1
500
49
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https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/3d3f48f116c4ffe4568544ef3f849a1e.pdf
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Finding Aids - Collection Descriptions & Inventories
Description
An account of the resource
Finding aids at the Clinton Presidential Library contain a detailed description of the collection including the total number of pages or photos and length of video and audio recordings. Finding aids also include background information of the collection’s topic and details on the record type (ex: email, memorandum, briefing book, Betacam video, audio cassette etc). <br /><br />Finding aids describe collections at the box and folder level, and include a folder title list and information about the arrangement of the collection. <br /><br /><strong>Please note the majority of collections have not yet been scanned nor made available online.</strong>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
White House Photographs from January 14, 1994, January 16, 1994, through January 21, 1994, and January 23, 1994 - Collection Finding Aid - Collection Finding Aid
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2016-0984-F Segment 6
Description
An account of the resource
The photographs processed in this segment were created from January 14, 1994, January 16, 1994, through January 21, 1994, and January 23, 1994. The segment consists of photographs pertaining to arrivals, departures, meetings, ceremonies, press briefings, interviews, photo-ops, etc., involving President Clinton, Hillary Rodham Clinton, White House Staff and others for the time period processed.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Subject
The topic of the resource
Audio-Visual
Clinton, Bill, 1946-
Clinton, Hillary Rodham, 1947-
Moscow (Russia)
Air Force One (Presidential aircraft)
Gore, Albert, 1948-
Los Angeles (Calif.)
Earthquakes
Statesmen
Clinton, Chelsea
Camp David (Md.)
Skiing
Air Force One
Albert Gore
Audio-Visual
Bill Clinton
Bonnie Raitt
Boris Yeltsin
California
Camp David
Chelsea Clinton
David Gergen
Earthquakes
Finding Aid
Hillary Rodham Clinton
King Hussein
Kremlin
Lloyd Bentsen
Los Angeles
Moscow
Pete Wilson
Photograph Contact Sheets
Queen Noor
Russia
Skiing
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/59722200edcf1f74927c68690eac57e1.pdf
8d1d88832ebf449cce8f7015eba0e136
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Finding Aids - Collection Descriptions & Inventories
Description
An account of the resource
Finding aids at the Clinton Presidential Library contain a detailed description of the collection including the total number of pages or photos and length of video and audio recordings. Finding aids also include background information of the collection’s topic and details on the record type (ex: email, memorandum, briefing book, Betacam video, audio cassette etc). <br /><br />Finding aids describe collections at the box and folder level, and include a folder title list and information about the arrangement of the collection. <br /><br /><strong>Please note the majority of collections have not yet been scanned nor made available online.</strong>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the Balkan Peace Agreement Ceremony on December 14, 1995 - Collection Finding Aid
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2021-0641-F
Description
An account of the resource
The photographs processed in this case relate to the signing of the Balkan Peace Agreement at the Quai D’Orsay (Foreign Ministry) in Paris, France on December 14, 1995. Principals at the signing include: President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia, President Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia, President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia, President Clinton, President Jacques Chirac of France, Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany, Prime Minister John Major of the United Kingdom, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin of Russia, and Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez of Spain. Ceremony Principals participating in a luncheon with Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Richard Holbrooke attending; President Clinton departing the Quai D’Orsay in Paris with President Jacques Chirac presiding.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Audio Visual
Audio-visual materials
Balkan Peace Agreement
Balkan Peninsula
Balkans
Bill Clinton
Bosnia
Croatia
Finding Aid
France
Germany
Helmut Kohl
Jacques Chirac
John Major
Paris
peace
Photograph Contact Sheets
President Clinton
Richard Holbrooke
Russia
Serbia
Slobodan Milosevic
Spain
United Kingdom
Warren Christopher
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/8eb7888874d4797fe4695c4b43f0e53c.pdf
fccf8657dbffa4f78e67d0346c3e75ba
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Finding Aids - Collection Descriptions & Inventories
Description
An account of the resource
Finding aids at the Clinton Presidential Library contain a detailed description of the collection including the total number of pages or photos and length of video and audio recordings. Finding aids also include background information of the collection’s topic and details on the record type (ex: email, memorandum, briefing book, Betacam video, audio cassette etc). <br /><br />Finding aids describe collections at the box and folder level, and include a folder title list and information about the arrangement of the collection. <br /><br /><strong>Please note the majority of collections have not yet been scanned nor made available online.</strong>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
All Photographs from 1994 - Collection Finding Aid
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2016-0984-F (seg 5)
Description
An account of the resource
The photographs processed in this segment were created from January 12, 1994 through January 13, 1994 & January 15, 1994 through January 17, 1994. The segment consists of photographs pertaining to: arrivals, departures, meetings, ceremonies, press briefings, interviews, photo-ops, etc., involving President Clinton, Hillary Rodham Clinton, White House Staff and others for the time period processed.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Air Force One
Audio Visual
Audio-visual materials
Ballet
Belarus
Bill Clinton
Boris Yeltsin
Chelsea Clinton
Dan Rather
Finding Aid
Geneva
Hillary Rodham Clinton
Minsk
Moscow
Photograph Contact Sheets
Russia
Switzerland
Warren Christopher
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/23a943b3a70aebcff933019bdb86765c.pdf
56d7785bbb8caa03aff170921f807afc
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Finding Aids - Collection Descriptions & Inventories
Description
An account of the resource
Finding aids at the Clinton Presidential Library contain a detailed description of the collection including the total number of pages or photos and length of video and audio recordings. Finding aids also include background information of the collection’s topic and details on the record type (ex: email, memorandum, briefing book, Betacam video, audio cassette etc). <br /><br />Finding aids describe collections at the box and folder level, and include a folder title list and information about the arrangement of the collection. <br /><br /><strong>Please note the majority of collections have not yet been scanned nor made available online.</strong>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of Prime Minister Chernomyrdin on 5/3/99 – Collection Finding Aid
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2019-0224-F
Description
An account of the resource
This collection consists of photographs of President William Jefferson Clinton participating in meetings at the White House with former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin of Russia on May 3rd, 1999. Prior to the meeting the President is briefed by senior staff including Sandy Berger, Madeleine Albright, John Podesta, and Jim Steinberg. The press pool enters the Oval Office for a photo opportunity prior to the meeting. The meeting with President Clinton and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin also includes Vice President Al Gore, Strobe Talbott, and Mary Mel French, and other members of the senior staff
<b>Please Note: No items in this collection have yet been scanned nor made available online. For access to the collection please visit the Clinton Library's research room.</b>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Audio Visual
Audio-visual materials
meeting
Photograph Contact Sheets
President Clinton
Prime Minister
Russia
Senior Official
White House
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/ea62364c3b5bf5399fc950b0969a32b7.pdf
33bd0fec4a641ee2e81a0cf1bbcfd976
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Finding Aids - Collection Descriptions & Inventories
Description
An account of the resource
Finding aids at the Clinton Presidential Library contain a detailed description of the collection including the total number of pages or photos and length of video and audio recordings. Finding aids also include background information of the collection’s topic and details on the record type (ex: email, memorandum, briefing book, Betacam video, audio cassette etc). <br /><br />Finding aids describe collections at the box and folder level, and include a folder title list and information about the arrangement of the collection. <br /><br /><strong>Please note the majority of collections have not yet been scanned nor made available online.</strong>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of President Clinton Meeting with Presidential Vladimir Putin in September 2000 - Collection Finding Aid
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2017-1266-F
Description
An account of the resource
This collection consists of photographs from the Clinton administration during the year 2000. The photographs include President Clinton meeting with President Vladimir Putin of Russia in New York on September 6th and 7th, 2000. The meetings occurred at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel and at the United Nations. President Clinton and President Putin sign a Joint Statement on Strategic Stability Cooperation Initiative between the United States and Russia.
<b>Please Note: No items in this collection have yet been scanned nor made available online. For access to the collection please visit the Clinton Library's research room.</b>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Audio Visual
Audio-visual materials
Bill Clinton
Chelsea Clinton
Finding Aid
Kofi Annan
Madeleine Albright
meetings
New York
Photograph Contact Sheets
Russia
Signing
United Nations
Vladimir Putin
Waldorf Astoria Hotel
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/0f21c4797cac687b07bed68cbdecca02.pdf
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https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/e9a79c38d138a3d402da81e078047e62.pdf
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https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/c805e661d71074736a278d335555bc78.pdf
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https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/ef28044451a354c4a210b9b58edfed1d.pdf
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https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/7feb2ad19c5784ab4a1a25edb275253f.pdf
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified records concerning Latvia
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2016-0314-M-1
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
9/21/2023
Description
An account of the resource
These Clinton Presidential Records were declassified in response to a Mandatory Declassification Review request for specific documents from FOIA Case 2011-1037-F (Records related to the Republic of Latvia) withheld under FOIA exemption 1. This request, 2016-0314-M, was split into two segments because of the number of records requested for declassification. This is the first of two segments. Open records include memcons, letters, briefing papers, cables, and emails. Much of the record to be opened in this segment relates to a July 1994 trip that President Clinton took to Riga, Latvia and Warsaw, Poland. Included in this collection are records related to Estonia, Lithuania, and Russia.
<a href="https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47925">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
WHORM-Subject File-General
NSC Office of Communications
Russell Horowitz
First Lady's Press Office
Lisa Caputo
National Security Council
NSC Central and Eastern European Affairs Office
Flanagan, Stephen
Daniel Fried
NSC European Affairs Office
Keirn Brown
Richard Norland
NSC Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs Office
Steven Naplan
NSC Records Management
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
8/2/2023
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Poland
Russia
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/6708f7b2fbd0e62d9a7c40c43e64e5cc.pdf
b6aa2a8e96337cc3c5168846c66599be
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning Russian President Vladimir Putin
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2017-0222-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
2/9/2020
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains records related to the telcon between Presidents Clinton and Putin on August 16, 2000.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Records Management System
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Russia
Telcon
Vladimir Putin
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/755eb2e5b1d692ef022b625fabcd549d.pdf
d9c500954b44b42975aef8bac4af3a3b
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/cca19812edd97a73babcff81009ad86d.pdf
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https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/c436d9599d7e83bd76055528288e1bec.pdf
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning the President's Trip to Russia and Ukraine, June 3-5, 2000
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2016-0114-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
11/20/2023
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains records related to President William J. Clinton's trip to Russia and Ukraine on June 3-5, 2000. Included are briefing memoranda, talking points, cables, and email regarding the President's meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma. Also included is the June 4, 2000 memorandum of conversation (memcon) between Clinton and Putin.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Records Management Office
NSC Cables
NSC Emails
NSC Records Management System
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files; Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Leonid Kuchma
Memcon
Russia
Ukraine
Vladimir Putin
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/d52a3f1da3d3bc3077c1667f325a9125.pdf
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https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/c4ab901ba9d3f7c1556ea75c24688a4f.pdf
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https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/c0b18b9c9939a9b6787a8b4f7cfb213f.pdf
bc374275bcb02ecc738e0a6425a7fdf6
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/bc806628a6edc3c81af27e981a978464.pdf
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified records concerning Latvia
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2016-0314-M-2
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
9/21/2023
Description
An account of the resource
These Clinton Presidential Records were declassified in response to a Mandatory Declassification Review request for specific documents from FOIA Case 2011-1037-F (Records related to the Republic of Latvia) withheld under FOIA exemption 1. This request, 2016-0314-M, was split into two segments because of the number of records requested for declassification. This is the second of two segments. Open records include memcons, letters, briefing papers, cables, and emails. Much of the record to be opened in this segment relates to a July 1994 trip that President Clinton took to Riga, Latvia and Warsaw, Poland. Included in this collection are records related to Estonia, Lithuania, and Russia.
<a href="https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47925">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasian Affairs Office
Coit Blacker
NSC Records Management
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
8/2/2023
Estonia
Guntis Ulmanis
Latvia
Lithuania
Poland
Russia
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/c9db0560ca86ca9ecf1e9b38b63a1a05.pdf
2bd358765df9ac07fc786630b9676b8d
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/78c41021a4498ac15e8e1ad9ada12ab0.pdf
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https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/39423f192dae6f23790221645788e563.pdf
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https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/34d7cf347cdf428ae036703e04664fbd.pdf
2e1ebe43db49687a94691a9f8cb29171
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Meetings between President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2016-0118-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
9/21/2023
Description
An account of the resource
These Clinton Presidential Records were declassified in response to a Mandatory Declassification Review request regarding cables related to meetings between President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin. The cables discuss meetings in Vancouver, Canada; Moscow, Russia; Halifax, Canada; Hyde Park, NY; and Sharm-el-Sheik, Egypt. Open records include memcons, letters, briefing papers, reports on preparatory meetings, and summary reports filed after meetings.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Cables
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
8/2/2023
Boris Yeltsin
Russia
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/5172f704a9fa875b50110905702a64d6.pdf
35458dc35d5553c136aa8e1d577d8977
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/2bf808397e8bc065c7aa08a8af53bdc4.pdf
c941f4769c1b44c35a9a0aebc4032162
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/aa9265fb3341b65ecb7fa2bd39015fd1.pdf
06101ce7b5bf2681d893062e8d7d9a8a
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/f4b5fee9911a7a53e424af09fa3649c4.pdf
23b7af6c8a95056c2362f7215982668a
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/79cce3373710a6c1b4d2b0b9be0302a0.pdf
3a3f960ba28d868a47451d03c5a46455
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/295c4d13e11ecc414fe733af77fca653.pdf
26ff0254be38dd18afcb5b8079e12231
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/ef2997f624ad8d653e44e91ca9a1763b.pdf
c83aeda3bc8e1e8e8ae9736f68447f10
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning the President's Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST)
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2016-0129-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
4/6/2023
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains drafts, memorandum to the President, memorandum to the National Security Advisor, scheduling requests, emails, administrative paperwork, and other documents related to the President's Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) Report on Nuclear Materials in the Former Soviet Union.
<a href="https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/44116">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Nonproliferation and Export Controls Office
Gary Samore
NSC Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasian Affairs Office
Jessica Stern
NSC Emails
NSC Records Management System
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Nuclear Weapons
Russia
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/b4dbd9b12ac57f695c2d56c616e85a0d.pdf
5b99bd12b0aeb25aa689f05fbf749c24
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Regarding Former President Richard Nixon
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2016-0115-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
4/6/2023
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains memoranda, talking points, and scheduling proposals for telephone calls and meetings between President William J. Clinton and former President Richard Nixon regarding Nixon’s trips to Russia in November 1993 and March 1994.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Records Management System
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
3/13/2023
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Exclusive Fraternity
Richard Nixon
Russia
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/109ec827cb23f4a5c224147eebb18710.pdf
d3874c46d2d0acf1cd1ac14fae4601c8
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning Estonia
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2014-0656-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
9/28/22
Description
An account of the resource
These Clinton Presidential Records were declassified in response to a Mandatory Declassification Review request for specific closures from Freedom of Information Act Request 2007-1804-F (Records related to Lennart Meri, President of Estonia). Included are letters, cables, drafts, and briefing memorandum related to correspondence between President Clinton and President Meri. Included also is a small amount of administrative paperwork related to records management. Topics include the former Estonia, Latvia, Belarus, NATO, Russian armed forces, and bilateral economic issues. These documents are from the White House Office of Records Management (WHORM) Subject File - General and the NSC Records Management System PRS File Series. This release includes sixty-seven pages of declassified materials and forty-four additional pages.
<a href="https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/362263">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
White House Office of Records Management
NSC Records Management System
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
07/22/22
Belarus
Estonia
Latvia
NATO
Russia
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/fc827249cbfef74779415b799def8e00.pdf
2700638dd00be650682cde19ba729c8b
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified documents concerning Russia
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2011-0892-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
9/28/22
Description
An account of the resource
These Clinton Presidential Records were declassified in response to a Mandatory Declassification Review request for specific closures from Freedom of Information Act Request 2006-1185-F (Records related to a June 13 and June 14 telephone conversation with Boris Yeltsin). Included are emails, draft telcons, and briefing memorandum. Topics include the former Bosnia and Russian armed forces. These documents are from the NSC Records Management System PRS File Series. This release includes 60 pages of declassified materials and forty-five additional pages.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Records Management System
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
07/22/22
Boris Yeltsin
Bosnia
Memcon
Russia
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/4be7455741be8d838b503b260b13b63d.pdf
4ed93ec92d0dc7ba016c845d79d6ecad
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified memo from R. Nicholas Burns concerning his lunch with President Nixon
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Emails
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
02/26/1994
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36253">2010-0546-F</a>
[03/04/1993-04/26/1994]
Description
An account of the resource
Declassified memo from R. Nicholas Burns concerning his lunch with President Nixon. During the lunch Burns briefed the former President on the situation in Russia.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management Systems
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Boris Yeltsin
Exclusive Fraternity
Richard Nixon
Russia
Ukraine
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/9d74bcf7ae1890c8720be86f0bda8048.pdf
e182e6b625ef6d73c32c8e128dbbea0d
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified memo and attachment from Sandy Berger to President Clinton
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Records Management System
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
03/01/1994
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36253">2010-0546-F</a>
9401557
[Richard Nixon; President Nixon]
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
9401557
Description
An account of the resource
Declassified Memo and attachment from Sandy Berger to President Clinton concerning: Telephone Call with Former President Richard Nixon.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management Systems
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Exclusive Fraternity
Richard Nixon
Russia
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/22e687b81699e7ef86a5f8521584d530.pdf
5de8d5b1a25571d2efdced7718d3ba6e
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning Russian President Boris Yeltsin
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2016-0139-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
4/3/2020
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains the briefing books for President Clinton’s trip to Moscow in April 1996 for the P-8 Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security and for his bilateral meeting with Russian President Boris Yeltsin. Included are memoranda, briefing papers, and talking points.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Executive Secretary
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
3/10/2020
Boris Yeltsin
Russia
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/493dd6588527305bbb8859c307259e96.pdf
60cdb17d3820f22066847d9991288581
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning Russian President Boris Yeltsin
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2016-0137-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
4/3/2020
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains the briefing book from President Clinton’s meeting with Russian President Boris Yeltsin in Hyde Park, New York on October 23, 1995. Included are the briefing memorandum from Anthony Lake to the President and attached briefing papers. These documents are from the Executive Security Office of the National Security Council.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Executive Secretary
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
3/10/2020
Boris Yeltsin
Russia
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/265d214617a1960aa4fe815f8cd46db8.pdf
425e71f54a44b5dc66108b10930bdf7b
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning Russian President Boris Yeltsin
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2015-0815-M-3
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
4/3/2020
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains correspondence between President William J. Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin. Also included are related memoranda, talking points, briefing papers, and drafts.
<a href="https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/48805">2014-0837-F</a>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Records Management System
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/26457815">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
3/10/2020
Boris Yeltsin
Russia
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/da228f24d8735f9d03a6c3c0501f6707.pdf
8338408741357e289474a09eb84ccd54
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified documents concerning Coit Blacker
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2016-0119-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
10/24/2019
Description
An account of the resource
These Clinton Presidential Records were declassified in response to a Mandatory Declassification Review request for documents authored, or co-authored, by Coit Blacker and related to denuclearization.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasian Affairs Office
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7585726">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/20/2019
denuclearization
Russia
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/0d33770e6b0f4390e351b0cac6511be2.pdf
b658389e680b02a07ff5b37b978017c9
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified documents concerning PDD/NSC-47
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2009-0110-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
10/24/2019
Description
An account of the resource
These Clinton Presidential Records were declassified in response to a Mandatory Declassification Review request for records related to Presidential Decision Directive/NSC 47, titled Nuclear Scientific and Technical Cooperation with Russia Related to Stockpile Security and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Monitoring and Verification.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Cables
NSC Records Management System
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/20/2019
PDD
Presidential Decision Directive
Russia
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/6d43bb887c868eeda9bf369eb2607714.pdf
0eb4714b4407bf774690b5d3befb0acb
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning Russian President Vladimir Putin
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2017-0222-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
8/29/2019
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains memoranda of conversation (memcons) and memoranda of telephone conversation (telcons) between Russian President Vladimir Putin and President William J. Clinton or National Security Advisor Samuel Berger. The memcons and telcons date from June 1999 through December 2000 and span Putin's career as Director of the Federal Security Service, Prime Minister, and President.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<b>Scanned documents that are a part of this Mandatory Declassification Review are not associated with a Freedom of Information Act Request</b>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Cables
NSC Email
NSC Records Management System
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
7/24/2019
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2017-0222-M.pdf
Memcon
Russia
Telcon
Vladimir Putin
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/5e81e50c87c868fa771a7f553f864f84.pdf
5c17b491e6017e233eec53b667345160
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2014-0945-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
8/29/2019
Description
An account of the resource
The Mandatory Declassification Review contains briefing memoranda, talking points, and drafts regarding the President's meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov on September 24, 1998.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<b>Scanned documents that are a part of this Mandatory Declassification Review are not associated with a Freedom of Information Act Request</b>
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/26457815">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Records Management System
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
7/24/2019
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2014-0945-M.pdf
Russia
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/25c32e5d4ab0d33c50eaa530cfcda9ce.pdf
ae58383806a7553d8deeddd5656fe0a1
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning Russian President Boris Yeltsin
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2014-0901-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
8/29/2019
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains memoranda of conversation (memcons) between President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin from a working dinner on April 3, 1993 and a meeting the following day.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<b>Scanned documents that are a part of this Mandatory Declassification Review are not associated with a Freedom of Information Act Request</b>
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/26457815">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Records Management System
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
7/24/2019
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2014-0901-M.pdf
Boris Yeltsin
Memcon
Russia
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/60837c954a4adc59ade38dfa8c5ce743.pdf
33bfac3a2e7f0f23c3291eb8340ebe94
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning President Clinton's Trip to Europe in January 1994
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2016-0117-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
5/2/2019
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains memorandum of conversations (memcons) from President Clinton's trip to Brussels, Prague, Kiev, and Moscow on January 8-15, 1994. Included are conversations with President Boris Yeltsin of Russia, President Stanislav Shushkevich of Belarus, President Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine, and Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich of Belarus.
<b>Scanned documents that are a part of this Mandatory Declassification Review are not associated with a Freedom of Information Act Request</b>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Records Management System
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/26457815">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
4/18/2019
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2016-0117-M.pdf
26457815
Boris Yeltsin
Memcon
Russia
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/187ef30939949576e1545dc189a506e4.pdf
d11538e9173fbc67664b9a09461ddc1c
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning Kosovo
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2014-0560-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
5/2/2019
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains correspondence between Russian Special Envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin or Russian Prime Minister Sergey Stepashin and either President Clinton or Vice President Gore from April to June 1999 regarding Kosovo. Materials include memorandum of conversations (memcons), talking points, and letters.
<b>Scanned documents that are a part of this Mandatory Declassification Review are not associated with a Freedom of Information Act Request</b>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Emails
NSC Records Management System
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
4/18/2019
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2014-0560-M.pdf
Kosovo War
Memcon
Russia
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/b872b9d34687797918803d46746a8efe.pdf
38b201df15e1f1591c5eef823c15cdac
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Kosovo
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2014-0546-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
5/2/2019
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains correspondence between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and President William J. Clinton regarding Kosovo from 1999. Materials include cables, talking points, letters, and memoranda.
<b>Scanned documents that are a part of this Mandatory Declassification Review are not associated with a Freedom of Information Act Request</b>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Records Management System
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/26457815">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
4/18/2019
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2014-0546-M.pdf
26457815
Boris Yeltsin
Kosovo War
Russia
Telcon
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/479330f9f3b321e90f379d0edc608ed0.pdf
af45d85c131a289abf054304fa7d7cd3
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning Russian President Boris Yeltsin
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2014-0473-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
9/21/2018
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material related to a March 23, 1999 letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President William J. Clinton regarding Kosovo.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<b>Scanned documents that are a part of this Mandatory Declassification Review are not associated with a Freedom of Information Act Request</b>
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/26457815">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Records Management System
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
8/29/2018
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2014-0473-M.pdf
26457815
Boris Yeltsin
Russia
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/699ee139dfc56167e2848d40e19c3982.pdf
5dfa3c199e2ecf18f61adac166c25408
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning Russian President Boris Yeltsin
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2015-0782-M-2
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
7/13/2018
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains memorandum of conversations (memcons) and memorandum of telephone conversations (telcons) between President Clinton and President Boris Yeltsin of Russia, April 21, 1996 through December 31, 1999.
<b>Scanned documents that are a part of this Mandatory Declassification Review are not associated with a Freedom of Information Act Request</b>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Records Management System
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/26457815">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
7/12/2018
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2015-0782-M-2.pdf
26457815
Boris Yeltsin
Memcon
Russia
Telcon
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/48b09a2a4eaf838a226a25a7abc1d207.pdf
c952a0ee3a080558adc3acd31c721613
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning Russian President Boris Yeltsin
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2015-0782-M-1
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
7/13/2018
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains memorandum of conversations (memcons) and memorandum of telephone conversations (telcons) between President Clinton and President Boris Yeltsin of Russia, January 23, 1993 through April 21, 1996.
<b>Scanned documents that are a part of this Mandatory Declassification Review are not associated with a Freedom of Information Act Request</b>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Records Management System
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/26457815">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
7/12/2018
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2015-0782-M-1.pdf
26457815
Boris Yeltsin
Memcon
Russia
Telcon
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/f87a1c6ee19069b9ec9171344040500c.pdf
8c5d02f4951b2b2e493fa25fb5149624
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning Russia
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2016-0140-M
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on the President's meeting with Russian President Boris Yeltsin on March 21, 1997 in Helsinki, Finland. Materials include a memorandum to the President from Samuel Berger regarding the Summit meeting with Yeltsin and a report on Pertti Torstila, Director of the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Records Management System
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/26457815">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
05/23/2017
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2016-0140-M.pdf
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
09/08/2017
Boris Yeltsin
Russia
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/b113f59334714ffcb5874a25bce76536.pdf
f7f8d91f2cdf68244ba66f42ed0cae78
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning Russia
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2016-0135-M
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on the President's meeting with Russian President Boris Yeltsin in May 1995 in Moscow. Materials include reports regarding various Russian officials.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Records Management System
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/26457815">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
05/23/2017
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2016-0135-M.pdf
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
09/08/2017
Russia
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/95afb684266edc4bb515f13d96f874a2.pdf
0759b63b3c7affbe215f5427acbe9991
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning Russia
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2016-0132-M
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on President Clinton's meeting with Russian President Boris Yeltsin in Vancouver in April 1993. Materials include a Department of Defense memorandum regarding the relationship between American and Russian armed forces and a report concerning Russian Minister of Finance Boris Fedorov.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Records Management System
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/26457815">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
05/23/2017
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2016-0132-M.pdf
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
09/08/2017
Russia
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/5c9adb82b3b04069463e9ff29c7d8e14.pdf
7301de7cd24041a402d6b8ce43a1d84d
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning Russia
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2014-1024-M
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains a memorandum of conversation between President Clinton and President Yeltsin for their meeting in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt on March 13, 1996.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Records Management System
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/26457815">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
05/23/2017
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2014-1024-M.pdf
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
09/08/2017
Boris Yeltsin
Memcon
Russia
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/2b36adcdafb579c99eb7b89aa89251c2.pdf
de69f1d505e8ef9f9b81d0c9a6c18bed
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning Russia
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2014-0953-M
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on a meeting between President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin in Halifax, Nova Scotia on June 17, 1995. Materials include a memorandum of conversation between the two Presidents.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Records Management System
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/26457815">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
05/23/2017
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2014-0953-M.pdf
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
09/08/2017
Boris Yeltsin
Memcon
Russia
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/45bc4cdbbcaf2439470d3e94722e9043.pdf
40820cb671f47d79bf0e3a3e704a5eb4
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning Russia and Belarus
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2014-0905-M
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on briefing books prepared for President Clinton's trip to Moscow, Russia and Minsk, Belarus in January 1994. Materials include a memorandum from Strobe Talbott to Secretary of State Warren Christopher regarding a meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev. Also included are Department of State cables providing background information for the President's trip.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Russia, Ukraine, Eurasian Affairs Office
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7388835">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
05/23/2017
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2014-0905-M.pdf
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
09/08/2017
Boris Yeltsin
Russia
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/1ee92fdd6a32cb6154ccc07dd2e75152.pdf
1e69d082529debcaf1b8b05dd7019df1
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning Russia
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2014-0904-M
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains a memorandum of conversation between President Clinton and President Yeltsin for their meeting in Moscow on May 10, 1995.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Records Management System
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/26457815">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
05/23/2017
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2014-0904-M.pdf
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
09/08/2017
Boris Yeltsin
Memcon
Russia
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/66f98e914dab727a92406edd85139b6f.pdf
b059dbfc5c2efbcd8968a83d45ed1bb1
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning Russian President Boris Yeltsin
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2016-0137-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
9/19/2016
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material from the briefing book for President Clinton's meeting with Russian President Boris Yeltsin on October 23, 1995 at Hyde Park, NY. Materials include biographic reports for President Yeltsin and Russian Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<b>Scanned documents that are a part of this Mandatory Declassification Review are not associated with a Freedom of Information Act Request</b>
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/2525024">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Executive Secretary
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/15/2016
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2016-0137-M
Boris Yeltsin
Russia
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/dfa1c50db09a3a042eee9dce0794f84e.pdf
1911c2577ae9676028c9448f8c3ae619
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning President's Trip to Moscow
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2014-0905-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
9/19/2016
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on President Clinton's trip to Moscow from January 12, 1994 through January 15, 1994. Materials include a memorandum regarding a telephone conversation between the Secretary of Defense to Russian Minister of Defense Grachev on January 5, 1994.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/2525024">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasian Affairs Office
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/15/2016
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
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Russia
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Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Sections 1.4 (c) and (d) and Section 3.5(c) of E.O. 13526.
�EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c
Vyacheslav Frantsevich KEBICH
BELARUS
(Phonetic: KEHbeech)
Prime Minister (since 1990)
Addressed as: Mr. Prime Minister
A former senior official of the Communist party
in Minsk under the Soviet regime, Vyacheslav
Kebich remains an unrepentant Communist who
holds most of the power in Belarus. Nevertheless,
he is sensitive about his Communist image in the
West
1.4c, 1.4d
and complains
that Western leaders do not accept him as a
reformer on a par with leaders of other countries
that had been pan of the Soviet Union. He has been
slow to move towardreformand a market economy
afld has opposed further privatization of land
ownership. Politically astute, Kebich has minimized
the potential for widespread opposition by
observing some of the rudiments of democracy,
allowing demonstrations, a parliament, and limited
freedom of the press 3.5c
Kebich has sent mixed messages about the
prospects for democratization in Belarus, although
his vision clearly entails keeping Belarus within
Russia's sphere of influenct
1.4c, 1.4d
Indeed, his statements to the pres;
suggest he yeams for the rebirthof a
"Russian-ruled Slavic empire in which Belarus
would be the most favored protectorate and in
which he would play a role like that of past
Communist Party first secretaries. Kebich has
emphasized that Belarus's only hope lies in evercloser ties to Russia, and he has strongly supported
both an economic union with other CIS members
and a CIS collective security treaty. (Kebich,
nevertheless, dislikes and distrusts Russian
President Boris Yelt'sin, whom he blames for
provoking bloodshed during the October 1992
showdown with some members of the parliament.)
Although Kebich has claimed that Western culture
and institutions threaten the Belarusian soul, he has
asked[
1.4c, 1.4d
the principles of democratic institutions. He
1.4c, 3.5c
1.4c, 1.4d, 3.5c
has said that China and South Korea are his models
because they reformed their economies whi e their
governments retained tight political control 1.4c, 3.5c
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
1
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
-7/2-V 5" XBH
(continued)
LDA M 93-16189
�1.4c, 3.5c
Kebich must contend with a division of executive
power between himself and popular Supreme
Soviet Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich. Kebich
controls the armed forces, the news media, all of the
military, and most of the security forces except the
KGB, and he has a strong power base among
hardline conservatives. He therefore has the upper
hand in a power struggle with Shushkevich, who
Machinery Production Association in Minsk, where
he eventually became director. He worked in a
vanety of Communist Party jobs in Minsk in the
early 1980s. At one point he headed the party's
heavy industry department. In late 1985 Kebich was
appointed deputy chairman of the Council of
Ministers and chairman of its State Planning
Committee (Gosplan). In 1991 he founded the
Belarusian State Academy o Management, which
he closely oversees 3.5c
:
Moscow
1.4c. 1.4d
he resents
said to
what he perceives as Western attention
Shushkevich but denied to him. The Prime
Minister's main vehicle of control in the Supreme
Soviet is the "Belarus" faction, which has been
working to sideline Shushkevich and favors
impeaching him.
3.5c
Kebich is trying to shape the ongoing
parliamentary debate on a new constitution,
including the division of powers between the
legislature and the executive. If the new
constitution establishes a strong presidency, Kebich
aspires to the post, although he appears less
concerned with holding a title than with retaining
power
3.5c
In March 1993 the media reported accusations—
as yet unconfirmed—that a commercial enterprise
owned by Kebich's wife, Elena, had received funds
originally earmarked for badly needed medical
supplies. Kebich has denied involvement in any
questionable activities. He is a colonel in the
1.4c, 1.4d
reserves
the Prime Minister claimed that he had been
assigned to the GRU while serving in the military.
He enjoysfishing.He does not speak English.
Kebich regularly visits the village where he was
bom to see his nonagenarian mother and work on
her house and garden He and his wife have at least
one daughter 3.5c
20 December 1993
Career and Personal Data
Kebich was bom on 10 June 1936 in the Minsk
region. Trained as a mechanical engineer, he began
working at the Kirov Rolling and Cutting
1.4c, 3.5c
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�
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Clinton Presidential Records
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2014-0905-M
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9/21/2015
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This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on briefing books prepared for President Clinton's trip to Moscow and Minsk, Belarus in January 1994. Materials include a report on a Russian political official.
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NSC Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasian Affairs Office
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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2014-0905-M
7388835
Declassified
Foreign Policy
Russia
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966098de939d4ebd1218510767d37165
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Section 1.4 (d) of E.O. 13526.
�Liechtenstein special prosecutor Spitzer ended his investigation on July 31, and
presented his report on August 31. Swiss press reports indicate that Spitzer found
indications of money laundering activities by prominent attorney Herbert Batliner,
including ties to a Latin American drug cartel (Joreg Reyes-Torres), Togo dictator
Eyadema, and Swiss-based precious metal dealer Marc Rich (indicted in U.S. courts
for racketeering, tax evasion and mail fraud).
In his final report, Spitzer wrote; "In all I can say that white-collar crime in the
principality of Liechtenstein is no different than in other European countries."
Spitzer's investigation triggered a defensive reaction from Liechtenstein's political
andfinancialleadership-particularly within its close-knit community of asset
managers. In June, Spitzer sent officers to seize documents from LGT Bank, owned
by the royal family, and several prominent citizens, including a MP and the brother of
the Deputy Prime Minister were arrested. The case sparked fears that major powersincluding the U.S. and France-could impose sanctions and hamstring the country's
role as a prime offshorefinancialcenter.
Prince Hans-Adam II and the Liechtenstein parliamentary president sounded
defensive notes in National Day speeches (Aug. 21) calling for increased national
unity and patriotism in response to "foreign" criticism.
When Spitzer was first appointed by Hans-Adam, the prince publicly announced that
he would dismiss any government minister who interfered with the special
prosecutor's investigation. Spitzer's complaints of stonewalling (by Liechtenstein law
enforcement and banking institutions) were ignored, however, by the prince and
government. Another Austrian, Robert Wollner, has been named to follow up on
Spitzer's findings.
Peter Ritter, Liechtenstein's Minister of Economics, is the brother of attorney and
SPAG/Trenton executive Rudolf Ritter, who according to the END is "an agent of
the Colombian drug cartel and Russian organized crime."
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET
2309
March 30,
1999
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
THROUGH:
RICHARD A. CLARKE
FROM:
WILLIAM F . WECHSLER
SUBJECT:
EO 13526 1.4d
— A New Interagency Mechanism f o r
P r i o r i t i z i n g I n t e r n a t i o n a l Crime Targets
At long l a s t , the i n t e l l i g e n c e , law enforcement and national
security communities have begun working together t o establish
integrated t a r g e t i n g p r i o r i t i e s f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l organized
crime groups t h a t threaten U.S. national security (other than
those with a primary focus on drug t r a f f i c k i n g ) . Once targeted,
we w i l l enhance i n t e l l i g e n c e c o l l e c t i o n and begin new
operational i n i t i a t i v e s to arrest the leaders and disrupt the
a c t i v i t i e s o f these crime groups. This new mechanism, a major
goal of the P r e s i d e n t s International Crime Control Strategy, i s
patterned a f t e r the successful Linear
and Linkage mechanisms that c u r r e n t l y focus on drug t r a f f i c k i n g
syndicates i n L a t i n America and East Asia, respectively.
We were successful i n our e f f o r t s t o ensure that NSC i s
represented]
I the penultimate
policymaking body on'this subject. This w i l l allow NSC t o
ensure that, where necessary, issues related t o the work
w i l l be raised t o the Deputies or Principals,
NSC w i l l not be represented on
working groups that
w i l l direct s p e c i f i c law enforcement operations.
Possible Targets: Agencies are i n the process of nominating
potential t a r g e t s f o r consideration
Thus far f i v e organizations have been proposed, each of which
currently engages i n criminal operations i n the United States:
DECRET
Reason: 1.5(b) (e) (g)
D e c l a s s i f y On:
3/30/09
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SCE
ERT
EO 13526 1 4
.d
Next Steps: By the end of A p r i l ,
complete the examination of nominated crime groups and determine
which groups should be targets f o r operations and which should
be targets f o r enhanced c o l l e c t i o n . At that point, we w i l l
inform you o f those decisions and recommend i f a Deputies or
Principals Committee meeting w i l l be necessary to review them.
Concurrences by:
Carlos Pascual, Ken Lieberthal, Susan
Braden, Erica Barks-Ruggles, Steve Ward,
Mary DeRosa
CECRET
~ U f l - o n - ' va?/o*
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�391FDE5E.FIN
Page 1 of 1
Exchange
Mail
DATE-TIME
04/21/2000 11:23:35 AM
FROM
Brzezinski, Mark F. (RUE)
CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL •
CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
04/21/2000
DECLASSIFYON
04/22/2010
SUBJECT
RE: Berezovsky [CONFIDENTIAL]
TO
Wolosky, Lee S. (TNT)
CARBON_COPY
TEXT BODY
Extremely interesting - nothing like generating legitimacy through
charitable donations. MB
Original Message
From: Wolosky,
Lee S. (TNT)
Sent: Friday, April 21, 2000 11:23 AM
To: Brzezinski,
Mark F. (RUE)
Subject: Berezovsky ^GONFIDENTIAL]
Further to
our discussion yesterday, I learned this morning that Berezovsky
approached Princeton in connection with a major gift. I am told
that the size of the proposed gift was $8 million, and that in exchange
Princeton would agree to name a center for him. Princeton ultimately
rejected the proposal.
He might also have approached Harvard.
I am finding out more.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
3/^/15" KBK
�Page 1 of 9
39928426.FIN
Exchange
Mail
DATE-TIME
07/14/2000 8:57:28 AM
FROM
Kurtz, Paul B. (TNT)
CLASSIFICATION
•SECRET
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(c)(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
07/13/2000
DECLASSIFYON
07/14/2010
SUBJECT
FW: POTUS-Putin memo {SECRET}
TO
Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)
CARBON COPY
Chen, Darren T. (INTERN/TNT)
Clarke, Richard A. (TNT)
Cressey, Roger W. (TNT)
Gordon-Hagerty, Lisa E. (TNT)
Grandrimo, Nicole M. (TNT/INTERN)
Green, Charles A. (TNT)
Hanley, Timothy P. (INTERN/TNT)
Hunker, Jeffrey A. (TNT)
Kurtz, Paul B. (TNT)
Lieberson, Donna P. (TNT)
Montgomery, Mark C. (TNT)
Mulligan, George D. (TNT)
Owens, Bernard M. Jr. (TNT/INTERN)
Pierce, Eric A. (TNT)
Robinson, Jack A. (TNT)
Rosa, Frederick M. (TNT)
Roundtree, Beverly (TNT)
Telleen, Erik K. (TNT/INTERN)
Wolosky, Lee S. (TNT)
TEXT BODY
Andrew suggest we add a point on terrorism. See language in text.
Not sure i f l have the right name for the working group.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
Original
Message
From: Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)
Sent: Thursday, July
13,2000 23:10 PM
To: @INTECON - Economic Affairs; @NONPRO - Export
Controls; Black, Steven K. (VP); Davidson, Leslie K. (VP); Hinckley,
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�39928426.FIN
Page 2 of 9
Steedman (VP); @SEE - Southeast European Affairs; @EUROPE European
Affairs; Camp, Donald A. (NESA); Kurtz, Paul B. (TNT); Wolosky,
Lee S. (TNT); @MULTILAT - Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs
Subject: POTUS-Putin
memo [SECRET]
Would appreciate comments by 10 a.m. Friday. Thanks.
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT Okinawa Bilat - Putin.doc
MEETING WITH
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN
KEY OBJECTIVES
* Review Putin's plans on economy, reengagement with IFIs, Sovietera debt.
Stress need for deeds over words. Highlight risk of losing momentum.
* Press Putin for progress on Iran nuclear and missile nonproliferation
issues,
highlighting corrosive effect on relationship. Emphasize need for
decisive
action.
* Highlight mounting questions about Putin's support for democratic
principles,
rule of law. Stress need for political solution in Chechnya,
accountability for
human rights abuses.
CONTEXT OF THE MEETING
Putin primarily wants to use Okinawa to demonstrate that he is fully
accepted as
an international statesman. He also intends to make a low-key pitch
for support
of his economic gameplan, to deflect criticism of Russian brutality in
Chechnya,
and, possibly, to rally international opposition to NMD. Putin will be
very
sensitive about whether being accorded the same reception as Yeltsin
at previous
summits and about Russia's desire for "full" membership in the G-8.
BACKGROUND
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�39928426.FIN
Page 3 of 9
Long Hot Summer. Putin's arrival in Okinawa coincides roughly with
the end of
his honeymoon period. The political situation at home is far hotter
than during
your visit to Moscow, exacerbated by Putin's relentless travel schedule
and
government disarray and divisions. Putin is preoccupied by the endgame in his
attempt to rein in Russia's governors. The bruising contest has
revealed the
limits of Putin's authority, alienated key constituencies, and sapped
momentum
from implementation of economic reforms and passage of legislation
by the Duma.
Unlike Yeltsin, who tried to play a balancing role among Russia's
fractious
elites, Putin is fighting several other battles simultaneously. The
recent
crackdown on prominent oligarchs - Gusinskiy/Media-MOST,
Alekperov/LUKOil,
Vyakhirev/Gazprom, Potanin/Oneksimbank ~ has clear political
overtones. While
thesefiguresare no angels, they also happen to own independent
media outlets
and relish their independence from the Kremlin. Other notorious
power-brokers
(Abramovich, Mamut) are escaping scrutiny from the tax police and
procuracy;
Putin's inner circle of security service veterans and the so-called
Yeltsin
"family" are reportedly pulling the strings.
The Putin administration is walking a very fine line between laying
down new,
more modem "rules of the game" and reverting to old methods of
centralization,
arbitrariness and intimidation ~ thus chilling the investment climate
and
damaging Putin's reputation abroad. While criticism of Putin's toughguy methods
and highly elastic political value system is mounting in the liberal
Russian
press, his approval rating is still over 75%.
Sound Thinking on Economics. Putin continues to say all the right
things on the
economy, but he has trimmed his sails somewhat regarding
international
assistance. Putin's chances of success depend on taking advantage of
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�39928426.FIN
Page 4 of9
the current
fragile economic upturn, galvanizing the rusted and suspicious
bureaucratic
apparatus behind his plan and selling the reforms politically. The
boldness of
his government's economic plan and the key economic themes of
Putin's recent
state of the nation address is unmistakeable.
Implementation is everything. He recognizes that Russia must create a
more
inviting business climate that protects investor and property rights,
collects
reasonable taxes, enforces a predictable rule of law, and promotes
competitiveness and growth. He also wants to rationalize public
finance at all
levels of government, to reduce opportunities for corruption and state
interference in the economy, and to establish a sustainable social
safety net.
The likely timing of a new IMF program is slipping to fall 2000. But
Putin knows
the importance of good relations with the IMF. He is likely to appeal
for more
flexibility from the Fund on structural reforms in recognition that
Russia is
setting its own economic priorities. In view of Russia's strong current
financial position and strong resistance from key creditors, Putin is
unlikely to
make panhandling for debt relief (particularly reduction) a high
priority at
Okinawa. In his speech to parliament, Putin decried Russia's reliance
on foreign
handouts and beneficence.
Putin and PM Kasyanov have also recognized the tenuousness of the
current
economic "recovery," correctly chalking it up to external factors such
as the
high price of oil and other commodities. Because of current account
inflows, the
ruble is already under strong upward pressure undermining the
domestic
competitiveness, which has been such a boon to industry since late
1998. This in
turn is creating new pressures on monetary policy, posing serious
questions about
the right exchange rate and inflation targets.
AGENDA
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�39928426.FIN
Page 5 of 9
Economic Program, IFIs, and Debt. You should applaud
announcement of a
systematic program and ask about specific priorities and plans for
implementation. You could explore what kind of political consensus
or coalitions
Putin expects to build in parliament, the regions, and the business
community.
You should express support for Russia's reengagement with the IMF
on a solid new
program, which would send a positive signal to investors. An IMF
deal would help
set the stage for another possible round of interim debt rescheduling
of
Soviet-era obligations. We also expect that the World Bank can play a
strong
supporting role on key structural reforms (e.g., reducing barter, fiscal
federalism, financial and social sector).
WTO. You should echo your big-picture message in Moscow about
the wisdom of
"going global" and accelerating efforts to join WTO. In the view of
USTR, the
key problem is the lack of high-level shepherds to coordinate the
technical and
legislative challenges. Putin's own buy-in for prioritizing WTO
accession is
fuzzy at best. He does not fully appreciate the benefits of using the
accession
process to leverage tough decisions on reforms.
Investment Climate. Most investors seem to be waiting for a track
record from
the new team. Bold, concrete moves would help, for example in the
area of tax
laws, corporate governance and shareholder rights, adoption of
international
accounting standards and enforcement of judgments. Our experts are
working
together on remaining issues in the Bilateral Investment Treaty.
Passage of a
solid money laundering law is a more distant prospect, but remains
important both
for international cooperation in the fight against cross-border financial
crime
and for improving Russia's business climate. We hope commercial
missions - Bob
Strauss, Commerce Secretary-designate Mineta - can be scheduled
later in the
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�39928426.FIN
Page 6 of 9
year. Finally, Jim Harmon is headed to Moscow at the end of July to
seek
progress on pending EXIM deals.
Bilateral Trade. If Putin raises the old hobby-horse of "market
economy" status
in anti-dumping cases, you should say that our experts have done a
good job of
clarifying the legal process and the pros and cons of switching status
and that
it's up to the GOR to decide whether to initiate a petition. The
Bilateral Steel
Dialogue, which was announced at the Moscow summit, will hold its
first session
in September and provides a good opportunity to study questions of
structural
impediments in key sectors.
Regional Issues. You should briefly review status on several fronts,
beginning
with the upcoming inaugural session of a working group on
Afghanistan agreed at
the Moscow summit. Tom Pickering and former SVR Director (and
present Deputy
Foreign Minister) Trubnikov will lead. On NATO-Russia, we want to
send a signal
that Putin's interest in closer cooperation has sparked brainstorming
on our end.
On the Balkans you lay markers about Milosevic's destabilizing
moves and our
concerns about the situation in Montenegro. Putin will remain coy
about the
Milosevic problem, but you should call for creation of diplomatic
working group
modeled on the Afghan example. This group will help us attempt to
bring our
policies more in synch and deal with the problem of Russian credits
and other
support for the FRY regime. Finally, you should ask Putin for a
readout on his
trip to China and North Korea.
Arms Control. TO BE PROVIDED.
Nonproliferation. On the Iran nuclear issue, Putin is expecting a
serious
exchange, drawing upon your July 10 conversation and an extensive
message from
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�39928426.FIN
Page 7 of 9
the Vice President spelling out the details of Iran's program and its
efforts to
obtain sensitive technology from Russia. Russian-Iranian nuclear
cooperation in
areas proscribed by the 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin commitments has
intensified and
now covers all areas of the nuclear fuel cycle.
You should emphasize that unless we make progress quickly,
cooperative programs
may be put at risk. You should highlight that the problem is causing
serious
damage to our relations and has far-reaching implications for
international and
regional security. To get around Atomic Energy Minister Adamov, a
key source of
the problem, you should suggest a special channel to discuss this
issue. As a
test case of Russian intentions, we have identified a Russian entity,
the Efremov
Institute, that is providing uranium emichment technology. We have
threatened
to impose trade penalties unless the Russians take decisive action to
shut down
this activity. You should ask for an update on their investigation.
On the Iran missile problem, we have made some progress but have
not achieved any
breakthroughs, despite the efforts of our main interlocutors in the
Russian space
ministry. We need Putin to see the practical benefits of curtailing
missile
cooperation and implementing a work plan agreed on the margins of
the Moscow
summit. We have drawn a clear linkage between the work plan
(Holum-Koptev) and
allowing the commercial space launch quota to expire at the end of the
year,
which could be worth hundreds of millions to Russia. You should tell
Putin that
dramatic action to stop a habitual offender, Glavkosmos, could allow
us to move
forward on that decision, provided that it was matched by good faith
efforts
against the lesser offenders (MAI, MATI, et al).
Democracy, Chechnya. At the Moscow summit, you made clear to
Putin that his
support for democratic principles and freedoms was central to
continued
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�39928426.FIN
Page 8 of 9
international support for Russia and its international integration. You
need to
reinforce that message, while informing Putin that the credibility gap
has
widened in the aftermath of Gusinskiy's arrest and recent moves
against
oligarchs. Putin will offer self-serving justifications for his actions,
but
does not appreciate how damaging these problems can be for his
international
reputation. Likewise, Putin is still in denial about Chechnya. You
should
emphasize the need to get the political track moving, to support return
of the
OSCE Assistance Group to the region, and to ensure proper
accountability for
human rights abuses.
Terrorism. The first meeting of the US-Russian Counter Terrorism
Working group
is scheduled for late July. You should welcome this dialogue and
request Putin's
assistance in engaging other UNSC members on the need for
additional sanctions
against the Taliban, such as an arms embargo.
People-to-people. The Russians have proposed an early experts
meeting to discuss
their proposals on expanded cooperation on social and cultural issues exchanges, status of women, fighting drug abuse, cultural
preservation. You
should embrace their initiative and offer to send a high-level team to
Moscow.
You could also note that Donna Shalala will be in Moscow July 20-21
to work on
health issues under Binational Commission auspices.
2
-CONriDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAfc
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5 (b)(d)
Declassify On: 07/05/10
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�39928426.FIN
Page 9 of 9
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�39F6BAAE.FIN
Exchange
Page 1 of 1
Mail
DATE-TIME
10/01/2000 10:49:17 AM
FROM
Wolosky, Lee S. (TNT)
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(c)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
10/01/2000
DECLASSIFYON
10/02/2010
r
SUBJECT
EO 13526 1.4d
[SECRET]
TO
Clarke, Richard A. (TNT)
CARBON COPY
Rosa, Frederick M. (TNT)
TEXT BODY
Berezovsky was in the US in late September, and was feted by US-Russia
Business Council (Bob Strauss's group) and the Council on Foreign
Relations. In New York, on the margins of UNGA, he met with U/S
Pickering.
Later this week (5-7 OCT), Harvard's Kennedy School
and the US-Russia Business Council host the 4th Annual US-Russian
Investment Symposium. Expected attendees include Mikhail
Khodorkovsky
(keynote speaker), Pyotr Aven (CEO Alfa Bank, which owns Tyumen
Oil),
German Gref (SPAG advisor) and Vladimir Evtushenkov (Chairman of
Sistema, Luzhkov's holding company).
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
s/iq/ir KSH
�
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Declassified documents concerning Russia
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2012-1021-M
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9/21/2015
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This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on Russian oligarchs, from the files of Lee Wolosky, National Security Council Transnational Threats. Materials include a memo on international organized crime groups and correspondence between President Clinton and Russian President Vladimir Putin.
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Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
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2012-1021-M
7585816
Declassified
Foreign Policy
Russia
Vladimir Putin
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/802eb45c7ea4e766bb8814f3af68c818.pdf
857378856cdf82f32da00107668a0e0b
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) of E.O. 13526.
�Subject:
CLASS:
DTG:
MSGTO:
LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT JIANG
•eecRET
ORIG:
PREC:
SSN:
TOR:
201823ZAUG 98
AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 0000
SECSTATE WASHDC
IMMEDIATE
2763
980821150149 M3432489
- C I I O R E T STATE 152763
NODIS
E.0.12958: DECL: 8/20/28
TAGS: PREL, PTER, ASEC
SUBJECT: LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT JIANG
1. GBJ CLASSIFIED BY UNDER SECRETARY THOMAS R. PICKERING FOR
REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).
2. (S) AMBASSADOR SHOULD SEEK EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY TO DELIVER
FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT
JIANG.
3. (S)BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR PRESIDENT JIANG,
FIRST, LET ME THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND CONDOLENCES FOLLOWING
THE BOMBINGS IN EAST AFRICA.
TODAY I AUTHORIZED OUR MILITARY FORCES TO STRIKE AGAINST
TERRORIST TARGETS IN AFGHANISTAN AND SUDAN. I AM WRITING,
IN THE SPIRIT OF OUR WORK TOGETHER AND OUR CONTINUING CLOSE
CONTACTS, TO TELL YOU HOW I REACHED THIS IMPORTANT
DECISION.
THE FACILITIES ATTACKED TODAY IN BOTH COUNTRIES ARE BEING
USED BY THE USAMA BIN LADIN NETWORK TO TRAIN AND EQUIP
TERRORISTS FOR WORLD WIDE OPERATIONS. WE HAVE SOLID
EVIDENCE FROM A NUMBER OF SOURCES THAT THIS GROUP WAS MOST
RECENTLY DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE BOMBINGS IN KENYA AND
TANZANIA. EXERCISING OUR RIGHT TO SELF DEFENSE UNDER
ARTICLE 51 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER.WE CARRIED OUT
STRIKES AGAINST TRAINING AND BASE CAMPS IN AFGHANISTAN AND
A FACILITY BEING USED TO PRODUCE VX NERVE GAS.
WE MADE EVERY EFFORT TO ENSURE THAT COLLATERAL DAMAGE WAS
HELD TO A MINIMUM. ALL STATES HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO
PREVENT TERRORISTS FROM USING THEIR TERRITORY TO COMMIT
ACTS OF TERRORISM. STATES WHICH FAIL TO UPHOLD THAT
OBLIGATION MUST BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE CONSEQUENCES OF
THAT FAILURE.
THE HARD TRUTH IS THAT WE ARE ENGAGED IN A CONFLICT WITH
THE FORCES OF TERRORISM, A CONFLICT WHICH WAS THRUST UPON
US, AND ONE WHICH WE WILL TAKE ALL NECESSARY STEPS TO BRING
T
OTTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
7/a>/»5 K8V1
�I URGE YOU TO JOIN US IN TAKING A STRONG PUBLIC STAND
AGAINST TERRORISM AND TERRORISTS. AS A FIRST STEP WE ASK
THAT YOU EXAMINE CAREFULLY ALL OF THE EVIDENCE WHICH I HAVE
ASKED OUR EMBASSY TO PRESENT TO YOU BEFORE YOU DECIDE YOUR
OWN POSITION. IF YOU DO SO, I AM CONFIDENT YOU WILL JOIN
US IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND ELSEWHERE IN TAKING ACTIONS TO
DEFEAT TERRORISM AND TO SPEAK OUT CLEARLY AND FIRMLY
AGAINST THOSE WHO PERPETUATE IT. WE ALSO ASK YOU TO RATIFY
ALL ELEVEN INTERNATIONAL ANTI-TERROR TREATIES.
OUR SOLIDARITY ON THESE ISSUES IS THE BEST DEFENSE AGAINST
THOSE PEOPLE AND ORGANIZATIONS THAT WOULD LAUNCH TERROR
ATTACKS AGAINST OUR PEOPLE AND INTERESTS.
AS WE DISCUSSED DURING MY VISIT TO CHINA THIS SUMMER, THIS
IS ANOTHER AREA IN WHICH WE CAN REACH A GENUINE DEGREE OF
OPERATION. I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR VIEWS ON THIS
IMPORTANT SUBJECT AND TO HAVING YOUR SUPPORT.
SINCERELY,
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
4. END TEXT.
ALBRIGHT
C I T N L B A Y POOOY
L N O I R R HTCP
�•eONPIDENTIAIf
5930
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT YELTSIN
•
B o r i s , wanted a chance t o t a l k t o you d i r e c t l y d u r i n g t h i s
momentous p e r i o d . Know the pressures must be enormous and
t h a t much i s a t stake f o r Russia. Pleased t h a t Vice P r e s i d e n t
had good c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h Chernomyrdin about t h i s on Sunday.
•
Strobe i s coming t o Moscow t h i s week. Hope you can f i n d time
t o meet w i t h him.
He w i l l have my l a t e s t t h i n k i n g .
I am sure
t h a t m e e t i n g w i t h him w i l l h e l p b o t h you and me prepare f o r
next week.
•
Wanted t o hear your thoughts about t h e c a b i n e t change and what
we can expect t o see over the coming week.
Economic C r i s i s
•
A few weeks ago, B o r i s , you t o l d me the f u t u r e o f Russian
r e f o r m c o u l d be a t s t a k e , and t h a t may be t r u e r now than ever.
•
Know you're aware o f the stakes and how i m p o r t a n t i t i s t o
move p r o m p t l y and c o n v i n c i n g l y t o address immediate f i n a n c i a l
crisis.
Even a day or two o f u n c e r t a i n t y c o u l d be dangerous.
•
I am sending one o f my t o p economics e x p e r t s b e f o r e the
meeting; i m p o r t a n t t h a t our teams work t o g e t h e r and t h a t you
and I have a f r a n k d i s c u s s i o n about economics next week.
Osama bin Ladin
•
I heard your comments about our a i r s t r i k e s l a s t week a g a i n s t
t e r r o r i s t f a c i l i t i e s i n A f g h a n i s t a n and Sudan. Wanted t o
reassure you t h a t I a c t e d because t h e evidence was
overwhelming t h a t more American l i v e s were a t s t a k e . I hope
you know me w e l l enough t o t r u s t me on t h i s .
•
A t times we have t o a c t based on what we know i s r i g h t and
d i s c u s s i t l a t e r . You and I have worked t o g e t h e r on the
problem o f t e r r o r i s m and share a common view o f t h e t h r e a t t o
our people.
I s i m p l y c o u l d not s t a n d by when Americans were
under a t t a c k .
Pause for
Yeltsin
response
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason:
1.5b,d
Declassify
PER E.O. 13526
^OO^-l^l-H
X i W m LB A Y PHOTOCOPf'^ ^
IRR
�•CONFIDENTIAL
•
B o r i s , I want t o be able t o say p u b l i c l y t h a t we d i s c u s s e d t h e
a i r s t r i k e s and t h a t you understand why I had t o a c t q u i c k l y .
We need t o g e t t h i s i s s u e behind us o r t h e press w i l l t r y t o
c a s t i t as a p o i n t o f c o n f l i c t a t t h e summit.
Summit Preparations
•
E s p e c i a l l y i m p o r t a n t r i g h t now t o show w o r l d t h a t t h i s
r e l a t i o n s h i p produces c o n c r e t e r e s u l t s .
•
We have made p r o g r e s s on two i m p o r t a n t new i n i t i a t i v e s :
s h a r i n g e a r l y warning data on b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e launches and
d i s p o s i n g o f excess p l u t o n i u m f o r n u c l e a r weapons. L e t ' s make
sure these agreements are f i n a l i z e d .
•
A l s o wanted t o r a i s e s e v e r a l i s s u e s t h a t you and I can t u r n
i n t o symbols o f c o o p e r a t i o n , r a t h e r t h a n p o i n t s o f c o n f l i c t .
Strobe w i l l be able t o go i n t o d e t a i l .
Iran
•
We've worked on I r a n and have a chance t o demonstrate we've
made r e a l p r o g r e s s .
•
Your people a r e w o r k i n g on i n v e s t i g a t i o n s o f Russian e n t i t i e s
t h a t have been c o o p e r a t i n g w i t h I r a n ' s m i s s i l e program. I f
r e s u l t s from i n v e s t i g a t i o n s were announced b e f o r e I g e t t o
Moscow, would s e t t h e r i g h t tone f o r o u r meeting.
Iraq
•
Saddam i s d e f y i n g t h e MOU he agreed t o w i t h K o f i Annan. I f we
are g o i n g t o s u s t a i n t h e c r e d i b i l i t y o f t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l ,
we need t o g e t him t o r e v e r s e course and do i t now.
I f t h a t message came d i r e c t l y from you - and we r e i n f o r c e i t
i n our p u b l i c remarks a f t e r t h e meetings - i t c o u l d show
Saddam we have a u n i t e d f r o n t .
Kosovo
Have a chance t o make a d i f f e r e n c e i n Kosovo t h a t c o u l d save
thousands o f l i v e s . Humanitarian s i t u a t i o n i s p r e c a r i o u s .
M i l o s e v i c f e e l s l i k e he can a t t a c k t h e Kosovars w i t h i m p u n i t y ,
i g n o r i n g t h e commitments he made t o you i n Moscow.
CONFIDENTIAL.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONFIDENTIAL
• Winter i s coming. There are 200,000 displaced people. Now i s
the time f o r us t o send a clear s i g n a l t h a t he cannot use
i n d i s c r i m i n a t e force against c i v i l i a n s . Strobe w i l l t a l k
about how we might do t h i s .
I f raised
•
larger
international
bailout?
Think t h i s would be wrong message t o send. Investors looking
now f o r Russian actions t o s t a b i l i z e economy. Talk of b a i l o u t
could b a c k f i r e and send signal that s i t u a t i o n i s desperate.
I f raised
•
- need
- go together
to Duma?
Need t o reassess t h i s i n l i g h t of changes i n government.
Seeing both of us together may only anger your opponents i n
Duma and complicate matters. Let's approach t h i s c a u t i o u s l y .
•CONFIDENT IAL-
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�^"""""tLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
ABCD
V
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT YELTSIN
•
B o r i s , wanted a chance t o t a l k t o you d i r e c t l y jduring t h i s
momentous p e r i o d . Know t h e pressures must be/enormous and
t h a t much i s a t stake f o r Russia. Pleased t h a t Vice P r e s i d e n t
had good c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h Chernomyrdin about t h i s on Sunday.
•
Strobe i s coming t o Moscow t h i s week. H^jpe you can f i n d time
t o meet w i t h him.
He w i l l have my l a t e s t t h i n k i n g .
•
Wanted t o hear your thoughts about t/he c a b i n e t change and what
we can expect t o see over the coming week.
Economic C r i s i s
•
A few weeks ago, B o r i s , you tefld me the f u t u r e o f Russian
r e f o r m c o u l d be a t stake, ar^d t h a t may be t r u e r now t h a n ever.
Know t h a t you're aware o f /the stakes.
I hope you and I can
have a f r a n k d i s c u s s i o n /bout economics next week.
^saiaa bin Ladin
•
I heard your comment^ about our a i r s t r i k e s l a s t week a g a i n s t
t e r r o r i s t f a c i l i t i e s i n A f g h a n i s t a n and Sudan. Wanted t o
reassure you t h a t A acted because the evidence was
overwhelming t h a t / more American l i v e s were a t s t a k e .
•
A t times we haye t o a c t based on what we know i s r i g h t and
discuss i t l a y e r .
I s i m p l y c o u l d not be i d l e .
I hope you
know me well/enough t o t r u s t me on t h i s .
Pause .for Yelzsin
•
response
B o r i s , I/Want t o be able t o say p u b l i c l y t h a t we d i s c u s s e d t h e
a i r s t r i / k e s and t h a t you understand why I had t o a c t q u i c k l y .
We need t o get t h i s i s s u e behind us or t h e press w i l l t r y t o
c a s t i t as a p o i n t o f c o n f l i c t a t the summit.
MaiW c r i t i c s jajh^want t o s e i z e on every d i f f e r e n c e between us
as/an excuse to' b l o c k our c o o p e r a t i o n . We cannot l e t t h i s
Overshadow our meeting.
E s p e c i a l l y i m p o r t a n t r i g h t now t o
show w o r l d t h a t t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p produces c o n c r e t e r e s u l t s .
-CONFIDENT I Air
Reason: 1.5b,d
D e c l a s s i f y On:
8/24/98
\
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
7/^/15"
KSH
�co riDD roim
" ' CLINTON LB A Y P O O l Y
I R R H T gP
•
I n t h a t s p i r i t , wanted t o r a i s e s e v e r a l i s s u e s t h a t you anc}/ I
can t u r n i n t o symbols o f c o o p e r a t i o n , r a t h e r / p o i n t s o f
conflict.
S t r o b e w i l l be able t o go i n t o d e t a i l .
Iraq
•
F i r s t i s I r a q . Saddam i s d e f y i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l colnmunity
d e s p i t e t h e e f f o r t s o f Primakov and K o f i Annan. /We have t o
get him t o r e v e r s e course and do i t now.
I f t h a t message came d i r e c t l y from you - and we r e i n f o r c e i t
i n our p u b l i c remarks a f t e r t h e meetings y i t c o u l d show
Saddam we have a u n i t e d f r o n t .
Iran
We've worked on I r a n and have a ch? ice t o demonstrate we've
made r e a l p r o g r e s s .
•
Your people are w o r k i n g on i n v e s t i g a t i o n s o f Russian e n t i t i e s
t h a t have been c o o p e r a t i n g w i t n I r a n ' s m i s s i l e program.
I f
r e s u l t s from i n v e s t i g a t i o n s vfere announced b e f o r e I g e t t o
Moscow, would s e t t h e r i g h t / t o n e f o r our meeting.
Kosovo
•
Have a chance t o make a d i f f e r e n c e i n Kosovo t h a t c o u l d save
thousands o f l i v e s . m i m a n i t a r i a n s i t u a t i o n i s p r e c a r i o u s .
M i l o s e v i c f e e l s l i k e / h e can a t t a c k t h e Kosovars w i t h i m p u n i t y ,
i g n o r i n g t h e commiments he made t o you i n Moscow.
•
Now i s t h e time f o r us t o send a c l e a r s i g n a l t h a t t h e a t t a c k s
must s t o p .
StrQDe w i l l t a l k about how we might do t h i s .
I f raised
- need/larger
international
bailout?
Think t h i s y b u l d be wrong message t o send. I n v e s t o r s l o o k i n g
now f o r Russian a c t i o n s t o s t a b i l i z e economy. Talk o f b a i l o u t
c o u l d b a c l / f i r e and send s i g n a l t h a t s i t u a t i o n i s d e s p e r a t e .
I f raised/-
go together
to Duma?
Need /to reassess t h i s i n l i g h t o f changes i n government.
Seeing b o t h o f us t o g e t h e r may o n l y anger your opponents i n
Duma and c o m p l i c a t e m a t t e r s . Let's approach t h i s c a u t i o u s l y .
-GeWi'lDLNUAL-
�SECRET
S£€RE?
6 i 5 3
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h French President Chirac
PARTICIPANTS:
(U)
The President
President Chirac
I n t e r p r e t e r : Marcel Bouquet
Notetakers: Bonnie C l i c k , Joel Schrader,
Liz Rogers, Cindy Lawrence and Lawrence
Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
August 8, 1998, 10:57-11:20 a.m. EDT
Oval O f f i c e
H e l l o , Jacques.
President Chirac:
The President:
Hello, B i l l .
I'm f i n e .
(U)
How are you?
(U)
(U)
President Chirac: I wanted t o say t h a t we have been traumatized
by the two a t t a c k s against Dar es Salaam and N a i r o b i , and I
wanted t o t e l l you how s o r r y I am and o f f e r a l l my f r i e n d s h i p on
t h i s occasion. (U)
The President: Thank you very much. I appreciate t h a t and a l l
the assistance you o f f e r e d . I t h i n k your embassy i n Dar es
Salaam was damaged as w e l l . (U)
President Chirac: Yes, a little bit. I don't know who these
people are. Do you have any idea? {&)
The President: Only suspicions. We have our bomb team there
now. I have been amazed a t what they can f i n d from t i n y pieces
about how the bombs were put together and sometimes t h a t o f f e r s
c l u e s . We have our suspicions, but we s t i l l don't know. (S)
SECRET
C l a s s i f i e d by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 9/4/08
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
aKfl-iw-n
7/*/15" KBH
�SECRET
President Chirac:
The President:
You don't know s t i l l ?
(S)
I t h i n k we w i l l f i n d o u t . (S)
President Chirac: I was very, very s o r r y and I wrote i t t o you.
But I t e l l you how s o r r y I was, and I f e e l i t from the bottom o f
my h e a r t about the people who were k i l l e d from the United States
and those two c o u n t r i e s . (U)
The President: Thank you. Jacques, f i r s t o f a l l , I want t o
apologize f o r d i s t u r b i n g your v a c a t i o n . I hear you are i n
M a u r i t i u s . I c a l l e d t o t a l k t o you about Kosovo. (€)
President Chirac: B i l l , do you mind going through an
i n t e r p r e t e r ? As you know, my English i s not so good.
(U)
The President: Let's go through an interpreter. I called to
talk to you about Kosovo because I am very concerned that we are
getting close to another humanitarian disaster and am worried
that we are on the verge of another Bosnia. The war in Bosnia
could not have ended in 1995 without your leadership and
determination. {&)
Here i s what I b e l i e v e has happened. I t h i n k M i l o s e v i c has
decided t o go f o r a m i l i t a r y v i c t o r y . But i n a d d i t i o n t o
f i g h t i n g the armed r e s i s t a n c e , he i s also c l e a n i n g out c i v i l i a n s
from t h e i r homes and v i l l a g e s and innocent c i v i l i a n s are being
h u r t because he b e l i e v e s , a f t e r t a l k i n g t o Primakov, t h a t there
i s not a chance o f a NATO m i l i t a r y response because he t h i n k s
they w i l l a c t o n l y w i t h a UN r e s o l u t i o n and Russia w i l l b l o c k
t h a t . (&)
EO 13526 1 4
.d
t h i n k i t would be b e t t e r w i t h a S e c u r i t y Council r e s o l u t i o n .
But here i s what I t h i n k i s the problem and why I t h i n k we need
to make i t c l e a r t h a t NATO could a c t w i t h o u t a S e c u r i t y Council
r e s o l u t i o n i f necessary and l e t them go ahead w i t h the p l a n n i n g
they have begun and i n i d e n t i f y i n g forces t h a t could be brought
i n t o p l a y t o stop a m i l i t a r y o f f e n s i v e i n Kosovo. Here i s what
I b e l i e v e : i f we t r y t o get a UN r e s o l u t i o n , we w i l l p u t
Y e l t s i n i n the worst of a l l p o s i t i o n s because i f they block i t ,
many people i n the w o r l d w i l l c r i t i c i z e Russia, and Russia needs
f r i e n d s now because the government i s i n a bad p o s i t i o n and the
economy i s hanging by a thread. I f they back i t and l e t i t go
through, I t h i n k Y e l t s i n w i l l be i n t e r r i b l e t r o u b l e a t home
w i t h the n a t i o n a l i s t s i n the Duma. I n p r i n c i p l e , I would l i k e a
r e s o l u t i o n t o o , but as a p r a c t i c a l matter we may have t o keep
GECRKT
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET
our o p t i o n s open and argue t h a t we can do t h i s i f necessary
because o f the previous a c t i o n s o f M i l o s e v i c . (S)
President Chirac: B i l l , I p e r f e c t l y understand t h a t and t h e r e
i s no need f o r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , but I would l i k e t o speak French,
EO 13526 1 4
.b
The President: Well, you know M i l o s e v i c b e l i e v e s h e ' l l never
have t o face NATO. That i s why there are 200,000 people d r i v e n
from t h e i r homes. A l l the past evidence suggests t h a t o n l y when
he i s under pressure w i l l he n e g o t i a t e .
my impression i s t h a t he would get k i l l e d i n t h e
Duma i f he voted f o r t h i s . (S)
i
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
SECRET
�o EC RET
SECRET
President Chirac:
The President:
I agree, i f we can. ( G
-)
President Chi rac :
_
The President: Here i s what I t h i n k . I t h i n k t h a t f i r s t o f
a l l , we are c l e a r l y b e t t e r o f f i f we can get i t .
My problem i s
I t h i n k i f we w a i t t o t h e p o i n t where a c l e a r humanitarian
d i s a s t e r i s on us t h i s w i n t e r , we may be too l a t e t o prevent a
mass o u t p o u r i n g o f refugees and there w i l l be a h e l l o f a l o t
more people k i l l e d by then. (ۥ)
President
Chirac:
The President: I understand your s i t u a t i o n , but what bothers me
i s t h a t by then M i l o s e v i c may have won h i s m i l i t a r y v i c t o r y by
massive e t h n i c c l e a n s i n g . (€)
President Chirac:
The President: What I want t o do i s avoid the s t i c k , b u t i f he
t h i n k s we've got i t , he may go back t o n e g o t i a t i o n s . I t i s the
p o s s i b i l i t y o f NATO a c t i o n w i t h o u t Russian approval t h a t i s a
CECRET
SCCRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET
5
deterrent.
I s t h a t what you are you saying, t h a t we can leave
i t unstated?
I would l i k e the p l a n n i n g t o go forward. (C)
President Chirac:
A b s o l u t e l y . (€)
The President: Then we need t o t e l l Y e l t s i n we do n o t want t h i s
to come t o pass. We don't want t o have t o ask f o r a UN
resolution.
I t w i l l give him more i n c e n t i v e t o t r y t o s e t t l e
t h i s t h i n g . (€)
President Chirac:
Yes. (€)
The President: Believe me he does not want us t o ask f o r a
resolution.
I f there i s a r e s o l u t i o n , Y e l t s i n w i l l be weakened
at home no matter what he does. (€)
President Chirac:
The President: He s a i d he would p r e f e r t h e UN, b u t he d i d n ' t
want t o p u t Y e l t s i n i n t o an impossible p o s i t i o n , and i n a
p o s i t i o n where i t looks l i k e Russia has a veto over a n y t h i n g
NATO wants t o do. I t h i n k we want t o avoid t h i s . Kohl s a i d he
wanted t o t a l k t o you again and have Sandy Berger meet w i t h
B i t t e r l i c h and check around and t a l k again i n a couple o f days.
(•
€)
President Chirac:
The President:
I agree w i t h t h a t .
(€)
President Chirac: At t h e same time, b r i n g a l l p o s s i b l e pressure
to bear i n order t o f i n d a s9lu.tJ.s.n^hro-U.a.h_th.e_QQnta.c.t_G.r.QiiD
which should remain u n i t e d .
J
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET
DECRET
EO 13526 1 4
.b
The President: I f t h a t i s your p o s i t i o n , I t h i n k i t i s
important t h a t our p u b l i c p o s i t i o n i s t h a t we should t r y t o be
s i l e n t on the matter and not make a b i g issue out o f the UN
mandate one way or the other. Otherwise we w i l l look t o t a l l y
h y p o c r i t i c a l . There i s a d i s a s t e r and then a veto and then we
have t o a c t . I t h i n k we have t o keep the p u b l i c p o s i t i o n t h a t
we hope we won't have t o a c t , we b e l i e v e there ought t o be a UN
r e s o l u t i o n , but not close the door. (€)
President Chirac: Yes, I agree completely w i t h you.
close the door. No polemics on t h a t . (e)
Don't
The President: On the other hand, we w i l l be q u i e t t o o . We
won't say o f course we don't need i t . We w i l l say i t would be a
good t h i n g t o have i t . (ۥ)
President Chirac: That i s good.
and a f f e c t i o n t o H i l l a r y . (U)
The President:
I will.
Please say a l l my best
(U)
President Chirac: Thank you very much, B i l l .
The President:
Thank you.
—
regards
Goodbye.
(U)
End o f Conversation --
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Goodbye.
(U)
�5961
/CONriDEl'TTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH
INGTON
September 2 8 ,
?
g8ShP28PMi2:30
1998
INFORMATION
'H^^R^llDENT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGE
SUBJECT:
L e t t e r from Chinese P r e s i d e n t J i a n g Zemin on £j£)<^
Afghanistan/Sudan M i l i t a r y A c t i o n s
/use CocJ
J i a n g Zemin, i n h i s r e p l y t o your l e t t e r e x p l a i n i n g our
r a t i o n a l e f o r t a k i n g m i l i t a r y a c t i o n against t a r g e t s i n
A f g h a n i s t a n and Sudan, r e i t e r a t e d Chinese condemnation o f t h e
t e r r o r i s t a t t a c k s a g a i n s t our Embassies i n Kenya and Tanzania,
c a l l e d f o r enhanced i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n a g a i n s t t e r r o r i s m ,
and s a i d u n i l a t e r a l a c t i o n should be avoided.
The most i n t e r e s t i n g element i n Jiang's l e t t e r i s a c a l l f o r
" i n c r e a s e d c o n s u l t a t i o n and c o o p e r a t i o n " between China and t h e
U n i t e d S t a t e s a g a i n s t t e r r o r i s m . We have been u r g i n g China t o
i n c r e a s e c o u n t e r t e r r o r i s m c o o p e r a t i v e e f f o r t s f o r t h e l a s t year
w i t h o u t much response. We are f o l l o w i n g up on t h i s h i n t by
riang t h a t China may be ready t o take up our s u g g e s t i o n .
Attachments
Tab A August 26 L e t t e r from Jiang Zemin
Tab B Your August 20 L e t t e r t o Jiang Zemin
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING
COUriDENTIAL
Reason:
1.5(b)(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On:
9./-10/0i
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
cc:
Vice President
Chief of S t a f f
�1
5961
COITFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH
INGTON
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGER
SUBJECT:
L e t t e r from Chinese P r e s i d e n t / j i a n g Zemin on
Afghanistan/Sudan m i l i t a r y A c t i o n s
J i a n g Zemin, i n h i s r e p l y t o your l e t t e r e x p l a i n i n g o u r
rationale f o rtaking m i l i t a r y action/against targets i n
A f g h a n i s t a n and Sudan, r e i t e r a t e d Chinese condemnation o f t h e
t e r r o r i s t a t t a c k s a g a i n s t our Erribassies i n Kenya and Tanzania,
c a l l e d f o r enhanced I n t e r n a t i o n a / c o o p e r a t i o n a g a i n s t t e r r o r i s m ,
and s a i d u n i l a t e r a l a c t i o n should be avoided nrr f n r m - j n n n a i b l g
• (att-achmont a t Tab ~A)
The most i n t e r e s t i n g elemei/h i n Jiang's l e t t e r i s a c a l l f o r
" i n c r e a s e d c o n s u l t a t i o n and c o o p e r a t i o n " between China and t h e
U n i t e d S t a t e s a g a i n s t t e r r o r i s m . We have been u r g i n g China t o
i n c r e a s e c o u n t e r t e r r o r / s m c o o p e r a t i v e e f f o r t s f o r t h e l a s t year
w i t h o u t much response/ We are f o l l o w i n g up on t h i s h i n t by
J i a n g t h a t China may be ready t o take up our s u g g e s t i o n .
Attachment S
Tab A August/26 L e t t e r from Jiang Zemin
Tab B Your August 20 L e t t e r t o Jiang Zemin
DECLASSIFSEE)
PER E.O. 13526
l/X\/rt
GONFIDENTIAL
KehTreth L i ibortherir
(d
1.5(b:
c i d s s l f l e d by:~
Reason:
D e c l a s s i f y On:
9/10//08
K6V1
cc: Vice P r e s i d e n t
Chief o f S t a f f
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�
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<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
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This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
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Clinton Presidential Records
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Declassified documents concerning Afghanistan and Sudan
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2009-1291-M
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9/21/2015
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This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on documents regarding military operations against Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998. Included is head of state correspondence between President Clinton and various world leaders, including Russian President Boris Yeltsin, Chinese President Jiang Zemin, and French President Jacques Chirac.
Creator
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<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7388808">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
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Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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9/2/2015
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2009-1291-M
7388808
Afghanistan
China
Declassified
Foreign Policy
France
Russia
Sudan
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/d20dd3e8a48b7e084accd4a5f24741de.pdf
77b43e1ec9e6629d26c4da7299817ed3
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full.
�Page 1 of 3
37.80F3B6.FIN
Exchange
Mail
DATE-TIME
6/12/99 6:04:35 PM
FROM
Kaufman, Stuart J.
CLASSIFICATION
•SECRET
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(b)(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
06/12/1999
DECLASSIFYON
06/12/2009
SUBJECT
Memos for POTUS call [GECRET]
TO
Pascual, Carlos E.
CARBONCOPY
TEXT BODY
Drafts attached and saved in G:/Documents, under package no. 4523.
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT 4523srb boris call.doc
June 12, 1999
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER
THROUGH: CARLOS PASCUAL
FROM: STUART KAUFMAN
SUBJECT: Memo and Points for Phone Call with Yeltsin
Attached are a memo and points for the President's phone call to
Russian
President Yeltsin on Sunday morning, June 13.
Concurrence by: Schulte, Fuerth
RECOMMENDATION
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
�3780F3B6.FIN
Page 2 of 3
That you sign the memo to the President attached at Tab I.
Attachment
Tab I Memo to the President on Phone Call with Yeltsin
Tab A Points to be Made in Phone Call with Yeltsin
1
-SECRET
•SECRET
9ECRET'4523
SECRET"
Classified by: Pascual
Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify On: 6/12/09
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT 4523presmemo boris call.doc
TELEPHONE CALL WITH
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN
DATE: June 13, 1999
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 9:00 a.m.
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
I. PURPOSE
To discuss with President Yeltsin a formula for Russian participation
in KFOR.
II. BACKGROUND
Our talks with the Russians in the last day or two have revealed a
great deal of
disarray in Moscow, forcing us to spend much of our time sorting
through their
mixed signals. Prime Minister Stepashin reaffirmed to Vice President
Gore that
Yeltsin did not authorize the Saturday morning deployment of
Russian troops to
Kosovo, but Kremlin Deputy Chief of Staff Prikhodko implied to the
press that
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 3 of 3
37S0F3B6.FIN
Yeltsin had. The truth may be that Yeltsin ordered preparations for the
movement
in a way that implied authority to go ahead but left him with
"plausible
deniability".
Meanwhile, discussions continue on two tracks. Track I in Macedonia
is aimed at
reaching agreement on an interim arrangement, based on the SFOR
model and under
US command, for troops already in place or about to arrive. Track II,
led on our
side by Strobe in Moscow, is to work out the overall arrangements for
Russia's
long-term participation in SFOR. Our preference is to keep the two
tracks
separate and resolve the immediate issue (Track I) quickly. The
Russians,
fearing that quick agreement on Track I would be portrayed as
capitulation to
NATO, have linked the two tracks, and are using our desire for quick
agreement as
leverage for achieving a better deal on the long-term structure (Track
IDAttachment
Tab A Points to Make in Call to Yeltsin
-SECRET•SECRET
•SECRET 4523
SECRETClassified by: Pascual
Reason: 1.5(bXd)
Declassify On: 6/12/09
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 1 of 10
3781A14C.FIN
Exchange
Mai
DATE-TIME
6/12/99 9:46:44 PM
FROM
Chastain, George M.
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(b)(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
06/12/1999
DECLASSIFYON
06/12/2009
SUBJECT
FW: URGENT ~ Yeltsin Call Package ESECRETf
TO
Davies, Glyn T.
Dejban, Donna D.
Hachigian, Nina L.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Millison, Cathy L.
Mitchell, Rebecca (Julie) J.
Moretz, Sheila K.
Rice, Edward A.
Rudman, Mara E.
Sargeant, Stephen T.
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.
Storey, Sharon V.
Sutphen, Mona K.
Bamett, Cheryl E.
Elkind, Jonathan H.
Faranda, Regina D.
Kaufman, Stuart J.
Pascual, Carlos E.
Russ, Judith P.
Segal, Jack D.
Silva, Mary Ann T.
Tedstrom, John E.
Weiss, Andrew S.
Bartlett, L. June
Davies, Glyn T.
Dejban, Donna D.
Hilliard, Brenda I .
Jacobson, Tracey A.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kerrick, Donald L.
Millison, Cathy L.
Powell, Elliott
Rice, Edward A.
Sargeant, Stephen T.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 2 of 10
3781A14C.FIN
Brody, Richard J.
Saunders, Richard M.
Davidson, Leslie K.
Schulte, Gregory L.
CARBON COPY
TEXT BODY
Bayley, Douglas C.
Bresnahan, Gary E.
Broadwick, Bonnie .
Campanella, Anthony
Chastain, George M.
Cheramie, Don E.
Crowder, Stevan D.
Crowell, Thomas R.
Ehrendreich, Joel
Erdahl, Douglas M.
Ford, Robert G.
Fuchs, Joachim D.
Glick, Bonnie L.
Jansen, Christian P.
Jarosinski, Frank J.
Laskowski, Gregory J.
Manning, Michael T.
McClellan, Christina L.
McGee, Jenny A.
Merletti, Roger D.
Murphy, Miles R.
Payne, Raymond H.
Porterfield Patrick C.
Powell, Elliott
Rickard, Robin S.
Rogers, Elizabeth B.
Schrader, Joel M.
Sibley, Matthew W.
Sigler, Ralph H.
Smith, James A.
Tarver, J. Sean
Per Mr. Steinberg and Mr. Slocombe, Mr. Pascual made changes in
the
"strobe note" and the "tps" documents. The changes are now reflected
in the attached documents. Also per Mr. Pascual, the Situation Room
will follow the below instructions, using these altered documents.
Original
Message
From: Pascual, Carlos E.
Sent: Saturday, June 12,
1999 6:58 PM
To: @WHSR - WH Situation Room
D
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�3781A14C.FIN
Page 3 of 10
Cc: @EXECSEC - Executive
Secretary; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor; @RUSSIA Russia/Ukraine;
Brody, Richard J.; Saunders, Richard M.; Davidson, Leslie K.;
Schulte,
Gregory L.
Subject: URGENT -- Yeltsin Call Package [SECRET]
Importance: High
1.
SITUATION ROOM -- please secure fax this note and the
attachments
to Sandy, Jim and Leon Fuerth. Please page Greg Schulte and read
them to him if he is not in the office.
2. Sandy, Jim, Leon,
Greg - attached is the Yeltsin call package and a note to Strobe.
Would appreciate your sending any comments to the Sit Room. Please
call if you have questions. If you concur, I recommend that the
Sit Room secure fax to Strobe the attached not to him from Sandy
and the points (and NOT the memos).
3. SITUATION ROOM -- assuming
Sandy et al concur, please fax to Strobe the note from Sandy and
the points once you get comments. Strobe will need these as early
in his day as possible. You will see that we have asked Strobe to
send back comments. If you get these, please insert in "track changes"
mode. If Strobe sends a complete re-write, could you please type
this into the system. Please call me once you get his comments.
TRANSLATEDATTACHMENT 4 2 3
5
s r b b o r i s
c a l
l.
d o c
June 12, 1999
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER
THROUGH: CARLOS PASCUAL
FROM: STUART KAUFMAN
SUBJECT: Memo and Points for Phone Call with Yeltsin
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�3781A14C.FIN
Page 4 of 10
Attached are a memo and points for the President's phone call to
Russian
President Yeltsin on Sunday morning, June 13.
Concurrence by: Schulte, Fuerth (they have not yet cleared)
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memo to the President attached at Tab I.
Attachment
Tab I Memo to the President on Phone Call with Yeltsin
Tab A Points to be Made in Phone Call with Yeltsin
1
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET 4523
•SECRET.
Classified by: Pascual
Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify On: 6/12/09
TRANSLATEDATTACHMENT 4523presmemo boris call.doc
TELEPHONE CALL WITH
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN
DATE: June 13, 1999
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 9:00 a.m.
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
I. PURPOSE
To discuss with President Yeltsin a formula for Russian participation
in KFOR.
II. BACKGROUND
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 5 of 10
5781A14C.FIN
Our talks with the Russians in the last day or two have revealed
tremendous
disarray in Moscow, forcing us to spend much of our time sorting
through their
mixed signals. Prime Minister Stepashin reaffirmed to Vice President
Gore that
Yeltsin did not authorize the Saturday morning deployment of
Russian troops to
Kosovo, but Kremlin Deputy Chief of Staff Prikhodko implied to the
press that
Yeltsin had. The truth may be that Yeltsin ordered preparations for the
movement
in a way that implied authority to go ahead but left him with
"plausible
deniability".
Meanwhile, discussions continue on two tracks. Track I in Macedonia
is aimed at
reaching agreement on an interim arrangement, based on the SFOR
model and under
US command, for troops already in place or about to arrive. Track II,
led on our
side by Strobe in Moscow, is to work out the overall arrangements for
Russia's
long-term participation in SFOR. Our preference is to keep the two
tracks
separate and resolve the immediate issue (Track I) quickly. The
Russians,
fearing that quick agreement on Track I would be portrayed as
capitulation to
NATO, may link the two tracks together. That, ironically, is Russia's
worst
option since it would create facts on the ground that make Russian
participation
all the harder to work out.
Attachment
Tab A Points to Make in Call to Yeltsin
2
OECRET
SECRET
SCCRET 4523
•SECRET
Classified by: Pascual
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�3781A14C.FIN
Page 6 of 10
Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify On: 6/12/09
TRANSLATEDATTACHMENT 4523tps.doc
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN
* Let me first congratulate you on Russia's national day yesterday.
Despite the
difficulties we face now, it is important to remember how far Russia
has come in
seven years and how far we have come in our relationship.
* That very progress makes the current situation in Kosovo all the
more serious.
It would be tragic to jeopardize all we've accomplished bilaterally and
in
bringing peace to Kosovo.
* Have to say that I'm disappointed in so many mixed signals these
past days:
Russia commits not to deploy, then deploys; orders withdrawal then
doesn't; says
it's a mistake, then claims it was authorized.
* I have no interest in blaming anyone, Boris, but these conflicting
signals are
hurting Russia's image, and it is making people question the value of
our work
together.
* But I also said that I would always offer solutions along with citing
problems,
and that is what I want to focus on now.
* Here's my goal: to achieve a solution that is satisfactory to Russia,
allows
it to participate in the international security force, and is consistent
with
unity of command and effectiveness, on which we have all agreed.
* Our teams worked day and night and have come up with a two-track
approach. The
ideas are sound, and I want to authorize our people to finalize the
details and
start to implement.
Track 1
* First, let's agree on the short-term proposal our generals have
worked out to
start to deploy forces together tomorrow.
* This is an interim approach based on what you and I worked out for
Bosnia. We
know it works; it's the fastest way to get Russian and American troops
on the
ground together now.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 7 of 10
3781A14C.FIN
* Second, let's give our people instructions to find a solution as fast as
possible that meets Russia's concerns and ours for an effective
security force
under unified command.
Version A - Offer Neutral and U.S.-Russian Sector
* Strobe and his team have put two options on the table, and your
ministers have
the details.
* One is to create a neutral sector with a Finn commander and a
Russian deputy
commander. When you study this, you'll see we listened carefully to
your
concerns about reporting to NATO.
* I also think that there is tremendous merit in the U.S. and Russia
working
together. So I'm ready to create, Boris, a joint U.S.-Russian sector.
* We would share a sector, and each of our generals would have
command of his
national forces within the sector. Each of our generals would report to
the
commander of KFOR and to our national authorities.
* We would work together as long as we can agree. If we don't agree
and cannot
work it out, the operation would not be paralyzed, and we'll work out
differences
like we have in Bosnia.
* But you and I will work together to make sure disputes do not come
up.
Version B - Offer U.S.-Russian Sector
* In this spirit, Boris, I want to suggest a joint U.S.-Russian sector
where we
would work together.
* We would share a sector, and each of our generals would have
command of his
national forces within the sector. Each of our generals would report to
the
commander of KFOR and to our national authorities.
* We would work together as long as we can agree. If we don't agree
and cannot
work it out, the operation would not be paralyzed, and we'll work out
differences
like we have in Bosnia.
* But you and I will work together to make sure disputes do not come
up.
Closing
* Boris, I hope at a minimum we can agree now to go ahead with the
first track.
Time is precious, and we need to show again that our troops can work
side-by-side
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�3781A14C.FIN
Page 8 of 10
to protect the peace.
* The second track is more complicated, but let's instruct our generals
to agree
on the details on the basis of our conversation.
* If we can do these things, not only can we make the peace
settlement work in
Kosovo, we will have the basis for a real celebration when we meet in
Cologne.
If Boris links Track 1 to agreement on Track 2
* There is a real urgency about Track 1 because we cannot allow a
security vacuum
to form that would jeopardize the peace.
* We know the interim model works. We're making it work in Bosnia.
So let's use
it.
* You also have my commitment to move as quickly as Russia can on
Track 2. My
bottom lines are effectiveness and unity of command and control.
* But let's not link these two tracks together, especially when we can
move
together now and get facts on the ground that show that we can work
effectively
side-by-side.
If Boris suggest a one-week deadline on Track 2
* I am committed to move as quickly as Russia as long as we stay
focused on an
effective force with unified command and control.
2
CONTIDDNTIAfe
jCOMFIDEMTMcfc
COlitHDEUTIAL 4523
JTIAL
Reason: 1.5b,d
Declassify On: 6/12/99
JCQNFIDD
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT 4533
s t r o b
e note.doc
FAX FOR STROBE TALBOTT FROM JIM STEINBERG
Strobe -
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 9 of 10
3781A14C.FIN
I am sending you a very preliminary draft of talking points for the
President's
call with Yeltsin. As you discussed with Carlos, I think you should
use these
points to preview with Minister Ivanov what the Russians might
accept on Track 1
and Track 2. Sandy still has not seen the points, so they may
obviously change.
On Track 1,1 know your priorities are to get commitment to move
ahead with an
SFOR model and to delink Track 1 from Track 2. That sounds like the
right
approach.
On Track 2, we have given you two models to work with: a neutral
zone and a
U.S.-Russia sector. As you requested, you have authority to explore
both
options. We'll need your advice on how to best play this issue in the
President's call-whether to propose version A or B in the points, or
simply
another variant. While we want to move the agenda forward, we also
want to avoid
overloading the circuits with Yeltsin.
On process, what would be most helpful is if your team could send the
Situation
Room after your meeting with Ivanov either pen and ink changes or a
revised
draft. If that does not work, call Carlos or the Situation Room and
give edits
or suggestions directly to them. If we need a wholesale rethink after
your
meetings, then we should talk. In any case, your report prior to the call
would
be most helpful. (The call is at 9:00 EST; 8:30 pre-brief.)
Regards,
Jim
1
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 10 of 10
3781A14C.FIN
SECRET'
SEeRET
LINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 1 of 4
37820922.FIN
Exchange
Mail
DATE-TIME
6/13/99 1:48:14 PM
FROM
Cheramie, Don E.
CLASSIFICATION
COI'tFIDEHTIAfc'
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(a)(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
06/13/1999
DECLASSIFYON
06/13/2009
SUBJECT
Yeltsin Talking Points [CQETriDENTIAL]
TO
Pascual, Carlos E.
CARBON COPY
Bayley, Douglas C.
Bresnahan, Gary E.
Broadwick, Bonnie .
Campanella, Anthony
Chastain, George M.
Cheramie, Don E.
Crowder, Stevan D.
Crowell, Thomas R.
Ehrendreich, Joel
Erdahl, Douglas M.
Ford, Robert G.
Fuchs, Joachim D.
Glick, Bonnie L.
Jansen, Christian P.
Jarosinski, Frank J.
Laskowski, Gregory J.
Manning, Michael T.
McClellan, Christina L.
McGee, Jenny A.
Merletti, Roger D.
Murphy, Miles R.
Payne, Raymond H.
Porterfield Patrick C.
Powell, Elliott
Rickard, Robin S.
Rogers, Elizabeth B.
Schrader, Joel M.
Sibley, Matthew W.
Sigler, Ralph H.
Smith, James A.
Tarver, J. Sean
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�37820922.FIN
Page 2 of 4
TEXTBODY
p
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT
TPnotes.doc
e r
y
o u r
request...
TALKING POINTS FOR CALL TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN
* Let me first congratulate you on Russia's national day yesterday.
Russia has
come a long way in seven years under your leadership ~ and so has
our
relationship, including through some tough times. We can both be
very proud of
that, and I'm proud to work with you.
* I believe we are at another important and promising moment in our
partnership.
Our hard work together brought an end to the conflict in Kosovo. We
kept our
disagreements, serious as they were, from ruining everything, and we
made the
most of our cooperation and friendship.
* We must now work equally hard to ensure a lasting and just peace
and that our
militaries work well together on the ground.
* As Vice President Gore made clear to Prime Minister Stepashin
yesterday, we
have had some difficult moments in the last two days in our efforts to
coordinate
our roles in Kosovo.
* We need to take charge of the situation - both for the sake of our
goals in
Kosovo and so that we can show the world that we are working
together.
* There is one matter I need to raise. We need to resolve the issue of
the use
of the airport at Pristina. I hope you will give orders to General
Zvarzin
(zuh-VAR-ZIN) to work this out today with General Jackson, the
KFOR Commander on
the basis of unity of command.
We expect Yeltsin will respond with the following points:
This situation arose because, until now, we didn't have an agreement
on the
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 3 of 4
37820922.FIN
modalities and conditions for the equitable participation of Russia in
the
peacekeeping operation.
As President, we should give instructions to find a solution as soon as
possible
to the problem - and thus, to create the necessary conditions for the
closest
possible cooperation of our forces in the interest of peace in Kosovo.
We are counting on you to take account of the interests of the Russian
Federation in this situation. This will allow us to erase any
misunderstanding
and to make sure the implementation of the peace is in strict
accordance with the
UN Security Council resolution.
* First, I understand we've agreed on the short-term proposal our
generals have
worked out to start to deploy forces together as soon as possible.
* This is an interim approach based on what you and I worked out for
Bosnia. We
know it works; it's the fastest way to get Russian and American troops
on the
ground together now.
* Second, Madeleine Albright and Strobe Talbott have been working
with Foreign
Minister Ivanov on what I regard as some promising ideas on how we
should use the
next week to solve important, even urgent, outstanding challenges.
* These ideas and proposals, if promptly developed, could guarantee
us a good
meeting in Cologne one week from today.
* While Madeleine and Minister Ivanov should intensify their efforts,
I think it
would be useful to give some instructions to our Ministers of Defense
as well.
* Let's have them meet urgently, in the coming days, to talk things
over and make
some concrete recommendations to us on how Russia and the U.S. can
coordinate and
cooperate in Kosovo and how we can resolve other organizational
issues.
* With the right guidance from us, Boris, I think we can resolve these
problems which matter a lot to both of us - by the time we meet.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 4 of 4
37820922.FIN
* At Cologne, I suggest we also issue a strong public statement on
next steps on
arms control and announce that our binational commission will
resume its work
under Vice President Gore and PM Stepashin in July.
If Yeltsin pushes for a Russian sector/commander:
* Boris, I think I understand your needs and interests. I'm going to do
everything I can - and will make sure that Madeleine and Secretary
Cohen do, too
- and go as far as we possibly can in accommodating you.
* Strobe's team that was just in Moscow made a number of creative
proposals on
how we can ensure that Russia has an area of responsibility in Kosovo
which is
equitable - and that is worthy of Russia's role and interests.
* At the same time, we must be careful about three things:
1) The operation must be militarily effective;
2) We must ensure unity of command;
3) We must not allow either the perception or the reality of a partition
of
Kosovo.
* We need to ask our Defense Ministers to develop these ideas this
week and
present us with solutions.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 1 of 3
R78261F3.FIN
Exchange Mail
DATE-TIME
6/13/99 8:07:13 PM
FROM
Weiss, Andrew S.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
CLASSIFICATION
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
06/13/1999
DECLASSIFYON
06/13/2009
SUBJECT
Yeltsin TPs ^CONriDCNTIAL]
TO
Pascual, Carlos E.
CARBON_COPY
TEXT BODY
I need to addfireproofersfromtoday's call.
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT
J
u n e
14 B N Y call tps.doc
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN
* Pleased to talk again after our good conversation yesterday. Our
hard work
together brought an end to conflict in Kosovo. We made the most of
our
cooperation and friendship and kept our disagreementsfromspoiling
everything.
* We must nOw work equally hard to ensure a lasting and just peace
and that our
militaries work well together on the ground in Kosovo. Know that's
important to
both of us.
* We agreed yesterday that we'd talk again today to review today's
discussion
between our generals inside Kosovo on how they're going to
cooperate. Also want
to address two other issues.
* We contacted all necessary people on our side, glad their meeting
was
productive and resolved situation at the airport in Pristina. Minister
Ivanov
told us instructions had been given to Zvarzin.
* [If the situation at the airport is resolved] Glad our people got this
CLINTON LIBRARY
"CP
O OY
�R78261F3.FIN
Page 2 of 3
issue
fixed. Just like with the UN Security Council resolution, we've taken
charge of
the issue and broken an impasse.
* [If the situation at the airport is not resolved] Despite what we asked
for
yesterday, problem at airport still isn't fixed. Boris, this is a really
serious
problem. We need to instruct our people to get this done today.
* Want to come back to the other part of our conversation yesterday.
You made
proposal for us to meet. I made a proposal that we need to resolve the
shorter-term issue of cooperation with the Russian troops already
inside Kosovo.
* I would like us to say yes to both proposals. On the Russian
contingent
already in Kosovo, key step now is to fold these forces into KFOR
under unified
command.
* Foreign Minister Ivanov has told us that this approach is acceptable
and that
appropriate orders have been issued. We need to instruct key military
officials
to move forward and implement these proposals.
* Regarding our meeting, I'm looking forward to seeing you on
Sunday in Cologne,
or outskirts of Cologne. For that meeting to be a success, I think it
would be
useful to give some instructions to our Ministers of Defense.
* Let's have them meet in next day or two to talk things over and
make some
concrete recommendations to us on how we can cooperate together in
Kosovo over
the longer-term.
* Our foreign ministers would follow-up. By the time of our meeting
in Cologne,
confident that we will have a well defined proposal to review.
2
GONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDCNTIAL
CONriDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 3 of 3
R78261F3.FrN
Reason: 1.5b,d
Declassify On: 6/12/99
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 1 of 3
37826A8D.FIN
Exchange
Mail
DATE-TIME
6/13/99 8:43:56 PM
FROM
Cheramie, Don E.
CLASSIFICATION
CQNEIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(a)(b)(d)
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
DATECLASSIFIEDON
06/13/1999
DECLASSIFYON
06/13/2009
SUBJECT
TALKING POINTS FOR POTUS-YELTSIN CALL (6/13)
[CONriDCMTLtt]
TO
Weiss, Andrew S.
CARBON_COPY
TEXT BODY
TALKING POINTS FOR CALL TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN
* Let me first congratulate
you on Russia's national day yesterday. Russia has come a long way
in seven years under your leadership ~ and so has our relationship,
including through some tough times. We can both be very proud of
that, and I'm proud to work with you.
* I believe we are at another
important and promising moment in our partnership. Our hard work
together brought an end to the conflict in Kosovo. We kept our
disagreements,
serious as they were, from ruining everything, and we made the most
of our cooperation and friendship.
* We must now work equally
hard to ensure a lasting and just peace and that our militaries work
well together on the ground.
* As Vice President Gore made clear
to Prime Minister Stepashin yesterday, we have had some difficult
moments in the last two days in our efforts to coordinate our roles
in Kosovo.
* We need to take charge of the situation - both for
the sake of our goals in Kosovo and so that we can show the world
that we are working together.
* There is one matter I need to
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 2 of3
37826A8D.FIN
raise. We need to resolve the issue of the use of the airport at
Pristina. I hope you will give orders to General Zvarzin (zuh-VAR-ZIN)
to work this out today with General Jackson, the KFOR Commander on
the basis of unity of command.
We expect Yeltsin will respond
with the following points:
This situation arose because, until
now, we didn't have an agreement on the modalities and conditions
for the equitable participation of Russia in the peacekeeping operation.
As
President, we should give instructions to find a solution as soon
as possible to the problem - and thus, to create the necessary conditions
for the closest possible cooperation of our forces in the interest
of peace in Kosovo.
We are counting on you to take account of
the interests of the Russian Federation in this situation. This
will allow us to erase any misunderstanding and to make sure the
implementation of the peace is in strict accordance with the UN Security
Council resolution.
* First, I understand we've agreed on the
short-term proposal our generals have worked out to start to deploy
forces together as soon as possible.
* This is an interim approach
based on what you and I worked out for Bosnia. We know it works;
it's the fastest way to get Russian and American troops on the ground
together now.
* Second, Madeleine Albright and Strobe Talbott have
been working with Foreign Minister Ivanov on what I regard as some
promising ideas on how we should use the next week to solve important,
even urgent, outstanding challenges.
* These ideas and proposals,
if promptly developed, could guarantee us a good meeting in Cologne
one week from today.
* While Madeleine and Minister Ivanov should
intensify their efforts, I think it would be useful to give some
instructions to our Ministers of Defense as well.
* Let's have
them meet urgently, in the coming days, to talk things over and make
some concrete recommendations to us on how Russia and the U.S. can
coordinate and cooperate in Kosovo and how we can resolve other
organizational
issues.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�37826A8D.FIN
Page 3 of3
* With the right guidance from us, Boris, I think we can
resolve these problems - which matter a lot to both of us - by the
time we meet.
* At Cologne, I suggest we also issue a strong public
statement on next steps on arms control and announce that our binational
commission will resume its work under Vice President Gore and PM
Stepashin in July.
If Yeltsin pushes for a Russian sector/commander:
* Boris,
I think I understand your needs and interests. I'm going to do everything
I can - and will make sure that Madeleine and Secretary Cohen do,
too - and go as far as we possibly can in accommodating you.
* Strobe's
team that was just in Moscow made a number of creative proposals
on how we can ensure that Russia has an area of responsibility in
Kosovo which is equitable - and that is worthy of Russia's role and
interests.
* At the same time, we must be careful about three
things:
1) The operation must be militarily effective;
2)
We must ensure unity of command;
3) We must not allow either the
perception or the reality of a partition of Kosovo.
* We need
to ask our Defense Ministers to develop these ideas this week and
present us with solutions.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 1 of 4
3-7827747.FIN
Exchange
Mail
DATE-TIME
6/13/99 9:38:13 PM
FROM
Pascual, Carlos E.
CLASSIFICATION
CONTIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(a)(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
06/13/1999
DECLASSIFYON
06/13/2009
SUBJECT
FW: June 13 Yeltsin Talking Points [CONFIDENTIAL]
TO
Weiss, Andrew S.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
CARBON_COPY
TEXT BODY
fyi
Original Message
From: Cheramie, Don E.
Sent: Sunday,
June 13, 1999 1:48 PM
To: Pascual, Carlos E.
Cc: @WHSR - WH Situation
Room
Subject: Yeltsin Talking Points ECOMFIDEMTIAL]
Per your
request...
TRANSLATEDATTACHMENT TPnotCS .doc
TALKING POINTS FOR CALL TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN
* Let me first congratulate you on Russia's national day yesterday.
Russia has
come a long way in seven years under your leadership ~ and so has
our
relationship, including through some tough times. We can both be
very proud of
that, and I'm proud to work with you.
* I believe we are at another important and promising moment in our
partnership.
Our hard work together brought an end to the conflict in Kosovo. We
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 2 of4
37827747.FIN
kept our
disagreements, serious as they were, from ruining everything, and we
made the
most of our cooperation and friendship.
* We must now work equally hard to ensure a lasting and just peace
and that our
militaries work well together on the ground.
* As Vice President Gore made clear to Prime Minister Stepashin
yesterday, we
have had some difficult moments in the last two days in our efforts to
coordinate
our roles in Kosovo.
* We need to take charge of the situation - both for the sake of our
goals in
Kosovo and so that we can show the world that we are working
together.
* There is one matter I need to raise. We need to resolve the issue of
the use
of the airport at Pristina. I hope you will give orders to General
Zvarzin
(zuh-VAR-ZIN) to work this out today with General Jackson, the
KFOR Commander on
the basis of unity of command.
We expect Yeltsin will respond with the following points:
This situation arose because, until now, we didn't have an agreement
on the
modalities and conditions for the equitable participation of Russia in
the
peacekeeping operation.
As President, we should give instructions to find a solution as soon as
possible
to the problem - and thus, to create the necessary conditions for the
closest
possible cooperation of our forces in the interest of peace in Kosovo.
We are counting on you to take account of the interests of the Russian
Federation in this situation. This will allow us to erase any
misunderstanding
and to make sure the implementation of the peace is in strict
accordance with the
UN Security Council resolution.
* First, I understand we've agreed on the short-term proposal our
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 3 of 4
37827747.FIN
generals have
worked out to start to deploy forces together as soon as possible.
* This is an interim approach based on what you and I worked out for
Bosnia. We
know it works; it's the fastest way to get Russian and American troops
on the
ground together now.
* Second, Madeleine Albright and Strobe Talbott have been working
with Foreign
Minister Ivanov on what I regard as some promising ideas on how we
should use the
next week to solve important, even urgent, outstanding challenges.
* These ideas and proposals, if promptly developed, could guarantee
us a good
meeting in Cologne one week from today.
* While Madeleine and Minister Ivanov should intensify their efforts,
I think it
would be useful to give some instructions to our Ministers of Defense
as well.
* Let's have them meet urgently, in the coming days, to talk things
over and make
some concrete recommendations to us on how Russia and the U.S. can
coordinate and
cooperate in Kosovo and how we can resolve other organizational
issues.
* With the right guidance from us, Boris, I think we can resolve these
problems which matter a lot to both of us - by the time we meet.
* At Cologne, I suggest we also issue a strong public statement on
next steps on
arms control and announce that our binational commission will
resume its work
under Vice President Gore and PM Stepashin in July.
If Yeltsin pushes for a Russian sector/commander:
* Boris, I think I understand your needs and interests. I'm going to do
everything I can - and will make sure that Madeleine and Secretary
Cohen do, too
- and go as far as we possibly can in accommodating you.
* Strobe's team that was just in Moscow made a number of creative
proposals on
how we can ensure that Russia has an area of responsibility in Kosovo
which is
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 4 of 4
37827747.FIN
equitable - and that is worthy of Russia's role and interests.
* At the same time, we must be careful about three things:
1) The operation must be militarily effective;
2) We must ensure unity of command;
3) We must not allow either the perception or the reality of a partition
of
Kosovo.
* We need to ask our Defense Ministers to develop these ideas this
week and
present us with solutions.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 1 of 4
37827A33.FIN
Exchange
Mail
DATE-TIME
6/13/99 9:50:41 PM
FROM
Weiss, Andrew S.
CLASSIFICATION
CONTIDENTIAfc
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(b)(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
06/13/1999
DECLASSIFYON
06/13/2009
SUBJECT
FW: Points for Yeltsin Call [COl'TIDEMTIAL]
TO
Pascual, Carlos E.
PER E.O. 13526
CARBON_COPY
TEXT BODY
Some suggestions. I hate to be a nudge, but I think the tone is
a little too negative. I've tried to soften. Unless there's sugar-coating,
we risk enraging Yeltsin who's already stirred up about anything
Kosovo-related.
Also, we cannot have the President do technical
issues or even technical terms that don't translate well into Russian
with this guy. It won't work. He'll check out of the call and we'll
get nothing.
Original Message
From: Pascual, Carlos
E.
Sent: Sunday, June 13, 1999 9:30 PM
To: Weiss, Andrew S.; Schulte,
Gregory L.
Subject: Points for Yeltsin Call tCONFIDENTIAL]
Importance: High
AW - made some changes. See if this still makes sense. Tires
to adjust based on comments SRB and POTUS made today.
Greg would appreciate your clearance.
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT j
u
n
e
^ B N Y call tps_.doc
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O Y
H CP
�37827A33.FIN
Page 2 of 4
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN
* Boris, we agreed yesterday to work hard to keep the peace in
Kosovo; glad we're
continuing to work on this today. Our perseverance has paid off so far.
No
issue is more important to sustain our cooperation and friendship.
* As we discussed yesterday, want to review today's discussion
between our
generals in Kosovo on how to resolve the problems at Pristina airport.
Also want
to address three other issues.
Airport Issue, Russian Troop Reinforcements
* Right after our call, we contacted all necessary people on our side to
make
sure Generals Jackson and Zavarsin got down to serious discussions to
resolve the
airport problem. I'm sure you got your instructions to Zavarzin.
* [If the situation at the airport is resolved] Once again we've shown
that when
we work together, we can resolve tough problems in a way that's good
for both of
us. As with the UN Security Council resolution last week, we've taken
charge of
the issue and broken an impasse.
* [If the situation at the airport is not resolved] Despite what we asked
for
yesterday, problem at airport still isn't fixed. This is serious. It will
cast
a negative tone over the meeting in Cologne. We must instruct our
people to fix
this today.
* Have to raise another matter of utmost urgency. Our ministers
agreed there
would be no new Russian deployments to Kosovo without mutual
agreement. But we
are seeing credible reports on reinforcements.
* Boris, I have to ask you to instruct your military to halt new
deployments to
Kosovo. This can really become a big stumbling block and will send a
confusing
signal about Russia's goals and intentions in Kosovo.
Track 1, Track 2
* Want to return to yesterday's conversation. You made a proposal for
us to
meet. I made a proposal to agree on the short-term plan our generals
worked out
to start to deploy forces together as soon as possible.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 3 of 4
37827A33.FIN
* I want to suggest how we might say yes to your proposal and to
mine.
* Our generals agreed, Boris, on an interim approach to deal with the
Russian
forces already in Kosovo. It is based on what you and I worked out for
Bosnia.
We know it works; it's the fastest way to get our troops cooperating on
the
ground together.
* Now let's get it done. Let agree to instruct our generals to implement
the
plan and develop real facts on the ground that show we can work
together to
implement the peace.
* Regarding your proposal for a meeting, I said yesterday we could
meet in
Cologne or on the outskirts. For that meeting to be a success, we need
to give
instructions to our Ministers of Defense.
* Let's have them meet urgently to make concrete recommendations to
us on how we
can cooperate together in Kosovo over the longer-term.
* Our foreign ministers would follow-up. By Cologne, we could have
a well
defined proposal to review.
* Boris, if we can move on all these fronts, we can get this issue under
control
and help make Cologne a success.
If Yeltsin pushes for a Russian sector/commander
* Boris, I think I understand your needs and interests. I'm going to do
everything I can - and will make sure that Madeleine and Secretary
Cohen do, too
- and go as far as we possibly can in accommodating you.
* Strobe's team that was just in Moscow made some creative
proposals on how we
can ensure that Russia has an area of responsibility in Kosovo which
is equitable
- and that is worthy of Russia's role and interests.
* At the same time, we must be careful about three things:
1) The operation must be militarily effective;
2) We must ensure unity of command;
3) We must not allow either the perception or the reality of a partition
of
Kosovo.
* We need to ask our defense ministers to develop these ideas this
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 4 of 4
37827A33.FIN
week and
present us with solutions.
If Yeltsin links progress on interim arrangements to agreement on
Russia's
overall role in KFOR
* There is a real urgency about getting the Russians already in Kosovo
into KFRO
because we cannot allow a security vacuum to form that would
jeopardize the
peace.
* Our people have agreed on an interim model that will get this
problem fixed
quickly. We're using a similar approach in Bosnia. So let's use it and
make it
work.
* You also have my commitment to move as quickly as possible on
the command
arrangements for Russian participation in KFOR. My bottom lines are
effectiveness and unity of command and control.
* But let's not link these two tracks together, especially when we can
move
together now and get facts on the ground that show that we can work
effectively
side-by-side.
3
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFTPfiNTIAL
CONFIDENTjAL
CaNFIDENTIAfc
Reason: 1.5b,d
Declassify On: 6/12/99
CLINTON LIBRARY DU O O Y
CP
�37.827A9C.FIN
Exchange
Page 1 of 5
Mai
DATE-TIME
6/13/99 9:52:25 PM
FROM
Schulte, Gregory L.
CLASSIFICATION
CONriDCNTIAL
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(b)(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
06/13/1999
DECLASSIFYON
06/13/2009
SUBJECT
FW: Points for Yeltsin Call ^^NFTPFNTTATr]
TO
Pascual, Carlos E.
CARBON COPY
Weiss, Andrew S.
TEXT BODY
Pis see some suggested toughening up. I'll trust you to de-toughen,
if you think my additions would be counterproductive. But I think
we need to tell Boris that what Russia is doing could wreak the peace,
and put his own soldiers at risk. We might also need to add hints
that he needs to get his military under control.
Original
Message
From: Pascual, Carlos E.
Sent: Sunday, June 13, 1999
9:30 PM
To: Weiss, Andrew S.; Schulte, Gregory L.
Subject: Points
for Yeltsin Call ECONTIDENTIAL]
Importance: High
AW -made some changes. See if this still makes sense. Tires to adjust
based on comments SRB and POTUS made today.
Greg ~ would appreciate
your clearance.
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT Junel4BNYcalltps_.doc
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
^CLASSIFIED
E.O.13526
�Page 2 of 5
37827A9C.FIN
PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN
* Boris, we agreed yesterday to work hard to keep the peace in
Kosovo; glad we're
continuing to work on this today. Our perseverance has paid off so far.
No
issue is more important to sustain our cooperation and friendship.
* We must be seen as working together, not at cross purposes.
Otherwise the
withdrawals will slow, the KLA will resume fighting, and the conflict
in Kosovo
will quickly re-ignite - with our forces in the middle.
* There were already report of the KLA preparing to attack Russian
forces, since
the KLA thought that your forces had come in to protect Serb forces.
We've made
clear to the Albanians that we would not tolerate any attacks on your
forces, but
this illustrates the importance of your forces coming fully into KFOR
with its UN
mandate.
* As we discussed yesterday, want to review today's discussion
between our
generals in Kosovo on how to resolve the problems at Pristina airport.
Also want
to address three other issues.
Airport Issue, Russian Troop Reinforcements
* Right after our call, we contacted all necessary people on our side to
make
sure Generals Jackson and Zavarsin got down to serious discussions to
resolve the
airport problem. Minister Ivanov told us you gave instructions to
Zavarzin.
* [If the situation at the airport is resolved] Once again we've shown
that when
we work together, we can resolve tough problems in a way that's good
for both of
us. Just like with the UN Security Council resolution, we've taken
charge of the
issue and broken an impasse.
* [If the situation at the airport is not resolved] Despite what we asked
for
yesterday, problem at airport still isn't fixed. This is serious and
potentially
dangerous. It's already cast a negative tone over all we've done on
Kosovo; it
could ruin the meeting in Cologne; it could cause the peace to break
down. We
must instruct our people to fix this today.
* Have to raise another matter of utmost urgency. Our ministers
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�37.827A9C.FIN
Page 3 of 5
agreed there
would be no new Russian deployments to Kosovo until we agree on a
plan. But
every day there are more reports on reinforcements.
* Some of our partners in the region are increasingly worried that your
military
intends to violate their airspace to send additional troops to Kosovo. I
know
that you wouldn't let your military do this - it would be an act
tantamount to
war.
* Boris, I have to ask you to instruct your military to halt new
deployments to
Kosovo. This can really set us at odds, and it is damaging Russia's
credibility.
Track 1, Track 2
* Want to return to yesterday's conversation. You made a proposal for
us to
meet. I made a proposal to agree on the short-term plan our generals
worked out
to start to deploy forces together as soon as possible.
* I want to suggest how we might say yes to your proposal and to
mine.
* Our generals agreed, Boris, on an interim approach to deploy forces
in Kosovo
based on what you and I worked out for Bosnia. We know it works;
it's the
fastest way to get Russian and American troops on the ground
together.
* Now let's get it done. Let agree to instruct our generals to implement
the
plan and develop real facts on the ground that show we can work
together to
implement the peace.
* Regarding your proposal for a meeting, I said yesterday we could
meet in
Cologne or on the outskirts. For that meeting to be a success, we need
to give
instructions to our Ministers of Defense.
* Let's have them meet urgently to make concrete recommendations to
us on how we
can cooperate together in Kosovo over the longer-term.
* Our foreign ministers would follow-up. By Cologne, we could have
a well
defined proposal to review.
* Boris, if we can move on both these fronts — implementing the
interim proposal
to deploy our forces in the short-term, and agreeing to have our
defense and
foreign ministers prepare for a meeting between you and me next
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 4 of 5
37827A9C.FIN
week — we can
get this issue under control and help make Cologne a success.
If Yeltsin pushes for a Russian sector/commander
* Boris, I think I understand your needs and interests. I'm going to do
everything I can - and will make sure that Madeleine and Secretary
Cohen do, too
- and go as far as we possibly can in accommodating you.
* Strobe's team that was just in Moscow made some creative
proposals on how we
can ensure that Russia has an area of responsibility in Kosovo which
is equitable
- and that is worthy of Russia's role and interests.
* At the same time, we must be careful about three things:
1) The operation must be militarily effective;
2) We must ensure unity of command;
3) We must not allow either the perception or the reality of a partition
of
Kosovo.
* We need to ask our defense ministers to develop these ideas this
week and
present us with solutions.
If Yeltsin links progress on interim arrangements to agreement on
Russia's
overall role in KFOR
* There is a real urgency about getting the Russians already in Kosovo
fully
integrated into KFOR because we cannot allow a security vacuum to
form that
would jeopardize the peace.
* Our people have agreed on an interim model that will get this
problem fixed
quickly. We're using a similar approach in Bosnia. So let's use it and
make it
work.
* You also have my commitment to move as quickly as possible on
the longer-term
command arrangements for Russian participation in KFOR. My
bottom lines are
effectiveness and unity of command and control.
* But let's not link these two tracks together, especially when we can
move
together now and get facts on the ground that show that we can work
effectively
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 5 of 5
37827A9C.FIN
side-by-side.
CONFIDENTIAL
•CQMFIDENTIAL
-CONFIDENTIAL
•eONriBENTTTtfc
Reason: 1.5b,d
Declassify On: 6/12/99
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�37829E26.FIN
Page 1 of 6
Exchange Mai
DATE-TIME
6/14/99 12:24:04 AM
FROM
Chastain, George M.
CLASSIFICATION
CONriDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(b)(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
06/13/1999
DECLASSIFYON
06/13/2009
SUBJECT
FW: Draft TPs for Yeltsin Call [CONFIDENTIAL]
TO
Schrader, Joel M.
McGee, Jenny A.
CARBON COPY
Chastain, George M.
TEXT BODY
FYI
Original Message
From: Tarver, J. Sean
Sent: Monday,
June 14, 1999 12:18 AM
To: Chastain, George M.
Subject: FW: Draft
TPs for Yeltsin Call [CONriDEl'JTIAL]
Importance: High
George
I
read the Yeltsin talking points to Berger on the Stu III. He dictated
the changes, which I added and e-mailed to all relevenat parties
(as shown below). Based on this, and the late hour, we did not fax
a revised copy to Berger. Called Steinberg. He said he doesn't
need to see the points until morning. We faxed a copy to Talbott.
Berger and Steinberg will get copies in their morning take. Can't
confirm if ExecSec has staffed them to the President's Staff Sec
yet.
Original Message-—
From: Tarver, J. Sean
Sent: Sunday,
June 13, 1999 11:52 PM
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 2 of 6
37829E26.FIN
To: @WHSR - WH Situation Room; @NSA - Natl
Security Advisor
Cc: @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; Schulte, Gregory
L.; Brody, Richard J.; Saunders, Richard M ; Davidson, Leslie K.;
@EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
Subject: FW: Draft TPs for Yeltsin
Call [CONnDENTIAl]
Importance: High
Mr. Berger's changes are
reflected in the attached copy.
Original Message
From: Pascual,
Carlos E.
Sent: Sunday, June 13, 1999 10:28 PM
To: @WHSR - WH
Situation Room; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: ©RUSSIA - RussiaAJkraine;
Schulte, Gregory L.; Brody, Richard J.; Saunders, Richard M.;
Davidson,
Leslie K.; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
Subject: Draft TPs for
Yeltsin Call [CONFIDCNTIALj
Importance: High
SIT ROOM
Please
send via secure fax to Sandy, Jim and Strobe Talbott.
Attached
is a first draft of points for the Monday Yeltsin call. Collins
and I will talk at about 05:00 EST to assess relevant updates. Greg
will make sure to have the latest on the situation in Pristina and
Russian reinforcements. We may also need to adjust quickly after
the VP-Stepashin call.
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT j
u
n
e
1
4
B
m
call tps.doc
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN
* Boris, we agreed yesterday to work hard to keep the peace in
Kosovo; glad we're
continuing to work on this today. Our perseverance has paid off so far.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�37829E26.FIN
Page 3 of 6
No
issue is more important to sustain our cooperation and friendship.
* We must be seen as working together, not at cross purposes.
Otherwise the
withdrawals will slow, the KLA will resume fighting, and the conflict
in Kosovo
will quickly re-ignite, with our forces in the middle.
* As we discussed yesterday, want to review today's discussion
between our
generals in Kosovo on how to resolve the problems at Pristina airport.
Also want
to address three other issues.
Airport Issue, Russian Troop Reinforcements
* Right after our call, we contacted all necessary people on our side to
make
sure Generals Jackson and Zavarsin got down to serious discussions to
resolve the
airport problem. I'm sure you got your instructions to Zavarsin.
* [If the situation at the airport is resolved] Once again we've shown
that when
we work together, we can resolve tough problems in a way that's good
for both of
us. As with the UN Security Council resolution last week, we've taken
charge of
the issue and broken an impasse.
* [If the situation at the airport is not resolved] Despite what we asked
for
yesterday, problem at airport still isn't fixed. This is serious. It will
cast
a negative tone over all we've done on Kosovo; it could ruin the
meeting in
Cologne; it could cause the peace to break down. We must instruct
our people to
fix this today.
* Have to raise another matter of utmost urgency. Our ministers
agreed there
would be no new Russian deployments to Kosovo without mutual
agreement. But we
are seeing credible reports on reinforcements.
* Some of our partners in the region are increasingly worried that your
military
intends to violate their airspace to send additional troops to Kosovo.
* Boris, I have to ask you to instruct your military to halt new
deployments to
Kosovo. This can really become a big stumbling block and will send a
confusing
signal about Russia's goals and intentions in Kosovo.
* Foreign Minister Ivanov repeated this to Secretary Albright
yesterday evening.
* We accept the Foreign Minister's word on this. He has worked hard
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�37829E26.FIN
Page 4 of 6
to resolve
these issues. However, Boris, I must tell you that if there are further
unilateral deployments to Kosovo before an agreement is made,
Russia's
credibility in the free world will be greatly diminished and it will have
a
serious impact on our relationship.
Track 1, Track 2
* Want to return to yesterday's conversation. You made a proposal for
us to
meet. I made a proposal to agree on the short-term plan our generals
worked out
to start to deploy forces together as soon as possible.
* I want to suggest how we might say yes to your proposal and to
mine.
* Our generals agreed, Boris, on an interim approach to deploy forces
in Kosovo.
It is based on what you and I worked out for Bosnia. We know it
works; it's the
fastest way to get ourRussian and American troops cooperating on the
ground
together over the next week.
* Now let's get it done. Let's agree to instruct our generals to
implement the
plan and develop real facts on the ground that show we can work
together to
implement the peace.
* Regarding your proposal for a meeting, I said yesterday we could
meet in
Cologne or on the outskirts. For that meeting to be a success, we need
to give
instructions to our Ministers of Defense.
* Let's have them meet urgently to make concrete recommendations to
us on how we
can cooperate together in Kosovo over the longer-term.
* Our foreign ministers would follow-up. By Cologne, we could have
a well
defined proposal to review.
* Boris, if we can move on these fronts ~ implementing the interim
proposal to
deploy our forces in the short-term, and agreeing to have our defense
and foreign
ministers prepare for a meeting between you and me next week ~ we
can get this
issue under control and help make Cologne a success.
If Yeltsin pushes for a Russian sector/commander
* Boris, I think I understand your needs and interests. I'm going to do
everything I can - and will make sure that Madeleine and Secretary
Cohen do, too
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�37'829E26.FIN
Page 5 of 6
- and go as far as we possibly can in accommodating you.
* Strobe's team that was just in Moscow made some creative
proposals on how we
can ensure that Russia has an area of responsibility in Kosovo which
is equitable
- and that is worthy of Russia's role and interests.
* At the same time, we must be careful about four things:
1) The operation must be militarily effective;
2) We must ensure unity of command;
3) We must not allow either the perception or the reality of a partition
of
Kosovo.
4) Russia must be fully integrated into KFOR to minimize the
possibility that
the KLA will see the Russian troops as a target. We became aware of
a KLA plot
against Russian troops yesterday, which we were able to head off.
* We need to ask our defense ministers to develop these ideas this
week and
present us with solutions.
If Yeltsin links Track 1 and Track 2
* There is a real urgency about getting the Russians already in Kosovo
fully
integrated into KFOR because we cannot allow a security vacuum to
form that
would jeopardize the peace.
* Our people have agreed on an interim model that will get this
problem fixed
quickly. We're using a similar approach in Bosnia. So let's use it and
make it
work.
* You also have my commitment to move as quickly as possible on
the longer-term
command arrangements for Russian participation in KFOR. My
bottom lines are
effectiveness and unity of command and control.
* But let's not link these two tracks together, especially when we can
move
together now and get facts on the ground that show that we can work
effectively
side-by-side.
If Yeltsin says the KLA is going to provoke Russian forces
* We learned of a plot against Russia but, Boris, if Russian troops are
not part
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 6 of 6
37'829E26.FIN
of KFOR, the KLA will believe they came into Kosovo to protect
Serb forces, and
Russian troops will become a greater target.
* We've made clear that we would not tolerate any attacks on your
forces, but
this illustrates the importance of your forces coming fully into KFOR
with its UN
mandate.
3
•CQMHBENTIAL
CONFIDaffhtfr
CONFIDCNTIAL
CQNriDENTIAE
Reason: 1.5b,d
Declassify On: 6/12/99
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�37830D9F.FIN
Page 1 of 4
Exchange M a i
DATE-TIME
6/14/99 8:19:41 AM
FROM
Millison, Cathy L.
CLASSIFICATION
COWIDCNTIAL
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(a)(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
06/13/1999
DECLASSIFYON
06/13/2009
SUBJECT
FW: June 13 Yeltsin Talking Points ECONriDENTIAL}
TO
Dames, Victoria J.
Ficklin, John W.
Kaplan, Dean M.
Konrad, Elizabeth M.
Marsh, Thomas S
Porter, Pete
Sanborn, Daniel R. K.(Records)
Starks, Tali T.
CARBON_COPY
TEXT BODY
FYI
Original Message
From: Pascual, Carlos E.
Sent: Sunday,
June 13,1999 9:39 PM
To: @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
Subject: FW:
June 13 Yeltsin Talking Points ECONFIDENTI AL]
These were the points
actually used for the call.
Original Message
From: Cheramie,
Don E.
Sent: Sunday, June 13, 1999 1:48 PM
To: Pascual, Carlos
E.
Cc: @WHSR - WH Situation Room
Subject: Yeltsin Talking Points
[CONFIDENTIAfc.]
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13S26
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�37830D9F.FIN
Page 2 of 4
Per your request.
TRANSLATEDATTACHMENT
TPnotes.doc
TALKING POINTS FOR CALL TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN
* Let me first congratulate you on Russia's national day yesterday.
Russia has
come a long way in seven years under your leadership - and so has
our
relationship, including through some tough times. We can both be
very proud of
that, and I'm proud to work with you.
* I believe we are at another important and promising moment in our
partnership.
Our hard work together brought an end to the conflict in Kosovo. We
kept our
disagreements, serious as they were, from ruining everything, and we
made the
most of our cooperation and friendship.
* We must now work equally hard to ensure a lasting and just peace
and that our
militaries work well together on the ground.
* As Vice President Gore made clear to Prime Minister Stepashin
yesterday, we
have had some difficult moments in the last two days in our efforts to
coordinate
our roles in Kosovo.
* We need to take charge of the situation - both for the sake of our
goals in
Kosovo and so that we can show the world that we are working
together.
* There is one matter I need to raise. We need to resolve the issue of
the use
of the airport at Pristina. I hope you will give orders to General
Zvarzin
(zuh-VAR-ZIN) to work this out today with General Jackson, the
KFOR Commander on
the basis of unity of command.
We expect Yeltsin will respond with the following points:
This situation arose because, until now, we didn't have an agreement
on the
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 3 of4
37830D9F.FIN
modalities and conditions for the equitable participation of Russia in
the
peacekeeping operation.
As President, we should give instructions to find a solution as soon as
possible
to the problem - and thus, to create the necessary conditions for the
closest
possible cooperation of our forces in the interest of peace in Kosovo.
We are counting on you to take account of the interests of the Russian
Federation in this situation. This will allow us to erase any
misunderstanding
and to make sure the implementation of the peace is in strict
accordance with the
UN Security Council resolution.
* First, I understand we've agreed on the short-term proposal our
generals have
worked out to start to deploy forces together as soon as possible.
* This is an interim approach based on what you and I worked out for
Bosnia. We
know it works; it's the fastest way to get Russian and American troops
on the
ground together now.
* Second, Madeleine Albright and Strobe Talbott have been working
with Foreign
Minister Ivanov on what I regard as some promising ideas on how we
should use the
next week to solve important, even urgent, outstanding challenges.
* These ideas and proposals, if promptly developed, could guarantee
us a good
meeting in Cologne one week from today.
* While Madeleine and Minister Ivanov should intensify their efforts,
I think it
would be useful to give some instructions to our Ministers of Defense
as well.
* Let's have them meet urgently, in the coming days, to talk things
over and make
some concrete recommendations to us on how Russia and the U.S. can
coordinate and
cooperate in Kosovo and how we can resolve other organizational
issues.
* With the right guidance from us, Boris, I think we can resolve these
problems which matter a lot to both of us - by the time we meet.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�37830D9F.FIN
Page 4 of 4
* At Cologne, I suggest we also issue a strong public statement on
next steps on
arms control and announce that our binational commission will
resume its work
under Vice President Gore and PM Stepashin in July.
If Yeltsin pushes for a Russian sector/commander:
* Boris, I think I understand your needs and interests. I'm going to do
everything I can - and will make sure that Madeleine and Secretary
Cohen do, too
- and go as far as we possibly can in accommodating you.
* Strobe's team that was just in Moscow made a number of creative
proposals on
how we can ensure that Russia has an area of responsibility in Kosovo
which is
equitable - and that is worthy of Russia's role and interests.
* At the same time, we must be careful about three things:
1) The operation must be militarily effective;
2) We must ensure unity of command;
3) We must not allow either the perception or the reality of a partition
of
Kosovo.
* We need to ask our Defense Ministers to develop these ideas this
week and
present us with solutions.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 1 of 5
•3783179B.FIN
Exchange
Mail
DATE-TIME
6/14/99 9:02:17 AM
FROM
Weiss, Andrew S.
CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(d)(x6)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
06/14/1999
DECLASSIFYON
06/14/2024
SUBJECT
Updated Yeltsin TPs [CONFIDENTIAL]
TO
Davies, Glyn T.
Dejban, Donna D.
Hachigian, Nina L.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Millison, Cathy L.
Mitchell, Rebecca (Julie) J.
Moretz, Sheila K.
Rice, Edward A.
Rudman, Mara E.
Sargeant, Stephen T.
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.
Storey, Sharon V.
Sutphen, Mona K.
CARBON COPY
Bamett, Cheryl E.
Elkind, Jonathan H.
Faranda, Regina D.
Kaufman, Stuart J.
Pascual, Carlos E.
Russ, Judith P.
Segal, Jack D.
Silva, Mary Ann T.
Tedstrom, John E.
Weiss, Andrew S.
Davidson, Leslie K.
Hurley, C. Michael
Moyn, Samuel A.
Quinn, Mary E.
Schulte, Gregory L.
Segal, Jack D.
Vaccaro, Jonathan M. (Matt)
Saunders, Richard M.
Brody, Richard J.
Davidson, Leslie K.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�.3783179B.FIN
Page 2 of 5
TEXT BODY
PLEASE PASS ASAP TO SANDY AND JIM
Below version incorporates Jim's
fixes as well as VP-Stepashin call. Strobe has cleared.
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT
June 14 BNY call tps_.doc
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN
* Boris, we agreed yesterday to work hard to keep the peace in
Kosovo; glad we're
continuing to work on this today. Vice President and Stepashin had
good call
this morning. Clearly, no issue is more important than Kosovo to
sustaining our
cooperation and friendship.
* We must be seen as working together, not at cross purposes.
Otherwise the
withdrawals will slow, the KLA will not be under control or
demilitarize, and the
conflict in Kosovo will quickly re-ignite, with our forces in the
middle.
* As we discussed yesterday, want to review today's discussion
between our
generals in Kosovo on how to resolve the problem at Pristina airport.
Also want
to address three other issues.
Airport Issue, Russian Troop Reinforcements
* Right after our call, we contacted all necessary people on our side to
make
sure Generals Jackson and Zavarzin got down to serious discussions
to resolve the
airport problem.
* Your representatives have told us that instructions were given to the
Russian
military to reach agreement on procedures for the airport.
* Despite what we asked for yesterday, problem at airport still isn't
fixed.
This is serious. General Zavarzin said today he was not there to work
things
out, only to listen. And he insisted on Russian control of airport.
* That won't do. Both the Ahtisaari-Chemomyrdin agreement and
UNSCR
specifically call for unity of command. It will be impossible to go on
to other
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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.3783179B.FIN
questions while this issue is pending.
* This problem will cast a negative tone over all we've done on
Kosovo; it could
ruin the meeting in Cologne; it could cause the peace to break down.
We must
instruct our people tofixthis today,
[pause for response]
* Have to raise another matter of utmost urgency. Vice President and
Albright
have been told by counterparts that there will be no new Russian
deployments to
Kosovo without mutual agreement. Let me underscore continuing
importance of this
issue. We also believe sending Russian forces to Serbia would be
[provocative
move][very serious matter].
* * Boris, this issue can really become a big stumbling block and will
send a
confusing signal about Russia's goals in Kosovo.
* Appreciate PM Stepashin's and FM Ivanov's assurances on this
issue, even in
past few hours. They have worked hard to resolve these issues.
* However, Boris, I must tell you that if there are further unilateral
deployments to Kosovo before an agreement is made, Russia's
credibility in the
free world will be greatly diminished and it will have a serious impact
on our
relationship.
[pause for response]
Track 1, Track 2
* Want to return to yesterday's conversation. You made a proposal for
us to
meet. I made a proposal to agree on the short-term plan our generals
worked out
to start to deploy forces together as soon as possible.
* I think we cansay yes to your proposal and to mine.
* Both Vice President and Stepashin and Albright and Ivanov have
agreed, Boris,
on an interim approach to deploy forces in Kosovo. It is based on
what you and I
worked out for Bosnia. We know it works; it's the fastest way to get
our Russian
and American troops cooperating on the ground together over the next
week.
* Now let's get it done. Let's agree to instruct our generals to
implement the
plan and develop real facts on the ground that show we can work
together to
implement the peace.
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* Regarding your proposal for a meeting, I said yesterday we could
meet in
Cologne later this week. For that meeting to be a success, we need to
give
instructions to our Ministers of Defense.
* Let's have them meet urgently to develop concrete recommendations
to us on how
we can cooperate together in Kosovo over the longer-term. Your
people and mine
have discussed Helsinki. I support that. You and I had a good meeting
there.
Let's have our defense ministers meet there.
* Our foreign ministers would follow-up. By Cologne, our teams
could present to
you and me a well defined proposal to review.
* Boris, if we can move on these fronts ~ implementing the interim
proposal to
deploy our forces in the short-term, and agreeing to have our teams
meet to
prepare for our meeting ~ we can get this issue under control and help
make
Cologne a success.
If Yeltsin pushes for a Russian sector/commander
* Boris, I think I understand your needs and interests. I'm going to do
everything I can - and will make sure that Madeleine and Secretary
Cohen do, too
- and go as far as we possibly can in accommodating you.
* Strobe's team that was just in Moscow made some creative
proposals on how we
can ensure that Russia has an area of responsibility in Kosovo which
is equitable
- and that is worthy of Russia's role and interests.
* At the same time, we must be careful about four things:
1) The operation must be militarily effective;
2) We must ensure unity of command;
3) We must not allow either the perception or the reality of a partition
of
Kosovo.
4) Russia must be fully integrated into KFOR to minimize the
possibility that
the KLA will see the Russian troops as a target. We became aware of
a KLA plot
against Russian troops yesterday, which we were able to head off.
* We need to ask our defense ministers to develop these ideas this
week and
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�3783179B.FIN
Page 5 of 5
present us with solutions.
If Yeltsin links Track 1 and Track 2
* There is a real urgency about getting the Russians already in Kosovo
fully
integrated into KFOR because we cannot allow a security vacuum to
form that
would jeopardize the peace.
* Our people have agreed on an interim model that will get this
problem fixed
quickly. We're using a similar approach in Bosnia. So let's use it and
make it
work.
* You also have my commitment to move as quickly as possible on
the longer-term
command arrangements for Russian participation in KFOR. My
bottom lines are
effectiveness and unity of command and control.
* But let's not link these two tracks together, especially when we can
move
together now and get facts on the ground that show that we can work
effectively
side-by-side.
If Yeltsin says the KLA is going to provoke Russian forces
* We learned of a plot against Russia. Boris, if Russian troops are not
part of
KFOR, the KLA will believe they came into Kosovo to protect Serb
forces, and
Russian troops will become a greater target.
* We've made clear that we would not tolerate any attacks on your
forces, but
this illustrates the importance of your forces coming fully into KFOR
with its UN
mandate.
3
4
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
•GQNFIDENTIAb
-CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5b,d
Declassify On: 6/12/99
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 1 of 3
378320DC.FIN
Exchange
Mail
DATE-TIME
6/14/99 9:41:46 AM
FROM
Millison, Cathy L.
CLASSIFICATION
CONTIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
06/14/1999
DECLASSIFYON
06/14/2009
SUBJECT
FW: FNAL YELTSIN POINTS [CONTIDENTIAL]
TO
Bartlett, L. June
Dejban, Donna D.
Hilliard, Brenda I .
Joshi, M. Kay
Millison, Cathy L.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
CARBON_COPY
TEXT BODY
Taken care of. Saved to G:/EXECSEC as Yeltsin Jun 14.doc
Original
Message
From: Hachigian, Nina L.
Sent: Monday, June 14, 1999
9:32 AM
To: @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary; @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine
Cc: @NSA
- Natl Security Advisor
Subject: FNAL YELTSIN POINTS [€QNFiDEWTlAfcj
APPROVED BY JS AND SRB--PLEASE TAKE TO STAFF
SECRETARY ASAP.
TRANSLATEDATTACHMENT D
o c
l
rfoc
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN
* Boris, you and I agreed yesterday to instruct our generals to meet
and resolve
the problem of command at the airport, and report back to us on what
they worked
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�Page 2 of 3
378320DC.FIN
out.
* I was very disappointed and concerned to learn that your general
said he was
only there to listen and refused to work out a plan with the
commander of KFOR,
General Jackson. This is a serious situation which must be resolved.
* I was encouraged to hear from Al Gore that he and Stepashin had a
good call a
few hours ago on this subject. Stepashin told Gore that you have
agreed that
Bosnia rules will apply in Kosovo in the interim until you and I agree
on a
long-term arrangement, and that the arrangements for your forces in
this interim
period will be worked out with General Jackson. This is a good
arrangement, but
it is essential that we give our generals clear and decisive instructions
to
implement this today. Let's both do it as soon as we finish this call. Do
you
agree?
* Stepashin and Al also discussed the idea of Sec Cohen and Minister
Sergeyev
getting together to prepare for the meeting between you and I this
weekend;they
can make a joint proposal to us on the long-term arrangements for
Russian
participation in KFOR. I think this is a good idea, but only if we have
the
airport issue and the interim arrangements in place.
* Once we have heard that your General in Pristina has reached
agreement with
General Jackson on the Bosnia model for the interim period, I will
instruct Cohen
to meet with Sergeyev.
* In the meantime, both PM Stepashin and FM Ivanov have assured
us there will be
no further deployments to Kosovo until you and I resolve this matter.
I hope we
can count on this.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 3 of 3
378320DC.FIN
CONriDEl'JTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�Page 1 of 7
R7A2F69C.FIN
Exchange
Mail
DATE-TIME
7/8/99 1:14:02 PM
FROM
Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)
CLASSIFICATION
SECRCT
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
07/08/1999
DECLASSIFYON
07/08/2009
SUBJECT
pis put in final, thanks. [OECRET]
TO
Silva, Mary Ann T. (RUE)
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CARBON_COPY
TEXT BODY
TRANSLATEDATTACHMENT
5128memcon.doc
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin
<«
PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Yeltsin
INTERPRETER: Nikolai Sorokin
Notetakers: Joel Schrader, Miles Murphy, Matt Sibley, Joel
Ehrendreich, Roger
Merletti, Doug Bayley, and Andrew Weiss
DATE, TIME June 14, 1999, 10:06 - 10:32 a.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office
The President: Hello. (U)
President Yeltsin: Good morning, Bill. (U)
The President: Good morning, Boris. Yesterday, you and I agreed to
instruct our
generals to meet and resolve the problem of command at the airport
and report
back to us on what they worked out. I was quite disappointed ~ p8f
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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President Yeltsin: Yes, they did. They met yesterday, and I gave
instructions
to hold the necessary negotiations in order to come to an agreement
with regard
to the regulations of the support team for the Russian presence at the
airport of
Slatina near Pristina. And we proceed from the understanding that this
group, in
the framework of the first stage, will remain at the airport and will be
functioning in the interests of the international security force. And the
cooperation of the group with the commanders of the international
peacemaking
force will be portrayed in an accord based on the Bosnia formula, ffl
The forces that are not there yet, to ensure the full functioning of the
group,
will be deployed upon reaching an agreement and in the framework of
coordination
with General Jackson. Generals Zavarzin and Jackson have already
exchanged
liaison officers. They have discussed the problems of ensuring the
security of
the personnel of the Russian contingent. {$)
I instructed General Zavarzin to arrive at an agreement providing for
the joint
operation of the Slatina airport. An example of such joint use, of
clear-cut
use, could be the joint operation of the Tuzla airport in Bosnia.
However, in
this case the positions of control should be retained by Russia. {$]
And it is of extreme importance to have, in the coming two or three
days,
completed the process of reaching an agreement on the principal issue
of
deployment in the course of the second stage of the full scope of the
peacemaking
operation of the Russian contingent under a joint command. Such
agreement to
Track 2, or the second stage, should be reached at the level of
Ministers of
Defense and Ministers of Foreign Affairs and reported to you and me
before the
meeting in Cologne. ^
In this connection, I consider it very important for our Ministers of
Defense to
meet tomorrow or at the latest, the day after tomorrow, at a place
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�Page 3 of 7
R7A2F69C.FIN
acceptable for
them. If Secretary Cohen is prepared, then Minster of Defense
Sergeyev would be
prepared to welcome him in Moscow and meet him here. ^
I proceed from the understanding that, having reached such
agreements on the
matters of principle regarding the settlement in Kosovo, that should
enable us
not to overburden the agenda of our conversation in Cologne. In that
event, we
would be in position to center our attention on Russian-American
cooperation in
other important areas. ^s
JQ
I should like to raise for your benefit, with regard to Kosovo, another
problem.
If measures, timely measures, are not taken then the settlement could
be in
danger, could be jeopardized. What is meant is the provocative actions
of the
so-called Kosovo Liberation Army. We continuously said, and all the
other
members of the G-8 agreed, that such a situation cannot be permitted
to
materialize in which the return of the Albanian refugees to Kosovo
could and
would result in chasing away the representatives of other nationalities.
Regrettably, that is taking place. And the main responsibility is with
the
Albanian militants. This is a cause of my disenchantment, that the
peacemakers
in Kosovo, in fact, tum a blind eye to that occurrence. The result of
that,
when it went as far as this, is that the militants begin to threaten the
Russian
peacekeepers. And you can imagine the consequences if these threats
are
translated into reality. Madam Albright assured Ivanov that
appropriate work has
been done vis-a-vis the leaders of the Kosovo Liberation Army. I
should like to
ask you to take this issue and keep it under your personal control. This
is all
I wanted to say.
The President: First of all, let me say with regard to the Kosovo
Liberation
Army, we did learn of a plot against Russia, and we told them we
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�Page 4 of7
R7A2F69C.FIN
would not
tolerate attacks on your forces, and they agreed not to do it. But it is
important to understand why they wanted to do it. They believe the
impasse at
the airport will prevent an effective KFOR. They believe you came
into Kosovo
only to protect the Serbs, not to be part of the international force. We
made it
clear we will not tolerate attacks on your forces. We have to get this
resolved
or we can expect trouble. We have to resolve the airport issue. ^
Now what you have said about the airport today is good. That is, it
could be
jointly operated and access be guaranteed, but this is not what came
out of the
meeting between General Jackson and your general. So based on what
you have said
to me and the conversation Al Gore and Stepashin had, the general
has to get
those instructions so we can resolve that matter today.
President Yeltsin: But that was not our agreement. First, the
agreement should
be reached, and then we shall immediately issue instructions.
The President: I agree. So what I am saying, if we are agreeing on
this, let me
go through the points, and see if we have agreement,
President Yeltsin: Okay. (U)
The President: First, there will be an interim deployment, short-term,
using the
Bosnian model that will include a Russian component at the airport.
Second,
impasses at the airport will be resolved. Russian troops will stay there,
but
there will be no more deployments until we agree. Third, our defense
ministers
will meet to work out the long-term arrangements for Russian
participation so we
can, you and I , have a meeting in Cologne and ratify that.
^
President Yeltsin: Agreed. (U)
The President: I would like to - (U)
President Yeltsin: I say outright and from the outset that I agree. (U)
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�Page 5 of 7
R7A2F69C.FIN
The President: Okay, I would like to make another point or two if I
might.
First of all, I would like to propose that Secretary Cohen and Minister
Sergeyev
meet in Helsinki because I know that we have discussed that with Mr.
Stepashin,
and I mentioned it to President Ahtisaari, and he has agree to do it, so
I think
they should meet there,
President Yeltsin: I agree and shall issue the appropriate instructions.
(U)
The President: That is great. The other thing I wanted to say is that I
will
work hard on this. There must be a fair and responsible role for Russia
in this
united operation, and there are issues somewhat different than in
Bosnia, and I
have some ideas that I will give to Secretary Cohen and try to work
through this
so you will be pleased and so that the mission will be successful. But I
think
it is very important that we come to terms that will assure us that this
mission
will succeed. ^5
Therefore, we have to agree on terms for the unified command, but
one that will
be acceptable to you. I think we can do that. I commit to you we will
ensure an
equitable and responsible role of Russia worthy of your interests and
capacity to
contribute. There are things there that no one else can do, and we need
you
there. It is very important, ffi
President Yeltsin: Did you set forth all your items that you wanted to
share
with me? (U)
The President: Absolutely. (U)
President Yeltsin: Then I would like to tell you I fully agree, that I
will
issue appropriate instructions and then those instructions would be
fully carried
into affect. (U)
The President: Thank you so much, Boris. I look forward to seeing
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�R7A2F69C.FIN
Page 6 of 7
you in
Cologne. We will work this out, and it will be a good thing. (U)
President Yeltsin: Very good, very good. Bill, I am very glad we have
elected
such issues, which do not infringe on the interests of the other partner.
(U)
The President: Good. Boris, I will see you soon. (U)
President Yeltsin: Until we meet. (U)
The President: Goodbye. (U)
President Yeltsin: Goodbye, Bill. I embrace you. (U)
~ End of Conversation ~
4
-SECRET 5128
•SECRET
Classified by:
Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify On: 7/7/09
TRANSLATEDATTACHMENT
5128srb.doc
July 6, 1999
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER
THROUGH: CARLOS PASCUAL
FROM: ANDREW
SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Yeltsin,
June 14, 1999
Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the June 14
telephone
conversation between the President and Russian President Yeltsin.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 7 of?
R7A2F69C.FIN
RECOMMENDATION
That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed
for the record.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
1
SgCR&T
.SECRET
SECRET XXXX
Classified by: XXXX
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 7/7/09
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�TALKING POINTS FOR CALL TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN
Let me first congratulate you on Russia's national day yesterday. Russia has come a
long way in seven years under your leadership — and so has our relationship,
including through some tough times. We can both be very proud of that, and I'm
proud to work with you.
I believe we are at another important and promising moment in our partnership. Our
hard work together brought an end to the conflict in Kosovo. We kept our
disagreements, serious as they were, from ruining everything, and we made the most
of our cooperation and friendship.
We must now work equally hard to ensure a lasting and just peace and that our
militaries work well together on the ground.
As Vice President Gore made clear to Prime Minister Stepashin yesterday, we have
had some difficult moments in the last two days in our efforts to coordinate our roles
in Kosovo.
We need to take charge of the situation - both for the sake of our goals in Kosovo and
so that we can show the world that we are working together.
•
There is one matter I need to raise. We need to resolve the issue of the use of the
airport at Pristina. I hope you will give orders to General Zvarzin (zuh-VAR-ZIN) to
work this out today with General Jackson, the KFOR Commander on the basis of
unity of command.
We expect Yeltsin will respond with the following points:
This situation arose because, until now, we didn't have an agreement on the
modalities and conditions for the equitable participation of Russia in the peacekeeping
operation.
As President, we should give instructions to find a solution as soon as possible to
the problem - and thus, to create the necessary conditions for the closest possible
cooperation of our forces in the interest ofpeace in Kosovo.
We are counting on you to take account of the interests of the Russian Federation
in this situation. This will allow us to erase any misunderstanding and to make sure the
implementation of the peace is in strict accordance with the UN Security Council
resolution.
•
First, I understand we've agreed on the short-term proposal our generals have worked
out to start to deploy forces together as soon as possible.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
CLINTON^MW^iPHOTOCOPY
�•
This is an interim approach based on what you and I worked out for Bosnia. We
know it works; it's the fastest way to get Russian and American troops on the
ground together now.
•
Second, Madeleine Albright and Strobe Talbott have been working with Foreign
Minister Ivanov on what I regard as some promising ideas on how we should use the
next week to solve important, even urgent, outstanding challenges.
•
These ideas and proposals, if promptly developed, could guarantee us a good meeting
in Cologne one week from today.
•
While Madeleine and Minister Ivanov should intensify their efforts, I think it would
be useful to give some instructions to our Ministers of Defense as well.
•
Let's have them meet urgently, in the coming days, to talk things over and make
some concrete recommendations to us on how Russia and the U.S. can coordinate and
cooperate in Kosovo and how we can resolve other organizational issues.
•
With the right guidance from us, Boris, I think we can resolve these problems which matter a lot to both of us - by the time we meet.
•
At Cologne, I suggest we also issue a strong public statement on next steps on arms
control and announce that our binational commission will resume its work under Vice
President Gore and PM Stepashin in July.
If Yeltsin pushes for a Russian sector/commander:
•
Boris, I think I understand your needs and interests. I'm going to do everything I can
- and will make sure that Madeleine and Secretary Cohen do, too - and go as far as
we possibly can in accommodating you.
•
Strobe's team that was just in Moscow made a number of creative proposals on how
we can ensure that Russia has an area of responsibility in Kosovo which is equitable and that is worthy of Russia's role and interests.
•
At the same time, we must be careful about three things:
1) The operation must be militarily effective;
2) We must ensure unity of command;
3) We must not allow either the perception or the reality of a partition of Kosovo.
•
We need to ask our Defense Ministers to develop these ideas this week and present us
with solutions.
CLINTON
"CP
O OY
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Y(A^
LINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�J
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CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�/c ^'
f
C I T N L B A Y POOOY
L N O I R R HTCP
�C I T N L B A Y POOOY
L N O I R R HTCP
�DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
UK
C I T N L B A Y POOOY
L N O I R R HTCP
�DECLASSIFIED
PERE.O. 13526
-GQffflMt
id
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C I T N L B A Y POOOY
L N O I R R HTCP
�.COMFIDEMTIAL
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN
•
B o r i s , you and I agreed y e s t e r d a y t o i n s t r u c t our g e n e r a l s t o
meet and r e s o l v e t h e problem o f command a t t h e a i r p o r t , and
r e p o r t back t o us on what they worked o u t .
•
I was v e r y d i s a p p o i n t e d and concerned t o l e a r n t h a t your
g e n e r a l s a i d he was o n l y t h e r e t o l i s t e n and r e f u s e d t o work
out a p l a n w i t h t h e coinmander o f KFOR, General Jackson. This
i s a s e r i o u s s i t u a t i o n which must be r e s o l v e d .
•
I was encouraged t o hear from A l Gore t h a t he and S t e p a s h i n
had a good c a l l a few hours ago on t h i s s u b j e c t . S t e p a s h i n
t o l d Gore t h a t you have agreed t h a t Bosnia r u l e s w i l l a p p l y i n
Kosovo i n t h e i n t e r i m u n t i l you and I agree on a l o n g - t e r m
arrangement, and t h a t t h e arrangements f o r your f o r c e s i n t h i s
i n t e r i m p e r i o d w i l l be worked o u t w i t h General Jackson. This
i s a good arrangement, b u t i t i s e s s e n t i a l t h a t we g i v e o u r
g e n e r a l s c l e a r and d e c i s i v e i n s t r u c t i o n s t o implement t h i s
today. L e t ' s b o t h do i t as soon as we f i n i s h t h i s c a l l . Do you
agree?
•
S t e p a s h i n and A l a l s o d i s c u s s e d t h e J i f i h a o t Sec Cohen and
M i n i s t e r Sergeyev g e t t i n g t o g e t h e r / t o p r e p a r e f o r t h e meeting
between you and I t h i s weekend; they can make a j o i n t p r o p o s a l
t o us on t h e l o n g - t e r m arrangements f o r Russian p a r t i c i p a t i o n
i n KFOR. I t h i n k t h i s i s a good idea, b u t o n l y i f we have t h e
a i r p o r t i s s u e and t h e i n t e r i m arrangements i n p l a c e .
•
Once we have heard t h a t your General i n P r i s t i n a has reached
agreement w i t h General Jackson on t h e Bosnia model f o r t h e
i n t e r i m p e r i o d , I w i l l i n s t r u c t Cohen t o meet w i t h Sergeyev.
•
I n t h e meantime, b o t h PM Stepashin and FM Ivanov have assured
us t h e r e w i l l be no f u r t h e r deployments t o Kosovo u n t i l you
and I r e s o l v e t h i s m a t t e r . I hope we can count on t h i s .
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON
D^OTOCOPY
At
�rnMnnriTTTTMr
a success, we need t o g i v e i n s t r u c t i o n s t o our M i n i s t e r s o f
Defense.
L e t ' s have them meet u r g e n t l y t o develop c o n c r e t e
recommendations t o us on how we can cooperate t o g e t h e r i n
."Kosovo over t h e l o n g e r - t e r m . Your people and mine have
discussed H e l s i n k i .
I support t h a t . You and I had a good
meeting t h e r e . L e t ' s have our defense m i n i s t e r s meet t h e r e .
Our f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s would f o l l o w - u p . By Cologne, our teams
c o u l d p r e s e n t t o you and me a w e l l d e f i n e d p r o p o s a l t o r e v i e w .
B o r i s , i f we can move on these f r o n t s — implementing t h e
i n t e r i m p r o p o s a l t o deploy our f o r c e s i n t h e s h o r t - t e r m , and
a g r e e i n g t o have our teams meet t o prepare f o r our meeting —
we can g e t t h i s i s s u e under c o n t r o l and h e l p make Cologne a
success.
I f Yeltsin
pushes
for (& Russian
sector/commander
•
Boris, I
going t o
Madeleine
possibly
t h i n k I understand your needs and i n t e r e s t s . I'm
do e v e r y t h i n g I can - and w i l l make sure t h a t
and S e c r e t a r y Cohen do, t o o - and go as f a r as we
can i n accommodating you.
•
Strobe's team t h a t was j u s t i n Moscow made some c r e a t i v e
p r o p o s a l s on how we can ensure t h a t Russia has an area o f
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n Kosovo which i s e q u i t a b l e - and t h a t i s
w o r t h y o f Russia's r o l e and i n t e r e s t s .
•
A t t h e same t i m e , we must be c a r e f u l about f o u r t h i n g s :
1) The o p e r a t i o n must be m i l i t a r i l y e f f e c t i v e ;
2) We must ensure u n i t y o f command;
3) We must n o t a l l o w e i t h e r t h e p e r c e p t i o n o r t h e r e a l i t y
of a p a r t i t i o n o f Kosovo.
4) Russia must be f u l l y i n t e g r a t e d i n t o KFOR t o m i n i m i z e
the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e KLA w i l l see t h e Russian t r o o p s as
a t a r g e t . We became aware o f a KLA p l o t a g a i n s t Russian
t r o o p s y e s t e r d a y , which we were able t o head o f f .
•
We need t o ask our defense m i n i s t e r s t o develop these ideas
t h i s week and p r e s e n t us w i t h s o l u t i o n s .
I f Yeltsin
links
Track
1 and Track
2
PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING
I
�T>
rE
_r;nNr *»*ft*T
•
There i s a r e a l urgency about g e t t i n g t h e Russians a l r e a d y i n
Kosovo f u l l y i n t e g r a t e d i n t o KFOR because we cannot a l l o w a
s e c u r i t y vacuum t o form t h a t would j e o p a r d i z e t h e peace.
•
Our people have agreed on an i n t e r i m model t h a t w i l l get t h i s
•problem f i x e d q u i c k l y . We're u s i n g a s i m i l a r approach i n
Bosnia. So l e t ' s use i t and make i t work.
•
You a l s o have my commitment t o move as q u i c k l y as p o s s i b l e on
the l o n g e r - t e r m command arrangements f o r Russian p a r t i c i p a t i o n
i n KFOR. My bottom l i n e s are e f f e c t i v e n e s s and u n i t y o f
command and c o n t r o l .
•
But l e t ' s n o t l i n k these two t r a c k s t o g e t h e r , e s p e c i a l l y when
we can move t o g e t h e r now and get f a c t s on t h e ground t h a t show
t h a t we can work e f f e c t i v e l y s i d e - b y - s i d e .
I f Yeltsin
says
the
KLA is
going
to provoke
Russian
forces
•
We l e a r n e d o f a p l o t a g a i n s t Russia. B o r i s , i f Russian t r o o p s
are n o t p a r t o f KFOR, t h e KLA w i l l b e l i e v e they came i n t o
Kosovo t o p r o t e c t Serb f o r c e s , and Russian t r o o p s w i l l become
a greater target.
•
We've made c l e a r t h a t we would n o t t o l e r a t e any a t t a c k s on
your f o r c e s , b u t t h i s i l l u s t r a t e s t h e importance o f your
f o r c e s coming f u l l y i n t o KFOR w i t h i t s UN mandate.
PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING
COtTFIDEMT IAD
G
fQN^t-TBRARY TOOTOCOPY
1
C&WMWfSW^tiSWeWY: :
�r^NFTHFiNTT ATi
•
B o r i s , I hope a t a minimum we can agree now t o go ahead w i t h
the f i r s t t r a c k . Time i s p r e c i o u s , and we need t o show again
t h a t our t r o o p s can work s i d e - b y - s i d e t o p r o t e c t t h e peace.
•
The second t r a c k i s more c o m p l i c a t e d , b u t l e t ' s i n s t r u c t our
-generals t o agree on t h e d e t a i l s on t h e b a s i s o f our
conversation.
•
I f we can do these t h i n g s , n o t o n l y can we make t h e peace
s e t t l ^ i i f i e n t work i n Kosovo, we w i l l have t h e b a s i s f o r a r e a l
r a t i o n when we meet i n Cologne.
Boris
linJfcs Track
1 to
agreement
on Track
2
There i s a r e a l urgency about Track 1 because we cannot a l l o w
a s e c u r i t y vacuum t o form t h a t would j e o p a r d i z e t h e peace.
We know t h e i n t e r i m model works.
Bosnia. So l e t ' s use i t .
We're making i t work i n
You a l s o have my commitment t o move as q u i c k l y as Russia can
on Track 2. My bottom l i n e s are e f f e c t i v e n e s s and u n i t y o f
command and c o n t r o l .
•
But l e t ' s n o t l i n k these two t r a c k s t o g e t h e r , e s p e c i a l l y when
we can move t o g e t h e r now and get f a c t s on t h e g ^ u n d t h a t show
t h a t we can work e f f e c t i v e l y s i d e - b y - s i d e .
If
Boris
suggest
a one-week
deadline
on T:
•
I am committed t o move as q u i c k l y as Russia as long as we s t a y
focused on an e f f e c t i v e f o r c e w i t h u n i f i e d command and
control.
PHOTOCOPY
. HANDWRITING
)r'MBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�SECRET
5128
THE WHITE HOUSE
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
WAS H I N GTO N
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telephone Conversation
Y e l t s i n (/)
PARTICIPANTS
The P r e s i d e n t
President Y e l t s i n
INTERPRETER:
N i k o l a i Sorokin
Notetakers:
J o e l Schrader, M i l e s Murphy, Matt
S i b l e y , J o e l Ehrendreich, Roger M e r l e t t i , Doug
Bayley, and Andrew Weiss
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
June 14, 1999, 10:06 - 10:32 a.m.
Oval O f f i c e
The
President:
Hello.
President Y e l t s i n :
w i t h Russian P r e s i d e n t
(U)
Good morning. B i l l .
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t : Good morning, B o r i s .
Yesterday, you and I agreed
to i n s t r u c t o u r generals t o meet and r e s o l v e t h e problem o f
command a t t h e a i r p o r t and r e p o r t back t o us on what they worked
out.
I was q u i t e d i s a p p o i n t e d —
(^0
P r e s i d e n t Y e l t s i n : Yes, they d i d . They met y e s t e r d a y , and I
gave i n s t r u c t i o n s t o h o l d t h e necessary n e g o t i a t i o n s i n o r d e r t o
come t o an agreement w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e r e g u l a t i o n s o f t h e
support team f o r t h e Russian presence a t t h e a i r p o r t o f S l a t i n a
near P r i s t i n a . And we proceed from t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t t h i s
group, i n t h e framework o f t h e f i r s t stage, w i l l remain a t t h e
a i r p o r t and w i l l be f u n c t i o n i n g i n t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y f o r c e . And t h e c o o p e r a t i o n o f t h e group
w i t h t h e commanders o f t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l peacemaking f o r c e w i l l
be p o r t r a y e d i n an accord based on t h e Bosnia f o r m u l a .
The forces that are not there yet, to ensure the full functioning
of the group, will be deployed upon reaching an agreement and in
the framework of coordination with General Jackson. Generals
Zavarzin and Jackson have already exchanged liaison officers.
They have discussed the problems of ensuring the security of the
personnel of the Russian contingent. { j f )
SECRET
Reason:
1.5(b)
Declassify O(;LINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�.SCCRET
I i n s t r u c t e d General Z a v a r z i n t o a r r i v e a t an agreement p r o v i d i n g
f o r t h e j o i n t o p e r a t i o n o f t h e S l a t i n a a i r p o r t . An example o f
such j o i n t use, o f c l e a r - c u t use, c o u l d be t h e j o i n t o p e r a t i o n o f
the Tuzla a i r p o r t i n Bosnia.
However, i n t h i s case t h e p o s i t i o n s
of c o n t r o l should be r e t a i n e d by Russia. (^ff
And it is of extreme importance to have, in the coming two or
three days, completed the process of reaching an agreement on the
principal issue of deployment in the course of the second stage
of the full scope of the peacemaking operation of the Russian
contingent under a joint command. Such agreement to Track 2, or
the second stage, should be reached at the level of Ministers of
Defense and Ministers of Foreign Affairs and reported to you and
me before the meeting in Cologne. [JS)
I n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n , I c o n s i d e r i t v e r y i m p o r t a n t f o r our
M i n i s t e r s o f Defense t o meet tomorrow o r a t t h e l a t e s t t h e day
a f t e r tomorrow a t a p l a c e acceptable f o r them. I f S e c r e t a r y
Cohen i s prepared, then M i n s t e r o f Defense Sergeyev would be
p r e p a r e d t o welcome him i n Moscow and meet him here.
^0
I proceed from t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t , h a v i n g reached such
agreements on t h e m a t t e r s o f p r i n c i p l e r e g a r d i n g t h e s e t t l e m e n t
i n Kosovo, t h a t should enable us n o t t o overburden t h e agenda o f
our c o n v e r s a t i o n i n Cologne. I n t h a t event, we would be i n
p o s i t i o n t o c e n t e r our a t t e n t i o n on Russian-American c o o p e r a t i o n
i n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t areas.
(/0
I should like to raise for your benefit, with regard to Kosovo,
another problem. If measures, timely measures, are not taken
then the settlement could be in danger, could be jeopardized.
What is meant is the provocative actions of the so-called Kosovo
Liberation Army. We continuously said, and all the other members
of the G-8 agreed, that such a situation cannot be permitted to
materialize in which the return of the Albanian refugees to
Kosovo could and would result in chasing away the representatives
of other nationalities. Regrettably, that is taking place. And
the main responsibility is with the Albanian militants. This is
a cause of my disenchantment, that the peacemakers in Kosovo, in
fact, turn a blind eye to that occurrence. The result of that,
when it went as far as this, is that the militants begin to
threaten the Russian peacekeepers. And you can imagine the
consequences if these threats are translated into reality.
Madame Albright assured Ivanov that appropriate work has been
done vis-a-vis the leaders of the Kosovo Liberation Army. I
should like to ask you to take this issue and keep it under your
personal control. This is all I wanted to say. i f f )
The P r e s i d e n t : F i r s t o f a l l , l e t me say w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e
Kosovo L i b e r a t i o n Army, we d i d l e a r n o f a p l o t a g a i n s t Russia,
*CWT
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�and we t o l d them we would n o t t o l e r a t e a t t a c k s on your f o r c e s ,
and t h e y agreed n o t t o do i t . But i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o understand
why t h e y wanted t o do i t . They b e l i e v e t h e impasse a t t h e
a i r p o r t w i l l p r e v e n t an e f f e c t i v e KFOR. They b e l i e v e you came
i n t o Kosovo o n l y t o p r o t e c t t h e Serbs, n o t t o be p a r t o f t h e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l f o r c e . We made i t c l e a r we w i l l n o t t o l e r a t e
a t t a c k s on your f o r c e s . We have t o g e t t h i s r e s o l v e d or we can
expect t r o u b l e .
We have t o r e s o l v e t h e a i r p o r t i s s u e .
Now what you have said about the airport today is good. That is,
it could be jointly operated and access be guaranteed, but this
is not what came out of the meeting between General Jackson and
your general. So based on what you have said to me and the
conversation Al Gore and Stepashin had, the general has to get
those instructions so we can resolve that matter today. {JOf
President Y e l t s i n :
But t h a t was n o t our agreement. F i r s t , t h e
agreement s h o u l d be reached, and then we s h a l l immediately i s s u e
i n s t r u c t i o n s . (^f
The P r e s i d e n t :
I agree. So what I am s a y i n g , i f we are a g r e e i n g
on t h i s , l e t me go through t h e p o i n t s , and see i f we have
agreement.
President Y e l t s i n :
Okay.
(U)
The President: First, there will be an interim deployment,
short-term, using the Bosnian model that will include a Russian
component at the airport. Second, impasses at the airport will
be resolved. Russian troops will stay there, but there will be
no more deployments until we agree. Third, our defense ministers
will meet to work out the long-term arrangements for Russian
participation so we can, you and I, have a meeting in Cologne and
ratify that.
{^]
President Y e l t s i n :
The
President:
Agreed.
(U)
I would l i k e t o —
President Y e l t s i n :
agree. (U)
(U)
I say o u t r i g h t and from t h e o u t s e t t h a t I
The President: Okay, I would like to make another point or two
if I might. First of all, I would like to propose that Secretary
Cohen and Minister Sergeyev meet in Helsinki because I know that
we have discussed that with Mr. Stepashin, and I mentioned it to
President Ahtisaari, and he has agreed to do it, so I think they
should meet there.
(pf
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�President Y e l t s i n :
instructions.
(U)
I agree and s h a l l i s s u e the a p p r o p r i a t e
The P r e s i d e n t :
That i s g r e a t . The o t h e r t h i n g I wanted t o say
i s t h a t I w i l l work hard on t h i s .
There must be a f a i r and
r e s p o n s i b l e r o l e f o r Russia i n t h i s u n i t e d o p e r a t i o n , and t h e r e
are i s s u e s somewhat d i f f e r e n t than i n Bosnia, and I have some
ideas t h a t I w i l l g i v e t o S e c r e t a r y Cohen and t r y t o work t h r o u g h
t h i s so you w i l l be pleased and so t h a t the m i s s i o n w i l l be
s u c c e s s f u l . But I t h i n k i t i s v e r y i m p o r t a n t t h a t we come t o
terms t h a t w i l l assure us t h a t t h i s m i s s i o n w i l l succeed.
(^f
T h e r e f o r e , we have t o agree on terms f o r the u n i f i e d command, b u t
one t h a t w i l l be acceptable t o you.
I t h i n k we can do t h a t . I
commit t o you we w i l l ensure an e q u i t a b l e and r e s p o n s i b l e r o l e of
Russia w o r t h y o f your i n t e r e s t s and c a p a c i t y t o c o n t r i b u t e .
There are t h i n g s t h e r e t h a t no one e l s e can do, and we need you
there.
I t i s very important.
(JST
P r e s i d e n t Y e l t s i n : Did you set f o r t h a l l your items t h a t
wanted t o share w i t h me?
(U)
The
President:
Absolutely.
you
(U)
P r e s i d e n t Y e l t s i n : Then I would l i k e t o t e l l you I f u l l y agree,
t h a t I w i l l i s s u e a p p r o p r i a t e i n s t r u c t i o n s and then those
i n s t r u c t i o n s would be f u l l y c a r r i e d i n t o e f f e c t .
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t :
Thank you so much, B o r i s . I l o o k f o r w a r d t o
seeing you i n Cologne. We w i l l work t h i s o u t , and i t w i l l be a
good t h i n g .
(U)
P r e s i d e n t Y e l t s i n : Very good, v e r y good. B i l l , I am v e r y g l a d
we have e l e c t e d such i s s u e s , which do not i n f r i n g e on t h e
i n t e r e s t s o f the o t h e r p a r t n e r .
(U)
The
President:
Good.
President Y e l t s i n :
The
President:
B o r i s , I w i l l see you soon.
U n t i l we meet.
Goodbye.
President Y e l t s i n :
(U)
(U)
Goodbye, B i l l .
—
(U)
I embrace you.
End o f Conversation
(U)
—
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�5128
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telephone Conversation with
Yeltsin {jfl
PARTICIPANTS
The P r e s i d e n t
President Y e l t s i n
INTERPRETER:
N i k o l a i Sorokin
Notetakers:
Joel
r a d e r , M i l e s Murphy,
Matt S i b l e y , J o e l
r e n d r e i c h , Roger
M e r l e t t i , Doug Ba^ .ey and Andrew Weiss
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
June 14, 1999,
Oval O f f i c e
The P r e s i d e n t :
Hello.
President Y e l t s i n :
issian President
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
06 - 10:32 a.m.
(U)
Good inorning, B i l l .
(U)
The President: Good morning,
Boris. Yesterday, you and I
agreed to instruct our/generals to meet and resolve the
problem of command at/the airport and report back to us on
what they worked out/.
I was quite disappointed -- (Jg)
President Yeltsin^/ Yes, they did. They met yesterday, and
I gave instructions to hold the necessary negotiations in
order to come tc/ an agreement with regard to the regulations
of the support /team for the Russian presence at the airport
of Slatina near Pristina. And we proceed from the
understanding/that this group, in the framework of the first
stage, will /remain at the airport and will be functioning in
the interests of the international security force. And the
cooperation of the group with the commanders of the
international peacemaking force will be portrayed in an
accord b^sed on the Bosnia formula. (jgfl
The foi/ces t h a t a r e n o t t h e r e y e t , t o ensure t h e f u l l
f u n c t i o n i n g o f t h e group, w i l l be deployed upon r e a c h i n g an
agreement and i n t h e framework o f c o o r d i n a t i o n w i t h General
JackJon.
Generals Z a v a r z i n and Jackson have a l r e a d y
exchanged l i a i s o n o f f i c e r s .
They have discussed t h e
problems o f e n s u r i n g t h e s e c u r i t y o f t h e personnel o f t h e
Russian c o n t i n g e n t .
I i n s t r u c t e d General Z a v a r z i n t o a r r i v e a t an agreement
providing f o r the j o i n t operation of the Slatina a i r p o r t .
An example o f such j o i n t use, o f c l e a r - c u t use, c o u l d be t h e
CECRETReason:
1.5(b)
D e c l a s s i f ^ ^ n J [\j7pQ|\j9 L I B R A R Y
Pl~
CP
OY
�j o i n t o p e r a t i o n o f t h e Tuzla a i r p o r t i n Bosnia. However, i n
t h i s case t h e p o s i t i o n s o f c o n t r o l should be r e t a i n e d by
Russia.
And i t i s o f extreme importance t o have, i n t h e coming two
or t h r e e days, completed t h e process o f r e a c h i n g an
agreement on t h e p r i n c i p a l i s s u e o f deployment i n t h e coarse
o f t h e second stage o f t h e f u l l scope o f t h e peacemakii
o p e r a t i o n o f t h e Russian c o n t i n g e n t under a j o i n t command.
Such agreement t o Track 2, o r t h e second stage, s h o u l d be
reached a t t h e l e v e l o f M i n i s t e r s o f Defense and M i n i s t e r s
of F o r e i g n A f f a i r s and r e p o r t e d t o you and me b e f o r e t h e
m e e t i n g i n Cologne. (X)
In this connection, I consider it very important for our
Ministers of Defense to meet tomorrow or at/the latest the
day after tomorrow at a place acceptable for them. If
Secretary Cohen is prepared, then Minster/of
Defense
Sergeyev would be prepared to welcome h/m in Moscow and meet
him here. (J?)
I proceed from t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h ^ t , having reached such
agreements on t h e m a t t e r s o f p r i n o i p l e r e g a r d i n g t h e
s e t t l e m e n t i n Kosovo, t h a t shoulcr enable us n o t t o
overburden t h e agenda o f our c o n v e r s a t i o n i n Cologne. I n
t h a t event, we would be i n p o s i t i o n t o c e n t e r our a t t e n t i o n
on Russian-American cooperat/on i n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t areas.
I s h o u l d l i k e t o r a i s e f o r your b e n e f i t , w i t h r e g a r d t o
Kosovo, another p r o b l e m / I f measures, t i m e l y measures, a r e
not t a k e n then t h e s e t t l e m e n t c o u l d be i n danger, c o u l d be
j e o p a r d i z e d . What is^meant i s t h e p r o v o c a t i v e a c t i o n s o f
the s o - c a l l e d Kosovo L i b e r a t i o n Army. We c o n t i n u o u s l y s a i d ,
and a l l t h e o t h e r members o f t h e G-8 agreed, t h a t such a
s i t u a t i o n cannot/be p e r m i t t e d t o m a t e r i a l i z e i n which t h e
r e t u r n o f t h e A l b a n i a n refugees t o Kosovo c o u l d and would
r e s u l t i n chasing away t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f o t h e r
n a t i o n a l i t i e s - ' . R e g r e t t a b l y , t h a t i s t a k i n g p l a c e . And t h e
main r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s w i t h t h e A l b a n i a n m i l i t a n t s .
This i s
a cause of/my disenchantment, t h a t t h e peacemakers i n
Kosovo, / n f a c t , t u r n a b l i n d eye t o t h a t occurrence.
The
r e s u l t / 6 f t h a t , when i t went as f a r as t h i s , i s t h a t t h e
m i l i t a n t s b e g i n t o t h r e a t e n t h e Russian peacekeepers. And
you/fcan imagine t h e consequences i f these t h r e a t s a r e
t r a n s l a t e d i n t o r e a l i t y . Madame A l b r i g h t assured Ivanov
t h a t a p p r o p r i a t e work has been done v i s - a - v i s t h e l e a d e r s o f
the Kosovo L i b e r a t i o n Army. I should l i k e t o ask you t o
take t h i s i s s u e and keep i t under your p e r s o n a l c o n t r o l .
This i s a l l I wanted t o say.
aINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�The President: First of all, let me say with regard to tl
Kosovo Liberation Army, we did learn of a plot against
Russia, and we told them we would not tolerate attacks /3n
your forces, and they agreed not to do it. But it is,
important to understand why they wanted to do it. T^ney
believe the impasse at the airport will prevent an/effective
KFOR. They believe you came into Kosovo only to /protect the
Serbs, not to be part of the international force. We made
it clear we will not tolerate attacks on your/forces. We
have to get this resolved or we can expect t/ouble. We have
to resolve the airport issue. y£)
Now what you have s a i d about t h e a i r p o r t / t o d a y i s good.
That i s , i t c o u l d be j o i n t l y operated and access be
guaranteed, b u t t h i s i s n o t what came/out o f t h e meeting
between General Jackson and your g e n e r a l . So based on what
you have s a i d t o me and t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n A l Gore and
S t e p a s h i n had, t h e g e n e r a l has t o /get those i n s t r u c t i o n s so
we can r e s o l v e t h a t m a t t e r t o d a y / (^1
P r e s i d e n t Y e l t s i n : But t h a t w^s n o t our agreement.
the agreement should be reac d, an^ then we s h a l l
and
immediately issue i n s t r u c t i o n s .
First,
The P r e s i d e n t :
I agree.
what I am s a y i n g , i f we a r e
a g r e e i n g on t h i s , l e t me/go through t h e p o i n t s , and see i f
we have agreement. ^20
President
Yeltsin:
The P r e s i d e n t : F i r ^ t , t h e r e w i l l be an i n t e r i m deployment,
s h o r t - t e r m , u s i n g t h e Bosnian model t h a t w i l l i n c l u d e a
Russian component/at t h e a i r p o r t .
Second, impasses a t t h e
a i r p o r t w i l l be /resolved. Russian t r o o p s w i l l s t a y t h e r e ,
b u t t h e r e w i l l /be no more deployments u n t i l we agree.
T h i r d , our defense m i n i s t e r s w i l l meet t o work o u t t h e l o n g term arrangements f o r Russian p a r t i c i p a t i o n so we can, you
and I , have/a meeting i n Cologne and r a t i f y t h a t . (S)
President/Yeltsin:
The
President:
Agreed.
(U)
I would l i k e t o -- (U)
President Y e l t s i n :
I agree. (U)
I say o u t r i g h t and from t h e o u t s e t t h a t
The P r e s i d e n t : Okay, I would l i k e t o make another p o i n t o r
two i f I m i g h t .
F i r s t o f a l l , I would l i k e t o propose t h a t
S e c r e t a r y Cohen and M i n i s t e r Sergeyev meet i n H e l s i n k i
because I know t h a t we have discussed t h a t w i t h ^ c J - ^ \ ^ R ( J j . ^ ^
Stepashin, and I mentioned i t t o P r e s i d e n t A h t i s a a r i , and4ie
has agreed t o do i t , so I t h i n k they should meet t h e r e . (^f
<^-e£lINT0N LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�President Y e l t s i n :
instructions.
(U)
I agree and s h a l l i s s u e t h e a p p r o p r i a t e
The P r e s i d e n t : That i s g r e a t . The o t h e r t h i n g I Wanted t o
say i s t h a t I w i l l work hard cn t h i s .
There must/be a f a i r
and r e s p o n s i b l e r o l e f o r Russia i n t h i s u n i t e d -eJperation,
and t h e r e are issues somewhat d i f f e r e n t than i^n Bosnia, and
I have some ideas t h a t I w i l l g i v e t o S e c r e t a r y Cohen and
t r y t o work t h r o u g h t h i s so you w i l l be p l e a s e d and so t h a t
t h e m i s s i o n w i l l be s u c c e s s f u l . But I t j / i n k i t i s v e r y
i m p o r t a n t t h a t we come t o terms t h a t w j / l l assure us t h a t
t h i s m i s s i o n w i l l succeed. (^f
Therefore, we have to agree on terifis for the unified
command, but one that will be acceptable to you. I think we
can do that. I commit to you we will ensure an equitable
and responsible role of Russia/worthy of your interests and
capacity to contribute. The/e are things there that no one
else can do, and we need yqn there. It is very important.
<fi
President Y e l t s i n :
Did/you s e t f o r t h a l l your items
you wanted t o share w i / h me? (U)
The
President:
Abso/utely.
that
(U)
P r e s i d e n t Y e l t s i n : / Then I would l i k e t o t e l l you I f u l l y
agree, t h a t I w i l d i s s u e a p p r o p r i a t e i n s t r u c t i o n s and t h e n
those i n s t r u c t i o n s would be f u l l y c a r r i e d i n t o e f f e c t . (U)
The P r e s i d e n t : / Thank you so much, B o r i s . I l o o k f o r w a r d t o
seeing you i n ' Cologne. We w i l l work t h i s o u t , and i t w i l l
be a good t h i n g .
(U)
P r e s i d e n t / Y e l t s i n : Very good, v e r y good. B i l l , I am v e r y
g l a d we h,4ve e l e c t e d such i s s u e s , which do n o t i n f r i n g e on
the i n t & r e s t s o f t h e o t h e r p a r t n e r . (U)
The
President:
Good.
B o r i s , I w i l l see you soon.
(U)
/
President Y e l t s i n :
U n t i l we meet.
(U)
/'
/
The
President:
Goodbye.
President Y e l t s i n :
(U)
Goodbye, B i l l .
—
I embrace you.
End o f Conversation
—
LINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
(U)
�
Dublin Core
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Title
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<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
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Clinton Presidential Records
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Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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Title
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Declassified Documents concerning Russia
Identifier
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2011-0892-M
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on telephone conversations (telcons) between President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin from June 13-14, 1999. Material includes emails with drafts of proposed talking points, background information on the military and political situation in Kosovo vis-a-vis Russia, and a telcon from June 14.
Creator
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National Security Council
Format
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Adobe Acrobat Document
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Reproduction-Reference
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<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7388766" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Publisher
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
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2/6/2015
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2011-0892-M
7388766
Boris Yeltsin
Declassified
Foreign Policy
Kosovo
Russia
Telcon
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/db3551b0d4dd2a015a0894c8c1f33336.pdf
efc18d16f22b14f5eb410bcf596596d4
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this declassification review were released in full
or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) of E.O. 13526.
�UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-25789 Doc No. C05283082 Date: 07/10/2013
RELEASED
IN FULL
PTQ5101
O C C R n — ^ PTQ5101
PAGE 01
STATE 320329 010223Z
ORIGIN SS-00
INFO LOG-00 CCO-00 OASY-00 EUR-01 TEDE-00 ADS-00
SSO-00 SNIS-00 /001R
ONY-00
DRAFTED BY: EUR/ISCA:ALL:MMC
APPROVED BY: S/NIS:SPIFER
S/S-0:BJSTEPHENSON
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
S/NIS, EUR/ISCA ONLY
8DDA35 010231Z/61
O010218Z DEC 94 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE
GC C R C T STATE 320329 TOSEC 280046
PLEASE PASS TO JIM COLLINS/MARCIA WONG
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: AMGT
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL
1. OFFICIAL-INFORMAL FOR JIM COLLINS. S/NIS DAR FOR 11/30,
BUDAPEST
2 . 4 e r F R O M PIFER. YOU SHOULD SEE SEVERAL MESSAGES IN
THE FRONT CHANNEL, ONE LAYING OUT THE (HOPEFULLY FINAL)
SCENARIO OF FOUR CEREMONIES, THE SECOND ADVISING WHICH
SECRET
REVIEW AUTHORITY: Frank Perez,
Senior Reviewer
-SECRET
PAGE 02
STATE 320329 010223Z
DOCUMENTS WE STILL NEED TO GET, AND THE THIRD REGARDING THE
UKRAINIAN INSTRUMENT OF NPT ACCESSION. SUFFICE IT TO SAY
THAT A LOT OF LOOSE ENDS NEED TO GET WRAPPED UP. PLEASE BE
SURE THAT JIM CUNNINGHAM SEES MESSAGES REGARDING THE
BUDAPEST CEREMONIES, SO THAT HE CAN FACTOR THEM INTO HIS
CSCE PLANNING.
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. DbpfeftrteW df'Sttr 3 O a s *
D
J25789
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
JsO^
Date: 07/10/2013
�UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-25789
Doc No. C05283082 Date: 07/10/2013
MOSCOW GAMEPLAN FOR CW AND BW ISSUES
3. -tS7~FROM JANETTE HILL. A GAMEPLAN HAS BEEN DEVISED BY
THE NSC TO CONDUCT A SERIES OF MEETINGS IN MOSCOW ON CW AND
BW ISSUES WITH THE RUSSIANS. THE INTENT OF THE GAMEPLAN IS
TO BREAK THE CW/BW LOGJAM WE ARE CURRENTLY FACING. THE
MEETINGS HAVE BEEN INTENTIONALLY PLANNED TO BE HELD JUST
PRIOR TO AND DURING THE DECEMBER GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN
COMMISSION MEETINGS, WITH AN ESCALATION IN THE SENIORITY OF
THE PARTICIPANTS AT EACH MEETING INTENDED TO RATCHET UP THE
PRESSURE ON THE RUSSIANS.
4 . - ( S r O M CW, AS A FOLLOW-UP TO THE CLINTON-YELTSIN
MID-NOVEMBER LETTER, WE HAVE PROPOSED HOLDING CONSULTATIONS
IN MOSCOW ON DECEMBER 12-13. THE RUSSIAN RESPONSE TO DATE
IS THAT THEY ARE CURRENTLY WORKING ON A RESPONSE TO THE
PRESIDENTS LETTER, WHICH WE ASSUME WILL INCLUDE A RESPONSE
TO HIS PROPOSAL TO HOLD CW CONSULTATIONS IN MOSCOW.
^-{6)-€>N BW, THE HEADS OF DEL HAVE AGREED TO MEET IN
MOSCOW DURING THE SAME TIME PERIOD (DECEMBER 12-13), WITH A
FOLLOW-UP MEETING TO BE HELD ON DECEMBER 14 WITH LYNN
DAVIS, MAMEDOV AND BRITISH HEAD OF DEL TO THE BW TALKS
BRIAN DONNELLY. IT IS THE INTENT OF THE NSC TO HAVE THE
PAGE03
STATE 320329 010223Z
VICE PRESIDENT DISCUSS THE STATUS OF BOTH CW AND BW WITH
CHERNOMYRDIN. OUR VIEW IS THAT THIS GAMEPLAN, WHILE WELL
INTENDED, IS OVERLY OPTIMISTIC IN ITS ABILITY TO MOVE THE
CW/BW PROCESS FORWARD.
TERRIBLE IN GROZNY
6,-(G)-FROM MARK PEKALA. ACCORDING TO EYEWITNESS REUTER
REPORTERS, AT LEAST THREE UNIDENTIFIED PLANES BOMBED A
MILITARY AIRFIELD FIVE KM FROM GROZNYY WEDNESDAY MORNING,
SETTING ABLAZE FUEL STORAGE TANKS AND AT LEAST 10 CHECHEN
AIRCRAFT. NO ONE HAS CLAIMED CREDIT FOR THE BOMBING RUN,
THE SECOND IN CHECHNYA IN TWO DAYS. DUDAYEV URGED WOMEN
AND CHILDREN ON WEDNESDAY TO LEAVE GROZNYY. INTERFAX IS
REPORTING THAT INTERIOR MINISTRY TROOPS ARE MASSING ON THE
CHECHEN BORDER; YELTSIN'S DEADLINE WILL EXPIRE AT 0600
MOSCOW TIME THURSDAY (0300 GMT).
7. - < e r t f RUSSIAN EMBOFF TOLD ISCA TODAY THAT MOSCOW IS
CONSIDERING DOING NOTHING AT THE EXPIRY OF THE DEADLINE AND
MAY SEND SERGEY YUSHENKOV, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DUMA DEFENSE
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. DfejJI r t r J r J ' T f Q a i cLsI l i P J ^ l ^ S l i g h t Q l X l Q Q S o f c Date: 07/10/2013
�UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-25789 Doc No. C05283082 Date: 07/10/2013
COMMITTEE, TO GROZNYY TO OFFER DUDAYEV AN (UNSPECIFIED)
FACE-SAVING WAY OUT. OUR PRESS GUIDANCE HAS EMPHASIZED
THAT THIS IS AN INTERNAL RUSSIAN MATTER, THAT CHECHNYA HAS
LONG BEEN AN UNSTABLE HAVEN FOR ORGANIZED CRIME AND WORSE,
AND THAT WE URGE ALL SIDES TO SEEK A PEACEFUL AND DURABLE
SOLUTION THAT RESPECTS LAW AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ALL
CONCERNED.
NO MOSCOW SUMMIT
- oecRrr
- oconrr
PAGE 04
STATE 320329 010223Z
8.-(0)- FROM MARIA GERMANO. ACCORDING TO REPORTING FROM
YEREVAN, BAKU AND MOSCOW, THERE WILL BE NO MOSCOW SUMMIT ON
DECEMBER 1. THE ARMENIANS REPORTED THAT ALIYEV BECAME
"ILL" AND WOULD NOT ATTEND. THE AZERBAIJANIS HAVE
REITERATED THAT ALIYEV DOES NOT PLAN TO GO TO MOSCOW AND
WILL NOT "CAVE" TO THE RUSSIANS. THE AZERBAIJANIS HAVE
RENEWED THEIR REQUEST FOR A MEETING FOR ALIYEV IN BUDAPEST
EITHER WITH THE PRESIDENT OR THE SECRETARY. ALIYEV IS THE
ONLY HOLD-OUT TO A RUSSIAN-DOMINATED PEACEKEEPING MISSION
FOR NAGORNO-KARABAKH.
9. ^G)-WE CHECKED WITH THE NSC, WHICH CONFIRMED THAT THE
PRESIDENTS SCHEDULE IS TOO TIGHT FOR A MEETING WITH
ALIYEV. A SHORT ASIDE WITH THE SECRETARY MIGHT BE AN
APPROPRIATE 'THANK-YOU" FOR STICKING WITH THE CSCE PEACE
PROCESS AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO URGE ALIYEV TO STAY THE
COURSE. PLEASE LET US KNOW IF YOU NEED ANYTHING FORMAL
FROM US FOR THE SECRETARY.
KOMI OIL SPILL
10.-(erFROM DAN SPECKHARD. THE U.N. HAS NOTIFIED US
THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE ASKED THEM FOR ASSISTANCE ON THE
KOMI OIL SPILL. SPECIFICALLY, THEY HAVE ASKED FOR SOME
SPECIALISTS AND MACHINERY. THE U.N. IN TURN HAS ASKED THE
U.S. AND A NUMBER OF OTHER COUNTRIES IF THEY CAN PROVIDE
THE PEOPLE OR EQUIPMENT. WE THINK WE WILL BE ABLE TO HELP
ON THE SPECIALISTS, BUT NONE OF THE EQUIPMENT IN
MANUFACTURED IN THE U.S.
occmrr
32
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. oMtftn *i(M"IfQtJs desl ^RARz^syBHjQ'li'DiQQJso^: Date: 07/10/2013
1
�UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-25789 Doc No. C05283082 Date: 07/10/2013
•• GECRET
PAGE 05
STATE 320329 010223Z
BALANCE OF PAYMENT SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE
11. - f S ^ R O M DAN SPECKHARD. WE ARE HEARING THROUGH THE
GRAPEVINE THAT THE GERMANS HAVE CONVINCED THE FRENCH TO
SUPPORT BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS FOR UKRAINE AT THE ECOFIN EU
MEETING ON MONDAY. HOWEVER, THE BRITISH REMAIN DEAD SET
AGAINST ANYTHING UNTIL THERE IS A STANDBY. IT APPEARS THAT
WE WILL BE UNSUCCESSFUL TO CHANGE THEIR MINDS SHORT OF A
CALL FROM POTUS TO MAJOR. AS A RESULT, WE ARE TALKING TO
THE NSC TO SEE IF THERE IS ANY POSSIBILITY OF A
PRESIDENTIAL CALL.
UKRAINIAN OP-ED
12. (U) FROM ANNE JOHNSON. THE UKRAINIAN WEEKLY TOLD ME
TODAY THAT THEY HAVE ACCEPTED THE OP-ED FOR PUBLICATION IN
THIS WEEK'S EDITION AND COMMENTED THAT THEY WELCOME ANY
FUTURE CONTRIBUTIONS. LOOKS LIKE WE'VE FOUND A VEHICLE TO
GET OUT THE MESSAGE. ON ANOTHER NOTE, HOPE YOU ARE HAPPY
WITH THE POSITIVE WORLDNET REVIEWS (FAXED SEPARATELY.) NOW
ITS ON TO PRIME TIME.
TAJIKISTAN ACTION MEMO
13.-<G)-FROM BILL JACKSON. WE CIRCULATED THE FIRST DRAFT
OF THE ACTION MEMO TO D ON THE UN OPERATION AND HOSTED A
MEETING WITH IO, PM, USUN/W AND OTHER CLEARERS. THE LONG
AND THE SHORT OF IT IS THAT THIS WILUWILL BE A SPLIT
MEMO. IO AND PM ARE NOT CONVINCED THAT THE PROSPECTIVE UN
MISSION MEETS THE PDD CRITERIA BUT, MORE IMPORTANTLY,
OPPOSE BRINGING THIS MISSION TO THE HILL AS THE FIRST NEW
CCCRDT-
3ECRET
PAGE 06
STATE 320329 010223Z
UN PKO PRESENTED SINCE THE REPUBLICANS CAME TO POWER. THEY
ARE CONCERNED THAT THE CASE IS NOT STRONG AND WILL FURTHER
SOUR THE HILL ON PEACEKEEPING.
14, (C) ALONG WITH USUN, WE ARE MAKING A STRONG COUNTERARGUMENT THAT THE CONSEQUENCES OF OPPOSING THE OPERATION
WILL BE BAD BOTH FOR THE PEACE PROCESS AND FOR FUTURE
COOPERATION WITH THE RUSSIANS IN THE UNSC. WE HOPE TO GET
A FINAL OF THE MEMO MOVED TO THE SEVENTH FLOOR THURSDAY.
THE WORD FROM NEW YORK IS THAT THE UNSYG'S REPORT WILL BE
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. D Q artr i€ r i T f Q aJe (Ls3 ^ R A R 2 Y 2 5 7 R N Q ; T l O < Q Q l 3 ^ Date: 07/10/2013
63062
�UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-25789 Doc No. C05283082 Date: 07/10/2013
ISSUED THURSDAY AND THAT IT WILL NOT/NOT INCLUDE THE OPTION
OF STICKING WITH THE CURRENT 17 OBSERVERS AS A NON-ASSESSED
OPERATION. IN OTHER WORDS, THE ISSUE WILL BE PRESENTED TO
THE UNSC FOR AN UP-OR-DOWN VOTE ON AN EXPANDED MISSION OF
40 OR NOTHING AT ALL.
BIT WITH UZBEKISTAN
15; (0) FftOM SIMON SCHUCHAT. AT A NOVEMBER 29 MEETING
WITH AMBASSADOR TESHABAEV AT USTR, OUR BIT NEGOTIATORS
PROPOSED THAT AN UZBEKI DELEGATION COME TO WASHINGTON
DECEMBER 14-15 FOR NEGOTIATIONS. EB IS PREPARING A
FRONT-CHANNEL CABLE WHICH WILL INCLUDE OUR RESPONSE TO
THEIR COMMENTS ON THE BIT TEXT. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE
NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE COMPLETED IN ONE ROUND.
UKRAINE CHECKLIST
16.-(e>- YOU ASKED FOR A CHECKLIST OF NEXT STEPS WITH
UKRAINE. ATTACHED IS OUR CURRENT UNDERSTANDING OF WHERE A
VARIETY OF SUMMIT-RELATED ISSUES STANDS.
—SECRfrF
CEOnET >
PAGE 07
STATE 320329 010223Z
-- ENCOURAGE EU/JAPAN BALANCE OF PAYMENTS SUPPORT
O NSC-STAFF ACTION: PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION WITH
KEY ALLIES
-- BILATERAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
-- DELIVERY OF ENERGY GRANT
O UKRAINE ACTION: AID SET TO DISBURSE QUICKLY
ONCE UKRAINE TAKES CERTAIN NECESSARY
BUREAUCRATIC STEPS
- EXIM BANK FINANCING
O NSC-STAFF ACTION: BERGER TO CALL BRODY
-- MONITOR STATUS OF UNDISBURSED FUNDS FROM DOLS. 350M
ASSISTANCE ANNOUNCED IN SPRING 1994
O S/NIS/C ACTION: ONGOING
- ASSISTANCE WITH WORLD BANK
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. o l p i f t t l e ^ : c f Qi L
C asl
^ 2 5 7 ^ 9 tibi) Q X ( Q C f i 30^: Date: 07/10/2013
l ^ N<M3G5283082
�UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-25789 Doc No. C05283082 Date: 07/10/2013
O NEGOTIATIONS COMPLETE ON DOLS. 500M LOAN, BANK
BOARD TO CONSIDER WEEK OF 12/5.
-
BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS
O S/NIS ACTION: SEEKING SECRETARY/UDOVENKO MEETING,
GCCRCT
• OECRET
PAGE 08
STATE 320329 010223Z
SECRETARY-UDOVENKO LETTER DRAFTED 11/23
-- SPACE COOPERATION
O PM ACTION: MTCR TALKS PROPOSED FOR DECEMBER 7-8,
AWAITING UKRAINIAN REPLY
O USTR ACTION: HELD INITIAL TALKS ON COMMERCIAL
SPACE LAUNCHES, FUTURE TALKS AGREED (POSSIBLE
JANUARY)
-
CHORNOBYL
O PM ACTION: DECISION ON NEXT STEPS AWAITING G-7
TASK FORCE DECISIONS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE G-7
ACTION PLAN
-
NUNN-LUGAR: REALLOCATE FUNDS FOR HOUSING PROGRAM
O DOD ACTION: NEED TO GO TO CONGRESS TO EXPLORE
POSSIBILITY OF REALLOCATING FOR HOUSING
-- BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY
-- H ACTION: BIT LIKELY TO BE RESUBMITTED TO SENATE
EARLY NEXT SESSION
-- GSP RENEWAL
O GSP RENEWAL INCLUDED WITH GATT LEGISLATION
CEORET
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. o C L n U r V l f Q i i
desl
I ^ ^ 2 ^ 2 5 7 5 9 H j Q T O c Q Q l s O ^32 Date: 07/10/2013
:
�UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-25789
Doc No. C05283082 Date: 07/10/2013
PAGE 09
STATE 320329 010223Z
CURRENTLY BEFORE CONGRESS
-- LAW ENFORCEMENT AGREEMENT
O ISCA ACTION: ENCOURAGING JUSTICE TO ADD UKRAINE TO
LIST OF "TO-BE-NEGOTIATED"
-- JOINT COMMISSION ON TRADE AND INVESTMENT
O COMMERCE ACTION: NEXT MEETING MOST LIKELY IN KIEV,
DATE TBD; ESTABLISHING WORKING GROUPS UNDER JCTI
SCHEDULING
17. (U) FROM MAURA PELLET. YOU'VE RECEIVED AN INVITE
FROM HOLBROOKE FOR A THURSDAY DEC 8 MEETING WITH THE
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS NATO EXPANSION STUDY GROUP
CHAIRED BY HENRY KISSINGER. I SPOKE WITH DAN HAMILTON IN
EUR, WHO CONFIRMS THAT HOLBROOKE PLANS TO ATTEND, AS WELL
AS "FOUR OR FIVE OTHERS FROM EUR, INCLUDING JOHN
KORNBLUM." THE MEETING WILL ALSO INCLUDE MEMBERS FROM THE
DOD INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON NATO EXPANSION. I ASKED
IF MORE THAN ONE FROM S/NIS COULD ATTEND. HAMILTON SAID
YES, BUT THEY WERE TRYING TO KEEP IT AT THE DAS LEVEL. THE
BAD NEWS IS THAT THE MEETING RUNS FROM 1530-1800(') ON
THURS AND YOU ARE ALREADY PACKED. I WOULD HAVE TO TRY AND
RE-SCHEDULE A/S RAPHEL (CENASIA/AFGHANISTAN) AND TRUBNIKOV
(GATI'S OFFICE). DO YOU WANT TO ATTEND? OTHERS?
18. (U) NEELA BANERJEE (WALL STREET JOURNAL) HAS BEEN
ASSIGNED TO THE WSJ OFFICE IN MOSCOW. SHE'LL BE IN D.C.
-OEGRCT
OCCRETPAGE10
STATE 320329 010223Z
DEC 7 AND 8 AND WOULD LIKE TO TALK TO YOU ABOUT FSU AND
CENTRAL ASIA IN PARTICULAR. ANNE THINKS IT WOULD BE A VERY
GOOD IDEA TO TAKE AT LEAST 30 MINUTES TO MEET HER. YOU HAD
WANTED TO BE OUT OF THE OFFICE BY 1230 ON 12/7. THINGS
WILL BE HECTIC - YOUR FIRST DAY BACK -- BUT WE COULD MAKE
IT WORK.
19. (U) DAN THINKS IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA FOR YOU TO
ATTEND TOM DINE'S CENTRAL ASIAN ASSISTANCE STRATEGY MEETING
ON THURS 12/8 AT 1030. YOU HAVE MICAH NAFTALIN AT 1000
WITH TOM SIMONS. THE DAY IS VERY FULL - YOUR CALL.
DINE'S OFFICE WILL SEND PAPERS. YOU DON'T HAVE TO STAY THE
WHOLE MEETING.
UNCLASSIFIED U.S.
D^Mi
PH
iDfifiesoY:
25769 DWN
32 Date: 07/10/2013
�UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-25789 Doc No. C05283082 Date: 07/10/2013
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�F:\Cable\Data Soiirce\Cables\CDO 10\DEC94\MSGS\M 1391886.html
Cable
PREC:
CLASS:
LINEl:
LINE2:
LINE3:
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OSRI:
DTG:
ORIG:
TO:
INFO:
IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED
OAAUZYUW RUEHCAA1324 3360141 -UUUU--RHEHAAA.
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
0 020130Z DEC 94
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
RUEHC
020130Z DEC 94
SECSTATE WASHDC
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY M S O IMMEDIATE 3292
OCW
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8122
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4139
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1410
RUEKJCS/DOD WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3594
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 0031
RUEATRS/TREASURY WASHDC IMMEDIATE 22 96
SUBJ:
REPORT OF DEFENSE CONVERSION COMMITTEE TO GCC
TEXT:
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 STATE 321324
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PARM, PREL, MARR, RS, US
SUBJECT: REPORT OF DEFENSE CONVERSION COMMITTEE TO GCC
1. ACTION REQUEST: TO FACILITATE COMPLETION OF THE REPORT
OF THE U.S.-RUSSIA COMMITTEE ON CONVERSION OF DEFENSE
INDUSTRY TO THE GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN COMMISSION, EMBASSY
SHOULD DELIVER THE NON-PAPER IN PARAGRAPHS 2-4 3 BELOW TO
GENNADIY KUZIN OF THE MOD. RUSSIAN LANGUAGE VERSION OF THE
TEXT WILL BE FAXED TO USDAO FOR DELIVERY ALONG WITH ENGLISH
TEXT. EMBASSY SHOULD SEEK RAPID RESPONSE TO THE TEXT.
2. WASHINGTON REGRETS THAT THE RUSSIAN COMPONENT OF THE
WORKING GROUP OF THE U.S.-RUSSIA COMMITTEE ON DEFENSE
CONVERSION IS UNABLE TO TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON TO COMPLETE
THE COMMITTEE REPORT TO THE GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN COMMISSION.
MEMBERS OF THE U.S. COMPONENT PROPOSE THAT THE WORKING
GROUP MEET IN MOSCOW, BEGINNING AT 1300 HOURS ON DECEMBER
13 STRICTLY FOR PURPOSES OF SEEKING TO COMPLETE THE
REPORT. TO FACILITATE THIS EFFORT, WASHINGTON FURTHER
PROPOSES THAT THE SIDES SEEK TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES IN THE
TEXT IN THE INTERIM THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.
3. WASHINGTON HAS REVIEWED THE RUSSIAN DRAFT TEXT OF THE
REPORT THAT WAS PROVIDED TO MR. JEFFREY MOORE AND PROPOSES
SEVERAL MODIFICATIONS TO THAT TEXT FOR PURPOSES OF CLARITY,
ACCURACY AND COMPLETENESS. TO AID THE RUSSIAN SIDE IN
REVIEWING THE U.S. SIDE'S PROPOSES REVISIONS, WE HAVE
PREPARED THE DRAFT IN PARAGRAPHS 4-24 BELOW; DIFFERENCES
ARE INDICATED BY THE BRACKETED TEXT, WITH U.S. PROPOSALS
Page 1 of
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Page 2 of
IDENTIFIED BY THE BRACKETED NUMBER ONE (1) AND RUSSIAN
PROPOSALS BY THE BRACKETED NUMBER TWO ( 2 ) . EXPLANATIONS
FOR THE PROPOSES U.S. CHANGES ARE PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPHS
26-44 BELOW.
4. REPORT OF THE U.S.-RUSSIAN COMMITTEE (ON) (1)
THE CONVERSION OF DEFENSE INDUSTRY
(FOR)
(2)
SINCE THE JUNE 1994 MEETING OF THE CHERNOMYRDIN-GORE
COMMISSION IN WASHINGTON, THE U.S.-RUSSIAN COMMITTEE (ON)
(1) (FOR) (2) DEFENSE INDUSTRY CONVERSION
HAS CONTINUED ITS SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS TO SUPPORT THE DEFENSE
INDUSTRY CONVERSION PROCESS.
5. IN THEIR MEETING IN M S O ON DECEMBER (16) (1) (13)
OCW
(2) , THE CO-CHAIRMEN REVIEWED A REPORT SUBMITTED BY THE
PERMANENT WORKING GROUP, WHICH HAD MET OCTOBER 5-8 AND
DECEMBER (13-14) (1) (1-2) ( 2 ) . THE CO-CHAIRMEN CONCLUDED
THAT THE GROUP SHOULD MEET ON A QUARTERLY BASIS. THE
PURPOSE OF THESE MEETINGS WOULD BE TO DISCUSS PROGRESS IN
THE FIELD AND (FACILITATE) (1) (DEVELOP) (2) ONGOING
COOPERATION. THIS GROUP WOULD COOPERATE WITH THE PERMANENT
WORKING GROUPS OF THE OTHER COMMITTEES UNDER THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMISSION FOR ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL
COOPERATION (THE CHERNOMYRDIN-GORE COMMISSION).
6. BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT THE W R OF IMPLEMENTING THE
OK
FIRST FOUR CONVERSION PROJECTS HAD GOTTEN OFF TO A GOOD
START. (THEY ALSO IDENTIFIED OBSTACLES RELATING TO BOTH
SPECIFIC RUSSIAN CONDITIONS AND CONDITIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES.) (1) (ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE WERE A NUMBER OF
OBVIOUS PROBLEMS, WHICH COULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO BOTH
SPECIFIC RUSSIAN CONDITIONS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF FUNDING
FOR THE PROJECTS UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE NUNN-LUGAR
PROGRAM.) (2) THE WORKING GROUP WILL STUDY (WAYS) (1) (THE
POSSIBILITIES) (2) OF REMOVING (OBSTACLES) (1) (THE
OBSTACLES STANDING IN THE WAY OF IMPLEMENTATION OF TNE
PROJECTS) (2) AND (DRAFT) (1) (IS N W DRAFTING ITS) (2)
O
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE COMMITTEE'S NEXT MEETING.
7.
THE AMERICAN SIDE ACKNOWLEDGED (THE DELAY IN
IMPLEMENTING ITS PROPOSAL) (1) (ITS CONSIDERABLE DELAY IN
MEETING THE OBLIGATIONS I T HAD ASSUMED UNDER
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS (MEMORANDUM "ON COOPERATION IN
THE FIELD OF DEFENSE FACILITY AND DEFENSE PLANT
CONVERSION", PROTOCOL "OF COOPERATION IN IMPLEMENTING
SPECIFIC DEFENSE FACILITY AND DEFENSE PLANT CONVERSION
PROJECTS")) (2) TO ESTABLISH A JOINT VENTURE TO MANUFACTURE
SINGLE-FAMILY HOMES FOR DISCHARGED RUSSIAN MILITARY
PERSONNEL, (THAT RESULTED FROM UNEXPECTED FUNDING
SHORTFALLS ON THE U.S. SIDE) (1) (A PROJECT WHICH HAD
ALREADY BEEN APPROVED AND HAS BEEN WIDELY PUBLICIZED IN
BOTH RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES.) (2) THE AMERICAN SIDE
ASSURED THE RUSSIAN SIDE THAT THE PROCESS OF SELECTING
AMERICAN PARTNERS FOR RUSSIAN DEFENSE PLANTS WOULD BE
COMPLETED (WHEN FUNDING COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE IN FY 95)
(1) (BY MID-DECEMBER OF THIS YEAR) ( 2 ) . THEIR PLANS CALLED
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD010\DEC94\MSGS\M1391886.html
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 06 STATE 321324
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PARM, PREL, MARR, RS, US
SUBJECT: REPORT OF DEFENSE CONVERSION COMMITTEE TO GCC
FOR USING FUNDS LEFT OVER FROM THE "FAST FOUR" PROJECTS AS
THE STARTUP FUNDS FOR THE JOINT VENTURE, KEEPING IN MIND
THAT THE PROJECT WOULD BE FULLY FUNDED (UP TO 20 MILLION
DOLLARS US) (WHEN FUNDING COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE IN FY 95)
(1) (NO LATER THAN FEBRUARY 1995, AS SPECIFIED IN THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS.) (2)
8. (REGARDING THE FOURTH INSTALLMENT OF THE RUSSIAN
DEFENSE BUSINESS DIRECTORY, THE RUSSIAN SIDE INDICATED THAT
IT RECOGNIZED THE IMPORTANCE _F PROVIDING U.S. BUSINESS
WITH INFORMATION ABOUT CONVERTING RUSSIAN DEFENSE
ENTERPRISES IN ORDER TO ATTRACT PRIVATE INVESTMENT. THE
RUSSIAN SIDE PROVIDED TO PROVIDE ITS CORRECTIONS AND
ADDITIONS ON THE CURRENT DRAFT INSTALLMENT BEFORE THE END
OF 1994. TO EXPEDITE THIS COOPERATIVE WORK IN THE FUTURE,
THE RUSSIAN SIDE AGREED THAT I T WOULD SUBMIT CORRECTIONS
AND ADDITIONS ON FUTURE INSTALLMENTS WITHIN FOUR WEEKS FROM
THE TIME OF RECEIPT, WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT
PUBLICATION WILL PROCEED FIVE WEEKS FROM THE DATE OF
ORIGINAL SUBMISSION TO THE RUSSIAN SIDE IN ANY CASE.) (1)
9. BOTH SIDES ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THE IMPORTANCE OF
(FACILITATING AND ENCOURAGING CONVERSION) (1) (SUPPORTING
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CONVERSION PROJECTS) (2) AT THE 82
RUSSIAN DEFENSE PLANTS INCLUDED ON THE LIST PUBLISHED IN
M S O ON MAY 27, 1994. IN THIS CONTEXT THE PARTIES LAUDED
OCW
THE N W EFFORTS OF OPIC (OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT
E
CORPORATION), THE DEFENSE ENTERPRISE FUND, AND THE US
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE WITH RESPECT TO THE BUSINESSES ON
THIS LIST.
10.
OPIC (OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION)
ANNOUNCED ITS PLANS TO (RESERVE A CAPACITY OF UP TO) (1)
(ALLOCATE) (2) 500 MILLION DOLLARS US TO INSURE PRIVATE
INVESTMENT IN CONVERSION PROJECTS (IN THE NIS) (1) ( I N
RUSSIA) (2) AGAINST FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL RISK.
11. IN COOPERATION WITH THE US DEFENSE DEPARTMENT AND THE
US DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, (THE) (2) OPIC (ANNOUNCED) (1)
PLANS TO (TAKE) (1) (SEND) (2) TEN EXECUTIVES OF PRIVATE
AMERICAN COMPANIES TO RUSSIA (TO IDENTIFY AND ASSESS) (1)
(FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDYING CONVERSION-RELATED
ISSUES. THIS DELEGATION'S MISSION WILL BE TO IDENTIFY AND
DESIGN) (2) COMMERCIALLY VIABLE PROJECTS FOR THE RUSSIAN
DEFENSE PLANTS ON THE "LIST OF 82" AND OTHER POTENTIAL
PARTICIPANTS. (THE T O SIDES ASSIGNED THE COMMITTEE'S
W
WORKING GROUP THE TASK OF FACILITATING THE PLANNED
DOD-OPIC-COMMERCE DEFENSE CONVERSION MISSION AND FURTHER
STRENGTHENING THE LEVELS OF COOPERATION BETWEEN AMERICAN
PARTNERS AND THE RUSSIAN DEFENSE PLANTS ON THE "LIST OF 82"
AND OTHER DEFENSE ENTERPRISES.) (1) (THE TWO SIDES ASSIGNED
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THE COMMITTEE'S WORKING GROUP THE TASK OF DESIGNING A
MECHANISM FOR THE COOPERATION OF THE AMERICAN PARTNERS AND
THE RUSSIAN DEFENSE PLANTS ON THE "LIST OF 82." (2) (THE
WORKING GROUP WILL W R TO IDENTIFY AND REMOVE POTENTIAL
OK
OBSTACLES WHICH COULD HINDER THE CREATION OF COMMERCIALLY
VIABLE JOINT VENTURE PROJECTS. THE SIDES ALSO NOTED THAT
THE FINAL DECISION TO PROCEED WITH ANY PROJECT RESULTING
FROM THE OPIC MISSION ULTIMATELY WILL BE MADE BY THE
AMERICAN PARTNER AND THE RUSSIAN ENTERPRISE. (1) (IN THE
FIRST PHASE, THE WORKING GROUP WILL REVIEW CONVERSION
PROJECTS SUBMITTED BY PLANTS ON THE "LIST OF 82" AND WILL
HOLD CONFERENCES WITH THE TEN AMERICAN EXECUTIVES FOR THE
PURPOSE OF APPROVING THE AMERICAN SIDE'S PROJECT SELECTION
CRITERIA AND PROCEDURES) ( 2 ) .
12. THE US DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE ANNOUNCED THAT I T HAS
DEVELOPED A SPECIAL PROJECT, (UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE
SABIT PROGRAM (SPECIAL AMERICAN BUSINESS INTERSHIP
TRAINING)) ( 1 ) , FOR TRAINING RUSSIAN DEFENSE INDUSTRY
PERSONNEL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS INVOLVED IN
VARIOUS ASPECTS OF CONVERSION AT AMERICAN COMPANIES (UNDER
THE AUSPICES OF THE SABIT PROGRAM (SPECIAL AMERICAN
BUSINESS INTERNSHIP)) ( 2 ) .
(THIS PROJECT WILL PLACE A
COMBINATION OF UP TO FIFTY RUSSIAN DEFENSE INDUSTRY
PERSONNEL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS INVOLVED IN
VARIOUS ASPECTS OF CONVERSION WITH AMERICAN FIRMS THAT HAVE
UNDERGONE DEFENSE READJUSTMENT. THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT
WILL PROVIDE APPLICATIONS TO THE WORKING GROUP TO BE PASSED
TO REPRESENTATIVES OF ENTERPRISES ON THE "LIST OF 82". THE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE PLANS TO MAKE APPLICATIONS FOR THIS
PROGRAM AVAILABLE TO OTHER POTENTIAL APPLICANTS AND TO
INTERVIEW NOMINEES IN WINTER 1995. U.S. COMPANIES
INTERESTED IN HOSTING SABIT INTERNS WILL THEN BE GIVEN THE
OPPORTUNITY TO SELECT AMONG THE POOL OF APPLICANTS IN LATE
WINTER-EARLY SPRING 1995.) (1) (PREFERENCE FOR ACCEPTANCE
UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 06 STATE 321324
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PARM, PREL, MARR, RS, US
SUBJECT: REPORT OF DEFENSE CONVERSION COMMITTEE TO GCC
IN THE ADVANCED TRAINING PROGRAM WILL BE GIVEN TO
INDIVIDUALS EMPLOYED BY THE RUSSIAN DEFENSE PLANTS ON THE
"LIST OF 82" . ) (2)
13.
(THE SABIT DEFENSE CONVERSION PROGRAM IS ENVISIONED TO
RUN IN FISCAL YEAR 1995, WITH INDIVIDUAL INTERNS SPENDING
EIGHT WEEKS IN U.S.-BASED INDUSTRY ASSIGNMENTS.
COMMERCE
WILL APPRISE THE RUSSIAN SIDE OF THE CANDIDATES THAT ARE
SELECTED BY INDUSTRY, THEIR U.S. HOSTS, AND THE SPECIFIC
PROGRAMS THAT HAVE BEEN DESIGNED FOR THE CHOSEN RUSSIAN
INTERNS.) (1)
14.
(THE SIDES ALSO INSTRUCTED THE COMMITTEE'S WORKING
GROUP TO COOPERATE WITH OFFICIALS OF THE US DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE IN DRAFTING PROCEDURES FOR SELECTING CANDIDATES
FOR THE IN-SERVICE TRAINING PROGRAM, ORGANIZING IN-SERVICE
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TRAINING AT AMERICAN COMPANIES FOR MANAGERS FROM BUSINESSES
ON THE "LIST OF 82", AND SCHEDULING AND ORGANIZING
ROUND-TABLE DISCUSSIONS FOR AMERICAN INDUSTRIALISTS ON THE
PROBLEMS OF CONVERSION IN RUSSIA.) (2)
15. THE US DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY REPORTED THAT (ITS
INDUSTRIAL PARTNERING PROGRAM (IPP)) (1) (ITS PROGRAM OF
INDUSTRIAL PARTNERSHIP) (2) CONTINUES AND HAS ADDED NEW
PROJECTS FOR DEVELOPING PRODUCTS AND TECHNOLOGIES (FOR
COMMERCIALIZATION) (1) IN COOPERATION WITH RUSSIAN RESEARCH
INSTITUTES. AT PRESENT, 14 9 (COOPERATIVE PROJECTS ARE
UNDERWAY. THESE PROJECTS WILL PROVIDE 9.9 MILLION DOLLARS
TO RUSSIAN INSTITUTES AND INVOLVE SCIENTISTS AT MORE THAN
60 RUSSIAN INSTITUTES.) (1) (CONTRACTS WITH A TOTAL VALUE
OF 9.9 MILLION DOLLARS HAD BEEN APPROVED BETWEEN THE
NATIONAL LABORATORIES OF THE US DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND
MORE THAN 60 FORMER DEFENSE CONTRACTORS RECOMMENDED BY THE
US INDUSTRIAL ASSOCIATION.) (2) (ADDITIONALLY, UNDER THE
INDUSTRY PARTNERSHIP PORTION OF THE IPP, THE U.S. INDUSTRY
COALITION (USIC) IS UNDERTAKING NINE PROJECTS WHICH INVOLVE
14 INSTITUTES, 147 SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS AND 1.350
MILLION IN CONTRACTS TO RUSSIA. THEL COOPERATIVE PRYJECTS)
(1) (THESE PLANS) (2) ARE DESIGNED TO EMPLOY RUSSIAN
INSTITUTES AND THE DEPARTMENT'S NATIONAL LABORATORIES AND
US BUSINESSES IN DEVELOPING PROFITABLE NEW (COMMERCIAL) (1)
TECHNOLOGY VENTURES.
16.
(THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY (ACDA),
IN COOPERATION WITH THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE
RUSSIAN MINISTRY OF ATOMIC ENERGY (MINATOM), IS PLANNING
THE FOURTH ENTREPRENEURIAL WORKSHOP ON DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY
CONVERSION, TO BE HELD AT ARZAMAS-16 (KREMLEV) IN MAY
1995. MINATOM HAS SAID THAT EVERY GRADUATE OF THE PROGRAM
-- DESIGNED TO SHIFT SCIENTISTS INVOLVED IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS
W R TO SELF-SUSTAINING NON-MILITARY VENTURES -- HAS GONE
OK
ON TO ESTABLISH A BUSINESS, TEACH OTHERS THE BASICS OF
DOING SO, OR BOTH. AN ACDA EXPERTS TEAM WILL VISIT ARZAMAS
IN JANUARY AS PART OF THIS PROCESS, AND ADDITIONAL MEETINGS
TO ENCOURAGE U.S. INDUSTRY PARTICIPATION WILL ALSO BE HELD
OVER THE NEXT FOUR MONTHS.) (1)
17. IN ORDER TO OPTIMIZE THE PROCESS OF SELECTION DEFENSE
CONVERSION PROJECTS FUNDED UNDER THE NUNN-LUGAR PROGRAM,
BOTH PARTIES AGREED THAT TWO RUSSIAN DELEGATES WOULD
PARTICIPATE AS OBSERVERS IN THE (PROPOSAL EVALUATION AND
AWARD SELECTION PROCESS FOR FUTURE DEFENSE CONVERSION
AWARDS) (1) (REVIEW AND SELECTION OF AMERICAN GRANT
RECIPIENTS) (2) UNDER THE NUNN-LUGAR PROGRAM.
18. BOTH SIDES ALSO AGREED THAT CONVERSION PROJECTS WHICH
UTILIZE DUAL-PURPOSE TECHNOLOGIES PREVIOUSLY DEVELOPED BY
THE RUSSIAN SIDE (COULD COMPETE FOR DEFENSE CONVERSION
AWARDS UNDER THE NUNN-LUGAR PROGRAM, SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATE
EXPORT CONTROLS) (1) (WOULD BE SUPPORTED UNDER THE
NUNN-LUGAR PROGRAM ON A COMPETITIVE BASIS AND WOULD COME
UNDER RUSSIAN EXPORT CONTROLS) ( 2 ) .
(TO FACILITATE
CONSIDERATION OF SUCH TECHNOLOGIES, RUSSIA WILL PREPARE
PROPOSALS FOR DEVELOPING THE RUSSIAN REGULATIVE AND LEGAL
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FOUNDATION IN THIS AREA AND WILL IDENTIFY DUAL-USE
TECHNOLOGIES THAT ARE AVAILABLE FOR COMMERCIALIZATION AT
THE ENTERPRISES ON THE "LIST OF 82") (1) THE US WOULD
CONTINUE TO INFORM THE RUSSIAN SIDE OF (ITS LEGISLATION AND
PROCEDURES FOR COMMERCIALIZATION) ( i ) (THE RESULTS) (2) OF
GOVERNMENT-FUNDED RESEARCH.
19. BOTH SIDES ALSO AGREED TO DISCUSS (UNDER COMMITTEE
AUSPICES) THE PROBLEMS OF COORDINATING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
TO SUPPORT THE ECONOMIC CONVERSION PROCESS IN RUSSIAN
CITIES WHICH ARE MOST HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON THE DEFENSE
INDUSTRY. THEY ALSO AGREED TO START THIS PROCESS WITH A
SINGLE RUSSIAN CITY IN COOPERATION WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE RUSSIAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND REGIONAL AND MUNICIPAL
UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 06 STATE 321324
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PARM, PREL, MARR, RS, US
SUBJECT:
REPORT OF DEFENSE CONVERSION COMMITTEE TO GCC
AUTHORITIES.
20. THE AMERICAN SIDE IS STEPPING UP ITS EFFORTS TO INFORM
THE RUSSIAN SIDE OF AMERICAN COMPANIES INTERESTED IN JOINT
VENTURES WITH RUSSIAN DEFENSE PLANTS. THE BUSINESS
INFORMATION SERVICE FOR THE NEW INDEPENDENT STATES (BISNIS)
OF THE US DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE IS WORKING WITH THE
RUSSIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS TO OPEN A
CENTER (IN MOSCOW) (1) WHERE RUSSIAN PLANTS COULD OBTAIN
INFORMATION ON AMERICAN BUSINESSES AND THEIR SPECIFIC
INTERESTS. THE NEW CENTER ALSO PLANS TO PUBLISH CONCISE
DIRECTORIES OF INTERESTED AMERICAN BUSINESS.
21. THE TWO SIDES REVIEWED THE ACTIVITY OF THE
GOVERNMENT-FUNDED PRIVATE AMERICAN FOUNDATIONS TO PROMOTE
ECONOMIC CHANGE IN RUSSIA (THE RUSSIAN-AMERICAN ENTERPRISE
FUND ((120 MILLION DOLLARS IN 1994)) ( 2 ) , (THE FUND FOR
LARGE ENTERPRISES IN RUSSIA) (1) (RUSSIAN BIG BUSINESS FUND
(100 MILLION DOLLARS IN 1994)) ( 2 ) , AND THE DEFENSE
ENTERPRISE FUND ((40 MILLION DOLLARS)) ( 2 ) .
22.
(THE TWO SIDES NOTED THAT THE NEW "ENTERPRISE FUND"
AND "BIG BUSINESS FUND" PROJECTS WERE NOT COORDINATED WITH
THE COMMITTEE AND ARE FOR THE MOST PART PURELY COMMERCIAL
IN NATURE.) (2) THE TWO PARTIES AGREED TO LOOK INTO THE
POSSIBILITY OF ATTRACTING FUNDS FROM (THESE AND OTHER) (1)
PRIVATE AMERICAN FOUNDATIONS TO FINANCE CONVERSION PROJECTS
AT PLANTS ON THE "LIST OF 82".
23. THE UNITED STATES INTENDS TO PROVIDE MORE (DETAILED)
(2) INFORMATION ON (THE PROGRESS AND RESULTS OF THE
CONTRACTING PROCESS AND THE SUBSTANCE OF RESULTING
CONTRACTS) (1) (NEW CONTRACTS AND THEIR SUBSTANCE) (2) TO
RUSSIA IN THE FUTURE. THE RUSSIAN SIDE INTENDS TO KEEP
INTERESTED RUSSIAN BUSINESSES ABREAST OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS
24. THE TWO SIDES AGREED TO HOLD THE NEXT MEETING OF THE
COMMITTEE IN WASHINGTON (EARLY NEXT YEAR) (1) (ON FEBRUARY
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21-22) ( 2 ) .
END OF DRAFT OF REPORT.
25. EXPLANATION FOR PROPOSED AMERICAN CHANGES TO RUSSIAN
DRAFT TEXT FOLLOWS. EXPLANATION IS KEYED TO CABLE
PARAGRAPHS. WHERE THE U.S. DOES NOT PROPOSE AN ALTERNATE
TO A RUSSIAN TEXT THAT IS IN BRACKETS, THE U.S. WOULD
PROPOSE DELETION OF THE RUSSIAN TEXT.
26.
PARAGRAPH 4:
MINOR ACCURACY CORRECTION.
27. PARAGRAPH 5: THE PROPOSED DATE CHANGES ARE FOR
ACCURACY; THE PROPOSED USE OF THE TERM "FACILITATE, RATHER
THAN "DEVELOP" IS EDITORIAL, TO MORE ACCURATELY DESCRIBE IN
ENGLISH THE ROLE OF THE WORKING GROUP.
28. PARAGRAPH 6: ACCURACY. THE RUSSIAN DESCRIPTION OF
U.S. OBSTACLES IS UNCLEAR. THE ALTERNATIVE IS INTENDED TO
BE GENERAL, AS IS THE DESCRIPTION OF OBSTACLES IN RUSSIA,
AND TO INDICATE THAT THE WORKING GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS
REMAIN TO BE DRAFTED.
29. PARAGRAPH 7: ACCURACY. NEITHER OF THE SPECIFIED
DOCUMENTS CONTAINS A LEGAL UNDERTAKING BY THE UNITED STATES
SPECIFICALLY RELATED TO THE HOUSING INDUSTRY CONVERSION
PROJECT OR A SPECIFIC COMMITMENT TO UNDERTAKE THE PROPOSED
PROJECT BY FEBRUARY 1995. AT THIS TIME, W ARE UNABLE TO
E
AWARD THE HOUSING PROJECT CONTRACT USING FUNDS THAT WERE
NOT EXPENDED ON THE "FAST FOUR" BECAUSE OF A PROTEST BY A
U.S. CONTRACTOR THAT HAS BEEN LODGED WITH THE U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE (THE AUDITING AGENCY OF THE U.S.
CONGRESS, WHICH HAS THE POWER TO INVESTIGATE SUCH PROTESTS
AND SUSPEND CONTRACT AWARDS PENDING COMPLETION OF ITS
INVESTIGATIONS.) THE CONTRACTOR HAS PROTESTED THE PROCESS
BY WHICH W PLAN TO AWARD A CONTRACT FOR THE HOUSING
E
INDUSTRY CONVERSION PROJECT. THE UNITED STATES HOPES TO BE
IN POSITION TO UNDERTAKE THE PROJECT EARLY IN FEBRUARY
1995, BUT MUST FIRST AWAIT RESOLUTION OF THIS PROTEST AND
SATISFY CONGRESS IONALLY- MANDATED REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO
THE GENERAL CERTIFICATION OF RUSSIAN ELIGIBILITY FOR
NUNN-LUGAR FUNDING AND TO NOTIFICATION OF THE HOUSING
PROJECT.
30.
PARAGRAPH 8:
COMPLETENESS.
31. PARAGRAPH 9: ACCURACY. THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE SUGGESTS
ENDORSEMENT OF SPECIFIC CONVERSION PROJECTS; THE AMERICAN
LANGUAGE IS CLEARER IN INDICATING THAT THE SIDES ENCOURAGE
CONVERSION, BUT THAT THE SELECTION OF SPECIFIC PROJECTS
UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 06 STATE 321324
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PARM, PREL, MARR, RS, US
SUBJECT:
REPORT OF DEFENSE CONVERSION COMMITTEE TO GCC
MUST BE MADE BY INDUSTRY.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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32. PARAGRAPH 10: ACCURACY. THE TERMINOLOGY USED TO
DESCRIBE THE OPIC EFFORT IS "TO RESERVE CAPACITY". IN
LAYMAN'S TERMS, THIS MEANS THAT OPIC -- AND THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT -- WILL INSURE PRIVATE LENDERS AGAINST LOSSES
FROM UP TO A TOTAL OF USD 500 MILLION IN LOANS THAT THEY
MAKE TO JOINT VENTURES FOR DEFENSE CONVERSION PURPOSES.
THIS "CAPACITY" IS APPLICABLE TO THE DEFENSE CONVERSION
PROJECTS THROUGHOUT THE FORMER SOVIET UNION THAT HAVE A
U.S. PARTNER, AND NOT SIMPLY FOR PROJECTS IN RUSSIA,
ALTHOUGH THERE IS AN EXPECTATION THAT MANY OF THE PROJECTS
THAT RECEIVE THIS INSURANCE GUARANTEE WILL BE PROJECTS IN
RUSSIA.
33. PARAGRAPH 11: ACCURACY: OPIC INVESTMENT MISSIONS ARE
DESIGNED TO INTRODUCE SENIOR U.S. BUSINESS EXECUTIVES TO
KEY BUSINESS LEADERS, POTENTIAL JOINT - VENTURE PARTNERS AND
HIGH-RANKING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN THE HOST COUNTRY. ON
SUCH MISSION, U.S. EXECUTIVES HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET
ONE-ON-ONE WITH THEIR FOREIGN COUNTERPARTS TO ASSESS
COMMERCIALLY VIABLE JOINT VENTURE PROJECTS.
EACH AMERICAN COMPANY HAS ITS OWN CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING
A COMMERCIALLY VIABLE PROJECT. BELOW IS A LIST OF STANDARD
QUESTIONS THAT A U.S. COMPANY MAY ASK THE RUSSIAN
ENTERPRISE:
-- GENERAL INTRODUCTION OF THE ENTERPRISE, INCLUDING
PRODUCTS, NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES, CAPACITIES, MARKET SIZE,
LOCATION WITHIN REGION, AND OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES.
-- STAGE OF PRIVATIZATION OF THE ENTERPRISE. DESCRIBE THE
CURRENT OWNERSHIP AND THE FUTURE, DESIRED OWNERSHIP OF THE
ENTERPRISE. IS THE ENTERPRISE WILLING TO PRIVATIZE SMALLER
SECTIONS AND/OR DIVISIONS OF THE WHOLE ENTERPRISE? DO
EXISTING LAWS ALLOW FOR THIS TO BE DONE?
-- MARKETS SERVED BY THE ENTERPRISE -- DOMESTIC OR
EXPORT. WHAT IS THE ESTIMATED FUTURE OF THESE AND OTHER
MARKETS?
-- SPECIFIC JOINT VENTURE PROJECT OR OTHER JOINT
COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS SOUGHT WITH AMERICAN PARTNERS, IN
THE FORM OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COLLABORATION, DIRECT
INVESTMENTS IN FACILITIES, ESTABLISHMENT OR EXPANSION OF
MANUFACTURING CAPABILITIES, LICENSING ARRANGEMENTS'
MANAGEMENT AND/OR TECHNICAL COLLABORATION, MARKETING
ASSISTANCE, OR A COMBINATION OF VARIOUS INTERESTS.
-- TYPE OF OWNERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS DESIRED WITH A U.S.
COMPANY THAT INVESTS IN THE ENTERPRISE.
RESOURCES (PROPERTY, PLANT, EQUIPMENT, LOCAL CURRENCY,
LABOR, ETC.) THAT CAN BE CONTRIBUTED TO A JOINT VENTURE
RELATIONSHIP WITH AN AMERICAN COMPANY.
--
DESCRIPTION OF ANY CURRENT RELATIONSHIPS AND PROJECTS
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WITH ANY FOREIGN FIRMS.
TO ENSURE A PRODUCTIVE PROGRAM FOR BOTH THE AMERICAN
COMPANIES AND RUSSIAN ENTERPRISES, THE SUPPORT OF THE
RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT IS CRITICAL. COOPERATION IS REQUESTED
IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS: COORDINATING LOGISTICS WITH
APPROPRIATE U.S. GOVERNMENT CONTACTS FOR THE OVERALL
PROGRAM AND BUSINESS MEETINGS; BRIEF ENTERPRISES ON THE
SCOPE AND GOALS OF THE PROGRAM; AND ASSISTANCE IN FOLLOW UP
ACTIVITIES WITH THE ENTERPRISES. ULTIMATELY, THE FINAL
DECISION TO PROCEED WITH ANY PROJECT RESULTING FROM AN OPIC
MISSION WILL BE MADE BY THE AMERICAN PARTNER AND THE
RUSSIAN ENTERPRISE.
34. PARAGRAPHS 12-14: ACCURACY AND COMPLETENESS. U.S.
MODIFICATIONS DESCRIBE THE PURPOSE AND SIZE OF THE SABIT
DEFENSE CONVERSION INTERN PROGRAM IN RUSSIA AND THE PROCESS
BY WHICH INDIVIDUALS WILL BE SELECTED FOR PARTICIPATION.
THIS PROCESS IS IDENTICAL TO THE PROCESS CURRENTLY USED FOR
SELECTION OF RUSSIAN SABIT PARTICIPANTS FROM OTHER SECTORS
OF THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY.
WHILE SPECIAL CONSIDERATION WILL
BE GIVEN TO APPLICATIONS FROM INDIVIDUALS FROM ENTERPRISES
ON THE LIST OF 82, THE FINAL DECISIONS ON SELECTION OF
PARTICIPANTS WILL BE MADE BY U.S. INDUSTRY.
35. PARAGRAPH 15: ACCURACY. FURTHER, THE MODIFICATIONS
PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
PROGRAM.
UNCLAS SECTION 06 OF 06 STATE 321324
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PARM, PREL, MARR, RS, US
SUBJECT: REPORT OF DEFENSE CONVERSION COMMITTEE TO GCC
36. PARAGRAPH 16: COMPLETENESS. THIS PARAGRAPH WAS
DROPPED FROM THE RUSSIAN TEXT. SINCE THE PROGRAM WILL SERVE
AN IMPORTANT PURPOSE FOR NUCLEAR SCIENTISTS WHO ARE
CONVERTING TO CIVILIAN ACTIVITIES, I T IS RECOMMENDED THAT
IT BE REFERENCED.
37. PARAGRAPH 17: ACCURACY. THE PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS
MORE PRECISELY EXPLAIN THE PHASES OF THE AWARD PROCESS IN
WHICH THE RUSSIAN OBSERVERS WILL PARTICIPATE.
38. PARAGRAPH 18: ACCURACY AND COMPLETENESS. WHILE
DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGY PROJECTS MAY BE CONSIDERED AND COMPETE
FOR NUNN-LUGAR AWARDS, THE U.S. CANNOT GUARANTEE THAT THESE
PROJECTS WOULD BE SUPPORTED, SINCE THAT DECISION WILL BE
MADE ON THE BASIS OF THE COMPETITION.
AT THE OCTOBER
WORKING GROUP MEETING, THE RUSSIAN SIDE VOLUNTEERED TO
UNDERTAKE THE STEPS SPECIFIED IN THIS PARAGRAPH; WE
RECOMMEND REFERENCE TO THAT COMMITMENT, SINCE I T SHOULD
FACILITATE PROGRESS IN THIS AREA. FURTHER, THE U.S.
COMMITMENT WAS TO INFORM THE RUSSIAN SIDE OF U.S.
LEGISLATION AND PROCEDURES FOR COMMERCIALIZATION OF
GOVERNMENT-FUNDED RESEARCH AND NOT OF THE RESULTS OF ITS
Page 9 of
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GOVERNMENT-FUNDED RESEARCH.
39.
PARAGRAPH 19:
EDITORIAL.
40.
PARAGRAPH 20:
EDITORIAL.
41.
PARAGRAPHS 21-22:
ACCURACY. FURTHER, THE U.S. SIDE
PREFERS NOT TO MENTION SPECIFIC DOLLAR FIGURES FOR THE
PRIVATE FUNDS, SINCE THE INVESTMENTS OF THE FIRST TWO ARE
NOT NECESSARILY TIED TO DEFENSE CONVERSION AND THE THIRD
FUND HAS NOT RECEIVED CAPITALIZATION AT THE LEVEL
INDICATED.
THE FIRST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 22 APPEARS
UNNECESSARY. WITH ITS DELETION, THE U.S. SIDE RECOMMENDS
THAT PARAGRAPHS 21-22 BE COMBINED.
42.
PARAGRAPH 23: ACCURACY AND COMPLETENESS. FURTHER,
THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE WOULD L I M I T THE PROVISION OF
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO NEW CONTRACTS; THE U.S. LANGUAGE
WOULD APPLY TO EXISTING CONTRACTS AND THE CONTRACTING
PROCESS AS WELL.
43.
PARAGRAPH 24: TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE DIFFICULTY OF
PLANNING A MEETING FOR THE FALL OF 1994, THE U.S. SIDE
PROPOSES THAT WE KEEP OPEN THE SPECIFIC DATE FOR THE NEXT
MEETING, TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL F L E X I B I L I T Y TO THE
CO-CHAIRMEN TO IDENTIFY AN OPTIMUM MEETING DATE.
TALBOTT
BT
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< TOR>941201204634 M1391888
<"TOR>941201204737 M1391890
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Page 10 of
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PREC:
CLASS:
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LINE3:
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OSRI:
DTG:
ORIG:
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INFO:
PRIORITY
UNCLASSIFIED
PAAUZYUW RUEHMOA4 6 8 9 3 3 6103 2 -UUUU--RHEHAAA.
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 021032Z DEC 94
FM AMEMBASSY M S O
OCW
RUEHMO
021032Z DEC 94
AMEMBASSY M S O
OCW
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7123
RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDC/USDOC WASHDC
RUEAUSA/HHS PHS WASHDC
RUEHLN/AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 3601
SUBJ: GCC HEALTH COMMITTEE - MEETING PREPARATIONS
TEXT:
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 M S O 034689
OCW
STATE FOR OES/STH (ROCK) AND
EUR/ISCA/CAST (FERGUSON-AUGUSTUS AND
S/NIS/C (MACKLIN)
AID FOR AID/NIS (TURNER)
WHITE HOUSE FOR OSTP (WALES/BORIGHT/SCHWEITZER)
STATE PASS TO HHS FOR PHS (BOUFFORD/HOHMAN)
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KGCC, TBIO, RS
SUBJECT: GCC HEALTH COMMITTEE - MEETING PREPARATIONS
REF(S): (A) M S O 32445 (B) HHS/OIH DRAFT CABLE 196
OCW
1. SUMMARY. IN FOLLOW UP TO REF A PARA 14, AN HHS
TEAM (VOGEL AND HENRY) VISITED MOSCOW, NOVEMBER 28DECEMBER 2. THEY WORKED WITH USAID/M AND EMBASSY EST
STAFF, MAKING SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN PREPARATIONS FOR
THE MEETING OF THE GCC HEALTH COMMITTEE (GCHC)
MEETING. AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON: VENUE AND RELATED
LOGISTICS; THE AGENDA, INCLUDING ALLOCATION OF TIME
AND DESIGNATION OF LEAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR SPECIFIC
ITEMS; THE CHARGE TO THE COMMITTEE; AND METHODS OF
WORK, INCLUDING CERTAIN PURVIEW ISSUES; EIGHT PRIORITY
AREAS FOR GCHC ATTENTION, INCLUDING A FORMAT FOR
PRESENTATION AT THE COMMITTEE MEETING; AND DESIGNATION
FUNCTIONS OF SECRETARIAT(S) TO THE GCHC. END SUMMARY.
2. I T WAS AGREED THAT THE GCHC'S ROLE WOULD BE TO
PROMOTE GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT CONTACTS, PROVIDE
VISIBILITY AND SUPPORT TO PLANNED AND ONGOING
INITIATIVES AND SERVE AS A FOCAL POINT TO IMPROVE
COORDINATION OF US-RUSSIA HEALTH INITIATIVES. I T WAS
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AGREED THAT THE GCHC WOULD NOT BECOME INVOLVED IN THE
MANAGEMENT OF ONGOING HEALTH ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS.
3. THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH (MOH) PROVIDED ITS FINAL
MEMBERSHIP LIST AND USDEL PROVIDED A U.S. DELEGATION
LIST, INCLUDING MOSCOW-BASED USAID AND EMBASSY STAFF.
THE CONTENT OF A MEETING AGENDA/BACKGROUND BOOK FOR
THE MEETING, INCLUDING SOME JOINTLY PREPARED
MATERIALS, WAS AGREED UPON. THE STRUCTURE OF THE
COMMITTEE REPORT WAS ALSO DISCUSSED, WITH A DRAFT TO
BE EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES ON OR ABOUT
DECEMBER 8. A FINAL DECISION ON ANNOUNCEMENT OF NEW
USAID-FUNDED PROGRAMS IS PENDING RESOLUTION OF AN
ISSUE WITH MOH. I T WAS LEARNED THAT MINISTER NECHAYEV
WOULD BE IN PARIS ON DEC. 1 FOR THE
HIGH-LEVEL AIDS MEETING. THIS INFORMATION AND
APPROPRIATE BACKGROUND INFORMATION WERE CONVEYED BY L.
VOGEL TO PARIS FOR SECRETARY SHALALA. END SUMMARY.
4. MRS. LINDA VOGEL AND DR. PETER HENRY, OFFICE OF
INTERNATIONAL HEALTH, HHS, VISITED M S O NOVEMBER 28
OCW
THROUGH DECEMBER 2. OVER A PERIOD OF FIVE DAYS, THEY
WORKED CLOSELY WITH USAID STAFF (TERRY TIFFANY AND
LISA CARTY) AND EMBASSY ESTOFF (MINGCHEN KELLER) ON
PREPARATIONS FOR THE FIRST MEETING, ON DECEMBER 14, OF
THE GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN COMMISSION (GCC) HEALTH
COMMITTEE (GCHC). THIS INCLUDED THOROUGH REVIEW AND
REVISION ON THE U.S. SIDE OF THE DRAFT CHARTER AND THE
METHODS OF W R FOR THE HEALTH COMMITTEE AND OTHER
OK
RELATED MATTERS. THESE DRAFT DOCUMENTS HAD ALREADY
BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE MULTIPLE AGENCIES PARTICIPATING
IN THE U.S. EXECUTIVE vESOURCE NETWORK FOR THE HEALTH
COMMITTEE. REFINEMENTS WERE MADE IN THESE DRAFTS TO
TAKE INTO ACCOUNT USAID/M CONCERNS ON SUCH ISSUES AS
THE NEED FOR THE COMMITTEE TO ESTABLISH CRITERIA FOR
PRIORITIZATION OF AREAS AND ACTIVITIES, THE POSSIBLE
DOWNSIDE OF A CALL FOR THE COMMITTEE TO ESTABLISH A
WORKING GROUP FOR EACH AREA, AND THE NEED TO AVOID
POTENTIAL MISUNDERSTANDING WITH THE GOR HEALTH
MINISTRY (MOH) REGARDING COMMITTEE CONTROL OF EXISTING
USAID PROJECTS.
DISCUSSIONS AT MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND MEDICAL INDUSTRY
5. A SERIES OF FOUR MEETINGS WERE HELD AT MOH
(MONDAY, WEDNESDAY, THURSDAY AND FRIDAY). DR. MIKHAIL
SAVELYEV, DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS, WAS THE LEAD ON THE RUSSIAN SIDE. HE
ADVISED THAT HE WAS EMPOWERED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON THE
TOPICS TO BE DISCUSSED. HE WAS FRIENDLY, AND REACHING
CONSENSUS ON DOCUMENTS WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT
DIFFICULTY. THE FOLLOWING SUMMARIZES THE CHRONOLOGY
AND OUTCOME OF DISCUSSIONS, THROUGH WEDNESDAY WHEN
MOST DECISIONS HAD BEEN REACHED, BOTH AT MOH AND
INTERNALLY (PHS, USAID, EMBASSY) ON OUR SIDE:
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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A.
MONDAY, NOVEMBER 2 8
-- U.S. TEAM PROVIDED DR. SAVELYEV WITH LIST OF WHAT
WE WISHED TO ACCOMPLISH DURING THE WEEK, TAKING INTO
ACCOUNT THAT THE COMMITTEE MEETING WAS ONLY TWO WEEKS
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 05 M S O 034689
OCW
STATE FOR OES/STH (ROCK) AND
EUR/ISCA/CAST (FERGUSON-AUGUSTUS AND
S/NIS/C (MACKLIN)
AID FOR AID/NIS (TURNER)
WHITE HOUSE FOR OSTP (WALES/BORIGHT/SCHWEITZER)
STATE PASS TO HHS FOR PHS (BOUFFORD/HOHMAN)
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KGCC, TBIO, RS
SUBJECT: GCC HEALTH COMMITTEE - MEETING PREPARATIONS
AWAY .
-- THE ORIGINALS OF THE LETTERS (REF B) FROM SECRETARY
SHALALA TO MINISTER NECHAYEV AND FROM DR. BOUFFORD TO
DR. TSAREGORODTSEV REGARDING PLANNING FOR THE MEETING
WERE GIVEN TO DR. SAVELYEV. THE LATTER INCLUDED THREE
ENCLOSURES--DRAFT OF U.S. COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP, DRAFT
CHARGE TO THE COMMITTEE AND DRAFT METHODS OF WORK.
THESE DOCUMENTS HAD BEEN CIRCULATED ON THE U.S. SIDE.
MRS. VOGEL INFORMED DR. SAVELYEV THAT THESE DOCUMENTS
WERE PRELIMINARY DRAFTS, PREPARED PRIOR TO HER ARRIVAL
IN M S O AND THEREFORE PRIOR TO THE OPPORTUNITY TO
OCW
DISCUSS THEM THOROUGHLY WITH COLLEAGUES AT USAID/M AND
EMBASSY. SHE ADVISED HIM THAT THE U.S. WOULD HAVE
SOME MODIFICATIONS THAT WOULD BE PROVIDED TO HIM THE
FOLLOWING DAY. DR. SAVELYEV INDICATED THAT MOH HAD NO
PROBLEMS WITH THE INITIAL U.S. DRAFTS AND LOOKED
FORWARD TO RECEIVING THE REVISED VERSIONS. (NOTE: ON
WEDNESDAY, HE ADVISED THAT THE DOCUMENTS HAD BEEN
DISCUSSED WITH DR. TSAREGORODTSEV.)
-- A U.S.-PREPARED DRAFT AGENDA FOR THE DECEMBER 14
COMMITTEE MEETING WAS REVIEWED. DR. SAVELYEV PROVIDED
HIS SUGGESTIONS AND COMMENTS. SPECIFIC MEETING
ARRANGEMENTS WERE DISCUSSED. THESE PLUS OTHER MATTERS
AGREED UPON ON WEDNESDAY ARE SUMMARIZED IN PARA C.l
BELOW.
-- DR. SAVELYEV ASKED WHETHER THE DEC. 14 MEETING
COULD, IN FACT, BE CONSIDERED A HEALTH COMMITTEE
MEETING, SINCE ONLY THE U.S. CHAIR, VICE CHAIR AND THE
POINT OF CONTACT WOULD BE THERE. L. VOGEL ASSURED HIM
THAT WE BELIEVE THIS FIRST MEETING COULD INDEED BE
CONSIDERED A REGULAR HEALTH COMMITTEE MEETING,
INASMUCH AS THE AGENDA IS FOCUSED LARGELY ON THOSE
ISSUES THAT WILL ESTABLISH A FIRM FOUNDATION FOR
FOLLOW-UP ACTION, INCLUDING CHARGE TO THE COMMITTEE,
METHODS OF WORK, PRIORITIES, ETC. SHE NOTED THAT THE
U.S. CHAIR AND VICE CHAIR COULD CERTAINLY ADDRESS
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THESE ISSUES EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF OTHER COMMITTEE
MEMBERS. MOREOVER, DR. SHALALA WOULD BE MEETING ON
DECEMBER 8 WITH ALL THE U.S. MEMBERS TO REVIEW PLANS
AND ISSUES FOR THE MEETING WITH THEM, AND THEY WILL
PROVIDE THEIR INPUT. THIS EXPLANATION APPEARED TO
FULFILL DR. SAVELYEV S NEEDS.
1
-- I T WAS AGREED THAT THE TWO SIDES SHOULD ADDRESS THE
ISSUE OF DESIGNATION AND FUNCTIONS OF SECRETARIATS TO
THE GCHC AND THAT THE U.S. WOULD PROVIDE A DRAFT PAPER
ON THIS TOPIC THE FOLLOWING DAY.
-- THE ISSUE OF PURVIEW, I.E., SCOPE OF THE COMMITTEE
WITH RESPECT TO ONGOING ACTIVITIES, SUCH AS CERTAIN
USAID PROJECTS AND THE U.S.-RUSSIA HEALTH AGREEMENT,
WAS BRIEFLY DISCUSSED. I T WAS AGREED THAT THE U.S.
WOULD PROVIDE A PAPER ON THIS ISSUE THE FOLLOWING DAY
(NOTE: I T WAS ADDED UNDER A NEW HEADING IN THE METHODS
OF W R PAPER).
OK
-- NEW USAID PROJECTS PROPOSED FOR ANNOUNCEMENT DURING
THE GCC MEETING -- THE MTTA PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTION
AND THE MATERNAL HEALTH AND FAMILY PLANNING PROJECTS
-- WERE DISCUSSED. DR. SAVELYEV REVEALED THAT THE MOH
HAS APPROVED ONLY THE MERCK PROJECT AND NOT THE AWARDS
TO THE OTHER PHARMACEUTICAL FIRMS. AID/M WILL BE
HOLDING SEPARATE DISCUSSIONS WITH MOH NEXT WEEK IN AN
ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE.
-- PRIORITY AREAS FOR COOPERATION WERE BRIEFLY
DISCUSSED. DR. SAVELYEV RECOMMENDED EIGHT PRIORITY
AREAS -- THE FOUR TOP RUSSIAN PRIORITIES. THIS
ELIMINATES SPACE AND PEDIATRIC CARDIAC SURGERY AND
FOUR U.S. PRIORITIES (INCLUDING MENTAL HEALTH).
-- MRS. VOGEL ADVISED THAT SECRETARY SHALALA WISHES TO
HOST THE MINISTER AND ONE OR TWO ADDITIONAL PEOPLE
FROM THE RUSSIAN SIDE AT A SMALL DINNER THE EVENING OF
DECEMBE
R 13. THIS WILL PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR
INFORMAL DISCUSSION BETWEEN THEM BEFORE THE COMMITTEE
MEETING BEGINS THE NEXT MORNING. DETAILS WILL BE
PROVIDED TO SAVELYEV LATER.
-- DR. SAVELYEV ADVISED THAT THE MINISTER WILL BE IN
PARIS FOR THE HIGH-LEVEL AIDS MEETING ON DECEMBER 1
UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 05 M S O 034689
OCW
STATE FOR OES/STH (ROCK) AND
EUR/ISCA/CAST (FERGUSON-AUGUSTUS AND
S/NIS/C (MACKLIN)
AID FOR AID/NIS (TURNER)
WHITE HOUSE FOR OSTP (WALES/BORIGHT/SCHWEITZER)
STATE PASS TO HHS FOR PHS (BOUFFORD/HOHMAN)
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KGCC, TBIO, RS
SUBJECT: GCC HEALTH COMMITTEE - MEETING PREPARATIONS
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Page 5 or9
AND COULD SPEAK TO THE SECRETARY THERE AS WELL. HE
NOTED THAT DR. VIKTOR LYKOV, AN ASSISTANT TO DR.
SAVELYEV WHO WAS IN THIS DISCUSSION, WOULD TAKE THE
DRAFT AGENDA AND OTHER AGREED DRAFTS TO THE MINISTER
FOR HIS INFORMATION AND POSSIBLE USE. (NOTE: THIS
INFORMATION HAS BEEN CONVEYED TO SECRETARY SHALALA S
PARTY IN PARIS . )
1
-- DR. SAVELYEV WAS ASKED HIS VIEW ON POSSIBLE HEALTHRELATED SITE VISITS FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT. HE HAD
SOME SUGGESTIONS. HE WAS INFORMED THAT POTENTIAL
SITES WERE GOING TO BE VISITED THIS WEEK BY
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE OVP AND MRS. GORE'S OFFICE AND
THAT THEY WOULD MAKE THE DECISION. WE DID NOT GET THE
IMPRESSION THAT HE CARED TO PLAY A ROLE, BUT, AS A
COURTESY, MOH WILL NEED TO BE ADVISED OF ANY HEALTHRELATED SITE SELECTED, IN THE EVENT THAT THE MINISTER
WISHES TO JOIN I N .
-- A TENTATIVE SCHEDULE OF DISCUSSIONS FOR THE REST OF
THE WEEK WAS AGREED UPON, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THAT DR.
SAVELYEV WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE ON TUESDAY, NOV. 29,
DUE TO COMMITMENTS AT THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE
ACADEMY OF MEDICAL SCIENCES (RAMS). I T WAS AGREED
THAT AMONG THESE MEETINGS WOULD BE A SESSION WITH THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIES OF THE HEALTH AGREEMENT,
INCLUDING THE THREE REPS FROM MOH, THE STATE COMMITTEE
FOR SANITARY- EPIDEMIOLOGICAL SURVEILLANCE (GKSEN) AND
RAMS. DR. HENRY IS THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR THE
U.S. THIS WOULD BE THE FIRST MEETING OF THIS GROUP
SINCE THE SIGNING OF THE HEALTH AGREEMENT IN JANUARY
1994. A PURPOSE OF THIS MEETING WILL BE TO REACH
AGREEMENT ON A JOINT REPORT, TO BE PRESENTED BY THE
RUSSIAN SIDE, TO THE GCHC.
B.
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 29
-- THE HHS REPRESENTATIVES, USAID AND ESTOFF DISCUSSED
AND WORKED OVER THE SEVERAL DOCUMENTS (AGENDA, CHARGE,
METHODS OF WORK SECRETARIAT FUNCTIONS, DELEGATION
LIST, AND PRIORITIES).
-- A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE CHARGE A N METHODS OF
_D
W R IS THE ELIMINATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
OK
WORKING GROUPS. THIS WAS DONE FOR SEVERAL REASONS.
THE ORIGINAL DRAFT OF THE METHODS OF WORK HAD INCLUDED
A SECTION ON PREPARATION OF PLANS OF ACTION INCLUDING
PROJECTED BUDGETARY REQUIREMENTS. INASMUCH AS THERE
IS NO NEW MONEY TO FUND PROJECTS, THIS SEEMED TO BE
RISKY. MOREOVER, SAVELYEV WAS CLEARLY THINKING OF
WORKING GROUPS IN A VERY TRADITIONAL MODE; I.E., THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF PANELS OF EXPERTS WHO GET TOGETHER TO
DECIDE WHAT TO DO AND THEN PROGRESSIVELY CARRY OUT A
PROGRAM OF SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION OVER TIME. WE FELT
THAT, WHILE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A WORKING GROUP OR
PERHAPS AN AD HOC STEERING GROUP COULD BE AN APPROACH
THAT THE GCHC COULD DECIDE UPON, WE WOULD NOT
NECESSARILY WISH TO SEE THIS DONE FOR EACH AREA. THIS
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Page 6 of 9
COULD RESULT IN EXPENDITURE OF VERY SCARCE RESOURCES
FOR MULTIPLE WORKING GROUP MEETINGS THAT MAY NOT NEED
TO BE HELD.
-- ANOTHER KEY CHANGE WAS ADDITION TO THE METHODS OF
WORK SECTION THE ESTABLISHMENT, BY THE COMMITTEE, OF
CRITERIA FOR THE SELECTION OF AREAS OF WORK. DR.
SAVELYEV AGREED THAT SUCH CRITERIA ARE NEEDED, BUT HE
BELIEVES THAT THE AGENDA FOR THE MEETING IS ALREADY
TOO FULL TO ACCOMMODATE A DISCUSSION AND ARRIVE AT A
CONSENSUS ON THIS. HE WAS AGREEABLE TO DEVELOPMENT OF
A PAPER FOR DECISION AT THE SECOND COMMITTEE MEETING.
-- CARE WAS TAKEN IN REVISED DRAFTS TO ELIMINATE OR
MINIMIZE ANY WORDING THAT WOULD SUGGEST THAT MOH OR
THE GCHC WOULD PLAY A DIRECT ROLE IN MANAGING ANY
EXISTING USAID PROJECTS.
-- THE DOCUMENTS WERE PROVIDED BY COB TUESDAY TO MOH,
FOR DISCUSSION ON WEDNESDAY.
C.
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 3 0
IN A TWO-HOUR MEETING AT MOH, FINAL AGREEMENT WAS
REACHED ON THE FOLLOWING:
C.l
ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MEETING ON DECEMBER 14.
UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 05 M S O 034689
OCW
STATE FOR OES/STH (ROCK) AND
EUR/ISCA/CAST (FERGUSON-AUGUSTUS AND
S/NIS/C (MACKLIN)
AID FOR AID/NIS (TURNER)
WHITE HOUSE FOR OSTP (WALES/BORIGHT/SCHWEITZER)
STATE PASS TO HHS FOR PHS (BOUFFORD/HOHMAN)
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KGCC, TBIO, RS
SUBJECT: GCC HEALTH COMMITTEE - MEETING PREPARATIONS
VENUE: MOH COUNCIL CHAMBER.
THE ROOM IS WELL-
APPOINTED AND WILL SEAT EIGHT ON EACH SIDE OF THE
TABLE WITH ADDITIONAL CHAIRS ALONG THE WALLS PLUS ROOM
AT THE END FOR THE INTERPRETERS (ONE PROVIDED BY THE
U.S. AND ONE PROVIDED BY MOH).
HOURS: 9:00 A.M. TO 1:00 P.M., FOLLOWED BY LUNCH.
SECRETARIATS WILL CONVENE AT 2:30 TO FINALIZE THE
REPORT TO THE COMMISSION.
THE
INTERPRETATION: CONSECUTIVE (MOH DOES NOT HAVE THE
FACILITY FOR SIMULTANEOUS INTERPRETATION).
C.2 THE AGENDA, INCLUDING ALLOCATION OF TIME BY ITEM
AND DESIGNATION OF LEAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR EACH ITEM.
AN EFFORT WAS MADE TO ENSURE BALANCE BETWEEN U.S. AND
�F:\Cable\Data Soiirce\Cables\CD010\DEC94\MSGS\M1392652.html
RUSSIAN PRESENTATIONS.
C.3. OTHER AGREED DRAFT DOCUMENTS, WITH CHANGES AS
NOTED ABOVE:
-- THE CHARGE TO THE COMMITTEE
-- COMMITTEE METHODS OF WORK, INCLUDING A NEW SECTION
ON RELATIONSHIP TO EXISTING MAJOR PROGRANS
-- SECRETARIAT(S) DESIGNATION AND FUNCTIONS
C.4 A DRAFT U.S. DELEGATION LIST WAS PROVIDED, WITH
THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THIS COULD BE REVISED I F
NEEDED.
C.5. A REVISED LIST OF PRIORITIES, BASED ON MONDAY'S
DISCUSSION AND INTERNAL U.S. CONSULTATIONS. AS PART
OF THIS, THE U.S. PROVIDED A DRAFT FORMAT (USING
DIABETES AS A MODEL) FOR PRESENTATION OF THE
PRIORITIES DURING THE COMMITTEE MEETING. USE OF THIS
FORMAT WILL ENSURE THAT EACH SIDE OF THE COMMITTEE
WILL HAVE THE SAME SUMMARY DOCUMENT BEFORE THEM. I T
WAS AGREED THAT MOH WILL PREPARE, WITH INPUT FROM THE
U.S., THE SUMMARIES FOR THE AREAS PROPOSED BY RUSSIA,
AND THE U.S. WILL DO THE SAME FOR THE AREAS WE
PROPOSED. THESE WILL BE EXCHANGED NEXT WEEK.
C.6. THE PROPOSALS ON PEDIATRIC CARDIAC SURGERY AND
MENTAL HEALTH WERE DISCUSSED BRIEFLY. I T WAS DECIDED
THAT THESE TWO AREAS ARE BEING ADDRESSED ADEQUATELY
THROUGH OTHER MECHANISMS --CARDIAC SURGERY THROUGH THE
HOSPITAL PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM AND MENTAL HEALTH UNDER
THE HEALTH AGREEMENT.
C.7. USAID OFFERED TO PROVIDE 20 SLOTS FOR MONTH-LONG
TRAINING PROGRAMS FOR RUSSIAN PARTICIPANTS THAT COULD
BE ORGANIZED AROUND THEMES IDENTIFIED BY THE
COMMITTEE.
6. ALL DOCUMENTS CITED IN THIS CABLE WILL BE
AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON ON MONDAY DECEMBER 4 THROUGH
L. VOGEL, DHHS/PHS.
FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS
7. THE FOLLOWING FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS SHOULD BE
COMPLETED NEXT WEEK:
-- FINALIZATION OF DELEGATION LIST OF GCHC MEETING.
HHS MUST BE ADVISED BY EPA, DOC AND STATE WHETHER
STAFF WHO WILL BE IN M S O FOR THE GCHC MEETING WILL
OCW
PARTICIPATE IN THE GCHC MEETING ON THE 14TH.
-- A DRAFT OF THE GCHC REPORT TO THE GCC SHOULD BE
SENT TO MOH ASAP FOR THEIR REVIEW AND COMMENTS. THIS
REPORT WILL BE BASED LARGELY ON THE UNDERSTANDINGS
Page 7 of 9
�F:\Cable\Data Soiirce\Cables\CD010\DEC94\MSGS\M1392652.html
REACHED THIS WEEK AND WOULD APPEAR TO BE RELATIVELY
PRO FORMA AT THIS JUNCTURE. WE, THEREFORE, URGE
EXPEDITED REVIEW AND CLEARANCE OF THIS DRAFT REPORT I N
WASHINGTON.
-- HHS SHOULD SHARE ASAP ITS PRIORITY AREA SUMMARIES
WITH MOH.
WE EXPECT THAT I N I T I A L DRAFTS PREPARED HERE
I N MOSCOW WILL BE REVISED BASED ON INTERAGENCY
DISCUSSION TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR TUESDAY, DECEMBER
6, AT HHS. EMBASSY HOPES TO HAVE MOH'S FOUR SUMMARIES
UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 05 MOSCOW 034689
STATE FOR OES/STH (ROCK) AND
EUR/ISCA/CAST (FERGUSON-AUGUSTUS AND
S/NIS/C (MACKLIN)
AID FOR AID/NIS (TURNER)
WHITE HOUSE FOR OSTP (WALES/BORIGHT/SCHWEITZER)
STATE PASS TO HHS FOR PHS (BOUFFORD/HOHMAN)
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAS: KGCC, TBIO, RS
SUBJECT: GCC HEALTH COMMITTEE - MEETING PREPARATIONS
TO SHARE WITH HHS NEXT WEEK AS WELL.
FOLLOW UP WITH MOH.
ESTOFF WILL
-- AS AGREED WITH VOGEL AND HENRY, ESTOFF WILL BE
FOCAL POINT HERE FOR FINAL ASSEMBLY OF MATERIAL FOR
GCHC MEMBER BRIEFING PACKAGES, ENSURING THAT COMPLETE
SETS WITH TABS ARE READY FOR MEETING. MILES
BT
#4689
NNNN
SECT:
SECTION: 0 1 OF 05
<"SECT>SECTION: 02
< SECT>SECTION: 03
< SECT>SECTION: 04
< SECT>SECTION: 05
A
A
A
SSN:
OF
OF
OF
OF
05
05
05
05
4689
<"SSN>4689
< SSN>4689
< SSN>4689
< SSN>4689
A
A
A
TOR:
941202053900 M1392652
< TOR>941202054003 M1392654
< TOR>941202054104 M1392655
<"TOR>941202054106 M1392657
< TOR>941202054209 M1392659
A
A
A
DIST:
PRT: BRANSCUM
Page 8 of 9
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD010\DEC94\MSGS\M1392652.html
SIT: BEYRLE BURNS NSC
< DIST>
SIT: SIMON
A
Page 9 of 9
�F:\Cable\Data Soiirce\Cables\CD010\DEC94\MSGS\M1393069.html
Cable
PREC:
IMMEDIATE
CLASS:
UNCLASSIFIED
LINEl:
OAAUZYUW RUEHMOA4 7 3 2 3361404 -UUUU--RHEHAAA.
LINE2:
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
LINE3:
0 021404Z DEC 94
LINE4:
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
OSRI:
DTG:
ORIG:
TO:
RUEHMO
021404Z DEC 94
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7 1 6 1
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEBAAA/DOE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEADNA/DNA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEAADN/OSIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO
SUBJ
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USVIENNA 1025
PACT: SECOND DAY'S MEETING, NOVEMBER 30,
TEXT
UNCLAS SECTION 0 1 OF 05 MOSCOW 034732
DEPT FOR ACDA; T, PM, EUR
DOE FOR NN-1; NN-40; NN-4 1; BERLS
JCS FOR J-5 DDIN
SECDEF FOR SSD:AE OSD: ISP USDA:SScSS, AND DIA/ODB-6
CIA FOR CHIEF/ACIS
OSIA FOR DIRECTOR, DEP DIR (EA)
NSC FOR AOKI
NRG FOR SHERR
DNA/OPAC
WHITE HOUSE FOR OSTP (VON HIPPED
AND OVP (FUERTH)
E.O. 12356:
N/A
TAGS: PARM, KSUM, KNNP, RS, MNUC
SUBJECT: PACT: SECOND DAY'S MEETING, NOVEMBER 30,
1994 .
1.
THIS I S PACT-IV-002.
TEXT .
UNCLASSIFIED -- ENTIRE
2. SUMMARY: CONTRARY TO TUESDAY'S AGREEMENT, THE
RUSSIAN SIDE REFUSED TO HAVE A TEXT WORKING GROUP
MEETING, INSISTING INSTEAD THAT THE DELEGATIONS MEET
ONLY AS A WHOLE.
I N THE DELEGATION MEETING, THE
RUSSIAN SIDE LED BY MIKERIN, BALAMUTOV AND RYZHOV
PRESENTED A RADICALLY NEW APPROACH TO COMPLIANCE
MONITORING AS A RESPONSE TO THE UPDATED U.S. TEXT.
AFTER STATING THAT AS OF OCTOBER 1 , 1994, THEY HAD
Page 1 of 9
�F:\Cable\Data Soiirce\Cables\CD010\DEC94\MSGS\M1393069.html
MET THEIR FULL OBLIGATION UNDER THE GORECHERNOMYRDIN AGREEMENT BY CEASING TO USE NEWLY
PRODUCED PLUTONIUM IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THEY
PRESENTED A DRASTICALLY SCALED-DOWN VERSION OF THE
COMPLIANCE REGIME THAT HAD BEEN AGREED UPON IN THE
RECORDS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETINGS. THE RUSSIAN SIDE
N W WANTS A PHASED APPROACH. THE FIRST PHASE
O
CONSISTS OF (1) UNCONFIRMED DECLARATIONS OF THE PU
MASS THAT IS PRODUCED AND THE REPROCESSED MATERIAL
THAT IS PLACED I N STORAGE, AND (2) MONITORING OF THE
INVENTORY IN STORAGE. THE U.S. WOULD BE ALLOWED TO
MEASURE PLUTONIUM OXIDE WEIGHT AND AM-241 CONTENT,
AND COULD MONITOR THE STORAGE FACILITY. ANY
MONITORING ACTIVITY AT OPERATING REACTORS WOULD BE
NEGOTIATED AS PART OF THE SECOND PHASE. ANY
PROGRESS BEYOND PHASE I WAS DIRECTLY LINKED TO
PROGRESS MADE ON REPLACEMENT ENERGY SOURCES. THE
RUSSIAN SIDE ACKNOWLEDGED THIS WAS A SIGNIFICANT
CHANGE FROM THE PREVIOUSLY AGREED APPROACH, BUT
STATED THAT I T REFLECTED THEIR REVISED VIEW OF THE
OVERALL INTERACTION WITH THE U.S. ON ALL THE RELATED
PLUTONIUM ISSUES. SEE DEL COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATION
IN PARA 13. END SUMMARY.
3. MIKERIN OPENED THE MORNING SESSION BY COMMENTING
THAT THE UPDATED U.S. TEXT PRESENTED TUESDAY WAS NOT
SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT FROM THE PREVIOUS VERSION
AND WOULD NOT REQUIRE FURTHER DISCUSSION. HE THEN
PRESENTED A NEW RUSSIAN VERSION OF THE DOCUMENT AS
THEIR RESPONSE. PREFACING HIS COMMENTS BY NOTING
RUSSIAN DESIRE TO AVOID LEGAL DETAILS SUCH AS
MONITORING PROCEDURES AND STATUS OF MONITORS, WHICH
WOULD BE TOO COMPLEX TO COMPLETE QUICKLY, MIKERIN
OUTLINED THE MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THEIR PROPOSAL AS:
A) A STATEMENT THAT AS OF OCTOBER 1, 1994, THE
RUSSIAN SIDE HAS MET ITS FULL OBLIGATION UNDER THE
GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN AGREEMENT BY CEASING TO USE NEWLYPRODUCED PLUTONIUM IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THIS
REPRESENTS UNILATERAL COMPLIANCE ON THEIR PART.
B) A MINIMALIST APPROACH TO MONITORING THAT INCLUDES
RUSSIAN DECLARATIONS OF THE AMOUNT OF PLUTONIUM
PRODUCED I N THE REACTORS AND RECOVERED FROM
REPROCESSING, U.S. MEASUREMENTS AT THE STORAGE
FACILITY OF PLUTONIUM OXIDE WEIGHT AND AM-241
CONTENT, AND STORAGE IN CASKS.
C) AN AGREED SET OF PROCEDURES TO MONITOR THE CASKS
IN STORAGE.
THESE STEPS WOULD CONSTITUTE A FIRST PHASE OF THE
COMPLIANCE REGIME. ONCE PROGRESS IS MADE IN THE
PROVISION OF ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOURCES, THE SIDES
WOULD RECONVENE TO DISCUSS MORE PROFOUND MEASURES TO
ADDRESS OPERATING REACTORS. (COMMENT: THE RUSSIAN
SIDE DID NOT DEFINE "PROGRESS." END COMMENT.)
KHLEBNIKOV ADDED THAT THE RUSSIAN SIDE WANTED TO
OMIT TECHNICAL DETAILS TO EXPEDITE SIGNING.
Page 2 of 9
�F:\Cable\Data Soiirce\Cables\CD010\DEC94\MSGS\M1393069.html
4. BALAMUTOV THEN DESCRIBED WHAT HE SAW TO BE THE
NECESSARy PROCEDURE TO OBTAIN A GOVERNMENT-TOGOVERNMENT ACRE
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 05 M S O 034732
OCW
DEPT FOR ACDA; T, PM, EUR
DOE FOR NN-1; NN-40; NN-41; BERLS
JCS FOR J-5 DDIN
SECDEF FOR SSD:AE OSD:ISP USDA:S&SS, AND DIA/ODB-6
CIA FOR CHIEF/ACIS
OSIA FOR DIRECTOR, DEP DIR (EA)
NSC FOR AOKI
NRG FOR SHERR
DNA/OPAC
WHITE HOUSE FOR OSTP (VON HIPPED AND OVP (FUERTH)
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PARM, KSUM, KNNP, RS, MNUC
SUBJECT: PACT: SECOND DAY'S MEETING, NOVEMBER 30,
1994 .
EMENT: FIRST EACH SIDE MUST PREPARE
WRITTEN PROPOSALS, THEN EACH MUST CONSIDER THE
OTHER'S PROPOSAL, THEN BOTH MUST DEVELOP A JOINT
DOCUMENT. SUCH A PROCEDURE GENERALLY TAKES LONGER
THAN THE SIDES HAVE HAD FOR THIS EXERCISE. THIS NEW
DOCUMENT REPRESENTS THE RUSSIAN PROPOSAL WHICH THE
U.S. SIDE SHOULD CONSIDER; BOTH SIDES SHOULD THEN
W R HARD TO DEVELOP A JOINT VERSION. THIS WOULD,
OK
IN HIS NPINION, CONSTITUTE A GOOD OUTCOME OF THIS
MEETING. MIKERIN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE RUSSIAN
PROPOSAL WAS A NEW APPROACH TO MONITORING; HE ADDED
THAT I T WOULD NOT PRECLUDE MORE COMPREHENSIVE
MONITORING IN THE FUTURE, BUT I T WOULD LIMIT THE
CURRENT OPTIONS. AS HE HANDED OVER THE RUSSIAN
TEXT, HE STATED THAT THE CONCEPTS CONTAINED THEREIN
WERE ENDORSED BY ALL THE RUSSIAN AGENCIES
REPRESENTED AT THE TABLE: MINATOM, MFA, AND MOD.
5. CZAJKOWSKI RESPONDED THAT WHAT THE RUSSIANS HAD
DONE WOULD MAKE THE SIDES' WORK VERY DIFFICULT. HE
POINTED OUT THAT THE U.S. DRAFT TEXT WAS THE RESULT
OP MANY MEETINGS AND INCLUDED MANY RUSSIAN INPUTS
AND MUCH THAT HAD BEEN AGREED BY THE SIDES. IN
ADDITION, HE MADE I T CLEAR THAT THE U.S. MUST, AS A
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, REJECT THE CONCEPT OF LINKING
PROGRESS ON THE MONITORING REGIME WITH PROGRESS ON
ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOURCES. THE U.S. SIDE
UNDERSTANDS THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS ISSUE AND WILL
CONTINUE TO REPORT RUSSIAN CONCERNS TO THOSE WHO ARE
HANDLING IT. HE REMINDED THE RUSSIANS THAT THE
CHARTER IN ARTICLE I I , PARAGRAPH 2, OF THE JUNE
AGREEMENT IS "TO DEVELOP PROCEDURES" BY DECEMBER 23.
THE APPROACH OUTLINED IN THE U.S. DRAFT TEXT WAS
AGREED UPON BY EXPERTS FROM BOTH SIDES AND IS BASED
ON MONITORING NEWLY PRODUCED, WEAPONS-GRADE
Page 3 of 9
�F:\Cable\Data Soiirce\Cables\CD010\DEC94\MSGS\M 1393069.html
PLUTONIUM I N AMOUNTS THAT CORRESPOND TO THOSE
CALCULATED USING REACTOR OPERATING PARAMETERS. BOTH
SIDES HAD AGREED THAT THIS WAS THE MINIMUM SET OF
STEPS NECESSARY TO ASSURE COMPLIANCE. THE U.S. TEXT
ALLOWS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT COMMISSION
TO REVIEW PROCEDURES AND ENHANCE OR SIMPLIFY THEM AS
NECESSARY, BUT THIS I S VERY DIFFERENT FROM STARTING
WITH ONLY HALF OF WHAT I S REQUIRED AND ADDING THE
REST AT SOME UNSPECIFIED FUTURE DATE. STAFFORD THEN
OBJECTED TO THE IDEA THAT THE U.S. TEXT I S TOO
COMPLEX TO CONCLUDE AT THIS MEETING. MOST OF THE
LANGUAGE WAS ALREADY AGREED TO DURING THE SEPTEMBER
AND OCTOBER MEETINGS, AND OTHER LANGUAGE WAS DRAWN
FROM OTHER AGREEMENTS THAT ALREADY EXIST BETWEEN THE
TWO SIDES AND THAT HAD BEEN SUGGESTED AS MODELS BY
THE RUSSIAN SIDE.
THE NUMBER OF IDENTIFIED,
UNRESOLVED ISSUES WAS RELATIVELY SMALL AND THE U.S.
SIDE HAD COME TO MOSCOW PREPARED TO SETTLE THEM THIS
WEEK.
6. MIKERIN SAID THAT WHILE HE UNDERSTOOD THE U.S.
POSITION, THE TEXT DEVELOPED TO DATE WAS DONE UNDER
THE PRESUMPTION THAT MUTUAL PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE
ON BOTH ASPECTS OF THE JUNE AGREEMENT. THE
MONITORING PORTION WILL REQUIRE LARGE EXPENDITURES
OF FINANCES AND EFFORT. SINCE THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION I S NOW I N A POSITION TO DECLARE
UNILATERAL DE FACTO COMPLETION OF I T S OBLIGATION
UNDER THE AGREEMENT AND SINCE EFFORTS ON ALTERNATIVE
ENERGY SOURCES ARE AT THE SAME STAGE THEY WERE I N
JUNE, THE RUSSIAN SIDE I S PROPOSING A LIMITED,
UNILATERAL MONITORING APPROACH THAT THEIR GOVERNMENT
CAN ACCEPT. INDEED, SOME I N THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT
MAY QUESTION WHY THEY SHOULD ALLOW ANY MONITORING OF
RUSSIAN PLUTONIUM SINCE THERE I S NO POLITICAL OR
ECONOMIC VALUE TO THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE. BY THE YEAR
2000 THE REACTORS WILL BE SHUT DOWN AND THIS
BILATERAL AGREEMENT SHOULD SIMPLY CONCENTRATE ON
UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 05 MOSCOW 034732
DEPT FOR ACDA; T, PM, EUR
DOE FOR NN-1; NN-4 0; NN-4 1; BERLS
JCS FOR J-5 DDIN
SECDEF FOR SSD:AE OSD:ISP USDA:S&SS, AND DIA/ODB-6
CIA FOR CHIEF/ACIS
OSIA FOR DIRECTOR, DEP DIR (EA)
NSC FOR AOKI
NRG FOR SHERR
DNA/OPAC
WHITE HOUSE FOR OSTP (VON HIPPEL) AND OVP
(FUERTH)
E.O. 12356:
N/A
TAGS: PARM, KSUM, KNNP, RS, MNUC
SUBJECT: PACT: SECOND DAY'S MEETING, NOVEMBER 30,
1994 .
THEM.
CZAJKOWSKI CONGRATULATED THE RUSSIAN SIDE ON
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Page 4 of 9
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD010\DEC94\MSGS\M1393069.html
THEIR CESSATION OF USE OF NEWLY PRODUCED PLUTONIUM
IN WEAPONS. HE REITERATED, HOWEVER, THAT THE SIDES'
TASK IS TO DEVELOP PROCEDURES TO ASSURE COMPLIANCE
AND POINTED OUT THAT THERE WAS NOT SYMMETRY BETWEEN
THE SIDES REGARDING PRODUCTION. THE U.S. IS NOT
PRODUCING PU SO THE SIDES HAVE RECIPROCITY ONLY ON
SHUTDOWN REACTORS. HE AGAIN ACKNOWLEDGED THE
IMPORTANCE OF THE ALTERNATIVE ENERG
Y ISSUE TO THE
RUSSIAN SIDE BUT RESTATED THAT THE ISSUE IS BEING
ADDRESSED IN ANOTHER FORUM. I T IS NOT IN THE
PURVIEW OF THIS GROUP TO ADDRESS THIS ISSUE AT THIS
MEETING. THE SIDES CANNOT HAVE TWO SEPARATE
DOCUMENTS THAT ARE AIMED AT T O GOVERNMENTS BUT MUST
W
WORK TO DEVELOP A JOINT DOCUMENT BOTH CAN SIGN.
THEY SHOULD NOT IGNORE ALL THE WORK OF THE TEAMS OF
EXPERTS W O HAVE DEVELOPED A REGIME BASED ON THE
H
REACTORS AND STORAGE. PRECEDING A BREAK, MIKERIN
AGAIN TIED PROGRESS BEYOND THE RUSSIAN - PROPOSED
PHASE I TO PROGRESS ON ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOURCES.
7. CZAJKOWSKI RECOMMENDED THAT THE SIDES SPEND THE
REST OF THE MORNING AS AGREED TUESDAY, NAMELY HAVING
A SUBGROUP G THROUGH THE U.S. TEXT TO DETERMINE
O
PORTIONS THE RUSSIAN SIDE WANTS TO BRACKET SO THE
U.S. COULD BETTER UNDERSTAND THE RUSSIAN POSITION.
MIKERIN DISMISSED THE IDEA, STATING THAT THE RUSSIAN
SIDE DISAGREED WITH 90 PERCENT OF THE U.S.
PROCEDURES, SO SUCH AN EXERCISE WOULD BE
INEFFICIENT. RATHER, THE U.S. SHOULD TRANSLATE THE
RUSSIAN TEXT AND CONSIDER I T FOR DISCUSSION THURSDAY
MORNING. SINCE THE RUSSIAN TEXT IS THE RUSSIAN
RESPONSE TO THE U.S. DRAFT TEXT AND USED AS MUCH OF
THE AMERICAN TEXT AS POSSIBLE, THE SIDES SHOULD
STUDY I T AND USE I T AS THE BASIS FOR DISCUSSION.
AGAIN CZAJKOWSKI STATED HIS CONCERN ABOUT THE
RADICAL CHANGE FROM PROCEDURES AGREED BY EXPERTS AND
MIKERIN RESTATED THAT THESE CAN NO LONGER BE
CONSIDERED ACCEPTABLE TO THE RUSSIAN SIDE.
8. AT THIS POINT, RYZHOV BEGAN A DISCOURSE ON THE
HISTORY AND CONTEXT OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THIS
PROTOCOL FROM THE RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE. HE STATED
THAT, FROM THE START, THE RUSSIAN SIDE HAD INSISTED
THAT THE MONITORING PROCEDURES REFLECT THREE
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE T O SIDES: THEIR NUCLEAR
W
STATUS, THEIR LEVEL OF POLITICAL INTERACTION, AND
THE LEVEL OF CREDIBILITY DEVELOPED BETWEEN THEM.
THE RUSSIAN SIDE CONSISTENTLY INFORMED THE U.S. SIDE
THAT MONITORING PROCEDURES DESIGNED FOR NON-NUCLEAR
STATES (IAEA) WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE FOR THIS CASE
AND THE U.S. NEVER OBJECTED FORMALLY TO THESE
PARAMETERS. N W THE RUSSIAN SIDE SEES THAT THE U.S.
O
HAS DUPLICATED IAEA ARRANGEMENTS FOR PART OF THE
MONITORING SCHEME. THE RUSSIAN SIDE HAS TRIED
CAREFULLY TO ASSESS THE COSTS AND IMPACTS OF THIS
PROPOSED REGIME AND PERCEIVES THE NEED FOR AN
ASTRONOMICAL CAPITAL OUTLAY. THE RUSSIAN SIDE HAS
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Page 5 of 9
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD0I0\DEC94\MSGS\M1393069.html
CONCLUDED THAT THE U.S. PROPOSAL GOES BEYOND THE
REGIME CALLED FOR I N THE B A S I C AGREEMENT.
THE
R U S S I A N S I D E HAS ATTEMPTED TO L I M I T MONITORING
PROCEDURES TO THE M A T E R I A L THAT I S REALLY IMPORTANT
TO THE A I M OF THE AGREEMENT.
THERE I S A FUNDAMENTAL
D I F F E R E N C E I N THE GENERAL APPROACH OF THE TWO S I D E S :
THE AMERICAN S I D E USES THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE
R U S S I A N FEDERATION I S A P O T E N T I A L D I V E R T E R AND THE
RUSSIAN APPROACH I S TO USE THE CREDIBILITY THAT HAS
BEEN DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE S I D E S .
9.
ON THE ISSUE OF ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOURCES,
RYZHOV CONTINUED, THE RUSSIAN VIEW I S THAT THERE I S
AN UNBREAKABLE L I N K BETWEEN T H I S AND THE MONITORING
UNCLAS S E C T I O N 0 4 OF 0 5 MOSCOW 0 3 4 7 3 2
DEPT FOR ACDA; T, PM, EUR
DOE FOR N N - 1 ; NN-4 0; N N - 4 1 ; BERLS
JCS FOR J - 5 D D I N
SECDEF FOR SSD:AE O S D : I S P USDA:S&SS, AND DIA/ODB-6
C I A FOR C H I E F / A C I S
O S I A FOR DIRECTOR, DEP D I R (EA)
NSC FOR A O K I
NRG FOR SHERR
DNA/OPAC
WHITE HOUSE FOR OSTP (VON HIPPEL) AND OVP (FUERTH)
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PARM, KSUM, KNNP, RS, MNUC
SUBJECT: PACT: SECOND DAY'S MEETING, NOVEMBER 30,
1994 .
AGREEMENT. MIKERIN IS NOT INTERESTED IN ANY
MONITORING WHATSOEVER IN THE U.S. OR RUSSIA, BUT HE
MUST REPORT TO THE GOVERNMENT ABOUT H W HEAT WILL BE
O
SUPPLIED TO THE CITIES IN SIBERIA. THE RUSSIAN
MESSAGE THAT PROGRESS MUST BE MADE ON THE ISSUE OF
PROVIDING ALTERNATIVE ENERGY IS OBVIOUSLY NOT BEING
TRANSMITTED TO THE PEOPLE WHO NEED TO HEAR I T . THE
RUSSIAN ECONOMY MUST BEAR THE COST OF THE COMPLIANCE
REGIME, SO NATURALLY RUSSIA WILL TRY TO MINIMIZE THE
SCOPE AND COST OF THE REGIME.
10. STAFFORD STRONGLY RESPONDED TO RYZHOV'S TWO
POINTS. REGARDING RYZHOV'S CLAIM THAT THE U.S.
POSITION SPECIFIED MONITORING PROCEDURES THAT WERE
TOO EXTENSIVE, STAFFORD NOTED THAT THE CURRENT U.S.
POSITION WAS A COMPROMISE THAT HAD BEEN AGREED IN
WRITING BY THE SIDES AFTER THE U.S. HAD
SUBSTANTIALLY REVISED ITS OPENING POSITION IN
RESPONSE TO JUST THE SORT OF ARGUMENTS RYZHOV WAS
MAKING TODAY. THESE ISSUES HAD ALREADY BEEN
SETTLED, TO RUSSIAN AS WELL AS
U.S. SATISFACTION.
REGARDING PROVISION OF ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOURCES,
HE STATED THAT THE U.S. OBLIGATION, AS SPECIFIED IN
ARTICLE I , PARAGRAPH 2, OF THE PLUTONIUM AGREEMENT,
Page 6 of 9
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WAS TO SEEK AGREED STEPS TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE.
REPORTS FROM ROBERT BERLS, U.S. POINT OF CONTACT FOR
THIS ISSUE, INDICATE THAT A LIST OF STEPS HAS BEEN
AGREED TO AND WILL BE UNDERTAKEN TO ADDRESS RUSSIAN
CONCERNS. THE RUSSIAN SIDE MIGHT SEE THESE STEPS AS
INADEQUATE, AND THIS COULD BE DISCUSSED WITH BERLS.
BUT NOTHING IN THE TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT LINKS THE
DEVELOPMENT OF MONITORING PROCEDURES TO THIS ISSUE.
STAFFORD ALSO ASKED THE RUSSIAN SIDE TO CONSIDER THE
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF FORCING THE
SIDES D W A PATH THAT, IN HIS OPINION, WOULD LEAD
ON
THE NEGOTIATIONS TO A DEAD END AND PREVENT REACHING
AGREEMENT BY DECEMBER 23. THE WRITTEN RECORD SHOWS
THAT THE U.S. HAS MADE A GOOD FAITH EFFORT TO
DEVELOP A MONITORING REGIME THAT IS RESPONSIVE TO
RUSSIAN CONCERNS. SHOULD AGREEMENT N W BE THWARTED
O
AS THE RESULT OF A DRASTIC, ELEVENTH-HOUR SHIFT IN
THE RUSSIAN POSITION, THIS COULD CAUSE SEVERE
DIFFICULTIES IN THE USG AND THE U.S. CONGRESS.
STAFFORD RECALLED HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH MIKERIN AND
RYZHOV LAST MAY ABOUT THE MARKEY AMENDMENT AND THE
IMPORTANCE OF THE PLUTONIUM AGREEMENT FOR CONTINUED
U.S. ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA IN LIGHT OF THAT
AMENDMENT. SHOULD IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLUTONIUM
AGREEMENT N W BE DELAYED, PROBLEMS SUCH AS THE
O
MARKEY AMENDMENT COULD RETURN, ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE
CHANGING CHARACTER OF THE U.S. CONGRESS. RYZHOV
OBJECTED THAT THE U.S. COMMENTS SOUNDED LIKE
THREATS. FURTHERMORE, HE QUESTIONED THE VALUE OF
U.S. ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO DATE. STAFFORD
RESPONDED THAT I T WAS NOT THE U.S. INTENT TO ISSUE
THREATS, BUT RATHER TO DESCRIBE THE OBJECTIVE
SITUATION IN WASHINGTON. HE WAS ALSO SEEKING TO
RESPOND TO MIKERIN'S EARLIER QUESTION ABOUT WHAT
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INCENTIVES THE RUSSIAN SIDE
WOULD HAVE FOR CONTINUING WITH THE CURRENT DRAFT
TEXT .
11. RYZHOV HAD TWO PARTING COMMENTS: 1) N W SEEING
O
THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES, HE WOULD HAVE A
BETTER IDEA OF H W TO WRITE THE OBLIGATIONS IN THE
O
PLUTONIUM AGREEMENT; AND 2) THE RUSSIAN
UNDERSTANDING OF THE STATUS OF THE RECORDS OF THE
MEETINGS OF SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER IS DIFFERENT FROM
THAT OF THE U.S. IN THAT THE RUSSIAN SIDE DOES NOT
VIEW THESE DOCUMENTS AS CONSTITUTING GOVERNMENTAL
COMMITMENTS. MIKERIN SUMMARIZED THAT THE OFFICIAL
RUSSIAN POSITION IS THAT APPLYING ALL OF THE U.S.
UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 05 M S O 034732
OCW
DEPT FOR ACDA; T, PM, EUR
DOE FOR NN-1; NN-40; NN-41; BERLS
JCS FOR J-5 DDIN
SECDEF FOR SSD:AE OSD:ISP USDA:S&SS, AND DIA/ODB-6
CIA FOR CHIEF/ACIS
OSIA FOR DIRECTOR, DEP DIR (EA)
NSC FOR AOKI
NRC FOR SHERR
Page 7 of 9
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DNA/OPAC
WHITE HOUSE FOR OSTP (VON HIPPEL) AND OVP (FUERTH)
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PARM, KSUM, KNNP, RS, MNUC
SUBJECT: PACT: SECOND DAY'S MEETING, NOVEMBER 30,
1994 .
PROCEDURES AT THEIR FACILITIES IS UNACCEPTABLE.
RUSSIA HAS RECEIVED PRACTICALLY NOTHING FROM THE
U.S. ON THE KEY ISSUE OF ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOURCES.
REDUCING THE SCOPE OF THE COMPLIANCE REGIME WOULD
SAVE U.S. TAX DOLLARS AND RUSSIA IS WILLING TO
PROMOTE THAT VIEW IN THE U.S. PRESS.
12. A SUB-GROUP CONVENED IN THE AFTERNOON TO HEAR A
REPORT FROM THE U.S. EXPERTS WHO HAD JUST RETURNED
FROM THEIR VISIT TO THE ADE-3 REACTOR AND THE
PROSPECTIVE STORAGE FACILITY AT TOMSK. A TRIP
REPORT WILL BE PROVIDED SEPTEL.
13. COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATION: THE GOR HAS
EVIDENTLY DECIDED THAT I T IS NOT GETTING WHAT I T
WANTS ON ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOURCES USING THE
LEVERAGE I T HAS APPLIED TO DATE AND, THEREFORE,
NEEDS TO RATCHET UP THE STAKES BY HOLDING THE
COMPLIANCE REGIME HOSTAGE. THIS INTENTION IS CLEAR
IN THE RUSSIAN PROPOSAL TO IMPLEMENT MONITORING IN
STAGES, WITH A FIRST STAGE THEY K O THE USG CANNOT
NW
ACCEPT AND A SECOND STAGE INCORPORATING PREVIOUSLY
AGREED PROCEDURES THAT WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED ONLY
WHEN RUSSIA PERCEIVES SATISFACTION ON THE PROVISION
OF ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOURCES. DEL BELIEVES THIS
IMPASSE CAN BE OVERCOME ONLY BY RAISING THE ISSUE TO
A HIGHER LEVEL. DEL RECOMMENDS THAT A LETTER FROM
VP GORE BE SENT TO PM CHERNOMYRDIN OBJECTING TO THIS
LAST-MINUTE, RADICAL SHIFT IN THE RUSSIAN POSITION
AND SEEKING TO GET THE PROCESS BACK ON THE
PRODUCTIVE TRACK ALONG WHICH I T HAS BEEN PROCEEDING
FROM SEPTEMBER UNTIL NOW. DEL RECOGNIZ
ES THAT GORECHERNOMYRDIN LETTERS HAVE PROLIFERATED RECENTLY, TO
THE POINT OF POSSIBLY DIMINISHING RETURNS.
NONETHELESS, DEL BELIEVES SUCH A LETTER IS THE BEST
SOLUTION AT THIS JUNCTURE, BECAUSE: 1) PROGRESS
SEEMS UNLIKELY UNLESS THE ISSUE IS RAISED ABOVE
MIKHAILOV'S LEVEL, AND 2) RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE
IS CRITICAL TO IMPLEMENTATION OF AN AGREEMENT THAT
WAS SIGNED BY GORE AND CHERNOMYRDIN. END COMMENT
AND RECOMMENDATION.
PICKERING
BT
#4732
Page S of 9
�F:\Cable\Data Source\CabIes\CD010\DEC94\MSGS\M1393069.html
NNNN
SECT:
SECTION: 0 1 OF 05
< SECT>SECTION: 02
< SECT>SECTION: 03
< SECT>SECTION: 04
< SECT>SECTION: 05
A
A
A
A
SSN:
OF
OF
OF
OF
05
05
05
05
4732
< SSN>4732
< SSN>4732
< SSN>4732
< SSN>4732
A
A
A
A
TOR:
941202090733 M1393069
< TOR>941202090736 M1393071
< TOR>941202090840 M1393074
< TOR>941202090945 M1393077
< TOR>941202090946 M1393078
A
A
A
A
DIST:
PRT: BERGER BRANSCUM FUERTH ITOH LAKE REED SENS S I T SODERBERG WOLIN
S I T : AOKI BELL BEYRLE BURNS FORSYTHE FRIED GARDNER GOTTEMOELLER NSC
PONEMAN SCHIFTER SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW WHSR I N WITKOWSKY
Page 9 of 9
�F:\Cable\Data Soiirce\Cables\CD010\DEC94\MSGS\M1399109.himl
Cable
PREC:
CLASS:
LINEl:
LINE2:
LINE3:
LINE4:
OSRI:
DTG:
ORIG:
TO:
ROUTINE
UNCLASSIFIED
RAAUZYUW RUEHMOA50 94 3401342 -UUUU--RHEHAAA.
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 061342Z DEC 94
FM AMEMBASSY M S O
OCW
RUEHMO
061342Z DEC 94
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RUEANAT/NASA WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DOE WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7390
INFO: RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0723
RUEHLN/AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 3665
SUBJ:
RESULTS OF FIRST MEETING OF U.S.-RUSSIA
WORKING GROUP ON GENERAL PROBLEMS OF S&T COOPERATION
SUMMARY
TEXT:
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 M S O 035094
OCW
DEPT. FOR OES/SCP AND EUR/ISCA/CAST
DEPT. PASS NSF (C.T. OWENS)
WHITEHOUSE FOR OSTP (WALES)
WHITEHOUSE PASS USTR FOR J. MURPHY
DOD FOR DTSA
USTR FOR J. MURPHY
NASA FOR ROBERT CLARKE
PARIS FOR NSF (GLENDAY)
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KGCC, TSPL, ETTC, CVIS, KSCA, RS, US
SUBJECT: RESULTS OF FIRST MEETING OF U.S.-RUSSIA
WORKING GROUP ON GENERAL PROBLEMS OF S&T COOPERATION
SUMMARY
1. THE FIRST MEETING OF THE GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN SCIENCE
& TECHNOLOGY (S&T) COMMITTEE'S WORKING GROUP ON
GENERAL PROBLEMS OF COOPERATION TOOK PLACE DECEMBER 12, 1994 IN MOSCOW. DIALOGUE WAS ESTABLISHED IN THE
AREAS OF CUSTOMS AND TAXES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS, COOPERATION IN SENSITIVE GEOGRAPHIC AREAS AND
ON SENSITIVE TOPICS, AND MULTIPLE-ENTRY VISAS. SOME
PROGRESS WAS MADE TOWARD SOLVING LONGSTANDING PROBLEMS
OF COOPERATION, PARTICULARLY IN THE AREA OF CLEARANCE
Page of 9
�F:\Cable\Dala_Source\Cables\CD010\DEC94\MSGS\M1399109.html
PROCESSES FOR RESEARCH VESSELS AND SOME STANDING
SUBGROUPS ON PARTICULAR TOPICS WERE CREATED. A
NETWORK OF OPERATIONAL CONTACTS WILL BE ESTABLISHED TO
COORDINATE AND FACILITATE THE ONGOING RESOLUTION OF
PROBLEMS IN S&T COOPERATION. END SUMMARY.
WORKING GROUP CONVENED
2. THE U.S.-RUSSIA WORKING GROUP ON GENERAL PROBLEMS
OF S&T COOPERATION MET FOR THE FIRST TIME IN M S O ON
OCW
DECEMBER 1-2, 1994. THE MEETING WAS CHAIRED BY NASA
SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ROBERT
CLARKE AND DEPUTY MINISTER OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
POLICY ZURAB YAKOBASHVILI. THIS MEETING REPRESENTS
THE FIRST TIME THE TWO SIDES HAVE MET JOINTLY TO
CONSIDER A COMPREHENSIVE RANGE OF ISSUES AND
CONSTRAINTS TO S&T COOPERATION. THE MEETING WAS A
CANDID AND FOCUSED DISCUSSION ON PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS
TO ISSUES OF CONCERN TO AN EXCEPTIONALLY WIDE ARRAY OF
AGENCIES (CIVILIAN AND MILITARY). SUBSTANTIVE
DISCUSSIONS FOCUSED ON FIVE MAJOR CONCERNS: CUSTOMS,
TARIFFS AND TAXES; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS;
ACCESS TO SENSITIVE FACILITIES, SITES AND REGIONS;
MULTIPLE ENTRY VISAS; AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A
NETWORK OF OPERATIONAL CONTACTS. DELEGATION LISTS
FOLLOW IN PARA. 18.
CUSTOMS, TARIFFS, AND TAXES
3. YAKOBASHVILI DESCRIBED THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
OF THE COMMISSION ON HUMANITARIAN AND TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE, THE DETERMINING BODY IN RUSSIA ON GRANTING
TAX AND TARIFF EXEMPTIONS FOR ITEMS ENTERING RUSSIA
PURSUANT TO S&T OR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AGREEMENTS.
YAKOBASHVILI, WHO REPRESENTS S&T ISSUES ON THE
COMMISSION, STRESSED THAT ONE FUNCTION OF THE
COMMISSION IS TO PREVENT ABUSE OF EXEMPTIONS BY
ENTITIES SEEKING COMMERCIAL ADVANTAGE AT TAXPAYER
EXPENSE. THE RUSSIAN IMPORTING ORGANIZATION APPLIES
FOR EXEMPTIONS TO THE STATE CUSTOMS COMMITTEE, WHICH
MAKES A RECOMMENDATION TO THE COMMISSION. HOWEVER, IN
THE CASE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, REQUESTS ARE SENT
TO THE MINISTRY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY OF
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (MINSCI), WHICH THEN MAKES
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COMMISSION. YAKOBASHVILI
AGREED TO PROVIDE A WRITTEN EXPLANATION OF THE ENTIRE
PROCEDURE, AS WELL AS CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING
EXEMPTIONS.
4. YAKOBASHVILI ELABORATED THAT THE NATURE OF THE
INVOLVEMENT OF RUSSIAN SCIENTISTS, NAMELY WHETHER THE
RUSSIANS ARE BEING HIRED UNDER CONTRACT OR ARE ENGAGED
IN COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIES AS TRUE COLLABORATORS, IS
CRUCIAL TO THE DETERMINATION OF TAX OR DUTY EXEMPTION.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Page 2 of 9
�F:\Cable\Data SoLirce\Cables\CD010\DEC94\MSGS\M1399109.html
HE STATED THE VIEW OF MINSCI THAT S&T PROJECTS SEEKING
TAX EXEMPTIONS SHOULD BE THOSE IN WHICH BOTH SIDES
JOINTLY DETERMINE FUNDING PRIORITIES. HE EXPRESSED
THE STRONG VIEW THAT WHEN RUSSIA IS ASKED TO PROVIDE
TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR S&T ACTIVITIES, RUSSIAN OFFICIA
LS
SHOULD BE INVOLVED IN THE EARLY STAGES OF PRIORITY
SETTING AND PEER REVIEW. THIS LED TO A SPIRITED
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 05 M S O 035094
OCW
DEPT. FOR OES/SCP AND EUR/ISCA/CAST
DEPT. PASS NSF (C.T. OWENS)
WHITEHOUSE FOR OSTP (WALES)
WHITEHOUSE PASS USTR FOR J. MURPHY
DOD FOR DTSA
USTR FOR J. MURPHY
NASA FOR ROBERT CLARKE
PARIS FOR NSF (GLENDAY)
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KGCC, TSPL, ETTC, CVIS, KSCA, RS, US
SUBJECT: RESULTS OF FIRST MEETING OF U.S.-RUSSIA
WORKING GROUP ON GENERAL PROBLEMS OF S&T COOPERATION
DISCUSSION OF THE ROLE OF PEER REVIEW AS THE PRIMARY
DETERMINING CRITERIA FOR FUNDING S&T. THE U.S.
DELEGATION STRESSED THE NEED FOR GREATER TRANSPARENCY
IN THE TAX AND TARIFF EXEMPTION PROCESS. THE U.S.
ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE DETRIMENTAL EFFECT OF
TAXES ON THE AMOUNT OF FUNDS THAT ULTIMATELY
RESEARCHERS AND APPROVED PROJECTS.
CUSTOMS & TAXES SUBGROUP
5. FOLLOWING THE INITIAL MEETING OF THE WORKING
PARTY, THE MAJORITY OF RUSSIAN AND AMERICANS AGREED I T
WOULD BE BETTER TO FORM TWO GROUPS, ONE TO EXAMINE TAX
ISSUES AND THE OTHER TO EXAMINE TARIFF ISSUES, WITH
THE FOLLOWING MANDATE: IDENTIFY AND FORMULATE PRECISE
ISSUES FOR RESOLUTION; IDENTIFY KEY PLAYERS AND
DECISION-MAKERS; OBTAIN BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE
EXEMPTION PROCESSES; AND PROPOSE SPECIFIC SOLUTIONS TO
THE IDENTIFIED PROBLEMS.
6. PARTICIPANTS AT THE FIRST MEETING OF THE WORKING
PARTY RECOMMENDED THAT SCIENTIFIC EQUIPMENT,
INSTRUMENTATION, MATERIALS AND SPARE PARTS BEING
DELIVERED UNDER THE BILATERAL S&T AGREEMENT SHOULD BE
EXEMPTED FROM CUSTOMS DUTIES AND TAXES. CUSTOMS
CLEARANCE PROCESSES SHOULD BE SIMPLIFIED, AND
TEMPORARY IMPORT STATUS SHOULD COVER THE ENTIRE PERIOD
OF UTILIZATION IN AN AGREED COOPERATIVE PROJECT. I T
WAS ALSO RECOMMENDED THAT THE INFORMATION ON CUSTOMS
PROCEDURES AND TAXES, AND ON RELATED LEGISLATION,
SHOULD BE EXCHANGED TO ENCOURAGE A FULLER
UNDERSTANDING OF FACTORS AFFECTING EXEMPTIONS. THE
Page 3 of 9
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SUBGROUP AGREED TO PRODUCE A COORDINATED DESCRIPTION
OF THE PROCESS FOR OBTAINING EXEMPTIONS FOR S&T
ACTIVITIES. EACH SIDE WILL PROVIDE THIS DESCRIPTION
TO ITS RESPECTIVE COLLABORATING AGENCIES AND RESEARCH
COMMUNITIES. IN THE INTERIM, RUSSIAN SIDE PROVIDED A
DIAGRAM OF THE GOR METHOD FOR RECEIVING PROPOSALS FOR
CUSTOMS EXEMPTIONS, AND GAVE THE U.S. DELEGATION A
LIST OF CATEGORIES WHERE TAX EXEMPTIONS ARE GRANTED.
7. TO BE PURSUED IN THE FUTURE ARE ISSUES CAUSED BY
WHAT RUSSIAN AUTHORITIES SEE AS OPPORTUNITY COSTS OF
AMERICAN DONATIONS. THE U.S. BELIEVES THAT RUSSIAN
EFFORTS TO OFFSET THESE COSTS THROUGH DUTIES AND TAXES
DIVERT AND DILUTE AMERICAN RESOURCES INTENDED TO
ADVANCE SCIENCE AND SUSTAIN THE RUSSIAN SCIENTIFIC
COMMUNITY. OTHER PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED BUT UNRESOLVED
INCLUDE EXEMPTIONS FOR FUND TRANSFERS FOR SALARY
SUPPORT AND BANK TRANSFERS, AND THE IMPACT OF
DIFFERING NUANCES IN DEFINITIONS OF "GRANT,"
"CONTRACT," "MUTUAL COOPERATION" VERSUS "HIRING
TALENT," AND THE EFFECTS OF EACH CATEGORY ON
ELIGIBILITY FOR EXEMPTIONS. SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS WILL
BE IN REGULAR COMMUNICATION VIA PHONE AND FAX ON THESE
ISSUES, AND WILL INVOLVE OTHERS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE
COUNTRIES TO FACILITATE ACHIEVEMENT OF EXEMPTIONRELATED OBJECTIVES.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
8. THE RUSSIAN SIDE ACKNOWLEDGED THE IMPORTANCE AND
VALIDITY OF THE IPR ANNEX TO THE 1993 U.S.-RUSSIA S&T
AGREEMENT, BUT STATED THAT RUSSIAN SCIENTISTS BELIEVE
THEY ARE NOT FULLY PROTECTED, IN PARTICULAR IN
COMPARISON WITH THEIR COLLABORATION WITH OTHER
COUNTRIES. THE RUSSIAN DELEGATION RAISED QUESTIONS
ABOUT THE APPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION OF SEVERAL
PHRASES IN THE IPR ANNEX. THE U.S. DELEGATION AGREED
TO WORK WITH THE RUSSIANS TO PROVIDE CLARIFICATION OF
SPECIFIC TERMINOLOGY AND PHRASES. A WORKING PARTY WAS
ESTABLISHED TO FACILITATE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ANNEX.
ACCESS TO SENSITIVE AREAS
UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF O M S O 035094
S OCW
DEPT. FOR OES/SCP AND EUR/ISCA/CAST
DEPT. PASS NSF (C.T. OWENS)
WHITEHOUSE FOR OSTP (WALES)
WHITEHOUSE PASS USTR FOR J. MURPHY
DOD FOR DTSA
USTR FOR J. MURPHY
NASA FOR ROBERT CLARKE
PARIS FOR NSF (GLENDAY)
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KGCC, TSPL, ETTC, CVIS, KSCA, RS, US
Page 4 of 9
�F:\Cable\Data Soiirce\Cables\CD010\DEC94\MSGS\M1399109.html
SUBJECT: RESULTS OF FIRST MEETING OF U.S.-RUSSIA
WORKING GROUP ON GENERAL PROBLEMS OF S&T COOPERATION
9. THE U.S. DELEGATION RAISED THE PROBLEM OF
CLEARANCE FOR RESEARCH VESSELS, CITING FIGURES THAT
INDICATE THE MAJORITY OF U.S. REQUESTS ARE FREQUENTLY
DENIED. THE U.S. ALSO MENTIONED THE DENIAL OF ACCESS
TO LABORATORIES EAST OF THE URAL MOUNTAINS, DESPITE
COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS IN WHICH SUCH VISITS ARE
ANTICIPATED.
THE U.S. DELEGATION PROPOSED FOUR
ACTIONS TO ADDRESS THE ACCESS ISSUE:
1) STREAMLIN
THE PROCESS; 2) ENSURE TIMELY NOTIFICATION OF
DECISIONS; 3) PROVIDE RATIONALE FOR DECISION; AND 4)
ESTABLISH A MEANINGFUL APPEALS PROCESS. BOTH
DELEGATIONS AGREED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF COORDINATION
BETWEEN CENTRAL AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES. THE RUSSIANS
NOTED THAT RECENT AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN BETTER
COORDINATED.
10. THE RUSSIAN NAVY REPRESENTATIVE NOTED THAT THE
DENIAL PROCESS INVOLVES A NUMBER OF GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES, WITH AN EMPHASIS ON SAFETY, NATIONAL
SECURITY, AND THE PROTECTION OF OTHER RIGHTS,
INCLUDING COMMERCIAL. HE ALSO MADE A NUMBER OF
SUGGESTIONS TO IMPROVE THE PROCESS, INCLUDING ONE-YEAR
ADVANCE NOTIFICATION AND THE BUNDLING OF PROJECTS FROM
MANY AGENCIES FOR A SINGLE REQUEST. ADVANCE
NOTIFICATION WOULD ENABLE THE RUSSIANS TO REVIEW
WHETHER THERE ARE NAVAL OPERATIONS PLANNED FOR THE
REQUESTED DATES AND SEARCH FOR ALTERNATE DATES I F A
CONFLICT EXISTS. I F NAVAL OPERATIONS ARE TAKING
PLACE, THE NAVY REPRESENTATIVE STATED, EVEN RUSSIAN
COMMERCIAL VESSELS ARE PREVENTED FROM ENTERING THE
AREA. THE RUSSIAN DELEGATION EMPHASIZED THE
IMPORTANCE OF CLEARLY DEFINING PROPOSED RESEARCH
PROPOSALS AND IDENTIFYING MECHANISMS OF IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE AGREEMENT IN FACILITATING ACCESS TO SENSITIVE
AREAS. THE NAVY REPRESENTATIVE NOTED THAT WORK UNDER
GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT AGREEMENTS TAKES PRIORITY FOR
ACCESS OVER WORK UNDER AGREEMENTS BETWEEN AGENCIES.
GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE ISSUES, BOTH SIDES
AGREED TO ESTABLISH A WORKING PARTY TO IDENTIFY AND
RESOLVE MAJOR PROBLEMS.
RESEARCH VESSEL CLEARANCE
11. THE WORKING PARTY, WHICH MET ON THE SECOND DAY,
INCLUDED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NAVY, MINSCI, AND THE
FEDERAL EXPORT CONTROL SERVICE ON THE RUSSIAN SIDE,
AND THE DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND DEFENSE ON THE U.S.
A FRIENDLY AND COOPERATIVE ATMOSPHERE PREVAILED
THROUGHOUT THE DISCUSSIONS. ON THE SUBJECT OF
CLEARANCE FOR RESEARCH VESSELS, THE GROUP WORKED
TOWARD FINDING A SOLUTION THAT WOULD SATISFY THE
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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SEEMINGLY CONTRADICTORY GOALS OF EARLIER NOTIFICATION
FOR THE RUSSIAN SIDE, AND A LESS CUMBERSOME PROCEDURE
AND GREATER TRANSPARENCY OF THE PROCESS FOR THE U.S.
SIDE. A PROCEDURE FOR VESSEL CLEARANCE WAS DEVELOPED
AND AGREED AD REF, AND WILL BE PROVIDED IN DETAIL TO
ALL INTERESTED PARTIES SEPTEL.
VISITS TO SENSITIVE FACILITIES
12. THE RUSSIAN WORKING PARTY DESCRIBED THEIR
INTERAGENCY PROCESS FOR REVIEWING APPROVAL OF VISITS
BY U.S. OFFICIALS AND SCIENTISTS TO RUSSIAN LABS AND
FACILITIES, NOTING THE FORMAL REQUIREMENT FOR TWO
MONTHS ADVANCE NOTICE FOR SUCH VISITS.
DUAL-USE AND EXPORT CONTROL CONCERNS
13. THE RUSSIANS FURTHER STRESSED THAT ANY PROPOSED
PROJECT WORK INVOLVING DUAL USE TECHNOLOGY MUST MEET
(AND BE CLEARED FOR) EXPORT CONTROL REQUIREMENTS. THE
UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 05 M S O 035094
OCW
DEPT. FOR OES/SCP AND EUR/ISCA/CAST
DEPT. PASS NSF (C.T. OWENS)
WHITEHOUSE FOR OSTP (WALES)
WHITEHOUSE PASS USTR FOR J. MURPHY
DOD FOR DTSA
USTR FOR J. MURPHY
NASA FOR ROBERT CLARKE
PARIS FOR NSF (GLENDAY)
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KGCC, TSPL, ETTC, CVIS, KSCA, RS, US
SUBJECT: RESULTS OF FIRST MEETING OF U.S.-RUSSIA
WORKING GROUP ON GENERAL PROBLEMS OF S&T COOPERATION
RUSSIANS AGREED TO SUPPORT U.S. RECOMMENDATIONS THAT
THE WORKING PARTY ON ACCESS BE ESTABLISHED AS A
STANDING GROUP UNDER THE U.S.-RUSSIAN WORKING GROUP ON
GENERAL PROBLEMS OF S&T COOPERATION.
MULTIPLE ENTRY VISAS
14. BOTH DELEGATIONS AGREED THAT I T IS DESIRABLE TO
INCREASE THE NUMBER OF MULTIPLE-ENTRY VISAS ISSUED TO
COOPERATING SCIENTISTS. MULTIPLE-ENTRY VISAS
FACILITATE COOPERATION BY REDUCING THE ADMINISTRATIVE
BURDEN ON BOTH SIDES, ALLOWING GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN
TRAVEL, INCLUDING, WHEN NECESSARY, RESPONSE TO
EMERGENCY SITUATIONS. THE U.S. AND RUSSIA AGREED TO
PROVIDE INFORMATION REGARDING PROCEDURES AND
REQUIREMENTS FOR ISSUANCE OF MULTIPLE-ENTRY VISAS.
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THE RUSSIAN MFA CONSULAR REPRESENTATIVE STATED THE
RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT POSITION ON ISSUING VISAS TO
SCIENTISTS ENGAGED IN COOPERATIVE S&T ACTIVITIES AS
FOLLOWS:
TO EXPEDITE MULT
IPLE ENTRY VISAS, THE U.S.G. AGENCY
RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTIVITIES UNDER AN APPLICABLE
BILATERAL S&T AGREEMENT SHOULD PROVIDE A LIST OF
TRAVELLERS TO THE SPONSORING RUSSIAN COUNTERPART.
THIS LIST WILL THEN BE FORWARDED TO THE MFA FOR
PROCESSING. THE CONSULAR REP STATED THAT PROCESSING
TIME FOR SUCH A LIST IS APPROXIMATELY ONE MONTH, AFTER
WHICH THE APPROVED LIST WILL BE TRANSMITTED TO THE
RUSSIAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON. MULTIPLE ENTRY VISAS
WILL THEN BE PROVIDED UPON APPLICATION BY ELIGIBLE
U.S. TRAVELLERS.
15.
(EMBASSY COMMENT: THE MFA CONSULAR REP GAVE
THREE ANSWERS IN RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION OF HOW MUCH
PROCESSING TIME THE MFA NEEDS TO APPROVE A MULTIPLE
ENTRY VISA: TWELVE MONTHS, SIX MONTHS, AND ONE MONTH.
IDEALLY, HE STATED, THE U.S. AGENCY SHOULD PREPARE A
LIST OF TRAVELLERS WISHING MULTIPLE ENTRY VISAS AND
TRANSMIT I T TO THE RUSSIANS A YEAR IN ADVANCE. HE
LATER STATED THAT SIX MONTHS WAS ACCEPTABLE. WHEN
PRESSED FURTHER, THE MFA REP SAID MULTIPLE ENTRY VISAS
REQUIRE A MINIMUM OF ONE MONTH PROCESSING TIME, BUT I T
WAS UNCLEAR WHETHER THIS WOULD BE POSSIBLE IN GENERAL,
OR WHETHER THIS PROCESSING TIME IS CASE - BY-CASE.
SIMILARLY, SOME CONFUSION REMAINED WHETHER U.S.
AGENCIES SHOULD SUBMIT THEIR LISTS TO MINSCI OR TO THE
COUNTERPART AGENCY DIRECTLY. RUSSIAN WORKING GROUP
CHAIRMAN YAKOBASHVILI, HOWEVER, STATED IN NO UNCERTAIN
TERMS THAT HE DID NOT WISH HIS MINISTRY TO BECOME A
CENTRAL CLEARINGHOUSE FOR VISAS. END COMMENT)
16. THE U.S. DELEGATION EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT VERY
FEW RUSSIAN MULTIPLE ENTRY VISAS, IN FACT, HAVE BEEN
ISSUED. THROUGH THE DISCUSSION, IT BECAME CLEAR THAT
THE U.S. AND RUSSIA DIFFER GREATLY IN THEIR APPROACH
TO THE ISSUANCE OF MULTIPLE ENTRY VISAS FOR
COOPERATING SCIENTISTS. THE U.S. AND RUSSIA AGREED TO
PURSUE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON THIS ISSUE AT THE
UPCOMING BILATERAL VISA CONSULTATIONS IN THE SPRING OF
1995, WITH THE GOAL OF EXPANDING OPPORTUNITIES FOR
COOPERATING SCIENTISTS WORKING UNDER BILATERAL S&T
AGREEMENTS TO RECEIVE MULTIPLE ENTRY VISAS.
NETWORK OF OPERATIONAL CONTACTS
17. THE U.S. DELEGATION NOTED THAT WHILE SOME ISSUES
RAISED DURING THE DISCUSSIONS OF THE WORKING GROUP HAD
BEEN ADDRESSED SUCCESSFULLY ON AN AD HOC BASIS,
INSTITUTIONAL SOLUTIONS ARE REQUIRED TO ACCOMMODATE
SIGNIFICANT EXPANSION OF U.S.-RUSSIAN COLLABORATION.
Page 7 of 9
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THE U.S., THEREFORE, PROPOSED A WORKING PARTY WITH TWO
PRIMARY OBJECTIVES: 1) TO DEVELOP A WORKING NETWORK
OF OPERATIONAL CONTACTS TO FACILITATE UNDERSTANDING
UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 05 M S O 035094
OCW
DEPT. FOR OES/SCP AND EUR/ISCA/CAST
DEPT. PASS NSF (C.T. OWENS)
WHITEHOUSE FOR OSTP (WALES)
WHITEHOUSE PASS USTR FOR J. MURPHY
DOD FOR DTSA
USTR FOR J. MURPHY
NASA FOR ROBERT CLARKE
PARIS FOR NSF (GLENDAY)
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KGCC, TSPL, ETTC, CVIS, KSCA, RS, US
SUBJECT: RESULTS OF FIRST MEETING OF U.S.-RUSSIA
WORKING GROUP ON GENERAL PROBLEMS OF S&T COOPERATION
AND RESOLUTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS; AND 2) TO
USE THE NETWORK TO ASSEMBLE A DATA BASE OF CURRENT
ADMINISTRATIVE BARRIERS AND THE STATUS AND METHODS OF
THEIR RESOLUTION AS A MEANS OF MONITORING PROGRESS. A
PLAN OF ACTION WAS PROPOSED, CALLING FOR A LIST OF
CONTACTS TO BE PROVIDED, CONNECTIONS AMONG THE NETWORK
TO BE ESTABLISHED VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL AND FAX, AND
QUARTERLY STATUS REPORTS TO BE DISTRIBUTED. THE TWO
LEAD PERSONS WILL ACT AS FACILITATORS TO ESTABLISH AND
MAINTAIN THE NETWORK, WHILE NETWORK MEMBERS WILL ACT
AS "PORTALS" TO THEIR AGENCIES AND ESTABLISH SUBNETWORKS WITHIN THESE AGENCIES, AS APPROPRIATE.
18.
DELEGATION LISTS:
U.S. DELEGATION
---------
ROBERT CLARKE, NASA, U.S. WORKING GROUP CHAIRMAN
CHARLES THOMAS OWENS, NSF
MARILYN PIFER, DOS
MICHAEL ROBERTS, DOE
JAMES MURPHY, USTR
JEFF SCHWEITZER, OSTP
LINDA STAHELI, OSTP
JOHN THOMAS, DOD
RUSSIAN DELEGATION
----------
ZURAB YAKOBASHVILI, MINSCI, RUSSIAN W CHAIRMAN
G
VALERY ALYOKHIN, MIN. JUSTICE
ROSTISLAV ATHKOV, MOD
VLADIMIR AVERKIYEV, MINATOM
PYOTR BOGDANOV, MINPRIRODA
ALEXANDER BRINDIKOV, MOD
ELENA BUDAYEVA, CUSTOMS COMMITTEE
S.V. EGOROVA, CUSTOMS COMMITTEE
YURI FOMICHEV, MINSCI
VICTOR GRIBANOV, MFA
-- ALEXANDER KHRISTOFOROV, PATENT & TRADEMARKS COM.
Page 8 of 9
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-- YURI KOLOCHKOV, MINISTRY OF ECONOMICS
-- GRIGORY KOROLKOV, NAVY
-- ALEXEY KOROSTELYOV
, MINSCI
-- SERGEI MAREEV, MINFINANCE
-- VLADISLAV NOCHKOV, MINSCI
-- IGOR PEREPYOLKIN, STATE REGULATION S&T
-- ANDREI PINCHUK, FED. EXPORT CONTROL SERVICE
-- ALEXANDER SHISHOV, STATE FISCAL SERVICE
-- YURI SHIYAN, RAS
-- PAVEL TATARINOV, MINSCI
-- VLADIMIR TYSHCHENKO, MINSCI
-- ALEXANDER YAKOVENKO, MFA
-- ANDREI ZOTOV, RAS
END DELEGATION LISTS.
BT
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941206084645 M1399109
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Page 1 of 3
Cable
PREC:
CLASS:
LINEl:
LINE2:
LINE3:
LINE4:
OSRI:
DTG:
ORIG:
TO:
IMMEDIATE
GOHriDDNTIALi
OAACZYUW RUEHMOA5154 3401627 -CCCC--RHEHAAA.
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
0 061627Z DEC 94
FM AMEMBASSY M S O
OCW
RUEHMO
061627Z DEC 94
AMEMBASSY M S O
OCW
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7504
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO: RUCPDC/USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SUBJ:
ISSUES FOR THE CONVENTIONAL ENERGY SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN COMMISSION
TEXT:
-CON>riBDNTI
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE M S O 035154
OCW
STATE PLEASE PASS TO DOE FOR BERLS
STATE PLEASE PASS TO EXIM BANK FOR MORAN/GLAZER
WHITE HOUSE FOR FUERTH
COMMERCE FOR 4 2 31/ITA/IEP/OEERIS/JBROUGHER
6110/ITA/TD/BI/JYANCIK
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: EPET, EINV, ECON, ETRD, RS
SUBJECT: ISSUES FOR THE CONVENTIONAL ENERGY SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN COMMISSION
REF: M S O 34986
OCW
1. EMBASSY SUGGESTS THE FOLLOWING TOPICS FOR
DISCUSSION AT THE CONVENTIONAL ENERGY SUB-COMMITTEE OF
THE GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN COMMISSION.
OIL EXPORT QUOTAS AND LICENSES
2. THE GOR IS CONSIDERING THE ELIMINATION OF OIL
EXPORT QUOTAS AND LICENSES, AND THE CREATION OF
EQUITABLE RULES FOR ACCESS TO OIL PIPELINES. PROVIDED
IT DOES NOT RESULT IN AN EVEN LESS DESIRABLE
ALTERNATIVE (REFTEL), WE ENCOURAGE THIS AS I T WOULD
REMOVE AN IMPEDIMENT TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE OIL
AND GAS SECTOR. HOWEVER, I T IS IMPORTANT THAT EXISTING
JOINT VENTURES NOT BE DENIED PREFERENTIAL ACCESS TO THE
PIPELINE SYSTEM FOR THE ENTIRETY OF THEIR "OWNED OIL."
THESE VENTURES ARE BASED ON THE GUARANTEE OF
UNRESTRICTED ACCESS TO THE PIPELINE SYSTEM; MOST, I F
PER E.0.13526
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD010\DEC94\MSGS\M1399486.html
NOT ALL, WOULD BECOME UNECONOMIC I F AFFORDED ONLY
PROPORTIONAL ACCESS RIGHTS, AS WE UNDERSTAND THE GOR
MAY BE CONTEMPLATING.
OIL EXPORT TAX
3. THERE ARE REPORTS THAT THE OIL EXPORT TAX MIGHT BE
LOWERED FROM 30 TO 15 ECUS PER TON IN EARLY 1995. THIS
WOULD BE A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT AND HELP TO ATTRACT
INVESTMENT TO THE OIL AND GAS SECTOR. HOWEVER, WE ARE
CONCERNED THAT THE GOR MAY AT THE SAME TIME RESCIND THE
OIL EXPORT TAX EXEMPTIONS THAT WERE RECENTLY GRANTED TO
A NUMBER OF FOREIGN JOINT VENTURES. THE EXEMPTIONS
WERE WIDELY PRAISED WHEN THEY WERE ANNOUNCED IN
OCTOBER. A REVERSAL OF THAT DECISION WOULD NOT BE A
GOOD SIGNAL TO OTHER POTENTIAL INVESTORS.
PRODUCTION SHARING LEGISLATION
4. TWO COMPETING BILLS FOR PRODUCTION SHARING
LEGISLATION ARE LIKELY TO BE INTRODUCED TO THE DUMA IN
THE NEAR FUTURE -- ONE BY THE GOVERNMENT, ANOTHER BY
THE DUMA'S OWN ENERGY COMMITTEE. THERE APPEAR TO BE
SERIOUS DIVERGENCES BETWEEN THE TWO VERSIONS, A
SITUATION WHICH COULD DELAY THE EVENTUAL PASSAGE OF
SUCH LEGISLATION. I T IS IMPORTANT TO STRESS TO THE
RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT THE NEED TO PUSH FOR APPROPRIATE
LEGISLATION IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME I F LARGESCALE FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN OIL AND GAS, SUCH AS THE
SAKHALIN ( I - I V ) , TIMAN PECHORA, AND PRIOBSKOYE
PROJECTS, ARE TO OCCUR IN THE NEAR FUTURE.
EXIM OIL AND GAS FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT
5. FOUR LOANS, TOTALING APPROXIMATELY USD 1.2 BILLION,
HAVE BEEN APPROVED SINCE THE OIL AND GAS FRAMEWORK
AGREEMENT WAS INITIATED; OTHER LOANS ARE IN VARIOUS
STAGES OF THE APPROVAL PROCESS. HOWEVER, NO FUNDS HAVE
YET BEEN DISBURSED DUE TO THE LACK OF PROGRESS IN
OBTAINING CENTRAL BANK WAIVERS FOR MANDATORY CONVERSION
INTO RUBLES AND DEPOSIT IN BANK ACCOUNTS IN RUSSIA OF
THE PROCEEDS FROM OIL SALES, NEITHER OF WHICH WOULD BE
ACCEPTABLE TO EXIM. I T APPEARS THAT THE WAIVERS MAY
REQUIRE THE ISSUANCE OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREES. UNTIL
THEY ARE ISSUED, THE FUNDS WILL NOT BE RELEASED AND THE
URGENTLY-NEEDED EQUIPMENT THEY WILL BE USED TO PURCHASE
WILL BE UNAVAILABLE.
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Cable
PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS:
UNCLASSIFIED
LINEl:
OAAUZYUW RUEHCAA53 6 6 34 10524 -UUUU--RHEHAAX.
LINE2:
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
LINE3:
0 070521Z DEC 94
LINE4:
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
OSRI:
DTG:
ORIG:
TO:
RUEHC
070521Z DEC 94
SECSTATE WASHDC
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO: ////
SUBJ:
HEALTH COMMITTEE PREPARATIONS FOR MID-DEC.
GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN COMMISSION MEETING - LETTERS TO MOH
TEXT:
UNCLAS STATE 325366
ATTN: FOR SCICOUNS SAMBAIEW; USAID T.TIFFANY
E.O.
12356: N/A
TAGS: TBIO, OTRA, KGCC, RS, US
SUBJECT: HEALTH COMMITTEE PREPARATIONS FOR MID-DEC.
GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN COMMISSION MEETING - LETTERS TO MOH
REFS:
(A) STATE 287413;
(B) MOSCOW 32445
THE FOLLOWING TEXT HAS BEEN COORDINATED AND APPROVED BY
EUR/ISCA.
1. FOR SCIENCE OFFICE INFORMATION AND I N FOLLOW UP TO
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR HEALTH BOUFFORDIS
V I S I T TO MOSCOW (SEE REFS A AND B ) , THE U.S. SIDE
INTERAGENCY RESOURCE GROUP FOR THE HEALTH COMMITTEE HAS
MET AND DISCUSSED THE TOPICS PROPOSED BY THE MINISTRY OF
HEALTH AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE FIRST JOINT HEALTH
COMMITTEE MEETING UNDER THE GORE - CHERNOMYRDIN PROCESS.
THE FOLLOWING TWO LETTERS; ONE FROM SECRETARY SHALALA TO
MINISTER NECHAYEV AND THE SECOND FROM U.S. SIDE POINT OF
CONTACT, JO IVEY BOUFFORD, CONSTITUTE A REPLY TO THE
MATERIALS PROVIDED BY THE MOH ON NOV 4 AND REPORTED I N
REFTEL B, PARAS 7 AND 9. THESE LETTERS WILL BE FAXED TO
THE MOH ONCE THIS CABLE I S TRANSMITTED TO POST.
2: TEXT OF LETTER ONE:
DR. EDUARD NECHAYEV
MINISTER OF HEALTH AND MEDICAL INDUSTRY
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
RAKHMANOVSKY PER.3
MOSCOW, RUSSIAN FEDERATION
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Page 01*9
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DEAR DR. NECHAYEV:
I WISH TO EXPRESS M THANKS TO YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES FOR
Y
ALL OF THE COURTESIES THAT YOU ACCORDED TO DR. BOUFFORD
DURING HER RECENT VISIT TO MOSCOW. SHE HAS BRIEFED ME ON
THE EXCELLENT PROGRESS THAT WAS MADE DURING THOSE
DISCUSSIONS. W APPRECIATED HEARING YOUR VIEWS ON
E
PRIORITIES FOR COOPERATION.
DR. BOUFFORD HAS SENT A LETTER, A COPY OF WHICH I HAVE
ENCLOSED, TO DR. TZAREGORODTSEV IN THEIR RESPECTIVE ROLES
AS POINTS OF CONTACT. HER LETTER IDENTIFIES U.S.
COMMITTEE MEMBERS, SHARES OUR VIEWS ON YOUR PROPOSALS AND
CONVEYS SOME OF OUR THOUGHTS ON OTHER POTENTIAL AREAS OF
COOPERATION. I T ALSO OUTLINES OUR THINKING ON THE CHARGE
FOR THE COMMITTEE, ITS METHODS OF WORK AND FUNCTIONING OF
THE RESPECTIVE SECRETARIATS FOR THE COMMITTEE.
IN ORDER TO FURTHER PREPARATIONS FOR OUR COMMITTEEIS
DISCUSSIONS DURING THE COMMISSION MEETING IN DECEMBER, I
AM SENDING, SUBJECT TO YOUR MINISTRY'S CONCURRENCE, TWO
SENIOR STAFF TO MOSCOW, BEGINNING NOVEMBER 28 FOR UP TO
ONE WEEK. THEY ARE MRS. LINDA VOGEL, DIRECTOR OF OUR
OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL HEALTH AND DR. PETER HENRY, W O IS
H
RESPONSIBLE FOR RUSSIAN AFFAIRS IN THAT OFFICE.
I WANT YOU TO K O THAT I AM ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT OUR
NW
COMMITTEE AND ABOUT THE OPPORTUNITIES WHICH W HAVE. I
E
LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN MOSCOW, IN THE EVENT I DO
NOT SEE YOU SOONER AT THE PARIS HIGH-LEVEL MEETING ON
AIDS .
WITH KIND REGARDS,
SINCERELY,
DONNA E. SHALALA
ENCLOSURE
3. BEGIN TEXT OF SECOND LETTER
DR. ALEXANDER TZAREGORODTSEV
DEPUTY MINISTER
MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND MEDICAL INDUSTRY
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
RAKHMANOVSKY PER. 3
MOSCOW, RUSSIAN FEDERATION
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DEAR DR. TZAREGORODTSEV:
WE VERY MUCH APPRECIATED THE TIME AND EFFORT THAT YOU AND
THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH PUT INTO RECEIVING MY DELEGATION
AND ME IN MOSCOW.
UPON MY RETURN, I DISCUSSED YOUR PROPOSALS WITH SECRETARY
SHALALA AND OTHER HEALTH COMMITTEE MEMBERS AS WELL AS WITH
OUR INTERAGENCY ADVISORY GROUP. I AM PLEASED TO REPORT
THAT WE ARE IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH FOUR OF THE SIX
PRIORITY AREAS YOU PROPOSED. WE HAVE RESERVATIONS
CONCERNING THE FIFTH PROPOSED AREA OF PEDIATRIC CARDIAC
SURGERY, WHICH WE CAN DISCUSS FURTHER, BUT WE NEED TO
ADDRESS ISSUES OF MUTUAL INTEREST AND BENEFIT. FOR THE
SIXTH AREA, SPACE MEDICINE, WE FEEL WOULD BE MORE
APPROPRIATELY HANDLED UNDER THE GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN SPACE
COMMITTEE OR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE.
ENCLOSED IS A DIRECT TRANSLATION (ENCLOSURE 1) OF THE
PRIORITY LIST THAT YOU PROVIDED TO US ALONG WITH OUR
COMMENTS (INDICATED IN PARENTHESES) ON POTENTIAL SCOPE OF
THESE AREAS. SOME OF THESE REFLECT GREATER DETAIL DRAWN
FROM OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH YOU IN MOSCOW. WE ARE ALSO
ENCLOSING A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF SEVERAL ADDITIONAL IDEAS
FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION (ENCLOSURE 2 ) .
WE ARE ALSO FINALIZING MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMITTEE ON OUR
SIDE. WHILE WE DO NOT YET HAVE SPECIFIC NAMES OF THE
INDIVIDUAL REPRESENTATIVES, DEPARTMENTAL MEMBERSHIP WILL
BE AS OUTLINED IN ENCLOSURE 3.
.ADDITIONALLY, WE HAVE DONE SOME FURTHER THINKING ON A
POSSIBLE "CHARGE" TO THE COMMITTEE AND PROPOSED METHODS OF
WORK. THESE ARE PROVIDED FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION IN
ENCLOSURES 4 AND 5, RESPECTIVELY.
IN ORDER TO FURTHER DISCUSS AND REFINE THESE MATERIALS AND
TO ASSURE AGREEMENT ON THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE FIRST
COMMITTEE MEETING, I WOULD LIKE TO PROPOSE THAT TWO
MEMBERS OF MY STAFF, LINDA VOGEL, DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE
OF INTERNATIONAL HEALTH, AND PETER HENRY, RETURN TO M S O
OCW
NOVEMBER 27 TO DECEMBER 3. DURING THIS TIME THEY COULD
W R WITH APPROPRIATE MEMBERS OF THE MINISTRY AND HEALTH
OK
COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT TO BETTER PREPARE THE GROUND FOR
DISCUSSIONS OF THE HEALTH COMMITTEE DURING THE COMMISSION
MEETING, INCLUDING PREPARATION OF A DRAFT REPORT TO BE
GIVEN BY MINISTER NECHAYEV AND SECRETARY SHALALA TO THE
FULL COMMISSION.
FINALLY, IN DIRECT RESPONSE TO THE MINISTER'S REQUEST, WE
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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ARE COLLECTING AVAILABLE MATERIALS ON DIABETES, AND WE
WILL BE PREPARED TO RECEIVE A DELEGATION FROM RUSSIA ON
DIABETES IN JANUARY SHOULD THIS BE CONVENIENT.
I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM YOU AND TO OUR CONTINUING
W R TOGETHER.
OK
WITH MY BEST WISHES
JO IVEY BOUFFORD, M.D.
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR HEALTH
ENCLOSURE 1
MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROPOSALS
AGREED TO BY THE U.S.
1. DIABETES. SEND A DELEGATION TO THE U.S. BY JANUARY TO
STUDY U.S. EXPERIENCE. INTEREST IN JOINT PRODUCTION OF
DIABETIC-RELATED PHARMACEUTICALS AND FOODS.
(THE U.S. COULD RECEIVE THE RUSSIAN DELEGATION IN JANUARY.
WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THIS PRIORITY AREA EXPANDED ALONG THE
LINES NOTED BY MINISTER NECHAYEV IN OUR MEETING WITH HIM.
THERE IS A BROAD RANGE OF OPPORTUNITIES, RANGING FROM
RESEARCH, TO PREVENTION, TO TREATMENT INCLUDING EDUCATION
OF PATIENTS AND HEALTH PROVIDERS, TO PRODUCTION OF
ESSENTIAL PHARMACEUTICALS, SUPPLIES, AND FOODS.
COOPERATIVE EFFORTS SHOULD ADDRESS BOTH TYPE I AND TYPE I I
DIABETES IN ADULTS AND CHILDREN.)
2. CONTROL OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES IN CHILDHOOD. GOOD
MANUFACTURING PRACTICES FOR PRODUCTION OF VACCINES AND
SERA, FIRST FOR DIPHTHERIA, AND THEN FOR OTHER CHILDHOOD
DISEASES.
(WE WOULD ESPECIALLY LIKE TO STRESS VACCINE-PREVENTABLE
INFECTIOUS DISEASES. INITIALLY, THE U.S. VIEWS THIS AREA
AS AN IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY TO W R WITH RUSSIA IN THEIR
OK
EFFORTS TO RESTORE/MODERNIZE THEIR VACCINE/SERA PRODUCTION
TO GMP LEVELS, AND I T WOULD BUILD ON COOPERATION CARRIED
OUT ALREADY BETWEEN THE U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION,
ASSISTANCE FROM USAID, AND CERTAIN RUSSIAN INSTITUTIONS.
IT ALSO OFFERS THE OPPORTUNITY TO PROMOTE IMMUNIZATION
PRACTICE AND TO STRENGTHEN THE CLINICAL PRACTICE OF
PEDIATRICIANS.)
3. COMBATING TUBERCULOSIS. STUDY OF THE EPIDEMIOLOGY AND
CURRENT TREATMENT OF TB CONTROL.
(THE U.S. BELIEVES THAT THIS AREA OFFERS AN IMPORTANT
OPPORTUNITY TO COOPERATE ON ANTI-TB W R INCLUDING
OK
IDENTIFICATION OF POPULATIONS AT RISK, SHARING OF
INFORMATION ON RESEARCH AND ON APPROACHES TO TREATMENT,
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AND FOR THE PRODUCTION OF ANTI-TB PHARMACEUTICALS.)
4. MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH. HEALTH EDUCATION MATERIALS
IN THE AREA OF PROMOTING IMMUNIZATION AND FAMILY PLANNING
IN RUSSIAN PRACTICE.
(THE U.S. BELIEVES THAT THIS AREA OFFERS IMPORTANT
OPPORTUNITIES FOR EXCHANGES OF HEALTH EDUCATION MATERIAL
AND SHARING OF EXPERIENCE AND TECHNIQUES ON COMMUNICATIONS
FOR HEALTH EDUCATION, INCLUDING BUT NOT NECESSARILY
LIMITED TO IMMUNIZATION AND FAMILY PLANNING. THERE IS
ALSO OPPORTUNITY FOR CONTINUING MEDICAL EDUCATION FOR
PHYSICIANS AND OTHER HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS ON THOSE
ISSUES, SUCH AS PREVENTING SERIOUS FORMS OF INFECTIOUS
DISEASES IN CHILDREN AND EARLY DIAGNOSIS OF GENETICALLYLINKED DISORDERS.)
5. PEDIATRIC CARDIAC SURGERY. TRANSFER OF SURGICAL
KNOW-HOW, DIAGNOSTIC PROCEDURES AND POST-OP TREATMENT.
(THIS AREA WILL NEED SUBSTANTIAL PRIVATE SECTOR
INVOLVEMENT IN THE U.S. THERE IS A NEED TO W R OUT
OK
ARRANGEMENTS. FURTHER DISCUSSION IS NEEDED BEFORE THIS IS
ADDED TO THE AGENDA.)
ENCLOSURE 2
U.S. PROPOSALS FOR COOPERATION
1. STRENGTHEN THE INFRASTRUCTURE FOR PUBLIC HEALTH
INFORMATION SYSTEM (DISEASE SURVEILLANCE) AND PUBLIC
HEALTH EDUCATION. THIS COULD BEGIN AROUND ISSUES ALREADY
IDENTIFIED--VACCINE PREVENTABLE INFECTIOUS DISEASES,
DIABETES, AND OTHER AREAS THAT LEAD TO BETTER HEALTH (E.G.
FOOD HANDLING/SANITATION, SMOKING, ALCOHOLISM) AND OTHER
AREAS THAT MAY BE MUTUALLY AGREED UPON. I T COULD BUILD ON
EXISTING AID-FUNDED PROJECTS TO ENHANCE THE INFRASTRUCTURE
FOR DISEASE SURVEILLANCE AND REPORTING.
2. STRENGTHEN PRIMARY CARE PROACTIVELY THROUGH PRACTICE
MANAGEMENT, CONTINUING CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR DOCTORS AND
NURSES CURRENTLY IN PRIMARY CARE SETTINGS, DEVELOPMENT OF
A RUSSIAN SPECIALTY OF FAMILY MEDICINE. (WE UNDERSTAND
THERE IS CURRENTLY POTENTIAL FUNDING IN THIS AREA FROM
WORLD BANK AND WOULD BE INTERESTED IN COLLABORATING I F I T
SEEMS TO BE OF VALUE.) THIS IS A PRIORITY AREA OF
DEVELOPMENT FOR THE HEALTH SECTORS OF BOTH COUNTRIES.
3. JOINT EXPLORATION OF THE ROLE OF A MINISTRY OF
HEALTH/DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH IN THE FACE OF HEALTH CARE
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REFORM AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORE DECENTRALIZED HEALTH
SECTOR MANAGEMENT. WHAT RE THE OBLAST/STATE
RESPONSIBILITIES; WHAT IS THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL LEVEL
(E.G., REGULATORY FRAMEWORK, QUALITY STANDARD SETTING,
HEALTH MANPOWER PLANNING AND CERTIFICATION, FACILITY
ACCREDITATION). AS BOTH COUNTRIES ARE GOING THROUGH THIS
TRANSITION, I T COULD BE OF CONSIDERABLE MUTUAL BENEFIT TO
HAVE A POLICY WORKING GROUP IN THIS AREA.
IN ADDITION TO THE FOREGOING, WE WOULD LIKE TO EXPLORE THE
POTENTIAL FOR FUTURE WORK IN TWO AREAS:
1.
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH. COOPERATIVE WORK ON RISK
ASSESSMENT AND STUDY OF ADVERSE IMPACT ON HUMAN HEALTH OF
VARIOUS FORMS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION. THIS WORK WOULD
BE CLOSELY COORDINATED WITH THE GCC COMMITTEE ON THE
ENVIRONMENT AND THE ENERGY COMMITTEE, SPECIFICALLY THE
ACTIVITIES BEING PURSUED UNDER THE JOINT COORDINATING
COMMITTEE FOR RADIATION EFFECTS RESEARCH (JCCRER).
MENTAL HEALTH. WHILE W DID NOT DISCUSS THIS DURING
E
OUR MEETINGS, I T IS A PARTICULAR INTEREST OF MRS. GORE,
AND WE WOULD LIKE TO BEGIN SOME DISCUSSIONS FOR POTENTIAL
FUTURE COOPERATION. AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST WOULD, FOR
EXAMPLE, BE EXCHANGES OF INFORMATION/RESEARCH ON MENTAL
DISORDER ASSESSMENT AS WELL AS TREATMENT APPROACHES.
ENCLOSURE 3.
U.S. COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP
DONNA E. SHALALA, PH.D., CO-CHAIR
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
CAROL LANCASTER, PH.D., VICE-CHAIR
DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
MEMBERS AS FOLLOWS: (FINAL DESIGNATION OF INDIVIDUALS
PENDING)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
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OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION
U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY
POINT OF CONTACT:
JO IVEY BOUFFORD, M.D.
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR HEALTH
SECRETARIAT:
LINDA VOGEL
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL HEALTH
PETER HENRY, PH.D,
DIRECTOR, OFFICE FOR EUROPE AND THE NIS
OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL HEALTH
TERRENCE TIFFANY, M.D,
CHIEF OF ENVIRONMENT AND HEALTH, USAID/MOSCOW
ENCLOSURE 4.
CHARGE TO THE COMMITTEE
1. TO PROMOTE U.S.-RUSSIA COOPERATION IN THE HEALTH
SECTOR INCLUDING DIRECT GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT PUBLIC
HEALTH COOPERATION ON ISSUES OF NATIONAL CONCERN AND
STRENGTHEN THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR COLLABORATIVE WORK IN
AREAS OF MUTUAL INTEREST.
2. TO IDENTIFY POLICY, REGULATORY AND OTHER BARRIERS TO
SMOOTH IMPLEMENTATION OF COOPERATIVE WORK AND SEEK
SOLUTIONS THROUGH THE BROADER GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN PROCESS.
3. TO PROMOTE FULL COMMUNICATION BY ALL PARTIES ABOUT
CURRENT U.S.-RUSSIA HEALTH SECTOR ACTIVITIES, ESPECIALLY
THOSE SUPPORTED BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES
AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.
4. TO PROVIDE VISIBILITY AND POLICY SUPPORT TO CURRENTLY
PLANNED O ONGOING INITIATIVES, ESPECIALLY THOSE INVOLVING
R
VULNERABLE POPULATIONS.
5. TO SERVE AS A FOCAL POINT TO IMPROVE CO-ORDINATION OF
US-RUSSIAN HEALTH SECTOR COOPERATION ACROSS GOVERNMENT AND
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS WITHIN EACH COUNTRY.
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6. TO PROMOTE THE WIDEST POSSIBLE INTERCHANGE AND
COOPERATION, IN AREAS OF AGREED PRIORITY, AMONG U.S. AND
RUSSIAN PUBLIC HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND BIOMEDICAL
SCIENTISTS, HEALTH SECTOR LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNMENT HEALTH
OFFICIALS AT ALL LEVELS.
7. TO DEVELOP AND MAINTAIN LINKAGES AND ASSURE
COOPERATION ACROSS THE GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN COMMITTEES ON
HEALTH-RELATED ISSUES.
8. TO OVERSEE AND MONITOR THE OUTCOMES OF THESE EFFORTS
AS WELL AS ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED UNDER THE CURRENT U.S.RUSSIAN HEALTH AGREEMENT AND TO DISCUSS THE POLICY
IMPLICATIONS OF THESE OUTCOMES FOR BROADER APPLICATION.
ENCLOSURE 5.
METHODS OF WORK
1. THE CO-CHAIRS OF THE COMMITTEE WILL ASSURE THE MAXIMUM
FEASIBLE CONSULTATION AND PARTICIPATION OF GOVERNMENT
COMMITTEE MEMBERS FROM EACH SIDE.
2. THE COMMITTEE WILL AGREE ON AN AGENDA FOR AN INITIAL
JOINT PROGRAM OF WORK AND REVISE I T AS NECESSARY.
3. AS AREAS FOR THE PROGRAM OF WORK ARE AGREED UPON,
JOINT WORKING GROUPS AND/OR JOINT AGENCY RESPONSIBILITY
WILL BE IDENTIFIED FOR DEVELOPING A PLAN OF ACTION TO
INCLUDE:
A STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE TO BE ADDRESSED
EXPECTED OUTCOMES OF THE WORK
AN IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
A TIMETABLE FOR JOINT ACTIVITIES IN EACH IDENTIFIED
AREA
-- PROJECTED RESOURCE NEEDS AND SOURCES OF SUPPORT
4. THE CO-CHAIRS WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ASSURING
APPROPRIATE INVOLVEMENT FROM GOVERNMENTAL AND
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN WORKING GROUPS DEVELOPED
BY THE COMMITTEE.
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Soiirce\Cables\CD010\DEC94\MSGS\MI400739.html
5. A JOINT SECRETARIAT FUNCTION WILL BE ESTABLISHED I N
ORDER TO SUPPORT THE HEALTH COMMITTEE AND I T S WORKING
GROUPS AND TO EXPEDITE COMMUNICATIONS, INCLUDING USE OF
ELECTRONIC MAIL. THE RUSSIAN SECRETARIAT WILL BE LOCATED
I N THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND MEDICAL INDUSTRY AND THE
U.S. SECRETARIAT WILL BE CO-LOCATED IN THE OFFICE OF
INTERNATIONAL HEALTH, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AND THE U.S MISSION A I D , MOSCOW.
THE COMMITTEE WILL AGREE UPON SCOPE OF RESPONSIBILITY AND
AUTHORITIES OF THE SECRETARIATS.
6. THE COMMITTEE WILL REQUEST PERIODIC REPORTS, INCLUDING
IDENTIFICATION OF OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTATION, ON EXISTING
. N OTHER RELEVANT HEALTH SECTOR PROJECTS FUNDED BY THE
AD
GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION WITH A VIEW, INTER ALIA, TOWARD DELINEATING
WAYS/MEANS OF OVERCOMING PROBLEMS/OBSTACLES.
END OF ENCLOSURES TO LETTER
3. HHS AND DEPARTMENT WOULD APPRECIATE EMBASSY'S PASSING
THESE TWO LETTERS TO MOH AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
TALBOTT
BT
#5366
NNNN
SECT
SSN
SECTION: 0 1 OF 0 1
5366
TOR
DIST
941207003313
M1400739
S I T : BRANSCUM NSC
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Cable
PREC
ROUTINE
CLASS
UNCLASSIFIED
LINEl
RAAUZYUW RUEHMOA5558 3430754 -UUUU--RHEHAAA.
LINE2
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
LINE3
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LINE4
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
OSRI
DTG
ORIG
TO
RUEHMO
090754Z DEC 94
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RUEANAT/NASA WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DOE WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7748
INFO:
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0734
RUEHLN/AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 3718
SUBJ:
RESULTS OF THE FOURTH MEETING OF THE GCC
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, DECEMBER 5,
1994
TEXT:
UNCLAS SECTION 0 1 OF 07 MOSCOW 035558
DEPT. FOR OES/SCP AND EUR/ISCA/CAST
DEPT. PASS NSF (C.T. OWENS)
WHITEHOUSE FOR OSTP (SCHWEITZER AND STAHELI)
DOD FOR DTSA (JOHN THOMAS)
NASA FOR ROBERT CLARKE
PARIS FOR NSF (GLENDAY)
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS:
KGCC, TSPL, KSCA, RS, US
SUBJECT: RESULTS OF THE FOURTH MEETING OF THE GCC
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, DECEMBER 5, 1994
REF:
MOSCOW 35094
SUMMARY
1.
THE GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN COMMISSION'S (GCC)
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, HEADED BY RUSSIAN
MINISTER OF SCIENCE BORIS SALTYKOV AND DR. JOHN
GIBBONS, U.S. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ADVISOR TO THE
PRESIDENT, MET DECEMBER 5 I N MOSCOW I N PREPARATION FOR
THE GCC MEETINGS DECEMBER 15 AND 16. THE COMMITTEE:
REVIEWED, I N I T I A L L E D AND PREPARED FOR SIGNATURE AT THE
GCC A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON ACOUSTIC
THERMOMETRY OF OCEAN CLIMATE (ATOC) AND A MEMORANDUM
OF INTENT ON ESTABLISHING A U.S.-RUSSIA BIOMEDICAL
TRAINING CENTER I N MOSCOW; REVIEWED THE STATUS OF
Pane 1 of 13
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COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIES UNDER SEVEN AGREEMENTS WITHIN
THE COMMITTEE'S PURVIEW; RECEIVED A REPORT ON THE
RESULTS OF THE FIRST MEETING OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
GENERAL PROBLEMS OF COOPERATION (REFTEL); DECLINED TO
FURTHER CONSIDER PROPOSALS FOR COOPERATION IN FREE
ELECTRON LASER RESEARCH, BUT AGREED TO EXPLORE
AGREEMENTS ON FUNDAMENTAL PROPERTIES OF MATTER, AND
RADIATION EFFECTS ON HUMANS; AND, ON THE MARGINS OF
THE MEETING, MEMBERS OF THE U.S. DELEGATION WORKED
WITH THE RUSSIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MFA) TO
ENSURE THAT A JOINT STATEMENT ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COULD BE APPROVED. END SUMMARY
NEW PHASE IN U.S.-RUSSIA S&T COOPERATION
2. THE U.S.-RUSSIA SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE
UNDER THE GORE - CHERNOMYRDIN COMMISSION (GCC) HELD ITS
FOURTH MEETING DECEMBER 5, 1994 IN MOSCOW. MINISTER
OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION, DR. BORIS SALTYKOV, WARMLY WELCOMED THE
U.S. DELEGATION, HEADED BY U.S. PRESIDENTIAL SCIENCE
ADVISOR, DR. JOHN GIBBONS, TO HIS MINISTRY (MINSCI).
(OTHER MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATIONS ARE LISTED PARAGRAPH
25) .
3. IN HIS OPENING REMARKS, MINISTER SALTYKOV SAID THE
TASK FOR THIS S&T COMMITTEE MEETING WAS TO PREPARE THE
REPORT FOR VICE PRESIDENT GORE AND PRIME MINISTER
CHERNOMYRDIN ON U.S.-RUSSIA S&T COOPERATION; TO
DISCUSS DIFFICULTIES TO COOPERATION AND SEEK THEIR
RESOLUTION; TO REVIEW ACTIVITIES UNDER THE COMMITTEE'S
PURVIEW DURING THE PAST YEAR; AND TO FINALIZE
AGREEMENTS FOR SIGNATURE OR ISSUANCE AT THE GCC.
4. MOVING BEYOND ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS, SALTYKOV
OFFERED HIS VIEW THAT U.S.-RUSSIA S&T COOPERATION HAD
REACHED A MORE MATURE STAGE, WHERE RUSSIAN AND
AMERICAN SCIENTISTS ARE COLLABORATING IN A TRUE SENSE,
RATHER THAN ENGAGING IN THE "SCIENTIFIC TOURISM" THAT
WAS PREVALENT TWO OR THREE YEARS AGO. SALTYKOV
CONTINUED THAT I T WAS THE S&T COMMITTEE'S MANDATE TO
ASSIST S&T COOPERATION AND TO CREATE THE LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS THAT WILL ENABLE COOPERATIVE
ACTIVITIES TO THRIVE. WHILE EMPHASIZING THE S&T
COMMITTEE'S PIVOTAL ROLE IN FOSTERING S&T COOPERATION,
SALTYKOV HIGHLIGHTED THE IMPORTANCE OF COOPERATING
WITH REGIONAL SCIENCE CENTERS, SUCH AS THOSE UNDER THE
SIBERIAN BRANCH OR THE URALS BRANCH OF THE RUSSIAN
ACADEMY OF SCIENCE (RAS). MINISTER SALTYKOV ENDED HIS
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY INVITING DR. GIBBONS TO LEAD
THE REVIEW OF THE STATUS OF COOPERATION UNDER THE
SEVEN S&T AGREEMENTS WITHIN THE COMMITTEE'S PURVIEW.
REVIEW OF ONGOING S&T COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIES
Page 2 of 13
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5. U.S. SCIENCE ADVISOR DR. GIBBONS THANKED MINISTER
SALTYKOV FOR HOSTING TH
E MEETING. DR. GIBBONS AGREED
WITH SALTYKOV THAT THE S&T COMMITTEE PLAYS AN
IMPORTANT ROLE IN FACILITATING U.S.-RUSSIAN SCIENCE
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 07 M S O 035558
OCW
DEPT. FOR OES/SCP AND EUR/ISCA/CAST
DEPT. PASS NSF (C.T. OWENS)
WHITEHOUSE FOR OSTP (SCHWEITZER AND STAHELI)
DOD FOR DTSA (JOHN THOMAS)
NASA FOR ROBERT CLARKE
PARIS FOR NSF (GLENDAY)
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KGCC, TSPL, KSCA, RS, US
SUBJECT: RESULTS OF THE FOURTH MEETING OF THE GCC
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, DECEMBER 5, 1994
COOPERATION. DR. GIBBONS IS OF THE OPINION THAT THE
S&T COMMITTEE SUCCESSFULLY HAS EXPANDED AND
INVIGORATED COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. IN
THIS RESPECT, DR. GIBBONS NOTED THAT THE COMMITTEE WAS
ABOUT TO EXPAND THE NUMBER OF AGREEMENTS WITHIN ITS
PURVIEW FROM SEVEN TO NINE, WITH THE EXPECTED SIGNING
AT THE GCC OF AN MOU ON ACOUSTIC THERMOMETRY OF OCEAN
CLIMATE (ATOC) AND AN MOI ON ESTABLISHING A JOINT
BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH CENTER IN MOSCOW. ACCORDING TO
DR. GIBBONS, NOTWITHSTANDING THE VALUE OF SIGNING NEW
AGREEMENTS, REVIEWING COOPERATION UNDER EXISTING
AGREEMENTS IS VERY IMPORTANT IN GAUGING H W
O
EFFECTIVELY THE COMMITTEE IS DOING ITS JOB.
6. DR. GIBBONS THEN PROVIDED A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE
STATUS OF ACTIVITIES UNDER THE SIGNED MOUS, AND
INVITED THE RUSSIAN DELEGATION TO COMMENT ALSO ON
THESE ACTIVITIES:
-- AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE
AND THE RUSSIAN COMMITTEE ON UNDERGROUND RESOURCES,
SIGNED IN JUNE 1994: DR. GIBBONS HIGHLIGHTED THE
BENEFITS OF ESTABLISHING A COMMON INFRASTRUCTURE AND
SOUND ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS IN OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS
DEVELOPMENT, PARTICULARLY IN THE CHUKCHI SEA. RUSSIAN
DEPUTY SCIENCE MINISTER YAKOBASHVILI (WHO REPLACED
MINISTER SALTYKOV AT THE HEAD OF THE RUSSIAN
DELEGATION WHILE SALTYKOV ATTENDED A BRIEF MEETING AT
THE RUSSIAN WHITE HOUSE) COMMENTED THAT THE AGREEMENT
WAS IMPORTANT TO INVIGORATE INVESTMENTS IN THE OIL AND
GAS SECTOR. HE REMARKED THAT OTHER RUSSIAN AGENCIES
COULD BENEFIT FROM THE AGREEMENT, PARTICULARLY
MINPRIRODA AND THE MINISTRY OF ENERGY. THE
REPRESENTATIVE FROM MINPRIRODA AGREED WITH
YAKOBASHVILI, STATING THAT THE AGREEMENT CAN ASSIST
THE ENVIRONMENTALLY-SAFE DEVELOPMENT OF IMPORTANT OIL
AND GAS PROJECTS, SUCH AS SAKHALIN I I AND TIMANPECHORA.
Page 3 of 13
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-- MOU ON BASIC SCIENCE BETWEEN THE NATIONAL SCIENCE
FOUNDATION (NSF) AND THE RAS, SIGNED I N JUNE 1994:
DR. GIBBONS STATED THAT THIS AGREEMENT (A SUCCESSOR TO
A PREVIOUS BASIC SCIENCES AGREEMENT) SERVES AS A
FRAMEWORK FOR SUPPORTING COOPERATION OF U.S.
RESEARCHERS WHO HAVE RECEIVED NSF GRANTS FOR
COOPERATIVE PROJECTS, SUCH AS ONE INVOLVING MICHIGAN
STATE UNIVERSITY CONDUCTING RESEARCH I N ENVIRONMENTAL
MICROBIOLOGY WITH RUSSIAN RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS.
YAKOBASHVILI, FOR HIS PART, STATED THAT THIS WAS A
LONG - STANDING AGREEMENT WHICH CURRENTLY I S SUPPORTING
MORE THAN 63 PROJECTS.
I N SPITE OF THE FRUITFUL
COOPERATION, HOWEVER, YAKOBASHVILI EXPRESSED SOME
CONCERN THAT COOPERATION DID NOT ALWAYS GO SMOOTHLY AS
A RESULT OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS ON THE AMOUNT OF TAXES
AND OTHER DUTIES TO BE PAID OUT OF RESEARCH FUNDS. I N
AN EFFORT TO AVOID PROBLEMS, YAKOBASHVILI CONTINUED,
RUSSIAN RESEARCHERS GO DIRECTLY TO AMERICANS RATHER
THAN THROUGH THEIR INSTITUTES.
THIS PROCESS I S
ENTIRELY UNNATURAL, ACCORDING TO YAKOBASHVILI, AND HE
BEMOANED THE FACT THAT THERE I S NO JOINT U.S.-RUSSIA
MECHANISM TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM.
-- MOU ON TRANSPORTATION SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,
SIGNED JUNE 1994 BETWEEN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AND THE RUSSIAN MINISTRY OF
TRANSPORTATION:
DEPUTY MINISTER YAKOBASHVILI
I N I T I A L L Y STATED THAT HE HAD TROUBLE DETERMINING HOW
THIS AGREEMENT F I T INTO THE S&T FRAMEWORK. DR.
GIBBONS COUNTERED THAT TECHNOLOGY PLAYS A VERY
IMPORTANT ROLE I N PROTECTING THE INTEGRITY OF OUR
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS AND INFRASTRUCTURE. HE DREW
YAKOBASHVILI'S ATTENTION TO TRANSPORTATION SECRETARY
PENA'S EFFORTS TO EMPHASIZE RESEARCH AND INCREASE THE
ROLE OF SCIENTISTS I N HIS DEPARTMENT. DR. GIBBONS
UNDERSCORED THE IMPORTANCE OF TRANSPORTATION TO
INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES. A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
RUSSIAN MINISTRY OF ECONOMICS AGREED WITH DR. GIBBONS,
COMMENTING THAT HIS MINISTRY IS PAYING VERY CLOSE
ATTENTION TO THIS FIELD.
YAKOBASHVILI ENDED BY
REQUESTING MORE INFORMATION OF U.S. AND DOT'S
TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH EF
UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 07 MOSCOW 035558
DEPT. FOR OES/SCP AND EUR/ISCA/CAST
DEPT. PASS NSF (C.T. OWENS)
WHITEHOUSE FOR OSTP (SCHWEITZER AND STAHELI)
DOD FOR DTSA (JOHN THOMAS)
NASA FOR ROBERT CLARKE
PARIS FOR NSF (GLENDAY)
E.O. 12356:
N/A
TAGS:
KGCC, TSPL, KSCA, RS, US
SUBJECT: RESULTS OF THE FOURTH MEETING OF THE GCC
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, DECEMBER 5, 1994
FORTS.
Page 4 of 13
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-- MOU ON MINING RESEARCH, SIGNED DECEMBER 1993
BETWEEN THE U.S. BUREAU OF MINES AND M S O STATE
OCW
MINING UNIVERSITY: DR. GIBBONS HIGHLIGHTED THE RESULTS
OF THE FIRST COORDINATING MEETING HELD IN MOSCOW, JUNE
1994, WHERE NINE TOPICS OF MUTUAL INTEREST WERE
SELECTED FOR PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT. YAKOBASHVILI
SUGGESTED THAT MORE INTERAGENCY COORDINATION AND
BETTER PRIORITIZATION WERE NEEDED.
MOU ON BASIC BIOMEDICAL SCIENCES BETWEEN THE
NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH (NIH) AND THE RAS,
SIGNED JUNE 1994:
DR. GIBBONS DESCRIBED THE AGREEMENT
AS FACILITATING COOPERATION IN CANCER, IMMUNOLOGY AND
AIDS, MOLECULAR BIOLOGY AND GENETICS, NEUROBIOLOGY,
AND CLINICAL RESEARCH. HE NOTED THAT 118 RUSSIAN
SCIENTISTS CURRENTLY W R AT NIH, AND THAT 32 NIH
OK
GRANTEES WILL BE WORKING WITH RUSSIAN COUNTERPARTS.
YAKOBASHVILI STATED HIS OPINION THAT THE AGREEMENT MAY
NOT BE ABLE TO COVER PRIORITY AREAS, SUCH AS
GENOTOXICITY (WHICH THE RUSSIANS ARE PROPOSING BE
COVERED BY A SEPARATE AGREEMENT ON RADIATION EFFECTS,
SEE PARAS. 18-20), AND WONDERED H W THIS AGREEMENT
O
WOULD AFFECT WORK CARRIED OUT AT THE U.S.-RUSSIA
BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH CENTER, WHICH WILL BE COVERED BY A
SEPARATE AGREEMENT (SEE PARAS. 12-13). YAKOBASHVILI
TERMED THIS "A VERY COMPLEX QUESTION" AND STATED THAT
THE S&T COMMITTEE NEEDS TO MONITOR CLOSELY THE
"MECHANISM, FORM, AND ORIENTATION" OF PROJECTS UNDER
THIS MOU TO ENSURE THEY DO NOT TRANSGRESS ITS
BOUNDARIES.
-- MOU ON GEOSCIENCES BETWEEN THE U.S. GEOLOGICAL
SURVEY, THE RUSSIAN COMMITTEE ON UNDERGROUND
RESOURCES, AND RAS, SIGNED JUNE 1994:
DR. GIBBONS
STATED THE AGREEMENT ALLOWS CONTINUATION OF
COOPERATION IN AN AREA THAT WAS COVERED BY A PREVIOUS
MOU BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION.
YAKOBASHVILI BRIEFLY NOTED THE NEED TO BETTER
COORDINATE ACTIVITIES UNDER THIS MOU AMONG RUSSIAN
AGENCIES.
-- MOU IN FORESTRY, SIGNED MAY 1994, BETWEEN THE
U.S.D.A. FOREST SERVICE AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERAL FOREST
SERVICE: YAKOBASHVILI AGAIN STRESSED THE NEED FOR
CLOSER COORDINATION IN THIS FIELD BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL
AGENCIES, NOTING, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT NASA AND THE
RUSSIAN SPACE AGENCY (RSA) COULD CONTRIBUTE REMOTE
SENSING CAPABILITIES, AND THAT MINPRIRODA SHOULD ALSO
BE INVOLVED.
GENERAL PROBLEMS WORKING GROUP REPORT
7. NASA SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE ADMINISTRATOR ROBERT
CLARKE AND DEPUTY MINISTER YAKOBASHVILI INFORMED DRS.
GIBBONS AND SALTYKOV OF THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST
MEETING OF THE WORKING GROUP ON GENERAL PROBLEMS OF
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S&T COOPERATION, HELD DECEMBER 1 AND 2, 1994.
(DETAILS ON THE RESULTS OF THAT MEETING SENT REFTEL.)
CLARKE GAVE A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE WORKING GROUP AND
LISTED THE PRIORITY AREAS FOR THE GROUP. BOTH CLARKE
AND YAKOBASHVILI STRESSED THAT THE DISCUSSIONS OF THE
WORKING GROUP WERE CHARACTERIZED BY OPENNESS AND
CANDID DIALOGUE. YAKOBASHVILI OPINED THAT BOTH SIDES
HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO BETTER DISTRIBUTE INFORMATION OR
EXPAND ON THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO CLARIFY THE
RATIONALE FOR REGULATORY IMPEDIMENTS AND TO DEVISE
SOLUTIONS I F POSSIBLE.
8. CLARKE AND YAKOBASHVILI REPORTED THAT PROGRESS HAD
BEEN MADE IN VARIOUS AREAS, AND THAT THE GROUP HAD
ACHIEVED A FEW CONCRETE RESULTS, NAMELY: A PROCEDURE
HAD BEEN FORMULATED TO MAXIMIZE ACCESS BY RESEARCH
VESSELS TO SENSITIVE AREAS; AND A SUB-WORKING GROUP
HAD BEEN CREATED TO STUDY DUAL-USE ISSUES. A SUBWORKING GROUP ON TAXES AND ONE ON DUTY-FREE ENTRY OF
GOODS WERE ALSO ESTABLISHED. YAKOBASHVILI USED THE
OPPORTUNITY TO ONCE AGAIN REMIND THE MEMBERS OF THE
COMMITTEE THAT I F A SCIENCE COOPERATION AGREEMENT WERE
UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 07 M S O 035558
OCW
DEPT. FOR OES/SCP AND EUR/ISCA/CAST
DEPT. PASS NSF (C.T. OWENS)
WHITEHOUSE FOR OSTP (SCHWEITZER AND STAHELI)
DOD FOR DTSA (JOHN THOMAS)
NASA FOR ROBERT CLARKE
PARIS FOR NSF (GLENDAY)
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KGCC, TSPL, KSCA, RS, US
SUBJECT: RESULTS OF THE FOURTH MEETING OF THE GCC
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, DECEMBER 5, 1994
SIGNED AT A GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT LEVEL, I T WOULD
BE POSSIBLE TO GRANT ALL PROJECTS UNDER THAT AGREEMENT
TAX FREE STATUS. CLARKE AND YAKOBASHVILI ENDED THEIR
PRESENTATION BY SUGGESTING ANOTHER TOPIC FOR
DISCUSSION AT THE GCC COULD BE THE POSSIBILITY OF
EXPANDING OPPORTUNITIES TO OBTAIN MULTIPLE ENTRY
VISAS FOR S
CIENTISTS.
NANODIAMOND RESEARCH
9.
JUST BEFORE THE MORNING SESSION ENDED, MINISTER
SALTYKOV ALLOWED A BRIEF PRESENTATION ON A JOINT
RESEARCH PROPOSAL INVOLVING PRODUCTION OF NANODIAMONDS
FOR INDUSTRIAL USE. MINISTER SALTYKOV URGED DR.
GIBBONS TO FUND THIS PROJECT I F THE U.S. SCIENCE
BUDGET ALLOWED. HE NOTED THAT U.S. RESEARCHERS WOULD
THEMSELVES BE APPROACHING THE U.S. SIDE FOR SUPPORT I F
THEY FELT THE PROJECT WORTHWHILE.
Page 6 of 13
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ATOC MOU
10. THE AFTERNOON SESSION BEGAN WITH A PRESENTATION
BY DR. PETER MIKHALEVSKY, U.S. PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR,
ON THE JOINT RESEARCH PROGRAM ON ACOUSTIC THERMOMETRY
OF OCEAN CLIMATE (ATOC). DR. MIKHALEVSKY REPORTED
THAT ATOC WAS A GOOD PROGRAM FOR COLLABORATION,
BUILDING UPON THE CAPABILITIES OF BOTH SIDES IN OCEAN
ACOUSTICS, MODELING AND INSTRUMENTATION; OCEANOGRAPHY;
CLIMATE STUDIES; AND ARCTIC STUDIES AND
EXPERIMENTATION. DR. MIKHALEVSKY ENDED HIS
PRESENTATION BY UNDERSCORING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS
SCIENTIFIC ISSUE TO WORLD SOCIETY.
11. DRS. GIBBONS AND SALTYKOV NOTED WITH SATISFACTION
THAT THE MOU ON ATOC COOPERATION WOULD BE INITIALLED
BY THEM AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE S&T COMMITTEE MEETING
AND SIGNED AT THE GCC BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PERRY,
RUSSIAN DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER KOKOSHIN, AND MINISTER
OF SCIENCE SALTYKOV. DEPUTY SCIENCE MINISTER
YAKOBASHVILI ADDED THAT AFTER THE AGREEMENT IS SIGNED,
THE IMPLEMENTING MECHANISM SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT
THE CONCERNS OF ENVIRONMENTALISTS AND OTHER RUSSIAN
"GREEN" ACTIVISTS.
BIOMEDICAL CENTER
12. DR. GIBBONS NEXT TURNED TO THE ISSUE OF
ESTABLISHING A U.S.-RUSSIAN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH
INSTITUTE IN MOSCOW. DR. GIBBONS ASKED NASA SPECIAL
ASSISTANT CLARKE TO REVIEW BRIEFLY FOR THE COMMITTEE
THE HISTORY AND STATUS OF THE PROPOSED COOPERATION.
CLARKE STATED THAT THE GENESIS OF THE PROPOSAL WAS
HOUSTON SURGEON MICHAEL DEBAKEY'S COOPERATION WITH
RUSSIAN RESEARCHERS AT M S O STATE UNIVERSITY. NASA
OCW
IS INTERESTED IN ASSISTING AND ENHANCING THOSE
RESEARCH EFFORTS, GIVEN THE POTENTIAL TECHNOLOGY AND
INFORMATION THAT CAN BE DEVELOPED OF RELEVANCE TO
SPACE MEDICINE. CLARKE REAFFIRMED THAT A STATEMENT OF
INTENT WOULD BE READY FOR SIGNATURE AT THE UPCOMING
GCC.
13. SALTYKOV SAID HE STRONGLY SUPPORTS ESTABLISHMENT
OF THE CENTER AND SAID HE WOULD PROVIDE 250 MILLION
RUBLES FOR INITIAL FUNDING. MINISTER SALTYKOV AND
YAKOBASHVILI ASKED WHETHER THE AGREEMENT WOULD TAKE
THE FORM OF A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING OR OF
INTENT. CLARKE POINTED OUT THAT NASA PROPOSES A TWOSTEP PROCEDURE: SIGNATURE OF THE MOI AT GCC IV,
FOLLOWED BY A FORMAL AGREEMENT TO DEFINE MUTUAL
OBLIGATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES. DRS. GIBBONS AND
SALTYKOV CONCLUDED THE DISCUSSION BY AGREEING TO
INITIAL THE DRAFT MOI AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE
COMMITTEE MEETING.
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UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 07 M S O 035558
OCW
DEPT. FOR OES/SCP AND EUR/ISCA/CAST
DEPT. PASS NSF (C.T. OWENS)
WHITEHOUSE FOR OSTP (SCHWEITZER AND STAHELI)
DOD FOR DTSA (JOHN THOMAS)
NASA FOR ROBERT CLARKE
PARIS FOR NSF (GLENDAY)
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KGCC, TSPL, KSCA, RS, US
SUBJECT: RESULTS OF THE FOURTH MEETING OF THE GCC
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, DECEMBER 5, 1994
FREE ELECTRON LASERS
14. THE DISCUSSION ON THE RUSSIAN PROPOSAL FOR
COOPERATION ON FREE ELECTRON RESEARCH BEGAN WITH A
PRESENTATION BY DR. PHILLIP SPRANGLE OF THE U.S.
EXPLORATORY WORKING GROUP. DR. SPRANGLE REVIEWED IN
DETAIL THE STEPS THE EXPLORATORY WORKING GROUP HAD
TAKEN TO DETERMINE WHETHER COOPERATION IN THIS AREA
WAS POSSIBLE AT THIS TIME. AFTER EXTENSIVE RESEARCH
AND BRIEFINGS FROM PRIVATE SECTOR, ACADEMIC, AND
GOVERNMENT SOURCES, THE U.S. EXPLORATORY WORKING GROUP
DECIDED AGAINST ESTABLISHING FORMAL COOPERATION ON FEL
WITHIN THE S&T COMMITTEE FRAMEWORK AT THIS TIME.
FACTORS WHICH WERE CRITICAL TO THE DECISION WERE THE
LOW PRIORITY OF RESEARCH IN THIS AREA RELATIVE TO
OTHER S&T PRIORITIES IN THE HIGHLY COMPETITIVE U.S.
BUDGET ENVIRONMENT; THE FACT THAT RUSSIAN FEL RESEARCH
IS BASED ON POTENTIALLY ATTRACTIVE BUT UNPROVEN AND
RISKY RESEARCH METHODS; THE FACT THAT U.S. FEL
FACILITIES, POSSIBLY INCLUDING THE PREMIER U.S. FEL
FACILITY AT BOEING, ARE BEING DISMANTLED; AND THE
CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF
FUNDING THE PROPOSED
COOPERATION WOULD REQUIRE. DR. SPRANGLE CONCLUDED HIS
PRESENTATION BY STATING THAT POTENTIAL FOR
COLLABORATION EXISTS AT THE FEL TECHNOLOGY/DEVICE
LEVEL, RATHER THAN AT THE FEL FACILITY LEVEL.
15. FOR ITS PART, THE RUSSIAN DELEGATION ASKED
PROFESSOR GRIGORIEV OF THE BUDKER INSTITUTE IN
NOVOSIBIRSK TO PRESENT THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE RUSSIAN
SIDE. GRIGORIEV REVIEWED THE RESEARCH EFFORTS OF
SCIENTISTS AT HIS INSTITUTE WITH COLLABORATORS AT
NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY, DUKE UNIVERSITY,
TITAN CORPORATION, AND THE MICROELECTRONICS CENTER OF
NORTH CAROLINA. HE HIGHLIGHTED THE "JEDI-ALT"
RESEARCH PROPOSAL AS POTENTIALLY PROVIDING MANY
BENEFITS TO BOTH SIDES, WHICH, HE CLAIMED, COULD BE
OBTAINED FOR RELATIVELY LOW FUNDING.
16. MINISTER SALTYKOV SUMMED UP THE PRESENTATIONS BY
NOTING THE OBVIOUS CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE FINDINGS
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OF THE RUSSIAN WORKING GROUP AND THOSE OF THE U.S.
EXPLORATORY GROUP. BEFORE FORECLOSING THE POSSIBILITY
OF FORMAL COOPERATION IN THIS AREA, DR. SALTYKOV ASKED
WHETHER THE U.S. WOULD AGREE TO HAVE A WORKSHOP WITHIN
THE NEXT TWO MONTHS THAT WOULD AIM TO BRING TOGETHER
MEMBERS OF THE EXPLORATORY GROUP WITH THE RESEARCHERS
FROM NOVOSIBIRSK AND NORTH CAROLINA. A FORMAL
DECISION ON AN FEL AGREEMENT COULD THEN BE MADE AFTER
THE WORKSHOP.
17. DR. GIBBONS RESPONDED THAT, WHILE THE
PRESENTATIONS HAD MADE I T CLEAR THAT FEL RESEARCH
HOLDS GREAT PROMISE, THE S&T COMMITTEE'S
RESPONSIBILITY IS TO ESTABLISH PRIORITIES GIVEN THE
LIMITED AMOUNT OF FUNDING FOR ALL S&T ACTIVITIES. DR.
GIBBONS CONTINUED THAT THE AGENCIES THAT WOULD BE
FUNDING THIS COOPERATION COULD NOT BE FORCED TO DO SO,
EVEN THOUGH HE WOULD ENCOURAGE THE NORTH CAROLINA
GROUP TO CONTINUE ITS PRIVATE RESEARCH EFFORTS WITH
NOVOSIBIRSK AND OTHER RUSSIAN INSTITUTES. DR. GIBBONS
CONCLUDED FIRMLY THAT A STANDING WORKING GROUP UNDER
THE S&T COMMITTEE IS NOT WARRANTED AT THIS TIME.
MINISTER SALTYKOV ACCEPTED THIS CONCLUSION, ADDING
THAT WHILE NO ONE CAN OR SHOULD INTERFERE WITH EFFORTS
TO COLLABORATE PRIVATELY, AT THIS STAGE COLLABORATION
COULD NOT BE SPONSORED BY THE GCC.
PROPOSED COOPERATION ON GENOTOXICITY/RADIATION EFFECTS
18. MINISTER SALTYKOV ASKED THE U.S. DELEGATION TO
CONSIDER A PROPOSAL FOR COOPERATION ON RADIATION
EFFECTS ON HUMANS, A DRAFT OF WHICH HAD BEEN SIGNED IN
SEPTEMBER 1994 BETWEEN AMERICAN AND RUSSIAN
RESEARCHERS. SALTYKOV STATED THAT THE PROPOSED
COOPERATION STEMMED FROM THE VALUABLE W R
OK
ACCOMPLISHED ON THE RUSSIAN-AMERICAN PROJECT ON
UNCLAS SECTION 06 OF 07 M S O 035558
OCW
DEPT. FOR OES/SCP AND EUR/ISCA/CAST
DEPT. PASS NSF (C.T. OWENS)
WHITEHOUSE FOR OSTP (SCHWEITZER AND STAHELI)
DOD FOR DTSA (JOHN THOMAS)
NASA FOR ROBERT CLARKE
PARIS FOR NSF (GLENDAY)
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KGCC, TSPL, KSCA, RS, US
SUBJECT: RESULTS OF THE FOURTH MEETING OF THE GCC
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, DECEMBER 5, 1994
"RADIATION GENOTOXICITY AS A RESULT OF THE ACCIDENT AT
THE CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR POWER PLANT." SALTYKOV ASKED
P.G. PLESHANOV FROM THE HYDROBIOS SCIENTIFIC
PRODUCTION CENTER IN M S O TO GIVE A BRIEF
OCW
PRESENTATION ON THE STATUS OF THAT PROJECT. AT THE
CONCLUSION OF THE PRESENTATION, SALTYKOV EMPHASIZED
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THAT THE PROPOSED AGREEMENT WAS FULLY SUPPORTED BY
LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABS.
19. THE U.S. DELEGATION NOTED THAT THE DRAFT MOU HAD
ONLY RECENTLY BEEN RECEIVED THROUGH OFFICIAL CHANNELS
BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. IN RESPONSE TO SALTYKOV'S
REQUEST FOR SIGNING A NEW MOU, DR. GIBBONS STATED THAT
THE U.S. AND RUSSIA HAD AN EXISTING AGREEMENT ON
RADIATION EFFECTS UNDER WHICH COOPERATION WAS
PROCEEDING SMOOTHLY. NEVERTHELESS, THE PRESENTATION
HAD PROVIDED COMPELLING REASONS TO CONSIDER FURTHER
COOPERATION IN THIS SPECIFIC AREA UNDER A NEW MOU.
DR. JEFF SCHWEITZER ADDED THAT THE PROPOSED
COOPERATION IS DISTINCT ENOUGH FROM THE RESEARCH
CONDUCTED UNDER THE EXISTING AGREEMENT AS TO POSSIBLY
WARRANT A NEW MOU. DR. SCHWEITZER MADE I T CLEAR,
HOWEVER, THAT THE DOCUMENT SIGNED BY THE DIRECTOR OF
LIVERMORE LABS AND OTHERS, CALLED A "MEMORANDUM OF
UNDERSTANDING" AND IN WHICH REFERENCE WAS MADE TO THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE) AND THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES
OF HEALTH (NIH), WAS NOT LEGALLY BINDING. THE PROCESS
TO NEGOTIATE A NEW AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE STARTED
DE NOVO, HE SAID.
20. THE TWO DELEGATIONS THEN DISCUSSED THE FORM A NEW
AGREEMENT COULD TAKE, WHETHER GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT
OR INTERAGENCY. DR. GIBBONS STATED THAT I T WOULD BE
NECESSARY TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER OTHER AGENCIES BESIDES
DOE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN THIS COOPERATION, AND THAT
AFTERWARDS A DETERMINATION COULD BE MADE WHETHER TO
MAKE I T AGENCY-TO-AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT.
MINISTER SALTYKOV SUMMED UP THE DISCUSSION BY NOTING
THAT WHILE THE COMMITTEE IS NOT READY TO SIGN A NEW
AGREEMENT AT THE NEXT GCC, THERE IS THE SENSE THAT A
NEW AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE. THE FORMAL RECOMMENDATION
OF THE COMMITTEE IS TO CONTINUE WORKING TO IDENTIFY
FURTHER POTENTIAL PARTNERS AND, THEREAFTER, AGREE ON
THE FORM OF THE FINAL PROPOSAL.
FUNDAMENTAL PROPERTIES OF MATTER
21. MINISTER SALTYKOV DISCUSSED THE REASONS FOR
CONSIDERING A NEW AGREEMENT ON FUNDAMENTAL PROPERTIES
OF MATTER, SIGNED BY MINSCI, AND SEPARATE FROM THE
PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY AGREEMENT (PUAE)
BETWEEN DOE AND MINATOM. (COMMENT: PUAE IS AN
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT WITH DOE AND MINATOM AS
EXECUTIVE AGENTS. DOE AND MINATOM ARE ALSO THE TWO
SIGNATORIES ON THE MEMORANDUM OF COOPERATION ON
FUNDAMENTAL PROPERTIES OF MATTER. END COMMENT) NOTING
THAT U.S.-RUSSIA COOPERATION IN FUNDAMENTAL PROPERTIES
OF MATTER WAS PARTICULARLY SUCCESSFUL, SALTYKOV STATED
THAT STEPS MUST BE TAKEN TO ENSURE ITS CONTINUATION.
THE PROBLEM IS, SALTYKOV AVERRED, THAT OVER THE PAST
TWO-THREE YEARS, POLITICAL CHANGES IN RUSSIA HAVE
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AFFECTED GOVERNMENT AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURES, AND
RESPONSIBILITIES HAVE BEEN SHIFTED AROUND. THE NEW
AGREEMENT IS NECESSARY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT NEW
REALITIES, AND, SPECIFICALLY, TO RECOGNIZE THE ROLE OF
MINSCI IN COORDINATING RUSSIAN INTERNAL RESEARCH IN
PHYSICS AND FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH. SALTYKOV EMPHASIZED
THAT THIS REQUEST SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A RUSSIAN
GOVERNMENT REQUEST, RATHER THAN SOLELY MINSCI. HE
PROPOSED THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT BE SIGNED BETWEEN DOE
AND MINSCI, OR BETWEEN DOE AND MINSCI/MINATOM.
22. DR. GIBBONS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT MINSCI'S STATUS
MERITS FULL RECOGNITION, AND REASSURED MINISTER
SALTYKOV THAT DOE WAS SYMPATHETIC TO MINSCI S
PROPOSAL. DR. GIBBONS THOUGHT THAT THE MOST PRACTICAL
WAY TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM WOULD BE TO ADD MINSCI AS A
THIRD PARTY TO THE EXISTING MOC. AT THIS POINT,
UNCLAS SECTION 07 OF 07 M S O 035558
OCW
1
DEPT. FOR OES/SCP AND EUR/ISCA/CAST
DEPT. PASS NSF (C.T. OWENS)
WHITEHOUSE FOR OSTP (SCHWEITZER AND STAHELI)
DOD FOR DTSA (JOHN THOMAS)
NASA FOR ROBERT CLARKE
PARIS FOR NSF (GLENDAY)
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KGCC, TSPL, KSCA, RS, US
SUBJECT: RESULTS OF THE FOURTH MEETING OF TE GCC
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, DECEMBER 5, 1994
SALTYKOV EXPRESSED SOME CONCERN THAT THE TITLE OF THE
PUAE AGREEMENT MAY NOT BE PROPER GIVEN THAT MINSCI HAS
NO ROLE IN ATOMIC RESEARCH. DR. GIBBONS RESPONDED
THAT FURTHER CONSULTATIONS ARE WARRANTED ON WHETHER
THE TITLE NEEDS TO BE CHANGED OR WHETHER I T WOULD BE
SUFFICIENT TO AMEND THE PREAMBLE OF THE AGREEMENT. A
DIALOGUE ON THIS WILL BE ESTABLISHED IN THE NEAR
FUTURE.
CONCLUDING STATEMENTS/TOPICS/ACTIONS
23. ISSUES DISCUSSED BRIEFLY AT THE END OF THE
SESSION INCLUDED MINSCI'S WISH TO ESTABLISH A
PERMANENT MEMBERSHIP FOR THE S&T COMMITTEE WHICH WOULD
BE EMPOWERED TO MAKE DECISIONS. DR. GIBBONS COUNTERED
THAT ATTENDANCE AT THE MEETINGS WAS LIMITED BY TRAVEL
BUDGETS, AND THAT THE U.S. WISHED TO HAVE THE
FLEXIBILITY TO HAVE IN ATTENDANCE ONLY THE MOST
RELEVANT MEMBERS. FINALLY, DR. SALTYKOV ASKED ABOUT
THE STATUS OF U.S. FUNDING FOR A CIVILIAN RESEARCH
CENTER IN SUPPORT OF BASIC SCIENCES. DR. GIBBONS
EXPLAINED THAT THE MATTER WAS TIED UP PRESENTLY BY
LEGAL ISSUES, AND THAT HE COULD NOT ELABORATE ON I T AT
THIS TIME.
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24. DRS. GIBBONS AND SALTYKOV CONCLUDED THE FOURTH
MEETING OF THE S&T COMMITTEE BY INITIALLING THE MOU ON
COOPERATION IN ATOC AND THE STATEMENT OF INTENT ON
ESTABLISHING A JOINT BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH CENTER IN
MOSCOW.
25 .
DELEGATION LISTS
U.S. DELEGATION
-- JOHN GIBBONS, U.S. SCIENCE ADVISOR, CHAIRMAN
-- ROBERT CLARKE
, NASA
-- JEFF SCHWEITZER, OSTP
LINDA STAHELI, OSTP
-- MARILYN PIFER, DOS
-- JOHN THOMAS, DOD
-- C.T. OWENS, NSF
-- ALBERT FAULSTICH, OFFICE OF NAVAL RESEARCH
PETER MIKHALEVSKY, SCIENCE APPLICATION CORP.
-- KENNETH SMITH, OFFICE OF NAVAL RESEARCH
-- PHILLIP SPRANGLE, NAVAL RESEARCH LABS
-- VLADIMIR SAMBAIEW, EST COUNSELOR
-- RICHARD FIGUEROA, EST OFFICER
-- CHARLES ARNDT, EST OFFICER
RUSSIAN DELEGATION
-------------
MINISTER BORIS SALTYKOV, MINSCI, CHAIRMAN
ZURAB YAKOBASHVILI, MINSCI
MIKHAIL KIRPICHNIKOV, RUSSIAN GVT. ADMINISTRATION
VALERY MESKOV, STATE HIGHER ED. COMMITTEE
GENNADIY NEFYODOV, MINATOM
ALEXANDER SOLOVIANOV, MIN. OF FUEL AND ENERGY
MIKHAIL TOLKACHYOV, MINPRIRODA
OLEG YUN, MINISTRY OF ECONOMICS
ALBERT TRIFONOV, COMM. FOR DEFENSE INDUSTRY
VLADIMIR TUZHIKOV, MOD
ALEXANDER YAKOVENKO, MFA
YURIY SHIYAN, RAS
END DELEGATION LISTS. PICKERING
BT
#5558
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< SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 07
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< SSN>5558
< SSN>5558
< SSN>5558
< SSN>5558
<'SSN>5558
<'SSN>5558
A
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TOR:
941209025918 M1405898
< TOR>941209030123 M1405901
< TOR>941209030226 M1405903
< TOR>941209030329 M1405905
< TOR>941209030432 M1405907
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DIST:
S I T : BRANSCUM NSC
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Cable
PREC
PRIORITY
CLASS
UNCLASSIFIED
LINEl
PAAUZYUW RUEHCAA84 84 3440008-UUUU--RHEHAAX.
LINE2
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
LINE 3
P 100013Z DEC 94
LINE4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
OSRI
DTG
ORIG
TO
INFO
SUBJ
RUEHC
100013Z DEC 94
SECSTATE WASHDC
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 3902
////
GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN ENVIRONMENT COMMITTEE:
RESPONSE TO RUSSIAN ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION PROPOSAL
TEXT:
UNCLAS STATE 3 2 84 84
EST FOR MILLER
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KGCC, SENV, RS
SUBJECT: GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN ENVIRONMENT COMMITTEE:
RESPONSE TO RUSSIAN ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION PROPOSAL
REF: A) MOSCOW 29963,
B) MOSCOW 16834
REQUEST EMBASSY PASS FOLLOWING LETTER AT FIRST
OPPORTUNITY TO TOLKACHEV AT MINPRIRODA:
DECEMBER 4,
1994
MR. MIKHAIL TOLKACHEV
DEPUTY MINISTER
MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AND NATURAL RESOURCES
B. GRUZINSKAYA 4/6
MOSCOW 123812, R.F.
DEAR MR.
TOLKACHEV:
AS WE DISCUSSED I N MOSCOW LAST MONTH, I AM PLEASED TO
RESPOND TO YOUR PROPOSAL FOR A JOINT STATEMENT ON U.S.RUSSIAN COOPERATION ON ENVIRONMENTAL
EDUCATION UNDER THE GORE - CHERNOMYRDIN COMMISSION
ENVIRONMENT COMMITTEE.
WE WELCOME YOUR FOCUS ON ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION. WE
VIEW ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION AS A VITAL COMPONENT OF ANY
SUCCESSFUL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION PROGRAM. WE BELIEVE
THAT MANY OF OUR JOINT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECTS I N
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RUSSIA INCLUDE, OR WILL INCLUDE, ELEMENTS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING. THIS I S
ESPECIALLY TRUE I N THE KHABAROVSK AND N I Z H N I I TAGIL
PROJECTS AS WELL AS THE PROPOSED BERINGIA HERITAGE
INTERNATIONAL PARK.
I T I S OUR VIEW THAT OUR RECENTLY CONCLUDED FRAMEWORK
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENT CAN PROVIDE THE NECESSARY BASIS
FOR COOPERATION I N THE ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION FIELD.
THUS, WE DO NOT SEE THE NEED FOR A SEPARATE AGREEMENT ON
ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION, SINCE COOPERATION I N THIS FIELD
PURSUED UNDER OUR EXISTING AGREEMENT.
WE ARE VERY WILLING TO WORK WITH YOU I N EXPLORING
FURTHER WHAT SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION PROJECT(S)
MIGHT BE BOTH MOST APPROPRIATE AND MOST EFFECTIVE FOR
JOINT COOPERATION UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE GORECHERNYRMYRDIN ENVIRONMENT COMMITTEE.
ON OUR PART, ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION I S A MATTER THAT
ENGAGES GOVERNMENT AT MANY LEVELS, PARTICULARLY STATE
AND LOCAL LEVELS, AND ALSO INCLUDES THE A C T I V I T I E S OF
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PRIVATE SECTOR
AFFILIATIONS.
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT DOES NOT IMPLEMENT A
FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION SYSTEM, BUT RATHER
ENCOURAGES INCORPORATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES INTO
SCHOOL CURRICULA. THUS, WE ARE PLANNING TO TAKE AN
INVENTORY OF CURRENT EFFORTS AT ALL LEVELS, INCLUDING
GOVERNMENTAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL SECTORS I N THIS
REGARD. AS YOU KNOW, HOWEVER, ANY NEW ACTIVITY I N THIS
AREA MUST BE SUPPORTED FROM CURRENT FUNDING.
I LOOK FORWARD TO OUR COOPERATION ON THIS ISSUE, AND I
WOULD WELCOME YOUR FURTHER THOUGHTS.
SINCERELY,
WILLIAM A. NITZE
ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR
U.S. EPA
TALBOTT
BT
#8484
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SIT: BEYRLE BRADLEY BRANSCUM BURNS CLAUSSEN FORSYTHE NSC
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Cable
PREC:
CLASS:
LINEl:
LINE2
LINE3
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OSRI
DTG
ORIG
TO:
INFO:
IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL
OAACZYUW RUEHTAA6788 34 613 44-CCCC--RUEADWW.
ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZZK
0 121344Z DEC 94 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY ALMATY
RUEHTA
121344Z DEC 94
AMEMBASSY ALMATY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2727
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEADWW/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY M S O PRIORITY 1472
OCW
TALKING POINTS FOR GORE/CHERNOMYRDIN ON
SUBJ:
CASPIAN PIPELINE: KAZAKHSTANI RELUCTANCE TO
MOVE FORWARD ON THIS ISSUE
TEXT:
C O N F I D E N T I A L
SECTION 01 OF 02 ALMATY 006788
FOR S/NIS/RA - SPECKHARD; EUR/ISCA - BOND/HARNISH; EB/IEP
RASE; NSC FORSYTHE, DOE DEPUTY SECRETARY WHITE; USDOC
FOR 4200/KALICKI
LIMDIS
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (GORE, AL), EPET, KZ
SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR GORE/CHERNOMYRDIN ON
CASPIAN PIPELINE: KAZAKHSTANI RELUCTANCE TO
MOVE FORWARD ON THIS ISSUE
REF: ALMATY 06646
I.
SUMMARY. THE GORE - CHERNOMYRDIN MEETINGS OFFER A
CHANCE TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THE CASPIAN PIPELINE ISSUE.
PARAGRAPH 2 OFFERS OUR SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS FOR THE
VICE PRESIDENT. US LEADERSHIP WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO
RESOLVE THIS IMPASSE. KAZAKHSTAN REMAINS RELUCTANT TO
PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE. AT PARA 6 I S A LETTER FROM
PRESIDENT NAZARBAYEV TO VICE PRESIDENT GORE THAT
REITERATES KAZAKHSTAN'S POSITION THAT CHEVRON AND OMAN
MUST RESOLVE THEIR DIFFERENCES THEMSELVES. KAZAKHSTAN IS
EVEN RELUCTANT TO ALLOW EBRD TO PURSUE ALTERNATIVE
FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PIPELINE PROJECT. W ARE
E
ENCOURAGING THEM TO DO SO (PARA 7). END SUMMARY.
2. AT THE GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN MEETINGS LATER THIS WEEK, W
E
BELIEVE I T WOULD BE HELPFUL I F THE VICE PRESIDENT
EXPRESSED CONCERN TO THE RUSSIAN PRIME MINISTER ABOUT THE
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD010VDEC94\MSGS\M1409668.html
RECENT CASPIAN PIPELINE CONSORTIUM DECISION TO PURSUE A
GO-IT-ALONE STRATEGY FOR BUILDING "PHASE 1" OF AN OIL
EXPORT PIPELINE (REFTEL), AN OPTION THAT WOULD EXCLUDE
CHEVRON. THE VICE PRESIDENT MIGHT USEFULLY POINT OUT
THAT:
0 BASED ON THE OMAN OIL COMPANY'S (OOC) PAST RELUCTANCE
TO PARTICIPATE IN LARGE-SCALE FINANCING OF THE PIPELINE,
THE U.S. DOUBTS THAT THE COMPANY HAS THE RESOURCES OR
WILL TO FINANCE BY ITSELF THE HALF - BILL ION DOLLAR
PROJECT.
0 INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS WOULD BE UNLIKELY
TO JOIN OMAN IN FINANCING WITHOUT THE PARTICIPATION OF A
MAJOR, CREDIT - WORTHY OIL SHIPPER LIKE CHEVRON.
0 MOREOVER, THE "PHASE 1" ROUTE THROUGH CHECHNYA WOULD
SEEM TO INVOLVE MAJOR POLITICAL RISKS THAT WOULD FRIGHTEN
INVESTORS, SUGGESTING THAT THE ORIGINAL PROPOSAL FOR A
BYPASS TO THE NORTH - - THOUGH MORE EXPENSIVE AT 12 BILLION
DOLLARS --CONTINUES TO MERIT ATTENTION.
0 CHEVRON HAS INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO FINANCE HALF
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE PIPELINE UNDER THE ORIGINAL
PROPOSAL, AND W UNDERSTAND THE EBRD IS WILLING TO LOOK
E
AT PLAYING A LEADERSHIP ROLE IN ORGANIZING THE REMAINDER
OF THE FINANCING.
0 WE URGE RUSSIA NOT TO TRANSFER OWNERSHIP OF ANY
PIPELINE ASSETS TO CPC UNTIL THIS ISSUE IS RESOLVED.
BACKGROUND
3. AS WASHINGTON IS AWARE, PRESIDENT NAZARBAYEV AND THE
KAZAKHSTAN IS1
EJ3526..._
O....J.4d
4. |
(NAZARBAYEV
REVERSED KAZAKHSTAN'S POSITION LAST MAY, MOVING AWAY FROM
OMAN'S AND TO CHEVRON'S MORE REALISTIC APPROACH. THEN,
IN AUGUST,I
NAZARBAYEV INTERVENED WITH OMAN I AND RUSSIAN LEADERS IN
FAVOR OF CHEVRON'S POSITION.
5. NOW, DESPITE EBRD'S INITIATIVE TO PLAY A LEADING ROLE
IN ORGANIZING FINANCING
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Page 2 ol'4
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD010\DEC94\MSGS\M1409668.html
FOR THE ORIGINAL PIPELINE PLAN,
AND DESPITE PRIME MINISTER KAZHEGELDIN'S INITIAL
ENDORSEMENT OF THE EBRD PROPOSAL, NAZARBAYEV MAY HAVE
DIRECTED HIS GOVERNMENT NOT TO SIGN A LETTER OF
UNDERSTANDING WITH EBRD THAT, WHILE NOT OBLIGATING EITHER
SIDE TO ANYTHING, WOULD HAVE ALLOWED EBRD TO EXPLORE WITH
RUSSIA AND OMAN WAYS TO RESTRUCTURE THE PROJECT AND
OBTAIN INTERNATIONAL FINANCING. THE EBRD HAS ASKED FOR
G 0 N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 ALMATY 006788
FOR S/NIS/RA - SPECKHARD; EUR/ISCA - BOND/HARNTSH; EB/IEP
RASE; NSC FORSYTHE, DOE DEPUTY SECRETARY WHITE; USDOC
FOR 4200/KALICKI
LIMDIS
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (GORE, AL), EPET, KZ
SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR GORE/CHERNOMYRDIN ON
CASPIAN PIPELINE: KAZAKHSTANI RELUCTANCE TO
MOVE FORWARD ON THIS ISSUE
OUR HELP. ON DECEMBER 12 W SENT A DIPLOMATIC NOTE
E
URGING THAT KAZAKHSTAN GIVE EBRD THE REQUESTED
AUTHORIZATION (PARA 7 ) . CHEVRON REPS HERE STRONGLY
SUPPORT EBRD'S INITIATIVE.
NAZARBAYEVS LETTER TO VICE PRESIDENT GORE
Page 3 ot 4
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD010\DEC94\MSGS\M1409668.html
DIPLOMATIC NOTE ON EBRD
7. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A DIPLOMATIC NOTE REGARDING EBRD
THAT THE EMBASSY SENT TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ON DECEMBER 12.
(BEGIN TEXT)
THE EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PRESENTS ITS
COMPLIMENTS TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE
REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN AND HAS THE HONOR TO EXPRESS
INTEREST IN KAZAKHSTAN'S SUPPORTING A POSSIBLE FINANCIAL
ROLE FOR THE EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT (EBRD) IN FINANCING THE OIL EXPORT PIPELINE.
THE EMBASSY REQUESTS THAT THE MINISTRY FORWARD THE
FOLLOWING INFORMATION TO THE PRESIDENCY.
W UNDERSTAND THAT THE EBRD HAS EXPRESSED TO THE
E
KAZAKHSTAN I GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN SEEKING TO ARRANGE
FINANCING FOR TRANSPORT OF OIL TO WORLD MARKETS. W
E
UNDERSTAND THAT THE EBRD HAS REQUESTED THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN TO SIGNIFY ITS AGREEMENT IN
PRINCIPLE WITH A POTENTIAL ROLE FOR THE EUROPEAN BANK BY
SIGNING A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING. WE URGE THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN TO DO SO.
(COMPLIMENTARY CLOSE)
(END TEXT)
COURTNEY
BT
#6788
NNNN
SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
< SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
SSN: 6788
<"SSN>6788
TOR: 941212085431 M1409668
< TOR>941212085432 M7409669
DIST:
PRT: FUERTH
SIT: BEYRLE BRANSCUM BURNS FORSYTHE NSC STERN
A
A
Page 4 of 4
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Cable
PREC
IMMEDIATE
CLASS
UNCLASSIFIED
LINEl
OAAUZYUW RUEHMOA5961 3481331 -UUUU--RHEHAAA.
LINE2
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
LINE 3
0 141331Z DEC 94
LINE4
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
OSRI
DTG
ORIG
TO
INFO:
SUBJ:
RUEHMO
141331Z DEC 94
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//CABLES// IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEADNA/DNA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUCPDC/USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 794 5
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
DEFENSE CONVERSION WORKING GROUP MEETINGS WITH
MIRONOV OF MOD: THREATS, LIES AND RED TAPE
SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION
TEXT:
UNCLAS SECTION 0 1 OF 04 MOSCOW 035961
STATE FOR EUR/ISCA AND S/NIS-C/CAESAR
STATE PASS OPIC FOR RIORDAN
SECDEF CABLES PASS TO ASD CARTER I N SECDEF'S
PARTY
OSD/ISP FOR DASD SHERWOOD AND SALLY HORN AND MOORE
OSD/ATSD (AE) FOR MG (RET) LAJOIE AND JOHN RUBERTO
NSC FOR BURNS
DNA FOR SCOTT MORTON AND MIKE HALL
COMMERCE
COMMERCE
COMMERCE
COMMERCE
FOR BXA/DUS BCARTER/DSTANTON/JISBELL/DHURLEY
FOR 3312/USFCS/010/WIS/GKNOWLES
FOR 4213/IEP/EUR/RISM/JBROUGHER
FOR ITA/US/JKALICKI
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: EIND, ECON, EFIN, BEXP, BMGT, PARM, RS
SUBJECT: DEFENSE CONVERSION WORKING GROUP MEETINGS WITH
MIRONOV OF MOD: THREATS, LIES AND RED TAPE
SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION
1.
THE WORKING GROUP OF THE GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN
COMMISSION'S DEFENSE CONVERSION COMMITTEE HAS COMPLETED
Page 1 of 8
�F:\Cable\Data_SoLirce\Cables\CD010\DEC94\MSGS\M1414024.html
TWO DAYS OF MEETINGS IN M S O (DECEMBER 12-13),
OCW
FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON THE COMMITTEE'S REPORT TO THE
DECEMBER 14-16 MEETINGS OF THE GCC. THE U.S. SIDE WAS
LED BY SALLY HORN OF OSD/ISP, SUPPORTED BY JOHN RUBERTO
OP OSD/ATSD AND EMBASSY OFFICERS. DAN RIORDAN, SPECIAL
ASSISTANT TO OPIC PRESIDENT RUTH HARKIN, ATTENDED THE
OPENING SESSION. THE RUSSIAN SIDE WAS LED BY GENERAL
VICTOR MIRONOV, SUPPORTED BY DR. GENADIY KUZIN, ALSO OF
THE MOD. SEVERAL DIFFERENT SUPPORT STAFFERS WERE IN
ATTENDANCE, BUT NEITHER THE MINISTRY OF ECONOMICS NOR
THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL ANALYTICAL CENTER WAS
REPRESENTED. ALEKSANDR HAGIN OF THE STATE COMMITTEE
FOR DEFENSE INDUSTRY ATTENDED PART OF THE SECOND DAY.
SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE ON THE REPORT, BUT
DIFFERENCES REMAIN REGARDING THE PUBLICATION OF DEFENSE
BUSINESS DIRECTORIES AND THE U.S. PROPOSAL FOR A SABIT
PROGRAM FOCUSED ON DEFENSE CONVERSION. I T IS POSSIBLE
THAT WITH THE ARRIVAL IN M S O OF DEPUTY UNDER
OCW
SECRETARY OF COMMERCE BARRY CARTER THAT THE DIALOGUE
CAN BE ELEVATED TO A HIGHER LEVEL AND THESE REMAINING
ISSUES FAVORABLY RESOLVED.
2. THIS MESSAGE DOES NOT, HOWEVER, PROVIDE A DETAILED
REVIEW OF PROGRESS ON THE REPORT OR ALL THE ISSUES
DISCUSSED, BUT RATHER FOCUSES ON A FEW EXAMPLES OF
MIRONOV'S VARIOUS THREATS, PREVARICATIONS AND EFFORTS
TO IMPOSE CENTRALIZED CONTROL. HIS REPEATED THEMES
WERE: THE NEED FOR THE DEFENSE CONVERSION COMMITTEE TO
SERVE AS THE SOLE VEHICLE FOR U.S.-RUSSIAN COOPERATION
IN DEFENSE CONVERSION (BE I T PUBLIC OR PRIVATE); THE
NEED FOR THE MOD TO CLEAR ON ALL CONTACTS BETWEEN
RUSSIAN DEFENSE ENTERPRISES AND THEIR EMPLOYEES FOR
PURPOSES OF ANY CONTACT WITH FOREIGN BUSINESSES; AND
THE THREAT OF FAR MORE RESTRICTIVE AND REGRESSIVE
FORCES IN RUSSIA GAINING THE UPPER HAND I F ADEQUATE
CONTROL OVER SUCH CONTACTS IS NOT EXERCISED BY THE MOD.
MIRONOV FOCUSED HIS IRE PARTICULARLY ON OPIC AND
AMCONGEN YEKATERINBURG'S URALS BUSINESS CONFERENCE N W
O
UNDER WAY IN MOSCOW, THE RELEASE OF INFORMATION
INHERENT IN THE DEFENSE CONVERSION BUSINESS DIRECTORIES
PROJECT AND LACK OF DIRECT MOD CONTROL OVER
PARTICIPATION IN THE DEFENSE CONVERSION SABIT PROGRAM
AS PROPOSED BY THE U.S. SIDE. THROUGHOUT THESE
DISCUSSIONS, MIRONOV ASSERTED HE WAS SPEAKING FOR THE
GOR, NOT JUST MOD, AN ASSERTION WE ARE NOT YET ABLE TO
CONFIRM OR REJECT. END SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION.
URALS DAY: WHERE DOES YOUR CONSULATE GET OFF?
3. VERY SOON AFTER OPENING PLEASANTRIES AND DISCUSSION
OF THE SCHEDULE FOR THE WEEK, THE SUBSTANTIVE
DISCUSSION STARTED WITH THOSE SECTIONS OF THE REPORT
PERTAINING TO OPIC. AFTER OPENING WITH GENERALLY
POSITIVE COMMENTS ON OPIC, MIRONOV SAID THAT THE
DECEMBER 13-14 OPIC AND AMCONGEN YEKATERINBURG
SPONSORED URALS DAY MEETING BETWEEN RUSSIAN DEFENSE
ENTERPRISES AND U.S. BUSINESS IN MOSCO
W IS PREMATURE
Page 2 ofS
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD010\DEC94\MSGS\M1414024.html
AND UNAUTHORIZED. HE SAID THAT MOD WAS AGAINST THE
CONFERENCE AND THAT I T "WILL NOT TAKE PLACE" AS I T
LACKS APPROVAL OF THE "SERVICES" RESPONSIBLE FOR
DEFENSE INDUSTRY. HE SAID THE DEFENSE CONVERSION
COMMITTEE DID NOT AGREE TO INVOLVE CONSULAR OFFICIALS
IN DEFENSE CONVERSION AND THAT I T IS THE "FUNCTION OF
THE COMMITTEE TO APPROVE CONTACTS."
HORN THEN
EXPLAINED THAT AT THE PERRY -KOKOSHIN LEVEL I T WAS
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 04 M S O 035961
OCW
STATE FOR EUR/ISCA AND S/NIS-C/CAESAR
STATE PASS OPIC FOR RIORDAN
SECDEF CABLES PASS TO ASD CARTER IN SECDEF'S PARTY
OSD/ISP FOR DASD SHERWOOD AND SALLY HORN AND MOORE
OSD/ATSD (AE) FOR MG (RET) LAJOIE AND JOHN RUBERTO
NSC FOR BURNS
DNA FOR SCOTT MORTON AND MIKE HALL
COMMERCE
COMMERCE
COMMERCE
COMMERCE
FOR
FOR
FOR
FOR
BXA/DUS BCARTER/DSTANTON/'JISBELL/DHURLEY
3312/USFCS/010/WIS/GKNOWLES
4213/IEP/EUR/RISM/JBROUGHER
ITA/US/JKALICKI
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: EIND, ECON, EFIN, BEXP, BMGT, PARM, RS
SUBJECT: DEFENSE CONVERSION WORKING GROUP MEETINGS WITH
MIRONOV OF MOD: THREATS, LIES AND RED TAPE
AGREED THAT THE COMMITTEE AND WORKING GROUP WOULD BE
VEHICLES FOR COOPERATION, NOT VEHICLES TO CONTROL
COOPERATION. RIORDAN THEN FURTHER EXPLAINED OPIC'S
PLANS IN RUSSIA.
4. IN HIS REJOINDER MIRONOV STRESSED THAT THIS IS NOT
A MATTER OF HIS DESIRE, BUT OF RUSSIAN LAW REQUIRING
THAT RUSSIAN DEFENSE PRODUCERS MAY NOT SPEAK -- ON ANY
LEVEL, NO MATTER H W INFORMAL -- WITH U.S. ENTERPRISES
O
WITHOUT MOD APPROVAL. AFTER BRIEF DISCUSSION OF
RELATED POINTS, MIRONOV RETURNED TO THE SUBJECT OF
RUSSIAN RULES ON CONTACTS BY DEFENSE ENTERPRISES WITH
FOREIGNERS, ARGUING THAT ALTHOUGH HE WANTS TO AVOID
UPSETTING TRANSACTIONS ALREADY UNDERWAY, " E HAVE NOW
W
IN RUSSIA POLITICAL POWERS THAT WANT TO CREATE
PROBLEMS, PERHAPS EVEN LARGE-SCALE SHOW-TRIALS ON
THIS." RETURNING SHORTLY THEREAFTER TO THE URALS DAY
THEME, MIRONOV SAID THAT THE ONLY PROBLEM IS THAT THE
SEMINAR WAS ORGANIZED BY THE U.S. CONSULATE NOT THE
GOR AND THAT THIS IS NOT THE CONSULATE'S PROPER TASK.
HE FURTHER ACCUSED THE CONSULATE OF CLAIIING TO LOCAL
OFFICIALS THAT MOD AND MINECON APPROVED THE CONFERENCE,
BUT THAT IN REALITY I T WAS DONE ON THE INSTRUCTION OF
USDOC AND THE EMBASSY.
AND WHERE DO LOCAL AUTHORITIES GET OFF?
Page 3 of 8
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD010\DEC94\MSGS\MI414024.html
5. AFTER RIORDAN EXPLAINED THAT THE CONFERENCE WAS
DONE AT UHE INITIATIVE OF THE CONSULATE WORKING VERY
CLOSELY WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES, MIRONOV REASSERTED THAT
THE CONFERENCE WOULD NOT TAKE PLACE AND THAT LOCAL
AUTHORITIES HAVE NO COMPETENCE TO AUTHORIZE IT, ONLY
THE MOD AND STATE COMMITTEE ON DEFENSE INDUSTRY MAY DO
SO. HE THEN ASKED THE U.S. SIDE TO "IMAGINE WHAT WOULD
HAPPEN I F VLADIVOSTOK OR YEKATERINBURG DECLARED
INDEPENDENCE" AND CONCLUDED IN THIS VEIN THAT RUSSIA
MUST SOLVE ITS PROBLEMS IN ITS OWN WAY AND DOES NOT
WANT "ANOTHER CHECHENYA OR CAUCASUS WAR."
LACKS APPROVAL OF THE "SERVICES" RESPONSIBLE FOR
DEFENSE INDUSTRY. HE SAID THE DEFENSE CONVERSION
COMMITTEE DID NOT AGREE TO INVOLVE CONSULAR OFFICIALS
IN DEFENSE CONVERSION AND THAT I T IS THE "FUNCTION OF
THE COMMITTEE TO APPROVE CONTACTS."
HORN THEN
EXPLAINED THAT AT THE PERRY-KOKOSHIN LEVEL I T WAS
AGREED THAT THE COMMITTEE AND WORKING GROUP WOULD BE
VEHICLES FOR COOPERATION, NOT VEHICLES TO CONTROL
COOPERATION. RIORDAN THEN FURTHER EXPLAINED OPIC'S
PLANS IN RUSSIA.
4. IN HIS REJOINDER MIRONOV STRESSED THAT THIS IS NOT
A MATTER OF HIS DESIRE, BUT OF RUSSIAN LAW REQUIRING
THAT RUSSIAN DEFENSE PRODUCERS MAY NOT SPEAK -- ON ANY
LEVEL, NO MATTER H W INFORMAL
O
WITH U.S. ENTERPRISES
WITHOUT MOD APPROVAL. AFTER BRIEF DISCUSSION OF
RELATED POINTS, MIRONOV RETURNED TO THE SUBJECT OF
RUSSIAN RULES ON CONTACTS BY DEFENSE ENTERPRISES WITH
FOREIGNERS, ARGUING THAT ALTHOUGH HE WANTS TO AVOID
UPSETTING TRANSACTIONS ALREADY UNDERWAY, " E HAVE NOW
W
IN RUSSIA POLITICAL POWERS THAT WANT TO CREATE
PROBLEMS, PERHAPS EVEN LARGE-SCALE SHOW-TRIALS ON
THIS." RETURNING SHORTLY THEREAFTER TO THE URALS DAY
THEME, MIRONOV SAID THAT THE ONLY PROBLEM IS THAT THE
SEMINAR WAS ORGANIZED BY THE U.S. CONSULATE NOT THE
GOR AND THAT THIS IS NOT THE CONSULATE'S PROPER TASK.
HE FURTHER ACCUSED THE CONSULATE OF CLAIMING TO LOCAL
OFFICIALS THAT MOD AND MINECON APPROVED THE CONFERENCE,
BUT THAT IN REALITY I T WAS DONE ON THE INSTRUCTION OF
USDOC AND THE EMBASSY.
AND WHERE DO LOCAL AUTHORITIES GET OFF?
UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 04 M S O 035961
OCW
STATE FOR EUR/ISCA AND S/NIS-C/CAESAR
STATE PASS OPIC FOR RIORDAN
SECDEF CABLES PASS TO ASD CARTER IN SECDEF'S PARTY
OSD/ISP FOR DASD SHERWOOD AND SALLY HORN AND MOORE
OSD/ATSD (AE) FOR MG (RET) LAJOIE AND JOHN RUBERTO
NSC FOR BURNS
DNA FOR SCOTT MORTON AND MIKE HALL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Page 4 of 8
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD010\DEC94\MSGS\MI414024.html
COMMERCE
COMMERCE
COMMERCE
COMMERCE
FOR
FOR
FOR
FOR
Page 5 of 8
BXA/DUS BCARTER/DSTANTON/JISBELL/DHURLEY
3312/USFCS/010/WIS/GKNOWLES
4213/IEP/EUR/RISM/JBROUGHER
ITA/US/JKALICKI
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: EIND, ECON, EFIN, BEXP, BMGT, PARM, RS
SUBJECT: DEFENSE CONVERSION WORKING GROUP MEETINGS WITH
MIRONOV OF MOD: THREATS, LIES AND RED TAPE
5. AFTER RIORDAN EXPLAINED THAT THE CONFERENCE WAS
DONE AT THE INITIATIVE OF THE CONSULATE WORKING VERY
CLOSELY WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES, MIRONOV REASSERTED THAT
THE CONFERENCE WOULD NOT TAKE PLACE AND THAT LOCAL
AUTHORITIES HAVE NO COMPETENCE TO AUTHORIZE IT, ONLY
THE MOD AND STATE COMMITTEE ON DEFENSE INDUSTRY MAY DO
SO. HE THEN ASKED THE U.S. SIDE TO "IMAGINE WHAT WOULD
HAPPEN I F VLADIVOSTOK OR YEKATERINBURG DECLARED
INDEPENDENCE" AND'CONCLUDED IN THIS VEIN THAT RUSSIA
MUST SOLVE ITS PROBLEMS IN ITS OWN WAY AND DOES NOT
WANT "ANOTHER CHECHENYA OR CAUCASUS WAR."
6. SHORTLY THEREAFTER MIRONOV SAID THAT WE SHOULD
CLOSE ON THE URALS DAY SUBJECT AND ASSERTED THAT DEPUTY
DEFENSE BUSINESS DIRECTORIES VIOLATE "LAW"
1
8. DURING THE DISCUSSION OF USDOC S GCC-APPROVED
PROJECT TO PREPARE RUSSIAN DEFENSE CONVERSION BUSINESS
DIRECTORIES FOR EVENTUAL RUSSIAN APPROVAL AND EVENTUAL
PUBLICATION, MIRONOV SAID THAT 90 PERCENT (LATER
LOWERED TO 80 PERCENT) OF WHAT IS IN THE DIRECTORIES
ALREADY PUBLISHED VIOLATES RUSSIAN LAW. SAYING THAT
THE GOR CANNOT N W TAKE PART IN SUCH A PROJECT (IN
O
LARGE PART DUE TO THE THREAT FROM UNNAMED DARK FORCES)
MIRONOV FIRST SUGGESTED THAT THE U.S. PUBLISH THE NEXT
VOLUMES OF THE DIRECTORY UNILATERALLY AND WITHOUT
REFERENCE TO THE GOR. HE THEN ADDED THAT MOST OF THE
INFORMATION IN THE UPCOMING DIRECTORIES IS RESTRICTED
UNDER RUSSIAN LAW AND THAT THERE IS "SOME QUESTION OF
H W THE U.S. GOT I T . " REPRESENTING HIMSELF AS A
O
CONCILIATORY FORCE, MIRONOV THEN SAID THAT EVEN THE
NAME OF A DEFENSE FIRM OR THE BUSINESS CARD OF A
DIRECTOR CANNOT LEGALLY BE PUBLISHED, BUT THAT HE
RECOGNIZES THAT THIS IS ILLOGICAL AND THAT SUCH AN
APPROACH IS "THE WAY TO SELF-DESTRUCTION" AND THE DEATH
OF RUSSIAN DEFENSE FIRMS. MIRONOV ASKED THAT WE HAVE
PRESIDENT CLINTON DISCUSS THIS ISSUE. WHEN HORN NOTED
THAT SHE WOULD TRY TO RAISEINFORMATION RESTRICTIONS IN THE GCC CONTEXT, MIRO
SAID HE AGREED ELEVATION AT THE GCC WOULD BE HELPFUL.
9. WHEN THE TALKS RETURNED TO THE BUSINESS DIRECTORIES
ON THE SECOND DAY, MIRONOV TOOK A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT
TACK, ARGUING THAT WE SHOULD WAIT UNTIL THE DIRECTORY
�F:\Cable\Data Soiirce\Cables\CD010\DEC94\MSGS\M1414024.html
ALREADY PUBLISHED "PRODUCED" SUBSTANTIAL INVESTMENTS
BEFORE PUBLISHING FURTHER DIRECTORIES. LATER, WHEN
HORN PRESSED ON THE SUBJECT OF RUSSIAN LAWS PROHIBITING
RELEASING SUCH INFORMATION, MIRONOV SAID THAT THE U.S.
SIDE COULD HAVE COPIES OF THESE LAWS. AFTER FURTHER
QUESTIONING, I T BECAME VERY UNCLEAR WHETHER OLD SOVIET
LAW, CURRENT RUSSIAN REGULATIONS OR PROPOSED
LEGISLATION RESTRICTS RELEASE OF BASIC INFORMATION ON
THE LOCATION, PERSONNEL, EXPERIENCE AND CAPABILITIES OF
RUSSIAN DEFENSE ENTERPRISES. SAYING THAT HE
UNDERSTANDS SUCH A SITUATION IS HARD FOR INVESTORS,
MIRONOV AGAIN ARGUED THAT THE SOLUTION IS FOR U.S.
INVESTORS TO GIVE MOD THEIR REQUIREMENTS SO THAT MOD
CAN PAIR THEM UP WITH APPROPRIATE FIRMS. AT THIS POINT
HORN RESPONDED FORCEFULLY THAT FROM THE BEGINNING OF
THE GCC PROCESS WE HAVE BELIEVED THAT OUR COOPERATION
IN DEFENSE CONVERSION IS BASED IN THE RUSSIAN DESIRE TO
RUSSIA" IS INTERESTED IN MOVING FROM CONTROL BY
GOVERNMENTS TO CONTROL BY MARKETS RATHER THAN THE
"COMMAND" APPROACH MIRONOV WAS ADVOCATING. (NOTE.
DESPITE FURTHER EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION ON THE
DIRECTORIES, THIS ISSUE REMAINS FOR BARRY CARTER TO TRY
TO RESOLVE AT HIGHER LEVELS. END NOTE.)
UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 04 M S O 035961
OCW
STATE FOR EUR/ISCA AND S/NIS-C/CAESAR
STATE PASS OPIC FOR RIORDAN
SECDEF CABLES PASS TO ASD CARTER IN SECDEF S PARTY
1
OSD/ISP FOR DASD SHERWOOD AND SALLY HORN AND MOORE
OSD/ATSD (AE) FOR MG (RET) LAJOIE AND JOHN RUBERTO
NSC FOR BURNS
DNA FOR SCOTT MORTON AND MIKE HALL
COMMERCE
COMMERCE
COMMERCE
COMMERCE
FOR
FOR
FOR
FOR
BXA/DUS BCARTER/DSTANTON/JISBELL/DHURLEY
3312/USFCS/010/WIS/GKNOWLES
4213/IEP/EUR/RISM/JBROUGHER
ITA/US/JKALICKI
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: EIND, ECON, EFIN, BEXP, BMGT, PARM, RS
SUBJECT: DEFENSE CONVERSION WORKING GROUP MEETINGS WITH
MIRONOV OF MOD: THREATS, LIES AND RED TAPE
AND WE CAN PICK SABIT CANDIDATES TOO
10. ON USDOC'S SABIT PROGRAM FOR PRACTICAL TRAINING OF
RUSSIAN DEFENSE INDUSTRY PERSONNEL, MIRONOV TOOK A
DISMISSIVE ATTITUDE FROM THE OUTSET, ASKING, "DO YOU
K O H W MANY COURSES FROM THE U.S. WE HAVE TAKEN?" HE
NW O
SAID THAT OF COURSE SUCH THINGS ARE NOT USELESS, BUT
CLOSE TO USELESS. HE THEN PROPOSED THAT WE (THE
COMMITTEE) SPEND THE MONEY THE U.S. HAS FOR THE SABIT
PROGRAM ON SOMETHING ELSE. AFTER HORN'S RESPONSE
Page 6 ofS
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EXPLAINING THE PROGRAM'S NATURE AND THE UTILITY OF SUCH
APPROACHES IN LEVERAGING LIMITED U.S. DEFENSE
CONVERSION FUNDS, MIRONOV PROPOSED THAT SUCH A PROGRAM
COULD GO FORWARD, BUT WITH THE COMMITTEE OR THE GOR
PICKI
NG THE SABIT GRANTEES. HORN THEN NOTED THAT THIS
IS CONTRARY TO THE SABIT APPROACH AND THAT PERHAPS
FURTHER DISCUSSION WOULD HAVE TO AWAIT BARRY CARTER'S
ARRIVAL.
A DISCUSSION THEN ENSUED REGARDING THE
POSSIBILITY OF LETTING THE U.S. FIRM PROPOSE THE
CANDIDATE AND THE GOR EXERCISE THE RIGHT TO APPROVE OR
REJECT THE INDIVIDUAL. MIRONOV INDICATED THIS MIGHT BE
ACCEPTABLE.
ON DAY TWO, THE TALKS RETURNED TO SABIT,
AND HORN EXPLAINED THAT THE PROGRAM COULD STRESS THE
LIST OF 82, BUT THAT COULD NOT BE ITS ENTIRE MANDATE.
MIRONOV THEN RESPONDED THAT IN THAT CASE, " E WOULD
W
LIKE TO THANK COMMERCE FOR ITS PROPOSAL, BUT I T CANNOT
BE IN THE REPORT." HE ADDED THAT KOKOSHIN COULD NOT
CHANGE THIS OUTCOME. THE U.S. SIDE THEN INDICATED THAT
BARRY CARTER WOULD RAISE THIS ISSUE DURING HIS MEETINGS
AT HIGHER LEVELS.
OH, BARRY CARTER IS COMING?
11. DESPITE DETAILED DISCUSSIONS ON DECEMBER 12 (WITH
MIRONOV) OF BARRY CARTER'S IMPENDING ARRIVAL AND DESIRE
TO MEET WITH EITHER RUSSIAN DEFENSE CONVERSION
COMMITTEE CHAIR KOKOSHIN OR VICE-CHAIR MIKHAILOV ON THE
14TH, AT THE END OF THE WORKING GROUPS MEETINGS ON THE
DECEMBER 13, MIRONOV CLAIMED TO K O NOTHING OF
NW
CARTER'S PLANS OR WISHES FOR DECEMBER 14. AFTER EMBOFF
RECOUNTED HIS EARLIER DISCUSSION ON DECEMBER 9 WITH
RECOUNTED HIS EARLIER DISCUSSION ON DECEMBER 9 WITH
KUZIN REGARDING CARTER'S REQUEST FOR JUST SUCH A
MEETING ON THE 14TH, KUZIN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SUCH A
CONVERSATION ALSO TOOK PLACE. LIKEWISE A DIPLOMATIC
NOTE WAS SENT REGARDING THIS REQUESTED MEETING, BUT
MIRONOV DID NOT ACKNOWLEDGE ITS RECEIPT, ALTHOUGH
EMBASSY WAS ABLE TO PROVIDE ITS NUMBER AND TIME OF
DELIVERY. (COMMENT. ALTHOUGH W INFORMED MIRONOV
E
DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY OF CARTER'S PLA-NS AT LEAST
THREE TIMES, HE SHAMELESSLY DENIED HVING BEEN
INFORMED. WHILE NOT SUBSTANTIVELY OF GREAT
SIGNIFICANCE, THIS STORY STRUCK THE U.S. SIDE AS A GOOD
ILLUSTRATION OF MIRONOV'S BEHAVIOR. END COMMENT.)
FURTHER MEETINGS ON THE REPORT ARE EXPECTED ON DECEMBER
14 AND POSSIBLY 15 IN PREPARATION FOR THE DEFENSE
CONVERSION COMMITTEE'S REPORT TO THE GCC ON DECEMBER
16 .
PICKERING
BT
#5961
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Page 7 ofS
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NNNN
SECT:
SECTION: 01 OF 04
<'SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 04
< SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 04
< SECT>SECTION: 04 OF 04
A
A
SSN: 5 9 6 1
< SSN>5961
< SSN>5961
< SSN>5961
A
A
A
TOR:
941214083147 M1414024
< TOR>941214083149 M1414025
< TOR>941214083252 M1414027
< TOR>941214083354 M1414028
A
A
A
DIST:
S I T : BRANSCUM NSC PONEMAN
Pa-e 8 of 8
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CDO 10\DEC94\MSGS\M 1418799.html
Cable
PREC
IMMEDIATE
CLASS
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161328Z DEC 94
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8 2 0 1
RUCPDC/USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
GCC I V : ENERGY COMMITTEE MEETING ON
TEXT
UNCLAS SECTION 0 1 OF 02 MOSCOW 036299
DEPT PLS PASS TO DOE FOR WHITE/GODLEY/ERVIN/BERLS
DEPT PLS PASS USDOC KALICKI/BROUGHER/YANCIK
DEPT PLS PASS TO US EX-IM BANK FOR MORAN/GLAZER
WHITE HOUSE FOR FUERTH
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: ENRG, EPET, EINV, ETRD, PREL, RS
SUBJECT: GCC I V : ENERGY COMMITTEE MEETING ON
CONVENTIONAL ENERGY
SUMMARY
1.
THE FOURTH GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN COMMISSION BEGAN ON
DECEMBER 15 WITH A DISCUSSION OF CONVENTIONAL ENERGY BY
THE ENERGY COMMITTEE.
SECRETARY O'LEARY AND MINISTER
SHAFRANIK CITED THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JOINTLYSPONSORED ENERGY AND LAW CONFERENCE (HELD I N MOSCOW I N
NOVEMBER) AND THE CREATION OF THE RUSSIAN-AMERICAN
PETROLEUM CLUB AS MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE
COMMITTEE SINCE THE LAST COMMISSION MEETING I N JUNE.
VICE PRESIDENT GORE URGED THE DUMA TO INCORPORATE THE
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CONFERENCE I N LEGISLATION ON
PRODUCTION SHARING AGREEMENTS NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION.
SHAFRANIK ANNOUNCED THAT A PACKAGE OF GOVERNMENT
DECREES WOULD BE ISSUED I N THE NEAR FUTURE SUPPORTING
THE USE OF EFFICIENT TECHNOLOGIES.
HE ALSO SAID THAT
RUSSIA WOULD SIGN THE EUROPEAN ENERGY TREATY AND THAT
I T WOULD LEAD TO GREATER CLARITY OF INVESTMENT RULES.
END SUMMARY.
O'LEARY: SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS ON ENERGY EFFICIENCY
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2. THE FOURTH GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN COMMISSION (GCC)
MEETING GOT UNDERWAY ON DECEMBER 15 WITH PRESENTATIONS
ON CONVENTIONAL ENERGY BY SECRETARY OF ENERGY HAZEL
O'LEARY, MINISTER OF FUELS AND ENERGY YURI SHAFRANIK,
AND USAID DEPUTY DIRECTOR TOM DINE. SECRETARY O'LEARY
BEGAN BY CITING THE PROGRESS THAT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED IN
THE AREA OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY, IN PARTICULAR THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF TWO PARTIALLY U.S.-FUNDED
DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS IN DISTRICT HEATING PLANTS. SHE
STATED THAT THE POTENTIAL FOR ENERGY SAVINGS RESULTING
FROM THE INSTALLATION OF ENERGY EFFICIENT CONTROLS IN
SIMILAR PLANTS THROUGHOUT RUSSIA WAS ENORMOUS:
APPROXIMATELY 5 BILLION CUBIC METERS OF GAS ANNUALLY.
ANOTHER THREE PROJECTS, SHE NOTED, HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED
AS CANDIDATES FOR PARTIAL FUNDING BY U.S. GRANTS AND
WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN IN THE NEAR FUTURE. ANOTHER
EXAMPLE OF ENERGY SAVINGS PROGRAMS BEING JOINTLY
DEVELOPED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE MINISTRY
OF FUELS AND ENERGY, SHE SAID, WAS THE DRAFTING OF
EFFICIENCY STANDARDS FOR THE MANUFACTURE OF ELECTRIC
APPLIANCES.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN THE OIL AND GAS AREA
3. ON OIL AND GAS ISSUES, SECRETARY O'LEARY REFERRED
TO TWO MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE
SINCE THE LAST GCC MEETING IN JUNE: THE CREATION OF A
RUSSIAN-AMERICAN PETROLEUM CLUB, AND THE CONVENING OF
THE JOINTLY-SPONSORED ENERGY AND LAW CONFERENCE IN
M S O IN NOVEMBER. THE PETROLEUM CLUB, SHE SAID,
OCW
AFFORDED OIL COMPANIES AN OFFICIALLY-RECOGNIZED CHANNEL
FOR COMMUNICATING THEIR VIEWS ON LEGISLATION AND
REGULATORY CHANGES TO THE GOVERNMENT AMD THE DUMA. AS FOR THE ENERGY AMD LAW
RECOMMENDATIONS THAT UNDERPIN DOE AND MINISTRY OF FUELS
AND ENERGY INITIATIVES IN SUPPORT OF LEGISLATIVE ACTION
ON MATTERS SUCH AS PRODUCTION SHARING AGREEMENTS.
SECRETARY O'LEARY TOLD PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN THAT
EXECUTIVES OF U.S. OIL COMPANIES HAD EXPRESSED TO HER
THEIR APPRECIATION FOR HIS GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS TO
ALLEVIATE THE TAX AND REGULATORY BURDEN ON U.S. OIL
COMPANIES OPERATING IN RUSSIA.
USAID: USD 77 MILLION IN PROJECT FUNDING APPROVED
4. TOM DINE GAVE AN OVERVIEW OF USAID PROGRAMS IN THE
ENERGY SECTOR, NOTING THE PROGRESS THAT HAD BEEN MADE
ON THE JOINT ENERGY ALTERNATIVES
STUDY (JEAS) SINCE THE
LAST GCC MEETING. WHILE THERE WAS STILL W R TO BE
OK
DONE ON INTEGRATING THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE NUCLEAR AND
NON-NUCLEAR ELECTRIC UTILITY STUDY GROUPS, THE PROBLEM
OF DISCREPANCIES OF DATA HAD BEEN RESOLVED. A FINAL
REPORT, HE STATED, WOULD BE PRESENTED AT THE NEXT GCC
MEETING. TURNING TO THE COMMODITY IMPORT PROGRAM
(CIP), HE SAID THAT USAID HAD RECEIVED MORE THAN 200
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PROPOSALS AGGREGATING USD 850 MILLION -- MORE THAN TEN
TIMES THE AVAILABLE FUNDS. FIFTY PROPOSALS TOTALLING
USD 77 MILLION HAD BEEN APPROVED, COVERING PROJECTS IN
THE AREAS OF ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING, ENERGY
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 M S O 036299
OCW
DEPT PLS PASS TO DOE FOR WHITE/GODLEY/ERVIN/BERLS
DEPT PLS PASS USDOC KALICKI/BROUGHER/YANCIK
DEPT PLS PASS TO US EX-IM BANK FOR MOR.AN/GLAZER
WHITE HOUSE FOR FUERTH
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: ENRG, EPET, EINV, ETRD, PREL, RS
SUBJECT: GCC IV: ENERGY COMMITTEE MEETING ON
CONVENTIONAL ENERGY
EFFICIENCY, COAL MINING SAFETY, AND ELECTRIC POWER
RESTRUCTURING. THE ELECTRIC POWER RESTRUCTURING STUDY,
WHICH HE SAID WAS NEARING CONCLUSION, WOULD BE
PARTICULARLY HELPFUL IN ATTRACTING FOREIGN INVESTMENT
TO THE SECTOR AND IN OBTAINING WORLD BANK FUNDING.
SHAFRANIK ECHOES U.S. VIEWS ON ACCOMPLISHMENTS
5. SPEAKING FOR THE RUSSIAN SIDE, MINISTER SHAFRANIK
COMMENTED ON THE SUCCESS OF THE GCC ENERGY COMMITTEE
SINCE ITS CREATION. HE UNDERSCORED SECRETARY 0'LEARY S
REMARKS, SAYING THE RUSSIAN-AMERICAN PETROLEUM CLUB AND
THE ENERGY AND LAW CONFERENCE WERE MAJOR
ACCOMPLISHMENTS. THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ENERGY AND
LAW CONFERENCE WERE N W UNDER ADVISEMENT BY THE DUMA,
O
WHICH IS CONSIDERING BILLS ON PRODUCTION SHARING
AGREEMENTS, OIL AND GAS, AND OTHER ENERGY-RELATED
MATTERS. THE CONFERENCE'S RECOMMENDATIONS ON TOPICS
SUCH AS TRANSPORTATION OF CRUDE OIL AND LIBERALIZATION
OF THE TAX REGIME WOULD ALSO VERY LIKELY INFLUENCE THE
DUMA. THE RUSSIAN-AMERICAN PETROLEUM CLUB, HE SAID,
WOULD ACT AS THE "IMPLEMENTING AGENCY" FOR THE
INDUSTRY'S VIEWS ON ALL RELEVANT LEGISLATION AND
REGULATIONS. RUSSIA'S DECISION TO SIGN THE EUROPEAN
ENERGY CHARTER TREATY, HE NOTED, WAS OF MAJOR
IMPORTANCE SINCE I T WOULD RESULT IN GREATER CLARITY OF
THE RULES FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE RUSSIAN ENERGY
SECTOR.
1
ISSUANCE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY DECREES IMMINENT
6. REGARDING ENERGY EFFICIENCY, SHAFRANIK TOLD THE
COMMISSION TO EXPECT THE ISSUANCE OF A PACKAGE OF
GOVERNMENT DECREES AND REGULATIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE
SUPPORTING THE USE OF ENERGY EFFICIENT TECHNOLOGY.
WORK WAS ALSO PROCEEDING, HE SAID, ON STANDARDS FOR
PIPELINES AND MACHINERY, AND ON THE CREATION OF MORE
JOINT VENTURES IN THE FIELD OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY.
THESE EFFORTS, HE STRESSED, SHOULD BE FOCUSED ON
�F:\Cable\Data_Soiirce\Cables\CD010\DEC94\MSGS\M1418799.html
IMPLEMENTING SPECIFIC PROJECTS. FINALLY, SHAFRANIK
SAID HE HOPED THAT THE ENERGY COMMITTEE COULD DEVELOP
ADDITIONAL PROJECTS I N THIRD COUNTRIES.
GORE: "EXTREMELY IMPRESSED"
7. CONCLUDING THE CONVENTIONAL ENERGY PORTION OF THE
MEETING, VICE PRESIDENT GORE COMPLIMENTED MINISTER
SHAFRANIK AND SECRETARY O'LEARY FOR THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF
THE ENERGY COMMITTEE. GORE SAID THAT HE HAD PERSONALLY
REVIEWED THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE ENERGY AND LAW
CONFERENCE WITH RESPECT TO PRODUCTION SHARING
AGREEMENTS AND HAD BEEN "EXTREMELY IMPRESSED." HE
EXPRESSED HIS HOPE THAT THE DUMA WOULD ADOPT THOSE
RECOMMENDATIONS AND PASS A "WORLD-CLASS" LAW.
PICKERING
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
RUEHC
172048Z DEC 94
SECSTATE WASHDC
AMEMBASSY M S O NIACT IMMEDIATE 4522
OCW
////
LETTER FROM SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER TO FOREIGN
MINISTER KOZYREV
TEXT:
6 D C R E T STATE 334992
NODIS
E.O. 12355: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (CHRISTOPHER, WARREN), PREL, RS
SUBJECT: LETTER FROM SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER TO FOREIGN
MINISTER KOZYREV
1.-ShLkbT/NOUlS - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. PARAGRAPH THREE CONTAINS THE TEXT OF A LETTER FROM
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER TO FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV URGIN6
THE RUSSIANS TO ATTEND A MEETING AT THE HAGUE ON
PLANNING TO STRENGTHEN UNPROFOR. EMBASSY M S O SHOULD
OCW
DELIVER THIS MESSA6E ASAP. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL
FOLLOW.
3. BEGIN TEXT OF CHRISTOPHER LETTER TO KOZYREV:
DEAR ANDREY:
I HAVE HEARD FROM THE VICE PRESIDENT ABOUT THE
IMPORTANT RESULTS OF HIS VISIT AND WANT TO EXPRESS
APPRECIATION FOR THE KEY ROLE THAT YOU AND THE FOREIGN
MINISTRY PLAYED IN MAKING THE VISIT A SUCCESS. THE
PER E.0.13526
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD010\DEC94\MSGS\M1421218.html
VISIT CLEARLY PRODUCED PROGRESS ON THE ISSUES OF
EUROPEAN SECURITY AND FURTHER DEVELOPED OUR BILATERAL
RELATIONSHIP ON THE RANGE OF MATTERS ADDRESSED BY THE
GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN COMMISSION.
AS YOU NOTED IN BUDAPEST, AND AS PRESIDENT YELTSIN
AND THE VICE PRESIDENT AGREED, W SHOULD N W DEEPEN OUR
E
O
DIALOGUE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY. I WOULD SUGGEST GETTING
TOGETHER AT OUR MUTUAL CONVENIENCE NEXT MONTH TO
CONTINUE THIS WORK AS WELL AS TO REVIEW OTHER ASPECTS OF
OUR RELATIONSHIP. I AM REVIEWING MY SCHEDULE AND WILL
GET BACK TO YOU SHORTLY WITH SUGGESTIONS ON A TIME AND
PLACE FOR AN EXTENDED DISCUSSION.
BOSNIA REMAINS AN IMPORTANT ISSUE, INCLUDING IN OUR
BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. AS YOU KNOW, THE UNPROFOR
CONTRIBUTING NATIONS HAVE ASKED THEIR MILITARY LEADERS
TO MEET IN THE HAGUE TO CONSIDER H W TO STRENGTHEN
O
UNPROFOR'S ROLE. W VERY MUCH HOPE THAT RUSSIA WILL BE
E
REPRESENTED AND I K O AN INVITATION HAS BEEN EXTENDED
NW
TO MINISTER GRACHEV AND GENERAL KALESHNIKOV. THE UNITED
STATES WILL BE REPRESENTED BY THE CHAIRMAN OF OUR JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF, GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI. ANDREY, I SEE
THIS AS A VERY IMPORTANT MEETING. AUTHORITATIVE,
HIGH-LEVEL MILITARY RUSSIAN REPRESENTATION FROM MOSCOW
IS CRUCIAL. I HOPE YOU WILL ENCOURAGE THE MINISTRY OF
DEFENSE TO SEND A SUITABLE DELEGATION.
IN CLOSING, I WANT TO AGAIN THANK YOU FOR YOUR ROLE
IN MAKING THE MEETINGS IN M S O A SUCCESS AND LOOK
OCW
FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOU CLOSELY ON EUROPEAN
SECURITY, THE WORK OF UNPROFOR, AND THE ENTIRE RANGE OF
ISSUES. CLOSE CONSULTATION BETWEEN US REMAINS ESSENTIAL
TO SUCCESSFULLY MANAGE THESE ISSUES.
SINCERELY
WARREN CHRISTOPHER
HIS EXCELLENCY
ANDREY KOZYREV,
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION,
MOSCOW.
END TEXT.
CHRISTOPHER
BT
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941217162033 M1421218
PRT: FUERTH SIT
SIT: BEERS BRANSCUM BURNS FORSYTHE SAUNDERS STERN SUM SUM2 WHSR_SPECIAL
WISE
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RAAUZYUW RUEHMOA6415 3531240-UUUU--RHEHAAA.
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 191240Z DEC 94
FM AMEMBASSY M S O
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RUEHMO
191240Z DEC 94
AMEMBASSY M S O
OCW
RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8259
INFO: ////
SUBJ:
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE REPORT TO
THE FOURTH MEETING OF THE GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN COMMISSION
DECEMBER 15, 1994
TEXT:
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 M S O 0364 15
OCW
DEPT FOR OES/SCP AND EUR/ISCA
WHITEHOUSE FOR OSTP
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KGCC, TSPL, US, RS
SUBJECT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE REPORT TO
THE FOURTH MEETING OF THE GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN COMMISSION
DECEMBER 15, 1994
1. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE ENERGY COMMITTEE REPORTS,
PRIME MINISTER VIKTOR CHERNOMYRDIN GAVE THE FLOOR TO
MINISTER OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION BORIS SALTYKOV. SALTYKOV
CHARACTERIZED THE S&T COMMITTEE'S PRINCIPAL MISSION AS
TWO-FOLD: FIRST, TO IDENTIFY AND FOSTER JOINT WORK IN
LARGE RESEARCH PROJECTS; AND ,SECOND, TO DEVELOP A
MECHANISM THAT WILL SOLVE ADMINISTRATIVE AND OTHER
BARRIERS TO S&T COOPERATION. SUCH A MECHANISM WOULD
BE USEFUL IN RESOLVING ISSUES IN THE AREAS OF
TAXATION, CUSTOMS DUTIES, AND OTHERS, ACCORDING TO
SALTYKOV.
2. SALTYKOV STRESSED THE USEFUL ROLE THE S&T
COMMITTEE HAS PLAYED IN ASSISTING JOINT U.S.-RUSSIAN
COOPERATION OUTSIDE BASIC RESEARCH, SUCH AS ON ENERGY
EFFICIENCY, AN (ENVIRONMENTAL) PROJECT ON LAKE BAIKAL,
AND ON SPACE RESEARCH. HE BRIEFLY NOTED THAT THE
COMMITTEE HAD NOT APPROVED A JOINT RESEARCH PROJECT IN
INDUSTRIAL USES OF NANODIAMONDS AND IN FREE ELECTRON
LASERS, BUT ALLOWED THAT THE COMMITTEE CANNOT APPROVE
ALL PROPOSALS.
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3. SALTYKOV STATED THAT THE COMMITTEE WILL HAVE TWO
DOCUMENTS READY FOR SIGNATURE AT THE SIGNING CEREMONY:
A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON "ACOUSTIC THERMOMETRY
OF OCEAN CLIMATE" (ATOC), AND A STATEMENT OF INTENT ON
ESTABLISHING A U.S.-RUSSIAN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH CENTER
IN MOSCOW. HE PRAISED THE WORK OF THE JOINT WORKING
GROUP ON GENERAL PROBLEMS OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
COOPERATION, WHICH HELD ITS FIRST MEETING DECEMBER 1
AND 2, 1994, AND WHICH HAD IDENTIFIED A POSSIBLE
MECHANISM TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF ACCESS TO AREAS THAT
ARE OF CONCERN FOR NATIONAL SECURITY REASONS.
4. MINISTER SALTYKOV ENDED HIS PRESENTATION BY ASKING
THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE VICE PRESIDENT TO HELP
RESOLVE T O QUESTIONS: FIRST, WHETHER EQUIPMENT
W
BROUGHT INTO RUSSIA ON A TEMPORARY BASIS, TO BE
EMPLOYED PURSUANT TO A JOINT S&T COOPERATION
AGREEMENT, CAN BE FREED FROM TARIFFS, CUSTOMS DUTIES,
AND TAXES. SECOND, WHETHER ACCESS TO MULTIPLE ENTRY
VISAS COULD BE FACILITATED FOR SCIENTISTS WORKING
UNDER COOPERATIVE S&T PROGRAMS.
5. THE FLOOR WAS THEN GIVEN TO DR. JOHN GIBBONS,
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR SCIENCE . N TECHNOLOGY
AD
POLICY, AND CO-CHAIRMAN OF THE S&T COMMITTEE. DR.
GIBBONS BEGAN BY JOINING MINISTER SALTYKOV IN PRAISING
THE WORK OF THE WORKING GROUP ON GENERAL PROBLEMS, AND
THANKING WORKING GROUP CO-CHAIRS ROBERT CLARKE OF NASA
AND ZURAB YAKOBASHVILI, DEPUTY MINISTER AT MINSCI, FOR
THEIR EFFORTS. DR. GIBBONS STATED THAT PROGRESS WAS
BEING MADE IN MANY AREAS IDENTIFIED BY THE GROUP,
INCLUDING TAXES AND TARIFFS, IPR, ACCESS TO SENSITIVE
AREAS, AND MULTIPLE ENTRY VISA ISSUANCE.
6. DR. GIBBONS BRIEFLY DESCRIBED THE ATOC AGREEMENT
NOTING IN PARTICULAR THAT THE COOPERATION CALLS FOR
JOINT DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EXPERIMENTS
USING SENSITIVE NAVY EQUIPMENT. THE EXPERIMENTS
(WHICH ARE BASED ON SONAR DEVICES), DR. GIBBONS
CONTINUED, WILL ALLOW RESEARCHERS TO DETERMINE CHANGES
IN THE OCEANS' AVERAGE TEMPERATURE, ALLOWING O
R
SENSITIVE MEASURES OF GLOBAL CHANGE. THE AGREEMENT
WAS INITIALLED BY DRS. GIBBONS AND SALTYKOV LAST WEEK,
AND WILL BE SIGNED BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PERRY AND
DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER KOKOSHIN, REPRESENTING THE
EXECUTIVE AGENTS, AND MINISTER OF SCIENCE SALTYKOV.
7. DR. GIBBONS UNDERSCORED THE IMPORTANT ROLE THE
JOINT BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH CENTER WILL PLAY IN
DEVELOPING BIOTECHNOLOGY, BIOMEDICAL INFORMATION, ETC.
HE ALSO NOTED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TELECOMMUNICATION
STATEMENT AS THE FIRST STEP IN A PROGRAM TO EXPAND
COOPERATION IN THIS AREA, TO IDENTIFY AREAS FOR
IMPROVEMENT, AND TO EN
COURAGE PRIVATE SECTOR
INVESTMENT.
8.
DR. GIBBONS BRIEFLY COMMENTED ON THE DECISION NOT
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TO INITIATE FORMAL COOPERATION UNDER THE S&T COMMITTEE
ON FREE ELECTRON LASERS AS A GOOD EXAMPLE OF HOW THE
COMMITTEE HAS THE EXPERTISE TO FAIRLY AND THOROUGHLY
REVIEW A LARGE AREA OF SCIENCE, AND STILL REMAIN
CONSCIOUS OF ITS RESPONSIBILITY TO PRIORITIZE IN THE
FACE OF FUNDING CUTBACKS.
9. DR. GIBBONS HIGHLIGHTED THREE OF THE SEVEN
AGREEMENTS UNDER THE S&T COMMITTEE'S PURVIEW: THE
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 M S O 036415
OCW
DEPT FOR OES/SCP AND EUR/ISCA
WHITEHOUSE FOR OSTP
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KGCC, TSPL, US, RS
SUBJECT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE REPORT TO
THE FOURTH MEETING OF THE GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN COMMISSION
DECEMBER 15, 1994
JUNE 1994 AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S. MATERIALS
MANAGEMENT SERVICE AND THE RUSSIAN COMMITTEE ON
UNDERGROUND RESOURCES, WHICH ASSISTS IN DEVELOPING OIL
AND GAS RESOURCES IN AN ENVIRONMENTALLY - SAFE MANNER.
AN ANNEX TO THAT AGREEMENT, SIGNED AUGUST 1994, IN THE
CHUCHKI SEA, DR. GIBBONS ADDED. DR. GIBBONS ALSO
HIGHLIGHTED THE TRANSPORTATION SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
AGREEMENT, UNDER WHICH A JOINT HIGHWAY REHABILITATION
PROJECT IS PLANNED THAT, IN TURN, FACILITATED A $350
MILLION LOAN FROM THE WORLD BANK. DR. GIBBONS STATED
THIS WAS A GOOD EXAMPLE OF S&T CONTRIBUTING TO THE
OVERALL MISSION OF THE GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN COMMISSION.
FINALLY, DR. GIBBONS HIGHLIGHTED THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY AND THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES/UNDERGROUND RESOURCES COMMITTEE AS ASSISTING
EFFORTS TO SAFELY DISPOSE OF NUCLEAR WASTES.
10. DR. GIBBONS ENDED HIS PRESENTATION BY COMMENTING
ON HIS VISIT TO THE KURCHATOV INSTITUTE DECEMBER 14.
HE STATED HE WAS IMPRESSED BY THE SECURITY UPGRADES
THE INSTITUTE HAD IN PLACE TO GUARD AGAINST THEFT OF
NUCLEAR FUEL AND. WAS IMPRESSED BY THE INSTITUTE'S
RESOURCEFULNESS IN FINDING COMMERCIAL USES FOR
ENRICHED STABLE ISOTOPES. DR. GIBBONS ALSO VISITED
THE TOKAMAK NUCLEAR REACTOR, WHERE FUSION RESEARCH IS
CONDUCTED. DR. GIBBONS MENTIONED H W IMPORTANT
O
RUSSIAN CONTRIBUTIONS ARE TO THE INTERNATIONAL FUSION
RESEARCH EFFORT.
11. THE VICE PRESIDENT THANKED DR. GIBBONS FOR HIS
REPORT AND FOR THE EXCELLENT W R OF THE S&T
OK
COMMITTEE. HE NOTED THAT THE S&T COMMITTEE CONTINUES
TO MAKE IMPORTANT PROGRESS IN ITS FIELD OF EXPERTISE,
AND, FURTHERMORE, THAT IS W R HAS HAD A DIRECT IMPACT
OK
ON ALL THE OTHER COMMITTEES. IN THIS RESPECT, THE
VICE PRESIDENT STATED THAT I T WAS DRS. GIBBONS AND
SALTYKOV'S PIONEERING W R THAT HELPED ESTABLISH THE
OK
HEALTH COMMITTEE CHAIRED BY HEALTH SECRETARY DONNA
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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SHALALA. HE WAS PERSUADED, SIMILARLY, THAT THE JOINT
STATEMENT ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS, ISSUED UNDER THE S&T
COMMITTEE'S PURVIEW, WOULD EVENTUALLY SPAWN A NEW GCC
TELECOMMUNICATION COMMITTEE. SEPARATELY, AT HIS
DECEMBER 16 PRESS CONFERENCE WITH PRIME MINISTER
CHERNOMYRDIN, VICE PRESIDENT GORE PRAISED THE WORK OF
THE S&T COMMITTEE I N MOVING FORWARD U.S.-RUSSIAN
COOPERATION I N TELECOMMUNICATIONS.
12.
PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN AGREED WITH THE VICE
PRESIDENT THAT THE S&T COMMITTEE'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE
GCC PROCESS I S COMMENDABLE. THE PRIME MINISTER
UNDERSCORED THE S&T COMMITTEE'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE
O I L AND GAS SECTOR AND GAVE HIS OPINION THAT THE JOINT
BIOMEDICAL CENTER TO BE ESTABLISHED UNDER THE S&T
COMMITTEE'S PURVIEW WILL BENEFIT RESEARCH I N MANY
AREAS, NOT ONLY THOSE I N WHICH THE MINISTRY 0 SCIENCE
I S INVOLVED.
13.
THE PRIME MINISTER ENDED THE S&T COMMITTEE'S
SESSION BY CHARGING THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE TO WORK
WITH THE MINISTRY OF SCIENCE TO DEVELOP A PROPOSAL FOR
GRANTING TAX AND DUTY-FREE ENTRY TO EQUIPMENT BROUGHT
INTO RUSSIA TEMPORARILY PURSUANT TO AN S&T COOPERATION
AGREEMENT. SIMILARLY, THE PRIME MINISTER CHARGED THE
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO DEVELOP A PROPOSAL TO
FACILITATE THE ISSUANCE OF MULTIPLE ENTRY VISAS FOR
COOPERATING SCIENTISTS.
MILES
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PREC
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CLASS
UNCLASSIFIED
LINEl
PAAUZYUW RUEHMOA6427 3531452 -UUUU--RHEHAAA.
LINE2
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
LINE 3
P 191452Z DEC 94
LINE4
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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SUBJ:
RUEHMO
191452Z DEC 94
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8 2 7 1
RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAEPA/HQ EPA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 0 2 8 1
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0359
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0847
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 04 98
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 0396
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0 3 8 1
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0573
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 0199
RUEHLN/AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 3 807
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
GCC ENVIRONMENT COMMITTEE MEETING
TEXT:
UNCLAS SECTION 0 1 OF 06 MOSCOW 036427
EPA FOR OIA (NITZE/WAXMONSKY)
STATE FOR EUR/ISCA/CAST (GORENZ) AND OES/ENV
PASS INTERIOR FOR USGS, NPS AND USFWS
DOD FOR DEPUTY U/S GOODMAN
(THOMAS)
WHITE HOUSE FOR OEP (MCGINTY) AND OVP (FUERTH)
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KGCC, SENV, KGLB, TPHY, RS
SUBJECT: GCC ENVIRONMENT COMMITTEE MEETING
REF: MOSCOW 33804
1.
SUMMARY: AT THE DECEMBER 15 GORE - CHERNOMYRDIN
COMMISSION ENVIRONMENT COMMITTEE SESSION, RUSSIAN
ENVIRONMENT MINISTER DAN ILOV - DAN ILY.AN EMPHASIZED GOR
INTEREST I N WORKING WITH THE USG ON THE EARTHQUAKE
FORECASTING SYSTEM THE RUSSIANS HAVE DEVELOPED. HE
STRESSED THAT THE SYSTEM DEPENDED ON U.S. HELP I N
PROVIDING DATA FROM OUR EARTH STATIONS TO FEED INTO
RUSSIANS OWN DATA BASE. NO MENTION, HOWEVER, WAS MADE
DURING THE COMMITTEE SESSION OF THE GOR'S PROPOSED
JOINT STATEMENT ON COOPERATION I N THIS AREA, WHICH
REFTEL EARLIER REPORTED.
THE MINISTER ATTACHED
IMPORTANCE TO THE BERINGIA PARK ISSUE AND DISCUSSED
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CLIMATE ISSUES IN BOTH THE CONTEXT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
TECHNOLOGY AND MONITORING FROM SPACE. THE USG
PRESENTATION HIGHLIGHTED OUR COOPERATION IN ARCTIC
ISSUES, INCLUDING THE ARCTIC AGREEMENT, THE TRILATERAL COOPERATION WITH NORWAY IN MURMANSK, AN UPDATE
ON THE PROGRESS OF USAID'S ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAM IN
RUSSIA AND EPA'S INTEREST IN WORKING WITH RUSSIAN?
INSTITUTES AND RESEARCHERS ON DEVELOPING BETTER
INFORMATION REGARDING ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH. END
SUMMARY.
2. THE ENVIRONMENT COMMITTEE (GCEC) REPORT AT THE
GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN COMMISSION (GCC) FOURTH SESSION TOOK
PLACE ON DECEMBER 15. PRESENTING THE COMMITTEE'S
REPORT WERE WILLIAM NITZE, ASSISTANT EPA
ADMINISTRATOR, AND JAMES NORRIS, DIRECTOR OF USAID'S
M S O MISSION. ENVIRONMENT MINISTER VIKTOR DANILOVOCW
DANILYAN MADE THE GOR'S GCEC PRESENTATION.
EPA PRESENTATION HIGHLIGHTS COMMITTEE W R
OK
3. THE ABBREVIATED MEETING, WHICH FOLLOWED THE
PREVIOUS SESSION WITHOUT INTERRUPTION, OPENED WITH
NITZE CITING PROGRESS THE COMMITTEE HAD MADE TO
FINALIZE THE NEW AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION IN THE
PREVENTION OF POLLUTION IN THE ARCTIC. SAYING THE
AGREEMENT WAS THE CULMINATION OF DISCUSSIONS BEGUN AT
THE VANCOUVER SUMMIT IN APRIL 1993, AND CONTINUED AT
THE SECOND AND THIRD GCC SESSIONS, NITZE SAID THE AIM
OF THE NEW AGREEMENT WAS TO IMPROVE OUR TWO NATIONS'
COORDINATION IN IDENTIFYING AND ANALYZING THE THREATS
TO THE ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT. HE SAID THAT, BILATERALLY
AND WITH OTHER ARCTIC NATIONS, W EXPECTED THIS
E
AGREEMENT TO BUILD A FOUNDATION FOR LONG-TERM
COLLABORATION IN THE SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT AND USE OF
THE REGION'S NATURAL RESOURCES. HE CHARACTERIZED AS
VITAL THAT W PAY CLOSE ATTENTION TO THE IMPACT ON
E
HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT. HE ALSO RAISED THE ISSUE
OF "ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE" -- THE DISPROPORTIONATE
EXPOSURE OF NORTHERN NATIVE PEOPLES TO ENVIRONMENTAL
CONTAMINATION -- AND SAID HE EXPECTED THE AGREEMENT TO
HELP US UNDERSTAND ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS THAT
THREATEN THE WELL-BEING OF NATIVE PEOPLES ON BOTH
SIDES OF THE BERING STRAIT.
4.
NITZE TOLD THE MEETING PARTICIPANTS THAT A VITAL
PART OF THE NEW ARCTIC AGENDA WAS OUR AGREEMENT TO
W R TOGETHER ON THE PROBLEM OF PROCESSING AND STORING
OK
LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTEWATER (LRW) IN THE RUSSIAN
ARCTIC. AS WAS ANNOUNCED AT THE SEPTEMBER
PRESIDENTIAL SUMMIT, THE EFFORT INVOLVED UPGRADING OF
THE ATOMFLOT LRW TREATMENT PLANT IN MURMANSK AND OUR
PROMOTION OF RUSSIAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE LONDON
CONVENTION THAT BANS DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE WASTES IN
THE OCEAN. HE CITE
D THE TRILATERAL EFFORT WITH
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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NORWAY, IN WHICH EXPERTS HAD THREE TIMES THIS YEAR AND
WERE PREPARING FOR A FOURTH MEETING EARLY IN 1995 IN
MURMANSK WITH A GOAL OF COMPLETING THE STUDY BY
SPRING. NITZE SAID I F WE DETERMINED THAT THE PROJECT
COULD BE CARRIED OUT WITHIN THE FINANCIAL PARAMETERS
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 06 M S O 036427
OCW
EPA FOR OIA (NITZE/WAXMONSKY)
STATE FOR EUR/ISCA/CAST (GORENZ) AND OES/ENV (THOMAS)
PASS INTERIOR FOR USGS, NPS AND USFWS
DOD FOR DEPUTY U/S GOODMAN
WHITE HOUSE FOR OEP (MCGINTY) AND OVP (FUERTH)
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KGCC, SENV, KGLB, TPHY, RS
SUBJECT: GCC ENVIRONMENT COMMITTEE MEETING
ALREADY DISCUSSED, AND I F THE TREATED EFFLUENT MET
ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS, THE U.S. WOULD WORK WITH
RUSSIA, NORWAY AND OTHER COUNTRIES TO FINANCE THE
EXPANSION AND UPGRADE OF THE ATOMFLOT PLANT. HE HOPED
THAT A DECISION WOULD BE READY BY THE NEXT GCC
SESSION. MEANWHILE, HE SAID WE PLANNED TO W R WITH
OK
NORWAY TO IDENTIFY SOURCES OF FUNDING FOR THE POSSIBLE
CONSTRUCTION PHASE AND TO ATTRACT DONORS IN OTHER
COUNTRIES. HE ALSO TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO REITERATE
OUR INTEREST IN HEARING ABOUT THE PROGRESS THAT RUSSIA
AND JAPAN WERE MAKING TO ADDRESS THE LRW PROBLEM IN
THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST. NITZE WAS COMPLIMENTARY ABOUT
THE COOPERATION WE HAD RECEIVED SO FAR FROM THE GOR,
THE MURMANSK REGIONAL AUTHORITIES, AND THE MURMANSK
SHIPPING COMPANY. HE EXPRESSED OPTIMISM THAT THIS
PROJECT WOULD SUCCEED IN HELPING SOLVE AN IMPORTANT
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM.
5. NITZE RAISED THE PROPOSED BERINGIA HERITAGE
INTERNATIONAL PARK. HE MENTIONED THAT THE U.S. HAD
ESTABLISHED SIMILAR BINATIONAL PARKS WITH CANADA AND
MEXICO, WHICH INVOLVED INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND
COORDINATED RESEARCH, BUT NO JOINT MANAGEMENT OR
TRANSNATIONAL AUTHORITY. HE NOTED THAT FOR THE GOR TO
ESTABLISH THE BERINGIA NATIONAL PARK ON ITS SIDE OF
THE BERING STRAIT -- EVENTUALLY FORMING THE RUSSIAN
PART . F THE BINATIONAL PARK -- COOPERATION WOULD BE
O
NECESSARY BY AUTHORITIES OF CHUKOTKA. HE ALSO
MENTIONED THAT ALASKAN NATIVE CORPORATIONS HAD
EXPRESSED CONCERNS ABOUT THE IMPACT BY SUCH A PARK ON
THEIR TRADITIONAL WAY OF LIFE.
6. TO NELP RESOLVE THE ISSUES SURROUNDING THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BINATIONAL PARK, NITZE REPORTED
THAT THE U.S. NATIONAL PARK SERVICE (NPS) HAD OFFERED
TO HOST A MEETING IN ALASKA WITHIN THE NEXT SEVERAL
MONTHS.
INVITED WOULD BE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TWO
FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS, ALASKAN AND CHUKOTKAN
AUTHORITIES, AND NATIVE ORGANIZATIONS FROM BOTH
COUNTRIES. THEY WOULD REVIEW DRAFT DOCUMENTS ABOUT
THE PARK AND CONTRIBUTE THOUGHTS ABOUT RELATED
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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LEGISLATION FOR EACH COUNTRY. EXPRESSING SUPPORT FOR
THE NPS INITIATIVE, NITZE WELCOMED GOR PARTICIPATION.
7.
TURNING TO NATURAL RESOURCES AND BIODIVERSITY,
NITZE SAID HE HAD NO DOUBT THAT TRADE AND INVESTMENT
IN NATURAL RESOURCES WOULD BE A VITAL PART OF
COMMERCIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO NATIONS FOR YEARS
TO COME. AS MUCH OF THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT THAT WAS
LIKELY TO BE MADE IN RUSSIAN NATURAL RESOURCES WOULD
BE IN THE SAME REGIONS THAT HAD THE GREATEST
ECOLOGICAL VALUE FOR RUSSIA AND FOR THE GLOBAL
ECOSYSTEM, NITZE SAID I T WAS IN THE INTEREST OF ALL
THAT THIS INVESTMENT BE ENVIRONMENTALLY RESPONSIBLE
AND SUSTAINABLE. HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT U.S. INDUSTRY
WOULD THRIVE IN AN INVESTMENT ENVIRONMENT THAT
EMPHASIZED SUSTAINABLE USE OF NATURAL RESOURCES -- FOR
THE SIMPLE REASON THAT THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION PROGRAM ALREADY COMPELLED OUR INDUSTRIES TO
DEVELOP ECOLOGICALLY SOUND PRACTICES. NITZE ARGUED
THAT THE PROPOSED JOINT STATEMENT ON NATURAL RESOURCES
WOULD AFFIRM THAT THE SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT OF
RUSSIA'S NATURAL RESOURCE BASE WAS CRITICAL NOT ONLY
TO RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC FUTURE, BUT ALSO TO THE GLOBAL
ECOLOGICAL BALANCE. NITZE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT WE
HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE A POWERFUL STATEMENT IN
SUPPORT OF CONSERVING BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY. NOTING
THAT RUSSIA AND THE USA HAD SIGNED THE BIODIVERSITY
CONVENTION, WHICH STILL AWAITED RATIFICATION BY OUR
RESPECTIVE LEGISLATURES, HE SAID THE GCEC HAD PROPOSED
A JOINT STATEMENT ENDORSING RATIFICATION OF THAT
CONVENTION BY BOTH LEGISLATURES.
HIGHLIGHTING USAID ACTIVITIES
UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 06 M S O 036427
OCW
EPA FOR OIA (NITZE/WAXMONSKY)
STATE FOR EUR/ISCA/CAST (GORENZ) AND OES/ENV (THOMAS)
PASS INTERIOR FOR USGS, NPS AND USFWS
DOD FOR DEPUTY U/S GOODMAN
WHITE HOUSE FOR OEP (MCGINTY) AND OVP (FUERTH)
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KGCC, SENV, KGLB, TPHY, RS
SUBJECT: GCC ENVIRONMENT COMMITTEE MEETING
8. USAID MISSION DIRECTOR JAMES NORR
IS INFORMED THE
GCC COMMISSION MEMBERS THAT USAID'S ENVIRONMENT
PROGRAM SUPPORTED RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION AND
COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRATIC APPROACHES BY PROMOTING A
BROAD-BASED, PUBLICLY SUPPORTED PROGRAM OF
ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT.
COMMENTING ON A USAID BROCHURE PASSED OUT AT THE
MEETING, NORR18 TOUCHED ON THE MAJOR REGIONAL
ACTIVITIES N W BEING CARRIED OUT: LAKE BAIKAL AND THE
O
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RUSSIAN FAR EAST; NOVOKUZNETSK AND NIZHNIY TAGIL IN
WESTERN SIBERIA AND THE URALS; AND VOLGOGRAD AND
M S O IN EUROPEAN RUSSIA. NORRIS HIGHLIGHTED SOME OF
OCW
THE ON-GOING PROGRAMS:
A. AT LAKE BAIKAL, THE THREE REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS HAD
AGREED TO THE PLAN TO PROTECT THE BAIKAL WATERSHED.
ACHIEVEMENTS INCLUDED ESTABLISHING WILDLIFE REFUGES
AND PARKS, DEVELOPING FOREST AND TIMBER MANAGEMENT
PLANS, DEVELOPING ECOTOURISM, INTRODUCING LESS
ENVIRONMENTALLY HARMFUL FORESTRY AND AGRICULTURAL
PRACTICES, INSTALLING ALTERNATIVE ENERGY EQUIPMENT,
AND CREATING LAND-USE DEPARTMENTS IN EACH REGIONAL
GOVERNMENT. NORRIS EXPRESSED PLEASURE THAT SEVERAL
OTHER REGIONS IN RUSSIA HAD SOUGHT ADVICE IN
REPLICATING THIS DESIGN AND THAT SIMILAR PROGRAMS HAD
BEGUN IN ALTAY AND THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST.
B. IN NIZHNIY TAGIL, NORRIS SAID THE COMMUNITY - BASED
EFFORT TO REDUCE POLLUTION-CAUSED HEALTH RISKS
EMPHASIZED ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITS AND POLLUTION
PREVENTION AT LOCAL PLANTS TO INCREASE PRODUCTION
EFFICIENCY AND CUT EMISSIONS, MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENTS
AT LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCIES, AND DEMOCRATIC
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKING.
C. IN NOVOKUZNETSK, USAID'S PROJECT WAS HELPING
REDUCE HEALTH RISKS BY CUTTING PARTICULATE EMISSIONS
FROM DISTRICT HEATING PLANTS, UPGRADING THE CITY'S
WATER TREATMENT FACILITIES, AND CONDUCTING INDUSTRIAL
AUDITS TO LEAD TO IMMEDIATE POLLUTION REDUCTIONS AND
TO INVESTMENT STRATEGIES FOR LARGE-SCALE IMPROVEMENTS.
NORRIS ALSO SAID THE PROGRAM SUPPORTED "NOVOKUZNETSK
2010," A GRASS ROOTS STRATEGY FOR ENVIRONMENTALLY
SOUND BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT THAT, WITH HELP FROM ITS
SISTER CITY, PITTSBURGH, INVOLVED PROVIDING BOTH
8TART-UP SERVICES TO ENTREPRENEURS AND MATCHMAKING
WITH U.S. FIRMS.
9. NORRIS MENTIONED THAT THE MISSION HAD RECRUITED A
SENIOR ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMIST FROM THE HARVARD
INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT TO COLLABORATE
WITH FEDERAL POLICY MAKERS, INCLUDING THE WORKING
GROUP FORMED TO IMPLEMENT PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S DECREE
ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT FOLLOWING THE RIO
CONFERENCE.
10. HE TOUCHED ON THE FACT THAT THE ENVIRONMENTAL NGO
PROGRAM HAD PROVIDED 160 GRANTS TO RUSSIAN NGOS AND 19
GRANTS TO RUSSIAN-U.S. PARTNERSHIPS FOR ACTIVITIES
LIKE ENVIRONMENTAL YOUTH CAMPS AND EDUCATIONAL
PROGRAMS, REMEDIATING POLLUTED AREAS, PROTECTING
ENDANGERED SPECIES, AND PROVIDING TRAINING IN
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT.
11. NORRIS REPORTED THAT 726 RUSSIAN ENVIRONMENTAL
SPECIALISTS HAD RECEIVED TRAINING IN SUBJECTS LIKE
ENVIRONMENTAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS, PUBLIC
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PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKING, AND
SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY; MORE THAN 400 RUSSIAN
INDIVIDUALS AND FIRMS HAD BEEN EMPLOYED TO IMPLEMENT
PROJECT ACTIVITIES; AND $29 MILLION IN ENVIRONMENTAL
MONITORING EQUIPMENT HAD BEEN AWARDED UNDER THE
COMMODITY IMPORT PROGRAM, MUCH OF WHICH WOULD DIRECTLY
COMPLEMENT AND HELP SUSTAIN THE POSITIVE RESULTS OF
ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN IN THIS PROGRAM.
UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 06 M S O 036427
OCW
EPA FOR OIA (NITZE/WAXMONSKY)
STATE FOR EUR/ISCA/CAST (GORENZ) AND OES/ENV (THOMAS)
PASS INTERIOR FOR USGS, NPS AND USFWS
DOD FOR DEPUTY U/S GOODMAN
WHITE HOUSE FOR OEP (MCGINTY) AND OVP (FUERTH)
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KGCC, SENV, KGLB, TPHY, RS
SUBJECT: GCC ENVIRONMENT COMMITTEE MEETING
12. NORRIS SAID FINALLY THAT A MEMORANDUM OF
UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT AND
USAID WAS UNDER DISCUSSION TO CONFIRM OUR MUTUAL
COMMITMENT. NORRIS CLOSED BY SAYING THAT THE
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM REFLECTED OUR SHARED
VISION -- THAT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DURING RUSSIA'S
TRANSITION TO A MARKET ECONOMY COULD BE COMPATIBLE
WITH ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION. HE HOPED FOR CONTINUED
PROGRESS AND FOR ACTIVE DISSEMINATION OF THE LESSONS
LEARNED TO OTHER AREAS OF RUSSIA.
INTEREST IN ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH
13. NITZE
SAID EPA ASCRIBED PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH ASPECTS OF OUR TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE EFFORT, SAYING THAT POLLUTION TENDED TO BE
PARTICULARLY HARMFUL TO THE MOST VULNERABLE ELEMENTS
OF SOCIETY: WOMEN, CHILDREN, AND THE ELDERLY. SINCE
DIFFICULTIES IN ACCESS TO DATA AND KEY RESEARCHERS NO
LONGER LIMITED OUR COOPERATION ON ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH
ISSUES, NITZE SAID EPA HAD CONSULTED CLOSELY WITH DHHS
REPS ON THE NEW GCC HEALTH COMMITTEE ON HOW WE MIGHT
MOVE FORWARD. AS ONE POSSIBILITY, NITZE SAID WE MIGHT
BUILD ON THE TRAINING PROGRAMS ALREADY BEGUN BY USAID
IN THE FIELD OF HEALTH-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL RISK
ASSESSMENT.
CLIMATE ISSUES
14. NITZE WELCOMED THE RUSSIAN PARLIAMENT'S DECISION
IN OCTOBER TO RATIFY THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
CLIMATE CHANGE. IN ACCORDANCE WITH PRESIDENT
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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CLINTON'S CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION PLAN, HE SAID OUR TWO
COUNTRIES WERE COLLABORATING TO IMPLEMENT THE CLIMATE
CONVENTION AND, OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS, WE WOULD
UNDERTAKE SEVERAL JOINT PROJECTS WITH AN EYE TO THE
UPCOMING BERLIN CONFERENCE OF PARTIES TO THE
CONVENTION. ONE SUCH ACTIVITY, EPA'S W R ON
OK
REFORESTATION IN THE SARATOV REGION, MIGHT SERVE AS A
PILOT FOR MORE AMBITIOUS PROJECTS UNDER THE "JOINT
IMPLEMENTATION" PROVISIONS OF THE CLIMATE CONVENTION.
NITZE SAID WE WOULD CONTINUE TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE
GCC ENERGY COMMITTEE AND WITH USAID ON ENERGY
EFFICIENCY.
15. NITZE REPORTED THAT OUR COOPERATION TO IMPLEMENT
THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL WAS GAINING MOMENTUM. EPA HAD
INCREASED ITS FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATIVE FOR OZONE LAYER PROTECTION (ICOLP), WHICH
ALLOWED WESTERN INDUSTRY TO W R DIRECTLY WITH RUSSIAN
OK
ENTERPRISES ON ALTERNATIVES TO OZONE-DEPLETING
SUBSTANCES. HE SAID EPA WOULD CONTINUE TO W R WITH
OK
RUSSIAN EXPERTS TO FIND OTHER SOURCES OF FUNDING TO
MEET THE GOALS OF THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL.
JOINT MILITARY CONTACTS
16. NITZE SAID EPA WAS GRATIFIED THAT DOD AND MOD WERE
PAYING INCREASING ATTENTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS.
HE REPORTED THAT DOD AND INTERIOR/USFWS HOSTED 24
RUSSIAN ENVIRONMENTAL SPECIALISTS FROM MOD LAST SUMMER
TO STUDY U.S. WILDLIFE AND NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
PRACTICES ON FORMER MILITARY LANDS. HE ALSO MENTIONED
THAT DOD DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY SHERRI GOODMAN WORKED
PRODUCTIVELY WITH HER MOD COUNTERPARTS DURING THE
NOVEMBER GCEC MEETING.
ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION
UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 06 M S O 036427
OCW
EPA FOR OIA (NITZE/WAXMONSKY)
STATE FOR EUR/ISCA/CAST (GORENZ) AND OES/ENV (THOMAS)
PASS INTERIOR FOR USGS, NPS AND USFWS
DOD FOR DEPUTY U/S GOODMAN
WHITE HOUSE FOR OEP (MCGINTY) AND OVP (FUERTH)
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KGCC, SENV, KGLB, TPHY, RS
SUBJECT: GCC ENVIRONMENT COMMITTEE MEETING
17. RAISING THE ENVIRONMENT MINISTRY'S INTEREST IN
ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING AS A FOG'S FOR
GREATER BILATERAL COOPERATION, NITZE SAID HE BELIEVED
THAT MUCH COULD BE DONE COLLABORATIVELY WITH EXISTING
RESOURCES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF CURRENT PROGRAMS,
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ALTHOUGH HE NOTED THAT MUCH OF THIS W R IN THE USA
OK
WAS CARRIED OUT AT THE STATE AND LOCAL LEVEL. NITZE
SAID THAT EPA AND STATE HAD BEGUN TO IDENTIFY U.S.
PROGRAMS THAT COULD HELP PROMOTE MORE BILATERAL
COOPERATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING.
WITH A SIMILAR EFFORT ON THE RUSSIAN? SIDE, NITZE SAID,
WE COULD REPORT ON THIS QUESTION IN DETAIL AT THE NEXT
COMMISSION MEETNG.
18. NITZE ENDED HIS REMARKS BY SAYING WE NEEDED TO
REVIEW THE RESEARCH AND MONITORING COOPERATION THAT
FOR MANY YEARS HAD BEEN CENTRAL TO OUR COLLABORATION
AND WAS VITAL TO CARRYING OUT THE PROVISIONS OF THE
NEW ENVIRONMENT AGREEMENT. HE FELT THAT, DESPITE
FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS IN BOTH COUNTRIES, THERE
CONTINUED TO BE OPPORTUNITIES FOR TECHNICAL
COLLABORATION, PARTICULARLY IN AREAS THAT WERE LARGELY
OFF-LIMITS BEFORE, SUCH AS CONTAMINANT TRANSPORT IN
THE ARCTIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL EPIDEMIOLOGY. THUS,
NITZE PROPOSED THAT PROPOSED THAT EPA'S ASSISTANT
ADMINISTRATOR FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, DR. ROBERT
HUGGETT, VISIT RUSSIA IN SPRING WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF
THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH COMMUNITY. THE
RESULTS OF HIS D
ISCUSSIONS COULD BE PRESENTED AT THE
NEXT COMMISSION MEETING. NITZE SAID EPA WOULD WELCOME
THE PARTICIPATION OF THE GCC S&T COMMITTEE IN
PREPARING AND CARRYING OUT THE VISIT.
IN RESPONSE TO
CHERNOMYRDIN'S QUESTION ON ANY PARTICULAR AREAS TO BE
CONSIDERED BY SUCH A VISIT, NITZE SUGGESTED THAT THEY
MIGHT INCLUDE ENVIRONMENTALLY BASED RISK ASSESSMENT
FOR HEALTH PURPOSES.
GOR ENVIRONMENT MINISTER'S PRESENTATION
19. ENVIRONMENT MINISTER VIKTOR DANILOV-DANILYAN TOOK
THE FLOOR TO MENTION THAT FOUR DOCUMENTS WOULD BE
READY AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE GCC SESSION: THE
ARCTIC AGREEMENT, THE GLOBE AGREEMENT AND THE TWO
JOINT STATEMENTS ON BIODIVERSITY AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, WITH ONLY MINOR DETAILS REMAINING IN THE
LATTER STATEMENT. HE NOTED THAT 8 0 0,000 SQ KM OF
RUSSIAN TERRITORY HAD BEEN PRESERVED FOR NATURE.
20. ON TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, DANILOV-DANILYAN TOOK
NOTE OF OUR JOINT EFFORTS THAT, WITH THE ECONOMIC
CREDITS PROVIDED BY THE WORLD BANK, PROMOTED POSITIVE
USE OF RUSSIA'S RESOURCES.
21. DANILOV-DANILYAN? ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO THE
BERINGIA PARK ISSUE, ADDING THAT THE GOR WAS ALSO
WORKING ON A JOINT PARK WITH CHINA AND MONGOLIA. THE
MAIN PROBLEM HOLDING UP PROGRESS, IN HIS VIEW, WAS
FEAR BY LOCALS OF LOSING THEIR RIGHTS. HE THOUGHT THE
TOPIC SHOULD BE EXPLORED IN THE NPS CONFERENCE ON
BERINGIA, AND ENDORSED THE IDEA OF INVITING LOCALS TO
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THE CONFERENCE.
22. ON CLIMATE/SPACE, DANILOV-DANILYAN TOUCHED ON
CLIMATE, SAYING THE GOR PLANNED TO EXPORT RUSSIAN
TECHNOLOGY FOR STUDYING GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, AS
RUSSIAN LABS COULD BE USED I N PLANES AND I N OUTER
SPACE. HE ADDED THAT AMERICAN INSTRUMENTS ALSO COULD
BE USED ABOARD RUSSIAN SPACECRAFT TO MONITOR CHANGES.
DANILOV-DANILYAN CALLED FOR MORE STREAMLINED
COOPERATION AND BETTER COORDINATION WITH THE GCC SPACE
COMMITTEE. HE POINTED OUT THAT THERE WERE ECOLOGICAL
IMPLICATIONS OF SPACE RESEARCH -- SPACE LAUNCHES
AFFECTED THE ENVIRONMENT, AND SPACE CRAFT USED F I S S I L E
UNCLAS SECTION 06 OF 06 MOSCOW 036427
EPA FOR OIA (NITZE/WAXMONSKY)
STATE FOR EUR/ISCA/CAST (GORENZ) AJ^D OES/ENV (THOMAS)
PASS INTERIOR FOR USGS, NPS AND USFWS
DOD FOR DEPUTY U/S GOODMAN
WHITE HOUSE FOR OEP (MCGINTY) AND OVP (FUERTH)
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KGCC, SENV, KGLB, TPHY, RS
SUBJECT: GCC ENVIRONMENT COMMITTEE MEETING
MATERIALS. HE CALLED FOR THE USA AND RUSSIA TO BE
TRAILBLAZERS I N COPING WITH THIS PROBLEM.
EARTHQUAKE FORECASTING TECHNOLOGY
23. DANILOV-DANILYAN SPOKE AT SOME LENGTH TO EMPHASIZE
THE GOR'S INTEREST I N GETTING THE USG TO COOPERATE
WITH THEM ON SHORT-TERM (3-5 DAYS) EARTHQUAKE
FORECASTING (REFTEL).
HE SAID THE GOR HAD DEVELOPED A
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY TO USE DATA REPORTING ANOMALIES
I N LOW-FREQUENCY RADIO WAVES. HE SAID RUSSIA HAD
TESTED THE TECHNOLOGY, BUT NEEDED MORE SOURCES OF
RADIO WAVES, WHICH HE SAID ONLY RUSSIA AND THE USA
COULD PROVIDE. WITH OUR HELP DANILOV-DANILYAN SAID WE
COULD EXTEND THE RUSSIAN SYSTEM TO FORECAST
EARTHQUAKES ANYWHERE ON THE GLOBE. DANILOV-DANILYAN
SAID LAND-BASED EARTH STATIONS COULD BE VERY USEFUL I N
THIS EFFORT. AS A FIRST STEP THE MINISTER SAID WE
NEEDED A JOINT EFFORT TO EXPLORE HOW WE COULD
COOPERATE.
24. COMMENT: THE VP AND PM SIGNED THE GLOBE AGREEMENT
AS WELL AS THE ARCTIC AGREEMENT AT THE DECEMBER 16
CEREMONY AFTER THE CLOSING OF THE GCC SESSION. THE
BIODIVERSITY JOINT STATEMENT WAS ANNOUNCED, AS
PLANWED; THE JOINT STATEMENT ON NATURAL RESOURCES WAS
NOT/NOT ANNOUNCED OR SIGNED. MILES
BT
#6427
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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NNNN
SECT:
SECTION: 01 OF 06
<'SECT>SECTION
02
< SECT>SECTION 03
< SECT>SECTION
04
< SECT>SECTION 05
< SECT>SECTION: 06
6427
< SSN>6427
< SSN>6427
< SSN>6427
< SSN>6427
< SSN>6427
A
A
A
A
SSN:
OF
OF
OF
OF
OF
06
06
06
06
06
A
A
A
A
A
TOR:
941219095957 M1422444
<"TOR>941219100005 M1422446
< TOR>941219100111 M1422447
< TOR>941219100243 M1422453
< TOR>941219100503 M1422457
< TOR>941219100608 M1422458
A
A
A
A
DIST:
PRT: FUERTH MCGINTY
S I T : BEYRLE BRADLEY BRANSCUM BURNS CLAUSSEN NSC PONEMAN SAUNDERS
< DIST>
S I T : BRADLEY CLAUSSEN
A
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Cable
PREC:
PRIORITY
CLASS:
COMriDDUTWlL
LINEl:
PAACZYUW RUEHMOA6513 3540755-CCCC--RHEHAAA.
LINE2:
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3:
P 200755Z DEC 94
LINE4:
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
OSRI:
DTG:
ORIG:
TO:
RUEHMO
200755Z DEC 94
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8362
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO:
RUEANAT/NASA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY 1468
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0316
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 1842
SUBJ:
GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN
COMMITTEE REPORT
COMMISSION I V :
SPACE
TEXT:
fe 0 N V I D • H T I A L
1
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 0 1 OF 06 MOSCOW 036513
DEPT FOR EUR/ISCA/CAST (DAVIDSON)
WHITEHOUSE FOR OVP (FUERTH), NSC (BURNS)
NASA FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (SCHUMACHER)
DEPT PASS USTR
(ALLGEIER)
PASS NOAA (BAKER)
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: TSPA, ETRD, ETTC, PARM, START, I N F , KSCA, RS, US
SUBJECT: GORE - CHERNOMYRDIN COMMISSION I V :
SPACE
COMMITTEE REPORT
1.
SUMMARY: ON DECEMBER 15 SPACE COMMITTEE CO-CHAIRS
DANIEL GOLDIN OF NASA AND YURIY KOPTEV OF THE RUSSIAN
SPACE AGENCY (RSA) REPORTED TO THE GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN
COMMISSION THAT THE COMMITTEE HAD ACHIEVED SIGNIFICANT
PROGRESS I N U.S.-RUSSIAN COOPERATION NOT ONLY ON THE
INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION, BUT ALSO I N A NUMBER OF
OTHER AREAS, INCLUDING SPACE AND EARTH SCIENCE, AND
AERONAUTICS. COMMISSION CO-CHAIRS GORE AND
CHERNOMYRDIN LOOKED FORWARD TO ACHIEVEMENT OF FURTHER
MILESTONES BY THE NEXT GCC, INCLUDING THE FIRST FLIGHT
OF A U.S. ASTRONAUT ON BOARD THE MIR SPACE STATION,
DEVELOPMENT OF AN IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR
INTERCONNECTING RUSSIAN AND U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL DATA
PER E.0.13526
�F:\Cable\Data Soiirce\Cables\CD010\DEC94\MSGS\M1424092.html
NETWORKS, FORMULATION OF A PROPOSAL FOR MERGING U.S.
AND RUSSIAN SATELLITE SEARCH-AND - RESCUE SYSTEMS, AND
COMPLETION OF A STUDY ON JOINT SOLAR SYSTEM
EXPLORATION.
2. ON TWO ISSUES FALLING OUTSIDE THE NASA-RSA
COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP, RUSSIAN PARTICIPANTS PRESSED
THEIR U.S. COUNTERPARTS. KOPTEV, SECONDED BY PRIME
MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN, ASKED THE COMMISSION TO
ELIMINATE OR GREATLY INCREASE THE QUOTA ON COMMERCIAL
LAUNCHES OF SATELLITES INTO GEOSYNCHRONOUS ORBIT
ALLOWED RUSSIA UNDER A SEPTEMBER 1993 AGREEMENT WITH
THE U.S. HE ALSO URGED THE COMMISSION TO ENSURE THE
FORMULATION OF LEGAL NORMS THAT WOULD SANCTION THE
CONVERSION OF STRATEGIC MISSILES INTO SPACE LAUNCH
VEHICLES FOR COMMERCIAL PAYLOADS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK
OF EXISTING ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES. END SUMMARY
REMARKS OF NASA ADMINISTRATOR GOLDIN
3. NASA ADMINISTRATOR DANIEL GOLDIN AND RSA GENERAL
DIRECTOR YURIY KOPTEV, CO-CHAIRS OF THE SPACE
COMMITTEE OF THE GORE - CHERNOMYRDIN COMMISSION (GCC) ,
DELIVERED THE COMMITTEE'S REPORT ON THE FIRST DAY OF
THE COMMISSION'S DECEMBER 15-16 MEETINGS. GOLDIN
BEGAN BY NOTING THAT THE AGENDA OF THE U.S. -RUSSLAN
SPACE PROGRAM IS FULL AND GROWING AND THAT WHILE THE
INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION IS THE CENTERPIECE OF THE
COOPERATION I T IS IMPORTANT TO POINT OUT THAT THE TWO
COUNTRIES ARE ALSO COOPERATING CLOSELY IN OTHER AREAS
SUCH AS AERONAUTICS, AND EARTH AND SPACE SCIENCES.
TURNING FIRST TO THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION,
GOLDIN UNDERSCORED THAT NASA AND RSA HAVE GONE BEYOND
TALK AND PAPERWORK AND ARE DEVELOPING HARDWARE AND
PREPARING FOR LAUNCHES. HE STRESSED THAT PERSONAL AND
CORPORATE RELATIONSHIPS BUILT UP OVER THE LAST SEVERAL
MONTHS, ARE NOW BEARING FRUIT AND CREATING
OPPORTUNITIES ON THE GROUND.
4. HE NOTED THAT SINCE THE JUNE 1994 MEETING OF THE
GCC THE SPACE COMMITTEE HAS OVERSEEN A NUMBER OF MAJOR
ACHIEVEMENTS, INCLUDING, AMONG OTHERS, JOINT
ASTRONAUT/COSMONAUT TRAINING AT THE JOHNSON SPACE
CENTER AND STAR CITY FOR THE MIR-18 MISSION, DELIVERY
BY A PROGRESS VEHICLE IN AUGUST 1994 OF THE FIRST NASA
HARDWARE TO THE MIR SPACE STATION AND A NOVEMBER 1994
JOINT PROGRAM REVIEW OF COOPERATION" IN HUMAN SPACE
FLIGHT WHICH INCLUDED SPACE INDUSTRY LEADERS FROM THE
U.S. AND RUSSIA. LOOKING AHEAD TO 1995, GOLDIN SAID
THAT THERE ARE PLANS FOR EIGHT LAUNCHES TO THE MIR
FROM THE U.S. AND RUSSIA ON WHICH THE COUNTRIES WILL
COOPERATE. GOLDIN ADDED THAT THE PACE OF COOPERATION
IS EXCEPTIONAL AND STRESSED THAT BOTH COUNTRIES CAN BE
PROUD OF THE PROGRESS WHICH THEIR EXPERTS, WORKING AS
ONE UNIT, ARE MAKING.
5. TURNING TO OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS, GOLDIN EXPLAINED
THAT NASA AND RSA HAVE DECIDED TO CONVERGE ONE
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ANOTHER'S SPACE MEDICINE PROGRAMS, COMBINING THE BEST
OF BOTH PROGRAMS. TOWARD THAT END, HE CONTINUED, IN
SEPTEMBER 1994, THE AGENCIES AGREED TO FORM A "JOINT
MEDICAL, OPERATIONS WORKING GROUP" TO ENSURE THAT AN
EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR JOINT MEDICAL
SUPPORT IS PROVIDED. IN ADDITION, GOLDIN SAID, KOPTEV
AND HE HAD JUST ENDORSED THE CREATION OF A SENIORT ^ M I T D n N T T M T
T
i
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 02 OF 06 M S O 036513
OCW
DEPT FOR EUR/ISCA/CAST (DAVIDSON)
WHITEHOUSE FOR OVP (FUERTH), NSC (BURNS)
NASA FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (SCHUMACHER)
DEPT PASS USTR (ALLGEIER)
PASS NOAA (BAKER)
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: TSPA, ETRD, ETTC, PARM, START, INF, KSCA, RS, US
SUBJECT: GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN COMMISSION IV: SPACE
COMMITTEE REPORT
LEVEL "JOINT MEDICAL POLICY BOARD" TO CONVERGE NASA
AND RSA'S SEPARATE MEDICAL OPERATIONS FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION PROGRAM. ACCORDING TO
GOLDIN, KOPTEV AND HE AGREED TO CREATE A SINGLE POINT
OF CONTACT ON EACH SIDE WITH FULL RESPONSIBILITY TO
RESOLVE ALL ISSUES RELATED TO CONVERGING THE MEDICAL
SUPPORT SYSTEMS FOR ASTRONAUTS AND COSMONAUTS.
6. GOLDIN STRESSED THAT KOPTEV AND HE, SHARING A
BELIEF IN THE IMPORTANCE OF SPACE SCIENCE, HAVE AGREED
THAT USD 20 MILLION OF THE USD 400 MILLION NSA-RSA
CONTRACT SHOULD BE SET ASIDE TO PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR
THE RUSSIAN SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY TO DEVELOP SCIENCE
PROJECTS TO BE UNDERTAKEN AS PART OF THE 1994-97
SHUTTLE-MIR JOINT FLIGHT PROGRAM. SO FAR, GOLDIN
NOTED, THE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL ADVISORY COUNCIL
ESTABLISHED BY RSA TO IMPLEMENT THE SOLICITATION, PEER
REVIEW AND SELECTION PROCESS FOR RUSSIAN PROPOSALS HAS
RECEIVED 120 FROM RUSSIAN SCIENTISTS. BY EARLY 1995,
GOLDIN SAID, THE CHOSEN PROJECTS WILL BE ANNOUNCED.
GOLDIN ALSO REPORTED THAT GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE OF
SAFETY TO THE SUCCESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE
STATION PROGRAM, KOPTEV AND HE AGREED TO ENDORSE THE
CREATION OF AN INDEPENDENT JOINT OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE
TASKED WITH EVALUATING MISSION QUALITY RELATIVE TO
SAFETY. THE COMMITTEE, GOLDIN SAID, WILL ADVISE
KOPTEV AND HIM OF ANY PROBLEMS BEFORE THE FIRST LAUNCH
OF A U.S. ASTRONAUT TO THE MIR NEXT SPRING.
7. GOLDIN REPORTED THAT A JOINT AERONAUTICS WORKING
GROUP HELD ITS FIRST MEETING IN OCTOBER 1994 AND AT
THAT TIME ESTABLISHED IMPLEMENTATION TEAMS TO PURSUE
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COOPERATION IN SEVEN SEPARATE PROGRAM AREAS. IN
ADDITION, GOLDIN SAID, IN AUGUST 1994, A U.S.
AEROSPACE INDUSTRY TEAM SIGNED A CONTRACT TO WORK WITH
RUSSIA'S TUPOLEV DESIGN BUREAU TO MODIFY THE TU-144
SUPERSONIC TRANSPORT JET FOR USE AS A FLIGHT RESEARCH
TEST VEHICLE AND TO CONDUCT UP TO 3 5 FLIGHT TESTS.
THIS PROJECT, GOLDIN POINTED OUT, IS A GOOD EXAMPLE OF
H W INDUSTRY TEAMS FROM THE TWO COUNTRIES ARE WORKING
O
TOGETHER FOR THE BENEFIT OF BOTH COUNTRIES. HE ADDED
ALSO THAT IN NOVEMBER 1994 NASA SIGNED A CONTRACT WITH
RUSSIA'S CENTRAL INSTITUTE OF AVIATION MOTORS (TSIAM)
TO CONDUCT SCRAMJET GROUND AND FLIGHT TESTING USING
EXISTING RUSSIAN LAUNCH AND FLIGHT TEST VEHICLES.
8. GOLDIN WAS ALSO UPBEAT ABOUT U.S.-RUSSIAN
COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF EARTH SCIENCE, NOTING
RECENT DISCUSSIONS ON INCREASED RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION
IN NASA'S EARTH OBSERVING SYSTEM (EOS), IN PARTICULAR,
THE POSSIBILITY OF INTERCONNECTING NASA'S EOS DATA AND
INFORMATION SYSTEM (EOSDIS) WITH THAT USED BY RUSSIAN
COUNTERPARTS. THE INTERCONNECTION, GOLDIN EMPHASIZED,
WOULD MAKE RUSSIAN DATA AVAILABLE TO THE INTERNATIONAL
SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY AND THE SHARING OF ENVIRONMENTAL
DATA WOULD PROVE VALUABLE TO POLICYMAKERS ON
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES. GOLDIN SAID THAT HE AND KOPTEV
HOPE TO FINALIZE A PROTOCOL ESTABLISHING THE RUSSIAN
CONNECTION TO EODIS BY SPRING 1995.
9. GOLDIN REPORTED THAT RUSSIA AND THE U.S. ARE
ALREADY BEGINNING TO MERGE THEIR EARTH SCIENCE
PROGRAMS. AS EVIDENCE, HE POINTED OUT THAT HE AND
KOPTEV HAD SIGNED AN AGREEMENT THAT WILL ALLOW TWO
U.S. SCIENTIFIC INSTRUMENTS-SAGE AND TOMS-TO FLY ON
RUSSIAN METEOR-3M SPACECRAFT WITH THE GOAL OF BETTER
UNDERSTANDING CHANGES IN THE OZONE LAYER. NASA, SAID
GOLDIN, WOULD CONTRIBUTE USD 10 MILLION FOR
INTEGRATION COSTS RELATED TO THE MISSIONS.
10. ALSO IN THE EARTH SCIENCES AREA, GOLDIN SAID,
NASA SUCCESSFULLY INSTALLED A SATELLITE DATA RECEIVING
SYSTEM IN KRASNOYARSK WHICH WILL RECEIVE
METEOROLOGICAL DATA FOR USE IN STUDYING FOREST
PRODUCTIVITY AND HEALT
H, FIRE RISK AND FIRE HISTORY.
GOLDIN ADDED THAT TWO ADDITIONAL INSTALLATIONS --ONE IN
IRKUTSK AND THE OTHER KHABAROVSK--ARE PLANNED FOR
-6- 0 N . I D D II 1 1 A L'
F
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 03 OF 06 M S O 036513
OCW
DEPT FOR EUR/ISCA/CAST (DAVIDSON)
WHITEHOUSE FOR OVP (FUERTH), NSC (BURNS)
NASA FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (SCHUMACHER)
DEPT PASS USTR (ALLGEIER)
Page 4 of 10
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PASS NOAA (BAKER)
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: TSPA, ETRD, ETTC, PARM, START, INF, KSCA, RS, US
SUBJECT: GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN COMMISSION IV: SPACE
COMMITTEE REPORT
1995 .
11. REPORTING ON COOPERATION IN THE AREA OF SPACE
SCIENCE, GOLDIN SAID THAT ON NOVEMBER 1, 1994, NASA
SUCCESSFULLY LAUNCHED THE FIRST RUSSIAN INSTRUMENT
EVER FLOWN ON A U.S. SPACE VEHICLE. ACCORDING TO
GOLDIN, THE RUSSIAN "KONUS" GAMMA-RAY BURST INSTRUMENT
WAS LAUNCHED ON THE "WIND" SPACECRAFT AND HAS ALREADY
DETECTED ITS FIRST GAMMA-RAY BURST. WHILE
ACKNOWLEDGING THAT RUSSIA AND THE U.S FACE DIFFICULT
FINANCIAL CONDITIONS, GOLDIN SAID THAT THE U.S. IS
WORKING HARD TO DELIVER T O U.S FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS FOR
W
THE RUSSIAN FIRST OBSERVATORY MISSION "SPECTRUM-X
GAMMA."
12. GOLDIN EXPLAINED THAT NASA AND RSA ARE CONTINUING
TO STUDY POSSIBLE COOPERATION IN SOLAR SYSTEM
EXPLORATION, INCLUDING MISSIONS TO MARS, WITHIN THE
LIMITS OF EXISTING FINANCIAL RESOURCES. GOLDIN ASKED
THAT THE COMMISSION CO-CHAIRS SUPPORT CONTINUED STUDY
OF SUCH MISSIONS BY NASA AND RSA. CONCLUDING HIS
REMARKS, GOLDIN EXPRESSED SATISFACTION THAT AS A
RESULT OF THE GCC PROCESS THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE IN
RUSSIA AND THE U.S ARE WORKING PRODUCTIVELY TOGETHER
ON SPACE PROJECTS THAT WILL BENEFIT BOTH COUNTRIES AND
HE THANKED THE COMMISSION CO-CHAIRS FOR THEIR
LEADERSHIP.
REMARKS OF RSA CHIEF KOPTEV
13. RSA DIRECTOR KOPTEV LAUGHINGLY NOTED THAT
GOLDIN'S COMPREHENSIJE COVERAGE OF THE COMMITTEE'S
WORK MADE HIS O N JOB EASIER. HE EXPLAINED THAT NASA
W
AND RSA HAVE BEEN WORKING TOGETHER FOR 18 MONTHS IN A
RANGE OF AREAS THAT INCLUDE NOT JUST MANNED FLIGHT BUT
ALSO FUNDAMENTAL AND APPLIED RESEARCH. HE BRIEFLY
DESCRIBED JOINT ACTIVITIES PLANNED UNDER THE 1994-97
SHUTTLE-MIR JOINT FLIGHT PROGRAM AND STRESSED THE NEED
TO MEET APPROACHING DEADLINES. HE SECONDED GOLDIN'S
TOUTING OF THE DECISION TO FLY SAGE AND TOMS
INSTRUMENTS ABROAD RUSSIAN SPACECRAFT. KOPTEV ALSO
NOTED THAT NASA AND RSA HAD SIGNED A CONTRACT FOR U.S
PARTICIPATION IN THE RUSSIAN BIOSATELLITE PROGRAM.
14. TURNING TO W R ON THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE
OK
STATION, KOPTEV SAID THAT NASA AND RSA UNDERSTAND THE
IMPORTANCE OF MEETING DEADLINES AND ARE COMMITTED TO
STICKING TO THE NOVEMBER 1997 LAUNCH DATE FOR
BEGINNING TO CONSTRUCT THE STATION. HE REPEATED
GOLDIN'S REQUEST THAT THE CO-CHAIRS ENDORSE FURTHER
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STUDY OF POSSIBLE JOINT MISSIONS TO MARS IN 1998 AND
2000 .
ELIMINATING COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH QUOTA
15. SHIFTING AWAY FROM CIVILIAN SPACE COOPERATION
WITH NASA, KOPTEV RECALLED THAT THE GCC CO-CHAIRS HAD
SIGNED AN AGREEMENT IN SEPTEMBER 1993 FACILITATING
RUSSIA'S ENTRY INTO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL SPACE
LAUNCH MARKET. HE ASSERTED THAT THE KHRUNICHEV STATE
SPACE SCIENCE AND PRODUCTION CENTER WORKING TOGETHER
WITH ITS JOINT VENTURE PARTNER LOCKHEED HAS ALREADY
EXHAUSTED THE LAUNCH QUOTAS UNDER THE AGREEMENT.
ACCORDING TO KOPTEV, I T IS THE VIEW OF RUSSIAN AND U.S
INDUSTRY THAT THE MARKET FOR GEOSYNCHRONOUS LAUNCHES
HAS EXPANDED GREATLY RENDERING THE 1993 AGREEMENT
INEFFECTIVE. KOPTEV ASKED THE COMMISSION CO-CHAIRS TO
CONSIDER ISSUING INSTRUCTIONS AIMED AT ELIMINATING THE
AGREEMENT'S QUOTA OR GREATLY INCREASING I T BY THE NEXT
GCC MEETING.
CONVERTING STRATEGIC MISSILES INTO COMMERCIAL SLV'S
16. KOPTEV REFERRED TO THE PROCESS OF DISARMING
STRATEGIC WEAPONS IN THE U.S AND RUSSIA UNDER ARMS
C O N F-J D • H T - I A L
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 04 OF 06 M S O 036513
OCW
DEPT FOR EUR/ISCA/CAST (DAVIDSON)
WHITEHOUSE FOR OVP (FUERTH), NSC (BURNS)
NASA FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (SCHUMACHER)
DEPT PASS USTR (ALLGEIER)
PASS NOAA (BAKER)
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: TSPA, ETRD, ETTC, PARM, START, INF, KSCA, RS, US
SUBJECT: GORE - CHERNOMYRDIN COMMISSION IV: SPACE
COMMITTEE REPORT
REDUCTION TREATIES AND POINTED OUT THE POTENTIAL FOR
CONVERTING STRATEGIC MISSILES INTO LAUNCH VEHICLES FOR
COMMERCIAL PAYLOADS. SO FAR, HOWEVER, KOPTEV
REMARKED, THE U.S. AND RUSSIA HAVE NOT DEVELOPED THE
LEGAL NORMS THAT WOULD PERMIT SUCH CONVERSION WITHIN
THE FRAMEWORK OF EXISTING ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES.
KOPTEV ASKED THE CO-CHAIRS TO INSTRUCT THE JOINT
SPECIAL VERIFICATION COMMISSION IN GENEVA TO DEVELOP
THE NECESSARY NORMS.
VP'S REMARKS
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17. THE VICE PRESI
DENT CONGRATULATED GOLDIN AND
KOPTEV FOR THEIR OUTSTANDING LEADERSHIP OF THE SPACE
COMMITTEE. HE NOTED THAT THEY HAD DEMONSTRATED AN
ABILITY TO W R TOGETHER PRODUCTIVELY AND THAT AS A
OK
RESULT U.S. AND RUSSIAN INDUSTRY ARE ALSO COOPERATING
CLOSELY. THE VICE PRESIDENT THEN TOUCHED UPON MANY OF
THE SAME MILESTONES MENTIONED BY GOLDIN IN HIS
REMARKS. IN CITING THE AGREEMENT TO FORM A JOINT
MEDICAL POLICY BOARD, HE ASKED GOLDIN WHEN THE BOARD
WILL READY TO BEGIN OPERATION. GOLDIN REPLIED THAT A
FEW MORE MONTHS WILL BE REQUIRED TO W R OUT REMAINING
OK
DETAILS SURROUNDING THE BOARD'S OPERATION.
18. THE VICE PRESIDENT POINTED OUT THAT THE U.S. HAS
SHIPPED MUCH EQUIPMENT TO RUSSIA FOR THE MIR AND THAT
RUSSIA HAS SHIPPED EQUIPMENT TO THE U.S. FOR THE
SHUTTLE. HE NOTED THAT HE AND CHERNOMYRDIN WOULD SIGN
AN AGREEMENT THE FOLLOWING DAY ON PROCEDURES FOR
CUSTOMS REGISTRATION OF GOODS TRANSPORTED WITHIN THE
FRAMEWORK OF U.S-RUSSIAN SPACE COOPERATION. IN TWO
MONTHS, HE SAID, THE SHUTTLE WILL FLY TO WITHIN 30
FEET OF THE MIR AND IN MARCH 1995 U.S. ASTRONAUT
NORMAN THAGARD WILL BEGIN A 90-DAY STAY ON BOARD THE
MIR. IN JUNE, HE CONTINUED, THE SHUTTLE WILL DOCK
WITH THE MIR. ALTHOUGH THE UPCOMING PROGRAM IS
DIFFICULT, THE VICE PRESIDENT CONTINUED, THE TWO TEAMS
HAVE DONE EXTENSIVE TESTING TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF
THOSE MISSIONS.
19. GORE SAID THAT IN ADDITION TO THE WORK ON THE
SPACE STATION, THE SPACE COMMITTEE IS EXPANDING
COOPERATION IN OTHER WAYS. THE VICE PRESIDENT CITED
IN PARTICULAR THE DECISION TO SET ASIDE USD 20 MILLION
FOR RUSSIAN SCIENTISTS TO DO W R CONNECTED WITH THE
OK
SPACE STATION. HE LAUDED THE FORMATION OF AN
INDEPENDENT GROUP TO REVIEW MISSION SAFETY AND
SUGGESTED THAT GOLDIN AND KOPTEV ALSO CAREFULLY REVIEW
EACH OTHER'S BUDGETS, EQUIPMENT, AND INVENTORIES AS AN
"EXTRA PRECAUTION" AND REPORT ANY SUGGESTED CHANGES TO
THE NEXT GCC. MAYBE, THE VICE PRESIDENT SUGGESTED,
GOLDIN AND KOPTEV COULD TAKE AN INITIAL CUT AT THIS
PROPOSAL DURING THE CURRENT GCC MEETINGS.
20. THE VICE PRESIDENT PRAISED THE PROPOSAL MENTIONED
BY GOLDIN TO INVITE RUSSIA INTO EOSDIS AND SAID HE WAS
HOPEFUL THAT AN IMPLEMENTATION PLAN COULD BE PRESENTED
FOR APPROVAL AT THE NEXT GCC MEETING. HE ALSO
EXPRESSED ADMIRATION FOR "IMPRESSIVE" JOINT ACTIVITIES
IN THE AREA OF SPACE SCIENCE.
SEARCH-AND-RESCUE COOPERATION
21.
THE VICE PRESIDENT NOTED THAT NOAA AND THE
RUSSIAN MARITIME SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY AND
THE MINISTRY OF TRANSPORTATION AND RSA ALL RECOGNIZE
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THE VALUE OF COOPERATING TO EXPAND SEARCH-AND-RESCUE
CAPABILITIES. FOR ELABORATION, HE TURNED TO NOAA
DIRECTOR JAMES BAKER WHO EXPLAINED THAT COOPERATION
WITH RUSSIA IN A SEARCH-AND-RESCUE PROGRAM USING
SATELLITES IN GEOSYNCHRONOUS ORBIT FROM BOTH COUNTRIES
WOULD PERMIT THE FORMATION OF A GLOBAL SEARCH AND
RESCUE SYSTEM WITH A 30 MINUTE RESPONSE TIME OVER MOST
OF THE WORLD.
• 0 • 0 M 1 J P E -t>] T I A 4
?
.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 05 OF 06 M S O 036513
OCW
DEPT FOR EUR/ISCA/CAST (DAVIDSON)
WHITEHOUSE FOR OVP (FUERTH), NSC (BURNS)
NASA FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (SCHUMACHER)
DEPT PASS USTR (ALLGEIER)
PASS NOAA (BAKER)
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: TSPA, ETRD, ETTC, PARM, START, INF, KSCA, RS, US
SUBJECT: GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN COMMISSION IV: SPACE
COMMITTEE REPORT
22. BAKER REFERRED TO THE RUSSIAN "LUCH" DATA RELAY
SATELLITE INDICATING THAT ONE HAS ALREADY BEEN
LAUNCHED AND A SECOND WILL BE LAUNCHED BY YEAR'S END.
BAKER ALSO NOTED THAT NOAA AND ITS RUSSIAN COUNTERPART
ROSGIDROMET ARE WORKING ON A PLAN FOR EXCHANGING
OPERATIONAL METEOROLOGICAL DATA FOR THE FIRST TIME.
THE VICE PRESIDENT PROPOSED THAT THE COMMISSION SHOULD
ANNOUNCE PLANS TO GO AHEAD WITH THE SEARCH-AND-RESCUE
COOPERATION AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE COMMISSION'S
SESSION THE FOLLOWING DAY AND NOTED THAT THE PROJECT
IS A GOOD EXAMPLE OF H W THE U.S. AND RUSSIA CAN DO
O
MORE TOGETHER THAN SEPARATELY.
CHERNOMYRDIN'S REMARKS
23. PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN STRESSED THAT GCC IS
DOING "REAL WORK" AND ACCOMPLISHING MUCH MORE THAN
"WHAT THEY SAY WE ARE DOING." HE ALLOWED, HOWEVER,
THAT NASA AND RSA HAVE MUCH TO DO IN 1995, INCLUDING
REACHING AGREEMENT ON A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
DETAILING THEIR WORK ON THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE
STATION. CHERNOMYRDIN ENDORSED KOPTEV'S REMARKS
REGARDING
ELIMINATING OR INCREASING THE COMMERCIAL
SPACE LAUNCH QUOTA AND CREATING LEGAL NORMS FOR
SANCTIONING THE CONVERSION OF STRATEGIC MISSILES TO
ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES AND RECOMMENDED THAT HE AND
GORE INSTRUCT RELEVANT AGENCIES TO PREPARE FORMAL
Page 8 of 10
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PROPOSALS ON THESE ISSUES.
KOPTEV PERSISTS ON THE LAUNCH QUOTA ISSUE
24. KOPTEV REQUESTED GORE AND CHERNOMYRDIN ADOPT
JOINT STATEMENTS ON THE SPACE STATION ON COOPERATION
IN EARTH SCIENCE ASKED THEM TO SIGN THE CUSTOMS
AGREEMENT. HE THEN RETURNED TO THE ISSUE OF
CONVERTING STRATEGIC MISSILES TO SLV'S FOR COMMERCIAL
PAYLOADS, ASKING FOR INSTRUCTIONS FROM GORE AND
CHERNOMYRDIN SO FORMAL PROPOSALS COULD BE PREPARED IN
TIME FOR THE NEXT GCC. VICE PRESIDENT GORE RESPONDED
THAT THE JOINT VERIFICATION COMMISSION IN GENEVA HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THAT ISSUE AND ASKED THE SPACE
COMMITTEE TO W R WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THAT
OK
COMMISSION AND REPORT BACK TO GCC.
25. ADDRESSING THE ISSUE OF THE COMMERCIAL SPACE
LAUNCH QUOTA, THE VICE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED
SATISFACTION THAT THE 1993 AGREEMENT WAS FULFILLING
ITS PURPOSE IN EASING RUSSIA'S ENTRY INTO THE
INTERNATIONAL LAUNCH MARKET. HE NOTED THAT THERE IS A
PROVISION IN THE AGREEMENT FOR INCREASING THE QUOTA I F
BOTH PARTIES JOINTLY FIND THAT THE MARKET HAS
EXPANDED. OUR CURRENT MARKET ASSESSMENTS, HE SAID,
HOWEVER, DO NOT S O A MEANINGFUL EXPANSION.
HW
NONETHELESS, HE ADDED, THE U.S. IS WILLING TO REVIEW
ANY PROJECTIONS THAT THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT WISHES TO
PUT FORWARD.
26. VICE PRESIDENT GORE TURNED AGAIN TO COOPERATION
IN SOLAR SYSTEM EXPLORATION, INDICATING HIS INTEREST
IN DIRECTING THE SPACE COMMITTEE TO PREPARE PROPOSALS
FOR JOINT PROBES TO MARS, PLUTO AND THE SUN WITHIN
EXISTING BUDGET CONSTRAINTS. CHERNOMYRDIN NODDED HIS
AGREEMENT.
27. KOPTEV RAISED THE COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH ISSUE
AGAIN, TELLING THE VICE PRESIDENT THAT THE NUMBER OF
LAUNCHES WILL INCREASE SIGNIFICANTLY AND IS NOW
ESTIMATED TO BE FIFTY PERCENT GREATER THAN I T WAS IN
SEPTEMBER 1993. HE NOTED THAT EUROPE CURRENTLY HAS
MORE THAN SIXTY PERCENT OF THE MARKET FOR LAUNCHES
INTO GEOSYNCHRONOUS ORBIT. GIVEN TWO RECENT EUROPEAN
LAUNCH FAILURES, HE CONTINUED, WESTERN FIRMS,
INCLUDING HUGHES AND LORAL, WANT TO USE RUSSIAN
0 OUi P I D • N T I h h"
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 06 OF 06 M S O 036513
OCW
DEPT FOR EUR/ISCA/CAST (DAVIDSON)
WHITEHOUSE FOR OVP (FUERTH), NSC (BURNS)
NASA FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (SCHUMACHER)
DEPT PASS USTR (ALLGEIER)
Page 9 of 10
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD010\DEC94\MSGS\M1424092.html
PASS NOAA (BAKER)
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: TSPA, ETRD, ETTC, PARM, START, I N F , KSCA, RS, US
SUBJECT: GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN COMMISSION I V : SPACE
COMMITTEE REPORT
LAUNCHERS INSTEAD OF ARIANE. WE NEED INSTRUCTIONS,
KOPTEV STRESSED, TO RECONSIDER ALL FACTORS OF THE
COMMERCIAL LAUNCH ISSUE, ADDING THAT RUSSIA'S PRICES
ARE WORLD PRICES. WE WANT TO WORK L I K E THE REST OF
THE WORLD, KOPTEV CONCLUDED. THE VICE PRESIDENT
RESPONDED THAT THE U.S SIDE WOULD NEED TO DISCUSS THE
ISSUE AND WOULD THEN RESPOND TO THE RUSSIAN
SUGGESTIONS.
PICKERING
BT
#6513
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SECTION: 0 1 OF 06
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A
A
A
A
A
OF
OF
OF
OF
OF
06
06
06
06
06
SSN: 6513
< SSN>6513
< SSN>6513
< SSN>6513
< SSN>6513
< SSN>6513
A
A
A
A
A
TOR:
941220025635 M1424092
< TOR>941220025850 M1424096
< TOR>941220025958 M1424098
< TOR>941220030102 M1424099
< TOR>941220030224 M1424104
<'TOR>941220030229 M1424105
A
A
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S I T : BELL BEYRLE BRANSCUM BURNS JONES NSC STERN TENET
< DIST>
S I T : BRADLEY CLAUSSEN
A
Page 10 of 10
�F:\Cable\Data Soiirce\Cables\CD010\DEC94\MSGS\M1424387.html
Cable
PREC:
CLASS:
PRIORITY
UNCLASSIFIED
LINEl:
PAAUZYUW RUEHM0A6 52 6 3541050 -UUUU--RHEHAAA .
LINE2:
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
LINE3:
P 201050Z DEC 94
LINE4:
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
OSRI:
DTG:
ORIG:
TO:
RUEHMO
201050Z DEC 94
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8375
INFO:
RUEAUSA/HHS PHS WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHLN/AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 3853
RUEAEPA/HQ EPA WASHDC
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC 2 0 4 1
RUCPDC/USDOC WASHDC
SUBJ:
GCC HEALTH COMMITTEE - REPORT TO VICE
PRESIDENT GORE AND PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN
SUMMARY
TEXT:
UNCLAS SECTION 0 1 OF 04 MOSCOW 036526
STATE FOR OES/STH (ROCK), EUR/ISCA/CAST (FERGUSONAUGUSTUS) AND S/NIS/C (MACKLIN)
HHS FOR OIA (HOHMAN) , OIH/OASH (BOUFFORD) , AND
PHS/OASH (VOGEL/HENRY)
USDOC FOR (MOTTUN)
EPA FOR OIA (NITZE/WAXMONSKY)
STATE PASS OPIC FOR (BORPOE)
WHITE HOUSE FOR OSTP (WALES/BORIGHT/SCHWEITZER)
PASS USIA FOR (SIGMOND)
PASS A I D FOR AID/NIS (TURNER)
PASS FDA (PENDERGAST/BUDASHEWITZ)
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KGCC, TBIO, SOCI, RS
SUBJECT: GCC HEALTH COMMITTEE - REPORT TO VICE
PRESIDENT GORE AND PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN
SUMMARY
1.
THE HEALTH COMMITTEE OF THE GORE CHERNOMYRDIN
COMMISSION (GCC) MADE ITS FIRST REPORT TO THE FULL
COMMISSION ON DECEMBER 15 AT THE GCC SESSION I N
MOSCOW. THE COMMITTEE AGREED ON I T S CHARGE, METHODS
OF WORK, SECRETARIAT FUNCTIONS AND ON EIGHT PRIORITIES
FOR COOPERATION.
I T ALSO REVIEWED ONGOING COOPERATION
Page 1 of 7
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD010\DEC94\MSGS\M1424387.html
IN THE HEALTH SECTOR IN THE CONTEXT OF COMMITTEE
INTERESTS. RUSSIAN MINISTER FOR HEALTH AND MEDICAL
INDUSTRY EDUARD NECHAYEV PLEDGED HIS FULL SUPPORT FOR
THE COMMITTEE'S WORK AND MADE SPECIAL NOTE OF THE
MUTUAL BENEFIT TO BE DERIVED FROM THE "PROPOSED
PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY",
AN APPARENT REFERENCE TO USAID'S MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER AGREEMENT (MTTA). HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVIKES
SECRETARY DONNA SHALALA REPORTED THAT THE COMMITTEE
HAD ESTABLISHED AN AMBITIOUS AGENDA FOR
ITSELF,INCLUDING W R IN EIGHT PRIORITY AREAS;
OK
DIABETES, HEALTH EDUCATION, PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF
INFECTIOUS DISEASE, STRENGTHENING PRIMARY CARE
PRACTICE, TUBERCULOSIS, MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH,
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH, AND HEALTH REFORM AND POLICY
DIALOGUE. SHE STRESSED THAT THE COMMITTEE WOULD FOCUS
ON PRACTICAL STEPS I T COULD TAKE IN EACH AREA TO
IMPROVE HEALTH STATUS IN BOTH COUNTRIES. SHALALA ALSO
ANNOUNCED TWO NEW USAID-SUPPORTED INITIATIVES; THE
MTTA PROJECT AND A WOMEN'S REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH
PROGRAM.
2. VICE-PRESIDENT GORE, NOTING THAT THE HEALTH
COMMITTEE HAD MET FOR THE FIRST TIME THE PREVIOUS DAY,
COMMENDED NECHAYEV AND SHALALA ON THE COMMITTEE'S
PROGRESS IN IDENTIFYING KEY AREAS FOR FUTURE
COLLABORATION. PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN ECHOED THE
VICE-PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, NOTING THAT HE WAS "VERY
SATISFIED" WITH THE COMMITTEE'S EFFORTS. FOLLOWING
THE REPORT TO THE COMMISSION, MINISTER NECHAYEV AND
SECRETARY SHALALA SIGNED A JOINT REPORT TO THE FULL
COMMISSION. TEXT OF THE REPORT IS IN PARAS 10 TO 14.
3. THE FDA-RUSSIAN MOU WAS RAISED IN A PRIVATE
DISCUSSION BETWEEN NECHAYEV AND SHALALA AND AT THE
COMMISSION MEETING BY THE BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT
COMMITTEE. END SUMMARY.
HEALTH MINISTER NECHAYEV'S REMARKS
4. FOLLOWING A BRIEF INTRODUCTION BY PRIME MINISTER
CHERNOMYRDIN, MINISTER NECHAYEV DIRECTED HIS REMARKS
TO THE ON-GOING DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN USAID AND THE MOH
CONCERNING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MTTA, A PROJECT TO
SUPPORT PRIVATE U.s'. INVESTMENT IN THE PRODUCTION OF
CRITICAL PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS. HE NOTED THAT
DURING THE PREVIOUS DAY'S MEETING OF THE HEALTH
COMMITTEE THERE HAD BEEN A GENERAL DISCUSSION OF AID'S
PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
( I . E . THE MTTA PROJECT), AND THAT I T WAS IMPORTANT
THAT BOTH SIDES COOPERATE TO MOVE THIS PROJECT
FORWARD. SUCH COOPERATION WOULD SOLVE A NUMBER OF
ECONOMIC AND TRADE PROBLEMS THAT SURROUND THE JOINT
PRODUCTION OF VACCINES AND PHARMACEUTICALS. NECHAYEV
THANKED SECRETARY SHALALA FOR HER ACTIVE PARTICIPATION
IN THE COMMITTEE'S DELIBERATIONS, AND EXPRESSED HIS
Page 2 of 7
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD010\DEC94\MSGS\M1424387.html
HOPE THAT THE COMMITTEE'S W R WOULD IMPROVE THE
OK
QUALITY OF LIFE OF BOTH RUSSIANS AND AMERICANS.
SECRETARY SHALALA'S REPORT
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 04 M S O 036526
OCW
STATE FOR OES/STH (ROCK), EUR/ISCA/CAST (FERGUSONAUGUSTUS) AND S/NIS/C (MACKLIN)
HHS FOR OIA (HOHMAN), OIH/OASH (BOUFFORD), AND
PHS/OASH (VOGEL/HENRY)
USDOC FOR (MOTTUN)
EPA FOR OIA (NITZE/WAXMONSKY)
STATE PASS OPIC FOR (BORPOE)
WHITE HOUSE FOR OSTP (WALES/BORIGHT/SCHWEITZER)
PASS USIA FOR (SIGMOND)
PASS AID FOR AID/NIS (TURNER)
PASS FDA (PENDERGAST/BUDASHEWITZ)
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KGCC, TBIO, SOCI, RS
SUBJECT: GCC HEALTH COMMITTEE - REPORT TO VICE
PRESIDENT GORE AND PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN
5. SECRETARY SHALALA OPENED HER REPORT TO THE
COMMISSION BY THANKING NECHAYEV FOR HIS COOPERATION
AND SUPPORT. SHE NOTED THAT RUSSIAN-U.S.
COLLABORATION IN THE HEALTH SECTOR HAS BEEN ON-GOING
FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS, AND THAT THE INAUGURATION OF A
NEW GCC HEALTH COMMITTEE WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT
EXPANSION OF THESE EFFORTS. TURNING TO EXISTING U.S.
PROGRAMS, SHALALA NOTED THAT USAID CURRENTLY SUPPORTS
A $100 MILLION PROGRAM OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE
RUSSIAN HEALTH SECTOR. THIS PROGRAM INCLUDES PROJECTS
DESIGNED TO STRENGTHEN HEALTH INFORMATION SYSTEMS,
PROMOTE PRIVATE SECTOR PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF
DRUGS, REFORM THE HEALTH CARE FINANCING AND SERVICE
DELIVERY SYSTEMS, AND CREATE PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN U.S.
AND RUSSIAN HOSPITALS. IN ADDITION, OTHER U.S.
AGENCIES, SUCH AS THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, THE
OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION, AND THE
UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY HAVE ALSO BEEN ACTIVE
IN THE HEALTH SECTOR. IN MID-1995, $6 MILLION IN
HOSPITAL EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES WILL BE DONATED BY DOD
TO HOSPITAL NO. TWO IN VLADIVOSTOK.
6. TURNING TO THE EIGHT PRIORITY AREAS IDENTIFIED BY
THE COMMITTEE FOR FUTURE ACTION, SHALALA NOTED THAT
BOTH THE U.S. AND RUSSIA AGREED THAT ALL EIGHT AREAS
ARE CRITICAL. SHALALA OFFERED A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF
THE FOUR PRIORITIES PROPOSED BY THE U.S. FIRST, IN
THE AREA OF HEALTH EDUCATION AND PROMOTION, SHALALA
NOTED THAT BOTH THE U.S. AND RUSSIA SHARE EXCESSIVE
LEVELS OF ACCIDENTS, PREVENTABLE ILLNESSES,
UNIMMUNIZED CHILDREN, AND LOW LEVELS OF MATERNAL
Page 3 of 7
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HEALTH. THE U.S. AND RUSSIA PLAN TO W R TOGETHER ON
OK
A PREVENTION INITIATIVE THAT WILL DEVELOP SYSTEMS TO
COLLECT SOUND EPIDEMIOLOGICAL DATA ON CRITICAL HEALTH
PROBLEMS. SECOND, BOTH IN RUSSIA AND THE U.S. THE
PRACTICE OF PRIMARY CARE MEDICINE REQUIRES
STRENGTHENING. RESPONSES TO THIS CHALLENGE INCLUDE
CREATING APPROPRIATE FINANCIAL INCENTIVES, IMPROVING
PRACTICE MANAGEMENT, AND CONTINUING CLINICAL
EDUCATION. THIRD, IN THE AREA OF HEALTH REFORM AND
POLICY DIALOGUE, BOTH THE U.S. AND RUSSIA SHARE COMMON
CONCERNS. THE U.S. AND RUSSIA CAN USE THIS PRIORITY
TO STRENGTHEN THE ROLE OF NATIONAL MINISTRIES OF
HEALTH AND TO ENHANCE PUBLIC HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURES.
FINALLY, IN THE AREA OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH, THE U.S.
AND RUSSIA NEED TO FIND WAYS TO SET PRIORITIES FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION AND PROTECT THOSE AT RISK. THE
HEALTH COMMITTEE WILL COOPERATE CLOSELY WITH THE
ENVIRONMENT COMMITTEE AND EPA TO ADDRESS THIS
CHALLENGE.
7. SHALALA REPORTED THE HEALTH COMMITTEE'S
RECOMMENDATION THAT THE COMMISSION ANNOUNCE TWO NEW
USAID-FUNDED INITIATIVES: A WOMEN'S REPRODUCTIVE
HEALTH PROJECT AND THE MTTA INITIATIVE. DESCRIBING
THE WOMAN'S HEALTH PROGRAM, SHALALA EXPLAINED THAT I T
WILL ADDRESS HIGH LEVELS OF MATERNAL MORTALITY AND
MORBIDITY CAUSED BY REPEAT ABORTIONS BY EDUCATING
WOMEN AND CLINICIANS ABOUT THE HEALTH BENEFITS OF
MODERN CONTRACEPTIVES. THE MTTA INITIATIVE WILL HELP
ACCELERATE PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN THE PRODUCTION OF
CRITICAL PHARMACEUTICALS IN RUSSIA THROUGH TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE, TRAINING AND THE GUARANTEED PURCHASE OF
DRUGS PRODUCED BY THE PROJECT. SHALALA NOTED THAT AN
MOH REPRESENTATIVE WOULD TRAVEL TO THE U.S. IN EARLY
1995 TO CONCLUDE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE PROJECT.
8. CONCLUDING HER REMARKS, SHALALA COMMENTED THAT THE
COMMITTEE HAD ESTABLISHED AN AMBITIOUS AND DIVERSE
AGENDA. SHE HOPED THAT ITS ACTIVITIES WOULD BE
FOCUSED ON PRACTICAL INITIATIVES THAT WOULD ENABLE
BOTH AMERICANS AND RUSSIANS TO LEAD HEALTHIER LIVES.
RESPONSES BY THE VP AND PM
UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 04 M S O 036526
OCW
STATE FOR OES/STH (ROCK), EUR/ISCA/CAST (FERGUSONAUGUSTUS) AND S/NIS/C (MACKLIN)
HHS FOR OIA (HOHMAN) , OIH/OASH (BOUFFORD) , AND
PHS/OASH (VOGEL/HENRY)
USDOC FOR (MOTTUN)
EPA FOR OIA (NITZE/WAXMONSKY)
STATE PASS OPIC FOR (BORPOE)
WHITE HOUSE FOR OSTP (WALES/BORIGHT/SCHWEITZER)
PASS USIA FOR (SIGMOND)
PASS AID FOR AID/NIS (TURNER)
PASS FDA (PENDERGAST/BUDASHEWITZ)
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Page 4 of 7
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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KGCC, TBIO, SOCI, RS
SUBJECT: GCC HEALTH COMMITTEE - REPORT TO VICE
PRESIDENT GORE AND PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN
1
9. VICE PRESIDENT GORE RESPONDED TO NECHAYEV S AND
SHALALA'S REPORTS BY COMMENDING THE MINISTERS FOR
THEIR HARD WORK AND THE COMMITTEE'S EARLY
ACCOMPLISHMENTS.
HE NOTED THAT THE IDEA FOR A HEALTH
COMMITTEE, THE MOST RECENT ADDITION TO THE GCC, HAD
GROWN
OUT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S SUGGESTION THAT
HEALTH-RELATED ISSUES BE ADDRESSED IN THE GCC FORUM.
THE VICE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED HIS OPTIMISM THAT WITH
COOPERATION FROM ALL SIDES THE COMMITTEE COULD
ACCOMPLISH MUCH TO BENEFIT W M N AND CHILDREN IN BOTH
OE
COUNTRIES.
10. PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN ECHOED THE VICE
PRESIDENT'S REMARKS AND ENDORSED THE SELECTION OF
PRIORITY AREAS. HE URGED THE U.S. AND RUSSIA TO
CONTINUE EFFORTS IN THE AREA OF MEDICAL RESEARCH, AND
REPORTED THAT HE WAS "VERY SATISFIED" WITH THE
COMMITTEE'S INITIAL EFFORTS.
GCC HEALTH COMMITTEE REPORT
BEGIN TEXT (ANNEXES OMITTED):
11. THE HEALTH COMMITTEE HELD ITS FIRST MEETING ON
DECEMBER 14, 1994, AT THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND
MEDICAL INDUSTRY. THE COMMITTEE TOOK STEPS TO
ESTABLISH A GOOD WORKING FOUNDATION FOR ITS FUTURE
EFFORTS BY ADOPTING: A CHARTER FOR THE COMMITTEE
(ANNEX 1) AND METHODS OF W R (ANNEX 2 ) . AGREEMENT
OK
WAS ALSO REACHED ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE
SECRETARIAT(S) (ANNEX 3 ) . THE COMMITTEE ENVISIONS ITS
ROLE TO BE ONE OF PROMOTING U.S.-RUSSIAN COOPERATION
IN THE HEALTH SECTOR, INCLUDING IDENTIFYING AND
REMOVING BARRIERS TO SMOOTH IMPLEMENTATION OF
COOPERATIVE EFFORTS; THE STIMULATION OF EXPANDED
COOPERATION IN IDENTIFIED AREAS, PARTICULARLY THROUGH
APPROPRIATE MULTI-DISCIPLINARY APPROACHES INVOLVING
BOTH GOVERNMENTAL AND PRIVATE SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS;
AND IMPROVEMENT OF PROGRAM RESULTS THROUGH COORDINATED
APPROACHES TO PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF
ACTIVITIES. THE COMMITTEE FELT THAT THE WIDEST
POSSIBLE INTERCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND EXPERTISE IN
AGREED AREAS SHOULD BE PROMOTED. THE NEED TO
COOPERATE WITH OTHER COMMISSION COMMITTEES,
PARTICULARLY THE ENVIRONMENT COMMITTEE AND THE
BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE, WAS NOTED.
12. THE CURRENT STATE OF COOPERATION IN THE HEALTH
Page 5 of 7
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD010\DEC94\MSGS\M 1424387.htm]
SECTOR BETWEEN THE U.S. AND RUSSIA WAS REVIEWED,
INCLUDING THOSE ACTIVITIES THAT ARE CARRIED OUT UNDER
THE AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION IN THE FIELDS OF PUBLIC
HEALTH AND BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH, SIGNED ON JANUARY 14,
1994. ALSO REVIEWED WERE USAID TECHNICAL SUPPORT
ACTIVITIES IN THE HEALTH SECTOR. THE COMMITTEE
EXPRESSED ITS SATISFACTION WITH THIS COOPERATION.
13. THE COMMITTEE IDENTIFIED EIGHT INITIAL AREAS FOR
COOPERATION UNDER THE GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN HEALTH
COMMITTEE AND REQUESTED THE SECRETARIAT(S) TO
ESTABLISH MECHANISMS TO DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT
APPROPRIATE PLANS OF ACTION AND TO REPORT THE RESULTS
AT THE NEXT COMMITTEE MEETING. THE AREAS ARE:
(A)
(B)
(C)
(D)
(E)
(F)
(G)
(H)
DIABETES;
HEALTH EDUCATION AND PROMOTION;
PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES;
STRENGTHENING PRIMARY CARE PRACTICE;
TUBERCULOSIS TREATMENT AND CONTROL;
MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH;
HEALTH REFORM AND POLICY DIALOGUE;
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH.
UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 04 M S O 036526
OCW
STATE FOR OES/STH (ROCK), EUR/ISCA/CAST (FERGUSONAUGUSTUS) AND S/NIS/C (MACKLIN)
HHS FOR OIA (HOHMAN), OIH/OASH (BOUFFORD), AND
PHS/OASH (VOGEL/HENRY)
USDOC FOR (MOTTUN)
EPA FOR OIA (NITZE/WAXMONSKY)
STATE PASS OPIC FOR (BORPOE)
WHITE HOUSE FOR OSTP (WALES/BORIGHT/SCHWEITZER)
PASS USIA FOR (SIGMOND)
PASS AID FOR AID/NIS (TURNER)
PASS FDA (PENDERGAST/BUDASHEWITZ)
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KGCC, TBIO, SOCI, RS
SUBJECT: GCC HEALTH COMMITTEE - REPORT TO VICE
PRESIDENT GORE AND PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN
14. THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDS THAT THE COMMISSION
ANNOUNCE THE FOLLOWING TWO NEW U.S.-RUSSIA
INITIATIVES, BOTH SUPPORTED BY THE U.S. AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, IN THE HEALTH SECTOR:
(A) WOMEN'S REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH INITIATIVE - THIS
PROGRAM OF TECHNICAL COOPERATION WILL ADDRESS HIGH
LEVELS OF MATERNAL MORTALITY AND MORBIDITY. I T WILL
INVOLVE COMMUNICATIONS ABOUT MODERN CONTRACEPTIVE
METHODS BOTH TO WOMEN AND HEALTH PROFESSIONALS, AND I T
WILL ESTABLISH MODEL FAMILY PLANNING CENTERS IN
APPROXIMATELY SIX OBLASTS.
(B) PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR COOPERATION - THIS PROGRAM
WILL TRANSFER MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY TO RUSSIA AND WILL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Page 6 of 7
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IMPROVE THE COUNTRY'S PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR, INCLUDING
PRODUCTION CAPACITY, DISTRIBUTION OF PRODUCTS, AS WELL
AS EDUCATION AND TRAINING I N THE USE OF SELECTED
PRODUCTS.
15.
THE NEXT COMMITTEE MEETING WILL BE HELD, BEFORE
THE NEXT COMMISSION MEETING, I N THE UNITED STATES I N
1995, AT A DATE TO BE MUTUALLY AGREED UPON.
END TEXT OF COMMITTEE REPORT.
BT
#6526
NNNN
SECT:
SECTION: 0 1 OF 04
< SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 04
< SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 04
< SECT>SECTION: 04 OF 04
A
A
A
SSN:
6526
< SSN>6526
< SSN>6526
< SSN>6526
A
A
A
TOR:
941220055208 M1424387
< TOR>941220055317 M1424389
< TOR>941220055324 M1424391
< TOR>941220055327 M1424392
A
A
A
DIST:
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PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: - OOMriDDtWIAL
LINEl:
OAACZYUW RUEHCAA70 8 9 3550737-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
LINE2:
ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZZK
LINE3:
0 210734Z DEC 94 ZFF4
LINE4:
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
OSRI:
DTG:
ORIG:
TO:
INFO:
RUEHC
210734Z DEC 94
SECSTATE WASHDC
RUEHNO/USMISSION
USNATO NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000
EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 0000
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 0000
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 0000
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 0000
RUEHCH/AMEMBASSY CHISINAU 0000
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU 0000
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 0000
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 0000
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 0000
RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN 0000
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY 0000
RUEHDB/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0000
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY T B I L I S I 0000
RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK 0000
RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA 0000
RUEHSL/AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA 0000
SUBJ:
DECEMBER 2 1 NAC:
GUIDANCE FOR DISCUSSION OF THE
VICE PRESIDENT'S V I S I T TO RUSSIA
TEXT:
- O O M f l - D G N T I A b . STATE
337089
E.O. 12356:
DECL: OADR
TAGS:
PREL, RS, NATO
SUBJECT: DECEMBER 2 1 NAC:
GUIDANCE FOR DISCUSSION OF THE
VICE PRESIDENT'S V I S I T TO RUSSIA
1.
freOUFIDENTIAlj-
-ENTIRE TEXT.
2. AMBASSADOR HUNTER MAY DRAW ON FOLLOWING POINTS TO BRIEF
ALLIES ON THE VICE PRESIDENT'S DECEMBER 14-16 V I S I T TO
MOSCOW.
3.
BEGIN POINTS.
-- VICE PRESIDENT GORE AND A LARGE DELEGATION WHICH
INCLUDED THE SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE, HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, AND COMMERCE, AND SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE STATE
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
PER
13526
�F:\Cable\Data
Source\Cables\CD010\DEC94\MSGS\M1426442.html
DEPARTMENT, TREASURY,
COMMISSION, OPIC, AND
M S O DECEMBER 14-16
OCW
THE GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN
NASA, THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL VISITED
FOR THE FOURTH SEMI-ANNUAL SESSION OF
COMMISSION.
-- TOGETHER WITH RUSSIAN PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN, THE
VICE PRESIDENT SIGNED THREE AGREEMENTS (ARCTIC POLLUTION,
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE AND EDUCATION, AND
CUSTOMS ASPECTS OF SPACE COOPERATION); 12 STATEMENTS OR
MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING ON TRADE AND SCIENTIFIC AND
TECHNICAL COOPERATION SUBJECTS WERE ISSUED BY THE
CO-CHAIRMEN OF THE COMMISSION'S EIGHT COMMITTEES; AND SIX
JOINT STATEMENTS WERE ISSUED.
-- THE VICE-PRESIDENT'S PRIVATE AND PLENARY MEETINGS WITH
TNE PRIME MINISTER WERE PRODUCTIVE AND POSITIVE, AS WERE
THE COMMITTEE MEETINGS. TECHNICAL IN SUBSTANCE, THE W R
OK
OF THE GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN COMMISSION HAS ESTABLISHED
PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CABINET OFFICERS AND
SUB-CABINET OFFICIALS OF A WIDE RANGE OF AGENCIES IN THE
TWO GOVERNMENTS. BEYOND THE PERSONAL CONTACTS, THE
COMMISSION HAS BEEN AN IMPORTANT MECHANISM IN BROADENING
AND DEEPENING U.S.-RUSSIAN PARTNERSHIP BY MAKING CLEAR TO
GROUPS AND BUREAUCRACIES OUTSIDE THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS AREA
THAT PARTNERSHIP HAS TANGIBLE AND MUTUAL BENEFITS.
-- THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT HAD IMPORTANT FOREIGN POLICY
DIMENSIONS WHICH ARE OF GREATEST INTEREST TO THIS GROUP.
IT WAS A TIMELY VISIT, COMING JUST AFTER FOREIGN MINISTER
KOZYREV'S UNEXPECTED ANNOUNCEMENT DECEMBER 1 THAT HE WOULD
NOT BE APPROVING THE INDIVIDUAL PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM
DOCUMENTS IN VIEW OF THE LANGUAGE OF THE NAC COMMUNIQUE
REGARDING NATO ENLARGEMENT, AND FOLLOWING PRESIDENT
YELTSIN'S EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN IN BUDAPEST ON DECEMBER 5
ABOUT THE POTENTIAL FOR A RE-DIVISION OF EUROPE AND THE
EMERGENCE OF A "COLD PEACE."
-- THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT SIGNIFICANTLY AND DIRECTLY
ADDRESSED THE SOURCES OF U.S.-RUSSIAN FRICTIONS REFLECTED
IN FOREIGN MINISTER KOYZREV'S AND PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S
STATEMENTS, AND RESULTED IN IMPORTANT REAFFIRMATIONS OF:
THE RELEVANCE AND VALIDITY OF U.S.-RUSSIAN PARTNERSHIP; OF
BOTH SIDES' DESIRE TO DEVELOP THAT PARTNERSHIP AND; OF BOTH
SIDES' DESIRE TO MANAGE THEIR DIFFERENCES THROUGH PRIVATE
DIALOGUE AND TO RE-INVIGORATE THE U.S. -RUSSIAN
RELATIONSHIP. IN THAT RESPECT, I T WAS SIGNIFICANT THAT THE
RUSSIANS MADE NO LINKAGE BETWEEN RECENT FRICTIONS AND THE
PROGRESS OF W R ON ANY OF THE NUMEROUS ELEMENTS OF OUR
OK
BILATERAL COOPERATION.
-- BESIDES MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, THE VICE
PRESIDENT SPENT AN HOUR WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN, THEN
RECUPERATING FROM MINOR SURGERY, IN HIS HOSPITAL ROOM.
PRESIDENT YELTSIN WAS WELL, AND ENERGETIC. IN ADDITION,
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE TALBOTT MET FOR 90 MINUTES WITH
FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV, AND ALSO WITH MR. RYURIKOV IN THE
KREMLIN.
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-- IN THESE MEETINGS WITH THE RUSSIAN PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN
MINISTER, OUR OFFICIALS FOCUSSED ON THE OVERALL ISSUES OF
EVOLVING EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE, INCLUDING
EXPANSION OF THE ALLIANCE, OVER WHICH THE RUSSIANS HAD
EXPRESSED CONCERN.
-- THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER AND
FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV WILL MEET SOMETIME IN JANUARY TO
CONTINUE THESE DISCUSSIONS, AND ALSO THAT THE VICE
PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER WILL THEMSELVES RETURN TO THE
ISSUES IN THE FUTURE.
-- BEYOND THESE UNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT CHANNELS, THE VICE
PRESIDENT AND DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT SOUGHT TO IDENTIFY,
TOGETHER WITH THEIR RUSSIAN INTERLOCUTORS AREAS OF RUSSIAN
MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT NATO ENLARGEMENT. WE REVIEWED WITH
THE RUSSIANS EXACTLY WHAT THE NAC COMMUNIQUE SAYS AND DOES
NOT SAY. THE VICE PEREIDENT NOTED THAT 1995 WILL BE A YEAR
OF STUDIES AND CONSULTATIONS. THE VICE PRESIDENT AFFIRMED
THE ALLIANCE'S INTENT TO TAKE IN NEW MEMBERS AND THE
PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN IN SEPTEMBER
THAT NATO EXPANSION WAS INEVITABLE, AND STRESSED THAT THE
PROCESS WOULD BE GRADUAL AND TRANSPARENT. THE VICE
PRESIDENT MADE CLEAR THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO AGREEMENT ON
WHEN THE ALLIANCE WILL TAKE IN NEW MEMBERS, OR WHAT
COUNTRIES ARE THE MOST LIKELY CANDIDATES. WE ALSO
UNDERSCORED OUR INTENT TO MANAGE ENLARGEMENT IN A MANNER
THAT ENHANCES THE SECURITY OF ALL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
THROUGH A GRADUAL, TRANSPARENT AND DELIBERATE PROCESS.
-- RUSSIAN LEADERS AND RUSSIAN OFFICIALS DISCUSSED THE
NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE RUSSIAN DOMESTIC POLITICAL
SCENE OF NATO EXPANSION WHICH COULD BE PERCEIVED AS
PRECIPTIOUS AND CONTRIBUTING TO THE SECURITY OF OTHERS' AT
THE EXPENSE OF RUSSIA'S OWN SECURITY. THE RUSSIANS SAID
THEY HAD INTERPRETED PRONOUNCEMENTS SINCE THE SEPTEMBER
WASHINGTON SUMMIT TO MEAN THAT THE UNITED STATES AND NATO
WERE SUBORDINATING, I F NOT ABANDONING, INTEGRATION TO NATO
EXPANSION. THE RUSSIANS SAID THEY HAD INTERPRETED
PRONOUNCEMENTS SINCE THE SEPTEMBER WASHINGTON SUMMIT TO
MEAN THAT THE UNITED STATES AND NATO WERE ABANDONING, I F
NOT SUBORDINATING, INTEGRATION TO NATO EXPANSION. BASED ON
OUR DISCUSSIONS W BELIEVE I T IS POSSIBLE THAT RUSSIAN
E
LEADERS AND OFFICIALS MISUNDERSTOOD THE CONTEXT AND MEANING
OF THE NAC COMMUNIQUE. THIS MISUNDERSTANDING WAS PARTLY
DRIVEN BY PRESS ACCOUNTS WHICH EMPHASIZED THE NATO
DIMENSION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE TO THE NEGLECT
OF, OR ABSENT ANY REFERENCE TO, THE CSCE, PFP, WEU, EU, AND
OTHER BODIES OR MECHANISMS IN WHICH NON-MEMBERS OF THE
ALLIANCE CAN PROJECT THEIR INTERESTS IN EUROPEAN SECURITY
ISSUES.
-- RUSSIAN LEADERS AND OFFICIALS DID NOT ENDORSE NATO
ENLARGEMENT. NOR DID THEY CLAIM A VETO OVER IT. THEY
AFFIRMED THAT NATO ENLARGEMENT POSES DIFFICULTIES FOR THEM
BECAUSE NATO IS STILL PERCEIVED IN RUSSIA AS A MILITARY
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ALLIANCE SYSTEM WHICH I S EITHER DIRECTED AT THEM, OR I S
MAINTAINED AND PLANS TO EXPAND PENDING THE FAILURE OF
RUSSIAN DEMOCRACY AND RUSSIAN ECONOMIC REFORM.
RUSSIAN
LEADERS AND OFFICIALS DID INDICATE, HOWEVER, THAT THEY ARE
PREPARED TO CHANGE THEIR MINDS, AND THEIR PERCEPTIONS,
ABOUT NATO.
-- WE RESPONDED TO THESE CONCERNS BY UNDERSCORING OUR
COMMITMENTS BOTH TO NATO EXPANSION AND TO BUILDING AN
UNDIVIDED, SECURE, AND STABLE EUROPE. WE EMPHASIZED THAT
DYNAMIC AND STRONG RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN NATO AND RUSSIA,
BETWEEN THE U.S. AND RUSSIA, AND BETWEEN THE OTHER MEMBERS
OF THE ALLIANCE AND RUSSIA, ARE ESSENTIAL TO FUTURE
EUROPEAN AND RUSSIAN SECURITY. WE ALSO REPORTED THAT WE
HAVE FULFILLED BOTH THE S P I R I T AND LETTER OF OUR
UNDERTAKING THAT EXPANSION WOULD TAKE PLACE THROUGH A
GRADUAL AND TRANSPARENT PROCESS WITH NO SURPRISES FOR
ANYONE, INCLUDING MOSCOW.
-- WE ADVISED THE RUSSIANS THAT WE HOPED THEY WOULD BE
ALBLE TO SIGN THE IPP DOCUMENTS I N THE NEAR FUTURE (WE
EXPECT THIS WILL HAPPEN BEFORE SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER AND
FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV MEET I N JANUARY). THE VICE
PRESIDENT PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY STATED THAT THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT HOPED THE MATTER OF CHECHENYA WOULD BE ENDED
WITH MINIMAL BLOODSHED AND THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. THE VICE
PRESIDENT EMPHASIZED THIS WAS AN INTERNAL RUSSIAN MATTER.
END POINTS.
4. BRATISLAVA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
CHRISTOPHER
BT
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Page 1 of4
Cab
PREC:
ROUTINE
CLASS:
COMreDGNTIMi
LINEl:
RAACZYUW RUEHMOA674 7 3561256 -CCCC--RHEHAAA.
LINE2:
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3:
R 221256Z DEC 94
LINE4:
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
OSRI:
DTG:
ORIG:
TO:
INFO:
SUBJ:
RUEHMO
221256Z DEC 94
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8593
RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC
RUKGNFA/NRC WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DOE WASHDC
GC-4: NRC-GAN
(SELIN-VISHNEVSKIY) MEETING
TEXT:
G 0 tl -F I"D • N T I A L
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 036747
STATE FOR EUR/ISCA AND PM/NE;
NRC FOR OIP AND CHAIRMAN SELIN;
DOE FOR NE-1 (LASH) AND S - l (BERLS);
WHITEHOUSE FOR OSTP (VON HIPPEL)
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: TRGY, KGCC, ENRG, ECON, RS, US
SUBJECT: GC-4: NRC-GAN (SELIN-VISHNEVSKIY) MEETING
DURING THE GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN COMMISSION
SUMMARY
1.
AT MEETINGS HELD DECEMBER 14 I N MOSCOW,
GOSATOMNADZOR (GAN), CHAIRMAN YURI VISHNEVSKIY AND
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC) CHAIRMAN IVAN
SELIN DISCUSSED A RANGE OF TOPICS RELATED TO NUCLEAR
SAFETY, INCLUDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LONG-TERM
IMPROVEMENTS I N NUCLEAR SAFETY AND CONTINUED REFORM OF
RUSSIA'S ENERGY SECTOR. I N VISHNEVSKIY'S VIEW, ENERGY
SECTOR REFORM AND DECENTRALIZATION OF AUTHORITY I N THE
NUCLEAR SPHERE WILL ENHANCE NUCLEAR SAFETY;
UNFORTUNATELY, THE MINISTRY OF ATOMIC ENERGY (MINATOM)
OPPOSES SUCH REFORM. ON OTHER TOPICS, VISHNEVSKIY
NOTED THAT MINATOM HAS NO INCENTIVE FOR CLOSING THE
TOMSK-7 (SVERSK) AND KRASNOARSK-26 (ZHELEZNOGORSK)
PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION REACTORS AND DESCRIBED THE SAFETY
SITUATION AT THE KOLA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT AS SERIOUS
BUT SAW NO SHORT-TERM REMEDY FOR THE PROBLEM. END
SUMMARY.
PER E O 13526
..
�F:\CabIe\Data_Source\Cables\CD010\DEC94\MSGS\M1429528.html
1
VISHNEVSKIY S VIEW OF MINATOM AND ENERGY SECTOR REFORM
2. VISHNEVSKIY OUTLINED THE STRUCTURE OF THE
ELECTRICITY SECTOR, FrOM PRODUCTION TO TRANSMISSION TO
PRICING. HE STATED THAT THE NATIONAL ENERGY MONOPOLY
(KNOWN AT RAO EES ROSSII OR UNIFIED ENERGY SYSTEMS UES) O N AND OPERATES VIRTUALLY ALL OF RUSSIA'S
WS
ELECTRICAL GRID AND THEREFORE IS ABLE TO DETERMINE
WHICH PRODUCTION FACILITIES CAN SELL THEIR PRODUCTION.
StNCE UES DIRECTLY O N MOST OF RUSSIA'S LARGE THERMAL
WS
(FOSSIL FUEL) POWER PLANTS AND HAS INTERESTS IN ALMOST
ALL NON-NUCLEAR ENERGY PRODUCERS IN RUSSIA, THE
COMPANY IS FINANCIALLY MOTIVATED TO PURCHASE
ELECTRICITY FROM ITS OWN PRODUCERS FIRST, LEAVING
NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS IN THE DE FACTO POSITION OF SWING
LOAD PRODUCERS.
3. VISHNEVSKIY EXPLAINED THAT THE FINANCIAL IMPACT ON
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS OF UES'S PURCHASING DECISIONS ARE
AMPLIFIED GREATLY BY TWO FACTS: FIRST, MANY
ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS DO NOT PAY THEIR ENERGY BILLS SO
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT MONEY TO PAY ALL ENERGY
PRODUCERS. SECOND, UES ACTS AS THE NATIONAL
ELECTRICAL BILL COLLECTOR AND THEN DECIDES WHICH
PRODUCERS SHOULD BE PAID. NOT SURPRISINGLY, UES PAYS
ITS OWN BILLS FIRS, THEN THOSE OF THE PLANTS I T OWNS
OR CONTROLS. NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS RECEIVE LITTLE (IF
ANY) FUNDS. WHILE ELECTRICAL RATES ARE SET BY
RUSSIA'S STATE ELECTRICITY COMMISSION (WHICH OPERATES
MUCH LIKE A LOCAL PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION IN THE
U.S.), THE ABILITY TO SET RATES MEANS LITTLE IN A
MARKET WHERE CONSUMERS TO NOT PAY THEIR BILL.
4. OF THE FUNDS WHICH DO FIND THEIR WAY TO THE NUCLEAR
POWER SECTOR, MOST OF THE MONEY GOES TO THE POWER
STATIONS THEMSELVES, WITH 10 TO 12 PERCENT OF THE
REVENUES GOING TO ROSENERGOATOM AND 3 PERCENT TO
MINATOM. (COMMENT: IN ADDITION, NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
PAY SMALLER PERCENTAGES TO THE DESIGN BUREAU IN CHARGE
OF THE REACTORS IN USE, TO THE PLANTS "SCIENTIFIC
ADVISOR" AND TO OTHERS). WHILE THE FACT THAT MINATOM
RECEIVE 3 PERCENT OF THE REVENUE RECEIVED BY NUCLEAR
POWER PLANTS MIGHT SEEM TO BE AN INCENTIVE TO MINATOM
TO SUPPORT ENERGY SECTOR REFORMS WHICH COULD INCREASE
PAYMENTS TO THE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, VISHNEVSKIY
BELIEVES THAT MINATOM OPPOSES SUCH REFORMS. HE
POINTED OUT THAT THE 3 PERCENT OF THE REVENUE WHICH
MINATOM RECEIVES IS SMALL WHEN COMPARED TO PAYMENTS
WHICH MINATOM RECEIVES FROM THE POWER PLANTS FOR
NUCLEAR FUEL. AT PRESENT, MINATOM IS CHARGING PRICES
HIGHER THAN WORLD PRICES FOR ITS FUEL. MINATOM USES
REVENUES GENER
ATED FROM FUEL SALES TO FUND ITS
PRIORITY PROGRAMS FOR EXPANSION, INCLUDING THE
DEVELOPMENT AND EVENTUAL CONSTRUCTION OF NEW REACTORS.
IF THE ENERGY SECTOR WERE REFORMED AND THE PRICING
SECTOR WERE RATIONALIZED, MINATOM FEARS THAT I T WOULD
LOOSE ITS CAPTIVE MARKET FOR OVERPRICED FUEL.
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FUNDING FOR REPLACEMENT POWER
5. VISHNEVSKIY AND SELIN ALSO DISCUSSED THE QUESTION
C 6 iUP I D C M T J A L
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 02 OF 02 M S O 036747
OCW
STATE FOR EUR/ISCA AND PM/NE;
NRC FOR OIP AND CHAIRMAN SELIN;
DOE FOR NE-1 (LASH) AND S-l (BERLS);
WHITEHOUSE FOR OSTP (VON HIPPEL)
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: TRGY, KGCC, ENRG, ECON, RS, US
SUBJECT: GC-4: NRC-GAN (SELIN-VISHNEVSKIY) MEETING
DURING THE GORE - CHERNOMYRDIN COMMISSION
OF FINDING REPLACEMENT POWER FOR THE PLUTONIUM
PRODUCTION REACTORS AT TOMSK-7 AND KRASNOYARSK-26.
VISHNEVSKIY BELIEVES THAT THE REAL ISSUE BLOCKING
PROGRESS IS NOT THE ABILITY OF MINATOM OR THE GOR TO
FUND THE CONSTRUCTION OF REPLACEMENT ENERGY SOURCES,
IT IS THE WILLINGNESS OF MINATOM TO ALLOW SUCH WORK TO
PROCEED. VISHNEVSKIY EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT I F NO
NUCLEAR REPLACEMENT SOURCES ARE BUILT, THEN MINATOM
WILL SIMPLY CONTINUE OPERATING THE PLUTONIUM
PRODUCTION REACTORS (PERHAPS IN SOME MODIFIED FORM)
AND WILL THEREFORE "WIN" THE ARGUMENT OVER THEIR
CLOSURE. ONE FINANCING SCHEME FOR REPLACEMENT POWER
DISCUSSED INVOLVED USING RUSSIA'S LARGE EXCESS
RESERVES OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM TO FINANCE (EITHER
DIRECTLY OR BY USING THE HEU AS LOAN COLLATERAL) THE
CONSTRUCTION OF FOSSIL FUEL PLANTS. VISHNEVSKIY NOTED
THAT WHILE THE CONCEPT HAS MERIT WHEN CONSIDERED IN
THE ABSTRACT, THE POLITICAL REALITY IN RUSSIA IS THAT
MINATOM "OWNS" THE NATION'S HEU STOCKPILE AND WILL
REFUSE TO ALLOW ANY OF I T TO BE USED TO BUILD FOSSIL
POWER PLANTS WHICH MINATOM MINISTER MIKHAYLOV VIEWS AS
A THREAT TO HIS EMPIRE.
6. EMBASSY COMMENT: VISHNEVSKIY HAS BEEN ARGUING FOR
THE CLOSURE OF THE PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION REACTORS AT
TOMSK-7 AND KRASNOYARSK-26 ON SAFETY GROUNDS FOR OVER
TWO YEARS AND THEREFORE HAS BOTH A STRONG PERSONAL
INTEREST IN EFFORTS TO LOCATE REPLACEMENT ENERGY
SOURCES AND CONSIDERABLE EXPERIENCE IN DEALING WITH
MINATOM ON THIS ISSUE. HIS VIEW OF MINATOM'S GAME
PLAN FOR THE PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION REACTORS IS BASED
BOTH ON EXPERIENCE AND FRUSTRATION. I T IS IMPORTANT
TO NOTE THAT THIS STRUGGLE OVER THE FATE OF RUSSIA'S
THREE REMAINING PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION REACTORS IS JUST
ONE SMALL EXAMPLE OF THE CONTINUING CHALLENGES GAN
FACES AS I T ATTEMPTS TO FULFILL IS LEGAL ROLE AS
RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR SAFETY WATCHDOG -- A ROLE WHICH OFTEN
PITS GAN AGAINST POWERFUL ENTERPRISES AND MINISTRIES
(INCLUDING MINATOM AS WELL AS MOST NUCLEAR ENTERPRISES
Page 3 of 4
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OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE) WHICH COMMAND MANY MORE
RESOURCES AND MUCH MORE POLITICAL CLOUT THAN GAN. END
COMMENT.
SAFETY AT KOLA
7. WHILE DISCUSSING PROSPECTS FOR THE PROBLEM-PLAGUED
KOLA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, VISHNEVSKIY NOTED THAT THE
PROBLEMS FACED BY THE PLANT ARE MORE SERIOUS THAN AT
OTHER RUSSIAN F A C I L I T I E S SINCE THE PERSONNEL/SOCIAL
PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE FINANCIAL CRISIS FACING THE
NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY I S EXACERBATED BY THE EXTREME
REMOTENESS AND COLD OF THE KOLA PENINSULA.
VISHNEVSKIY SUGGESTED THAT A MOVE TO REGIONAL ELECTRIC
HOLDING COMPANIES COULD LEAD TO REPLACEMENT OF
EXISTING PLANTS AND/OR IMPROVED SAFETY BY INSURING
THAT THE KOLA PLANT RECEIVES REVENUES FOR THE ENERGY
I T PRODUCES.
(NOTE: THE KOLA PLANT'S PRIMARY
CUSTOMERS ARE MINING ENTERPRISES ON THE KOLA
PENINSULA.) ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF EXPORTING
EXCESS ELECTRICITY TO GENERATE ADDITIONAL FUNDS,
VISHNEVSKIY NOTED THAT ALTHOUGH THE KOLA REGION HAS AN
ENERGY SURPLUS, THE EXISTING LOW VOLTAGE GRIDS AND THE
HIGH CAPITAL COSTS OF REPLACING THEM MAKE ENERGY
EXPORTS IMPRACTICAL.
PICKERING
BT
#6747
NNNN
SECT:
SSN:
SECTION: 01 OF 02
<"SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
6747
< SSN>6747
A
TOR:
941222075713 M1429528
< TOR>941222075815 M1429529
A
DIST:
PRT: FUERTH S I T
S I T : BEYRLE BRANSCUM BURNS NSC STERN SUM SUM2
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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Cable
PREC:
PRIORITY
CLASS:
UNCLASSIFIED
LINEl:
PAAUZYUW RUEHMOA6 812 3 561658 -UUUU--RHEHAAA.
LINE2:
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
LINE3:
P 221658Z DEC 94
LINE4:
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
OSRI:
DTG:
ORIG:
TO:
RUEHMO
221658Z DEC 94
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8688
INFO:
RUEHLN/AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 3 903
SUBJ:
U.S.-RUSSIA BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT
TEXT:
UNCLAS SECTION 0 1 OF 03 MOSCOW 036812
DEPT FOR OES/SCP AND EUR/ISCA
WHITEHOUSE FOR OSTP
NSC FOR JBEYRLE
OVP FOR LFUERTH
USDOC
USDOC
USDOC
USDOC
USDOC
FOR
FOR
FOR
FOR
FOR
1100/ITA/JKALICKI
6100/MCOPPS
3133/USFCS/OIO/NIS/GKNOWLES
4231/IEP/EUR/OEERIS/RISD/JBROUGHER
4201/IEP/EUR/OEERIS/BISNIS/LNEMEC
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KGCC, TSPL, BEXP, BMGT, ECON, US, RS
SUBJECT: U.S.-RUSSIA BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT
COMMITTEE'S REPORT TO THE GORE - CHERNOMYRDIN
COMMISSION
1.
U.S. SECRETARY OF COMMERCE RON BROWN AND
RUSSIAN DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER DAVYDOV, JOINED BY
HIGH-LEVEL REPRESENTATIVES OF U.S. AND RUSSIAN
TRADE AND INVESTMENT AGENCIES, DELIVERED THE
REPORT OF THE U.S.-RUSSIAN BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT
COMMITTEE TO THE ASSEMBLED GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN
COMMISSION ON DECEMBER 16, 1994, I N MOSCOW. THIS
CABLE SUMMARIZES THE MAIN POINTS OF THE
PRESENTATIONS.
BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE (BDC)
2.
SECRETARY BROWN OPENED THE U.S. SIDE'S REPORT
BY NOTING THE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS THAT HAS BEEN
MADE ON THE COMMERCIAL FRONT, PARTICULARLY SINCE
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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THE LAST GCC MEETING IN JUNE 1994. HE POINTED TO
THE SIGNIFICANT GROWTH IN U.S.-RUSSIAN TWO WAY
TRADE, AND ESPECIALLY TO RAPIDLY INCREASING
RUSSIAN EXPORTS TO THE U.S., AS TANGIBLE EVIDENCE
OF THIS PROGRESS. HE PRAISED THE "PARTNERSHIP FOR
ECONOMIC PROGRESS" SIGNED IN SEPTEMBER BY
PRESIDENTS CLINTON AND YELTSIN FOR ELEVATING U.S.RUSSIAN COMMERCIAL RELATIONS TO A NEW LEVEL OF
PRIORITY. THE SECRETARY EMPHASIZED FUTURE ISSUES
FOR JOINT WORK BY THE BDC, INCLUDING "ECONOMY IN
TRANSITION" STATUS FOR RUSSIA, REDUCTION OF
TARIFFS THAT ARE SUPPRESSING U.S. EXPORTS TO
RUSSIA IN KEY SECTORS SUCH AS MOTOR VEHICLES AND
CHOCOLATE CONFECTIONERY, BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATY RATIFICATION, AND INTENSIFICATION OF A
JOINT DIALOGUE ON COMMERCIAL TAXATION ISSUES.
3.
SECRETARY BROWN NOTED THE IMPORTANCE OF OIL
AND GAS PROJECTS AND ISSUES TO THE OVERALL U.S.RUSSIAN COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIP AND EMPHASIZED THE
NEED FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BDC'S RECENTLY
CONCLUDED OIL AND GAS TAX REPORT. HE PRAISED
PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN'S RECENT DECREE
EXEMPTING SIX JOINT VENTURES FROM THE CRIPPLING
OIL EXPORT TAX AND EXPRESSED HIS HOPE THAT THE
RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD SOON APPROVE SIMILAR
EXEMPTIONS FOR OTHER JOINT VENTURES. THE
SECRETARY EMPHASIZED THAT A NUMBER OF STEPS STILL
NEED TO BE TAKEN TO CATALYZE NEW PROGRESS ON
COMMERCIAL OIL AND GAS PROJECTS IN RUSSIA,
INCLUDING PROVISION OF ADEQUATE PIPELINE ACCESS TO
WESTERN JOINT VENTURE, EARLY PASSAGE OF PRODUCTION
SHARING LEGISLATION BY THE RUSSIAN PARLIAMENT,
CONCLUSION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF AN EXIMBANKGAZPROM FINANCING ACCORD AND REMOVAL OF OBSTACLES
TO MORE RAPID IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXIM OIL AND
GAS FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT. SECRETARY BROWN ADDED
THAT THE BDC'S DIALOGUE ON OIL AND GAS COMMERCIAL
ISSUES HAD BEEN COMPLEMENTED BY THE VERY POSITIVE
AND PRODUCTIVE WORK OF THE GCC'S ENERGY POLICY
COMMITTEE.
4.
THE SECRETARY HIGHLIGHTED NEW PLANS FOR
UPCOMING BDC INITIATIVES, INCLUDING A JOINT
DIALOGUE ON COMMERCIAL TAXATION, A RUSSIAN
BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT MISSION TO THE U.S. IN 1995,
A NEW WORKING GROUP TO PROMOTE COMMERCIAL
COOPERATION BETWEEN THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST AND THE
AMERICAN NORTHWEST, THE OPENING OF NEW AMERICAN
BUSINESS CENTERS AND THE CREATION OF A NEW RUSSIAN
BUSINESS INFORMATION SERVICE.
MACROECONOMIC ISSUES
5.
SECRETARY BROWN THEN ASKED TREASURY
UNDERSECRETARY LARRY SUMMERS TO SAY A FEW WORDS
ABOUT THE INTERSECTION OF MACROECONOMIC POLICY AND
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Page 2 of 6
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BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT. U/S UNDERSCORED THE
CRITICALITY OF THE OVERALL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT IN
RUSSIA TO THE ATTRACTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND
BUSINESS DEVE
LOPMENT IN GENERAL. HE POINTED TO
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 M S O 036812
OCW
DEPT FOR OES/SCP AND EUR/ISCA
WHITEHOUSE FOR OSTP
NSC FOR JBEYRLE
OVP FOR LFUERTH
USDOC
USDOC
USDOC
USDOC
USDOC
FOR
FOR
FOR
FOR
FOR
1100/ITA/JKALICKI
6100/MCOPPS
3133/USFCS/OIO/NIS/GKNOWLES
4231/IEP/EUR/OEERIS/RISD/JBROUGHER
4201/IEP/EUR/OEERIS/BISNIS/LNEMEC
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KGCC, TSPL, BEXP, BMGT, ECON, US, RS
SUBJECT: U.S.-RUSSIA BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT
COMMITTEE'S REPORT TO THE GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN
COMMISSION
THE RECENT PROLIFERATION OF PRIVATE INVESTMENT
FUNDS TARGETING RUSSIAN EQUITIES AS EVIDENCE THAT
ECONOMIC REFORM IS SPARKING INVESTOR INTEREST. HE
EMPHASIZED THAT STABILITY OF THE RUBLE IS A
PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT GOAL FOR RUSSIA TO PURSUE:
ALTHOUGH I T HAD ACHIEVED MUCH ON THIS FRONT IN THE
FIRST 2/3 OF THIS YEAR, SOME RECENT SLIPPAGE WAS
APPARENT. HE ALSO EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF
REACHING A NEW IMF AGREEMENT, WHICH IN TURN WOULD
STRENGTHEN THE RUBLE, CREATE INCENTIVES FOR THE
RETURN OF SOME FLIGHT CAPITAL, ENCOURAGE RUSSIA'S
CREDITORS TO RENEGOTIATE ITS DEBTS ON A MULTI-YEAR
BASIS, AND STIMULATE NEW FOREIGN INVESTMENT. KEY
OBSTACLES TO REACHING A NEW IMF AGREEMENT, U/S
SUMMERS ADDED, WOULD BE DIFFERING ESTIMATES OF
RUSSIA'S BUDGET DEFICIT AND UNCERTAINTIES OVER
RUSSIA'S PLEDGE TO ELIMINATE OIL EXPORT QUOTAS AS
OF JAN. 1, 1995.
U.S. ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA
6.
U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR TOM DINE BRIEFLY EXPLAINED
AID'S ROLE AND APPROACH IN RUSSIA. HE NOTED THAT,
IN GENERAL TERMS, AID SEEKS TO ASSIST THE
DEVELOPMENT IN RUSSIA OF AN ENVIRONMENT CONDUCIVE
TO INDIVIDUAL PROSPERITY AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP.
AID, HE NOTES, PROMOTES PRIVATIZATION, COMPETITION
AND AN OVERALL MARKET-BASED ECONOMY IN RUSSIA BY
HELPING THE GOVERNMENT DRAFT LAWS SUPPORTING
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP, BANKRUPTCY, DEMONOPOLIZATION,
CAPITAL MARKETS, SECURITIES AND BANKING. MR. DINE
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Page 3 of 6
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EMPHASIZED IN PARTICULAR THE CRITICAL CONTRIBUTION
THAT AID'S WORK HAD MADE TO RUSSIA'S MASS
PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM.
OPIC
7.
OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION
PRESIDENT RUTH HARKIN DESCRIBED HER AGENCY'S
AGGRESSIVE APPROACH TO SUPPORTING U.S. INVESTMENT
IN RUSSIA. OPIC HAS APPROVED OVER USD 2.5 BILLION
IN INSURANCE AND LOANS TO THE NIS, MOST OF WHICH
HAS GONE TO RUSSIA. TO DATE, OPIC HAS SUPPORTED
U.S. INVESTMENTS IN RUSSIA IN TELECOM, OIL,
PRINTING, COMPUTERS, AND TRUCKING, AND IS
PREPARING NEW PROJECTS IN PORTS, HEALTH,
MANUFACTURING AND INFRASTRUCTURE. AT THE JUNE GCC
MEETING, MS. HARKIN NOTED, OPIC HAD SIGNED
PROTOCOLS FOR FINANCE AND INSURANCE IN RUSSIA
SUPPORTING OVER USD 0.5 BILLION IN U.S.
INVESTMENT. FINALLY, SHE POINTED TO THE MANY
PRIVATE INVESTMENT FUNDS SUPPORTED BY OPIC INCLUDING A NEW AGRIBUSINESS FUND OF USD 100
MILLION - AS EVIDENCE OF OPIC'S WILLINGNESS TO USE
A VARIETY OF CHANNELS TO SUPPORT INVESTMENT IN
RUSSIA.
TDA
8.
U.S. TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT AGENCY DIRECTOR
JOSEPH GRANDMAISON EXPLAINED THAT TDA HAD PROVIDED
GRANT FUNDING FOR 70 FEASIBILITY STUDIES IN RUSSIA
TO DATE TOTALLING OVER USD 26 MILLION. IN 1995
HIS AGENCY PLANS TO PROVIDE ANOTHER USD 15
MILLION. TDA-SUPPORTED PROJECTS HIGHLIGHTED BY
MR. GRANDMAISON INCLUDED THE IL-96M AIRCRAFT, ATI
DIESEL/HERCULES AND ZIL/CATERPILLAR. A PRIORITY
FOR THE FUTURE, HE NOTED, WOULD BE MORE AGGRESSIVE
FOLLOW-UP ON TDA-SUPPORTED PROJECTS IN RUSSIA TO
ENSURE THAT THEY RESULT IN COMPLETED INVESTMENTS
AND U.S. EXPORTS.
OMBUDSMAN REPORT
UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 M S O 036812
OCW
DEPT FOR OES/SCP AND EUR/ISCA
WHITEHOUSE FOR OSTP
NSC FOR JBEYRLE
OVP FOR LFUERTH
USDOC
USDOC
USDOC
USDOC
USDOC
FOR
FOR
FOR
FOR
FOR
1100/ITA/JKALICKI
6100/MCOPPS
3133/USFCS/OIO/NIS/GKNOWLES
4231/IEP/EUR/OEERIS/RISD/JBROUGHER
4201/IEP/EUR/OEERIS/BISNIS/LNEMEC
Page 4 of 6
�F:\Cable\Data Soiirce\Cables\CD010\DEC94\MSGS\M1430009.html
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KGCC, TSPL, BEXP, BMGT, ECON, US, RS
SUBJECT: U.S.-RUSSIA BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT
COMMITTEE'S REPORT TO THE GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN
COMMISSION
9.
U.S. OMBUDSMAN JAN KALICKI DESCRIBED THE
MAJOR ACTIVITIES AND RESULTS OF THE U.S. AND
RUSSIAN OMBUDSMEN FOR ENERGY AND COMMERCIAL
RELATIONS. ON THE ENERGY SIDE, 2 JOINT VENTURES
(PRIOKSKOYE AND VANYOGAN) HAD BEEN ELEVATED TO
PRIORITY STATUS, POLAR LIGHTS HAD PRODUCED ITS
FIRST OIL, AND A RECENT RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT ORDER
HAD EXEMPTED 6 JOINT VENTURES - INCLUDING 4 U.S. FROM THE CRIPPLING OIL EXPORT TAX. MR. KALICKI
NOTED SEVERAL AREAS OF FUTURE EMPHASIS FOR THE
ENERGY OMBUDSMEN, INCLUDING CONCLUSION OF TIMAN
PECHORA PRODUCTION SHARING NEGOTIATIONS AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BDC OIL AND GAS WORKING
GROUP'S TAX REPORT. TURNING TO OTHER COMMERCIAL
PROJECTS, MR. KALICKI EMPHASIZED THAT 3 OF THE 5
U.S.-RUSSIAN PROJECTS DESIGNATED AS PRIORITY BY
THE OMBUDSMEN HAD SEEN SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN THE
LAST YEAR: HUNTER ENGINEERING'S KRASNOYARSK
METALLURGICAL PLANT VENTURE, TPC FOOD'S "GIANT"
STORE AND AMERICAN CYANAMID.
10.
RUSSIAN DEPUTY MINISTER OF FUELS AND ENERGY,
AND ENERGY OMBUDSMAN, ANATOLIY SHATALOV, ADDED HIS
VIEW THAT SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS HAD BEEN ACHIEVED
IN THE OIL AND GAS SECTOR. IN PARTICULAR, HE
EMPHASIZED U.S. EXIMBANK AND WORLD BANK LOANS TO
TANGIBLE OIL AND GAS PROJECTS IN RUSSIA AND THE
SIGNING OF A PSA FOR THE SAKHALIN -11 PROJECT. HE
ALSO NOTED THAT MORE THAN USD 50 BILLION IN
PRODUCTION SHARING PROJECTS STOOD TO BE COMPLETED
IN THE NEXT YEAR.
CONCLUSION
11.
IN CONCLUSION, RUSSIAN DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER
DAVYDOV PRAISED THE COOPERATION THAT HAS TAKEN
PLACE BETWEEN MANY AGENCIES OF THE RUSSIAN AND
U.S. GOVERNMENTS. HE MENTIONED A NUMBER OF AREAS
WHERE THE BDC HAD MANAGED TO ACHIEVE TANGIBLE
PROGRESS ON A NUMBER OF FRONTS, INCLUDING:
PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS OF A NEW
RUSSIAN TRADE MISSION IN NEW YORK AND THE OPENING
OF AMERICAN BUSINESS CENTERS IN RUSSIA; GREATLY
INCREASED TRADE TURNOVER IN 1994 AS COMPARED WITH
THE PREVIOUS YEAR; CREATION OF A TASK FORCE ON
BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT BETWEEN THE U.S. NORTHWEST
Page 5 of 6
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AND THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST; AND A JOINT STATEMENT
TO BE SIGNED THAT DAY ESTABLISHING A NEW JOINT
DIALOGUE ON COMMERCIAL TAXATION. MINISTER DAVYDOV
IDENTIFIED SEVERAL PROBLEMATIC COMMERCIAL ISSUES
THAT THE U.S. AND RUSSIA WOULD NEED TO RESOLVE I N
THE COMING 6 MONTHS, INCLUDING CONCLUSION OF THE
TIMAN PECHORA NEGOTIATIONS, U.S. IMPORT LICENSES
FOR RUSSIAN HUNTING RIFLES, RUSSIAN FIRMS'
I N A B I L I T Y TO COMPETE FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT
PROCUREMENTS, AND NEGOTIATION OF A NEW U.S.RUSSIAN TRADE AGREEMENT NEXT YEAR WHEN THE CURRENT
PACT EXPIRES.
(FCS MOSCOW/DRAFTED:CO-RJOHNSON/APPROVED:CAEWEAVER)
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LINEl:
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DTG:
ORIG:
TO:
IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL
OAACZYUW RUEHMOA6900 3571335-CCCC- -RHEHAAX.
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 231335Z DEC 94
F AMEMBASSY M S O
M
OCW
RUEHMO
231335Z DEC 94
AMEMBASSY M S O
OCW
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8719
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY IMMEDIATE 1484
RUCPDC/USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO: ////
SUBJ: FOLLOWUP ON GCC DISCUSSION REGARDING
CASPIAN PIPELINE PROJECT
TEXT:
0-9 N F I D E N T I A L
MOSCOW 036900
EXDIS
USDOC FOR COUNSELOR KALICKI
E.O. 123 56: DECL/OADR
TAGS: ENRG, KZ, RS
SUBJECT: FOLLOWUP ON GCC DISCUSSION REGARDING
CASPIAN PIPELINE PROJECT
REF (S) : ALMATY 6646
2.
CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. AT GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN LUNCH ON DECEMBER 15,
DOC COUNSELOR AND U.S. OMBUDSMAN KALICKI NOTED
THAT USG HAD BEEN BRIEFED ON LATEST CASPIAN
PIPELINE FINANCING PROPOSAL FROM OMAN AND
CHEVRON. HE PASSED TO PRIME MINISTER AND RUSSIAN
GCC MEMBERS, INCLUDING MINISTER OF FUEL AND
ENERGY YURI SHAFRANIK, CHART INDICATING THAT
RUSSIA WOULD ACHIEVE HIGHER REVENUES FROM CHEVRON
THAN FROM OMAN PROPOSAL. HE URGED THAT P
M
CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS WITH CHEVRON AND THAT RUSSIA
NOT TRANSFER OWNERSHIP OF ANY PIPELINE O OTHER
R
ASSETS UNTIL ISSUE IS RESOLVED.
3. KALICKI STATED USG UNDERSTANDING THAT EBRD
WOULD BE PREPARED TO ARRANGE UP TO 50 PERCENT OF
PIPELINE FINANCING - THE PARTY NOT COVERED BY
THE CHEVRON PROPOSAL. SUPPORTED BY VICE
PRESIDENT, HE SUGGESTED THAT RUSSIA AND
KAZAKHSTAN ASK EBRD TO MAKE FORMAL PROPOSAL TO
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O 13526
.
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD010\DEC94\MSGS\M 14323 /i.ntmi
ALL PARTIES.
4. PM CHERNOMYRDIN STATED THAT HE HAD MET WITH
CHEVRON AND SULTAN OF OMAN IN NOVEMBER. HE
CHALLENGED OMAN TO COMMIT TO FINANCING PIPELINE,
AND SULTAN SAID HE WAS PREPARED TO DO SO FOR
PHASE I .
PM QUESTIONED VALIDITY OF U.S. ANALYSIS
OF RESPECTIVE ADVANTAGES OF TWO PROPOSALS.
5. VICE PRESIDENT AND KALICKI PROPOSED THAT EBRD
BE REQUESTED TO ANALYZE BOTH PROPOSALS AND TO
PROVIDE OBJECTIVE OPINION TOGETHER WITH FINANCING
PROPOSAL. P CHERNOMYRDIN STATED THAT HE HAD NO
M
OBJECTION TO SUCH REQUEST.
6. MINISTER SHAFRANIK EXPRESSED SERIOUS DOUBTS
ABOUT MERITS OF CHEVRON PROPOSAL AND STATED THAT
IT HAD OFFERED QUOTE NOTHING NEW UNQUOTE.
KALICKI RESPONDED THAT WE BELIEVE CHEVRON'S WAS
SUPERIOR TO OMAN'S PROPOSAL, IN TERMS OF 1)
REVENUES TO RUSSIA, 2) OOACT THAT OMAN WOULD
SUPPORT ONLY PART OF THE PIPELINE WHEREAS CHEVRON
WOULD SUPPORT THE ENTIRE PIPELINE WHICH WOULD
ACCOMMODATE BOTH TENGIZ AND ADDITIONAL RUSSIAN
PRODUCTION, AND 3) OMAN'S REQUIREMENT FOR RUSSIAN
THROUGHPUT GUARANTEES AS OPPOSED TO 10 0 PERCENT
PROJECT FINANCING IN CHEVRON PROPOSAL. IN ANY
EVENT, EBRD COULD MAKE ITS O N EXPERT, OBJECTIVE
W
ANALYSIS.
7. MINISTER OF ENVIRONMENT DANILOV-DANILYAN
NOTED SERIOUS MERCAPTAN THREAT TO CASPIAN REGION
AND SUGGESTED SECOND STUDY OF RISKS TO BE
SUPERVISED BY THE U.S. IN RESPONSE, VICE
PRESIDENT SUGGESTED THAT GCC SUPPORT BOTH
FINANCING AND ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES. KALICKI
SUGGESTED, AND P CHERNOMYRDIN AGREED,
M
SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS ALREADY ACHIEVED IN
DEMARCAPTANIZATION SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT
IN ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY.
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
�F:\Cable\Data Sourcc\Cablcs\CD010\DEC94\MSGS\M 143237j.html
1.4b, 1.4d
11.
COMMENT: KALICKI WILL FOLLOW UP WITH RON
FREEMEN AND SUGGEST EBRD PROVIDE BOTH ANALYSIS
AND FINANCING PROPOSAL I
BECAUSE SHAFRANIK HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY
IDENTIFIED WITH OMAN POSITION, EBRD REPORT SHOULD
BE ADDRESSED TO BOTH CHERNOMYRDIN AND SHAFRANIK,
AS WELL AS TO GOK.
12. ACTION FOR ALMATY: AMBASSADOR IS REQUESTED
TO FOLLOW UP HIS LETTER TO GOK (REFTEL) AND
REQUEST GOK CONFIRMATION THAT I T WOULD WELCOME
EBRD REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS. AMBASSADOR MAY
BRIEF GOK ON THIS DISCUSSION AS HE DEEMS
APPROPRIATE.
13. MR. KALICKI HAS CLEARED THE ABOVE TEXT.
(ORIGIN:4231/ITA/IEP/EUR/OEERIS/R1SD/ALOFFT)
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0 231428Z DEC 94
FM AMEMBASSY M S O
OCW
RUEHMO
231428Z DEC 94
AMEMBASSY M S O
OCW
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8734
////
GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN LUNCH: DECEMBER 15
TEXT:
- 0 H-T I D D-N T I
C
L M S O 036922
OCW
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: EAID, EFIN, PREL, GCC, US, RS
SUBJECT: GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN LUNCH: DECEMBER 15
REF: M S O 36900
OCW
1.
eONriDDNTrSB - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. VICE PRESIDENT GORE AND PRIME MINISTER
CHERNOMYRDIN AND THEIR TEAMS DISCUSSED AT LUNCH ON
DECEMBER 15 THE CASPIAN PIPELINE CONSORTIUM (CPC)
ARRANGEMENTS (SEE REFTEL) AND DECIDED THAT RUSSIA
WOULD CALL OFFICIALLY FOR AN EBRD ASSESSMENT OF THE
CURRENT CPC ARRANGEMENTS AND THE CHEVRON INTEREST, AS
WELL AS THE FACT THAT THE T O WOULD UNDERTAKE RAPIDLY
W
AN IMPARTIAL INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT OF
THE PIPELINE AND TENGIZ OIL FIELD PRODUCTION.
3. THE SECOND ISSUE DISCUSSED AT LUNCH WAS THE
PROPOSAL BY NASA AND THE RUSSIAN SPACE AGENCY TO SIGN
AN AGREEMENT ON FRIDAY, DECEMBER 16, OUTLINING THE
DUTY-FREE ENTRY ARRANGEMENT WHICH WOULD COVER THE
MATERIAL COMING INTO EACH COUNTRY IN CONNECTION WITH
THEIR JOINT SPACE ACTIVITIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL
SPACE STATION PROJECT. CHERNOMYRDIN SAID HE WOULD
AGREE TO SIGN THE ARRANGEMENT.
4. AT THE END OF THE MEETING, MINISTER MIKHAILOV OF
THE MINISTRY OF ATOMIC ENERGY MADE A PROPOSAL THAT THE
UNITED STATES WOULD ADVANCE TO THE MINISTRY ANOTHER UP
TO 300 MILLION DOLLARS FOR THE FABRICATION OF FUEL
ASSEMBLIES FOR THE UKRAINE IN CONNECTION WITH THE
DISMANTLEMENT OF UKRAINIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HE NOTED
THAT RUSSIA WAS NOT ABLE TO FUND A CONTINUATION OF THE
PROCESS, AND THAT UNTIL I T STARTED SENDING LOW-
PER E O 13526
.,
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD010\DEC94\MSGS\M1432207.html
ENRICHED FUEL TO THE UNITED STATES, I T WOULD NOT
RECEIVE ANY INCOME.
5.
SECRETARY O'LEARY INDICATED THAT SHE WAS NOT ABLE
TO FUND THIS PROPOSAL FROM THE DOE BUDGET.
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CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
L I N E l : PAAUZYUW RUEHCAA15 92 3 6 2 2 215-UUUU- -RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNR UUUUU ZZH
LINE3: P 282214Z DEC 94
LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC
OSRI: RUEHC
DTG: 282214Z DEC 94
ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
TO: AMEMBASSY M S O PRIORITY 5047
OCW
INFO: ////
SUBJ:
LETTER TO AMBASSADOR PICKERING FROM DEPUTY
ENERGY SECRETARY WHITE ON GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN CONFERENCE ON
ENERGY AND LAW
TEXT:
UNCLAS STATE 341592
PASS TO AID MOSCOW; PASS TO EMBASSY AMBASSADOR PICKERING
E.O. 12356:
N/A
TAGS:
ENRG
SUBJECT:
LETTER TO AMBASSADOR PICKERING FROM DEPUTY
ENERGY SECRETARY WHITE ON GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN CONFERENCE ON
ENERGY AND LAW
1. CONGRATULATIONS AND THANK YOU TO EMBASSY MOSCOW AND
AID FOR OUTSTANDING SUPPORT FOR NOVEMBER 14-18 ENERGY AND
LAW CONFERENCE. LETTER TO AMBASSADOR PICKERING FROM
DEPUTY ENERGY SECRETARY WHITE FOLLOWS.
2.
BEGIN TEXT:
AMBASSADOR THOMAS PICKERING
U.S. EMBASSY M S O
OCW
DEAR AMBASSADOR PICKERING:
ON BEHALF OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, I WOULD LIKE TO
THANK YOU AND YOUR STAFF FOR THE TIME AND EFFORT
CONTRIBUTED TO THE NOVEMBER 14-18 ENERGY AND LAW
CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW. AS ALWAYS, THE EMBASSY STAFF
PROVIDED EXCELLENT SUPPORT. W GREATLY RESPECT THE
E
EMBASSY'S PROFESSIONALISM AND EXPERTISE.
AS YOU KNOW, VICE PRESIDENT GORE AND SECRETARY O'LEARY
DISCUSSED THE CONFERENCE AND ITS RECOMMENDATIONS WITH
MINISTER SHAFRANIK AND PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN DURING
THE RECENT COMMISSION MEETINGS. THE PRIME MINISTER AND
MINISTER SHAFRANIK BOTH AGREED THAT THE SPECIFIC
RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY RUSSIAN AND AMERICAN EXPERTS AT
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THE CONFERENCE ARE VALUABLE. THEY ALSO SHARED THE HOPE
THAT THE RECOMMENDATIONS WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE
DEVELOPMENT OF AN EFFECTIVE LEGAL FRAMEWORK THAT
ENCOURAGES FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND REDUCES I T S RISK.
I AM PERSONALLY GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR TAKING THE TIME TO
GIVE US SUCH AN ARTICULATE AND INFORMATIVE BRIEFING ON
SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 13. ALSO, THANK YOU FOR YOUR REMARKS AT
THE OPENING SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE. YOUR V I S I B L E
SUPPORT WAS A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE DISCUSSION
THAT FOLLOWED.
PLEASE EXTEND MY APPRECIATION TO YOUR STAFF FOR THEIR
HARD WORK. SPECIAL THANKS GO TO ED VERONA FOR HIS
ATTENTION TO THIS CONFERENCE THROUGHOUT THE PLANNING
PROCESS AND TO MIKE HART, WHO HELPED WITH HOTEL AND OTHER
LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS. WE OWE A GREAT DEAL TO YOU AND
YOUR STAFF.
THANK YOU FOR YOUR GRACIOUS HELP, YOUR WISE COUNSEL, AND
YOUR TIME.
SINCERELY,
B I L L WHITE
3.
THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY APPRECIATES EMBASSY AND A I D
SUPPORT OF CONFERENCE. A I D REPRESENTATIVES ROBERT
ICHORD, GENE GEORGE, YURY ANDRIANOV, MASSOOD MALIK, KEVIN
BLISS, AND GORDON WEYNAND ARE THANKED FOR THEIR
OUTSTANDING SUPPORT OF THE CONFERENCE.
4.
THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY LOOKS FORWARD TO WORKING
WITH EMBASSY AND A I D ON FUTURE PROJECTS.
TALBOTT
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INFO LOG-00 OASY-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00
/001R
DRAFTED BY: EUR/ISCA: TALYNCH
APPROVED BY: EUR/ISCA: JEHERBST
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
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976B1C 292355Z/38
O 292348Z DEC 94
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
-&4r C R h T STATE 342755
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: AMGT
SUBJECT: MOSCOW OFFICIAL INFORMAL NO. 264, SENT 12/29/94
1. (U) FOR TATYANA GFOELLER-VOLKOFF FROM LAUREN RE
ASSIGNMENTS: I COULDN'T GET A LINE THROUGH TO YOU, BUT
THERE'S NO PANEL THIS WEEK AND THE LOCAL GURUS ARE ON
LEAVE, SO THERE'S NO HURRY. AS I TOLD MIKE, WE CAN BRING
HIM TO PANEL (POL OR ECON MIGHT HOLD, BUT WE CAN START THE
PROCESS) BUT WE CANT PANEL YOU INTO A 1997 STRETCH
POSITION THIS EARLY. I WILL CONSULT THE ORACLES, BUT
YOU MIGHT HAVE TO GO FOR LWOP & SHOOT FOR THE
LANGUAGE/ASSIGNMENT NEXT YEAR. LET ME KNOW IF MIKE WANTS
TO GO FOR ASHGABAT ON JANUARY 6. HAPPY NEW YEAR AND ALL
THE BEST.
-eecRET
-S£GRFP
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REVIEW AUTHORITY: Frank Perez,
Senior Reviewer
STATE 342755 292349Z
2. (U) DRAFT GCC REPORTS FOR KEN FAIRFAX FROM THERESA
GORENZ: HERE ARE THE DRAFT REPORTS WHICH REFLECT DR.
BERLS' CHANGES. I'M STILL AWAITING CLEARANCE FROM NRC
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. DfQrrtrr e TJ cf Q«itl else • ^ f ^ ^ S y J i ) ^ Q f l o Q G f l l f l56 Date: 07/10/2013
^
�UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-25789 Doc No. C05314186 Date: 07/10/2013
CHAIRMAN DR. SELIN. DR. BERLS WAS CONCERNED THAT THE
TONE OF THE SUMMARY OF THE NUCLEAR ENERGY SUBCOMMITTEE
MEETING WAS TOO NEGATIVE. HE SUGGESTS TAKING OUT
MIKHAILOV'S STATEMENTS ENTIRELY, UNLESS THERE'S A WAY TO
MAKE THEM MORE POSITIVE AND END ON AN UPBEAT NOTE.
PLEASE GIVE ME YOUR FEEDBACK ON THESE REPORTS,
PARTICULARLY HOW YOU WANT ME TO HANDLE THE SUMMARY FOR
THE SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING. I WILL BE IN TOMORROW IF YOU
WANT TO CALL. AS SOON AS I HEAR FROM YOU AND DR. SELIN,
I CAN SEND THESE REPORTS FRONT CHANNEL. HAPPY NEW YEAR!
SUBJECT: GC-4: MEETING OF NUCLEAR ENERGY SUBCOMMITTEE
(DOE O'LEARY, NRC SELIN, MINATOM MIKHAILOV, GAN
VISHNEVSKIY)
1. SUMMARY. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY SECRETARY HAZEL
O'LEARY AND RF MINISTER FOR ATOMIC ENERGY VICTOR
MIKHAILOV CHAIRED THE NUCLEAR ENERGY SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING
IN MOSCOW ON DECEMBER 14, 1994. IN A DIFFICULT BUT
PRODUCTIVE SESSION, THE U.S. AND RUSSIA EXPRESSED
DIFFERING PERSPECTIVES AND EXCHANGED FRANK VIEWS ON MANY
ISSUES, PARTICULARLY ON HOW TO PROCEED WITH REPLACEMENT
ENERGY SOURCES AT TOMSK AND KRASNOYARSK. MIKHAILOV
STATED THAT THE RUSSIANS COULD PREVENT THE AGREEMENT ON
THE SHUTDOWN OF PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION REACTORS AND THE
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STATE 342755 292349Z
CESSATION OF USE OF WEAPONS PLUTONIUM FROM ENTERING INTO
FORCE AND NOTED DISSATISFACTION WITH THE U.S. CONCERNING
FUNDING FOR THE "LISBON INITIATIVE" NUCLEAR SAFETY
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, THE HEU SALES AGREEMENT, AND THE
TRILATERAL AGREEMENT ON THE DISMANTLEMENT OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS. THE CANDOR OF BOTH SIDES PROVED PRODUCTIVE AND
RESULTED IN CONCRETE ACTION. END SUMMARY.
O'LEARY AND MIKHAILOV OFFER DIFFERING PERSPECTIVES
2. SECRETARY O'LEARY OPENED THE MEETING BY STATING THAT
IT WOULD BE PRODUCTIVE TO START WITH AREAS IN WHICH THE
U.S. AND RUSSIA HAVE LITTLE GOOD NEWS TO REPORT: THE
COMMITTEE REPORT AND THE PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION REACTORS.
SECRETARY O'LEARY EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE TWO SIDES
COULD COMPLETE A JOINT REPORT; MINISTER MIKHAILOV AGREED
WITH THE NEED TO ISSUE A JOINT REPORT. SECRETARY O'LEARY
THEN COMMENTED ON THE REACTORS, STATING THAT THE TWO
SIDES WERE FAR APART WHEN THEY MET IN WASHINGTON IN
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SEPTEMBER. SHE ALSO EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT MINISTER
MIKHAILOV APPEARED DISTRESSED THAT THE TWO SIDES REMAIN
AT AN IMPASSE.
3. MINISTER MIKHAILOV RESPONDED BY DEFINING HIS
PERCEPTION OF THE PROBLEM: THE U.S. DOES NOT SUPPORT THE
DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR ENERGY. RUSSIA, HOWEVER, BELIEVES
THAT THE 21 ST CENTURY WILL BE THE NUCLEAR CENTURY. SINCE
THIS IS RUSSIA'S NATIONAL POLICY, HE STATED THAT THE TWO
SIDES NEED TO GIVE UP ATTEMPTS TO CONVINCE EACH OTHER AND
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STATE 342755 292349Z
COMPROMISE. HE COMMENTED THAT THE TWO SIDES ACHIEVED
GOOD PROGRESS WITH THE COMPLETION OF THE NOVEMBER 22
PROTOCOL WHICH CALLS FOR THE SIGNING OF TWO FEASIBILITY
STUDIES AT GCC-IV AND A THIRD STUDY FOR A NUCLEAR POWER
SOURCE. MINISTER MIKHAILOV THEN PROPOSED AN
INTER-MINISTERIAL OR INTER-GOVERNMENTAL PROTOCOL LAYING
OUT EACH SIDE'S OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 1.2. HE
CONCLUDED HIS COMMENTS BY STATING THAT ON OCTOBER 1,
RUSSIA FORMALLY AND OFFICIALLY CEASED PLUTONIUM
PRODUCTION FOR USE IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS. (COMMENT:
ALTHOUGH THE RUSSIANS ANNOUNCED THE CESSATION OF USE OF
NEWLY PRODUCED PLUTONIUM FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE SIDES
STILL NEED TO COMPLETE NEGOTIATIONS ON A COMPLIANCE
MECHANISM. END COMMENT.)
4. SECRETARY O'LEARY STATED THAT SHE WAS AWARE OF THE
OCTOBER 1 MILEPOST AND CONGRATULATED MINISTER MIKHAILOV.
SHE ALSO CONGRATULATED BOTH TEAMS FOR THEIR WORK ON THE
NOVEMBER 22 PROTOCOL. ALTHOUGH SHE REJECTED MIKHAILOVS
SUGGESTION OF ANOTHER INTER-MINISTERIAL AGREEMENT, SHE
PROPOSED THAT THE JOINT REPORT REFLECT OBLIGATIONS OF
BOTH SIDES REGARDING THE STUDY OF A NUCLEAR OPTION FOR
REPLACEMENT POWER.
5. MINISTER MIKHAILOV AGREED THAT THE LIST OF
RESPONSIBILITIES COULD TAKE ANY FORM, SUCH AS THE JOINT
REPORT; HE STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT HE WANTED A COMMITMENT
OF THE U.S. TO FINANCE FEASIBILITY STUDIES AND A
COMMITMENT FROM THE U.S. TO HELP FIND FINANCING FOR
NUCLEAR SOURCES OF ENERGY. SECRETARY O'LEARY RESPONDED
THAT THE U.S. WAS PREPARED TO FUND FEASIBILITY STUDIES
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STATE 342755 292349Z
AND ASKED WHAT ELSE HE NEEDED. MIKHAILOV MADE THE
FOLLOWING THREE POINTS: 1) THE RUSSIANS COULD PREVENT
THE AGREEMENT ON THE SHUTDOWN OF THE PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION
REACTORS AND CESSATION OF USE OF WEAPONS PLUTONIUM FROM
ENTERING INTO FORCE AND JUST GO WITH THEIR OWN PLANS TO
SHUT DOWN REACTORS AND CEASE MILITARY USE OF PLUTONIUM;
2) NOTHING COULD STOP MINATOM FROM WORKING ON 2LST
CENTURY REACTORS; AND 3) NOTHING CAN STOP THE RUSSIANS
FROM MAKING GOOD USE OF PLUTONIUM FOR CIVILIAN POWER.
6. IN RESPONSE, SECRETARY O'LEARY URGED THE MINISTER TO
FOCUS ON NEXT STEPS TO MOVE FORWARD. SHE EMPHASIZED THAT
PRECISE FEASIBILITY DATA IS NEEDED TO GET FINANCING SINCE
EVERY BANK WANTS TO KNOW THE ANSWERS TO THE FOLLOWING
QUESTIONS. WHAT IS THE CHEAPER, SAFER SOURCE OF POWER?
CAN CONSUMERS PAY FOR POWER? WHAT ARE THE DESIRES OF THE
LOCAL INHABITANTS? WILL THEY COOPERATE AND SUPPORT A
NUCLEAR ENERGY SOURCE? WILL THEY BENEFIT? WHAT SAFETY
MEASURES WILL BE EMPLOYED? WHAT IS THE RISK? CAN THE
ENTERPRISE PAY THE DEBT? SHE CONCLUDED BY STATING THAT
MINISTER MIKHAILOV THINKS THERE'S ONLY A NUCLEAR SOLUTION
WHILE THE U.S. THINKS THE ECONOMICS OF THE SITUATION
POINT TO COAL OR GAS.
7. MINISTER MIKHAILOV COUNTERED THAT HE ONLY WANTED TO
KNOW WHAT "AGREED STEPS" THE U.S. IS READY TO TAKE. IF
THE "AGREED MEASURES" ARE ONLY COAL OR GAS, THEN IT WILL
NOT BE ACCEPTABLE. HE REITERATED THAT HE WANTED TO SEE
THE NUCLEAR ANALYSIS MADE CONCRETE.
8. SECRETARY O'LEARY STATED UNEQUIVOCALLY THE U.S. WILL
OCORCT
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STATE 342755 292349Z
LOOK AT NUCLEAR OPTIONS ALONG WITH FOSSIL FUEL OPTIONS.
SHE INDICATED THAT THE TWO SIDES UNDERSTOOD EACH OTHER
PERFECTLY, THAT THEY WERE TRYING TO ANALYZE OPTIONS AND
FIND SOURCES OF FINANCING FOR FUTURE POWER PLANTS.
9. MINISTER MIKHAILOV ADMITTED THAT BOTH CITIES (TOMSK
AND KRASNOYARSK) HAVE BOTH NUCLEAR AND FOSSIL POWER. IT
WAS THEN AGREED TO PLACE THREE ACTION ITEMS IN THE
PROTOCOL: 1) COMPLETE THE TDA STUDIES, 2) DECIDE WHO
WILL PAY FOR THE NUCLEAR OPTION STUDY, 3) AGREE TO
T J Q CLJ iBRAft^s? J h Q iTcQCSfiVe07/10/2013
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COMPLETE ALL STUDIES WITHIN SIX MONTHS.
10. SECRETARY O'LEARY CONTINUED THAT THE SIDES NEED TO
COMPLETE THE FEASIBILITY STUDIES AND MOVE ON. THIS MEANS
THAT BOTH SIDES NEED THE BEST POSSIBLE DOCUMENTATION TO
ALLOW DEBT FINANCING. AS A MATTER OF NATIONAL POLICY,
THE U.S. DRAWS THE LINE ON CONSIDERING THE GT-MHR, A
HELIUM GAS REACTOR, AS A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE FUEL SOURCE.
11. DR. ROBERT BERLS OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
INDICATED THAT THE U.S. SIDE HAD JUST RECEIVED FROM
MINATOM THE MATERIALS IT HAD REQUESTED CONCERNING NUCLEAR
OPTIONS AND THAT USAID IS ANALYZING THIS DOCUMENTATION TO
DECIDE IF IT CAN FINANCE THIS STUDY. IT WAS AGREED THAT
MR. DINE WOULD HAVE A RESPONSE ABOUT FUNDING THE NUCLEAR
OPTION STUDY BY JANUARY 15, 1995, AND, IF AID FUNDED, THE
STUDY WOULD BE COMPLETED WITHIN SIX MONTHS.
SELIN AND VISHNEVSKIY REPORT ON NUCLEAR SAFETY
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STATE 342755 292349Z
12. DR. IVAN SELIN, CHAIRMAN OF THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION, REPORTED ON NUCLEAR SAFETY ISSUES. HE STATED
THAT A NUMBER OF PROJECTS WERE SHOWING PROGRESS, BUT AT A
MUCH LOWER LEVEL. HE REPORTED THAT NUCLEAR MATERIALS
CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING WERE PROGRESSING ON A SATISFACTORY
BASIS. HE STATED THAT BOTH NRC AND DOE WILL EXPAND
SUPPORT OF GAN IN A FULLY COORDINATED FASHION. HE
CONSIDERED NUCLEAR POWER STATION INTERACTIONS
SUCCESSFUL. HE INTENDED TO ANNOUNCE SATISFACTORY
MOVEMENT IN THE COMMISSION REPORT AND ASKED IF THE
RUSSIAN SIDE AGREED OR IF THERE WERE ITEMS THE RUSSIANS
WANTED TO DISCUSS.
14. GAN CHAIRMAN VISHNEVSKIY SUPPORTED DR. SELIN'S POINT
OF VIEW AND EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH THE PROGRESS OF
GAN/NRC COOPERATION. HE STATED THAT HE HAD ALSO SIGNED A
PROTOCOL WITH UNDER SECRETARY OF ENERGY CURTIS. HE
PREFERRED, HOWEVER, TO ELEVATE THE EXISTING COOPERATION
TO AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL LEVEL.
15. DR. SELIN CONCLUDED BY INDICATING THAT NUCLEAR
SAFETY REQUIRES MORE THAN TECHNICAL COOPERATION. HE
STATED THAT ECONOMIC QUESTIONS ARE ESSENTIAL TO NUCLEAR
SAFETY. THE TWO SIDES NEED TO ENGAGE IN A DISCUSSION OF
UNCLASSIFIED U.S.. D J p A t m l e J i J o Q : t ^
:
C a s I r B . R A S X?5789
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fDcWNo Q G f l l E j i Y e Date: 07/10/2013
�UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-25789 Doc No. C05314186 Date: 07/10/2013
ECONOMIC, REGULATORY AND TECHNICAL QUESTIONS, ALTHOUGH
TIME DID NOT ALLOW FOR SUCH A DISCUSSION TO TAKE PLACE
DURING THE COMMITTEE MEETING.
MIKHAILOV COMPLAINS ABOUT U.S. FUNDING
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16. PICKING UP ON DR. SELIN'S ECONOMIC THEME, MINISTER
MIKHAILOV TURNED THE DISCUSSION TO FINANCIAL MATTERS.
THE MINISTER INDICATED THAT THE BUDGET ALLOCATION FOR
NUCLEAR SAFETY WAS USD 20 MILLION IN 1993 AND USD 75
MILLION IN 1994, BUT STILL NO MONEY HAD BEEN MADE
AVAILABLE THIS YEAR TO IMPLEMENT THE PROGRAMS. SINCE THE
GOR DEPENDS ON THESE U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS IN ITS BUDGET FOR
ITS NUCLEAR SAFETY PROGRAM, THE MINISTER WANTED THE
REPORT TO TALK ABOUT THE NEED FOR MORE EFFECTIVE DELIVERY
OF FUNDS.
17. SECRETARY O'LEARY REASSURED MINISTER MIKHAILOV THAT
THE MONEY WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE SOON. WHEN SHE
EXPLAINED THAT THE SLOW DELIVERY OF FUNDS WAS DUE TO A
PROBLEM OF CASH FLOW, NOT CAPITAL, MINISTER MIKHAILOV
EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH O'LEARY'S RESPONSE.
18. THE DISCUSSION THEN TURNED TO NUCLEAR MATERIAL
PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTING (MPCA). SECRETARY
O'LEARY INDICATED THAT GOOD PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE IN
REGARD TO MPCA AND PRAISED THE LAB-TO-LAB AGREEMENTS.
SHE STATED THAT THE ARZAMAS PROPOSAL THAT UNDER SECRETARY
OF ENERGY CURTIS RECEIVED SHOWED PROMISE AND SUGGESTED
MEETING IN JANUARY TO DISCUSS IMPLEMENTING THE PROPOSAL.
19. SECRETARY O'LEARY BROUGHT UP THE WARHEAD SAFETY
AGREEMENT WHICH SHE AND MIKHAILOV WOULD SIGN ON DECEMBER
16. SHE SUGGESTED THAT THE SIDES MEET IN JANUARY TO WORK
OUT THE IMPLEMENTING AGREEMENT. MIKHAILOV AGREED TO THIS
-CEORET
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Dipirinlee N I Q M d a s I l B R A f e ^ S y ^ U O r C Q f i O f i l V e
(QUI
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STATE 342755 292349Z
PROPOSAL.
20. MIKHAILOV THEN RAISED FOUR ADDITIONAL ISSUES: 1)
CONSTRUCTION OF THE MAYAK STORAGE FACILITY WAS BEHIND
SCHEDULE: 2) THE GOR WAS ENCOUNTERING DELAYS WITH ITS
HEU/LEU SALES; 3) THE GOR WAS ALSO EXPERIENCING
DIFFICULTIES WITH THE TRILATERAL AGREEMENT ON THE
DISMANTLEMENT OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS; AND 4) THE
GOR WOULD LIKE TO EXPAND THE SCOPE OF THE EXISTING
AGREEMENT ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY WHICH
TERMINATES IN 1995.
21. SECRETARY O'LEARY CONCLUDED THE MEETING BY AGREEING
TO REVIEW THE LIST OF PROBLEMS THE RUSSIAN SIDE RAISED
AND BY ASSURING MINISTER MIKHAILOV THAT SHE AND THE U.S.
SIDE WOULD TRY TO BE HELPFUL.
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR ENERGY SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT AT GCC-IV
1. SUMMARY. VICE PRESIDENT GORE HERALDED THE COMPLETION
OF A GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT AGREEMENT THAT WILL ALLOW
THE EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION IN THE FIELD OF
NUCLEAR WARHEAD SAFETY AND SECURITY AS ONE OF THE MOST
IMPORTANT ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN
COMMISSION TO DATE. TWO U.S. TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT
AGENCY (TDA) GRANTS PROVIDING USD 1.63 MILLION IN FUNDING
FOR FEASIBILITY STUDIES OF POSSIBLE FOSSIL-FIRED
REPLACEMENT POWER FOR TOMSK OBLAST AND FOR KRASNOYARSK-26
WERE SIGNED. IN ADDITION, BOTH SIDES REACHED AN
AGREEMENT TO SUPPORT ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE NUCLEAR
REPLACEMENT POWER, IF SUCH SOURCES CAN BE FINANCED AND
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STATE 342755 292349Z
COMPLETED NO LATER THAN THE YEAR 2000. END SUMMARY.
2. THE GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN NUCLEAR ENERGY SUBCOMMITTEE
REPORTED ON ITS COLLABORATION IN THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR
ENERGY TO THE JOINT COMMISSION ON DECEMBER 15 IN MOSCOW.
SECRETARY OF ENERGY HAZEL O'LEARY AND CHAIRMAN OF THE
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DR. IVAN SELIN MADE
PRESENTATIONS FOR THE U.S. SIDE. MINISTER FOR ATOMIC
ENERGY VICTOR MIKHAILOV AND GOSATOMNAZOR (GAN) CHAIRMAN
YURIY VISHNEVSKIY PRESENTED FOR THE RUSSIAN SIDE.
3. MINISTER MIKHAILOV REPORTED FIRST TO THE COMMISSION,
COMMENTING ON SEVERAL ITEMS: DISAPPOINTMENT WITH U.S.
FUNDING FOR RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SAFETY, SATISFACTION WITH THE
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. D ^ p i r t r l e N I Q i ^
dasl i B R A f e ^ S y f i h l Q T c Q G S B l V e
Date: 07/10/2013
�UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-25789 Doc No. C05314186 Date: 07/10/2013
PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS, THE NEED FOR
COLLABORATION IN DEVELOPING 21 ST CENTURY NUCLEAR
TECHNOLOGY, THE IMPORTANCE OF ENHANCING IAEA SAFEGUARDS,
AND COMPLAINTS THAT RUSSIA HAS LOST MONEY BECAUSE THE
U.S. INVOKED ANTI-DUMPING LAWS WHICH PREVENTED SALES OF
RUSSIAN URANIUM.
4. THE MINISTER NOTED THAT RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SAFETY HAS
INCREASED. HE COMPLAINED, HOWEVER, THAT THE U.S. HAD NOT
DELIVERED THE MONIES APPROPRIATED IN FY 94.
5. MOVING TO THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR
MATERIALS, MIKHAILOV NOTED THAT VISITS AND CONTROL
MEASURES WERE STEPS TOWARD MUTUAL TRUST. HE ALSO NOTED
COOPERATION ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF A WEAPON-GRADE NUCLEAR
MATERIALS STORAGE FACILITY AND INDICATED THAT THE
RUSSIANS WOULD PROVIDE SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS.
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STATE 342755 292349Z
6. THE MINISTER CONCENTRATED A NUMBER OF HIS COMMENTS ON
SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION IN THE PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC
ENERGY. HE LISTED TYPES OF RESEARCH BOTH THE U.S. AND
RUSSIA WERE CONDUCTING AND CALLED FOR COOPERATION IN
DEVELOPING 21 ST CENTURY TECHNOLOGY.
7. MIKHAILOV STATED THAT THE COMMISSION SUPPORTS THE
NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HE ALSO INDICATED
THAT NATIONAL LABORATORIES OF BOTH COUNTRIES SHOULD WORK
COOPERATIVELY TO ENHANCE IAEA SAFEGUARDS AND TO PROMOTE
NONPROLIFERATION.
8. TRADE IN URANIUM ON AMERICAN MARKETS WAS THE LAST
TOPIC MINISTER MIKHAILOV RAISED. HE COMPLAINED THAT IN
TWO YEARS THE RUSSIANS HAVE GAINED NOTHING. HE CONTINUED
BY STATING THAT THE TWO YEAR LEGAL BATTLE HAS BEEN
INEFFECTIVE. HE CLAIMED THAT WHILE THE RUSSIANS ARE
LOSING USD 100 MILLION EACH YEAR WHILE THE CANADIANS AND
AUSTRALIANS HAVE MOVED INTO THE MARKET.
9. ENERGY SECRETARY O'LEARY RESPONDED, NOTING THAT THE
SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING THE DAY BEFORE HAD BEEN A LONG,
DIFFICULT, BUT PRODUCTIVE SESSION. THE TWO SIDES NOW HAD
A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE
SHUTDOWN OF PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION REACTORS AND THE
CESSATION OF USE OF NEWLY PRODUCED PLUTONIUM FOR NUCLEAR
WEAPONS AND HAD MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS ON THE ISSUE OF
ALTERNATIVE POWER SOURCES FOR TOMSK AND KRASNOYARSK.
Date:
U C A S I D US DCLLM JQW dasl iBRA&^Syfi H)QT<Q£fi'Bll& 07/10/2013
N L S IE . .
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�UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-25789
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O'LEARY NOTED THAT THE TWO SIDES HAD SIGNED A PROTOCOL IN
NOVEMBER IN WHICH THEY AGREED TO STUDY NUCLEAR OPTIONS
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STATE 342755 292349Z
ALONG WITH FOSSIL FUEL. ONCE THE STUDIES ARE COMPLETED,
THE TWO SIDES CAN TAKE THEM TO THE FINANCIERS. O'LEARY
EMPHASIZED THAT ONE OUTSTANDING ISSUE RELATED TO THE
INAPPROPRIATENESS OF THE GT-MHR, A HELIUM GAS REACTOR.
10. THE SECRETARY PRAISED THE WARHEADS AGREEMENT AND
STRESSED THE NEED TO NEGOTIATE AN AGREEMENT ON THE
EXCHANGE OF SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. SHE
COMMENTED FAVORABLY ON COOPERATION ON THE PHYSICAL
CONTROL, PROTECTION, AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF NUCLEAR
MATERIALS AND ON THE EXPANSION OF THIS EFFORT INTO DIRECT
LAB-TO-LAB COOPERATIVE PROJECTS. SECRETARY O'LEARY
CONCLUDED BY STATING THAT ALTHOUGH DISAGREEMENTS
REMAINED, THE SIDES WERE SEEKING TO CLOSE THE GAP AND
CONTINUE TO MAKE PROGRESS.
SELIN AND VISHNEVSKIY REPORT ON NUCLEAR SAFETY
11. DR. IVAN SELIN, CHAIRMAN OF THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION, REPORTED ON NUCLEAR SAFETY ISSUES. HE
PRAISED THE SPEED WITH WHICH THE KUCHATOV INSTITUTE HAS
SET UP SECURITY MEASURES TO PROTECT NUCLEAR MATERIAL.
DR. SELIN REPORTED THAT THE NRC AND DOE HAVE WORKED WITH
GAN IN EXCHANGING INFORMATION AND DELIVERING EQUIPMENT.
HE INDICATED THAT BOTH SIDES WERE ENGAGED IN ANALYZING
THE SAFETY OF THE W E R 1000 NUCLEAR REACTOR. DR. SELIN
ASKED WHAT TYPE OF EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE DELIVERED AND
COMMENTED POSITIVELY ON THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURES GAN WAS
PUTTING INTO PLACE, ESPECIALLY IN TERMS OF COMMUNICATION
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STATE 342755 292349Z
PROCEDURES AND FIRE PREVENTION MEASURES.
12. GAN CHAIRMAN VISHNEVSKIY EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. o l p i f t n J e N J Q M
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THE PROGRESS OF GAN/NRC COOPERATION. HE STATED THAT HE
HAD ALSO SIGNED A PROTOCOL WITH UNDER SECRETARY OF ENERGY
CURTIS. HE PREFERRED, HOWEVER, TO ELEVATE THE EXISTING
COOPERATION TO AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL LEVEL.
13. DR. SELIN CONCLUDED BY STATING THAT NUCLEAR ISSUES
CUT ACROSS A NUMBER OF SECTORS: THE STUDY OF ENERGY
ALTERNATIVES, PRICING, CONSERVATION, RESTRUCTURING OF THE
ENERGY SECTOR IN BOTH FOSSIL AND NUCLEAR FUELS,
ECONOMICS, AND LEGISLATION THAT WOULD GIVE A NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION IN RUSSIA THE STATUTORY BASIS ON
WHICH TO OPERATE.
COMMITMENT ON COMPLIANCE AGREEMENT SOUGHT
14. THE VICE PRESIDENT NOTED THAT THE TRADE DEVELOPMENT
AGENCY PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE ENERGY SECTOR. HE
COMPLIMENTED MR. GRANDMAISON FOR HIS HARD WORK IN FUNDING
SOURCES OF ALTERNATIVE ENERGY.
15. IN TERMS OF THE COMPLIANCE AGREEMENT FOR THE
SHUTDOWN OF THE PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION REACTORS, THE VICE
PRESIDENT INDICATED THAT IT WAS NEAR CLOSURE SINCE BOTH
SIDES AGREED PHILOSOPHICALLY; DISAGREEMENTS CENTERED ON
TECHNICAL DETAILS. SECRETARY O'LEARY STATED THAT BOTH
SIDES WERE MOVING TO MEET THE DECEMBER DEADLINE
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STATE 342755 292349Z
ESTABLISHED IN THE COMPLIANCE AGREEMENT. THE VICE
PRESIDENT STRESSED THE SYMBOLIC VALUE OF CONCLUDING THE
COMPLIANCE AGREEMENT WITHIN THE STIPULATED DEADLINE AND
REQUESTED AN EXTRA PUSH TO GAIN REAL RESULTS.
PRIME MINISTER URGES SIDES TO TAKE CONCRETE STEPS
16. THE PRIME MINISTER AGREED THAT THE COMMITTEE HAD
MADE PROGRESS BUT STRESSED THAT PROBLEMS ARE NOT YET
SOLVED. CONCERNING THE PLUTONIUM REACTORS, THE PRIME
MINISTER INDICATED THAT THE AGREEMENT HAD TO BE
IMPLEMENTED. HE FURTHER STIPULATED THAT RUSSIA WILL SHUT
DOWN THOSE PLUTONIUM REACTORS ONLY WHEN THEY ARE
REPLACED. HE REITERATED THE NEED FOR A MORE PRACTICAL,
RATHER THAN A THEORETICAL, APPROACH AND STRESSED THE NEED
FOR PRACTICAL RESULTS.
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. o i p J r t J e l l J I Q c M
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1d6 Date: 07/10/2013
�UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-25789
Doc No. C05314186 Date: 07/10/2013
17. THE VICE PRESIDENT EMPHASIZED THE NEED TO IDENTIFY
REPLACEMENT POWER SOURCES FOR THE PLUTONIUM REACTORS. HE
POINTED TO THE USD 1.63 MILLION TO FUND FOSSIL FUEL
FEASIBILITY STUDIES AND NUCLEAR OPTIONS. HE STRESSED THE
IMPORTANCE OF COMPLETING THE ANALYSIS SO THAT BOTH SIDES
CAN LOOK AT THE FULL RANGE OF POSSIBILITIES AND THEN MOVE
TO IMPLEMENTATION. THE VICE PRESIDENT REITERATED THAT
THE U.S. HAS WORKED HARD TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF
REPLACEMENT FUEL SOURCES FOR THE PLUTONIUM REACTORS AND
STATED THAT HE REMAINED OPTIMISTIC. IN RESPONSE TO AN
ASSERTION THAT "NO PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE," THE VICE
PRESIDENT HANDED OVER TO THE PRIME MINISTER A RUSSIAN
OECRET
'
SECRET
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STATE 342755 292349Z
LANGUAGE LISTING OF STEPS THE U.S. SIDE HAS TAKEN TO
DEVELOP REPLACEMENT POWER SOURCES. THE VICE PRESIDENT
PLEDGED TO CONTINUE THIS WORK.
18. PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN THANKED THE VICE
PRESIDENT AND AGREED THAT THE U.S. HAS DONE SOME WORK,
BUT THAT IT MUST WORK MORE INTENSELY. THE PRIME MINISTER
INDICATED THAT THE ISSUES ARE NOT JUST ECONOMIC ISSUES
AND ASKED THAT U.S. COLLEAGUES BE AWARE OF RUSSIA'S
PROBLEMS.
COMMENT
19. IN ADDITION TO THE ITEMS REPORTED ABOVE, THE
SUBCOMMITTEE'S WRITTEN REPORT TO THE COMMISSION COVERED
THE FOLLOWING 12 TOPICS: 1) THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
GOR AND THE USG ON THE EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION
IN THE FIELD OF SAFETY AND SECURITY OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS;
2) COMPENSATION TO THE GOR RELATED TO DISMANTLEMENT OF
UKRAINIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS; 3) THE SHUTDOWN OF PLUTONIUM
PRODUCTION REACTORS AND CESSATION OF USE OF WEAPONS
PLUTONIUM; 4) THE CONSTRUCTION OF WEAPON-GRADE NUCLEAR
MATERIALS STORAGE FACILITY; 5) THE REMOVAL OF
RESTRICTIONS FOR RUSSIAN URANIUM EXPORT TO THE U.S.; 6)
THE AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION IN PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC
ENERGY; 7) JOINT ENERGY ALTERNATIVES STUDY OF RUSSIA; 8)
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT TO
PROVIDE FOR THE SAFE OPERATION OF NUCLEAR REACTORS; 9)
CONTROL, ACCOUNTING AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR
GECRET
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. DdpirtrrieH J J Q M
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J a e l l B . R A f e ^ s y i s y Q X D G f l f i X
Date: 07/10/2013
�UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-25789 Doc No. C05314186 Date: 07/10/2013
oecrciiT
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STATE 342755 292349Z
MATERIALS; 10) PROGRAM ON COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF
ADVANCED DEFENSE TECHNOLOGIES CONVERSION; 11) SCIENTIFIC
COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
NONPROLIFERATION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A U.S.-RUSSIAN
SCIENTIFIC TEAM; AND 12) COOPERATION IN THE AREA OF
REDUCED ENRICHMENT RESEARCH AND TEST REACTORS.
20. THREE AGREEMENTS WERE SIGNED DURING GCC-IV:
- MINISTER MIKHAILOV AND SECRETARY O'LEARY SIGNED THE
AGREEMENT ON THE EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION ON
WARHEAD SAFETY
- THE MAYOR OF KRASNOYARSK-26 AND TDA'S GRANDMAISON
SIGNED A TDA GRANT AGREEMENT ON THE STUDY OF ALTERNATIVE
ENERGY SOURCES TO REPLACE PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION REACTOR AT
KRASNOYARSK-26
- REPRESENTING TOMSK, MINATOM'S DEPUTY MINISTER YEGOROV
AND TDA'S GRANDMAISON SIGNED A TDA GRANT AGREEMENT ON THE
STUDY OF ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOURCES TO REPLACE PLUTONIUM
PRODUCTION REACTOR AT TOMSK-7. (COMMENT: TOMSK
OFFICIALS WERE NOT PRESENT IN MOSCOW FOR THE SIGNING,
BUT, WITH TDA'S PERMISSION, MINATOM AGREED TO SIGN AND
THEN SUBSEQUENTLY GET SIGNATURE FROM TOMSK OBLAST. END
COMMENT.)
3. -(GhFOR DICK MILES/BRUCE DONAHUE FROM JOHN
HERBST/KEN FORDER RE KICKLIGHTER. YOUR INSTINCTS ARE
SOUND: KICKLIGHTER'S REASON IN COMING TO MOSCOW IS MORE
FOCUSED ON PARADES, BANDS AND VETS AND LESS ON POLITICAL
OCORCT
PAGE 17
STATE 342755 292349Z
ASPECTS (INCLUDING SUMMITRY) OF THE COMMEMORATION. ON
MEETINGS, OUR ADVICE IS THAT YOU TRY TO ENSURE THAT
KICKLIGHTER SEES THE EMBASSY LEADERSHIP AND APPROPRIATE
MOD INTERLOCUTORS. AS FOR DFM IVANOV, A BRIEF COURTESY
CALL WOULD MAKE SENSE.
REGARDING KICKLIGHTER'S MANDATE, THE GENERAL HAS RUN THE
N
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. D&piKtnW
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Date: 07/10/2013
�UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-25789 Doc No. C05314186 Date: 07/10/2013
SHOW IN CONCEPTUALIZING U.S.-HOSTED WWII COMMEMORATION
EVENTS. WE ARE NOT TALKING ABOUT A MAN WHO IS TOLD BY
SUPERIORS THAT "WE WANT THE FOLLOWING EVENT, YOU MAKE
SURE THE MARCHING BAND ARRIVES ON TIME." THE GENERAL
(ALONG WITH HIS STAFF) HAS DECIDED WHAT EVENTS WILL BE
HELD IN THE U.S. AND HOW THEY WILL BE ORGANIZED. A GOOD
EXAMPLE IS THE PLANNED SEPTEMBER 1995 EVENT IN HONOLULU.
WHILE THERE IS AN INTER-AGENCY PROCESS TO VET PLANS, IT
IS CLEAR THAT KICKLIGHTER IS THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND THE
EVENT. INDEED, THE GENERAL APPEARS TO HAVE SECURED
PRESIDENT CLINTON'S PARTICIPATION (THOUGH THIS IS NOT SET
IN STONE). KICKLIGHTER ALSO APPEARS TO HAVE BROAD
AUTHORITY TO COMMIT DOD ASSETS TO COMMEMORATION EVENTS
BOTH HERE AND ABROAD. KICKLIGHTER SEES HIMSELF AS AN
ADVOCATE FOR U.S. VETERAN INTERESTS AND WORKS TO ENSURE
THAT THE VETS GET THEIR DUE WHEN PLANNING COMMEMORATION
EVENTS.
THAT SAID, KICKLIGHTER IS NOT LIKELY TO ARRIVE IN MOSCOW
WITH GRANDIOSE PLANS TO REORGANIZE RUSSIAN COMMEMORATION
EVENTS AND TO MAKE U.S. PARTICIPATION A CENTRAL ASPECT TO
MOSCOWS PLANNED PARTY. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT IN
THE CASES OF FOREIGN COMMEMORATION EVENTS, KICKLIGHTER
AND HIS STAFF ASSUME MORE A FACILITATION/COORDINATION
•OECRPT
OECRET
PAGE 18
STATE 342755 292349Z
ROLE. HE WILL PROBABLY ASK THE RUSSIANS WHAT THEY ARE
PLANNING ON DOING, WHAT U.S. PARTICIPATION THEY WOULD
LIKE, WHAT TIME AND WHERE SHOULD THE BAND ARRIVE, ETC.
THE GENERAL WILL THEN TELL HIS STAFF TO MAKE SURE THE
MARCHING BAND ARRIVES ON TIME. KICKLIGHTER IS A GOOD
LISTENER AND HAS SHOWN SENSITIVITY TOWARD THE "POLITICAL"
ASPECTS OF COMMEMORATION EVENTS DURING MEETINGS WITH A/S
LORD AND OTHER DEPARTMENT PRINCIPALS.
OF COURSE, IF PRESIDENT CLINTON DECIDES TO ATTEND THE MAY
COMMEMORATION IN MOSCOW, KICKLIGHTER'S AND YOUR WORLD
WOULD PROBABLY BE TURNED UPSIDE DOWN AND ALL BETS WOULD
BE OFF. WE COULD GO FROM AN AIR FORCE BAND, A MILITARY
CHAPLAIN, AND A COLOR GUARD TO A WHOLE HOST OF DOD BRASS
WITH THEIR ACCOMPANYING CIRCUS. THAT SAID, WE DON'T
THINK THE GENERAL WILL DROP ANY BOMBS ON YOU. WE HAVE
HEARD NOTHING TO SUGGEST THAT KICKLIGHTER WANTS TO TALK
ABOUT EXPANDED EVENTS LINKED TO A BORIS-BILL SUMMIT.
4. -i&rrOR DICK MILES FROM HERBST: CHECHNYA. WITH THE
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. DtQirtrrLM J Q M
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Date: 07/10/2013
�UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-25789 Doc No. C05314186 Date: 07/10/2013
INTENSIFICATION OF THE FIGHTING, CRITICISM OF RUSSIA'S
POLICY IS GROWING HERE, AS IS THE CONCOMITANT ANXIETY
ABOUT THE USG POSITION. I THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR
YOU TO HAVE ANOTHER EXCHANGE WITH THE RUSSIANS, NOTING
THAT THE INTENSIVE USE OF FORCE IN THE REGION IS
ENGENDERING MORE CONTROVERSY, NOT ONLY IN MOSCOW AND
WASHINGTON, BUT ALSO IN COUNTRIES ALONG RUSSIA'S
BORDERS. WE SHOULD ONCE AGAIN MAKE THE POINT THAT WE
URGE RUSSIA TO SEEK TO RESOLVE THE SITUATION WITH A
• OECRET
OECRE-T
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STATE 342755 292349Z
MINIMUM USE OF FORCE. YOU MIGHT ALSO POINT OUT THAT WE
HAVE HEARD FROM THE AZERBAIJANIS AND THE TURKS ABOUT
THEIR CONCERNS REGARDING THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF
CHECHNYA FOR RUSSIA'S OVERALL POLICY IN THE CAUCASUS. WE
WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO TELL THE AZERBAIJANIS AND THE
TURKS THAT WE HAVE RELAYED THEIR CONCERNS.
5.^e)-FOR THE AMBASSADOR, DICK MILES AND BILL BURNS
FROM HERBST. ON DECEMBER 28 DICK HOLBROOKE CHAIRED A
MEETING OF THE INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP (IWG) ON
EUROPEAN SECURITY; JIM COLLINS AND I ATTENDED.
HOLBROOKE'S FOCUS WAS ENERGIZING THE DEPARTMENT AND THE
INTERAGENCY COMMUNITY FOR THE COMING YEAR'S WORK ON NATO
EXPANSION AND OTHER EUROPEAN SECURITY QUESTIONS. A MAJOR
FOCUS OF THE IWG (AND A SUBSEQUENT SMALLER, RUSSIA-ONLY
MEETING) WAS HANDLING THE RUSSIAN ANGLE, WITH PARTICULAR
REFERENCE TO THE UPCOMING GENEVA MINISTERIAL.
ALTHOUGH NEITHER MEETING REACHED ANY FINAL CONCLUSIONS,
AMONG THE SUBJECTS ADDRESSED WERE:
-- THE RUSSIA-NATO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP. WHAT DO THE
RUSSIANS WANT? DOES THE NON-PFP DOCUMENT KOZYREV REFUSED
TO APPROVE IN BRUSSELS OFFER A ROADMAP FOR THE FUTURE?
WOULD A TREATY BE APPROPRIATE OR COULD WE MANAGE WITH
SOMETHING LESS FORMAL?
-- CALENDARS. HOW DO NATO AND RUSSIAN CALENDARS RELATE
TO EACH OTHER? WILL THE DECEMBER NATO MINISTERIAL IMPACT
OECRET
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UNCLASSIFIED U.S. D*
Date: 07/10/2013
�UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-25789 Doc No. C05314186 Date: 07/10/2013
CEORET
PAGE 20
STATE 342755 292349Z
ON THE RUSSIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS? (IN THIS REGARD,
KEITH EDDINS WILL BE PREPARING A CALENDAR AND NEEDS THE
EMBASSY'S CURRENT BEST ESTIMATE OF WHEN THE DUMA
ELECTIONS SCHEDULED FOR DECEMBER 1995 WILL ACTUALLY TAKE
PLACE.)
-- THE U.S. VISION FOR EUROPE'S FUTURE. ALTHOUGH STILL
BE DEFINED, WHAT DOES THE U.S. WANT/EXPECT EUROPE TO LOOK
LIKE FIVE OR TEN OR TWENTY YEARS DOWN THE ROAD?
-- CONSULTATIVE PROCESS WITH THE RUSSIANS. WHAT SHOULD
IT INCLUDE ABOVE AND BEYOND THE JANUARY MINISTERIAL?
SHOULD WE CREATE A NEW DEPUTY SECRETARY-LEVEL MECHANISM?
SHOULD WE REINVIGORATE THE STRATEGIC STABILITY GROUP?
-- KEEPING THE ALLIES INFORMED. SHOULD CHRISTOPHER
TRAVEL TO BRUSSELS AFTER THE JANUARY MINISTERIAL TO BRIEF
THE NAC? ALTERNATIVELY, COULD COLLINS AND A SENIOR EUR
REP ACCOMPLISH THE SAME THING WITH PERMREPS?
IN ADDITION, HOLBROOKE ANNOUNCED THE CREATION OF AN
INTERNAL EUR TASK FORCE (BASED IN RPM) TO HONCHO THE
EXPANSION EFFORT. U.S. GOALS HAVE NOT CHANGED (INTERNAL
AGREEMENT WITHIN NATO BEFORE THE MAY MINISTERIAL,
BRIEFING PARTNERS BEFORE THE DECEMBER NAC), BUT HOLBROOKE
IS CONCERNED THAT WITHOUT SUCH A SPECIAL FOCUS NEEDED
TASKS WILL FALL THROUGH THE CRACKS. TOM LYNCH AND KEITH
EDDINS WILL BE WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE EUR TASK FORCE;
THEY ALREADY HAVE A GOOD WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
KEY PLAYERS IN EUR AND EUR/RPM.
•OECRET
OEORET
PAGE 21
STATE 342755 292349Z
HOLBROOKE HAS ASKED US (AS WE WOULD HAVE DONE ANYWAY) TO
SOLICIT YOUR VIEWS ON WHAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE IN MIND FOR
GENEVA AND HOW BEST TO HANDLE THE NATO/EUROPEAN SECURITY
QUESTIONS DURING THE JANUARY MINISTERIAL. IN THIS
REGARD, WE WILL INCLUDE IN TOMORROWS O-l OUR DRAFT
DISCUSSION PAPER FOR THE TUESDAY, JANUARY 3 SESSION.
FINALLY, THE SMALL RUSSIAN-FOCUSSED GROUP WILL MEET AGAIN
ON TUESDAY, JANUARY 3. HOLBROOKE WANTED YOU TO KNOW THAT
YOU WERE WELCOME, SINCE BOB HUNTER WILL BE THERE. HE
UNDERSTANDS THAT YOUR ATTENDANCE IS ALMOST CERTAINLY
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. o C L I e N elf Q i i
c l a s I B f t A l ^ s y B h l Q f f i f i f l f i l Y e
Date: 07/10/2013
�UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-25789 Doc No. C05314186 Date: 07/10/2013
IMPOSSIBLE, BUT WANTED US TO EXTEND THE INVITATION ALL
THE SAME.
6 T - ( 0 ) FOR THE AMBASSADOR, DICK MILES AND BILL BURNS
FROM HERBST/EDDINS. JIM HAS ASKED ME, TOM AND KEITH TO
FORM OUR OWN LITTLE EUROPEAN SECURITY STUDY GROUP TO KEEP
AN EYE ON OUR COLLEAGUES IN RPM AND THE EUR FRONT
OFFICE. WE WILL KEEP YOU FULLY INFORMED. ALSO,
REGARDING SPASSKIVS REQUEST FOR AGENDA APPROVAL FOR
GENEVA, WE'RE AFRAID THAT WE CANT OFFER ANY REAL
COMMENTS FOR THE TIME BEING. STROBE HAS ASKED JIM TO DO
SOME PONDERING ON JUST THIS SUBJECT OVER THE WEEKEND,
WHICH MEANS WE'LL HAVE TO GET BACK TO YOU (AND SPASSKIY)
EARLY NEXT WEEK.
TALBOTT
-3CCRCT
PAGE 22
STATE 342755 292349Z
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. D ^ p W e N J O W
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RAAUZYUW RUEHCAA3 7 5 6 3642112 -UUUU--RHEHAAX.
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 302107Z DEC 94
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
RUEHC
302107Z DEC 94
SECSTATE WASHDC
AMEMBASSY M S O 0000
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////
NUCLEAR ENERGY SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT AT GCC-IV
TEXT:
UNCLAS STATE 34 3756
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: TRGY, KGCC, ENRG, ECON, RS, US
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR ENERGY SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT AT GCC-IV
1. SUMMARY. VICE PRESIDENT GORE HERALDED THE COMPLETION
OF A GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT AGREEMENT THAT WILL ALLOW THE
EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION IN THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR
WARHEAD SAFETY AND SECURITY AS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT
ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE DCHERNOMYRDIN COMMISSION TO
DATE. TWO U.S. TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT AGENCY (TDA) GRANTS
PROVIDING USD 1.63 MILLION IN FUNDING FOR FEASIBILITY
STUDIES OF POSSIBLE FOSSIL-FIRED REPLACEMENT POWER FOR
TOMSK OBLAST AND FOR KRASNOYARSK-2 6 WERE SIGNED. IN
ADDITION, BOTH SIDES REACHED AN AGREEMENT TO SUPPORT
ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE NUCLEAR REPLACEMENT POWER, I F SUCH
SOURCES CAN BE FINANCED AND COMPLETED NO LATER THAN THE
YEAR 2 000. END SUMMARY.
2. THE GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN NUCLEAR ENERGY SUBCOMMITTEE
REPORTED ON ITS COLLABORATION IN THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR
ENERGY TO THE JOINT COMMISSION ON DECEMBER 15 IN MOSCOW.
SECRETARY OF ENERGY HAZEL O'LEARY AND CHAIRMAN OF THE
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DR. IVAN SELIN MADE
PRESENTATIONS FOR THE U.S. SIDE. MINISTER FOR ATOMIC
ENERGY VICTOR MIKHAILOV AND GOSATOMNAZOR (GAN) CHAIRMAN
YURIY VISHNEVSKIY PRESENTED FOR THE RUSSIAN SIDE.
3. MINISTER MIKHAILOV REPORTED FIRST TO THE COMMISSION,
COMMENTING ON SEVERAL ITEMS: DISAPPOINTMENT WITH U.S.
FUNDING FOR RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SAFETY, SATISFACTION WITH THE
PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS' THE NEED FOR
COLLABORATION IN DEVELOPING 21ST CENTURY NUCLEAR
TECHNOLOGY, THE IMPORTANCE OF ENHANCING IAEA SAFEGUARDS,
AND COMPLAINTS THAT RUSSIA HAS LOST MONEY BECAUSE THE U.S.
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INVOKED ANTI - DUMPING LAWS WHICH PREVENTED SALES OF RUSSIAN
URANIUM.
4. THE MINISTER NOTED THAT RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SAFETY HAS
INCREASED. HE COMPLAINED, HOWEVER, THAT THE U.S. HAD NOT
DELIVERED THE MONIES APPROPRIATED IN FY 94.
5. MOVING TO THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS,
MIKHAILOV NOTED THAT VISITS AND CONTROL MEASURES WERE STEPS
TOWARD MUTUAL TRUST. HE ALSO NOTED COOPERATION ON THE
CONSTRUCTION OF A WEAPON-GRADE NUCLEAR MATERIALS STORAGE
FACILITY AND INDICATED THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD PROVIDE
SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS.
6. THE MINISTER CONCENTRATED A NUMBER OF HIS COMMENTS ON
SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION IN THE PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC
ENERGY. HE LISTED TYPES OF RESEARCH BOTH THE U.S. AND
RUSSIA WERE CONDUCTING AND CALLED FOR COOPERATION IN
DEVELOPING 21ST CENTURY TECHNOLOGY.
7. MIKHAILOV STATED THAT THE COMMISSION SUPPORTS THE
NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HE ALSO INDICATED
THAT NATIONAL LABORATORIES OF BOTH COUNTRIES SHOULD WORK
COOPERATIVELY TO ENHANCE IAEA SAFEGUARDS AND TO PROMOTE
NONPROLIFERATION.
8. TRADE IN URANIUM ON AMERICAN MARKETS WAS THE LAST TOPIC
MINISTER MIKHAILOV RAISED. HE COMPLAINED THAT IN TWO YEARS
THE RUSSIANS HAVE GAINED NOTHING. HE CONTINUED BY STATING
THAT THE TWO YEAR LEGAL BATTLE HAS BEEN INEFFECTIVE. HE
CLAIMED THAT WHILE THE RUSSIANS ARE LOSING USD 100 MILLION
EACH YEAR WHILE THE CANADIANS AND AUSTRALIANS HAVE MOVED
INTO THE MARKET.
9. ENERGY SECRETARY O'LEARY RESPONDED, NOTING THAT THE
SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING THE DAY BEFORE HAD BEEN A LONG,
DIFFICULT, BUT PRODUCTIVE SESSION. THE TWO SIDES NOW HAD A
CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE
SHUTDOWN OF PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION REACTORS AND THE CESSATION
OF USE OF NEWLY PRODUCED PLUTONIUM FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND
HAD MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS ON THE ISSUE OF ALTERNATIVE
POWER SOURCES FOR TOMSK AND KRASNOYARSK. O'LEARY NOTED
THAT THE TWO SIDES HAD SIGNED A PROTOCOL IN NOVEMBER IN
WHICH THEY AGREED TO STUDY NUCLEAR OPTIONS ALONG WITH
FOSSIL FUEL. ONCE THE STUDIES ARE COMPLETED, THE TWO SIDES
CAN TAKE THEM TO THE FINANCIERS. O'LEARY EMPHASIZED THAT
ONE OUTSTANDING ISSUE RELATED TO THE INAPPROPRIATENESS OF
THE GT-MHR, A HELIUM GAS REACTOR.
10. THE SECRETARY PRAISED THE WARHEADS AGREEMENT AND
STRESSED THE NEED TO NEGOTIATE AN AGREEMENT ON THE EXCHANGE
OF SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. SHE COMMENTED
FAVORABLY ON COOPERATION ON THE PHYSICAL CONTROL,
PROTECTION, AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND ON
THE EXPANSION OF THIS EFFORT INTO DIRECT LAB-TO-LAB
COOPERATIVE PROJECTS. SECRETARY O'LEARY CONCLUDED BY
STATING THAT ALTHOUGH DISAGREEMENTS REMAINED, THE SIDES
Page 2 of 5
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WERE SEEKING TO CLOSE THE GAP AND CONTINUE TO MAKE PROGRESS.
SELIN AND VISHNEVSKIY REPORT ON NUCLEAR SAFETY
11. DR. IVAN SELIN, CHAIRMAN OF THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION, REPORTED ON NUCLEAR SAFETY ISSUES. HE PRAISED
THE SPEED WITH WHICH THE KUCHATOV INSTITUTE HAS SET UP
SECURITY MEASURES TO PROTECT NUCLEAR MATERIAL. DR. SELIN
REPORTED THAT THE NRC AND DOE HAVE WORKED WITH GAN IN
EXCHANGING INFORMATION AND DELIVERING EQUIPMENT. HE
INDICATED THAT BOTH SIDES WERE ENGAGED IN ANALYZING THE
SAFETY OF THE WER 1000 NUCLEAR REACTOR. DR. SELIN ASKED
WHAT TYPE OF EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE DELIVERED AND COMMENTED
POSITIVELY ON THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURES GAN WAS PUTTING INTO
PLACE, ESPECIALLY IN TERMS OF COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES AND
FIRE PREVENTION MEASURES.
12. GAN CHAIRMAN VISHNEVSKIY EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH
THE PROGRESS OF GAN/NRC COOPERATION. HE STATED THAT HE HAD
ALSO SIGNED A PROTOCOL WITH UNDER SECRETARY OF ENERGY
CURTIS. HE PREFERRED, HOWEVER, TO ELEVATE THE EXISTING
COOPERATION TO AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL LEVEL.
13. DR. SELIN CONCLUDED BY STATING THAT NUCLEAR ISSUES CUT
ACROSS A NUMBER OF SECTORS: THE STUDY OF ENERGY
ALTERNATIVES, PRICING, CONSERVATION, RESTRUCTURING OF THE
ENERGY SECTOR IN BOTH FOSSIL AND NUCLEAR FUELS, ECONOMICS,
AND LEGISLATION THAT WOULD GIVE A NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION IN RUSSIA THE STATUTORY BASIS ON WHICH TO
OPERATE.
COMMITMENT ON COMPLIANCE AGREEMENT SOUGHT
14. THE VICE PRESIDENT NOTED THAT THE TRADE DEVELOPMENT
AGENCY PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE ENERGY SECTOR. HE
COMPLIMENTED MR. GRANDMAISON FOR HIS HARD WORK IN FUNDING
SOURCES OF ALTERNATIVE ENERGY.
15. IN TERMS OF THE COMPLIANCE AGREEMENT FOR THE SHUTDOWN
OF THE PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION REACTORS, THE VICE PRESIDENT
INDICATED THAT I T WAS NEAR CLOSURE SINCE BOTH SIDES AGREED
PHILOSOPHICALLY; DISAGREEMENTS CENTERED ON TECHNICAL
DETAILS. SECRETARY O'LEARY STATED THAT BOTH SIDES WERE
MOVING TO MEET THE DECEMBER DEADLINE ESTABLISHED IN THE
COMPLIANCE AGREEMENT. THE VICE PRESIDENT STRESSED THE
SYMBOLIC VALUE OF CONCLUDING THE COMPLIANCE AGREEMENT
WITHIN THE STIPULATED DEADLINE AND REQUESTED AN EXTRA PUSH
TO GAIN REAL RESULTS.
PRIME MINISTER URGES SIDES TO TAKE CONCRETE STEPS
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16. THE PRIME MINISTER AGREED THAT THE COMMITTEE HAD MADE
PROGRESS BUT STRESSED THAT PROBLEMS ARE NOT YET SOLVED.
CONCERNING THE PLUTONIUM REACTORS, THE PRIME MINISTER
INDICATED THAT THE AGREEMENT HAD TO BE IMPLEMENTED. HE
FURTHER STIPULATED THAT RUSSIA WILL SHUT D W THOSE
ON
PLUTONIUM REACTORS ONLY WHEN THEY ARE REPLACED. HE
REITERATED THE NEED FOR A MORE PRACTICAL, RATHER THAN A
THEORETICAL, APPROACH AND STRESSED THE NEED FOR PRACTICAL
RESULTS.
17. THE VICE PRESIDENT RESPONDED BY AGREEING ON THE NEED
TO IDENTIFY REPLACEMENT POWER SOURCES FOR THE PLUTONIUM
REACTORS. HE POINTED TO THE USD 1.63 MILLION TO FUND
FOSSIL FUEL FEASIBILITY STUDIES AND NUCLEAR OPTIONS. HE
STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPLETING THE ANALYSIS SO THAT
BOTH SIDES CAN LOOK AT THE FULL RANGE OF POSSIBILITIES AND
THEN MOVE TO IMPLEMENTATION. THE VICE PRESIDENT REITERATED
THAT THE U.S. HAS WORKED HARD TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF
REPLACEMENT FUEL SOURCES FOR THE PLUTONIUM REACTORS AND
STATED THAT HE REMAINED OPTIMISTIC. IN RESPONSE TO AN
ASSERTION THAT "NO PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE," THE VICE
PRESIDENT HANDED OVER TO THE PRIME MINISTER A RUSSIAN
LANGUAGE LISTING OF STEPS THE U.S. SIDE HAS TAKEN TO
DEVELOP REPLACEMENT POWER SOURCES. THE VICE PRESIDENT
PLEDGED TO CONTINUE THIS WORK.
18. PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN THANKED THE VICE PRESIDENT
AND AGREED THAT THE U.S. HAS DONE SOME WORK, BUT THAT I T
MUST WORK MORE INTENSELY. THE PRIME MINISTER INDICATED
THAT THE ISSUES ARE NOT JUST ECONOMIC ISSUES AND ASKED THAT
U.S. COLLEAGUES BE AWARE OF RUSSIA'S PROBLEMS.
COMMENT
19. IN ADDITION TO THE ITEMS REPORTED ABOVE, THE
SUBCOMMITTEE'S WRITTEN REPORT TO THE COMMISSION COVERED THE
FOLLOWING 12 TOPICS: 1) THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOR AND
THE USG ON THE EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION IN THE
FIELD OF SAFETY AND SECURITY OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS; 2)
COMPENSATION TO THE GOR RELATED TO DISMANTLEMENT OF
UKRAINIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS; 3) THE SHUTDOWN OF PLUTONIUM
PRODUCTION REACTORS AND CESSATION OF USE OF WEAPONS
PLUTONIUM; 4) THE CONSTRUCTION OF WEAPON-GRADE NUCLEAR
MATERIALS STORAGE FACILITY; 5) THE REMOVAL OF RESTRICTIONS
FOR RUSSIAN URANIUM EXPORT TO THE U.S.; 6) THE AGREEMENT ON
COOPERATION IN PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY; 7) JOINT
ENERGY ALTERNATIVES STUDY OF RUSSIA; 8) THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT TO PROVIDE FOR THE SAFE
OPERATION OF NUCLEAR REACTORS; 9) CONTROL ACCOUNTING AND
PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS; 10) PROGRAM ON
COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF ADVANCED DEFENSE TECHNOLOGIES
CONVERSION; 11) SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS NONPROLIFERATION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A
U.S.-RUSSIAN SCIENTIFIC TEAM; AND 12) COOPERATION IN THE
AREA OF REDUCED ENRICHMENT RESEARCH AND TEST REACTORS.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Page 4 of 5
�F:\Cable\Data Soiirce\Cables\CD010\DEC94\MSGS\M 1440721 .hlml
20.
THREE AGREEMENTS WERE SIGNED DURING GCC-IV:
- MINISTER MIKHAILOV AND SECRETARY O'LEARY SIGNED THE
AGREEMENT ON THE EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION ON
WARHEAD SAFETY
- THE MAYOR OF KRASNOYARSK-2 6 AND TDA'S GRANDMAISON SIGNED
A TDA GRANT AGREEMENT ON THE STUDY OF ALTERNATIVE ENERGY
SOURCES TO REPLACE PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION REACTOR AT
KRASNOYARSK-2 6
- REPRESENTING TOMSK, MINATOM'S DEPUTY MINISTER YEGOROV AND
TDA'S GRANDMAISON SIGNED A TDA GRANT AGREEMENT ON THE STUDY
OF ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOURCES TO REPLACE PLUTONIUM
PRODUCTION REACTOR AT TOMSK-7. (COMMENT: TOMSK OFFICIALS
WERE NOT PRESENT I N MOSCOW FOR THE SIGNING, BUT, WITH TDA'S
PERMISSION, MINATOM AGREED TO SIGN AND THEN SUBSEQUENTLY
GET SIGNATURE FROM TOMSK OBLAST. END COMMENT.)
TALBOTT
BT
#3756
NNNN
SECT
SECTION: 01 OF 0 1
SSN
3756
TOR
9 4 1 2 3 0 1 6 2 1 0 1 M1440721
DIST
PRT: BRANSCUM
S I T : NSC PONEMAN
Page 5 of 5
�
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Foreign Policy
Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission
Russia
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https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/3a2cea10bb0c1b12b416cef9ec1fa50f.pdf
050a6728fc32ab729f8cb95d277c2393
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full.
�Page 1 of 7
3936127D.FIN
Exchange M a i l
DATE-TIME
05/05/2000 6:19:46 PM
FROM
Wolosky, Lee S. (TNT)
CLASSIFICATION
CONriDCNTIAL -
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(b)(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
05/05/2000
DECLASSIFYON
05/06/2010
SUBJECT
ALFA BANK CHIGF WARNS AGAINST UNREALISTIC
EXPECTATIONS FOR PUTIN'S TERM
•icomiDENTtxcp
TO
Wolosky, Lee S. (TNT)
CARBON_COPY
TEXT BODY
-Message TextO N F LP E N T I A-fc SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 010365
E.O.12958:
DECL: 4/16/10
TAGS: ECON, EFIN, EINV, PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: ALFA BANK
CHIEF WARNS AGAINST UNREALISTIC
EXPECTATIONS FOR PUTIN'S TERM
(U)
CLASSIFIED BY A. DANIEL WEYGANDT, MINISTERCOUNSELOR FOR ECONOMIC
AFFAIRS. REASONS 1.5 (B) AND
(D).
14G>«UMMARY: IN A FAREWELL
MEETING WITH DEPARTING
ECON MINCOUNS, ALFA BANK CHIEF PETER AVEN
WAS NOT
OPTIMISTIC ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR MOVEMENT ON
ECONOMIC
REFORM
EARLY IN PRESIDENT-ELECT PUTIN'S FIRST TERI^gCLASSIFIED
32
CLI NTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY PERE.O. 156
�3936127D.FIN
Page 2 of?
INSTEAD HE PREDICTED
"NOTHING TOO CATASTROPHIC,
NOTHING TOO GOOD" IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.
AVEN
CONCEDED THAT NOMINATION OF ANDREY ILLARIONOV AS
ECONOMIC
ADVISOR WAS A POSITIVE SIGN, BUT SUGGESTED
THAT THE ABSENCE OF A
MANDATE FOR ECONOMIC REFORM, OF
A PROVEN ECONOMIC TEAM, OR OF DEEP
PRESIDENTIAL
COMMITMENT TO THE CAUSE WOULD PRECLUDE SWIFT
ACTION.
AVEN
ADDED THAT THE LACK OF MANAGERIAL EXPERIENCE IN
PUTIN'S ENTOURAGE
WILL ALSO BE A SERIOUS HANDICAP:
PUTIN NEEDS PEOPLE FROM BUSINESS,
HE ARGUED, WHO CAN
"MANAGE" WHAT WILL CONTINUE TO BE A DIFFICULT
TRANSITION
AND TRANSLATE IDEAS INTO REALITY. FOR THAT
REASON, HE PREDICTED
THAT WHILE FDPM KASYANOV WILL BE
SELECTED AS PRIME MINISTER, HE
WILL ONLY BE AN INTERIM
FIGURE. PUTIN HAS NO ONE ELSE, HE SAID,
BUT"KASYANOV
IS NOT PREPARED FOR RADICAL STEPS." END SUMMARY.
2.
-^EXPECTATIONS: AVEN OFFERED A SOBER ASSESSMENT
OF RUSSIA'S IMMEDIATE
FUTURE UNDER PUTIN, OPINING THAT
RUSSIA WOULD NOT GET THE "REVOLUTION
THAT IS NEEDED IN
THE NEAR FUTURE." INSTEAD, HE PREDICTED "NOTHING
TOO
CATASTROPHIC, NOTHING TOO GOOD." HE AGREED THAT
INVESTMENT
WOULD BE MORE SECURE UNDER PUTIN THAN
YELTSIN, THOUGH "PERHAPS NOT
SECURE ENOUGH." HE
EXPECTED THE COUNTRY COULD MANAGE MODEST GROWTH
RATES
OF 2-3 PERCENT BUT NOTED THAT AS A RESULT RUSSIA
WOULD
CONTINUE
TO LOSE GROUND RELATIVE TO ITS TRADING
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�3936127D.FIN
Page 3 of 7
COMPETITORS WHO ARE GROWING
AT FASTER RATES. HE
PREDICTED THAT THE PROBLEM OF REGULATION MIGHT
BECOME
WORSE RATHER THAN BETTER UNDER PUTIN.
3.-(RUTIN'S ADVISOR:
AVEN DID SEE GROUNDS FOR HOPE
IN THE APPOINTMENT OF ANDREY ILLARIONOV
AS ECONOMIC
ADVISOR TO PUTIN. THE APPOINTMENT WAS AN EXCELLENT
ONE,
HE SAID, IN THAT ILLARIONOV IS "WESTERN AND NOT
EASTERN" IN OUTLOOK
AND WILL BE VERY STRAIGHTFORWARD
WITH PUTIN, ALWAYS TELLING HIM
WHAT HE THINKS. AVEN
AGREED THAT AS ADVISOR ILLARIONOV WILL NOT
BE INVOLVED
IN CARRYING OUT DECISIONS, BUT EXPECTS HE WILL PLAY
AN
IMPORTANT ROLE IN POLICY FORMULATION AND IN
IDEOLOGY.
"PUTIN
NEEDS LEAVENING AND EDUCATION IN THE ECONOMIC
SPHERE," AVEN SAID,
AND ILLARIONOV IS WELL-EQUIPPED TO
PROVIDE IT. HE EXPRESSED DOUBT
THAT PUTIN SUPPORTS
ALL OF HIS ADVISOR'S VIEWS, BUT EXPRESSED HOPE
THAT
ILLARIONOV WOULD HELP PUTIN "BECOME A BELIEVER" IN
ECONOMIC
REFORM. THE ABSENCE OF SUCH STRONG
PRESIDENTIAL COMMITMENT TO REFORM,
AVEN ARGUED, IS ONE
CONSTRAINT MITIGATING AGAINST A FAST START OUT
OF THE
BOX FOR A NEW PUTIN ADMINISTRATION. A PRESIDENT
NEEDS
SUCH
CERTITUDE HE SUGGESTED, GIVEN THE BROAD
OPPOSITION HE WILL FACE.
4.
- M O T H E R CONSTRAINTS: ADDITIONAL CONSTRAINTS
IDENTIFIED BY AVEN
INCLUDE THE ABSENCE OF A MANDATE
FROM THE ELECTION FOR ECONOMIC
REFORM, AS PUTIN
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 4 of?
3936127D.FIN
LARGELY AVOIDED OFFERING A DETAILED PROGRAM
DURING
THE
CAMPAIGN, AND THE LACK OF A COHERENT ECONOMIC
TEAM TO
DEVELOP
AND CARRY OUT POLICY. ILLARIONOV MUST HELP
ASSEMBLE A TEAM, AVEN
ARGUED, AS "PUTIN KNOWS NO ONE"
BEYOND THE SMALL GROUP ALREADY IN
GOVERNMENT OR IN THE
STRATEGIC RESEARCH CENTER. OF THESE FIGURES,
MOST
LIKE DEPUTY FINANCE MINISTER KUDRIN OR GERMAN GREF
LACK MANAGERIAL
EXPERIENCE AND THE ABILITY TO
TRANSLATE IDEAS INTO REALITY. AVEN
NOTED THAT THIS
HAS HAMPERED THE WORK OF THE STRATEGIC RESEARCH
CENTER,
WHICH IS STILL LARGELY FOCUSED ON CONCEPTS AND
IDEAS RATHER THAN
ON THEIR PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION.
5.-(€>KASYANOV: TURNING TO
PRESIDENT-ELECT PUTIN'S
LIKELY CHOICE AS PRIME MINISTER, AVEN SUGGESTED
THAT
KASYANOV IS "VERY ORIENTAL," DESCRIBING HIM AS
"MUTNY"- THE
RUSSIAN WORD FOR "CLOUDY WATER" THAT
DOES NOT REVEAL ITS DEPTH.
HE TERMED HIM A TYPICAL
RUSSIAN BUREAUCRAT, THOUGH "ONE OF THE
BEST," AND SAID
PUTIN WILL CHOOSE HIM AS PRIME MINISTER BECAUSE
HE HAS
NO ONE ELSE. "HE WILL STAY FOR A WHILE," AVEN ADDED,
BUT
NOT FOR LONG AS HE IS "NOT PREPARED FOR RADICAL
STEPS."
6.^
BUSINESS-PEOPLE: AVEN WAS CATEGORICAL THAT IN
THE NOT-TO-DISTANT
FUTURE PUTIN WILL HAVE TO TURN TO
PEOPLE FROM BUSINESS TO RUN THE
GOVERNMENT. HE
POINTEDLY EXCLUDED HIMSELF, NOTING THAT HE HAS NO
INTEREST
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 5 of?
3936127D.FIN
IN SUCH A CHANGE OF CAREER, BUT POINTED TO
CONFI D E N T I N
-fc-SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 010365
E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/16/10
TAGS:
ECON, EFIN, EINV, PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: ALFA BANK CHIEF WARNS AGAINST
UNREALISTIC
EXPECTATIONS FOR PUTIN'S TERM
YOUNG STEEL MAGNATE
MORDASHEV, HEAD OF THE SEVERSTAL
STEEL MILL IN CHEREPOVETS AS THE
TYPE OF FIGURE PUTIN
NEEDS. "WE NEED SOMEONE WHO CAN BUILD SOMETHING,"
AVEN
SAID, ARGUING THAT THE NEW CLASS OF PROFESSIONALS
IN THEIR MID-THIRTIES
WHO HAVE STUDIED ABROAD AND ARE
FLUENT IN THREE TO FOUR LANGUAGES
FIT THE BILL. IF A
RUSSIAN LEADER CAN PROVIDE THEM WITH A "SENSE
OF
MISSION," AVEN ADDED, THEN THEY WILL BE PREPARED TO
MAKE THE
SACRIFICES NECESSARY TO PURSUE SUCH A CAREER.
7rfe^AVENS WISHLIST:
ASKED ABOUT HIS OWN PRIORITY
LIST OF REFORMS THAT PRESIDENT-ELECT
PUTIN SHOULD
PURSUE, AVEN CITED A FAMILIAR LITANY OF NEEDED
CHANGES,
INCLUDING LEGAL REFORM, TAX REFORM, REFORM OF
THE STATE APPARATUS,
DEREGULATION OF NATURAL
MONOPOLIES, AND A STRONG ANTI-CORRUPTION
PUSH. ON THE
LATTER, AVEN JUDGED THAT PUTIN COULD BEST ACT BY
SETTING
A GOOD EXAMPLE: "A NON-CORRUPTED TOP WILL
SPREAD" DOWN THROUGH THE
RANKS. AVEN ARGUED THAT
PUTIN CAN DO THIS FOR HE IS NOT BEHOLDEN
TO ANY
OLIGARCHS AND IS INSTEAD VERY INDEPENDENT. AVEN
DISCOUNTED
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�3936127D.FIN
Page 6 of?
THE IDEA OF A SPECIAL TIE TO BEREZOVSKIY,
NOTING THAT HE HIMSELF
HAD INTRODUCED THE TWO. PUTIN
PERIODICALLY MEETS AND SPEAKS TO
THE OLIGARCHS, AVEN
SAID, BUT THEY HAVE NO "INSTRUMENT OF INFLUENCE
OVER
HIM." AVEN CLAIMED TO SEE PUTIN ABOUT ONCE A MONTH
FOR BROAD
DISCUSSIONS OF REFORM.
8.-f€3rBANKING: AVEN NOTED THAT CBR CHAIRMAN
GERASHCHENKO
IS CONDUCTING HIMSELF AS IF HE IS SURE
THAT HE WILL STAY ON IN THE
NEW ADMINISTRATION. IT
APPEARS THAT HE HAS A DIRECT PROMISE, AVEN
SAID, AND
AS A RESULT HE JUDGED THAT THERE IS VIRTUALLY "NO
CHANCE"
FOR SERIOUS REFORM OF THE BANKING SECTOR.
AVEN NOTED THAT SBERBANK,
THE STATE SAVINGS BANK,
CONTINUES TO KILL ITS COMMERCIAL COMPETITION,
WHICH
CANNOT COMPETE WITH THE RATES IT OFFERS. HE ARGUED
THAT
SBERBANK, INSTEAD OF DOMINATING THE FIELD OF
CORPORATE LENDING AS
IT DOES, SHOULD BE INVOLVED IN
RETAIL LENDING, FOR CONSUMER PURCHASES
AND THE
MORTGAGE MARKET. HOWEVER, HE STRESSED THAT ALFA IS
DOING
WELL, PARTICULARLY IN ITS INTERNATIONAL
OPERATIONS.
COMMENT:
AVEN IS AN OPINIONATED AND EXTREMELY
WELL-CONNECTED INTERLOCUTOR.
HIS APPRAISAL OF THE
RUSSIAN SCENE WAS NOTABLE FOR ITS GENERALLY
PESSIMISTIC
TONE, AND ITS CAUTION ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR
DRAMATIC REFORMS IN THE
SHORT TERM. HE ALSO DID NOT
REITERATE HIS RECENT COMMENTS IN THE
PRESS THAT RUSSIA
NEEDS A "PINOCHET" TO HELP IT TURN THE CORNER
ON
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 7 of?
3936127D.FIN
ECONOMIC REFORM." END COMMENT.
COLLINS
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 1 of 9
39AAAC57.FIN
Exchange
Mail
DATE-TIME
08/04/2000 6:15:50 PM
FROM
Wolosky, Lee S. (TNT)
CLASSIFICATION
•CONFIDENTIAT
CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(b)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
08/04/2000
DECLASSIFYON
08/05/2010
SUBJECT
THE KREMLIN AND BIG BUSINESS: A NEW ERA?
[CONFIDEMTfrtfcfr
TO
Rosa, Frederick M. (TNT)
CARBON_COPY
TEXT BODY
Message Text
Q N F-j-D C N T I M r SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 015383
E.O.12958:
DECL: 8/3/10
TAGS: ECON, EFIN, EINV, PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: THE KREMLIN
AND BIG BUSINESS: A NEW ERA?
REF: MOSCOW 14664
(U) CLASSIFIED
BY A. DANIEL WEYGANDT, ACTING DEPUTY
CHIEF OF MISSION. REASONS
1.5 (B) AND (D).
1.^SUMMARY: PRESIDENT PUTIN'S CORRECT, BUT
FAR
FROM CORDIAL JULY 27TH MEETING WITH LEADING RUSSIAN
BUSINESSMEN,
TOGETHER WITH THE RECENT WAVE OF
INVESTIGATIONS INTO TAX FRAUD AND
OTHER MISDEEDS BY
LEADING RUSSIAN FIRMS AND BUSINESSMEN, SUGGESTS
THAT A
CLI N O LIBRARY P O O O Y
TN
HTCP
�39AAAC57.FIN
Page 2 of 9
NEW ERA IN RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS RELATIONS
MAY
BE
OPENING. IN PLACE OF THE INTERMIXING OF ECONOMIC
AND POLITICAL
POWER THAT LED TO THE COINING OF THE
TERM "OLIGARCH," PUTIN APPEARS
DETERMINED TO DISTANCE
GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS, DRAWING ON BUSINESS'
EXPERTISE
AND CONNECTIONS WHEN IT IS USEFUL TO HIM,
BUT MAKING CLEAR THAT
HE IS AN INDEPENDENT ACTOR WITH
NO DEBTS TO PAY. WHETHER HIS STATED
GOAL OF KEEPING
ALL BUSINESSMEN "EQUIDISTANT" FROM THE STATE WILL
BE
FULFILLED, HOWEVER, REMAINS UNCLEAR. WHILE THE
RECENT
CRACKDOWN
SUGGESTED THAT CERTAIN BUSINESS LEADERS
CLOSELY TIED TO THE GOR
ARE STILL OFF-LIMITS, COMMENTS
BY PUTIN AND GOR OFFICIALS HINT THAT
EVEN BUSINESSES
WITH TIES TO KREMLIN ALLIES, SUCH AS SIBNEFT, COULD
BE
BE TARGETED FOR TAX VIOLATIONS. END SUMMARY.
2.-{erWORDS:
FROM THE TIME HE ASSUMED THE RUSSIAN
PRESIDENCY ON AN ACTING BASIS
AT THE START OF THE
YEAR, PRESIDENT PUTIN HAS SENT CLEAR VERBAL
SIGNALS
THAT THE YELTSIN ERA, WITH ITS INTERMIXING OF
ECONOMIC
AND
POLITICAL POWER, IS OVER. THE THEME MADE ITS
FIRST MODEST APPEARANCE
IN HIS "OPEN LETTER ON THE EVE
OF THE MILLENNIUM," WHERE HE SPOKE
OF THE NEED FOR
OLIGARCHS TO BE KEPT "EQUIDISTANT" FROM THE STATE.
SOON,
IN THE PRE-ELECTION PERIOD, PUTIN'S RHETORIC
BECAME TOUGHER. HE
TOLD RADIO MAYAK IN AN INTERVIEW
IN FEBRUARY, FOR INSTANCE, THAT
THOSE WHO SEEK TO
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�39AAAC57.FIN
Page 3 of 9
"MESH" THE STATE AND CAPITAL WOULD NO LONGER EXIST
AS
A CLASS. PUTIN ALSO REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED THAT ALL
SHOULD BE
EQUAL BEFORE THE LAW, FROM SO-CALLED
OLIGARCHS TO THE NODEST SHOE
REPAIRMAN. HE ALSO
PLEDGED NOT TO INTERFERE IN ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS
OF
THE PROCURACY AND OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT
AUTHORITIES.
3.-(€)—
AND DEEDS: WHETHER PUTIN'S RECENT ACTIONS LIVE
UP TO THIS AMBITIOUS
AGENDA HAS BEEN HOTLY DEBATED IN
MOSCOW. CRITICS POINT TO THE FACT
THAT THE CRACKDOWN
OF RECENT MONTHS HIT KREMLIN CRITICS, INCLUDING
MOST
NOTABLY MEDIA-MOST MAGNATE VLADIMIR GUSINSKIY,
AND
LEFT UNSCATHED
SUCH KREMLIN INSIDERS AS BORIS
BEREZOVSKIY AND RONAN ABRAMOVITCH.
OTHERS WHO WERE
TARGETED ALSO HAD CONNECTIONS TO THE POLITICAL
OPPOSITION:
LUKOIL'S VAGIT ALEKPEROV, FOR INSTANCE,
LIKE GUSINSKIY, SUPPORTED
"FATHERLAND-ALL RUSSIA".
SOME CRITICS, LIKE FORMER "UNITY" PARTY
DEPUTY
VLADIMIR RYZHKOV, SUGGESTED THAT VLADIMIR POTANIN
(NORILSK
NICKEL) AND ANATOLIY CHUBAYS (UES) HAD BEEN
TARGETED FOR THEIR SUPPORT
OF THE "UNION OF RIGHT
FORCES." GIVEN THAT PARTY'S STRONG SUPPORT
FOR PUTIN,
HOWEVER, SUCH SUGGESTIONS SEEN STRAINED. CHUBAYS,
IN
FACT,
HAS BEEN HARDLY INCONVENIENCED BY THE AS YET
UNPURSUED PLAN OF THE
ACCOUNTING CHAMBER TO LOOK INTO
FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF UES SHARES,
A MOVE THAT IN ANY
EVENT WAS INITIATED BY THE DUMA RATHER THAN THE
GOVERNMENT.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�39AAAC57.FIN
Page 4 of 9
INTERESTINGLY, WHILE SPS LEADER BORIS
NEMTSOV TOLD THE AMBASSADOR
IN JULY THAT HE BELIEVED A
"PERSONAL VENDETTA" EXPLAINED THE ASSAULT
ON
GUSINSKIY, HE OFFERED NO POLITICAL/PERSONAL
RATIONALE
FOR THE
OTHER INVESTIGATIONS.
4.4G^A TELLING DEFECTION: THE RECENT POLITICAL
TRAJECTORY
OF BORIS BEREZOVSKIY SUGGESTS, HOWEVER,
THAT MORE THAN SETTLING
SCORES MAY BE AT WORK. WE
UNDERSTAND THAT F
ROM AN EARLY STAGE
IN THE PUTIN
ADMINISTRATION, BEREZOVSKIY LOST HIS PRIVILEGED
ACCESS
TO
THE KREMLIN, AND WAS REQUIRED TO APPLY FOR
PERMISSION EACH TIME
HE WISHED TO VISIT THERE. HIS .
DECISION TO LEAVE THE
DUMA AND PUBLICLY OPPOSE PUTIN'S
FEDERAL REFORMS IS A CLEAR SIGNAL
THAT HE NO LONGER
FELT SURE OF KREMLIN PROTECTION. THE RECENT
INVESTIGATION
INTO AVTOVAZ, IN WHICH BEREZOVSKIY
REPORTEDLY HAS AN INTEREST, THE
REOPENING OF THE
INVESTIGATION INTO EMBEZZLEMENT FROM AEROFLOT,
AND
APPARENT PLANS BY THE GOR TO TAKE BACK CONTROL OF
ORT
TELEVISION
CHANNEL MAKES CLEAR THAT HIS PERCEPTION OF
HIS CHANGING FORTUNES
WAS NOT FAR OFF.
S.^efTHE UNTOUCHABLE?: CENTRAL TO CONTINUED
CRITICISM
OF THE KREMLIN FOR FAILURE TO ADHERE TO THE
PRINCIPLE OF "EQUIDISTANCE"
HAS BEEN THE CONTINUED
IMMUNITY OF ROMAN ABRAMOVICH FROM INVESTIGATION.
KREMLIN
INSIDER GLEB PAVLOVSKIY MADE CLEAR TO POLOFF
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 5 of 9
39AAAC57.FIN
C 0 N T I D E-N T I
^-trSECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 015383
E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/3/10
TAGS:
ECON, EFIN, EINV, PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: THE KREMLIN AND BIG BUSINESS:
A NEW ERA?
IN JULY THAT THE KREMLIN PERCEIVES A DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN
HIM AND POTANIN, BEREZOVSKIY AND GUSINSKIY.
IN CONSTRAST TO THE
LATTER, HE SUGGESTED, ABRAMOVICH
IS A "GOOD" OLIGARCH WHO DOES "HELPFUL"
WORK IN THE
OIL BUSINESS, AND DID NOT CROSS THE KREMLIN THROUGH
TAX
AVOIDANCE, FUNNELING MONEY TO THE REGIONS, OR
SUPPORTING THE OPPOSITION.
6.
-{e)-NEXT IN LINE?: MORE RECENTLY, HOWEVER, A CHANGE
IN TONE HAS
OCCURRED. FINANCE MINISTER KUDRIN
RECENTLY COMMENTED CRITICALLY
ON THE TAX RECORD OF
ABRAMOVICH'S SIBNEFT OIL COMPANY (WHICH PAYS
SEVENFOLD LESS IN TAXES ON EACH BARREL OF OIL IT PRODUCES
THAN
ITS RIVALS, INCLUDING LUKOIL). PUTIN HIMSELF
SHARPLY QUESTIONED
SIBNEFT OFFICIALS ON THE ISSUE
DURING THE JULY 27TH ROUNDTABLE.
HOWEVER,
ABRAMOVICH'S BUSINESS EMPIRE EXTENDS FAR BEYOND
SIBNEFT
AND ANY MOVE AGAINST SIBNEFT COULD BE LIMITED
TO THE COMPANY AND
NOT TOUCH ABRAMOVICH PERSONALLY.
FURTHERMORE, GIVEN THAT THE KREMLIN
HAS BEEN THE
OBJECT OF CRITICAL PRESS DUE TO THE LACK OF
"EQUIDISTANCE"
OF ABRAMOVICH, MAMUT AND DERIPASKA,
COMPARED TO OTHER OLIGARCHS,
THE SWIPES AGAINST
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SIBNEFT COULD BE AN ATTEMPT TO DEFLECT SUCH
CRITICISM.
7.
-(€^A CHILLY EMBRACE: THE NEW DYNAMICS OF
RELATIONS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT
AND BUSINESS WERE ON
DISPLAY AT THE JULY 27TH ROUNDTABLE, WITH PUTIN
STERNLY
ADMONISHING LEADING BUSINESSMEN THAT THEY
THEMSELVES HAD HELPED
CREATE THE RUSSIAN STATE IN ITS
CURRENT FORM, AND SHOULD NOT COMPLAIN
AT THE
REFLECTION THAT FACED THEM IN THE MIRROR AS A
RESULT.
IN
CONTRAST TO MEETING INITIATOR BORIS NEMTSOV, WHOSE
INITIAL MORE
ROBUST VISION OF THE SESSION INCLUDED
CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT
BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND
BUSINESS DELINEATING THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
OF
EACH SIDE, PUTIN REJECTED ANY SUCH EFFORT TO PUT
GOVERNMENT AND
BUSINESS ON AN EQUAL FOOTING. THE
KREMLIN ALSO BLOCKED SUGGESTIONS
THAT GUSINSKIY,
BEREZOVSKIY AND AMBRAMOVICH BE INCLUDED IN THE
GUEST
LIST.
8.
-f€)-STRAIGHT TALK: IN HIS EXCHANGES WITH LEADING
BUSINESSMEN, ALL
OF WHOM HE OFFERED AN OPPORTUNITY TO
SPEAK, PUTIN WAS TERSE AND
DIRECT. HE REITERETED HIS
LONGSTANDING POLICIES, REASSURING THOSE
PRESENT THAT
THE WHOLESALE REOPENING OF PAST PRIVATIZATIONS IS
NOT
ON
HIS AGENDA. BUT HE RULED OUT A GENERAL AMNESTY FOR
PAST WRONGDOING,
SAYING THAT HE WILL NOT INTERFERE
WITH INVESTIGATIONS BY LAW-ENFORCEMENT
AUTHORITIES.
AS NOTED ABOVE, HE QUESTIONED SIBNEFT CHIEF YEVGENIY
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SHVYDLER
OVER WHY HIS FIRM PAID SO LITTLE TAX. HE
WARNED ALL PRESENT THAT
THEY SHOULD ABANDON ATTEMPTS
TO PUT THEIR SUPPORTERS IN GOVERNMENT
"POWER
STRUCTURES." TO VLADIMIR POTANIN, WHO HAS PROTESTED
HIS
INNOCENCE IN RESPONSE TO PROCURACY ALLEGATIONS
THAT HE UNDERPAID
BY 140 MILLION USD FOR A CONTROLLING
STAKE IN NORILSK NICKEL, PUTIN
ASKED IF HE WAS SURE HE
COULD DEMONSTRATE THIS FACT IN COURT. WHEN
POTANIN
REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY, PUTIN REPORTEDLY RESPONDED
"WELL,
GO AHEAD AND PROVE IT," ADDING "WHAT ARE YOU
AFRAID OF THEN?"
9.
-4G)-¥HE KREMLIN'S STATEMENT: IN PLACE OF THE
AGREEMENT AND JOINT
STATEMENT NEMTSOV ENVISIONED, THE
KREMLIN PUT OUT A SIMPLE STATEMENT
OUTLINING THE
MEETING'S CONTENT. NO MENTION WAS MADE OF THE
BUSINESSMEN'S
CONCERN ABOUT ONGOING LEGAL PROCEEDINGS.
THE STATEMENT INCLUDED
PUTIN'S ASSURANCE THAT
PRIVATIZATIONS WOULD NOT BE REVIEWED, BUT
ADDED THAT
HE MADE THE POINT THAT IT IS "UNACCEPTABLE FOR
COMPETING
COMPANIES TO TRY TO USE STATE STRUCTURES AND
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
TO ACHIEVE THEIR GOALS." IN
THE ONE CONCRETE RESULT OF THE SESSION,
THE STATEMENT
NOTED THAT AN ADVISORY COUNCIL WOULD BE SET UP TO
ADVISE
THE PRESIDENT AND THE GOVERNMENT ON ISSUES OF
INTEREST TO BUSINESS.
THIS SUGGESTION OF PRIME
MINISTER KASYANOV, WHO WITH MINISTERS
KUDRIN AND GREF
ALSO ATTENDED THE SESSION, CLEARLY AIMS TO CALL
ON
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Page 8 of9
BUSINESS WHEN
IT IS IN THE GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST TO DO
SO. THIS HAPPENED MOST
RECENTLY JUST IN THE WEEK
BEFORE THE MEETING, WHEN KASYANOV CONVENED
BUSINESS
LEADERS AND URGED THEM TO LOBBY THE FEDERATION
COUNCIL
IN
FAVOR OF TAX REFORM.
l O . ^ M J X E D REACTIONS: THOSE PRESENT PUT
THE BEST
FACE ON THE MEETING AFTERWORDS, CITING PUTIN'S
ASSURANCE
THAT PRIVATIZATION WOULD NOT BE REOPENED.
BORIS NEMTSOV SAID THE
SESSION WAS A SIGN THAT THE
"PERIOD OF PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION OF
CAPITAL" IS AT AN
- C O N F I D E N T I A L-SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW
015383
E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/3/10
TAGS: ECON, EFIN, EINV, PGOV,
RS
SUBJECT: THE KREMLIN AND BIG BUSINESS: A NEW ERA?
END, AND
BUSINESS CAN NOW GET DOWN TO NORMAL WORK.
"THE OLIGARCHS HAVE
BECOME SICK OF BEING OLIGARCHS,"
HE TOLD A NEWS CONFERENCE, AND
WANT TO BE "LAW-ABIDING
TAXPAYERS." NOT ALL PRESENT SHARED NEMTSOV'S
POSITIVE
APPRAISAL. SEVERAL COMMENTED ANONYMOUSLY IN THE
MOSCOW
PRESS THAT THE MEETING HAD NOT BEEN USEFUL. IN
A POST-MEETING PRESS
CONFERENCE, KAKHA BENDUKIDZE OF
URALMASH, UNITED MACHINE-BUILDING
PLANTS, DISTANCED
HIMSELF FROM THE POSITIVE ASSESSMENT OF OTHER
PARTICIPANTS,
COMMENTING IRONICALLY THAT PERHAPS HE
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HAD BEEN IN A DIFFERENT MEETING.
11.
4G)-€0MMENT: FROM THE KREMLIN'S PERSPECTIVE, THE
GOAL OF THE SESSION
(AS WAS ADMITTED BY ONE ANONYMOUS
SOURCE IN THE BUSINESS DAILY "VEDEMOSTIY")
WAS TO "PUT
THE OLIGARCHS IN THEIR PLACE," AND DISPEL ANY
PRETENSIONS
THEY MIGHT CONTINUE TO ENTERTAIN AS TO
THEIR INFLUENCE OVER NATIONAL
POLICY. UNLIKE YELTSIN,
PUTIN CLEARLY DOES NOT FEEL INDEBTED TO
BIG BUSINESS,
AND APPEARS DETERMINED TO REIN IT IN, AS HE HAS REINED
IN
THE NATION'S REGIONAL ELITES. REGARDLESS OF
WHETHER ANY FORMER
"OLIGARCH" IS EVER PROSECUTED, THE
RECENT CRACKDOWN HAS MADE PUTIN'S
POINT: THE FORMER
UNTOUCHABLES HAVE BECOME TOUCHABLE. PUTIN IS
NOT
DEPENDENT ON OLIGARCHS, THEY ARE DEPENDENT ON HIM,
AND
IT IS
NOT CLEAR AT THIS POINT THAT HE WILL HELP THEM.
124G^FHE OUTCOME
OF THIS CAMPAIGN MAY BE TO TURN
OLIGARCHS INTO SOMETHING RESEMBLING
TAXPAYING
BUSINESSMEN, AS NEMTSOV SUGGESTS THEY WANT TO BE.
TO
THIS
POINT, SOME ARE BEING JAWBONED INTO IT
(ABRAMOVICH, CHUBAYS) AND
OTHERS INTIMIDATED
(ALEKPEROV, POTANIN) AND STILL OTHERS FORCED
(GUSINSKIY).
THE TREATMENT METED OUT TO EACH APPEARS
TO BE RELATED TO POLITICS
AND PERSONALITIES, NOT
UNUSUAL ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD. END COMMENT.
ORDWAY
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39F6B6D1.FIN
Exchange M a i l
DATE-TIME
10/01/2000 10:32:00 AM
FROM
Wolosky, Lee S. (TNT)
CLASSIFICATION
-CONPIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(b)(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
10/01/2000
DECLASSIFYON
10/02/2010
SUBJECT
TO
U/S PICKERING MEETING WITH BORIS BEREZOVSKIY
-jCONITDCNTIACT
Rosa, Frederick M. (TNT)
CARBON_COPY
TEXT BODY
fyi
-Message TextO N F I D C N T I A L STATE 190013
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/10
TAGS:
PGOV, PHUM, RS
SUBJECT: U/S PICKERING MEETING WITH BORIS BEREZOVSKIY
(SEPT.
18,2000, NEW YORK)
CLASSIFIED BY U/S FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS THOMAS
R.
PICKERING. REASONS: 1.5 B AND D.
1. fe)-SUMMARY: RUSSIAN MEDIA
MAGNATE BORIS BEREZOVSKIY
TOLD U/S PICKERING IN NEW YORK THAT PUTIN
IS GOING DOWN
THE PATH OF PERON OR PINOCHET - NOT SEEKING AN
AUTHORITARIAN
STATE PER SE, BUT PURSUING THE GOAL OF A
DEMOCRATIC STATE VIA AN
AUTHORITARIAN PATH. PUTIN, HE
SAYS, HAS UNDERMINED THE INDEPENDENCE
OF THE SEPARATE
BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT AND IS INTENT ON RE-
CENTRALIZING
DECLASSIFIED
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POWER.
HE HAS STRIPPED THE REGIONS OF THE RIGHT TO PURSUE
THEIR OWN FOREIGN
INVESTORS AND FIRED ELECTED MAYORS AND
GOVERNORS. PUTIN IS ALSO
PURSUING STATIST ECONOMIC
POLICIES WITHOUT UNDERSTANDING THE PRIVATE
SECTOR. PUTIN
NOW SEEKS TO GAIN "TOTAL CONTROL" OF THE THREE TV
STATIONS
THAT DOMINATE THE MASS MEDIA. (BEREZOVSKIY HAS THUS
PLACED
HIS ORT TELEVISION HOLDINGS IN A SPECIAL TRUST HELD
BY A GROUP
OF INDEPENDENT JOURNALISTS.) BEREZOVSKIY
CLAIMED TO WANT TO BUILD
A SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC "LOYAL
OPPOSITION" AND NOTED THAT, IN VIEW OF
THE PRESTIGE OF THE
UNITED STATES AMONG MOST RUSSIANS, MORE PUBLIC
U.S.
CRITICISM OF PUTIN'S MEASURES WOULD FIND RESONANCE
IN
RUSSIA.
HE ADMITS HE LACKS A LEADER FOR THIS APPROACH; A
CRITICAL FACTOR
FOR SUCCESS. HE ADDED THAT PUTIN FEARS
NEITHER THE U.S. NOR NATO,
BUT THINKS THE U.S. HOLDS
POSITIONS THAT RUN COUNTER TO RUSSIAN
INTERESTS.
PICKERING NOTED THAT, WHILE YELTSIN HAD A CLEAR
STRATEGY
BUT
WAS CONFUSED ON TACTICS, PUTIN WAS AT THE MOMENT
UNPREDICTABLE IN
BOTH STRATEGY AND TACTICS. END SUMMARY.
2.-feHUJSSIAN MEDIA MAGNATE
BORIS BEREZOVSKIY CALLED ON
U/S PICKERING OCTOBER 18 ON THE MARGINS
OF THE UNGA IN NEW
YORK. BEREZOVSKIY WAS ACCOMPANIED BY ALEC
GOLDFARB
AND
VLADIMIR VORONKO. U/S PICKERING WAS ACCOMPANIED BY
P
STAFF
(NOTETAKER). BEREZOVSKIY OPENED BY OUTLINING HIS
w
i—
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THREE GOALS FOR
HIS TRIP TO NEW YORK: TO GIVE HIS VISION
OF CURRENT STATE OF EVENTS
IN RUSSIA; TO SEND A MESSAGE ON
THE NEED FOR DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION
TO PUTIN; AND, TO OPEN
COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE RUSSIAN EXPATRIATE
COMMUNITY IN
THE UNITED STATES. OVERSEAS RUSSIANS, HE SAID, NEED
TO
DEVELOP A MODERN AND SUPPORTIVE RELATIONSHIP TO
MOTHER
RUSSIA.
NOTING HE WAS GOING STRAIGHT TO BRIGHTON BEACH
AFTER THE MEETING,
HE PLACED THE NEW YORK CITY RUSSIAN
COMMUNITY AT 900,000 AND 4 MILLION
IN THE ENTIRE U.S. (A
FIGURE PICKERING SAID SOUNDED HIGH).
3.
-(Q^EREZOVSKIY BEGAN BY RECOUNTING THAT YELTSIN
HAD
INITIATED SOUND,
LOGICAL REFORMS, NOT ONLY LAYING THE
FOUNDATION FOR NEW ECONOMIC
SYSTEM BUT CHANGING THE
RUSSIAN MENTALITY. NO LONGER DO PEOPLE DEPEND
ON THE
STATE, HE SAID, BUT ON THEMSELVES. PUTIN, HE AVERRED,
NEEDS
TO CONTINUE WITH THIS LONG EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS.
YELTSIN TURNED
THE COUNTRY 180 DEGREES, BUT PUTIN NOW
APPEARS INTENT ON CONTINUING
SOME OF YELTSIN'S OWN
STRATEGIC MISTAKES WHILE ADDING NEW ONES OF
HIS OWN.
PUTIN IS CONTINUING YELTSIN'S ERRORS IN CHECHNYA, HE
SAID,
AS
WELL AS THE FAILING TO ATTEND TO THE ISSUE OF
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION.
PUTIN, CLAIMED BEREZOVSKIY, IS
DESTROYING THE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM
BY HIS MOVES AGAINST THE
COURTS AND THE LEGISLATURE. THE DUMA,
HE SAID, IS "NOW
JUST A RUBBER STAMP OF THE KREMLIN."
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4 . ^
PICKERING CONCURRED THAT PUTIN HAS UNDERMINED
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENTAL BRANCHES, WHILE DOING
AWAY WITH THE FEDERATION
COUNCIL AND LIMITING THE AUTONOMY
OF THE OBLASTS. THE GOAL APPEARS
TO BE THE
RECENTRALIZATION OF POWER. BEREZOVSKIY STATED THAT
CONTROL
OF THE MASS MEDIA IS ALSO BEING CONCENTRATED,
CLAIMING THAT 90 PERCENT
OF ALL TV INFLUENCE IS
CONCENTRATED IN THE TOP THREE CHANNELS: ORT,
NTV ("NOT
MASS MEDIA, IT HAS GOOD URBAN, BUT NOT RURAL OR
NATIONAL
COVERAGE")
AND RTR ("WEAK, WITH NO POLITICAL POWER").
5.-(BEREZOVSKIY
STATED THAT HE BELIEVES THAT PUTIN
DOES NOT ACTIVELY SEEK THE CONSTRUCTION
OF AN
AUTHORITARIAN STATE, JUST THAT HE BELIEVES A
DEMOCRATIC
STATE
CAN BE ESTABLISHED VIA THE AUTHORITARIAN PATH. HE
LIKENED PUTIN
TO PERON AND PINOCHET. ASKED IF HE THOUGHT
PUTIN WAS ALSO MOVING
TOWARDS A STATIST ECONOMY,
BEREZOVSKIY REPLIED "ABSOLUTELY," NOTING
THE REGIONS WERE
NO LONGER PERMITTED TO DEVELOP THEIR OWN BUSINESS
RELATIONS
WITH FOREIGN INVESTORS. STILL, BEREZOVSKIY
SAID, "PUTIN IS BETTER
THAN PRIMAKOV," ALTHOUGH HE IS "NO
INTELLECTUAL." HE ADMITTEDLY
INHERITED A TERRIBLE
SITUATION, SAID BEREZOVSKIY, BUT SEEKS SIMPLE
SOLUTIONS
WHERE THERE ARE NONE. NONETHELESS, HE CLAIMED, HE IS
OPTIMISTIC
THAT THE COUNTRY IS GENERALLY PROCEEDING IN THE
RIGHT DIRECTION
(PUTIN ASIDE) AND "MILLIONS OF RUSSIANS
REMAIN OPTIMISTIC."
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6.
-(€)-ASKED ABOUT HIS OWN BUSINESS SITUATION,
BEREZOVSKIY STATED "THEY
CAN PUT ME IN JAIL BUT IT WON'T
HELP." HE EXPLAINED THAT HE HAS
PLACED HIS OWNERSHIP
SHARES OF ORT TV INTO A SHARE TRUST CONTROLLED
BY A GROUP
OF JOURNALISTS. HE STRESSED HE WAS NOT DIVESTING
HIMSELF
OF
ORT. THE PRESIDENT OF RUSSIA COULD PROPOSE TO
REPLACE
THE CURRENT
GENERAL MANAGER ("NOT A STRONG MAN, BUT..").
A QUALIFIED MAJORITY
OF THREE-FOURTH'S OF THE TOTAL
SHARES, HOWEVER, WOULD BE NEEDED
IN ORDER TO APPROVE SUCH
A MOVE. ASKED BY PICKERING WHY THE KURSK
AFFAIR WAS
HANDLED SO POORLY, BEREZOVSKIY REPLIED THAT
PAVLOVSKY
AND
THE FSB LEADERSHIP WERE "STALINISTS" WHO DID NOT
UNDERSTAND
THAT THESE ARE NOT SOVIET TIMES. NOT ONLY ARE
OTHER INFORMATION
STREAMS AVAILABLE TO PEOPLE, BUT THE
PEOPLE HAVE ALSO CHANGED IN
THEIR EXPECTATIONS OF THEIR
GOVERNMENT.
7.^-BEREZOVSKIY STATED
THAT THIS WAS A CLEAR EXAMPLE
OF WHY, IF RUSSIA TRULY WANTED TO
DEVELOP A LIBERAL
SYSTEM, IT NEEDED TO CREATE "A REAL OPPOSITION,
NOT A
POTEMKIN ONE." BEREZOVSKIY HAD SOUGHT TO DEVELOP,
HE
SAID,
A SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION. "BUT PUTIN MOVED
LEFT, SO I ASKED
FOR A RIGHT OPPOSITION." EVEN AFTER HE
EXPLAINED THE IDEA OF A LOYAL,
DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION TO
PUTIN, HE SAID, PUTIN "REACTED AGGRESSIVELY,"
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CHALLENGING
AND QUESTIONING BEREZOVSKIY'S EVERY MOVE. PUTIN
MADE
A
STRATEGIC ERROR, HE ANALYZED, "BY PICKING A FIGHT
WITH THE
BUSINESS
ELITE." THE GOVERNORS HAD BEEN DIVIDED IN 1999.
BUT AFTER PUTIN
ATTACKED ONE OF THEM, THEY WERE UNITED IN
SUPPORTING PUTIN. AFTER
HE BECAME PRESIDENT, EACH OF THE
GOVERNORS SAW PUTIN AS "HIS" PRESIDENT
- ONLY TO FEEL
BETRAYED AFTER HE REDUCED THEIR POWER AND TOOK
THEM
OUT OF
THE FEDERATION COUNCIL.
S.-fC^-THE CENTRAL ISSUE NOW,
SAID BEREZOVSKIY, IS
WHETHER RUSSIAN SOCIETY ACCUMULATES ENOUGH
OF THE "POWER
OF FREEDOM" TO LIMIT PUTIN. TACTICALLY, HE SAID HE
HAS
CONCLUDED THAT "IT IS USELESS TO FIGHT PUTIN; IT IS
BETTER
TO
PRESS HIM." THE FSB HAS SOME POWER OVER PUTIN, BUT
IVANOV HAS THE
MOST INFLUENCE. VOLOSHYN, HE ARGUED, IS A
BIGGER INTELLECT THAN
PUTIN, BUT HAS "NO CHANCE AT ALL" OF
REPLACING PUTIN. ONLY HIGH
WORLD OIL PRICES WERE KEEPING
THE ECONOMY AFLOAT, AND PUTIN, WHO
DOES NOT UNDERSTAND THE
PRIVATE SECTOR OR THE EFFECTS OF HIS OWN
DECISIONS, HAS NO
IDEA OF HOW TO HELP THE ECONOMY. THE YOUNGER
GENERATION
IS
LEAVING RUSSIA, HE CLAIMED, TRUSTING NEITHER PUTIN
NOR
THE FUTURE.
GOVERNMENT CONFISCATIONS AND TAXES WERE ALSO
FORCING MORE OF THE
ECONOMY UNDERGROUND AND TOWARD HIDING
THEIR ASSETS.
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�39F6B6D1.FIN
Page 7 of 8
BY PICKERING IF PUTIN FEARS EITHER THE
UNITED STATES OR NATO, BEREZOVSKIY
REPLIED, "NO, BUT HE
THINKS THE U.S. HOLDS A POSITION (THAT IS)
AGAINST THE
INTERESTS OF RUSSIA." PUTIN'S MAIN GOVERNMENTAL
SUPPORT
RESTS
ON THE MILITARY AND THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. HE
FEARED THAT PUTIN'S
INNER CIRCLE IS ISOLATED AND "DO NOT
KNOW REALITY." ONE EXAMPLE:
PUTIN TRULY BELIEVES
MILOSEVIC WOULD WIN A FAIR VOTE IN SERBIA BECAUSE
THE FSB
TELLS HIM SO. PUTIN, SAID BEREZOVSKIY, MEETS EVERY
TWO
WEEKS
WITH YELTSIN. YELTSIN HAS REPORTEDLY TOLD PUTIN TO
JETTISON MANY
OF THE FSB PEOPLE SURROUNDING HIM, BUT PUTIN
HAS REFUSED TO DO SO.
WHEN HE FEELS THREATENED,
BEREZOVSKIY SAID PUTIN WITHDRAWS, SUSPECTS
THE WORST AND
LOOKS FOR THE SIMPLEST OF SOLUTIONS. HE SAID PUTIN
DOES
NOT LIKE THE CURRENT DEFENSE MINISTER AND WILL
LIKELY
NOMINATE
A CIVILIAN POLITICIAN (ONE ACCEPTABLE TO THE
MILITARY LEADERSHIP)
TO REPLACE HIM. HE SPECULATED THAT
SERGEI IVANOV OR KUDRIN MIGHT
BECOME PRIME MINISTER. HE
SAID THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND ZUGANOV ARE
TRYING TO SUPPORT
PUTIN. HE PLACED ZHIRINOVSKY'S POPULAR SUPPORT
AT LESS
THAN FIVE PERCENT, NOTING HE HAD SUPPORTED PUTIN'S
REFORM
OF
THE FEDERATION COUNCIL. HE SAID ROSSEL, RUTSKOI AND
SHAYMEYEV WERE
THE STRONGEST GOVERNORS WORTH WATCHING.
lO.tCTPICKERING SUMMARIZED
THE VIEW AT THIS JUNCTURE.
RUSSIA'S FUTURE REMAINS IN PUTIN'S HANDS.
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HE IS
NONETHELESS CONFUSED AND UNABLE TO MOVE FORWARD
ON MAY
ISSUES
THAT ARE IMPORTANT TO THE UNITED STATES. AN
ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENT
MIGHT HELP SOME (AND OIL EXPORTS ARE
HELPING), BUT WE SEE NO LONG-TERM
EFFORTS BY PUTIN IN THAT
REGARD. YELTSIN MAY HAVE BEEN UNPREDICTABLE
IN TACTICS,
BUT HE HAD A PLAN - AND CONFIDENCE IN THAT PLAN.
PUTIN
IS
PROVING UNPREDICTABLE IN BOTH TACTICS AND STRATEGY.
BEREZOVSKIY NOTED "ORT IS SILENCED, WE CANNOT
CRITICIZE HIM; NO
CHANCE." ORT'S MOST INFLUENTIAL
JOURNALIST AS WELL AS THE INFORMATION
MANAGER HAD BOTH
BEEN FIRED BY THE GOVERNMENT. BEREZOVSKIY WAS
STUMPED
WHEN
THEN ASKED BY PICKERING WHO NOW COMPETES WITH
PUTIN
FOR NATIONAL
LEADERSHIP OR HOW A NATIONAL OPPOSITION COULD
BE DEVELOPED IF
ORT WAS, AS BEREZOVSKIY PUT IT, "90
PERCENT MUZZLED." BEREZOVSKIY
SAID LEADERS WOULD ARISE IF
THE PEOPLE WERE NOT AFRAID TO STEP FORWARD.
THE USG, HE
ARGUED, SHOULD BE MORE CRITICAL PUBLICLY OF PUTIN'S
MISTAKES.
THE USG IN GENERAL, AND PRESIDENT CLINTON IN
PARTICULAR, ENJOY
BROAD PUBLIC SUPPORT AND APPRECIATION.
TALBOTT
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�
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<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
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This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
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Clinton Presidential Records
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Title
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Declassified Documents concerning Russia
Identifier
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2012-1021-M
Description
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This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on Russian oligarchs from the files of Transnational Threat director, Lee Wolosky. Included are Department of State cables from the U.S. embassy in Moscow to the Secretary of State regarding various Russian political and business leaders.
Creator
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National Security Council
Lee Wolosky
NSC Transnational Threats Office (1998-2001) Office
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<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7585816" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
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Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
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2/6/2015
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2012-1021-M
Declassified
Foreign Policy
Russia
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/7fc50c23f9dd319a3b4ddde539c9366e.pdf
dccf5075079d13d73369c691762cef96
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full.
�- CONFIDENTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: BUJOLD, EGGERT, ELKIND, FORT, HESLIN, PASCUAL, PIFER, RUMER, NSC
PREC: PRIORITY
CLASS: "SOtdRBElTFTCL
DTG:201405Z NOV 96
FM: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7781
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 6833
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 6796
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 6690
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O H r i D C N T I A f L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 032207
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/06
TAGS: PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: THE YELTSIN-LEBED ANALOGY
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY THOMAS GRAHAM, ACTING POLITICAL
COUNSELOR. REASON: 1.5(B,D)
SUMMARY
2. 4GPMANY OBSERVERS HAVE DRAWN AN ANALOGY BETWEEN
THE YELTSIN OF THE EIGHTIES AND FORMER SECURITY
COUNCIL SECRETARY LEBED, ARGUING THAT, LIKE YELTSIN,
LEBED COULD RIDE A WAVE OF POPULAR DISCONTENT TO
POWER. THE ANALOGY IS APPEALING, BUT FLAWED. IN THE
LATE SOVIET PERIOD, YELTSIN FACED AN ELITE IN DECLINE,
SOCIETY WAS POLITICALLY ENGAGED, AND GORBACHEV
INITIALLY SAW YELTSIN AS A USEFUL INSTRUMENT IN HIS
BATTLE AGAINST CONSERVATIVE FORCES. IN TODAY'S
RUSSIA, LEBED FACES A DYNAMIC, SELF-CONFIDENT ELITE,
SOCIETY IS POLITICALLY DISENGAGED, AND YELTSIN DOES
NOT SEE LEBED AS SOMEONE HE CAN MANIPULATE FOR HIS OWN
ENDS. MOREOVER, YELTSIN CAME TO POWER PRIMARILY
THROUGH AN INTRA-ELITE POWER STRUGGLE, AND HIS MAIN
POPULAR BACKING WAS FROM THE LIBERAL INTELLIGENTSIA,
WHICH ESCHEWED VIOLENCE AS IT PURSUED DEMOCRATIZATION.
IF LEBED WERE TO COME TO POWER, IT WOULD MOST LIKELY
BE AGAINST THE WISHES OF THE ELITE AND WITH THE
BACKING OF DISAFFECTED WORKING CLASSES INTERESTED IN
RECTIFYING SOCIO-ECONOMIC INJUSTICES. HIS ASSUMPTION
OF POWER - WHETHER BY CONSTITUTIONAL MEANS OR NOT -
^
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON i m m . P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONriDCNTIAL
WOULD LIKELY PROVE MORE DESTABILIZING OR MORE VIOLENT
THAN YELTSIN'S WAS. END SUMMARY
3. (SBU) AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF FORMER SECURITY
COUNCIL SECRETARY LEBED'S UNEXPECTEDLY STRONG SHOWING
IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS EARLIER THIS YEAR, HIS
UNRESTRAINED POPULISM AS A MEMBER OF THE GOVERNMENT,
AND HIS DISMISSAL IN MID-OCTOBER, MANY OBSERVERS ARE
ASKING WHETHER LEBED IS THE YELTSIN OF THE NINETIES.
THIS QUESTION AGITATES, IN PARTICULAR, THOSE WHO
PLAYED A CENTRAL ROLE IN ENGINEERING LEBED'S FIRING,
MOST NOTABLY PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION HEAD CHUBAYS.
THEY ARE CONCERNED THAT THE DISMISSAL WILL ONLY
INCREASE LEBED'S POPULARITY - EVEN OVER THE LONG RUN AS GORBACHEV'S FIRING OF YELTSIN AS MOSCOW PARTY BOSS
DID IN 1987, AND ENHANCE LEBED'S CHANCES OF SUCCEEDING
YELTSIN AS RUSSIA'S TOP LEADER.
OBVIOUS SIMILARITIES
4. (U) ON THE SURFACE, THE ANALOGY IS APPEALING.
BOTH YELTSIN'S EARLIER POPULISM AND LEBED'S ARE
GROUNDED IN AN ATTACK ON THE PRIVILEGES AND
PREROGATIVES OF THE RULING ELITE, WHICH IS WIDELY SEEN
AS TOTALLY DIVORCED FROM THE PROBLEMS OF COMMON
PEOPLE. BOTH CAME TO PROMINENCE AGAINST THE
BACKGROUND OF PERVASIVE DISCONTENT WITH CURRENT
CONDITIONS. BOTH HAD REPUTATIONS FOR BEING ABLE TO
GET THINGS DONE. BOTH REFUSED TO PLAY BY THE ELITE'S
RULES, AND BOTH FELL VICTIM TO ITS WRATH.
BUT ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCES
5. (SBU) THIS ANALOGY, HOWEVER, MISSES MANY
ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCES THAT SUGGEST THAT LEBED'S PATH
TO POWER WOULD DIFFER FROM YELTSIN'S AND BEAR
DIFFERENT CONSEQUENCES FOR RUSSIA'S POLITICAL SYSTEM.
6. (SBU) WHAT ARE THOSE DIFFERENCES?
--
IN THE LATE SOVIET PERIOD, THE ELITE WAS IN
DECLINE, LACKING DYNAMISM AND A FIRM BELIEF IN
ITS RIGHT TO RULE; ITS EFFORTS TO DEFEND ITSELF
WERE FEEBLE AND HALTING, EPITOMIZED BY THE
BLUNDERING OF THE FAILED AUGUST (1991) PUTSCH
AND, ESPECIALLY, THE TREMBLING HAND OF COUP
PLOTTER (AND SOVIET VICE PRESIDENT) YANAYEV. IN
TODAY'S RUSSIA, A NEW ELITE IS ON THE RISE; IT IS
DYNAMIC, CONVINCED OF ITS RIGHT TO RULE,
CONFIDENT IN ITS ABILITY TO GOVERN, AND PREPARED
TO DEFEND ITSELF, WITH FORCE IF NECESSARY.
CLINTON imMLPHOTOCOPY
�CONriDDJTIAL-
YELTSIN'S AND HIS ALLIES' HANDLING OF THE OCTOBER
(1993) VIOLENCE AND THEIR MORE RECENT CONDUCT OF
THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS ARE THE BEST
ILLUSTRATIONS OF THIS WILL TO
POWER.
--
IN THE LATE SOVIET PERIOD, SOCIETY, ESPECIALLY IN
MOSCOW, WAS FILLED WITH GREAT EXPECTATIONS,
ELEVATED - AND SURPRISED - BY ITS BRAVERY IN
• c o N F i ere N T i A t S E C T I O N 02 OF 03 M o s c o w 032207
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/06
TAGS: PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: THE YELTSIN-LEBED ANALOGY
CONFRONTING THE REGIME AND ENTHRALLED WITH THE
PROMISES OF DEMOCRACY. IN TODAY'S RUSSIA,
SOCIETY IS TIRED OF POLITICS, SOBERED BY THE
DIFFICULTIES OF THE TRANSITION, UNCERTAIN ABOUT
THE FRUITS OF DEMOCRACY AND THE MARKET.
--
IN THE LATE SOVIET PERIOD, SOVIET LEADER
GORBACHEV INITIALLY SAW YELTSIN AS A USEFUL TOOL
IN HIS STRUGGLE AGAINST MORE CONSERVATIVE,
RECALCITRANT FORCES IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY.
RATHER THAN CRUSH YELTSIN, GORBACHEV GAVE HIM A
SECOND POLITICAL LIFE, ONLY TO DISCOVER THAT HE
COULD NOT CONTROL YELTSIN. IN TODAY'S RUSSIA,
ALTHOUGH RUSSIAN LEADER YELTSIN USED LEBED TO WIN
THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, HE NO LONGER BELIEVES
HE NEEDS HIM FOR ANY BROADER POLITICAL PURPOSE.
7. -4€1-MOREOVER, DESPITE THE SIMILARITIES, THE
DIFFERENCES IN THE PERSONALITIES AND BACKGROUND OF
YELTSIN AND LEBED ARE MORE STRIKING. YELTSIN WAS
INDISPUTABLY PART OF THE ELITE WHEN HE TURNED POPULIST
POLITICIAN. HE HAD COME UP THROUGH PARTY RANKS AND
SERVED LOYALLY AS SVERDLOVSK PARTY BOSS FOR ELEVEN
YEARS BEFORE COMING TO MOSCOW AND THE CPSU CENTRAL
COMMITTEE APPARATUS IN THE MID-EIGHTIES. IN CPSU
TERMS, HE WAS AN ACCOMPLISHED APPARATCHIK AND A RISING
STAR. BY CONTRAST, LEBED IS AN OUTSIDER, CERTAINLY TO
THE POLITICAL ELITES, WHERE HE IS A NEWCOMER, BUT ALSO
TO SENIOR MILITARY CIRCLES, AS ONE OF THE FEW GENERALS
NOT TO HAVE ATTENDED THE STAFF ACADEMY.
PATHS TO POWER AND CONSEQUENCES
8. (SBU) IN ADDITION, FOR ALL HIS POPULISM, YELTSIN
CAME TO POWER AS THE VICTOR IN AN INTRA-ELITE STRUGGLE
THAT REVOLVED PRIMARILY AROUND POLITICAL ISSUES LINKED
TO THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF SOVIET SOCIETY. HIS
CLINTON Lm^PHOTOCOPY
�CONriDCHTIAL
1
ASSUMPTION OF POWER WAS REMARKABLY PEACEFUL FOR
SEVERAL REASONS:
-- EVEN IN DISGRACE, YELTSIN RETAINED SOLID TIES TO
THE MORE REFORM-MINDED ELEMENTS IN THE SOVIET
LEADERSHIP. AS HIS STAR ROSE, HE GAINED CONSIDERABLE
BACKING FROM SENIOR LEVELS IN THE MILITARY AND
SECURITY SERVICES. AS A RESULT, YELTSIN'S ASSUMPTION
OF SUPREME POWER DID NOT PRECIPITATE A MAJOR OR ABRUPT
CHANGE OF ELITES, ALTHOUGH THE TOP ECHELON IN MOSCOW
WAS STRIPPED OF POWER.
-- YELTSIN'S GOALS OVERLAPPED WITH THOSE OF THE
ELITES OF THE NON-RUSSIAN REPUBLICS OF THE SOVIET
UNION. THAT ALLOWED FOR A NEGOTIATED DISSOLUTION OF
THE SOVIET UNION.
- YELTSIN'S CRITICAL POLITICAL SUPPORT CAME FROM THE
LIBERAL INTELLIGENTSIA IN MAJOR URBAN CENTERS,
ESPECIALLY MOSCOW, LENINGRAD (NOW ST. PETERSBURG), AND
SVERDLOVSK (NOW YEKATERINBURG). THIS GROUP DOMINATED
THE FREQUENT MASSIVE STREET DEMONSTRATIONS IN SUPPORT
OF YELTSIN IN MOSCOW. FOR THE MOST PART, IT ESCHEWED
VIOLENCE, WHILE EXPLOITING THE OPENING CREATED BY
GORBACHEV'S POLICIES OF DEMOCRATIZATION AND GLASNOST.
9. -{et-BY CONTRAST, LEBED'S POPULISM IS GROUNDED IN
SOCIO-ECONOMIC ISSUES (CRIME, DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH).
THERE IS A GREATER RISK THAT SIGNIFICANT INSTABILITY
OR VIOLENCE WOULD ACCOMPANY ANY RISE TO POWER BY LEBED
- WHETHER BY CONSTITUTIONAL OR EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL
MEANS - FOR TWO REASONS:
-- BECAUSE LEBED'S TIES WITH THE ELITE ARE TENUOUS,
HE WOULD FACE AN EVEN MORE FORMIDABLE TASK IN
ASSERTING HIS AUTHORITY ACROSS RUSSIA THAN YELTSIN
DID. THE GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY AND SENIOR MILITARY
LEADERS WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO RESIST HIS
INITIATIVES. MOREOVER, TO STAFF THE SENIOR LEVELS OF
GOVERNMENT, HE WOULD BE INCLINED TO BRING IN HIS OWN
PEOPLE, MOST OF WHOM WOULD BE DRAWN FROM HIS ALLIES IN
THE MILITARY AND LACKING IN EXPERIENCE IN RUNNING A
GOVERNMENT.
-- LEBED'S CORE SUPPORT WOULD COME FROM THE
DISAFFECTED WORKING CLASSES, NOT THE LIBERAL
INTELLIGENTSIA (WHOSE SUPPORT LEBED HAS ALREADY
REJECTED). DISAFFECTED RUSSIAN WORKERS HAVE FEWER
QUALM
S ABOUT USING FORCE TO RECTIFY WHAT THEY SEE AS
SOCIO-ECONOMIC INJUSTICES. (INDEED, ONE LEBED
INFORMAL ADVISOR, POLITICAL COMMENTATOR ANDRANIK
C O N r i D C N T I / r t SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 032207
CLINTON Ligfimr-PHOTOCOPY
�GONriDCNTIAtT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/06
TAGS: PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: THE YELTSIN-LEBED ANALOGY
MIGRANYAN, TOLD POLOFF ONE OF HIS GREATEST CONCERNS IS
THAT LEBED WOULD TRY TO ORGANIZE MASSIVE WORKERS'
DEMONSTRATIONS IN MOSCOW, WHICH MIGRANYAN WAS
PERSUADED WOULD TURN VIOLENT.)
LEBED'S FUTURE UNCERTAIN
10. 46)—WHETHER LEBED WILL ULTIMATELY RISE TO POWER
IN RUSSIA REMAINS TO BE SEEN. OPINION IN MOSCOW IS
DECIDEDLY MIXED, EVEN SINCE LEBED'S DISMISSAL FROM THE
SECURITY COUNCIL.
-- PEOPLE CLOSE TO CHUBAYS, INCLUDING FINANCIERS
BEREZOVSKIY AND GUSINSKIY, HAVE TOLD US THEY BELIEVE
LEBED WILL FADE QUICKLY BECAUSE HE LACKS A FINANCIAL
BASE AND GUARANTEED ACCESS TO THE MEDIA. MOREOVER,
THEY BELIEVE THEY WILL BE ABLE TO USE THEIR
CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE OVER NATIONAL TELEVISION TO
FINISH HIM OFF AS A SERIOUS POLITICAL THREAT.
-- OTHERS, SUCH AS A CLOSE GORBACHEV ADVISER, VIKTOR
KUVALDIN, POINT OUT THAT YELTSIN HAD BEEN OUT OF THE
LIMELIGHT FOR WELL OVER A YEAR AFTER HE WAS FIRED AS
MOSCOW PARTY BOSS, ONLY TO RESURFACE AND RIDE A TIDE
OF ANTI-REGIME DISCONTENT INTO THE USSR CONGRESS OF
PEOPLES. IF THERE IS WIDESPREAD DISCONTENT WHENEVER
THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS OCCUR, KUVALDIN
ARGUES, LEBED WILL BE A LIKELY CHOICE TO PERSONIFY IT.
11. (SBU) ONE THING IS CLEAR, HOWEVER: TODAY'S
RUSSIA IS NOT YESTERDAY'S SOVIET UNION. WHILE LEBED
COULD LEARN MUCH FROM YELTSIN'S RISE TO POWER, IF HE
TRIES TO RETRACE THE SAME PATH, HE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY
FAIL. MOREOVER, EVEN IF LEBED SHOULD COME TO POWER
CONSTITUTIONALLY BY WINNING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN
THE YEAR 2000, HIS VICTORY COULD BE DESTABILIZING IF
HE HAS NOT MADE PEACE WITH THE KEY ELITES BY THEN.
TEFFT
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: EGGERT, ELKIND, FORT, HESLIN, PASCUAL, PIFER, RUMER, NSC
PREC: PRIORITY
CLASS: GQNriDCNTIAL
DTG:1 91 721Z NOV 96
FM: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7733
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 6680
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 6786
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 6823
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
C O N r i D C N T I A LSECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 032143
E.O. 12958: 11/19/01
TAGS: PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: CHUBAYS CAMPAIGN CORRUPTION SCANDAL
FADES
REF: MOSCOW 31819
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY TOM GRAHAM, ACTING
POLITICAL COUNSELOR. REASON: 1.5 (B).
SUMMARY
2.-4GhTHE NOVEMBER 1 5 LEAK OF A PURPORTED
CONVERSATION AMONG PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION
CHIEF CHUBAYS AND CLOSE ASSOCIATES ABOUT ILLEGAL
CAMPAIGN FINANCIAL PRACTICES HAS THUS FAR FAILED
TO DEVELOP INTO A FULL-BLOWN POLITICAL SCANDAL.
A DAY AFTER THE "MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS"
PUBLICATION, MOST RUSSIAN MEDIA WERE MORE
PREOCCUPIED WITH WHO LEAKED THE RECORDED
CONVERSATION THAN ITS LEGAL AND POLITICAL
IMPLICATIONS. BY SUNDAY, THE EXPLOSION IN
KASPIYSK HAD PUSHED THE STORY OFF THE FRONT
PAGES. THE CAMPAIGN FINANCING LEAK IS THE LATEST
IN A SERIES OF REVELATIONS THAT HAVE TARRED CLOSE
CHUBAYS ASSOCIATES, BUT THUS FAR CHUBAYS HIMSELF
SHOWS SIGNS OF BECOMING THE "TEFLON" CHIEF OF
STAFF. CHUBAYS" FATE WILL ULTIMATELY BE DECIDED
NOT BY THE COURT OF PUBLIC OPINION BUT BY
YELTSIN. SHOULD HE DECIDE TO TAKE CHUBAYS DOWN A
ERE au526
CLINTON LieMK4-PH0T0C0P/ '
�• CONriDHNTIAL
PEG, HE IS MORE LIKELY TO BE GUIDED BY HIS USUAL
PREFERENCE FOR A BALANCE OF FORCES AMONG HIS
CLOSEST ASSOCIATES THAN BY REPORTS OF THEIR
MISCONDUCT. END SUMMARY.
HOW DO YOU SAY "DEEP THROAT" IN RUSSIAN?
3. (U) "MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS" STANDS VIRTUALLY
ALONE IN PUSHING THE CAMPAIGN FINANCING STORY AS
A MAJOR, PRESIDENCY-THREATENING SCANDAL. "MOSCOW
WATERGATE" TRUMPETED THE FRONT PAGE HEADLINE OF
THE NOVEMBER 16 EDITION. ON NOVEMBER 18 THE
PAPER PUBLISHED A SHORT HISTORY OF THE ORIGINAL
WATERGATE AFFAIR AS ITS LEAD STORY -- COMPLETE
WITH JUXTAPOSED PHOTOGRAPHS OF NIXON AND THE
WATERGATE HOTEL AND YELTSIN AND THE PRESIDENT
HOTEL IN MOSCOW. (THE PRESIDENT HOTEL HOUSED
YELTSIN'S CAMPAIGN HEADQUARTERS AND WAS THE SITE
OF THE ALLEGED CONVERSATION AMONG CHUBAYS,
ILYUSHIN AND KRASAVCHENKO.)
KTO KOGO?
4. 4e*-MAINSTREAM MEDIA HAVE BEEN MORE
PREOCCUPIED WITH THE PERPETUAL RUSSIAN QUESTION
OF "KTO KOGO" (WHO IS DOING WHAT TO WHOM) THAN
WITH THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF
CAMPAIGN ILLEGALITIES. VIRTUALLY ALL THE MEDIA
AND OUR CONTACTS AGREE THAT FORMER PRESIDENTIAL
BODYGUARD KORZHAKOV IS NOT THE ONLY SUSPECT, AND
PERHAPS NOT EVEN THE MOST LIKELY ONE. ON THE
NOVEMBER 16 "VREMYA" PROGRAM, FOR EXAMPLE,
ANCHORMAN DORENKO REJECTED THE POSSIBILITY THAT
KORZHAKOV, CHERNOMYRDIN OR THE COMMUNISTS
ENGINEERED THE LEAK AND STRONGLY IMPLIED THAT
MOSCOW MAYOR LUZHKOV HAD THE MOST TO BENEFIT FROM
TARRING CHUBAYS. A NOVEMBER 16 EDITORIAL BY
"NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA" CHIEF EDITOR TRETYAKOV, FOR
INSTANCE, WROTE THAT KORZHAKOV'S GROUP WAS NOT
THE ONLY GROUP TO HAVE AN INTEREST IN TOPPLING
THE "CHUBAYS GROUP." (IN PRIVATE, TRETYAKOV TOLD
POLCOUNS THAT HE THOUGHT CHERNOMYRDIN WAS BEHIND
THE LEAK).
5. (SBU) POLITICAL OBSERVER PAVEL VOSHCHANOV
NOTED IN "KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA" NOVEMBER 19 THAT
POLITICAL SCANDALS IN RUSSIA HAVE A SHORT SHELFLIFE. VOSHCHANOV LAMENTED THAT THE CHUBAYS
CAMPAIGN FINANCE SCANDAL HAS ECLIPSED THE SCANDAL
OVER SECURITY COUNCIL DEPUTY CHAIRMAN
CLINTON LtBRABXPHOTOCOPY
�CONriDCNTIAL
BEREZOVSKIY'S DUAL RUSSIAN-ISRAELI CITIZENSHIP.
THE POLITICAL DRAMA IN BELARUS (WITH ITS
UNCOMFORTABLE PARALLELS TO RUSSIA CIRCA 1993) AND
THE EXPLOSION IN KASPIYSK HAVE, IN TURN, PUSHED
THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE SCANDAL OFF THE FRONT PAGES.
THE REVELATION THAT ANOTHER CHUBAYS ASSOCIATE,
PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION DEPUTY CHIEF YURIY
YAROV, WAS INVOLVED IN CORRUPTION SURROUN
DING THE
-€> 0 H f I C b N I I AtrSECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 032143
J
E.O. 12958: 11/19/01
TAGS: PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: CHUBAYS CAMPAIGN CORRUPTION SCANDAL
FADES
AFGHAN VETERANS FUND BARELY REGISTERED IN THE
AFTERMATH OF THE BOMBING AT THE KOTLYAKOVSKOYE
CEMETARY.
6. •fGfr-TAKEN TOGETHER, THE BEREZOVSKIY, YAROV,
AND CAMPAIGN FINANCING SCANDALS ALL DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY TARNISH CHUBAYS BUT ARE UNLIKELY BY
THEMSELVES TO AFFECT HIS POLITICAL FATE. OUR
CONTACTS HAVE FOR SOME TIME NOTED THAT CHUBAYS
HAS AMASSED DISPROPORTONATE POWER AND INFLUENCE,
UPSETTING THE BALANCE OF FORCES AMONG KREMLIN
ELITES, BUT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THAT
SOMEONE IS COORDINATING A CAMPAIGN AGAINST
CHUBAYS. RATHER, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS APPEAR TO
BE TAKING SHOTS AT CHUBAYS AND HIS ALLIES FOR
THEIR OWN PERSONAL REASONS.
7.4€t-IN ANY EVENT, CHUBAYS' FATE WILL ULTIMATELY BE DECIDED NOT BY THE COURT OF PUBLIC
OPINION BUT BY YELTSIN, ONCE HE RETURNS TO FORM.
SHOULD YELTSIN DECIDE TO TAKE CHUBAYS DOWN A PEG,
HE IS MORE LIKELY TO BE GUIDED BY HIS USUAL
PREFERENCE FOR A BALANCE OF FORCES AMONG HIS
CLOSEST ASSOCIATES THAN BY CONCERNS OVER THEIR
MISCONDUCT.
COMMENT
8. (SBU) WITH MOST RUSSIAN MEDIA ALREADY
PREOCCUPIED WITH OTHER NEWSWORTHY STORIES, ONLY
THE DUMA HAS THE POTENTIAL AND MOTIVATION TO KEEP
THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE SCANDAL ALIVE, AND EVEN IT
FACES SHARP CONSTRAINTS. ANY INVESTIGATION
CONDUCTED BY A SPECIALLY CREATED PARLIAMENTARY
COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE ABUSES RAISED BY
CLINTON LiSM^rPHOTOCOPY
�•CQNriDCNTIAC
THE "MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS" STORY WILL DEPEND ON
COOPERATION FROM THE PROCURATOR'S OFFICE, WHICH
IS NOT A DISINTERESTED PARTY IN THE DISPUTE. IN
TRUTH, AS THE WEEKLY "NOVAYA GAZETA" COMMENTED ON
NOVEMBER 18, MOSCOW'S POLITICAL ACTIVISTS HAVE
KNOWN FOR MONTHS THAT YELTSIN'S CAMPAIGN RECEIVED
ILLEGAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND THAT CHUBAYS' PEOPLE
HANDLED DOLLARS BY THE BOXLOAD. SINCE THE
STORY'S SHOCK VALUE ALREADY SEEMS TO HAVE FADED,
THE ONLY REAL QUESTION IS WHETHER THE SCANDAL
WILL RESURFACE AT ANOTHER TIME, PERHAPS IN
COMBINATION WITH NEW ALLEGATIONS, AND DO REAL
DAMAGE TO CHUBAYS. TEFFT
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: BUJOLD, EGGERT, FORT, HESLIN, PASCUAL, PIFER, RUMER, NSC
PREC: PRIORITY
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
DTG:181527Z NOV 96
FM: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7646
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
G O N M D C N T I A L MOSCOW 031 972
CORRECTED
C O P Y (MISSING TEXT)
STATE FOR EUR/RUS (GESHWILER) AND OES/RPI (PIFER)
WHITE HOUSE FOR OSTP (CAMPBELL)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/01
TAGS: TPHY, KGCC, KSCA, RS
SUBJECT: KGCC: BATTLE BREWING BEHIND THE SCENES ON THE
RUSSIAN SIDE OF THE GCC SCIENCE COMMITTEE
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY ESTCOUNS JOHN ZIMMERMAN. REASON:
1.5(D).
2. 4GH>UMMARY: SENIOR OFFICIALS WORKING FOR PRESIDENT
YELTSIN'S SCIENCE ADVISOR NIKOLAY MALYSHEV RECENTLY TOLD
US THAT THEY ARE IN THE "INVESTMENT BANKING BUSINESS."
ALSO, THEY SAID THAT MALYSHEV INTENDS TO TAKE OVER THE COCHAIRMANSHIP OF THE GCC S AND T COMMITTEE. END SUMMARY.
3. te)-"0N NOVEMBER 15, ESTCOUNS HAD LUNCH WITH TWO SENIOR
OFFICIALS FROM THE OFFICE OF NIKOLAY G. MALYSHEV, SCIENCE
ADVISOR TO PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN: GEORGIY MARKOSOV,
DIRECTOR-DESIGNATE OF THE WASHINGTON OFFICE OF THE FUND
FOR PRESIDENTIAL PROGRAMS, AND LEONID AVRAMENKO, DEPUTY
DIRECTOR OF THE CENTER FOR PRESIDENTIAL PROGRAMS. THE
CONVERSATION LARGELY CENTERED AROUND THE FUND'S ACTIVITIES
AND MALYSHEV'S FUTURE.
4. 4erWHEN ASKED TO DESCRIBE HOW THE FUND OPERATED,
MARKOSOV WAS DIRECT IN CHARACTERIZING IT AS "AN INVESTMENT
BANK" WHICH ARRANGES FINANCING VIA WESTERN INVESTORS FOR
THE VARIOUS GOR CONTRACTORS PARTICIPATING IN FUND
PROGRAMS. THE FUND'S MOST RECENT ENDEAVOUR IS A U.S.RUSSIAN JOINT VENTURE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY; MARKOSOV WILL
RETURN SOON TO THE U.S. TO COMPLETE CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS
AND, IN PARTICULAR, TO SECURE EX-IM BANK FINANCING FOR THE
j r w n M A CCIICiriCFft
UM.LASMMM&
PER E.0.13526
�•CONriDCNTIAL
PROJECT. DURING A QUICK OVERVIEW OF FUND PROGRAMS,
ESTCOUNS ASKED AVRAMENKO WHAT THE "MOBIL'NIY KOMPLEKS"
WAS. AFTER AVRAMENKO EXPLAINED THAT THE OBJECTIVE WAS TO
BUILD MOBILE OIL/GAS EXPLORATION RIGS, MARKOSOV ADDED THAT
THIS WAS ONE PARTICULAR PROGRAM WHICH WAS NOT OPEN TO
FOREIGN INVESTORS.
5. tej-WHEN ESTCOUNS ASKED HIS HOSTS ABOUT THE RUMOR THAT
FORMER MINISTER OF SCIENCE BORIS SALTYKOV WOULD REPLACE
MALYSHEV, BOTH OFFICIALS BRISTLED AND REPLIED THAT THIS
WAS A SILLY STORY WHICH SHOULD HAVE DIED OUT LONG AGO.
MARKOSOV THEN WENT ON THE OFFENSIVE, STATING THAT MALYSHEV
SHOULD BE THE COUNTERPART ON THE GCC SCIENCE COMMITTTEE TO
DR. GIBBONS AND THAT THE CHANGE WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED
PRIOR TO THE NEXT GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN COMMISSSION MEETING.
(THEY DID NOT, HOWEVER, EXPAIN HOW MALYSHEV INTENDED TO
REMOVE DUPUTY PRIME MINISTER VLADIMIR FORTOV FROM THE
POSITION OF RUSSIAN CO-CHAIRMAN OF THE S AND T COMMITTEE.)
6. •(GfCOMMENT: WHILE IN THE PAST WE HAVE OFFHANDEDLY
DESCRIBED NIKOLAY MALYSHEV AS YELTSIN'S "INVESTMENT
ADVISOR" -- NOT HIS SCIENCE ADVISOR -- THIS DESCRIPTION
MAY BE MORE APT WITH EACH PASSING DAY. ACCORDING TO THEIR
OWN CHARACTERIZATION, MARKOSOV AND AVRAMENKO PUT TOGETHER
BUSINESS DEALS ON THE FUND'S AND MALYSHEV'S BEHALF; THEY
NEVER MENTIONED A SINGLE, REAL SCIENCE PROJECT DURING THE
ENTIRE LUNCHEON. IF MALYSHEV SUCCEDES IN TAKING OVER THE
CO-CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE GCC S AND T COMMITTEE, IT WILL BE
INTERESTING TO SEE IN WHAT DIRECTION HE TRIES TO TAKE THE
COMMITTEE'S WORK. END COMMENT.
< SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
< SSN>1972
< T O R > 9 6 1 1 1 9081048 M2500435
A
A
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FROM:
SITREPRT
CLINTON
UBBARXL P O O O Y
HTCP
�GOMnnCNTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: NSC, EGGERT, ELKIND, FORT, HESLIN, PASCUAL, PASSDOWN, PIFER, RUMER, SUM,
SUM2, WISE, SIT{C2}
PREC: PRIORITY
CLASS: CONriDCNTIAL-
DTG:1 51701Z NOV 96
FM: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7566
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 6652
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 6795
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 6758
C 0 N C I D C N T I A-t SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 03181 9
E.O. 12958: 11/15/01
TAGS: PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: CHUBAYS BECOMES LATEST TARGET IN KOMPROMAT
WAR
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY TOM GRAHAM, ACTING POLITICAL
COUNSELOR. REASON 1.5 (B).
SUMMARY
2. (SBU) ON 15 NOVEMBER, THE POPULAR NEWSPAPER
"MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS" PUBLISHED THE PURPORTED
TRANSCRIPT OF A JUNE 22 CONVERSATION AMONG TOP YELTSIN
CAMPAIGN ADVISERS IN WHICH THEY URGENTLY DISCUSSED HOW
TO LIMIT THE POTENTIAL FALL-OUT FROM THE ARRESTS OF
CAMPAIGN ASSOCIATES YEVSTAFYEV AND LISOVSKIY. OF
PARTICULAR CONCERN TO THEN-PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN CHIEF
CHUBAYS, FIRST PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT ILYUSHIN, AND
PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER KRASAVCHENKO WAS TO COVER UP
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE DETAILING ILLEGAL CAMPAIGN
FINANCING. THE NEWSPAPER STRONGLY HINTED THAT FAPSI
WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR RECORDING THE CONVERSATION, BUT IT
DID NOT INDICATE WHO TURNED THE TAPE OVER TO THE
NEWSPAPER. EMBASSY CONTACTS AGREE THAT FORMER
PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY CHIEF KORZHAKOV IS THE MOST
LIKELY SOURCE, BUT THEY ALSO SAY THAT MANY OTHERS HAVE
A STRONG INTEREST IN DISCREDITING CHUBAYS. WE CAN BE
CERTAIN THAT THIS TRANSCRIPT IS ONLY THE LATEST -- NOT
THE LAST -- ROUND IN AN AN ESCALATING WAR OF
CLINTON LiSMRX. PHOTOCOPY
p
m
^
�CONriDCNTIAL.
"KOMPROMAT" (COMPROMISING MATERIALS), WHICH IS MORE
LIKELY TO FURTHER UNDERMINE POPULAR CONFIDENCE IN THE
AUTHORITIES IN GENERAL THAN IN PARTICULAR INDIVIDUALS.
END SUMMARY.
THE NOT-SO-SECRET SECRET CONVERSATION
3. (U) "MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS," THE MOST WIDELY READ
NEWSPAPER IN MOSCOW, CARRIED IN ITS NOVEMBER 15 EDITION
THE PURPORTED TRANSCRIPT OF A CONVERSATION AMONG
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN STRATEGISTS CHUBAYS, ILYUSHIN,
AND KRASAVCHENKO. ACCOMPANYING EDITORIAL NOTES MAKE IT
CLEAR THAT THE CONVERSATION TOOK PLACE AFTER CHUBAYS
ASSOCIATES YEVSTAFYEV AND LISOVSKIY WERE ARRESTED ON
JUNE 19 WHILE CARRYING A BOX FILLED WITH USD 500,000
OUT OF THE GOVERNMENT "WHITE HOUSE." THE DAY AFTER THE
ARREST, FOLLOWING THE DISMISSALS OF KORZHAKOV, FIRST
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER SOSKOVETS, AND FSB DIRECTOR
BARSUKOV, CHUBAYS CHARGED IN A PRESS CONFERENCE THAT
THE ARREST WAS A SET UP AND THE MONEY HAD BEEN PLANTED
ON THE TWO MEN. THE LEAKED CONVERSATION, HOWEVER,
REVEALS THAT THE THREE YELTSIN ADVISERS KNEW ABOUT THE
MONEY AND KNEW THAT KORZHAKOV HAD ACQUIRED
INCRIMINATING EVIDENCE OF ITS EXISTENCE AND OTHER
FINANCIAL ABUSES, INCLUDING HARD CURRENCY TRANSACTIONS.
MOREOVER, THE TRANSCRIPT SUGGESTS THAT YELTSIN WAS
INFORMED OF ILLEGAL CAMPAIGN FINANCIAL ACTIVITITES
AFTER THE ARRESTS BUT THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST THAT
YELTSIN KNEW OF SUCH PRACTICES. HIS ADVISERS EVIDENTLY
FEARED THAT KORZHAKOV HAD ALREADY TAKEN STEPS TO HAND
THIS MATERIAL TO GENERAL PROCURATOR SKURATOV AND TO
MOSCOW FSB CHIEF TROFIMOV, FROM WHENCE THEY EXPECTED IT
TO REACH COMMUNIST PARTY LEADERS.
4. (U) THE TRANSCRIPT INDICATES THAT THE MOST URGENT
ISSUE FOR THE CAMPAIGN STAFF WAS PREVENTING THE
EVIDENCE FROM BECOMING PUBLIC BEFORE THE JULY 3 RUN-OFF
ELECTION. ILYUSHIN CONFIDENTLY STATED THAT THEY COULD
RELY ON NTV PRESIDENT MALASHENKO (A CAMPAIGN ADVISER),
FEDERAL TV AND RADIO SERVICE CHAIRMAN LAZUTKIN, RUSSIAN
PRESS COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN LAPTEV, AND OTHER LOYAL
FIGURES IN THE MEDIA TO HUSH UP THE EVIDENCE. THEY
ALSO EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE IN THEIR ABILITY TO GAIN
GENERAL PROSECUTOR SKURATOV'S COOPERATION IN SITTING ON
THE EVIDENCE UNTIL AFTER THE RUN-OFF ELECTION, OR EVEN
TO HAVE YELTSIN REQUEST THE DOCUMENTS FROM SKURATOV "TO
ANALYZE" AND THEN HAVE THEM CONVENIENTLY DISAPPEAR.
SWIFT REACTION
5. (U) NTV, WHOSE REPUTATION FOR JOURNALISTIC
INDEPENDENCE IS FURTHER JEOPARDIZED BY THE LEAKED
CLINTON LIBRAEX P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONriDCNTIAL
TRANSCRIPT, REPOR
TED IN ITS AFTERNOON NEWSCAST NOVEMBER
15 THE QUICK REACTION PROVOKED BY THE PUBLICATION:
-- PRESIDENTIAL SPOKESMAN YASTRZHEMBSKIY CONVENED A
PRESS CONFERENCE TO ANNOUNCE THAT CHUBAYS, NOT
SURPRISINGLY, "CATEGORICALLY DENIES THAT THE
CONVERSATION EVER TOOK PLACE."
-- LED BY "PEOPLE'S POWER" DEPUTY BABURIN, THE DUMA
•C 0 N T I D L N I I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 031 819
E.O. 12958: 11/15/01
TAGS: PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: CHUBAYS BECOMES LATEST TARGET IN KOMPROMAT
WAR
DEBATED THE LEAKED TRANSCRIPT AT ITS REGULAR SESSION
TODAY. SECURITY COMMITTEE (AND CPRF DEPUTY) ILYUKHIN
ANNOUNCED THAT THE DUMA WOULD FORM A COMMISSION TO
INVESTIGATE THE DOCUMENT'S AUTHENTICY AND WOULD APPEAL
TO YELTSIN TO LOOK INTO THE REVELATIONS OF FINANCIAL
ABUSES.
SOURCES AND MOTIVATIONS
6.4Gf-ALL OUR CONTACTS AGREE THAT KORZHAKOV IS THE
MOST LIKELY SOURCE OF THE LEAKED TRANSCRIPT, BUT HE IS
NOT THE ONLY SUSPECT: CHUBAYS' ENEMIES ARE LEGION.
-- SERGEY KOLESNIKOV, A CLOSE ADVISER TO PRIME MINISTER
CHERNOMYRDIN, TOLD POLOFF THAT THE TRANSCRIPT IS
AUTHENTIC AND THAT KORZHAKOV WAS THE MOST LIKELY SOURCE
OF THE LEAK. HE INTIMATED THAT CHERNOMYRDIN WAS NOT
UNHAPPY TO SEE IT APPEAR IN THE PRESS BECAUSE OF THE
LATENT TENSIONS BETWEEN HIM AND CHUBAYS.
-- STEPAN KISELEV, A JOURNALIST AT "IZVESTIYA," TOLD
POLOFF ON NOVEMBER 14 THAT HE THOUGHT THE TRANSCRIPT
AUTHENTIC AND THAT KORZHAKOV HAD CIRCULATED IT TO THE
MEDIA, BUT "IZVESTIYA" HAD REFUSED TO PUBLISH IT.
- VALERIY SOLOVEY, AN EXPERT AT THE GORBACHEV
FOUNDATION WITH GOOD LINES INTO THE SECRET SERVICES,
ALSO ASSUMED THAT KORZHAKOV IS BEHIND THE LEAK.
MOREOVER, HE THOUGHT IT NO COINCIDENCE THAT THE
TRANSCRIPT SHOULD BE PUBLISHED ON THE SAME DAY THAT
KORZHAKOV WAS OFFICIALLY REGISTERED AS A CANDIDATE IN
THE UPCOMING TULA ELECTION FOR A STATE DUMA SEAT. HE
POINTED OUT, AND POLOFF VERIFIED, THAT THE DUMA
ELECTION LAW GRANTS CANDIDATES LIMITED IMMUNITY FROM
PROSECUTION AND ARREST (ANY LEGAL ACTION WOULD HAVE TO
CLINTON i m m L P O O O Y
HTCP
�"CONriDCNTIAlL
BE SANCTIONED BY THE GENERAL PROCURATOR).
-- SUGGESTING THAT THE CONTENTS OF THE TAPED
CONVERSATION HAVE BEEN KNOWN FOR SOME TIME, RUSSIAN
PUBLIC TELEVISION (ORT) GENERAL DIRECTOR BLAGOVOLIN
TOLD POLOFFS ON OCTOBER 31 THAT "WE HAD NOT HEARD THE
LAST OF THE BOX WITH THE MONEY."
COMMENT
7.4ehWE CANNOT VOUCH FOR THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE
LEAKED TRANSCRIPT, BUT ITS REVELATIONS OF ILLEGAL
CAMPAIGN FINANCING TRACK WITH WHAT WE HAVE HEARD FOR
MONTHS. THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT HARD CURRENCY WAS
INVOLVED (DOLLARS ARE NOT LEGAL TENDER IN RUSSIA) AND
THAT THE SUMS VASTLY EXCEEDED LEGAL CAMPAIGN LIMITS.
THAT KORZHAKOV SHOULD BE THE PRIME SUSPECT IN LEAKING
THE TRANSCRIPT IS NO SURPRISE, BUT WE WOULD CAUTION
THAT HE IS NOT THE ONLY POLITICAL FIGURE TO BEAR A
GRUDGE AGAINST CHUBAYS. SOLOVEY, FOR EXAMPLE, THOUGHT
THE TRANSCRIPT COULD NOT HAVE APPEARED IN "MOSKOVSKIY
KOMSOMOLETS" WITHOUT AT LEAST THE APPROVAL OF MAYOR
LUZHKOV, WITH WHOM THE PAPER HAS LONG BEEN IDENTIFIED.
(HAD IT APPEARED IN "IZVESTIYA," HE SAID, HE WOULD BE
MORE INCLINED TO SUSPECT CHERNOMYRDIN, WHOM HE CLAIMS
NOW HAS A GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PAPER.)
8. m - OF GREATER IMPORT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE
LATEST ROUND IN THE "KOMPROMAT" WAR. IF THE BORIS
FEDOROV-NATIONAL SPORTS FOUNDATION ALLEGATIONS OF
KORZHAKOV-BARSUKOV-SOSKOVETS INVOLVEMENT IN EXTORTION
AND MURDER WERE PERHAPS MORE SENSATIONAL, THE LATEST
REVELATIONS CAST DOUBT ON THE LEGITIMACY OF YELTSIN'S
ELECTORAL VICTORY. WHILE CHUBAYS IS THE MOST OBVIOUS
TARGET, THE LATEST KOMPROMAT LEAK MAY DO MORE TO
DISCREDIT THE AUTHORITIES IN GENERAL THAN ANY ONE
INDIVIDUAL IN PARTICULAR. TEFFT
< SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02
< SSN>1819
< T O R > 9 6 1 1 1 5120928 M2495858
< SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
< SSN>1819
< T O R > 9 6 1 1 1 5121225 M2495864
A
A
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A
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FROM:
SITREPRT
CLINTON imm.PHOTOCOPY
�CONriDCNTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: CLARKER, EGGERT, FORT, HESLIN, LINDSAY, ORR, PASCUAL, PIFER, RUMER, SHEEHAN,
WECHSLER, NSC
PREC: PRIORITY
CLASS: CONriDCNTIAL
DTG:141 511Z NOV 96
FM: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7419
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USVIENNA 3340
C O N r i D C N T I A L MOSCOW 031658
EXDIS
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/06
TAGS: PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL DEPUTY BEREZOVSKIY ON CHECHNYA
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY JOHN TEFFT, CHARGE. REASON:
1.5(B,D) .
SUMMARY
2. 4GHSECURITY COUNCIL DEPUTY SECRETARY BEREZOVSKIY
TOLD US NOVEMBER 6 HE WAS CONFIDENT HE COULD CUT A DEAL
WITH CHECHEN SEPARATIST LEADERS. NEGOTIATIONS ON THE
RUSSIAN SIDE, HE SAID, WOULD BE CONCENTRATED IN HIS HANDS.
ALTHOUGH HE OPPOSED CHECHEN INDEPENDENCE, THE KHASAVYURT
AGREEMENT, WHICH ALLOWED THAT POSSIBILITY, WAS "A FACT"
AND WOULD BE THE STARTING POINT FOR CURRENT TALKS. THE
KEY TO A SETTLEMENT WAS REACHING AGREEMENT WITH THE "FOUR
TO FIVE" CHECHEN LEADERS WHO CONTROLLED THE SITUATION IN
CHECHNYA. THAT WOULD ENTAIL "GIVING MONEY TO CONCRETE
MEN." HE BELIEVED THE CHECHEN LEADERS WOULD EVENTUALLY
CUT A DEAL BECAUSE THEY WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THEIR OWN
ABILITY TO CONTROL THE SITUATION OVER THE LONG RUN, WERE
OPPOSED TO ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM, AND UNDERSTOOD THAT
CHECHNYA COULD NEVER BE INDEPENDENT (EVEN IF THEY COULD
NOT SAY SO PUBLICLY NOW). BEREZOVSKIY WILL UNDOUBTEDLY
FIND THE TALKS MORE DIFFICULT THAN HE SUGGESTED IN THIS
CONVERSATION. IN PARTICULAR, FINDING THE NECESSARY MONEY
WILL BE A DAUNTING TASK GIVEN MOSCOW'S CURRENT BUDGET
CONSTRAINTS. END SUMMARY.
PER E 0 13526
o
CLINTON i m m , P O O O Y
HTCP
o
�"CONriDCNTIAL
MOSLEM WORLD AS A THREAT
3. <te)-IN A MEETING WITH POL/INT CHIEF NOVEMBER 6,
SECURITY COUNCIL DEPUTY SECRETARY BEREZOVSKIY OUTLINED HIS
THINKING ON CHECHNYA. IN HIS VIEW, THE MOSLEM WORLD
PRESENTS A GROWING THREAT TO WESTERN CIVILIZATION, WHICH
THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER LEADING WESTERN STATES GROSSLY
UNDERESTIMATE. HE PROFESSES NOT TO BE ANTI-MOSLEM, BUT
SIMPLY ARGUES THAT THE MOSLEM WORLD IS JUST BEGINNING TO
EMERGE AS A MAJOR WORLD ACTOR ON THE EVE OF THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY. LIKE ALL NEWCOMERS, IT IS YOUNG, DYNAMIC,
AND AGGRESSIVE, IN BEREZOVSKIY'S VIEW. THIS IS
PARTICULARLY WORRISOME SINCE RUSSIA IS IN A STATE OF
DECLINE AT A TIME WHEN IT MUST CONTINUE TO ACT AS A
BARRIER BETWEEN THE MOSLEM AND CHRISTIAN WORLDS, AS IT HAS
HISTORICALLY.
4. i O - A S FAR AS CHECHNYA IS CONCERNED, BEREZOVSKIY
SAID, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT IT REMAIN A PART OF RUSSIA IF
RUSSIA IS TO REMAIN A BULWARK AGAINST THE MOSLEM WORLD.
DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS,
BEREZOVSKIY TOLD SEPARATIST LEADER MASKHADOV BEFORE
TELEVISION CAMERAS, "RUSSIA WILL PAY ANY PRICE FOR PEACE
AND STABILITY IN THE CAUCASUS, AND IT WILL PAY ANY PRICE
TO KEEP CHECHNYA IN RUSSIA." (ACCORDING TO BEREZOVSKIY,
THESE WORDS OF HIS WERE NOT REPORTED ON RUSSIAN
TELEVISION.)
4-5 MEN CAN SOLVE THE CHECHNYA PROBLEM
5. -(€)-BEREZOVSKIY BELIEVES THAT THE SOLUTION TO
CHECHNYA LIES FIRST OF ALL IN IDENTIFYING THE FEW MEN THAT
ARE CAPABLE OF CONTROLLING THE SITUATION THERE. IN ANY
COUNTRY, ONLY A FEW PEOPLE COUNT, BEREZOVSKIY EXPLAINED.
"IN THE UNITED STATES IT MAY BE 200 HUNDRED FAMILIES,
PROBABLY FEWER; IN SOUTH KOREA, IT IS TWENTY,; IN
CHECHNYA, IT IS FOUR, PERHAPS FIVE, MEN." MOREOVER, IN A
PLACE LIKE CHECHNYA WHERE SOCIETY IS NOT WELL-FORMED (IN
BEREZOVSKIY'S VIEW), THESE FOUR OR FIVE MEN ARE CAPABLE OF
RADICALLY AND QUICKLY CHANGING THE MOOD AND STRUCTURE OF
SOCIETY AS A WHOLE. DURING HIS TRIP TO THE CAUCASUS,
BEREZOVSKIY BELIEVES, HE FOUND THESE FOUR OR FIVE MEN, WHO
INCLUDE MASKHADOV AND ICHKERIYA PRESIDENT YANDARBIYEV
(BEREZOVSKIY DID NOT NAME THE OTHERS.). THEY CONTROL
"EIGHTY PERCENT OF THE SITUATION IN CHECHNYA".
(BEREZOVSKIY SAID HE HAD MET WITH MASKHADOV, BUT NOT
YANDARBIYEV, DURING HIS VISIT.)
CLINTON LiSfiAR^ P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONI ILtLNIIAL
NEGOTIATING A SETTLEMENT
6. -4€*-NOW THAT HE HAD IDENTIFIE
D THE KEY LEADERS, HOW
DOES BEREZOVSKIY PROPOSE TO PROCEED?
-- FIRST, HE ARGUED, THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS ON THE
RUSSIAN SIDE HAD TO BE CONCENTRATED IN THE HANDS OF ONE
PERSON, THAT IS, HIS OWN. PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN
WOULD BE IMPORTANT ONLY IN GIVING THE NEGOTIATIONS
MOMENTUM AT THE BEGINNING AND SIGNING ANY AGREEMENT AT THE
END.
-- SECOND, ALL RUSSIAN OFFICIALS WHO WERE PREVIOUSLY
INVOLVED IN PROSECUTING THE WAR HAD TO BE REMOVED FROM THE
NEGOTIATIONS. BECAUSE THEY WERE DEFEATED BY THE CHECHENS,
THEY ARE PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPABLE OF MAKING THE
COMPROMISES NECESSARY TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH THE CHECHEN
SEPARATIST.
-- THIRD, THE KHASAVYURT AGREEMENT NEGOTIATED BY THE
FORMER SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARY LEBED HAS TO BE THE
STARTING POINT OF THE CURRENT TALKS, EVEN THOUGH
BEREZOVSKIY FINDS THEM INADEQUATE. IN PARTICULAR, THE
MENTIONING OF EVEN THE POSSIBILITY OF INDEPENDENCE FOR
CHECHNYA WAS A GRAVE MISTAKE. NEVERTHELESS, "THE
AGREEMENT IS A FACT," AND THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL GO
NOWHERE IF MOSCOW TRIES TO REOPEN THAT AGREEMENT NOW.
-- FOURTH, MOSCOW NEEDS TO SATISFY THE REAL INTERESTS OF
THOSE FOUR OR FIVE MEN WHO CONTROL THE SITUATION IN
CHECHNYA. IN BEREZOVSKIY'S MIND, THAT ENTAILS "GIVING
MONEY TO CONCRETE INDIVIDUALS."
-- FIFTH, THE TASK IS CONSOLIDATING THE CHECHEN LEADERS.
MOSCOW'S RESORT TO A DIVIDE-AND-RULE STRATEGY BEFORE AND
DURING THE WAR HAD LED ONLY TO GREATER RESISTANCE AND LESS
HOPE FOR A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME.
-- SIXTH, OSCE ASSISTANCE GROUP LEADER GUILDIMANN HAS A
ROLE TO PLAY IN PERSUADING THE CHECHEN LEADERS THAT THEY
ARE BEING DEALT WITH FAIRLY AND NOT FALLING INTO ANY
TRAPS. (BEREZOVSKIY SAID HE HAD BEEN CONCERNED THAT
GULDIMANN APPEARED INCLINED TO TAKE THE CHECHEN
SEPARATISTS'S SIDE AND WONDERED WHETHER THIS WAS A
REFLECTION OF THE WEST'S TRUE GOALS IN THE REGION. HIS
TALKS WITH CHECHEN SEPARATIST LEADERS HAD, HOWEVER, CAUSED
HIM TO REASSESS GUIDIMANN'S ROLE, ALTHOUGH HE STILL WISHED
GUILDIMANN WOULD BE LESS PARTISAN.)
THE CHECHEN LEADERS ARE GOOD "SOVIETS"
CLINTON i m m L P O O O Y
HTCP
�-eONnOCNTIAL
—
7. «t6t BEREZOVSKIY SAID HE HAD COME AWAY FROM HIS FIRST
TALKS WITH THE CHECHEN LEADERS WITH A SENSE OF RESPECT FOR
THEM AND ALSO A CONVICTION THAT HE CAN CUT A DEAL. THE
CHECHEN LEADERS ARE "SMART, EVEN IF THEY HAVE A BIT OF
EASTERN IRRATIONALISM ABOUT THEM." THEY UNDERSTAND THAT
CHECHNYA'S FATE IS TIED WITH RUSSIA, AND THEY ARE WORRIED
ABOUT THEIR OWN ABILITY TO CONTROL THE SITUATION OVER THE
LONG RUN. IN PARTICULAR, THEY EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT
YOUNG CHECHENS, WHO, THEY BELIEVE, ARE PRONE TO TURNING TO
NARCOTICS AND VIOLENCE IF NOT GAINFULLY EMPLOYED, AND
SMALL "BANDIT FORMATIONS," WHO ALLEGEDLY RECEIVE OFFERS TO
CARRY OUT TERRORIST AND OTHER PARAMILITARY ACTIONS FROM A
WIDE VARIETY OF SOURCES. (NINETY PERCENT OF THE REQUESTS
COME FROM RUSSIA, BEREZOVSKIY SAID, BUT SOME HAVE COME
FROM SPAIN, ITALY, AND ELSEWHERE.)
8. 4G)-IN ADDITION, THE CHECHEN SEPARATIST LEADERS WERE
EDUCATED IN THE SOVIET SYSTEM, BEREZOVSKIY STRESSED. "THEY
HAVE LITTLE LOVE FOR ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM AND ARE
OPPOSED TO THE SHARIAT, ALTHOUGH THEY REALIZE THEY ARE NOT
POWERFUL ENOUGH TO RESIST ITS INTRODUCTION AT THIS TIME.
MOREOVER, THEY ARE ALSO NOT DEADSET ON INDEPENDENCE, BUT
REALIZE THEY CANNOT PUBLICLY EXPRESS THEIR DOUBTS FOR THE
TIME BEING.
BUILDING TRUST
9. -(GHOVERALL, BEREZOVSKIY THOUGHT HIS INITIAL TALKS
WITH THE CHECHEN SEPARATIST LEADERS HAD GONE WELL. HE HAD
UNDERTAKEN CERTAIN OBLIGATIONS AND WAS NOW MAKING GOOD ON
THEM. "I PROMISED MASKHADOV A MEETING WITH CHERNOMYRDIN;
THAT HAS BEEN DECIDED. I PROMISED THEM THAT (PRO-MOSCOW
CHECHEN LEADER) ZAVGAYEV WOULD BE REMOVED FROM THE
PROCESS; HE HAS BEEN REMOVED. I PROMISED THEM THAT MOSCOW
WOULD AGREE TO THEIR ELECTIONS JANUARY 27, WE HAVE
AGREED." THERE WERE A FEW OTHER (UNSPECIFIED) THINGS THAT
REMAINED TO BE D
ONE, BUT BEREZOVSKIY WAS CONFIDENT THE
PIECES WERE FALLING INTO PLACE. (HE SAID HE HAD NOT
REQUESTED THE CHECHEN SIDE TO UNDERTAKE ANY OBLIGATIONS
VIS-A-VIS MOSCOW, BECAUSE HE THOUGHT THE FIRST STEP HAD TO
COME FROM MOSCOW AND THAT IT WAS INCUMBENT UPON HIM AND
MOSCOW TO WIN THE CHECHEN SEPARATIST LEADERS' CONFIDENCE.)
ISRAELI CITIZENSHIP MATTER
10.
AT THE CLOSE OF THE MEETING, BEREZOVSKIY SAID
THAT RECENT REPORTS THAT HE HAD TAKEN ON ISRAELI CITIZEN-
CLINTON LiSM^PHOTOCOPY
�-CONriDCNTIAL'
SHIP WERE ACCURATE. "I DID IT IN 1993 AND HAD TOTALLY
FORGOTTEN ABOUT IT." HE HAD, HOWEVER, RECENTLY REVOKED
HIS ISRAELI CITIZENSHIP, IN PART BECAUSE OF THE MOUNTING
PUBLIC SCANDAL. MOREOVER, JUDGING BY A PHONE CONVERSATION
HE HAD IN POL/INT CHIEF'S PRESENCE, HE WAS SEEKING TO HAVE
THE REVOCATION ANTEDATED TO PRECEDE HIS APPOINTMENT TO THE
SECURITY COUNCIL. AT THE SAME TIME, HE WAS CONCERNED THAT
HIS REVOKING ISRAELI CITIZENSHIP WOULD DAMAGE HIS STANDING
WITH THE JEWISH COMMUNITY IN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES
AND EXPRESSED HOPE THAT U.S. AND ISRAELI LEADERS WOULD
UNDERSTAND WHY HE HAD TAKEN THAT STEP.
COMMENT
11. 4G*~ WHILE BEREZOVSKIY IS KNOWN FOR HIS CONFIDENCE
AND HIS ABILITY TO GET THINGS DONE, CUTTING A DEAL WILL
PROVE MORE DIFFICULT THAN HE SUGGESTED IN THIS
CONVERSATION. HIS CONFIDENCE THAT ONLY FOUR OR FIVE MEN
CONTROL THE SITUATION IS MISPLACED AND IGNORES THE LARGER
SOCIAL FORCES AT WORK THAT WILL IMPEDE PROGRESS TOWARD A
SETTLEMENT. MOREOVER, EVEN IF HE IS RIGHT THAT GIVING
MONEY TO THE RIGHT PEOPLE IS THE KEY TO A SETTLEMENT, IT
IS NOT CLEAR WHERE HE WILL FIND THE MONEY. "KOMMERSANTDAILY" (NOVEMBER 6) REPORTED THAT MAJOR MOSCOW BANKS WERE
NOT ABOUT TO MAKE THE LARGE INVESTMENTS IN CHECHNYA
BEREZOVSKIY IS NOW URGING. THAT SAID, BEREZOVSKIY WILL
PROBABLY PROVE CAPABLE OF MAKING SOME PROGRESS AND
PREVENTING A SERIOUS DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION ON THE
GROUND IN CHECHNYA.
12. t e r FINALLY, BEREZOVSKIY DID NOT MENTION SECURITY
COUNCIL SECRETARY RYBKIN WHILE DISCUSSING CHECHNYA, EVEN
THOUGH RYBKIN IS TECHNICALLY IN CHARGE OF THE
NEGOTIATIONS. THAT PROBABLY REFLECTS BEREZOVSKIY'S
CONFIDENCE BOTH IN HIS OWN SKILLS AND IN HIS TIES TO
CHERNOMYRDIN. TEFFT
< SECT>SECT10N: 01 OF 01
< SSN>1658
< TOR>961114115228 M2493602
A
A
A
FROM:
SITREPRT
CLINTON LfcSMliX P O O O Y
HTCP
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
PREC: ROUTINE CLASS:-GGNfHBENTWl SSN: 4224MSGID: M2534934
RAACZYUW RUEHMOA4224 3461729-CCCC-RHEHAAX.
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 111729ZDEC96
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
FM: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9104
INFO: RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 6967
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 7006
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 6829
G O N r i D C N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 034224
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/96
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, RS t ^ w A ^
SUBJECT: FINANCIER ^ M H M
0
N
RUSSIAN POLITICS
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY JOHN TEFFT, CHARGE. REASON:
1.5(D)
SUMMARY
2. {e)-OVER LUNCH WITH CHARGE DECEMBER 5, MOST
FINANCIAL GROUP PRESIDENT H ^ ^ B i , WIDELY COr*
ONE OF RUSSIA'S MOST INFLUENTIAL BUSINESSMEN:
- ARGUED THAT DISINFORMATION TYING LEADING RUSSIAN
BUSINESSMEN TO THE MAFIA IS BEING SPREAD BY THE
RUSSIAN SPECIAL SERVICES TO PERSUADE THE WEST TO STEM
CAPITAL FLIGHT AND BY NON-RUSSIAN BUSINESSMEN HOPING
TO COMPROMISE THEIR RUSSIAN COMPETITORS.
- CLAIMED HE AND OTHER LEADING BUSINESSMEN HAD
BECOME SO INFLUENTIAL THAT THEY NO LONGER HAD TO PAY
BRIBES, BUT ADMITTED MOSCOW MAYOR LUZHKOV OFTEN TURNS
TO HIM "FOR FAVORS" THAT HELP BURNISH LUZHKOV'S IMAGE
(E.G., MONEY FOR THE CHRIST THE SAVIOR CATHEDRAL).
- SAID THAT OVER THE PAST YEAR LEADING BUSINESSMEN
HAD REALIZED THAT THEY HAD A RESPONSIBILITY TO DEFEND
RUSSIA'S NATIONAL INTERESTS AND COULD NOT SIMPLY
CONTINUE TO PURSUE THEIR OWN COMMERCIAL ADVANTAGE.
- HOPED, BUT WAS NOT ENTIRELY CONFIDENT, YELTSIN
WOULD DEVOTE HIS SECOND TERM TO ACCELERATING REFORM
AND FIGHTING CRIME. END SUMMARY
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L N O I R R HTCP
AND FIGHTING CRIME. END SUMMARY
3. (U) MOST FINANCIAL GROUP PRESIDENT VLADIMIR
mmm^m is WIDELY CONSIDERED ONE OF THE MOST
INFLUENTIAL BUSINESSMEN IN RUSSIA TODAY, HE IS AMONG
THE SEVEN BANKERS WHO, SECURITY COUNCIL DEPUTY
SECRETARY (AND FINANCIER) BEREZOVSKIY HAS CLAIMED,
DOMINATE THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY AND HAVE TREMENDOUS
POLITICAL INFLUENCE. IN HIS INITIAL MEETING WITH THE
CHARGE, • • • • OFFERED AN INTRODUCTION INTO WHAT IS
ON THE MIND OF RUSSIA'S NEW BREED OF BIG CAPITALISTS.
HIS COMMENTS ON RUSSIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS ARE
REPORTED SEPTEL. OTHER HIGHLIGHTS FOLLOW.
RUSSIAN BUSINESS
4
- i ^ T W K K K K M COMPLAINED ABOUT WHAT HE SAW AS THE
WIDESPREAD PERCEPTION IN THE WEST THAT RUSSIAN
BUSINESS AND THE MAFIA ARE CLOSELY LINKED. "WE
OURSELVES ARE TO BLAME FOR THAT," HE NOTED. IN 19911992, WITH THE BREAK UP OF THE SOVIET UNION AND
GROWING CONCERNS ABOUT STABILITY IN RUSSIA, CAPITAL
FLIGHT HAD BECOME A MAJOR DRAIN ON THE RUSSIAN
ECONOMY. IN AN EFFORT TO PERSUADE WESTERN COUNTRIES
TO STEM THIS FLIGHT, • • • • • CONTINUED, THE RUSSIAN
SPECIAL SERVICES BEGAN TO SPREAD THE NOTION THAT ALL
MONEY FLOWING OUT OF RUSSIA WAS ULTIMATELY LINKED TO
ORGANIZED CRIME. TODAY, SUCH DISINFORMATION IS SPREAD
BY NOT ONLY THE SPECIAL SERVICES BUT ALSO NON-RUSSIAN
BUSINESSMEN TO COMPROMISE THEIR RUSSIAN COMPETITORS.
MORE SPECIFICALLY, • • • • CLAIMED THAT FORMER
PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICES HEAD KORZHAKOV (AND
^ H ^ H ' S NEMESIS) HAD VERY GOOD TIES IN FRANCE AND
SWITZERLAND AND WAS USING THOSE CHANNELS TO SPREAD
ALLEGATIONS OF CLOSE LINKS BETWEEN M m m m AND
ORGANIZED CRIME.
5 -terwa^^m DID NOT DENY THAT MANY RUSSIAN
.
BUSINESSMEN, INCLUDING HIMSELF, HAD ENGAGED IN DUBIOUS
ACTIVITIES, ESPECIALLY AS THEY WERE SETTING UP THEIR
OPERATIONS AND ACCUMULATING CAPITAL. NEVERTHELESS, A
NUMBER OF BIG BUSINESSMEN HAD NOW EMERGED - FOR
EXAMPLE, THE BEREZOVSKIY'S SEVEN BANKERS - WHO WERE SO
LARGE AND INFLUENTIAL ENOUGH THAT THEY NO LONGER HAD
TO ENGAGE IN SUCH ACTIVITIES AND NO LONGER DID.
6. {G)-THE MOST FINANCIAL GROUP, FOR EXAMPLE, NO
LONGER PAYS BRIBES, • • • • • I CONTINUED, WHILE
ADMITTING THAT HE STILL ENJOYED A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP
WITH MOSCOW MAYOR LUZHKOV, WHO FROM TIME TO TIME
TURNED TO H H ^ B "FOR FAVORS." LUZHKOV IS NOT
INTERESTED IN MflNEV; HE IS INTERESTED IN "VLAST"
(POWER AND AUTHORITY), ^ ^ H H NOTED. TO ENHANCE
HIS REPUTATION, LUZHKOV WAULE) A&K • H ^ H AND OTHERS
TO HELP, FOR EXAMPLE, WITH REBUILDING THE BORDER
GUARDS APARTMEN
�TTN TRR P O O O Y
NO
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GUARDS APARTMfetiT BLOC, DESTROYED IN A TERRORIST ATTACK
IN KASPIYSK, DAGESTAN, LAST MONTH, OR THE CHRIST THE
SAVIOR CATHEDRAL IN MOSCOW; REPAIRING MOSCOW ROADS; OR
PAYING LOCAL SCHOOL TEACHERS' SALARIES. LUZHKOV, OF
- C O N F I D E N T I A T SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 034224
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/96
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, RS
SUBJECT: FINANCIER
ON RUSSIAN POLITICS
COURSE, HAD LEVERAGE: WHEN • • • • DEMURRED THAT IT
WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO COME UP WITH USE) ONE MILLION FOR
THE APARTMENT BLOC IN KASPIYSK BY THE END OF THE YEAR,
LUZHKOV SIMPLY NOTED THAT ^ ^ ^ H WOULD NEED TO GET
PERMISSION TO SET UP SATELLITE D\SHES FOR HIS DBS
CHANNEL (I.E., HE WOULD NOT GET IT IF HE WASN'T
FORTHCOMING). B H ^ H FOUND THE FUNDS.
7. 4&)r AT THE SAME TIME, • • • • ADMITTED THAT THE
DRIVERS FOR MOST'S FLEET OF 600-700 CARS STILL PAID
BRIBES TO THE TRAFFIC POLICE (THE NOTORIOUS
"GAISHNIKI") A COMMON ENOUGH OCCURRENCE. THE POLICE,
HOWEVER, NOW KNEW ENOUGH NOT TO STOP ^ ^ ^ H ' S
MERCEDES (THEY WOULD HAVE HELL TO PAY BECAUSE
mmmmm HAD POWERFUL FRIENDS), ^ ^ ^ H , HOWEVER,
SIMPLYDID NOT HAVE THE TIME TO COMPLAIN EACH TIME THE
TRAFFIC POLICE HARASSED ONE OF HIS DRIVERS. PAYING
THESE BRIBES WAS JUST A COST OF BUSINESS.
8.
OVERALL, W ^ ^ ^ m SAID, SECURITY WAS A MAJOR
EXPENSE FOR ALL I A R G I BUSINESSES, EATING UP AS MUCH AS
TWENTY-FIVE PERCENT OF INCOME (DOKHOD). ^ ^ H H
HIMSELF, HAD, HOWEVER, FOUND A WAY TO MAKEMONEY OUT
OF THIS SITUATION: "MOST" ITSELF HAD A LARGE SECURITY
FORCE IT HIRED OUT TO BUSINESSES AROUND MOSCOW.
RULES OF THE ROAD AND NATIONAL INTERESTS
9
H H H H ARGUED THAT TIES AMONG RUSSIA'S
LEADING BUSINESSMEN HAD SHARPLY IMPROVED OVER THE PAST
YEAR. THEIR COMMON EFFORT TO GET YELTSIN REELECTED
HAD BEEN BOTH A STIMULUS TO COOPERATION AND PROOF OF
ITS BENEFITS. THEY WERE SLOWLY DEVISING RULES OF THE
ROAD TO REGULATE THEIR COMPETITION. "I HATE
SMOLENSKIY (OF STOLICHNYY BANK) AND KHODORKOVSKIY (OF
MENATEP), BUT WE NEED TO COMPETE IN WAYS THAT DO NOT
DESTROY ALL OF US," ^ • H H
S i l D
10. -fe^-MOREOVER, • • • • • CONTINUED, AS A RESULT
OF THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN AND THEIR GROWING
POLITICAL INFLUENCE, LEADING BUSINESSMEN NOW
UNDERSTOOD THAT THEY HAD AN OBLIGATION TO LOOK OUT FOR
MORE THAN THEIR NARROW COMMERCIAL INTERESTS; THEY HAD
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RUSSIA'S NATIONAL INTERESTS.
RUSSIA, • • • • • EXPLAINED, WAS NOT A DEMOCRATIC OR
EUROPEAN COUNTRY; IT IS AN ASIATIC COUNTRY. THE
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
COUNTRY WAS RUN BY AN OLIGARCHY, OF WHICH BUSINESSMEN
LIKE HIM WERE AN INTEGRAL PART, AND WOULD BE FOR SOME
TIME. THAT MIGHT BE UNFORTUNATE BUT IT WAS REALITY.
KOMPROMAT
11. i B f - ^ ^ ^ ^ m SAID HE KNEW WHERE THE RECENT
KOMPROMAT AGAINST CHUBAYS AND HIS COLLEAGUES IN
YELTSIN'S REELECTION EFFORT WAS COMING FROM, LEAVING
THE CLEAR IMPRESSION IT WAS KORZHAKOV. HE DID NOT
THINK IT WOULD ULTIMATELY LEAD TO MUCH. SINCE ALL
CANDIDATES HAD ENGAGED IN ILLEGAL CAMPAIGN FINANCING INCLUDING THE COMMUNISTS AND FORMER SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARY LEBED, NO ONE WAS REALLY INTERESTED IN
PURSUING THIS.
12. { G H B ^ H ™ WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE DETAILS OF
THE CASE OF THE FAMOUS BOX WITH USD 500,000 CHUBAYS'
ASSOCIATES WERE CAUGHT TRYING TO TAKE OUT OF THE
RUSSIAN WHITE HOUSE, HE ARGUED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE
WAS NO EVIDENCE OF A CRIME. THAT SAID, HE HAD NO
DOUBTS THAT THERE HAD BEEN A BOX AND THERE HAD BEEN
MONEY IN IT. THE POINT WAS THAT THERE WAS NOTHING
ILLEGAL IN WHAT CHUBAYS' ASSOCIATES WERE DOING.
YELTSIN AS THE LESSER EVIL
13. 4&t • m H I SAID HE HAD SUPPORTED YELTSIN FOR
PRESIDENT AS THE "LESSER EVIL." HE DISAGREED WITH
YELTSIN ON MANY ISSUES, BUT HE - LIKE HIS BUSINESS
FRIENDS - ALL REALIZED THAT IF THE COMMUNISTS HAD WON
THEY WOULD HAVE HAD BUT TWO CHOICES: EITHER TO GO
"WEST" (INTO EMIGRATION) OR "NORTH" (TO A LABOR CAMP).
FOR THAT REASON, THE MEDIA THESE BUSINESSMEN
CONTROLLED OR INFLUENCED ALSO LINED UP SQUARELY BEHIND
YELTSIN. "IT MAY NOT HAV
E BEEN FAIR OR DEMOCRATIC AND OUR FRIENDS IN THE WEST WERE RIGHT FOR CRITICIZING
US - BUT WE FELT WE HAD NO CHOICE,"
CONCLUDED.
-G-0 i r r I D C N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 034224
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/96
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, RS
SUBJECT: FINANCIER H H ^ H
ON RUSSIAN POLITICS
14. 'i&jr ANTICIPATING YELTSIN'S RETURN TO THE KREMLIN
AFTER HIS HEART OPERATION, H ^ ^ H HOPED YELTSIN
WOULD MOVE FORWARD ON TWOKEYISSUES: ECONOMIC REFORM
AND CRIME. YELTSIN WOULD NOT HAVE TO WORRY ABOUT
REELECTION AND THEREFORE COULD TAKE NECESSARY BUT
UNPOPULAR MEASURES.
HOWEVER, WAS NOT
WHOLLY PERSUADED Y E L T S I N W O U L D MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION.
�C I T N L B A Y POOOY
L N O I R R HTCP
ELTSIN WOULD MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION.
WHOLLY PERSUADED Y
ANTI-SEMITISM
1 5 . - ^ - A S K E D ABOUT ANTI-SEMITISM IN RUSSIA,
m m m / m SAID HE HAD BEEN DEALING WITH THIS ALL HIS
LIFE. HE HAD GROWN UP IN A WORKERS* BARRACKS, WHERE
HIS WAS THE ONLY JEWISH FAMILY. HE WAS INVOLVED IN
. NUMEROUS SCUFFLES WITH BOYS WHO MADE ANTI-SEMITIC
SLURS. LIKE THE JEWS IN ISRAEL, HE SAID, JEWS OF HIS
GENERATION IN RUSSIA HAD LEARN HOW TO FIGHT TO DEFEND
THEIR HONOR. AND THEY HAD DONE SO WITH SOME SUCCESS.
WHATEVER MANY RUSSIANS MIGHT THINK IN PRIVATE, PUBLIC
MANIFESTATIONS OF ANTI-SEMITISM HAD DECREASED
DRAMATICALLY, AND THAT WAS OF PRINCIPAL CONCERN TO
| AND THE JEWISH COMMUNITY. IN THIS CONTEXT,
EXPRESSED HIS GRATITUDE FOR AMBASSADOR
?S SUPPORT FOR THE JEWISH COMMUNITY.
COMMENT
16. -(O)- H H H H ' S COMMENTS REFLECT THOSE WE HEAR
FROM O T H E R T E A D I N G RUSSIAN BUSINESSMEN AND BANKERS.
THEY ARE LOOKING FOR RESPECT, NOT ONLY IN RUSSIA BUT
ABROAD, AND ARE INCREASINGLY CONCERNED BY THE BAD NAME
RUSSIAN ORGANIZED CRIME IS GIVING RUSSIAN BUSINESS.
INDEED, m / m ^ M RECENTLY TOLD A/POLCOUNS THAT HE
WOULD SOON BE SETTING UP A SMALL PUBLIC RELATIONS
UNIT, THE CHIEF RESPONSIBILITY OF WHICH WOULD BE
REBUTTING CHARGES THAT MOST BANK HAD MAFIA LINKS.
• ^ ^ H ALSO MENTIONED HE WAS GOING TO HAVE A
CORPORATE REORGANIZATION SHORTLY, WHICH WOULD SEPARATE
THE BANK FROM THE MEDIA, AND REMOVE HIM FROM RUNNING
THE BANK. AT THE SAME TIME, m m / ^ M CLEARLY WANTS
TO EXPLOIT HIS COZY RELATIONSHIP WITH LEADING
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS FOR PERSONAL GAIN, ESPECIALLY AS
HE MOVES MORE BOLDLY INTO THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
SECTOR. LIKE BEREZOVSKIY AND OTHERS, HE SEES NOTHING
WRONG WITH THIS, ARGUING THAT OLIGARCHIC RULE IS ONLY
APPROPRIATE FOR RUSSIA AT THIS STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT.
TEFFT
DIST:
DIST>
SIT: EGGERT FORT PASCUAL PIFER RUMER
SIT: NSC
�CONriDCNTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: EGGERT, FORT, HESLIN, PASCUAL, PIFER, RUMER, NSC
PREC: PRIORITY
CLASS: UUNI IUE1N I IAL
DTG:301 614Z OCT 96
FM: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6685
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 6565
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 6672
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 6714
C O ^ M D C N T I A - L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 030488
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/06
TAGS: PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: REFLECTIONS ON CHUBAYS' POWER
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR THOMAS R. PICKERING.
REASON: 1.5 (D)
SUMMARY
2. 4G^ PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION HEAD CHUBAYS IS
THE MOST POWERFUL FIGURE IN KREMLIN POLITICS TODAY,
BESIDES THE AILING YELTSIN. HIS POWER RESTS ON
RELIABLE ACCESS TO YELTSIN, CLOSE TIES WITH LEADING
FINANCIERS, AND CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE OVER THE MASS
MEDIA. LIKE THE OLD BOLSHEVIKS TO WHOM THEY ARE OFTEN
COMPARED, CHUBAYS AND HIS TEAM ARE TOUGH, AMBITIOUS,
AND CONFIDENT. HIS FATE IS CLOSELY TIED TO YELTSIN'S.
SHOULD YELTSIN DIE, THE IMMENSELY UNPOPULAR CHUBAYS
WOULD HAVE TROUBLE MAINTAINING HIS POSITION IN THE FACE
OF NEW PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. SHOULD YELTSIN RECOVER
FULLY FROM HEART SURGERY, HE WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY
REIN CHUBAYS IN, IF ONLY TO ENLARGE HIS OWN ROOM FOR
MANEUVER. THE CURRENT AILING YELTSIN IN FACT OFFERS
CHUBAYS THE BEST OPPORTUNITY TO CONSOLIDATE HIS OWN
POWER. THIS MIGHT NOT BE A BAD OUTCOME FOR THE WEST,
GIVEN CHUBAYS' REPUTATION AS A MARKET REFORMER. BUT
THE COMPANY CHUBAYS IS NOW KEEPING WITH FINANCIERS OF
DUBIOUS PROBITY SHOULD GIVE US PAUSE, AS SHOULD THE
TRUISM THAT POWER CORRUPTS. END SUMMARY.
3. (SBU) BY MOST ACCOUNTS, PRESIDENTIAL
CLINTON LiSRAKt P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONriDCNTIAL
ADMINISTRATION HEAD CHUBAYS PLAYED THE LEAD ROLE IN
ENGINEERING LEBED'S DISMISSAL AS SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARY. IT WAS ANOTHER FINE DEMONSTRATION OF
CHUBAYS' DEFT BUREAUCRATIC INFIGHTING SKILLS, WHICH HAS
LEFT HIM THE MOST POWERFUL FIGURE - BESIDES THE AILING
YELTSIN - IN KREMLIN POLITICS TODAY.
FOUNDATIONS OF CHUBAYS' POWER
4.
CHUBAYS' POWER AND AUTHORITY REST ON SEVERAL
FOUNDATIONS, WHICH WERE LAID OR FORTIFIED DURING THE
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN EARLIER THIS YEAR:
-- RELIABLE AND READY ACCESS TO YELTSIN THROUGH
YELTSIN'S DAUGHTER TATYANA DYACHENKO, WHO HAS BEEN
CLOSELY ALLIED WITH CHUBAYS SINCE AT LEAST EARLY THIS
YEAR, ACCORDING TO VARIOUS SOURCES IN CHUBAYS' INNER
CIRCLE. (FEW OTHER POLITICAL FIGURES HAVE INDEPENDENT
ACCESS TO YELTSIN. PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN DOES,
BUT IT IS NOT CLEAR HOW OFTEN HE TALKS TO YELTSIN
BEYOND THEIR WEEKLY MEETINGS.)
-- CLOSE TIES WITH LEADING FINANCIERS AND. BANKERS, IN
PARTICULAR, LOGOVAZ PRESIDENT BEREZOVSKIY, MOST
FINANCIAL GROUP PRESIDENT GUSINSKIY, ROSPROM (AND
FORMER MENATEP) HEAD KHODORKOVSKIY, AND FIRST DEPUTY
PRIME MINISTER (AND FORMER ONEKSIMBANK PRESIDENT)
POTANIN.
-- CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE OVER THE MEDIA, ESPECIALLY
NATIONAL TELEVISION, FACILITATED BY HIS BANKER FRIENDS.
BEREZOVSKIY, FOR EXAMPLE, IS A MAJOR INFLUENCE ON
RUSSIAN PUBLIC TELEVISION (ORT); GUSINSKIY OWNS NTV (AN
OSTENSIBLY INDEPENDENT CHANNEL). THE OTHER MAJOR
CHANNEL, RUSSIAN TV (RTR), IS STATE OWNED. IN A RECENTCONVERSATION WITH POLOFF, RTR DEPUTY DIRECTOR SVANIDZE
MADE IT CLEAR CHUBAYS SETS GOVERNMENT MEDIA POLICY.
5. • i & r IN ADDITION, LIKE THE OLD BOLSHEVIKS TO WHOM
THEY ARE OFTEN COMPARED, CHUBAYS AND HIS TEAM HAVE A
REPUTATION - JUSTIFIED, BASED ON OUR OBSERVATIONS - FOR
BEING TOUGH AND RUTHLESS, AMBITIOUS TO THE POINT OF
CYNICISM AND CONFIDENT TO THE POINT OF HUBRIS. CHUBAYS
HIMSELF, MANY BELIEVE IS THE MOST EFFECTIVE
ADMINISTRATOR IN RUSSIA TODAY AND COMPARES FAVORABLY
WITH RUSSIA'S OTHER GREAT PRE-REVOLUTIONARY
ADMINISTRATORS, SUCH AS PRIME MINISTER STOLYPIN OF THIS
CENTURY, AND ALEKSANDR I'S STATE SECRETARY SPERANSKIY
OF THE LAST.
EXPANDING AUTHORITY
CLINTON I m m , P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONriDCNTIAL
6. (SBU) OVER THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS, CHUBAYS' HAS
USED HIS ACCESS TO YELTSIN, HIS AUTHORITY TO VE
TALL
PRESIDENTIAL DECREES, AND YELTSIN'S RELATIVE ISOLATION
AND SHORT WORK DAY TO STRENGTHEN HIS BUREAUCRATIC BASE
AND EXPAND HIS RESPONSIBILITY.
e O N r i D E N T I A L-SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 030488
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/06
TAGS: PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: REFLECTIONS ON CHUBAYS' POWER
- A DECREE ON THE PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION OF
OCTOBER 2, FOR EXAMPLE, GAVE CHUBAYS BROAD
RESPONSIBILITY FOR CADRE POLICY IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
AT THE NATIONAL AND REGIONAL LEVELS. IT ALSO ENSURED
THAT ALMOST ALL PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
HAVE ACCESS TO YELTSIN ONLY THROUGH CHUBAYS, WITH ONLY
PRESS SPOKESMAN YASTRZHEMBSKIY AND CHIEF OF PROTOCOL
SHEVCHENKO RETAINING A DIRECT CHANNEL TO THE PRESIDENT.
-- ON OCTOBER 1 1 , YELTSIN NAMED CHUBAYS DEPUTY CHAIRMAN
OF THE EXTRAORDINARY COMMISSION ON TAX COLLECTION.
THAT APPOINTMENT, CHUBAYS ALLY BEREZOVSKIY RECENTLY
TOLD US, WAS INTENDED TO GIVE CHUBAYS PRIMARY
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ECONOMIC POLICY, WHICH TECHNICALLY
IS SUPPOSED TO BELONG TO CHERNOMYRDIN.
- ON OCTOBER 2 1 , YELTSIN NAMED CHUBAYS HIS
REPRESENTATIVE ON A CONSULTATIVE POLICY-COORDINATING
COMMITTEE THAT ALSO INCLUDES CHERNOMYRDIN, FEDERATION
COUNCIL CHAIRMAN STROYEV, AND DUMA SPEAKER SELEZNEV.
DEPENDENCE ON YELTSIN
7. 4€*-MORE THAN THAT OF ANY OTHER MAJOR POLITICAL
FIGURE, HOWEVER, CHUBAYS' FATE IS DEPENDENT ON
YELTSIN'S. IRONICALLY, BOTH YELTSIN'S DEATH AND FULL
RECOVERY FROM HEART SURGERY POSE SERIOUS THREATS TO
UNFETTERED EXERCISE OF CHUBAYS' CONSIDERABLE AUTHORITY.
8. t e r i N THE FIRST CASE, THE CONSTITUTION CALLS FOR
NEW PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS WITHIN THREE MONTHS OF
YELTSIN'S DEMISE. CHUBAYS HIMSELF WOULD HAVE NO CHANCE
OF BEING ELECTED: THE DATA OF CHUBAYS' POLLSTER,
PUBLIC OPINION FOUNDATION GENERAL DIRECTOR OSLON,
CONFIRMS THE PREVAILING OPINION THAT CHUBAYS IS THE
MOST UNPOPULAR POLITICIAN IN RUSSIA TODAY; ON OCTOBER
13, CHUBAYS' NEGATIVE RATING STOOD AT 69 PERCENT AND
�CONriDHNTIAL'
WAS GETTING WORSE. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT ANY CURRENTLY
PLAUSIBLE NEXT PRESIDENT, WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION
OF CHERNOMYRDIN, WOULD GIVE CHUBAYS A POWERFUL POSITION
IN HIS ADMINISTRATION, AND EVEN CHERNOMYRDIN WOULD BE
SURE TO CUT CHUBAYS DOWN AT LEAST A NOTCH OR TWO.
9. 4 Q - IN THE SECOND CASE, YELTSIN WOULD ALMOST
CERTAINLY SEEK TO REIN CHUBAYS IN, IF ONLY TO ENLARGE
HIS OWN ROOM FOR MANEUVER. THAT WOULD ACCORD WITH
YELTSIN'S PREFERRED LEADERSHIP STYLE: THROUGHOUT HIS
PRESIDENCY, HE HAS SOUGHT TO MAINTAIN A CIRCLE OF
COMPETING FORCES OF ROUGHLY EQUAL STRENGTH AROUND HIM.
MOREOVER, CHUBAYS' RIVALS WITH THE POLITICAL ELITE INCLUDING CHERNOMYRDIN AND MOSCOW MAYOR LUZHKOV - WOULD
UNDOUBTEDLY USE IMPROVED ACCESS TO A HEALTHY YELTSIN TO
SEEK TO MODERATE CHUBAYS' INFLUENCE AND AUTHORITY.
HOW LONG CAN THE CHUBAYS ERA LAST?
10. 4 e t - I F CHUBAYS' PRINCIPAL GOAL IS TO CONSOLIDATE
AND EXPAND HIS POWER AND AUTHORITY, YELTSIN'S CURRENT
SEMI-ENGAGEMENT OFFERS CHUBAYS AN EXCELLENT
OPPORTUNITY. IF YELTSIN CONTINUES TO BE ENGAGED ONLY
PARTIALLY, THE QUESTION IS HOW LONG CHUBAYS CAN OPERATE
BEFORE A COALITION OF KEY POLITICAL FORCES EMERGES TO
DEMAND THAT YELTSIN STEP DOWN. THE ANSWER IS:
PROBABLY FOR QUITE SOME TIME. FOR, WITH THE OBVIOUS
EXCEPTION OF LEBED, NO OTHER MAJOR POLITICAL FIGURE OR
FORCE APPEARS INTENT ON FORCING THE ISSUE, IN LARGE
PART BECAUSE NONE ARE PREPARED FOR EARLY PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS.
-- CHERNOMYRDIN AND MOSCOW MAYOR LUZHKOV ARE BOTH
TRAILING LEBED BY LARGE MARGINS IN THE POLLS (OSLON'S
DATA ON VOTING INTENTIONS FROM OCTOBER 13 PUT BOTH IN
LOW SINGLE DIGITS, WHILE LEBED WAS CLOSE TO 30
PERCENT). WHILE BOTH HAVE THE FINANCES, NEITHER YET
HAS THE ORGANIZATION NEEDED TO RUN AN EFFECTIVE
CAMPAIGN. MOREOVER, NEITHER CAN COUNT ON THE UNDIVIDED
SUPPORT OF THE "PARTY OF POWER" THAT WAS INSTRUMENTAL
IN YELTSIN'S COME-FROM-BEHIND VICTORY THIS PAST SPRING.
- THE COMMUNIST/PATRIOTIC LEADERS LIKEWISE FEAR LEBED,
BUT IRONICALLY, THEY ALSO FEAR THEY COULD WIN EARLY
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
. THEY ARE LOATHE, HOWEVER, TO
TAKE ON PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR RUSSIA'S SOCIOECONOMIC SITUATION, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE
IT WILL DETERIORATE SHARPLY IN THE NEXT FE7 MONTHS.
BOTH OUR CONTACTS WITHIN THE COMMUNIST/PATRIOTIC
G O N M - D E N T I A tr SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 030488
CLINTON LiSMfiX P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONriDCNTIAL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/06
TAGS: PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: REFLECTIONS ON CHUBAYS' POWER
OPPOSITION AND OUTSIDE OBSERVERS SUGGEST THE
OPPOSITION'S PREFERENCE IS SOME KIND OF POWER-SHARING
ARRANGEMENT AND COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE
HARDSHIPS TO COME.
POWER CORRUPTS
11. 4Gf-WHAT THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN INDEFINITE
CONTINUATION OF CHUBAYS' UNCHECKED AUTHORITY WOULD BE
FOR RUSSIA'S FUTURE IS AN OPEN QUESTION. HE HAS A
WELL-DESERVED REPUTATION FOR HAVING BEEN THE
INTELLECTUAL AND BUREAUCRATIC FORCE BEHIND RUSSIA'S
MARKET REFORM. WHETHER HE WILL CONTINUE TO REMAIN A
REFORMER REMAINS TO BE SEEN, HOWEVER. IN THE PAST FEW
WEEKS, CHUBAYS HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT HIS TOP PRIORITY
IS CONSOLIDATING CENTRAL STATE POWER AND THAT HE WILL
LOOK TO THE INSTITUTIONS OF COERCION FOR SIGNIFICANT
HELP. FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN RECENTLY DISCUSSING THE NEWLY
FORMED TEMPORARY EXTRAORDINARY COMMITTEE ON TAX
COLLECTION WITH THE PRESS, HE STRESSED ITS PUNITIVE
CHARACTER.
12. 4Gh AFTER A DECADE OF DISINTEGRATION, THE
CONSOLIDATION OF STATE POWER IS NOW NECESSARY TO THE
BUILDING OF BOTH AN EFFICIENT MARKET ECONOMY AND A
WELL-ORDERED DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY IN RUSSIA. BUT WE
SHOULD NOT BE INDIFFERENT TO THE MEANS, PARTICULARLY IN
A COUNTRY WITH A LONG TRADITION OF AUTOCRATIC AND
AUTHORITARIAN RULE WHERE TEMPORARY PUNITIVE MEASURES
HAVE A WAY OF BECOMING PERMANENT. WHILE WE SHOULD GIVE
CHUBAYS THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT AT THIS POINT, HIS
GROWING CLOSENESS TO FINANCIERS OF DUBIOUS PROBITY IS A
CAUSE FOR CONCERN. MOREOVER, AS CHUBAYS ACCUMULATES
POWER AND AUTHORITY, WE SHOULD ALSO REMEMBER A TRUISM:
AS IS THE CASE EVERYWHERE, BUT ESPECIALLY IN RUSSIA,
POWER CORRUPTS. PICKERING
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CLINTON LiSUAfiXt.PHOTOCOPY
�CONriDCNTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: FORT, PIFER, RUMER, NSC
PREC: PRIORITY
CLASS: CONriDCNTIAL
DTG:030926Z DEC 96
FM: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO:
SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8456
////
-ii U N I I U L I'J I I'A L MOSCOW 033241
EXDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/01
TAGS: PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: "MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS" EDITOR ON CHUBAYS
TRANSCRIPT
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY JOHN ORDWAY, ACTING DCM. REASONS
1.5 (B) AND (D).
SUMMARY
2.
IN A MEETING WITH POLOFFS NOVEMBER 25,
"MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS" (MK) CHIEF EDITOR GUSEV:
-- SAID HE WAS CONVINCED A TOP MOST-GROUP OFFICIAL HAD
MADE THE RECORDING OF THE ALLEGED CONVERSATION AMONG
CHUBAYS, ILYUSHIN, AND KRASAVCHENKO RECENTLY PUBLISHED IN
MK. THAT MOST-GROUP OFFICIAL - AND NOT KRASAVCHENKO WAS THE REAL THIRD PERSON IN THE CONVERSATION. THE
OFFICIAL HAD MADE THE RECORDING TO COVER HIMSELF SHOULD
HIS OWN ROLE IN CAMPAIGN FINANCING ABUSES COME TO LIGHT.
KORZHAKOV'S PEOPLE, HOWEVER HAD OBTAINED A COPY OF THE
TAPE AND LEAKED IT TO MK.
-- EXPECTED FURTHER LEAKS OF "KOMPROMAT," STRONGLY
SUGGESTING HE HAD ADDITIONAL MATERIAL ON CHUBAYS AND
YELTSIN'S DAUGHTER TATYANA DYACHENKO.
-- CALLED SECURITY COUNCIL DEPUTY SECRETARY BEREZOVSKIY A
"PURE MAFIOSO," WHO HOPED TO GAIN CONTROL OVER THE
AIRPORT IN GROZNYY FOR TRAFFICKING IN ILLICIT GOODS.
GUSEV IS AN INTERESTED PARTY AND HIS ALLEGATIONS SHOULD
„
^
rER E.0.1352©
CLINTON HfiMLPHOTOCOPY
�CONriDCNTIAL •
BE TREATED WITH CAUTION. WE ARE REPORTING HIS STATEMENTS
BECAUSE OF THE INSIGHT THEY PROVIDE INTO THE MINDSET OF A
KEY PLAYER IN THE CURRENT BATTLE OF KOMPROMAT. END
SUMMARY.
GUSEVS VIEWS
3. -^GMN A DISCUSSION WITH POLOFFS NOVEMBER 25,
"MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS" (MK) CHIEF EDITOR, PAVEL GUSEV,
SHARED HIS IDEAS ON THE SOURCE BEHIND THE RECORDED
TRANSCRIPT DETAILING YELTSIN CAMPAIGN ABUSES PUBLISHED IN
MK NOVEMBER 15; THE MEDIA'S REACTION TO THIS PUBLICATION;
AND THE POSSIBLE CONS[QUENCES OF SUCH REVELATIONS. IN
PARTICULAR:
-- GUSEV STATED THAT THE THIRD PERSON IN THE RECORDING IS
NOT PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT SERGEY KRASAVCHENKO. INSTEAD,
GUSEV WAS CONVINCED THAT THE THIRD PERSON IS A TOP MOSTGROUP OFFICIAL.
- WITHOUT NAMING NAMES, GUSEV OUTLINED HIS UNDERSTANDING
OF THE CHAIN OF EVENTS THAT LED TO THE TRANSCRIPT'S LEAK.
THE MOST-GROUP OFFICIAL INVOLVED IN THE CONVERSATION MADE
THE RECORDING HIMSELF AND DELIBERATELY COVERED UP HIS
NAME TO CONCEAL HIS ROLE IN THE BUGGING. IF THE MOSTGROUP OFFICIAL'S ROLE IN CAMPAIGN FINANCE ABUSES EVER
CAME TO LIGHT, HE COULD THEN USE THE RECORDING TO BOLSTER
HIS CLAIM THAT HE WAS ONLY TAKING ORDERS FROM FIRST
PRESIDENTIAL AIDE ILYUSHIN AND CAMPAIGN LEADER CHUBAYS.
THE MOST-GROUP OFFICIAL SHARED THE RECORDING WITH MOSTGROUP'S HEAD OF SECURITY, FILIP BOBKOV, FORMER KGB FIRST
DEPUTY CHAIRMAN. THE RECORDING SOMEHOW MADE IT FROM
BOBKOVS OFFICE TO HIS FORMER KGB ASSOCIATES (NOW WORKING
IN THE FSB). KORZHAKOV'S FRIENDS IN THE FSB THEN LEAKED
THE TAPE TO "MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS" TO DAMAGE CHUBAYS
AND TO TRY TO COMPEL PRESIDENT YELTSIN TO TAKE STEPS TO
REIN HIM IN.
- MEDIA REACTION TO THE LEAKED TRANSCRIPT PROVES THAT
THEY ARE FULLY UNDER CHUBAYS' CONTROL, GUSEV SAID. IT
WAS OBVIOUS BY THEIR COVERAGE THAT ALL THREE MAJOR
RUSSIAN TV CHANNELS WERE UNDER ORDERS FROM CHUBAYS TO
DIVERT ATTENTION AWAY FROM THE TRANSCRIPT'S REVELATIONS
OF ILLEGAL FINANCING TO SECONDARY ISSUES SUCH AS WHO
LEAKED THE TRANSCRIPT AND WHO AUTHORIZED THE BUGGING.
-- GUSEV INDICATED THAT WE COULD EXPECT FURTHER LEAKS OF
"KOMPROMAT." ASKED WHETHER THEY MIGHT INVOLVE CHUBAYS
AND/OR YELTSIN'S DAUGHTER TATYANA DYACHENKO, GUSEV
SQUIRMED AND SAID YES. ASKED WHETHER HE WOULD PUBLISH
SUCH MATERIAL, HE AGAIN SQUIRMED AND REPLIED THAT HE
WOULD ONLY PUBLISH SOMETHING THAT MADE VERY PRECISE
ALLEGATIONS. (NOTE: GUSEV LEFT THE IMPRESSION HE ALREADY
CLINTON i m m t P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONriDCNTIAL
HAS ADDITIONAL "KOMPROMAT" TO PUBLISH BUT IS TRYING TO
USE HIS PAPER'S OWN INVESTIGATIVE RESOURCES TO
CORROBORATE THE INFORMATION. END NOTE.)
-- ASKED WHETHER HE HAD FELT ANY REPERCUSSIONS FOR
PUBLISH
ING THE LEAKED TRANSCRIPT, GUSEV SAID NO AND ADDED
THAT HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL OFFICIALS KNOW THAT HE AND HIS
NEWSPAPER ENJOY TOO MUCH CLOUT AND INDEPENDENCE TO BE
CURBED THROUGH POLITICAL OR FINANCIAL PRESSURE. HOWEVER,
GUSEV INDICATED THAT MOST-GROUP PRESIDENT GUSINSKIY HAD
REQUESTED A MEETING WITH HIM, PRESUMABLY TO COME TO AN
AGREEMENT OVER DAMAGE CONTROL. (NOTE: GUSEV TOLD POLOFF
LAST SUMMER THAT GUSINSKIY HAD APPROACHED HIM BACK IN
1993 OR 1994 TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF A
"COOPERATIVE" RELATIONSHIP, BUT GUSEV DECLINED. END
NOTE.)
-- DEPUTY SECURITY COUNCIL CHAIRMAN BEREZOVSKIY IS A
"DANGEROUS" FIGURE, ACCORDING TO GUSEV. HE IS A "PURE
MAFIOSO," AND HIS APPOINTMENT IS PROOF THAT MAJOR
CRIMINAL GROUPS HAVE REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF
GOVERNMENT. ACCORDING TO GUSEV, BEREZOVSKIY'S MAIN
PRIORITY IN CHECHNYA HAS BEEN TO SECURE CONTROL OVER THE
AIRPORT IN GROZNYY, THROUGH WHICH HE CAN IMPORT "DRUGS,
MONEY, MERCEDES 600'S, YOU NAME IT" -- ALL WITHOUT PAYING
IMPORT TARIFFS AND WITHOUT ANY OVERSIGHT. BEREZOVSKIY
AND HIS COHORTS NEED SUCH AN OPERATION, GUSEV CLAIMED, TO
MAKE UP FOR THE LOSS OF INCOME FROM THE NATIONAL SPORTS
FOUNDATION, THE AFGHAN VETERANS FUND, AND OTHER
ACTIVITIES THAT HAVE DRAWN TOO MUCH ATTENTION.
-- "MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS" WILL CONTINUE TO PUBLISH
INFORMATION RELATED TO CAMPAIGN OR OTHER ABUSES COMMITTED
BY CHUBAYS AND ANY OTHER HIGH-LEVEL FIGURES. ALTHOUGH
GUEV CONCEDES THAT SUCH DISCLOSURES PLAY INTO THE HANDS
OF THE COMMUNISTS, HE ARGUES THEY ALSO BENEFIT THE
GENERAL PUBLIC WHO HAVE THE RIGHT TO KNOW WHO IS
GOVERNING THEM.
COMMENT
4.4GfGUSEV IS NO STRANGER TO SCANDAL AND HIS PAPER HAS
BEEN AMONG THE MOST FEARLESS IN RUSSIA IN REPORTING THE
PROBLEM OF HIGH-LEVEL CORRUPTION. ALTHOUGH VERY MUCH
OPPOSED TO THE COMMUNISTS, GUSEV IS NOW DEEPLY CONCERNED
ABOUT THE CHARACTER OF SOME TOP-LEVEL OFFICIALS
SURROUNDING YELTSIN. BEFORE THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION,
HE TOLD POLOFFS, A GROUP OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS MET WITH
THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR. ONE EDITOR CAUTIONED THAT THE
WEST WAS PREOCCUPIED ONLY WITH THE CONSEQUENCES OF A
C — \ 0\ —c^^A^X-^ 0 O OY
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�•CONI IULNIIML
POSSIBLE COMMUNIST VICTORY AND HAD NOT THOUGHT ABOUT THE
CONSEQUENCES IF THE YELTSIN REGIME REMAINED IN POWER.
NOW, GUSEV STRESSED, SOME OF THOSE CONSEQUENCES ARE
BECOMING CLEAR IN A DIRTY WAR OF "KOMPROMAT" THAT
THREATENS TO UNDERMINE THE VERY POWERS THAT WERE ELECTED
ON JULY 3. TEFFT
< SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
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CLINTON i m M L P O O O Y
HTCP
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: BUJOLD, EGGERT, FORT, HESLIN, PASCUAL, PASSDOWN, PIFER, RUMER, SUM, SUM2,
NSC, SIT{C2}
PREC: ROUTINE
CLASS:-CONFIDENTIAL
DTG:021300Z DEC 96
FM: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8386
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0038
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 6900
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 6869
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 6746
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E NTTTTL SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 033078
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/06
TAGS: PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: POLITICAL IMPACT OF YELTSIN'S RECOVERY
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY THOMAS GRAHAM, ACTING POLITICAL
COUNSELOR. REASON: 1.5(D).
SUMMARY
2. -(6}—YELTSIN'S STEADY RECOVERY FROM HEART SURGERY
HAS ALTERED THE TIME FRAME FOR THE SUCCESSION
STRUGGLE, ALTHOUGH IT HAS NOT PUT AN END TO IT, AND
HAS LED PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION HEAD CHUBAYS'
RIVALS TO STEP UP EFFORTS TO WEAKEN HIM. FORMER
SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARY LEBED, WHO HAD WAGERED MOST
ON EARLY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, IS GRADUALLY SHIFTING
HIS HORIZONS TO THE YEAR 2000, WHEN YELTSIN'S CURRENT
TERM ENDS. PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN IS REMAKING
HIS IMAGE, HOPING TO PERSUADE FIRST THE ELITE AND THEN
THE PUBLIC THAT HE IS YELTSIN'S LOGICAL, AND CHOSEN,
HEIR. THE COMMUNISTS ARE REASSESSING THEIR TACIT
TACTICAL ALLIANCE WITH CHERNOMYRDIN,WHO THEY BELIEVED
WAS BEST PLACED TO LIMIT THE POWER OF THEIR BETE
NOIRE, CHUBAYS, WHILE YELTSIN WAS GRAVELY ILL. THEY
ARE STEPPING UP THEIR ATTACKS ON CHUBAYS, AS OTHER
FORCES MOUNT A "WAR OF KOMPROMAT" AGAINST HIM.
YELTSIN'S FIRST POST-OPERATION PUBLIC ADDRESS, WHICH
SHOULD OCCUR SOON, MAY PROVIDE IMPORTANT CLUES TO HOW
n
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P E R E.O. 13526
CLINTON I M M L P O O O Y
HTCP
�'CONriDCNTIAL
HE ASSESSES THE CURRENT BALANCE OF FORCES AROUND HIM.
END SUMMARY.
EVERYONE'S ADJUSTING
3. (SBU) YELTSIN'S HEART OPERATION NOVEMBER 5 AND
APPARENTLY STEADY RECOVERY MAY NOT PUT AN END TO THE
SUCCESSION STRUGGLE, BUT THEY HAVE ALTERED ITS
DYNAMICS. THE MAJOR CANDIDATES ARE NO LONGER ACTING
AS IF THEY BELIEVE EARLY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS ARE
LIKELY. RATHER, THEY ARE CONCENTRATING ON HOW BEST TO
POSITION THEMSELVES FOR ELECTIONS THAT COULD TAKE
PLACE AS LATE AS THE YEAR 2000, WHEN YELTSIN'S CURRENT
FOUR-YEAR TERM ENDS.
. . . LEBED
4. 4G)-THE MOST RADICAL CHANGE IN PERSPECTIVE
BELONGS TO FORMER SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARY LEBED,
WHO HAD WAGERED MOST THAT YELTSIN'S DETERIORATING
HEALTH WOULD FORCE HIM FROM OFFICE IN THE NEAR FUTURE.
IMMEDIATELY AFTER HIS MID-OCTOBER DISMISSAL, LEBED AND
HIS SUPPORTERS RULED OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF HIS
RUNNING FOR GOVERNOR OF TULA OBLAST OR RETURNING TO
WORK FOR YELTSIN, MAINTAINING THAT ALL EFFORT WOULD BE
FOCUSED ON PREPARING FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS.
DURING HIS TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES IN MID-NOVEMBER,
HOWEVER, LEBED SAID BOTH THOSE OPTIONS REMAINED OPEN.
HE HAS APPARENTLY CONCLUDED THAT HE NEEDS A POSITION
IN THE POWER STRUCTURE TO MAINTAIN ACCESS TO THE MEDIA
ANDKEEP HIMSELF IN THE PUBLIC SPOTLIGHT FOR THE LONG
HAUL. LIKEWISE, LEBED HAS RECENTLY SAID HE WILL PAY
PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO BUILDING A GENUINE PARTY
ORGANIZATION OUT OF THE LOOSE COALITION, "FOR TRUTH
AN ORDER," THAT NOW BACKS HIM. THAT WILL TAKE TIME,
BUT SUCH AN ORGANIZATION WOULD BE CRITICAL TO RUNNING
AN EFFECTIVE CAMPAIGN THREE OR FOUR YEARS DOWN THE
ROAD; IT WOULD BE LESS IMPORTANT IN A NEAR-TERM
CAMPAIGN, IN WHICH LEBED WOULD HAVE COUNTED ON HIS
CHARISMA TO CARRY HIM TO POWER.
...LUZHKOV
5. -(O-MEANWHILE, MOSCOW MAYOR LUZHKOV'S PEOPLE ARE
BEGINNING TO VIEW THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE FEDERATION
COUNCIL AS AN EXCELLENT SPRINGBOARD TO THE PRESIDENCY,
ACCORDING TO AN ADVISOR TO THE CURRENT CHAIRMAN, YEGOR
STROYEV. IT IS THE THIRD-RANKING PROTOCOL POSITION
CLINTON LigMLPHOTOCOPY
�GONriDCNTIAL-^
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, YET IT DOES NOT BURDEN THE
INCUMBENT WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR GOVERNMENTAL
ACTIONS. ALREADY, LUZHKOV EXERTS AN INFORMAL
LEADERSHIP ROLE IN THE FEDERATION COUNCIL, AND HE HAS
USED HIS POSITION AND A SERIES OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION
AGREEMENTS TO BUILD UP SUPPORT OUTSIDE MOSCOW.
. . . CHERNOMYRDIN
• C O N r i D C N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 033078
E.O. 1295802/02/06
TAGS: PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: POLITICAL IMPACT OF YELTSIN'S RECOVERY
6. 4G)-THE CO
NVENTIONAL WISDOM HAS BEEN THAT PRIME
MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN'S UNINSPIRING PUBLIC IMAGE, HIS
GREYNESS, PRECLUDES HIS WINNING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
IN THE NEAR TERM. TO HAVE ANY CHANCE OF SUCCESS, HIS
STRATEGY HAD TO BE LONG-TERM AND AIMED AT PERSUADING
FIRST THE ELITE AND THEN THE ELECTORATE THAT HIS
POSITION AS PRIME MINISTER MADE HIM YELTSIN'S LOGICAL
- AND CHOSEN - HEIR. INDEED, ONE CHERNOMYRDIN
CONSULTANT RECENTLY TOLD US THAT THE GOAL NOW IS TO
CREATE THE PERCEPTION THAT A DIARCHY - YELTSIN AND
CHERNOMYRDIN - IS RUNNING THE COUNTRY, IN WHICH
CHERNOMYRDIN WOULD PLAY THE GREATER PUBLIC ROLE GIVEN
YELTSIN'S FRAIL HEALTH. THAT GOAL, OUR SOURCE NOTED,
ENTAILS DIMINISHING THE PUBLIC ROLE OF PRESIDENTIAL
ADMINISTRATION HEAD CHUBAYS AND LUZHKOV.
7. ^G)- MOREOVER, EVEN BEFORE YELTSIN'S OPERATION,
CHERNOMYRDIN'S AIDES HAD EMBARKED ON AN EFFORT, WHICH
THEY EXPECTED WOULD REQUIRE AT LEAST A YEAR, TO
ENHANCE THEIR BOSS'S PUBLIC IMAGE. AN EARLY PRODUCT
WAS A MAWKISH FAMILY PORTRAIT AIRED ON NTV IN LATE
OCTOBER. IN ADDITION, CHERNOMYRDIN HAS RECENTLY
RAISED HIS PROFILE BY MAKING WELL-PUBLICIZED
APPEARANCES AND STATEMENTS AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF
EVENTS SUCH AS THE LABOR PROTEST NOVEMBER 5 AND THE
MILITIA-DAY CEMETERY BOMBING NOVEMBER 10. HIS
APPEARANCE IN LISBON THIS WEEK WILL OFFER HIM ANOTHER
CHANCE TO APPEAR PRESIDENTIAL BY DEALING WITH AN ISSUE
THAT IS FORMALLY YELTSIN'S, EUROPEAN SECURITY.
. . . YELTSIN
8. -ter FINALLY, YELTSIN'S STEADY RECOVERY HAS
RENEWED SPECULATION THAT HE WILL SEEK REELECTION IN
CLINTON imMtiL P O O O Y
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�OONriDENTIAL
THE YEAR 2000. THE CONSTITUTION LIMITS A PRESIDENT TO
TWO TERMS, BUT YELTSIN COULD TRY TO MAKE THE CASE TO
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT THAT HIS 1991 ELECTION TOOK
PLACE UNDER THE PREVIOUS CONSTITUTION AND THUS DOES
NOT FALL WITHIN THE LIMITATIONS OF THE CURRENT ONE.
EVEN IF, AS WE BELIEVE LIKELY, YELTSIN DECIDES NOT TO
TAKE THAT ROUTE, HE WILL BE LOATHE TO ANOINT AN HEIR
IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THAT WOULD UPSET THE BALANCE OF
POWER HE LIKES TO MAINTAIN AMONG HIS TOP LIEUTENANTS
TO MAXIMIZE HIS OWN ROOM FOR MANEUVER.
COMMUNISTS RETHINKING
9. -fer THROUGHOUT THE FALL, WHILE OTHER LEADERS WERE
POSITIONING THEMSELVES TO SUCCEED YELTSIN, COMMUNIST
LEADER ZYUGANOV WAS FOCUSED ON HOW TO MAXIMIZE HIS
INFLUENCE WITHOUT HAVING TO FACE ELECTIONS AND HOW TO
UNDERMINE THE GROWING POWER OF THE COMMUNISTS' BETE
NOIRE, CHUBAYS. THAT THINKING LED TO THE COMMUNISTS'
TACIT TACTICAL ALLIANCE WITH CHERNOMYRDIN, WHO THEY
BELIEVED WAS BEST POSITIONED TO CONTAIN CHUBAYS WHILE
YELTSIN WAS GRAVELY ILL. (THE COMMUNISTS ALSO
BELIEVED THAT CHERNOMYRDIN MAY HAVE BEEN WILLING TO
FORESTALL ELECTIONS IN THE EVENT YELTSIN BECAME UNABLE
TO CONTINUE IN OFFICE.) WITH YELTSIN'S RECOVERY, THE
COMMUNISTS ARE BEGINNING TO DISTANCE THEMSELVES FROM
CHERNOMYRDIN, WHILE CONTINUING THEIR SHARP ATTACKS ON
CHUBAYS. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN MONTHS, COMMUNIST
LEADERS RECENTLY CRITICIZED CHERNOMYRDIN OVER HIS
OFFICIAL ENDORSEMENT OF THE CHECHNYA PEACE AGREEMENT;
SOME COMMUNISTS EVEN SUGGESTED A NO-CONFIDENCE VOTE IN
THE DUMA. BY THE TIME OF THE NOVEMBER 29
EXTRAORDINARY SESSION ON CHECHNYA, HOWEVER, THE
COMMUNISTS RETURNED TO THEIR TACTIC OF ATTACKING
CHUBAYS AND IMPLICITLY SUPPORTING CHERNOMYRDIN. THUS
ZYUGANOV REITERATED HIS WARNING THAT TWO GOVERNMENTS
HAD ARISEN IN RUSSIA, AND DECLARED THAT "THE ONE LED
BY CHUBAYS IN THE KREMLIN SHOULD RESIGN." AT THE SAME
TIME, ZYUGANOV HAS STEPPED UP EFFORTS TO TIGHTEN
CONTROL OVER THE OPPOSITION COALITION "PEOPLE'S
PATRIOTIC UNION OF RUSSIA," PRESUMABLY CALCULATING
THAT, WITH VERY LITTLE LIKELIHOOD OF NEAR-TERM
ELECTIONS, PARTY DISCIPLINE BECOMES MORE IMPORTANT
THAN BREADTH.
CHUBAYS DRAWS FIRE
C O N r i D C N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 033078
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/06
TAGS: PGOV, RS
CLINTON i m M L P O O O Y
HTCP
�• CONriDCNTIAL
SUBJECT: POLITICAL IMPACT OF YELTSIN'S RECOVERY
10. {eh- THE COMMUNISTS' GOAL IS PROBABLY TO WEAKEN
RATHER THAN DESTROY CHUBAYS: A DIMINISHED YET STILL
PRESENT CHUBAYS WOULD CONTINUE TO SERVE AS
A USEFUL
TARGET BUT WOULD BE LESS ABLE TO THWART COMMUNIST
OBJECTIVES. OTHER ANTI-CHUBAYS FORCES HAVE ALSO
STEPPED UP THEIR ATTACKS ON CHUBAYS SINCE YELTSIN'S
OPERATION. THE BIGGEST BLOW SO FAR WAS THE
PUBLICATION, ON THE DAY YELTSIN HAD PLANNED TO MAKE
HIS FIRST PUBLIC SPEECH SINCE THE OPERATION, OF AN
ALLEGED TRANSCRIPT OF CHUBAYS DISCUSSING ILLEGAL
CAMPAIGN FINANCING WITH OTHER AIDES. SUBSEQUENT
ATTACKS INCLUDE A COMMUNIST-LED DUMA INVESTIGATION
INTO THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE ALLEGATIONS (ACCOMPANIED BY
DEMANDS THAT YELTSIN SUSPEND CHUBAYS DURING THE
INVESTIGATION). MEANWHILE, CHUBAYS ALLY AND SECURITY
COUNCIL DEPUTY SECRETARY BEREZOVSKIY REMAINS UNDER
FIERCE ATTACK OVER HIS EARLIER DUAL RUSSIAN-ISRAELI
CITIZENSHIP AND REPORTS THAT HE HOLDS A U.S. GREEN
CARD. FORMER PRESIDENTIAL BODYGUARD KORZHAKOV,
CHUBAYS' ARCH-ENEMY, HAS PROMISED THE RELEASE OF
FURTHER "KOMPROMAT," WHILE AT LEAST ONE EDITOR,
"MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS'" GUSEV, CLAIMS TO BE PREPARED
TO PUBLISH ADDITIONAL MATERIAL IN HIS POSSESSIN.
YELTSIN DISPOSES
11. - m - AS HAS BEEN TRUE THROUGHOUT HIS PRESIDENCY,
YELTSIN WILL MAKE THE FINAL DECISIONS ON THE FATE OF
KEY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. THOSE HE MAKES IN THE NEAR
FUTURE WILL HAVE FAR-REACHING CONSEQUENCES NOT ONLY
FOR THE CURRENT BALANCE OF FORCES AROUND HIM BUT ALSO
FOR THE SUCCESSION STRUGGLE OVER THE LONGER TERM. THE
MOUNTING KOMPROMAT AGAINST CHUBAYS AND HIS ALLIES
ALMOST ENSURES THAT YELTSIN WILL HAVE TO ADDRESS
CADRES ISSUES IN HIS FIRST POST-OPERATION PUBLIC
STATEMENT, WHICH SHOULD OCCUR N THE NEAR FUTURE (EVEN
THOUGH HIS PRESS SERVICE HAS NOT ANNOUNCED A DATE).
IN ANY EVENT, THE MOSCOW POLITICAL ELITE WILL
SCRUTINIZE WHATEVER HE DOES SAY FOR CLUES TO THE FATE
OF CHUBAYS AND OTHER HIGH-RANKING GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS, AS WELL AS TO HOW ACTIVE A ROLE YELTSIN
PLANS TO PLAY IN GOVERNING RUSSIA.
TEFFT
< SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 03
<"SSN>3078
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<"SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03
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CLINTON i m m , P O O O Y
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<"SSN>3078
<"TOR>961202081137 M2519469
<"SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03
<"SSN>3078
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FROM:
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CLINTON imm. DU
CP
OY
�••CONriDDJTIAtr
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: EGGERT, FORT, PASCUAL, PIFER, RUMER, NSC
PREC: PRIORITY
CLASS: OONIIULNI IAL
DTG:1 91 735Z DEC 96
FM: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9461
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 7081
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 6898
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 7036
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
G 0 N f" I D C N T I *rt-SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 034765
E.O. 12958: 12/19/01
TAGS: PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: THINKING ABOUT KOMPROMAT: TEN QUESTIONS AND
THESES
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY TOM GRAHAM, ACTING POLITICAL
COUNSELOR. REASON 1.5 (B).
INTRODUCTION
2. (SBU) IN THE COURSE OF PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S LONG
PUBLIC ABSENCE, THE RUSSIAN PUBLIC HAS BEEN TREATED TO
A STEADY STREAM OF "KOMPROMAT" (COMPROMISING MATERIAL)
AS TOP KREMLIN LEADERS HAVE JOCKEYED FOR INFLUENCE IN A
SECOND YELTSIN ADMINISTRATION AND POSITIONED THEMSELVES
FOR EVENTUAL SUCCESSION. INDEED, THE WIELDING OF
KOMPROMAT HAS BECOME AN INTEGRAL ELEMENT OF THE
STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN RUSSIA, BUT ITS ROLE IS NOT FULLY
UNDERSTOOD. BELOW WE OFFER SOME THOUGHTS ON WHAT
KOMPROMAT CAN TEACH US ABOUT THE RUSSIAN POLITICAL
SYSTEM. END INTRODUCTION.
TEN QUESTIONS AND THESES
3. (SBU) WHAT IS KOMPROMAT?
--
IN THE NARROWEST SENSE, KOMPROMAT IS COMPROMISING
CLINTON m m t P O O O Y
HTCP
PER
�CONriDCNTIAL.
MATERIALS -- USUALLY ON ABUSE OF OFFICE, CRIMINAL
ACTIVITIES, OR PERSONAL DISLOYALTY -- GATHERED
SPECIFICALLY FOR POSSIBLE USE IN PUBLIC OR PRIVATE
AGAINST RIVALS IN POWER STRUGGLES. IN A BROADER SENSE,
KOMPROMAT IS INFORMATION THAT MAKES ITS WAY INTO THE
PUBLIC SPHERE AND SHEDS LIGHT ON THE INNER WORKINGS OF
RUSSIA'S POLITICAL ELITES, WHO WOULD PREFER TO KEEP
THIS INFORMATION OUT OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE.
4. (SBU) WHY GO PUBLIC WITH KOMPROMAT?
-- LEAKING KOMPROMAT TO THE MEDIA SERVES AS AN
ALTERNATIVE CHANNEL TO THE HIGHEST DECISION-MAKING
LEVEL, ESPECIALLY FOR THOSE WHO HAVE LOST POWER AND,
CONSEQUENTLY, ACCESS. FOR THOSE WHO HAVE ACCESS,
KOMPROMAT RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC AUGMENTS EXISTING
CHANNELS AND ADDS PRESSURE TO TAKE ACTION.
5. (SBU) WHAT DOES KOMPROMAT DO?
-- UNLIKE LEAKS IN THE WEST, WHICH GENERALLY ARE
INTENDED TO SQUELCH A PARTICULAR POLICY CHOICE,
KOMPROMAT TARGETS INDIVIDUALS. AS SUCH, IT PROVIDES
INSIGHT INTO THE ETERNAL RUSSIAN QUESTION KTO KOGO (WHO
IS DOING WHAT TO WHOM?) AND IS A REFLECTION OF A
CENTRAL TRUTH: POWER (WHO DECIDES) IS MORE IMPORTANT TO
THE POLITICAL EQUATION IN RUSSIA THAN POLICY (WHAT IS
DECIDED).
- ONE WAY THAT KOMPROMAT WEAKENS RIVALS IS BY
DISTRACTING THEM FROM OTHER SERIOUS BUSINESS AND MORE
SUBTLE THREATS TO THEIR POLITICAL POSITIONS. ONCE
RIVALS ARE FORCED TO DEFEND THEMSELVES IN PUBLIC OR
PRIVATE, ENGAGE IN DAMAGE CONTROL, AND ATTEMPT TO
PREVENT FUTURE FLOWS OF KOMPROMAT, OTHER POLITICAL
FIGURES FIND THEMSELVES WITH INCREASED ROOM FOR
MANEUVER. FOR THIS REASON, PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN
AND MOSCOW MAYOR LUZHKOV ARE INDIRECT BENEFICIARIES OF
THE CHUBAYS-KORZHAKOV KOMPROMAT WAR, ACCORDING TO
"MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS" CHIEF EDITOR GUSEV.
- IN ADDITION, THE RELEASE OF KOMPROMAT WEAKENS
RIVALS BY SIGNALING WHO MIGHT BE UP OR DOWN IN THE NEAR
FUTURE, CAUSING MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL CLASS TO
RECONSIDER THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE VICTIMS OF
KOMPROMAT.
6. -m-\NHO IS THE INTENDED AUDIENCE?
-- WHEN KOMPROMAT IS RELEASED THROUGH LEAKS TO THE
MEDIA, THE COMMON ASSUMPTION IS THAT IT IS INTENDED FOR
THE BROAD PUBLIC AUDIENCE. THE CHOICE OF MEDIA
VEHICLES MAY SAY SOMETHING ABOUT THE INTENDED AUDIENCE
OR MAY SIMPLY INDICATE THE DEGREE OF ACCESS BETWEEN A
CLINTON L l f i M L P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONriDCNTIAL
POLITICAL PLAYER AND A MEDIA OUTLET. DID KORZHAKOV,
FOR EXAMPLE, CHOOSE TO GIVE HIS FIRST PUBLIC INTERVIEW
AFTER HIS SACKING TO "ARGUMENTY I FAKTY" BECAUSE THAT
WEEKLY HAS BY FAR THE HIGHEST CIRCULATION IN RUSSIA OR
BECAUSE THE SECURITY SERVICES HAVE TRADITIONALLY HAD
GOOD ACCESS TO THAT PAPER?
- THE REAL AUDIENCE IS PROBABLY VERY NARROW.
ACCORDING TO GLEB PAVLOVSKIY, DIRECTOR OF THE EFFECTIVE
e t l I J h I L) b N I I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 034765
V
E.O. 12958: 12/19/01
TAGS: PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: THINKING ABOUT KOMPROMAT: TEN QUESTIONS AND
THESES
POLICY FOUNDATION, KOMPROMAT GENERALLY RESONATES ONLY
AMONG THE POLITICALLY ACTIVE C
LASS IN MOSCOW AND A FEW
OTHER KEY CITIES, SUCH AS ST. PETERSBURG AND
YEKATERINBURG.
-- IN MOST CASES INVOLVING SENIOR GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS, THE KEY AUDIENCE IS PRESIDENT YELTSIN. WHEN
NTV AND ORT WENT ON THE AIR IN THE EARLY HOURS OF JUNE
20 TO RAISE THE ALARM OVER THE ARRESTS OF YELTSIN
CAMPAIGN STAFFERS YEVSTAFYEV AND LISOVSKIY, THEIR AIM
WAS TO INFLUENCE YELTSIN. ACCORDING TO ONE EDITOR
FAMILIAR WITH THAT NIGHT'S EVENTS, CHUBAYS NEEDED TO
DEMONSTRATE TO YELTSIN THAT TELEVISION HAD THE STORY TO
INCREASE PRESSURE ON HIM TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST
KORZHAKOV, SOSKOVETS, AND BARSUKOV. SIMILARLY, FORMER
YELTSIN PRESS SECRETARY SERGEY MEDVEDEV CONTENDED IN A
RECENT MEETING WITH A/POLCOUNS THAT CHUBAYS NEEDED TO
GET HIS VERSION OF EVENTS OUT IN PUBLIC TO REACH
YELTSIN -- PROBABLY THROUGH HIS DAUGHTER -- BEFORE
KORZHAKOV AND BARSUKOV COULD TELL THEIR VERSION TO
YELTSIN FIRST THING IN THE MORNING IN HIS OFFICE.
7. (SBU) WHAT EFFECT DOES KOMPROMAT HAVE ON THE PUBLIC?
-- RESIGNATION RATHER THAN PUBLIC MORAL OUTRAGE IS
THE GENERAL RESPONSE, WIDENING THE GAP BETWEEN "VLAST"
(POWER AND AUTHORITIES) AND "NAROD" (THE PEOPLE).
NUMEROUS CONTACTS HAVE ARGUED THAT KOMPROMAT TENDS TO
DISCREDIT "VLAST" AS SUCH MUCH MORE THAN ANY SINGLE
INDIVIDUAL.
-- IN ONE TELLING GAUGE OF THE PUBLIC'S CASUAL
ACCEPTANCE OF OFFICIAL MALFEASANCE REPORTED BY
"ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI" (NOVEMBER 22), A JOURNALIST
OBSERVED: "CORRUPTION HAS ALWAYS BEEN A CHARACTERISTIC
FEATURE OF RUSSIA. THE PRESENT TIME IS NO EXCEPTION.
CLINTON i m m L P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONriDCNTIAb.
EVEN IF ONLY ONE ONE-HUNDREDTH OF WHAT YOU READ IN THE
PRESS IS THE TRUTH, IT'S ENOUGH TO BE CONVINCED THAT WE
LIVE IN A TOTALLY CORRUPT STATE."
-- FOLLOWING THE PUBLICATION OF AN ALLEGED TRANSCRIPT
OF A CONVERSATION AMONG CHUBAYS, ILYUSHIN, AND AN
INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFIED AS SERGEY KRASAVCHENKO DISCUSSING
CAMPAIGN FINANCING ILLEGALITIES, "MOSKOVSKIY
KOMSOMOLETS" COMMISSIONED A POLL OF 1600 MUSCOVITES -WHO TEND TO BE MORE POLITICALLY ENGAGED THAN MOST
RUSSIANS - TO GAUGE PUBLIC REACTION. A FULL 40
PERCENT HAD NO OPINION ABOUT WHAT WHAT MEASURES SHOULD
BE TAKEN AGAINST THE THREE OFFICIALS, AND ONLY 30
PERCENT THOUGHT THE TRANSCRIPT HAD ANY FACTUAL BASIS.
8. (SBU) WHEN DOES KOMPROMAT LEAD TO SOMEONE'S
DISMISSAL?
-- PUBLIC OPINION IS FAR FROM THE MOST IMPORTANT
MEASURE OF POLITICAL LIABILITY. THE PUBLIC RELEASE OF
KOMPROMAT IS NOT ENOUGH TO LEAD AUTOMATICALLY TO A
LEGAL HEARING THAT EITHER EXONERATES THE INDIVIDUAL OR
LEADS TO HIS DISMISSAL AND PUNISHMENT. IN AN INTERVIEW
TO "KOMMERSANT" (NO. 45), FOR EXAMPLE, FORMER STATE
SECRETARY BURBULIS (A MAJOR POLITICAL LIABILITY IN HIS
TIME) OBSERVED THAT ONLY IF "THE MOOD OF THE MASSES"
COINCIDES WITH THE VIEWS OF THE REGIONAL, BUSINESS, AND
INTELLECTUAL ELITES DOES THE COMBINED PRESSURE BECOME
"HARDER" FOR THE PRESIDENT TO IGNORE -- BUT NOT
IMPOSSIBLE. MINISTER OF DEFENSE GRACHEV SURVIVED FOR
MORE THAN A YEAR IN YELTSIN'S INNER CIRCLE DESPITE
CONSIDERABLE AMOUNTS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE KORMPROMAT
AGAINST HIM. YELTSIN DISMISSED HIM ONLY WHEN THE
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS MADE IT POLITICALLY EXPEDIENT.
-- TIMING IS CRITICAL TO THE SUCCESSFUL WIELDING OF
KOMPROMAT. GATHERING EVIDENCE OF OFFICIAL WRONG-DOING
AND ROUTINELY PUTTING IT INTO A FILE FOR PRESIDENT
YELTSIN, AS MEDVEDEV RECOUNTED, IS NOT ENOUGH. IF,
HOWEVER, YELTSIN IS ALREADY IRRITATED AT A LEBED OR A
KORZHAKOV FOR OTHER REASONS, BRINGING THE DOSSIER OF
KOMPROMAT TO HIS ATTENTION -- ESPECIALLY THROUGH THE
ADDED PRESSURE OF THE MEDIA -- STRENGTHENS THE
LIKELIHOOD OF DISMISSAL AND CREATES THE APPEARANCE OF A
CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KOMPROMAT AND DISMISSAL.
9. -teH/VHAT ARE THE MOST SERIOUS KINDS OF KOMPROMAT?
-- IN RUSSIA'S POLITICAL SYSTEM, WHERE PERSONAL TIES
ARE MORE IMPORTANT THAN FORMAL INSTITUTIONS, KOMPROMAT
THAT REVEALS A BETRAYAL OF PERSONAL LOYALTY DOES MORE
DAMAGE THAN KOMPROMAT THAT ALLEGES CRIMINAL ACTIVITY.
IN AN ANALYSIS OF SIX INFRACTIONS THAT CO
C 0 N I I U L N I I /CL' SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 034765
CLINTON LIM&LPHOTOCOPY
�CONriDHNTIAL.
E.O. 12958: 12/19/01
TAGS: PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: THINKING ABOUT KOMPROMAT: TEN QUESTIONS AND
THESES
ULD LEAD TO AN
OFFICIAL'S DISMISSAL, "KOMMERSANT" RATED BETRAYAL OF
LOYALTY AS BY FAR THE MOST EGREGIOUS. YELTSIN'S
PERCEPTION THAT KORZHAKOV BETRAYED AN INTIMATE FAMILY
SECRET WAS, ACCORDING TO "ITOGI" ANCHORMAN YEVGENIY
KISELEV, A MAJOR REASON THAT YELTSIN SEVERED ALL TIES
TO KORZHAKOV AND TURNED AGAINST LEBED, WHO WAS PUBLICLY
FLAUNTING HIS TIES TO KORZHAKOV AT THE TIME (SEE
SEPTEL).
10.4€hHOW DOES KOMPROMAT AFFECT POLITICAL DECISIONMAKING?
-- BEFORE IT BECOMES PUBLIC, KOMPROMAT IS USED AS
BLACKMAIL TO INFLUENCE POLICY DECISIONS. THE THREAT
THAT POLITICAL RIVALS WILL LEAK DAMAGING INFORMATION OR
PASS IT ON TO YELTSIN (OR ANOTHER KEY INDIVIDUAL)
INCREASES THE RISK OF PUSHING A POLICY INITIATIVE THAT
WOULD DAMAGE RIVAL INTERESTS.
- ACCORDING TO A SOCIOLOGIST WHO HAS CLOSELY STUDIED
POLITICAL ELITES IN TYUMEN OBLAST, FOR EXAMPLE,
GOVERNOR ROKETSKIY IS SO TERRIFIED OF REVELATIONS OF
PERSONAL CORRUPTION THAT HE HAS BECOME A VIRTUAL
HOSTAGE TO THE DEMANDS OF LOCAL OPPOSITION LEADER
ATROSHENKO, WHO HIMSELF HAS MADE A QUESTIONABLE CAREER
IN THE SHADY AREAS OF SPORTS, BANKING, AND POLITICS.
11. - t e n s ANYONE IMMUNE TO KOMPROMAT?
-- PRESIDENT YELTSIN, OR WHOEVER SUCCEEDS HIM AS THE
SYSTEM'S RECOGNIZED, LEGITIMATE LEADER. IN HIS ROLE AS
ARBITER, YELTSIN IS ESSENTIAL TO RUSSIA'S OLIGARCHIC
SYSTEM OF COMPETING GROUP INTERESTS. IT WOULD RUN
COUNTER TO ANY OF THE BENEFICIARIES OF THE CURRENT
SYSTEM TO USE KOMPROMAT TO WEAKEN THE ONE FORCE THAT
ACTS AS THE GUARANTOR OF THE SYSTEM'S BALANCE.
MOREOVER, THE GOAL IS TO USE KOMPROMAT TO STRENGTHEN
ONE'S POSITION AGAINST RIVALS AND MOVE INTO THE CENTER
OF POWER - YELTSIN'S INNER CIRCLE -- NOT TO DESTROY
THE SYSTEM OF POWER ITSELF.
-- MORE BROADLY, HOWEVER, TO THE EXTENT THAT YELTSIN
SYMBOLIZES THE REGIME'S LEGITIMACY AND THE PUBLIC
RELEASE OF KOMPROMAT UNDERMINES THE REGIME, YELTSIN,
TOO, IS WOUNDED POLITICALLY BY THE RECURRING KOMPROMAT
WARS EVEN THOUGH HE IS NOT THE INTENDED TARGET.
CLINTON
�GONriDCNTIMf
12. ^Gf WHY DID THE GORBACHEV ERA PRODUCE GLASNOST AND
THE YELTSIN ERA KOMPROMAT?
-- GLASNOST WAS, IN EFFECT, WHOLESALE KOMPROMAT
AGAINST THE ENTIRE REGIME USED BY THE TOP LEADER AS A
WEAPON IN ADVANCING HIS EFFORT TO RADICALLY REFORM THE
REGIME. TODAY, YELTSIN HAS NO INTEREST IN
FUNDAMENTALLY QUESTIONING HOW THE REGIME FUNCTIONS.
INDIVIDUALS WITHIN THE REGIME, HOWEVER, HAVE AN INTENSE
INTEREST IN ENHANCING THEIR POSITION AND RESORT TO
KOMPROMAT AS PART OF THEIR STRUGGLE FOR POWER.
NEVERTHELESS, ONE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCE OF EVEN THIS
KIND OF KOMPROMAT IS DAMAGE TO THE LEGITIMACY OF THE
REGIME ITSELF. TEFFT
<"SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 03
<"SSN>4765
<"TOR>961219124755 M2547080
<"SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03
< SSN>4765
<"TOR>961219124906 M2547082
<"SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03
<''SSN>4765
<"TOR>961219124921 M2547084
A
FROM:
SITREPRT
CLINTON L
CP
OY
�CONriDCNTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: KYLE, LEE, PASCUAL, RUMER, TARULLO, WALSH, NSC
PREC: ROUTINE
CLASS:-OONriPCNTIAL
DTG:111 720Z DEC 96
FM: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9095
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHDIFCC/FCC WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPTTREAS WASHDC
• C O N r i D C N T I A L MOSCOW 034220
STATE PLEASE PASS OPIC
DEPT FOR E: DMILLER; EUR/RUS: MEARLE, JGESHWILER;
OES/STH: RBRAIBANTI; EB/CIP:REARNEST
USDOC FOR NTIA/DSTEINOUR
USDOC FOR 3313/USFCS/OIO/NIS
USDOC FOR 4231/IEP/EUR/OEERIS/JBROUGHER
USDOC FOR 6320/ITA/TDTAI/RPADDOCK
TREASURY FOR IEE
FCC FOR IB:KCOLLINS
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS USTR FOR EISS
OPIC FOR HURLEY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/01
TAGS: PGOV, RS, ECPS, EINV, ECON, CTRD
SUBJECT: MEDIA BARON GUSINSKIY ON SVYAZINVEST DEAL
REF: MOSCOW 33363 AND PREVIOUS
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY JOHN TEFFT, CHARGE. REASON:
1.5 (D)
SUMMARY
2. -<GM)VER LUNCH DECEMBER 5, MOST FINANCIAL GROUP
PRESIDENT GUSINSKIY ASSURED THE CHARGE THAT THE TENDER
FOR SHARES IN SVYAZINVEST (RUSSIA'S TELECOMMUNICATION
GIANT) WOULD BE TRANSPARENT AND THAT WESTERN FIRMS
WOULD BE ABLE TO PARTICIPATE ON THE SAME TERMS AS
RUSSIAN INVESTORS. HE EXPECTED THE SALE OF TWENTYFIVE PERCENT OF SVYAZINVEST'S SHARES TO YIELD USD 10-
CLINTON i m m t P O O O Y
HTCP
P E R E.O. 13526
�CONriDCNTIAL
12 BILLION FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERAL BUDGET, NOTING THAT
THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD UNDERTAKE TO INVEST
FIFTEEN PERCENT OF THE PROCEEDS IN RUSSIA'S
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR (I.E., SVYAZINVEST). GIVEN
GUSINSKIY'S OWN INTEREST IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS, WE
WOULD BE SURPRISED IF HE DID NOT FIND A WAY TO GAIN
CONTROL OF A LARGE SHARE OF THE SVYAZINVEST TENDER,
DESPITE HIS LAMENT THAT "MOST" SIMPLY DID NOT HAVE THE
SUMS NEEDED TO DO THAT. END SUMMARY
3. -^-GUSINSKIY BEGAN BY SAYING HE SUPPORTED THE
PLAN TO MERGE ROSTELEKOM (WHICH CONTROLS INTERNATIONAL
LINES) AND SVYAZINVEST (A HOLDING COMPANY FOR THE
STATE'S CONTROLLING SHARES IN LOCAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMPANY), ARGUING HAVING A SINGLE ENTITY CONTROLLING
BOTH INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS
SYSTEMS WAS WIDESPREAD THROUGHOUT THE DEVELOPED WORLD.
THE UNITED STATES, HE NOTED, HAD HAD SUCH A SYSTEM
UNTIL VERY RECENTLY. THE RUSSIAN SYSTEM HAD BEEN
BROKEN UP WITH THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE SOVIET UNION,
GUSINSKIY CONTINUED; IT MADE SENSE NOW TO MERGE THE
VARIOUS PIECES TO BUILD UP RUSSIA'S TELECOMMUNICATIONS
SYSTEM. HE ALLOWED THAT IN THE FUTURE IT MIGHT MAKE
SENSE TO BREAK IT UP ONCE AGAIN TO ENCOURAGE
COMPETITION AS HAD BEEN DONE IN THE UNITED STATES.
4. -ter TURNING TO PLANS TO PRIVATIZE RUSSIAN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS, GUSINSKIY NOTED THAT THERE
WAS LITTLE OPPOSITION TO SELLING SHARES IN ROSTELEKOM
TO WESTERN INVESTORS BECAUSE THE COMMUNICATIONS LINES
WERE INTERNATIONAL (NOTE: ROSTELEKOM HAS BEEN
PREPARING AN ADR ISSUE IN NEW YORK FOR SOME TIME. SEE
MOSCOW 31723. ENDNOTE.) SVYAZINVEST WAS ANOTHER
MATTER, HOWEVER, BECAUSE THE MILITARY AND SECURITY
SERVICES DEPENDED ON ITS NETWORK FOR MOST OF THEIR OWN
COMMUNICATIONS. MINISTER OF COMMUNICATIONS BULGAK WAS
FRONTING FOR THESE SERVICES WHEN HE HELPED BLOCK THE
SALE OF SHARES IN SVYAZINVEST TO THE ITALIAN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS FIRM STET LAST DECEMBER, GUSINSKIY
SAID. THAT STET WAS A NATIONALIZED FIRM ONLY
HEIGHTENED THE SUSPICIONS OF THE MILITARY AND SECURITY
SERVICES THAT A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT WAS SEEKING TO GAIN
ACCESS TO THEIR COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS. (SEE MOSCOW
31724.)
5. ACT A FEW MONTHS AGO, GUSINSKIY CONTINUED, STATE
PROPERTY COMMITTEE (GKI) CHAIRMAN KOKH ASKED GUSINSKIY
(AS PRESIDENT OF THE MOST FINANCIAL GROUP) AND ALFA
BANK TO ORGANIZE THE TENDER OF SVYAZINVEST (BEFORE THE
SHARE TRANSFER WITH ROSTELEKOM). (NOTE: GKI CONTROLS
THE GOVERNMENT SHARE IN BOTH COMPANIES. END NOTE.)
KOKH HAD BECOME DISENCHANTED WITH ROTHSCHILD
INVESTMENT BANK, WHICH HAD BEEN ORGANIZING THE TENDER.
"ROTHSCHILD HAD PRODUCED NOTHING IN A YEAR AND A
HALF," GUSINSKIY EXPLAINED. "AND NOW ALL THEY WERE
CLIN
�CONriDCNTlAt*
PREPARED TO DO WAS LOAN USD 250 MILLION ON THE
CONDITION THAT THEY RECEIVED A RUS
SIAN GOVERNMENT
GUARANTEE."
6.
BEFORE ACCEPTING KOKH'S OFFER, HOWEVER,
GUSINSKIY HAD CONSULTED WITH VARIOUS GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS, INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MILITARY
AND SECURITY SERVICES, TO SATISFY HIMSELF THAT HE
COULD OVERCOME OPPOSITION TO THE SALE OF SVYAZINVEST
SHARES TO WESTERN INVESTORS. HE PERSUADED THE
MILITARY AND SECURITY SERVICES BY ARGUING THAT NO
WESTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS FIRMS WOULD PURCHASE SHARES
AND THAT THE WESTERN INVESTORS WOULD NOT BE INVOLVED
IN SVYAZINVEST'S OPERATIONS.
7. - m - ACCORDING TO GUSINSKIY, THE TENDER WOULD BE
FOR TWENTY-FIVE PERCENT OF THE SHARES IN SVYAZINVEST.
WESTERN AUDITORS HAD ESTIMATED THAT THE PACKAGE COULD
SELL FOR AS MUCH AS USD 10-12 BILLION -- BY FAR, THE
HIGHEST ESTIMATES WE HAVE SEEN. THE MOST GROUP, OF
COURSE, WOULD BE INTERESTED IN BUYING SOME OF THE
SHARES, GUSINSKIY ADMITTED, BUT IT AND ALFA BANK
SIMPLY DID NOT HAVE THE MONEY TO BUY THE ENTIRE
PACKAGE. THUS, HE ARGUED, THIS TENDER WOULD NOT BE A
REPEAT OF THE WIDELY AND SHARPLY CRITICIZED "LOANSFOR-SHARES" DEALS OF LAST FALL (UNDER WHICH THE
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION THAT ARRANGED A TENDER WOUND UP
ACQUIRING A COMPANY'S SHARES AT CUT-RATE PRICES.) THE
TRANSACTION WOULD BE TRANSPARENT AND WESTERN FIRMS
WOULD BE ABLE TO PARTICIPATE ON THE SAME TERMS AS
RUSSIAN INVESTORS. GUSINSKIY STRESSED THAT SEVERAL
WESTERN FIRMS WERE ALREADY PREPARED TO BUY SHARES.
THE PROCEEDS WOULD GO TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERAL BUDGET,
WHILE THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD UNDERTAKE TO INVEST
FIFTEEN PERCENT OF THE PROCEEDS IN THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR (THAT IS, SVYAZINVEST).
COMMENT
8. - m - GUSINSKIY HAS A GROWING INTEREST IN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS. HE TOLD CHARGE OF HIS PLANS TO
MOVE OUT OF BANKING AND OTHER SECTORS IN ORDER TO
CONCENTRATE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND HIS BLOSSOMING
MEDIA EMPIRE. HE IS LOOKING AT BOTH RUSSIA AND
FARTHER AFIELD, INCLUDING EUROPE AND ISRAEL. GIVEN
THIS STRATEGIC DIRECTION, WE WOULD BE SURPRISED IF
GUSINSKIY DID NOT FIND A WAY TO GAIN CONTROL OF A
MAJOR SHARE OF THE SVYAZINVEST TENDER, DESPITE HIS
LAMENT THAT "MOST" SIMPLY DID NOT HAVE THE SUMS NEEDED
TO DO THAT.
LINTON i m m , P O O O Y
HTCP
�-coNriDcrnw
9. -ferGUSINSKY'S ESTIMATE OF USD 10-12 BILLION IS
FAR ABOVE THE USD 1.4 BILLION OF LAST YEAR'S TENDER,
NOT TO SPEAK OF THE USD 2-4 BILLION GENERALLY CITED BY
EMBASSY CONTACTS IN THE SECTOR. IT WAS NOT CLEAR
WHERE THE "WESTERN AUDITORS" EXPECTED THE MONEY TO
COME FROM. TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEMAND IN RUSSIA HAS
GROWN EXPONENTIALLY AND THE VALUE OF SHARES IN SOME OF
THE LOCAL COMPANIES HAS QUADRUPLED IN THE LAST FEW
MONTHS; GUSINSKY MAY BE COUNTING ON CONTINUING MARKET
INTEREST IN TELECOMS AND RUSSIAN STOCKS TO BOOST
INTEREST. RUSSIAN INVESTORS WITH LARGE STOCKS OF
CAPITAL OVERSEAS MAY WELL BE GUSINSKY'S TARGET.
WESTERN INVESTORS MIGHT WELL BE WARY OF A PLAN THAT
RETURNS ONLY FIFTEEN PERCENT INTO THE SECTOR.
PRESUMABLY THE REST WILL GO TOWARD LESSENING RUSSIA'S
YAWNING BUDGET DEFICIT.
10. 4efTHE AREA MANAGER FOR ONE OF RUSSIA'S LARGEST
TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT SUPPLIERS, WHO WOULD
STAND TO BENEFIT FROM A MONOPOLY, TOLD ESTOFF ON
DECEMBER 6 THAT THE QUESTION WAS STILL BEING FOUGHT
OVER. THE SECURITY FORCES MAY BE EXPLORING SETTING UP
AN ALTERNATIVE NATIONAL NETWORK OF THEIR OWN; THEY
HAVE REPORTEDLY APPROACHED AT LEAST ONE WESTERN
SUPPLIER ABOUT PROVIDING EQUIPMENT FOR PARTS OF SUCH A
SYSTEM.
11. ^ GUSINSKY'S PLAN TO EXCLUDE WESTERN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS FIRMS - PRESUMABLY SERVICE
PROVIDERS, WHO WOULD HAVE AN INTEREST IN MANAGEMENT
CONTROLS - FROM THE TENDER WILL COME AS BAD NEWS FOR
THE WESTERN TELECOMS PROVIDERS HERE, PARTICULARLY IF A
MONOPOLY THREATENS TO RESTRICT COMPETITIVE LICENSING.
WESTERN INVOLVEMENT PER SE IS NOT A REQUIREMENT FOR
RUSSIAN SUCCESS ON THE STOCK MARKETS -- WITNESS THE
RECENT SUCCESS OF GAZPROM AND THE PRIVATE CELLULAR
COMPANY VYMPELCOM, BUT IT COULD BE BAD NEWS FOR THE
RUSSIAN CONSUMER.
TEFFT
<"SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
<"SSN>4220
<"TOR > 961 214173309 M2539748
FROM:
SITREPRT
CLINTON LIB!
DM
.NTIAt-
O OY
CP
�CONriDCNTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: EGGERT, FORT, PASCUAL, PIFER, RUMER, NSC
PREC: ROUTINE
CLASS: CONriDCNTIAL
DTG:191334Z DEC 96
FM: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9411
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 7074
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 7029
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 6891
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
1
C 0 N r* I D C N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 034672
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/06
TAGS: PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: SUB-PLOTS AROUND LEBED'S FIRING
REF: MOSCOW 32154
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY TOM GRAHAM, ACTING POLITICAL
COUNSELOR. REASONS 1.5 (A) AND (D).
SUMMARY
2. -4G>-ALTH0UGH THE BASIC PLOTLINE OF LEBED'S RISE (IN
ORDER TO HELP ENSURE YELTSIN'S EELECTION) AND FALL
(BECAUSE HE THREATENED THE POWER STRUCTURE) IS WELL
KNOWN, DETAILS OF THE MACHINATIONS LEADING TO HIS
DISMISSAL OFFER INSIGHTS INTO HOW THE GAME IS PLAYED AT
THE UPPER REACHES OF RUSSIA'S POWER PYRAMID. THE ANTILEBED CAMPAIGN INCLUDED EFFORTS TO SOW PERSONAL ANIMOSITY
BETWEEN HIM AND YELTSIN AND TO TARNISH LEBED'S REPUTATION
IN THE EYES OF KEY ELITES AND OPINION-MAKERS IN MOSCOW;
MEANWHILE, CHERNOMYRDIN WORKED TO BURNISH HIS OWN IMAGE
AND SHORE UP HIS STATUS AS PRESUMPTIVE SUCCESSOR. THE
ANTI-LEBED CAMPAIGN UNDERSCORES THE PRESIDENT'S ROLE AS
RUSSIA'S ULTIMATE POLITICAL ARBITER; HIGHLIGHTS THE
GROWING USE OF THE MEDIA, ESPECIALLY NATIONAL TELEVISION,
AS A WEAPON IN POLITICAL CONTESTS; AND ILLUSTRATES THE
ROLE OF KOMPROMAT (COMPROMISING MATERIAL), GENUINE OR
FABRICATED, AS AN INSTRUMENT OF PERSUASION. (SEE SEPTEL
FOR MORE ON THE ROLE OF KOMPROMAT.) END SUMMARY.
PER E.0o 13526
CLINTON i m m , P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONriDCHTIAL
THE LEBED PROBLEM
3. (SBU) YELTSIN TOOK LEBED, AN OUTSPOKEN CRITIC AND
RIVAL, INTO HIS ADMINISTRATION IMMEDIATELY AFTEj THE
FIRST ROUND OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN AN ACT OF
PREMEDITATED EXPEDIENCY. VIRTUALLY NO ONE EXPECTED THE
"PARTNERSHIP" TO ENDURE FOR LONG. LEBED IMMEDIATELY CAST
HIMSELF AS THE NATURAL SUCCESSOR, THEREBY DIRECTLY
THREATENING CHERNOMYRDIN. LEBED'S UNCONCEALED THIRST FOR
POWER AND UNCOMPROMISING CRITICISM OF THE STATUS-QUO
QUICKLY BROUGHT HOME TO MOST OF THE REST OF THE MOSCOW
POWER STRUCTURE THAT HE CONSTITUTED A THREAT TO THEIR
INTERESTS AS WELL. THE ATTEMPT TO DISCREDIT LEBED BY
ENTANGLING HIM IN THE CHECHNYA MESS BACKFIRED BADLY, BUT
ONLY ACCELERATED THE MOVE TO OUST HIM.
4. (SBU) MEMBERS OF THE MOSCOW POLITICAL ELITE EACH HAD
THEIR OWN FEARS ABOUT LEBED. PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN
HAD LONG BEEN ANNOYED BY LEBED'S TALK ABOUT SUCCEEDING
YELTSIN AND HIS EFFORTS TO ENCROACH ON CHERNOMYRDIN'S
TURF IN ECONOMIC PLICY-MAKING. MINISTER OF INTERNAL
AFFAIRS KULIKOV WAS DISTURBED BY LEBED'S PEACEMAKING
INITIATIVE IN CHECHNYA, WHICH HE SAW AS A BETRAYAL OF
NATIONAL INTERESTS; KULIKOV WAS NO DOUBT EVEN MORE
DISCOMFITED BY LEBED'S CHARGE THAT HE WAS ONE OF THOSE
PRINCIPALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FIASCO. PRESIDENTIAL
ADMINISTRATION HEAD CHUBAYS WAS CONCERNED BY LEBED'S
RISING POPULARITY COUPLED WITH HIS REFUSAL TO BEHAVE AS A
TEAM PLAYER. MANY FEARED THAT LEBED WAS AN
"UNPREDICTABLE" (READ: UNWILLING TO ACCEPT BUSINESS AS
USUAL) POPULIST WHO COULD QUICKLY COME TO POWER SHOULD
YELTSIN'S DETERIORATING HEALTH FORCE HIM FROM OFFICE.
5. - ^ - T H E EFFORT TO REMOVE LEBED HINGED PRIMARILY ON
CONVINCING YELTSIN THAT HE HAD TO GO. AN IMPORTANT
SECONDARY CONSIDERATION WAS ASSURING THE POLITICAL ELITE
THAT LEBED WOULD BE LESS OF A PROBLEM OUT OF POWER THAN
IN. JUDGING BY OUR CONVERSATIONS WITH PEOPLE WHO PLAYED
A ROLE IN OUSTING LEBED, VARIOUS GROUPS LAUNCHED THEIR
OWN CAMPAIGNS FOR THEIR OWN REASONS. AS PRESIDENTIAL
COUNCIL MEMBER ALEKSEY SALMIN PUT IT, THE VARIOUS ANTILEBED FORCES WERE ACTING LIKE A MILITARY UNIT THAT HAD
BEEN SCATTERED ON THE BATTLEFIELD: EACH SEPARATE SUBUNIT
HAD A VAGUE NOTION OF THE BASIC OBJECTIVE AND THE
LOCATION OF THE FRONT, BUT WAS OPERATING ON ITS OWN. BY
MOST ACCOUNTS, ONLY AT THE VERY END DID CHUBAYS AND HIS
ALLIES COORDINATE WITH THE OTHER ELEMENTS TO DELIVER THE
FINAL BLOW TO LEBED.
6. (SBU) THE STRAINS CHUBAYS BROUGHT TOGETHER INCLUDED
EFFORTS TO TURN Y
ELTSIN AGAINST LEBED (BOTH POLITICALLY
CLINTON i m m , P O O O Y
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�GONriDCNTIAL
AND PERSONALLY),-TO UNDERMINE LEBED'S STANDING AMONG KEY
ELITES IN MOSCOW, AND TO BUILD AN ALTERNATIVE IMAGE OF
"VLAST" (GOVERNMENTAL POWER AND AUTHORITY) AROUND YELTSIN
AND CHERNOMYRDIN THAT DIMINISHED LEBED'S ROLE. THIS
EFFORT WAS FACILITATED BY LEBED'S OWN WEAKNESSES AND
MISSTEPS, INCLUDING HIS OVERWEENING AMBITION, HIS ILLADVISED PUBLIC ANTI-SEMITIC REMARKS AND COMMENTS ABOUT
YELTSIN'S HEALTH, AND HIS COOPERATION WITH FORMER
PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICES HEAD KORZHAKOV.
G 0 M T I D C N T I A C SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 034672
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/06
TAGS: PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: SUB-PLOTS AROUND LEBED'S FIRING
TURNING YELTSIN AGAINST LEBED
7. tehASSOCIATION WITH KORZHAKOV BURDENED LEBED WITH
THE HEAVY LOAD OF GRIEVANCES AGAINST KORZHAKOV.
ACCORDING TO "ITOGI" ANCHORMAN KISELEV, YELTSIN HAD COME
TO LOATHE HIS FORMER BODYGUARD IN THE BELIEF THAT HE WAS
THE SOURCE OF AN OCTOBER 3 "KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA" ARTICLE
ON TATYANA DYACHENKO'S FIRST HUSBAND THAT REVEALED THAT
THE FATHER OF YELTSIN'S GRANDSON WAS TATYANA'S FIRST
HUSBAND, AND NOT HER SECOND AS THE GRANDSON HAD BELIEVED
ALL HIS LIFE. KISELEV SAID THE ARTICLE HAD TRAUMATIZED
THE GRANDSON AT A TIME WHEN THE YELTSIN FAMILY WAS
ALREADY OVERBURDENED WITH CONCERN ABOUT NAINA'S RECENT
KIDNEY OPERATION AND YELTSIN'S UPCOMING HEART SURGERY.
AGAINST THIS BACKDROP OF WOUNDED FAMILY PRIDE, LEBED'S
ENDORSEMENT OF KORZHAKOV FOR HIS FORMER DUMA SEAT IN A
JOINT PUBLIC APPEARANCE WITH KORZHAKOV IN TULA OCTOBER 13
WAS THE FINAL EVENT THAT PERSUADED YELTSIN TO FIRE LEBED,
ACCORDING TO KISELEV.
8. 4GHN ANOTHER EFFORT TO SOW DISCORD BETWEEN YELTSIN
AND LEBED, LEBED WAS FED DISINFORMATION INDICATING THAT
YELTSIN WAS ON HIS DEATHBED. IN LATE AUGUST, SALMIN TOLD
POLOFF LEBED WAS MOVING AGGRESSIVELY TO MOUNT A
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ON THE BASIS OF
"(MISLEADING) INFORMATION ON YELTSIN'S HEALTH HE WAS
RECEIVING FROM THE WEST." IN A RECENT MEETING WITH
A/POLCOUNS, IGOR BUNIN, DIRECTOR OF THE CENTER FOR
POLITICAL TECHNOLOGIES AND CURRENTLY A CONSULTANT FOR
PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN, ADMITTED THAT THAT
INFORMATION WAS TO SOME EXTENT DISINFORMATION PREPARED BY
LEBED'S RIVALS AND SOURCED TO WESTERN INTELLIGENCE
SERVICES. THE ASSUMPTION WAS THAT LEBED WOULD GIVE
GREATER CREDENCE TO A WESTERN ASSESSMENT, ESPECIALLY IF
HE BELIEVED THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT HAD OBTAINED IT
CLANDESTINELY. THE DISINFORMATION WORKED: LEBED STEPPED
CLINTON I M M L P O O O Y
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�CONriDCNTIAL-
UP HIS CAMPAIGN, AND YELTSIN CITED THAT AS ONE REASON FOR
DISMISSING HIM.
TARNISHING LEBED'S REPUTATION
9. -teHN ADDITION, DURING THE FALL, LEBED'S RIVALS
SOUGHT TO UNDERMINE HIS POTENTIAL SUPPORT WITHIN THE
MOSCOW LIBERAL INTELLIGENTSIA, WHICH PLANS A CENTRAL ROLE
IN SHAPING ELITE AND PUBLIC OPINION. SEVERAL PIECES OF
DISINFORMATION WERE CIRCULATING IN MOSCOW (BOTH GLEB
PAVLOVSKIY, THE DIRECTOR OF THE EFFECTIVE POLICY
FOUNDATION, AND SERGEY KURGINYAN, WHO CLAIMS TO ADVISE
MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS KULIKOV, STRONGLY HINTED IN
CONVERSATIONS WITH POLOFF THAT KULIKOV WAS BEHIND THIS
EFFORT.) KISELEV MENTIONED TWO IN PARTICULAR:
-- A PURPORTED TRANSCRIPT OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN A
LEBED ADVISOR AND A FORMER HIGH-RANKING KGB OFFICIAL.
LEBED'S ADVISOR LAYS OUT LEBED'S STRATEGY FOR COMING TO
POWER, WHICH ESSENTIALLY CALLS FOR WORKING WITH CHUBAYS
TO OUST CHERNOMYRDIN, THEN ALLYING WITH MOSCOW MAYOR
LUZHKOV TO OUST CHUBAYS, AND FINALLY USING THE ANTICORRUPTION CAMPAIGN TD ELIMINATE LUZHKOV. ONCE LEBED HAD
COME TO POWER HE WOULD ESTABLISH AN AUTHORITARIAN REGIME,
DISBAND THE FEDERAL ASSEMBLY AND CLOSE DOWN THE PRESS.
(KISELEV THOUGHT THE TRANSCRIPT WAS FABRICATED OR HEAVILY
DOCTORED. IN PARTICULAR, HE FOUND IT "TOO LITERARY" TO
HAVE BEEN A NORMAL CONVERSATION.)
-- AN ALLEGED REPORT OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN LEBED AND
HIS ADVISORS AFTER HIS DUMA APPEARANCE OCTOBER 2 (DURING
WHICH HE WAS SHARPLY CRITICIZED FOR HIS CHECHEN PEACE
INITIATIVE). LEBED REPORTEDLY RANTED AB
OUT SHUTTING DOWN
THE PRESS AND DUMA AND "DEALING WITH THE JEWS." (NOTE:
IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER THIS IS SUPPOSED TO REFER TO HIS
OPPONENTS GUSINSKIY AND BEREZOVSKIY, OR TO JEWS IN
GENERAL.) (KISELEV THOUGHT THIS REPORT HAD THE RING OF
TRUTH, BUT WAS NOT CERTAIN THE TRANSCRIPT WAS GENUINE.)
10. <erAT THE SAME TIME, THE NATIONAL MEDIA, ESPECIALLY
RUSSIAN PUBLIC TELEVISION (ORT) AND INDEPENDENT
TELEVISION (NTV), MOUNTED AN ANTI-LEBED CAMPAIGN.
FINANCIERS BEREZOVSKIY AND GUSINSKIY, WHO HAVE MAJOR
INFLUENCE OVER ORT AND NTV RESPECTIVELY, WERE THE KEY
FIGURES BEHIND THIS CAMPAIGN, WHICH KISELEV AND RUSSIAN
STATE TELEVISION (RTR) DEPUTY DIRECTOR SVANIDZE TOLD
POLOFF HAD CHUBAYS' BLESSING. BEREZOVSKIY, MOREOVER,
HELPED ORCHESTRATE THE ANTI-KORZHAKOV (AND INDIRECTLY
ANTI-LEBED) KOMPROMAT CAMPAIGN THAT FEATURED ACCUSATINS
CO N M P E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 034672
CLINTON LTRRARY, P O O O Y
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�-felONI IULN I IAL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/06
TAGS: PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: SUB-PLOTS AROUND LEBED'S FIRING
BY NATIONAL SPORTS FEDERATION OFFICIAL BORIS FEDOROV THAT
KORZHAKOV WAS CLOSELY TIED TO ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS.
KISELEV HELPED HYPE MINISTER OF INTERIOR AFFAIRS
KULIKOV'S CHARGES THAT LEBED WAS PLOTTING A COUP, CHARGES
KISELEV LATER TOLD POLOFF HE HIMSELF DID NOT BELIEVE.
11. 4GHT IS DIFFICULT TO JUDGE THE IMPACT OF THIS
CAMPAIGN. LEBED'S APPARENTLY ANTI-SEMITIC GAFFE (IN
NAMING TRADITIONALLY ESTABLISHED RELIGIONS IN RUSSIA, HE
FAILED TO INCLUDE JUDAISM) MAY HAVE BEEN SUFFICIENT TO
RAISE CONCERNS AMONG LEADING BANKERS AND OTHER OPINION
MAKERS, MANY OF WHOM ARE JEWISH, ABOUT HIS SUITABILITY
FOR HIGH POLITICAL OFFICE; THE DISINFORMATION MAY HAVE
REINFORCED THOSE CONCERNS. THE ANTI-LEBED TELEVISION
CAMPAIGN RECEIVED MIXED REVIEWS IN MOSCOW. PUBLIC
OPINION FOUNDATION DIRECTOR OSLON, FOR EXAMPLE, TOLD
POLOFF IN LATE SEPTEMBER THAT HE THOUGHT IT HAD HELPED
BRING DOWN LEBED'S HIGH POPULARITY RATING. PAVLOVSKIY
AND "IZVESTIYA" COMMENTATOR OTTO LATSIS, HOWEVER, WORRIED
THAT THE CAMPAIGN WAS TOO CRUDE AND WOULD ENHANCE LEBED'S
POPULARITY WHILE DISCREDITING "VLAST" AS SUCH IN THE LONG
RUN. AT THE MOMENT, LEBED STILL REMAINS THE MOST POPULAR
POLITICIAN IN RUSSIA.
BUILDING A POSITIVE IMAGE OF POWER
12. ^COMPLEMENTING THE ANTI-LEBED CAMPAIGN WAS AN
EFFORT TO ENHANCE CHERNOMYRDIN'S REPUTATION AS YELTSIN'S
SECOND-IN-COMMAND AND THE NATURAL HEIR. ACCORDING TO
PAVLOVSKIY, IN LATE AUGUST/EARLY SEPTEMBER, CHERNOMYRDIN
AND CHUBAYS HAD DECIDED TO CUT OFF LEBED'S DIRECT ACCESS
TO YELTSIN. PAVLOVSKIY HIMSELF WROTE A MEMO FOR THE TWO
ADVOCATING THAT LEBED BE MADE TO REPORT TO YELTSIN
THROUGH CHERNOMYRDIN, A PROCEDURE THAT WAS IN FACT PUT IN
PLACE. IN ADDITION, THERE WERE EFFORTS TO MAKE
CHERNOMYRDIN LOOK BOTH PRESIDENTIAL AND CLOSE TO YELTSIN.
(YELTSIN ISSUED A DECREE TRANSFERRING TEMPORARILY TO
CHERNOMYRDIN SOME OF HIS AUTHORITY OVER THE MILITARY AND
DECIDED TO HAVE CHERNOMYRDIN CHAIR MEETINGS OF THE
DEFENSE COUNCIL IN HIS ABSENCE.) FINALLY, AS KISELEV HAS
POINTED OUT, THE MAJOR TELEVISION STATIONS MADE A
CONCERTED EFFORT TO PORTRAY CHERNOMYRDIN IN A MORE
POSITIVE LIGHT AND TO RAISE HIS PROFILE, AN EFFORT THAT
CONTINUES TO THIS DAY.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
CLINTON immLPHOTOCOPY
�CONriDCNTIAL-
13. J&-THE EFFORT TO OUST LEBED UNDERSCORES SOME
CONTINUING TRUTHS ABOUT RUSSIAN POLITICS.
-- YELTSIN RETAINS THE CENTRAL ROLE BECAUSE, AS
PRESIDENT, HE IS THE KEY SYMBOL OF THE REGIME'S
LEGITIMACY. EVEN BEFORE HIS OPERATION, WHEN CONCERNS
ABOUT HIS ABILITY TO GOVERN WERE GREATEST, KEY DECISIONS
HAD TO BE REFERRED TO HIM.
-- PERSONAL CONSIDERATIONS LOOM LARGE, ESPECIALLY BECAUSE
"VLAST" IS WEAKLY INSTITUTIONALIZED.
-- TOP GOVERNMENT LEADERS INCREASINGLY GIVE IN TO THE
TEMPTATION TO USE THE MEDIA AGAINST THEIR POLITICAL
OPPONENTS. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE MEDIA HAS GROWN
LESS OBJECTIVE ACROSS THE BOARD; ONLY THAT ITS
OBJECTIVITY IS SELECTIVE. NTV, FOR EXAMPLE, RECENTLY
CARRIED REPORTS ON BELARUS AND FORMER YUGOSLAVIA THAT RAN
CONTRARY TO GOVERNMENT POLICY. SELECTIV
E OBJECTIVITY
PER SE DAMAGES THE MEDIA'S CREDIBILITY OVER TIME,
HOWEVER.
KOMPROMAT (COMPROMISING MATERIAL), USED PUBLICLY OR
SURREPTITIOUSLY, CAN BE AN EFFECTIVE POLITICAL WEAPON,
ALTHOUGH PUBLIC SCANDALS ULTIMATELY TEND TO DISCREDIT
"VLAST" ITSELF MORE THAN THE INDIVIDUALS IMPLICATED.
TEFFT
<"SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 03
< "SSN > 4672
<"TOR>961219195150 M2547703
<"SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03
<"SSN>4672
<"TOR>961219195233 M2547704
<"SECT> SECTION: 03 OF 03
<"SSN>4672
<"TOR>961219195317 M2547707
FROM:
SITREPRT
CLINTON l i m M L P O O O Y
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�H
v
CJ i
_/w
CJ i
a
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-
United States Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520
November 5/ 1996
COHiniDENgiAL
DECL!
1.6X1
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
S/S
TO:
The Secretary
FROMt
INR - Toby T. Gati
SUBJECT:
Yeltsin's Operation and i t s Implications
^%J^
The apparent success of Yeltsin's operation should mean the
return of strong leadership to the Kremlin, following Cour
months of infighting during Yeltsin's illness. Other political
figures must adjust to the likelihood that Yeltsin may remain
until the end of his term in 2000.
Successful suroerv. pover transfer. Following seven hours
of surgery at Moscow's Cardiological Center, Yeltsin's doctors
and foreign medical observers, including Dr. Debakey, pronounced
the operation a success. The head of the surgical team, Dr.
Renat Akchurin, told a press conference that Yeltsin's condition
is stable, and that the president's heart i s receiving a
sufficient supply of blood. As of mid-day today, Yeltsin was
reported to have come out from anasthesiaj he i s expected to
remain on a respirator until tomorrow. Dr. Akchurin noted that
the team stopped Yeltsin's heart for sixty-eight minutes and
carried out several artery bypasses—he declined to say how
many. Dr. Debakey later told Embassy Moscow that the number of
bypasses was five; he also said Yeltsin's heart looked healthy
and had good color after being restarted. Dr. Akchurin said the
length of the rehabilitation period cannot be accurately
predicted for several days, fejr
Prior to today's operation, Yeltsin signed a decree handing
over presidential powers, including nuclear release authority,
to Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, in accordance with the
constitution. Dr. Akchurin said Yeltsin likely would be able to
reclaim his powers within two days. Assuming no complications,
Yeltsin probably would begin gradually to resume some of his
duties within a few weeks, and would return full-time around the
beginning of next year. (U)
CLASSIFIED BY: Toby T. Gati, INR
REASON: 1.5(c)(d)
A/S
CONFIDENTTftfc
CLINTON.LIBRARY P O O O Y
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PER E.0.13526
�NOV 07 ' 96
P. 23
07:24m
GOlTTIDDIIBlIfttr
- 2 -
Implications of Yeltsin's return. The return of a vigorous
Yeltsin to the Kremlin should bring much-needed stability to the
Russian political scene/ which has been characterized by
executive branch infighting over the past four months. Key
political figures would a l l be affected:
— Lebed has badly miscalculated and Yeltsin will not soon
forget Lebed's insubordination and arrogance. I f Yeltsin
recovers fully, presidential elections are a long four years
off. Maintaining Lebed's high popularity ratings will require
strong financial and organizational support, both of which he
currently lacks, and political s k i l l s that he has yet to
demonstrate. The Russian media i s unlikely to afford Lebed the
coverage required to keep him in the public eye.
— Chief-of-staff Chubavs can maintain his powerful
position, in part because of his close relations with Yeltsin's
daughter, but w i l l almost certainly have to lower his public
profile. I t would not be out of character for Yeltsin to
demonstrate he is back in charge by making a point of trimming
Chubays's influence or the influence of people beholden to
Chubays.
— Chernomyrdin would almost certainly be relieved not to
have to run a presidential campaign next year, an effort that
would require a complete image makeover and sap most of his
energy from the job of running the government. His loyalty to
Yeltsin is his strong suit, but no one can guarantee that a
reinvigorated Yeltsin might not order a government shakeup. -^tLono term problems remain. Yeltsin's return does nothing
to diminish the serious problems the country faces. The current
economic c r i s i s w i l l be Yeltsin's f i r s t priority (though i t i s
unlikely to be solved anytime soon), with Chechnya a close
second. As before, progress on foreign policy issues, such as
NATO enlargement, i s more likely with the president's direct
involvement, -fe)Yeltsin's return increases the odds that the government's
reform course w i l l continue and allows the Russian political
establishment to focus more of i t s energy on substance rather
than jockeying for influence. Political infighting w i l l not
disappear, but i t s practitioners will have to be more cautious
about attracting the President's wrath. After Yeltsin makes his
return, he I s likely to take a careful look at how hie
subordinates behaved In his absence.-fC}-
OONFIDBNTfttfr
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�P 24
.
N V 07 ' 96 07:25m
O
- 3A new Yeltsin? I n i t i a l l y , Yeltsin would benefit p o l i t i c a l l y
from a period of "rebirth" and a sense that the leader has
returned. His successful surgery and recovery also would
provide an important signal that the country can come through
such a c r i s i s by following constitutional provisions. (The event
has already established a new tradition of openness on the
health Russia's top leadership.
However, the issue of Yeltsin's leadership style remains.
Never a hands-on president, he has always been prone to bouts of
depression and periodic withdrawal from the political scene, If
this pattern continues despite apparently successful surgery,
Russia's p o l i t i c a l scene will continue to be erratic.
CLINTON
m
K
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OY
�NOV 07 '96 07:25fiM
Draftod:
REA/JWilliams/x7-9l86
Cleared: REA/JSontag/x7-9203
REA/LSell/x7-5642
Approved: INR/DAS/AN: TFingar
F i l e Name: 961105MEMO.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�CONriDCNTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: BELL, DOWLING, EGGERT, ELKIND, FEELEY, FORT, MATERA, PASCUAL, PIFER, RUMER,
SCHMIDT, VERSHBOW, WITKOWSKY, NSC
PREC: PRIORITY
CLASS: •SONHOEimAt
DTG:041158Z FEB 97
FM: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1674
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 7367
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 7393
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 7194
C O-N r I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002543
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/97
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, RS
SUBJECT: TV EXECUTIVES ON NATO EXPANSION DEBATE
REF MOSCOW 01960
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE D'AFFAIRES JOHN F. TEFFT.
REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).
SUMMARY
2 . i e i ~ A J A LUNCHEON HOSTED JANUARY 30 BY CHARGE, THE
TOP EXECUTIVES OF PUBLIC RUSSIAN TV (ORT), INDEPENDENT
TV (NTV), AND THE ENTERTAINMENT-ORIENTED TV-6 AGREED
THAT THE DEBATE IN RUSSIA OVER NATO EXPANSION HAS
BECOME COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. THE TWO MOST POLITICALLY
ENGAGED EXECUTIVES ARGUED THAT THE NATO-RUSSIA DEBATE
HAS DISPLACED A PUBLIC AIRING OF MORE FUNDAMENTAL
ISSUES THAT WOULD ALLOW RUSSIA TO COME TO TERMS WITH
ITS PAST AND DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH ITS PRESENT. THE
THIRD, LESS CONCERNED WITH GEOPOLITICS AND NATIONAL
IDENTITY, PAINTED A COMPELLING PICTURE OF THE DESPERATE
SOCIAL CONDITIONS THAT ARE GOING UNRESOLVED AS THE
RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP POSTURES OVER RUSSIA'S RIGHTFUL
PLACE IN THE WORLD. IN DIFFERENT WAYS, EACH AGREED
THAT UNTIL THERE IS A PROBING EXAMINATION OF THE
REASONS FOR RUSSIA'S CURRENT DIFFICULTIES, THE RUSSIAN
LEADERSHIP WILL BE HARD-PRESSED TO MOVE FORWARD AND
CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR ITS CITIZENS TO LEAD A
PER E„a 13526
CLINTON i m M L P O O O Y
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�CONriDCNTIAL
"NORMAL LIFE." END SUMMARY.
THREE PERSPECTIVES
3. (SBU) THE VIEWS OF THE THREE TV EXECUTIVES WERE
INFORMED BOTH BY THEIR BACKGROUNDS AND THE AUDIENCES
THEIR RESPECTIVE COMPANIES CATER TO. ORT'S SERGEY
BLAGOVOLIN, A LONG-TIME FOREIGN AFFAIRS EXPERT WHO CAME
UP THROUGH THE PRESTIGIOUS SOVIET INSTITUTE FOR THE
WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (IMEMO--WHERE
HE WORKED FOR FOREIGN MINISTER PRIMAKOV), SPOKE FOR THE
MOST TRADITIONAL AUDIENCE. IN HIS OWN WORDS, BOTH HIS
PEERS AND HIS VIEWERS ARE "TRAPPED IN THE OLD
PROPAGANDA" AND HAVE DIFFICULTY RELATING TO NATO AS
ANYTHING OTHER THAN A POTENTIAL ENEMY. NTV'S IGOR
MALASHENKO, WHO ALSO CAME UP THROUGH THE RANKS OF ELITE
FOREIGN POLICY THINK-TANKS, REPRESENTS THE COUNTRY'S
NEW BUSINESS ELITES, THOSE WHO ARE CONCERNED ABOUT
"EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE" DEBATES ONLY TO THE
EXTENT THEY AFFECT THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IN RUSSIA AND
THEIR OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE MONEY. TV-6 GENERAL DIRECTOR
ALEKSANDR PONOMAREV IS A PROVINCIAL JOURNALIST WHO MADE
GOOD AND NOW HEADS A TV COMPANY THAT HAS CONSCIOUSLY
TARGETED RUSSIA'S POLITICALLY ALIENATED MASSES FOR WHOM
NATO EXPANSION IS UTTERLY IRRELEVANT.
OLD THINK
:
4.4CH 0R THE MOST PART, BLAGOVOLIN MADE THE SAME
UTTERANCES ABOUT THE UNDESIRABILITY OF NATO EXPANSION
AND THE NEED FOR "SPECIAL AGREEMENTS" THAT HAVE BEEN
HEARD AD NAUSEUM AROUND TOWN (REF). HIS ONLY
DIVERGENCE FROM THE PARTY LINE WAS WHEN HE CONCEDED
THAT POLICY AND OPINION MAKERS "ARE TRAPPED IN THE
PROPAGANDA OF THE PAST," UNABLE TO BREAK OUT OF OLD
SOVIET STEREOTYPES ABOUT NATO. AS THE DEBATE DRAGS ON
AND PEOPLE'S DESPERATE LIVING STANDARDS CONTINUE TO GO
UNADDRESSED, HE SAID, RUSSIA'S LEADERS WILL FIND
THEMSELVES "SITTING ON A POWDER KEG."
NEW THINK
5. -fef-MALASHENKO SHOWED OBVIOU IMPATIENCE OVER THE
WHOLE NATO EXPANSION DEBATEAND ARGUED THAT IT HAS
BADLY DISTRACTED THE LEADRSHIP FROM MORE PRESSING
PROBLEMS ON THE DOMESTI FRONT. REFLECTING HIS
POSITION AS AN ENTREPRENEUR WHO HAS A STAKE IN
POLITICAL STABILITY AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY, MALASHENKO
STATED THAT "DOMESTIC ISSUES ARE THE ONLY PROBLEMS THAT
CLINTON i m m . P O O O Y
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�CONriDIIPJTIAL
MATTER TO ME." HE RECOGNIZES THAT NATO EXPANSION IS
INEVITABLE AND RECOMMENDED HALF-SERIOUSLY THAT THE U.S.
"JUST DO IT QUIETLY." IN RESPONSE TO CHARGE'S COMMENT
THAT DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT HAD RECENTLY TOLD RUSSIAN
LEADERS WE WILL WORK HARD WITH RUSSIA TO MANAGE THE
NATO ENLARGEMENT ISSUE "BUT IT TAKES TW
O TO TANGO,"
MALASHENKO REITERATED HIS DISINTEREST: "THIS IS NOT MY
TANGO."
-CO N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 002543
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/97
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, RS
SUBJECT: TV EXECUTIVES ON NATO EXPANSION DEBATE
6. 4G)-MORE FUNDAMENTALLY, MALASHENKO ARGUED, THE
ELITES HAVE USED THE DEBATE OVER THE FUTURE OF U.S.RUSSIAN RELATIONS AND RUSSIA'S ROLE IN EUROPE AS A
SUBSTITUTE FOR A FULL PUBLIC AIRING OF THE MORE
FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE OF THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION.
"RUSSIA LOST THE COLD WAR," HE SAID, "BUT YOU WILL
NEVER HEAR ANY OF OUR LEADERS SAY THIS." HE NOTED THAT
JAPAN AND GERMANY HAD TO GO THROUGH A PROCESS OF
NATIONAL RE-EXAMINATION AFTER THEIR DEFEAT IN WORLD WAR
II BEFORE THEY COULD EVEN BEGIN TO THINK OF THEIR ROLE
IN THE WORLD. GERMANY HAD DONE SO; JAPAN STILL HAD NOT
COME TO GRIPS WITH ITS PAST. IN HIS VIEW, THE RUSSIAN
LEADERSHIP'S INABILITY TO COME TO TERMS WITH THE
COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE CURRENT REALITY OF
RUSSIA'S WEAKNESS PREVENTS THE NATION FROM MOVING AHEAD
TO DEVELOP A NEW NATIONAL IDENTITY THAT WOULD ITSELF
RESOLVE RUSSIA'S RIGHTFUL PLACE IN THE WORLD.
MASS THINK
7.-ten"V6'S PONOMAREV EXPRESSED THE VIEW OF RUSSIA'S
SILENT MAJORITY WHEN ASKED FOR HIS OPINION ON THE NATO
EXPANSION DEBATE. HE RESPONDED BY TELLING IN STARK
TERMS THE STORY OF A SMALL TOWN -- AND THOUSANDS OTHERS
LIKE IT -- THAT IS DYING A SLOW SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
DEATH WHILE THE RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP DEBATES NATO
EXPASION. HIS STORY CONCERNED HIS NATIVE TOWN OUTSIDE
SAMARA, WITH A POPULATION OF 30,000 (ALMOST HALF OF
WHICH ARE PENSIONERS) AND ONLY TWO FACTORIES. THE
FACTORIES HAVE BEEN IDLE FOR ALMOST TWO YEARS. THE
ONLY MONEY THAT PEOPLE HAVE HAD TO SPEND HAS COME IN
THE FORM OF PENSIONS, BUT IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE
GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION LAST FALL, EVEN PENSIONS STOPPED
BEING PAID. HIS SISTER, A SCHOOL TEACHER,
THEORETICALLY EARNS 180,000 RUBLES PER MONTH (ABOUT USD
35), BUT THAT WAS CUT TO 90,000 RUBLES (USD 17) BECAUSE
CLINTON I M M L P O O O Y
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�GONriDCNTIAL
THE CLASS IS NOT ENTIRELY FULL. "AND EVEN THEN, SHE
DOESN'T GET PAID ANYWAY." HE SAID HE LEARNED LATER
THAT 40 PERCENT OF RUSSIANS LIVE IN TOWNS SUCH AS THIS.
"FOR THEM AND FOR ME," HE SAID, "THE DEBATE ABOUT NATO
EXPANSION IS A CONVERSATION CONDUCTED BETWEEN TWO SPACE
ALIENS."
COMMENT
B . ^ - T H E LUNCHEON DISCUSSION DROVE HOME WHAT WE HAVE
KNOWN ABOUT THE NATO EXPANSION DEBATE IN RUSSIA FOR A
LONG TIME: IT IS BEING CONDUCTED BY AND FOR A VERY
NARROW ELITE WHO (1) DO NOT FULLY UNDERSTAND THE NTURE
OF NATO AND THE ADAPTATION PROCESS UNDERWAY, AND (2)
HAVE ALLOWED THE NATO DEBATE TO DISTRACT THEM FROM MORE
DIFFICULT AND FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES FOR RUSSIA'S FUTURE.
THE MISINFORMATION CURRENTLY CIRCULATING IN MOSCOW
ARGUES IN FAVOR OF A MORE DYNAMIC PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
CAMPAIGN, ALTHOUGH MALASHENKO'S INJUNCTION TO THE U.S.
TO JUST GET ON WITH NATO ENLARGEMENT "BUT DO IT
QUIETLY" IS A USEFUL WARNING OF THE NEED FOR A DEFT
HAND IN THE PRESENT POLITICALLY CHARGED ATMOSPHERE.
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PUBLIC DIPLOMACY CAMPAIGN ON
NATO WILL DEPEND GREATLY ON THE RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP'S
WILLINGNESS TO SET A MORE APPROPRIATE TONE IN THEIR OWN
PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS. IN THIS CONNECTION WE NOTE THAT
PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN SAID FLATLY IN A NATIONAL
TV INTERVIEW FROM DAVOS FEBRUARY 2 THAT NATO HAD NOT
CHANGED A BIT. TEFFT
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: EGGERT, FORT, HESLIN, PASCUAL, PIFER, RUMER, NODIS
PREC: PRIORITY
CLASS:-SE€ftET
DTG:1 91 226Z NOV 96
FM: AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO:
SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2240
////
-S-E-e-K b I SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 003809
NODIS
DEPT PLEASE REPEAT TO EMBASSY MOSCOW, ALSO FOR AMB COLLINS
E.O. 12958: 19 NOV 06
TAGS: PREL, GG
SUBJECT: SHEVARDNADZE COMMENTS ON BEREZOVSKIY AND RUSSIAN
FOREIGN POLICY
CLASSIFIED BY AMB WILLIAM COURTNEY, REASONS 1.5(B,D)
REF: TBILISI 3707 (EXDIS)
SUMMARY
1. IN A PRIVATE NOVEMBER 1 5 MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR-ATLARGE COLLINS, PRESIDENT SHEVARDNADZE CAUTIONED THAT THE
U.S. SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR ANY UNEXPECTED TURN IN RUSSIA,
BUT NOT EXCLUDE A SMOOTH DEVELOPMENT, WHICH WAS QUITE
POSSIBLE. MUCH DEPENDED ON YELTSIN AND HIS REEMERGENCE IN
POLITICAL LIFE. NEW SECURITY COUNCIL DEPUTY SECRETARY
BEREZOVSKIY COULD BE AN IMPORTANT FIGURE IN RUSSIAN
FOREIGN POLICY. BEREZOVSKIY WAS DISMISSIVE OF ATTEMPTS TO
RESTORE THE OLD ORDER, AND WANTED A RADICALLY DIFFERENT
FOREIGN POLICY, PUTTING RUSSIA SQUARELY WITH THE WEST. HE
MERITED U.S. SUPPORT. END SUMMARY.
2. FOLLOWING THE NOVEMBER 15 PLENARY WITH THE U.S.
DELEGATION, SHEVARDNADZE MET PRIVATELY WITH AMBASSADORS
COLLINS AND COURTNEY AND NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR PIFER.
RUSSIA -- ANY TURN POSSIBLE
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON LIBMS-Y P O O O Y
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�GECRET-
3. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THE U.S. SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR ANY
UNEXPECTED TURN IN RUSSIA BUT SHOULD NOT EXCLUDE A SMOOTH
DEVELOPMENT -- THAT WAS QUITE POSSIBLE. MUCH WOULD DEPEND
ON YELTSIN AND HIS REEMERGENCE. PRIOR TO YELTSIN'S
OPERATION, A REAL POWER STRUGGLE HAD BEEN UNDERWAY.
FORTUNATELY, THE MOD LEADERS WERE "NORMAL."
RODIONOV A FACTOR FOR STABILITY
4. SHEVARDNADZE SAID YELTSIN WOULD NOT HAVE APPOINTED
RODIONOV DEFENSE MINISTER HAD GEORGIA INDICATED IT WOULD
REACT NEGATIVELY. LEBED HAD CALLED SHEVARDNADZE IN
ADVANCE AND SAID YELTSIN'S DECISION DEPENDED ON
SHEVARDNADZE'S VIEW. SHEVARDNADZE NOTED THAT RODIONOV WAS
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE 1989 TRAGEDY (IN WHICH SOVIET TROOPS
ATTACKED AND KILLED A NUMBER OF CIVILIAN DEMONSTRATORS IN
TBILISI), ALTHOUGH HE WAS FULFILLING ORDERS. SHEVARDNADZE
COMMENTED THAT HE HAD SUPPORTED RODIONOV'S CANDIDACY.
RODIONOV WAS NOT A MAN TO SEEK POWER. HE WAS NO ONE'S MAN
-- NOT CHERNOMYRDIN'S OR ANYONE ELSE'S. THIS REPRESENTED
A FACTOR FOR STABILITY.
CHUBAYS-CHERNOMYRDIN
5. SHEVARDNADZE ASSERTED THAT A POWERFUL WING WAS BEING
FORMED UNDER CHUBAYS. IF YELTSIN DID NOT REGAIN HIS FORM,
THE CHUBAYS-CHERNOMYRDIN RELATIONSHIP WOULD DEVELOP IN A
"PAINFUL MANNER." THE CHOICE OF RYBKIN AS SECURITY
COUNCIL SECRETARY WAS FORTUNATE AND RIGHT. IT WAS GOOD
THAT RYBKIN HAD HAD THE CHANCE TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT
CLINTON IN 1994. RYBKIN WAS A MODERATE.
BEREZOVSKIY AN IMPORTANT FIGURE
6. SHEVARDNADZE CONTINUED THAT BEREZOVSKIY'S EMERGENCE AS
RYBKIN'S DEPUTY WAS IMPORTANT. HE REPRESENTED RUSSIA'S
BIG NEW CAPITAL, AND WAS ONE OF THE SIX OR SEVEN MOST
POWERFUL PERSONS IN RUSSIA ECONOMICALLY, A GROUP IN WHICH
BEREZOVSKIY SAID THERE WAS NO INFIGHTING. HE WAS AN
"EXTRAORDINARY PERSON."
7. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THERE HAD BEEN A SHIFT IN KAZAKSTANI
PRESIDENT NAZARBAYEV'S STANCE, AND BEREZOVSKIY HAD
CONFIRMED IT. DUE TO THE LARGE ETHNIC RUSSIAN POPULATION
IN KAZAKSTAN, NAZARBAYEV WAS UNDER PRESSRE FROM THE
RUSSIANS AND HAD TO CONSIDER THEIR VEWS. BUT HE HAD
RECENTLY VISITED TBILISI, AND SHEVARDNADZE HAD DISCOVERED
C I T N LIB^Y P O O O Y
LNO
HTCP
�ANOTHER MAN.
8. SHEVARDNADZE SAID BEREZOVSKIY FELT RUSSIAN POLICY
SHOULD RADICALLY CHANGE, AND HE UNDERSTOOD THIS WOULD BE
IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT CHANGES IN PERSONNEL. BEREZOVSKIY
BELIEVED THE RUSSIA/BELARUS/KAZAKSTAN/KYRGYZSTAN CUSTOMS
UNION WAS NONSENSICAL, A VIEW SHARED BY NAZARBAYEV.
BEREZOVSKIY UNDERSTOOD IT WAS SENSELESS FOR RUSSIA TO
SPEAK OF RESTORING THE OLD ORDER. SHEVARDNADZE HAD TOLD
BEREZOVSKIY THAT RUSSIA HAD LOST AN OPPORTUNITY FOR BETTER
0 E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 TBILISI 003809
NODIS
DEPT PLEASE REPEAT TO EMBASSY MOSCOW, ALSO FOR AMB COLLINS
E.O. 12958: 19 NOV 06
TAGS: PREL, GG
SUBJECT: SHEVARDNADZE COMMENTS ON BEREZOVSKIY AND RUSSIAN
FOREIGN POLICY
RELATIONS WITH THE WEST; RUSSIA SHOULD HAVE GONE WEST
AFTER THE SOVIET UNION'S COLLAPSE. BY NOT HAVING DONE SO,
RUSSIA HAD ACCELERATED THE MOVE BY OTHER NIS (UKRAINE,
AZERBAIJAN, GEORGIA, UZBEKISTAN, KAZAKSTAN) TO THE WEST.
RUSSIA WAS IN SELF-ISOLATION. SHEVARDNADZE REPORTED THAT
BEREZOVSKIY AGREED. (REF)
MERITING U.S. SUPPORT
9. SHEVARDNADZE SAID BEREZOVSKIY BELIEVED RUSSIAN POLICY
WAS NOT PREEMPTIVE OR FORWARD-LOOKING BUT BEHIND THE
TIMES. BEREZOVSKIY HAD OTHER INTERESTING IDEAS.
SHEVARDNADZE VIEWED HIM POSITIVELY AND HAD TOLD HIM HE
MIGHT SHARE SOME OF THEIR DISCUSSION WITH WESTERN
OFFICIALS. BEREZOVSKIY WOULD NEED "YOUR SUPPORT," BUT
ONLY WHEN IT WAS REALLY NECESSARY; SUPPORT NOW WOULD HARM
HIM. BEREZOVSKIY HAD A CORRECT ORIENTATION, AND SUPPORT
WOULD HAVE TO BE DONE IN THE RIGHT DOSAGES. HE WOULD
DEVELOP INTO A NECESSARY AND USEFUL MAN.
TALKING TO RUSSIA ABOUT THE NIS
10. COLLINS COMMENTED THAT HE WAS TROUBLED THAT THE U.S.
AND RUSSIA HAD NOT FOUND A WAY TO TALK EFFECTIVELY ABOUT
THE NIS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE INTERESTS. THERE WAS A GOOD
DEAL OF SUSPICION. COLLINS HAD SUGGESTED TO RYURIKOV THAT
IT WAS TIME FOR SUCH AN EXCHANGE, AND RYURIKOV WAS
RECEPTIVE. THE STRATEGIC INTERESTS OF THE U.S., RUSSIA
AND EUROPE IN THE CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA WERE
CLINTON l i m m P O O O Y
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�-Gccnei—
COMPATIBLE -- A STABLE AND DEVELOPING REGION THAT DID NOT
BECOME LIKE ITS SOUTHERN NEIGHBORS. THE PROBLEM WAS HOW
RUSSIA WOULD PURSUE ITS INTERESTS. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO
FIND THE RIGHT RUSSIANS FOR THIS DISCUSSION.
11. ISHEVARDNADZE RESPONDED THAT IT WOULD TAKE A LONG TIME
FOR RUSSIA TO BE CURED OF IMPERIAL DISEASE. THE EMPIRE
CREATED TANGLES OF CONTROVERSY ON ITS BORDERS. RUSSIA WAS
USING ABKHAZIA AND THINKING ABOUT USING AJARIA (A MUSLIM
GEORGIAN REGION IN THE SOUTHWEST ON THE BLACK SEA) AGAINST
GEORGIA. NAZARBAYEV, ALIYEV, AND KUCHMA WOULD SAY THE
SAME IF THEY WERE CANDID. KUCHMA AHD BEEN IN DESPAIR WITH
{SHEVARDNADZE! ABOUT HOW THE RUSSIANS WORKED OPENLY IN
UKRAINE'S DONBASS REGION. SHEVARDNADZE SAID HE SAW IN
BEREZOVSKIY! A MAN FREE OF ALL THIS -- A PERSON WHO
BELIEVED THAT PROCEEDING ON SUCH AN IMPERIAL BASIS WOULD
LEAD TO RUSSIA'S COLLAPSE.
12. SHEVARDNADZE NOTED THAT THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW FORCE
IN MOSCOW DID PROVIDE SOME HOPE. IF YELTSIN CAME BACK TO
FULL FORM, ONE SCENARIO WOULD BE A BOOST FOR THIS NEW
FORCE. THAT COULD CHANGE MANY THINGS. IT WAS IMPORTANT
NOT TO LET THE OPPORTUNITY SLIP AWAY. RUSSIA NEEDED
AMERICA'S HELP, BUT THE U.S. SHOULD GET SOME QUID PRO QUO.
THERE MUST BE AN OPEN AND DIRECT DIALOGUE.
DISAPPOINTMENT WITH PRIMAKOV
13. |SHEVARDNADZEj OBSERVED THAT HE HAD HAD HIGH HOPES FOR
PRIMAKOV, BELIEVING HE WOULD ASSUME A PRO-WESTERN POLICY.
BUT PRIMAKOV HAD PROVED CAPTIVE TO OLD IDEAS AND
IDEOLOGIES. PLAYING WITH IRAQ NOW WAS TOO LATE; IT WAS
RIDICULOUS. BEREZOVSKIYj AND HIS TEAM WANTED TO CREATE
S O M E T H I N G LIKE A S E C R E T A R Y O F S T A T E W I T H I N T H E R U S S I A N
SECURITY C O U N C I L ; OTHERWISE THEY C O U L D N O T OPPOSE
PRIMAKOV. (SHEVARDNADZE! SAID HE HAD MENTIONED FORMER
DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ADAMISHIN TO pEREZOVSKIYj AS
SOMEONE WHO WAS MORE FLEXIBLE.
14. AMBASSADOR COLLINS HAS CLEARED THIS TELEGRAM.
COURTNEY
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Y P OO O Y
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: EGGERT, ELKIND, FORT, MATERA, PASCUAL, PIFER, RUMER, NSC
PREC: ROUTINE
CLASS:-feONriDENTIAL
DTG:161301Z JAN 97
FM: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0595
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 7231
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 7039
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 7193
C O N F I D E MTIA-fc SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000970
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/07
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, RS
SUBJECT: DUMA'S BARK WORSE THAN BITE IN FALL '96
REF(S): A) 96 MOSCOW 22499 B) 96 MOSCOW 31806
C) 96 MOSCOW 33787 D) 96 MOSCOW 35027
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR
THOMAS GRAHAM. REASONS: 1.5 B) AND D).
SUMMARY
2.-4€>-BURING ITS AUTUMN SESSION, THE RUSSIAN
STATE DUMA FOSTERED SURPRISINGLY COOPERATIVE
RELATIONS WITH THE GOR UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF
SPEAKER GENNADIY SELEZNEV AND COMMUNIST FACTION
BOSS GENNADIY ZYUGANOV. ON KEY ISSUES, THIS LED
TO A PATTERN OF FIERY PARLIAMENTARY POLEMICS
FOLLOWED BY RAPID RETREAT FROM THE BRINK OF
CONFRONTATION WITH THE GOR. AS A RESULT, THE
DUMA FAILED TO STRENGTHEN EITHER RUSSIAN REFORM
OR ITS OWN POSITION AS A POLITICAL INSTITUTION.
(DETAILS ON ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL LEGISLATIVE
AGENDA FOLLOW SEPTEL.) END SUMMARY.
FEW NEW LAWS; PLENTY OF POLEMICS
3. (SBU) THE RUSSIAN STATE DUMA'S AUTUMN 1996
SESSION WAS DOMINATED BY FIERY POLEMICS BUT
PER E,0.13526
CLINTON I M M L P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONriDCNTIAL
LITTLE LEGISLATIVE ACHIEVEMENT. ECONOMIC REFORM
MOVED AHEAD -- IF AT ALL -- AT A SNAIL'S PACE,
WITH LAWS ON PROFIT SHARING, PRIVATIZATION,
TRADE, AND THE LAND CODE PUT ON THE BACK BURNER.
(DETAILS SEPTEL). THE DUMA ALSO MADE LITTLE
PROGRESS ON STRENGTHENING RUSSIA'S DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTIONS. THE DUMA DID PASS CONSTITUTIONAL
LAWS ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS OMBUDSMAN, GOVERNMENT,
AND COURT SYSTEM, WHICH SPEAKER SELEZNEV DUBBED
THE DUMA'S TOP ACHIEVEMENTS THIS FALL. BUT THESE
WERE DRAFTED DURING PRIOR DUMA SESSIONS. DURING
AUTUMN 1996, THE DUMA SIMPLY RE-WORKED PREVIOUS
VERSIONS OF THESE BILLS FOLLOWING THEIR REJECTION
BY THE FEDERATION COUNCIL.
4. (SBU) AS 1996 CLOSED, THE DUMA THUS
CONTINUED TO FUNCTION PRIMARILY AS A FORUM FOR
POPULIST DEBATE BY OPPOSITION POLITICIANS. AS
DURING THE FIRST PART OF 1996, TOP DUMA DEPUTIES
REMAINED MORE CONCERNED WITH MAINTAINING ACCESS
TO THE MEDIA THAN ENACTING LEGISLATION. AT THE
SAME TIME, SPEAKER SELEZNEV'S PROFESSIONAL
LEADERSHIP STYLE HAS HELPED TO PURGE THE DUMA OF
CLOWNISH BEHAVIOR, SUCH AS THE SEPTEMBER 1995
MINI-BRAWL IN WHICH EXTREME NATIONALISTS VLADIMIR
ZHIRINOVSKIY (LDPR) AND NIKOLAY LYSENKO BEAT
FATHER GLEB YAKUNIN WITH THE PRIEST'S OWN CROSS
AND PULLED THE HAIR OF A FEMALE DEPUTY. ON THE
OTHER HAND, THE DUMA'S REPEATED THREATS OF NOCONFIDENCE VOTES FOLLOWED BY ITS BACKING DOWN
FROM CONFRONTATION WITH THE GOR UNDERSCORED THE
EMPTINESS OF PARLIAMENTARIANS' RHETORIC.
KEY DEVELOPMENT: IMPROVED DUMA-GOR RELATIONS
S . - m - T H E MOST SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT IN THE
DUMA THIS AUTUMN WAS THE COOPERATION IT DEVELOPED
WITH THE GOR. ONE YEAR AGO, GENNADIY ZYUGANOV
AND HIS COMMUNISTS WERE SQUARING OFF FOR A
BRUISING FIGHT IN RUSSIA'S APPROACHING
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN, FOLLOWING THEIR
SWEEPING VICTORY IN DECEMBER 1995'S DUMA
ELECTIONS. MANY OBSERVERS THUS PREDICTED A YEAR
OF EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE GRIDLOCK, POSSIBLY
MIRRORING THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN PRESIDENT YELTSIN
AND THE SUPREME SOVIET THAT CULMINATED IN THE
BLOODY EVENTS OF OCTOBER 1993. THE FIRST FEW
MONTHS OF 1996 WERE INDEED STORMY. IN MARCH,
MOSCOW BUZZED WITH RUMORS THAT YELTSIN WAS ON THE
VERGE OF DISSOLVING THE DUMA AFTER THE COMMUNISTS
ENGINEERED A DUMA VOTE DECLARING THE DECEMBER
1991 BELOVEZHSKOYE ACCORD NULL AND VOID. THE
LINTON LWMLPHOTOCOPY
�'CONriDCNTIAL
DUMA'S COMMUNIST-LED ATTACKS ON RUSSIA'S
EXECUTIVE BRANCH CONTINUED THROUGH THE
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN JULY.
6. {GkTHE DUMA'S ATTITUDE SHIFTED ABRUPTLY
HOWEVER, WHEN IT CONVENED ON AUGUST 10 TO VOTE ON
THE RE-CONFIRMATION OF PRIME MINI
STER
CHERNOMYRDIN. DESPITE ZYUGANOV'S WARNING THAT
•G-0 N T I D L N I I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 000970
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/07
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, RS
SUBJECT: DUMA'S BARK WORSE THAN BITE IN FALL '96
HIS COMMUNISTS -- HOLDING NEARLY ONE-THIRD OF THE
DUMA'S SEATS -- WOULD NOT SUPPORT THE NOMINATION,
THE DUMA RE-CONFIRMED CHERNOMYRDIN BY A VOTE OF
314 TO 85 (REF. A). AS THE DUMA'S AUTUMN SESSION
PROGRESSED, THE COMMUNISTS INCREASINGLY FOCUSED
THEIR CRITICISM ON PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION
CHIEF ANATOLIY CHUBAYS RATHER THAN PRIME MINISTER
CHERNOMYRDIN. ZYUGANOV AND SELEZNEV WORKED TO
BUILD A TACTICAL ALLIANCE WITH CHERNOMYRDIN, WHOM
THEY SAW AS A NATURAL COUNTERWEIGHT TO CHUBAYS
AND A PROVIDER OF ACCESS TO REAL POWER (REFS. B,
C). ZYUGANOV AND SELEZNEV THUS LED THE DUMA FROM
THE BRINK OF CONFRONTATION WITH THE GOR ON
SEVERAL OCCASIONS, INCLUDING THREATENED NOCONFIDENCE VOTES OVER THE CHECHEN PEACE AGREEMENT
AND BUDGET (REF. D) IN DECEMBER.
7. (U) COOPERATION THUS CONTINUED TO
CHARACTERIZE THE DUMA'S RELATIONS WITH THE GOR
THROUGH THE END OF 1996. AS THE DUMA CLOSED ITS
AUTUMN SESSION ON DECEMBER 28, FIRST DEPUTY PRIME
MINISTER ALEKSANDR LIVSHITS WARMLY INVITED DUMA
DEPUTIES TO CONTINUE WORKING WITH THE GOR IN 1997
TO RESOLVE RUSSIA'S MOST PRESSING PROBLEMS.
SPEAKER SELEZNEV, MEANWHILE, GUSHED THAT "FOR THE
FIRST TIME, THE DUMA AND GOVERNMENT ARE NOW
WORKING TOGETHER TO PULL RUSSIA OUT OF CRISIS."
COOPERATION ROOTED IN DUMA'S WEAKNESS
8. - f € r WHILE THE IMPROVEMENT OF DUMA-GOR
RELATIONS WAS A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT, ITS ROOT
CAUSE PROVIDES REASON FOR CONCERN. ZYUGANOV AND
SELEZNEV ULTIMATELY SOUGHT ACCOMMODATION RATHER
THAN CONFRONTATION WITH THE GOR BECAUSE OF THE
DUMA'S RELATIVE WEAKNESS AS A POLITICAL
INSTITUTION. THE RUSSIAN CONSTITUTION DELINEATES
CLINTON LiUEARL P O O O Y
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�•CONriDENTW
A POLITICAL SYSTEM CONSISTING OF A WEAK
PARLIAMENT AND A STRONG PRESIDENT, WHICH ALLOWS
THE PRESIDENT TO ISSUE DECREES ON ALMOST ANY
MATTER, AS LONG AS THEY DO NOT CONTRADICT THE
CONSTITUTION OR FEDERAL LAW. MOREOVER, THE
PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY TO DISSOLVE THE DUMA (UNDER
CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES) HAS UNDERMINED THE
WILLINGNESS OF MANY DUMA DEPUTIES TO STAND UP TO
THE GOR ON KEY ISSUES SUCH AS THE PRIME
MINISTER'S CONFIRMATION AND THE BUDGET.
9. -{eTTHE ZYUGANOV-SELEZNEV "STRATEGY" OF
ACCOMMODATION IS OPPOSED BY CONS]RVATIVE
COMMUNISTS WHO ARGUE THAT THIS APPROACH DENIES
THEIR FACTION ITS OPPOSITION STATUS. GRIGORIY
YAVLINSKIY AND HIS PRO-REFORM YABLOKO FACTION,
MEANWHILE, SIMILARLY MAINTAIN THAT THE DUMA IS
LOSING ITS RELEVANCE AS AN INDEPENDENT BRANCH OF
POWER DUE TO ITS FAILURE TO STAND UP TO THE GOR.
HOWEVER, ZYUGANOV'S USE OF STRICT PARTY
DISCIPLINE AND HIS CONTROL OF A NEAR-MAJORITY 222
DUMA SEATS (THROUGH THE COMMUNISTS' ALLIANCE WITH
THE AGRARIAN AND "PEOPLE'S POWER" FACTIONS)
SHOULD ALLOW HIM TO KEEP THE DUMA ON A
COOPERATIVE COURSE WITH THE GOR, IF HE SO
DESIRES.
NEXT SESSION: AMENDMENT STRENGTHENING DUMA POWER?
10. AGT AS THE DUMA OPENS ITS SPRING 1997
SESSION, ITS LEGISLATIVE PRIORITIES ARE LIKELY TO
INCLUDE SOCIAL WELFARE ISSUES, MILITARY REFORM, A
FOURTH AND FINAL READING OF THE 1997 BUDGET, AND
ATTEMPTS TO STRENGTHEN PARLIAMENTARY POWERS
RELATIVE TO THE PRESIDENCY. IN THE WAKE OF
YELTSIN'S LATEST ILLNESS, SELEZNEV AND FELLOW
COMMUNIST VIKTOR ILYUKHIN HAVE REVIVED THEIR
THREAT OF LAST OCTOBER TO INTRODUCE LEGISLATION
TO DETERMINE WHEN THE PRESIDENT IS PHYSICALLY
INCAPACITATED, AND THUS REQUIRED TO SURRENDER HIS
AUTHORITY TO THE PRIME MINISTER. TO A CERTAIN
EXTENT, THIS LATEST MOVE REFLECTS THE COMMUNISTSPERCEIVED NEED TO REPAI THEIR IMAGE AS AN
OPPOSITION PARTY. IT DOES NOT, HOWEVER, MARK A
DEPARTURE FROM THEIR TACTIC OF ATTACKING THE
PRESIDENCY WHILE WORKING WITH THE GOVERNMENT. IT
IS THEREFORE APPARENT THAT THE DUMA'S RECENT
PATTERN OF BARKING LOUDLY BUT NOT BITING IS
LIKELY TO CONTINUE FOR THE NEXT FEW MONTHS,
ABSENT A MAJOR K
REMLIN SHAKE-UP.
- f i 0 H T I D E N T I ATSECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 000970
CLINTON I m m t P O O O Y
HTCP
�I.UNI IULN I IAL"
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/07
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, RS
SUBJECT: DUMA'S BARK WORSE THAN BITE IN FALL '96
TEFFT
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PREC: ROUTINE CLASS: CONriDCNTIAL SSN: 3787 MSGID: M2530022
RAACZYUW RUEHMOA3787 3440946-CCCC-RHEHAAX.
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 090946Z DEC 96
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
FM: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8801
INFO: RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 6965
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 6793
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 6915
C O N F I D E N-T I A L CECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 033787
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/9/06
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, RS
SUBJECT: COMMUNIST LEADER ZYUGANOV RESETS HIS SIGHTS
REFS: A) MOSCOW 30398 B) MOSCOW 26590 C) MOSCOW 31806
D) MOSCOW 27420 E) MOSCOW 33078
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR THOMAS
GRAHAM. REASONS: 1.5 B) AND D).
SUMMARY
2. -(G)- ALTHOUGH HE LOST JULY'S PRESIDENTIAL RUNOFF
ELECTIONS BY A WIDE MARGIN, COMMUNIST LEADER GENNADIY
ZYUGANOV REMAINS RUSSIA'S MOST PROMINENT OPPOSITION
POLITICIAN. HIS MAIN AMBITION, HOWEVER, SEEMS TO HAVE
SHIFTED FROM WINNING THE PRESIDENCY TO BECOMING THE
UNRIVALED LEADER OF A BROAD OPPOSITION BLOC CENTERED IN
THE DUMA, AND ENJOYING ACCESS TO EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY.
DESPITE SUBSTANTIAL ORGANIZATIONAL AND FINANCIAL
RESOURCES, ZYUGANOV IS UNLIKELY TO ACQUIRE SIGNIFICANTLY
GREATER INFLUENCE THAN HE ENJOYS AT PRESENT. HIS
LONGEVITY AT THE TOP LEVEL OF RUSSIAN POLITICS WILL
ULTIMATELY DEPEND ON WHETHER HE CAN SUCCESSFULLY RESIST
CENTRIFUGAL FORCES WITHIN THE OPPOSITION CAMP. END
SUMMARY.
DECLASSIFIED
AMBITIONS: TSAR OF ALL THE OPPOSITIONS
3. -(G^ZYUGANOV WOULD PROBABLY RUN IN THE NOW UNLIKELY
EVENT OF EARLY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. AS ZYUGANOV-
PER E.Oo 13526
�C I T N L B A Y POOOY
L N O I R R HTCP
EVENT OF EARLY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. AS ZYUGANOVADVISOR ALEKSEY PODBEREZKIN TOLD US JUST BEFORE YELTSIN'S
HEART SURGERY, "OF COURSE ZYUGANOV WOULD RUN. THERE
REALLY IS NO OTHER OPPOSITION CANDIDATE." ZYUGANOV'S
APPARENT PREFERENCE, HOWEVER, IS TO AVOID ANOTHER
POTENTIALLY HUMILIATING PRESIDENTIAL RACE. THROUGHOUT THE
AUTUMN, HE CONSISTENTLY AVOIDED ADVANCING HIS OWN NAME AS
A POSSIBLE CANDIDATE IN EARLY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS.
WHILE HE REPEATEDLY CALLED ON YELTSIN TO RESIGN FOR HEALTH
REASONS, ZYUGANOV ALSO CONSISTENTLY DEMANDED THAT
PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY BE TRANSFERRED TO PRIME MINISTER
CHERNOMYRDIN. EVEN WHEN ASKED DIRECTLY AND PRIVATELY BY
AMBASSADOR PICKERING WHETHER HE WOULD RUN IF EARLY
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS WERE HELD, ZYUGANOV DODGED THE
QUESTION (REF. A).
4. -(G)-ABOVE ALL, ZYUGANOV SEEKS TO GAIN THE
RESPECTABILITY AND AUTHORITY OF A TRUE STATESMAN WITHOUT
HAVING TO RUN AGAIN FOR PRESIDENT. HE WISHES TO BE SEEN
AS THE LEADER OF A BROAD BUT LOYAL OPPOSITION BLOC,
SERVING THE INTERESTS OF A WIDE CROSS-SECTION OF RUSSIAN
SOCIETY, AND ENJOYING ACCESS TO EXECUTIVE BRANCH POWER.
THE KEY TO ZYUGANOV'S POLITICAL STRATEGY IS HIS CONTINUING
EFFORT TO PORTRAY HIMSELF AS A MODERATE NATIONALIST RATHER
THAN A SOVIET-STYLE COMMUNIST. HE HAS EMBRACED
NATIONALIST RHETORIC AND PUBLISHED A BOOK OUTLINING HIS
VISION OF A STRONG, INDEPENDENT, NON-SOCIALIST RUSSIA. HE
ALSO ENGINEERED THE FORMATION OF THE PEOPLE'S PATRIOTIC
UNION OF RUSSIA (PPUR), A COALITION OF COMMUNISTS,
NATIONALISTS, AND AGRARIANS, TO BROADEN HIS SUPPORT BASE
(REF. D).
STRENGTHS: PERSONAL STATUS AND ORGANIZATION
5. (SBU) ZYUGANOV'S GREATEST STRENGTH IS HIS STATUS AS
RUSSIA'S MOST PROMINENT OPPOSITION FIGURE. BY LEADING
(AND MAINTAINING STRICT DISCIPLINE OVER) THE DUMA'S MOST
POWERFUL FACTION, ZYUGANOV'S AUTHORITY OUTSTRIPS THAT OF
ANQ OTHER PARLIAMENTARIAN, INCLUDING DUMA SPEAKER GENNADIY
SELEZNEV. ZYUGANOV IS ALSO THE DE-FACTO LEADER OF A NEARMAJORITY BLOC OF 220 DUMA DEPUTIES THAT INCLUDES THE
COMMUNIST, PEOPLE'S POWER, AND AGRARIAN FACTIONS. HE
CONSEQUENTLY ENJOYS CONSTANT MEDIA EXPOSURE, DRAWING MORE
JOURNALISTS TO HIS PRESS CONFERENCES THAN ANY OTHER DUMA
DEPUTY.
6. (SBU) ZYUGANOV'S SECOND ADVANTAGE IS HIS ACCESS TO
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES. AS LEADER OF A DUMA FACTION,
ZYUGANOV RECEIVES A LARGE SUITE OF OFFICES, STAFF, PHONES,
COMPUTERS AND CARS, ALL AT GOR EXPENSE. MOREOVER, AS
CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
(CPRF), ZYUGANOV ALSO SITS ATOP RUSSIA'S ONLY TRULY
NATIONWIDE POLITICAL PARTY. THE CPRF CLAIMS A MEMBERSHIP
OF OVER 500,000, WITH LOCAL CHAPTERS OPERATING IN
THOUSANDS OF TOWNS AND VILLAGES IN EACH OF THE 89 SUBJECTS
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. THE CPRF ALSO OWNS DOZENS OF
�OF THE RUSSIAN
NEWSPAPERS AND OVERSEES A NATIONWIDE NETWORK OF GRASSROOTS ACTIVISTS. NO OTHER POLITICAL ORGANIZATION CAN
MATCH EITHER THE NUMBERS OR THE GEOGRAPHIC REACH OF THE
CPRF.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 033787
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/9/06
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, RS
SUBJECT: COMMUNIST LEADER ZYUGANOV RESETS HIS SIGHTS
7. -(G}—ZYUGANOV MAY ALSO ENJOY SIGNIFICANT SOURCES OF
FINANCIAL SUPPORT. IT IS WIDELY RUMORED THAT THE CPRF
GAINED ACCESS TO SOME OF THE BILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN
COMMUNIST PARTY FUNDS THAT WERE TRANSFERRED TO COMMERCIAL
BANKS AS THE SOVIET UNION WAS COLLAPSING, THANKS IN PART
TO THE EFFORTS OF FORMER SOVIET PRIME MINISTER AND
PEOPLE'S POWER LEADER NIKOLAY RYZHKOV. WHETHER OR NOT
THESE RUMORS ARE TRUE, SEVERAL WELL-CONNECTED JOURNALISTS
HAVE ALSO TOLD US THAT ZYUGANOV AND THE CPRF ARE NOW
DEVELOPING PATRONS IN MOSCOWS BANKING WORLD. A SENIOR
EDITOR OF "SEGODNYA", FOR EXAMPLE, RECENTLY MENTIONED THAT
INKOMBANK AND MENATEP ARE PROVIDING SOME FUNDS TO ZYUGANOV
AND THE CPRF. ZYUGANOV ADVISOR ALEKSEY PODBEREZKIN HAS
ALSO TOLD US THAT THE COMMUNISTS ENJOY GOOD RELATIONS WITH
MOSCOW BANKERS AND BUSINESSMEN. HE ADDED THAT IN THE CASE
OF EARLY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, "WE WOULD HAVE ENOUGH
MONEY FOR ZYUGANOV TO RUN A DECENT CAMPAIGN."
WEAKNESSES: NARROW SUPPORT; LOW CHARISMA
8. -(6)- ZYUGANOV'S PRIMARY WEAKNESS IS THE POOR PROSPECTS
FOR EXPANDING HIS ELECTORATE BEYOND THE CORE COMMUNIST
VOTE, ROUGHLY 20-25 PERCENT OF THE ELECTORATE. THE
COMMUNIST MONIKER THUS APPEARS TO ALIENATE MORE VOTERS
THAN IT ATTRACTS. AS MIKHAIL GORBACHEV TOLD AMBAcSADOR
PICKERING IN OCTOBER, "50 PERCENT OF THE RUSSIANS THAT
VOTED FOR YELTSIN DID NOT SUPPORT HIM; THEY SIMPLY FEARED
THE COMMUNISTS." SIMILARLY, ONE ZYUGANOV AIDE RECENTLY
CONFIDED TO US, "WE NEVER REALIZED HOW BADLY THE WORD
'COMMUNIST' WOULD HURT US DURING THE PRESIDENTIAL RACE."
WHETHER ZYUGANOV CAN CONVINCE RUSSIAN VOTERS HE IS
ANYTHING "MORE" THAN A SOVIET-STYLE COMMUNIST REMAINS TO
BE SEEN. FOR NOW, HOWEVER, EVEN FORMER COMMUNISTS FROM
EASTERN EUROPE VIEW ZYUGANOV AS AN OLD-STYLE THINKER.
ACCORDING TO A CONTACT AT THE POLISH EMBASSY, PRESIDENT
KWASNIEWSKI REMARKED AFTER HIS MOSCOW VISIT THIS SUMMER
THAT HIS VIEWS ARE MUCH CLOSER TO YELTSIN'S THAN TO
ZYUGANOV'S. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF ZYUGANOV IS SUCCESSFUL
IN PLAYING DOWN THE COMMUNIST ELEMENTS OF HIS WORLDVIEW,
IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT HE WILL BE ABLE TO HOLD ON TO THE
LARGER SHARE OF THE CORE COMMUNIST VOTE.
9. -ferZYUGANOV'S L A C K OF CHARISMA IS ANOTHER WEAKNESS.
IN PRIVATE MEETINGS, HE DOES NOT EMIT THE AURA OF A GREAT
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
LEADER. DESPITE HIS WARM PERSONALITY AND HEALTHY SENSE OF
HUMOR, HIS WOODEN MANNERISMS AND USE OF PARTY SLOGANS
CONVEY THE SENSE OF A PRE-PROGRAMMED POLITICIAN RATHER
THAN AN ENERGETIC THINKER. IN PUBLIC, HIS FACE OFTEN
TAKES ON A DEER-IN-THE-HEADLIGHTS EXPRESSION THAT SEEMS TO
BETRAY SELF-DOUBT. WHILE HIS BOOMING VOICE AND ABILITY TO
DODGE TOUGH QUESTIONS MAY COMFORT COMMUNIST TRUEBELIEVERS, THEY DO NOT SEEM TO REASSURE YOUNGER LOOKING
FOR REASONABLE AND FORWARD-LOOKING ANSWERS TO RUSSIA'S
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS.
PROSPECTS
10. - ( e r i N ALMOST ANY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION SCENARIO
OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS, ZYUGANOV WOULD ENCOUNTER STIFF
OPPOSITION FROM MOSCOWS BUSINESS ELITE.
BUSINESS/POLITICAL GIANTS SUCH AS VLADIMIR j S P l M M AND
BORIS BEREZOVSKIY ARE SURE TO RENEW T H E I R A C L - O U T ASSAULT
ON ZYUGANOV, FREEZING HIM OUT OF POSITIVE MEDIA STORIES
AND PORTRAYING HIM AS A FRIGHTENING REACTIONARY, AS THEY
DID DURING THIS SUMMER'S PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN. IT IS
HARD TO BELIEVE THAT ZYUGANOV WOULD ENJOY GREATER SUCCESS
A SECOND TIME AROUND.
11. - f e r C E N
TRIFUGAL FORCES WITHIN THE OPPOSITION CAMP,
MEANWHILE, UNDERCUT ZYUGANOV'S QUEST TO LEAD A UNIFIED
OPPOSITION. HIS ABILITY TO RELY ON THE PPUR TO BROADEN
HIS ELECTORAL APPEAL WAS UNDERMINED BY THE DEFECTIONS OF
TWO OF THE UNION'S TOP LEADERS, AMAN TULEYEV (NOW MINISTER
OF CIS AFFAIRS) AND ALEKSANDR RUTSKOY (WHO DECLARED HIS
LOYALTY TO THE KREMLIN FOLLOWING HIS GUBERNATORIAL VICTORY
IN KURSK). MOREOVER, PPUR CO-CHAIRMAN AND AGRARIAN PARTY
(APR) LEADER MIKHAIL LAPSHIN HAS TOLD US FOR MONTHS OF HIS
CONTINUING RESISTANCE TO THE CPRF'S ATTEMPTS TO DOMINATE
THE APR. A LAPSHIN STAFFER SIMILARLY COMPLAINED TO US
RECENTLY OF CPRF ATTEMPTS "TO EXTEND ITS ROOF (KRYSHA)
OVER ALL OPPOSITION GROUPS."
12. - ( e f FISSURES WITHIN ZYUGANOV'S OWN PARTY AND DUMA
FACTION POSE ANOTHER DANGER. A BLOC OF CONSERVATIVE
COMMUNISTS ARE RUMORED TO BE READY TO QUIT THE FACTION IN
GO N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 033787
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/9/06
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, RS
SUBJECT: COMMUNIST LEADER ZYUGANOV RESETS HIS SIGHTS
PROTEST OF ZYUGANOV'S STRICT PARTY DISCIPLINE AND HIS
WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH THE GOVERNMENT. ACCORDING
TO ANOTHER RUMOR, THE GOR IS SIMULTANEOUSLY TRYING TO FORM
A NEW PRO-GOVERNMENT FACTION BY DRAWING MEMBERS AWAY FROM
THE COMMUNISTS, PEOPLE'S POWER, AND THE AGRARIANS. IF
SUCCESSFUL, THIS EFFORT COULD DROP PEOPLE'S POWER AND THE
AGRARIANS BELOW THE MINIMUM 35 MEMBERS REQUIRED TO QUALIFY
AS FACTIONS. IN THIS CASE, THE COMMUNISTS WOULD LOSE MUCH
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
AS FACTIONS. IN THIS CASE, THE COMMUNISTS WOULD LOSE MUCH
OF THEIR ABILITY TO EXERT CONTROL OVER DUMA STRUCTURES,
THUS DEALING A SERIOUS BLOW TO ZYUGANOV'S PRESTIGE.
13. ^ - Z Y U G A N O V MUST ALSO COME UP WITH A NEW POLITICAL
STRATEGY IN RESPONSE TO YELTSIN'S IMPROVING HEALTH (REF.
E). SINCE LATE SUMMER, ZYUGANOV HAS RELIED ON A TACIT
ALLIANCE WITH PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN TO PROVIDE
ACCESS TO REAL POWER (REFS. B,C). AS YELTSIN'S HEALTH
DETERIORATED, ZYUGANOV AND CHERNOMYRDIN RECOGNIZED THAT
THEY SHARED TWO KEY INTERESTS: UNDERCUTTING THE GROWING
POWER OF PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION CHIEF CHUBAYS AND
DELAYING EARLY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS THAT ALEKSANDR LEBED
WAS LIKELY TO WIN. ZYUGANOV'S AND CHERNOMYRDIN'S TEAMS
BEGAN TO CONSULT REGULARLY, AND THE TWO LEADERS AVOIDED
PUBLIC CRITICISM OF EACH OTHER. AS THE THREAT OF EARLY
ELECTIONS HAS RECEDED, HOWEVER, THIS RELATIONSHIP
APPARENTLY HAS BEGUN TO BREAK DOWN. DURING THE PAST TWO
WEEKS, ZYUGANOV HAS PUBLICLY ATTACKED CHERNOMYRDIN FOR THE
FIRST TIME IN MONTHS, CRITICIZING THE PRIME MINISTER'S
HANDLING OF THE CHECHNYA PEACE AGREEMENT AND THE FEDERAL
BUDGET. VIKTOR ILYUKHIN, A LEADING COMMUNIST DUMA DEPUTY,
HAS TOLD US TO EXPECT MAJOR CHANGES IN CPRF STRATEGY SOON:
"OUR COOPERATION WITH CHERNOMYRDIN HAS NOT WORKED OUT...
AND A MAJOR CORRECTION IN OUR APPROACH IS LIKELY AT OUR
DECEMBER 13-14 PLENUM."
14. -(GfOVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS, ZYUGANOV'S STRENGTHS
ARE LIKELY TO KEEP HIM ATOP THE OPPOSITION CAMP. BUT HIS
FAILURE TO WRAP UP JULY'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND HIS
READINESS TO COOPERATE WITH THE GOVERNMENT LEAVE THE DOOR
OPEN FOR A MORE CHARISMATIC AND CONSERVATIVE CHALLENGER TO
ARISE LATER IN 1997.
TEFFT
DIST:
DIST>
SIT: FORT PIFER RUMER
SIT: NSC
�Weiss, Andrew S.
Sent:
To:
Subject:
WHSR
Wednesday, February 10, 1999 10:26 AM
Pascual, Carlos E.; Sigler, Ralph H.; Weiss, Andrew S.
AMBASSADOR'S FEBRUARY 5 MEETING WITH RUSSIAN
CLASS:
DTG:
MSGTO:
ORIG:
PREC:
SSN:
TOR:
101429Z FEB 99
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4902
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
IMMEDIATE
2993
990210101605 M3687769
From:
- e - E l T K h TSECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 002993
NODIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2004
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S FEBRUARY 5 MEETING WITH RUSSIAN
BUSINESS TYCOON BEREZOVSKIY
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR JAMES F. COLLINS. REASON: 1.5
(B) AND (D).
SUMMARY
1 .-(SHN THE MIDST OF WHAT HE CALLED A "WAR" WITH
PRIMAKOV, BEREZOVSKIY CALLED ON THE AMBASSADOR ON
FEBRUARY 5 TO WARN OF PRIMAKOVS DESIGNS ON THE RUSSIAN
PRESIDENCY AS YELTSIN'S SUCCESSOR. BEREZOVSKIY
SHRUGGED OFF THE MUCH PUBLICIZED GOVERNMENT RAIDS ON
BUSINESSES REPUTED TO BE STRONGHOLDS OF BEREZOVSKIY'S
EMPIRE, BUT COMPLAINED THAT PRIMAKOV IS USING THE POWER
MINISTRIES AND PRESSURE ON THE MEDIA TO HELP SECURE HIS
CLAIM TO YELTSIN'S POST. ARGUING THAT PRIMAKOV'S
"POLITICAL ACCORD" BACKFIRED, BEREZOVSKIY PREDICTED
THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE OUT OF A JOB BY MAY AND HE MADE CLEAR THAT HE AND OTHERS WERE WORKING TO
ENSURE A "SOFT" (I.E., WITHOUT CONFRONTATION)
TRANSITION TO A NEW PRIME MINISTER. BEREZOVSKIY ASKED
IF THE U.S. WOULD BE PREPARED TO HELP STABILIZE RUSSIA
IN SUCH A CIRCUMSTANCE. END SUMMARY
PRIMAKOV AND BEREZOVSKIY AT WAR
2. ^6)-BORIS BEREZOVSKIY'S FIRST CALL ON THE
AMBASSADOR IN 1999, ON FEBRUARY 5, WAS DISTINGUISHED BY
THE OBVIOUS SIGNS OF WORRY REFLECTED ON THE FACE AND IN
THE VOICE OF THE REPUTED "OLIGARCH." BEREZOVSKIY
DESCRIBED HIS CURRENT CONFRONTATION WITH PRIMAKOV AS A
"WAR," BUT SHRUGGED OFF THE REAL IMPACT IT WOULD HAVE
ON HIS INTERESTS IN THE BUSINESSES WHICH GOVERNMENT
FORCES HAVE RAIDED SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE MONTH.
THIS WAR IS DIFFERENT, HE ARGUED - TACTICALLY DIFFERENT
AND COMPLICATED.
PER E„(l 13526
3.- ^ B E R E Z O V S K I Y DREW THE AMBASSADOR'S ATTENTION TO
THE NEWS OF PROCURATOR GENERAL YUR Y SKURATpV'S MUCH
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�PUBLICIZED REQUEST TO RESIGN. HE NOTED THAT SKURATOV'S
RESIGNATION WOULD BE A WELCOME DEVELOPMENT, GIVEN
SKURATOVS CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH HARD-LINE COMMUNIST
DUMA DEPUTY VIKTOR ILYUKHIN. BEREZOVSKIY COMPARED
SKURATOVS CONNECTIONS WITH THE COMMUNISTS TO THOSE OF
TAX POLICE CHIEF SERGEY ALMAZOV'S, ARGUING THAT WHILE
ALMAZOVS LINKS ARE JUST AS BAD, SKURATOV IS MUCH MORE
BLATANT ABOUT HIS.
4. -^-REGARDING REPLACEMENTS FOR SKURATOV,
BEREZOVSKIY MENTIONED THREE POSSIBILITIES -- SKURATOVS
PRESENT DEPUTY MIKHAIL KATYSHEV, THE ACTING PROCURATOR
GENERAL YURIY CHAYKA, AND PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION
DEPUTY HEAD YEVGENIY LISOV. BEREZOVSKIY RULED OUT
KATYSHEV, CONCLUDED THAT CHAYKA WOULD NOT TAKE THE JOB,
AND SPECULATED THAT LISOV IS THE MOST LIKELY SUCCESSOR.
PRIMAKOV'S PRESIDENTIAL AMBITIONS
5. - i j & m IS MORE AND MORE OBVIOUS, BEREZOVSKIY
WARNED, WHAT PRIMAKOVS REAL INTENTIONS ARE. WITH
PRIMAKOV'S MEAGER EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE ECONOMY
FAILING, IT IS CLEAR THAT HIS PRIORITY IS NOT THE
ECONOMY. ACCORDING TO BEREZOVSKIY, HIS REAL OBJECTIVE
AND CLEAR PRIORITY IS GETTING INTO POWER. BEREZOVSKIY
EXPLAINED HOW PRIMAKOVS ACTIONS REGARDING HIS PROPOSED
"POLITICAL ACCORD" HAD UPSET PRESIDENT YELTSIN. IT
BECAME OBVIOUS TO YELTSIN THAT PRIMAKOV WAS AFTER THE
PRESIDENCY.
6. -{e)-BEREZOVSKIY RELATED THAT WHEN YELTSIN AND
PRIMAKOV FIRST MET FACE-TO-FACE AFTER PRIMAKOV ALREADY
HAD SENT THE PROPOSAL TO THE DUMA, THEY HAD A NASTY
CONFRONTATION. PRIMAKOV STORMED OUT OF THE MEETING
THREATENING TO "WRITE HIS STATEMENT" (I.E.,
RESIGNATION), THOUGH HE ACTUALLY DID NOT FOLLOW THROUGH
WITH THIS THREAT. YELTSIN HAS NO LOVE FOR PRIMAKOV,
BEREZOVSKIY CONCLUDED.
7. -{6)-THE REASONING BEHIND THE LETTER IS NOT AN EASY
THING TO UNDERSTAND, ARGUED BEREZOVSKIY. HE COMPARED
IT TO SHAKHRAY'S PROPOSAL ABOUT CHECHNYA -- A BAD IDEA,
AND AN OVERSIMPLISTIC ATTEMPT TO SEPARATE HIS
SUPPORTERS FROM HIS DETRACTORS. BEREZOVSKIY BELIEVED
THAT NEITHER LUZHKOV NOR ZYUGANOV WOULD SUPPORT THE
ACCORD AND IT ULTIMATELY WOULD FADE FROM THE POLITICAL
SPECTRUM. BESIDES, BEREZOVSKIY CONCLUDED, THE ACCORD
IS ONLY WORDS ON A LETTER. THE PRESIDENT UNDERSTANDS
THIS AND IT WILL NOT AFFECT HIS POSITION.
C E O PM!: I SECTION 02 OF 04 MOSCOW 002993
NODIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2004
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S FEBRUARY 5 MEETING WITH RUSSIAN
BUSINESS TYCOON BEREZOVSKIY
8. -4S)-PRIMAKOVS STRATEGY, BEREZOVSKIY MAINTAINS, IS
TO USE POWER MINISTRIES AND PRESSURE ON THE MEDIA,
PARTICULARLY ORT, TO ENSURE HIS CONTROL OF THE LEVERS
BY WHICH HE CAN ELEVATE HIMSELF TO THE PRESIDENCY. TO
UNDERSCORE THIS, BEREZOVSKIY NOTED THAT PRIMAKOV
GRADUALLY HAS BEEN PUTTING INTO INFLUENTIAL POSITIONS
HIS OWN PEOPLE (I.E., FORMER SVR/KGB CRONIES). THIS
GIVES PRIMAKOV GREATER FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND HELPS TO
ENSURE THAT THE QUALITY OF H S POWER S100P ERCENT
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�COMPLETE. BEREZOVSKIY CITED SPECIFICALLY GOVERNMENT
PRESSURE TO REMOVE ORT'S SHABDURASULOV AS AN EXAMPLE.
SUCH "PALACE GAMES" WILL CONTINUE AS LONG AS PRIMAKOV
IS PURSUING HIS OBJECTIVE, BEREZOVSKIY MAINTAINED.
9.-(8)-BEREZOVSKIY ARGUED, HOWEVER, THAT BORIS
YELTSIN, THOUGH WEAKER, REMAINS THE LAST HOPE FOR
RUSSIA'S IMMEDIATE FUTURE. YELTSIN STILL HAS
TREMENDOUS LEVERS AT HIS DISPOSAL AND, DESPITE HIS ILL
HEALTH, WILL MANAGE TO SERVE OUT HIS TERM AS PRESIDENT,
BEREZOVSKIY MAINTAINS. MEANWHILE, THE INTERNAL
SITUATION IS LIKELY TO WORSEN, THOUGHT THE EXTERNAL
SITUATION FOR RUSSIA HAS MORE POTENTIAL FOR STABILITY.
PRIMAKOV OUT BY MAY - BUT WITH A "SOFT" LANDING
10. -^DESCRIBING PRIMAKOV AS HIS "IDEOLOGICAL
ENEMY," BEREZOVSKIY WARNED AGAINST BEING TAKEN IN BY
THE PRIME MINISTER AND CHARGED THAT PRIMAKOV ACTUALLY
IS AS "RED AS A TOMATO." BEREZOVSKIY DECLARED THAT
PRIMAKOV WOULD NOT SERVE AS PRIME MINISTER BEYOND MAY.
WARNING THAT IF THE "REDS" COME TO POWER AGAIN THEY
WILL STAY MUCH LONGER, BEREZOVSKIY STRESSED THAT
WITHOUT EXTERNAL HELP, IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR RUSSIA
TO GET ITSELF OUT OF THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SWAMP
IT IS IN NOW. HE EXPRESSED PROFOUND PESSIMISM THAT
RUSSIA'S DOMESTIC SITUATION WOULD IMPROVE.
11 .-^erTHE AMBASSADOR UNDERSCORED THE VALUE AND
IMPORTANCE OF THE COMMON STRATEGY OF OUR TWO PRESIDENTS
AIMED AT RUSSIA'S INTEGRATION INTO THE POLITICAL,
SECURITY, ECONOMIC AND DEMOCRATIC GLOBAL COMMUNITIES.
HE REMINDED BEREZOVSKIY OF THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE
REGARDING A REALISTIC APPROACH IN OUR RELATIONS WITH
RUSSIA AND THAT THE U.S. HAS MADE CLEAR ITS PRINCIPLES
IN THIS REGARD AND INTENDS TO STICK TO THEM. THE
AMBASSADOR ASKED ABOUT OTHER PRESIDENTIAL CONTENDERS.
12. ^ B E R E Z O V S K I Y OBSERVED THAT MOSCOW MAYOR YURIY
LUZHKOV HAS CHANGED SOMEWHAT HIS POLITICAL POSITION
RECENTLY AND HAS ADOPTED A WAIT-AND-SEE ATTITUDE (ABOUT
THE PRESIDENCY). STILL, BEREZOVSKIY NOTED, LUZHKOV
REMAINS MUCH WEAKER THAN PRIMAKOV. REGARDING LEBED,
BEREZOVSKIY OBSERVED THAT THE KRASNOYARSK GOVERNOR IS
CLOSER TO MANY OF THE PRESIDENT'S OWN POSITIONS,
PARTICULARLY REGARDING THE WAR ON CRIME AND CORRUPTION
AND NON-PROLIFERATION. LEBED WANTS TO SHOW THAT HE IS
A FIGHTER AGAINST CORRUPTION AND IS DEMONSTRATING THIS
EVEN NOW IN KRASNOYARSK WAR HE IS ENGAGED IN AGAINST
LOCAL ALUMINUM MAGNATE BYKOV. BEREZOVSKIY EVEN CLAIMED
THAT, ACCORDING TO THE LATEST POLLS, SHOULD THE
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION BE HELD TODAY LEBED COULD WIN.
(COMMENT: NOT ACCORDING TO THE POLLS WE HAVE SEEN.
END COMMENT)
13.4S)-YAVLINSKIY, MEANWHILE, REMAINS TOO CLOSELY
ASSOCIATED WITH MOST (I.E., GUSINSKIY) AND IT PAST TIME
FOR HIM TO TAKE A DEFINITIVE STANCE OF HIS OWN.
YAVLINSKIY, BEREZOVSKIY BELIEVES, CONTINUES TO SUFFER
FROM AN ILLUSION THAT PRIMAKOV WILL INVITE HIM TO
REPLACE MASLYUKOV (AS FIRST DEPUTY PM), BUT THIS IS
ONLY AN ILLUSION. PRIMAKOV WILL NOT DO THAT. AT THE
SAME TIME, MOST'S NTV IS STILL TRYING TO PLAY ALL
SIDES. BEREZOVSKIY STRESSED THAT NTV'S INFLUENCE COULD
BE DANGEROUS.
BEREZOVSKIVS VIEWS FOREIGN POLICY
OTtMTfBRARY p
HOTOCO
p
Y
�14.-{SHN RESPONSE TO THE AMBASSADOR'S QUESTION ABOUT
RISING ANTI-AMERICANISM, BEREZOVSKIY NOTED THAT THERE
ARE MANY LEVELS TO THIS. HE WARNED THAT THE PRIME
MINISTER IS NOT A CONCRETE (I.E., RELIABLE) PARTNER
AND, CITING KOSOVO AS AN EXAMPLE, SAID THAT U.S.RUSSIAN RELATIONS ARE ON THE WRONG TRACK. HE ARGUED
THAT THE MORE LIBERAL PART OF RUSSIAN SOCIETY HOLD
OPPOSITE VIEWS OF AMERICA. IT CONTINUES TO PERCEIVE
THE U.S. AS THE CARRIER OF DEMOCRATIC IDEALS AS WELL AS
A POWERFUL COUNTRY WITH GLOBAL PLANS. UNFORTUNATELY,
THE U.S. BOMBING OF IRAQ AND OTHER RECENT EVENTS HAVE
CALLED THIS POSITIVE ASSESSMENT INTO QUESTION.
C E C nCTGECTION 03 OF 04 MOSCOW 002993
NODIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2004
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S FEBRUARY 5 MEETING WITH RUSSIAN
BUSINESS TYCOON BEREZOVSKIY
15. -^6)- BEREZOVSKIY COMMENTED ON THE EXPANSION OF
NATO, CHARGING THAT IT WAS A MISTAKE FOR RUSSIA NOT TO
CAPITALIZE IMMEDIATELY ON NATO'S INVITATION TO RUSSIA
TO BECOME A MEMBER. EVEN IF RUSSIA HAD AGREED SIMPLY
TO LEAVE SUCH AN OPTION OPEN FOR THE FUTURE, IT WOULD
BE IN A FAR BETTER POSITION VIS-A-VIS NATO THAN IT IS
TODAY. BEREZOVSKIY ADMITTED THAT HE HAD OPPOSED
RUSSIA'S AGREEMENT TO THE "FOUNDING ACT," ARGUING THAT
IT SEVERELY LIMITED RUSSIA'S INFLUENCE WITH NATO.
PRIMAKOV'S VIEW ON THIS MATTER, HOWEVER, PREVAILED. AS
A RESULT, BEREZOVSKIY MAINTAINED, RUSSIA EXTRACTED NO
BENEFITS FROM THIS MOVE.
16. -(^-NOTING AN EMERGING CONVICTION ON THE PART OF
THE RUSSIAN ELITE THAT A CONFRONTATION (ECONOMIC)
BETWEEN THE U.S. AND EUROPE IS BREWING, BEREZOVSKIY
REPORTED THAT THERE ARE THOSE THAT WELCOME THIS,
BELIEVING THAT SUCH A CONFRONTATION WOULD BENEFIT
RUSSIA. HE EXPRESSED DOUBTS THAT SUCH CONVICTIONS HAVE
ANY BASIS SINCE RUSSIA CAN ONLY BENEFIT IF THERE IS A
SOUND ECONOMIC BASIS FOR INTEGRATION. HE LATER NOTED
THAT SUCH IS THE SAME FOR THE CIS -- THE MOST IMPORTANT
REAL OBJECTIVE IS THE INTEGRATION OF THE ECONOMIES.
EVEN BELARUS PRESIDENT LUKASHENKO AGREED THAT, WITHOUT
A COMMON ECONOMIC STANDARD BETWEEN RUSSIA AND BELARUS,
THERE IS NO POINT TO A UNION.
17. -{6)-THE AMBASSADOR EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF
STABILITY AND PREDICTABILITY IN THE BUILDING OF
ECONOMIC TIES AND URGED BEREZOVSKIY TO EXERCISE CAUTION
ABOUT VIEWING EUROPE AND THE U.S. IN CONFRONTATION. HE
UNDERSCORED THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMON ECONOMIC TIES,
NOTING IN PARTICULAR THAT SUCH TIES ARE STRONG BETWEEN
EUROPE AND THE U.S. AND THAT RUSSIA SHOULD AIM TO
CREATE A SIMILAR ECONOMIC BASIS FOR COOPERATION. ASKED
IF POLITICAL CHANGES IN THE U.S. COULD AFFECT THE LEVEL
OF ASSISTANCE THE U.S. WOULD OFFER RUSSIA, THE
AMBASSADOR SAID MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON WHETHER OR NOT
THERE WERE SIGNIFICANT DISRUPTIONS (AS VIEWED FROM THE
U.S.) IN RUSSIA.
18. - ^ F O L L O W I N G UP, MAKING HIS POINT NOW IN
CAREFULLY CHOSEN ENGLISH BEREZOVSKIY ASKED A
HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION. IF, AS A RESULT OF AN INTERNAL
POLITICAL FIGHT, THE "RIGHT" GOVERNMENT EMERGED IN MAY,
WITHOUT A CONFRONTATION W TH THE DUMA, BUT RATHER WI H
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�A "SOFT" CHANGE IN LEADERSHIP, IT CERTAINLY WOULD NOT
BE ABLE TO IMPROVE THE ECONOMIC SITUATION BEFORE THE
ELECTIONS. BUT SUCH A GOVERNMENT WOULD UNDERSTAND AND
HAVE A "CLEARER" APPROACH ON WHO AND HOW THE ECONOMY
SHOULD BE LEAD. IN THIS CASE, HE ASKED, WOULD THE U.S.
BE READY TO HELP STABILIZE THE SITUATION IN RUSSIA?
WOULD THE U.S. BE ABLE TO MOVE THE COUNTRY FORWARD?
19. -(SJ-THE AMBASSADOR RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT
WASHINGTON AND THE EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS ARE REALISTIC
ABOUT RUSSIA AND STAND BY THEIR PRINCIPLES NO MATTER
WHO LEADS THE GOVERNMENT OF RUSSIA. MOST WANT AND
BELIEVE THEY MUST HAVE SOME MEANS OF PARTICIPATING IN
RUSSIA IN A WAY THAT CAN WORK. THEY WANT TO KNOW THAT
THERE IS A GOVERNMENT THAT CAN IMPLEMENT A REALISTIC
BUDGET, THAT WILL GOVERN DEMOCRATICALLY, AND THAT HAS
STABLE AND REALISTIC POLICIES. IF WE SEE THAT KIND OF
GOVERNMENT, THE KIND THAT IS COMMITTED TO THESE GOALS
AND CAN ACHIEVE THEM, THE U.S. WILL SUPPORT THE
PRINCIPLES WE HAVE ARTICULATED CONSISTENTLY. THE
AMBASSADOR EMPHASIZED THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO BE
REALISTIC ABOUT WHAT IS NEEDED IN TODAY'S ENVIRONMENT.
AT THE SAME TIME, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT RUSSIANS
UNDERSTAND THAT IT IS NOT TRUE THAT THE U.S. WANTS TO
WEAKEN RUSSIA A WEAKENED RUSSIA WOULD BE A DANGEROUS
PARTNER.
20. -(e)-BEREZOVSKIY THANKED THE AMBASSADOR FOR HIS
TIME AND INFORMED HIM THAT HE WOULD BE RESTING FOR THE
NEXT TWO WEEKS, PERHAPS SPENDING PART OF THAT TIME OUT
OF THE COUNTRY, BUT WOULD RETURN THREE DAYS BEFORE THE
CIS SUMMIT ON FEBRUARY 26.
COMMENT
21. i & f DESPITE SHRUGGING OFF THE POSSIBLE IMPACT
GOVERNMENT RAIDS ON HIS BUSINESS INTERESTS COULD HAVE,
BEREZOVSKIY APPEARED WORRIED AND SPOKE IN HUSHED TONES.
HE DISMISSED AS FOOLISHNESS THE DUMA'S THIRD CALL TO
SACK HIM AS CIS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ADOPTED EARLIER
THE SAME DAY, BUT SEEMED LESS SELF-CONFIDENT ABOUT HIS
ABILITY TO ENGINEER PRIMAKOV'S REMOVAL ANYTIME SOON.
WHETHER OR NOT HE STILL BELIEVES HE HAS THE INFLUENCE
TO SEE TO PRIMAKOV'S OUSTER, HE CLEARLY SEES MAY AS THE
• S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 04 MOSCOW 002993
NODIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2004
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S FEBRUARY 5 MEETING WITH RUSSIAN
BUSINESS TYCOON BEREZOVSKIY
TURNING POINT. BEREZOVSKIY DID NOT COMMENT ON RECENT
RUMORS OF PENDING RESIGNATIONS FROM PRIMAKOV'S CABINET
NOW CIRCULATING ABOUT MOSCOW. BRITISH AMBASSADOR SIR
ANDREW WOOD INFORMED US FEBRUARY 10 THAT FORMER YELTSIN
CHIEF OF STAFF YUMASHEV EXPRESSED TO HIM SERIOUS
CONCERN ABOUT DEPUTY PRIME MINISTERS MASLYUKOV AND
KULIK. YUMASHEV, WIDELY BELIEVED TO BE CLOSE TO
BEREZOVSKIY, SAID THAT THEY DEFINITELY ARE NOT UP TO
THE JOB AND SHOULD GO, AND THAT PRIMAKOV MAY HAVE TO GO
AS WELL, THOUGH HE WAS LESS CATEGORICAL ON THAT POINT.
22. -(e)-NEVERTHELESS, BEREZOVSKIY DID NOT SOUND
THREATENING IN HIS DESIRE TO SEE PRIMAKOV REMOVED. HIS
REFERENCE TO A "SOFT" TRANSITION INDICATES THAT HE
FORESEES PRIMAKOV'S DEPAR UBEAS ONE TO WHICH PRIMAKQy
CLTNTOR LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�ALSO WOULD AGREE, AND WHICH WOULD HAVE THE SUPPORT OF
THE DUMA AND THE PRESIDENT. STILL, BEREZOVSKIY'S
THINLY-VEILED QUERY ABOUT U.S. SUPPORT IN SUCH A
CIRCUMSTANCE AND HIS WELL-DEVELOPED PENCHANT FOR
SCHEMING SHOULD BE INTERPRETED AS A WARNING TO BE EXTRA
CAUTIOUS ABOUT REACTING TO RUMORS OR EVENTS IN THE
COMING MONTHS TOO QUICKLY. IT ALSO PUTS A PREMIUM ON
OUR BEING CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS IN STATING OUR SUPPORT
FOR POLICY AND PRINCIPLE AND NOT PERSONALITIES.
COLLINS
C I T N L B A Y POOOY
L N O I R R HTCP
�FROM DEPARTMENT OF
STATE 4B
(THU)
,
1. 28 99 1 5 : 16/ST. 15: 14/NO. 3760626058 P
2
Toria:
John T e f f t saw Berezovskiy today. Berezovskiy, saying he was
meeting tomorrow (January 29) w i t h Summers i n Davos, t o l d us the
following.
He s t a r t e d o f f by p r a i s i n g the e a r l i e r r e f o r m e r s , and knocking
Primakov. He claimed t h a t Primakov was t r y i n g t o c o n s o l i d a t e
power, g e t t i n g c o n t r o l over the s e c r e t s e r v i c e s , media, and "cash
f l o w . " Only a f t e r g e t t i n g complete power would he r e a l l y t u r n t o
the economy, and the methods he was employing t o get power showed
what he would do t o the economy.
Berezovskiy c i t e d the l e t t e r t h i s week from Primakov t o the Duma
as showing " c l e a r l y " t h a t YMP i s aiming t o become P r e s i d e n t .
S t a t i n g t h a t he had not seen the President p e r s o n a l l y (but a l s o
saying he had spoken t o people "very c l o s e " t o the P r e s i d e n t ) ,
Berezovskiy s a i d t h a t yesterday BNY t o l d YMP t h a t YMP was not
going about the BNY-YMP r e l a t i o n s h i p i n the r i g h t way.
Berzovskiy s a i d he d i d not b e l i e v e Primakov would l a s t as prime
m i n i s t e r more than a few months. Berezovskiy s a i d t h a t he was
a p p l y i n g i n d i r e c t persuasion on the President t o can YMP.
Berezovskiy s a i d t h a t he wanted the West t o be aware of h i s views
and a c t i v i t i e s , and he wanted t o understand the p o s i t i o n o f the
West on s u p p o r t i n g the c u r r e n t government. He noted he had met
the day b e f o r e w i t h the B r i t i s h Ambassador, and would see Summers
the next day.
John T e f f t reviewed very b r i e f l y and very g e n e r a l l y the p o i n t s
the Secretary had made i n Moscow about the e x t e n t of our support
f o r the government, and the need f o r a r e a l i s t i c budget.
He
asked Berezovskiy whod would be the next prime m i n i s t e r .
Berezovskiy l i s t e d a bunch of " q u a l i f i c a t i o n s " f o r the next PM
(more reform o r i e n t e d , not opposed by the Duma, p r e d i c t a b l e and
understandable t o the west, not opposed by Primakov. Good
s o l u t i o n : Ivanov. Showed h i s independence a t the MFA, good t i e s
w i t h the west, growing a u t h o r i t y a t home, acceptable t o YMP.
"We" (business, c a p i t a l i s t s , reformers) "gave him a message t o
t h i n k about i t . "
T e f f t asked about Luzhkov. Berezoskiy dumped a l l over the Mayor
("very, v e r y dangerous").
He claimed t h a t Lebed, whom he
acknowledged s u p p o r t i n g i n the r a c t f o r governor and now, was the
most e l e c t a b l e candidate. (His reasoning was the the people are
a g a i n s t e v e r y t h i n g . The o n l y person who expresses t h i s f e e l i n g
i s Lebed. Berezovskiy s a i d he supported Lebed i n order t o oppose
Luzhkov, who otherwise would c l a i m 70% of the e l e c t o r a l spectrum.
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�FHOM DEPARTMENT OF STATE 4B
(THU)
1. 28• 99 1 5 : 1 6/ST. 15 : 1 4/NO. 3760626058
Asked how the President was, Berezovskiy s a i d t h a t he had not
seen him, but had i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t i t r e a l l y was stomach t r o u b l e .
The c o n d i t i o n had e x i s t e d f o r 10 months b e f o r e t h i s
h o s p i t a l i z a t i o n . BNY i s now b e t t e r . Berezovskiy was convinced
t h a t BNY would s u r v i v e u n t i l t h e end o f h i s p r e s i d e n t i a l term and
would not y i e l d any o f h i s powers.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
P 3
�
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Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Sections 1.4 (b), (c), and (d) or Section 3.5(c) ofE.O. 13526
or (b)(6) of the FOIA.
�NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504
November 2, 1998
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
THROUGH:
. FROM:
BRUCE RIEDEL ~ 1\
JOSEPH MARTy0W1
SUBJECT:
P~S
Briefing Memo for
Call to Crown Prince
Abdullah of Saudi Arabia
Attached at Tab I is the briefing memorandum for the President
.
.
for his Iphone call with Crown Prince Abdullah.
I
There is currently some confusion about what Cohen plans to. ask
of Abdullah. We had understood that both OSD and JCS wanted to
press hard for using strike aircraft based in the Kingdom for an
attack on Iraq. But the initial points we've seen from OSD
(Tab II~
ar to ask onl for use of
ort aircraft based
The President's talking points don't need to address this
question. But we need to have a clearer idea about what the
Pentagon wants be re Cohen gets on the ground in Riyadh.
RECOMMENDATION
That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.
Attachm~nts
Tab I
~emorandum for the President
Tab A Points to be made
Tab II ~ohen Points
.DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER 1.0.13516
-BECRE'!'
Reason:
1.5(b), (d) ,A..,_ ."
Declassify On:
11l!I2/08
!;[:~IN:ON LmRARY PHOTOCOPY
"..1
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..
. ,
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ZDU".,'" \2..1.1..' r-
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�7367
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TELEPHONE CALL WITH
CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH
DATE: November 3, 1998
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LEON FUERTH
I.
PURPOSE
Toiprepare Crown Prince Abdullah for Secretary Cohen's
vi~it, and to reinforce Cohen's message that Saudi Arabia
ne~ds to join us in a forceful response to the latest Iraqi
challenge.
,
I I . . BACKGROUND
The President last spoke to Abdullah October 25 after the
Wye Agreement was signed. When the President and Abdullah
spoke at the White House Septernber24, the President
pressed him to consider allowing us to use combat support
planes based in the Ki
if a strike was necessa
Iraq.
You returned to this issue in your one-on-one after lunch.
The Crown Prince agreed that existing arrangements first
agreed to between King Fahd and Secretary Perry and then
reaffirmed by the Crown Prince to Secretar Albri t would
,
remain in ef
Attachment
Tab A Points to be made
DECLASSIFIED IN PARI'
PER E.O. 13526
-s~c~.
Reason; 1.5(b), (d)
Declassify On: 11/~108>
rt.~~~~ON LmRARY PHOTOCOPY,.
.
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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH OF SAUDI ARABIA
• We spoke just"a week ago about a very pleasant outcome:
the
Wye River Agreement between 'the Palestinians and the Israelis.
Despite some difficulties, I am pleased that this is still on
track.
• Now we are faced with a new challenge:
Iraq's decision to
further restrict UN inspectors' activities inside Iraq.
• I have asked Secretary Cohen to see you urgently because of
this challenge.
• He will convey my view that we must respond convincingly to
Iraq's latest actions.
• Iraq's decision to further restrict and inhibit the UN
inspectors is a clear violation of UN Security Council
resolutions, and also of what Iraq committed to Kofi Annan in
February.
• The Security Council has been clear and unequivocal in
rejecting Saddam's actions.
The
atement issued on Saturday
demonstrates that the Council is united.
• Iraq's action is a direct challenge to the Security Council.
Without a convincing response, we risk making the Council .
irrelevant and emboldening Saddam to further challenge the
sanctions regime.
If he does, he will become an even greater
threat to his neighbors.
• Your Royal Highness, we have faced these challenges from
Saddam Hussein too many times in the past.' I am determined to
take decisive action this time to respond to his challenge.
• I believe it is now imperative that we begin to take the
decisive action necessary to change the Baghdad regime.
It
will take time to get rid of Saddam but we should start in
earnest now.
• The plan that Secretary Cohen will brief to you is both a
response to the current challenge and the necessary first step
in a long-term plan to get rid of Saddam.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
JO fj't" 12111.' ,..,....
(llr"/r~ (N
�2
• ·You told me last month in the Oval Office that you would
support mi tary action if diplomacy failed.
• You know well. how actively we pursued the diplomatic route
over the last three months since Saddam stopped cooperation
with the UN .
• We supported a comprehensive review of Iraq's compliance,
but Iraq rejected a letter from the Council last week that
laid out in generous terms how that review would work.
• That letter was a diplomatic way out for Saddam, and he
rej ected it.
• The Security Council has no further diplomatic tools
available.
• I know we can count on you to support this effort.
• If after meeting with him you wish to talk about these issues
more, I will be available.
-""'i:;'li:;:'~"'7:
.,
.. ..
.
'~UNT6N LIBRARY PHO~d.~dPY
- .!::~~-:-:~:... ':-'::"'::21,_,
..
.
�POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CO~ERSATION WITH
CROWN PRINCE ABD~LLAH OF SAUDI ARABIA
• We spoke just a week ago ab6ut a very pleasant outcome:
the
Wye River Agreement between the Palestinians and the Israelis.
Despite some difficulties, I
pleased that this is still on
track.
am
• Now we are. faced with a new r:hallenge:. Iraq's decision to
further restrict UN inspectors' activities inside Iraq.
• I
have asked Secretary Cohen to see you urgently because of
this challenge.
.
• He
will convey my view that
Iraq's latest actions.
•
\12
Gc.£,..cI\ ~
.
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must respond fQltcc:t:)A:N:¥ to
decision to further re~trict and inhibit the UN
violatiop of UN Security Council
of what Iraq committed to Kofi Annan in
ec", ~
14-
<:or""'" dZ.
(..O(\V-(I.
0. ;...)
irect challenge to the Security Council.
response, \/1e risk making the Council
irrelevant and emboldening Sa·:Jdam to further challenge the
sanctions regime.
•
•
Your Royal Highness, we have faced these challenges from
Saddam Hussein too many times in the past.
I am determined to
take decisive action this time to respond to his challenge.
•
I believe it is now imperati \/E; that we begin to take the'
decisive action necessary to'change the Baghdad regime.
It
will take time to get rid of Saddam but we should start in
earnest now.
•
The plan that Secretary Cohen will brief to you is both a
response to the current challenge and the necessary first step
in a long-term plan to get rid of Saddam.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
').1X:lA:" lU\ 2.... r-
I
U It, j r~
('I"t
I
�2
,... SECRET
• You
told me last month in the Oval Office that you would
support military action if diplomacy failed.·
41~ St.le£w.. ?~ CO(,l~ w ..1... ~Jt}
know well how actively ~pursued the diplomatic route
over the las~ three m o n t h s ; ! '
• You
.
• We supported a comprehensiv.e review of Iraq's compliance,
but Iraq rejected a letter- from the Council last week that
laid out in generous terms how that review would work.
•
• That letter was a diplomatic way out for Saddam, and he
rej ected it.
I~ WQ (...aVV\ cOvv\"" "'" 'jlhi +::> S' "'f f <N -\ ~~-\~ ~ ~ ~ e;- '2r--: .b J~ fL.:;:.. ~
.
I J1.opQ you WJ l..} gl VEl? SEl?creta~y Col}en iii pas J tlve re~se.
• If after meeting .with him you wish to talk about these issues
more, I will be available .
..
SECRE'f
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D~tINtON.LI~~RYP·i-lOf(~,)'99PY :11
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.
�THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
f( -Lf -CJ g
~CRE.if"
7470
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 3, 1998
TELEPHONE CALL WITH
PRESIDENT CHIRAC
DATE: November 4, 1998
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD
FROM: SAMUEL BERGE~
I.
PURPOSE
To urge Chirac to accept the need for a firm and relatively
prompt response to Iraq's decision to further limit
UNSCOM's operations.
II.
BACKGROUND
While the French have pushed for a Comprehensive Review and
potential carrots" for Iraq,' our willingness to rely on
Council actions as well as Iraq's missteps have made it
more difficult for France to champion Iraq's cause. France
has joined the Council in denouncing Iraq's actions since
August, and has also spoken out against this most recent
Iraqi violation. While French diplomats have intervened
with Baghdad and pressed us to of
face-savings means for
Iraq, the French have also expressed great irritation with
Iraqi tactics, especially the recent decision to further
limit UNSCOM's operations.
Nonetheless,Chirac may well want to offer limited
incentives for the Iraqis to come back into compliance, and
will oppose use of force as a self-defeating exercise. He
will very likely feel a good deal less urgency about
responding than we do.
Attachment
Tab A Points to be made
-
SECf<ET'
Reason: 1.5 (d)
" ___ _
Declassify On:
1l/~~8~C
_." .
. .-.'. . , . '
O,\":tiNtbNUBRARYPHotoCOPy;
~ .~!:-:--. ~\;::..~
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
Q.000\.- (1-~z.."'1'-
It{to/to
f'M
�POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT CHIRAC OF FRANCE
• Appreciate the clear, message your government has sent to Iraq
on UNSCOM.
Your, public statements, and decision to recall
your ambassador, helped underscore the unanimous view
expressed by the Security Council last Saturday. Hope we can
formalize this by approving the UK draft resolution now before
the Council.
• The offer of a comprehensive review provided Saddam a real
chance to show that he intended to meet his obligations.
I
think we all agree that this affords hi~ a real opportunity to
move forward.
The only conclusion we can draw from the fact
Saddam rejected our proposal is that he wants to force the
Council to lift sanctions without giving up his WMD and
missile programs.
• Iraq's action is a direct challenge to the Council. Without a
convincing response, we risk making the Council irrelevant and
emboldening Saddam to further challenge the sanctions regime.
• We have faced these challenges from Saddam Hussein too many
times in the past.
I believe we are left with no alternative
except to respond with force to his challenge.
• Jacques, I want to stress that I believe we should act
expeditlously to respond to this challenge.
• We have been negotiating patiently since he suspended
cooperation in August. Unfortunately, Saddam has rejected all
reasonable proposals.
I f he can effect·i vely shut down UNSCOM
with impunity, there must be a.strong response or the
credibility of the Security Council will be shattered.
• I have called Tony Blair, who shares this view.
• I want us to be together on this -- defending·the integrity of
the Security Council's decisions.
• (If asked)
Can't you ,show more flexibility on paragraph 22
(concerning, lifting the oil'export sanctions if he complies
with UNSCOM)?
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O.13526
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• I think our offer on the comprehensive review, which you took
the lead on, offers Saddam a reasonable way forward. As long
as he has rejected it and is out of compliance, it would send
all the wrong signals for us to offer new concessions.
If
he's serious "about compliance, he ought to let UNSCOM do its
work.
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�POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CO~JERSATION WI~H
PRESIDENT CHIRACOF FRANCE
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• Appreciate the clear me~sage your government has
UNSCOM. Your public statements, and decision to
ambassador, helped underscore the unanimous view expresse
/1
the Security Council last Saturday.
•
The offer of a comprehensive review providdd Saddam ?;;eal
chance to show that· he wanted to meet his obligatio.l'is. ,The only
conclusion we can draw from the fact he rejected Q6r proposal is
that Saddam wants to force the Council to lift sanctions without
giving up his WMD and missile programs.
• Iraq's action is a direct challenge to the Cci~ncil. Without a
convincing response, we risk making the
il irrelevant and
emboldening Saddam to further challenge
•
•
We have faced these challenges from
times in the past. We should resol
challenge.
want to
to this
•
lIed Tony Blair who sh3res this
•
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us to be together QIA defending the integrity
rity Council's decisions.
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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
EPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
RESIDENT CHIRAC OF FRANCE
dedision to restrict UN inspectors' activiXL~s once
again places Iraq in direct violation of i~s oblig~tions to
the international c o m m u n i t y .
• Baghdad's
,/
• Iraq's
further rest.riction of the UN , inspecto.:;.l violates UN
I.
Security Council resolutions and also the MO~ that Iraq signed
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with Annan in February.
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• It is clear now that Saddam really want~r~6 force the Council
to lift sanctions without giving up h~s<WMD and missi
programs.
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actions.
Council is
• The Security
Saturday's Council statement
united.
• Iraq's action is a direct ,challenge to the!Council. Without a
convincing response, we ~{sk making the Council irrelevant and
emboldening Saddam to f~rther challenge the sanctions regime.
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• We have faced these qMallenges from Saddam:Hussein too many
am determined to take decisive action
times in the past.
to his challenge.
this time to resp
• Jacques, I want
responding to t
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We want to
stress the sense of urgency I feel about
challenge.
position tc use force if necessary as soon
not want another big buildup which allows
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with President Chirac of France
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
.French President Jacques Chirac
Notetakers: George Chastain, Frank
Jarosinski, Jenny McGee', Jim Smith
I
November 4, 1998,
Oval Office
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
Jacques?
President Chirac:
glad in France
Congratulations.
The President:
3:08 p.m. - 3:31 p.m.
i
.'
(U)
Bill? Ah, Bill, congratulations. We are so
the historic success that you had yesterday.
(U)
Thank you.
(U)
President Chirac:
llary,· and the Uni
posi ti ve.
(U)
cannot imagine how
states. The
The President:
~lad
(U)
Good.
President Chirac:
It was a great feat.
a very long time.
(U)
President:
we are for you,
press is extremely
This hasn't been done
That's right, it's been a long time.
(U)
President Chirac: That is justice, and I want to tell you
the bottom of my heart. Congratulations and please say the same
to
llary; I'd like to congratUlate you also, as I wrote to
you in the letter, for
Wye River agreement. We were very
gl
for your personaL success in Wy~.
(U):
The President: Thank you, Jacques, we're
hard, all of us.
(U)
conFI I:'1.I!:Itf'f mL
Reason:
1.5(d)
Declassify On:
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to have to work
I
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13516
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President Chirac:
I'm going to use a translator now, since my
English is not very good.
(U)
The President: Your English is wonderful.
go to a dinner, 'so I' 11 be brief.' (U)
President Chirac:
No problem.
I kn9w you have to
(U)
The President:
I appreciate the clear message your government
has sent to Iraq about UNSCOM ~- the public statement, the
decision to recall your ambassador -- they helped to underscore
the unanimous view of the Security Council.
The offer of a
comprehensive review, which you took. the lead on, gave Saddam a
chance to show he intended to meet his obligations.
It would
have afforded him a real opportunity to move forward, and I can
only conclude he wants to force the Council .to lift sanctions
without giving up his WMD and missile programs. We have been
negotiating patiently with Saddam since he suspended cooperation
in August.
I believe we now have to act prbmptly to respond to
this challenge, because if he can shut down 'UNSCOM with
impunity, there must be a strong response, or the credibility of
the Security Council will be damaged.
I knOw you've talked to
Tony Blair about this, and I hope we can formalize the approval
of the UK draft resolution that is now before the Security
Council. And I also think we have to be prepared to use force,
and we have to be together on it. ,..K'J
President Chirac: Yes, but Bill, first of all I want to say the
UK proposal is a very good one. We concur ~ithit, and I think
we will be able to reach agreement for unanimous adoption.
,
Secondly, I'd like to share with you my anal~ysis of Saddam's
behavior. Naturally, some of this is just ~rovocation; he. can't
resist that, and it's naturally directed at the American
President and the Security Council. But the re~l problem is
elsewhere. At the present time, the situation with the Iraqi
people is deteriorating, so far as Saddam is concerned; in other
words, he is beginning to be criticized.
The. people are
suffering more and more in a material sense, and they're
beginning to blame Saddam. The way Saddam thinks is the best
way to regain control of the people is to pretend to be a
martyr. And in the same way, insofar as Arab public opinion is
concerned, he doesn't seem to be supported anymore.
So as I see
it then, what he's trying to do is play the-martyrdom card.
What he's thinking is that if there is a mil~tary strike against
him, he'll regain control of those people and public opinion in
the Arab world.
Furthermore, he hasn't yet sent away the
UNSCOM teams. And if there is a military strike, naturally,
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they would all be expelled and he'll be able: to go about his
business as calmly as he likes. ' So it's clear that we find
ourselves in a rather peculiar position. We: have nothing to
give, nothing to offer. We can't change anything in our
position, which must be a position of great firmness. And this
time we are unanimous, including the Russians and the Chinese.
So there's nothing to negotiate. At the sam~ time, it is in
Saddam's interest to be the victim of a military strike. Which
is why this time the problem is going to be very hard to
resolve. We sent a two-fold message: first: we recalled our
ambassador, which is a very strong message .. We do it rarely,
and we haven't done it here before. Second,: we communicated
through Tariq Aziz the risk of military action was clear, and
that the world was unanimous with respect to sanctions. But in
truth I'm afraid we are working here with an, unarmed gun. I
think it's in his own interest to be bombed.: ,.;.e1
The President: How is he better off? You think even though it
wouldn't help him get the sanctions lifted, ~he people would in
their adversity be more supportive of him? ~
President Chirac:
attitude.
!J21
Yes, naturally, of course.
That explains his
The President: But, on the other hand, that puts us in the
position of saying there's no action he can't justify in
defiance of the Security Council. It is a difficult problem.
)f21
President Chirac: Well, I share that view completely. I'm
saying indeed it's a difficult situation. He wants two things
today: he wants to regain control of his own people, and look
like a martyr in the eyes of Arab public op~nion. And secondly,
he wants to get rid of UNSCOM once and for all, and the lAEA,
and he wants to be able to go about his business as he pleases.
And that's why we're in somewhat of a trap here. We have
nothing to offer. You know that I've alwa
lifting the sanctions.
Saddam has taken, we can't give him anything
,all.
want to send Tomahawks, with all the danger 'and
represent.
The President: It seems to me that if his people see the world
is united when we act, they will see him isolated. It would not
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help him with his people; it only helps if his strategy is to
divide people.
~
ident Chirac: Well, we are not, of course, divided.
Perhaps in the past there might have been divisions, but today
we are not divided.
I am completely certain that public opinion
would support him. They'd rally around, and that's why he's
doing what he's done. Because otherwise, the initiative he's
taken would be stupid~ He's a man who doesn't know anything
about the outside world, but he krlows his'own country very well.
)J21
The President: But we still are back to the main question.
What happens to countries when they pledge to complete an
inspection regime and don't do it? I' mean, he was very close to
being certified in the atomic ar~a .. Why did he do it, because
he thought the sanctions would never be lifted, or not soon
enough, or'perhaps he actually does have some WMD capability?
yr
President Chirac: His incomprehensible and really stupefying
actions can only be explained with regard to the internal
situation in Iraq.
In. any case what's cl~ar is there is nothing
more we can give. We should give full.powers to Kofi Annan and
adopt the UK draft in the Security Council unanimously. We
should-then authorize Kofi Annan to make one last demarche to
attempt to get Saddam to reverse what he's done.
I think that
then we have to wait and see what Saddam's reaction will be, but
I fear very much there won't be any change. What he wants is to
regain his influence over his own people, to regain control, and
go about rearming. ~
The President: Well, I think that you have a good grasp of
this.
I wonder if it would be helpful if Sandy Berger would
come over this weekend and discuss it with Levitte. ~
President Chirac: Bill, I thi~k the plan is for Sandy Berger to
come with John Holmes, the advisor to Tony Blair, and the three
of them will be able to discuss together.
This is already the
plan.
)JZJ
The President:
That's good. All right, we'll stay in close
touch, and we may have to talk again early in the week. ~
President Chirac:. Well, yes, I'm at your entire dispbsal as far
as that is concerned, and.:r wanttb tell you in France how very
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glad we are for your great success, and tell
we are. And bravo for Wye Plantation.
(U)
Hill~ry
how happy
The President:
Thank you, Jacques, I really appreciate the kind
words you have said to others, as well, about what happened at
the Wye Plantation.
If we can get the process kicked off and
the final status talks started, then we should be working with
the EU as well, to build up the economy of the Palestinians, so
they will have every opportunity to keep it going.
(U)
President Chirac:
The President:
(U)
I agree.
(U)
Thank you, Jacques. Goodbye, have a good dinner.
President Chirac:
the phone.
(U)
The President:
'i;es,
Thank you, Bill.
Okay, goodbye.
President Chirac:
Goodbye.
I'll talk to you soon on
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation
-bQHFI BEnT IJ.\.L
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PREC:
IMMEDIATE
FROM:
THE WHITE HOUSE
TO:
AMEMBASSY RIYADH
INFO:
SECSTATE WASHDC
SUBJECT:
MESSAGE TO CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH
1.
AM~ASSADOR OR DCM:
PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE
FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH AT THE
EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW.
2.
BEGIN TEXT.
YOUR HIGHNESS:
I WANT TO EXPRESS MY DEEP THANKS FOR THE WARM RECEPTION AND
VALUABLE SUPPORT YOU PROVIDED TO SECRETARY COHEN DURING HIS
RECENT VISIT TO THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA.
I AM HEARTENED
BY THE KNOWLEDGE THAT WE STAND TOGETHER IN ADDRESSING THE
CONTINUED THREAT POSED TO THE REGION BY SADDAM HUSSEIN'S
DANGEROUS BEHAVIOR. THROUGH OUR JOINT EFFORTS, I AM CONFIDENT
THAT WE WILL OVERCOME THIS AND OTHER CHALLENGES IN THE REGION
AND PEACE WILL TRIUMPH.
I THANK YOU FOR YOUR WORDS OF CONGRATULATION, EXPRESSED BY
PRINCE BANDAR, OVER THE RESULTS OF THE RECENT ELECTIONS.
I
TAKE THIS AS A STRONG SIGN THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE PLACE THE
IMPORTANCE OF OUR EFFORTS TO FURTHER PEACE AND PROSPERITY
WORLDWIDE AT THE TOP OF THEIR AGENDA.
SINCERELY,
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
END TEXT
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2~; 'lq~r-
ll/I;D/r-o
~
�NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C, 20504
November 6, 1998
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
8",
THROUGH:
BRUCE RIEDEL
FROM:
GWENYTH TODD (i\
SUBJECT:
Message to Crown Prince Abdullah
Attached at Tab I is a short message from the President to Saudi
Crown Prince Abdullah thanking him for his continued support.
Crown Prince Abdullah met with
We would like to see this go out today if at all possible.
RECOMMENDATION
That you authorize transmittal of the cable at Tab I.
Attachment
Tab I
Cable to Crown Prince 'Abdullah
.. c mlFI BElM'f EttL
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On:
DECLASSIFIED IN PARr
PER 1.0. 13526
1.Ol't - Ivt 1..- "'"
U/1fJ/J 1» 1M
�Weiss, Andrew S.
From:
Subject:
WHSR
Saturday. November 14,19984:55 AM
Weiss•. Andrew S.
*"* NO SUBJECT FOUND *'**
CLASS:
DTG:
MSGTO:
ORIG:
PREC:
SSN:
TOR:
WHITE HOUSE
FLASH
1072
981114010414 M3557719
Sent:
To:
• a eRE :r
QQQQ
,
VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
\
MOscow FOR THE AMBASSADOR·
AMBASSADOR: PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT
CI_INTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN IMMEDIATELY. ALSO, A COpy CAN BE
PASSED TO ROBERT MARKARYAN IN PRIME MINISTER PRIMAKOV'S OFFICE.
BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR BORIS,
I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR LETTER ABOUT IRAQ AND AM REPLYING
PROMPTLY BECAUSE OF THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION AND ALSO
BECAUSE OF THE SPECIAL IMPORTANCE I ATTACH TO OUR PERSONAL
RELATIONSHIP.
YOUR LETTER MAKES CLEAR THAT WE AGREE ON A CRUCIAL POINT:
SADDAM HUSSEIN HAS CREATED THIS CRISIS. HE HAS HAD IT WITHIN
HIS POWER TO END IT PEACEFULLY. HE COULD DO SO BY RESCINDING
HIS DECISION TO CEASE COOPERATION WITH UNSCOM AND BY
COMPLYING WITH THE UNSC RESOLUTIONS.
I APPRECIATE YOUR EFFORTS, INCLUDING IN YOUR OWN LATEST LETTER
TO HIM, TO PERSUADE HIM TO TAKE WHAT WE BOTH SEE AS THE
NECESSARY STEPS. UNFORTUNATELY, HE HAS, YET AGAIN. REFUSED TO
DO SO. HE IS PLAYING FOR TIME. HE HAS MADE CLEAR THAT HIS
.
OBJECTIVE IS TO MAINTAIN HIS PROGRAMS TO DEVELOP AND
ULTIMATELY TO DEPLOY WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. SUCH AN
OUTCOME WOULD CONSTITUTE A DIRE THREAT TO PEACE. AFTER MUCH
CAREFUL THOUGHT. I ALSO REMAIN CONVINCED THAT HE WILL BE
MORE LIKELY TO ATTAIN HIS AMBITION IF WE DO NOT ANSWER HIM
DECISIVELY.
I HAVE THOUGHT LONG AND HARD, BORIS; ABOUT THE RISKS THAT
ATTEND THE USE OF FORCE. YOUR OWN COUNSEL WEIGHS HEAVILY
WITH ME. BUT SO DOES THE PROSPECT OF SADDAM'S SUCCEEDING IN
HIS CAMPAIGN TO FLOUT INTERNATIONAL WILL AND TO DIVIDE THE
SECURITY COUNCIL. IN SO DOING, HE SEEKS ALSO TO DIVIDE THE U.S.
AND RUSSIA.
IN RESPONSE TO YOUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES FOR
U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS AND THE VENTURES TO WHICH YOU AND I
HAVE DEVOTED SO MUCH OF OUR OWN ENERGY. I WILL ENDEAVOR, AS I
HAVE FOR THE LAST SIX YEARS, TO SUSTAIN AND STRENGTHEN THE
WORK YOU AND I HAVE DONE TOGETHER. I KNOW I CAN COUNT ON YOU
TO DO THE SAME. OUR ACHIEVEMENTS ARE TOO VALUABLE. AS IS .
THEIR PROMISE FOR THE FUTURE, FOR US TO LET SADDAM PUT THEM AT
RISK. I HOPE IN THE DAYS, WEEKS AND MONTHS AHEAD. WE CAN
CONTINUE TO MAKE COMMON CAUSfi.VlttCEREVVE AGREE AND TO .
nf'cLINTON LffiRMtY PHOTOCOPY
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PERLO.13516
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�MANAGE WHATEVER DIFFERENCES WE HAVE.
SINCERELY,
BILL
DECL: X1, X4
#1072
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�7859
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGER
SUBJECT:
Letter from Russian President Yeltsin on Iraq
Purpose
Respond to a November 17 letter from Russian President Boris
Yeltsin on the Iraqi cris
Background
President Vel in's letter applauded recent developments in the
showdown with Iraq. Yeltsin emphasized the importance of not
resorting to the use of force, preserving UNSCOM's ability to
fulfill its duties, and avoiding a split within the UN Security
Council. The letter stressed the importance of full Iraqi
compliance with its UNSC obligations and rehearsed familiar,
Russian positions about the comprehensive review, possible
closure of files, and potential shift to long-term monitoring.
Your response underscores the need to press Saddam to comply
fully with Iraq's obligations under all relevant Security
Council resolutions. You ask Yeltsin to send a clear message to
Saddam about the importance of full disclosure (including
UNSCOM's request for documentation) and full compliance and the
consequences if he does not.
RECOMMENDATION
That you authorize the message to President Yeltsin at Tab A.
Approve
Disapprove
DECLASSIFIED
PERE:O.13526
Attachments
Tab A Message to President Yeltsin
Tab B
Incoming Correspondence
2.l)Opt; 12Jq 1.... (Y
H/'b / VtJ
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~PI ri~tU IAL
Reason:
1. 5 (d)
11 ~gffd:~P~~'
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'~
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ijfu:LINtON LiBRARY PHOTOCOP~. ;
- ,.::~,~~~~~:~~~~~
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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff
�...
IMMEDIATE
,
-eONFIDENTIAiWHITE HOUSIE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 01 OF 02
PRT: BERGER COMMCOSGRIFF DAVIES FUERTH HACHIGIAN KERRICK RICEE
STEINBERG SUTPHEN
SIT: BLACK BOLAN COQ MARTY PASCUAL RIEDEL SUM2 TODD WEISS
SIT: NODIS
-
S~T
._----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
,
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> eOHFIDEM'I'!"AL
<DTG> 242027Z NOV 98,
FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC
C 0 l'I i1ii' T D }:!; ~I T I Jr~
NODIS
QQQQ
BEGIN TEXT:
1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM:
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE
FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. A COpy MAY ALSO
BE PROVIDED TO ROBERT MARKARYAN IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S
OFFICE. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL BE PROVlpED.
, BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR BORIS:
PAGE 2
RHEHAAAl172 -e- 0 H P
~
!)
E "N 'r I A"""t,
THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER ON THE OUTCOME OF THE LATEST IRAQI
CRISIS. THE INSISTENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ON IRAQI:
COMPLIANCE AND OUR WILLINGNESS TO USE FORCE PRODUCED OUR
PREFERRED RESULT:
IRAQ RESCINDED ITS AUGUST AND OCTOBER
DECISIONS, AND COMMITTED IN WRITING TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH
UN WEAPONS INSPECTORS AND TO ALLOW THEIR RETURN TO WORK
WITHOUT CONDITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS. '
WE MUST NOW CONCERT OUR EFFORTS TO ENSURE IRAQ FULFILLS 'ITS
OBLIGATIONS UNDER ALL OF THE RELEVANT SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTIONS.
TOO MANY TIMES BEFORE, SADDAM HUSSEIN HAS MADE
COMMITMENTS WHEN THREATENED BY FORCE ONLY TO TURN AROUND
AND VIOLATE THEM.
THE COMING WEEKS WILL PROVIDE A REAL TEST OF SADDAM'S
INTENTIONS. THERE MUST BE NO AMBIGUITY ABOUT WHAT WE MEAN BY
UNFETTERED, UNCONDITIONAL ACCESS FOR UNSCOM AND IAEA.
IRAQ
MUST PROVIDE UNSCOM AND THE IAEA WITH ALL RELEVANT
DOCUMENTS AS SPECIFIED IN THE UNSCRS. BAGHDAD'S RESPONSE SO
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
20i"-.. .
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CONFIDENTIAl::
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 02 OF 02
PAGE 3 RHEHAAAl172 -e 0 'N F IDE N 'I' I A L"
FAR IN THAT AREA IS FAR FROM ADEQUATE AND RAISES QUESTIONS
ABOUT BAGHDAD'S COMMITMENT TO COOPERATE FULLY. THAT IS WHY
I HAVE MADE CLEAR PUBLICLY THE CRITERIA THAT WE WILL USE TO
JUDGE IRAQ'S COMPLIANCE.
KOFI ANNAN HAS ASSURED ME HE AGREES
FULLY THESE ARE IRAQI OBLIGATIONS.
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT ALS0
REVIEWED THEM WITH MINISTER IVANOV DURING THEIR MEETING IN
KUALA LUMPUR.
IRAQ MUST 'ALLOW FULL RESUMPTION OF UNSCOM
ACT,IVITY TO UNCOVER AND TO THWART ITS ABILITY TO PRODUCE OR
DELIVER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.
..
..
~
YOU HAVE PLAYED A VERY IMPORTANT ROLE IN YOUR
COMMUNICATIONS WITH SADDAM.
I HOPE YOU WILL SEND HIM A
CLEAR MESSAGE ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF FULL DISCLOSURE
INCLUDING THE DOCUMENTS UNSCOM HAS ASKED FOR AND THE
CONSEQUENCES IF HE DOES NOT. WHILE I AM READY TO SEE IF SADDAM
LIVES UP TO HIS WORD THIS TIME, THE U.S. REMAINS PREPARED TO ACT
IF SADDAM ONCE AGAIN INTERFERES WITH UNSCOM'S ABILITY TO
OPERATE OR REFUSES TO DISCLOSE ALL REQUESTED INFORMATION
NEEDED BY UNSCOM AND THE IAEA.
,
.....
PAGE 4 ' RHEHAAAl172 C e N r I D B 'N ';P I Ii L
NONE OF US WANTS TO RESORT TO MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAQ IN
THE FUTURE.
FOR OUR PART, FULL SECURITY COUNCIL SUPPORT FOR
UNSCOM, IAEA, AND THESE ORGANIZATIONS' LEADERSHIP AND
PROFESSIONAL INTEGRITY WILL BE CRUCIAL TO ACHIEVE OUR
OBJECTIVES. ULTIMATELY, OF COURSE, SADDAM ALONE WILL
DETERMINE WHETHER THIS SITUATION IS RESOLVED PEACEFULLY OR
WHETHER HE LEAVES US NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO RESORT TO FORCE.
I
HOPE THAT YOU WILL WORK TO ENSURE THAT IRAQ HEEDS THIS
MESSAGE.
SINCERELY,
BILL
END TEXT
<ASECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
<ASSN>1172
<MSGID> M3573073
,
�7859'
REDO
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504
November 23, 1998
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER
THROUGH:
BRUCE
CARLOS
RIEDEL~~
PASCUA~
FROM:
GWENYTH TODD~~f
ANDREW WEISSI!(M
SUBJECT:
Message to President Yelts
on Iraq
The memorandum at Tab I recommends a Presidential message to
Russian President Boris Yelts 's'November 17 letter on the
Iraqi crisis. At your suggestion, the revi
message takes
into account recent Iraqi de ance on UNSCOM's document request.
Despite President Yeltsin's hospitalization, we still believe it
would be useful to send
message, which in any event will be
double-tracked to Prime Minister Primakov.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.
'Attachments
Tab I
Memorandum for the President
Tab A Message to President Yeltsin
Tab B
Incoming Correspondence
~mIFI BEM'f IAL
Reason:
1.5(d)
Declassify On:
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O.13526 '
Z~. . '2~l""~
'Y tlO I
Y/)
"".
�IM:MEDIATE
FROM:
THE WHITE HOUSE
TO:
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
SECSTATE WASHDC
1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM:
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE
FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL
WILL BE PROVIDED.
BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR BORIS:
THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER ON THE OUTCOME OF THE LATEST IRAQI
CRISIS.
THE UNANIMOUS INSISTENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
ON IRAQI COMPLIAlfCE BACKED BY OUR WILLINGNESS TO USE FORCE
~DUCED~ PREFERRED RESULT:
IRAQ RESCINDED ITS AUGUST AND
OCTOBER DECISIONS, AND COM:MITTE~ IN WRITING TO COOPERATE FULLY
WITH UN WEAPONS INSPECTORS AND '1':) ALLOW !fHEIR RE'i'URN 'i'O' W0RK
W,J.~ C0(f3IONS OR RESTRICTION'S.
WE MUST Ni CONCERT OUR EFFORTS:~O ENSURE IRAQ FULFILLS ITS
OBLIGATION . TOO MANY TIMES BEFOEE, SADDAM HUSSEIN HAS MADE
COM:MITMEN S WHEN THREATENED BY Fr)RCE ONLY TO VIOLATE THEM LATER.
THE COMING WEEKS WILL PROVIDE A:8.EAL TEST OF SADDAM'S
INTENTION'S.
THERE MUST BE NO AMBIGUITY ABOUT WHAT WE MEAN BY r l>vLL
lJl:JEETTERED, lThLCO~m±.!I;IOMl\L ACCESS FOR TTM~COH AND IAEA. THAT IS
(.(."",/(.. hV
WHY I HAVE MADE CLEAR PUBLICLY THE CRITERIA THAT WE WILL USE TO. krVO
JUDGE IRAQ'S COMPLIANCE. KOFI ANNAN HAS ASSURED ME HE AGREES
c..,.. wfVM.lFULLY THESE ARE IRAQI OBLIGATIONS. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT ALSO
REVIEWED THEM WITH MINISTER IVANOV DURING THEIR MEETING IN KUALA
LUMPUR.
IRAQ MUST ALLOW FULL RESUMPTION OF UNSC0M ACTIVITY AND
MEET ITS 02JECTI~TO DISCLOSE FlJLLY ITS WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION PROG~ Ob/'F
.
YOU HAVE PLAYED A VERY IMPORTANT ROLE IN YOUR COM:MUNICATIONS
WITH SADDAM.
I HOPE YOU WILL SEND HIM A CLEAR MESSAGE ABOUT THE
IMPORTANCE OF FULL DISCLOSURE AND FULL COMPLIANCE AND THE
CONSEQUENCES IF HE DOES NOT. WHILE I AM READY TO SEE IF SADDAM
LIVES UP TO HIS WORD THIS TIME, THE UNITED STATES REMAINS
PREPARED TO ACT IF SADDAM ONCE fl~(;AIN INTERFERES WITH UNSCO~' S
<~¥,~,-r.
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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2~~~- IL'Il-t
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�2
ABILITY TO OPERATE OR REFUSES TO DISCLOSE ALL INFORMATION NEEDED
BY UNSCOM AND THE IAEA.
NONE OF US WANT TO RESORT TO MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAQ IN THE
FUTURE. FOR OUR PART, FULL SECURITY COUNCIL SUPPORT FOR UNSCOM,
IAEA,. AND THESE" ORGANIZATIONS' IJEADERSHIP AND PROFESSIONAL
INTEGRITY WILL BE CRUCIAL TO ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVES. '
ULTIMATELY, OF COURSE, SADDAM ALONE WILL DETERMINE WHETHER THIS
SITUATION IS RESOLVED PEACEFULLY OR WHETHER HE LEAVES US NO
ALTERNATIVE BUT TO RESORT TO FORCE. I HOPE THAT WE CAN WORK
TOGETHER TO ENSURE THAT IRAQ HEEDS THIS MESSAGE.
SINCERELY,
BILL
END TEXT
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TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
IAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN
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Sustaining the Relationship
• Know recent events in Ir~q strained our partnership.
your message through Foreign Minister Ivanov.
.
Rebeived
~
• Share unique responsibility for ensuring that the,United
States and Russia enter next century as partners. Need to
stay in close touch to sustain relationship.
-0
~
0)
(
~
Agenda for 1999
•
Important to get our teams engaged by setting meaningful
agenda for coming year:
helping Russian economy recover,
stemming proliferation, and strengthening arms control via
START II and START III;
Lfu
Important meeting between Al and Yevgeniy set for March. Need
to build toward that. Also sending Madeleine to Moscow at end
of January, and Sandy will be contacting Bordyuzha (Bore-DYOO
zhuh) .
~
• Essential for you and me to give our teams tight tone,
direction, and momentum.
Economics
• Want to support economic reform program that promotes
stability and growth. Strobe discussed with Primakov.
• Still much to do. ·Next step is for Primakov's team to engage
intensively in coming days with IMF, especially on budget.
• International community hoping to support Russian-owned reform
program that builds on realistic budget, tax reform, and sound
bank restructuring efforts.
• Durable reform program can open door to resumed cooperation
with IMF, which is critical foi help on restructuring Russia's
external debt.
PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING
--G01?JF1 DEW!' 1M
Reason:
1.5
Declassify on:
·DECLASSIFIED .
PER E.O. 13526
2-c1O'l-
11.~Z""''-
\1/1'0/17:>
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• Decision to strike Iraq driven by Iraqi defiance of
international community. Didn't take this decision lightly.
Gave Saddam every opportunity to keep his word on cooperation.
• Problem remains Saddam's repeated failure to comply'with UNSC
obligations. He betrayed promises to you and international
community.
• Saddam bears responsibility for what happened, not UNSCOM or
Butler.
Important to find a way forward in New York to get
Saddam back in compliance and let inspectors do their job.
• But can't lo~er standard by accepting an inspection regime
that is not professional and qualified.
• Can't reward Saddam for his be'havior.
Sanctions won't be
lifted until we see an end to his deception and lies.
~~ Troubled
by Iraqi belligerence toward coalition aircra
enforcing no-fly zones.
Iraqis should understand that
continued challenges could lead to serious confrontation.
• Most importantly, can't let Saddam undermine U.S.-Russia
relationship. We have too much crucial work to do.
If Yeltsin says Butler abused his authority and should be
replaced:
• Butler made clear that conclusions in his report were his own
and based on unambiguous facts.
• He discussed findings with broad range of Council members,
including Russia.
Problem is not with Butler.
If Yeltsin complains that U.S. failed to consult in advance or
seek a political solution to crisis:
• Made clear in November that we'd give Saddam one last chance
to cooperate. Gave him every, benefit of the doubt, but we
left no doubt that we'd act if he
led this test.
PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING
COHFIDEN'f IAL"
�-eOlfFI OEM! lAb-
8524
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
PHONE CALL WITH
PRESIDENT YELTSIN
DATE: Decerr,ber 28, 1998
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: TBD
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
I.
PURPOSE
To call Yeltsin and set a frame rk for bilateral contacts
that will get the relationslnp on tr,ack after the Iraq
crisis.
II.
BACKGROUND
,.'
Russia,en
instructed
the U. S.'
that he,
differen
letter to Yeltsin, stressing that we
come between the United States and
red a positive response. Yeltsin reportedly
gn Minister Ivanov to tell Madeleine that
tionship is at the top of Russia's agenda, and
is committed to working through our
we can gauge, Yeltsin health appears to have
zed, which means that he can work a _few hours a day.
ct that he will stick to general principles on the
ionship and Iraq, but anything may be possible. He
d call for Butler to be fired or complain about not
consulted prior to the bombings. Our suggestion is
keep him focused on first principles and get him to give
al guidance to Primakov and his staff: the U.S.
Russia relationship matters, Russia needs to pursue a
course of integration, and Russia needs to manage its
.cOWFI BEtt! 1m
Reason: 1.5b,d
,
,
Declassify On: 12/£'3'708"
(;[:::~ON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
,
'<'\.,
DECLASSIFIED 1N PART
PER F...O. 13526
~~ \24J1-r
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�2
//
foreign affairs and economy in a way that supports such
integration, and not its isclation from the internat/fonal
community.
/
The most practical outcome from the call would e to get
Yeltsin to" reaffirm the importance of a solid schedule of
early 1999 meetings that would tackle the t
gh issues
before us:
economics, nonp!~oliferation an arms control.
The key meeting to highlight is the Gore- rimakov session
in lat~ March. Madeleine will see Ivan v in late January.
I plan to invite my new counterpart,
kolay Bordyuzha, for
a visit in February. We will also w k on Cohen and
Richardson seeing their counterpart .
While we cannot count on Yeltsin 0 deliver on
ecific
commitments, it appears he can· ill set a tone for his
government. The more const:;~-uc i ve his guidance, the better
the chance it will reverber~t through the bureaucracy.
III. PARTICIPANTS
TBD
IV.
SEQUENCE
We will initiate
call. You should start by affirming
the importance of
e relationship and let Yeltsin respond.
You can close by sking Yeltsin to give. guidance to his
team to work wit us to develop a strong and sUbstantive
calendar for 19 9.
Attachment
Tab A
Points t
\
eOUFIDEtffIAL
be 'Made
�,'-C9UF'IDEN'NAL
8524
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 24, 1998
PHONE CALL WITH
PRESIDENT YELTSIN
DATE: December 28, 1998
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: TBD
FROM: SAMUEL BERGE~
I.
PURPOSE
To call Yeltsin and set a framework for bilateral contacts
that will get the relationship on ttack after the Iraq
crisis.
II.
BACKGROUND
Your December 18 letter to Yeltsin, stressing that we
cannot let Saddam come between the United States and
Russia, engendered a _positive response. Yeltsin reportedly
instructed Foreign Minister Ivanov to tell Madeleine 'that
the U.S. relationship is at the top of Russia's agenda, and
that he, too, is committed to working through our
differences.
As best we can gauge, Yeltsin' health appears to have
stabilized, which means that he Gan work a few hours a day.
We expect that he will stick to general principles on the
relationship and Iraq; but anything may be possible. He
could call for Butler to be fired or complain about not
being consulted prior to the bombings. Our suggestion is
to keep him" focused on first principles and get him to' give
general guidance to Primakov and his staff: the U.S.
Russia relationship matters, Russia needs to pursue a
course of integration, and Russia needs to manage'its
foreign affairs and economy in a way that supports such
integration, and not its isolation from the international
community.
The most practical outcome from the call would be to get
Yeltsin to reaffirm the importance of'a solid schedule of
early 1999 meetings that ,would tackle the tough issues
GONF!IDBtlTlAL..
Reason: 1.5b,d
Declassify On: 12/23/08
DECLASSIFIED '
PER E.O. 13526
1JIY\- 12" l~l!~tl ~
(W
r-
�2
before us: economics, nonproliferation and arms control.
The key meeting to highlight is the Gore-Primakov session
in late March. Madeleine will see Ivanov in late January.
I plan to 'invite my new counterpart, Nikolay Bordyuzha, for
a visit in February. We will also work on Cohen and
Richardson seeing their counterparts.
While we cannot count on Yeltsin to deliver on specific
commitments, it appears he can still set a tone for his,
government. The more constructive his guidance, the better
the chance it will reverberate through the bureaucracy.
III. PARTICIPANTS
TBD
IV.
SEQUENCE
We will initiate the call. You should start by affirming
the importance of the relationship and let Yeltsin respond.
You can close by asking Yeltsin to give guidance to his
team to work with us to develop a strong and substantive
calendar for 1999.
Attachment
Tab A Points to be Made
GONFIDEN'tJAL.
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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN
Sustaining the Relationship)C
•
recent events in
message through
'?/~"
~strained
our partnership.
Received
agree:
cLitiCElllY'
;a;od T fJllly
p~.cL ~
~~S&··
• Share unique responsibility for e,rsuring that(~>V- and Russia
enter next century as partners. /iEmpoI tant \.Je '--s-fay in roqular:
touch to ~ susta
relationship. tHrough challonqing
rperiods .
Agenda for 1999.(1
(
~
• Important
our earns engaged for coming year: .~ould
~t
eaningful agend~contQLed on three *eY' issue&-== getting
Russian economy back on track, stemming proliferation, and
strengthening etlt legacy ~n arms control via START II and
START III.
~d
• Important meetr' between Ai and Yevgeniy, set for March.
g
Need
to build towar that. -f-L-m. )hso sending. Madeleine to Moscow at
end of January
Sandy will be contacting Bordyuzha (Bore
DYOO-zhuh~ to initiate a dialogue.
Economics)ll
• Want to support .a RU66iaB economic reform program that
promotes stability and growth. ~ent high level tOam led bY'
Strobe .t.e- discusgec!'E-fr.a.t;. wi th Primakov.
• :ream came back 'dith better elonso of your plano i but thin-ks
- UIere' s;~till much to do.
Next step is for Primakov's team to
engage intensively
coming days with IMF, especially on
budget.
• International community hoping to support Russian-owned reform
program that builds on realistic budget, tax reform, and sound
bank restructuring efforts.
COHFIDBl?iTIA~
Reason:
1.5b,
Declassify on:
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
~
til",' to
�2
• ~at coming yea.r poses real cbaJ]eng@s.
Critical to have
~rable reform program ~n pla~e.
~hfrt can open door to
resumed cooperation with IMF, which is critical
help on
restructuring Russia's external debt.
• Decision to strike Iraq driven by Iraqi defiance of
international community.
Didn't ta~e this decision lightly.
,Gave Saddam every opportunity to keep his word on cooperation.
lure to comply
• '~rpioblem remains Saddamis repeated
with UNSC obligations.
He betrayed promises to you and
international community.
• Saddam bears responsibility for what happened, not UNSCOM or
Butler.
Important to find a way forward in New York to ,get
Saddam back in compliance and let inspectors do their job.
~
s~~"d{
can't ~e B~ lower~ the bar for Ira.qi per~rmsnce
~a~ accepting an inspection regime that is not professional
and qualified.
• But
• Can't reward Saddam
his behavior.
Sanctions won't be
lifted until we see an end to his deception and lies.
• Most importantly, can't let Saddam undermine U.S.-Russia
'relationship. We have too much crucial work to do.
Too ffiuch
~s at stake.
If
Yel tS..//,'
i.?)says Butler abused his authori ty and should be
replaced, :
.
,-",'
• Butler made clear that conclusions in his report were his own
and based on unambiguous facts.
• He discussed findings with broad range of Council members,
incl uding Russia.
Problem is not with Butler,p ·bJ1t ~r
SiloGdsm'8 ptltteLlI of behavior.
tv
If Yel tsin complains tha t U.S. LaiJ~ to consul t in advance or
seek a political solution to cri
• Made clear in November that we'd giveSaddam one last chance
to cooperate.
Gave him every benefit of the doubt, but we
left no doubt that we'd act if he failed this test .
..gOHFI DB~+'1" IAL
�3
GONF;J;DEH'fI:Pd;,..
/~
."
• Ha9// "prrserve. ,91j"e~at' onal s,.~curit. in a3'y~of. airstrikes
~,d'
t9" protect our/servlce. en ',../'·Also, d d9/want to~ ve S.addam
ohance to dis'perse his ~orces and eq lpment.
I
..,.,/
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�8436
-rHE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS: The President
Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia
NOTE TAKERS:
Bonnie Glick, Sean Tarver, Joel Schrader, David
Higgins, Jim Smith and Roger Merletti
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
December 15, 1998 -- 1:00p.m. - 1:15p.m. EDT
Oval Office
The President: Hello? Your Royal Highness, .thank you for
taking the call.
I wanted to call you to tell you that I have
decided to take action against Iraq .very soon.
I have spoken
with Prime Minister Blair, and the British will participate.
I
know that you would prefer a peaceful solution, as would I, but
it is clear that this is not possible at this time.
On November 14, I called off a military strike to try one more
time to find a peaceful solution.
The strong statement by the
Damascus Declaration of States, placing responsibili
solely on
Iraq, helped us to avoid a confli
Then Iraq committed to
provide full and unconditional cooperation as provided by UNSC
resolutions.
Since that time, Baghdad has repeatedly violat
that commitment and consistently refused to provide documents
and information, barred access and harassed inspectors, lied
repeatedly and destroyed documents.
I hope you will agree that we can't continue this cycle.
Our
strike will be significant, with the stated aim to degrade his
capacity to develop weapons of mass destruction and to degrade
his ability to threaten his neighbors, and it will weaken his
regime and thus further our long-term goal of ~hanging the
leadership in Baghdad.
Classified by:
Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
1. 5 (a) (d)
.
Declassify on:
12/¥:11:~O'EVw:;-;-I-:"'~ .. ~,
, ... __
.-::. :;... ......,. ~
O~DrN;[ON'tIBRARY PHof6GQPY;' ':'~\
~;Z~~2~~~tc~:~;=:!j:.:"~l;:
DECLASSIFIED TN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2JIJ,\- \2-'\ t:'" r-
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�2
We will not need to use
I have ordered.
eneral Z
i and our military will be in touch with your
ary for a detailed briefing soon. This has been a
difficult decision for me.
If I thought diplomacy could get
Saddam to comply with the inspections and keep his commitments,
I would not have ordered this
ike. But the record has shown
that he will not voluntarily give up his weapons of mass
destruction. The support of Saudi Arabia and·the GCC are
critical. The statement at the GCC summit made clear that Iraq
is responsible for the consequences of its own decisions.
I
hope you will communicate to your GCC partners your support of
our action. .Over the next few days, I will be following
developments very closely, and our people will be in close touch
with yours.
Crown Prince. Abdullah:
The President:
That's fine, and thank you.
Thank you very much, Your Royal Highness.
Crown Prince Abdullah:
Thank you, Mr. President, and I hope
that God will bring whatever is good for the world. and for the
people of the Middle East, especially.
The President:
Thank you very much.
Crown Prince Abdullah: Can you give me, Mr. President, how many
days, what is the time required for what you just said?
The President: We will start now and we expect to finish in a
couple of days, before Ramadan. We think it's very important
that we finish before Ramadan, which is why time is so short.
Crown Prince Abdullah:
Mr. President.
I hope everything will be to the best,
The President:
I hope so, too.
I wish there were another
alternat
but I don't believe there is.
Crown Prince Abdullah:
The President:
This is understood.
Well, thank you very much.
/,.'~'-
.acRE1'"'
Yes, yes.
'.
;j~:~N LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
,,~
,
<.....
~
.
�3
Crown Prince Abdull
Thank you, thank you, Mr. President, and
I wi
you success in your endeavor always.
The President:
Thank you.
Goodbye, sir.
- End of Convers
.A;.)iZ:r-:x;-i","' -
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,
O~LiNT6N liBRARY PH()TOe;Opy'
-,'.:'.-~=~~..,=~
�8436
THE WHITE HOUSE.
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS: The p,resident
Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel
NOTE TAKERS:
Jim Smith and Frank Jarosinski
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
December 17, 1998 -- 12:02 p.m.
Oval Office
The President:
Hello.
(Ui
Bill, how are you?
Prime Minister
The President:
12:06 p.m. EST
I'm fine.
Prime Minister Ne
(U)
(U)
HOw's it going?
(U)
The President:
Fine.
I wanted to check in. We have some
damage assessment that shows good results,
1 of our pilots
have come back so far, but ~e have more flights today and
British pilots will be up there.
So far there are very low
civilian casualties.
They say not, but that is our information,
that they're quite low. We're doing all we can to support you;
beyond the extra Patriot batteries, we'll be standing by to
support you if Saddam starts making threatening statements.
Interestingly enough, the Gulf count es and Egypt are giving us
all the cooperation we asked for. Mubarak made a pretty strong
statement. My intelligence of cer, George Tenet, was in today
and said that so far all the military activity has been
completely defensive in nature. ~
Prime Minister Net
: Do you-have any indication of
acti vi ty' in western Iraq? ~
The President: No. All the military activity so far has been
defensive. You know, the first thing we try to take out is
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their integrated communications and air defense systems. So we
haven't, and obviously if we do, we'll tell you as soon as we
can.
y
Prime Minister Netanyahu: Good. You know you have our support.
We're keeping a~low-pro Ie, saying that we're not a part of
this conflict, but we reserve the right to self-defense if they
try to involve us. We prefer to stay out, but you enjoy .out
full support.~
.
The President:
They're equating you and Butler? ~
Yes, I'm Butler now. ~
Prime Minister Netanyahu:
The President:
I like Butler.
Prime Minister Netanyahu: You have your friends who are always
your friends and will stand by the United States. Always.
I
don't make a big issue now of our support in consideration of
your needs, but let me know if I can help and I will be happy to
do it. )9f
The President:
I will. We'll watch over the next day or two.
I'll call back if I need to, and if you need to, call me. ~
Prime Minister Netanyahu: What do you think - let me not ask
you that. We'll follow
as we go, and if ~ere's anything you
want to pass through special channels -- ~.
The President:
I'll do it.
Prime Minister Netanyahu:
wish you the best.
(U)
The President:
(U)
Things here are pretty calm and we
Thank you so much.
......::::.,
(U)
.....
(t=~":ON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY _
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Prime Minister Ne
up on our conversation?
President:
Did you ever have a chance to follow
~
I did, and I did what I could.
.A'
...
Prime Minister Netanyahu:
Okay.
(U)
The President: I did what I could. I foll
up and I did
what I could. I'll have another conversation in a day or two.
~
Prime Minister Netanyahu:
The President:
Goodbye.
Prime Minister Netanyahu:
That's it.
Thank you, Bill.
(U)
Goodbye.
(U)
-- End of Conversat
~~~~~''7~l
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�8436
TH E: WH ITE: HOUSE:
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS: The .President
President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt
NOTE TAKERS:
Jim Smith and Frank Jarosinski
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
December 17, 1998 Oval Office
The President:
Hello, Hosni.
President Mubarak:
The President:
12:18 p.m. - 12:23 p.m. EST
(U)
Yes, Bill, how are you?
I'm fine, and you?
ident Mubarak:
Fine.
(U)
(U)
(U)
The President:
I just call
to discuss a couple of things.
The Iraqi operation seems to be going well. We have some damage
assessment
indicates good results, and all our pilots have
come back so far. ~
Presldent Mubarak:
The Pre
Good results, then?
Yes.
President Mubarak:
(U)
(U) ;
This is very good.
(U)
The President:
The strike will be significant and will contiriue
for some time, but I' think it is import'ant to degrade his
capacity to develop weapons of mass destruction and his ability
to threaten his neighbors as much as possible.
The Gulf
countries are giving us all the cooperation we need and King
Fahd and Abdallah are support
of what we've done.
I think
we're in good shape.
I am grateful for your prompt,clearance
overflights and Suez passage. ~
~gCR~
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President Mubarak:
Yes, we're making all the decisions needed.
(U)
The President: _I think what you said before about Saddam
Huss~in being entirely responsible
r this chain of events was
very valuable, and if you have a chance, if you ~illteiterate
that -- ~
.
..
sident Mubarak:
I already mentioned that yesterday, and
today we made a communique saying that I talked to Madelein'e
Albright
sterday. ~
The President: That's good.
I also wanted
pretty good trip to Gaza and Israel.
(U)
say that I had a
President Mubarak:
It was a wonderful trip, I told Madeleine
Albright it was a wonderful trip, and I prai,sed it publicly
today on TV.
(U)
The President: Thank you.
I'm a little ,concerned about the
possibility of a ihort-term problem because ~f the unstable
political situation in Isra~l, because you know the temptation
is always there
do things that are not constructive" and they
may even wind' up having elections befor~ long. We'll try to
deal with it and
ep
on a good track.
I'm glad I went to
Gaza.I hope it helped Arafat, and I hope the historic sympathy,
of the Palestinians for Iraq won't undermine him too much. ~
President Mubarak:
I think your visit was a historic visit.
Arafat -- whom I met yesterday -- Arafat and his group were all
very pleased with that; On Iraq, expect some small
demonstrations, but don't give it any attention. We had very
small ones. ~
The President:
me,
(U)
Thank you.
President Mubarak:
The President:
Yes.
I expected that
a~d
it didn't bother
(U)
Are you doing well?
(U)
. President Mubarak: Yes, I'm doing very well. Your visit, your
trip and speech were very well-balanced and appreciated. ~
The President: Thank you.
I think the Israeli public is coming
along.
The problem is, when they have el
ions there, Israeli
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society is getting more complicated, and a lot o~ people get
elected to the Knesset for reasons that don't have much to do
with the peace process. Then we have trouble getting a solid
majority to do the right thing. I'll just keep pushing. A
survey in Israel indicated that 80 percent agreed with what I
said to the Palestinians, so it was helpful, I think. ~
President Mubarak:
I asked
him today and had long talks.
The President:
Yes.
President Mubarak:
even before April.
The President:
one of the Labor party; I met
(U)
I think there'll be elections in April or
~
Yes.
We'll keep working on it.
President Mubarak: We're always working.
working, Bill.
(U)
The President:
Thank you, Hosni.
(U)
We nev.er stop
(U)
President Mubarak: Thank you. Give our best regards to
Hillary. Everybody appreciated her words and visit there.
wife sends her best regards.
(U)
The President: Thank you.
, she's well.
(U)
k:
-----------------The President:
President Mubarak:
Tell her hello and that we hope
Thank you.
Goodbye.
I'll tell her that now.
(U)
Goodbye.
(U)
End of Conversation -
.....,'-'
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�8436
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
. The
sident
King Husse
of Jordan
and Frank Jaros
ki
NOTE TAKERS:
Jim Smi
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
December 17, 1998 --12:25 p.m. - 12:32 p.m. EST
Oval Office
President:
King Hussein:
The President:
Hello, Your Majesty.
How are you?
Hello, welcome home and well
I had a great time.
How are you, sir?"
Gaza.
don~.
(U)
(U)
(U)
(U)
The President:
I. thought it was a good trip. Arafat produced a
big crowd; he had over 500 members of the PNC there,. and a lot
of others.· I think it went well.
(U)
King Hussein:
Very, very good,
That is very promising.
(U)
The President:
I think I struck a responsive chord. The people
of Israel supported my speech, even though Ne~anyahu's
rnment
dn't like it much.
(U)
It was a wonder
speech about the future.
Very
moving.
The Pres
Thank you.
I want
to call and say
the
Iraq seems tb be going pretty
1.
damage
assessment indicates good
ts, all our pilots are back so
far, and from what we can see, there are very low civilian
ca
ties.)R1'.
by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
1.5 (a) (d)
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King Hussein:
That's wonderful.
(U)
The President: You know, I called
but in the wake. 6f 'Britler's report
to cooperate, I had no choice.
giving us the cooperation we need
ion a month ago,
trying
so we are Just go ng.
world will become more
So far, their reactions are muted and even privately
supportive, but it can become more difficult with civilian
casualties. I know you are 'probably concerned with the refugee
problem~
We'll stay in close torich and I will help in any way
possible with a rapid response. ~
King Hussein: To support the refugee problem would be nice.
may be beyond our ability to deal with large numbers, and we
look forward to your help. ~
It
The President: We'll help if we can. One other thing. In
spite of the fact that I had a good trip, the political
situation in Israel s quite unstable. Bibi said that in short
order one of three things will happen: he'll have Levy back and
four more votes; he'll have a unity government with Barak; or
there'll be nitional elections., If there are national
elections, it may well delay the Wye implementation process.
We'll work hard with the Palestinians, but the resultant
government might be more secure in going forward. We'll keep
pushing the Israel government to implement, but we need to watch
c losely i it's qu i t e unstab1 e . 'J.81
King Hussein: Yes, sir. May I ask, have Arafat and the
Israelis finished working out cooperation on security and
intelligence? ~
The President: I think that's on track. i think there are two
big problems for.the Israelis, at least for the Netanyahu
government: the whole question of how to handle the prisoner
releases and Arafat's speeches on declaring unilaterally a
Pa~estinian state in May.
If Netanyahu implements the next
redeployment, there'll be a vote Monday, a kind of no-confidence
vote. If he does not make the next redeployment, the issue is
why didn't he do it, and can ,he do it before the elections.
We'll keep pushing for full implementation. I think security is
back on track and I think we'll see evidence of that over the
next few days. Now there's this Iraq situation; I'll try to get
Arafat not to overreact. I wish I could say it was more
certain, but it/s uncertain . .k81'
~-,
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t~~~N LIDRARY PHOTOCOPY.,
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King Hussein: Everything you contribute to gives results, sir.
This time, we're full of admiration for the way you went there
and everything you said.
I hope it will work out.
If there's
anything I can s,ay, don't hesi ta te. ~
The President: Thanks.
here very soon?
(U)
Are you and Noor coming back through
I am improving all the time. They're very
optimistic.
I just . have to have time to build up resistance,
and I will come through Washington be
taking my leave
go
home.
(Ul
sident:
---'-----
That's wonderful news.
You sound strong.
Your
(U)
King Hussein: Yes, my spi ts are good. You did very well with
regard to yesterday. He asked for it. ~
The Pres
. King Hussein:
The President:
Thank you, Your Majesty.
Good day.
(U)
(U)
Thank you.
Goodbye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation -
~F:--:t)c-~
.
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O~LiNtON LiBRARY PHOTOCOP.Y·
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�8436
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Jacques Chirac of France
NOTE TAKERS:
Jim Smith, Joel Schrader and Frank Jarosinski
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
December 17, 1998 -- 12:38 p.m. - 12:53 p.m. EST
Oval Office
The President:
Hello.
(U)
President Chirac:
I just wanted to say hello and'I want to talk
through the interpreter, if you don't mind.
First of all, I
want to congratUlate you on your visit to Israel and Palestine.
It was a very difficult visit,but I thought you did it the best
way you could. Second, needless to say,
1 the French people
feel affection and sympathy for you for the ridiculous test you
have to go through. Well, you know all that.
I would not be
ringing you up if I did not have a third question. When the
strikes against Iraq are over, what are we going to do? What is
going to happen? Do you already have a plan to get out of the
crisis, to which France would be glad to contribute; or should
we still be discussing things? Well, for example, if Saddam
Hussein is neither killed nor overthrown, does UNSCOM go back or
not? Is there tight control or not? How will the oil-for-food
program be implemented? So, how do we get out of the crisis?
~
The President:
First of all, I think that the trip to Israel
and Gaza went great. But there are great difficulties there, as
you know.
The Netanyahu government is not stable and there may
be new elections before long, arid the political situation in
Israel ·will make it difficult to go forward on the peace
process.
So I thought it was important to go and I hope we can
keep going forward with the Wye agreement.
The trip was a
success.
Secondly, I think in terms Of what happens next,
I
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think it would be goodifUNSCOM can go back there.
If he does
not let them back, then we have to keep the sanctions on. We
have to keep that in force if he threatens his neighbors. We
have to keep the oi for-food program.
If there are medical
pr9blems to be ~et, we may need to meet them and think about how
to dramatically expand it to meet other needs and help the
country develop and minimize military expenditures. ;kf51
President Chirac: Do you think we will be able to send UNSCOM
back in to do its work? ~
The President:
I don't know.
I think there may be a chance if
he thinks he can
t the comprehensive
ew. But I think the
impo"rtant thing is for us to say we would 1 ike to do it and I
think we need to expand the oil-for-food program in the
meantime. Really
whole idea behind
oil-for-food program
was to return the people as close t? normalcy as possible
without a big military build~up.
I think
is a chance he
will take UNSCOM back under the right circumstances, if we make
clear that if he
his commitments, we'll keep ours. Maybe
Levitte could talk to Sandy Berger about it.
I'm glad you're
thinking about it, because I've been thinking that we should
talk about where we"all go from here. ~
ident Chirac:
There is no doubt about that. Do you think
Saddam Hussein could accept having UNSCOM
k? If not, what do
we do? ~
The President:
I think he might if the French Government asks
him, if he understood from my point of view all the commitments
are still on the table so long as there is actually compliance.
I further think we should also be for a broader oil-for-food
program. That is
only way we in the United States can move
toward an end to the sanctions regime. What I am looking for is
a strategy to end
danger that his WMD program causes and to
alieviate the suffering of the Iraqi people.
I think that for
me I have n6t ruled out the possibility th~t we ~ould go back to
a situation where Iraq is committed to implementing the
~~jPrandum of Understanding that Saddam and Kofi Annan reached.
~'
"
President Chirac:
In any case, France has taken a very clear
position that Saddam Hussein bears responsibility for the
situation and,
actual fact, I just repeated that a short
while ago on TV. So my concern now is about" the modalities for
getting out of the crisis and France is quite ready to associate
itself with any discussion of how to do so. ~
.
�3
The President:
I will have Sandy Berger follow up with you.
I'm very grateful for the statement you made at the UN.
It was
very, very helpful. We need to work through the UN to get a
resolution to this.
I hope -- you know, the Russians are going
to try to do something to express their opposition to what I
have done and to Butler in particular. I hope France will not
join this, and will perhaps work to become a mediating force.
What's done is done; we need to talk about the future and how to
help the people of Iraq.
I'm glad to focus on that with you.
I
think you are in a unique position to reach out to the Russians
and Chinese to get us on a responsible course and figure out
where we all go from here. ~
President Chirac:
That is precisely the issue.
posi tion I took on television.
(U)
The President:
Jacques.
(U)
Well, that is great.
That is the
Thank you very much,
President Chirac:
to the UN that everything is to be done so
is no division.
~
The President:
Thank you very much for that.
(U)
President Chirac: Everything -- so that there should be a
cormnon position. We hoped S·addam Hussein would have understood
by now.
I don't know if you have spoken to Yeltsin, but I found
him in extraordinarily good form.
I tried to talk to him about
the Iraq affair.
I think he's being pushed toward
ticism by
Primakov and the Duma, but I found him -- Hello? ~
The President: Jacques, I lost that.
extraordinarily gooq form?
(U)
President Chirac:
Who did you find in
Boris Nikolayevich Yel tsin.
~
The President: He's doing better?· Good.
I'm going to talk to
Primakov and then I may call Yeltsin, but I'm glad to hear that
he's doing be
That's good news. ~
PresidentChirac: You ought to ring him up. Yeltsin is much
r
s respect than Primakov. And I tried to calm him
down, but he remained very bothered by this a
r because of
.... ....
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.
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PHOTOCOPY _
�4
domestic public opinion. But I thirik if you ring him up it will
be a very good thing. ~
The President:
Thanks very much.
I will.
(U)
President
rac: Well, Bill, we will ke
in touch.
I'm glad
1 my best greetings to
to have you on the phone.
Please give
Hillary.
(U)
The President:
Thank you.
(U)
President Chirac: I hope to see you soon, because we have a
meeting in two months in Washington.
(U)
The President:
I'm looking forward to it.
President Chirac:
The President:
Thank you.
Goodbye.
Goodbye.
Thank you.
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation -
(U)
�!¥OL? SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom
NOTE TAKERS:
Roger Merletti, Bonnie Glick and Frank Jaros
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
December 18, 1998 -- 9:42 a.m. - 9:51 a.m. EST
Oval Of ce
The President:
Prime Minister
Hello, Tony?
air:
--~~--~~~~~~--
Hello.
ki
(U)
(U)
The President: How are you? So far so good.
going as well as can be expected.
(U)
Everything is
Prime Minister Blair: Good hearing from you, Bill. I think
.there are two issues we need to think thrDugh. How much more do
we need to do with Ramadan coming up? Secondly, then, what is
the strategy for the day after? Those are the two things that
concern me, but so far it's been successful. Your assessments
are showing we did well. What is your consensus? ~
The President: So far it looks good. Our
tial assessment is
really good, but it's too early to make any. jUdgments.
I'm
looking at the reports and they look good, and I think
politically we're getting good support in the region, and the
world, except the Russians are mad because they weren't
consulted first.
But if we had they wou
have told the Iraqis .
.J?1
Prime Minister Blair: That's right. On the other hand, it
would have been difficult to say that, to them.
pr
The President: Then I think we'll face some questions in the
Council of how to go forward. W~ o~ghtto try to go back to
·TOP
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2
something to devise a system that could lead to immediate and
meaningful actions by Iraq, like documents being given back
over.
Then we can look to broaden oil-for-fodd to make it look
like we have no problem with the Iraqi people.
This is what I
think we shoul~ do
terms of theUNSC.
I had a pretty good
talk with Chirac yesterday. What's your domestic situation?
yr
Prime Minister Blair:
Pretty good.
Parliament is fine.
I
think the most important thing
people is they understand
that we have reduced his military capability significantly. One
of
things is that you are not able to kill him personally.
We don't want
haim the civilians, so you target these
particular buildings. What I think is important is to show that
his command, control, and delivery system is so damaged that his
ability to mount offensive attacks and cause trouble
the
region is greatly reduced.
If we were in a position to announce
that we put back
s military capability by several years, I
think people would be supportive. The public is ambivalent.
They don't want lots of people kill
but they would like to see
that his military is damaged.
They want to know after 4 days of
bombing something has been accomplished. We've got to be able
to say to people here's what hitting these targets means and
he's a significantly reduced threat.
See what I mean? ,.)-8i
The President:. We've got to have our military and intelligence
folks as a guide.
It has to be
driven. ~ .
.
Prime Minister BI r:
Butler's report detailed all the weapons
that the UNSCOM people have uncovered and included a detailed,
blow-by-blow account of hassle and~bstruction . . We need a
constant diet of fact
the public of what these systems ~ould
have done and what destroying them gives us.
That's what keeps
opinion with us, and it allows us ~o saYi "Look, this thing has
had an effect. His ability to pose a danger has been reduced.~
You don't want to get back into the UNSCOMbusiness, or we'll be
doing this every three months.
I think we need to tie up the
military side and then have a political strategy. We need to
get into a situation where there are demands made of him.
I
think from my conversation with Chirac this morning, if we get
the
ght basis of a diplomatic initiative together, France
would be abl~ to say to Iraq, "You've got to get these things
together or you'll get hit again at the end of Ramadan." I
think it forcesSaddam into a policy of containment that is
considerable without landing us into where we were. ~
TO~
~ECREg;.
�3
The President: Yes, I agree with that. We need to work
together on it tomorrow or in the next couple of days. ~
Pr
Minister Blair:
Yes.
(U)
President: Our intelligence is pretty clear that Usama bin
Laden may be ordering some sort of attack in the next couple of
days and it's important that we work together on this.
I hope
you'll get a review on this. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Our people will cooperate
,fir
any way.
The President:
I know your guys are skittish about giving us
something.
I think your lawyers are worried. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
well. ~
Ok.
I will work on that.
(U)
One more thing - Northern Ireland.
You did
Minister Blair: Yes, I think we will get somewhere on the
decommissioning stuff. ~
The President: Well, I'll be
touch.
else to help you on·
s, let me know.
Prime Minister Bl
The President:
r:'
Ok.
Thank you.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Thank you.
( U)
(U)
(U)
Good-bye.
Good-bye.
If we can do anything
(U)
(U)
-- End of Conversation -
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8436
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan
NOTE TAKERS:
Joel Schrader, James Smith and Frank Jarosinski
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
December 18, 1998 -- 11:48 a.m.
Oval Office
The President:
Hello, Prime Minister?
Prime Minister Sharif:
The President:
(U)
Mr. President, how are you?
I'm fine.
Prime Minister Sharif:
voice.
(U)
11:54 a.m. EST
(U)
Thank you for taking my call.
(U)
It is a great pleasure listening to your
The President: Thank you.
I really enjoyed our meeting earlier
s month, and I hope the rest df your visit to the United
States was a good one. '(U)
Prime Minister Sharif:
It was very good, and I thank you for
your kind and generous hospitality.
(U)
The President: Well, thank you. ,Let me say, too, that I
understand we have reached a solution to the F-16 issue. ~
Prime Minister Sharif:
Thank you very much.
(U)
The President: And I am very pleased by that~
I know you want
to complete this by the end of the month, and we will do
everything we can to meet that deadline. ~
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Prime Minister Sharif: That is very kind of you.
I will
announce this myself tq the people of Pakistan in the next
days.
j;e1
The President:
I have been trying to do this for four years.
It's been a point of embarrassment to me, and I've been trying
to' put it right.
I feel very good about
s. ~ ..
Prime Minister Sharif:
I will tell the people 6f Pakistan that
this is what the President of the United States has done
Pakistan, that this matter is resolved. ~
The President: Let me also say that I called you about another
issue
is urgent, and I need your
sonal help. We have
reliable intelligence, and quite a lot of it, that
ama bin
Ladin intends to strike a U.S. target very soon, perhaps in 48
hours, and that the operations -- there may be two of them -
are being orchestrated by bin Ladin from within Afghanistan.
Now, all I can tell you is this is not in reaction to Iraq; .he's
been working on this.
I think it .i5!. imperative the Taliban do
everything it can to bring him to justice.
I think Pakistan has
a lot at stake in the Taliban
ing accepted in the
international community, and if this happens it wilT become
virtually impossible. We have warned the Taliban repeatedly
that we will hold them responsible, and we will warn them a in.
I want
to ask you to do whatever you can to stop
s
immediately.
I cannot overstate the importance or urgency of
it. He has this cooking in the next several days here. We are
king to the Saudis again about it. Anyway, I wanted to tell
you I am very, very worried about it and the consequences if it
occurs. ~
Prime Minister Sharif:
I understand your anxiety and your
position, Mr. President. You know, I told you
Washington
that the Taliban are very stubborn and very uncooperative
people.
I told you what transpi
between us and
Talib~n
and
so Saudi Prince Turki, who came especially from Saudi
Arabia on that
icular issue and they were very stubborn. We
will do everything we can, I assure you.
I will send my people
tomorrow to Afghanistan to meet with them and discuss this with
them, and tell them this will not be in their interest and it
will serve no purpose, that it will invite retaliation and a
world reaction.
I will do whatever I can, I can assure you of
that, but you must understand they are very stubborn and
uncooperative. ~
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The President: Yes, I understand, but.there's a difference
between being uncooperative and not giving him up, and being
uncooperative and allowing him to conduct operations.
Those are
fundament ly different things.
I hope you can bring that home
to them.~
Prime Minister Sharif:
The President:
to do.
(U)
I wi
I can.
(U)
I know you will try; that is all I can ask you
Prime Minister Sharif:
I have and I will. They don't listen to
us all the time.
I'm very disappointed with their attitude.
~
The President:
Thank you.
Thank you very much.
(U)
The President and Prime Minister Sharif exchanged closing
pleasantries.
(U)
-- End of Conversation -
TOE
~ECREg;:...
�e(:ONFIBENT;J,;M
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHI NGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
The Presldent
,Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United
NOTE TAKERS:
Matt Sibley, Doug
ey, Robin Rickard,
McGee, David Higgins and Roger Merletti
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
December 19, 1998-- 5:43
Oval Office
The President:
Hello.
Prime Min is t e r B1 air:
p.m~
ngdom
Jenny
- 5:51 p.m. EST
(U)
Hi Bill.
(U)
The 'President:
Hey Tony.
I just got my brie ng on the bomb
damage and am pleased with the way things have gone, and I think
the operation should end now.
I hope you are pleased with
British participation.
:tt was, quite important. )91'
Prime Minister Blair~
Sure~
it
been a job well done.
(U)
Prime Minister Bl r:
I think what is important now is that we
really show people, one, that we've significantly damaged his
capabilities in a very
ise way and in a sense that we have
not brought him down.
The point is we have reduced
significantly the threat he po
to the rest of the world that
is a darn sight better than l~aving him in, breath of his UN
obligations and us taking no action against him
'all.)91'
The
Pre~ident:
Yes,
I
with that.
(U)
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1.5 (d)
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Prime Minister Blair:
I think it has been an operation with a
purpose. The purpose
s been achieved.' He is back in his box,
and we now have to work out a strategy
containment and
stability. )K1
The President:
I
with all that. I think we should say we
will continue to contain him, restate the redl
for use of
force:
no threat to
neighbors, no developing WMD, and no
movement against the Kurds.
I also think we should say we
support the extension of the oil-for-food. And, when it comes
to UNSCOM and the lAEA, I can tell you we will welcome their
r~turn to Iraq, and I intend to say we will work on their return
but only after concrete, affirmative, and demonstrable action by
Iraq showing that it will piovide full cooperation nec~ssary for
UNSCOM and the IAEA to do their job. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
to say.
(U)
I think that is exactly the right thing
The President: The Russ
and the Chinese are hot and really
angry at me right now -- and the burden is on us to work hard to
manage the Council.
I think they are a lot madder at me than
you. But we will get through it . . If we w?uld have given them
all the advance notice they wanted, we would have had a very
different operation these last three days. ~
I
Prime Minister Blair: The truth of the matter is that we have
not acted other than what we said we would. We
we would
without further warning, and if we had not, they would think
we were not serious at
1. ~
President: Everything was terrific. We did exactly what we
said we would do and I am
pleased. Our people said the
work we did with the Briti
great and the cooperation was
at.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I think .i t is tremendously important that
as much material as possible about the damage is re
ed as
soon as possible. We need to build up a picture of what we've
achieved in military terms.
In a funny way people will be
sed that none of our s
ce people bave bee~ killed ~nd
relieved it was a short campaign. On the other hand, they will
want to know what
is that we actually did in milit
terms
-- the more detailed we can get the better. ~
The President:
I agree with that, and I will support it. And I
think our people have shared all the information.
I really want
COWFIDEH'I'IPrL
�3
to do that just like you say.
I've got the Secretary of
Defense, Secretary of State, and General Shelton here with me
(U)
now and we will follow up.
Okay Bill. When are you going to go out
is about quarter to 11 here now.
(U)
Prime Minister
and say
I'm going on in a
The President:
Yes, go out now and do it.
minute.
Just go on now.
(U)
Prime Minister Blai
I will do a short statement.
(U)
The President:
We are going outright now.
They say I'm
sched)lled to go' out in five minutes.
I have. got a. three-minute
statement, so why don't you just wait and go on out.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
stay in close touch.
Okay, that is great.
(U)
Our people need to
The President:
Let me ask you. , . I have a three-minute
statement.
Let me go give it and if' you want to answer
questions..
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I am not going to answer questions,
(U)
I am not going to answer any questions either.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Our defense guys thought it would be good
if we could release(;?e aftermath of the Ba'ath Party
headquarters h
. ~'
.
The President:
I will check with them.
I thought ·they were
going
do that. Al Gore is on the phone wi
them.
We will
check on it.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Good show.
Prime Minister
air·:
---------------------The President:
All right.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Bye-bye.
(U)
(U)
Good-bye.
(U)
End of Conversation
-COWFIDEH~
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Dl~CfNTON LiBRARY PHOTdCOPY
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�CO~JFlDEI~ 117I:t'
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: COQ, NODIS
PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: -GON(:IBENTIAL
DTG:18D14DZ DEC 98
FM: THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
TO:
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW NIACT
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC .
G 0 NFl
QQQQ
ErE NT i Jt't"
NODIS
SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN
1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM·
PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST
OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW.
BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR BORIS:
PAGE 2 RHEHAAA1426 60 NFl 0 E Iq =f'I A t
I AM WRITING YOU PERSONALLY TO MAKE SURE WE DO WHAT WE HAVE
OFTEN DONE BEFORE: KEEP U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS ON THE TRACK
YOU AND I LAID DOWN NEARLY SIX YEARS AGO. THE MOST IMMEDIATE
CHALLENGE - THOUGH BY NO MEANS THE ONLY ONE -- IS IRAQ.
YOU AND I HAVE WORKED CLOSELY FOR MANY YEARS TO ENSURE THAT
IRAQ AND SADDAM HUSSEIN COMPLY WITH THE WILL OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE DECISIONS OF THE UN SECURITY
COUNCIL. OUR COMMON EFFORTS, INCLUDING THOSE YOU, YEVGENIY
MAKSIMOVICH AND MINISTER IVANOV HAVE UNDERTAKEN ON THE .
DIPLOMATIC TRACK, HELPED PREVENT SADDAM FROM ACQUIRING THE
CAPABILITY TO THREATEN HIS REGION AND THE WORLD WITH .
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. LAST MONTH, OUR EFFORTS
PERSUADED SADDAIVI TO COMMIT HIMSELF TO FULL COOPERATION
WITH UNSCOM.
UNFORTUNATELY, SAD DAM HAS BETRAYED HIS PROMISES TO YOU AND
TO ALL OF US IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY. THERE IS NO DOUBT IN MY
MIND THAT SADDAM HAS CHOSEN A COURSE OF DEFIANCE. DESPITE
THE PROMISES HE GAVE IN ORDER TO AVOID THE USE OF FORCE
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
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PAGE 3 RHEHAAA1426 60 til FlO El\I"'I"1"A L
AGAINST HIM, SAD DAM HAS ENGAGED IN A DELIBERATE AND
WIDE-SCALED EFFORT,.TO OBSTRUCT UNSCOM FROM CARRYING OUT ITS
MANDATE. INDEED, WE KNOW THAT IRAQ ORDERED THE DESTRUCTION
OF WEAPONS-RELATED DOCUMENTS IN ANTICIPATION OF AN UNSCOM
INSPECTION.
I KNOW WE DISAGREE ON THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST IRAQ.
HOWEVER, BOTH TONY BLAIR AND I CONCLUDED THAT SADDAM'S
ACTIONS LEFT US NO OTHER CHOICE. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT I
SOUGHT EVERY AVENUE AVAILABLE IN ORDER NOT TO UNDERTAKE THE
ACTIONS I AUTHORIZED ON DECEMBER 16. AL GORE DISCUSSED OUR
REASONING AND ACTIONS WITH YEVGENIY MAKSIMOVICH. FROM AL'S
REPORT, THEY HAD A GOOD AND CONSTRUCTIVE EXCHANGE. AL TOLD
ME OF YOUR CONCERNS ABOUT CHAIRMAN BUTLER. I AM FIRMLY
CONVINCED THAT THE PROBLEM IS IRAQ'S UNWILLINGNESS TO
COMPLY; THE PROBLEM IS NOT WITH BUTLER.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA THAT
YOU AND I HAVE WORKED SO HARD TO BUILD IS.FAR TOO IMPORTANT
AND, TO MY MIND, FAR TOO SOUND, TO BE SUBVERTED BY SADDAM
PAGE 4 RHEHAAA1426~ G ~J F I" f! Iq 'f I A'"t
HUSSEIN. I REGRET THAT YOU CHOSE TO WITHDRAW YOUR
AMBASSADOR FROM WASHINGTON. EVEN WHEN OUR GOVERNMENTS
DISAGREE, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU AND YEVGENIY MAKSIMOVICH
HAVE ALL POSSIBLE CHANNELS TO EXCHANGE VIEWS AND SEEK TO
ADDRESS OUR DIFFERENCES.
OUR CHALLENGE NOW IS TO TAKE PRACTICAL STEPS TO MAKE SURE
THE RELATIONSHIP STAYS ON TRACK. FOR ONE, LET'S MAKE SURE
RHETORICAL EXCESSES DO NOT PREVENT US FROM FOCUSSING
CONSTRUCTIVELY AND COOPERATIVELY ON NEXT STEPS TO ENSURE·
SADDAM'S COMPLIANCE. WE ARE READY TO ENGAGE WITH YOU ON
HOW WE ENSURE THAT IRAQ DOES NOT DEVELOP ITS WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION OR THREATEN ITS NEIGHBORS. AL AND MADELEINE
STAND READY TO CONTINUE THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH YEVGENIY
MAKSIMOVICH AND IGOR SERGEYEVICH ON THIS, AS WELL AS THE
MANY OTHER ISSUES THAT MAKEUP OUR COMMON AGENDA.
SINCERELY,
BILL
PAGE 5 RHEHAAA1426 ~ L
<I\SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
<I\SSN>1426
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<"TOR>981217205350 M3610196
FROM:
SITREPRT
�·Pascual, Carlos E.
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Importance:
Message Flag:
Flag Status:
@NSA - Natl Security Advisor
@RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; @WHSR - WH Situation Room; @VP - VP Natl Security Affairs;
@NESASIA - NElSouth Asia
FW: RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR TO U.S. RECALLED [UNCLASSIFIED ~
.
~
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Read
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PLEASE PASS TO SANDY AND JIM
ry represe
ng maps
the Russians did not cancel loday's PJC with Defense
rs.
oug
ey stopped Minister Sergeyev from attending, they still held the
meeting with their ambassador in the chair. In addition, the Russian DCM told me they
are buying Vorontsov a two-way ticket, even though he is scheduled to leave
permanently early next month.
s reason,
r
Strobe has asked that
- "Original MessageFrom:
Campanella, Anthony
Sent:
Thursday, December 17, 1998 5:50 PM
To:
~NSA - Nail Security Advisor; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary; @\l\lHSR - \I\IH Situation Room; @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine;
PRESS - Public Affairs; @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs; Black, Sleven K.; Saunders, Richard M.; Fuerth, Leon S.; Marty,
oseph H.; Riedel, Bruce O.
SUbJect:
RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR TO U.S. RECALLED (UNCLASSIFIED]
Ir~portance:
High
Paul Simons of State Oeprtment reported that the Russian OeM called Ambassador Sestanovich to
tell ~Iim that the Russian An1bassasdor to Washington has been recalled. There was no reason
given, but STate assesses that it is in regards to U.S.-UK actions in the Gulf.
;,.. ,.4.'~.-·
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER 1.0. 13526
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�8438
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504
December 17, 1998
ACTION
MEMORANDUM· FOR ffAl1UEL BERGER
THROUGH:
. FROM:"
SUBJECT:
CARLOS
PASCUA~
ANDREW WEISSiS>J
Letter to. President Yeltsin on Iraq
The memorandum at Tab I recommends a Presidential message to
Russian President Boris Yeltsin on the Iraq crisis.
Strobe
feels that a tailored message to Ye~tsin may help cushion some
of the Russian pique about the strikes.
Mamedov told Collins this morning that Primakov had reacted
"very emotionally" to the strikes and· was blindsided.
The Vice
President had a lengthy telephone conversation with Primakov on
Thursday to explain that we went the extra mile to give Saddam a
chance to comply and that our actions were fully consistent with
existing UN Security Council resolutions.
Despite our efforts,
the Russians withdrew tonight their ambassador from Washington.
The letter underscores the continued importance of the U.S.
Russian reI ionship and places the blame for the strikes
squarely on Saddam's defiance. We strongly recommend a
handwritten note from the President at the end of the letter to
show the President's personal interest.
The letter will be sent
by confidential fax and will be double-tracked to Prime Minister
Primakov's office.
Concurrence by:
Ceon Fuerth, Joe Marty
kW~
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.
Attachments
Tab I
Memorandum for the President
Tab A Letter to President Yeltsin
c mJF I DEW:P Il'.tlr'
Reason:
1.5 (d)
Declassify On:
12/
DECLASSIFIED
PERE.O.13526
1Po~ \1~2:" r
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t""
�-.r;;;ONET ];;lENT IAL
TH E WH ITE HOUS E
WASHINGTON
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
BERGE~
FROM:
SAMUEL
SUBJECT:
Letter to Russian President Yeltsin on Iraq
e
Approve a letter to Russian President Boris Yeltsin on the Iraq
crisis.
Not surprisingly, the Russians have been highly critical of the
airstrikes against Iraq. Strobe and I believe that a t
lored
message from'yoU might help allay some of Yeltsin's and
Primakov's anger over the s
kes.
The Vice President called
Primakov on Thursday afternoon to reassure him that we gave
Saddam more than enough chances to comply with his obligations
and that our actions were fully authorized under existing UN
Security Council resolutions.
On Thursday evening, the Russians
recalled their ambassador from Washington, who was scheduled to
leave within a month.
Your letter outlines our rationale for the attack and rebuts
Russia's public complaints.
It also emphasizes the ~nduring
importance of the U.S.-Russian relationship and calls on the
Russian leadership not to let Saddam drive a lasting wedge
between us. A copy will also be provided to Prime Minister
Primakov's office.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the letter at Tab A and add the following
handwritten note:
"Boris
I know how committed you are to a
better future for your country and to our partnership; I trust
you know how deeply I share and support your goals. We must not
let Saddam destroy what we have built.u
Attachment
Tab A
Letter to President Yeltsin
COWFIGENHAL
Reason:
1.5(d)
Declassify On:
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
21D+" (ZIt t - ,...
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"...
cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff
�8654
THE WHITE H6u5E
,
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telephone
President
PARTICIPANTS:
Conversa~~
with Russian
Yeltsin~J
.President Clinton
President Boris Yel
in
Interpreter: Dmitry Zarechnak
Notetakers:
David Higgins, Matt Sibley,
Doug Bayley, Jim Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
December 30, 1998, 10:00-10:33 a.m.,
Oval Of ce
PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Hello, Bill.
THE PRESIDENT:
Hello, Boris.
(U)
It is nice to hear your voice.
(U)
PR~SIDENT YELTSIN:
Well, I think it is important
r us now to
talk about the future of Russia-U.S. rel ions.
I have always
shared with you in a very frank way our views about our
relationship and have always paid heed to what you had to say.
Through those very frank exchanges, on many occasions we proved
we were able to find solutions to very critical, and ve
crucial
problems.
,)91'
I want to be quite straightforward.
I want to tell you how sad
and sorry I was about the military action by the U.S. and UK
against Iraq.
Because what is at stake is not just the person
of Saddam Hussein but our relations with the U.S.
I believe
what we need ,to do now is reconstruct the unity of action in the
UN Security Council, and also to actively work for our joint and
agreed actions in the future.
I am sure that we can draw
lessons from what has happened because we must not
low the
situation to happen which would impose a threat to the great and
positive accomplishments that you and,I have scored.
,)if
We are faced now with quite a few very di icult tasks.
Some of
them we discussed when you came to Moscow in September, and we
CONFIDhN.:l:.Il';I;
Classified by:
Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
1.S(b)
DeclassiOn:
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
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can not deal with all those unless there is a measure of good
will from both sides. I talked to Primakov about Iraq. We have
to turn what has not been the best page in Russian-U.S.
relations. I got your message, and I agree with, you the best
way to get our relationship back on the right track is to try to
move the action" forward in practical steps and moves. At this
point in time, one of those critical steps would be cfcti ve steps
forward in the Primakov~Gore Commission. I value very much
their last conversation. ~
The main task now is to move forward in the area of economic
cooperation between Russia and the U.S., especially on the eve
of the critical phase of the next round of our discussions with
the IMF. I would like to continue to look forward to the
support you promised before. / )
We also agreed, you and I, that we must do everything to assure
a very rapid transition from START II to START III. Of course,
you are aware that I, myself, and Primakov, did everything we
could to assure prompt and early ratification of the agreement.
You are fully aware of that. Regrettably, at this point in
time, prospects for passing this agreement have deteriorated.
Still, despite this, we will move in a very straightforward and
consistent way to get this task accomplished. "Kr
To be able to move forward in this manner, I suggest you and I
instruct Ivanov and Mrs. Albright, in the course of their
meeting at the end of January, to concentrate on finding
solutions to the CFE Treaty. This is really critical in terms
of the future of European security and the future relationship
between Russia and NATO.
yrl
1999 will be a very important year in terms of the development
of the Russian-U.S. relationship. In the foundation underneath
that relationship, we must leave behind a very good inheritance.
In concluding my remarks, I wish to extend to you and your
family, very good wishes in the New Year. Now I pass the floor
to you, Bill. )'C'l
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Bo s. First of all, I wanted to
thank you for your good review of the issues. It is good to
hear you sounding so good. ,1Jlf
Let me just briefly say a
have to figure out how to
our relationship and keep
take military action. In
GOHFIDl!!M'fI:M.
word or two about Iraq. I agree we
go beyond here and continue to build
it going. I obviously did not want to
March, when the memorandum Saddam
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signed with Kofi Annan was violated, we didn't act militarily.
In October, we went out of our way to avoid it~ In November,
when the Security Council voted to condemn Iraq 15-0, I calle~
off the attack at the last minute because he said he would
comply. The position we were in was that when the report carne
back saying he was not in compliance with UNSCOM, we and the
British felt we had no choice. ~
We have to figure outhow.we go from here. We can't let Saddam
undermine the U.S.-Russian relationship. One thing i am very
troubled by is the belligerence Iraq is showing against
coalition aircraft in the no-fly zone. If they keep shooting
missiles at our planes, this could lead·to a very s
ous
confrontation. I don't want further military action, but they
need to stop that.
~
Let me say a word about the agenda for 1999. It is very
important for us to get started on supporting the Russian
economic recovery, strengthening arms control, and stemming
proliferation. I am encouraged Madeleine is corning to Moscow at
the end of January, and, of course, Gore and Primakov will meet
in March. I·t is important you and I give our teams the right
tone, direction, and momentum. ~
I understand the difficulties you have in ratifying START II
now, but am glad you continue to support it. It would be .
terrible if you· and I finish our terms without START II and
START III. It would be good for our security interests and good
for your economic interests. There would be no more tangible
sign of our cooperation. On CFE, I,too, want to move as fast
as we can. I will see what can be done. I know it is important
to you, and the Duma has been holding up START on the basis of
it. y:;t
On the economy, let me. just say, I think you know I want to do
more to support your economic recovery and reform, and I
obviously want to help all I can with the IMF. I think the
entire international community is interested in supporting
Russian reform with greater investment from both multilateral
and private sources, building on a realistic program. As we
discussed in the pa ,we believe you can get billions and
billions .of dollars in energy investment with changes in the
laws to protect investments there. ~
What is the critical thing here is a durable reform program that
will lead to resumed cooperation with the IMF, which will bring
support from the international community . . That is also
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important to restructure your external debt. We are also
working on other measures with Primakov to help spe fic sectors
of the Russian economy. ~
I want to do all I can, but I think Mr. Primakov's government
has to support ~ufficient reform for me to convince the IMF to
invest.
It is important to get the whole world community
putting money into Russia instead of taking money out. ~
The other thing I wanted to emphasize, the final thing, is we
have to get this IMF deal done because that opens the door to
all other good economic things. We will do all we can to help.
We don't want to see the Russian people hurt any more, but there
~
Well,
great
sends
these
to be some positive moves to get the IMF to move forward.
Boris, I wanted to thank you again for the call.
It was
to hear your voice.
Please give Naina our best. Hillary
you a big hug for the New Year. We have to work on
1
things together, and we will.
(U)
PRESIDENT YELTSIN:
I thank you, Bill, for what you just said.
One final question I want to raise and that relates to the April
summit in Washington. Of course, you should understand our
final decision to participate would depend on the way the
discussion goes forward concerning the.new NATO strategy. We
are very seriously concerned over plans underway to expand the
theater of NATO activity.
This would not take notice of UN
Security Council decisions, and this is what really gives us a
lot of concern. A lot of things depend on whether or not it is
possible to find agreement on the CFE Treaty.
I would say that
we agreed with you that we need to turn this page in our
relati~nship which has not been the best one.
Let us stay the
course. ~
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I like that.
I do hope Russia will be
able to come to Washington in April. We have a good partnership
between Russia and NATO. The agreement we signed is a good one;
we don't have conflicting issues for the future. We need to
discuss changes we are trying to make and walk you through them.
I hope you can feel comfortable enough to have Russian
participation.
It would be a big plus, in view of the agreement
we signed for a partnership between Russia and NATO. ~
I look forward to talking and working with you.
Thank you for
the phone call.
It has been a good one, I think. )J21
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PRESIDENT YELTSIN:
I also think we have had a very constructive
conversat
,and we really got to understand what each of us
was telling the other. What remains is to work until we realize
what was just discussed. ~
THE PRESIDENT:
Good.
(U)
PRESIDENT YELTSIN:
Please pass my best wishes to all the
members of your family.
I wish you a happy New Year and Merry
Christmas.
(U)
THE PRESIDENT:
Thank you, Bo
PRESIDENT YELTSIN:
Good bye.
s.
Good bye.
(U)
End of Conversation
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CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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Unofficial translation
December 2, 1998
Dear Bill,
Thank you for your letter on Iraq. I value our close contact on this
complicated issue. The matter is well worth it as we are dealing with the
implementation of the international community resolutions.
I would like to reaffirm that we continue exerting heavy pressure on
Baghdad to compel it to fulfill its obligations to fully restore cooperation with the
UN. With respect to your letter we have once again addressed the Iraqi
leadership with an urgent request not to allow any backslides in the interaction
with UNSCOM.
At the same time we should not overdramatize the situation over the recent
requests to Baghdad. We, quite naturally, urged the Iraqis from the very
beginning to exercise constructiveness in this issue as well. According to the
clarifications of the UNSCOM Chairman the problems which have emerged are
quite solvable in the framework of the relationship between UNSCOM and
HIS EXCELLENCY
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
Washington, D.C.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Iraq. What is essential is that inspections are conducted steadily and restoration
of the monitoring is fully underway. It is important to advance to a
comprehensive review on Iraq in the Security Council which will put everything
in its place as well as allow to objectively evaluate what has been achieved and
highlight issues which Baghdad should still report on.
I hope that we will not see any aggravation of the situation. I beheve that
our joint efforts will once again allow to find a solution to the emerged
complications by diplomatic means.
Sincerely,
B.Yeltsin
Moscow, Kremlin
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�
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Clinton Presidential Records
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Declassified Documents concerning Iraq
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This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on communications between President Clinton and various world leaders regarding air strikes against Iraq in December 1998. Correspondence between President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin is included.
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<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7388808" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Boris Yeltsin
Declassified
Foreign Policy
Iraq
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Office of Records Management - Presidential Decision Directives
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1993-2001
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<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7585718" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>Presidential Decision Directives communicate Presidential decisions concerning national security and U.S. foreign policy.</p>
<p>Presidential directives are signed or authorized by the President on issues of foreign policy and national security. The National Security Council gathers facts and views of appropriate government agencies, conducts analyses, determines alternatives, and presents policy choices to the President for decision. The President's decisions are announced by decision directives.</p>
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PDD-47 - Nuclear Scientific and Technical Cooperation with RU.S.sia Related to Stockpile Safety and Security and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, CTBT Monitoring and Verification, 3/4/1996
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Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
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PDD-47
7585718
Declassified
Foreign Policy
Presidential Decision Directive
Russia
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Title
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<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
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This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
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Declassified Documents concerning Presidential Decision Directive 47 (PDD-47)
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Nuclear Scientific and Technical Cooperation with Russia Related to Stockpile Safety and Security and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Monitoring and Verification (3/4/1996).
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