES F O THE NEULY-INSTALLED
RM
GOVERNMENT.
— THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, T R U H UNAMIR, NEEDS T
HOG
O
DEPLOY A VISIBLE PRESENCE THAT UILL ASSURE THE HUTUS THAT
THEY C N RETURN T THEIR H M S IN SAFETY. UNAMIR M S
A
O
OE
UT
ALSO REASSURE THE TUTSIS A D HUTUS REMAINING IN R A D
N
UNA
THAT THEY UILL N T BE THREATENED B THE RETURNEES•
O
Y
UNAMIR CANNOT BE PRIMARILY A OPERATION M N E B
N
AND Y
AFRICAN STATES. DESPITE THE BEST OF INTENTIONS, THESE
NATIONS SIMPLY D N T HAVE THE WHEREWITHAL T DEPLOY
O O
O
QUICKLY A D T SUSTAIN THEMSELVES WITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL
N O
ASSISTANCE F O THE U O O H R M M E STATES. THE
RM
N R TE EBR
PROCESS O MARRYING THESE T O P CONTRIBUTORS T EQUIPMENT
F
RO
O
HAS G N F R T O SLOWLY.
OE A O
/
•
— THE PRESIDENT HELD A N W CONFERENCE O JULY 22 T
ES
N
O
A N U C O R INITIATIVES T HELP RELIEVE THE SUFFERING IN
NONE U
O
RUANDA. .
— U PLAN A UIDE R N E O ACTIVITIES T SUPPORT THE
E
AG F
O
EFFORTS O UNHCR, DHA, A D THE O H R HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS
F
N
TE
THERE. THE U _ MILITARY UILL SUPPORT THE FOLLOWING EFFORTS:
S
— AIRPORT SERVICES: GIVING G M A 24-HOUR CAPABILITY A D
OA
N
IMPROVING BUKAVU A D O H R KEY AIRHEADS
N TE
•CONriDCNTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
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LOGISTICS SUPPORT FOR ALL AIRHEADS TO ENSURE THE RAPID
DISTRIBUTION OF SUPPLIES
- - ORGANIZE AN EXPANDED AIRHEAD AT ENTEBBE TO SUPPORT THE
WHOLE REGIONAL EFFORT
WATER PURIFICATION AND DISTRIBUTION CAPABILITY
BY THE END OF THE WEEKEND WE WILL HAVE HUNDREDS OF U . S .
MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE REGION AND SOON WE WILL HAVE
SEVERAL THOUSAND COMMITTED TO THIS EFFORT.
WE WOULD L I K E TO WORK WITH YOU TO MAKE A STRONG APPEAL TO
OTHER MEMBER STATES TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE EFFORT BY
SUPPORTING UNHCR, UNAMIR, OR IN ANY OTHER WAY THEY ARE
ABLE.
THE ZAIRE R E L I E F EFFORT
OUR IMMEDIATE EFFORT WILL BE IN ZAIRE TO HELP ALLEVIATE
THE SUFFERING THERE.
MOST OF OUR MILITARY AND HUMANITARIAN EFFORT WILL BE
FOCUSED THROUGH ENTEBBE, UGANDA TO Z A I R E .
HOWEVER, WE
WILL NOT BE ABLE TO DO I T A L L , AND I URGE THAT WE
COOPERATE CLOSELY IN NEW YORK AND THE F I E L D TO IDENTIFY
GAPS IN SUPPORT AND SEEK ADDITIONAL DONORS QUICKLY.
RECONFIGURE UNAMIR
MY STAFF HAS HAD DISCUSSIONS WITH DPKO AND ALL AGREE
THAT THE UNAMIR MISSION MUST SHIFTED AND RECONFIGURED TO
SUPPORT THE R E L I E F EFFORT AND TO A S S I S T IN ESTABLISHING
THE CONDITIONS FOR THE RETURN OF REFUGEES TO RWANDA.
WE ARE PLEASED TO SEE THE US-LEASED A P C S FOR THE GHANA
BATTALION FINALLY BEGINNING TO REACH KIGALI — BUT UE ARE
CONCERNED ABOUT THE PACE OF DEPLOYMENT AND CAPABILITY OF
THE REST OF UNAMIR.
UNAMIR CANNOT BE AN OPERATION MANNED ONLY BY AFRICAN
STATES.
DESPITE THE BEST OF INTENTIONS, THESE NATIONS
SIMPLY DO NOT HAVE THE UHEREUITHAL TO DEPLOY QUICKLY AND
TO SUSTAIN THEMSELVES UITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE FROM
THE UN OR OTHER MEMBER STATES. THE PROCESS OF MARRYING
THESE TROOP CONTRIBUTORS TO EQUIPMENT HAS GONE FAR TOO
SLOULY.
-CONriDCNTIAL-
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
H
�CONriDCNTIAL
- UE THINK THAT THE U SHOULD S OUT AGAIN T S M OF THE
N
O
O OE
M R DEVELOPED COUNTRIES T ASK FOR SPECIAL MILITARY
OE
O
CAPABILITIES T M K THIS MISSION A SUCCESS IN AREAS SUCH
O AE
AS LOGISTICS, COMMUNICATIONS, TRANSPORTATION, A D MEDICAL
N
SUPPORT. DEVELOPED COUNTRIES SHOULD AGAIN BE ENCOURAGED
TO SUPPORT. THE EQUIPPING OF THE AFRICAN STATES THAT HAVE
OFFERED T PARTICIPATE IN UNAMIR'S MISSION.
O
- UE SUGGESTED T D K THAT YOU MIGHT CONTACT COUNTRIES
O PO
SUCH AS GERMANY, JAPAN, RUSSIA, ITALY, A D AUSTRALIA.
N
- UE UNDERSTAND THAT AUSTRALIA HAS DECIDFD TO CftflMTT A
MEDICAk_ilNXXJjlIJriLjTS_OUN SECURITY DEIA^HiTENT. THIS IS
THE7TYPE OF ASSISTANCETTHfUN SHOULD IjESEEKTNG.
- UE ARE PREPARED T JOIN YOU IN HIGH LEVEL DEMARCHES TO
O
THESE COUNTRIES TO URGE THEIR SUPPORT.
- THE UNITED NATIONS ALSO HAS ASSETS - S C AS VEHICLES,
CUH
GENERATORS, UATER TANKS, ETC.> IN SOMALIA THAT COULD BE
TRANSFERRED T R A D A D ZAIRE.
O UNA N
- IN ADDITION T HELPING T ALLEVIATE THE SUFFERING IN
O
O
ZAIRE A D RUANDA, SUCH A TRANSFER COULD SIGNAL CLEARLY TO
N
SOMALIS THAT INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION" IS MOVING TO OTHER
CRISES A D THAT THEY C N O COUNT O INTERNATIONAL AID
N
ANT
N
FOREVER. •
- HAVE YOU CONSIDERED ASKING SOME OF THE U O O TROOP
NSM
CONTRIBUTORS IF THEY ARE UILLING TO TRANSFER S M OF THEIR
OE
FORCES F O SOMALIA Tfr UNAMIRf THE TRANSFER OF A
RM
BATTALION, FOR INSTANCE, UOULD HAVE A RELATIVELY M N R
IO
IMPACT IN SOMALIA BUT COULD MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE IN
RUANDA.
CONCLUSION
,
- THE PRESIDENT IS COMMITTED T A M J R US MILITARY,
O
AO
ECONOMIC, A D DIPLOMATIC EFFORT T ASSIST THE PEOPLE OF
N
O
R A D IN THIS CRISIS.
UNA
- I APPRECIATE THE E O M U EFFORTS YOU HAVE M D O
NROS
AE N
BEHALF OF RUANDA A D LOOK FORUARD T UORKING UITH YOU O
N
O
N
ENCOURAGING BROADER INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT T THE EFFORT IN
O
RUANDA.
- LET US KEEP EACH OTHER INFORMED O U A IS NEEDED TO
N HT
M K THESE OPERATIONS SUCCESSFUL A D U O YOU HAVE
AE
N H
CONriDCNTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONFIDCNTIM.
APPROACHED. UE ARE UILLING T FOLLOU Y U APPROACHES UITH
O
OR
HIGH-LEVEL APPEALS T SUPPORT Y U ACTIVITIES IN RUANDA.
O
OR
VV
C I T N L B A Y POOOY
L N O I R R HTCP
�GONFIDENTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DISST: CLARKER, DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, SCHWARTZ, STEINBERG, VAX
PREC: ROUTINE
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
DTG:222251ZJUL94
FM: USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC-7917
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC
RUEICJCS/OSD WASHDC
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 003033
JOINT STAFF FOR DIR, DIR J5; WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC: OSD
FOR OASD (SR&R)PK/PE
E.O. 12356: OADR
TAGS: MARR, MOPS, PREL, OAU, UN, RW
SUBJEC
1. GONFI
2. SUMMARY. AT A MEETING BETWEEN AMB iFTOERFURTH AND
A/SYG RIZA ON 22 JULY (SEPTEL), A REVIEW WAS
CONDUCTED ON THE STATUS OF RESOURCES FOR UNAMIR.
UNAMIR TROOP STRENGTH CURRENTLY STANDS AT 578 IN
KIGALI. BY Min-Ai
IRT ^ m n - ^ n n ARF FYPFr.TFn IM
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4cl
COUNTRY.
IN BARIL'S WORDS: "WE HAVE TO QUIT
TTANCING~ATroOND . UNAMIR IS STILL SHORT SIGNIFICANT
AMOUNTS OF EQUIPMENT INCLUDING ITEMS REQUESTED BY
RHANA. USUN MILAD HELD FURTHER TALKS WITH THE UN.
END SUMMARY.
3. IN SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN USUN MILAD
AND UNHQ PLANNING CELL, THE UN SUMMARIZED CURRENT
UNAMIR DEPLOYMENT AS: 578 TROOPS IN KIGALI, 89 IN
NAIROBI (MILITARY OBSERVERS WAITING DEPLOYMENT), 4 IN
BUKAVU (LIAISON TEAM). 11 IN MILINDI, 52 IN ENTEBBE,
THAT THE GHANIAN BATTALION IS STILL SHORT ONE COMPANY
THAT WILL BRING THEM TO FULL STRENGTH AT 880 TROOPS.
THEY ALSO NOTED THAT THE CANADIAN ADVANCE TEAM OF 39
TROOPS WILL ARRIVE IN KIGALI TODAY.
4. ON THE ISSUE OF EQUIPMENT, THE UN PROVIDED THE
FOLLOWING INFORMATION HIGHLIGHTING THE NUMBERS
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PERE. O. 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAL
3/iyi5" KSH
�CONFIDENTIAL
REQUESTED BY THE TROOP CONTRIBUTOR/AVAILABLE FROM UN
AND EQUIPMENT CONTRIBUTORS (#/#):
GHANA ZIMBABWE TUNISIA NIGERIA
EQPT TYPE *
"
'
APCS
48/48 TBD/50 30/0 12/12
4-5T TRUCK
7/7 TBD/34 4/4
3T VEHS
8/8
6/6
23/10
WATER TRK LOOOOL 2/0
1/0
FUEL BOWSERS
1/0
2/0
SEDAN 4 WD
4/0
BUS 25PAX
4/0
STORES BIN TRK
1/0
REFRIG UNITS
2/0
|
7 M J L A N C E 4X4
"570Y
4/0
WKSHOP VAN
1/0
mTEFTfF
5/0
[WATER TRLS
28/0
ARGOTRLS
8/0
RECOV VEHS
2/2
WATER PUR UNITS 3/3
FUEL BLAD15000L
5/4
FD KITCHENS
8/8
WATER PUMP 506"G 14/01
FUEL PUMP 2000L 10/oV
ELMETS
1000/1000
BINOCULARS
100/100
NIGHT VIS GLS
15/15
MINE DETECTORS 10/10
SQD RADIOS
29/0
COY/BN RADIOS ~~38/38
VIEW MICROFICHE 4/4
TENT LOMAN
4/4
SANDBAGS
600K/600K
EQPT TYPE
ETHIOPIA MALI MALAWI ZAMBIA
72/0
APCS
12/12
5/5 150/0
4-5T TRUCK
8/8 120/0
3T VEHS
20/0 4/0 10/0
LT RECCE VEHS
5/0
WATER TRK LOOOOL
5/0
FUEL BOWSERS
2/0
REFRIG UNITS
2/0
WKSHOP VAN
2/0 15/0
WATER TRLS
15/0
CARGO TRLS
4/0
RECOV VEHS
2/0
ROUGH TER FKLIFT
2/0
FRONT END LOADER
1/0
FD KITCHENS
1/0
5/0
WATER PUMP 500G
FLAK JACKETS
850/850 150/
150
1000/0
NIGHT VIS GLS
42/0
e N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 003033
r
G
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
JOINT STAFF FOR DIR, DIR J5; WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC; OSD
FOR OASD <SR&R)PK/PE
E.O. 12356: OADR
TAGS: MARR, MOPS, PREL, OAU, UN, RW
SUBJECT: RWANDA: UNAMIR STATUS REPORT
MINE DETECTORS
5/0 11/0
SQD RADIOS
1/0 9/0
VIEW MICROFICHE 205/25
RAZOR WIRE ROLL
200/0
HY MG
12/0
RIFLES
150/0
LT MG
12/0
THE UN ALSO NOTED THAT:
--THE REQUIREMENTS FOR ZIMBABWE AND MALI ARE BEING
DETERMINED BY A UNHQ RECON PARTY CURRENTLY DEPLOYED
TO BOTH COUNTRIES (UN TEAM ALSO VISITED MALAWI,
ETHIOPIA, TUNISIA, AND ZAMBIA).
- - ZAMBIA IS BEING TREATED AS A RESERVE AS THEIR
REQUIREMENTS ARE EXCESSIVE. THE UN IS TRYING TO GET
REALISTIC REQUIREMENTS FROM ZAMBIA.
- - THE 50 APCS FROM SOUTH AFRICA WILL NOT BE
AVAILABLE BEFORE THE END OF SEP 94.
- - THE MALI EQUIPMENT MAY BE SUPPLIED DIRECTLY FROM
FRANCE.
- - FRANCE HAS OFFERED TO DEPLOY A "FRANCOPHONE"
BATTALION, MADE UP LARGELY OF SENEGALESE. THE UN HAS
REQUESTED THEY BE AVAILABLE IMMEDIATELY. THE UN
BELIEVES AS THIS UNIT WILL RELIEVE OPERATION
TURQUOISE TROOPS AS PART OF UNAMIR THE FRENCH WILL
PURSUE VIGOROUSLY. ACCORDING TO THE UN THE RPF HAS
TENTATIVELY AGREED TO THE "FRANCOPHONE" BATTALION AS
LONG AS IT IS PART OF UNAMIR.
- - THE UK TRUCKS WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE BEFORE THE
END OF SEP 94. COMMENT: USUN MILAD SPOKE WITH UK
MILAD WHO STATED THAT IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE THE
TRUCKS IN AS FEW AS TWO WEEKS.
- - THE NETHERLANDS OFFERED LIGHT RECCE VEHICLES BUT
THEY WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE BEFORE THE END OF OCT 94.
- - BELGIUM OFFERED $3 MILLION DOLLARS TO PROVIDE
RECOMMENDED THE MONEY BE USED TO SUPPORT THE MALAWI
UNIT.
- - NEW ZEALAND HAS OFFERED TO SELL UP TO 100 3T
TRUCKS.
- - SPAIN IS CONSIDERING PROVIDING APCS. HOWEVER,
THE UN POINTED OUT THAT THESE WOULD HAVE TO BE DRAWN
FROM ACTIVE UNITS AND THIS OFFER WOULD PROBABLY FALL
THROUGH.
- - THE POSSIBILITY OF REDEPLOYING A BATTALION FROM
UNOSOM IN SOMALIA TO RWANDA IS ON HOLD, SUBJECT TO
THE VISIT OF A DPKO SPECIAL MISSION BEING DISPATCHED
TO MOGADISHU AT THE END OF NEXT WEEK.
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
ALBRIGHT
"BT
*3033
NNNN
< SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02
<ASSN>3033
<*TOR>940722191001 M1165523
< SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
<*SSN>3033
< TOR>940722191108 M1165525
A
A
A
FROM:
SITREPRT
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�JUL
CO
CW-CW
U H S L V 1 S M ' Mr rr
UNAMIR JUMPSTART STRATEGY
1) Determine status of all potential troop contributing nations
(TNCs) -- identify barriers to deployment.
2) Identify potential additional TNCs
deployment.
identify barriers to
3) Make diplomatic demarches to (potential) TNCs urging
deployment.
4) Make diplomatic demarches to urge other advanced nations
to provide equipment or other support to enable TCN's to participate.
5) After sufficient information/action, follow up these efforts with a
high-level team traveling to appropriate states to urge deployment or
"sponsorship."
6) Press the UN to push for redeployment of UNOSOM units, if
appropriate.
7) Get DC/.PC to determine whether USG is p/epared to take
additional steps to speed deployment ("sponsorship" of another
battalion; free support or equipment; supplementary logistical support
for UNAMIR).
8) Pursue blanket airlift LOA, if possible.
9) Communicate strategy with universal cable to coordinate USG
efforts.
10) Offer to detail a USG person to work on this issue at the UN.
11) Monitor progress and communicate regularly with UN; press UN
to move expeditiously on its actions.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�UBAMIA RECRUITMEUT STSATEGY
(State/PM ~ 7/27/94^
I.
T
Overall J.S. Sicruitment Strategy
•
•
Create l i s t of possible a d d i t i o n a l troop c o n t r i b u t o r s
by CCB 7/28. (State/PM) ^
•
Determine phone c a l l s to be made by Christopher,
Talboct, Lake, or the President i n connection w i t h
recruitment e f f o r t s , including t a l k i n g points by COB
7/28. (State/PM, NSC)
•
Scrub l i s t s of "required" equipment submitted by
potencial troop c o n t r i b u t o r s , and task P&A request by
COB 7/28. (JCS, OSD/DSAA)
•
Plan rroop recruitment t r i p (Warner, JCS, NSC, State?)
to capitals by COB 7/29. (OSD, NSC, State).
•
/
Determine status of "adopt-a-battalion" f i r s t - w o r l d
commitments by COB 7/27. (OSD, State/IO)
•
II.
Confirm status of countries already approached by UN
and/cr U.S. by COB 7/28. (OSD, State/IO)
D r a f t "master cable" o u t l i n i n g U.S. recruitment
strategy
who's doing what, who's being ask«d t o do
what, and what the U.S. i s doing or prepared t o do;
by CCS 7/29. (State/FM)
A d d i t i o n a l Policy/Procedural Issues to be Resolved
Determine i f DoD w i l l provide l i f t to A f r i c a n troop
c o n t r i b u t o r s (are others included?), w i t h eventual
reimbursement from the UN, under a "blanket" LOA; by
COB 7/27. (OSD)
Confirm the current status of the UNAMIR^^2n^ by COB
7/27. (OSD)
y
\
\
A r t i c u l a t e how a U.S. JTF, located i n K i g a l i , w i l l
interface, with UNAMIR. W i l l the JTF provide any
short-term l o g i s t i c a l and/or sustainment assistance to
nswiy deploying UNAMIR troops as they t r a n s i t through
K i g a l i ? When w i l l UNAMIR be ready t o provide C3,
medic=: food, water, t r a n s p o r t a t i o n f o r a l l of
UNAMI3; by COB 7/27. (JCS, OSD, NSC)
f
6*4^
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
COHII'IUJLMIIAL
DECISION PAPER
Subject:
Use o f K i g a l i A i r p o r t
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
low- 0 ^ 3 . (n
3/1^/15 K6V|
1.
(JZ?) Purpose. P r o v i d e d i s c u s s i o n o f key c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n a
d e c i s i o n f o r deployment and standup o f JTF i n K i g a l i .
2.
(J?) USCINCEUR has t a s k e d Support Hope JTF commander t o
e v a l u a t e t h e need and c a p a b i l i t y o f K i g a l i t o s u p p o r t c o n t i n u i n g
t a s k i n g f o r h u m a n i t a r i a n o p e r a t i o n s w i t h i n t h e r e g i o n . JTF w i l l
go i n t o K i g a l i on Thursday, 28 J u l , t o meet w i t h Amb Rawson and
make recommendation t o USCINCEUR. This paper d i s c u s s e s t h e
pro/con arguments f o r such a deployment.
PRO:
• JTF o p e r a t i o n s would be c e n t r a l i z e d w i t h r e s p e c t t o
r e g i o n a l o p e r a t i o n s , i m p r o v i n g c o o r d i n a t i o n w i t h US
Ambassador (and t h r o u g h him t h e Rwandan government), UNAMIR,
and NGOs.
• TALCE a t t h e a i r p o r t and a d d i t i o n a l l o g i s t i c s p e r s o n n e l
c o u l d p r o v i d e more e x p e d i t i o u s means o f convoying a i r
d e l i v e r e d h u m a n i t a r i a n a s s i s t a n c e t o Goma (659 k i l o m e t e r s
from a i r h e a d a t Entebbe, 160 from K i g a l i ) .
• O p t i o n a l s o maximizes s e t up f o r NGO, c o n t r a c t o r , o r
m i l i t a r y operations i n running f u t u r e l o g i s t i c s operations
s u p p o r t i n g r e t u r n o f refugees and d i s p l a c e d persons
r e t u r n i n g t o Rwanda from Goma and Bukavu and t h e s a f e zone
i n s o u t h w e s t e r n Rwanda.
• Supports o p t i o n t o e s t a b l i s h way s t a t i o n s and l i n e s o f
communications along r o u t e s being used by t h e refugees t o
r e t u r n t o t h e i r homes.
(DIA
Gisenyi
maximum
w i l l be
of whom
assesses 95% o f a l l refugees i n Goma a r e from t h e
and Ruhengeri p r e f e c t u r e s . Return would r e q u i r e
o f two days w a l k i n g t i m e . More d i f f i c u l t i s s u e
r e t u r n o f d i s p l a c e d i n s a f e area, a l a r g e p o r t i o n
w i l l be r e q u i r e d t o t r a v e l 3-5 days t o home).
• Helps r e l i e v e growing h u m a n i t a r i a n a i r f l o w backlog by
i n c r e a s i n g number o f e n t r y p o i n t s a v a i l a b l e t o U.S. a i r l i f t
f o r d e l i v e r i n g r e l i e f s u p p l i e s i n t o r e g i o n , e s p e c i a l l y Goma.
Goma runway a l r e a d y d e t e r i o r a t i n g , l i m i t i n g types o f
a i r c r a f t capable o f l a n d i n g a t a i r p o r t .
Leading by example may encourage o t h e r c o u n t r i e s t o
s u p p o r t a i r l i f t i n t o Rwanda, r e g i o n i n g e n e r a l .
- Supports i n t e r a g e n c y g o a l o f USG being p e r c e i v e d as
d o i n g a l l i t can t o s u p p o r t h u m a n i t a r i a n r e l i e f .
CONFIDENTIAL
C l a s s i f i e d by M u l t i p l e Sources
D e c l a s s i f y on OADR
�-eOWFlDEMTIAL
- O p e r a t i o n s conducted w i t h i n Rwanda w i l l p l a c e t h e focus
of r e l i e f e f f o r t s on t h e c u r r e n t government i n Rwanda and
a l l o w t h e government t o c o n t r i b u t e d i r e c t l y t o r e l i e f
efforts.
•
CON:
• USG would be p l a c i n g t r o o p s i n t o Rwanda p r i o r t o t h a t
government r e c e i v i n g f o r m a l US r e c o g n i t i o n .
P e r c e p t i o n t h a t USG supports p o l i c i e s o f t h a t
government w i t h o u t t r a c k r e c o r d o f seeing them
implemented, i n c l u d i n g processes f o r s c r e e n i n g and
d e t a i n i n g those suspected o f a c t s o f g e n o c i d e , s u p p o r t i n g
r e t u r n o f lands t o refugees and d i s p l a c e d Rwandans, and
w o r k i n g w i t h French government and UNAMIR t o ensure
s e c u r i t y f o r a l l refugees and d i s p l a c e d .
• T h r e a t assessment a t K i g a l i a i r p o r t i s low-moderate.
Reports o f RPF a t t a c k s on Hutus i n t h e area and c o n t i n u e d
e x t r e m i s t Hutu r h e t o r i c on m i l i t a r y resurgence c o u l d
r e i g n i t e h o s t i l i t i e s which c o u l d t h r e a t e n p e r s o n n e l ,
equipment and o p e r a t i o n s a t K i g a l i a i r p o r t .
• A i r p o r t i s t h e p r i m a r y means o f mass e v a c u a t i o n i f need
a r i s e s . E s t a b l i s h m e n t o f JTF and/ora l a r g e s c a l e l o g i s t i c a l
i n f r u s t r u c t u r e i n K i g a l i would make e x p e d i t i o u s d e p a r t u r e
difficult.
• Depending on degree t o which t r o o p s w i l l be armed, t h e r e
may be a r e q u i r e m e n t t o n o t i f y Congress o f t h e i r deployment
i n t o Rwanda under t h e War Powers A c t .
3.
Conclusion.
Since t h e p o s s i b i l i t y s t i l l e x i s t s f o r an
RPF/Hutu c l a s h (FAR), a degree o f r i s k would be undertaken i n
u s i n g K i g a l i a i r p o r t t o conduct o p e r a t i o n s i n s u p p o r t o f
h u m a n i t a r i a n r e l i e f e f f o r t s . Absent any h o s t i l i t i e s , t h e use o f
t h e a i r p o r t would be v e r y s u p p o r t i v e o f USG g o a l s .
CONriDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�Department of State
•
AUTH
: DRAFT • -
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'
I . -cont.i.'d,e.nb.i.o.,l - e n t i r e t e x t
dep-a-L i. ment appreciates
ambassador ' s concerns
about the .
P.'rbpostf.rl ,s-C'"'pe of •. t_he moroccan-•.mission
to .zaire.
while we '
wpi Id ' i'\re t' e i. 't'.he. •' mdroc.c'a'rils'-r-.'ag'fee '-'tp" a' 1 'a-fger'• missi6n> •
i.hc.lu.d i,ii-ii- .a.iv eventual
deploymentto' r.wand'a . as part of
uiiVahvaa'-iv-wov-tygree' with- 'ypu'r 'as-sessrhent -pf ,.the likely
'
n'eg'a.t i vr .'M espon.se'. f ronr the king.
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^ .
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' iisniK• i 'iiscincer-u. vaihi'ngen ge
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
priority\
' •COHriDCHTIAL .
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2o\\- oab3- t*Y
' ''\-''r'/.'T'.
�CONriDCNTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: BEERS, CLARKER, DESHAZER, KELLY, NSC, RICE, SCHWARTZ, STEINBERG, VAX
PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: OONriDCNTIAL
DTG:291601Z JUL 94
FM: AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4507
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0964
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHLS/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA IMMEDIATE 0012
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHGV/USMISSION GNEVA IMMEDIATE 6812
RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0107
RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC//CH1//
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0013
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 2295
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 0072
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 0009
O O N r i D C N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 004695
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
REFS: A) STATE 202260, Bj THE HAGUE 4560
C) THE HAGUE 4530, D) THE HAGUE 4529,
E) STATE 197418
F) THE WHITE HOUSE 231808Z
1. -OONriDCNTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
SUMMARY
2. THE AMBASSADOR DELIVERED DEPUTY SECRETARY
TALBOTT'S MESSAGE ON UNAMIR (REF A) TO FOREIGN
MINISTER KOOIJMANS JULY 29. KOOIJMANS.xAND.DEfcENSE,
THE DUTCH1NDICATED"THEY WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO MEET
ALL ZAMBIAN EQUIPMENT NEEDS, BUT SUGGESTED THAT
PER E.O. 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCU^
CONriDCNTIAL
^
�-OONriDCNTIAL
3. MINISTER KOOIJMANS ALSO INDICATED THAT THE
NETHERLANDS, AS WEU PRESIDENT, WAS TAKING THE LEAD
IN COORDINATING AWEURESPONSE TO THE U.N.'S AND
PRESIDENT CLINTON'S REQUESTS REGARDING BOTH UNAMIR
AND THE PROVISION OF REMAINING S F R V M j ? F W c W G E ^
(REFF). DUICH,OEEICIALSJ.OLD.US;ni7i!
PRUSSIAN'ANTONOv'CA'RGO'PLANE DEPARTED THE
NETHERLANDS JUNE 29 WITH HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, 4
FOUR-TON TRUCKS, 8 WATER WAGONS, MEDICAL PERSONNEL,
AND A 7-PERSON RECCE TEAM. END SUMMARY.
NETHERLANDS AS ZAMBIAN CORNERSTONE
4. AS REQUESTED IN THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MESSAGE
TO MINISTER KOOIJMANS, THE NETHERLANDS HAS AGREED
TO SERVE AS THE CORNERSTONE OF U.N. EFFORTS TO
EQUIP ZAMBIA'S UNAMIR CONTINGENT. MOD AND MFA
OFFICIALS INDICATED THAT THE DUTCH WOULD NOT BE
ABLE TO PROVIDE ALL OF THE ZAMBIAN BATTALION'S
NEEDS, PARTICULARLY APCS, BUT SUGGESTED LINKING
DUTCH EQUIPMENT WITH SOUTH AFRICAN APCS.
ARRANGEMENTS FOR DELLVERXtOETHESE ITEMStjlilUEfA'RMY
^^MMlMpGv,
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WILL D O
S O
EITHER ll^nHE'lSlETHERLANDS;ZAMBIA, OR'ELSEWHERE.
THE COSTS FOR THE PROPOSED DUTCH CONTRIBUTIONS TO
UNAMIR ARE ESTIMATED AT BETWEEN 3-4 MILLION GUILDERS.
SEEKING WEU SUPPORT
6. THE NETHERLANDS IS TAKING THE LEAD AS WEU
PRESIDENT TO COORDINATE A WEU RESPONSE TO THE
RWANDAN CRISIS, INCLUDING BOTH SUPPORT FOR UNAMIR
AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE EFFORTS. THE WEU
PLANNING CELL HAS BEEN TASKED TO ASSEMBLE A LIST OF
POTENTIAL MEMBER STATE CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNAMIR
WITH AN EYE TO HAVING THE WEU ADOPT A CONTINGENT.
THE OBJECTIVE IS TO COMBINE THE EFFORTS OF SMALL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
-GONFIDENTIAL
�•CONriDCNTIAL
G O N r i D C N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 THE HAGUE 004695
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PHUM, PREL, EUN, WEU, RW, NL
SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP ON SUPPORT FOR EXPANDED UNAMIR
AND REFUGEE ASSISTANCE - THE NETHERLANDS
STATES WITH EXCESS MATERIEL OF LARGER MEMBERS INTO
A COHESIVE CONTRIBUTION. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT
SOME OF THE ALREADY COMMITTED CONTRIBUTIONS COULD
BE PLACED UNDER A WEU UMBRELLA.
7. ON THE HUMANITARIAN SIDE, THE WEU IS LOOKING TO
PROVIDE ONE OF THE SERVICE PACKAGES AS REQUESTED BY
PRESIDENT CLINTON. CURRENT DISCUSSION IS FOCUSSING
ON SERVICE PACKAGE THREE - ROAD SERVICING AND ROAD
SECURITY. TO DATE, THE U.K., FRANCE, AND GERMANY
HAVE INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT SUCH AN EFFORT.
DUTCH HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS
8. BEYOND ITS SUPPORT OF UNAMIR AND MULTILATERAL
EFFORTS THROUGH THE WEU, THE NETHERLANDS IS ALSO
MOVING QUICKLY TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
TO RWANDAN REFUGEES. AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED (REFS
B-D), THE NETHERLANDS HAS DOUBLED ITS ASSISTANCE IN
THE PAST WEEK FROM 20 MILLION GUILDERS TO ALMOST 40
MILLION (1 DOLLAR EQUALS 1.77 GUILDERS.). A C-130
WITH FOOD AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES ARRIVED IN GOMA
EARLIER THIS WEEK, AND A LEASED RUSSIAN ANTONOV
DEPARTED JULY 29 WITH 4 FOUR-TON TRUCKS, 8 WATER
WAGONS, DEHYDRATION KITS AND OTHER MEDICAL
SUPPLIS, FOOD, 2 DOCTORS, A NUMBER OF NURSES, AND
A 7-PERSON RECCE TEAM, WHICH WILL MEET UP WITH THE
EUCOM TEAM IN GOMA. THIS FIRST FLIGHT AIMED ABOVE
ALL AT ASSISTING DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS.
SUBSEQUENT RELIEF FLIGHTS ARE EXPECTED NEXT WEEK,
WHICH WILL INCLUDE A 25,000 LITER WATER
PURIFICATION UNIT MANNED BY A TEAM OF 17, AS WELL
AS A NUMBER OF WATER TRANSPORT TRUCKS.
PARLIAMENT URGES CONTINUED EFFORTS
9. AT A SPECIAL PARLIAMENTARY HEARING JULY 28,
MPJS URGED THE GOVERNMENT TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE
TO ADDRESS THE SITUATION IN RWANDA. SOME URGED
DUTCH MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN RWANDA ITSELF,
HOWEVER THE GOVERNMENT INDICATED THAT SUFFICIENT
TROOPS WERE AVAILABLE, AND THE TOP PRIORITY WAS TO
EQUIP THEM PROPERLY. MINISTERS KOOIJMANS AND TER
BEEK POINTED TO PRESIDENT CLINTON'S LETTER TO PRIME
MINISTER LUBBERS AS A CLEAR STATEMENT OF U.N. NEEDS
AND PRIORITIES. CONSIDERABLE CONCERN WAS EXPRESSED
ABOUT THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN BURUNDI, AND
PARLIAMENT URGED EFFORTS TO PREVENT THE OUTBREAK OF
VIOLENCE THERE. PARLIAMENT ALSO EXPRESSED SUPPORT
FOR THE GOVERNMENT'S ANNOUNCED INTENTION TO SUPPORT
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
OONriDCNTIAL
�OONriDCNTIAL
PROSECUTION OF WAR CRIMINALS, HIGHLIGHTED BY A
75,000 GUILDER CONTRIBUTION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD
OFFICERS TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER IN GENEVA.
DORNBUSH
BT
#4695
NNNN
< SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02
< SSN>4695
< TOR>940729121003 Ml 176908
< SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
< SSN>4695
< TOR>940729121004 Ml 176909
A
A
A
A
A
A
FROM:
SITREPRT
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
OONriDCNTIAfc
�INITIAL HERE
OUTGOING TELEGRAM
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AUTH FDC_
CLEAR
1
S.l
DR AFT_R]iJ
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2
3
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5
b
7
6
CONriDCNTIAL
PM/ISP:RUHARTON."RNU
08/03/^4 Xb7?43
SEAISPRW 334
PM:JLEUIS
IO/PHO:AKANNE
P:ES(JICKER
JCS:BBARTOLAIN
AF/RA:SFISHER
EUR/UE:ACARSON
AF/C:MGRANDFIELD
T:TBUCKLEY
OSD:UBRUNDAGE
NSC:
PM/ISP:PSUTER
IMMEDIATE
PARIS
ROUTINE
USMISSION USUN NY, SECDEF UASHDCi CJCS UASHDC,
N'DJAMENA, BRAZZAVILLE • DAKAR, BAMAKO +
.
E.O. 123.5b:
TAGS:
DECL: O D
AR
MOPS, PREL, PHUM, MARR, RU, FR, UN
SUBJECT:
SEEKING FRENCH INTENTIONS O RUANDA
N
REF: A> PARIS 20656
c
B> STATE l i2Qti6
1. •CONriDCNTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
S M A Y AND ACTION REiJUEST
UMR
2. THE DEPARTMENT UOULD APPRECIATE AN UPDATE O FRENCH
N
INTENTIONS CONCERNING THEIR PLANNED STAGED UITHDRAUAL F O
RM
RUANDA CULMINATING O AUGUST 21, AND THEIR PLANS FOR
N
EQUIPPING AND DEPLOYING FRANCOPHONE NATIONAL CONTINGENTS
IN THEIR STEAD. POST IS REQUESTED T APPROACH THE GOF AT
O
AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL DRAUING O THE TALKING POINTS
N
PROVIDED BELOU.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
•CONFIDCNTIAL
�CONriBCNTIA-L
BACKGROUND
3. OPERATION TURtJUOISE, THE FRENCH-LED HUMANITARIAN
OPERATION T RUANDA, DEPLOYED FOLLOUING UNSC APPROVAL
O
UNDER RESOLUTION
O JUNE 22. IN APPROVING THE
F
OPERATION, THE UNSC NOTED THAT IT UAS A TEMPORARY MEASURE
T FILL THE INTERIM UNTIL UNAMIR COULD DEPLOY. ALTHOUGH
O
UNAMIR HAS BEEN SLOU T DEPLOY, THE FRENCH HAVE CONFIRMED
O
THAT THEY UILL UITHDRAU F O RUANDA BY THE AUGUST 21
RM
EXPIRATION O THE U MANDATE, AND HAVE RECENTLY INITIATED
F
N
THE FIRST OF THEIR STAGED UITHDRAUALS.
H. THE DEPARTMENT HAS RECEIVED DIFFERING ACCOUNTS OF
FRENCH INTENTIONS CONCERNING ITS PLANS T E<2UIP AND DEPLOY
O
FRANCOPHONE TROOPS T RUANDA T REPLACE THEIR DEPARTING
O
O
FORCES. UE UISH T LEARN F O THE FRENCH THE EXACT
O
RM
NUMBERS O FRANCOPHONE TROOPS PRESENTLY IN RUANDA UNDER
F
OPERATION TUR<2UOISE, THE NUMBERS AND DEPLOYMENT DATES OF
THOSE EXPECTED T JOIN, AND THE STATUS OF ON-GOING FRENCH
O
ACTIONS T ECJUIP AND DEPLOY THESE FORCES, AS UELL AS PLANS
O
FOR THEIR INTEGRATION INTO UNAMIR. UE ALSO UISH AGAIN TO
ENCOURAGE THE FRENCH, AS PER REF B, T LEAVE BEHIND THEIR
O
EQUIPMENT F R USE BY THE FRANCOPHONE UNAMIR FORCES.
O
TALKING POINTS
S. POST M Y DRAU UPON THE FOLLOUING TALKING POINTS IN Y U
A
OR
DISCUSIONS:
-- THE USG CONTINUES T APPLAUD THE GOF FOR ITS
O
INITIATIVE A D DECISIVENESS IN DEPLOYING A HUMANITARIAN
N
MISSION T RUANDA.
O
-- UE UNDERSTAND Y U INTENTION TO UITHDRAU Y U TROOPS.
OR
OR
UE ALSO UNDERSTAND F O DEFMIN LEOTARD'S VISIT T THE U.S.
RM
O
LAST UEEK AND RECENT STATEMENTS F O P BALLADUR, THAT
RM M
FRANCE UILL MONITOR THE SITUATION CLOSELY AND NOT EXECUTE
A PRECIPITOUS UITHDRAUAL IF IT UOULD THREATEN RUANDAN
LIVES IN THE PROTECTION ZONE.
UITH THE APPROACHING TERMINATION OF THE MANDATE
ACCORDED BY UNSCR W
AND UITH THE GOF'S STATED INTENTION
NOT T EXTEND ITS PARTICIPATION BEYOND THAT DATE, UE UOULD
O
APPRECIATE BEING KEPT APPRISED OF Y U PLANS FOR A
OR
N
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CON F I D E NTIArk
�•GONriDCNTIAL
ORDERLY DEPARTURE A D DEPLOYING ADDITIONAL FRANCOPHONE
N
TROOPS IN Y U PLACE. UE WOULD ESPECIALLY APPRECIATE THIS
OR
INFORMATION AS U HAVE BEEN RECEIVING VARYING AND
E
SOMETIMES CONFLICTING REPORTS AS T ACTIONS BEING
O
UNDERTAKEN IN THIS RESPECT.
v
IN PARTICULAR, U UOULD APPRECIATE KNOUING:
E
- THE NUMBERS AND NATIONALITIES O FRANCOPHONE AFRICAN
F
FORCES PRESENTLY DEPLOYED ALONG UITH Y U FORCES UNDER
OR
OPERATION TURdUOISE
- THE NUMBERS A D NATIONALITIES O ADDITIONAL
N
F
FRANCOPHONE AFRICAN FORCES UHICH UILL BE DEPLOYED T THE
O
PROTECTED AREA PRIOR T AUGUST 21
O
- Y U EFFORTS T E(2UIP THESE FORCES, THE TYPE AND
OR
O
QUANTITIES O EQUIPMENT YOU ARE PROVIDING, AND Y U
F
OR
AIRLIFT ARRANGEMENTS F R DEPLOYING THESE FORCES
O
- Y U PLANS T INTEGRATE THESE FORCES INTO UNAMIR
OR
O
UPON Y U DEPARTURE
OR
- Y U UNDERSTANDING O UHAT OTHER FORCES UNAMIR
OR
F
INTENDS T DEPLOY T THE PROTECTED AREA.
O
O
-- AS YOU KNOU, THE U.S. IS PLANNING T PROVIDE AIFLIFT
O
F R SEVERAL COUNTRIES DEPLOYING T UNAMIR. IT IS CRITICAL
O
O
THAT UE COORDINATE O R PARALLEL EFFORTS T EQUIP AND
U
O
TRANSPORT TROOPS T RUANDA.
O
-- ALSO, UE UOULD APPRECIATE KNOUING IF YOU HAVE ANY
INFORMATION A T THE UHEREABOUTS O THE 15 SURFACE-TO-AIR
S O
F
MISSILES UHICH Y U GOVERNMENT HAD PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED T
O
O
THE RUANDAN MILITARY. ARE THERE ANY INDICATIONS THAT
THESE SAM'S ARE STILL IN THE HANDS O FORMER A M REMNANTSf
F
RY
IN ADDITION, UE UOULD LIKE T TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY T
O
O
RAISE AGAIN THE ISSUE O THE EQUIPMENT UHICH Y U FORCES
F
OR
PLAN T TAKE BACK UITH THEM UPON TERMINATION OF OPERATION
O
TURQUOISE.
-- A Y U KNOU, UE HAVE BEEN UORKING CLOSELY UITH THE U
S O
N
AND UITH POTENTIAL TROOP- AND EQUIPMENT-DONOR COUNTRIES T
O
MEET EQUIPMENT NEEDS UITH AVAILABLE SUPPLIES IN ORDER T
O
EXPEDITE DEPLOYMENT O ADDITIONAL FORCES T UNAMIR. UE
F
O
SEEK Y U GOVERNMENT'S RENEUED CONSIDERATION T O R
OR
O U
EARLIER REQUEST THAT Y U FORCES LEAVE THEIR EQUIPMENT IN
OR
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
coNriDCNTiAi
�CONFIDCNTIAL
RUANDA F R USE BY THE FRANCOPHONE FORCES U O WILL BE
O
H
JOINING UNAMIRi A D UE ENCOURAGE Y U T CONTACT THE U T
N
O O
N O
ARRANGE TERMS F R Y U EQUIPMENT TRANSFER.
O OR
VV
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
coNriDENTiA-u
�•CONriDCNTIAL
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN
V
GE//ECJ-S/ECJ-4//
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONriDCNTIfrfc
�United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
•GQMPlDCMTHrtr
S
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TFSO01
S/S-0(2)
S/S-S
S/S(3)
S/S~IRM
S/S-O/CMS
S/S-EX
EDITOR
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
Operations Center
RWANDA MONITORING GROUP
SITUATION REPORT NO. 33
SITUATION AS OF 1800 EDT, 08/03/94
•
(U) Kenya's M D has granted permission for U.S.
o
military personnel to drive U.S. military vehicles
overland in Kenya in support of the humanitarian mission
to Rwanda. (Nairobi 13817)
•
(U) While a "blanket" f l i g h t clearance has been
approved by the Government of Kenya, KUSLO Nairobi
reports that overflights and landings continue to require
GOK clearance. This process normally takes four hours.
(KUSLO Telecon)
AF (5)
ALL STATE
BUREAUS &
OFFICES
ADDITIONAL:
MDP
/G
FMP
M/FLO
IM
PA/HO
OTHER
AGENCIES:
AID
USIA (LDX)
CIA (LDX)
ENERGY (LDX)
FBIS (LDX)
JCS (LDX)
N C (LDX)
MC
NMIC (LDX)
NSA (LDX)
NSC (LDX)
NSOC (LDX)
SECDEF (LDX)
TREAS (LDX)
W S (LDX)
HR
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
•
EUCOM reports that water production at Goma
continues to exceed distribution capability. The arrival
of US and Finnish water trucks has given the JTF t;he
capability to meet survival needs. According to UNHCR,
i t i s 60 percent of the level required for the basic
health of the refugee population,, (USCINCEUR SITREP 34)
•
{J?) U.S. Mission Geneva reports that the August 2
U.N. Rwanda Pledging Conference resulted in an additional
$137 million pledged in response to the U appeal and
N
$437 million in-kind contributions for overall needs.
Although support was extraordinary, much of what was
pledged i s not new money, rather i t i s already in donor
pipelines. Non-traditional donors include Croatia,
Tunisia and Russia. While this conference i s seen as a
success, coordination vrill take time to effect and w i l l
not be perfect.
(Geneva 6738 and 6736)
•
(U) The new Prime Minister of Rwanda, Faustin
Twagiramungu, stated that genocide t r i a l s , expected to
number over 30,000, should be conducted under Rwandan
courts rather than by ah international tribunal. This
c o n f l i c t s with a statement made last week by AID
Administrator Atwood, who announced that the new
government had agreed to try suspected war criminals via
international tribunal. (Reuter)
Jarlene U. de Breeri
Coordinator
David Stewart
Senior Watch Officer
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECL:OADR
�Ft, ex.
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C.
20520
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
DIST.
S
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TFSO01
S/S-0(2)
S/S-S
S/S(3)
S/S-IRM
SSOCS
/-/M
S/S-EX
EDITOR
AF (5)
ALL STATE
BUREAUS &
OFFI.CES
ADDITIONAL:
MDP
/G
FMP
M/FLO
IM
PA/HO
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
Operations Center
R A D MONITORING GROUP
WNA
SITUATION REPORT NO. 34
SITUATION AS OF 0600 EDT, 08/04/94
•
(U) UNHCR A i r Operations C e l l Geneva (AOCG) has
fourteen C-141 or larger a i r c r a f t , twelve C-130
equivalent a i r c r a f t , and twelve small a i r c r a f t scheduled
for Goma today. AOCG reported that 268 s o r t i e s from a l l
types of a i r c r a f t delivered humanitarian r e l i e f supplies
to Goma from July 19 through August 1. (UNHCR AOCG
Update of Aug 4)
•
(LOU) UNAMIR Commander General D a l l a i r e i s scheduled
to be replaced on August 15. He w i l l assume h i s new
command i n Canada s h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r , and another
Canadian general w i l l take h i s place i n Rwanda.
(Telcon/Embassy K i g a l i )
•
(U) Press reports i n d i c a t e that hate broadcasts by
hard-line Hutus have resumed a f t e r two weeks of silence.
The broadcasts are causing refugees t o run the r i s k of
worsening dysentery and measles i n the Zairean camps.
(EUCOM S i t r e p 35)
Robert P^ Ja ckson
Coordinator
W i l l i a m Davnie
Senior Watch O f f i c e r
OTHER
AGENCIES:
AID
USIA (LDX)
CIA (LDX)
ENERGY (LDX)
FBIS (LDX)
JCS (LDX)
N C (LDX)
MC
NMIC (LDX)
NSA (LDX)
NSC (LDX)
NSOC (LDX)
SECDEF (LDX)
TREAS (LDX)
W S (LDX)
HR
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�Tri;
0 6. 'J J.
; c : 4 c.
'. - J
r
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.
r .-. u z
RWANDA TROOP RECRUITMENT UPDATE
UNAMIRi Eastern ^iiirg, Turq«aise Rsplacgments
(State/PM/ISP — Q/QZ/94)
Contacts:
P h i l Suter, Robert Dam, o r J a c q u e l i n e N a t t e r
202-647-3136
Australia
Ref:
USUN 3078 (270018Z JUL 94)
300 t r o o p s pledged (medical u n i t ) , and 120 man
s e c u r i t y u n i t t o guard h o s p i t a l and medical
convoys.
Advance team a r r i v e s K i g a l i 8/6, balance by 8/22.
Self-deployed.
Next Steps: S t a t e t o m a i n t a i n c o n t a c t w i t h USUN
and Embassy Canberra.
Belgium
R e l : Brussels 8461 (291606Z JUL 94)
Committed t o adopt Malawi c o n t i n g e n t (120-150
t r o o p s ) , w i t h BF 1 m i l l i o n t o cover 100% o f
Malawi's equipment requirements..
FM Claes has o f f e r e d t o c a l l EU c o l l e a g u e s ,
encouraging support o f T u n i s i a n c o n t i n g e n t , FM
w i l l b r i e f Embassy Brussels 8/3.
Malawi c o n t i n g e n t c o u l d a r r i v e K i g a l i as e a r l y as
3rd week i n August, i f B e l g i a n m a t e r i a l i s t h e r e .
B e l g i a n UN M i s s i o n c o o r d i n a t i n g d i r e c t l y w i t h UN
M i l i t a r y Advisor's o f f i c e .
Next Steps: S t a t e t o m a i n t a i n c o n t a c t w i t h USUN
and Embassy B r u s s e l s .
Burkina-Faso
Rgf:
Ouagadougou 3016 (291520Z JUL 94)
Pledged USD 96,000.
W i l l deploy 10-person medical team.
Next Steps: S t a t e t o c l a r i f y deployment date and
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n requirement w i t h Embassy and USUN.
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
�SECKE1-
Canada
Ref:
Ottawa 3862 (292123Z JUL 94)
7/25/94 National Defence News Release
Relief e f f o r t s focus on medical services, water
production, and K i g a l i a i r p o r t .
Also operating C-130 r e l i e f f l i g h t s to K i g a l i
from Nairobi, f o r Canadian NGO's.
25 ATC and a i r p o r t management personnel on the
ground now. Communications, engineering, and
a d d i t i o n a l medical personnel may bring t o t a l
deployed to Rwanda t e m p o r a r i l y to over 400 by
mid-August.
Next Steps: State t o maintain contact w i t h USUN
and Embassy Ottawa. DoD t o double-track and
coordinate through m i l - m i l channels.
Chad
£££: USUN 3078 (270018Z JUL 94)
Part of Francophone group i n Operation Turquoise.
44 troops c u r r e n t l y deployed i n French zone.
Some reports have Chad committing 200 troops to
Operation Turquoise, w i t h 86 already deployed.
French & Chadians discussing post-Turquoise
Chadian presence f o r UNAMIR.
Next Steps: State t o c l a r i f y Chad's UNAMIR plans
w i t h Embassy and USUN. DoD t o work m i l - m i l
channels w i t h French re: equipment needs.
Congo
RQL: B r a z z a v i l l e 2189 (261906Z JUL 94)
Deployed 40 i n f a n t r y t o Operation Turquoise on
July 25 (French transported).
Some reports have Congo committing 300 troops t o
Operation Turquoise.
Next Steps: State t o c l a r i f y Congo's UNAMIR
plans w i t h Embas'sy and USUN. DoD to work m i l - m i l
channels w i t h French re: equipment needs.
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�Denmark
Rai:
Copenhagen 3954 (221012Z JUL 94)
Copenhagen 4013 (261048Z JUL 94)
Seriously UN considering appeal f o r APCs. MoD
and FM discussing a l l o c a t i o n of costs.
U n l i k e l y t o provide m i l i t a r y personnel, due to
commitments elsewhere.
Next Steps: State t o c l a r i f y status of UN
request f o r APCs, w i t h Embassy Copenhagen and
USUN. DoD t o double-track v i a m i l - m i l channels.
Consider c a l l from high-ranking USG o f f i c i a l to
encourage p o s i t i v e decision.
Egypt
fifif.:
Cairo 11496 (191418Z JUL 94)
Embassy Cairo pessimistic. Reports that UN has
not requested anything from Egypt.
Egypt has troops and APCs i n Somalia.
Next Steps: State sending cable t o USUN
encouraging UN t o redeploy UNOSOM troops t o
UNAMIR. State t o suggest t h a t UN ask Egypt f o r
support (troops and/or APCs). DoD to work
m i l - m i l channels.
Ethiopia
Ref: DAO and other reports
Have pledged 800 troops.
Have plans t o self-deploy — f e r r i e d t o Goma, i n
10 s o r t i e s of an AN-12 Ethiopian a i r c r a f t -possibly by mid-August. UN has suggested U.S.
a i r l i f t . Ethiopians prefer U.S. l i f t .
Advance team on ground now.
Equipment requested ( t o be reviewed by UN
Contracts Committee 8/2):
850 Flak jackets
• 850 A n t i - m a l a r i a l p i l l s
• 1 SATCOM u n i t
• Other misc (e.g. t e n t s )
Per Col Layton, UNAMIR plans c a l l f o r Ethiopians
to take over the western section of the French
Free Zone, near Bukavu.
Next Steps: State t o contact Embassy Addis Ababa
to determine date when ready t o deploy, and UN
w i l l i n g n e s s t o "reimburse l a t e r " . DoD to work
m i l - m i l channels t o f i n a l i z e l i f t arrangements.
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France
Ref:
P a r i s 20858 (291834Z JUL 94)
P a r i s 20860 (291931Z JUL 94)
EUCOM SitRep (301200Z JUL 94)
Complete w i t h d r a w a l s t i l l scheduled f o r August
21, as O p e r a t i o n Turquoise mandate ends. 300 o f
1500 t r o o p s withdrawn from s a f e zone as o f 7/31.
May r e c o n s i d e r r a t e o f w i t h d r a w a l i f Rwandan
l i v e s a r e a t stake.
Not d e p l o y i n g r a d i o s t a t i o n t o counter Hutu
message.
S t i l l r e l u c t a n t t o leave equipment behind f o r
Francophone t r o o p c o n t r i b u t o r s which c o n v e r t t o
UNAMIR.
Neyt Steps: S t a t e and DoD t o c o n t i n u e t o work
a l l channels i n P a r i s , New York and c a p i t a l s o f
Francophone t r o o p c o n t r i b u t o r s t o ensure t h a t
O p e r a t i o n Turquoise t r o o p c o n t r i b u t o r s remaining
to j o i n UNAMIR are equipped.
Germany
RS£:
Bonn 18191 (291824Z JUL 94)
H e a v i l y engaged i n h u m a n i t a r i a n r e l i e f i n Z a i r e .
Domestic pressure t o i n c r e a s e involvement,
i n c l u d i n g w i t h UNAMIR.
W i l l i n g t o p r o v i d e equipment and o t h e r a s s i s t a n c e
d i r e c t l y t o t h e UN o r UNAMIR, b u t n o t d i r e c t l y t o
UN m i l i t a r y detachments. Equipment i n c l u d e s 35
t r u c k s , mobile k i t c h e n s , e t c . A package o f APCs
a l s o being c o n s i d e r e d .
May be i n d i r e c t l y h e l p f u l i n the UN's e f f o r t t o
equip T u n i s i a and/or o t h e r t r o o p s .
Next Steps: S t a t e and DoD t o c o n f i r m t h e German
o f f e r , and a v a i l a b i l i t y date f o r shipment. DoD
to work w i t h USUN on t r a n s p o r t a t i o n .
OECRET
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Ghana
Ref: USUN 3148 (300038Z JUL 94)
800 troops pledged.
Ca. 550 on ground at end of July; 250 to deploy
upon receipt of remaining equip (mid-August?).
U.S. equipping:
50 APCs -- F i n a l APCs due i n K i g a l i 7/31
15 M1008 truck CUCV
10 M813A1 5T trucks
5 M1010 CUCV Ambulance
2 M185A3 Shop Vans
1 M1098 5K Water Tanker
1 M969A1 5K Fuel Tanker
2 M818A1 5T Tractor
5 Man Mobile Training Team
UN has requested 6 month lease; t o t a l cost of
$5,032,007, i n c l u d i n g t r a n s p o r t a t i o n . . . to be
reviewed at Contracts Committee meeting on 8/2.
Ammunition request:
De-bo/re-ob memo to U/S Davis by 8/2.
15 day CN required ( s t a r t o/a 8/3).
DoD t o i d e n t i f y stock l o c a t i o n and shipping.
Col Layton reports UNAMIR plan to deploy t o the
eastern section of trie French free zone.
Determine degree of U'S. a i r l i f t involvement.
Next Steps: Following UN Contracts Committee
commitment, DoD to assemble and ship equipment as
soon as possible. State to consider high l e v e l
USG contact with Pres Rawlings to ensure e a r l i e s t
deployment of remaining troops, DoD t o consider
l i f t f o r remaining troops.
1
Greece
Ref: Athens 7455 (251547Z JUL 94)
Hellenic M i l i t a r y has ruled out adopting a
b a t t a l i o n due to bad experience i n Somalia.
Next Steps: None.
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Ireland
Ref: Dublin 4148 (290956Z JUL 94)
In response t o Clinton/Atwood appeals, have
committed 32 troops (8 teams of 4, experienced i n
l o g i s t i c s , t r a n s p o r t a t i o n and engineering).
DFA has asked f o r USG assistance i n transporting
troops. Also need 8 jeeps upon a r r i v a l .
Otherwise w i l l be s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t i n Rwanda.
Next Steps: DoD t o consider providing jeeps, and
w i l l work out t r a n s p o r t a t i o n w i t h UN.
Israel
R&f:
Tel Aviv 14610 (291425Z JUL 94)
Tel Aviv 14140 (250908Z JUL 94)
I n i t i a l l y o f f e r e d "ten plus" APC's (M-llS's).
Then rejected "adopt-a-battalion" concept, but
said they would work " i n our own way."
Nfixt Steps: None.
Italy
Rome 12228 (291620Z JUL 94)
Rome li593 (201633Z JUL 94)'
Have committed 40 APC's (M113) to the UN. W i l l
announce 8/2 i n Geneva.
Total new p l e d g e o f $1.9 m i l l i o n .
Next Steps: State t o confirm o f f e r w i t h USUN and
Embassy Rome. DoD t o work out t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of
APC's t o K i g a l i .
Ref:
Malawi
Ref:
Lilongwe
See Belgium entry.
"Disappointed" w i t h recent UN assessment team
v i s i t ; may withdraw from UNAMIR?
Next Steps: State t o consider having A/S Moose
v i s i t or c a l l Lilongwe t o c l a r i f y . State to also
c l a r i f y transport needs and otljier issues w i t h
Embassy and IJSUN. See also next steps f o r
Belgium.
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Mali
RQL:
Bamako 5311 (011559Z AUG 94)
Bamako 5162 (261447Z AUG 94)
USUN 3033 (222251Z JUL 94)
40 person c i v i l i a n medical team w i l l need food
and quartering assistance.
Have pledged 200 troops. Timing unknown. Not
seeking reimbursement.
Have asked UN f o r equipment:
20 L i g h t Recce Vehicles
150 R i f l e s
12 Machine Gun H
12 Machine Gun L
5 Mine Detectors
150 Flak Jackets
Equipment could be sent d i r e c t l y from France
(USUN cable c i t e d above).
Next Steps: State and DoD to double-track
confirmation of troop readiness s t a t u s . DoD t o
work w i t h UN on equipment and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n .
State to look f o r p o t e n t i a l sponsor t o "adopt."
Morocco
Ref:
Rabat
(01
AUG 94)
Rabat 6873 (251218Z JUL 94)
Offered to deploy to Eastern Zaire, to provide
s e c u r i t y and disarmament assistance to Z a i r i a n
troops (not UNAMIR). Zaire has not yet i n v i t e d
Morocco i n .
During 8/1 Ginsberg-Hassan meeting. King reminded
Ambassador that Rwanda was one of the f i r s t
countries t o recognize the P o l i s a r i o . King may
not be i n c l i n e d to help.
I f Morocco does decide to deploy, DoD w i l l
provide g r a t i s l i f t f o r several hundred troops.
Next Steps: NSC to have President c a l l King.
DoD to work out equipment and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n
issues w i t h USUN and Moroccans.
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Netherlands
Ref:
The Hague 4695 (291601Z JUL 94)
USUN 3033 (222251Z JUL 94)
Have committed t o be "cornerstone" f o r Zambian
UNAMIR contingent.
As WEU president, FM taking the lead i n
coordinating a WEU response t o both UN and
C l i n t o n requests f o r both UNAMIR and remaining
UNHCR service packages (esp. #3 - roads).
O f f e r i n g m i l i t a r y material t o UNAMIR f o r Zambia,
i n c l u d i n g t r u c k s , jeeps, generators, mobile
kitchens and Fokker-27 cargo plane t o the
Zambians, but cannot meet a l l needs as
a r t i c u l a t e d by Zambia.
Light RECCE vehicles may be a v a i l a b l e , but not
u n t i l l a t e October (USUN cable c i t e d above).
Prepared t o t r a i n 125 d r i v e r s & 10 mechanics i n
Netherlands or Zambia.
Suggests S. A f r i c a n APC's be used t o complement
their contribution.
Next Steps: State t o confirm status of o f f e r
w i t h USUN and Embassy The Hague. DoD to work
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n issue w i t h USUN and Dutch
m i l i t a r y . High l e v e l USG contacts w i t h Dutch or
Zambian o f f i c i a l s t o be considered.
New Zealand
Ref:
Wellington 2091
USUN 3033 (222251Z JUL 94)
As of 7/29, sent 36 people to Rwanda.
NZ has also o f f e r e d to s e l l up t o 100 3T trucks
to the UN f o r UNAMIR.
Next Steps: State t o ascertain whether NZ
requires assistance of any type.
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Nigeria
fiel:
USUN 3078 (270018Z JUL 94)
UN has requested that Nigeria ready i t s troops
(ca. 250) to move t o Rwanda. Could be ready by
mid-August.
Have requested 12 APC's, which UN says are
a v a i l a b l e (from where?).
4 25-passenger buses requested? B r i t a i n ?
Next Steps: State/DoD t o confirm readiness of
Nigerian troops. DoD t o query UN re where APC's
requested might come from.
Norway
Ref: Oslo 4172 (211503Z JUL 94)
U n l i k e l y t o p a r t i c i p a t e m i l i t a r i l y , but i s
i n t e r e s t e d i n humanitarian assistance and human
r i g h t s issues (e.g. monitors).
Next Steps: None at t h i s time.
Pakistan
Bel:
(
)
UN may consider requesting t r a n s f e r of some
troops from UNOSOM.
State cable t o USUN oh requesting movement of
UNOSOM troops t o UNAMIR s p e c i f i c a l l y excludes
formal request t o move Paks.
Next Steps: None at t h i s time.
Poland
Rgi.:
7/29 PM/ISP-Polish Embassy TelCon
Polish embassy o f f i c e r reported Poland w i l l
c o n t r i b u t e t o UNAMIR, w i t h p r o v i s i o n & transport
of APCs. Want t o know "what arrangements have
been made f o r reimbursement of APC's"?
Next Steps: State/DoD t o double-track
confirmation of Polish w i l l i n g n e s s t o a s s i s t ,
including requirement to t r a n s p o r t . State (IO)
to respond t o Polish embassy t o explain
reimbursement plan.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�GECRET
Romania
Eef: USUN 2667 (290116Z JUN 94)
Some i n t e r e s t i n sending s u r g i c a l team (20
persons); no f i r m commitment.
Next Steps: State to contact Embassy Bucharest
and USUN to ascertain i f any commitment has been
made or contemplated.
Russia
Rel:
Moscow 21508 (291556Z JUL 94)
USUN 2667 (290116Z JUN 94)
I n i t i a l l y showed strong i n t e r e s t (8 transport
h e l i c o p t e r s & heavy transport cargo a i r c r a f t ) ,
but w i t h no f i r m commitment.
Amb Pickering made new p i t c h to Dep FM l a t e
July. Was t o l d response would be forthcoming i n
e i t h e r New York or Moscow.
Next Steps: State to follow-up w i t h USUN.
Senegal
BfiJE.: Dakar 5669 (060!926Z JUL 94)
240 troops c u r r e n t l y deployed i n Operation
Turquoise. RPF has withdrawn any o b j e c t i o n to
Senegalese p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n UNAMIR.
Expected to commit a d d i t i o n a l b a t t a l i o n (550?) to
UNAMIR, i f equipped (by France?). Have asked UN
for equipment.
Next Steps: State/DoD to double-track status of
Senegalese deployment w i t h Embassy Dakar, USUN,
and through m i l - m i l channels.
Singapore
Ref: Singapore 4757 (280833Z JUL 94)
Considering UN APC appeal.
Embassy f e e l s decision w i l l probably be negative.
May provide assistance i n some form; maybe money,
Next Steps: None at t h i s time.
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South Africa
E£f:
USUN 2667 (290116Z JUN 94)
State 204348 (300100Z JUL 94)
SAG "committed" 50 APC's ("mambas").
May make sense to combine sponsorship of Zambia
w i t h the Dutch, or possibly t o take the lead on
sponsoring Zimbabwe.
Next Steps: State to confirm current status of
o f f e r and how soon equipment can move.
South Korea
Ref: Seoul 6352 (282320Z JUL 94)
ROK has need of a l l i t s APC's. Can't spare any
for UNAMIR.
Next Steaa: None.
Switzerland
RSf: Bern 3992 (2815093 JUL 94)
May have "a few" "APC's i n reserve, but legal
issues remain unresolved (current law p r o h i b i t s
e x p o r t a t i o n of m i l i t a r y equipment t o war zones).
Considering other ways to assist UNAMIR without
legal r e s t r i c t i o n s .
Next Steps: State t o maintain contact w i t h USUN
and Embassy Bern.
Tunisia
Rfif: USUN 3033 (222251Z JUL 94)
DoD reviewing massive l i s t of equipment, reducing
i t t o manageable dimensions.
O r i g i n a l commitment was f o r ca. 600 troops...now
over 1000 troops.
May be a good match f o r Germany ( w i t h UN as
middle man).
W i l l l i k e l y require l i f t .
Next Steps: DoD to continue t o work l i s t s and
request f o r l i f t w i t h USUN and UN. State w i l l
c l a r i f y number of troops b e i n g b f f e r e d and
timetable for' deployment.
i
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�• GECRET
United Kingdom
Ref:
London 12002 (291703Z JUL 94)
State 204726 (301421Z JUL 94)
450-600 engineers, e l e c t r i c i a n s & medical
personnel committed ( f i e l d ambulance co. of 200,
Royal Engineering F i e l d squadron of 200,
electrical/mechanical personnel of 20-30; a l l
s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t f o r f i r s t few days.
F i r s t troops a r r i v e d 8/1.
Preparing to send large l o g i s t i c s u n i t u n t i l UN
can contract permanent p r o v i d e r , assessment team
headed to the area, log. team a r r i v e w/in 14
days, sm. log. team to report back by 8/3.
Need C-5 f o r a i r l i f t of 250-300 blue helmet
personnel. OSD assessing a i r l i f t request f o r 50
4-ton f l a t b e d "Bedford" trucks.
Next Steps: State/DoD to double-track exact l i s t
of equipment r e q u i r i n g l i f t .
DoD to work out
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n issues w i t h USUN and UN.
Zambia
Rfif.:. Lusaka 4430 (281503Z JUL 94)
Offered 800-man b a t t a l i o n .
Netherlands to "cornerstone".
Ready t o deploy when equipment needs are met by
UN or b i l a t e r a l donor (same status as Zimbabwe),
Excessive requirements, regarded as a reserve
Have agreed to scale down i n i t i a l requirements;
UN w i l l provide "enough" equipment f o r "basic
operational c a p a b i l i t y " .
Next Steps: See Netherlands. State w i l l also
track through AF Desk O f f i c e r . DoD to do
likewise through i t s channels.
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�Zimbabwe
Ref:
Harare 8086 (201341Z JUL 94)
Harare 7343 (010921Z JUL 94)
Not too e n t h u s i a s t i c , but has mobilized an
i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n f o r such duty. UN team
v i s i t e d 7/21 t o r e c r u i t .
S t i l l have troops i n Somalia. May be t h i n .
Need equipment. South A f r i c a could help?
Currently providing KC-130 r e f u e l i n g hub f o r Goma
humanitarian r e l i e f operations.
W i l l not deploy unless paid i n advance, or paid
f o r UNOSOM.
W i l l need l o g i s t i c a l support once i n Rwanda.
Next Steps: State/DoD to double-track current
status. State to consider high l e v e l USG c a l l
(A/S Moose to v i s i t ? ) .
END
Note: There are a number of other countries who have been
contacted f o r UNAMIR, including A u s t r i a , Burkina-Faso, B r a z i l ,
Gabon, Cote D ' l v o i r e , Norway. None seems l i k e l y at t h i s time
but w i l l be re-examined to see i f p o s i t i o n s have changed.
13
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�occncT-
5 AUGUST 1994
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
sccncT
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�UNAMIR II
COMBAT UNIT
PARTICIPANTS
COUNTRY
UNIT
DEPLOY
ETHIOPIA
GHANA
FR AFRICAN
MALAWI
MALI
NIGERIA
TUNISIA
BN
BN
BN(-)
CO
CO
CO
BN
ZAMBIA
ZIMBABWE
BN
BN
BY 19 AUG
MAIN BODY (-) IN PLACE
IN PLACE W/OPN TURQUOISE
AWAIT UN DECISION ON EQUIPMENT
AWAIT UN DECISION ON EQUIPMENT
BY MID-AUGUST
BY 30 AUG; AWAITING UN DECISION
ON EQUIPMENT
BY MID-AUGUST; AWAITING EQUIP
APPROX 15-31 AUG
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�UNAMIR II
SUPPORT UNIT
PARTICIPANTS
COUNTRY
TYPE UNIT
DEPLOY
ISSUES
AUSTRALIA
FIELD HOSP
(300 PERS)
ADV PARTY
6 AUG
MAIN BODY
TBD
NOT CRIT; UK UNIT
HAS MED CAPABILITY
CANADA
COMMO UNIT
MAIN BODY (-)
IN PLACE
UK
LOG BN
ADV PARTY
IN PLACE
MAIN BODY
15 AUG
UK TRANSPORTS
US TRANSPORTS
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�UN REQUEST FOR
ASSISTANCE
A CONTRIBUTING NATION OR UN CDR
REQUEST A CAPABILITY OR SERVICE
UN REQUESTS A DONOR NATION FOR
PRICE AND AVAILABILITY (P&A) DATA
DONOR NATION PROVIDES P&A DATA
UN ACCEPTS P&A DATA AND ISSUES A
LETTER OF ASSIST (LOA)
DONOR NATION EXECUTES
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�AIRLIFT
REQUIREMENTS
• AIRLIFT OF UNAMIR CONTINGENTS
-
ETHIOPIAN BN BY 19 AUG
TUNISIAN BN BY 30 AUG
ZAMBIAN BN BY MID-AUG
AUSTRALIAN MEDICAL CO TBD
NIGERIAN CO BY MID-AUG
MALI CO TBD
MALAWI CO TBD
UK LOG BN BY 15 AUG
ZIMBABWIAN BN TBD
(SELF DEPLOY)
(UN REQUEST)
(LOA ISSUED)
(LOA ISSUED)
• AIRLIFT OF EQUIPMENT
- 50 X GERMAN APC'S
- 40 X ITALIAN APC'S
- ASSORTED DUTCH TRUCKS / EQUIPMENT
- 50 X SOUTH AFRICAN WHEELED APC'S
(COUNTRY REQUEST)
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP*
�•GECRET
EQUIPMENT
REQUIREMENTS
.
•
.
•
•
•
45 X LONG RANGE NIGHT VISION SYSTEMS
4 X OBSERVATION HELICOPTERS
4 X UTILITY HELICOPTERS
3 X BAILEY BRIDGES [4M, 12M, AND 20 M WIDE]
3000 X FLAK JACKETS
3000 X HELMETS
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET
!
UNAMIR VEHICLE
REQUIREMENTS
. 120X1/4-1 TON UTILITY VEHICLE
- 50% WITH SINGLE RADIO INSTALLATION KITS
• 145 X 4-5 TON CARGO VEHICLES
- 30 TO BE FUEL OR WATER TANKERS
• 50X1-1/2 TON CARGO TRAILERS
NOTE: HIGHEST PRIORITY IS
50 X 2-1/2 - 5 TON TRUCKS
(25 WITH TRAILERS)
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET
UNAMIR UNIT
REQUIREMENTS
• ENGINEER UNIT CAPABLE OF GRADING
AND CONSTRUCTING CULVERTS ON 350
KM OF UNIMPROVED LATERAL ROADS
BETWEEN THE MAIN SUPPLY ROUTES
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CONriDCNTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: BEERS, CLARKER, DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, SCHWARTZ, STEINBERG, VAX
PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: OONriDCNTIAL
DTG:051601Z AUG 94
FM: AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5484
RUEHTO/AMEMBASSY MAPUTO PRIORITY 6705
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY 0174
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY 0499
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0118
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 4700
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 0147
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 8790
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 1056
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1070
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0351
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1381
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 4840
RUKGNLA/DLA CAMERON STA VA
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA
RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ3//
RUSNNOT/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//N3/N31/N5/N7//
RHFRAAB/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//CC/DO/DOX/RS//
RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//AEAGE-0//
RUEHLS/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 0753
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP//OASD-PA-DPL//PA//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-4/J-5//
RUSNTCA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ETCC//
G O N T I D C N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 DAR ES SALAAM 005023
GENEVA FOR RMA; ROME ALSO FOR FODAG; NAIROBI FOR DART
AND REFCOORD; DEPARTMENT FOR AF/C, MGRW02, PRM/AAA,
PM/ISP, IO/PHO, IO/ESA, IO/UNP, DRL/AAA
USAID FOR AID/A, AID/BHR, AID/BHR/OFDA, AID/BHR/FFP,
AID/PPC
E.O. 12356: DECLOADR
TAGS: EAID, OVIP (MOOSE, GEORGE), PREL, RW, BY, TZ
SUBJECT: A/S MOOSE REVIEWS RWANDA AND BURUNDI
SITUATIONS WITH PRESIDENT MWINYI, AUGUST 5
1. GONriDCNTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: IN BRIEFING PRESIDENT MWINYI ON HIS
TRIPS TO BURUNDI AND RWANDA, A/S MOOSE SUGGESTED THAT
A REGIONAL MEETING ON REFUGEES AND REFUGEE-RELATED
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MATTERS BE CONVENED ON AN URGENT BASIS. REVIEW OF THE
MANY ISSUES MADE CRITICAL BY THE REFUGEE CRISIS, HE
OFFERED, COULD EVEN LEAD TO MUCH-NEEDED DISCUSSION OF
THE COMPLICATED POLITICAL ISSUES WHICH THREATEN THE
NEW GOVERNMENT IN RWANDA AND THE CURRENT BURUNDI
REGIME. WITH RESPECT TO BURUNDI, A/S MOOSE EXPRESSED
IN STRONG TERMS HIS CONCERN OVER THE FRAGILITY OF THE
SITUATION THERE. END SUMMARY.
3. IN HIS MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MWINYI AUGUST 5, A/S
MOOSE THANKED MWINYI FOR THE GOT'S COOPERATION IN
FACILITATING REFUGEE RELIEF FLIGHTS TRANSITTING
THROUGH TANZANIA AND BRIEFED THE TANZANIAN PRESIDENT
ON HIS JUST-CONCLUDED TRIPS TO RWANDA AND BURUNDI
(DISCUSSION OF LIBERIA WILL BE REPORTED SEPTEL). WITH
RESPECT TO CONDITIONS IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS IN ZAIRE,
A/S MOOSE NOTED BRIEFLY THAT THE SITUATION, WHILE
STILL DIFFICULT, HAS BEGUN TO EASE IN THE PAST TWO
WEEKS, LARGELY DUE TO THE AMOUNTS OF ASSISTANCE
RECEIVED RECENTLY. DEATH RATES IN THE CAMPS ARE
DECLINING. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS LIKE UNICEF
ARE WORKING TO CONTROL FURTHER DISEASE OUTBREAKS.
4. TURNING TO RWANDA, A/S MOOSE DESCRIBED THE
DISTURBING, EERIE VIEW HE HAD RECEIVED FLYING OVER THE
COUNTRY. EVERYWHERE ONE CAN SEE HOUSES AND PLANTED
FIELDS BUT ABSOLUTELY NO PEOPLE-THE COUNTRY APPEARS
DEPOPULATED. IN KIGALI, PERHAPS ONLY 5 PER CENT OF
THE FORMER POPULATION REMAINS. THE WATER SUPPLY HAS
JUST BEEN RESTORED BUT THERE IS STILL NO ELECTRICITY,
TELEPHONE SERVICE, BANKS, MONEY OR A FUNCTIONING CIVIL
SERVICE.
5. A/S MOOSE INFORMED MWINYI THAT IN MEETINGS WITH
GOR OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME
MINISTER, HE CAME AWAY IMPRESSED THAT THEY ARE SINCERE
ABOUT ESTABLISHING A BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT TO ATTRACT
SUPPORT. THEY ALSO RECOGNIZE THE NEED TO INSTILL A
SENSE OF SECURITY WITHIN THE COUNTRY TO PERSUADE
REFUGEES TO RETURN. AT THE SAME TIME, THE GOR IS
SEVERELY HANDICAPPED BY ITS TOTAL LACK OF RESOURCES
AND INSTRUMENTS OF GOVERNMENT. GOR RANKS INCLUDE
THOSE WHO BELIEVE THE RPF VICTORY SHOULD TRANSLATE
INTO THE FORMATION OF AN RPF GOVERNMENT. IN REFUGEE
CAMPS OUTSIDE RWANDA, A PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN OF
INTIMIDATION AND TERRORIZATION BY FORMER MILITIA
MEMBERS AND MILITARY-NOT ALL OF WHOM HAVE BEEN
DISARMED-CONTINUES. THE DANGER OVER TIME, A/S MOOSE
OBSERVED, IS THAT RECRIMINATIONS WILL BE NURTURED
AMONG THOSE ELEMENTS HOPING FOR A RETURN. HE POINTED
OUT THAT THESE CONSTITUTE PROBLEMS WITH NO EASY
SOLUTIONS.
6. ALSO DELICATE, A/S MOOSE CONTINUED, IS THE
SITUATION IN THE FRENCH ZONE. THE FRENCH ARE LEAVING
AND SHOULD LEAVE BUT IT IS CRITICAL THAT
THE
TRANSITION FROM OPERATION TURQUOISE TO UNAMIR PROCEED
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP\ CONFIDENTIAL
�OONriDCNTIAL.
0 O N T I D C N T I A-L SECTION 02 OF 05 DAR ES SALAAM 005023
GENEVA FOR RMA; ROME ALSO FOR FODAG; NAIROBI FOR DART
AND REFCOORD; DEPARTMENT FOR AF/C, MGRW02, PRM/AAA,
PM/ISP, IO/PHO, IO/ESA, IO/UNP, DRL/AAA
USAID FOR AID/A, AID/BHR, AID/BHR/OFDA, AID/BHR/FFP,
AID/PPC
E.O. 12356: DECLOADR
TAGS: EAID, OVIP (MOOSE, GEORGE), PREL, RW, BY, TZ
SUBJECT: A/S MOOSE REVIEWS RWANDA AND BURUNDI
SITUATIONS WITH.PRESIDENT MWINYI, AUGUST 5
1. -OONriDCNTIAt: - ENTIRE TEXT.
IN AN ORDERLY MANNER. IF NOT, THE FRENCH WITHDRAWAL
COULD TRIGGER A MASSIVE REFUGEE EXODUS WHICH COULD
OVERWHELM NOT ONLY ZAIRE, BUT EVEN MORE DANGEROUS,
DESTABILIZE BURUNDI.
7. A/S MOOSE THEN TOOK UP THE SITUATION IN BURUNDI,
WHICH HE DESCRIBED IN SOBERING TERMS. HE INFORMED
MWINYI THAT WHILE HE HAD BEEN ANXIOUS ABOUT BURUNDI
BEFORE TRAVELLING THERE, HE IS EVEN MORE CONCERNED NOW
AFTER HIS BRIEF VISIT. THE BURUNDI SITUATION IS
EXTREMELY FRAGILE AND TENSIONS ARE RUNNING VERY HIGH.
A/S MOOSE POINTED OUT THIS DANGER IN ALL HIS MEETINGS
WITH THE GRB AND WITH OTHER POLITICAL PLAYERS.
NEVERTHELESS, THE PARTIES REMAIN LOCKED AT THE NOVOTEL
HOTEL HAGGLING OVER ARCANE ISSUES WHILE OUTSIDE, A
PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN SIMILAR TO THE RWANDA EXAMPLE,
BEGINS TO MATERIALIZE. MILITIAS ARE EXPANDING AND IN
THE INCREASED CLIMATE OF INSECURITY, PEOPLE ARE ARMING
THEMSELVES. THE ECONOMY IS PARALYZED BECAUSE OF THE
POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY; MONEY IS BEING SPENT BUT NO
FUNDS ARE COMING IN.
8. A/S MOOSE OFFERED HIS DISTURBING IMPRESSION THAT
THE CURRENT BURUNDI SCENE IS ALL TOO REMINISCENT OF
RWANDA, PRE-APRIL 6. A VERY SMALL NUMBER OF EXTREMIST
ELEMENTS ON BOTH SIDES ARE DOMINATING THE POLITICAL
DIALOGUE, BLOCKING RESOLUTION OF THE CRISIS AND
APPEALING TO THE FEARS OF THE POPULATION. THE
MODERATES ARE AFRAID TO SPEAK OUT AGAINST THEM. A/S
MOOSE NOTED THAT SOMETHING NEEDS TO BE DONE URGENTLY
TO OVERCOME THE IMPASSE OVER THE ISSUE OF PRESIDENTIAL
SUCCESSION AND TO ENCOURAGE MODERATE VOICES TO BE
HEARD.
9. ANOTHER FACTOR THREATENING THE PEACE IN BURUNDI IS
THE REFUGEES IN THE FRENCH ZONE. A/S MOOSE REITERATED
THE NEED TO ENSURE THAT THE FRENCH WITHDRAWAL PROCEED
IN AN ORDERLY FASHION TO PREVENT AN INFLUX OF REFUGEES
INTO BURUNDI-A DEVELOPMENT WITH POTENTIALLY OMINOUS
CONSEQUENCES. THE PROBLEM OF REFUGEES IN ITSELF COULD
CONTAIN THE SEEDS OF ANOTHER CYCLE OF VIOLENCE IN THE
REGION.
10. THIS LEAD A/S MOOSE TO UNDERSCORE THAT "ALL OF US
HAVE TO EXPEND EVEN MORE ENERGY AND EFFORT" TO RESOLVE
THE CRISIS. HE TOLD MWINYI HE IS AWARE THAT TANZANIA
IS THINKING OF HOLDING A REGIONAL MEETING ON RWANDA, A
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP
OONriDCNTIAL
�OONriDCNTIAL
DEVELOPMENT HE ENCOURAGED. IN HIS MEETING WITH
MUSEVINI, THE UGANDAN LEADER HAD AGREED IT IS URGENT
FOR REGIONAL LEADERS TO COME TOGETHER TO DISCUSS WAYS
TO MANAGE THESE PROBLEMS. A/S MOOSE NOTED THERE ARE
DIFFERENT VIEWS OF HOW SUCH A MEETING COULD BE
ORGANIZED. SOME MIGHT CALL FOR A COMING TOGETHER OF
NEIGHBORING STATES, THE GOR AND PERHAPS EVEN THE
RWANDAN OPPOSITION. A/S MOOSE PREDICTED THE REACTION
OF THE GOR TO THIS PROPOSAL COULD BE QUITE NEGATIVE AS
PASSIONS IN RWANDA ARE "STILL RUNNING STRONG."
11. MOOSE HIMSELF OFFERED THAT A MEETING ON REFUGEES
AND REFUGEE-RELATED ISSUES (E.G. ON CAMP SECURITY,
ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION, AND DETENTION OF SUSPECTED
C O N r i D C N T I A L - SECTION 03 OF 05 DAR ES SALAAM 005023
GENEVA FOR RMA; ROME ALSO FOR FODAG; NAIROBI FOR DART
AND REFCOORD; DEPARTMENT FOR AF/C, MGRW02, PRM/AAA,
PM/ISP, IO/PHO, IO/ESA, IO/UNP, DRL/AAA
USAID FOR AID/A, AID/BHR, AID/BHR/OFDA, AID/BHR/FFP,
AID/PPC
E.0.12356: DECLOADR
TAGS: EAID, OVIP (MOOSE, GEORGE), PREL, RW, BY, TZ
SUBJECT: A/S MOOSE REVIEWS RWANDA AND BURUNDI
SITUATIONS WITH PRESIDENT MWINYI, AUGUST 5
1. •OONriDCNTIAt - ENTIRE TEXT.
CRIMINALS) IS URGENTLY NEEDED. A REGIONAL REFUGEE
MEETING-INDEED ALREADY PROPOSED BY BURUNDI-CONVENED
URGENTLY, PERHAPS AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL IN THE NEXT
TEN DAYS TO TWO WEEKS, COULD OFFER A MEANS TO ADDRESS
EVEN MORE COMPLICATED ISSUES. REFUGEE RECEIVING AND
SENDING COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL RELIEF
ORGANIZATIONS WOULD ATTEND SUCH A SESSION-AS COULD
OBSERVER STATES LIKE THE U.S. WHICH ARE INTERESTED IN
THESE PROBLEMS.
12. MWINYI CONFIRMED THE GOT IS THINKING OF CONVENING
A REGIONAL SESSION. THIS PLANNING WAS INTERRUPTED
EARLIER ONLY AFTER MUSEVINI LEFT FOR TRAVEL ABROAD.
UPON MUSEVINI'S RETURN, NEGOTIATIONS HAD RESUMED.
MWINYI, NEVERTHELESS, CONFESSED THAT "WE ARE STILL
GROPING IN THE DARK." THE PROBLEM IN BURUNDI, HE
CONTINUED, IS COMPLICATED BECAUSE THE ARMY THERE HOLDS
THE GOVERNMENT HOSTAGE SO THAT "WHEN YOU TALK TO A
GOVERNMENT PERSON, YOU TALK TO SOMEONE WHO CANNOT MAKE
A DECISION." EVEN SO, TANZANIA WOULD CONTINUE TO TRY
TO WORK WITH THE REGIONAL PARTIES. MWINYI ADDED THAT
HE LIKED THE IDEA OF A MINISTERIAL MEETING WHICH COULD
LEAD I
NTO A REGIONAL HEADS OF STATE SUMMIT. MOOSE
OBSERVED THAT MINISTERS COULD DEFINE AN AGENDA,
SOMETHING NEEDED BEFORE SOLUTIONS CAN BE PROPOSED.
13. OBVIOUSLY STILL TURNING THE IDEA OVER IN HIS
MIND, MWINYI COMMENTED THAT "WHILE AT LEAST YOU NOW
HAVE A GOVERNMENT IN RWANDA, IN BURUNDI YOU HAVE A
GOVERNMENT IN A SHELL." THE SITUATION THERE IS
DELICATE BECAUSE THE ARMY HAS THE GUNS AND CARE NEEDS
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
OONriDCNTIAL
�•OONriDCNTIAL
TO BE TAKEN NOT TO ANTAGONIZE IT. MOOSE AGREED IT IS
IMPORTANT NOT TO TAKE ACTIONS THAT MIGHT INCREASE THE
ARMY'S LEVEL OF ANXIETY. THE BURUNDIAN ARMY, HE
SUGGESTED, COULD EVEN BE INVITED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE
REGIONAL REFUGEE MEETING, PERHAPS IN THE CONTEXT OF
REFUGEE SECURITY, AS A WAY TO BEGIN POLITICAL
DISCUSSIONS.
14. MWINYI INFORMED A/S MOOSE THAT IN HIS RECENT
MEETINGS WITH THE RWANDA PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT,
THEY HAD DISCUSSED THE NEED TO PERSUADE REFUGEES TO
RETURN TO RWANDA. A WEEK LATER, THE NUMBER OF
REFUGEES INTO TANZANIA INCREASED TO 3000 A DAY. THIS
WAS CAUSED BY YOUNG TUTSIS TAKING REVENGE AGAINST THE
HUTU POPULATION. SO, HE NOTED, TANZANIA IS VERY WELL
AWARE OF THE NEED TO CREATE A SECURE ENVIRONMENT IN
RWANDA IF REFUGEES ARE TO RETURN. MOOSE AGREED AND
SAID HE HAD UNDERSCORED TO GOR LEADERS THE NEED TO
CONTROL UNDISCIPLINED ARMY ELEMENTS AND YOUNG TUTSIS
SEEKING REVENGE IF REFUGEES ARE EVER TO BE CONFIDENT
OF THE DOMESTIC SITUATION. THIS IS YET ANOTHER
CRITICAL ISSUE NEEDING TO BE DISCUSSED.
15. REPEATING ASSURANCES HE HAD MADE TO PRESIDENT
BIZIMUNGU, MWINYI TOLD A/S MOOSE TANZANIAN FORCES ARE
DISARMING THOSE ENTERING TANZANIA-UNLIKE ZAIRE. A/S
MOOSE EXPLAINED THAT IN ZAIRE THE PROBLEM IS GREATER
BECAUSE ALL THE RWANDAN MILITARY AND MILITIA REMNANTS
HAD FLED THERE. ALTHOUGH UNHCR REPORTS THAT 80-85 PER
•COM F I D E N T I A Lr SECTION 04 OF 05 DAR ES SALAAM 005023
GENEVA FOR RMA; ROME ALSO FOR FODAG; NAIROBI FOR DART
AND REFCOORD; DEPARTMENT FOR AF/C, MGRW02, PRM/AAA,
PM/ISP, IO/PHO, IO/ESA, IO/UNP, DRL/AAA
USAID FOR AID/A, AID/BHR, AID/BHR/OFDA, AID/BHR/FFP,
AID/PPC
E.0.12356: DECLOADR
TAGS: EAID, OVIP (MOOSE, GEORGE), PREL, RW, BY, TZ
SUBJECT: A/S MOOSE REVIEWS RWANDA AND BURUNDI
SITUATIONS WITH PRESIDENT MWINYI, AUGUST 5
1. OONriDCNTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
CENT OF THESE FORCES HAVE BEEN DISARMED, THIS STILL
LEAVES A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER WITH GUNS. FURTHER, THE
MOVE TO KEEP THE MILITARY TOGETHER AS A SEPARATE
REFUGEE GROUP, DESPITE HAVING SOME ADVANTAGES, COULD
CONCEIVABLY LEAD TO THE FORMATION OF A NUCLEUS INTENT
UPON RETURNING TO RWANDA. THUS THE QUESTION OF WHAT
TO DO ABOUT THE MILITARY PRESENTS ANOTHER ISSUE
DEMANDING URGENT ATTENTION.
16. IN DISCUSSING THE PROBLEM OF SUSPECTED MURDERERS
IN REFUGEE CAMPS, A/S MOOSE CITED ONGOING EFFORTS AT
THE U.N. TO PASS A RESOLUTION CREATING AN
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL TO TRY ACCUSED CRIMINALS. THIS
RESOLUTION MAY BE PASSED NEXT WEEK. IN ADDITION, THE
U.N. IS AWARE THAT THERE ARE PRACTICAL ASPECTS TO THE
PROBLEM. FOR EXAMPLE, IT IS CLEAR THAT SECURITY NEEDS
TO BE ESTABLISHED IN THE CAMPS WITHOUT PROVOKING
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY •eeNriDCNTiAL
�• CONFIDENTIAL
INSURRECTION. AGAIN, THIS IS ANOTHER URGENT ISSUE
REQUIRING ADDRESS.
17. IN ANSWER TO MWINYI'S QUESTION ABOUT CURRENT RPF
VIEWS ON CREATING A NEW ARMY, A/S MOOSE REPLIED THAT
RPF COMMANDER KAGAME HAD CONFIRMED TO HIM THAT THE
ARUSHA ACCORDS PROVISION TO JOIN RPF AND GOVERNMENT
FORCES TOGETHER STILL STANDS (OF COURSE, THOSE
INVOLVED IN MASSACRES WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED INTO THE
NEW ARMY). KAGAME IS EVEN CLAIMING THAT 100-150
SOLDIERS HAVE RETURNED, INCLUDING SENIOR OFFICERS.
THE GOR HAD HINTED THAT THE 40-60 RATIO OF FORCES
AGREED TO UNDER THE ACCORDK MIGHT HAVE TO CHANGE;
NEVERTHELESS, THE RPF'S ADHERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF
AMALGAMATION IS WELCOME.
18. MWINYI'S NEXT QUESTION CONCERNED PROPAGANDA.
MOOSE ANSWERED THAT THE HATE RADIO BROADCASTS HAVE
REPORTEDLY BEEN SILENT FOR ABOUT TWO WEEKS.
UNFORTUNATELY, REMNANTS OF THE INTERHAMWE AND MILITIA
IN THE CAMPS ARE STILL INTIMIDATING AND PROPAGANDIZING
PEOPLE-MAKING THE PROBLEM EVEN MORE INSIDIOUS AND
DIFFICULT. THE QUESTION OF HOW TO SEPARATE THESE
ELEMENTS IS YET ANOTHER MATTER MERITING URGENT REVIEW.
19. MWINYI THEN RAISED THE ISSUE OF LAND CLAIMS.
REFUGEES RETURNING TO RWANDA AFTER MANY YEARS, HE
NOTED, ARE REPORTEDLY CLAIMING THEIR FORMER PLOTS.
A/S MOOSE REPLIED THAT THE GOR HAS ANNOUNCED IT WILL
ABIDE BY THE ARUSHA ACCORDS PROVISION STIPULATING THAT
THOSE RETURNING AFTER AN
ABSENCE OF OVER TEN YEARS ARE
NOT ENTITLED TO RECLAIM THEIR LAND. THIS WOULD BE
PUBLICLY BROADCAST. WHILE MOOSE SAID HE BELIEVES THE
GOR IS SINCERE, IT ALSO NEEDS TO UNDERSTAND THAT
ENFORCEMENT OF THIS STRICTURE IS CRITICAL IF REFUGEES
ARE TO BE ENCOURAGED TO RETURN HOME.
20. AFTER PRAISING TANZANIA'S EXCELLENT STEWARDSHIP
OF THE ARUSHA PROCESS AND URGING THAT IT CONTINUE TO
PLAY ITS CRITICAL ROLE AS FACILITATOR, MOOSE TOOK THE
OPPORTUNITY TO SUGGEST BUJUMBURA AS THE SITE OF A
REGIONAL MEETING. THIS VENUE COULD HAVE THE ADDED
BENEFIT OF BRINGING A SPOTLIGHT ON INTRACTABLE PARTIES
IN BURUNDI AND RESTRAIN THEM FROM DESTABILIZING ACTS.
• G O N r i D C N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 05 DAR ES SALAAM 005023
GENEVA FOR RMA; ROME ALSO FOR FODAG; NAIROBI FOR DART
AND REFCOORD; DEPARTMENT FOR AF/C, MGRW02, PRM/AAA,
PM/ISP, IO/PHO, IO/ESA, IO/UNP, DRL/AAA
USAID FOR AID/A, AID/BHR, AID/BHR/OFDA, AID/BHR/FFP,
AID/PPC
E.O. 12356: DECLOADR
TAGS: EAID, OVIP (MOOSE, GEORGE), PREL, RW, BY, TZ
SUBJECT: A/S MOOSE REVIEWS RWANDA AND BURUNDI
SITUATIONS WITH PRESIDENT MWINYI, AUGUST 5
1. CONriDCNTIAL- ENTIRE TEXT.
PERHAPS TANZANIA COULD SEND AN ENVOY TO NEIGHBORING
STATES TO ASCERTAIN IF THEY ARE AMENABLE TO SUCH A
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
•OONriDCNTIAL-
�•OONriDCNTIAL
PROPOSAL. A/S MOOSE ADDED HE OFFERED THIS AS A
SUGGESTION ONLY. MWINYI ASSURED THE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY THAT HE AND PRESIDENT MUSEVINI REMAIN IN
CLOSE TOUCH AND WILL CONTINUE TO DISCUSS PLANS FOR A
REGIONAL MEETING.
21. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED
BROWNING
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FROM:
SITREPRT
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
-CONFIDENTIAr
�TOP SECRET CODEWORD/CXDIC
INK.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
SECRET WWW
Rwanda: UNAMIR Contributors (as of August 2, 1994)
Aon-o?a,3- PI
Country
Date
Committed Number*
Ghana
Ethiopia
Senegal
Zimbabwe
Nigeria
Mali
May 19
May 25
May 26
May 27
May 10
June 2
July 26
Canada
Tunisia
Australia
Britain
June 1
June 23
July 25
July 28
Status
Battalion (BOO)
Battalion
550 men
Battalion
300 men
150 men
40 (medical team)
440 men
Battalion (600)
500 men
600 men
On ground, short a company
Needs equipment
Needs equipment
Needs equipment
Nearly ready to deploy
Needs equipment
260 on ground
Equipped, win deploy after September 15
Deployment imminent
78 on ground
Contributors to French-Led Operation Turquoise
(as of August 2, 1994)
Country
Senegal
Chad
Guinea-Bissau
Niger
Number and Status
Country
Number and Status
243: On ground
132: On ground
45: Will arrive 'soon'
43: On ground
Congo
Guinea
Mauritania
Egypt
40: On ground
35: On ground
10: On ground
20: 7 on ground, 13 will arrive 'soon'
Note: These African forces ware recruitedtttdtransported to Rwanda by the French within weeks of
the French late June deployment. Total troops, with the French, were 3,153 as of August 2,10M.
SECRET NOfOfW
according to Embassy Nairobi. NGOs and the French fear another mass exodus of
Hutusfleeingthe RPF if the French pull out of the area too quickly.
1.4b, 1.4d
reports the RPF has systematically massacred some 4,000 rerugees
wno"fiaveTeturaedfromZaire to RPF-controlled parts of Rwanda, according to a
foreign government service.
u
Comment: The prevention of a mass exodus of fearful Hutus from the French
zone into adjacent areas of Zaire largely depends on France's ability to manage a
smooth withdrawal and the insertion of a trusted alternative force. Despite the
RPF's professions of its willingness to cooperate with the international
community, the conversion to UNAMIR of the approximately 550
FrancophoneAfrican troops serving with Operation Turquoise has not occurred.
SC-12301-94
TOP SECRET CODEWORD/EXDIS
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCu,
Augusts, 1994
�US U9 94
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
T H O P H I M C M I N I S T E B
Coponhagtn, 6 August 1994
The Honourable William J. Clinton
President of the United States of America
The White Houee
Washington D.C.
•ear Mr. President.
Thank you for your letter of 23 July 1994 concerning the Rwandan refugee eriela.
I am deeply impressed by your efforts to Mtitt in the international response to this
humanitarian tragedy and bv vour initiative to raise further internetlonal support to
enhance relief meaauros.
Since the outset of the crisis, Denmark has been following the situation cloaely and has
taken severe! measures to meet eome of the most urgent humehitnrian needs of the
affected refugee population.
Tho total amount from our humanitarian budget allocated to far towards the Rwandan
refugee crisis amounts to 40 million Danish Kroner (equivalent to 6.4 million USD). In
addition considerable contributions have been made through the European Union's relief
mechanisme.
The Danish assistance has primarily been directed to Rwandan refugees in Burundi.
Tanzania and Zaire in ordar to meet immediate needs of food, shelter end medical
supplies for the most vulnerable groups. The assistanee hse been channelled through
internationel organizations, primarily the UN High Commlsaioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
end the United Nations Children's Pund (UNICEF), as well as through a number of private
i
�US 09 94
13:15
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Page 981
pis ^1 l i w v[ iv
On 2 AUQUST 1994 Denmark responded favourably to a request from UNHCR to arrange
the purchase and transport of medical supDlies to address The precarious situation In
refugee camps in Goma where severe mJt'breaks of cholera have occurred. Within a week
from now, supplies of cholera medicine from Denmark are expected to reach Gome.
On request from UNICEF the DatflBh Government is arranging C-130 military flights of
UNIPAC medical kits from Denmark: to Goma.
Denmark fully shares your vtfw of the importance of assisting in facilitating the refugees'
return to Rwanda as soonp the situation allows. The promotion of a massive return to
Rwanda should be given ihe highest priority in the international community's response
to prevent a further detairioretion of the humanitarian tragedy,
The present situation highlights the need to rally behind U peace-keeping efforts and
N
to work together to mfflke this unique Instrument in intBrnational conflict prevention more
efficient and able to^espond adequately, and In time, to crises around the world.
Although Denmarwis not in a position to contribute troops to UNAMIR due to large
commitments in Jther United Nations peace-keeping missions, notably in the former
Yugoslevia, we share the concern over the slow deployment of the designated troops
for the expandetfUNAMIR. A U presence on the ground will coritfibufe^ra^lng the
N
necessary confidence for the refugees
U^ptti&ffo asdbt the United Nations In speeding up the deployment, we Inter
tolease
up to 40 APWo the U Peace-keeping department for use with UNAf
N
Yours sincerely.
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
i
�United States Department of State
X£T.
Washington, D.C.
FHA01
/S-0{2)
/S-S
/S(3)
/S-IRM
/S-O/CMS
/S-EX
DITOR
RA(5)
W
G
/SAH
LL STATE
BUREAUS &
OFFICES
DDITIONAL:
S
/DGP
M
P
/FLO
H
k/HO
20520
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
Operations Center
RWANDA MONITORING GROUP
SITUATION REPORT NO. 3 8
SITUATION AS OF 1000 EDT, 08/06/94
•
(LOU) Mrs. Gore has accepted an i n v i t a t i o n f o r
breakfast from Mrs. Museveni. Embassy Kampala, which
f e e l s t h a t t h i s i s important f o r p r o t o c o l reasons, i s
t r y i n g t o f i n d a convenient time. Monday morning seems
l i k e l y . Mrs. Gore i s scheduled t o a r r i v e i n Entebbe on
8/6 a t 2240 l o c a l time. (Telcon TFl/Embassy Kampala)
•
(LOU) Reliable reports from missionaries r e t u r n i n g
from Goma i n d i c a t e that the s e c u r i t y s i t u a t i o n i n the
Goma area continues t o d e t e r i o r a t e . Some former Rwandan
s o l d i e r s have regrouped i n t o u n i t s and are s t e a l i n g from
refugees. Z a i r i a n s o l d i e r s are also preying on refugees
and r e l i e f supplies; p e t t y crime i n the area i s also
e s c a l a t i n g . (Telcon TFl/Emba^ssy Kampala)
•
(LOU) The UNHCR radio s t a t i o n i n Goma began
operating on 8/5. UNHCR apparently believes that f o r now
broadcasts should be l i m i t e d t o comments made i n High
Commissioner Ogata's speech of 8/2. They w i l l probably
also contain refugee assistance i n f o r m a t i o n . (Geneva
6852)
THER
AGENCIES:
•
(U) UNHCR s t a t i s t i c s of 8/5 l i s t the f o l l o w i n g
ID
Rwandan refugee numbers: Zaire - 1.26 m i l l i o n , Tanzania
SIA (LDX)
- 322,000/ Burundi - 200,000, Uganda - 10,500. There are
IA (LDX)
also an estimated 1.5 m i l l i o n i n t e r n a l l y - d i s p l a c e d
OJ (LDX)
Rwandans. (Geneva 6852)
NERGY (LDX)
BIS (LDX)
•
(JZ) Rwanda's new government has selected Bakuramutsa
CS (LDX) Manzi as i t s U.N. envoy. The U.N. i s awaiting a formal
MCC (LDX)
l e t t e r from the Rwandan Foreign M i n i s t e r appointing
MIC (LDX)
Manzi. (Reuter, USUN 3261)
SA (LDX)
SC (LDX) •
(LOU) The State Department has decided t o replace
SOC (LDX) the Rwanda Task Force w i t h a f u l l - t i m e "coordinating
ECDEF (LDX)o f f i c e " e f f e c t i v e 8/8. (AF, S/S) •
REAS (LDX)
SCG (LDX)
HSR (LDX)
1
A.
Ronald S. Robinson
Senior Watch O f f i c e r
Oliver G r i f f i t h
Coordinator
DECL:
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
OADR
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
3/1V5" KBH
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PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL
PAACZYUW RUEHGVA6863 2200936-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 080936Z AUG 94
FM USMISSION GENEVA
RUEHGV
080936Z AUG 94
USMISSION GENEVA
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2254
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 9222
MGRW02: PDD-25 AND SECONDMENTS TO DHA
C O M F 1
EXDIS
D E N T I A L
GENEVA 06863
FOR AMB. ALBRIGHT, AID ADMINISTRATOR ATWOOD,
IO A/S BENNET AND NSC ERIC SCHWARTZ, SUSAN RICE
FROM AMB. SPIEGEL
STATE PASS AID AND NSC
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREF, EAID, RW, UN, AORC
SUBJECT: MGRW02: PDD-25 AND SECONDMENTS TO DHA
REF: A) GENEVA 6643 B) USUN 3233 C) GENEVA 6819
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT
2. WE STRONGLY SUPPORT AMB. ALBRIGHT'S URGING (REFTEL
B) THAT THE USG RESPOND QUICKLY TO U/SYG HANSEN'S
REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL TO BOLSTER COORDINATION OF
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS IN RWANDA (REFTELS A,C). AS AMB.
ALBRIGHT EMPHASIZES, PDD-25 ENVISAGES U.S. SUPPORT FOR
THIS TYPE OF SURGE CAPACITY IN TIMES OF HUMANITARIAN
CRISIS.
3. WE HAVE BEEN SEEKING FROM DHA A DEFINITION OF THE
DUTIES OF THE POSITIONS THAT HANSEN NEEDS HELP IN
FILLING TO RESPOND TO THE RWANDA CRISIS, AND WE HAVE
ALREADY FAXED PRELIMINARY VERSIONS TO THE DEPARTMENT
(PRM AND IO), AID/OFDA, AND USUN. HANSEN IS REQUESTING
UP TO 20 OFFICIALS TO SERVE AS FIELD COORDINATORS,
INFORMATION OFFICERS AND COMMUNICATIONS/LOGISTICS
OFFICERS AT SIX FIELD OFFICES INSIDE RWANDA (GITERAMA,
GIKONGORO, GISENYI, BUTARE, BYUMBA AND KIBUYE). SOME OF
THESE WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR LIAISON WITH GOVERNMENT
COORDINATION OFFICES IN THE SAME CITIES.
4. BEFORE AGREEING TO SECOND USG PERSONNEL TO DHA, WE
MAY WISH TO HAVE A DETAILED DISCUSSION WITH DHA TO GET A
CLEARER PICTURE OF ITS PLANS FOR COORDINATION. LN_
PARTICULAR. I
EQ 13526 1.4b. EO 13526 1.4d
CLINTON LIBRARY PH0T0C0P\
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E O 13526
. .
3LOw- oai*3- f*\
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD008\AUG94\MSGS\Ml 191560.html
5. DHA REQUESTS THAT SALARY COSTS BE COVERED BY THE
COUNTRIES PROVIDING SECONDED PERSONNEL. DHA INTENDS
THAT THE UN COVER TRAVEL AND PER DIEM COSTS, BUT NEEDS
TO CONSULT WITH UN ADMINISTRATIVE OEFICIALS BEFORE A
FINAL DECISION CAN BE MADE. DHA IS APPROACHING OTHER
DONORS IN ADDITION TO THE U.S. TO FILL THE REQUEST, AND
ALREADY HAS A POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM NORWAY FOR THE
GISENYI FIELD COORDINATOR POST.
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
SECT
SSN
TOR
DIST
B. WE ARE AWARE THAT CONCRETE DISCUSSIONS ON PDD-25
HAVE ALREADY TAKEN PLACE IN N W YORK WITH THE DEPARTMENT
E
OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS. WHEN THE PACE OF THE RESPONSE
TO THE RWANDA CRISIS PERMITS, W WILL COMMENCE SIMILAR
E
DISCUSSIONS HERE WITH UNHCR TO DISCUSS LONG TERM
SYSTEMIC SUPPORT WHICH CAN BE PROVIDED UNDER THE TERMS
OF PDD-25. PLEASE PROVIDE ANY NECESSARY GUIDANCE.
SPIEGEL
BT
#6863
NNNN
SECTION: 01 OF 01
6863
940808054318 M1191560
SIT: VAX NSC
•
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Page 2 of2
�CONFIDENTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: SIT, DESHAZER. NSC, RICE. SARTOR, STEINBERG, SUM, SUM2, VAX
PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: CONriDENTIAL
DTG:220640Z AUG 94
FM: AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4311
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0839
C 0 N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUJUMBURA 002822
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/C, A/S MOOSE, A/S JOHN SHATTUCK
AF/C PLEASE PASS TO AMBASSADOR RAWSON
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS NSC FOR A. LAKE
DEPARTMENT ALSO PASS TO SENATOR PAUL SIMON
USUN FOR AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH
E.O. 12356: DECLOADR
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PREF, PREL, RW. BY
SUBJECT: NO WHITE HATS FOR THE RPF
1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. TESTIMONY FROM RWANDAN FtFFIIfiFFS AND
REPORTS FROM WESTERN AMBASSADORS AND
1.4b, 1.4d
EMPLOYEES IN BURUNDI REVEAL THAT THE RPF IS CURRENTLY
TORTURING AND KILLING SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF HUTU
RWANDESE CIVILIANS IN ORDER TO TAKE THEIR LANDS.
HOUSES, AND POSSESSIONS TO BE GIVEN TO RWANDAN TUTSIS
RETURNING FROM BURUNDI. END SUMMARY.
3. LAST WEEK I SENT A FAIRLY DETAILED 6-PAGE REPORT
FROM A WESTERN DIPLOMAT SPECIFYING RECENT ATROCITIES
AND KILLINGS BY RPF FORCES IN SOUTHEASTERN RWANDA AND
NORTHERN BURUNDI (REFTEL BUJUMBURA 02708). THIS PAST
WEEK HAS BROUGHT SIMILAR REPORTS FROM 3 SOURCES:
(A)
[EMPLOYEES IN NORTH BURUNDI WHO DAILY
INTERVIEW NEW RWANDAN REFUGEES; (B) CONVERSATIONS
BETWEEN WESTERN AMBASSADORS AND THEIR LOCAL EMPLOYEES:
(C) DIRECT TESTIMONY FROM RWANDAN REFUGEES GIVEN TO ME
IN REFUGEE CAMPS.
4. (A) ON MONDAY, AUGUST 15,1 WAS ACCOMPANIED ON A
TRIP TO KIRUNDO IN NORTHEAST BURUNDI BY DCM SUSAN
7 F I I F FflONOFF .IIII IF D'RFAGAN. DART MFMBER MARY LANGE.
WE SPOKE
IWHCTREGUtARtY, OFTEN
"WITH
DAILY, INTERVIEW NEWLY-ARRIVED RWANDAN REFUGEES.
THEIR INTERVIEWS WITH REFUGEES FROM DIFFERENT COLLINES
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. 0.13526
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CONFIDENTIAL
OR COMMUNITIES, ALMOST ALL IN SOUTHERN RWANDA,
REVEALED A CONSISTENT PATTERN: RPF SOLDIERS ARE
TERRORIZING HUTUS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, FORCING THEM TO
ABANDON THEIR HOMES. THEIR PREFERRED METHOD OF
TORTURE IS TO TIE THE HANDS OF THE VICTIM (USUALLY
MALE) BEHIND HIS BACK, BEAT HIM WITH RUBBER HOSES,
AND, IF DEATH IS INTENDED, TO USE A MACHETE TO
DISPATCH THE VICTIM (ALTHOUGH BULLETS WILL DO ALSO).
MOST (BUT NOT ALL) REFUGEES FLEE ON SHORT NOTICE AND
BRING FEW POSSESSIONS TO BURUNDI. IN THE KIL .INGS
NEAR THE BORDER, ON BOTH SIDES, BOTH THE
1.4b, 1.4d
REPRESENTATIVE AND THE OAU REGIME COMMANDANT ARE
CONVINCED THAT THERE IS COMPLICITY BETWEEN THE RPF AND
THE BURUNDI MILITARY FORCES.
(B) FOR THE SECOND TIME, I VISITED THE REFUGEE CAMP AT
MAGARA, NEAR NGOZI, WHOSE 50,000-60,000 RESIDENTS
COMPRISE WHAT AMOUNTS TO THE 2ND LARGEST CITY IN
BURUNDI. IN SPITE OF THE SUPPOSED RESERVE OF RWANDANS
AND BURUNDIANS, THE REFUGEES TALKED FREELY, EVEN IN
THE PRESENCE OF A UNIFORMED OAU COMMANDANT AND A
MEMBER OF THE BURUNDI ARMY. THEIR STORIES CONFORMED
TO THOSE RECEIVED BYl
I WHEN
ASKED WHY THEY LEFT RWANDA, THE ANSWER WAS SIMPLE:
BECAUSE THEY WERE FLEEING THE RPF. SOME TOLD STORIES
OF MEMBERS OF THEIR GROUPS WHO HAD GONE BACK FROM THE
CAMP TO THEIR HOMES TO RECOVER SOME POSSESSIONS. THEY
REPORTED THAT MOST NEVER RETURNED, AND THAT THOSE WHO
ESCAPED TO RETURN TO THE CAMP SAID THE OTHERS WERE
KILLED. UPON BEING ASKED WHEN THEY EXPECTED TO RETURN
TO THEIR HOMES IN RWANDA. THEY REPLIED THAT ONLY WHEN
THE RPF WAS GONE, OR A DIFFERENT GOVERNMENT WAS IN
PLACE THAT WOULD NOT KILL THEM. SOME SAID THAT THEY
HAVE HEARD BROADCASTS FROM RWANDA TELLING THEM TO
RETURN. BUT THEY REFUSE TO DO SO BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE
THE RPF WILL KILL THEM. I CONCLUDED THAT PERSUADING
THESE REFUGEES TO RETURN WOULD BE LIKE TRYING IN THE
1930'S TO CONVINCE JEWISH REFUGEES WHO HAD ESCAPED
HITLER TO RETURN TO GERMANY. REFUGEES LIKE THESE FROM
SOUTHEAST RWANDA WILL BE IN BURUNDI (OR TANZANIA) FOR
LONG TIME UNLESS RPF POLICIES CHANGE.
(C) CONVERSATIONS WITH THE OTHER WESTERN AMBASSADORS
HERE CONFIRM EARLIER REPORTS THAT RWANDANS IN BURUNDI
ARE BEING "ORDERED" TO RETURN TO RWANDA. ONE WESTERN
AMBASSADOR INDICATED THAT A RWANDAN TUTSI GUARD AT HIS
RESIDENCE WHO HAS LIVED IN BURUNDI FOR OVER 30 YEARS
SAID THIS WEEK, "MR. AMBASSADOR, I HAVE BEEN ORDERED
TO RETURN TOMORROW TO RWANDA." AT THE AMBASSADOR'S
REQUEST, HE AGREED TO DELAY HIS DEPARTURE FOR 24
HOURS. HE ALSO INDICATED THAT HE HAD BEEN PROMISED A
HOUSE FOR HIS FAMILY. OTHER WESTERN EMBASSIES, LIKE
OURS, HAVE HAD RWANDAN TUTSI EMPLOYEES WHO HAVE LIVED
IN BURUNDI FOR MANY YEARS RETURN TO RWANDA DURING THE
PAST FEW WEEKS. AND SOME. LIKE THE AMBASSADOR ABOVE,
REPORT THAT THOSE RETURNING ARE PROMISED HOMES THAT
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOF*
�CONFIDENTIAL
HAVE BEEN VACATED BY (HUTU) RWANDAN REFUGEES.
5. THE PRESENCE OF THESE HUTU REFUGEES. AFRAID OF
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 BUJUMBURA 002822
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/C, A/S MOOSE, A/S JOHN SHATTUCK
AF/C PLEASE PASS TO AMBASSADOR RAWSON
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS NSC FOR A. LAKE
DEPARTMENT ALSO PASS TO SENATOR PAUL SIMON
USUN FOR AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PREF, PREL, RW, BY
SUBJECT: NO WHITE HATS FOR THE RPF
DEATH IF THEY RETURN TO THEIR HOMELAND, IS OBVIOUSLY
A PROBLEM FOR BOTH BURUNDI AND RWANDA, SHORT-TERM AND
LONG-TERM. SHORT-TERM. THESE HAPLESS, PENNILESS, AND
JOBLESS FAMILIES LIVING UNDER BLUE PLASTIC SHEETING
ARE POTENTIALLY SUBJECT TO INCITEMENT TO VIOLENCE. IN
THE CASE OF THE CAMP AT MAGARA, A SMALL CONTINGENT OF
10 SOLDIERS HAS PROVIDED SECURITY FOR THIS REFUGEE
CITY, AND I WAS TOLD BY THE DIRECTOR OF THIS CAMP THAT
THERE HAVE BEEN NO INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE AT HIS
LOCATION. NONETHELESS, THESE WILL NOT BE HAPPY
CAMPERS, AND THEY COULD BE SUBJECT TO FUTURE
TEMPTATION.
6. LONG-TERM, THE PROSPECTS FOR RWANDA ARE WORSE. THE
RAINY SEASON BEGINS NEXT WEEK. WITH THE TROPICAL
RAINS, THE DUSTY CAMPS WILL TURN TO MUD AND SLUSH.
RESENTMENTS WILL GROW AS REFUGEES REMEMBER HOME, AND
RECEIVE REPORTS OF TUTSI FARMING THEIR LANDS AND
SLEEPING IN THEIR BEDS. IF WEEKS BECOME MONTHS OR
YEARS, THE RESENTMENTS WILL ONLY GROW, AND THE URGE
WILL INCREASE TO RECLAIM THEIR HOMES, OR TO DIE
TRYING.
7. IF RWANDA IS LIKE BURUNDI, THERE ARE NO COUNTY
COURT HOUSES. NO FORMAL LAND SURVEY LINES, NO
CAREFULLY MEASURED PLOTS OF LAND WITH RECORDED DEEDS
AND TITLES. INSTEAD, OWNERSHIP RELIES ON TRADITION
AND THE MEMORIES OF ELDERS AND NEIGHBORS. WHEN THEIR
JUDGMENTS ARE NOT ACCEPTED. THE DISPUTES ARE TOO OFTEN
RESOLVED BY A TORCH OR MACHETE.
8. THE MASSACRES PERPETRATED BY THE FORMER GOVERNMENT
OF RWANDA WERE OF HISTORIC DIMENSION IN THEIR MINDLESS
MERCILESSNESS. THE RPF VENGEANCE NOW, AND THE REVENGE
THAT IT WILL SURELY PROVOKE, CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO
MATCH THE SLAUGHTER OF RECENT MONTHS. BUT THESE SEEDS
ARE BEING PLANTED, AND IF NOT AFTER THIS RAINY SEASON,
THEN IN SOME OTHER, THE HARVEST OF RETRIBUTION WILL
SURELY COME.
9. IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT OUR INFLUENCE OVER THE RPF AND
THE NEW GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA WILL EVER BE GREATER THAN
IT IS NOW, WHEN THEY ARE VICTORIOUS BUT WITHOUT
ELECTRICITY, WATER, CURRENCY, OR THE USUAL SINEWS OF
GOVERNMENT. FOR THE SAKE NOT ONLY OF RWANDANS, BUT
ALSO OF THE PEOPLE LIVING IN SURROUNDING COUNTRIES, I
HOPE THAT OUR GOVERNMENT WILL APPLY MAXIMUM PRESSURE.
CONFIDENTIAL
v
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP
�CONFIDENTIAL
WHILE OUR STRENGTH IS AT ITS HEIGHT, TO THE NEW
GOVERNMENT AND RPF TO CHANGE ITS PRACTICES.
KRUEGER
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FROM:
SITREPRT
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP i
�t9UG-22-1994
14:03
FROM
TO
,
^7tt9^ u23951199
P. '32
PHOTOCOPY
UNAMIR DEPLOYMENT
•
Ghana:
All Ghanaians have deployed to Rwanda. We have received a formal
LOA for a ROWPU, mine detectors, binoculars and spares and have
moved those items to Dover APB. Caveated LOA (CLOA) for transport
received on 16 August. CLOA received from the UN for the lease and
lift of vehicles on 16 August. Did not include refurbishment. DSAA has
lead. The 15 day congressional notification on the ammo for Ghana
ends at 0001,20 August. Next step is OMB completing the reob-deob.
Should occur on 22 August. Upon completion DSAA will send FMS
LOA to Ghana for signature. Upon receipt execute order will be sent.
• Ethiopia:
Self-deploy began on 15 August and should be complete by 21 August..
USG begin to lift heavy equipment on 16 August with the schedule of 6
days to complete the movement. It will take three additional sorties to
complete the movement, we are awaiting confirmation from the UN.
UNAMIR Force Commander plans to deploy the Ethiopian battalion
into the French zone. UN will be providing flak jackets, tents, night
vision devices, mine protected vehicles and anti-malaria pills; USG to
provide COMSAT (congressional notification required).
Zambia:
•
Dutch to provide equipment. USG airlift will begin on 23 August.
Under the USG "volcano plan," Zambia would deploy into the
northwest but this has not been broached with the UN. Zambia
scheduled to deploy on 29 August but appear to falling behind schedule.
Recce team to deploy for one week with main body to deploy one week
later. No date set for deployment of recce team.
France:
The interagency has given up on the prospect of the French remaining
in Operation Turquoise beyond 22 August. We are now pursuing the
idea of a French presence in the UNAMIR staff.
• Tunisia:
<7
The UN has passed to the Tunisians what they consider to be a final list
of equipment available (attached). USUN met with the Tunisians
yesterday to ask them to be reasonable. We expect the UN to receive a
response to the list soon. The UN has not requested any of the
outstanding equipment from the USG. Deployment date of the
Tunisians is unclear, but believed to be at the beginning of September.
•
Danes:
President Clinton received a letter from PM about APCs. Dick Clarke
pointed out the need to speed their lift. Cannot accomplish until the
UN requests lift support.
•
Italy:
Awaiting a signed lease from the UN. Unclear when they will receive it.
•
Germany
Awaiting P&A from J-4 LRC on APC lift.
15:00,
22
August
1994
1
I;!
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�9UG-22-1994
14:09 F O
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TO
*789202.3951199
P. 03
1
PHOTOCOPY •
POP SUPPORT, QF UNAMIR
Ghanaian Battalion
* Lease of 50 APCs
. * US airlifted and signed over APCs to the UN in Entebbe on 2 July.
• All APCs have been moved from Entebbe to Kigali.
•
Lease of water purification unit (ROWPU) and sale of airlift for the mine
detectors, binoculars, ROWPU and spares
• 4 Aug. - LOA received. Did not included transport.
• DSAA issued execute order on 5 Aug.
• 15 Aug. - ROWPU at Dover AFB.
• 16 Aug. - CLOA for transport received.
• 20 Aug. - ROWPU in country.
•
Sale of Mine Detector, Binoculars and Spares
• LOA received on 9 Aug. Did not included transport. DSAA is working
with USUN.
• DSAA to issue execute order.
• 15 Aug. - Mine Detector, Binoculars and Spares at Dover AFB.
• 16 Aug. - CLOA for transport received.
• 20 Aug. - in process of being lifted.
* Lease of Vehicles (15 CUCV, 10 5T trucks, 5 ambulances, 2 shop vans, 1 water
tanker, 1 fuel tanker, 2 5T tractors) DoD pulling some vehicles from active
units.
• 16 Aug. - CLOA received from UN.
• CLOA did not include refurbishment. DSAA working with COB
22 Aug. deadline.
• Ammunition
• Congressional notification occurred on 5 August.
• 16 Aug. - Army drafted bilateral FMS LOA.
• Deobligation-reobligation of $.285M of FY91 and FY93 Rwanda will not
occur until 23 Aug. LOA cannot be sent to Ghana until deob-reob
complete. Execute order will be sent on receipt of signed FMF LOA.
QthexAirlift
• Completed Requests
• 31 advance personnel with equipment from Australia to Kigali (7 Aug.)
• 1 C-141 sortie ($43,000).
• 50 British trucks and personnel from the UK to Kigali (16 Aug).
• 23 C-5 sorties.
• UN Request in the execution phase
• Ethiopian equipment to Kigali.
15:00,
22
August
1994
2
i i CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
•'i.
�HUG-22-1994
1 4 : 0 9 " FROM
TO
.K7892023951199
P.04
^HOTOCO^v
•
•
•
•
3 C-141 and 12 C-5 ($1.07M)
13 Aug. - Authorization signed by SecDef.
16 Aug. - First sortie.
21 Aug. - Last sortie scheduled but will take 3 additional C-141
sorties at a cost of $50,000. UN informed 19 August.
•
•
•
Australian main force (311 personnel).
• 32 C-5 ($8,650,560)
• 13 Aug. - Authorization signed by SecDef.
• 21 Aug. - 3 Sorties flown
Dutch equipment for the Zambians to Kigali.
• 9 C-141 and 7 C-5 ($2.17M).
• 13 Aug. - Authorization signed by SecDef.
• 23 Aug. - Dutch lift to begin.
Requests Awaiting UN Actions
• Request received for P&A of MREs from Germany to Kigali on 9 Aug.
• P&A sent to UN on 10 Aug.
• 5 C-141($366,630) or contract DC-8 ($280,000).
• 13 Aug. - Authorization signed by SecDef.
• 15 Aug. - Awaiting CLOA
•
Request received for P&A of APCs from Germany to Kigali on 9 Aug.
• 13 Aug. - Authorization signed by SecDef.
• 16 Aug. - P&A sent to the UN.
• 28 C-141 and 3 C-5 ($3,207,325)
•
Likely Future Requests
• Italy - 40 APCs and trucks, for an undetermined country.
•
Requests Placed on Hold by UN
• South African Mombas (wheeled APCs) from Johannesburg to Kigali.
• 9 C-5 sorties ($2.66M).
• This request put on indefinite hold by the UN in lieu of higher
priority items.
•
UN-owned MREs from Kuwait to Kigali
• 1 C-141 sorties ($43,000).
• This request put on indefinite hold by the UN in lieu of higher
priority items.
S T A T U S OF MAJOR T R O O P C O N T R I B U T O R S
France (Operation Turquoise)
• Withdrew from Rwnada on 21 August.
15:00,
;
;'
i i CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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22
August
1994
3
�IHU6-22-1994
14:10
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TiJ
*?8'ri2U^3951199
P. 05
PHOTOCOPY
•
•
Approaching French and RPF about French Staff in UNAMIR.
Working with France to ensure that they equip all 1000 Francophone forces.
Ghana (see above)
• Mechanized battalion (850 personnel).
« Deployment: All in Rwanda (south-west).
• Vehicles CLOA did not include refurbishment.
Ethiopia
» Motorized battalion (800 personnel).
• Deployment: All in Rwanda (south-west).
• US lift of Ethiopian heavy equipment will take three additional sorties.
• DSAA working to provide COMSAT to the Ethiopia?ts.
Zambia
" 800 person motorized battalion.
• Deployment: Zambians expected to deploy 29 Aug. but process appears to have
slowed.
• Dutch will provide equipment.
• US lift of Dutch equipment to commence 23 August.
Tunisia
• Motorized battalion (950 personnel).
• Deployment: unknown, believed to be at the beginning of September.
• 18 Aug. - UN provides Tunisia final equipment list.
• Germany has indicated a willingness to provide some equipment.
Francophone battalion
• Senegal (400), Niger (150), Guinea-Bissau (150), Mali (150), Chad (has indicated
willingness to deploy up to 800 troops).
« Deployment: Those forces currently in Operation Turquoise (550) will change
hats as soon as UNAMIR deploys.
• France plans to equip 500 of these troops. State believes that French will equip
all of the Francophone troops.
S T A T U S OF MATOR TROOP SUPPORT C O N T R I B U T O R S
* UK logistics battalion (600 personnel).
• Fully deployed.
•
Australian medical unit (300 personnel) and a security unit (120 personnel).
• Advance party lifted by USG into Kigali on 7 August.
• Main force deploying via US lift.
15:00,
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1994
4
i j CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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14:10
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TO
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P. 06
_ PHOTOCOPV
« Canadian communications battalion and a runway repair and air traffic control team
(511 personnel).
• Fully deployed.
STATUS OF EQUIPMENT CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES
» Netherlands - 50 4T trucks, 25 Land Rovers, 15 generators, 10 mobile kitchens, 2
ambulances, 2 work shop vans, 15 cargo trailers, 16 mine detectors and a cargo plane.
Equipment, which will be ready for lift on 15 Aug., is scheduled for the Zambian
battalion.
• liS lift to begin 23 August.
• France - 20 fuel/water trucks and working level (BG Faupin) assurance of intention to
equip the 1,000-person composite Francophone battalion comprised of soldiers from
Mali, Senegal, Chad, Niger, and Guinea-Bissau.
o Germany - 50 APCs, 2 water trucks with trailers, 5 kitchen trailers, 1 Recovery vehicle,
1 5T workshop van, 15 cargo trailers and 2 front end loaders and other equipment.
•
US lift requested.
* Belgium - "adopting" Malawi contingent (150 personnel).
* Italy - 40 APCs, 15 trucks for water/gas and 1 C-130.
• US Lift request expected.
• Denmark - Expected to provide 40 APCs.
• US Lift request expected.
• State to confirm xvith AmEmbassy when APCs zoill be ready and if there will be
a lift request.
15:00,
22
August
1994
5
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�h!lJG-22-1994
14: 11 FROM
TO
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P
. a?
PHOTOCOPV
U N OPERATION P L A N N I N G
Gen. Dallaire's Concept of Operations for UNAMIR
o UNAMIR forces will deploy in three phases. Presently Phases II.
. o Phase I: Ghana battalion equipped and deployed (approximately 2/3's of
the force is presently in Kigali).
* Phase II: Deploy two additional combat battalions, elements of the
support battalion, force HQ's, and communications.
• Phase III: Deploy remaining support units and additional infantry
battalions.
•
UNAMIR forces will be deployed into five Zones.
• In Zone 4, the current French Zone, three mechanized battalions
(Ghanaians, Ethiopians and Francophones) will be deployed.
* Dellaire believes overwhelming force with a Chapter VII mandate
will be necessary here because of Hutu suspicions and the
presence of some Hutu militia forces.
* He wants the UN forces to move in before the RPF and is
concerned because he feels there is no way the UN will be in place
before 22 August when the French are supposed to depart.
* In the other four Zones, UNAMIR will have a minimal force that can
respond quickly to local contingencies. (Under USG "volcano plan" one
or two battalions would deploy to the northwest)
* This is based upon a more permissive security environment than
in the French Zone and envisions that UNAMIR forces will
provide a modicum of security to various population centers.
Prepared by Michael Greenspon, (S&R) PK/PE, x52322
15:00.
22
August
1994
6
! CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�• COHriDCNTIAfc-
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: BEERS, CLARKER, DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, SCHWARTZ, STEINBERG, VAX
PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: CONriDENTIAL
DTG:231404Z AUG 94
FM: AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3436
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0251
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0378
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0605
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 6171
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2294
RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FU/INTEL CTR//
RUCJAAS/USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL//POLAD//
RUEHLS/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 3033
RUEHOR/AMEMBASSY GABORONE 9917
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//CRC/J5//
RUSNNOM/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ4/ECJ5//
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0285
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 9294
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0424
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//ISA-ME/AF//
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 1150
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUFGAID/USEUCOMAIDES VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 0032
RUEHMV/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA 0599
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0770
J&O N F I D C N T I A-trHARARE 009405
DEPT FOR RP/POP, AF/C, AND AF/S - JACKSON
E.0.12356: DECLOADR
TAGS: MARR, PREL, MOPS, FR, PREF, RW, Zl
SUBJECT: ZNA COULD DEPLOY TO RWANDA WITH US$1.2
MILLION "UP FRONT"
1. -CONriDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. AT AN AUGUST 27 LUNCHEON FOR VISITING
COMMANDER OF JTF SUPPORT HOPE LIEUTENANT GENERAL
DANIEL R. SCHROEDER, ZNA MAJOR GENERAL A.N.N.
CHINGOMBE COMMENTED ON ZIMBABWE'S PREPARATION FOR
DEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS TO RWANDA UNDER U.N.
AUSPICES. HE COMPLAINED THAT THE GOZ HAD GOTTEN
VIRTUALLY NO RESPONSE FROM THE UN ASSESSMENT TEAM
WHICH VISITED ZIMBABWE JULY 21 AND 22. HE SAID
THE UN PROMISES OF EQUIPMENT AND TRANSPORT ON A
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
^ „
DECLASSIFIED
PER E O 13526
Aou-oius -
n
•OQNnDENTIAL
7, > ' ,
'
1
�CONFIDENTIAL.
"FIRST COME FIRST SERVE BASIS" AS TROOPS DEPLOYED
IN RWANDA WERE TOO VAGUE. HE SAID ZIMBABWE IS
STILL COMMITTED POLITICALLY TO CONTRIBUTING FORCES
TO RWANDA AND COULD, IN FACT, DEPLOY WITH AS
LITTLE AS US$1.2 MILLION UP FRONT, AS LONG AS THE
UN PROVIDED ASSURANCES THAT THE BATALLION'S
COMMUNICATIONS, TRANSPORT AND PER DIEM NEEDS WERE
PROVIDED FOR ONCE THEY REACHED RWANDA.
3. AT OUR REQUEST, CHINGOMBE PROVIDED THE
FOLLOWING LIST OF "REQUIREMENTS FOR ZIMBATT
RWANDA" ON AUGUST 22:
ITEMS TO BE SOURCED LOCALLY
(NEEDED BEFORE THE BATTALION DEPLOYS, SAID
CHINGOMBE):
1. ENGINEERING EQUIP. Z$ 303,994
2. DEFENSE STORES
100,000
3. SIGNALS
146,816
4. MEDICAL EQUIPMENT/DRUGS 882,335
5. ELECTRICAL AND
MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT 281,000
6. ORDINATE STORES BREA/ET 2,327,282
7. CLOTING AND EQUIPMENT 2,170,682
8. AMMUNITION
934,100
9. ARMY HEALTH UNIT EQIP. 56,295
10. RATIONS AND WATER
1,034,640
11. FUEL, OIL, LUBRICANTS
(30 DAY SUPPLY)
747,619
12 PUBLIC RELATIONS
64,000
TOTAL
Z$ 9,048,763
(US$1,117,131)
Z$8.1 EQUALS US$1
ITEMS TO BE SECURED EXTERNALLY
1. ENGINEERING EQUIPMENT US$ 234,380
2. SIGNALS EQUIPMENT
6,944,350
3. ORDINANCE EQUIPMENT
421,640
4. VEHICLES AND TRAILERS
9,496,000
5. MEDICAL EQUIPMENT
247,944
TOTAL
US$ 17,344,314
4. COMMENT: THESE NUMBERS REPRESENT NO MAJOR
CHANGES FROM THE ZIMBABWEANS' INITIAL, SOMEWHAT
INFLATED WISH LIST. HOWEVER, THE SEGREGATION INTO
COSTS WHICH MUST BE RECEIVED BEFORE THE ZNA CAN
DEPLOY AND THOSE WHICH THE UN COULD PROVIDE LATER,
DEMONSTRATES THE ZIMBABWEAN'S CONTINUED
WILLINGNESS TO COMMIT A BATALLION TO UNAMIR
OPERATIONS IN RWANDA. END COMMENT STAPLES
BT
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FROM:
SITREPRT
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONriDCNTlAb-
�-CONriDENTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: BEERS, CLARKER, DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, SCHWARTZ, STEINBERG, VAX
PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: CONriDCNTIAL
DTG:231401Z AUG 94
FM: AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9709
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUFHTH/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 0038
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
6-0 N F I D E N T I A h
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LUSAKA 004927
SECSTATE FOR AF/S AND AF/RA
E.0.12356: N/A
TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PREL, ZA, UN, RW
SUBJECT: RWANDA: ZAMBIAN DEPLOYMENT ISSUES
REFS: A) STATE 225942, B) LUSAKA 4846 AND PREVIOUS
1. PER REF A, WE SPOKE WITH ZAMBIA ARMY OPERATIONS
CHIEF MUMBI ON 23 AUGUST. HE PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING
INFORMATION, WHICH IS GENERALLY CONSISTENT WITH THAT
CONTAINED IN REF A:
- A U.N. C-130 WILL PICK UP THE ZAMBIAN DRIVERS AND
RECCE TEAM ON AUGUST 25 AND TRANSPORT THEM TO KIGALI.
(THIS IS CONFIRMED, MUMBI SAID.) HE PRESUMED THE U.N.'S
REFERENCE TO THE RECCE TEAM DEPARTING FOR RWANDA ON 2
SEPTEMBER WAS A GARBLE. IN HIS THINKING THE RECCE TEAM,
HAVING DEPLOYED WITH THE DRIVERS ON 25 AUGUST, WOULD
RETURN TO ZAMBIA ABOUT 2 SEPTEMBER AND BRIEF THE MAIN
BODY DURING 2-5 SEPTEMBER. MUMBI STILL SAYS THE MAIN
BODY WILL MOVE ONE WEEK AFTER THE RECCE TEAM RETURNS;
HE NOW FORECASTS ADVANCE ELEMENTS TRAVELLING DURING
5-6 SEPTEMBER AND THE BULK OF THE TROOPS FOLLOWING
AROUND 9 SEPTEMBER.
- HOW THE MAIN BODY WILL BE TRANSPORTED IS STILL
UNCERTAIN. MUMBI HOPES THE U.N. C-130 CAN BE USED.
HIS CONTACTS AT UNAMIR HQ IN KIGALI HAVE ASSURED
MUMBI THAT AIR TRAFFIC IN AND OUT OF KIGALI IS
OPERATING SAFELY. BASED ON THESE ASSURANCES, HE
HOPES ZAMBIA AIRWAYS CAN BE CONVINCED TO FLY TO
KIGALI (ASSUMING THE U.N. C-130 IS NOT AVAILABLE).
- USING THE TELEPHONE NUMBER WE GAVE HIM LAST WEEK
(REF B), MUMBI HAS HAD PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH
UNAMIR HQ IN KIGALI, WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS HAVING
DECLASSIFIED
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
C Ni C TA .
O rD N I L
Tn^oal^H
8/iyi5 K8H
�CONriDCNTIAL
BEEN MOST HELPFUL IN PROVIDING INFORMATION ON
ACCOMMODATION, FOOD, AND WATER FOR THE ZAMBIANS,
PARTICULARLY THE DRIVER CONTINGENT.
- MUMBI HAS LEARNED THAT WATER IS BEING RATIONED,
AND HE IS CONSIDERING HAVING THE DRIVERS BRING SOME
DRINKING WATER WITH THEM; FOOD (GERMAN AND FRENCH) IS
AVAILABLE IN GOOD QUANTITIES, AND UNAMIR ASSURED
MUMBI THAT FOOD WOULD BE ISSUED TO THE DRIVERS;
INITIAL ACCOMMODATION FOR THE DRIVERS WOULD BE IN A
HANGAR AT KIGALI AIRPORT.
2. COMMENT: MUMBI SEEMED SATISFIED WITH THE
ASSURANCES OF LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR HIS DRIVERS THAT
HE HAD RECEIVED FROM UNAMIR. THE 25 AUGUST PICK-UP
OF THE DRIVERS AND RECCE TEAM BY THE U.N. C-130
APPEARS TO BE FIRM. STILL TO BE WORKED OUT IS THE
MOVEMENT OF THE MAIN BODY. END COMMENT.
KUCHEL
BT
#4927
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< SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
< SSN>4927
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FROM:
SITREPRT
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
OONriDCNTIAL
�eONriDCNTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: BEERS, CLARKER, DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, SCHWARTZ, STEINBERG, VAX
PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASSrSONFIDENTIAL
DTG:231404Z AUG 94
FM: AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3436
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0251
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0378
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0605
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 6171
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2294
RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//INTEL CTR//
RUCJAAS/USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FU/POLAD//
RUEHLS/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 3033
RUEHOR/AMEMBASSY GABORONE 9917
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//CRC/J5//
RUSNNOM/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ4/ECJ5//
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0285
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 9294
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0424
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//ISA-ME/AF//
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 1150
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUFGAID/USEUCOMAIDES VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 0032
RUEHMV/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA 0599
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0770
C O N r i D C N T I A L HARARE 009405
DEPT FOR RP/POP, AF/C, AND AF/S - JACKSON
E.O. 12356: DECLOADR
TAGS: MARR, PREL, MOPS, FR, PREF, RW, Zl
SUBJECT: ZNA COULD DEPLOY TO RWANDA WITH US$1.2
MILLION "UP FRONT"
1. GONriDCNTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. AT AN AUGUST 27 LUNCHEON FOR VISITING
COMMANDER OF JTF SUPPORT HOPE LIEUTENANT GENERAL
DANIEL R. SCHROEDER, ZNA MAJOR GENERAL A.N.N.
CHINGOMBE COMMENTED ON ZIMBABWE'S PREPARATION FOR
DEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS TO RWANDA UNDER U.N.
AUSPICES. HE COMPLAINED THAT THE GOZ HAD GOTTEN
VIRTUALLY NO RESPONSE FROM THE UN ASSESSMENT TEAM
WHICH VISITED ZIMBABWE JULY 21 AND 22. HE SAID
THE UN PROMISES OF EQUIPMENT AND TRANSPORT ON A
DECLASSIFIED
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPi
CONriDCNTIAL
PFR F O 11*526
aon-oiul-n
8/iyi5~ tfen
�-OONriDCNTIAL
"FIRST COME FIRST SERVE BASIS" AS TROOPS DEPLOYED
IN RWANDA WERE TOO VAGUE. HE SAID ZIMBABWE IS
STILL COMMITTED POLITICALLY TO CONTRIBUTING FORCES
TO RWANDA AND COULD, IN FACT, DEPLOY WITH AS
LITTLE AS US$1.2 MILLION UP FRONT, AS LONG AS THE
UN PROVIDED ASSURANCES THAT THE BATALLION'S
COMMUNICATIONS, TRANSPORT AND PER DIEM NEEDS WERE
PROVIDED FOR ONCE THEY REACHED RWANDA.
3. AT OUR REQUEST, CHINGOMBE PROVIDED THE
FOLLOWING LIST OF "REQUIREMENTS FOR ZIMBATT
RWANDA" ON AUGUST 22:
ITEMS TO BE SOURCED LOCALLY
(NEEDED BEFORE THE BATTALION DEPLOYS, SAID
CHINGOMBE):
1. ENGINEERING EQUIP. Z$ 303,994
2. DEFENSE STORES
100,000
3. SIGNALS
146,816
4. MEDICAL EQUIPMENT/DRUGS 882,335
5. ELECTRICAL AND
MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT
281,000
6. ORDINATE STORES BRE/VET 2,327,282
7. CLOTING AND EQUIPMENT 2,170,682
8. AMMUNITION
934,100
9. ARMY HEALTH UNIT EQIP. 56,295
10. RATIONS AND WATER
1,034,640
11. FUEL, OIL, LUBRICANTS
(30 DAY SUPPLY)
747,619
12 PUBLIC RELATIONS
64,000
TOTAL
Z$ 9,048,763
(US$1,117,131)
Z$8.1 EQUALS US$1
ITEMS TO BE SECURED EXTERNALLY
.
1. ENGINEERING EQUIPMENT US$ 234,380
2. SIGNALS EQUIPMENT
6,944,350
3. ORDINANCE EQUIPMENT
421,640
4. VEHICLES AND TRAILERS
9,496,000
5. MEDICAL EQUIPMENT
247,944
TOTAL
US$ 17,344,314
4. COMMENT: THESE NUMBERS REPRESENT NO MAJOR
CHANGES FROM THE ZIMBABWEANS' INITIAL, SOMEWHAT
INFLATED WISH LIST. HOWEVER, THE SEGREGATION INTO
COSTS WHICH MUST BE RECEIVED BEFORE THE ZNA CAN
DEPLOY AND THOSE WHICH THE UN COULD PROVIDE LATER,
DEMONSTRATES THE ZIMBABWEAN'S CONTINUED
WILLINGNESS TO COMMIT A BATALLION TO UNAMIR
OPERATIONS IN RWANDA. END COMMENT STAPLES
BT
#9405
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< SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
< SSN>9405
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
_
i
r
_
m
,
GONriDCNTIAL •
�-QONriDCfJTIAfc
FROM:
'
SITREPRT
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
OOMriDEWI lAtr
�OONriDCNTIAt'
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: BEERS, CLARKER, DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, STEINBERG, VAX
PREC: PRIORITY
CLASS: CONriDENTIAL
DTG:251758Z AUG 94
FM: AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7798
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0654
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1113
RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
C O N n DC N T lAL'SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 05031
E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREF, PHUM, PREL, EAID, UNHCR, RW, CG
SUBJECT: KENGO REQUESTS HELP IN MOVING EXRWANDAN ARMY
FROM BORDER AREA
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT
2. ZAIRIAN PRIME MINISTER KENGO WA DONDO HAS FORMALLY
REQUESTED USG ASSISTANCE FOR THE TRANSPORTATION AND CARE
OF THE EX-RWANDAN ARMY ELEMENTS WHO HAVE TAKEN REFUGE IN
ZAIRE. CHARGE USED AN APRIL 24 TO EXPRESS OUR
APPRECIATION FOR KENGO'S PROMPT, PERSONAL REACTION TO OUR
SUNDAY MORNING DEMARCHE IN SUPPORT OF THE UNHCR ON
RE-OPENING THE BORDER. KENGO RESPONDED, AS HE HAS
BEFORE, THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD DO WHAT IT COULD TO
FACILITATE THE HUMANITARIAN EFFORT BUT IT NEEDED
INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE THINGS THAT COST MONEY.
3. SPECIFICALLY HE HAD JUST WRITTEN TO THE UN SECRETARY
GENERAL, UNDER ARTILE 11 OF THE CHARTER, TO REQUEST HELP
IN MOVING THE EX-RWANDAN ARMED FORCES (FAR) 150 MILES
FROM THE FRONTIER "AS REQUIRED." HIS GOVERNMENT HAS
IDENTIFIED A BASE AT ITURI, AS ONE AREA OF RELOCATION.
KENGO WAS NOT SURE HOW MANY OF THE ESTIMATED 20,000
EX-FAR SOLDIERS AND THEIR FAMILIES COULD BE ACCOMMODATED
AT ITURI BUT IT WOULD REQUIRE MONEY. TRANSPORT WOULD BE
A BIG ITEM; ALSO REPAIRS TO THE CAMP, TENTS TO LIVE IN
AND CLOTHING (TO GET THE FAR OUT OF THEIR MILITARY
UNIFORMS WHICH WAS ALL THEY HAD) WOULD ALL BE REQUIRED,
NOT TO MENTION DAILY SUSTENANCE FOR THE REFUGEES FOR AN
INDEFINITE PERIOD. (COMMENT: WHEN HE MENTIONED ITURI,
KENGO SAID "TOWARDS KISANGANI" BUT IN ACTUALITY ITURI IS
A SUB REGION OF HAUT-ZAIRE PROVINCE OF WHICH KISANGANI IS
THE CAPITAL. IT IS LOCATED JUST NORTH OF NORTH KIVU AND
BORDERED BY UGANDA AND SUDAN. KENGO MENTIONED THE
AIRPORT AT BUNIA BEING THE CLOSEST TO THE SITE UNDER
CONSIDERATION).
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
tAjNuubmiAL
8/iq/i5 KBH
�CONriDENTIAL
3. KENGO SAID HE HAD ALSO ASKED (WHETHER VIA THE SAME
LETTER TO THE UNSYG OR SEPARATELY WAS NOT CLEAR) UNHCR
HELP IN REMOVING ABOUT ONE HUNDRED EX-RWANDA POLITICAL
LEADERS FROM THE GOMA/BUKAVU AREA AND, FIRSTRESETTLING
THEM IN WESTERN ZAIRE, AND THEN FINDING THEM ASYLUM IN
THIRD COUNTRIES.
4. CHARGE ACKNOWLEDGED OUR OWN PREOCCUPATION WITH THE
EX-MILITARY AND EX-POLITICIANS COMINGLED WITH THE
REFUGEES. THE CAPACITY FOR INTIMIDATION EFFECTIVELY
COUNTERMANDED EFFORTS TO REPATRIATE THE REFUGEES AND THE
VERY PRESENCE OF EX-FAR ON THE BORDER WAS UNSETTLING TO
THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN KIGALI. HE ENCOURAGED KENGO TO
CONTINUE TO PURSUE MULTINATIONAL SOLUTIONS TO THESE
INTRACTABLE PROBLEMS. AS THE LARGEST FINANCIAL
CONTRIBUTOR TO THE UN FAMILY OF ORGANIZATIONS, THE UNITED
STATES WOULD IN ALL LIKELIHOOD END UP BEARING A MAJOR
SHARE OF THE COST OF ANY PLAN TO BE IMPLEMENTED WITH
INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE. CHARGE EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER,
THAT THE ENTIRE REFUGEE QUESTION AND THE SECURITY OF
CENTRAL AFRICA WERE NOT BILATERAL ISSUES WHICH COULD BE
MANAGED SOLEY BY OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS. HOPEFULLY
MULTILATERAL MACHINERY WILL BE UP TO THE TASK. KENGO
TOOK THE POINT NOTING THAT HIS ORIGINAL REQUEST HAD BEEN
TO THE UNSYG, BUT ALSO REJOINED THAT REALISTICALLY,
WITHOUT OUR SUPPORT, THERE WOULD BE NO SOLUTION.
5. LATER IN THE DAY CHARGE MET WITH KAMEL MORJANE, UNHCR
REGIONAL BUREAU DIRECTOR FOR AFRICA, AND SPECIAL ENVOY
MICHEL MOUSSALLI. MORJANE WAS EFFUSIVE IN HIS
APPRECIATION FOR THE USG CONTRIBUTION TO DEALING WITH THE
ENTIRE REFUGEE PROBLEM, FROM MILITARY EFFORTS IN GOMA AND
KIGALI TO OUR DEMARCHING KENGO TO OPEN THE BORDER SUNDAY
MORNING. HE DISCLAIMED UNHCR RESPONSIBILITY FOR
RESETTLING THE 20,000 EX-FAR AND/OR EVEN THE 100
POLITICAL LEADERS IDENTIFIED BY THE GOZ TO BE REMOVED
FROM THE AREA OF THE CAMPS. IT WAS, HE SAID, AGAINST THE
UNHCR MANDATE. MORJANE THOUGHT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A
RESTRICTED MEETING OF RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS AND KEY DONORS SUCH AS OURSELVES TO TRY TO
SOLVE THE PROBLEMS KENGO IDENTIFIED AND PROVIDE THE
ASSISTANCE HE REQUESTED.
6. COMMENT: FOR TOO LONG A TIME ZAIRE HAS BEEN
UNWILLING OR INCAPABLE OF RESPONSIBLY EXERCISING ITS
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS. WITHIN HIS LIMITS, KENGO HAS
RESPONDED TO OUR REQUESTS. WE DO NOT THINK IT IS WITHIN
HIS LIMITS TO TAKE THE MEASURES NECESSARY TO GUARANTEE
C O N r i D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 KINSHASA 05031
E.0.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREF, PHUM, PREL, EAID, UNHCR, RW, CG
SUBJECT: KENGO REQUESTS HELP IN MOVING EXRWANDAN ARMY
SECURITY AT THE CAMPS AND ALONG THE BORDER AREA (ALTHOUGH
WE THINK SOME OF THE REPORTING OVER-ESTIMATES THE
QUANTITY OF ARMAMENTS RETAINED BY EX-FAR AND ESPECIALLY
THEIR CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT CROSS BORDER RAIDING SORTIES,
AT LEAST IN THE GOMA SECTOR). NOR WILL IT CONTRIBUTE TO
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAL.
�CONFIDENTIAL
RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM SIMPLY TO EXHORT ZAIRE TO
ASSUME ITS RESPONSIBILITIES. GUIDANCE AND SUPPORT FROM
THE APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS; INCLUDING,
OF COURSE, OUR OWN STRONG ROLE, WILL BE CRUCIAL.
YATES##
BT
#5031
NNNN
< SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02
< SSN>5031
< TOR>940825140249 Ml220595
< SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
< SSN>5031
< TOR>940825140250 M1220596
A
A
A
A
A
A
FROM:
SITREPRT
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
••OONriDCNTIAL
�IJED 25 AUG 94 11:31
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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY
DU
CP
OY
�SECRET/NOFORN
Current Threat Assessment (U)
(S/NF) The degree of risk to US personnel involved in the Rwandan
relief operation is dependent on the type of threat posed and the
particular location under consideration. Generally, the threat to US
personnel, including armed forces personnel, in the region is assessed as
low to medium. The threat of terrorism in all locations where US forces
are operating presently is judged to be low.
,
(S/NF) The risk to US personnel in Goma, Zaire was-mttetfnigher. In
Goma, both Zairian Army and ex-Rwandan Army (FAR) personnel engage
in criminal activity. Further, factional fighting and ethnic violence, along
with the presence of disaffected military groups operating independently,
pose a medium threat to US citizens in the Goma area. The security
situation in the Goma area will continue to deteriorate as Western forces
withdraw from this location. All US personnel redeployed from the Zairian
border region by August 25.
(S/NF) In Kigali, crime and factionalism pose a medium level of
threat, while the potential threat from disaffected individuals or groups is
thought to be low. In addition, there is a medium level threat from land
mines in the Rwandan capital. Recently, a number of mine-related
accidents have been reported. Although these reports give cause for
concern, thus far no US personnel have been affected.
(€) The new Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) maintains a strong
presence in the capital, serving as a deterrent to violence there. Moreover,
the RPA's command-and-control is quite good, and the organization is
assessed as a cohesive fighting force, comprised mainly of members of the
T't*?! ethnic group, most of whom have had training and combat
experience in the Ugandan Army and in the four year Rwandan civil war.
Conduct and discipline among troops in Kigali is probably better than it is
in the outlying areas, and it is probably better among the older veterans.
(S/NF) Table I displays the threat to US personnel from all
categories and for all locations where US forces currently are engaged or
conceivably could be engaged. The matrix is updated by the US European
Command (CINCEUR) on a daily basis.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
SECRET/NOFORN
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
3p
..
^
.
?
^
'J}
�SECRET/NOFORN
Table I. FORCE PROTECTION THREAT ASSESSMENT
AREA
Entebbe, Uganda
Bukavu, Zaire
Goma, Zaire
Kigali, Rwanda
PORT:
TER:
CRIM:
FIS:
FACT:
MINE:
MIL
PORT
L
M
M
M
TER
L
L
L
L
CRIM
M
M
H
M
F75
M
L
L
L
FACT
I
M
M
M
MIME
I
L
L
M
MIL
L
L
M
L
TERMINOLOGY
Threat to aircraft/airfields and ships/ports
Terrorist threat
Criminal threat
Foreign Intelligence Service threat
Threat from Factional fighting/ethnic violence
Mine threat
Threat from disaffected Military members/groups operating
independently
L:
M:
H:
C:
Low to Negligible threat
Medium Threat
High Threat
Critical Threat
Source:
USCINCEUR
Current as of 31 August 1994
Capabilities of the Ex-FAR (U)
(S/NF) On 17 July 1994, the bulk (approximately 20,000) of the FAR
in northwestern Rwanda fled to Goma, Zaire as intact combat units,
bringing with them their heavy weapons (totals and types unknown). The
primary reason given by the FAR for this retreat was a severe shortage of
ammunition and heavy weapons to sustain the fight against the RPA.
(S/NF) As the FAR crossed into Goma, about 50 percent of the troops
were disarmed. Although some units retained small arms and caches of
ammunition, there was practically no ammunition for crew served
weapons in Zaire. Most of the FAR encampments in the Goma area are
along the east-west road from Goma to Sake and at several camps north of
Goma. Outside the Goma area, there are reports that elements of the exFAR's Paracommandos and Presidential Guard remain hidden in the
National Park of the Volcanoes (Rwanda) between Ruhengeri and Gisenyi
in order to begin insurgency operations against the RPA
SECRET/NOFORN
JNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET/NOFORN
(S/NF) Other less organized and less well-equipped ex-FAR troops
fled to Bukavu, Zaire, including approximately 8,000 army and gendarme
and up to 5,000 Hutu militia forces. During the course of the war, probably
in early May, about 1,000-2,000 additional ex-FAR soldiers sought refuge
along the Tanzania frontier in the vicinity of the Akagera National Park,
and have launched sporadic attacks against the RPA in northeastern
Rwanda. An additional group of about 3,000 ex-FAR soldiers are in the
Benaco region of Tanzania. Finally, there are reports of as many as 5,000
armed Hutu elements (ex-FAR and militia) in the French Safe Zone, '
primarily in the Nyungwe Forest west of Gikongoro.
(S/NF) The total number of ex-FAR in Rwanda, Zaire, and Tanzania is
roughly 33,000-36,000, but most of these elements are assessed to be of
generally low combat capability. Only about 10,000 are believed to be
well disciplined and well-trained, the majority of whom are in the Goma
area.
(S/NF) The ex-FAR has no open allies or sponsors at the present.
Zaire is a future possibility though probably not within the next 3 months
while Goma remains the site of much international activity. The local
Zairian military is sympathetic to the Hutus and, if it is not already doing
so, could assist the ex-FAR. Much of the friction between the ex-FAR and
the Zairian Army came from the Elite Forces, Special Presidential Division
(DSP), and 31st Parachute Brigade, based outside the region. Furthermore,
Zaire, with French assistance, could renew its support to the Hutus in order
to force a more favorable political solution in Rwanda.
(G) The overall combat effectiveness of the ex-FAR units in the
region is judged to be low. There are reports of small-scale raids into
eastern Rwanda which are probably conducted by elements in the vicinity
of the Akagera National Park and Benaco refugee camp in Tanzania. These
forces in all likelihood lack a significant stockpile of weapons and
ammunition for lengthy insurgency and would need resupply within two
to three months.
(€) Ammunition and other supplies are the key factor degrading the
ex-FAR's near-term capability. Currently, the ex-FAR has insufficient
stocks to mount large-scale, sustained combat operations. Most crewserved weapons remain under the control of the Zairian armed forces
(FAZ). The ultimate disposition of this-equipment has not been
determined, but an estimated 20-30 percent of ex-FAR and militia forces
retain arms. Because the precise amount of combat equipment available to
ex-FAR prior to hostilities is unknown, the amount still retained by the exSECRET/NOFORN
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET/NOFORN
FAR-and that which is under FAZ control, destroyed in conflict, or left in
Rwanda-is also unknown.
Near Term Outlook (U)
(S/NF) Kigali. A serious security threat is unlikely to emerge in Kigali
over the near term. The Tutsi-dominated government and army are in
reasonably firm control of the capital, and they are gradually consolidating
their power. Their capability to ensure a safe environment for US
personnel and others in and around Kigali increases daily. Tensions could
mount, however, if the government alienates wide segments of the Hutu
population (who constituted 85% of the pre-civil war Rwandan population),
even inadvertently. Thus far, the new Government of Rwanda has
steadfastly avoided taking any actions which might provoke trouble with
the Hutu.
(S/NF) Goma. The potential threat in the border areas, especially
Goma, is likely to increase over the near term as the former Rwandan
military attempts to re-group and stage a comeback. These defeated
forces remain defiant and have begun to launch small-scale insurgency
operations. Extremist Hutus retain their militia and village organization in
the camps, providing an environment wherein hate propaganda and fear
can be used to incite violence against US personnel. Moreover, many of
them blame the UN/^and the US in pai tictfla^ffir their downfall, which they
attribute to the UN-imposed arms embargo that denied them the means to
win the war. Despite their intentions, these forces currendy lack the
capability to engage in sustained insurgency operations, although they wilr^
conduct limited cross-border forays in the coming weeks.
(S/NF) The Paracommando Battalion and Presidential Guard could
launch limited squad or platoon-size raids and insurgent operations in
Ruhengeri and Gisenyi Prefectures, possibly from the Volcanoes National
Park in northwest Rwanda. The Paracommando battalion may have
received extensive terrorist training from French military advisors during
the Civil War (1990-1993). This unit is the linchpin of the ex-FAR, and its
actions most likely would serve as an indicator of what the ex-FAR would
do as a whole.
(S/NF) Bukavu. The forces in the Bukavu region lack organization
and weapons, and thus pose little threat and are not likely to begin
insurgency operations. However, the forces in the Nyungwe Forest area of
the Safe Zone will continue to terrorize the local population, could interfere
with UN Assistance Mission In Rwanda (UNAMIR) troops, and prompt the
SECRET/NOFORN
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET/NOFORN
RPA to renew military operations in southwest Rwanda. If the RPA
resumes its attacks, the local Hutu population will probably flee to Zaire.
SECRET/NOFORN
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPi
�THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED
UN SECURITY SYSTEM IN RWANDA
Executive Summary
^ ^
As of^Septenaroer there were over 460(^JNAMIR troops in Rwanda,
about half of which are deployed in the southwest Humanitarian Protection
Zone (HPZ, formerly the French Safe zone). Additionally, UNAMIR troops
have begun to establish an operational hub in Kigali. The deployment of
the remainder of UNAMIR's 5500 troops is to occur over the next month.
UNAMIR forces have been performing in the southwest both during
and since the French withdrawal. While this deployment has not been of
sufficient duration to assess their viability as a security force, to date the
units have performed satisfactorily. UNAMIR's security presence in the
rest of Rwanda remains limited. With only two-thirds of its force in place,
UNAMIR has not yet established a viable security system throughout the
country.
THIS PAGE UNCLASS:
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET/NOFORN
Current UNAMIR Operations (U)
(U) The expanded United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda,
known as UNAMIR II, was established after the resurgence of civil war in
Rwanda last April. It has multiple missions: to promote stability and
security in Rwanda; to facilitate the return of the refugees; to ensure safe
conditions for humanitarian relief operations; and to promote the
reconciliation process. To accomplish these goals, UNAMIR II has a
mandated force strength of 5500 troops. It is a Chapter VI "peacekeeping"
operation under the UN Charter, as opposed to a Chapter VII "peace
enforcement" operation (the latter allows forces to use whatever means
necessary, including deadly force, to accomplish their mission).
(S/NF) As of ^September, there were ^dWroops under UNAMIR II
command deployed throughout Rwanda. The southwestern portion of
Rwanda, the Humanitarian Protection Zone (HPZ), is currently the high
priority area for UN operations. Because of the withdrawal of French
forces, there is considerable fear among the Hutu refugees in the HPZ that
the new Kigali government, dominated by Tutsis, will conduct reprisals
against them. Further, ex-FAR and militia are applying pressure on Hutus
to relocate into Zaire. The movement of Rwandans westward toward the
Bukavu area in Zaire reflects the anxiety which has been generated among
the Hutus.
(€) The role played by extremist radio broadcasts is integral to the
ex-FAR campaign to intimidate Hutus. The anti-Tutsi propaganda being
broadcast reinforces ethnic hatreds, as well as the fears of Hutu refugees
about the safety of returning. To some extent, this has been countered by
radio campaigns conducted by the new government in Kigali and by
Hen^nts of the international community. Nevertheless, the returnflowof
refugees has been limited, suggesting that the former government so far
has been more successful in convincing-and coercing-the Hutu refugees
to remain outside Rwanda.
(S/NP) UNAMIR's focus on the HPZ has brought an increased force
presence to the area which, along with the positive radio campaign being
conducted by the international community, hopefully will bring about
repatriation. Thus far, a Ghanaian mechanized battalion has moved into
the Gikongoro area of the HPZ. An Ethiopian battalion is deploying to the
Cyangugu area of the HPZ. Additionally, the African contingent of
approximately 550 troops of the previous French-led multinational effort
transferred to UNAMIR control after Paris withdrew its forces. A number
SECRET/NOFORN
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�SECRET/NOFORN
of African countries have also pledged company to battalion-sized (120800 personnel) units to UNAMIR II.
(S/NF) UNAMIR's ability to provide adequate security is unclear at
this time. Once the entire force has been deployed, the size of the security
presence should be sufficient, but that only tells half the story. More than
any other factor, UNAMIR's success will be measured by the extent to
which the refugees' perceive they can return home without fear of
reprisal.
The Role of the Government (U)
(S/NF) While UNAMIR may attempt to bring temporary security to
the Rwandan population, it is the new government which must be able and
willing to sustain that protection. Although there are reports of some
reprisal killings, possibly by field-officers of the RPA, there is no evidence
yet of government sanction for such killings. Indeed, the government
continues to condemn all such acts of reprisal.
(S/NF) Little information is currently available about the precise size
of the RPA. By piecing together a variety of un-corroborated reports, we
conclude that the RPA comprises about 35,000 soldiers. Of this number,
only about 13,000 troops are combat experienced, and 5,000 are
administration/support troops. The RPA is organized into three sectors:
the Ruhengeri Sector, the Kigali Sector, and the Butare Sector. The entire
force comprises 5 brigades, with each brigade containing 4 to 6 battalions.
The total force boasts 75 light infantry battalions, each battalion
comprising 300-400 soldiers. Separate battalions (those not organic to a
brigade) ^virlpnflv SPT-VP as strarpcrir rpsprvp fnrrps f n r p i n f n r r p gprtnn; ac
required.
EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d
(S/NF) RPA soldiers are highly skilled in guerrilla tactics, which
proved successful in Rwanda's rugged terrain against the better equipped
and larger forces of the FAR. The RPA may be somewhat less capable in a
more traditional role as a national army. Logistically, the RPA is highly
mobile and adapted to ensure rapid resupply of ammunition and food.
Special logistics troops transport supplies by truck to forward distribution
sites, which are then brought by porters to the forward-deployed units.
Based on its performance against the FAR, it is apparent that the RPA is a
highly disciplined and cohesive fighting force with reasonably good
leadership. The influx of large numbers of new recruits since the Rwandan
SECRET/NOFORN
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�>
SECRET/NOFORN
Patriotic Front took control of Rwanda's government in mid-July mav havp
caused a temporary decline in the combat capability of the RPA,
(S/NF) Relatively little is known about the current disposition of
RPA units throughout the country. As far as can be determined, it appears
that the French Safe Zone in Rwanda's southwest is devoid of RPA units.
Only three Rwandan cities are known to host RPA battalions (Ruhengeri,
Kigali, and Gisenyi). RPA units have been seen in the capital in three
locations: the Gendarme Camp north of downtown, an RPA camp in
downtown Kigali, and Kanombe Barracks, east of downtown Kigali. RPA
key training sites are located at Gabiro and Bigogwe.
Near Term Outlook (U)
, i»
(S/NF) Not only are Rwandan Hutus generally skeptical of the UN's
ability to protect them, they are aware of its limitations eirthe use of force.
If necessary, they will find ways to cross over the porous border into Zaire,
regardless of efforts to interdict them. Their return will depend on
UNAMIR's ability-^o offer Huttfe^a secure environment in Rwanda and the
extent to which thk international community can break the control of Hutu
extremists and this ex-FAR in the Zaire camps. ^J-etp
SECRET/NOFORN
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�•DECL: OADR
Auqust 25, 1994
TO:
AF - Mr. Moose
DECLASSIFIED
-HROUGH:
AF - Prudence Bushnell
FROM:
AF/C - Terence ?. McCuliey, Acting
P E R E.O. 13526
Slow- 030,3-n
S/iyi5" KBH
SUBJECT:
Relocating Rwandan Refugees FAR Remnants and 1Z0R
The Problem
Security i n the Rwandan refugee camps i n eastern Zaire
remains a major concern:
-he presence of armed m i l i t i a members
and former Rwandan government (IGOR) o f f i c i a l s i n the camps and
throughout eastern Zaire, and the concentrations of rump
Rwandan armed forces (FAR) along the Goma-Bukavu axis pose
problems f o r both the i n t e r n a t i o n a l humanitarian e f f o r t and the
long term s t a b i l i t y of Rwanda. The Government of Zaire (GOZ)
has made an e f f o r t t o disarm the FAR, ensure s e c u r i t y i n the
camps, and i n t e r d i c t e f f o r t s by Hutu m i l i t a n t s to prevent
refugees from returning to Rwanda. Regrettably, the Zairians
have f a i l e d i n most of these areas, and have now turned t o the
UN and the United States f o r assistance. Security i n the
camps, disarming ex-FAR and r e l o c a t i o n of former Rwandan
government o f f i c i a l s and m i l i t a r y are a l l i n t e r r e l a t e d . The
Zairians have put a problem on the t a b l e which requires a
b i l a t e r a l or m u l t i l a t e r a l s o l u t i o n , and which incorporates the
r e l a t e d issues of arrest and detention of suspected war
criminals.
Z a i r i a n Plan A:
IGOR O f f i c i a l s
The GOZ wishes to separate snd remove former o f f i c i a l s of
the Rwandan regime (along w i t h t h e i r f a m i l i e s ) , and to disperse
them t o Bandundu, Equateur and 3as Zaire provinces. The
Zairians have i d e n t i f i e d 100 key figures i n the former
government, and have n o t i f i e d them of the GOZ i n t e n t . Along
w i t h hangers-on and dependents, the GOZ wishes to relocate
about 1,000 persons Erorr. the camps along the s e n s i t i v e border
area i n eastern Zaire to points •••.'est. The u l t i m a t e goal i s to
engineer the e x i t of the former : : : i c i a l s to t h i r d countries
•-•here they might f i n d asylum. Zairian Prime M i n i s t e r Kengo has
raised t h i s issue w i t h the UNHCR A f r i c a D i r e c t o r , and requested
UN assistance to prepare camps and provide t r a n s p o r t for the
former Rwandan government o f f i c i a l s ; he passed along a s i m i l a r
request for U.S. help to Charge Yates Wednesday.
<:3iiri SENT SMr
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�The Heart of the Matter:
Disarmir.g/Relccating the FAR
The remnant FAR and m i l i t i a present i n eastern Zaire
probably do not represent = m i l i t a r y threat to the new RPF-led
Rwandan government. They were routed on the f i e l d of b a t t l e by
Kagame's troops, and are now for the most part b e r e f t of heavy
weapons and m a t e r i e l . As long 3S the rump Rwandan army remains
consolidated i n camps along the Goma - Bukavu a x i s , however, i t
continues tc pose a r i s k of d e s t a b i l i z i n g the new a u t h o r i t i e s
in K i g a l i . In a more irrmediate sense, the force could also be
used t o i n t i m i d a t e refugees who v i s h to return to Rwanda.
Disarming and r e i o c a t m c the FAR orings us back t o the
d i f f i c u l t issue of who w i l l do the deed. C l e a r l y the Zairians
cannot, and the United States w i l l not. The various b i l a t e r a l
and m u l t i l a t e r a l options discussed below o u t l i n e some possible
responses to the problem.
1)
Disarming/Relocating
- A B i l a t e r a l Approach
The prospects f o r success i n convincing a t h i r d country to
send i t s troops to disarm and move the FAR, and to assist the
Z a i r i a n s w i t h s e c u r i t y i n the refugee camps seem dubious at
best. Although we may wish to approach a t h i r d country (such
as I s r a e l or France) to provide troops to disarm and relocate
the ex-FAR, there may be few who would be w i l l i n g t o take on
the j o b . The ex-FAR remains armed ( a l b e i t l i g h t l y ) w i t h
command s t r u c t u r e s i n t a c t . Although a w e l l - d i s c i p l i n e d t h i r d
country force could l i k e l y disarm and c o n t r o l the ex-FAR, the
r i s k of c o n f r o n t a t i o n might deter any nation from committing
troops. A d d i t i o n a l l y , such an action would ensure that the
t h i r d country's troops would be widely perceived as a party to
the c o n f l i c t by the Hutu refugees i n Zaire. Using such troops
to provide s e c u r i t y i n the camps or to c o n t r o l the relocated
ex-FAR would be problematic under these circumstances.
Given the problems related tc a disarming the ex-FAR, i t
might be worthwhile t o consider asking a t h i r d country to
f a c i l i t a t e the r e l o c a t i o n of the rump Rwandan army -- without
disarming i t -- to the camp proposed by the GOZ i n f a r
northeastern Zaire. This v a r i a t i o n might defuse the tension
which an e f f e c t i v e move to disarm and i n t e r n the ex-FAR would
engender, while removing the force from the s e n s i t i v e border
area. On the other hand, such an action could be expected to
generate c r i t i c i s m from the new Rwandan government i n K i g a l i .
CONriDCMTHrir
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�-CQNFIDgNTIAL
- M-
2)
Disarming/Relocating
- M u l t i l a c e r a i Options:
--
Expand UNAMIR's Mandate?
A m u l t i l a t e r a l approach may be the most r e a l i s t i c option,
but i s t a r from the most expeditious way to resolve the
oroblem. Expanding UNAMIR's mandate would require a new
Security Council r e s o l u t i o n , which i n turn would lead d i r e c t l y
to the question of where to f i n d troops. Deployment of UNAMIR
11 has taken four months, and remains incomplete. Beyond t h i s ,
disarming the ex-FAR and m i l i t i a snd a s s i s t i n g the GOZ w i t h
o r o v i s i o n cf s e c u r i t y i n the camps i s a f a r d i f f e r e n t mandate
from that of UNAMIR: countries now c o n t r i b u t i n g troops to the
Chapter VI operation i n Rwanda can be expected t o balk at a
m o d i f i c a t i o n of the mandate which could raise the r i s k factor
for t h e i r s o l d i e r s .
--
A New UN Force f o r Eastern Zaire?
The UNSYG has f l o a t e d the idea of a UN " r a p i d r e a c t i o n
f o r c e , " deployed i n eastern Zaire, w i t h a mandate t o intervene
in Burundi should f i g h t i n g erupt between Tutsis and Hutus.
While most on the Security Council have been decidedly tepid to
t h i s concept, we may wish t c consider a new UN mandated force
for the region to deal w i t h the problem of the ex-FAR and
s e c u r i t y i n the camps. The problem remains that while a
Chapter v u operation could o f f e r a UN blessing, i t might f i n d
few countries w i l l i n g t o commit troops ( f o r the same reasons
o u t l i n e d above). As w i t h the idea of expanding UNAMIR's
operation, however, obtaining a new UN mandate could be a
lengthy process, and i n the i n t e r i m , the UNHCR and other
i n t e r n a t i o n a l organizations w i l l not move the ex-FAR while they
remain under arms.
An Added Complication:
The Question of War Crimes
The ex-FAR and IGOR contain people g u i l t y of genocide, and
as we move forward w i t h a War Crimes Tribunal f o r Rwanda we
need to consider that many of those we propose t o relocate may
be suspected war c r i m i n a l s . The GOZ may have an i n t e r n a t i o n a l
o b l i g a t i o n to a r r e s t and detain suspected war c r i m i n a l s , but
has scant means and l i t t l e w i l l zo undertake such an
n i t i a t i v e . The b i l a t e r a l or m u i t i i a t e r a 1 force would then
.ace the thorny issue of whether to get involved i n the
detention cf war c r i m i n a l s .
:
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
(WE)
09.31.
'94
10:08
NO.
M 6 0 I 20438
PAGE
OONPIDEHTmDECL: OADR
Rwanda/Burundi SVTS Agenda
August 31, 1994 at 1100 hours
CIA Report
Ad Hoc Meeting - Readout
Radios - Status of Team i n K i g a l i
Security i n Refugee Camps
Gm
oa
- Relocating Ex-FAR and IGOR
- Providing general s e c u r i t y through:
— B i l a t e r a l Means
— M u l t i l a t e r a l Peacekeepers
—
P r i v a t e Contractors
Tanzania - What i s the problem?
U.S. M i l i t a r y Presence - K i g a l i
Security i n Rwanda - Status of human r i g h t s monitors and
international tribunal
B u l l e t i n Board - General information sharing
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
G 1 I3 £
�SEP 06"•'94
03:09PM USMISSION-I RJN-NY
P. 2
•CQHriPBMTSfr
TO:
Rwanda Working Group
FROM: Susan Varisco
SUBJECT: UNAMIR Deployment
The following i s the information on UNAMIR deployment that
I promised for today's SVTS:
Tunisia: There was a misunderstanding at UN HQ oyer the
APC issue. The Force Commander w i l l restructure APC
allocations and take 20 from the Ghanaian battalion for
Tunisia. Meanwhile, the UN has asked Russia for BTRs
(wheeled APCs), 1-2 Tunisian companies w i l l deploy on 25
Sept and the remaining w i l l deploy over the following
three weeks.
India: An advance party of 1 company w i l l deploy 30 Sept
and the remainder w i l l deploy over the following two weeks,
A i r l i f t : The UN' i s s t i l l working out i t s l i f t plans, but
we should expect a request for assistance at some point.
No further details yet as to what and when.
Troop Ceiling: UNAMIR will.be within the mandated troop
strength for the next few weeks. I t w i l l s t a r t to go over
in mid-October, based on the deployment schedule we have
now. Once f u l l y deployed, the force w i l l exceed the
mandated strength by 1600. The UN w i l l probably come to
the Security Council by the f i r s t week on October asking
for a new troop strength—unless there i s an unforseen
change i n the deployment schedule or other troops rotate
out. In any case, we should consider whether we have
objections to a larger UNAMIR.
Give me a c a l l i f you have any further questions.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�DECL: OADR
Strategy on Security in Rwandan Refugee Camos
o
The international community should a s s i s t the GOZ and GOT in
moving ex-IGOR leaders and ex-FAR out of the camps and away
from the border.
o
We should not allow the elements that have been moved to
s o l i d i f y into an organized group bent on invading Rwanda.
- We should redouble efforts to establish a war crimes
tribunal as soon as possible, so the genocidal leadership in
e x i l e can be plucked from the group that has been relocated
(or from the regular refugee camps, i f some remain there).
o
We need to pursue demobilization and integration of the ex-FAR
into the new Rwandan army or other employment:
- We should provide occupational training to the relocated
ex-FAR for demobilization and integration into the Rwandan
economy.
- We should press the GOR to accelerate and expand i t s program
pf integrating elements of the ex-FAR into the new GOR army.
- We should build on the example of UNAMIR's voluntary
disarmament program in the former safe zone by encouraging the
GOR to offer similar incentives (gendarme or other jobs) to
ex-FAR outside the country.
- We must work with the donor community and I F I ' s to help "get
the GOR up and running so that i t can afford to integrate or
offer other carrots to the ex-FAR.
o
We should press the GOZ and GOR to agree to destroy the arms
that have been confiscated and, in the meantime, we should
seek to ensure that the weapons are safeguarded.
o
We should press UNHCR to implement i t s plan to break the camps
up into smaller, more manageable sub-camps to f a c i l i t a t e
control and administration. We should offer our financial and
l o g i s t i c a l assistance.
Policing in the camps must be improved:
- The international community should assist GOT and GOZ
military/police (to the extent possible) in f u l f i l l i n g the
DECLASSIFIED
country's responsibility to provide security.
1 1 0 5 1
W e
^ooiu'^i^m ~
should seriously consider extending UNAMIR's mandate and
2.oi\- 03.1*3-v\ O R t cover the refugee camps.
8/1 yi5
KBH
A
0
- At the same time, we should continue to look for countries
w i l l i n g to provide or a s s i s t the GOZ/GOT in providing security
on a b i l a t e r a l basis.
o
We must keep up the pressure on the GOR to encourage
repatriation through broadening i t s p o l i t i c a l base and ending
human rights abuses. We must press for f u l l deployment of
UNAMIR and human rights monitors.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�OONriDCNTIAL.
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: BEERS, CLARKER, DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, SCHWARTZ, STEINBERG, VAX
PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: OONriDCNTIAL-
DTG: 100731Z SEP 94
FM: AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4034
RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
CONriDCNTIAL
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ADDIS ABABA 006785
DEPT FOR RP/AFR AND AF/C; USAID FOR A, BHR, BHR/OFDA, AFR
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREF, ET, OAU, RW, UN, EAID
SUBJECT: UNHCR/OAU RWANDA SESSION
INTRODUCTION
1. UNHCR AND OAU HELD A SPECIAL RWANDA/BURUNDI SESSION ON
SEPTEMBER 9 DURING THE SEPTEMBER 8-10 UNHCR/OAU AFRICA
REFUGEE CONFERENCE IN ADDIS. U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER MRS.
OGATA AND OAU SECRETARY GENERAL SALIM SALIM CO-CHAIRED THE
MEETING. REPRESENTING THE AFFECTED REGION WERE RWANDA'S
FOREIGN MINISTER, BURUNDI'S AMBASSADOR TO ETHIOPIA, ZAIRE'S
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND TANZANIA'S AMBASSADOR TO
ETHIOPIA. THE U.S. DELEGATION WAS LED BY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OAKLEY AND INCLUDED AF/DAS BUSHNELL, AMBASSADOR
RAWSON, SCOTT FISHER (AF/RA), MELANIE MARLETT (USAID/A) AND
VALERIE NEWSOM (USAID/DART). THE EUROPEAN UNION, SWEDEN,
DENMARK, BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS AND TUNISIA (AS OAU
PRESIDENT) ALSO ATTENDED. THE AGENDA FOR THE MEETING
INCLUDED SECURITY IN RWANDAN REFUGEE CAMPS, REPATRIATION OF
RWANDAN REFUGEES AND THE UPCOMING REGIONAL REFUGEE
CONFERENCE.
2. FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THE MEETING'S PROCEEDINGS.
IMMEDIATE ACTIONS ARE LISTED IN PARA 23.
SEPARATION OF MILITIA AND CIVILIANS
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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rnrjr nn T|
GONriDCNTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
ao\\- oai>3- ^
^
�CONFIDENTIAL-
3. ALL SPECIAL SESSION PARTICIPANTS AGREED ON THE URGENT
NEED TO SEPARATE MILITIA FROM CIVILIAN REFUGEES IN ZAIRE
CAMPS. ACCORDING TO THE RWANDAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS (MFA), THE PRIMARY OBSTACLES TO REPATRIATION ARE
INTIMIDATION OF REFUGEES BY MILITIA AND THE THREATENING
PROPAGANDA OF THE EX-GOVERNMENT. MILITIA (INCLUDING BOTH
ATTEMPT TO RETURN TO RWANDA. STEPS NEED TO BE TAKEN
IMMEDIATELY BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, STATED THE MFA,
TO SEPARATE THE MILITIA FROM CIVILIAN PERSONNEL. THE MFA
ALSO SUGGESTED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SECURE CORRIDOR FOR
RETURNING REFUGEES. THE THREATENING PROPAGANDA OF THE
FORMER GOVERNMENT MUST ALSO BE STOPPED.
4. ACCORDING TO THE ZAIRE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER (DPM), THE
GOVERNMENT OF ZAIRE (GOZ) IS COMMITTED TO DOING EVERYTHING
IN ITS POWER TO NEUTRALIZE THOSE WHO VIOLATE ZAIRIAN LAWS
AND HOSPITALITY. THE GOZ WILL NOT TOLERATE NEITHER MILITIA
NOR POLITICAL ACTIVITY THAT PREVENTS THOSE WHO WISH TO
RETURN HOME FROM DOING SO. AS PER THE AGREEMENT REACHED
BETWEEN THE PRESIDENTS OF RWANDA AND ZAIRE AT THE JULY 30
MAURITIUS MEETING, THE GOZ PLANS TO DIVIDE THE REFUGEE
POPULATION IN ZAIRE INTO CIVILIAN CAMPS AND MILITARY CAMPS.
THE GOZ HAS IDENTIFIED APPROPRIATE SITES FURTHER FROM THE
RWANDAN BORDER FOR RELOCATION OF THE SOLDIERS AND IS
PURSUING CONTRACTS WITH FRIENDLY COUNTRIES TO FACILITATE
THE ACTUAL MOVEMENT PROCESS. ONCE THE MILITIA ARE
ENCAMPED, THE ZAIRE GOVERNMENT WILL REQUIRE ASSISTANCE FROM
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO FEED, CLOTHE (IN OTHER THAN
MILITARY UNIFORM) AND OTHERWISE CARE FOR THE ENCAMPED
MILITIA. LATER, SAID THE DPM, THE GOZ WILL PURSUE GENERAL
DISARMAMENT (FAR SOLDIERS, STATED THE ZAIRIAN DPM, HAVE
BEEN DISARMED ALTHOUGH FAR OFFICERS CONTINUE TO HAVE ACCESS
TO THEIR PERSONAL WEAPONS) AND ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF
MILITARY OFFICERS. THE GOZ RECOGNIZES THAT SEPARATING THE
INTERHAMWE FROM THE CIVILIAN POPULATION WILL PROVE
DIFFICULT AS THEY ARE HARD TO IDENTIFY.
5. THE GOZ IS ALSO PLANNING TO RELOCATE FORMER RWANDAN
LEADERS, CURRENTLY IN THE GOMA AREA, TO BANDUNDU AND BAS
ZAIRE. THE GOZ HAS BANNED ALL POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF THE
FORMER RWANDAN GOVERNMENT IN THE BORDER AREAS.
6. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION ASKED BY AS OAKLEY, THE ZAIRE
DPM STATED THAT THERE ARE 20,000-25,000 MILITIA IN ZAIRE
AND AN ESTIMATED 2 MILLION REFUGEES IN TOTAL. (NOTE: THE
2 MILLION FIGURE IS SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER THAN OFFICIAL
UNHCR ESTIMATES OF ABOUT 1.3 MILLION, WHICH ARE ALSO LIKELY
HIGH;
THE NUMBER OF MILITIA MAY BE CORRECT. END NOTE.)
OAKLEY ALSO ASKED WHETHER THE RWANDAN MILITIA IN ZAIRE HAD
AGREED TO BE MOVED. ACCORDING TO THE ZAIRE DPM, THE ZAIRE
MINISTER OF DEFENSE HAS CONTACTED MILITIA OFFICIALS TO
ADVISE THEM OF THE EMINENT MOVEMENT/ENCAMPMENT OF MILITIA
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AND HAS NOT RECEIVED AN OFFICIAL REFUSAL TO MOVE.
7. COMMENTING ON THE ABOVE DISCUSSION, OAU/SYG SALIM SALIM
AGREED THAT THE SEPARATION OF INTERHAMWE, WHILE MORE
COMPLICATED THAN TROOPS, MUST ALSO BE EFFECTED TO INSURE
POPULATIONS AND ASSERTED THAT THE UNHCR STANDS READY TO
HELP IN THIS EFFORT. OGATA ASKED FOR A TIMELINE FOR THE
COMPLETION OF THIS SEPARATION AS, SHE STATED, THE UNHCR
CANNOT CONTINUE PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO THE MIXED
POPULATION FOR MORE THAN THREE MORE MONTHS WITHOUT A
SERIOUS LOSS TO THE ORGANIZATION'S CREDIBILITY. OGATA ALSO
STATED THAT WHILE THE SEPARATION OF INTERHAMWE ELEMENTS
WOULD BE EVEN MORE COMPLICATED THAN THE ENCAMPMENT OF
MILITARY TROOPS, REMOVAL OF THE TROOPS WILL BE A GOOD FIRST
STEP TOWARDS CONTAINING INTERHAMWE ACTIVITY. REGARDING THE
RWANDAN MFA'S PROPOSAL FOR SAFE CORRIDORS TO ENCOURAGE
REFUGEE REPATRIATION, OGATA SAID THAT IT IS AN INTERESTING
CONCEPT WHICH UNHCR WILL FURTHER EXAMINE.
DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
B. THE MFA STATED THAT THE SECURITY CONDITIONS INSIDE
RWANDA ARE ACCEPTABLE FOR REPATRIATION AND THE GOVERNMENT
OF RWANDA (GOR) IS ACTIVELY URGING REFUGEES TO RETURN. THE
GOR HAS MADE RADIO ANNOUNCEMENTS OF PEACE AND
RECONCILIATION IN THE SPIRIT OF ARUSHA BOTH INSIDE RWANDA
AND IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. THE MFA STATED THAT "THE GOR
HAS KEPT THEIR DOOR AJAR FOR PEOPLE OF THE FORMER
GOVERNMENT WHO HAVE NO BLOOD ON THEIR HANDS". THEY HAVE
ALSO KEPT THE DOOR OPEN TO FORMER MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY
FOR INTEGRATION INTO THE NATIONAL ARMY.
9. THE MFA STATED THAT THE GOR WANTS THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY TO ASSIST IN ESTABLISHING A LEGAL SYSTEM TO
PROVIDE SECURITY FOR WAR CRIMINALS. HE INDICATED THAT THE
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS WILL
PROVIDE ASSURANCES TO REFUGEES WHO WANT TO RETURN HOME. HE
SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT ALSO RECOGNIZES THAT "THE BALL IS
IN THEIR COURT", I.E. THAT IF THERE IS NO RECONCILIATION
PROCESS AND IF THEY DO NOT ABIDE BY THE ARUSHA ACCORDS,
THERE WILL BE MORE REFUGEES.
TANZANIA - CONTINUED INFLUXES
10. ACCORDING TO THE TANZANIAN AMBASSADOR TO ETHIOPIA,
THERE ARE CURRENTLY 500,000 REFUGEES IN KAGERA REGION WITH
DAILY INFLUXES OF ANYWHERE FROM 150 TO 1,500 PEOPLE.
(NOTE: UNHCR'S OFFICIAL NUMBERS FOR REFUGEES IN TANZANIA
ARE CLOSER TO 450,000. END NOTE) THE GOVERNMENT OF
TANZANIA (GOT) HOPES TO BREAK DOWN LARGE CONCENTRATIONS OF
REFUGEES (AS IN BENACO WHERE THERE ARE ABOUT 200,000) INTO
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
OONHDCNTIAL-
�•CONriDENTIAL
SMALLER CAMPS. WHILE MILITIA PRESENCE WITHIN THE CAMPS IS
REQUIRES AN ADDITIONAL 450 TO CONTROL WEAPONS AND PROVIDE
ADDITIONAL SECURITY IN THE CAMPS. THE GOZ HAS APPEALED TO
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FOR ADDITIONAL SECURITY
OFFICERS AND HAS APPARENTLY RECEIVED A POSITIVE RESPONSE
FROM THE U.S. (OF WHICH WE WERE NOT AWARE).
11. THE GOT IS VERY INTERESTED IN THE TIMELY REPATRIATION
OF THE RWANDAN REFUGEES IN TANZANIA AND WARNED THE RWANDAN
GOVERNMENT THAT "WITCH HUNTING DOES NOT PROMOTE PEACE."
THE GOT URGED THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT TO ISSUE AMNESTY TO
THOSE RWANDANS WHO HAD COMMITTED LESSER CRIMES ("LESSER"
WAS LEFT UNDEFINED) AND APPEALED TO THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY TO STRENGTHEN SOCIAL GROUPS IN RWANDA WHICH ARE
SUPPORTING RECONCILIATION AND ASSIST THE NEW RWANDAN
GOVERNMENT TO ESTABLISH EFFECTIVE GOVERNING STRUCTURES
WHICH WOULD GIVE PEACE OF MIND TO REFUGEES THUS ENCOURAGING
THEIR RETURN. THE TANZANIAN AMBASSADOR CITED THE NEED FOR
THE COUNTRYWIDE PRESENCE OF INTERNATIONAL (UNAMIR) FORCES
AND SUGGESTED THAT THESE F
ORCES ACTUALLY ESCORT REFUGEES
RETURNING HOME. HE ALSO ASKED THE NEW GOVERNMENT TO SET A
TIME LINE FOR REFUGEE REPATRIATION.
LAND TENURE AND RETURNEES
12. THE MFA IS CONCERNED THAT RECENT REFUGEES WILL RETURN
TO FIND THEIR HOMES HAVE BEEN CLAIMED BY OTHERS. MANY
LONG-TIME REFUGEES (PRIMARILY TUTSI EXILES) ARE RETURNING
TO RWANDA SPONTANEOUSLY AND SETTLING ON THEIR FORMER LAND
(WHICH HAS BEEN OCCUPIED BY OTHERS FOR THE PAST 30 YEARS)
OR OTHER PROPERTY ABANDONED BY THE RECENT REFUGEES. THE
NEW RWANDAN GOVERNMENT HAS REPORTEDLY INFORMED THE EXILES
TO FOREGO THE RIGHT TO THEIR ORIGINAL PROPERTY IN THE
INTEREST OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. FOR THE MOMENT, THERE
IS NOWHERE OTHER THAN HOMES PREVIOUSLY OCCUPIED BY RECENT
REFUGEES TO MOVE INTO. THE LONGER IT TAKES FOR THE RECENT
REFUGEES TO RETURN, THE MORE DIFFICULT IT WILL BE TO EVICT
THE EXILES FROM THEIR LAND. BY NOT ADDRESSING THE HOUSING
NEEDS OF THE EXILES WHO ARE NOW RETURNING, THE RWANDAN
DELEGATION CLAIMED THAT UNHCR WAS IGNORING THEIR BASIC
NEEDS.
13. MRS. OGATA STATED THAT THE UNHCR MAKES NO DISTINCTION
BETWEEN LONG-TERM AND RECENT REFUGEES IN THE REPATRIATION
PROCESS. REPATRIATION CURRENTLY APPEARS UNORGANIZED,
STATED OGATA, BECAUSE UNHCR IS NOT CONDUCTING ORGANIZED
REPATRIATION; IT IS MERELY SUPPORTING SPONTANEOUS
REPATRIATION. UNHCR CANNOT IN GOOD CONSCIENCE SUPPORT
LARGE SCALE ORGANIZED REPATRIATION AT THIS TIME DUE TO
ONGOING UNCERTAINTY REGARDING HOUSING, LAND TENURE ISSUES,
LONG-TIME REFUGEES CAN BE TAKEN ON A TEMPORARY BASIS UNTIL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP i
OONriDCNTIAL
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MORE PERMANENT HOUSING CAN BE LOCATED. OGATA REPORTED
THAT THE WORLD BANK HAS IDENTIFIED SHELTER AS THEIR
POTENTIAL AREA OF INTERVENTION AND THUS MAY BE WILLING TO
ASSIST WITH LONG TERM HOUSING NEEDS.
14. COMMENT. WHILE THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT CLAIMS THAT THE
EXILE RETURNEES ARE WELL AWARE THAT THEY CAN ONLY
TEMPORARILY OCCUPY HOUSES VACATED BY RECENT RETURNEES, MANY
OF THOSE IN EXILE FOR DECADES HAVE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED THEIR
FORMER HOMESTEADS AND WILL BE DIFFICULT TO DISPLACE IF
THERE IS A MASS RETURN OF RECENT REFUGEES. LAND TENURE
WILL LIKELY BE ONE OF THE MOST SENSITIVE ISSUES TO BE
ADDRESSED IN THE REHABILITATION PHASE. END COMMENT.
REFUGEE CAMP MANAGEMENT AND WAY STATIONS
15. MRS. OGATA STATED THAT THERE HAS BEEN MAJOR
IMPROVEMENTS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF REFUGEE CAMPS IN GOMA AND
THAT COORDINATION AMONG THE ESTIMATED 50 OPERATIONAL NGOS
HAS IMPROVED. UNHCR IS NOW IN THE PROCESS OF CONDUCTING A
REFUGEE REGISTRATION IN GOMA (USING THE SAME COMPUTER
TECHNIQUES SUCCESSFULLY UTILIZED IN NGARA) WHICH SHOULD
YIELD ACCURATE NUMBERS AND IMPROVE RELIEF DISTRIBUTION
PROCESSES. THERE REMAINS A NEED TO BREAK THE CAMPS DOWN
INTO SMALLER SITES.
16. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM OAKLEY, UNHCR'S DEPUTY
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR RWANDA STATED THAT THE WAY
STATIONS, ESTABLISHED IN THE NORTHWEST TO PROVIDE FOOD,
MEDICAL AND OTHER RELIEF ASSISTANCE TO RETURNEES REMAIN A
POSITIVE, VISIBLE SIGN OF INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE AND WILL
SERVE A CRITICAL ROLE IN THE CONTEXT OF A MASS REPATRIATION
(WHICH HAS YET TO HAPPEN).
FUNDING
17. MRS. OGATA STATED THAT UNHCR HAD ASKED FOR $258.2
MILLION FOR THE RWANDAN CRISIS AND AS OF AUGUST 31 HAD
RECEIVED PLEDGES OF $191.1 MILLION.
REGIONAL CONFERENCE
18. OAU SYG SALIM SALIM STATED THAT A DECISION HAD BEEN
MADE AT THE RECENT OAU SUMMIT IN TUNIS THAT A REGIONAL
THAT THE CONFERENCE WOULD REQUIRE EXTENSIVE PREPARATIONS.
SHE INDICATED THAT HER OFFICE IS COMMITTED TO
PARTICIPATING IN THOSE PREPARATIONS.
19. THE AMBASSADOR OF BURUNDI STATED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT
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WAS WILLING TO CONTRIBUTE FULLY TO THE SUCCESS OF THE
CONFERENCE. HE INDICATED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD LIKE TO
HOLD TWO
MEETINGS: A PREPARATORY SCIENTIFIC MEETING OF
EXPERTS FOLLOWED BY A HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL MEETING. THE
PURPOSE OF THE FIRST MEETING WOULD BE TO PROVIDE AN
ANALYTICAL/FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE POLITICAL DECISIONS THAT
WOULD NEED TO BE MADE IN THE SECOND MEETING.
20. BOTH THE DPM OF ZAIRE AND THE RWANDAN MFA DID NOT
SUPPORT THE IDEA OF TWO CONFERENCES. THEY AGREED THAT A
HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL MEETING OR SUMMIT WAS REQUIRED. THEY
ALSO AGREED THAT THE CONFERENCE SHOULD FOCUS NOT ONLY ON
THE CURRENT REFUGEE PROBLEM BUT ALSO ON THE UNDERLYING
CAUSES OF REFUGEE MOVEMENTS, PEACE AND SECURITY ISSUES, AND
SOLUTIONS TO CURRENT PROBLEMS FACING THE REGION. THE
TUNISIANS AGREED THAT THE CONFERENCE SHOULD ADDRESS THE
ROOT CAUSES OF REFUGEE FLOWS, INCLUDING ETHNICITY, AND THAT
CRISIS PREVENTION SHOULD BE A MAJOR THEME.
21. AS OAKLEY STATED THAT SPECIFICITY NEEDED TO BE BUILT
INTO THE CONFERENCE WITH A FOCUS ON: (1) IMMEDIATE-TERM
ACTIONS IN THE AREAS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE, PEACEKEEPING, REHABILITATION AND RECOVERY; (2)
DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITIES; (3) MARSHALLING OF RESOURCES;
AND (4) WAYS IN WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY CAN DO A
BETTER JOB IN BOTH PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO REFUGEE
SITUATIONS IN THE FUTURE. THE EU AGREED THAT THE
CONFERENCE SHOULD BE STRUCTURED TO QUICKLY ACHIEVE TANGIBLE
RESULTS.
22. SYG SALIM SALIM CONCLUDED THAT THE CONFERENCE SHOULD
TAKE A GLOBAL AS WELL AS PRACTICAL APPROACH. HE STATED
THAT A PREPARATORY COMMITTEE NEEDED TO BE ESTABLISHED
IMMEDIATELY TO INCLUDE THE OAU, UNHCR, UN, RWANDA, BURUNDI,
ZAIRE, TANZANIA, UGANDA, ZAMBIA, KENYA, THE GREAT LAKE
ASSOCIATION, US, GERMANY, FRANCE, BELGIUM, NETHERLANDS,
TUNISIA, GREECE, DENMARK, AND SWEDEN. THE UNHCR AND THE
OAU WILL SERVE AS COORDINATORS OF THE CONFERENCE. THE
PREPARATORY COMMITTEE WILL CONVENE WITHIN THE NEXT COUPLE
OF WEEKS TO DECIDE THE SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE
CONFERENCE, THE LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION, ETC.
IMMEDIATE ACTIONS
- SEPARATE MILITIA FROM CIVILIAN POPULATIONS IN REFUGEE
CAMPS. ENCAMP MILITIA FURTHER FROM BORDER.
- DISARM MILITIA.
- DEPLOY UNAMIR TROOPS TO RWANDA'S BORDER WITH ZAIRE,
BURUNDI, AND TANZANIA, TO ENSURE SECURITY AND ENCOURAGE
REFUGEES TO RETURN.
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- ESTABLISH SECURITY CORRIDORS FOR THE SAFE RETURN OF
REFUGEES. ASSESS WAYS OF USING WAY STATIONS AS PART OF
SECURITY CORRIDORS.
- IDENTIFY LANDS WITHIN RWANDA FOR TEMPORARY PLACEMENT OF
RETURNED REFUGEES (BOTH EXILES AND RECENT) FOR THOSE
RETURNED REFUGEES WHO HAVE LOST THEIR LAND AND HOMES UNTIL
LONG-TERM SITES CAN BE FOUND.
- DEPLOY HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS AS WIDELY AS POSSIBLE.
- ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL.
- IDENTIFY AND NEUTRALIZE HATE RADIO.
- SIGN TRIPARTITE COMMISSION AGREEMENT (UNHCR, RWANDA,
AND NEIGHBORING COUNTRY) AND ESTABLISH JOINT COMMISSION
(OAU, UNHCR, COUNTRIES IN REGION AND COUNTRIES THAT WERE
OBSERVERS AT THE ARUSHA CONFERENCE) TO ESTABLISH CONDITIONS
IN RWANDA NECESSARY FOR REPATRIATION.
/
- FOLLOW-UP ON NEEDS IDENTIFIED IN BY SRSG KHAN'S RWANDA
EMERGENCY NORMALIZATION PLAN FOR IMMEDIATE, SHORT AND
MEDIUM TERM REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION.
- CONVENE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE MEETING FOR HIGH-LEVEL
REGIONAL CONFERENCE.
OUTSTANDING ISSUES
24. THE FOLLOWING OUTSTANDING ISSUE WAS BY THE US
DELEGATION:
- THE NEED TO DESIGNATE SOMEONE, LIKE SRSG KHAN, TO TAKE
CHARGE OF COORDINATING HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS ON THE GROUND.
25. KIGALI AND BUJUMBURA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. HICKS
BT
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Rwanda/Burundi SVTS Agenda
September 14 at 1100 hours
CIA Report
Review Status of Ad Hoc Taskings
Security Issue
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DECLASSIFIED
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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Rwanda Criflin;
Security and Hexh Steps
SUMMARY
There i s no single i n i t i a t i v e or quick f i x for securing the
refugee camps and dealing with the ex-FAR and m i l i t i a s . The
available options for attempting to forcefully disarm the
ex-FAR and neutralize the m i l i t i a s are not l i k e l y to be
successful in the current situation. Instead, we must whittle
away at the problem by a series of coordinated steps in the
security, p o l i t i c a l , r e l i e f , and economic realms. Above a l l ,
we need to focus on mitigating the problem, through moving the
bad elements away from the innocents, reorganizing and breaking
down the camps into more manageable sub-units, integrating some
elements of the ex-FAR into the new Rwandan security apparatus,
the c i v i l i a n refugee,population, or c i v i l i a n economy, and
improving conditions inside-Rwanda to encourage gradual
repatriation of the refugee population. These incremental
i n i t i a t i v e s may help bring the situation under control and
reduce the overall size of the task. The international
community might then, i f necessary, take a more forceful
approach to deal with any remaining elements that pose a
serious security threat. This multi-layered strategy i s
outlined below.
Security:
Relocation and Demobilization
The international community should a s s i s t the GOZ and GOT
in moving ex-IGOR leaders and ex-FAR (voluntarily) out of the
camps and away from the border. Once moved, these elements
should not be permitted to s o l i d i f y into an organized group
bent on invading Rwanda. Additionally, r.we should continue
efforts to establish a war crimes tribunal as soon as possible,
so the genocidal leadership in e x i l e can be plucked from the
group that has been relocated (or from the regular refugee
camps, i f some remain there). F i n a l l y , we should also press
the GOZ and GOR to agree to destroy the arms that have been
confiscated and, in the meantime, we should seek to ensure that
the weapons are safeguarded.
The Belgian View:
The Belgians agree that the ex-FAR and IGOR should be
relocated away from the main body of refugees, although
Brussels i s dubious of the Zairian proposal to move the group
north to the Ugandan border. The Belgians suggest that the
issue of relocation and security can best be addressed by
expanding UNAMIR's mandate and Area of Responsibility ( l i k e l y
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
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-2under Chapter V I I ) .
in his debrief to the Security Council,
General D a l l a i r e also argued for a robust UNAMIR move into the
camps in force. The Ghanaians (expressing l i k e l y concerns of
other troop contributing nations) evinced l i t t l e enthusiasm for
a Chapter VII expansion into Zaire.
The French View:
The French are less exercised over the ex-FAR than the US
and Belgium. The French told us that most of the ex-FAR's
personal arms have been confiscated, and Paris believes that
the international "community should focus on the issue of
"progressive demobilization" of the troops, integration into
the main body of refugees, and ultimate repatriation and
reintegration into a new Rwandan national army. According to
Zairian J u s t i c e Minister Kamanda wa Kamanda, however, the
French have offered the Zairians unspecified "technical
assistance" in moving the ex-FAR. We have asked Embassy Paris
to confirm whether the French are indeed prepared to a s s i s t the
Zairians, and in what manner.
The Khan Mission:
We understand that SYGSR Khan w i l l recommend to the SYG
that an experts committee travel to Zaire on Monday to begin a
.two week mission to survey s i t e s for relocating the ex-FAR plus
dependents (approximately 90,000 to 100,000 persons).
The
committee would include l o g i s t i c i a n s , transport experts, UNDP
and UNHCR reps, and possibly the Deputy Commander of UNAMIR.
The committee would then present i t s report to the UN Security
Council. Khan believes that moving the ex-FAR and dependents
requires an extension of UNAMIR's mandate, l i k e l y under Chapter
VII.
The SYG§R believes the UN should complete this operation
by the end of the year, and that both Kengo and Mobutu support
the concept.
Security:
Camp Administration
and the FAZ
Factor
The Government of Zaire has f a i l e d woefully to f u l f i l l i t s
responsibility to ensure security in the camps. In many
instances, the Zairian Army (FAZ) has been part of the problem
in Goma and Bukavu (attacks on refugees, shakedowns, e t c . ) .
The, Tanzanians have been more successful but the scope of the
problem c l e a r l y exceeds the GOT's a b i l i t y to respond. To the
extent possible, the international community should a s s i s t GOT
and GOZ military/police to improve s e c u r i t y in the camps. This
might involve technical assistance to the GOT and GOZ to
upgrade the professionalism of the host country
military/police. In Zaire's case at l e a s t , this i s c l e a r l y a
long term solution.
• CQMFIDENT4AJL-
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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In the short term, we should press UNHCR to implement i t s
plan to break the camps up into smaller, more manageable
sub-camps to f a c i l i t a t e control and administration. We
understand that UNHCR plans to use some of the equipment
donated by the US military, and that OFDA has agreed to finance
additional equipment and engineering personnel. OFDA advises
that the engineers are on s i t e in Goma, and are ready to begin
preparation of the sub-camps.
An additional option might be to request the US military to
provide engineering personnel and equipment to a s s i s t UNHCR
with s i t e preparation.
A P o l i t i c a l Strategy:
Demobilization and After
The US and i t s partners need to pursue demobilization and
integration of the ex-FAR into the new Rwandan army or other
employment. We should provide (or fund) occupational training
to the relocated ex-FAR, and as appropriate, ex-RPF for
demobilization and integration into the Rwandan economy. At
the same time, we should press the GOR to accelerate and expand
i t s program of integrating elements of the ex-FAR into the new
GOR army. As a model, we should build on the example of
UNAMIR's voluntary disarmament program in the former safe zone
by encouraging the GOR to offer similar incentives (gendarme or
other jobs) to ex-FAR outside the country. We must keep up the
pressure on the GOR to encourage repatriation through
broadening i t s p o l i t i c a l base and ending human rights abuses.
We must press for f u l l deployment of UNAMIR and human rights
monitors.
Similarly, we must work with the donor community and I F I ' s
to help get the GOR up and running so that i t can afford to
integrate or offer other carrots to the,ex-FAR. To t h i s end,
we should press forward with the notion-of a "Friends of
Rwanda" group, composed of countries with a clear interest in
the region (US, France, Belgium, UK, Germany, and possibly
Japan given i t s proposed deployment to the region).
Peeling the Onion:
Summary of Next Steps
We should be supportive of the Khan mission's
recommendations to send an experts' committee to Zaire to
assess s i t e s , study l o g i s t i c s , and examine the cost of
relocating and setting up new camps.
CONFIDENTIAL.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
3
�-4We should try to influence the committee's report so that the
relocation s i t e ( s ) selected is/are away from the border and
other refugees but not deep in the interior. Too far of a
move might make reintegration of ex-FAR elements back into
Rwanda more d i f f i c u l t and would increase costs and present
greater l o g i s t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s
Once the requirements are known, we should be prepared to
contribute non-DoD resources (financial, l o g i s t i c a l ,
transport) to a s s i s t the UN effort move the ex-FAR
At the same time, we should press the UN (either Khan, Dillon
or SYGSR to Zaire Brahimi) to engage the ex-FAR leadership to
determine i f the troops would relocate voluntarily. The UN
mission would also emphasize the steps the international
community i s taking to press the new authorities in Kigali to
press forward with a serious plan for
repatriatioh/reintegiration.
Assuming the ex-FAR agrees to a voluntary move, we should
seriously consider extending UNAMIR's mandate and AOR to cover
the refugee camps. This would involve blue berets in the
voluntary relocation e f f o r t , but would also involve an
expanded UNAMIR in an active role to assure security in the
camps. With the addition of the Indian battalion, UNAMIR now
has troop commitments well i n excess of i t s 5500 c e i l i n g ; the
"excess" could be deployed in the camps.
I f the ex-FAR does not agree to relocate, we should explore
immediately with other UNSC members the v i a b i l i t y of Khan's
recommendation that a Chapter VII UN operation undertake the
task.
We should use the "Friends of Rwanda" framework to examine
incentives (primarily f i n a n c i a l ) which the international
community could offer the ex-FAR to disarm, don c i v i l i a n
clothing, and relocate voluntarily.
At the same time, we should continue to look for countries
w i l l i n g to provide or a s s i s t the GOZ/GOT in providing security
on a b i l a t e r a l basis.
We might also pursue the option of a regional security effort
(the immediate neighbors/the Great Lakes States organization),
with OAU/UN blessing, which would provide security in the
camps and might even escort volunteer refugees back and
provide temporary security in Rwanda. This latter aspect (an
idea floated by Tanzania) faces obvious problems (e.g., the
need for GOR agreement, the need for donor financing) and
assumes that, absent intimidation in the camps, a large
numbers of refugees would be willing to return to Rwanda,
which i s a doubtful assumption at this time.
CONF I DENT m-
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OONriDCNTIAk
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: BEERS, CLARKER, DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, SCHWARTZ, STEINBERG, VAX
PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: CONriDCNTIAL •
DTG: 160411Z SEP 94
FM: AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4126
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 0120
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE 3197
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE 3892
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE 0164
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 7560
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0104
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE 0001
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T l A b SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 006977
GENEVA FOR RMA
KIGALI FOR DAS BUSHNELL
E.O. 12356:DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UN, MARR, RW, CG, TZ, UNAMIR, PREF, OAU, ET
SUBJECT: OAU THOUGHTS ON SECURITY IN THE RWANDAN
REFUGEE CAMPS
REF: STATE 245725
1. OONriDCNTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
SUMMARY
2. OAU SECRETARY GENERAL SALIM SALIM TOLD AF/DAS
BUSHNELL HE BELIEVES ZAIRE AND TANZANIA SHOULD BE GIVEN
THE OPPORTUNITY (AND ASSISTANCE) TO DISARM AND RELOCATE
EX-FAR, AND CIVILIAN FORMER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND THE
MILITIA. SALIM BELIEVES THIRD COUNTRY FORCES MIGHT THEN
BE NEEDED TO MAINTAIN SECURITY IN THE CAMPS,
PARTICULARLY IN ZAIRE. SALIM IS ENGAGED ON BURUNDI AND
WILL VISIT BUJUMBURA FOLLOWING HIS VISIT TO NEW YORK
LATER THIS MONTH, OR SOONER IF EVENTS REQUIRE.
GONFIDENTIAL'
DECLASSIFIED
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�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
•OONFIDENTIAL
END SUMMARY.
ZAIRE AND TANZANIA SHOULD PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN SECURITY
3. OAU SECRETARY GENERAL SALIM SALIM MET WITH VISITING
AF/DAS PRUDENCE BUSHNELL ON 15 SEPTEMBER TO DISCUSS
SECURITY IN THE RWANDAN REFUGEE CAMPS AND DEVELOPMENTS
IN BURUNDI. BUSHNELL WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AF/RA SCOTT
FISHER AND ADDIS P/E CHIEF. BUSHNELL REVIEWED THE SIX
OPTIONS (LISTED REFTEL) AND ASKED SALIM FOR HIS VIEWS ON
THE MOST EFFECTIVE MECHANISM TO ENSURE SECURITY FOR THE
CAMPS IN ZAIRE AND TANZANIA. SALIM INITIALLY SAID HE
FAVORED AN EXPANSION OF UNAMIR, BUT ADDED THAT ZAIRE
WOULD LIKELY RESIST THIS OPTION. HE REJECTED THE NOTION
OF CONTRACT SECURITY. SALIM BELIEVES THE TANZANIAN
GOVERNMENT IS CAPABLE OF PROVIDING ADEQUATE SECURITY FOR
THE CAMPS WITHIN ITS TERRITORY, PROVIDING TANZANIA IS
GIVEN ADEQUATE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE TASK. THE
ISSUE IS SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT WITH ZAIRE, SALIM NOTED. HE
RECOUNTED A RECENT CONVERSATION WITH ZAIRE'S DEPUTY
PRIME MINISTER, KAMANDA WA KAMANDA, IN WHICH SALIM WAS
ASSURED THAT ZAIRE'S ARMY IS CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING
SECURITY IN THE CAMPS. SALIM THOUGHT KAMANDA SINCERE IN
HIS OFFER, BUT DOUBTED THAT ANYONE IN ZAIRE HAS
SUFFICIENT CONTROL OVER THE ARMY TO MAINTAIN CAMP
SECURITY OVER AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME. SALIM SAID IT
IS POSSIBLE THE FAZ MIGHT BE ABLE TO DISARM AND HELP
RELOCATE THE EX-FAR AND MILITIA, BUT THAT THIRD COUNTRY
FORCES WOULD LIKELY BE REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN SECURITY
AFTER THE INITIAL PHASE.
SENEGAL, MAURITIUS AND TUNISIA MIGHT BE APPROACHED
4. ASKED WHICH COUNTRIES MIGHT BE CALLED ON FOR THIS
LATTER TASK, SALIM MENTIONED SENEGAL, MAURITIUS, AND
TUNISIA AS FRANCOPHONE STATES WHICH MIGHT BE BOTH
WILLING AND ACCEPTABLE TO MOBUTU. SALIM HIGHLIGHTED THE
PROFESSIONAL AND IMPARTIAL ROLE PLAYED BY THE SENEGALESE
FORCES IN RWANDA. THE OAU SECRETARY GENERAL ADVISED
AGAINST USING TROOPS FROM THE GAMBIA OR THE CAR, CITING
MOBUTU'S LIKELY SENSITIVITY ABOUT RECEIVING HELP FROM
'THESE SMALL NEIGHBORING STATES." SALIM ALSO NOTED
THAT, WHILE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT TANZANIA COULD, WITH
ADEQUATE SUPPORT, PERFORM BOTH FORCE SEPARATION AND
POLICING, IT WOULD PROBABLY BE NECESSARY TO SUGGEST A
THIRD COUNTRY PRESENCE IN TANZANIA AS WELL TO AVOID
OFFENDING MOBUTU.
SALIM AND OAU STILL ENGAGED ON BURUNDI
CONriDCNTIAL
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP
OONriDCNTIAfc
5. TURNING TO BURUNDI, SALIM ASSURED BUSHNELL THAT HE
AND THE OAU REMAIN DEEPLY ENGAGED. SALIM PLANS TO VISIT
BUJUMBURA LATER THIS MONTH, FOLLOWING A TRIP TO NEW
YORK. SALIM
PLEDGED TO TRAVEL TO BURUNDI EARLIER IF
THERE IS A PRESIDENTIAL SWEARING-IN OR OTHER SIGNIFICANT
DEVELOPMENTS. SALIM REMAINS HOPEFUL THAT A PEACEFUL
O O N r i D C N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 006977
GENEVA FOR RMA
KIGALI FOR DAS BUSHNELL
E.O. 12356:DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UN, MARR, RW, CG, TZ, UNAMIR, PREF, OAU, ET
SUBJECT: OAU THOUGHTS ON SECURITY IN THE RWANDAN
REFUGEE CAMPS
SOLUTION TO BURUNDI IS STILL POSSIBLE BUT THAT "THE
CAPACITY FOR NUISANCE" IS STILL REMARKABLE ON BOTH
SIDES. HE BELIEVES THE MAINSTREAM OF HUTUS AND TUTSIS
STILL WANT AN AGREEMENT. SALIM CONFIRMED THE IMMINENT
DISPATCH OF TEN ADDITIONAL (GUINEAN) OAU MILITARY
OBSERVERS TO BURUNDI.
6. DAS BUSHNELL DID NOT CLEAR THIS MESSAGE PRIOR TO
DEPARTURE FROM ADDIS.
7. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
WALKER
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THE P E I E T HAS S E '
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EN
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 20, 1994
Attached i s a memo frdin Tony Lake seeking
your approval t o withdraw t h e 674 remaining
U.S. m i l i t a r y personnel from.:the Rwanda
C r i s i s Area by September 30. Three o f t h e
four s p e c i f i c UNHCR missions which were being
supported by t h e U.S. m i l i t a r y centered i n
Goma have been completed and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
f o r ongoing management has been t r a n s f e r r e d
t o UNHCR and NGO r e l i e f e f f o r t s . The
remaining mission — airhead management i n
Entebbe and K i g a l i — w i l l be completed and
t r a n s f e r r e d t o UNHCR by September 28. The
U.S. w i l l continue t o supply a i r l i f t support
on a case by case basis. State/AID have no
o b j e c t i o n t o h i s withdrawal schedule.
] Approve
] Discuss
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•CONr-IDCUTIftL
OAACZYUW RUCNDTA4 003 2 6617 2 6-CCCC--RUEADWW.
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
.0 231726Z SEP 94
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUCNDT
231726Z SEP 94
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9186
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 5856
////
PDD 25 USUN IMPLEMENTATION 130 DAYS LATER
C 0 N F I D D N T I A h SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 004003
DEPARTMENT FOR IO/PHO
JOINT STAFF FOR J-5 (JASON BARLOW)
WHITE HOUSE ALSO FOR SUSAN RICE
E.0.12356:DCL:12/31/95
TAGS: UNSC, PREL, MARR, PINS, PREF, EAID,
SUBJECT: PDD 25 USUN IMPLEMENTATION 130 DAYS LATER
REF: 118190
1.
-CONIrlDENTIAL". ENTIRE TEXT
2. SUMMARY: WITH THE OPENING OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
WHERE PEACEKEEPING REFORM ISSUES WILL BE A KEY USG
PRIORITY, USUN HAS PREPARED AN INITIAL STATUS REPORT ON
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE
(PDD) 25 "US POLICY ON REFORMING MULTILATERAL
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS", SIGNED BY THE PRESIDENT MAY
3. IMPORTANT STEPS, AND SOME NOTABLE PROGRESS, HAVE
OCCURED, INCLUDING: ADOPTION OF PDD FACTORS TO GUIDE
APPROVAL OF PEACEKEEPING (PKO) MANDATES; IMPROVED
COORDINATION BETWEEN HUMANITARIAN AND PEACEKEEPING
HEADQUARTERS AND FIELD OPERATIONS; LAUNCHING OF THE
CAMPAIGN TO REDUCE OUR PKO DUES TO 25
; ESTABLISHMENT OF
AN INDEPENDENT OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES
(INSPECTOR GENERAL FUNCTION); AND A MAJOR DEFENSE
INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY (DISA) STUDY ON UN
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION NEEDS HAS BEEN CONCLUDED
THAT WILL HELP ADDRESS THE PEACEKEEPING INFRASTRUCTURE
COMMITMENTS IN THE PDD.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
s/iyis K H
B
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3. WHILE WORK CONTINUES ON RESTRUCTURING THE DEPARTMENT
OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (DPKO), WHICH WILL BENEFIT
FROM THE DISA STUDY, PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN ASSISTING
DPKO CAPACITY-BUILDING IN SUCH AREAS AS: CORE STAFFING;
PKO TRAINING; CIVILIAN POLICE; PKO COORDINATION WITH
DHA;COST CONTAINMENT AND CONTROL; AND . LOGISTICS SUPPORT
AND READINESS. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES MISSION'S INITIAL
REVIEW OF PDD IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITY, OTHER REPORTS
WILL FOLLOW PERIODICALLY. END SUMMARY.
4. INTRODUCTION
WITH THE SIGNING OF THE PDD 25 ON PEACEKEEPING MAY 3 THE
UNITED STATES ESTABLISHED A COHERENT FRAMEWORK FOR US
ACTIONS TO PROMOTE STRENGTHENED UN CAPACITY TO MANAGE
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND TO CLARIFY AND IMPROVE US
PARTICIPATION. SECTIONS I - IV OF THE PDD RELATE, IN
LARGE PART, TO THE UN SPHERE, BOTH SECURITY COUNCIL AND
SECRETARIAT. SECTIONS V - V I I INVOLVE US COMMAND (C2),
INTER-AGENCY, AND CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS, AND
PUBLIC AFFAIRS. WHILE LARGELY WASHINGTON ISSUES, USUN
HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN ASPECTS OF THE LATTER, SUCH AS THE
PEACEKEEPER PROTECTION ISSUE. SINCE EARLY MAY, THE
MISSION HAS UNDERTAKEN A COMPREHENSIVE EFFORT TO
IMPLEMENT THE PDD PROPOSALS IN THOSE AREAS (CHIEFLY I IV) WHERE USUN PLAYS A LEAD OR SIGNIFICANT SUPPORTING
ROLE.
5. SUPPORTING THE RIGHT OPERATIONS (PDD SECTION I AND
ANNEX I )
ON MAY 3 THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADOPTED A PRESIDENTIAL
STATEMENT ON PEACEKEEPING INCORPORATING THE "FACTORS TO
BE CONSIDERED IN VOTING ON UN PEACE OPERATIONS
RESOLUTIONS" FOUND IN ANNEX I OF THE PDD. MANY OF THESE
HAD ALREADY BEGUN TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT PART IN COUNCIL
DELIBERATIONS. NEVERTHELESS THE EXERCISE ATTACHED MORE
WEIGHT TO SOME - SUCH AS AVAILABLE MEANS, AND ESTIMATED
TIME FRAME - AND THE WHOLE COMPOSITE HAS NEW WEIGHT AS A
RESULT OF HAVING BEEN CODIFIED. THIS HAS RESULTED IN
MORE RIGOROUS CONSIDERATION OF PKO PROPOSALS, AS SEEN IN
THE CASES OF RWANDA, A PROPOSED "PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT"
IN ZAIRE, GEORGIA, AND THE PROPOSED NEW MISSION IN
ANGOLA.
6. STRENGTHENING THE UN - - DPKO REORGANIZATION AND
EXPANSION (PDD SECTION IX)
ONE GOAL OF THE PDD IS TO ASSIST THE UN TO IMPROVE
SIGNIFICANTLY ITS CAPABILITY TO MANAGE PEACE OPERATIONS
EFFECTIVELY AND AS AN INTEGRATED WHOLE. OVER THE PAST
SEVERAL MONTHS THE UN HAS TAKEN SEVERAL STEPS TO
ACCOMPLISH THIS. FIRST, THE DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS (DPKO), HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY EXPANDED AND
REORGANIZED TO BETTER INTEGRATE MOST MAJOR COMPONENTS OF
PEACEKEEPING PLANNING AND
MANAGEMENT. A POLICY AND
ANALYSIS UNIT HAS BEEN CREATED IN THE USYG'S OFFICE, AND
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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TWO LARGE FUNCTIONAL OFFICES, FOR PLANNING AND SUPPORT,
AND FOR OPERATIONS, HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED. THE FIRST
COMPRISES MISSION PLANNING, DE-MINING, TRAINING, AND
CIVILIAN POLICE, FIELD ADMINISTRATION, LOGISTICS,
COMMUNICATION, PERSONNEL AND FINANCE. IN ADDITION TO
THE REGIONAL OFFICES FOR EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA, ASIA
AND THE MIDDLE EAST, AND AFRICA, THE OPERATIONS OFFICE.
- € O N F I D D M T T f l I i SECTION 02 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 004003
DEPARTMENT FOR IO/PHO
JOINT STAFF FOR J-5 (JASON BARLOW)
WHITE HOUSE ALSO FOR SUSAN RICE
E.0.12356:DCL:12/31/95
TAGS: UNSC, PREL, MARR, PINS, PREF, EAID,
SUBJECT: PDD 25 USUN IMPLEMENTATION 130 DAYS LATER
ALSO N W INCLUDES AN ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE DIVISION.
O
7. TO HELP THE UN BUILD UP CRITICAL K O - O AT
NWHW
HEADQUARTERS THE US HAS LOANED MILITARY PERSONNEL TO
FILL GAPS IN MISSION PLANNING AND ELSEWHERE.
IMPORTANTLY, ALL MILITARY SECONDMENTS HAVE N W BEEN
O
STABILIZED AS LONGER TERM ASSIGNMENTS. ON THE CIVILIAN
SIDE, THIS WEEK AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH MET WITH ASSISTANT
SECRETARY GENERAL RIZA TO DISCUSS LONGTERM SECONDMENTS
OF US STATE DEPARTMENT, USIA AND OTHER EXPERTS TO THE
OFFICE OF PLANNING AND SUPPORT. UN NEEDS ARE BEING
IDENTIFIED FOR WHICH USG SECONDMENTS WOULD BE USEFUL,
INCLUDING IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, FIELD
ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS SUPPORT. IN PARALLEL WITH
THIS, THE INTER-AGENCY COMMUNITY IS DEVELOPING A LIST OF
CIVILIAN AND POSSIBLY ADDITIONAL MILITARY FUNCTIONS
WHICH MAY BE OFFERED TO THE UN.
8.
STRENGTHENING THE UN - - DISA STUDY (PDD SECTION IX)
ANOTHER GOAL OF THE PDD IS IMPROVING UN CAPACITY TO
DEPLOY PKOS FASTER AND DIRECT DAY-TO-DAY FIELD
OPERATIONS BETTER. LAST SPRING, DEFENSE SECRETARY PERRY
OFFERED TO USYG FOR PEACEKEEPING KOFI ANNAN AN
EXAMINATION OF DPKO'S CURRENT CAPABILITIES AND NEEDS.
THIS STUDY, CARRIED OUT BY THE DEFENSE INFORMATION
SYSTEMS AGENCY (DISA) WILL PRODUCE A REPORT SHORTLY THAT
ADDRESSES: DPKO'S ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE; PHYSICAL
REQUIREMENTS, AND DESIRABILITY OF A NEW "TURN-KEY
OPERATION"; H W TO ACHIEVE A MODERN C3 CAPACITY,
O
BUILDING ON THE EXISTING DPKO SITUATION ROOM; A COMPUTER
NETWORK LINKING DPKO WITH A SINGLE LOGISTICS OFFICE IN
EACH MEMBER STATE; WAYS TO ASSIST IN DESIGNING AND
DEVELOPING A DATA BASE OF PERSONNEL AVAILABLE FROM
MEMBER STATES FOR THE FULL RANGE OF PKO AND HUMANITARIAN
OPERATIONS, AND OTHER AREAS. BASED ON THE FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THIS REPORT, USUN INTENDS TO PROPOSE
THAT WE ENLIST THE SUPPORT OF SEVERAL DONOR COUNTRIES TO
HELP CARRY OUT THE MEASURES IDENTIFIED TO IMPROVE DPKO
CAPACITY.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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9. STRENGTHENING THE UN - - CAPACITY-BUILDING (PDD
SECTION IX)
CAPACITY-BUILDING EFFORTS IN OTHER AREAS INCLUDE: (A)
STANDBY CAPABILITIES INITIATIVE: A POSITIVE US RESPONSE
TO THE UN'S REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ABOUT SPECIFIC
CAPABILITIES W MAY OFFER FOR PKOS IS IMMINENT. IN THE
E
UN'S VIEW, OUR RESPONSE WILL HAVE MAJOR PRACTICAL AND
SYMBOLIC BENEFITS FOR THEIR MISSION PLANNING EFFORTS;
(B) TRAINING: D D IS CONSIDERING A PROPOSAL TO HELP
O
SUPPORT PKO TRAINING CORRESPONDENCE COURSES; MISSION IS
REVIEWING PROPOSALS BY THE STIMSON CENTER FOR UN
TRAINING COORDINATION WITH A VIEW TO POSSIBLE
INITIATIVES IN THE 4 9TH UNGA; (C) INTELLIGENCE: USG
INFORMATION SHARING N W INCLUDES A REGULAR F O OF
O
LW
SANITIZED INTELLIGENCE TO SUPPORT PKOS IN SOMALIA,
R A D AND THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. PROCEDURES ARE ALSO
WNA
IN PLACE FOR FAST RESPONSES TO AD HOC REQUESTS FOR
CONTINGENCY PLANNING INFORMATION FOR N W OPERATIONS,
E
TACTICAL MILITARY INFORMATION BEARING O THE SAFETY OF
N
PEACEKEEPERS IN SOMALIA AND BOSNIA, INFORMATION O THE
N
SIZE AND AREAS OF CONCENTRATION OF REFUGEE FLOWS, AND
OTHER CRITICAL NEEDS. RECENTLY THE US ALSO PASSED
SANITIZED VERSIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
ESTIMATES ON HUMANITARIAN CRISES AND POPULATION TO
INTERESTED UN PARTIES AND MEMBER STATES (THE FORMER JUST
IN TIME FOR THE CAIRO CONFERENCE); (D) CIVILIAN POLICE:
OVER THE S M E USUN LED A NEEDS ASSESSMENT EFFORT WITH
UMR
A GROUP OF MEMBER STATES AND A DRAFT REPORT CONTAINING
RECOMMENDATIONS WILL BE PRESENTED SHORTLY; (E) PUBLIC
AFFAIRS: GOALS INCLUDE A DEDICATED PUBLIC AFFAIRS
OFFICE
WITHIN DPKO, ASSURING STRONG PUBLIC AFFAIRS CAPABILITIES
AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF MOST PKO MISSIONS, AND PROMOTING
GUIDELINES FOR TRAINING DPKO OVERSEAS SPOKESMEN A G O P
RU
OF USG EXPERTS WILL D A NEEDS ASSESSMENT THIS MONTH,
O
AFTER WHICH THE MISSION WILL SEEK TO ELICIT THE SUPPORT
OF OTHER UN MEMBERS; (F) CIVILIAN RESERVE: AN EFFORT IS
N W UNDERWAY TO IDENTIFY POSSIBLE US SOURCES FOR SKILLED
O
PERSONNEL WILLING TO MAKE THEMSELVES AVAILABLE FOR
NON-MILITARY PKO O HUMANITARIAN ASSIGNMENTS; MISSION IS
R
ALSO SEEKING GUIDANCE FROM DPKO O THE TYPE OF CIVILIAN
N
RESERVE THAT WOULD BE USEFUL.
10. STRENGTHENING THE UN - EMERGENCY HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE (PDD SECTION IX)
- C O H r i D ' C N T I A f e
SECTION 03 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 004003
DEPARTMENT FOR IO/PHO
JOINT STAFF FOR J-5 (JASON BARLOW)
WHITE HOUSE ALSO FOR SUSAN RICE
E.0.12356:DCL:12/31/95
TAGS: UNSC, PREL, MARR, PINS, PREF, EAID,
SUBJECT: PDD 25 USUN IMPLEMENTATION 130 DAYS LATER
THE NEED FOR GREATER COORDINATION BETWEEN UN PKO AND
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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HUMANITARIAN RELIEF ORGANS AND ACTIVITIES WAS
HIGHLIGHTED IN JUNE BY AID ADMINISTRATOR ATWOOD'S SPEECH
TO THE HIGH LEVEL SESSION OF ECOSOC ON A "DIPLOMACY OF
CRISIS PREVENTION". TO PROMOTE IMPLEMENTATION OF A
NUMBER OF PDD PROPOSALS IN THIS AREA, NEWLY APPOINTED
USYG FOR HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS (DHA) PETER HANSEN IS
WORKING CLOSELY WITH USUN ON THE PANOPLY OF HUMANITARIAN
ISSUES. THIS HAS STIMULATED AN INTENSIFICATION OF
DPKO-DHA COORDINATION EFFORTS IN RECENT MONTHS: (A) THE
HUMANITARIAN LIAISON WORKING GROUP IS NOW FUNCTIONING AS
AN INFORMAL DONOR'S OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE, A RECENT USUN
INITIATIVE SHOULD STRENGTHEN THIS ROLE; (B) A
CRISIS-NEEDS TRACKING SYSTEM WAS DESIGNED WITH OFDA
ASSISTANCE AND THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS
(DHA) IS SEEKING JOINT US-JAPANESE FUNDING TO IMPLEMENT
I T ; (C) DHA AND THE DEPARTMENT ARE WORKING JOINTLY ON
PLANS FOR RECRUITMENT OF USG EMPLOYEES TO MEET BOTH
SURGE AND LONG-TERM HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS;
(D) USYG HANSEN, WITH MISSION SUPPORT, IS VIGOROUSLY
PURSUING IMPROVED HEADQUARTERS AND FIE,D COORDINATION
WITH SOME EARLY SUCCESS, INCLUDING IN RWANDA-BURUNDI.
HOWEVER, AGENCY RESISTANCE CONTINUES IN THE FIELD.
PARTLY TO ADDRESS THIS PROBLEM IN THE CASE OF
RWANDA-BURUNDI, THE SYG APPOINTED A HUMANITARIAN ENVOY
(FORMER US AMBASSADOR DILLON) TO OVERSEE AND TIGHTEN UN
AGENCY, NGO AND DONOR COOPERATION, ANTICIPATE FUTURE
PROBLEMS AND DEVISE A REGIONAL APPROACH.
11. REDUCING UN COSTS: FINANCE, BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
REFORMS (PDD SECTION IX AND ANNEX I I I )
IN JULY, EFFORTS TO PERSUADE MEMBER STATES OF THE
NECESSITY FOR BETTER UN FISCAL AND MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT
PAID OFF WITH THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S ESTABLISHMENT OF AN
OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES AND THE SYG'S
SUBSEQUENT APPOINTMENT OF A WELL QUALIFIED GERMAN
NATIONAL, KARL THEODOR PASCHKE, TO THE POST.
APPOINTMENT OF PASCHKE, A UN SYSTEM OUTSIDER, IS A
VICTORY FOR THE PDD'S INJUNCTION THAT A SERIOUS,
INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATIVE INSTRUMENT SHOULD BE PUT IN
PLACE. THE NEXT STEP WILL BE TO MONITOR CLOSELY THE
OFFICE'S IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS AND THE RESOURCES
ALLOCATED TO THE POST.
12. A MAJOR EFFORT IS ALSO UNDERWAY TO SEEK THE
INGREDIENTS OF A POLITICAL FOUNDATION FOR REDUCING OUR
PKO DUES FROM 31.7
TO 25
. LAST SPRING THE SYG
DISPATCHED A DELEGATION TO URGE WEALTHIER DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES TO PAY PKO DUES MORE CONSISTENT WITH THEIR
CAPACITY TO PAY. ONLY CYPRUS HAS RESPONDED POSITIVELY.
THE SYG ALSO CONVENED A "GROUP OF FRIENDS" (F-16) TO
LOOK INTO THE ISSUE AND RELATED MATTERS. ITS REPORT
SUGGESTED WELCOME CORRECTIONS IN ASSESSMENT RATES BUT
DID NOT PROPOSE LOWERING US DUES TO 25
. . OUR G-7
PARTNERS ARE SYMPATHETIC BUT, EXCEPT FOR JAPAN,
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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RELUCTANT TO ABSORB THE RESULTING INCREASE TO THEM.
SUCCESS WILL REQUIRE STRONG PRESSURE IN CAPITALS IN
ORDER TO GAIN THE NECESSARY UNGA MAJORITY. A STRATEGY
TOWARD THAT END IS UNDER DEVELOPMENT IN WASHINGTON. IN
THE MEANTIME MISSION WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE THE CASE THAT
31.7
IS TOO HIGH FOR THE HEALTH OF THE UN OR FAIRNESS
TO THE US TAXPAYER.
13. TO ADDRESS THE UN'S INEFFICIENCIES IN PEACEKEEPING
AND RELATED AREAS, THE USG SENT A COST-CONTAINMENT TEAM
TO NEW YORK WHICH HAS ALREADY PROPOSED SEVERAL
COST-SAVING POLICY CHANGES AND IS CONSULTING WITH UN
OFFICIALS ON IMPLEMENTATION. THE US HAS ALSO BEEN
RECRUITING USG EXPERTS TO REVIEW UN FIELD OPERATIONS AND
MAKE FURTHER PROPOSALS. ADDITIONALLY, A PROCUREMENT
STUDY HAS BEEN COMPLETED BY A FORMER OMB OFFICIAL WITH
EXTENSIVE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PROCUREMENT EXPERIENCE
AND HAS RESULTED IN SEVERAL PROPOSED CHANGES IN THIS
AREA AS WELL. FINALLY, THE US IS HELPING THE UN
STREAMLINE THE PKO BUDGET PREPARATION PROCESS.
14.
PROTECTION OF PEACEKEEPERS
(PDD SECTION IX)
ON PEACEKEEPER PROTECTIONS, THE USUN LEGAL DEPARTMENT
HAS ENGAGED IN NEGOTIATIONS ON A TREATY THAT WOULD
PROVIDE SPECIAL INTERNATIONAL STATUS AND LEGAL
SAFEGUARDS FOR INDIVIDUALS SERVING IN PEACEKEEPING OR
PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS UNDER A UN MANDATE. I T
WOULD MAKE ATTACKS ON PEACEKEEPERS A CRIME WITH
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION WITH STATES OBLIGATED TO
PROSECUTE OR EXTRADITE THOSE ACCUSED. PROGRESS HAS BEEN
MADE BUT DIFFICULT ISSUES OF SCOPE REMAIN TO BE RESOLVED.
• 0 M F I - D C N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 004003
C
DEPARTMENT FOR IO/PHO
JOINT STAFF FOR J-5 (JASON BARLOW)
WHITE HOUSE ALSO FOR SUSAN RICE
E.0.12356:DCL:12/31/95
TAGS: UNSC, PREL, MARR, PINS, PREF, EAID,
SUBJECT: PDD 25 USUN IMPLEMENTATION 130 DAYS LATER
15.
CONCLUSION
- - PROGRESS MADE, MORE NEEDED
IN EVERY IMPORTANT AREA OF THE PEACEKEEPING SYSTEM,
PROGRESS HAS BEGUN, AND SOME OF I T - SUCH AS DPKO
REORGANIZATION AND THE INSPECTOR GENERAL-TYPE FUNCTION
- IS VERY SIGNIFICANT. WE EXPECT TO OFFER US
INITIATIVES IN SEVERAL KEY AREAS OF CAPACITY-BUILDING
THIS FALL. YET PRESENT PROGRESS IS OVERSHADOWED BY THE
ENORMITY OF CHANGES THAT L I E AHEAD I F THE UN IS TO
DEVELOP THE PHYSICAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL RESOURCES,
MANAGEMENT DEPTH, ORGANIZATIONAL K O - O AND BUDGETARY
NWHW
PROCEDURES AND FUNDING TO RESPOND EFFECTIVELY TO THE
DEMANDS OF MEMBER STATES. UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP AND
COMMITMENT TO THE GOAL IS ESSENTIAL TO GENERATE AND
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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MAINTAIN MOMENTUM AS WELL AS THE ESSENTIAL POLITICAL AND
FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF MEMBER STATES.
ALBRIGHT
BT
#4003
NNNN
SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 04
< SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 04
< SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 04
< SECT>SECTION: 04 OF 04
SSN: 4003
< SSN>4003
< SSN>4003
< SSN>4003
TOR: 940923143344 M1269410
< TOR>940923143346 M1269411
< TOR>940923143448 M1269412
< TOR>940923143449 M1269413
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
DIST:
SIT: NSC RICE VAX
•
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
ooNriDDdTiAL
fL^M
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: ATKINS, BEERS, CLARKER, DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, SCHWARTZ, STEINBERG, VAX
PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS;-CONriDCNTIAL
DTG:281229Z SEP 94
FM: AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO:
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0087
////
C O N r i - D C N T I AL
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE KIGALI 001642
FOR UNDER SECRETARY WIRTH FROM AMBASSADOR
ALSO FOR AF AND AF/C
E.0.12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, EAID, RW, US
SUBJECT: HELPING RWANDA HELP ITSELF: NEXT STEPS
1. INFORMED BY EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS OVER THE PAST DAYS
WITH DAS BUSHNELL AND YOURSELF, I OFFER BELOW A VISION OF
WHAT WE MIGHT QUICKLY DO IN RWANDA. I AM CONVINCED THAT
THE NEW GOVERNMENT REMAINS COMMITTED TO THE GOALS OF
BRINGING ALL RWANDANS BACK HOME, ESTABLISHING SECURITY
AND JUSTICE, RESTORING GOVERNMENT SERVICES AND BREAKING
THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE THAT HAS TRAUMATIZED THIS REGION;
THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER REAFFIRMED THOSE
PRINCIPLES YESTERDAY. BUT THE GOVERNMENT WILL FAIL
UNLESS WE HELP IT ACHIEVE ITS LAUDABLE OBJECTIVES. OUR
HUMANITARIAN INTERESTS AND COMMITMENT TO JUSTICE CAUSE US
TO ENGAGE IN ASSISTING THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT ESPECIALLY
IN THESE DIFFICULT START-UP DAYS.
2. TWO FACTORS CHALLENGE AN OPTIMISTIC VISION OF
RWANDA'S FUTURE: THE GERSONY INVESTIGATION, ADDING MORE
WEIGHT TO SUSPICIONS OF RPA ATTACKS ON INNOCENT CIVILIAN
POPULATIONS, AND, THE RESTIVENESS OF HUTU ARMY AND
MILITIA ON RWANDA'S BORDERS. BOTH FACTORS SHOULD HASTEN
OUR ASSISTANCE RATHER THAN DETER IT. WE CAN SAVE RWANDAN
LIVES BY HELPING THE GOVERNMENT BRING TO JUSTICE OUTLAWS
WHO ARE KILLING PEOPLE IN THE SOUTH EAST. WE CAN BRING
STABILITY BACK TO THE REGION BY GIVING RWANDAN REFUGEES
THE SECURE RIGHT TO RETURN HOME SHOULD THEY CHOOSE. I
SEE A NEED FOR IMMEDIATE HELP IN TWO AREAS - JUSTICE AND
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
-GONriDCNTIAL
^ 0 \ \ - oaU>3 -
H
S/\<\/\5 KBH
�CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONriDCNTIAL
RESETTLEMENT; AND, MEDIUM-TERM ASSISTANCE IN AN
ADDITIONAL THREE - GOVERNMENT REFORM, POPULATION AND
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT. ACTIONS WE COULD UNDERTAKE IN
THESE AREAS ARE AS FOLLOWS:
A: JUSTICE:
1. INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL: SUPPORT THE COMMITTEE
OF EXPERTS' CALL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL WITH
IMMEDIATE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION.
2. INVESTIGATIONS: RECRUIT FOLLOW-ON TEAM TO
PURSUE INVESTIGATION OF GENOCIDE; EXTEND MCCABE'S TOUR AS
REQUESTED BY HRC BILL CLARENCE.
3. MONITORS: RECRUIT EX-PEACE CORPS RWANDA
VOLUNTEERS FOR UNV/HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER MONITOR POSITIONS.
4. NATIONAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM: USE AVAILABLE
GOVERNANCE (DIG OR GSA ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT) FUNDS TO
REHABILITATE COURTS, ESTABLISH RECORD SYSTEMS AND TRAIN
JURISTS.
5. POLICE: SUPPORT U/S ANNAN'S REQUEST TO TRANSFER
ICITAP POLICE TRAINING FROM SOMALIA TO RWANDA. (NAIROBI
17257) THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE TOLD ME THAT HE
DESPERATELY NEEDS A FORCE TRAINED IN CIVILIAN POLICE
FUNCTIONS.
6. JUSTICE AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: FILL USIS PAO
SLOT WITH TDY JUDICIAL EXPERT WHO WOULD DEVELOP CIVIL
SOCIETY SUPPORT OF JUDICIAL SYSTEMS AND RULE OF LAW.
B: RESETTLEMENT: THE ONLY HUMANE FUTURE FOR DISPLACED
AND RGFUGEE RWANDANS IS REPATRIATION AND RESETTLEMENT IN
A SECURE ENVIRONMENT ON THEIR OWN HILLSIDES OR WITHIN
THEIR OWN TOWNSHIPS. ACTIONS TO THIS END INCLUDE:
1. ENHANCE REFUGEE CAMP SECURITY: FAR AND MILITIA
MUST BE REMOVED FROM CAMPS AND REFUGEES GIVEN SECURITY TO
DECIDE WHETHER TO RETURN HOME. THIS COULD REQUIRE
TEMPORARY SECURITY MEASURES BY FRENCH FORCES IN GOMA OR A
UNAMIR CONTINGENT IN NGARA AND GOMA.
2. BREAK UP BENACO CAMP. BENACO IS INCREASINGLY
UNTENABLE FROM A SANITATION, WATER AND HEALTH POINT OF
VIEW, NOT TO MENTION THE AUGMENTED FAR MILITARY PRESENCE
THERE. THE CAMP SHOULD BE BROKEN UP AS A MATTER OF FIRST
PRIORITY; WE MUST ACCELERATE DEPLOYMENT OF UNAMIR, NGO'S
AND MONITORS TO RWANDA'S SOUTHEAST TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE
FOR THE BULK OF REFUGEES TO RETURN HOME.
3. REDUCE POPULATIONS IN ZONE 4. RAINS WILL MAKE
MANY CAMPS AROUND GIKONGORO IN ZONE 4 INACCESSIBLE.
DISPLACED WILL MOVE HOME HUNGRY, WET AND MISERABLE ON
THEIR OWN, OR WITH SOME DIGNITY, ASSISTANCE AND SECURITY
OONriDCNTIAL
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
•CONriDCNTIAL
IF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HELPS THEM. UN ORGANIZATIONS
SHOULD
SPEED UP PROCESS OF TRANSPORTING DISPLACED BACK
EAST; FUNDING FOR NGO'S SHOULD FOCUS ON RESETTLEMENT
SUPPORT PACKAGES FOR BUTARE, GITARAMA AND EAST.
4. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON RESETTLEMENT. IF THE
RWANDAN GOVERNMENT IS TO KEEP ITS PLEDGE TO RETURN HOMES
AND LANDS TO RIGHTFUL OWNERS, IT WILL NEED TECHNICAL HELP
WITH ADMINISTRATION OF THE NATIONAL RESETTLEMENT
COMMISSION TO RESOLVE SUCH ISSUES AS LAND TENURE,
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LAND SURVEY. (LAND TENURE CENTER AT
U. OF WISCONSIN MIGHT BE ABLE TO HELP; WE MIGHT CONSIDER
A HOUSING PROGRAM UNDER RHUDO).
C. GOVERNMENT REFORM. NOW THAT WE ARE STARTING WITH
CARTE BLANCHE, WE MIGHT MORE READILY THAN BEFORE HELP
INTRODUCE PRINCIPLES OF TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
INTO GOVERNMENT PRACTICE. OUR GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC
REFORM (BUD/SER) PACKAGE MIGHT WORK WITH THIS NEW TEAM.
I RECOMMEND THAT:
1. WE REVISIT THE ELEMENTS OF THE BUD/SER PACKAGE
PREVIOUSLY NEGOTIATED WITH THE GOVERNMENT AND CHECK OUT
ITS APPLICABILITY WITH THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION.
2. IF THIS ADMINISTRATION CAN ACCEPT THE REFORM
CONDITIONALITIES OF THAT PACKAGE, WE USE BUD/SER AS AN
INSTRUMENT FOR SUPPORT TO THE GENERAL BUDGET IN THE FORM
OF $2 MILLION CONTRIBUTION TO WORLD BANK ARREARAGES.
D. POPULATION. WE CANNOT BE SERIOUS ABOUT HUMANITARIAN
OR DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO RWANDA UNLESS WE ADDRESS
POPULATION ISSUES. WE SHOULD:
1. EXPAND TO CAMPS IN ZAIRE THE MODEL PSI/CARE AIDS
PROGRAM BEING CARRIED OUT WITH AID (AIDSCAP) FUNDING IN
BENACO CAMP.
2. REVIEW WITH THE NEW ADMINISTRATION, ESPECIALLY
WITH THE MINISTER OF HEALTH WHO IS ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT
POPULATION PROGRAMS, THE GOALS OF OUR RWANDA INTEGRATED
MATERNAL/CHILD HEALTH (RIMS) PROJECT AND TAILOR THAT
PROJECT TO RWANDA'S NEW NEEDS.
E. ENVIRONMENT. RWANDA HAS A PRECIOUS BUT ENDANGERED
BIOLOGICAL HERITAGE (INCLUDING ITS OWN PEOPLE) BUT LACKS
THE RESOURCES AND SKILLS TO PRESERVE IT. WE SHOULD:
1. SUPPORT DEMINING TRAINING FOR RWANDAN SECURITY
FORCES AND EOD/MINES EDUCATION FOR SCHOOLS.
2. CONCERT WITH SWISS TO REVIVE SPECIES PROTECTION,
PUBLIC EDUCATION AND ECO-TOURISM OF NYUNGWE FOREST.
•OONriDCNTIAL
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CC' )yctO/*<tz
United States Department of State
Under Secretary of State
for Global Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20520-7250
October 3, 1994
MEMORANDUM TO THE SECRETARY
FROM:
Timothy E. W i r t h * ^
SUBJECT:
Rwanda and Burundi
I have j u s t returned from a week i n these s m a l l , poor and
desperately over-populated c o u n t r i e s — a f i t t i n g climax t o a
month t h a t began w i t h the United Nations P o p u l a t i o n Conference
i n Cairo.
1. Rwanda - Impressions: From the a i r , the r i c h v o l c a n i c
h i l l s of Rwanda could w e l l be China, as they are t e r r a c e d r i g h t
to the peak of the mountains. The mountain g o r i l l a s , l i k e
China's panda bears, are a remaining symbol o f a broadly
devastated environment. And wherever you f i n d adults you f i n d
more c h i l d r e n .
I n K i g a l i , a s t a l w a r t U.S. mission l i v e s w i t h remarkable
good cheer: the USIA l i b r a r y i s a bunk room; the residence i s
u n l i v a b l e , and the Ambassador stays i n t h e DCM's house, where
uoarly every window i s broken, the jagged broken glass i s s t i l l
i n the window frames, and pieces o f shrapnel are lodged i n the
porch f u r n i t u r e . But the hot water works; across the s t r e e t ,
UNAMIR s o l d i e r s are bathing i n a pan of c o l d water ( t h e power
i s on o c c a s i o n a l l y ) and most have been on hard r a t i o n s f o r
three months (mobile r e f r i g e r a t i o n u n i t s t h a t would allow a
varying of the menu have been s i t t i n g i n Antwerp f o r weeks
awaiting UN approval t o be flown s o u t h ) . On the s t r e e t s every
f o u r t h house appears t o be destroyed, a p a t t e r n repeated i n
v i l l a g e a f t e r v i l l a g e . Burned out cars, now s t r i p p e d of
e v e r y t h i n g , l i t t e r n e a r l y every s t r e e t ; i n the country, the
roads are completely empty except f o r t h e occasional long UN
convoy.
F l y i n g i n t o Goma, the eye q u i c k l y picks out the b r i g h t blue
sheets of p l a s t i c , d i s t r i b u t e d by UNHCR, and the sign o f
another sprawling refugee camp. I n these, the ever-present
Toyota Land Cruisers c a r r y the competent and dedicated
government and non-government o f f i c i a l s i n t h e i r tasks of
t r y i n g t o create a l i t t l e order or hope f o r the hundreds of
thousands. A l l watch the clock c a r e f u l l y , and get out of the
camps or o f f the roads before dark, when danger and v i o l e n c e
replace the apparent order of the day. And again, there are
c h i l d r e n everywhere — and a l l expect t h a t i f the camps are
s t i l l open, an explosion of the camp populations w i l l begin i n
seven months (nine months
�-2-
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
a f t e r the camps were e s t a b l i s h e d ) . AIDS i s reportedlydevastating the camps, w i t h so many unaccompanied women and
mothers v i c t i m s of the v i o l e n c e of the n i g h t .
Two hours d r i v e from the c a p i t a l , we v i s i t e d two r u r a l
C a t h o l i c churches. I n one, the f r o n t door was broken i n ,
hundreds of people had been slaughtered, the c e i l i n g was
pock-marked w i t h grenade fragments, and l a r g e pools of d r i e d
blood caked the pews. I n the o t h e r , the bodies had not yet
been cleaned up, and corpses, many completely d e c a p i t a t e d , were
strewn around the church amid c l o t h i n g , shoes, and b i b l e s .
The
stench of r o t t i n g bodies, and the p i l e of corpses next t o the
a l t a r , on which l a y a broken c r u c i f i x , reminded of the horrors
of the A p r i l massacres.
Vast sections of t h i s i n t e n s e l y c u l t i v a t e d country, w i t h
huts every few yards, are e e r i l y empty, because so many people
have l e f t . Crops s i t i n so many f i e l d s , and the r a i n y season
i s underway. P l a n t i n g should soon be s t a r t i n g , and one can't
help but t h i n k t h a t the huge r e l i e f operations w i l l have to be
around next year as w e l l , attempting t o avert s t a r v a t i o n i n the
camps or among those who have returned home t o u n c u l t i v a t e d
fields.
(Before the war, Rwanda was l a r g e l y food
self-sufficient).
W i l l the empty countryside f i l l up? Probably, but e x a c t l y
how i s perhaps the most problematic issue i n t h i s t u r b u l e n t
land. The government Army (RPA) i s l e d by T u t s i o f f i c e r s who
have been i n e x i l e i n Uganda, and who came South when t h e i r
g u e r i l l a campaign began i n the e a r l y 1990*s. Now they are
being j o i n e d by o t h e r s , r e t u r n i n g t o t h e i r homeland from
Tanzania, Burundi, and Zaire as w e l l as Uganda. Whose houses
are they l i v i n g i n and whose f i e l d s are they t i l l i n g ?
I f the
m a j o r i t y Hutu p o p u l a t i o n r e t u r n s , w i l l they f i n d t h e i r houses
occupied and land taken — the country has no e x t r a land
anywhere. Long term, when the p o p u l a t i o n doubles i n the next
twenty years, where w i l l a l l these people go? Can the poverty
get even worse, as more people share the l i m i t e d economic pie?
2. What are we doing i n Rwanda? How do we e x p l a i n t o the
American taxpayer t h a t t o date we have spent n e a r l y $500
m i l l i o n i n refugee assistance, i n a country of unexplained and
i n e x p l i c a b l e v i o l e n c e , where we have no apparent s t r a t e g i c or
economic i n t e r e s t s , and where the prospects f o r the short term
and the long term are dim at best? How long can the enormous
p o l i t i c a l , f i n a n c i a l and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l e f f o r t be maintained?
And won't t h i s l i t t l e country on the other side of the globe
get crowded out of the p u b l i c a t t e n t i o n span, despite the
horrors of i t s genocide?
These c o l d questions have t o be addressed, even i f answers
aren't obvious or even p o s s i b l e . We have t o have some
d e f i n i t i o n of our mission, of the possible endgames, and of the
costs. Undoubtedly there w i l l be other Rwandas i n our f u t u r e ,
and w h i l e we s t r u g g l e t o make sense of our c u r r e n t operations
�-3-
CLINTON L B A Y P O O O Y
IRR HTCP
i n Rwanda, we must also work t o l e a r n from our experience so we
can b e t t e r understand and p r e d i c t f u t u r e challenges.
3.
Rwanda —
Next Steps
The Rwandan c o n f l i c t i s not over. Two m i l l i o n refugees
remain o u t s i d e t h e country, elements of t h e ex-FAR are
t h r e a t e n i n g t o renew f i g h t i n g , the e x - i n t e r i m government
leadership and much of t h e refugee p o p u l a t i o n consider t h e new
government unacceptable, and an o v e r a l l p o l i t i c a l settlement
and n a t i o n a l r e c o n c i l i a t i o n are d i s t a n t goals.
Under these circumstances, our f i r s t p r i o r i t y must be t o
ensure t h a t f i g h t i n g and widescale v i o l e n c e do not resume and
t h a t c o n d i t i o n s are created, i n s i d e and o u t s i d e Rwanda, t h a t
w i l l lead t o a lessening of tensions and a move t o an o v e r a l l
settlement.
I n l i n e w i t h t h i s g o a l , we should focus our e f f o r t s on the
f o l l o w i n g key near term goals designed t o improve s e c u r i t y i n
the subregion- and create c o n d i t i o n s i n s i d e Rwanda t h a t w i l l
encourage refugee r e t u r n :
o
Improving Security/Confidence I n s i d e Rwanda
Accelerated, f u l l deployment of UNAMIR i n a l l sectors
Accelerated deployment of human r i g h t s monitors
Expansion of NGO a c t i v i t i e s i n t h e south and east
Foster a dialogue between t h e K i g a l i government and
UNHCR
o
D e t e r r i n g a Resumption of H o s t i l i t i e s
A c t i v e p u r s u i t of plans t o move t h e FAR away from the
refugees
Deployment of a UN f o r c e t o provide s e c u r i t y i n Zaire
refugee camps
S e c u r i t y assistance t o Tanzanians
Break down l a r g e camps
UN m o n i t o r i n g of borders against i n c u r s i o n
o
Removing the Bad Actors from t h e Scene
Expedited f o r m a t i o n of a War Crimes t r i b u n a l / t r i a l s
o
Improving Conditions I n s i d e Rwanda
Assistance t o get the Government f u n c t i o n i n g , r e s t a r t
j u d i c i a l processes, and r e s t o r e basic services
- Pay o f f World Bank a r r e a r s t o f r e e up funds f o r GOR
- Increase d i r e c t b i l a t e r a l assistance
Assistance on r e s o l v i n g p r o p e r t y disputes
Assistance t o address demining, p o p u l a t i o n pressures,
and environmental issues
Pressure on the GOR t o keep i t s commitment t o f o l l o w
the Arusha accord, w i t h t h e p o s s i b i l i t y at some f u t u r e
p o i n t of renewed Arusha t a l k s w i t h "innocent" elements
of the Hutu diaspora
�CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
-44. Burundi - an apparent c o n t r a s t . The country next door
seems peaceful by comparison. Markets are open, the a i r p o r t
operates, cars are on the s t r e e t s , and a government of
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n w i l l under present plans, come together w i t h i n
the next week. The President, a French-educated philosopher,
speaks e l o q u e n t l y of the need t o p r o t e c t women, promote f a m i l y
planning, and maintain a vigorous dialogue w i t h the West. The
m i l i t a r y leadership speak proudly of t h e i r recent human r i g h t s
t r a i n i n g i n Geneva, and ask i f they can have help from the U.S.
i n promoting broader understanding of human r i g h t s and
r e l a t i o n s h i p s between m i l i t a r y and c i v i l i a n a u t h o r i t i e s .
Can
t h i s be the same country where 100,000 people were slaughtered
i n a coup attempt l a s t October, and where the t r i b a l r a t i o s are
the same as i n t h e i r deeply t r o u b l e d neighbor?
I t was hard t o
remember t h a t our s e c u r i t y warned us away from the markets
where two grenades had been exploded the previous week.
As one moves from Rwanda t o Burundi, i t becomes
i n c r e a s i n g l y c l e a r t h a t the problems are r e g i o n a l (Rwanda,
Burundi, Z a i r e , Uganda, Tanzania) and common (refugees,
m i l i t a r y - c i v i l i a n r e l a t i o n s , human r i g h t s , economics,
p o p u l a t i o n and AIDS). Key areas to pursue f o r Burundi are:
o
A r e g i o n a l refugee
conference
o
Improved c i v i l - m i l i t a r y r e l a t i o n s
Human r i g h t s t r a i n i n g f o r the m i l i t a r y
Future r e g i o n a l conferences on c i v i l - m i l i t a r y
relations
o
Economic/financial support and reform, through support t o
the World Bank/IMF Friends of Burundi donor group process
o
A c t i o n t o counter hate radio
o
Further f a m i l y planning assistance
broadcasts
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PREC:
CLASS:
LINE1:
LINE2:
LINE3:
LINE4:
OSRI:
DTG:
ORIG:
TO:
PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL
PAACZYUW RUEHCAA9485 2772307-CCCC—RHEHAAX.
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 042304Z OCT 94
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
RUEHC
042304Z OCT 94
SECSTATE WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN N W YORK PRIORITY 0000
E
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI 0000
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASHA 0000
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0000
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0000
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0000
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0000
INFO: RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0000
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0000
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0000
SUBJ:
A/S MOOSE MEETS WITH USYG FOR PKO KOFI ANNAN 9/27
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PERE. O. 13526
S/^/i5 K6H
TEXT:
& O N F I D E N T I A L
STATE 269485
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP, R , SO
W
SUBJECT: A/S MOOSE MEETS WITH USYG FOR PKO KOFI ANNAN 9/27
1. SUMMARY. A/S MOOSE MET WITH USYG FOR PKO KOFI ANNAN
ON THE MARGINS OF THE UNGA SEPTEMBER 27. ANNAN DESCRIBED
H W THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE RECENTLY RELEASED UNHRC
O
REPORT LED TO THE FORMATION OF A JOINT UN-GOR
INVESTIGATION AND TO A POSSIBLE REORGANIZATION OF UN
OPERATIONS. HE PROMISED TO RESOLVE THE REMAINING UNAMIR
DEPLOYMENT ISSUES WHEN KAHN RETURNS FROM PAKISTAN, AND
AGREED THAT I F AN EXPANDED MANDATE BECAME NECESSARY, A
CHAPTER 7 MANDATE WOULD NOT BE SOUGHT. 1
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
ON SOMALIA,
ANNAN PROPOSED SETTING MARCH 1995 AS THE WITHDRAWAL DATE
FOR UNOSOM-- A DATE THAT WOULD GIVE THE MILITARY UNITS
TIME TO PREPARE AND ONE THAT WOULD LEVERAGE POLITICAL
RECONCILIATION OF THE WARRING FACTIONS. END SUMMARY.
THE UNHRC REPORT
2. ANNAN EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE RECENT CONTROVERSY
OVER THE UNHRC REPORT ALLEGING RPA REPRISALS IN SOUTHEAST
RWANDA. HE HAD HOPED TO USE THE REPORT AS A CONSTRUCTIVE
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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DOCUMENT TO REORGANIZE UN OPERATIONS, BUT WORRIED THAT
OVERREACTIONS BY SOME UN AGENCIES, NAMELY UNHCR, COULD
UNDERMINE RECONCILIATION EFFORTS. HE WAS SURPRISED BY THE
STRENGTH OF RWANDAN PRIME MINISTER'S REACTION TO THE
REPORT'S FINDINGS, PARTICULARLY TWAGIRAMUNGU'S QUESTIONING
OF THE METHODOLOGY USED. HE WAS REASSURED, HOWEVER, ONCE
THE P AGREED TO A JOINT UN-GOR INVESTIGATION OF THE
M
ALLEGATIONS. WITH THE STAKES SO HIGH, ANNAN ADDED, IT IS
IMPORTANT THAT THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS CONTINUE ITS
WORK, WHILE OTHER ASPECTS OF THE MISSION-- THE DEPLOYING
UN HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS AND ADDITIONAL UNAMIR TROOPS-QUICKLY BECOME FULLY OPERATIONAL.
UN CONSIDERS COMMAND RESTRUCTURING
3. ANNAN SAID THAT MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS WILL BE REDUCED
BY REORGANIZING COMMAND AND OPERATIONAL STRUCTURES IN
RWANDA. THE CAMBODIAN MODEL WILL BE USED AS A TEMPLATE.
EACH ORGANIZATION WILL REMAIN IN CHARGE OF THEIR
RESPECTIVE PORTFOLIOS, WHILE UNSYGSR KAHN WILL ACT AS THE
S T F rnORn T MATOR FOR UN OPERATIONS. INCIDENTS LIKE
O..
COMING IN WITHOUT KAHN'S KNOWLEDGE, SHOULD NOT
(b)(6)
HAPPEN AGAIN. MOOSE AGREED THAT ORGANIZATIONAL
IMPROVEMENTS WERE NECESSARY, AND SUGGESTED THAT A STRONG
NUMBER 2 BE SOUGHT TO ASSIST KAHN.
4. ANNAN COMMENTED THAT THE REPATRIATION NUMBERS , N W
O
STABILIZED AT 100-200,000, SHOULD INCREASE AGAIN ONCE THE
TUNISIAN AND INDIANS ARRIVE. HE ADMITTED PROBLEMS IN
DEPLOYING.FORCES, USING THE UN'S POOR RESPONSE TO THE
ETHIOPIANS AS AN EXAMPLE (NOTE: EIGHTY PERCENT ARE STILL
ON FOOT AND 700 REMAIN WITHOUT THE FLACKJACKETS PROMISED
UPON THEIR ARRIVAL). MOOSE ASKED W Y THE DEPLOYMENT HAD
H
TAKEN SO LONG, COMMENTING THAT HE HAD BEEN INFORMED BY
THE TUNISIAN FORMIN THAT GOT WAS READY FOR DEPLOYMENT.
HE UNDERSCORED THAT THE UN HAD NO CAPACITY TO RUN A
COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM THROUGHOUT THE SOUTHWEST AND
SOUTHEAST, WITHOUT TUNISIAN TROOPS SUPPLEMENTING THE
GHANAIANS. GENERAL BARIL EXPLAINED THAT THE PROBLEM WITH
THE TUNISIAN DEPLOYMENT STEMMED FROM A COMBINATION OF
ISSUES-- IDENTIFYING PROPER TRANSPORT, FAILURE TO
PREPOSITION NECESSARY EQUIPMENT ON THE GROUND AND THE
NEED TO REDEFINE THE TYPE OF ARMORED VEHICLES REQUIRED
FOR TROOP MOBILITY. ANNAN CONTINUED THAT MANY OF THESE
ISSUES WOULD BE RESOLVED SHORTLY AFTER KAHN'S RETURN FROM
PAKISTAN THIS WEEK. MOOSE ASKED ANNAN TO ALSO CONSIDER
WHETHER A "FRIENDS GROUP" IS NEEDED TO HELP RESOLVE THESE
AND FUTURE ISSUES.
ADDRESSING SECURITY CONCERNS
5. KAHN'S ASSESSMENT WAS THAT SECURITY PROBLEMS EXTENDED
BEYOND RWANDA AND ZAIRE TO BURUNDI AND TANZANIA. HE
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOH
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EXPRESSED HTS DILEMMA ABOUT WHAT TO DO WITH THE MILITIAS
IF EXTRACTED FROM THE CAMPS AND H W TO MAKE ZAIRIAN
O
ROOPS, W O HAVE AGREED TO PARTICIPATE IN SECURITY
H
OPERATIONS, PART OF THE SOLUTION AND NOT MORE OF THE
PROBLEM. HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT AN EXPANSION OF UNAMIR
INTO ZAIRE WOULD NOT COMPLICATE ITS OPERATIONAL
CHARACTER, BUT EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF
RECEIVING SUCH AN EXPANDED MANDATE FROM THE UNSC. HE
ALSO QUESTIONED THE ABILITY OF UNAMIR TO DO THE JOB UNDER
THE 5,500 CEILING. WHEN MOOSE RESPONDED THAT HE
UNDERSTOOD UNAMIR TO BE OVERSUBSCRIBED, ANNAN EXPLAINED
THAT IT WAS A TEMPORARY BLIP AS TROOPS MOVE IN AND OUT.
MOOSE SUGGESTED THAT THE SECURITY VOID RESULTING FROM THE
FRENCH DEPARTURE, ESPECIALLY AROUND G M AIRSTRIP, NEEDED
OA
SPECIAL ATTENTION. WITH THE JAPANESE PROVIDING ONLY
MEDICAL AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT, MOOSE SUGGESTED THAT
UNAMIR CONSIDER IMMEDIATELY SUPPLANTING FRENCH TROOPS
AFTER SEPTEMBER 30. MOOSE QUESTIONED THE NEED TO SEEK A
CHAPTER 7 MANDATE TO PERFORM ITS N W MISSION. ANNAN
E
AGREED THAT THE PROBLEMS IN THE CAMPS REQUIRED A STRATEGY
THAT FOCUSSED ON BOTH POLITICAL ISSUES AND SECURITY.
RECONSTRUCT ION/REHAB I LI TAT ION
6. ANNAN SAID THAT WHILE NGOS HAD BEEN MEETING THEIR
OBJECTIVES, THE GOR LACKED THE MEANS TO ADDRESS THE
IMMENSE INFRASTRUCTURAL NEEDS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. IN
SOME NORTHERN AREAS AS MANY AS 80 PERCENT OF THE PEOPLE
HAVE RETURNED YET THE GOR HAD BEEN UNABLE TO RESTART
WATER AND ELECTRIC SERVICES. AGREEING THAT THE GOR HAD
SERIOUS ORGANIZATIONAL AND FINANCIAL PROBLEMS, MOOSE
EXPLAINED-THE DILEMMA WITH THE WORLD BANK'S SUSPENSION OF
DOLLARS 250 MILLION IN PROJECTIZED FUNDS. THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY NEEDED TO DEVISE A WAY TO RESOLVE
THE ISSUE OF RWANDA'S DOLLARS 7 MILLION IN ARREARS, SO
THAT THE BANK WOULD RELEASE THE FUNDS.
SOMALIA
7. ANNAN DESCRIBED HIS VISIT TO SOMALIA AND A PLAN OF
ACTION WHICH CONCLUDED WITH UNOSOM'S WITHDRAWAL BY THE
END OF MARCH 1995. HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH REGIONAL
LEADERS LED HIM TO BELIEVE THAT THEY WILL TRY TO INSTALL
AN INTERIM NATIONAL GOVERNMENT BY THE END OF OCTOBER.
THIS GOVERNMENT WOULD ESTABLISH A POLICE FORCE WHOSE MAIN
RESPONSIBILITY WOULD BE TO KEEP THE MILITIAS OFF THE
STREETS. 1
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
~
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
ANNAN ADDED THAT THE UN MIGHT TAKE THE "ANGOLAN APPROACH"
BY FOCUSSING ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION RATHER THAN
SUSTAINING A PKO. AT THIS POINT IN THE CONVERSATION,
MOOSE AND ANNAN WERE JOINED BY AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH, NSC
STAFF SUSAN RICE AND USUN STAFF MIKE SHEEHAN, W O
H
REITERATED THE USG VIEW THAT THE SOMALIA OPERATION SHOULD
BE WOUND D W AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.
ON
CHRISTOPHER
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•
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�OCT 07 ' 9 4
13:51AM
OUTfiOINfi TELEGRAM
S.l
0
INITIAL ^
PEPARTflENT OF STATE
AUTH
DRAP'T.
CLEAR 1
2 .
3
'
4
5 .
b _
7
a.
CONFIDENTIAL
IO/UNP:6HSTANTON:GHS
in/QS/W
70042
SEUNPA 21A1
10:GUARS
IO/UNP:JSNYDER
DRL:JBURT-LYNN
PM:PSUTER
PRM: finCKELVEY
USUN/U:DSCHEFFER
G:AJOYCE
AF/C:RFENDRICK
S/S: NSC:SRKE S/S-O:
10,AF
PRIORITY
KIGALIi USUN NEU YORK PRIORITY, OTTAUA PRIORITY
KINSHASA, DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY, BUJUMBURA,
PRIORITY
NAIROBI, GENEVA, U SE
N
E.O. 1535b; DECL: O D
AR
TAGS: PREL-, P U , MOPS, R•' BU, ZA, TZ
HM
W,
SUBJECT:
1.
GENERAL DALLAIRE BRIEFS DEPARTMENT O RUANDA
N
CONFIDENTIAL —
ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: FORMER UNAMIR C M A D R DALLAIRE PREDICTS
OMNE
RENEUED UAR IN RUANDA. HE ADVOCATES EXPANSION OF UNAMIR'S
MANDATE TO INCLUDE THE REFUGEE CAMPS IN ZAIRE AND
TANZANIA. UNAMIR SHOULD ENTER THE CAMPS AND ACTIVELY
DISARM THE EX-FAR AND MILITIAS. HE SAID THE U SHOULD
N
MAKE THE POLITICAL DECISION NEEDED TO GIVE UNAMIR
EFFECTIVE AUTHORITY, AND PROVIDE UNAMIR UITH THE RESOURCES
NEEDED TO BRING PEACE AND ATTRACT THE REFUGEES BACK TO
RUANDA.
3. CANADIAN MAJOR-GENERAL R M O DALLAIRE, FORMER
OE
C M A D R OF UNAMIR IN RUANDA, GAVE THREE BRIEFINGS AT THE
OMNE
DEPARTMENT, WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 5. HE MET UITH
UNDERSECRETARY UIRTH, ASSISTANT SECRETARIES BENNET {10}
AND SHATTUCK {DRL>, ASST. ADMIN. STAFFORD -CAID/AA/BHR>,
DAS BUSHNELL {AF/C>, NSC'S RICE, JCS'S BALTIMORE, OSD'S
KERNn AND OTHER RUANDAPHILES.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
CONriDCNTIAL
CLINTON LIBRAKY PHOTOCOPY
�OCT 07
IQ-5ZW
CONFIDCNTIAL
THE RUANDAN SITUATION
H. DALLAIRE SAID, "UE'RE LINING OURSELVES UP FOR ANOTHER
UAR." UITH EX-GOVERNMENT FAR A M FORCES A D MILITIAS
RY
N
STILL ARMED A D ORGANIZED, DALLAIRE EXPECTS ATTACKS F O
N
RM
ZAIRE-, BURHNET. A D TAN2ANTAN RORDFRK MTTHTN ? T flQNTH^
N
;X
EO 13526 1 4 . EO 13526 1 4
.b
.d
HE SAID-,r
I THE CAMPS ARE
BECOMING SEMI-PERMANENT CITIES, BASECAMPS FOR UAR. THE
RUANDAN GOVERNMENT {RPA> A M HAS NEVER BEEN PASSIVE A D
RY
N
UILL EVENTUALLY ATTACK THE CAMPS ACROSS THE BORDER.
UNAMIR'S MANDATE
5. DALLAIRE SAID THE BEST UAY T HEAD OFF THE COMING U R
O
A
A D TO ESTABLISH SECURITY IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS IS T
N
O
BROADEN UNAMIR'S PEACEKEEPING MANDATE T INCLUDE THE
O
CAMPS, T MANDATE DISARMAMENT OF THE EX-FAR A D MILITIAS
O
N
BY FORCE, A D T MANDATE DETENTION OF FORMER GOVERNMENT
N O
LEADERS A D OTHERS U O LED THE GENOCIDE. HE SUBMITTED A
N
H
PLAN FOR A TOTAL UNAMIR FORCE OF 6100 TO THE U
N
SECRETARIAT. RUANDAN VICE PRESIDENT KAGAME HAS READ IT
A D UILL G ALONG•
N
O
b. DALLAIRE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH A "ROBUST" CHAPTER t
AUTHORITY MIGHT BE ENOUGH, HE RECOMMENDS CHAPTER•7
AUTHORITY SO IT IS CLEAR THAT THE POLITICAL DECISION HAS
BEEN M D T DISARM THE CAMPS A D ACTIVELY STOP A RENEUED
AE O
N
UAR. {FRANCE HAS ALREADY STATED THAT UNAMIR'S CURRENT
MANDATE IS N T BROAD ENOUGH FOR THE PEACE-MAKING DALLAIRE
O
PROPOSES.>
7. DALLAIRE BELIEVES THAT ARRESTING THE MILITIA LEADERS
A D DISARMING THE CAMPS UILL FREE REFUGEES T RETURN T
N
O
O
RUANDA - INDEED, HE BELIEVES REFUGEES UILL TURN AGAINST
THEIR FORMER LEADERS,' U O UILL NEED DETENTION FOR THEIR
H
O N PROTECTION. UNAMIR SHOULD ALSO PROVIDE SECURITY UITHIN
U
R A D FOR REFUGEES U O RETURN. THE GOAL MUST BE T
UNA
H
O
ATTRACT THEM T RUANDA, RATHER THAN PROVIDING A MAGNET IN
O
THE CAMPS. " E SHOULD GIVE THE CAMPS THE MINIMUM, A D
W
N
TELL THEM THE REAL SUPPORT IS BACK IN RUANDA."
CONFIDCNTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�OCT 07 '94 10:54OM.
p
CONFIDCNTIAL
U PEACEKEEPING
N
6. DALLAIRE SAID R A D TURNED F O " VERY HOPEFUL
WNA
RM A
SCENARIO INTO THE UORST DISASTER IN RECENT TIMES. UE UERE
5 TO b M N H LATE IN IMPLEMENTING THE ARUSHA ACCORDS.
OTS
THIS DELAY PERMITTED THOSE OPPOSED T THEM TO ORGANIZE A D
O
N
UNDERMINE THE PEACE AGREEMENT."
DALLAIRE SAID THE "INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY" HAS FAILED
T SUPPORT U PEACEKEEPING IN TUO UAYS:
O
N
~
THE U HAS NOT M D THE POLITICAL DECISIONS NEEDED T
N
AE
O
AUTHORIZE PEACEKEEPING FORCES T EXERCISE EFFECTIVE
O
CONTROL UHERE THEY INTERVENE.
THE U DOES NOT HAVE RESOURCES NEEDED FOR RAPID
N
RESPONSE UHEN PEACEKEEPING IS NEEDED.
10. INSTEAD-, IN A W R D OF SOVEREIGN STATES, THE STATES
OL
UON'T GIVE THE U THE ABILITY T RESPOND PROMPTLY. "THE
N
O
U IS N M R THAN A COORDINATING AGENCY FOR SOVEREIGN
N
O OE
STATES." EVERY PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IS A HOC,
D
DEPENDENT O VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS OF TROOPS A D
N
N
MATERIEL BY NATIONS, UHICH ARE UNUILLING T CONVERT THEM
O
INTO A SECURITY FORCE. THEN UHEN THEIR TROOPS ARE
ATTACKED THOSE NATIONS PULL THEM OUT, AS BELGIUM A D
N
BANGLADESH DID IN RUANDA, FOLLOWED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL
DECISION T PULL M S OTHERS OUT. " LOT OF US DID
O
OT
A
PONTIUS PILATE O RUANDA."
N
THE RUANDAN GENOCIDE
11. UHEN ASKED WHETHER UNAMIR COULD HAVE PREVENTED THE
MASSACRES, DALLAIRE SAID A ACTIVE RESPONSE COULD HAVE
N
LIMITED THE NUMBER KILLED. HE POINTED OUT THAT POLITICAL
KILLINGS BEGAN IN KIGALI, THEN TURNED INTO SYSTEMATIC
GENOCIDE. H D THE 5500 UNAMIR TROOPS BEEN ABLE T RESPOND
A
O
UITH FORCE T DESTROY THE BARRICADES IN KIGALI A D PREVENT
O
N
MASSACRES BY MILITIAS, M N LIVES UOULD HAVE BEEN SAVED.
AY
"IF I COULD HAVE GOTTEN M R TROOPS IN THE FIRST FEU WEEKS
OE
THERE UOULD HAVE BEEN 100,000 BUT NOT 500,000 DEATHS."
A D THE GENOCIDE UOULD NOT HAVE SPREAD TO BUTARE A D OTHER
N
N
REGIONS UHICH DID NOT BECOME KILLING FIELDS UNTIL MID-MAY.
IE.
BUT THE U REFUSED T MAKE THE POLITICAL DECISION TO
N
O
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�OCT 07 "Pa 10:56PM
P. 5
i *
CONFIDCNTIAL
STOP THE GENOCIDE. AND THE UNAMIR FORCES IN KIGALI H D
A
ONLY JEEPS AND RIFLESi UHEN THEY NEEDED HEAVY WEAPONS A D
N
REINFORCEMENTS. THE ONLY UELL-EdUIPPED TROOPS WERE
BELGIANS, W O UERE NEUTRALIZED UHEN RADIO MILLES COLLINES
H
CHARGED THAT BELGIANS H D SHOT D U PRESIDENT
A
ON
HABYARIMANA'S PLANE, TEN BELGIANS HERE MASSACRED, A D
N
BELGIUM DECIDED TO PULL OUT.
13. THE COMBINATION OF LACK OF POLITICAL WILL AND LACK OF
RESOURCES PARALYZED UNAMIR, PREVENTING EFFECTIVE
INTERVENTION TO STOP THE GENOCIDE.
THE FRENCH A D OPERATION TURtJUOISE
N
EO 13526 1 4 , EO 13526 1 4
.b
.d
THE FUTURE OF THE U IN R A D
N
WNA
15. DALLAIRE SAID, "UE HAVE LOST THE INITIATIVE IN
R A D . THE U SHOULD GIVE UNAMIR THE MANDATE AND THE
WNA"
N
RESOURCES TO REGAIN IT. "THE U NEEDS THE PERMANENT
N
CAPACITY TO RESPOND UHEN THE ATROCITIES START. UE NEED A
RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE A D A CONTINUOUS FIELD
N
HEADQUARTERS. THE U MUST BE PROACTIVE IN PEACEKEEPING.
N
THE U IS NOT PERFECT BUT IT IS STILL THE BEST GAME IN
N
TOUN."
lb.
KIGALI AND BUJUMBURA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.VV
CONFIDCNTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
f^^JU
DIST: CLARKER, DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, SARTOR, STEINBERG, VAX
PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
DTG:060019Z OCT 94
FM: SECSTATE WASHDC
TO:
RUEHSD/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 6299-6301
ZEN/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
ZEN/AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE 0504-06
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0000
ZEN/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE 0689-91
ZEN/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE 6558-60
C O M F I D E N T I A-fc STATE 270964
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UN, RW, PHUM, MOPS
SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS BY THE UN IN RWANDA AND THE REGION
1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST.
2. pzfsUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST. THE SECURITY
SITUATION IN THE REFUGEE/DISPLACED PERSONS CAMPS IN
RWANDA, ZAIRE, TANZANIA AND BURUNDI NEEDS TO BE ADDRESSED
URGENTLY. USUN SHOULD PRESENT AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY
THE FOLLOWING NON-PAPER TO UN DPKO (AND ALSO SHARE WITH UN
DHA) AS A REFLECTION OF USG THOUGHTS ON AND QUESTIONS
ABOUT OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO
ADDRESS THESE PROBLEMS. IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR TO THE UN
THAT THE USG HAS NOT DECIDED ON A PARTICULAR COURSE OF
ACTION, BUT WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS WITH THE UN OPTIONS
WHICH WOULD CREATE A SECURE ENVIRONMENT IN RWANDA THAT
WILL LEAD TO THE RETURN HOME OF REFUGEES/DISPLACED
PERSONS. WE WOULD APPRECIATE UN REACTIONS ASAP AND WE
WOULD LIKE TO SEND A TEAM TO NEW YORK TO DISCUSS THIS
FURTHER. END SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST.
3. BEGIN TEXT OF NON-PAPER.
-THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN
RWANDA SHOULD BE TO CREATE A SAFE AND SECURE ENVIRONMENT
SO THAT REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS CAN VOLUNTARILY
REPATRIATE IN CONFIDENCE.
-THERE ARE AT LEAST THREE RELATED PROBLEMS WHICH NEED TO
• CONriDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
3/1 y / 5 " KBH
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
OONriDCNTIAL
ADDRESSED: SECURITY IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS (INCLUDING
SECURITY FOR REFUGEES, RELIEF WORKERS, AND
REMOVAL/SEPARATION OF EX-FAR AND HUTU MILITIA); EX-FAR AND
HUTU MILITIA INCURSIONS INTO RWANDA; AND HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS BY THE RPA.
-THESE PROBLEMS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED THROUGH A COORDINATED
STRATEGY OF CONCURRENT AND INTEGRATED STEPS THAT WILL
CREATE CONDITIONS FOR THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE: SAFE,
VOLUNTARY RETURN OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS.
-THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS EXPLORING VARIOUS IDEAS TO
ADDRESS THE SECURITY ISSUES INVOLVED IN REPATRIATION OF
FUGEES/DISPLACED PERSONS FROM THE CAMPS IN RWANDA,
ZAIRE, TANZANIA AND BURUNDI.
-AT LEAST TWO ACTIONS ARE NECESSARY TO REACH THE PRIMARY
GOAL OF A SAFE REPATRIATION.
- -UNAMIR MUST BE FULLY DEPLOYED THROUGHOUT RWANDA.
- -UNTIL RESTORATION OF CONFIDENCE IS ACHIEVED, THERE IS
A NEED TO MINIMIZE SUFFERING AND EXPOSURE TO VIOLENCE IN
THE CAMPS. THIS MEANS PROTECTION OF REFUGEES AND RELIEF
WORKERS FROM MILITIA AND EX-FAR.
-THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS READY TO COOPERATE IN BOTH
ENDEAVORS. HOWEVER, TO BE EFFECTIVE, WE MUST EXPLORE
THOROUGHLY THE OPTIONS AND DEFINE EXACTLY THE MISSION.
-QUESTIONS ABOUT THE MANDATE OF AN EXPANDED UNAMIR
MISSION OR ANY OTHER OPTION MUST BE ADDRESSED AND THOUGHT
THROUGH. THESE QUESTIONS ARE A FACT-FINDING TOOL, AND
SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN TO IMPLY ANY PREFERRED COURSE OF
ACTION. WE WOULD LIKE THE UN TO ADDRESS THE FOLLOWING
QUESTIONS:
GENERAL QUESTIONS
- -HOW DOES THE UN INTEND TO WORK TOWARD THE PRIMARY
OBJECTIVE AS WE SEE IT, THAT IS TO CREATE A SECURE
ENVIRONMENT IN RWANDA TO ENABLE THE SAFE REPATRIATION OF
REFUGEES AND THE RETURN TO THEIR HOMES OF INTERNALLY
DISPLACED PERSONS?
- -DOES THE UN INTEND TO PROPOSE AN EXPANSION OF UNAMIR,
OR THE CREATION OF A NEW FORCE (OR FORCES) TO ACHIEVE
THESE GOALS?
- -IF SO, WHAT WOULD BE THE ROLE OF THIS FORCE (AN
EXPANDED UNAMIR, AN OAU FORCE, SOMETHING SIMILAR TO THE
FRENCH-LED OPERATION TURQUOISE, OR A COUNTRY ACTING
•GONriDCNTIAL
�CONriDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
BILATERALLY ARE POSSIBLE IDEAS)? WOULD THIS FORCE (OR
FORCES) PROVIDE SECURITY ONLY FOR RETURNEES IN RWANDA?
FOR REFUGEES IN CAMPS OUTSIDE RWANDA? FOR RELIEF WORKERS
IN CAMPS?
- -ASSUMING A UN-LED MISSION, IF THIS FORCE WAS BEING
ASKED TO PROVIDE SOME FORM OF PROTECTION IN THE CAMPS,
WOULD IT BE UNDER A CHAPTER VI MANDATE, OR WOULD A CHAPTER
VII MANDATE BE REQUIRED?
- - I F CHAPTER VI, WHO WOULD THE FORCE ASK FOR CONSENT RWANDA, ZAIRE, TANZANIA, BURUNDI, FORMER GOVERNMENT
LEADERS?
- - I N GENERAL, SHOULD THERE BE A UN POLITICAL DIALOGUE
WITH THE REFUGEE HUTUS, AND WHO WOULD THE UN (DILLON OR
KHAN) TALK TO? WOULD THE UN TALK TO ARMED GROUPS? IF
NOT, WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CH VI VS. CH VII?
- -WHAT SIZE FORCE IS ENVISIONED? WHAT IS THE PREDICTED
BUDGET FOR SUCH A FORCE AND WHERE WOULD RESOURCES BE
IDENTIFIED TO SUPPORT THE FORCE?
- -WHAT WOULD BE THE UN'S STRATEGY TO RECRUIT SUFFICIENT
TROOPS?
- -WHAT WOULD BE THE PROPOSED TIMELINE OF THE
OPERATION? WHAT CLEAR OBJECTIVES AND REALISTIC CRITERIA
WOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT FOR ENDING THE OPERATION?
- -WHAT WOULD BE THE UN.S RESPONSE IF POLITICAL
RECONCILIATION DOES NOT PROGRESS AS EXPECTED?
CAMP SECURITY
- - I T IS VITAL TO KNOW EXACTLY WHAT THREAT EXISTS BEFORE
A MISSION TO ADDRESS THAT THREAT CAN BE FORMULATED. WE
UNDERSTAND THAT THE THREAT VARIES FROM CAMP TO CAMP, AND
FOR EACH INDIVIDUAL (I.E., A DIFFERENT THREAT EXISTS FOR
TUTSI REFUGEES, HUTU REFUGEES, AND RELIEF WORKERS, ETC.).
- -WHAT IS THE UN'S VIEW OF THE EXISTING THREAT(S) IN
THE REFUGEE CAMPS IN ZAIRE, BURUNDI AND TANZANIA?
- -ARE YOU CONSIDERING HAVING A POTENTIAL FORCE REMOVE
THE EX-FAR AND HUTU MILITIA FROM THE CAMPS? WHAT ROLE
SHOULD THE FORCE PLAY IN DISARMING/REINTEGRATING EX-FAR
FORCES? ARE THESE ACHIEVABLE GOALS THAT ARE WORTH
PURSUING?
PURSUING?
PURSUING?
CONriDCNTIAL
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
OONriDCNTIAL
PURSUING?
PURSUING?
PURSUING?
PURSUING?
PURSUING?
PURSUING?
PURSUING?
PURSUING?
PURSUING?
PURSUING?
PURSUING?
PURSUING?
PURSUING?
PURSUING?
PURSUING?
PURSUING?
PURSUING?
PURSUING?
PURSUING?
PURSUING?
PURSUING?
PURSUING?
PURSUING?
PURSUING?
PURSUING?
PURSUING?
PURSUING?
PURSUING?
PURSUING?
PURSUING?
PURSUING?
- -IT IS VITAL TO KNOW EXACTLY WHAT THREAT EXISTS BEFORE
A MISSION TO ADDRESS THAT THREAT CAN BE FORMULATED. WE
UNDERSTAND THAT THE THREAT VARIES FROM CAMP TO CAMP, AND
FOR EACH INDIVIDUAL (I.E., A DIFFERENT THREAT EXISTS FOR
TUTSI REFUGEES, HUTU REFUGEES, AND RELIEF WORKERS, ETC.).
- -WHAT IS THE UN'S VIEW OF THE EXISTING THREAT(S) IN
THE REFUGEE CAMPS IN ZAIRE, BURUNDI AND TANZANIA?
- -ARE YOU CONSIDERING HAVING A POTENTIAL FORCE REMOVE
THE EX-FAR AND HUTU MILITIA FROM THE CAMPS? WHAT ROLE
SHOULD THE FORCE PLAY IN DISARMING/REINTEGRATING EX-FAR
FORCES? ARE THESE ACHIEVABLE GOALS THAT ARE WORTH
PURSUING?
- -HOW WOULD EFFORTS TOWARDS DEMOBILIZATION AND
REINTEGRATION OF THE EX-FAR AFFECT PLANNING?
BORDER INCURSIONS
CONriDCNTIAL
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONriDENTIAL
- -IS IT NECESSARY TO PLACE AN INTER-POSITIONAL FORCE
ALONG RWANDA'S BORDER? IF SO SHOULD UNAMIR ASSUME THIS
ROLE, OR SHOULD A SEPARATE FORCE BE FOR THIS PURPOSE?
HUMAN RIGHTS
- -WHAT SHOULD BE UNAMIR'S MANDATE CONCERNING THE
DETERRENCE/HALTING OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES INSIDE RWANDA?
WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UNAMIR OR ANY
NEW FORCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS?
OTHER CONCEPTS
-IN ADDITION TO THE MULTILATERAL FORCE OPTION, OTHER
CONCEPTS NEED TO BE EXPLORED.
- -THE DONOR COMMUNITY SHOULD EXAMINE INCENTIVES
(PRIMARILY FINANCIAL) WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
COULD OFFER THE EX-FAR TO DISARM. DON CIVILIAN CLOTHING,
AND RELOCATE VOLUNTARILY.
- -CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO CONTINUING TO LOOK
FOR COUNTRIES WILLING TO PROVIDE OR ASSIST ZAIRE AND
TANZANIA TO PROVIDE SECURITY ON A BILATERAL OR
MULTILATERAL BASIS.
- -CONSIDERATION SHOULD ALSO BE GIVEN TO PURSUING THE
OPTION OF A REGIONAL SECURITY EFFORT (THE IMMEDIATE
NEIGHBORS/THE GREAT LAKES STATES ORGANIZATION), WITH
OAU/UN BLESSING, WHICH WOULD PROVIDE SECURITY IN THE CAMPS
AND MIGHT EVEN ESCORT VOLUNTEER REFUGEES BACK. THIS
LATTER ASPECT (AN IDEA FLOATED BY TANZANIA) FACES OBVIOUS
PROBLEMS (E.G., THE NEED FOR GOR AGREEMENT, THE NEED FOR
DONOR FINANCING) AND ASSUMES THAT, ABSENT INTIMIDATION IN
THE CAMPS, A LARGE NUMBER OF REFUGEES WOULD BE WILLING TO
RETURN TO RWANDA.
-ABOVE ALL, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY NEEDS TO CONTINUE
ITS EFFORTS TO REDUCE THE LEVEL OF INSECURITY IN RWANDA BY
ENCOURAGING THE NEW AUTHORITIES IN KIGALI TO ELIMINATE
REPRISAL KILLINGS AND HELP THE GOR TO REESTABLISH
IWFRASTRUCTURE (JUDICIAL, FINANCIAL, COMMERCIAL AND
TRANSPORT) AND CREATE CONDITIONS WHICH WILL ENCOURAGE
VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES. EFFECTIVE ACTION IS
ESPECIALLY NECESSARY TO ADDRESS LAND/PROPERTY TENURE
ISSUES INSIDE RWANDA IN ORDER TO ADDRESS COMPETING CLAIMS
ON THE PART OF RECENTLY-DEPARTED HUTU REFUGEES AND
RETURNING LONG-DURATION TUTSI REFUGEES.
•OONriDCNTIAL
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
-GONriDCNTIAL
- A N ACHIEVABLE MISSION TO ADDRESS THESE URGENT PROBLEMS
MUST BE CLEARLY DEFINED. WE WOULD APPRECIATE HEARING YOUR
VIEWS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
- W E WOULD LIKE TO SEND A TEAM OF US GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
TO NEW YORK TO DISCUSS FURTHER THESE ISSUES. WE LOOK
FORWARD TO THE ISSUANCE OF UN SECRETARIAT'S NEXT REPORT ON
RWANDA AND THE REGION.
END NON-PAPER.
4. MISSION SHOULD REPORT TO DEPARTMENT ON UN DPKO, DHA
AND ANY OTHER SECRETARIAT THINKING ON OPTIONS FOR SECURITY
IN RWANDA AND THE REFUGEE/DISPLACED PERSONS CAMPS.
5. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. CHRISTOPHER
BT
#0964
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< SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
< SSN>0964
< TOR>941006005315 M1290789
A
A
A
FROM:
SITREPRT
•CONriDCNTIAL
�COKFIDEMTIAL
DECL: OADR
^/
Infox^al Notes on Meeting with DPKO on UNAMIR
X
10/7/94
DPKO. New York
Summary: Everything About Rwanda belongs i n tha too-hard
basket.
US side: NSC-Clark* Rice; USUN-Indorfurth; State-Bushnell,
L o f t i s ; OSD-Sewall, Kern; JCS-Baltimore
#
UN: USYG Annan, USYG Goulding, G«n. B a r i l
Note: one of very few aaatings where UN backbenchers
outnumbered US side.
Annan opened the meeting by recounting hia recent t r i p to
region, GOR i s broke, cannot pay c i v i l servants, restore basic
services, repair war damage because a l l money going to agencies
and NGO's. He i s frustrated at rules requiring payment of
arrears before can get new Loan. (Bushnell and Clarke noted us
%i million oontribution, efforts to get other donations to
clear arrears).
The UNHCR report helped in ©penning country to UNAMIR;
contingents now moving into East and Southeast- The troops
w i l l supplement the work of the human rights monitors, acting
as eyes and ears.
UNAMIR facing tremendous logistical problems - wood bridges
mean APC's can't be used (no comment).
UNHCR reports some 100,000 to 200,000 have returned home from
Zaire. U i s looking at moving ex-FAR away from border and i s
N
talking to Zaire about moving p o l i t i c a l leaders to exile problem i s finding countries willing to accept and to keep them
available for t r i a l .
Biggest problem i s what to do with m i l i t i a s . I f they are taken
from camps, can they be held for t r i a l ; i f they are set free,
then become bandits.
Annan dismissed the idea of private security firms for the
camps.
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
^
�(Rwanda)
C0HFIDI31TIAL
-2-
Clarke ran through spectrum of options for camps: daytime
security for r e l i e f workers and escort of returnees to protect
from harassment (about a battalion) to complete takeover of
camps for protection, interpositional force, disarming ex-FAR,
Hutus (5-6 battalions). Low end of the spectrum more feasible.
EO 13526 1 4 , EO 13526 1 4
.b
.d
Kofi noted that the government i s making the right noises about
reconciliation, no vengeance, broad-base government and
emphasis on p o l i t i c a l solution.
UNHCR rep (didn't get name) noted that the problem i s not
bringing the refugees to safety but bringing safety to the
region. Japanese are acting as operational partner of UNHCR
(like NGO) but w i l l run at f i r s t sign of danger.
Kofi noted the technical team returns this weekend. Wants
report from them in 10 days.
EO 13526 1 4 , EO 13526 1 4
.b
.d
U Legal division ran down status of tribunal- Noted that at
N
least part of the Tribunal had to be located in Africa (not
Kigali - too charged). They are setting up task force to work
on administrative matters. In long term, need proper legal
system for RwandaOnly action: to meet after report i s issued, to discuss l i s t
of countries that might be approached to provide security,
relationship to UN/UNAMIR l e f t unstated.
Drafted: IO/PHO: RGLoftis
SEPKA 1024
10/7/94
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�1 G.
G.
= •=*
<
October 10, 1994
TO:
EXEC - Ambassador Inderfurth
FROM:
POLMIL - Susan V a r i s c o ^ ^ ^
SUBJECT: Actions from 10/7 Haiti/Rwanda Meeting
HAITI
o
D D w i l l work with the UN to plan the movement of pledged
O
UNMlH forces,
o
State to continue to coordinate with UN on who's going from
M F to UNMIH.
N
o
D D to coordinate l o g i s t i c s contracts with UN so i t can
O
decide early which ones to pick up. (ongoing effort between
USACOM and FALD)
o
State w i l l convene a joint planning group periodically to
augment military planning between USACOM and DPKO. Recommend
monthly intervals, more frequently "on c a l l , " as necessary.
o
State w i l l resolve variances between USG and UN contributors
l i s t for UNMIH and advise U of results through USUN.
N
RWANDA:
o
U to submit the Joint Commission report on security i n the
N
camps within 10-22 days.
Cleared:WClont4-*C
Wang #1543 Polmil
CC:
USUN
UU/
SNW
NSC
AF
IO/PHO
OSD
JCS/J-5
JGuerra
DScheffer
RClarke
SRice
PBushneH
RLoftis
SSewa.U
PBaltimor*
CLINTON LIBRARY
DU
O OY
CP
�Rice, Susan E.
From:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Date:
Atkin, Timothy J.
Clarke, Richard A.; Rice, Susan E.
/N, NonRecord at A1
[CONriDCNTIAL] Rwanda
Tuesday, October 18,1994 11:20AM
Yesterday's "seminar" at state on conflicts in Rwanda was quite good, especially for my level of knowledge... a
few personal impressions from the afternoon.
1. The divisions/strife are so deep and long standing, the contol of different factions over people so strong, and
the trauma so significant that THERE IS NO REALISITIC SOLUTION TO THE POLITICAL SITUATION... CIVIL
WAR WILL RETURN. I honestly believe the two unknowns are:
- when will it occur
- can genocide be avoided
2. The U.S. is generally seen as one of the few (if not only) states to be an honest broker.
3. The PRIMARY reason for U.S. involvement (i.e. national interest, public justification) is that there have been
outrageous crimes against humanity (genocide)... which also caused a massive humanitarian crisis (refugees).
Regardless of the refugee situation, I would argue that the crimes against humanity issue would be deserving of
USG involvement/interest.
In light of these impressions, I propose we target our efforts in areas that recognize the STRONG likelihood of
renewed civil war and that preserve our reputation of honest broker so as to position ourselves to continue to be
influential with all powers.
RECOMMEND:
Ad Hoc mtg with 5 decision/action items:
a. UNAMIR - expand CH VI mandate to protect NGOs, relocate refugees to refugee only camps (???)
b. ID jumpstart funds for the tribunal
c. ID ways to meet the HR monitors goals/placements, asap
d. Meet internal Justice system support requests fm Rwanda
e. ID funds to clear arrears, asap
WHEN CIVIL WAR ERUPTS, THERE WILL BE INTENSE SCRUTINY OF OUR ACTIONS.. .All of these actions
address what I argue are our primary and secondary interests. I believe that these actions could, as a minimum,
avert another genocidal episode.
IS THERE ANY WAY TO ACTUALLY GET AN AD HOC MTG (in light of problems even getting a half hour sched
to discuss options???????????????????)
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
D
P a g e 1
,
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
aoW-oaua-H
K
z/u/'S" fcM
�CONriDENTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: ATKINS, BEERS, CLARKER, DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, SCHWARTZ, STEINBERG, VAX
PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS:-CONriDCNTIAL
DTG:181847Z OCT 94
FM: SECSTATE WASHDC
TO:
ZEN/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 9784-86
RUEHSD/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE IMMEDIATE
ZEN/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 4527-29
RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 0000
ZEN/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 1051-53
ZEN/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 6836-38
RUEHSD/AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE 0720-22
ZEN/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 0049-51
ZEN/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 6851-53
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 0000
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 0000
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0000
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 0000
ZEN/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 3888-90
ZEN/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 4482-84
ZEN/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 2015-17
ZEN/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 0871-73
ZEN/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 7251-53
ZEN/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 7009-11
ZEN/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2870-72
C O N r i D E N T I A L STATE 282177
PARIS FOR MORAN, LONDON FOR YOUNG,
PARIS ALSO FOR USOECD
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: EFIN, EAID, PREL, RW, IBRD
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE: INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO CLEAR
RWANDAN WORLD BANK ARREARS
REF: PARIS 26839 (NOTAL)
1. CONriDCNTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THIS IS AN ACTION CABLE. PLEASE SEE P^RA t F«R ACTION
REQUEST. FOR PARIS SEE A L S t PAftA 9. F«R BRUSSELS A N t
BONN PLEASE SEE ALSO PARA 10.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
2o\\ - o au3 - ^
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONn DENTIAL
8/tf/IS
KSH
�•OONFIDENTIAL
BACKGROUND
3. AS YOU ARE AWARE, THE SITUATION INSIDE RWANDA IS
DIFFICULT AND THE POTENTIAL FOR ANOTHER MASSIVE
HUMANITARIAN DISASTER IS VERY REAL. THE NEW RWANDAN
GOVERNMENT SPEAKS OF RECONCILIATION AND RECONSTRUCTION,
BUT LACKS THE RESOURCES TO FOLLOW THROUGH WITH CONCRETE
ACTIONS. LACKING THE MOST BASIC ITEMS NECESSARY FOR A
FUNCTIONING GOVERNMENT, THE NEW RWANDAN ADMINISTRATION HAS
BEEN UNABLE TO RESTORE SERVICES OR ORDER, STOP
RETRIBUTIONS, OR OTHERWISE CREATE AN ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH
REFUGEES MIGHT WISH TO RETURN.
4. THIS IS A CATCH-22 SITUATION. FOR THE RWANDAN
GOVERNMENT TO BEGIN ADDRESSING THE PROBLEMS IT SAYS IT IS
COMMITTED TO SOLVING, IT MUST RECEIVE A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT
OF QUICK DISBURSING ASSISTANCE. PER REFTEL, DONORS HAVE
EXPRESSED RELUCTANCE TO MOVE FORWARD WITH SUCH ASSISTANCE
BEFORE SEEING THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL LIVE UP TO ITS
PROMISES.
5. RECENTLY, WE HAVE HAD MORE ENCOURAGING CONTACT WITH
POTENTIAL DONORS AS HAS THE WORLD BANK. THE BANK HAS
PROVIDED AN OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND QUICKLY AND MASSIVELY
TO GIVE THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA A CHANCE TO BEGIN
ADDRESSING ITS PROBLEMS. AT THE SEPTEMBER 27 "FRIENDS OF
RWANDA" MEETING IN PARIS (ATTENDED BY THE UNITED STATES,
CANADA, EU, FRANCE, BELGIUM, GERMANY, JAPAN, THE IMF, AND
UNDP), THE WORLD BANK TOLD DONORS THAT RWANDA WAS USD 4.43
MILLION IN ARREARS TO THE BANK (AS OF OCTOBER 15) IF THE
ARREARS THROUGH JUNE 1, 1995 (TOTALLING USD 9.5 MILLION)
ARE SETTLED, SAID THE BANK REPRESENTATIVES, THE BANK WOULD
BE IN POSITION TO RESUME DISBURSEMENTS AND TO RESTRUCTURE
PROJECTS TOTALLING APPROXIMATELY USD 250 MILLION FOR
RWANDA.
6. IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE MEETING IN PARIS, THERE HAS
BEEN FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE USG'S ROLE IN POTENTIALLY
SEIZING THIS OPPORTUNITY. SUBSEQUENTLY, IN AN OCTOBER 4
MEETING, NSC ADVISOR LAKE TOLD RWANDAN PRESIDENT BIZIMUNGU
THAT THE UNITED STATES INTENDS TO ASSIST IN THE REDUCTION
OF RWANDAN ARREARS TO THE WORLD BANK WITH THE
UNDERSTANDING THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA WILL TAKE
CONCRETE ACTIONS TO CONFIRM ITS COMMITMENT TO THE
PRINCIPLES OF THE ARUSHA ACCORD - POWER-SHARING,
DEMOCRACY, AND THE RULE OF LAW. WE ARE NOW IN THE PROCESS
OF SECURING USD 2.5 MILLION TP HELP REDUCE RWANDA'S BANK
ARREARS. WE STRONGLY ENCOURAGE OTHER DONORS TO CONTRIBUTE
AS WELL TO ENABLE THE WORLD BANK TO GO FORWARD WITH
DISBURSEMENTS.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
eeraraNTtAt
�CONriDDJTIAL
7. WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE OTHER DONORS WORK WITH THE UNITED
STATES IN MONITORING THE BENCHMARKS WE WOULD JOINTLY
EXPECT THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT TO MEET DURING THE NEXT YEAR
IN EXCHANGE FOR CLEARING ARREARS. WE STRONGLY ENCOURAGE
OTHER DONORS TO PARTICIPATE IN A "FRIENDS OF RWANDA"
MEETING TO BE HELD OCTOBER 27 ON THE MARGINS OF THE WORLD
BANK'S SPECIAL PROGRAM OF ASSISTANCE FOR AFRICA (SPA)
MEETING IN PARIS. AT THIS MEETING, WE CAN DISCUSS
APPROPRIATE BENCHMARKS BY WHICH RWANDA'S PROGRESS CAN BE
MEASURED OVER THE NEXT TWELVE MONTHS.
ACTION REQUEST
8. ACTION ADDRESSEES SHOULD INFORM APPROPRIATE HOST
GOVERNMENT COUNTERPARTS OF USG INTENTIONS VIS-A-VIS
RWANDAN ARREARS AND STRONGLY ENCOURAGE THEM TO ALSO BE
FORTHCOMING. TALKING POINTS FOLLOW.
9. FOR PARIS. WE HAVE TAKEN NOTE OF CABLES OUT OF PARIS
CONCERNING FRENCH VIEWS ON RWANDA AND ITS ARREARS . WE
WOULD, HOWEVER, APPRECIATE YOUR MAKING THE FOLLOWING
POINTS.
10. FOR BRUSSELS AND BONN. ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE HAS
BEEN IN CONTACT WITH HIS COUNTERPARTS IN BRUSSELS AND BONN
ON THIS ISSUE AND RECEIVED POSITIVE FEEDBACK. PLEASE
THANK THE APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS IN BOTH CAPITALS FOR THEIR
EFFORTS TO DATE, REINFORCE THEIR WILLINGNESS TO
PARTICIPATE IN THE CLEARING OF ARREARS AND SHARE WITH THEM
THE POINTS WE WILL BE MAKING WITH THE OTHER "FRIENDS OF
RWANDA."
TALKING POINTS
11. BEGIN TALKING POINTS - FOR POTENTIAL DONOR
GOVERNMENTS.
- FOLLOWING THE SEPTEMBER 27 FRIENDS OF RWANDA MEETING
IN PARIS AT WHICH YOUR GOVERNMENT WAS REPRESENTED, THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS DECIDED TO SEEK A
CONTRIBUTION OF USD 2.5 MILLION TO HELP CLEAR RWANDA.S
ARREARS TO THE WORLD BANK. THIS CONTRIBUTION WILL BE
EXPLICITLY TIED TO CONCRETE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT ACTIONS
THAT CONFIRM ITS COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE
ARUSHA PEACE ACCORD - POWER-SHARING, DEMOCRACY, AND THE
RULE OF LAW.
- AS YOU KNOW, THE WORLD BANK HAS APPROXIMATELY USD 250
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPV
GONriDCNTIAL
�•OONriDCNTIAL
MILLION IN RESTRUCTURED PROJECTS AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY
CREDITS AVAILABLE IN THE PIPELINE FOR RWANDA ONCE RWANDA'S
ARREARS ARE CLEARED.
- ACCORDING TO THE WORLD BANK, AS OF OCTOBER 15 RWANDA.S
ARREARS TO THE BANK TOTAL USD 4.43 MILLION. HOWEVER, THE
BANK IS ASKING THAT DONORS PAY OFF RWANDAN ARREARS THROUGH
JUNE 1, 1995. ARREARS AS OF THAT DATE WILL TOTAL USD 9.5
MILLION.
- WE SHARE THE CONCERNS OF MANY DONORS ABOUT THE ABILITY
OF THE NEW RWANDAN GOVERNMENT TO TURN ITS POLICY
STATEMENTS OF RECONCILIATION AND RECONSTRUCTION INTO
TANGIBLE RESULTS. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT WITHOUT
SUBSTANTIAL, QUICK DISBURSING ASSISTANCE, IT WILL BE
VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO CARRY OUT ITS
COMMITMENTS.
- THE BEST AVAILABLE SOURCE OF A LARGE AND QUICK
INFUSION OF ASSISTANCE IS THE WORLD BANK. WORLD BANK AID
TO RWANDA WILL ALLOW THE GOVERNMENT THE OPPORTUNITY, AND,
MORE IMPORTANTLY, THE MEANS TO MAKE GOOD ON ITS PROMISES.
-- THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT WORLD BANK FUNDS FOR
RWANDA COULD PUT THE GOVERNMENT IN A POSITION TO BEGIN
RESTORING ORDER AND BASIC SERVICES, REBUILDING
INFRASTRUCTURE, HALTING RETRIBUTIONS, AND CREATING AN
ENVIRONMENT THAT WILL ATTRACT REFUGEES BACK TO RWANDA.
THIS COULD END MISERY, SAVE LIVES AND REDUCE THE MASSIVE
HUMANITARIAN RELIEF COSTS THAT WE ALL ARE INCURRING.
-- THEREFORE, THE USG HAS AGREED TO PROVIDE A
CONTRIBUTION TO RWANDA'S WORLD BANK ARREARS. AS WE NOTED
BEFORE, THIS CONTRIBUTION WILL BE EXPLICITLY LINKED TO
SPECIFIC STEPS THAT WE WOULD EXPECT THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT
TO TAKE OVER THE NEXT TWELVE MONTHS. WE STRONGLY
ENCOURAGE OTHER "FRIENDS OF RWANDA" TO BE PREPARED TO TAKE
A SIMILAR STEP AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, BEFORE THE ARREARS
MOUNT FURTHER AND THE SITUATION IN RWANDA DRIFTS BACK INTO
ANOTHER HUMANITARIAN DISASTER.
- WE FURTHER ENCOURAGE OTHER DONORS TO PARTICIPATE IN AN
OCTOBER 27 "FRIENDS OF RWANDA" MEETING SCHEDULED ON THE
MARGINS OF THE WORLD BANK'S SPECIAL PROGRAM OF ASSISTANCE
FOR AFRICA (SPA) MEETINGS IN PARIS. THERE, BILATERAL AND
MULTILATERAL DONORS CAN DEFINE THE SPECIFIC STEPS THAT WE
WOULD LIKE THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT TO TAKE OVER THE NEXT
TWELVE MONTHS AND BEGIN THINKING ABOUT HOW RWANDA.S
PROGRESS CAN BE MEASURED.
END TALKING POINTS.
12. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. CHRISTOPHER
BT
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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�•CONriDCNTIAL
#2177
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< SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
< SSN>2177
< TOR>941020033730 M1315085
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A
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FROM:
SITREPRT
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
OONriDCNTIAL
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY •GONI-IDCNTIAL
(Ix^^
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: ATKINS, BEERS, CLARKER, DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, SCHWARTZ, STEINBERG, VAX
PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: OOHriDCNTIAL
DTG:200126Z OCT 94
FM: USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO:
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE 0716
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9916
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE 0672
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE 0447
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0435
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE 0035
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0264
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 1273
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 6065
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 1418
C O N P I D E N T I A b SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 004459
DEPT FOR C - AJOYCE; L - MMATHESON; AF - A/S MOOSE
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND STEINBERG;
E.0.12356: DECLOADR
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PREF, AORC, RW, UN
SUBJECT: RWANDAN VIEWS ON WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL
REF: STATE 283000
1. •OONriDCNTIAL'- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: RWANDAN DELEGATION MET WITH USUN
AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH AND LEGAL EXPERTS TO DISCUSS
RWANDAN MISUNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL. RWANDAN DEL LEFT THE
MEETING WITH MOST OF THE ISSUES RESOLVED, EXCEPT FOR THE
QUESTION OF AN END DATE FOR THE PERIOD TO BE COVERED BY
THE TRIBUNAL. FRANCE IS INSISTING ON AGREEMENT FROM
FOUR NEIGHBORING STATES TO CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE
RESOLUTION. END SUMMARY.
3. RWANDAN PERM REP BAKURAMUTSA, FORMER RPF UN REP
CLAUDE DUSAIDI AND AN ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT MET WITH
USUN AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH, USUN LEGAL ADVISER
ROSENSTOCK, L'S PRINCIPAL DEPUTY LEGAL ADVISER MICHAEL
CONriDCNTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
�CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
•OONriDCNTIAL
MATHESON, USUN/W SENIOR ADVISER AND COUNSEL DAVID
SCHEFFER AND POLOFF SHESTACK (NOTETAKER) TO DISCUSS THE
DRAFT SC RESOLUTION AND STATUTE OF THE RWANDAN WAR
CRIMES TRIBUNAL. AMB INDERFURTH LED OFF BY DELIVERING
THE TALKING POINTS (REFTEL) WHICH U/S WIRTH USED IN HIS
10/19 CONVERSATION WITH RWANDAN PRESIDENT BIZIMUNGU.
BAKURAMUTSA INTRODUCED HIS REMARKS BY NOTING THAT RWANDA
DID WANT AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL.
4. DATES. THERE WAS PROTRACTED DISCUSSION ABOUT THE
APPROPRIATE TIME FRAME TO BE COVERED BY THE TRIBUNAL,
WITH THE RWANDANS ARGUING STRENUOUSLY FOR AN EARLIER
BEGINNING DATE AND A CERTAIN END DATE. MATHESON AND
ROSENSTOCK ASSURED THE RWANDANS THAT EVIDENCE DERIVED
FROM ACTIONS BEFORE THE BEGINNING POINT WOULD BE
ADMISSIBLE IF THERE WAS A CONTINUING CONSPIRACY TO
COMMIT GENOCIDE. THEY SUGGESTED IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO
FIND LANGUAGE CLARIFYING THIS POINT ON THE ADMISSIBILITY
OF EVIDENCE, BUT WARNED THAT OPENING SUCH A DEBATE MIGHT
CAUSE DELAY IN THE COUNCIL. THE RWANDANS REJECTED THE
NOTION THAT THIS MATTER COULD BE SPELLED OUT AND
CLARIFIED BY AN ORAL STATEMENT AT THE TIME OF ADOPTION
OF THE RESOLUTION. THE RWANDANS SUGGESTED AN
ALTERNATIVE OF FIXING A STARTING DATE OF OCTOBER 1993
(SIX MONTHS PRIOR TO THE MASSACRES). THE U.S. THOUGHT
THAT DATE MIGHT NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE FRENCH.
5. THE U.S. SIDE POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS PREMATURE FOR
THE SC TO DETERMINE AN END DATE FOR THE TRIBUNAL'S
PROSECUTIONS, SINCE THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY OF A
RECURRENCE OF MASSACRES IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS- WE
SUGGESTED SPECIFYING A DATE AT WHICH POINT THE COUNCIL
WOULD REOPEN THE QUESTION OF THE END DATE. RWANDANS
ASKED THAT SUCH A DATE BE LINKED TO EVENTS ON THE
GROUND, NOT TO PROCEDURES WITHIN THE TRIBUNAL SUCH AS
ELECTION OF JUDGES. THEY PROMISED TO APPROACH THEIR
GOVERNMENT ON THE QUESTION OF DATES.
6. PRIMACY. THE U.S. SIDE CLEARED UP RWANDAN
MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT ARTICLE 8, PARA 2 WHICH SAYS "THE
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA SHALL HAVE PRIMACY
OVER NATIONAL COURTS. AT ANY STAGE OF THE PROCEDURE,
THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA MAY FORMALLY
REQUEST NATIONAL COURTS TO DEFER TO ITS COMPETENCE IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRESENT STATUTE AND THE RULES OF
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR
RWANDA." THE FIRST SENTENCE CAN BE AMENDED TO READ "...
PRIMACY OVER NATIONAL COURTS OF ANY MEMBER STATE",
THEREBY CLARYING THE MEANING.
7. RWANDANS QUESTIONED WHETHER THE LEVEL OF COOPERATION
BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL AND LOCAL RWANDAN
COURTS COULD BE SPELLED OUT, SINCE THE INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL WOULD OBVIOUSLY NOT BE ABLE TO BRING ALL THE
-eQNFI DENTIAL
�:LINTON LIBRARY
^
PHOTOCOPY
rnMFinFMTiAi
NUMEROUS CRIMINALS TO TRIAL. THEY ALSO ASKED WHETHER
THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL COULD ORDER THE ARREST OF
INDIVIDUALS WHO WOULD THEN BE TURNED OVER TO THE RWANDAN
COURTS FOR TRIAIL. MATHESON POINTED OUT THAT THERE WOULD
HAVE TO BE CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COURTS, AND
THAT THE RWANDANS SHOULD MEET WITH THE INTERNATIONAL
PROSECUTOR SOONEST TO WORK OUT SUCH QUESTIONS. HE
EXPLAINED THAT COUNTRIES WOULD NOT BE WILLING TO TURN
THEIR NATIONALS OVER TO A LOCAL COURT WITHOUT
• O O N r i D C N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 004459
DEPT FOR C - AJOYCE; L - MMATHESON; AF - A/S MOOSE
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND STEINBERG;
E.0.12356: DECLOADR
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PREF, AORC, RW, UN
SUBJECT: RWANDAN VIEWS ON WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL
EXTRADITION TREATIES SPELLING OUT SAFEGUARDS. HE NOTED
THE ACHIEVEMENT OF GETTING THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO AGREE
TO TURN PERSONS OVER TO THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL. THE
ISSUE OF HOW TO EXTEND JURISDICTION OVER CRIMINALS NOW
IN REFUGEE CAMPS WAS TIED IN TO THE LARGER QUESTION OF
HOW TO HANDLE THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE CAMPS, AND
WOULD NEED TO BE DEALT WITH LATER.
8. VENUE. THE RWANDANS AGREED THAT THE ADMINISTRATIVE
SEAT OF THE TRIBUNAL WOULD BE LOCATED OUTSIDE RWANDA,
BUT WANTED REASSURANCE THAT TRIALS WOULD BE HELD IN
RWANDA, SO THAT THE GOR COULD CONVINCE ITS CITIZENS THAT
JUSTICE WAS COMING TO RWANDA. MATHESON ACKNOWLEDGED
THAT PRACTICAL REASONS WOULD DICTATE THAT MUCH OF THE
PROCEEDINGS WOULD BE HELD IN RWANDA, ALTHOUGH THE
STATUTE COULD NOT INSIST THAT ALL TRIALS BE HELD THERE.
HE OFFERED TO FIND LANGUAGE NOTING THE INTENTION TO
CONDUCT PROCEEDINGS TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE IN RWANDA..
9. PARDON AND PLACE OF IMPRISONMENT. THE RWANDANS
ASKED THAT ALL OF ARTICLE 27 OR AT LEAST THE FIRST
SENTENCE BE DELETED. (FYI, ARTICLE 27 READS: "IF,
PURSUANT TO THE APPLICABLE LAW OF THE STATE IN WHICH THE
CONVICTED PERSON IS IMPRISONED, HE OR SHE IS ELIGIBLE
FOR PARDON OR COMMUTATION OF SENTENCE, THE STATE
CONCERNED SHALL NOTIFY THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR
RWANDA ACCORDINGLY. THE PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE JUDGES,
SHALL DECIDE THE MATTER ON THE BASIS OF THE INTERESTS OF
JUSTICE AND THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW." END FYI)
ALTERNATIVELY, THE GOR WANTED TO BE CONSULTED ABOUT
WHERE PEOPLE WOULD BE IMPRISONED AND WHEN THEY WOULD BE
RELEASED.
10. MATHESON EXPLAINED THAT RWANDA WAS ONE OF THE
POSSIBLE PLACES TO IMPRISON THE CRIMINALS, AND THAT NOT
•CONriDCNTIAL
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
OONriDCNTIAL
MANY OTHER COUNTRIES WERE LIKELY TO OFFER TO ACCEPT
PRISONERS, ALSO, THE TRIBUNAL WAS NOT OBLIGED TO GRANT
PAROLE JUST BECAUSE A PERSON WAS ELIGIBLE. AFTER THE
TRIBUNAL WAS DISBANDED THE SC WOULD DETERMINE WHO WOULD
MAKE DECISIONS ABOUT PARDON, WITH THE LIKELY RECIPIENT
OF THAT RESPONSIBILITY BEING THE RWANDANS. MATHESON
SUGGESTED THAT GENERALIZED LANGUAGE BE ADDED TO THE
RESOLUTION INSTRUCTING THE TRIBUNAL TO CONSULT WITH THE
GOR IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS FUNCTIONS.
11. FOCUS ON GENOCIDE. TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE
TRIBUNAL.S PRIMARY FOCUS WILL BE ON GENOCIDE, ARTICLE 2
(WHICH DEALS WITH VIOLATIONS OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION)
WILL BE MOVED TO BECOME ARTICLE 4 (FOLLOWING ARTICLES ON
"GENOCIDE" AND "CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY"). ALSO, THE
ENTIRE TITLE OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION (WHICH MENTIONS
ACTIONS "CONCERNING ARMED CONLICT") WILL BE ADDED TO THE
ARTICLE TO AVOID ANY MISPERCEPTION THAT COMMON CRIMES
WILL FALL UNDER THE TRIBUNAL'S JURISDICTION.
12. TIMING. AMB BAKURAMUTSA DID NOT THINK HE COULD GET
HIS GOVERNMENT'S FINAL REACTION ON THE TRIBUNAL BEFORE
THE END OF THE WEEK, GIVEN DIFFICULTCOMMUNICATIONS WITH
KIGALI AND THE TIME DIFFERENCE, AND ASKED THAT ACTION IN
THE COUNCIL BE PUT OFF UNTIL MONDAY, OCTOBER 24.
13. FOREIGN MINISTER. ON THE SEPARATE ISSUE OF THE
FOREIGN MINISTER WHO DISAPPEARED WITH THEIR MONEY,
BAKURAMUTSA NOTED THAT HE WAS FROM AN OPPOSITION PARTY,
THAT HE WAS CONSIDERED ONE OF THE LEAST DANGEROUS OF THE
OPPOSITION, AND THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WAS
PRESSURING THE GOR TO INCLUDE SUCH OPPOSITION MEMBERS.
14. VIEWS OF OTHER SC MEMBERS. SUBSEQUENT TO THE
MEETING WITH RWANDANS, USUN CONFERRED WITH OTHER
CO-SPONSORS OF THE SC RESOLUTION. NEW ZEALAND AND UK
HAD NO BASIC PROBLEMS WITH THE GROUND COVERED WITH THE
RWANDANS. FRANCE, HOWEVER, MAY POSSIBLY HAVE A PROBLEM
WITH PUSHING THE STARTING DATE BACK TO OCTOBER 1,1993.
ALSO, FRANCE INSISTS THAT THE GOVERNMENTS OF ZAIRE,
TANZANIA, UGANDA AND BURUNDI MUST AGREE TO ARTICLE 1 OF
THE STATUTE, WHICH EXTENDS THE COMPETENCE OF THE
TRIBUNAL TO ACTS CONNITTED BY RWANDAN CITIZENS IN THE
TERRITORY OF NEIGHBORING STATES. (FYI: ARTICLE 1 READS
AS FOLLOWS: "THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA
O O N r i D C N T I A IrSECTION 03 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 004459
DEPT FOR C - AJOYCE; L - MMATHESON; AF - A/S MOOSE
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND STEINBERG;
E.0.12356: DECLOADR
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PREF, AORC, RW, UN
SUBJECT: RWANDAN VIEWS ON WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL
GONriDCNTIAL
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAfcr
SHALL HAVE THE POWER TO PROSECUTE PERSONS RESPONSIBLE
FOR SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
CONNITTED IN THE TERRITORY OF RWANDA AND BY RWANDAN
CITIZENS IN THE TERRITORY OF NEIGHBOURING STATES SINCE 1
JANUARY 1994 IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE
PRESENT STATUTE." END FYI)
15. FOR KINSHASA, BUJUMBURA, KANPALA AND DAR: USUN
SUGGESTS THAT POSTS CONTACT APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES TO
CONFIRN THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION
OVER WAR CRINES AND ACTS OF GENOCIDE CONNITTED IN THEIR
TERRITORY BY RWANDANS. USUN BELIEVES THAT UN
REPRESENTATIVES OF THOSE COUNTRIES WILL NOT HAVE
SUFFICIENT AUTHORITY TO CONNIT THEIR GOVERNNENTS TO
THIS, ALTHOUGH WE WILL APPROACH THEM ALSO IN NEW YORK .
16. MININIZE CONSIDERED.
ALBRIGHT
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U N I T E D S T A T E S M I S S I O N TO T H E
799 UNITBD NATIONS PLAZA
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017
TO*
UNITED
NATIONS
20 October 1994
Interagency Group on Rwanda
THROUGH: Michael S h e e h a n ^
FROM:
Susan V a r i s c o ^
SUBJECT: Rwanda: UN-Zaire Joint Working Group Report
DPKO has received a report from the working group technical
team as well as the SRSG's recommendation. The report, i t s e l f ,
contains only the UN view. Apparently, the Zairian participants
are holding off on submitting their input in an effort to be paid
for more working days. A true joint report should follow soon.
wgrKinq grow Congmslaaa:
The report concludes that a 10,000-12,000 s i z e force i s
required to separate and move the m i l i t i a , leaders, and the army
and contain them thereafter. I t assumes violent resistence and
the necessity of a Chapter V I I mandate. Not surprisingly, the
report recommends that the UN cannot accomplish t h i s mandate.
The only force that can do the job i s a strong national force or
multinational force consisting mainly of one strong state.
The report also stresses the need to s t a r t a p o l i t i c a l
dialogue between refugee leaders and the Government of Rwanda as
well as i n i t i a t e significant s o c i a l and economic reconstruction
inside the country.
SRSG Rgcpnwgntifltlpn*
Realizing that a large Ch V I I operation i s p o l i t i c a l l y
u n r e a l i s t i c , the SRSG recommends a smaller UN force (size
undefined). The force would provide security for humanitarian
operations and attempt to "suppress" the m i l i t i a through presence.
Khan also emphasizes p o l i t i c a l dialogue and socioeconomic
reconstruction as integral components of the operation.
-CQWFJBENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
aow- ocUo3- PI
3/1V 5" KBH
�DPKO w i l l be meeting today to decide how to handle the report
(whether or not to wait for Zairian input) and to discuss the
recommendations. Eventually, the SYG w i l l weigh in and a report
w i l l be sent to the Council. This could happen as early as next
week.
Annan i s expecting a second interagency v i s i t to discuss the
new report. I f another v i s i t i s in order, the team should come
early next week, before the SVG finalizes his recommendations.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�OONriDCNTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: ATKIN, DESHAZER, NSC, STEINBERG, VAX
PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: GONriDCNTIAL
DTG:251807Z OCT 94
FM: USMISSION GENEVA
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5091
RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
0-0 N T I D C N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 009140
E.O. 12356: DECLOADR
TAGS: PREF, PREL, RW, CG
SUBJECT: UNHCR SEEKS USG INPUT AND SUPPORT FOR RWANDA
CAMP SECURITY SERVICE PACKAGE.
1. CONriDCNTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT
2. THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST (PARA 8).
3. SUMMARY. CONCERNED ABOUT THE RAPID DETERIORATION OF
CAMP SECURITY IN EASTERN ZAIRE, UNHCR IS DEVELOPING A
"SECURITY SERVICE PACKAGE" TO QUICKLY ADDRESS THE
PROBLEM AND OBTAIN DONOR SUPPORT. THE UNHCR PACKAGE
CONCEPT RELIES ON THE INTRODUCTION OF A MULTINATIONAL
POLICE FORCE WHICH WOULD SUPPORT ZAIRIAN SECURITY FORCES
IN PROTECTING REFUGEES AND THE DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN
ASS1SIANCE. THE MULTINATIONAL POLICE FORCE WOULD BE
CONSTITUTED WITH: ® AMULTINATIONAL CONTINGENT
COMPOSED OFBOLICE/GENDARMES FROM FRENCH SPEAKING
AFRICAN COUNTRIES (AND PERHAPS CANADA);(|) LOGISTICAL
SI IPPOBT IN TRANSPORT AND EQUIPMENT FROM NON-AFRICAN
COUNTRIES; ANDU^FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM OTHER
COUNTRIES. A SENIOR UNHCR OFFICIAL TOLD MISSOFF THAT
HIGH COMMISSIONER OGATA HAS INFORMED THE SECRETARY
GENERAL ABOUT THE INITIATIVE, AND ASKED FOR INFORMAL,
BUT QUICK USG INPUT WHILE THE INITIATIVE IS BEING
DEVELOPED. END SUMMARY.
CAMP SECURITY PROBLEM HAS WORSENED
4. ON OCTOBER 25, THE COORDINATOR FOR THE SPECIAL UNIT
FOR RWANDA AND BURUNDI, AUGUSTINE MAHIGA, TOLD MISSOFF
THAT UNHCR HAS REALIZED THAT SEPARATING THE EX-FAR FROM
_
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
OONFIDCNTIAL
^
3/1
^
KBH
�-OONriDCNTIAL
THE CAMPS IN EASTERN ZAIRE WILL NOT SOLVE WORSENING CAMP
SECURITY PROBLEMS, AND THAT MORE RADICAL STEPS ARE
NEEDED. MAHIGA EXPLAINED THAT UNHCR ALREADY HAS "LOST"
KATALE, AND THAT QUICK ACTION IS NEEDED TO FORESTALL THE
TAKEOVER OF OTHER CAMPS IN THE AREA. IN THIS REGARD,
MAHIGA GAVE MISSOFF A COPY OF AN OCTOBER 24 MEMORANDUM
FROM HIGH COMMISSIONER OGATA TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL,
WHICH OUTLINES THE SECURITY PROBLEM AND THE STEPS UNHCR
INTENDS TO TAKE TO ADDRESS THEM (COPY FAXED TO
STATE/PRM).
UNHCR PROPOSES SECURITY SERVICE PACKAGE
5. THE MEMORANDUM TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL STARTS WITH
THE PREMISE THAT THE SECURITY FORCES OF THE ASYLUM
COUNTRIES ARE NOT ABLE TO PROVIDE SECURITY IN THE
CAMPS. AS A RESULT, SECURITY CONDITIONS IN ZAIRE,
BURUNDI, AND TANZANIA HAVE DETERIORATED STEADILY,
RESULTING IN: A) A REDUCTION OF SPONTANEOUS RETURNS; B)
THE DIVERSION OF RELIEF ITEMS: C) DISRUPTIONSlKT
DEUVERY OF ASSISIANCE; D) A RESISTANCE TO THE
REGISIBAI04-QF-REFUGEES; AND, C) PERSISTENT ATTEMPTS OF
CAMPJ-EADERS TO TAKE OVERD AY-TO-DAY RUNNING OF THE
CAMPS.
6. UNHCR NOTES THAT IT IS WORKING WITH THE TANZANIAN
GOVERNMENT TO INCREASE TANZANIAN POLICE PRESENCE IN THE
CAMPS, AND ADMITS THAT MORE NEEDS TO DONE THERE.
HOWEVER, UNHCR'S MAIN PREOCCUPATION IS SECURITY IN THE
ZAIRIAN CAMPS. WHILE UNHCR WELCOMES THE INITIATIVE OF
SRSG KHAN TO SEPARATE THE EX-FAR FROM THE CAMPS, THIS
WILL NOT ADDRESS THE PROBLEMS CAUSED BY MILITIA AND THE
OLD POLITICAL STRUCTURE, BOTH OF WHICH WOULD REMAIN
AFTER THE EX-FAR WOULD DEPART. WITHIN ITS MANDATE,
UNHCR WILL DEVELOP A "SECURITY SERVICE PACKAGE," WHICH
WOULD AIM AT QUICKLY ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM AND
OBTAINING DONOR SUPPORT- THE PACKAGE AIMS AT
INTRODUCING A MULTINATIONAL POLICE FORCE IN SUPPORT OF
ZAIRIAN SECURITY FORCES. MAHIGA NOTED THAT ZAIRIAN PM
KENGO AND THE DEPUTY PM SUPPORT THIS CONCEPT. THE
MULTINATIONAL FORCE WOULD BE CONSTITUTED OF:
- A
MULTINATIONAL CONTINGENT (SIZE TO BE DETERMINED)
COMPOSED OF POLICE/GENDARMES FROM FRENCH-SPEAKING
AFRICAN COUNTRIES (AND PERHAPS) CANADA;
- LOGISTICAL SUPPORT IN TRANSPORT AND EQUIPMENT FROM
NON-AFRICAN COUNTRIES;
-- FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM OTHER COUNTRIES.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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OONriDCNTIAfc
�•OONriDCNTIAL
7. THE MEMORANDUM NOTES THAT UNHCR IS PREPARED TO
UNDERTAKE THE NECESSARY DEMARCHES TO INITIATE THE
OPERATION, AND THAT PRELIMINARY BUT UNNAMED CONTACTS
WITH GOVERNMENTS WOULD MEET WITH FAVORABLE REACTIONS.
THE PLAN HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH U/SYG PETER HANSEN AND
SRSG KHAN, WHO HAVE REACTED POSITIVELY TO IT. THE NOTE
CONCLUDES THAT IN VIEW OF THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION,
IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THIS INITIATIVE BE FORMALIZED AS
SOON AS POSSIBLE.
C O N I I D E N I I A b SECTION 02 OF 02 GENEVA 009140
E.O. 12356: DECLOADR
TAGS: PREF, PREL, RW, CG
SUBJECT: UNHCR SEEKS USG INPUT AND SUPPORT FOR RWANDA
CAMP SECURITY SERVICE PACKAGE.
ACTION REQUEST
8. MAHIGA ASKED MISSOFF FOR A QUICK USG REACTION TO AND
EVENTUAL SUPPORT OF THE CONCEPT, ESPECIALLY WHILE IT IS
BEING DEVELOPED. HE NOTED THAT MRS. OGATA IS AWARE OF
THIS REQUEST. PLEASE PROVIDE GUIDANCE ASAP.
STATUS OF SGSR KHAN INITIATIVE TO SEPARATE EX-FAR
9. MAHIGA ALSO EXPLAINED THAT THE JOINT UN/GOVERNMENT
OF ZAIRE MISSION COMPLETED ITS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
RELOCATING THE EX-FAR. THE MISSION ESTIMATES THAT
50,000 PEOPLE, OF WHICH ABOUT 20,000 ARE SOLDIERS, WOULD
HAVE TO BE MOVED TO THREE CAMPS IN EQUATORIA, SHABA, AND
KIVU PROVINCES. THE OPERATION WOULD REQUIRE THE
DEPLOYMENT OF ONE BATTALION PER CAMP TO PROVIDE
SECURITY, AND WOULD COST USDOLS 6 MILLION- ONE HALF OF
THE COST WOULD COVER SITE PREPARATION, THE OTHER HALF
AIR TRANSPORTATION, AS THERE ARE NO ROADS BETWEEN THE
CURRENT CAMPS AND THE NEW SITES. SPIEGEL
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RWANDA WEEKLY RSPORT
Friday, October 28, 1994
DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES
A f t e r three days of n e g o t i a t i o n , the Rwandan and Z a i r i a n prime
m i n i s t e r s and UNHCR signed a t r i p a r t i t e agreement on refugees.
Zaire agreed to guarantee the voluntary nature of r e p a t r i a t i o n ,
to f a c i l i t a t e the r e t u r n of the refugees and of t h e i r property,
and to continue t o o f f e r asylum to those refugees who wish to
remain i n Zaire. Rwanda agreed to create conditions t o
f a c i l i t a t e the "safe, d i g n i f i e d " r e p a t r i a t i o n of the refugees,
and to ensure t h e i r r e i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o Rwandan society i n
residences of t h e i r choice. The UNHCR i s to mobilize the
necessary l o g i s t i c a l and f i n a n c i a l resources to implement the
accords. Both governments guarantee the UNHCR access to a l l
refugees and r e p a t r i a t e s i n t h e i r respective t e r r i t o r i e s .
Press reports that the p a r t i e s had agreed to create a
UN-protected b u f f e r zone i n Rwanda turned out to be
exagerated. Instead, welcome centers would be set up, w i t h
UNAMIR i n the area providing s e c u r i t y (as they are already
doing).
DAS Bushnell has been speaking t o the OAU and UNHCR (through
our Mission i n Geneva) t o press f o r a prepatory conference t o
set out the agenda and lay the groundwork f o r the planned
refugee conference i n Bujumbura. The Embassy i n K i g a l i has
been i n constant contact w i t h G R o f f i c i a l s to f a c i l i t a t e
O
passage of the War Crimes t r i b u n a l r e s o l u t i o n i n New York.
HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS:
There i s , at long l a s t , modest progress to record. Monitors
have f i n a l l y been deployed; l o g i s i t i c a l and coordination
d i f f i c u l t i e s are g e t t i n g the a t t e n t i o n needed to sustain an
e f f e c t i v e operation. Two teams of four monitors were deployed
as of Monday, w i t h two more set to be deployed by Wednesday
evening, and another when an a d d i t i o n a l vehicle come out of
UNAMIR's repair shop. A report today (yet to be confirmed by
K i g a l i ) indicates that 12 a d d i t i o n a l monitors have a r r i v e d i n
Rwanda. Embassy K i g a l i w i l l advise us s h o r t l y how we can
a s s i s t i n the a c q u i s i t i o n of yet more vehicles.
We have b r i e f e d and coordinated the a c t i v i t i e s of a number of
" f i x e r s , " i n c l u d i n g q u a l i f i e d NGO's and UN personnel en route
to Geneva and K i g a l i . With t h e i r help, we have galvanized the
UN (USYG Hansen, USYG Conner, UNHCR Ogata) s u f f i c i e n t l y to
overcome the immediate r e c r u i t i n g and l o g i s t i c a l support
problems.
(Indeed, there i s c u r r e n t l y an embarrassment of
riches, w i t h UNHCR and UNAMIR vying f o r the main support r o l e . )
�CLINTON LiBRM* PHOTOCOPi
GOMFIDENTfMr
- 2According t o USUN, the d r a f t cooperation agreement between the
UN and the G R has f i n a l l y been approved by headquarters and
O
sent back t o Ayala Lasso f o r n e g o t i a t i o n w i t h and signature by
the GOR.
The challenge now s h i f t s to the longer term as we seek t o
assess the effectiveness of a) the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e arrangements
that are f i n a l l y j e l l i n g ; and b) the effectiveness and impact
of the monitors program.
RfiPUGEE SITUATION
Concerned about the rapid d e t e r i o r a t i o n of refugee camp
s e c u r i t y i n eastern Zaire and the lack of UN headquarters
decision-making i n addressing t h i s growing problem, UNHCR i s
developing a " s e c u r i t y service package" which would r e l y on the
i n t r o d u c t i o n of a m u l t i n a t i o n a l p o l i c e force which would
support Z a i r i a n s e c u r i t y forces i n p r o t e c t i n g refugees and the
d e l i v e r y of humanitarian assistance. The m u l t i n a t i o n a l p o l i c e
force would be c o n s t i t u t e d by a) a m u l t i n a t i o n a l contingent
composed of police/gendarmes from French speaking A f r i c a n
countries (and perhaps Canada); b) l o g i s t i c a l support i n
t r a n s p o r t and equipment from non-African countries; and c)
f i n a n c i a l support from other c o u n t r i e s . UNHCR believes (and we
agree) t h a t separating the ex-FAR forces from the camps i n
Zaire w i l l not solve worsening camp s e c u r i t y problems also
caused by the presence of the m i l i t i a and the o l d p o l i t i c a l
s t r u c t u r e . Mrs. Ogata has w r i t t e n t o the Secretary General
proposing t h i s concept and also seeks USG views thereon (read
what support we would o f f e r ) . This w i l l be discussed, along
w i t h other d r a f t UN s e c u r i t y concepts, by our interagency group,
On October 25, approximately 50 Rwandan refugees were k i l l e d
and 12 wounded i n refugee camps i n northern Burundi i n an
attack by uniformed s o l d i e r s . The government of Burundi i s
investigating.
PRM i s c u r r e n t l y o b l i g a t i n g $30 m i l l i o n i n Emergency Funds
(from the FY94 Dire Supplemental f o r Rwanda). These a d d i t i o n a l
c o n t r i b u t i o n s should help carry UNHCR, IFRC, IOM and WFP
through the end of the calendar year.
�•coHFiiikwi I AL-
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
- 3 ECOHQMIC/BILATKRAL ASSISTANCE:
World Bank Arrears:
A State/AID delegation t r a v e l e d to Paris f o r meetings en
October 27 w i t h the World Bank and other donors to discuss
payment of Rwanda's World Bank arrears. The session turned out
to be more an information sharing meeting than a pledging
conference.
Nonetheless, about s i x m i l l i o n d o l l a r s was
pledged, s t i l l shy of the $9.5 m i l l i o n the World Bank says i t
needs to r a i s e .
We expressed our i n t e n t i o n t o c o n t r i b u t e $2.5 m i l l i o n , w i t h
disbursement contingent on a commitment by the Rwandan
government to grant free access throughout Rwanda to UNAMIR
peacekeepers and human r i g h t s monitors. We also reviewed the
p o l i t i c a l , human r i g h t s , and other benchmarks we are t r a c k i n g .
Belgium said i t planned t o c o n t r i b u t e about
$2 m i l l i o n , although the f i n a l f i g u r e might be lower or
higher. Canada said i t planned t o o f f e r 2 m i l l i o n Canadian
d o l l a r s (about $1.5 m i l l i o n US). The Swiss and Dutch l a i d they
were considering c o n t r i b u t i o n s , but d i d not give any f i g u r e s .
(The World Bank asked them t o report back w i t h a decision
w i t h i n 10-12 days.) The Germans said they were providing
9 m i l l i o n marks f o r government functions (equipment, s a l a r i e s ,
etc.) but d i d not plan t o provide d i r e c t budget support
(seemingly excluding a c o n t r i b u t i o n t o paying o f f a r r e a r s ) .
France d i d not o f f e r any assistance, and Japan was not
present. (The World Bank said they would t a l k t o the Japanese
later.)
The donors expressed a w i l l i n g n e s s to help Rwanda generally but
shared s i m i l a r concerns about p o l i t i c a l r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , human
r i g h t s , s e c u r i t y , etc, and seemed t o favor progressive
c o n d i t i o n a l i t y . Canada believed t h a t the donors should impose
the same c o n d i t i o n s , and USAID*s Carol Peasley volunteered to
put together a document to c i r c u l a t e to the donors and then
submit t o the World Bank.
Other B i l a t e r a l A i d :
Our focus w i l l be to sustain humanitarian assistance as
required, revive the j u s t i c e system and assist the
R e h a b i l i t a t i o n M i n i s t e r w i t h resettlement programs. The
Embassy's d r a f t work plan proposes the f o l l o w i n g near-term
b i l a t e r a l assistance program:
a. humanitarian: OFDA $20 m i l l i o n ; PL480 $75 m i l l i o n
(region-wide);
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
- 4-
b. j u s t i c e : democracy and governance
FY94: $600,000 f o r commodities (e.g., computers, o f f i c e
m a t e r i a l s , e t c . ) , $3.1 m i l l i o n d o l l a r s i n s t i t u t i o n b u i l d i n g ;
FY95: $2.5 m i l l i o n i n s t i t u t i o n b u i l d i n g ; o f f i c e of new
i n i t i a t i v e s $750,000 d o l l a r s f o r human r i g h t s center.
c. resettlement: a i d t o displaced persons,
FY94: $1.3 m i l l i o n
FY95: $2.5 m i l l i o n
for resettlement/demobilization;
d. a g r i c u l t u r e r e h a b i l i t a t i o n : WFP PL480 monetization
program i n FY95-possible $30 m i l l i o n ;
e. population: c e n t r a l funding f o r aidscap and p r o j e c t
design on maternal c h i l d h e a l t h .
We have c i r c u l a t e d the Embassy's work plan t o determine whether
other bureaus might have a d d i t i o n a l funding sources t o apply to
these p r i o r i t i e s or whether the other bureaus believe that
other areas w i l l also require assistance. On October 26, we
held an interagency meeting to discuss i n more d e t a i l possible
funding mechanisms f o r assistance t o the j u d i c i a r y . Ambassador
Rawson i s also using h i s consultations t o discuss t h i s and
r e l a t e d issues, i n c l u d i n g possible assistance i n p o l i c e
training.
UNAMIR
Mandate:
<jtf The rump Peacekeeping Core Group met on October 26 t o •
discuss the a n t i c i p a t e d UN options on Rwandan refugee camp
s e c u r i t y and other issues r e l a t i n g to Rwanda p r i o r t o the
interagency team t r a v e l i n g t o New York next week. On camp
s e c u r i t y , i t was decided t o recommend t o the UN a concept
corresponding roughly t o SRSG Khan's suggestions.
S p e c i f i c a l l y , the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community would create a UN
force to provide temporary s e c u r i t y i n the camps located i n
Zaire. I t would consist of at least one b a t t a l i o n but probably
more. The force's duties would include providing daytime
s e c u r i t y i n the Zaire camps f o r r e l i e f workers.
Simultaneously, one b a t t a l i o n would move from camp t o camp t o
provide f u l l s e c u r i t y f o r r e l i e f workers, war crimes
i n v e s t i g a t o r s while they work among refugee populatioh and
provide safe c o r r i d o r s / e s c o r t s f o r those who want t o r e t u r n
home; conduct disarmament t o the extent possible; and escort
moderate Hutu ex-FAR leaders i n t o camps to persuade ex-FAR t o
r e i n t e g r a t e i n t o new Army.
�-^QWPIPBMTiftfc-
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
- 5 Tanzania would provide s e c u r i t y i n i t s own camps. W would
e
send survey team to assess needs, then lead a t i n - c u p exercise
to push other countries t o provide the wherewithal. W would
e
f i n d what we could from our assets. This would be outside the
UNSC r u b r i c . (Tanzanian President Mwinyi has already asked the
U.S. and UNHCR f o r $1.2 m i l l i o n i n assistance f o r his s e c u r i t y
forces, but t h i s amount w i l l support operations around the
camps f o r only three-four months.)
(fi) Further discussions on t h i s subject w i t h UN w i l l take place
Tuesday, November 1. Prudence Bushnell (DOS), Dick Clarke &
Susan Rice (NSC), Col. Perry Baltimore (JCS), Sarah Sewall &
Vince Kern (OSD), Bob L o f t i s (IO/PHO) and Susan Varisco (USUN)
w i l l s i t i n f o r the U.S. side.
Deployment:
— As of October 20, UNAMIR had deployed a t o t a l o f 5,376
personnel (5,022 t r o o p s ) . Breakdown of n a t i o n a l contingents i s
as f o l l o w s : 303 A u s t r a l i a n s , 576 B r i t i s h , 364 Canadians, 800
Ethiopians, 819 Ghanaians, 166 Malawians, 200 Malians, 330
Nigerians, 43 Nigeriens, 35 Bissauans, 40 Congolese, 241
Senegalese, 130 Chadians, 101 Zambians, 826 Tunisians, 322
m i l i t a r y observers, 48 H s t a f f , 32 CIVPOL.
Q
— The UN has accepted the Zambian l o a d l i s t and plans t o deploy
the contingent on/about November 4.
— The Indian b a t t a l i o n i s scheduled t o deploy i t s
reconnaissance team on/about October 28, w i t h the main body of
troops moving over the subsequent two-week period.
— The Ethiopian contingent i s being issued insect r e p e l l a n t ,
f l a k jackets and t e n t s ; f r e s h rations should also have been
d i s t r i b u t e d by now, according t o the UN. Another item of
concern t o t h i s contingent i s n i g h t v i s i o n devices, which w i l l
not be a v a i l a b l e u n t i l l a t e November due t o manufacturing
requirements. UNAMIR has issued the contingent two of these
devices t o use on p a t r o l , w i t h the advice that they can sign
out a d d i t i o n a l sets from the l i m i t e d UNAMIR stores. The
shipping contract f o r mine-protected vehicles i s c u r r e n t l y i n
being concluded i n New York, but UNAMIR has issued the
Ethiopians two APCs (M-113) to use u n t i l two South A f r i c a n
vehicles a r r i v e .
SEFOA 2 78 6
�SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRAGT
IgiteHBgewce A s s e s s m e n t
United States Department of State
• Bureau of Intelligence and Research
INR foreign affairs brief
Entering a More Dangerous Phase in Rwanda and
Burundi
There has been concern that armed Rwandan Hutu incursions into Rwanda
and Burundi would heighten political instability in both countries and
throughout the region, EO 13526 1.4c indicates the effect will be
especially destabilizingfor the fragile government in Burundi and could
provoke another ethnic explosion.
* * *
Confirmation of organized insurgency
confirm that cross-border incursions from Zaire into Rwanda and Burundi
are taking place. |
| has reported that Rwandan Hutu
militias crossed into northwestern Burundi near Bukavu to try to provoke the
Tutsi-dominated Army in Burundi and rekindle the war in a bid to reclaim
power in Kigali. According tcL
former
Rwandan Government Army (FAR) soldiers have launched small commando
raids into southwestern Rwanda from an island in Lake Kivu near Bukavu.
helps to clarify sometimes contradictory claims in the
press and by some UN sources during the past month of armed incursions
into northwestern Burundi and southwestern Rwanda. Those claims have
been variously identified as the Burundian Army fighting Burundian Hutu
residents and organized Hutu extremists; Rwandan Hutu refugees and/or
Rwandan Hutu infiltrators, perhaps joined by Hutu extremists from Burundi;
and attacks by Rwandan Patriotic Army forces. It is beginning to appear that
all of the above are true, indicating not only the complexity but also the
intractability of the problem.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
aow- o^SS/iV'5"
KBM
SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT
Declassify: OADR
November 4, 1994
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECnET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT
INR'
Zaire supports Rwandan Hutus
EO 13526 1.4c
indicate that former FAR Chief of Staff Gen. Augustin
Bizimungu—located in Goma—and civilian authorities representing Hutus
in exile have approved an organized insurgency operating out of eastern
Zaire against the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Bizimungu has appointed
two sector commanders with backup staff and logistics support.
I
[that President Mobutu's key generals and Mobutu
himselfTavor and support the ex-FAR. It is becoming clear that neither the
Zairians nor the ex-FAR will allow the army in exile to be moved from the
border.
A new equation for Burundi?
The pressure is not only coming from military/militia e ements.
Hutu political fronts are also involved.
has linked one
element of Burundi's majority and Hutu-dominated Burundi Democratic
Front (FRODEBU) party to PALIPEHUTU extremists. They and Hutu
refugees in Tanzania are connected to a new Hutu organization, the Front for
Democratic Defense, which has a military wing. The reported objective of
this new party is to enter Burundi from eastern Zaire and gain control of
areas in the northwest. Its ultimate objective is to secure a power base from
which to supplant the current, fragile power-sharing arrangement negotiated
during August and September. Apriority objective is to achieve Hutu parity
in the military, an extremely sensitive and, from most Burundian Tutsis'
point of view, unacceptable outcome.
Prognosis
The former Rwandan government and ex-FAR have gained control of
the refugee camps and international humanitarian relief and are now in the
initial stages of building an insurgency against the RPF and Kigali. Former
government and FAR leaders apparently believe the Hutu government in
exile is winning some international support. Their objective is to establish
themselves militarily, win international recognition, and either topple the
RPF or, more likely, move eventually to negotiations with Kigali from a
position of strength. The RPF will try to defeat the insurgency and will carry
the fight into eastern Zaire.
Any protracted insurgency aimed at Kigali is likely to lead to a
breakdown of Burundi's fragile power-sharing pact and renewed ethnic
upheaval. Rwandan Hutus and Burundi's Hutu extremists will join in a
broad, two-front political and military push for the restoration of majority
rule in Kigali and the overthrow of Tutsi domination in Burundi. The Tutsi,
having nowhere to go, will fight.
cncna^ron^ocoMTn.CT
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CONFIDENTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
' '
DIST: ATKIN, BEERS, CLARKER. DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, SCHWARTZ. STEINBERG, VAX
PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
DTG:080253Z NOV 94
FM: USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0540
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 1366
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 6381
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 2322
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0451
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 0166
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0745
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0320
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 0697
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0465
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI 0056
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0885
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 1586
G-0 N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 004820
NSC FOR CLARKE
STATE FOR WIRTH
E.0.12356: DECLOADR
TAGS: MARR, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, RW, UNSC,
SUBJECT: RWANDA: 11/4 WIRTH-ANNAN MEETING
1. CONFIDENTIAL. ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. U/SYG ANNAN BELIEVES THAT WE ARE ON
THE WAY TO ANOTHER FAILED STATE IN RWANDA. THE
DRAFT SYG REPORT IS COMPLETED AND CONTAINS A THREE
PART PROPOSAL FOR SECURITY AND REPATRIATION IN THE
CAMPS: OGATA'S INTERNATIONAL POLICE FORCE
(SHORT-TERM), A UN POLICE FORCE (LONGER-TERM). AND
A 2-3 BATTALION PEACKEEPING FORCE. UNDERSECRETARY
WIRTH URGED ANNAN TO CONSIDER CONTRACT POLICE, AND
AGREED TO TAKE THE LEAD WITH UNHCR HEAD OGATA IN
DRUMMING UP RESOURCES. END SUMMARY.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAL
aon- o a v a - n
*
�CONFIDENTIAL
HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS
3. UNDERSECRETARY WIRTH OPENED THE MEETING BY
EXPRESSING HIS CONCERNS ABOUT THE SLOW DEPLOYMENT
OF HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS. HE ASKED IF DPKO WOULD
REDEPLOY THE SOMALI POLICE VEHICLES FROM MOGADISHU
TO RWANDA. ANNAN DID NOT ANSWER DIRECTLY, BUT HE
SAID THAT EQUIPMENT WAS CONTINUING TO MOVE OUT OF
MOGADISHU AND THAT THE HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS WERE
RECEIVING VEHICLES.
ANOTHER FAILED STATE
4. ANNAN THEN LAUNCHED INTO A STARK ACCOUNT OF THE
DETERIORATING SITUATION IN RWANDA. HE SENSED THAT
THE WORLD WOULD FAIL RWANDA AGAIN. HE SAID THAT
THE RWANDA SITUATION IS WORSE THAN ANYTHING WE HAS
SEEN. THE GOVERNMENT IS LITERALLY WITHOUT ANY
RESOURCES. THE RPF IS LOSING ITS REPUTATION AS A
DISCIPLINED FORCE, THERE ARE NO PROVISIONS FOR
ASSISTANCE IN BASIC INSTITUTION BUILDING SUCH AS
PRISONS AND POLICE. WE ARE WITNESSING THE
DEVELOPMENT OF ANOTHER FAILED STATE. UNDER SUCH
CIRCUMSTANCES THE UN CANNOT ENCOURAGE REFUGEES TO
GO BACK, BUT IS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY READY
TO CARE FOR THIS POPULATION FOR AN INDEFINITE
PERIOD? FINALLY, ANNAN IS WORRIED ABOUT HIS OWN
PEACEKEEPERS. BECAUSE THEY ARE THE ONLY FORCE IN
RWANDA, THEY WILL BE BLAMED WHEN THINGS FALLS APART.
UN PROPOSAL
5. ANNAN ARTICULATED A THREE PART PROPOSAL THAT
REPRESENTS AN ADVANCE IN DPKO THINKING FROM LAST
WEEK'S INTERAGENCY MEETING (SEE REFTEL). THE FIRST
PART IS THE OPERATION PROPOSED BY UNHCR HEAD
OGATA-IMMEDIATE BUT TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE TO THE
ZAIRIAN FORCES THROUGH BI-LATERAL ARRANGEMENTS.
THIS IS A SHORT-TERM SOLUTION THAT
WILL BE PHASED OUT ONCE THE UN FORCE IS DEPLOYED.
ANNAN BELIEVES THAT THIS OPERATION COULD BE CARRIED
OUT UNDER UNHCR AUTHORITY AND NEED NOT BE
AUTHORIZED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL (COMMENT:
MISSION QUESTIONS WHETHER A UN AGENCY SHOULD CARRY
OUT A PEACE AND SECURITY OPERATION WITHOUT SECURITY
COUNCIL OVERSIGHT. END COMMENT.).
6. THE SECOND PART OF ANNAN'S OPERATION IS A UN
VERSION OF THE USG "BUBBLE" CONCEPT. 2-3
CONFIDENTIAL
alNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CONFIDENTIAL
BATTALIONS WOULD ESTABLISH SECURE AREAS WITHIN
REFUGEE CAMPS UNDER A ROBUST CHAPTER VI MANDATE.
IN ADDITION, THE FORCE WOULD SECURE CROSSING POINTS
AND SAFE PASSAGE FROM THE CAMPS INTO RWANDA.
7. THE THIRD PART IS A LONGER-TERM TRAINING
OPERATION THAT WOULD ENTAIL THE SELECTION.
TRAINING. EQUIPING, MONITORING AND SUPERVISING OF
G O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 004820
NSC FOR CLARKE
STATE FOR WIRTH
E.0.12356: DECLOADR
TAGS: MARR, PREL, PHUM. MOPS, RW, UNSC,
SUBJECT: RWANDA: 11/4 WIRTH-ANNAN MEETING
ZAIRIAN AND HUTU GENDARMERIE.
8. A SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION WITH THE DPKO SENIOR
POLITICAL OFFICER FOR RWANDA CONFIRMED THAT THE 24
HOUR SECURITY FORCE WILL START WITH 1-2 CAMPS AT A
TIME AND REMAIN FOR ONLY A LIMITED PERIOD (30
DAYS). UNLIKE THE USG PROPOSAL, DPKO ENVISIONS
LEAVING BEHIND A CIVILIAN POLICE UNIT AS WELL AS
SOME PEACEKEEPING FORCES AFTER THE "BUBBLE" MOVES
ON. DPKO IS THINKING THAT THE "BUBBLE" SHOULD
START WITH GOMA CAMPS. HOWEVER, THE FORCE
COMMANDER HAS RECOMMENDED BUKAVU CAMPS. THE FORCE
COMMANDER ALSO BELEIVES THAT A FORCE OF 4,000 WOULD
BE REQUIRED FOR THE PROPOSED OPERATION.
9. A DRAFT REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS BEEN
COMPLETED AND WILL BE USED BY THE SYG AS A BASIS
FOR HIS TUESDAY MEETING IN GENEVA. (IN ADDITION TO
THE ABOVE OPTIONS, THE DRAFT REPORT CONTAINS THE
REJECTED OPTION FOR SEPARATING AND MOVING MILITIA
AND FORMER GOVERNMENT LEADERS.) THE REPORT WILL BE
FINALIZED AFTER THAT MEETING.
DONORS AND CONTRACT POLICE
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
CONFIDENTIAL
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CONFIDENTIAL
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
12. WIRTH ASKFD ABOUT THE COST OF A PRIVATE
CnNTRAOTOR I
AT ANNAN'S URGING, WIRTH
AGREED THAT THE US WOULD CONSIDER TAKING THE LEAD
WITH OGATA TO DRUM UP RESOURCES FOR CONTRACT POLICE.
KIGALI AND BUJUMBURA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
ALBRIGHT
BT
#4820
NNNN
< SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02
< SSN>4820
< TOR>941107220647 Ml 349042
< SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
< SSN>4820
< TOR>941107220648 M1349043
A
A
A
A
A
A
FROM:
SITREPRT
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONriDENTIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CONFIDCNTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: ATKIN, BEERS, CLARKER. DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, SCHWARTZ, STEINBERG. VAX
PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
DTG:080250Z NOV 94
FM: USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0535
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0463
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0449
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0318
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 0695
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 1364
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 1584
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 6379
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0883
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 2320
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 0164
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0743
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI 0054
G G N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 004818
NSC FOR CLARKE
STATE FOR WIRTH
E.0.12356: DECLOADR
TAGS: MARR. PREL, PHUM, MOPS, RW, UNSC,
SUBJECT: RWANDA: 11/4 WIRTH-OGATA MEETING
1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. UNHCR HEAD OGATA ASSURED
UNDERSECRETARY WIRTH THAT UNHCR WOULD NOT PULL OUT
OF THE RWANDAN REFUGEE CAMPS. AT WIRTH'S URGING.
SHE WILL CONSIDER USING CONTRACT GUARDS TO EXPEDITE
UNHCR'S "SECURITY ASSISTANCE PACKAGE" IN ZAIRE.
MRS. OGATA HOPES TO SEND AN ASSESSMENT TEAM TO
ZAIRE AT THE END OF THIS WEEK. MRS. OGATA WAS ALSO
CONCERNED ABOUT THE WATER SITUATION IN THE
TANZANIAN CAMPS. WIRTH RAISEP THE POSSIBILITY OF
USING US WATER PURIFICAIION EQUIPMENT IN KIGALI.
END SUMMARY.
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED I N PART
PER E. 0.13526
ao\\-oau3-n
0
S/i !/! S
K8H
�CONFIDENTIAL
3. ON FRIDAY. 11/4. US UNDERSECRETARY FOR GLOBAL
AFFAIRS AND RWANDA COORDINATOR, TIM WIRTH, MET WITH
UNHCR HEAD, MRS. OGATA TO DISCUSS A RANGE OF RWANDA
ISSUES INCLUDING UNHCR'S SECURITY ASSISTANCE
PACKAGE, CONTRACT GUARDS, JAPANESE TROOPS, CAMPS IN
TANZANIA, AND UNHCR-GOR RELATIONS.
UNHCR'S SECURITY ASSISTANCE PACKAGE
4. MRS. OGATA OPENED THE MEETING BY EMPHASIZING
THAT, UNLIKE THE NGO'S. UNHCR CANNOT LEAVE ZAIRE.
HOWEVER, THIS IS THE FIRST TIME SHE HAS ENCOUNTERED
A HOST GOVERNMENT THAT HAS NO CAPACITY TO DEAL WITH
REFUGEE CAMPS IN ITS TERRITORY. THIS IS WHY SHE
HAS PROPOSED THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PACKAGE FOR
ZAIRE.
5. SHE SAID THAT THE PROPOSAL IS STILL JUST AN
IDEA AND, IN ANY CASE, ENVISIONED ONLY AS A STOPGAP
MEASURE THAT WILL HOPEFULLY BE COMPLIMENTED BY
LARGER MEASURES UNDER CONSIDERATION IN DPKO. THUS
FAR. NO ONE HAS OFFERED POLICE TRAINERS. NO ONE IS
LIKELY TO DO SO UNLESS THE SYG FORMALLY ENDORSES
THE PROPOSAL. HE WILL PROBABLY HOLD OFF ON
ENDORSING THE PROPOSAL AT LEAST UNTIL THE TUESDAY
MEETING IN GENEVA. MS. OGATA HAS, HOWEVER. BEEN
GIVEN THE GO AHEAD TO CONSULT WITH GOVERNMENTS.
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
PRIVATE SECURITY
8. UNDERSECRETARY WIRTH SUGGESTED THAT MRS. OGATA
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CONFIDENTIAL
CONSIDER USING PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANY IN ORDER TO
EXPEDITE THE OPERATION. HE EMPHASIZED THAT WE MUST
DO WHATEVER WE CAN TO ADDRESS THIS SECURITY
SITUATION NOW. WIRTH SUGGESTED THAT OGATA LOOK
INTO THE ISRAELI FIRM THAT HAS TRAINED MOBUTU'S
SECURITY FORCE. OGATA SAID THAT SHE IS HOPING TO
SEND OUT AN ASSESSMENT TEAM TOWARD THE END OF THIS
WEEK. SHE HOPES THAT DPKO AND NATIONS WITH POLICE
Q Q N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 004818
NSC FOR CLARKE
STATE FOR WIRTH
E.0.12356: DECLOADR
TAGS: MARR. PREL. PHUM. MOPS, RW. UNSC,
SUBJECT: RWANDA: 11/4 WIRTH-OGATA MEETING
TRAINING PROGRAMS (SUCH AS THE UNITED STATES) WILL
PARTICIPATE. WIRTH ASKED IF A PRIVATE CONTRACTOR
MIGHT PARTICIPATE IN THE ASSESSMENT MISSION. SHE
SAID IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE. SHE HAD ALREADY BEEN IN
TOUCH WITH A BRITISH FIRM, BUT WAS CONCERNED ABOUT
THE EXPENSE OF A PRIVATE CONTRACTOR. WIRTH
RESPONDED THAT THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION CALLED
FOR INVESTIGATING ALL MEANS AND THAT THE USG MIGHT
BE INTERESTED IN PARTICIPATING.
OTHER INITIATIVES
JAPANESE
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
EXPANDED UNAMIR
10. WIRTH SAID THAT IN ADDITION TO A CONTRACTED
POLICE FORCE. THE USG IS INTERESTED IN AN EXPANDED
UNAMIR. MRS. OGATA CAUTIONED AGAINST USING FORCE
TO SEPARATE SOLDIERS AND LEADERS. SHE FELT THAT IT
WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE IN THE LONG RUN.
TANZANIA
11. WIRTH ASKED OGATA ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
^
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: CLARKER, DESHAZER. NSC, RICE, SARTOR, STEINBERG, VAX
PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
DTG:090425Z NOV 94
1
FM: USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO:
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE 0061
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0621
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 1320
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0325
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 1375
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 6434
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 1628
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 0700
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0453
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0467
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0747
G G N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 USUN NEW YORK 004861
HAGUE PLEASE PASS DAVID SCHEFFER
DEPT FOR G - AJOYCE; L - MMATHESON: AF - A/S MOOSE
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND STEINBERG;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS. J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.0.12356: DECLOADR
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PREF, AORC, RW. UN
SUBJECT: RWANDA TRIBUNAL ESTABLISHED BY SC 11/8
1. (U) SUMMARY: THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADOPTED
RESOLUTION 955 ESTABLISHING AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL
FOR RWANDA BY A VOTE OF 13-1 (RWANDA)-1 (CHINA) ON
NOVEMBER 8- IN AN EXPLANATION OF VOTE, RWANDA REMINDED
THAT PRESIDENT BIZIMUNGU HAD ASKED FOR A TRIBUNAL.
ENUMERATED RWANDAN PROBLEMS WITH THE RESOLUTION, AND DID
NOT/NOT STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY WOULD COOPERATE WITH
THE TRIBUNAL. CHINA AND BRAZIL VOICED RESERVATIONS, AND
THE OTHER COUNCIL MEMBERS SPOKE OF THE NEED FOR JUSTICE
AND GOR COOPERATION. TEXT OF RESOLUTION AND USG
STATEMENT BELOW. END SUMMARY.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
3. (G) THE CO-SPONSORS OF THE TRIBUNAL RESOLUTION
CONSULTED ACTIVELY AMONG THEMSELVES AND WITH THE
NON-ALIGNED CAUCUS, IN ORDER TO ADDRESS SOME OF THE
SECONDARY CONCERNS WHICH THE RWANDANS HAD RELAYED TO THE
NON-ALIGNED. ALTHOUGH NOTHING SHORT OF ALLOWING THE
DEATH PENALTY COULD GAIN AN AFFIRMATIVE VOTE FROM
RWANDA, THEY WERE WILLING TO MAKE OTHER CHANGES TO
SOLIDIFY NON-ALIGNED SUPPORT FOR THE RESOLUTION. THE
NON-ALIGNED HAD NO SERIOUS OPPOSITION TO THE RESOLUTION,
BUT WERE ACTING TO MOLLIFY THE RWANDANS. MINOR CHANGES
WERE MADE IN PARAGRAPHS REFERRING TO THE NUMBER OF
JUDGES, PARDON FOR CONVICTED CRIMINALS, AND THE LOCALE
FOR THE TRIBUNAL'S WORK. FRANCE REFUSED TO ALLOW THE
STARTING DATE FOR THE TRIBUNAL'S JURISDICTION TO BE
MOVED BACK.
4. (G) RWANDAN PERMREP MANZI MADE CLEAR IN COUNCIL
INFORMALS 11/7 THAT HE WOULD VOTE AGAINST THE
RESOLUTION, PRIMARILY DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A DEATH
PENALTY IN THE TRIBUNAL. DURING A MEETING OF THE
CO-SPONSORS, AMB. ALBRIGHT BROACHED THE IDEA OF A
BILATERAL APPROACH TO THE RWANDANS ON THE DEATH PENALTY
ISSUE.
EO 13526 1.4b. EO 13526 1.4d
INSTEAD, AMB.
ALBRIGHT INCORPORATED THE U.S. UNDERSTANDING OF THE
DEATH PENALTY ISSUE IN HER EXPLANATION OF VOTE.
5. (U) STATEMENTS WERE MADE BY RUSSIA, FRANCE. NEW
ZEALAND, UK. CZECH, ARGENTINA. BRAZIL, PAKISTAN, CHINA.
SPAIN. NIGERIA, RWANDA, OMAN AND THE U.S. RWANDAN
PERMREP MANZI THANKED THE CO-SPONSORS FOR THEIR PATIENCE
AND WORK. HE RAN THROUGH A BRIEF HISTORY OF MASSACRES
FROM 1959 TO PRESENT. STRESSING THE SILENCE AND INACTION
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, AND THE CREATION OF A
CULTURE OF IMPUNITY. HE REMINDED THAT PRESIDENT
BIZIMUNGU HAD SPOKEN TO THE UNGA OF THE URGENT NEED TO
ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL WHICH WOULD AVOID
THE APPEARANCE OF VENGEANCE, HAVE ACCESS TO CRIMINALS
OUTSIDE THE TERRITORY OF RWANDA AND HELP REBUILD RWANDAN
SOCIETY. HE STATED THAT THE STATUTE AND TRIBUNAL AS
DRAFTED WOULD NOT BRING THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR GENOCIDE
TO JUSTICE. HE REITERATED THE GOR'S DIFFICULTIES ON THE
ISSUES RELATING TO: (1) STARTING DATE, (2) NUMBER OF
JUDGES, (3) INCLUSION OF LESSER CRIMES THAN GENOCIDE,
(4) JUDGES POSSIBLY COMING FROM COUNTRIES IMPLICATED IN
TRAINING CRIMINALS FOR THE MASSACRES. (5) PAROLE AND
IMPRISONMENT OUTSIDE RWANDA. (6) CAPITAL PUNISHMENT. AND
(7) SEAT OF THE TRIBUNAL HE SAID THE DESIRED RWANDAN
CHANGES WOULD NOT IMPAIR THE INTERNATIONAL NATURE OF THE
TRIBUNAL MANZI DID NOT/NOT ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF
WHETHER OR NOT THE GOR WOULD COOPERATE WITH THE TRIBUNAL
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
IN CARRYING OUT ITS WORK. USDEL HAD STRESSED TO MANZI
THAT WE EXPECTED HIS EOV TO EXPLICITLY SAY RWANDA WOULD
COOPERATE WITH THE TRIBUNAL, IN LIGHT OF SIMILAR
STATEMENTS BY GEN KAGAME IN THE NEW YORK TIMES. MANZI.
LOOKING SURPRISED. SAID HE WOULD HAVE TO CHECK WITH
KAGAME BEFORE MAKING SUCH A STATEMENT. SINCE HE HAD NOT
BEEN INSTRUCTED TO DO SO.
G O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 05 USUN NEW YORK 004861
HAGUE PLEASE PASS DAVID SCHEFFER
DEPT FOR G - AJOYCE; L - MMATHESON; AF - A/S MOOSE
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND STEINBERG;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.0.12356: DECLOADR
TAGS: PHUM. PREL, PREF, AORC, RW, UN
SUBJECT: RWANDA TRIBUNAL ESTABLISHED BY SC 11/8
6. (U) CHINA EXPLAINED THAT ITS ABSTENTION WAS BASED
ON THE LACK OF RWANDAN SUPPORT FOR THE TRIBUNAL CHINA
REITERATED ITS OPPOSITION TO INVOKING CHAPTER 7 WHEN
ESTABLISHING A TRIBUNAL, AS IT HAD UPON ESTABLISHMENT OF
THE YUGOSLAV TRIBUNAL BRAZIL VOICED MANY LEGAL
RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE PROCEDURE FOR ESTABLISHING THE
TRIBUNAL, BUT VOTED YES AS A POLITICAL CONDEMNATION OF
THE RWANDAN ATROCITIES. BRAZIL ASSERTED THAT THE
SECURITY COUNCIL WENT BEYOND ITS CONSTITUTIONAL
COMPETENCE IN ESTABLISHING A COURT, AND IN INVOKING
CHAPTER 7 TO DO SO. IT WOULD HAVE PREFERRED A THOROUGH
REVIEW IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S SIXTH COMMITTEE, WHICH
DEALS WITH LEGAL MATTERS.
7. (U) SEVERAL OTHER SPEAKERS VOICED SUPPORT FOR THE
IDEA OF AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT WITH BROADER
JURISDICTION. ALL CALLED ON THE GOR TO COOPERATE WITH
THE TRIBUNAL
8. (U) BEGIN TEXT OF USG STATEMENT:
-GENOCIDE OCCURRED IN RWANDA LAST SPRING. OTHER GRAVE
VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW ALSO HAVE
RAVAGED THAT STATE. THIS COUNCIL HAS BEEN SEIZED WITH
THESE HORRIFIC EVENTS THROUGH MUCH OF THIS YEAR. THE
COUNCIL ITSELF HAS NOT BEEN IMMUNE FROM CRITICISM. BUT
TODAY MARKS THE CULMINATION OF MONTHS OF VERY HARD AND
PERSISTENT WORK BY OUR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS, THE
SECRETARIAT. THE COMMISSION OF EXPERTS. AND THIS COUNCIL
TO CREATE A NEW AD HOC TRIBUNAL FOR THE INVESTIGATION
AND PROSECUTION OF GENOCIDE. CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY,
AND WAR CRIMES IN RWANDA AND BY RWANDAN CITIZENS IN
STATES NEIGHBORING RWANDA.
CLINTON UBRARY PHOTOCOPY
COUriDENTIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
-WE REGRET THAT THE GOVERNNENT OF RWANDA CAST ITS VOTE
AGAINST THE RESOLUTION. AS OTHER NEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL
HAVE STATED, THE CO-SPONSORS WORKED HARD TO ACCONNODATE
A NUMBER OF RWANDAN CONCERNS, BUT WE WERE NOT ABLE TO
ACCOMNODATE ALL OF THEN. WHILE WE UNDERSTAND THEIR
CONCERNS REGARDING SEVERAL KEY ISSUES - INDEED ON THE
DEATH PENALTY WE NIGHT EVEN AGREE - IT WAS SIMPLY NOT
POSSIBLE TO MEET THOSE CONCERNS AND STILL MAINTAIN BROAD
SUPPORT IN THE COUNCIL THEREFORE, NY GOVERNNENT
BELIEVES THAT THE RIGHT CHOICE IS TO ESTABLISH THE
TRIBUNAL THIS TRAGEDY DEMANDS RATHER THAN WAIT TO
ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT THAT WOULD NEVER COME.
-NONETHELESS, WE URGE THE GOVERNNENT OF RWANDA TO HONOR
ITS OBLIGATION TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL AND THE INVESTIGATION IT MUST UNDERTAKE IN
ORDER TO PROSECUTE THOSE GUILTY OF THE UNSPEAKABLE ACTS
OF GENOCIDE AND OTHER ATROCITIES. WE APPRECIATE THE
EFFORTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS LEGAL COUNSEL. HANS
CORELL, TO CONSULT WITH THE GOVERNNENT OF RWANDA IN
KIGALI ABOUT THIS RESOLUTION AND THE STATUTE FOR THE
TRIBUNAL. OVER THE LAST FEW NONTHS, THIS COUNCIL HAS
ACTED WITH DETERNINATION TO ESTABLISH THE TRIBUNAL AT
THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE.
-THE PROSECUTOR WILL NEED TO WORK VERY CLOSELY WITH THE
GOVERNNENT OF RWANDA TO ESTABLISH A PRESENCE IN THAT
COUNTRY AND TO OPERATE FREELY IN HIS INVESTIGATIONS AND
PROSECUTIONS. MY GOVERNNENT FULLY SUPPORTS THE
ESTABLISHNENT OF A TRIBUNAL OFFICE IN KIGALI AND FOR A
GREAT DEAL OF THE TRIBUNAL'S WORK NECESSARILY TO PROCEED
IN RWANDA. WE ALSO LOOK FORWARD TO FURTHER
CONSULTATIONS ON THE OFFICIAL SEAT OF THE TRIBUNAL IT
IS INPERATIVE THAT THE TRIBUNAL OPERATE EFFICIENTLY.
SECURELY. AND IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH THE OVERALL
DEVELOPNENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW. WE WILL
LOOK FORWARD TO THE VIEWS OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND
THE PROSECUTOR IN OUR EVALUATION.
G 0 N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 05 USUN NEW YORK 004861
HAGUE PLEASE PASS DAVID SCHEFFER
DEPT FOR G - AJOYCE; L - MMATHESON; AF - A/S MOOSE
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND STEINBERG;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.0.12356: DECLOADR
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PREF. AORC. RW, UN
SUBJECT: RWANDA TRIBUNAL ESTABLISHED BY SC 11/8
-AS CHIEF PROSECUTOR, JUSTICE GOLDSTONE WILL BRING TO
THIS ENDEAVOR THE SANE INTEGRITY AND SKILL THAT HE
ALREADY HAS INFUSED INTO THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR
CLINTON UBRAKY PHOTOCOfi
coNriDEMTiAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. WE LOOK FORWARD TO ASSISTING
JUSTICE GOLDSTONE IN WHATEVER WAY WE CAN TO FACILITATE
HIS WORK ON RWANDA. WE ALSO LOOK FORWARD TO THE
SELECTION OF A DEPUTY PROSECUTOR FOR RWANDA WHO WILL
HAVE MAJOR RESPONSIBILITY FOR INVESTIGATIONS AND
PROSECUTIONS.
-THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR
RWANDA IS ONLY THE BEGINNING. ONE MAJOR CHALLENGE AHEAD
OF US IS ADEQUATE FUNDING FOR THE TRIBUNAL. WE URGE ALL
MEMBER STATES TO MAKE VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS. MORE
IMPORTANTLY, THE UNITED NATIONS MUST PROVIDE SUFFICIENT
FUNDS FOR THESE EARLY, CRITICAL MONTHS OF THE TRIBUNAL'S
WORK. WE STRESS, HOWEVER. THAT WITH THE GROWING
BUDGETARY NEEDS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, OUR CHALLENGE WILL BE TO FINANCE BOTH
AD HOC TRIBUNALS WITH ENOUGH RESOURCES TO GET THE JOB
DONE.
-THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN RWANDA ALSO WILL REQUIRE MUCH
REBUILDING IN ORDER TO TAKE ON THE ENORMOUS TASK OF
DAILY LAW ENFORCEMENT. AS WELL AS THE PROSECUTION OF
MANY OF THE SUSPECTS WHOM THE TRIBUNAL WILL NOT BE ABLE
TO HANDLE. MY GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO ASSIST RWANDA
IN THIS IMPORTANT TASK. AND WE ENCOURAGE OTHER
GOVERNMENTS TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE.
-THE INVESTIGATION OF GENOCIDE IS INDEED VERY GRIM
WORK. BUT WE HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO SEE THAT THE
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA CAN ACCOMPLISH ITS
OBJECTIVE-ONE THAT THIS COUNCIL INCREASINGLY
RECOGNIZES: TO HOLD INDIVIDUALS ACCOUNTABLE FOR THEIR
VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW. AS
EVIDENT IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. IN RWANDA THERE IS AN
EQUAL NEED TO FORGE HARMONY AMONG ETHNIC GROUPS BY
BRINGING TO JUSTICE THE INDIVIDUALS WHO COMMITTED SUCH
HEINOUS CRIMES. REGARDLESS OF THEIR POSITION IN SOCIETY.
-IN CLOSING, LET ME EXPRESS MY GOVERNMENT'S HOPE THAT
THE STEP WE HAVE TAKEN HERE TODAY CAN PROMOTE BOTH
JUSTICE AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, LEST THE RWANDAN
PEOPLE BE UNABLE TO ESCAPE THE MEMORY OF MADNESS AND
BARBARISM THEY HAVE JUST LIVED THROUGH.
END TEXT OF EOV.
9. BEGIN TEXT OF RESOLUTION:
ARGENTINA. FRANCE, NEW ZEALAND, RUSSIAN FEDERATION,
SPAIN, UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: DRAFT RESOLUTION
THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
REAFFIRMING ALL ITS PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS ON THE
SITUATION IN RWANDA,
HAVING CONSIDERED THE REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 3 OF RESOLUTION 935 (1994 OF 1
JULY 1994 (S/1994/879 AND S/1994/906), AND HAVING TAKEN
NOTE OF THE REPORTS OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR FOR RWANDA
OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
(S/1994/1157, ANNEX I AND ANNEX II),
EXPRESSING APPRECIATION FOR THE WORK OF THE COMMISSION
OF EXPERTS ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 935
(1994), IN PARTICULAR ITS PRELIMINARY REPORT ON
VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN RWANDA
TRANSMITTED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S LETTER OF 1
OCTOBER 1994 (S/1994/1125),
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 05 USUN NEW YORK 004861
HAGUE PLEASE PASS DAVID SCHEFFER
DEPT FOR G - AJOYCE; L - MMATHESON; AF - A/S MOOSE
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND STEINBERG;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.0.12356: DECLOADR
TAGS: PHUM. PREL, PREF, AORC, RW, UN
SUBJECT: RWANDA TRIBUNAL ESTABLISHED BY SC 11/8
EXPRESSING ONCE AGAIN ITS GRAVE CONCERN AT THE REPORTS
INDICATING THAT GENOCIDE AND OTHER SYSTEMATIC.
WIDESPREAD AND FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW HAVE BEEN COMMITTED IN RWANDA.
DETERMINING THAT THIS SITUATION CONTINUES TO CONSTITUTE
A THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY,
DETERMINED TO PUT AN END TO SUCH CRIMES AND TO TAKE
EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO BRING TO JUSTICE THE PERSONS WHO
ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEM,
CONVINCED THAT IN THE PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF
RWANDA. THE PROSECUTION OF PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR
SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
WOULD ENABLE THIS AIM TO BE ACHIEVED AND WOULD
CONTRIBUTE TO THE PROCESS OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND
TO THE RESTORATION AND MAINTENANCE OF PEACE.
BELIEVING THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL FOR THE PROSECUTION OF PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR
GENOCIDE AND THE OTHER ABOVE-MENTIONED VIOLATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW WILL CONTRIBUTE TO
ENSURING THAT SUCH VIOLATIONS ARE HALTED AND EFFECTIVELY
REDRESSED.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONPIDENTIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
STRESSING ALSO THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO
STRENGTHEN THE COURTS AND JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF RWANDA.
HAVING REGARD IN PARTICULAR TO THE NECESSITY FOR THOSE
COURTS TO DEAL WITH LARGE NUMBERS OF SUSPECTS.
CONSIDERING THAT THE COMMISSION OF EXPERTS ESTABLISHED
PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 935 (1994) SHOULD CONTINUE ON AN
URGENT BASIS THE COLLECTION OF INFORMATION RELATING TO
EVIDENCE OF GRAVE VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW COMMITTED IN THE TERRITORY OF RWANDA
AND SHOULD SUBMIT ITS FINAL REPORT TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL BY 30 NOVEMBER 1994.
ACTING UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS.
- 1. DECIDES HEREBY, HAVING RECEIVED THE REQUEST OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA (S/1994/1115), TO ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF PROSECUTING PERSONS RESPONSIBLE
FOR GENOCIDE AND OTHER SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW COMMITTED IN THE TERRITORY OF RWANDA AND RWANDAN
CITIZENS RESPONSIBLE FOR GENOCIDE AND OTHER SUCH VIOLATIONS
COMMITTED IN THE TERRITORY OF NEIGHBOURING STATES, BETWEEN 1
JANUARY 1994 AND 31 DECEMBER 1994 AND TO THIS END TO ADOPT THE
STATUTE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA ANNEXED
HERETO;
- 2. DECIDES THAT ALL STATES SHALL COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL AND ITS ORGANS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
PRESENT RESOLUTION AND THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL
AND THAT CONSEQUENTLY ALL STATES SHALL TAKE ANY MEASURES
NECESSARY UNDER THEIR DOMESTIC LAW TO IMPLEMENT THE PROVISIONS OF
THE PRESENT RESOLUTION AND THE STATUTE, INCLUDING THE OBLIGATION
OF STATES TO COMPLY WITH REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE OR ORDERS ISSUED
BY A TRIAL CHAMBER UNDER ARTICLE 28 OF THE STATUTE, AND REQUESTS
STATES TO KEEP THE SECRETARY-GENERAL INFORMED OF SUCH MEASURES;
- 3. CONSIDERS THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA SHOULD BE
NOTIFIED PRIOR TO THE TAKING OF DECISIONS UNDER ARTICLES 26 AND
27 OF THE STATUTE;
- 4. URGES STATES AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS TO CONTRIBUTE FUNDS, EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES TO THE
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL, INCLUDING THE OFFER OF EXPERT PERSPNNEL;
- 5. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO IMPLEMENT THIS
RESOLUTION URGENTLY AND IN PARTICULAR TO MAKE PRACTICAL
G G N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 05 USUN NEW YORK 004861
HAGUE PLEASE PASS DAVID SCHEFFER
DEPT FOR G - AJOYCE; L - MMATHESON; AF - A/S MOOSE
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND STEINBERG;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
•UNION LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
E.0.12356: DECLOADR
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PREF, AORC, RW, UN
SUBJECT: RWANDA TRIBUNAL ESTABLISHED BY SC 11/8
ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING OF THE INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL, INCLUDING RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COUNCIL AS TO POSSIBLE
LOCATIONS FOR THE SEAT OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL AT THE
EARLIEST TIME AND TO REPORT PERIODICALLY TO THE COUNCIL;
- 6. DECIDES THAT THE SEAT OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL
SHALL BE DETERMINED BY THE COUNCIL HAVING REGARD TO
CONSIDERATIONS OF JUSTICE AND FAIRNESS AS WELL AS ADMINISTRATIVE
EFFICIENCY, INCLUDING ACCESS TO WITNESSES, AND ECONOMY, AND
SUBJECT TO THE CONCLUSION OF APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN THE
UNITED NATIONS AND THE STATE OF THE SEAT. ACCEPTABLE TO THE
COUNCIL, HAVING REGARD TO THE FACT THAT THE INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL MAY MEET AWAY FROM ITS SEAT WHEN IT CONSIDERS IT
NECESSARY FOR THE EFFICIENT EXERCISE OF ITS FUNCTIONS; AND
DECIDES THAT AN OFFICE WILL BE ESTABLISHED AND PROCEEDINGS WILL
BE CONDUCTED IN RWANDA, WHERE FEASIBLE AND APPROPRIATE, SUBJECT
TO THE CONCLUSION OF SIMILAR APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENTS;
- 7. DECIDES TO CONSIDER INCREASING THE NUMBER OF JUDGES AND
TRIAL CHAMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL IF IT BECOMES
NECESSARY;
- 8. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.
END TEXTMINIMIZE CONSIDERED
ALBRIGHT
BT
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CLIN10N LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAL
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FROM:
SITREPRT
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAL
�Rwanda/Zaire Camp S e c u r i t y
Issues/Questions
DRAFT
I.
T h i s "paper" does not i n c o r p o r a t e USG t h o u g h t s on t h e
s h o r t term problem o f camp s e c u r i t y . While PM has done
some i n i t i a l i n v e s t i g a t i n g o f t h e types o f p r i v a t e f i r m s
which c o u l d be approached by t h e UN/UNHCR, PM has not
f l e s h e d o u t t h e concept any f u r t h e r (PRM has developed a
rough "scope o f w o r k " ) . I n p u t from t h e DS team c u r r e n t l y
t r a v e l i n g i n t h e r e g i o n w i l l be i m p o r t a n t i n f o r m u l a t i n g
f u r t h e r USG t h o u g h t s on t h i s concept.
PRM and AF should
c o n t i n u e t o t a k e t h e l e a d . PM, IO, DS and DoD should be
prepared t o a s s i s t .
II.
N o t i o n a l S t r a t e g y f o r Implementing "Bubble" Concept
( u s i n g d r a f t DPKO paper as d e s c r i p t i o n o f concept)
1.
Develop l i s t s o f q u e s t i o n s r a i s e d by t h e concept,
b o t h as r e l a t e s t o p o s s i b l e U.S. p a r t i c i p a t i o n - i n any
form - i n such an o p e r a t i o n , and as r e l a t e s t o t h e U.S.
view o f t h e v i a b i l i t y o f t h e concept as d e s c r i b e d by t h e
UN paper. (by COB 11/15/94).
2. D e s c r i b e and d i s c u s s t h e concept w i t h "Friends o f
Rwanda" d u r i n g i n i t i a l meeting.
Feedback from t h e
" F r i e n d s " w i l l be c r i t i c a l i n d e v e l o p i n g a concept o f
o p e r a t i o n s which can be adopted by t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l ,
as w e l l as by p o t e n t i a l t r o o p c o n t r i b u t o r s .
3. Address any remaining q u e s t i o n s p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e
U.S. r o l e ( i f any) i n t h i s o p e r a t i o n . The Ad Hoc
Committee began t o address t h i s i s s u e , b u t s e v e r a l o t h e r
i s s u e s may a r i s e from p o i n t s 1 and 2 above. While i t
would be p r e f e r a b l e t o have these i s s u e s c l e a r l y r e s o l v e d
p r i o r t o t h e i n i t i a l " F r i e n d s " meeting, i t w i l l l i k e l y
t a k e 1-2 weeks f o l l o w i n g t h e meeting.
(by COB 11/30/94).
4. Assuming a S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l R e s o l u t i o n t o a u t h o r i z e
the "Bubble" concept, USG p e r s o n n e l s h o u l d meet w i t h UN
o f f i c i a l s t o determine a l i s t o f c o n t r i b u t i n g c o u n t r i e s ,
whether i t be f o r t r o o p s , o t h e r p e r s o n n e l , o r s u p p o r t ,
(by 12/10/94).
5. Immediately f o l l o w i n g an i n i t i a l approach by t h e UN
to t h e c o u n t r i e s t a r g e t e d t o p a r t i c i p a t e , U.S. embassies
s h o u l d d e l i v e r demarches i n support o f t h e concept.
Demarches from o t h e r s among t h e " F r i e n d s " would also be
encouraged.
(by 12/20/94).
6. Counting t i m e f o r r e c r u i t m e n t and deployment,
p r o j e c t e d time t o begin implementing t h e "Bubble" concept
i s p r o b a b l y no sooner than 3/1/95.
DECREf-
ni? A F T
i
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
�DRAFT
III.
Potential/Probable Questions/Issues
the "Bubble" concept.
1.
2.
to be Addressed on
What i s the u l t i m a t e objective?
How long do we think i t w i l l take t o achieve the
o b j e c t i v e , and how long i s the mandate?
3.
Who w i l l be i n charge?
4.
I s t h i s a Chapter VI or Chapter V I I operation?
5.
Are we expected t o separate ex-FAR and/or m i l i t i a
from other refugees?
How do we know who i s who?
Are we expecting to conduct disarmament? What type
of resistance can be expected?
6.
W i l l troops have a r r e s t / d e t e n t i o n powers? I f so,
under what authority?
7.
What r o l e w i l l the U.S. play?
8.
How much w i l l t h i s operation cost, and how w i l l i t
be paid? when w i l l troop c o n t r i b u t o r s be paid?
9.
What i f the ex-FAR invade Rwanda? What i f the RPA
conduct preemptive s t r i k e s i n t o Zaire?
10. Which countries w i l l form t h i s force? How w i l l they
be equipped, and who w i l l equip them?
11. How w i l l troops deploy? How w i l l they deploy home
at the end of the operation?
12. Who w i l l t r a i n the troops? Where? How long w i l l i t
take? Who w i l l t r a i n Z a i r i a n gendarmes? Who w i l l
pick them?
13. What i s the role of the government of Zaire? W i l l
they be part of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l force?
14. What are the rules of engagement?
-tS-r—Ts~XYii"s~a~ 3-4 yecrr- commrtment-? - —
•
16. How do we know that an area of 30,000 refugees can
be "secured" i n 30 days? What happens i f the
s i t u a t i o n reverts to poor s e c u r i t y a f t e r the 30 day
period?
17. How does t h i s plan work i n concert w i t h the possible
i n t r o d u c t i o n of a p r i v a t e s e c u r i t y force t o provide
near-term s e c u r i t y i n the camps?
18. How does t h i s force work w i t h UNAMIR?
19. I f the operation i s expected t o take several years,
what are the benchmarks along the way which w i l l
i n d i c a t e progress, or lack thereof?
20. What conditions would cause the U.S. and/or the
i n t e r n a t i o n a l community to conclude that t h i s
concept i s not working, and t h a t the mission should
be shut down?
DRAFT
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCUi-
�DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
Aon- oauS- m
Department of State
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CONriDCNTlAb
�OONriDCNTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: ATKIN, BEERS, CLARKER, DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, SCHWARTZ, STEINBERG
PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: OONriDCNTIAL
DTG:180152Z NOV 94
FM: SECSTATE WASHDC
TO:
RUEHLS/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA IMMEDIATE 0000
RUDKLD/AMEMBASSY LUANDA IMMEDIATE 0000
////
OOHriDDNTIAL
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 310789
LUSAKA, LUANDA FOR A/S MOOSE FROM AF/C DEPDIR FENDRICK
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, RW
SUBJECT: BACKGROUND FOR FRIENDS OF RWANDA MEETING
1. FOLLOWING IS AGENDA AND AF-PREPARED BACKGROUND
BRIEFERS FOR TUESDAY'S FRIENDS OF RWANDA MEETING. TO
DATE, GERMANY, SWEDEN, BELGIUM, TUNISIA, CANADA, THE
NETHERLANDS, UK AND THE UN HAVE ACCEPTED; JAPAN AND EU ARE
ALSO EXPECTED TO SEND REPRESENTATIVES; FRANCE HAS
INDICATED IT WOULD NOT ATTEND EXCEPT POSSIBLY TO SEND A
WASHINGTON EMBASSY NOTETAKER. AGENDA HAS BEEN APPROVED BY
U/S WIRTH AND CIRCULATED TO OTHER BUREAUS. REMARKS AND
BACKGROUND HAVE BEEN CLEARED BY AF AND FORWARDED TO U/S
WIRTH. WE WILL FORWARD BACKGROUND FROM OTHER BUREAUS AS
IT BECOMES AVAILABLE. ATTACHED MEMOS AND REMARKS WERE
DRAFTED BY AF/C.
2. BEGIN AGENDA:
INAUGURAL MEETING OF THE RWANDA OPERATIONAL SUPPORT GROUP
WASHINGTON, NOVEMBER 22, 1994
AGENDA
1030-1100
REGISTRATION
1100-1115
OPENING REMARKS
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
-H
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
-GONriDIINTIAL
S/iyiT
KBH
�•OONriDCNTIAL
- TIMOTHY WIRTH, U.S. UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
GLOBAL AFFAIRS, "PURPOSES OF THE RWANDA
OPERATIONAL SUPPORT GROUP: SUPPORT FOR A
STRATEGY OF RECONCILIATION AND REPATRIATION"
1115-1245
SECURITY IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS, AS PART OF A LARGER
REGIONAL STRATEGY
CAMP SECURITY: PRACTICAL OPTIONS
ROLE OF UNAMIR
1245-1400
WORKING LUNCH
TOPIC OF DISCUSSION: UN AND BILATERAL COORDINATION
1400-1430
PREPARATIONS FORTHE REGIONAL REFUGEE CONFERENCE
1430-1515
HUMAN RIGHTS AND ACCOUNTABILITY
EXPEDITING DEPLOYMENT AND SUPPORTING THE MONITORS
SUPPORT TO THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL/INVESTIGATIONS
1515-1530
BREAK
1530-1600
ASSISTANCE TO THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT
ASSISTANCE IN THE JUDICIAL SECTOR
OTHER MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL AID EFFORTS
1600-1630
EFFORTS AT POLITICAL RECONCILIATION
RESTARTING THE DIALOGUE
MILITARY INTEGRATION EFFORTS
1630-1700
BURUNDI: REINFORCING PEACE AND STABILITY
END AGENDA
3. BEGIN OPENING REMARKS:
MEETING OF RWANDA OPERATIONAL SUPPORT GROUP
OPENING REMARKS
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP Y
CONriDENTIAL
1
�•OONriDCNTIAL
GOOD MORNING. I WOULD LIKE TO WELCOME YOU ALL TO THIS
FIRST MEETING OF THE RWANDA OPERATIONAL SUPPORT GROUP, OR
"FRIENDS OF RWANDA" AS SOME OF US REFER TO IT INFORMALLY.
I MUST SAY WE WERE EXCEEDINGLY PLEASED WITH THE
ENTHUSIASTIC RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSAL. WE THANK YOU FOR
YOUR STRONG INTEREST AND EAGERNESS TO PARTICIPATE.
AS SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER OUTLINED IN HIS INITIAL LETTER OF
INVITATION, WE SEE THE RWANDA OPERATIONAL SUPPORT GROUP AS
AN INFORMAL BODY WHICH WILL HELP COORDINATE AND SUPPORT
THE EFFORTS OF THE UN AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO
ADDRESS THE CRISIS IN RWANDA AND THE SUBREGION.
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS UNDERTAKEN A MASSIVE
HUMANITARIAN RELIEF EFFORT TO ADDRESS THE IMMENSE HUMAN
SUFFERING BROUGHT ON BY THE CRISIS. HOWEVER, ENORMOUS
EFFORT IS STILL REQUIRED ON SEVERAL FRONTS TO STABILIZE
THE SITUATION AND HELP PROMOTE CONDITIONS THAT WILL
ENCOURAGE REFUGEE REPATRIATION, NATIONAL RECONCILIATION,
AND LASTING PEACE.
WHILE THE WAR IN RWANDA MAY BE OVER, THE UNDERLYING
CONFLICT IS NOT:
- TWO MILLION REFUGEES REMAIN OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY WITH
HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS MORE DISPLACED INTERNALLY;
- THE EXILED LEADERSHIP OF THE OUSTED INTERIM GOVERNMENT
AND THEIR SUPPORTERS CONSIDER THE NEW GOVERNMENT
UNACCEPTABLE;
- EXTREMIST MILITIAS ALIGNED WITH THESE FORCES ARE
INTIMIDATING REFUGEES WHO MAY WISH TO RETURN AND FOMENTING
VIOLENCE IN THE CAMPS;
- MEANWHILE, VIOLENT INCIDENTS HAVE OCCURRED INSIDE
RWANDA, RAISING FEARS AMONG REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS
ABOUT THEIR SAFETY SHOULD THEY RETURN HOME;
- AN OVERALL POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND NATIONAL
RECONCILIATION ARE DISTANT GOALS.
UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S
FIRST PRIORITY SHOULD BE TO ENSURE THAT FIGHTING AND
WIDESCALE VIOLENCE DO NOT RESUME AND THAT CONDITIONS ARE
CREATED, INSIDE AND OUTSIDE RWANDA, THAT WILL LEAD TO A
LESSENING OF TENSIONS AND A MOVE TO AN OVERALL RESOLUTION.
IN LINE WITH THeS GOAL, WE BELIEVE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY SHOULD FOCUS ITS EFFORTS ON KEY NEAR TERM GOALS
DESIGNED TO IMPROVE SECURITY IN THE SUBREGION AND CREATE
CONDITIONS INSIDE RWANDA THAT WILL PROMOTE RECONCILIATION.
WE NEED TO IMPROVE SECURITY AND CONFIDENCE INSIDE RWANDA,
THROUGH FULL AND EFFECTIVE DEPLOYMENT OF UNAMIR AND
ACCELERATED DEPLOYMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS.
WE NEED TO ENHANCE SECURITY IN THE CAMPS OUTSIDE RWANDA.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
OONriDCNTIAL
�-OONriDCNTIAL
WE NEED TO IDENTIFY AND PUNISH THE PLANNERS OF THE
GENOCIDE, THROUGH EXPEDITED ACTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL.
WE NEED TO HELP IMPROVE CONDITIONS INSIDE RWANDA THROUGH
ASSISTANCE TO GET THE NEW GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONING, RESTART
JUDICIAL PROCESSES, AND RESTORE BASIC SERVICES.
WE NEED TO ENSURE THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT MAKES GOOD ON
ITS PROMISE TO UPHOLD THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF ARUSHA:
POWERSHARING, AN INTEGRATED SECURITY FORCE, AND RESPECT
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS.
THESE GOALS NEED TO BE PURSUED FROM A REGIONAL
PERSPECTIVE, WITH THE ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT OF RWANDA'S
NEIGHBORS, AND WITH A CLOSE EYE TO THE FRAGILE CONDITION
IN BURUNDI.
AS SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER STATED, THIS IS INDEED AN
AMBITIOUS UNDERTAKING, ONE THAT CAN ONLY SUCCEED THROUGH
SUSTAINED, COORDINATED SUPPORT BY RWANDA'S FRIENDS.
WE ARE INDEED HAPPY TO SEE EACH OF YOU HERE TO INITIATE
WHAT WE HOPE WILL BE A VERY FRUITFUL ENDEAVOR. WE KNOW
YOU SHARE OUR GOALS OF PEACE AND STABILITY FOR THE REGION
AND WE LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING CLOSELY WITH YOU IN THE
MONTHS AHEAD TO SEE THAT THESE KEY OBJECTIVES ARE ACHIEVED.
END REMARKS.
4. BEGIN BRIEFER ON POLITICAL RECONCILIATION:
MEETING OF RWANDA OPERATIONAL SUPPORT GROUP
EFFORTS AT POLITICAL RECONCILIATION
I. BACKGROUND
POLITICAL. THE GOR HAS REPEATEDLY STATED IT WILL NOT
NEGOTIATE WITH THOSE WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE GENOCIDE.
ACCORDING TO THEIR LIST OF 220 "RINGLEADERS", THIS WOULD
INCLUDE ALL MEMBERS OF THE EX-IGOR IN ZAIRE. IN RESPONSE
TO NUMEROUS APPROACHES BY USG OFFICIALS, THE GOR HAS ALSO
REPEATEDLY INSISTED THAT MODERATE MRND MEMBERS HAD BEEN
APPROACHED BUT HAD REFUSED CABINET POSITIONS. THE CURRENT
CABINET OF 22 INCLUDES 5 PARTIES (9 RPF, 4 MDR, 3 LIBERAL
PARTY, 3 SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1 CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC
PARTY AND 2 NON-AFFILIATED). ON NOVEMBER 15, THE GOR
REDISTRIBUTED TO THESE PARTIES AND THREE OTHERS ALL 19
PARLIAMENTARY SEATS RESERVED IN THE ARUSHA ACCORDS FOR THE
MRND AND 8 OTHER PARTIES NOW BANNED DUE TO ALLEGED
PARTICIPATION IN THE GENOCIDE. ON THE LOCAL LEVEL,
CIVILIANS ARE GRADUALLY REPLACING RPA OFFICIALS; NEARLY
ALL MILITARY PREFECTS (GIKONGORO BEING A NOTABLE
EXCEPTION) HAVE NOW BEEN REPLACED BY CIVILIANS. THE GOR
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
•OONriDCNTIAL
�•OONriDCNTIAL
HAS STATED ITS COMMITMENT TO INCLUDE OFFICIALS FROM A
NUMBER OF PARTIES, ALTHOUGH NOT THE FORMER INCUMBENTS NOR
ANY MRND MEMBERS, AS FAR AS WE KNOW.
MILITARY. THE RPA HAS UNDERTAKEN A LIMITED PROGRAM TO
RE-INTEGRATE EX-FAR TROOPS INTO ITS RANKS. ACCORDING TO
OUR LATEST INFORMATION, AT LEAST TWO THOUSAND EX-FAR HAVE
BEEN SCREENED AND ARE UNDERGOING JOINT TRAINING WITH RPA
SOLDIERS; TRAINING INCLUDES A HEFTY "POLITICAL EDUCATION"
COMPONENT. THE RPA HAS ALLOWED RELATIVELY FREE BUT NOT
UNSCHEDULED VISITS BY INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS (INCLUDING
US EMBASSY PERSONNEL) TO THE PRINCIPAL TRAINING SITE AT
GAKO, SOUTH OF KIGALI. OF COURSE, THE TEST OF RPA
INTENTIONS WILL BE THE ACTUAL ASSIGNMENT OF THESE
SOLDIERS, INCLUDING OFFICERS, TO ACTIVE DUTY. THE FIRST
TRAINING PERIOD, SCHEDULED TO LAST UP TO THREE MONTHS, IS
STILL ONGOING. TO DATE, THE RPA HAS BEEN RELUCTANT TO
MAKE ANY COMMITMENT REGARDING REASSIGNMENT OF OFFICERS.
EX-FAR RECRUITS ACCEPTABLE TO THE RPA ARE BOUND TO BE FEW
AS LONG AS EX-IGOR/EX-FAR DEMONSTRATE INTENTIONS TO RETAKE
THE COUNTRY OR TO ACHIEVE NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH MILITARY
PRESSURE. LIKEWISE, DEMOBILIZATION IS FOR THE FORESEEABLE
FUTURE A NON-STARTER.
INTERNAL SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS. IN ADDITION TO THE
CONCERN OVER THE EXTERNAL THREAT IS THE RPA'S CONVICTION
THAT THE INTERAHAMWE MILITIA HAS INFILTRATED AND IS NOW
CONTROLLING THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED CAMPS, PARTICULARLY
IN THE SOUTHWEST (FORMER FRENCH TURQUOISE ZONE). THIS HAS
LED IN RECENT WEEKS TO AGGRESSIVE RPA ACTION TO DISBAND
THOSE CAMPS. THE MOST RECENT INCIDENT - THE BURNING OF
MUSENGE CAMP IN GIKONGORO PREFECTURE - RESULTED IN SEVEN
DEATHS. THESE INCIDENTS AND CONTINUING REPORTS OF
REPRISAL KILLINGS AND OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY THE
RPA OR TUTSI CIVILIANS ARE SEVERELY HAMPERING
REPATRIATION/RESETTLEMENT EFFORTS, WITH OBVIOUS NEGATIVE
CONSEQUENCES FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.
II. TALKING POINTS
O IT IS VITAL TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF GENOCIDE AND TO
BEGIN TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEMS OF CAMP SECURITY AND
VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION BEFORE LASTING POLITICAL
RECONCILIATION CAN BE ACHIEVED.
O WE SHOULD THEREFORE ENERGETICALLY PROMOTE THE WORK OF
THE INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL AND THE PROPOSED
REGIONAL REFUGEE CONFERENCE.
O WE SHOULD ALSO SUPPORT EFFORTS BY SRSG KHAN AND SPECIAL
REGIONAL ENVOY DILLON TO FOSTER REGIONAL COOPERATION IN
PROMOTING POLITICAL RECONCILIATION.
O WE EXPECT THAT THIS WOULD EVENTUALLY INCLUDE POIITICAL
DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE GOR AND EX-GOVERNMENT MODERATES, AND
A RETURN TO THE ARUSHA FRAMEWORK, ALTHOUGH PROBABLY NOT
THE PRECISE LETTER OF THE ACCORDS.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
OONriDCNTIAL
�OONriDDJTIAL
O WHILE WE WOULD WELCOME THIS DIALOGUE, WE SHOULD NOT
CONDITION SUPPORT FOR THE GOR ON WILLINGNESS TO UNDERTAKE
DIRECT POLITICAL TALKS NOW.
O WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO URGE THE GOR TO BROADEN ITS
POLITICAL BASE AT BOTH THE NATIONAL AND LOCAL LEVELS.
THIS WOULD INCLUDE THE APPOINTING OF MODERATE MRND AND
OTHER NON-RPF PARTY MEMBERS TO LOCAL POSITIONS.
O WE CAN ALSO ENCOURAGE THE RPA TO EXPAND ITS PROGRAM TO
REINTEGRATE EX-FAR SOLDIERS, AND TO PUBLICIZE THIS EFFORT
(JOINTLY WITH UNAMIR RADIO, ONCE OPERATIONAL).
END TEXT.
5. BEGIN BRIEFER ON BURUNDI
MEETING OF RWANDA OPERATIONAL SUPPORT GROUP
BURUNDI: REINFORCING PEACE AND STABILITY
I. BACKGROUND
POLITICAL. WITH THE PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION CRISIS
RESOLVED, THE RULING HUTU-DOMINATED FRODEBU PARTY AND THE
TUTSI-DOMINATED OPPOSITION ARE NOW NEGOTIATING OVER THE
LEADERSHIP OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. FRODEBU THOUGHT THEY
HAD THE OPPOSITION'S AGREEMENT TO ELECT FORMER FRODEBU
HEALTH MINISTER JEAN MINANI AS THE ASSEMBLY'S NEW
PRESIDENT; HOWEVER, THE OPPOSITION IS NOW COMPLAINING
THAT MINANI IS TOO HARDLINE. THE DIVISION OF POSTS WITHIN
THE NEW GOVERNMENT WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE A SOURCE OF
CONTINUED TENSIONS. NATIONAL DEBATES ARE PLANNED IN 1995
TO DISCUSS THE BASIC PROBLEMS (ETHNIC TENSION, INSECURITY,
MILITARY REFORM) THAT WERE NOT ADDRESSED IN THE
POWERSHARING TALKS. WITH THE SUCCESSION ISSUE SETTLED,
SRSG ABDALLAH HAS INDICATED HE WOULD LIKE TO MOVE ON TO
ANOTHER ASSIGNMENT.
SECURITY. THE TUTSI-DOMINATED BURUNDI MILITARY HAS
CARRIED OUT A PROGRAM TO DISARM (HUTU) CIVILIAN GROUPS.
WHILE THE CAMPAIGN WAS ORDERED BY THE HUTU-LED GOVERNMENT,
THE MILITARY HAS FAILED TO SHOW RESTRAINT, LEADING TO
NUMEROUS CIVILIAN DEATHS. EXILED FORMER HARDLINE FRODEBU
INTERIOR MINISTER
LEONARD NYANGOMA HAS REJECTED THE HUTU MODERATESACCOMMODATION WITH THE TUTSI MILITARY/OPPOSITION AND HAS
THREATENED TO DO BATTLE AGAINST THE BURUNDI
GOVERNMENT/MILITARY. HIS SUPPORTERS MAY HAVE ALREADY MADE
INCURSIONS INTO NORTHERN BURUNDI FROM ZAIRE, LINKING UP
WITH ARMED HARDLINE HUTU GROUPS THAT HAVE BEEN CLASHING
OFF AND ON WITH THE TUTSI MILITARY. RWANDAN HUTU REFUGEES
HAVE ALSO CLASHED WITH THE BURUNDI MILITARY IN THE NORTH,
AND POSSIBLY WITH RPA SOLDIERS CROSSING INTO BURUNDI.
REFUGEES. THERE ARE OVER 200,000 NEW RWANDAN HUTU
REFUGEES IN BURUNDI, WHILE TENS OF THOUSANDS OF OLD TUTSI
REFUGEES HAVE RETURNED TO RWANDA SINCE THE RPF'S MILITARY
VICTORY. SOME RWANDAN REFUGEES AND BURUNDI HUTUS HAVE
BEEN FLEEING INTO TANZANIA, APPARENTLY AS A RESULT OF
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BURUNDI MILITARY HARASSMENT. THERE ARE OVER 300,000 NEW
AND OLD BURUNDI REFUGEES LIVING PRIMARILY IN TANZANIA AND
ZAIRE. HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS REMAIN INTERNALLY DISPLACED
FOLLOWING THE OCTOBER 1993 COUP ATTEMPT AND SUBSEQUENT
ETHNIC MASSACRES THAT KILLED AN ESTIMATED 50,000.
U.S. AID. THE U.S. HAS PROVIDED OVER DOLLARS 60 MILLION
IN RELIEF AID TO BURUNDI SINCE OCTOBER 1993. ASSISTANCE
TOWARD RECONCILIATION INCLUDES: STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE
SYG'S VERY EFFECTIVE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, AHMEDOU
ABDALLAH; DOLLARS 250,000 TO HELP THE OAU DEPLOY MILITARY
OBSERVERS (40 OF 47 DEPLOYED SO FAR); DOLLARS 300,000 FOR
THE UNHRC'S HUMAN RIGHTS TECHNICAL ADVISORY SERVICES
PROGRAM; AND DOLLARS 5 MILLION IN FY-94 AND FY-95 FOR
DEVELOPMENT AID, INCLUDING DEMOCRACY/GOVERNANCE FUNDING.
II. TALKING POINTS
ALL SIDES IN BURUNDI MUST EXERCISE MODERATION AND ACCEPT
THE NEED FOR COHABITATION. ALL BURUNDIANS MUST UNDERSTAND
THAT ANY GROUP THAT SEEKS TO TAKE POWER BY FORCE WILL FIND
ITSELF COMPLETELY ISOLATED.
WE HAVE SENT SEVERAL HIGH-LEVEL VISITORS TO BURUNDI. WE
KNOW OTHERS HAVE DONE THE SAME; WE STRONGLY ENCOURAGE
CONTINUATION OF THIS PRACTICE.
UN SRSG ABDALLAH HAS DONE A VERY GOOD JOB, BUT HAS
INDICATED HE MAY BE PLANNING TO MOVE ON NOW THAT THE
GOVERNMENT IS IN PLACE.
THE UN NEEDS SOMEONE OF ABDALLAH'S SKILL AND EXPERIENCE IN
BURUNDI.
WE ARE ALSO LOOKING AT PROPOSALS TO SEND FACILITATORS TO
COMPLEMENT THE EFFORTS OF THE UN AND OAU.
WE HAVE PROVIDED DOLLARS 250,000 FOR THE OAU MONITORS. WE
ARE ENCOURAGING THE OAU TO FULLY DEPLOY AND HAVE ITS
MONITORS PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN CONFIDENCE BUILDING.
SPORADIC ETHNIC VIOLENCE CONTINUES, AND LOCAL HATE RADIOS
ARE REPORTEDLY STILL BROADCASTING. BOTH GROUPS STILL HAVE
REAL SECURITY CONCERNS. THE OAU MONITORS MAY HELP INSTILL
SOME CONFIDENCE. ARE THERE OTHER INITIATIVES POSSIBLE?
WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT THE RADIOS?
WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE REGIONAL REFUGEE CONFERENCE IN
BUJUMBURA AND BELIEVE THIS MAY HAVE A STABILIZING EFFECT.
END TEXT.
6. LUANDA - MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
SPERO
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DIST: ATKIN, BEERS, CLARKER, DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, SCHWARTZ, STEINBERG
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CLASS:-CONriDCNTIAL-
DTG: 190314Z NOV 94
FM: SECSTATE WASHDC
TO:
RUEHLS/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA IMMEDIATE 0000
RUDKLD/AMEMBASSY LUANDA 0000
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0000
RUEKJCS/DOD WASHDC 0000
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE 0000
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHDC 0000
////
C O N r i D C N T I A L STATE 312201
FOR A/S MOOSE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, RW
SUBJECT: FRIENDS OF RWANDA BACKGROUND
REF: STATE 310789
1.
UQ FURTHER TO REFTEL, FOLLOWING ARE ADDITIONAL
BACKGROUND PAPERS FOR THE NOVEMBER 22 RWANDA OPERATIONAL
SUPPORT GROUP MEETING. ALL BUT ONE QPARA 6
HAVE BEEN
FULLY CLEARED AND FORWARDED TO U/S WIRTH'S OFFICE.
2.
UQ BEGIN BRIEFER ON REFUGEE CONFERENCE
BACKGROUND
RWANDA/BURUNDI REGIONAL REFUGEE CONFERENCE
PURPOSE OF CONFERENCE: TO FOCUS ON THE DIPLOMATIC AND
PRACTICAL STEPS NEEDED TO PERMIT LARGE-SCALE REPATRIATION
OF RWANDAN AND BURUNDI REFUGEES WHILE ALSO PROVIDING AN
OPPORTUNITY FOR REGIONAL PLAYERS TO DISCUSS THE POLITICAL
CONTEXT QE.G., THE NEED TO AVOID RETURN TO OPEN WARFAREQ.
THIS CONFERENCE WOULD BE DISTINCT FROM ANY ADDITIONAL
REGIONAL SUMMITS WHICH HAVE BEEN SUGGESTED.
SPECIFIC DESIRED OUTCOMES: WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE CONCRETE,
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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PER E.O. 13526
aou- oau>3- ^
s / n / i s KBM
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PRAGMATIC PLANS ADOPTED FOR ADDRESSING STICKY ISSUES SUCH
AS CAMP SECURITY, LAND TENURE QUESTIONS,
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MECHANISMS, AND INDEMNIFICATION.
CHAIRS: UNHCR AND THE OAU HAVE AGREED TO CO-CHAIR.
TIMING: WE WANT TO SEE A PLENARY CONFERENCE HELD IN
JANUARY WITH A PREPARATORY CONFERENCE TO BE HELD BEFORE
THE END OF THE CALENDAR YEAR.
VENUE: THE GOVERNMENT OF BURUNDI HAS AGREED TO HOST THE
CONFERENCE IN BUJUMBURA. WE SUPPORT THIS AS A MEANS OF
UNDERSCORING SUPPORT FOR THE GRB AND HELPING TO STABILIZE
THE TENUOUS SITUATION THERE.
PARTICIPANTS: WE HAVE SUGGESTED TO UNHCR AND THE OAU THAT
THE PREPCON INVOLVE WORKING LEVEL OFFICIALS FROM THE
COUNTRIES IN THE REGION WHO HAVE PREVIOUSLY PARTICIPATED
IN SIMILAR DISCUSSIONS QRWANDA, BURUNDI, ZAIRE, TANZANIA,
UGANDA, KENYA AND ZAMBIAQ; INTERESTED DONORS FROM THE
FRIENDS OF RWANDA OPERATIONAL SUPPORT GROUP QUS, UK,
GERMANY, FRANCE, BELGIUM, JAPAN, TUNISIA, CANADA,
NETHERLANDS, THE EU, AND SWEDENQ; THE SYG'S SPECIAL ENVOY
DILLON, THE SRSG KHAN, UNHCR, DHA, AND OTHER UN
DEPARTMENTS/AGENCIES AS THE UN SECRETARIAT DETERMINES; AND
THE OAU. THE PLENARY SESSION WOULD THEN INVOLVE
MINISTERIAL LEVEL OFFICIALS.
RESOURCES: AS NEITHER UNHCR NOR THE OAU HAS BUDGETED FOR
SUCH A CONFERENCEQSQ, VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS WILL NEED TO
BE MADE BY DONORS TO SUPPORT THE EFFORT. NO COST
ESTIMATES HAVE YET BEEN MADE AVAILABLE.
CURRENT STATE OF PLANNING: IT NOW APPEARS THAT THE OAU
IS THINKING THAT THERE WILL BE TWO SEPARATE CONFERENCES
STEMMING FROM TWO RESOLUTIONS-THE ONE PASSED AT THE OAU
SUMMIT IN JUNE AND THE OTHER ONE PASSED AT UNGA. THE OAU
CONFERENCE WOULD FOCUS ON REFUGEES AND TAKE PLACE IN
MARCH, WHEREAS THE UN CONFERENCE, WHICH WOULD COVER
REFUGEES AND POLITICAL ISSUES WOULD TAKE PLACE SOMETIME IN
JUNE, UNHCR HAS ASKED THE UN SECRETARIAT AND THE OAU TO
SORT THIS OUT AS IT BELIEVES QAND WE AGREEQ THAT ONLY ONE
REFUGEE CONFERENCE IS NEEDED. SALIM SALIM REPORTEDLY
CONSIDERS THE CONFERENCE A HIGH PRIORITY AND IS PUSHING
HIS STAFF TO MOVE PREPARATIONS FORWARD. THE OAU HAS
ESTABLISHED A PREPARATORY COMMITTEE TO ORGANIZE THE
CONFERENCE, BUT IT DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE MET YET. AN
AIDE MEMOIRE WAS PREPARED WHICH OUTLINES A SERIES OF
OBJECTIVES, DOCUMENTATION, PARTICIPATION AND FINANCIAL
ASPECTS. WE HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE OBJECTIVES FOCUS ON
SPECIFICS SUCH AS PROTECTING REFUGEES, ADDRESSING ROOT
CAUSES, AND ENSURING SAFETY OF RETURNEES. WE ALSO
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SUGGESTED THAT THE OAU'S LIST OF PARTICIPANTS WAS OVERLY
AMBITIOUS.
TALKING POINTS - REGIONAL REFUGEE CONFERENCE
O THE USG ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE PROPOSED
RWANDA/BURUNDI REGIONAL REFUGEE CONFERENCE. WE SEE THIS
AS AN IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY TO FOCUS ON THE DIPLOMATIC AND
PRACTICAL STEPS NEEDED TO PERMIT LARGE-SCALE REPATRIATION
OF RWANDAN AND BURUNDI REFUGEES AS WELL AS AN OPPORTUNITY
FOR REGIONAL PLAYERS TO DISCUSS THE INESCAPABLE POLITICAL
CONTEXT.
O WE ARE PUSHING THE OAU AND UNHCR TO HAVE A PREPARATORY
CONFERENCE AT THE TECHNICAL LEVEL BY THE END OF THE YEAR
AND A PLENARY CONFERENCE AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL IN
JANUARY. BUJUMBURA SHOULD BE THE VENUE.
O WE WANT TO AVOID A CONFERENCE WHICH CONSISTS OF A
SERIES OF SPEECHES WHICH DESCRIBE CURRENT EVENTS, THE
PROBLEM OF REFUGEES ON ASYLUM COUNTRIES, AND THE NEED FOR
ADDITIONAL RESOURCES.
O RATHER, WE ENVISION THE OUTCOME OF THE CONFERENCES TO
BE A DECLARATION OF A PLAN OF ACTION WHICH ENCOMPASSES
PRAGMATIC STEPS TO BE TAKEN FOR ADDRESSING DIFFICULT
ISSUES SUCH AS CAMP SECURITY, LAND TENURE QUESTIONS,
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MECHANISMS, AND INDEMNIFICATION.
O WE NEED TO URGE THE OAU AND THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED TO
CRAFT THE CONFERENCE IN SUCH A WAY THAT IT REMAINS FOCUSED
ON REALISTIC SOLUTIONS TO REGIONAL REFUGEE PROBLEMS.
3.
UQ BEGIN BRIEFER ON CAMP SECURITY
BACKGROUND PAPER
SECURITY IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS
KEY FACTORS:
OVER TWO MILLION REFUGEES REMAIN OUTSIDE RWANDA, WITH SOME
850,000 IN THE GOMA, ZAIRE CAMPS. THE SECURITY OF
REFUGEES AND OF RELIEF WORKERS AS WELL AS THE INTEGRITY OF
THE RELIEF EFFORT ITSELF ARE PREOCCUPYING ISSUES.
REPATRIATION HAS BEEN HINDERED TO AN UNKOWN DEGREE BY
FORMER RWANDAN GOVERNMENT OPERATIVES QFORMER OFFICIALS,
MILITIA AND EX-FARQ.
INSECURITY AND CORRUPTION/MANIPULATION OF THE RELIEF
EFFORT ARE PERCEIVED TO BE THE WORST IN ZAIRE. THE GOZ,
WHICH SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR BOTH POLICING REFUGEE
CAMPS AND DISARMING/CONTROLLING THE FORMER RWANDAN
GOVERNMENT OPERATIVES, IS CAPABLE OF NEITHER.
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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�•OONriDCNTIAL
THIS PROBLEM WAS HIGHLIGHTED RECENTLY BY THE ANNOUNCEMENT
OF 15 INTERNATIONAL NGOS, CITING THE ETHICAL DILEMMA OF
HAVING THEIR ATTEMPTS TO ASSIST REFUGEES ACTUALLY SUPPORT
THOSE WHO HAVE COMMITTED GENOCIDE, THAT THEY WOULD
WITHDRAW FROM THE CAMPS UNLESS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
DOES "SOMETHING" TO BREAK THE CONTROL OF THE FORMER
RWANDAN REGIME.
THE UN HAS CONSIDERED VARIOUS OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING
SECURITY, BUT HAS NOT YET COME TO A CONCLUSION ON A
SPECIFIC COURSE OF ACTION TO BE PRESENTED TO THE SECURITY
COUNCIL NOR ON POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTORS TO SOME KIND OF
FORCE.
AMONG THE OPTIONS BEING CONSIDERED: 1
EXPAND UNAMIR'S
MANDATE SO TROOPS COULD OPERATE IN THE CAMPS OLE.,
OUTSIDE RWANDA'S BORDERS; 2
AUTHORIZE A SEPARATE UN FORCE
WITH A SPECIFIC MANDATE; 3
ESTABLISH A UN RAPID
DEPLOYMENT FORCE; 4
UNHCR CONTRACTS FOR A PRIVATE GUARD
FORCE; AND 5
UNHCR'S IDEA OF FIELDING A COALITION OF
AFRICAN/WESTERN POLICE FORCES TO TRAIN, SUPERVISE AND WORK
CLOSELY WITH ZAIRIAN POLICE.
UNHCR'S PLAN
- UNHCR'S PLAN INVOLVES THE INTRODUCTION OF A
MULTINATIONAL POLICE FORCE WHICH WOULD COME IN SUPPORT OF
THE ZAIRIAN SECURITY FORCES. THE CONTINGENT WOULD BE
COMPOSED OF POLICE/GENDARMES FROM FRENCH-SPEAKING AFRICAN
COUNTRIES, LOGISTICAL SUPPORT IN TRANSPORT AND EQUIPMENT
AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT WOULD BE SOLICITED FROM NON-AFRICAN
COUNTRIES.
- WE SEE A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS WITH THIS APPROACH WITH
THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ONE BEING THE TIME INVOLVED TO
RECRUIT AND EQUIP MULTILATERAL POLICE AND THEN TRAIN
ZAIRIAN POLICE. SUCH AN EFFORT NO DOUBT WOULD BE
EQUIVALENT IN DIFFICULTY AND SLOWNESS TO TRYING TO OBTAIN
PEACE-KEEPING TROOPS FROM OTHER NATIONS. ANOTHER CONCERN
IS THE ZAIRIAN POLICE AND MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN THE
CORRUPTION AND HARAVSMENT OF REFUGEES. IT IS ALSO NOT
CLEAR UNDER WHAT AUTHORITIES SUCH A POLICE FORCE WOULD
OPERATE.
USG PLAN QMAY NOT HAVE FULL UN SUPPORTQ
STEP ONE: CONTRACT GUARD FORCE
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WE BELIEVE THAT, GIVEN THE GROWING IMPATIENCE WITH
MANIPULATION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, THE HEIGHTENED
TENSIONS IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS THAT COULD SPARK MORE
VIOLENCE, AND THE FAILURE OF NATIONAL AND/OR UN
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS, IT IS TIME TO CONSIDER CONTRACTING
FOR COMMERCIAL GUARD SERVICES.
A CONTRACT GUARD FORCE, UNDER UNHCR'S DIRECTION, WOULD
PROVIDE PROTECTION TO INTERNATIONAL RELIEF WORKERS; ENSURE
DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES; AND
THROUGH THEIR PRESENCE REDUCE INTIMIDATION OF REFUGEES
WITHIN A COMPARATIVELY SHORT TIME-FRAME AND UNTIL SUCH
TIME AS A UN GUARD OR ADDITIONAL/EXPANDED PEACEKEEPING
FORCE COULD BE FIELDED.
SUCH A GUARD FORCE WOULD BE FUNDED BY VOLUNTARY
CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNHCR. THE FORCE WOULD COORDINATE ITS
EFFORTS WITH THE ZAIRIAN POLICE WHICH WOULD MAINTAIN THE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARREST, DETENTION AND PROSECUTION.
STEP 2: UN BUBBLE FORCE
WHILE THE CONTRACT FORCE IS BEING HIRED AND PUT IN PLACE,
EFFORTS SHOULD BEGIN TO HAVE A UN PEACE-KEEPING/GUARD
FORCE AUTHORIZED AND STOOD UP.
A UN FORCE WOULD HAVE A BROADER MANDATE THAN THAT OF THE
CONTRACT FORCE. IN ADDITION TO PROTECTION OF REFUGEES AND
RELIEF WORKERS, THE UN FORCE WOULD ALSO PROTECT HUMAN
RIGHTS INVESTIGATORS, ADDRESS DISARMAMENT, AND FACILITATE
REPATRIATION. ARREST/DETENTION POWERS MAY ALSO BE NEEDED.
THE "BUBBLE" FORCE CONCEPT IS STILL BEING DEVELOPED;
SEVERAL QUESTIONS STILL NEED TO BE ANSWERED, IT IS
DESIGNED TO INSERT A MINIMUM OF 2-3 WELL TRAINED
BATTALIONS, DEPLOYED FROM UN MEMBER STATES, INTO THE
REFUGEE CAMP, TO SEPARATE THE EX-FAR AND MILITIA ELEMENTS
FROM REFUGEES WISHING TO RETURN TO RWANDA. THE FORCE
WOULD ENSURE "SAFE PASSAGE" INTO RWANDA, WITH THE GOR AND
UNAMIR RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING THEIR SAFETY ONCE
REPATRIATED. THE "BUBBLE" WOULD COVER LIMITED AREAS AT A
TIME, LEAVING ZAIRIAN AUTHORITIES IN CHARGE BEHIND THEM.
THE U.S. HAS CONSULTED WITH UN OFFICIALS ON THIS, AND IS
IN THE PROCESS OF COMMUNICATING WITH SEVERAL GOVERNMENTS
TO GAUGE RECEPTIVENESS TO THE GENERAL CONCEPT, AS WELL AS
TO THE POSSIBILITY OF PARTICIPATING IN SUCH AN EFFORT.
THE BELGIAN PLAN
THE BELGIANS WILL LIKELY RAISE THEIR CONCEPT FOR PROMOTING
THE STABILIZATION OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI, AS PRESENTED TO
A/S MOOSE. WHILE THE BELGIAN PLAN MENTIONS SECURITY IN
THE CAMPS, IT PRIMARILY FOCUSES ON THE LONGER TERM NEED TO
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�CONriDDJTIAL
GET THE GOR TO BEGIN A DIALOGUE WITH THE EX-FAR.
TALKING POINTS - CAMP SECURITY
O WE ALL AGREE THAT THE DETERIORATING SECURITY SITUATION
IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS, PARTICULARLY IN ZAIRE, IS ONE OF THE
MOST IMPORTANT REGIONAL ISSUES THAT MUST BE RESOLVED
QUICKLY IN ORDER TO SEE PEACE RESTORED TO RWANDA.
O THE UNSYG HAS YET TO PRESENT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL
HIS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDRESSING THE SECURITY PROBLEM,
ALTHOUGH WE ARE AWARE OF SEVERAL IDEAS BEING CONSIDERED.
O OUR VIEW IS THAT WE MUST ACT QUICKLY TO FORESTALL
FURTHER VIOLENCE AND A RETURN TO OPEN WARFARE. WE NEED TO
AGREE ON A PLANT GET IT ADOPTED BY THE UN AND IMPLEMENT IT.
O OUR IDEA INVOLVES TWO STEPS. THE FIRST STEP IS FOR
UNHCR TO HIRE A CONTRACT GUARD FORCE WHICH COULD BE
FIELDED QUICKLY-HOPEFULLY WITHIN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS.
THIS CONTRACT FORCE WOULD PROVIDE PROTECTION TO
INTERNATIONAL RELIEF WORKERS; ENSURE EQUITABLE DELIVERY OF
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES; ASSIST UNHCR IN
CONDUCTING A REFUGEE REGISTRATION; AND THROUGH ITS
PRESENCE REDUCE INTIMIDATION OF REFUGEES.
O THE SECOND STEP IS FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO
AUTHORIZE A NEW MANDATE - EITHER BY EXPANDING UNAMIR'S
MANDATE OR AUTHORIZING A SEPARATE MANDATE - WITH, AT THE
MINIMUM, ROBUST CHAPTER VI RULES. WE PROPOSE A "BUBBLE"
CONCEPT, COMPRISED OF AT LEAST 2-3 COMPETENT BATTALIONS,
WHEREBY ONE BATTALION WOULD PROVIDE DAYTIME SECURITY TO
REFUGEES AND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF WORKERS, WHILE ANOTHER
BATTALION QOR SEVERALQ WOULD MOVE FROM CAMP TO CAMP TO
PROVIDE FULL, 24-HOUR SECURITY FOR A LIMITED PERIOD TO
ALLOW REFUGEES WISHING TO RETURN TO RWANDA TO DEPART FREE
OF INTIMIDATION FROM ANY EX-FAR OR MILITIA IN THE CAMP.
O BY PROVIDING SUCH A FORCE AND HOPEFULLY REDUCING THE
INTIMIDATION OF THE EX-FAR, MILITIAS AND CIVILIAN
AUTHORITIES, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO TEST THE AS-YET UNPROVEN
HYPOTHESIS THAT THE BULK OF THE REFUGEES WOULD RETURN HOME
IF IT WERE NOT FOR THE OVERWHELMING INTIMIDATION.
OBVIOUSLY, DEPLOYMENT OF UNAMIR AND HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS
TO MORE LOCATIONS INSIDE RWANDA AND CONCRETE GOR STEPS TO
ADDRESS LAND CLAIMS MUST BE PART OF THIS EFFORT.
O IF THIS PLAN IS TO WORK - AND THERE IS NO GUARANTEE
THAT IT WILL - WE WILL NEED TO EXPAND ON IT QUICKLY, AND
MOVE BOLDLY TO IMPLEMENT IT. IF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY, BE IT GOVERNMENT OR NGO, IS INTERESTED IN
MOVING RWANDA TOWARD RECONCILIATION AND PEACE, WE MUST
SHOW IT BY OUR ACTIONS,
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4.
CQ BEGIN BRIEFER ON UN COORDINATION
BACKGROUND: UN COORDINATION
I OBJECTIVE
DISCUSS THE UN'S ORGANIZATION OF ITS VARIOUS PROGRAMS IN
RWANDA: HOW THE LINES OF AUTHORITY RUN, HOW THE
MECHANISMS FOR CFRDINATION ARE MANAGED.
II. BACKGROUND
THE U.S. AND OTHER MAJOR DONOR-NATIONS HAVE BEEN QUIETLY
EXPRESSING CONCERN ABOUT A PERCEIVED LACK OF COORDINATION
AMONG THE NUMEROUS UN PROGRAMS NOW OPERATING IN RWANDA.
WE HAVE INQUIRED ABOUT THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UN'S LINES OF
AUTHORITY IN-COUNTRY. THE ANSWERS HAVE BEEN PATCHY, WHICH
IS ESPECIALLY DISTURBING IN LIGHT OF RISING TENSIONS IN
THE CAMPS AND WITHIN RWANDA.
THIS MAY PROVE TO BE A PROBLEM AS THE UN EXPANDS ITS
INVOLVEMENT IN RWANDA. UN SPECIAL ENVOY TO RWANDA ROBERT
DILLON QU.S.A.
CONFIDED HIS CONCERNS ON THIS TOPIC DURING
A MEETING IN THE DEPARTMENT TWO WEEKS AGO. SUBSEQUENTLY,
HE MET IN GENEVA WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND SRSG KHAN,
AND LATER WITH AMBASSADOR SPIEGEL. WE HAVE HEARD
INFORMALLY THAT THE CLEAR MESSAGE EMERGING FROM THOSE
CONSULTATIONS IS THAT BOUTROS-GHALI IS LOOKING TO THE SRSG
TO TAKE CHARGE OF UN PROGRAMS IN RWANDA, INCLUDING THE
CONVENING OF VARIOUS CONFERENCES ON REGIONAL ISSUES
TOUCHING RWANDA,
WE HAVE ALSO HEARD INFORMALLY THAT THE NEW UN HUMANITARIAN
COORDINATOR, RANDOLPH KENT QU.S.A.
, IS MOVING TO
CONSOLIDATE HIS OWN PORTFOLIO AND MAY BE PLANNING TO
INCLUDE SUCH NASCENT UN PROGRAMS AS THE HUMAN RIGHTS
MONITORS. DURING A RECENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON, KENT
EXPRESSED SOME UNCERTAINTY OF HIS OWN IN REGARD TO THE UN
LINES OF AUTHORITY. HE ATTEMPTED TO CLARIFY HIS
RELATIONSHIP TO KHAN PRIOR TO DEPARTING; HE WAS TOLD IN
NEW YORK THAT HE ANSWERS TO KHAN, BUT WAS CHOSEN BY AND
WORKS FOR PETER HANSEN QDENMARKQ, UN UNDER SECRETARY FOR
HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS. HANSEN IS ALSO IN CHARGE OF THE UN
INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE FOR RWANDA, WHICH IS INTENDED TO
SUPPORT KHAN'S WORK FROM NEW YORK.
THOUGH WE MUST ENSURE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL AND
HUMAN RESOURCES - AND POLITICAL CAPITAL - EXPENDED BY
THE UN IN RWANDA AND THE REGION ARE WISELY AND EFFECTIVELY
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USED, WE SHOULD NOT FOCUS TOO NARROWLY ON THE COORDINATION
ISSUE TO THE POSSIBLE DETRIMENT OF MORE SUBSTANTIVE ONES.
AS THIS TOPIC IS INTENDED FOR A WORKING LUNCH, THE
ATTACHED TALKING POINTS ARE COUCHED IN THE FORM OF
QUESTIONS INTENDED TO GENERATE DISCUSSION.
TALKING POINTS
O WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO ESTABLISH CLEAR
LINES OF AUTHORITY IN AN OPERATION AS COMPLEX AS THE UN'S
IN RWANDA.
O DO LUNCHEON PARTICIPANTS QPARTICULARLY THE UN
REPRESENTATIVE/SQ KNOW:
WHO HAS OVERARCHING AUTHORITY FOR UN PROGRAMS IN RWANDA?
WHO IS THE PRINCIPAL CONTACT IN NEW YORK?
WHAT IS THE THINKING BEHIND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TASK
FORCE?
WHAT IS SPECIAL ENVOY ROBERT DILLON'S ROLE IN THE REGION,
AS COMPARED TO SRSG KHAN'S?
WHAT UN ELEMENTS IN RWANDA WILL RANDOLPH KENT BE
RESPONSIBLE FOR?
WILL THE SRSG HAVE DAY-TO-DAY RESPONSIBILITIES FOR
OVERSIGHT OF THE PROGRAMS? OR WILL HE HAVE DEPUTIES FOR
DETAILED MANAGEMENT?
DOES UNAMIR'S FORCE COMMANDER ANSWER DIRECTLY TO THE SRSG?
TO WHOM DOES RANDOLPH KENT REPORT?
O THIS MEETING IS INTENDED TO FACILITATE COORDINATION TO
BACK-STOP THE UN'S EFFORTS IN RWANDA.
0 ARE THERE CONCRETE WAYS IN WHICH WE, THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY, CAN ACT TO FURTHER OUR GOALS FOR THE UN?
5.
CQ BEGIN BRIEFER ON THE ROLE OF UNAMIR.
BACKGROUND: THE CONTINUED ROLE OF UNAMIR
I. OBJECTIVES
DISCUSS TIMING OF THE UPCOMING UNAMIR MANDATE RENEWAL;
ELICIT PARTICIPANTS' VIEWS ON POSSIBLE ELEMENTS FOR THE
RENEWAL RESOLUTION.
II. BACKGROUND
THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA QUNAMIRQ
IS NOW AT FULL STRENGTH, WITH 5,599 TROOPS AND HQ STAFF,
344 MILITARY OBSERVERS AND 80 CIVPOL. TWENTY-SIX
COUNTRIES ARE REPRESENTED; THE U.S. DOES NOT PARTICIPATE.
THE TROOPS AND MILITARY OBSERVERS ARE DEPLOYED THROUGHOUT
THE COUNTRY. THEIR ENCOUNTERS WITH THE RPA WERE FOR A
TIME INCREASINGLY CONFRONTATIONAL, BUT A SERIOUS INCIDENT
BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE AUSTRALIAN CONTINGENT AND THE RPA
CAUSED SOME REFLECTION ON THE NEED FOR UNAMIR TROOPS TO
EXERCISE EXTRAORDINARY DISCRETION. THE RELATIONSHIP IS
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SOMEWHAT LESS TENSE NOW. SEVERAL OF THE NATIONAL
CONTINGENTS MADE SPECIFIC COMPLAINTS ABOUT LACK OF
SUPPORT, BUT THE UN HAS SOLVED OR IS SOLVING MANY OF THE
MOST PRESSING PROBLEMS. THE U.S. HAS BEEN PUSHING FOR
FULL DEPLOYMENT OF UNAMIR TROOPS, AND HAS SUPPORTED THE
OPERATION DIRECTLY BY PROVIDING AIRLIFT AND EQUIPMENT.
THE BRITISH CONTINGENT WILL DEPART ON/ABOUT DECEMBER 1,
WITH THE AUSTRALIANS AND CANADIANS FOLLOWING SHORTLY.
UNAMIR WILL REMAIN AT FULL STRENGTH, HOWEVER, AS OTHER
NATIONAL CONTINGENTS TAKE THEIR PLACE.
UNAMIR'S MANDATQ EXPIRES DECEMBER 9. HOWEVER, THE U.S.
WILL PUSH THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO REVIEW THE SECRETARY
GENERAL'S FORTHCOMING REPORT TO THE COUNCIL AND ADDRESS
THIS ISSUE EARLIER. WE EXPECT TO TABLE AND CALL TO VOTE A
RESOLUTION ON RENEWAL NO LATER THAN NOVEMBER 30, WHICH IS
THE LAST DAY THE U.S. PERMREP IS COUNCIL PRESIDENT. OUR
DRAFT RESOLUTION WILL PROPOSE EITHER EXPANDING UNAMIR TO
CONDUCT OPERATIONS UNDER THE "BUBBLE" CONCEPT QSEE
SEPARATE BACKGROUND PAPERQ FOR REFUGEE CAMP SECURITY, OR
ESTABLISHMENT OF A SEPARATE PEACEKEEPING OPERATION FOR THE
SAME PURPOSE. ON DECEMBER 1, RWANDA ITSELF BEGINS ITS
MONTH AS SC PRESIDENT, POSTPONED FROM LAST SEPTEMBER.
WHILE WE DO NOT INTEND TO MAKE AN ISSUE OF IT, 17 SEEMS
HIGHLY INAPPROPRIATE FOR THE PERMREP OF A COUNTRY SO
GREATLY AFFECTED BY A RESOLUTION TO LEAD THE DISCUSSION
AND VOTING ON IT. THE NEED FOR EXPEDITIOUS ACTION TO
ADDRESS CAMP SECURITY PROBLEMS IS ANOTHER REASON TO ACT ON
THE EXTENSION AND REVISION OF THE MANDATE EARLY.
THE COUNCIL WILL MOST LIKELY RENEW THE MANDATE FOR SIX
MONTHS. AS WELL, THE SC MAY HAVE TO RAISE UNAMIR'S TROOP
CEILING FROM FROM ITS PRESENT LEVEL OF 5,500. AT MINIMUM,
THE CEILING MUST BE RAISED TO 6,500 TO ACCOMMODATE LENGTHY
PERIODS WHEN THE NUMBERS INCREASE FOR LOGISTICAL REASONS.
WE MAY ALSO HAVE TO ACCOMMODATE THE EXPANSION OF UNAMIR BY
ROUGHLY 2,500 TROOPS, IF THE COUNCIL CHOOSES THE "BUBBLE"
CONCEPT AND IF AN EXPANSION OF UNAMIR IS THE METHOD BY
WHICH THESE NEW PEACEKEEPERS WILL BE DEPLOYED. THE
RESOLUTION WILL ENGENDER SOME CONTROVERSY MOVING THROUGH
THE USG AND IN THE COUNCIL, AS WE AND THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY WILL BE FORCED TO ADDRESS IN CONCRETE WAYS THE
CRITICAL ISSUE OF CAMP SECURITY.
WE SHOULD ALSO ENSURE THAT UNAMIR IS FULLY AND EFFECTIVELY
DEPLOYED THROUGHOUT RWANDA, AS THIS IS CRITICAL TO THE
SUCCESS OF WHATEVER SECURITY OPERATION IS CHOSEN FOR THE
REFUGEE CAMPS. IN THIS REGARD, THE OPERATION'S LOGISTICAL
SUPPORT FOR OTHER KEY OPERATIONS, SUCH AS THE HUMAN RIGHTS
MONITORS, IS CRITICAL.
TALKING POINTS
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONriDCNTIAL-
�•OONriDDdTIAI=.
O UNAMIR'S MANDATE EXPIRES DECEMBER 9; THE U.S. BELIEVES
THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD NOT WAIT UNTIL THAT DATE
TO REVIEW, REVISE AND EXTEND THE MANDATE.
O THE LEVEL OF TENSION IN THE REFUGEE AND
DISPLACED-PERSON CAMPS IS RISING.
O WE NEED TO CONSIDER VERY SERIOUSLY THE PROPOSALS THE
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS WILL SHORTLY
PRESENT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL.
O THE U.S. FAVORS THE IDEA OF TWO BATTALIONS OF
PEACEKEEPERS QNOT NECESSARILY ATTACHED TO UNAMIRQ
PROVIDING COMPLETE SECURITY TEMPORARILY AT VARIOUS CAMP
LOCATIONS, ALLOWING REFUGEES/DISPLACED PERSONS TO LEAVE
WITHOUT INTIMIDATION BY THE EX-FAR OR HUTU MILITIA
ELEMENTS NOW IN CONTROL.
O WE HOPE TO PRESENT A RESOLUTION ON THESE ISSUES IN THE
SECURITY COUNCIL NEXT WEEK,
O WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN THE VIEWS OF THIS GATHERING.
O WE BELIEVE THAT FULL AND EFFECTIVE DEPLOYMENT OF UNAMIR
INSIDE RWANDA IS CRITICAL TO THE SUCCESS OF WHATEVER
SECURITY OPERATION IS UNDERTAKEN IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS.
O IN THIS REGARD, WE SHOULD ALSO ENSURE THAT UNAMIR IS
FULLY DEPLOYED WITHIN RWANDA, AND IS PROVIDING ADEQUATE
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO SUCH KEY PROGRAMS AS THE HUMAN
RIGHTS MONITORS.
O OUR PERCEPTION IS THAT THE LEVEL OF TENSION BETWEEN
UNAMIR TROOPS AND THE RPA HAS ABATED SOMEWHAT, MUCH TO THE
CREDIT OF UNAMIR'S LEADERSHIP.
O DO OTHERS SHARE THAT PERCEPTION?
6.
CQ BEGIN BRIEFER ON RULE OF LAW ASSISTANCE QDRAFT
ONLY014PRECEDENCE = O038CLASS = tK!> N H U b N I I A L
190314Z NOV 94
0150SRI = RUEHC 020DTG =
BACKGROUND: RWANDA RULE OF LAW ASSISTANCE
REBUILDING THE RWANDAN LEGAL SYSTEM IS A LONG-TERM
PROCESS; IT WILL TAKE YEARS TO GET THE LAW SCHOOL
FUNCTIONING PROPERLY, TO TRAIN THE LAWYERS, MAGISTRATES
AND LEGAL OFFICIALS NECESSARY FOR THE EFFECTIVE OPERATION
OF A FAIR LEGAL SYSTEM AND, MOST IMPORTANTLY, TO FIT THE
LEGAL SYSTEM INTO A FUNCTIONING AND RESPECTED SYSTEM OF
GOVERNMENT. SATISFYING THESE LONG-TERM,
DEMOCRACY-BUILDING OBJECTIVES WILL REQUIRE A COMPREHENSIVE
AND INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM.
HOWEVER, THE GOR FACES IMMEDIATE NEEDS IN GETTING ITS
LEGAL SYSTEM UP AND RUNNING. AT ONE LEVEL, THE RWANDAN
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE NEEDS THE PHYSICAL TOOLS - DESKS,
PAPER, COMPUTERS, ETC. - NECESSARY FOR ITS MOST BASIC
FUNCTIONS. MORE SUBSTANTIVELY, THE GOR FACES THREE
IMMEDIATE CHALLENGES TO ITS DEVASTATED LEGAL SYSTEM:
1
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C I D C M T I A L
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TRYING AND PUNISHING OR FREEING MOST OF THE APPROXIMATELY
5000 PRISONERS CURRENTLY BEING HELD FOR PARTICIPATING IN
ACTS OF VIOLENCE DURING THE CIVIL WAR QTHE WAR CRIMES
TRIBUNAL WILL ONLY PROSECUTE A SMALL FRACTION OF THESE
CASESQ;
2
RESOLVING THE PROPERTY DISPUTES THAT WILL
ARISE BETWEEN RETURNING "NEW" REFUGEES AND REPATRIATING
"OLD" REFUGEES; AND Q3
DEALING WITH THE DAILY CRIME AND
VIOLENCE ENDEMIC TO ANY SOCIETY. THE GOR'S MOST PRESSING
NEED IN ADDRESSING EACH OF THESE CHALLENGES IS LOCATING A
SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF ADEQUATELY TRAINED MAGISTRATES TO
HANDLE THE CONSTANTLY RISING CASELOAD.
DONOR PLANS TO ADDRESS LEGAL SYSTEM NEED
THERE HAS BEEN WIDESPREAD INTEREST AMONG THE DONORS IN
ASSISTING THE GOR REBUILD ITS LEGAL SYSTEM. IN ADDITION
TO THE U.S., THE BELGIANS, SWISS, THE U.N. DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAM, THE U.S, HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER AND THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS HAVE ALL EXPRESSED A
DESIRE TO HELP THE RWANDANS IN THIS EFFORT. BEFORE
PROVIDING ANY LEGAL REFORM ASSISTANCE, THESE POTENTIAL
DONORS INTEND TO ASSESS THE STATUS AND NEEDS OF THE
RWANDAN LEGAL SYSTEM. BETWEEN NOW AND CHRISTMAS, EACH
DONOR, EXCEPT THE U.S., HAS PLANS TO MAKE AN ASSESSMENT
TRIP TO RWANDA. AN INITIAL OPPORTUNITY TO SHARE
INFORMATION FROM THESE ASSESSMENTS AND BEGIN TO COORDINATE
THE DONORS' LEGAL REFORM EFFORTS WILL OCCUR AT THE UNDP'S
NEXT RWANDA ROUNDTABLE MEETING IN GENEVA ON DECEMBER 14-15.
U.S. RULE OF LAW ASSISTANCE
THE U.S. IS WORKING TO ADDRESS BOTH THE IMMEDIATE NEEDS OF
THE RWANDAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND THE LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE OF
REESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW IN RWANDA. THE USAID
MISSION IN KIGALI IS PRESENTLY USING DOLLARS 600,000 OF
EXISTING FUNDS QFY94??
TO PURCHASE THE HARDWARE, DESKS
AND MATERIAL NECESSARY TO GET THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE UP
AND RUNNING. RATHER THAN SENDING OUT AN ADDITIONAL LEGAL
SYSTEM ASSESSMENT TEAM, USAID HAS ACCEPTED AN INVITATION
TO PLACE SOMEONE ON THE UNDP'S ASSESSMENT TEAM WHICH WILL
BE IN RWANDA FROM NOVEMBER 22 TO DECEMBER 2 AND IS
EXPECTED TO HAVE A REPORT PREPARED BY THE MIDDLE OF
DECEMBER. IN THE INTERIM, USAID IS EXPLORING THE
POSSIBILITY OF FUNDING FOREIGN JUDGES AND MAGISTRATES TO
WORK IN RWANDA AND HELP ALLEVIATE THE BACKLOG OF CASES,
TO ADDRESS THE RISING TIDE OF PROPERTY DISPUTES, UNDP'S
ASSESSMENT WILL TEST THE POSSIBILITY OF USING ARBITRATION
AND MEDIATION IN THE SHORT TERM, AND USAID IS EXPLORING
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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MORE LONG-TERM SOLUTIONS SUCH AS ENGAGING THE WISCONSIN
LAND TENURE CENTER IN DEVELOPING A LAND REGISTRY SYSTEM
FOR RWANDA.
TALKING POINTS:
O THE U.S. HAS MADE REBUILDING THE RWANDAN LEGAL SYSTEM A
PRIORITY FOR ITS ASSISTANCE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA.
IF THE REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS ARE TO
RETURN TO THEIR HOMES, THE GOR MUST SHOW THAT IT IS
OPERATING UNDER THE RULE OF LAW, WHERE CONFLICTS CAN BE
RESOLVED PEACEFULLY IN A FAIR AND EFFECTIVE LEGAL SYSTEM.
O WE ARE PRESENTLY PURCHASING MATERIAL NECESSARY TO GET
THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE UP AND RUNNING. WE ARE ALSO
EXPLORING WAYS TO HELP THE RWANDANS FIND A SHORT-TERM
SOLUTION FOR TRYING THE MANY PRISONERS ACCUSED OF CRIMES
DURING THE CIVIL WAR AND DEALING WITH THE MORE ROUTINE
PROBLEM OF CRIME IN THE COUNTRY. IN ADDITION, WE ARE
LOOKING FOR WAYS TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF LAND TENURE
DISPUTES.
O I UNDERSTAND THAT THERE ARE VARIOUS LEGAL SYSTEM
ASSESSMENT TRIPS PLANNED OVER THE NEXT COUPLE OF WEEKS.
RATHER THAN ADD TO THHS, THE U.S. HAS ACCEPTED AN
INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE UNDP'S ASSESSMENT VISIT
WHICH STARTS TOMORROW.
O THESE ASSESSMENT TRIPS WILL PLACE A PREMIUM ON
COORDINATING OUR ASSISTANCE EFFORTS. OUR COORDINATION
MUST GO BEYOND SIMPLY TELLING EACH OTHER WHAT PROGRAMS WE
INTEND TO FUND. I WOULD HOPE THAT WE COULD SHARE OUR
ASSESSMENT OF THE NEEDS OF THE RWANDAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND
THEN DETERMINE HOW, AS A GROUP, WE CAN BEST MEET THESE
NEEDS. THIS CAN BE DONE EITHER HERE AT FUTURE SUPPORT
GROUP MEETINGS OR AT THE UNDP ROUNDTABLE MEETINGS.
BACKGROUND AND TALKING POINTS: RWANDAN RULE OF LAW
7. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED,
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: ATKIN, BEERS, CLARKER, DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, SCHWARTZ, STEINBERG
PREC: ROUTINE
CLASS:-OONriDCNTIAL-
DTG:231259Z NOV 94
FM: AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0495
RUEHLGB/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
C O N r i D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KIGALI 002299
E.0.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREL, SCUL, PREF, KDEM, MOPS, RW
SUBJECT: RWANDA'S TUTSIS: A GLIMPSE BEHIND THE
LOOKING GLASS
1. •OONriDCNTIAL — ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. THE RETURF OF THE TUTSI DIASPORA HAS NOT
CREATED A HOMOGENOUS MASS. THE RETURNEES BEAR THE
LINGUISTIC AND CULTURAL STAMP OF THEIR MOST RECENT COUNTRY
OF SOJOURN, AND THIS HAS CREATED STRAINS AMONG THEM AND
GENERATED NEGATIVE STEREOTYPES. THESE CENTRIFUGAL FORCES
ARE BALANCED AGAINST THE CENTRIPETAL FACT OF THE GENOCIDE.
THE DEEPLY TRAUMATIZED TUTSI POPULATION HAS IN REACTION
ASSEMBLED IN DISCRETE ENCLAVES, A PROCESS SUPPORTED BY
HARDLINERS BUT NOT OFFICIALLY SANCTIONED BY EITHER THE GOR
OR THE RPF. THE MOST EXTREME ELEMENTS MAY DREAM OF A NEW
TUTSILAND, BUT THE MORE PRAGMATIC MAJORITY REALIZES THAT
NUMBERS AND ECONOMIC REALITIES MILITATE AGAINST THIS. THE
TUTSIS ARE DETERMINED NOT TO FALL UNDER HUTU DOMINATION AND
THE RENEWED THREAT OF ETHNIC EXTERMINATION AGAIN; THE HUTU
COMMUNITY IS EQUALLY OPPOSED TO RENEWED TUTSI PRIMACY. EACH
SIDE SEES ITSELF AS THE HISTORICAL VICTIM AND SEEKS REDRESS
AND INTERNATIONAL APPROBATION. THIS ATTITUDE LEAVES LITTLE
ROOM FOR MEANINGFUL RECONCILIATION. END SUMMARY.
3. THE DIASPORA COMES HOME
THE TUTSIS WHO FLED ABROAD IN THE VIOLENT UPHEAVALS OF 1959,
1968, AND 1972-1973 AND THEIR OFFSPRING ARE BACK IN FORCE.
THE AUTHOR HAS CHANCED UPON OLD ACQUAINTANCES FROM ELSEWHERE
IN THE STREETS OF KIGALI:
(b)(6)
THIS DOES NOT INCLUDE THE EVEN GREATER VOLUME
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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�OONnDCNTIAla*
WHO HAVE RETURNED FROM ANGLOPHONE EAST AFRICA. THERE ARE
CONFLICTING FIGURES FOR THE TOTAL NUMBER OF "OLD" RETURNEES.
BUT A SAFE ESTIMATE LIES BETWEEN 400.00 AND 600.000.
4. THE TOWER OF BABEL SYNDROME'
THE HOMECOMING HAS NOT CREATED A SEAMLESS TUTSI FRONT.
RETURNEES, ESPECIALLY THOSE BORN OR RAISED ABROAD, HAVE
BROUGHT BACK DIFFERENT MINDSETS, HABITS AND VALUES. THE
MOST GLARING DIVIDE IS LINGUISTIC, CENTERED UPON THE
ANGLOPHONE-FRANCOPHONE RIFT. ON THE SURFACE, THIS MANIFESTS
ITSELF IN PUBLIC EVENTS WHERE FIFTY PER CENT OF THE AUDIENCE
DOES NOT UNDERSTAND WHAT IT BEING SAID AT ANY GIVEN TIME.
THE BRIDGING LANGUAGE, KINYARWANDA, WORKS FOR INTERNAL
EVENTS SUCH AS CABINET MEETINGS BUT AT PUBLIC OCCASIONS
LEAVES FOREIGNERS IN THE DARK. ADD TO THIS STEW A
SMATTERING OF SWAHILI AND YOU HAVE RADIO KIGALI, A
POLYGLOTS FEAST.
5. A LINGUISTIC MINORITY, THE ANGLOPHONES NONETHELESS ENJOY
DISPROPORTIONATE POLITICAL POWER. A FAIR NUMBER OF RPF
LEADERS ARE BILINGUAL IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH. BUT SENIOR
RPF/RPA ANGLOPHONES COMPRISE A VIRTUAL WHO'S WHO OF THE
POLICY APPARATUS: KAGAME, INYUMBA, KAREMERA, MAZIMHAKA, ET
AL. KAGAME IN PARTICULAR IS SENSITIVE TO THE LINGUISTIC
PROBLEM AND HAS GONE OUT OF HIS WAY TO TELL BELGIAN
FRANCOPHONE OFFICIALS THAT HE INTENDS TO LEARN FRENCH AND
SCHOOL HIS CHILDREN IN THE LANGUAGE.
6. THE LINGUISTIC FISSURE SPLITS ALONG SOCIAL, RELIGIOUS,
AND IDEOLOGICAL LINES AS WELL. MANY FRANCOPHONE TUTSIS WERE
SALARIED CITY DWELLERS: BUSINESSMEN, EDUCATORS, THE
LIBERAL PROFESSIONS. UGANDAN ANGLOPHONE TUTSIS WERE WELL
REPRESENTED IN THE PROFESSIONS. BUT MANY OF THEM FOLLOWED
OLD PASTORALIST TRADITIONS. A TRAIT COMMON TO THE TUTSIS OF
RUTSHURU AND MASISI IN NORTH KIVU AND IN THE RWANDAN
COLLINES.
7. RELIGION IS ANOTHER CLEAR DIVIDE. FRANCOPHONE TUTSIS
ARE OVERWHELMINGLY CATHOLIC IN BELIEF AND PRACTICE. THE
RELIGION DID NOT FOLLOW THE DIASPORA NORTH INTO UGANDA; AS A
RESULT, PROTESTANT AND LIMITED MUSLIM INFLUENCES SPREAD
AMONG THIS GROUP. THERE ARE ALSO MANY NON-BELIEVERS, A RARE
PHENOMENON IN RWANDA.
8. THE DIFFERENT NATIONAL BACKGROUNDS CAN ALSO BE CHARTED
THROUGH DIFFERENT IDEOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL VALUES. THE
ANGLOPHONE 59ERS HAVE PROMOTED THE NOTION OF 'THE
BANYARWANDA PEOPLE" WITHOUT DISTINCTION TO ETHNIC
BACKGROUND, A DIVISIVE PRACTICE THAT THEY BLAME ON COLONIAL
POLITICS. THE ZAIRE AND BURUNDI 73ERS - THE LATTER
ESPECIALLY. HAVING LIVED THROUGH THE RECENT ETHNIC FLARE-UPS
IN THAT COUNTRY - ARE VISIBLY UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE RPF
PARTY LINE. THE SURVIVING RWANDAN TUTSIS WE HAVE SPOKEN
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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WITH DO NOT COUNTENANCE IT AT ALL
9. THIS WELTER OF LANGUAGES, CUSTOMS AND ATTITUDES HAS
CREATED CONFUSION, FRICTION, AND FERTILE GROUND FOR
STEREOTYPES. TUTSI SURVIVORS COMPLAIN THAT THEY PAID FOR
THE RPF VICTORY WITH THE LOSS OF THEIR FAMILIES AND GOODS;
THEY RESENT INSINUATIONS FROM HARDLINE RETURNEES THAT MANY
OF THEM SURVIVED THROUGH COLLABORATION. THE BURUNDIANS, WHO
HELPED FINANCE THE RPF MILITARY CAMPAIGN HAVE RUSHED IN TO
SET UP BUSINESSES AND SEIZE LAND AND PROPERTY. THEY ARE
O O H r i D C N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 KIGALI 002299
E.0.12356: DECLOADR
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREL, SCUL, PREF, KDEM, MOPS, RW
SUBJECT: RWANDA'S TUTSIS: A GLIMPSE BEHIND THE
LOOKING GLASS
VIEWED BY "NATIVE" RWANDANS - BOTH HUTU AND TUTSI - AS
AGGRESSIVE CARPETBAGGERS. EVERYONE AGREES THAT ZAIRE HAS
HAD A DELETERIOUS EFFECT UPON THE BUSINESS ETHICS OF TUTSIS
RETURNED FROM THERE. THE CATHOLIC FRANCOPHONES COMPLIMENT
THE GOOD MANNERS OF UGANDAN RETURNEES BUT FREQUENTLY LABEL
THEM - ESPECIALLY THE RPF - "ATHEISTS", LEFTIST
IDEOLOGUES, AND ANTI-FEMINIST THROWBACKS TO AN EARLIER TIME.
WE HAVE HEARD NUMEROUS COMPLAINTS FROM FRANCOPHONE TUTSI
WOMEN ABOUT THE NEGATIVE ANGLOPHONE ATTITUDES TOWARD SHORT
SKIRTS AND THE FRENCH-INSPIRED HABIT OF EXCHANGING KISSES IN
GREETING.
10. CIRCLE THE WAGONS ANYWAY
AN ANECDOTE WILL SERVE THE POINT. A TUTSI WOMAN WHO HAS
NEVER LIVED OUTSIDE OF RWANDA (AND WHO LOST EVERY MEMBER OF
HER IMMEDIATE NATAL FAMILY IN THE GENOCIDE) RECENTLY
DESCRIBED THE SITUATION WHEN SHE RETURNED TO KIGALI FROM
BYUMBA, WHERE SHE HAD SOUGHT REFUGE BEHIND RPA LINES DURING
THF APRIL TQ JUNE PERIOD.|
M i l
AS LIVING IN HER HOUSE, WHICH HAD BEEN
PARTIALLY LOOTED. WHEN SHE EXPLAINED HER PLIGHT, THE
LIEUTENANT OFFERED TO MOVE OUT AND GIVE HER ALL THE
FURNITURE IN THE HOUSE. MUCH OF WHICH HAD BEEN LOOTED
ELSEWHERE. SHE SAID THAT] (b)(6) I A MUSLIM. WAS DEEPLY
OFFENDED AT THE HOUSE "REWARMING" DINNER IN HIS HONOR
BECAUSE UNBEKNOWNST TO HIM, SHE HAD PUT PORK IN THE POT OF
BEANS. A TRADITIONAL RWANDAN RECIPE.
CONriDCNTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�OOHriDCNTIAL
12. BITTER THOUGH THEY MAY BE, SUCH DIVISIONS ARE
OVERSHADOWED BY THE FACT OF THE GENOCIDE AND THE EMOTION IT
ENGENDERS IN THE TUTSI COMMUNITY. FEAR AND LOATHING IS NOT
TOO STRONG A TERM. TUTSI AND TO A LESSER DEGREE MODERATE
HUTU FACTIONAL DIFFERENCES ARE IMMEDIATELY LAID ASIDE WHEN
THE GENOCIDE WORD IS SPOKEN. THE FLOODGATES OF ANECDOTAL
ATROCITY OPEN; THE LIST OF DEAD FAMILY AND FRIEND REELS OUT.
THERE IS OUTRAGE AND IMMEDIATE SOLIDARITY ON THE NEED TO
METE OUT JUSTICE TO THOSE WHO PLANNED AND DROVE THE KILLING.
AN UNSPOKEN CURRENT OF REVENGE UNDERUES.
13. THE FEAR WITHIN THE TUTSI COMMUNITY MATCHES ITS ANGER.
FOR MODERATE HUTUS, WHO FEAR HARM FROM BOTH HUTU AND TUTSI
EXTREMES, THE FEAR PREVAILS.
14. THE QUESTION OF GREATER TUTSILAND
AS THE TUTSIS RETURN, THERE IS THE ENIGMA OF WHAT THESE
RETICENT PEOPLE ACTUALLY INTEND. OUR CONVERSATIONS HAVE
REVEALED A CONFUSING DIVERGENCE OF VIEW. THE EXTREMIST
FRINGE OF THE RPF/RPA CLEARLY DESIRES TUTSI DOMINATION OF
THE ENTIRE COUNTRY. MO
RE MODERATE ELEMENTS CALL FOR POWERSHARING WITH MODERATE HUTUS AND A NATIONWIDE RECONCILIATION
AT SOME STILL UNDEFINED LEVEL. NO TUTSI WE HAVE SPOKEN TO
- AND FEW HUTU - SUPPORTS THE PARTICIPATION OF HUTU
HARDLINERS AT ANY LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT.
15. THE EVIDENCE CONFIRMS THE GROUPING OF RETURNING TUTSIS
IN CERTAIN PARTS OF THE COUNTRY AND IN URBAN AREAS. KIGALI
IS OVERFLOWING WITH NEWLY ARRIVED TUTSIS, AS IS BUTARE.
THERE ARE RELIABLE REPORTS OF TUTSIS CONGREGATING AROUND
KIBUNGO AND IN OTHER AREAS OF THE SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST. A
LARGE NUMBER OF TUTSIS PASTORALISTS HAVE GATHERED IN THE
OPEN SAVANNAH AREAS NEAR THE AKAGERA PARK IN THE NORTHEAST.
THE UNANSWERED QUESTION IS WHETHER THIS IS PART OF A LARGER
PLAN TO CARVE OUT A GREATER 'TUTSILAND".
16. CERTAIN EXTREMIST ELEMENTS WOULD LIKE TO SEE THIS
OUTCOME, BUT WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THEY PRESENTLY CONTROL
EITHER GOR OR RPF POLICY. WE HAVE HEARD THAT]
(b)(6)
LUMBERS AMONG THESE, HE
ALLEGEDLY ORGANIZED TVIE RAPID MOVEMENT OF LARGE NUMBER OF
RWANDAN TUTSIS CIRCA 1959 AND 1973 FROM BUJUMBURA TO THE
AREA AROUND BUTARE. THE TUTSI HEARTLAND IN THE COLONIAL AND
PRECOLONIAL ERAS. WE ARE CERTAIN - ALTHOUGH WE CAN OFFER
NO HARD PROOF - THAT THE RPF APPROVED IF NOT ORCHESTRATED
THE RAPID RETURN OF THE DIASPORA TO REBUILT ITS TUTSI
CONSTITUENCY, WHICH HAD BEEN DECIMATED BY THE GENOCIDE.
17. HOWEVER. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THAT THE RPF,
AND CERTAINLY NOT THE GOR AT LARGE, HAS SET OUT TO DRIVE THE
HUTU POPULATION INTO EXILE. MORE LIKELY EXPLANATIONS OF THE
r TTX ^ » r .
T
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
OONriDCNTIAL-
�OONriDCNTIAL •
GROUPING PHENOMENON ARE VOCATIONAL BACKGROUNDS, PREFERENCE
FOR URBAN ENVIRONMENTS, AND STRENGTH IN NUMBERS. A VISIT TO
THE VAST, ROLLING GRASSLANDS OF THE AKAGERA SUFFICES TO
-0 O H f I D C N T I A-L SECTION 03 OF 03 KIGALI 002299
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREL, SCUL, PREF, KDEM, MOPS. RW
SUBJECT: RWANDA'S TUTSIS: A GLIMPSE BEHIND THE
LOOKING GLASS
EXPLAIN THE ASSEMBLAGE OF TUTSI PASTORALISTS FROM UGANDA AND
THEIR ANKOLE HERDS. BUJUMBURA AND KINSHASA RETURNEES CAME
TO KIGALI AND BUTARE BECAUSE THEY ARE URBANITES FROM YOUTH.
NOT FARMERS OR HERDERS. AND HAVE NO SKILLS FOR SURVIVING IN
THE COLLINES. THERE IS FINALLY THE PHENOMENON OF SECURITY
IN NUMBERS. SEVERAL OF OUR "NATIVE RWANDAN" TUTSI
INTERLOCUTORS ADMIT THAT THEY ARE AFRAID TO LIVE AS A
MINORITY AMONG HUTUS IN OUTLYING AREAS AND FOR NOW WILL NOT
RETURN TO THEIR FORMER ABODES.
18. OUR CONVERSATIONS WITH SENIOR GOR AND RPF CIVILIAN
OFFICIALS REVEAL UNDERLYING POLITICAL REALISM. MOST ARE
AWARE THAT THE GOVERNMENT CAN GOVERN ONLY WITH SOME LEVEL OF
COOPERATION FROM THE MAJORITY HUTU POPULATION, WHICH MEANS
MORE THAN TOKEN HUTU PARTICIPATION IN THE GOVERNANCE
PROCESS. THE RPF FORMED THE BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT OF
NATIONAL UNITY WITH THIS IN MIND, ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT YET
CLEAR HOW MUCH POWER THE PRIME MINISTER AND OTHER NON-RPF
HUTU ELEMENTS REALLY WIELD. ON PAPER, THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
THAT WILL CONVENE FOR THE FIRST TIME ON NOVEMBER 25 COULD
YIELD A MAJORITY OPPOSITION COALITION AND A HUTU ABSOLUTE
MAJORITY. ON ANOTHER LEVEL, TUTSI TECHNOCRATS IN GOR
MINISTRIES UNDERSTAND THAT RWANDA'S AGRARIAN-BASED ECONOMY
CANNOT RECOVER UNLESS THE HUTU FARMERS RETURN TO THEIR
FIELDS. EVERYONE REALIZES THAT SECURITY AND STABILITY WILL
REMAIN BEYOND REACH UNTIL THE REFUGEE PROBLEM ON THE BORDERS
IS SOMEHOW RESOLVED.
19. DOMINATION AND VICTIMIZATION. RECONCILIATION AND GUILT
THE RPF LEADERSHIP MAY REALIZE THE NEED TO BRING THE HUTUS
INTO THE PROCESS. BUT WE DO NOT THINK THAT THEY INTEND FOR
THE HUTU TO RUN IT. QUERIES TO TUTSI LEADERSHIP ABOUT
EVENTUAL POPULAR ELECTIONS INEVITABLY ELICITS EVASION.
CAUTIONS ABOUT MOVING DELIBERATELY AND WAITING UNTIL JUSTICE
HAS BEEN SERVED AND THE MOMENT IS RIPE. TUTSI CONTACTS
OUTSIDE OF GOVERNMENT ARE LESS NUANCED, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT
THEY DO NOT EVER AGAIN INTEND TO FIND THEMSELVES IN A
POSITION WHERE THE HUTU MAJORITY CAN DOMINATE THEM AND
EXTERMINATE THEM IF IT SO CHOOSES. THE MOST VOCAL CLAIM
THEY ARE PREPARED TO PAY THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL COST
S
OF KEEPING THE HUTU REFUGEES OUTSIDE OF RWANDA, IF THE
CONDITIONS OF RETURN ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
OONriDCNTIAt
�COIMHUbNTIAL-
20. OUR SOUNDINGS OF THE HUTU POPULATION HAVE BEEN LESS
DEEP LARGELY BECAUSE SO MUCH OF THE LEADERSHIP IS IN IDP
CAMPS OR ABROAD. HOWEVER, CONVERSATIONS WITH MODERATE HUTUS
HERE IN KIGALI HAVE TAPPED A DEEP WELL OF RESENTMENT AT WHAT
THEY PERCEIVE TO BE HARDLINE TUTSI DETERMINATION TO
DOMINATE. AMPLE REPORTING FROM THE OUTSIDE CAMPS INDICATE
THAT FEELINGS RUN EVEN STRONGER THERE: THE EXTREMISTS IN
PARTICULAR PREFER EXILE AND EVENTUAL RENEWED WARFARE TO LIFE
IN RWANDA UNDER TUTSIS AND THE RPF.
21. UNDERPINNING THIS IS THE WIDESPREAD REJECTION OF
COLLECTIVE AND, IN MANY CASES, INDIVIDUAL GUILT. WHEN ONE
MENTIONSHAT THE RPF INVASION IN 1990 LAUNCHED THE MOST
RECENT CYCLE OF VIOLENCE, TUTSI HACKLES TEND TO RISE. THEY
PORTRAY THE INVASION AS A NECESSARY MEASURE TO REDRESS THREE
DECADES OF HUTU INTIMIDATION AND DISCRIMINATION, CITE THE
GOOD FAITH SHOWN BY THE RPF AT THE ARUSHA NEGOTIATING TABLE,
AND DECLARE THEMSELVES BLAMELESS. MODERATE HUTUS, ALMOST
ALL OF WHOM SUFFERED LOSSES IN THE GENOCIDE AND WAR. CLAIM
TO BE THE INNOCENT VICTIMS OF BOTH EXTREMES. REPORTING .FROM
THE CAMPS INDICATES THAT THE ELEMENTS THERE WHO PERPETRATED
THE GENOCIDE SHOW LITTLE REMORSE FOR THEIR MISDEEDS AND MUCH
ANGER AT THE TUTSIS/RPF, WHOM THEY ACCUSE OF UNJUSTLY
DRIVING THEM INTO A HARSH EXILE. HEALING WILL BE HARD TO
BROKER UNTIL SUCH ATTITUDES CHANGE. IN A WORLD OF VICTIMS
WITHOUT VICTIMIZERS AND WRONGDOING WITHOUT GUILT,
RECONCILIATION IS A WISHFUL WORD.
WHITEHEAD
BT
#2299
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FROM:
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MSMail
DATE-TIME
13 December 94 19:40
FROM
Rice, Susan E.
CLASSIFICATION
CONriDENTIAL
SUBJECT
[CONFIDENTIAL] My paper
TO
Andricos, George M.
Blinken, Antony J.
Danvers, William C.
Punches, Christina L.
CARBON_COPY
NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT BODY
[[ 104PKO.DOC : 4936 in 104PKO.DOC ]]
Give comments to Randy asap, pis.
ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE
13 December 94 19:39
ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME
104PKO.DOC
Deputies Committee Discussion Paper
Peacekeeping Policy and the 104th Congress
The Deputies will discuss the financial, policy and political challenges the
Adminis
tration faces in trying to maintain
support for UN peacekeeping during the Republican-controlled 104th Congress
as well
as appropriate next steps.
I. The New Legislative Landscape
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
8/11/15- KBH
The Ghost of Congress Past: The UN and peacekeeping proved highly
contentious issu
es in the 103rd
Congress. The Administration faced sustained, often bipartisan criticism for its
ma
nagement of crises in
Somalia, Bosnia and Haiti. The GOP, sensing the Administration's increasing
vulnera
bility, worked to transform
support for the UN into a partisan issue, despite President Bush's record of strong
support for the UN and his
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decisions to initiate the bulk of the new missions that led to the rapid growth in p
eacekeeping costs. Additionally,
members of both parties joined forces to protest soaring peacekeeping costs and
impo
se UN financial and
management reforms.
From the latter months of 1993 through the Spring of 1994, the Administration
fought
numerous amendments to
restrict participation of U.S. forces in UN missions and limit funding for
peacekee
ping. On mainly party-line
votes, the Administration defeated or diluted the most detrimental initiatives, incl
uding the Nickles amendment on
command and control, much of the Dole Peace Powers Act, and the
Michel/Gingrich/Hyde
/Gilman/Spence
amendment that would have effectively prohibited payments of all future UN
peacekeep
ing assessments.
Following release of PDD-25, the intensity of opposition in Congress subsided
somewh
at, enabling the
Administration to obtain an authorization and full appropriation of its FY 95
peacek
eeping request and a $670
million FY 94 supplemental. Yet, despite an affirmative vote in the Senate (with
ei
ght Republicans supporting), the
Administration failed to obtain Congressional support even for a modified
version of
shared responsibility. The
Armed Services committees merely agreed to revisit the issue in the next
Congress.
Peacekeeping in the 104th Congress: The substantially partisan pattern of voting i
n 1993-1994, coupled with the
Republicans' sustained rhetorical campaign, are bad omens for peacekeeping in
the co
ming Congress. We no
longer have the votes to defeat restrictive amendments. We are unlikely to muster
s
ignificant bipartisan support
to defeat GOP leadership-sponsored legislation; hence, we will either have to
modera
te crippling amendments,
accept them, or veto the bills to which they are attached. The GOP Contract With
Am
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erica (described below)
reveals the Republicans' determination to force us to make such tough choices.
Moreover, the Republican members who will hold leadership positions and chair
key co
mmittees and
subcommittees are among the most strident opponents of the UN and
peacekeeping. Sen
ator Dole and
Speaker-designate Gingrich both sponsored highly restrictive, anti-peacekeeping
legi
slation in the last Congress.
Apart from Senator Hatfield, incoming chair of the Appropriations Committee
and a UN
supporter, we can expect
little cooperation from influential Chairmen. Senators Helms, Thurmond,
Pressler, M
cConnell, and Domenici are
all key chairmen who are likely to oppose sustained support for the UN. In the
Hous
e, Representatives Livingston
(Appropriations Chair), Rogers, Spence and possibly Oilman are likely to remain
form
idable opponents of
peacekeeping.
Taken together, these factors indicate we will have a far more difficult time in the
new Congress in obtaining UN
funding, fending-off hostile legislation, sustaining support for current UN
missions
and building support for
potential new missions.
II. Our Immediate Challenges
Funding Forecast and Implications
As soon as Congress begins consideration of the budget, we face challenges to
our pe
acekeeping funding requests.
Arrears: By the end of this fiscal year, State estimates we will have accumulated
a
pproximately $800 million in
peacekeeping arrears. (The paper at Tab outlines the current and projected
statu
s of U.S. payments to the
UN.) Given the difficulty we experienced in funding our arrears last year, plus th
e absence of any "budget
headroom" this year and the growing perception that peacekeeping is effectively
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an
Executive branch entitlement
program, the chances of obtaining any funds to pay our arrears are almost nil.
Neve
rtheless, we must try hard.
FY 96 Budget Request: Congress is unlikely to appropriate funds to cover our
total
projected requirements in FY
96. While it is crucial that the Administration fulfill our treaty obligations and
request full funding, we must
anticipate that Congress will under-fiind our FY 96 requirement, perhaps
substantial!
y, thereby compounding
our arrears problem. Moreover, assuming we not be able to negotiate within the
UN
for a reduction of our
peacekeeping assessment to 25%, our legal (if unacknowledged) arrears will
grow by m
ore than $200 million
annually starting in FY 96 when Congress imposes the mandated 25% cap.
Shared Responsibility: As a necessary first step in implementing the President's
po
licy, the Administration has
decided to budget in FY 96 according to the Nunn version of shared
responsibility, w
herein DOD would pay
assessments only for those missions involving U.S. combat forces (i.e. Haiti and
Mac
edonia at present). DOD
has committed to fund contingencies in this category up to $600 million per
annum.
While we did obtain
bipartisan support in the Senate for shared responsibility last year, we failed even
to carry a majority of
Democrats on the House Armed Services Committee. In fact, the House passed
legislat
ion prohibiting use of any
DOD funds for UN assessments. We face a serious uphill battle to reconstitute
suppo
rt in the Senate as well as to
build support in the House this session for shared responsibility.
If we cannot pay our arrears during the next two years and Congress under-funds
our
FY 96 requirement, U.S.
indebtedness will force the UN into a veritable cash flow crisis at some point
over
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the next two years, most likely
in the Spring of 1996. The only way to avert this outcome is radical cost savings
m
easures, which are discussed
below. The political and practical ramifications of an impending cash flow crisis
a
re severe:
u UN peacekeeping missions may grind to a halt. As its cash dwindles, the UN
will c
ease payments in
roughly the following order:
1. Troop Contributors: who eventually will refuse to participate in new missions,
as
happened in
FY 94, and/or withdraw from existing missions.
2. UN Services: i.e. cuts in utilities and specialized services like translation.
3. Reimbursements to Countries that have provided the UN goods and services.
(As a m
ajor
supplier to the UN, the U.S. would suffer directly.)
4. Payments to Commercial Contractors for food, fuel, transport etc. will be
delayed
or not
made at all. When this occurs, some or all missions could no longer function
effect
ively.
(N.B.: U.S. companies provide over 27% of the goods and services purchased
commercia
lly
by UN HQ.)
u Pressure will build to avoid UN peacekeeping through resort to MNFs. The
Secretar
y General has
already signaled his growing preference for utilizing ad hoc multinational forces
fo
r missions that
the UN cannot assume without adequate funds or troops. The SYG has sought to
shift
the burden
from the UN to wealthier member states like the U.S. in Haiti and France in
Rwanda,
and NATO in
Bosnia. To the extent that the U.S. is expected to shoulder part of such burdens, o
ur costs will grow
and the utility of the UN as a burden-sharing mechanism will diminish. We also
risk
acquiescing in
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the resurgence of regional and post-colonial hegemony.
u Pressure May Build to Shut-down UNPROFOR prematurely, which accounts
for more than
half the
entire UN peacekeeping budget. This would entail obvious risks and costs to the
U.S
., including
those associated with UNPROFOR extraction and lifting of the arms embargo.
u The U.S. may have difficulty gaining UNSC support for U.S. priorities. As our
sta
tus as a serious and
potentially permanent debtor sinks in, other member states, led by our Western
allie
s, may seek to
build their influence at our expense. Specifically, we may find it hard to build su
pport for U.S.
objectives in Haiti as well as elsewhere.
u The U.S. will risk losing all potential support for negotiating a reduction in our
peacekeeping
assessment to 25%. We have had very little success in negotiating a reduction of
ou
r peacekeeping
assessment at the UN. (See Tab
for summary of U.S. efforts to date). The
likeli
hood of eventual
success is slim, as this is a zero-sum game. Our allies and others resent U.S. unil
ateralism on this and
other UN issues and have elicited little interest in assuming a greater financial bu
rden.
Policy Pressures
The GOP Contract with America contains the major policy challenges at hand.
We exp
ect the House to begin
marking up the Contract during the week of January 9. We need to prepare for
votes
on the Contract in its
entirety as well as on pieces of it during consideration of various pieces of legisl
ation, such as the DOD
supplemental, the State and DOD authorization bills, and various appropriations
bill
. An NSC-led Legislative
Affairs subgroup of the Peacekeeping Core Group is working with friendly Hill
staffe
rs to craft a viable
legislative strategy.
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The Contract itself incorporates and tightens many of the defeated provisions in
the
Dole Peace Powers bill, the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1994, and other restrictive but
unsuccessful
amendments offered in 1994.
A detailed summary of the Contract's peacekeeping provisions is at Tab
n
otably, the Contract would:
. Most
u Prohibit the payment of all U.S. peacekeeping assessments unless the total
amount
we owe exceeds the cost to
the U.S. of support we provide voluntarily pursuant to UN resolutions. The total
co
st of our voluntary support
(including NATO air support, sanctions enforcement, Provide Comfort, and our
troops
in South Korea) is
likely always to exceed our assessments. Thus, this provision would force us
wither
to cease such
activities or prevent us from paying any more peacekeeping assessments.
u Prohibit funding for any U.S. personnel (individuals or units) placed under
foreig
n operational control in any
multilateral operation (seemingly including NATO) unless the President certifies
in
advance to Congress that it
is in our vital national interests to do so. This provision has no emergency waiver
. Thus it would preclude
commanders making real-time decisions in the field to subordinate U.S. forces to
for
eign operational control,
as we did in Desert Storm. Due to the vital national interest threshold, this provi
sion would also chill our
ability to detail individual officers to the UN to assist the UN with planning or ot
her functions or serve to
as observers in UN missions.
u Prohibit participation of U.S. personnel in UN missions unless Congress has
specif
ically authorized and
appropriated funds for this purpose. By barring expenditure of DOD funds on
incremen
tal costs of
participation in UN missions without prior Congressional action, the Contract
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would
infringe on the
President's authority as Commander-in-Chief.
u Require 15 days advance notification to Congress for any provision of goods or
ser
vices to the UN on a
reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis, regardless of its value. Although this
prov
ision can be waived until
48 hours after, if the President declares an emergency, its effect will be to elimin
ate all but the most substantial
contributions to the UN. The U.S. constantly supports the UN (almost always on
a re
imbursable basis) in
myriad ways that are difficult to track or precisely quantify. Since there is no do
liar threshold, this provision
would substantially curtail U.S. assistance to the UN.
u Require 15 days advance notification to Congress before any vote in the UNSC
on vi
rtually any matter
pertaining to a UN peacekeeping mission, sanctions regime, or "other action",
unless
the President certifies
an emergency (then 48 hours after). This appears to represent an infringement on
th
e President's
constitutional powers and would hamstring the UN Security Council.
u Annually withhold 50% of our peacekeeping assessments pending certifications
on th
e role and performance
of the UN Inspector General. This provision substantially raises the bar, requirin
g certifications that go well
beyond the requirements of current law. It will be very difficult for the U.S. to m
ake the certifications
envisioned in the Contract.
III. Issues for Discussion
In anticipation of the challenges described above, the interagency Peacekeeping
Core
Group (PCG) met on
December 2 to consider potential remedies and next steps. (The Summary of
Conclusion
s of this meeting is at Tab
). The PCG identified discussed several issues that merit Deputies' attention.
1) Should the Administration decide now not to support any additional
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peacekeeping
missions or should we
deliberately amass debt that we cannot reasonably expect to repay?
The choice presented is stark but not unrealistic. If we continue supporting new
mi
ssions, we will exacerbate and
accelerate the UN's cash flow crisis and face all the potential consequences
outline
d above. On the other hand, if
we suddenly cease to support all new missions, we will miss important
opportunities
to contain or resolve regional
crises that directly or indirectly affect U.S. interests, e.g. Haiti, Angola, and in
vite serious confrontations with our
Security Council partners.
However, to delay and/or avert the UN's cash flow crisis, the U.S. and the UN
must m
ake very difficult choices
that we have been reluctant to make thus far. Specifically:
~ We will have to be extremely circumspect in approving new missions —
possibly t
o the extent of seeking
Congressional agreement (at least in principle) to support as well as fund any new
c
ommitments. A summary of
potential new missions is at Tab .
-- We must terminate and/or substantially scale-back existing missions to reduce
th
e aggregate costs of
peacekeeping. At least three UN missions are expected to close in 1995 (See Tab
). To reap cost savings,
however, we will have to close others. By far the most expensive UN mission is
UNPR
OFOR, costing a total of
approximately $1.5 mill./year.
- We must set internal USG priorities and encourage UNSC members to try to
do the
same. Not all UN missions
are created equal; some serve U.S. interests more directly than others. The Deputi
es should consider consciously
prioritizing existing missions, weighing the cost against their utility, and evaluat
ing new missions in light of their
relative place in our hierarchy of interests.
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2) What cost-saving opportunities should the Administration pursue both inside
and
outside the UN?
In addition to doing less, we must do everything more economically. This means
iden
tifying, championing and
implementing radical cost saving opportunities. The Deputies could provide
useftil g
uidance on the cost savings
ideas considered by the PCG and summarized at Tab . These ideas include:
u Reducing the amount paid to troop contributors, presently $988/man/month.
UN reim
bursement rates
are excessive - substantially more than most countries' incremental costs of
provid
ing a soldier to the
UN. (U.S. incremental costs in UN missions are $200-$250/man/month). Most
countrie
s are
profiting from peacekeeping. Yet, countries that are rational actors would decide t
o participate if
only their incremental costs plus a small risk premium plus a marginal incentive
wer
e provided. Some
countries that claim they maintain certain forces solely for peacekeeping and thus
h
ave higher
incremental costs would resist a reduced payment, as would certain poor
countries.
OECD
countries could, however, individually or collectively offer lower income
countries
training, excess
equipment or other support as incentives to participate in UN missions.
u G-7 Compact. A substantial portion of our UN assessments go to pay
reimbursements
to our G-7
partners who participate in peacekeeping. In effect, we are engaged in large, circu
lar transfer
payments among the world's richest countries. We could try to gain agreement
among
our G-7
partners to voluntarily waive reimbursement for our troop contributions to the
UN or
to limit them
to a lower level to cover incremental costs. Such a move would significantly
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reduce
aggregate UN
costs.
u Section 607. The U.S. could consider more extensive use of Section 607 FAA
in con
tracts between
the U.S. and the UN. Through this authority, the U.S. may be able to supply some
of
the goods and
services that the UN will require over the coming months. The UN would
reimburse th
e U.S. when
funds became available.
u Reducing excessive UN per diems and other compensation paid to civilians and
milit
ary observers in
UN missions. This would require complicated negotiations with the UN but
would redu
ce costs
noticeably.
3) How can the Administration Improve Consultations with Congress on
Peacekeeping I
ssues?
The Administration initiated, and Congress has since mandated, monthly staff
consult
ations on new and on-going
peacekeeping activities. Nevertheless, part of congressional frustration with the
size and cost of peacekeeping
missions remains many Member's sense that the Administration incurs new
obligations
without Congressional
approval or even adequate consultation. If we are to have any success in forging c
onsensus with Congress on
peacekeeping issues, we must do more and better consultations with Congress on
areg
ular basis and especially
before we vote for new or expanded UN missions.
The paper at Tab
outlines three options for Congressional consultations:
i) status quo;
ii) elevate the monthly briefings to the Member/Deputy or Principal level or
conduc
t quarterly briefings
with Members and staff while maintaining other monthly briefings for staff only;
iii) establish an ad hoc bipartisan consultative group of members to discuss
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peaceke
eping policy issues.
Recommendation: That the Deputies agree to elevate the monthly briefings to the
Mem
ber-level once a quarter,
starting in January and led by a senior Administration official. In addition, that
we explore with Congressional
leaders the possibility of establishing an ad hoc consultative group.
4) How should the Administration convey to the UN and our allies the new
constraint
s on U.S. support for new
and existing UN missions?
While the UN has undoubtedly gleaned the significance of the changes brought
about b
y the elections, we may
wish to consider a frank discussion with key players at the UN that details the diff
icult challenges we now face.
The conversations, possibly to be conducted by senior representatives from
Washingto
n and USUN representatives
with Undersecretaries General Connor and Annan, would set the stage for many
of the
tough choices we face and
specify the implications for the UN of long-term and substantial U.S.
indebtedness.
Recommendation: That the Deputies endorse appropriate officials discussing
with sen
ior UN officials the specific
implications of the new constraints on U.S. policy and task State to recommend
whet
her and how to conduct
similar discussions with key allies.
5) How can the Administration effectively marshal public opinion in support of
its
peacekeeping policy?
Polls consistently show that the Congress is far more hostile to the UN and
peacekee
ping than the average
American. In fact, a recent USA TODAY poll showed that the prohibition on
placing U
.S. forces under foreign
operational control is the least popular portion of the Contract with America 41%
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in favor.
However, the Administration has largely failed to make a convincing case to
Congress
or the American people for
continued U.S. support for the UN. Clearly, we must clarify and deliver our
message
more effectively. The first
annual mandated report to Congress on peacekeeping is due when we submit the
budget.
This report offers the
opportunity to make a compelling case in a reader-friendly fashion. In addition,
as
part of a broader strategy, the
Deputies should consider whether the President should touch briefly on
UN/peacekeepi
ng reform in the State of the
Union address.
IV. Next Steps
At its December 2 meeting, the PCG established a Legislative/Policy Sub-Group
to dev
ise and implement
congressional strategies on peacekeeping for use in the coming months. This
Sub-Gro
up met on December 8.
The Summary of Conclusions at Tab
outlines the steps to be taken in the near
ter
m to prepare for the opening
of the new Congress.
The Deputies should task any additional actions they deem appropriate.
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AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE 0000
RWANDA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RWANDAN VP KAGAME MEETS WITH NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISOR LAKE
TEXT:
GQ N F I D E N T I A L
-
STATE 341035
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PREF, PHUM, PGOV, EAID, US, R
W
SUBJECT: RWANDAN VP KAGAME MEETS WITH NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISOR LAKE
1.
CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. IN A MEETING WITH NSA LAKE ON DECEMBER 13,
RWANDAN VICE PRESIDENT AND DEFENSE MINISTER PAUL KAGAME
ASKED THAT MORE U.S. AID BE DIRECTED INSIDE RWANDA. NSA
LAKE ASSURED KAGAME THAT AID TO THE GOR IS A HIGH
PRIORITY. IN TURN, HE STRESSED THE NEED TO SEE PROGRESS
TOWARD RECONCILIATION AND RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
INCLUDING THE NAMING OF A POINT PERSON ON HUMAN RIGHTS.
KAGAME POINTED TO THE PRESENCE OF LARGE NUMBERS OF UNAMIR
TROOPS AND THE EVENTUALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS IN
EVERY COMMUNE AND SAID ANYONE W O WANTED TO COME AND
H
OBSERVE THE5SITUATION WAS WELCOME. HE THOUGHT SOME KIND
OF FORCE WOULD BE REQUIRED TO DEAL WITH THE CRIMINALS IN
THE CAMPS WHO ARE HOLDING REFUGEES HOSTAGE. ON LAND
TENURE, KAGAME SAID LOCAL ADMINISTRATORS AND A NATIONAL
COMMISSION ARE WORKING TO RESOLVE LAND DISPUTES, BUT THE
GOR WILL NEED RESOURCES TO MOVE SQUATTERS TO OTHER
PROPERTIES. END SUMMARY
3. KAGAME, W O VISITED WASHINGTON FROM DECEMBER 9-14 AT
H
THE INVITATION OF THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT, WAS ACCOMPANIED
BY HEALTH MINISTER JOSEPH KAREMERA, PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT
CHARLES MURIGANDE, RWANDAN CHARGE JOSEPH MUTABOBA, AND AN
AIDE. NSA LAKE WAS JOINED BY STATE/AF DAS BUSHNELL, NSC
SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR AFRICA DON STEINBERG, NSC DIRECTOR FOR
GLOBAL ISSUES SUSAN RICE, AND OSD AFRICA DIRECTOR VINCE
KERN. STATE RWANDA DESKOFF AISTON ALSO ATTENDED.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E O 13526
. .
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USG ASSISTANCE AND GOR COMMITMENTS
4. NSA LAKE STRESSED THAT THE USG HAS WORKED HARD TO BE
SUPPORTIVE OF RWANDA. W UNDERSTAND THAT THE GOR LACKS
E
MANY BASIC NECESSITIES AND W INTEND TO HELP ADDRESS THAT
E
PROBLEM. IT IS IMPORTANT FOR US TO DELIVER ON OUR
COMMITMENTS, BUT IT IS EQUALLY IMPORTANT FOR US TO. BE ABLE
TO POINT TO PROGRESS TOWARD RECONCILIATION AND RESPECT FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS. NSA LAKE SAID W WERE ENCOURAGED BY THE
E
GOR'S COMMITMENTS IN THESE AREAS AND STRESSED THE NEED FOR
THE GOR TO NAME THE POINT PERSON ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND TO
SEE UNAMIR AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS MONITOR PROGRAM OPERATING
SUCCESSFULLY.
5. KAGAME EXPRESSED THE GOR'S GRATITUDE FOR THE USG'S
ASSISTANCE SO FAR, AND ASKED THAT MORE AID BE DIRECTED
INSIDE RWANDA' WHERE MOST RWANDANS ARE LOCATED. KAGAME
SAID THIS WILL HELP STABILIZE THE SITUATION AND HELP THE
GOR TO GOVERN, WHICH IN TURN WILL HELP SOLVE THE REFUGEE
PROBLEM. KAGAME STRESSED THAT RWANDANS MUST BE HELPED TO
HELP THEMSELVES. NSA LAKE AGREED AND SAID THIS IS WHY OUR
DOLLARS 9 MILLION AID PROGRAM IS AIMED AT ASSISTANCE TO
KEY MINISTRIES AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS. HE
ASSURED KAGAME THAT W HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGING USAID TO GIVE
E
VERY HIGH PRIORITY TO AID TO RWANDA. NSA LAKE NOTED THAT
OUR DOLLARS 2.5 MILLION CONTRIBUTION TO THE WORLD BANK
ARREARS WAS IMMINENT AND WOULD HELP MAKE AVAILABLE DOLLARS
50 MILLION IN CREDITS FROM THE BANK. HE EXPRESSED
CONCERN, HOWEVER, THAT I F PROGRESS IS NOT MADE BOTH ON OUR
SIDE AND THE GOR'S SIDE, THE SITUATION COULD DETERIORATE
AND IT COULD BE MORE DIFFICULT TO MOBILIZE SUPPORT FOR A
SECOND CRISIS.
FOR THESE REASONS, W NEED TO KEEP
E
PUSHING.
LAND TENURE
6. NSA LAKE RAISED THE LAND TENURE ISSUE. KAGAME SAID
THAT SQUATTERS TOOK OVER LANDS DURING A PERIOD OF
TURBULENCE WHEN THE GOR WAS NOT ABLE TO CONTROL THE
SITUATION. THE PROBLEM REQUIRED THE GOR TO ACCOMMODATE
TWO COMPETING INTERESTS: ASSURING RESPECT FOR PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND ASSURING SHELTER FOR ALL THOSE WITHIN RWANDA.
LOCAL ADMINISTRATORS ARE HANDLING DISPUTES ON A
CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. THE GOR HAS ALSO SET UP A NATIONAL
COMMISSION, WHICH WOULD TEMPORARILY TAKE OWNERSHIP OF
DISPUTED LANDS AND THEN HAND THEM OVER TO THE RIGHTFUL
OWNER. KAGAME STRESSED THE GOR WILL NEED RESOURCES TO
MOVE THE SQUATTERS TO OTHER PROPERTIES. HEALTH MINISTER
KAREMERA ADDED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OFTEN
IGNORED THE PLIGHT OF THE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF OLD
REFUGEES WHO HAVE RETURNED (AND WHOSE NUMBERS KAREMERA
CLAIMED EXCEEDED THOSE OF THE N W REFUGEES). THIS GROUP
E
HAS SERIOUS SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND LACKS SCHOOLS, HEALTH
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Page 2 of 4
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Gables\CD010\DEC94\MSGS\M1435742.html
FACILITIES, AND OTHER BASICS.
7. NSA LAKE STRESSED THE NEED FOR THE GOR TO W R CLOSELY
OK
WITH THE WORLD BANK ON PLANNING TO MAKE SURE THE BANK
UNDERSTANDS THE GOR'S PRIORITIES. KAGAME SAID THE BANK
HAD A LOCAL REPRESENTATIVE AND SENT DELEGATIONS. BUT-HE
T.fiMtTMTm T U P RANK''.';
qr.nW
PfiPK
1
^
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
, AF DAS BUSHNELL SAID W WOULD
E
PRESS Q H - nONDRS ON THF. ARRRARS AT THF. PRC. I f FRTF.NDS
TFP
MIT T7TT Mr:
HUMAN RIGHTS
8. NSA LAKE RETURNED TO THE NEED FOR MOVEMENT ON A HUMAN
RIGHTS POINT PERSON. HE SAID THERE WERE THOSE WHO WERE
SKEFTICAL ABOUT THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION WITHIN RWANDA;
THE MORE FACTS W HAVE THE EASIER IT WILL BE TO RESOLVE
E
THESE DOUBTS. KAGAME REPLIED THAT THERE ARE OVER 5000
UNAMIR.TROOPS INSIDE RWANDA AND HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS
PLANNED FOR EVERY COMMUNE; HE WELCOMED ANYONE WHO WANTS
TO COME AND MONITOR THE SITUATION. HOWEVER, HE QUESTIONED
WHETHER NAMING ONE PERSON WOULD MAKE A DIFFERENCE; IT IS
REALLY THE GOVERNMENT n F R T T WHTGH MUST ASSURE RESPECT
V.A..
FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS.
~
~
CAMP SECURITY AND REPATRIATION
9. NSA LAKE ASKED ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR REFUGEE RETURN.
KAGAME SAID THERE WAS NOT MUCH THE GOR COULD DO. THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY COULD D A GREAT DEAL, HOWEVER, TO
O
PRESS ZAIRE TO TAKE NECESSARY ACTIONS. HE SAID THE GOR
WANTS TV PFFIir.F.Fq TO RETURN AND WILL COOPERATE WITH SUCH
V
F.FFDRTS
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP]
Page 3 of 4
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CDO 10\DEC94\MSGS\M 1435742.html
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
10.
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCUn
Page 4 of 4
�DEPARTMENT OF STATE
(TH) 12.29.
"94 12-25
NO. 1460120253 PAGE
CQNFIDKNTIA-fi
DECL:OADR
R A D WEEKLY REPORT
WNA
Thursday, December 29, 1994
PIPLQMftTIC IHmATIVES
Amb. Rawson demarched the G R December 23 to urge the
O
government to cooperate w i t h the UN on i t s plan to f a c i l i t a t e
the return of i n t e r n a l l y displaced persons (IDPs) to t h e i r
homes ("Operation Retour").
W were concerned i n p a r t i c u l a r
e
that forced closures of the IDP camps i n southwest Rwanda could
lead to a s i g n i f i c a n t outflow of refugees to or through
Burundi, which has been p a r t i c u l a r l y f r a g i l e i n recent weeks.
The G R has confirmed Kagame's assurances that the Government
O
has not set any deadline f o r closure of the camps, and Amb.
Rawson reports that UNAMIR i s happy w i t h the GOR's cooperation
and w i t h the preparations f o r "Operation Retour", which i s set
to begin on December 29.
Presidents Mobutu and Mwinyi have called f o r a regional heads
of state summit i n Nairobi on January 7.
President Moi has
agreed to host, and the Presidents of Burundi, Rwanda, and
Uganda are also being i n v i t e d , although i t i s not known whether
they have accepted.
The U.S. and other interested countries
w i l l be i n v i t e d as observers.
W believe the regional refugee
e
conference prepcom w i l l be held January 9 i n Addis Ababa and
are awaiting confirmation from UNHCR and/or the OAU.
Attendees
are expected to be the e n t i r e OAU membership and the f o r t y - f i v e
nation executive board of UNHCR. The next Friends of Rwanda
meeting i s set f o r the afternoon of January 17 i n Geneva/ with
the UNDP roundtable on January 18 and 19.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
CLINTON LIBKM* HiOTOu* .
mNPTnun*™*.
^W- 03J.3 - ^
3
�DEPARTMENT OF STATE
(TH) 12.29.
'94 12:25
NO. 1460120253 PAGE
CONFIDEHTIAL
- 2 BILATKPAT. ATT)
The G R completed the necessary AID paperwork for the $2.5
O
m i l l i o n arrears contribution and named Emmanuel Munyagishali as
i t s coordinator for human rights issues.
(Amb.
Rawson does not
know him and i s t r y i n g to get relevant biographic
information.)
With these preconditions f i n a l l y met, AID
disbursed our $2.5 m i l l i o n contribution to the World Bank's
Federal Reserve account on December 27.
H M N RIGHTS
UA
International Tribunal
Judge Goldstone went to K i g a l i on December 19-21 and apparently
had a successful t r i p .
He said the G R pledged f u l l
O
cooperation and he held a j o i n t press conference with Justice
Minister Nkubito and I n t e r i o r Minister Sendashonga to that
effect.
The four-member USG team sent to assist Goldstone
apparently was quite h e l p f u l .
The Tribunal i s seeking to move
into the former UNICEF building i n i t i a l l y and then ultimately
to have o f f i c e space (and perhaps some housing) constructed i n
the UNAMIR compound. The Tribunal s t a f f i s concerned about the
preservation of documents, and we are considering whether to
send a team i n January to continue with document c o l l e c t i o n .
PRyilCTK
STTIJATIOH
Camp Security:
According to UNHCR i n Geneva, the UN held an
i n t e r n a l meeting on December 22 i n New York to review the
results of the recent DPKO/UNHCR assessment mission to Zaire.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CQHriPEHTafc
4
�(TH)
iy E ARTME NT OP STATE
12.29.
"94 12.25
NO.
1460120253
PAGE
GOMFIDENTTAfr
-3-
The meeting concluded that establishing a U peacekeeping force
N
in Zaire i s not possible as not one out of 60 countries polled
was willing to commit/troops. Therefore, the U i s pursuing
N
the idea of establishing a force of 3,000 local Zairian troops
who would be trained by some 150-200 c i v i l i a n and "police
expert" trainers from other countries.
SRSG Khan was to have
travelled to Zaire yesterday or today to discuss this plan with
the GOZ.
According to UNHCR, the trainers could be funded from
assessed PKO contributions ( s i c ) , but the Zairian troops would
have to be paid from voluntary contributions pledged to U H R
NC
(sic).
Deputy High Commissioner Walzer has discussed this with
A/S Oakley and hopes that the USG ( i . e . , PRM) w i l l contribute
to this effort.
Fundraising to
support i t i s a likely agenda item for the next Friends of
Rwanda meeting in Geneva.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CQHriDEHTIMi
5
�DtPARTMENT
OF STATE.
CONFIDENTIkh
-4-
Safe Havens:
President Mwinyi of Tanzania recently met with
President Mobutu to discuss the idea of establishing UN safe
havens inside Rwanda to which refugees could return.
The GOT
i s feeling increased pressure from Tanzanians unhappy with the
i n f l u x of refugees and believes i t must do "something" given
the upcoming elections i n 1995.
Mwinyi, Moi and Mobutu have
agreed to a regional heads of state summit i n Nairobi on
January 7 to promote t h i s idea of safe havens.
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1 4
.d
Gorpa: Zairian m i l i t a r y continue to force refugees i n Goma town
to clear out and move to refugee camps.
Since the end of
November, some 200,000 refugees have moved into Goma camps. On
December 13/14, and for the f i r s t time since early September,
UNHCR f a c i l i t a t e d voluntary r e p a t r i a t i o n of 780 refugees from
Goma to Rwanda.
CQHriDENTIAfe
CLINTON UBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�-5-
UHAfUB
DeploymRnt-.:
As of December 13, there were 5,863 personnel
deployed with UNAMIR,/including 322 m i l i t a r y observers, 69
headquarters personnel, 80 CIVPOL and 5,392 troops from f i f t e e n
countries.
Mandate:
As part of i t s mandate to protect returning refugees,
i n t e r n a l l y displaced persons and other c i v i l i a n s , the UN
reports that UNAMIR has "cleaned up" an i n t e r n a l l y displaced
persons camp i n the southwest, i n order to stop "disruptive
elements."
The UNAMIR presence was welcomed by the refugees.
Screening of the refugees and the camps with metal detectors
turned up caches of spears, machetes and hand grenades.
Twenty-three "troublemakers" were taken into custody.
The RPF
set up i t s perimeter several kilometers away from the camps, to
ensure that i t s troops d i d not i n t e r f e r e with UNAMIR. UNAMIR
did not take any casualties.
CQNFIDEHTi&fc
CLINTON UBKAKY PHOTOCOPY
�(TU) 0 1. 17.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DECEASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
95 17:29
CONFIDENTIAL
Department of State
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'95
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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N . 1460120843 PAGE
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Department of State
ACTION
PAGE 0 1
ACTION I O - 1 6
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0 0 5 1 S 2 0 Z J A N 95
FM AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC I M M E D I A T E 5 0 6 1
I N F O UN S E C U R I T Y COUNCIL C O L L E C T I V E I M M E D I A T E
AMEMBASSY K I G A L I I M M E D I A T E
U S M I S S I O N USUN NEW YORK I M M E D I A T E
• O H r
G
I
P C IH T
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/4S
000060
E. 0. 1 2 3 5 6 :
DECL:
OADR
TAGS:
PREF, PREL, PHUM, UNSE, RW, ZA, BY
SUBJECT:
RWANDA-UNSC R E S O L U T I O N ON WAR C R I M I N A L S
REF:
1.
STATE
000754
1
C OUr IOC I IT I AL
- E N T I R E TEXT.
2.
WE R A I S E D THE Q U E S T I O N S I N R E F T E L W I T H TWO
HOST GOVERNMENT O F F I C I A L S . THE F O R E I G N M I N I S T E R
AND THE M I N I S T E R OF J U S T I C E .
THE F O R E I G N M I N I S T E R
S A I D THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF B U R U N D I COULD, I N
P R I N C I P L E , COMPLY W I T H A UN R E S O L U T I O N C A L L I N G
UPON THEM TO D E T A I N RWANDANS I N BURUNDI A G A I N S T
WHOM THERE I S C R E D I B L E E V I D E N C E OF R E S P O N S I B I L I T Y
FOR GENOCIDE OR WAR CRIMES, AND THAT BURUNDI LAW
WOULD P E R M I T COMPLIANCE.
B U R U N D I , S A I D THE
F O R E I G N M I N I S T E R , HAD THE P O L I T I C A L W I L L TO CARRY
OUT SUCH ARRESTS, BUT M I G H T NOT HAVE THE P O L I C E
RESOURCES TO DO SO.
3.
THE M I N I S T E R OF J U S T I C E S A I D THAT THE
GOVERNMENT COULD COMPLY W I T H SUCH A R E S O L U T I O N
THROUGH USE OF THE E X T R A D I T I O N TREATY BETWEEN
RWANDA AND B U R U N D I UNDER WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF
RWANDA WOULD ASK THAT C E R T A I N I N D I V i D V U A L S BE
E X T R A D I C T E D.
HE S A I D THAT HE THOUGHT BURUNDI HAD
THE RESOURCES AND P O L I T I C A L W I L L TO ARREST A SMALL
NUMBER OF C R I M I N A L S , BUT COULD NOT ARREST
"HUNDREDS, " P A R T L Y BECAUSE T H E I R BURUNDI J U D I C I A L
SYSTEM I S NOT F U N C T I O N I N G WELL.
WHEN ASKED ABOUT
A R R E S T I N G RWANDANS WHO T E R R O R I Z E REFUGEES AND
CONDUCT P R E P A R A T I O N S FOR WAR, HE S A I D THAT THE
M A I N L Y T U T S I B U R U N D I ARMY WOULD BE W I L L I N G TO
ARREST SUCH I N D I V I D U A L S .
4.
MINIMIZE
CONS'I DERE D.
KRUEGER
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
PER E.O. 13526
ao\\- oaus-n
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DECL:OADR
R A D WEEKLY REPORT
WHA
^CLASSIFIED
r
K
5' *"0. 13526
Friday, January 6, 1995
Z/iy\T
S1HMABX
- H
KBH
Regional heads-of-stafce w i l l meet in Nairobi on January 7 when
Tanzania and Zaire are expected to press for the creation of
"safe zones" inside Rwanda. The next "Friends of Rwanda"
meeting, which w i l l be co-chaired by Assistant Secretary Moose
and Ambassador Spiegel, w i l l take place in Geneva on January
17. UNAMIR reports multiple insurgency a c t i v i t y in northwest
and southwest Rwanda, Amb. Rawson has been requested to further
report on an attack on an orphanage near Cyangugu. This week
the GOR started the process of replacing old currency with
new. This, suggests Amembassy K i g a l i , w i l l undercut the power
structure of the refugee camps. AID w i l l send s p e c i a l i s t s to
Kigali to help implement a two-phase "rapid response program"
to re-establish Rwanda's j u s t i c e system. However, for fear of
being entangled in p o l i t i c a l issues, AID i s reluctant to
provide judges for criminal cases, or technical assistance for
the national commission charged with performing triage on
thousands of criminal cases.
PIPLQWATIC IWmATIVES
The regional heads-of-state are scheduled to meet in Nairobi
January 7. I t i s expected that Tanzania and Zaire w i l l press
for the creation of "safe zones" inside Rwanda into which
refugees could be moved. While this achieves the neighbors'
goal of getting the refugees out of their countries, i t
presents security and sovereignty concerns for the GOR, which
might view i t as another Operation Turquoise-type situation.
We are preparing for the next Friends meeting in Geneva January
17, which A/S Moose and Amb. Spiegel w i l l co-chair. AID
Assistant Administrator for Africa John Hicks w i l l also attend,
and w i l l lead the U.S. delegation to the UNDP roundtable on
January 18 and 19.
UBAMIB
Internal PoUticalVSecurUy Pevelopments:
UNAMIR informed our
DATT in Kigali that there have been multiple reports of
insurgency a c t i v i t y in northwest and southwest Rwanda, with
reports of troops operating at night with v i r t u a l freedom of
movement. So far, the attackers have avoided direct contact
with the RPA, focusing instead on c i v i l i a n and economic
targets. The UN provided no d e t a i l s on incidents, but the DATT
learned that in the early hours of January 4, a raiding party
attacked an orphanage near Cyangugu, spraying i t with small
arms f i r e and throwing at least one grenade inside. At least
one c h i l d was k i l l e d and several others wounded. The RPA
responded to the attack with heavy machine gun f i r e throughout
most of the day. The DATT sees this as the beginning of an
organized g u e r r i l l a campaign; we have asked Ambassador Rawson
to provide us with further information on this issue.
•fiaSEIPBHTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PROTOCOL
�w c r n r u M c n i u r 6 i'A i'E
-C0MFIDENTIAL
- 2The other major i n t e r n a l development t h i s week was the GOR's
operation t o replace a l l o l d currency w i t h new notes. UNAMIR
assisted i n p r o v i d i n g s e c u r i t y f o r t r a n s p o r t of the new notes,
but poor c o o r d i n a t i o n and money shortages have delayed the
operation. The G R closed the border at Goma, Zaire, i n order
O
to f o r e s t a l l any e f f o r t by the refugee population —
p a r t i c u l a r l y those i n the power s t r u c t u r e — from attempting t o
smuggle o l d bank notes back f o r changing before they are
declared worthless. Embassy K i g a l i reports that the money
changing operation w i l l undoubtedly undercut the power
s t r u c t u r e of the refugee camps, but the question remains
whether innocent refugees who decide t o r e t u r n permanently t o
Rwanda a f t e r the operation i s over w i l l be allowed t o exchange
some amount of o l d notes.
STATUS OF H M H RIGHTS
UA
Rwanda Rule of Law Assistance; On Tuesday DRL met w i t h AID/AFR
to discuss AID's proposal f o r a "rapid response program" t o
help Rwanda r e - e s t a b l i s h i t s j u s t i c e system. The AID program
w i l l : (1) provide t e c h n i c a l assistance t o the Rwandan MoJ; (2)
provide f o r e i g n j u r i s t s t o help handle c i v i l cases; and (3)
explore the p o s s i b i l i t y of e s t a b l i s h i n g p i l o t a l t e r n a t i v e
dispute programs, p r i m a r i l y f o r land disputes.
AID intends t o h i r e a c o n t r a c t o r t o send 5 s p e c i a l i s t s t o
K i g a l i f o r approximately one month ( s t a r t i n g possibly before
the UNDP Roundtable (Jan. 18-19)) t o develop s p e c i f i c , d e t a i l e d
work programs i n these three areas. I n the second phase, AID
w i l l supply ^ong-term (approximately one year) s p e c i a l i s t s t o
work w i t h the MoJ, i d e n t i f y and fund as many as 20 f o r e i g n
j u r i s t s , and supply a six-person team t o begin a l t e r n a t i v e
dispute programs i n Rwanda.
AID was r e l u c t a n t t o provide judges f o r c r i m i n a l cases or
t e c h n i c a l assistance f o r the n a t i o n a l commission charged w i t h
performing t r i a g e on the 10,000+ c r i m i n a l cases. AID f e l t that
p r o v i d i n g assistance here would entangle the U.S. i n p o l i t i c a l
issues and get them too involved w i t h the Rwandan government.
We noted that the need t o show progress i n meting out j u s t i c e
i n c r i m i n a l matters was a most pressing need i n Rwanda. DRL
agreed t o work w i t h AID i n developing more i n f o r m a t i o n on the
n a t i o n a l t r i a g e commission so t h a t AID could add t h i s t o i t s
assistance package.
SEFOA 2 786
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�95
(TU) 0 1. 17.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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P 07 1 040Z J AN 95
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0126
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY OAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY K I G A L I
UNSECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
CIAE-00
INM-02
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071046Z /38
- O U f I D • g.. M T 1 / L KINSHASA 00107
C
T
E.O. 1 2356:
DECL: : OADR
TAGS:
PREL, UNSE,: PREF, PHUM, RW, ZA, TZ, BY, UG, CG,
SUBJECT:
RWANDA-^UNSC RESOLUTION ON WAR CRIMINALS
REF:
1.
STATE 0 0 7 5 4 !
r O N F I D S H T I AU- - ENTIRE TEXT.
2.
AS REQUESTED REFTEL, E MB OF F MET WITH VICE PRIME
MINISTER OF JUSTICE, KAMANDA WA KAMANDA, TO INFORM THE
GOZ OF THE US PLAN TO PROPOSE A UN SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING DETENTION OF SUSPECTED RWANDAN WAR
CRIMINALS.
KAMANDA SAID THAT THE GOZ WOULD FULLY COMPLY
WITH A UNSC RESOLUTION CALLING UPON UN MEMBER STATES TO
DETAIN RWANDANS ON THEIR TERRITORY AGAINST WHOM THERE I S
CREDIBLE EVIDENCE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR GEROCIDE OR WAR
CRIMES.
3.
KAMANDA SAID THAT SUCH A UN RESOL UTION WOULD NOT BE
IN CONFLICT WITH Z A I R I A N LAW SO LONG AS THERE I S CREDIBLE
EVIDENCE OF RESPONSIBILITY.
HE SAID THAT WAR CRIME
ARRESTS WOULD BE CARRIED OUT BY THE Z A I R I AN "GUARD
C I V I L E " AND/OR THE "GENDARMERIE" BUT ZAIRE WOULD NEED
LOGISTICAL ASSISTANCE FROM THE UN OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS TO CARRY OUT SUCH ARRES TS SAFELY.
HE NOTED
THAT THIS WAS ANOTHER EXTRA FINANCIAL BURDEN ON THE
Z A I R I A N PEOPLE AND I T COMES AT A TIME WHEN NATIONAL
FINANCES ARE BADLY NEEDED ELSEWHERE I N THE COUNTRY.
4.
WITH REGARD TO THE GOZ WILLING TO ARREST RWANDANS
TERRORIZING REFUGEES I N CAMPS, KAMANDA SAID THAT THERE
WAS NO QUESTION THAT ZAIRE WOULD ARREST SUCH
INDIVIDUALS.
KAMANDA RECALLED THAT ZAIRE HAD ALREADY
ARRESTED AND DEPORTED 37 REFUGEES SUSPECTED OF CARRYING
OUT TERRORISM I N THE REFUGEE CAMPS.
HE SAID THAT THE GOZ
ALSO HAD STATED CATEGORICALLY THAT I T WOULD NOT TOLERATE
GROUPS CONDUCTING PREPARATIONS FOR WAR ON I T S SOIL NOR
THE FORMATION OF A RWANDAN GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE ON I T S
TERRITORY TO CARRY OUT ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST THE
PRESENT RWANDAN GOVERNMENT. YATES» »
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
9
�DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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NO. I 460120843 PAGE
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101200Z /38
R 101148Z JAN 95
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6837
INFO UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY K I G A L I
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
1
• O N P I D C N—T I A L- DAR ES SALAAM 000258
C
E.O. 1 2356:
DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UNSE, PREF, PHUM, RW. TZ
SUBJECT:
TANZANIAN PRIME MINISTER ASSERTS GOT
PREPARED TO DETAIN RWANDAN WAR CRIMINALS UNDER UNSC
AUTHORITY
REF:
1.
STATE 754
-COMP I DENT I Ab -- ENTIRE TEXT.
2.
I N H I S INTRODUCTORY CALL ON NEWLY-APPOINTED PRIME
MINISTER CLEOPA MSUYA, AMBASSADOR RAISED THE USG' S
PLAN TO PROPOSE A UNSC RESOLUTION ON DETAINING RWANDAN
WAR CRIMINALS <REF».
AMBASSADOR EXPLAINED THAT THE
RESOLUTION WOULD AUTHORIZE MEMBER STATES TO DETAIN
SUSPECTED RWANDAN WAR CRIMINALS BOTH FOR CRIMES
COMMITTED I N RWANDA AND INSIDE REFUGEE CAMPS.
AMBASSADOR ASKED I F THE GOT WOULD BE WILLING TO HOLD
SUCH PERSONS.
ALSO, WOULD THE TANZANIAN POLICE HAVE
THE POWER AND RESOURCES TO 0 0 SO.
3.
MSUYA REPLIED THAT THE GOT WOULD TREAT CRIMES
COMMITTED WITHIN TANZANIA AS AN ISSUE OF NATIONAL
SOVEREIGNTY.
"WITH OR WITHOUT THE UN," I F RWANDANS
BROKE TANZANIAN LAWS, "WE WILL HANDLE THEM. "
4.
AS FOR THOSE WHO COMMITTED ATROCITIES WITHIN
RWANDA, MSUYA D I D NOT FORESEE ANY PROBLEMS WITH
OPERATING UNDER A UN ARRANGEMENT TO APPREHEND
CULPRITS.
HE D I D CAUTION THAT HE S T I L L NEEDED TO
CHECK THIS WITH THE GOT' S LEGAL EXPERTS.
I F THEY
INFORMED HIM THAT SUCH ACTION WAS NOT POSSIBLE, HE
WOULD GET BACK TO THE AMBASSADOR.
S
MSUYA QUICKLY ADDED THAT HE HOPED SUCH DETENTIONS
WOULD BE L I M I T E D TO THE LEADERSHIP AND NOT AFFECT
LARGE NUMBERS OF REFUGEES.
I F MORE WERE TARGETED IAS
THE GOR ITSELF WANTED), PROBLEMS WOULD BE MULTIPLIED.
6.
MSUYA CONFIRMED THAT THE GOT BELIEVED THE
TANZANIAN POLICE COULD HANDLE THESE ARRESTS. BUT THE
POLICE WOULD PROBABLY NEED MATERIAL ASSISTANCE, SUCH
AS EQUIPMENT.
THIS WAS ANOTHER MATTER MSUYA SAID HE
WOULD LOOK INTO.
ANDERSON
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CNiETA
OrDNIL
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KBH
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�CITNLBAYPOOOY
LNO IRR HTCP
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
DECL: OADR
TO:
G - Mr. W i r t h
FROM:
AF - George E. Moose
SUBJECT:.
NSC Ad Hoc Meeting on Rwanda, F r i d a y , Feb. 2
Agenda Item:
IMET f o r Rwanda
I.
PURPOSE
To^ s t a t e our support f o r resuming...an IMET program focused
j * . , ^ " - - - i . - s ^ - s e • • c-.^-ii-j. r i ^ h t s - - . v . i i l i .
— t
o%'yg£-ngi*£';*f£jj; hixmgn/ - j g i - i :iand-ind,c ic i v l i a na n a.uatuhtohroirtiyt,y ,and - o
support.' r e p e a l ( i f p o s s i b l e ) o t h e FY95 l e g i s l a t i v e
of
restriction.
J J
r
II.
KEY POINTS
Legal R e s t r i c t i o n s
o
The FY95 F o r e i g n O p e r a t i o n s A p p r o p r i a t i o n s a c t p r o h i b i t s
IMET ^funding t o Rwanda. T h i s p r o v i s i o n a p p l e s ' o n l y t o
FY95; however, i t c o u l d be c a r r i e d over i n t o ' n e x t y e a r " s
a p p r o p r i a t i o n s b i l l u n l e s s t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ensures t h a t
i t i s not included.
o
These r e s t r i c t i o n s were enacted i n response t o t h e
g e n o c i d a l v i o l e n c e and w a r f a r e t h a t broke o u t i n
A p r i l 1994. The measures were n o t d i r e c t e d a t t h e new
government, b u t t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s remained i n e f f e c t a f t e r
t h e new government t o o k power i n J u l y 1994.
The
RPA's Request and Department
o
D u r i n g hisJDec.embex.. 1994 v i s i t t o Washington, Kagame s a i d
he' wou.Id^like.lthte'.;'U...S... to. resume' IMET . t r a i n i n g .
Secretary
Perry' £ofd ' hirii' t h a t "we were js.e.eki,.ng i.g.g i s l.atiye-.relief t o
r e - i n i t i a t e IMET i n FY95." DoD" i s p r e s s i n g for.tacti.on t o
r e p e a l o r waive t h e IMET r e s t r i c t i o n so FY95 IMET funds
might be reprogrammed f o r Rwanda.
Decisions
v
5>
o
:
:
:
:
I n December, U/S Davis endorsed e f f o r t s t o ensure t h a t t h e
s t a t u t o r y p r o h i b i t i o n i s n o t c a r r i e d over i n t o FY96 so t h a t
we would be able t o reprogram FY96 IMET funds f o r Rwanda.
(She d e c i d e d a g a i n s t i n c l u d i n g Rwanda IMET i n t h e FY96
budget submission f o r reasons o f C o n g r e s s i o n a l s t r a t e g y . )
The i s s u e o f p o s s i b l e FY95 IMET was n o t r a i s e d a t t h a t time,
•CONFIDENTIAL
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPI
•CONFIDENTIMI
- 2 -
Reasons We Support IMET
o
We agree w i t h DoD t h a t IMET should resume.. State has
already approved reprogramming IMET i n FY96, assuming the
l e g a l r e s t r i c t i o n s are no longer i n place. We believe that
FY95 IMET i s worth pursuing, i f i t i s possible at t h i s l a t e
stage. Up t o $50,000 i n funds i s s t i l l a v a i l a b l e .
o
We believe that an IMET program t a i l o r e d t o promoting
professionalism and respect f o r c i v i l i a n a u t h o r i t y and
human r i g h t s would be b e n e f i c i a l i n Rwanda.
We have urged the GOR and RPA t o prevent RPA s o l d i e r s
from engaging i n or a l l o w i n g r e p r i s a l s , and a
c a r e f u l l y c r a f t e d IMET program should help the
Rwandans meet t h i s commitment.
When PM Twagiramungu v i s i t e d Washington, he asked us
p r i v a t e l y f o r help w i t h ensuring c i v i l i a n supremacy
over the m i l i t a r y . IMET could help i n t h i s area.
o
We recognize that too close an a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h the RPA
could suggest USG endorsement of RPA behavior or cause
p o l i t i c a l problems i f RPA d i s c i p l i n e d e t e r i o r a t e s
s e r i o u s l y ; however, we believe the b e n e f i t s outweigh the
r i s k s and that IMET could help reduce the l i k e l i h o o d of an
increase i n RPA i n d i s c i p l i n e .
H i l l View and Possible Waiver or Repeal
o
I n i t i . - ^ l ..consultations w i t h A f r i c a p o l i c y makers on the H i l l
r , f ; : e no^fesi'stance t o the l i f t i n g of the FY95 IMET
e£eald
p r o h i b i t i o n / H i l l contacts recognized t h a t the p r o h i b i t i o n
was enacted under a very d i f f e r e n t set of circumstances
which no longer apply.
o
W e . ^ i l l - try..tp tack, a repeal p r o v i s i o n onto some s u i t a b l e
l^Xs,taJtiy.!e^yehic
i f ; a v a i l a b l e . An a p ^ B ^ g ^ ^ ^ y e h i c l e
may not be. available'"for several months ahd'ccTuM^i^ib
defeated f o r reasons unrelated t o Rwanda, given current
Congressional r e a l i t i e s . Nonetheless, we w i l l make our
best e f f o r t .
o
While Sec.. 614 or 451 waivers of the FY95 s t a t u t o r y
p r o h i b i t i o n are possible options, Congress t h i n k s these
provisions are overused and views them w i t h d i s f a v o r . To
maintain good Congressional r e l a t i o n s and not p r e j u d i c e
other, larger issues, we oppose attempting a waiver.
Attachment:
Talking Points
•CONFIDENTIAL
�CONF I DENT I ALDECL: OADR
TALKING POINTS ON IMET
We believe that an IMET program t a i l o r e d t o promoting
professionalism and respect f o r c i v i l i a n a u t h o r i t y and
human r i g h t s would be b e n e f i c i a l i n Rwanda.
We have urged the G R and RPA t o prevent RPA s o l d i e r s from
O
engaging i n or allowing r e p r i s a l s . A c a r e f u l l y c r a f t e d
IMET program should help the Rwandans meet t h i s commitment.
When PM Twagiramungu v i s i t e d Washington, he asked us
p r i v a t e l y f o r help w i t h ensuring c i v i l i a n supremacy over
the m i l i t a r y . IMET could help i n t h i s area, as w e l l .
We recognize that too close an association w i t h the RPA
could suggest USG endorsement of RPA behavior or cause
p o l i t i c a l problems i f RPA d i s c i p l i n e d e t e r i o r a t e s
s e r i o u s l y . However, we b e l i e v e the b e n e f i t s outweigh the
r i s k s and that IMET could help reduce the l i k e l i h o o d of an
increase i n RPA i n d i s c i p l i n e .
We f u l l y agree t h a t Rwanda should receive IMET i n FY96 and
support reprogramming of FY96 funds f o r t h a t purpose,
assuming l e g a l r e s t r i c t i o n s are no longer i n place. We d i d
not include Rwanda IMET i n the FY96 budget f o r reasons of
Congressional s t r a t e g y ; we w i l l wo'rk t o see t h a t the
current r e s t r i c t i o n s are not c a r r i e d over i n t o FY96.
We believe t h a t FY95 IMET i s worth pursuing, i f i t i s
possible at t h i s l a t e stage. Up t o $50,000 i n funds i s
s t i l l available.
I n i t i a l c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h A f r i c a p o l i c y makers on the H i l l
revealed no resistance t o the l i f t i n g of the FY95 IMET
p r o h i b i t i o n . H i l l contacts recognized t h a t the p r o h i b i t i o n
was enacted under a very d i f f e r e n t set of circumstances
which no longer apply.
We w i l l t r y t o tack a repeal p r o v i s i o n onto some s u i t a b l e
l e g i s l a t i v e v e h i c l e , i f a v a i l a b l e . An appropriate v e h i c l e
may not be a v a i l a b l e f o r several months and could be
defeated f o r reasons unrelated to Rwanda, given current
Congressional r e a l i t i e s . Nonetheless, we w i l l make our
best e f f o r t .
While Sec. 614 or 451 waivers of the FY95 s t a t u t o r y
p r o h i b i t i o n are possible options, Congress t h i n k s these
provisions are overused and views them w i t h d i s f a v o r . To
maintain good Congressional r e l a t i o n s and not p r e j u d i c e
other, larger issues, we oppose attempting a waiver.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAL.
DECLASSIFIED
E R EXUSSM
P
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
S/iyiS" KBH
•GOMFIDEMT4Afr
DECL: OADR
TO:
G - Mr. Wirth
FROM:
AF - George E. Moose
SUBJECT:
NSC Ad Hoc Meeting on Rwanda, Friday, Feb. 2
Agenda Item: UN Arms Embargo
I.
o
II.
PURPOSE
To s t a t e our view t h a t the time i s not r i g h t f o r . l i f t i n g or
modifying the arms embargo
KEY POINTS
DoD Support f o r RPA Request t o L i f t Embargo
o
The May 17, 1 . 4 . U S e c u r i t y Council arms , embargo p r o h i b i t s
99..N
"the sale or supply t o Rwanda ... of arms and r e l a t e d
m a t e r i e l of a l l types, i n c l u d i n g weapons and ammunition,
m i l i t a r y vehicles and equipment ...."
o
Kagame has c a l l e d f o r the l i f t i n g of the embargo and
f^jn'
implementing, regulations.so the RPA might receive
(e.ss,ential.ly^-n.OLn.-:lethal) equipment, such as communications
gear^ahd vehicle's. He argues the embargo was d i r e c t e d at
ending the k i l l i n g and was not intended t o punish the new
government, and that the new government has the sovereign
r i g h t t o obtain m i l i t a r y equipment f o r n a t i o n a l defense.
o
DoD favors l i f t i n g / m o d i f y i n g the embargo so the RPA would
at. least--be«-ab,l.e...to. o b t a i n the equipment Kagame mentioned.
DoD t h i n k s communications gear could improve command and
c o n t r o l and might thereby help reduce RPA i n d i s c i p l i n e .
cV
:
Our View:
Leave Embargo i n Place
o
We should not pursue l i f t i n g or modifying the arms embargo
at t h i s time.
o
We do not want t o encourage the Rwandans to resolve t h e i r
d i f f e r e n c e s through more f i g h t i n g . L i f t i n g the arms
embargo j u s t as incursions are making the news would
d e f i n i t e l y send the wrong s i g n a l .
CONFIDENTIAL'
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
conriDEHTiAir
- 2-
o
The RPA does not need the embargo l i f t e d i n order to defend
i t s e l f or prevent another genocide. Moreover, the GOR/RPA
have very l i m i t e d resources and much b e t t e r ways t o spend
t h e i r money.
o
Both the Belgians and the UK oppose l i f t i n g the embargo,
and we have heard no one (other than the Rwandans) speak i n
favor of t h i s move. The Belgians added that they saw no
support f o r l i f t i n g the embargo i n the S e c u r i t y Council.
o
Of course, the time may come when moving to l i f t or relax
the embargo would be appropriate; indeed, we could even use
i t as a c a r r o t w i t h the GOR; however, that time would not
appear to be i n the immediate f u t u r e .
What Equipment Then?
o
Even w i t h the embargo i n place, we c a n . s t i l l supply NGOs
and c i v i l i a n a u t h o r i t i e s (but not the RPA) w i t h excess DoD
humanitarian m a t e r i a l s , such as school and h o s p i t a l
supplies. Several requests f o r such aid have already been
forwarded from PM t o DoD f o r a c t i o n .
o
As f o r the items mentioned by Kagame, excess DoD vehicles
and communications gear would almost c e r t a i n l y be covered
by the embargo, which applies broadly and does not depend
on whether the equipment i s " l e t h a l . " Generally speaking,
U.S. i n t e r e s t s are served by adhering t o , and advocating,
broad i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of UNSC arms embargos.
o
Regardless of the scope of the embargo and our
implementation of i t , we-do not believe t h a t we should
become a m i l i t a r y equipment supplier f o r the new government
when we were not t r a d i t i o n a l l y a supplier t o previous
governments.
In t h i s regard, we note that p r i o r to the resumption
of the c i v i l war, we gave IMET assistance t o the
-Rwandan m i l i t a r y but g e n e r a l l y d i d not, "proviafe
r ^ i l i t a r y equipment (except f o r some engineering and
b i o d i v e r s i t y assistance).
o
I f , however, i t can be shown that a piece of equipment w i l l
have a p o s i t i v e impact on RPA d i s c i p l i n e and can be
supplied without modifying the embargo, we are w i l l i n g t o
consider exploring supply of such equipment to the GOR/RPA.
CONF I DENT I Atr
�CONriDEHTOMr
DECL: OADR
TALKING POINTS ON UN EMBARGO
We should not pursue l i f t i n g or modifying the arms embargo
at t h i s time.
We do not want to encourage the Rwandans to resolve t h e i r
d i f f e r e n c e s through more f i g h t i n g . L i f t i n g the arms
embargo j u s t as i n c u r s i o n s are making the news would
d e f i n i t e l y send the wrong s i g n a l .
The RPA does not need the embargo l i f t e d
i t s e l f or prevent another genocide.
i n order to defend
The GOR/RPA have very l i m i t e d resources and much b e t t e r
ways t o spend t h e i r money.
Both the Belgians and the UK oppose l i f t i n g the embargo,
and we have heard no one (other than the Rwandans) speak i n
favor of t h i s move. The Belgians added t h a t they saw no
support f o r l i f t i n g the embargo i n the S e c u r i t y Council.
Of course, the time may come when moving to l i f t the
embargo would be appropriate; indeed, we could even use i t
as a c a r r o t w i t h the GOR; however, t h a t time would not
appear to be i n the immediate f u t u r e .
Even w i t h the embargo i n place, we can s t i l l supply NGOs
and c i v i l i a n a u t h o r i t i e s (but not the RPA) w i t h excess DoD
humanitarian m a t e r i a l s , such as school and h o s p i t a l
supplies. Several requests f o r such a i d have already been
forwarded from PM to DoD f o r a c t i o n .
As f o r the m i l i t a r y equipment mentioned by Kagame, we
b e l i e v e excess DoD v e h i c l e s and communications gear would
most probably be covered by the embargo.
Regardless of the scope of the embargo, we do not b e l i e v e
t h a t we should become a m i l i t a r y equipment supplier f o r the
new government when we were not t r a d i t i o n a l l y a s u p p l i e r t o
previous governments.
In t h i s regard, we note that p r i o r to the resumption of the
c i v i l war, we gave IMET assistance to the Rwandan m i l i t a r y
but g e n e r a l l y d i d not provide m i l i t a r y equipment (except
f o r some engineering and b i o d i v e r s i t y assistance).
I f , however, i t can be shown that a piece of equipment w i l l
have a p o s i t i v e impact on RPA d i s c i p l i n e and can be
supplied without modifying the embargo, we are w i l l i n g t o
consider exploring supply of such equipment to the GOR/RPA.
r
•CONFIDENTIAL •
C I T N LB A Y P O O O Y
LN O I R R H T C P
PER
s/n/is"
ffi™
KBv
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�j2-95 T U 20:58
H
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F X N . 202 646 4179
A O
P. 02
IP's Kenommftnrieri OpH on: Under tha Volcanr)
Accelerate planning f o r r e p a t r i a t i o n from Zaire as d i r e c t l y as
possible t o refugees' former homes i n Rwanda. Prepare l o g i s t i c s ,
resettlement supply centers (where r e t u r n i n g refugees would get
supplies but not be allowed t o s t a y ) , and UNAMIR m o b i l i z a t i o n t o
provide s e c u r i t y f o r the r e t u r n i n g refugees. Increase s e c u r i t y i n
the Zaire camps w i t h UNHCR t r a i n e d and d i r e c t e d Zaire p o l i c e , t o
provide o r d e r l y departure p r o t e c t i o n f o r refugees. Warn people of
the impending e r u p t i o n , and step up the psyop program t o persuade
people t o r e t u r n t o Rwanda.
Pros
— W i l l provide short-term preparation f o r quick response when the
volcanoes erupt. Even i f refugees w a i t t o r e t u r n u n t i l the
e r u p t i o n , r e l i e f w i l l be ready when they come.
— P r o v i d e s a pro-active response t o the impending catastrophe.
This time the world w i l l be prepared, rather than hoping the
d i s a s t e r doesn't happen, as i t d i d i n Goma i n J u l y .
—Reduces the p r o b a b i l i t y of long-term c i v i l war organized from
refugee camps outside Rwanda.
— W i l l c o n t r i b u t e t o long-term r e s o l u t i o n of the Rwandan refugee
crisis.
— W i l l r e s u l t i n much lower long-term expeditures f o r r e l i e f t o
refugees.
— W i l l l i k e l y be supported by both Zaire and Rwandan governments.
Cons
— R e q u i r e s establishment of r e a l s e c u r i t y f o r r e t u r n i n g refugees,
possibly beyond the capacity of current UNAMIR troop l e v e l s , unless
the RPA can be a d i s c i p l i n e d , p r o t e c t i v e army.
— W i l l be r e s i s t e d by former Rwandan leaders, who need the refugee
population i n Zaire as a p o l i t i c a l base.
—Refugees w i l l be slow t o move back t o Rwanda, r e s u l t i n g i n a
massive outflow when the volcano erupts.
— P l a c i n g more supplies i n Rwanda would require e i t h e r r e d i r e c t i o n
of supplies i n t o Rwanda from the camps, or a temporary increase i n
the t o t a l q u a n t i t y t o allow s t o c k p i l i n g i n Rwanda.
—May r e q u i r e more vehicles than are now i n Rwanda t o provide
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n f o r the weak and i n f i r m , t o reduce deaths during
repatriation.
—Resettlement centers could become new refugee camps. Unless
r e t u r n i n g refugees f e e l secure, they w i l l prefer t o stay i n
resettlement centers.
S e c u r i t y i n Rwanda i s c r u c i a l .
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�Si
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
VIILI
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON D C 20508
Summary of Conclusions o f
Ad Hoc Meeting on Rwanda
DATE:
Wednesday, February 8, 1995
LOCATION:
White House S i t u a t i o n Room
TIME:
3:00 p.m. - 4:00 p.m.
SUBJECT:
Summary o f Conclusions of the Ad Hoc Meeting
on Rwanda fS-)
PARTICIPANTS:
O f f i c e o f the Vice President
Leon Fuerth
Mark Thomas
CIA
STATE
George Moose
Townsend Friedman
P h y l l i s Oakley
JCS
David M c l l v o y
Wayne Young
AID
JUSTICE
Jamie G o r e l i c k
(b)(3)
B r i a n Atwood
OSD
Walter Slocombe
V i n c e n t Kern
USUN
David S c h e f f e r
OMB
Gordon Adams
The White House
Anthony Lake
Nancy Soderberg
NSC
Don S t e i n b e r g
Susan Rice
Mac DeShazer
Summary o f Conclusions
I t was agreed t h a t :
Camp S e c u r i t y
—
State/RPM w i l l p r o v i d e a t l e a s t $3.5-5 m i l l i o n t o the UNHCR
s e c u r i t y program f o r t h e Rwandan refugee camps i n Z a i r e . fG4
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
GECRET
D e c l a s s i f y on:
�SC E
E RT
SECRET
rUNTON LB A Y P O O O Y
IRR HTCP
2
Threat from Volcanoes
—
During the refugee conference next week in Bujumbura, State
will press UNHCR to prepare concrete, viable contingency plans to
respond to the potential eruption of one or both volcanoes, te}
— Beginning immediately, senior State Department o f f i c i a l s w i l l
use our substantial leverage with UNHCR to urge Mrs. Ogata to
take the opportunity of the threat from the volcanoes t o
encourage refugees to return home to Rwanda. I f necessary, State
w i l l apply earmarks to UNHCR funds to ensure that i t s e f f o r t s i n
Zaire are focused p r i m a r i l y on r e p a t r i a t i o n , fe)
— By COB February 15, State w i l l prepare cost estimates of the
various options for moving the refugees to new camps outside the
Goma area, including to locations further north i n Zaire. (U)
Assistance t o Rwandan Government and War Crimes Tribunal
-- AID w i l l continue disbursement of programmed funds t o Rwanda
as s w i f t l y as possible, p a r t i c u l a r l y the $4 m i l l i o n i n the
p i p e l i n e to support government m i n i s t r i e s . (U)
— AID w i l l take immediate steps to ensure that funds are made
available to support the National Triage Commission. f&)
—
The Department of Justice w i l l provide four experts (possibly
r e t i r e e s ) to assist the Rwandan Wars Crimes Tribunal. USUN w i l l
ensure that the Prosecutor's Office of the Rwandan War Crimes
Tribunal promptly f u l f i l l s i t s commitment to reimburse the USG
for the cost of providing four individuals (two prosecutors and
two investigators) for a year. (U)
—
USUN w i l l provide DOJ with an analysis of the January 12
Mansfield f i e l d report by February 13. (U)
—
USUN w i l l explore with Treasury the p o s s i b i l i t y of securing
several detailees f o r the Rwanda War Crimes Tribunal from i t s law
enforcement d i v i s i o n s . (U)
M i l i t a r y Issues
—
USUN w i l l i n i t i a t e consultations i n New York to b u i l d the
case f o r a p a r t i a l l i f t of the UN arms embargo against Rwanda i n
order to enable provision to the G R of non-lethal m i l i t a r y
O
equipment (e.g. vehicles, parts, communications equipment, etc.)
—
State w i l l i n s t r u c t Embassy K i g a l i to approach the G R to ask
O
i f the G R wants USG assistance
O
EO 13526 1.4d
CECRET
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
GECRET
W
EO 13526 1.4d
Embassy K i g a l i w i l l ensure the GOR understands we can by no means
guarantee the success of such e f f o r t s . (ۥ)
—
S t a r t i n g the week of February 13, State w i l l consult w i t h key
members of Congress and relevant committees on the
Administration's i n t e n t i o n to resume the IMET program f o r Rwanda
i n FY95. State w i l l s o l i c i t congressional views as t o how to
remove the e x i s t i n g legal barriers, while stressing our
preference f o r using a Presidential waiver to speed resumption of
the program. Based on congressional reaction, State w i l l proceed
e i t h e r w i t h the waiver or with l e g i s l a t i o n . (U)
Burundi
— State w i l l continue i t s e f f o r t s to promote s t a b i l i t y i n
Burundi. The White House w i l l pursue the p o s s i b i l i t y of taping a
one minute Presidential radio address urging calm. (U)
�DEPARTMENT
OF
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VUIUVJ.IMU
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CROSSHATCH
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P:LBASSETT
PRIORITY
KIGALI
BUJUMBURA PRIORITY
PRIORITY
KINSHASA, RUAND
BUJUMBURA FOR AMBS• RAUSON AND FRIEDMAN
E.O. 123St:
TAGS:
DECL: O D
AR
MOPS, PREL, RU, CG
SUBJECT:
DESTRUCTION OF EX-FAR EQUIPMENT IN ZAIRE
1.
CONriDENTIAL' - ENTIRE TEXT.
a.
THIS IS AN ACTION REdUEST.
SEE PARAS h - 6.
3. THE ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT SEIZED EX-FAR APC'S AND OTHER
HEAVY MILITARY EQUIPMENT AT THE TIME THE EX-FAR CROSSED
OVER INTO ZAIRE LAST YEAR; HOUEVER, THE GOZ'S ABILITY AND
UILLINGNESS TO PREVENT EX-FAR USE OF THIS EQUIPMENT IS
OPEN TO QUESTION. UHILE EX-FAR APC'S AND OTHER HEAVY
EflUIPMENT HAVE BEEN PLACED IN CANTONMENT SITES UNDER
OSTENSIBLE GOZ CONTROL, THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS THAT THE
EX-FAR HAS ACCESS TO, AND IS EVEN MAINTAINING/SERVICING,
THIS EQUIPMENT. SOME APC'S MAY HAVE ALREADY LEFT THE
CANTONMENT SITES FOR POINTS UNKNOUN• GIVEN THE RECENT
INCURSIONS INTO RUANDA AND REGULAR REPORTS OF
EX-FAR/MILITIA TRAINING IN ZAIRE, EX-FAR ACCESS TO AND
POSSIBLE USE OF "SEIZED" EQUIPMENT IS A MATTER OF SERIOUS
CONCERN AND MAY POSE A SECURITY THREAT TO THE NEU
GOVERNMENT IN RUANDA.
_
-CONFIDCNTIAL'
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
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S/J9/iS
KBM
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
V
�DEPARTMENT OF STATE
<TU, 0 2 . 1 4 .
'95
13:56
NO.
I 4 6 u 1 i^U I DO
•CONFIDENTIAL.
4.
THE EX-FAR EQUIPMENT AND OTHER MATERIALS AND MONEY
CARRIED OVER INTO ZAIRE HAVE BEEN THE SUBJECT OF ONGOING
NEGOTIATIONS BETUEEN THE GOR AND GOZ.
UHILE THE GOR HAS
GENERALLY BEEN PRESSING FOR THE RETURN OF RUANDAN
GOVERNMENT AND RUANDAN MILITARY ASSETS, THE SEIZED
MILITARY EQUIPMENT UOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE UN ARMS EMBARGO
AND THUS COULD NOT BE RETURNED TO THE GOR UNLESS THE
EMBARGO IS LIFTED OR MODIFIED.
UHILE THE USG HAS BEGUN
DISCRETE CONSULTATIONS ON THIS ISSUE IN NEU YORK {FOR
REASONS UNRELATED TO THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE> {DISCUSSED
SEPTEL> t I T IS LIKELY THAT AN EMBARGO OF SOME KIND UILL
REMAIN IN EFFECT FOR AT LEAST SOME PERIOD.
MOREOVER, THE
GOZ HAS BEEN DRAGGING ITS FEET ON RETURNING RUANDAN ASSETS
NOT SUBJECT TO THE EMBARGO.
THUS, THE POSSIBILITY OF
IMMINENT RETURN OF EX-FAR EflUIPMENT TO THE GOR IS REMOTE.
5.
DEPARTMENT BELIEVE THAT UE SHOULD PURSUE THE
POSSIBILITY OF DESTRUCTION OF THE HEAVY EQUIPMENT,
PARTICULARLY THE APC'S.
THIS UOULD DENY THE EX-FAR THE
USE OF THE MATERIEL AND REDUCE THE SECURITY THREAT TO THE
NEU GOVERNMENT.
I T UOULD ALSO SEND A CLEAR MESSAGE THAT
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OPPOSES ANY EFFORT BY FORMER
GOVERNMENT FORCES TO RESUME THE UAR AGAINST THE NEU
GOVERNMENT, UHICH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY RECOGNIZES
AND IS SUPPORTING.
b.
EMBASSY KIGALI SHOULD APPROACH THE GOR {EITHER IN
KIGALI O ON THE MARGINS OF THE BUJUMBURA REFUGEE
R
CONFERENCE, AS APPROPRIATE! TO ASK I F THE GOR UANTS USG
ASSISTANCE TO TRY TO CONVINCE THE ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT TO
DESTROY IN PLACE EX-FAR APC'S {AND OTHER HEAVY EQUIPMENT,
I F THE GOR UISHES} IN ORDER TO PREVENT THEIR USE FOR
FUTURE MILITARY A C T I V I T I E S .
EMBASSY KIGALI SHOULD ENSURE
THAT THE GOR UNDERSTANDS THAT, EVEN I F THE GOR CONCURS IN
THIS PROPOSAL, UE CAN IN NO UAY GUARANTEE THAT THE GOZ
UILL AGREE TO THE REQUEST.
7.
IN MAKING THIS DEMARCHE, POST MAY DRAU ON FOLLOUING
POINTS:
-DESPITE EFFORTS BY THE ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT TO SEIZE AND
HOLD EX-FAR APC'S AND OTHER HEAVY EQUIPMENT, UE ARE
CONCERNED THAT THE EX-FAR OR M I L I T I A S MIGHT REGAIN CONTROL
IN ORDER TO USE THE EQUIPMENT FOR MILITARY PURPOSES.
GIVEN THE RECENT INCURSIONS INTO RUANDA AND REGULAR
REPORTS OF E X - F A R / M I L I T I A TRAINING IN ZAIRE, EX-FAR ACCESS
TO AND POSSIBLE USE OF "SEIZED" APC'S AND OTHER HEAVY
CONFIDENTIAL-
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
rAuc
�DEPARTMENT OF STATE
(TU) 0 2 . 1 4 .
'95 13:56
NO.
MGU I dU I oo r A u c
COWfIDCNTIAL
EQUIPMENT I S A MATTER OF SERIOUS CONCERN.
-UE KNOU YOU HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING THE DISPOSITION OF
RUANDAN GOVERNMENT AND RUANDAN MILITARY ASSETS UITH THE
GOVERNMENT OF ZAIRE.
--
HAVE YOU CONSIDERED HAVING THE EX-FAR APC'S {OR OTHER
EflUIPMENT> DESTROYED?
DESTRUCTION UOULD DENY THE EX-FAR
THE USE OF THE MATERIEL AND UOULD REDUCE THE SECURITY
THREAT TO YOUR GOVERNMENT.
I T UOULD ALSO SEND A CLEAR
MESSAGE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OPPOSES ANY
EFFORT BY FORMER GOVERNMENT FORCES TO RESUME THE UAR
AGAINST YOU.
-UOULD YOU LIKE OUR ASSISTANCE IN TRYING TO CONVINCE
THE ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT TO DESTROY I N PLACE THE REMAINING
RUANDAN APC'S I N ZAIRIAN CUSTODY SO THEY CANNOT BE USED BY
THE EX-FAR O MILITIAS?
R
IS THERE OTHER HEAVY EQUIPMENT
THAT MIGHT ALSO BE DESTROYED?
--
I F YOU UOULD LIKE OUR ASSISTANCE, UE ARE PREPARED TO
APPROACH THE ZAIRIANS T URGE THEM T PROCEED UITH
O
O
DESTRUCTION IN PLACE OF THE EQUIPMENT.
--
UE UOULD CAUTION, HOUEVER, THAT OUR LEVERAGE UITH THE
ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT IS LIMITED, AND EVEN IF THE GOVERNMENT
IN KINSHASA AGREES TO SUCH A REQUEST, I T MAY NOT BE ABLE
TO CARRY I T OUT. NONETHELESS, UE ARE PREPARED TO MAKE OUR
BEST EFFORT.
{ I F THE GOR SAYS I T UOULD PREFER RETURN OF THE EQUIPMENT,
POST MAY DRAU ON THE FOLLOUING ADDITIONAL POINTS:>
-THE APC'S AND OTHER MILITARY EQUIPMENT UOULD PROBABLY
BE SUBJECT TO THE UN ARMS EMBARGO AND THUS COULD NOT BE
RETURNED TO THE GOR UNLESS THE EMBARGO I S LIFTED O
R
MODIFIED.
-FOLLOUING THE REQUEST MADE BY VICE PRESIDENT KAGAME
DURING HIS V I S I T TO THE U . S . LAST DECEMBER, UE HAVE BEGUN
DISCRETE CONSULTATIONS I N NEU YORK ON THE ISSUE OF
MODIFYING THE EMBARGO, AT LEAST TO ENABLE PROVISION OF
NON-LETHAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT.
--
THESE CONSULTATIONS ARE IN THEIR EARLIEST STAGES, AND
I T I S LIKELY THAT AN EMBARGO OF SOME KIND UILL REMAIN IN
EFFECT FOR AT LEAST SOME PERIOD.
•CONriDCNTIAL
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
^
�DEPARTMENT OF STATE
(TU) 02.14.
'95 13:56
NO.
CONriDCNTIAL-- MOREOVERi AS YOU UELL KNOU, THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE
MOVEMENT IN GENERAL O RETURN OF RUANDAN ASSETS BROUGHT
N
INTO ZAIRE.
-- THUS, THE POSSIBILITY OF IMMINENT RETURN OF EX-FAR
EQUIPMENT TO THE GOR IS REMOTE, AND DESTRUCTION UOULD
THEREFORE APPEAR TO BE THE BEST OPTION.
{NOTE FOR KIGALI: SEPTEL FOLLOUS UITH ADDITIONAL
BACKGROUND AND TALKING POINTS O SEPARATE ISSUE OF USG
N
EFFORTS TO CONSULT O MODIFYING ARMS EMBARGO.>
N
fl. FOR BUJUMBURA: PLEASE PASS THIS MESSAGE TO AMB.
FRIEDMAN AND AMB. RAUSON {ASSUMING THE LATTER ATTENDS
REFUGEE CONFERENCE}. N OTHER ACTION IS REQUESTED FROM
O
POST. VV
CONFIDCNTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPi
1460120156 PAGE
�Ufc^AKIMbNI
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VUIUVXIIU
ILUCUIVHII
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CROSSHATCH
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AUTH
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DRAFT.
CLEAR 1
S .
3
4
5 .
b
7
a .
CONFIDENTIAL
AF/C:KAISTON:KCA
0S/14/^S 1,47-3131
AF:6M00SE
SECC
saio
AF/C:ARENDER/TMCCULLEY (3:AJ0YCE IO/UNP: GSTANTON
GiAJOYCE
PM/ISP:PSUTER
P:LBASSETT
PRM/AAA:ANELSON DRL/AAA:RPOUERS
JCS:
OSD:
NSCS:
S/S:
S/S-O:
PRIORITY
KIGALI- USUN PRIORITY
ROUTINE
RUAND
E.O. 153Sb: DECL: O D
AR
TAGS: MOPS, PREL•> RU, U
N
SUBJECT:
1.
CONSULTATION O MODIFICATION OF ARMS EMBARGO
N
CONFIDCNTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT•
5. THIS IS A ACTION REQUEST.
N
USUN. SEE PARA 5.
KIGALI SEE PARAS b-7.
3. THE MAY 17, 1114 U SECURITY COUNCIL A M EMBARGO
N
RS
PROHIBITS "THE SALE O SUPPLY TO R A D ... OF A M AND
R
UNA
RS
RELATED MATERIEL OF ALL TYPES, INCLUDING UEAPONS AND
AMMUNITION, MILITARY VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT
" DURING
HIS DECEMBER 1114 VISIT TO UASHINGTON, VICE PRESIDENT
KAGAME SOUGHT SUPPORT FOR LIFTING O MODIFYING THE EMBARGO
R
AND IMPLEMENTING USG REGULATIONS SO THE RPA MIGHT RECEIVE
{ESSENTIALLY NON-LETHAL> EfiUIPMENT, SUCH AS COMMUNICATIONS
GEAR AND VEHICLES• HE ARGUED THE EMBARGO UAS ENACTED W E
HN
THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT UAS IN POUER AND UAS DIRECTED AT
ENDING THE KILLING', IT UAS NOT INTENDED TO PUNISH THE NEU
GOVERNMENT. MOREOVER, HE STRESSED THAT THE NEU GOVERNMENT
HAS THE SOVEREIGN RIGHT TO OBTAIN MILITARY EQUIPMENT FOR
NATIONAL DEFENSE.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. 0.13526
3.011- o ^ s -
8/iy»5"
n
KBH
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
X)
�CONFIDCNTIAL
2
!
i
4. IN LIGHT OF THE GOR'S POSITIONS A D O R GENERAL POLICY
N U
OF SUPPORT TO THE NEU GOVERNMENT, UE BELIEVE IT IS
APPROPRIATE T CONSULT IN NEU YORK O THE POSSIBILITY OF A
O
N
PARTIAL LIFTING OF THE A M EMBARGO AGAINST R A D IN
RS
UNA
ORDER TO ENABLE PROVISION TO THE G R OF NON-LETHAL
O
MILITARY EflUIPMENT. UE NOTE THAT SOME OF THIS EQUIPMENT
{E.G., COMMUNICATIONS GEAR} COULD ALSO IMPROVE C M A D A D
OMN N
CONTROL A D MIGHT THEREBY HELP REDUCE RPA INDISCIPLINE.
N
5. FOR USUN: MISSION IS REQUESTED TO INITIATE
CONSULTATIONS IN NEU YORK TO BUILD THE CASE FOR A PARTIAL
LIFTING OF THE U A M EMBARGO AGAINST R A D IN ORDER TO
N RS
UNA
ENABLE PROVISION TO THE GOR/RPA OF NON-LETHAL MILITARY
EflUIPMENT {E.G., VEHICLES, PARTS, COMMUNICATIONS
EflUIPMENT, ETC.} MISSION M Y DRAU O THE FOLLOUING POINTS
A
N
IN ITS CONSULTATIONS:
THE A M EMBARGO AGAINST RUANDA UAS ENACTED IN M Y
RS
A
1114, DURING THE HORRENDOUS PERIOD OF MASSACRES A D
N
GENOCIDE UHEN THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT UAS STILL IN POUER
A D UHILE THE CIVIL UAR UAS STILL RAGING.
N
THE SITUATION HAS CHANGED DRAMATICALLY SINCE THAT
TIME- THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT LINKED TO THE GENOCIDE UAS
DEFEATED A D FLED THE COUNTRY LAST JULY, AND A NEU
N
MULTIPARTY GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN INSTALLED UHICH HAS STATED
ITS COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ARUSHA.
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS RECOGNIZED THE NEU
GOVERNMENT A D IS HELPING IT RECOVER F O THE UAR AND
N
RM
RETURN R A D TO NORMALCY. THE BROAD INTERNATIONAL
UNA
SUPPORT FOR THE NEU GOVERNMENT WAS APPARENT AT THE JANUARY
U D R U D TABLE, UHICH PRODUCED NEARLY DOLLARS tOO
NP ON
MILLION IN PLEDGES.
AT THE SAME TIME, THE SITUATION REMAINS FRAGILE.
INCURSIONS INTO R A D F O ZAIRE HAVE BEGUN, AND EX-FAR
UNA RM
AND MILITIA HAVE BEEN OBSERVED ENGAGED IN MILITARY
TRAINING IN THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES.
-- THE NEU GOVERNMENT HAS ASKED FOR LIFTING OF THE
EMBARGO, AT LEAST TO ALLOU IT TO PROCURE ESSENTIAL BUT
NON-LETHAL MILITARY EflUIPMENT, SUCH AS VEHICLES AND
COMMUNICATIONS GEAR.
-- UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, UE BELIEVE THE TIME HAS
C M TO BEGIN CONSIDERATION OF A POSSIBLE MODIFICATION OF
OE
THE U ARMS EMBARGO TO ALLOU PROVISION OF NON-LETHAL
N
CONFIDENTIAL
^LINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
^
�CONFIDCNTIAL
MILITARY EflUIPMENT TO THE NEU GOVERNMENT AND ITS SECURITY
FORCES.
-- SUCH A M V UOULD SIGNAL CONTINUED INTERNATIONAL
OE
SUPPORT TO THE NEU GOVERNMENT AND A DESIRE TO SEE R A D
UNA
RETURN TO THE COMMUNITY OF SOVEREIGN AND RESPONSIBLE
NATIONS.
— CERTAIN EflUIPMENT -CE-G., COMMUNICATIONS GEAR} COULD
ALSO IMPROVE C M A D AND CONTROL AND MIGHT THEREBY IMPROVE
OMN
OVERALL DISCIPLINE UITHIN THE RANKS OF THE NEU
GOVERNMENT'S ARMY.
THE PARTIAL LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO UOULD HELP THE
FLEDGLING GOVERNMENT DEFEND ITSELF AGAINST RECENT
INCURSIONS. IT UOULD ALSO SEND A CLEAR MESSAGE TO EXILED
FORMER INTERIM GOVERNMENT FORCES AND SUPPORTERS IN
NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
OPPOSES ANY EFFORT BY EXILED FORCES TO RESUME THE UAR.
b. FOR KIGALI: POST IS REflUESTED TO INFORM THE G R OF
O
OUR EFFORTS O ITS BEHALF IN THE U SECURITY COUNCIL AND
N
N
MAY SHARE TALKING POINTS UE ARE USING IN OUR CONSULTATIONS
IN NEU YORK. POST SHOULD CAUTION THF GOR, HOUFVFRi THAT
THIS COULD BF AN UPHILL BATTLE,
_ UITHOUT
HM
SHARING THE SOURCE OF THESE VIEWS, POST SHOULD BRING T E
TO THE GOR'S ATTENTION SO THE GOR IS AUARE OF THE
OPPOSITION THE PROPOSAL FACES.
EO 13526 1 4
.d
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCO,
�I
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
(TU)
0 2 . 14.
yo
i j . DO
.-io.
CONFIDCNTIAL
EO 13526 1.4d
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�< ^.-C/L^L
5
7
0
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�Ll.U
Automtited Telegram
»m S u b j e c t :
- B~> 1
NSC ATKIN VISIT TO RWANDA
KIGALI
3JECT:
Handler
477
1316162; FEB 95
BSC ATKIN VISIT TO RWANDA
NSC DIRECTOR TIM ATKIN MET UP WITH INCOMING USAID
WDA/BURUWDI DESK OFFICER MALAIKA STOLL I N BUJUMBURA
) SPENT ONE WEEK IN AND AROUND KIGALI WITH A DAY TRIP
REFUGEE CAMPS I N TANZANIA. I N BURUWDI ATKIN MET
: EMBASSY POLITICAL/ECONOMIC AFFAIRS OFFICER JULIE
H
XAGAN, UN3R POLITICAL ADVISOR HANY ABDUZ AZIZ, OAU
iITARY COMMANDANT LTCOL BEN A L I , AS WELL AS
'TRACTORS WORKING FOR USAID ON HUMANITARIAN RELIEF
• DEMOCRACY INITIATIVES. I N KIGALI ATKIN MET WITH US
ASSADOR DAVID RAWSON, USAID MISSION DIRECTOR MYRON
DEN, JUSTICE MINISTER ALPHONSE MARIE NKUBITO, UNHCR
EGATE ROMAIN URASA, UNHCHR INVESTIGATOR ANDREAS
ESS, AND UNAMIR FORCE COMMANDER GENERAL TOUSIGNANT.
IN ALSO TRAVELED TO NYAMATA/NTARAMA, VISITED WITH A
tlDAN UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR I N BUTARE, TOURED KIGALI
TRAL PRISON WITH UNICEF AND NGO REPRESENTATIVES AND
ITED THE REFUGEE CAMPS I N NGARA, TANZANIA WITH UNHCR
TECTION OFFICER GREGORY GARRAS AND AMEMB DAR ES
\AM VICE COUNSEL GEORGE HOGEMAN. ATKIN MET WITH THE
DELEGATION PRIOR TO THEIR DEPARTURE FROM KIGALI FOR
BUJUMBURA REFUGEE CONFERENCE. FOLLOWING ARE HIS
iFAL IMPRESSIONS OF THE TRIP. A MORE DETAILED
"'T WILL FOLLOW UPON RETURN.
.R
•ALL
SECURITY SITUATION IM RWANDA I S VERY GOOD.
ITARY PRESENCE WAS BARELY NOTICEABLE ON THE TRIP TO
• AllIA.
IN KIGALI IN PARTICULAR, BEGINNING THIS WEEK
E ARE NO LONGER MILITARY ROAD CHECK POINTS AND MANY
TAP.Y MEMBERS NO LONGER CARRY WEAPONS. UNAMIR ACCESS
BEEN REGARDED AS UNLIMITED*.*THROUGHOUT RWANDA.
E THERE HAVE BEEN SOME RESTRICTIONS FROM TIME TO
, THEY DO NO APPEAR SYSTEMATIC^ I N ANY AREA AMD
AF. TO BE RELATED TO SPECIFIC COUNTERINSURGENCY
F.T3.
ACCESS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS WAS
F.IBED AS "ASTONISHINGLY UNLIMITED.'"- COORDINATION
3 DONOR COUNTRIES IS IMPROVING AND THE INCREASE IN
• ' . E AT THE USAID MISSION WAS A CRITICAL STEP .
.FCS
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
•IlIATIOM BETWEEN UNAMIR AMD THE GOR IN ALL EFFORTS
-.1IERAL AND IN THE CLOSURE OF THE IDP CAMPS IN
ICULAR I S QUITE GOOD.
THE COMPOSITION OF UNAMIR
13 SHOULD BEGIN TO CHANGE TO MATCH THE CHANGES
11 RWANDA. AM INCREASE I N CIVILIAN POLICE AND
OP.S, OFFSET BY A DECREASE I N MILITARY TROOPS
D BEGIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. UNAMIR HAS TRAINED
02/15/95
08:37
am
Faq°:
CLINTON LIBRARY PH0T0C0P\
100 CIVILIAN POLICE, HAS 400 MORE I N TRAINING AND HAS
BEGUN DEVELOPING RWANDAN TRAINERS. THE ETHIOPIAN
CONTINGENT REPORTEDLY STILL INTENDS TO DEPART WITHOUT
REPLACEMENT LATER THIS MONTH. THE EXACT AMOUNT AND
TYPE OF SECURITY SUPPORT TO BE PROVIDED TO THE
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL I S UNCLEAR. GENERAL TOUSIGNANT
PLANNED TO DEDICATE A COMPANY BUT WAS TOLD BY THE UN
THAT OHE OR TWO PEOPLE I N FRONT OF THE TRIBUNAL OFFICES
WOULD BE ADEQUATE; THIS I S NOT CONSISTENT WITH
ANTICIPATED SUPPORT.
HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS
THE UNHCHR PROGRAM — HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS,
INVESTIGATIONS, AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE — NEEDS
SERIOUS ATTENTION I F I T I S TO FUNCTION PROPERLY. I T
DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE WELL COORDINATED; THE ROLE OF THE
MONITORS REMAINS UNDEFINED AND I S AT ODDS WITH
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE EFFORTS. THE WORK OF THE
INVESTIGATIONS SECTION I S BEING TURNED OVER TO THE
TRIBUNAL. THERE ARE PRESENTLY 50 MONITORS IN THE
FIELD, 10 SPECIAL INVESTIGATORS, AND 8 MEMBERS IN THE
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE UNIT. AROUND 35 TO 40 MONITORS
MAY ARRIVE FROM THE EU BY THE END OF THE MONTH (THIS
HAS BEEN THE STATUS FOR 3 MONTHS THOUGH); DELAYS ARE
BELIEVED TO BE THE RESULT OF THE LACK OF CCOPJjINATIOH
AND MISSION DEFINITION. AN ABSENCE OF A CIVILIAN
POLICE FORCE THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY EXACERBATES THE
PROBLEMS. WITH TIME, THIS PROGRAM WILL ONLY BECOME
MORE IMPORTANT TO RECONCILIATION AND REPATRIATION.
BILATERAL ASSISTANCE
SIGNIFICANT DELAYS I N ASSISTANCE TO THE MINISTRIES IS
PRIMARILY DUE TO AH ABSENCE OF A STAFF IN KIGALI AND
SECONDARILY DUE TO PRODUCT AVAILABILITY IN THE REGION.
WITHIN THE LAST WEEK USAID MISSION BURUNDI /RWANDA HAS
ADDED TO THE FSN STAFF AT THE KIGALI OFFICE A FULL-TIME
DEPUTY, EXO, DG AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OFFICERS,
AND TWO MORE POSITIONS (USAID DART CLOSES 15 FEB) . THE
MINISTER OF JUSTICE HAS BEEN GIVEN A VEHICLE; MORE APE
SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE WITHIN THE NEXT 4 WEEKS. A TEAM
FROM USAID ARRIVES LATER THIS MONTH TO BEGIN TO PROVIDE
FLAIIHING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE MINISTRY OF
JUSTICE. USAID FINALIZED A CONTRACT TODAY WITH THE
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR TO PROVIDE COMMUNE ADMINISTRATIONS
WITH THE FORMS NECESSARY TO GOVERN (REGISTRATION FOR
BIRTHS, DEATHS, PROPERTY, BUSINESSES, ETC). DOD HAS A
TDY RESERVIST AT USEMB KIGALI ASSISTING WITH THE
ARRIVAL OF DOD PROVIDED HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT (MEDICAL
AND SCHOOL SUPPLIES) WHICH WILL BE GIVEN TO MINISTRIES
FOR DISTRIBUTION OVER THE NEXT TWO WEEKS.
1
�)EL'IS Automated Telegram Handler - B71
:em
Subject:
02/15/95
atiriooHTifm
06:37 am
Page: 2
NSC ATKIN VISIT TO RWANDA
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
NEXT STEPS
1 1
11. LT I LATERAL ASSISTANCE
AT A MEETING THIS WEEK WITH IMF AND WORLD BANK
OFFICIALS I N KIGALI, THE WORLD BANK INDICATED THE USD
50 MILLION WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR ANOTHER FOUR TO
SEVEN WEEKS; ITS AVAILABILITY WAS DEPENDENT ON THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF A CENTRAL PROCUREMENT OFFICE I N
'ANDA. THIS NEW CAVEAT HAS NEVER BEEN FLAGGED BEFORE
TME BANK. THIS I S NOT CONSISTENT WITH WHAT THE
• O S HAVE BEEN TOLD WOULD OCCUR WHEN THEIR
NR
'NTRIBUTIONS CLEARED RWANDA'S ARREARS.
FUGEE REPATRIATION/CAMP SECURITY
THE NGARA CAMPS I N TANZANIA, THE AMOUNT OF WATER
AILABLE I S APPROXIMATELY 25-PERCENT OF THE LEVEL
IFULATED I N UNHCR GUIDELINES AND I T I S ESTIMATED
ERE WILL BE A FOOD SHORTAGE WITHIN THE NEXT TWO
NTHS. A COORDINATED EFFORT BY UNHCR AND NGOS APPEARS
AT I T WILL ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE FOOD SHORTAGE.
TIL RECENTLY, REPATRIATION HAS BARELY BEEN DISCUSSED
THE TANZANIAN CAMPS BECAUSE OF ONGOING INTIMIDATION
THOSE INTERESTED IN RETURNING AND NGO WORKERS. THE
HCR PROTECTION OFFICER INDICATED THERE I S INCREASING
LK BY THOSE IN THE CAMPS, INCLUDING MODERATE
ADERSHIP, OF REPATRIATING. SOME PEOPLE ARE FAYING
HERS TO RETURN TO RWANDA TO INVESTIGATE THE SECURITY
TUATION AND IN GENERAL THE REPORTS MAKING I T BACK TO
E CAMPS ARE GOOD. INTERVIEWS WITH THOSE REPATRIATING
DICATE APPROXIMATELY 60 TO 70-PERCENT OF THE
5IDENTS OF THE CAMPS IN THE NGARA REGION WOULD LIKE
RETURN TO RWANDA. THE CAMP LEADERSHIP'S POWER I S
CLINING; THE CHANGE I N CURRENCY HAS UNDERMINED THEIR
MANCING; THE ANNOUNCEMENT OFV^THE TRIBUNAL HAS
3NALED INTERNATIONAL RESOLVE; 'THE LEADERSHIP'S
JpAGANDA STORIES OF MASS KILLINGS OCCURRING I N RWANDA
THE GOR AFE INCONSISTENT WITH WORD GETTING BACK TO
t CAMPS BY OTHER S
?.CES. UNHCR FELT STRONGLY THAT
Z TANZANIAN OFFICER-IN-CHARGE OF POLICE FOR CAMP
"UF.ITY SHOULD REMAIN BEYOND HIS THREE MONTH ROTATION
• ASKED US EMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM TO ASSIST IN MAKING
LS IIAFFEIl. THE PROTECTION OFFICER BELIEVED PUBLIC
jE/'.iE OF THE LIST OF THOSE PEOPLE TARGETED FOR
/EoTlGATION BY THE TRIBUNAL (PRIMARY ORGANIZERS)
JLD HAVE A POSITIVE IMPACT I N TME CAMPS. NGO
I C I A L S INDICATE THEY PLAN ON SETTING UP AND
CFATING A RADIO FOR THE NGARA CAMPS; I T WOULD RELAY
1ERAL INFORMATION. WHEN ASKED I F THE RADIO WOULD
JAY FACTUAL INFORMATION SUCH AS THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE
) REPATRIATED, THE ANSWER WAS NO/NO — THAT WOULD BE
•.P.CIVE.
r
THERE I S A REAL SENSE THAT THE OPERATION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL I S A CRITICAL, TIME URGENT
MATTER. WHILE I T I S NOT THE SOLE ANSWER TO THE COMPLEX
INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JUSTICE, REPATRIATION, AND
RECONCILIATION, I T I S A TREMENDOUSLY IMPORTANT FIRST
STEP IN OVERCOMING THE TRAUMA OF GENOCIDE AND ENABLING
THE RWANDAN PEOPLE TO MOVE FORWARD. I T I S DIFFICULT
FOR THE GOR TO PROCEED MORE RAPIDLY WITH JUSTICE FOR
THOSE IN PRISON WHEN THE MORE SIGNIFICANT PERPETRATORS
OF GENOCIDE REMAIN AT LARGE. ALONG WITH EFFORTS TO
SPEED UP THE OPENING OF THE TRIBUNAL, A COORDINATED
EFFORT I S NEEDED BETWEEN THREE KEY PROGRAMS: HUMAN
RIGHTS MONITORING, TRANSITION TO A CIVILIAN POLICE
FORCE, AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUSTICE PROGRAM WITH
EMPHASIS ON PREFECTURE AND COMMUNE LEVEL EFFORTS.
RAWSON
COliriDDiraiAL
PTF1059
COMFTPFNTT R T
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DP.L-09
-A62660
R 131616Z FEB 95
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
G-00
131921Z /38
�FOEHS Automated Telegram Handlei; - B71
Item Subject:
AMEMBASSY
NSC ATKIN V I S I T
02/15/95
08:37 am
Page:
3
TO RWANDA
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP*
DAR ES SALAAM
"F* 'STATE WASHDC 0 1 8 0
M (EMBASSY BUJUMBURA
• F I-D D H T I
H
COHriDDHTIftb
KIGALI 000477
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO AID - GLENN SLOCUM
5.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: EAID, PGOV, PREL, RW
�CONFIDENTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: ATKIN, BEERS, CLARKER, DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, SCHWARTZ, STEINBERG
PREC: PRIORITY
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
DTG:171527Z FEB 95
FM: AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5290
RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BUJUMBURA 000774
FOR UNDERSECRETARY WIRTH AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE
FROM OAKLEY AND FRIEDMAN
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREF, BY, RW
SUBJECT: GOMA, RWANDA AND US
1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.
2. FOLLOWING OUR IMPRESSIONS OF THE GOMA AND RWANDA
PORTIONS OF OUR TRIP.
CAMP SECURITY '
3. THE CONDITION OF THE REFUGEES HAS BEEN TRANSFORMED
SINCE PHYLLIS VISITED LAST AUGUST. GOMA TOWN HAS BEEN
CLEARED. WELL CARED FOR REFUGEES LIVE IN BUSTLING
CAMPS. THERE ARE MANY YOUNG MEN IN MILITARY BOOTS AND
PANTS SWAGGERING ABOUT. INDEED, MANY OBSERVERS
COMMENTED ABOUT THE TOTAL LACK OF REMORSE AMONG THE
REFUGEES. THE LIVELY CAMP COMMERCE, THE CONTINUED
USE OF THE OLD CURRENCY, THE OLD GOR'S AUTHORITY, AN
ARMY AND MILITIA MAKE THE GOMA AREA HOME NOT TO A
GOVERNMENT IN EXILE BUT A STATE PREPARING TO RETURN
HOME, NO MATTER HOW UNLIKELY THAT PROSPECT APPEARS TO
OTHERS, INCLUDING US.
4. THE NGOS VIEW IS THAT THE OLD GOVERNMENT'S
AUTHORITY HAS BECOME FIRMER THAN EVER. NGO'S
REPEATEDLY TOLD US THAT THEY ARE SUBJECTED TO
INTIMIDATION AT THE WILL OF THE LOCAL CAMP CHIEFS.
THE ONLY IMPROVEMENT IS THAT THE RANDOM CRIMINALITY OF
LAST YEAR HAS ENDED AS THE MACHINE BOSSES HAVE TAKEN
HOLD. THE NGO'S DARK ASSESSMENT, FOR WHICH THEY HAVE
VIVID EXAMPLES, )S SHARED BY THE THE GOVERNMENT IN
KIGALI WHICH NOTED TO US THAT THE OLD LEADERSHIP
CLINTON LIBRAR* PHOTOCOPY
GONRDENmL
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
.
S/\y\5
a o u
^
K6W
�CONFIDENTIAL
CONDUCTED AND WON ELECTIONS IN THE CAMPS EARLIER THIS
YEAR. REPULSED AT SERVING UNREPENTANT MURDERERS.
EO 13526 1.4d
5. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE UNHCR IS VERY UPBEAT ABOUT
THE SECURITY SITUATION AND PROUD OF WHAT IT HAS DONE TO
WEAKEN THE AUTHORITY OF THE OLD LEADERSHIP. THEY POINT
TO LESSENED INSTANCES OF INTIMIDATION AND THE INCREASED
RATE OF REPATRIATION. THEY EXPECT ORGANIZED
REPATRIATION WILL REACH 1000 PER DAY THIS WEEK AND WILL
SOON MOVE TO 2000.
MRS. OGATA'S ARMY
7. ONE IMPORTANT VARIABLE WILL BE THE UNHCR'S ZAIRIAN
SECURITY FORCE WHICH WAS JUST SETTING UP WHEN WE
ARRIVED. THE UNHCR UNDERSTANDS AND IS ATTEMPTING TO
MINIMIZE THE RISKS OF THIS OPERATION. NONE OF THE
CONCERNS WE OR OTHERS HAVE EXPRESSED WERE NEW TO THEM.
THEY FEEL IT CAN WORK, CITING SUCCESSFUL PILOT
OPERATIONS IN THE AREA WITH SEVERAL ZAIRIAN UNITS.
THEY ALSO HAVE GREAT CONFIDENCE IN THE SKILLS AND
EXPERIENCE OF THE LIAISON GROUP LEADER WHO ARRIVED THIS
WEEK AND ON WHOM SO MUCH WILL DEPEND. MRS. OGATA'S
ANSWER TO HER CRITICS IS TO SAY WAIT AND SEE IF IT
WORKS AND IN THE MEANTIME GIVE ME YOUR SUPPORT. WE
AGREE WITH HER. (MISTAKES WILL BE MADE, AS THEY SAY.
NO PALESTINIANS THESE
8. EVERYBODY FAMILIAR WITH THE RWANDAN REFUGEES
BELIEVES THAT THEY WILL FOLLOW THE MOZAMBICAN EXAMPLE
OF REFUGEES RETURNING AS SOON AS THEY FEEL SAFE. THE
ATTRACTION OF HOME AND LAND IS VERY STRONG. RETURNEES
NOW ARE SUBSTANTIALLY COMPOSED OF PEASANTS WHOSE TIES
TO PLACE ARE STRONGEST AND WHO ARE WILLING TO RUN MORE
RISKS TO GET BACK HOME. WE WERE TOLD THAT THE SIMPLE
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP
CONFIDENTIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
THREAT THAT THEY MIGHT BE MOVED FURTHER INTO ZAIRE
BECAUSE OF TEH VOLCANOS MADE MANY REFUGEES FEAR THAT (#)
EXILE WOULD BECOME {#)
LEADERS'
PROMISES TO TAKE THEM BACK SEEMED HOLLOW. THEY
PREFERRED TO RUN THE RISKS OF RETURN NOW.
9. IF THE PUSH AND PULL FACTORS PROPELLING THE REFUGEES
BACK TO RWANDA ARE IN CO
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 BUJUMBURA 000774
FOR UNDERSECRETARY WIRTH AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE
FROM OAKLEY AND FRIEDMAN
E.O. 12356: DECLOADR
TAGS: PREF, BY, RW
SUBJECT: GOMA, RWANDA AND US
SPONTANEOUS RETURN WILL EVENTUALLY OUTSTRIP THE
ORGANIZED VARIETY. WHETHER RWANDA HAS THE CARRYING
CAPACITY TO ACCEPT A MASSIVE RETURN IS SOMETHING ON THE
MINDS OF ALL, INCLUDING THE GOR. BETTING IS THAT ROOM
WILL BE FOUND FOR ALL WHO COME --BUT THE PROCESS WILL
BE ROCKY AND FRAUGHT WITH DANGERS.
10. BUT IN ANY CASE, SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS WILL OPT NOT
TO RETURN, BARRING A TOTAL HUTU VICTORY. HOW MANY
WILL CHOOSE EXILE IS ANYBODY'S GUESS. THOSE THAT DO
GUESS PUT THE FIGURE AS HIGH AS 50&. THE UNHCR IS
ALREADY PLANNING FOR MOVING THIS RESIDUE AWAY FROM THE
BORDERS INTO ZAIRE AND TANZANIA. MRS. OGATA POINTS OUT
THAT SUCH RELOCATION IS IN KEEPING WITH BOTH
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND AFRICAN PRACTICE. IT IS
ALSO ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY GIVEN THE OLD REGIME'S
MILITARY REVANCHISM AND THE GOR'S CLEAR RESERVATION OF
THE RIGHT TO USE FORCE AGAINST THE CAMPS SHOULD THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE HOST COUNTRIES PROVE
INCAPABLE OF HALTING SUCH ACTIVITIES.
DIALOGUE
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
12. THE GOR ITSELF SEEMS TO BE OF SEVERAL MINDS ON
THIS SUBJECT. OUR MEETINGS IN KIGALI LEFT US WITH AN
ENHANCED APPRECIATION THAT THE KIGALI GOVERNMENT IS
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CONFIDENTIAL
r O A l ITIDM OF V/IFWg A S \A/FI I
D F FORPFQ
IT IS LITTLE WONDER
THAT IN A COUNTRY WHERE SPOILS ARE LIMITED AND THE
SENSE OF VICTIMIZATION STRONG (AND VALID) THERE IS A
RELUCTANCE TO INVITE OTHERS TO THE TABLE. AS WE SEEK
TO HELP THE GOR IT WILL REQUIRE GREAT SKILL TO
ENCOURAGE MODERATION WITHOUT EMBOLDENING THE GOR7
IRRECONCILABLES.
13. BUT NOTHING IS SIMPLE OUT HERE. IN THE FACE OF
EVIDENCE CALLING INTO DOUBT THE GOVERNMENT'S INTENTIONS
AND/OR CAPABILITIES TO CARRY OUT RECONCILIATION AND
REPATRIATION COME MANY OTHER HOPEFUL SIGNS. THUS, SOME
10,000 TUTSI 1959 RETURNEES WHO HAD RECENTLY OCCUPIED
EMPTY HOMES AND FARMS IN THE GISENYI AREA ARE NOW IN
UNHCR CAMPS. THEY WERE MOVED OUT OF THE PROPERTIES BY
THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES WHEN THE FORMER HUTU OWNERS
RETURNED AND WERE DEEMED THE RIGHTFUL OWNERS. THIS MAY
BE A LOCAL PHENOMENON —- BUT IT IS A POSITIVE SIGN,
IN ANY CASE.
THE VOLCANOS
14. THE UNHCR IS ACTING ON NEW INFORMATION DEVELOPED
THE PREVIOUS WEEK THAT PORTRAYS THE VOLCANO THREAT AS
SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED OVER WHAT HAD BEEN THOUGHT.
WE DID NOT WANT TO GET INTO A GAME OF "CHOOSE THE
EXPERT", FEELING THIS TASK WAS BEST LEFT TO THE UN,
ESPECIALLY AS WE HAVE NO COMPETING OPINION THAT MAY BE
MORE VALID. THUS, RATHER THAN PRESSING THE UNHCR ON
THIS POINT WE FELT IT BEST TO DROP IT, AT LEAST FOR
THE MOMENT. MOREOVER, THE UNHCR SEEMS TO BE VERY MUCH
COMMITTED TO GETTING THE CAMPS CLOSED OUT ASAP,
PERHAPS BECAUSE THEY SHARE THE NGOS DISTASTE FOR THESE
CLIENTS AND KNOW RESOURCES ARE LIMITEDFOOD
15. YOU ARE AWARE OF THE LOOMING FOOD CRISIS IN THIS
AREA. JADED EXPERTS DON'T RECALL ANYTHING OF THIS
PROPORTION, EVER. HELPING GET THIS ONE SOLVED HAS TO
BE A MAJOR PRIORITY. WE NEED TO SEE WHAT MORE WE CAN
DO AND HELP MOBILIZE OTHER DONORS. THOUGH NUMBERS ARE
ALWAYS A PROBLEM IN REFUGEE CAMPS, THE LOOMING SHORTAGE
HERE AND COMPETING NEEDS ELSEWHERE MAKE ACCURATE
NUMBERS AN ABSOLUTE PRIORITY. THE WFP ASKED IF THE USG
MIGT BE ABLE TO TO HELP WITH OVERHEAD, A METHOD WHICH
THE WFP BELIEVES WOULD BE MORE ACCURATE THAN
REGISTRATION. IF TRUE, WE THINK WE SHOULD STEP
FORWARD.
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CONFIDENTIAL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 BUJUMBUFtA 000774
FOR UNDERSECRETARY WIRTH AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE
FROM OAKLEY AND FRIEDMAN
E.O. 12356: DEQADR
TAGS: PREF, BY, RW
SUBJECT: GOMA, RWANQD US
(THERE HQEN MUCH CRITQ OF THE UNHCR
REGISTRATION EFFORT IN GOMA. IT MAY BE SOMEWHAT
MISPLACED. THE NGOS TOLD US THAT THE MARGIN OF ERROR IN
THE FIRST PHASE, THE CENSUS, WAS 5-10 PERCENT,
CERTAINLY NOT ENOUGH TO INVALIDATE IT. I
EO 13526 1.4d
A FINAL WORD
16. THIS TRIP CONFIRMED ONE THING YOU ALREADY KNOW:
THERE ARE NO GOOD, EASY SOLUTIONS TO THE MESS OUT HERE
--JUST UNSATISFACTORY COMPROMISES WITH AN INTRACTABLE
REALITY AND UNHAPPY CHOICES BETWEEN COMPETING
OBJECTIVES. RISKS AND DOWNSIDES ARE EASIER TO
IDENTIFY THAN WORKABLE SOLUTIONS. AND WE OPERATE IN A
SEA OF RUMOR AND MISINFORMATION. ( WE BELIEVE IT
IMPERATIVE THAT DAVE RAWSON BE GIVEN THE KIND OF STAFF
THAT CAN HELP HIM IN WHAT HE IS ALREADY DOING AS WELL
AS ANY SINGLE PERSON COULD--SORTING OUT THE FACT FROM
THE FICTION AND REPORTING. WASHINGTON IS WORKING ON
THIS ONE BUT IT NEEDS TO DONE QUICKLY.)
17. WHAT IMPRESSED US THE MOST ARE PEOPLE DEALING
WITH THIS PROBLEM ON THE GROUND, INCLUDING UNHCR STAFF.
THE NGOS ARE VIRTUALLY ALL TOP NOTCH. SO IS OUR
KIGALI MISSION. EVERYBODY IS PLAYING A RUM HAND.
BUT WE ALL MUST PLAY ON.
18. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
KRUEGER
BT
#0774
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
GONFIDENTIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
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< SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 03
< SSN>0774
< TOR>950217114413 M1521415
<*SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03
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< SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03
< SSN>0774
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FROM:
SITREPRT
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAL
�THE
REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TO THE
*
UNITED NATIONS
February 17, 1995
DECL:OADR
TO:
DOJ - Ms. G o r e l i c k
FROM:
USUN/W - David J. Scheffe
SUBJECT: S e c u r i t y of U.S. Personnel C o n t r i b u t e d t o the
I n t e r n a t i o n a l T r i b u n a l f o r Rwanda
This memorandum f o l l o w s our d i s c u s s i o n at the l a s t meeting
of the Ad Hoc Committee on Rwanda (February 8) and the t a s k i n g
t o provide you w i t h an a n a l y s i s of
(b)(6)
January 12
.
r e p o r t (Tab 1 ) .
I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e i n f o r m a t i o n I provide below, I urge you
t o read the other r e p o r t prepared f o r DOJ on the events
described i n t h e January 12 r e p o r t (Tab 2 ) . I t i s c o n s i s t e n t
w i t h t h a t r e p o r t but more p o s i t i v e .
We should also review r e p o r t s from t h e many U.S. and U.N.
experts who have v i s i t e d Rwanda over the l a s t several months.
In p a r t i c u l a r .
describes the
s e c u r i t y s i t u a t i o n i n Rwanda as "very good" and stresses t h a t
human r i g h t s monitors, who would face s e c u r i t y t h r e a t s s i m i l a i
t o those c o n f r o n t i n g T r i b u n a l personnel, have " a s t o n i s h i n g l y
u n l i m i t e d " access throughout Rwanda (Tab 3 ) .
The i n f o r m a t i o n below t r a c k s t h a t provided t o |
(b)(6)
on hi s v i s i t t o t h e T r i b u n a l l a s t week. I look forward t o
seeing^ (b)(6) comments about the s i z e o f the Yugoslav T r i b u n a l
as soon as p o s s i b l e . As he may have mentioned t o you, t h e U.N.
budget approval process f o r the Yugoslav and Rwanda T r i b u n a l s
s t a r t e d t h i s week. His views could be u s e f u l i n our e f f o r t s t o
reduce t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and support costs of both T r i b u n a l s .
The Yugoslav T r i b u n a l ' s e s s e n t i a l i n v e s t i g a t i v e and t r i a l tasks
depend l a r g e l y on personnel c o n t r i b u t e d by DOJ and other
agencies; t h i s week's twenty-one indictments are a mark o f the
important r o l e those c o n t r i b u t e d personnel p l a y .
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
ikon- 054*3 -ft
S/iyi5
K6H
�"COmriDDMTIAL
- 2S t a t i o p i n q T r i b u n a l Personnel i n K i g a l i
A f t e r the December t r i p , State and USUN concluded t h a t
K i g a l i lacks t h e i n f r a s t r u c t u r e t o support a l a r g e prosecutor's
o f f i c e . The Secretary General o f the United Nations has agreed
(paragraph 38(a) o f h i s r e p o r t , at Tab 4 ) .
We understand t h a t the Prosecutor has decided since January
12 not t o s t a t i o n people i n K i g a l i permanently.
The Prosecutor
a n t i c i p a t e s t h a t he w i l l r o t a t e i n v e s t i g a t o r s and a n a l y s t s (not
prosecutors) t o K i g a l i f o r periods o f about t h r e e weeks;
prosecutors w i l l not be s t a t i o n e d i n or r o t a t e d through K i g a l i ,
although i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t they w i l l go on s h o r t v i s i t s l i k e
has made. The Prosecutor would thus have a
those
(b)(6)
permanent presence i n K i g a l i , although t h e i n d i v i d u a l s would
change. This approach matches |
(b)(6)
recommendation (p.5
of h i s January 12 r e p o r t ) .
The r e g i o n a l headquarters o f the o f f i c e w i l l be o u t s i d e
Rwanda. The Secretary General has recommended Arusha,
Tanzania. S e c u r i t y problems there w i l l be minimal, the United
Nations has concluded, and a large i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference
center already e x i s t s . The f i n a l d e c i s i o n on the headquarters
w i l l be made by the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , where we w i l l play a
leading r o l e , ensuring t h a t our concerns are met.
With|
(b)(6)
|at J u s t i c e (who i s making
recommendations f o r the T r i b u n a l ' s l i t i g a t i o n support system),
we have worked t o suggest a K i g a l i base f o r the Prosecutor t h a t
w i l l both permit the T r i b u n a l t o m a i n t a i n a high p r o f i l e i n
K i g a l i and acknowledge the r e a l l o g i s t i c a l l i m i t a t i o n s t o
operating i n K i g a l i .
We understand t h a t t h e Prosecutor i s now c o n s i d e r i n g a plan
of i n v e s t i g a t i o n s t h a t would place n e a r l y a l l h i s assets i n
Europe f o r the next several months. This w i l l enable him t o
concentrate on high-ranking suspects who have f l e d t h e r e . The
time i t provides (perhaps three months o r more) w i l l permit the
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e i n K i g a l i t o develop.
Should he continue along
these l i n e s , we w i l l press him t o e x p l a i n how he w i l l
simultaneously m a i n t a i n a presence i n K i g a l i adequate t o
reassure the p a r t i e s t h a t he i s v i g o r o u s l y pursuing the
i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f genocide and other a t r o c i t i e s .
Security
(b)(6)
UNAMIR i s
As
f u l l y committed t o p r o v i d i n g the T r i b u n a l ' s s e c u r i t y as
r e q u i r e d by U.N. S e c u r i t y Council R e s o l u t i o n 965 (Tab 5 ) . (The
Secretary General also emphasizes UNAMIR's commitment
(paragraph 27 o f h i s r e p o r t a t Tab 4 ) . We understand t h a t
-CQNF! DEIST I'AL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CONF IDEHTIAL.
- 3UNAMIR w i l l p r o v i d e round-the-clock p r o t e c t i o n f o r each
T r i b u n a l person i n Rwanda. Due t o i t s own personnel
l i m i t a t i o n s , UNAMIR recommends t h a t no more than f i f t e e n (15)
T r i b u n a l s t a f f be present i n Rwanda simultaneously. (As I
mentioned above, t h a t s t a f f i s not expected t o i n c l u d e
prosecutors.) The Prosecutor intends t o abide by t h a t
recommendation.
As I noted, [
(b)(6)
[describes t h e s e c u r i t y s i t u a t i o n i n
Rwanda as "very good." The State Department i s s t a t i o n i n g
personnel i n K i g a l i , an i n d i c a t i o n t h a t the Bureau o f
D i p l o m a t i c S e c u r i t y has concluded t h a t s a f e t y concerns can be
met.
The State Department has an evacuation p l a n , which i s
under review; as U.S. o f f i c i a l s , any DOJ personnel would be
i n c l u d e d i n t h e U.S. evacuation p l a n . We expect t o have time
to review t h e s i t u a t i o n again before the U.S. personnel reach
Rwanda and t o evaluate whether the s i t u a t i o n i s l i k e l y t o
deteriorate.
O f f i c e Space gnd Accomrpodations
These concerns are less pressing than i n e a r l y January,
given t h e lower T r i b u n a l presence a n t i c i p a t e d i n K i g a l i . The
United Nations has obtained temporary o f f i c e space i n t h e
former UNICEF B u i l d i n g (paragraph 26 o f the Secretary General's
Report at Tab 4 ) , and premises i n the UNAMIR compound have been
i d e n t i f i e d as a p o s s i b l e permanent l o c a t i o n . This t r a c k s t h e
recommendation of both)
(b)(6)
land DOJ's c o n t r a c t o r
(Tab 2 ) . The former UNICEF b u i l d i n g i s guarded by UNAMIR.
The Department of State i s a c t i v e l y working t o p r o v i d e the
former Ambassador's residence f o r T r i b u n a l personnel.
I f that
proves u n a v a i l a b l e , the UNAMIR o f f i c e r s * compound has been
o f f e r e d f o r T r i b u n a l personnel. I f necessary, a f l o o r o f the
Hotel M e r i d i a n ( s u i t a b l y r e h a b i l i t a t e d ) i s a v a i l a b l e ; UNAMIR
has determined t h a t t h i s arrangement would be secure. Wherever
the U.S. 'personnel lodge, they w i l l be t o g e t h e r , and they w i l l
have s e c u r i t y . We w i l l work w i t h the United Nations t o ensure
t h a t lodgings are s u i t a b l e and safe.
In a d d i t i o n , a f u l l - s e r v i c e Belgian h o s p i t a l , s t a f f e d by
western d o c t o r s , has been o f f e r e d f o r t h e use of T r i b u n a l
personnel (provided they have medical i n s u r a n c e ) . The
Prosecutor's o f f i c e has found these f a c i l i t i e s t o be adequate.
Conclusiou
The developments i n the Prosecutor's plans i n d i c a t e t h a t he
i s addressing d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h o p e r a t i n g i n Rwanda i n an open,
reasonable way. We w i l l continue t o work c l o s e l y w i t h t h e
Prosecutor and UNAMIR on s e c u r i t y and accommodations before any
•eew IDEHTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�-60NFIDENTIAL
- 4 U.S. personnel begin work i n Rwanda. Because our personnel
w i l l probably begin work o u t s i d e Rwanda, I hope t h a t they are
able t o s t a r t soon.
The U.S. Government has s t r o n g l y supported the T r i b u n a l and
has encouraged the Rwandan Government t o cooperate c l o s e l y w i t h
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n v e s t i g a t o r s . I appreciate your w i l l i n g n e s s at
l a s t week's meeting t o begin i d e n t i f y i n g DOJ personnel f o r the
T r i b u n a l so t h a t they can begin work as soon as p o s s i b l e . They
w i l l p l a y an important r o l e i n e s t a b l i s h i n g i n d i v i d u a l
a c c o u n t a b i l i t y f o r genocide and i n promoting n a t i o n a l
reconciliation.
Attachments
(b)(6)
[Report (January 12, 1995);
Tab 1 Tab 2 - Report: Advance Planning f o r L i t i g a t i o n Support
(January 4 , 1995) ;
Tab 3 - K i g a l i 477 ( A t k i n Report) (February 13, 1995);
Tab 4 - Secretary General Report (February 13, 1995);
Tab 5 - U.N. S e c u r i t y Council R e s o l u t i o n 965.
cc: Anthony Lake; Mark Richard
\
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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SUBJECT: INITIAL R A D N R S O S T A M A D E B R O
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1. GOHEIOCMTIAL-ENTIRE TEXT
2. I DISCUSSED P O O A S CONTAINED REFTELS WITH FOREIGN
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�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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WITH N I H O S A D T S C R AN O E POLITICAL
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The French can be expected to be f a r more b u l l i s h on Kengo
(and Mobutu) than our Belgian partners. Paris may consider a
resumption of assistance, although t h i s w i l l be l i m i t e d at
least i n i t i a l l y to expanding humanitarian a i d . I t i s l i k e l y
that Paris w i l l phase out the visa sanction, and i t would be
useful to probe the French on how f a r they plan to go i n the de
facto r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of Mobutu. You may also wish to query
de la Sabliere on whether and f o r how long the French intend to
stay i n eastern Zaire f o l l o w i n g t h e i r withdrawal from Rwanda,
and on his views of s e c u r i t y f o r the refugee camps i n Zaire.
POINTS
o
We view favorably Kengo's moves to e s t a b l i s h committees to
d r a f t l e g i s l a t i o n on an e l e c t o r a l calendar and budget, and
to i d e n t i f y and free p o l i t i c a l prisoners. Plans t o d r a f t a
r e a l i s t i c government budget and reform p r o v i n c i a l
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n are also p o s i t i v e signs,
o
I n conjunction w i t h his t r i p to the U.S. f o r UNGA, Kengo
w i l l meet at the Assistant Secretary and U/S Tarnoff
l e v e l . W have urged him to meet w i t h the IMF and the Bank.
e
o
Brooke Amendment and other c o n s t r a i n t s prevent a renewal of
b i l a t e r a l aid f o r the present. The U.S. w i l l continue and
expand our humanitarian assistance, and we have not
excluded electoral., assistance (working through NGOs or the
UN).
Discussions w i t h i n the USG are at a very p r e l i m i n a r y
stage. The visa sanction w i l l remain i n place, but we w i l l
employ i t on a case-by-case basis.
o
We w i l l b o l s t e r Kengo through p u b l i c support f o r his
program. W are working c l o s e l y w i t h the Kengo government
e
to f a c i l i t a t e our humanitarian mission i n eastern Zaire,
i n c l u d i n g on s e c u r i t y issues. I f Kengo continues to govern
e f f e c t i v e l y and move his agenada forward, we may r e v i s i t
the question of an Ambassador i n Kinshasa.
o
The Moroccans refused to send a contingent to assist the
Z a i r i a n s , and s e c u r i t y i n the refugee camps remains a
concern. What are GOF views on the most s u i t a b l e means of
providing t r a i n i n g f o r the FAZ? which country might be
best-suited to assist the Z a i r i a n s w i t h the task of
disarming the former Rwandan army and m i l i t i a , and of
assuring the s e c u r i t y of refugees and r e l i e f workers?
o
How long do the French intend to remain i n eastern Zaire
f o l l o w i n g withdrawal from Rwanda?
o
I t would be useful i f France could raise w i t h the GOZ the
c r i t i c a l importance of disarming the Rwandans, of ensuring
t h a t Z a i r i a n t e r r i t o r y not be used to stage attacks on the
new a u t h o r i t i e s i n K i g a l i , and of ending the inflammatory
broadcasts by Hutu extremists.
cmr_i_DE.tiTlM
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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�MEETING WITH FRENCH
Rwanda/Burundi
Transition...grQm Turquoise to UNAMIR
o
We should continue to push the French to provide support to
UNAMIR by leaving equipment behind f o r , and f a c i l i t a t i n g
deployment of, a d d i t i o n a l francophone UNAMIR contingents.
(Senegal, i n p a r t i c u l a r , had planned to send troops t o
supplement i t s Turquoise contingent.)
o
We may want to raise the idea of the French p r o v i d i n g a few
s t a f f e r s f o r UNAMIR headquarters to reassure the Hutus.
o
What are French plans for staying on i n Eastern Zaire?
o
What are French views on enhancing s e c u r i t y i n the refugee
camps i n Zaire? How do we handle disarmament?
Encouraging
Repatriation/Reconciliation
o
Where are the hate radio broadcasts emanating from now?
What can be done to suppress or counter them? (We have
demarched the Burundi and Zaire governments on t h i s . )
o
We need to push deployment of human r i g h t s monitors. (We
plan to c o n t r i b u t e $750,000, and the French have indicated
a w i l l i n g n e s s to provide funding, as w e l l . )
o
We w i l l continue to monitor the behavior of the new GOR and
encourage them to broaden i t s base and respect hyman r i g h t s .
Accountability
o
We need to speed up establishment of a war crimes
t r i b u n a l . (The French support a UN t r i b u n a l but have not
yet agreed w i t h our proposal to expand the j u r i s d i c t i o n of
the current Yugoslav t r i b u n a l t o cover Rwanda.)
o
We need to move to d e t a i n suspects. We are considering a
UN r e s o l u t i o n g i v i n g member states the a u t h o r i t y t o do so.
Burundi
o
We must continue to push Burundians to i n s t a l l a President.
o
We should encourage the French to follow our lead and send
high level v i s i t o r s .
o
We should press the idea of a refugee conference i n
Bujumbura. (The French have not yet answered us.)
o
We are supporting the UNHRC s human rights advisory
services plan ($300,000 c o n t r i b u t i o n ) and pressing the OAU
to make better use of i t s monitors? What other i n i t i a t i v e s
should the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community consider?
1
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPV *»Bsamu.
v m i a S
S/iyi5 KBH
�* Foster a broad-based government that respects rule of law
and transparent governance.
* Avoid the c r e a t i o n on Rwanda's borders of a permanent,
h o s t i l e Hutu diaspora.
* Save l i v e s i n refugee and displaced person camps and
s t a b i l i z e camp environments.
* Ensure the successful conclusion and hand-off of Operation
Support Hope i n both i t s humanitarian and p o l i t i c a l / m i l i t a r y
aspects.
* Help t o stem any f u r t h e r large scale exodus i n t o surrounding
countries.
* Foster c o n d i t i o n s f o r the safe return and u l t i m a t e
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of Rwandan refugees and i n t e r n a l l y displaced and
encourage v o l u n t a r y r e p a t r i a t i o n once conditions are r i p e .
* Help e s t a b l i s h c r e d i b l e n a t i o n a l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l systems
f o r i d e n t i f y i n g , apprehending, t r y i n g and punishing those
g u i l t y of a t r o c i t i e s , including genocide.
* Help r e - e s t a b l i s h basic economic and s o c i a l service
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e so that Rwanda can become l a r g e l y s e l f - r e l i a n t .
ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN TO MEET THESE GOALS:
Continue to press.the Government of Rwanda t o ensure the
p r o t e c t i o n and respect f o r the human r i g h t s of a l l Rwandans.
- Continue t o press f o r rapid deployment of UNAMIR.
- Deploy human right's monitors as a confidence b u i l d i n g measure
and t o help avert f u r t h e r outflows of refugees.
- Press f o r establishment of a f u n c t i o n a l war crimes t r i b u n a l
and c o l l e c t evidence f o r prosecution of persons who committed
a t r o c i t i e s , i n c l u d i n g genocide
- E s t a b l i s h mechanisms f o r the detention of persons suspected
of a t r o c i t i e s , including genocide, and a s s i s t f r o n t l i n e states
in e f f o r t s to detain such suspects.
- Press f o r disarmament and demobilization of the former
Rwandan army and i n t e g r a t i o n of appropriate elements i n t o a
broadly-based n a t i o n a l Rwandan army.
- Work t o shut down/counter hate-mongering
UNAMIR or other organizations.
radios, working with
- A s s i s t f r o n t l i n e states t o maintain s e c u r i t y i n refugee areas.
- Reinforce e f f o r t s t o r e - e s t a b l i s h s t r u c t u r e s of government
and c i v i l society w i t h i n Rwanda.
- Create and coordinate an appropriate assistance strategy.
- Help UNHCR implement a strategy t o r e p a t r i a t e refugees.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOr i
�SECRET
P o t e n t i a l / P r o b a b l e q u e s t i o n s r e g a r d i n g an expanded UNAMIR
mandate.
1.
What i s t h e u l t i m a t e o b j e c t i v e ?
The o b j e c t i v e i s t o p r o v i d e a safe and secure environment i n
the refugee camps f o r a f i x e d p e r i o d o f t i m e and safe passage
back t o Rwanda. R i g h t now refugees are b e i n g i n t i m i d a t e from
l e a v i n g t h e camps.
2. How l o n g do we t h i n k i t w i l l take t o achieve t h e o b j e c t i v e ,
and how l o n g i s t h e mandate?
A n t i c i p a t e t a r g e t i n g a p p r o x i m a t e l y 30,000 refugees over a 30
day p e r i o d , a l l o w i n g as many as want t o t h e a b i l i t y t o r e t u r n ,
and then moving on t o another camp o r p o r t i o n o f a camp. To
reach a l l o f t h e refugees would take around 30 months.
The t r o o p s you p r o v i d e could be d e d i c a t e d f o r a f i x e d p e r i o d o f
time, i . e . 6 months o r so, which would h o p e f u l l y p r o v i d e 180,000
refugees w i t h t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o r e t u r n home. I t i s n o t
necessary t h a t you d e d i c a t e your t r o o p s t o complete t h e e n t i r e
mandate.
3.
Who w i l l be i n charge?
The UNAMIR f o r c e commander w i l l be i n charge.
4.
I s t h i s a Chapter V I o r Chapter V I I o p e r a t i o n ?
I t i s viewed as a r o b u s t Chapter V I mandate.
5. Are we expected t o separate ex-FAR and/or m i l i t i a from o t h e r
refugees?
How do we know who i s who? Are we e x p e c t i n g t o
conduct disarmament? What t y p e o f r e s i s t a n c e can be expected?
We a r e n o t l o o k i n g f o r a s e p a r a t i o n o f ex-FAR and/or m i l i t i a
from refugees. Disarmament would be v o l u n t a r y i n t h a t those
refugees who move i n t o a p r o t e c t e d zone o f t h e camp p r i o r t o
moving home would need t o e n t e r w i t h o u t weapons. With an
organized m i l i t a r y presence we would expect l i m i t e d r e s i s t a n c e .
6. W i l l t r o o p s have a r r e s t / d e t e n t i o n powers?
authority?
I f so, under what
The t r o o p s w i l l have t h e a u t h o r i t y t o a s s i s t t h e Government
of Z a i r e i n c a r r y i n g o u t i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o a r r e s t and d e t a i n
people as necessary.
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7.
What r o l e w i l l t h e U.S.
play?
This i s a UN o p e r a t i o n and t h e U.S. w i l l pay i t s
c o n t r i b u t i o n . The U.S. w i l l n o t be committing t r o o p s
commitments a l r e a d y i n o t h e r UN sponsored o p e r a t i o n s ,
requested we would expect t o p r o v i d e needed l o g i s t i c a l
support as requested by t h e UN.
8. How much w i l l t h i s o p e r a t i o n c o s t , and how w i l l
When w i l l t r o o p c o n t r i b u t o r s be paid?
assessed
due t o our
however, as
and l i f t
i t be paid?
The UN w i l l p r o v i d e c o s t e s t i m a t e s and t h e m i s s i o n w i l l be
p a i d f o r i n t h e normal UN method w i t h r e g u l a r assessments.
Troops w i l l be p a i d by t h e normal UN procedures as w e l l .
[ASK 10 TO PROVIDE AN ESTIMATE OF AN EXPANDED UNAMIR WITH TROOP
STRENGTH OF 2500]
9. What i f t h e ex-FAR invade Rwanda?
preemptive s t r i k e s i n t o Zaire?
What i f t h e RPA conduct
The UN mission w i l l n o t have a mandate t o stop ex-FAR o r RPA
i n c u r s i o n s . I f these o c c u r r e d t h e r o l e o f UN f o r c e s would be t o
p r o t e c t humanitarian a s s i s t a n c e workers and c i v i l i a n s .
10. Which c o u n t r i e s w i l l form t h i s
equipped, and who w i l l equip them?
force?
How w i l l they be
We are i n t h e process o f l o o k i n g f o r c o u n t r i e s , l i k e yours,
w i t h w e l l equipped and capable t r o o p s t o augment t h e UN t r o o p s
a l r e a d y i n t h e Rwanda c r i s i s area. We would expect them t o have
t h e i r own normal equipment and t h e UN would p r o v i d e a d d i t i o n a l
equipment as needed.
11. How w i l l t r o o p s deploy?
end o f t h e operation?
How w i l l they deploy home a t t h e
Deployment w i l l be a t t h e d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e UN and c o u n t r i e s
donating troops.
12. Who w i l l t r a i n t h e troops? Where? How long w i l l i t take?
Who w i l l t r a i n Z a i r i a n gendarmes? Who w i l l p i c k them?
The troops should a l r e a d y be t r a i n e d , capable t r o o p s .
a n t i c i p a t e the Z a i r i a n gendarmes t o be t r a i n e d by agencies
c o n t r a c t e d bv UNHCR.
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
We
�-3 EG RET
13. What i s t h e r o l e o f t h e government o f Zaire?
part o f t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l force?
W i l l they be a
No, Z a i r e w i l l n o t be p a r t o f t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l f o r c e .
the host c o u n t r y they w i l l consent t o and cooperate w i t h t h e
expanded UN f o r c e .
14.
As
What a r e t h e r u l e s o f engagement?
Rules o f engagement w i l l be r o b u s t . S p e c i f i c ROE a r e t o be
determined by t h e UNSC i n c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h t r o o p c o n t r i b u t i n g
countries.
15.
I s t h i s a 3-4 year commitment?
For t h e o v e r a l l mandate, i t i s e s t i m a t e d a t 30 months (2.5
years) however, no s i n g l e n a t i o n s f o r c e i s n e c e s s a r i l y engaged
f o r t h a t d u r a t i o n as t h e m i s s i o n i s e n v i s i o n e d i n 30 day
increments.
16. How do we know t h a t an area o f 30,000 refugees can be
secured i n 30 days? What happens i f t h e s i t u a t i o n r e v e r t s t o
poor s e c u r i t y a f t e r t h e 30 day period?
The mandate i s t o p r o v i d e a window o f o p p o r t u n i t y f o r
refugees t o r e p a t r i a t e . For those who remain i n t h e camps, t h e
UN i s a n t i c i p a t i n g i t may leave a company o f t r o o p s behind f o r
daytime s e c u r i t y f o r t h e h u m a n i t a r i a n a s s i s t a n c e workers.
17. How does t h i s plan work i n c o n c e r t w i t h t h e p o s s i b l e
i n t r o d u c t i o n o f a p r i v a t e s e c u r i t y f o r c e t o p r o v i d e near-term
s e c u r i t y i n t h e camps?
These elements a r e n o t m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e . P r i v a t e s e c u r i t y
c o u l d be on t h e ground more q u i c k l y and would p r o v i d e l o n g e r term
a s s i s t a n c e a f t e r t h e b u l k o f UN t r o o p s move on t o another camp.
18.
How does t h i s f o r c e work w i t h UNAMIR?
The f o r c e would be under t h e same command as UNAMIR and once
refugees r e e n t e r Rwanda UNAMIR would ensure safe c o r r i d o r s f o r
r e t u r n home.
19.
I f t h e o p e r a t i o n i s expected t o t a k e s e v e r a l years, what a r e
the benchmarks along the way which w i l l i n d i c a t e progress, o r
lack thereof?
Progress w i l l be marked w i t h each p o r t i o n o f a camp t h a t i s
p r o v i d e d t h e chance t o r e t u r n f r e e from i n t i m i d a t i o n .
For any
refugees t o be able t o r e t u r n , f r e e from i n t i m i d a t i o n , w i l l be
.
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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s u c c e s s f u l beyond t h e p r e s e n t c o n d i t i o n s . C l e a r l y t h e l a r g e r
number o f r e p a t r i a t i o n s t h e more s u c c e s s f u l t h e o p e r a t i o n .
20. What c o n d i t i o n s would cause t h e U.S. and/or t h e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l community t o conclude t h a t t h i s concept i s n o t
working, and t h a t t h e m i s s i o n should be shut down?
For t h e expanded p o r t i o n :
i f they are i n c a p a b l e o f
f a c i l i t a t i n g r e f o r m o r i f war resumes and impedes t h e mandate
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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GOAL. A s s i s t i n the movement o f refugees and drawdown of camps
d u r i n g a d e f i n e d time p e r i o d as p a r t o f an i n t e r n a t i o n a l
community change i n focus from one of long term humanitarian a i d
t o the camps t o more p r o a c t i v e assistance t o the new Rwandan
goverment and i t s people i n d e a l i n g w i t h t h e i r humanitarian
needs. Goal i s t o lead ( w i t h a c a r r o t , not a s t i c k ) t h e GOR t o
open, r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s t r u c t u r e through p r o v i s i o n of a i d
and assistance, and a drawing back o f refugees through p r o v i s i o n
^ s e c u r i t y and humanitarian a i d w i t h i n Rwanda.
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Use o f UNAMIR t o a s s i s t i n movement o f refugees i s key t o :
showing UN commitment t o s t a b i l i t y o f new government
KWr*! ASSIFIED" working the problem on the ground t o keep camps from
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- b r i n g i n g the s p o t l i g h t onto t h e GOR and i t s i n t e r n a l
problems v i c e the camps
working w i t h GOR t o r e p a t r i a t e a l a r g e number of refugees
speed the process of d e a l i n g w i t h genocide
provide immediate assistance t o governments of Tanzania,
Burundi, Zaire i n decreasing permanent refugee camps i n s i d e
t h e i r borders
working w i t h the GOR t o deal w i t h r e t u r n o f land p o l i c y
allow^USG t o i n f l u e n c e GOR t o deal w i t h tough issue of
expanding government, i n f r a s t r u c t u r e t o deal w i t h Hutus
bypass establishment o f l a r g e refugee camps i n s i d e Rwanda
( b u f f e r zone) which RPA w i l l l i k e l y see as a d d i t i o n a l
s e c u r i t y concerns, t h r e a t s t o t h e i r forces on the border.
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MISSION: To provide a defined p e r i o d o f time i n which refugees
w i l l be o f f e r e d safe passage back t o t h e i r homes i n Rwanda, w i t h
humanitarian assistance guaranteed by the UN and p r o t e c t i o n
guaranteed by UNAMIR ( c u r r e n t mandate authorizes p r o t e c t i o n of
d i s p l a c e d Rwandans).
END STATE: The i n t e n t i s t h a t a m a j o r i t y of a l l refugees would
r e t u r n t o t h e i r homes i n Rwanda. A f t e r t h i s t i m e , (assuming
UNHCR, UN, i n t e r n a t i o n a l community agreement) refugee camps
could continue t o be operated i n s i d e Rwandan borders ( b u f f e r
zones) w i t h the approval of the GOR. A d d i t i o n a l refugee camps
might also have t o be operated i n surrounding c o u n t r i e s .
FORCE SIZE: One b a t t a l i o n minimum, more l i k e l y two b a t t a l i o n s
(a f o r c e s i z e a v a i l a b l e under c u r r e n t UNAMIR p r o j e c t e d f o r c e
b u i l d u p ) . Force would be augmented w i t h p o l i c e and troops from
border c o u n t r i e s i n which UNAMIR was o p e r a t i n g . Force capable
of s e l f p r o t e c t i o n and presence missions, and o f s e i z i n g crew
served weapons v i s i b l e t o c o n t i n g e n t . NGOs would be responsible
f o r t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of refugees back i n t o Rwanda w i t h UNAMIR
escort.
ROE: Provide s e c u r i t y f o r refugees, NGOs, i n v e s t i g a t o r s .
Escort NGO humanitarian convoys, provide s e c u r i t y f o r
d i s t r i b u t i o n of food by NGOs, provide s e c u r i t y through presence
w i t h troops prepared and authorized t o disarm i f necessary.
I n d i v i d u a l s accused of crimes would be turned over t o government
t r o o p s / p o l i c e f o r judgment. Force would not serve as a p o l i c e
force.
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�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
COHFIDENTIAL
TIMEFRAME: 30-60 days per country, a f t e r which time UNAMIR
f o r c e w i l l be withdrawn and remaining refugees w i l l be t o l d t h a t
camps are now i n s i d e Rwandan borders.
ASSUMPTIONS:
UNAMIR contingent c o u n t r i e s accept mission outside
Rwandan borders as part of i t s mission.
GOR and bordering government agree t o presence o f UNAMIR
forces f o r purpose of a s s i s t i n g i n the r e t u r n of refugees.
Refugees want t o r e t u r n , but are being threatened by
ex-FAR and m i l i t i a .
G R w i l l i n g t o deal w i t h steady stream o f refugees,
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provide s o l u t i o n t o land r e t u r n problems, allow UNAMIR
unimpeded access t o areas where refugees w i l l be r e t u r n i n g .
RPA w i l l accept r e t u r n of Hutu refugees t o t h e i r homes.
RPA i s b e l i e v e d t o be s t r o n g l y opposed t o b u i l d i n g of large
b u f f e r zones i n s i d e Rwandan borders f o r these refugees.
SALES PITCH. Mission w i l l be preceded by p e r i o d of i n t e n s i v e
n e g o t i a t i o n s between GOR, RPA, UNAMIR, NGOs, UNHCR, and
bordering governments.
UNAMIR goes i n t o t h e camps one country at a time. Camps
i n c o r p o r a t e the basic leadership i n f r a s t r u c t u r e f o r m e r l y present
i n t h e i r Rwandan v i l l a g e s , w i l l be a slow, hit-and-miss process
to gain leaders' agreement t o "take t h e i r people home". Must
deal w i t h Hutu leaders. Send high ranking GOR Hutu leaders t o
be p a r t o f n e g o t i a t i n g teams, press Hutu refugees t o r e t u r n and
become p a r t o f a new Rwanda. Threat must be i m p l i c i t t h a t
c u r r e n t refugee camps w i l l become even less h o s p i t a b l e a f t e r
^ UNAMIR departs w i t h those refugees w i l l i n g t o leave. This p o i n t
} must be made c l e a r throughout the camps, along w i t h counterpoint
I t h a t bordering governments want them t o leave, and NGOs w i l l now
s h i f t t h e i r focus t o refugees r e t u r n i n g t o Rwanda.
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Best UNAMIR can hope f o r i s t o o f f e r a f i x e d time p e r i o d o f
guaranteed s e c u r i t y , humanitarian support and ( p o s s i b l y )
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n f o r refugee r e t u r n . The GOR w i l l r e t a i n t h e
r i g h t t o screen at the border, but o n l y f o r the purposes of
denying e n t r y , not f o r the purposes o f s e i z i n g i n d i v i d u a l s .
Once i n s i d e the country, refugees must be guaranteed safe
passage t o t h e i r former d o m i c i l e s , unimpeded by RPA
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checkpoints. A given time p e r i o d w i l l be s e t , w i t h a d e f i n i t e
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of i n v e s t i g a t o r s l o o k i n g i n t o accusations o f genocide. Key t o
.
refugee r e t u r n i s not so much presence of UNAMIR, but i t s t i e s
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L i n k up w i t h host n a t i o n forces t o separate (disarm i s another
matter) ex-FAR and Hutu m i l i t a s t h a t refuse r e p a t r i a t i o n .
Government and UNAMIR would announce r e p a t r i a t i o n , UNAMIR and
GOR o f f i c i a l s would guarantee s a f e t y o f refugee r e t u r n , access
to t o o l s , food, and r e t u r n t o former v i l l a g e s w i t h a process of
a r b i t r a t i o n f o r those who f i n d others on t h e i r land.
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DANGER OF ANY MOVE INTO THE CAMPS. I n t e l l community assesses
t h a t e n t i r e v i l l a g e s are present i n t h e camps, along w i t h t h e i r
s t r o n g l y p a r t i s a n , p o l i t i c a l l y motivated Hutu leadership. These
leaders would see no reason t o r e t u r n i f they b e l i e v e t h a t at a
f u t u r e time they can r e t u r n t o Rwanda as p a r t of a vanquishing
Hutu army. They w i l l also see no reason t o urge t h e i r people t o
r e t u r n i f they f e e l t h e i r own l i v e s are i n danger from m i l i t i a
ex-FAR. They w i l l see no reason t o r e t u r n i f they are the
t a r g e t s o f accusations of genocide and t h e r e f o r e subject t o
imprisonment or execution once they cross the border. They may
w e l l urge t h e i r people t o r e s i s t movement and spread rumors t h a t
the UNAMIR f o r c e i s there t o f o r c e a b l y r e p a t r i a t e refugees.
o r
NEEDED. UNAMIR forces must be preceded by some s o r t of PSYOPs
campaign and come equipped w i t h s e l f - c o n t a i n e d PSYOPs u n i t s t o
s t r o n g l y counter these rumors.
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<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
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This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
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Clinton Presidential Records
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Declassified documents concerning Rwanda
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2011-0263-M
Date Available
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9/21/2015
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on Rwanda from 1993 through 1995, from the files of Susan Rice, Director for National Security Council Global Affairs. Material includes cables, letters, reports, and memos on a variety of topics on Rwanda, including UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), troop deployment, and Rwandan refugees.
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National Security Council
NSC Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs Office (1993-1998)
Susan Rice
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<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7585536" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
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Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
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Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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9/2/2015
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2011-0263-M
7585536
Declassified
Foreign Policy
Peacekeeping
Rwanda
Susan Rice
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https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/d9facdc50a21e1b6155645dca2f8c678.pdf
3b3153e1702675d36ca64b14d724ac02
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Finding Aids - Collection Descriptions & Inventories
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Finding aids at the Clinton Presidential Library contain a detailed description of the collection including the total number of pages or photos and length of video and audio recordings. Finding aids also include background information of the collection’s topic and details on the record type (ex: email, memorandum, briefing book, Betacam video, audio cassette etc). <br /><br />Finding aids describe collections at the box and folder level, and include a folder title list and information about the arrangement of the collection. <br /><br /><strong>Please note the majority of collections have not yet been scanned nor made available online.</strong>
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Photographs of President Clinton and First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton’s Trip to Rwanda on March 25, 1998 - Collection Finding Aid
Identifier
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2019-0175-F
Description
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This collection consist of photographs related to the Clinton’s visit to Kigali, Rwanda on March 25, 1998. (All events are from March 25, 1998) Events include: President Clinton’s statement to reporters on the tarmac at Entebbe, Uganda regarding a school shooting in Jonesboro, Arkansas; President Clinton and Hillary Rodham Clinton departure from Uganda and travel to Kigali, Rwanda; President Clinton and Hillary Rodham Clinton arrival at Kiglai Airport in Rwanda; Meeting with President Bizimungu of Rwanda at the Rigali Airport; U.S. Delegation discussion with Genocide survivors and future builders at Kigali Airport (Members of the U.S. Delegation include: President Clinton, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Rev. Jesse Jackson, Sandy Berger, Rep. Maxine Waters, Rep. Charles Rangel, Susan Rice and others); Remarks honoring Rwandan Genocide Survivors at Kigali Airport; Sculpture Dedication at the Kigali Airport
<b>Please Note: No items in this collection have yet been scanned nor made available online. For access to the collection please visit the Clinton Library's research room.</b>
Publisher
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Africa
Audio Visual
Audio-visual materials
Bill Clinton
Finding Aid
Genocide
Hillary Rodham Clinton
Jesse Jackson
meetings
Photograph Contact Sheets
Rwanda
Survivors
Susan Rice