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Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) of E.O. 13526.
�SECRET/PLUTO
20633
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
May 19, 1994
Na^l Sec Advisor
has seen
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
FROM:
DANIEL PONEMANTp
SUBJECT:
P r i n c i p a l s ' Committee Meeting on North Korea,
May 20, 1994, 4:30 p.m.-5:30 p.m.
A f t e r o b t a i n i n g the usual updates (agenda a t Tab I ) , you should
pursue the f o l l o w i n g o b j e c t i v e s i n t h i s meeting:
R e i t e r a t e the need f o r d i s c r e t i o n a t t h i s c r i t i c a l
j u n c t u r e , e s p e c i a l l y i n l i g h t o f t h e resumption o f
serious leaks o f [
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
s e n s i t i v e matters o f n e g o t i a t i n g
strategy.
Decide on the a p p r o p r i a t e l i n k a g e between a p o s s i b l e
t h i r d round and the d e f u e l i n g campaign.
Task State t o c l e a r a message f o r d e l i v e r y t o the
DPRK r e f l e c t i n g t h a t d e c i s i o n .
Decide whether t o encourage Senators Nunn and Lugar t o
t r a v e l t o Pyongyang and, i f so, when.
I f the d e c i s i o n i s t o proceed:
c o n f i r m the Senators' w i l l i n g n e s s t o go;
task State t o r e f l e c t t h a t i n a response t o
the l e t t e r sent by the leader o f the DPRK
l e g i s l a t u r e t o the Vice President;
ask Defense i f i t could f a c i l i t a t e t h e
Senators' t r a v e l arrangements; and
task NSC t o d r a f t a P r e s i d e n t i a l message f o r
Nunn and Lugar t o c a r r y .
Provide guidance t o the SSK on our approach e i t h e r t o
the t h i r d round o r t o sanctions (depending on t h e
answer t o the f i r s t question) and task f u r t h e r work
accordingly.
Agree on a press and Congressional s t r a t e g y f o r the
weeks ahead, and underline the need f o r press and H i l l
statements t o be f u l l y coordinated.
SECRET/PLUTO
D e c l a s s i f y on:
OADR
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
�2
The f i r s t and l a s t p o i n t s a r e s e l f - e x p l a n a t o r y ; t h e b a l a n c e o f
t h i s memo w i l l f o c u s on t h e m i d d l e t h r e e i s s u e s . S t a t e has
c i r c u l a t e d a d i s c u s s i o n paper!
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1,4d
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
L i n k a g e between t h i r d r o u n d and d e f u e l i n g campaign
T h i s i s s u e r e l a t e s t o whether t o propose a t h i r d r o u n d t o t h e
DPRK and, i f so, under what c o n d i t i o n s .
On t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t
t h e IAEA r e p o r t s t h a t i t has f u l f i l l e d i t s UNSC March 31
mandate - - t o c o n c l u d e t h e March and maintenance i n s p e c t i o n
a c t i v i t i e s -- t h e SSK i d e n t i f i e d t h r e e o p t i o n s :
Set a d a t e f o r t h e t h i r d
round
EO 13526 1.4d
EO 13526 1.4d
The sense o f t h e SSK was t o s u p p o r t t h e f i r s t o p t i o n .
After a l l ,
we s a i d t h a t we w o u l d s e t a d a t e f o r t h e t h i r d round i n t h o s e
circumstances.
The downside, o b v i o u s l y , i s t h a t we c o u l d appear
once a g a i n t o have a d e a l w h i c h , s u d d e n l y , f a l l s t h r o u g h i f
Pyongyang d e f u e l s i n an u n a c c e p t a b l e way . |
EQ 13526 1.4d
We recommend t h e f i r s t
option.
EO 13.526_1_4.d_
EO 13526 1.4d
The DPRK has been c a l l i n g f o r a m e e t i n g i n New York; S t a t e
t e n t a t i v e l y agreed t o one S a t u r d a y so t h a t a PC-cleared p o s i t i o n
c o u l d be conveyed a t t h a t t i m e .
You s h o u l d t a s k S t a t e t o c l e a r
our message t o t h e DPRK i n t e r a g e n c y .
SECRET/PLfcHFO
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET/PbggQ
3
Nunn-Lugar DPRK T r i p
You r e c a l l t h a t Ambassador Laney was pushing t h i s idea, based on
a vague North Korean message brought back by B i l l Taylor o f CSIS.
We understood t h a t Nunn was w i l l i n g t o go, i f Lugar d i d , t o o . We
need t o c o n f i r m t h a t , probably through G a l l u c c i .
The Vice President r e c e i v e d a l e t t e r i n h i s c a p a c i t y as t h e
President o f the Senate from the leader o f t h e DPRK Supreme
People's Assembly. (Tab IV.) Apart from the usual cant i t
proposed b i l a t e r a l l e g i s l a t i v e c o n t a c t s . The SSK agreed t h i s was
a more a p p r o p r i a t e v e h i c l e t o use than the Taylor c o n t a c t i f we
wish t o pursue t h i s .
The SSK b e l i e v e d t h i s idea worth pursuing, and one t h a t could
enhance our prospects i n the t h i r d round. Nunn and Lugar would
not n e g o t i a t e , and would c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e i r s as a f a c t f i n d i n g
trip.
I d e a l l y , the t r i p would take place l a t e next week, before
a June 1 t h i r d round. A l t e r n a t i v e l y , t h e t h i r d round could s l i p
a week i f necessary t o accommodate t h e Senators' t r i p . More
delay i s probably unwise, i n l i g h t o f the c o n t i n u i n g d e f u e l i n g ;
i f necessary the t r i p could f o l l o w the t h i r d round.
While not n e g o t i a t i n g , we could use Nunn and Lugar t o c a r r y a
P r e s i d e n t i a l message, along the l i n e s t h a t we e a r l i e r prepared
f o r Dellums.
T h i r d Round Issues
Beyond the issues r a i s e d i n the State paper a t Tab I I , d i s c u s s i o n
has continued over the t h i r d round s t r a t e g y paper (Tab V)
prepared f o r the SSK meeting t h i s week ( i n c l u d i n g the ACDA
p r o p o s a l ) . Defense continues t o r a i s e general concerns about
whether we have a coherent s t r a t e g y f o r the t h i r d round. What
concrete outcomes do we seek? What next steps do we envisage?
What i s our o v e r a l l gameplan t o move from t h e t h i r d round t o f u l l
achievement o f our o b j e c t i v e s ? What are the areas o f interagency
disagreement surrounding these issues, and how should they be
resolved?
I t i s u n r e a l i s t i c t o expect the P r i n c i p a l s t o make much progress
here, a t the end o f the meeting.
I t would be u s e f u l , however, t o
s t i m u l a t e P r i n c i p a l s ' views on these questions by asking G a l l u c c i
to s p e l l out h i s answers t o these questions. I have primed
G a l l u c c i t o be prepared t o speak t o t h i s a t your prompting. He
w i l l a l s o have a d r a f t Framework Agreement t o d i s t r i b u t e a t t h e
meeting.
P r i n c i p a l s ' views should then i n f o r m the d r a f t i n g o f a s t r a t e g y
paper f o r the t h i r d round and beyond t h a t i s addressed by
P r i n c i p a l s once more before the t h i r d round.
F i n a l Note: Sanctions Strategy
We have y e t t o provide the l e v e l o f refinement urged by
P r i n c i p a l s , i n terms o f what a c t i o n s t r i g g e r what s a n c t i o n s , and
SECRET/PLUTO
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET/PLUTO
4
under what circumstances sanctions are removed.
retask t h a t next c u t a t the sanctions s t r a t e g y .
You should
EO 13526 1 4
.d
EO 13526 1.4d
Concurrences by:
Stanley Roth
N
A
Attachments
Tab I
Agenda
Tab I I
State Discussion Paper
Tab I I I
Cables on IAEA Inspections
Tab IV
DPRK L e t t e r t o the Vice President
Tab V
State and ACDA Papers on T h i r d Round Strategy
SECRET/PLUTO
OCINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�GECRET/PLUTQ
(DECL:OADR)
ARCHITECTURE FOR THE THIRD ROUND
What We Want from the DPRK
Our o v e r a l l o b j e c t i v e i s DPRK agreement t o our "broad and
thorough" approach f o r r e s o l v i n g nuclear and other issues,
i n c l u d i n g North Korean r e t u r n .. the NPT, compliance w i t h
'o
f u l l s c o p e safeguards, imple-rentation of the North-South
D e n u c l e a r i z a t i o n D e c l a r a t i o n , and progress on non-nuclear
issues such as the conventional m i l i t a r y balance, m i s s i l e
exports, t e r r o r i s m , and human r i g h t s .
Our primary immediate o b j e c t i v e i s North Korea's r e t u r n
to f u l l membership i n the N o n - P r o l i f e r a t i o n Treaty (NPT) and
compliance w i t h i t s fu'ilscope safeguards o b l i g a t i o n s under
the Treaty. NPT compliance requires t h a t the DPRK accept
r o u t i n e and ad hoc inspections and cooperate and a s s i s t the
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) t o v e r i f y North
Korea's i n i t i a l plutonium d e c l a r a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g s p e c i a l
inspections.
We would require t h a t the DPRK's commit t o
accept measures t o resolve d i s c r e p a n c i e s , i n c l u d i n g special
inspections]
EO 13526 1.4d
We would also i n s i s t t h a t the North m a i n t a i n the current
"freeze" on i t s nuclear program (e.g., no reprocessing),
which ensures no a d d i t i o n a l production or d i v e r s i o n o f
nuclear m a t e r i a l as a basic c o n d i t i o n f o r c o n t i n u i n g the
process leading t o a thorough and broad r e s o l u t i o n . We would
also attempt t o convince the DPRK t o r e f r a i n from a d d i t i o n a l
steps t h a t would be i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a f i n a l r e s o l u t i o n of
the nuclear issue.
For example, since f i n a l r e s o l u t i o n
includes DPRK conversion t o l i g h t water r e a c t o r s , we could
argue t h a t the DPRK should h a l t f u r t h e r development of i t s
g r a p h i t e reactor-based i n f r a s t r u c t u r e ( i . e . , no r e f u e l i n g the
5 M r e a c t o r , cease c o n s t r u c t i o n o f the 50 and 200 M
W
W
r e a c t o r s ) . To support our non-nuclear o b j e c t i v e s , we could
also seek DPRK agreement t o suspend f u r t h e r m i s s i l e exports.
EO 13526 1.4d
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�GCCnET/PLUTQ
- 2What- We Would O f f e r
We would commit t o implement a long term plan on the basis
of r e c i p r o c i t y to improve U.S./DPRK b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s ,
address t h ^ North's s t a t e d s e c u r i t y concern
EO 13526 1.4d
EO 13526 l.4d
|and support i n t e r n a t i o n a l assistance to the
North's energy sector
EO 13526 1.4d
I EQ 13526 1.4d Iwe would s t a t e c l e a r l y that we are prepared to
e s t a b l i s h f u l l d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s , l i f t b i l a t e r a l economic
s anctions
EO 13526 1.4d
and
f a c i l i t a t e m u l t i l a t e r a l p r o v i s i o n of a l i g h t water r e a c t o r .
In the short term, we would agree t o take s p e c i f i c steps as
the North moves toward f u l l compliance w i t h i t s NPT
o b l i g a t i o n s . We can begin taking steps as the North implements
ad h o c / r o u t i n e i n s p e c t i o n s , and moves t o implement measures
necessary t o c l e a r up past discrepancies i n i t s plutonium
production d e c l a r a t i o n . !
E0 13526 1.4d
Once B l i x r e p o r t s t o the IAEA Board o f Governors t h a t North
Korea has s a t i s f i e d the IAEA requirements t o v e r i f y i t s
plutonium d e c l a r a t i o n and i s i n compliance w i t h i t s safeguards
o b l i g a t i o n s under the NPT|
EO 13526 1.4d
EO 13526 1.4d
EO 13526 1.4d
|(The attached
paper and t i m e l i n e provides a d e t a i l e d scenario f o r
simultaneous a c t i o n s leading t o s p e c i a l i n s p e c t i o n s . )
Form of the Agreement
I f p o s s i b l e , we would conclude a j o i n t "framework
agreement", l a y i n g out both sides' commitment t o the p r i n c i p l e s
and o b j e c t i v e s of our broad and thorough approach.
This
framework agreement could be issued as a j o i n t statement t o
mark the end of the meetings i n Geneva.
In any event, we would seek agreement on a s p e c i f i c
t i m e t a b l e and sequence f o r implementing the North's compliance
w i t h i t s NPT o b l i g a t i o n s and the r e c i p r o c a l U.S. a c t i o n s t h a t
w i l l be taken along the way.|
EQ 13526 1.4d
EO 13526 1.4d
Scenario f o r the T h i r d Round
We e n v i s i o n roughly two weeks of meetings i n Geneva.
1. F i r s t Session
I n two or t h r e e days of formal meetings,
we w i l l present our concept of a "broad and thorough
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET/DLUTQ
- 3r e s o l u t i o n " and l i s t e n t o the North Korean proposal f o r
"comprehensive package s o l u t i o n . " I n t h i s opening session,
we a n t i c i p a t e t h a t the U.S. and DPRK p o s i t i o n s w i l l be f a r
apart. I n a 4 March p u b l i c statement, v i c e M i n i s t e r Kang
Sok Ju suggested t h a t the DPRK's "comprehensive s o l u t i o n "
requires " t e r m i n a t i o n of the U.S. nuclear t h r e a t and
h o s t i l e p o l i c y against the DPRK, the i n t r o d u c t i o n of l i g h t
water r e a c t o r s , and the improvement of b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s "
in exchange f o r resumption of IAEA ad hoc and r o u t i n e
i n s p e c t i o n s . The North i s l i k e l y to be p l e a s a n t l y
s u r p r i s e d by what we are prepared t o o f f e r over the long
term on the d i p l o m a t i c frontf
EO 13526 1.4d
Over lunch and i n the margins, where the r e a l bargaining i s
done, A/S G a l l u c c i w i l l begin to s p e l l out our minimum
requirements f o r c o n t i n u i n g the process, i n c l u d i n g DPRK
commitment t o accept and complete measures t o resolve
d e c l a r a t i o n d i s c r e p a n c i e s such as s p e c i a l i n s p e c t i o n s
EO 13526 l.4d
[Presumably, Kang w i l l also drop h i n t s
about what the.DPRK r e a l i s t i c a l l y expects from the U.S. i n
exchange f o r resuming ad hoc and r o u t i n e i n s p e c t i o n s .
2. The Break Once the formal p r e s e n t a t i o n s are completed,
we would propose t o break f o r a few days f o r
c o n s u l t a t i o n s . Kang may need to r e t u r n t o Pyongyang f o r
further instructions
EQ 13526 1 4
.d
EO 13526 1.4d
3. Second Session A f t e r the break, we would reconvene t o
determine whether a basis e x i s t s f o r c o n t i n u i n g the t a l k s ,
EO 13526 1.4d
I f the North accepts our basic approach, we would begin
work on a framework agreement and as much of t h e
implementing agreement as p o s s i b l e . Depending on
circumstances, we could t a c k l e the issues s e r i a t i m , or the
d e l e g a t i o n s could d i v i d e i n t o working groups t o n e g o t i a t e
i n d i v i d u a l elements simultaneously. The most contentious
EO 13526 1.4d
would need to be
issues
reserved Eor d i r e c t GaTlucct^Kang t a l k * .
-
�- 4 -
In any event, the n e g o t i a t i o n s are l i k e l y to be
difficult.|
EO 13526 1.4d
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
very
�- 5 What Happens I f the Talks f a i l ?
EO 13526 1 4
.d
�•ODORDT/PLUTO
20638
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
Summary o f Conclusions f o r
Meeting o f NSC P r i n c i p a l s ' Committee
May 20, 1994
DATE
S i t u a t i o n Room
LOCATION
4:40-5:35 p.m.
TIME
SUBJECT:
Summary o f Conclusions o f PC Meeting on N o r t h Korea (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The V i c e P r e s i d e n t ' s O f f i c e :
Leon F u e r t h
State:
Warren C h r i s t o p h e r
Robert G a l l u c c i
The White House:
Anthony Lake
Samuel Berger
NSC:
D a n i e l Poneman
DOD:
W i l l i a m Perry
USUN:
Madeleine A l b r i g h t
CIA:
James Woolsey
JCS:
John S h a l i k a s h v i l i
Summary o f Conclusions
ACDA:
John Holum
I t was agreed
that:
I n speaking t o t h e DPRK r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n New York on May
21, S t a t e w i l l s e t a date o f June 1 f o r t h e t h i r d round,
p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e IAEA does n o t conclude between now and
then t h a t t h e DPRK has d i v e r t e d a d d i t i o n a l n u c l e a r m a t e r i a l
from t h e core o f t h e 5 M r e a c t o r o r p r e c l u d e d t h e IAEA from
W
t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o conduct h i s t o r i c a l a n a l y s i s o f t h e spent
f u e l i n t h e core.
OBCRET/PLUTO-p T K \ \
D e c l a s s i f y OAJ L i)AM>I
DECLASSIFIED
PER E,0.13526
�2
The date o f June 1 w i l l n o t be made p u b l i c o r
backbriefed outside the P r i n c i p a l s ' present a t t h e
meeting.
Our p u b l i c diplomacy w i l l s t r e s s t h a t we have p r e v e n t e d
future diversion o f plutonium while preserving the a b i l i t y
t h r o u g h n e g o t i a t i o n s t o c l a r i f y whether t h e r e have been p a s t
d i v e r s i o n s o f p l u t o n i u m beyond t h e amounts d e c l a r e d by t h e
DPRK t o t h e IAEA.
We w i l l encourage Nunn and Lugar t o accept an i n v i t a t i o n t o
t r a v e l t o N o r t h Korea, n o t as A d m i n i s t r a t i o n e m i s s a r i e s b u t
on a f a c t f i n d i n g m i s s i o n . I f p o s s i b l e , t h e y should t r a v e l
b e f o r e t h e t h i r d round; o t h e r w i s e t h e y can t r a v e l a f t e r t h e
t h i r d round. We w i l l n o t d e f e r t h e date o f a t h i r d round.
S t a t e and OVP w i l l d i s c u s s whether o r n o t t h e l e t t e r t o
the Vice P r e s i d e n t i s t h e a p p r o p r i a t e v e h i c l e t o
respond t o t h e i n v i t a t i o n t o Nunn and Lugar.
On t h e t h i r d round s t r a t e g y , t h e SSK w i l l prepare two
o p t i o n s f o r P r i n c i p a l s ' c o n s i d e r a t i o n . One o p t i o n would
approach t h e i s s u e w i t h e a r l y , major steps designed t o
achieve c o n c r e t e r e s u l t s i n t h e near term; t h e o t h e r would
t a k e a more measured approach t o account f o r t h e r i s k o f
DPRK r e v e r s a l s . These p r o p o s a l s s h o u l d be s p e l l e d o u t i n
s u b s t a n t i a l d e t a i l , e.g., i n t h e form o f a d r a f t framework
agreement.
The SSK s h o u l d a l s o sharpen t h e a n a l y s i s i n t h e s a n c t i o n s
paper f o r f u r t h e r P r i n c i p a l s ' c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
Press themes s h o u l d emphasize t h a t we view t h i s s i t u a t i o n as
s e r i o u s , t h a t i t i s n o t c l e a r how i t w i l l t u r n o u t , b u t t h a t
we have seen progress i n r e c e n t days i n p r e v e n t i n g t h e r i s k
of f u t u r e d i v e r s i o n o f p l u t o n i u m . We s t i l l have q u e s t i o n s
c o n c e r n i n g past North Korean n u c l e a r a c t i v i t y , which we w i l l
c o n t i n u e t o press i n t h e t h i r d round.
•0E6RBT/PLUT0
CLINTON UWYrWOCOPY
�
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Clinton Presidential Records
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Declassified Documents concerning North Korea
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2013-0870-M
Description
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This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on a Principals Committe (PC) meeting on North Korea from May 20, 1994. Included is the PC summary of conclusions and a background memo to National Security Advisor Anthony Lake regarding the upcoming PC meeting.
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National Security Council
Records Management Office
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Adobe Acrobat Document
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<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7388808">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
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Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management Systems
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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2/6/2015
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2013-0870-M
7388808
Declassified
Foreign Policy
North Korea
Nuclear
PC
Principals Committee
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/1aac9717ff57c7d0d8be1d6a6c6f7b11.pdf
461df0c4694a7303bf4aa29afb7b2b86
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Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full.
�MM
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
SUBJECT:
Warren Christopher
Tony Lake
Proposed US - DPRK Nuclear Agreement
FROM: John Deutch
V
I regret that this afternoon's Principal's Meeting on the proposed
agreement with North Korea has been called off. Of course, before
coming to any conclusion we should hear from Bob Gallucci, but there
are substantive issues that lie outside the negotiation that deserve
discussion. I fear that the all too frequent call for a rapid decision will
prevent us from considering several broader issues that are of concern
to us here in Defense. Accordingly, in Bill's absence, I have decided to
share our concerns directly with you.
The proposed agreement is a notable achievement and much to
Bob Gallucci's credit. Trading alternative energy supplies for a longterm freeze on North Korea's nuclear weapons program and trading the
provision of LWR systems for dismantlement of the facilities for that
program will, when accomplished, be two good trades for US and world
security. Accordingly, we beheve that the currently tabled agreement
with North Korea (subject to North Korean agreement on the northsouth dialogue) should be accepted by us with two modifications, each
designed to insure that we get in practice the benefit of the bargain we
have reached in overall principle.
Perhaps equally important, these modifications will make it far
easier to deal with criticisms of the agreement that we can expect in
Congress and elsewhere from both the left and right, as we seek
support for implementing it.
Those two issues are (1) clarification of the provision for
repackaging the spent fuel from the 5 MW(e) reactor currently in wet
storage and (2) clarification of our expectation about the disposition of
the spent fuel from the operation of the two Light Water Reactors that
we are agreeing to provide. Since the North Koreans have reopened the
deliberations in Geneva on the matter of the north-south dialogue, it
seems perfectly appropriate for us to raise issues as well, even in the
closing stages.
DECLASSIFIED
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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1. The Disposition of the existing spent fuel.
It is an important part of our story, in favor of this agreement,
that it commits the North Koreans to ship the existing load of spent
fuel out of the country, even if the shipment starts only after several
years when the LWR project has reached the stage where the turbines
are in place and the nuclear components about to be delivered. But for
that to be possible, the spent fuel must be left in a state such that it
can eventually be exported. We have to be able to show that under the
agreement we cannot find ourselves three to six months from now,
after having supplied a winter's alternative fuel, with the the spent fuel
dissolving in the pool.
The important issue of stabilizing the spent fuel currently in wet
storage is addressed in point 9 of the Confidential Minute to the
proposed agreement by the phrase:
"... Within the period required by technical and safety
consideration^), following discussion with the US, the DPRK
will select and begin to implement a method of spent fuel
storage that permits ultimate transfer."
The problem with this provision (and the even more vague
statement in Paragraph 1.4 of the proposed agreement that speaks of
"cooperation" on storage and eventual "disposition" that does not
involve in-country reprocessing) is that prompt engineering action is
required to repackage the rods which are now corroding in the spent
fuel pool. There is no assurance that an agreement on storage
methodology will be reached in the handful of months remaining before
the fuel is dissolved. Without such a methodology being agreed and
implemented, we will face the prospect of the North's current spent fuel
supply becoming impossible to export.
This problem is exacerbated by the asymmetry between the
treatment of the two early actions the Framework Agreement requires
of the two sides - stabilizing the spent fuel rods and delivering the
initial oil supply. There is a fixed date (3 months) for the first oil being
shipped, but there is no such date for stabilizing the spent fuel.
I understand the North Korean delegation has agreed orally that
North Korea will give "immediate" access zo the spent fuel. That's a
welcome step, but it should be reflected in the text, as should an
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�undertaking to agree bv a set date on the methology. Within the USG,
we need to work out who will do the substantial work involved and who
will pay.
2. Treatment of fuel from the LWRs.
The proposed agreement must address the planned disposition
of the spent fuel from the operation of the LWRs. Contrary to what
may be the popular impression, Pu from an LWR can be used for
bombs. The reprocessing effort needed for such use is different from,
but not significantly more difficult than, that employed with spent fuel
from a graphite-moderated reactor. The North Koreans have
demonstrated an ability to reprocess and this can be done covertly
quite easily.
The details of the ownership and management of the LWR reactor
fuel can be left to negotiation of the formal contract. However, right
from the start, we must be in a position to show publicly that this
agreement provides: (1) that none of the Pu produced in the LWRs will
ever be reprocessed on the Korean Peninsula, and (2) that the US will
retain the right to direct that spent fuel from these LWRs will be
transferred from North Korea to another location. Without these
assurances, we are correctly vulnerable to the accusation that the
agreement accepts (indeed facilitates) the production and accumulation
of a much greater quantity of Pu in North Korea than the projected
levels of the current North Korean program, albeit in an unseparated
form.
I am informed that North Korea has today agreed that the terms
they have already accepted necessarily mean that, once the two LWRs
are complete, they cannot possess a reprocessing capability nor
reprocess in North Korea. That agreement should be recorded
explicitly.
However, it leaves unaddressed the question of the disposition
of spent fuel from the LWRs. Given the relatively short time required to h
build a new reprocessing facility (probably only about a year), unless thef
LWR spend fuel is exported, we will never be free of a reprocessing
threat so long as the fuel stays in North Korea. So long as the
agreement leaves open the possibility that this LWR spent fuel will stay
in North Korea, we will be open to the charge that they can simply build
a new reprocessing line (perhaps covertly) and proceed with their bomb
program. To be sure, there are cases where LWR spent fuel is stored
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�-SECRET
indefinitely in the country where LWRs operate. Facilities exist for outof-country storage in Europe, Russia, China , and other places.
Accordingly, we should lay down a clear marker now that the fuel
supply arrangement North Korea should provide for export of the LWR
spent fuel. I realize that the question of fuel supply and disposition is
a controversial one, but without such an assurance, we will have
difficulty explaining how the agreement's details fulfill its overall
promise of effectively eliminating North Korea's nuclear weapons
capacity.
Conclusion
With these modifications the Department is prepared to support
the proposed agreement. As you know we believe that the agreement
should only be signed or initialed after South Korean acceptance is
obtained, there is some consultation with Congressional leaders, and
we have agreed to a single set of talking points that can be used by all
agencies to describe the agreements.
One final point. Perhaps I am a victim of my past experience.
But, I know how hard it is to design, build, and operate nuclear reactors
to reasonable environmental and safety standards and to arrange for
the fuel contracts and financing for such projects. At this stage, the
proposed agreement envisions a contract negotiation that will define all
these matters -- and do so in a situation where no one has the hard
currency to pay for the electricity. It seems to me more likely than not
that the project will not proceed rapidly or even ever get done. This
may not be a fatal outcome but we should think through the
consequences now.
cc:
Mr.Berger
Amb. Galucci
Mr. Fuerth
LINTON LIBRARY P O O O V
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<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
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This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
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Clinton Presidential Records
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Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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Declassified documents on North Korea
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2013-0865-M
Date Available
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9/21/2015
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on North Korea from the files of Daniel Poneman, National Security Council Nonproliferation and Export Controls. Material includes a Department of Defense memo regarding a proposed nuclear agreement in 1994.
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National Security Council
Nonproliferation and Export Controls Office
Daniel Poneman
Is Part Of
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<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7585685">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Format
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Adobe Acrobat Document
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Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
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Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
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9/2/2015
Source
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2013-0865-M
7585685
Declassified
Foreign Policy
North Korea
Nuclear