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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning Northern Ireland from the files of Nancy Soderberg
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2011-0355-F
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
8/29/2023
Description
An account of the resource
This Freedom of Information Act request contains records regarding the Northern Ireland peace process from the files of Nancy Soderberg, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Soderberg served as President Clinton's key advisor on Northern Ireland during the first term of the Administration. Included are memoranda, talking points, papers, cables, email, and notes detailing U.S. support of the peace process. Topics include Gerry Adams' Visa and fundraising requests, the June 15, 1996 Manchester Bombing, Dumcree Parade violence in July 1996, and President Clinton's meetings with Irish President Mary Robinson in May 1993 and Prime Minister Albert Reynolds in 1993 and 1994. Also included are memoranda of telephone conversation (telcons) between Gerry Adams and Soderberg and Anthony Lake.
<a href="https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/48896">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Staff Director
Nancy Soderberg
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
5/26/2023
Albert Reynolds
David Trimble
Gerry Adams
Good Friday Agreement
Good Friday Agreement 25th Anniversary
IRA
John Holmes
John Hume
John Major
Mary Robinson
Nancy Soderberg
Northern Ireland
Sinn Fein
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/97a1b4355028ff3a4d8709c2624f4200.pdf
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https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/b22017bdd0f4b9469ab74ae0c753bb05.pdf
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https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/7071c4a6f0f7912ddb9df020f59c36f1.pdf
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning Northern Ireland from the files of Nancy Soderberg
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2011-0355-F
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
6/14/2023
Description
An account of the resource
This Freedom of Information Act request contains records regarding the Northern Ireland peace process from the files of Nancy Soderberg, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Soderberg served as President Clinton's key advisor on Northern Ireland during the first term of the Administration. Included are memoranda, reports, letters, talking points, cables, email, and notes. Several documents discuss Gerry Adams' request for a visa to visit the United States. Also included are memoranda of telephone conversation (telcons) between President Clinton and Prime Minister's John Major and John Bruton and memoranda of conversation (memcons) from discussions between Gerry Adams and Soderberg and Anthony Lake.
<a href="https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/48896">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Staff Director
Nancy Soderberg
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
4/24/2023
Bertie Ahern
Gerry Adams
Good Friday Agreement
Good Friday Agreement 25th Anniversary
John Bruton
John Hume
John Major
Nancy Soderberg
Northern Ireland
Sinn Fein
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/82ae305dff2309602b5138a5287f98a2.pdf
9eefb64c820a50416fc34f36cc492bd1
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Document Concerning the Good Friday Agreement and the Northern Ireland Peace Process
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
4/3/2023
Description
An account of the resource
Included is a briefing memorandum to the President regarding meetings with Northern Ireland political leaders on March 16 - 17, 1998, including Gerry Adams, Bertie Ahern, David Trimble, John Hume, Gary McMichael, and John Alderdice.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
First Lady's Office
Daniel Nanau
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
3/7/2023
Bertie Ahern
David Trimble
Gerry Adams
Good Friday Agreement
Good Friday Agreement 25th Anniversary
John Hume
Northern Ireland
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/5883969a7bf21532f36f25d0793ac093.pdf
7033d36704cd908cb4a116a5087c7345
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning the Good Friday Agreement and the Northern Ireland Peace Process
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2015-0158-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
4/3/2023
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains Department of State cables regarding the continuing impasse over decommissioning and the establishment of Northern Ireland departments. Also included is a cable regarding Commerce Secretary William Daley's meeting with Irish Taoiseach Bertie Ahern.
<a href="https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36383 ">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Cables
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
3/8/2023
Bertie Ahern
Good Friday Agreement
Good Friday Agreement 25th Anniversary
Northern Ireland
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/797c9df6618720e0beeab200c7a0c760.pdf
f197464e01a7628e8913c3a324fbe811
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning the Good Friday Agreement and the Northern Ireland Peace Process
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2015-0157-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
4/3/2023
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains National Security Council memoranda and talking points regarding a meeting with Marjorie "Mo" Mowlam in December 1998 and a telephone call to Nobel Peace Prize Winners David Trimble and John Hume in October 1998. Also included is a Department of State cable summarizing the mood of the peace talks on April 9, 1998.
<a href="https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36383 ">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC European Affairs Office
Lawrence Butler
NSC Cables
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files; Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
3/7/2023
David Trimble
Good Friday Agreement
Good Friday Agreement 25th Anniversary
John Hume
Marjorie Mowlam
Northern Ireland
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/78e3110ab3226a328c39d6644615d42c.pdf
73716d4bb5c34da6dc3f18326c6bff88
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning the Good Friday Agreement and the Northern Ireland Peace Process
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2015-0156-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
4/3/2023
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains Department of State cables, reports, and memoranda regarding the status of the Northern Ireland Peace Process in 1998. Also included are notes from a phone call between President Clinton and Prime Minister Tony Blair on April 11, 1998 and a letter from John Holmes, Blair's Private Secretary, regarding his discussion with Paddy Teahon about the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement.
<a href="https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36383 ">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC European Affairs Office
Keirn Brown
Lawrence Butler
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
3/23/2023
Good Friday Agreement
Good Friday Agreement 25th Anniversary
Northern Ireland
Tony Blair
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/338f1a422368c441b9fc6d9c7c121604.pdf
ab28c86db1042c9ef252a8e6c05067ab
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
White House Situation Room email regarding Northern Ireland "New Beginning" agreement reached
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
04/10/1998
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2015-0156-M
Description
An account of the resource
White House Situation Room email to Donald K. Bandler, Leslie K. Davidson, and Ralph H. Sigler regarding NSC Cable. The subject of the NSC Cable is Northern Ireland: "New Beginning: Agreement Reached.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Good Friday Agreement
Good Friday Agreement 25th Anniversary
New Beginning
Northern Ireland
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/80f44db49f77a3ab11028ebc9ae2252a.pdf
4d2ef583da34ffad4d79ddc2d5d042a9
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning British Prime Minister Tony Blair
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2009-0816-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
04/12/2022
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains records related to specific meetings between President Clinton and British Labour leader, later Prime Minister, Tony Blair. Included are records related to meetings on April 12, 1996, May 29, 1997, and February 5, 1998.
<a href="https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36016">2006-0217-F</a>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Records Management System
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/26457815">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
03/28/2022
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2009-0816-M.pdf
Declassified
Northern Ireland
Tony Blair
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/f96a205b3e7ba7b8dc925d468b0cb719.pdf
8c46b68e3e830b43c2a8251f5f1298b7
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning the Good Friday Agreement and the Northern Ireland Peace Process
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2015-0159-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
02/04/2020
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains cables, email, memoranda, talking points, and letters regarding the Good Friday Agreement and the Northern Ireland peace process. Topics include status reports, decommissioning, and human rights reports.
<a href="https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36383"></a>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Cables
NSC Emails
NSC Records Management System
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
1/10/2020
Declassified
Good Friday Agreement
Ireland
Northern Ireland
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/072c1528e7084477406096a83d6cc81c.pdf
9cd5641003599b972b4d70b67dd804c2
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning the Good Friday Agreement and the Northern Ireland Peace Process
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2015-0158-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
02/04/2020
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains Department of State cables regarding the Good Friday Agreement and the Northern Ireland peace process. Topics include status updates, recommendations to advance the peace process, summaries of meetings, the Omagh bombing, decommissioning, and the Patten Report.
<a href="https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36383"></a>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Cables
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/24194018">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
1/7/2020
Declassified
Good Friday Agreement
Ireland
Northern Ireland
Omagh
Patten Report
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/4627185f7b5b10f397523cb8d790754c.pdf
a34c3703dbda990acba79cb3b6d02368
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning the Northern Ireland Peace Process
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2016-0375-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
12/05/2019
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains memoranda of telephone conversation (telcons) between President Clinton and Irish officials involved in the negotiations for peace in Northern Ireland. Included are telcons with Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern, Sinn Fein Leader Gerry Adams, Ulster Unionist Party Leader David Trimble, and Social Democratic and Labour Party Leader John Hume.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Records Management System
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/26457815 ">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
11/7/2019
Bertie Ahern
David Trimble
Declassified
Gerry Adams
Good Friday Agreement
John Hume
Northern Ireland
Sinn Fein
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/54d14e67fe8a006471a88244fbd28f7d.pdf
c92a7cffcaa74ac96da1c366c373bda1
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning the Good Friday Agreement and the Northern Ireland Peace Process
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2015-0157-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
12/05/2019
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains memoranda, talking points, briefing papers, letters, notes, and cables regarding the Good Friday Agreement and the Northern Ireland peace process. Also included are memoranda of conversation (memcons) between President Clinton and Gerry Adams, leader of Sinn Fein, and David Trimble, First Minister, Northern Ireland.
<a href="https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36383"></a>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Keirn Brown
Lawrence Butler
NSC Cables
NSC Email
NSC Records Management System
NSC European Affairs Office
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files; Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
11/12/2019
David Trimble
Declassified
Gerry Adams
Good Friday Agreement
Memcon
Northern Ireland
Sinn Fein
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/c83c54a47111fe6676739fd8c0c6a0a5.pdf
153a4bf0786dcf8bbbc4f986a5a1e524
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning the Good Friday Agreement and the Northern Ireland Peace Process
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2015-0156-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
12/05/2019
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains memoranda, briefing papers, and talking points regarding the Good Friday Agreement and the Northern Ireland peace process. Also included are memoranda of telephone conversation (telcons) and memoranda of conversation (memcons) between President Clinton and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern, Ulster Union Party Leader David Trimble, and Labor Party Leader John Hume.
<a href="https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36383"></a>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Keirn Brown
Lawrence Butler
NSC European Affairs Office
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7386505 ">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
11/6/2019
Bertie Ahern
David Trimble
Declassified
Good Friday Agreement
John Hume
Northern Ireland
Tony Blair
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/94a2ed5adf6bb83497758fec170a3bb0.pdf
57ac724a5803c170eeae68f2210a0309
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning John Major
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2013-0449-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
8/29/2019
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains documents regarding meetings and communication between British Prime Minister John Major and President William J. Clinton. Included are memoranda of conversation (memcons), memoranda of telephone conversation (telcons), cover memoranda, briefing papers, letters, and transmittal forms.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36216"></a>
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/26457815">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Records Management System
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
7/24/2019
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2013-0449-M.pdf
Declassified
John Major
Northern Ireland
United Kingdom
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/b4b8538cebd2749241677441abea60bb.jpg
597f3e89c24808798b97dbed37860ef0
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Queens University
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Bob McNeely
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/95
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34554_28
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton participates in a meeting with Protestant Religious leader Ian Paisley at Queens University in Belfast
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34554_28_30Nov1995_H
594653
Bill Clinton
Ian Paisley
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
Queens University
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/50013a6db21781eb8115c52cc9582774.jpg
8f8d781dc4d4affa0b78f29a60ac57eb
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Omagh, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm (Panoramic)
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Omagh Bombing Site
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Sharon Farmer
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
9/3/2018
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P66167-20a
Description
An account of the resource
Panoramic view of the street scene during President Clinton's visit to the Omagh bombing site
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P66167-20a_03Sep1998_H
594653
City
Northern Ireland
Omagh
Panoramic
Streets
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/81195c6e0452680ad5ecb095286785bd.jpg
2113fb2280c0414c9def2647d59284e6
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast , Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Belfast Arrival
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Barbara Kinney
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34503-02
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton and Hillary Rodham Clinton arrive at Aldergrove Airport in Belfast. They are met by Lord O'Neil, Lord Lieutenant of County Antrim and others.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34503-02_30Nov1995
594653
Air Force One
Hillary Rodham Clinton
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/e5300dfc891832b9c05c88e668f43f37.jpg
3855462a1d09ee9b62001ca1d0d6aeb3
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast , Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Black & White
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Waterfront Hall
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Ralph Alswang
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
9/3/1998
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P66131-18
Description
An account of the resource
Hillary Rodham Clinton talks with Dr. Marjorie "Mo" Mowlam, Secretary of State, Northern Ireland in a holding room at the main auditorium of Waterfront Hall in Belfast
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clintno Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P66131-18_03Sep1998_H
594653
Hillary Rodham Clinton
Marjorie Mowlam
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
Waterfront Hall
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/726673e815e2600a8386c2f88c2e208c.jpg
26597917601507c3ea1392efce5f3f00
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast , Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Black & White
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Waterfront Hall
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Ralph Alswang
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
9/3/1998
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P66131-33
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton talks with Gerry Adams, Jim Steinberg, Sandy Berger and others in a holding room at the main auditorium of Waterfront Hall in Belfast
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestriced
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P66131-33_03Sep1998_H
594653
Gerry Adams
Jim Steinberg
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
Sandy Berger
Waterfront Hall
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/4c140bb3760a789374d675f415a63058.jpg
f2a403d6785a50135a5130d4a96a7222
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast , Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Black & White
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Waterfront Hall
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Ralph Alswang
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
9/3/1998
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P66131-23
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton talks with Gerry Adams, Sandy Berger and others in a holding room at the main auditorium of Waterfront Hall in Belfast
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P66131-23_03Sep1998_H
594653
Gerry Adams
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
Sandy Berger
Waterfront Hall
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/0ec4fcc5648a042386704072d83ba311.jpg
77d0a4d2484aecc59f01c99cf29ba444
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast , Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Mackie Plant
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Sharon Farmer
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34489-07a
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton hugs a young girl named Catherine Hamill on the dais at the Mackie Plant in Belfast
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34489-07a_30Nov1995_H
594653
Mackie Plant
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/ca778bfd54b9b1080be598c014a5ecc6.jpg
d9eec2302f7fd07d0c750621546590be
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast , Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Mackie Plant
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Ralph Alswang
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34498-01a
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton addresses Mackie Plant personnel and others from the factory floor in Belfast
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34498_01A_30NOV1995_H
594653
Mackie Plant
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/dc8fdd74ab30879271b95db000aa433e.jpg
8a2570ca205016a5ebb28e563fa84a74
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast , Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
East Belfast Enterprise Park
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Sharon Farmer
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34491-20
Description
An account of the resource
Nancy Soderberg, Mike McCurry, Bruce Lindsey and other Senior Staff ride in staff van to a business owners event in East Belfast area of the city.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34491-20_30Nov1995
594653
Bruce Lindsey
Mike McCurry
Nancy Soderberg
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/c177334bbe82fcedcd69e84f8039b5b1.jpg
829c37fb4470084936ce801029da1883
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast , Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Mackie Plant
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Sharon Farmer
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34489-23a
Description
An account of the resource
Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown, Secretary of Education Richard Riley and President Clinton's Step-Father Dick Kelley are seated next to each other at the Mackie Plant event in Belfast, Northern Ireland.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34489-23a_30Nov1995_H
594653
Mackie Plant
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/f14e9338d0b1ac0161d093e08cdb745b.jpg
cc5d01c3943a42a2720ecaa872590a56
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Londonderry , Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Remarks at Londonderry
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Sharon Farmer
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34522-18
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton addresses the people of Londonderry on the city square
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34522-18_30Nov1995_H
594653
Londonderry
Northern Ireland
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/04c5e97efcd80bc1085035d5951d635b.jpg
c0949cfa9628d09dd1579689a51ee068
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Londonderry , Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Remarks at Londonderry
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Sharon Farmer
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34522-15
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton addresses the people of Londonderry on the city square
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34522-15_30Nov1995_H
594653
Londonderry
Northern Ireland
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/7397fc6ada59001a53bdaad29389cf24.jpg
fdf12a9502d9d6ad4b639d50e9918a83
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Omagh, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Black & White
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Omagh Bombing Site
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Ralph Alswang
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
3/9/1998
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P66149-17
Description
An account of the resource
Flowers at bombing site on Market Street in Omagh.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Adminisration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P66149_17_03Sep1998_H
594653
Flowers
Northern Ireland
Omagh
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/65d491b9c0cc6527e93078ec19a1300c.jpg
23ac9c1756a78b76f500aca7363cb719
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
David Trimble
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Robert McNeely
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34546-16a
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton participates in a bilateral meeting with Northern Ireland Ulster Unionist Party leader David Trimble in Belfast
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Adminisration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34546-16a_30Nov1995_H
594653
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Bill Clinton
David Trimble
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/7e17b4334468ccd27af953943b3eff4a.jpg
b7d168d4a44cf23b3cdd3490af1feeef
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Omagh, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Omagh Bombing
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Ralph Alswang
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
3/9/1998
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P66149-14
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton and Hillary Rodham Clinton and British Prime Minister Tony Blair visit a bombing site in Omagh. President Clinton and Hillary Rodham Clinton place flowers at the site on Market Street.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P66149-14_03Sep1998_H
594653
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Northern Ireland
Omagh
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/9910b8abb2ed488d2bfa2586f7c29cc5.jpg
5500df62e3dc905a83fa75c0e7ca22a7
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Omagh, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Omagh Bombing
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Ralph Alswang
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
3/9/1998
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P66149-10
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton and Hillary Rodham Clinton and British Prime Minister Tony Blair visit a bombing site in Omagh. They unveil a plaque and place flowers at the site on Market Street.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P66149-10_03Sep1998_H.jpg
594653
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Northern Ireland
Omagh
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/088022c250329e8893cec73a90813449.jpg
2407d70b6e5d8bc897cb31f09bf4e66f
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Omagh, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Omagh Bombing
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Ralph Alswang
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
3/9/1998
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P66144-12
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton and Hillary Rodham Clinton and British Prime Minister Tony Blair visit a bombing site in Omagh. President Clinton greets people on the street and shake hands with people in the crowd.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P66144-12_03Sep1998_H
594653
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
British Prime Minister
Hillary Rodham Clinton
Northern Ireland
Omagh
President Clinton
Tony Blair
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/de33b25e47e2d97133a570543eb2fb85.jpg
6f62f13c8ff074dac908589b4c18cf71
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast , Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Hillary Rodham Clinton meets with Joyce McCartan and other women at the Women's Information Drop-In Center
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Barbara Kinney
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34509-01
Description
An account of the resource
Hillary Rodham Clinton meets with Joyce McCartan and other women at the Lamplighter Traditional Fish and Chips restaurant. McCartan is the founder of the Women's Information Drop-In Center.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34509-01_30Nov1995_H
594653
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/8d3f8b792c046d377fa9f22e2e7f4e32.jpg
b2ba059a04365bcf3f6ac1b663ba25d8
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast , Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Mackie Plant, Belfast
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Sharon Farmer
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34489_02A
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton is introduced by two children: Catherine Hamill, a Catholic and David Sterrett, a Protestant
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34489_02A_30Nov1995_H
594653
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/23c78858f098a44a8a8b5df2e008bf85.jpg
5edd5fa50f034a1eea8fe47bfc23f9c2
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast , Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Belfast Tree Lighting Ceremony
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Ralph Alswang
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34563-09A
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton and Hillary Rodham Clinton arrive Belfast City Hall.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34563-09A_30Nov1995_H
594653
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/e9960d7d10d435bf3d82214b9bcb2615.jpg
faaf3cb90692dab44e57aeb6ff3af080
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Omagh, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Omagh
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Ralph Alswang
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
09/03/1998
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P66147-13a
Description
An account of the resource
The President and First Lady shake hands with the mayor of Omagh.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P66147-13a_03Sep1998_H
594653
Northern Ireland
Omagh
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/863ed029216609c72bd6137710614574.jpg
691754b2dbd39dbb071daa9ec7fcf0fe
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Omagh, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Omagh
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Ralph Alswang
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
09/03/1998
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P66146-07
Description
An account of the resource
The President and First Lady walk by the bomb site with British PM Tony Blair.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P66146-07_03Sep1998_H
594653
Northern Ireland
Omagh
Tony Blair
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/4b2a382be61da488f18d7a3616ee2ad8.jpg
0cf8b48d14363883af7ed46648398eae
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Omagh, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Omagh
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Ralph Alswang
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
09/03/1998
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P66146-01
Description
An account of the resource
The President and First Lady walk by the bomb site with British PM Tony Blair.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P66146-01_03Sep1998_H
594653
Northern Ireland
Omagh
Tony Blair
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/b589454e57a5d318236ff751ee0d5c2d.jpg
55f71d479510b26c51eb63ca15565fcd
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Omagh, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Omagh
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Ralph Alswang
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P66144-15
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton comforting the citizens of Omagh.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34518-35a_30Nov1995_H
594653
Northern Ireland
Omagh
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/cce5aa8a1878e20788051cc330bbdb11.jpg
5d0ad4da6c4b7421712eb6fb8340b4c2
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Omagh, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Omagh
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Ralph Alswang
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P66143-13a
Description
An account of the resource
The President and First Lady listening to Lord Lieutenant Duke of Abrecorn in front of Marine One.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs fo the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P66143-13a_03Sep1998_H
594653
Northern Ireland
Omagh
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/bed5151d4acc042ab7fde2dfa13307ac.jpg
fd8618e3184d46fe57cf4601fbb6d942
Moving Image
A series of visual representations imparting an impression of motion when shown in succession. Examples include animations, movies, television programs, videos, zoetropes, or visual output from a simulation.
Player
html for embedded player to stream video content
<iframe width="480" height="360" src="//www.youtube.com/embed/NoBgZv-9vwY" frameborder="0" allow="autoplay; encrypted-media" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
President Clinton's Remarks to the Northern Ireland Assembly (1998)
Description
An account of the resource
This is video footage of President Clinton delivering remarks to the Northern Ireland Assembly. This footage is official public record produced by the White House Television (WHTV) crew, provided by the Clinton Presidential Library.
Date: September 3, 1998
Location: Belfast, Northern Ireland
Access Restriction(s): unrestricted
Use Restrictions(s): unrestricted
Camera: White House Television (WHTV) / Main
Local Identifiers: MT08895, MT08896, MT08897
This material is public domain, as it is a work prepared by an officer or employee of the U.S. Government as part of that person's official duties. Any usage must receive the credit "Courtesy; William J. Clinton Presidential Library," and no exclusive rights or permissions are granted for usage.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2013-06-05T21:25:30.000Z
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
http://YouTube.com
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
<a href="https://www.youtube.com/static?template=terms">Standard YouTube License</a>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
clintonlibrary42<br />published via YouTube.com
License
A legal document giving official permission to do something with the resource.
<a href="https://www.youtube.com/static?template=terms">Standard YouTube License</a>
Date Submitted
Date of submission of the resource. Examples of resources to which a Date Submitted may be relevant are a thesis (submitted to a university department) or an article (submitted to a journal).
2013-06-05T21:25:30.000Z
Audio-visual materials
Bill Clinton
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
Peace Movement in Northern Ireland
Prime Minister Tony Blair
speech
Tony Blair
Video Recording
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/d3d3ca91d5c680d8cb29bbf2ca3dbdfe.jpg
fec63ea993cf0a5b63fdb70046f21bd6
Moving Image
A series of visual representations imparting an impression of motion when shown in succession. Examples include animations, movies, television programs, videos, zoetropes, or visual output from a simulation.
Player
html for embedded player to stream video content
<iframe width="480" height="360" src="//www.youtube.com/embed/7YKpvT53iaA" frameborder="0" allow="autoplay; encrypted-media" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
President Clinton's Remarks to the People of Armagh (1998)
Description
An account of the resource
This is video footage of President Clinton delivering remarks to the community of Armagh. This footage is official public record produced by the White House Television (WHTV) crew, provided by the Clinton Presidential Library.
Date: September 3, 1998
Location: Armaugh, Northern Ireland
Access Restriction(s): unrestricted
Use Restrictions(s): unrestricted
Camera: White House Television (WHTV) / Main/Cut
Local Identifiers: MT08898, MT08899, MT08900
This material is public domain, as it is a work prepared by an officer or employee of the U.S. Government as part of that person's official duties. Any usage must receive the credit "Courtesy; William J. Clinton Presidential Library," and no exclusive rights or permissions are granted for usage.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2013-06-06T12:21:57.000Z
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
http://YouTube.com
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
<a href="https://www.youtube.com/static?template=terms">Standard YouTube License</a>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
clintonlibrary42<br />published via YouTube.com
License
A legal document giving official permission to do something with the resource.
<a href="https://www.youtube.com/static?template=terms">Standard YouTube License</a>
Date Submitted
Date of submission of the resource. Examples of resources to which a Date Submitted may be relevant are a thesis (submitted to a university department) or an article (submitted to a journal).
2013-06-06T12:21:57.000Z
Audio-visual materials
Bill Clinton
Crowd
Library
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Armaugh
Peace Movement in Northern Ireland
speech
Video Recording
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/96c593b73e3689ff28827720bc6c8638.jpg
32071a2b7747645f57ec1b6171d161cc
Moving Image
A series of visual representations imparting an impression of motion when shown in succession. Examples include animations, movies, television programs, videos, zoetropes, or visual output from a simulation.
Player
html for embedded player to stream video content
<iframe width="480" height="360" src="//www.youtube.com/embed/mYlMk_1_18o" frameborder="0" allow="autoplay; encrypted-media" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Pres. Clinton at a Christmas Tree Lighting Ceremony (1995)
Description
An account of the resource
This is video footage of President William Jefferson delivering remarks at a Christmas tree lighting ceremony. This footage is official public record produced by the White House Television (WHTV) crew, provided by the Clinton Presidential Library.
Date: November 30, 1995
Location: City Hall Plaza. Belfast, Northern Ireland
Access Restriction(s): unrestricted
Use Restrictions(s): unrestricted
Camera: White House Television (WHTV) / Main
Local Identifiers: MT04594, MT04595
This material is public domain, as it is a work prepared by an officer or employee of the U.S. Government as part of that person's official duties. Any usage must receive the credit "Courtesy; William J. Clinton Presidential Library," and no exclusive rights or permissions are granted for usage.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-11-05T17:55:12.000Z
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
http://YouTube.com
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
<a href="https://www.youtube.com/static?template=terms">Standard YouTube License</a>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
clintonlibrary42<br />published via YouTube.com
License
A legal document giving official permission to do something with the resource.
<a href="https://www.youtube.com/static?template=terms">Standard YouTube License</a>
Date Submitted
Date of submission of the resource. Examples of resources to which a Date Submitted may be relevant are a thesis (submitted to a university department) or an article (submitted to a journal).
2015-11-05T17:55:12.000Z
Audio-visual materials
Bill Clinton
Christmas
Christmas Tree
Ireland
Northern Ireland
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/6ee8db10383e8cd98cd87a3c37fc420a.jpg
9013fb4d135cfba89560c7d339d1b1d5
Moving Image
A series of visual representations imparting an impression of motion when shown in succession. Examples include animations, movies, television programs, videos, zoetropes, or visual output from a simulation.
Player
html for embedded player to stream video content
<iframe width="480" height="360" src="//www.youtube.com/embed/wikiq0-hdaI" frameborder="0" allow="autoplay; encrypted-media" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
President Clinton's Remarks in Londonderry (1995)
Description
An account of the resource
This is video footage of President Clinton delivering remarks to the community of Londonderry. This footage is official public record produced by the White House Television (WHTV) crew, provided by the Clinton Presidential Library.
Date: November 30, 1995
Location: Londonderry, Northern Ireland
Access Restriction(s): unrestricted
Use Restrictions(s): unrestricted
Camera: White House Television (WHTV) / Main/Cut
Local Identifiers: MT04591, MT04592, MT04593
This material is public domain, as it is a work prepared by an officer or employee of the U.S. Government as part of that person's official duties. Any usage must receive the credit "Courtesy; William J. Clinton Presidential Library," and no exclusive rights or permissions are granted for usage.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2013-06-06T16:01:10.000Z
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
http://YouTube.com
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
<a href="https://www.youtube.com/static?template=terms">Standard YouTube License</a>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
clintonlibrary42<br />published via YouTube.com
License
A legal document giving official permission to do something with the resource.
<a href="https://www.youtube.com/static?template=terms">Standard YouTube License</a>
Date Submitted
Date of submission of the resource. Examples of resources to which a Date Submitted may be relevant are a thesis (submitted to a university department) or an article (submitted to a journal).
2013-06-06T16:01:10.000Z
Audio-visual materials
Bill Clinton
Crowd
Londonderry
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Londonderry
speech
Video Recording
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/534e335643e150feeeddde01d4042cb0.jpg
90981e9409ff98c5ffb2145c5bf3303e
Moving Image
A series of visual representations imparting an impression of motion when shown in succession. Examples include animations, movies, television programs, videos, zoetropes, or visual output from a simulation.
Player
html for embedded player to stream video content
<iframe width="480" height="360" src="//www.youtube.com/embed/sLCBP3o2kOM" frameborder="0" allow="autoplay; encrypted-media" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
President Clinton's Remarks at the Mackie Plant (1995)
Description
An account of the resource
This is video footage of President Clinton delivering remarks at the Mackie plant in Northern Ireland. This footage is official public record produced by the White House Television (WHTV) crew, provided by the Clinton Presidential Library.
NOTE: Tape #s 04588 & 04590 have considerable noise damage on the footage that cannot be rectified.
Date: November 30, 1995
Location: Belfast, Northern Ireland
Access Restriction(s): unrestricted
Use Restrictions(s): unrestricted
Camera: White House Television (WHTV) / Main/Cut
Local Identifiers: MT04588, MT04589, MT04590
This material is public domain, as it is a work prepared by an officer or employee of the U.S. Government as part of that person's official duties. Any usage must receive the credit "Courtesy; William J. Clinton Presidential Library," and no exclusive rights or permissions are granted for usage.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2013-06-06T15:22:40.000Z
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
http://YouTube.com
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
<a href="https://www.youtube.com/static?template=terms">Standard YouTube License</a>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
clintonlibrary42<br />published via YouTube.com
License
A legal document giving official permission to do something with the resource.
<a href="https://www.youtube.com/static?template=terms">Standard YouTube License</a>
Date Submitted
Date of submission of the resource. Examples of resources to which a Date Submitted may be relevant are a thesis (submitted to a university department) or an article (submitted to a journal).
2013-06-06T15:22:40.000Z
Audio-visual materials
Bill Clinton
Mackie Plant
Northern Ireland
speech
Video Recording
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/445440a5b8b0b8b32a1d49f2d72455cd.jpg
d13cc0920ee427ad96ce7e9999bbedad
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Londonderry, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
President Clinton and SDLP leader John Hume on stage at the Londonderry Event
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Sharon Farmer
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34528-13
Description
An account of the resource
Close-up photo of President Clinton and SDLP leader John Hume.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34528-13_30Nov1995_H
594653
John Hume
Londonderry
Northern Ireland
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/f80445fc571d76d793bc1e67e0746bf0.jpg
cc5d01c3943a42a2720ecaa872590a56
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Londonderry, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Londonderry Event
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Sharon Farmer
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34522-18
Description
An account of the resource
Panoramic photo of crowd in Guildhall Square
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34522-18_30Nov1995_H
594653
Londonderry
Northern Ireland
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/5fe2202eaab9a125dbd4b04199603629.jpg
c0949cfa9628d09dd1579689a51ee068
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Londonderry, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Londonderry Event
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Sharon Farmer
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34522-15
Description
An account of the resource
Panoramic photo of crowd in Guildhall Square
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34522-15_30Nov1995_H
594653
Londonderry
Northern Ireland
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/1d8de708667dbfdfe3ee5f78c956c281.jpg
661b01d1c2a979afbb0d2e2c3854e177
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Londonderry, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Londonderry Event
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Sharon Farmer
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34518-27a
Description
An account of the resource
Close-up photo of President Clinton shaking hands with the crowd.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34518-27a_30Nov1995_H
594653
Londonderry
Northern Ireland
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/6f55b8ba71aada1f66ada1fcb80debd2.jpg
d01b31c6d4ead052808f5586be2f475e
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Londonderry, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
A girl is holding an American flag at the Londonderry Event
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Sharon Farmer
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34518-25a
Description
An account of the resource
A girl sitting on the shoulders of her father holding an American flag close to her face.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34518-25a_30Nov1995_H
594653
Londonderry
Northern Ireland
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/df6fe296cf418fcd713cd1e72ad7cfab.jpg
c361331df8ef050b755a106b72510b1d
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Londonderry, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Londonderry Event
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Sharon Farmer
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34518-12a
Description
An account of the resource
Behind view of a boy holding American flags in each hand.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34518-12a_30Nov1995_H
594653
Londonderry
Northern Ireland
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/2691c9208d66883aab2785f0f3113329.jpg
76d456b7f52f3389f5cad8e887200476
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Londonderry, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Londonderry Event
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Sharon Farmer
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34518-0a
Description
An account of the resource
A group of girls greet President Clinton with American flags.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34518-0a_30Nov1995_H
594653
Londonderry
Northern Ireland
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/689f12735ff9a6f150badf139edd82a7.jpg
e932c914003776b392a946b91502c022
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Londonderry, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Londonderry Event
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Sharon Farmer
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34516-33a
Description
An account of the resource
SDLP Leader John Hume introduces President Clinton who is seen laughing with the crowd.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34516-33a_30Nov1995_H
594653
John Hume
Londonderry
Northern Ireland
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/b73fd30b867b3ae16303ae0161b5d087.jpg
afbdd5e5102d1184ebf2c75e8ec3f449
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Londonderry, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Londonderry Event
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Sharon Farmer
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34516-24a
Description
An account of the resource
A crowd greets the Presidents with American flags in Guildhall Square.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34516-24a_30Nov1995_H
594653
Londonderry
Northern Ireland
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/44f78718ad8ed71cb65b9dce49ad4504.jpg
04d50e66d33fe73e159a1abb0a911301
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Londonderry, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Londonderry Event
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Sharon Farmer
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34515-05
Description
An account of the resource
A woman greeting the President and First Lady's arrival by waving an American flag in Guildhall Square.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs fo the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34515-05_30Nov1995_H
594653
Londonderry
Northern Ireland
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/94041456a13a45491a3e24d98aee12ab.jpg
7ec3e5cac209e33ead1a28a0ac0002fa
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Londonderry, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Lord Lieutenant of Londonderry, Northern Ireland greets President Clinton
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Sharon Farmer
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34514-18a
Description
An account of the resource
Lord Lieutenant of Londonderry Sir Michael McCorkell greeting President Clinton on the tarmac.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34514-18a_30Nov1995_H
594653
Londonderry
Northern Ireland
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/74676ed7e4e5e9ab3a9afb2a522e3294.jpg
09d867eebada439234e3bbb6833cd36d
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Shopping in Belfast
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Ralph Alswang
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34503-18
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton laughing with shop owner Victoria Clarke, Shankill District, Belfast
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34503-18_30Nov1995_H
594653
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/5f845c87e8eaf10921a27fef68da5fca.jpg
35d00a68d246cffc6dce2975bbd8475d
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Shopping in Belfast
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Ralph Alswang
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34503-13
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton exiting his motorcade in the Shankill District, Belfast
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34503-13_30Nov1995_H
594653
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/c53e465b21adac1d8ceed3dbbea82349.jpg
7f743d8e89ef18d5cc4776d94777b15b
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Shopping in Belfast
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Ralph Alswang
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34502-11
Description
An account of the resource
Hillary Rodham Clinton greeting shoppers in the Shankill District, Belfast
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34502-11_30Nov1995_H
594653
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/3d8a0e3eb86f39d08ba564728dd4ca67.jpg
919895a5106a22db1073b4932dbec176
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Shopping in Belfast
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Ralph Alswang
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34502-01
Description
An account of the resource
Hillary Rodham Clinton greeting shoppers in the Shankill District, Belfast
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34502-01_30Nov1995_H
594653
Hillary Rodham Clinton
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/79ab4d15fa94be2709a0e96ca4ce9b25.jpg
9706b4aacf6228106cfef2083ed4ff99
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
President Clinton greets children in the Shankill District, Belfast, Northern Ireland
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Ralph Alswang
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34501-28a
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton greets children in the Shankill District, Belfast, Northern Ireland.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34501-28a-30Nov1995_H
594653
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/5d13300f5a9a8a00db56aa2f31ae8d10.jpg
80d6d7e8c4721038518d3da1ac5a5f03
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Motorcade in Falls Road District, Belfast
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Sharon Farmer
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34506-31a
Description
An account of the resource
Crowd greeting President Clinton's motorcade in the Falls Road District, Belfast
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34506-31a_30Nov1995_H
594653
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/ad8510c2167def5cd27c465b58931154.jpg
417a4e347a67b8274a02ccb67c68e8ed
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
President Clinton shaking hands with Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Sharon Farmer
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34505-25
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton shaking hands with Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams in the Falls Road District, Belfast
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34505-25_30Nov1995_H
594653
Gerry Adams
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/7d3ed278bbac0e2cddb5bb90ae8f7078.jpg
c148a89a89f4c4f662bbcb28716166da
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Motorcade in Falls Road District, Belfast
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Sharon Farmer
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34504-19
Description
An account of the resource
Crowd waiting to greet President Clinton's motorcade in the Falls Road District, Belfast
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34504-19_30Nov1995_H
594653
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/82cd88cfb7b6a82d75c74c21d137e292.jpg
7a94aa8d7c4e6180120440bcae9f3672
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Hillary Rodham Clinton listens to Joyce McCartan and other women at the Women's Information Drop-In Center
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Barbara Kinney
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34512-27a
Description
An account of the resource
Hillary Rodham Clinton meeting Joyce McCartan and other members of the Women's Information Drop-In Center
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34512-27a_30Nov1995_H
594653
Hillary Rodham Clinton
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/5c62ce0a3a93c36b1aa8ddaafc9e4135.jpg
dea945fac63c95a5277adbddd34ab031
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Strandmillis, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Playboard Event
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Ralph Alswang
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
09/03/1998
Description
An account of the resource
Hillary Rodham Clinton signs autographs for school children on a walking path in Strandmillis, Northern Ireland
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P66127-02_03Sep1998_H
594653
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P66127-02
Autographs
Hillary Rodham Clinton
Northern Ireland
Strandmillis
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/c03e3eae8fa831017e9e5e2309d514bd.jpg
9229408f892e7ecce1ff4d2b6a85ccd5
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Black & White
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Parliament
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Barbara Kinney
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
09/03/1998
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton walks along a corridor at the Parliament Building in Belfast with Seamus Mallon, Deputy First Minister and David Trimble, First Minister of the Northern Ireland Assembly
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P66120-02_03Sep1998_H
594653
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P66120-02
Bill Clinton
David Trimble
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
Parliament
Seamus Mallon
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/aed56a8e809bbd6041836726896651b9.jpg
37eb0a08912f9ad4f5300330118a5df5
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Black & White
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Waterfront Hall
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Barbara Kinney
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
09/03/1998
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton meets with Prime Minister Tony Blair and Sandy Berger at Waterfront Hall in Belfast
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P66119-24_03Sep1998_H
594653
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P66119-24
Bill Clinton
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
Sandy Berger
Tony Blair
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/5560826dedf54ddf2a7a46419a88fa51.jpg
e00f1abdd69189ef6a272d04e509d4d8
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Black & White
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Waterfront Hall
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Barbara Kinney
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
09/03/1998
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton meets with Prime Minister Tony Blair and Sandy Berger at Waterfront Hall in Belfast
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P66118-05_03Sep1998_H
594653
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P66118-05
Bill Clinton
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
Sandy Berger
Tony Blair
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/3a255eb24162affe6b8ae30412dd3c82.jpg
84c8643e6853bf0a4c44c155c12c147f
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Belfast Arrival
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Barbara Kinney
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
09/03/1998
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton greets British Prime Minister Tony Blair following his arrival to Belfast
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P66106-17a_03Sep1998_H
594653
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P66106-17a
Arrivals
Bill Clinton
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
Tony Blair
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/76cd85d3de6df612a3a29cd11a6d4c41.jpg
e7996eb7b394f6433e21954f69abc758
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Vital Voices Conference
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Ralph Alswang
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
09/02/1998
Description
An account of the resource
Hillary Rodham Clinton addresses the Vital Voices Conference at Waterfront Hall in Belfast
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P66082-02_02Sep1998_H
594653
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P66082-02
Hillary Rodham Clinton
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
Vital Voices
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/56e55bdf1c6d17ea5f5d8e6db907e4d5.jpg
4946036ce4853caad9b528a753e80e0c
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Belfast Departure
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Robert McNeely
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
12/01/1995
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton talks with a young boy on the tarmac before his departure from Belfast
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34578-26a_01Dec1995_H
594653
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34578-26a
Bill Clinton
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/4ba340645a74644336160c7c79767565.jpg
1ae8ce7d56625ddfba43936aa1d9057c
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
David Trimble
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Robert McNeely
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton participates in a bilateral meeting with Northern Ireland Ulster Unionist Party leader David Trimble in Belfast
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34546-11a_30Nov1995_H
594653
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34546-11a
Bill Clinton
David Trimble
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/deb9bb823e7f31803081752d10dc7d39.jpg
7f0c678c82b8657e999f39e724b479d4
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Londonderry, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
A boy reaches out to shake President Clintons hand at Londonderry, Northern Ireland
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Barbara Kinney
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Description
An account of the resource
A young boy reaches out to shake President Clinton's hand on the rope line following the President's speech in Londonderry
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34527-23_30Nov1995_H
594653
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34527-23
Bill Clinton
Londonderry
Northern Ireland
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/20d6f959de1d555724b49448ff2629a4.jpg
b7e5b69b7358f359fab57f268b58d0c6
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Londonderry, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
A boy watches President Clinton at the Londonderry Event
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Barbara Kinney
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Description
An account of the resource
A young boy watches President Clinton address the people of Londonderry in the city's square
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34527-06_30Nov1995_H
594653
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34527-06
Londonderry
Northern Ireland
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/91b67698f89a9ddba9f14a817afa4a45.jpg
ae67f0238433fbe581ce276df40013da
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Motorcade in Belfast
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Sharon Farmer
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton's motorcade travels through East Belfast
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34506-26a_30Nov1995_H
594653
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34506-26a
Motorcade
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/953d4e1018672fe2670a032cca1d57e6.jpg
2b617c77e068e3d0f8ecc310357c139e
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
President Clinton visits bakery on Falls Road in Belfast, Northern Ireland
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Sharon Farmer
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton talks with merchants and customers inside McErlean's bakery on Falls Road in Belfast, Northern Ireland.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34505-31_30Nov1995_H
594653
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34505-31
Bill Clinton
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/892d07f15ac42453955daaee12409673.jpg
fb81a54f27aa360cfe1188bd166cfd36
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
President Clinton greets Gerry Adams in East Belfast, Northern Ireland
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Sharon Farmer
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton greets Gerry Adams outside a business in East Belfast Enterprise Park
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34505-26_30Nov1995_H
594653
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34505-26
Bill Clinton
Gerry Adams
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/23dfd80881008f859462aa6edd4a5978.jpg
c9af0b81e8fd8ec00bf94d9eb1c10eca
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Motorcade in Belfast
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Sharon Farmer
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Description
An account of the resource
Views of the people lined up on the streets of Belfast to watch President Clinton's motorcade pass through the city
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34504-18_30Nov1995_H
594653
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34504-18
Motorcade
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/2dfd4d9d37ed8f1d2d0cff18dc5558cf.jpg
6a774a35aeb669ae25e6e4c31729e6bb
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Hillary Rodham Clinton greets people in the Shankill District, Belfast, Northern Ireland
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Ralph Alswang
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Description
An account of the resource
Hillary Rodham Clinton is greeted by people on the street in the Shankill District of Belfast
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34502-13_30Nov1995_H
594653
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34502-13
Hillary Rodham Clinton
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
Shankill
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/a311c291cf73bf6b796614ea9536c8dc.jpg
7597d9207fef1d6d7a02699da8b460d4
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Violets Fruit Store in the Shankill District, Belfast, Northern Ireland
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Ralph Alswang
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton visits Violet's Fruit Store in the Shankill District of Belfast
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34501-15a_30Nov1995_H
594653
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34501-15a
Bill Clinton
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
Shankill
Shopping
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/ce7491ee2df2a4265295481751c5bcbd.jpg
d0d01fb96eda8e9abb5ef28cb5fa1e0f
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
President Clinton waves at crowds in the Shankill District, Belfast, Northern Ireland
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Ralph Alswang
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton waves to people as he arrives at Violet's Fruit Store in the Shankill District of Belfast
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34501-02a_30Nov1995_H
594653
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34501-02a
Bill Clinton
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
Shankill
Shopping
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/1f29802f64a689f775a4255d4b4f35e0.jpg
c4751ba8607b02e15482b5adfbed2ec6
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Motorcade in Belfast
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Ralph Alswang
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton's motorcade travels through the Shankill District of Belfast
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34500-13a_30Nov1995_H
594653
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34500-13a
Motorcade
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
Shankill
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/c039b8ed8a8fae474b8a7f3ceb3b1c1f.jpg
b6a6352f1391242f602f58e900f229bd
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Mackie Plant
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Sharon Farmer
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton delivers remarks to employees and others at the Mackie Plant in Belfast
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34490-12a_30Nov1995_H
594653
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34490-12a
Mackie Plant
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/e5319d92ed04cb5e9e57e17a7ce7db41.jpg
2821cac14ac2503c6ab2ae99e64d4902
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Mackie Plant
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Sharon Farmer
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Description
An account of the resource
Mackie Plant employees watch and applaud the leaders at the plant event
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34489-12a_30Nov1995_H
594653
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34489-12a
Bill Clinton
Employees
Mackie Plant
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/8b7497db5f30b91d7c86569d367a99c5.jpg
f13d86e5a015493fffb76002d3f2c97c
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Mackie Plant
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Barbara Kinney
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton is introduced prior to his address to Mackie Plant employees by two children: Catherine Hamill, a Catholic and David Sterrett, a Protestant
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34484-25_30Nov1995_H
594653
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34484-25
Bill Clinton
Mackie Plant
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/6f115db17ce1e49d21f6fb4438ff210a.jpg
e24d42081bb8e276634f73d8b80538ee
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Omagh, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Omagh Bombing
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Ralph Alswang
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
09/03/1998
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Prime Minister Tony Blair and Cherie Blair visit and place flowers on the Market Street site in Omagh, Northern Ireland
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
42-WHPO-P66145-01
594653
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P66145-01
Bill Clinton
Bombing
Cherie Blair
Hillary Rodham Clinton
Northern Ireland
Omagh
Tony Blair
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/06be14d11a85790c18866198a5785912.jpg
99dfc847ec39c7f93d884f7d1bb63c34
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Black & White
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Queens University
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Robert McNeely
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton talks with Ambassador William Crowe and Senator George Mitchell at Queens University in Belfast, Northern Ireland
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
42-WHPO-P34558-25
594653
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34558-25
Bill Clinton
George Mitchell
Ireland
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
Queens University
William Crowe
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/901d69abf5f8419f4c092d919a450c27.jpg
255f81d60249218dbf68c0b24e4f27e2
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Black & White
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Queens University
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Robert McNeely
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton talks with Senator George Mitchell, Ambassador William Crowe and Harold Ickes at Queens University in Belfast, Northern Ireland
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
42-WHPO-P34558-22
594653
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P34558-22
Bill Clinton
George Mitchell
Harold Ickes
Ireland
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
Queens University
William Crowe
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/11e4d493472a1fb429f9a1323eca10e8.jpg
35818278feb8d7abc58a01b33b17d7a6
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Belfast, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Black & White
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Queens University
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Robert McNeely
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton meets with Gerry Adams at Queens University in Belfast, Northern Ireland. Ambassador William Crowe, Senator George Mitchell and Tony Lake are present at the meeting.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library
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Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
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42-WHPO-P34558-17
594653
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P34558-17
Bill Clinton
George Mitchell
Gerry Adams
Ireland
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
Queens University
Tony Lake
William Crowe
-
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Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
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1993-2001
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<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
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<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
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Belfast, Northern Ireland
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Black & White
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35mm
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Queens University
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Robert McNeely
White House Photograph Office
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11/30/1995
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President Clinton meets with Gerry Adams at Queens University in Belfast, Northern Ireland
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<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
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42-WHPO-P34558-09
594653
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P34558-09
Bill Clinton
Gerry Adams
Ireland
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
Queens University
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/aba900bf6644282d1d8d6c6b2a30ae64.jpg
43537e0ee7eed04878e6c987becd5ef2
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Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
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1993-2001
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<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
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<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
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Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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Belfast, Northern Ireland
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Color
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35mm
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Title
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Waterfront Hall
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Sharon Farmer
White House Photograph Office
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09/03/1998
Description
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President Clinton, Prime Minster Tony Blair, David Trimble, Seamus Mallon and Lord Mayor David Alderdice address the Assemby of Northern Ireland in the Main Auditorium at Waterfront Hall
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<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
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Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
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P66159_17_03Sep1998_H
594653
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P66159_17
Bill Clinton
David Trimble
Ireland
Northern Ireland
Tony Blair
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/6f6c0eab606104aeb217096f9e174f72.pdf
6634eeaac74cb5b16008d259be8858a1
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<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
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Clinton Presidential Records
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Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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Declassified Documents Concerning the Northern Ireland Peace Process
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2015-0159-M
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9/19/2016
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This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on the Northern Ireland Peace Process. Materials include emails transmitting a tasking memorandum for the President's meeting with Irish Prime Minister Bruton.
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<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36383">2006-1759-F</a>
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/24194021">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
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National Security Council
NSC Emails
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Adobe Acrobat Document
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Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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9/15/2016
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2015-0159-M
24194021
Declassified
John Bruton
Northern Ireland
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/2f760ad25ed4dba1ca8256c93c6cf7f0.pdf
3e5eab87162e879ba2a32a3fad7d27a1
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<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
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This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
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Clinton Presidential Records
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Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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Declassified Documents Concerning British Prime Minister Tony Blair
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2013-0804-M
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9/19/2016
Description
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This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on memcons, telcons, and correspondence related to British Prime Minister Tony Blair. Materials include background and briefing materials for meetings and conversations with Prime Minister Blair, covering topics of mutual interest such as NATO enlargement, Bosnia, terrorism, and trade. Also included are memcons with Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, French President Jacques Chirac, and Chinese President Jiang Zemin.
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<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36016">2006-0217-F</a>
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/2525024">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
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National Security Council
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Adobe Acrobat Document
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Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
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Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
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9/15/2016
Source
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2013-0804-M
Bosnia
Declassified
Great Britain
Memcon
Northern Ireland
Telcon
Tony Blair
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/baad2e6b4749883eb276322268a9ab7d.pdf
a8b5da3c2857cdac097a6d1704287424
Dublin Core
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<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
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This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
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Clinton Presidential Records
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Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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Declassified Documents Concerning British Prime Minister John Major
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2012-0801-M
Date Available
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9/19/2016
Description
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This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on memcons, telcons, and related correspondence concerning British Prime Minister John Major. Materials include 1995 memcons and telcons between the President and Major, as well as briefing documents related to those conversations, which primarily focus on Bosnia and Northern Ireland. Telcons from the President's conversations with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French President Jacques Chirac are also included.
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<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36216">2006-0215-F</a>
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/2525024">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
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National Security Council
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Adobe Acrobat Document
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Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
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Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
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9/15/2016
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2012-0801-M
Bosnia
Bosnia War
Declassified
Great Britain
John Major
Memcon
Northern Ireland
Telcon
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/5aa4876f138a60330e869d23b372880d.pdf
81087b5ee20e37b1803873db43bc5c51
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) of E.O. 13526.
�3087
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
1.0 I
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATICN
SUBJECT:
Telcon with ~abour Party Leader and Prime
Minister-elect Tony Blair
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Mr. Blair
Notetakers: Natalie Johnson, Marc Koehler
and Marian~a Papadimitriou
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
May I, 1997, 11:25-11:27 p.m. EDT
Residence
The President:
Mr. Blair:
Hello.
The President:
Mr. Blair:
. Hello?
Tony?
Congratulations.
Thanks very much indeed.
The President:
What are you doing, making a round of parties?
Mr. Blair: Yes we are just off. There's a big celebration by
the banks of the Thames. I'm just heading off there now. We're
slowing duwn through the night. It's a stunning result, really.
The President:
Mr. Blair:
Yes, it's amazing, isn't it?
The President:
Mr. Blair:
That was amazing.
I'm really happy for you.
Yes, well you showed the way.
The President:
I'm sorry you got so much grief from the press.
Mr. Blair: That's right.
Left don't defend you.
.
Always the Right attack you and the
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O.13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 1
'~' ·~_f'''~';;' DECLASSI~ICATION ~ATE: October 14,2015
,_At'"
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r-.,J
INTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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The President: Well, the people voted for you. That's the main
thing.
I wish you well and look forward to working with you.
I
guess I'll see you soon, at that NATO meeting, if not. sooner.
Mr. Blair: Yes, that's right.
I would love to do that. We have
a chance to do something now.
I look forward to meeting with
you. We have a good and strong relationship.
The President: See you soon. Go on back to your people now.
just wanted to wish you congratulations.
Mr. Blair:
Thanks, thank you very much indeed.
The P.resident:
Mr. Blair:
Good-bye.
Good-bye.
End of Conversation
I
�CONFlOENriAL
GOHFIDji;NTIAI..
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Private Meeting with Prime Minister Blair and
British Cabinet (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
William Daley, Secretary of Commerce
William Crowe, Ambassador to the UK
Samuel Berger, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
James Steinberg, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Mary Ann Peters, Director for European
Affairs, NSC (Noteta~ec)
Prime Minister Blair
John Holmes, Private Secretary to the
Prime Minister for Overseas Affairs
Members of the British Cabinet
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
May 29, 1997, 11:40 a.m. - 12 noon
The Cabinet Room, No. 10 Downing Street
Prime Minister Blair:
(Following introductions of Cabinet
members)
Parliament is in recess; we are having a hell of a time
getting underway -- the honeymoon doesn't last long.
The second
term is what we need; to take nothing for granted and not rely on
the other side's unpopularity. »Ci
The President:
I am delighted to be here.
I admire what you did
for the party; it is important to have the freedom to capture the
center and move into tomorrow. -f€t
Prime Minister Blair:
The truth is we took part of what we did
from you;
I am happy that these issues are on the agenda in the
rest of Europe now. ~
The President:
There are some leaders like the prime ministers
of the Netherlands and Portugal who have the same ideas. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
other examples.
~
CONFIDEH'l'IAL
Reason:
1.5 (b) ,
Declassify On, , 6/
And Sweden -- it is helpful to look at
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 2
5€;~;iiooiE]' O:"hff 14, 2015
�CONFIDtNTlAL
CONFIDEN'I'IAL
2
The President:
Kok was talking about France; they are not ready
yet to do what is needed.
~he UK, the Netherlands and the Uniterl
states have good social compacts that make the country work; in
the United States we need to maintain competitiveness while
looking out for people. Millions can't cope with work and
family; and these are the people who face education and safe
streets and health care challenges.
If you succeed, and I think.
you will, constructive change will have to take place.
France
and Germany need to balance social programs and global realities;
a different version of that problem faces us all. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
That is why it is so important to exchange
ideas; we have learned from the best and worst of experiences;
there. must .be structural change.
It could well be premature to
. introduce the euro without it. ;e1
The President:
It is interesting how a currency acquires a life
of its own -- it has become the litmus test for France and
Germany, though the underlying changes have not taken place.
yz(
(Cabinet meeting adjourned, discussion continued with Chancellor
of Exchequer Brown.)
Mr. Brown:
There is a need for a flexible labor market, which
you faced up to in the United States. You have 50 percent more
consumption per head than France and Germany because they have
not liberalized shopping hours, and 50 percent more computer
work.
If possible, we should make the G-7 the forum for
discussion of flexible labor forces so others can learn from the
U.s. experience.
The debate needs to go forward in Europe.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
It doesn't mean giving up the social
compact but it is. a new world.
The role of government is not
about hostilities with business but to equip people with the
skills and technology they need and help families. ~
The President:
I agree with that.
k81
Mr. Brown:
In Great Britain, the long-term unemployed make up 40
percent of our unemployed, compared with 10 percent in the United
States. We have no way to get them back to work. There will
have to be huge changes; France is the best example because their
public sectqr is huge. We need to demonstrate that growth and
social programs can work together -- you do not have to sacrifice.
one for the other.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I told Jospin that he was attacking the
right for the wrong reasons -- he should be doing it because they
are not going far enough. Je7
CONFIDENTIAL
~.,......
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Cur~riUtj\~ IIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
3
The President:
We cut government employment by 300,000.
It is
now the smallest since the Kennedy Administration and, on a per
capita basis, the smallest it has been since 1933. We have
direct transfers to social security and to state and local
governments. You could be helpful with the difficulties within
France and Germany with regard to social spending. At least in
Germany they spend the money better, on long-terr:. training i in
France people are paid to stay unemployed for very long periods.
],Kf
Mr. Brown:
The system can only work if there is mobility,
flexibility and la~ge transfers. Right now, none of these three
exists. 0
.The President:
There is one thing to look at.
I know the United
states are different than EU member nations, but you would be
interested in how far big states can go in having different
financial policies. New Jersey is an example - - i t proved you
can raise the minimum wage and create more low-wage jobs.
I used
this experience to justify our rc:ising the minimum wage. But
unemployment will go up if the rise is too big. Your
unemployment rate is lower than other Europeans' because of your
f1exible system. -+-er
.
Mr. Brown:
Since they are not required to work, no long-term
unemployed single parents are included in our statistics.
That means unemployment is really closer to 20 percent in some
cases. We have the biggest single-parent population in Europe.
-+-er
The President:
If the culture says it is no longer necessary to
have a marriage to have children, then that means single parents
should have to work. ~
-- End of Conversation --
CONFIDENTIAL
�6EGRE"T
SECRET
2
THE WHITE HOUSE
.
I.
o
~~
WASHINGTON
o~
('>0
Ir)ECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
i iNTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
I E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 3
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
SUBJECT:
Restricted Meeting with British Prime
Minister Tony Blair (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
William Crowe, Ambassador to the UK
Samuel R. Berger, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Mary Ann Peters, Director for European
Affairs, National Security Council
(Notetaker)
Anthony Blair, Prime Minister
Sir John Kerr, Ambassador to the U.S.
John Holmes, Private Secretary to the
Prime Minister
Jonathan Powell, Chief of Staff to the
Prime Minister
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
May 29, 1997, 12:00-12:30 p.m.
No. 10 Downing Street, London
Prime Minister Blair:
Should we work through our cards?
(U)
The President: If you see me with all the cards they give me,
you know it is going to be ~ long meeting because I have not done
my homework. If I .do it, I reduce it to this one card.
(U)
With regard to Northern Ireland, ,I would like to tell you that
when it comes time that you think it would be helpful for us to
say something about a cease-fire or decommissioning, let me know.
We may have to wait for the Irish election. I have some pull and
can call in chits; just let me know. --i-E"t"'
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)( d)
3ECRE'f
Reason: 1.5 (b,l
Declassify On:;
,
�SECRE'l'
SECRET
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I will think about the parade problem.
The
conflict reminds me of the Middle East. Do yuu have a resolution
in mind? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
One problem is that the people are farther along
than the leaders.
For people like Sinn Fein and Ian Paisley, the
conflict is their whole life. ~
Ambassador Crowe: At Drumcree, however, all those peace-loving
people went indoors and shut their blinds.
(U)
The President:
Those were the same people in the streets
cheering us -- they need leadership. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Some of my rich yuppie friends cancelled trips to
Belfast to play golf. J21
Ambassador Crowe:
The President has been strongly supportive of
investment in Northern Ireland.
K)
SE(gET
�6EGf<E~r
SECRET
3
The President:
You need a place for the politicians to go to be
relevant.
They have to have a life
"
other than
their ability to stop the process.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
You've got it right with a
guaran ee 0
some connection to Ire:and.
I have listened to them
talk and I think that if there were no political leaders, we
could get the people to agree. -fer
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
~------------------------~I
I
Mr. Holmes: /
The President:
Sinn Fein needs to be on board with the substance
·of the resolution, whatever the details of the relationship to
Ireland. What is the role for the DUP and Paisley? If we leave
the extremes out, they can undermine the solution.
I was struck
by that when I met Paisley.
I didn't get a word in edgewise for
20 minutes, but I didn't care. ~
Mr. Holmes:
/r~I=E=.=O=.1=3=52=6=,s=e=ct=io=n=1.=4(=b=)(=~~1------------------11
I
The President:
You mean if you give them a meaningful devolved
government? .JB1
Mr. Berger:
We are maintaining contact with the unionists -- I
called Trimble recently. ~
The President:
He is impressive.
~
Ambassador Crowe: But not at Drumcree. And the SDLP needs Sinn
Fein.in the talks so they cannot criticize the compromises Hume
makes.
(S)
The President:
You know where we are.
can do, let me know at the right time.
If there is anything I
(.e)
Mr. Berger: Mo Mowlam was over last week and we had a great
meeting. .Jce)
The President:
She is good, great on TV. Her happy face
inspires confidence. She seems soiid and not full of herself;
you don't need another person over there posturing like a
peacock.
-\-e1
Prime Minister Blair:
I will tell her that.
End of Conversation
SECRE'!'
~
�CmJFI DEN''fIAL
CONfiDENTIAL
'/
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 4
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
SUBJECT:
PARTICIPANTS:
Luncheon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
The President
William Crowe, Ambassador to the UK
Samuel R. Berger, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
John Podesta, Deputy Chief of Staff
Daniel Tarullo, Head of the National
Economic Council
James Steincerg, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
E. Anthony Wayne, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for European and
Canadian Affairs
Mary Ann Peters, Director for European
Affairs, ~ational Security Council
(Notetaker)
Prime Minister Blair
Sir John Kerr, Ambassador to the U.S.
Alistair Darling, Chief Secretary, Treasury
Colin Budd, Cabinet Office
Alex Allan, Principal Private Secretary
to the Prime Minister
Jonathan Powell, Chief of Staff
Philip Barton, Assistant Private Secretary
for the Prime Minister
John Holmes, Private Secretary for Overseas
Affairs
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
May 29, 1997, 12:30-3 p.m.
No. 10 Downing Street, London
The President:
We should talk about NATO.
I have the impression
that most leaders in Paris are in favor of a group of five,
adding Romania and Slovenia to the other three. We have
reservations about that.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
COHFIDEN'fIAL
Reason:
1.S(b)i
Declass:lfy On: ,:
�CONFIDENTIAL
2
. COHFI DEN'fIJltL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
~I Our first concern is that the first shall not be the
last -- we have said that all along.
That is why we need
aggressively to build on PFP for future members.
If there are
five, no one will believe in a second round and we will be under
greater pressure to reassure them publicly.
This could lead
Russia to think tha~ we are committed to Baltic membership.
We
don't want any grey zones, but the open door must be credible.
That may not be as satisfying, but it may be the proper thing to
do. Ael
L -______
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
(1) I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Ambassador Kerr:
Mr. Berger:
They're shifting because of Slovenia and because
they are grateful for Romania's deal with Hungary. ~
The President:
I see Kohl next week; he should know where you
are on this.
JkM
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Mr. Berger:
We need to be reassuring and embracing in our
language; perhaps not using the example of waiting room. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Mr. Berger:
E.O. 13526, section 1.
One way is to emphasize self-selection.
~
The President:
We are working on it and thinking of the package
we can put forward.
Bill just whispered, "Are Romania and
Slovenia ready? This is a military alliance." ~
Ambassador Crowe:
context. J.e1
You need to make the judgment in the military
The President:
We have a disagreement with our partners on the
continent but I am sure a larger group would turn up the heat on
the Baltic issue and we are not prepared to handle that yet.
This is a problem that needs time to sort itself out; we need to
give it a few years.
If you give it away now, you have nothing
to fill the time. ~
CONFIDENTIAL
�CONFiDENTIAL
,CONFIDENTIAL
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O, 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Mr, Holmes:
The President:
Mr. Holmes:
What argument did they make?
'l'hat they are not ready.
j)21
~
Ambassador. Kerr:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:
I would have thought that, but the republican
caucus actually favors letting in more countries.
I don't want
to misrepresent the Hill; I think the republicans will follow
their leadership on this. Some are against enlargement because
of the fear of provoking a nationalist response in Russia -- that
is a silly argument. )ef
Prime Minister Blair: Yes.
Je1
Mr. Berger:
New polling data shows that NATO is just not a
grass-roots issue in Russia.
ket
they are just being
Prime Minister Blair: What a surprise
normal and caring more about the economy. --+er
The President:
What do you think about the Iranian election?
.(..e')
Ambassador Kerr:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Mr. Budd:
The President:
That is where we are. We hope things will get
better.
It concerns me that we are getting to the point that
there are no Western-educated politicians in the government.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
CONFIDEH'I'IAL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
�CONFI WENTIAL
_ CONFIDENTIAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
We have made an attempt to address this within
NATO -- the European Security and Defense Identity. Except for
AFSOUTH we are happy with that. And we are trying to work out
AFSOUTH. -ter
On the Middle East, Saddam has literally violated the no-fly
zone. We would be stupid to take action against those flights
that 99 percent of the world think are okay. But the UN
resolutions- are at stake; we have to do something about his
challenge of the no-fly zone. Our idea is that he can have as
many humanitarian flights as he wants but we need to-have advance
notice.
The only problem is that if you tell him that and he
does not comply, you have to respond.
That puts a burden on us.
But if we believe in the UN resolutions, it is the best we can
do. ....(..G1Ambassador Crowe:
Shoot them down?
P?i
The President: No. We want to avoid deaths and especially
deaths of civilians.
I don't want to comment because we have not
,defined it yet.
We will get credit with world opinion for
permitting humanitarian flights and it is reasonable to demand
notification. ~
Prime
Ambassador Kerr:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
Mr. Berger:
There has been a refinement in our thinking. A
conversation between our two militaries produced a range of
options. -tet
The PresideDt:
This is not a question cf how to win, but how to
avoid a loss.
There is no way to win with world public opinion
but we are not prepared to let Saddam walk away from the
resolutions. We are not looking for a victory; this is not like
our response to the attempt on President Bush's life. There is a
sanctions committee in the UN but we don't trust them.
We don't
want him to think he can sucker punch us into shooting down
innocent civilians. ~
:'
.
�CONFIDENTIAL
. CONFIDENTIAL
Mr. Holmes.:
Prime Minister
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Mr. Budd:
Prime Minister Blair:
Mr. Berger:
If he knocks and a door opens, he will knock again
next time . .~
The President:
together. ::fC)
Whatever we do, even if it is less, we must do it
Ambassador Crowe:
I wonder what his lawyers are telling him?
fof'
The President:
I concur with your analysis on Iran.
It is
imperative we stay together.
I want to discuss it on its merits,
not in terms of money. Others are saying that all is well as
long as they don't blow up our people, and we can all make money.
But we have a larger responsibility. You know about terrorism
because of the IRA. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I agree.
We need to hold firm.
~
The President:
In terms of yesterday's NATO conference, there is
less than meets the eye.
I think what we are really doing is
reorganizing ourselves to face the new challenges, getting rid of
the intellectual clutter to free ourselves for the future.
If
you believe we need to combat proliferation, ethnic hatred and
terrorism and that we need a common policy on the environment,
then we have to be organized to deal with these transnational
problems. The world looks to us to be honest about these
problemsi we may not always be right but we have to be honest.
The pressure to go for the commercial benefits is enormous. )£1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Can we discuss China and Hong Kong?
We are with you oh that.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
COWFIPEWTIAL
~
�CONFI DEH'fIAL
6
The President:
Under the terms of the 1984 agreement, the UK and
China made a deal that you asked us to endorse.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
Have you heard about this
movie that is to released on July I? It is the story of how the
British got Hong Kongi you do not come off well. They are doing
what we did in Germany after the war, in reverse.
That won't
make much difference since Hong Kong is one of the most open
places in the world, but it is a metaphor for how they are going
to play it. ;ef
We want to be helpful.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
We have more leverage with Russia because of IFI programs
and denuclearization funding. We have some leverage with China
through the WTO, but Hong Kong is unique and we will support you.
)e(
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Mr. Berger:
It would be useful to come up with agreed benchmarks
such as early elections under fair conditions, civil liberties.
If we are all sending the same message, it will be more
effective. We are not there yet. ~
Prime Minister Bla'
Mr. Steinberg:
Mr. Holmes:
COHFIDEN'l'IAL
.
I
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
It depends what that means.
E.O.13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
~
I
)I)
�.CONFIDE~TTIAL
7
The President: We will be doing our best to stick with you -you have a big dog in this hunt.
jZ(
Ambassador·· Crowe:
The President:
once.
(U)
That is an Arkansas expression.
They hunt with dogs here too;
(U)
I went beagling
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1A(b)(d)
The President:
Red Army. ....ke1'"
So our officials will be sitting in front of the
Mr. Holmes:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
We don't want to put them in a box publicly, but
privately we can try to persuade them. ~
Mr. Berger:
There will be 25,000 reporters there.
The danger is
that you set the bar too high with a press that wants a
confrontation, as do some people in Hong Kong.
If our benchmarks
are not clear, we could be drawn into a confrontation. +eJ
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
The press tried to get me to comment yesterday.
I ducked the question because it is not our business.
I know
Kohl and Chirac are for it.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
I
I
CONFIDEN'f'IAL
�COHFI DEN'!' IM
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
But it
e good to un erstan w at t e consequences and
alternatives are.
It is usually discussed at the theological
level rath~~than in practical terms.
That is what I would want
to know.
~)
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Mr. Tarullo:
It is difficult for us to say anything because they
think we are concerned about the euro displacing the dollar as a
reserve currency. ~
The President:
If it leads to lower growth, it will not be good
for us or the rest of the world. At Denver we are going to talk
about an Africa initiative; but if we, you and Japan don't have
economic growth, we cannot help Latin America or Africa.
Your position is principled; the Tories' is ideological. Yours
is the best way to go forward since the theological arguments are
hard to understand. ).R1
Mr. Alan: What is lacking is a strategy for job creation and
structural adjustment. ~
The President:
Our labor ministers held a conference in Detroit,
but it didn't accomplish much because of economic conditions.
Delors put out a white paper at the time but nothing happened.
I
think we should acknowledge we tried it a few years ago; it is a
grea t idea.
(,e')
I'd like you to come to Washington soon on an official visit.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
York.
(U)
I'd like to as long as I can visit New
The President: You can. You know I ~m giving the commencement
speech at Chelsea's school. Dan Tarullo's daughter goes there
too; Chelsea says she is frighteningly smart but still nice.
Seniors finish a month early so they can do a special project.
Chelsea is going to be a doctor so she is at Georgetown Hospital
with a surgeon.
She watched a heart valve implant operation and
said it was too interesting to be queasy about the sight of
blood.
(U)
Dan, what is your daughter's project?
(U)
Mr. Tarullo:
She is teaching English, but I think she is going
to be a psychologist.
(U)
CONFIDENTIAL
�c;mIFIDEN1'I}'rL
Ambassador Kerr:
It is amazing the extent to which his daughter
has a private life.
(U)
The President:
The press has been wonderful in honoring the
request Hillary and I made to them, with one or two exceptions.
Children deserve a chance to grew up in private.
I think the
press respected this because we did not put Chelsea in the
poli tical spotlight.
(U)
We will see each other in Denver. We are staying at an old
cowboy hotel.
Do you know where you are staying?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I am not sure.
(U)
The President:
We are arranging a dinner at a place called The
Fort that specializes in buffalo meat, which is low fat.
When I
had lunch with Boris, he served roast pig and told me real men
hack off the ears and eat them. And once he served 24 courses,
including moose lips.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
conference.
(U)
It is time to get ready for the press
End of Conversation
CONFIDEN'fIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDEN'l'IAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O.13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 5
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with Bricish Prime Minister Blair (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
John Smith, Tony Campanile,
Lyle Harrison, Marc Koehler, Marianna
Papadimitriou and Mary Ann Peters
DATEr TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
June lOr 1997, 1458-1517
The Oval Office
Hello?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Hello.
The President:
(U)
Tony?
Prime Minister Blair:
Bill?
The President:
(U)
(U)
Fine.
How are you?
Prime Minister Blair: Thanks very much
through.
I 'ust want a uick word with
for comin
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
What can I do to help?
Prime Minister Blair:
COHFI DBNTIl'rL
Reason:
1. 5 (b)/
Declassify on: ;
(U)
(U)
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
�CONFIDENTIAL
GOHFIDE~J'I'IAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I'll be happy to do that.
immediately.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
That's great
We'll contact them
~
The President:
This is crazy.
I don't know why they're doing
this now, when you're trying to put all this together. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Yes, I agree with that. We'll get in touch with
them today and convey this in the strongest possible terms.
If
they are thinking about proceeding like this while you are
working in good faith, it makes no sense, it's crazy. +&r
Prime Minister Blair:
That's what I think.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I've got it and I'll get on it.
doing otherwise? ~
How are you
Prime Minister Blair:
Fine. There are pretty turbulent waters
here about European monetary union, with Jospin's victory.
~
The President:
It might give you a little more room, though.
+G+Prime Minister Blair:
I
Yeah, maybe it will give me more room.
>:'0. 13526,
~,ti'n
1.4(b)(d)
_.:Ai:':-"'_h~;';'"\.....--':;""':;---:...o::--:.--~--~-~...
cmlFIDEN'FIAL
n'
-'1'
"'..
-,_
.
,~
J-_~. '7"'~;'
":'
�COHFIDEN'PIAL
CONFlfJENllAL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I thought the Econoflist this week had some
interesting suggestions on how to proceed with the currency but
change some of the Maastricht requirements.
They argue that
France cannot make it anyway with 12 percent unemployment; but
they acknowledge that the Bundesbank would not agree to such
changes.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
It's just pretty hard to ask a Socialist
government -- it was hard to ask Chirac's government -- to do
nothing except cut spending when you have 13 percent
unemployment.
~
Prime Minister Blair: Absolutely right, and if you're doing it
while kee
the franc hi h
ou're reall
the
econom .
The President:
Well, I don't believe they can solve their
economic and unemployment problems through the budget anyway.
They need structural reform. Maybe Socialist governments can
actually do this better than Conservative governments. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
COHFIDEN'PIAL
�CONFJ DENTIAL
CONF IDEN'PIAL
The President:
Is he coming to Denver.or not?
Prime Minister Blair:
He must be?
(U)
(U)
The President: Well the way their constitution works, Chirac has
foreign policy and he has economic policy, so they normally bot~
come.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Well, I suppose he will, won't he?·
should be interesting. Have you met him?
It
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
there? :Jef
"You guys have to help me."
Tell me who was
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The president: Well I'm looking forward to it.
I'm glad to see
the debate being carried on our side of the field, but there
could be a huge backlash if the left fails to deliver.
Ultimately, in a democracy the poor rely upon the social judgment
of the middle class. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
that we will fail.
Absolutelyri ht.
There's a real risk
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
That nearly happened to us, you know, when the
Congress in '94 didn't pass my plan.
I fended it off and we now
have agreement in the budget to repair it.
I think we saved it,
but you don't want to miss those chances when they come along.
~
CONFI DEN1'IPrL
�CONFiDENTIAL
CONFIDEN''fH\:L
Prime Minister Blair: Absolutely right, there's a huge mood of
uncertainty in Europe at the moment.
It's almost impossible to
overstate it. %
The President: Well, they keep trying to draw me into
discussions on details and I keep trying to stay out of it.
)Q1
Prime Minister Blair:
I think where you could have an impact is
that people look across the Atlantic, they see the American
economy and see that it works. ~
The President: What I try to do is to avoid getting drawn into
discussions of issues such as:
"If the European currency is
delayed, does that mean it is dead. N What I need to do is stay
'on my general theme that you can't create jobs without reform,
but you don't have to cut out the social safety net.
That is
what your election showed. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I think they are afraid that global corporations
and global money movers will take away the capacity of the
nation-state to preserve the social contract, but I don't think
that's true.
There was a fascinating piece in the Economist on
how the Czech experiment failed.
The market outran the capacity
of the regulators and they have negative growth now. You ought
to have somebody pull that for you, just because it makes the
case for reform without the Thatcher/Reagan idea of getting rid
of government. A little article on how the Czech economy, the
jewel of the post-communist period, could be in all this trouble
ironically because there was not enough regulation.
l-e1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
The Economist?
(U)
Not in this edition, but in the last one.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I will look for it. We've got to provide
people with a way through this problem, so it's not a choice
between dismantlement and corporatism. This is a very European
problem, born out of the ideological clash between socialism and
capitalism . . You do not have it in the same way in the United
States.
(U)
CON"PI DEW!' IAL
�LUf'U /BENT/At
CONPIDEN'fIAL
6
The President:
The problem here is that because union membership
is declining, even if you have more jobs, people worry that
their families are vulnerable, especially because there is no
universal h.ealth care. But without growth and lower unemployment
it's hard to get these things done.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, that's right. You could have a more"
universal system of health care in your country without wrecking
the system.
(U)
The President:
Of course we could. We'd save money. But we're
going to take another pop at it this time, at least for the
children. Anyway, I can't wait to see you in Denver and I'll
call the appropriate people and send the message publicly and
privately.
kef
Prime Minister Blair: That would be very kind, Bill; it would
really help.
It will be great to see you in Denver.
(U)
The President:
Have you talked Bertie Ahern?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
kef
Do you think he'll be Okay?
Prime Minister Blair:
~
Yes, I like him,
Y21
I
-1
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Yes.
I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
We have to have a
unified position or it doesn't mean a thing. So I'll stick with
you as far as I can and see you in Denver. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
OK, Bill, many, many thanks indeed.
(U)"
The President:" Once again, give my best to your wi fe. We had a
great time, and let's follow up on that project about philosophy.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, we are; it was great to see you and
Hillary. One of my few moments of real enjoyment.
(U)
The President: Well, you get to be a real person.
Denver. Bye-bye.
(U)
COHFIDEN'I'IM
See you in
�Luhl
CONFIDEWPIAL
Prime Minister Blair;
uJLJ'ijj iHL
7
,
See you in Denver.
End of Conversation
CONFIDENTIAL
Bye-bye.
(U)
�CONFIDENTIAL
COHFI DEN'fIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
IS CAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 6
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14,2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Tony
Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
-
The President
Prime Minister, Tony Blair
Notetakers: Doug Mueller, Wylma Robinson,
Pat O'Shaughnessy, Bonnie Glick
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
July 27, 1997, 12:41 - 1:02 p.m. EDT
Private Residence, Los Angeles, California
Tony?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hi, Bill.
How are you?
Very well, indeed.
(U)
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I am sitting here outside Chequers having
a cup of tea with a friend of yours, Steven Spielberg.
(U)
The President: Steven Spielberg? You are? You tell Mr.
Spielberg that you may be drinking tea with him, but I am here
on the beach in Santa Monica having coffee with Ron Burkle,
which shows California has more influence than either the
British or the U.S. Government.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
You are?
(U)
The President:
Yes.
I am looking at people skateboarding at
the beautiful beaches of Santa Monica.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
then?
(U)
CONFIl3EH'FIAL
Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify On:
You lucky man.
This is your vacation,
�CONFIDENTIAL
CONPIDEN'PIl's:L
2
The President: No, no.
I am out here working, but it is a
Sunday morning and you wanted to talk. And Ron Burkle is a
friend of mine who bought a house very close to the hotel where
I was last night.
I interrupted coffee to speak with you.
Congratulations again on the ceasefire. I think we have a
chance now.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, we have a chance now.
to fill ou in on that.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Is there anything we can do to help you with
Trimble? Probably not. kef
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
one more time.
You know that is a well I can only go back to
I am certainly willing to try to do that though.
).e"r
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:
I could try to come on over to see you or
something. -+e1
cmlFI DEN'E' L"rL
�CONFIDEN'PIAL
CONFIOENTIAL
3
Prime Minister Blair: What I think, the reason why I think
there is some hope in the situation is that the ordinary people
in Northern Ireland are desperate for peace. ~
The President:
Oh God yes. This is the place in the world
where there is the largest disconnect between the leaders and
what the ordinary people want. Jer
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: And we will do that.
I got your letter on the
Middle East and I basically agree with the letter.
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d)
And I am
really glad you are going to become EU president in January
because my sense is that we can get some grudging progress for
CONFIDEN'PIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
4
CONFIDEN'l'IAL
I
the rest of the year, and if there is going to be a
breakthrough, then we will need everyone's help to close next
year. I don't think the present situation can be maintained.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I
I
(JZ)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The_President:
point.
Well, first of all, a flashpoint or meltdown
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4( d)
Prime Minister Blair:
That's right.
~
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I'll give you an example, here you are trying to do this
Northern Ireland and one day the IRA has the whole thing in its
power and the next day, Paisley does.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
�CONFIDENTIAL
COHFIDEN'fIAL
5
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
That may be somet lng you cou
the Europeans examine -- because it is very important -you want to provide economic assistance to Jordan. With
parliamentary elections coming, we would be in a tough situation
without any real power if the people he is backing, who have
stable relations with Israel, lose ground because of economic
difficulties. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
One of the things that would help is to raise
the economic fortune of the Palestinians.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
there.
(U)
Hello?
You are getting a bit faint
The President:
I know that you can't come to us on September 9
because of the Scottish devolution and 13-15 doesn't work for
CGHFIDEN'fIl's:L
�CONFIDEN'f'IAL
,
CONFIDENTIAL
6
.'
me, but we need to set up some time.
we find the time.
(V)
Prime Minister Blair:
We will keep working till
September is really difficult?
The President:
Just those two days for me.
out another time.
(V)
(V)
I think I can work
Prime Minister Blair:
I think it probably is a bit difficult
for me because if something starts to go wrong.
(V)
The President:
How are the English reacting?
pretty well? jQ1
Prime Minister Blair:
Is it going down
It is okay for the minute.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Are most of the Scots in the Westminster
parliament in your party? .J.0r
Prime Minister Blair:
We are going to give up a few seats.
)£1
The President:
You may have some to spare now, but you can
never tell what you'll need in five years.
JK)
Prime Minister Blair: However, it has not always been like this
in Scotland.
In the 50's it was mostly Tory. What I am trying
to do is build ,new bases of support, one of the most difficult
things to do.
There are two referendums, one in Scotland and
one in Wales.
yM
The President:
So you stay there and handle it. Your
preference is to get the visit done in the month of September.
(V)
Prime Minister Blair:
I think so.
(V)
The President:
That is my strong preference.
people and we'll get it done.
(V)
I will talk to my
Prime Minister Blair: Let us do that, Bill, and I also had a
note from Hillary about the other thing we talked about and we
will work on that. You have a good time in Santa Monica.
(V)
CONFI DEH'fIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
cown DEl?ITIAL
7
The President:
Tell Steven Spielberg I hate coming all the way
out here and not get to see him because he is hanging out in
Chequers.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I will certainly.
(U)
The President:
I always suspected that beneath that ruffled,
intelle-ctual demeanor was a real Tory aristocrat working.
(UrPrime Minister Blair:
He is out here making a movie.
(U)
The President:
I know.
I told you before that he really wants
to help rebuild the movie industry in Great Britain because he
is so grateful for its influence. He got a lot of- input from
early Br{tish film makers.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Lots of possibilities here, but also
important to them that the U.S. and the British work closely,
especially because some of the other countries and some of the
stuff from the EU is not very sensible. The French and the
Italians have weird rules and prescriptions on film making.
It
would help if we can get some decent British movies.
(U)
The President:
You can do it.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Bye.
Prime Minister Blair:
Tell him I said hello.
All the best.
We'll be in touch.
(U)
Bye.
(U)
End of Conversation
cown DEWT Il'.L
(U)
(U)
�CONFIDENTIAL
COHFI DEN'f' IAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH J NGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
British Prime Minister Tony Blair
PARTICIPANTS:
(U)
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Doug Mueller, Bonnie Glick,
Sean Rice and Larry Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
September I, 1997, 11:29 - 11:54 a.m.
Martha's Vineyard
Tony?
Prime Minister Blair:
grim business.
(U)
(U)
Hi, Bill.
It's a grim business, a very
The President:
It's awful, it's really awful. We're up here on
Martha's Vineyard vacationing, and we're with a lot of people
who knew her.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: We saw her again just weeks ago when we
hosted her for lunch with Prince William, he's a great kid. ~
The President:
Yeah, I worry a lot about those kids now.
le1
Prime Minister Blair: She was such a rock of stability in the
sense she connected them with the outside world. The eldest
boy, William, is quite like her in a way, he is very "feet on
the ground," he does things kids his age do. j..Q-t'
The President: Well, I just feel so bad for her.
basically getting a hold of her life.
~
She was just
Prime Minister Blair:
Thanks for your telegram yesterday and
your kind words.
The problem was the way she lived, in a press
frenzy.
It's impossible to contemplate how intrusive it was,
into every single aspect of her life. The last time I spoke
COMFI DEH'f' IAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On:
�CONFIPENTfAL
CONFI DEN'FIAL
with her, she said that were it not for the boys, she'd be off
the board.
The country is stunned.
(.et'
The President:
They liked her a lot, didn't they.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
She was not the royal family but .she was
liked by ordinary people, it gave her problems with the royal
establishment.
{.Q1"
The President: Well, I know it's a difficult time for you.
just wanted to let you know I was thinking of you.
yx
I
Prime Hinister Blair:
I will personally miss her, it's like a
She was a star for them.
j..e}
star falling.
The President:
What do they know? Is the British security
guard who was with her still alive?
%
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, he is. And he may be able to offer
some more information. There has been some talk this afternoon.
They went to the hotel and thought they would be left alone.
The Embassy and the French government did not know they were
there. The media turned up, SQ they decided to go to dinner
then on to one of al-Fayed's houses. When they got to their
car, it did not start. They called someone from the hotel and
the hotel provided a car and driver. Apparently he'd been
drinking. yc)
The President:
That's what I was afraid of. Those guys were
chasing them? Jet
Prime Minister Blair:
Jumped on them as they left the hotel,
yet I can't believe some of the reports of how fast they were
going though.
It's just not possible they were going 100 mph
They wouldn't have to be going that fast
I mean, I know Paris.
in those tunnels, though. They must have hit a rim in the road
and turned over and smashed into a wall.
j..e}
The President:
It's a sad thing, I tell you.
~
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, someone we knew and liked. She had
a remarkable gift. She was beginning to get her life together.
j..e}
The President:
Yes, Hillary had a nice visit with her a few
weeks ago when she was here. We liked her a lot.
I just think
that anything you can do for those boys, I don't know how
CONFIDEN'fIl'rL
........ ~,i". -.
taNfl DtNTIAt~~;
~~~TON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY ;'i;
..
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.
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�CONFIDENTIAL
3
CONFIDEN'fIAL
~~____~~I_E_.~O~._13_5_2~6~,s~e~ct_io_n 1._4(~d~)~____~~~__~I in a situation like
__
this, about the challenges they will face.
Prime Minister Blair:
over.
~
I'll try to keep in touch and have them
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
~I
______________
What about her sisters? What are they like?
~I~E=.O==.1=3=52=6~,s=ec=ti=on==1.4d(~d)~__________________~I jQ1
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I E.O.13526, section 1.4(d)
The President:
Prime Minister Blair:
I
I
I E.O.13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
The President:
E.O.13526, section 1.4(d)
Hillary and I just wanted to tell you all we were thinking of
you. .-keI
Prime Minister Blair: Your words yesterday were greatly
appreciated.
Thank you. So you are on holiday now?
(U)
The President:
I'm having a good holiday.
It's the longest
vacation we have had in ten years. We're getting ready to send
Chelsea: off to university.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Are you looking forward to that?
(U)
The President: She is, but that's all part of it, it's what you
raise them for.
(U)
cmlFIDENTIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
CONFI DEN'fIAL
4
Prime Minister Blair:
there, then?
(U)
You're going straight to California from
The president: No, we have one more week here, then we go back
to Washington for a week to ten days, then we will go to
California to take her out there.
(U)
You're doing well in Northern Ireland, no?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
tha t . -+-c+-
The Sinn Fein shouldn't have a problem with
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
circumstances.
He's actually been good about this, under the
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Do you think there is anything we can do to
Trimble to stroke him? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
cm~PIDEH'3'IM
f~"~' --'OONF!HENTlAE~->
'~L~TON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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The President:
I think they're worried about being rendered
irrelevant in 20 years, given the way the demographics are
going, it's better to make a deal now rather than later. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
If you look at it, their popular majority is
eroding over time with the increasing birth rates, so now is the
time.
You'll have to come up with some sort of creative dual
relationship.
kef
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
That's consistent with what you are doing in
Scotland and Wales, anyway. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The.President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
No one wants to get up and put a sandwich in a
lunch tin to go to the factory if you have this going on.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
with you?
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
So all is well
You're getting re-engaged in the Middle East? kef
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
CONFl DEHT L'\L
�CONFIDENHAL
CONFIDENTlhL
6
We're in a
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
difficult position'L-~.~==================______~ but we don't
want to be someone on the outside just seen as complaining.
We've got a good set of ideas. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
What's your actual estimate?
~
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Now
progress.
or some
~
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
CO}IFIDJ1::HTIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIUENTfAL
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4( d)
Things are getting a little better in Bosnia. Plavsic is
showing some get up and go. You've got a decision coming your
way that we can't discuss on this line, but I think things are
going in -the right direction over the last weeks, no the last
couple of months, after a bad year.
I feel good about this.
We've got a shot to move it forward.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
to you today.
Tell Cherie I said hello.
I just wanted to talk
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
calling about Diana.
The President:
I E.O.13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Give our love to Hillary.
(U)
Take care, friend.
Prime Minister Blair:
Goodbye Bill.
Bye.
(U)
All the best.
End of Conversation --
COHFIDEN'PIAL
Thanks for·
(U)
�THE WHITE HOUSE
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O.13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 8
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Tony
Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Tony Blair
Notetakers: Sean Rice, Larry Wright, Tom
Crowell, James Smith, Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
October 9, 1997, 9:18 - 9:40 a.m. EDT
The Oval Office
Hi, Tony.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Hi, Bill. How are you? I am in good
form; I just got my party conference out of the way.
(U)
The President:
here.
(U)
It went great, didn't it?
It got great press
Prime Minister Blair: Well, I feel like a man who is facing an
inevitable collapse, but in good shape, actually. How are you?
(U)
The President:
I'm doing great, thanks.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I saw a great picture of you and Hillary
taking Chelsea to Stanford.
It was marvelous.
(U)
The President:
Well, it looked better than it felt.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
It looks like she's having a good time.
(U)
The President: She's very happy. She called last night and we
had a good talk.
It's a three-hour difference, so she always
calls late, but she knows I'm always up late. She had her first
:'lECRE't'
Reason:
1.5{b;d)
Declassify On';
....
___ .__ c- .• --F--;"
l0~::_
_
Yl
. ~.::,~:~~ Y:::.:(_L~;J-,.>·~i
�.sECRET
chemistry test.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Look, Bill, the reason I called was to
mention
couple of things:
I went to Moscow early in the week,
and also I have some thoughts on Northern Ireland. ~
a
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:
Did he give any hint of whether he would run for
another term? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)( d)
The President:
Yeah.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
SECRET
�bt:br"{c i
SECRE'f'
3
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: We will do that.
I was very encouraged by my
visit with Trimble, he's trying to be a part of this, more
upbeat than in the past. ~
Prime-Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Did Yeltsin mention the START II treaty?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
~
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
How about Iran?
+&t
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I believe that a lot of things do happen without
his knowledge.
When they changed their economy, they did not
have the intermediate controls in place that a normal economy
has. We have a process going with the Vice President,
Chernomyrdin, Wisner and Koptev, that I think will work. They
say they're cracking down, but he is careful about what he says
in public, maybe because he doesn't want to be seen to be
SECRE'f
�3ECREf
4
dancing to our tune.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Oh God, I'm really worried about it.
so strongly opposed to any of that stuff that I'm
about how they'd react to it.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Let me ask you one other thing. I appreciate
your help in keeping the issue over the French oil company Total
from becoming a bigger problem. We need to work the twin tracks
of an EU waiver and the Total-Gazprom case. I know that a lot
of Europeans don't agree with us, but I'm still concerned about
Iran becoming an industrial and military giant, given their
philosophy. I'm hoping that the new leadership in time will
have enough influence to change things, but there are no
indications of this yet. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: I'd appreciate anything you can do to help.
don't want to get crossways with the French and EU. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
SECRET
---~
.
":
r
·l
I
�5
SECRET
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
'---_--'I yJ
The President:
The Iranians -- and I sometimes think the
Chinese ar.ethis way, too -- think we're so motivated by money
that we'll eventually cave in.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
to do. .k51.
It took a long time, but it was the right thing
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
So, we're with you on that
entirely.
People are very supportive of your efforts to bring
people around on the environmental issue. ~
The President:
The problem is, the u.s. Senate won't ratify
anything I sign. They're in the Dark Ages on this -- mostly the
Republicans, but Democrats, too.
They're being told against all
evidence that you can't do this without wrecking the economy.
We had a big conference here this week with energy experts,
people who are making a living implementing changes. But with
everything going on in Washington, it didn't break through as
I'd hoped.
It may have moved things a little.
I'm chipping
away, trying to do everything I can to get us in decent shape,
and the Japanese are trying to get us together.
+er
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The president:
One thing we ought to do is to some way get the
developing countries involved in a regime -- where they don't
have the same controls as we -- to develop an alternate energy
future.
There are things they can do now that won't hamper
growth, but they can do it now so that when they become
developed, they'll already have a different energy structure.
The trick is to get them involved without their thinking that
we're trying to choke off their growth; we need their growth for
our own sake. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I agree with that totall
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
SECRET
�SECRE'f
The President: We need to find some formula to participate.
If
we gamble and take this on, but by the time you get halfway
through the. century, we're no better because we've been replaced
by China and India, still worse off, nothing has happened to
lower the global temperature. Get them to talk to us, find a
formula to benefit from, build a different energy structure.
The Indians are open, they're doing some big alternative
projects, more open than the Chinese. China is giving us grief
about criticism of their big Three Gorges hydropower project,
which is their biggest greenhouse gas project. Because it will
displace a million people and change the ecosystem, all the
environmentalists who are fighting global warming are fighting
the dam. Biggest dilemma. ~
.
Prime Minister Blair:
I a ree with the same basic
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Yes, we will.
Well, carry
Thank you for calling.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I'm looking forward to seeing Hillary
when she is here. Everything ok with you?
(U)
The President:
Great.
She is thrilled, looking forward to it,
and we are working on a time for you to come here.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Thanks.
Prime Minister Blair:
It will be great to see you.
Bye.
Bye.
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation
SECRE'l'
�THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Tony
Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Cindy Lawrence, Peter Huggins,
Lyle Harrison, James Smith, Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
October 22, 1997, 3:53-4:00 p.m. EDT
The Oval Office
Hello?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hi, Bill.
Hey, Tony.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
(U)
How's it going?
(U)
The President:
The speech went over pretty well, and we've
gotten some reasonable press. Some environmental groups are
pretty positive, some said we should have tighter deadlines.
We've gotten more business support than I thought, but the
traditional industries have dumped on it. The best we can hope
for right now.
I tried to leave open the language on developing
nations.
I was pretty explicit about the kind of joint projects
I think we ought to have, but using the language you gave me, I
was general on it. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
CO~TnDENTIl'rL
Classified by:
Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
1.5(b,d)
Declassify On:
lCJA,>~,3j.9.ki;.r'. .--..
- - -- --.~'~;
te~N LIBRARY PHO~OCOPYl
�2
CON'PIDEN'I'IAL
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)( d)
The President:
here. )J21
Well, I don't know.
We'll have to see how we do
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Do you know when he'll be here?
Prime Minister Blair:
think.
+et
The President:
~
I'm not sure; in the next few days, I
Have him check in with Sandy Berger.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
do. )Cl
Good, we will work with John and see what we can
Prime Minister Blair:
CONPIDEN'l'IAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b )( d)
�3
• COHPIBENl'IAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Well, I'm really encouraged.
I guess you know
this, we had a plane crash over here and a British pilot was
killed. An F-16 and a T-38 were on a photo chase mission and
collided over Edwards Air Force Base. There was an American
pilot, but there was also a British pilot, Flight Lieutenant
Leigh Alexander Fox. His wife is there with him at Edwards, and
it is just awful. No one has figured out how it happened.
Somehow the F-16 was able to land, but the pilots of the T-38
ejected. Both were found dead.
I'll send you the information
on it. ~
-
-
Prime Minister Blair:
Thanks, Bill.
~
The President: We will work on this other thing and see John
Prescott when he gets here. Thanks for working with me on this,
man.
(~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Not at all.
OK, bye.
Prime Minister Blair:
I'll be in touch.
(U)
Alright, Bill, speak to you soon.
End of Conversation --
CONFIDENTIAL
(U)
(U)
�• CONFIDEH'l'IAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
[1
'.".
10
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Cindy Lawrence, David Higgins,
Anthony Campanella, Peter Huggins, James
Smith, Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
October 21, 1997,
The Oval Office
Hey,
~Jny.
3:23~3:32
p.m. EDT
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Bill, hello. Tony here.
I'm sorry·this
has to be ... I'm in the middle of a big dinner, but I thought I
would come out and speak to you about what we spoke about
yesterday.
(U)
The President:
Okay.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
I am due to speak to Wim Kok tomorrow.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
CONPI DENT IM
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E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
On joint implementation?
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
kef
~
The President:
What 1 can say there is we know we need to leave
some room on language for implementing on how developing
countries would participate, but what about targets? That's
what I am really worried about. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
The big problem we have here is that I not only
talked to you, Kohl and Hashimoto -- and I want you to talk to
as many as you can -- but I also briefed Senate leaders this
afternoon and I will brief the House on what I am trying to do.
It will raise more questions than it will answer if I cancel the
speech tomorrow.
I see what you're doing, what you want me to
do:
say what I have to say, but leave as much wiggle room as
possible for you.
jef
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Alright, I will work on it as well as I can.
What I want you to do is to welcome the fact that we are clearly
committed to binding targets and clearly committed to
participa}ion.
If you give negotiations a chance, that would
help. fCl
CONFIDEN'fIAL
"
�3
cmrFIDEHTIAL
Prime Minister Blair:
Very haoov to do that.
I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
~
I have been saying that for months.
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
The President:
The problem is I will lose all credibility if I
don't give some target range.
I have to say what our position
will be.
I will try to figure out a way to give it flexibility,
and, on jotnt implementation, I think I can do precisely what
. you want. ...{-et'
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:
Alright.
Thank you very much.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Well, we are going to get out there and do the
best we can.
I will try to leave you as much wiggle room as
possible. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Thanks.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Alright, Bill.
(U)
(U)
All the very best.
Good-bye.
Good-bye.
-- End of Conversation --
cmlFI DENT IAL
'.
�cmrn DENT lAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS HI NGTO N
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Tony
Blair (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Lyle Harrison, J. Laurence
Wright II, Jeff Rathke, Anthony Campanella,
Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
November 15, 1997, 12:40-12:50 p.m. EST
Air Force One, en route Las Vegas to
Sacramento
The President: Hello?
connection.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Hello?
Hello?
We still don't have a good
(U)
The President:
Tony, can you hear me?
last time.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
No problem.
I'm so serry about the
(U)
The President:
I am on the airplane and usually it works, but
sometimes it doesn't.
Thank you for the letter you sent me
earlier this week.
I want to talk throu h what I am thinkin
about this issue.
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d)
CONFI DEN'±' L'\L
Classified by:
Reason:
1.5(b
Declassify on:
�CONFI DEN'£' lAb
2
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
We all see this looking back through the prism of the
Gulf War, but I want to see this looking forward through the
prism of the future. My goal in this and my definition of
victory, is that this is not a macho contest of getting him to
back down, but to reestablish the inspections regime, which I
think was a smashing success. Jef
Prime Minister Blair: Bill, I am in total agreement with
everything you saif~d~.__~I~w~a~n~t~~y~o~u~t~o__k_n_o~w~w~e~w~i~l~l~s~t~i~c~k~w~i~t~h~y~ou
throughout this.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I think this is very important.
Jacques Chirac
is in Vietnam right now, and I am trying to call him.
I will
talk to Yeltsin and several others over the next two days.
If
there is anything you can do to promote unity among the allies,
I would appreciate it.
I understand their position and the
popular sympathy in the Middle East for the people of Iraq.
I
CONFIDEH'l'IAL
�3
COHFIDEN'fIAL
think we need to get people in your country, in France, and
elsewhere, to see what UNSCOM has destroyed. Tpey need to see
how successful the program of eliminating weap'ons of mass
destruction has been. But there is one thing going on in our
country and also in the UN, and that is that the only time Iraq
gets attention is when Saddam creates a crisis.
If people knew
how many weapons UNSCOM inspectors have exposed, they would
understand why this is so important.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O, 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
We may need to talk again several times over the
next week, but I won't bother you unless I have to. We will
have to work together on this.
~
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, absolutely right. And the more that
can be done to publicize the work that UNSCOM has done over the
last six years, the better. )e1
The President:
Did you see Netanyahu in London?
Prime Minister Blair:
~
Yes, I did.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I know what you mean.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
I will sen
meetings, I'm not sure
over the weekend.
+et
Let's
in touch
The President:
Thank you for the meeting and the time you spent
with Hillary.
She just loved it. It looked like it was very
successful.
(U)
CONTIDE1H:' IAL
�4
COHFI DENT IAL
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, it was great.
form. All right then, all the best.
(U)
The President:
Okay, I will talk to you later.
Prime Minister Blair:
Goodbye.
(U)
End of Conversation
CmJFIDEH'i'IAL
She was in fantastic
Bye-bye.
(U)
�CONFTDEN'fIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O.13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 12
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: George Chastain, Tony
Campanella, James Smith, Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
December 9, 1997, 3:19-3:24 p.m. EST
The Map Room
Tony?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hi, Bill.
How are you doing?
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
(U)
Fine, how are you?
(U)
The President:
I'm doing great. I know it's later there, but I
wanted to check in with you.
I've been on the phone a lot the
last three or four days.
I think we've made a lot of progress
in Kyoto and John Prescott has been very helpful. We have made
quite an effort to come to a common posjtion, and I've
1""------,
authorized our negotiators to show more flexibility.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
to move to the European position on
based on some variation of the proposal
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
They're getting closer.
If we can get all the
big I Annex I countri es to agree, mC' ·jb<:o~· get the developing
cOtqFI DElffIAL
Reason:
1.S(d)
Declassify On::
�LUNtO'!UtN IIAL
CONFIDEN'fI:AL
2
countries to do more.
They agree on joint implementation
projects, but they're still resisting Article 10~
They seem to
think that we'll coerce them into joining. fe1'
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Really?
in~Jrmation than I do.
You may have more up to date
y6
~
" Prime - Minis"ter Blair: /
'------~/
The President:
That's pretty good.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes, we will get a lot of abuse, and I'm going
to get a lot of abuse at home. And I can't get it ratified
unless we get commitments under Article 10 from developing
countries. ;e1
Prime Minister Blair:
I
~
'-------~/
The President:
I do, too. We have one more day, and maybe we
can talk tomorrow, if we need to. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I
I agree with that.
Prime Minister Blair:
~
I hope it is okay. /
I
CONFI DEN'3'IAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
�3
CONFIElEH'fIAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Thank you.
This is good news.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I
l'he President:
Pr~me
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Me, too . ..J,12r
Minister Blair:
The president:
Fine.
Is everything fine
~ith
you?
IU)
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Okay, I will try to find out exactly what
is happening on Kyoto and we can talk again tomorrow if there is
(U)
a continuing problem.
The President: Okay, I'll be available.
Goodbye, my friend.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Okay, goodbye.
(U)
End of Conversation
GONFI DEW!' IJlcL
Let's bring it horne.
�,-.--- .. ----... ~---...", ... ,,---,---.---.
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 13
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
CONFI DEN'f' IAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
PART I C'I PANTS :
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
James Smith, George Chastain,
Bonnie Glick, Tom Crowell, Larry Wright,
Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
January 27, 1998, 10:30 - 10:41 a.m. EST
The Oval Office
Hello
Prime Minister Blair: Hello
The President:
Tony!
Prime Minister Blair:
about you.
How are you doing?
Bill!
I'm doing fine, and I'm thinking
The President:
I'm doing alright, I'm slogging on.
i t ' l l be alright.
I think
Prime Minister Blair:
I just wanted to say that anything that
You have my 100
you want me to do or say, I'm happy to do.
percent support, and Cherie sends her love.
The President: When you're here, we can talk about it. One or
two things might actually make a difference, and we will talk
about it.
Prime Minister Blair:
Well, anything you want, we'll do it.
The President:
I wanted to talk to you a little bit about Iraq
and Northern Ireland.
I E.O. 13526, section I.4( d) I
�~. ".,
. CONl!"IVI!:M"fIAL
2
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I really appreciate your saying that.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
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3
Prime Minister Blair:
I agree with that.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I generally agree with that, but there's not a
lot of time left, we waited a long time, until the end of the
Muslim holy period.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b )(d)
The President: /
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
I
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Ok.
Prime Minister Blair:
this? ...RJ
(U)
What is your sense about the timing of
The President:
It's going to take a couple of weeks to get
together, but not much longer. I would imagine we will be ready
to move with it not.J.,o;.ng__ ii!l.~t~H?-ybll'-r~ner::e~, .~
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Prime Minister Blair:
it when .. ,(Z) .
So we should have a chance to talk about
The President: We are on an open line, so I will have Sandy get
with your 2eo~le. ~
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
r------------------~
~
Prime Minister Blair, /
The President:
violence? -tet
Where are we on Northern Ireland, Loyalist
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
right? j.e}
So we need to work to keep them from doing that,
Prime Minister Blair:
The President
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
�5
CO~TFIDENT IAL
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: Well, I worked like hell on the Middle East last
week, but I didn't get very far. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
.
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Thank you so much for what you said.
little about it when you arrive. ye(
Prime Minister Blair:
Bill.
The President:
Yes.
Anyway, we're thinking of you,
Take care man.
Prime Minister Blair:
OK, bye.
End of Conversation
CONFIDEN'fIAL
We'll talk a
�SEeKEr
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Tony Blair, Prime Minister of
the United Kingdom
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
The Vice President
Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State
Samuel Berger, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Donald K. Bandler, Special Assistant to the
President and Senior Director for European
Affairs, Notetaker
Tony Blair, Prime Minister
John Holmes, Principal Private Secretary to
the Prime Minister
John Sawers, Notetaker
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
February 5, 1998, 11:00 a.m.-12:40 p.m.
Oval Office
The President: We're off to a good start, Tony. Shall we turn
to Northern Ireland? How do you see the prospects for peace and
how can I help?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)( d)
The President:
I agree, and some others do as well, but not
everyone thinks the ceasefire,w~~~LUL--LUL~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~,
SECRET
Reason:
1.5 (el)
,
Declassify On:; .
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O.13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
IS CAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 14
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
�2
SECRE'3'
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
Samuel Berger: Your efforts to develop the equality agenda seem
to us a key in the effort to keep the Republicans in the
process.
V1
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I agree. We will continue our contacts and
dialogue with Sinn Fein.
I also intend to keep seeing Trimble
and the other key Unionist leaders when they come to town.
Y21
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Thank you again for your continuing help on this critical
dimension of the peace process.
(U)
The President: Let's turn now to Iraq.
after your trip, Madeleine?
(rU)
Secretary Albright:
The trip worked rather well.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
SECRE'f
What is your assessment
�SECRET
3
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
The President:
I agree that their willingness to open eight
sites is interesting and offers some hope that our approach
could lead to an acceptable formula.' ~.
Samuel Berger:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Yes, that might be acceptable if a few political
people were there in addition to the essential UNSCOM team. ~
Secretary Albright:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4( d)
SECRET
�4
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4( d) I
Samuel Berger:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
The Vice President:
In the meantime, we are getting new
pressures, especially from Capitol Hill, to go after Saddam's
head.
l21
The President:
That's right, Tony, and you just heard our press
making exactly that point. But that approach is nowhere near as
simple as it sounds on the surface. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
That's what is working and will work.
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4( d)
SECRE'f'
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�SECRET
5
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
SECRE'F
�SECRE'l'
6
Prime Minister Blair: Our public opinion is not the same as
yours, but we are working hard to educate the public. We put
out a white paper yesterday on Iraq's WMD programs.
(U)
The President:
I heard it is an outstanding document.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: We have to educate international opinion
so they see the real threat and choices we face.
(U)
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
, Secretary Albright:
panicky reaction.
If we doa white paper, it could create a
~
The President:
But such a paper could also give us a margin of
maneuver.
It would show how much UNSCOM has accomplished in
reducing his stocks and capacity -- but not his future
potential. .J..!Cf'
Secretary Albright:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4( d)
The President:
AI, what do you think?
The Vice President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4( d)
:3ECRET
(U)
�aECRET
7
E.O. 13526, section lA(b)( d)
SECRET
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as part of the materials in this appeal because it could not be
found.
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9
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
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I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
End of Conversation
SECRE!
�COMPIDEN'I'IAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: K.C. Brown, Cindy Lawrence,
Anthony Campanella, Joel Schrader and James
Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
February 16, 1998, 5:14 - 5:41 p.m. EST
Camp David, Maryland
The President:
Hello?
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
Hi, Bill.
(U)
The President:
Hey, Tony.
I saw you on the Prime Minister's
question time on C-SPAN yesterday.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
What a treat for you!
(U)
The President:
You got one hateful comment on Iraq from one of
your back benchers, and one hit you on welfare reform.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
It doesn't much matter which row they
come from, they're very often stingers.
(U)
The President:
here.
J..e1
It kind of reminds me of Paul Wellstone over
Prime Minister Blair: Well you know, it is from a very usual
suspect. On Iraq, they are pretty good on the whole so it
doesn't much matter. So you watched? What did you think of my
opposite number there?
~
The President:
I didn't see him. I only saw the last 10
(Z)
minutes of you answering questions.
CONFIDEN'l'IAL
Classified by:
.
Glyn T. Davies
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CONFIDENTIAL
Prime Minister Blair:
It is the sort of thing you would do
really well, but frankly I could do without it every Wednesday .
.-ter
The President:
Well they just replayed it on C-SPAN last night.
So, how are you doing? }e1
Prime Minister Blair:
I'm doing fine.
We have two big problems
to take care of at the moment: Northern Ireland and Iraq.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Yeah. He was very good.
told me to and he was very good. +&r'
I called him after you
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section lA(b)(d)
The President:
You're doing right. Absolutely right.
I'll
support you on this. Even our Irish guys have been great.
Kennedy and Dodd say there is no choice and they promised to get
in touch with Adams to say [gap]. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
CONFIDENTIAL
�3
CONFIDENTIAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Let's hope they behave while they are out.
That's the key, isn't it? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I agree with that. On Iraq, I just talked to
Sandy Berger. We have an agreed upon proposal to take to Kofi
Annan about how to do this. The Russians keep saying... can you
wait a second? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Taking care of Buddy are you?
(U)
The President:
Yes, he's got to go outside.
I have a door
right here.
I will let him out. (Pause)
Sorry. Hillary is at
another place working. We are not together. We're at Camp
David. Here's the problem we all have to watch. Because of
European public opinion and Arab public opinion, we don't want
to look blood thirsty and have to go the last mile. Saddam
needs a face saver. Kofi Annan would love to go in and save the
day, which is fine with me. The problem from my point of view
is, we can give them some sort of change in appearance here on
how to deal with the presidential palaces but it can't undermine
the integrity of the inspections and turn it from a professional
process to fundamentally a political one. We are trying to
arrive at language, whereby they open Presidential sites to
UNSCOM but palaces would be treated differently. Palaces would
be open to diplomats and political personages.
I think we are
agreed, at least that is what Sandy said. Apparently the actual
palaces would be subject to UNSCOM and then Annan could name
diplomats to go with them. But if you take UNSCOM out of the
decision making and let Annan make all the decisions, the
pressures on him would be enormous for a different standard.
Annan is talking about taking Ekeus with him. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
He's Swedish, right?
(U)
The President: Yes. He was Butler's predecessor. He's now the
ambassador to the United States as fate would have it. But that
CONFH)ENTIAL
�4
COHFIDENTIAL
might not be all bad, even though Ekeus is viewed as softer than
Butler because he didn't put heat on the presidential sites.
The truth is Ekeus was there at the beginning and he had so damn
much work ,to do on other places that it was an acceptable
compromise at the time. He wasn't really at the point because,
he was full up on other sites.
It might work out all right. My,
worst nightmare is being isolated because we can't agree to
something that looks perfectly all right on the surface. We
simply have to insist on technically qualified inspectors.
Look, I wouldn't know a chemical lab from a football field.
We
have a good opening position but the trouble is there is no
place to go after the opening. You and I have to work closely
together on this.
I called King Hassan and had a long talk with
him. He has been a good friend of the United States and of
mine.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I told him to go to
Saddam, call him and tell him that I have no interest in killing
him or hunting him down.
I'm not fooling with him.
I just
don't want his chemical and biological program going forward.
By the way, the memo you put out on the web is phenomenally
successful. But you must know that.
Everybody wants it.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:
I agree.
~
Prime Minister Blair: My view, very clearly indeed, is that the
bottom line all the way through is that the inspectors have got
to be able to do their job uninhibited.
I don't care who
accompanies the inspectors provided they are not interfering
with the inspectors.
That doesn't trouble me.
~
The President:
CONFIDEN'fIAL
I agree.
(U)
�CONFIDENl'IAb
5
Prime Minister Blair: Where Saddam is at the moment is that he
will let us in to the presidential sites, but onl once and
Annan into the presidential palaces.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
It puts him in a terrible position.
It looks
good to him because he gets to be a peacemaker and the real
issues are technical. Let me go back to the history a bit. The
history is that UNSCOM originally was set up answerable to the
Security Council and not to him, and he doesn't particularly
like that. There was a working group and an oversight board.
But there is a permanent staff at UNSCOM.
The real problem is,
for example, that if it were put under the Secretary General and
out from under UNSCOM, all decisions would come to him:
it
would be up to him to determine which site to inspect, where and
when.
They would have to go back to him and he would decide
when the files got closed, and which sites need future
monitoring. What we tried to do is say, look we don't want to
make those decisions either. We only care that independent,
making the inspections.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4 d
Politically, the idea of letting these
inspectors decide when to inspect and where to inspect and when
to close files and which sites most likely require future
monitoring is very important. You can dress it up in a lot of
different ways. Our opening position, which Sandy said your
guys signed off on, we can take to Kofi and the French and the
Russians, but then what? It is hard to think of a fallback
position if the French and Russians push us on this.
I have
enormous regard for Kofi Annan.
I think he is a heck of a man,
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
a
ave oun out dealing with this is that most
people, even in our own country, have not thought much about the
facts of chemical and biological weapons and how little space it
takes to produce them and their capacity for delivering this
stuff now.
That is what basically concerns me. They say in the
Middle East we are hypocrites. They say there are others who
CONFIDEH'fIAL
�CONFIDEN'l'IAL
6
have this, they say the Israelis, but no one else has shown a
willingness to use them or share them with anyone else. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
tell me this because I don't quite understand it, where is
Saddam Hussein on this, where does he corne down on this? My
people have been unable to tell me. ~
The President: . We. don't know either. The only outstanding
issue is who is in charge of the presidential site inspections.
He even tried to get Newt Gingrich to bring a congressional
delegation to the presidential sites. Newt was smart enough to
-know that one site has nearly 100 buildings that could be
warehousing these chemicals, labs, and stuff.
t€t
Prime Minister Blair:
A huge complex.
~
The President:
On biological agents, you hardly need a room the
size of a photographer's darkroom to do it. 121
Prime Minister Blair: That's right.
Is he now saying the only
outstanding issue is not the presidential sites but simply who
authorizes inspections? +e1
The President:
It is my understanding ... I've had so damn many
conversations today, I am not sure I remember.
I'm not sure I
know the answer on monitoring and corning back again. My
understanding is what he says is the outstanding issue is who
gets to come into the presidential sites. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Sites or palaces?
Jef
The President:
Both, I think. He has a higher standard for
palaces than sites, but he is basically saying he will let
someone corne in and look at both categories.
;zi
Prime Minister Blair:
I
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
The President:
Yes and basically he thinks Kofi will be
responsive to political pressures if he does that and will take
us off line.
Saddam thinks Butler is a stooge of America, but
hell, I never even talk to Butler. He is a tough guy and I like
what he is doing.
I've reached the conclusion after eliminating
CONFIDEN'F Hili
�CONFI DEN'fIAL
7
all possible alternatives that Saddam still has the makings of a
chemical and biological program he doesn't want to give up.
+et
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Yes.
I'm
and will call you back to
together on this.
If our
he wants Kofi to make all
construct a good argument
I
looking at some other things we can do
talk about it. We'll need to stay
two staffs are together and if he says
of the calls, then we need to
why that is not a good thing.
ker
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Je1
Awful.
Prime Minister Blair:
I
E.O.13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
L -_ _~~~~~~~~~~_ _ _ _~
The President:
I am going to talk to him tomorrow-or maybe
tonight.
If I get any clUe, I'll let you know. Listen Tony,
what's the most direct contact you have had with Iraq since
1991? For instance, has the British Foreign Minister talked to
Tariq Aziz?
.JRf
Prime Minister Blair:
I honestly don't know.
check and get back to you. Jer
I'll have to
The President:
If I weren't constrained by the press, I would
pick up the phone and call the son of a bitch. But that is such
a heavy-laden decision in America.
I can't do that and I don't
think you can. ..J..e"}
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
CONFIDENTIAL
�8
CONFIDENI IAL
'Phe PresidepL:
I agree.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
~
Prime Minister Blair:J
The President:
I can't tell you how critical it is.
It costs
us a hell of a lot of money to do all this moving around we are
. doing, not counting the political costs. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: Agree, but I will have a hard time selling
anything here short of military action, but I can do that if I
~
know it is real.
IPrime Minister Blair,
The President:
~
I
Can't allow that.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
CONFI DEN'3'IAL
I can't agree more.
~
�,
CONFIDEN'f'IAL
9
-
Prime Minister Blair:
If we stay in close contact tomorrow,
when will we send him off to Baghdad? ~
The President:
I don't know. He wants to go Wednesday or
Thursday.
I will let you know. Let's keep in close touch on
this.
If you want to talk about this, I don't care if you get
me up in the middle of the night if you want to. There is
hardly anything more important. le1
Pr-ime Minister Blair:
If I have more thoughts tomorrow, I'll
just give you a call, shall I? ~
The President:
Yes, I'm not doing much more.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay.
Goodbye.
Goodbye, Bill, all the best.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
CONFIDENTIAL
ke1
(u)
�CONi luCNT AL
COHFIDEN1'IAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telecon with British Prime Minister Blair
PARTICIPANTS:
President Clinton
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Larry Wright, Tony Campanella,
Bob Ford, Tom Crowell, Jim Smith, Peter
Huggins
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
FEBRUARY 12, 1998, 4:05 - 4:20 p.m. EST Oval
Office
Hello?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi Bill.
Hey.
Prime Minister Blair:
How are you?
The President: All right. We had a wonderful time with you
here.
I hope you enjoyed it half as much as we did.
Prime Minister Blair: We had an absolutely fantastic time.
especially enjoyed Friday night and Saturday morning.
We
The President: You've turned me into an icon for everyone at
the State dinner.
Prime Minister Blair: We had a great time. We are so pleased
at all the time you and Hillary spent with us; we really enjoyed
it.
I hope it wasn't too fraught or difficult for you.
The president: Everything is going okay from what we can see
here; we had a great time and wanted to thank you for that.
Prime Minister Blair:
Bill, I have a problem now.
CONFIDE~lTIAL
Reason:
1.5 ( b , e D . .
. '
DeclaSS2fy On,
~ '"'-.-
..._~_~
._--' .-:-...;.-- -
-:-"
02/~tlJ~!1~t:J
,
�tONFIDEN':FL"rL
The President:
2
I know you do.
Prime Minister Blair: I spoke with Bertie Ahern this evening
and here is how the land lies. There have been two murders
carried out.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
President Clinton:
What were they thinking about?
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
CONFIDEN'fIAL
�3
CONFIDENTIAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b )( d)
President Clinton:
they?
They haven't protested their innocence, have
Prime Minister Blair: /
~
~---~
President Clinton: What are they thinking?
is payback for what happened before?
Do you think this
Prime Minister Blair:~r__________________________________________~
President Clinton:
Within the IRA?
Prime Minister Blair:
President Clinton:
ever you do?
Can you get Bertie to go along with what
Prime Minister Blair: /
COHFIDEN'fIAL
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
�CONE IDEN'fIAL
4
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
President Clinton:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I The only thing
we've done so far, because we thought it would be what you
wanted, is we got in touch with Sinn Fein and told them they
have to make a statement and have the IRA make a statement.
Prime-Minister Blair:
President Clinton:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
We have said that.
I want to do whatever I
can to be helpful, really helpful, it's important for me to keep
this thing going. I don't want to get in the position of you
and me against Ireland. I want some influence over those
people ...
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
President Clinton: Let me call him. Give me one more chance to
hit these people, to get them to make a tough statement because
you can't be caught in the middle of this:
you are in a hell of
a pickle.
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
President Clinton: Me too. It's so damned stupid unless they
have a spli t between them and their bad guys ...
CONFI DENT L'tL
�eONPI DEN9:' IAL
5
Prime Minister Blair: IIE.o.13526, section IH(b)(d)
President Clinton: ... and their.bad guys got out of hand and
their good guys don't think they have the strength to kick them
publicly.
It doesn't make a lick of sense.
Prime Minister Blair:
President Clinton:
are lucky
No, I agree with that.
You are the best friend they have and they
there.
This is so stupid,
this.
Let me get
in touch wLth Bertie and we'll get back together.
I want to do
·it in a way that's possible to keep this going.
Prime Minister Blair:
I just want to tell
ou Bill.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)( d)
President Clinton:
I agree.
Let me get on this and we will be
back in touch.
I am really sorry Tony this happened to you.
Prime Minister Blair:
the way through this.
President Clinton:
Well, there have been ups and downs all
We just have to make sure this works.
Thanks, man.
Prime Minister Blair:
Let's get back in touch.
End of Conversation
COlqPIDEH'f TAL
�3E C!<:E 'I'
THE: WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Peter Huggins, Bonnie Glick,
Tom Crowell, Lawrence Butler, Gwenyth
Todd and Joe Marty
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
February 22, 1998, 1:15 - 1:26 p.m. EST
The Residence
Hello?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hello Bill.
Fine, thank you.
How are you?
(U)
Have you talked to Kofi?
Prime Minister Blair:
I talked to him
toda. He said he was going to call me.
~
but not
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The Pr"esident: Well, I'll tell you what I heard.
a little intelli ence this morning.
We picked up
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
to wait.
Now I don't know all the facts, we just have
The main thing I wanted to say is that it is really
�2
important to stay in close contact and stay determined on this.
1'&)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: All I got is secondhand rumor. All Madeleine
has is a cryptic call saying all the elements are in place. Who
knows what that means? ~
Prime Minister Blair: . Who does Butler work under anyway?
·The President:
He works for the Security Council.
the Security Council.
1G1
UNSCOM is
I E.O. 13526, section IA(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
I totally agree with that.
The President:
This is twice he's done this.·
again, it's our fault, not his. Jer
ke1
If it happens
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Here's the thing. We need to make sure, in
fairness to him and to us, we need to make sure we are speaking
in the same terminology. CNN had some damn fool of a reporter
saying these sites are smaller than I had led the American
public to believe.
If you're talking about the palaces, that's
one thing.
If you are talking about the grounds, that is quite
another.
If we ask Kofi to revisit where someone is living,
some house with a lab in the basement that's one thing. But
some of those sites have a hundred warehouse-sized buildings.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
£ECRET
I
�SECRET
3
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: We have got to have another resolution so we
don't have to go through this again. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O.13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Well, if Kofi calls you before me, call me.
if he calls me, I will contact you.
I am just going to be
hanging around here today_
(~
And
Prime Minister Blair:
I have to travel for 45 minutes today,
but other than that I am in Chequers or Downing Street. You're
at Camp David? ~
The President:
No, I stayed at the White House this weekend
because I think this thing is going to break. OK, we're totally
agreed on this situation, then, how do you feel on this Northern
Ireland thing?
tet
SECRET
�SECRE'l:'
4
KO. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Adams is not coming here, which is good news.
--<-e-J
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I'll do that.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I want to work with you.
I don't want to
undercut you.
I'm pleased. Youfre doing well so far, we will
just stay in touch. This Iraqi thing might break in the next
six hours. -te1'""
Prime Minister Blair:
whatever time...
(e)
The President:
Alright.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Bill, obviously itfs earlier for you, but
(U)
Goodbye.
Thank you.
(U)
Goodbye friend.
-- End of Conversation --
SECRE'P
(U)
�C ONFI DENT L"rL
THE: WH ITE HOUSE:
WASnl~GTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 18
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
Peter Huggins, Torn Crowell,
Jeff Rathke, Lawrence Butler and Gwenyth
Todd
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
February 22, 1998, 4:38 - 4:49 p.m. EST
The Residence
Hi, Tony.
prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hi, Bill.
You're faint.
Can you hear me now?
(U)
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I've spoken with Kofi and I gather he's
spoken to Madeleine as well.
~
The President:
Yeah.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
But I'm not sure.
detail?
Have you been able to glean any more
-k-e"}
The President:
Well, I haven't.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4( d)
�2
CONFI DEN'fIAL
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Yeah, I don't think he wanted to talk on the
phone, and our guys are guessing on it, too. i€t
Prime Minister Blair:
,The Preside'nt:
sure. -teT-
I
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
Well, I hope he hasn't either, but I'm just not
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I
e Just have to wait and see what
happens.
If there is another violation we need to seriously
consider funding opposition groups and giving whatever help we
can and just cut the umbilical cord. +er
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Yeah, and it's weird, because Kofi is not coming
back until Tuesday.
It's going to leak. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
It's bound to.
ke1
The President:, It would put poor old Butler in a terrible
situation. Madeleine talked to him today, but couldn't say
much. We don't want him to spout off without knowing what kind
of deal it is. --+er
Prime Minister Blair:
bloke is he? teT
The President:
Prime Minister Blair:
of him? .fE7
~
C~IFIP£H'I'L'\L
I've never come across him.
What kind of
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
Madeleine couldn't get the details out
�CONFIDEN'fIAL
The President:
3
No, she doesn't know much more than
[ E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
He said he's going to have a press
conference tomorrow morning. What's he going to say then?
The President: We don't know.
I think
tomorrow morning that he has a'deal but
about it until he comes back and briefs
in Paris and give Chirac his plane back
What else can I tell you? I just don't
Prime Minister Blair:
Paris? l€1
The President:
he's going to say
he can't really talk
us. Then he will stop
and come on over here.
know.
~
And there's no one he's going to see in
Yeah, no.
Prime Minister Blair:
Y21
~
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Yep, it's a very tenuous situation, and maybe
when he gets to Paris, we can figure something out.
It's a
really raw deal to sit for a day and a half, not knowing what
the deal is.
fCT
Prime Minister Blair:
If he just lands and takes off again ...
-f€t"
The President:
I don't know, I just heard he will stop in Paris
and then fly on to New York City.
~
Prime Minister Blair: He may say he won't talk or speak to
anybody, but on the other hand, we have got to know what is
happening.
(-eJ
The President:
Yeah.
(U)
Prime Minister
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
CONPIDENTIAL
�eONFI15EM'fIAL
4
The President:
That's what I worry about -- I talked to
Madeleine and Sandy before I talked to you. Let me see what I
can find out -- they think it can work if it is strictly
administered by Kofi, but we need to know what Butler's going to
say about it.
J,.e1
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
]
Prime Minister Blair:
_
The President: Apparently he did that, but maybe Kofi gets to
decide who goes back, and when. ~
Prime Minister Blair: /
The President:
Yep, uh-huh.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yep, but if we can't get it, we have to say what
we were going to say anyway.
(0
Prime Minister Blair:
I think we'd better get working on that
right away.
I hate being in this position for the next thirtysix hours.
~
The President:
That's really bad. Let me call my crowd back
and see what they say, what we can work out.
I don't like being
in this position. -+etPrime Minister Blair:
I can try to contact Kofi and tell him
that when he gets to Paris he needs to call us right away, that
we really need to know what is going on.
I think I will try
that. -fer
The President:
Okay.
~
)
L-________________- - - - - - Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yep.
(U)
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
CONFIDEN'PIAL
�5
cmlFIDEN'PIAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister Blair: Bill, I'll get John Weston to start
working On the Security Council thing right away.
I'll try to find out some more from Baghdad.
The President:
Okay.
And in the meantime,
)k1
(U)
:_I___________________________________
_iL_p_r_i_m_e__
M_i_n_i_s_t_e_r B_l_a_l_.r
__
__
The President:
Yeah.
----~:J
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
It's a curious way of doing business.
(C)
The President:
Yes, it's a weird deal.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: That bothers me. Kofi's wait gives him a chance
to spin it, and I don't like that. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I
~
'--------~
The President: Yes, Madeleine does.
there, too. ;ef
Prime Minister Blair:
I
I'll see what we can do
~
L I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
- - - - - - - - - -
The President:
Yeah.
(U)
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister Blair: Okay. Right, Bill--I am here all night
if you need to get a hold of me... f€t
CONFIDEH'PIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
The President:
6
I'll do it.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I
Alright.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Thank you.
(U)
Thanks, Bill.
(U)
End of Conversation
COHFI Dg~IT L1\d,
�CONP1DEN'PL"rL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHLNGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
IS CAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 19
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Pat O'Shaughnessy, Bonnie
Glick, Tom Crowell, Jeff Rathke, Lawrence
Butler and Don Bandler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
February 23, 1998, 8:57 - 9:12 a.m. EST
The Residence
Hello?
Prime Minister Blair:
we, then?
(U)
(U)
Hi, Bill, how are you doing?
The President:
Let me tell you what I
document.
First of all, the ood thin
How stand
been told about the
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I think we
have to study this document and listen carefully to what Kofi
says tomorrow.
je}
.
It is important that the commission rush a group of qualified
experts -- I think that we have to test the agreement soon. You
know, we have to get whatever the agreement is:
show up at one
of these sites and start looking around.
I'd like to do it
before I have to move the whole U.S~ Navy around again. Now,
COHFI DEN'l' 1M
Classified by:
Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (bi; d) - _ ;;..ri,---_ ~~sr'-' ~~~ .----~--------"',.
Declassify On:! 2/~80 - . _ ]
; __-<~ .-'~:r~~ LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY ).
.<?:..~::,-::;~-::~ __._,,_~ . c-';';:;";~_~"-' "->""..::___ ~ __/:;~-';'/
�eOMFIBEM'I'IAL
2
Baghdad has done this before with weapons of mass destruction.
-+et-"
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
First of all, you need to get this thing and look at it. What I
would like is to be in a position in the next two or three hours
to talk to Yeltsin and Chirac. ~
I want to compliment Kofi and say we understand they have agreed
to free and unfettered access,
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
You guys get this document. He is going to make it
widely available in an hour. Let's go through it. ~
[ E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
CONn DEH'I'IAL
�CONFIDEU'fIAL
3
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Exactly, my view is that we may have another
twenty-four to thirty-six hours of word wrangling.
We just have
to see. )Q1
- Prime- Minis-ter Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Well, apparently, he has some leeway over how
the UN structures itself for this special team. He has to know
that we want this done correctl , we don't want this to be a
bunch of olitical B.S.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
We very much hope this will work out.
approach.
That's my
-ret
Prime Minister Blair:
are you, Bill? ~
You're going to say something publicly,
The President:
I'm not going to say anything for three or four
hours -- I may not be able to, but I'm going to try.
The trick
is to embrace the effort, pocket his commitment, and thank Kofi
for getting it, and he has never done this before.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
or four hours,
gOlng
flesh
Prime Minister Blair:
I agree with that.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
CONFIDEN'3'IAL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
three
�4
CONFIDEN'fIAL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Tony, I don't know the answer to that.
We
haven't studied the agreement closely, and Kofi isn't here, so
.we can' t cail him. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
No one has spoken to Kofi?
~
The President: He told me he'd call me from Paris.
I don't
know if he will or not.
I talked to him late last night.
You
know, he clearly thinks he has a good deal, the question is
whether his definition of a good deal is the same as ours. Jef
Pr ime Minis ter Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:
You and I don't want to rain on it, because if
we hadn't been tough, we wouldn't have had the damned deal. We
can't completely embrace it until we see the details.
We don't
want to be in the position of buying a pig in a poke and then
say, "Holy cow -- we don't know what happened to it." ket
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Absolutely.
message is, "Yes, if." ~
Sandy says we ought to say our
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
CONFIDEN'fIAL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
�5
eONPIDEN'FIAL
I E.O. 13526, section IA( d)
Prime Miniiter Blair:
I
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
That's why I just have to leave everyone where
they are, because we have to have a test.
I have to leave our
troops in place. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
We're having a vigorous agreement here.· Any
time in the next two hours you want to talk, after you have seen
it, let me know.
)4
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I wish you would.
I understand Yeltsin can take
my call in one hour. Chirac said he can't take my call for twoand-a-half hours.
That's a long time. He called here earlier,
while I was still in bed, and said he didn't want them to wake
me.
I don't think it's evasion, I think it's just the schedule.
It may be better not to talk to them right away. You get the
document and parse it a little, and see if there are any holes
in the road.
I'll try to call you before I talk to Yeltsin and
Chirac. Otherwise, I'll just talk to Yeltsin. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The moment I get the document I will look
at it carefully. And we can talk later. je1
The President:
Goodbye.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
Thanks, bye.
(U)
End of Conversation
GONFIDaFfIAL
�CON FI DEN'fIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 20
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: James Smith, Pat O'Shaughnessy,
Tom Crowell, Bonnie Glick, Jeff Rathke,
Nancy McEldowney, Rexon Ryu
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
February 23, 1998, 12:28-12:42 p.m. EST
The Oval Office
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi, Bill.
(U)
Tony, how are you?
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
Fine, I'm fine.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Hold on.
Here's one, go on.
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
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E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Who's the commissioner?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I couldn't agree more. We believe he'll appoint
a guy with technical expertise, who will have credibility with
Butler, but it certainly needs to be. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O.13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I couldn't agree more. You've identified the
same things I'm worried about. Sandy suggested a
which
is quite good; our position on this shoul b to
and
test. We need to clarif , then test.
[ E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
CONFIDENTIPrL
Yes, I agree with that entirely.
;ef
�3
COl>TFI DEN'FIAI:;
The President:
One thing that we thought of doing, is to get
Butler back in the ballgame, because we don't want him out; Kofi
is supposed to consult with Butler and the head of the IAEA, and
presumably that will keep him from underminin the inte rit .
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
he can get a team In there until
What is today, the 23 rd , so that's
He doesn't think he can get a good team in
there, but I think that having someone say, "we're UNSCOM and we
want to check the Ministry of Defense" would be a good way to
check in a hurry.
te1
~rime ~inis~er Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:
I understand. We need to ask all these
questions, but no matter how good his answers, we need an early
test.
kcJ
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President: It will take me a few weeks to withdraw troops
from the Gulf, so we will sit tight.
I think we need to test,
as you said, test under 4 but also 5, because there are
sensitive sites that aren't presidential sites. Also it will
take longer under Para 4 to get started.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
I think that is right.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Has
anyone spoken to Kofi?
The President:
I spoke to him last night at 8:30 my time, which
was 4:30 his time. He was a little groggy, but he wanted to
demonstrate to us that the agreement would fully meet the P-5
instructions he took to Baghdad.
I said that's great, but at
that time I hadn't seen the agreement. He promised to call me
when he got to Paris.
I don't know if he's in Paris, but I
CONFI DEN'l'IAL
�COHFIDEH'FIAL
4
understood that he did not want to talk in enormous detail over
Iraqi phones. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
No, quite smart.
~
The President: Now, let me tell you some good news,
potentially.
I spoke with Yeltsin, and went over m concerns,
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
.Prime -Minister Blair:
The President:
That's pretty good.
That's pretty damn good.
.(.e-)-
Jer
The President: My relationship with Yeltsin is such that all
his hard-liners believe I could talk to Yeltsin and get him to
sell the oil wells for three dollars and a half, but that's not
true.
He's just more far-sighted and progressive than they are.
Half the time they go to work on him, and I have no doubt that
they'll make some effort to undermine this. He was quick and
unambiguous, and one thing about Yeltsin, he doesn't like for
people to take advantage of him.
If Saddam Hussein doesn't do
it, Yeltsin would take it as a personal insult to him.
I think
he wants to do right, so if he can stay hitched,
rea y e leve
a s
have that he'll observe the agreement.
If you talk to Yeltsin,
I would appreciate it if you would reinforce this. ~.
Prime Minister Blair: I
The President:
with me,
to.
13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
II tel
You should say you've talked to me and you agree
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair: Absolutely right.
spoken to Chirac, Bill? Aer
Did you say you've
The President:
I'll talk to him after I talk to you . And i f I
get anything, I may talk to you after I talk to him. .....(-e1
CONFIDEN'f'IlW
�i
5
CONI"IDEM'fIAL
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b )(d)
(C)
The President:
That's it, you got it.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Thanks.
~
Okay, Bill, let's keep in touch.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
CCMFIDEN'l'IAL
~
�cmrFI DEf<l''f IAt
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Bonnie Glick, Tom Crowell,
Joel Schrader, Jeff Rathke, James Smith
and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
March 9, 1998, 5:38 - 6:05 p.m. EST
The Oval Office
The President:
Tony?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Great.
(U)
Hi, Bill.
How are you?
(U)
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Bill, I'm sorry to trouble you.
There
are a couple of things I wanted to discuss with ou.
First of
all, the Middle East Peace Process.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Let me tell you where we are and we may be able
to do something together. You mean you have aid to facilitate
some of these things? ~
COHFIDEN'P IAL
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Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
about it.
Let me tell
ou where we are and then we'll talk
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I think they're really ready to go now on the airport and the
industrial park, but they keep messing around with each other.
I think they're afraid, each for different reasons, to go ahead.
I had to put this off until the Iraq thing was resolved,
temporarily, at least. What I'd like to do is give them this
proposal and coordinate with you.
Part of the proposal is that
we want them to go ahead and finish the industrial park and get
on to safe passage. +er
Prime Minister Blair:
proposal? -t€t-
When do you think you will put forth your
The President: As soon as I can.
two weeks.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
This month; within the next
Right.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Arafat is afraid to take a redeployment now and
go to final status talks without a guaranteed third one; my view
is he can always make a final deal, and more is better than
less. ..(..et
CONn DEN'fIAL
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.
:
3
CONFI DENT IAL
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I think there might be a way to do that. What
I'd like to do ... if I could give them the overall proposal
first, then we could get together and put this to them.
I think
if we could coordinate that way, it would give them a way to get
started on it. By putting more money on the table, it would
create a
if they're looking for a reason -- an excuse to go
forward, it would be good. k€1
Prime Minister Blair: Right. You reckon you will put your
proposal forward in the next couple of weeks? ~
The President:
Absolutely.
j€f
Prime Minister Blair: Some sort of redeployment package
including the other issues as well? Jer
The President:
Yes.
fer
Prime Minister Blair:
Then we could help by having some sort of
quadrilateral summit afterwards. 1e1
The President:
Yes.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Yes. We're ready to go back to them and I think
we have some chance of getting them to move.
~
cmlFImmTIAL
�CONPIDEH'PIAL
4
Prime Minister Blair:
I'm set to go to the Middle East in
April, early April. Obviously it would help to have something
fairly concrete up and running before then.
(~
The President:
We'll have something by then.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: We had a good day yesterday.
They were able to
go into the Ministry of Defense and get some records out which I
am hopeful will resolve something one way or another.
The fact
that ~hey ~ere able to get into ministry buildings is a real
reaffirmation of UNSCOM's ability to fulfill the understanding
Kofi says they got. Now we have to continue to test compliance
on sensitive sites, which will happen near the end of the month,
but my own view is we should leave our forces there to monitor
compliance and keep the integrity of UNSCOM strong.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
~~I~E~.~O~.1_3~52~6~,s~e~ct~io_n_l~.4~(b.)(~d~)__~1 ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes, I thought we ought to fight if off. My own
view is that Saddam got what he asked and we got what we asked
for, and not to politicize UNSCOM.
~
,--_____--'7
-J/
L -______________________________
The President:
Jer
Yes.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
~
Absolutely.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
That's right.
~
J
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d),
I
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The President:
So far I'm feeling pretty good about it.
keeping my fingers crossed. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I
I'm
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b )( d)
The President: Oh yeah.
I saw him.
I'll call him
few days. He doesn't want me to make this
the next
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
be down. ...(..e1""
They're really down, and they've got reason to
Prime Minister Blair:
I think the Palestinians are coupling
redeployment with some of these other issues. By all means, if
you guys in the United states can put together a big package,
that's fine.
Since we have so much aid tied up in this, we
should try to move on smaller stuff, as well.
~
The President:
I couldn't a ree more.
move on all three things.
I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
leaded for a
ear to
I
Let us put our proposal to them and let's see if we can get
together and meet and we can push ahead. That can give them the
boost to move to permanent status talks.
s,e1
Prime Minister Blair: Right, okay, Bill, just one other thing
on Northern Ireland. ...(-e1""'
The President:
Where are we on that?
Prime Minister Blair:
~
We're getting along, basically.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
�l..;L:;
'~j"
'u "- 1 ,I,''i_
•
t','
CONFIDENTIAL
6
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)( d)
The President:
You do?
~
Prime Minister Blair: /
~------------------~I
The President:
We'll do that.
Prime Minister Blair:
them all.
Mo's coming too, isn't she?
Yeah, I think she is.
~
So you can see
The President:
Let me ask you this: have you gotten a good
reaction to Straw's extradition decision?
»cr
Prime Minister Blair: Yeah, I mean we got a good reaction in
certain quarters
as usual, it was a good reaction in certain
quarters and not so ood in others and that's 'ust the wa it
is.
The President:
I will do my best to bang their heads together
and caution them on good conduct, but attacks are likely to come
from quarters none of us can control.
J,.e)
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
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COHFIDEN'fIAL
;
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7
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
You really think you can go back to the original
timeframe and get something done by May?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes, I do.
ke1
When will the referendum be?
Prime Minister Blair:
In May.
The President:
fCl
.~
When?
ke(
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:
Then they think they'll get a bigger turnout for
their referendum, too? ;ef
Prime Minister Blair:
A bit of that,
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
So there it is, really, Bill.
just have to keep pushing on . ....(.eY
We
The President: Alright. We'll be in touch. We'll coordinate
with your people on the peace process in the next two weeks,
we'll hang around in Iraq to see what happens, and I'll do what
you ask on St. Patrick's Day. That's just a week from tomorrow.
I'll report back if I hear anything interesting. )Q1
Prime Minister Blair:
COI?lFIDENTIAL
Yeah, okay.
~
�CONf'IDEN''fIAL
The President:
How are you doing?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President;
along. -ter
(U)
I'm fine, actually.
(U)
It looks like your economy's still pumping
Prime Minister Blair:
It is, I remember you telling me once
that once the guys start coming in with good news, there are
other guys telling you that it's not good news. ~
The President:
Wall Street used to go down every time the
·economy would grow. Now it doesn't go down as much, now that
there's been such a long period without inflation.
I think if
you have the same experience, then soon investors and ordinary
folks begin to agree, and that's good news.
There's a guy at
Stanford who is an economist, and who COincidentally is the son
of DNC Chairman Roy Roemer. He's a bit of a libertarian, but he
argues that in the technological era, in countries with open
markets, the constraints of the business cycle have been
considerably loosened, and you can grow more and longer. All of
us are essentially underestimating productivity and the most
important economic policy is not to limit the ability of
technology to prod the economy.
;e1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Well, I hope to goodness he's right.
Me, too.
~
~
Prime Minister Blair: We keep looking across the Atlantic
hoping it will happen . .-JRr
The President:
Well, I think it will.
I think it's coming to
you, and unemployment is way down, and you've got to stick with
it. ..{.e-jPrime Minister Blair: We have a very tough battle ahead on
welfare, there are a lot of things to do there.
~
The President:
you? jQ1'
Are the Tories going to vote against you or with
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)( d)
COHFIDEN'PIAL
�9
C ONFI DEt<f'f lAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: And with the parliamentary system, it really
pays off.
If I could have waited another year for elections,
I'd still have a majority.
I think you're doing the right
thing:
as long as you have the muscle and juice, go ahead and
go. ;e{ ..
Prime Minister Blair: Well that's what I reckon.
are testing this theory to destruction!
~
The President:
Ha!
Birmingham.
ke1
You'll be alright.
Anyway, we
I'm looking forward to
Prime Minister Blair: Well, that'll be great.
forward to having you.
Is Hillary well? ~
We are looking
The President:
She's great. You need to decide, we all do, if
anything would be served by me going to Ireland after
Birmingham. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
We'll know that in the next few weeks, if
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
It is a mess.
-+er
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1A(b)(d)
COMFIDEN''f'IAL
�10
CONFI DEN'FIl'rL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
. Yes, alright.
Prime Minister Blair:
Well I'll see you soon.
Okay, Bill.
All the best.
End of Conversation --
CONP ID'EH'fIAL
(U)
(U)
�SECRE'P
!i2v
THE WHITE HOUSE
WA.'" 1-1 ,"-, "TO N
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
KO. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 22
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
Peter Huggins, Sean Rice,
Tony Campanella, Jim Smith and Lawrence
Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
March 20, 1998, 5:18 - 5:50 p.m. EST
The Residence
Tony. How are you?
Prime Minister Blair:
day in Germany.
(U)
The President:
Fine, thank you very much.
Where are you in Germany, Berlin?
Prime Minister Blair:
Bonn.
(U)
The President:
(U)
I went to see Helmut Kohl.
I like Bonn.
Prime Minister Blair:
I spent the
(U)
I went to
It's a sweet little town.
I like i t as well.
(U)
The President: What is your take on the elections and on
Schroeder? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
f5"!
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
(U)
�~.-
....
\~"'.: ~.-. ~
5ECRE'l'
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Yeah, he's a wonderful man.
)81
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
That's interesting, but remember, Tony, he was
18 points down in the last election, but I'm afraid in this last
term they haven't been able to restore any growth. He looked
good in the beginning.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
£ECRET
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
�3EC~El'
The President:
3
Scharping?
Prime M.inister Blair:
The President:
Prime Minister
~
Yes, Scharping.
I
¢
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
~B11~ali~r~:~=;~;=;i~~~~~~~~~~============~~
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)( d) I
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
~hat kept us going in 1992.
~
That is
Prime Minister Blair: There was a sort of buzz about the place.
We .had a good time. Bill, thanks for everything you've done on
Ireland.
(.21
The President:
J.&'r
I tried to do exactly what you asked me to do.
Prime Minister Blair:
can't tell you how much.
ou did. I dee 1
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime·Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
bECRET
reciated it.
I
�SECRET
§ECRE'F
4
The President:
I tried to use public and private meetings.
met with all of them. Well almost all of them.
I
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d)
Prime Minister
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b )(d)
The President:
I see something else relevant in my observation
·of the Middle East, and Bosnia where we sent in an occupying
army.
If we didn't, the peace would have led to more violence.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d
One problem is there are always enemies of peace out
there. The people that killed Rabin and blew up the bombs knew
exactly what they were doing. They were each other's best
friends. As part of this peace deal, we have to make the deal
first, but you have to have someone you trust thinking about the
next steps.
It is not too soon to start thinking about what you
want me to do and speculate what kind of outbursts or problems
you envision in the next few years.
I am prepared to make
whatever reasonable investment I can.
I'm worried that some
enemy of peace will gum it up, stop the investment coming in
there and torment people . . You have to have somebody thinking
about it, someone you trust but who's not involved: don't take
your eye off the ball. Churchill and Roosevelt were thinking
about the UN in 1943 and 1944. It's not too soon to start
thinking about this. J21
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
1 E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
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Prime Minist.er Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
When are you off to Africa,
Bill ?
JZl
The President:
Sunday.
Prime Minister Blair:
We're very excited.
(U)
It's quite a big trip.
(U)
The President:
Yes, for the United States. No American
president has even been to Africa. Carter went to Nigeria and
Liberia and Roosevelt and Reagan stopped over there.
It's
unconscionable what we. haven't done in Africa.
(C)
Prime Minister Blair:
I think it's a fascinating continent.
I'm really excited for you.
(U)
The President:
Keep your fingers crossed.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: All the best to you.
I see you have been
defeating your enemies as usual. Keep it up. ~
The President:
They've got a lot of money out there to get
people to say a lot of stuff. We're doing extremely well, but
it's a weird way to live.
~
Prime Minister Blair: We'll talk more the next time we meet.
Every time we see another one fall, we cheer.
~
The President:
Take care, man.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
Okay, Bill and lots of love to Hillary.
(U)
The President:
Okay.
(U)
End of Conversation --
£EGRE'P
�3ECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION S.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 23
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Peter Huggins, Anthony
Sampanella, Robert Ford, Karen Harris and
Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
AprilS, 1998, 2:08 - 2:24 p.m. EDT
The Residence
Hey Tony.
How are you?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I'm fine, absolutely fine. You had a
successful trip over there. The crowd scenes were amazing.
(U)
The President: Unbelievable! It was my first time. We really
had a great time. We did some things that most people don't do
in South Africa. We got into the townships and little villages.
They were very good.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
It looked fantastic.
You really made an
impact on them.
It was a big boost to those countries. I t will
(U)
be a bigger boost to the people than to the government.
The President:
Well, I hope so.
How are we doing in Ireland?
-tet
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O.13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
3ECRET
�2
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Is there anything else that you want me to do?
.-fCf
Prime Minister Blair:
I don't think at the moment.
-+G+
The President:
I had a good round on Saint Patrick's Day.
really got to know each of them. ~
I
Prime Minister Blair: ri===================~------------------~
The President:
There is something else I would like to discuss:
the meeting I had with Mandela when Bandar magically showed up .
....f-B-r
II
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
E.O.13526,section1.4(b)(d)
I
I knew him before I became President.
I
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Yes, I agree with that.
We need to know things;
1~________________-tl=E~.O~.~1~35=2=6,~s=ec:t=io=n~l=.4~(d~)~I____________________~I~)
Prime Minister Blair:
II E.O.13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
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The President:
That's my theory.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
~
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
When are you going out there'?
Prime Minister Blair:
...(-et"
I'm going in a couple of weeks time.
~
The President:
ah good. By then we should have a clear path on
what to do by then. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:
Good.
Prime Minister I:lair:
The President:
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It's touch and go all the time.
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Let me know i f you want me to do anything.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay.
Good.
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I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
))21".
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Prime Minister Blair:
bye.
(U)
The President:
Bye.
Alright, Bill.
~ay
hello to Hillary,
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
SECRE'f
�3EeRE'!'
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 24
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Tony
Blair, (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
Peter Huggins, Joseph Wright,
James Smith, Anthony Campanella and Robert
Ford
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
April 24, 1998, 11:36-11:52 a.m.
The Oval Office
Hello.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
EDT
(U)
Hi, Bill.
Hello, Tony.
(U)
How are you?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Fine. Bill, I thought we should have a
word to bring you up to date on Northern Ireland and the Middle
~~~--~==~~~~~
I East. I
I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
Yeah, I saw some of Trimble's guys made a big
show when you voted. )Qf
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I wonder if there is anything I can do from this
end.
I will have some announcements when I go to Birmingham;
there are a number of things we can do, even if they don't want
me to go to Ireland.
One of the things we could do is have
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Bertie come down to Birmingham and make a 10 to 15 minute
presentation to the G-B, and you and I could go out and make
some statements that there are some goodies on the horizon.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
In terms of my going there, I have no feelings
at all on it.
I just want to win the vote.
This thing could be
a parochial vote and those unionists could say, "this is our
lives and our futures, we have to decide." .k81"
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Why don't we do an informal poll at the end of
the first week in May, see where the undecided voters are by
religion, and see if that would help.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Good.
Prime Minister Blair: /
.(.G-1-
~------------~I
I
The President:
It's a weird world, isn't it?
J81
Prime Minister Blair:
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Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
here. -ter
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
If you want to talk more about it, I will be
Prime Minister Blair:
Ireland. -+er
Thanks again, you were a real
he~p
with
The President:
It will be a great victory.
You know, it will
be interesting to see where the splits are between the
Protestants and Catholics.
I know you must have someone up
there working the polls. We ought to be able to calibrate
everything.
The important thing is just to win the referendum.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:· This thing is bigger than foreign policy.
You're better at campaigning than the rest of them and have a
more sophisticated insight; you should just treat it like
another election and do whatever is necessary to win the
election. ..(-e1"
Prime Minister Blair:
to Hillary.· (U)
The President:
Bye.
Right.
Thanks Bill, all the best.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
SECRET
Love
�cmlFIDENTIlrL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(UP
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Sean Rice, James Smith, David
Higgins, Marianna Papadimitriou, Jeffrey
Rathke
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
May 8, 1998, 1:50 - 2:12 p.m.
Dover, Delaware
The President:
Tony?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hi, Bill.
How are you?
(U)
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I'm fine.
I'm great, I'm just, actually,L---------in my local workman's club doing constituent surgery in county
Durham.
(U)
The President:
Are you in Durham?
I love the Durham Cathedral.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I just came out of a bar where the old
blokes were telling me about their troubles; from that to you.
(U)
The President:
Good for you.
Prime Minister Blair:
I
love Durham.
Did you come here?
(U)
(U)
The President:
I did.
I liked it so well I brought Hillary
back to see the cathedral and walk around the town.
I took her
to York and Durham on one of our trips.
(U)
COHFI DEN'I'IAL
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Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
1.5(b(d)
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2
Prime Minister Blair: Oh, well.
I was a choirboy at the
cathedral in Durham, if you can believe that.
(U)
'The President:
You still have that choirboy look.
Prime Minister Blair:
How are you doing?
(U)
(U)
The President:
I'm doing wonderful.
I'm looking forward to
being with you.
I'm glad you and Major went up there together.
It was good.
(U)
Prime -Minister Blair:
The President:
Yeah, I hope it helped.
You know it did help some.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Yes.
right to take the decision you did.
I know Jim
there and took the temperature of the unionist
I
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
(U)
was
I
The President:
I think they didn't want to give Paisley and his
crowd a new pretext -- "that's the guy that gave Gerry Adams a
visa and broke the eggs," and all that stuff. j.Q-'(
Prime Minister Blair:
That's true, but it's the right decision
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I'd like that. We released a few things
yesterday that we will do, and maybe we could pony it up some.
,ke)
Prime Minister Blair:
this thin and runnin
Yes, well, I'm now taking a real grip
i t like a oli tical
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: So you think we ought to do some sort of joint
announcement while we are there?
~
COH"FIDEN'FIAL
�3
cmIFIDEH'f IAL
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, I think if we can do that
comin down to one point.
it's all
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The president:
And they can't be in government if they don't ...
.JKf
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
It wouldn't just be me, but it would mess them
up here in America. Almost all Irish guys here, including guys
who gave them money under questionable circumstances, would bail
out on them if the vote went positive and if they reneged.
You'd see major abandonment of them by Irish-Americans. That's
something they can't afford. They know they can't.
I'm not so
worried anymore -- I was worried some of the IRA offshoots might
take action against Gerry, but the mainstream crowd knows they
can't violate the agreement or the Americans will go berserk on
them. ..keJ
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, I think for that to be said is very
important. That's reassuring. ~
The President: That's the only reason I wanted to go.
under the illusion that all those Protestants love me.
Prime Minister Blair:
I was keen
I'm not
()21
Well, you're absolutely right, that's why
�~E~.O~.~1~35~2~6~,s~ec~t=io=n~1~.4~(b~)~(d~)~I________________~I
L I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
The President:
If we say it in Birmingham, it might still have
enough echo to get there.
fer
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, I agree.
It certainly would. And
the stuff you've been saying today, or someone in the White
House has been saying today, about money and investment -there's something leading the news now about that. ~
The President:
That's something we put out yesterday.
kef
Prime Minister Blair:
It shows you, though, that anything you
say will be carried and given prominence. What Paisley keeps
CONFIDENTIAL
�4
COWFIDEN'HA::b
doing is putting out posters saying that Gerry Adams will be
Minister of Health.
E.O.13526,section1.4(b)(d)
I Jj2f
I I
The President:
The old guy is good.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
What will the vote be?
Prime Minister Blair:
(C)
Sinn Fein, you mean?
~
The President: Will three-quarters of Sinn Fein vote for the
referendum?
j,.ef
Prime Minister Blair:
I don't know.
I suspect yes, about that .
.ke!
The President:
It seems like a pro forma thing.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I don't think Gerry Adams would say he'll
win the vote unless he is going to win the vote. So I think it
will be pretty resounding. They're prepared to lose some of
their folks.
Prisoners is a big issue for them.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I agree with that. Yesterday, I had a group in
to see me that I think is called WAVE.
It's a group of victims
who lost children, brothers, and parents. They were mostly, but
CONFIDENTIAL
�5
CONFIlSEN'fIAL
not entirely, Protestants. A group that really wants the IRA to
decommission.
They're a militant peace group.
They want to
deal with thousands of people in their inner and physical pain.
I agree with you. ~
We've all taken our licks for Gerry, so if they want a role in
the government, they have got to have some demonstration of good
faith on this violence issue.
These women gave me an idea
yesterday. Your people could vet it for practicality. Maybe
you and Bertie and I could ask for it. ~
They say that there is a some relatively small number of people,
like 2D -- people in the police or otherwise hated by the IRA,
whose remains have never been recovered.
They say if there's
not immediate decommissioning, right after the vote, if you
could work out the legalities so that people would not be
prosecuted and the IRA could somehow direct people to the
remains, so their families could give them a sanctified burial,
that would have a huge psychological impact over there.
I told
them I'd try to help, but I'd talk to you about it. They don't
want vengeance, they just want their people back.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
will. )ef
Yeah, I think that would be good.
I
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
look into that \
The President:
Yeah, I think that's a great idea, we'11
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
I will do it,
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
CONFIDEN'PIAL
I
�CONFIDEl1''l?IM
6
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
I
~
~--------------~
The President:
Yes, it could give them some breathing space .
....(.ef"
Prime Minister Blair:
Okay, I'll look into that, Bill.
~
The President:
In terms of you and me making another economic
statement, I will do whatever you think is best for the vote.
If you want to do it in Birmingham or down in London.
yc(
'Prime Minister Blair: Well, I think there are two sorts of
stories from your angle: one is investments; the other is a firm
message to the IRA. ~
The President:
I'm glad to do that, too.
Prime Minister Blair:
very good.
.(R)
J€f
I think those two in combination would be
The President: See, by the time I get there, we are only a week
from the vote.
So it probably is good to do it sooner rather
than later so it does not seem like some desperate election
move.
tet
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I'll have our guys get in touch with you. Maybe
we could do two separate announcements -- a Sinn Fein one and an
economic one. You organize it, and I will read whatever script
you want me to read. .+eI
~
~
Prime Minister Blair:!
L - - - - -_
_
_
The President:
That's all it is. What did you make of
Netanyahu? Madeleine said you were very good.
J£1
Prime Minister Blair:/
COHFIDEN'FIlrL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
�7
CONFIDEN'fIAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I spent a lot of time with him in the last year.
After Madeleine's first session, I thought he was a hard
negotiator and not a no-negotiator.
Then he called and asked
Dennis to come over, and I thought that was a good sign. And
now Dennis is there and his spokesman put out a statement saying
he is not coming Monday. I never thought he would, but I
thought he would come once I got back from Europe.
I don't know
yet what's going on, but I may want to call you again once I
find out. Je}
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
be a place where we could do a reverse goo
Europe could bump him a little harder.
ket
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President; .. .And then it vanishes.
CONFIDEN'fL"iL
}e1
This may
cop, where
�COMFIDEH'fIAL
8
Prime Minister Blair:
It vanishes. ~
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
But, when I see you, we can wor
on It more.
Prime Minister Blair: Yeah, well I'll do the same.
pretty regularly at the moment.
He calls me
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
"The President:
You know they will.
)R1'
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
That's exactly where the Israelis are.
percent of them want that.
(e)
Eighty
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:
Okay.
Prime Minister Blair:
comes". -\-&r
The President:
Aef
~
We'll stay in touch and talk when the G-8
I agree.
You just let me know what you want.
Prime Minister Blair: And, as ever, many thanks for all your
help. Love to Hillary.
(U)
The President:
CONFIDENT lAL
Yes.
(U)
�9
CONFIDENTIAL
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Bye.
Yes, goodbye.
(U)
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
COHFIDEN'3'IAL
�tONFIDElif'i'IAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 26
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Tony
Blair (C)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Larry Wright, Bonnie Glick, Pat
O'Shaughnessy, James Smith, Peter Huggins,
Jenny McGee, Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
May 21, 1998, 4:31 - 4:42 p.m. EDT
The Oval Office
The President:
Tony?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hi, Bill.
How are you doing?
Prime Minister Blair:
Fine, fine.
hours in Northern Ireland.
(U)
The President:
(U)
(U)
I just spent the last 48
I hear it is turning around a little bit.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I think so. I did a complete blitz of
the place, really. Every single kind of radio show, TV show,
audience participation program -- sort of a two-day election
campaign.
It's coming around a bit.
(U)
The President:
I did a radio Bpot yesterday that they are
replaying today.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4 b d
The President:
What were the best lines?
;z1
CONFIDEN'fIAL
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
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2
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
He has come along, hasn't he?
JWf
Prime Minister Blair: Yes. They had a U2 concert last night
that was great.
Instead of having speeches, Bono told them to
"have a minute of silence for the victims, which was very clever .
..(..G7-
The President: He's a smart man. I met him by accident in 1992
in Chicago, he helped me out and we've stayed in touch ever
since. He's a very smart man. ~
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, we'll have to keep our fingers
crossed. Thanks for what ou did last weekend' it
tremendousl helpful;
The President: Good.
I've just been thinking about you.
I
couldn't think of anything else. I did a big plug for it during
a NATO expansion event.
I talked about Indonesia and Northern
Ireland at our NATO expansion ratification event. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
It has
layed ver
well here.
The President: Yes, but you have to follow the locals. You've
done all you can.
I was glad to see in my morning intelligence
that there is movement in the polls your way.
I think the
undecided may break your way. +&r
Prime Minister Blair:
It is possible.
I
But it sure was the
I literally have spent the last 48 hours
L-~______________________________________~I
right thing to advise.
cmlFIDEN'l:'IAL
I E.O. 13526, section l.4{b)(d)
�3
CONFIDEN'FL"<L
there blitzing the place, everywhere, doing everything.
I
stayed on longer today to visit a hospital, visit a regiment,
saw the police, did a walk-about in the street. And as I got
back into my car, the last person's hand I shook was
(indistinct) McCartney.
~
The President:
Paul McCartney?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
The President:
No, Bob McCartney.
That's great.
Prime Minister Blair:
.J!2:'J
(Y1'
fer
He started haranguing me.
Did he really?
j.C1-
fer
Prime Minister Blair: Yes. And after I left, he accused some
of the people around of being a rent-a-mob for us.
This old
lady turned on him and gave him a real'earwigging on television.
She said that she was out to vote Yes and that she was not
anyone's rent-a-mob.
She thought he was
disgrace. J.:ei
a
The President: Sometimes, something like that can be more of a
benefit than anything else.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
Let's keep our fingers crossed.
Put it
this way:
last weekend it was well that we did what we did.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
COHFIDEN'FIAL
�4
C'ONFIDEN'fIAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Well, let me tell you also that Hillary and I
had a wonderful time at Chequers.
It was wonderful for us.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Oh Bill, I can't tell you how great it
was to have you. And for the kids, Euan's friend went back to
school the next day in a daze.
I told my people that it was a
real tribute to you that you were prepared to sit down and spend
·time with them in that way. We loved having you and had a great
time, we really did.
(U)
The President: Even in the darkest days back in '94 and early
'95, when people thought we were finished, you can always spend
time with kids and you'll never know how you'll have an impact
on a young person that will change everything for them. A
little extra time is the best investment you can make.
Besides
that, it's interesting for me.
And in the work we do, you can
lose contact with people younger than you. A year'younger is a
year younger than you.
You don't even think about it, and then
you turn around and find out it's been a year since you've
.talked to anyone who is 25.
I liked it:
they were delightful
young men.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Yeah, I'm glad you did.
are still on cloud nine.
(U)
For them, they
The President:
You ought to be proud of yourself. You've done
every damn thing you COUld. When the vote happens, we'll be on
pins and needles over here.
I guess we should know something by
mid-day our time tomorrow. What kind of vote counting operation
do they have over there? lei
Prime Minister Blair: Well, this is Northern Ireland.
Everything is done differently.
They won't start counting until
Saturday morning. We will know Saturday afternoon some time.
(C)
The President:
They will do exit polls, won't they?
yef
Prime Minister Blair:
In Northern Ireland, they've never done
an exit poll.
But you can never tell.
If you are in the wrong
part of town, you'll get completely skewed results.
I think we
~~~~~~~~~~--
CONFIDENTIAL
�5
ce)HFI DEN'? IM
will know by this time tomorrow evening. We will let you know,
and when the result comes through, let's just hope it is the
right one .. ---f.€-r
The President:
thing.
(C)
Well, keep your chin up.
Prime Minister Blair:
All right.
You did the right
(U)
The President: Okay, you've done a heck of a job turning this
thing around.
Take care my friend.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
Alright, Bill.
The President:
a
We had
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
great time.
(U)
(U)
We had a great time too.
Goodbye.
(U)
'-- End of Conversation --
CONFIDEN:fIAL
!
Goodbye.
(U)
�GOJ?rFr'DE~JT IAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Tony
Blair ~
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: David Higgins, Sean Rice,
George Chastain, Joel Schrader and
Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
May 23, 1998, 1:36
1:46 p.m. EDT
Camp David, Maryland
Tony?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hi Bill.
(U)
Well, congratulations.
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes, thank goodness.
The President:
You got 71 percent.
Protestant vote was yet?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
(U)
Do you know what the
I think it was 55 percent.
(U)
The President:
Do you think it was as high as that? I just
talked to Trimble and he was still moaning about the vote. He
sounded upbeat but he said he lost in his constituency.
jQ1
Prime Minister Blair: Overall, the most accurate poll was 55
percent. Yes, it was about five percent of the nationalist vote
that went no as well,so that brought figures down a bit. ~
The President:
I just did the math and it seems the vote is 53
percent of the nationalists and 49 percent for the Unionists.
Is that about right? ).G1'
emU'I ElENl'IAL
Classified by:
Glyn T. Davies
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CON'FIDEN'PIFtL
Prime Minister Blair: Roughly, possibly a little higher on the
Unionist side but they reckoned that probably about five or six
percent of the non-Unionist voted "No" so that brought the
figure down.
Of the 28 or 29 percent, that will probably bring
it down to about 24 percent or 23 percent. The Unionists voted
"No" 23 percent, see what I mean? It probably means just the
majority of the Unionists went with the resolution. ke1
The President:
That is great though.
God, it's great.
I'm so
happy.
You must be ecstatic. You turned all those undecided
¢)
voters -- almost 100 percent.
Prime Minister Blair: Again, a million thanks for what you did.
It began with the interview on Sunday.
From then on it began to
turn. We were at one point considerably behind, although we
were looking at under 60 percent. Jeffery Donaldson, who is a
reasonable part of the no vote, is on TV now saying he wants to
work with Trimble now. ~
The President:
I don't think Paisley can maintain the level of
support. You are going to have a significant share of those
people from the 25-30 percent who think the thing ought to be
given a chance to go, and that will give you three out of four,
or four out of five of the Unionist voters who want to see
peace. -tel
The process will play out -- but we ought to get Gerry and his
crowd to do a thing or two to get this off on a good footing.
He's going to be hereon Thursday for reasons unrelated to me to
make some speeches. But he always seems to pop into the White
House.
If you want to have your guys tell us in the next three.
or four days what you want me to say I would appreciate it.
(~
Prime Minister Blair:
Are you going to see him yourself?
JGr
The President:
I don't know.
I was just calling to
congratulate a few of the guys and he told me about it.
I have
to check my schedule on whether I see him or not but we can
always have the message delivered. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
CONFIDEN'f'IAL
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�'CONF'IDEN'I'IAL
The President:
shouldn't he?
3
He ought to chunk in some weapons pretty soon,
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President: Yes, let me ask you something else. We had a
group touring the United states and I met with them for 10-15
minutes. I am embarrassed that I can't remember their name -- I
think maybe it was Waves. It was a group who had relatives
killed. I think it would help if the IRA indicated where the
remains are -- without exposing them. Would that help? Is
there some way to do that without exposing them to criminal
l i ab i l i t y? J.e1'
Prime Minister Blair:
Sure.
(U)
The President: If by Wednesday somebody can call Sandy or
Steinberg to let me know what kind of presentation I can make to
them if they tell where remains are and that they would not be
subject to criminal prosecution. That's a human touch that
might have a big psychological impact -- differentiate them from
the IRA. ...(..e-J
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
CONFIDENTIAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I will get right on that.
Je1
�4
€OHFI DENT HlcL
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:
I'll hammer it hard.
I thought if I can advance
a specific agenda -- I will work on getting a Sinn Fein person
to work on decommissioning. You just let me know if I can say
to him, "I want you to tell where those remains are and whoever
tells won't be subj ect to criminal liability." ~
Prime Minister Blair: Okay, I will get someone to come back to
your guys in the next few days.
~
The President:
Have a great celebration.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I offered him a helluva deal to see if he will
do it.
I scraped together every penny, every pop gun I could in
72 hours.
I still think there is "a chance he won't do it.
f/2:)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
All right Bill, all the best.
Goodbye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
CONFI DENT lAL
(U)
�CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
PRESIDENT CLINTON
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
LOCATION:
EAST HAMPTON, NEW YORK
NOTE TAKERS:
LARRY WRIGHT, TOM CROWELL, MATT SIBLEY, JOEL
SCHRADER, JAMES SMITH, STEVE SIMON
DATEmME:
31 JULY 1998/1609-1642 EDT
THE PRESIDENT: Tony?
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Hi, Bill.
THE PRESIDENT: Hey, how are you?
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: I'm looking forward to my holiday. I start tomorrow. I've been
reshuffling my cabinet this week.
THE PRESIDENT: You have? Who'd you change?
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Quite a loti
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I'm doing fine. How are things with youl;;?;---L......;;;;';';;;';;";:;;;====-';;';";':";;':';=...J......_-_....J
THE PRESIDENT: Good.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: I'm really looking forward to your visit to Ireland.
THE PRESIDENT: We are trying to work out the final schedule. You and Cherie are
coming up to see us, we'll be there together, right?
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: That is right. We're still trying -we came through the
Drumcree situation, got through a terrible thing. The tragedy of the kidsc-THE PRESIDENT: It sobered them up though, didn't it?
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Yes, it did. We still have a lot of problems.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
,
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E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
THE PRESIDENT: Let me tell you where we are. We are having terrible trouble with
Janet Reno. I think the FBI must be working on her. If you know anything about this
Starr business, you know law enforcement agencies are not really under direction of the
President. What she is saying is that this is coddling terrorists and making concessions
to get a trial. That is a policy statement and not her call, and I can disagree. Then she
raised all these questions as to whether it was legally sufficient. If you say there is no
British or Scottish objection to the character or legality of the trial, it is your law; it's not
our judgment to make. What I am trying to get her to do is give me an opinion saying
she disagrees as a matter of policy, but Justice can find no fault from the point of view of
the law. Then I think we are OK.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Ri ht.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b (d)
THE PRESIDENT: You got it. That is where I am trying to go.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
THE PRESIDENT:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Bill, a cou Ie of other things. Kosovo.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
THE PRESIDENT: I agree.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR:
I
.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
i·
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3
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
THE. PRESIDENT: The KLA has put us in a tough position.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Yes.
fr,
==E;.::::O=.1::::3::::5:;:26=,=se=c=ti=on=1=.=4(:;:b=)(::::d)::::;------,
THE PRESIDENT: Alright.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: One other thing, on the Middle East peace process.
THE PRESIDENT: It's ve
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Right. Good. OK, Bill.
THE PRESIDENT: What else do you know?
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Not much. I can't wait to go on holiday. I have got the flu this
week and am a bit under the weather. Basically, I'm fine and looking forward to my
holiday. But I have reshuffled my cabinet and done my spending plan. We will have an
economic downturn this next year, and we have to be careful about that. I called Stan
Greenberg today.
THE PRESIDENT: Yeah?
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Yes, he did some polling for us.
THE PRESIDENT: You know, the funny thing is our growth was down to 1.4 percent this
quarter. It was 5.4 percent last quarter, but we lost ~ painton the GM strike and a full
point off the Asian downturn already. We have got to do something about Japan. I am
very discouraged about what Obuchi and Miyazawa have said. Miyazawa, when he was
Prime Minister, he was already about 72 or 68.
PRIME MINISTE,R BLAIR:
,
I E.O. 13526, section l.P}{4:-k
.~ . . ~:·~~~~~RAR1'PBbTbCOPY· ;~;:;
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THE PRESIDENT:
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d)
What they are worried about is not being
able to stimulate growth in their economy with tax cuts because they put these curlicues
in them and people in Japan take the money and save it, because they don't think they
are permanent or adequate. They think if they do all this bank restructuring, in the
absence of increased demand and demand for exports, a" it will do is just contract the
economy and further deflation. What we have to do is try to work with them to get the
necessary mix. I have been prepared to eat lower growth this year just to sop up some
of their exports so they wouldn't go down, but this whole thing is going to slow what I
think would be a boom in Europe and it is going to brake our expansion unless we can
turn Japan around. I don't think there is enough money to move Asia there
. independently, without Japan coming back in Indonesia and all the other places. I just
don't see it.
L...,--_--,-_ _ _ _---,_--:_ _ _ _ _- '
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: What do you think we have to do?
THE PRESIDENT: What we have to do is find a way to be supportive of them without
pushing, nudging them along and not humiliating them so they don't hunker down and
turn inward. It's a funny little balance we have to strike but we need a coherent strategy.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b) d)
but if I get an opening may press 1m an may e
ca you an w
something. We have to get the Europeans involved. What's going on in Germany?
Schroeder is going to win isn't he?
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: I think so.
THE PRESIDENT: Is Stan polling for Schroeder?
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: I think he's doing some work along those lines.
THE PRESIDENT: When I was there before I didn't see any --I think Kohl is where
Churchill was at the end of World War II: the people are grateful but ready for a change.
PRIME MINSITER BLAIR: "'=E=.=O=.1=3=52=6=,=se=ct=io=n=l=.4=(b=)(=d=): : : ; - - - - - - - - - l
,THE PRESIDENT:!
. -_ _hIE~.~O~.~13~5~2~6,~s~ec~ti~o~n~1.~4~(d~)~_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~I'
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR:
!
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)td)
�CONFJDENTML
5
THE PRESIDENT: How long has Helmut been in, 16 years? That's a hell of a long
time.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: That's right.
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
THE PRESIDENT: Very clever.
RIME MIN ISTER BLlAR: IrI=E=.=O=.1=3=52=6=,=se=ct=io=n=l=.4=(b=)=( :::;--------1
d=)
THE PRESIDENT: If the vote is close enough, he should do that. I still think Netanyahu
would have been better off doing that.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Me, too.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
THE PRESIDENT: You ought to tell him what I told you.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: I agree with you. Just today we had the announcement of
job losses here as a result of Asia. It's the first time it's been brought home.
THE PRESIDENT: I am really very concerned about it. The first place it hit us was in
agriculture. We export about half our grain and about 40 percent goes to Asia and we
are down 30 percent this year.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Gee. Thirty percent.
THE PRESIDENT: And we can't get new markets because of bumper crops and the
. climate change caused by el Nino. I think with 1.4 percent growth, unemployment will go
up a little. I just don't see any set of scenarios where we do better unless we get Japan
turned around. I would guess that you're seeing increased flows to Latin America like we
are. Thank God for Latin America, they are doing quite well.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Absolutely right.
PRESIDENT CLINTON:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
PRIME MINISTE~ BLAIR:,I!10pe~t.,..... _~<=-----='-",:'.'i'
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6
THE PRESIDENT: Anyway, I think our first order of business should be to deal with the
Japanese government. The Chinese are hanging in there and have not devalued, but
their target was revised downward. I feel I they will hang in there several more months.
There is a limit to the pounding they can take, expectations have been raised. You can
see, it is so palpable, they are proud as hell they have stayed strong and have not had to
devalue. But at some point, they'll have a hard time hanging on. I think the quicker we
could have some sort of EU-US initiative - This was this huge real estate boom, but the
Japanese stock market lost 50 percent of its value in the last five years. We're just not
getting any reinvestment in growth. The way they have done all tax changes to date,
people are saving the money, and they're spending all this money on a world-class big
infrastructure that hasn't done anything. I know they are frustrated because, basically,
they-have taken a whole series of half-measures and it has not helped them. They have
dragged Asia down.
THE PRESIDENT: Talk to Prodi. They've been very good at working with us, by the
way. Bob Rubin sent a/l our best people over there, but their political mechanism is
inadequate.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR:
II E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
THE PRESIDENT: E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
1
I
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: "----;:=E==.=O=.==13==5=26=,=se=c=ti=on=1.=4(::::b=(==d)::::,-----i
THE PRESIDENT:
L I_ _ _
---"-I=E.=O=.=13=5=26;,=se=ct=io=n=l=.4~(d",",)='.I_ _ _.....l
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b
THE PRESIDENT: Yeah, the reform movement had a false birth under Hosokawa. Did
you ever meet him?
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: No.
THE PRESIDENT:
1
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Yes, and maybe not the last. Jospin was here last week. He
really loved his time in Washington.
�CONFIDENTIAL
DRAFT
7
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR:\-;========::::;-------~
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
THE PRESIDENT: Well, that's good. France and Brazil are two countries that have
permanent governments, for good or bad, but have inbred an anti-Americanism that
colors the atmosphere and the left in France had a lot of that, as well as the Gaullist
crowd, but! always admired the guy so much from a distance. You had a big influence
on him, too.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
THE PRESIDENT: I will follow up on Kosovo and get you a briefing on the Middle East.
It's a little more ambiguous than the last time we talked. Netanyahu has moved on some
issues and there is a chance we can break through. I didn't think he was bargaining in
good faith, but now I have seen some change and we might have a shot at it. We'll work
out Irish schedule and get the Attorney General to sign off on the legal adequacy as
soon as possible.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Again Bill, 101 percent support.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, I appreciate it, goodbye.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Goodbye.
�CONFIDEN'f'IhL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Tony Campanella, Robert Ford,
Cindy Lawrence, Sean Tarver, Matthew Sibley
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
August 6, 1998, 4:46 p.m. - 5:06 p.m. EDT
Oval Office
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi, Bill.
(U)
How are you doing? (U)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I'm fine, enjoying my holiday.
Are you in Tuscany?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
(U)
(U)
God I'm jealous.
Prime Minister Blair:
Have you been to Sienna?
We're going there next week.
The President: Oh, that is a great place.
beautiful little town?
(U)
Yes, it is.
The President: When I
four star restaurant.
sign of a fish, like a
three-hour lunch there
was there about ten years ago,
I can't remember its name, but
peace symbol, or something.
I
and they had to carry me out.
Declassify On:
i
,
(U)
(U)
Isn't that a
Prime Minister Blair:
COMFIDEN'fIAL
Reason:
1. 5 (d)
(U)
(U)
I ate at a
it had a
had a
(U)
�2
cm:rFIDE~H'IAL
Prime Minister Blair:
It's a good place to be carried out from.
(U)
Are you on holiday?
The President:
The House is here for another month, one more
day actually and so we are all working here.
I am going to go
on holiday in ten or eleven days.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Weren't you up with Steven Spielberg?
(U)
The President:
I spent the weekend up in Long Island with him.
We talked about you. He and Tom Hanks came here last month and
showed me their movie "Saving Private Ryan," about Normandy,
before it was in the theater.
It's an enormous film, really
. good.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
So you're back in your office.
(U)
The President: Yes, I'm sitting here in my office.
It's a
beautiful day outside.
I'm concerned about the Japanese
situation, really worried. But that is not why I called.
Gerhard Schroeder was here yesterday and we had a long talk.
He's apparently still leading the polls by a solid 5-8 points.
You think he is going to win don't you? kef
Prime Minister Blair:
I
The President:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
He just thinks it's time for a change?
Prime Minister Blair: Yes.
je1
You can never tell for sure.
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President: Well, you know, it's the second time we've met;
it was much more relaxed this time.
The first time was in
Germany and I was on a campaign swing for Kohl
ou can
ima ine, but we had a good talk
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
GOHFIDEH'f IAL
�COHFIDEHTIAL
3
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b )(d)
The President:
I E.O.13526, section 1.4(d) I
The longer you hang
around this business, it becomes apparent that very few people
make it this far by accident. They don't just give these jobs
away.
J.Ri
Prime Minister Blair:
Yeah, I think that's true.
(U)
The President:
I called you to talk about Kosovo.
It is
getting worse. The headlines show that, but Milosevic is going
for a military solution. Serb security forces are not only
suppressing Albanian militants, but are also engaging in a
systematic campaign against the civilian population.
I think we
are getting closer to a major humanitarian disaster. ~
Milosevic has a sense of doing this under the threshold for NATO
military response because he believes that NATO will respond
only with a UN resolution, but Russia guarantees to block it.
My view is, at a minimum, we need to make him think again. We
need to finalize planning that we started, identify forces and
think about some sort of ultimatum to get him to stop the
offensive and restore autonomy for Kosovo.
~
I believe we ought to make it clear that, while we would like to
get UN authority, we can do it without it.
I know you differ
here, and Albright talked to Cook about asking the UN Security
Council for the necessary authority.
U21
Let me tell you we are headed to a collision on Kosovo and what
is going on in Russia.
I talk to Bob Rubin about every day.
I
am still quite concerned about their economy and about the
stability of the Yeltsin government. His health is
deteriorating and a lot of noise is being made about controls on
freedoms to get order in society. ..(.e)
CONFIDEN'PIAL
�.4
CONFI DEN'I' IAL
What I'm afraid of is, if things get worse in Kosovo, a lot of
civilians will be dying and others turning into refugees.
If we
put Yeltsin into this box, he will be forced to abstain because
it is so bad and would really hurt him at home politically with
the economy the way it is, or he can keep with Primakov and veto
it and run the risk of alienating the rest of the world at the
very time he needs the most support from the international
community. While it is better to have UN support, I am very
worried about bringing this to a vote right now.
(C)
Milosevic thinks he has a free hand.
I talked to you and John
Major and I understand you have different system to decide legal
authority there.
One thing I had our guys do -- there is a
.basis:- there have been a number of cross-border incursions and
threats to international observers, which could be a trigger for
self-defense. Also, there is Milosevic's record of threat to
international peace and security and then the humanitarian
atrocities.
I think we could construct a legal case, but if I
can't convince you about it, we don't have a chance with Chirac
and Kohl. ).ef
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Let me ask you this then. Shouldn't we try to
get Chirac and Kohl to sign off on ultimatums we would give
Milosevic? Word of planning would be somewhat helpful.
Convince Chirac and Kohl that a UN resolution is not legally
necessary.
I know how Chirac is on this, but it will hurt
Yeltsin if we put him in a position of having to sign off or
block now. .J.e1
Prime Minister Blair: /
/J
[------------------The President:
We can nose around it. His economic problems
are horrible and his internal political problems are awful.
I'm
very worried about this.
Yeltsin was going to go on vacation in
COMPI DEN'I'IAL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
�COWFIDEN'fIAL
5
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
August, but then he had to come early, even though his health
needs the rest.
I am going over there and meet with him for a
few days in September, but I'm very worried about this. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I
].
'------------/
The President:
I don't know, we have to work on that.
We have
to work through another option, apart from a Security Council
resolution.
They would have to raise holy hell, but, in the
end, if we handle it in the right way, it would be the best of
three bad alternatives. Better than forcing them to veto it .
. Better than forcing him to eat it. My problem is I am afraid
what happens if we let it deteriorate more. There is a rumor,
news story, of 500 people in a mass grave.
It may not be true,
but the other side is trying to force us in, too. We have all
those problems you and I discussed before. People want us to be
their air force to get independence. But I think the near term
problem is we went through all this with the Bosnian civil war
and I don't want to replay it with another Muslim population .
..+er
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes, that is exactly what's doing it and
Primakov gave it to him. ).e1
Prime Minister Blair: /
The President:
down. Kinkel's
impact on their
basically it is
I'm going to call Helmut first and nail him
been aware of where the French are. Given the
election, but might help him electorally. But
a domestic election, so my guess is no effect.
J,e)
Prime Minister Blair:
COWFIDENTL"rL
I
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
�6
• COHFIDEHTI1'.L
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: We will nose around some more.
They may decide
to shape this and go along with us, but right now I don't see
it. ..J!Cr
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Maybe they will want to try to go along with us
on a resolution, but I doubt it. Let me mention a couple of
.other-things.
The Security Council had a discussion about Iraq
today with Kofi.
I think we have to playa measured game here.
I think this is a reaction by Iraq to the fact the IAEA says
they couldn't recommend ending the inspection regime and going
to monitoring on the nuclear issue.
~
This was a serious report that we had nothing to do with, on
very specific issues.
It could be they simply overacted, but my
instinct right now is to not come out with a bellicose reaction
at this point. We ought to be relaxed and work with the
Secretary General and focus on inspection requirements. We will
just say that we will postpone sanctions reviews until Iraq
achieves compliance. ~
Butler was very upfront.
I think the Iraqis may have been
showing a little leg about it. About every six months they try
to provoke us with their rhetoric, but they may come back. With
all these other problems in the world we should give Kofi a
chance to work through this.
If not, then we can say to hell
with them and we leave the sanctions on indefinitely. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
What about these. reviews?
~
The President:
I think they over read the IAEA refusal to
recommend ending the inspection regime and going to monitoring
on nuclear.
The IAEA said they had just a few more things to do
here.
It would have been reviewed in August for monitoring in
October but, for whatever reason, they reacted the way they did.
Now is not the time for us to overact.
They probably hope we
will do that and spend a lot of money moving the fleet back in,
but I don't want to do that right now.
We'll monitor it
closely, but, on the other hand, don't let them think they can
wish this away. ~
CONF'I DEN1'L"xL
�7
• CONFHlEN'fIAL
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I think we might, but hopefully we'll have our
course on Kosovo by then. Two other things.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I talked to'you about Lockerbie. I have the decision memo in
front of me and I will work through it as quickly as I can and
get back to you on that. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
L-----1:1=E=.O=,=1=35=2::6=,s:=ec=:ti=:o=n=1.::4(:::;b::::)(=d)"==!.._ _ _.......J1
The President:
1)
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minster Blair:
Yes.
keJ
The President: You have more riding on it than I do.
The
Scottish regime has enough restrictions as it is. Go back to
your holiday, tell Cheri I said hi, have a wonderful time, and
drink a glass of wine for me tonight. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Thanks.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
All the best to you.
(U)
We are thinking of you.
We're doing fine.
Prime Minister Blair:
Thanks Bill.
Thank you.
(U)
End of Conversation
CONFIDENTIAL
(U)
(U)
(U)
�CO!<fPIDCN'fIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Tony Blair
Notetakers: David Higgins, Tony Campanella,
George Chastain, Jenny McGee, Chris Jansen
and Ralph Sigler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:'
August 16, 1998, 7:51-8:04 p.m. EDT
The Residence
The President:
Tony?
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
Hi, Bill.
(U)
The President:
Tony. Well, I just called to tell you I was
thinking about you.
You've had a miserable day.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes, it's pretty grim.
What the hell happened?
(U)
Who did it?
Aer
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Do you believe the person who gave the warning
made a mistake or did it deliberately? )Q7
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
The truth is, we don't know.
Jer
Do you still want me to come?
CG}{fI DE,HT 1AL
Classified by:. Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
1.5 (b, id).;A-~ .. -_~;;.r---~~-- ----~--.:,<
Declassify On: ! 8/1~~~ ". 1
: '. i-'e
TON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY' :
;
-
.
J.
--;-~'::~-"" ::,:~~;.. _.__-:~. ~~,: ;.";";~: :".r. "-'f-...' -"~-,_.,;",,_,,,-,:---~,:~, .;.... ~,!':
~
�2
COlifl"IDElif'f IAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
---ll (,0'
Prime Minister Blair:
L . . -_ _ _ _
The President:
It is probably more important now than before.
You need to decide as time goes by if we need to visit the site
and make a stop.
(.t')
Prime Minister Blair: Absolutely.
I've visited some of the
victims and families tonight.
It was pretty harrowing. kef
Pretty tough, isn't it? ~
The President:
Prime _Minister Blair:
-helpless. ~
Yes, it's an awful feeling -- completely
The President:
I just had to sit with all those people, with
their families, who got murdered in Africa.
There's nothing you
can say, but it matters to them to know the leader of their
country came to see them, so you did a good thing. Even if you
felt like you have five thumbs. ~
Prime Minister Blair: /
C~----The President:
Can Gerry Adams help you get these people?
Prime Minister Blair:
Je'(
I
~--------------~
The President:
Do you think they will? They could do more good
in less time by helping you get these guys.
tGt
//J
prime Minister Blra_i_r_:___________________________________________
I
1
/
1.... _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_
The President:
Did they condemn it at all?
Prime Minister Blair:
~
~I____________________~
The President: Not just Gerry Adams, but did the IRA condemn
it?
What do you want them to say? --fE-)Prime Minister Blair:
~
'--------~/
CONl"IDENTIAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
�COHPIDEH'PIAL
3
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
If who proposes?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: And they will agree? Both will agree? You
would like the IRA to say, look, what happened is a part of the
past, it's allover, and if the chief constables can agree on
new security measures, they will support them? I'll see what I
can do.
(Q1"
Prime Minister Blair:
L-______________________________________________------------------
The President:
~
I think this is an opportunity for him, too.
%
Prime Minister Blair:
I
The President:
I've got it.
I will get on this right away.
I
guess I'll have to wait until morning to call them, but I'll be
up late tonight. ~
\
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
name?
(R)
Ninety people, 15 hardcore.
Do they have a
Prime Minister Blair: \
com IDEN"fIAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
�4
The President:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
All right I'll get on this .
I
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
...(..G-J-
I
Okay, got it.
Prime Mini.ster Blair:
yz)
Bill, how are you?
yzr
The President:
I've been up to my ass in this Africa bombing,
because there's a lot more than meets the eye on what happened
in Africa.
If we were on a secure line, I could tell you more.
But I'll see what I can do.
I'll put Sandy on this tomorrow.
I'll make some calls tomorrow. )e(
'-------------Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I
Damn right.
Prime Minister Blair:
~
~
]
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
If Sinn Fein really forms an alliance with the
Unionists, that leaves the other group out. You'll have a
localized version of what's happened around the world, where
terrorists are not associated with or funded by governments.
In
this case, what you've got is a cell.
~
I don't know who's giving them money, but we're going to
increasingly have to deal with terrorists with no ties to any
nation-state, including Iran, if the precedent there keeps on
track. But in the case of a lot of Middle East and African
countries, we could be dealing with these people, like in those
old James Bond movies with SPECTRE and Dr. No. We're going to
have a twenty-first century version of those.
ycr
We're already dealing with drug cartels. The Colombian Army has
been defeated in battle four times in the last year with narcodealers.
They do not have the physical capacity to extract
these people.
They don't engage in terrorism; they just kill
people who get in the way of people making money.
If you can
CON rlfJEN'I' IAL
�CQ~JFIPEN'PIAL
5
get somebody worth about 200 or 300 million bucks to operate
this and earn enough money per year through stock earnings and
interest accounts, and if you're prepared to spend it building
an internati.onal network. -ter
Some of these guys earn enough money in terrorism and think,
compared to whatever they get paid, it's more than they were
making before. My worry is for all these IRA offshooots,
isolated cells who were kept apart and were kept isolated from
centralized control, that psychologically they may not be able
to handle it.
If what their real prospect is that they could
lay down their arms and not go to jail and take low-paying jobs
instead of terrorism, a lot of them may not be able to
·psychologically handle going to work everyday and carrying a
1 unchbox . )ef
What kind of psychological message are you sending to them?
What kind of economic message? Have you had someone working on
getting them college payments or job help? My worry is these
people will think, "I cannot imagine leading this deadly dull
life. ff I may be wrong, but I think these people personally
cannot imagine living in a different way.
If you're only
dealing with 15 killers and 75 others in a support system, what
thought can you give to offering them an interesting life? But
I'm all into dull these days.
I'm all for a little more dull.
This really is a problem, Tony.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Absolutely, and infused with meaning.
You ought
to have a really smart person think about the psychological and
economic dynamics about how they would spend their days, and do
a concerted effort on persuading them how else they could spend
their days.
It may be B.S., but I think it's part of the
problem and is worth thinking about.
You've got a lot of
brilliant people over there that could figure out a
psychological campaign to deal with them specifically. You
don't have much to lose and you might have some benefit from it.
I will do these things you asked.
I'm really sorry, Tony.
I'm
so sorry this happened.
You know, I was afraid this would
happen before the vote.
I was afraid they might try to kill
Gerry or David.
jQ1
Prime Minister Blair:
COHFI DENT L'\L
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
�6
CQNFIDEN'P IAL
The President:
If you could bust these guys in a hurry, even
pick up just one or a couple of these guys.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay,
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
We will try to do that.
I'll get on this.
~
Best of luck to you, too.
Thanks, man.
Goodbye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
CONFIDEU'PIAL
~
Goodbye.
(U)
�THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: David Higgins, Lyle Harrison,
Cindy Lawrence, Liz Rogers, Jim Smith and
Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
August 20, 1998, 4:52 - 4;59 p.m. EDT
Oval Office
Prime Minister Blair:
Hello, Bill.
(U)
The President:
Hi, Tony.
I am sorry the other phone was not
working.
Thank you for your statement.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
Not at all.
It is important it is done.
~~~~~
The President;
Yes. We thought they were having a big meeting
there today, but we won't know for sure for a few hours.
This
place we hit is maybe the biggest terrorist camp in the world,
with 500-600 people there at a time. We thought we had good
intelligence that the leaders planned to meet there, but
unfortunately i t was reported in the international press; there
was no hint in our press of any consideration of an attack. l81
There was a report yesterday of rumors, and more than rumors,
that we were concerned that they planned to attack a third
embassy.
We also took down one of their cells in the Balkans,
so they are annoyed at us anyway. I'm sure you know this guy
signed a Fatwa and said that he would kill thousands of our
people.
J.81.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
SECRET
�SECRET
2
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I am very grateful for
your statement.
~
Prime Minister Blair: Not at all.
happened tonight? ~
So, what has actually
The president:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
So
got in Afghanistan,
training facility.
the worst case, it
Yeah.
~
that is where we are. We don't know what we
but in the worst case we took out his
So we have to hope for the best, but even in
was worth doing.
E.O.13526, section 1.4(c)(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b )(d)
�SECRET
The President :
3
Yes.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Let me tell you, I need to speak to the
Pakistani Prime Minister before I go on TV, but I need to call
you next week to talk to you about Ireland before I come. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b )( d)
-The President:
All right, my friend.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
All the very best to you.
Goodbye.
End of Conversation
SECRE'f
Goodbye.
(U)
�CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Tony
Blair (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Bonnie Glick, Joel Schrader,
Liz Rogers, Jenny McGee, Jim Smith and
Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
August 27, 1998, 4:32 - 4:54 p.m. EDT
Martha's Vineyard, Massachusetts
Tony?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
Hi, Bill.
(U)
(U)
How are things?
(U)
The President: Oh, fine.
I just interrupted my vacation a
little bit today.
I went into Massachusetts and did an event.
It was great.
I got to work a line and speak to a cheering
crowd.
It wasn't something organized.
It was just put together
in two days.
There were thousands.
It was amazing.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Good, I'm pleased.
(U)
The President:
This is my best state. You know, if I'd been in
Wyoming, they probably would have been shooting at me. You
never can tell.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Good, I'm pleased about that.
you had all this stuff with the hurricane, too.
(U)
The President:
That's all right.
a lot worse.
(U)
It could have been a hell of
cmlFI DENTIAL
Reason:
1.5(b,Q)
Decla"ify On, .
I'm sorry
8/2t;;-;;;::::;:::':oPY~1
-f._:':-"!-:;'~-_ .~~ -__ ,_,:_,-;---.-:..~:~~~.:.._~..-_~ ..........._._,;. __ ,,:;:;--__ -,::._./.,,:.:,,:,~-
�COHFIDEHTIPrL
2
Prime Minister Blair:
holiday.· (U)
The President:
I'm really sorry to interrupt your
Go ahead.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I just wanted to raise a couple of
things.
The first is Ireland.
I know that my eople have
talked to your people today.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
CONTI DENT IAb
�COHFIDEN'fIAL
3
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: I
I E.O.13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I'll do it. When do you want me to call him?
Today, tomorrow, as quickly as I can?
(e)
Prime Minister Blair:
I think so, Bill.
yC)
The President: What's your view of the timetable? What's your
preferred timetable where all the leaders meet face-to-face?
o
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
That would be great.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Let me ask you this. What's the date that Gerry
does the actual decommissioning? When does the IRA actually
have to turn some guns over? A week after that?
~
CONE IEJEN'l'I1'l:L
�COHFIDEN'FIAL
Prime Minister Blair:
4
lE.o. 13526, section
1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Let me ask, what kind of understanding are you
trying to reach on the volume of weapons and type of ammunition?
$)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O.
13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
So it's something de Chastelain can say is
sUbstantial and must be significant.
I got it.
I'll call him .
.Je)
Prime Minister Blair:
Okay, Bill, that would be fantastic.
~
The President: Now, what the hell do you think is going on over
in Russia? I've got Strobe Talbott, my Deputy Secretary of
State, over there in Russia. We're watching it closely. Our
stock market took a big hit with this rumor that he would
resign. Yeltsin's in the dacha, Chernomyrdin's working on
confirmation.
There are rumors that Yeltsin would resign once
Chernomyrdin is confirmed.
I don't know, but I know this:
They
are absolutely insistent that I come.
I can't initiate my not
going.
It's kind of a mess. That could sink their economy or
politics sure enough.
kCl
Their economy is still rapidly deteriorating. The Central Bank
is still under pressure to inject liquidity into the banking
sector.
The problem is when they do, the banks turn around and
take the money out of the country, and so there's no control
over that money.
There's no clear economic policy, and I think
they've got this new Trilateral Duma Commission, talking about
renationalizing industries and price controls. ~
What I think they have to do is bite the bullet and pass a
decent regulatory system and tax system and a decent bank and a
decent social welfare system~
I think there's alienation among
the people because social welfare has always been a fraud in
CmJFIDEN'fIlrL
�CONFIDEHTL~iL
5
Russia.
The Economist a couple of weeks ago had a great little
piece on the missing social agenda. The charities are taking
over a lot of it, but the reason ordinary people felt so totally
insecure was they really don't think there's any social safety
net. --fC!
I think it's worth going over to try to work through this.
We've got to reassert our commitment and reassert the importance
of the weapons agreements we can still make, but tell them
they've still got to embrace democracy and free markets and have
tough Russian solutions to tough Russian problems.
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
You can make money out of that under any circumstances,
even when it's screwed up, and God knows, it was screwed up.
It's a cash cow.
f,.e')
Prime Minister Blair:
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
These social pressures, nationalism, retrograde
socialism, were present in Poland, Hungary, and to a lesser
extent, the Czech Republic.
For all kinds of reasons, they were
able to make the transition with a lot less fallout.
Russia is
a big country that could basically suck in a lot of stuff from
Warsaw Pact nations.
I am appalled to the extent there are not
'the functioning intermediary institutions without which neither
a democracy nor market economy can succeed.
I'm quite concerned
now that a working majority of the populace is for the
suspension of some democratic freedom just to have a strong
leader who'll get the damn show on the road again and make the
trains run on time.
They're disappointed in the executive but
also disappointed in the Duma going too much the other way. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
If you think about it, it's quite interesting
how many places in the world there are -- including in your
discussion. with me -- where, at least to outsiders, the econom~c
answer or the political answer seems clear. And if you could
eOMFlDEWf lAL
�COlU'IElENl'IAL
6
just get over the hard knock of doing it, i t ' l l be better on the
other side, but the political system is unable to cross the
hurdle.
Both of us have been rather fortunate that our
political systems are still functioning well enough to do what
has to be done. ~
The biggest economic tragedy is not Russia, but Japan. Even
with their massive infrastructure and understanding of the
modern economy, they still can't put together the political
decisions that are manifestly in their interest.
I don't know
if Europe is on the upsurge of growth.
There's still some
internal growth that could be generated by France and Germany by
internal changes. ~
I don't know how much longer we can s'ustain our growth without
some more growth in Japan. We're absorbing 30 percent of
Chinese exports now, 50 percent more than our world GDP share,
and there's a huge increase in Japanese exports.
They can't buy
our imports, and the Chinese can take a lot more but they have
certain controls.
I'm worried that if we have three quarters
rather than one quarter of economic slowdown, there'll be an
increase in the trade deficit. We'll see a whole round of
protectionist pressure build up again, which will affect Europe,
if only indirectly. jQt
I think the Japanese issue is still the biggest economic issue.
The Russia issue is a political issue.
If they get a
dictatorial leader, they'll be much harder to deal with on
Kosovo and other things, I'm afraid.
I think it's worth my
going over there.
I'll meet with the Duma leaders from other
parties and have a little no-BS conversation about what's going
on here and hopefully reduce a little of their paranoia about
America and the West.
It may not be a conventional success, but
I'll go as long as they want me to come -- unless Yeltsin
resigns in the next two days -- if nothing else but to talk to
Chernomyrdin, who is physically and mentally quite alert and
strong, personally. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O.
13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
What I'm worried about with Yeltsin is -- in my
last conversation I had with him, he said all the right things,
even on the things we disagree on, he said all the right things,
at least from his point of view, but he really seemed profoundly
tired in a way I had never heard him before.
I am afraid his
energy, his will to go on may be sapped.
~
COHFI DgNT ll'd,
�COHFID£HTIAL
7
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yeah, I'm afraid so.
~
But there's nothing I can do about it.
yz)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O.
13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: One thing, we've got to do everything we can to
keep their IMF program going. You know, they've only gotten,
what, $7 billion out of $21 billion. There may be some other
"little thin"gs we could do, which I'm working on. But the hard
truth is we will be pouring good money after bad if the banks
keep taking the money and putting it in Europe. I'm worried
about Russia becoming like Africa.
It's bad enough the market
takes the pipe, but the citizens of the country who ought to be
putting their own wealth in there are shipping it out, and you
have massive capital outflows instead of internally generated
growth. We've got to talk through all that with them.
They
think they've been taken for a ride on an economic theory that
they were not able to embrace.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
Hello?
Hello?
Bill?
(U)
The President:
Yeah, I can barely hear you.
It sounds like
four other people are having a conversation on the same line.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
You were saying?
(U)
The President: No, that's it. Look, if I find out anything
about Russia in the next few days before I come, I'll call you .
..kef
Prime Minister Blair:
lE.o. 13526, section
1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I got it. And I'll get to work on it.
Honestly, I think politically for him, for Gerry, it might be
easier for him to do the decommissioning if it comes about with
me being there.
There's a perception in Northern Ireland, and
I've tried not to do this, but there's a perception that I've
tilted more toward him than Trimble.
In that case, it could be
CONFIDEN'l?IAL
�8
• COHFIDEH'FIAL.
an advantage and could make it a little easier, if it all goes
around this issue. )Xi
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Let me get on it, and I'll give you a report.
-*'t
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
All right, Bill.
Goodbye.
Prime-Minister Blair:
(U)
(U)
Goodbye.
(U)
End of Conversation
CONFIDEHTIAL
�CONFIDEN'fIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAE=iH I NGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O.13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, documeut no. 33
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
The President
Prime Minister Blair
PARTICIPANTS:
Notetakers: Tony Campanella, Doug Bayley,
Liz Rogers, Cindy Lawrence and Lawrence
Butler
DATE,· TIME
AND PLACE:
August 30, 1998, 2:29
The Oval Office
The President:
Hello.
Prime Minister Blair:
with the Queen.
(U)
The President:
Tony?
Yes.
Well, good.
~
2:38 p.m. EDT
(U)
How are you?
I'm up at Balmoral
Lucky for you.
Is it still light?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
doing?
(U)
It is a beautiful evening.
How are you
The President:
I bet it is.
I'm doing fine, working.
I just
got off the phone with Kohl on Russia. How are we doing on
Ireland? -+er
Prim€ Minister.Blair: Many, many thanks indeed for speakin
with Gerr Adams. Where we are?
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
That's what he told me.
~
COHFIDEH'fIAL
Reason: 1.5(b,-d)
. _ . _ ..~ ______ ---,.---::----",.'
Declassify On:! 8 / ~~. -j"';'>~
~~
:
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~TON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY ..
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�· CONFIDEN'fI1II:L
2
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section tA(b)(d)
The President: Well, you know do you think we can get them to
meet next week, while I am there? )J2f
Prime Minister Blair:
It's possible you know.
Not impossible.
je(
The President:
It would be huge and help me enormously here
with what I am dealing with.
Prime Minister Blair:
You are here on Thursday?
The President:
They could obviously do it in Belfast, or they
could go to Omagh with us.
It would be profoundly symbolic.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
C@JFIDEN'l'IAL
�3
COUFIDEN'fIAL
The President:
I'm not asking you to promise.
I had a tough
talk with Gerry Adams.
It was probably worth doing even though
he didn't say yes on five and six.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
-The President: When I see you, I really hope we have some time
to talk about Russia and Kosovo too. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I agree with that.
do is get him confirmed, and
The first thing we have to
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
It is rea
frustrating; all the money t a wen In as gone back out
$7.5 billion.
I'll see what I can do over there and work like
hell to influence the Duma people. Keep your fingers crossed.
When I see you we'll get a chance to talk about it.
I can't
wait to see you. J...G1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes, likewise.
See you soon.
Prime Minister Blair:
Goodbye.
Goodbye.
~
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation
cmfFI DEN'fIAL
�CONFIDEN'l'IPtL
THE WHITE HOUSE
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, documeut no. 34
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Cindy Lawrence, Robin Rickarad,
Matt Sibley, Joel Schrader, James Smith, Don
Bandler and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
September 11, 1998, 4:33 p.m.-4:58 p.m. EDT
Oval Office
The President:
Tony.
Prime Minister Blair:
How are you doing?
I'm fine.
(V)
I'm fine.
How are things?
(V)
The President:
anyway.
(V)
We're doing pretty good here.
That's my gut,
Prime Minister Blair:
I saw you on television; I thought you
were pretty good, actually.
(U)
The President:
This morning?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
(V)
(U)
Yes, it was pretty good.
It's coming together.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I think that is right really.
(U)
we're thinking of you.
The President:
Thanks.
What's up?
Anyway,
(V)
Prime Minister Blair:
Two things.
I wanted to update you on
the Northern Ireland situation.
~
CONFIDElf'PlkL
Reason:
1.5{b,d)
Declassify On:
9/2lL.!;l:8' ___f"~~,,--~<~~·-_c.---~-·L\
r·
~:'~T~NLmRA~Y PHOTOCOPY
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�2
CONFIDEN'l'IAL
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
Tell me where we are.
y1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
In theory that is what they agreed to.
willing to do any kind of schedule? keJ
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Are they
~
I
What is the main Sinn Fein argument against it?
-+er
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
The IRA never disarmed and it can't look like
the Unionists forcing them to do so? yc)
]
Prime Minister Blair:!
The President:
Well, they made a deal, though.
+Gt
Prime Minister Blair: /
GONF! DEN'l'IAL
IE.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)I
�IE.o.
3
COHFIDE1H' IAL
13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The fact is there is a very
good feeling in Northern Ireland right now.
Your visit went
very well. -tel
The President:
It was wonderful.
-f€+-
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I agree with that. Everybody is so up. The
trip to the Irish Republic was unbelievable.
There were 50,000
in Limerick.
Bertie is in a strong position to weigh in with
Sinn Fein.
ter
=-oJ
Prime Minister Blair:
L l_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
--~
The President:
Let me ask you something.
I've been thinkin
about all the possible permutations and angles.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I understand why the schedule is not enough.
Then he is giving them something concrete that he can't take
back and he is gettin something symbolic.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair: /
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
COHFI DEN'l'IAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
4
The President:
Let me ask, I understand you announced that you
will leave your army in the barracks while your police do the
actual patrols. Are they putting any pressure on you to make a
symbolic withdrawal of British forces? fer
Prime Minister Blair:
1L-____~IE=.=O=.=13=5=26=,=s=ec=t=io=n=1=.4=(b=)=~=)~I______~
The President:
Would that matter to Gerry? Jim Steinberg
doesn't think you could work a deal with him.
I tried to
him to ex lain to me what the roblem was
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
This is a big hang-up and they are not ready to
cross the psychological divide.
I understand and sympathize
with them; I am kind of an expert in that.
But they did make a
deal.
I wonder, it seems to me the biggest barrier was they
have talked themselves into this position that is linguistically
accurate, but politically unrealistic. ~
The deal said they would get in the Executive branch when they
get the votes, and they would decommission in two years.
They
never disarmed, but here they would be disarmed to get something
they are legally entitled to anyway.
What if we could get the
schedule out and there was a symbolic decommissioning, for
something outside the agreement, so they would not look like
they were coerced by the Unionists? +er
I E.O. 13526, section IA(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Do you want me to raise this with him in a whatif way? I won't tell him I talked to you about this. ~
CONFIDENTIAL
~~:,~.f'':'"':~~~~~-:'c-~ ~-~'--- "--~.~,
C~~T~~ LIBIU.RY PHOTOCOPY'
J
'';-'.:'_~ ,---~_:,-,::,._<-;;~-,:-",~::...~~",_;"--<-t.'";~""-_._::~..". r.~_
�CONFIDEN'fIAL
5
J
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
Prime Minister Blair:
I
\~--------------~
The President: Are there any other sort of permutations or
circumstances that might permit them to do it? keJ
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: When I talked to Bertie he thought he could take
those guys down that did the Omagh bombing. I thought it would
be sooner. I had the impression it was imminent when I left
Ireland. ~
LP_r_~_.m_e
__M
__
i_n_i_s_t_e_r Bl_a_i_r_:______________
____
/
The President:
------------------------~
Of course they do.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
\
The President: An actual arrest, even if it only just one
person -- you've got 29 dead people there. It would be a real
coup for Trimble.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
argument you could make.
J&r
Prime Minister Blair:/
The President:
COHFIDEN'l'IAL
Do you want me to raise that with him?
yn
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
�CONFIDEN'l'IAL
6
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I'll get on it.
(;tl
]
Prime Minister Blair: /
I
The President:
I agree. The chemistry is a lot better than
what I thought. We cOincidentally have a big Irish celebration
here in about 30 minutes. They are applauding George Mitchell.
I might nose around with some of the Sinn Fein supporters to see
what I can do to nudge them a bit. These Americans still have a
littl:e bit-of influence because they have money. ).e1
Prime Minister Blair:
I
\
The President:
schedule. Jc.ef
Let's explore this idea -- arrests -- plus a
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I bet you anything, if you explain that the arms
thing is not a big deal because they have a stash, and they are
easily replaced.
Whereas, the arrest of people who murdered 29
folks in a country that is so small would be a tangible act of
good faith.
I think disbanding the Real IRA was an act of good
faith, but I am trying to work Trimble's politics around
Gerry's. +er
Prime Minister Blair: /
I
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
I agree. From Trimble's point of view, he is
not asking for much. He is asking for something symbolic in
return for something tangible.
From Adams point of view, it is
not such a good deal since he gets a year and a half in return
for something he has a legal right to right now. Either you
have to get Trimble to change by getting a different good deal,
or get Adams to change. Jim Steinberg says we tried that latter
course, and he didn't seem very excited about it.
It might be
worth going back to Adams and Bertie to see if they can't figure
out how to identify who has done this. ~
Just because they disbanded, I don't think it is enough for
those 29 people, that beautiful teenaged girl who was blinded,
COUFIDEN'PIAL
�CONFIDEN'l'IAL
7
and the other people. They need to arrest somebody anyway.
Unless whoever did this left the country, but Bertie didn't
think that was the case. Let us raise this with Sinn Fein, and
I will have Jim Steinberg nose around with three to four of the
most influential here today. -+eT
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President: Let me say a word about Russia.
is they have a government,
The
ood news
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
I am glad
that you are hosting this G-7 meeting and Russia will be able to
be part of it.
It think it would be a good idea to talk to them
practically about the lessons learned from other countries with
financial problems.
I am
to call Yeltsin now that he has
Primakov in place.
The fundamental problem
was they
proper y Wl
putting in place the
building
that created a vacuum. All the oligarchs
and mafia are shipping money out of the country. They want to
come back with a solution that they can put old Humpty Dumpty
back together again and they can't do that. ~
On the other hand, it is equally true that there are
international dimensions here. We have to rethink the IMF deal.
It seems to me that we need to develop some sort of pro-growth
strategy for the rest of the world. You have 40 percent of the
world in recession now.
In the end, you and I can't keep our
growth going.
I just want you to do anything you can to walk
the Russians through this and maybe cut them a little slack on
some of these macro issues, but hey, you have to build a
skeleton before you can have the body of an economic power. You
might want to call Yeltsin after this meeting. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Yeah.
~
The President: But, I think we just have to get their attention
on what they have to do, before it ever gets better there. We
need to look at it in the context of a larger settlement. We
have even considered paying for their space program for a year
so their scientists don't go build rockets for someone else.
The scientists on the board of the space program have not been
paid for six months.
It is unbelievable.
I know you have more
than you can say grace over, but to whatever extent you can tone
CONFIDENTIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
8
up that G-7 meeting and to call Yeltsin or Primakov when it is
over. %
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
I am going to give a speech in New York on
Monday on the general outline of what we see. Deputy Finance
Ministers in the G-21 have been working for over a year. We
have the basis for some work. Maybe I can talk to you when you
get here on the 21 st • My instinct is that the G~7 should call
for them to at least present recommendations to us and to get
heads of state together and show some leg here. Bob Rubin
continually cautions me that we don't want to unrealistically
raise expectations if we don't know where we are going.
¢
The fundamental difficulty is that you can't get out of the fact
that these countries have to do certain things. On the one
hand, there is incredible fluidity in capital movements, while
on the other hand there is a pro-growth strategy.
If they are
not willing to have the infrastructure, all this pro-growth
strategy won't matter.
If we get them juiced up again, the
money will flow out and be in somebody's Swiss bank account.
It's a tough knot to untie.
The IMF tried to modify their
approach in Indonesia, but it doesn't necessarily work in the
context of massive, breathtakingly rapid capital flow.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I've reviewed what the G-21 people are working
on. A lot of it is technical and arcane, but in aggregate it's
pretty good stuff.
It can make a big difference.
It will
remain arcane and complex and dense to the world as long as it
is operating at the level of deputy finance ministers. My
instinct is maybe we ought to talk next week before you corne to
New York and we do this conference, because maybe while we are
CONE'IDEN'HAL
�9
CONfIDEN'f'IAL
there we can make decisions and some scenario to elevate the
visibility of this and to get world leaders involved. kef
Prime Minister Blair:
IIE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d~1
...+-e-r
·The President:
It might help. Cardoso is cratering and is
facing reelection in October.
I am just sick about that.
I
think he will get reelected, but it will be tough.
Let me do
the Irish thing and you can chew on all of this.
I think you
should call Yeltsin after the meeting. Let's try to talk again
on this. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
time.
(U)
Thanks again.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay, Bill.
Good.
Goodbye.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
Hillary and I had a wonderful
All the best.
(U)
(U)
Bye, bye.
(U)
End of Conversation
cmlFIDEN'l'IAL
.. ,·r
�COHF'IDEN'l'IAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
Telcon with ~ritish Prime Minister Blair
SUBJECT:
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Tony Blair
Notetakers: Mariana Papadimitriou, Doug
Bayley, Matt Sibley, Joe Schrader and
Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
October 6, 1998, 9:44 - 10:05 a.m. EST
Oval Office
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hey Tony how are you?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hello Bill.
I'm fine.
(U)
I'm in China.
Are you having a good time?
(U)
Is it hot there?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
It was until we got here, but we brought
some British weather with us.
(U)
The President:
I just wanted to check in with you on Kosovo.
Yeltsin called me yesterday, as he called you, to say Milosevic
got the OSeE to come in and now everything is going to be all
right.
I think it would be a real mistake for us to take the
pressure off now. Kofi's report is going to be filed today and
it is a graphic account of Milosevic's continued defiance of the
UN and the International Community. »Cr
I believe we have to maintain momentum and keep building a
consensus for the NATO decision to authorize force.
Dick
Holbrooke is there and is still meeting either in Belgrade or
Pristina.
Fighting has been in a lull for the past few days,
COHFIDENTIAL
Classified by:
Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
1.5(b,d)
Declassify On:i 10/QJ4,Q.~_.j,'_;';;~--'~"'~---·-~----:-~.,·
t::INTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~ ~
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COWFIDEHTL"xL
but Milosevic hasn't withdrawn or agreed to measures that would
make the end of hostilities verifiable or durable.
(C)
I would like to find some way to get the Russians on
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
We can't force Yeltsin
into a veto.
I KO. 13526, section 1.4( d)
We have got to tell Yeltsin, look, if you are
right and we are wrong then Milosevic will be in full
compliance.
If he lied to you one more time, then we are going
to do it. This is an issue that to me seems to be a real
mistake to let pressure up now.
U?(
- Let me mention one other thing.
I KO. 13526, section 1.4( d)
That may be necessary but
it is a terrible time for me to deal with it with this Congress
of mine. They are always willing to give more money to the
military and then do not want to do anything with it. There is
a really strong block in the Republican party that wants to do
that and I have worked to get them to continue to support SFOR
in Bosnia. And we really do have a readiness problem. ~
Keep in mind this is the same group that took eight months to
approve IMF funding.
If we have to do this publicly, it will be
a real problem for me.
I don't want to do anything to undermine
my ability or encourage them to try some eleventh hour measure
to stop these air strikes. They will be gone in a week.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I totally understand that Bill.
first point I am in complete agreement.
IKO. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
CONFIDEN'l'IM
On the
�COHFIDEN'FIAL
3
IE-O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: I completely agree with that. I am just saying
injecting that now into the public debate would be a problem .
.Y:!
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President: It also might create problems with some other
NATO allies and get them to vote against it and we don't want to
complicate our business with .NATO. ~
By the way, Gordon Brown did a hell of a job here yesterday.
met with the Finance Ministers and Central Bankers about
international finance issues. I went over and met with him.
was terrific, you would have been really proud of him. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Bloody bright, isn't he?
Yes, he is great.
He
He
(-C)
~
Prime Minister Blair: I will tell him today when I go to talk
to him. How are we going to go on this now Bill. ;e(
The President: I hope we can get support for the G7
G7 met after we talked last time to endorse the idea
the crisis from spreading to Latin America. We will
funding by the end of next week and can proceed with
emergency plan·. ..J,.e'(
plan. The
of keeping
have IMF
the
Gordon said what I have been saying all along. We have got to
modify the Bretton Woods convention and implement some sort of
bank regulatory system that has the effect of doing what bank
regulation does in each of our countries and the stock market
regulatory systems do, so that we can control the boom and bust
cmIFIDEN'FIAL
�CONFrDEN'I'IAL
4
cycles on an international scale. Bretton Woods dealt with how
to have sufficient money to deal with trade and services but
didn't anticipate independent financial forces, which leveraged
financial instruments, and that trading in money itself would
have an effect on the global economy. ~
Bretton Woods assumed 50 years ago that no matter what, the
issue would be to find enough money to facilitate trade and
investment -- not that money flows themselves would become a
greater force of nature in the global economy. We have got to
find a way to set up systems to replicate national systems that
prevent depressions by limiting boom and bust cycles. There are
two ways to do it.
You can do it outright or have some sort of
oversight. mechanism that requires countries to make those
. changes. .ke"1
r think that is where we are going, but we still have to decide.
r tried last night, but had a little wrinkle. I tried to get
this group of 22 -- I counted 25 around the table -- to
accelerate the reporting process. The working group of the
deputy finance ministers reports in December/January after which
we would have a meeting of world leaders. Aef
I think we can do one of two things.
If you and Prodi and I
want to have a meeting earlier than that they can accelerate the
reporting process, which we can meet and validate. Or the
alternative, based on this meeting, we could have a larger
meeting, or a G7 meeting, and endorse this central idea, that is
precisely I
I
1-)
There is another wrinkle. /
Europe is
The big three
doing quite well and the forecast is for growth.
countries in Europe are going to do well also. ~
I didn't want to confuse people and scare them about a worldwide
recession, but I wanted to say that Europe has a bigger stake in
Latin America than the United States does right now. We have
seen bigger credit strictures and a tightening of credit here
because of so many bad loans in the global economy.
Regulators
are cutting off good credit risks because of problems our banks
are having elsewhere.
~
COHFIDEN'l'IAD
�CmJFIDEN'fIA'b
5
I can understand it, but I did not place a lot of stock
E.O. 13526, section 1.4 d
But they did not disagree with the central idea that
was succinctly put in Gordon's comments, which is what we have
all been trying to say.
I think there is still a chance we can
do something more quickly if we want.
The big front line test
now is what happens to Brazil. Cardoso won the election but he
has a lot of people in the run-off elections, three weeks from
Sunday, or whenever.
They have less than $40 billion in cash
reserves now, and I don't think he can stall for three weeks
without saying what his reform proposal is.
If. Brazil goes
south we are all going to suck eggs big time.
~
-r
want to go give my speech today -- it is consistent with what
you and Gordon said -- and then see what the status of the group
is.
Then, we'll see if we should have the G7 or some other
group meeting where everybody gets together and endorses the
idea.
The developing countries were there and not one spoke
against it.
The Thais were there and they're doing quite well.
They seem to be in harness on interim measures and suffering
contractions because of it. ~
They need a dramatic increase in World Bank investment to build
a social safety net, but the problem is financial institutions
are running short of money, not just the IMF.
The World Bank is
worried about having so many bad investments out and that its
credit rating will go down. The longer we wait to get
consensus, the worse it will be. We can have consensus in the
long term.
I don't know enough yet, but my instinct is to move
sooner rather than later. But I need to let today pass to see
where we are and get back to you. You should ask the Chinese
where they stand.
They have been champs in not devaluing their
currency. They have taken some hits for it, but the benefits
outweigh the burden. Anyway, I wanted to say that's where we
are.
In 48 hours we will be in a place to decide whether to get
the leaders together sooner rather than later.
I am for it but
my Treasury department is against it. lef
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
CONFIDEN'fIAL
�6
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
Do you think we will get any grief for not
having the Russians there? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I
But they would probably go along?
rfl
Vl
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I agree. That is why I want to go in there
today and be very aggressive.
If Europe and Japan will support
this and we have a united G7 front, we will be in pretty good
I
'hape.
I
I KO. 13526, ,octioo 1.4(d)
]
Prime Minister Blair:/
I
The President:
They might like it if we could put outside
pressure on them without appearing to.
That would be the best
of all possible worlds.
I need to go over now and give a talk.
I will be back to you within 48 hours to let you know where we
go from here.
How long are you going to be in China? kef
CONFIDEN'fIAL
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
�CONtIDEN'PIAL
7
Prime Minister Blair:
J..ef
A few days here and then in Hong Kong.
The President:
Back on Kosovo, we will be in touch with the
French.
If the Contact Group meets Thursday we have to go
forward with the ACTORD no matter what the Russians say. We
will tell them we won't have to do this if your deal works.
This guy, all he understands is pressure and he lied before, and
pressure will increase the chances that the deal will work. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
couple of days.
(U)
The President:
I agree Bill, I'll talk to you in a
Okay, goodbye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation
CONFI DEN'!' lAL
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Tom Crowell, Liz Rogers,
Robin Rickard, George Chastain, Jim Smith,
Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
October 14, 1998, 2:38 - 2:58 p.m. EDT
Oval Office
Hey, Tony, how are you?
(UD)
Prime Minister Blair:
Fine, fine, how are you?
The President:
It's nice to hear your voice.
Good.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: It's good to hear you, too.
Arafat on his way to you. ~
The President:
..
'"
I saw Mr.
How did you find him?
Prime Minister Blair:
deal.
(C)
§
(U)
He still thinks it is possible to do a
;::
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it is.
He wants it, I think.
In a way,
I What we have to do is keep them from
falling into these old habits. I keep telling them if we don't
make this deal now, we've got May 1999 staring us straight in
the face and I think it will be a disaster. It will be
impossible to avoid a bad outcome unless we get this interim
agreement now and get into final status talks. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d) I
CONFIDENTIAL
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(b,d)
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Declassify On: i 10/1J~9~~.;,.;::'--~·-c------~~~···.
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COliFI DEN'F IAL
IE.O. 13526, section I.4(b)(d)1
The President:
first.
Maybe.
I think he wants to see how it plays,
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d)
lS lS aggrava e
y the fact that their economic
situation is worse than when they signed on to peace. The
Israelis close borders at the drop of a hat and they never
concluded all these economic things, the roads and airport and
industrial park, they have been on the verge of doing for months
and months.
~
Somehow we have to convince them they have to resolve all that
crap.
There is a train wreck facing them in May 1999 unless we
somehow can give them some breathing room, some progress and
confidence in one another's work.
If I were in their position,
the one interest they have in cornmon is finding some way to live
together before they have this horrible train wreck in 1999.
Ul)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
I think it might be important, depending on what
each side asks for.
During the next four days I might need to
call you again a time or two. Where will you be? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I will be here and anything I can do to
be helpful I will, just give me a call anytime.
I will speak to
the Europeans or anything. ~
The President:
Adams and Trimble are both over here, you know.
(e)
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
(U)
The President: My deputy labor secretary participated in the
opening of the road show last week and I think it's going pretty
COHFIDEH'FIAL
�CONFIDElfl'L"tL
3
well.
I understand de Chastelain's group got the lead on the
decommissioning issue, but I heard you think it will have to
wait until next spring.
If there's anything I can do to help .
.)-e"r
Prime Minister Blair:
Bill, I am going to speak to McGuinness
and Trimble in the next few days.
It's tricky stuff. Sinn Fein
is saying we will decommission, but not just yet.
IE.O.
13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
At the moment, we're working on it.
If it
comes to It, an
think you need to speak to people, I will
just give you a call.
J.G-r
The President:
I will do anything you want.
I don't know how
you are going to solve it, they both seem so dug in.
If you can
figure out anything I can do, I will. ~
I just cannot thank you enough for the strength you showed on
Kosovo.
It was fascinating to watch that NAC meeting unfold,
compared to where we were three months ago.
They all acted as
if they were disappointed Milosevic caved.
I told my folks here
that it bore some of the similarities to Bosnia, where we worked
for two years to get everybody off the dime. But it happened a
lot quicker, in no small measure because we were in lockstep
from the get-go. )£1
Parenthetically, we have to do the same on this global financial
thing; maybe we can talk about it in the next few days. ~
It was amazing to see how that happened. Here is where our next
problem in Kosovo is.
I think right now we are in a position
where we passed the ACTORD -- this action order -- and are
sus endin it as we see if he complies.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
And as soon as
happens, he
start cheating, but they'll argue it's not enough.
~
We really need to carefully coordinate our positions to keep
maximum pressure on him so we don't have to take military
action. We don't want to look weak three months from now.
It
CONFIDENTIAL
�4
COHFIDEHTL''xL
looks so good right now, just the right thing being done in the
right way. We really, really need to coordinate our positions;
I'm convinced we can avoid military action if it is always
hanging there.
But it would take 3-4 months to try to get
everybody where they were. And all the forces of the last 3
months will reassert themselves. Milosevic will cheat a little
here and there and undermine the integrity of this thing.
That
is my only sort of yellow caution light, but otherwise it's
terrific.
It's good to have some good news. -+et
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
Prime Minister Blair:
I
The President: We have to figure out a posture. Some guys will
say you can't keep granting 96-hour extensions, and then they
will say we ought to say, okay, let's go to one-week extensions,
two-week extensions. The point is, we don't want to let them
put us in a position where we have to do this allover again.
The minute we do that, he will start cheating.
(BT
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I like that. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Bill, one thing I want to raise on the
global economic stuff.
I've got a little bit to reportj-.___ _...,
I
think Gordon has done brilliant work on the Europeans.
GOHFIDEN'fI}'rL
IE.O.
13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
�COHFIDEN'l'IAL
5
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
the seed issue I a ree. On an of these
finance problems,
E.O.13526, section 1.4 d
they could
have done this for a pittance of what they have to. We have two
different issues here. The longer we wait, given the amount of
leveraged money that is out there,.the greater chance of a more
serious collapse that will take more money to fix.
I do believe
we need to have a hardcore bright line to help Brazil and keep
Latin America from getting into this. The risks of our not
being successful are greater than when we helped Mexico. But
the risk will be minimized if simultaneously we have a
comprehensive short-term strategy, including these countries but
not limited to these countries.
~
At least have a framework agreement that in the long run wiil
sort of stabilize confidence and make people think this can be
made to work.
I believe the global version of what we're trying
to do in our respective countries is riding on this.
If this
comes apart at the seams, we'll have hell putting this back
together and putting in a coherent social component.
That is
what I believe. I think it is very, very serious. Much more
than what I say in my public remarks, because I have to keep
people jollied up here. ~
We just literally this minute got Gordon's proposals in.
Everybody here will be ready to see him by tomorrow and I will
CONFIDEN'FIAL
�CGNFIDEN'PIAL
6
We just literally this minute got Gordon's proposals in.
Everybody here will be ready to see him by tomorrow and I will
read this personally.
I would like to follow up on the
suggestion you made to me before. Let's assume pretty good
accord among G-7 treasury and central bank people.
There should
be some meeting of the G-7, and sooner rather than later to
realize some momentum here; even the Wall street crowd, who hategovernment interference. Every time .1 give a talk, the market
goes up a bit, and they're disappointed we're not doing more.
There is an openness to action here in the market community that
I think is important.
I don't want to meet if we don't have
an thin to say, but I think you ought to think about it. ~
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
Prime-Minister Blair:
The President: Absolutely. Let me read this.
I may call you
in a day or so. There's some urgency in timing.
If you look at
the amount of unregulated, leveraged cash out there and the fact
that people on their own are trying to reduce their exposure
within emerging markets and in the EU and U.S. already, we
already have a liquidity crisis that will affect our economies
in less than a year. But simultaneously the amount of risk is
so great that the two trends could run head on into each other
and cause an even bigger problem.
I hope Gordon will come
tomorrow, but if there is some problem at Treasury, let me look
into that.
I don't know about that. Let me have a little time
to look over this stuff, but I can't imagine not having him
here. )£1
Prime Minister Blair:
I'm sure they will be happy to see him.
The President:
If you have gotten Tietmeyer and the French
central bank moved off where they were at the meeting of 25
countries (G-22) over here where Gordon spoke so well -- it
sounded like we'd read the same book just before speaking, we
don't want to give them a chance to change again. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
COUFIDEN'FIAL
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
�-
7
GGHFI DEN'fIkL
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President: Yes. Let me read this stuff and get back to
you, and over the next few days we may have to talk again on the
Middle East.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
it with him.
je1
I'll get Gordon and get him to go through
The President: Tell.you what. Let me call Rubin and let
everybody read it.
They need time to talk about it and they
need digestion time.
I've been talking to them and pushing them
. every- day; . I feel the same sense of urgency you do, and I will
be back in touch.
(..e')
Prime Minister Blair:
In the meantime, just get someone to let
Gordon or us know about -~
The President:
-- the timing.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes, I will.
Okay, that is great.
Goodbye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
CONFIDEnTIAL .
~
Goodbye.
(U)
�CONFI DEN'l' IAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
..s
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SUBJECT:
~
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
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(U)
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PARTICIPANTS:
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The President
Prime Minister Blair
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DATE, TIME
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Air Force One
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The President:
Hello?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi, Bill.
(U)
-z'"
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Tony, how are you doing?
I am doing great.
00,",'"
(U)
(U)
Things are going well here.
Prime Minister Blair:
You seem to be routing your enemies and
we're all happy about that. Where are you? Are you in a car or
something? kel
The President:
I'm doing fine.
I am in a plane.
I wanted to
say one thing to you.
I really believe we've got to do
something about this financial situation. I liked what you
outlined -- your speech was good. G-7 finance ministers are
meeting here this weekend.
I think we need to come up with some
sort of emergency coordinated set of bilateral credit lines.
The Germans are against it, but the French are moving toward it.
Some central banks are reluctant. We'll need to then get the
cooperation from private lenders to stem the tide.
I'm very
Cm~FIDEN'I'IAL
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I've just had our party "'zq 00'"
Prime Minister Blair:
I'm doing fine.
convention this week so I just got that out of the way.
The President:
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CONFIDENTIAL
worried about it affecting Latin America, particularly Brazil.
European bankers have so much exposure on these hedge loans that
we have a real risk of a world-wide recession here.
I think
that it is very important we get these guys to reach some kind
of agreemen i:: •
(£'!
Prime Minister Blair:
I am in total agreement. We have got to·
act.
I don't think we have seen the worst of this thing by any
means.
J9f
The President: No, but if we move in quick we could keep it
from taking down Brazil.
I think it would be really important
if you could tell your folks that.
I am going to see them on
_ Monda-y and -do my best to bring them around, as well.
(C)
Prime Minister Blair: Certainly, I will speak to our folks and
I think they will, in principle, be in favor of concerted
action.
I have just read the outline of the comments ou made
earlier today,
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
Exactly.
i€T
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
I couldn't agree with you more.
I have not
mentioned the prospect of using our exchange rate stabilization
fund.
I wanted to get IMF funding through Congress, and the
Germans are not yet for it.
I keep thinking that if we work at
this, we can get a lot done, but I have to figure out a way to
get them into it. We got to do it, and the central bank is
notoriously independent.
Prime Minister Blair:
issues really.
I agree with you.
I think there are two
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
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IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
I agree with everything you said.
If you could
urge your people to be forward leaning. Maybe we could talk on
Monday before I talk to the IMF. The other thing I wanted to
mention was Kosovo. We have begun to prepare Congress and the
people for the possibility of air strikes. We wanted to ask
NATO to authorize operations next Wednesday.
I
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I agree with that.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
I told Chirac I would talk to him on Tuesday
after the UN report is released. Our guys can lead this
economic thing, we can say we want a short-term solution and a
long-term structural solution that will help.
~
Prime Minister Blair: What do you think about a summit of some
sort at some stage?
(e)
The President:
I am in favor of it.
If we can get anything
like remote consensus, I think we should do it by the end of the
(C)
year and before the final report toward the end of October.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Like the G-8 summit or something.
Yep, maybe even the G-22.
Prime Minister Blair:
~
~
Well, I'm all for it.
;ef
If we've
Let's see how far we get on Monday.
The President:
(.Q1
got something to say. How are you doing on Ireland?
It will be helpful i f you can intervene
Prime Minister Blair:
I'm seeing de Chastelain, who is
some time in the near future.
CONFIJ3EM'l'IAL
�4
CONfIDENTIAL
the bloke in charge of decommissioning on Monday.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
I gather you made good progress as well on the Middle
Eas t .
).,Q1
The President:
Yes, I think so.
I would say we have a better
than 50-50 chance to get a deal, to get them into final status
talks. Well, take care.
~
Prim~
MiniSter Blair:
Take care.
(U)
The President:
That would be good.
We will speak again soon.
Prime Minister Blair:
Goodbye.
(U)
End of Conversation
CONFI DEloiT 1AL
All the best, Bill.
Goodbye man.
(U)
�CONFIDEN'fIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O.13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, documeut no. 38
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Tom Crowell, Frank Jarosinski,
Elizabeth Rogers and Robin Rickard
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
October 25, 1998,2:14 -2:42 p.m. EST
San Francisco, California
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi Bill.
Thank you.
Prime Minister Blair:
Congratulations.
It was terrible.
(U)
+e!
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
I was going home every morning at two or three.
The last go around dragged on for 36 hours, like the Irish
thing. But to be fair, the difference was you were integrating
both into one political system. Here we were dealing with two
diverging political systems.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
CONFIDEH'fL"tL
Classified by:
Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
1.5(b,d)
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,.
When you were doing the Irish thing, you were actually in it
with them -- you had some leverage. All I can do is give them
money and my time. Here I just had to talk them through it and
wait it out.
It took 85 hours.
In the end, everybody pats me
on the back; but they have to take all the flak; Arafat took
some too. -t€+If it works, I think we have a chance to break the whole thing
open.
If this is faithfully implemented, this mra~k~e~s~t~h~e~______,
ultimate resolution of bilateral issues easier.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
e
Israe-lis know in the end they have to have an agreement.
good, but we still have along way to go. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I know exactly how you feel.
I feel
~
The President:
It is a lot like the Irish thing, there are a
lot of similarities. But you are in it with them. You have
more moral authority.
You have to make a decision to release
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
I I t is an
prisoners.
I don't. I
interesting thing.
(C)
Prime Minister Blair:
I was absolutely fascinated watching this
on the news.
It was a real roller coaster, wasn't it? ~
The President:
It was amazing. We had the agreement, then it
got undone. We had a deal. You see there were two prisoners.
Most can't understand, but ou know what symbolic significance
prisoners have in Ireland.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
COHFIDEN'fIAL
I can imagine.
~
�3
CONFIDENTIAL
The President:
The beautiful thing about it was Hussein, who
looks l.ike he is at death's door. ;e1
Prime Minister Blair:
He is an amazing man.
~
The President: Hussein kept telling them to think about their
children.
It was a thing of beauty.
I would fly him down and
he would wait in his house for 30 to 40 minutes for them to come
down. Then he would lecture them in a fatherly way.
It was
bizarre. +er
Prime Minister Blair:
I thought this would be an extraordinary
To-have done it is a tremendous achievement. Even
- making all allowances, it wouldn't have happened unless you had
been there and done it yourself. ~
thin~.
The President: There was no way.
For you it is the same. But
there is a limit to how many times you can do this.
I had to
just get there and listen to them for hours and hours. ~
Prime Minister Blair: We end up being part negotiator, part
therapist, and part leader.
~
I
The President:
Someday we should write a book together about
these two things, about our role as shrinks. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I could tell when I saw the signing
ceremony.
I could just tell what must have been going on -- the
nightmares to not let it disintegrate. You see they needed a
figure there.
This is what you will have done. You will have
brought them to see in the end that both of them had to do the
deal. -t€-)The President:
I don't have any question that I did the right
thing, but it was tough for them.
I tell
is one
thing I would like you tOrrd=o~.~~I~w~i~s~h~~o~u~~~~~~~o~f~f~a~____,
letter to both of them.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
~~==~====~------------~
Prime Minister Blair:
I am supposed to phone him, but I will
write him a letter.
I will definitely do that. Aef
The President: Call him, but if you write a letter, it can be
released.
I know we need to talk about finances and Kosovo a
bit, but, the other thin;
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
CQNn DENT IAL
�CONFIDEN'fIAL
4
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Mi ni s t e r BI air: / r:::-::o--:-:-::-:--:----:--:-:-:::-:-~
IE.O.13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
f
~~~~__~~__~--:---:-__~~~~~~~________~__~~~I
Okay,
Bill, I will certainly do that. And once again, well done. It
was a real personal triumph. ~
. The Presiderit:
Thank you.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: We had Arafat out to the EU get together
-- this informal European summit we just had. He told us a bit
about it. I will try to gear up the other Europeans to do the
same.
The President: Okay, let's talk about Kosovo briefly and then
go back to finances. What is your sense of where we are on
Kosovo? )Z1
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: I got it. Last night Wes Clark literally stayed
up all night working on him. Milosevic agreed to a specific set
of things that most reasonable people would conclude if he did
between now and the day of the ACTORD, the 27 th , he would be in
compliance. The one thing that is most important is that
nothing we and the French say between now and then should look
like anything other than that we are prepared to put the planes
in the air. We are on the same wavelength. {et
I think that he will do enough to comply for us all to agree
that he's done what he has to do. In the last several days, he
has done a lot of things to comply but also some backsliding.
We just have to hang in there. -+etcmlFIDKNTIAL
�CONFIDEH'FL7I,L
Prime Minister Blair:
that.
5
I agree absolutel.
We are at one with
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: That is good enough right now. I don't want to
give him mixed messages. Based on his meeting last night with
Wes, he will stick on compliance enough that we will not have to
use violence, but only if he thinks we are prepared to do it.
t,.ef -
Prime Minister Blair:
We are absolutely agreed on that.
+e1
The President: On the financial issues, I have a couple of
things. I got your letters last week and Bob talked to Gordon
Brown. There is a lot of good stuff in there. I would like to
propose that we try to put this in context of the heads of state
of the G-7 statement. ~
I would like to give you my view of this and let you respond.
First of all, I think we should be looking for -- without
raining on what Gordon has done so far -- I think we should be
looking for a G-7 statement from the leaders themselves
addressing long term reforms and the short term crisis as well
as the banking legislation in Japan and what we did with the IMF
here. ~
What I would hope we could do, because I think Rubin has a good
sense of how the markets will react, is ideally to get a
statement out next week, with or without a conference call with
our G-7 colleagues. It's your call as G-7 leader what you would
like. Then we would have a statement and it would have the
existing consensus on the promise for reform, on a detailed
agenda and procedure for achieving consensus. JR1
It would be good if we can get others to agree on this and on a
financial architecture. And I would also like to see, and Bob
thinks this is really important, an agreement on the proposal
for precautionary financing facility. In addition, we could
then or later also endorse the package for Brazil that the
finance ministers are working on. We know the shape it will be
in and who will pony up the money. ;e1
CONFIDENTIAL
�CONFIDEN'l'VlrL
6
It is okay for the finance ministers to announce it, but we need
to ratify it in the context of our statement next week -- or
when w~ get it done.
If Gordon and Bob Rubin could work to
build consensus around these elements, we could then have two
complementary statements.
First, a leaders' statement
describing key elements with consensus on long term reform,
endorsing the precautionary financing facility and also
endorsing the Brazilian thing.
Then the finance ministers and
central bank governors could lay it all out in greater detail.
I think if you have the finance ministers do something without
the leaders at this time, it doesn't break through with the
necessary force.
Je1
Prime Minister Blair:
I am in total agreement with that.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
One thing I can't figure out how to do, is to
find a device that all of us can live with directly or
indirectly to put limits on the degree of speculation while
leaving markets open to trade, investment, and even appropriate
hedging against currency reevaluation up or down. We can't have
over a trillion dollars a day changing hands without some
regulatory limits. We car.'t afford to have hundreds of millions
of dollars moving on a 90 percent leverage where they only have
to put up 10 percent. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
We need prudent rules.
~
The President:
You just can't have 90 percent leverage -- the
compounding is devastating. You also have to have some way to
buy the private sector into this to stop hemorrhaging outflows
from these countries.
Some don't feel this way, but these
capital credit controls for the short term can work -- just like
if the market drops more than 10 percent in a day, we can
suspend trading. But they don't work over the long or medium
COl?lFIDEH'fIAL
�7
COHFI DEN'l? IAL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
term. Malaysia
cas h res e rve s. r---""--O.";",;""==,,;:,,::,,,=-==--,-,-='--..C::,=::,,::,,--=,,:::,,:::,,:::,,:::,:::,,,:=-=::::.r.-=.:=::..:::...--.:::.:.;
Prime Minister Blair:
I agree. These ~re other things we need
to look at.
If we do a leaders' statement and finance
ministers' statement, it obviates the need for a summit now.
.JK}
The President:
One thing
particularly if there are
that our absolute outside
meeting, leaving open the
or Ja-nuary _or if we think
we should leave in reserve,
adverse reactions in the market, is
deadline should be the next G-7
possibility of a meeting in December
we have something else to say. j£'(
But let me say, this is more about your European political
situation than mine.
Two things: number one, it is important
to have the leaders' statement and let the finance ministers
fill in the blanks because you have a new leader in Germany
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Absolutely.
~
And we have a new leader in Italy
Prime Minister Blair:
Absolutely right.
~
The President:
It will empower them and makes them members of
the club. I think it is very good politics. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
It is why I am anxious to do it.
s otted it absolutel .
You
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
Alright.
Have you talked to Prodi?
I
CONFIDEN'f'IAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
�COtilfIElEHlIAL
8
IE.O.13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes, he is.
You probably don't
know D'Alema, do you?
The President:
No.
Prime Minister Blair:
~
I
:J
L-____________________- - - - The President:
He did a good job.
got a chance to call him. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I'm just sick.
I haven't
He would like that.
The President:
There are center left governments in every
country in Europe now.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
It is interesting with its possibilities,
but it also poses problems.
(e)
The President: Now that we have the responsibilities we have to
bear the burdens of the consequences. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The summit was quite interesting -- the
(Q')
The President:
I'll have Rubin follow up with Gordon Brown. We
may want to do a conference call next week. We can put out our
general statement on architecture of the precautionary financing
facility and ratify it when it is done.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
That would be great.
The President:
I E.O.13526, section 1.4(d)
us greater credibility.
)£1
Prime Minister Blair:
CONFIDEN'FIAL
Absolutely.
~
i t will give
�9
_ COMf'IDEliffTAL
,'
The President;
We also need to show we are serious on Brazil.
!z')
Prime Minister Blair: Okay Bill.
(U)
again congratulations.
The President:
Okay, goodbye.
All the very best'and once
(U)
-- End of Conversation
CONFIDEH'l'IAL
�COHFIDEN'PIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTO N
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Tony Blair
Notetakers: Tom Crowell, Frank Jarosinski,
George Chastain, Jenny McGee and Lawrence
Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
November 3, 1998, 3:29 - 3:37 p.m. EST
Oval Office
Prime Minister Blair:
Hi, Bill, how are you?
(U)
The President:
Fine, how are you doing? It's election day, so
I am just sitting around. Essentially, the elections are going
well.
These are good times, but the Republicans are in the
majority and have more money than we do. Not since 1922 has the
president's party gained seats, but we are doing well and the
exit polls look good.
They have outspent us, but we essentially
have a good message going.
(U)
I understand that you have been briefed on Bill Cohen's message
on Iraq.
I really appreciate all that you have said publicly,
but I still think that we have to take decisive action this time
to respond to Saddam's challenge. It is clear to me that Saddam
really wants to force the Council to lift sanctions without
giving up his weapons of mass destruction and missile program.
The Vice President talked to Crown Prince Abdallah today in
Saud'i Arabia, and he promised the support that we need. Bill is
discussing the details with him tonight in Riyadh.
~
We are working on a resolution for the Council, and I hope that
it can be finished in a couple of days. But it seems to me that
we need to be in a position to act soon, rather than drag it
out. We need to be in touch with Chirac.
I still have
questions about what they would say about the use of force.
The
COHFI DENT IA1
Classified by:
Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
1/5(b,d)
... '
Declassify On: _. 1l/0Y~-GB~,J'7C:'';;':''-~-'O-~~"-~'-~--'-~""'\.
i~tNTON L;:BRARY PHOTOCOPY
-:r
i?:~:~;~!:4;:~:~;;~.,.);"i;-;~.:;~-.>-~,-:\~.~.~~:.~:_---/.,~.~",\.
�2
COPlFIDENTIAl
French have been great in their public comments -- they have
been tough on Iraq -- but anything that you can do to keep
Chirac .on board.
I will call him tomorrow. -tetPrime Minister Blair:
The President:
Maybe I should call him.
I think you should.
~
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I actually made my comments in a press
conference with Schroeder yesterday.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
next day to see where we stand.
I will talk to Chirac in the
~
The President: As far as the Russians are concerned, they seem
pretty angry, too. jQ(
Prime Minister Blair:
JE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) J
The President:
I agree with you. Kofi seems to be keeping his
distance since Saddam shafted him. What do you think about
sooner rather than later?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)J
COIU'I15EWf IAL
�3
'CONTI DEN'!' TAt
IE-O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
I agree with that.
Prime Minister Blair:
~
~
How soon were you thinking of, Bill?
The President:
I don't know. I was thinking of over the next
several days.
It will take time to set things up and to develop
a case against him.
I've got to know who is dancing with us and
who is not.
I just wanted to check your temperature on it and
ask you to call Chirac. On the details, we need to be in very
close touch and work together. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE-O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
Keep your fingers crossed for us tonight.
Prime Minister Blair:
Bill.
(U)
The President:
Thanks.
All right.
Goodbye.
All the very best to you,
(U)
-- End of Conversation
CONFIDENTIAL
(U)
�THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 20l3-090, document no. 40
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom
NOTE -TAKERS:
Bonnie Glick, Sean Tarver, Joel Schrader, David
Higgins, Jim Smith and Roger Merletti
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
December 11, 1998 -- 1:00 p.m. - 1:15 p.m. EDT
Oval Office
The President:
Hello.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hi, Bill.
Hey, Tony.
Prime Minister Blair:
Fine.
(U)
How are you?
(U)
I am at the EU summit in Vienna.
(U)
The President:
Is it cold in Vienna?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: It is absolutely freezing.
cold, but a beautiful city.
(U)
Amazingly
The President:
I just wanted to check in with you on Iraq and
Ireland before I go to the Middle East this weekend. On
November 15, we said we would hold off on any strike while we
test Saddam's promise to cooperate with UNSCOM. So far, the
results have been mixed. There has been a lot of monitoring,
which is easy for the Iraqis to accept. But, UNSCOM was blocked
at Ba'ath party headquarters this week. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
~
_______________________
___
�2
~he
President: And they've received only 1 of 10 documents they
asked for, and Iraq is making inspections harder than they have
to be.
I can't tell if they are trying to get some concession
on sanctions review, or if they think we can't do anything at
this time of year.
If Iraq blocks another inspection this
weekend and if Butler finds that they are not cooperating as
they are required to do under the October 30 Security Council
letter -- if he actually says that -- I am inclined to think
that we should take the action that we suspended in November.
But, if he isn't significantly undercutting UNSCOM's ability to
do its job and Butler says that, I think he will simply have
slipped the disarmament noose forever. Now, we have a very
narrow window to operate with because of Ramadan and my going to
Israel this weekend. We will need to talk, and I will have to
find you wherever you are.
If the inspections are not blocked,
then we have to figure out how to handle the comprehensive
review issue.
Do we delay it or go forward? If we delay it,
there will almost certainly be a crisis, and out of respect for
their faith, we can't hit them during Ramadan. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.D. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
We don't have much, I don't think.
Prime Minister Blair:
~
No.
IE.D. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
It's
The President: We think we can get them out in 24 hours.
a much quicker turn-around. This may be part of what he is
miscalculating. He may think he will have more notice than he
would.
yt'll
/
TQf
.sECRE'f
�3
Prime Minister Blair: Right. What happens if we start to take
action and Shen Ramadan starts, as it were? Ramadan starts next
Friday?
(j'1)
The President:
If we start on Wednesday, we have enough time.
They assure me we do.
(jl) .
Prime Minister Blair:
Ramadan?
ifj)
The President:
We can do it.
(l~s,
Then, we can go in and get out by
we have four days.
That's plenty of time.
~)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O.13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
So, Butler is going to try to get more access
tomorrow? ..k8'f
The President:
says. ~
He has two more days, and then say whatever he
Prime Minister Blair:
say? -+&r
Right.
Do we know what he is going to
The President:
No, we don't. My gut is that he most likely is
going to say that he got some cooperation, but not full.
This
will make us think really hard on whether we can in good
conscience vote for this comprehensive review, and if we don't,
he will provoke a crisis over that.
It seems to me that it is
pretty substantial that he didn't let them go into Ba'ath party
headq~arters.
Anyway, you will have to talk to your folks, and
we may have to talk again in a few days when I am in the
Mideast. -+&JPrime Minister Blair:
Okay.
~
The President: Anyway, the other thing I wanted to tell you was
that I talked to Trimble and Adams on Tuesday.
I missed Hume
because he had to leave for Oslo.
I made it clear privately and
publicly in a speech that decommissioning is essential,
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
What do you think is happening?
J.Z!
�4
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I did all I could.
can do, just let me know. ~
If there is anything else I
Prime Minister Blair:
There may be a time to speak to Adams
again, but, for now, it is for us to sort out.
~
The President:
Okay, I agree with that.
I just wanted to
mention very briefly that I am going to make a real push to
resolve the Cyprus issue next year. But, before that, we have
to avert this missile problem next month.
I hope when you see
Clerides on Saturday that you persuade him to stop delivery to
Cyprus.
It would be terrible.
I hope you will do what you can.
You really tried to get the ED to soften its stance on Turkey.
I don't know if the coming of Schroeder helps at all. Maybe,
you can et a little better Ian ua e in our statement in
Vienna.
I think this missile deal
rea ly bothers me because of the Russian connection, and I see
so much in Russia going south on us.
Their space scientists
haven't received a check in eight months, and they could be
making' a fortune on missile launches from us.
I
~ 3ECRE'I'
/'
I
�5
SECRE'f
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
If you could make headway,
Prime Minister Blair:
tomorrow.
Oka, Bill.
I would appreciate it.
I will speak to Clerides
The President: After the first of the year, after I get all
this crap behind me, I would like to talk to you about this.
?-f
Prime Minister Blair:
I'd like to talk to you about a bunch of
things because there is a lot going on here in Europe.
yei
The President:
How is Schroeder working out?
~
J
Prime Minister Blair:
~----------------The President:
I had impressions watching his campaigning that
they adopted rhetoric similar to ours, but they didn't think it
through. You had a program to implement and so did I, and
that's a big difference. ~
prime Minister Blair:
Actually, I like him very much.
The president:
I do, too. The reason I mentioned this is
because I had a good talk with him on Turkey.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Now,
ere are other prob
Turkey, such
as human rights. Anyway, you might nose around Vienna and see
if you can send him help. +eT
Prime Minister Blair:
Sure, I
opportunity at dinner tonight.
The President:
There rna
be an
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
Tp('eECRE'P
/
�TOSE,CRET
'7-
6
T
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: As Christians, we are supposed to help whether
people appreciate it or not and it's the season for it. See you
soon.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Alright, Bill.
All the best.
Prime Minister Blair:
Bye.
Bye.
See you soon.
(U)
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
/
~SECRE!
(U)
�TH E WH ITE HOUSE
WAS HI NGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Tony Blair
Notetakers:
James Smith, Roger Merletti,
Frank Jarosinski and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
January 21, 1999, 2:26-2:53 p.m. EST
Oval Office
Prime Minister Blair:
Hi, Bill.
Kosovo.
I
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
Classified by:
Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
1.5 (d)
'-" >9-J~"-'''''''--"~-=~-~-'--''-''''~'--':''>~~' ,
Declassify on:! 1 /~'
l'
'f i .." ,- 'i~()NJJB~RYPHo;rocOPY' '1
I
-
.~.:~::::~::::":=~~=-_ ~;;;:";'',!'~-=:;' _.,'~
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2
be determined not to let him undermine the KVM and work over
Walker. I don't want to be slow or indecisive. I will try to
get Congress to go along with me and not stop it.
(R:')
Domestic politics aside, my problem about ground forces is that
if we send them in without some type of agreement beforehand -it doesn't have to be as detailed as Dayton --
I
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I really think we have to do somet ing, but I know
if we do military action without a political plan we will have a
problem. ...(.GtPrime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: I agree with that. On the other hand, this is
likely to be one of ·!:JieSe things where we can't see completely
to the end.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
eave 0 eep
working on it. We are in a much different situation than we
were legally and politically in Bosnia because the world has
said these people deserve autonomy but not independence. I
don't want to get into a pickle, but now that 45 people have
been slaughtered and Milosevic is trying to throw the KVM out,
we don't have any choice but to do something.
~
CONPIDEN''fIAL
�· COHFI DElff' IAL
3
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
One thing is to go to them and say, "Look, if
you want us to do any more you have to help, too.
They
probably have as many violations of cease-fires as Milosevic,
though his are more egregious.
"For a long-term resolution you
have to come to the table too, you can't have it both ways, and
you never take any responsibility.
J,K1
U
/I
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
It's important we do that.
~
They may ignore it but we have to try.
Prime Minister Blair:
we may get somewhere.
~
If we do that in a really concerted way,
I think it very important we do that,
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
That makes a lot more sense.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister
Blair·~~s.
(U)
The President:
It is a very difficult problem and I don't
pretend to have all the answers. We have to be careful not to
be weak and move decisively with NATO now, knowing it won't
solve the problem without a political resolution.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4 d
to sell
COMn OEM! IAL
ln an lmposslble posltlon.
I may not be able
time with Congress, but I certainly can't do
�4
CONFIDENTIAL
it unless there is an appropriate environment.
I think we
r - -.....
we have to keep working and go full speed ahead with NATO
E.O. 13526 section 1.4 d
Prime Mihister Blair:
The President:
I think that is exactly right.
I agree with that.
That is good.
~
~
Prime Minister Blair:
L -_ _-------------~
The President:
I agree.
That is what we need to do.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I agree with that.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
GONFIDEH'f'IM.
~
Okay, Bill, let's keep in touch on that.
Can I do anything?
Can I help at all?
(U)
�5
• C3HFI DEN':' L,\L
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: I'm really worried. Gerry Adams was here not
long ago, and I had a firm talk with him. I am really getting
kind of frustrated by them not doing anything. yel
.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: You just let me know.
have not hit a lick of this.
ye)
I am concerned that they
Prime Minister Blair:
I
The President:
),Q1
Yes, it does.
I don't know how .. just bizarre.
LP r_i_ffi_e__
__
M_i_n_l_.s_t e_r__
__ B_l_a_l_.r : ____________________________________==:::>
__
I
r::IE-.O-.-c-':-35::":2-::-6,-s-ec-ti=-o-n-1.-4(-b:-)(--'d)I
1
CONFIDENTIAL
�, CONFIDEHTL'I:L
The President:
6
All right.
What else? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Let me tell you what we're going on and what the
lay of the land is. We tried to negotiate to get a solution to
the EU restrictions in '92.
I would still like to do it. The
problem now for me is, I don't have any flexibility for
delaying.
Congress was going to impose them by statute, and
that-was trouble that I headed off. But the only way I could do
it was by sending them a letter that said I would do it, and
basically there is a little time left.
February 1 plus 10 days,
then there is probably another week after that before customs
could enforce it.
If there is any way you think your guys have
flexibility and work out a solution I would like to do it, but
one operation here lost nearly a billion dollars since this all
happened.
The law is pretty clear.
I don't want to do anything
to cause you problems.
In principle, I don't want Congress
legislating in the trade area. We had to send a letter that we
would do it, and now time has run out. So if there is anything
we can do, I will do it.
I don't want to cause you any trouble
but we're sort of stuck on it. Jer
Pr ime Mini ster Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
I know it does.
I've been fooling with it a
long time and also some people who are pushing it have enormous
influence in Congress and I know them well.
We sort of delayed
this for years and if there is any way we can resolve it, it
would be a good thing.
yef
Let me ask you another thing.
another year in office,
Menem was here and he said he has
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
He has a great economic policy. We're trying to stave off the
financial crisis from reaching Latin America, and Brazil is
shaky" He asked i f you might be able to do something on it.
The thing he mentioned the most was travel.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
CONFIDENTIfJ,
I~.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
I
(C)
�7
.C ON F I DEIfy I f.L
The President: It's something you might think about.
He would
like to work out some accommodation.
The thing he mentioned
three different times was travel restrictions. ~
I
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
He was here last week.L-~~~--~~==~~~~==~====~----------~
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
There was a war, which they lost, and he understands that.
But
there are Argentines with relatives there, or relatives buried
there, and if they could get some across, to get access to do
things.
Whatever happens, if you could look into it, without
raising the fundamental questions from the war, it would be
positive for you and him.
Je1
Prime Minister Blair:
speak soon. ~
Okay.
Okay.
Bye.
Prime Minister Blair:
Bye.
The President:
I will look at that.
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation
..- :;
CONE'IDElfrIAL
Bill, we.' 11
�cm;rFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 42
DECLASSIFICATION DATE; October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION.
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
James Smith, Roger Merletti,
David Higgins, Matthew Sibley, Elizabeth
Rodgers, Robin Rickard, Michael Manning,
Larry Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
time.
(U)
February 4, 1999, 2:13-2:30 p.m. EST
Oval Office
Nice to hear your voice.
Al had a wonderful
Prime Minister Blair:
It was great. He went down well. He was
fantastic with all the New Deal programs. He met with all those
business people.
The unemployment program was really
impressive.
I thought it was a good visit and he was fantastic
on it.
(U)
The President:
He also liked when he went into Prescott's
office and the only decoration was a bowl of bananas.
I heard
(U)
all about it. He was very happy.
Prime Minister Blair:
I hope we get all that sorted out.
(U)
The President: My staff won't let me talk to you unless I have
a banana at hand.
I'm sitting here with a banana; it's a big,
ugly, brownish one.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
about Kosovo.
~
COHFIDENTIAL
Reason:
1.5(d
Declassify On:
Now Bill, I thought we should have a word
�2
CONFIDEH'fIAL
The President:
Yes.
Let me tell you, the Prime Ministers of
both Macedonia and Albania were here today and they make .us look
like old men.
They are 31 and 33 years old.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I
Prime Minister Blair:
I think Robin and Madeleine did a reall~
good job and we got a plan.
The parties are coming on Saturday
and the KLA are involved, as well.
That is all good.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
I agree.
Prime Minister Blair:
(C)
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
First of all, I agree with everything you say
about maintaining pressure on Belgrade and the Kosovars on the
interim settlement.
I'm encouraged by Saturday's talks.
There
is no other way it works over the long run unless we can get a
peace agreement and troops on the ground. -tc+-
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
It is a hard sell in Congress. They still lecture me on Bosnia
and how we didn't pay for it in advance.
I tell them Bosnia is
a great success story and they ought to be proud of it and keep
it going, and not let it be wiped out.
I gather there is a
general feeling that a lot of European countries are willing to
make troop contributions. That will help me to get Congress to
support participation. You know I always want to be part of
these things.
~
CONFIDEN'fIAL
�3
CONFI DENT IA L
I just gave a speech today.
I basically said we were
considering our participation and talking to Congress about it.
I will make the strongest case I can, but our system is that
they have to come up with money for it. The more European
countries that are willing to participate and the greater
extent, the better luck I will have with the Republican
Congress. .J.I21
Ironically, all the business with me might help us get something
done here.
I think the announcement of substantial British
participation, which I gather is your decision, will help us a
lot.
I want to help and I made my first big public pitch today.
We will work with Congress and stay in close touch. Our
military people are in contact and are simultaneously designing
this concerning who contributes what.
I will do the best that I
can.
I wish I could give you a number now, but I don't know
what level yet.
I am working it and I'll do the best I can .
..k81"
Prime Minister Blair:
Well, Bill, that is great.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
Great. Let me say, there's one other thing that
would help me.
If you put out that we talked, say that we have
this under active consideration. That is what I just said
publicly.
If you could not say that I have made a definite
decision. Because the Congress is Republican, at every public
hearing we have, they start moping and saying that I expect them
to fall in line afterward because they never refuse to support
the troops.
If you could say I haven't made a decision, that
would give me another day to massage the congressional psyche
and break it loose here. kef
Prime Minister Blair:
Don't worry, that is absolutely fine.
That is very good indeed. Thanks, as ever.
~
The President:
Well, you are doing great.
press in the New York Times.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
CONFI DEH'l? IAb
Well,
You even got good
it cost a lot of money.
(U)
�4
The President:
You got good press in the New York Times and I
got a good editorial in the Guardian.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Guardian. ·(U)
Yes, you got an editorial in the
The Pres iden t : They said I was more 1 iberal than you.
know if that is good or bad.
(U)
I don't··
Prime Minister Blair: Well, it's good for you. Your state of
the Union, as I suspected, had a big impact around Europe.
I
was in Vienna last week with center-left leaders.
It made a big
impact there.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President: We need to think about our next steps.
thought that NYU conference was good.
~
I
Prime Minister Blair:
They (the Center-left leaders) are
absolutely desperate for it. They now buy entirely the argument
that we can learn from America. The State of the Union did
help. The leader of the United states was talking about
building a cohesive, peaceful society and the rest of it.
It
was language they can understand.
JR7
The President:
Yes.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I think we certainly should do some more.
They are desperate. ~
The President: One thing I think you should have your guys
thinking about. What is our response to tough challenges?
Like, is there a third way response to financial crises? How do
we stop the reversal of trade liberalization and take it up
again? With all these troubles in Asia, the temptations to
close down the movement for trade liberalization will be great.
-i-et"
Prime Minister Blair:
I think that is absolutel
to be a big part of our discussions.
IE.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)1
COHFIDEH'FL"rL
. ~-;~--.ft~F'c'=~~c~~~-"'~!
'~~INTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
. ~~~_:~~~.-..::_ ;~"~~.!~~,",,-_';_:::::~~~J...."""
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right.
It has
�5
CONFIDEHT L,\L
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The president:
I agree with that.
I think when we do the next
G-8 meeting we really ought to give some thought to setting up
our trade position and also think about what wrinkles need to be
in the finance system position as well. We will have a lot to
talk about in advance, but the G-8 will give you a forum and me
a forum and our crowd a forum to elevate some of these issues.
J..&r
Prime Minister Blair:
I agree completely.
vtI
The President: We will be in constant touch the next few days
to wrap it up and nail down what to do.
;e1
Prime Minister Blair: King Hussein.
I'm really sorry. Je1
What a terrible thing.
The President:
Yes, he just left here. He is going home on
life support. You know he did his best, but I will be surprised
if he pulls out of this. -+et
Prime Minister Blair:
I just saw him a couple of days ago and
thought he was looking better.
(e)
The President: He had a severe relapse. Noor brought him over
here.
I just think that this is the way these conditions are.
They overwhelm your system and you have nothing left.
Y1
Prime Minister Blair:
other thing.
CONFI DEN'±' lAL
It's a shame for the guy.
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
(,,~~?-ffi;~~i""~-,-,..·=~p~,-·-..-c;""1
INTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY' . t
,. .
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.
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.~;'.~\~~~.:':'>-.<- . -.--~.,.'.."" ",-
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,;
',"
Bill, just one
�.IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
6
CONFIDENTIAL
The President: Any time, day ar night.
It is my awn private
passian . . I have been warried far yau. To. the peaple an the
autside, it seems idiatic that we wauld allaw these elements to.
disrupt progress. You are where you are and whatever I can do
to. disladge it, let me know.
If you have something specific for
me to come at them with, let me know that, too. -tet
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
1
Is Bertie going to be all right?
(C)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I hope so.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
We need him.
(C)
Really, we do need him.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Yes.
Prime Minister Blair:
matters. -+&lThe President:
Let us keep in touch on Kosovo and other
All right, man.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
All right, Bill.
Goodbye.
Prime Minister Blair:
I'll see you soon.
All the best.
(U)
Goodbye.
(U)
End of Conversation
COUFIDEN'l'IAL
,-
(U)
(U)
�CONFI DEN'P VeL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Tony Blair
Of the United Kingdom
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
British Prime Minister Blair
Notetaker: Bonnie Glick, David Higgins,
Robin Richard, Joel Schrader, James Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
February 19, 1999, 10:59 a.m. - 11:24 a.m. EST
Oval Office
How are you?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay.
Prime Minister Blair:
Fine.
(U)
How are you?
(U)
(U)
Kosovo
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Chlrac lS with you today?
The President: He is here and I will meet with him in a few
~m~iEn~U!t~e~s~.~==~--~~~~~~======~~~~--~--~--~----~-----\
I
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d) I
_
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
Let's make sure we are on the same
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1. 5 (d)
Declassify On:i
2/~_,~~~-~~~~,,~~-~~
';:-.
i
_.
-.
;, ~~I
t'."L~tON LIBRARY PHOT060fy ',:.1. '
"2.~.:::'~ ¢~!;~:~:;"-:':~;'-~~~;d;~~~;:;'~~';i~_..;'·;5...-+f~
.
�CONFIDEN'fIAL
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
2
I
Prime Minister Blair:
'I
The President: Well, I agree with that.
The trick is to give
him some chance to come around and not seem lik
unlimitedly.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
I
agree with that.
you?
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
The President:
Prime Minister Blair:
COHFI DEN'!' lAL
--,
€,~fi~'~~~;(,
'r~: ,!~TON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY'
f
t-;.=...~~~~~~.::~:...." ..~--:_._.-.~,: -'-''':'.h._ L':'~~;:'_"" -~-:-o- r;~r,·.,:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
�· CONFIDEN'l'IAL
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
3
The President:
I agree with that. That is good.
I think we are
doing all right on getting the enabling force together.
I don't
know if Milosevic is playing brinkmanship or not. He seems to
believe he loses Serbia if he lets NATO in there. ke1
Prime Minister Blair:
Yeah.
]
L l_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _- - - - -
The President: Let me ask you a couple of questions. What is
your sense on KVM? I know the EU is interested in a n w
structure,
I E.O.13526, section 1.4(d) I
accomplished by tFh~e~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~----,
implementation.
been so forthcoming, and I
want to screw it up. je)
Prime Mi nister Blaic
I
)
IL--_ _ _ ______
The President:
That's right.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
Is there anything else?
(U)
The President: No, I don't think so. What about Northern
Ireland? Jim Steinberg had a good meeting with Ambassador
Christopher Meyer yesterday on the outlook for the next two
months. We are working on some ideas to complement your strategy
for a push by the first anniversary of the Good FridayAgree~ent.
I am ready to do my part around st. Patrick's day here and look
forward to seeing Mo Mowlam. You have made a lot of progress and
seem to have gotten it back on track. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
CO~jFI DENT' 1AL
�· COh'PIDEN'fIAL
4
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I'm with you.
have no choice.
~
It could boomerang on us but we
Prime MinioterBlair:
- I . - - I_
The President:
_
)
_
I agree.
_
_
~
~
Prime Minister Blair:
Obviously you and I should speak before St. Patrick's day.
The President:
I think that's right.
yt)
Prime Minister Blair: So there it is, I think.
keep in close touch on things. I
CGNF I DEN'3?IAL
~)
So Bill, let's
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
�· conFIDENTIAL
5
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The P:r:e,sident:
Six months o:r: so ago
when I spoke to you, I was in a big flght with my T:r:easu:r:y guys'
about the need to have leade:r:s get togethe:r: on it and cha:r:t a
cou:r:se whe:r:e we change the o:r:ientation of the IMF a little bit
and get into the necessity fo:r: inte:r:national standa:r:ds fo:r:
banking. We :r:eally a:r:e moving in steps, in increments towa:r:ds a
B:r:etton Woods II arrangement. I think we realized we :r:ushed into
getting money into them without them having the internal
protection'they needed. But a lot of T:r:easu:r:y folks treat this
like Einstein looking for the theory of relativity or biologists
looking for the cure for cancer: when they find it they will
tell us. I felt our Treasury kept resisting a big meeting six
months ago because markets we:r:e so shaky that if we met and did
not come up with an answer it would foster instability. They
don't feel that way anymore.
(Q1
We have to find a wa
thing kicked off.
around the G-7 or otherwise try to get this
We do need some
forum in which leaders can clearly articulate where we are, what
we have done, and where we are going.
o 0 peop e are upse
the composltion of
the commlt ee of the 25 nations (G-22) meeting because they are
not a sanctioned IMF type group. Maybe the G-7 cuts a lot of
people out of the loop and a lot of those nations think Europe is
over-represented. I am not hung up on that myself but, we do
need to find a way to have higher visibility to let the world
know we are working toward a more stable position. We ou ht to
tr to resolve this when the G-7 meets in Germany.
P:r:ime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
COHFI moNT L",L
.§
~
~
'"
~
~
......
�CONFIDEHl'IAL
6
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
say?
yt)
Yes,
I like that.
What do you think Chirac will
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I got
track, but we need to
you back after I talk
right frame of mind.
).e1
Prime Minister Blair:
I
it.
I'm with you.
I think we are on same
figure out how to keep going.
I may call
to him, but I will try to get him in the
I
~I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~/
The President:
I am worried about Russia as well.
have spent some quite intense discussion time on this.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
The Russians have no tax
system.
I don't know what to do about all that either, but we
should talk about it.
Its almost like a psychological problem,
in part, as well as the obvious political problem. We may need
to put a little more money on the table for them to do that.
~
I
Prime Minister Blair:
i You and I
can talk about it later~.----------------------------~ ~=-~~--~----~~
IE.O. 13526, section
The President: All right, I'll follow up.
with Jacques right now.
+e1
--End of Conversation--
CONFI D£NTI}U
I'm going to meet
1.4(b)(d)i
�COpFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
The President
Prime Minister Tony Blair
PARTICIPANTS:
Notetakers: George Chastain, Doug Bayley,
Frank Jarosinski, Matthew Sibley, Roger
Merletti, Jim Smith and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
March 4, 1999, 4:40 - 5:04 p.m. EST
Oval Office
Prime Minister Blair:
Hi, how are you doing?
(U)
The President:
I'm fine, I guess.
I just got a bunch of stuff
going on here, but everything is all right. How are you doing?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I am fine.
you about this damn thing.
I'm really sorry to bother
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
When is the election, May 6?
Prime Minister Blair:
Jef
Yes, May 6.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: Let me tell you what.
I have to be a little
careful about how I say this. Most of our people think that the
WTO panel may approve a smaller aggregate amount.
If they
will try to do what I can to be helpful.
CONFIDENTIAL
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On:;
i
�CONFIDENT 13\L
2
we do this, it will presumably be well in advance of the
election. Anything you can do through Leon to get the WTO panel
to make their decision would be very helpful.
The only way we
can get nailed is if they approve the exact amount, but I assume
it will be lower, then we'll have an opportunity. -teT
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minlster Blair:
The President:
They are significant.
One of the things I've
tried to do before, and I hope this year will pass, is a new
initiative to get more money through trade and investment.
They're extremely vulnerable to drug lords, and bananas will be
essentially a holding action.
I think that maybe this is
something the European Union and United States can do together
and get them more help down there.
I am worried about both
Caribbean and Central America because of this storm.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I
I think it is a legitimate serious issue, not just
about two Central American countries going broke.
It's a deeper
thing on all sides.
I would be prepared to work on that.
The
main thing between now and May is to get these guys to talk.
If
you could get the WTO panel to make a rapid decision, maybe we
could work something through on this.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I
(..e)
The President: What they could do, what I am worried about, is
they may be sympathetic to you, and maybe rule against you on
the merits.
If they keep kicking the can down the road, that
would be the worst for you politically. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I agree with you.
I'm trying to pass a billion
dollar trade initiative and all the right-wing Republicans
bailed out on me yesterday.
They spent all that money, billions
Ir.: 0;::-".-:17
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35==2:-::6-,
s-ec-'-tl:-' 71."':-4(7b7":)(-:7ld)I
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�COHFIDEN'fIPrL
3
'JE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)J
and billions, supporting dictatorships and taking sides in civil
wars, but they won't help me get them back on their feet.
They're trying to keep me from getting it before I go down there
next week,
..(-et
~rime
Minister Blair:
The President:
I got it. Look, basically what is at stake here
is I've had to fight back 80 percent of both parties in Congress
who want to legislate something worse than what I did. The
whole credibility of the WTO is at issue here. But what is
important, in order for me to do anything, is for the WTO to
decide sooner rather than later.
I should have some flexibility
if they decide that it should be X million dollars less. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
That would be very helpful.
~
The President:
That is why it's important not to talk about it.
Because if we do I will have everybody allover me.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
\
The President:
Can I ask you another quick question.
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
(U)
(U)
The President: What do you want me to say on
over here? Where will we be by then? ~
st.
Patrick's Day
Prime Minister Blair:
CmJFIDENTIAL
JE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)J
�4
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
1
'----_ _ _--'--_-----'1
The President: Let me ask you this.
Is there some way to
manifest the commitment by something they say to you or me?
Then a week later, some big declaration on decommissioning.
there some way to do it that way? le1
Is
~
Prime Minister Blair: /
'------~~
The President:
Right now, they're saying trust me.
could make these statements, then dick around. Jk1
But they
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
J,R:}
How do they justify the Good Friday accords?
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
GOHFI DEWl'Ilffi
�5
CGNFIDENnAL
• IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
I
The President:
I completely agree. If you have any more
instructions or advice between now and st. Patrick's Day, I'll be glad to have it. But, I got it. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I
The President:
I think we have a chance to get the Kosovars to
all right on the Kosovo agreement. J21
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
Prime Minister Blair:
Really?
(C)
(91
That would be great.
~
The President: Bob Dole went over there today for me. He's
been a champion of theirs.
I'd say we have a pretty goud
chance.
I'm worried about the possibility of the Kosovars
saying yes, Milosevic saying no, and NATO will blink.
I'm
really worried. We need to suck it up. You and I may have to
do another round of calls. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
stuff,
j)2')
All right.
Prime Minister Blair:
Let me know about all this other
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
Thanks a lot.
(U)
The President:
I'll see you.
If you have anything more on the
other issues, let me know, directly or indirectly, through our
channels.
(U)
CONFlDEN'i'IAL
�6
C~FIDEN'fIAL
Prime Minister Blair:
Again, sorry to trouble you.
(U)
The President: That's okay.
I may have to start ordering 50
_percent of my bananas from the Caribbean and Central America.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
See you.
(U)
The President:
Okay, Bill.
Good-bye.
All the very best to you.
(U)
-- End of Conversation
CONFI DEN'!' lAL
�., ..' ••..:...!....
COHFI DEN}' IAL
lil{l
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Tom Crowell, George Chastain,
Robert Ford, Matt Sibley, Lawrence Butler
and Miriam Sapiro
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
March 14, 1999, 1:55-2:12 p.m. EST
The Residence
Prime Minister Blair:
Hi, Bill.
(U)
The President: Hi, Tony.
I had a really good trip down to
Central America.
I am a bit tired.
It was a good trip.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Did you just get back?
(U)
The President:
I got back a couple of days ago and then had to
turn around and go to Arkansas. But it was a good trip.
The
thing I found interesting was that despite all the horrible
problems they have had with the hurricane and the legacy of all
of the civil wars, those places are very well governed, with
enormous potential.
They're all very poor, except for Costa
Rica, but they're very well governed. The biggest problem is in
the aftermath of all the civil wars a lot of guns were left
there, something that you know about. There are also a lot of
criminal gangs in the rural areas that make them less than safe
so it is hard to get tourism going there.
In El Salvador there
were former rebels and soldiers in suits listening to my speech.
It was quite nice.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I thought we could have a quick word on
Northern Ir'eland before they all get there.
(U)
The President:
I agree.
(U)
COUFIDEN'1'IAL
Reason:
1.5(d)
Declassify On: 13/1~{.Ji~~,.;.{,,-~~-~-:--~-----,:\'
~~1NTO~ LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY, 'f'
'.
~:~~..:;~.-,:,,:,.~:,".<;';~j_.~..:::+; .>__ :~_;'~:~.r.-.~.t.~.:. ~r'"
�CotfPIDEN'fIAL
2
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
First, I completely agree with that. George
Mitchell believes that there can't be very much time between
what Trimble does and the movement on decommissioning. They
need to give some sort of private assurances that they can
pocket. If they can't give i t to Bertie or DeChastelain, to you
or someone.
I am beginning to get a little concerned. )k1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I agree.
I will do whatever I can to help get
this done.
We will just have to see, but I am quite hopeful.
(,e'(
Prime Minister Blair:/
CONFI DE~lT L""L
\
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
�3
CONFIDEN'I'IAL
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
That's fine.
I don't mind.
I am determined not
to let this. get away_
We need this badly, and I would like to
resolve this in the first half of this year, if we can. This
will give us the momentum while all the other things are going
on.
I will do whatever you want me to.
I will do whatever it
takes. )ef
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
Yes, I told D'Alema you can do whatever you
should. We have never had a problem with the EU having a
different position than the United States. EVen going back
before my presidency, we were sponsors of the resolution leading
to the Oslo accords.
We have to sa those issues will have to
be resolved in the last phase.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
principle.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Exactl.
That is m
osition as a matter of
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
~
Okay, thanks.
I think you are right where you
The President:
If not, then don't
need to be.
If you think it helps, do it.
do it. ..(-e)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
CONFI LiEN T 1AL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
�CONFIDENTIAL
4
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
Prime Minister Blair: I
~
The President:
~----------------------------------~
That is my conclusion. -fer
]
Prime Minister Blair: /
The President:
When is the G-7 meeting in Germany?
Prime Minister Blair:
~
In the middle of June.
The President:
You are going to do something here with the DLC,
aren't you?
(C)
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes, in April.
~
The President:
Our guys are worried about it raining on NATO's
parade. We got huge press coverage here yesterday. They went
to Harry Truman's home to sign the documents for the NATO event
with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. +et
Prime Minister Blair:/
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
Let me have a look at my schedule.
In the first
half of the year it would be extremely difficult to make a
separate trip, but if I am in Germany, maybe I can add a day
onto my trip. Where does he want me to do it, in Florence? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I think so.
ke1
The President: That would be a real burden, would it not?
Someone has to shoulder the responsibility.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
Have you been there before?
(Q1
The President:
Yes, Hillary and I spent a wonderful week there.
As a matter of fact, it was ten years ago this week.
Y21
I love it. It is one of my favorite
Prime Minister Blair:
cities in the world.
I will think about it and get back to you.
JKJ
CONFIDEN'fIAL
�COHPIDEN'PIAL
5
The President: Good.
I think that we are in sync on the other
two matters.
I won a big vote in Congress on Kosovo.
I think
it's interesting because when the Republicans pushed for it,
they didn't think I would win it. Our guys worked very hard on
it and won a big vote with explicit authorization to deploy,
consistent with the conditions I've stated.
I feel good about
it. But I don't think there is any way that Milosevic will take
this deal.
But we believe the Kosovars will take it and then .
we will be right back
and I.
KO. 13526, section 1.4 d
Prime Minister Blair:
IKO. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)I
The President:
If the Kosovars say yes, and they have been
difficult, we may even get Milosevic to the point where he will
say yes -- if we stay tough and if we are prepared to use force.
But if not, he will jerk us around. ).e1
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
Yeah, I will do that. Do you want me to buy a
cashmere sweater from him with duties? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
bananas.
.(.e)
You don't have to do that or give him
The President:
I wish we could get this resolved before your
elections, you know.
IZ5
Prime Minister Blair:
IKO. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President: We got a really rough column that said this is
not what the new world order was meant to be. Kosovo goes to
hell, and we have a war over this. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
CONPI DEN'fIAL
Do shake hands with him.
(91
�courT BEtH' L"tL
6
The President:
I thought I could have my whole wardrobe of
Scottish cashmere brought down to him.
The Irish wouldn't like
it.
Hell, I think even the Irish sweaters I have are Scotti~h.
Okay, I will see you.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
Okay, all the best to you.
End of Conversation --
COUPI DEWPIAL
(U)
�SECR]!;T
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
IS CAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 46
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Doug Bayley, Frank Jarosinski,
Joel Schrader, Miles Murphy and Lawrence
Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
March 21, 1999, 12:50.- 1:12 p.m. EST
Residence
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi, Bill.
How are yoU?
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
(U)
I'm fine.
How were things last week?
(U)
The President:
What do you mean, last week?
Prime Minister Blair:
and everything.
jet
(U)
With the Irish -- Gerry Adams, Trimble
The President:
I'm sorry; I have been through all kinds of hell
with this Kosovo thing. You ought to get a transcript of George
Mitchell's comments to them.
I gave him a Medal of Freedom
here. He said, "I don't want to talk about what I did, but what
needs to be done." He said, "I hope that about a thousand
people will ignore me while I make these remarks to the
parties." It was devastating. He was great.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I heard he was brilliant.
~
The President:
I did exactly what you asked me to. Hell, I
don't know.
It looks to me like Gerry needs some sort of cover
SECRE'f
Reason:
1.5(d)
Declassify On:
�8ECRET
2
for demilitiariztion and then can give cover to Trimble to do
what he needs to do. ,It is important to keep pushing it
forward.
(.Q1"
Prime Minister Blair:
Okay, that's what we will do.
J.Gt
The President: Anyway, I did the very best I could.
I had
chills running up and down my spine yesterday.
There is a new
book here by Daniel Silva who is a former Washington journalist.
The book is called "The Marching Season" and you are in it.
For
some reason he uses a fictitious President, but the real you.
There is an ultrasecret Protestant group and they are out there
acting against everybody -- Protestants, Catholics.
It's purely
fictional,-but it gave me the chills about what could happen if
we don't keep doing this.
I was frustrated, and I know you are,
but I don't know what else I can do.
I will do whatever.
(C)
Prime Minister Blair:
Okay, Bill, thanks anyway for last week .
..(-e)
The President:
You have to table some fix for this and let us
pressure Adams to take it.
I don't think there is anything else
we can do. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President: Can we talk Kosovo? Milosevic has agreed to
meet Holbrooke. He will go over there tomorrow and tell him he
will bear the full responsibility for consequences for NATO
military action unless he does what he is told to do.
I got
reports this morning of one village of 13,000 people that has
been completely evacuated.
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d)
SECRE'f
�SECRE'I'
3
Primakov is supposed to come here next week, and I need to give
him a heads up so if he wants to cancel he can. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Absolutely . .....fBi
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
I couldn't a ree more.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
There are one "or two issues
that I want to talk to you about'before going on, but we can
talk in the next day or two on that. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
I agree with that.
I had a meeting with a lot
of members of congress and several Republicans said that it
sounds bad -- if he were out there practicing ethnic cleansing
again we would support it, but if we take the initiative and he
moves against the people it will look like we caused it.
(S)
Sr:CIZEI
�3ECRET
4
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
Prime Minister Blair:
I
I
The President:
The reason we did not take any other action is
because the peace process was going on. ~
Prime Minister Blair:/
The President:
That is what my critics here are going to say .
......l-51
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I agree with that. Let me ask you this. How
are the Tories reacting at home? Are they supporting you? .-\-B1
,prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
Our right wing isolationists certainly would if
they thought they could get public opinion on their side and
since they have the parliamentary majority they would cause a
problem.
The Republicans fluctuate between isolationism and
unilateral action. They want the biggest possible military and
want to spend money on only the military and concrete, but never
want to use it on anything.
I think that in the near term I am
in need of a stronger presentational argument than you are.
I
am hoping that it will be fine, I couldn't agree more that we
3ECRE'f'
�SECREr
5
need to get a strong presentation.
If the others are going with
us, we need Chirac and Schroeder saying the same thing. ~
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
Prime Minister Blair: /
I
The President: Yes, I will call them when I get off the phone
with you.
I understand they are even chiding us a little bit
about whether we are moving quickly enough.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I have to call and tell him the
truth and let him stay home if he wants to. But he still needs
to come here because he needs the money and the IMF agreement
worked out.
%
Prime Minister Blair:
(S)
The President:
I am still very worried about it. And I am
worried about them because the Duma seems incapable of doing
anything positive to help themselves along.
We could save them
a lot of money if they could ratify START II.
Then I could go
immediately to START III. And then I could pass this bill to
accelerate threat reduction with the nuclear stockpile that
could occupy as many as 20,000 or half the military scientists
over the next two years. But the Duma seems incapable of doing
a lot of this stuff.
I don't think we have any choice
whatsoever. We don't want to polarize them further, but we need
to take some form of action. 121
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
You got it. One thing we have to figure out is
a strategy that will keep the money there that we pump in. All
the money disappeared in 48 hours the last time. ..(..et
Prime Minister Blair:
SEeRE'!'
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�SECRE'f
6
The President:
Why don't we plan on talking tomorrow or the
next day and we will work on Kosovo right now.
~
Prime Minister Blair.
Okay, we will be in a position to
discuss it again tomorrow. ~
The President:
Okay man. Sorry I didn't do more on Ireland,
but I tried.
I even got Trimble and Adams to sit in my private
office alone for a while.
JQ1
Prime Minister Blair:
Well it went off very well here.
kef
The President:
I think the public vibes were very good indeed,
but I didn't have the feeling that I helped you move the ball
forward on the substance of it. ~
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)!
Prime MInIs er Blair:
.~I
________________________________------------~
The President:
I don't think Gerry wants it to get off the
tracks and that is heartening.
I know damn well Trimble does
not, but he wants his leadership position as well.
(e)
~
Prime Minister Blair:
'-------~/
The President:
If you could have a referendum on this, the
people could come up with 15 permutations. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I
IE-O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
That's another thing I thought about.
I think
the IRA people with personal history have a lot more ideology on
this whole decommissioning issue than the facts warrant. They
seem to think that if they unilaterally do this, it is like
saying that what the struggle is all about and what they said
all those years is illegitimate. They are loading a lot of crap
that does not need to be loaded. The only way to get off the
psychological hook is to make it part of a bigger disarmament or
find some proposal people could ratify and let their reps off
the hook.
The atmospherics seem great, but I didn't have any
specifics that I could glean.
I don't see Trimble having a
viable option.
I did not mean to be so negative but I don't
SECRE'F
�7
3ECREl'
think Sinn Fein thinks they can say different words and make it
happen. I don't think words alone will do it.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
All right man.
(U)
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
Prime Minister Blair:
(C)
The President:
I agree. If there is a problem with Chirac or
Schroeder I will have to call you back.
(C)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I am here.
Bye, Tony.
(U)
(U)
-- End of Conversation
�TH E WH ITE HOUSE:
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Jenny McGee, Miles Murphy,
Ralph Sigler and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
March 23, 1999, 5:11-5:22 p.m. EST
The Oval Office
Prime Minister Blair:
I'm fine.
I'm in Berlin.
(U)
The President:
I know, Gerhard just told me you were there.
Holbrooke is on his way back. Milosevic stiffed him. He
wouldn't agree to a cease-fire. He was belligerent and it seems
to me he's strongly poised to unleash reater violence in
Kosovo.
I want to talk about two things: first, Pri~akov has postponed
his visit to Washington. I think that's the best outcome given
the circumstances. Maybe you can call him in the next day or
two and tell him you understand why he didn't come to
Washington.
I E.O. 13526, section IA( d)
SECl":t!:T
Reason:
1.5(a,b,d)
Declassify On:
3/23/0_9~,c~~,~ __~---~(
r"...A,?.::-.----,"~- .. ~;::--,:.
.
,'
J
'~:r~~LffiRA~~ PtlO:OCOPy__
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,""
�2
SECRE'P
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
Prime Minister Blair:
I
\
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President: \
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
I
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
/
The President:
Yes, we sat around the room today saying, "Geez,
this is re~11y bad. We could lose what we did in Bosnia but we
have no option." If we don't, he will just clean them out, kill
a bunch of people and do bad things.
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d)
SECRE'f
�SECRET
3
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
L-~IE=.=O=.1=3=52=6=,s=e=ct=io=n=1.=4(=b=)(::::d)::!....I_...J1 ~
Is Jacques there with you, or is Jospin there?
( C)
Prime Minister Blair:
The
~resident:
They are both in Berlin, yes.
~
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
Did it go over well in Europe?
~
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, it went over very well.
said it was ver effective.
Our media
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
I am completely there and knew you would be too.
I
Prime Minister Blair:
I "0.13526,
""'0" 1.4(d)
Okay, I will speak to him about that.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
SECRET
�SECRf:T
4
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
I couldn't agree more.
fer
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
There have never been any natural boundaries.
couldn't agree more. ~
I
. Prime Minister Blair: We will make strong points and I will
speak to D'Alema and Chirac tomorrow. ~
The President:
Great, if you want to call me any time of the
day or night, call me.
I don't expect to sleep much tonight.
(C)
Prime Minister Blair:
Tougher than Iraq isn't it?
~
The President: Yeah. They have better air defenses and we have
people in the vicinity that are vulnerable. The stakes are high
but the potential benefits are enormous. jQ1
Prime Minister Blair:
I
The President:
I hope Milosevic can find a way out. He
compares it to the Ottoman Empire and how they stopped them In
Bosnia, and now he stands up to the Empire of the West.
It is
crazy.
()21
Prime Minister Blair:
I
)
L -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _- - - - The President:
Okay.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
All right, Bill.
Goodbye.
All the best.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
SECRE'f
(U)
�.
.
SECRE'f
.'
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Joel Schrader, Miles Murphy,
Jenny McGee, Jim Smith and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
March 30, 1999, 6:12 - 6;24 p.m. EST
Residence
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi Bill.
Hey Tony.
(U)
How are you doing?
Are you sleepy?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
doesn' t it?
yzi
Not much sleep in Northern Ireland.
(U)
Kind of makes you long for the Albanians,
Prime Minister Blair:
Pretty much.
How is it going there?
The President:
I think your statements have been
seem to have a real consensus.
reat.
We
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Yes, I agree with that. They're all saying
maybe we didn't think it through, but we didn't have all the
time in the world.
,sECElli:T
Reason:
1 . 5 ( a, b, d)-
Declaosify On"
1
' . , ._" ___ 0~·--~~""
4/~~::::~CPHO:OCOPY
,t_:=~3.:.~i;'i~;;C~.:"-:~;,j"~·"7""~~:"":"'. .:.-.:.:,~~ ..~,...:::-,-/;o.:;-'"
fC)
�2
SECR!!:!
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I urge you to keep briefed on this issue on particulars, in part
because we are being nickeled and dimed on some of the details
by the Allies. My instinct is to go on for maximum
effectiveness. ~
IE.O.13526, section l.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
We need them over here.
The President:
Where? -+€T
ye)
~
Prime Minister Blair: \
L - - I_
Who were they?
_
_
---:----~
Are they living in London now, or Albania?
Prime Minister Blair:
]
I
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Can you have your people send the names to our
people so we know who they are? I want to stage a meeting here
to give them some American publicity. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
SECRE'P
I will put that in train.
Alright, where are we on Ireland?
-+er~
�SECRE'!'
3
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Why?
What is their argument?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
What is the IRA excuse for not doing it?
~
Prime Minister Blair: /
\
The President:
How can it be surrender when the war is over?
-teT
Prime Minister Blair:
I
I
'--------_--..1
The President:
3ECRE'!'
And they don't buy that?
~
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
�gECRE'f
4
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Do you want me to caI1 Gerry?
-+e-r
I
~
\~--------------------~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
When do you want me to call Adams?
Prime Minister Blair:
time is it now?
I think it's worth calling him.
(91
The President:
there? ..ke7
ye1
It's getting late.
Prime Minister Blair:
even now. j.eJ
What
What is it, twelve-thirty
It's probably not too late to call him
The President: But in no case no later than tomorrow.
see what I can do. k€1
OK, I'll
~
Prime Minister Blair:/
~--------------~
The President: All he ever wanted was an aggravated bonfire.
To all of us linear thinkers it doesn't seem like much of a big
deal. -+er
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: It doesn't look like surrender if you have all
these people involved being let out of prison and all the others
are involved. It's crazy. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I.
£EGRET
, \\
INTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY •L
i.
'k-:;:2~~~?~~~~~::;':,-:"j~c.::~\':·~;:;. ~).:~,_~~~.:;" __·:?-:.:_<fF.......::1t: _,"
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SECRE't'
, iE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) i
The President:
What are you offering?
What is Bertie offering?
.(e)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
That's got to be harder for them.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay, I will follow up and give you a
have to call you tomorrow anyway.
Thanks, Tony. )K1
Okay, thank you.
(U)
End of Conversation --
SECRET
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1':1
Prime Minister Blair:
report~
1
�· GONFIDEHTIAJ:j
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair arid
Irish Prime Minister Ahern (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Prime Minister Ahern
Notetakers: Jenny McGee, Miles Murphy,
Matt Sibley, Bob Ford and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
April 1, 1999, 6:32 - 6:38 a.m. EST
The Residence
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
CONFI DEN'f IAL
Reason: 1.5(d
Declassify On
�COUFIDEN1'IAL
2
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
Prime Minister Ahern:
\
Prime Minister Blair:
I
Prime Minister Ahern: /
The President:
It's naIve for them to beiieve you can have a
break or a pause or wait for Easter without this thing getting
out. It's not possible.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
Prime Minister Ahern:
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
night?
(U)
No, no, It's all right.
Prime Minister Blair:
up.
(U)
You have problems.
Have you been up all
I gather you've been
The President:
Tony, what are you going to do the rest of the
day?
Are you going to bed?
(U)
CONFIDENTIAL
,-
�'CO~IFIDEN'fViL
3
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: ,r may want to talk to you on a secure line later
to tell you where I think things got off track a bit and what we
need to do now.
I don't have it all sorted out but would really
like to talk to you, because we really cannot afford to be
defeated on it. Let me talk to Gerry. 'The main thing is to let
you publish this thing if you pause for reflection. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
Let me call him back.
Prime Minister Ahern:
Goodbye.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Goodbye.
~
(U)
End of Conversation
cmlFI DEN'fIAL
�3EeRE'!'
I,S2-THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Joel Schrader, Miles Murphy,
Jenny McGee and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
April I, 1999, 7:03 - 7:12 a.m. EST
The Residence
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes, hi Bill.
(U)
Have you talked to Adams since I talked to you?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
No.
(U)
IL____~I=E=.O==.1=3=5=26=,=se=c=ti=on==1.=4=(d=)=_________~1(C)
Prime Minister Blair:
Well done, Bill.
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President: A week from Tuesday we'll have a celebration,
but we'll probably need it by then.
I never thought I'd ever be
longing for the problems of Northern Ireland. ~
CONFIDEN'I'IAL
Reason: 1.5(a.b,d)
Declassify On
4~~_~--' ~_O' ~,
-i -~T~~ L;~RARY PHOTOCOPY' '}.
~':o'~~.-~~-:-_~_.:_ -...';.. =-.:-__~ '__ -..-:,;- _'_, '. ,,- ~
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�2
We had another bad night weather-wise. I should go out a little
more. There was a good article in the New York Times. I don't
know if you saw it but it talked about what a good job you've
done making the case in Britain. Although we're at about 58
percent, but having these guys arrested and beat up may not be
so ood.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime
Blair:
/
~--------------------~
The
the
hit
hit
our
President: The press today has got this big article saying
CIA tried to tell us he would accelerate his attacks if we
him. Hell, we knew that but that's an argument for having
him 30 -day s earlier. I t
;::.-,-,h""i~n,""k,--"w:..;:e=-'-,r"-,e",--"-",o~n",n",a,--,h.:.:a=-v"-e",--",t""o---->t,-,,a,-,l,-,k-,--,,,",,,-_--,
allies on where we are.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: Are you having to run all these targets by your
Attorney General? k8f
Prime Minister Blair:
I
~
'-------------)
The President: Holbrooke believes strongly we should be hitting
the media, power grids, and oil stuff with little collateral
damage. Shutting down the TV networks will have an impact.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
SECREl'
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
�3
The President:
The refineries. I approved all that stuff.
There is some chance of collateral damage, but it seems to me
really.remote. }81
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: We may need to examine if anything can be done
in the daytime, too. k8f
Prime Minister Blair: E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Tell you what I'll do. I have a meeting on this
in about two hours time, and will fly down to Norfolk to see the
troops, which I certainly need to do now that three of our guys
have been apprehended.
We are torn between doing something to
keep the alliance unified or do something that works.
I will
check back in and ca 1 1 you 1 ater today. You and I have to talk
this thing through. I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
Prime Minister Blair:!
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Well.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
SECRET
(U)
I'm around anytime you want, Bill.
Thanks, Tony.
(U)
(U)
�4
3ECRE'±
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Alright.
(U)
Alright Tony, we'll talk.
-- End of Conversation
SECRET
(U)
�£ECRE'l'
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Bob Ford, Sean Tarver, James
Smith and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
April 1, 1999, 3:54 - 4;04 p.m. EST
Oval Office
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
get any sleep?
Hi, Bill.
Hi and excuse me.
(U)
(U)
How are you doing?
Did you
Prime Minister Blair: Not yet, but hoping to.
God, these
negotiations are a nightmare, but thanks so much for the help.
(U)
The President:
I hope I did help and Sinn Fein will start
negotiations.
The initial spin on it was okay. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
It looks like we got permission tonight from all
the NATO guys to do most of what we wanted to do, but I wanted
to say that I think we need better procedures here.
They tell
me Wes Clark is spending half or more than half his time every
day trying to schmooze the Allies. There should be'a mor
orderly way to pick the targets and vet them.
don't think we want to be in a position where every
I have to make six phone calls to ramp things up . ,r
,sECRET
Reason:
1.5(a.b,~l
, " ..
Declassify On:!
' .
<
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I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair: I
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
No.
j81
The President: A lot of people knew what they were going to be
and were preparing for the~, so one of our fighter groups had to
turn around and come back. j81
Prime Minister Blair:
My God.
}21
The President:
That's why we keep this close.
I am not
accusing anybody, these are just the facts.
But the more people
that know, you increase exponentially the potential for leaks or
intercepted conversations, anything of that kind. So we need to
try to keep this closehold.
(5)
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
SECRET
�3
3ECRE'f'
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I will have Sandy follow up with your guys and
we will figure out who contacts whom. We'll talk to Solana and
get a new·procedure approved. We need to approve targets
quickly and hit them. We need to be relaxed about this,
determined but relaxed. We're not in a panic.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
If it looks like we're afraid someone is going
to wimp out on us, we would never get a decent deal.
~
Prime-Minigter Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
We've unsettled him some. We've had some
substantial strikes. We're not where we need to be yet, but we
need to keep after it.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Yes. And it would be very well received here;
we cannot act like we're bombing timidly and making a plea for
peace.
That's not a position we can afford to be in. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
That we have to hit them harder.
In fact, a
couple of senators have come out in favor of ground troops.
Though that could be a Trojan Horse. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
We'll have our people come up with a strategy
for who you and I should call.
I will call Schroeder to see if
he will agree to a new procedure on target setting.
This is too
slow; we are encumbered by weather now, but as a practical
measure you will have more influence with Europeans than I will.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4( d) I
I
We can't afford to have Clark spending half his day, every day
trying to get approval to do his job rather than doing his job.
DEeRE'!'
�SE'CRE'F
4
e re on an open l~ne, so I don't want to
get into details, but we have gotten in a position now where we
can really, with the weather cooperating, do some more things
and get some more results.
I think it is quite important, and
it's an acceptable agreement if we don't have to keep slashing
awa. We've got to show real strength and impact here. )...S1
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
\
I agree.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Alright.
Thanks.
121
I
I
~-------------------~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I am happy to do it.
It's lasted so long that I
yz)
may miss it when it's gone. But I doubt it.
Prime Minister Blair:/
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Goodbye. -tel
We'll have our people work out strategy.
Prime Minister Blair:
Goodbye.
(U)
End of Conversation
agCRET
�§E:CRE'f
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with Prime Minister Blair
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
(U)
Notetakers: Joel Schrader, Miles Murphy,
Matthew Sibley, James Smith, Roger Merletti
and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
April 5, 1999, 1:50 - 2:11 p.m. EST
Oval Office
The President:
How are you?
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
I'm okay. \
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I agree with that.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
this is important, it helps with the efficacy issue.
SECRE'f
Reason:
1.5(a,b,d)
Declassify On:! 4/91J),§>,,-_~,;.;:"·--'~-·-• ~ ...
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. . . . .---'--'--:..~ _ _ -7-'".~_
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~
�SECRET
Presentationally,
2
I think you are right.
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
I agree absolutely.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�SECRE'f
3
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I agree with that, but I don't think we are
quite ready to say it. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I agree. You can be sure all these offers he
makes will not meet that standard. More and more of the
Europeans are of the mind that we may have some definitional
problems down the road.
I'd like to talk about two things that
are related.
One is the refugee issue.
It seems to me we are
doing a little bit better, with NATO taking the lead organizing
with Macedonia and Albania. But we have got to do more and
quickly in finding places to resettle them and the conditions of
their return.
Different countries have different conditions,
camps. J.&r
I don't know, but I know we have to create a release valve to
take the pressure off Albania and Macedonia.
We're increasing economic assistance to
countries bearing the greatest burden.
I hope we
others as we can, but the
offers out now. We don't
their borders and cause a
SECRE'f
can get as many concrete offers from
most important thing is to get those
want Albania and Macedonia to close
worse situation.
~
�4
3ECRE'f
The other thing I wanted to mention is I am quite concerned
about Russia's growing involvement,
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I
We have to make it clear we understand this is a
political problem for them, and we don't mind them jumping on
us, but they shouldn't have military support that will put our
pilots and our forces at risk. We can't act as if there are no
consequences to that. -k81
Another issue that we're trying to work on is that surrounding
countries need to thoroughly inspect all the Russian shipments
going into Kosovo to make sure they are not violating the arms
. embargo.
I am concerned about that.
I think the military
situation is in pretty good shape,
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
This is an open line; we have to be careful what
we say. You and I have discussed this before. _ (£)
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
I agree with that. The problem we are having
here is whether we're taking people in Guantamano or the
continental United States, then they like it and say they don't
SECRE'l'
f·
�SECRE'l'
5
Will they want to go home, once they've seen
Blair:
The President:
I understand the problem. On the other hand, we
have to take enough pressure off Macedonia and Albania so they
don't close the borders to keep their countries from coming
apart. Talk to your folks.
On one level, I'd like to take 100
thousand and put them in America tomorrow and run the risk of
saying people don't want to go home. On another level/ I don't
want any. They might like it here and not want to leave.
(ef
Prime-Minister Blair:
J
The President:
I agree with that.
I wonder if our public
affairs people should talk specifically to each other.
ke1
Prime Minister Blair.:
]
The President:
Let's see if we can get this organized.
would make a huge difference. ~
It
Prime Minister Blair:/
~
L - - - -_
_
~
_
The President:
Let's have our own media people talking. We can
offer to have all 19 join the conference call.
If not, we ought
to have the major countries agreed.
Prime Minister Blair:
The president:
5ECRE1'
Je1
'r--------------------------------------------
I couldn't agree more.
7
okay, that's good.
)91
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�SgCRgT
6
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I do, too, but we have a ways to go.
People can
say to us you don't have a clear strategy, but we have had clear
goals, but you have got to have the proper mix of long-term
goals and enough flexibility to deal with day-to-day realities.
Getting our presentation a little better has helped some, with the clearing of the weather, the targeting process being worked
out.
I thought your memo was terrific, by the way. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: Absolutely. We've got that here.
They would be
calling people traitors, now they all join in. Everybody is a
Monday morning quarterback.
The right is saying you should have
ground forces in there. Some people think I'm on the receiving
end of a Trojan horse, that it's a.deliberate set-up. But we
have to take it as it comes and be determined we will not be
defeated, that we will run this strategy out. But under no
circumstances are we going to be defeated.
If you tell me that,
and I tell you that, and we hold hands. ~
Now, let me say one other thing. We had good news on Lockerbie,
with the suspects arriving in the Netherlands.
Thanks for
everything you did on that.
This is great. We got the
sanctions lifted, suspended for 90 days, but Libya will have to
do more to get them lifted permanently. But this is a pretty
good day for us since last August; it's a good argument for
staying the course against terrorism in the long run. You going
to follow up on the NATO PR thing and get back to us -- to Sandy
or someone else -- to see how we coordinate our daily message?
-+BY
Prime Minister Blair:
Okay, Bill.
The President:
Goodbye.
Okay.
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation
SECRE'¥
�SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telephone Conversation with British Prime
Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Bonnie Glick, Matthew Sibley,
Robert Ford, Robin Rickard, Lawrence Butler
and K. C. Brown
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
April 10, 1999, 1:31 -- 1:S0 p.m. EDT
Residence
The President:
Tony?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hi Bill.
(U)
Are you still in Scotland?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: No, I am back in Chequers now.
(U)
with Jose Maria Aznar.
The President:
days.
(U)
Good.
Prime Minister Blair:
wishes.
(U)
The President:
I am
He is coming to see me in a couple of
He was telling me to send you his best
Are they happy in Scotland?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, a lot happier in Scotland and you
will be getting any amount of cashmere that you want.
(U)
The President:
What I want, is that when I am done here to be
made an honorary UK citizen and give me a seat from Scotland
next door to a good golf course. The daily papers today are
filled with China being pissed off and Russia threatening war.
SECRET
Reason: 1.S(a,b,d)
.
Declassify On:
4/12~_ =,;,r'-~"----'-'-=-~~"\!-:
.
,
~:~~~_~IBRA~YPHOTOC~~~;_J .. :
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If you want, you can give me citizenship and make me a Brit.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
You are one very popular man there.
I hope that it helps in the elections.
(U)
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
It has helped, Thanks for seeing Donald
Leu as well.
What it has done is to emphasize to the people
that sometimes it is useful to be part of something bigger. ~
The President:
Yes, I believe that.
We don't have time to talk
about this today, but when you are here -- I want you to think
about something between now and then -- we have to figure out
how to resolve this stupid banana thing. But the real thing is
that the Caribbean is in. bad shape economically.
I would like
to get a bill through that would treat them like Mexico in
exports.
It would help them a lot if the United states, and if
not the entire EU, then the French, Dutch, and British and
everybody that had some presence there could think about setting
up a joint effort for the long-term development strategy . . We
all have limited money, but if we coordinate it we could
leverage it.
Think about what we could do to help them
diversify their economies. We could try to improve their
economies, increase tourism and personal income, and reduce
their vulnerabilities to the narco-traffickers. Get them to
where they are not completely dependent on bananas. Anyway,
there has never been anything like this in this part of the
world where all the countries with ownership or colonization of
these islands coordinated together.
I think that this is a
third way deal, and I bet we could get some other Europeans
interested.
I don't know if the French would help. The Dutch
might be interested. Some of the Europeans might be interested.
We might think about doing something like that. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
That's right. The EU is wrong on the trade
issue but right on the general concern for the Caribbean. The
EU is in the right on the larger economic well being, on the
longer-term interests of the Caribbean. lef
Prime Minister Blair:
SECRET
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�3
SEeRE'!'
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
In Central America they are all concerned, I
was just down there and talked to all these guys. They are
sensitive because of the hurricane. What few bananas they have,
they want to sell.
I told them we will help them get through
this, but that we would have to diversify their economies too .
.J.Zi
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
The Central Americans. and the Caribbeans sound
like a boys school argument. They ought to be thinking about
making common cause and not pissing down each others' leg to see
who has the biggest bananas. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
~
____________~1
~
The President:
OK, on Kosovo, just want to check in and
reconnoiter where we are. We had greater military impact with
the air actions.
I think if we could do a couple more weeks I
think that we could really have it. The G-8 statement is good.
Have you received the report on the G-8 ministers? We are
hoping to get a statement here involving the Russians.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
Ll_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
The President:
That was good. Madeleine is going to see Ivanov
on Tuesday or Wednesday.
I also think that Kofi gave a good
statement.
k81
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: He is a little miffed, though maybe that's too
strong a word, disappointed maybe or concerned that neither of
us have put out a statement on it.
I told him that you were in
Scotland and that I was preoccupied with the Chinese. I think
that we ought to put one out now because he is out in Europe
now.
There are two things we need to think about.
One is
whether any economic pressures could be put on Milosevic that
don't hurt the Macedonians and the Montenegrens too badly.
I
have a list of things, maybe cutting down on their money
laundering in Cyprus and putting the squeeze on their London
accounts.
I don't want to cause the Montenegrins any trouble.
I will get that list to you today and let you guys look at it
�· SECRET
4
and respond to it. Any time that I try to get our banks to do
something the Treasury Department gets squirrelly on me.
It is
always a fight with those guys.
I would like to send you this
list and let you evaluate it. ~
We have to decide whether we want to have a more aggressive
diplomatic initiative and if so, how to intensify the military
action to enhance the likelihood that diplomatic efforts will
succeed, assuming we can achieve all our ob'ectives that Kofi
signed off on and bring Russia into it.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
It may turn
out to be, a bigger problem for me than you.
It assumes that we
can achieve our political objectives because Milosevic doesn't
want to get the hell bombed out of him and have Apaches on top
of his tanks.
If you assume -- the one downside is that we are
facing a lot of hurdles -- if you assume that all of our stated
objectives are achievable if we intensify our bombing campaign
without actually toppling Milosevic. Then it seems to me that
there will be some kind of diplomatic agreement for an
international force that will include Russian participation.
They will push Milosevic back when he says who can and cannot be
part of it.
I think that it will be difficult to have NATO as
NATO participate.
The problem this creates for us is Somalia.
J.8J
I don't want to take too much time going over this now but this
is a big problem for us. We went through this in Somalia when
the UN took over command and control. We had a messy deal
during the first part of the Administration. We stayed on in
Somalia when the UN took it over and it was a messy deal.
I
lost some American boys over there and one of them was dragged
naked through the streets of Mogadishu. We made some mistakes
there in what we did and did not do. We basically had serious
command and control problems where the Americans were supposed
to do two things -- the same things we'd have to do if it were a
non-NATO force in Kosovo -- in Somalia we were supposed to be
there doing humanitarian relief and act as a mUltinational peace
force.
One of the factional leaders who since has died, killed
a bunch of Pakistani peacekeepers -- something like 15-20. We
were the only presence there that had the capabilities to figure
out who did it and to go and get him. So the UN wanted us and
tasked us to go and get him, Aideed. The UN tasked us to do
that while doing humanitarian relief. They tasked our guys to
go'into a hotel and get him. Our guys landed on the top of a
hotel in the middle of the day -- he got away and then all of a
SECRS'!'
�5
GECRE'P
sudden more than 300 Somalis started shooting at them.
It is
the sort of thing that if NATO had been doing it, it would have
been totally different:
there would have been different command
and control arrangements, armor and artillery.
So there is
still a lingering bad taste.
I have a lot of support in
. Congress right now.
There is even more than before the Gulf
War. More and more in Congress are saying that they are in
favor of ground troops if we had to put them in there. And I am
telling you this in advance, if you could help me on this
because it is your guys' necks, too.
If they say NATO can
participate, but not as NATO, instead as the UN, we have this
awful memory of Somalia. We would also need the serious command
and control issues to be worked out. We did not have these
problems in Bosnia.
It worked like a charm once NATO went in
and the Russians came in with us. We only had to make an
amendment to the NATO issue.
Does that make sense? kef
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
This was the lowest point of my presidency.
It
was a goddamned nightmare.
I felt personally responsible for
that kid's body being dragged through the streets. So I see
this as a practical measure about k2.eping people alive. We were
prepared to take risks. We had all these glitches because of
the command and control problems. The Russians are allergic to
NATO and Milosevic is allergic to NATO. Keep in mind Tony, I
know you know this, if we go in, we can't go in with one foot.
If we get a multi-national force we have to go in at least with
the commitment to protect the Serbs in Kosovo at a minimum as
well as the Kosovar Albanians. There is enormous grass roots
support right now for the freedom fighters.
This will be a big
force protection issue -- command and control will be critical
with huge political implications. We may have all kinds of
problems where we have both sides pissed at us.
They will be
politically important as well in any country.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
IE.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)1
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I will send you the list of economic sanctions. We
will look like assholes at the garden party if we don't make
SECRE'f
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�SECRE'l'
6
sure that everybody understands that NATO means keeping our
people alive.
i&1
Prime Minister Blair:
/ E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)/
The President:
It is horrible.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
/ E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
We need to talk on a secure line or talk when
you get here.
There are arguments both for it and arguments
against it.
We will need to look at in the context of where it
is going to be five years from now. We need to keep our crowd
together and keep at him and get a diplomatic solution with a
mechanism that includes the UN and Russia.
I will follow up on
this.
I am in the country all next week and will get that
economic list out to you. Tell Jose Maria I said hello. Did
you show him Napoleon's pistol and Charles' sword? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I took him to Rothschild House today to
see the most amazing works of art.
(U)
The President:
I want to get there.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
You must come back.
(U)
The President:
I will come back to t'he Scottish golf course.
You were the best first-timer that I ever saw play.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
keep in touch.
(U)
The President:
Joking apart, thanks for cashmere.
Thank you, find me a safe seat in a golf cart.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Right, good-bye.
Goodbye.
(U)
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
SECRE'E'
Let's
�£ECREf
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with Prime Minister Blair
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
(U)
Notetakers:
Jenny McGee, Roger Merletti,
Frank Jarosinski, James Smith,
Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME:
The President:
April 14, 1999, 1:56 - 2:14 p.m. EDT,
Oval Office
Hello, Tony.
Prime Minister Blair:
fortunately.
Go on.
(U)
Hi, Bill .
This is a secure line,
.JRl"
The President:
Yes.
First of all, I didn't mean to take you
out of a meeting there, but I thought it was important I talk to
you as soon as possible. Aznar was here last night and he was
really good, and I know he is there.
181
Wes Clark asked for another 300 airplanes, and we've got these
Apaches corning in, but the truth is we're just going to have
more and more planes filling the air and restriking old targets
or hoping the weather gets better so we can hit tanks and
soldiers, unless we can get into Phase III targets. We have got
to make these people start paying a higher price. ~
~
was hoping while you're there, you and Aznar could convince
~____~Ito give Clarke and Solana the authority to strike a wider
range of targets.
That would require hitting national level
headquarters, military-industrial targets, the TV towers (which
he has resisted), some of the presidential targets, the power
plants, the Socialist Party headquarters, which also has a
radio-TV broadcasting facility there.
I really believe we are
making a mistake not .turning the heat up on these guys. )-21
SEeR]!!'f
Reason:
1.5 (Q., q)
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I have also been urged by our people to look at preventative
action against some targets in Montenegro.
I know I
I
doesn't want to hit there, but even I
Isaid there were
some things we ought to be hitting. Let me give you an example
or two:
there are several facilities where we think they are
moving in to take their missiles out; in and around the ports in
Montenegro; there's one critical bridge we need to take out,
before they start moving their military units.
So we're quite
worried about their ability to use these facilities.
There are
not a lot of targets and not a lot of risk of civilian damage,
But it's even more important we get to Phase I I I targets within
Serbia.
I know there'll be collateral damage and some
controversy, but if we want any chance of a solution soon, we
have to turn the heat up. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
SECRE'f'
That's what I want to do.
~
�SECRET
3
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I completely agree.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
SECREr
�I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
:SECRE!
4
The President:
Let's talk about all the points you've made.
First of all, we're agreed on targets.
On fuel and other
things, we are now banning Yugoslav ships from our ports and the
export and reexport of goods to Yugoslavia.
I hope you can
succeed in tightening EU exports, freezing government and
private projects and the assets of the leadership. You and I
should propose NATO search ships going into Yugoslav ports to
make sure there's no arms or fuel. 121
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Agreed.
(U)
On presentation, Solana is not there, is he?
Je1
Prime Minister Blair:
~
'-------~
The President:
Do you want to send someone in? I think there
would be some resentment if I sent an American over there.
Maybe we should talk to Solana and have him ask for more help on
presentation? Do you have someone you can deputize? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: We've had to start doing a lot more of our
briefings, because they are so ineffective.
(.8f
Prime Minister Blair:
They start off every day at 3 or 4 o'clock, and the press
conference sometimes goes on for an hour or an hour and a half,
literally answering all their questions.
k&t
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
£ECRET
�3ECRE't'
The
him
5
Shouldn't we talk to Solana personally and get
how do we get this done? What's your
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I would support that strongly, and then he could
do the conference call every day, your guy.
keJ
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay.
I am completely agreed.
Should we call
Solana separately or together. Separately.
I will tell him we
discussed this, I think your take is right and ask him to work
with you on it. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
That is great, Bill.
(U)
Call me after you talk to Chirac and Schroeder.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes, I will call
ou back.
The President:
That's why I agreed to do this. With all the
problems, I figured you wouldn't have 19 elected officials with
their asses hanging out to dry. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
~
\L-_ _ _ _ _~~
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)1
SECRE'P
�6
SECRE'f
The President:
You've got a deal.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President.:
(U)
Alright, Bill.
(U)
And on the economic things,
you support them?
.Aef
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Absolutely.
Alright.
One hundred percent.
I will get on it.
-- End of Conversation --
3ECRE'l'
~
~
�SEGREg:'
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS H I NGTON
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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
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SUBJECT:
PARTICIPANTS:
Telcon with Prime Minister Blair
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(U)
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The President
Prime Minister Blair
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Notetakers: Matt Sibley, Tom Crowell,
James Smith, Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
PLACE:
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Prime Minister Blair:
Hi, Bill.
Riqht.
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I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
Okay.
Prime Minister Blair:
straight ahead. fer
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Fine.
I'll call him tomorrow.
(U)
We'll get clearance on that and go
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April 14, 1999, 6:28 - 6:31 p.m. EDT
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The President:
2
Good.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: On presentation and structure. I will
speak to Solana tomorrow, and I think it would be good if you
did, too. J81
The President:
Do you want to call first?
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
I'd be happy to do that.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
It's a deal. After you talk to him, have
someone c~11our office and then I'll call him. That's great.
J,e1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
We'll speak soon.
Goodbye.
(U)
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
SECRET
��2
COMFI DEN!'!:' IAL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
\~~
]
__~~~~~~~~~__~~~~r-I-t
was a terrible thing, but in the Gulf War, we had soldiers
killed by friendly fire where the Americans and British were.
So even in a relatively small conflict, these kinds of things
happen. We can't lose the forest for the trees.
(£1
Prime Minister Blair:
Absolutely right.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
That's what I said yesterday.
I was very strong
with the newspaper editors -- you know I completely agree with
you. We're on the same page. We'll get the briefing sorted out
there.
¢
Prime Minister Blair:
I'll tell you what I have done.
I have
done a note, which is longish, which sets out all my thoughts,
concerns, suggestions on this, on everything we are doing.
If
it's okay with you, I will fax it over to you on a secure fax .
.ket
The President:
Good.
Are we going to get together on Thursday?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes, I think.
(U)
The President:
Do you want to spend the night at the White
House? Or at Blair House, if you want.
I won't get in until 1
a.m., and you may want to be in bed by then, but it's your
option. You can sleep in the same bed Churchill did. +&T
Prime Minister Blair:
I hope it's appropriate.
(U)
The Presiden-t: As long as you don't parade around naked before
the bath. You're too young and too trim.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I'm getting older in this bloody job.
Bill, that is great, and then we can meet Thursday mornin .
will get this information over to
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
there Tuesday to tal k
CONFIDEN'fLAL
�3
CONFIDEN'l'IAL
to people, and to SACEUR as well, to get a real fix on what is
happening before the summit.
)Q1
The President:
That's a very good idea. When you come here,
I'd like to develop a strategy on how to work with the others,
including some of the smaller countries.
I think a little
effort on the side could get us a strong voice in making those
folks feel included. Between the two of
I think we can
touch most people . . ,.all of that ... I
E.O. 13526, section l.4(d)
I probably need to call him.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
~
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
That is what I think.
In Detroit, we had 40,000
Albanians and a whole bunch of Serbs. The Albanians were
outside demonstrating, and I said we have no fight with the
Serbian people; they were our allies in World War II and most
don't have a clue what Milosevic has done in their name in
Kosovo.
I said that was the proper way to express disagreement,
not by killing. We have to be upbeat and resolute.
It is
important to be determined, but not too damned grim, either. We
have to keep spirits up. We're in this world where people
expect instantaneous results. We need to act like this started
the day before yesterday and not twenty years ago. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I think that is right.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
If you want me to do any more, like talking to
I thought it would be less
Solana or Wes Clark, let me know.
abrasive to everybody if I didn't lead the charge, and it seems
to have worked out well; but I'll be happy to follow up. +eY
COlQ'FIDEH'I'IAL
�4
COlH'IDEM'fIAL
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I'm sure that's right. There's no reason to
believe these people are trained to deal with this situation.
J..0"
Prime Minister Blair: That's totally right.
This is a
situation they haven't dealt with before. ~
The President:
We will plan on being together on Thursday.
You
decide whether Blair House is more convenient.
It probably will
be fQr your retinue, but you can stay here and put another aide
upstairs if you want.
~
Prime Minister Blair: That is really kind, Bill.
I will get
this note to you on secure fax, and probably we should have a
word over the weekend on the secure phone. ~
The President: Alright, we'll do that.
I understand we made a
little progress on those operational changes you and I wanted
and I am a little encouraged by that.
k8t
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, I think if we really work we can
unblock any obstacles there. We still know where the difficult
points are. ~
The President: We're finally getting some indication they're
feeling it and there's a lot of internal debate within the high
councils. That is important and we need to bear down.
I will
get your fax, and we will talk over the weekend. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Best of luck in Detroit.IU)
I'll see you next week.
Prime Minister Blair:
Goodbye.
IU)
IU)
End of Conversation
COHFIDEN'PH'W
�SECRE'F
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
...
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
Doug Bayley, Miles Murphy,
James Smith, Lawrence Butler and K. C. Brown
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
April 29, 1999, 5:22 - 5:43 p.m. EDT
Oval Office
How are you?
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
Fine, how are you?
(U)
The President:
Great.
I thought your trip went very well, and
everyone loved the DLC event we did later.
So I think your trip
went great.
I called to follow up a little bit on the memo you
gave me and what we're doing here.
Let me make three or four
points to respond to your memo and tell you what we are doing,
then we can talk about whatever else we need to. ~
First, on your statement I
I E.O.13526, section 1.4(d) I
We've got a small group working to develop an integrated
strategic plan that will merge our military and strategic
objectives and focus on putting pressure on Milosevic,' his
cronies, integrating military targets, covert action,
psychological operations and public affairs. And it is my
understanding we're already in touch with you. We'll have a
detailed plan ready sometime this weekend and share it with your
people. We will coordinate two to three times a week in a
telephone conference with people in a group led by John Sawers
and Sandy Berger.
So, we'll deal with that issue.
J81
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
SECRET
Reason:
1.5 (a, b, d)
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affairs thing is in much better shape now; the war room you and
I set up has a 24-hour capability and a rapid-response element,
and I think Joe and Alistair are talking two or three times a
day, including~ith the people in Brussels.
I think that's good
and we're trying to bring in the guy who used to work as my
communications director to work our operation here for 30 days
to make sure we've melded our political and diplomatic efforts
together. On all those areas, we're doing pretty well. JBf
Prime Minister Blair:
That sounds great.
(U)
The President:
The last item you raised is the need to do joint
planning on the ground force option.
I personally believe it
can be done under the umbrella of the assessment. As I told
you, we're working with our guys; they're so afraid it will
leak. We have to work through it, because there's no point in
doing this in detail unless we know how it will mesh together.
I will keep working on that, but I think we've made reasonable
progress on what we discussed and I wanted to see where you are
on that.
.k51
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
If he means we won't assassinate him
or bomb him or extract him from Serbia, I think we can make that
commitment.
I don't think we can make a public commitment on
war crimes, because that is an independent body. Louise Arbour
is here, by the way. ~
I said we're cooperating with the tribunal, so that is a more
difficult issue. He's looking for some assurance, but that's a
pretty dicey thing.
So, that's all I have to report.
I do
think Chernomyrdin has the bit in his teeth to do something, but
whether he can, I don't know.
They are very anxious to playa
role in a diplomatic settlement and go in with their troops.
~
�SECRET
3
One other point:
the Russians might want to be in an area of
Kosovowhere the Serbs are dominant in population.
I said I
personally had'-no problems, as long as the Russians had a hard
and fast commitment to protect the Kosovars.
I had never
discussed this with the American people, not one time, without
saying that if the United States has a role, it will be
providing protection to the Serb minority as well as the
Kosovar/Albanian majority.
vn
The second thing -- and Sandy raised the red flag on this -- I
asked him to make it clear to Chernomyrdin that having Russians
and Greeks, Ukrainians, or other Orthodox denominations could
not become a de facto partition, because the EU has taken a
strong position on this, as has the United States and as has
NATO. As long as there's no partition, I think we could work
that out. Basically, that's a read-out of what D'Alema said.
ft}
Prime Minister Blair: Right. That is very helpful, Bill.
First, I think on the bit with the press side, and NATO and
SHAPE working together, we have a lot of people working well
with your people. That is working better and will get better
still. On the military side, I think that is great, to help
SACEUR with what he is doing. On the video conferencing, I
think that's fine.
The thing to do is have a constant updating
of all the different issues so they know exactly where we are,
feeding through the information we are getting to your guys, and
vice versa. ~
The President:
I agree.
j,21
Prime Minister Blair: On the ground troop thing:
I understand
all the problems, and we don't want this to start running in the
press and everything. We have done some work we are fairly
confident of, ~a~n~d~~~~~u~s~w~i~l~l~h~a~v~e~t~o~~e~t~i~n~t~o~u~c~h~a~s~~o~u~__,
want, reall .
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
So that is my only worry, is
not to get caught by the winter.
~
The President: Yes, I'm watching the calendar pretty closely.
We're back to the efficacy argument here.
The public in
America, in the latest survey yesterday, is against ground
troops; it supports bombing, but doesn't think it will work.
I
think whatever I decide is right, we can go forward with.
I
03ECRE'f
�SECRE'f
4
think what we don't want to do is not do what we need to do in
terms of planning. They're asking when this will be over.
I
looked at the weather map and said, "May is better than April,
and June is be'Eter than May, and July is better than June."
That had the right effect. It wasn't lost on them, to talk
about how the weather is getting better.
(81
Prime Minister Blair:
I think it is important, also.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
~
Yes.
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:
I don't know. I just don't know. We have to
wait and see.
We may have to talk again before the weekend is
over, when we see how he does.
We'll have to wait and see.
My guess is Milosevic will offer a little more tomorrow, but not
enough, and then come back and say, "How about a pause in
bombing?" He's still trying to stiff the Alliance. ~
I want you to think about two things with your planners, if
you've got a pretty good military plan now on the ground troop
option. There are two things. Life is not perfect~ but I
basically had three objectives going in:
one is to win in
Kosovo, to have the people come back to a protected area and
give them autonomy and then to have the larger approach to
southeastern Europe that we discussed.
k5i
The second thing is, to get from beginning to end with the NATO
alliance intact. When you think about it, this is the first
thing NATO has had to do in 50 years.
In Bosnia, we had a lot
of help on the ground from Croatian and Muslim forces; we didn't
have to do as much as we do here. ~
The third thing is, I was so happy about Chernomyrdin being back
in harness.
In talking to all our people, I've said that I want
this to come out in a way that enhances Russia's diplomatic role
and strategic partnership with us. That would be a real boost
SECRE'f
�SECRET
5
to the forces of progress and those who want a partnership with
us, rather than those who want to go off by themselves angry,
hurt and humiliated.
;zl
....
One thing you need to have your best Russia people dealing with:
if it comes to a troop option, what the hell are we going to do
with Russia if it leads to the collapse of our relationship.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
My view on this is,!
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
are you? .ke7
I agree with that.
How about Ireland?
Where
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
Do you think the IRA has decided they are never
going to decommission? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
SECI<ET
�•
6
3ECRE'f
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
I
The poll shows more people are in favor of the
Good Friday agreement than at the time of the referendum.
People just want this damn thing to happen.
Je1
'--,::_-,-;::;--;-,--_ _ _....11
The President:
...+GY
They're tired of screwing with it, aren't they?
Prime Minister Blair:
Anyway, we will keep on it.
I
think the next two wee s lS pretty crucial and I am just
thinking about what big thing we can do.
I am going to
Macedonia and Romania for a few days next week to visit our
troops and also to address the Romanians. When I come back,
will do a couple of days on the Irish thing.
JG1
I
The President:
Great.
I go to Germany next week.
Germany is
the one country where we have people flying and doing
humanitarian operations and there are refugees, and Schroeder
has the EU Presidency. My guys asked me not to go down to
Aviano because it,would be too disruptive, so I'll honor that.
J,Z)
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes, I think Germany is just the right
place to go next week.
If you give a message of public support,
it will be very important.
J21
The President:
Yes,
He's been good to stay with us.
There's a
big article in the paper today, "Germans Seek to Separate Serb
Leader From support." It's in The New York Times.
I can't
tell, but it looks like they're trying to set him up for war
crimes.
I want to talk to Gerhard about it.
I'll have somebody
fax that to you.
k&t
Prime Minister Blair:
Okay.
Just before we go.
our people should think about. I
Three things
1
£gCRET
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
�7
SECRE'f'
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I agree.
I will get on all of them and talk to ..
you.
If you want to talk over the weekend, I'm available.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Thanks for the weekend.
The President:
Okay.
Goodbye.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Goodbye.
(U)
End of Conversation
SECRET
(U)
�3ECRE'f
THE WH ITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
..s
z
""
-<e
Telcon with Biitish Prime Minister Blair
(U)
~
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PARTICIPANTS:
...:l
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The President
Prime Minister Blair
""
~
Notetakers: Doug Bayler, Bonnie Glick,
Roger Merletti, James Smith and K. C. Brown
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
May 4, 1999, 1:29 - 1:48 p.m. EDT
Oval Office
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The President:
Hello, Tony.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hi, Bill.
How did you do on your trip?
(U)
(U)
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Prime Minister Blair: It was good. It was extraordinary,
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really. They've got a lot of problems in the refugee camps, and . .:l "" ~ -<e...:l
I am trying to help them set up another in Macedonia. Things
~~q ~~
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are pretty difficult there, because the refugees keep coming in. ~________~
But no, it was good. And the thing with the Romanian parliament
went well. It was good. We have also got good contacts with
the Kosovar people now. I met some leading people there, and
they've got quite a formidable network there, so we tapped into
all that.- How are you doing? How are you getting on? -\-&r
The President: Fine. I met yesterday with Chernomyrdin for a
long time, theu he met for an even longer time with Al Gore last
night, and Sandy, and then they met again this morning. I think
that Chernomyrdin's involvement is a chance to move Belgrade
toward our position, but we need to get Moscow moving in that
direction. I
I
/ I explained
to him what was necessary for this to be a success.
I told him we need a timetable on
withdrawal, as well as a commitment to an international security
SECRE'I'
Reason: 1.5 (a,j.:>,d)
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INTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
force.
I
We sald he has to
commit to get all his forces out, then we can talk about a
presence symbo}ic of Serbian sovereignty. )21
We had a long talk about the rationale for an international
security force with NATO at its core and the rapid deployment
capability, to keep the Serbs and Albanians from clashing. I do
think he understands that if we are not in there, the peaceful
Albanians won't go back and the guerrillas will, and we'll all
be back where we are in six to eight months. I think he
understands. I
I
The only other thing is, the G8 political directors yesterday
was pretty good, except they talked about an international
authorized by the UN.
u
e1ne 1S trY1ng to have it redrafted to avoid
any 1mp 1cation that we're undermining the common requirements
of NATO. That is kind of where the diplomacy is. Sandy and the
rest of the Foreign Policy Team will review this 30-day
strategic campaign plan -- and I got your message the other day
-- and we'll share it with you. And we're making the
arrangements for the secure video teleconferencing between our
teams. So, we're kind of rocking along here. But I'm concerned
with Milosevi9's peace initiative and his release of the POWs
and the collateral damage, which is getting publicity. I'm
worried about Allied unity. I feel good about continuing this
for months, if necessary, but we've got to keep everybody else
in harness. Milosevic is in more trouble than we think, or he
wouldn't be going to all this trouble to stop the bombing.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
SECRET
Yes.
+SJ
What do you think? -\-&t
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
�3ECRE'l'
3
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
I agree entirely.
First, the military
campaign is going a bit better, and I think it's beginning to do
real damage.
Taking out the power stations and blacking out
Belgrade .real19 made a difference.
The President:
They were too wimpy on the NATO thing.
Prime Minister Blair:
+Bt
You've just got to be careful.J
I I thlnk It's necessary to have constantly -~a~n~d"I~am~-tr=r~y7l~n~g~t~o get it sorted at this end -- people who go up
and talk to those refugees -- everyone has a horror story to
tell.
The most horrible things have been going on in there.
I
don't know whether public opinion in other countries is
different -- ours is pretty solid -- but most people, if they
think the campaign is beginning to work, will hold with it.
k5i
The President:- Also, there is going back, and there is going
back.
If they don't think it's strong and reliable and gives
them autonomy, even if you and I were there, we would have a
problem with the military elements.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I agree. But, Bill, what is your frank
assessment about how much damage we are prepared to do in the
next month to two months? Ir--~--------~~~--------------------)~
I
.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
SEC'tl::E'f
;-
�4
SECRE'f
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
.
The President:
I agree with that.
Prime Minister Blair:
J2f
I
The President:
I think we should stick where we are.
The
Europeans feel strongly about it.
I don't feel strongly, I
could go either way, but I have been publicly strong about
leaving it in the country, because I don't want to be accused of
having a campaign for a greater Albania and disrupt the frontline states.
I think we ought to hang in there. The rest of
the EU have been pretty adamant against independence and we
ought to hang in there with them on that. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
True. \
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
First of all, I strongly agree with that, and we
hammered Chernomyrdin on that. Let me tell you how I look at
this; I think it might also be helpful on the presentational
aspect in Europe.
I rarely talk about Kosovo now that I don't
talk about Bosnia.
It took us almost four years to get that
together and get Dayton. We defeated ethnic cleansing, but we
did not reverse it, because so many refugees were not going
home. The Kosovars have to be able to go home. We not only
have to defeat. it, we have to reverse it. When I remind people
of our work in Bosnia, I think it reinforces it.
I've got a
full-time person now doing nothing but Kosovo public affairs and
getting these stories out. What I think we need to look at is,
either we should have some more of those people -- should we put·
more people on it? It's delicate; it's in other countries where
this problem exits.
I don't want to mess on people's turf.
Maybe talk to D'Alema and others about it.
It would help if
there were more of these people in the Italian press and other
3Ee~ET
�SECRET
5
countries that are getting a lot of pressure, in the Spanish and
Portuguese press and others.
k81
Prime Minister-Blair:
Is your thinking that public opinion is
going soft in those countries? ~
The President:
I think it's softer in those than ours and I
don't know if they have a strategy for dealing with it.
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d)
I
o
lng
campaign, one thing I hope will happen, now
we have hit and
taken out most of the bridges, I think we may be able to focus
more on power systems. And, looking at all hours at more
military targets, that will reduce further horror stories about
collateral damage, like the bus that got hit on the bridge.
That is, we can do more, more freely and with fewer civilian
problems.
f.-81
One thing I said here that sends a good message, that shows our
resolve:
I just comment on the weather, that the weather is
better in June than in May and July is better than June. All
you've got to do is say that. Psychologically, it's a very good
thing to say, and I've said it a couple of times.
(S)
One or two other things -- we're going to open another camp in
Albania, like you are in Macedonia.
If it appears we've been
too reluctant here and we haven't done enough there, this thing
could spin out of control on us and collapse our timetable. We
don't want opponents to be able to say we didn't do enough
there, so we've got to bring them here. We just have to work on
it.
I leave this afternoon for Belgium and Germany, so I'll
check with you when I get back, or maybe while I'm there.
I'll
see Dehaene and Schroeder. )Z!
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, the Macedonian situation with the
refugees is ve~y worrying. We're trying to get unblocked some
European money.
I talked to Michel Camdessus about the IMF
position on Macedonia.
I'm trying to get Macedonia to agree to
a big transit camp to drain off the problem, and we're also
taking some more ourselves. But I think we really have to watch
Macedonia. ,~
The President:
I do, too.
I'm worried about the politics of
Macedonia. The government could collapse and consensus could
SECRE'P
�3ECRET
6
disappear. The countr~ is so small and so poor.
could chan e that. ~)
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister-Blair:
The president:
I
]
Good for you.
Prime Minister Blair:
this. /
These numbers
~
We've got to just manage them through
I
\
"J
Kosovo 1S about
that is, it's
it's not unimaginably large. ,-----.
L..,t;:-h=e--:::s"'l-;:z;-::e""-;o""t"-"'t't::h-:::e"-;:c::-::o~u;-;n"'t"..y:-;--::::o-':f""""yr.:'"'r::"1k""'s"'h""l::-r=e--::"l-=nc-rE""n:-:g=-rra
"'n::ld,
o
not small, -but it's not vast:
The President:
I agree, there is a chance of that.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: That's bullshit, and we know it. We want,
obviously if we could, to get out where Russia plays a bigger
role and a pos1tive role. That will reinforce the position of
the progressives within Russia and s-tabilize the situation and
have a good lead into the 2000 elections. I also think it will
help us keep the Alliance together.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
If we can achieve our objectives of having
defeated and reversed ethnic cleansing and kept the Alliance
together -- with the ties between Russia and the West stronger,
not weaker. That might be too much to hope for.
(~
SECRET
�7
:3EGRET
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
Prime Minister Blair:
That would be a full hand.
great thing to achieve. I
It would be a
----'I That's where the people are on tnlS. ,)$)
L -_ _ _ _ _ _
The President:
I agree.
xei
Prime Minister Blair: Hillary is going to the camps, is she?
..(-87-
The President:
Yes.
.J.G-'J
Prime Minister Blair: Her presence and the pictures that will
come out of that -- all the time, we've got to repersuade
people, remind them, really. You know the public attention
span. We had a terrible nail bomb thing going off in London
ut for four ays,
Kosovo ceased to be in people's minds. We have to persuade them
about it. Littleton happened and obviously the whole of America
s tar t s to ref 0 cus .
.4-Gt"
=--:::------:---------.1
~.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
rl
The President: We didn't want Jesse to be able to bring out
those soldiers, because people would feel we had to do a good
turn.
I mean, we got three guys going home, but a million can't
go home. -f€-T
Prime Minister Blair:
It's a constant, constant business. Her
going to the camps will make a big difference. When you go and
talk to them, then you realize what you have to do.
~
The President:
Alright, my friend.
Prime Minister Blair:
you soon.
(U)
The President:
(U)
Have a good time in Germany.
Goodbye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation.
·SECRB'P
Speak to
�THE WHITE HOUSE
.
WASHINGTON'
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcen with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Joel Schrader, Jenny McGee,
Miles Murphy and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
May 8, 1999, 3:26 - 3:46 p.m. EDT
Air Force One
Tony, can you hear me?
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
The President:
Yes.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Yes, you're on Air Force One are you?
This was a "great" day wasn't it?
I
am afraid these things happen.
That's what I said too.
...(-e}
J.Q-'r
¢
Prime Minister Blair:
I t is bad, but we have just got to steady
our nerves on it, really. ..f.Et
The President:
Yes, that's what I did.
I just went out and
made a statement saying that we hit several important command
and contreltargets, and that the damage to the' Chinese Embassy
and the death~ and injuries were completely inadvertent.
I
extended deep regrets to the people and the leaders of China but
said it is important to remember why the strikes were necessary
and how to put an end to them. -k8r
They asked about the Chinese and Russian r.eactions and whether
it could derail the diplomatic efforts we're making toward a
peace deal.
I said I hoped not because that was the quickest
way to get it over with and I restated the conditions and
pointed out that we'd done over 10,000 sorties and because TV is
8ECRE'f
Reason:
1. 5 Ca, b, dL ' .
.
'., ~~_____~.
Declassify On'; 5/~'9'-~""'~'~-.',
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�SECRET
2
in Belgrade, they could cite every time there's unintended
consequences, but our pilots have literally risked their lives
to avoid hitting innocent civilians in Serbia -- shot at from
rooftops and in the middle of civilian areas, they have not
responded.
They have done everything they could to dodge the
weapons and go on. We have to remember what caused these
strikes and what could end them, but our conditions have to be
met. No one would like to stop them more than me. Jei
~
Prime Minister Blair:
That is absolutely right.
The TV cameras
are not in Kosovo but if they were, they would be seeing people
killed every day by Serbs, by Milosevic.
~
The President: Yes.
If we had one TV picture of the 15 men
being roped together and burned alive, they would be demanding
that we bomb the hell out of them, people would be wondering why
we haven't leveled the place, but our people need to be telling
that to the media all the time. ~
Prime Minister Blair: What I'did today was to get the NATO
conference to go through all the atrocities in the last two weeks in Kosovo. We did a press conference on the same theme.
I understand when something like this happens, people get very
nervous about it, but day after day after day, things are
happening without any cameras and no one reports a bit of it.
Milosevic can take the cameras to wherever he likes and point to
these things.
But in Kosovo this is a daily happening, as a
result of deliberate policy, not as an accident. J.e1"
The President:
I am with you.
I just wanted to check in to
make sure we're on the same page. -0?r
Prime Minister Blair:
ri ht thing.
No doubt, Bill.
I'm sure you've said the
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I am with you.
Prime Minister Blair:
SECRET
,
"
~
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�SECRET
3
! E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)!
The President:
That is right.
They asked, 'What about the
Russians and Chinese saying this was barbaric?#
I said it was
not barbaric but a tragedy.
We ought to take that word and turn
it on them. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
You are absolutely right.
! E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)!
The President:
Let me ask a couple of questions.
In Germany, I
did what you suggested.
I did an hour interview with the press
people from Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Macedonia and
Albania. Did it get press coverage? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
AbsDlutely, it got a lot of coverage.
-t-etThe President:
I think we all need to do more of that, reaching
into other countries.
One other thing, when I was there, I did
a lot of spade work with our people working on humanitarian
stuff about Macedonia, with the view as quickly as possible of
turning Maedonia into a way-station and you know telling them we
would move all of the refugees through there.
We would need to
get Turkey to~gree to take about 100,000, get safe passage for
them to Turkey.
I believe we have enough money to do this.
If
my supplemental passes the Senate this coming week, and I think
it will, what we would like to do is go to Turkey, with whatever
help we get from Europe, and build these camps.
We could build
camps for 20,000 which are quite comfortable with public space,
schools. They are tents, but nice tents. Also, if worse comes
to worse, they can be winterized with wooden floors and heaters.
They would be quite adequate.
Obviously, it would be better to
get them to Turkey anyway because the climate is better. )£1
SECRE'l.'
f.
�4
SECRE'f
Then we could build a couple of camps in Macedonia; it would be
easier to secure a throughway if we could get them direct cash
...
to the government in a hurry -- which you could do quicker than
me through the EU -- then tell them we want to make Macedonia a
throughway, not permanent stops for refugees. We will be able
to get the numbers manageable and stabilize this thing in the
next few weeks.
If they know where we were going, they'd do a
lot better to hold and fend off domestic opponents. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I totally agree. That is an excellent
idea and I will do everything to facilitate it.
I spoke to
Santer about getting European money released.
The critical
priority is to get money as quickly as possible that will buy
their goodwill for forward transit to Turkey. We need to talk
to Greece as well, but that is an excellent idea and eXactly
what we need to be doing. ~
The President:
When' does Prodi take over? ...l8f
Prime Minister Blair:
It's not quite clear, not for a couple of
months.
I should think we need to get santer to work on that.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
necessary, we
from the EU.
Santer in the next
The President:
too.
W
If
money ourselves and then get it back
need money quickly.
I will speak to
of days. ~
If I get my money this week; I will ship some
Prime Minister Blair:
If I get the money there, we'll have the
goodwill to facilitate all of this.
I totally agree this is the
right thing to do if Turkey is willing to do it. ~
The President: We can put these camps up in a hurry for 20,000
people for about $20 million by the time you clear the land,
work sewage, water and all that. That is $1,000 a person,
that's not aIr that much. ..(..&1Prime Minister Blair: When you consider weapons and everything,
it is a pretty sensible investment. ~
The President:
I will work on this and get your guys in touch
with our guys.
We have to get money to Macedonia and Turkey to
take 100,000, build transit camps in Macedonia that are
physically separate and secure a commitment to build camps in
Turkey and then get safe passage. We also need to get money to
SECRE'f
�8ECRET
Albania.
5
They've taken a lot in homes now, but we need better
(.£-1-"
Prime Minister Blair: Right. We need to watch in Albania,
particularly because a lot of refugees are living with families
and are not getting any support. /
L......,,...,,_:::;-_ _ _ _---;-~;----...JI
I f necessary we can CiO 1 t ourse.L ves
with Germany and France and get it back from the EU. ~
The President:
Does -it? .~
The EU Parliament doesn't have to vote on it.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: What if you got a letter from every EU member to
Santer saying release it tomorrow? Would it help? J81
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, it would help. In the end, we
should probably just give them the money ourselves and then get
it back from the EU.
LM
The President: Do we need to call anyone else about this
incident with China to buck them up? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I was going to speak to D'Alema anyway.
(S)
The President:
Okay, I will call Jacques.
US)
Prime Minister Blair: I still think that in the end, the public
understands t~at in war these things happen. We have this
operation in NATO and SHAPE workin better now.
e medla is just bored with picttires of refugees. We
need actual pictures of what is happening in KoSovo. ~~~~~~_~_~~~
The President: Okay, I will work on that.
great ideas but I'll work on it. ~
3ECREI
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
I don't have any
�£ECRE'f
6
Prime Minister Blair: There are ways we could do it. We are
looking at, but I think people, all the time, need to be
J>
reminded of the basic principles. When I went to Macedonia and
saw those people, any doubt immediately leaves you. What has
happened to these people is just dreadful.
We need to make all_
the right diplomatic moves, but just carryon. ~
The President:
I'm with you. Where are we on Ireland? kG1
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prlme Mlnls er B alr:
We got a little bit of a breakthrough
last week, because Sein Fein came up with far more positive
language. .1
1 I have a totally
different proposition which is based on words rather than
product and now I have to say to them you may not get product,
but you may get better words.
~
Sinn Fein may say, ~you've got better words, we want an answer
tomorrow."
For six months, we've been trying to get better
words. You can't rush. We actually had a good series of
meetings at Downin on Thursda and there is some possibilty
there.
But we're not quite
~y~e~t~a~tZ-~a~n~a~b~s~~~u~t~e~~c~r~i't~l~c~a~~~~~--~~e~n~it is at a critical
moment, if you are willing to do so, to help.
It may take in
the end,· a high profile intervention in this.
j.ZJ I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Yes.
I will do whatever you want me to do.
Prime Minister Blair:
I know Bill. You've been fantastic on
this.
I will try to bring this to a boil next week and will
keep in touch.
(eJ
SECREt
.(.e)
�7
13gCRE'J:'
The President:
I'll keep working on all of this and if I need
to call you again I will.
yn
Prime Minister"'Blair:
The President:
Okay Bill.
Thank you.
(U)
(U)
-- End of Conversation
SECRE'f
�SECRE'F
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
Jenny McGee, Joel Schrader,
Miles Murphy, Sean Tarver, Roger Merletti,
James Smith and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
May 27, 1999, 10;10 - 10:22 a.m. EDT
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi, Bill.
I am fine.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
So.
How are you?
(U)
(U)
What's happening?
(U)
How's the indictment going down over there?
Prime Minister Blair:
~
I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
I agree with that.
JQ1
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
So, anyway, I sent
you a note setting out my thoughts.
I don't know whether it's
reached you yet, I just finished it this morning, but I think
the situation is, we are doing a lot of damage, but I think
�2
we're right to be stepping up the pressure.
We've got to be.
%
The President:
This planning process has got to proceed,
because we only have a few days before deciding what else to do
but I think 45,000 troops for KFOR is quite good. The more
people we have deployed in the area, the more quickly we can
move.
I agree entirely with you; we· obviously can't afford to
lose and have to keep doing everything necessary to make him
think that we're ready to intervene and no matter what we can't
afford ,to lose. But the combination of the impact of last
week's strikes and the fact that the NAC has voted to let NATO
increase the number of targets that will be hit and the nature
of them and the buildup will give us maximum pressure.
I agree
with you, I don't care what happens to him, whether he stays
there or goes someplace as you've said, like Belarus, it's all
right with me if we get our objectives met. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I agree with that.
~
Prime Minister Blair: Because you save lives by doing that.
I
think we are in just about the right frame and it probably
hasn't reached you yet, but I have set out in a note what I
think you can do if we have to go a step further -- how you
would explain that and how you would take people with you. You
can set it in
er vision for the Balkans and how it's good
for people.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
That may be.
wouldn't do that.
E.O.13526 section l.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I think he would.
J&r
He has been very tough on this so far. ~
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, he has and I think they will come
along with us.
The problem is, until you see a real plan,
3ECRE'f
�SECRET
3
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
you're a bit in the dark on this.
So, I think if we get a
clear military consensus, I think people would go with that.
yr
The President:
The military consensus is 175,000 to 200,000
troops, at least that's what our people say, so we could
probably do it with less. But one thing we've found out is the
more we send in, the fewer will die. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Absolutely.
i81
The Fresident:
So the more unattractive we make it, the safer
it is for everyone. ~
Prime Minister Blair: /
The President:
That is a big problem.
They're reeling around.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
I think we need to let this
thing percolate for a day or two and see what the reaction in
Serbia is.
There's some chance it will be helpful, and there is
a chance that it will be harmful; I would be surprised if it had
no impact.
So I think we'll see something fairly soon.
~
Prime Minister Blair: \
The President:
I agree with that.
J21
Prime Minister Blair:
SECRE'f
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�4
.3ECRE'f
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: Yes, I agree with that. Hillary and I are
taking a couple of days off, and I am mulling that over right
now. My gut feeling is that I have to give something sooner
rather that later. Unless it cracks in two or three days, it's'
better to say something very strong, that we have no intention
of losing this. Now the good news about the indictment, Tony,
is that is makes it less forgiveable for us to lose it. No one
can say, 'Oh well, they're just nationalists." I think it is
interesting that apparently the whole indictment is premised on
Kosovo and shows a systematic government policy. I thought in
the beginn:i..ng that if she (Louise Arbour) did do this, some
might be based on his role in the Bosnia slaughters. But
apparently it's all based on Kosovo. It's quite interesting.
And apparently -- I haven't seen it, but apparently it says that
it's more than chain of command, it's specific personal things
he ordered, not that he was just the head of the apparatus.
This will be quite helpful in makin that case. I a ree with
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
away and
lS ma lng lt lmpossible for everyone
see people are not going to walk away.
Prime Minister Blair: I th~k that is right.
haven't got this yet -- ()n
The President:
second. ..(-B-1
I just got it.
I just read it.
walk
V1
As I say, you
Just this
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: Good. Well, I will be back in a few days and
get back with you on that, and we'll keep our fingers crossed.
I think the NAC did the right thing by approving a new range of
targets. JZ1'
SECRET
�PECRE!
5
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes, I think it has been a good few days.
%
The President:
Alright, I will talk to you soon.
Prime Minister Blair:
Alright, Bill, all the best.
End of Conversation --
:;,gCRE'f
(U)
(U)
�SECRE'f
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
Doug Bayley, George Chastain,
Frank Jarosinski, Miles Murphy, Don Cheramie
and Lawrence Butler
June 3, 1999, 6:42 - 6:57 p.m. EDT
Oval Office
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
Hi, Tony.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
Let's hope it sticks.
The President:
Yes, I hope it will.
best answer.
(U)
(U)
I think you and I gave the
Prime Minister Blair: Here (Cologne) it's like trying to stamp
down a bush fire.
(U)
The President:
There are a lot of unanswered questions. Maybe
72 hours from now we can celebrate, but we will all look stupid
if it turns into a red herring by Milosevic. My response today
was 'welcome, but cautious." ).81'"
Prime Minister Blair: As I said tonight, of course, the fact
that we got an agreement was great news,but it has to be done,
it has to be implemented and some trick questions have to be
answered in the right way.
I E.O. 13526, section tA(b)(d)1
The President:
I agree.
Academy speech. +eI
I turned up the heat at my Air Force
SECRE'f
Reason:
1.5 (a;b, d ) .
.
.~~~ __
'_-~'?-."'
Declassify on:! 61!::~r "'J'·:-,.;.r~· - - - ,
.
Ii
!".
I~:r?N LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
1-
~:'..'-::.::~.,...::~!~~_:....;,. .-:-c~--..,:--~~L. ~" ,:'"c.;-;>-~, __~./·"';(-.;
�3EeRE~
2
Prime Minister Blair:
you've been dotn .
Absolutely, I think its critical what
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: We have a new problem, but we should be careful··
on this line.
Sometime in the next 72 hours I need to talk to
you about the planning process. Do you think over the next 72
hours we can talk about this? Do you think we could talk secure
over the weekend? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Sure.
(U)
The President:
Just tell them they can dance around a Maypole - you'll hold it up for them while they dance. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
should only rejoice when
We
The President: He's been a champ. Chernomyrdin has been good
too and for the Russians this is good too.
They have come out
well. ..(-et"
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, I think it is a good thing for
Russia.
They came out extremely well. ~
The President:
It makes them look like a world leader. They
don't want to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. This
should help them with their economic stabilization.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
He is getting a lot of
criticism at home.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I mostly agree with that. Absolutely
right, people tonight are talking far more positively about them
and asking what we can do to help the Russians in economic
terms.
It really changes the atmosphere there, doesn't it? ~
The President: Yes, it certainly does. The other thing that
they and the Serbs should think about is that this saves us a
hell of a lot of money that can be used on development, the
money we would save from putting in a ground force. Also, the
main thing we need to do is look like we remain determined.
~
SECRET
��4
3ECRE'f
The President: Apparently, they are meeting on Saturday. He
wanted to wait-until Sunday probably to find out how much wiggle
factor, wiggle room he had. They pushed for Sunday and we
pushed him back to Saturday. ,.ke)
Prime Minister Blair: There is no reason they can't meet
tomorrow from NATO's point of view.
~
The President: Saturday is the earliest day we can get Wes to
meet them.
(i)
Prime Minister Blair:
Serbs to meet.
(-e1
The President:
Yes.
Prime Minister Blair:
This is the quickest we could get the
Un
I don't like that very much.
+et
The President: We may know Sunday or Monday where we are.
Maybe you and I could talk on Sunday. I need to talk to you
~
about the other option. There is good news and bad news.
Prime Minister Blair:
Okay, Bill.
The President:
Keep your fingers crossed.
Okay.
Prime Minister Blair:
Right.
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation
SECRET
(U)
�8ECRE'f
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Pr.ime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Bonnie Glick, Michael Manning,
Miles Murphy and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
June 6, 1999, 12:32 - 12:42 p.m. EDT
Camp David, Maryland
Hi, Tony.
Prime Minister Blair:
tied down.
(V)
How are you?
(U)
I'm anxious until this thing is properly
The President:
This is exactly what I was afraid of. A bombing
pause and then they would try to steal the peace now that we
have won the war. The position is that the Russians and Chinese
won't let a Security Council Resolution go through until there
is a bombing pause, but we won't pause unless there is clear
evidence of withdrawal.
Funny, but I understand the Serb
position; they don't want a vacuum so when their withdrawal
starts, they want us to come in. Yesterday, our guys said ~you
begin withdrawal, we will pause and try for one day to get a
Security Council Resolution.
If the Chinese and Russians won't,
we'll get a NATO accord and move in immediately." .k81
That was our position yesterday. Today, the Serbs came back and
said they couldn't live with this.
They want a Security Council
Resolution that links the authority to deploy and the authority
to run the country under the UN; if there is a delay, we'll
return to our pre-conflict force levels before we invaded until
the Security Council works it out. That's a nightmare and we
can't let that happen.
They're trying to steal the peace after
we won the conflict.
I know you agree with that.
I am going to
3ECRE':P
Reason:
1.S(a,b,d)
Declassify On:
6();'{9!!.fl~:-:----~---·-- -------~-,<, .
i~b~NLI~RARY PHOTOCOPY '-'s~~ ."
�SECRET
2
call D'Alema.
I don't know what to do except tell our guys to
hang tough. Ahtisaari delayed his China trip.
I)t)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I just talked to Ahtisaari.
What did he say?
J31
yi)
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
Prime Minister Blair: !
I
The President:
I'm not against that.
+&r
Prime Minister Blair: I said I wanted to think about
talk to ou.
If we ask him he would 0 do that toni
The President:
Good for him.
and
~
Prime Minister Blair:!
I
The President:
Yes.
~
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
Prime Minister Blair: What do we lose? My guy down there,
Michael Jackson, is a good bloke, but he is a general not a
negotiator. J$t
The President:
I think Ahtisaari made a good impression on
Milosevic.
I haven't talked to Sandy, Madeleine or anyone about
him going down. But I worry about this thing dragging on.
I'm
not worried about sending a signal; we need to get this going
while the iron is hot. 1St
Prime Minister Blair:
that.
M
The President:
SECREr
Absolutely, I'm in total agreement on
You talk to your guys.
I'll talk to mine.
)Sf
�3
SECRET
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)l
Prime Minister Blair:
I told Martti I'd get back to him in an
hour.
If we want to have a chat to our folks and have them
chat..
The President:
I agree.
nervous as hell all da .
from us.
I've been waiting for this.
I've been
We can't let him take the eace away
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
I agree 100 percent.
The President: We owe it to these people (the Kosovars), and
don't forget that they (the Serbs) are asking us to eat a hell
of a lot of shit. Now that they want us to sweep out Thaqi and
the KLA and give this Authority five years to work, our crowd is
going to be at some physical risk too. We have to think down
the road here.
Look at Bosnia four years later. We're taking
on a lot of water here.
If we can spring some money from the
IMF and the World Bank ... but there are all kinds of hurdles
with that.
Well, you and I are in the same place. We can't let
our folks get weak on this.
If the Europeans stay hitched on
this, we should be okay in a day or two.
I might give Chretien
a call too.
He has a lot of friends over there in Europe.
I
know he agrees with us. We may have to do some hand holding on
this.
1.21
Prime Minister Blair:
[
I agree.
J
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I'll tell you what I'll do.
I'll call Sandy now
and talk to our guys and then I'll try to call D'Alema, and
decide who else I should call.
If there is any other problem,
I'll be available.
It's sunny here.
I may go out, but I'll
have phones with me. ~
SECREg:}
�SECRE~
4
Prime Minister Blair:
I have some people I really trust out
there at the negotiations. Okay, our people will be in touch .
.J.&tThe President:
If this thing is going to be drug out for
another 72 hours or so, we may also need a story about how our
planning is continuing. We have to put a squeeze on and we
can't let them get the peace. Okay, we have a vigorous
agreement going here, so we don't need to waste time.
I'll talk
to Sandy and we'll be in touch. Goodbye. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Goodbye.
(U)
End of Conversation
"'~""'--~~------.-
--- ----
•• - -
:~~",~N LIBRARY PHO:OCOPY
~ ........ !
I
�SECRET·
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS H 11\1 (:iTO 1\1
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O.13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 63
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Tony C~mpanella, Michael
Manning, Robin Rickard, Roger Merletti
and Lawrence Butler
June 7, 1999, 9:55 - 10:06 a.m. EDT
Oval Office
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
Prime Minister Blair:
what I know? . (U)
The President:
Yep.
Prime Minister Blair:
Hi Bill.
Now do you want me to tell you
(U)
The talks broke off.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)l
Do you see
what I mean?
k81
�2
The President:
Yes.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
Yes.
I completely agree with everything you've
said.
The key here is where the Russians are on this.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
just have to be tough as hell with them.
accord with where you are. )<r,(
We
I am completely in
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
SECl\E:T
�8ECRE'P
3
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Yep. We are in the same place Tony, and we've
got to tough it out and get a good UN draft. Ma be I am
sensitive, but let me say something.
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d) I
OK?
Prime Minister Blair:
)-51
OK Bill. /
I
The President:
with you.
?l
I am going to call Yeltsin as soon as I hang up
Prime Minister Blair:
I
The President:
I agree to that.
hold to it? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
morning.
aECRET
Yes.
Do you think the Allies will
I spoke with Schroeder this
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
�4
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: Alright. Let's hang ip there.
develops tonight I might call you.
kS)
If anything
Prime Minister Blair: I might trouble you again if I get a firm
readout on the Russians. If there is something we need to talk
about then we can talk again.
(S)
The President:
Thank you.
OK.
Prime Minister Blair:
Good-bye
(U)
The President:
(U)
Alright.
Goodbye.
All the best.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
SEeRE,],
f'~"'" £I'
-'~'---" v
.
.
'!~\,ti-"tQ~ LiBRARY PHOTOCOPyt
c"
"cc
\ :~~:~':~T':~::~>-l;-<~:'~~~"~:~:'-' ,)._.,:')c:. :._\;--/;,-,-~~'f[·
Thank you.
�SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Matt Sibley, Robert Ford,
George Chastain, Sean Tarver, Jim Smith,
Roger Merletti and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
June 10, 1999, 9:09 - 9:27 a.m. EDT
Oval Office
The President:
Hey, I just called to say thanks, it's been a
good run.
Life's greatest curse is the answer to our prayers;
now we have to figure out how to get all those people back in,
without getting blown up by all those landmines.
I had Elie
Wiesel here -- do you know him?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
(U)
The President:
He's a Holocaust survivor, and an advisor.
I
sent him to some of the camps, and he said, ~boy, there is so
much anger there.
Every Kosovar believes he knows the Serb who
ousted him."
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes, it's going to be tough, isn't it?
tell you what, it could be a lot worse.
(U)
The President:
Well, it's quite wonderful.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: At least now it will be a problem of
construction instead of destruction.
(U)
The President: We've just got to hold everybody together and
keep working on it.
(U)
SECRET
I
�SECRET
2
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)\
Prime Minister Blair:
~~~~~~~~~-'__-nvr________________________~[line drops, and
is reestablished.
The President:
Hey, Tony, I'm sorry.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: No, no, it's our fault.
person who dropped the line executed.
(U)
I'll have the
[Laughs]
The President:
We're trying to think through the
obvious questions, about how fast we can get people back in and
clear out the landmines, and we need to flush out Macedonia
first. -1-e:I
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yeah, we have to keep working on that.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I am, too.
There are not a lot of places he can
go, given his indictment by the war crimes tribunal. Maybe
Russia or Belarus would take him, or maybe he'd get a Pinochet
deal and leave him in Serbia. ~
Prime Minister Blair: /
/~--------~-------------------~==~~~~I
IE.O.13526, section 1.4(b)(d~
L -_ _ _ _ _.
The President:
Yeah, we can't do that.
We need to look at
basic humanitarian conditions, and make sure the lights are on
by winter,/
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d)
\ ______~============~/
L
SECRE'P
.~
,
I
�3
SECRET
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: We have to do that, too. Frankly, I don't know
what else I can do. I've been reading about it all through
this, because my daughter just happens to be doing a paper on
Adams. I don't know what the real deal is between him and the
IRA. It'phard to put pressure on him when you don't know
. what's going on. It's just bizarre.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I
We've got to keep working on it, and I'll do whatever
you want me to do.
yr:).
Let me say this: we sent out our top people to NATO for Kosovo,
we need to do the same thing with getting the refugees back and
setting up a government. Whatever the formal structure, we have
to put our best people in to set up the mechanics and make this
thing work. There are literally thousands of detail questions
that we have to answer. ~
Prime Minister Blair: \
~
'----------~/
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)
The major concern I have about the
person on top is I want someone with confidence and energy to do
this thing.· I want someone to go there and stay. --fG+Prime Minister Blair:
I
The President: The commander of the overall military is going
to be British, isn't h.e? I think he's good. I haven't met him,
but I've seen him on TV. -+er
Prime Minister Blair:
2ECRET
L I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
~
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�4
SECRET
The President: Anyway, this won't require our obsession like
the battle, but it will require our attention for the next 10
days.
(Z).
Prime Minister Blair:
Cologne meeting? JRr
Right, well, Bill, you'll be over for the
The President:
Yeah, when we come to Cologne, we should have
major questions to answer as a body. We need to boost Yeltsin
and his pro-reform forces.
I wish we could resuscitate
Chernomyrdin, and I realize this may be more water than we can
carry.
J,.e1
I'd like to have him and Ahtisaari there to receive our thanks.
We may want to think about this.
They did a hell of a job for
us.
I think we also ought to think about some other things at
Cologne. We need to have good positions coming out of Cologne
for debt relief, and because of compound interest and falling
incomes, I think it will be a big deal there. We also need to
do more on the AIDS issue. According to our people, one percent
of the people in the world have AIDS.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
In Africa the numbers are staggering, and
in a country like South Africa it's just massive.
(ei
The President: And you've got 60 million people more or less,
and 35 million in Africa, and the number is going to double in
the next four years. kef
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)!
The President:
Yeah, let's see where they are with the World
Bank. Russia collapsed politically and economically after .1995.
It also deteriorated with Yeltsin's health problems even though
he was reelected in 1996. )Qt
[Line drops and is reestablished.]
The President:
Hi, Tony.
Solana is on TV.
(U)
You need to go to the press now.
Prime Minister Blair: Right, I'm sorry about that.
Let's speak before Cologne.
(U)
The President:
Yeah we need to talk.
(U)
Okay, yes.
�~ECRE'P
5
Prime Minister Blair:
Right, let's talk again before Cologne.
(U)
The President:
Okay.
Goodbye.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Goodbye.
(U)
End of Conversation
aEGRE'f
�CON'FIlJEM'fIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 65
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
Jenny McGee, George Chastain,
Robert Ford, Joel Ehrendreich, Jim Smith,
Roger Merletti
June 21, 1999, 2:26 - 2:33 p.m. EDT
Ljubljana, Slovenia
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
your soldiers.
Hello, Bill.
(U)
Hey, Tony, I called to tell you I'm sorry about
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Thanks very much.
It's very kind of you
to call. We're still trying to find out the details.
(U)
The President:
Tony?
(U)
[Call dropped and reestablished.]
The President:
You're still trying to get the news?
seen is what's on CNN.
(U)
All I've
Prime Minister Blair: We don't know how much more than that at
the moment.
It appears one of them was a sergeant, and they
were trying to demine a school, and a mine went off.
I'm afraid
we're going to see quite a bit of this before it's all through.
(U)
COHFIDEN'fIAL
Classified by:
Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
1.5 (d)
Declassify on:;
J.
�2
COl,PIDEfi"'fIAL
The President:
Yes.
They said it might have been more like a
booby trap than a traditional mine.
It's difficult to tell
whether they're deactivated.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: And it was in a school, I think. Well,
they're pretty sick, actually. As more comes out about these
Serb soldiers, it really is unbelievable.
(U)
~~~~~~~~~~~
The President:
There was a show
are at America and me. Our guys
interviewed with yesterday seems
close to showing the truth about
They're going to have to come to
. Prime Minister Blair:
on CNN on how mad the Russians
told me this TV station I
to be the only one that came
what Milosevic was up to.
grips with it.
(U)
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I think in the near term we have to check the
schedule by which our people are moving in. There was also a
special about the French troops trying to separate the Serbs and
the Kosovars. JR1
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)1
The President: Well, I won't keep you.
I feel like we had a
good G-8.
I just wanted you to know I'm sorry about your men.
(U)
That's kind of you, Bill.
I thought we
Prime Minister Blair:
had a good G-8, too.
So you're off to Macedonia tomorrow?
(U)
The President:
Yeah, I'm going to a state dinner in Macedonia
[n.b., the President meant Slovenia] tonight, and Djukanovic,
I'll give you a readout in
the Montenegrin President, is here.
a couple of days. )ei
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay, Bill.
Goodbye, Tony.
Goodbye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation
CmtFIDEHTL".L
(U)
�CONFIDBNTL"tL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
The President
Prime Minister Blair
PARTICIPANTS:
Notetakers: Bob Ford, Joel Ehrendreich,
Rob Williams, Jenny McGee, Roger Merletti
and James Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
June 3D, 1999, 3:14 - 3:22 p.m. EDT
Chicago, Illinois
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi, Bill.
(U)
How are you doing?
Prime Minister Blair:
Pretty grim.
(U)
I
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
CONFIDEN'fIAL
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(qJ
Declassify On:!
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I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
do now? j...G-Y
What exactly do the unionists want Sinn Fein to
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
~
Prime Minister Blair: /
~
~
L - - - -_ _ _ _
The President:
That way the IRA doesn't look like it's
surrendering to the unionists? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
CONn DEN'!' IAL
�3
COktFI DENT IAb
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
It looks like you could manage this marching
thing if you could solve the bigger problem.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: Which means i f they meet all the local people's
conditions, they could march. JRf
Prime Minister Blair:
J
I
I
The President:
Are you going back to the meeting now?
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
J,e1
~
The president:
Do you want me to call them in a couple of hours
-- Adams and Trimble? ~
Prime Minister Blair: /
I
The President:
Right now?
~
~
Prime Minister Blair:/
L-----------------~/
The President:
Why don't I monitor it from here?
~
IrE-.O-.1"C":3-52-6-,-se-c-ti-on-1,-4(-b-)(---'d)l
CONFI DEN''l'IAL
�4
CGNF I DEN'fIAL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I will check in where I am in 20 minutes to see
if they're through. JBr
Prime Minister Blair: \
I
The President:
If they're in a meeting, I will wait until they
finish to call them. ~
Prime Minister Blair: /
The President:
They, the unionists?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
J&r
Yes.
Prime Minister Blair: /
The President:
Okay, I'm on it.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Thanks, Bill.
Goodbye.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
(U)
(U)
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
CO~IFIDEN'fIAL
�COHFIDEN'fIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
I
'I
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, documeut uo. 67
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM~-F-TELEPHONE-C:ONVERSATI~O~N~--------------~
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
Jarosinski
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
Sean Tarver and Frank
June 30, 1999, 9:25 - 9:38 p.m. CDT
Chicago, Illinois
Prime Minister Blair:
Hi, Bill.
(U)
The President:
You are where you were last time we talked,
aren't you?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
"'===:;======~:;;""'=~--":"----'
The President:
I know.
take my call now? .Jrf?'r
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
It's just terrible.
Yes.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Make a counterproposal?
Prime Minister Blair:
Will Trimble even
~
Yes.
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)I
The President:
Yeah.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
CONFIDENTIAL
Classified by:
Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on:}' '~t;' -~,~ .-~--- C<'\
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IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)\
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Is that their counterproposal one?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
What is Gerry Adams saying in response?
(~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
You mean put that through Parliament?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
~
!
What did he say?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)\
The President: Do you think keeping them up all night will get
them weary and make them give in? ~
cmlFI DENT L'\L
�3
CONFI DENT L",L
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I
You mean let them get a little sleep . ...+8-
Prime Minister Blair:
\
Yes . \
[
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Is there anything I
can say to Gerry Adams? Anyth~ng
e
states can offer
them to help them politically to move closer to where Trimble
is? You know I actually have far more popularity within the
Catholic community than the Protestant community. Most of the
Protestants think I am a turncoat.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
You offered him an act of Parliament, right?
.JR!I
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
CONFIDE~lTIAL
�cmIFIDEN'fIAL
4
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
So, they are not a judge of it?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
____________________________~I .ye1
I
Do you think Trimble will take that?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
~I
God, I think that is the best deal.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
~
I
But Gerry thinks that is like crying uncle.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: Especially if Great Britain can be the guarantor
of both sides.
If you have legal authority; they won't
understand that. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: Yes. So I should tell Adams that Trimble will
help him work through that? ~
�5
COHFI DEN'fIPrL
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Let me ask you this.
a halt until tomorrow morning?
(Z)
Are you going back to call
Prime Minister Blair: Yes.
I have a little fiddling around to
do, but probably in the next quarter hour. ~
The President:
Do you believe I should call in the next half
hour or let them sleep first? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I would call them now.
~
The President:
Okay, I will start to call them. My national
security people are in if you need to call me in the middle of
the night.
I know what to say now. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I will try to call them now.
~
The President: You think I might be able to get them in the
next ten minutes?
yc)
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
)X'r
The President:
Okay, I am getting ready to get on the plane, so
(U)
let me see what I can do.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Alright, Bill.
Okay, goodbye.
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation
CONFI DEN'!' lAL
�CONFIDEN'l'IAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
Joel Schrader, Miles Murphy,
Matt Sibley, Amy Swarm and Roger Merletti
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
July 1, 1999, 7:26 - 7:58 a.m. EDT
The Residence
Hello Tony?
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
Sorry, it must be early morning for you.
(U)
The President:
It's fine.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
CONFI DEH'l'IAL
Classified by:
Reason:
1.5(d
Declassify On:
Glyn T. Davies
G'" -- .
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7/8
(",
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I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I talked to Adams about that for a long time.
I
spent the better part of a year trying to convince him that
ought to be his position without success. And last night I do
believe, rightly or wrongly, his belief is that he made some
significant commitments esterday about what he is
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair: L-__~I=E=.O=.=13=5=26=,=se=ct=io=n=1=.4=(b=)(=d)~I____~I
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
CGNFIDEN'PIAb
Yes.
~
~
.,
~ '-.'~
�CON'FIDEN''fIAL
3
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Did they commit to follow Chastelain's
timetable? ..)-e}
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
CQNFI DEN'l' IA!7
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
�4
Cotifr'I Il:l!:l<f'f IAL
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
that. JGt
There is no question -- I think Adams believes
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President: What about the argument they can all take the
government down later, and we will all support it. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
CONFIDEH'fL'\L
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
�c mr FI DEN'J'IAL
5
I EoO. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
I
The President:
~
Yes.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
My view is that is what you ought to work on.
Is there anything you can do, any stick or carrot, to shore
Trimble up? ~
Prime Minister Blair: /
The President:
I do believe they are trying to help on that; I
think Gerry was open to it. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Is that an argument
The President: Well let me ask you this.
for you to go back to a hard deadline?
(Yl"
Prime Minister Blair:
I
~
'--------------/
CGNPI DENT IAL
I EoO. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�6
CONFIDgNTIAl,
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
It's crazy. The whole thing is just nuts, but I
think your·best chance is to get, based on what you say, I do
think they will accelerate the timetable.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
I have talked until I am blue in
the face.
Prime Minister Blair: /
The President:
For one thing, there has to be some
definitiveness to the commitment.
I didn't know they weren't
.{.et
more definite.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
tGr
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: But the one thing that I am now persuaded on is,
after one year of trying to make a case,
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
CONFI DENT 1M
�7
CONFIDEN'flt,L
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
!E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)!
I think that is what we need to work on, and
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
!E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)!
The President:
(U)
Okay.
Prime Minister Blair:
Goodbye.
(U)
End of Conversation
CONFIDEN'PIAL
�cmlFIDEHTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Robin Rickard, Joel Schrader,
Don Cheremie and James Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
July 1, 1999, 7:25 - 7:34 p.m. EDT
Jack Kent Cooke Stadium
Hey, Tony.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Hi, Bill.
finally getting somewhere. I
Hello.
Well.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
CONFIDEWfIAL
Classified by:
Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
1.5 (dJ
Declassify On:' 7 / !~"~' _fic~i;.,:'------ ------.--~~~.
f<.~T6N LIBl0-RY PHOTOCOPY
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I think we're
�CONPIDEH'fIAL
2
The President:
Yes.
of October? ~
They say they can't do it before the end
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes, they can't do it earlier.
~
The President:
It would be interesting to see if they would do
it earlier if they can get in earlier.
~
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes, I can see that, actually.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
I
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I'm happy to. Do you want me to call tonight?
Do they know about the proposal? JZ}
CO~tFI DENTIAL
�3
CONn lJ!!:N'f IAL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I'll call Trimble tonight.
Prime Minister Blair:
Gerry tonight?
~.
j
I
~--------------~
The President:
Because Bertie's gone back to Dublin, right?
.-+er
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes, he has.
Jim can check.
;e1
The President:
I will have Jim check to see if the Irish have
talked to Gerry.
If they have, I will call him.
In any event,
I'll talk to David. When I call him, what should I say? That I
hope he takes this deal? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes, that's right.
I
~
'--------------~
The President:
Yes. And you will make this agreement public
tomorrow? This proposal? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.}
The President: At what point tomorrow will you publicly float
this? So I could make a public comment.
~
Prime Minister Blair: Our people will coordinate with
folks. Hang on just a second.
our
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President: Yes, I shouldn't talk to Gerry before the Irish.
That would be usurping. )J21'
cm1FIDE~f'l'IAL
�"
4
CONFIDENTIAL
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Got it.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
~
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Get some sleep.
~
Prime Minister Blair: You, too. I'm sorry.
It was very
helpful when you talked to them yesterday.
je1
The President:
Okay.
Goodbye.
(U)
End of Conversation
CQI>IFI P8HTIAL
�_CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
I
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Miles Murphy, Robin Rickard,
Don Cheremie, Doug Bayley and James Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
July 2, 1999, 6:39 - 6:48 p.m. EDT
Oval Office
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi, Bill.
(U)
Well, congratulations.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
~========~----------~
The President: Yes, but old Trimble was in a good frame of
He was
mind. I was stunned. I
I ~3¥~e D l m . I J,R:)
ttc~"n ~4(d)
pretty proud of himself when
a
I
F?
Prime Minister Blair:
Did you talk to him?
JQr
The President: Yeah, I talked to him an hour ago, 30 minutes
ago. He was really upbeat, saying it's bad and it'll get worse,
but it'll get better. He went through a laundry list of who was
with him, who was against him, who was on the fence. I told him
I would call them if he wanted. I told him what we always
agreed I'd tell him. I was very encouraged to see how upbeat he
was.
vJ
Prime Minister Blair: When I left a couple of hours ago, I was
I a bit down. /
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)l
]
I
CONFIDENTIAL
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1/5 (d,)
Declassify on:!
�CONFIDEN'l'IltL
2
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I think it is and I think he may be there now.
-+etPrime Minister Blair:
Do you mean that?/
The President: Absolutely.
I told him, give me a list; I will
call every damn one of them.
J.&r
Prime Minister Blair:
I had no idea.
~--------------------------~/
The President:
i t . ...J!C(
He said Taylor was with him, but I'm glad to do
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Adams was in a good humor, too.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
J
The president:
I'll keep doing it. Trimble said it will be a
real hard sell, but I think I could do it. He was really in a
very good place. That is all I know.
~
[The line dropped and was reestablished.]
The President:
Sorry.
Prime Minister Blair:
airport.
(U)
The President:
My fault.
Are you in London?
Prime Minister Blair:
CmlFIDg~ITL"<L
We got cut off.
(U)
I'm on my way back from the
(U)
Yes, I just landed.
(U)
�CONFIDEN'fIAL
3
The President: Well, I don't know what else to say, but I think
this is great. You did great. We've just got to nurse them
now, to get them there. Gerry was happy
clam. He said he
had to make Trimble look good, one thing
I E.O. 13526, section IA( d)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I told him if he wanted me to call anybody,
would call.
I
j)21
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I made a statement.
I said you had issued this
proposal as a way forward and I thought it was a very good
thing, it gave them a chance to shape their own destiny and
their own government and to get rid of guns and violence for
everybody.
The United States expects everybody to comply and we
support you strongly and expect everyone who benefits to fully
comply. J,..eI
Prime Minister Blair:
And you said that on screen, did you?
JR5
The President:
Right.
Prime Minister Blair:
k€1
That will be good.
~
The President: We already got some feedback from Ireland.
was already beamed over there on CNN or something.
U?)
CONn j,)~NT H! L
It
�4
CONPIDEN'fIAL
Prime Minister Bl . .
The President:
Yes, even the ones who are mad at me for being
too pro-Sinn Fein, my dumping allover them will give them a
little confidence. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: Yeas, I will see about that. You have your
people call me back with a list. Talk to Trimble; whoever he
wants me to call, I will call.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Get yourself some sleep, you've earned it.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Many, many thanks.
Thanks, I will.
Goodbye.
Goodbye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
CONFIDEN'fL".L
(U)
(U)
�CONFIDENTIAL
5298
,.13
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 71
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Ralph Sigler, Liz Rogers,
Michael Manning, Rob Williams, Joel
Ehrendreich and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
July 12, 1999, 10:01 - 10:14 a.m. EDT
Oval Office
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi, Bill, how are you?
Hi, Tony, I'm fine.
(U)
(U)
P~ime Minister Blair:
I keep seeing these great pictures over
here of you in the press from your trip.
You are doing some
great sweeping tours.
(U)
The President:
I've been going through the poorest parts of
America.
People have got to realize that not everyone here is
rich.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
can say so.
(U)
It is really effective campaigning if I
The President:
I don't know exactly what kind of financing you
do to encourage British investment.
I've gotten quite a bit of
stearn behind the idea of offering the same incentives to "invest
in poor -- really poor -- neighborhoods that I've given them to
invest in developing economies overseas.
So it turns around the
argument that people gripe about giving incentives for overseas
but not giving them the same incentives to invest in our own
CONFI DEHT L1l,d;,
Classified by;
Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
1. 5 (d)
Declassify On:j 7 ;iJ~'9" ~",r",~__----"-"'"--~;"\
;t::~:~~":~RARY PHOTOCOPY ,I
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COMFI DEN'fIAL
reservations.
Prime Minister Blair:
here's where we are.
The President:
Interesting.
Yes, I agree.
It's getting a
Now, on the Irish issue
)<1
Prime Minister Blair:
/ E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)/
CG~TF IDEN'l'IAL
�3
CGHFIDEHTI}\L
The President:
What does the Good Friday Accord say on the
timing of prisoner releases?
(~
e
Prime Minister Blair:
It says that it's in the hands of the
body thatd~als with prisoner releases and shbuld run up to
May 2000. But it also says that decommissioning should run to
May 2000 as well.
"""
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~
The President:
Yes.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I got nowhere with Hume on SDLP after I talked
The President:
with you. So I don't know if I can nose around there again.
LQ1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: Adams is still holding out the position that
nobody else should be in the executive even if it is all their
fault. .JGt"
Prime Minister Blair:/
CONFI DEN':FIAL
�COHPIDEN''l.'IAL
4
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d~
. The President:
Yes, I agree with that but I don't know what
that does for you on the other side. 1er
Prime Minister Blair:
I don't know either for the minute.
I
The President:
Yes, well I'll look at what is ... I think the IRA
might give some kind of commitment that there would be a
statement after July 15. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
CQWFIDg~ITL'lrL
I R.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
�COWFWENTIAL
5
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)\
The President:
tf)
Yes, alright, let me see what I can do.
~
Prime Minister Blair: Okay, Bill, I'll be around anytime.
think the next two days. are pretty crucial, really.
~)
The President:
Well, I'll see what I can do.
Prime Minister Blair:
then.
(U)
. The President:
Thanks, Bill, I'll speak to you soon
Goodbye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
CONFIDEN'i'IAL
~
I
�CQNFIDEfi'I'IAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 72
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Liz Rogers, Michael Manning,
Rob Williams, Joel Ehrendreich and Lawrence
Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
July 12, 1999, 1:56 - 2:01 p.m. EDT
Oval Office
Hello?
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
Hi, Bill, sorry to trouble you again.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Yes, McGuinness is here.
CONFIDEN'fIAL
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (d);
,
Declassify On:
JR1
�2
CQNFIDENTIAL
-IKO. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: Won't the IRA say this is just changing the
sequencing again. Basically they have a matter of mistrust.
They still think they're going to get jacked around on the
executive on this, don't they? Jei
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Let me ask you this. What about the legislation
itself? I hear the SDLP has problems with it.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I
The President:
But do you think the legislation problems would
go away if you had any statement from the IRA?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I think s
The President: Could you change the legislation to overcome
directives if you get the IRA statement? -H=T
~
Prime Minister Blair:
L - I_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
/
The President:
Let me call you back. When are you going to
bed? It must be getting pretty late there now.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
It's only 7 o'clock now.
(U)
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
cmlFIDEHTIJ'IJ,
;
�3
CQNFIDEN'T lAL
Tte President:
Let me see what I can do.
I'll call you back.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay, thanks, Bill.
Okay, goodbye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation
GO~lFIDEH'fIAL
(U)
�COHrI Dg~IT III L
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
Doug Bayley, Don Cheramie,
Robin Rickard, Bob Ford, James Smith and
Richard Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
July 16, 1999, 10:09-10:33 a.m. EDT
Camp David, Maryland
Hello?
Prime Minister Blair;
The President;
(U)
Hi, Bill.
(U)
Well, today is not as bad as yesterday, is it?
J;if
Prime Minister Blair:
I
think that is the right analysis.
(f)
The President:
I just had Barak here, and he said how much you
had done to help.
He admires you so much. We had a great talk.
(e)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
seeing Massimo D'Alema on Monday.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)D
.J.e1
.
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
CONFIDElffIAL
Classified by:
Reason:
1.5 (d!)
Declassify On:i
(IZ)
I
am
�CeitH'IB~M'fIA:L
Prime Minister Blair:
is he? .(.e)
2
He's quite optimistic on the peace stuff,
The President:
Prime Minister Blair:
That is a bit of hope, then . . ~
The President:
The other nice trivial thing is that the British
Open is humiliating every golfer in the world. The average
score yesterday was 79.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
It's the bloody weather, is it?
(U)
The President:
Yes. They have made i t has hard as they could.
They enjoy making people miserable.
It's quite good, though.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
We must get you up there playing someday.
(U)
The President:
Where are we? I hope I gave a helpful statement
yesterday.
I said that I had failed to persuade them to work it
out, too, and we should just go on from here. ;e1
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
GONFIDENTIM
�COHFIDEH'fIAL
3
'1 E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
There's nothing to do now, is there?
Mitchell going to do something to help a bit? .,.kef
Prime Minister Blair:
That would be helpful, Bill.
Is George
I
The President:
COHFIDE~J'l'VrL
Yes.
ye1
1E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�CONnDK~JTPL
4
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: They can't have it both ways. So many of them,
I believe, there are so very many of them who are having a hard
time,- whatever they say, in letting go of it. It's like their
security blanket. Imagine what their lives are like, a certain
amount of romance, danger, drama
fe1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: -- power. You're asking them to put a little
white bread sandwich in a lunchbox and go off to work at the
factory. It'll be hard for them. ~
Prime Minister Blair: You mentioned this once before, I don't
know if you recall. I have put some people to work on that. I
The President: Sinn Fein proper can imagine themselves running
social services agencies or political services, but somebody
ought to talk to Gerry about what are their people going to do
with their lives when this is over. I think it's a big problem.
It plays on their psychology. I just -- I've been thinking a
lot of what I'm going to do when I leave here, but -- this may
be a big postulate -- but what if I had been a romantic
terrorist, especially lately, when it wasn't a lot of work and
you didn't have to set off more than one bomb every two years,
you know? I think you really have to think about what we can do
not only to guarantee their security and safety, but to give
some meaning to their lives, some way that they can participate
in the new Ireland. I may be wrong, but I think it's a huge
problem for Gerry Adams, even if most are not aware of what the
real problem is. )£1
Prime Minister Blair: I agree. I have some people working on
that. ~J_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~
C O~IFI DEHT IAL
J E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)J
�5
CONFI DEHTIAL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
They should be asked whether they have ever
actually talked to these people about what they would do with
their lives when this is over. They may have some ideas, but I
can't help but believe that is a big problem here.
If Gerry
thinks it's silly, at least you've opened it with him and he
should consider doing something. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
weekend, too.
We will do that.
I'll call some of our Irish guys over the
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I
I
COHFIDENTIJ'.L
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�CONFIDEN'1'L",L
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
I
6
The President:
Do you think I should come over there?
what you were going to say?
rer
Prime Minister Blair:
Is that
I was going to say it is not a bad idea .
.....(.ff
The President:
day trip.
JQ1
Okay, I'll do it.
I can do an overnight or a
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I'll call George and some of our congressmen
over the weekend.
I'll get on that. Maybe I can do that, if
George can come up with something different.
It wouldn't be
very different, but it could look different. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Bill, one other thin
IKO. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Yes, we have to have something there.
see George Soros' article? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
No, I didn't.
Did you
~
The President:
It's what you're arguing, but on a faster
timetable. He is arguing for a customs union within the Balkans
and some provision where you put them on a clear path to EU
membership as a region. Even if Serbia gets rid of Milosevic,
you can't deal with them on a nation-by-nation basis, because of
the inter-ethnic problems. He basically said they need to come
up with a regional currency to force them together.
It's quite
COWFIDE~l'TIl'.L
�7
• CQNFIDKNTL",L
a clever piece. Soros is not always right, but he's a genuine
visionary.
I will get someone to fax it over to you. And I'11
see what we can say on the 30 th • )Zl
./
Prime Minister Blair: Maybe our people should talk.
I think we
have to have an impact beyond just holding a conference.
J,Q-)"
I agree with that. We sure as hell can't go
The President:
just have a conference. Alright, man. Keep your
over there and
chin up. .kef
Prime Minister Blair:
All the best.
The President:
Goodbye.
Okay.
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation
CONFIDEN'FIAL
�. CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, documeut uo. 74
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Bilateral Meeting Between The President and
Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
United States
The President
Samuel R. Berger, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
James Steinberg, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Steven Ricchetti, Deputy Chief of Staff
Gene Sperling, Assistant to the President
for Economic Policy and Director of
the National Economic Council
Antony Blinken, Special Assistant to the
President and Senior Director for
European Affairs, NSC Staff (notetaker)
Great Britain
Tony Blair, Prime Minister
John Sawers, Diplomatic Advisor
Allistar Campbell, Press Secretary
Private Secretary
-
DATE, TIME
PLACE:
June 18, 1999, 1:40 - 2:35 p.m.
Hyatt Hotel, Cologne, Germany
The President:
Tony, you did a very good job on the debt issue.
If we can make it work, that will mean almost 2/3 debt
forgiveness for the poorest countries. This would be a real
step forward.
The Jubilee has enormous appeal -- getting rid of
all the debt for the millennium. But it also has real problems
that we would need to access before we embrace the concept.
For
example, Bob Rubin points out that for countries that may want
to borrow more who get 100 percent forgiveness, wiping out their
debt will be much harder for them because it will effect their
credit rating. Maybe we should look at adding rescheduling
CONFI±:lE~JTIAL
Classified by:
Robert A. Bradtke
Reason:
1.5 (~)..
Decla"ify OU,(
.
. _ .
JUIE~'-'2- _~u-'c-~
e:"., '. mTON LiBRARY PHOTOCOpy
~~~_:2.~~~~::.
t
"}_._-__:::--):,", . ,'
..
�COHFI D£HTIAL
2
without taking them out of the credit market. Rubin feels very
strongly about this. But anyway, what we need to do is focus on
the fact that we are doing a huge deal here. This is a major
achievement. We must not let what we are not doing become the
s or. It's what we are doing that's important. je1
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
'-
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes, I fully agree with that.)
I
Jim Steinberg:
The problem is specifying who. That is, who are
the 1,000 companies and why are we choosing them.
I think it
woul~be better to callan the private sector as a whole.
kef
The President: That's true but on the other hand this needs to
be organized. We can't just calion companies to act.
~
Jim Steinberg: Well there is a legal question when asking
specific companies.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
Gene Sperling:
The problem of asking specific companies is that
there could be a feeling of coercion. )£1
The President:
I think the thing to do would be to designate a
lead person in the business community to do this. That's what
we did on welfare.
I asked Eli Segal to run a voluntary
program.
ter
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Gene Sperling:
It would be a real political challenge to
support. And also I think there would be concern that we have
opened the door at the last moment. ~
The President:
The problem frankly is Congress. It is a
different party and not likely to do me any favors and so I do
not think we would get support. The way it works is that there
is an allocation to each committee. It is always less for
foreign affairs. So we are forced to choose among programs.
CONFIDEN'PIAL
�CQl)IFIDEN'FIJrL
3
There is a real weakness of commitment to foreign aid,
especially since the end of the Cold War. We have a big
surplus.
If I take the caps off, the Republicans will push for
a tax cut.
We have made a commitment to save Social Security.
So it wouidbe hard to do this without opening a Pandora's Box.
We need to wait to see if we get an omnibus deal. So I am
reluctant to look like we are urging this and then be in a
position where we can'tdelivet. But if we can quietly see that
there is a consensus on this, I can say to Congress this is what
the whole world wants to do.
It is a good idea on the merits.
But it would be better to forge a consensus here than for us to
lead on this issue given the politics. Also, we will have
another shot over the next couple of years. J21
Tony, do you want to talk about Kosovo? I have one big point to
make:
you had a huge impact on the execution of this campaign
and on our ability to sell what we needed to do. You realized
the need to improve our communications. Now, the big decision
we have to face is making sure that this works.
There is a huge
effort in bringing people back, in rebuilding lives, in spite of
the magnitude of the crisis. There is a mental health crisis.
I sent Elie Wiesel to the region to talk to the refugees.
I
talked to Jesse Jackson about this. All of us agree that we
need some kind of systematic, organized effort maybe working
through faith groups. We need to start. But before even all of
that, the UN must pick someone we would hire to oversee the
civilian implementation. Nationality doesn't matter to me. All
that counts is confidence, energy, and organization skills.
Those are the ke s.
The Economist had a uff eace on Bildt.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, I fully agJee.
decision. Who are the candidates?
~)
This is a critical
Samuel Berger: No one has emerged that I am aware of. The
selection seems to focus on former Foreign Ministers or defeated
Prime Ministers. With all respect, that is the wrong mind-set.
We need a CEO-type. Je1
The President: There must be a terrific European business
person who has worked in the Balkans, for example. Someone with
imagination and executive ability. Je1
CONFIDEN"i'IAL
�4
CotilPIDEN'f'IAL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
European.
J.e1
Yes he is, but of course, the Europeans want a
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
weeks.
r...e1
Well I am happy with an American.
I am afraid that the UN will dither on this for
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes,
Samuel Berger:
If I could just raise one idea. You both should
lay down a marker with the Secretary General on how you see the
job. You should imply a veto right.
In other words, you
together would expect he would not appoint someone without your
approval.
t,.e)
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Anyway, I don't
know your politics in Europe. But I do know that this is our
deal.
If it fails, it will be our failure. My have no
preconceived notions and no conditions on nationality. My only
concern is confidence. ~
Jacques Klein is tough and good. But I keep coming back to the
bottom line -- whoever it is has to be up to the job. ~
John Sawers:
.....(.Gt-
Allister Campbell:
I
I
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
COHFIDEN'PIAL
�CONFIDEN:t'IAL
5
The President:
I don't think the Secretary General is thinking
ask who is the
and Europe. Who
Y POSl lon lS on
00
navigated the shoals of partisan politics and never
anything.
This requires special additional skills.
have loved to have the job myself.
(x1
Prime Minister Blair:
from scratch.
(U)
I would
Yes, it really is rebuilding a country
If I were the head of a company, I'd love this
Prime Minister Blair: We should start di
least there is a good choice.
The President:
for names so at
This must not be about politics.
Prime Minister Blair:
~
I
The President:
I KO. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
In the end, this really is a unique
position.
It's like being the procounsel of a country. You
need communication skills, executive skills.
John Sawers:
I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President: On the issue of relief we've got $1 billion
earmarked for the short-term. On long-term reconstruction, I
guess we have this conference in the Fall. On the EU's
Stability Pact, we want to contribute but since most of the
money is European, it's hard for us to shape it.
I think we
need to take a step back and look at the Marshall Plan, and also
think about what we want this to look like in ten years. We
CONFIDENTIAl.
�6
COHFI DEN l' 1M
need a prosperous Balkans so there is less temptation for
conflict. We want it to be more integrated with Europe. With
the EU, with NATO.
The first thing we need to do is to define
the universe: Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, ~acedonia, Albania,
Montenegro, Kosovo. And Serbia if we can get rid of Milosevic.
I think we need to apply one of the central ideas of the
Marshall plan which is to get the beneficiaries to meet together
and define their own vision of the Balkans, how they would use
the money, how they would apportion it. We need to force them
to assume responsibility for their own future.
They need to
have a real plan and develop themselves with our help.
There
are some real smart u s there that can do this,
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes,
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: That's true. We all need to think about what
more we can do. We, in the United States, need to think about
whether we should say to Congress that we should accelerate
accession for some of the Balkan countries into NATO. You might
consider the same thing for the European Union. Should there be
a customs Union with the EU, like Turkey. Should you accelerate
the session process? If you think we, should push the envelope,
we can push Schroeder, Chirac and D'Alema to think about this~
j.Q1
Prime Minister Blair:
I agree we should push the envelope.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: We need direct aid too. We've already got some
going for Albania and Macedonia.
I think we need to structure
our assistance in Kosovo in a way that is helpful to the Front
Line States.
For example, using their construction companies.
We need to get people on the ground to start turning our roadrnap
for the Balkans into reality. We need the person, we need the
plan, we need an approach that takes into account the whole
region. What I think we should do on the Stability Pact is for
us and Prodi to convene a meeting in the Balkans maybe in
Sophia. Bring all the people together, the U.S., the EU, the
CONP! DEN'!' IAL
�7
cmIFHlEN'I'IAb
concerned countries, and the international financial
institutions.
We need to forge a common vision and get their
buy in. We need to start a process for them to meet and to plan
their own future.
It's not like these people are not smart.
¢
Prime Minister Blair:
way to proceed.
Jet
Yes, I agree that would be a very good
The President: Similarly, we need to decide whatever we can do
with NATO, the EU, and with aid. We need to get to work.
If we
can get the people in the region bought in, it will change the
d namics and sychology of people and the region. ~
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prlme Mlnlster B air:
I agree very strongly.
Samuel Berger: We also have to solve this problem with the
Russians.
I think we are almost there.
(U)
I
I
1'===~--------------------~
John Sawers:
Samuel Berger: Actually, that's been sorted out. The real
problem that still needs to be resolved is that Yelstin
continues to want a sector. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Let me make clear my view:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
I think we all need to watch them.
If we have
something that we can live with, I don't mind letting them
declare victory so we can just get this out of the headlines and
move on. Right now they are in the way and we need to resolve
this.
I want to nail this Russian thing down. The other reason
is that I am truly worried that Yeltsin might make a dangerous
decision. He thinks we are trying to extend our sphere of
influence. He just doesn't understand we are trying to make a
more peaceful Europe and reverse ethnic cleansing. But I think
he wili do the right thing at the end.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
CONFIPEN'I'IAlJ
We need to close on this today.
(U)
�CONTI DEN'I' IAL
8
The President:
Yeltsin is the only Russian leader who truly
hates communism, believes in freedom and integration with the
west.
vz!
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I agree with that.
In addition, we need a huge
effort to move the center of Russian politics.
I think one way
to do that is for us to get more parliamentarians there.
It's a
huge effort to go to them and to bring them to us in a more
. systematic way but I think it's worth it.
That will really help
to educate politicians there and move them to the center. We
need to combat their insularity.
02f
Prime Minister Blair:
I know we have run out of time but at
some point I would like to have a few words about Northern
Ireland.
tel'
The President:
Yes, I've got some ideas that we should discuss.
Let's try to find some time this afternoon. -+et
End of Conversation
GONFI QEHTIM
�cor,nSENTIAl
CONFIDEH'fIAL
/,11
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 75
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SVBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(V)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Michael Manning, Deana Sutliff,
Roger Merletti, James Smith and Richard
Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
September 8, 1999, 5:13 - 5:32 p.m. EDT
Oval Office
Hello.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(V)
Hi, Bill.
(V)
Tony, how are you?
(V)
Prime Minister Blair: Fine, I'm great.
holiday and I'm feeling good.
(V)
The President:
Did you go to Italy?
I've had a very good
(V)
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, I went to Italy and France and had a
good" time. ," Where were you now? (V)
The President: I was in Martha's Vineyard and then New York,
but I'm about to go off to New Zealand for a week, and I wanted
to talk to you before I left. I've been talking to everybody
about this East Timor situation and the rumor mill is rife that
Habibie might be deposed or they're sending some military leader
out there who says he will never give East Timor up. I believe
we all need to put as much pressure as possible on Indonesia to
accept a force and then figure out who'll make it up. The
Aussies are ready to go, they want to send 2,000 or 3,000 people
cmrn DEU'fIAL
Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On:!
�2
CONFIDENTIAL
there; they don't think it will (take very many people. And, if
the UN approved it, the Chinese might even send some people.
But I think it would be a very embarrassing comparison to Kosovo
if Indonesia runs all the Timorese out of the country or if they
reverse it and we don't do anything. We've got to do something,
it seems to me, so anything you can do to put the heat on
Indonesia would be helpful. Je1
Prime Minister Blair:
I agree.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: Guterres is
going to table a
motion even if Indonesia won't support it. He's got to. He
said there was a lO-km human chain demonstrating against him.
-tet
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Absolutely right.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
JCr
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O.13526, section l.4(b)(d)1
The President:
would
Prime Minister Blair:
CONTIDEN'fIAL
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�CONFIDENTIAL
3
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Yes. I think -- I don't think the Chinese wili
allow the resolution to go through if they don't accept it,
because of this whole sovereignty thing.
tef
I_p_r_i_m_e__M_i_n_l_.s t_e_r__B_l_a_l_.r : _____________________________________~
~
__
__ I
The Bresident:
No.
Prime Minister Blair:
.J.e-rI haven't, either.
~
The President: The reason I haven't -- there's a rumor he's
being deposed now -- the reason I haven't called is, every time
I put pressure on him, he gets unmerciful grief there that he's
toad in to the United states.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
L -_______________________________- ~-----
The President:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
wan e
0 say a word a out
the Balkans.
I got your letter and I understand the pressure
you're under to cut deployment in order to increase readiness
and retention, but I hope you can maintain your position as a
lead nation in both Bosnia and Kosovo, because our partnership
there has been a bedrock of success and the Russians, I believe,
are working out better than we'd hoped. I think the Kosovo
thing is settling down, if we can just hang on. Your letter
indicated you're talking to allies about making contributions to
backfill your forces.
I don't know how that's going, but I hope
we can maintain a good level of cooperation and ability with
whoever goes in there. ~
LP_r_i_ID_e M_l_'n_l_._s_t_e_r__
__
B_l_a_i_r_:_/
_________________________________________
CONFIDEWl'IAL
~j)
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�CONFIDEH'fIAL
4
.The President: Me, too.
I think we shouldn't get too soft on
these sanctions against Serbia.
I think we ought to tighten the
sanctions on Milosevic and his crowd.
I hope you'll get the
other
~
(C)
The President:
setback? 18
Have you talked to Schroeder since his
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Prime Minister Blair:
weeks.
¢
ele~tion
No.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I'm due to see him in the next couple of
The President:
I'll try to call him before I leave for Asia.
There's not much I can do, but I can encourage him.
(~
Prime Minister Blair:
cmiFIDENTIAL
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�5
CONFIDEN':PIAL
How are we doing on Northern Ireland?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
George is doing fine.
The Catholic?
Prime Minister Blair:
~
Yes.
The President:
It was unanimous, wasn't it?
Americans? )..e1
Including the two
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Don't you think it will just get worse if we
don't resolve the politics of it? ..+-e-r
CONFIDENTIAL
;.
�6
CONFIDEWfL"do
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)\
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: You don't think there's any chance the Mitchell
talks will produce a breakthrough? Jef
Prime Minister Blair:
I think there's some chance, but it's
pretty slim at the moment.
The President:
when. Jct
I'm ready any time.
You just have to tell me
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)\
CONFIDBN''fL'lL
�7
The President:
So, the main thing you, want me to do now is say
something nice about the Patten report? )X1
Prime Minister Blair:
/kj
For us, now, that is the critical thing.
The President:
I'll be down in New Zealand, but there's a hellof a lot going on in the world at the moment, and we can always
talk.
I just wanted you to know I'll be out of pocket for the
next week or 10 days.
Jet
Prime Minister Blair: When am I going to see you?
doing the Third Way thing in Florence?
(U)
The President:
Absolutely.
Prime Minister Blair:
Are you
(U)
They're all very excited.
(U)
The President: You shouldn't be the only guy speaking English
who gets to go to Italy.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Italian.
(U)
The President:
You did?
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)!
Pr~me M~n~s er Blair:
The President:
When I was in Italy I learned a little
(U)
,-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _,
Enough to get by. /
Is he one of ours?
Prime Minister Blair:
~
Yes, he's one of ours.
The President: Gosh, I thought I had had him in here.
check it out. .J&r
Let me
Prime Minister Blair:!
l
I
The President:
GG~TFI DENT 1hL
Got it.
When are his elections?
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
j.G-f
�8
GOHFIDEHI'IAb
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Okay, I'll do it.
Thank you.
Prime Minister Blair:
Zealand. (U)
Okay, Bill.
The President:
Goodbye.
Okay.
Have a good time in New
(U)
End of Conversation
CONFI DEN'FIAL
Je1
�SECREr
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INCHON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
Jenny McGee, Robert Ford,
Joel Ehrendreich, Elizabeth Rogers,
Roger Merletti and Richard Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
October 13, 1999, 10:38 - 11:29 a.m.
Oval Office
Tony, how are you?
Prime Minister Blair:
I'm fine.
(U)
(U)
The President:
I haven't talked to you in a while and I wanted
to check in on a few things.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
How are you doing?
(U)
The President:
I'm great.
I've been fighting reactionaries in
Congress, we're winning with the people.
I thought your speech
to your party group was great.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Thanks. We've got an interesting
situation here at the moment because the conservatives have
really moved off to a very far right position.
(U)
The President:
That's what our guys are doing here. One reason
Bush is doing so well is because he criticized one thing on the
right. He is making people think he is saving them from the
right. But, it's a fraud because he is really for them on
everything else.
I have to figure out how to expose the fraud
that Bush is the new Clinton, establishing a new Republican
party like I made a new Democratic party.
It's helping Bush but
it is killing AI. They asked me what I thought, and I said it
SECRE'f
Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason:
1.5(c,~d)
~~.'
_~~ ___,__ ~~_~-~,
Declassify On:! 10/~9~J~'<'''~' ---c~;
0';, .' ~TON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY . i'
. 'p! ~~~:.;.__ .__ .;.:---._..~ ..:.,..c..:,_",~~~_~~.~
~
:.. -<-:J._----'-, '. ,'-' -:-;~" ,."
�SEeRE'£'
2
was terrible how the right wing was treating him. After all, he
was for them, and his lobbyists organized them to kill our
patients' bill ·of rights. He was for school vouchers and for
the NRAtrying to kill our handgun measures.
Why were they
being so mean to him? I thought it was terrible how mean they
were being, but they wouldn't give what I said that much press
-- it wasn't what they wanted to say.
That is what we've got to
do. Al has to position himself between Bush and Bradley. Now
it's very interesting. We are at a point where the perceptioos
of major players are at variance with their positions.
It's a
terrible thing and there'~ a limit to how much I can do because,
in our political culture, I can say what I think but it will
hurt if it appears I'm trying to control the outcome of another
election.
I've got to be careful not to tell people how to
vote.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
it?
(U)
Yes.
Policy is the way to do it, isn't
The President:
Yes, you're right, it is . . What I am doing -the results speak for themselves. The question is not whether
we are going to change, but how we change -- a u-turn or hold on
to what we're doing. Here are the new ideas for the 21 st
century. That is the argument I am making, and the argument
Gore has to make.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I think he's got to really.
If it comes
down to general positioning, it will get more difficult.
(U)
The President:
The people still don't know what a VP does in
our country.
It's not an accident we've elected only two in our
history. But it's still the best way to become president -someone dies or something happens in the interim.
The Vice
President has become more important in modern American history.
That's how Nixon got to come back as President. Nixon barely
lost, and Bush won when Dukakis collapsed.
It's not such a bad
thing to be a Vice President now.
It's not the handicap it once
was, but you have to capitalize on it. So far we haven't been
able to capitalize on it even though our ratings are slightly
higher than Eisenhower's and Reagan's were at this point. He
ought to be able to do that, I think he is getting it sorted out
now.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
SECRET
It's really about definition, I think.
�3
The President: It always is, isn't it? I have half a dozen
things I'd like to discuss. How did your government change play
Prime Minister
The President:
I really like him.
He is such a bright man.
+&l-
Prime Minister Blair:
-The President:
I saw him recently.
Prime Minister Blair:
~
He told me that. /
I
The President:
It was probably time for Mo to get out.
;e1
~_p_r_i_m_e M_~_'n
__
__
i_s_t_e_r B_l_a i_r_:____________________________________________
__ __
~~
The President: She served you well and worked very hard. She
made people laugh when she pissed them off, and that's a great
thing. ).e}
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: If you want me to do anything, let me know.
know that Ian Paisley got mad at what I said last week, but
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
I
~
I I'll try
'-n-o-t:---;-t-=-o--=o"";f::-f::-e""':r::--=-a-=n-=-ym=-o-=r-:e=-u":"n=-h;--::-e'l-=p""f;:'u::-il;--a-:n-a-l'o-:--:-g"i-e-=s-:.---'I'i"-:w:-::-:"r':-o-':t-=e--:It::-:o:---lh im t ha t I
will try to stay out of the analysis business.
~)
Prime Minister Blair: /
I
aECRET
J
/
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�:>ECRET
4
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I've always found that if someone's offended by
a remark, it is better to apologize immediately because people
who agree with what you said won't hold it against you. Anyway,.
ring the bell if you want me to do anything. They just have to
finally decide whether to cut a deal ·or not.
I think in the end
they have to decide.
It has dragged on so long I don't expect
either side to eat the whole thing. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes. /
The President:
One thing Gerry said, I've never talked to you
about it, Gerry told me they trusted de Chastelain and would
stay on it if he promulgated a schedule. ~
]
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
You could even have de Chastelain promulgate a
schedule for decommissioning starting on a date that was ten
days after they got in the executive. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
Pr ime Minister Blair:
~
I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
What if de Chastelain promulgated a schedule for
decommissioning and then you said to Trimble that he'd better
:>ECRE'I'
,
,.
�5
let Sinn Fein in the government before then so he doesn't give
them an excuse for slipping that date. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
~
The President: And then Trimble lets them in and says if they
sli , we'll walk out. What about that?
~)
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister Blair: /
The President:
What about Adams? -tet
. Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
Prime Minister Blair:
~
I
\
The President:
Anyway, that is best idea I've got.
Prime Minister Blair:
~
LI_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
~
The President:
It sort of takes it away from them.
If you
could let de Chastelain offer the schedule, they could say
something nice about how they respect de Chastelain. But
they've got to be in the government to fulfill this obligation,
then if this date slips then Trimble says I'm walking. And then
it is allan them.
They both have what they asked for, they are
in the executive and then have this date staring them in the
face -- only ten days away.
It seems that would help Trimble
with his constituents if he has a deal in advance and not three
months away. Everybody's used to wandering around their offices
and getting to know each other and trying not to look like the
biggest asshole at the garden party.
This has to happen fairly
quickly.
(.G+Prime Minister Blair:
]
\====~----------------------~
SECRET
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�6
SECRE'P
The President: Why don't we call Mitchell and run it by him if
ou think it ml ht have some merit. ~
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
I
I
]
-
The President:
That way Adams doesn't have to say anything to
get into the government but they are screwed immediately and
quickly if they don't deliver. Let me run it by Mitchell. ~
Prime Minister Blair:~
\
The President:
Okay. There a couple of other things I'd like
to run through.
First, thank you and Jacques and Gerhard for
running that piece on CTBT in the New York Times. Here's the
problem. My Senate agreed to a truncated schedule. Half of the
Republicans are against this on its merit.
For the others it's
just politics. They are out to screw me because they don't want
to help me and don't want to help AI. But a bunch are genuine
isolationists.
They just say 'piss on our allies n and "to hell
with what they thinki screw anybody who screws with us. n
It's
just sick what a world we are living in here. But I'm trying to
work a deal so this is not voted down.
I'm trying to work on a
schedule.
If they start hearings, we will get them involved in
the process.
Even if they don't ratify while I am president,
it'll be obvious to the world that they are strengthening the
treaty. They will if they are working on safeguards. But it is
just silly intellectually, just awful what they are doing. And
they are hurting themselves. They are giving us a good issue in
the elections.
It is terrible what they have done. But your
piece was very helpful and I wanted to thank you for it. The
problem is that under the-rules of the Senate they are in a
position where a small majority can prevent the vote from being
delayed now. We may get it put off by one vote. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Right.
~
Whatever happens, we'll bang them pretty good.
(C)
Prime Minister Blair:
L -__________________
I
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)l
The President: Thank you.
I don't think this is the end of
American leadership on arms control, just parliamentary
�SECRET
7
maneuvers.
out there.
It's just a rightwing group and they are just way
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b )( d)
The President:
It's stupid. They won't pay UN dues and they
don't want an aid budget. They want a big military that never
does anything.
They spend more money on defense than I do, but
don't want them to do anything, and I'm the most pro-defense
Democrat President that we've had; They want a bunch of bombs
and missile.s and a defense system, and then they just cut
·everybody's taxes. They want to put rich people behind gates so
the starving can't get at them. They basically want an upscale
Brazil for America.
It is awful, but I think we can beat them
back.
I want to say a word about Florence, and then I've got
two other things.
I'm glad we let Cardoso come, but can you
explain to me, in a European context, why we didn't invite Wim
Kok or Guterres from Portugal? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
The other guy I thought should have been
invited, who has been a wonderful ally to all of us is Chretien.
r=~~~~~~~~I~E~.O~.=1=3=52=6~,~se=ct=io=n=1=.4=(d~)~I~~~~=-~~~~~I
Prime Minister Blair:
~
I agree.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I'm afraid it will undercut the whole idea of a
global movement.
I will not be in office to work with these
people more than another 15 months, but you and Chretien may be
around another five ears. The other guy in Latin America is
Zedillo,
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I
But if I were doing it and I were
European, I would want Guterres and Kok and I don't know about
Austria, I don't know him. Chretien, every time we need him, he
shows up and raises the flag.
~
al!:CRgT
�8
SECRET'
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Absolutely.
I am in complete agreement.
Are you going to sing the Marseillaise?
Prime Minister Blair:
~
Yes.
The President:
I do too. And it is also a way for Europe to
get more influence over him in a positive way. )Zl
~
Prime Minister Blair:
'-------~~
The President:
Is there anything we can do to help him?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: Maybe one thing that could come out of Italy is
some sort of statement that will help him.
~
)
Prime Minister Blair: \
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)l
The President:
The thing that bot~ers me is that he has the
worst of both worlds.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
At least for all the horrible
�SECRE'f
9
bloodshed in '94 we had policies in place that turned the
country around by '96, congressional gains in '96 and '98, and
we rna be able 't get Congress back in 2000. -+erE.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
]
The President:
Yeah.
I'll take some guidance from you, and I
will talk to him about it.
I think he's trying to do the right
thing but he's been a little foggy about it.
jQ1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I agree.
I will do what I can.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Ye·s. Okay, we need to think about that. Let me
mention a couple of other things. The WTO ministerial will be
held in Seattle in Washington State in December and preparations
are in full swing.
I think this is a major opportunity for the
third way agenda to put a human face on the global economy. We
have to come out for more open trade and the legitimate
interests of labor and environment. I've been to Geneva twice
to talk about this and the child labor convention. We think it
would be a very good thing to have a WTO working group on trade
and strategy analysis, not on negotiations. We have been in
touch with your people, and I hope we can work together on this.
A lot of people are afraid to discuss the two things in the same
breath. But the whole pitch here has to be we can't turn our
backs on integrating the global economy. But I want to do it in
a way that takes everybody along. ~
�10
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
Prime Minister Blair:
I
)
~--------------~
The President: Yes, it is. We're going to have every NGO and
labor union demonstrating against us and we have to have
something that answers what they are saying.
I see rising
protectionism in this country.
In the last two years, we took
on a huge amount of the shortfall of the Asian economy by
increasing imports and running a trade deficit which is unusual
in conventional terms, but the world has changed quite a lot.
For example, in '97 and '98 we bought ten times more steel from
. Japan; China, and Russia than Europe did.
Protectionism is
rising among Republicans and Democrats, and I see it manifesting
itself in other countries. We have to find a way to turn back
the tide of it. We have to try to find mechanisms where we can
discuss all these things together.
Europe is in better shape on
this than we are.
I'm not trying to impose standards on other
countries, but there's got to be a way to work our way through
this. -+e-r
Prime Minister Blair:
~_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _--J~
The President:
I wish you would. We have to see how this plays
out against the media story in America to see if there is more
coverage given to the people demonstrating than to the fact that
we are going to meet.
Two others issues I would like raise.
President Frei of Chile raised Pinochet with me in New Zealand.
He said Pinochet's presence in London is a big problem for the
Chilean government. He thought they had worked out a solution
to get rid of him by putting him in the Senate. They are very
concerned now.
Our position has got to be that this is a legal
matter and whatever you do, we will be in agreement. But Chile
has twice the per capita income of any other in Latin America,
they have had this immense success, and they thought they had
put this nightmare behind them.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
SECRBT
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�£ECRE'f
11
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
The real thing we need to do is get more victims
to say ~send him home and let us handle it here. n
I got it .
.Jet
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I won't say this to anybody.
I'm also aware
what a problem this is for you. My take on where they are is
they thought they had done their version of Mandela's Truth
Commission -- put it in a box and store it there, not live
forever. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
~
The President: A final point -- Iraq.
I am afraid we're in a
different place in the Security Council. We worked all these
years on negotiations and before that, and I hope we don't get
divided here.
The language your people worked out with the
French crosses a red line because it suspends sanctions on
Saddam Hussein before disarmament. When I took office, the Bush
position was, I thought, unfair. We wouldn't ever lift
sanctions until Saddam Hussein complied with his disarmament
obligations and with obligations on all other UN resolutions,
human rights and all that. Now I am prepared to say that if he
meets his disarmament obligations and puts a system in place
where he's complying, I would be prepared to suspend sanctions
and liberalize the oil-for-food program -- especially with the
price of oil going up, we should be better off. But I think if
we say to this guy, ~If you start to comply, we will lift
sanctions,n he will quickly reestablish the weapons of mass
destruction program, and it will become known in two years that
he has.
It may not happen "rhile I'm in office,
1
you.
It could become a real ni htmare for
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
I understand where the French are and we are prepared
to move from our former position aspecially on oil-for-food
SECRE'f
�gECREP
things.
12
I know everyone is getting sanctions fatigue,
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Would it end the suspension because any country
could vote to veto continuing it? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
SECRET
�SECRET
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
13
The President: Our guys here in Congress, even the Democrats,
are attacking me because I haven't. done enough to get rid of
him. I think they will eat me alive if I agree to lift
sanctions while he has his weapons program going on. f6+
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: But it looks like the UN has finally given in to
him if you have no sanctions without disarmament.
I
LP_r i_m_e__
__
M_i_n_l_'s_t e_r__
__ B_l_a_l_'r : __________________________________________
__
~/:).
The President: Have you worked out the differences between
"certain" and "all"? ye;)
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: I don't know, I am very skeptical.
at the specifics.
~
SECRE'f
I will look
�SECRET
14
Prime Minister Blair:
Look Bill.
! E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)!
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
! E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)!
The President: There may be a solution here in the details, but
I am genuinely quite skeptical.
I've been dealing with this guy
for a long time. )J21
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)\
The President:
We've been criticized for not bein
condemning of the coup.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
£ECRE'f'-
more
�oS EeRE'!'
15
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Two
strong people can do the sensible thing.
I think our objective
ought to be to get them to do the sensible' thing. J&r
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Okay.
Prime Minister Blair:
We will stay in touch.
(U)
Bill, when will we see you then?
(U)
The President:
I will see you in Italy and probably at the OSCE
thing in Turkey.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
talk with you.
(U)
Yeah.
It will be good to have a proper
The President:
Yeah.
You are in a position, as you get more
influence in Europe, I believe we've got a shot now, because of
the two earthquakes, to resolve the conflict between Greece and
Turkey. To accept Turkey into the EU will lock Turkey into the
West for the next fifty years and that would help solve some
problems if east of there goes sour.
Two areas that I have
wanted to make progress on -- the Aegean and India/Pakistan. We
need to talk again, maybe before the OSCE, and I will tell you
what I have been doing on it. But I think we've got a shot in
the Aegean now.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I
�16
SECRE'P
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The president:
The Turks and Greeks are getting along better.
The earthquakes made them see. each other as human beings again.
The problem is Cyprus. The Greeks think they were uprooted and
can't go to visit their relatives' graves.
It's got to be a
strictly cold-blooded deal. We've done our part with military
coope~atio~.
We've got to get something that leads them on the
-path to Europe.
Otherwise, they'll never do it because they
think they need to ~get alonif' like the Irish.
tGt
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
That is what we need.
Prime Minister Blair:
The president:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
Okay Bill.
~
(U)
I will see you soon and thank you.
Prime Minister Blair:
Goodbye.
(U)
End of Conversation
SECRET
(U)
�tONFI DEt.'!' IM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
PARTICIPANTS:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Tony
Blair
(U)
The President
Prime Minister Blair
..s
'~
"
~
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Notetakers: Jenny McGee, Joel Ehrendreich,
Robert Ford, Hoyt Yee and Richard Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
I ~~
~~
""<
Ou
November 26, 1999, 11:55 a.m.-12:02 p.m. EST ~5
Penn National Golf Course, Maryland
; ~
0<
:t...l
"'U~
The President: Can you hear me? I am celebrating Thanksgiving
with my entire family.
The wind is blowing and the rain is
going like crazy.
I might as well be in England.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Where are you?
(U)
The President:
I am up at Camp David.
I am out playing golf
and it is raining like hell, and the wind is blowing.
(U)
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Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
Can I help in any way?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
conFIDEN'fIAL
Classified by:
Robert A. Bradtke
Reason:
1.5(d)
Declassify On:;
�2
CONFIDENTIAL
do that and put a statement out
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: Sounds to me like you got some pretty good
language with Chirac on the European Security issue. Jef
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: I just don't want to give the isolationists here
any encouragement.
~
Prime Hinister Blair:
The President:
am behind you.
I appreciate that.
I agree.
You are doing the right thing, and I
.(e)
Prime Minister Blair: I think it might be helpful, if at some
stage, I came over and saw some of the people on the Hill and
made a speech.
.(-e)
The President:
I agree with that.
Prime Minister Blair:
j£l
[Gap)!
The President: Let me ask you one other thing. I hear Chirac
wouldn't go along with the position you wanted to take on
Cyprus.
{.e1
Prime Minister Blair:
-tetcmiFI DEN'!' lAL
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�3
CWNFI DEH'I'IAL
The President: No, I just heard something and it may not be
right. The main thing, I know what Simitis wants you to say.
But it would be good if it didn't leak until as close to the loth
as possible. That would give us a week to get these talks,
(with Denktash)-, in New York, and I don't want to give him any
excuse to leave.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
[GAP]
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
IE.O. 13526, section I.4(b)(d)1
IE.O. 13526, section I.4(b)(d)1
That's good news.
(I)
Prime Minister Blair: Incidentally, I thought you did
brilliantly in Florence.
(U)
The President:
Oh, thanks.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
You made a big impression on Jospin.
je1
The President: I tried to make him see that you and I were not
threatening everything he believes in. ye7
Prime Minister Blair: It would be really good to get together
in the next few months. I have so much that I would like to go
through with you. -+e-r
The President:
than February?
When would be good?
Is January better for you
~
Prime Minister Blair: We will see what we can arrange. If it's
not a summit in Bermuda, we can try something else. --t€+The President: I will look for something on the calendar. We
will do a statement on devolution and will clear it with you in
advance. ..+eY
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay Bill, all the best.
Okay, bye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation
COHFIDEHTIAL
(U)
�~
COHF'IDEH'fIAL
(~ I, ~ 0 \~
<
THE WHITE HOUSE
,-----------------------------------------------~~
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
~
I>
~)
I
S,»--O,/
. 'f,-/.LN3 0 \
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 78
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
. NOTE TAKERS:
Michael Manning,' Frank Jarosinski, Miguel
Aguilo, and Jim Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
December 16, 1999, 5:01 - 5:11 p.m. EST
Oval Office
Tony, how are you?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
(U)
How are you getting on?
(U)
I'm fine.
\
I Prodi will be
';':h-:e-:r::-e--:t;:-o::-m:-:-o-::r-:-r-:o-:-w:--a-:n::-d:;--:;=I-:-w:-:;i'l""l~s:::p::-e::-n:::-:;d-=s-=o-=m-:e~t:::l;-:'m::-e::--w""""'i""t-;:h""'h:-:l~'m---1.
I t h ink the r e
will be some investments needed, and we'll carry a lot of it, but
we may need EU help~1~------~--~--~~-------:-~--71 If things.
get resolved, it might come to a head in a couple of months. jQ1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
jQ1
That would be unbelievable, wouldn't it?
Prime Minister Blair:
he?
(U)
The president:
That would be marvelous.
Yes.
When is Prodi getting there?
j£i
Tomorrow, is
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: So they are going to come back in early
January, and you think you can pull it together then? ~
The President:
Yes, I do.
~
Prime Minister Blair: That would be fantastic. If you can put
this and Northern Ireland together, it would be pretty good.
yz(
CONFIDEN"fIAL
Reason: 1.5d
Declassify on
�IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
2
The President:
Yes.
That would be a good deal. Trimble is
coming in the next few days and I will see him. And we are doing
what we can with Sinn Fein on the issue of IRA guns. -ter
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
That's good. The only other thing I wanted to
mention is that I think it is important to bring this Iraq
resolutioh-to a vote tomorrow.
I know the French are going to
abstain, but we've got to get something moving -- this thing is
stuck on idle. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
You _mean with Iraq?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
I don't know.
(JZ')
Je1
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: We played around with this for so long, we
should go for it. ~
The President:
next. .J..C+
I think it will give us an idea of where to go
Prime Minister Blair:
If we let it go much longer, it will get
complicated for everybody,1
I
The President:
I agree.
~
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
�3
Prime Minister Blair:
It is sad for the people in Iraq.
everything all right with you apart from this? ~
So is
The President:
Yes.
11m doing fine and I am delighted things
are going well. We have to just keep working .at it -- chippin~
!':I.t.f::::l U
Lf?1::
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
I
)
~------The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
preparing to be a father again? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
selves. ...(-e}
It was so unexpected.
Yes, they have their good selves and their bad
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Are you
I
Yes, we have to keep working at it.
Prime Minister Blair:
Are you getting any golf in?
The President: No, but I'll play soon.
out of the way first.
(V)
~
(U)
I have to get this work
I am really thrilled about the Helsinki decisions. The Turkey-EU
thing is a big move and it will be a big help.
It will bring
resolution to other issues. The ESDI decision was good, too.
-f€+Prime Minister Blair:
I
~
~------------~/
I
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�4
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
)k1
He's really good.
~p_r_l_'m
____
e M_i_n_i_s_t_e r __
__ B_l_a_i_r : ________________
__
The President:
Yep,
~
~
__________________
I am quite worried about it, too.
Prime Minister Blair:
]e1
I
L ____________________________________________
~
The President:
The in-crowd is making a lot of votes on
Chechnya. Maybe it will change when people start seeing a lot of
body bags, but as long as they keep getting the votes, they'll
keep'doing'it . ..J...e-r
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair: Larry Summers came through here the other
day.
I had a good chat with him. Jef
The President:
He's a good man.
Prime Minister Blair:
rest of it.
(C)
The President:
keJ
We talked about the IMF job and all the
We've got to get somebody good.
Prime Minister Blair:
Really good.
~
~
The President: You take care of yourself.
I will keep you
posted on the Middle East stuff. It will take a little money.
kef
Prime Minister Blair:
I
I
The President: Not yet.
we'll see.
.\Zl
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Thanks.
I will say something to Prodi, then
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
All the best to you Bill.
Bye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation
(U)
�co'iH'IDEN'FIAL
L «) I
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with Prime Minister Blair of the
United Kingdom
(u)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Michael Manning, Rob Williams,
Roger Merletti,James Smith, Dick Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
January 11, 2000, 4:22 to 4:45 p.m. EST
Air Force One
Hello?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi,
B~ll.
Hey, Tony.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
(U)
.How are you?
Same to you.
Happy New Year.
a'm fine.
(U)
You getting ready for fatherhood?
Prime Minister Blair:
Well, I'm psyched up.
(U)
(U)
How are you doing?
(U)
'-------'
The President:
I'm doing great. We're moving into our new home
and staying busy.
I've just been out to the Grand Canyon,
protecting another million acres of land, and Al's doing better.
So I'm feeling pretty good about things right now.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
He seems to be picking up.
That's
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
Yes, I'm going to see him tomorrow.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
-- a difficult situation --
Hello, Tony?
(U)
(U)
I can't hear a word you're saying.
(U)
Classified by: Robert Bradtke
Reason:
1.5 (d)
Declassify on,!:
"-----"
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Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Is this any better?
I can hear you fine, now.
Prime Minister Blair:
Alright.
(U)
(U)
Good.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: For one thing, he will. We've worked very hard
this, and I want them to give de Chastelain something credible
wi h.
d n't hink the hav re'e ted it out of hand,
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
It's very helpful
de Chastelain and Mandelson have minimized the sense of a
·deadline," certainly publicly, because I think we need to frame
the issue for January not as meeting Trimble's deadline, but as
the need for concrete steps for de Chastelain to say the IRA is
on the way to meeting the timetable in the Good Friday agreement.
I know that Adams is trying to keep everybody together, but one
of the possibilities might be if they could be seen as responding
to you, rather than a unionist deadline. If something could be
done on the Patten report or something -- I want to make the
argument he's doing this in response to that, in addition to the
Good Friday Accord. .(.e1
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
COWHDiWTIU
�·
3
CONFIDSN1'IAL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)J
The President:
giving? .-tel
What is their reasoning?
What reason are they
Prime Minister Blair: /
J
The President:
Yes.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
CONE IDENTIAL
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
��5
"OMFIfJE1<f'fIAL
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Yes. Well, I think we have to keep reaching out
toward them and just do our best. But I'm glad you saw him. Let
me say very briefly, we had a good week here with the Israelis
and the Syrians. There's a lot of tough work to go but when they
come back, I think you will see a break one way or another. I
just hope and pray it works. I think we have some chance to
achieve it, but we are not there by a long shot. jQt
Prime Minister Blair: Best of luck on it.
you're putting into it. ~
The President:
It's a great effort
I think we'll make'
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, and Bill, I think we will see each
other in Davos. You're making a speech? (V)
The President: Yes. So, I will see ~ou there, but I will call
you as soon as I know something on tnis.
(V)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
That's great.
okay, Tony.
Prime Minister Blair:
Goodbye.
Goodbye.
(V)
(V)
(V)
End of Conversation
CONFIDEH1'IAL
.~~~._fl... ~;,.:,--·----
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�SECRE'f
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
0777
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 80
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with Prime Minister Blair of the
United Kingdom
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Deana Sutliff, Frank Jarosinski,
James Smith, Roger Merletti and Dick Norland
DATE, TIME
AND. PLACE:
The President:
January 31, 2000, 2:29-2:50 p.m. EST
The Residence
Hello.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hello, Bill.
Hello, Tony.
(U)
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I am really sorry to trouble you, but I
thought I should bring you up to date on the Irish front.
(U)
The President:
It's okay.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
lE.o. 13526, section
3ECRET
Classified by:
Reason:
1.5d
Declassify on
tA(b)(d)
�2
$~CRE~
The President:
What do you think is really going on in the IRA?
J.81
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
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The President:
Everyone else has made compromises
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Everybody else already delivered first.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
~
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Okay.
So you want me to call Gerry and take one
more whack at him?
(jf)
Prime Minister Blair:
I think it's a
IE.o. 13526, section
ood idea.
1.4(b)(d)
The President:
So this statement they were willing to make about
the IRA, they can't even make that public? ~
SECRET
�3ECRE'l'
,
3
Prime Minister Blair:
lE.o.
13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Do you know what I mean?
The President:
language.
(..81
Yes,
I agree with you.
This is very conditional
Prime Minister Blair:
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: No, no, I think the IRA may not care if America
withdraws its support, but I think Sinn Fein will be in a lot
worse condition if its friends in Congress lay it all on them.
He may not be able to do anything about it, ma be he even wants
it in some manner. He can't say this,
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
That is the thing.
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
SECRE'l'
�3ECRET
4
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I
I agree.
I'll call Adams and do the best I can.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O.
13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The president:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4( d)
Prime Minister Blair:
SECRET
IE.O.
13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
�SECRE'l'
5
I E.O: 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
'11---_ _ _ _ _---'
The President: Yes. Even that is silly because they could
always get more if they had any grounds. The radical Irish could
get more. J.£-Y
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
--t3"I
That is what I think.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Of course they could tomorrow.
I
They are being pig-headed.
Yes.
-r-n-
NO, no.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Right, Bill.
(U)
I'll see what I can do.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
(U)
Many thanks.
Goodbye.
(U)
Goodbye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
(U)
�3ECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
/. C3,
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
Frank Jarosinski, Deana
Sutliff, Miguel Aguilo, RO'ger Merletti, Don
Gentile and Richard Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
Februa~y 8, 2000, 11:15 to 11:42 a.m. EST
Oval Office
Hello.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi Bill.
Hi Tony.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
(U)
(U)
How are you doing?
I'm all right.
(U)
I'm having a pretty good time.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
You just presented the budget.
The President:
I did it yesterday.
the Senate in New York.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
interesting.
(U)
(U)
Hillary just declared for
Your presidential race is very
The President: Yes, it is.
I can't tell where it's going yet.
It's got a few turns left in the road. We have got to see if
Bush has anything inside him to pull himself back up and respond
to McCain. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Al seems to be running pretty well.
-SEO,Er
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: - 2/9/10 _
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The President:
2
He is doing fine.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I think the State of the Union stuff and
what I have read about the budget seems very interesting indeed.
Well, I'm glad you're having a good time.
(U)
The President:
Yeah.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Well, let me tell
is where you can help me a bit.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
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ou about mine.
Here
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E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: What's your reaction to the argument that they
ought to be given more time since there was a such a delay in
setting up the government? .kf5}
SECRET
~.
�4
SECRE'l'
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Of course I do.
I'm just trying to think about
how to keep this thing together.
JZI
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Let me ask you something. Do you think any
argument they use is looking for a pretext for doing this and
they wanted to make it clear they did not support such things
and wanted to do it partly because of the terrorist incident in
the north? \
I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair: /
E.O.13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
�5
2iECR£'l'
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Well, did Adams give you any -kind of opening
when you asked for an act of reconciliation? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Let me ask you, you and Bertie have agreed on
~hat you've asked Adams to do? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
to Trimble?
vn
Right.
y()
And if he does it, do you think you can sell it
�3ECRE'f
6
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Trimble is coming over here in a couple of days
-- a week or 10 days, but it will be done by then. ~
Prime Minister Blair: Yeah it will be done by then.
need is a two-week breathing space. ~
The President:
you two weeks?
What we
Exactly what do you think it will take to get
+&t-
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Okay. I'll get in touch with Gerry and Martin
and see what we can do.
I'll let you know.
(S)
Prime Minister Blair:
I'm sorry to lay this on you.
~
The President:
No, no.
I think about this more than anything
else, besides the screw-ups in the Middle East. Let me ask you
3ECRE'£'
�7
BECRE':F
something on a much more mundane issue. Yesterday, I met with
some cabinet members and Rodney Slater said we put some more
ideas down to resolve the airport dispute we have with British
Airways, USAIR and American Airlines. Would you take another
look at that and see if we can get it done?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I'm not completely familiar with that.
(C)
The President:
I know you're up to your ears in other things
but we've been dealing with this for years and it's sort of a
big deal here. Rodney told me he put some more stuff down on
the table.
In a political season, it would be big over here to
_ get this open sore resolved.
If you could have somebody take a
look at it.
I have never seen him more agitated about anything.
He is just trying to get it resolved. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Sure, I will have a look.
Okay, I will get on this.
~
How is mother doing?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Fine. She's getting pretty large.
you going to come oV,er incidentally?
(U)
Are
The President: Let me tell you what we are trying to work out.
You want me to come, don't you? -fC+Prime Minister Blair:
proper talk with you.
I'm desperate to sit down and have a
-+G-l-
The President: I'm trying to figure out what the best time is
because we have to do this Third Way thing in Germany and there
might be time to run to Russia. We're trying to resolve
bilateral issues with Russia and kind of get this Chechnya thing
resolved.
Putin has enormous potential, I think.
I think he's
very smart and thoughtful.
I think we can do a lot of good with
him.
I'm trying to figure how to do all these things and come
to London because Cherie's time is coming close.
I want to come
when it would cause you the least problems and try to leave open
the option, if you need me to, to go to Ireland.
I want to come
and do you the most good.
(£)
Prime Minister Blair:
It's a good idea in any sort of
circumstances. They would be delighted to see you. Well,
(U)
Cherie is due on May 20.
I mean, anytime is good.
BECKE'!'
�8
SECI'tc';r
The President: Obviously, I hav~ to leave you a couple of weeks
on the front.
If we decided to do it, afterward, how much time
do you need for paternity leave?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I don't know that I would need much time,
more than a ~eek, on either end of it. We'd love for you to
come over and there is lots to discuss.
(U)
The President:
Fathers get that in Britain.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
I don't know if I'll do too much of it.
(U)
The President:
I just don't want to screw it up.
Prime Minister Blair:
and see them.
(U)
(U)
It would be quite nice for you to come
The President:
I would love to come afterwards and get to see
the baby. Let me see what I can do.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Okay Bill, we will be in touch.
love to see you come over.
(U)
The President:
Okay, see you soon.
Prime Minister Blair:
Bye.
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation
SECRE'1'
I would
�SF·eRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
Telcon with
SUBJECT:
B~itish
Prime Minister Blair
(U)
The President
Prime Minister Blair
PARTICIPANTS:
Notetakers: Doug Bayley, Robin Rickard, Don
Cheramie, Roger Merletti, Don Gentile and
Dick Norland
February 11, 2000, 12:38 - 12:49 p.m. EST
Oval Office
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
Hello.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hey.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Bill.
(U)
(U)
How are you doing?
I'm okay.
(U)
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Bill, sorry to trouble you again but I
thought I would bring you up to date with what .has happened.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
3ECRE'f
Yes.
Y0
�£pCRE'l'
.1
2
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
What about Trimble?
Where is he on this?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
f5t-
But if you haven't announced it, can't you ...
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I think you ought to go to Trimble and try to
work it out. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
SECRE'P
Can't you go to Trimble today?
~
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
�3
3ECRE'f'
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
If you can get Trimble to say okay...
~
Prime Minister Blair: /
The President:
If we could get to him today you could have this
all resolved by Monday.
(.,g-)
Prime Minister Blair:
~I________________________________~
The President: We can't run the risk of this thing unraveling
over the weekend just because of the timing of it. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I
The President:
If we don't have some move by you and Trimble
today or tomorrow, this thing could unravel over the weekend.
How much does Trimble know about this?
~
)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
What I'm suggesting is we tell him what they
said and get him to make some noise in tomorrow's papers saying,
you know, there is movement here, something where he can reach
out to them.
Or call Adams or something. You need them to
connect before they go to bed tonight.
I just think that
something has to be done before the papers corne out and all hell
breaks loose...
t&}
Prime Minister Blair:
3:ECr<:EI
Okay.
~
�4
~ECRE'f
·1 E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
... at least the IRA got off their backsides and
did something half reasonable.
u()
Prime Minister Blair: \
I
The President: Yes, I think to make that really work we need
some sort of signal from Trimble that he believes this is all
possible. .J...91
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: I agree, but my problem is that if he waits
until next week ...
k&r
Prime Minister Blair: ~I______________________________~
The President:
.keI
I don't want this thing to get away from you .
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: If you could get it tonight that would be
wonderful.
I know it is a pain in the rear end, but I'm scared
that if this thing drifts for three days ... yn
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: I agree with that, but if Trimble can give them
an excuse to do that it would be great. ~
Prime Minister Blair: /
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
SECRET
�5
oSgCRgT
The President: We will go to work on our side. Have someone
call us to let us know what Trimble said. We need to know what
we are going to say to Adams when we call him. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Okay, thanks Bill.
The President:
Goodbye.
Fine.
(U)
End of Conversation
SECRi;T
Bye.
(U)
�·CONFIDENTIAL
/1<6 S
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with Prime Minister Blair (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Deana sutliff,
Frank Jarosinski, Sean Tarver, Don Gentile
. DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
March 6, 2000, 12:56 - 1:04 p.m. EST
Oval Office
Hello, Tony.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hello, Bill, how are you?
Hi, Tony.
(U)
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Look, Bill, I've got to do this live
television thing in five minutes?
(U)
The President:
Okay,
just talk.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
(U)
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: Let me tell you what I told Schroeder this
morning.
I talked to him for forty minutes this morning. The
CONFIDEN'fIAL
Classified by:
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On:,
Robert A. Bradtke
�2
· CONFIDENTIAL
I E-O. 13526, section 1.4( d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
IE-O. 13526, section
1.4(b)(d) I
I E-O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
This is a really important job.
jQ1
The President:
It is really important.
It's not just
political.
You need to talk to him. )Q1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
He's in that frame of mind, is he?
~
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE-O. 13526, section
L4(b)(d) I
The President:
There are a couple of Germans who are qualified,
but he can't get them to accept the job.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
(U)
The President: Absolutely. I can't afford to be the skunk at
the garden party.
I have got to have some help. jQf
conFI DEH'f' IAL
rk~"'-~-ft'7'-';'::'·· ".~'-'~"-'~'-~"-;;,
;;~~~~~LIBRA~Y PHO~~CO~YJ' .
~'~""-::;''-:~_;_:_J:'':-~ -:;-o,J. .. :- -.~~_ o~_ -,_-;:...-~ ___ ,,-'-/.':,.
�.COHFIDEN'l'IAL
3
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.G. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: He is going to call you. He is calling
Kwasniewski first.
I told him "this is going to look bad for
you.
It can't look like you and I made a deal and gagged Europe
and infuriated all of the developing countries." ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.G. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
Yes.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.G. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
I
Prime Minister Blair:
check with you. JQ1
E.G. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I will say that to him.
I just wanted to
The President:
I E.G. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
CONTI DElif'l'IAL
Go.
Look, Bill, I've got to go.
(U)
We also need to talk about Kosovo.
ket
�4
-COHFIDEN'FIhL
Prime Minister Blair: We need to talk about Kosovo and we need
to talk about Northern Ireland as well.
+er
The President:
Call me in the next couple of days.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay, Bill.
Good Bye.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
(U)
Good Bye.
(U)
End of Conversation
COHFIDE11!Il'tL
~
�SECRE'l'
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
1820
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 84
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14,2015
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with Prime Minister Blair of the
united Kingdom
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
("
Notetakers: Don Gentile, Joel Ehrendreich,
Deana Sutliff, Frank Jarosinski, Dick Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
March 14, 2000, 1:05-1:29 p.m. EST
The Residence
Hello.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hi, Bill.
(U)
Can we talk about Kosovo a little bit?
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes, sure.
feI
~
The President:
Let me give you my thoughts. We've got violence
everyday, KFOR attrition, UN operations too slow, and;:.-w.:..:..:::e'--'-"ro..:e"--_ _---.
corning up on spring which is a most dangerous time.
I KO. 13526, section l.4(d) I
Basically, you and I gave it a lot of highlevel attention during the air campaign. NOW, you're worried
about elections, I'm worried about elections and the Middle East.
Somehow, we have got to get this operation on a sounder footing
before Milosevic challenges us. ~)
I think three things have to be done.
We have the biggest stake
in this because we believed in it. You'll be around after I'm
gone and this will come back and bite you in the behind.
First
of all, we've got to make sure KFOR has enough forces to counter
the threat and then we've got to make sure the UN gets funding to
do the job and then get enough police there to take pressure off
KFOR. KFOR is getting weaker when it should be getting stronger.
We have to look at our pledged force levels and have a smooth
transition when the new KFOR commander takes over.
If not, I
think Milosevic, who seems to be getting stronger in Serbia, will
take it as a sign of weakness and then we'll be back in conflict.
3ECl3:E!
Classified by:
Robert A. Bradtke
Reason:
1.S(d)
i
Declassify on;
�2
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I
rn!e
Ls--e-c-o-n-d~t~h~i-n-g--~i-s~t'h-a-t~-w-e~h-a-v--e~t-o--r-e-d'-o-u'b~l~e--o--u-r--e-f~f-o-r~t-s--w-l~'~t~h~the
Kosovar Albanians. We sent the two best people with connections
there this week to deliver that message. Then, we've got to send
We're sending more police this month, from 490 to.
Blair:
The President: That's good. Let's talk about DNMIK. They are
crippled by the funding shortage. I'm trying to do what we can
to increase our contributions to improve the infrastructure, and
I hope you can give some sort of concrete pledge as well.
If you
and I won't do it, nobody will. We can give up to $500 million
if other people kick in some money. I've got Republicans in the
Senate trying to pass some bill saying that we can't give more
money until the Europeans do. We need some help. We have given
out 100 percent of the money we promised to give but I think the
ED has only given 40 percent of what was committed. Je1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: At some
with this Kosovo status
mine together and get a
deal
ind of muscle this up
a bit.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes. I
And a lot more money.
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
~
/
' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - '
glbCRE'I'
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
�SECRE'f
3
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
"E.O.
The President:
Let me ask you.
13526, section 1.4(d) I J
h' k
J
I
I t In the
trick is and the problem is that authority is too dispersed.
Is
there any way we can get Kofi to somehow empower them? The
problem is that Kouchner works for the UN, KFOR is a UN force,
and we're here not wanting to get in the way, but not wanting to
I
~
I
13526, section 1.4(d)
~
s_c r_e_w__ __________________________________________________
__
u_p_. I
E.O.
L..
Prime Minis
The President:
I think the other. You know, my sense is the
Stability Pact, because you're putting up the money, would be no
problem there.
What is Kouchner's relationship with the French?
If they tell him what to do, will he do it? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I think so, yes.
.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
I agree with that. We will work on it from our
side and can talk about it.
I just think this is so important.
I think this is part of the calls you'll make next week in
Lisbon. We need to have our people gaming out what we will or
won't do if Milosevic sends people into the northern part of
Kosovo allegedly to protect the Serbs. What are we going to do
if there is a real battle in southern Serbia and what are we
going to do about Montenegro if he invades them?
(~
�SECRET
4
Prime Minister Blair:
Absolutely. Okay. I agree.
The President: Everyone of them is
wants to do anything, including us.
have an aggressive response in these
not only minimize these problems but
anything out of line in Montenegro.
~
a tough problem. No one
On the other hand, if we
other three areas early, we
also minimize him doing
J..&t
Prime Minister Blair:
I agree.
I believe that the window of
opportunity is starting to close.
J.Zl
The President:
I real 1
like this idea.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
The President:
Did you have a good trip to Russia?
it was very good. J€1
The press on
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I
~
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I don't know.
(S)
Absolutel.
What does he think about Chechnya?
Prime Minister Blair:
J,.21
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
It's a really rough situation over there and in a"
lot of Central Asian countries bordering there.
It was so
typically Russian ham-handed. -HHPrime Minister Blair:
SECREr
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
�5
,3ECRE'I'
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: We had a good joint statement on the Genome
project -- thank you for that. Go see the Queen.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Okay, Bill.
All the best.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
SJ;:CRET
See you
soon~
�3ECP.£'f'
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with Prime Minister Blair of The
United Kingdom
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Deana Sutliff, Jenny McGee,
Miguel Aguila, Don Gentile, Rob Hargis and
Richard Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
April 19, 2000, 1:05-1:40 p.m. EDT
Oval Office
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hello.
(U)
Hello, Wdad," how are you doing?
Prime Minister Blair:
I am preparing.
(U)
(U)
The President: You know, after January I'm available for
babysitting duties.
(U)
The President: You said you wanted to continue my work with the
Third Way, and this is it: helping Blair balance work and
family.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I could do with a bit of help, I tell you.
Cherie is in great form but just keeps getting bigger and bigger.
I tell you, just the thought and I feel as if my life's about to
begin again.
(U)
The President:
It is going to be interesting. Given the way the
world is changing, it'll be a completely different childhood than'
the one your others had. Anyway, it is a great thing.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Right, Bill, we'll put you down on the
babysitting list now, mate.
(U)
The President:
3ECRE'f'
Reason:
1.5(ct)
Declassify on;,
You've got a deal.
(U)
�Sl!;CRl!;'f
2
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
LIF_r_l_'____
m e M_i_n_i_s_t_e r __
__ B_l_a_i_r : ________________________________________
__
The President: Yes, I really want to hear about that.
to see him. ~
~~
I'm going
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: We have a lot to discuss. I agree with that. I
think we'll get more out of this guy since he just started his
term and if he thinks we're trying to help him achieve his
obj ecti ves.
I..e:J
Prime Minister Blair:
SECRE'P
That's right.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
�IE.O.
fjECRE'f
13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
3
The President:
I think to get there we have to somehow
demonstrate, number one, that it is only useful as a defense,
even assuming it works and assuming it meets the criteria I set
out. Basically it's a defense against people who can lob a few
missiles at you rather than a lot. We need to show that those
cooperating in the nonproliferation movement are actually
benefiting, and I need to keep working on it. There's got to be
a way to do that.
I think there is a way to make sure all the
countries that are cooperating on this do benefit.
I need to
keep working on it . .J.8l
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d) I
The President:
I know.
I used to have these arguments with
Yeltsin all the time when we were looking at expanding NATO.
I
asked him once, ~Do you really believe that if we got a foothold
in Poland we would bomb western Russia?" He said, ~No, I don't,
but there are a lot of old ladies out in the country who do." He
was dead serious.
I think it's important to understand their
mentality on this.
They are still affected by Napoleon, Hitler,
and the way the Cold War .came to end, and about the way the
SECRE'l?
�SECRET
4
Soviet Empire collapsed.
Yeltsin was much more enthusiastic
about this in some ways than his progressive successors.
He
wound up mortally hating communism, but still believing in Mother
Russia. All these guys do, and we've got to be sensitive about
that. -+£+.
But we can't walk away from something that can keep a lot of usalive.
I want to talk to you about it in greater detail, maybe
before I go to see him. We can't get this done without serious
adverse implications unless both Russia and Europe believe this
can be something that benefits all of us.
Since it's a defense
system, I'm committed to that.
I think there might be some way
to plug him into that.
(8)
I am still formulating my ideas on it, but let's talk one more
time.
Let's do that first before my meeting with him.
I'll
really read up on it.
I will talk to you about it one more time
before I leave. ~
Another thing I was going to say about the tax system is that
they have to keep working on it. Before I became president, I
was there in 1990 when Boris Yeltsin was elected president when
it was still nominally the Soviet Union and then he got reelected head of the whole deal.
I knew a guy who ran a
McDonald's restaurant there, and we were talking about this tax
problem.
He said ~Look, by the time we pay our taxes -- federal,
local, etc. -- our effective tax rate is 85 percent.
Because
it's McDonalds, I can still end up making a hell of a lot of
money here.
However, my nominal Russian competitor pays an
effective tax rate of 5 percent. But there's almost no other
kind of economic activity you can imagine, except maybe for the
energy sector, that can sustain that kind of tax burden."
1%
He wasn't pleading for help.
I was just a governor at the time.
But later, after I was President, we talked again.
If they want
to get a huge amount of foreign investment, they need to
rationalize their tax system and treat everybody the same.
Otherwise, they are never going to be competitive. That is
essentially the problem with the tax system and their regulatory
problems. J..e-r
I think all the internal energy problems they've got have caused
and cost untold billions of dollars of investment.
Their whole
view of energy is caught up in the notion of sovereignty, and
we've had trouble cracking that nut. Al Gore couldn't move
Chernomyrdin very far on that stuff, but I still think they've
got just staggering potential.
1Gr
The other thing I think would be helpful to do without being
patronizing is to do something about their health system.
SECRET
�5ECREl'
5
They're the only country in the world where their life expectancy
is declining because of unsanitary conditions, not because of
doctors~
They still have a fairly large number of good doctors
over there.
It's so embarrassing that it's difficult to talk
about.
I'm convinced it's one of the things that really
demoralizes the country. ~
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
lair:
I agree.
The President:
I might be completely wrong, but my gut tells me
he could do wonders with his popularity if he could make some
progress on the health care problem.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I'm sure you're right.
Yes, God, yes.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
SECRE'f
IE.O.
13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
�SECRET
IE.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d) I
6
The President:
Let me ask you this.
Is there any way to link
the d~comm~ssioning with the Good Friday accord in a concrete way
- that doesn't stick them on the date? Are there any up-front
confidence building measures they can take, short of a bonfire,
which they still see~ reluctant to do?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
We did something like that in Bosnia, too.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
un
Exactly. «1
Are they going to do it?
+&T-
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
SECRET
�aECRET
7
The President: Well, I'm ready to do it. Do you think that
Gerry and Martin realize that after this last vote, Trimble can't
=-~::i.1.L.!....lI...l...l.l.E....-LL-.l..,Lll:!.),c,don' t do something more?
.+etPrime Minister Blair:
The President: Absolutely. Not only that, I just can't conceive
how anybodY thinks this thing could go forward without the
- unionists. Gerry Adams told me in private he thought there was
no way forward without Trimble. They've got to know. Je1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: It's inconceivable. The whole premise of the
Good Friday Accord was consent. It's a fraud if you get rid of
them. )Z1
)
Prime Minister Blair:/
L-____________________________________- - The President:
What are they going to give back?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
3ECRE'I'
Really?
;e1
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
�'SECRET
8
IE.a. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
Prime Minister Blair:
I
LT_h_e_pr_e_Sl_'d_en_t_:I
___
I
~========================~~
Prime Minister Blair:
I
The President:
You can't make that dog hunt.
Prime- Minister Blair:
JQ1
+G+-
It isn't realistic.
The President:
I think you're onto some good ideas. We'll keep
talking to them. We have our channels open and when you want me
to do something, I will. I
~~______~__~____~__~~~~____~__~~__~~~~~Ithe same
thing may be happening in Northern Ireland.
It might not happen
again, there is so much prosperity, but it's one hell of a gamble
to take over basically, what are you going to do with a few arms?
You're not asking them to give them all up right now and they can
always replace what they lose. They can always go back.
It's so
bizarre.
Jj::1'
13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
IE.a.
Prime Minister Blair:
It is.
~
The President:
I know you offered to meet with the IRA and they
said no. My only other suggestion is whether you or someone on
your behalf could open a channel of communication with others in
Sinn Fein/IRA besides.
In a way, at some point, it gets hard for
the leadership to make a case, and I have the feeling that the
rank and file read the newspapers and are sophisticated on one
level but in the absence of personally engaging with someone who
can explain what's going on out there, it's pretty tough.
I know
I have told you before, I think a lot of these guys can't imagine
how their lives are going to be different if this thing works
out.
I don't know how to do it, and I don't know if I can help
you, but that's the only suggestion I have.
It's a pretty narrow
funnel you're pouring all this in, and Gerry and Martin have a
heavy load.
Some may think, well, Martin is the Minister of
Education and Martin has a nice life, what/s in it for us? Maybe
3ECRE'f
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�SECRET
IE.O. 13526, section
9
1.4(b)(d) I
there's nothing to this, but I think you should keep thinking
about this. .+-e1
~
I
L_p_r_i_m_e M_1_"n i_s_t_e_r B_l_a i_r_:_____________________________________________
__ __
__ __
The President: If I had your blessing, I'd be happy to do it. I
don't know if they~w~OU~l~d~d~O~i~t~-=-==i=f==t=h~e~y~w~o~U=l=d=-=t=a=l~k~t=o~a=n~__~
American either. I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
ere 1S a uge gap, you
. Prime Minister Blair:
I
j
The President: Give some thought to it. I'll have our people
talk to your people about how to establish some sort of dialog
through a British or American contact and talk these things
through and give some thought to what this will be like -- what
are they going to do with their lives, how will it be different?
I may be overstating this, but it strikes me that if we just
could get them to think about how their lives would be different
if this worked out. I now believe Gerry and Martin want this to
work. But, if they brought it to a vote and jammed the vote and
caused half of them to bolt to some other faction -- we don't
want that. It's worth some leakage, but not much. It's easy for
me to say this, because I don't have to deal with the aftermath
of the bombs, but you would be right back in the soup. -8?r
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
J£f
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
�10
8ECRE1'
!E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) !
The President:
You know how badly I want this to work.
I really
think it's important. You have a good economy and good social
reform. And, if you could get a breakthrough here, I think you
would secure your place and your party's place for a long time to
come. You could help New Labor in ways we can't even evaluate.
I just want to do whatever I can for you before I have to leave
here.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
When are we going to see you?
y1
The P~esident:
I'll see you for sure in Berlin. 1'd like to
come to the UK and to Ireland before I go, but I want to be
flexible on timing.
I want to come see you when I can do the
mos t good.
JZI
/J
Prime Minister Blair:!
L-__________________- - - - - -
The President:
I've got a lot of things to talk to you about.
The main thing I don't want to do is something harmful to the
peace process, and it's not too good for me to look like I'm
taking a sentimental journey. I want to come and do something .
.....(..Gt""
Prime Minister Blair:
I
!E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) !
The President: God if you could do that, that'd be great. Let
me know when you want us to weigh in the next couple of weeks.
y(
Prime Minister Blair:
How is Hillary?
(U)
The President: She's doing well. I think she's going to win!
She is starting to sound like a real politician. She's always
been a good speaker, but now she's got to where she can get up
and give a real political speech and sound like a politician.
I'm beginning to sound like a meandering old man.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
well, too? ~
Not quite.
And Al?
He's doing pretty
The President: God, yes. He's doing much better. I expect him
to win. We have a big problem here. The cultural aversion of
white, married, Protestants to voting Democratic is a real
3gCRE'P
�SECRET
11
problem -- and one we have to overcome. Bush is a skilled
politician, but he is not ready to be president, maybe not ever,
certainly not now. But they want it real bad and they've got
lots of money and lots of media access and they are not freshly
discredited. And in this level of economic performance some tend
to believe it's automatic and nobody's going to screw it up, a
lot of people expect it -- think it is automatic.
It is going to
take a lot of discipline -- but I think Al will win. God knows
I'm doing everything I can to get it done without being
counter roductive. )R1
.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d,
!
Prime Minister Blair:
I
I
~
The President: Whew. Well, yes. We're making a little progress
on the Africa trade bill.
(gap) I may run over to Nigeria in a
few months.
(,e1
Prime Minister Blair: /
I
The President:
But better gay than sad.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
\
The President:
But I think we've given a lot of evidence.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
\L---=~====~-------------r~~~~~
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:
If you are, you've;got a hell of a cover-up!
are doing the best you can do. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay, Bill.
Thank you, man.
Prime Minister Blair:
Bye.
(U)
(U)
All the best.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
8CCRC'P
You
�DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
SECRET
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 86
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
(U)
Notetakers: Joel Ehrendreich, Jenny McGee,
Miguel Aguilo, and Richard Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE.:
May 4, 2000, 6:26-6:34 p.m. EDT
Columbus, Ohio
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hello.
Hello, Tony.
Prime Minister Blair:
me.
Hi.
(U)
(U)
Thanks for callin
IE.D. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
Sounds like what we did in Bosnia.
Prime Minister Blair: .. [gap]
IE.D. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
SECREi'
Reason: 1.5d
Declassify on: i
~
�·
SECRET
2
The President:
I heard it all. It sounded good to me.
I like
this idea of third-party verification. That way the IRA keeps
the nominal title to their weapons, so they didn't decommission,
but they did. ~)
Prime Minister Blair:
Exactly.
kB1
I like it.
If the IRA will take it, it's a good
put the government back up as soon as
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
How about "Formerly Royal Police Service?"
s,.e1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
You don't want me to call Gerry or Martin now?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
That's good.
Prime Minister Blair:
f€t
There we are.
We're trying our best.
I
The President: Well, I like this very much.
I always thought
the only way around this conundrum was something like secure
SECRET
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
�3
storage with third-party verification.
I think that's about the
best we can do right now.
It is going to come down to whether
both believe it would be a crying shame to let May come and go
and basical~y junk the Good Friday Accord.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: You'll find a way, and I'll be glad to call them.
We've kept in touch with their people. You've got a really good
proposal. -I don't see how you could make it better than it is.
f-Q1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
Anything else?
Prime Minister Blair:
No.
(U)
I will keep in close touch, if I may.
).QY
The President: You can call me in the middle of the night if you
want, if this thing gets hot. You know I care deeply about it.
I will do what I can. ~
.Prime Minister Blair:
If you don't mind, I may have to do that.
~
The President:
bye.
(U)
Okay, I'm eagerly looking forward to it.
Prime Minister Blair:
Okay.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
SECRET
Okay,
�CONFIJ;lENl'f'IAL
3363
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE
~ONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
PARTLCIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
(U)
Notetakers: Deana Sutliff, Frank Jarosinski,
Joel Ehrendreich, Matthew Sibley, Don
Gentile, Richard Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
May 15, 2000, 5:20 - 5:34 p.m. EDT
The Residence
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hey, Tony.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Sellers movie.
Hello.
(U)
Hi, Bill.
I'm great.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
How are you doing?
(U)
I'm watching the end of an old Peter
Which one?
(U)
The President:
I can't tell.
I've only seen about five minutes.
But Herbert Long just disappeared along with a castle.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Pink Panther, I think.
I think it's the second one.
(U)
It's funny as hell.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
He was so funny, Peter Sellers.
Anyway ...
(U)
The President:
I just wanted to put you in good humor since
you're dealing with Northern Ireland.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I just wanted to bring you up to date.
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
CONFIDEN'fIAL
Reason: 1. 5d'
Declassify on
�CONFIDEHTlhL
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
2
What does your legislation say right now?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
When do you have to move on this?
+G+-
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: Weren't they saying before -- when you and I were
talking, I had a copy of the other legislation -- weren't they
claiming that they ... ~
~
Prime Minister Blair: /
L - - -_ _ _ _
----~
The President: But weren't the republicans saying if you did
that, unionists would just say that all time, and, therefore, the
Catholics wouldn't join? ;e1
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
CON"FIDENTIAL
�3
CONFIDg~nIAL
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
~
Prime Minister Blair:
L-~_ _-------------~
The President:
But the real fact is you would take it off.
Jer
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: Let me see what I can do.
I'll mull it over a
bit. Let me ask you this. What do you think should be done in
Sierra Leone? Your guys have done a good job there. .Jret
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: We're talking about it here. My take on this is
that we could strengthen the UN hand if the Nigerians go in, and
you and whoever can stay in the coastal areas and the city, but
you don't want to be subjected to being picked off in those
jungles by those crazy people. They've got all these young kids
they've brutalized, hopped up on drugs.
I think if we can defeat
that kind of thing, it would be a good thing to do. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
CONFIDEH1'IAL
IE-O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
�CONFIDENTIAL
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
4
I
Yes.
jQ1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes, we're taking them in.
fer
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I think you're doing fine.
I'm just worried
about whether we're doing enough and how to do it.
I think
having you there and securing the airport is about what you
should be doing. You don't have enough people to venture out,
and I would hate to see you go out and be shot into fodder.
I
think we need more troops. They will be scared if the Nigerians
come in there in full force and the Indians are willing to do so.
I may want to call you again if you think there is something else
we should do.
Let me know if we can hel . ou. You've done a
good thing.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I agree with that. You keep chewing on that.
I'll get back to you on that and on the Irish thing.
~
\E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) \
CONPIDEIJ'PIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
5
,.=p",r=i=m=e==M=~=·n=~='s=t~e=r=B=l=a=i=r:..::~_O:...:k..::.:a::::y,-,~B::..~::..·1::..::..1.:..J'
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: It's too bad the unionists won't let you kick the
can down the road a bit. If you could, the issue would become
relatively less important to both sides once things are up and
running. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
How's mama Cherie doing?
Prim~ Minister Blair:
producing.
(U)
The President:
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
Fine.
(U)
She's about a week away from
Is she in a bad humor about being big?
Prime Minister Blair:
She's okay.
(U)
She's been in court today.
(U)
The President:
Good!
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: She's going to court to take on the
government over parental leave. Don't even talk to me about it.
She is great, but she could produce at any time.
(U)
The President:
That's great.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Thanks.
Alright, I'll see you soon.
Okay, Bill.
Bye.
(u).
(U)
-- End of Conversation
CONFIDEN'1'IAL
(U)
�CONPIDEN'f'IAL
1.40
THE: WHITE HOUSE
WAS H I N,GTO N
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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
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SUBJECT:
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
en
Telcon with Prime Minister Blair of the
United Kingdom (U)
Notetakers:
DATE, TIME
Hi, Bill.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
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Amy Swarm and Sean Tarver
May 27, 2000, 12:27-12:44 p.m. EDT
The Residence
AND PLACE:
Hey.
Prime Minister Blair:
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Congratulations!
What a good day.
Yes, it was good, but tight.
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The President: Trimble was ri ht. He had to 0 back to
those crazies in his party. ~1~E~.=O=.=1=35=2=6=,=s=ec=t=io=n=1=.4=(=d=)~~~~~~
Yes.
Prime Minister Blair:
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The President: Yes.
I talked to Adams this morning. He is a
little bit peeved about Trimble talking about house-training him,
but, I said, "Oh hell, it's part of the deal to get the
government back up."
I told him, "Look Gerry, I will support
you. You've got to get the Patten thing, but you also have to do
those CBMs."
(.e1'
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes. /
~
'-----------~-----CONPIDEN'f'IAL
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2
IE.D. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
I think that is exactly what the republicans are
thinking, so you have go to talk to them. There is no question··
they will completely, once they move forward with their CBM, cut
the ·ground from under the "no" unionists.
(.e-r
Prime Minister Blair:
I think that is right.
IE.D. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
"he President:
How's fatherhood coming?
·.,me Minister Blair:
It's different.
(U)
(U)
The President: You're not coming to Berlin?
to be on family leave.
(U)
Are you still going
I really wanted to come,
Prime Minister Blair: It's difficult.
but it is difficult to leave Cherie home alone on weekends
without anyone.
(U)
The President:
I think that is the right thing.
Prime Minister Blair:
to Russia?
(U)
(U)
It should be a good do and then you go on
I guess you saw
The President: Yes. What I am trying to do.
the sort of crazy speech Bush gave last week. . .(..G1Prime Minister Blair:
Yes, I did.
~
The President:
[gap]
He didn't promise to unilaterally reduce
below START III levels. He just promised to cut them below START
CONFIDENTIAL
�CONP'IDEM'fIAL
3
II levels. Hell, I've already done that. This is just crazy.
am terrified these guys will get in and say Reagan was right
about Star Wars. And then you'll get the Chinese building a
thousand weapons, after all the work I did passing China
Permanent Normal Trade Relations. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Congratulations, that was brilliant.
I
(91
The President:
It was a great thing, but too hard. The only
problem we have in this country is that our business community
always kills legislation. Anyway, I am just so afraid that all
the benefits will be squandered if Bush wins the elections.
I
still think we have a 50 percent or better chance to win.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
Quite close, isn't it?
~
The President:
It shouldn't be. White married'Protestants don't
think they should be voting for Democrats, partly because of the
gun issue that Al and I are taking on. All the specifics people
agree with. [gap] it is crazy. You can take a poll about
loopholes.
Sixty-five percent to 30 percent say yes, but even in
New York where it is more liberal than the rest of the country,
if Hillary were endorsed by this group that did the Million Mom
March, it's like 40 to 40 percent. A lot of the country likes it
when we are in, but they have a hard time admitting it. My job
approval was like 65 percent. Bush is really smart. The
campaign against McCain was the most vicious in modern memory.
He has these right wing foot soldiers do his dirty work, so he
can be nice.
I think Al had not the best couple of months, but
now he is in good form and doing well. And we have the record
and the people.
I think he'll do fine in debates, but I still
think he has a better than 50 percent chance of winning this
thing.
If he doesn't, then you will have to do a lot of heavy
lifting.
I think Al is sort of where I am on this stuff. Of
course, if Bush wins, whatever I do with Putin, they can reverse.
If we just came out and said we are not going to do this now and
we are not going to do it until we have technology everybody buys
into and believes in, but we have to do research -- if I did
that, all I would do is make Al vulnerable. There is an article
by Hugo somebody in one of your papers, saying he thought we were
nuts. ....(.et"
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hugo Young?
j£1
Did you see the piece?
Prime Minister Blair:
yn
No, but I had it summarized for me.
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
�CONFIDEN'fIAL
4
The President:
It would be a good thing if national missile
defense worked on a broader basis.
If it gives people the
impression that it would work, people would believe that we could
use the thirig and they would be less likely to attack. But
you've got to figure out if you deploy and if you got beyond the
second phase and it could stop 50 or 60 warheads, what position ..
would that put the· Chinese in.
I don't think a lot of people say
let's go full tilt on this thing. The goal ought to be to get
rid of these damn offensive weapons and direct our energies
toward that.
In the meantime, we must not do anything in the
interim to increase the chances these weapons would be used.
j£1
Prime- Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d) I
The President: The main thing is, the United States should take
a position that we have got to do this in the context of our
larger objectives.
I am working with Al in an effort to preserve
the arms control regime.
If we could do it, it would be good.
The problem I have with the Republican approach is they would
deploy this big Star Wars in the sky system and an adversary can
get under it if they want. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
L I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
'=E=.O==.1=3=5=2=6,=s=e=ct=io=n=1=.4=(=b=)(= ________~
d=)~I
.(.G1-
The President: One thing Republicans say is that nobody believes
we can have bad intentions, but we are the only people who have
ever dropped one of these weapons. My objective is to try and
leave office with the thing in the best possible state in terms
of a decent outcome.
I am trying to do this deal with Putin to
foreclose the possibility of going to any bigger system which
would undermine arms control.
It might not work. We might not
be able to do it. But I still think we are going to win this
thing. We might not.
It might be close.
I always believed Al
is going to win.
I am going to try to make it difficult for Bush
to go off half-cocked on this Star Wars deal. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
Any chance of seeing you?
(~
The President:
I hope so.
I would still like to come over
there. Now that we have the Northern Irelaqd government back up,
maybe I can go by Ireland again.
yeJ
Prime Minister Blair:
I think it would be good.
I have some
ideas on this stuff.
It would be nice to sit down and talk in
detail.
It would also be nice to see you in Ireland. ~
CONFIDENTIAL
�COHFIDENTI."lL
5
The President:
I didn't want to go until it makes sense all
around in terms of the peace process and your schedule. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
arranged. J.G-r
Why don't we see what dates could be
The President:
I want to see your baby.
babies, you know.
(U)
I am quite good with
Prime Minister Blair: He is a great guy.
So good. A little
star, really.
And Cherie is doing great. We are going off to
mass now on Saturday night, to try to avoid the media.
If it is
not too mUGh of a hassle, to meet quite soon would be good and we
could use Ireland as the reason and have a proper talk at the
same time. Thanks for all your help again. When do you leave?
+c+The President:
I depart the Uni ted States on Monday.. I have an
EU thing in Portugal, then on to Russia, and then a brief stop in
the Ukraine.
I go to Portugal, Berlin, Russia, Ukraine, and then
home.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
So you leave next week?
(U)
It is a
The President: Yes. All right, tell Cherie hello.
great day for you. The way you keep everybody talking is amazing
to me.
~
Prime Minister Blair: Occasionally it is amazing to me, too.
One day at a time.
~
The President:
All right man.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
All the best.
(Ul
End of Conversation
CONFIDENTIAL
�_,_J . •
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
...i'
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
~
~
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
"'l
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Prime Minister Blair
~
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The President:
Hello, Tony?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi, Bill.
Where are you?
CI::~;;r
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Are you here?
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Prime Minister Blair: Yes, I'm just driving in from the airport ..J"'l ..... ~..J
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"'lzq 00'"
now, complete with baby.
(U)
~_"'l
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The President:
Really?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, Cherie is coming with me and making
a speech in New York at some lawyer thing, so we have to bring
the baby with us.
(U)
The President:
That's great.
Where are you staying?
(U)
I hope I get to see your baby.
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
CONFIDENTIAL
�2
CONFIDBlffIAL
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: Here's the problem we've got.
First of all, I
won't do anything until I see you.
I don't want to jam you in
public. Our guys tell me that Lott .will basically shut down the
Senate and not even do China if we don't do something, and now
our Foreign Sales Corporation plan was rejected.
It is not a
political thing with me.
I am not running for election, and I
don't want to do anything to hurt you, but, on the other hand, I
can't take the risk they will shut the Senate down.
The real
damage will be if they walk away from the China issue.
That is
my p~oblem, We ought to talk tomorrow. We are going to. have
dinner tomorrow, right? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Right.
(u)
The President:
Why don't we talk a little and see if there is
any reasonable prospect.
If I could just get either one of
these things resolved.
They are killing me on the FSC and the
other thing.
They know, or at least I know, you tried to help
us on both of these things.
I just can'.t let them shut the
thing down on me. JR1'
Prime Minister Blair: /
L -__________
~------------------------------~/
The President:
There might be.
don't we talk again tomorrow.
Prime Minister Blair:
Let me talk to our people.
Je1
Why
Okay.
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: The real problem on the banana issue is a
feeling over here that there is an Anglo-Irish company that is
the main beneficiary of not resolving the issue. That is adding
to the heat.
But the issue isn't a political one for me. We
were able to avoid putting cashmere on the list last time.
You
had those elections in Scotland, and I took a lot of crap the
last time.
It is not a political thing with me, it's just that
I've got to do business with these people for the next six
weeks.
I can't run the risk of having this blamed on me or
being accused of acting on the basis of a personal relationship,
and I can't do anything to hurt Al.
I think he is going to win,
but it is tight as a tick.
(p1
CONFIJ;;BNTIAL
�@OHFIDBHTIAL
3
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
Prime Minister Blair:
(gap)
(U)
The President:
So when we tried to run it by them that you were
trying to help us, they said how can that be, this Anglo-Irish
company is the main beneficiary? Normally I do what I want but
Congress has a big oar in the water.
(gap)
Why don't you talk"
to your folks, and I'll talk to you tomorrow.
Maybe it will be
alright to call Lott, what the hell.
This has been dragging on
so long.
(gap) about as long as I can, and I can't run the risk
they would use that as a pretext against something as profoundly
important as China. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Okay,
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
I think that is quite possible.
I know the heat
they are getting, and I know where it is coming from.
But it
might be helpful, if we could have any indication we could get
that or the FSC thing resolved. Both are hanging out there
feeding on each other. And, in the Senate, it is not totally
confined to the Republicans either.
ye1
Prime Minister Blair:
I totally understand, okay.~
The President:
Okay, so I get to see your baby?
will see you tomorrow.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Alright, Bill, all the best.
End of Conversation --
CONFIDENTIAL
Alright, I
(U)
�..
..:
.;- .
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O.13S26, SECTION s.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 90
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October ]4, 20]5
TH E WH ITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
l.4L--
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Rob Hargis, Tina Yarmchuk, Kurt
Van der Walde, and Don Cheramie
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE
The President:
October 12, 2000, 9:11 - 9:19 a.m. EDT
Chappaqua, NY
Hello?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hello .Bill?
Hey, Tony.
(U)
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
It's a terrible situation.
It's terrible
what happened to your servicemen.
I want to express my
sympathies.
If there is anything I can do, I am glad to.
It
looks like it is spinning out of control.
je1
The President:
I tried for days.
We had two
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Now, we don't know who blew up our ship.
We know there have been terrorist elements trainin for
something like this.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Now you have these
�SECRET
2
instabilities working against each other.
t
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
tE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) t
The President:
Let me te
you w at my pans are.
I'm In
New Yor , we Just celebrated our 25 th anniversary. What a
romantic background.
I'm on my way back to the· off;Lce.
It will
take about 2 hours.
I will call you back when I get there.
I've tried to put something concrete together for two days.
I '11 get back to you when I get to. Washington. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Biarritz.
I'm going off to the EU Council in
tE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) t
The President:
t
Prime Minister Blair:
it to me.
J.e1
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
If you need anything from us, please pass
The President:
I will.
Right now what we need is a nonjudgmental break. For God's sake, let's get past this and start
talking.
I'll know more later.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
'Let us know what we can do.
).e1
The President: Hell, in a 100 days you can call me to go to
places like Biarritz to go skiing. God really doesn't want me
to ease my way out. -ter
Prime Minister Blair:
SECRET
Take care Bill.
(U)
�3
The President:
Bye.
Prime Minister Blair:
+er
Bye.
~
End of Conversation
�THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Robert Hargis, Don Cheramie,
Tina Yarmchuk, Kurt Van der Walde, and Dick
Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
October 13, 2000, 3:36-3:59 p.m. EDT
Oval Office
Hi Tony.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
Hi Bill.
How are you?
(U)
The President: Well, we haven't been sleeping much, but we've
been on the phone for the ast two days. We may be near putting
something together.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
for two days now, and I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4( d)
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
to work on the
�SECRBT
2
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
SECREI
�3ECRE'f
3
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
. SECRET
�SECRE'F
4
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b )(d) I
SECRET
i.
�5
IE.a. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The presirjent:Okay.
Good-bye.
Prime Minister Blair:
Bye.
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation
i3BCRBT
�eONFIDEN'fIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Jenny McGee, Rob Hargis, Dianne
Ruschaupt, Jill Sandler and Dick Norland,
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE
The President:
November 10, 2000, 3:40 - 3:54 p.m. EDT
Army-NaVy Country Club
Hello?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
CU)
Hi, Bill.
(U)
Hi, Tony.' How are you?
Prime Minister Blair:
brilliantly.
(U)
Fine.
(U)
How are you?
Hillary just did
The Pre.sident:
She did great. And it looks tome like Al' s got
the votes, but we don't know if theY'll get counted. --+er
Prime Minister Blair:
Well, what's going to happen?
+et
The President:
I don't know. They still have to count
5,000 overseas ballots.
It's a very confusing situation. There
was an illegal ballot in Florida, where they use a punch card
system. The Bush people are trying to bully him.
Some votes
went to Buchanan and there are 19,000 ballots for him that were
disqualified, and they were African-Americans. Usually, you'd
just say "tough," but here you've got a situation where Gore won
the popular vote. He picked up five points in five days and
also pulled out a huge minority vote, I just hope he can pull it
out. Last night we had former Presidents Ford, Bush, Carter, and
Lyndon Johnson's widow, and we all made reassuring sounds to the
public. --tel
CONFIDENtpIAL
Classified by:
Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5 ($1)
. -"
"."~ __ c~ .•~~~~--~"~~
Declassify On:
11~·mO~"-"..
.';
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';. . INTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
1
-:::.>';~ ~~~;_ ,___ ,""".-~Y;':~'-;::.-)i:;..."':.':"::o-~~,,",- }-----: ,;.~--;
�CGUFI8EH'fIAL
2
Prime Minister Blair:
Where is public opinion?
~
The President: Most want it settled but they don't understand
the issue. They do not understand how clearly these votes were
for Gore. They cite Nixon not challenging in Illinois. The
dif·ference is that i f Nixon had won Illinois, he still would not
have won the electoral vote. It's really bogus. Hillary is
doing great, happy as a clam.
I am really proud of her. -+eJ
Prime Minister Blair: Well, Hillary did wonderful. Give her
our love. She was just fantastic during the campaign. She was
so strong and brave.
I thought she was just great.
J,M.
The President:
She was . . Je(
Prime Minister Blair:
brilliant.
(..et'
Well, Cheri sends her love.
Hillary was
The President: Yeah, she was the "Little Engine That Could."
I
wish you were with me, I'm playing golf. The three guys with me
are on the green right now.
~
Prime Minister Blair: The thing I wanted to say to you was on
Northern Ireland.
I think if you still want and are able to
come over, I think you could playa part in putting this
together. We had a bit of a breakdown, but it should not be
terminal because both sides want this to happen now. There are
certain thin s we have to do and certain thin s the re ublicans
have to do.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
Trimble is really getting it done in the government as
the government is working well. ~
The President:
I saw what he said about no North-South
cooperation before they reengage. But the problem now is that
( C)
the IRA can't appear to be caving in to a unionist demand.
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
CGHPI8ENTIAL
�COHFIDEN'fIAL
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
3
I think it ·would be great if you came over, and people
really welcome it.
I had a word with Trimble, and I think
he is keen about it as well.
He is desperate to make this work·
and so is McGuinness. We need something new, something
different to come in and sort it out a bit. ~
The President:
What's your thought?
ker
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
When do you want me to come?
Prime Minister Blair:
~
Sometime in early December.
~
The President: We are working on this agreement with North
Korea to try to get them to end their missile program, and I
leave this weekend for Vietnam. It sounds weird but it will be
hard for me to take two more trips but I might be able to do
them both. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
here? J...e7
Do you want us to leave some of those deportees
Prime Minister Blair:
CONFIDEN'FIAL
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
�CONFIDEN'fIAL
4
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
In the end it would be up to you if you cando this, but I
think it is possible to put together a deal, and you wouldn't
just be visiting, but you would actually be helping to get the
deal done.
)£1
The President:
if I can come?
.
Do you want me to do some work on this and see
~
Prime Minister Blair: Yes.
We can meet the Irish in the next
two or three days to try to get a common position with them, and
we will brief your guys on it.
I can send you a note with the
elements of the deal 'on it. je}
The President:
That would be wonderful.
You know I want to if
I can.
I realiy want to get this m.issile deal in Korea done, it
will make us all a lot safer.
I'll tell Hillary that you
called. .-k€1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
CONFIDBN'3'IAL
(U)
He's perfect, just great.
Wonderful.
The Prime Minister:
(U)
The President:
(U)
How is your baby doing?
The Prime Minister:
The President:
Thank you.
(U)
I'll get to work on this.
Bye-bye.
(U)
(U) .
All the best.
�5
COUP IDBNT L"soL
Prime Minister Blair:
Bye.
(U)
End of Conversation
GONFIDEN'fIAL
�CONFIDEN'fIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with the British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Sean Tarver, Frank Jarosinski,
Jill Sandler, Clark Lystra, Dick Norland and
Ian Bowles
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE
The President:
November 23, 2000, 9:10-10:06 a.m. EST
Camp David, Maryland
Hello, Tony?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hello, Bill.
(U)
Hey, Tony, How. are you?
Prime Minister Blair:
you?
(U)
I'm fine.
I'm fine.
(U)
I'm in good form, but how are
The President:. I'm doing great. I had a good trip to Vietnam.
I'm still jet lagged.
I guess it's just old age.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
It was a great visit.
(U)
The President:
It was great for us.and generally for
encouraging a force for change within Vietnam. They tried to
discourage the people, but they came out in droves. Sixty
percent of the country is under thirty years old, so they are
all kids. Most of them are thinking about tomorrow and there
are not a lot of elderly people. The Chairman of the party in
Saigon was talking. up private sector activity -- he sounded like
the mayor of a big mid-western city.
It was like a chamber of
commerce speech. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
CONFIDENTIAL
That's good.
�.CONFIDEN1'IAL
2
The President:
On the other side, the General Secretary said
first we have to get what happened in the war straight. He said
I'm glad you were against it. Your visit has· helped us a lot.
Our Ambassador, Pete Peterson, was in the Hanoi Hilton for six
years.
I said we were debating the nature of the conflict, but .
let's get one thing straight: we were not friends.
Now ~hat
you have a united country, we are still having the same debate
about how much of these things are eternal questions and how you
have to join the debate. )e}
Prime Minister Blair:
returned to.?
(J27
It looks fascinating -- but what have you .
The President: Between you and me, here's the problem. We
always knew this could happen where someone could win the
popular vote but lose the electoral college. You have electoral
votes that correspond to representation in the House and then
you get two more for your Senators, so it gives more influence
to smaller states. The other argument in the old days was that
we didn't have the telegraph, so we needed honest people to come
and say how the people voted.and now that is obviously
unnecessary.
This happened only twice before where nobody could
get a majority.
In 1876 and 1888 we had a case where the winner
of the popular vote lost the electoral college.
In both times,
the results were clouded and controversial, but largely the
South was still solidly democratic.
It was against the people
who won the Civil War so you had fluky results. This is just a
case where it just happened that 40,000 votes out of 200 million
people is what the dispute in Florida is about.
Gore has said
he will not challenge the electoral college, but he wants to
make sure that if Bush is given Florida that the people who
showed up got their vote counted. The truth is, Tony, everybody
knows Florida had complicated procedures.. They used a ballot a
lot of older people couldn't read, and more people intended to
vote for Gore than Bush. You still have ten thousands blacks in
one precinct.
They were going to vote for Gore. Ten thousand
uncounted votes in one county and six thousand in another. You
have nineteen thousand predominately blacks in Palm Beach County
who punched Buchanan and then punched Gore.
That is another
sixteen thousand votes for Gore. Then you had thirty two
hundred Jewish people who voted for Buchanan and we had a
statistician say it was a trillion to one shot that Buchanan
could have gotten that many votes. The real question is:. can
Gore re-enfranchise enough people to win the elections instead
of the Republicans? The Secretary of State was Bush's campaign
chairman and now the Republican House is threatening to make him
CONP IDEN'l'IAL
�CONFIDEN'fIAL
3
President if the electoral votes go to Gore or not.
The Florida
constitution says if you can divine the intention of the voter,
the vote should be counted and ironically, everything Bush is
fighting in Florida in the recount is precisely what the law he
signed in Texas requires. Any indentation at all these voters
make is supposed to count. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
So what's your bet?
~
The President:
I don't know. On the merits, Gore should win,
if we can re-enfranchise enough voters, but even the Florida
Supreme Court, they issued a great decision for Gore but Miami
Dade said· "we can't finish by Sunday, so we are not going to do
·it at all." So now they have to decide whether they can get
their own order by delaying. They don't need to have any of
this done until December 12th, but you know the Florida
Legislature is Republican. The Republican Congress is
threatening to change the law and they would throw it into the
House. But if they do that, he will be destroyed and he never
will recover. Je1
Prime Minister Blair:
What ~s your opinion?
jZ1
The President: Right now it's evenly divided because the
process is confusing but generally thought to be fair.
The
Republicans are great spin meisters. They just say it
differently.
It is a power grab. N~w we probably will not get
the ones reenfranchised who double voted on that illegal ballot,
but the truth is, if these people were running for State
Legislature, under the law, those courts would get those votes
to Gore. They just don't have the courage to do it in a
presidential election. You have heard only a slightly biased
opinion.
If I thought Bush won fair and square, I would tell Al
to pack it in, but Gore has on the merits of those who voted,
the stronger claim. So Bush is just trying to run out the
clock. That's why they are desperate to shut it down because
they know Gore lost a lot more votes in those that were thrown
out.
I don't know what. is going to happen. ))2t
Prime Minister Blair:
Really amazing.
jef
The President:
I think we will work it out and be all right.
It is very important to remember that the whole right wing in
America desperately wants this and they still control the
Congress. There are.other things we can talk about when I see
you because Gore carne back 4-5 percent last week and he started
running his campaign on continuing the progress of the last
CONFIDEN''fIAL
r~",::-:~~~AR~P:OIDcO:t _,"
\ <-~~2;~_:_~.~::-,,",;'.:,~~~~.~~~ .. :-_,~- __ '::_-e ..;:--~!,
�4
CONFIDENTIAL
eight years and it was obvious to me in the last 48 hours, I
told one of our people, he might win the popular vote and lose
the electoral college,
I don't think there is any question that
if everybody in Florida had'their vote counted as intended, Gore
would have won by thirty thousand votes. ~
Prime Minister Blair: The right wing press here has just been
desperate for Bush. ~
The President: They are all upset that the military people got
disenfranchised because they came out in force for Governor Bush
so he carried them 2 to 1. But World War II veterans and
holocaust, survivors, they were perfectly fine with having them
disenfranchised. ~
Prime Minister Blair: They are a lot more ruthless than our
folks aren't they? ..(..G1The President: They are. They hate us more than we hate them.
It's all about power to them. They don't care as much about
government, they just want the power.
I will tell you more when
I see you.
I have not said ~ublicly what I just told you.
I
have to be President here. The New York Times finally went
after the Republicans today. They said they are just over
reaching.
I wouldn't even be surprised to see the u.s. Supreme
Court try to overturn the Florida Supreme Court. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Blimey.
JGr
So here we are.
Jet
Prime Minister Blair: As I say, I can't wait to see you.
are going to have a good talk about it.
ktJ
We
The President: Yes. Let's talk about that. Did our people
tell you we might be able to come over on the 12th and maybe go
to Belfast and Dublin on the 13 th 'and 14 th? ...(.G)Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Any time.
%
Is that soon enough?
ke1
Prime Minister ~lair:
I've got to go to Zagreb tonight to this
European Balkans thing. ~
The -President:
COMFIDENIIAL
I'm really glad you are going.
jkn'
�5
CONFIDENTIAL
Prime Minister Blair:
will talk on the plane about
Steinberg will fill you in.
there with Bertie Ahern and we
outlines of an a reement.Jim
r=~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
Yes.
tet
Prime Minister Blair: I am going to go through with Bertie
tonight what are the three more difficult issues:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
What we aim to have by the middle of.
next week is a package we agree on. The right package to go
with. But I would have thought the 12th_14th is about the right
time.
k-e1"
The President: Okay, I will set it up. I can do whatever in
England.
I am coming there basically for you, so I will do
whatever helps you the most.
I can come to Chequers or maybe
give a speech at Oxford.
I thought about talking about five or
six major issues the whole world will face together over the
next ten years.
Something that would keep the Third Way thing
going, but I don't have to give a speech at all.
I am
interested in helping you.
~
Prime Minister Blair: That is very good of you, Bill. I think
a speech on that theme would be very useful. Why don't I give
some thought to where it should be. We got an inkling, and it's
fine with us, that you preferred outside of London.
(C)
The President: No.
I just thought that if we went to London,
you would have to do a big dinner or something.
I wanted to
help you politically and push our agenda.
If it helps you, I am
happy to do that. J.et
Prime Minister Blair:
on that basis.
J.Q1
The President:
That is really kind of you.
r will work
If you think it is better, r will .go to Oxford.
..keJ
Prime Minister Blair:
through. --+Gt-
CONFIDE~nL'l.L
That is great.
r will think that
�6
,CONFIDEN'fIAL
The President:
The only caveat might be if we have timing
problems because the 12th is the day all the electors are
supposed to be certified and there might be some reason I have
to wait until the next morning to come. But I went to Brunei
and Vietnam and the best I can do is show the' country that
everything is just chugging along.
If in the next week
something goes haywire, I will call you.
ker
Prime Minister Blair:
I certainly think a speech is good and my
instinct is to stay outside of London.
We can get some private
time as well.
That is my instinct. But why don't I go through
it with my folks and we will come back to you with clear
suggestions.
~
The President:
Okay.
Prime Minister Blair:
the 14th?
()
~
So you will be here on the 12 th , through
The President:
Yes. My thought is the 12th'with you and to go
to Belfast on the 13 th . Maybe Dublin too, or on the 14th -- might
'have to allow two days in Be~fast.
If there is actually some
sort of deal cooked that you need me to bless, we might be able
to allocate a whole day to be there to work this.
I am going to
allow for that, but I think I just have to wait and see. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I will be in a better position once I
speak to Bertie tonight and take the temperature of the people
over the weekend.
I don't want to land you in something where
you only have a half day. fer
The President:
I won't do that.
That's why I left a day open.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay.
.JR'f
Can we talk about the Hague and climate change?
( C)
Prime Minister Blai'r:
Absolutely.
(..e1"
The President:
You know, first of all, thank you for helping
moderate the EU position so that we can all have agreement.
I
think you and Dutch are key for an agreement. The French and
the Germans aren't there yet.
I have to tell you where the
politics are going to be in,the United States. We have Congress
evenly divided.
We have Republicans ,acknowledging, even Bush,
CONFIDEN'fL~L
~~~Y:H::COPYJ
.
,
'.,::,~2:--' =-~~~~~_~J. ,~~.'~ ;."-:..;<:.}~ . .,: ;,--.;~_J~. _",
�CGNFIDENTL\L
7
that this is a real problem.
Something has to be done. We now
have through this partnership with Detroit on the next
generation of vehicles that Al Gore spearheaded, we got these
cars that will get 80 mpg.
We are trying hard.
The last step
is chemical research, which would help everybody and make your
oil money good for 30 years. Bio-mass fuels can help us get
something like seven or even eight times more efficient gas or
oil than we have today. That is about a third of the problem
with transportation. We are also trying to get this massive
progress to rapidly accelerate the construction industry. We
have another plan for dealing with our utilities and heavy
manufacturing which is the last third.
Finally, after being
treat€d like I was trying to wreck the economy, we are finally
- getting broad acknowledgement.
If we get what we need on the
sinks, forests and all our potential, the gain is something like
300 million tons. We are prepared to go down to less than a
third of that, but we need to get something. We will be
flexible, but we need to get something.
I think we are down to
125. I think it is a mistake to put limits on emission 'trading
because that is a real killer for us politically.
I think it
would be seen for what it is, that Europe wants to try to make
America adopt its tax struct~re and reduce our emissions in the
least efficient way.
It would give us less incenti ve-.
So the
problem may get worse as we get better.
I think it is bad
policy. Even Bush acknowledges it. Right now, about two House
seats left to be decided. The Senate is 50-50 if Bush wins but
51-49 if Al wins because Lieberman would leave his Senate seat
and the Governor of Connecticut is a Republican and would
appoint a Republican. _There are enough Democrats from energy
producing areas that i f this looks like we are getting a bad
deal, that will hurt us.
It also sends the wrong message to
developing countries. What matters is not the results, but how
we achieve it.
I think it is important to get an agreement.
If
we get no agreement, we just give the reactionaries an excuse to
walk away.
>¢)
Prime Minister Blair: Here's my take.
I just spoke with John
who is headin our delegation over there, on the sinks
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
you can
The president: Absolutely. We are prepared to take the overall
number lower than the science indicates.
I think the other
thing is you want to have some encouragement in this document
for sinks. We also need to do something about the rain forests
- an approach that is totally voluntary. ~
CONFIDEM'fIAL
�CONFIDEN'FIAL
8
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.a. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: Yes. But the French proposal is to tax itself.
We said, "Let's establish a fund."
I don't think any other
countries have done this as much as we have. We have done it in
two contexts in America with pollutants.
We had quicker
compliance with clean air efforts at lower costs than the people
projected. Every time we did it, it worked faster and cheaper.
I understand why some Europeans want to limit trading in any
way, but it is a big mistake. Developing countries are
important.
They don't have much of a problem, but you have to
give them the incentive to take action. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I am totally in agreement with you.
IE.a. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
emJF IDE~JT L,\L
�,COllfFIBEM'fIAL
9
The President: Yes.
I will push our proposal on a fund more
and make it attractive to the G-77 and you want us to buck up
Aznar and Guterres. jQY
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
And Schroeder.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
We ought to be more for a market solution here.
( e)
Prime-Minister Blair:
Exactly.
02?
The President: The regulation sh9uld be the outcome, but how to
get there should be left to the most efficient means. Let me
ask something else. How did your visit with Putin go?
(e)
Prime Minister Blair:
It was fine.
Very interesting . He' feels
that he is not understood about the problems he is facing there.
He was very anxious to impress me. He wanted to see America as
}Q1
a partner, I think.
The President:
I think he does, depending on who wins our
elections, it might take a while to get it going, but the more
time you can spend with him the better. I think he is a guy
with a lot of ability and ambitions for the Russians. His
intentions are generally honorable and straightforward, but he
just hasn't made up his mind yet. He could get squishy on
democracy. -+e7
Prime Minister Blair:
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
Politically, he has got to be with the Arabs on
the Middle East dispute, but I told him one real problem you
have here is that it is not clear how much can be controlled in
CQNFIDi:WTI7\ 1.
�tONFIDEN'PIAL
this situation.
10 .
Violence beqets violence.
I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
If you are the st'ronger person, that is
what you have to do.
It was like (gap) but I think especially
for the next year, whoever is President here, and until we get
organized, the more time you spend with him, the more it will
payoff. jJCJ
L--;--:-_ _--;-_...-----;-_-;----II
Prime Minister Blair: Yes.
I will carryon with it.
I think
the other thing is he is only now choosing the people around
);lim. That really matters in terms of what is being pumped into
his ears. He is highly intelligent. ~
The President: Yes. A lot of people pour crap in. He wants to
do a good job and he works at.it every day. He is intelligent
and disciplined. The last thing. I know you had a meeting with
Barak, and I know you're worried. I am doing my best. We've
made little headwa toda.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I
am doing my best but yqu see what the problem is, don't 'you?
;er
.
Prime Minister Blair:
Absolutely.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
Did you tell him
Prime Minister Blair:
speak to him.
CONFIDRN'PIAL
that?~
Yes, I have.
I will follow
E.O.13526,section 1.4(b)(d)
and
�COnFIDEN''fIAL
13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
lE.o.
11
I
l . . . - - -_ _ _ _ _
----'I
The President:
It is interesting. The Israelis have good
substantive policies, but the level of misunderstanding between
the two sides is pretty high. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
)
~------The President:
I agree with that. +G+Pr~me
Minister Blair:
We will try.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: Yes. We're trying to take another run at him on
that and maybe we'll get some movement today.
I am really glad
you are going to this Balkans conference. Tell all those Balkan
guys I said hello.
I am thrilled about what you are doing.
I
think America will do its part out there, no matter what you're
hearing out of the Bush campaign. ~
Prime Minister. Blair:
Bill. -+er
The President:
Thank you so much.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Ridiculous isn't it.
(U)
How is the Senator?
Happy as a clam.
Happy Thanksgiving,
(U)
Chelsea asked about Leo.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: He is absolutely great and you will see
when you come over.
(U)
The President:
I know Chelsea is coming. Hillary wants to but
she still has to sort out some scheduling things. I hope we see
you on the 12th.
(C)
Prime Minister Blair:
Okay.
(U)
�12
CONFIDEN'fIAL
The President:
Good-bye.
(U)
End of conversation
•
CONFHl~lTIAL
�~
• CONFTDE:N1'I"L
•
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime" Minister Blair
PARTICIPANTS: "
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
(U)
Michael Manning and Clark Lystra
December 13, 2000, 4:30-4:41 a.m. EST
Belfast, Ireland
Hello?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Hello?
The President:
(U)
Good.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi, Bill, how are you doing?
Did you get some rest?
Yes, a little.
(U)
(U)
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: It was amazing coverage of your visit
yesterday.
It was unbelievable.
In Northern Ireland, it "looks
( C)
good. Did you speak to Adams and Seamus this morning?
The President: No. Our people have been talking.
what they are going to say to you. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
What's that?
(gap) I know
(U)
The President: That the Sinn Fein view is that before the
election campaigns in the UK, there ought to be a deal on
demilitarization and decommissioning. They want to delay on
Patten and can't embrace it right now. They will not cooperate
directly on the Real IRA. We need to talk to them on the input
they would do.
There need to be more arrests in Omagh. Anyway,
all they said was that they couldn't do more.
Seamus Mallon is
in a particular situation, you know, and the problem is that he
says he will not agree yet on a police force.
He may agree on
one if arrests are made or something and if we find out more we
will tell you, but I think you have to flush them out.
I will
CONFIDE}lTI."tL
Reason: 1.5 <cp
Declassify on;
---. ,
�.
CONFIDENTIAL
2
JE.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d) J
work today in our meeting with him.
I'll try to find out more
about\whatever the sequence is. -kef
Prime Minister Blair~
The President:
I
That might cut the mustard with them.
~
~
Prime Minister Blair:/
L - - f_
_
The President:
OK.
_
_
_
_
~/
~
Prime Minister Blai
The President:
CONFIDEN'fI.".L
There may be something there.
)Z'5
JE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) J
�•
CO~JFIDEN'fIM:.
3
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: That's why I think that if I were you, I would do
a specific trade-off and if you could make some progress there,
it would be alright (gap).
I have to go and get to my meetings
now. We'll be in touch. J<1
Prime Minister B.lair: We need to decide on how specific we
should be when we meet later.
(91
The President:
OK.
Prime Minister Blair:
Good-bye.
Good-bye.
~
(U)
End of Conversation·
CONFIDEUnAL i
�
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Declassified documents concerning Tony Blair
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2012-0600-M
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Creator
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10/15/2015
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7388808
2012-0600-M
Declassified
Foreign Policy
Iraq
Kosovo
Memcon
Northern Ireland
Telcon
Tony Blair
United Kingdom
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/665151584c284392585d01ade3275433.pdf
9757e69789d231eba472719a843b3b87
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full.
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD045\Sep00\M4642124.html
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Cable
PREC:
CLASS:
LINE1:
LINE2:
LINE3:
LINE4:
OSRI:
DTG:
ORIG:
TO:
PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL'
PATCZYUW RUEKDIA1725 2662115-CCCC--RUCRDIC.
ZNY CCCCC
P 221910Z SEP 00
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//TWC-2//
RUEKDIA
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INFO: RUEALGX/SAFE WASH DC
SUBJ: DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE TERRORISM SUMMARY 184-00, 25 SEP 00(U)
TEXT: ^-e-N i ! X U i L l l T I ^ L
QQQQ
SUBJ: DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE TERRORISM SUMMARY 184-00, 25 SEP 00(U)
1. (U) TABLE OF CONTENTS
- 2. WORLDWIDE TERRORISM NOTES
-- A. (U) UNITED KINGDOM: UPDATE TO MI6 ATTACK
2. (U) WORLDWIDE TERRORISM NOTES
( / ] UNITED KINGDOM: UPDATE TO MI6 ATTACK. BRITISH POLICE HAVE FOUND
THE LAUNCHER OF A SHOULDER-FIRED RPG-22 ROCKET I N A SMALL PARK NEAR
THE MI6 HEADQUARTERS BUILDING, WHICH WAS ATTACKED ON 20 SEPTEMBER
[SEE DITSUM 183-00, 22 SEP 0 0 ] . I T IS BELIEVED THE WEAPON WAS MOST
LIKELY FIRED FROM THE PARK OR THE NEARBY RAILWAY LINE. THE RPG-22 IS
PAGE 2 RUEKDIA1725
C P H r i B E W T I A I i
A RUSSIAN-BUILT ANTI-TANK WEAPON USED BY THE RUSSIAN, AS WELL AS THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIAN, ARMY. I T IS RELATIVELY PORTABLE, EASILY HIDDEN,
AND ABLE TO BE USED WITH A MINIMUM OF TRAINING. THE RPG-22 IS
CAPABLE OF PIERCING CONCRETE ONE METER THICK. THE FIND STRENGTHENS
SUSPICIONS THAT THE REAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY [RIRA] WAS RESPONSIBLE
FOR THE ATTACK. A SIMILAR DEVICE WAS FOUND I N A SUSPECTED RIRA ARMS
CACHE I N NORTHERN IRELAND, AND CROATIAN POLICE ARE INVESTIGATING
IRISH DISSIDENT GROUPS I N CONNECTION WITH THE RECENT DISCOVERY OF AN
ARMS CACHE CONTAINING RPG-22S I N CROATIA. THERE I S SPECULATION THAT
THE ATTACK MAY HAVE BEEN TIMED TO INFLUENCE A CRUCIAL BY-ELECTION I N
SOUTH ANTRIM, NORTHERN IRELAND, I N WHICH A UNIONIST OPPOSED TO THE
GOOD FRIDAY ACCORDS IS RUNNING. RIRA HAS NOT CLAIMED RECENT ATTACKS
FOR WHICH I T IS BELIEVED RESPONSIBLE, MAINTAINING THE FICTION THAT I T
STILL ABIDES BY ITS SELF-IMPOSED CEASE-FIRE THAT I T ANNOUNCED AFTER
THE OMAGH BOMBING I N 1998. HOWEVER, THE HEAD OF SCOTLAND YARD'S
ANTI-TERRORIST UNIT HAS REITERATED THAT AUTHORITIES ARE CONTINUING TO
LOOK AT ALL POSSIBLE PERPETRATORS AND HAVE NOT RULED OUT ANY GROUP.
DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES
DECLASSIFY ON: SOURCE MARKED OADR
IDRSRYTRDTOCOPY
CLINTONTm
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
7/13/15
xert
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD045\Sep00\M4642124.html
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PAGE 3 RUEKDI A1725 g - O l T r i E T E N ' T I f t L
TOR: 09/22/00 17:26:43
DIST: SIT: ANDREASEN BEARDSWORTH BINNENDIJK BLACK BOLTON NSC CULLOM WITKOWSKY
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�
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Title
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<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
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Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
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Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
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Declassified documents on Northern Ireland
Identifier
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2015-0159-M
Date Available
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9/21/2015
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on Northern Ireland and the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. Material includes an intelligence cable regarding a domestic terrorism attack in the United Kingdom.
Creator
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NSC Cables
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Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
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Date Created
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9/2/2015
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2015-0159-M
Declassified
Foreign Policy
Good Friday Agreement
Northern Ireland
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/2d3514df261478f390d02cb3358bf9b6.pdf
241817996c58f8200f86030bd8f4719f
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Sections 1.4 (b) and (c) of E.O. 13526 or (b)(3) of the FOIA.
�F:\Cable\Data
Source\Cables\CD025\MAY97\MSGS\M2751185.html
Page 1 of 5
Cable
INFO:
SUBJ:
TEXT:
S E C R E T US ONLY
SECTION 1 CF 3
SUBJ: DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE TERRORISM SUMMARY {U}
DITSUM 149-97, 09 MAY 1997
CONTENTS
1
<U) REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
C.
(U) UNITED KINGDOM/EUROPE:
POSSIBLE PIRA TERRORISM PLANNING
PAGE 7. RUF.KDIA1963 fi F C n-EL^f US ONLY
i
1.4b, 1 4
.c
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
K6V1
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD025\MAY97\MSGS\M2751185.html
1.4b, 1.4c
PAGE 4 RUEKDIA1963 G E C R E T US ONLY
PAGE 5 RUEKDIA1963 S E C R E T US ONLY
Page 2 of 5
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD025\MAY97\MSGS\M2751185.html
1.4b, 1.4c
PAGE 6 RUEKDIA1963 S E C R-E-? US ONLY
(U) UNITED KINGDOM/EUROPE: POSSIBLE PIRA TERRORISM PLANNING
(6/U0)
THE PROVISIONAL
IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY 1PIRA) HAS ESTABLISHED AN ACTIVE SERVICE
UNIT (ASU) IN THE NETHERLANDS FOR TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE
EUROPEAN CONTINENT. INITIAL PREPARATIONS FOR ATTACKS HAVE ALREADY
S E C R E T US ONLY
SECTION 2 OF 3
SUBJ: DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE TERRORISM SUMMARY {Ul
BEEN COMPLETED, BUT THE ASU APPARENTLY IS AWAITING FURTHER
INSTRUCTIONS FROM PIRA LEADERSHIP. ALTHOUGH I
[OFFICIALS
BELIEVE PIRA IS MOST LIKELY TO ATTACK IN NORTHERN GERMANY,
BELGIUM, OR THE NETHERLANDS, THE SPECIFIC DATES AND TARGETS
REMAIN UNKNOWN. PIRA MAY CHOOSE TO CONDUCT LARGE-SCALE ATTACKS
IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS AS A S O OF STRENGTH IN RESPONSE TO THE
HW
CONCLUSION OF THE BRITISH GENERAL ELECTIONS {HELD ON 1 MAY).
(2) fG-) COMMENT: IT IS VERY POSSIBLE THAT PIRA IS PLANNING
C.
in
PAGE 2 RUEKDIAl964 S E C R E T US ONLY
ATTACKS AGAINST BRITISH INTERESTS IN EUROPE. THE GROUP STEPPED
UP ITS TERRORIST CAMPAIGN ON THE BRITISH MAINLAND IN THE RUN-UP
TO THE 1 MAY GENERAL ELECTIONS, AND MAY ATTEMPT TO INTIMIDATE THE
N W LABOR GOVERNMENT WITH LARGE-SCALE ATTACKS BOTH AT HOME AND
E
ABROAD. THIS IS PARTICULARLY LIKELY SINCE THE NEW NORTHERN
IRELAND SECRETARY MO MOWLAM ANNOUNCED ON 7 MAY THAT THERE WOULD
BE NO CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT POLICY WITH REGARD TO SINN FEIN,
PIRA'S POLITICAL WING, DESPITE THE GENERAL BELIEF THAT THE
LIBERAL LABOR GOVERNMENT WOULD BE MORE AMENABLE TO SINN FEIN'S
POSITION THAN JOHN MAJOR'S CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT. MOWLAM'S
ANNOUNCEMENT MADE I T CLEAR SINN FEIN WOULD NOT BE INVITED TO
NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE TALKS AND HER TEAM WOULD HAVE NO
DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GROUP UNTIL PIRA DECLARED AN UNEQUIVOCAL
CEASEFIRE. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT PIRA WOULD USE ATTACKS IN EUROPE
AS A FINAL TERRORIST CAMPAIGN PRIOR TO THE DECLARATION OF ANOTHER
CEASEFIRE, IN ORDER TO REENTER NEGOTIATIONS FROM A PERCEIVED
POSITION OF STRENGTH.
13} (C/UO) PIRA HAS HISTORICALLY TARGETED BRITISH MILITARY
FACILITIES THROUGHOUT EUROPE, INCLUDING THE NETHERLANDS AND
GERMANY, BUT REFRAINED FROM SUCH ATTACKS BETWEEN 1990 AND 1996.
Page 3 of 5
�F:\Cable\Dala Source\Cables\CD025\MAY97\MSGS\M2751185.htral
PAGE 3 RUEKDIA1964 S E C R E T US ONLY
ON 28 JUNE 1996, THE GROUP DEMONSTRATED ITS INTENTION AND
CAPABILITY TO RENEW THIS ACTIVITY WITH A MORTAR ATTACK AGAINST
THE BRITISH ARMY QUEBEC BARRACKS IN OSNABRUCK, GERMANY. A SEVENTO-EIGHT MAN PIRA ASU BASED IN OLDENBERG, GERMANY WAS RESPONSIBLE
FOR THAT ATTACK.
(4) (C/UO) THE ASU IS PIRA'S MAIN FIELD OPERATING ELEMENT,
NORMALLY COMPRISED OF BETWEEN SEVEN AND 14 PERSONNEL. THE UNITS
ARE ORGANIZED IN HIGHLY COMPARTMENTED CELLS TO AVOID COMPROMISE
SHOULD ONE MEMBER BE ARRESTED. MEMBERS FROM ONE ASU ARE OFTEN
DEPLOYED TO OTHER COUNTRIES TO CONDUCT ATTACKS AND MAY USE
TARGETING INFORMATION GATHERED BY PREVIOUS ASUS.
(5) (S/UO) PIRA IS BELIEVED TO MAINTAIN ASUS THROUGHOUT EUROPE,
IN ADDITION TO AN UNKNOWN NUMBER ON THE BRITISH MAINLAND. THE
GROUP HAS PREVIOUSLY USED ITS CELLS IN THE NETHERLANDS TO ATTACK
BRITISH INTERESTS THERE AND TO STAGE ATTACKS IN GERMANY. PIRA
GENERALLY USES BELGIUM AS A SAFEHAVEN AND WEAPONS STORAGE SITE,
THOUGH IT IS CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING ATTACKS THERE AS WELL. THE
MOST LIKELY SITE FOR ANOTHER STRIKE, HOWEVER, REMAINS NORTHERN
GERMANY DUE TO THE PREPONDERANCE OF BRITISH MILITARY FORCES
THERE. PIRA IS LIKELY TO DEPLOY ANOTHER ASU (PROBABLY THE ONE
PAGE 4 RUEKDIA1964 C E C R E T US ONLY
IDENTIFIED IN THE NETHERLANDS) TO CONDUCT THIS ATTACK DUE TO THE
PUBLIC IDENTIFICATION OF MEMBERS OF THE OLDENBERG ASU.
(6) fG) THOUGH BRITISH SOLDIERS ARE CO-LOCATED WITH US FORCES
ON SOME INSTALLATIONS, INCLUDING THE KAISERSLAUTERN MILITARY
COMMUNITY (KMC) AND RAMSTEIN AIRBASE, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT PIRA
WOULD CHOOSE THESE SITES FOR ATTACK. PIRA RECEIVES A SUBSTANTIAL
AMOUNT OF FUNDING FROM SYMPATHIZERS IN THE US, AND AN
INDISCRIMINATE TERRORIST ATTACK THAT THREATENED US LIVES WOULD
JEOPARDIZE FUTURE PIRA REVENUE.
2. (U) WORLDWIDE TERRORISM NOTES
1.4b, 1.4c
Page 4 of 5
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD025\MAY97\MSGS\M2751185.html
1.4b, 1.4c
SECTION 3 OF 3
SECT:
(b)(3)
SSN:
TOR:
DIST:
Page 5 of 5
�E:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD032\JUL98\MSGS\M3392284.html
Page 1 of 3
Cable
INFO
SUBJ
TEXT
SECTION 1
QQ
QQ
SUBJ:DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE TERRORISM SUMMARY (U]
DITSUM 202-98 , 21 JULY 1998(U)
1. (U) TABLE OF CONTENTS
- 2. (U) REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
-- A. (S/NF) UNITED KINGDOM: MORTAR ATTACK IN COUNTY D W LINKS PIRA
ON
WEAPONRY WITH REPUBLICAN DISSIDENTS
- 3. (U) WORLDWIDE TERRORISM NOTES
-- A. JV) BELGIUM: TWO KIDNAPPED BELGIUM PRIESTS RELEASED
-- B.
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4c
C.
1
PAGE 2 RUEKDI A ! 7 63
C C R C T NOFORM
1.4b, 1 4
.c
2. (U) REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. (0/HF) UNITED KINGDOM: MORTAR ATTACK IN COUNTY D W LINKS PIRA
ON
WEAPONRY WITH REPUBLICAN DISSIDENTS
[1] (S/NF) INVESTIGATION INTO THE 21 MAY MORTAR ATTACK ON THE FORMER
MAIN POLICE AND BRITISH ARMY STATION IN NEWRY, NORTHERN IRELAND, HAS
LINKED PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY [PIRA] WEAPONRY TO THE
REPUBLICAN DISSIDENTS BELIEVED RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ATTACK. THE
WEAPON USED IN THE ATTACK WAS A MARK 15 MORTAR, A SIGNATURE PIRA
WEAPON. THE TIMER P W R UNIT [TPU] USED TO FIRE THE MORTAR WAS AN
OE
EXCLUSIVELY REPUBLICAN DISSIDENT DESIGN. THE TPU HAS BEEN GIVEN THE
DESIGNATION MARK 191
14, 14
,b ,c
THIS IS THE FIRST INCIDENT
IN WHICH AN IDENTIFIABLE PIRA WEAPON HAS BEEN USED WITH COMPONENTS
DESIGNED SOLELY BY DISSIDENT REPUBLICANS IN NORTHERN IRELAND.
|
^AUTHORITIES BELIEVE BEYOND DOUBT PIRA IS SUPPORTING THE
RECENT TERRORIST ATTACKS BY DISSIDENT REPUBLICANS.
IN NORTHERN IRELAND HAVE STOPPED CATEGORIZING
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
HOIS' - 0 \ 5 8 7/31/15
KGH
�E:\CabIe\Data
Source\Cables\CD032UUL98\MSGS\M3392284.html
PAGE 3 RUEKDIA4763 S E C R E T NOFORN
INDIVIDUAL REPUBLICAN DISSIDENTS INTO ONE GROUP OR ANOTHER [E.G.,
CONTINUITY IRISH REF
ISH REPUBLICAN ARMY OR 32 COUNTY SOVEREIGNTY COMMITTEE].
INSTEAD, 1.4b, 1.4c PF
OFFICIALS CATEGORIZE ALL INDIVIDUALS THOUGHT TO BE
ASSOCIATED WITH THESE GROUPS AS "REPUBLICAN DISSIDENTS" BECAUSE IT IS
B2LIEVED THEY ARE WORKING TOGETHER AS A MATTER OF CONVENIENCE TO
ACHIEVE A C M O GOAL. IT HAS N W BECOME DIFFICULT TO ASSOCIATE
OMN
O
INDIVIDUALS WITH SPECIFIC GROUPS.
[2] [S/NF4 COMMENT: IT IS LIKELY INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
CONTINUING TERRORIST ATTACKS IN NORTHERN IRELAND ARE DISGRUNTLED
FORMER MEMBERS OF PIRA. THESE HARDLINERS MAINTAIN THE SOPHISTICATED
WEAPONS AND TECHNICAL EXPERTISE TO CONDUCT ATTACKS SIMILAR TO THOSE
DONE BY PIRA PRIOR TO THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE AGREEMENT.
SECTARIAN VIOLENCE PERPETRATED BY REPUBLICAN AND LOYALIST SPLINTER
GROUPS WHO OPPOSE THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS IS LIKELY TO
CONTINUE. NEITHER PARAMILITARY NOR SPLINTER GROUPS ON EITHER SIDE OF
THE CONFLICT DIRECTLY TARGET US INTERESTS.
3. (U) WORLDWWIDE NOTES
A. (U) BELGIUM: TWO KIDNAPPED BELGIUM PRIESTS RELEASED. TWO BELGIUM
PRIESTS ABDUCTED ON 21 JULY BY SUSPECTED HUTU REBELS WERE RELEASED
PAGE 4 RUEKDIA4763 S E C R E T NOFORN
UNHARMED THREE DAYS LATER, ACCORDING TO A BELGIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY
OFFICIAL. THE TWO MISSIONARIES RETURNED TO RUHENGERI DISTRICT, 70
KILOMETERS NORTH OF THE CAPITAL OF KIGALI, FROM WHERE THEY WERE
KIDNAPPED AT GUNPOINT. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHAT THE KIDNAPPERS HAD
INTENDED TO ACHIEVE WITH THE HOSTAGE TAKING. POLITICAL OBSERVERS IN
THE REGION SAID THE HUTU MAJORITY IN RWANDA IS ATTEMPTING TO
DESTABILIZE THE AREA TO PERSUADE PEOPLE THAT KIGALI DOES NOT CONTROL
THE WHOLE COUNTRY. SINCE 1994 A NUMBER OF RELIGIOUS MISSIONARIES AND
EXPATRIATE WORKERS HAVE BEEN KILLED OR ABDUCTED IN RWANDA. IN RECENT
MONTHS, ONE CANADIAN AND TWO SPANISH NUNS WERE KIDNAPPED. ALL THREE
WERE SUBSEQUENTLY RELEASED APPARENTLY UNHARMED.
Page 2 of 3
�E:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD032\JUL98\MSGS\M3392284.html
1.4b, 1.4c
S I T : NSC
Page 3 of 3
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD034\Nov98\M3564135.html
Page 1 of 3
Cable
INFO:
SUBJ:
TEXT:
S E C R E T NOFORN
QQQQ
SUBJ:DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE TERRORISM SUMMARY
DITSUM 034-99, 19 NOVEMBER 1998 (U)
1. (U) TABLE OF CONTENTS
- 2. (U) REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
-- A. (S/MF) UNITED KINGDOM: DISSIDENT REPUBLICANS ALLEGEDLY PLAN
PRE-CHRISTMAS TERRORIST ATTACK ON BRITISH MAINLAND
- 3. (U) WORLDWIDE TERRORISM NOTES
-- A. (U) GREECE: CITIBANK BOMBED BY ANARCHISTS IN ATHENS
-- B. (U) TURKEY: PKK SUICIDE BOMBING INJURES FIVE IN HAKKARI
PAGE 2 RUEKDIA34 8 3 D C R E T HOTORN
PROVINCE
2. (U) REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. (S/NF) UNITED KINGDOM: DISSIDENT REPUBLICANS ALLEGEDLY PLAN
PRE-CHRISTMAS TERRORIST ATTACK ON BRITISH MAINLAND,
[l] |
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1 4
.c
REPUBLICAN DISSIDENTS FROM NORTHERN IRELAND ARE ALLEGEDLY PLANNING A
TERRORIST ATTACK IN ENGLAND BEFORE CHRISTMAS. THE MOST LIKELY
SCENARIO FOR SUCH AN ATTACK IS THE USE OF INCENDIARY DEVICES AGAINST
LOCAL BUSINESSES IN AN EFFORT TO CAUSE DISRUPTION.
ALTHOUGH NO
DETAILS REGARDING THE ACTUAL TARGET WERE PROVIDED, LONDON WAS
ASSESSED AS THE LIKELY LOCATION. THIS SCENARIO IS SIMILAR TO THE 10
JULY 1998 THWARTED BOMB ATTACK IN WHICH SIX DISSIDENT REPUBLICAN
OPERATIVES WERE ARRESTED CARRYING INCENDIARY DEVICES TO BE PLACED IN
VARIOUS SHOPS IN D W T W LONDON. THE INDIVIDUALS WERE AFFILIATED
ONON
WITH THE REPUBLICAN SPLINTER GROUP, 32 COUNTY SOVEREIGNTY COMMITTEE
[32 CSC], AND ITS MILITARY WING, THE REAL IRA. THE REPUBLICAN
DISSIDENTS ALLEGEDLY PLANNING THE PRE-CHRISTMAS ATTACK DO NOT BELONG
TO ANY ONE GROUP BUT ARE MEMBERS OF VARIOUS REPUBLICAN PARAMILITARY
GROUPS OPPOSED TO THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE AGREEMENT. THE
DISSIDENTS MAY BE EMULATING PREVIOUS REPUBLICAN TACTICS, AS THE
PAGE 3 RUEKDIA3483 S E C R E ? NOFORN
.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
-oi58-n
7/31/15- K6H
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD034\Nov98\M3564135.html
PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY [PIRA) HAS A HISTORY OF ATTEMPTING
BOMBING CAMPAIGNS ON THE BRITISH MAINLAND DURING THE HOLIDAY SEASON.
[2) (S/NF) COMMENT:
REPUBLICAN AND PROTESTANT PARAMILITARY AND
SPLINTER GROUPS ARE OBSERVING A CEASEFIRE, EXCEPT FOR THE CONTINUITY
IRA AND THE NEWLY-ANNOUNCED LOYALIST SPLINTER GROUP, THE RED HAND
DEFENDERS. WHILE IT IS PLAUSIBLE DISSIDENT REPUBLICANS HAVE THE
INTENT TO CONDUCT ATTACKS ON THE MAINLAND, AND MAY HAVE ACCESS TO
REPUBLICAN PARAMILITARY WEAPONS CACHES, THERE IS NO OTHER REPORTING
TO SUBSTANTIATE THE THREAT. NEITHER REPUBLICAN NOR PROTESTANT
PARAMILITARY NOR SPLINTER GROUPS HAVE DIRECTLY TARGETED US INTERESTS
IN THE PAST. US PERSONNEL ARE AT RISK OF INADVERTENT INJURY FROM
TERRORIST ATTACKS CONDUCTED IN PUBLIC VENUES ON THE BRITISH MAINLAND.
3. IU) WORLDWIDE NOTES
A. (C/NF) GREECE: CITIBANK BOMBED BY ANARCHISTS IN ATHENS. DURING
THE NIGHT OF 17-18 NOVEMBER GREEK ANARCHISTS DETONATED GAS CANISTER
EXPLOSIVE DEVICES AT A CITIBANK OFFICE IN ATHENS AND AT A GREEK
COMMUNIST PARTY OFFICE IN A NEARBY SUBURB. NO INJURIES WERE REPORTED
IN EITHER EXPLOSION. AN UNIDENTIFIED CALLER TOLD A LOCAL NEWSPAPER
THE BOMBS WERE PLANTED BY ANARCHISTS IN PROTEST AGAINST ARRESTS MADE
DURING THE ANNUAL STUDENT MARCH ON 17 NOVEMBER. THE MARCH
PAGE 4 RUEKDIA3483 S E C R E T NOFORN
COMMEMORATES THE 1973 STUDENT UPRISING AGAINST THE MILITARY JUNTA
THAT RULED THE GOVERNMENT FROM 1967-1974. LOW-LEVEL BOMBINGS BY
ANARCHISTS ARE C M O IN ATHENS AND ARE TYPICALLY CONDUCTED DURING
OMN
LATE EVENING OR EARLY MORNING HOURS IN ORDER TO AVOID PERSONAL
INJURY. LEFTIST ANARCHISTS ARE K O N TO CONDUCT SUCH ATTACKS AGAINST
NW
SYMBOLIC US INTERESTS, INCLUDING COMMERCIAL TARGETS. THE TERRORIST
THREAT TO US INTERESTS IN GREECE IS HIGH FROM THE LETHAL INDIGENOUS
TERRORIST GROUP 17 NOVEMBER WHICH HAS CONDUCTED SEVERAL ATTACKS
AGAINST US PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES IN ATHENS SINCE 1975.
B. (U) TURKEY: PKK SUICIDE BOMBING INJURES FIVE IN HAKKARI
PROVINCE. ON 17 NOVEMBER A FEMALE KURDISTAN WORKERS' PARTY [PKK]
OPERATIVE EXPLODED BOMBS STRAPPED TO HER BODY NEAR A MILITARY
GARRISON IN THE SOUTHEASTERN PROVINCE OF HAKKARI, KILLING HERSELF AND
INJURING FIVE OTHERS. THE W M N APPROACHED A MILITARY CONVOY WAITING
OA
IN FRONT OF THE GENDARME HEADQUARTERS IN YUKSEKOVA COUNTY, WHERE SHE
PREMATURELY DETONATED THE BOMBS. FOUR NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND
A 12 YEAR OLD CHILD WERE INJURED IN THE ATTACK. THE PKK HAS
CONDUCTED SEVERAL SUICIDE BOMBING ATTACKS IN THE LAST THREE YEARS,
PRIMARILY DIRECTED AT TURKISH NATIONAL POLICE [TNP] FACILITIES AND
OTHER TURKISH GOVERNMENT TARGETS. THE HAKKARI BOMBING FOLLOWS THE 12
PAGE 5 RUEKDIA3483 S E C R E T MOFORM
NOVEMBER ARREST OF PKK LEADER ABDULLAH OCALAN BY ITALIAN AUTHORITIES.
OCALAN'S ARREST SET OFF WIDESPREAD DEMONSTRATIONS BY KURDS
THROUGHOUT EUROPE, PROTESTING OCALAN'S POSSIBLE EXTRADITION TO
TURKEY. THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS. THE ARREST OF OCALAN AND HIS
POSSIBLE EXTRADITION, PUBLICLY SUPPORTED BY THE US, HAVE INFLUENCED
PKK TARGETING. THE GROUP HAS REFRAINED FROM DIRECTLY ATTACKING US
INTERESTS' IN TURKEY.
4. (U) THE ABOVE WAS WRITTEN BY ANALYSTS OF DIA'S TERRORISM WARNING
DIVISION; QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO THIS OFFICE AT
DSN 224-4923 [STU I I I ] , GREY: 960-4138. PUBLICATION INFORMATION:
THE DITSUM IS GOVERNED BY THE US GOVERNMENT'S "NO DOUBLE STANDARD"
POLICY. IT MUST RETAIN THE CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS INDICATED.
THE DITSUM IS PUBLISHED DAILY MONDAY THROUGH FRIDAY WITH INFORMATION
CUT OFF AT 1500 EST. THE DITSUM IS ALSO AVAILABLE ON INTELINK.
IMMEDIATE TERRORIST THREAT INFORMATION IS PUBLISHED IN THE NMJIC
OVERNIGHT DEVELOPMENTS AVAILABLE AT THE 24-HOURS NMJIC TERRORISM DESK
AT [703] 614-7706 STU I I I , DSN 224-7706.
Page 2 of 3
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD034\Nov98\M3564135.html
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Page 3 of 3
�
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Clinton Presidential Records
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Declassified documents on Northern Ireland
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2015-0158-M
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This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on Northern Ireland and the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. Material includes cables on domestic terrorism in the United Kingdom.
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NSC Cables
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Declassified
Foreign Policy
Good Friday Agreement
Northern Ireland
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/1a3066a382aba3d099a95fb0e06caf27.pdf
2ebd61a426cc1fb7fcbb18c967224b2d
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Sections 1.4 (c) and (d) and Section 3.5(c) of E.O. 13526.
�-
. CONFIDENTS EO 13526 3.5c
^ ( 0 - 1^
16 December 1994
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Northern Ireland: The Economics of Peace
Office of European Analysis,
The attached paper was prepared by
for Senator George Mitchell in his capacity as Special Advisor for Economic Initiatives in
Ireland. Comments and queries are welcome and mav be directed
The attached report is UNCLASSIFIED when separated from this cover note,
Attachment:
As Stated
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
2015 - c>»5L>- n
7/30/15
KftVl
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
EO 13526 3.5c
Sean O'HUIGINN
(Phonetic: o-heh-GEEN)
IRELAND
Ambassador to the United States
(since September 1997)
Addressed as: Mr. Ambassador 3.5c
Respected career diplomat Sean O'Huiginn is
serving in his third ambassadorial assignment and
second US tour. (He was Ireland's Consul
General in New York during 1980-83.) The
Ambassador has been described by knowledgeable
observers as one of the preeminent experts on the
Northern Ireland peace process and also as one of
the Irish bureaucracy's greenest (most
nationalistic) members; in fact, one experienced
journalist has characterized O'Huiginn as the most
formidable exponent of IrUh nationalism that-he.
has ever encountered.
1.4c, 1.4d
O'Huiginn is a sophisticated, urbane, and
magfifp
t
-';''U::violations and harassment by Ulster security
forces. Maryfield's occupants eventually came to
refer to the heavily guarded facility as "the
bunker," according to press reports. O'Huiginn
reportedly came to be known by British officials as
Dublin's "dark prince" because of his occasional
brooding manner. 3.5c
conceptualizing and drafting agreements.
O'Huiginns as
During his tenure as head of the Department
of Foreign Affair's Anglo-Irish Division
(1992-September 1997), O'Huiginn established
himself as a man who pre rets to work behind the
scenes, according to pres;
1.4c, 1.4d
reports.
O'Huiginn was bom on 25 September 1944 in
County Mayo (northwest Ireland). He holds a
bachelor's degreefromUniversity College,
Galway, and a master's degree from the University
of Bordeaux. He joined the Department of Foreign
Affairs in 1969. In addition to his two tours in the
United States. O'Huiginn has served abroad as
head of Ireland's CSCE delegation in Geneva
(1974-76), Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
(1983-87), and Ambassador to Denmark
(1990-91).
head of the Irish delegation to
Belfast's Maryfield Secretariat, an investigative
body formed under the provisions of the 1985
Anglo-Irish Agreement While there, O'Huiginn
wasresponsiblefor fielding and evaluating
nationalists' complaints about civil rights
O'Huiginnrecentlychanged the spelling of his
name from the original "O'hUiginn" to avoid
confusing American audiences, according to press
reports. He isreportedto be fluent in six
languages. He is married to the former Bemadette
Gallagher, a sculptor anfLoneii^ne broadcaster:
They have two children. 3.5c
able to hold forth impressively on medieval history,
contemporary art, and international politics.
3.5c
3.5c
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
3.5c
7/30/15 KBH
LP 98-102894
6 March 1998
�EO 13526 3.5c
Bertie AHERN
(Phonetic: uhHERN)
IRELAND
Taoiseach (Prime Minister, since June 1997);
Leader, Fianna Fail (since 1995)
Addressed as: Taoiseach (fee-shuk)
He is every great Irish mother's son.
The Irish Times, November 1994
He's the man . .. the most cunning, devious,
and ruthless of my ministers.
Former Taoiseach Charles Haughev.
circa 1991
O
The Taoiseach Up Close
Bertie Ahem, leader of Ireland's largest political
party, became Taoiseach in a close vote in the Dail,
the lower house of Parliament, last June. (He won
the support of 85 of the Dail's 166 members.) He
has since lost one of his supporters to resignation—
Foreign Minister Ray Burke turned in his notice in
the midst of a corroption investigation last October.
Ahem has also found himself having to mollify two
independent members of the Dail—who", along with
the Progressive Democrats, keep Fianna Fail in
power—ever since he agreed to expel Sinn Fein, the
political wing of the Irish Republican Army, from
Northern Ireland peace talks in February, according
to pressreports.(Sinn Fein's expulsion, which
lasted from 20 February until 9 March, came about
after the Irish Republican Army allegedly
committed two murders in Ulster.)
Ahem, at least in the view of Irish voters, has
handled his duties well since June; 75 percent of the
respondents to a December press poll expressed
satisfaction with him. (That result reportedly made
him the most popular taoiseach in over 20 years.)
Throughout his tenure, Ahem has burnished Fianna
Fail's credentials as Ireland's most nationalistic
political party. He has been at the forefront of
those calling for—and granting—measures that will
build confidence in the peace process. At the same
time, he also has sought to reassure Ulster unionists
(1994)
1.4c, 1.4d
Ahem is bright, relaxed.
soft-spoken, and charming. He is at heart a
conciliator, and his "backroom negotiating
skills, "forged in labor union negotiations and
during service as Fianna Fail's chief whip
(1980-81), reportedly served him well during
the runup to the May 1997 election and as he
il for his election as
built suppo
Taoiseach.
Colleagues say Ahem is capable of "steely
resolve. [
1.4c, 1 Ad
He did a commendable job as Finance
Minister (1991-94), however, laying the
groundwork for Ireland's current economic
"boom, "rjaccordipg to press
reports,
that Dublin does not wish to impose ajuniled
Ireland upon them against their will.
The Common Touch
Ahem, a former accountant, speaks with a
working-class accent, and—much like Haughey, his
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. 0. 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
,
s
-7/30/15- KfcU
(continued)
LP 98-102896
10 March 1998
�3.5c
mentor—portrays himself as a common man,
according to pres 1.4c, 1 Ad \ reports. The press
has also noted that Ahem invariably is cheerful and
friendly, characteristics that have helped him to
build and maintain a warm and close rapport with
people across Ireland's social and political
spectrum. Ahem still lives in the neighborhood
where he grew up and enjoys an occasional pint of
ale at a pub across the road from his office,
according to press reports. He reportedly has
maintained his membership in the Federated
Workers' Union of Ireland, as well as the good
relations he established with other Irish trade unions
while serving as his party's chief spokespprson-Qn ,
labor and public service during 1984-87.
Ahem has been described by Irish media
observers as a devout but "pragmatic" Roman
Catholic; he takes a conservative stand on social
issues like coptniceD.tkiJLand-aborti.Qn^ac£X!cdine.tQ_^
press reports.!
I- . d
40
1 4
noted that Ahem is quite open about his domestic
situation and that he spends considerable time with
his two teenage daughters.
Career and Personal Data[
Ahem was bom in Dublin on 12 September
1951. (His father, who apparently had a
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
tremendous influence on him, fought for the IRA
around 1919-20, according to press reports.) Bertie
Ahem became known at age 13 as Fianna Fail's
"director of lampposts" for his ability to emblazon
his Drumcondra neighborhood with campaign
posters, according to press reports. He later
graduated from Rathmines College of Commerce
and University College, Dublin. (He also holds
diplomas in taxation, business administration, and
computer studies from the London School of
Economics, according to press reports.) Ahem's
career as an accountant included service with the
Irish Milk Board (1969-73) and Mater Hospital in
Dublin (1974-87). He was elected to the Dail on
his first attempt in 1977. He later served as
minister of state at the Department of Defense
(1980-81). opposition chief whip (1982-84), Lord
Mayor of Dublin (1986-87). and Minister for Labor
(1987-91). While serving as Lord Mayor, Ahem
was known to work as many as 100 hours per
week, and he donated his entire 1982_sala^y to
charity, according to press reports.
Ahem enjoys reading and watching soccer,
according to press reports. He is a founding
member of the Hampton Sports Club and has
served as chairman of the Drumcondra Football
Club. His brother, Noel. las been a member of the
Dail since 1992.
�EO 13526 3.5c
Mary
IRELAND
McALEESE
President (since October 1997)
Addressed as: Madam President
3.5c
I'm an Irishwoman, nothing more, nothing less,
and I'm no less an Irishwoman because I was born in
Belfast
Marv McAleese. October 1997
3.5c
Former law professor Mary McAleese lived and
worked on both sides of the Irish border before she
became the eighth head of state since the
Republic's constitution was adopted in 1937. (She
is the first northem-bom holder of the largely
ceremonial post.) McAleese has been
characterized by the press as a woman of
formidable intellect, energy, and personality. She
also has been described as thoughtful, complex,
individualistic, and "one of the bright hopes of her
generation." McAleese's candidacy was sponsored
by Ireland's governing parties, the strongly
nationalist Fianna Fail and the center-right
Progressive Democrats.
35
C
McAleese promised during her election
campaign that, as president, she would build
bridges between the island's disparate
communities—an endeavor that apparently is
proving difficult for her in office.
'She's No Mary Robinson'
3.5c
McAleese has succeeded former President
Mary Robinson in two posts, those of Reid
Professor of Criminal Law, Criminology, ami
Penology at Trinity College, Dublin (1975-79.
1981 -87), and President of Ireland. As
President, McAleese has found her workload
compared unfavorably with that of her tireless
predecessor, press reports say. As an Ulster
native, she also has fought to overcome the
feeling—reportedly held by many in the
Republic—that she is an outsider. (Robinson,
by contrast, has been called the "Joan of Arc
of Dublin's chattering classes" by pundits.)
McAleese's popularity rating dropped from 82
percent to a very un-Robinson-Uke 69 percent
during November 1997-April I998.\ 2,.5c
Dublin, an act that many of her fellow Roman
Catholics viewed as a viohtion of church law.
according to press reports
She gained considerable
notoriety in December 1997, for example, by
taking Communion at a Protestant church in
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
(continued)
LP 98-106797
15 June 1998
�Page 1 of 3
EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c
EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d, EO 13526 3.5c
UNITED KINGDOM
Marjorie MOWLAM
(Phonetic: •MOEluhm)
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland
(since May 1997)
Addressed as: Secretary
3.5c
Marjorie "Mo" Mowlam oversees the economic and political well-being of Northern Ireland's 1.5
million residents. She also serves on the National Executive Committee, the Labor Party's
29-member governing body. A former university lecturer in Britain and the United States, Mowlam
is highly regardedbY_nQliticaLallies and opponents alike for her intelligence, creativity, and charm,
according to press
1 4 1 4d
reports. However, it is her raucous sense of humor and
outspokenness-orrtopicsTraiiguig-nim her undergarments to the royal family-that reportedly have
endeared her to her constituents. Mowlam is a member of the "North East Mafia," Labor members of
Parliament (MPs) whose constituencies—and political leanings—are especially close to those of
Prime Minister Tony Blair, according to press reports 3.5c
Ci
3.5c, 1.4c
DECLASSIFIED I N PART
PER E. O. 13526
Vso/is" Ken
7/20/98
�3.5c
Page 2 of 3
Mowlam has made impressive strides through Labor Party ranks since first being elected to the
House of Commons in 1987: she has served as a parliamentary spokesperson on Northern Ireland
(1987-89), trade and industry (1989-92), and the Citizens' Charter and women (1992-93). She also
was shadow secretary ptslateJonnational heritage during 1993-94 and Northern Ireland during 1994
- May 1997. The press
1.4c
note that Mowlam has emphasized women's issues and
civil rights in each of her assignments. They add that she has been a staunch supporter of Labor's last
three leaders as they have maneuvered the party toward the political center. The Irish press reported
in late February 1998 that Mowlam and Blair have discussed her possible appointmenLa^Labor
Party chairman when the Prime Minister shuffles his Cabinet, possibly in July
3.5c
Mowlam actively sought the Northern Ireland portfolio during Labor's 1994 shadow cabinet election;
she observed about that time that there is "something about Ulster that draws one in and then makes
it difficult to withdraw." Mowlam subsequently won praise for keeping her party united behind the
then Conservative government's peace efforts. She also reached out to leaders of both Northern
Ireland "traditions," particularly unionists-and reportedly warned them that the status quo would not
be an option if Labor came to power. During her tenure as shadow secretary, Mowlam expressed
support for using international funds for job training schemes in Northern Ireland, establishing a bill
of rights to help soothe both unionist and nationali^.t.nery.es^an(J recruiting more Catholics and
women into the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC).
3.5c
Out of the Frying Pan . . .
3.5c
Mowlam got off to a fast start as Northern Ireland Secretary last May. Thefirstwoman to hold the
post, she went "walkabout" in Belfast just hours after her appointment and startled residents there
with her warm and outgoing manner, according to press reports. (Much was said in the Ulster press
about the contrast between Mowlam's demeanor and that of her staid and conservative predecessor,
Sir Patrick Mayhew.) She also engaged in what was later described as a mmishine schedule.of
meetings with Northern Ireland political leaders and security officials]
1.4c, 1.4d, 3.5c
Career and Personal Data} 3 5c"
1.4c, 3.5c
7/20/98
�Page 3 of 3
1.4c, 3.5c
Mowlam was bom on 18 September 1949 in Southall, Middlesex. She holds a bachelor's degree in
social anthropology (1971) from Durham University. She also holds master's and doctoral degrees
(1978) from the University of Iowa. Mowlam has worked as a research assistant for writer Alvin
Toffler and left-wing Labor MP Tony Benn, according to press reports. She has also lectured at
Florida State University (1977-78) and the University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne (1979-83). Mowlam
was an administrator with Northern College, in Bamsley, during 1984-87. She became the
"surprise"-and successful-Labor candidate for the Redcar seat in the House of Commons when the
incumbent officeholder announcedJni^ retirement just three weeks before the 1987 election,
according to media accounts. 3.5c
In December 1996, after experiencing a twitch in one arm, Mowlam was diagnosed with a
non-malignant brain tumor, according to press reports. She reportedly was treated with radiotherapy
and steroids and, in November 1997. told TV presenter Sir David Frost that she was "fiillv hack-to
Mowlam enjoys swimming, travel, walking, and jigsaw puzzles. She was on the rowing team at
Durham University. She has also played on parliamentary soccer and hockey teams, according to
press reports. Mowlam speaks some French. She is married to Jon Norton, an investment banker. He
has two daughters. Mowlamiias publicly acknowledged that the two girls' "constant nagging" helped
her to quit smokingj^ 3.5c
10 March 1998
1.4c, 3.5c
1.4c, 3.5c
7/20/98
�
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Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) of E.O. 13526.
�THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTON
May
3,
'S7MftV5AHS:t10
1997
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
ACTION
xo^- ova- r\
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
SAMUEL B E R G E g ^
SUBJECT:
Purpose
8/U/15
Your Trip t o Europe i n May
To approve the o u t l i n e o f your May t r i p t o Europe and decide
whether t o stop i n London f o r a meeting w i t h Tony B l a i r .
Background
You w i l l be making a short t r i p t o Europe i n l a t e May. At t h i s
p o i n t , you w i l l be departing the evening o f Memorial Day, Monday,
May 26 and r e t u r n i n g Thursday, May 29. This t r i p w i l l focus
l a r g e l y on European s e c u r i t y i n the run-up t o the Madrid NATO
Summit i n July.
There are two a l t e r n a t i v e scenarios f o r the t r i p . I f we succeed
i n n e g o t i a t i n g a NATO-Russia agreement w i t h Moscow (and we are
c a u t i o u s l y o p t i m i s t i c ) , then the f i r s t major event o f your t r i p
w i l l be a NATO-Russia Summit May 27 i n Paris. A NATO-Russia
agreement would be a major step toward achieving your v i s i o n o f a
democratic, undivided and prosperous Europe. The Summit and
r e l a t e d events would take v i r t u a l l y a l l day Tuesday.
For May 28, you have accepted the i n v i t a t i o n o f the Dutch
Government t o v i s i t The Hague t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n the semiannual
U.S.-EU Summit and d e l i v e r an address commemorating the 50th
anniversary o f the Marshall Plan. We envisage t h a t address as a
major speech t o the people o f Europe l i n k i n g your v i s i o n f o r
Europe's f u t u r e w i t h the generosity and commitment o f the
Marshall Plan. The Dutch have i n v i t e d each o f the 52 OSCE
countries t o send t h e i r heads of state or government and two
youth leaders t o the Marshall event; a t t h i s p o i n t we expect 40
of those leaders, i n c l u d i n g Kohl and p o s s i b l y Y e l t s i n , t o attend.
There w i l l not be time f o r b i l a t e r a l meetings i n the Hague but
Queen B e a t r i x w i l l host a luncheon i n your honor f o r the v i s i t i n g
leaders.
•CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5b
Declassify On:
cc: Vice President
Chief o f S t a f f
5/2/07
-G6NRBENT1AL
CNO LR R POOOY
LT N B A Y H T C P
I
I
�•CONFI DENT IAL
The t h i r d major piece o f the t r i p , subject t o your agreement,
would be a short stop i n London t o meet w i t h Tony B l a i r . A stop
i n London would be seen by the B r i t i s h p u b l i c as a compliment t o
B l a i r and would set the stage f o r what we expect t o be an
extremely productive r e l a t i o n s h i p . We would also recommend t h a t
you use an e a r l y meeting w i t h B l a i r t o encourage him t o t r y t o
make progress on Northern I r e l a n d r i g h t away, rather than p u t t i n g
i t on the back burner. I f there i s a NATO-Russia Summit May 27
you could stop i n London on your way back t o Washington May 29;
i f there i s no Summit, you could stop there on your way t o The
Hague May 27.
I w i l l send you a more d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n o f the themes and
goals o f the t r i p closer t o the event; a t t h i s p o i n t I would
appreciate your agreement t o the o u t l i n e described above and your
decision on London.
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve the general o u t l i n e f o r the t r i p described
above.
Approve
Disapprove
That you agree t o stop in-^London t o see Tony B l a i r ,
Approve
Disapprove
-CONFIDENTIAL.
C I T N LB A Y P O O O Y
LN O I R R H T C P
�mmm
-\o-'(n
3996
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH
INGTON
June 1 0 , 1997
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
61/
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGE
SUBJECT:
Your Phone C a l l w i t h Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r ,
June 10, 1997, 2:45 p.m.
My c o u n t e r p a r t John Holmes c a l l e d t o ask t h a t you accept a c a l l
from Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r t h i s a f t e r n o o n . B l a i r wants t o g i v e
you an update on t h e B r i t i s h response t o t h e f o u r issues Sinn
Fein has s a i d must be s e t t l e d b e f o r e t h e y can go t o t h e IRA f o r a
c e a s e f i r e . We expect B l a i r w i l l a l s o ask t h a t you take a tough
l i n e on t h e resumption o f v i o l e n c e i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d .
I n h i s May 16 speech i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d , B l a i r announced t h a t
B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s would meet w i t h Sinn Fein r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s t o
d i s c u s s t h e p r o s p e c t s f o r a c e a s e f i r e (the f i r s t such meetings
s i n c e t h e c e a s e f i r e was broken i n February 1996). There have
been two meetings so f a r . Sinn Fein has s a i d i t needs p r o g r e s s
on f o u r p o i n t s : a date f o r Sinn Fein e n t r y i n t o t a l k s once t h e r e
i s a c e a s e f i r e ; assurance t h a t t h e decommissioning i s s u e w i l l n o t
b l o c k m e a n i n g f u l n e g o t i a t i o n s ; a timeframe t o ensure t h a t
n e g o t i a t i o n s do h o t go on i n d e f i n i t e l y ; and c o n f i d e n c e - b u i l d i n g
measures from t h e B r i t i s h Government. Though Sinn Fein has n o t
s a i d so e x p l i c i t l y , i t should a l r e a d y be s a t i s f i e d on two o f
those p o i n t s : t h e timeframe and c o n f i d e n c e - b u i l d i n g measures
(e.g. t h e t r a n s f e r o f p r i s o n e r s , acknowledgment o f p a r t i a l
B r i t i s h r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e Great Famine, and Mo Mowlam's
comments on r e f o r m o f p o l i c e ) .
Sinn Fein has complained t h a t t h e B r i t i s h have n o t y e t s e t a f i r m
date f o r t h e i r e n t r y i n t o t a l k s c o n t i n g e n t on a c e a s e f i r e , b u t
t h e y u n d e r s t a n d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h would be w i l l i n g t o do so.. I t
i s t h e decommissioning i s s u e t h a t may prove t h e most i n t r a c t a b l e .
D u b l i n and London are now w o r k i n g o u t t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s over how
t o handle t h i s i s s u e i n t h e B e l f a s t t a l k s , b u t they w i l l have t o
s e l l David T r i m b l e and t h e U l s t e r U n i o n i s t P a r t y on whatever p l a n
t h e y agree on. Up t o t h i s p o i n t , T r i m b l e has remained adamant
t h a t decommissioning must s t a r t b e f o r e t h e t a l k s move i n t o t h e i r
-6QKP-I DENT IAL
Reason: 1.5b
D e c l a s s i f y On:
cc: V i c e P r e s i d e n t
Chief o f S t a f f
6/10/07
Nf IDbNTIftL'
CNO LR R POOOY
LT N B A Y HTCP
I
I
�j ON FIDEMTI AL
s u b s t a n t i v e phase; t h e governments want t o use M i t c h e l l ' s f o r m u l a
o f decommissioning " i n p a r a l l e l " w i t h progress i n n e g o t i a t i o n s .
About 10 days ago, what had looked l i k e a "de f a c t o " IRA
c e a s e f i r e began t o u n r a v e l when t h e IRA abandoned a van f u l l o f
e x p l o s i v e s ( r e p o r t e d l y n o t primed t o explode) t h a t was p r o b a b l y
on i t s way t o a m i l i t a r y s i t e . Today t h e IRA c l a i m e d
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r a s h o o t i n g a t t a c k on B r i t i s h t r o o p s i n which
no one was i n j u r e d .
The B r i t i s h have made c l e a r t h a t they are deeply concerned about
the renewal o f IRA v i o l e n c e , even i f i t has n o t c l a i m e d any
v i c t i m s y e t . B l a i r w i l l want your support i n condemning t h i s
v i o l e n c e and making c l e a r t o t h e IRA t h a t i t i s
c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e , as w e l l as wrong.
Attachment
Tab A
P o i n t s t o be Made
•CONn DENT IAL
n m i r n r k r IRI
C Ni E ifL
O rD Nll
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�tUNiiUimlnL
CONn DENT IAL
3996
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
Northern I r e l a n d
General p o i n t s as a p p r o p r i a t e :
•
As always w i l l do what we can t o h e l p .
•
Renewal o f IRA v i o l e n c e deeply u n s e t t l i n g , coming as Sinn
Fein's e l e c t o r a l successes show t h a t they have a f u t u r e i f
they pursue t h e democratic p a t h .
•
With your government, e l e c t i o n o f Ahern, M i t c h e l l i n B e l f a s t
and my own commitment, IRA has best p o s s i b l e c o n s t e l l a t i o n .
I f t h e y do n o t grab o p p o r t u n i t y , agree t h a t t a l k s must move
ahiad w i t h o u t them (though w i t h o u t c l o s i n g door t o Sinn Fein
p a r t i c i p a t i o n on b a s i s o f a c e a s e f i r e . )
I f Blair
says
HMG o f f i c i a l s will
stop
meeting
with
Sinn
Fein:
•
Understand t h a t you f e e l you must do t h i s .
o n l y wrong b u t c o m p l e t e l y i l l o g i c a l .
•
Assume you w i l l c o n t i n u e t o seek agreement w i t h D u b l i n on how
to handle decommissioning. S t i l l t h i n k you need t o p u t a l l
p i e c e s i n p l a c e so t h a t t h e r e i s no excuse f o r IRA n o t c a l l i n g
ceasefire.
•
W i l l you s t o p c o n t a c t s w i t h Sinn Fein
I f Blair
asks
for
strong
message
IRA v i o l e n c e n o t
indefinitely?
condemning
IRA
violence:
•
NSC (Jim S t e i n b e r g ) a l r e a d y p l a n s t o d e l i v e r tough message t o
Adams on resumption o f v i o l e n c e i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d .
(Call
w i l l p r o b a b l y take p l a c e Thursday).
•
I f asked: W i l l be happy t o have Mike McCurry make p u b l i c
statement condemning renewed v i o l e n c e .
•
I f appropriate:
I f you are n o t t a l k i n g t o Sinn Fein d i r e c t l y ,
we w i l l be happy t o pass any o t h e r messages you may have.
CONFI BEN'TTEMJ
Reason: 1.5b
D e c l a s s i f y On:
6/10/07
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�xtntnijtfttW:
-COMF1 DEMT IAL
If Blair
discusses
progress
on Sinn
Fein's
four
points:
•
You have taken number o f c o n f i d e n c e - b u i l d i n g steps -- your
moves on p r i s o n e r s , your comment on t h e famine ( f i r s t B r i t i s h
acknowledgment o f some r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ) . Mo Mowlam's remarks on
need f o r r e f o r m o f p o l i c i n g . A l l have made c l e a r your good
f a i t h , d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o addross a l l aspects o f problem.
•
On timeframe, agree t h a t May 1998 e x p i r a t i o n o f your
l e g i s l a t i o n a u t h o r i z i n g t h e Forum i s n a t u r a l p e r i o d t o assess
progress o f n e g o t i a t i o n s .
•
Urge you t o press ahead w i t h I r i s h t o reach agreement on how
to handle decommissioning and how t o s e l l i t t o T r i m b l e . I f
t h e r e i s any chance f o r c e a s e f i r e , w i l l o n l y happen i f IRA
assured Sinn Fein w i l l n o t be s t u c k i n t a l k s about
decommissioning.
•
On date f o r Sinn Fein e n t r y , have i m p r e s s i o n t h i s can be
worked o u t as l o n g as t a l k s do n o t proceed i n p l e n a r y s e s s i o n
w i t h o u t Sinn Fein a f t e r an IRA c e a s e f i r e .
New I r i s h Government
•
A l t h o u g h new government ( l e d by B e r t i e Ahern) w i l l n o t be
f o r m a l l y i n p l a c e u n t i l June 26, understand t o p I r i s h
o f f i c i a l s expect t o be empowered t o a c t when t h e y meet your
o f f i c i a l s next week t o d i s c u s s decommissioning.
•
Doubt you w i l l see change.in b a s i c I r i s h p o s i t i o n s on peace
p r o c e s s . What do you t h i n k ?
NATO
•
Have been c o n s i d e r i n g f u r t h e r which c o u n t r i e s t o i n v i t e t o
j o i n NATO a t Madrid and w i l l be meeting w i t h C o n g r e s s i o n a l
l e a d e r s tomorrow.
•
W i l l be i n touch w i t h you i n couple o f day t o d i s c u s s how t o
b r i n g t h i s issue t o closure w i t h i n A l l i a n c e — i f p o s s i b l e ,
w i t h o u t messy argument w i t h Jacques C h i r a c .
•
I f asked: S t i l l l e a n i n g toward s m a l l f i r s t group combined
w i t h s t r o n g "open door" t o assure those.not s e l e c t e d t h a t
process w i l l c o n t i n u e . W i l l e l a b o r a t e when we t a l k a g a i n .
•€0NFI DENT TAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
• O r I TA
C NDN I L
i
�SQNriDCNTlAL-
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: SUM2, BASS, BERGER, HELWEG, KERRICK, SIT{C2}, STEINBERG, HOTLINEJN, PETERS,
VERSHBOW
PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: CONriDCNTIAL
DTG: 111 845Z JUN 97
FM: CABINET OFFICE LONDON
TO:
THE WHITE HOUSE
////
C O N F I D E N T I A L - VIA CABO CHANNELS
QQQQ
MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
11 JUNE 1997.
CONriDCHTIAfc AND PERSONAL
DEAR BILL
IT WAS GOOD TO TALK TO YOU ON THE PHONE LAST NIGHT, PARTICULARLY
ABOUT NORTHERN IRELAND. I AM GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR AGREEING TO USE YOUR
INFLUENCE WITH SINN FEIN TO PUT A STOP TO RENEWED IRA VIOLENCE, WHICH
COULD HAVE DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES JUST AT THE TIME WHEN WE ARE
TRYING TO MOVE THINGS FORWARD. THE KILLING OF A LOYALIST TERRORIST
THIS MORNING FURTHER INCREASES MY FEARS, ALTHOUGH RESPONSIBILITY
FOR THIS IS NOT YET CLEAR.
AS YOU KNOW, I WANT TO GET SINN FEIN INTO THE TALKS IF I CAN. WE HAVE
HAD TWO MEETINGS WITH THEM AT OFFICIAL LEVEL TO CLARIFY OUR POSITION
ON VARIOUS ISSUES OF CONCERN TO THEM, AND TO SET OUT OUR OWN. I NOW
WANT OFFICIALS TO SEND THEM A SHORT PIECE OF PAPER BY THE END OF THIS
WEEK, SO THAT THEY CAN BE IN NO DOUBT OF WHERE WE STAND. I ATTACH A
COPY OF WHAT WE PROPOSE TO SEND. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD
TREAT THIS IN STRICT CONFIDENCE FOR THE MOMENT. WE MAY WANT TO
ARRANGE A FURTHER MEETING OF OFFICIALS WITH SINN FEIN EARLY NEXT
WEEK, BUT THAT ITSELF IS SERIOUSLY THREATENED BY CONTINUING IRA
VIOLENCE.
IN ANY CASE I PLAN TO MAKE A STATEMENT ABOUT OUR POSITION, PROBABLY
NEXT WEEK. THIS WOULD EXPLAIN AGAIN OUR POSITION ON
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING, DECOMMISSIONING, AND THE TIME-FRAME FOR THE
NEGOTIATIONS. IT WOULD ALSO SET OUT THAT WE HAVE IN MIND A PERIOD OF
SOME SIX WEEKS TO ASSESS A CEASEFIRE. IN OTHER WORDS A CEASEFIRE
IN MID-JUNE WOULD LEAD, IF IT WERE SATISFACTORY IN WORD AND DEED, TO
SINN FEINS FORMAL ENTRY INTO THE TALKS BY THE END OF JULY.
C I T N LB A Y P O O O Y
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I SHOULD ADD THAT I PROPOSE TO ENSURE THAT THE SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL
TALKS GET UNDER WAY IN SEPTEMBER, WHETHER SINN FEIN ARE IN THE TALKS
OR NOT. I AM NOT PRPEARED TO ALLOW FURTHER DELAY. SO SINN FEIN NEED
TO MAKE UP THEIR MINDS WHETHER THEY WANT TO BE PART OF THE POLITICAL
PROCESS OR NOT.
I HOPE YOU WILL BE READY TO SUPPORT FULLY THIS APPROACH. I AM
PREPARED TO MAKE A REASONABLE OFFER TO SINN FEIN, DESPITE THE RISKS
THIS ENTAILS. I HOPE THEY WILL NOT MISUNDERSTAND THE POSITION OR MY
DETERMINATION. I WILL NOT TOLERATE AN APPROACH FROM THEM WHICH CLAIMS
TO BE POLITICAL BUT REMAINS UNDERPINNED BY VIOLENCE OR THE THREAT OF
IT. THEIR CURRENT TWIN-TRACK STRATEGY LEAVES ME GENUINELY ALARMED
ABOUT THEIR SINCERITY.
I WANT TO MAKE RAPID PROGRESS THIS SUMMER AND WILL DO EVERYTHING I
CAN TO ACHIEVE THIS. I KNOW I CAN COUNT ON YOUR INFLUENCE TO HELP ME
DO SO.
KINDEST REGARDS TO HILLARY.
YOURS EVER
TONY
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AIDE MEMOIRE
MEETINGS WITH SINN FEIN
THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETINGS ON 21 AND 28 MAY WAS TO ENSURE THERE WAS
NO MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE GOVERNMENTS POSITION OR OF SINN FEINS.
THIS NOTE SETS OUT THE GOVERNMENTS POSITION, IN PARTICULAR ON THE
POINTS RAISED BY SINN FEIN.
FIRST, SINN FEINS PARTICIPATION IN TALKS. THE ENTRY OF SINN FEIN
INTO THE TALKS REQUIRES AN UNEQUIVOCAL RESTORATION OF THE IRA
CEASEFIRE. NEGOTIATING WHILE VIOLENCE CONTINUES, OR UNDER THE THREAT
OF VIOLENCE, IS UNACCEPTABLE.
THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WANTS TO SEE THE TALKS PROCEED ON AN INCLUSIVE
BASIS, AND MOVE ON TO THE SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL ISSUES AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE, AND IN ANY CASE BY SEPTEMBER. IT WANTS TO SEE SINN FEIN
PARTICIPATING IN THESE TALKS. SINN FEINS ENTRY IS GOVERNED BY THE
LEGAL REQUIREMENTS SET OUT IN PARAGRAPHS 8 AND 9 OF THE GROUND RULES
FOR ALL-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE IS LEGALLY
OBLIGED TO ISSUE AN INVITATION TO SINN FEIN WHEN SHE CONSIDERS THOSE
REQUIREMENTS ARE MET, HAVING MADE A POLITICAL JUDGEMENT OF ALL THE
CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE ROUND.
�CONriDCNTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
SOME TIME WILL BE NEEDED TO ASSESS A CEASEFIRE TO SEE THAT WORDS AND
DEEDS ARE MATCHING BEFORE SUCH A JUDGEMENT CAN BE MADE. WE UNDERSTAND
THAT AN OPEN-ENDED TIME PERIOD GIVES RISE TO ACCUSATIONS OF BAD
FAITH.
WE ARE PREPARED THEREFORE TO REMOVE ANY MISUNDERSTANDING BY SAYING
THE PERIOD OF TIME FOR SUCH A JUDGEMENT IS SOME 6 WEEKS. IF AN
UNEQUIVOCAL CEASEFIRE IS IN PLACE BY MID-JUNE, AND IS SATISFACTORY IN
WORD AND DEED, SINN FEIN WOULD BE INVITED TO A PLENARY SESSION
OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BY THE END OF JULY. THAT WOULD BE THE OCCASION
FOR SINN FEIN TO MAKE CLEAR ITS COMMITMENT TO THE MITCHELL 6
PRINCIPLES.
IN THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING A CEASEFIRE, WE EXPECT
PARTICIPANTS MIGHT WISH TO CONSIDER ADJOURNING THE TALKS. AS WAS SAID
BY THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT AND THIS GOVERNMENT, MINISTERIAL MEETINGS
WITH SINN FEIN WOULD BE POSSIBLE, AS WELL AS BILATERAL AND OTHER
MEETINGS IN CASTLE BUILDINGS, INCLUDING BETWEEN THE INDEPENDENT
CHAIRMEN AND SINN FEIN. SINN FEIN WOULD ALSO HAVE ACCESo TO AN OFFICE
IN CASTLE BUILDINGS.
SECOND, TIMEFRAME. BECAUSE OF ITS CONCERN TO GET THIS PROCESS MOVING,
THE GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THE TALKS SHOULD NOT CONTINUE BEYOND MAY
1998, THE DATE ENVISAGED BY CURRENT LEGISLATION AND THAT A SETTLEMENT
SHOULD BE ACHIEVED BY THEN. THERE WILL BE REGULAR REVIEWS OF'
PROGRESS.
THIRD, DECOMMISSIONING. THE TALKS PARTICIPANTS ARE CURRENTLY
ADDRESSING THE ISSUE OF DECOMMISSIONING. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALWAYS
MADE IT CLEAR IT SUPPORTS PARALLELDECOMMISSIONING AS RECOMMENDED BY
MITCHELL AND THAT m W A N T ^ T O RESOLVE THIS RAPIDLY TO THE
SATISFACTION OF TH^PARTICIPANTS SO THAT IT DOES NOT BLOCK THE START
OF SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS IN SEPTEMBER. IT IS WORKING
WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT TO DO SO. THIS CAN ONLY BE ON THE BASIS
OF IMPLEMENTING ALL ASPECTS OF THE MITCHELL REPORT. AS MUTUAL
PROGRESS IS MADE ON POLITICAL ISSUES AND DECOMMISSIONING, THIS CAN
CREATE GROWING MUTUAL TRUST AND CONFIDENCE ON ALL SIDES.
ANY AGREEMENT ON DECOMMISSIONING SEEMS LIKELY TO INCLUDE A COMMITMENT
BY EACH PARTICIPANT TO WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY AND IN GOOD FAITH TO
IMPLEMENT ALL ASPECTS OF THE MITCHELL REPORT? AN INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION, TO BE ESTABLISHED IN PARALLEL WITH THE LAUNCH OF
SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS? A DEDICATED COMMITTEE OF
THE PLENARY TO ADVANCE ALL ASPECTS OF THE MITCHELL REPORT? AND A
REVIEW MECHANISM FOR PROGRESS ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF THE
NEGOTIATIONS.
FOURTH, CONFIDENCE-BUILDING. THE GOVERNMENT WANTS TO BUILD CONFIDENCE
ON ALL SIDES OF THE COMMUNITY, BASED ON PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY OF
OPPORTUNITY, EQUITY OF TREATMENT AND PARITY OF ESTEEM. MEASURES
ALREADY ANNOUNCED INCLUDE THE INCORPORATION OF THE ECHR INTO DOMESTIC
LAW? A REVIEW OF TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES FOR YOUNG PEOPLE? A
CONriDCNTIAL
�CLINTON LB A Y P O O O Y
IRR HTCP
-CONriDCNTIAL
COMMITMENT TO EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY IN THE LABOUR MARKET? A
COMMITMENT TO LEGISLATE THIS YEAR ON THE NORTH REPORT? AND A
COMMITMENT TO IMPLEMENT PROPOSALS TO DEVELOP A POLICING SERVICE
CAPABLE OF SECURING THE SUPPORT OF THE WHOLE COMMUNITY, INCLUDING A
MORE INDEPENDENT COMPLAINTS SYSTEM.
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING IS OF COURSE A TWO WAY STREET. A GENUINE AND
LASTING ABANDONMENT OF VIOLENCE WOULD DO MORE TO REBUILD CONFIDENCE
ACROSS THE COMMUNITY THAN ANY OTHER STEP. OTHER PARAMILITARY ACTIVITY
SUCH AS INTIMIDATION THROUGH SO-CALLED PUNISHMENT ATTACKS SHOULD ALSO
STOP, ON ALL SIDES. THIS WOULD HELP THE GOVERNMENT TO RESPOND
IMAGINATIVELY IN AREAS SUCH AS SECURITY-FORCE DEPLOYMENTS.
SINN FEINS CONCERNS WERE SET OUT IN ITS PAPER OF 10 OCTOBER. THIS
NOTE ANSWERS THOSE CONCERNS FULLY. AN IMMEDIATE AND UNEQUIVOCAL IRA
CEASEFIRE IS NOW NEEDED TO ENABLE SINN FEIN TO ENTER THE TALKS AS SET
OUT ABOVE. IF SINN FEIN DO NOT ENTER THE TALKS, THE SUBSTANTIVE
NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE TAKEN FORWARD IN SEPTEMBER IN ANY EVENT.
#0001
NNNN
< "SECT > SECTION: 01 OF 01
< SSN>0001
<~rOR>970611162018 M2800269
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FROM:
SITREPRT
CONriDCNTIAL
�CONriDCNTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: COQ, PETERS, S U M 2 , VERSHBOW, NSC, BASS, BERGER, BRADEN, BROWN, DAVIES,
FUERTH, HELWEG, KERRICK, SIT{C2}, SODERBERG, STEINBERG, TRIP
PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: CQMFIUENTIAL
DTG:1 3 2 1 4 5 Z JUN 97
F M : CABINET OFFICE LONDON
TO:WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
///////CORRECTED COPY////////
CONriDCNTIAL
QQQQ
MESSAGE FROM JOHN HOLMES
TO SANDY BERGER
DEAR SANDY
I WAS GRATEFUL THAT YOUR PEOPLE WERE ABLE TO RESPOND SO QUICKLY TO
THE DRAFT AIDE MEMOIRE WHICH WE SENT TO YOU UNDER COVER OF A LETTER
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT. WE HAVE TRIED TO TAKE
ACCOUNT OF THE COMMENTS YOU AND THE IRISH GOVERNMENT HAVE MADE. I
NOW ENCLOSE A REVISED VERSION OF THE AIDE MEMOIRE, WHICH WE ARE
PASSING TO SINN FEIN THIS EVENING.
YOURS EVER
JOHN HOLMES
BEGINS
AIDE MEMOIRE
THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING ON 21 AND 28 MAY WAS TO ENSURE THERE
WAS NO MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE GOVERNMENTS POSITION OR OF SINN
FEINS. THIS NOTE SETS OUT THE GOVERNMENTS POSITION, IN PARTICULAR ON
THE POINTS RAISED BY SINN FEIN.
FIRST, SINN FEINS PARTICIPATION IN TALKS. THE ENTRY OF SINN FEIN INTO
THE TALKS REQUIRES AN UNEQUIVOCAL RESTORATION OF THE IRA CEASEFIRE.
NEGOTIATING WHILE VIOLENCE CONTINUES, OR UNDER THE THREAT OF
VIOLENCE, IS UNACCEPTABLE.
THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WANTS TO SEE THE TALKS PROCEED ON AN
INCLUSIVE BASIS, AND MOVE ON TO THE SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL ISSUES AS
SOON AS POSSIBLE, AND IN ANY CASE BY SEPTEMBER. IT WANTS TO SEE
SINN FEIN PARTICIPATING IN THESE TALKS. SINN FEIN'S ENTRY IS GOVERNED
BY THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS SET OUT IN PARAGRAPHS 8 AND 9 OF THE
GROUND RULES FOR SUBSTANTIVE ALL-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS. THE SECRETARY
OF STATE IS LEGALLY OBLIGED TO ISSUE AN INVITATION TO SINN FEIN WHEN
SHE CONSIDERSTHOSE REQUIREMENTS ARE MET, HAVING MADE A POLITICAL
JUDGEMENT OF ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE ROUND.
SOME TIME WILL BE NEEDED TO ASSESS A CEASEFIRE TO SEE THAT WORDS AND
DEEDS ARE MATCHING BEFORE SUCH A JUDGEMENT CAN BE MADE. Tti!S_PERIOD
SHOULD BE USED CONSTRUCTIVELY TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE NEEDSOFAlT
CLINTON LB A Y P O O O Y
IRR HTCP
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�CONriDCNTIAL
PARTIES. WE UNDERSTAND THAT AN OPEN-ENDED TIME PERIOD GIVES RISE TO
ACCUSATIONS OF BAD FAITH. WE ARE PREPARED THEREFORE TO REMOVE ANY
MISUNDERSTANDING BY SAYING THE PERIOD OF TIME FOR SUCH A JUDGEMENT IS
SOME 6 WEEKS. IF AN UNEQUIVOCAL CEASEFIRE IS IN PLACE BY MID-JUNE,
AND IS SATISFACTORY IN WORD AND DEED, SINN FEIN WOULD BE INVITED TO
A PLENARY SESSION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BY THE END OF JULY. THAT
WOULD BE THE OCCASION FOR SINN FEIN TO MAKE CLEAR ITS COMMITMENT
TO THE MITCHELL 6 PRINCIPLES.
IN THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING A CEASEFIRE, WE EXPECT
PARTICIPANTS MIGHT WISH TO CONSIDER ADJOURNING THE TALKS. AS WAS SAID
BY THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT AND THIS GOVERNMENT, MINISTERIAL MEETINGS
WITH SINN FEIN WOULD BE POSSIBLE, AS WELL AS BILATERAL AND OTHER
MEETINGS IN CASTLE BUILDINGS, INCLUDING BETWEEN THE INDEPENDENT
CHAIRMEN AND SINN FEIN. SINN FEIN WOULD ALSO HAVE ACCESS TO AN OFFICE
IN CASTLE BUILDINGS.
SECOND, TIMEFRAME. BECAUSE OF ITS CONCERN TO GET THIS PROCESS MOVING,
THE GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THE TALKS SHOULD NOT CONTINUE BEYOND MAY
1998, THE DATE ENVISAGED BY CURRENT LEGISLATION, AND THAT A
SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE ACHIEVED BY THEN. THERE WILL BE REGULAR REVIEWS
OF PROGRESS.
THIRD, DECOMMISSIONING. THE TALKS PARTICIPANTS ARE CURRENTLY
ADDRESSING THE ISSUE OF DECOMMISSIONING. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALWAYS
MADE IT CLEAR THAILULWANTfi TO RFSOI VF THIS RAPIDLY TO THE
SATISFACTION OF THE PARTICIPANTS SO THAT IT OOFS NOT BfOfflTTHE
SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS. REALISTICALLY, THIS CAN ONLY BE
ON THE BASIS OF IMPLEMENTING ALL ASPECTS OF THE MITCHELL REPORT.
IT IS WORKING WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT TO SECURE AGREEMENT AMONfe
THE PARTICIPANTS TO MOVE FORWARD RAPIDLY ON THIS BASIS. AS MUTUAL
PROGRESS IS MADE ON POLITICAL ISSUES AND DECOMMISSIONING, THIS
CAN CREATE GROWING MUTUAL TRUST AND CONFIDENCE ON ALL SIDES.
ANY AGREEMENT ON DECOMMISSIONING SEEMS LIKELY TO INCLUDE A COMMITMENT
BY EACH PARTICIPANT TO WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY AND IN GOOD FAITH TO
IMPLEMENT ALL ASPECTS OF THE MITCHELL REPORT; AN INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION, TO BE ESTABLISHED IN PARALLEL WITH THE LAUNCH OF
SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS; A DEDICATED COMMITTEE OF THE
PLENARY TO ADVANCE ALL ASPECTS OF THE MITCHELL REPORT; AND A REVIEW
MECHANISM FOR PROGRESS ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF THE NEGOTIA1 IONS.
FOURTH, CONFIDENCE-BUILDING. THE GOVERNMENT WANTS TO BUILD CONFIDENCE
ON ALL SIDES OF THE COMMUNITY, BASED ON PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY OF
OPPORTUNITY, EQUITY OF TREATMENT AND PARITY OF ESTEEM. MEASURES
ALREADY ANNOUNCED INCLUDE THE INCORPORATION OF THE ECHR INTO DOMESTIC
LAW; A REVIEW OF TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES FOR YOUNG PEOPLE; A
COMMITMENT TO EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY IN THE LABOUR MARKET; A COMMITMENT
TO LEGISLATE THIS YEAR ON THE NORTH REPORT; AND A COMMITMENT TO
IMPLEMENT PROPOSALS TO DEVELOP A POLICING SERVICE CAPABLE OF
SECURING THE SUPPORT OF THE WHOLE COMMUNITY, INCLUDING A MORE
INDEPENDENT COMPLAINTS SYSTEM. IN RESPONSE TO A FURTHER POINT
OF APPARENT CONCERN. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALWAYS MADE CLEAR IT HAS
EQUAL RESPECT FOR THE VARIED CULTURAL TRADITIONS OF BOTH
COMMUNITIES, INCLUDING THE IRISH LANGUAGE AND CULTURE. IT ALSO
RECOGNISED THE PARTICULAR SENSITIVITIES OF PRISONER ISSUES ON ALL SIDES.
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING IS OF COURSE A TWO WAY STREET. A GENUINE AND
LASTING ABANDONMENT OF VIOLENCE WOULD DO MORE TO REBUILD CONFIDENCE
ACROSS THE COMMUNITY THAN ANY OTHER STEP. OTHER PARAMILITARY ACTIVITY
SUCH AS INTIMIDATION THROUGH SO-CALLED PUNISHMENT ATTACKS SHOULD ALSO
STOP, ON ALL SIDES. THIS WOULD HELP THE GOVERNMENT TO RESPOND
CONriDCNTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�COMEIDEffflAtr
IMAGINATIVELY IN AREAS SUCH AS SECURITY FORCE DEPLOYMENTS, AND OTHER
CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT.
SINN FEINS CONCERNS WERE SET OUT IN ITS PAPER OF 10 OCTOBER. THIS
NOTE ANSWERE THOSE CONCERNS FULLY. AN IMMEDIATE AND UNEQUIVOCAL IRA
CEASEFIRE IS NOW NEEDED TO ENABLE SINN FEIN TO ENTER THE TALKS AS SET
OUT ABOVE. IF SINN FEIN DO NOT ENTER THE TALKS, THE SUBSTANTIVE
NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE TAKEN FORWARD IN SEPTEMBER IN ANY EVENT.
ENDS
#0001
A
< SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
< SSN>0001
< TOR>970613201812 M2804944
A
A
FROM:
Alexander R. Vershbow/National Security Council
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPV
CONriDENTIAL-
�COIttriDENTIAir
4 1 7 5 REDO
NATIONALSECURITYCOUNC.IL
W A S H I N G T O N . D.C. 2 0 5 0 4
June 16, 1997
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
THROUGH:
ALEXANDER VERSHBOW fo
FROM:
MARY ANN PETER^i
SUBJECT:
Memorandum t o t h e P r e s i d e n t on N o r t h e r n
I r e l a n d / R e p l y t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
As you r e c a l l , Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r sent t h e P r e s i d e n t a message
l a s t week c o v e r i n g t h e o r i g i n a l t e x t o f t h e B r i t i s h o f f e r t o Sinn
Fein on Sinn Fein's e n t r y i n t o t h e peace t a l k s i f an u n e q u i v o c a l
c e a s e - f i r e i s d e c l a r e d . We had i n t e n d e d t o send a P r e s i d e n t i a l
r e p l y l a t e r t h i s week, f o l l o w i n g Jim's planned c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h
Adams t o get Sinn Fein's i n i t i a l r e a c t i o n t o t h e B r i t i s h o f f e r .
In l i g h t o f t h e IRA murders today, Jim d i d n o t t a l k t o Adams.
However, a P r e s i d e n t i a l l e t t e r i s needed i n any event t o express
sympathy on t h e l o s s o f t h e policemen. We recommend u s i n g t h e
l e t t e r a l s o t o make c l e a r t h a t we t h i n k t h e o f f e r i s a good one
and t o pass on a message Mary Ann g o t from Sinn Fein today.
The l o c a l F r i e n d s o f Sinn Fein r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , Mairead Keane,
c a l l e d Mary Ann w i t h a message from Adams. He s a i d t o t e l l us
t h a t he w i l l n o t be d i s t r a c t e d by t h e IRA a t t a c k from t h e t a s k o f
g e t t i n g t h e p o l i t i c a l process going and t h a t we s h o u l d read
n o t h i n g i n t o t h e a t t a c k beyond t h e IRA's ongoing campaign.
Adams s a i d Sinn Fein had r e c e i v e d t h e B r i t i s h o f f e r F r i d a y and
Sinn F e i n (read IRA) a r e s t u d y i n g i t ; though t h e r e remains a
problem w i t h decommissioning, t h e d r a f t c o n t a i n s p o s i t i v e
elements.
I f i t would be u s e f u l , Adams s a i d , he i s ready t o t a l k
to J i m about t h i s .
The bottom l i n e appears t o be t h a t today's
a t t a c k was n o t i n t e n d e d as a response t o t h e B r i t i s h o f f e r .
RECOMMENDATION
That you s i g n t h e memorandum t o t h e P r e s i d e n t a t Tab I .
Attachments
Tab I Memorandum t o t h e P r e s i d e n t
Tab A Reply t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Tab B Statement on Murders i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d
Tab C F i n a l Text o f B r i t i s h O f f e r t o Sinn F e i n
Tab D Incoming Correspondence
-CONFIDENTIAfc
Reason:—TTSb
D e c l a s s i f y On:
PER E.O. 13526
6/16/07
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPV
WMS-O^"?* - H
�COUriDEUTraiT
417 5
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS H I N G T O N
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGER
SUBJECT:
L e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r on N o r t h e r n
Ireland
Purpose
To express condolences on t h e deaths o f t h e two policemen who
were murdered by t h e IRA June 16 and t o pass on a message from
Sinn F e i n .
Background
On June 16, two policemen w a l k i n g a beat were shot and k i l l e d i n
the N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d town o f Lurgan.
The IRA c l a i m e d
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e a t t a c k w i t h i n hours. B l a i r and B r u t o n
(who i s s t i l l Taoiseach u n t i l June 26) were b o t h i n Amsterdam f o r
the EU Summit; b o t h i s s u e d s t r o n g statements condemning t h e
murders. F u t u r e Taoiseach B e r t i e Ahern i s s u e d a p a s s i o n a t e
statement, c l e a r l y i n t e n d e d t o disabuse r e p u b l i c a n s o f t h e n o t i o n
t h a t a Fianna F a i l prime m i n i s t e r w i l l be s o f t on v i o l e n c e .
Senator Kennedy i s s u e d h i s s t r o n g e s t d e n u n c i a t i o n y e t o f t h e
r e p u b l i c a n t a c t i c o f seeking t o combine v i o l e n c e w i t h t h e
democratic process.
The statement we i s s u e d i n your name i s a t
Tab B.
The B r i t i s h government had passed t o Sinn Fein on June 13 i t s
o f f e r f o r Sinn Fein e n t r y i n t o t h e B e l f a s t t a l k s on t h e b a s i s o f
an u n e q u i v o c a l c e a s e - f i r e . The t e x t (Tab C) r e f l e c t e d
s u g g e s t i o n s from us and from the I r i s h government. Assuming t h a t
the B r i t i s h and I r i s h governments can reach a more s p e c i f i c
agreement on how t o handle decommissioning i n t h e t a l k s process,
t h i s i s t h e b e s t o f f e r Sinn Fein can expect from t h e B r i t i s h . I t
would a l l o w them i n t o t a l k s w i t h i n 6 weeks o f t h e d e c l a r a t i o n o f
a m e a n i n g f u l c e a s e - f i r e ; i t s t a t e s t h a t decommissioning w i l l n o t
be a l l o w e d t o d e l a y s u b s t a n t i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s ; promises a d d i t i o n a l
c o n f i d e n c e - b u i l d i n g measures; and s e t s May 1998 as t h e n o t i o n a l
timeframe f o r c o m p l e t i o n o f n e g o t i a t i o n s .
We have no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t the B r i t i s h a r e g o i n g t o w i t h d r a w t h e
o f f e r i n t h e wake o f the murders, though B l a i r d i d announce t h a t
CONFIDENTTm
Reason: 1.5b
D e c l a s s i f y On:
1
6/16/07
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the B r i t i s h have c a l l e d o f f t h e meeting w i t h Sinn Fein scheduled
f o r t h i s week. B l a i r w i l l a l s o p r o b a b l y postpone t h e p u b l i c
announcement o f t h e elements o f t h e o f f e r .
We w i l l be w o r k i n g on a s t r a t e g y t o g e t t o a c e a s e - f i r e on t h e
b a s i s o f t h e B r i t i s h o f f e r i n s p i t e o f t h e murders o f t h e
policemen. P u b l i c l y , we w i l l want t o t a k e a h i g h p r o f i l e t o
underscore your c o n t i n u e d p e r s o n a l commitment t o t h e process,
p a r t i c u l a r l y as t h e w o r s t o f t h e marching season approaches i n
early July.
Jim S t e i n b e r g had planned t o t a l k t o Gerry Adams today t o g e t h i s
i n i t i a l r e a c t i o n t o t h e B r i t i s h o f f e r , b u t d i d n o t do so because
of t h e murders.
However, t h e l o c a l Sinn Fein r e p r e s e n t a t i v e d i d
c a l l an NSC s t a f f member w i t h a message from Adams t h a t he does
not i n t e n d t o be " d i s t r a c t e d " by today's a t t a c k from t h e business
of g e t t i n g a p o l i t i c a l process going and t h a t we s h o u l d read
n o t h i n g i n t o t h e a t t a c k beyond the c o n t i n u a t i o n o f t h e IRA
campaign. We b e l i e v e t h e purpose o f t h e message was t o t e l l us
t h a t t h e a t t a c k i s n o t any k i n d o f response t o t h e B r i t i s h o f f e r .
The B r i t i s h a l r e a d y r e a l i z e t h i s , as t h e y know t h a t such a t t a c k s
are planned w e l l i n advance, b u t we recommend t h a t you l e t B l a i r
know t h a t we heard t h i s from Adams.
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve
t h e message t o Prime M i n i s t e r
B l a i r a t Tab A.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab
Tab
Tab
Tab
A
B
C
D
Reply t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Statement on Murders i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d
Text o f B r i t i s h O f f e r t o Sinn F e i n
Incoming Message
CITN LBAY P O O O Y
LNO IRR H T C P
CONFIDENTIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
FROM:
THE WHITE HOUSE
TO:
CABINET OFFICE LONDON
SUBJECT:
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER
(BEGIN TEXT)
DEAR TONY:
LIKE YOU, I AM OUTRAGED AND DEEPLY SADDENED BY THE IRA'S VICIOUS
MURDER OF THE TWO POLICEMEN IN NORTHERN IRELAND. YOU HAVE MY
SINCERE SYMPATHY AMD HILLARY'S. OUR HEARTS GO OUT TO THEIR YOUNG
FAMILIES.
I ISSUED A STRONG STATEMENT THAT WAS IN STEP WITH WHAT YOU, JOHN
BRUTON AND BERTIE AHERN ARE ALL SAYING. SENATOR KENNEDY HAS ALSO
ISSUED A VERY FORCEFUL STATEMENT. SINN FEIN CANNOT MISS THE
MESSAGE BUT I T REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER I T WILL HAVE ANY
IMPACT.
I ALSO WANTED TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER LAST WEEK FORWARDING
THE DRAFT TEXT OF YOUR GOVERNMENT'S OFFER TO SINN FEIN. PRIOR TO
HIE ATROCITY ON MONDAY, MY DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR, JIM
STEINBERG, HAD INTENDED TO TALK TO ADAMS AND TELL HIM THAT WE
BEIrl-EVE-^OUR-OFFSR-^-S FORTHCOMI-NG-AN-B—SER IOU-S—AND—T-HAT THE IRA
SHOULD ACT ON I T WITHOUT DELAY. BECAUSE OF THE MURDERS/ JIM DID
NOT GET I N TOUCH WITH ADAMS, F o l l o w i n g our phone c a l l , my Deputy
N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A d v i s o r , Jim S t e i n b e r g , c o n t a c t e d Adams t o pass
on my deep concern about the c o n t i n u e d v i o l e n c e , and t o urge a
f o r t h c o m i n g response t o y o u i e f f o r t s . We had planned t o f o l l o w
up on Monday, b u t p u t o f f the c a l l f o l l o w i n g t h e murders. BUT
SINN FEIN PASSED A MESSAGE TO US; THE ESSENCE OF I T WAS THAT
NO^H^NG—SHOULD BE REAB-INTO THE ATTACK BEYON-B-T-H-E-which was t h a t
t h e a t t a c k was n o t i n response t o your p r o p o s a l , b u t r a t h e r a
CONTINUATION OF THE IRA'S CAMPAIGN. WE TAKE THAT TO MEAN THAT
SINN FEIN DOES NOT WANT THE MURDERS TO BE SEEN AS THE
RE-PUBixiGANS-* RBSFQNSS TO YOUR—OFFER-; WHILE I AM NOT REPOSING
ANY CONFIDENCE I N THEIR GOOD FAITH, I WANTED TO PASS THAT ON TO
YOU.
SANDY BERGER AND JIM STEINBERG ARE PREPARED TO WORK WITH YOUR
OFFICIALS AND WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT TO SEE WHAT CAN BE DONE
TO KEEP THE PEACE PROCESS ON TRACK I N SPITE OF THIS TERRIBLE
CRIME. WE WILL HAVE THE CHANCE TO TALK PERSONALLY I N DENVER. I
LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOUR THERE.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
^OV^ - 0\"72. -
�'•GONFIDENTIAL
4175
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGER
SUBJECT:
L e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r on N o r t h e r n
Ireland
Purpose
.To express condolences on t h e deaths o f t h e two policemen who
were murdered by t h e IRA June 16 and t o pass on a message from
Sinn F e i n .
Background
On June 16, two policemen w a l k i n g a beat were shot and k i l l e d i n
the N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d town o f Lurgan.
The IRA c l a i m e d
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e a t t a c k w i t h i n hours. B l a i r and B r u t o n
(who i s s t i l l Taoiseach u n t i l June 26) were b o t h i n Amsterdam f o r
the EU Summit; b o t h i s s u e d s t r o n g statements condemning t h e
murders. Future Taoiseach B e r t i e Ahern i s s u e d a p a s s i o n a t e
statement, c l e a r l y i n t e n d e d t o disabuse r e p u b l i c a n s o f t h e n o t i o n
t h a t a Fianna F a i l prime m i n i s t e r w i l l be s o f t on v i o l e n c e .
Senator Kennedy i s s u e d h i s s t r o n g e s t d e n u n c i a t i o n y e t o f t h e
r e p u b l i c a n t a c t i c o f seeking t o combine v i o l e n c e w i t h t h e
democratic process.
The statement we i s s u e d i n your name i s a t
Tab B.
F o l l o w i n g up on B l a i r ' s request t o you, Jim S t e i n b e r g made c l e a r
t o Adams l a s t week your concern t h a t t h e v i o l e n c e i n N o r t h e r n
I r e l a n d was t h r e a t e n i n g the p r o s p e c t s f o r g e t t i n g Sinn F e i n i n t o
t a l k s . We a l s o i s s u e d a statement by the press s e c r e t a r y warning
a g a i n s t v i o l e n c e a t t h i s j u n c t u r e . While t h e a t t a c k was
p r o b a b l y planned w e l l b e f o r e our message was g i v e n , n o n e t h e l e s s
the IRA c a r r i e d o u t t h e murder o f the policemen i n t h e face o f
c l e a r warnings from t h e B r i t i s h and from us.
The B r i t i s h Government had passed t o Sinn Fein on June 13 i t s
o f f e r f o r Sinn Fein e n t r y i n t o t h e B e l f a s t t a l k s on t h e b a s i s o f
an u n e q u i v o c a l c e a s e - f i r e . The t e x t (Tab C) r e f l e c t e d
s u g g e s t i o n s from us and from the I r i s h Government. Assuming t h a t
the B r i t i s h and I r i s h governments can reach a more s p e c i f i c
agreement on how t o handle decommissioning i n t h e t a l k s process,
.CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5b
D e c l a s s i f y On:
6/16/07
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23
t h i s i s t h e b e s t o f f e r Sinn Fein can expect from t h e B r i t i s h . I t
would a l l o w them i n t o t a l k s w i t h i n 6 weeks o f t h e d e c l a r a t i o n o f
a m e a n i n g f u l c e a s e - f i r e ; i t s t a t e s t h a t decommissioning w i l l n o t
be a l l o w e d t o d e l a y s u b s t a n t i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s ; promises a d d i t i o n a l
c o n f i d e n c e - b u i l d i n g measures; and s e t s May 1998 as t h e n o t i o n a l
timeframe f o r c o m p l e t i o n o f n e g o t i a t i o n s .
We have no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e B r i t i s h a r e going t o withdraw t h e
o f f e r i n t h e wake o f t h e murders, though B l a i r d i d announce t h a t
the B r i t i s h have c a l l e d o f f t h e meeting w i t h Sinn Fein scheduled
f o r t h i s week. B l a i r w i l l a l s o p r o b a b l y postpone t h e p u b l i c
announcement o f t h e elements o f t h e o f f e r .
There a r e no a t t r a c t i v e choices i n t h e wake o f t h e murders: i f
the B r i t i s h withdraw t h e i r o f f e r , v i o l e n c e c o u l d w i l l r e t u r n t o
the l e v e l s c f t h e "The T r o u b l e s " w i t h l i t t l e p r o s p e c t o f a
p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n i f t o f o r s e v e r a l y e a r s . Nonetheless, t h e
B r i t i s h have made c l e a r t h a t i f no c e a s e f i r e i s d e c l a r e d i n t h e
r e a s o n a b l y near f u t u r e (perhaps by t h i s f a l l ) t h e y w i l l t r y t o
move t h e peace process f o r w a r d w i t h o u t Sinn F e i n . Meanwhile,
t?he o n l y a l t e r n a t i v e i s t o c o n t i n u e t o t r y t o p u t t o g e t h e r a
deal f o r a c e a s e - f i r e . Assuming t h e B r i t i s h leave t h e i r o f f e r on
the t a b l e , we w i l l be w o r k i n g on a s t r a t e g y t o s u p p o r t them and
the I r i s h a t t h i s c r u c i a l t i m e . P u b l i c l y t i n c . P u b l i c l y , we w i l l
want t o t a k e a h i g h p r o f i l e t o underscore your c o n t i n u e d p e r s o n a l
o p p o s i t i o n t o v i o l e n c e and commitment t o peace and
reconciliation,
p a r t i c u l a r l y as t h e worst o f t h e marching season
approaches i n e a r l y J u l y .
Jim S t e i n b e r g had planned t o t a l k t o Adams June 16 t o g e t h i s
i n i t i a l r e a c t i o n t o t h e B r i t i s h o f f e r , b u t d i d n o t do so because
of t h e murders. However, t h e l o c a l Sinn Fein r e p r e s e n t a t i v e d i d
c a l l an NSC s t a f f member w i t h a message from Adams t h a t he does
not i n t e n d t o be " d i s t r a c t e d " by today's a t t a c k from t h e business,
of g e t t i n g a p o l i t i c a l process going and t h a t we s h o u l d read
n o t h i n g i n t o t h e a t t a c k beyond t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n o f t h e IRA
campaign. We b e l i e v e t h e purpose o f t h e message was t o t e l l us
t h a t t h e a t t a c k i s n o t any k i n d o f response t o t h e B r i t i s h o f f e r .
The B r i t i s h a l r e a d y r e a l i z e t h i s , as t h e y know t h a t such a t t a c k s
are p l a n n e d w e l l i n advance, b u t we recommend t h a t you l e t B l a i r
know t h a t we heard t h i s from Adams.
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve t h e message t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r a t Tab A.
Approve
•CQMJf-lbLiN'l I A L
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�•CONriDCHTIAL
33
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab
Tab
Tab
Tab
A
B
C
D
Reply t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Statement on Murders i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d
Text o f B r i t i s h O f f e r t o Sinn Fein
Incoming Message
C
-CONFI DEMT IAL
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C
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�COHriDDNTIAtr
4175
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGER
SUBJECT:
L e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r on N o r t h e r n
Ireland
Purpose
To express condolences on t h e deaths o f t h e two policemen who
were murdered by t h e IRA June 16 and t o pass on a message from
Sinn F e i n .
Background
On June 16, two policemen w a l k i n g a beat were shot and k i l l e d i n
the N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d town o f Lurgan.
The IRA claimed
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e a t t a c k w i t h i n hours. B l a i r and B r u t o n
(who i s s t i l l Taoiseach u n t i l June 26) were b o t h i n Amsterdam f o r
the EU'Summit; b o t h i s s u e d s t r o n g statements condemning t h e
murders. Future Taoiseach B e r t i e Ahern i s s u e d a p a s s i o n a t e
statement, c l e a r l y i n t e n d e d t o disabuse r e p u b l i c a n s o f t h e n o t i o n
t h a t a Fianna F a i l prime m i n i s t e r w i l l be s o f t on v i o l e n c e .
Senator Kennedy i s s u e d h i s s t r o n g e s t d e n u n c i a t i o n y e t o f t h e
r e p u b l i c a n t a c t i c o f seeking t o combine v i o l e n c e w i t h t h e
d e m o c r a t i c process.
The statement we i s s u e d i n your name i s a t
Tab B.
F o l l o w i n g up on B l a i r ' s request t o you, Jim S t e i n b e r g made c l e a r
t o Adams l a s t week your concern t h a t t h e v i o l e n c e i n N o r t h e r n
I r e l a n d was t h r e a t e n i n g t h e prospects f o r g e t t i n g Sinn Fein i n t o
t a l k s . We a l s o i s s u e d a statement by t h e press s e c r e t a r y w a r n i n g
a g a i n s t v i o l e n c e a t t h i s j u n c t u r e . While t h e a t t a c k was p r o b a b l y
planned w e l l b e f o r e our message was g i v e n , nonetheless t h e IRA
c a r r i e d o u t t h e murder o f t h e policemen i n t h e face o f c l e a r
warnings from t h e B r i t i s h and from us.
The B r i t i s h Government had passed t o Sinn Fein on June 13 i t s
o f f e r f o r Sinn Fein e n t r y i n t o t h e B e l f a s t t a l k s on t h e b a s i s o f
an u n e q u i v o c a l c e a s e f i r e . The t e x t (Tab C) r e f l e c t e d s u g g e s t i o n s
from us and from t h e I r i s h Government. Assuming t h a t t h e B r i t i s h
and I r i s h governments can reach a more s p e c i f i c agreement on how
COMF1 DENT-£ftj=r
Reason: 1.5b
D e c l a s s i f y On:
6/16/07
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CITN LBAY P O O O Y
LNO IRR H T C P
�CITN L B A Y P O O O Y
LNO I R R H T C P
CONFIDENTIAh
t o handle decommissioning i n t h e t a l k s process, t h i s i s t h e best
o f f e r Sinn Fein can expect from t h e B r i t i s h .
I t would a l l o w them
i n t o t a l k s w i t h i n s i x weeks o f t h e d e c l a r a t i o n o f a m e a n i n g f u l
c e a s e f i r e ; i t s t a t e s t h a t decommissioning w i l l n o t be a l l o w e d t o
d e l a y s u b s t a n t i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s ; promises a d d i t i o n a l c o n f i d e n c e b u i l d i n g measures; and s e t s May 1998 as t h e n o t i o n a l timeframe
for completion of negotiations.
We have no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e B r i t i s h are going t o w i t h d r a w t h e
o f f e r i n t h e wake o f t h e murders, though B l a i r d i d announce t h a t
the B r i t i s h have c a l l e d o f f t h e meeting w i t h Sinn Fein scheduled
f o r t h i s week. B l a i r w i l l a l s o p r o b a b l y postpone t h e p u b l i c
announcement o f t h e elements o f t h e o f f e r .
There a r e no a t t r a c t i v e choices i n t h e wake o f t h e murders: i f
the B r i t i s h withdraw t h e i r o f f e r , v i o l e n c e c o u l d r e t u r n t o t h e
l e v e l s o f t h e "The T r o u b l e s " w i t h l i t t l e p r o s p e c t o f a p o l i t i c a l
s o l u t i o n f o r s e v e r a l years. Nonetheless, t h e B r i t i s h have made
c l e a r t h a t i f no c e a s e f i r e i s d e c l a r e d i n t h e reasonably near
f u t u r e ( p r r h n p n b y t h i n f n l l ) t h r y w i l l t r y tc move t h e peace
process f o r w a r d w i t h o u t Sinn Fein. Meanwhile, t h e o n l y
a l t e r n a t i v e i s t o continue t o t r y t o put together a deal f o r a
c e a s e f i r e . Assuming t h e B r i t i s h leave t h e i r o f f e r on t h e t a b l e ,
we w i l l be w o r k i n g on a s t r a t e g y t o support them and t h e I r i s h a t
t h i s c r u c i a l t i m e . P u b l i c l y , we w i l l want t o take a h i g h p r o f i l e
t o underscore your continusra p e r s o n a l o p p o s i t i o n t o v i o l e n c e and
commitment t o peace and r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y as t h e
worst o f t h e marching season approaches i n e a r l y J u l y .
Jim Sfcoinborflp had planned to talk to Adams June 16 to get his
initial reaction to the British offer, but did not do so because
of the murders. However, the local Sinn Fein representative did
call an NSC staff member with a message from Adams that he does
not intend to be "distracted" by today's attack from the business
of getting a political process going and that we should read
nothing into the attack beyond the continuation of the IRA
campaign^ ^BTn . bn ] i
the purpose of the message was to tell us
that the attack is not any kind of response to the British offer.*
The British already realize this, as they know that such attacks^
are planned well in advance, but we recommend that you let Blair
know that we heard this from Adams. /L
RECOfoM^NDATION
That you
CONFIDENTIAL
the
mes^ctge t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r a t Tab A.
�COMF1DENTIAL
3
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Attachments
Tab A Reply t o Prime Minister B l a i r
Tab B Statement on Murders i n Northern I r e l a n d
Tab C Text of B r i t i s h Offer to Sinn Fein
Tab D Incoming Message
CONFIDENTIAL
�CONn DENT I A I T
4175
THE WHITE HOUSE
W A S H I N GTO N
17 .^.'f'J-3
June 17, 1997
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE P E DENT
R'
KBH
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGEI^/
SUBJECT:
L e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r on Northern I r e l a n d
Purpose
To express condolences on the deaths of the two policemen who
were murdered by the IRA June 16 and t o pass on a message from
Sinn Fein.
Background
On June 16, two policemen walking a beat were shot and k i l l e d i n
the Northern I r e l a n d town o f Lurgan. The IRA claimed
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the attack w i t h i n hours. B l a i r and Bruton
(who i s s t i l l Taoiseach u n t i l June 26) were both i n Amsterdam f o r
the EU Summit; both issued strong statements condemning the
murders. Future Taoiseach B e r t i e Ahern issued a passionate
statement, c l e a r l y intended t o disabuse republicans o f the n o t i o n
that a Fianna F a i l prime m i n i s t e r w i l l be s o f t on v i o l e n c e .
Senator Kennedy issued h i s strongest denunciation yet of the
republican t a c t i c o f seeking t o combine violence w i t h the
democratic process. The statement we issued i n your name i s a t
Tab B.
Following up on B l a i r ' s request t o you, Jim Steinberg made clear
to Adams l a s t week your concern t h a t the violence i n Northern
I r e l a n d was threatening the prospects f o r g e t t i n g Sinn Fein i n t o
t a l k s . We also issued a statement by the press secretary warning
against violence a t t h i s juncture. While the a t t a c k was probably
planned w e l l before our message was given, nonetheless the IRA
c a r r i e d out the murder of the policemen i n the face o f clear
warnings from the B r i t i s h and from us.
The B r i t i s h Government had passed t o Sinn Fein on June 13 i t s
o f f e r f o r Sinn Fein entry i n t o the Belfast t a l k s on the basis o f
an unequivocal ceasefire. The t e x t (Tab C) r e f l e c t e d suggestions
from us and from the I r i s h Government. Assuming t h a t the B r i t i s h
and I r i s h governments can reach a more s p e c i f i c agreement on how
•CONFI DENT I Air
Reason: 1.5b
D e c l a s s i f y On:
cc: Vice President
Chief- of S t a f f
6/16/07
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�COMF1DEMTIAL
to handle decommissioning i n t h e t a l k s process, t h i s i s t h e best
o f f e r Sinn Fein can expect from t h e B r i t i s h .
I t would a l l o w them
i n t o t a l k s w i t h i n s i x weeks o f t h e d e c l a r a t i o n o f a m e a n i n g f u l
c e a s e f i r e ; i t s t a t e s t h a t decommissioning w i l l n o t be a l l o w e d t o
d e l a y s u b s t a n t i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s ; promises a d d i t i o n a l c o n f i d e n c e b u i l d i n g measures; and s e t s May 1998 as t h e n o t i o n a l timeframe
for completion of negotiations.
We have no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e B r i t i s h a r e going t o withdraw t h e
o f f e r i n t h e wake o f t h e murders, though B l a i r d i d announce t h a t
the B r i t i s h have c a l l e d o f f t h e meeting w i t h Sinn Fein scheduled
f o r t h i s week. B l a i r w i l l a l s o p r o b a b l y postpone t h e p u b l i c
announcement o f t h e elements o f t h e o f f e r .
There a r e no a t t r a c t i v e choices i n t h e wake o f t h e murders: i f
the B r i t i s h withdraw t h e i r o f f e r , v i o l e n c e c o u l d r e t u r n t o t h e
l e v e l s o f t h e "The T r o u b l e s " w i t h l i t t l e p r o s p e c t o f a p o l i t i c a l
s o l u t i o n f o r s e v e r a l years. Nonetheless, t h e B r i t i s h have made
c l e a r t h a t i f no c e a s e f i r e i s d e c l a r e d i n t h e r e a s o n a b l y near
f u t u r e t h e y w i l l t r y t o move t h e peace process f o r w a r d w i t h o u t
Sinn Fein ( p r o b a b l y i n September). Meanwhile, t h e o n l y
a l t e r n a t i v e i s t o continue t o t r y t o put together a deal f o r a
c e a s e f i r e . Assuming t h e B r i t i s h leave t h e i r o f f e r on t h e t a b l e ,
we w i l l be w o r k i n g on a s t r a t e g y t o support them and t h e I r i s h a t
t h i s c r u c i a l t i m e . P u b l i c l y , we w i l l want t o take a h i g h p r o f i l e
to underscore your c o n t i n u e d p e r s o n a l o p p o s i t i o n t o v i o l e n c e and
commitment t o peace and r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y as t h e
w o r s t o f t h e marching season approaches i n e a r l y J u l y .
Jim had planned t o t a l k t o Adams June 16 t o g e t h i s i n i t i a l
r e a c t i o n t o t h e B r i t i s h o f f e r , b u t d i d n o t do so because o f t h e
murders. However, t h e l o c a l Sinn Fein r e p r e s e n t a t i v e d i d c a l l an
NSC s t a f f member w i t h a message from Adams t h a t he does n o t
i n t e n d t o be " d i s t r a c t e d " by today's a t t a c k from t h e business o f
g e t t i n g a p o l i t i c a l process going and t h a t we s h o u l d r e a d n o t h i n g
i n t o t h e a t t a c k ; t h e purpose o f t h e message was t o t e l l us t h a t
the a t t a c k i s n o t any k i n d o f response t o t h e B r i t i s h o f f e r , b u t
a c o n t i n u a t i o n o f t h e ongoing campaign a g a i n s t t h e B r i t i s h .
The
B r i t i s h a l r e a d y r e a l i z e t h i s , as t h e y know t h a t such a t t a c k s are
planned w e l l i n advance, b u t we recommend t h a t you l e t B l a i r know
what we heard from Adams. Adams' message i s , o f course,
d i s i n g e n u o u s s i n c e Monday's a t t a c k c o u l d presumably have been
c a l l e d o f f i f t h e IRA l e a d e r s h i p had wanted t o do so. From t h e
r e p u b l i c a n s ' warped p e r s p e c t i v e , t h e v i o l e n c e w i l l c o n t i n u e
unless an a c t u a l d e a l i s reached on a c e a s e f i r e . They may a l s o
be under t h e m i s t a k e n i m p r e s s i o n t h a t c o n t i n u e d v i o l e n c e w i l l
soften the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n .
A t t a c h e d a t Tab A i s t h e r e p l y t o B l a i r ' s message t h a t I
a u t h o r i z e d on your b e h a l f .
C 0 1 i r i D E
"
T I A L
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�-
CONriDENTIAL
Attachments
Tab A Reply t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Tab B Statement on Murders i n Northern I r e l a n d
Tab C Text of B r i t i s h Offer to Sinn Fein
Tab D Incoming Message
CONFIDENTIAL
C N O LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
UTN
�PREC: .
IMMEDIATE
CLASS:
FROM:
THE WHITE HOUSE
TO:
CONFIDENTIAL
CABINET OFFICE LONDON
SUBJECT: MESSAGE F O THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER
RM
(BEGIN TEXT)
DEAR TONY:
LIKE YOU, I AM OUTRAGED AND DEEPLY SADDENED BY THE IRA'S VICIOUS
MURDER OF THE T O POLICEMEN IN NORTHERN IRELAND. OUR HEARTS G
W
O
OUT TO THEIR YOUNG FAMILIES.
I ISSUED A STRONG STATEMENT THAT W S IN STEP WITH WHAT YOU, JOHN
A
BRUTON AND BERTIE AHERN ARE ALL SAYING. SENATOR KENNEDY HAS ALSO
ISSUED A VERY FORCEFUL STATEMENT. SINN FEIN CANNOT MISS THE
MESSAGE BUT IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER IT WILL HAVE ANY
IMPACT.
I ALSO WANTED TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER LAST WEEK FORWARDING
THE DRAFT TEXT OF YOUR GOVERNMENT'S OFFER TO SINN FEIN.
FOLLOWING OUR PHONE CALL, MY DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR,
JIM STEINBERG, CONTACTED ADAMS TO PASS ON MY DEEP CONCERN ABOUT
THE CONTINUED VIOLENCE, AND TO URGE A FORTHCOMING RESPONSE TO
YOUR EFFORTS. W HAD PLANNED TO FOLLOW UP ON MONDAY, BUT PUT OFF
E
THE CALL FOLLOWING THE MURDERS. BUT SINN FEIN PASSED A MESSAGE
TO US; THE ESSENCE OF WHICH WAS THAT THE ATTACK W S NOT IN
A
RESPONSE TO YOUR PROPOSAL, BUT RATHER A CONTINUATION OF THE IRA'S
CAMPAIGN. WHILE I DO NOT PLACE CONFIDENCE IN THEIR G O FAITH, I
OD
WANTED TO PASS THAT ON TO YOU.
SANDY BERGER IS PREPARED TO W R WITH YOUR OFFICIALS AND WITH THE
OK
IRISH GOVERNMENT TO SEE WHAT CAN BE DONE TO KEEP THE PEACE
PROCESS ON TRACK IN SPITE OF THIS TERRIBLE CRIME. W WILL HAVE
E
THE CHANCE TO TALK PERSONALLY IN DENVER. I LOOK FORWARD TO
SEEING YOUR THERE.
SINCERELY,
BILL
(END TEXT)
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
3/fc/iS rtBM
�IMMEDIATE
CONriDCNTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
C NO LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
UT N
PAGE 01 OF 02
PRT: BASS BERGER BRADEN COMM DAVIES FUERTH HELWEG KERRICK RICEE SIT
SODERBERG STEINBERG
SIT: COQ FICKLIN FRIEDRICH MILLISON PETERS SUM2 VERSHBOW
SIT: NSC
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> CONFIDENTI-AL
<DTG> 1723 36Z JUN 97
PM WHITE HOUSE
TO CABINET OFFICE
INFO ////
• C O N F I D E N T I A L
QQQQ
V I A CABINET CHANNELS
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER
BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR TONY:
LIKE YOU, I AM OUTRAGED AND DEEPLY SADDENED BY THE IRA'S
VICIOUS MURDER OF THE TWO POLICEMEN I N NORTHERN IRELAND.
OUR HEARTS GO OUT TO THEIR YOUNG FAMILIES.
I ISSUED A STRONG STATEMENT THAT WAS I N STEP WITH WHAT YOU,
JOHN BRUTON AND BERTIE AHERN ARE ALL SAYING. SENATOR
KENNEDY HAS ALSO ISSUED A VERY FORCEFUL STATEMENT. SINN FEIN
CANNOT MISS THE MESSAGE BUT I T REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER I T
WILL HAVE ANY IMPACT.
I ALSO WANTED TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER LAST WEEK
FORWARDING THE DRAFT TEXT OF YOUR GOVERNMENT'S OFFER TO SINN
FEIN. FOLLOWING OUR PHONE CALL, MY DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISOR, J I M STEINBERG, CONTACTED ADAMS TO PASS ON MY DEEP
CONCERN ABOUT THE CONTINUED VIOLENCE, AND TO URGE A
FORTHCOMING RESPONSE TO YOUR EFFORTS. WE HAD PLANNED TO
FOLLOW UP ON MONDAY, BUT PUT OFF THE CALL FOLLOWING THE
MURDERS. BUT SINN FEIN PASSED A MESSAGE TO US; THE ESSENCE OF
WHICH WAS THAT THE ATTACK WAS NOT I N RESPONSE TO YOUR
PROPOSAL, BUT RATHER A CONTINUATION OF THE IRA'S CAMPAIGN.
WHILE I DO NOT PLACE CONFIDENCE I N THEIR GOOD FAITH, I WANTED
TO PASS THAT ON TO YOU.
SANDY BERGER I S PREPARED TO WORK WITH YOUR OFFICIALS AND
WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT TO SEE WHAT CAN BE DONE TO KEEP THE
PEACE PROCESS ON TRACK I N SPITE OF THIS TERRIBLE CRIME. WE WILL
HAVE THE CHANCE TO TALK PERSONALLY I N DENVER. I LOOK
FORWARD TO SEEING YOUR THERE.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
SINCERELY,
BILL
CONFIDCNTIAL
�IMMEDIATE
-GONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
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CONFIDENTIAL
�bOlNl'WElM HAL - PERSONAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
IO DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA
31 July 1997
THE PRIME MINISTER
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
^o\S- OV72.- n
)
When we spoke on the telephone on Sunday, I promised to send you some
more specific thoughts on Northern Ireland and areas where you may be able to
help.
As we agreed, the renewed IRA ceasefire offers a new opportunity to
move to a lasting political settlement and the lasting peace which the people of
Northern Ireland are so desperate to see. Halting violence is a very welcome
move by the republicans. As the word suggests, a ceasefire is not of course the
same as peace. We must all work very hard to turn what may be currently no
more than a tactical move by the republican movement into a permanent
abandonment of violence and commitment to exclusively peaceful and democratic
means. Nothing else will do in the end. This means keeping up the pressure on
Sinn Fein to move away from a twin-track strategy of politics and violence to
politics alone. Your influence may be very important here. I hope your
response to Sinn Fein over the next few months will be carefully graduated to
reflect real progress in consolidating the ceasefire and making it permanent.
It is the issue of permanence which gives the vexed question of the
decommissioning of illegally held arms its importance, particularly in Unionist
�-CONFIDENTIAL - PERSONAL
2
- •
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O V
HTCP
eyes but also in our own. Of course decommissioned arms could be replaced,
even if the decommissioning process were complete. But readiness to
decommission implies readiness to give up violence. That is why Sinn Fein
statements that the IRA will not give up a single weapon cause such disquiet, and
are so unhelpful in terms of keeping the Ulster Unionists tied in to the multi-party
process.
We spoke about how you might be able to help influence David Trimble.
As I said, I think it is useful if the Administration keeps in close touch with him,
to show that his effort to stay in the process is both important and appreciated,
and to reinforce that you are even-handed in dealings with both communities (the
Unionists will obviously be watching your contacts with Sinn Fein very closely).
Anything you can say to show understanding of the Ulster Unionist concerns
about decommissioning would also be helpful. I hope that we and the Irish
Government may be able to say a little more in due course about our own desire
to see at least some actual decommissioning during negotiations, in accordance
with George Mitchell's proposals. This may be very important in influencing
David Trimble towards staying in the talks.
I also mentioned to you my desire to do more to harness the strong desire
of the people of Northern Ireland for a settlement, by showing them that this is
now a real prospect with high-level international support. You may be able to
play a key role in this at the right moment, when substantive talks are well under
way. I hope we can be in touch about this in the autumn.
�•GONFIDENTIAL - PERSONAL
-3CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
I am absolutely determined to make progress soon on the substance of the
Northern Ireland issue. That is why I have set a timetable of September-May for
a settlement to come out of negotiations. This is an arbitrary target, but I believe
it can be achieved if all concerned are prepared to put aside old enmities and
prejudices. Our aim must be to create conditions where they can most easily do
so.
(/
The President of the United States of America
�O LIBRARY P O O O Y
N
HTCP
IO DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA
THE PRIME MINISTER
2 October 1997
I am pleased to say that in the past couple of weeks we have made progress
in Northern Ireland. As you will have heard, Sinn Fein have joined the talks and
sworn their commitment to the Mitchell principles; we have kept the Ulster
Unionists in play - though only just; we succeeded in finding a procedural way
through the decommissioning problem for now and ultimately got agreement to
move, at last, into the substantive talks.
This is all good news. Ian Paisley's Democratic Unionists and one of the
other smaller Unionist parties have withdrawn from the discussions but otherwise
the pieces are now in place for us to press on with the real negotiations. As
always, part of the credit must go to George Mitchell and the other independent
chairmen who have skilfully helped to guide the parties round the obstacles.
I also want you to know how grateful I am to you for providing
Ambassador Donald Johns on as a member of the Independent International
Commission on Decommissioning, which was formally established on
24 September, and to Ambassador Johnson for agreeing to take on this
challenging role. The Commission is now ready to commence work on
decommissioning alongside the substantive negotiations. It marks an important
�LINTON LIBRARY P C P
H OY
-2-
step in our objective to bring about an enduring political settlement in Northern
Ireland by May next year. As before, we have found we can rely on you to give
generous and speedy assistance. I am most grateful.
Both communities will need constant encouragement to make the most of
the opportunity so painstakingly created. I know I can look to you for help over
this. I look forward to staying in close touch.
/
J
(
The President of the United States of America
�CONriDCNTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL
57 07 REDO 4
W A S H I N G T O N , D.C. 2 0 5 0 4
October 2, 1997
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER
THROUGH:
DONALD K. BANDLER fP)
FROM:
LAWRENCE E. BUTLER '• j
SUBJECT:
P r e s i d e n t i a l L e t t e r t o Tony B l a i r , Prime M i n i s t e r
of t h e U n i t e d Kingdom
The P r e s i d e n t and B l a i r have kept i n r e g u l a r touch on N o r t h e r n
I r e l a n d and o t h e r issues. There have been v e r y s i g n i f i c a n t
developments i n B e l f a s t , t h e s u b j e c t o f a B l a i r l e t t e r t o t h e
P r e s i d e n t dated October 2. P r i o r t o t h a t , t h e P r e s i d e n t c a l l e d
the Prime M i n i s t e r September 1. E a r l i e r , B l a i r wrote t o t h e
P r e s i d e n t f o l l o w i n g t h e i r phone c o n v e r s a t i o n J u l y 27 conveying
h i s thoughts on t h e Northern I r e l a n d peace process, asking t h a t
we f i n d ways t o support t h e U n i o n i s t s . I t would be a p p r o p r i a t e ,
now t h a t t h e t a l k s are due t o s t a r t and Trimble w i l l see t h e
P r e s i d e n t and you October 7, f o r t h e P r e s i d e n t t o send a
c o n g r a t u l a t o r y l e t t e r . Attached a t Tab I f o r your approval i s
your memorandum t o t h e President f o r w a r d i n g a d r a f t message t o
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r i n b o t h signed o r i g i n a l (TaD A) and cable
format (Tab B ) .
RECOMMENDATION
That you s i g n t h e memo t o t h e President a t Tab I .
Attachments
Tab I Memo
Tab A
Tab B
Tab C
t o the President
L e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Cable v e r s i o n o f l e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Incoming Correspondence
•CONFI DEN^Ma
Reason: 1.5d
D e c l a s s i f y On:
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
09/30/07
CITN LBAY POOOY
LNO IRR HTCP
3/{p/i5" K 8 H
�COMF1DENTIAL
5707
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGER
SUBJECT:
L e t t e r t o B r i t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r Tony B l a i r
Purpose
To c o n g r a t u l a t e Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r on recent developments i n
Northern I r e l a n d .
Background
You spoke w i t h B l a i r October 9 b r i e f l y on N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d .
B l a i r w r o t e you October 2 w i t h an update. W i t h t h e s u b s t a n t i v e
t a l k s underway, i t i s w o r t h c o n g r a t u l a t i n g B l a i r f o r t h e
breakthroughs i n B e l f a s t which have made t h i s p o s s i b l e . E a r l i e r
i n t h e summer he conveyed h i s impressions on t h e process ( l e t t e r
a t t a c h e d a t Tab C), and asked t h a t you look f o r ways t o support
David T r i m b l e , who you d i d October 7. A t t a c h e d a t Tab A i s your
l e t t e r on these developments.
RECOMMENDATION
That you s i g n t h e l e t t e r t o Tony B l a i r a t Tab A.
Attachments
Tab A L e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Tab B Cable V e r s i o n o f L e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Tab C Incoming correspondence
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
SI\*llS KBH
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason:
1.5(b)
D e c l a s s i f y On:
9/30/07
cc: Vice President
Chief o f S t a f f
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�)
HOUTINE
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
"? t 7 ^
PAGE 01 OF 02
PRT: BERGER COSGRIFF DAVIES FUERTH HELWEG KERRICK MALLEY RI£EE SIT
SeBERBfiRG STEINBERG
SIT: BANDLER FICKLIN POOLE RIEDEL SUM2
SIT: HOTLINE_IN
<PREC> ROUTINE
<CLAS> UUNtIDENTIAL" <DTG> 082245Z NOV 97
FM CABINET OFFICE
TO-WHITE HOUSE
INFO / / / /
C O W F I D E M T 1 A L VIA CABINET CHANNELS
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
1.0\?> - O ^ T . - H
FM THE PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
ONCE MORE, WE FACE A TEST OF OUR RESOLVE OVER IRAQ AND THE
DANGERS POSED BY THE BEHAVIOUR OF SADDAM HUSSEIN. I KNOW THIS
WILL BE OF GREAT CONCERN TO YOU, AS I T I S TO ME.
I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT, AS I N THE PAST, WE MUST STAND ABSOLUTELY
FIRM AND ABSOLUTELY TOGETHER. THAT IS THE ONLY WAY WE CAN
ACHIEVE THE VITAL OBJECTIVE OF UNSCOM RESUMING ITS OPERATIONS
AND COMPLETING ITS WORK I N AN UNFETTERED WAY. CLEARLY OUR
PREFERENCE MUST BE FOR A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION I F ONE CAN BE
FOUND. EQUALLY, I N THE LAST RESORT, WE MUST BE PREPARED TO
CONTEMPLATE OTHER MEANS.
WE WILL FACE A SIGNIFICANT TEST I N THE SECURITY COUNCIL I N
THE NEXT FEW DAYS. THE UNITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY,
AND PARTICULARLY THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, I S ESSENTIAL I F WE
ARE TO SEND THE RIGHT MESSAGE TO SADDAM. BUT WE MUST AT THE SAME
TIME WORK TOGETHER TO ENSURE THAT THIS MESSAGE I S ROBUST ENOUGH
TO ACHIEVE THE DESIRED RESULT, WHILE ALLOWING FOR THE POSSIBILITY
OF THE EVENTUAL LIFTING OF SANCTIONS ONCE UNSCOM HAS FULLY AND
SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED ITS TASK. THAT WILL NOT BE AN EASY
BALANCE TO STRIKE, GIVEN THE RELUCTANCE OF SOME TO CONTEMPLATE
FURTHER ACTION AGAINST IRAQ.
I AM PARTICULARLY CONSCIOUS OF THIS FOLLOWING MY DISCUSSIONS AT
THE END OF LAST WEEK WITH JACQUES CHIRAC. AS YOU WILL KNOW,
HE HAS STRONG PERSONAL DOUBTS ABOUT OUR APPROACH TO SADDAM HUSSEIN.
SO WE WILL HAVE TO WORK VERY HARD TO KEEP THE FRENCH WITH US,
NOT TO MENTION THE RUSSIANS. I N THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WE MUST
BOTH WORK VERY CLOSELY WITH THEM, AS FAR AS WE CAN, TO ENSURE
THERE I S NO POSSIBILITY OF MISUNDERSTANDING OR DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
US BECAUSE OF ALLEGED LACK OF CONSULTATION.
I KNOW OUR PEOPLE ARE I N VERY CLOSE TOUCH ABOUT ALL THIS ALREADY,
BUT I WANTED YOU TO KNOW PERSONALLY THE STRENGTH OF MY SUPPORT FOR
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�ROUTINE
CONriDENTIALWHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 02 OF 02
YOU I N THE PRESENT SITUATION. I WILL BE MAKING THIS VERY CLEAR I N A
SPEECH ON MONDAY. I F WE NEED TO TALK BEFORE THEN, I WILL OF COURSE
BE HAPPY TO DO SO.
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�7717
P o i n t s f o r - g f e g i d c a L i a l r ^ l l t o /PM^Tony B l a i r
_ii^r47^
•
A p p r e c i a t e v e r y much t h e message you sent me e a r l i e r t h i s
week. We share views on t h e t h r e a t I r a q poses w i t h i t s l a t e s t
a t t e m p t t o undermine UNSCOM, and how r e s o l u t e we must be.
Firmness i s e s s e n t i a l .
•
I r a q ' s l a t e s t demand i s a v e r y s e r i o u s c h a l l e n g e t o t h e UN,
the UN S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , and t h e s e c u r i t y o f t h e P e r s i a n G u l f .
•
Since Saddam c h a l l e n g e d us on October 29, we have t r i e d t o
work t h r o u g h d i p l o m a t i c means t o respond.
Your and n r ^ ^ ^ ^
c o u n t r i e s ' s u c c e s s f u l e f f o r t s i n New York y e s t e r d a y ^ g e t - t t e a
c l e a r statement from t h e C o u n c i l about t h e need f o r I r a q t o
s t e p back.
•
Saddam's announcement today t o expel t h e Americans i s a c l e a r
r e p u d i a t i o n o f the S e c u r i t y Council's w i l l .
We s u p p o r t
Ambassador B u t l e r ' s d e c i s i o n t o withdraw UNSCOM p e r s o n n e l from
Iraq.
•
We w i l l c o n t i n u e t o seek d i p l o m a t i c means t o t u r n back I r a q ' s
c h a l l e n g e . S e c r e t a r y A l b r i g h t w i l l be i n London tomorrow, and
she w i l l l a y o u t t o Robin Cooke our ideas on how t o move
f o r w a r d t o g e t h e r on t h i s c h a l l e n g e , and how t o work t o g e t h e r
w i t h t h e French and Russians.
•
Tony, I have r e a l concerns t h a t diplomacy w i l l n o t be
sufficient.
I w i l l need you t o j o i n w i t h me should we need t o
use m i l i t a r y f o r c e .
•
Once t h e UNSCOM s t a f f e r s are o u t o f I r a q tomorrow, I p l a n t o
announce t h e i n c r e a s e o f U.S. m i l i t a r y assets i n t h e G u l f
region.
I n p a r t i c u l a r , t h i s means movement o f t h e a i r c r a f t
c a r r i e r USS George Washington t o t h e G u l f .
•
We remain committed t o f l y i n g t h e U-2 f l i g h t i n s u p p o r t UNSCOM
t h i s weekend, and p e r i o d i c a l l y t h e r e a f t e r .
•
I want us t o c o n s u l t c l o s e l y d u r i n g t h i s . p e r i o d . As ever, I
t a k e s t r e n g t h from t h e c l o s e w o r k i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p we have. I
know t h a t I can count on you.
DECLASSIFIED
r
.
( l i ^ ^ . I-S.
PER E.O. 13526
CLINTON LB A Y P O O O Y
IRR HTCP
S / L , / ^ KBH
�-eemfclbENllAL
7717
THE WHITE HOUSE
. '97 NOU 14 PMb-3b
f
WASHINGTON
November 14, 1997
TELEPHONE CALL TO
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
DATE F r i d a y , November 14, 1997
LOCATION Oval O f f i c e
TIME TBD
FROM: SAMUEL R. BERGER ( M
I.
PURPOSE
Place phone c a l l t o B r i t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r t o respond
t o h i s November 8 l e t t e r (Tab B) on t h e I r a q c h a l l e n g e , t o
a d v i s e him o f our deployment o f a d d i t i o n a l f o r c e s t o t h e
P e r s i a n G u l f and t o ask t h a t he be w i t h us as we move
forward.
II.
BACKGROUND
B l a i r ' s l e t t e r was w r i t t e n b e f o r e t h e UN S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l
r e s o l u t i o n was passed, and p r i o r t o Thursday's demand t h a t
UNSCOM remove a l l Americans i m m e d i a t e l y . As i n p a s t
c o n f r o n t a t i o n s w i t h I r a q , t h e B r i t i s h have been b o t h
r e s o l u t e and d e s i r o u s o f f u l l c o n s u l t a t i o n . Y o u ' l l want t o
e x p l a i n our planned movement o f t h e USS George Washington
t o t h e r e g i o n , and press f o r h i s support i f and when we
need t o b u i l d t h e case f o r use o f f o r c e . You can commit t o
c l o s e s t c o n s u l t a t i o n s as t h i s c r i s i s u n f o l d s .
Attachments
Tab A
P o i n t s t o be Made
Tab B
Incoming Cable
PER E.0.13526
CONFIDENT tA=L-.
Reason:
1.5 (d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 11/13/07
S/b/'S" K B H
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
i 0 r
�rONFIDEMTIATr
7717
P o i n t s f o r C a l l t o Prime M i n i s t e r Tony B l a i r
•
A p p r e c i a t e v e r y much t h e message you sent me e a r l i e r t h i s
week. We share views on t h e t h r e a t I r a q poses w i t h i t s l a t e s t
a t t e m p t t o undermine UNSCOM, and how r e s o l u t e we must be.
•
Firmness i s e s s e n t i a l .
to Robin Cook.
•
I r a q ' s l a t e s t demand i s a v e r y s e r i o u s c h a l l e n g e t o t h e UN,
the UN S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , and t h e s e c u r i t y o f t h e P e r s i a n G u l f .
•
Since Saddam c h a l l e n g e d us on October 29, we have t r i e d t o
work t h r o u g h d i p l o m a t i c means t o respond.
Your and my
c o u n t r i e s ' s u c c e s s f u l e f f o r t s i n New York on t h e r e s o l u t i o n
and on t h e P r e s i d e n t i a l statement produced c l e a r statements
from t h e C o u n c i l about t h e need f o r I r a q t o s t e p back.
•
Saddam's e x p u l s i o n o f t h e Americans i s a c l e a r r e p u d i a t i o n o f
the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l ' s w i l l . We s u p p o r t Ambassador B u t l e r ' s
d e c i s i o n t o w i t h d r a w UNSCOM p e r s o n n e l from I r a q .
•
Madeleine l a i d o u t t o Robin Cook our d i p l o m a t i c s t r a t e g y .
Know t h a t Madeleine made these p o i n t s
•
F i r s t , m a i n t a i n UNSC u n i t y .
•
Second, press French and Russians t o use a l l o f t h e i r
l e v e r a g e t o g e t I r a q t o comply; i f t h e y f a i l , c h a l l e n g e
them t o j o i n us i n r a t c h e t i n g up p r e s s u r e .
•
F i n a l l y , your and my governments should d i s c u s s q u i e t l y
some c r e a t i v e means t o g i v e I r a q some " l i g h t a t t h e end o f
the t u n n e l " t h a t gets UNSCOM back o p e r a t i n g and c o n t i n u e s
our a b i l i t y t o c o n t a i n I r a q .
•
Tony, I have r e a l concerns t h a t diplomacy w i l l n o t be
sufficient.
I w i l l need you t o j o i n w i t h me s h o u l d we need t o
use m i l i t a r y f o r c e .
•
I announced y e s t e r d a y t h e movement o f t h e a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r USS
George Washington t o t h e r e g i o n . I may announce f u r t h e r f o r c e
movements as necessary.
Know you have s t a r t e d moving HMS
Invincible.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason:
1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y on:
O-OVi - O V 7 a - W
S/k/iS" K 8 H
11/13/07
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�•
We remain committed t o f l y i n g the U-2 f l i g h t i n support o f
UNSCOM t h i s weekend, and p e r i o d i c a l l y t h e r e a f t e r .
•
I want us t o consult closely during t h i s period. As ever, I
take strength from the close working r e l a t i o n s h i p we have. I
know t h a t I can count on you.
I f Asked:
Q.
Don't we need f i n d i n g of "material breach" t o conduct
m i l i t a r y operations?
A.
I f we can get Council on board t h a t would be e x c e l l e n t .
But we may not be able t o . Shouldn't l e t t h a t stop us from
t a k i n g necessary a c t i o n .
Our lawyers and yours are consulting on how t o handle.
Iraq-Potus-Blair-11-14
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�H e l w e g , M. D i a n a
Courtney, William H.
Thursday, November 20,1997 8:50 AM
@NSA - Natl Security Advisor
©RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; ©NESASIA - NE/Sou
FW: Proposed POTUS Note to Yeltsin fOONriDCN
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
High
Importance:
FOR SANDY AND JIM FROM BILL
Embassy Moscow just called to say that a few minutes ago Yeltsin foreign policy aide Prihodkho had informed
them Yeltsin would call the President on Iraq. The call would most likely take place tomorrow, but timing was
unclear. We'll work with NESA on contingency talking points.
The President's doing a short note of the kind proposed below is now less urgent, but it would still be a good
gesture, especially if we could get it out today.
—Original Message
From:
Courtney, William H.
Sent:
Thursday, November 20, 1997 8:34 AM
To:
Malley, Robert; Helweg, M. Diana
Cc:
©RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine
Subject:
Proposed POTUS Note to Yeltsin [rnMFIDFNTIfll ]
Importance:
High
—
Now might be a good time for the President to write a short note to Yeltsin offering appropriate praise for
Russia's effort on Iraq, for CWC ratification and Yeltsin's China visit, and for the appointment yesterday of the
new, reformist economics minister, which will could help maintain international confidence in Russian economic
policy.
In his call on Sandy two weeks ago, Jim Collins suggested occasional handwritten notes to Yeltsin to bolster his
confidence and augur relations. Sandy agreed.
I would be grateful if you could run this proposal for a note by Sandy and Jim to see if they concur. Thanks.
^
,
.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
no
8/u/iS
r.
CLINTON LB A Y P O O O Y
IRR HTCP
nirae.
*S>A
�SECRDT
:
" - ?- ';•-?
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH
07
'97 N0y2lPM8:2
INGTON
November 2 1 , 19 97
ACTION
/•
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
T
^'
FROM:
SAMUEL
BERGE^/
SUBJECT:
Messages t o P r e s i d e n t Y e l t s i n a n d ^ b a r t ' d ' ^ "
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r r e I r a q
'
\/
-1 •
'V
Purpose
Approval to send messages on Iraq to Presidents YeltsifcrTa'nd
Chirac and Prime Minister Blair.
^
'-//
;
Background
We have been a t t e m p t i n g t o arrange telephone c a l l s on I r a q from
you t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r , P r e s i d e n t Chirac and P r e s i d e n t
Yeltsin.
(We a l s o heard today from Embassy Moscow t h a t Y e l t s i n
wanted t o t a l k t o you and might t r y t o c a l l . )
Unfortunately,
g i v e n t h e time d i f f e r e n c e , no one was a v a i l a b l e t o t a k e a c a l l
y e s t e r d a y . We b e l i e v e , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t immediate messages from
you conveying your thanks f o r t h e i r p e r s o n a l e f f o r t s on I r a q and
your t h o u g h t s on next steps w i l l be t h e most e f f e c t i v e way t o
d o u b l e - t r a c k any e v e n t u a l c a l l s .
RECOMMENDATION
That you a u t h o r i z e t r a n s m i s s i o n o f t h e a t t a c h e d message t o
P r e s i d e n t s Y e l t s i n and Chirac and Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r .
Approve
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab A Message t o Russian P r e s i d e n t Y e l t s i n
Tab B Message t o French P r e s i d e n t Chirac
Tab C Message t o B r i t i s h PM B l a i r
-SECRET
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 11/20/2007
cc: V i c e P r e s i d e n t
Chief o f S t a f f
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
.qrp.pg^.
�•OCCnCT/NODIC
PREC:
IMMEDIATE
FROM :
THE WHITE HOUSE
TO:
AMEMBASSY LONDON
INFO:
SECSTATE WASHDC
SUBJECT:
MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE PASS THE /OLLOWIN^ MESSAGE FROM
PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRIME MINISTER BLAIR AT TI}E EARLIEST
OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW.
2.
BEGIN TEXT.
DEAR TONY:
I VERY MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR PERSONAL EFFORTS TO HELP RESOLVE THE
RECENT CRISIS WITH UNSCOM, AND WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU MY
THOUGHTS ON NEXT STEPS REGARDING IRAQ. I WILL BE WRITING TO TO
JACQUES AND BORIS AS WELL. WE WORKED TOGETHER EFFECTIVELY TO
ENCOURAGE IRAQ TO REVERSE ITS EFFORT TO WEAKEN UNSCOM.
MADELEINE GAVE ME A POSITIVE REDOUT ON THE GENEVA MEETING.
IRAQ HAS/PROMISED TO COOPERATE
WE NEED TO KEEP TOGETHER NOW
TO TCWTHAT COOPERATION ON THE
WITH UNSCOM FULLY, AND WE NE
IOULD EXPECT AN END TO IRAQ'S
GROUND AND I N THE AIR. WE
R
ATTEMPTS TO HARASS AND HAM C UNSCOM INSPECTIONS, AS WELL AS A
CESSATION OF IRAQI THREAT^ AGAINST U-2 FLIGHTS.
I SHARE YOUR DESIRE TO ^NCREASE HUMANITARIAN AID TO THE IRAQI
PEOPLE. I PROPOSE THAT OUR PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES I N NEW
YORK WORK TOCCTIIER T^BRING THIS ABOUT QUICKLY. THE PEOPLE OF
IRAQ DESERVE OUR HE1
I DO WANT TO EMPHASIZE, HOWEVER, MY BELIEF THAT THE LAST CHAPTER
OF THIS STORY HA^ NOT YET BEEN WRITTEN. WE WILL STILL NEED TO
ENSURE COMPLIANCE BY SADDAM HUSSEIN. THAT SAID, I AM PLEASED
THAT STRONGLY /ETERMINED DIPLOMACY, BACKED BY HIGHLY CREDIBLE
FORCE, APPEAR/ TO HAVE MOVED US TOWARD A PEACEFUL AND PRINCIPLED
RESOLUTION OF THIS LATEST CRISIS.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
.&/ic/\5
KBVj
�SINCERELY,
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
END TEXT.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPV
�IMMEDIATE
^ ~
SECRET
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 01 OF 02
PRT: BERGER COSGRIFF DAVIES FUERTH HELWEG KERRICK MALLEY RICEE SIT
SODERBERG STEINBERG
SIT: COQ FICKLIN MARTY POOLE RIEDEL SUM2 f f L ^ W - i / ^ . ^ j d j L A
SIT: NSC
V
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> CECRET
<DTG> 221819Z NOV 97
FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
TO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC
•- E C R E T
S
QQQQ
BEGIN TEXT:
SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE
FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRIME MINISTER BLAIR AT THE EARLIEST
OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW.
2.
BEGIN TEXT.
PAGE 2 RHEHAAA5 482 G D G R E T
*
DEAR TONY:
I VERY MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR PERSONAL EFFORTS TO HELP RESOLVE
THE RECENT CRISIS WITH UNSCOM, AND WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU MY
THOUGHTS ON NEXT STEPS REGARDING IRAQ. I WILL BE WRITING TO
JACQUES AND BORIS AS WELL. WE WORKED TOGETHER EFFECTIVELY
TO ENCOURAGE IRAQ TO REVERSE ITS EFFORT TO WEAKEN UNSCOM.
MADELEINE GAVE ME A POSITIVE READOUT ON THE GENEVA MEETING.
WE NEED TO KEEP TOGETHER NOW. IRAQ HAS PROMISED TO
COOPERATE WITH UNSCOM FULLY, AND WE NEED TO SEE THAT
COOPERATION ON THE GROUND AND I N THE AIR. WE SHOULD EXPECT
AN END TO IRAQ'S ATTEMPTS TO HARASS AND HAMPER UNSCOM
INSPECTIONS, AS WELL AS A CESSATION OF IRAQI THREATS AGAINST U-2
FLIGHTS.
I SHARE YOUR DESIRE TO INCREASE HUMANITARIAN AID TO THE IRAQI
PEOPLE. THE PEOPLE OF IRAQ DESERVE OUR HELP.
I DO WANT TO EMPHASIZE, HOWEVER, MY BELIEF THAT THE LAST
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
CLINTON LB A Y P O O O Y
IRR HTCP
-SECRET
-OMT31- H
8/t*/l5 KBH
�-fMMEpiATE
CCCnCTWHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 02 OF 02
PAGE 3 RHEHAAA5 482 • O E C R E T "
CHAPTER OF THIS STORY HAS NOT YET BEEN WRITTEN. WE WILL STILL
NEED TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE BY SADDAM HUSSEIN. THAT SAID, I AM
PLEASED THAT STRONGLY DETERMINED DIPLOMACY, BACKED BY
HIGHLY CREDIBLE FORCE, APPEARS TO HAVE MOVED US TOWARD A
PEACEFUL AND PRINCIPLED RESOLUTION OF THIS LATEST CRISIS.
SINCERELY,
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
END TEXT.
A
< SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
< SSN>5482
<MSGID> M3038215
A
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�IO D O W N I N G STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA
18 February 1998
THE PRIME MINISTER
> - . ,
I am writing to mention one matter I did not have the chance to raise
you during my visit to Washington.
I have recently learnt that the Kuwaitis may be on the point of selecting a
system to meet their requirement for self-propelled artillery, even though they
have given assurances that they would hold an open competition first. I
understand that the only real contenders in any such.competition would be your
M109 and our AS90. There are obviously arguments in favour of both.
Nevertheless, I strongly believe that the AS90 would be much better for the
Kuwaitis. I therefore hope that they will not be rushed into a decision and that
the two systems will be allowed to compete on equal terms.
(fW
The President of the United States of America
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I N G T O N
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGER
SUBJECT:
L e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Purpose
To respond t o a l e t t e r from B r i t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r .
Background
/ l - r^
p
J
/
I
f
!
1 •
•
J
Tony B l a i r wrDte you a-^r&fefee^j-4atod
FGbg^a-]^y----l-8T "btrtr-nert
_ v
de^i-veiretl~TrtTt
his i n t e r e s t i n
f i t J ^ U - J - ~ - ^ 'O
"
irl"~MaTre-h—Ay a - i ^ i i f ^ ^ us
Kttwa-i-t. We—have
•eas-systems --sa-l
e-E-i-€a-Jriy--l-ee-ked—up-t-h-i-s- sa-le^' fo^—a—se-li-ptope4ied--a-rti4-i&r-y
sy&t-enL. Your response acknowledges t h e B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t and
notes t h a t i t i s up t o t h e K u w a i t i s t o decide which system i s
b e t t e r f o r them.
CJ
RECOMMENDATION
That you s i g n t h e l e t t e r a t Tab A.
Attachments
Tab A L e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Tab B Incoming Correspondence
CITN L B A Y P O O O Y
LNO I R R H T C P
cc: V i c e P r e s i d e n t
Chief o f S t a f f
�-eeWFIDEMTIAL
1617
N A T I O N A L S E C U R I T Y C'. U N C I L
W A S H I N G T O N . D C . ZC
M
March 19, 199
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
THROUGH:
DONALD K. BANDLER
FROM:
LAWRENCE E. BUTLE
SUBJECT:
B l a i r L e t t e r t o P r e s i d e n t on K ^ a i t A r t i l l e r y
Sale
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r sent a l e t t e r t o t h j ^ P r e s i d e n t , d a t e d
February 18 b u t n o t d e l i v e r e d u n t i l March 4, r e g a r d i n g
c o m p e t i t i o n t o s e l l a s e l f - p r o p e l l e d ^ a r t i l l e r y system t o Kuwait.
We have locked-up t h i s c o n t r a c t f o r /Our s u p e r i o r P a l a d i n system.
The B l a i r l e t t e r appears t o be a p/o forma appeal on b e h a l f o f
the competing B r i t i s h system. Gi/zen t h a t t h i s i s a done deal
f o r us, t h e r e i s l i t t l e p o i n t i r / the P r e s i d e n t r e p l y i n g i n
writing toBlair.
I n s t e a d , we/p op°se t h a t t h e P r e s i d e n t
respond t o t h i s l e t t e r t h e next time he and B l a i r speak on t h e
M i d d l e East; NESA would prepare a t a l k i n g p o i n t .
r
Concurrence by:
and St
Simon
RECOMMENDATION
That t h e P r e s i d e n t us4 h i s n e x t c a l l w i t h Prime M i n i s t e r
t o respond t o t h e I s x t e r .
. .
AprSrove
Blair
„-
.u
Disapprove
/ '
^
h
Attachment
Tab A Incoming correspondence
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
jason:
1.5(b)
D e c l a s s i f y On:
3/18/08
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
8/fr/i5" K8W
�NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
1617 r e d o
W A S H I N G T O N . D C. 2 0 5 0 4
March 26, 1998
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
THROUGH:
DONALD B A N D L E ^ O
FROM:
LAWRENCE E. BUTLER ;. ,
.'
SUBJECT:
P r e s i d e n t i a l L e t t e r t o UK Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r on
Kuwait A r t i l l e r y Sale
As a p o s t s c r i p t t o h i s o f f i c i a l v i s i t here February 5-7, Prime
Minister/v'wrote t h e P r e s i d e n t w i t h a p r o forma appeal f o r us t o
p u l l back from c l o s i n g an arms s a l e t o Kuwait. Your memorandum
c o v e r i n g t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s r e p l y i s a t Tab I .
Concurrences by:
Joe Marty and Steve Simon
RECOMMENDATION
That you s i g n t h e memorandum t o t h e P r e s i d e n t a t Tab I .
Attachments
Tab I Memorandum t o t h e P r e s i d e n t
Tab A L e t t e r t o PM B l a i r
Tab B Incoming correspondence
CITN LBAY POOOY
LNO IRR HTCP
�T H E W H I T E H( . S I :
WASHINGTON
A p r i l 6, 19 S
Dear Tony:
Thank you f o r your note on the Kuwaiti s e l f propelled a r t i l l e r y system sale. I can
appreciate your keen i n t e r e s t i n t h i s issue.
I am sure t h a t the U.K. and U.S. systems hot:
have strong merits ana that the Kuwaitis w i i :
face a d i f f i c u l t decision. I know you agree
that, i n the end, i t w i l l be up to the
Kuwaiti government to decide which system
best s u i t s t h e i r needs.
Again, thanks f o r your note.
w i t h you soon.
I hope to t a l k
Sincere i.y,
The Right Honorable Tony B l a i r ,
Prime M i n i s t e r
London
M.P.
C N O LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
UTN
�r
n
P'H i QHri
CONriDENTIAL
3311
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
May
8,
1998
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
SAMUEL B E R G ^ ^ ^
SUBJECT:
Your c a l l t o B r i t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r Tony B l a i r ,
F r i d a y , May 8, 1998, time TBD.
Tony B i a i r has asked t o speak t o you r e g a r d i n g the M i d d l e East
Peace Process and N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d .
Background
N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d . The press i s now aware t h a t you are not going
t o N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d b e f o r e the May 22 referendum.
Blair visited
N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d on Wednesday, w i t h John Major, t o press f o r a
yes v o t e on May 22. He met w i t h U l s t e r U n i o n i s t s and Orange
Order l e a d e r s i n an e f f o r t t o a l l e v i a t e t h e i r a n x i e t i e s
r e g a r d i n g t h e A p r i l 10 Peace Accord and secure t h e i r b a c k i n g .
Key q u e s t i o n s r a i s e d were decommissioning, p o l i c i n g r e f o r m and
p r i s o n e r r e l e a s e s . I n response t o a q u e s t i o n on whether t h e
accord can be made t o work i f approved, B l a i r s a i d t h e yes v o t e
enables people t o have a chance, a s k i n g what a l t e r n a t i v e was
o f f e r e d by t h e "no" v o t e campaign. His p r e v i o u s i n t e r v e n t i o n i n
the n o r t h was t o b l o c k the r e l e a s e o f a Parades Commission
r e p o r t recommending t h a t the most c o n t e n t i o u s marches ( i n J u l y )
be banned. This would have g i v e n ammunition t o t h e opponents o f
the Accord, weakening the yes v o t e on May 22.
T r i m b l e gave a b l i s t e r i n g speech Wednesday accusing u n i o n i s t
opponents o f " p o l i t i c a l cowardice" and o f " r u n n i n g away from the
b a t t l e f i e l d l a s t year." Pundits are b e i n g c a r e f u l not t o
presume a l a r g e U n i o n i s t m a j o r i t y i n f a v o r o f the accord, b u t
v a r i o u s N I town c o u n c i l s w i t h U n i o n i s t m a j o r i t i e s have passed
r e s o l u t i o n s f o r the accord — a b i t t e r blow t o I a n P a i s l e y .
Sinn Fein members w i l l vote Sunday on motions i n f a v o r o f the
Accord and changing the SF c o n s t i t u t i o n t o p e r m i t members t o
take seats i n the new Assembly. A copy was leaked p r e m a t u r e l y ,
t o t h e d i s t r e s s o f SF l e a d e r s h i p b u t t o warm welcomes i n I r e l a n d
-60NFI DENT I Air
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 5/8/08
cc : Vice P r e s i d e n t
Chief o f S t a f f
on?- : r j n n .
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CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�COMFIDEHTIALas evidence t h a t Sinn Fein i s serious about peace. The IRA
continues t o have problems w i t h d i s s i d e n t s . There are reports
that they are seeking t o make a l l i a n c e s w i t h other f r i n g e
republican groups f o r j o i n t attacks. The I r i s h p o l i c e k i l l e d
one such person, p a r t of a gang attempting t o rob an armored car
t r a n s p o r t i n g cash. There have been a series of so-far
i n e f f e c t i v e attacks i n the North. B l a i r ' s people now b e l i e v e ,
since the problems w i t h the vote are i n the Unionist community,
a Blair-Ahern-Clinton event i s inadvisable; we w i l l work on
something w i t h you and B l a i r .
Middle East Peace Process. Dennis a r r i v e d i n Jerusalem today
and w i l l see Netanyahu immediately. We w i l l get you a readout
as soon as a v a i l a b l e . He w i l l see A r a f a t e i t h e r l a t e r t o n i g h t
or f o r lunch tomorrow w i t h a message of reassurance t h a t we are
not watering down our ideas. Dennis plans t o see Netanyahu
again a f t e r Shabat ends on Saturday before the cabinet meeting
Sunday. I n t e r e s t i n g l y , I n f r a s t r u c t u r e M i n i s t e r Sharon has not
returned t o I s r a e l f o r the cabinet session, s t r o n g l y suggesting
he i s confident B i b i w i l l not accept our ideas.
Attachment
Tab A Points t o Make
CONriDENTIAL
00^
UUr*
Ll'
8
nL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�n
CONriDDNTIAL
mmm
3311
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
Northern Ireland
• Met w i t h a t e r r i f i c v i c t i m s support group yesterday - WAVE.
Wounded woman p o l i c e o f f i c e r , widows and mothers who l o s t
sons, and a Methodist preacher whose father was k i l l e d . They
are the reason why t h i s peace must work. Their courage
i n s p i r e s us, and shames others.
• Also announced i n i t i a t i v e s — w e ' l l help w i t h funding f o r
Springvale campus and t o support establishment o f the NI
assembly. Also, Secretary Daley w i l l lead business mission
next month — hope we can speed up j o b c r e a t i o n there. Jim
Lyons has some great ideas f o r t h a t .
•
Powerful image of you and John Major i n B e l f a s t t h i s week.
Are you having any luck w i t h the Orange Order and the
undecided Unionists?
Middle East Peace Process
• Despite media claims, Madeleine and Dennis made progress.
B i b i and A r a f a t were serious and c o n s t r u c t i v e .
• B i b i asked f o r few days t o consult w i t h h i s Cabinet. Hopeful
he i s using t h i s time t o convince them of the need t o move
forward.
• He faces important decision — serious consequences whichever
path he chooses. He needs time t o work t h i s out.
• At B i b i ' s request, I sent Dennis Ross back t o pursue c r e a t i v e
ways t o make our ideas acceptable t o both p a r t i e s .
• We have c o n s i s t e n t l y pursued a p o l i c y of c o n f i d e n t i a l
diplomacy and "no surprises" w i t h the I s r a e l i s , and I w i l l
continue t h a t approach.
•
I'm not going t o s e l l A r a f a t out.
down and r i s k l o s i n g him.
I know we can't l e t him
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONriDENHftfr
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 5 / 7 / 0 8
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
8/1*/ JT K6V1
C Ni E T L
O r NA
D I
�-CONFIDENTIAL
•
But i t i s important we get r e a l r e s u l t s on the ground, not a
package t o which one party says yes and the other cannot.
•
I f t h a t i s not achievable, we w i l l remain engaged i n the peace
process, but we re-evaluate our approach.
•
I spoke l a s t night t o an Arab American Leadership conference;
made clear that while I am best f r i e n d I s r a e l has ever had i n
White House, I am also committed t o peace process and t o
s o l u t i o n meeting the needs of both p a r t i e s .
•
Dennis should be back by the time I see you i n Birmingham
where we can discuss t h i s more i n depth.
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�COMF1DENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
3311
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
Northern I r e l a n d
•
Met w i t h a t e r r i f i c v i c t i m s support group y e s t e r d a y - WAVE.
Wounded woman p o l i c e o f f i c e r , widows and mothers who p o s t
sons, and a M e t h o d i s t preacher whose f a t h e r was k i l L e d .
They
are t h e reason why t h i s peace must work. T h e i r courage
i n s p i r e s us, and shames o t h e r s .
•
A l s o announced i n i t i a t i v e s — w e ' l l h e l p w i t h f u n d i n g f o r
S p r i n g v a l e campus and t o support e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f t h e N I
assembly. A l s o , S e c r e t a r y Daley w i l l l e a d Jousiness m i s s i o n
n e x t month — hope we can speed up j o b c r e a t i o n t h e r e . J i m
Lyons has some g r e a t ideas f o r t h a t .
•
P o w e r f u l image o f you and John Major
B e l f a s t t h i s week.
Are you h a v i n g any l u c k w i t h t h e Or/mge Order and t h e
undecided U n i o n i s t s ?
yoy^iyiinJeOLt would-be/use]
f a t h e r t l i s ^ o n 1 y(
/for.
WO]
f o r B ^ r t i e i s Sunday.
Middle E a s t Peace Process
•
D e s p i t e media c l a i m s , Madeleine and Dennis made p r o g r e s s .
B i b i and A r a f a t wereyeerious and c o n s t r u c t i v e .
•
B i b i asked f o r f e y days t o c o n s u l t w i t h h i s Cabinet.
Hopeful
he i s u s i n g t h i s / t i m e t o convince them o f t h e need t o move
forward.
•
He faces imgJbrtant d e c i s i o n — s e r i o u s consequences
p a t h he chooses. He needs time t o work t h i s o u t .
•
A t Bibi^'s r e q u e s t , I sent Dennis Ross back t o pursue c r e a t i v e
waysyco make our ideas acceptable t o b o t h p a r t i e s .
•
We/have c o n s i s t e n t l y pursued a p o l i c y o f c o n f i d e n t i a l
Iiplomacy and "no s u r p r i s e s " w i t h t h e I s r a e l i s , and I w i l l
'continue t h a t approach.
•
I'm n o t going t o s e l l A r a f a t o u t .
down and r i s k l o s i n g him.
CONFI DENS^jU,
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 5/7/08
whichever
I know we can't l e t him
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
�CONriDCNTIALas evidence t h a t Sinn Fein i s s e r i o u s about peace. The IRA
c o n t i n u e s t o have problems w i t h d i s s i d e n t s . There a r e r e p o r t s
t h a t they a r e seeking t o make a l l i a n c e s w i t h o t h e r f r i n g e
r e p u b l i c a n groups f o r j o i n t a t t a c k s . The I r i s h p o l i c e k i l l e d
one such person, p a r t o f a gang a t t e m p t i n g t o rob an armored ca/
t r a n s p o r t i n g cash. There have been a s e r i e s o f s o - f a r
i n e f f e c t i v e attacks i n the North.
1
M i d d l e E a s t Peace Process. Boopito modia claima t o t h e con)
Madeleine and Dennis made some progress i n London.
Netanyahu and A r a f a t were s e r i o u s and constxuetir^e. Netanyahu
asked f o r a few days t o go back a£ui--etyrfsult w i t h h i s Cabinet.
We a r e h o p e f u l t h a t he_J_s---trrfngthis time t o convince/them o f
the need t^in©ve --Torward i n t h e process. Netanyahu /aces an
i m p o ^ r t a n t d e c i s i o n and we need t o g i v e him t h e time/and space t o
;nnis Ross wont back t-Qleft^.j^
grfe region ie-pursue creative ways to make our requests
acceptable to both parties, ^^j^
^Q^tr^TtT^l^r^^^
r
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
8/u/lS K6H
�CONFIDENTIAL
as evidence t h a t Sinn Fein i s s e r i o u s about peace. The IRA
c o n t i n u e s t o have problems w i t h d i s s i d e n t s . There are r e p o r t s
t h a t t h e y are s e e k i n g t o make a l l i a n c e s w i t h o t h e r f r i n g e
r e p u b l i c a n groups f o r j o i n t a t t a c k s . The I r i s h p o l i c e k i l l e d
one such person, p a r t o f a gang a t t e m p t i n g t o rob an armored/car
t r a n s p o r t i n g cash. There have been a s e r i e s o f s o - f a r
i n e f f e c t i v e a t t a c k s i n t h e M^t-h fr^v^n i.n i i
t - f n nnlf n.irm r
whethei: he t h i n k s yotr?—AlTum and 1* >• s h o u l d moat a f t e r fe
W f l n
•Bi rm-i n g h n m
.qiirfimi±. n n
flnnriny,.—May
1'
M i d d l e East Peace Process. Dennis a r r i v e d i n Jerusalem today
and w i l l see Netanyahu immediately/ We w i l l g e t v6u a readout
as soon as a v a i l a b l e . He w i l l seer A r a f a t e i t h e r / l a t e r t o n i g h t
or f o r l u n c h tomorrow w i t h a message o f reassurance t h a t we are
not w a t e r i n g down our i d e a s . Dermis p l a n s t o >see Netanyahu
again a f t e r Shabat ends on Saturday b e f o r e th'e c a b i n e t meeting
Sunday. I n t e r e s t i n g l y , I n f r a s t r u c t u r e M i n i s t e r Sharon has n o t
r e t u r n e d t o I s r a e l f o r t h e cabinjet s e s s i o n / s t r o n g l y s u g g e s t i n g
he i s c o n f i d e n t B i b i w i l l n o t aqcept o u r A d e a s .
Attachment
Tab A
P o i n t s t o Make
-CONFIDENTIAL
xmm LlttKARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
2 / u / i S KBV1
�COHriDCHTIAfc
3311
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I N G T O N
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGER
SUBJECT:
Your c a l l t o B r i t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r Tony B l a i r ,
F r i d a y , May 8, 1998, time TBD.
\
Tony B l a i r has a sked t o speak t o you r e g a r d i n g the Middle
Peace Process and^Northern I r e l a n d .
Proce
v
East
Background
N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d . The\press i s now aware t h a t you are not going
t o N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d b e f a r e t h e May 22 referendum.
Blair visited
N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d on Wednesday, w i t h John Major, t o press f o r a
yes v o t e on May 22.
He meV w i t h U l s t e r U n i o n i s t s and Orange
Order l e a d e r s i n an e f f o r t r o a l l e v i a t e t h e i r a n x i e t i e s
r e g a r d i n g the A p r i l 10 P e a c e V c c o r d and secure t h e i r b a c k i n g .
Key q u e s t i o n s r a i s e d were d e c o W i s s i o n i n g , p o l i c i n g r e f o r m and
p r i s o n e r r e l e a s e s . I n response\to a q u e s t i o n on whether t h e
accord can be made t o work i f apWoved, B l a i r s a i d t h e yes vote
enables people t o have a chance, \ s k i n g what a l t e r n a t i v e was
o f f e r e d by the "no" v o t e campaign. \ His p r e v i o u s i n t e r v e n t i o n i n
the n o r t h was t o b l o c k t h e r e l e a s e o^. a Parades Commission
r e p o r t recommending t h a t t h e most contventious marches ( i n J u l y )
be banned. T h i s would have g i v e n ammunition t o the opponents o f
the Accord, weakening the yes vote on Mav 22.
T r i m b l e gave a b l i s t e r i n g speech WednesdaAaccusing u n i o n i s t
opponents o f " p o l i t i c a l cowardice" and o f R u n n i n g away from the
b a t t l e f i e l d l a s t year." Pundits are being c f e r e f u l not t o
presume a l a r g e U n i o n i s t m a j o r i t y i n f a v o r ofVthe accord, b u t
v a r i o u s N I town c o u n c i l s w i t h U n i o n i s t m a j o r i t i e s have passed
r e s o l u t i o n s f o r t h e accord — a b i t t e r blow t o X
Paisley.
a n
Sinn Fein members w i l l v o t e Sunday on motions i n f a v o r o f the
Accord and changing the SF c o n s t i t u t i o n t o p e r m i t members t o
take seats i n t h e new Assembly. A copy was leaked p r e m a t u r e l y ,
t o t h e d i s t r e s s o f SF l e a d e r s h i p but t o warm welcomes i n I r e l a n d
CONFIDDNTIAL.
cc: Vice P r e s i d e n t
Reason: 1.5(d)
Chief o f S t a f f
DECLASSIFIED
D e c l a s s i f y On: 5/8/08
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�-eeNUlDhNllALas evidence t h a t Sinn Fein i s serious about peace. The IRA
continues t o have problems w i t h d i s s i d e n t s . There are reporl
t h a t they are seeking t o make a l l i a n c e s w i t h other f r i n g e
republican groups f o r j o i n t attacks. The I r i s h p o l i c e k i l l e d
one such person, p a r t of a gang attempting t o rob an arprored car
t r a n s p o r t i n g cash. There have been a series of so-fa]
i n e f f e c t i v e attacks i n the North.
Middle East Peace Process. Dennis a r r i v e d i n Jerusalem today
and w i l l see Netanyahu immediately. We w i l l gel? you a readout
as soon as a v a i l a b l e . He w i l l see A r a f a t e i t h e r l a t e r t o n i g h t
or f o r lunch tomorrow w i t h a message of reassurance t h a t we are
not watering down our ideas. Dennis plans/to see Netanyahu
again a f t e r Shabat ends on Saturday befoj?4 the cabinet meeting
Sunday. I n t e r e s t i n g l y , I n f r a s t r u c t u r e i ^ i n i s t e r Sharon has not
returned t o I s r a e l f o r the cabinet session, s t r o n g l y suggesting
he i s confident B i b i w i l l not accept/our ideas.
Attachment
Tab A Points t o Make
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CONriDENTIAL
3311
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
Northern Ireland
Met w i t h a t e r r i f i c v i c t i m s supporlt group yestei?aay - WAVE.
Wounded woman p o l i c e o f f i c e r , widows and mothers who l o s t
sons, and a Methodist preacher whose f a t h e r vfas k i l l e d . They
are the reason why t h i s peace must work. jPheir courage
i n s p i r e s us, and shames others.
Also announced i n i t i a t i v e s — w e ' l l h^lp w i t h funding f o r
Springvale campus and to support establishment of the NI
assembly. Also, Secretary Daley w i l l lead business mission
next month — hope we can speedup j o b c r e a t i o n there. Jim
Lyons has some great ideas f o r / t h a t .
• Powerful image of you and J
* Major i n B e l f a s t t h i s week,
Are you having any luck wi
the Orange Order and the
undecided Unionists?
I U ^^T^X f - y,-, ft-t /4<~
Do ^.u^
Do
H
•
totfAild JtSye-*lik^.d» t o hi
K u k i K i [s &<^ieftefleVdo^s4
:
M i d d l e E a s t Peace Process
ee B e r t i e 2^herxL--W'ith~Ysii^in
r
London,
pferflfit.
.
^
-Vuc t-~r ^
• Despite media c/aims, Madeleine and Dennis made progress.
B i b i and A r a f a / were serious and c o n s t r u c t i v e .
• B i b i asked >r few days t o consult w i t h h i s Cabinet. Hopeful
he i s usinc t h i s time t o convince them o f the need t o move
forward.
• He faces' important decision — serious consequences whichever
path her chooses. He needs time t o work t h i s out.
• At R i b i ' s request, I sent Dennis Ross back t o pursue c r e a t i v e
wave t o make our ideas acceptable t o both p a r t i e s .
have c o n s i s t e n t l y pursued a p o l i c y of c o n f i d e n t i a l
liplomacy and "no surprises" w i t h the I s r a e l i s , and I w i l l
continue t h a t approach.
I'm not going t o s e l l Arafat out.
down and r i s k l o s i n g him.
CONFI DENT I Ab
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 5/7/08
I know we can't l e t him
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
K 6 M
SO^A
�neettFI DENT IAL
•
But i t i s important we get r e a l r e s u l t s on the ground, noi
package t o which one party says yes and the other cannol
•
I f t h a t i s not achievable, we w i l l remain engaged i n / t h e peace
process, but we re-evaluate our approach.
•
I spoke l a s t night t o an Arab American Leadersh^j conference;
made clear t h a t while I am best f r i e n d Israelyfias ever had i n
White House, I am also committed t o peace process and t o
s o l u t i o n meeting the needs of both p a r t i e s ^
•
Dennis should be back by the time I se( you i n Birmingham
where we can discuss t h i s more i n dep,*
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�3778
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS
HINGTO N
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h I r i s h Prime M i n i s t e r B e r t i e
Ahern
PARTICIPANTS:
The P r e s i d e n t
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern
N o t e t a k e r s : David H i g g i n s , Sean Rice,
George Chastain, J o e l Schrader and
Lawrence B u t l e r
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The P r e s i d e n t :
May 23, 1998, 12:13 - 12:16 p.m. EDT
Camp David, Maryland
Hello?
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
H e l l o , Mr. P r e s i d e n t ?
The P r e s i d e n t : B e r t i e , i t ' s a g r e a t day f o r t h e I r i s h . You
must know by name every S.O.B. t h a t v o t e d i n the R e p u b l i c .
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
The
President:
I t h i n k we g o t 95 p e r c e n t .
They broke 70 p e r c e n t i n t h e N o r t h .
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: Well I headed out t r y i n g t o g e t 80-20
here, b u t I t h i n k i t s going t o be 95-5 on a huge v o t e .
It's
almost as good as our l a s t e l e c t i o n .
I'm r e a l l y happy about
t h a t . Yes, by o u r r e c k o n i n g they g o t 71 p e r c e n t . Four o r f i v e
p e r c e n t o f t h e Republicans would have v o t e d "No," b u t i t i s
c e r t a i n l y a m a j o r i t y o f Republicans by f i v e p e r c e n t . There i s i
m a j o r i t y o f U n i o n i s t s who v o t e d "Yes," b u t even on t h e v e r y
w o r s t case every s i n g l e n a t i o n a l i s t would have t o have v o t e d
a g a i n s t . That c o u l d n ' t have happened, so, c l e a r l y I would say
f i v e o r s i x p e r c e n t more v o t e d "No;" b u t we g o t t h e
N a t i o n a l i s t s , Republicans, I r i s h and t h a t wasn't bad, Mr.
President.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�The P r e s i d e n t :
God i t ' s w o n d e r f u l .
I'm happy f o r you.
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: I a p p r e c i a t e your h e l p .
t o g e t t i n g you back soon.
We l o o k
forward
The P r e s i d e n t :
W e l l , i f t h e r e i s a n y t h i n g we can do t o h e l p ,
you l e t me know. I hope t h e assembly e l e c t i o n s now go as w e l l .
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
P a i s l e y w i l l have t o be n e g a t i v e .
The P r e s i d e n t : W e l l , I b e t a l o t o f people who v o t e d w i t h
P a i s l e y w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t l y impressed t o come over and work
w i t h t h i s agreement.
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: About 85 p e r c e n t o f t h e i s l a n d v o t e d
"Yes." I can't t h i n k o f anywhere i n t h e w o r l d where such a
c l e a r v o t e has been h e l d i n t h e l a s t 50 years.
The P r e s i d e n t :
God, i t ' s so t o u c h i n g .
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: We a p p r e c i a t e a l l your e f f o r t Mr.
President.
I f we d i d n ' t i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e t h i s , i t would never
have happened Mr. P r e s i d e n t . Without your support we never
would have been able t o s t a y around t h e t a b l e .
The P r e s i d e n t :
celebration.
I can't w a i t t o come because i t w i l l be a g r e a t
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
The P r e s i d e n t :
We'll have a good c e l e b r a t i o n .
Keep i n t o u c h .
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: Thank you, Mr. P r e s i d e n t .
f o r w a r d t o seeing you g e t back here.
The P r e s i d e n t :
bye.
I l o o k f o r w a r d t o g e t t i n g back.
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
—
We l o o k
Take care,
good
Goodbye.
End o f C o n v e r s a t i o n
—
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�3778
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h David T r i m b l e , U l s t e r U n i o n i s t
P a r t y Leader
PARTICIPANTS:
The P r e s i d e n t
David T r i m b l e
Notetakers:
David H i g g i n s , Sean Rice,
George Chastain, J o e l Schrader and
Lawrence B u t l e r
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The P r e s i d e n t :
Mr. T r i m b l e :
The P r e s i d e n t :
May 23, 1998, 1:01 - 1:04 p.m. EDT
Camp David, Maryland
David?
Yes.
Congratulations.
Mr. T r i m b l e : Thank you v e r y much Mr. P r e s i d e n t .
Everything
came t h r o u g h i n t h e end w i t h a b i t o f a f i g h t , b u t we g o t t h e r e .
The P r e s i d e n t :
I'm r e a l l y proud o f you. I n t h e l a s t t h r e e days
everyone was r e a l l y pumping hard. You g o t a l l t h e undecided t o
break f o r you.
Mr. T r i m b l e :
I t took t h e whole r u n o f t h e week, b u t I t h i n k i t
t u r n e d over t h e weekend and more people w i l l come a f t e r t h e
event.
Even some o f those who v o t e d "No" w i l l change.
The P r e s i d e n t : I b e l i e v e t h a t a l s o . I've heard what P a i s l e y i s
s a y i n g , b u t I b e l i e v e a l o t o f people who v o t e d "No" w i l l say
g i v e i t a chance. Do you t h i n k you g o t 52 p e r c e n t i n t h e
Protestant elections?
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP\
�Mr. T r i m b l e :
I don't know i f i t was as good as t h a t . I f i t was
a Westminster e l e c t i o n today, I would have l o s t my s e a t .
I have
a p r o b l e m b u t i t w i l l come r i g h t .
I ' v e g o t a few years.
The P r e s i d e n t : You d i d a h e l l o f a t h i n g and you were v e r y
brave.
I want t o h e l p however I can.
Mr. T r i m b l e : That was one t h i n g I was q u i t e sure o f i n my mind
and I managed t o do i t . I t was t h e r i g h t t h i n g and I knew t h a t
i t would come r i g h t i n t h e end. There were some times l a s t week
when I wondered i f we would a c t u a l l y make i t .
The P r e s i d e n t :
I j u s t wanted t o say c o n g r a t s .
Mr. T r i m b l e :
I am now l o o k i n g f o r Adams t o d i v v y up a b i t .
There a r e a number o f t h i n g s he has g o t t o do and t h e sooner he
s t a r t s d o i n g them t h e b e t t e r .
The P r e s i d e n t :
earned i t .
I w i l l g e t on i t .
Have a w o n d e r f u l day. You
Mr. T r i m b l e :
I'm heading o f f i n 45 o r 50 minutes t i m e f o r t h e
f i r s t m e e t i n g o f our c o n s t i t u e n c y c o u n c i l t o p l a n f o r our f i r s t
assembly e l e c t i o n .
The P r e s i d e n t :
Mr. T r i m b l e :
That's g r e a t .
Take care man.
Right.
—
End o f Conversation
—
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�3778
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Gerry Adams, Sinn Fein Leader
PARTICIPANTS:
The P r e s i d e n t
Gerry Adams
N o t e t a k e r s : David H i g g i n s , Sean Rice,
George Chastain, J o e l Schrader and
Lawrence B u t l e r
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
Mr. Adams:
May 23, 1998, 1:28 - 1:32 p.m. EDT
Camp David, Maryland
Hello?
The P r e s i d e n t :
Mr. Adams:
Gerry, c o n g r a t u l a t i o n s .
Thank you v e r y much; you are v e r y k i n d
The P r e s i d e n t :
You guys d i d a g r e a t j o b .
Mr. Adams: I have t o l d everyone a l l day t h a t t h i s
b e g i n n i n g and we're moving t o t h e f u t u r e . Thank you f o r keeping
f a i t h i n a l l t h i s . I r e f l e c t sometimes on t h e f i r s t t i m e I went
t h e r e , and I t h i n k you were r i g h t then — w e l l done.
The P r e s i d e n t :
What do you t h i n k t h e f i n a l P r o t e s t a n t v o t e was?
Mr. Adams: I t ' s i m p o s s i b l e t o know. I t ' s c l e a r t h a t t h e
m a j o r i t y v o t e d i n f a v o r o f t h i s , and I t h i n k i t was a v e r y
s o p h i s t i c a t e d v o t e . O b v i o u s l y people from a l l q u a r t e r s ,
i n c l u d i n g Republicans had problems. I do b e l i e v e t h i s i s a leap
of f a i t h i n t o t h e f u t u r e .
I was a p p e a l i n g t o t h e "No" v o t e r s
t h a t t h e y were v o t i n g t h r o u g h f e a r and n o t t o t h i n k about i t .
There w i l l be r e s i s t a n c e from t h i s q u a r t e r , b u t we c o n t i n u e t o
s t a y focused and work t h r o u g h i t .
The P r e s i d e n t : That's what I t h i n k . We have t o work a t i t now,
and l o o k a t some ways t o keep everybody's f a i t h and good s p i r i t s
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP j
�up now. We need t o g e t t h e process on t h e r i g h t t r a c k . You a r e
i n a s t r o n g e r p o s i t i o n now; w i t h t h i s v o t e ; you have been
validated.
Mr. Adams: 70 p e r c e n t v o t e d i n f a v o r i n t h e n o r t h . I n t h e
south, t h e r e wasn't such a h i g h t u r n o u t , b u t 92 p e r c e n t i n
favor... t o me, i t ' s t h a t they were v o t i n g i n f a v o r o f a whole
r a f t o f f u t u r e issues.
I am going t o t a l k t o B l a i r l a t e r .
I'm
going t o be a t t h e White House next week, Thursday o r Wednesday;
I ' d l i k e t o see you t h e r e . I'm going t o t h e S t a t e s f o r some
speaking engagements.
The
President:
I f I'm i n town, I ' d be g l a d t o see you.
Mr. Adams: My sense o f a l l t h i s i s t h a t t h e people a r e ahead o f
the p o l i t i c i a n s .
The
You
President:
They o f t e n are; n o t j u s t t h e r e , b u t everywhere.
have a good time and enjoy your c e l e b r a t i o n .
Mr. Adams:
The
Please say h e l l o t o my w i f e .
President:
Sure.
[Mr. Adams passes phone t o Mrs. Adams.]
Mrs.
Adams:
Hello?
The P r e s i d e n t :
good today.
Mrs.
Adams:
Hello.
Yes.
How are you?
I s n ' t i t grand.
You must be f e e l i n g so
I t ' s g r e a t t o t a l k t o you.
The P r e s i d e n t :
Thank you. I'm r e a l l y l o o k i n g f o r w a r d t o
keeping on w i t h t h i s . You must be v e r y proud.
Mrs.
The
Adams:
W e l l , I'm v e r y proud o f my husband.
President:
Mrs. Adams:
bye.
I t ' s n i c e speaking t o you.
W e l l , i t was n i c e speaking t o you. Thank you; bye
[Mr. Adams back on l i n e . ]
Mr. Adams:
Thanks f o r t h a t .
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�The President:
Okay, man.
Mr. Adams: Tomorrow, by the way, my county team, the one my son
plays on, plays Donegal i n Gaelic f o o t b a l l . That w i l l be the
r e a l t e s t ; Antrim hasn't beaten them i n 15 years. That would be
the u l t i m a t e m i r a c l e .
The President:
Mr. Adams:
Well done, and thanks again.
Good bye.
-- End of Conversation
—
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�3778
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h John Hume, S o c i a l Democratic and
Labour P a r t y Leader
PARTICIPANTS
The P r e s i d e n t
John Hume
Notetakers:
Cindy Lawrence, Anthony
Campanella, Robert Ford, J o e l Schrader
and Lawrence B u t l e r
May 23, 1998, 7:05 - 7:09 p.m. EDT
Camp David, Maryland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The
President:
Mr.
Hume:
John?
Yes. H i t h e r e , Mr. P r e s i d e n t .
The P r e s i d e n t :
day was over.
I j u s t wanted t o say c o n g r a t u l a t i o n s b e f o r e t h e
Mr. Hume: Thanks a m i l l i o n .
Thank you f o r your h e l p and
support.
We c o u l d n o t have done i t w i t h o u t you, and we would
not be where we a r e today.
The P r e s i d e n t :
ecstatic.
W e l l , I'm j u s t t h r i l l e d .
Everyone over here i s
Mr. Hume: Very good. I t was t r u l y amazing and q u i t e an
h i s t o r i c day. We had 80 p e r c e n t come o u t t o v o t e and 71 p e r c e n t
voted yes.
The P r e s i d e n t :
d i d n ' t you?
You g o t a s l i g h t m a j o r i t y o f t h e P r o t e s t a n t s ,
Mr. Hume: Oh, yes, r i g h t across t h e board. There i s a g r e a t
mood among t h e people.
I t was marvelous a l l t o g e t h e r . There i s
g r e a t g r a t i t u d e f o r a l l you've done.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP
�The President: Well, thank you. I t ' s been my pleasure.
have t o keep at i t and I ' l l do my p a r t .
We
Mr. Hume: Absolutely! The months ahead w i l l be very c r u c i a l .
P o l i t i c i a n s are now moving t o work together across our d i v i d e .
The r e a l t h i n g i s working the common ground, which I c a l l
economics. Economically, both sides w i l l be able t o break down
the b a r r i e r s of c e n t u r i e s .
The President: I agree w i t h t h a t . Like I said, I am ready t o
go t o work. I t a l k e d t o B e r t i e and Tony and others.
Mr. Hume: That w i l l be very good and encouraging t o everyone.
I understand that the Secretary o f State ( s i c - Commerce) w i l l
be coming here next month.
The President:
That's what I hear.
Mr. Hume: Funny, the two days he i s here, I am i n New York.
w i l l be l o o k i n g forward t o your next v i s i t .
I
The President: Yes, I ' d l i k e t o come. I t ' s a great day. I t
took years and years. You must f e e l somewhat v i n d i c a t e d today.
Mr. Hume: Ah, yes. I t ' s very good. I t o l d people the problem
has not changed and n e i t h e r should our approach t o solve i t .
You know what i s r e a l l y i n t e r e s t i n g i s the mood of the people,
e s p e c i a l l y the mood of the young people. Young people are
generally very c y n i c a l about p o l i t i c s ; but t h e i r p o s i t i v e
response i n the s t r e e t s — I couldn't believe i t . I t was
powerful. We had a special show the other n i g h t w i t h U2, you
know the pop group. Well, a young person got up on stage and
said, "our generation i s the one generation t h a t has l i v e d w i t h
the t r o u b l e s our whole l i f e . And we don't want t o see another
generation l i v e through i t . " The statement made a tremendous
impact.
The President:
Oh great.
Mr. Hume: I am about t o c a l l your Ambassador, Jean Kennedy
Smith. She had a great TV show l a s t n i g h t . I t was on a l l over.
I t ' s a p i t y she's leaving us.
The President:
She's a good soul.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�Mr. Hume: She r e a l l y got down t o the grass-root l e v e l i n a way
most ambassadors don't.
The President: Well, I ' l l t r y t o p i c k another good one f o r you
who w i l l do the same.
Mr. Hume:
I look forward t o seeing you.
The President:
Mr. Hume:
Thank you. Goodbye,
Thanks a m i l l i o n .
friend.
A l l the best.
—
End of Conversation
—
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP V
�C NI DNIL
O F ET
A
CONFIDENTIAL
4114
Redo(2)
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
W A S H I N G T O N , D.C. 2 0 5 0 4
June 16, 1998
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
THROUGH:
ROBERT G. BELL
FROM:
ANNE WITKOWSKt
SUBJECT:
Landmines: POTUS L e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
At Tab A i s a proposed l e t t e r t o be sent v i a p r i v a c y channels
from t h e P r e s i d e n t t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r on U.S. APL concerns,
g i v e n UK adherence t o t h e Ottawa Convention.
On A p r i l 27, on
the margins o f a memo from you, t h e P r e s i d e n t agreed t o r a i s e
the i s s u e w i t h B l a i r t h e next time they spoke. However, t h e
press o f o t h e r business has p r e c l u d e d a d i s c u s s i o n on i t .
Though S e c r e t a r i e s A l b r i g h t and Cohen have r a i s e d t h e i s s u e w i t h
t h e i r c o u n t e r p a r t s , we have been t o l d r e p e a t e d l y by t h e B r i t i s h
Embassy here t h a t B l a i r i s t h e ke^
Concurrence by:
Larry Butle
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve t h e Memorandum f o r t h e P r e s i d e n t a t Tab I
recommending he send t h e proposed l e t t e r a t Tab A.
Attachment
Tab I Memorandum f o r t h e P r e s i d e n t
Tab A Proposed L e t t e r
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 6 / 0 2 / 0 8
eemftiAt
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
�^I.TIDCHTIAb-
598 5
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I N G T O N
August 27, 1998
TELEPHONE CALL WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
DATE: August 27, 1998
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: 4:15 p.m.
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
I.
g^.
PURPOSE
To d i s c u s s your v i s i t t o Russia, and the Russian f i n a n c i a l
s i t u a t i o n i n p a r t i c u l a r , and t o N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d .
II.
BACKGROUND
Tony B l a i r w i l l be e i t h e r i n S c o t l a n d o r have j u s t r e t u r n e d
from t h e r e when you speak. He has the Russian f i n a n c i a l
s i t u a t i o n v e r y much on h i s mind. Your t a l k i n g p o i n t s cover
the main issues t h a t he w i l l cover -- seriousness o f the
f i n a n c i a l s i t u a t i o n and who i s i n power i n Moscow.
Russia.
News r e p o r t s and rumors o f Y e l t s i n ' s death o r
r e s i g n a t i o n have c i r c u l a t e d t h r o u g h o u t Moscow and g l o b a l
f i n a n c i a l markets today. The most s e r i o u s i s t h a t Y e l t s i n
s i g n e d a l e t t e r o f r e s i g n a t i o n , b u t w i l l not date i t u n t i l
Chernomyrdin i s c o n f i r m e d as prime m i n i s t e r ; upon Y e l t s i n ' s
r e s i g n a t i o n , Chernomyrdin would become a c t i n g P r e s i d e n t f o r
90 days, f o l l o w e d by new e l e c t i o n s . We cannot c o n f i r m any
of these r e p o r t s . Y e l t s i n ' s spokesman s a i d e a r l i e r today,
"No r e s i g n a t i o n has been on the agenda."
S t r o b e r e p o r t s from Moscow t h a t the s i t u a t i o n i s indeed
s e r i o u s , and events are changing r a p i d l y . B l a i r w i l l a l s o
want t o review your plans f o r t h e Summit and assessment the
Russian economic s i t u a t i o n .
Russia's economic s l i d e
a c c e l e r a t e d again today. Currency markets d i d not reopen
a f t e r y e s t e r d a y ' s r u b l e c r a s h . Stocks c o n t i n u e d t h e i r
plunge, f a l l i n g 17%. P u b l i c concern i s growing; l i n e s f o r
b a s i c goods and a t banks are b e i n g r e p o r t e d i n v a r i o u s
cities.
Work c o n t i n u e d on a d r a f t a n t i - c r i s i s program
j o i n t l y a u t h o r e d by the Duma, F e d e r a t i o n C o u n c i l , and t h e
eONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 8/27/08
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
P E R E.O. 13526
aoiS - OM-?*- n
�CCNFIDLNTIAL
e x e c u t i v e branch; t h e p l a n a p p a r e n t l y i n c l u d e s s e v e r a l
r e p u d i a t i o n s o f t h e p r e v i o u s government's s t a b i l i z a t i o n and
r e f o r m measures.
N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d . Tony B l a i r w i l l want t o review your
schedule and t r i p o b j e c t i v e s and themes, as w e l l as b r i e f
you on h i s s i x s t e p p l a n t o break t h e logjam i n
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e Good F r i d a y Accord. He and B e r t i e
Ahern have engaged b o t h l e a d e r s i n an i n t e n s i v e s h u t t l e
d i a l o g u e and have a s i x - s t e p p l a n . F i r s t i s g e t t i n g Adams
to make a statement t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t the war i s over.
Second i s f o r a meeting o f a l l t h e p a r t y l e a d e r s . T h i r d i s
an Adams-Trimble b i l a t e r a l .
Fourth i s appointing Martin
McGuinness as Sinn Fein's c o o r d i n a t o r f o r decommissioning.
F i f t h i s some form o f a c t u a l decommissioning. S i x t h i s
T r i m b l e naming t h e E x e c u t i v e ( i n c l u d e s two Sinn Fein
m i n i s t e r s ) . The dominant h u r d l e i s number f i v e ; B l a i r may
suggest (and we concur) t h a t you c a l l Adams t h i s week t o
urge him t o a c t b o l d l y on t h i s unique o p p o r t u n i t y t o
demonstrate t h a t process has momentum.
You should ask B l a i r what c o n c r e t e steps we can t a k e t o
b r i n g Adams on board, i n c l u d i n g any sweeteners t h a t e i t h e r
the UK o r we can p r o v i d e him t o make i t e a s i e r ; however,
you should a l s o e x p l a i n t h a t your experience w i t h Adams t h e
past f o u r years shows we need t o be c a u t i o u s i n i s o l a t i n g
him -- weakening Gerry w i l l n o t advance our common
o b j e c t i v e i n f i n a l l y m a r g i n a l i z i n g the "hard men."
Regarding t h e Real IRA and A n g l o - I r i s h measures t o suppress
i t , you should i n d i c a t e t o B l a i r concern about a backlash
to suspension o f f i r s t and f i f t h amendment r i g h t s i n
N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d . The UK w i l l enact l e g i s l a t i o n next week
making i t p o s s i b l e f o r a suspected RIRA member t o be
c o n v i c t e d on t h e word o f a s e n i o r RUG o f f i c e r when t h e
i n d i v i d u a l r e f u s e s t o t e s t i f y a g a i n s t h i m s e l f . This runs
counter t o t h e l i b e r a l i z a t i o n e n v i s i o n e d under t h e Good
F r i d a y Accord, seems t o be a d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e response t o
the t h r e a t posed by a v e r y s m a l l group, and (as r e c e n t
h i s t o r y shows) lends i t s e l f t o abuse by s e c u r i t y o f f i c i a l s
w i t h o l d scores t o s e t t l e .
N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d Schedule. We are l a r g e l y i n sync w i t h t h e
B r i t i s h on your schedule, t h e d e t a i l s o f which were passed
to B l a i r ' s o f f i c e t h i s morning. You a r r i v e mid-morning
from Moscow and go d i r e c t l y t o Stormont f o r a s h o r t
b i l a t e r a l w i t h T r i m b l e and M a l l o n , f o l l o w e d by s e r i e s o f
CONriDCNTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�COHriDCMTIAL
s e m i - p r i v a t e meetings w i t h t h e p a r t i e s a t a r e c e p t i o n w i t h
the assembly. You w i l l then go t o W a t e r f r o n t H a l l , b r i e f l y
m e e t i n g w i t h John Hume upon a r r i v a l , t o d e l i v e r your p o l i c y
speech t o t h e Assembly members and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f
N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d ' s s o c i e t y . Your l a s t stop i n B e l f a s t i s
f o r t h e S p r i n g v a l e E d u c a t i o n a l V i l l a g e groundbreaking;
B l a i r i s uncomfortable w i t h t h i s as he has not been seen i n
p u b l i c w i t h Adams y e t . Adams w i l l be present among a group
of VIPs ( i n h i s d i s t r i c t ) b u t he w i l l not be onstage and
has no i n d i v i d u a l r o l e . The B r i t i s h are s l i g h t l y uneasy
w i t h what might seem t o be a reward t o Adams i f t h e r e i s no
p r o g r e s s on democracy, b u t t h e y now seem t o accept our
l o g i c on t h e importance o f S p r i n g v a l e and i t s c o n n e c t i o n
w i t h t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Fund f o r I r e l a n d and t h e low key
n a t u r e o f t h e Adams r o l e .
You w i l l then depart f o r Omagh t o meet b r i e f l y w i t h a group
i n c l u d i n g a c r o s s - s e c t i o n o f community leaders and f a m i l y
members and l a y a wreath, and c o n t i n u e on t o Armagh f o r
your crowd event. Each o f those events accomplishes your
major o b j e c t i v e s i n s u p p o r t i n g N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d ' s peace and
prosperity:
the peace process and a new p o l i t i c a l
i n s t i t u t e , e d u c a t i o n , help f o r e c o n o m i c a l l y disadvantaged
areas, r e c o n c i l i a t i o n and r e d e d i c a t i o n o f American support
f o r t h e N o r t h e r n I r i s h people.
III.
PARTICIPANTS
TBD
IV.
PRESS PLAN
Closed
V.
SEQUENCE
TBD
Attachment
Tab A
P o i n t s t o Make
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
COMriDCNTIAI,
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59^5
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
S i t u a t i o n i n Moscow
•
Strobe i s on the ground t a l k i n g t o a l l the major p l a y e r s .
He
says t h e s i t u a t i o n i s o b v i o u s l y s e r i o u s ; some r e p o r t s o f
u n r e s t and d i s o r d e r may be exaggerated. Agrees t h a t we need
t o watch the s i t u a t i o n v e r y c l o s e l y .
•
Key concern: who's i n charge. Seen r e p o r t s o f Y e l t s i n
r e s i g n a t i o n ; cannot c o n f i r m them. Y e l t s i n i n dacha,
Chernomyrdin focused on c o n f i r m a t i o n .
•
Strobe met w i t h Y e l t s i n ' s c h i e f o f s t a f f Yumashev. He
r e a f f i r m e d t h a t Chernomyrdin w i l l lead a r e a l government, n o t
a government o f n a t i o n a l u n i t y .
•
Strobe underscored t h e r i s k o f being o v e r - i n c l u s i v e .
s a i d t h a t they are p r e p a r e d t o r e s i s t .
•
What t h a t means i s u n c l e a r . Yumashev i m p l i e d t h a t new
government c o u l d have members w i t h " d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l
labels."
Yumashev
Economic Issues
•
We a r e e x t r e m e l y concerned about r a p i d d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n t h e
economy. C e n t r a l Bank i s under tremendous p r e s s u r e t o i n j e c t
l i q u i d i t y i n t o the banking sector.
•
Banks are t a k i n g t h a t money o u t o f t h e c o u n t r y , i n s t e a d o f
meeting t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s .
The Russians need t o send c l e a r e r s i g n a l s about t h e i r economic
p o l i c y . Concerned t h a t we may get c o n f u s i n g messages b e f o r e
t h e r e i s more c l a r i t y .
New t r i l a t e r a l commission (Duma/Federation C o u n c i l / E x e c u t i v e
Branch) f l o a t i n g ideas l i k e p r i c e c o n t r o l s and r e n a t i o n a l i z i n g
key i n d u s t r i e s .
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•
This k i n d o f t a l k w i l l send p r e c i s e l y t h e wrong s i g n a l s t o
markets, even though i t ' s n o t c l e a r t h e ideas w i l l be
implemented.
•
Russians need t o understand t h a t s t a b i l i z a t i o n depends on t h e
steps t h e y take i n t e r n a l l y . No easy choices or s i l v e r b u l l e t s
available.
Summit
•
As f a r as Strobe can t e l l ,
underway.
Russian summit p r e p a r a t i o n s
•
Know t h a t I'm w a l k i n g i n t o v e r y c o m p l i c a t e d s i t u a t i o n .
agenda:
still
My
-- underscore t h a t engagement w i t h Russia remains v e r y
i m p o r t a n t and has major s e c u r i t y i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e U.S.
and i n t e r n a t i o n a l community;
-- r e a f f i r m stakes i n Russia's fundamental c h o i c e t o
embrace democracy and f r e e markets and t h e importance o f
Russia s t a y i n g on t h a t p a t h ;
-- s t r e s s t h a t economic s t a b i l i z a t i o n and r e c o v e r y depends
on Russian s o l u t i o n s t o Russian problems; and
-- speak c l e a r l y t o a broad spectrum o f Russian l e a d e r s ,
i n c l u d i n g Chernomyrdin, t h e Duma, and r e g i o n a l l e a d e r s ,
about t h e c h a l l e n g e s Russia faces.
Northern
Ireland
•
G r e a t l y impressed by t h e r e a c t i o n t o your v i s i t t o Omagh.
Think t h a t t r a g e d y makes my v i s i t even more i m p o r t a n t t o
peace i m p l e m e n t a t i o n -- remind people t h a t t h e f i r s t b l o o d
shed s i n c e t h e Good F r i d a y Agreement does n o t a f f e c t our
commitment.
•
My i n s t i n c t was t o go t o Omagh from the b e g i n n i n g ; we
wanted t o g i v e t h e community t h e r e b r e a t h i n g space b e f o r e
t h e y g e t caught up i n p r e p a r a t i o n s . I was s u r p r i s e d a t t h e
warmth o f t h e welcome t h e town has extended t o o u r advance
p e o p l e . There, and a f t e r w a r d s i n Armagh, I i n t e n d t o
r e i n f o r c e message i n p r i v a t e and p u b l i c l y t h a t a d e s i r e f o r
.COMF1 DEMEJM.
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCUi .
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peace and t h e promise o f r e c o n c i l i a t i o n a r e t h e e s s e n t i a l
i n g r e d i e n t s f o r making t h e Good F r i d a y Accord work.
P e r v e r s e l y , Omagh and o t h e r bombings i n t h e w o r l d t h i s
month may have made i t e a s i e r f o r Gerry Adams t o begin
moving on weapons. I am ready t o h e l p w i t h t h e s i x step
p l a n . What do you want me t o do, and how do you e n v i s i o n
an a c t u a l a c t o f decommissioning? That seems v e r y hard and
we need t o be c a r e f u l n o t t o lose him i n t h e process.
On o t h e r events on t h e schedule, I am l o o k i n g f o r w a r d t o
w o r k i n g t h e Assembly w i t h you a t Stormont; want t o keep t h e
f o r m a l i t i e s t h e r e b r i e f t o spend more time w i t h t h e
parties.
That w i l l g i v e me a b e t t e r sense f o r how t o
d e l i v e r my p o l i c y address a f t e r w a r d s a t W a t e r f r o n t .
A f t e r w a r d s , S p r i n g v a l e stop i s i m p o r t a n t . I t i s symbol o f
American support f o r t h e I F I and e d u c a t i o n and economic
r e g e n e r a t i o n . Our j o i n t presence underscores t h a t
n o r m a l i t y r e i g n s d e s p i t e Omagh, and t h a t we c o n t i n u e t o
share i n t h e r i s k s Adams, and T r i m b l e , a r e t a k i n g .
CONFIDENTIAL.
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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CONFIDEHTIAL
6252
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
Northern I r e l a n d
Deeply a p p r e c i a t e d your and Cherie's h o s p i t a l i t y l a s t week.
D i d n ' t expect c o u l d t o p t h e 1995 v i s i t , b u t t h i n k i t d i d .
•
What i s your thinking on how to f i n i s h the Trimble and Adams
two-step - decommissioning and naming the executive?
•
Gerry's coming here next month.
What do you want me to do?
Russia
•
Primakov has a huge t a s k -- i n s o l v e n t banks, c o l l a p s e d currency,
s p i r a l i n g i n f l a t i o n -- and no economic experience.
Fear i s t h a t Primakov w i l l t r y t o govern on t h e b a s i s o f
p o l i t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s r a t h e r than s t a k i n g meaningful steps t o
r e s t o r e t h e economy. E a r l y i n d i c a t i o n s on h i s economic team are
not encouraging.
Glad you are h o s t i n g G-7 meeting on Russia and t h a t t h e Russians
w i l l j o i n f o r p a r t o f t h e d i s c u s s i o n . Good o p p o r t u n i t y f o r us
to share w i t h Russians lessons l e a r n e d from f i n a n c i a l c r i s e s i n
other parts of the world.
I p l a n t o c a l l Y e l t s i n now t h a t Primakov i s c o n f i r m e d .
Will
emphasize t h a t now t h a t he has a Prime M i n i s t e r i n p l a c e , he
needs t o make sure someone i n t h e government can preserve h i s
legacy on economic r e f o r m .
Do you t h i n k i t makes sense f o r you t o make a s i m i l a r c a l l t o
Y e l t s i n on b e h a l f o f t h e G-7 b e f o r e t h e Monday meeting?
New York Conference
•
H i l l a r y and I are l o o k i n g f o r w a r d t o seeing you September 21 a t
the NYU d i a l o g u e on democracy and t h e g l o b a l economy; Persson
(Sweden), P r o d i , Stoyanov ( B u l g a r i a ) are on board, and we are
w a i t i n g f o r Mandela - w i l l make f o r d i v e r s e and v e r y i n t e r e s t i n g
panel d i s c u s s i o n .
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" Jftu
t^mrTKH
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On:
9/11/08
�INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ISSUES
•
As we discussed when we were together, I am q u i t e concerned
about the i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l system. Over l a s t month,
c r i s i s i n confidence has taken on global character a f f e c t i n g
a l l emerging markets. Believe i t i s important t o p u b l i c l y
discuss the nature of the c r i s i s and show we are focused on
addresing i t .
Plan t o make a speech on Monday i n New York.
•
I believe i t would be h e l p f u l i f the G-7 finance m i n i s t e r s
and c e n t r a l bank governors made a statement recognizing the
serious s t r a i n s i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l system and
committing t o respond appropriately. Our Treasury has
discussed t h i s idea w i t h your o f f i c i a l s .
•
S i t u a t i o n i n B r a z i l has d e t e r i o r a t e d s e r i o u s l y . Believe we
may need t o consider bold f i n a n c i a l responses. Finance
o f f i c i a l s are i n touch.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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6252
•COMF1 BENT IAL.
POINTS TO RE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
Northern I r e l a n d
Deeply appreciated your and Cherie's hospitality last Week.
Didn't expect could top the 1995 visit, but think
it/did.
What i s your thinking on how to f i n i s h the Trimble and Adams
two-step - decommissioning and naming the executive?
•
Gerry's coming here next month, so I've got,.some Icvorago e-m—.
kijjju What do you want me t o do? W&at i s B e r t i e ' s take-on t h i ^ 3
Russia
•
Primakov has a huge t a s k — i n s o l v e n t banks, collapsech-GUxrency,,
s p i r a l i n g i n f l a t i o n -- and no economic e x p e r i e n c e . Somo rumoi
te-head euunuiuic Learn are from t h e o l d s c h o o l . •
Fear i s t h a t Primakov w i l l t r y t o govern on t h e b a s i s o f
p o l i t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s r a t h e r than s t a k i n g meaningful steps t o
r e s t o r e t h e economy. Early' i n d i c a t i o n s on h i s economic team are
not encouraging.
Glad you are h o s t i n g G-7 meeting on Russia and t h a t t h e Russians
w i l l j o i n f o r p a r t o f t h e d i s c u s s i o n . Good o p p o r t u n i t y f o r us
to share w i t h Russians lessons l e a r n e d from f i n a n c i a l c r i s e s i n
other p a r t s of the world.
I p l a n t o c a l l . Y e l t s i n a f t e r Primakov i s c o n f i r m e d .
Will
emphasize t h a t now t h a t he has a Prime M i n i s t e r i n p l a c e , he
needs t o make sure someone i n t h e government can p r e s e r v e h i s
legacy on economic r e f o r m .
Do you t h i n k i t makes sense f o r you t o make a s i m i l a r c a l l t o
Y e l t s i n , on b e h a l f o f t h e G-7 b e f o r e t h e Monday meeting?
New York Conference
{
a ,
• H i / t l a r y and I are l o o k i n g f o r w a r d t o seeing you September 21 aft ( ^ ^ ^ r
t/e NYU d i a l o g u e on democracy and t h e g l o b a l economy; Persson/,
P r o d i , Stoyanov ( B u l g a r i a ) are on board, and we are w a i t i n g f o r
/Mandela - w i l l make f o r d i v e r s e and v e r y i n t e r e s t i n g panel
/ discussion.
/CONFIDENTIAL.
y/ Reason: 1. 5 (d)
/ D e c l a s s i f y On: 9/11/08
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)
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CONFIDENTIAL
6252
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
DECLASSIFIED
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Northern I r e l a n d
Deeply a p p r e c i a t e d your and Cherie's h o s p i t a l i t y l a s t week.
D i d n ' t expect c o u l d t o p t h e 1995 v i s i t , b u t t h i n k i t d i d .
What i s your thinking on how to f i n i s h the,.-Trimble and Adams
two-step - decommissioning and naming the-'executive?
/-A
/
e i r meeting y e s t e r d a y Ipo^ed l i k e / ^ t N ^ ^ . ' £ ) \ ^
j m ^ ^ n t ^ a . rplation^hijD,
• [Knpw t h a t packaging s e c u r i t y ' ^ r e s e n c e . r e a c t i o n s and t r o o p
j w i t h d r a w a l s / f o r an\ IRA a c t ' o f c^eeommi'ssioning t r i , c f l c y \ f o r y o y ^
•i
y ^ . ^ v ^ , ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ s u f f i c i f e n t ^ l i f t foNs^Ad^ms t o s^l-K'to Whe hodmen.
v
4 T r i m b l e l o s t \ t h r e e UUP Assembly members y e s t e r d a y over t h e
l e los-fcv
'•^Adams^b i l / t ; • an he s u r v i v e l e t t i n g /Sirm Fein i n t b N t h e
Executive unde^an^.-c'ircum^ances?.-'' What \qan yje' do u©—bolster
his position?
^
Gerry's coming here next month, so I've got some leverage on
him. What do you want me to do? What is Bertie's take on
this?
^
1
R u s s i a
\
• •"'
k
GlXd E o r i s f i n g j ^ y ^ p a m e d a^riirres^Minister
y-
\
XT
be
U^. -f pJa-A
-
P-rimakov l i k e l y _
t^ojifirmed-r'''' The^pe-3ritical v o i d - w a - s c i e b i l i t a t i n g .
'
^— .
- — ,
— • -
Pr^-itTakov has a huge task -- i n s o l v e n t banks, c o l l a p s e d ^~*~)''^Ccur^ency, s p i r a l i n g i n f l a t i o n — and no economic e x p e r i e n c e .
" ''"^
"'"
:me rumored t o head economic team are from t h e o l d s c h o o l .
Real f e ^ r i s t h a t Primak6v m^y apply t o economics t h e same
'.philo'sopny he f o l l o ws-'on f o r e i g n p o l i c y -- . g e t i h t e r n a t i o n a l
ws
o
•I comifiunity\ t o bend ,to Russia' s\views . If.-he f l a u n t s reai-rtTT^H ""
\ oV i n t e r n a .ona. economics, i t ' ^ i l l be^a d i s a s t e r r 5 r Russia.
-
•
1
Glad you a r e h o s t i n g G-7 meeting on Russia and t h a t t h e
Russians w i l l j o i n f o r p a r t o f t h e d i s c u s s i o n . Good
e a
CONFIDENTIAL
' "'Reason: 1.5(d)
^
D e c l a s s i f y On: 9/11/08
^
". "
^ C : , \
v
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�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFI DEMT IAL.
6252
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
TELEPHONE CALL WITH
PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR
DATE: September 11, 1998
LOCATION: Oval O f f i c e
TIME: 4:15 - 4:35 p.m. .•
.
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER/
I.
PURPOSE
To d i s c u s s f u r t h e r steps i n the N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d peace
process t o f o l l o w up your v i s i t , as w e l l as review
developments i n Russia and note t h a t you w i l l see him i n
New York on September 21.
II.
BACKGROUND
N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d . Your v i s i t l a s t week helped unlock a
growing logjam on.Good F r i d a y Accord i m p l e m e n t a t i o n (Adams
statements on v i o l e n c e and t h i s week's f i r s t - e v e r AdamsT r i m b l e meeting) , but the df.commissioning-Shadow e x e c u t i v e
d e a l i s p r o v i n g e l u s i v e . Tony B l a i r w i l l want t o o u t l i n e
h i s ideas f o r a second round o f steps t h a t c o u l d get Adams
and T r i m b l e over t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e h u r d l e s .
T r i m b l e d e l i v e r e d on h i s premise t o you l a s t week t o meet
w i t h Gerry Adams. He engaged Adams i n d i r e c t d i a l o g u e a t a
m u l t i l a t e r a l event Monday, and then had an one-on-one
y e s t e r d a y . A T i i m b l u p a i d a v,Biee, •thtragh-: Throojj&P
Assembly members q u r t the p ^ t t y , p u t t i n g J T j i i m b T e ' s m a j o r i t y
•at r i s k z / x h e a n t i - a c c o t d \ m i o i n l s X ^ ^ r r 5 u p c a n now t r i g g e r
the s p e c i a l "suf f i c i e n t ^ ^ ^ e n s u s " v o t i n g mechanism.
)le w i l l hav^^t<r^anpeaiNto the p r o - a c c o r d b u t nona l i g n e d Assembly mem^^rs (Womeh<^Coalition and A l l i a n c e )
to^jLsg-rstcr as u n i u n i ^ L ^ fuz L a C l i c d l v u l l u y Iedbuns-r.
\Adams and T r i m b l e agreed t o meet again next week. The next
events are. the September 14-15 meeting o f the new Assembly,
which w i l l be f o l l o w e d by announcement o f a f i n a l round o f
c o n s u l t a t i o n s September 28-29 b e f o r e T r i m b l e moves f o r w a r d
CONriDENTIAL•
Reason: 1.5(d)
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CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
on naming t h e new E x e c u t i v e . This a l l o w s t h r e e weeks t p '
f i n a l i z e a decommissioning d e a l .
/
T r i m b l e c o u l d be t o p p l e d as UUP l e a d e r next month/at t h e
p a r t y c o n v e n t i o n i f he were t o p u t SF i n t o t h e Executive^--- / -W
absent an a c t u a l a c t o f decommissioning.
However, / ^ I f a r t i n g '
decommissioning i n exchange f o r seats on t h e / E x e c u t i v e i s
^
more than Adams^can s e l l t o IRA h a r d l i n e r s . - As B e r t i e
Ahern o u t l i n e d , he and B l a i r a r e working t o e x p l o i t t h e
RIRA c e a s e - f i r e and lessened s e c u r i t y t h r e a t t o s e l l t h e
^(\.C •'
consequent drawdown i n t h e B r i t i s h s e c u r i t y presence as
" d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n , " t o secure an IRA u n i l a t e r a l response
( e x p l o s i o n o f Semtex t h a t c o u l d be v e r i f i e d a f t e r w a r d s ) .
C
u
1
L
J
A down payment was made yesterday, when Chief Constable
Flanagan announced that he no longer needs B r i t i s h Army
p a t r o l s to protect the poli.ce i n B e l f a s t , which has been
understood as a prelude to UK.-troop withdrawals .^^gg^gj^^&k
La—the- -Bri t i sh-i s—t-hat--t-hey- ,<^uld'-be^Ccu'sed"of
l e g i t i m i z i n g the IRA i f they were to engage i n a fjbrce
drawdqwn e x e r c i s e with t e r r o r i s t s . This^.will remire-'you,
B l a i r jand Ahern' to engag^ i n very ^ u i e t ; and/per sonal /
diplomp.cy to £;et up the /choreography t h a t gives /Trimble'
cover/to let;'Sinn F e i n / i n t o the Exectitive,/ ailcnt^ th4/lRA
to s p i n to Q & i r f o l k /th^ decoinii^Lssioning,^and p r o t e c t s
B l a i r from accusatipns-"bf appea^iaent.
-
/
S\
ha^ve'some upcoming l e v e r a g e ^ i t h Adams^^AHe i s p l a n n i n g
a; v i s i t t o t h e / j j n i t e d S t a t e s / i n Qctober,/anq w i l l / \
undbubte^dly ^ e e k an Oval O f f i c e meeting'; t h i f e w p u l d
^p^ropriaJug' i f he i s i n t h e E x e c u t i v ^ a n d engaged i n
(^commissioning.
-—
V
Russia. Primakov's nomination i s l i k e l y t o s a i l t h r o u g h
c o n f i r m a t i o n on F r i d a y . E a r l y i n d i c a t i o n s about t h e makeup
of t h e Cabinet a r e n o t encouraging. Gorbachev-era f i g u r e s
such
Gerashchenko and Maslyukov have t h e i n s i d e t r a c k
f o r t h e C e n t r a l Bank and macroeconomic czar p o s i t i o n s ,
r e s p e c t i v e l y . Gerashchenko i s t h e man who t r i e d t o s o l v e
Russia's problems i n 1992 by p r i n t i n g money t o keep
f a c t o r i e s open, s p a r k i n g 25% monthly i n f l a t i o n .
Maslyukov
/has s i m i l a r views. I f t h e downward s p i r a l c o n t i n u e s , i t
w i l l l i k e l y a c c e l e r a t e . The impacts a r e p r e d i c t a b l e : r u n
away i n f l a t i o n , f u r t h e r e r o s i o n o f t h e c u r r e n c y , food
s h o r t a g e s , t h e i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r goes i d l e , b l a c k markets,
crime and c o r r u p t i o n become p e r v a s i v e .
/
/
/
/
• O FI DENT I Ah
SN
�CONTI DGNT IAD.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
,Wc have t-wo—obvfrms—aprt-fon-s-:—Hd—ie-fe—the—R-u-s sians—go—the i r
'©iiO_j^y_jjid_no^ge±^t^r-red--wirth-^
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eggage the__Ru_s,sJ-aas-,—at-tempWto.-.educate-P-r-imako-v—on—T--e &CLnnriu^_jLeali.ties---and---t-ry-feo-m-i-fe-igat e - the- • prospects f o r
j±Laas-t-er-r^—We--a4v-i-se-t-he---seeond---r-©ute --.but^_w.e__.ne.e,dLto
~aeeep-t~a-t-the-_ou.t set- t-ha-t- -chances -f or—sueeess--a-r-e-not-"hTgh .
I n your c a l l w i t h B l a i r , you s h o u l d s t r e s s t h e importance
of t h e Monday G-7/G-8 London meeting on Russia and t h e need
t o have a s e r i o u s exchange w i t h t h e Russians on lessons
l e a r n e d from f i n a n c i a l c r i s e s i n o t h e r p a r t s o f t h e w o r l d .
You might a l s o i n d i c a t e t h a t you w i l l c a l l Y e l t s i n a f t e r
Primakov i s confirmed t o underscore the,-importance o f
naming a s t r o n g leader on economic r e f o r m t o t h e
government. You might suggest t h a t B l a i r make a s i m i l a r
call.
T
NY event. NYU School o f Law i s h o s t i n g September 21 an
"opening d i a l o g u e " on democracy i n t h e g l o b a l economy. The
format i s a one-day seminar composed o f t h r e e panels. The
f i r s t two w i l l be made up o f ' l e a d i n g w o r l d f i g u r e s and t h e
NYU community and are on c i v i l s o c i e t y , and t h e new economy
and t h e f u t u r e f o r o p p o r t u n i t y . The F i r s t Lady w i l l
p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e f i r s t panel. You w i l l p a r t i c i p a t e i n
the t h i r d panel on s t r e n g t h e n i n g democracy.
Participation
of l e a d e r s i s e v o l v i n g p o s i t i v e l y .
I naddition to Blair,
Persson (Sweden), Prodi and Stoyanov ( B u l g a r i a ) . NYU i s
seeking c o n f i r m a t i o n from Mandela. C h r e t i e n , Cardoso,
Havel and Kok were i n v i t e d b u t are unable t o a t t e n d .
III.
PARTICIPANTS
TBD
IV.
PRESS PLAN ,
Closed press.
V.
SEQUENCE
TBD /
Attachment
Tab A ' P o i n t s t o make
'
/
•CONriDENTIAL
/
�c o n n DCI JT IAL
6789
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR
K o f i Annan's r e p o r t i s a g r a p h i c account o f M i l o s e v i c ' s
d e f i a n c e o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l community.
B e l i e v e we need t o
m a i n t a i n momentum and b u i l d consensus f o r NATO d e c i s i o n t o
authorize force.
•
Holbrooke c o n t i n u e s h i s meetings i n Belgrade and P r i s t i n a
today. F i g h t i n g has been i n a l u l l f o r t h e p a s t few days, b u t
M i l o s e v i c has n o t y e t withdrawn t h e necessary p o l i c e and
m i l i t a r y f o r c e s , nor agreed t o measures t h a t would make t h e
end o f h o s t i l i t i e s v e r i f i a b l e and d u r a b l e .
•
Know t h a t you've been t h i n k i n g about ways t o g e t Russia on
board.
•
We have a l l g o t t e n a c l e a r s i g n a l from Moscow t h a t t h e y w i l l
not s u p p o r t another UN r e s o l u t i o n . Seems t o me o n l y harm can
come a t t h i s p o i n t i n f o r c i n g Y e l t s i n t o v e t o .
•
A l t h o u g h I have doubts about t h e wisdom, we can agree t o
Contact Group meeting p r i o r t o NATO ACTORD b u t o n l y i f key
a l l i e s agree i n advance t h a t NATO w i l l proceed r e g a r d l e s s o f
what Russian p o s i t i o n i s .
•
A l s o , I u n d e r s t a n d t h a t some o f your o f f i c i a l s a r e p r e s s i n g t o
l i n k a d e c i s i o n on a p p r o v i n g a i r s t r i k e s t o NATO's w i l l i n g n e s s
to commit ground f o r c e s t o oversee a c e a s e - f i r e o r p o l i t i c a l
settlement.
•
You s h o u l d know t h a t t h i s i s a v e r y d i f f i c u l t i s s u e f o r us,
p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h t h e Congress.
I t ' s been an u p h i l l s t r u g g l e
to s u s t a i n s u p p o r t f o r SFOR g i v e n Congress's concerns about
r e a d i n e s s and any s u g g e s t i o n t h a t we a r e a l s o r a i s i n g f o r c e s
f o r Kosovo w i l l make i t v e r y d i f f i c u l t t o ensure domestic
support f o r possible a i r s t r i k e s .
Our o b j e c t i v e now i s t o secure f u l l compliance w i t h UNSCR
1199.
I f t h e r e i s an agreement on a peace s e t t l e m e n t , t h e n we
w i l l need t o c o n s i d e r what k i n d o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l presence i s
needed and what i f any r o l e we w i l l p l a y i n implementing i t .
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
^ONFTPFNTT AT.
Reason:
1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 10/05/08
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
�•CQNriDENTIAL
We want t o keep a l l options open at t h i s p o i n t , rather than
beginning t o generate forces f o r a large NATO-led
implementation force.
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
6789
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR
K o f i Annan's r e p o r t i s a g r a p h i c account o f M i l o s e v i c ' s ,
d e f i a n c e o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. B e l i e v e we n e e d A o
m a i n t a i n momentum and b u i l d consensus f o r NATO d e c i s i o n t o
authorize force.
Holbrooke c o n t i n u e s h i s meetings i n Belgrade and P r i s t i n a
today.
F i g h t i n g has been i n a l u l l f o r t h e pafet few days, b u t
M i l o s e v i c has n o t y e t withdrawn t h e necessary p o l i c e and
m i l i t a r y f o r c e s , n o r agreed t o measures t h / t would make t h e
end o f h o s t i l i t i e s v e r i f i a b l e and durabl<
I/
Und^r^tand that/^yo^r represent^
po'ssii^yility seeking UN Se i r i t y
1 p e c i f\c a 1 ly/a
u t h o r r^ing^ pz
ce.
New YorkT i s ' c o n s i d e r i n g
more
)uncil Re^oluti
We have all go't4^en a clear signal from Moscow that'they will
not support anoh^a resolution/ Seems to me only harm can come
at this point in forcing Yelzsin
to veto.
, .^
i..
c
;king a^r&w r e s o l u t i o
ild
5m]3\licat(
.so
IIS
;eture NATO CG^nsensu^-^la/er
fek t o ^ a i i t i
strikes.
,
effo]
Rather than purouin)g a UNSCR, w ^ c a n agree t o Contact Group
m e e t i n g p r i o r t o NATO ACTORD/cfs "luny as key a l l i e s agree i n
advance t h a t NATy w i l l proceed r e g a r d l e s s o f what Russian
position i s . /
. n^w^j^,
,
i
(IA)
V?'
A l s o , I u n d e r s t a n d Irnat some o f y o u r / o f f i c i a l s are p r e s s i n g t o
l i n k a d e c i s i o n o n / a i r s t r i k e s t o frfre gern
ireff'Of ground
forces to/oversee a cease-fire or p o l i t i c a l settlement.
You s h o u l d know t h a t t h i s i s a v e r y d i f f i c u l t issue f o r us,
p a r t i / c u l a r l y w i t h t h e Congress. I t ' s been an u p h i l l s t r u g g l e
to gcit roady f o r SFOR/ and any s u g g e s t i o n t h a t we a r e a l s o
r a c i n g f o r c e s / f o r K o s t n ^ w i l l make i t v e r y d i f f i c u l t t o
e/sure domesl^lc support f o r ^ p e i s s i b l e a i r s t r i k e s .
5
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 10/05/08
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
8/y\5 v e
<n
'c^a
�CONriDCNTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
6789
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR
K o f i Annan's r e p o r t i s a g r a p h i c account o f M i l o s e v i c V s
d e f i a n c e o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. B e l i e v e we need t o
m a i n t a i n momentum and b u i l d consensus f o r NATO d e c / s i o n t o
authorize force.
Holbrooke c o n t i n u e s h i s meetings i n Belgrade /nd P r i s t i n a
today.
F i g h t i n g has been i n a l u l l f o r t h e / p a s t few days, b u t
M i l o s e v i c has n o t y e t withdrawn t h e necessary p o l i c e and
,
m i l i t a r y forces^
Understand t h a t your r e p r e s e n t a t i v e yh New York i s c o n s i d e r i n g ^ ^
p o s s i b i l i t y o f seeking UN S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l R e s o l u t i o n more
\
s p e c i f i c a l l y authorizing force.
/
civ>- ^ .
W
We have a l l g o t t e n a c l e a r s i g n a l from Moscow t h a t they w i l l
not support such a r e s o l u t i o n / Seems t o me o n l y harm can come
at t h i s p o i n t i n f o r c i n g Y e l t s i n t o v e t o .
Seeking a new r e s o l u t i o n / / o u l d a l s o c o m p l i c a t e our e f f o r t t o
secure NATO consensus 1 4 t e r t h i s week t o a u t h o r i z e a i r
strikes.
I u n d e r s t a n d t h a t /&me o f your o f f i c i a l s are p r e s s i n g t o l i n k
a d e c i s i o n on a i r / s t r i k e s t o t h e g e n e r a t i o n o f ground f o r c e s
to oversee a c e / s e - f i r e o r p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t .
You s h o u l d ki*ow t h a t t h i s i s a v e r y d i f f i c u l t i s s u e f o r us,
p a r t i c u l a r ! ^ w i t h t h e Congress. I t ' s been an u p h i l l s t r u g g l e
to g e t ready f o r SFOR and any s u g g e s t i o n t h a t we are a l s o
r a i s i n g / o r c e s f o r Kosovo w i l l make i t v e r y d i f f i c u l t t o
ensure d o m e s t i c support f o r p o s s i b l e a i r s t r i k e s .
Our e f o j e c t i v e now i s t o secure f u l l compliance w i t h UNSCR
119B.
I f t h e r e i s an agreement on a peace s e t t l e m e n t , then we
w i / l l need t o c o n s i d e r what k i n d o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l presence i s
ifeeded and what i f any r o l e we w i l l p l a y i n implementing i t .
We want t o keep a l l o p t i o n s open a t t h i s p o i n t , r a t h e r than
b e g i n n i n g t o generate f o r c e s f o r a l a r g e NATO-led
implementation force.
GONn DENT IAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 10/05/08
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
aoi3- o n a - n
�•CONFIDENTIAL
i
\
Can agree t o Contact Group meeting p r i o r t o ACTORD at NATCX as
'long as key a l l i e s agree i n advance that NATO w i l l proceed
regardless of what Russian p o s i t i o n i s .
This woul^L-^rVe^ the Russiansj3J3---eppT7rTfuhity to •Coh^dlt and t o
themselves w i i h — e t r r ^ p o s i t i o n .
€ONriDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�-CONFI DEITT IAL
6789
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR
•
_
K o f i Annan's report i s a graphic account of Milosevic's
defiance of i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. Believe we n^ed t o
maintain momentum and b u i l d consensus f o r NATO decision t o
_ authorize force.
• ' Understand t h a t your representative i n New^York i s considering
p o s s i b i l i t y of seeking UN Security Counc/l Resolution more
s p e c i f i c a l l y a u t h o r i z i n g force.
• We have a l l gotten a clear s i g n a l f/om Moscow t h a t they w i l l
not support such a r e s o l u t i o n . Serfems t o me only harm can come
at t h i s p o i n t i n f o r c i n g Yeltsiry to veto.
•
Seeking a new r e s o l u t i o n viou/a also complicate our e f f o r t t o
secure NATO consensus l a t e ? t h i s week t o authorize a i r
strikes.
•
I f A l l i e s know t h a t Security Council i s considering a
r e s o l u t i o n on use op f o r c e , t h i s w i l l r e i n f o r c e view of some
t h a t a f u r t h e r r e s o l u t i o n may oe necessary. Could also enable
Moscow t o delay NATO a c t i o n by prolonging debate i n New York.
I also understand that some of your o f f i c i a l s are pressing t o
l i n k a decleion on a i r s t r i k e s t o the generation of ground
forces to/oversee a cease-fire or p o l i t i c a l settlement.
You sh*mld know t h a t t h i s i s a very d i f f i c u l t issue f o r us,
p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h the Congress. I t ' s been an u p h i l l struggle
to / e t ready f o r SFOR and any suggestion t h a t we are also
r a i s i n g forces f o r Kosovo w i l l make i t very d i f f i c u l t t o
isure domestic support f o r possible a i r - s t r i k e s .
Our objective now is to secure full compliance with UNSCR
1199.
I f there i s an agreeraen : on a peace settlement, then we
w i l l need t o consider what ( i f any r o l e we w i l l play i n
implementing i t .
j t i ^ d oP
pres«*CA
/i
1
We want t o keep a l l options open at t h i s p o i n t , rather than
beginning t o generate forces f o r a large NATO-led
implementation force.
Y
oUNTUN LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFI DENTfMr
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 10/05/08
1^*4-
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
�•CONriDCNTIAL
6789
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR
K o f i Annan's r e p o r t i s a g r a p h i c account o f M i l o s e v i c ' s
d e f i a n c e o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. B e l i e v e }/e need t o
m a i n t a i n momentum and b u i l d consensus f o r N^O d e c i s i o n t o
authorize force.
c
Holbrc^ke c o n t i n u e s h i s meetings i n Belgfade and P r i s t i n a
today.
F i g h t i n g has been i n a l u l l fefr t h e past few days, but
M i l o s e v i c has n o t y e t withdrawn t h e ecessary p o l i c e and
m i l i t a r y forces.
i
•
I a l s o u n d e r s t a n d t h a t some o f /our o f f i c i a l s are p r e s s i n g t o
l i n k a d e c i s i o n on a i r s t r i k e s / t o t h e g e n e r a t i o n o f ground
f o r c e s t o oversee a c e a s e - f i p e o r p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t .
You s h o u l d kjiow t h a t t h i s / i s a v e r y d i f f i c u l t issue f o r us,
p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h t h e Congress. I t ' s been an u p h i l l s t r u g g l e
t o g e t ready f o r SFOR and any s u g g e s t i o n t h a t we are a l s o
r a i s i n g f o r c e s f o r Ko/ovo w i l l make i t v e r y d i f f i c u l t t o
ensure domestic support f o r p o s s i b l e a i r s t r i k e s .
Our o b j e c t i v e nov/ i s t o secure f u l l compliance w i t h UNSCR
1199.
I f t h e r e / i s an agreement on a peace s e t t l e m e n t , then we
w i l l need t o c o n s i d e r what k i n d o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l presence i s
needed and wferat i f any r o l e we w i l l p l a y i n implementing i t .
We want t c / keep a l l o p t i o n s open a t t h i s p o i n t , r a t h e r than
b e g i n n i n g t o generate f o r c e s f o r a l a r g e NATO-led
implementation force.
I f Ra/sed)
e r s t a n d t h a t your r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n New York i s c o n s i d e r i n g
p o s s i b i l i t y o f seeking UN S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l R e s o l u t i o n more
p e c i f i c a l l y authorizing force.
•/ We have a l l g o t t e n a c l e a r s i g n a l from Moscow t h a t t h e y w i l l
not s u p p o r t such a r e s o l u t i o n . Seems t o me o n l y harm can come
at t h i s p o i n t i n f o r c i n g Y e l t s i n t o v e t o .
-CONFI DENIAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 10/05/08
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2013-or?aZ
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY M
XS
K 6 W
�CONFIDEMTIAL
•
Seeking a new r e s o l u t i o n would a l s o c o m p l i c a t e our e f f o r t
secure NATO consensus l a t e r t h i s week t o a u t h o r i z e a i r
strikes.
•
I f A l l i e s know t h a t Securjy^y---Council i s c o n s i d e r i n g
r e s o l u t i o n on use ojU-^tfrce, t h i s w i l l reinfo^ce-^TTe^ o f some
t h a t a further>-ir£solution may be necg^s^r^TT Could/also enable
Moscow t p ^ d ^ l a y NATO a c t i o n by^prSTonging d e b a t e / i n New York.
CONriDENTIAL-
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CONFIDENTIAL
7033
)INTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
Middle East
•
Understand you are met w i t h A r a f a t today. As you know, he's
coming here tomorrow t o begin i n t e n s i v e t a l k s w i t h B i b i on the
i n t e r i m agreement, so I ' d love t o hear your thoughts.
•
Let me t e l l you b a s i c a l l y where we are. Both sides have taken
some important steps - B i b i on the redeployment f r o n t , A r a f a t
on the s e c u r i t y f r o n t . But they s t i l l remain f a r a p a r t .
•
There i s more d i s t r u s t here than I had imagined - every step
the p a r t i e s must take and every comma thev must agree on i s a
Struggle,
•
Outcome o f the Summit i s f a r from a done d e a l . I don't know
where we w i l l end up on Monday. Sharon i s another b i g new
f a c t o r . He won't a c t u a l l y show up a t Wye u n t i l Friday a f t e r
I've l e f t f o r a day.
•
But I'm persuaded we had t o take matters i n t o our hands. The
a l t e r n a t i v e o f l e t t i n g the process founder i s unacceptable e s p e c i a l l y w i t h the May 1999 deadline looming.
Northern I r e l a n d
o
Both Adams and Trimble are i n the United States.
o My Deputy Labor Secretary p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the opening o f the
NI roadshow l a s t week. Have impression t h a t i t i s going w e l l ,
•
Understand de Chastelain's group has the lead on t r y i n g t o
work the decommissioning issue, but t h a t your people t h i n k
a c t u a l l y decommissioning has t o w a i t u n t i l next s p r i n g .
•
What can I do t o help?
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 10/15/08
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. 0.13526
3 - 0412. -
�COHFIDCWHAfe
7C3 3
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
Middle East
o Understand you are met w i t h A r a f a t today. As you know, he's
coming here tomorrow t o begin i n t e n s i v e t a l k s w i t h B i b i on the
i n t e r i m agreement, so I ' d love t o hear your thoughts.
•
•
Let me t e l l you b a s i c a l l y where we are. Both sides have taken
some important steps — B i b i on the redeployment f r o n t , A r a f a t
on the s e c u r i t y f r o n t . But they s t i l l remain f a r a p a r t .
There i s more d i s t r u s t here than I had imagined —
the
p a r M p . q Tnnst f a V p anH
PVPI-V
rnmma t h e v m n s t
every step
arrrpp nn—i_s a_
struggle.
•
Outcome of the Summit i s f a r from a done d e a l . I don't know
where we w i l l end up on Monday. Sharon i s another b i g new
f a c t o r . He won't a c t u a l l y show up a t Wye u n t i l Friday a f t e r
I've l e f t f o r a day.
o But I'm persuaded we had t o take matters i n t o our hands. The
a l t e r n a t i v e o f l e t t i n g the process founder i s unacceptable e s p e c i a l l y w i t h the May 1999 deadline looming.
Northern I r e l a n d
•
Both Adams and Trimble are i n the United States.
• My Deputy Labor Secretary p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the opening o f the
NI roadshow l a s t week. Have impression t h a t i t i s going w e l l .
• Adams i s f r y i n g t p ^ f a i s e money, and keep syp£brters^b€hind the
peace agreement
o Understand de Chastelain's group has the lead on t r y i n g t o
work the decommissioning issue, but t h a t your people t h i n k
a c t u a l l y decommissioning has t o w a i t u n t i l next s p r i n g .
• What can I do t o help?
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 10/15/08
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
S/fc/iS" KBH
�TELEPHONE CALL WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR/PRESIDENT CHIRAC/CHANCELLOR SCHROEDER
DATE: March 21, 1999
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
I.
PURPOSE
To ensure key a l l i e s are ready f o r NATO t o i n i t i a t e a i r
s t r i k e s i f Belgrade continues t o conduct o f f e n s i v e
operations i n Kosovo and t o r e j e c t an i n t e r i m settlement.
II.
BACKGROUND
Several thousand MUP and VJ continue t o conduct operations
i n Kosovo t o secure l i n e s of communication f o r a major
o f f e n s i v e , which could be launched a t short n o t i c e . The
North A t l a n t i c Council i s meeting t o assess the s i t u a t i o n ,
and Secretary General Solana i s c o n s u l t i n g w i t h a l l i e s on
the i n i t i a t i o n o f a i r s t r i k e s . We are pressing f o r Solana
to pass the "key" f o r Phase I a i r s t r i k e s t o SACEUR on
Monday, and f o r the NAC on the same day t o give Solana the
"key" f o r follow-on s t r i k e s so t h a t NATO can respond
q u i c k l y i f Belgrade mounts a major o f f e n s i v e or attacks
NATO forces.
A l l three leaders who you are c a l l i n g seem committed t o
e a r l y NATO a i r s t r i k e s i f there i s no change i n Milosevic's
p o s i t i o n . Over the l a s t several days, senior o f f i c i a l s
from each o f t h e i r governments have issued p u b l i c
statements making clear that the t h r e a t of a i r s t r i k e s i s
r e a l . The three leaders w i l l be aware of Dick Holbrooke's
impending mission t o Belgrade because Madeleine A l b r i g h t
informed t h e i r Foreign M i n i s t e r s yesterday. They may have
questions about U.S. w i l l i n g n e s s t o move t o e a r l y a i r
s t r i k e s i n l i g h t o f the upcoming v i s i t by Primakov.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason:
1.5 ( b , d )
D e c l a s s i f y On: 3 / 2 1 / 0 9
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
- 0^-73.- H
8/L>/l5
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K
�-CQNFTDFNTTAL
Attachment
Tab A Points t o Make
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENT I AIi
�GONFEBENTIAL
9902006
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR/PRESIDENT CHIRAC/CHANCELLOR SCHROEDER
•
The s i t u a t i o n i n Kosovo continues t o d e t e r i o r a t e , w i t h several
thousand army and p o l i c e conducting operations against the
Kosovar Albanians. Forty thousand Serb s e c u r i t y forces are i n
and around Kosovo.
•
While M i l o s e v i c has yet not launched an a l l - o u t o f f e n s i v e , he
continues t o augment h i s forces i n Kosovo and i s poised t o do
so a t short n o t i c e .
•
I n the meantime, h i s forces are securing roads, c l e a r i n g
v i l l a g e s i n s t r a t e g i c areas and t e r r o r i z i n g t h e i r Albanian
i n h a b i t a n t s . This i s d i s p l a c i n g thousands of a d d i t i o n a l
Albanians. The town o f Srbica, which had 13,000 i n h a b i t a n t s
when Serb s e c u r i t y forces moved i n yesterday, i s today l a r g e l y
vacant.
•
Through h i s aggression and continued defiance, Milosevic has
c l e a r l y passed the threshold f o r NATO m i l i t a r y a c t i o n . I f he
does not change course i n the next few days, I b e l i e v e NATO
w i l l need t o i n i t i a t e a i r s t r i k e s . And we w i l l need t o
i n i t i a t e these s t r i k e s very q u i c k l y i f he launches a major
offensive.
•
NATO's a i r s t r i k e s w i l l need t o be s u b s t a n t i a l p a r t i c u l a r l y i f
he launches a major o f f e n s i v e , i n order t o achieve t h e i r
o b j e c t i v e o f demonstrating NATO's resolve, d e t e r r i n g f u r t h e r
aggression and damaging Belgrade's a b i l i t y to conduct
repressive operations i n Kosovo.
•
Of course our o b j e c t i v e i s not t o conduct a i r s t r i k e s , but t o
stop the violence and achieve an i n t e r i m settlement. With
t h i s i n mind, we are sending Ambassador Holbrooke tomorrow t o
Belgrade t o give Milosevic one l a s t chance.
•
Dick Holbrooke w i l l emphasize that NATO a i r s t r i k e s are
imminent and that Milosevic faces a stark choice. He can h a l t
aggression against the Kosovar Albanians and accept an i n t e r i m
settlement w i t h a NATO-led implementation force. Or he can
bear f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the consequences of NATO m i l i t a r y
action.
•
Dick i s now scheduled to see Milosevic tomorrow;
•CONFTPFNTJAL
d
£ £ « ; i ^ : ' 3 / 2 i / 0 9 CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DPD'P^?^?^^^
E.O. 13526
^ S ^ v T
�•COMriDCNTIMj
•
I n the meantime, we need t o prepare f o r m i l i t a r y a c t i o n .
Tomorrow Javier Solana should pass the "key" t o General Clark,
thus s t a r t i n g the countdown to i n i t i a l s t r i k e s . At the same
time, the NATO Council should give Javier the "key" f o r
follow-on s t r i k e s , so that NATO can respond q u i c k l y i f
Milosevic launches a major offensive or attacks our forces i n
Macedonia or Bosnia.
•
We need t o stay f i r m and u n i t e d . And we a l l need t o work w i t h
President Y e l t s i n and Prime M i n i s t e r Primakov t o minimize the
damage to our r e l a t i o n s w i t h Russia i f Milosevic gives us no
choice but t o proceed w i t h a i r s t r i k e s .
I f asked about Holbrooke's terms of reference:
•
Holbrooke w i l l press Milosevic to p u l l back h i s forces i n
Kosovo and accept the Rambouillet accords, p a r t i c u l a r l y the
establishment of a NATO-led implementation force.
•
He i s not going to re-negotiate the i n t e r i m settlement already
agreed w i t h the-Kosovar Albanians.
•
We w i l l p u l l him out of Belgrade immediately i f Milosevic
launches a major offensive while he i s present.
I f asked about timing and the Primakov v i s i t :
•
We w i l l need to i n i t i a t e a i r s t r i k e s q u i c k l y i f Milosevic
continues h i s aggression and r e j e c t i o n of an i n t e r i m
settlement. The precise timing w i l l depend i n p a r t on the
dynamics i n Kosovo and Belgrade.
•
We have already warned Russia, so t h a t Primakov can draw h i s
own conclusions f o r h i s upcoming t r i p . A l Gore has spoken t o
Primakov personally and Madeline has had numerous phone c a l l s
w i t h Foreign M i n i s t e r Ivanov.
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET
2100
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Chancellor Schroeder
PARTICIPANTS:
(U)
The President
Chancellor Schroeder
I n t e r p r e t e r : Gisela Marcuse
Notetakers: Jenny McGee, Jim Smith,
Murphy and Lawrence B u t l e r
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
March 23, 1999, 4:57-5:09 p.m.
The Oval O f f i c e
H e l l o , Gerhard?
Chancellor Schroeder:
Miles
EST
(U)
Hello, B i l l .
(U)
The President: Thank you f o r t a k i n g my c a l l . M i l o s e v i c gave
Ambassador Holbrooke no i n d i c a t i o n of being w i l l i n g t o n e g o t i a t e
a p e a c e f u l s o l u t i o n and refused even t o agree t o a c e a s e - f i r e
and continued t o r e j e c t any i n t e r n a t i o n a l presence. He was
t h r e a t e n i r i g and b e l l i c o s e , and i t ' s c l e a r he intends to unleash
g r e a t e r v i o l e n c e i n Kosovo.
Chancellor Schroeder: I was a f r a i d of t h a t , and I q u i t e agree
w i t h your a n a l y s i s of the s i t u a t i o n . |
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 l.4d
The President: Well, I'm glad to hear you say t h a t . I agree
w i t h t h a t and am ready t o support NATO f u l l y .
Two t h i n g s :
f i r s t , Prime M i n i s t e r Primakov has postponed h i s t r i p t o
Washington. I t was the best outcome under the circumstances.
We need t o l e t him know we w i l l continue t o work c l o s e l y w i t h
him and make i t c l e a r t h a t , number one, t h a t we share the same
o b j e c t i v e he does f o r a peaceful s o l u t i o n and, number two, we
are committed t o Russia's economic recovery. I t might not be a
bad idea i f you could c a l l him i n the next day or so and say
t h a t t o him.
GECRET
Reason: 1.5(a,b,d)
D e c l a s s i f y On:
3/23/09
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
S/u/iS"
KBM
�SECRET
Chancellor Schroeder: I w i l l d e f i n i t e l y c a l l him, and I see
t h i n g s the same way you see them. I w i l l make c l e a r t o him
Germany i s committed t o help w i t h Russia's economic development
and p r i v a t e investment, and also we have p o l i t i c a l o p t i o n s t h a t
can be used. I agree t h a t a t t h i s p o i n t i n the game i n
p a r t i c u l a r t h a t we t e l l him these t h i n g s and make sure Russia
does i t s share t o make the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund view the
Russia s i t u a t i o n i n a p o s i t i v e way. But there are t h i n g s we can
do, as w e l l . ffr)
The President: Thank you, but l e t me j u s t mention one o t h e r
t h i n g . I t h i n k t h e r e i s a chance t h a t M i l o s e v i c w i l l a t t a c k the
NATO f o r c e s i n Bosnia w i t h m i s s i l e s .
Chancellor Schroeder: Does he have what it takes to attack NATO
forces in Bosnia? IrSj
The President:
Yes, the FROG m i s s i l e s can do t h a t . ( S
-i
Chancellor Schroeder:
FROGs? fS*
Yes, you're t a l k i n g about the Russian
The President: I b e l i e v e , obviously, we should discourage him
and we should t r y t o get Primakov t o discourage him from doing
t h a t . I t ' s not inconceivable t h a t he w i l l t r y t o use t h i s t o
wreck our success i n Bosnia. We have t o be very, very f i r m on
t h i s , and i f he does i t , we w i l l have t o be prepared t o s t r o n g l y
r e t a l i a t e . fS4
Chancellor Schroeder:
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
The P r e s i d e n t : He i s a f r a i d , o f course, because he t h i n k s t h a t
his h o l d on Montenegro may be broken by t h i s , j u s t by the
n a t u r a l course of- t h i n g s . So we have t o be prepared f o r a l l
these t h i n g s . fS-)
Chancellor Schroeder:
The President: Yes, t h a t ' s r i g h t . What he may t r y t o do i s
move a g a i n s t Montenegro, although I t h i n k t h a t w i l l b a c k f i r e
against him. ( S
-4
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET
Chancellor
Schroeder:
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
The President: Well, you know, t h i s whole t h i n g has a c e r t a i n
element o f u n p r e d i c t a b i l i t y . We don't know how i t w i l l p l a y out
i n Montenegro, o r how i t w i l l p l a y out i n Serbia i t s e l f . We
also have t o prepare f o r him t o t r y t o s t r i k e the NATO forces i n
Macedonia. <S)
-Chancellor
Schroeder:
The President: That i s good news, and we're a l l doing our best
to p r o t e c t the f o r c e s . But we have t o be prepared t h a t he might
be able t o h i t them, and i t has t o s t i f f e n our resolve and not
f o r c e us t o withdraw. (S
-4
Chancellor Schroeder: I see t h i n g s e x a c t l y the way you do, and
i t ' s a l l the more important f o r t h a t reason we stay i n touch and
coordinate what should be done and needs t o be done. You're
aware, o f course, the 15 European heads o f s t a t e and o f
government are i n B e r l i n , and we should, t o the e x t e n t p o s s i b l e ,
coordinate t h i n g s w i t h regard t o tomorrow, f o r instance. fS-)
The President: Thanks. We'll stay "close by and c o o r d i n a t e . I
know t h a t Solana i s also s t a y i n g i n touch w i t h you.
I f e e l much
b e t t e r a f t e r t h i s conversation, and I can't thank you enough.
Thank you, Gerhard. fS-}
Chancellor Schroeder:
The President:
I f e e l the same way.
Thank you.
—
Best t o you.
(U)
End o f Conversation
—
SECRET
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
(U)
�GECRET
2
1
0
0
THE W H I T E H O U S E
WASH
INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h French President Chirac
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
President Chirac
I n t e r p r e t e r : Marcel Bouquet
Notetakers: Jenny McGee, Jim Smith,
Murphy and Lawrence B u t l e r
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
Miles
March 23, 1999, 5:24-5:37 p.m. EST
Oval O f f i c e
President Chirac:
The President:
(U)
Bill.
(U)
How are you?
Thank you f o r t a k i n g my c a l l .
(U)
President Chirac: I'm i n B e r l i n f o r the meeting tomorrow
morning about t h e agenda, b u t we were w i t h Gerhard Schroeder f o r
d i n n e r . And we agree completely w i t h the d e c i s i o n taken by
NATO. f^)
The President: Well, thank you. I agree, too; we don't have
any choice. f^)
President Chirac:
get any progress?
The President:
No, I understand we don't.
fG-)
Nothing.
President Chirac:
Holbrooke d i d n ' t
(U)
Nothing a t a l l ?
fG-)
The President: I wanted t o speak t o you about two issues. The
f i r s t i s Primakov. We t a l k e d about t h i s b e f o r e . He has
postponed h i s t r i p t o Washington, which i s probably best under
the circumstances.
But I t h i n k i t ' s important we a l l
communicate t o him two t h i n g s . We a l l need h i s help on Kosovo
and we want t o work w i t h him t o get a peaceful r e s o l u t i o n t o a l l
t h i s , so t h a t whatever he says about us i n p u b l i c , he should be
GECRET
Reason: 1.5 (a,b,d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 3/23/09
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
ao\3- OH1X- n
�3ECRET
working w i t h us i n p r i v a t e t o get M i l o s e v i c t o moderate h i s
r e a c t i o n t o the a i r s t r i k e s . fS-j
The second t h i n g i s , I t h i n k there i s a chance t h a t M i l o s e v i c
w i l l t r y t o a t t a c k w i t h m i s s i l e s the NATO forces i n Bosnia,
which means the French and the Americans are the most exposed.
He may also t r y t o take some a c t i o n against the NATO forces i n
Macedonia. The o n l y t h i n g s I wanted t o say i s t h a t i f he i s
able t o cause some c a s u a l t i e s t o us where we are already working
to keep the peace, I t h i n k we have t o be very f i r m t o not a l l o w
our Bosnia mission t o c o l l a p s e , and not running away from t h e
mission as d e f i n e d i n Kosovo. fS-)
And, Jacques, t h e r e i s only one more p o i n t I wanted t o make.
When we t a l k e d before, we discussed the p o s s i b i l i t y o f having
the f i r s t phase o f t a k i n g out the a i r defense system and having
a pause t o get M i l o s e v i c back t o the peace t a l k s and agreement.
The o n l y p o i n t I wanted t o make about t h i s i s we have t o be very
c a r e f u l n o t t o have a pause so long t h a t i t defeats our purpose.
Because he has 40,000 forces i n o r on the border o f Kosovo and
almost 300 tanks, i f we waited too long, we could lose t h e
o b j e c t i v e f o r which we s t r u c k . So we have t o be very c a r e f u l
about t h a t . We'll o b v i o u s l y be i n d a i l y c o n t a c t , b u t I wanted
to mention t h a t . f&j
President Chirac: B i l l , concerning these three p o i n t s , t h e
f i r s t , Primakov. I had intended t o c a l l him tomorrow and speak
to him e x a c t l y about what you have spoken o f . I say tomorrow,
because i t i s now 12 o'clock a t n i g h t here. fS4
The P r e s i d e n t :
Tomorrow i s p e r f e c t . { &
-)
President Chirac:
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
The President: The only problem I'm w o r r i e d about i s what i f he
j u s t charges ahead. He can d i s p l a c e thousands o f people i n two
days.
President Chirac:
The President:
Good, t h a t ' s p e r f e c t .
President Chirac:
Egypt?
(U)
The President:
tonight.
(U)
Do you have any good news from the l a d i e s i n
Oh, yes, they are l o v i n g i t . I ' l l get a r e p o r t
President Chirac:
lucky.
(U)
The President:
Jacques.
(U)
f^)
Give them my best regards.
Yes, they're lucky.
President Chirac:
A l l right. B i l l .
—
They are very
I ' l l t e l l them.
Goodbye.
End o f Conversation —
GECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
(U)
Thank you,
�SECRET
2100
THE
WHITE H O U S E
W A S H I N G T O N
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema
(U)
I n t e r p r e t e r : Simm Smiley
Notetakers:
Jenny McGee, Miles Murphy,
Ralph S i g l e r and Lawrence B u t l e r
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
March 23, 1999, 5:44-5:49 p.m.
The Oval O f f i c e
H e l l o , Massimo.
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
Hello.
EST
(U)
(U)
The President: Before I get t o more serious matters I wanted to
c o n g r a t u l a t e you on the success of Roberto Benigni a t the
Oscars. I t was great.
(U)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: Thank you, thank you. That was
important moment f o r our f i l m i n d u s t r y and our country.
a very
(U)
The President: The movie was a great g i f t .
I wanted t o c a l l t o
check i n w i t h you about Kosovo. I'm sure you know M i l o s e v i c
gave Ambassador Holbrooke no room t o b e l i e v e t h a t he would agree
to a c e a s e - f i r e or any terms of the peace agreement and made i t
c l e a r t h a t he intends t o unleash g r e a t e r v i o l e n c e i n Kosovo. I
f e e l we have no choice but t o go forward w i t h NATO a c t i o n . I
i n t e n d t o support i t and I hope we can a l l do i t t o g e t h e r . fS^
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
SECRET
Reason: 1.5(a,b,d)
D e c l a s s i f y On:
3/23/09
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
1
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP
B/u/15" KBH
�SECRET
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
The President: Well, I agree w i t h t h a t . I've been t r y i n g t o
t h i n k o f a l l the permutations.
I'd l i k e t o s t a r t w i t h my f i r s t
p o i n t . Russian Prime M i n i s t e r Primakov has c a n c e l l e d h i s t r i p
to Washington which I b e l i e v e i s best under the circumstances.
The t h i n g I t h i n k , important f o r us t o do now i s t o f i r s t o f a l l
t e l l Primakov we s t i l l want t o work w i t h him on a p e a c f u l
s o l u t i o n t o t h i s c r i s i s and urge him t o t a l k t o M i l o s e v i c , and
secondly, t h a t Europe and the U.S. very much want Russia t o
recover economically.
That w i l l be my message and I hope i t
w i l l be yours as w e l l .
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: There's a p o i n t t h a t I would l i k e t o
r a i s e w i t h you t h a t i s important.
The President: Yes, I agree w i t h t h a t but i t depends on what
M i l o s e v i c does. He could immediately r e t a l i a t e against NATO
forces i n Bosnia or Macedonia. He might also redouble h i s
e f f o r t s t o s l a u g h t e r the Kosovars. He has moved 40,000 troops
and 300 tanks on the border o r i n s i d e Kosovo. I t h i n k i t i s
very important t o make i t as b r i e f as p o s s i b l e but i t a l l
depends on what M i l o s e v i c does. (S)
-Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
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The President: Yes, I t h i n k we can stop unless M i l o s e v i c i s
h u r t l i n g the t r o o p s , v i l l a g e a f t e r v i l l a g e a f t e r v i l l a g e . fSi
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
However, a t t h e
moment, a l l o f us have given the green l i g h t t o NATO and Solar
to a c t .
The President: Yes, o f course, we w i l l a l l have t o be i n close
c o n s u l t a t i o n and I thank you f o r t a k i n g my c a l l and also hope
t h a t you w i l l be i n touch w i t h Primakov and keep working w i t h
him. Thank you f o r t a k i n g my c a l l . fS-)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: I s h a l l c a l l Mr. Primakov undoubtedly.
Tomorrow, we have a meeting o f the European Council i n B e r l i n so
we w i l l have c o n s u l t a t i o n s among the EU leaders as w e l l . And
p o s s i b l y we could c a l l Primakov together w i t h the other leaders
of t h e Union, w i t h Mr. Schroeder, Mr.Chirac . fS4
The President: That's a p o s s i b i l i t y ,
w i t h them.
fS4
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
work. (U)
The President:
You should discuss i t
Fine, goodbye and best wishes w i t h your
Bye, t o you t o o . (U)
—
End o f Conversation
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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�CONFIDENTIAL
2395.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
PARTICIPANTS:
Telcon w i t h Sinn Fein Leader Gerry Adams (U)
The P r e s i d e n t
Gerry Adams
Notetakers:
J o e l Schrader, Jenny McGee,
M i l e s Murphy, Matt S i b l e y , Robert Ford and
Lawrence B u t l e r
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
A p r i l 1, 1999, 6:14 - 6:20 a.m. EST
The Residence
The P r e s i d e n t :
Mr. Adams:
H e l l o , Gerry.
(U)
You're up v e r y e a r l y .
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t :
I've been b r i e f e d on where you guys a r e now. I
t h i n k t h e Prime M i n i s t e r s a r e v e r y w o r r i e d about a two-week
d e l a y and I j u s t c a l l e d t o ask i f t h e r e ' s a n y t h i n g t h a t can be
done t o do i t q u i c k e r . (^)
Mr. Adams: I understand you have been t r y i n g t o g e t i n c o n t a c t .
I was i n w i t h Tony and B e r t i e .
I don't know b u t I t h i n k we may
have an agreement t h a t , even though t h e r e would be a two-week
timeframe, I would p r o b a b l y g e t back an i n d i c a t i o n q u i c k e r than
t h a t ; can't say. (j?*)
I stepped o u t from t h e t a l k s t o make t h i s c a l l .
We a r e a c t u a l l y
a g a i n s t an adjournment. What we have done i s t o l d t h e
government t h a t t h i s i s n o t working t h e way t h a t t h e y wanted.
Nonetheless, we went back i n and gave t h e government o u r b e s t
assessment, and now t h a t t h e y ' r e u n d e r t a k i n g t o t r y i t a g a i n .
We would have p r e f e r r e d more t i m e , b u t t h e y went a g a i n s t our own
a d v i c e . So we have jumped b e f o r e we were shoved. (j?)
We a r e a g a i n s t an adjournment. We need cover.
The t h i n g t h a t
w i l l guarantee t h i s i s t h a t we're n o t ganging up w i t h everyone
e l s e a g a i n s t t h e IRA. We j u s t have t o b e l i e v e t h a t i t ' s g o i n g
-CQMgj-DENTIAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 4/1/09
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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jgeWP ! DENT TAL
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to be managed. We moved from that position to doing what they
wanted us to do. [&)
The P r e s i d e n t :
I n o t h e r words you t h i n k t h e r e ' s some way you
can g i v e him some s o r t o f assurance -- (£7
Mr. Adams: Very d e f i n i t e l y assured.
We have t o s o r t t h i s o u t .
We have s u f f e r e d our f i r s t d e f e a t i n terms o f t h e i n t e r n a l
management. Secondly, we cannot guarantee a n y t h i n g e l s e o t h e r
than our v e r y , v e r y b e s t t o g e t back t o them as q u i c k l y as
p o s s i b l e t o l e t them know how we're g e t t i n g i t on and what has
happened. (J?)
The P r e s i d e n t : Yes. L e t me ask you t h i s , how w i l l i t work i f
p r i v a t e l y you can t e l l them... why do you want t o w a i t two weeks
b e f o r e you go p u b l i c ? (jzf
Mr. Adams: We have a c t u a l l y suggested t h a t t h e y c a l l b i l a t e r a l s
on Tuesday a week from now. We need more t i m e , t h e n , t o g e t
away from any p r e s c r i b e d timeframe which engages people.
O b v i o u s l y , i f we can g e t back t o them w i t h some i n d i c a t i o n i n
f o u r days, t h r e e days, two days. We'll do a l l o f t h a t .
We
don't want t o go t o t h e f a r extreme o f any t i m e t a b l e .
C#T
The P r e s i d e n t :
Okay, I g o t i t .
027
Mr. Adams: I s t h a t f a i r enough? We need space and cover t o
make t h i s work, and t h e l a s t t h i n g we want i s p u b l i c
s p e c u l a t i o n . The l a s t t h i n g we want i s t o have Sinn Fein seen
as ganging up on t h e IRA because t h a t w i l l g e t people's backs up
and make o u r j o b s h a r d e r . We w i l l get back w i t h them w i t h
honest soundings and t h a t c l e a r l y w i l l h e l p them w e l l w i t h i n t h e
two weeks. ( p i
The P r e s i d e n t :
Okay. I understand.
(pi
Mr. Adams: I'm going back i n t o see Tony and B e r t i e
minutes here.
Do you want me t o c a l l you back?
The P r e s i d e n t :
a g a i n . (pf
Mr. Adams:
I w i l l j u s t c a l l you back i f we need t o t a l k
Good l u c k .
The P r e s i d e n t :
within
Thanks.
Goodbye.
—
(U)
(U)
End o f Conversation
—
.CONFIDENTIAL.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�•CONFIDENTIAL
2 3 95
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Sinn Fein Leader Gerry Adams
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The P r e s i d e n t
Gerry Adams
Notetakers:
J o e l Schrader, Jenny McGee,
M i l e s Murphy, Matt S i b l e y , Robert Ford and
Lawrence B u t l e r
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
A p r i l 1, 1999, 6:45 - 6:49 a.m. EST
The Residence
The P r e s i d e n t :
Mr. Adams:
H e l l o Gerry.
Good morning.
(U)
(U)
The President: Look, I talked to Tony and Bertie, and they
understand where you are and why, and what they say must be
right. I'm sure there's no way this document is not going to
leak. ijZ)
Mr. Adams:
I told them that when they give it out.
(Stf
The P r e s i d e n t :
What t h e y ' r e s a y i n g i s they t h i n k t h i s document
can be t h e b a s i s f o r agreement b u t they know t h e p a r t i e s need
t i m e t o r e f l e c t on i t and suggest reconvening a week from
Tuesday. Otherwise i t ' l l l o o k k i n d o f c r a z y i f i t j u s t leaks
out t h e r e . (00
Mr. Adams: I t h i n k a l l o f t h a t ' s dead on. What we can't have
them say i s t h e y t h i n k we're going t o agree t o i t . ( "
£)
The P r e s i d e n t :
No, no, I t h i n k they can say t h e y don't know
what y o u ' l l say. 027
Mr. Adams:
Mr. P r e s i d e n t , we t o l d them when they gave o u t t h e
document i t ' l l end up i n t h e p u b l i c arena. There i s no bad
f e e l i n g s — t h e y ' r e d o i n g t h e i r j o b and we understand.
We
-eONFIDENFfftL
D ^ s s i f ^ r
4/1/09
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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2
a c t u a l l y said we couldn't d e l i v e r but then they gave us a l l
sorts of t r o u b l e . I am t r y i n g to manage t h a t and I t h i n k i t ' s
going t o be a p u b l i c issue. At t h i s point I don't t h i n k the
government can do anything except put i t out there as the basis
for agreement. A l l of that's okay?
The President: Yes.
(jzl
Mr. Adams:
And they are t a l k i n g about reconvening
i n a week from Tuesday. C ?
()
bilaterals
The President: Okay. Yeah, I got it. Well, all right, I think
if they can publish and say it could be the basis for an
agreement and give all the parties time to reflect. [tf
Mr. Adams: We were against adjournment and we t o l d the
Government. We t o l d them that we would have t o r e f l e c t our
disappointment.
I t i s more acceptable t o them, but they should
be saying t h e y ' l l adjourn f o r a period of r e f l e c t i o n and then
w e ' l l resume intense discussion on such-and-such a date. (£
.7
The President:
Mr. Adams:
(£7
You happy enough?
The President:
Mr. Adams:
I got i t .
Yes, I t h i n k t h i s w i l l work.
Okay, goodbye.
The President:
(£7
Thank you.
(^T
(U)
(U)
-- End of Conversation
—
aiNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET
2429
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
PARTICIPANTS:
Telcon w i t h German Chancellor Schroeder
The President
Chancellor Schroeder
I n t e r p r e t e r : B r i g i t t a Richman
Notetakers: Matt S i b l e y , James Smith, Bob
Ford, Sean Tarver and Lawrence B u t l e r
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
A p r i l 1, 1999, 4:06 - 4:43 p.m. EST
Oval O f f i c e
The P r e s i d e n t :
Gerhard, how are you?
Chancellor Schroeder:
(U)
I'm f i n e , thank you. (U)
The President: I wanted t o t a l k t o you about where we are on
Kosovo. I t h i n k i n the l a s t couple o f n i g h t s , even though the
weather has been bad, we have s t a r t e d t o h i t some t a r g e t s t h a t
w i l l make some d i f f e r e n c e . I am encouraged t h e A l l i e s have
approved what I consider t o be an a p p r o p r i a t e range o f t a r g e t s
f o r t o n i g h t and maybe the next couple of days because o f the
weather. fS-)
But I t h i n k we have t o f i n d some way o f more e f f i c i e n t l y p i c k i n g
these t a r g e t s and going forward. I t ' s t a k i n g an enormous amount
of time from Solana and Clark, who spends as much time on
p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h the A l l i e s as he does conducting the
campaign. I t h i n k i f we have any chance o f a d i p l o m a t i c
i n i t i a t i v e working t h a t won't be a defeat f o r Europe and the
United States, we have got t o keep h i t t i n g hard and give the
impression we are w i l l i n g t o do i t f o r some time. fS4
That means t o me some way of having the leaders o f NATO n a t i o n s
approve c a t e g o r i e s o f t a r g e t s and then have Clark p i c k t h e
m i l i t a r y t a r g e t s and then have Solana have our leave t o take
some o f f i f he b e l i e v e s the c o l l a t e r a l damage would be too
g r e a t . Because we're already being questioned here about why we
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PERE.O.13526
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are so slow to ramp up the campaign if he is doing these
terrible things. Part of it is the weather, of course, but part
of it is this process of picking targets, which I think has
become cumbersome. t&j
Chancellor Schroeder:
The President:
Can I make a few comments? fSI
Of course.
(S)
--
Chancellor Schroeder:
The President:. F i r s t o f a l l , i n general I agree w i t h your
a n a l y s i s and o b v i o u s l y I agree w i t h your p o i n t s . He has t o
withdraw h i s troops and stop h i s m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t y ; the Kosovars
have t o be able t o r e t u r n i n s e c u r i t y ; and then I t h i n k f o r a
long-term s e t t l e m e n t they have t o have some degree o f the
autonomy t h a t they enjoyed before he took i t away from them. So
i n general, I agree w i t h t h a t . My o n l y concern i s t h a t i f we
were t o o f f e r such a t h i n g tomorrow — I can o n l y say how i t
w i l l be perceived i n t h i s country because o f the press coverage
— i t would look l i k e an o f f e r from the p o s i t i o n o f weakness.
L i k e we d i d n ' t want t o go ahead w i t h the bombing campaign,
t h a t ' s been c a l l e d h a l f - h e a r t e d t o date, and t h a t i n e f f e c t we
were suing f o r peace. That would make i t impossible f o r him t o
accept. I n a way, we would both decrease t h e chance t h a t he
w i l l take a reasonable o f f e r and our being perceived as having
defended the people o f Kosovo. I f we r e a l l y can r a t c h e t t h i s up
and h i t him hard f o r a few days and then discuss the parameters
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of a s o l u t i o n , I'm a f r a i d i t w i l l be perceived i n the United
States t h a t we are weak and i n d e c i s i v e and haven't h i t him hard.
I'm a f r a i d i f t h a t i s the way he perceived i t , i t would be
impossible f o r him t o accept those terms. He would countero f f e r w i t h something we cannot accept, because he would t h i n k we
are about t o q u i t on him. {S)
-Chancellor Schroeder:
The President: F i r s t o f a l l , I don't disagree w i t h a n y t h i n g you
s a i d . Let me put i t another way. Whenever we decide t o go
p u b l i c w i t h an o f f e r o f n e g o t i a t i o n , e i t h e r from one leader l i k e
you o r NATO as a whole, i f we have not impressed upon the p u b l i c
i n Europe and the U n i t e d States, as w e l l as i n Serbia, t h a t we
have done a l o t o f damage and could do a l o t more -- t h a t i s , i f
not a l o t o f damage has already been done and i f we do i t before
t h a t happens, i t i s imperative we have the agreement o f a l l NATO
members t o say he needs t o understand we are prepared t o
continue and escalate t h i s a i r e f f o r t f o r several weeks more, i f
t h a t i s what i t takes. And t h a t we have no s h o r t - t e r m deadline
on t h i s .
And i f we say i t , we have t o be prepared t o do i t .
I f we have a
peace o f f e r on the t a b l e , even i f i t ' s one he can't accept,
before there's been a p e r c e p t i b l e negative impact on h i s
s i t u a t i o n on the ground, then we have t o be even more e x p l i c i t
t h a t we are prepared t o do t h i s f o r weeks and weeks and we have
no s e t t i m e l i n e o r deadline. We have an o b j e c t i v e and we are
going t o achieve i t . (S)
-Chancellor Schroeder:
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EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
The President: Let me suggest, I t h i n k we need t o c o o r d i n a t e
through our s t a f f people how t o handle t h i s as we go forward on
this.
I know Madeleine i s t a l k i n g t o Fischer. I mentioned t h i s
to Tony B l a i r today, because I thought you had probably
discussed i t w i t h him. I f we three could work i t out, how do
you t h i n k we can do t h i s ? We c e r t a i n l y have t o make i t c l e a r
there are c o n d i t i o n s under which we would be w i l l i n g t o stop the
hostilities.
We're i n there t o stop the h o s t i l i t i e s , so I agree
w i t h t h a t . I want t o ask whether you agree we should e s t a b l i s h
some smoother procedures on the t a r g e t s issue, because I t h i n k
we w i l l be moving p r e t t y q u i c k l y once the weather c l e a r s up.
[The l i n e t o the Chancellor dropped and was r e e s t a b l i s h e d . ]
The President: Gerhard, we got c u t o f f . Maybe ( t h e
i n t e r p r e t e r ) can do the t r a n s l a t i o n again. (U)
Chancellor Schroeder:
The President: Yes. I have no problem w i t h t h a t . A l l I am
t r y i n g t o do i s f i n d a system t h a t works more r a p i d l y . Maybe we
can have J a v i e r — he's got sense enough t o know what t a r g e t s
are s e n s i t i v e because o f high c o l l a t e r a l damage o r the l o c a t i o n
— maybe we j u s t need t o t e l l him he needs the a b i l i t y t o check
i n on a d a i l y basis a t a c e r t a i n time, and i f they don't present
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5
c o l l a t e r a l damage problems or break huge new ground, he ought t o
l e t them go. A u t h o r i z i n g him t o do i t might be an e f f i c i e n t
way. f S )
-Chancellor Schroeder:
The President: Let me say t h a t i f we do i t t h a t way, we may
a c t u a l l y lengthen the process. As i t i s now, they b r i n g us
proposed m i l i t a r y t a r g e t s and i f one has considerable c o l l a t e r a l
damage o r represent h i s t o r i c a l or s i g n i f i c a n t c u l t u r a l
s i g n i f i c a n c e t o Serbs, they b r i n g i t t o me and say, "maybe we
shouldn't h i t t h i s , " and I say, "okay, maybe we s h o u l d n ' t . "
What I t h i n k i s , i n s t e a d o f announcing t h a t new phases have j u s t
been a u t h o r i z e d , we could a u t h o r i z e m i l i t a r y t a r g e t s , but they
could come back t o us w i t h ones t h a t have c o l l a t e r a l damage or
c u l t u r a l s i g n i f i c a n c e , then we could say yes o r no. I f we t h i n k
we are a l l i n c l i n e d t o say yes, but a l l our A l l i e s a r e n ' t , then
we could go t o them. I t h i n k t h a t maybe t h e most e f f i c i e n t way
of doing t h i s . fS-)
Chancellor Schroeder:
I have no problem w i t h t h a t . ( S
-i
The President: Good. A l r i g h t . We w i l l be i n touch. I t h i n k
your t h i n k i n g on the o u t l i n e o f what we should say i s q u i t e
r i g h t , and w e ' l l work on i t .
We may have t o t a l k again i n a day
or so, but thank you very much. fSi
Chancellor Schroeder: Yes, but I t h i n k we have t o s t a r t —
going t o be here t h i s week, I'm not going t o take an Easter
v a c a t i o n , and I t h i n k you aren't, e i t h e r —
SECRET
I am
�JECRET
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
The President:
I agree.
tS-)
Chancellor Schroeder: And about the guestion of when we become
a c t i v e , we can discuss t h i s f u r t h e r .
The President: I t h i n k we are on the same page and we j u s t need
to work out the d e t a i l s .
I am sure Madeleine and Fischer can
work out the d e t a i l s . fS-)
Chancellor Schroeder:
together here. fS-)
The P r e s i d e n t :
Easter. (U)
Yes.
Absolutely.
Chancellor Schroeder:
—
GECRET
Perhaps Sandy and S t e i n e r can work
Okay, thank you.
Thank you. Goodbye.
End o f Conversation
(U)
—
Happy
�SECRET
2679
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telephone Conversation
w i t h United Nations
Secretary General K o f i Annan (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Secretary General Annan
Notetaker: Bonnie C l i c k , Matthew S i b l e y ,
Robin Rickard and Robert Ford
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
A p r i l 10, 1999,
Oval O f f i c e
1:01 - 1:08
H e l l o K o f i , how are you?
p.m.
(U)
Secretary General Annan: How are you B i l l ?
these are d i f f i c u l t times f o r us.
(U)
I am f i n e , but
The President: Yes, I thought your statement was very good.
N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g the b i g headline from Russia, I t h i n k we have a
r e a l chance over next week. I t h i n k i t was g r e a t . Even though
the headlines i n the New York Times t h i s morning are d i s t u r b i n g ,
I t h i n k we. have a chance f o r a d i p l o m a t i c u n i t e d f r o n t . What
the Russians need i s t o get back i n t o the ballgame. I f they are
p a r t of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l f o r c e , which I always thought they had
to do, l i k e i n Bosnia. I f the Russians are happy, then the
Chinese w i l l stop what they are saying, and then we can get the
whole t h i n g sanctioned by the UN.
Madeleine i s seeing Ivanov
next week and we are working through the Europeans and I know
you are. I f we could get them to take a common d i p l o m a t i c
p o s i t i o n , where i t i s obvious they would be p a r t o f any
i n t e r n a t i o n a l f o r c e , there may be a way t o work through t h i s .
I t ' s important t o get a n e g o t i a t e d s e t t l e m e n t . I f we keep t h i s
up f o r another month or two, w e ' l l be able to move i n t h e r e
uncontested.
Then the t h i n g t h a t concerns me i s having Europe
w i t h us and being there f o r e v e r and a day.
Look how long we had
to stay i n Bosnia, w i t h the Russians. I t i s almost a l i c e n s e
f o r Kosovar m i l i t a r y elements to r e c o n s t i t u t e themselves and
s t a r t going the other way.
I t h i n k we have a chance i n the next
SECRET
Reason: 1.5 (a),(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: A p r i l 12, 2009
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couple o f weeks to break the iceberg and get the Russians back
i n the hunt. They're not j u s t coming to Europe and the United
States now, but they're working through a whole range o f t h i n g s .
I f we can get them there sometime over the next couple o f weeks,
then I t h i n k we have a chance to put t h i s together. ( S
-i
Secretary General Annan:
The President: I t h i n k as a p r a c t i c a l matter, what would matter
there i s the l e v e l o f assurance and d e t a i l we have about
acceptance, and a t i m e t a b l e f o r withdrawal and when the
i n t e r n a t i o n a l force w i l l get i n . What B l a i r , Schroeder, and I
are w o r r i e d about i s having him accept i t , having a c e s s a t i o n o f
bombing, and then a reason why he can't get i t across, and the
t r o u b l e then i s having the a l l i e s resume bombing. The problem
w i l l be i n the d e t a i l s . fS-)
Secretary General Annan:
The President:
Yep. I agree w i t h t h a t .
(U)
Secretary General Annan: I w i l l work w i t h you and a l l the
governments concerned t o f i n d a way out o f t h i s and I t h i n k we
may get t o a p o i n t where he w i l l crack, but M i l o s e v i c i s such an
i n c r e d i b l y u n p r e d i c t a b l e character.
The President: Even though there i s a most f r i g h t e n i n g headline
about Y e l t s i n ' s bombast, as near as we can t e l l , t h i s i s an
e f f o r t by Russia to get back i n t o the d i p l o m a t i c hunt. £S4
Secretary General Annan: I t had q u i t e an impact here i n Europe,
but some o f the c l a r i f i c a t i o n s from Moscow seem to have
c l a r i f i e d t h i n g s a b i t . (S)
-The President: Let's stay i n close touch next week t o see what
we can do to put t h i s t h i n g together. I t h i n k you have r e a l l y
done a good t h i n g here. We have got a chance t o get t h i s done.
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Secretary General Annan:
i n i t i a t i v e , then? t€}
Would you say something about my
The President: A b s o l u t e l y .
yesterday. fe)
Secretary General Annan:
I thought I p u t something out
I am i n Europe. (U)
The President: I was t h r i l l e d by what you s a i d .
check. I f we haven't put out a statement, I w i l l .
I will
(G
-4
double-
Secretary General Annan: Thank you very much. I n f a c t , one o f
the European leaders s a i d t o me t h a t France, Germany, e t c . have
s a i d something, but the U n i t e d States and UK have n o t . t&j
The President: Tony B l a i r i s supposed t o c a l l i n the next hour.
When he c a l l s , I w i l l ask him t o say something a l s o . (€-)
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1 4
.d
Secretary General Annan:
I
f i n d i n these s i t u a t i o n s t h a t when the whole w o r l d comes
t o g e t h e r , we always make progress.
The President:
Okay, I got i t . (U)
Secretary General Annan:
f a m i l y . (U)
The P r e s i d e n t :
I will,
Thank you B i l l and give my best t o the
thank you so much. (U)
Secretary General Annan:
Goodbye.
(U)
End o f Conversation
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telephone Conversation w i t h French President
Chirac
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
President Chirac
I n t e r p r e t e r : Alec Toumayan
Notetakers: Bonnie C l i c k , M i l e s Murphy,
Doug Bayley
A p r i l 11, 1999, 1:00 - 1:13
Camp David, Maryland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
H e l l o , Jacques?
President Chirac:
The President:
EDT
(U)
B i l l , how are you?
Fine, how are you?
President Chirac:
p.m.
(U)
(U)
I t i s very good t o hear from you.
(U)
The President: Thank you. I j u s t wanted t o check i n w i t h you
to see where we are on Kosovo. I t h i n k K o f i Annan made a very
good statement on Friday, the way he s t a t e d our c o n d i t i o n s . The
o n l y d i f f e r e n c e , of course, i s t h a t he asked NATO t o suspend
a i r s t r i k e s once M i l o s e v i c commits t o the c o n d i t i o n s . But I
t h i n k we need some s i g n of implementation f i r s t .
I am very
encouraged t h a t the G-8 p o l i t i c a l d i r e c t o r s ' statement has
Russia i n v o l v e d . I f we can lock t h a t i n a t the h i g h e s t l e v e l s ,
I t h i n k we can get back on the d i p l o m a t i c t r a c k .
f&)
President Chirac: I a b s o l u t e l y share these f e e l i n g s .
t h i n k t h a t K o f i Annan's statement i s p e r f e c t .
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Reason: 1.5(a,b,d)
D e c l a s s i f y On:
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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
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EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
The President: Well, I t h i n k we are agreed on t h a t .
I just
wanted t o mention one or two other t h i n g s . F i r s t , Hubert, Robin
Cook and Madeleine w i l l meet w i t h t h e i r NATO c o u n t e r p a r t s i n
Brussels on Monday. This i s an important s i g n a l o f our
d e t e r m i n a t i o n , and makes sure the smaller A l l i e s not i n the
Contact Group don't f e e l l e f t out. I am going t o c a l l some o f
them, e s p e c i a l l y those c o n t r i b u t i n g f o r c e s . Any t h a t you f e e l
p a r t i c u l a r l y close t o , i f you have the occasion, you could say
something u s e f u l t o them. I t would be h e l p f u l t o spend a l i t t l e
time s h o r i n g them up. f&)
President Chirac: I am i n absolute agreement, and I s h a l l make
my c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o t h i s e f f o r t . I also i n t e n d t o ask
Schroeder, as President o f the European Union, t o do so. I
would a l s o l i k e t o add t h a t we have a European Union Council on
Wednesday. There w i l l be 15 heads o f European s t a t e s and
governments present. A t t h i s time we s h a l l consider Kosovo i n
the s p i r i t j u s t i n d i c a t e d , which w i l l a l l o w heads o f smaller
governments t o express t h e i r p o i n t s o f view.
I t i s even
p o s s i b l e K o f i Annan might come, and t h i s i s something t h a t would
g r e a t l y please the German p r e s i d e n t . fe}
The President: That i s very good. Let me mention a couple
other t h i n g s . I r e a l l y appreciate what you have done w i t h the
refugees. The s i t u a t i o n i s beginning t o get i n b e t t e r shape,
but we need t o be s e n s i t i v e t o what i s happening t o the f r o n t
l i n e s t a t e s . We need t o ask our people what we are going t o do
a f t e r t h i s i s over t o help the r e s e t t l e m e n t o f Kosovo and the
l a r g e r recovery e f f o r t s . There may be a way a f t e r t h i s i s over
t o get a l l these c o u n t r i e s i n v o l v e d i n a common economic
endeavor t h a t w i l l reduce e t h n i c s t r i f e .
We need t o s t a r t t o
t h i n k about t h i s now.
We need the best people i n a l l these
c o u n t r i e s t h i n k i n g about what i t w i l l look l i k e f i v e years from
now, assuming we get a d i p l o m a t i c s o l u t i o n here. f G)
President Chirac: This i s also my f e e l i n g .
Also, what we wish
to do w i t h the European Union. Also, the s p e c i f i c problem o f
the refugees, but more p r e c i s e l y the d i s p l a c e d persons, who are
s t i l l i n Kosovo and cannot get out. And we know n e i t h e r where
they are, nor what s t a t e they are i n . I t w i l l be necessary t o
consider help by the m i l i t a r y , p a r t i c u l a r l y how t o get more
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i n f o r m a t i o n about the s i t u a t i o n and, i f need be, t o parachute i n
the necessary h e l p . fS4
The President: Yes, t h a t i s very good. One l a s t t h i n g . I got
a couple l e t t e r s from Y e l t s i n l a s t week t h a t I thought were
p r e t t y encouraging, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g the r a t h e r inflammatory
p u b l i c comments he made. I n the next week or so, once we get
t h i s G-8 statement n a i l e d down, we ought t o make an e f f o r t t o
get t h e Russians back i n t h e game, and t h a t might serve Y e l t s i n
at home where he i s fending o f f a t t a c k s i n t h e Duma.
President Chirac: Yes, I have heard o f a resumption o f dialogue
between Russia and America, and I know Madeleine i s meeting w i t h
Ivanov on Tuesday.
The President: Yes, w e l l , I t h i n k t h a t i f we can j u s t keep the
pressure up, I t h i n k we may get a break i n the next couple o f
weeks, Jacques. I f we can keep t h e pressure up. We j u s t have
to stay a f t e r i t . fS-)
President Chirac: This i s q u i t e p o s s i b l e .
countries i s perfect.
The President:
The u n i t y o f NATO
Yes. (U)
President Chirac:
The President: Yes, i t i s very, very unstable. I am very
w o r r i e d about i t .
But we are t r y i n g t o get them t o take a
higher p r o f i l e i n an attempt t o promote s t a b i l i t y , because on
one hand i t b r i n g s Russia c l o s e r t o Europe, and on t h e o t h e r ,
Y e l t s i n can say t o t h e n a t i o n a l i s t s he i s t r y i n g t o stop t h e
bombing. (S)
--
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President Chirac: Yes, I completely agree, and we can make use
of the NATO-Russia p a r t n e r s h i p . ( S
-i
The President: Yes, okay, I w i l l see you here p r e t t y soon, b u t
i f we need t o t a l k t h i s week, I w i l l be around a l l week. I may
need t o c a l l you again. f G)
President Chirac: Okay, e v e r y t h i n g i s a b s o l u t e l y c l e a r . As
long as we stay on the K o f i Annan process, I t h i n k we can
achieve success.
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
The President:
Yes, I agree w i t h t h a t .
President Chirac:
The President:
Okay, B i l l .
f&4
(U)
Thank you, Jacques.
(U)
President Chirac: Please give my regards t o H i l l a r y , and I w i l l
see you soon. (U)
The President:
A l l r i g h t , good bye. (U)
President Chirac:
Bye. (U)
—
End o f Conversation
—
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�'HESRESlC^r HAS SEEN
THE
WHITE
HOUSE ^ "
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WA S HI N G T O N
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
A p r i l 17, 1999
TELEPHONE CALLS TO BRITISH PRIME MINISTER BLAIR,
FRENCH PRESIDENT CHIRAC AND CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER CHRETIEN
DATE: TBD
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD
\C
V'
FROM: SAMUEL BERG
I.
PURPOSE
B l a i r . Review UK paper. Discuss shoring up A l l i e s on
widening t h e range o f t a r g e t s and the NATO Summit.
Chirac.
Press Chirac t o stay f o r d u r a t i o n o f NATO Summit.
Secure support f o r pressing on w i t h the NATO a i r campaign and
widening the range o f t a r g e t s .
C h r e t i e n . Express a p p r e c i a t i o n f o r strong support, i n c l u d i n g
d e c i s i o n t o c o n t r i b u t e more f i g h t e r s . Ask him t o buck up
Chirac on the NATO Summit. Get readout o f Zhu's Canada v i s i t .
II.
BACKGROUND
B l a i r . You spoke t o B l a i r today about moving t o Phase I I I .
Y o u ' l l want t o discuss the paper he i s sending as w e l l as
ways t o p r e v a i l upon Chirac t o stay f o r t h e e n t i r e NATO
Summit. B l a i r may again r a i s e b e t t e r c o o r d i n a t i o n on NATO
communications -- the B r i t i s h press termed the convoy
i n c i d e n t an understandable accident o f war b u t a p u b l i c
r e l a t i o n s d i s a s t e r because o f i n e p t handling by NATO p u b l i c
affairs officials.
Chirac
You should p r e v a i l
upon Chirac t o stay f o r the d u r a t i o n because: ( i ) every
day o f t h e Summit has a Kosovo focus and discussions f o r
which he needs t o be present; ( i i ) l e a v i n g e a r l y would send
SECRET
Reason: 1 . 5 ( a ) ( b ) ( d )
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
D e c l a s s i f y on:
4/16/09
PER E. O. 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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^
q.q q
a t e r r i b l e message o f A l l i e d d i s u n i t y ; ( i i i ) we have
e l i m i n a t e d o r toned done the c e l e b r a t o r y aspects of the
summit. I f necessary, you can remind Chirac t h a t not o n l y
d i d you a t t e n d the Lyons G-8 i n the wake o f the Khobar
Towers bombing, you kept your promise t o dine w i t h him i n
Paris.
Meanwhile, Chirac continues t o take a s t r o n g p u b l i c l i n e on
Kosovo, speaking t o the French people a t r e g u l a r i n t e r v a l s
t o m a i n t a i n support f o r t h e a i r s t r i k e s . His l e a d e r s h i p has
been e f f e c t i v e f o r NATO and f o r Chirac p e r s o n a l l y — t h e
French p u b l i c ' s support f o r the a i r s t r i k e s (70 percent) i s
topped o n l y by t h e i r support f o r Chirac ( j o b approval
r a t i n g : 79 p e r c e n t ) . Like Schroeder and D'Alema, Chirac
i s convinced t h a t a key t o m a i n t a i n i n g p u b l i c backing i s t o
c o n s t a n t l y take t h e i n i t i a t i v e — i f the p u b l i c senses
s t a g n a t i o n o r b e l i e v e s there i s no end i n s i g h t t o
( i n e f f e c t i v e ) a i r s t r i k e s , t h e i r support could wane. Hence
Chirac's support f o r the Fischer p l a n , h i s c a l l f o r the UN
t o be more i n v o l v e d , h i s p u b l i c e f f o r t s t o woo the Russians
on board, and h i s proposal t h a t t h e EU administer any peace
settlement.
EO 13526 1.4d
You a l s o should know t h a t P h i l i p p e Seguin, the leader o f
Chirac's G a u l l i s t p a r t y but also h i s r i v a l , q u i t Friday as
p a r t y leader and head o f i t s l i s t f o r the European
p a r l i a m e n t a r y e l e c t i o n s . That's good news f o r Chirac i n
the long term because i t marginalizes Seguin b u t bad news
i n the s h o r t term, because i t makes the r i g h t ' s already
bleak prospects i n the European e l e c t i o n s even b l e a k e r .
F i n a l l y , Chirac and the French are preoccupied w i t h
A l g e r i a , whose e l e c t i o n Friday was d i s c r e d i t e d by the
w i t h d r a w a l o f a l l but the army-backed candidate.
C h r e t i e n wants t o t a l k about the way ahead i n Kosovo, how
i t w i l l f i t i n t o the Summit and t o give you a readout o f
Zhu's v i s i t t o Canada. He remains s t e a d f a s t l y behind NATO
a c t i o n s i n Kosovo and i s i n c r e a s i n g l y i n favor o f ground
f o r c e i n t e r v e n t i o n . This Monday, he won complete support
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i n Parliament f o r Canada's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n A l l i e d Force.
A d d i t i o n a l l y , Ottawa w i l l c o n t r i b u t e another s i x F-18
f i g h t e r s t o the e f f o r t ( b r i n g i n g i t s contingent from 12 t o
18 p l a n e s ) , and has agreed t o take i n up t o 5 Q Q Kosovar
,Q
refugees w i t h p r e - e x i s t i n g t i e s t o Canada.
Attachments
Tab A Points t o be Made f o r Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Tab B Points t o be Made f o r President Chirac
Tab C Points t o be Made f o r Prime M i n i s t e r C h r e t i e n
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�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
•
Agree t h a t Summit i s p i v o t a l .
•
W e ' l l want t o demonstrate u n i t y and d e t e r m i n a t i o n , and show
t h a t we're s t e p p i n g up pressure on M i l o s e v i c . W e ' l l a l s o want
t o work q u i e t l y t o d e a l w i t h any blockages.
•
We c o u l d a l s o aim t o announce t h e NATO m a r i t i m e i n s p e c t i o n
regime a t t h e Summit, showing how we i n t e n d t o s t e p up
economic p r e s s u r e . I understand t h a t concept i s b e i n g
q u e s t i o n e d by France and I t a l y i n NATO; hope t h a t you can h e l p
unstick i t .
•
F i n a l l y , i t would be good i f our statement i n d i c a t e d t h e
i n t e n t i o n o f a l l a l l i e s t o t i g h t e n economic s a n c t i o n s on
Y u g o s l a v i a . Our F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s ' meeting w i t h f r o n t - l i n e
s t a t e s can be used f o r t h e same purpose.
•
Our s t a f f s h o u l d remain i n c l o s e touch over t h e n e x t few days
as we p r e p a r e f o r t h e Summit. Reserve judgment f o r now on t h e
need f o r them t o come here.
•
Look f o r w a r d t o t a l k i n g w i t h you Thursday morning.
•
C h i r a c sending s i g n a l s he may leave Summit as e a r l y as F r i d a y
because we d i d n o t s h o r t e n i t , focus i t e n t i r e l y on Kosovo as
he wants. I n f a c t , t h e r e ' s a heavy Kosovo focus every day f o r
which he i s needed, we've g o t t e n r i d o f t h e c e l e b r a t o r y
aspects and h i s l e a v i n g e a r l y would send a t e r r i b l e message
about A l l i e d d i s u n i t y . Maybe you can t a l k t o him about t h i s .
CECRET
Reason: 1 . 5 ( a ) ( b ) ( d )
D e c l a s s i f y on: 4/16/09
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
SM U S
H
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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT CHIRAC
•
Pleased t h a t you're w i l l i n g t o expand range o f t a r g e t s i n
NATO's a i r campaign. E s s e n t i a l t h a t we i n t e n s i f y the a i r
s t r i k e s and make our d e t e r m i n a t i o n c l e a r t o M i l o s e v i c .
'-- A p p r e c i a t e s t r o n g messages you and L i o n e l J o s p i n d e l i v e r e d on
n a t i o n a l TV and t o the N a t i o n a l Assembly.
/
v
^yNATO Summit p r o v i d e s i m p o r t a n t o p p o r t u n i t y t o demonstrate
u n i t y and d e t e r m i n a t i o n and t o show t h a t we're s t e p p i n g up
p r e s s u r e on M i l o s e v i c .
I t ' s p o s s i b l e t h a t the Apaches i n Task Force Hawk w i l l be able
t o b e g i n o p e r a t i o n s a t the t i m e o f the Summit. That w i l l send
a strong signal.
We c o u l d a l s o aim t o announce the NATO m a r i t i m e i n s p e c t i o n
regime a t t h e Summit, showing how we i n t e n d t o s t e p up
economic p r e s s u r e .
I understand t h a t your d e l e g a t i o n has
r a i s e d v a r i o u s q u e s t i o n s i n NATO; hope t h a t you can h e l p move it.
F i n a l l y , i t would be good i f our statement i n d i c a t e d t h e
i n t e n t i o n o f a l l a l l i e s t o t i g h t e n economic s a n c t i o n s on
Yugoslavia.
Our F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s ' meeting w i t h f r o n t - l i n e
s t a t e s can be used f o r the same purpose.
•
Understand your concerns about not w a n t i n g t o be so l o n g away
from home. But Jacques, i t i s c r i t i c a l you s t a y f o r d u r a t i o n .
We reworked agenda so t h a t every day has a heavy Kosovo focus
-- you are v i t a l t o these d i s c u s s i o n s . We've e l i m i n a t e d
v i r t u a l l y a l l o f the c e l e b r a t o r y aspects.
F i n a l l y , i f you
l e f t e a r l y , i t would send a t e r r i b l e message o f a l l i e d
disunity.
•
[ I f necessary:
Jacques, I ' d ask you t o remember t h a t a f t e r
the Khobar Towers bombing, not o n l y d i d I a t t e n d t h e Lyons G-8
—- as planned, I kept my d i n n e r appointment w i t h you i n P a r i s . ]
•SECRET
Reason:
Declassify
1.5(a)
on:
(b) (d)
4/16/09
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
PFR F Ci llOJi*
^
O ia n
M
S/t/is KBH
-
�•OCCRCT
2
•
You've p r o b a b l y seen\;prae o f t h e r e p o r t i n g about d i s s e n s i o n i n
t h e FRY, and q u e s t i o n s i o e i n g r a i s e d about M i l o s e v i c ' s
leadership.
I f we keep up t h e pressure, and make c l e a r t h a t
i t w i l l i n t e n s i f y , t h e r e may be some hope o f f i n d i n g a crack
i n Belgrade's r e s o l v e .
•
I n t e r n a t i o n a l p r e s s u r e continues t o mount. Thought K o f i ' s and
t h e G-8 p o l i t i c a l d i r e c t o r s statements were s t r o n g .
•
jECRET
-
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPI
�-SECRET
2882
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER CHRETIEN
\ghu V i s i t
•
Understand you had good meetings w i t h Zhu, and he's now o f f on
a t o u r o f Canada. I n t e r e s t e d i n your readout.
NATO Summit
•
Need t o s t a r t t h i n k i n g about NATO Summit i n week's t i m e .
Given M i l o s e v i c ' s a t t i t u d e , p r o b a b l e NATO a i r campaign
ongoing.
•
W e ' l l want t o demonstrate u n i t y and d e t e r m i n a t i o n , as o u r
F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s d i d e a r l i e r t h i s week. But w e ' l l a l s o want
to show t h a t we're s t e p p i n g up p r e s s u r e on M i l o s e v i c .
•
You may have heard Chirac sending s i g n a l s he may leave Summit
as e a r l y as F r i d a y because we f a i l e d t o s h o r t e n i t and focus
e v e r y t h i n g on Kosovo. I n f a c t , we've re-worked summit so thatevery day has a heavy Kosovo focus and we've e l i m i n a t e d t h e
c e l e b r a t o r y aspects. Most i m p o r t a n t , i f Jacques were t o leave
e a r l y , i t would send a t e r r i b l e message o f a l l i e d d i s u n i t y .
Maybe you can t a l k t o him.
Kosovo
•
L e t me say f i r s t how much I a p p r e c i a t e your p l a n s t o
c o n t r i b u t e another s i x f i g h t e r s .
•
I t ' s p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e Apaches i n Task Force Hawk w i l l be a b l e
to b e g i n o p e r a t i o n s a t t h e time o f t h e Summit. That w i l l send
a s t r o n g s i g n a l . A p p r e c i a t e your sending an a d d i t i o n a l s i x
CF-18s t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e a i r campaign.
•
We c o u l d a l s o aim t o announce t h e NATO m a r i t i m e i n s p e c t i o n
regime a t t h e Summit, showing how we i n t e n d t o s t e p up
economic p r e s s u r e . I understand t h a t concept has r u n i n t o
some o p p o s i t i o n i n NATO; hope t h a t you can h e l p move i t .
I r ^
Reason:
Declassify
, , , WKWH,
1.5 (a) (b) (d)
on: 4/16/09
DECLASSIFIED
PERE.0.13526
ao\^
*
3
OWIQ.
JAI'J
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY S/u/iy
^
�-OECRET
•
F i n a l l y , i t would be good i f our statement i n d i c a t e d t h e
i n t e n t i o n o f a l l a l l i e s t o t i g h t e n economic s a n c t i o n s on
Y u g o s l a v i a . Our Foreign M i n i s t e r s ' meeting w i t h f r o n t - l i n e
s t a t e s can be used f o r t h e same purpose.
•
You've p r o b a b l y seen some o f t h e r e p o r t i n g about d i s s e n s i o n i n
the FRY, and q u e s t i o n s b e i n g r a i s e d about M i l o s e v i c ' s
leadership.
I f we keep up t h e p r e s s u r e , and make c l e a r t h a t
i t w i l l i n t e n s i f y , t h e r e may be some hope o f f i n d i n g a crack
i n Belgrade's r e s o l v e .
•SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
GECRET
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
2882
POINTS TO 3E MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
Nticd Lu b l d i l — L l i i u k i n y dbuuL 1>A'1U bliMuil i n VJCGJC"' • t i m e .
^jr^en M i l o s e v i c ' g atfeitude?—probable NATO airyfcampaign
W e ' l l want to demonstrate u n i t y and d e t e r m i n a t i o n , aa
our^
Foreign M i n i s t e r s d i d e a i l i c i . — t i l l s wtt]
But w e ' l l a l s o want
show t h a t we're s t e p p i n g up p r e s s u r e on M i l o s e v i c .
C h i r a c sending s i g n a l s he may l e a v ^ Summit as e a r l y as F r i d a y
because we d i d not s h o r t e n i t , focus i t e n t i r e l y on Kosovo as
he wants. I n f a c t , t h e r e ' s a h^avy Kosovo focus every day f o r
which he i s needed, we've gotyen r i d o f the c e l e b r a t o r y
aspects and h i s l e a v i n g e a r l y would send a t e r r i b l e message
about A l l i e d d i s u n i t y . Maybe vou can t a l k t o him about t h i s .
It's possible t
to b e g i n g
a str
C
e able
u m m i t j ^ — m a t w i l l send
additional six
We c o u l d a l s o a/m t o announce t h e NATO m a r i t i m e i n s p e c t i o n
regime a t t h e /Summit, showing how we i n t e n d t o s t e p up
economic p r e s s u r e .
I understand t h a t concept Jsss—fcurT'TntQ
ome (»ppoci/ion i n NATO; hope t h a t you can h e l p u n s t i c k i t .
t - , r^-u
F i n a l l y , A t would be good i f our statement i n d i c a t e d the
i n t e n t i o n o f a l l a l l i e s t o t i g h t e n economic s a n c t i o n s on
Yugoslavia.
Our F o r e i g n ' M i n i s t e r s ' meeting w i t h f r o n t - l i n e
s t a t e s can be used f o r the same purpose.
7
ng a b o u t d i - S s e n s i o n i n
about MjJrcr^evic's
and make c l e a r t h a t
of f i n d i n g a c r a c k
Reason:
1.5(a (b) (d)
D e c l a s s i f y on: 4/16/09
i n •
TL...,^
�)£CRC?
2882
POINTS TO 3E MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT CHIRAC
N^TO
< • -•
Summit
0
1
teed Y s t a r t t h i n k i n g about NATO Summit i n week s . t i m e .
G \ v e n V l i l o s e v i c ' s a t t i t u d e , p r o b a b l e NATO a i r campaign
X A^
^ —\
oncloinc
1
W-c 11 v^an^/to demonstrate u n i t y and d e t e r m j ^ a t i o n y a-s^-o u r
F n r e i g n Mi n-j 1-p c: H i H o a r - l - j p r t h i s W P P V / R n t - WP ' 1 1
so want
to show t h a t we're s t e p p i n g up pressure/on M i l o s e v i c .
ff
r
Understand your concerns about n o t w a n t i n g t o be so l o n g away
from home. But Jacques, i t i s c r i c i c a l you s t a y f o r d u r a t i o n .
We reworked agenda so t h a t every/day has a heavy Kosovo focus
you are v i t a l t o these d i s c u s s i o n s . We've e l i m i n a t e d
v i r t u a l l y a l l o f t h e c e l e b r a t o r y a s p e c t s . F i n a l l y , i f you
l e f t e a r l y , i t would send a / r e r r i b l e message o f a l l i e d
disunity.
[ I f necessary: Jacques^ I ' d ask you t o remember t h a t a f t e r
the Khobar Towers bombang, n o t o n l y d i d I a t t e n d t h e Lyons G-f
as planned, I kept ity/ d i n n e r appointment w i t h you i n P a r i s . ]
•
•
I t ' s p o s s i b l e t & a t t h e Apaches i n Task Force Hawk w i l l be a b l e
t o b e g i n o p e r a r i o n s a t t h e t i m e o f t h e Summit. T h a t _ _ w i l l send
a s t r o n 3 _ s j ^ g ^ a J ^ _ ^ A p p r e c i a t e s t r o n g messages you and LTone"2r-.
^^^ospTri d e l i v e r e d on n a t i o n a l TV and t o the N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y ^
We c o u l d Also aim t o announce t h e NATO m a r i t i m e i n s p e c t i o n
regime a t t h e Summit, showing how we i n t e n d t o _ s t e p up
economic/pressure.
I understand that <roncopt has r u n i n t n ^
some o p p o o i t i o f l i n NATO; hope t h a t you can h e l p move i t .
tt
F i n a l l y , i t would be good i f our statement i n d i c a t e d t h e
i n t e n t i o n o f a l l a l l i e s t o t i g h t e n economic s a n c t i o n s on
Yugc/slavia. Our F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s ' meeting w i t h f r o n t - l i n e
s t a t e s can be used f o r the same purpose.
•SECRE'T
Reason:
1.5(a)(b)(d)
D e c l a s s i f y o n : 4/16/09
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2.013- OH72- (*)
�-SfTCRET
You've probably seen some of r.he r e p o r t i n g about dissension i n
the FRY, and questions being raised about Milosevic's
/ '
leadership. I f we keep up the pressure, and make clear t h a t /
i t w i l l i n t e n s i f y , there may be some hope of f i n d i n g a cracj
i n Belgrade's resolve.
I n t e r n a t i o n a l pressure continues t o mount. Thought^f&^fi's and
the G-8 p o l i t i c a l d i r e c t o r s statements were strono-'
OECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�yfiCRET
4 310
THE W H I T E H O U S E
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h German Chancellor Schroeder
PARTICIPANTS:
(U)
The President
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder
I n t e r p r e t e r : Harry Obst
Notetakers: Bonnie C l i c k , Roger M e r l e t t i ,
Robin Rickard and Lawrence B u t l e r
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
June 3, 1999, 1:35 - 1:45 p.m. EDT
Oval O f f i c e
Chancellor Schroeder: H e l l o , B i l l .
This i s Gerd Schroeder. We
have j u s t had the r e p o r t o f Mr. A h t i s a a r i and i t looks t o me,
a f t e r reading i t , l i k e a r e a l breakthrough i n the s i t u a t i o n .
The p a r l i a m e n t has approved t h i s , t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f the NATO
proposals, and t h a t approval looks t o me l i k e t h a t i s t h e same
as implementation. fS-)
The P r e s i d e n t : Gerhard, would you ask t h e i n t e p r e t e r t o say
t h a t again? (U)
( I n t e r p r e t e r repeats t h e Chancellor's previous
statement)
The P r e s i d e n t : What the parliament approved i s s l i g h t l y
d i f f e r e n t from NATO's proposal, as they l e f t out the word ' a l l "
i n terms o f t r o o p withdrawal, but i t looks h e l p f u l . We have t o
say, o b v i o u s l y , t h a t we appreciate the work t h a t Chernomyrdin
and A h t i s a a r i have done and we appreciate the vote i n t h e
p a r l i a m e n t , b u t we f e e l t h a t we need t o see some r e s u l t s . We
don't want t o be once again i n the p o s i t i o n o f t h i n k i n g we have
an agreement and then not have i t m a t e r i a l i z e . We w i l l keep
working t h i s b u t want t o see concrete r e s u l t s . (S)
-Chancellor Schroeder: I understand. Well, i t looks t o us as i f
i t were t r u e . I t speaks o f t h e withdrawal o f a l l Serbian
troops, i t speaks t o t h e r e p a t r i a t i o n o f t h e refugees and i t
SECRET
Reason:
1.5(a,b,d)
D e c l a s s i f y On:
6/7/09
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
\3 - O
1- n
�SECRET
2
does speak also to having a NATO core in the peacekeeping force.
Now it also says this will be dealt with in the Security
Council. Now what we have to do is bring about this Security
Council meeting as fast as possible. Already, I believe the
NATO military experts are sitting down with the Yugoslav
military experts. Time is of the essence, we should move this
forward as fast as possible. tS)
The President: I agree t h a t we ought t o move t h i s forward as
f a s t as p o s s i b l e . My r e a l concern today i s only f o r our p u b l i c
r h e t o r i c . I f we are o v e r l y p o s i t i v e and there i s no c a u t i o n i n
our r h e t o r i c , he may not comply. He may get h i s bombing pause
and h e ' l l t u r n e v e r y t h i n g back t o mud. We need t o see r e a l
compliance. I agree we should push forward q u i c k l y b u t my o n l y
concern i s t h a t the NATO A l l i e s be somewhat cautious i n our
p u b l i c statements — so t h a t we don't t h i n k t h a t t h e i r words a r e
as good as t h e i r deeds. He has made a l o t o f deals i n t h e s i x
years t h a t I have been working w i t h him t h a t he has not kept. I
t h i n k t h i s one w i l l be kept i f we show firmness.
Chancellor Schroeder:
The P r e s i d e n t : I t h i n k our m i l i t a r y people have already worked
a l l t h i s out. I don't t h i n k we need t o t a l k about i t on t h i s
l i n e o r p u b l i c l y , b u t I t h i n k our m i l i t a r y people have reached a
s o l u t i o n on t h a t . (S)
-Chancellor Schroeder: Okay. I agree, by the way, t h a t i t would
d e f i n i t e l y be wrong t o spread euphoria i n p u b l i c statements. We
are n o t about t o do t h a t . We w i l l do so i n a r a t i o n a l ,
s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d manner but also i n d i c a t e t h e r e i s hope. f&}
The P r e s i d e n t :
Okay. (U)
Chancellor Schroeder:
I hope we w i l l stay i n touch.
(U)
The President: This could make f o r a b e t t e r G-8 meeting i n
Cologne i f t h i s works out. (U)
CECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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3
Chancellor Schroeder:
The President:
Yes. Okay.
Goodbye.
Goodbye.
(U)
— End of Conversation
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
—
(U)
�-SECRET-
4339
THE WHITE H O U S E
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Canadian Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien
Notetakers: Bonnie C l i c k , Michael Manning,
Miles Murphy and K. C. Brown
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
June 6, 1999, 1:35 - 1:42 p.m. EDT
Camp David, Maryland
Hello?
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien:
The President:
(U)
Hello, B i l l ?
Jean, how are you?
(U)
(U)
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien: I'm doing great. I am beside my lake,
and I've got a book I'm sure you read by Michener, a book about
Kennedy. I t ' s a good book. There was some r a i n , so I am j u s t
r e s t i n g a t t h i s moment. (U)
The President:
thing settled.
That's good.
(U)
I t looks l i k e we got t h a t salmon
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien: Yes. That i s s e t t l e d and we managed
to s e t t l e the magazine t h i n g too, and now I have t o see i f the
war i s s e t t l e d . (U)
The President: That i s what I wanted t o t a l k t o you about,
because we have a l i t t l e danger here w i t h the Serbs. The Serbs
yesterday had three d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n s . The Russians were
saying we can't approve a UN r e s o l u t i o n u n t i l the bombing pause,
and the Serbs were saying we can't withdraw u n t i l NATO comes i n
because we don't want a vacuum, which I'm sympathetic w i t h . We
said we can't have a pause u n t i l there i s a withdrawal, so we
Declassify on,
6/7/09 QJ^JQ^J
LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
?
^
V
^
�-CECRET
2
o f f e r e d a bombing pause i f they begin withdrawal and then we
would t r y 24 hours f o r a r e s o l u t i o n . We d i d n ' t want the Chinese
and Russians t o have a veto and then get a UN r e s o l u t i o n , which
we could get i n short order. (pf
Now the Serbs are coming back at us; they and the Russians want
to say they need a r e s o l u t i o n before we w i l l deploy and
a u t h o r i t y t o implement these other changes they want. I f there
i s a delay, then the Serbians would stay at the l e v e l s they were
before they invaded. That i s j u s t a way of s t e a l i n g the peace
a f t e r l o s i n g the c o n f l i c t . ^81
As long as we stay together, they w i l l agree today or tomorrow.
They are t r y i n g to give the Russians a veto over everything that
happens a f t e r t h i s i s resolved. I have wanted the Russians t o
be involved, and I'm pleased they are and want t o r e p a i r the
t i e s between NATO and Russia, but not i f i t means he i s going t o
wreck t h i s mission. I f i t were up t o the Russians, they w i l l
screw t h i s r e s o l u t i o n around, watering down what we can do. (pf
The only reason I c a l l e d you i s t h a t I t h i n k i t i s important
t h a t a l l o f us s t i c k behind the p o s i t i o n s o f our n e g o t i a t o r s .
We can't l e t the Russians design and d i c t a t e . That's e x a c t l y
what we would be doing i f we said there has t o be a UN
r e s o l u t i o n . We j u s t can't do t h a t . We would have gone t o a l l
t h i s t r o u b l e f o r nothing and given i t a l l back t o them.
(jgf
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien: For me, I have no strong view one way
or the other. I t h i n k i t i s over now, and everybody, the
Russians, I t h i n k , and the Serbs want a f i g l e a f . (Pf
The President: I don't mind about a f i g l e a f , but i f i t breaks
down, then, the Kosovars won't come home. (PI
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien: We have t o make s\.re the Kosovars can
go home s a f e l y and i f there i s no such agreement i t w i l l be very
d i f f i c u l t , because o f the Kosovar freedom f i g h t e r s . (po
The President: Yes, the moderates and the KLA will work with
us, but there will be some risk. The operational integrity in
what we do is very, very important. Thank you for all your
help. I just wanted to say that. (JS)
Prime Minister Chretien: That's a big deal for me. I hope we
stop bombing as soon as possible, but if the bombing takes a few
more days, it is all right with me because it is better to do it
properly. They want a UN resolution first. (JS)
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�GCCRCT
The President:
3
As long as we hang on. ( "
P)
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien:
So they want a r e s o l u t i o n f i r s t ?
(#5
The President: Yes, but we can't. That i s f i n e i f we t r y t o
get one but i f we don't get one, we have to go on anyway. We
don't want to give the Russians a veto over the contents o f the
r e s o l u t i o n , because they w i l l be r u t h l e s s and w i l l b a s i c a l l y
undo everything that was done over the l a s t few days. Even
France, who has always been strong on t h i s , has admitted i f we
t r y f o r a day to get a r e s o l u t i o n and can't, we should go i n
under a NATO order. I t h i n k i f everyone stays together on t h i s ,
we should have an agreement w i t h i n the next 4 8 hours. (pf
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien:
The President:
Thank you.
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien:
OK, no problem.
I w i l l side w i t h you.
(U)
Have you been playing?
(U)
The President: Yes, I played yesterday and may get to play nine
holes today. We are c e l e b r a t i n g my mother-in-law's 80
b i r t h d a y . (U)
th
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien: I played g o l f yesterday and had my
best game ever. I shot a 79 and had f i v e pars and a b i r d i e on
the back nine. (U)
The President:
Good f o r you.
That i s wonderful.
(U)
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien: OK, B i l l , we w i l l keep i n touch, and
a l l the other problems are s e t t l e d . I got a l i t t l e b i t o f f l a p
here i n Canada because I was not tough enough on the magazines,
but t h a t i s s e t t l e d . On salmon, we have an agreement f o r 10
years. I t i s always a touchy issue, and your senators and
governors of Washington and Oregon were a l i t t l e much f o r
Canadians, but t h a t i s a l l r i g h t . We put i t i n a d i f f e r e n t
context of conservation more than catching f i s h , and they were a
l i t t l e easier to handle when we talked about conservation.
(jzf
The President: Yes, t h a t ' s important to do, because our b i g
problem i s w i t h the Alaskans. The people i n Washington and
Oregon were closer to Canada. (pf
•GECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SEGRC¥-.
4
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien: OK. I am happy w i t h t h a t , so I w i l l
see you i n a couple of weeks i n Germany. (U)
The President:
I can't wait.
Bye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
-SCCRDT
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET
4339
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h I t a l i a n Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema
I n t e r p r e t e r : Sim Smiley
Notetakers: Michael Manning and M i l e s
Murphy
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The P r e s i d e n t :
June 6, 1999, 2:15 - 2:36 p.m. EDT
Camp David, Maryland
Hello.
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
Massimo?
Hello.
(U)
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t : Thank you f o r t a k i n g t h i s c a l l .
I wanted t o
t a l k t o you a minute about the n e g o t i a t i o n s . fG-)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: And t h a t i s e x a c t l y the same t h i n g I
wanted t o t a l k t o you about. fG}
The President: Yesterday, we had b a s i c a l l y t h r e e p o s i t i o n s .
The Russians wouldn't go t o the UN f o r a r e s o l u t i o n u n t i l there
was a bombing pause. We s a i d we couldn't pause u n t i l t h e r e was
evidence t h a t t h e troops were withdrawing. The Serbs s a i d , and
i t was the o n l y t h i n g t h a t I was sympathetic t o , they d i d n ' t
want t o withdraw and leave a vacuum. They wanted us t o come i n
as they were withdrawing. So we a r r i v e d a t what I thought was a
good s o l u t i o n . We s a i d , okay you s t a r t the w i t h d r a w a l , we w i l l
have a pause and t r y f o r 24 hours t o get a UN R e s o l u t i o n , but i f
we f a i l , we w i l l then go t o NATO and get approval t o go i n . f&)
So I thought we would have an agreement on t h i s b a s i s , b u t today
they came back, t h e Serbs, and s a i d before deployment, before
the mission can be c a r r i e d out, there has t o be a UN R e s o l u t i o n .
The problem w i t h t h a t , o b v i o u s l y , i s they w i l l t r y t o give the
SECRET
Reason: 1.5(a,b,d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 6/7/09
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Russians veto power over the nature and design o f our
deployment, o f t h e e n t i r e o p e r a t i o n , and i f t h a t happens, they
w i l l then t r y t o give back t o the Serbs what they have l o s t i n
the c o n f l i c t . And we w i l l have a s i t u a t i o n where i t would
become unmanageable q u i c k l y , and they w i l l add a l o t o f
requirements t h a t w i l l keep the Kosovars from coming home. I
t h i n k i f we can a l l be f i r m w i t h our p o s i t i o n s we w i l l be f i n e
i n a day o r so, but I wanted t o c a l l t o l e t you know t h a t i s
where I t h i n k t h i n g s are. fS-)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: Yes. I c e r t a i n l y understand we need
guarantees on the composition o f the force and o f the NATO
presence on the f o r c e i t s e l f . |
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 i.4d"
The President: Yes, I agree w i t h t h a t . I n Bosnia, we found
t h a t s o l u t i o n by having them work i n one sector, w i t h the United
States, b u t t h a t wouldn't be acceptable t h i s time because they
blame us f o r the whole t h i n g i n Kosovo. So we have t o f i n d
another s o l u t i o n , but I t h i n k the same basic o u t l i n e w i l l work,
where they work w i t h the l o c a l commander, one f o r c e , b u t not
s t r i c t l y under NATO. f&}
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: Yes, I t h i n k t h a t the most c r u c i a l
p o i n t i n a l l t h i s i s thp t e c h n i c a l - m i l i t a r y ..aareentfiirL. IhaiL
the c r u c i a l p o i n t now.
The President: I am too b u t we cannot give t h e Russians veto
power over the design o f what i s going on. We have t o be
s e n s i t i v e t o them not s e r v i n g under NATO, b u t we cannot l e t them
decide who goes where and i n what numbers, because i f we d i d ,
they would simply i n s t a l l M i l o s e v i c again. That i s what they
would do. We have t o keep working over the next day or so. I
t h i n k we a l l have t o stay together.
GECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
The President:
Yes. I agree. fS}
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
The P r e s i d e n t : Yes. I agree. The most important t h i n g i s t o
keep t h e Russians from g e t t i n g a veto. I f we t r y t o get a
R e s o l u t i o n and f a i l , they have t o know we are more than w i l l i n g
to stop the bombing and t h a t we want t h i s t h i n g t o be over.
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
The P r e s i d e n t : I agree w i t h you. We s e t c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s and
t h a t i s n o t one o f them. We have t o honor t h a t . So i f t h e
agreement i s reached, I w i l l agree w i t h you.
ffr)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: I t h i n k t h a t when we have peace the
t r u t h w i l l come o u t . Witnesses w i l l come out, the problem w i l l
explode on the p u b l i c scene and t h e p u b l i c w i l l become aware o f
the r e a l M i l o s e v i c , b u t we cannot put i t on the agenda now. fS-)
The P r e s i d e n t :
Yes. I agree w i t h you.
F i r s t things
first,
ffr)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: There was one l a s t t h i n g I wanted t o
say. We are very close t o agreement on the S i l v i a B a r a l d i n i
case and t h e Ambassador i s aware o f t h i s . Very soon, i n the
next few days, we w i l l be able t o make t h i s announcement, and I
wanted t o thank you very much f o r your help on t h i s matter. f£4
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET
4
The President: . Yes. I know how important t h i s was to you. I
asked our people to work hard on i t . I hope i t w i l l be worked
out and that i t w i l l be h e l p f u l to you when i t i s . fe)
Prime Minister D'Alema: Yes. I think so, and I think i t w i l l
be considered an important signal of the good relations between
the United States and I t a l y . I think that i t w i l l be considered
a sign of goodwill toward I t a l y , and f o r t h i s I thank you. fe)
The President: Thank you. I w i l l be back i n touch i n a few
days. I w i l l see you i n Germany. (U)
Prime Minister D'Alema:
The President:
Goodbye. (U)
Goodbye. (U)
— End of Conversation
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
—
�4474
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH
INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h NATO Secretary General Solana
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Secretary General Solana
Notetakers: George Chastain, Matt Sibley,
Robert Ford, Sean Tarver, Jim Smith and
Roger M e r l e t t i
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
June 10, 1999, 10:03 - 10:05 a.m. EDT
Oval O f f i c e
The President:
Hello?
Secretary General Solana:
The President:
How are you?
Good morning t o you.
I t r e a l l y i s a good morning.
Secretary General Solana: Good morning, i n a l l the sense of the
phrase. You have done a r e a l l y great job. I t would not have
been done without your leadership. I t succeeded because we
r e a l l y maintained the l i n e t o the l a s t minute. And we were able
to maintain the a l l i e s u n t i l the l a s t minute. I t was f a n t a s t i c .
Thank you very much f o r everything you have done.
The President: We could not have done i t without you. You kept
them a l l together.
Secretary General Solana: When we have forces deployed on the
ground i n the next few days i t w i l l be a memorable p i c t u r e t h a t
w i l l be u n f o r g e t t a b l e . We w i l l see what we have done. We have
established A l l i e d l i n k s of f r i e n d s h i p among ourselves t h a t can
not be broken. We must maintain that forever.
1
The President:
You've got i t .
Secretary General Solana:
The President:
Thanks very much.
Thank you so much.
Have a great day.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCO*,
�Secretary General Solana:
Goodbye.
End of Conversation
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�-eON P I DENT IAL
4474
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h I t a l i a n Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema
(U)
PARTICIPANTS
The P r e s i d e n t
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema
I n t e r p r e t e r : E l i z a b e t a Ullman
N o t e t a k e r s : George C h a s t a i n , M a t t S i b l e y ,
Robert Ford, Sean Tarver, Roger M e r l e t t i and
Jim Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The P r e s i d e n t :
June 10, 1999, 10:56 - 10:59 a.m. EDT
Oval O f f i c e
Hello.
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
Massimo?
Hello, B i l l .
(U)
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t : I j u s t c a l l e d t o say thank you. I t has been a
g r e a t day f o r a l l o f us. I know what a tremendous burden you
have borne t h r o u g h t h i s whole t h i n g , and I j u s t wanted t o c a l l
and say thank you. (U)
Prime Minister D'Alema: Mr. President, I have gathered around
me all of our military pilots; I have come here to thank them,
and there is also a presence of some Allied officers and an
American general. I will give your regards to everyone here. I
am on one of the most active bases during the conflict. (jtf
The President: I hope you will tell your military people how
grateful I am for their brave and effective performance. I am
very gratified by what they have done. Especially those of you
in Italy, for whom this was a very difficult thing. I am very
grateful. (jt)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: Yes, I b e l i e v e t h a t I t a l y has t o g e t
used t o becoming a grown-up c o u n t r y and take up i t s own
CONFI DEN¥-feAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y on: 6/11/09
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
�•eomri DENT IAL
2
responsibilities. It was a hard test, but I think we have grown
up a lot. ijt)
The President: Well, you c e r t a i n l y performed i n a magnificent
manner. I cannot wait t o see you i n Cologne. We have a l o t t o
discuss there. (£1
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: Yes, we have a meeting there. I t h i n k
i t i s important and u s e f u l t o organize a meeting i n the f a l l . I
t h i n k i t w i l l be an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r you t o come t o I t a l y f o r a
couple of days. (U)
The President: Yes. We are hoping t o work t h a t out.
i t i s important. (U)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
i n Cologne. (U)
The President:
Thank you very much, and I w i l l see you
Thank you very much and goodbye.
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
—
I think
Arrivederci.
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation
—
CONriDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�4474
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH
INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Spanish President Aznar
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
President Aznar
Notetakers: George Chastain, Matt Sibley,
Robert Ford, Sean Tarver, Roger M e r l e t t i
and Jim Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
President Aznar:
The President:
President Aznar:
June 10, 1999, 11:40 - 11:43 a.m. EDT
Oval O f f i c e
Hello?
Jose Maria?
How are you?
The President: Fine, thank you. I j u s t c a l l e d t o thank you so
much f o r your l o y a l support t o NATO. This i s a good day f o r us.
I j u s t wanted t o say thank you.
President Aznar: I'm very happy that you c a l l e d me. Thank you
so much. I'm very happy w i t h your leadership and the success of
the operation.
The President:
Thank you.
President Aznar: I t h i n k you can also count on Spain continuing
to cooperate i n t h i s new phase. We w i l l cooperate m i l i t a r i l y as
w e l l as p o l i t i c a l l y , of course.
The President: I can't wait.
to do but we can do i t .
There i s s t i l l a l o t of hard work
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�President Aznar: Well, we've done a very tough job. We have a
tough job ahead, but when a l l of us work together, we achieve
our o b j e c t i v e s .
The President:
And we always w i l l i f we stay together.
President Aznar: Well, you know you can r e l y on me personally
and on Spain. No doubt together we w i l l achieve our goals.
The President:
That's great.
I w i l l see you soon.
Thank you.
President Aznar: L i s t e n , thank you f o r your c a l l and, j u s t one
second, l e t me ask you, how are the cigars doing?
The President: I j u s t smoked the l a s t one yesterday.
Hillary
got mad at me because I stopped chewing them and s t a r t e d smoking
them. They were too good to keep chewing.
President Aznar: I t i s much b e t t e r to smoke them. As I t o l d
you, I am reserving one very special cigar that I ' l l smoke
during H i l l a r y ' s campaign i n New York.
The President:
Thank you.
I ' l l t e l l her t h a t .
President Aznar: I hope to see you soon and thank you f o r the
c a l l . A l l the best.
The President:
Thank you.
-- End of Conversation
—
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�4474
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH
INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h French President Chirac
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
President Chirac
I n t e r p r e t e r : Carol Wolter
Notetakers: George Chastain, Matt Sibley,
Robert Ford, Sean Tarver, Roger M e r l e t t i
and James Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
June 10, 1999, 11:35 - 11:37 a.m.
Oval O f f i c e
Hello, Jacques?
President Chirac:
you.
The President:
Bill?
You too.
Oh, How are you?
Congratulations t o
I j u s t c a l l e d t o thank you.
President Chirac: That i s very nice o f you. This i s a r e a l l y
great success, also a great success f o r cooperation between the
United States and France. Also. Not 'only," but 'also."
The President:
Absolutely.
President Chirac: We are very glad, and French p u b l i c opinion
is very s a t i s f i e d .
The President: Now we have t o get the refugees back i n and make
i t work. I j u s t c a l l e d t o say thank you. We can t a l k more i n
Cologne.
President Chirac: Yes, we have, i n a week, a dinner i n a l i t t l e
b i s t r o i n France and we can t a l k a l i t t l e longer, but I t h i n k
everything i s going t o go a l l r i g h t now.
The President:
Well, I can't thank you enough.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�President Chirac: Oh, we can thank each other.
together and we have been r i g h t .
We have been
The President: Yes, the same as i n Bosnia. Now we have a r e a l
chance f o r Europe t o be put r i g h t and continue t h i s move toward
i n t e g r a t i o n on s e c u r i t y and economic strategy. I t h i n k 20 years
from now t h i s w i l l be looked back on as a great day.
President Chirac: Yes, I think so, too. Public opinion i n
France approved t h i s a l l the time l i k e i n the United States.
The President:
see you.
I can't wait t o see you.
President Chirac:
The President:
H i l l a r y can't wait t o
A l l my love t o H i l l a r y , too. See you soon.
I can't w a i t .
Goodbye.
President Chirac: We w i l l see you i n a French b i s t r o . I can't
wait t o see you. Thank you f o r c a l l i n g . I am moved. Goodbye.
-- End o f Conversation
—
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CONFI D E I t f j f t L
4474
THE WHITE H O U S E
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Canadian Prime M i n i s t e r C h r e t i e n
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The P r e s i d e n t
Prime M i n i s t e r C h r e t i e n
Notetakers:
George Chastain, Matt S i b l e y ,
Robert Ford, Sean Tarver, J i m Smith and
Roger M e r l e t t i
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The P r e s i d e n t :
June 10, 1999, 11:45 - 11:47 a.m. EDT
Oval O f f i c e
Hello?
(U)
Prime M i n i s t e r C h r e t i e n :
Hello, B i l l ?
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t : Jean, I j u s t c a l l e d t o say thank you.
good day f o r us. (U)
This i s a
Prime M i n i s t e r C h r e t i e n : Oh, good, I am v e r y happy. I t i s a
g r e a t success you g o t , t h a t we got c o l l e c t i v e l y , t o be able t o
remain t o g e t h e r d u r i n g these d i f f i c u l t t i m e s . (U)
The P r e s i d e n t : We d i d and I t h i n k i t i s a g r e a t t h i n g f o r
Europe t o o . We have t o h e l p them so the m i s s i o n i n Kosovo
doesn't g e t screwed up.
This w i l l g i v e Europe enormous s e l f c o n f i d e n c e because they d i d n ' t w a i t l i k e Bosnia and a l l o w the UN
to u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y r a t i f y the e t h n i c c l e a n s i n g . I t h i n k t h i s
w i l l l e a d t o a more u n i f i e d Europe and i s i n the l o n g - t e r m best
i n t e r e s t s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and Canada. Reversing e t h n i c
cleansing i s very important.
Prime M i n i s t e r C h r e t i e n : You can be sure we w i l l do our p a r t .
We haven't decided how many we w i l l send. We know you have
seven t o e i g h t thousand. I a l r e a d y have e i g h t hundred. NATO
wants a thousand more but I don't know i f we can a f f o r d i t . (£1
•CONFI DEtrefrftfc
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y on: 6/15/09
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The President: Do the best you can. Your guys are so competent
and so good. I know one thing we w i l l have h e l l doing i s t r y i n g
to f i g u r e out how t o prevent the understandable blood l u s t of the
Kosovars from running against the Serbs that want t o stay.
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien:
Kosovo? 0^
When do you expect troops t o move i n t o
The President: Tomorrow. I t has t o be tomorrow. We can't wait
long because I am a f r a i d these refugees w i l l pour across the
border l i k e the I s r a e l i t e s out of Egypt. We have t o get the mines
out.
We don't want a bunch of refugees having t h e i r legs blown
o f f t r y i n g t o go home. f^J
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien: We w i l l be p a r t i c i p a t i n g
Thank you f o r c a l l i n g .
The President:
Okay, I ' l l see you i n Cologne.
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien:
Yep. Goodbye.
-- End of Conversation
a l l the way.
(U)
(U)
—
•eONriDENHAfe-
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�•CONriDENTIAL-
4 4 74
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Portuguese Prime M i n i s t e r
Guterres (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The P r e s i d e n t
Prime M i n i s t e r Guterres
N o t e t a k e r s : Matt S i b l e y , Robert Ford,
George Chastain, Sean Tarver, Roger
M e r l e t t i and Jim Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The P r e s i d e n t :
June 10, 1999, 1:47 - 1:49 p.m. EDT
Oval O f f i c e
Hello?
Prime M i n i s t e r G u t e r r e s :
b i g day. (U)
The P r e s i d e n t :
(U)
Hello, B i l l .
Congratulations, i t i s a
I j u s t c a l l e d t o thank you. (U)
Prime M i n i s t e r G u t e r r e s :
Not a t a l l . You have n o t h i n g t o thank
me f o r . We have a l l t o thank you. You d i d t h e r i g h t t h i n g .
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t : I j u s t wanted t o say thanks. We had a hard j o b ,
and we have a hard j o b ahead o f us, b u t you were w o n d e r f u l . (U)
Prime M i n i s t e r G u t e r r e s :
No, I must confess, i n my o p i n i o n a l l
t h i s was p o s s i b l e because o f t h e d e c i s i o n s taken a t t h e
Washington Summit. Your p o s i t i o n was c r i t i c a l .
The o p p o s i t i o n
was a l s o key t o making t h i s happen. I am v e r y happy, b u t now we
have a l o t t o do and many problems t o f a c e . But you can count
on us. We a r e a s m a l l c o u n t r y , b u t our e f f o r t w i l l be
p r o p o r t i o n a l , i f i t i s a t a l l p o s s i b l e . (Pf
The P r e s i d e n t :
Thank you so much.
(U)
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Prime M i n i s t e r Guterres: I t h i n k i t w i l l be a very hard task
now t o make things move i n Kosovo, but our experience w i t h the
Kosovars i s t h a t they want t o come back. (£7
The President: Yes. We've got t o get them home as q u i c k l y as
possible. I t ' l l be d i f f i c u l t , but i t ' s possible. ( p f
Prime M i n i s t e r Guterres:
The President:
Thanks.
A l l the best.
Goodbye.
Prime M i n i s t e r Guterres:
—
Fine.
Goodbye.
Thanks.
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation --
COIIFI DENT IAL
CLINTON UBRARY PHOTOCOPY
(U)
�•CONFIDENTIAL
4474
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH
INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Dutch Prime M i n i s t e r Kok (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The P r e s i d e n t
Prime M i n i s t e r Kok
N o t e t a k e r s : George Chastain, M a t t S i b l e y ,
Robert Ford, Sean Tarver, Roger M e r l e t t i and
Jim Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The P r e s i d e n t :
June 10, 1999, 2:01 - 2:07 p.m. EDT
Oval O f f i c e
H e l l o , Wim?
(U)
Prime M i n i s t e r Kok: H e l l o , B i l l .
The P r e s i d e n t :
(U)
I c a l l e d t o say thank you. (U)
Prime M i n i s t e r Kok: W e l l , thank you. You d i d i t , t h e
Americans. We gave you a l l t h e support you needed, b u t you d i d
it.
I'm most happy f o r what we r e a l i z e d . (U)
The President: I think it's a great day for Europe. It will be
a great day if we can get most of them to go home now. We'll
have a reverse in the ethnic cleansing in a way that we couldn't
do in Bosnia because it went on so long. [ft]
Prime M i n i s t e r Kok: A b s o l u t e l y , i f we can g e t them home b e f o r e
w i n t e r s t a r t s i n November and October o r even September. There
i s a l o t t o be done.
The P r e s i d e n t :
I t h i n k t h e c o n f i d e n c e and t h e p r i d e I sense i n
Europe i s a g r e a t t h i n g . They're so proud. I t a l k e d t o
D'Alema, and i t was v e r y h a r d f o r him, and t h e y a r e so proud,
and now we have t o make t h e peace work. I f we can do t h i s , we
may have stopped a l o t o f t h i s elsewhere. We have been w o r k i n g
q u i e t l y , and h o p e f u l l y can t a l k more l a t e r , b u t we have t r i e d
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quietly for four years in Africa to try to prevent another
Rwanda with a rapid reaction force. I think if we can have a
set-up now elsewhere, we can stop this from happening in the
future, it will be a great thing. (j?)
Prime Minister Kok: This will certainly have an effect
elsewhere in Europe. I must tell you, here in the Netherlands
during the last few weeks, there was a growing sentiment that we
needed some kind of pause in the bombing. But I think the way
it was done was the best exercise, facilitating the Chinese to
agree on the UN resolution. (ft)
But I must say, Bill, I was there as you were in the last few
weeks and I am so impressed by what Albania, Macedonia and
others need in terms of logistics support. At the same time, we
have to invest politically and militarily in the future of the
whole region, if not elsewhere. (fS)
With no economic perspective, people tend even more to
nationalistic policies. We are now entering summer but must be
aware of the fact that now is when our responsibility starts.
To rebuild. Reconstruct. (&]
The President: One thing I'd like you to think about. I will
raise all those issues at the G-8 in Cologne next week. I know
the EU already began a partnership relationship with countries
in Southeast Europe, but it seems to me if we could package this
thing structurally the way the Marshall Plan worked, I know it's
an over-used analogy, but if we could say to Macedonia, even to
Montenegro and Albania, but also to Romania and Bulgaria, 'Get
yourselves together as a unit and we will do the following
things that will be very helpful." The United States will help,
but it is important for the EU to take the lead. {{£)
Prime M i n i s t e r Kok: Yes, I have considered t h a t .
c e r t a i n premium on i t now.
There i s a
The President: I t could be a dressed up customs union, I don't
know, whatever we want, but something t o make them say, 'We w i l l
deepen regional i n t e g r a t i o n w i t h Europe based on common
p r i n c i p l e s and, i n r e t u r n f o r t h a t , w i l l depend on the EU f o r
help." The Canadians w i l l p i t c h i n and w e ' l l do our p a r t . (J2f
Prime M i n i s t e r Kok: That's a very good idea.
about i t , B i l l . (U)
The President:
Thanks, Wim.
I will
(U)
•CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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�GOMFIDENratt.
3
Prime M i n i s t e r Kok: Goodbye.
The President:
Goodbye.
—
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation
CONFIDENTS,
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�•CONriDCNTIAL
4 47 4
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I N G T O N
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h German C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder
PARTICIPANTS:
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t
C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder
I n t e r p r e t e r : G i s e l a Marcuse
Notetakers:
Sean Tarver, Matt S i b l e y ,
Robert Ford, Roger M e r l e t t i , James
Smith and Lawrence B u t l e r
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The
President:
June 10, 1999, 4:00 - 4:04 p.m. EDT
Residence
Gerhard, I j u s t c a l l e d t o say thank you. (U)
C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder: I have t o thank you. Without America, i t
would have been i m p o s s i b l e t o i n t e r v e n e i n Kosovo. (U)
The
President:
But we d i d a good t h i n g t o g e t h e r .
C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder:
(U)
I t h i n k so. (U)
The P r e s i d e n t : Yes, me t o o . And I t h i n k now we j u s t have t o
keep w o r k i n g , we have t o make i t work. We have t o w i n t h e
peace, now t h a t we've won t h e c o n f l i c t . (U)
C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder: I t h i n k t h e most i m p o r t a n t j o b f o r us i s
t o make sure t h e c o u n t r y gets back on i t s f e e t e c o n o m i c a l l y and
politically.
They have t o i n Macedonia and A l b a n i a and
e s p e c i a l l y i n Montenegro. (pT
The P r e s i d e n t : Yes, I agree. I s t r o n g l y support i t and w i l l
h e l p as much as I can. I t h i n k t h e f i r s t t h i n g i s t o make sure
landmines a r e o u t o f t h e way, and g e t t h e refugees o u t o f
Macedonia as soon as we can, then we have t o go t o work on t h e
economy. I t ' s a d e c i s i o n f o r Europe, b u t I would l i k e t o see
some e f f o r t s made i n t h e whole e a s t e r n European r e g i o n f o r a
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n e f f o r t t h a t w i l l i n v o l v e everyone, p u l l them
=r!%,
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�closer together and closer to Europe. I think there is a model
there in the Marshall Plan, not so much in the money, but in the
way it was done,
($>?)
Chancellor Schroeder: I t o t a l l y agree. We can t a l k about the
d e t a i l s , but i t ' s important t o develop the region economically
and t o give i t some prospect of becoming part of Europe. This
whole t h i n g should be done i n step. There are many economic
d i f f e r e n c e s , but i t ' s important they have the prospect
eventually of j o i n i n g . Germany was i n support of the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland j o i n i n g the EU. We are also i n
favor o f eastern countries being given the prospect o f
eventually j o i n i n g . That i s something we have t o continue t o
support, t h i s i s not a s h o r t - l i v e d t h i n g . We intend t o work on
it.
(pO
The President: Well, I think we will have a chance to talk more
at the EU, but I think you're going to have a good summit at
Cologne, now. It'll be much happier than it might have been.
We'll have to work on it together. It was nice to hear your
voice. I just wanted to thank you today. \g]
Chancellor Schroeder: I also thank you very much f o r your good
cooperation and I look forward t o seeing you again. (U)
The President:
Okay.
Chancellor Schroeder:
(U)
Goodbye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation
CONFIDENTIAL
—
�4474
THE WHITE H O U S E
WASH
INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h B e l g i a n Prime M i n i s t e r
PARTICIPANTS:
The P r e s i d e n t
Prime M i n i s t e r
Dehaene
Dehaene
Notetakers:
George Chastain, M a t t S i b l e y ,
Robert Ford, Sean Tarver, Roger M e r l e t t i ,
Jim Smith, Lawrence B u t l e r and Sam Moyn
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
June 10, 1999, 4:10 - 4:11 p.m. EDT
Oval O f f i c e
The P r e s i d e n t :
Hello,
Jean-Luc.
Prime M i n i s t e r
Dehaene:
Hello,
The P r e s i d e n t :
Prime M i n i s t e r
job.
The P r e s i d e n t :
Bill.
I j u s t c a l l e d t o say thank you.
Dehaene:
I t h i n k t h a t t o g e t h e r we d i d a good
Yes, I t h i n k we d i d a good t h i n g f o r t h e w o r l d .
Prime M i n i s t e r Dehaene: I t h i n k t h a t i t i s a good agreement, b u t
now i t w i l l be a q u e s t i o n o f p u t t i n g t h e necessary means i n and
h e l p i n g t h e whole area s t a b i l i z e .
The P r e s i d e n t :
Prime M i n i s t e r
The P r e s i d e n t :
We can do t h a t .
Dehaene:
I t h i n k so.
We have t o work on i t .
Prime M i n i s t e r Dehaene: I t h i n k t h a t i f we can work t h e same
way, between you and the EU, we can r e a l i z e i t .
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�The President: Yes, I am o p t i m i s t i c , but there are a l o t of
operational problems, but I t h i n k we can do i t .
I am looking
forward t o i t and j u s t wanted t o c a l l and say thank you very
much.
Prime M i n i s t e r Dehaene: I appreciate i t .
NATO and the EU i t was a very good t h i n g .
The President:
Me too.
Prime M i n i s t e r Dehaene:
The President:
I t h i n k t h a t between
Okay, goodbye.
Goodbye.
—
End of Conversation
—
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CONFIDENTIAL
5675
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
B i l a t e r a l Meeting Between the President and
German Chancellor Schroeder (U)
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The President
Samuel R. Berger, A s s i s t a n t t o the President
for National Security A f f a i r s
James Steinberg, Deputy A s s i s t a n t t o t h e
President f o r N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A f f a i r s
Steven R i c c h e t t i , Deputy Chief o f S t a f f
John Kornblum, Ambassador t o Germany
Antony B l i n k e n , Special A s s i s t a n t t o t h e
President and Senior D i r e c t o r f o r European
A f f a i r s , NSC S t a f f , (notetaker)
Germany
Gerhard Schroeder, Chancellor
Joschka Fischer, Foreign M i n i s t e r
Michael S t e i n e r , N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y Advisor
Hans Blomeyer, A s s i s t a n t t o the Chancellor
f o r North America
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
June 18, 1999, 2:55 - 3:30 p.m.
Gurzenich, Germany
Chancellor Schroeder: Well, f i r s t l e t me extend t o you our
warmest welcome. I hope you w i l l get a chance t o enjoy t h e
c i t y . (U)
The President: We went out f o r a wonderful meal l a s t n i g h t —
we had a great time and I c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e l o c a l economy. (U)
Chancellor Schroeder:
Kosovo. (U)
Perhaps we could s t a r t by t a l k i n g about
CONFIDENTIAL
C l a s s i f i e d by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5 (d)
D e c l a s s i f y On:
J u l y 30,
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The President:
we are. (U)
Why don't I l e t Sandy give us a r e p o r t on where
N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y Advisor Berger:
I t ' s been an intense two
days. The Russians have kept i n s i s t i n g on t h e i r own s e c t o r .
But now we have j u s t heard t h a t they have f a l l e n o f f t h a t .
Where we are now, i s t h a t they would have two b a t t a l i o n s i n our
s e c t o r , one i n the French sector and one i n yours. The l a s t two
would be contiguous areas, k i n d of l i k e a f i g u r e e i g h t . But the
c o n t i g u i t y would be very small. The remaining issues seemed t o
be f i g u r i n g o u t the a i r p o r t l o g i s t i c s . The Russians want 1500.
The B r i t i s h b e l i e v e t h a t i s very excessive. The Russians may
also want a 5 b a t t a l i o n . Secretary Cohen i s going t o say t o
them *you have u n t i l 4:30 t o make a deal."
fe)
th
The President: I t h i n k t h i s w i l l work o u t . I t ' s r e a l l y more
about what i s going on i n s i d e o f Russia. What i s d i s t u r b i n g i s
the b e l i e f even among the Y e l t s i n group t h a t we went t o war i n
Kosovo t o extend our i n f l u e n c e from the Caucasus t o the Caspian.
That we want t o push back the Russians. Of course, t h i s i s n o t
t r u e , b u t we have t o convince them o f t h a t . fG-)
Chancellor Schroeder:
The President: I agree. And t h a t ' s why we have t o be a l i t t l e
b i t f l e x i b l e . But t h e r e d l i n e s are very c l e a r and must not
change. F i r s t , they cannot have t h e i r own s e c t o r . The Kosovar
Albanians would n o t go home. I t would be a r e c i p e f o r carnage.
Second, t h e r e can be no defacto p a r t i t i o n . That would be
tantamount t o l o s i n g t h e peace. But w i t h i n those r e d l i n e s I
t h i n k we can be f l e x i b l e w i t h o u t embarrassing the Russians. I n
a l a r g e r sense, we need them t o understand t h a t t h i s i s not
about t e r r i t o r y , or wealth but t o reverse e t h n i c c l e a n s i n g .
This i s n o t 19th century great power p o l i t i c s . Now given the
unique German r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Russia, I t h i n k you have a
unique a b i l i t y t o i n f l u e n c e them and help t o see what our goals
r e a l l y are. My time i s running out, and so i s Y e l t s i n ' s . I
have done my best t o support them. Now, I j u s t spoke t o B l a i r .
He agrees t h a t we should t a l k about t h i s t o n i g h t . One t h i n g we
discussed was t o t r y and b r i n g more p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s t o Russia
and v i c e versa. What we need t o do i s t o move the center o f
Russian p o l i t i c s . fG)
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Chancellor Schroeder: You know we j u s t had t h i s EU Summit. We
adopted a j o i n t statement and an approach t o Russia. I t goes
beyond government-to-government a f f a i r s . I t i n c l u d e s economic
p o l i t i c a l and youth c o n t a c t s . A more i n t e g r a l approach as you
were saying — t h a t ' s the only way t o reassure t h e i r f e a r s .
They are the younger generation o f Russian p o l i t i c i a n s and
i r o n i c a l l y they have not had the i n t e r n a t i o n a l exposure t h a t the
o l d e r ones have had. We need t o make sure t h a t we work w i t h the
up and coming people as w e l l . f&)
The P r e s i d e n t : Can we t a l k about Kosovo? Let's assume the
Russian piece works o u t . Then we've got a huge r e c o n s t r u c t i o n
j o b . We want t o do our p a r t . S e t t i n g aside the q u e s t i o n o f
a s s i s t a n c e , i t seems t o me there are two issues.
First,
r e b u i l d i n g c i v i l s o c i e t y i n Kosovo. Second, the b u i l d i n g o f the
Balkans as a whole w i t h the EU S t a b i l i t y Pact I n i t i a t i v e .
Now,
i t i s v i t a l t h a t we get the r i g h t person t o handle r e b u i l d i n g i n
Kosovo. I don't care about n a t i o n a l i t y . I am w o r r i e d t h a t the
d e c i s i o n w i l l be p o l i t i c a l . Not based on competence and energy.
We need t o approach t h i s as i f we were h i r i n g someone t o do a
job f o r a m i l l i o n Deutch Marks. What would we look f o r ?
Someone w i t h p o l i t i c a l s k i l l s , since the people hate each o t h e r .
Someone w i t h human f e e l i n g , we w i l l l i t e r a l l y need t o b r i n g an
army o f p s y c h i a t r i s t s and r e l i g i o u s leaders. Someone who can
handle t h e machinery o f r e b u i l d i n g houses and roads. Someone
w i t h tremendous energy, w i t h r e a l management a b i l i t y , w i t h
i m a g i n a t i o n . Maybe someone who ran a b i g German company. That
would be b e t t e r than a former cabinet m i n i s t e r . We cannot a l l o w
p o l i t i c s t o obscure the need t o do i t r i g h t . Just l i k e our
d e c i s i o n t h a t we could not lose the war i n Kosovo, i t i s a
c r i t i c a l decision.
I f we g e t t h e wrong p e r s o n , i t w i l l be a
d i s a s t e r . We need t o work w i t h K o f i on t h i s .
i s f i n d i n g t h e r i g h t person. fG4
My o n l y i n t e r e s t
Chancellor Schroeder: I t o t a l l y agree w i t h t h a t . But I wonder
i f we found a c l a s s i c a l manager, would he or she would have the
p o l i t i c a l s k i l l s and f e e l i n g necessary f o r the j o b . My
experience i s t h a t good managers have o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s k i l l s b u t
t h i s i s a h i g h l y complex p o l i t i c a l environment as w e l l . We have
a German expression which i s t h a t we need a e i g h t - l e g g e d warm
m i l k p i g . Obviously t h i s doesn't t r a n s l a t e but I t h i n k you get
the p o i n t . fG}
The P r e s i d e n t : I agree w i t h t h a t . We need someone w i t h s t r o n g
p o l i t i c a l s k i l l s , w i t h s t r o n g communications s k i l l s , and, o f
course, w i t h a s t a f f t h a t can do the day-to-day. But again,
t h a t person also needs a s t r o n g w i l l , energy, tremendous
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4
organizational skills and also the approach to go there and stay
there and let the world media come to him. He has to roll his
sleeves up. To bring people together, to be deeply committed —
I'd love to do this job. It's incredibly challenging and we
just have to find the right person. I understand the Europeans
don't want an American. I don't care about the nationality, I
don't care where he is from. If all of us could say to Kofi —
this is what we want: a strong person, real organizational
skills, don't make a political decision — that would be very
helpful.
m
Chancellor Schroeder: We have also got t o move forward on the
S t a b i l i t y Pact f o r t h e r e g i o n .
The President:
There i s a Donor's Conference next month, r i g h t ?
Chancellor Schroeder: Yes, we have t o do t h i s s p e e d i l y ,
p o s s i b l y as e a r l y as next month. fG}
The P r e s i d e n t : Let me ask you t o t h i n k about something. F i r s t ,
I recognize t h i s i s r e a l l y about what t h e EU wishes t o do. But
there are two t h i n g s I t h i n k i t would be good t o t h i n k about.
F i r s t , we need t o get t h e Balkans more i n t e g r a t e d among
themselves. Then, we need t o push i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o Europe over
time, i n c l u d i n g i n t o our s e c u r i t y system. I went back and
s t u d i e d what we d i d w i t h Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic
a f t e r the B e r l i n Wall f e l l . And I also looked back a t the
M a r s h a l l Plan. So l e t me suggest a couple o f ideas — and l e t
me a l s o make c l e a r t h a t w h i l e I t h i n k the lead has t o be w i t h
the EU and the i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s on the
f i n a n c i a l side we w i l l do our share. fG}
I n the M a r s h a l l Plan, one o f the smartest t h i n g s they d i d was t o
say t h a t the major c o n d i t i o n f o r g e t t i n g money beyond democracy
i s t h a t r e c i p i e n t s have t o get together and d e f i n e t h e i r needs
as a group. They need t o come together t o d e f i n e t h e i r f u t u r e .
So i n a d d i t i o n t o the Donors' Conference, i t s seems t o me t h a t
g e t t i n g t h e leaders o f the Balkans together w i t h us soon, i n the
r e g i o n , and t o say t o them you need t o assume r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,
t e l l us how you want t o a l l o c a t e funds, and what your p r i o r i t i e s
are — t h i s would be an important t h i n g t o do and r e a l i n c e n t i v e
t o get them t o work more c l o s e l y t o g e t h e r . fG}
Second, we need t o examine whether t h e r e are other t h i n g s we can
put on t h e t a b l e i n terms o f i n t e g r a t i o n . Should we move up
NATO enlargement and EU enlargement? I f n o t , EU enlargement
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r i g h t away, maybe a customs union. We need t o c r e a t e an
environment i n which t h e people o f the r e g i o n look forward t o
the f u t u r e and create i n c e n t i v e s t o get them moving forward.
Anyway, i f you t h i n k i t i s a good idea, maybe we can t r y and
move forward w i t h a meeting of leaders i n the r e g i o n sometime
d u r i n g t h e next 30-60 days. I ' l l d e f e r t o you, b u t t h i n k about
t h i s , we j u s t cannot a f f o r d t o lose the peace. fe}
Chancellor Schroeder: I very much agree e s p e c i a l l y about
g e t t i n g leaflers. „tO-a£.thex-in_th.e^-r££[i.Q.n-. I t h i n k t h i s i s a ve»rv
good idea.
Now about b r i n g i n g c o u n t r i e s i n t o the EU. I have t o t e l l you
t h e r e i s such a backlog t h a t i t w i l l be hard t o add them t o the
list.
But ideas l i k e a customs union o r a s s o c i a t i o n agreements
are important and we should pursue them. (€}
The President: One t h i n g t o t h i n k about i s t h a t doing i t as a
group, n o t j u s t i n d i v i d u a l n a t i o n s , can get these c o u n t r i e s t o
work t o g e t h e r , even though, o f course, there are dramatic
d i f f e r e n c e s among them. I t would create a group psychology. We
need t o s e t up a system i n which c o u n t r i e s are rewarded f o r
working t o g e t h e r t o t e l l them w e ' l l work w i t h you i f you work
w i t h each o t h e r . f€}
Chancellor Schroeder: Yes, I t h i n k t h i s i s an i n t e r e s t i n g idea
and we should t a l k some more about i t . But f o r now I am a f r a i d
we w i l l have t o end t h i s d i s c u s s i o n o r else t h e two o f us w i l l
be accused o f keeping everyone else w a i t i n g t o s t a r t t h e Summit,
fe}
End o f Conversation
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4760
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Former German C h a n c e l l o r Helmut
Kohl (U)
PARTICIPANTS
The P r e s i d e n t
Former C h a n c e l l o r Kohl
I n t e r p r e t e r : B i r g i t t a Richman
N o t e t a k e r s : Jenny McGee, George C h a s t a i n ,
Robert Ford, J o e l E h r e n d r e i c h and Roger
Merletti
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The P r e s i d e n t :
June 2 1 , 1999, 7:30 - 7:34 a.m. EDT
A i r Force One
H i , Helmut.
I j u s t c a l l e d t o say h e l l o .
(U)
Former C h a n c e l l o r Kohl: W e l l , B i l l , thank you v e r y much. I
hope you're d o i n g w e l l , and please a l s o say h e l l o t o your w i f e .
I hope you had a good t i m e i n Germany. (U)
The P r e s i d e n t : I had a w o n d e r f u l t i m e . I am so r e l i e v e d we
worked t h r o u g h o u r problems w i t h Y e l t s i n .
He seemed i n a good
frame o f mind. (^f
Former C h a n c e l l o r K o h l : I a l s o had t h a t i m p r e s s i o n . I t a l k e d
t o him and t o l d him over and over t h a t he had t o t o e t h e l i n e
now. You know, B i l l , you have t o d i s c u s s as much as p o s s i b l e
w i t h him. E v e r y t h i n g you can n a i l down now you have s e t t l e d .
You don't know how t h i n g s a r e going t o work o u t w i t h h i s
successor. ( p f
The P r e s i d e n t : Yes. I t o l d him y e s t e r d a y we have t o f i n i s h
t h i s n u c l e a r work, because he can't a f f o r d t o l e t h i s successor
throw i t a l l away.
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Former Chancellor Kohl: Very good. If you think I can do
something from here, let me know, because everything you can do
now is work well done. ytf
The President:
Yes, I understand.
Former Chancellor Kohl:
(U)
Are you going d i r e c t l y home?
(U)
The President: No, I'm on the way t o Slovenia, then Macedonia,
and then I'm going home. (U)
Former Chancellor Kohl: That is very good. Say some good
things to the two in Slovenia and Macedonia; they need
encouragement. And I think especially in Slovenia, things are
going to develop well. y£)
The President: I think so, too. (J?)
Former Chancellor Kohl: B i l l , I am going t o get i n touch w i t h
you i n two weeks or so i n Washington. (U)
The President: Oh, that's great. I would love t o hear from
you. I look forward t o hearing from you then, Helmut. (U)
Former Chancellor Kohl:
The President:
Thank you very much, and goodbye.
Thank you, Helmut.
—
Goodbye.
End of Conversation
(U)
—
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5675
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
United States-European Summit — R e s t r i c t e d
Session (U)
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The President
Madeleine A l b r i g h t , Secretary o f State
Samuel R. Berger, A s s i s t a n t t o t h e President
for National Security A f f a i r s
Antony B l i n k e n , Special A s s i s t a n t t o t h e
President and Senior D i r e c t o r f o r
European A f f a i r s
European Union
Gerhard Schroeder, Chancellor
Jacques Santer, President o f t h e European
Commission
Joschka Fischer, Foreign M i n i s t e r
Michael S t e i n e r , N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y Advisor
S i r Leon B r i t t a n , European Commissioner
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
June 21, 1999, 9:45 - 10:30 a.m.
P a l a i s Schaumberg,
Bonn, Germany
Chancellor Schroeder: Welcome, Mr. President. I am very
pleased t o see you i n t h i s s p e c i a l place where Adenauer r u l e d
t h i s country. I was happy t o be able t o show you h i s personal
office.
I must say i t i s much a i r i e r and l i g h t e r than the
o f f i c e t h a t I work i n r i g h t now. As you know, we've spent the
l a s t few days d i s c u s s i n g problems between Europe and t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s . I t h i n k we've covered l o t s o f ground. Today, I thought
t h e r e were some p o i n t s t h a t we could discuss f o r f u r t h e r
c o o r d i n a t i o n . Maybe we can s t a r t w i t h the question o f how
Europe and t h e United States should deal w i t h the problem o f
Kosovo. We've o b v i o u s l y seen some very important progress; the
H e l s i n k i Agreement, which continued the G-8 success, and
progress i n d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n w i t h t h e UCK. These are important
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Reason:
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D e c l a s s i f y on: 07/29/2009
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achievements. Now, we need t o j o i n t l y address t h e problem o f
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , n o t j u s t f o r Kosovo but f o r a l l o f t h e Balkans,
as the S t a b i l i t y Pact e s t a b l i s h e s . fe)
As t o t h e Leaders' Conference t h a t you have proposed, we a l l
agree on the need t o move forward. I would propose as an
a p p r o p r i a t e venue, Sarajevo, and t h a t we move q u i c k l y as e a r l y
as J u l y . We have t o t h i n k about the contexts depending on who
hosts t h e Conference. I f t h e EU does i t , then the i n v i t a t i o n s
must be extended by the Finns who w i l l assume the Presidency.
I f we p u t i t under a G-8 umbrella, then we can extend t h e
i n v i t a t i o n s . fG-)
S e c u r i t y Advisor Michael S t e i n e r : A h t i s a a r i could issue the
i n v i t a t i o n s . Maybe we can ask him. fe)
The P r e s i d e n t : Yes, we should. I t h i n k i t would be b e t t e r t o
do t h i s i n J u l y given a l l the f a s t moving events. I t h i n k the
message should be: we're there f o r them b u t also t h a t they need
to work t o g e t h e r and t h e sooner they do so, the b e t t e r . fG-)
Chancellor Schroeder: We need t o t a l k t o A h t i s a a r i and organize
t h i s w i t h t h e Finns. fe}
President Santer: With the EU, we are p u t t i n g t o g e t h e r a
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n program f o r Kosovo. We are s e t t i n g up an agency
to handle t h i s . We're also p r e p a r i n g f o r t h e a s s o c i a t i o n o f
Macedonia and A l b a n i a . I t i s important t o i n v o l v e t h e whole
r e g i o n . A l b a n i a has a longer way t o go because o f the problem
of i n s t i t u t i o n b u i l d i n g . But we are working on t h i s — although
we must be c l e a r i t i s n o t f o r tomorrow.
fG-)
The Agency t h a t we are c r e a t i n g would take t h e l e a d f o r Kosovo
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n t o c o o r d i n a t e humanitarian assistance and
p h y s i c a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n programs. I t h i n k i t would be good t o
l o c a t e i t i n t h e r e g i o n , i f p o s s i b l e i n P r i s t i n a because the
refugees are coming back and we need t o have t h e presence o f
t h i s agency on t h e ground. I hope t h e Commission w i l l g i v e us a
green l i g h t soon t o e s t a b l i s h the agency. Meanwhile, we are
sending i n 20 c i v i l servants t o a c t as l i a i s o n s . We have t r i e d
to l e a r n from the lessons o f Bosnia. We need t o move s w i f t l y ,
to s i m p l i f y the f i n a n c i a l r e g u l a t i o n s . This agency i s t h e
answer. We w i l l also take a lead i n o r g a n i z i n g the process o f
the Donors' Conferences. (G}
Chancellor Schroeder: There i s one question t o r a i s e again t h a t
we have a l r e a d y discussed and t h a t i s the r e l a t i o n s h i p between
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the European Union and Turkey.
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
The P r e s i d e n t : The f a c t t h a t you made t h i s i n i t i a t i v e i s very
i m p o r t a n t and I s t r o n g l y support i t .
I've always b e l i e v e d t h a t
i f Turkey b e l i e v e d i t had r e a l i s t i c prospects f o r e n t e r i n g the
EU, t h i s would create c r i t i c a l leverage t o help r e s o l v e human
r i g h t problems and i t s d i f f e r e n c e w i t h Greece. So what you've
done i s very h e l p f u l . f€-)
I n t h e end, I t h i n k
we need t o p u t a l l o f t h i s i n t o a l a r g e r c o n t e x t ; t h e Aegean,
human r i g h t s , Cyprus, and the r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Europe. (G)
--
President Santer:
For us, t h i s i s important also because o f the
n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h Cyprus. I t would be d i f f i c u l t t o have a
d i v i d e d i s l a n d i n the EU. fG-)
The P r e s i d e n t : I agree w i t h t h a t . I f we can make progress on
Cyprus, I b e l i e v e t h e Greeks would remove t h e i r o b j e c t i o n s t o
Turkey i n the EU. This week, there was a good s i g n w i t h Turkey
d e c i d i n g t o take the m i l i t a r y judges o f f o f t h e s p e c i a l c o u r t
panels. f&)
Chancellor Schroeder:
Foreign M i n i s t e r Fischer: There i s also i n the wider
environment, i n the European Parliament, a vast m a j o r i t y f o r
having t h e human r i g h t s l i n e , e s p e c i a l l y the Scandinavians, b u t
also now I t a l y .
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EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 i.4d
There i s a d i f f e r e n c e i n
p e r c e p t i o n between the United States and Europe r e g a r d i n g the
f i n a l sentence and the death p e n a l t y . fe-)
Chancellor Schroeder:
Foreign M i n i s t e r Fischer
I n the end, we need a comprehensive deal t h a t
i n v o l v e s Cyprus, the Aegean, human r i g h t s , the Turks i n Europe.
We need t o work very c l o s e l y w i t h them. We have an i m p o r t a n t
m i l i t a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the Turks so we can p l a y an important
role.
But a t t h e same time, we have c o n s t r a i n t s because o f t h a t
r e l a t i o n s h i p . But together, we might have enough leverage t o
move t h i n g s forward. Now i s a good time because o f Kosovo. As
a r e s u l t , Greece and Turkey are working t o g e t h e r . But the t r i a l
complicates m a t t e r s . We need a sustained e f f o r t . I t ' s crazy t o
have t h i s c o n f l i c t over Cyprus. f&)
Michael S t e i n e r : I l i k e your idea o f a comprehensive approach
and t h e U n i t e d States and Europe working t o g e t h e r . The time
might be r i g h t i n September. I t would a l l o w us t o take a step
forward a t t h e next EU Summit. fG}
The President: I am prepared over the next 18 months t o spend a
l o t o f time on t h i s . And, o f course, I have appointed a number
of s p e c i a l envoys. But I t h i n k n e i t h e r o f us has enough
leverage t o do i t alone. We need t o do i t t o g e t h e r . The bottom
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l i n e i s that I do not believe the Cyprus stalemate i s worth the
cost that i t imposes on either side. fe)
National Security Advisor Berger: I f I can add one thing and
with a l l respect, I have watched the EU f o r six years on Turkey.
Nothing has happened. Now the change i n German views i s a very
important development. But the Greeks are blocking things. I f
Turkey r e a l l y does embrace human r i g h t s requirements, can i t
t r u l y be put i n the queue for the EU, or w i l l i t always be i n
back of the line? f&)
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4cl
President Santer:
I t i s important for us to deal w i t h Cyprus on a
poTTtical l e v e l . We w i l l be f i n i s h i n g a Progress report i n
September.
Foreign Minister Fischer: The S t a b i l i t y Pact can help. The
Greeks and Turks realize that thev are neighbors i n a region and
thev have common interests.
Secretary Albright: Of course, Turkey will also be the Chairman
in office of the OSCE. m
Sir Leon B r i t t a n :
i n the queue.
R e a l i s t i c a l l y , we can give them a real place
The President:
Anyway, I think we need to work t h i s i n the f a l l ,
p u t t i n g a l l the cards on the table. fG}
Secretary A l b r i g h t : There are also the confidence-building
measures that Solana i s working on.
The President:
When i s Solana taking his new post?
Security Advisor Michael Steiner:
This f a l l .
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The President:
General.
fG}
Well, we need t o move on a new NATO Secretary
Let me j u s t ask two other t h i n g s about Kosovo. F i r s t , as I have
s a i d t o t h e Chancellor already, i t i s v i t a l l y important t h a t we
p i c k o r t h a t t h e UN p i c k the r i g h t person f o r c i v i l
implementation.
I r a i s e d t h i s w i t h Chirac and w i t h Jospin.
Jospin i s proposing Kouschner. I don't know i f he i s good, but
he sounds l i k e he might be the r i g h t s o r t o f person.
We need
someone w i t h i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a t u r e , who can speak w e l l , b u t most
of a l l who can get t h i n g s done. There must be German business
person.
This should not be a handout f o r p o l i t i c a l reasons. We
a l l need t o work K o f i on t h i s . fG}
Chancellor Schroeder: The second t h i n g on the agenda i s who i s
the r i g h t person t o be the European Union c o o r d i n a t o r f o r the
S t a b i l i t y Pact? I t h i n k whoever i t i s needs the same q u a l i t i e s
t h a t you described. fG}
The President: Yes, I see we need two d i f f e r e n t people -- one
f o r Kosovo, t h e other f o r the S t a b i l i t y Pact. What i s t h e
t i m e t a b l e ? fG}
N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y Advisor Berger: The United Nations has the
lead on Kosovo, i n p i c k i n g what w i l l amount t o a procounsel who
w i l l be charged w i t h overseeing r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , i n c l u d i n g t h e
economic, p o l i t i c a l s e c u r i t y and refugee r e t u r n issues. fG}
Michael S t e i n e r : And t h e other i s the S t a b i l i t y Pact, which the
EU w i l l c o n t r o l . fe}
Secretary A l b r i g h t :
Who do you have i n mind?
(U)
Foreign M i n i s t e r Fischer: Let me add a l s o , t h a t we need someone
f o r Bosnia t o replace Westendorf. We need t o make a l l o f these
d e c i s i o n s q u i c k l y . E s p e c i a l l y w i t h the UCK t r y i n g t o f i l l the
vacuum i n Kosovo. I hope we can s i g n t h e S t a b i l i t y Pact i n
Sarajevo a t t h e heads-of-state l e v e l . But before then, we need
t o f i n d t h e r i g h t people o f h i g h q u a l i t y w i t h quick d e c i s i o n s .
fG}
The P r e s i d e n t :
So what i s your t h i n k i n g ?
Chancellor Schroeder:
at t h e moment. fG}
(U)
We don't r e a l l y have concrete
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Secretary A l b r i g h t : Can I make a p i t c h f o r A h t i s a a r i f o r t h e
S t a b i l i t y Pact. He leaves o f f i c e as President i n January o r
February.
He w i l l be heading the EU. He knows the problems
w e l l because he has been i n Bosnia. I t h i n k he would be very
s t r o n g , b u t I know t h a t Joschka doesn't t h i n k t h i s i s a good
idea.
Foreign M i n i s t e r Fischer: My only concern i s t h a t the f i r s t s i x
months are key and i t would be good t o have the permanent person
i n place r i g h t away. f€-)
Secretary A l b r i g h t : What i f we got someone t o work w i t h him
d u r i n g t h i s time? (U)
Michael S t e i n e r :
anyway. fe)
H e ' l l be deeply i n v o l v e d i n the EU Presidency
Foreign M i n i s t e r Fischer: Whoever i t i s must l i v e i n Kosovo.
Or a t l e a s t i n Sarajevo. f G)
Secretary A l b r i g h t :
him. fG}
He i s such an asset, we r e a l l y need t o use
Foreign M i n i s t e r Fischer:
another name. f G)
I f you don't l i k e B i l d t , we w i l l need
The P r e s i d e n t : My o n l y problem w i t h him i s t h a t he was gone t o o
much i n Bosnia. f G)
N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y Advisor Berger:
He had very good d e p u t i e s .
f€J
The P r e s i d e n t :
Michael, do you t h i n k we need B i l d t ?
Michael S t e i n e r : Let's w a i t f o r a week on t h i s .
ourselves a week t o make these d e c i s i o n s . fG-)
fe)
Let's g i v e
The P r e s i d e n t : Let me j u s t emphasize t h i s i s n o t a p u b l i c i t y
job, i t ' s a working j o b , i n place. The media w i l l come t o
whoever t h i s person i s . With the S t a b i l i t y Pact, i t ' s ok t o
have a h i g h . p r o f i l e person and he o r she could work o u t s i d e t h e
area. fG}
N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y Advisor Berger: One o t h e r p o s s i b i l i t y i s
Paddy Ashdown, He's very t a l e n t e d . But I recognize i t would be
hard t o have B r i t s i n two j o b s . fe)
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Chancellor Schroeder: Well, I think our time has run out on the
r e s t r i c t e d session and I am determined to keep you on schedule.
Why don't we move into the other room to meet with our
ministers.
— End of Conversation
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
U.S.-European Union Summit —
Session (U)
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The President
Secretary A l b r i g h t , Secretary o f State
Charlene Barshefsky, Ambassador, United
States Trade Representative
Ambassador John Kornblum, Ambassador t o
Germany
Ambassador Richard Morningstar, Ambassador
to the European Union
Steven R i c c h e t t i , Deputy Chief o f S t a f f
Samuel R. Berger, A s s i s t a n t t o t h e President
for National Security A f f a i r s
Gene S p e r l i n g , A s s i s t a n t t o the President
f o r Economics
David Aaron, Under Secretary o f Commerce
S t u a r t E i z e n s t a t , Under Secretary o f State
Lael Brainard, Deputy A s s i s t a n t t o the
President f o r Economics
Antony J. Blinken, Special A s s i s t a n t t o the
President and Senior D i r e c t o r f o r
Europe, NSC
Lawrence B u t l e r , D i r e c t o r o f European
A f f a i r s , NSC S t a f f (notetaker)
Plenary
Germany
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder
Joschka Fischer, Foreign M i n i s t e r
Werner Mueller, Economics M i n i s t e r
Michael S t e i n e r , Chancellery D i p l o m a t i c
Advisor
Klaus Grestchmann, Chancellery Head f o r
Economics
Uwe-Karsten Heye, Chancellery Spokesperson
Franz K u d l i c h , European Council S e c r e t a r i a t
CONFIDENTIAL
C l a s s i f i e d by: Robert A. .Bradtke
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y on: J u l y 29, 2009
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
�CONFIDENTIAL
President Jacques Santer, European
Commission
S i r Leon B r i t t a n , Vice President
Hans-Friedrich Beseler, D i r e c t o r General
Hugo Paemen, Washington EC Delegation head
Ivan Rogers, Head of S i r Leon B r i t t a n ' s
Office
C h r i s t i n e Roger, Counselor t o the President
DATE, TIME
PLACE:
June 21, 1999, 10:40 - 11:10 a.m.
K a b i n e t t s a a l , Schaumburg Palace, Bonn,
Germany
Chancellor Schroeder: Let's get s t a r t e d . I would l i k e t o
i n v i t e our m i n i s t e r s t o r e p o r t on t h e i r meeting. (U)
Charlene Barshefsky:
F i r s t , I would l i k e t o say what a pleasure
i t has been working w i t h S i r Leon B r i t t a n .
I have great
personal a f f e c t i o n f o r S i r Leon. (U)
We met over the past hour t o review the progress towards
implementation o f the T r a n s a t l a n t i c Economic P a r t n e r s h i p . We
welcomed the i n i t i a t i v e t o launch a p i l o t p r o j e c t on
b i o t e c h n o l o g y and noted progress on the s e r v i c e s framework
agreement. There we agreed t h a t we should i n c l u d e engineering
and insurance. We spent time t a l k i n g about c o o r d i n a t i n g on
r e g u l a t o r y cooperation and the d e s i r a b i l i t y o f c r e a t i n g a
s c i e n t i f i c panel, i n c l u d i n g consumer NGOs, t o deal w i t h food
s a f e t y issues. fG}
We a l s o discussed the importance o f science f o r the r e g u l a t o r y
process. WTO r u l e s a l l o w f o r p r e c a u t i o n a r y measures when the
science i s u n c e r t a i n , b u t we cannot apply p r e c a u t i o n i n every
i n s t a n c e . f€}
Regarding t h e upcoming S e a t t l e WTO m i n i s t e r i a l , we agreed t o
s t r i v e f o r a three-year round, and make progress on l a b o r and
environmental aspects o f t r a d e . Other c e n t r a l areas w i l l be
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y t r a n s p o r t a t i o n and government
procurement, e l e c t r o n i c commerce, and a c c e l e r a t e d t a r i f f
l i b e r a l i z a t i o n . f&)
We noted t h e importance o f i n v o l v i n g the f r o n t l i n e s t a t e s
(Kosovo) i n t h e WTO. We are already p r o v i d i n g t e c h n i c a l
assistance t o A l b a n i a and C r o a t i a i n t h e i r b i d t o j o i n ; should
extend t o Macedonia. fe)
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CONFIDENTIAL
3
M i n i s t e r M u e l l e r : Thank you, Charlene and the American
d e l e g a t i o n f o r your e f f o r t s today. Regarding food s a f e t y , i t i s
hard t o separate the s c i e n t i f i c aspects from consumer f e a r s i n
the debate.
Though we s t r i v e f o r transparency, we must expect
to get u n s c i e n t i f i c questions from consumers. I b e l i e v e t h i s
w i l l enable a l l sides t o f i n d agreement.
We do agree l a r g e l y on the goals f o r t h e WTO round, where a
p r i o r i t y i s g r e a t e r transparency. The NGO community w i l l take
i n t o account i n c r e a s i n g l y the o v e r a l l aims o f the trade round.
m
S i r Leon B r i t t a n :
( o f f e r s personal remarks about h i s
r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Charlene Barshefsky and o t h e r U.S. o f f i c i a l s )
I t h i n k t h a t the tone on both sides shows understanding on our
mutual t r a d e problems. I t i s a good s i g n t h a t we are reducing
megaphone diplomacy.
(U)
On beef hormones, t h e s o l u t i o n i s on market-opening, n o t marketc l o s i n g measures. Americans should n o t be deprived o f European
commodities.
(U)
The T r a n s a t l a n t i c Economic P a r t n e r s h i p has helped i n t h i s
regard, f o s t e r i n g cooperation t o k i c k - s t a r t the S e a t t l e
m u l t i l a t e r a l t a l k s . We have a more comprehensive view than you
on the new round. We need t o have more on t h e agenda o r we w i l l
not get t h e developing n a t i o n s i n v o l v e d p o s i t i v e l y . We should
t r y t o g e t an agreement on investment, a v o i d i n g the mistakes o f
the M u l t i l a t e r a l Agreement on Investment (MAI); i n s t e a d we
should seek a more modest agreement on the r u l e s o f c o m p e t i t i o n
— t h i s i s e s p e c i a l l y important f o r d e a l i n g w i t h Japan. fe}
| I propose
t h a t we make i n f o r m a l c a l l s among the key c o u n t r i e s t o f i n d an
acceptable candidate. fG}
The P r e s i d e n t : Thank you.
you have undertaken on food
i n t e n s i t y of p u b l i c f e e l i n g
long-term negative impact.
I appreciate the c o n s t r u c t i v e work
issues. The combination o f
and u n c e r t a i n t y has p o t e n t i a l f o r a
fe}
I would l i k e t o echo Charlene's words on S i r Leon. He has been
a worthy adversary.
I w i l l miss harassing him over bananas! (U)
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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Chancel lor Schroeder! You still have President Chirac to argue
with.
te)
The President:
(laughs)
Chancellor Schroeder: I would l i k e t o review the proposals on
the t a b l e now, the Bonn D e c l a r a t i o n and the D e c l a r a t i o n on
Ukraine.
Regarding Ukraine, we adopt i t w i t h a cautious
f o r m u l a t i o n . We asked f o r t h a t change because o f our p a r l i a m e n t
(Bundestag).
I t u r n t o S i r Leon f o r comments on t h e E a r l y
Warning D e c l a r a t i o n . fG}
S i r Leon B r i t t a n : The E a r l y Warning paper i s an important step
forward. With proper a t t e n t i o n t o e a r l y warning, we can n i p
problems i n the bud. For our p a r t , r e g a r d i n g h u s h k i t s , i f we
had known, we could have defused the issue e a r l i e r . On your
side, r e g a r d i n g ( i n d u s t r i a l ) f a s t e n e r s and the 211 A p p r o p r i a t i o n
b i l l could have been d e a l t w i t h . But, e a r l y warning cannot
solve the problem, but i t can increase the chances o f success.
We are n o t c r e a t i n g a new s t r u c t u r e w i t h t h i s . We w i l l employ
i t a t a l l l e v e l s . We p l a n t o p u t i n t o every piece o f Commission
l e g i s l a t i o n a requirement t o study impact on EU t r a d i n g
p a r t n e r s . R e c i p r o c a l l y , we need t o be aware o f t h i n g s i n
Congress. fG}
Secretary A l b r i g h t : The Bonn D e c l a r a t i o n sets out a v i s i o n f o r
our p a r t n e r s h i p i n t o the 2 1 Century. I t i s not h o r t a t o r y , but
makes a c o n s t r u c t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n t o our r e l a t i o n s h i p .
Separately, may I o f f e r our welcome f o r J a v i e r Solana's
appointment as your High Representative f o r Foreign and S e c u r i t y
Policy? (U)
s t
On e a r l y warning, t h i s i s an important i n i t i a t i v e t o help us
r e s o l v e d i s p u t e s more q u i c k l y . I t i s forward l o o k i n g .
(U)
Ukraine,
E0 13526 1.4d
i s important t o
a l l o f us. They have t o deal w i t h an u n i t e d Europe and
increasing democratization.
] I t i s high on our l i s t o f c o u n t r i e s where we want t o
push democracy. f€-)
The Senior Level Group r e p o r t summarizes, c o r r e c t l y , the
p r i o r i t i e s f o r the coming s i x months. I t i s a t r i b u t e t o Stu
E i z e n s t a t , who i s moving t o Treasury a t t h e d i r e c t i o n o f t h e
President. This i s one t h i n g I cannot f o r g i v e t h e President
f o r . (U)
CONFI DENHftfc
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�CONFI DENHAfe
5
Under Secretary E i z e n s t a t :
I want t o pay t r i b u t e t o President
Santer.
He has been a t r u e champion o f the t r a n s a t l a n t i c
dialogue these past f i v e years. (U)
I t i s i m p e r a t i v e f o r the coming December U.S.-EU Summit t h a t the
Senior Level Group continue t o be s p e c i f i c about i t s goals. The
next s i x months w i l l be c r i t i c a l t o the S t a b i l i t y Pact i n
Southeastern Europe as we attempt t o b r i n g i t i n t o the EuroA t l a n t i c mainstream. No other r e l a t i o n s h i p comes c l o s e . We
a p p r e c i a t e t h e EU load, t a k i n g the l i o n ' s share o f the
a s s i s t a n c e burden. I t i s important how we cooperate i n t h e
s h o r t - t e r m , e s p e c i a l l y on decisions l i k e Serbian s a n c t i o n s . We
won t h e war. Now we have t o win the peace. fe-)
On data p r i v a c y , I c o n g r a t u l a t e t h e important work David Aaron
and John Mogg have done; l i k e w i s e on T h i r d Generation w i r e l e s s
issues. We have some remaining problems. Biotechnology i s a
systemic one. The f e a r i n Europe i s unfounded. You need an
FDA-process t o t e s t products. I t i s c r i t i c a l t h a t Europe
develop mechanism t o calm p u b l i c s . As Charlene s a i d , we must
begin dialogues. fG}
We look forward t o the F i n n i s h presidency and cooperating on
n o r t h e a s t e r n Europe/Northwest Russia. We each have s i m i l a r
i n i t i a t i v e s , which can form the basis f o r recommendations. f G)
Foreign M i n i s t e r Fischer: On b e h a l f o f t h e German presidency, I
thank the American side f o r i t s cooperation. The Bonn
D e c l a r a t i o n i s a good p l a t f o r m f o r cooperation. The Kosovo war,
w i t h a l l i t s t e r r i b l e consequences, r e s u l t e d i n more i n t e n s i v e
U.S.-EU c o o p e r a t i o n . I t would be a p o l i t i c a l e r r o r i f i t were
now allowed t o go t o waste. The S t a b i l i t y Pact has i m p l i c a t i o n s
f o r t h e t r a n s a t l a n t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p , i f we succeed.
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
The E a r l y Warning i n i t i a t i v e i s t h e r i g h t d i r e c t i o n on t r a d e
d i s p u t e s . I t i s hard t o e x p l a i n how we can have c o o p e r a t i o n on
war, b u t have c o n f l i c t s on t r a d e . (U)
We i n t e n d t o keep working on Ukraine.
I t i s n o t easy
f o r our Ukraine p a r t n e r s . This i s a chance f o r Kiev and we
cannot r e l a x . The idea i s a b o u t ' i n t e g r a t i o n , change over
t i m i n g . We want t o be t h e i r s t r a t e g i c p a r t n e r s . fG}
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CONFIDENTIAL
I wanted t o r a i s e changes i n the Helms-Burton Act. We need
waivers as we c o n f r o n t , together, p o l i t i c a l challenges,
organized crime, s o - c a l l e d c r i m i n a l s t a t e s , e t c . O v e r a l l , we
have t h e c l o s e s t , t r u s t i n g cooperation on Kosovo; t h e war can be
used t o s t r e n g t h e n our e f f o r t s together. fe)
President Santer:
The New T r a n s a t l a n t i c Agenda (NTA), agreed i n
1995, had important i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r a more e f f e c t i v e
p a r t n e r s h i p . Then the EU introduced changes w i t h t h e Amsterdam
Treaty. The NTA f i r s t recognized the EU as a s e c u r i t y p a r t n e r .
Now the Bonn D e c l a r a t i o n acknowledges t h e EU's s t a t u s as a f u l l
and equal p a r t n e r . This i s a challenge f o r us t o l i v e up t o .
(U)
Under my presidency, the EU achieved monetary union and a common
European currency. We also began the EU enlargement process.
There are s i x accession candidates. Under t h e F i n n i s h
presidency, there w i l l be progress r e p o r t s as some w i l l be
b e t t e r than others i n t h e i r p r e p a r a t i o n s . Each w i l l be
c r i t i c i z e d on i t s own m e r i t s . But, g e n e r a l l y , a l l are on a good
t r a c k . I hope t h a t H e l s i n k i (the semi-annual European Council
meeting) w i l l go a step f u r t h e r ; we have t o solve the
Cyprus/Turkey problem. We need t o enter the new m i l l e n n i u m w i t h
new EU members, reform o f our i n s t i t u t i o n s — we are c u r r e n t l y
at the margin o f e f f e c t i v e n e s s w i t h 15; the i n s t i t u t i o n s were
c r e a t e d f o r s i x . This i s an important challenge i f the EU i s t o
remain e f f e c t i v e and e f f i c i e n t . fG}
Chancellor Schroeder: We are approaching the end o f t h e time
a l l o t t e d f o r t h i s meeting.
I f there i s no more d i s c u s s i o n , I
d e c l a r e t h e t h r e e documents a d o p t e d .
fG-)
The P r e s i d e n t : I want t o say a f i n a l word. I a p p r e c i a t e t h e
l e a d e r s h i p o f Jacques Santer.
I also want t o welcome our new
Ambassador t o the EU, Dick Morningstar. Thank you, Chancellor
Schroeder, f o r your e f f o r t s d u r i n g the German Presidency.
(U)
—
End o f Conversation --
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50 61
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH
INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h F i r s t M i n i s t e r Designate Trimble
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Designate Trimble
Notetakers:
Jarosinski
DATE, TIME
PLACE:
The President:
Sean Tarver and Frank
June 30, 1999 - 11:06 - 11:13 p.m. EDT
A i r Force One
David, can you hear me?
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Trimble:
(U)
Yes, I can. (U)
The President: Well, I am glad you have resumed your good
sleeping h a b i t s . (U)
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Trimble:
The President:
I d i d n ' t hear you c l e a r l y .
(U)
I said you are p u l l i n g another a l l nighter?
(U)
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Trimble: Yes. I t i s so l a t e a t n i g h t , but we
are about t o break here and come back l a t e r i n the morning a f t e r
a b i t of r e s t . (U)
The President: Well, I've been b r i e f e d by Tony B l a i r on the
s t a t e o f play. As I understand i t , Adams has said t h a t they
would p u b l i c l y commit t o decommission on DeChastelain's
schedule, which means a f i n i s h by the time described by the Good
Friday agreement and s t a r t by the end of the year. But they
want t o c o n d i t i o n that on going i n t o the government now because
they want t o r e l y e x c l u s i v e l y on the sequence i n the Good Friday
Accord; and you say your guys want proof that they are serious,
t h a t you want t o put them i n the shadow government now, and
CONFI DEN^Afe
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
DECLASSIFIED
Reason: 1. 5 (d)
PER E.O. 13526
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On: 7/8/09
3>0\Z (*)
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�eONFIDENTIAE
achieve devolution only when they s t a r t decommissioning.
t h a t where we are?
Is
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Trimble: Yes. (pf
The President: And t h a t you now have tabled two possible
a l t e r n a t i v e s , or you got those and w i l l present them i n the
morning. (pf
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Trimble: Yes. I w i l l work up some a l t e r n a t i v e s
along those l i n e s and w i l l leave a few o u t l i n e ideas here
t o n i g h t . But, we are going t o have t o get people around when
t h e i r minds are reasonably clear, so they can work through the
d e t a i l s , some of which may involve quick decisions. But I want
to do t h a t i n the morning. This whole t h i n g comes down t o
sequencing, and i n a way, each side i s sure the other w i l l do
i t , which i s our concern. The time i n t e r v a l i s important,
otherwise we didn't t h i n k we could survive p o l i t i c a l l y . (^f
The President: Yes. For one t h i n g , I don't know i f you saw my
BBC i n t e r v i e w , but I said I hope your people would stay w i t h you
i f you made a f a i r agreement. (pf
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Trimble: We don't intend t o walk away from i t .
The President: No one will be able to understand if it falls
apart on sequencing. But as you go home tonight, you guys can
wake me up in the middle of the night if you can think of
anything I can do or say that will either help you with your own
people by showing the United States will give you the high
ground by completely disavowing the other side, if they don't
keep their word, or if you can think of anything I can do to
persuade Sinn Fein to come closer to you. I will do that. I
know what position you are in. {jtf
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Trimble: I very much appreciate t h a t .
i s a way, I w i l l come back t o you. (pT
I f there
The President: Let me say one other t h i n g . I spent a^ year, the
b e t t e r p a r t of i t — when wa^the Good Friday Accord'-^adopted —
more than a year, a l o t of time t r y i n g t o persuade Gerry Adams.
You were r i g h t about sequencing because a l l you wanted was t o
get him t o show good f a i t h , and I f a i l e d . And I f a i l e d , not
because of him, so much as because the IRA wants t o be seen as
to be decommissioning because the people they represent
overwhelmingly voted f o r the Good Friday Accord. They don't
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3
want to be seen as surrendering to you. They want to surrender
to the world or Irish Catholics who voted for the Accord. I
understand that. I think personally, they should do more. I
appreciate Trimble's political position and difficulties you
face. But I can tell you, I have worked harder than you know to
persuade them that the initial going-in position you had was a
right and reasonable position. And I have failed. On the other
hand, I don't think they want you to be deposed.
(g)
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Trimble:
That i s r i g h t .
(JZf
The P r e s i d e n t :
I t h i n k he wants you t o p r e v a i l as a l e a d e r and
he wants t h i s t o work. So, i f t h e r e i s a n y t h i n g you can t h i n k
o f t h a t I can do t o p u t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n your c o r n e r , as
most o f your people t h i n k I have been t o o c l o s e t o them, o r
something I can g i v e t o him t o have him come c l o s e r t o you, you
can wake me i n t h e middle o f t h e n i g h t . (j^T
First Minister Trimble: I will try not to disturb your sleep,
but I thank you very much for this call. (Off
The P r e s i d e n t : I r e a l l y admire you, David,
h e l p i f I can. yzf
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Trimble:
The P r e s i d e n t :
Thank you v e r y much.
Okay, goodnight.
—
and I j u s t want t o
(U)
Get some s l e e p .
End o f Conversation
(U)
--
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50 61
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Sinn Fein Leader Gerry Adams
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Gerry Adams
Notetakers:
Jaraosinski
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
Mr. Adams:
June 30, 1999, 11:31 - 11:52 p.m. EDT
A i r Force One
H e l l o , Mr. President.
The President:
Mr. Adams:
Sean Tarver and Frank
Gerry?
How are you?
(U)
(U)
(U)
The President: I am g l a d t o see you decided t o go back t o
s l e e p i n g twelve hours a day. Do you guys ever go t o bed? You
know, my daughter wrote a paper on you at S t a n f o r d . D i d someone
t e l l you t h a t ? (U)
Mr. Adams:
No, I d i d n ' t know t h a t .
Was i t good?
(U)
The President: Yes, i t was good, but the p r o f e s s o r s a i d i t was
too f a v o r a b l e . However, they s a i d i t was supposed t o be an
academic exercise and should have been more balanced.
(U)
Mr. Adams:
Ask her t o send me a copy, i f you would.
(U)
The President: Okay, I w i l l .
I t was j u s t a s h o r t essay, not a
term paper, l i k e an eight-page paper. She c a l l e d me and I sent
her some s t u f f , and they gave her a l i t t l e g r i e f . The p r o f e s s o r
s a i d w h i l e her f a t h e r i s c e r t a i n l y a u t h o r i t a t i v e , he i s not
r e a l l y an academic source; you need t o be a l i t t l e more
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balanced. So I druituned up some a r t i c l e s , f i n d i n g one m i l d l y
c r i t i c a l o f you; i t was r e a l l y f u n . (U)
Look, I know you need t o get some sleep, but I wanted t o say a
couple o f t h i n g s . A l l o f t h i s you know, o f course, b u t i t took
me a long time t o understand your p o s i t i o n on t h i s sequencing
issue and why the IRA would consider i t wrong t o have t o do
decommissioning f o r Sinn Fein t o get i n the government.
I think
I understand i t now and how they f e e l . I t h i n k i t ' s important
t h a t your people know when you decommission t h a t i t ' s not
s u r r e n d e r i n g t o Unionism b u t t o the people who voted f o r the
Good Friday Accord. We a l l work f o r people we represent. I got
t h a t . fG}
On the o t h e r hand, no one w i l l understand, no one i n the w o r l d
or i n Northern I r e l a n d , i f t h i s comes apart over sequencing.
You and I know what the problem i s . As I understand i t , you
o f f e r e d t o support the process t o be developed by DeChastelain
which would have decommissioning completed by the date o f the
Good Friday Accord and would s t a r t before t h e end o f the year —
i f the r e s t o f the Accord i s implemented and Sinn Fein went i n t o
Executive. I s t h a t accurate? fG}
Mr. Adams:
Yes. fe}
The President: As I understand i t , the r e a l problem f o r Trimble
is —
I t a l k e d t o him — t h a t he would l i k e t o take t h a t , b u t
r i g h t now he i s v i r t u a l l y c e r t a i n i f he d i d , he would be
deposed. So we've got t o f i g u r e out how t o move forward; we
don't want t h a t t o happen, we've got t o f i g u r e some way o u t . I
t h i n k i t would be good f o r you t o get some sleep. I t h i n k
tomorrow he w i l l t a b l e a couple o f ideas. Based on my
understanding, I don't t h i n k you can accept e i t h e r one o f them,
but hope t h a t i n saying *no," and i f t h a t i s what you have t o
do, you f i g u r e o u t how t o keep pushing the b a l l forward. And i f
there i s a n y t h i n g I can do t o be h e l p f u l t o you, or him, when
you get up and s t a r t working, even though i t w i l l be the middle
of the n i g h t f o r me, I don't mind waking up. I f t h e r e i s
anything w i t h i n my l e g a l powers t o do, I w i l l do i t . I don't
want t o do i t now. I t h i n k you need t o t h i n k i t through. fG}
Mr. Adams: F i r s t o f a l l , I want t o thank you f o r your c a l l and
f o r your i n t e r e s t , which I know i s very genuine, v e r y emotional,
and r e a l . Secondly, what we put t o these people i s what M a r t i n
McGuinness discussed w i t h Jim Steinberg i n the White House on
May 5. We took t h a t and gave i t t o Tony and B e r t i e . fG}
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rri
We a c t u a l l y got a deal done on the 14 o f May and an agreement
i n my presence.
The B r i t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r gave i t t o us and
Trimble walked away. We came back t o the idea and, we p u t i t t o
them today, i t was i n the general b a l l park you o u t l i n e d , b u t
f u r t h e r they r e j e c t e d i t . They s a i d "No." fe)
David Trimble sent h i s n e g o t i a t i n g team home w i t h o u t t e l l i n g
anyone an hour-and-a-half ago and adjourned the t a l k s . He w i l l
come back tomorrow and p u t together a proposal which we can't
accept. My concern a t the moment i s not David Trimble. My
concern i s Tony B l a i r . He's been very s o l i d i n terms o f a l l
t h i s b u t what Trimble needed today was t o be t o l d by the B r i t i s h
Prime M i n i s t e r very v i g o r o u s l y t h a t he had t o do t h i s .
I asked
to t a l k t o h i s team; they refused t o l e t us do i t and t h e i r team
won't go t o t h e i r people. fe}
This i s my p o s i t i o n which M a r t i n worked w i t h Jim and which we
have o u t l i n e d t o the U n i o n i s t s and everybody else i n v o l v e d .
They are going t o cause us t e r r i b l e t r o u b l e w i t h the Republicans
because they w i l l be o u t i n the news i n a day or two. Some say
Republican a c t i v i s t s w i l l not be able t o understand how we d i d
so and n o t get a n y t h i n g i n r e t u r n . I t h i n k t h e problems are
q u i t e worsened as a r e s u l t o f these past couple o f n i g h t s o f
n e g o t i a t i o n s . This i s the best they are going t o get. I j u s t
don't know what we can do, t o t e l l the t r u t h . fG-)
The P r e s i d e n t : Let me ask you t h i s . I want t o mention two key
thoughts, and t h i s i s something you don't need t o answer but
sleep on i t . One i s , I t h i n k i f B l a i r i s going t o do any good
w i t h them, he has t o get out o f the n e g o t i a t i n g session and and
go see Trimble's p a r t y leaders. fe-)
Mr. Adams:
I agree.
The P r e s i d e n t :
Mr. Adams:
fe)
EO 13526 1.4d
You are a b s o l u t e l y r i g h t .
fG}
The President: That i s o p t i o n one, o r some v a r i a t i o n o f i t .
Option two, and I know where t h i s i s going, tomorrow, when
Trimble puts something on the t a b l e t h a t changes sequencing i n
ways you can't accept, because you won't accept going i n t o a
shadow executive u n t i l f i r s t decommissioning occurs. B l a i r w i l l
ask i f t h e r e i s something he can do f o r you along these l i n e s i n
a way o f a guarantee; maybe even an a c t o f p a r l i a m e n t , which he
can pass i n no time because o f h i s massive m a j o r i t y , which takes
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the d e c i s i o n away from the U n i o n i s t s i n a sense t h a t Sinn Fein
no longer agrees t o p u t i t s f a i t h i n the hands of the U n i o n i s t s .
The thing I was impressed by in your last offer was your
willingness to be far more explicit than in the past in terms of
decommissioning. You may not be able to take what Tony wants to
do, which is to say, *Can you do these things if I take the
decision away from the Unionists by an act of parliament?" I
understand the difficulty with that, but I ask you to think
whether there is something else he can do by act of parliament.
kG)
..
Mr. Adams: The Good Friday Accord guarantees us, and other
p a r t i e s w i t h mandates, the r i g h t t o p a r t i c i p a t e . You're t a l k i n g
about o r d i n a r y c i t i z e n s who pay taxes, who have been denied
t h e i r r i g h t s , t h e i r e n t i t l e m e n t s , and the U n i o n i s t s got away
w i t h t h i s f o r the l a s t twelve months d e s p i t e the governments are
saying t h e r e i s no p r e c o n d i t i o n s . The o n l y t h i n g t h a t i s going
t o move the U n i o n i s t s i s by your f i r s t o p t i o n . That i s a very
good o p t i o n . I j u s t don't know of any guarantee.
fG}
The P r e s i d e n t : A l l I'm saying i s I'm a f r a i d t h a t Tony b e a t i n g
up on Trimble i s not enough because I t a l k e d t o some of those
guys and I know what t h e i r p o s i t i o n s are and I t h i n k they are
crazy enough t o take him down. I know i t ' s crazy on t h e i r p a r t
and they would be d i s c r e d i t e d by the w o r l d . Here i s what I
thought I could do. I s a i d t o the BBC i n t e r v i e w e r l a s t week
t h a t i t seems t o me t h a t i f B l a i r can f i g u r e out some way t o put
some heat on the guys behind Trimble, t h r e a t e n i n g him every step
of the way, and I make more e x p l i c i t the f a c t t h a t i f a l l t h i s
could be done along the l i n e s you t a l k about and f o r some reason
the IRA walks away from your commitment, then they could b r i n g
the government down and I would support them i n doing so. ' fG}
Mr. Adams:
I think a l l that i s useful.
fG)
The President: I know you and Trimble have both met and
c o n s c i o u s l y avoided mixing t h i s Drumcree business i n t o t h e t a l k s
but I can't help but wonder, given some o f the concessions by
the marchers, i f t h e r e i s something you can do t o help them w i t h
t h a t and whatever. I f you d i d , he might be w i l l i n g t o take more
r i s k h i m s e l f . I n the end, Gerry, no matter what Tony does or
what I say, Trimble, t o get a deal, i s going t o have t o take
some r i s k s . You are going t o take a w o r l d o f crap. We can't
immunize him from a l l t h a t r i s k . You can be n e u t r a l i z e d , but he
can be deposed. I got t o f i g u r e out i f something can be done
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t h a t he could h o l d up as a f l a g , o f h i s bona f i d e s .
don't want t o mix b u t . . . fe)
I know you
Mr. Adams: We a c t u a l l y have experience i n t h a t s i t u a t i o n . The
one t h i n g I was very s t r u c k by was what you s a i d no one should
ever be persecuted by r e l i g i o n or e t h n i c background, and I t h i n k
t h a t i s where t h i s i s i n terms o f t h a t . I don't have t h a t much
i n f l u e n c e w i t h the people there b u t we can continue t o t r y . I
w i l l continue wherever I can t o make t h i n g s e a s i e r . The problem
i s David Trimble has brought i n the same people who voted
against t h e Good Friday agreement and oppose i t p u b l i c l y are the
ones we are n e g o t i a t i n g w i t h ; David Trimble t o l e r a t e s them. To
me, t h a t c r y s t a l l i z e s t h e problem. E i t h e r he stands up t o those
people — whatever way he does i s a very important element. We
have stuck our necks out f a r enough now t o hang ourselves. I
w i l l r e f l e c t on what you s a i d . I appreciate your a t t e n t i o n and
the f a c t t h a t you are very much up t o speed, as usual. fe)
The President: Okay, I'm going t o c a l l Tony back and then leave
you guys t o sleep. fe)
Mr. Adams: My sense a t the moment i s t h a t we are a t a very
p r e c a r i o u s s i t u a t i o n and my concern i s t h a t Tony must be very
a s s e r t i v e w i t h these guys. fe}
The President: Just because o f your p o s i t i o n alone, I don't
t h i n k we've got an e x i t s t r a t e g y s h o r t o f an agreement. We have
got t o p r o t e c t everybody concerned u n t i l we hammer through i t .
I f you walk away w i t h n o t h i n g , you might have t o modify your
p o s i t i o n t o come back t h e way he d i d . Two weeks ago, he would
have taken t h i s deal i n a b i r d dog's minute. fe)
so we have t o f i g u r e o u t a way t o somehow
give him some more elbowroom. Whatever you can work on
Drumcree, wave i n h i s face and say, "screw you." You t h i n k
about i t . I w i l l c a l l B l a i r and Ahern back and, i f you need me,
wake me up. fe)
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Mr'. Adams:
Okay.
6
Thanks again.
The President: Thanks, Gerry.
—
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I N G T O N
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h I r i s h Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern
(U)
Notetakers: Doug Bayley, Robin Rickard,
Don Cheramie and Jim Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
July 1, 1999, 8:08 - 8:13 p.m. EDT
Jack Kent Cooke Stadium,
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
(U)
The President:
Hello, Mr. President.
How are you doing?
B e r t i e , how are you? (U)
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: Not too bad at a l l . Thanks f o r a l l your
time over the l a s t few days. I know you have been i n tough
t a l k s w i t h these d i f f i c u l t people.
The President: What about t h i s l a t e s t proposal Tony t a l k e d
about? Have you run i t by Sinn Fein?
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: Yes. I was t a l k i n g t o them as of h a l f an
hour ago. I t h i n k the d i f f i c u l t y i s the 12 o f August w i l l not
work f o r them w i t h July and August being the marching season.
They w i l l not be able t o s e l l that t o t h e i r u n i t s but they have
committed themselves now t o decommission. They need t o
strengthen t h e i r p o s i t i o n a l i t t l e . The statements Tony and I
put out tomorrow should be as strong as possible i n what we can
say, but I don't t h i n k there i s any p o s s i b i l i t y they w i l l say
th
they w i l l do something by the 12
th
The President:
What about moving the whole t h i n g back some?
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Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: Yes, I t h i n k i f we can get some leeway
and move i t back a t b i t . (pi
The President: They need it. Trimble said he can't stand more
than six weeks with no first act. What if you put up the
government in the middle of August? That would give them until
the first of October to decommission. Do you think that
framework might work? (g)
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: I t h i n k the framework w i l l work but i f we
put up the 15 of August i t might jeopardize s e l l i n g i t t o t h e i r
guys. ( ?
/)
th
The President: Tony wanted me t o c a l l Trimble and push the
generic idea t o n i g h t but I d i d n ' t want t o t a l k t o him u n t i l I
t a l k e d t o you f i r s t and I can't t a l k t o Gerry u n t i l you have put
t h i s t o him. Are you going t o t a l k t o him about i t tomorrow?
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
the morning. (pi
I w i l l t a l k to Gerry the f i r s t t h i n g i n
The President: I really should not call him until tomorrow.
&
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: The question w i t h Sinn Fein i s , now they
have i t c l e a r i n t h e i r minds and are going t o convince the IRA
to do an act o f decommissioning before Christmas.
The r e a l
question i s how q u i c k l y they w i l l do t h a t . I t h i n k from t h e i r
p o i n t o f view as soon as they nominate someone t o the Chastelein
Commission the b e t t e r . That i s not as quick as mid-August. At
the same time, we don't want t o put a new date t h a t creates
f r u s t r a t i o n and creates a new deadline. We have t o get
something agreed t h a t automatically happens provided they have
decommissioning. Gerry Adams i s worried about g e t t i n g ahead of
the IRA because there would be more problems than i t i s worth.
I t h i n k John Hume f e e l s , I've spoken t o him, t h a t Sinn Fein has
not got t h a t f a r i n i t s statements. They could push themselves
a b i t f u r t h e r . I t i s the o l d story. How f a r can you push them?
I f they could give us another sentence t h a t would give i t
c r e d i b i l i t y . They r e a l l y have t o give us something. I t h i n k
you could give them another sentence t o make i t t h a t much
f i r m e r . (p')
The President: That it is really going to work.
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Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: Exactly. Otherwise we get i n t o a
d i f f i c u l t marching season again. Did you t a l k to Trimble? 02^
The President: Yes, but I have not t a l k e d to him yet on t h i s .
Maybe I should wait u n t i l morning to t a l k to him and Gerry i n
closer p r o x i m i t y . (pT
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: That would be wise. We w i l l meet a t
8 o'clock i n Belfast t o f i n a l i z e the words. So maybe as soon as
we got t h a t done we should get that sent t o your people r i g h t
away. (^)
The President:
8 o'clock a.m.?
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
(p\
8 o'clock our time.
The President: I w i l l have my guys wake me a t 2 o'clock our
time. I would l i k e t o c a l l them both at the same time. (sound
of cheering i n background) Do you know where I am? I am at the
World Cup Women's Soccer Game and we j u s t scored a goal t o t i e
Germany. ( 0
^
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
The President:
OK.
—
"
F I D E
"
I I f i L
(U)
Goodbye. (U)
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
C 0
You go and enjoy i t , B i l l .
God Bless.
(U)
End of Conversation —
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH
INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h I r i s h Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern
PARTICIPANTS:
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern
N o t e t a k e r s : Matt S i b l e y , M i l e s Murphy,
M i c h a e l Manning and James Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
J u l y 2, 1999, 12:04 - 12:11 p.m. EDT
Oval O f f i c e
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
The P r e s i d e n t :
H e l l o , Mr. P r e s i d e n t .
Hey, B e r t i e .
(U)
(U)
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: How do you do? Tony w i l l be j o i n i n g us
i n a few m i n u t e s ; he's s t i l l w i t h David and h i s c o l l e a g u e s . (U)
The P r e s i d e n t :
How a r e t h i n g s a t t h e zoo?
(U)
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: I ' l l f i l l you i n . I t h i n k we're f a i r l y
f a r a l o n g i n g e t t i n g somewhere, b u t we're n o t t h e r e y e t .
It's
never easy i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d . But j u s t t o f i l l you i n
b r i e f l y , I t h i n k we've p r a c t i c a l l y agreed t h a t t h e IRA w i l l
nominate someone on t h e 1 5 o f J u l y . That would s e t up t h e
e x e c u t i v e . The d e v o l u t i o n o r d e r would be l a i d b e f o r e t h e
B r i t i s h P a r l i a m e n t on t h e 1 6 o f J u l y and t a k e e f f e c t on t h e 1 8
of J u l y and t h e d i f f i c u l t y i s t o a l l o w a p e r i o d where Sinn F e i n
nominates an IRA person t o s t a r t w o r k i n g on decommissioning w i t h
General de C h a s t e l a i n and t h e o t h e r p e o p l e . What w i l l happen i s
t h a t t h e person nominated by t h e IRA w i l l s t a r t d i s c u s s i o n s i n
the p e r i o d a f t e r t h a t , t a l k i n g about a c t u a l decommissioning t o
s t a r t w i t h i n a s p e c i f i e d t i m e , and t h e decommissioning body w i l l
make p r o g r e s s r e p o r t s i n September and December. We hope t o
s t a r t decommissioning i n September.
(PT
th
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The President: But you wouldn't have a Sinn Fein commitment by
a c e r t a i n time? (pj
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
good, President. (pf
The President:
I f we achieve t h a t , i t w i l l c e r t a i n l y be
What do you t h i n k they w i l l say? (pf
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: I t h i n k i t ' s looking good at t h i s stage.
We've got a l i t t l e b i t of work t o do and we need a l l the help we
can get. (pf
The President:
I s i t time f o r me t o c a l l now?
(p7
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: I t h i n k the problems w i l l be i n t h i s
order. Trimble w i l l be very worried because some of h i s guys
w i l l d e f i n i t e l y get wobbly again. We need t o pump as much
confidence i n him and put as much s t e e l behind him as p o s s i b l e .
This i s the time where the governments, the two t r a d i t i o n s i n
Northern I r e l a n d work today together i n the devolution we've
worked f o r a l l these years and thought we had i n the Good Friday
Agreement but couldn't get i t . And secondly, give us the
decommissioning of the p a r a m i l i t a r i e s i n a reasonable time.
Third, the f a i l - s a f e clause, where the governments undertake
t h a t i f any d i f f i c u l t i e s arise i n regard t o decommissioning,
based on the r e p o r t by the decommissioning body, or a r i s i n g from
devolution, we w i l l automatically i n i t i a t e an immediate review
and suspend the i n s t i t u t i o n . That i s , i f anybody s t a r t s messing
we j u s t stop the whole bloody l o t . (pf
The President: That ought t o at l e a s t convince Trimble that
Sinn Fein w i l l be blamed i f the t h i n g goes down. (jzf
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: I t h i n k we need t o have Sinn Fein and the
u n i o n i s t s not go bumping each other, but say t h i s i s the
completion of the h i s t o r i c breakthrough of the Good Friday
Agreement, t h a t the two Northern I r e l a n d t r a d i t i o n s w i l l work
together. This has t o be solved. The two need t o f e e l
confidence, t o see the bigger p i c t u r e because i f we get t h i s
through, B i l l , t h i s procedure nominating on the 15 of July,
t h a t ' s j u s t a f o r t n i g h t . The devolution order would be l a i d
before Parliament i n 2 weeks. I f i t gets through, i t w i l l be
tremendous. These guys have t o have the s t e e l t o go f o r i t i n
the next hour or so, as we t r y t o f i n a l i z e t h i s . I am holding
Sinn Fein's hand and Tony i s holding the u n i o n i s t s ' . I t h i n k i n
terms of where the u n i o n i s t s are, i t i s more d i f f i c u l t and shaky
for Trimble. Tony i s doing a great j o b helping them through i t .
th
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�•couriDEMmar
3
The two p a r t i e s need t o have a f e e l i n g that something i s i n t h i s
and they r e a l l y should have a go. I t h i n k i t w i l l be very
h e l p f u l i f you could c a l l and have a word w i t h them. (jzf
The President: I'll call right now. What's the timetable for
this? (Jt)
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: This i s the new order. I'm not j u s t
dumping on the government f o r Northern
Ireland...traditions...selling it and selling it hard, not just
bumping on the other side. Bill. If it shapes up like this,
this will be good. I am reluctant to call it yet. [Jt]
The President: No, I'm happy to call. I got up this morning
ready to call, and they said it wasn't time yet. (&)
Prime Minister Ahern: If you want, Tony has obviously got the
latest, he's still in with the unionists. If you want, we could
get back to your people in the next 15 to 20 minutes and tell
them now is the time to move. (g)
The President: Right. Give us a call when you're ready for me
to call Trimble. (JZ)
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: I t h i n k the c a l l to Gerry could be made
now, and we could get a message back t o you when i t i s good t o
c a l l David.
The President: B e r t i e , the President of Korea i s coming i n here
for 2 or 3 hours, so I w i l l c a l l Gerry now, and the quicker I
can c a l l Trimble, the b e t t e r . I t ' l l be hard t o walk out of the
meeting. (pf
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: What I ' l l do i s check w i t h Tony; he's
s t i l l w i t h him. As soon as he comes out, I w i l l c a l l s t r a i g h t
away. (J2T
The President:
Okay, man.
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
—
Goodbye.
Goodbye.
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation
—
.CONFIDENTIAL.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CONFIDEMT IAL
5061
THE W H I T E H O U S E
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Sinn Fein Leader Gerry Adams
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Gerry Adams
Notetakers: Michael Manning, Roger
' M e r l e t t i , Miles Murphy, Joel Schrader,
Matt S i b l e y , James smith and Amy Swarm
J u l y 2, 1999, 12:17 - 12:19 p.m. EDT
Oval O f f i c e
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
Mr. Adams:
H e l l o , Mr. President.
The President:
Mr. Adams:
Gerry? (U)
How areyou?
(U)
How are we doing? fG}
I t h i n k we are g e t t i n g t h e r e .
The President: I do, t o o . The l a s t deal sounds p r e t t y
me. We have t o convince Trimble he should take i t . fG}
Mr. Adams:
I t h i n k he w i l l go f o r i t . fG}
The President: I s t h e r e anything t o do t o make sure they don't
t r y t o depose him over i t ? fG}
Mr. Adams:
They w i l l t r y t o do t h a t anyway.
EO 13526 1 4
.b
We need t o get t h i s done i n the
s h o r t e s t p e r i o d p o s s i b l y r e q u i r e d and make sure someone i s
I'm sure Tony w i l l do i t .
h e l p i n g him.
He j u s t needs help g e t t i n g over t h a t p e r i o d .
We w i l l help ease him over i t . We'll be as
magnanimous as p o s s i b l e . f&)
CONFIDENTIAL
C l a s s i f i e d by: Glyn T. Davies
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Reason: 1.5(d)
PERE. O. 13526
D e c l a s s i f y On: 6/8/09
CITN LBAY POOOY
LNO IRR HTCP
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�CONFIDENTIAL
The President:
We don't want anyone claiming v i c t o r y . fe-)
Mr. Adams: No. I already said that to people here. I t i s n ' t a
matter of getting him to do i t . I t ' s j u s t a matter of getting
i t done. I want to galvanize the positive elements w i t h i n the
Unionists.
I think he i s going to do i t . I ' l l bet you a d o l l a r
he goes f o r i t . f&)
The President:
That i s a dollar I would love to pay o f f .
Mr. Adams: Okay. We w i l l be i n there. I t sounds s i l l y and I
couldn't say t o him, l i k e I can to you, but we'll make sure he's
okay. fG)
The President: Okay. I w i l l get on i t . Tony i s s t i l l with him
and as soon as he gets out I'm going to c a l l him. fG)
Mr. Adams:
I look forward to taking your money. f€-)
The President:
Mr. Adams:
Okay.
Goodbye. (U)
Goodbye. (U)
— End of Conversation
CONFIDENTIAL
C N O LIBRARY P O O O V
UTN
HTCP
—
�COtiiriDEH^Mr-
50 61
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d F i r s t M i n i s t e r
David T r i m b l e (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The P r e s i d e n t
David T r i m b l e
Notetakers:
Doug Bayley, Don Cheramie,
M i l e s Murphy, Robin R i c k a r d and James
Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The
President:
J u l y 2, 1999, 5:40 - 5:44 p.m. EDT
Oval O f f i c e
David?
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Trimble:
The P r e s i d e n t :
(U)
(U)
Yes.
(U)
How a r e you keeping?
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Trimble:
w i l l be b e t t e r .
(U)
Are you s t i l l
S t i l l standing.
standing?
Could be worse b u t i t
The President: Look, I wanted first of all to thank you and
second, to say I tried to issue a helpful statement. Thirdly,
to ask what can I do to help? Personally, if they screw us on
this, I will support kicking them out and stand up publicly and
say that you are not to blame and they are. [ f f i
F i r s t M i n i s t e r T r i m b l e : R i g h t . The o n l y problem i s I can't
muster enough steam t o g e t i t i n . Whether we w i l l g e t i n over
the course o f t h e n e x t week o r t e n days I don't know. I'm
t r y i n g t o g i v e enough space f o r people.
When I f i r s t p u t t h e
s u g g e s t i o n t o t h e session o f t h e p a r t y , o n l y a couple showed a
f a v o r a b l e response and some were a g a i n s t . Most o f t h e o t h e r s
were o f d i f f e r i n g v i e w p o i n t s . Key members from whom I needed
CONFIDEN'MAL
C l a s s i f i e d by:
Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On:
7/8/09 QJNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCO^ i
DECLASSIFIED
m r n r- r^
PER E.O. 13526
2.013-OMl^-n
�CONFIDENTIAL
support were unhappy. Maybe we can work something i n t h e next
week o r two t o change aspects o f t h i s scheme. (^T
The P r e s i d e n t : L e t me ask you, i f you t h i n k i t w i l l h e l p f o r me
t o c a l l any o f them p e r s o n a l l y . I w i l l do t h a t .
(£7
F i r s t M i n i s t e r T r i m b l e : John T a y l o r i s on our s i d e as i s
Maginnis; and Reg Empey i f we leave him alone f o r a couple o f
days. I made a s e r i o u s mistake i n o r g a n i z i n g . I thought i f I
brought J e f f r e y Donaldson onto my team we c o u l d smother some o f
the o p p o s i t i o n . I am a f r a i d i t b a c k f i r e d on me. I need t o g e t
J e f f r e y away f o r a w h i l e t o get t h i n g s b e t t e r . (pf
The P r e s i d e n t : Yes. You t h i n k about i t and i f you t h i n k I can
h e l p i n any way. I f you want me t o send somebody over, I w i l l .
F i r s t M i n i s t e r T r i m b l e : I v e r y much a p p r e c i a t e t h i s ,
Mr. P r e s i d e n t . I r e a l l y do. I don't know how we w i l l work i t
out in the next week or two. If there's any chance I will.
(pj
The President: I know you will. You're a good man, David.
You've made decommissioning real. This decision would really
not have happened if it was not for you. It will work now, I
think. (jt)
First Minister Trimble: I hope so. They have changed their
position. If only I can get my people to see that and take
advantage of it. (j?)
The P r e s i d e n t : There's no doubt they changed t h e i r p o s i t i o n . I
h o n e s t l y b e l i e v e , based on my c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h Adams i n t h e
l a s t week, t h a t he knows w i t h o u t you t h a t t h i s i s a dead dog.
You have t o come o u t l o o k i n g l i k e t h e l e a d e r you a r e . Once he
gets h i s ducks i n a row, he w i l l bust h i s ass t o make i t work.
I've a l r e a d y t o l d him t h i s i s i t . (pi
F i r s t M i n i s t e r T r i m b l e : I went o u t o f my way i n comments t o
throw a l i n e o u t t o them. We now hope t h a t works. ( p i
The President:
can do.
(jt)
All right.
Let me know if there is anything we
F i r s t M i n i s t e r T r i m b l e : Once again, I r e a l l y a p p r e c i a t e your
support and encouragement. You may f i n d me c a l l i n g again next
week. (pf
-CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�COHn DENT IALThe President:
Thanks.
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Trimble:
—
(U)
Thanks.
Cheers.
(U)
End of Conversation --
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�•CONFIDENT I A L
50 61
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH
INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d F i r s t M i n i s t e r
T r i m b l e (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The P r e s i d e n t
F i r s t M i n i s t e r David
Trimble
Notetakers:
Matthew S i b l e y , Sean Tarver and
Frank J a r o s i n s k i
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The P r e s i d e n t :
J u l y 5, 1999, 10:03 - 10:05 a.m. EDT
A i r Force One
H e l l o , David.
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Trimble:
The P r e s i d e n t :
(U)
H e l l o , Mr. P r e s i d e n t .
(U)
W e l l , t h e march went p r e t t y w e l l y e s t e r d a y .
(U)
F i r s t M i n i s t e r T r i m b l e : Yes, i t d i d . I'm v e r y g l a d t h a t i t
went o f f as w e l l as i t d i d . I hope i t doesn't leave them t o o
b i g a problem. I t i s a c r e d i t t o t h e Portadown Orangemen t h a t
t h e y d i d w e l l . They a r e hoping t h a t Tony B l a i r w i l l r e c i p r o c a t e
it.
I'm n o t sure i f he can. (U)
The P r e s i d e n t :
What can I do f o r you? (U)
First Minister Trimble: There are two things that would be a
great help to me. One which I think you are already doing and
that is to talk to Gerry Adams about a statement from the IRA
about decommissioning. The other thing is the so called "fail
safe" mechanism. It is fairer to exclude Sinn Fein from the
executive, but the problem continues to be John Hume. Seamus
Mallon is trying to persuade him. If John Hume could move, that
would help greatly. [yf
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENrear
PER E.O. 13526
C l a s s i f i e d by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 7/8/09
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
ClO\3 - OM1 CL^
3/k/l5
�COMF1 DENT lAtr
2
The President: So I'll call John and get back to Gerry about
the other thing. I'll get back to you in a day or so. y?)
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Trimble:
The President:
Thank you. (U)
Goodbye.
—
(U)
End of Conversation --
• CONFI DENHAfc.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CQWIDEWTIAL
5061
THE WHITE H O U S E
WASH I N G T O N
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h SDLP Leader John Hume (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
John Hume
Notetakers: Jenny McGee, Robert Ford,
George Chastain and Joel Ehrendreich
July 5, 1999, 6:50 - 6:57 p.m. EDT
A i r Force One
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
Mr. Hume:
Hello, how are you doing, Mr. President?
The President:
Mr. Hume:
Hello, John. (U)
Well, I'm a l r i g h t .
(U)
How are you? (U)
Oh, I'm s u r v i v i n g . (U)
The President: Well, I think we got a pretty good proposal if
we can get them to take it. I've been talking to Trimble and
Adams. Trimble is having a bit of a hard go with Maginnis and
with Empey and others who are being critical of the proposal.
He thinks they can still get blamed if the government comes down
and the IRA doesn't comply. I know Seamus Mallon has a piece in
the paper tomorrow, which will help bring the Unionists on board
for the Blair-Ahern proposal — you know what it says — it
doesn't say outright that Sinn Fein should be expelled but gets
pretty close. I have told Trimble in private and said publicly
if the IRA doesn't live up to its obligations, I would support
Sinn Fein being excluded. The United States would say — it's
not their fault, it's your fault and not the Unionists'.
Similarly, if anybody else doesn't comply. We have to help
Trimble a little. You've been working on this for 30 years now.
I believe Gerry is ready to take the final steps. (jtj
CONFIDENTIAL
C l a s s i f i e d by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 7/8/09 CLINTON
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
LIBRARY PHOlui^
aovi- 0 - ^ n
47 -
�^UHFI DENT IAL
Mr. Hume: I don't t h i n k i t ' s easy i f he's being seen as being
under p u b l i c pressure. ( Z
J?
The President: I agree with that.
(£)
Mr. Hume: I t h i n k i t ' s b e t t e r done q u i e t l y than w i t h p u b l i c
pressure. (pi
The President:
I do agree.
(pT
Mr. Hume: What I've been saying today on the radio and TV i s
there i s no way my p a r t y would s i t i n government w i t h any p a r t y
i f they were engaged i n violence. I'm convinced from my
experience t h a t Sinn Fein i s committed t o the peace process.
Therefore, the i n t e r n a t i o n a l commission i s going t o r e p o r t , so
what we should a l l do i s suspend judgment u n t i l we a l l hear the
report and then make our judgment having heard t h a t r e p o r t . (pi
The President: Let me ask you this. How are we going to deal
with Trimble's problem to sell it? (Jt)
Mr. Hume: The time of the year i s the major p a r t o f the
problem.
I t ' s marching season f o r h i s people. Every year the
tensions are very high f o r t h i s time of the year. By the second
h a l f o f July, when we move beyond t h a t , tensions w i l l f a l l , and
i t should be easier f o r him then than now. Do you know what I
mean? (p)
The President: Yes, absolutely. And we had a p r e t t y good day
for t h a t yesterday. (pf
Mr. Hume: Yes. I t was p r e t t y welcome that they behaved very
responsibly. (pf
The President: You know, John, he doesn't have t o lose very
many people before he can't go on. (pT
Mr. Hume: Yes, I know, but the overwhelming m a j o r i t y o f people
voted f o r i t . I n a d d i t i o n , l a s t week we had special messages
from organizations representing the business community, trade
unions, community groups and youth groups a l l t e l l i n g us t o keep
the agreement on the road. There i s very b i g p u b l i c support f o r
the agreement. This can be resolved and w i l l be resolved i n the
coming weeks, but I don't t h i n k we should be p u t t i n g anybody
under pressure. G T
^
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�•CONFIDENTIAL
3
The President: Let me ask you t h i s .
t h i n k I can do t o help Trimble? (pf
I s there anything else you
Mr. Hume: I t h i n k one of the things you could do i s make very
clear from your p o i n t o f view that as soon as a new
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i s i n place, t h a t ' s when the goodwill o f the
i n t e r n a t i o n a l world w i l l become evident. That's when the
economic development and investment and marketing w i l l transform
our economy and society. The sooner the two communities s t a r t
working together t o set up the i n s t i t u t i o n s , the b e t t e r . There
needs t o be a c l e a r understanding of the agreement t h a t t o t a l l y
respects both i d e n t i t i e s , therefore no section o f the community
i s under t h r e a t . ( p f
The President: Okay, w e l l , I ' l l j u s t keep plugging along. I
understand what you are saying. I r e a l l y worry about the hard
guys on Trimble's side t a k i n g him out. I f we lose him, we're i n
trouble. (pf
Mr. Hume: I know that. Listen, thanks again for your interest
and support. (pf
The President:
phone. (jzf)
Mr. Hume:
I f you want t o t a l k anymore, I'm as close as the
Okay, thank you. (U)
The President:
Goodbye. (U)
— E n d of Conversation
—
CONFIDEN'HAtr
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCO^
�Dear Carlos:
I want t o congratulate you on the successful
conclusion of the negotiations w i t h the
United Kingdom regarding the South A t l a n t i c
islands. As you know, during our l a s t meeting
we addressed the challenges facing Argentina
and the United Kingdom, and the (L
a t t a i n i n g diplomatic s o l u t i o n s .
impressed by your determination t o resolve
these matters peacefully^and t o the mutual
b e n e f i t of both countries.
Your work, and t h a t of Piime Minijfedir Tony
B l a i r , greatly contributed to resolving
important i n t e r n a t i o n a l issues and w i l l enhance
the s t a b i l i t y and well-being of the region.
Again, congratulations and I look forward t o
w o r k i a ^ together w i t h you t o advance peace i n
the region.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Carlos Menem
President of the Argentine Nation
Buenos Aires
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�Dear Tony:
I want t o congr t u l a t e you on t h e s u c c e s s f u l
conclusion of t l negotiations w i t h Argentina
e
regarding the Siuth A t l a n t i c islands.. I
— i
a p p r e c i a t e ^ t h e a - i f f i c u l t y you fooecl ^ ^ m e e t i n g /
the c h a l l e n g e ^ f a c i n g t h e U n i t e d Kingdom and
|
A r g e n t i n a as you b o t h , p e r s i s t e d i n
d i p l o m a t i c a l l y resolv^Jthese important issues.
I was impressed by your d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o
•• «—
these m a t t e r s p e a c e f u l l y . t o t h e mutual
b e n e f i t o f both countries.
^-O—
Your work, and that of ITrbcidenfc"Menem, greatly
contributed to enhancing the stability of the
region and the well-being of its people.
Again, congratulations and I look forward to C^^^^v
ihac. w i t h you t o advance peace i n
worki
the r e g i o n .
Sincerely,
The R i g h t Honorable
Tony B l a i r , M.P.
Prime M i n i s t e r
London
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP
.
&~
�S a r g e a n t , S t e p h e n T. ( E X S E C )
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Bremner, Sue L. (EUR)
nppr ASWIFn
Thursday, July 22,1999 10:36 AM
p
c T ^ S r L . , « /UN
Schulte, Gregory L. (EUR); vonLipsey, Roderick K. ( D E F E N s f i ? u
' r ^ ^ ' - ^ f t L
©EXECSEC -Executive SecretaiV
^ t e House Guidelines, August 28,1997
FW: Talkers on Solana Successor for Blair? [eONriDENTIAL]
By-^iNARA,
TMaolll*/oJ
n
1 9 0
R
Greg, Rod - Not sure which of you is doing the Blair package, but here are a few points on the NATO Secgen question
that should be included, based on the call that just ended with Schroeder.
-Original MessageFrom:
Blinken, Antony J. (EUR)
Sent:
Thursday, July 22, 1999 10:33 AM
To:
Bremner, Sue L. (EUR)
Cc:
©EUROPE - European Affairs
Subject:
RE: Talkers on Solana Successor for Blair?- [CONFH3CNTIAL]
great, couple of tweaks, pis. work with rod/Greg to get htese in package. Tx.
DECLASSIFIED
E.0.12958, As Amended, Sec. 3i (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28,1997
By^LNARA, DHttuY/^ *
—Original Message—
From:
Bremner, Sue L. (EUR)
,
Sent:
Thursday, July 22, 199910:19 AM
/
To:
Blinken, Antony J. (EUR)
Cc:
©EUROPE-European Affairs
Subject:
Talkers on Solana Successor for Blair? fOONriDCNTIAL]
Think we should seek to have the following, or some version thereof, inserted into the Blair telcall package:
Spoke with Chancellor Schroeder to convey that we needed to come to closure on a successor for NATO SYG
Solana.
Told him we would be prepared to support Scharping, provided Germany were willing to put him in the running.
But made clear that we also liked Haekkerup, and we would look very favorably on any of the UK candidates
mentioned in the press, including Paddy Ashdown.
p
6^^L,
Schroeder said he was reluctant to put Scharping forward because he is needed at home but, knowing of our
interest, would speak again with Scharping and would make a decision wmin a week -before Sarajevo.
Schroeder also suggested that we chat with you on the margins of the Sarajevo Conference.
Looking forward to seeing you in Sarajevo.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
0.013- 04-72.- H
8/U/I5" KGH
�-emfi£S6Mq-ra±r
5562
. .... /
"7 - ^ v -q Cf
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
J u l y 23, 1999
TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
AND EU COMMISSIONER PRODI
DATE: TBD
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD
FROM: SAMUEL BERGEP^^
GENE S P E R L I N ^ ^
I.
PURPOSE
Secure s u p p o r t f o r our proposed economic i n i t i a t i v e s a t t h e
J u l y 30 Summit i n Sarajevo. S t r e s s t o P r o d i t h e need t o s u s t a i n
c u r r e n t EU s a n c t i o n s a g a i n s t the FRY.
II.
BACKGROUND
Economic I n i t i a t i v e s
We are w o r k i n g on a s e r i e s o f economic i n i t i a t i v e s f o r t h e
Sarajevo Summit. You asked us t o f i n d a c r e a t i v e approach,
s i m i l a r t o the one o u t l i n e d by George Soros. A l t h o u g h
i n n o v a t i v e , the Soros p r o p o s a l would not p r o v i d e r e a l l o n g - t e r m
b e n e f i t s ; t h e i r b i g g e s t g a i n would come from access t o U.S. and
EU markets.
I n t h a t s p i r i t , we have prepared a comprehensive
s t r a t e g y which i n c l u d e s a t r a d e i n i t i a t i v e , an investment
compact and a commitment t o h e l p achieve WTO membership. We
want t h e Europeans t o support these and g i v e a c o n c r e t e
statement r e g a r d i n g e v e n t u a l EU membership.
Trade I n i t i a t i v e :
We recommend you commit t o u n i l a t e r a l t r a d e
p r e f e r e n c e s , s i m i l a r t o the Caribbean Basin I n i t i a t i v e , t o
c o u n t r i e s i n the r e g i o n except Serbia, b u t i n c l u d i n g Kosovo and
Montenegro. These p r e f e r e n c e s should apply u n i f o r m l y and should
be as generous as p o s s i b l e t o spur economic development. We
would n o t r e q u e s t s p e c i a l access r i g h t s t o U.S. o r EU e x p o r t s .
This would p r o v i d e immediate access t o developed markets and the
g r e a t e s t s h o r t - t e r m t a n g i b l e b e n e f i t . However, i n o r d e r f o r
t h i s t o be a success, EU p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s c r i t i c a l .
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFI DENT IMr
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 7/22/09
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
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8/G/I5" KBH
�•CUNK IDENTIAL
2
On our s i d e , we are e x p l o r i n g w i t h members o f t h e c o n g r e s s i o n a l
t r a d e committees l e g i s l a t i o n p r o v i d i n g a ten-year GSP
commitment, t o i n c l u d e expanding t h e l i s t o f e l i g i b l e goods,
w i t h the exception o f c e r t a i n t e x t i l e s . Although a m a j o r i t y o f
p r o d u c t s from these c o u n t r i e s , except f o r B u l g a r i a and Romania,
a l r e a d y e n t e r d u t y - f r e e under GSP or normal t r a d e s t a t u s , t h e
U.S. would o f f e r a new program t h a t a l s o i n c l u d e s v i r t u a l l y a l l
a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t s (except sugar) and footwear a t l i t t l e
p o l i t i c a l o r economic c o s t . I n a d d i t i o n , a ten-year program
would p r o v i d e much g r e a t e r c e r t a i n t y t o i n v e s t o r s than t h e
c u r r e n t GSP program, which i s funded from year t o year. I t
would a l s o encourage r e g i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n by p r o v i d i n g s p e c i a l
access t o p r o d u c t s c o n t a i n i n g i n p u t s from d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s i n
the r e g i o n .
Investment Compact: Because investment and t r a d e w i l l d r i v e
s u s t a i n e d growth, we propose a * compact" between l e a d e r s from
o u t s i d e t h e r e g i o n and t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s
to c r e a t e v e h i c l e s f o r m o b i l i z i n g p r i v a t e f i n a n c e and m i t i g a t i n g
risk.
I n r e t u r n , t h e r e g i o n a l leaders would commit t o concrete
a c t i o n s t o improve t h e investment c l i m a t e and a c c e l e r a t e
economic r e f o r m s .
One s p e c i f i c o p t i o n i s e s t a b l i s h i n g an EBRD t r u s t fund w i t h U.S.
funds t o c r e a t e a p o l i c y framework f o r investment and f a c i l i t a t e
debt f i n a n c e through l o c a l banks. I n a d d i t i o n , we would work
w i t h t h e I F I s t o c r e a t e a r e g i o n a l e q u i t y fund. The fund would
i n v e s t i n p r i v a t e or p r i v a t i z i n g e n t e r p r i s e s i n t h e r e g i o n ( t o
i n c l u d e Kosovo and Montenegro) and h e l p leverage p r i v a t e
f i n a n c i n g . F i n a l l y , we are d i s c u s s i n g w i t h George Munoz t h e
p o s s i b l e c r e a t i o n o f an OPIC fund f o r t h e Balkans.
WTO Membership: For non-member c o u n t r i e s , we w i l l o f f e r
t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e needed t o meet t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l standards
and work t o f a c i l i t a t e accession on an a c c e l e r a t e d b a s i s . I n
many cases, t h i s i s e a s i l y p r o v i d e d a t v e r y l i t t l e cost t o t h e
U.S. o r EU governments.
EU statement:
Our key goal i s f o r t h e r e g i o n t o be i n t e g r a t e d
i n t o t h e EU, which o f f e r s t h e best o p p o r t u n i t y f o r development
and growth.
An EU commitment on membership i n a reasonable
p e r i o d w i l l be t h e most d i f f i c u l t — b u t a l s o t h e most i m p o r t a n t
-- p a r t o f our s t r a t e g y .
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP"
�•CONFIDENTIAL
Economic Sanctions (Prodi C a l l Only)
At Monday's meeting o f t h e General A f f a i r s C o u n c i l , EU F o r e i g n
M i n i s t e r s reviewed c u r r e n t EU s a n c t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e FRY. Greece
and I t a l y pressed f o r a l i f t i n g o f t h e o i l embargo, w i t h some
support from Germany and France. The UK and Netherlands
s t r o n g l y r e s i s t e d any l i f t i n g o f s a n c t i o n s . M i n i s t e r s
u l t i m a t e l y agreed t o t a s k t h e EU Commission t o examine t h e
p o s s i b i l i t y o f l i f t i n g some o f t h e s a n c t i o n s ( t h e f l i g h t ban and
s p o r t i n g ban) and o f d i r e c t i n g o i l and e l e c t r i c i t y t o
opposition-controlled localities.
We oppose any l i f t i n g o f
sanctions i n order t o avoid b o l s t e r i n g M i l o s e v i c p o l i t i c a l l y or
f i n a n c i a l l y . We a l s o disagree w i t h t h e f e a s i b i l i t y o f d i r e c t i n g
o i l and e l e c t r i c i t y t o s p e c i f i c l o c a l i t i e s .
We are prepared t o
d i s c u s s w i t h a l l i e s t h e concept o f a s s i s t a n c e t o o p p o s i t i o n c o n t r o l l e d l o c a l i t i e s ; however, any such a s s i s t a n c e would need
t o be c a r e f u l l y c i r c u m s c r i b e d , m o n i t o r e d and c o o r d i n a t e d , as
w e l l as c o n d i t i o n e d on i n c r e a s e d u n i t y w i t h i n t h e o p p o s i t i o n .
Attachments
Tab A
P o i n t s t o be Made f o r Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Tab B
P o i n t s t o be Made f o r EU Commissioner P r o d i
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPi
•CONFI DENHAL
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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR
Sarajevo Summit Trade I n i t i a t i v e s
•
Looking f o r w a r d t o t h e Sarajevo Summit. Must work i n t e n s i v e l y
i n t h e r e m a i n i n g days t o ensure meaningful r e s u l t s .
•
We a l l agree t h a t we want s u b s t a n t i v e outcomes from Sarajevo.
We should t r y t o b r i n g t o g e t h e r a t r a d e i n i t i a t i v e t h a t
prepares Southeast Europe f o r f u l l and r a p i d i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o
European and g l o b a l t r a d e .
•
The most m e a n i n g f u l gesture we can make i n t h e near term i s t o
p r o v i d e u n i l a t e r a l t r a d e access i n t o our markets. This w i l l
h e l p c a t a l y z e p r o d u c t i o n and investment i n t h e r e g i o n . The
U.S. and EU can agree t o g e t h e r t o g r a n t u n i l a t e r a l t r a d e
concessions as soon as p o s s i b l e t o c o u n t r i e s i n t h e r e g i o n .
We would exclude Serbia, b u t i n c l u d e Kosovo and Montenegro.
•
I am prepared t o work w i t h Congress t o p r o v i d e d u t y - f r e e
access i n t o o u r market across a range o f p r o d u c t s .
However, I
can o n l y succeed i n t h i s e f f o r t i f t h e EU makes i t a s i m i l a r
effort.
•
I understand t h e EU i s c o n s i d e r i n g s i m i l a r i n i t i a t i v e s f o r
i n d i v i d u a l c o u n t r i e s i n t h e r e g i o n . I t would be more p o w e r f u l
i f t h e EU c o u l d extend t o t h e r e g i o n as a whole ( e x c l u d i n g
Serbia) a program p r o v i d i n g d u t y - f r e e t r e a t m e n t f o r as many
i n d u s t r i a l and a g r i c u l t u r a l goods as p o s s i b l e .
•
Understand t h a t o f f e r i n g meaningful t r a d e concessions w i l l be
p o l i t i c a l l y d i f f i c u l t , b u t we must make t h e commitment t o t r y
and announce a r e s u l t a t t h e Summit.
•
A l s o a s k i n g r e g i o n a l leaders t o make an * investment compact"
and commit t o key reforms t h a t would improve t h e investment
climate.
I n r e t u r n f o r them making reforms, we should
m o b i l i z e p r i v a t e c a p i t a l and m i t i g a t e r i s k t o i n v e s t o r s .
•
We're c o n s i d e r i n g c r e a t i n g a t r u s t fund a t t h e EBRD t o make
loans e s p e c i a l l y t o s m a l l e n t e r p r i s e s . We should a l s o
encourage t h e I F I and EBRD t o c r e a t e a r e g i o n a l e q u i t y fund.
•
We should work g e t t i n g these s t a t e s i n t o t h e WTO p r o v i d i n g t h e
t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e they need t o meet t h e c r i t e r i a f o r e n t r y .
IDEHTIAL
CLINTON LUJKm m m J U * .
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 7/22/09
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•
2
F i n a l l y , I would ask your support f o r as c o n c r e t e and
a m b i t i o u s a statement as p o s s i b l e a t t h e summit r e g a r d i n g
e v e n t u a l EU membership f o r t h e Southeast European n a t i o n s .
NATO S e c r e t a r y General
•
Spoke w i t h C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder t o convey t h a t we needed t o
come t o c l o s u r e on a successor f o r NATO SYG Solana.
•
T o l d him we would be prepared t o support Scharping, i f
Schroeder p u t s him i n t h e r u n n i n g .
•
Said t h a t we a l s o l i k e d Haekkerup, and we would l o o k v e r y
f a v o r a b l y on any o f t h e UK candidates mentioned i n t h e p r e s s ,
i n c l u d i n g Paddy Ashdown.
•
Schroeder s a i d he would delay p u t t i n g Scharping f o r w a r d , b u t
would make a d e c i s i o n w i t h i n a week -- b e f o r e Sarajevo.
Schroeder a l s o suggested t h a t we a l l chat i n Sarajevo.
•
Looking f o r w a r d t o seeing you i n Sarajevo.
CONFIDDNTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPv
�GONriDEHffcftfe
55 62
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
EUROPEAN UNION COMMISSIONER ROMANO PRODI
Sarajevo Summit Trade I n i t i a t i v e s
•
Hope you are s e t t l i n g i n t o your new p o s i t i o n .
Looking f o r w a r d
to t h e Sarajevo Summit. Must work i n t e n s i v e l y i n t h e
r e m a i n i n g days t o ensure meaningful r e s u l t s .
•
We a l l agree t h a t we want s u b s t a n t i v e outcomes from Sarajevo.
We s h o u l d t r y t o b r i n g t o g e t h e r a t r a d e i n i t i a t i v e t h a t
p r e p a r e s Southeast Europe f o r f u l l and r a p i d i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o
European and g l o b a l t r a d e .
•
The most m e a n i n g f u l gesture we can make i n t h e near term i s t o
p r o v i d e u n i l a t e r a l t r a d e access i n t o o u r markets. This w i l l
h e l p c a t a l y z e p r o d u c t i o n and investment i n t h e r e g i o n . The
U.S. and EU can agree t o g e t h e r t o g r a n t u n i l a t e r a l t r a d e
concessions as soon as p o s s i b l e t o c o u n t r i e s i n t h e r e g i o n .
We would exclude S e r b i a , b u t i n c l u d e Kosovo and Montenegro.
•
I am prepared t o work w i t h Congress t o p r o v i d e d u t y - f r e e
access i n t o o u r market across a range o f p r o d u c t s .
However, I
can o n l y succeed i n t h i s e f f o r t i f t h e EU makes i t a s i m i l a r
effort.
•
I understand t h e EU i s c o n s i d e r i n g s i m i l a r i n i t i a t i v e s f o r
i n d i v i d u a l c o u n t r i e s i n t h e r e g i o n . I t would be more p o w e r f u l
i f t h e EU c o u l d extend t o t h e r e g i o n as a whole ( e x c l u d i n g
Serbia) a program p r o v i d i n g d u t y - f r e e t r e a t m e n t f o r as many
i n d u s t r i a l and a g r i c u l t u r a l goods as p o s s i b l e .
•
Understand t h a t o f f e r i n g meaningful t r a d e concessions w i l l be
p o l i t i c a l l y d i f f i c u l t , b u t we must make t h e commitment t o t r y
and announce a r e s u l t a t t h e Summit.
•
A l s o a s k i n g r e g i o n a l leaders t o make an '"investment compact"
and commit t o key reforms t h a t would improve t h e investment
c l i m a t e . I n r e t u r n f o r them making reforms, we should
m o b i l i z e p r i v a t e c a p i t a l and m i t i g a t e r i s k t o i n v e s t o r s .
•
We're c o n s i d e r i n g c r e a t i n g a t r u s t fund a t t h e EBRD t o make
loans e s p e c i a l l y t o s m a l l e n t e r p r i s e s . We should a l s o
encourage t h e I F I and EBRD t o c r e a t e a r e g i o n a l e q u i t y fund.
COMF1 DENgrEAfe
Reason: 1.5(d)
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•
We s h o u l d work g e t t i n g these s t a t e s i n t o t h e WTO p r o v i d i n g t h e
t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e they need t o meet t h e c r i t e r i a f o r e n t r y .
•
F i n a l l y , I would ask your support f o r as concrete and
a m b i t i o u s a statement as p o s s i b l e a t t h e summit r e g a r d i n g
e v e n t u a l EU membership f o r t h e Southeast European n a t i o n s .
Serbia and Economic Sanctions
•
A l s o need t o use Summit t o demonstrate Serbia's i s o l a t i o n
under M i l o s e v i c , w h i l e h o l d i n g o u t t h e p r o s p e c t o f r a p i d
integration after Milosevic.
•
M i l o s e v i c i s s e r i o u s l y weakened, and we have a window o f
o p p o r t u n i t y t o b r i n g fundamental change t o t h e r e g i o n .
•
Understand t h a t EU f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s discussed s a n c t i o n s a t
t h e i r Monday meeting, and asked t h e Commission t o l o o k a t
p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r l i f t i n g some.
•
Need t o keep s a n c t i o n s f u l l y i n p l a c e .
any h i n t t h a t they w i l l be r e l a x e d .
•
I n f a c t , we s t i l l need t o t i g h t e n i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f e x i s t i n g
f i n a n c i a l s a n c t i o n s t a r g e t e d a t M i l o s e v i c and h i s regime.
Hope you can convince i n d i v i d u a l EU c o u n t r i e s t o take
necessary steps, f o l l o w i n g t h e r e c e n t example o f S w i t z e r l a n d .
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On our s i d e , we^would propooe a ten-year GSP commitment, t o
i n c l u d e expanding t h e l i s t o f e l i g i b l e goods, w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n '
of c e r t a i n t e x t i l e s .
A l t h o u g h a m a j o r i t y o f p r o d u c t s from t M s e
c o u n t r i e s , except f o r B u l g a r i a and Romania, a l r e a d y e n t e r .dutyf r e e under GSP or, normal t r a d e s t a t u s , t h e U.S. would offfer a
new program t h a t i n c l u d e s v i r t u a l l y a l l a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t s
(except sugar) .at l i t t l e p o l i t i c a l o r economic c o s t / W c a r c i n
the process o f I m a k i n g congrcGsional c a l l o - I-Q t t t h e watf^^F .
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Investment Compact: Because investment and trade will drive oJ"
sustained growth, we propose a * compact" between leaders from ^ '^"^
outside the region and the international fijFlancial institutions -V~^v
to create vehicles for mobilizing private^finance and mitigating
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economic reforms.
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t o create t .
One specific option\is establishimg an EBRD trust fund^uo c r e a t e i __
a policy framework for investment and facilitate debt finance
through local banks. ^ JWe woul^ tl^h work with the IFIs to create
a regional equity fund. They''fund would invest in private or
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privatizing enterprises in/the region (to include Kosovo and
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WTO Membership: For ^on-member countries, we will offer3j t*.J. ^'"
t e c h n i c a l assistance''needed t o meet t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a n d a r d s .
I n many cases, t h i s ' i s e a s i l y p r o v i d e d a t v e r y l i t t l e ^
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the U.S. o r EU governments.
^
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EU statement: ^Our key goal i s f o r t h e r e g i o n t o be i n t e g r a t e d
i n t o t h e EU, v^nich o f f e r s t h e best o p p o r t u n i t y f o r development
*
and growth. /An EU commitment on avontua-i membersh:u3 w i l l be t h e
most d i f f i c m l t — b u t a l s o t h e most i m p o r t a n t — ^ f f ^ r t o f our
strategy./
,
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Economic Sanctions (Prodi Call Only)
^ j f
1
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At Monday's meeting o f t h e General A f f a i r s C o u n c i l , EU F o r e i g n
M i n i s t e r s reviewed c u r r e n t EU s a n c t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e FRY. Greece V and I t a l y pressed f o r a l i f t i n g o f t h e o i l embargo, w i t h some
^
support from Germany and France. The UK and Netherlands
^
s t r o n g l y r e s i s t e d any l i f t i n g o f s a n c t i o n s . M i n i s t e r s
^
u l t i m a t e l y agreed t o t a s k t h e EU Commission t o examine t h e
;~
p o s s i b i l i t y o f l i f t i n g some o f the s a n c t i o n s (the f l i g h t ban and
^
s p o r t i n g ban) and o f d i r e c t i n g o i l and e l e c t r i c i t y t o
opposition-controlled localities.
We oppose any l i f t i n g o f
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PER £ Q 13525
�CONFIDENTIAL
sanctions i n order t o avoid b o l s t e r i n g Milosevic p o l i t i c a l l y or
f i n a n c i a l l y . We also disagree w i t h the f e a s i b i l i t y of d i r e c t i n g
o i l and e l e c t r i c i t y t o s p e c i f i c l o c a l i t i e s . We are prepared t o
discuss w i t h a l l i e s the concept of assistance t o o p p o s i t i o n c o n t r o l l e d l o c a l i t i e s ; however, any such assistance wotild need
to be c a r e f u l l y circumscribed, monitored and coordina'ted, as
w e l l as conditioned on increased u n i t y w i t h i n the o p p o s i t i o n .
Attachments
Tab A Points t o be Made f o r Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Tab B Points t o be Made f o r EU Commissioner Prodi
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CONFIPFNTTAh .
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�/
The most meaningful gesture we can make i n the near term i s to
provide u n i l a t e r a l trade access i n t o our markets. This w i l l
help catalyze production and investment i n the region.
I am prepared t o work w i t h Congress t o provide duty-free
access i n t o our market across a range of products, -rflawever,
-can only succeed-In this_£££prt i f - the. EU- makes a s i
-effort.
I understand the EU i s considering s i m i l a r i n i t i a t i v e s f o r
i n d i v i d u a l countries i n the region. I t - would be more powerful
i f the EU could extend t o the region as a whole(excluding
Serbia) a program p r o v i d i n g duty free treatment f o r as many
i n d u s t r i a l and a g r i c u l t u r a l goods as possible.+
/
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E Oo 13526
2.o\3 - oH7a - V\
%/<*/\S HBH
�5562
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH
INGTON
PHONE CALLS TO U.K. PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
AND EU COMMISSIONER PRODI
DATE: TBD
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
GENE SPERLING
I.
PURPOSE
To secure support f o r our proposed economic i n i t i a t i v e s a t t h e
J u l y 30 S t a b i l i t y Pact Summit i n Sarajevo.
To s t r e s s t o P r o d i
t h e need t o s u s t a i n c u r r e n t EU s a n c t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e FRY.
Ii.
BACKGROUND
Economic I n i t i a t i v e s
We a r e c u r r e n t l y working w i t h c o u n t i f i e s o f t h e EU and southeast
Europe t o develop a s e r i e s o f i n i t / i a t i v e s f o r t h e Sarajevo
Summit, i n c l u d i n g i n t h e e c o n o m i o ^ f i e l d . You have asked us t o
f i n d an i n n o v a t i v e approach, s i o a l a r t o t h e one o u t l i n e d by
George Soros. A l t h o u g h i n t e r e / t i n g and i n n o v a t i v e , t h e Soros
p r o p o s a l would n o t p r o v i d e r e f i l l o n g - t e r m b e n e f i t s t o t h e
c o u n t r i e s -of southeast Eurone. T h e i r b i g g e s t g a i n would be
access t o U.S,) and EU market^. I n t h a t s p i r i t , we have prepared
a comprehensive s t r a t e g y which i n c l u d e s a t r a d e i n i t i a t i v e , an
investment compact and a /commitment t o h e l p achieve WTO
membership. We want ther Europeans t o support these and g i v e a
c o n c r e t e statement r e g a r d i n g e v e n t u a l EU membership.
Trade I n i t i a t i v e :
We' recommend c o m m i t t i n g t o u n i l a t e r a l t r a d e
p r e f e r e n c e s , s i m i l a r / t o t h e Caribbean Basin I n i t i a t i v e , t o
c o u n t r i e s i n t h e r e g i o n o t h e r than S e r b i a , as w e l l as Kosovo and
Montenegro. These/ p r e f e r e n c e s should be u n i f o r m across t h e
r e g i o n and as generous as p o s s i b l e t o r a p i d l y spur economic
development. We would n o t , i n t u r n , request s p e c i a l access
r i g h t s t o U.S\ o r EU e x p o r t s . This p r o v i d e s immediate access t o
developed markets and t h e greatest, s h o r t - t e r m t a n g i b l e b e n e f i t .
However, i n o r d e r f o r t h i s t o be a success, EU p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s
c r i t i c a l , n o t o n l y t o m o b i l i z e Congressional support here a t
home, b u t a l s o because access t o t h e European market i s an
e s s e n t i a l component t o southeast Europe's economic development.
CLINTON LIBRARY PH0T0C0P\
�To e f f e c t t h i s , we would propose a t e n ^ y e ^ r GSP commitment, t o
i n c l u d e expanding t h e l i s t o f e l i g i b l e ^ g o o d s , w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n
o f c e r t a i n ^ t e x t i l e s . Although a m a j o r i t y o f p r o d u c t s from these
countries/-/-' except f o r B u l g a r i a and Romania.y^ a l r e a d y e n t e r
d u t y - f r e e under GSP o r normal t r a d e s t a t u s / t h e U.S. would offe
a new program t h a t i n c l u d e s v i r t u a l l y a l l a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t ^
(except sugar) a t l i t t l e p o l i t i c a l o r economic c o s t . We a r e / i n
the process o f making c o n g r e s s i o n a l c a l l s t o t e s t t h e watei?4.
s
Investment Compact: Because we have underscored t h a t i/ivestment
and t r a d e , and n o t donor a s s i s t a n c e , w i l l d r i v e susta^med
growth, we propose a "compact" under which l e a d e r s firom o u t s i d e
t h e r e g i o n would agree t o work w i t h t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l
i n s t i t u t i o n s t o create appropriate vehicles f o r irfobilizing
p r i v a t e f i n a n c e and m i t i g a t i n g r i s k .
I n r e t u r n ^ the regional
l e a d e r s would commit t o concrete a c t i o n s t o jjrfprove t h e
investment c l i m a t e and a c c e l e r a t e economic reforms.
We ar,g~workdng on s e v e r a l o p t i o n s . T h e / f i r s t i s e s t a b l i s h m e n t
o f ari EBRD/trust fund which would e s t a b l i s h a p o l i c y framework
f o r ^Euzje^tment and f a c i l i t a t e debt fi/fance t h r o u g h l o c a l banks.
Based on our experiences i n c e n t r a l / E u r o p e , we would then work
with the i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l i j f s t i t u t i o n s t o create a
r e g i o n a l e q u i t y fund. The fund w6uld i n v e s t i n p r i v a t e o r
p r i v a t i z i n g e n t e r p r i s e s i n t h e r e g i o n d j t o i n c l u d e Kosovo and
Montenegro), h e l p leverage p r i v a t e f i n a n c i n g from i n s t i t u t i o n s
and b i l a t e r a l donors, and u t i l i z e guarantees o f f e r e d by n a t i o n a l
investment agencies such as GOPIC.
WTO Membership: For t h o s e / c o u n t r i e s n o t c u r r e n t l y members o f
t h e WTO, we would o f f e r t>ie t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e needed t o meet
t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l standa/ds. I n many cases, t h i s i s e a s i l y
p r o v i d e d a t v e r y l i t t l e / c o s t t o t h e U.S. o r EU governments.
EU statement:
The most i m p o r t a n t step f o r t h e r e g i o n i s t o be
i n t e g r a t e d i n t o t h e S u r o - A t l a n t i c s t r u c t u r e s l i k e t h e EU; t h i s
o f f e r s t h e b e s t o p p o r t u n i t y f o r development and growth. A
commitment by t h e EU on e v e n t u a l EU membership w i l l be t h e most
d i f f i c u l t p a r t o f <6ur s t r a t e g y , b u t a l s o t h e most i m p o r t a n t t o
show r e a l commitment by t h e Europeans.
Economic Sanctions (Prodi C a l l Only)
At Monday's meeting o f t h e General A f f a i r s C o u n c i l , EU F o r e i g n
M i n i s t e r s reviewed c u r r e n t EU s a n c t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e FRY. Greece
and I t a l y pressed f o r a l i f t i n g o f t h e o i l embargo, w i t h some
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�support from Germany and France. The UK and Netherlands
s t r o n g l y r e s i s t e d any l i f t i n g o f s a n c t i o n s . M i n i s t e r s
u l t i m a t e l y agreed t o t a s k t h e EU Commission t o examine t h e
p o s s i b i l i t y o f l i f t i n g some o f t h e s a n c t i o n s ( t h e f l i g h t ban and
s p o r t i n g ban) and o f d i r e c t i n g o i l and e l e c t r i c i t y t o
o p p o s i t i o n - c o n t r o l l e d l o c a l i t i e s . ' We oppose any l i f t i n g o f
s a n c t i o n s i n o r d e r t o a v o i d b o l s t e r i n g M i l o s e v i c p o l i t i c a l l y o\
financially.
We a l s o d i s a g r e e w i t h t h e f e a s i b i l i t y o f d i r e c t x i n g
o i l and e l e c t r i c i t y t o s p e c i f i c l o c a l i t i e s .
We are prepared t o
d i s c u s s w i t h a l l i e s t h e concept o f a s s i s t a n c e t o o p p o s i t i o n c o n t r o l l e d l o c a l i t i e s ; however, any such a s s i s t a n c e wouixl need
t o be c a r e f u l l y c i r c u m s c r i b e d , m o n i t o r e d and c o o r d i n a t e d , as
w e l l as c o n d i t i o n e d on t h e l o c a l l e a d e r s t a k i n g steps t o
increase u n i t y w i t h i n the opposition.
Attachments
Tab A
T a l k i n g P o i n t s f o r PM B l a i r
Tab B
T a l k i n g P o i n t s f o r EU Commissions
Prodi
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�5562
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
EUROPEAN UNION COMMISSIONER ROMANO PRODI
Sarajevo Summit Trade I n i t i a t i v e s
Looking f o r w a r d t o t h e Sarajevo Summit. Must work i n t e n s i v e l y
i n t h e r e m a i n i n g days t o ensure m e a n i n g f u l r e s u l t s .
We a l l agree t h a t we want s u b s t a n t i v e outcomes from Sarajevo.
I b e l i e v e t h a t we should t r y t o b r i n g t o g e t h e r a t r a d e
i n i t i a t i v e t h a t prepares Southeast Europe f o r f u l l a n d / r a p i d
i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o t h e European and g l o b a l t r a d i n g system.
•
The f i r s t s t e p ta=da. i s t o show t h e s i n c e r i t y o f /Our support
f o r t h e r e g i o n . The U.S. and EU can agree t o g e t h e r t o g r a n t ,
as soon as p o s s i b l e , u n i l a t e r a l , one way t r a d e / c o n c e s s i o n s t o
c o u n t r i e s i n t h e r e g i o n . We would, o f cours^, exclude S e r b i a ,
but want t o i n c l u d e Kosovo and Montenegro.
•
We a r e p r e p a r i n g a package which would anow our commitment,
but I w i l l o n l y have a good shot a t w i r m i n g c o n g r e s s i o n a l
s u p p o r t i f t h e EU makes a s i m i l a r e f f o r t .
I know t h a t you
have a range o f i n i t i a t i v e s underway w i t h C e n t r a l and
Southeast Europe. Would urge t h a t / y o u expand t h e most
generous o f these, t h e Lome o r ayronomous t r a d e p r e f e r e n c e s t o
the whole r e g i o n .
Understand t h a t o f f e r i n g m e a n i n g f u l t r a d e concessions w i l l be
p o l i t i c a l l y d i f f i c u l t f o r Vou, as i t w i l l be f o r us. But, we
must make t h e commitment / t o t r y and announce a r e s u l t a t t h e
Summit.
We a r e a s k i n g t h e r e g i o n a l l e a d e r s t o make an " i n v e s t m e n t
compact" and t o conunit t o key reforms t h a t would improve t h e
i n v e s t m e n t c l i m a t e / I want t o make sure t h a t , i n r e t u r n f o r
them making t h o s e / d i f f i c u l t reforms, we do our best t o
m o b i l i z e p r i v a t e / c a p i t a l and m i t i g a t e r i s k t o d i r e c t
investors.
/
To do t h i s , w d ' r e l o o k i n g a t working w i t h t h e EBRD t o c r e a t e a
r e g i o n a l equjKiy fund.
CLINTON LlBKAKi PHOTOCUi-1
�o
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•
Would also urge that we work towards g e t t i n g a l l of these
states i n t o the WTO providing the t e c h n i c a l assistance they
need t o meet the c r i t e r i a f o r entry as soon as possible.
• F i n a l l y , I would ask your support f o r as concrete and
ambitious a statement as possible at the summit regarding
eventual EU membership f o r the Southeast European nations
Serbia and Economic Sanctions
Also need t o use Summit t o demonstrate S e r b i a ' s / i s o l a t i o n
under Milosevic, while holding out the prospejzr of r a p i d
i n t e g r a t i o n a f t e r Milosevic.
Milosevic i s s e r i o u s l y weakened, and we have a window of
o p p o r t u n i t y t o b r i n g fundamental change/to the region.
Understand t h a t EU f o r e i g n ministers/discussed sanctions at
t h e i r Monday meeting, and asked th^r Commission t o look at
p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r l i f t i n g some.
•
Need t o keep sanctions f u l l y ipf place, Milosevic w i l l e x p l o i t
any h i n t t h a t they w i l l be re/axed.
•
I n f a c t , we s t i l l need t o t/ighten implementation of e x i s t i n g
f i n a n c i a l sanctions targelzed at Milosevic and h i s regime.
Hope you can convince incaividual EU countries t o take
necessary steps, follow/ng the recent example of Switzerland.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�5562
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR
•
Looking f o r w a r d t o t h e Sarajevo Summit. Must work i n t e n s i v e l y
i n t h e r e m a i n i n g days t o ensure m e a n i n g f u l r e s u l t s .
•
We a l l agree t h a t we want s u b s t a n t i v e outcomes from S a r a j e v o ^
I b e l i e v e t h a t we should t r y t o b r i n g t o g e t h e r a t r a d e
i n i t i a t i v e t h a t prepares Southeast Europe f o r f u l l and r ^ 5 i d
i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o t h e European and g l o b a l t r a d i n g syster
•
The f i r s t s t e p t o do i s t o show t h e s i n c e r i t y o f oufr s u p p o r t
f o r t h e r e g i o n . The U.S. and EU can agree t o g e t h e r t o g r a n t ,
as soon as p o s s i b l e , u n i l a t e r a l , one way t r a d e / c o n c e s s i o n s t o
c o u n t r i e s i n t h e r e g i o n . We would, o f course/f exclude S e r b i a ,
but want t o i n c l u d e Kosovo and Montenegro.
•
We a r e p r e p a r i n g a package which would snow our commitment,
but I w i l l o n l y have a good shot a t w i n n i n g c o n g r e s s i o n a l
s u p p o r t i f t h e EU makes a s i m i l a r e f f o r t .
I know t h a t you
have a range o f i n i t i a t i v e s underway^with C e n t r a l and
Southeast Europe. Would urge t h a t / y o u expand t h e most
generous o f these, t h e Lome o r autonomous t r a d e p r e f e r e n c e s t o
the whole r e g i o n .
•
Understand t h a t o f f e r i n g m e a n i n g f u l t r a d e concessions w i l l be
p o l i t i c a l l y d i f f i c u l t f o r yo/, as i t w i l l be f o r us. But, we
must make t h e commitment t o / t r y and announce a r e s u l t a t t h e
Summit.
•
We a r e a s k i n g t h e r e g i o n a l l e a d e r s t o make an " i n v e s t m e n t
compact" and t o commit / t o key reforms t h a t would improve t h e
investment climate.
/ w a n t t o make sure t h a t , i n r e t u r n f o r
them making those d i f f i c u l t reforms, we do our best t o
m o b i l i z e p r i v a t e c a p i t a l and m i t i g a t e r i s k t o d i r e c t
investors.
•
To do t h i s , we're/ l o o k i n g a t working w i t h t h e EBRD t o c r e a t e a
r e g i o n a l equity^/fund.
•
Would a l s o u r g ^ t h a t we work towards g e t t i n g a l l o f these
s t a t e s i n t o t h e WTO p r o v i d i n g t h e t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e t h e y
need t o meet t h e c r i t e r i a f o r e n t r y as soon as p o s s i b l e .
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�F i n a l l y , I would ask your support f o r as concrete and
ambitious a statement as possible at the summit regarding
eventual EU membership f o r the Southeast European nations,
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�•COMriDEMP-frftfi-
55 62
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
AND EU COMMI35IONER PRODI
DATE: TBD '
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD
/
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
I.
/
PURPOSE
Secure s u p p o r t f o r our proposed econoipic i n i t i a t i v e s a t t h e J u l y
3 0 [ s t a b i l i t y PactjSummit i n S a r a j e v o / S t r e s s t o P r o d i t h e need
t o s u s t a i n curreffE" EU s a n c t i o n s agaanst t h e FRY.
II.
BACKGROUND
/
Economic Initiatives
^
CSJ /
r
>. c c \t- A i HL.
t
/
We a r e c u r r e n t l y working -wijfrh t e n a n t r i e s o f t h e EU-aftd-'-a-era-t-fee^g^:
Euxope-J^o - do v o l op a s e r i e s ^ o f ' i n i t i a t i v e s f o r t h e Sarajevo
Summit^ ifte-luding i n t h o .ci'conomi-G ^icil-d. You faava asked us t o
f i n d v a n — i a n o v a t i v c approach, s i m i l a r t o t h e one o u t l i n e d by
George Soros. Although/ irnter-Qst i.Q^_an.ci. i n n o v a t i v e , t h e Soros
p r o p o s a l would n o t prqpVi-de r e a l long-term b e n e f i t s ^ to- t-fee
•GouRt^ire^--of--sou-t-heaa!4--Eur-f>p«". -Their b i g g e s t g a i n would be- f l i € Ft~'('A L
VI'
access t o U.S. and EO markets. f i r t h a t s p i r i t , we have prepared
a comprehensive s t o ^ t e g y which .includes a t r a d e i n i t i a t i v e , an
investment compact? and a commitnent t o h e l p achieve WTO
membership. We W^nt t h e Europeans t o support these and g i v e a
c o n c r e t e statemynt r e g a r d i n g e v e n t u a l EU membership.
Trade I n i t i a t i v e :
We recommend c o m m i t t i n g 'to u n i l a t e r a l t r a d e
p r e f e r e n c e s , s i m i l a r t o ^ . ^ ^ ^ r i b b e a n Basiix, I n i t i a t ^ v ^ t o
c o u n t r i e s i n t h e r e g i o n ^-fetiei. tharr Sert^.i.a, c wo-i-i'^ac Kosovo and
Montenegro .^^^Th^s^pref erences should fee u h i f o r ^ a c x a a s - i f e e
I^jg4r&ti a n d ^ s 'generous as p o s s i b l e to_rap-idl-y spur economic
development. We would n o t , -,ifi—t.urnr^request s p e c i a l access
r i g h t s t o U.S. o r EU e x p o r t s . This p r o v i d e ^ ' immediate access t o
developed markets and t h e g r e a t e s t s h o r t - t e r m t a n g i b l e b e n e f i t .
However, i n o r d e r f o r t h i s t o be a success, EU p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s
eONFIDENTIAL
Reason:
1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y on:
7/22/09
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
P E R E . O . 13526
KBH
�CONFIDENffftL
2
-
r
c r i t i c a l ^ - n-o^—only -txr-mobi-i i-z-e Congr ess ional—s-uppo-r-fe—her-e-at
liome^, hut...al^o-^bee-a-u-se access t o the • European market • i s • arv
e s s e n t i a l component-to- southeast Europe's economic development..
e f f e c t t h i r s ^ w e would propose a ten-year GSP commitment, t o
i n c l u d e expanding'the l i s t o f e l i g i b l e goods, w i t h .the e x c e p t i o n
o f c e r t a i n t e x t i l e s . A l t h o u g h a m a j o r i t y o f p r o d u c t s from these
c o u n t r i e s , except f o r B u l g a r i a and Romania, a l r e a d y e n t e r d u t y f r e e under GSP o r normal t r a d e s t a t u s , t h e U S . would o f f e r a
.'
new program t h a t i n c l u d e s v i r t u a l l y a l l a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t s
(except sugar) a t l i t t l e p o l i t i c a l o r economic c o s t . We a r e i n
the process o f making c o n g r e s s i o n a l c a l l s . - t o t e s t t h e w a t e r s .
Investment Compact: Because Jate have—und^r-a^oxed-^feh-gfe- investment
and trade,, ^USLMQX^^.Q.UQJ: a^s-ista-n&e^-.will/arive s u s t a i n e d
growth, we propose a * compact" under'which- l e a d e r s from o u t s i d e
t^_reglon_-jfl/ould agree, t o work w i t h t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l
£
i n s t i t u t i o n s t o c r e a t e appropria^fe v e h i c l e s f o r m o b i l i z i n g
ht;<s- p r i v a t e f i n a n c e and m i t i g a t i n g r i s k .
I n return, the regional
l e a d e r s would commit t o concrete a c t i o n s t o improve t h e
investment c l i m a t e and a c c e l e r a t e economic reforms.
- c o-re- w o r k i n g ou.. se.vera.1, _optionc-a
W
3 % ^ — f ^ r r r t i f\_ ^ s t n h l i -hmrrHI=an EBRD t r u s t fund 4^1 ^ j f c ^ ^ s ^ d e s t a b i i a h a p o l i c y framework
f o r investment and f a c l l i tale debt f i n a n c e through l o c a l banks,
fiaocd oil. pur c«pe3?4eftees -in engnfo^jg—Eucope, we would then work
with the^ infcp-r-national/f iiiauuidl ins L'lLuLioi»s' to create a
regional equity fund.. The fund would invest in private or
privatizing enterprises in the region (to include Kosovo and
Montenegro) , help leverage private financingfrromin-etifrufcimij
and bilat-e-r^l^-dQft&c.s^'a'nd nfrii i Eir^guarantees offered by national
investment agencies such as OPIC. C^/u^i, y.,A,( 2 £ ^X-' Of
c
1
1
1
r
WTO Membership: Forfel'mje.•eountifiGO not.. c - . ; f f l y momborc , o l
urao»ai
the—WTO7 we^woul-d o f f e r *he- t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e needed t o meet
the i n t e r n a t i i o n a l standards.
I n many cases, t h i s i s e a s i l y
p r o v i d e d a t / v e r y l i t t l e c o s t t o t h e U.S. o r EU governments.
^Z^-
M-—-WILL
EU statement:
The m^st i.mportant^i.tpp~,.ft>r t h e r e g i o n -ars^to be
i n t e g r a t e ^ ' i n t o fche-Eggo Afejb-aft-tlg'-ofe&ag^ur.ea ^a^ke. t h e EUj tl-ri-s W t f
o f f e r s thte best o p p o r t u n i t y f o r development and growth. A*J
commitment byj the EU on e v e n t u a l -By^membership w i l l be t h e most
d i f f i c i A t , p a r t o f our s t r a t e g y b u t also t h e m-ost-Impo-rt-aB-fe-^to
s.w...a^Gimtei.„.y-.h..u.paihQ..rel.oiim.it.h.,te.ErQsrsr
¥
^
\
•GONFIDEMgrEftfc
C I T N U R R POOOV
L N O B A Y HTCP
�-COMFTDENTTAI.
55 62
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR
Sarajevo
Summit Trade I n i t i a t i v e s
•
Looking f o r w a r d t o t h e Sarajevo Summit. Must work i n t e n s i v e l y
i n t h e r e m a i n i n g days t o ensure meaningful, r e s u l t s .
•
We a l l agree t h a t we want s u b s t a n t i v e outcomes from Sarajevo.
We s h o u l d t r y t o b r i n g t o g e t h e r a t r a d e i n i t i a t i v e t h a t
prepares Southeast Europe f o r f u l l and r a p i d i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o
European and g l o b a l t r a d e .
•
The f i r s t s t e p i s t o show our Support f o r t h e r e g i o n . The
U.S. and EU can agree t o g e t h e r t o g r a n t u n i l a t e r a l t r a d e
concessions'! strofteet t o c o u n t r i e s i n t h e r e g i o n . We would
exclude Serlpia, b u t i n c l u d e Kosovo and Montenegro.
•
We a r e p r e p a r i n g a package t o show our commitment, b u t I w i l l
o n l y w i n c o n g r e s s i o n a l support i f t h e EU makes a s i m i l a r
effort.
I know t h a t you have a range o f i n i t i a t i v e s underway
w i t h C e n t r a l and Southeast Europe. Would urge t h a t you expand
the most generous/of these, t h e Lome, o r autonomous t r a d e
p r e f e r e n c e s t o t h e whole r e g i o n .
•
Understand t h a t o f f e r i n g meaningful t r a d e concessions w i l l be
p o l i t i c a l l y d i f f i c u l t , b u t we must make t h e commitment t o t r y
and announce a r e s u l t a t t h e Summit.
Vx?fsking r e g i o n a l l e a d e r s t o make an 'investment compact" and
Acommit t;o key reforms t h a t would improve t h e investment
climate'. I n r e t u r n f o r them making reforms, we s h o u l d
m o b i l i z e p r i v a t e c a p i t a l and m i t i g a t e r i s k t o i n v e s t o r s .
•
We'j/e c o n s i d e r i n g c r e a t i n g a r e g i o n a l e q u i t y fund w i t h EBRD.
•
Vis s h o u l d work g e t t i n g these s t a t e s i n t o t h e WTO p r o v i d i n g t h e
t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e they need t o meet t h e c r i t e r i a f o r e n t r y .
F i n a l l y , I would ask your support f o r as c o n c r e t e and
a m b i t i o u s a statement as p o s s i b l e a t t h e summit r e g a r d i n g
e v e n t u a l EU membership f o r t h e Southeast European n a t i o n s .
fMvi
CONFIDENHMr
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on:
7/22/09
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
P E R E . O . 13526
^OVb-cma-W
S/o/iS" K8M
�CONn DCI ¥¥±tt7
5562
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
EUROPEAN UNION COMMISSIONER ROMANO PRODI
S a r a j e v o Summit Trade I n i t i a t i v e s
•
Hope you a r e s e t t l i n g i n t o your new p o s i t i o n . Looking f o r w a r d
to t h e Sarajevo Summit. Must work i n t e n s i v e l y i n t h e
r e m a i n i n g days t o ensure m e a n i n g f u l r e s u l t s .
•
We all agree that we want substantive outcomes from Sarajevo.
We should try to bring together a trade initiative that
prepares Southeast Europe for full and rapid integration into
European and global trade.
f
•
The f i r s t s t e p i s t o show our support f o r t h e r e g i o n . The
U.S. and EU can agree t o g e t h e r t o g r a n t u n i l a t e r a l t r a d e
concessions soonest t o c o u n t r i e s i n t h e r e g i o n . We would
exclude S e r b i a , b u t i n c l u d e Kosovo and Montenegro.
•
We a r e p r e p a r i n g a package t o show our commitment, b u t I w i l l
o n l y w i n c o n g r e s s i o n a l support i f t h e EU makes a s i m i l a r
effort.
I know t h a t you have a range o f i n i t i a t i v e s underway
w i t h C e n t r a l and Southeast Europe. Would urge t h a t you expand
the most generous o f these, t h e Lome, o r autonomous t r a d e
p r e f e r e n c e s t o t h e whole r e g i o n .
•
Understand t h a t o f f e r i n g m e a n i n g f u l t r a d e concessions w i l l be
p o l i t i c a l l y d i f f i c u l t , b u t we must make t h e commitment t o t r y
and announce a r e s u l t a t t h e Summit.
•
A s k i n g r e g i o n a l l e a d e r s t o make an * investment compact" and
commit t o key reforms t h a t would improve t h e i n v e s t m e n t
c l i m a t e . . I n r e t u r n f o r them making reforms, we s h o u l d
m o b i l i z e p r i v a t e c a p i t a l and m i t i g a t e r i s k t o i n v e s t o r s .
•
We're c o n s i d e r i n g c r e a t i n g a r e g i o n a l e q u i t y fund w i t h EBRD.
/ We s h o u l d work g e t t i n g
these s t a t e s i n t o t h e WTO p r o v i d i n g t h e
t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e they need t o meet t h e c r i t e r i a f o r e n t r y .
•
F i n a l l y , I would ask your support f o r as c o n c r e t e and
a m b i t i o u s a statement as p o s s i b l e a t t h e summit r e g a r d i n g
e v e n t u a l EU membership f o r t h e Southeast European n a t i o n s .
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason:
1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y on: 7/22/09
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
P E R E . O . 13526
�CONriDEN¥*ftb
2
NATO S e c r e t a r y General
/'S C L ^1
" "
~
•
Spoke w i t h C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder t o convey t h a t we needed t o
come t o c l o s u r e on a successor f o r NATO SYG Solana.
•
T o l d him we would be prepared t o support Scharping, i f
Schroeder p u t s him i n t h e r u n n i n g .
•
S t a t e t h a t we a l s o l i k e d Haekkerup, and we would l o o k v e r y
f a v o r a b l y on any o f t h e UK candidates mentioned i n t h e press,
i n c l u d i n g Paddy Ashdown.
•
Schroeder s a i d he'delay p u t t i n g Scharping f o r w a r d , b u t uattiti
make a d e c i s i o n w i t h i n a week
b e f o r e Sarajevo.
Schroeder
a l s o suggested t h a t we a l l chat i n Sarajevo.
•
Looking f o r w a r d t o seeing you i n Sarajevo.
eoNFiDEMTiAb
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPi
�CONriDCNTIAL
5562
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR
Sarajevo Summit^^/W*^—
>
^ ^tfJJ?t£Z~t
• Looking forward t o the Sarajevo Summit. Must work i n t e n s i v e l y
i n the. remaining days t o ensure meaningful r e s u l t s .
• We a l l agree that we want substantive outcomes from Sarajevo.
J - f r ± e e LlidLr-celV
should t r y to b r i n g together a t r a d g _ ^ ^ r f ^ :
i n i t i a t i v e t h a t prepares Southeast Europe, f o r <£]^Tlfl»i^xapi^^
i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o tfee^European and global tradi^^sy&Eeau-I
=
•
The f i r s t step i s t o show the s i n c e r i t y of our support f o r the
region. The U.S. and EU can agree tag^tker- t o grant/—as ooon—•
as posslbLe; (uolJ-a-t^^ffiv-egre wyj^tiffiae concessions/^o
''"^
countries i n tTTe—tegran,. We would^ nr r o n r m ^ exclude Serbia,
but want to- include Kosovo and^Montenegro.
• We are preparing a package wk4eh would show our commitment,
but I w i l l only havo a cjuud Lihot- crt> winn-iug congressional
support i f the EU makes a s i m i l a r e f f o r t . I know t h a t you
have a range of i n i t i a t i v e s underway w i t h Central and
Southeast Europe. Would urge that you expand the most
generous of these, the, Lome, or autonomous trade preferences to
the whole region.
• Understand t h a t o f f e r i n g meaningful trade concessions w i l l be
p o l i t i c a l l y d i f f i c u l t , f n r ynm—a-o i t w i l l bo f o r uc i ^ u t ^ we
must make the commitment to t r y and announce a r e s u l t at the
Summit.
/
/
•
We are asking/the regional leaders to make an "investment
compact" and/to commit to key reforms that would improve the
investment climate. J-want -to makp sure thaJi/ _£n return for
them making' those difficult reforms, we do our best to
mobilize brivate capital and mitigate /isk to direct
investors/.
/
•
To do tjfiis, we're looking at working w i t h the EBRD t o create a
regiona/l equity fund.
• Would also urge t h a t we work towards g e t t i n g .aJJ—cu£_these
states i n t o the WTO providing the t e c h n i c a l assistance they
need t o meet the c r i t e r i a f o r entry as soon as p o s s i b l e .
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
€eNFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 7/22/09
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
�F i n a l l y , I would ask your support f o r -arSconcrete and
C O /
a m b i t i o u s a statement as p o s s i b l e a t t h e summit r e g a r d i n g v ^ '
'
e v e n t u a l EU membership f o r t h e Southeast European n a t i o n s .
NATO S e c r e t a r y
General
•
Spoke w i t h C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder t o convey t h a t we needed t o
come t o c l o s u r e on a successor f o r NATO SYG Solana.
•
T o l d him we would be prepared t o support Scharping, i f
Schoreder p u t s him i n t h e r u n n i n g .
•
S t a t e t h a t we a l s o l i k e d Haekkerup, and we"'would l o o k v e r y
f a v o r a b l y on any o f t h e UK candidates mentioned i n t h e press,
i n c l u d i n g Paddy Ashdown.
•
Schroeder s a i d he d e l a y p u t t i n g Scharping f o r w a r d , b u t would
make a d e c i s i o n w i t h i n a week -- b e f o r e Sarajevo.
Schroeder
a l s o suggested t h a t we a l l chat i n Sarajevo.
•
Looking f o r w a r d t o seeing you./in Sarajevo.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
•SECRET
07 77
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH
INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Gerry Adams o f Sinn Fein
PARTICIPANTS:
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t
Sinn Fein P r e s i d e n t Gerry Adams
Notetakers:
Deana S u t l i f f , Frank J a r o s i n s k i ,
James Smith and Dick Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
January 31, 2000, 2:55-3:13 p.m. EST
The Residence
The P r e s i d e n t :
Mr. Adams:
Gerry.
(U)
H e l l o , Mr. P r e s i d e n t .
How are you?
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t :
I'm a l r i g h t . I j u s t wanted t o c a l l and t a l k t o
you one more time b e f o r e t h i s comes down. I know how hard you've
worked on t h i s decommissioning i s s u e , b u t we've been i n touch
w i t h t h e I r i s h and B r i t i s h governments and I ' v e t a l k e d t o most o f
Sinn Fein's f r i e n d s i n Congress t h e l a s t few days, and no one I
t a l k e d t o b e l i e v e s what t h e IRA i s prepared t o say t o
de C h a s t e l a i n about arms and e x p l o s i v e s and t h e n t o say he can't
say t h a t p u b l i c l y w i l l p r e v e n t t h i s whole t h i n g from going down.
The i n s t i t u t i o n s w i l l be suspended and I don't know how t h e h e l l
w e ' l l ever g e t them up a g a i n . Then i t w i l l be even more
d i f f i c u l t ; t h e IRA w i l l l o o k l i k e t h e y ' r e c r y i n g u n c l e , i n s t e a d
of squeezing o u t t h e l a s t ounce o f good w i l l , e s p e c i a l l y s i n c e
B l a i r i s p r e p a r e d t o go f o r w a r d w i t h implementing t h e P a t t e n
Report.
We're j u s t i n a t e r r i b l e s i t u a t i o n .
I don't know i f
t h e r e ' s a n y t h i n g you can do t o get a c l e a r commitment on a
timetable.
I am v e r y w o r r i e d about t h i s . I t h i n k de C h a s t e l a i n
w i l l have no c h o i c e , and T r i m b l e i s gone i f t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s are
not suspended. I f t h e y are suspended, we w i l l a l l do our b e s t t o
keep them a l i v e , b u t i t does n o t h e l p t h e IRA a t a l l . (^f
Mr. Adams:
I t w i l l work backward.
The P r e s i d e n t :
I t w i l l be even harder f o r them. R i g h t now,
t h e y ' r e i n an admirable p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n , s a y i n g , we made
everyone f o r k over b e f o r e we d i d . " We can g e t by w i t h o u t an a c t
i f t h e r e ' s a c l e a r commitment and t i m e t a b l e , b u t w i t h o u t t h a t , I
w
SECRET
C l a s s i f i e d by:
Reason: 1. 5d
Declassify
on:
Robert Bradtke
02/04/10
DECLASSIFIED
PFR F f l I ' W f i
^ - V H I ^ A
�CITN L B A Y P O O O Y
LNO I R R H T C P
6-CCRCT
t h i n k de C h a s t e l a i n i s going t o i s s u e h i s r e p o r t , i n s t i t u t i o n s
w i l l be suspended and t h e IRA — I agree w i t h you, i t w i l l work
backward. Otherwise, T r i m b l e i s going t o f a l l .
They a r e going
t o g e t him. No one I know t h i n k s he w i l l s u r v i v e . No one w i l l
say, i n v e s t m e n t s a r e coming i n , we j u s t hope t h e IRA does r i g h t
down t h e road."
They j u s t won't do i t . (#]
w
Mr. Adams: I think that there are -- first of all, I agree with
you on the seriousness of the situation. Have you seen the
words? (St)
The President: It says something like they will consider putting
arms beyond use -- (£)
Mr. Adams: Yes, i t a l s o says IRA guns a r e s i l e n t and t h e r e i s no
t h r e a t t o t h e peace process by t h e IRA. (^)
The
President:
But they won't even l e t h i m make t h a t one p u b l i c .
Mr. Adams: I t h i n k David T r i m b l e , i f he r e c e i v e s a p o s i t i v e
r e p o r t from de C h a s t e l a i n and he notes t h e B r i t i s h government
accepts t h a t as p o s i t i v e , then he c l e a r l y has t h e p o l i t i c a l w i l l
t o go back. (^5
The P r e s i d e n t : But t h e problem i s , t h e i r view i s they've done
what t h e y ' r e supposed t o do and, h e l l , t h i s c o u l d t a k e p l a c e i n
2010.
(^)
Mr. Adams:
Well, okay.
I mean —
(^
The P r e s i d e n t : Look, we can buy a few days here because t h e
B r i t i s h and I r i s h a r e b o t h committed t o do t h e b e s t t h e y can,
even i f t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e suspended. The problem i s , t h e
language would seem l e s s c o n d i t i o n a l i f t h e r e were any r e f e r e n c e
t o a t i m e t a b l e . I know t h e IRA view i s t h e y gave f i r s t because
t h e y gave t h e p r i n c i p l e o f consent, b u t everybody e l s e ' s view o f
t h i s i s a l l t h e o t h e r p a r t s o f t h e Good F r i d a y Accord and even
the P a t t e n Report i s b e i n g implemented and t h a t was d i f f i c u l t f o r
t h e u n i o n i s t s — and d i f f i c u l t i s a m i l d word -- and o l d T r i m b l e
i s s t i l l hanging on, b u t t h e r e i s no c l e a r t i m e t a b l e . I f t h e
language were p u b l i c and t h e r e was a t i m e t a b l e r e f e r e n c e d , i t
would seem l e s s c o n d i t i o n a l , b u t w i t h o u t a t i m e t a b l e t h i s
language seems v e r y c o n d i t i o n a l indeed.
I don't t h i n k t h e r e ' s
any chance o f g e t t i n g a p o s i t i v e r e p o r t o u t o f t h i s .
Mr. Adams: Okay, I am going t o t a l k t o Tony and a l s o go have a
meeting w i t h Peter Mandelson. I don't t h i n k i t i s g o i n g t o be
p o s s i b l e , i n f a c t I know i t won't be p o s s i b l e . We t r i e d t o get a
d e f i n i t i v e t i m e t a b l e . What we g o t was i n t e n t on m o d a l i t i e s and
•SECRET
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
SECRET
3
on a timetable determined by political developments as opposed to
a calendar timetable. It is going to cause trouble within the
IRA, no matter what people think, trouble within the IRA and its
leadership. The worst possible scenario was failing to get the
IRA to move, because the IRA's position was that not under any
circumstances will they decommission, and now they are saying
they will consider decommissioning, putting weapons beyond use,
which is the exact wording of the legislation, which is a total
change from their previously stated position. Whatever has been
created in terms of public expectation of the IRA, the fact is
this is a unilateral deadline set by the unionists. But that is
not the way to try and make this work. There is perhaps some
room to maneuver in terms of de Chastelain including some of the
statement in his report, if that helps, if there are problems in
not being able to publicize or publicly comment on this. I think
there is a possibility, but only in the context that it would
help stabilize the situation. We won't get it; we tried over the
weekend to get a definitive timetable. For all that is said
about the Patten Report, the reality is it is all promises.
We've seen no legislation from the British. Demilitarization has
not happened; there has been remilitarization. Two children — •
two teenagers -- were killed in my constituency some years ago, a
young girl and boy, killed by British soldiers. They were
joyriding and they were killed. The soldiers perjured
themselves. Today all the charges were dropped. All of this is
playing into what was done. The guns are silent. I don't
believe for a moment that Tony Blair for one moment disagrees
with my analysis of how this can be done. I think he accepts it.
The problem is in the unionists who are dictating this, not in
the Irish government by itself or in the British government. I
think it is in the way this issue has been used to choke the
process. (jifi
The P r e s i d e n t : I agree w i t h a l l t h a t b u t l o o k , t h e problem i s
the whole Good F r i d a y Accord and t h e e l e c t i o n s a r e a l l premised
on a l l t h e p i e c e s f a l l i n g i n t o p l a c e a t t h e same t i m e .
[ B r e a k } . . . o f t h e Accord t h a t s e t up t h e t i m e t a b l e f o r
decommissioning. A l l t h e v o t i n g proceeded under t h e assumption
i t would happen. Now, t h e u n i o n i s t s have absorbed t h e f a c t t h a t
i t w i l l n o t a l l u n f o l d as t h e accord p r e d i c t e d , b u t s t i l l t h e r e
i s t h i s process and i t has t o have some i n t e g r i t y t o i t . The IRA
may n o t c a r e , b u t a l l t h e Americans who have n o r m a l l y been so
s u p p o r t i v e o f you w i l l b a s i c a l l y say t h e same t h i n g , t h a t they
d i d n ' t come across. As a p r a c t i c a l m a t t e r , I t h i n k t h a t ' s what
i s going t o happen. The r e a l problem was T r i m b l e g o t those guys
to go a l o t f u r t h e r t h a n I thought he c o u l d . He's eaten a l o t
more t h a n t h e IRA has, he's eaten h i s words f o u r o r f i v e t i m e s ,
and t h e n he j u s t found a way t o g e t o u t o f i t and s u r v i v e . I
j u s t don't t h i n k he can do t h a t now. I f you can work a d e a l w i t h
Mandelson, you need t o go see him. We need t o buy a day o r two.
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If you can get something specific on the Patten Report, maybe you
can use that. Details of how it's going to be implemented and
when. Maybe you can synchronize that with the IRA commitment.
Maybe they'll be willing to do that. (JS)
Mr. Adams: The big problem for the IRA is that the
decommissioning issue will be dictated by political circumstances
that exist, not a timetable which they never signed up to. (JS]
The P r e s i d e n t : But i f t h a t ' s t h e i s s u e , what i f you worked o u t
w i t h Mandelson and B l a i r a t i m e t a b l e on t h e P a t t e n Report and
agreed t o g e t t h e IRA t o say, " I f they do t h i s and t h i s , w e ' l l do
the f o l l o w i n g t h i n g s . " ( g )
jT
Mr. Adams: It wouldn't work in that context. The big problem
for the IRA is the unarmed police service. We can probably get
unionists to buy it, but for the republicans, it is still a
partitionist service. Our whole intent was to get the IRA out of
the game, on the sidelines, so other people could take more
pragmatic positions. So the big thing is to keep the IRA
sidelined and spectating in all this. So I am going to see
Mandelson, because we have to make the best effort to make sure
this situation is rescued. I would mislead you if you left with
the impression that something could be done on Patten which could
help on this, but I'll go and see Mandelson now. (JS]
The P r e s i d e n t : L e t me ask you: i f they want t h e t i m e t a b l e t o be
d i c t a t e d by p o l i t i c a l circumstances, why can't t h e r e be some
statement t h a t i f such and such occurs, we w i l l do something?
Mr. Adams: That's what the statement says. Let me just read it
to you. "The IRA wants a permanent peace in Ireland. IRA guns
are silent. We have contributed in a real and meaningful way to
the search for a durable peace, but for that goal to be reached,
steps taken need to be sustained. British forces and loyalist
militias must be removed. The challenge is to remove the cause
of conflict. In this context, and in the context of the full
implementation of the Good Friday Accord, the leadership of the
IRA will consider how to put arms and explosives beyond use. For
our part, we are committed to enhancing our engagements with the
IICD to resolve the conflict and deliver a durable peace. There
is no threat to peace by the IRA." That language is going to
cause trouble within republican ranks. (jrf
The P r e s i d e n t : But t h a t ' s buying t r o u b l e w i t h o u t t h e b e n e f i t s .
The p o i n t o f view o f t h e o t h e r guys i s , ' A f t e r a l l they've s a i d ,
they've backed o f f . " This w i l l be read by s k e p t i c s as, you know,
"We m i g h t never do t h i s , even though t h i s ^ w a s p a r t o f t h e d e a l ,
even though p a r t s o f t h e p l a n precedent t o t h e a c t o f
•CECRET
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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5
decommissioning have o c c u r r e d . " This goes back t o my t h i n k i n g i n
the b e g i n n i n g .
I s t i l l t h i n k t h e e a s i e s t t h i n g t o have done t o
buy you t h e most and hamper you t h e l e a s t was a symbolic a c t .
Mr. Adams: I agree with you completely, but we tried and failed.
The problem Is Trimble said things and then backed off. He
shouldn't have said them in the first place and we got him off of
them.
(#)
The P r e s i d e n t :
Mr. Adams:
The f a c t remains, i f he goes, we a r e sunk.
{#7
There's no reason f o r him t o go.
The P r e s i d e n t :
I t ' s n o t up t o us i f they depose him. That's t h e
problem, no m a t t e r what t h e r i g h t o r wrong. I t may n o t m a t t e r t o
the IRA, b u t based on what I ' v e heard my view i s everyone w i l l
t r y f o r a s o f t l a n d i n g i f these i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e suspended, b u t
a t l e a s t as o f y e s t e r d a y , when I spoke t o a bunch o f o u r I r i s h
congressmen who have been so s u p p o r t i v e o f you and s t i l l a r e ,
t h e i r u n i v e r s a l view i s they need more. You go t o Mandelson andsee i f you can work i t o u t . We've g o t t o buy a couple o f days.
I don't t h i n k t h i s i s going t o f l y . The i n s t i t u t i o n s w i l l be
suspended and i f we p l e a d w i t h him t o hang on, I t h i n k t h e
chances he w i l l be deposed are about 90 p e r c e n t .
Mr. Adams:
Steinberg.
(S)
L e t me go see Mandelson and g e t back t o Jim
S o r r y t o keep you w a i t i n g ; I wasn't near a l a n d l i n e .
The P r e s i d e n t :
Mr. Adams:
Thanks.
Goodbye.
Goodbye.
(U)
—
•SECRET-
Good l u c k .
End o f C o n v e r s a t i o n --
(U)
�NATIONAL SECURITY
1242
COUNCIL
W A S H I N G T O N , D.C. 2 0 5 0 4
February 24, 2000
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
n
FROM:
IAN A. B 0 W L E § J ^ 7
SUBJECT:
P r e s i d e n t i a l L e t t e r s t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r ,
C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder and P r e s i d e n t P r o d i on
C l i m a t e Change
I n response t o a weekly r e p o r t i t e m fromyGeorge Frampton t h a t
r e f e r e n c e d t h e f i n d i n g s o f a r e c e n t ft VSA Center on G l o b a l
C l i m a t e Change r e p o r t h i g h l i g h t i n g t h j f e c o n o m i c e f f i c i e n c y o f
greenhouse gas emissions t r a d i n g , t h ^ P r e s i d e n t wrote a m a r g i n a l
note s a y i n g " s h o u l d send t h i s with^Eover l e t t e r from me t o Tony
B l a i r and o t h e r EU l e a d e r s . "
Your memo responds t o t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s r e q u e s t and p r o v i d e s cover
l e t t e r s t o B l a i r , Schroeder anc^'Prodi f o r h i s s i g n a t u r e . We
recommend these t h r e e r e c i p i e n t s f o l l o w i n g c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h
S t a t e . As a p o i n t o f i n t e r e ^ , t h e Pew Center i s d i r e c t e d by
E i l e e n Claussen, f o r m e r l y o i NSC/Environment d i r e c t o r a t e .
The NSC r e c e i v e d a copy
199
Concurrence by:
e s i d e n t ' s weekly r e p o r t on January 10,
r o l i n e Krass, Antony
BlinkenS
RECOMMENDATION
That you s i g n t h j f a t t a c h e d memorandum a t Tab I
Attachments
Tab I Memo/andum t o t h e P r e s i d e n t
t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Tab A
better t o President Prodi
;r t o C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder
Tab B POTUS Note Requesting L e t t e r s
Tab C Reports
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Tony:
I write with regard to global climate change. Kribwim^ o-f our
common interest in the subject, I am sending yoyf a copy of a
recent Pew Center on Global Climate Change rep.prt on greenhouse
gas emissions trading.
,f
/
The r e p o r t emphasizes t h a t an emissions t r y i n g system t h a t i s
g l o b a l i n scope and f l e x i b l e i n applicati^fh w i l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y
reduce the costs of climate change m i t i g a t i o n . Minimizing costs
w i l l not only promote compliance w i t h oirr emissions reduction
t a r g e t s , but w i l l also allow us t o mov^e more aggressively over
the long term t o address t h i s challei^ge. The study b u i l d s on a
l a s t year's OECD r e p o r t ]
growing body o f l i t e r a t u r e (includi^
b e n e f i t European countries
t h a t shows t r a d i n g can i i gnii f i rnnj
and other nations f o r whom greenl^use gas abatement i s
r e l a t i v e l y expensive.
•>
the broader, more open,
merous s t u d i e s als^x-tnake c l e & r t h
nd u n r e s t r i c t e d ^ t f i e t r a d i n g J^yarffem, the greater th^--b^nef i t s .
gned under the
you know,^rfie f l e x i b i l i j t y m e c h a n i s m s b e i n g
Kyoto Pro£<5col a l s o hayetefemendous p o t e n t i a l " t o c o n t r i b u t e t o
our b r p ^ d e r e f f o r t s ^ o prapnote energy e f f i c i e n c y and c l e a n e r
enej?4y developmep't: i n d e ^ l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s .
I hope we can work t o q ^ t h e r t o address these i m p o r t a n t i s s u e s
and set t h e tone f o r M h a l J—hope w i l l be c l o s e c o o r d i n a t i o n
between our governmafits i n the l e a d - u p t o the c l i m a t e change
c o n f e r e n c e a t The Uague l a t e r t h i s y e a r .
I look forward t o
d i s c u s s i n g t h e s e j ^ s u e s w i t h you t h i s s p r i n g .
W i t h best r e g a r d s ,
1
*
Enclosure
The Right Honorable
Tony B l a i r , M.P.
Prime M i n i s t e r
London
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�1820
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema o f I t a l y
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema
Interpreter:
E l i s a b e t t a Ullmann
Notetakers: Don G e n t i l e , Roger M e r l e t t i ,
Miguel A g u i l o , Frank J a r o s i n s k i ,
Deana S u t l i f f and Hoyt Yee
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
March 15, 2000, 1:30 - 1:53 p.m., EST
Oval O f f i c e
Hello.
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
The President:
(U)
How are you?
Fine, Massimo.
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
(U)
How are you?
Good. Thank you.
(U)
(U)
The President: Thank you f o r t a k i n g t h i s c a l l . I wanted t o t a l k
about Kosovo and my concern about where we're going t h e r e . Over
the past few weeks, I t h i n k we have seen almost d a i l y v i o l e n c e ,
KFOR a t t r i t i o n and a UN o p e r a t i o n t h a t i s going very s l o w l y .
We' re coming i n t o the springtime, which has always been the most
dangerous season i n the Balkans and I'm deeply concerned t h a t
Kosovo could b o i l over and t h a t M i l o s e v i c may s t i r up some
t r o u b l e . During the a i r campaign, we were a l l focused c l o s e l y on
Kosovo and now we have other t h i n g s t o worry about, and I t h i n k
the problem i s n o t g e t t i n g the h i g h - l e v e l a t t e n t i o n i t needs t o
have success t h e r e . fG-)
As I see i t , there are three c r i t i c a l tasks. F i r s t , ensuring t h a t
KFOR has the forces i t needs t o counter any t h r e a t ; second,
g e t t i n g UNMIK the funding i t needs t o do i t s j o b e f f e c t i v e l y and;
t h i r d , d e p l o y i n g enough p o l i c e t o take pressure o f f o f KFOR. fG^
CONFIDENTIAL
C l a s s i f i e d by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y on: 3/16/10
CITN LBAY POOOY
LNO IRR HTCP
DECLASSIFIED I N PART
PER E. 0.13526
8/1,/15
K8M
�CONFIDENTIAL
On the f i r s t issue, KFOR i s g e t t i n g weaker when i t should be
g e t t i n g s t r o n g e r . I understand t h a t you are adding troops and
hope t h a t you can add an a d d i t i o n a l f u l l b a t t a l i o n o f troops t o
those you c u r r e n t l y have deployed t o Kosovo. I'm asking a l l o f
us t o look a t our pledged force l e v e l and t r y t o get back up
t h e r e . I w i l l do the same. We also need t o ensure a smooth
t r a n s i t i o n when the new KFOR commander takes over. We must not
send a s i g n a l t o M i l o s e v i c t h a t t h e r e are weaknesses he can
e x p l o i t . And I t h i n k we need t o i n t e n s i f y e f f o r t s w i t h the
Kosovar Albanians t o counter e x t r e m i s t elements. We sent two o f
our people w i t h the best connections there t h i s weekend t o
d e l i v e r t h a t message. I know t h a t Madeleine has t a l k e d t o your
people about the need f o r p o l i c e but t h i s i s e s s e n t i a l i f we are
to take the pressure o f f o f KFOR. We're sending more people and
I hope you w i l l do the same. We've got t o get more people there.
I'm also very concerned about the UN program UNMIK. They have
been unable t o move forward on c r i t i c a l tasks and are c r i p p l e d by
funding shortages. We have t o get them the resources they need
as q u i c k l y as p o s s i b l e . I t h i n k the appointment o f General Nash
i n M i t r o v i c a should help and I'm doing a l l I can from here. We
have a l r e a d y d i s t r i b u t e d 100 percent o f what we committed t o , b u t
I hope you can do something t o get the EU t o disperse the money
they have committed more q u i c k l y . fG^
Later t h i s month, we also have a r e g i o n a l conference t o finance
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e p r o j e c t s and reforms, and I t h i n k i t i s important
t h a t we a l l make a concrete pledge. We're prepared t o pledge
n e a r l y .$500 m i l l i o n i f others are w i l l i n g t o do t h e i r p a r t .
F i n a l l y , I know t h a t w e ' l l have t o address the Kosovo s t a t u s
issue, but I r e a l l y t h i n k our focus now ought t o be on
e s t a b l i s h i n g s e c u r i t y , b u i l d i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s and developing l o c a l
leaders' sense o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y so we can have e l e c t i o n s t h i s
fall.
Thank you, Massimo. f&)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: Thank you.
concerns and your suggestions
Generally, I do share your
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1 4
.d
I w i l l ask t h a t d u r i n g the next
"European Council meeting i n Lisooh a r e p o r t should be prepared on
t h i s and a c o n f i d e n t i a l d i s c u s s i o n among leaders should take
place on t h i s issue. So, i t i s very important t h a t President
Guterres be f u l l y i n v o l v e d i n your concerns so t h a t we can
discuss t h i s issue together next week. f&)
We have decided t h a t we are sending 150 troops t h a t are not
e x a c t l y p o l i c e but armed forces and t r a i n e d f o r t a k i n g c o n t r o l o f
the t e r r i t o r y . And we also have 350 C a r a b i n i e r i t h e r e . We are
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CONFIDENTIAL
3
not reducing our forces there, on the c o n t r a r y we are i n c r e a s i n g
them. And i f we also include our people i n Albania, we have a
presence o f 6,300 troops a l l over the area. For us, t h i s i s a
very b i g e f f o r t . However, we w i l l focus our a t t e n t i o n on the
p o l i c e and C a r a b i n i e r i and w e ' l l see i f on t h i s issue we can do
more.
^
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1 4
.d
The President: Yes, I agree w i t h t h a t . I t h i n k i f we are s t r o n g
i n Kosovo, t h i s w i l l discourage M i l o s e v i c from m i s c h i e f i n
Northern Kosovo and also i n d i r e c t l y support Djukanovic and I
agree we have t o help him economically. We have been doing what
we can b u t perhaps we can do more. fG^
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONFIDENTIAL
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1 4
.d
So, t o summarize, I f u l l y share your suggestions and we w i l l
increase our involvement i n p o l i c e forces and m i l i t a r y forces and
i n economic support. I f e e l the need f o r a thorough p o l i t i c a l
a n a l y s i s and f o r t h i s maybe we could put our d i p l o m a t i c advisors
i n touch. And I hope t h a t the European d i s c u s s i o n next week w i l l
help us take steps forward. f&)
The President: Yes, I agree w i t h a l l t h a t , and I look forward t o
working w i t h you on i t . Thank you very much.
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
The President:
Thank you. (U)
Thank you, Massimo.
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
—
I hope t o see you soon.
Good bye. (U)
End of Conversation --
CONriDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
(U)
�CONFI DENHAfe
182 0
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h President Jacques Chirac of
France (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
President Jacques Chirac
Interpreter:
Carol Walter
Notetakers: Don G e n t i l e , Roger M e r l e t t i ,
Miguel A g u i l o , Frank J a r o s i n s k i , and
Deana S u t l i f f
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
March 15, 2000, 1:56 - 2:10 p.m., EST
Oval O f f i c e
Hello.
President Chirac:
The President:
(U)
H e l l o , Mr. President.
H e l l o , Jacques.
President Chirac:
(U)
How are you? (U)
I am very glad t o hear you. (U)
The President: Thanks f o r t a k i n g the c a l l .
t h i n g s about Kosovo. fG-)
President Chirac:
I want t o say a few
I wanted t o t a l k t o you about t h a t .
(U)
The President: The s i t u a t i o n i s d i f f i c u l t there w i t h d a i l y
v i o l e n c e and KFOR a t t r i t i o n and a slow moving UN o p e r a t i o n .
Spring has always been the most d i f f i c u l t season i n the Balkans
and I am w o r r i e d t h a t Kosovo could b o i l over or M i l o s o v i c might
t r y t o s t i r up t r o u b l e . For understandable reasons, we have l o s t
the h i g h - l e v e l a t t e n t i o n we gave t o Kosovo d u r i n g the a i r
campaign. I t h i n k we should put t h i s o p e r a t i o n on a stronger
f o o t i n g . fG^
I t h i n k there are three c r i t i c a l tasks as I see i t . F i r s t ,
ensuring KFOR has the forces i t needs t o counter any t h r e a t .
Second, g e t t i n g the UN the funding i t needs t o do i t s j o b
CONFIDENTIAL
C l a s s i f i e d by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y on: March 16, 2010
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
g/^/iT
Kf5M
�e f f e c t i v e l y . T h i r d , deploying enough p o l i c e t o take the pressure
o f f KFOR to m a i n t a i n s e c u r i t y . KFOR i s g e t t i n g weaker when i t
needs t o get stronger. I understand you have o f f e r e d a d d i t i o n a l
forces and I hope you can employ an a d d i t i o n a l b a t t a l i o n t o those
you deployed. I am asking a l l o f us t o look a t our force l e v e l s
to see i f more i s needed. Also, American forces remain a v a i l a b l e
t o support the French sector i n case o f emergency. I know you
have the most d i f f i c u l t s i t u a t i o n . fe)
We also need t o ensure t h a t when the new KFOR commander takes
over, the t r a n s i t i o n i s smooth so we don't send a s i g n a l o f
weakness t o M i l o s o v i c .
We need to do more t o counter e x t r e m i s t
elements among Kosovar Albanians. We sent two o f our people w i t h
the best connections there t h i s weekend t o d e l i v e r t h a t message.
We a l s o need more p o l i c e . I know Madeleine has t a l k e d t o your
people about t h a t . We are increasing our c o n t r i b u t i o n by more
than 10 percent and we hope you can do the same. fe)
I am a l s o concerned about the status o f the UN operation, UNMIK.
They have been c r i p p l e d by funding shortages, and we have t o get
the resources there so Kouchner can succeed. I t h i n k the
appointment o f General Nash as the r e g i o n a l a d m i n i s t r a t o r i n
M i t r o v i c a w i l l help, and I am doing what I can do here t o
increase our c o n t r i b u t i o n . I hope you w i l l t h i n k about whether
there i s more t h a t you can do and we can push the EU t o disburse
the money even f a s t e r .
There i s also a r e g i o n a l conference l a t e r t h i s month t o finance
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e p r o j e c t s and reforms. I am ready t o pledge about
$500 m i l l i o n i f a l l the others are ready t o do t h e i r p a r t . Of
course, a t some p o i n t , we need t o address the s t a t u s o f Kosovo,
but r i g h t now our focus should be on g e t t i n g the o p e r a t i o n r i g h t
on e s t a b l i s h i n g s e c u r i t y , b u i l d i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s , and developing
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y among l o c a l leaders so we can have e l e c t i o n s l a t e r
t h i s f a l l . (€J
President Chirac: I a b s o l u t e l y agree w i t h t h i s a n a l y s i s . As
concerns the m i l i t a r y means, f i r s t o f a l l we have already__tali
the d e c i s i o n t o r e i n f o r c e our m i l i t a r y presence t h e r e . |
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
_ As concerns
m a t e r i a l assistance t o the region, we, w i t h i n the framework o f
the EU, are prepared t o face up to our share o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .
CITN L B A Y P O O O Y
LNO I R R H T C P
�An hour ago, we received Prodi, EU Chairman, i n my o f f i c e and
discussed t h i s matter p r e c i s e l y along the l i n e s you hoped f o r ,
From t h i s p o i n t o f view there i s no problem.
is d i f f i c u l t .
Last p o i n t , I t h i n k the Contact Group should meet
r e g u l a r l y once again. fG-)
The President: Well, f i r s t o f
e l e c t i o n s should be f i r s t , and
a l l your a l l i e s recognize t h a t
problem. Everyone should take
President Chirac:
a l l , I agree t h a t municipal
I t h i n k t h a t i t ' s important t h a t
M i t r o v i c a i s not j u s t a French
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . f€-)
That's what you d i d . (U)
The President: And I agree on the Contact Group. I t h i n k we
ought t o i n c l u d e Russia. P u t i n wants t o be a c o n s t r u c t i v e
p l a y e r . We w i l l f o l l o w up on a l l these t h i n g s . fG-)
The President:
Thank you. Hope t o see you soon.
President Chirac:
Good bye.
(U)
End o f Conversation
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Goodbye. (U)
�NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
1
2
4
W A S H I N G T O N , D.C. 2 0 5 0 4
A p r i l 5, 2000
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
FROM:
IAN A. BOWLES/?^)
r
SUBJECT:
P r e s i d e n t i a l L e t t e r s t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r ,
C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder and P r e s i d e n t P r o d i on
C l i m a t e Change
I n response t o a weekly r e p o r t i t e m from George Frampton t h a t
r e f e r e n c e d t h e f i n d i n g s o f a r e c e n t a Pew Center on G l o b a l
C l i m a t e Change r e p o r t h i g h l i g h t i n g t h e economic e f f i c i e n c y o f
greenhouse gas emissions t r a d i n g , t h e P r e s i d e n t wrote a m a r g i n a l
note s a y i n g " s h o u l d send t h i s w i t h cover l e t t e r from me t o Tony
B l a i r and o t h e r EU l e a d e r s . "
Your memo responds t o the P r e s i d e n t ' s request and p r o v i d e s cover
l e t t e r s t o B l a i r , Schroeder and P r o d i f o r h i s s i g n a t u r e . We
recommend these t h r e e r e c i p i e n t s f o l l o w i n g c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h
S t a t e . As a p o i n t o f i n t e r e s t , the Pew Center i s d i r e c t e d by
E i l e e n Claussen, f o r m e r l y o f NSC/Environment d i r e c t o r a t e .
I have r e v i s e d t h e l e t t e r s based on comments from Jim S t e i n b e r g .
The l e t t e r s are not t i m e s e n s i t i v e .
The NSC r e c e i v e d a copy P r e s i d e n t ' s
1999
Concurrence by:
weekly report on January 10,
3 6 fee
*
C a r o l i n e Krass, Antony B l i n k e n *
RECOMMENDATION
That you s i g n the a t t a c h e d memorandum a t Tab I
Attachment
Tab I Memorandum t o the P r e s i d e n t
Tab A L e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Tab B L e t t e r t o P r e s i d e n t P r o d i
Tab C L e t t e r t o C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder
Tab D M a r g i n a l note on George Frampton's weekly r e p o r t
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
2
�THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear M r . P
Knowing o u r shared i n t e r e s t i n g l o b a l clime
change, I have enclosed a r e p o r t on t h e
b e n e f i t s o f greenhouse gas emissions t r a c i n g .
As you know, I f e e l s t r o n g l y t h a t a
emissions t r a d i n g system r e p r e s e n t s M I T best
hope t o c o s t - e f f e c t i v e l y meet t h e gmallenqe o f
c l i m a t e change. T h i s new r e p o r t my t h e nonp r o f i t Pew Center on G l o b a l C l i r n ^ e Change
s u p p o r t s t h e view t h a t a f l e x i h ^ , w e l l
designed t r a d i n g system w i l l y g n i f i c a n t l y
reduce t h e c o s t s o f c l i m a t e cmanqe m i t i g a t i o n .
The s t u d y a l s o b u i l d s on a airowing body o f
l i t e r a t u r e ( i n c l u d i n g a r e d o r t l a s t year by t h e
OECD) showing t h a t t r a d i n g w i l l p a r t i c u l a r l y
b e n e f i t i n d u s t r i a l i z e d i ^ ^ i n t r i e s f o r whom
greenhouse gas abatemeiy i s r e l a t i v e l y
expensive,
I a p p r e c i a t e your ^ E o r t s , and those o f your
member c o u n t r i e s , Jto b u i l d an e f f e c t i v e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l /te^ponse t o one o f t h e most
c h a l l e n g i n g i f e s j ^ s o f t h i s new c e n t u r y . I know
our governmejpity can work t o g e t h e r t o achieve
a d d i t i o n a l .pygress at. the c l i m a t e change
conferenc^''
The Hague. I l o o k f o r w a r d t o
d i s c u s s i h ' g ^ h i s c r i t i c a l m a t t e r w i t h you
further..,
Sincerely,
His E x c e l l e n c y
Romano P r o d i
P r e s i d e n t o f t h e European Commission
Brussels
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�T H E W H I T E HOUSE
WASHINGTON
[V— ^ r \ f
Dear Tony:
.
// , - ^ f l
' ^ j ^ ^ ^ — T " t h o u g h t you would be i n t e r e s t e d i n t h ^
e n c l o s e d r e p o r t j o n t h e b e n e f i t s o f grej^ihouse
gas emissions t r a d i n g .
As you know, I f e e s t r o n g l y t h a t J g g l o b a l
1
emissions t r a d i n g system r e p r e s e n t s our best
hope -i^S^meetIftg t he c h a l l e n g e JPr c l i m a t e
change.(gost-ef f ect i v e l y j ) T h i a r
r e p o r t by
the n o n - p r o f i t Pew Center on^Global C l i m a t e
Change s u p p o r t s t h e view t j p t a f l e x i b l e , w e l l
designed t r a d i n g s ystem ^ j r l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y
reduce t h e c o s t s o f c l i m a t e change m i t i g a t i o n ,
Tn a d r i i f i n n , "^he s t u d v w o u i l d s on a growing body
of l i t e r a t u r e ( i n c l u j f f n g a r e p o r t l a s t year by
the OECD) showing
t trading w i l l
p a r t i c u l a r l y bene 't i n d u s t r i a l i z e d c o u n t r i e s
f o r whom greenho e gas abatement i s r e l a t i v e l y
expensive.
n e w
I a p p r e c i a t e Jpour e f f o r t s , and those o f your EU
p a r t n e r s , t o r b u i l d an e f f e c t i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l
response t<y one o f t h e most c h a l l e n g i n g issues
o f t h i s nafw c e n t u r y . I know our governments
can w o r k i c o g e t h e r t o achieve a d d i t i o n a l
p r o g r e s j f a t t h e c l i m a t e change conf erence--iat-e-r..
t i & s - ^ w k r ^ a t £Vie Hague. I l o o k f o r w a r d t o
d i s e a s i n g these- c r i t i c a l m a t t e r ^ w i t h you t h i s
spryg.
With best r e g a r d s .
The R i g h t Honorable
Tony B l a i r , M.P.
Prime M i n i s t e r
London
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�THE WHITE HOUSE
/
WASHINGTON
c
Dear Mr. P r e s i d e n t :
I thought you would be i n t e r e s t e d / i n the
enclosed report on the b e n e f i t s j p i greenhouse
gas emissions t r a d i n g .
As you know, I f e e l strongl]^(fthat a global
emissions t r a d i n g system rey^resents our best
hope f o r meeting the challiEnge of climate
change c o s t - e f f e c t i v e l y . T h i s new report by
the n o n - p r o f i t Pew Centjrc on Global Climate
Change supports the vi/w t h a t a f l e x i b l e , w e l l
designed t r a d i n g syst/m w i l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y
reduce the costs of / l i m a t e change m i t i g a t i o n .
In a d d i t i o n , the st^dy b u i l d s on a growing body
of l i t e r a t u r e (inc/uding a report l a s t year by
the OECD) showingfthat t r a d i n g w i l l
p a r t i c u l a r l y benjefit i n d u s t r i a l i z e d countries
for whom greentylouse gas abatement i s r e l a t i v e l y
expensive.
I appreciatefyour e f f o r t s , and those of your
member couiytries, t o b u i l d an e f f e c t i v e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l response t o one of the most
challenging issues of t h i s new century. I know
our govolrnments can work together t o achieve
a d d i t i ^ a l progress a t the climate change
conference l a t e r t h i s year at .?he Hague. I
l o o p forward t o discussing these c r i t i c a l
ma/ters w i t h you f u r t h e r .
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Romano Prodi
President of the European Commission
Brussels
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Gerhard:
I thought you would be i n t e r e s j id i n the
enclosed report on the benefij of greenhouse
gas emissions t r a d i n g .
As you know, I f e e l strongiPy t h a t a global
emissions t r a d i n g system Represents our best
hope f o r meeting the challenge of climate
change c o s t - e f f e c t i v e l y * * This new report by
the n o n - p r o f i t Pew Cen/er on Global Climate
Change supports the v/evi t h a t a f l e x i b l e , well
designed t r a d i n g syyem w i l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y
reduce the costs o y c l i m a t e change m i t i g a t i o n .
In a d d i t i o n , the sZudy b u i l d s on a growing body
of l i t e r a t u r e ( i n / l u d i n g a report l a s t year by
the OECD) showin/ that t r a d i n g w i l l
p a r t i c u l a r l y bej/efit i n d u s t r i a l i z e d countries
for whom greenl^buse gas abatement i s r e l a t i v e l y
expensive.
I appreciata^your e f f o r t s , and those of your EU
partners, t / b u i l d an e f f e c t i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l
response t d one o f the most challenging issues
of t h i s n/w century. I know our governments
can work/together t o achieve a d d i t i o n a l
progresy a t the climate change conference l a t e r
t h i s y/ar at £he Hague. I look forward t o
discu/sing these c r i t i c a l matters w i t h you t h i s
sprj/g.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Gerhard Schroeder
Chancellor of the
Federal Republic of Germany
Berlin
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�THE
WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Gerhard:
I w r i t e w i t h regard t o global cl#hate/change.
Given our common i n t e r e s t i n thM subject, I am
sending you a copy o f a recent/t'ew/Center on
Global Climate Change report dn. g/eenhouse gas
emissions t i ing,
'
/
The r e p o r t emphasfx^s t h a t ^ n / e m i s s i o n s t r a d i n g
system t h a t i s globa^v i n seoj/e and f l e x i b l e i n
a p p l i c a t i o n w i l l signiMc^inlrly reduce the costs
of c l i m a t e change mitigaAiafn. Minimizing costs
w i l l not only promote c/mpSUance w i t h our
emissions r e d u c t i o n t
but w i l l also
allow us t o move more
ress^ively over the
long term t o address
.s chal\enge. The study
b u i l d s on a growing ojdy o f l i t e r a t u r e
( i n c l u d i n g l a s t ye
OECD reports! t h a t shows
t r a d i n g can benefi
iropean countries and
other nations f o r
m greenhouse gasN^batement
i s r e l a t i v e l y ex
ive.
I hope we can w^rfe together t o address t h e s ^
important issues/and set the tone f o r close
c o o r d i n a t i o n Weltween our governments i n the
lead-up t o t l ^ /climate change conference a t The
Hague l a t e r A h L s year. I look forward t o
discussing these issues w i t h you t h i s spring.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Gerhard Schroeder
Chancellor o f the
Federal Republic o f Germany
Berlin
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�THE W H I T E HOUSE
Lie
WASHINGTON
Dear Mr. President:
I w r i t e w i t h regard t o global climate/change.
Given our common i n t e r e s t i n the apbgect, I am
sending you a^copy o f a recent Pgw/Center on
Global CIimatexchange r e p o r t on^teenhouse gas
emissions tradinc
The r e p o r t emphasizes t h a t
/emissions t r a d i n g
system t h a t i s global^ i n sdbr/e and f l e x i b l e i n
a p p l i c a t i o n w i l l s i g n r f i c a j i t r l y reduce the costs
of c l i m a t e change m i t i g a t i o n . Minimizing costs
w i l l not only promote ccflKm-iance w i t h our
emissions reduction targec^, but w i l l also
allow us t o move more Aggressively over the
long term t o address Jthi/s challenge. The study
b u i l d s on a growing J^ody o f i i t e r a t u r e
( i n c l u d i n g l a s t yeap's/oECD report) that shows
t r a d i n g can benefijC European couiitries and
other nations forfwhfom greenhouse\qas abatement
i s r e l a t i v e l y ex/ei/sive.
I hope we can worhi together t o address these
important issjees/ and set the tone f o r close
coordinationAiexween our governments i n the
lead-up t o Ipe climate change conference at The
Hague l a t e y t h i s year.
look forward t o
discussinc/these issues w i t h you t h i s spring.
S
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Romano Prodi
President of the Europeaii Commission
Brussels
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP Y
�THE WHITE HOUSE
S
WASHINGTON
J
Dear Tony:
I write with regard to global climate, chanaie. Given our common
interest in the subject,. I am sending you/a copy of a recent Pew
Center on Global Climate Change report OJL greenhouse gas
emissions trading.
g
The r e p o r t emphasizes t h a t an emissiaps t r a d i n g system t h a t i s
global i n scope and f l e x i b l e i n a p p l i c a t i o n w i l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y
reduce the costs of climate changajpnitigation. Minimizing costs
w i l l not only promote c o m p l i a n c e g i t h our emissions reduction
t a r g e t s , but w i l l also allow us JLO move more aggressively over
the long term t o address t h i s challenge. The study b u i l d s on a
growing body of l i t e r a t u r e (irvcluding l a s t year's OECD report)
t h a t shows t r a d i n g can b e n e f i t European countries and other
nations f o r whom greenhouse gas abatement i s r e l a t i v e l y
expensive.
/
Numerous s t i es also makjp clea
and unresj i c t e d the t r a d i n g ^ y s t
'ty
As you Jmow, the flexibjQrlTty mechani
Kyoto^Trotocol also
tremendous
ou^oroader e f f o r
promote e
mergy developi;
i i / developing c o u n t r i e s .
the
I hope we can work/:ogether t o address these important issues
close coordination between our governments
and set the tone
i n the lead-up t$ the climate change conference a t The Hague
I look forward t o discussing these issues w i t h
l a t e r t h i s year
you t h i s sprinc
i
With best regards,
The R i c r f l t H o n o r a b l e
Tony ^ f a i r , M . P .
Prime M i n i s t e r
London
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP i
�THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Mr. President:
I w r i t e w i t h regard t o global climate change. G^en our common
i n t e r e s t i n the subject, I am sending you a c o t # of a recent Pew
Center on Global Climate Change report on greenhouse gas
emissions t r a d i n g .
The r e p o r t emphasizes t h a t an emissions t r a d i n g system t h a t i s
global i n scope and f l e x i b l e i n applicayfon w i l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y
reduce the costs o f climate change i n i t i a t i o n . Minimizing costs
w i l l not only promote compliance with^our emissions reduction
t a r g e t s , but w i l l also allow us to vpve more aggressively over
the long term t o address t h i s challenge. The study b u i l d s on a
growing body o f l i t e r a t u r e ( i n c i t i n g l a s t year's OECD r e p o r t )
t h a t shows t r a d i n g can b e n e f i t ^ u r o p e a n countries and other
nations f o r whom greenhouse g ^ abatement i s r e l a t i v e l y
expensive.
studies also mate/clear t h a t thejaroader, more open,
ricted the tdfac^fng system, tbe greater t h e j ^ n e f i t s .
enow, the f l ^ x i b ^ i t y mechap^ms being des^gfied under the
Protocol a^so have tremen^kms p o t e n t i a l > 0 c o n t r i b u t e t o
broader ef-forts
promote energy e f f i g i ^ n c y and cleaner
Energy development i f developing countries.
I hope we can workAtogether t o address these important issues
and set the tone, .or close coordination between our governments
i n the lead-up
the climate change conference a t The Hague
l a t e r t h i s yeaj
I look forward t o discussing these issues w i t h
you t h i s spring.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Romano Prodi
President o f the European Commission
Brussels
EincrlNqsiire
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Gerhard:
I w r i t e w i t h regard t o global climate
i n t e r e s t i n the subject, I am sending
Center on Global Climate Change repoj
emissions t r a d i n g .
Lnge. Given our common
)U a copy o f a recent Pew
on greenhouse gas
The r e p o r t emphasizes t h a t an emissions t r a d i n g system t h a t i s
global i n scope and f l e x i b l e i n ^ p l i c a t i o n w i l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y
reduce the costs o f climate chadge m i t i g a t i o n . Minimizing costs
w i l l not only promote complianj^ w i t h our emissions reduction
t a r g e t s , but w i l l also allow jfs t o move more aggressively over
the long term t o address t h ^ challenge. The study b u i l d s on a
growing body of l i t e r a t u r e ^ i n c l u d i n g l a s t year's OECD r e p o r t )
t h a t shows t r a d i n g can b e r p f i t European countries and other
nations f o r whom greenhoi^jle gas abatement i s r e l a t i v e l y
expensive.
Numerous st^Klies also
and u n r e s t r i c t e d the
As you/lcnow, the f l e i
Kyoto Protocol alsq.
broader e f f o j
to
'energy developlfientj i n
r
take c l ^ a f ' t h a t the broad
rad^iig syst
i t y mechani
tremendous
promote em
developing c o u n t r i e s .
I hope we can WOJ/IC together t o address these important issues
and set the tonw f o r close coordination between our governments
i n the lead-upJto the climate change conference at The Hague
l a t e r t h i s y e ^ . I look forward t o discussing these issues w i t h
you t h i s s p r ^
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Gerhard Schroeder
Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany
Berlin
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�1242
THE WHITE HOUSE
i 0
^.36
WASH INGTON
A p r i l 10, 2000
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRE^IpENT
FROM:
SAMUEL R. BERG
SUBJECT:
Cover L e t t e r s t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r , P r e s i d e n t
P r o d i and C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder f o r T r a n s m i t t a l o f
Pew Center on G l o b a l C l i m a t e Change Report on
C l i m a t e Change
Purpose
To t r a n s m i t t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r , P r e s i d e n t P r o d i , and
C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder a r e p o r t on greenhouse gas emissions
t r a d i n g by t h e Pew Center on G l o b a l C l i m a t e Change.
Background
You made a m a r g i n a l note on George Frampton's weekly r e p o r t t o
send t h e r e f e r e n c e d r e p o r t t o Tony B l a i r and t h e EU l e a d e r s h i p
w i t h a cover l e t t e r from you. The l e t t e r s you r e q u e s t e d a r e
attached.
The Pew Center r e p o r t a s s e r t s t h a t a worldwide greenhouse gas
emissions t r a d i n g program can c u t t h e c o s t s o f r e d u c i n g
greenhouse gas emissions n e a r l y i n h a l f . The r e p o r t found t h a t
w i t h no t r a d i n g , r e t u r n i n g emissions t o 1990 l e v e l s by 2010
would c o s t t h e seven l a r g e s t i n d u s t r i a l c o u n t r i e s $111.6
billion.
With t r a d i n g o n l y among t h e seven Western i n d u s t r i a l
c o u n t r i e s and former Eastern b l p c c o u n t r i e s , t h e t o t a l c o s t o f
t h e emissions r e d u c t i o n s f a l l s by $20 b i l l i o n .
I f trading i s
w o r l d w i d e i n scope, t h e savings from t r a d i n g r i s e t o $49
billion.
The EU has proposed a s e t o f "caps" on emissions t r a d i n g
mechanisms (e.g. t h a t o n l y 50 p e r c e n t o f emissions r e d u c t i o n s
c o u l d be a c h i e v e d t h r o u g h t r a d i n g ) under t h e Kyoto P r o t o c o l t h a t
would d r i v e up t h e c o s t o f a c h i e v i n g emissions r e d u c t i o n s . The
U n i t e d S t a t e s opposes any such caps on t r a d i n g .
Your l e t t e r
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
-
S ^ / ™ ^
�h i g h l i g h t s the m e r i t s o f u n r e s t r i c t e d t r a d i n g i n l i g h t o f t h e
r e p o r t ' s f i n d i n g s , and urges c l o s e c o o r d i n a t i o n between t h e
U n i t e d S t a t e s and t h e EU on these i s s u e s .
RECOMMENDATION
That you s i g n the a t t a c h e d l e t t e r s a t Tabs A, B, and C.
Attachments
Tab A L e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Tab B L e t t e r t o P r e s i d e n t P r o d i
Tab C L e t t e r t o C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder
Tab D M a r g i n a l note on George Frampton's weekly r e p o r t
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�THE WHITE HOUSE
('
WASHINGTON
A p r i l 11, 2000
Dear Gerhard:
Knowing our shared i n t e r e s t i n global climate
change, I have enclosed a report on the
b e n e f i t s o f greenhouse gas emissions t r a d i n g .
As you know, I f e e l s t r o n g l y t h a t a global
emissions t r a d i n g system represents our best
hope t o c o s t - e f f e c t i v e l y meet the challenge of
climate change. This new report by the nonp r o f i t Pew Center on Global Climate Change
supports the view t h a t a f l e x i b l e , w e l l
designed t r a d i n g system w i l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y
reduce the costs o f climate change m i t i g a t i o n .
The study also b u i l d s on a growing body of
l i t e r a t u r e ( i n c l u d i n g a report l a s t year by the
OECD) showing t h a t t r a d i n g w i l l p a r t i c u l a r l y
b e n e f i t i n d u s t r i a l i z e d countries f o r whom
greenhouse gas abatement i s r e l a t i v e l y
expensive.
I appreciate your e f f o r t s , and those of your EU
partners, t o b u i l d an e f f e c t i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l
response t o one of the most challenging issues
of t h i s new century. I know our governments
can work together t o achieve a d d i t i o n a l
progress a t the climate change conference a t
The Hague. I look forward t o discussing t h i s
c r i t i c a l matter w i t h you t h i s spring.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Gerhard Schroeder
Chancellor o f the
Federal Republic of Germany
Berlin
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�THE WHITE HOUSE
I"!
WASHINGTON
A p r i l 11, 2000
Dear Romano:
Knowing our shared i n t e r e s t i n global climate
change, I have enclosed a report on the
b e n e f i t s o f greenhouse gas emissions t r a d i n g .
As you know, I f e e l s t r o n g l y t h a t a global
emissions t r a d i n g system represents our best
hope t o c o s t - e f f e c t i v e l y meet the challenge of
climate change. This new report by the nonp r o f i t Pew Center on Global Climate Change
supports the view that a f l e x i b l e , w e l l
designed t r a d i n g system w i l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y
reduce the costs o f climate change m i t i g a t i o n .
The study also b u i l d s on a growing body o f
l i t e r a t u r e ( i n c l u d i n g a report l a s t year by the
OECD) showing t h a t t r a d i n g w i l l p a r t i c u l a r l y
b e n e f i t i n d u s t r i a l i z e d countries f o r whom
greenhouse gas abatement i s r e l a t i v e l y
expensive.
I appreciate your e f f o r t s , and those of your
member c o u n t r i e s , t o b u i l d an e f f e c t i v e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l response t o one o f the most
challenging issues o f t h i s new century. I know
our governments can work together t o achieve
a d d i t i o n a l progress a t the climate change
conference a t The Hague. I look forward t o
discussing t h i s c r i t i c a l matter w i t h you
further.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Romano Prodi
President o f the European Commission
Brussels
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCur
�THE WHITE HOUSE
r
WASHINGTON
i
A p r i l 11, 2000
Dear Tony:
Knowing o u r shared i n t e r e s t i n g l o b a l c l i m a t e
change, I have enclosed a r e p o r t on t h e
b e n e f i t s o f greenhouse gas emissions t r a d i n g .
As you know, I f e e l s t r o n g l y t h a t a g l o b a l
emissions t r a d i n g system r e p r e s e n t s our best
hope t o c o s t - e f f e c t i v e l y meet t h e c h a l l e n g e o f
c l i m a t e change. T h i s new r e p o r t by t h e nonp r o f i t Pew Center on G l o b a l Climate Change
s u p p o r t s t h e view t h a t a f l e x i b l e , w e l l
designed t r a d i n g system w i l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y
reduce t h e c o s t s o f c l i m a t e change m i t i g a t i o n .
The study a l s o b u i l d s on a growing body o f
l i t e r a t u r e ( i n c l u d i n g a r e p o r t l a s t year by t h e
OECD) showing t h a t t r a d i n g w i l l p a r t i c u l a r l y
b e n e f i t i n d u s t r i a l i z e d c o u n t r i e s f o r whom
greenhouse gas abatement i s r e l a t i v e l y
expensive.
I a p p r e c i a t e your e f f o r t s , and those o f your EU
p a r t n e r s , t o b u i l d an e f f e c t i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l
response t o one o f t h e most c h a l l e n g i n g i s s u e s
of t h i s new c e n t u r y . I know our governments
can work t o g e t h e r t o achieve a d d i t i o n a l
p r o g r e s s a t t h e c l i m a t e change conference a t
The Hague. I l o o k f o r w a r d t o d i s c u s s i n g t h i s
c r i t i c a l m a t t e r w i t h you t h i s s p r i n g .
With best r e g a r d s ,
The R i g h t Honorable
Tony B l a i r , M.P.
Prime M i n i s t e r
London
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�GECRET
3235
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h B r i t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
PARTICIPANTS:
(U)
The President
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Notetakers: Jenny McGee, Michael Manning,
Robert W i l l i a m s , Matthew S i b l e y , Don G e n t i l e ,
Richard Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
May 10, 2000, 5:45 - 6:02 p.m. EDT
Army-Navy Country Club
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
The President:
Hey Tony.
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
The President:
Hi B i l l .
(U)
(U)
We've h i t a snag.
Yes, we sure have.
£6}
f&)
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
This i s as much t o get your thoughts and advice, B i l l .
I'm s o r r y
f o r t r o u b l i n g you. This i s the s i t u a t i o n . When Trimble l a s t
went t o h i s U l s t e r U n i o n i s t Council, they passed a r e s o l u t i o n
t h a t s a i d they couldn't go back i n t o the Executive again unless
he r e t a i n e d the name o f the RUC i n some way.
The President: Yes, I saw i t .
resolution.
fG}
I even got a copy o f t h e
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
GDCRBT
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y on: 5/11/10
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
CLINTON LB A Y P O O O Y
IRR HTCP
�CECRET
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
The President: Yes, what I t h i n k , what I'm concerned about and
what t h e SDLP i s a l s o concerned about i s t h a t t h e u n i o n i s t s w i l l
c a l l i t RUC and the C a t h o l i c s won't j o i n i t . I t h i n k t h e SDLP i s
w o r r i e d t h e r e won't be any C a t h o l i c s t o j o i n because t h e
u n i o n i s t s w i l l use t h i s t o r e f e r t o themselves as RUC. fe}
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
The President: Let me t e l l you what bothers me about your
difficulties.
I worry t h a t i f you put t h i s l e g i s l a t i o n through
l i k e t h i s and Sinn Fein withdraws t h e i r o f f e r , we are worse o f f
than i f we're i n a stalemate and we j u s t h o l d t h e IRA t o t h e i r
o f f e r . Ever since t h e l a s t impasse, I thought t h e u n i o n i s t s had
the complete h i g h ground. Now i t looks t o me l i k e the IRA and
Sinn Fein have t h e h i g h ground, e s p e c i a l l y i f the SDLP s t i c k s
w i t h them r h e t o r i c a l l y .
I f you can't get t h i s done, the question
i s , what do you want t o give up r i g h t now? I'm very w o r r i e d
about i t . We can t r y again, but we've been working on Sinn Fein
a l l day and we haven't g o t t e n any f u r t h e r than you. Now they
want t o change the Patten r e p o r t , t h a t ' s t h e i r p e r s p e c t i v e . I
know what t h e counter-arguments are; i t ' s a lousy deal e i t h e r
way.
E i t h e r way, I f e e l so badly f o r you. The o n l y t h i n g t h a t
bothers me i s the SDLP. No matter what the u n d e r t a k i n g i s , the
u n i o n i s t s would continue t o r e f e r t o i t i n t h a t way i n every nono f f i c i a l channel p o s s i b l e and t h a t would keep the C a t h o l i c s from
joining.
The p r a c t i c a l problem i s they're two hardheaded sides
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p o u r i n g o l d grudges i n t o l i t t l e words. We can t a l k t o them
again, b u t I have next t o no hope t h e y ' l l change and i f they
don't, what's c o n f r o n t i n g you i s what you're b e t t e r o f f g i v i n g
up. I ' d r e a l l y be w o r r i e d i f these IRA guys withdraw t h e i r o f f e r
before we p u t i t on t h e t a b l e . Would you want something e l s e , a
t i t f o r t a t deal? Any way, can you buy y o u r s e l f another 24 hours
to keep working on t h i s ? ( &
-)
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
The President: I ' l l keep t h i n k i n g about i t some more t o come up
w i t h a n y t h i n g e l s e . I r e a l l y have only been pondering i t f o r
about 3 0 minutes because I thought i t would g e t worked o u t . Our
guys pounded Sinn Fein today. fG}
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
p o s i t i o n . f€4-
They f e e l they're i n a v e r y s t r o n g
The President: Yes, they f i n a l l y got t h e h i g h ground back. I
know t h e I r i s h community here was so r e l i e v e d when t h e IRA s a i d
t h a t they would commit themselves t o p u t arms beyond use; before
t h a t , t h e I r i s h here were i n t h e uncomfortable p o s i t i o n o f
f i n d i n g themselves d i s i l l u s i o n e d w i t h Sinn Fein. Now they f e e l
they k i n d o f came across and took a huge step forward. I am
sympathetic t o Trimble's p o s i t i o n , but I don't know what t o do
r i g h t now. I sure worry about t a k i n g t h e r i s k t h e IRA w i l l take
the o f f e r o f f t h e t a b l e and I don't know what I would do i f I
were you. f&}
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
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�CECRET
The President: That's why you t r y t o buy a l i t t l e time. Do you
t h i n k t h e r e i s any chance i f Trimble and Adams met, they could
work t h i s out? fe}
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
I w i l l t r y t o buy time.
would f i l l you i n on t h e s i t u a t i o n . fe}
I j u s t thought I
The President: Do you t h i n k t h a t i f Trimble and Adams met, they
could work i t out? fe}
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
them t o do t h a t .
I t ' s p o s s i b l e , and may be worth g e t t i n g
EQ 13526 1.4b. EO 13526 1.4d
The President: That's why I wondered. The problem i s i f they
had a meeting and i t leaked, then everyone would t r y t o s p i n t h e
crap out o f i t i f t h e r e was no r e s o l u t i o n . I t ' s t h e s o r t o f
t h i n g t h a t might work i f they looked a t each o t h e r face t o face,
assuming- no p r a c t i c a l impact and assuming you can work i t out
w i t h t h e C a t h o l i c s t o n o t refuse t o j o i n , o r even have Hume
t h e r e . They've been a t loggerheads f o r so long and come so f a r .
I t would be t r u l y h e a r t b r e a k i n g , since they made t h i s b i g move on
decommissioning. Maybe you could f i n d a way out o f i t , i f they
sat down and t a l k e d , maybe they could work t h i s out. I don't
know i f t h i s i s t r u e , I'm j u s t t h i n k i n g . fe}
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
I t ' s worth t r y i n g .
anything's worth t r y i n g . fG}
The P r e s i d e n t :
w i l l i n g ? fG}
To be honest,
Do you t h i n k you ought t o ask t o see i f they were
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
I do. fG}
The President: Do you t h i n k i t would be b e t t e r o r worse i f Hume
were there? f&}
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
The P r e s i d e n t : Yeah, I know. I f he has t h i s language, he can
say I'm d e c i d i n g the requirement has been s a t i s f i e d , and we are
going t o stand up t h e government. I f t h e language i s n o t i n
t h e r e , then he has t o a c t u a l l y c a l l them a l l back t o g e t h e r and
get another v o t e . fe}
3ECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�SECRET
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
E x a c t l y . fe}
The President: Well, l e t me t a l k t o our guys about t h i s and
t h i n k about whether you want t o ask them t o get t o g e t h e r and have
anybody t h e r e , o r j u s t t h e two o f them alone i n a room t a l k i n g .
I t h i n k they b o t h r e a l i z e they have come a long way and they both
have u n r u l y elements i n t h e i r c o a l i t i o n s . I t would be a t r a v e s t y
t o l e t t h i s s l i p away now, and they might be able t o f i n d an
answer among themselves t h a t we haven't thought o f . They know
t h e i r needs b e t t e r than we t h i n k we know t h e i r needs. fe}
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
The President:
Yes. fe}
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
I can't b e l i e v e there's not a l e g a l way o r
u n d e r t a k i n g capable o f e l i m i n a t i n g t h a t problem. fe}
The P r e s i d e n t : Let me ask you t h i s -- t h e u n i o n i s t s , when they
passed t h i s r e s o l u t i o n , what d i d they have i n mind? They
b a s i c a l l y d i d n ' t want t o erase t h e r o l e t h e RUC h i s t o r y played,
and pretend t h a t Northern I r e l a n d was independent and not a p a r t
of Great B r i t a i n ? fG}
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
The President: I wonder i f there's some way f o r Burhside t o work
out some s o r t o f statement t h a t would be s u f f i c i e n t l y r e a s s u r i n g
t o Sinn Fein, so they would be a b s o l u t e l y sure t h e C a t h o l i c s
would be comfortable j o i n i n g t h i s f o r c e . fe}
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
That's a p o s s i b i l i t y .
(£}
The P r e s i d e n t : I f they're not j u s t w o r r i e d about t h e words, b u t
the p r a c t i c a l impact, t h e r e might be some way f o r people t h a t
supported t h i s t o h e l p . That's another t h i n g I t h i n k t h a t works
on them. One o f t h e t h i n g s I learned about Adams and McGuinness,
they were very w o r r i e d t h a t t h e i r requirements would cause
Trimble t o f a l l .
I f you can get some o f these guys who caused
these problems t o help solve i t by some s o r t o f statement o r
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPV
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something, maybe even something else t h a t c o u l d be adopted t h a t
Trimble, g i v e n t h e support o f these guys, c o u l d take t o h i s
people, t h a t might a l s o work. There's a theology o f t h e words,
which you may not ever be able t o solve, and t h e p r a c t i c a l impact
of them, which you might be able t o solve, o r a t l e a s t some basis
on which Trimble c o u l d t a l k t o Adams and work t h i s o u t . My
i n s t i n c t i s t h i s seems t o be t h e r e a l l a s t straw and a s i t u a t i o n
where Adams might c l a i m t h a t Trimble i s t r y i n g t o change t h e
importance o f t h e Patten r e p o r t . Maybe t h a t ' s t h e answer. Maybe
the sponsors of t h i s r e s o l u t i o n could do something t h a t would
support Trimble and reassure Adams. That and having them meet
t o g e t h e r are t h e o n l y ideas I've got r i g h t now. I've had a
hundred conversations w i t h Gerry Adams and I c o u l d have another
one, b u t based on what my guys say, I t h i n k I ' d be b e t t e r o f f
c a l l i n g him and u r g i n g him t o meet p e r s o n a l l y w i t h Trimble and
u r g i n g t h e same t h i n g on Trimble. There are two t h i n g s t h e r e .
There i s psychology and theology, where Sinn Fein and t h e IRA
t h i n k they have t h e h i g h ground and then t h e r e i s t h e p r a c t i c a l ,
and I t h i n k , understandable f e a r t h a t no matter how you s l i c e
t h i s , t h e people who've been t h e dominant p a r t y w i l l f i n d a way
to use t h i s t o make i t very uncomfortable f o r t h e C a t h o l i c s t o be
a p a r t o f t h i s i n s t i t u t i o n , which w i l l undermine a l l t h e g r i e f
you've taken f o r l e t t i n g people out o f p r i s o n . fG}
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
I t h i n k there may be something i n t h a t .
The P r e s i d e n t : You want t o t h i n k about i t and I ' l l have my
people be i n touch w i t h your guys? I know i t ' s l a t e f o r you, b u t
i t ' s e a r l y here and I w i l l be up l a t e , so I can s t a r t e a r l y i n
the morning, i f you want. fG}
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r : That's very h e l p f u l ; t h e r e may be
something i n t h a t . fG}
The P r e s i d e n t : Talk t o your f o l k s and have them get back t o us
and i f you want me t o make c a l l s a t t h e crack o f dawn, I w i l l be
happy t o do t h a t . Get some r e s t . The worst t h i n g we can do i s
having everybody where they can't t h i n k anymore. I t ' s n o t so
l a t e f o r me and I've got a l o t o f work t o do, and I ' l l be happy
to do t h a t , so I can make t h e e a r l y morning c a l l . Let me know,
fe}
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
The P r e s i d e n t :
I ' l l l e t you know. (e}
Goodbye, Tony.
(U)
-- End o f Conversation --
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�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONriDENTIAL
3617
THE WHITE H O U S E
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h U l s t e r U n i o n i s t P a r t y Leader
David T r i m b l e (U)
PARTICIPANTS
The P r e s i d e n t
David T r i m b l e
N o t e t a k e r s : Amy Swarm, Sean T a r v e r , and
R i c h a r d Norland
May 27, 2000, 11:57-11:59 a.m. EDT
The Residence
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The
President
Hello.
Mr. T r i m b l e :
The
illo.
(U)
(U)
(U)
President
Mr. T r i m b l e :
The P r e s i d e n t
brilliant.
tyt]
Mr. Trimble: It is kind of unfortunate other people were
incensing their delegates, and there was more than a little bit
of dubious practices going on. There were some discrepancies in
the voting figures, and I have to see if we can't give ourselves
a bigger margin next time. (jt)
The
President:
Good.
I ' l l go back t o t h e o t h e r s on t h e CBMs.
t#
Mr.
Trimble:
Good.
I need a success s t o r y q u i c k l y .
(^T
The P r e s i d e n t : I w i l l go t o work on i t . But you were b r i l l i a n t .
I f o l l o w e d you on BBC and UTV. They may have t o g i v e you a
second Nobel Peace P r i z e .
^
Mr. T r i m b l e :
I t was q u i t e a weekend.
CONFIDDNTIAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y on: 5/30/10
(U)
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
•CONFIDENTIAL
2
The P r e s i d e n t : The w e i r d t h i n g about p o l i t i c s i s t h a t sometimes
you have t o t a k e more g r i e f from y o u r f r i e n d s than y o u r enemies.
Mr. T r i m b l e :
The P r e s i d e n t :
Yes.
W e l l , i t ' s good o f you t o c a l l .
Okay.
Thanks, f r i e n d .
(U)
-- End o f C o n v e r s a t i o n
•GOM-FTPFNTTftTi
--
(U)
�-eONFIDENTEAL
3 617
THE WHITE H O U S E
WASH I N G T O N
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Sinn F e i n Leader Gerry Adams (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The P r e s i d e n t
Gerry Adams
Notetakers:
Sean T a r v e r , Amy Swarm, and
R i c h a r d Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
May 27, 2000, 12:20-12:24 p.m. EDT
The Residence
The P r e s i d e n t :
Mr. Adams:
H i , Mr. P r e s i d e n t .
The P r e s i d e n t :
Mr. Adams:
H e l l o . (U)
(U)
Gerry, i t ' s been a good day. (U)
Good day, s u r e l y .
Thanks f o r a l l your h e l p .
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t : Glad we c o u l d do i t .
I'm r e a l l y pleased. I
hated t o see T r i m b l e have t o go back t o a l l h i s c r a z i e s , b u t i t
came o u t okay. ^ 0
Mr. Adams: I t c o n t i n u e s t o be. f r u s t r a t i n g and messy. David
T r i m b l e ' s l i n e about " h o u s e - t r a i n i n g " Sinn F e i n doesn't h e l p . I
can l i v e w i t h i t , b u t i t w i l l upset t h e r e p u b l i c a n c o n s t i t u e n c y .
The President: I saw all that, but we've just got to get the
government up and calm everybody down. (j?)
Mr. Adams: You're r i g h t about t h a t . I have a l s o been w o r k i n g on
Downing S t r e e t t o claw back t h e e m a s c u l a t i o n o f t h e P a t t e n
report.
I a c t u a l l y had t o t a l k t o Number 10 on Thursday n i g h t
because we almost l o s t t h e c o n f i d e n c e - b u i l d i n g measure on t h i s
i s s u e -- t h e IRA were v e r y c l o s e t o i s s u i n g a statement. Any
k i n d o f f o r m a l meeting and we would have l o s t i t . They a r e v e r y
c l e a r . 0?T
The President: I don't think this whole letter thing amounted to
anything. I think we will be all right. [p)
CONFIDENTS
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y on: 05/30/10
DECLASSIFIED
P E R E.O. 13526
iOl'i - OHTS.S/G/iS"
K6H
�CONriDDNTIAL
Mr. Adams:
Okay.
^5
Tbe President: I wanted t o t a l k t o everyone. The main t h i n g i s
to get the government up and keep moving forward on the Patten
Report and on CBMs. I t h i n k Trimble was j u s t traumatized by
having t o deal w i t h a l l those people. Sometimes i n p o l i t i c s our
f r i e n d s are our biggest problem.
Mr. Adams: I said so p u b l i c l y here, but once again we are at
t h i s p o i n t because of your unique understanding. I have been
saying t o people: l e t ' s make sure we get as much progress as we
can w h i l e you are i n the White House. I t i s no accident t h a t
t h i s has happened during your Presidency. Thanks again.
The President:
i t . (pi
Mr. Adams:
Yes. We've got almost e i g h t months, so we can do
We'll need you every day.
The President:
^
Have you given your commencement speech yet?
Mr. Adams: No, I w i l l be g i v i n g i t tomorrow morning.
again. (U)
The President.
Okay. Good bye.
CONFIDENTIAL
Thanks
Thanks f o r a l l your help.
-- End of Conversation --
CLINTON UBRARY PHOTOCOPY
(U)
(U)
�CONriDDNTIAL
3 617
THE WHITE H O U S E
WASH
INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern o f I r e l a n d
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
President C l i n t o n
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern
Notetakers:
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
Sean T a r v e r and Amy Swarm
May 27, 2000, 12:45-12:49 p.m. EDT
The Residence
The P r e s i d e n t :
Hello.
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
The P r e s i d e n t :
(U)
H e l l o , Mr. P r e s i d e n t .
(U)
Hey, B e r t i e . (U)
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
The P r e s i d e n t :
How a r e you, B i l l ?
Congratulations.
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
(U)
I t was a good day. (U)
I t was a good day i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d .
The President: Back on St. Patrick's Day, I was a little
worried, but I feel good now. (jtf
Prime Minister Ahern: Trimble worked hard. He had to rally
troops. But it was a good win, because people are with him.
Public opinion was 80 to 20 with him. We now have to get the
Executive up and make as much progress as we can. We need the
republicans and the IRA to make quick gestures, but the key issue
is the Patten issue. Seamus Mallon has come out strongly in
favor of serious amendments. If we don't get into position soon
where they are recommending Catholics to the RUC, then.... It
brings us forward from where we were. {flfT
The P r e s i d e n t :
We j u s t g o t t o g e t t h e government back up and g e t
those CBMs done t o o . That w i l l change e v e r y t h i n g .
The u n i o n i s t s
w i l l c o m p l e t e l y change t h e i r mood when t h a t happens[gap].
^
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
-coNriDENT^L
DecJassify'on?
DECLASSIFIED
1
5/30/10
^ O ^ ' o ^ n
SA/»5 K6V\
�Prime Minister Ahern: I think that has to happen quickly. The
pressure will be back on Trimble. If out of this he gets a quick
move on the CBMs, that will mean a lot. {£?)
The P r e s i d e n t :
Good.
(£0
Prime Minister Ahern: It is a good move. I don't know if anyone
mentioned it, but Mallon is worried about Patten and RUC, but if
we hold our nerve, we should be okay. (jZ)
The P r e s i d e n t :
I'll
call
Mallon.
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: Cheer him up. He i s g o i n g t o see Tony
B l a i r tomorrow, b u t j u s t t o g e t h i s c o n f i d e n c e up. How i s
e v e r y t h i n g w i t h you?
Campaigning?
The President: Hillary is doing well. I think she is going to
win that race. We've got two big issues this week -- China and
[gap] trying to pass the World AIDS initiative. I'm feeling kind
of good. ty?)
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
The P r e s i d e n t :
And Mbeki i s over w i t h you? (>Zl
Yes, he was here.
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
(U)
Give my regards t o H i l l a r y .
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t : I w i l l .
She was d o i n g g r e a t a g a i n s t G i u l i a n i and
now we have t o do a d i f f e r e n t race. A l had a good week. (U)
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: That's g r e a t . Thanks f o r t h e c a l l and a l l
y o u r work and i n t e r e s t .
You [gap] been o u t and we do a p p r e c i a t e
it.
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t :
Okay.
Keep i n t o u c h .
(U)
-- End o f C o n v e r s a t i o n
--
«OONP I DENT IAD
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CONriDENTIAL
3 617
THE WHITE H O U S E
WASH
INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d Assembly Deputy
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Seamus M a l l o n (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The P r e s i d e n t
Seamus M a l l o n
N o t e t a k e r s : Amy Swarm, Sean T a r v e r , and
Richard Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
May 27, 2000, 1:20-1:21 p.m.
The Residence
The P r e s i d e n t :
Mr. M a l l o n :
(U).
H e l l o , Mr. P r e s i d e n t .
The P r e s i d e n t :
Mr. M a l l o n :
Hello.
Seamus, how a r e you?
Very w e l l .
EDT
How a r e you?
(U)
(U)
(U)
The President: I'm doing fine. I'm just glad the government is
going back up and this is really important and a good sign. I
think it has been a tough time for you. I talked to Tony Blair
today, and he assured me that they are going to go ahead and
implement the Patten report. I think we need to get on with
work.
ijt)
Mr. M a l l o n :
full,
Yes.
We w i l l have t o make sure he implements i t i n
oe-y
The P r e s i d e n t : I t h i n k he w i l l . There a r e d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r him,
b u t I t h i n k he i s i n t e n t on d o i n g i t . Get t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s back
up and t h e n g e t t h e IRA t o do t h e CBMs as promised. (JZT
Mr. M a l l o n :
P a t t e n i s t h e key f a c t o r now.
The President:
I agree with that.
(pf
[pff
Mr. M a l l o n : I am seeing him tomorrow... s e e i n g B l a i r tomorrow and
I w i l l be g i v i n g him a s t r o n g message on i t . j^T"
wariDDHTiM.
Reason:
1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y on:
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
5/30/10
ffi^"?
2o\3 - C>M7>L - H
8/k/l5
K6H
�•CONF I DEMT I AL'
The President: Good. I will do what I can. I had a good talk
with him today. I told him you guys are worried about him
weakening it more, but he understands and I am hopeful, and just
wanted to say congratulations to you today and whatever I can do
to help, I will certainly do it.
tytf
Mr. M a l l o n : Thank you, Mr. P r e s i d e n t . We hope t o see you here
soon. I f you can make i t , you w i l l be v e r y welcome, and b r i n g
the g o l f c l u b s w i t h you. (U)
The P r e s i d e n t :
I w i l l do i t . (U)
Mr. M a l l o n : Thank you f o r e v e r y t h i n g you have done and we l o o k
f o r w a r d t o seeing you soon. (U)
The P r e s i d e n t :
Mr. M a l l o n :
Thanks, f r i e n d .
Thanks, B i l l .
(U)
W e ' l l be seeing you soon. (U)
-- End o f C o n v e r s a t i o n --
• COHF I DENT I Air
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPi
�
Dublin Core
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Title
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<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
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This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
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Clinton Presidential Records
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Declassified documents concerning Tony Blair
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2013-0472-M
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9/21/2015
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This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on Tony Blair, specifically on President Clinton's meetings and correspondence with the Prime Minister from 1997 through 2000. Material includes memos, letters, and talking points on a variety of topics, including Kosovo, Northern Ireland, and the European Union Summit. Telcons between President Clinton and various heads of state, including French President Jacques Chirac, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien, and Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams, are included.
Creator
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National Security Council
Records Management Office
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<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7388808">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
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Adobe Acrobat Document
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Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
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9/2/2015
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2013-0472-M
7388808
Declassified
Foreign Policy
Gerhard Schroeder
Gerry Adams
Jacques Chirac
Jean Chretien
Kosovo
Northern Ireland
Tony Blair
United Kingdom
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https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/70d92bdd6fa9f6ae2b6c5244cdfb734a.jpg
9484e849b62da8fdf51a4dc56c4339dd
Dublin Core
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Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
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1993-2001
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<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
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<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
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Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
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35mm Negative
Location
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Belfast, Northern Ireland
Color
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Color
Physical Dimensions
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35mm
Dublin Core
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Belfast Tree Lighting Ceremony
Creator
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Bob McNeely
Date
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11/30/1995
Identifier
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P34539-21
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594653
Description
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President Clinton poses for a photo with musiciam Van Morrison in Belfast, Northern Ireland
Provenance
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Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
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JPEG
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Unrestricted
Medium
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Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Photographs and other Graphic Materials
Source
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P34539_21_30NOV1995_H
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
Tree Lighting
Van Morrison
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/459357e7fce28ab4d59d7ceadaa313ac.jpg
a5bec88f3bd9e3d82d368ae02782a86e
Dublin Core
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Title
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Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
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<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
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Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
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Original Format
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35mm Negative
Location
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Belfast, Northern Ireland
Color
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Color
Physical Dimensions
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35mm
Dublin Core
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Belfast Tree Lighting Ceremony
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Bob McNeely
Date
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11/30/1995
Identifier
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P34539-16
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<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
<a href="https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/exhibits/show/rock/morrison">The Rock and Roll Beat: Musicians and White House Related Events</a>
Description
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President Clinton receives a gift from musician Van Morrison in Belfast, Northern Ireland
Provenance
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Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
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JPEG
Publisher
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William J. Clinton Library
Access Rights
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Unrestricted
Medium
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Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Photographs and other Graphic Materials
Source
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P34539_16_30NOV1995_H
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
Tree Lighting
Van Morrison
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/73b2bfaffdeb7fd8ab705faa963c93e3.jpg
a9fe0d4eff231e5e8f08215374cfc747
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
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Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
35mm Negative
Location
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Belfast, Northern Ireland
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Belfast Tree Lighting Ceremony
Creator
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Bob McNeely
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
11/30/1995
Identifier
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P34544-11a
Is Part Of
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594653
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton and Hillary Rodham Clinton pose for a photo with musician Van Morrison in Belfast, Northern Ireland
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
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JPEG
Publisher
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William J. Clinton Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
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Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Photographs and other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P34544_11A_30NOV1995_H
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland-Belfast
Tree Lighting
Van Morrison
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/16581db376221ea3ceef915f0600787c.pdf
f3f3da78fa9f5fb357abbd91e2f7c302
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Section 1.4 (d) of E.O. 13526.
�• O F I DENT IAL*
CM
DECL:OADR
0763
9303100
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
February 18, 1993
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
C l i f t o n Wharton, J r . , A c t
SUBJECT:
Meeting w i t h Prime M i n i s t e r John Major
of Great B r i t a i n
I.
SETTING
•
U.S.-UK t i e s remain u n i q u e l y c l o s e . But t h e end o f t h e
Cold War, t h e process o f European i n t e g r a t i o n , and t h e
s t r a i n o f p r o l o n g e d r e c e s s i o n a r e changing B r i t i s h as w e l l
as American p e r s p e c t i v e s , and our r e l a t i o n s w i t h each o t h e r .
•
B r i t a i n i s our most r e l i a b l e a l l y .
By p o l i c y and i n s t i n c t ,
the B r i t i s h w i l l h e l p us, i f t h e y can and i f we l e t them,
i n e v e r y area t h a t m a t t e r s —
defense and s e c u r i t y ,
t r a d e , t h e M i d d l e East, Russia and E a s t e r n Europe, t h e UN,
environment, and t h e f i g h t s a g a i n s t t e r r o r i s m and drugs.
•
Major's government i s no longer i n t h e p o l i t i c a l f r e e f a l l
of l a s t autumn. But i t s t i l l faces a b r u i s i n g b a t t l e f o r
p a r l i a m e n t a r y r a t i f i c a t i o n o f M a a s t r i c h t , and t h e
unaccustomed d i f f i c u l t i e s o f having o n l y a narrow Tory
m a j o r i t y i n t h e House o f Commons. N e a r l y t h r e e years o f
r e c e s s i o n have t a k e n t h e i r t o l l on B r i t i s h c o n f i d e n c e and
leadership.
•
Major's v i s i t t o Washington w i l l be s c r u t i n i z e d by press on
b o t h s i d e s o f t h e A t l a n t i c , which had a f i e l d day w i t h
r e p o r t s o f Tory involvement i n t h e Bush campaign and t h e
Home O f f i c e f i l e search. The Major government was
e x c o r i a t e d by T h a t c h e r i t e s and L a b o r i t e s a l i k e f o r s o u r i n g
the s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p .
•
Given t h i s i n a u s p i c i o u s b e g i n n i n g , Major's o v e r r i d i n g g o a l
f o r t h i s v i s i t i s t o e s t a b l i s h a r e l a t i o n s h i p o f t r u s t and
candor w i t h you, and t o be seen as having done so. Major
was g r a t e f u l t h a t you telephoned him t o d i s c u s s Bosnia, and
f o r t h e e a r l y i n v i t a t i o n t o Washington.
•
B r i t a i n sees i t s n u c l e a r power s t a t u s as v i t a l t o i t s
s t a n d i n g i n Europe and t h e w o r l d . Major w i l l want a
promise o f p r i o r c o n s u l t a t i o n b e f o r e any A d m i n i s t r a t i o n
d e c i s i o n s on n u c l e a r t e s t i n g or b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e defense.
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-2Major a l s o has some concerns about s t a t e m e n t s made d u r i n g
the campaign on UN S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l expansion, N o r t h e r n
I r e l a n d , and MFN f o r China. However, he i s pleased and
much r e a s s u r e d by our stance on Bosnia, which t r a c k s v e r y
c l o s e l y w i t h B r i t i s h t h i n k i n g and concerns.
Major w i l l be c a r e f u l not t o o v e r l o a d t h i s f i r s t meeting
w i t h t o o many i s s u e s . He w i l l focus on areas he t h i n k s
most u r g e n t l y r e q u i r e c l o s e c o o r d i n a t i o n , p r o b a b l y I r a q ,
former Y u g o s l a v i a , Russia, and t h e GATT Uruguay Round
n e g o t i a t i o n s . He suspects you may r a i s e N o r t h e r n
I r e l a n d . He w i l l touch a t l e a s t b r i e f l y on Hong Kong,
China and MFN.
II.
TOPICS
A f f i r m t h a t on most i m p o r t a n t i s s u e s B r i t i s h p o l i c y i s
s y n e r g e t i c w i t h our own, and t h a t c l o s e b i l a t e r a l
c o o p e r a t i o n i s e s s e n t i a l t o a c h i e v i n g o u r common
objectives.
Express a p p r e c i a t i o n f o r the courage and e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f
B r i t i s h t r o o p s i n Bosnia engaged i n h u m a n i t a r i a n r e l i e f .
E n l i s t Major's
a c t i v e h e l p i n our n e x t steps on Bosnia.
Lay out your views on key i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic issues
such as t h e Uruguay Round and G-7 p o l i c y c o o r d i n a t i o n .
Recognize Major's e f f e c t i v e n e s s i n p r o m o t i n g agreement on
the Uruguay Round, and s o l i c i t h i s c o n t i n u e d c o o p e r a t i o n .
Discuss c u r r e n t b i l a t e r a l economic i s s u e s , such as c i v i l
a v i a t i o n , s t e e l , and t h e proposed m i n i v a n r e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ,
C o n f i r m our support o f the t a l k s process i n N o r t h e r n
I r e l a n d , and d i s c u s s ways i n which we can be h e l p f u l .
Share your thoughts on the s i t u a t i o n i n Russia
Yeltsin's d i f f i c u l t i e s .
and on
A f f i r m t h a t we w i l l c o n t i n u e t o l o o k t o t h e B r i t i s h f o r
c l o s e c o o p e r a t i o n i n o b t a i n i n g I r a q ' s compliance w i t h a l l
UNSC r e s o l u t i o n s .
Exchange views on the broader i s s u e s o f European
i n t e g r a t i o n , the f u t u r e o f NATO, and the American presence
i n Europe.
Discuss approaches t o promoting d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n i n Hong
Kong and human r i g h t s i n China.
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UNITED KINGDOM: POLITICAL OVERVIEW
Prime M i n i s t e r Major v i s i t s Washington t h i s month w i t h h i s
country a t the bottom o f a long and d i f f i c u l t recession and h i s
countrymen i n a d i s t i n c t l y uneasy mood. Though the pressure on
Major has eased a b i t f o l l o w i n g a seemingly endless s t r i n g o f
t r o u b l e s l a s t f a l l , s t i f f challenges s t i l l loom:
Embarrassing i n q u i r i e s i n t o government handling o f coal mine
closures and o f sales o f arms-related equipment t o I r a q w i l l
soon come t o a head.
In A p r i l and May, a new l o c a l t a x scheme w i l l be introduced.
While undoubtedly f a i r e r than the hated " p o l l t a x " i t
replaces, i t w i l l h i t hard at Tory constituencies i n
southern England.
From now through at l e a s t May, several c o n t r o v e r s i a l
parliamentary committee votes could d e r a i l Maastricht t r e a t y
ratification.
The government must deal w i t h increasing parliamentary
concern about B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y entanglement i n Bosnia.
Major's government w i l l l i k e l y muddle through. Unlike Thatcher
i n 1990, Major gets along w e l l w i t h h i s Cabinet colleagues, and
so f a r faces no c r e d i b l e challenger. Tory rebels, however much
they may want t o block Maastricht, do not r e l i s h a snap e l e c t i o n
t h a t Labor might win. But Major also has a m a j o r i t y o f only 21,
not the 100 or so of the Thatcher years; h i s whips are only now
l e a r n i n g how t o handle t h i s r e a l i t y .
I f the government can r i d e out the Maastricht storm, and l i m i t
damage from the i n q u i r i e s and c o u n c i l tax, i t should be able t o
carry on a f u l l term.
(The next general e l e c t i o n must be held by
A p r i l 1997, and i s l i k e l y t o be i n spring or autumn 1996.)
Economic recovery, plus r e d i s t r i c t i n g , plus Labor's own woes,
might w e l l win t h e Tories an unprecedented f i f t h e l e c t i o n i n a
row.
Labor should be r i d i n g high but i t ' s not. I t s morale i s
c e r t a i n l y b e t t e r than s i x months ago, due i n no small p a r t t o the
Democratic win i n the U.S. But i t has not yet emerged as a t r u l y
c r e d i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e government. I t perhaps w i l l not be a
serious contender u n t i l i t reaches the f a r side o f an i n t e r n a l
p o l i c y debate t h a t has scarcely begun. Labor Party leader John
Smith i s not an i n s p i r i n g leader, and he has not used the mandate
of h i s sweeping v i c t o r y i n the July leadership e l e c t i o n t o take
command o f the p a r t y . Smith's g r a d u a l i s t approach t o preparing
for the next e l e c t i o n gives Major some breathing room.
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ECONOMIC SITUATION AND OUTLOOK
The B r i t i s h economy remains weak a f t e r three years o f recession
although i n d u s t r i a l i s t s ' confidence i s improving w i t h some signs
of stronger experts. Unemployment reached 10.5% of the labor
force i n December. Sharp declines i n house p r i c e s , and fears o f
job losses, have continued t o i n h i b i t consumer spending.
I n f l a t i o n f e l l t o a 1.7% r a t e i n the year t o January. Strong
speculative pressures forced s t e r l i n g ' s departure from the
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System
September 16. Since early September, s t e r l i n g has depreciated
about 16% against the DM and about 25% against the d o l l a r .
Taking the currencies of the UK's t r a d i n g partners as a whole,
s t e r l i n g has f a l l e n about 13% on a trade-weighted basis. This
s t e r l i n g d e c l i n e , and the expanding U.S. economy, should improve
the UK's export prospects s u b s t a n t i a l l y and help an economic
recovery t o begin l a t e r t h i s year. S t i l l , recovery w i l l be
modest u n t i l the UK's main t r a d i n g partners i n Europe r e g i s t e r
stronger growth — an uncertain prospect.
The budget d e f i c i t escalated t o an estimated 6.7% o f GDP i n 1992,
p a r t l y from c y c l i c a l f a c t o r s d r i v i n g the recession and p a r t l y
from e a r l i e r e f f o r t s t o s t i m u l a t e the economy by f i s c a l p o l i c y .
The high d e f i c i t w i l l severely c o n s t r a i n any e f f o r t t o use f i s c a l
p o l i c y f o r expansion purposes. Despite the recession, t h e
current account d e f i c i t i s too high ($20 b i l l i o n or 2% o f GDP
l a s t y e a r ) , r a i s i n g fears t h a t even a modest recovery would
expand e x t e r n a l d e f i c i t s t o even higher l e v e l s .
Public d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h the economy continues t o plague the
Major government, and s t r a i n s have developed w i t h i n the
Conservative m a j o r i t y over such issues as possible tax increases
t h i s s p r i n g t o reduce the budget d e f i c i t , and closure o f
uneconomic coal mines.
With f u r t h e r a c t i o n t o s t i m u l a t e recovery l i m i t e d by concerns
about s t e r l i n g , budget d e f i c i t s and worsening e x t e r n a l d e f i c i t s ,
the UK i s l e f t t o hope f o r recovery elsewhere i n Europe (e.g. by
an e a r l y s u b s t a n t i a l reduction i n German i n t e r e s t rates which
could then spread t o other c o u n t r i e s ) .
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PER E.O. 13526
British Sensitivity
Few issues have more p o t e n t i a l f o r c r e a t i n g problems i n AngloAmerican r e l a t i o n s than Northern. I r e l a n d .
The B r i t i s h regard i t as an i n t e r n a l matter.
They believe t h a t the U.S.
n a t i o n a l i s t perspective.
tends t o view i t from the
The extension of t e r r o r i s t campaigns t o England,
innocent loss of l i f e , and the t a r g e t i n g of B r i t a i n ' s
p o l i t i c a l leadership have made HMG s e n s i t i v e t o advice
from outside.
In Northern I r e l a n d , the President's campaign statements aroused
hopes i n the Catholic community and fears among the Unionists
t h a t the USG would weigh i n on the n a t i o n a l i s t side.
Status of the Talks
The p o l i t i c a l t a l k s , which broke o f f i n November without
agreement, contain three "strands" — devolved government i n
Northern I r e l a n d , r e l a t i o n s between North and South i n I r e l a n d ,
and t i e s between the UK and I r e l a n d .
The major stumbling blocks are: 1) who w i l l exercise
executive power i n Northern I r e l a n d , 2) Dublin's r o l e
i n Northern I r i s h a f f a i r s , and 3) the U n i o n i s t s ' demand
t h a t I r e l a n d r e v i s e i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l claim t o the
North.
Informal t a l k s continue and formal sessions may resume
soon. Dick Spring, the new I r i s h Foreign M i n i s t e r , i s
expected t o press f o r an agreement.
Terrorism
The l e v e l of violence (84 deaths i n 1992 i n Northern Ireland) i s
w e l l down from i t s 1972 peak of more than 450 deaths. Two recent
trends, however, are worrisome:
1) the increased p r o f i c i e n c y of
the l o y a l i s t (Protestant) p a r a m i l i t a r i e s , who caused more deaths
l a s t year than the IRA: 2) the IRA's bombing campaigns i n
Northern I r e l a n d and on the B r i t i s h mainland.
MacBride P r i n c i p l e s
B r i t i s h American groups have pressed f o r an investment code of
conduct c a l l e d the MacBride P r i n c i p l e s , modeled a f t e r the South
A f r i c a - r e l a t e d S u l l i v a n P r i n c i p l e s . You spoke favorably about
them d u r i n g the campaign. You should know, however, t h a t
generally among responsible leaders i n Northern I r e l a n d , the
P r i n c i p l e s have l i t t l e support because they impede u r g e n t l y
needed investment. The d i s t i n c t i o n i s drawn w i t h South A f r i c a
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because d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i s l e g a l there; i t i s i l l e g a l i n Northern
I r e l a n d . Major i s not l i k e l y t o raise the issue.
Human Rights
Human r i g h t s issues have become a key concern i n Northern
I r e l a n d . The issues transcend s p e c i f i c i n c i d e n t s and p o i n t t o a
p a t t e r n o f c o l l u s i o n between B r i t i s h s e c u r i t y forces and L o y a l i s t
f a c t i o n s as w e l l as an environment o f i n t i m i d a t i o n and fear.
Excessive force ( i n c l u d i n g "shoot t o k i l l " p r a c t i c e s ) , harassment
by s e c u r i t y forces (stopping people unnecessarily or conducting
a r b i t r a r y and d i s r u p t i v e house searches), u n f a i r d e t e n t i o n
(holding people f o r up t o seven days w i t h t r i a l ) and t r i a l s
without j u r i e s have been p r e v a l e n t .
Current cases i n Northern I r e l a n d w i t h human r i g h t s i m p l i c a t i o n s
(the f i r s t two are the most widely known):
Two Royal Marines were charged i n February 1992 w i t h
murder f o r the December 1990 k i l l i n g o f Fergal Caraher.
In February 1992 four acknowledged PIRA t e r r o r i s t s were
k i l l e d by s e c u r i t y forces s h o r t l y a f t e r having attacked
an RUC s t a t i o n i n Coalisland. Human r i g h t s groups
claimed t h a t excessive force was used and t h a t the men
could have been arrested rather than k i l l e d . The
p o l i c e are i n v e s t i g a t i n g whether the use o f force was
warranted.
In September 1992 Peter MacBride (no r e l a t i o n t o the
" P r i n c i p l e s " ) was shot and k i l l e d while running away
from an Army p a t r o l . Two s o l d i e r s have been charged
w i t h murder.
I n November 1992 Pierce Jordan was shot and k i l l e d by
p o l i c e a f t e r a car chase. A p o l i c e i n v e s t i g a t i o n has
begun, but no charges have been f i l e d .
At the Tab e n t i t l e d " L e t t e r s " are l e t t e r s from t h e House and the
Senate asking you t o raise the subject o f human r i g h t s i n
Northern I r e l a n d during the Major v i s i t .
Joe Doherty
Joe Doherty i s a PIRA member convicted i n 1981 of murdering a
B r i t i s h Army o f f i c e r i n Northern I r e l a n d . Just before the
c o n v i c t i o n was handed down, he escaped t o the U.S., where he was
picked up i n 1983 f o r immigration v i o l a t i o n s and remained i n j a i l
f o r almost nine years, while h i s case was being fought i n the
U.S. courts. A B r i t i s h e x t r a d i t i o n request was r e j e c t e d by a
D i s t r i c t Court judge on the grounds t h a t h i s offense was
p o l i t i c a l . The USG then attempted t o deport him f o r having
entered the country under f a l s e documentation.
Doherty asked t o
be deported t o I r e l a n d instead of the UK but, - a f t e r those two
countries signed an e x t r a d i t i o n t r e a t y , requested asylum i n the
U.S. Eventually, the matter went t o the Supreme Court, which
r u l e d t h a t the Attorney General had the d i s c r e t i o n t o deport
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Doherty without f u r t h e r hearings. I n January 1992, Doherty was
deported t o t h e UK, and he i s now i n p r i s o n i n Northern I r e l a n d .
The B r i t i s h a u t h o r i t i e s have turned down Doherty's request t h a t
he be given c r e d i t f o r time served i n the U.S. and some I r i s h Americans groups, f o r whom Doherty was a major cause celebre,
have asked t h e USG t o intervene. The U.S. has no current l e g a l
or j u r i s d i c t i o n a l i n t e r e s t i n the Doherty case.
The Gerrv Adams Visa Issue
Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams has been turned down f o r visas
several times i n the past few years — most r e c e n t l y i n 1991.
Under t h e Immigration and N a t i o n a l i t y Act, h i s advocacy o f
violence and i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t he was a member o f t h e PIRA Army
Council, which decides on t e r r o r i s t actions, makes him i n e l i g i b l e
for a visa.
(Executive Branch r u l i n g s were supported by the U.S.
C i r c u i t Court o f Appeals i n 1990.) To overcome h i s
i n e l i g i b i l i t y , Adams would need a waiver — granted by the INS at
the recommendation o f the State Department. I t would be odd t o
do so now, since Sinn Fein i s l o s i n g support and Adams himself
was defeated i n the 1992 Parliamentary e l e c t i o n . Nor has Sinn
Fein agreed t o abandon i t s support of v i o l e n c e .
A current complication i s the request by t h e defense i n the Smyth
e x t r a d i t i o n case t h a t Adams t e s t i f y .
(Smyth was convicted o f
attempted murder, was imprisoned i n Northern I r e l a n d , and escaped
i n 1983.) The U.S. consul s t i l l has the f i n a l say about g r a n t i n g
a v i s a , but J u s t i c e could be asked t o parole Adams i n t o the
country. J u s t i c e would r e s i s t on the grounds t h a t Adam's
testimony i s not germane i n an e x t r a d i t i o n hearing. Even i f i t
were, he could make i t by deposition.
During the campaign, you spoke favorably o f p r o v i d i n g him a v i s a ,
since at the time he was a member o f the B r i t i s h Parliament.
However, he has since l o s t h i s seat i n Parliament and t h i s , the
main r a t i o n a l e i s no longer r e l e v a n t .
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�IRAQ
The UK continues t o be one of the strongest supporters of our
I r a q p o l i c y , p a r t i c i p a t i n g f u l l y i n a l l missions, whether
p o l i t i c a l , m i l i t a r y , or humanitarian. B r i t i s h leaders believe
t h a t continued, steady, p r o p o r t i o n a t e pressure must be maintained
on Saddam Hussein.
U.S. p o l i c y on I r a q remains t o i n s i s t upon f u l l I r a q i compliance
w i t h a l l Security Council r e s o l u t i o n s and respect f o r measures
enacted by the C o a l i t i o n t o monitor and enforce those
resolutions.
The UK and French have f l o a t e d the idea o f a P3
statement on Iraq's o b l i g a t i o n s under the UNSCRs — an
idea we fear could weaken the UNSC requirements and
open the door f o r those who want t o normalize t i e s w i t h
Saddam.
Iraq's current "charm o f f e n s i v e " aims t o show i t i s i n
" s u f f i c i e n t " compliance w i t h UNSC r e s o l u t i o n s f o r
sanctions t o be eased at the next review i n March.
Past experience suggests t h a t I r a q w i l l not f u l l y
comply by March and t h a t , i f i t s s t r a t e g y does not
work, I r a q w i l l r e t u r n t o open defiance.
J o i n t UN, U.S. UK and EC humanitarian r e l i e f e f f o r t s are showing
some signs of success. I n t e r i m reports suggest t h a t at the
present pace o f a i d d e l i v e r y there w i l l not be a repeat o f
widespread d e p r i v a t i o n and population movements o f 1991.
However, I r a q could e a s i l y d i s r u p t d e l i v e r i e s and put
the population at r i s k .
In order t o make northern I r a q less r e l i a n t on outside a i d , the
UK i s leaning toward f i n d i n g ways t o obtain sanctions exemptions
t o provide assistance which would r e a c t i v a t e l i g h t i n d u s t r i e s and
improve i n f r a s t r u c t u r e i n the region.
We support t h i s idea, but need t o act c a r e f u l l y so as
t o keep the i n t e r n a t i o n a l consensus behind sanctions.
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GATT-URUGUAY ROUND
The Uruguay Round (UR), which involves 108 countries, has been
under n e g o t i a t i o n since 1986 w i t h U.S. p a r t i c i p a t i o n authorized
by f a s t t r a c k a u t h o r i t y t h a t expires June 1. USTR Kantor
announced February 11 t h a t the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n would seek renewal
of f a s t t r a c k although d e t a i l s of the request would be decided
a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h Congress. We are also reviewing our UR
negotiating positions.
GATT Director-General Dunkel attempted t o accelerate the t a l k s i n
December 1991 by i s s u i n g a d r a f t " F i n a l Act" (DFA), which
incorporated agreements already reached and proposed s o l u t i o n s t o
unresolved issues.
Most governments w i l l accept the DFA without changes
beyond U.S.-EC amendments on a g r i c u l t u r e r e s u l t i n g from
the November " B l a i r House Accord." The EC i s pressing
t h i s approach, although i t also wants comprehensive
market access agreements, w i t h U.S. concessions, t o
"balance" the agreement before concluding the Round.
The U.S. p o s i t i o n has been t h a t we need s u b s t a n t i a l progress i n
market access i n goods (including free trade i n key s e c t o r s ) ,
a g r i c u l t u r e , and services as w e l l as improvements i n the DFA.
The U.S. agreed t o use the DFA as the basis f o r
n e g o t i a t i n g a f i n a l agreement, but stated t h a t
improvements were necessary, e s p e c i a l l y on antidumping,
i n t e l l e c t u a l property, t r a d e - r e l a t e d environment
issues, and the M u l t i l a t e r a l Trade Organization (MTO).
The UK has worked e n e r g e t i c a l l y as an EC member and as EC
President i n July-December 1992 t o complete the UR as soon as
possible. While the UK can accept the DFA, i t also favors
tougher antidumping rules and i s the EC country most w i l l i n g t o
accommodate U.S. i n t e r e s t s . The UK wants the U.S. t o reduce
"peaks" ( i . e . high t a r i f f s on ceramics and t e x t i l e s ) and i s
prepared t o meet our zero-for-zero sector o f f e r s (e.g. nonferrous metals, paper and wood).
Prime M i n i s t e r Major can be expected t o urge completing
the Round as quickly as possible.
The U.K. and the EC have urged us t o l i m i t f a s t t r a c k
a u t h o r i t y extension t o s i x months i n order t o maintain
needed pressure t o conclude the Round.
The U.K. w i l l r e s i s t attempts t o r e i n s t a t e Super 301 i n
f a s t t r a c k renewal due t o s e n s i t i v i t y about u n i l a t e r a l
U.S. e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l actions.
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RUSSIA
The Russian economy continues t o d e c l i n e . Y e l t s i n has s t a r t e d
reforms i n a number of important areas: c r e a t i n g market
mechanisms, l i b e r a l i z i n g trade, u n i f y i n g the currency exchange
r a t e , and undertaking an ambitious p r i v a t i z a t i o n program - but
a l l of these gains could be swept away by h y p e r i n f l a t i o n .
( I n f l a t i o n i s now running at a monthly r a t e of about 30 percent.)
Under present economic conditions an IMF stand-by program i s not
j u s t i f i a b l e f o r Russia. Such a program i s a p r e - r e q u i s i t e ,
however, f o r other forms of f i n a n c i a l support, i n c l u d i n g a $6
b i l l i o n currency s t a b i l i z a t i o n fund promised at the G-7 summit
l a s t year. Given Russia's need and the i n a b i l i t y t o produce an
IMF standby agreement any time soon, we are c u r r e n t l y examining
new ways i n which we could render a i d t o Russia.
The B r i t i s h approach t o debt re-scheduling i s s i m i l a r t o ours:
f l e x i b i l i t y and a w i l l i n g n e s s t o accept any sensible arrangement
between Russia and Ukraine on r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the debt.
(The
UK p o r t i o n of the o f f i c i a l b i l a t e r a l debt owed by the FSU i s only
. 1 % , or less than $400 m i l l i o n . )
The new Chernomyrdin government recognizes t h a t s t a b i l i z i n g the
economy i s i t s main economic p r i o r i t y , but i t w i l l face s t i f f
resistance t o i t s proposed a u s t e r i t y measures from the Supreme
Soviet and Central Bank. Parliamentary opposition t o Y e l t s i n ,
led by speaker Khasbulatov, has continued t o chip away at
Y e l t s i n ' s powers and p o l i c i e s .
Y e l t s i n had hoped t o break both the p o l i t i c a l and economic
impasse by means of a n a t i o n a l referendum on c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
reform t o be held A p r i l 11. Opposition from parliamentarians as
w e l l as r e g i o n a l leaders, fear of a b e t t i n g s e p a r a t i s t tendencies
w i t h i n Russia i t s e l f , and u n c e r t a i n t y over the outcome of the
vote apparently have forced him, however, at least t o consider
other ideas.
Y e l t s i n has proposed instead e a r l y parliamentary and p r e s i d e n t i a l
e l e c t i o n s during 1994 and 1995 r e s p e c t i v e l y . Unless accompanied
by a genuine consensus on economic and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reform,
t h i s proposal would continue the current stalemate f o r the next
year w i t h no guarantee t h a t e l e c t i o n s would produce a more
p l i a b l e l e g i s l a t u r e . Y e l t s i n , Khasbulatov, and C o n s t i t u t i o n a l
Court Chairman Zorkin are engaged i n n e g o t i a t i o n s t o hammer out a
s o l u t i o n t o Russia's p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s . Pressure i s increasing on
a l l the p a r t i c i p a n t s and the outcome i s f a r from c e r t a i n . I f
agreement i s reached, an extraordinary session of the Congress of
Peoples' Deputies could convene i n e a r l y March t o r a t i f y the
agreement.
Absent some renewal of Y e l t s i n ' s a u t h o r i t y , the Russian domestic
and f o r e i g n policymaking process w i l l continue t o be marked by
bureaucratic i n f i g h t i n g combined w i t h parliamentary pressures
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toward greater assertiveness of Russia's prerogatives as a great
power. On a number o f f o r e i g n p o l i c y issues (Bosnia, I r a q , nonp r o l i f e r a t i o n ) , Y e l t s i n ' s margin f o r maneuver w i l l be
constrained.
Despite the pressures, he has shown no sign o f abandoning h i s
basic pro-Western o r i e n t a t i o n .
Almost since e l e c t i o n day, the Russians have been pressing
f o r an e a r l y summit. Christopher i s proposing A p r i l 3-4,
w i t h March 28-29 as a back-up, t o Kozyrev on Thursday.
The p r e l i m i n a r y Russian r e a c t i o n t o our new approach on the
former Yugoslavia has been p o s i t i v e .
We continue t o cooperate closely on arms c o n t r o l . Y e l t s i n
has f o r m a l l y submitted START I I t o the Supreme Soviet f o r
r a t i f i c a t i o n , and we are working c l o s e l y w i t h the Russians
t o persuade the parliament t h a t the t r e a t y i s f a i r and
balanced.
The most urgent task i n arms c o n t r o l i s t o obtain f u l f i l l m e n t o f
the Lisbon Protocol by Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Ukraine, which
has n e i t h e r r a t i f i e d the START I Treaty nor adhered t o the NPT,
i s key here.
(Belarus has already approved START and NPT;
Kazakhstan has approved START but not yet adhered t o the NPT.)
We have pressed the Ukrainians t o f u l f i l l t h e i r commitments under
the Lisbon P r o t o c o l , and both we and the UK have o f f e r e d them
s e c u r i t y assurances and assistance i n the dismantlement o f
s t r a t e g i c arms.
At the same time, we have urged the Russians t o amend t h e i r own
s e c u r i t y assurances t o Ukraine i n order t o take account o f
Ukrainian concerns. We have also i n s i s t e d t h a t the proceeds o f
Russian sales t o the U.S. o f h i g h l y enriched uranium (HEU) from
dismantled former Soviet nuclear warheads be e q u i t a b l y shared
w i t h Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, something the Russians
have r e s i s t e d .
UK Views
Major i s becoming increasingly s k e p t i c a l o f Y e l t s i n ' s a b i l i t y t o
hold h i s p o l i t i c a l opponents a t bay, and t o continue t o implement
meaningful economic reform. This sense of a looming c r i s i s has
been echoed by h i s Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd.
Major w i l l be b r i n g i n g w i t h him h i s in-house advisor on the FSU,
Sir Rodric B r a i t h w a i t e (who i s also Chairman o f the J o i n t
I n t e l l i g e n c e Committee and was the UK Ambassador t o Moscow from
1988 t o 1992). Braithwaite's views o f Y e l t s i n ' s problems are
summed up as f o l l o w s :
Russia has no t r a d i t i o n of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l i m i t s on the
power o f the executive or of the r u l e of law.
The decay of the Communist party s t r u c t u r e has not been
o f f s e t by the development of new p o l i t i c a l organizations.
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Y e l t s i n toyed w i t h the idea of c r e a t i n g a "President's"
p a r t y , but abandoned i t .
I n Russia, p a r t i e s are equated
w i t h conspiracies. Y e l t s i n chose instead t o use the Russian
h i s t o r i c a l model of "going t o the people". Yet, as economic
hardships t u r n i n t o c r i s e s , t h i s t a c t i c i s l o s i n g i t s
effectiveness.
Braithwaite's recommendations
t o Major are:
Expand programs whereby younger Russians study and work
abroad as a way t o help develop a new p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e .
Provide greater economic t e c h n i c a l assistance and t r a i n i n g
programs i n Russia.
Ensure t h a t the IMF take i n t o account the micro-economic
problem facing Russia: the dismantlement o f rustbowl
defense i n d u s t r i e s and the need t o r e t r a i n workers.
Treat Russia as a great power ( i f not a super-power) rather
than a supplicant. Part of the reason f o r Gorbachev's
downfall was the perception t h a t he was no longer viewed as
an equal i n the West.
B r a i t h w a i t e wrote h i s memorandum as a follow-up t o a conversation
you had w i t h Major l a s t December. The complete memo i s included
i n your b r i e f i n g book.
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HONG KONG AND THE UK
B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s expect the l a s t f i v e years of t h e i r r u l e i n
Hong Kong t o be among the most d i f f i c u l t i n the colony's h i s t o r y .
Their goals are:
t o preserve the s t a b i l i t y and p r o s p e r i t y of Hong Kong
through 1997 and beyond:
t o b u i l d democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s capable of withstanding
expected Chinese pressure a f t e r t r a n s i t i o n ;
t o achieve the l e a s t d i s r u p t i v e t r a n s f e r of power p o s s i b l e ;
t o maintain the commercial p o s i t i o n of B r i t i s h firms i n Hong
Kong and China; and
t o prevent Hong Kong from becoming a domestic p o l i t i c a l
football in Britain.
These goals have already come i n t o c o n f l i c t , most notably over
Governor Chris Patten's proposals t o broaden modestly the
franchise of the 1995 e l e c t i o n s t o the L e g i s l a t i v e Council, which
w i l l continue t o s i t when China takes over sovereignty i n 1997.
Progress towards the smooth t r a n s i t i o n t o PRC sovereignty has
also been marred by an ongoing dispute over construction of a new
Hong Kong a i r p o r t .
B e i j i n g reacted vehemently t o Patten's proposals, making t h r e a t s
ranging from undoing any changes t o a n n u l l i n g contracts made
without i t s consent a f t e r 1997. Although the Chinese may only be
p o s t u r i n g , the verbal barrage weakens the foundation f o r a smooth
t r a n s i t i o n , has caused the stock market t o reverberate, and has
shaken l o c a l confidence i n Hong Kong's f u t u r e s t a b i l i t y .
B e i j i n g i s moving, however, t o resume t a l k s w i t h B r i t i s h
o f f i c i a l s on Hong Kong's f u t u r e . Coming back t o the t a b l e
represents a major Chinese concession, and w i l l help t o defuse
the c r i s i s over Patten's proposals. But i t i s s t i l l unclear
whether the Chinese are prepared t o resume substantive
n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h Hong Kong o f f i c i a l s , or simply plan t o use the
t a l k s t o delay l e g i s l a t i v e action on Patten's proposals.
Hong Kong, China, and MFN
H G b e l i e v e s MFN i s the wrong t o o l f o r t r y i n g t o remedy human
M
r i g h t s abuses i n China. The B r i t i s h claim t h a t Hong Kong could
lose up t o $16 b i l l i o n of i t s o v e r a l l trade and as many as 60,000
jobs i f MFN were suspended. Although Governor Patten has on
occasion h i n t e d t h a t he might favor an informal linkage between
China's a t t i t u d e toward Hong Kong and MFN, he. has most r e c e n t l y
emphasized t h a t the r i s k s of such linkage are f a r greater than
the p o t e n t i a l b e n e f i t s .
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BRITAIN, THE U.S. AND THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS
The B r i t i s h have welcomed the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s i n i t i a t i v e on
Bosnia, which they see as r e f l e c t i n g t h e i r own views and
concerns. John Major comes t o Washington eager t o do a l l he can
t o help i t succeed.
The B r i t i s h have c o n s i s t e n t l y argued t h a t the West has l i t t l e
choice but t o support the Vance/Owen plan, however flawed i t may
be. I n recent weeks they urged t h a t the United States and NATO
play a l a r g e r r o l e i n reaching and implementing a Vance/Owen
brokered settlement, i n c l u d i n g p r o v i d i n g troops. Our i n i t i a t i v e
addressed both these p o i n t s , much t o John Major's s a t i s f a c t i o n .
The U.S. i n i t i a t i v e also put o f f the k i n d of a c t i o n London most
dreads - use o f force, such as a i r s t r i k e s against Serb t a r g e t s .
London fears t h a t such a c t i o n would t r i g g e r r e p r i s a l against UN
( i n c l u d i n g B r i t i s h ) troops on the ground, the collapse of the
humanitarian e f f o r t , and eventual i r r e s i s t i b l e pressure f o r
massive Western i n t e r v e n t i o n . The B r i t i s h b e l i e v e t h a t once i n ,
the West would be a long time g e t t i n g out. They were v a s t l y
r e l i e v e d t h a t t h e i r warnings were heard i n Washington, and
encouraged t h a t the new A d m i n i s t r a t i o n i s ready t o consider
c o n t r i b u t i n g more m i l i t a r i l y t o peacekeeping or humanitarian
e f f o r t s . As you r e c a l l from your telephone conversation w i t h
Major, the B r i t i s h are not w i l d l y e n t h u s i a s t i c about proceeding
t o get an enforcement r e s o l u t i o n f o r the NFZ over Bosnia. We
have t r i e d t o address t h e i r concerns v i a NATO planning, but have
not been wholly successful. As we move more aggressively i n New
York t o win passage of the NFZ enforcement r e s o l u t i o n , we w i l l
have t o take care t h a t the B r i t i s h (with the French, Russians,
and others) not torpedo our e f f o r t s .
Since Yugoslavia erupted i n open f i g h t i n g i n 1991, the B r i t i s h
have doubted the a b i l i t y o f outsiders t o help solve the c r i s i s .
S t i l l , B r i t a i n agreed w i t h i t s more a c t i v i s t EC partners t h a t the
Community should take the lead i n the e f f o r t t o broker a
settlement. When the EC proved unequal t o the task, HMG as EC
President launched the August 1992 London Conference on
Yugoslavia t o regenerate a peace process, t h i s time w i t h deeper
UN involvement. The B r i t i s h continue t o work a c t i v e l y i n the UN
t o resolve the Greek-Macedonian impasse.
So long as the f i g h t i n g i s confined t o the former Yugoslavia,
London sees no n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s d i r e c t l y a t stake. But
domestic pressure t o "do something" plus EC considerations (and
U.S. pressure f o r an " a l l necessary means" r e s o l u t i o n i n the UN)
prompted HMG t o deploy some 2,500 s o l d i e r s t o Bosnia. B r i t a i n i s
among the l a r g e s t troop c o n t r i b u t o r s i n ex-Yugoslavia, and
operates i n one of the toughest areas.
The B r i t i s h response t o our proposal t o conduct a i r drops i n
Eastern Bosnia has been muted. A B r i t i s h c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the
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operation i s probably not i n the cards, but they w i l l give the
i n i t i a t i v e t h e i r p u b l i c endorsement. London's ambivalence t o a i r
drops i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the B r i t i s h unease w i t h much o f the
i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e a c t i o n t o the c r i s i s i n Bosnia. I n t h e i r view,
each step t h a t increases i n t e r n a t i o n a l involvement only brings us
a l l closer t o f u l l involvement i n the f i g h t i n g w i t h no obvious
way out. Thus, w h i l e they w i l l lend v e r b a l support b i l a t e r a l l y
and through NATO t o our i n i t i a t i v e , we can expect t h a t they w i l l
also act as a q u i e t 'conscience' t o curb, where they t h i n k they
can, undirected energies t o "do something."
Defense Secretary R i f k i n d , w i t h m i l i t a r y and Tory backbench
support, s t r o n g l y opposes any UK m i l i t a r y engagement beyond
humanitarian r e l i e f . C o n t r i b u t i n g t o a peacekeeping e f f o r t i n
support o f a brokered agreement would be a hard decision i n
London. Major and Foreign Secretary Hurd say they w i l l need
close c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h Washington i f they are t o overcome
R i f k i n d ' s r e s i s t a n c e . NATO leadership, and commitment o f U.S.
ground troops, i s probably a necessary p r e c o n d i t i o n t o f u r t h e r
B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y involvement i n ex-Yugoslavia.
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G-7 ECONOMIC SUMMIT
This year's Economic Summit w i l l take place i n Tokyo July 7-9.
Economic issues w i l l be a major focus o f the agenda (macro p o l i c i e s
and growth, trade, economic reform i n Central and Eastern Europe and
Russia, and r e l a t i o n s w i t h developing c o u n t r i e s ) . Foreign and
Finance M i n i s t e r s w i l l attend.
EC President Delors r e c e n t l y c a l l e d f o r an e a r l y G-7
Summit t o consider measures t o stimulate economic growth.
The Japanese strongly oppose t h i s .
The agenda w i l l also feature p o l i t i c a l issues (e.g., FSU, exYugoslavia, Iraq) and cross-border issues such as global
environmental concerns, t e r r o r i s m , nuclear safety, nonp r o l i f e r a t i o n and human r i g h t s . Summit preparations are handled
through a network o f p a r a l l e l "Sherpa," sub-Sherpa and p o l i t i c a l
d i r e c t o r s meetings i n v o l v i n g State, Treasury, NSC and other USG
agencies. The Sherpas prepare the d r a f t Summit communique (economic
d e c l a r a t i o n ) and the p o l i t i c a l d i r e c t o r s prepare the p o l i t i c a l
d e c l a r a t i o n . The Summit provides a unique opportunity f o r frank,
informal exchanges at the c h i e f o f state/head o f government l e v e l ,
but the r i g i d i t y o f a "pre-cooked" agenda and communique sometimes
precludes such exchanges.
To show Western support f o r reform, Soviet/Russian leaders have been
i n v i t e d t o j o i n the Summit a f t e r formal meetings, Gorbachev i n 1991
and Y e l t s i n i n 1992.
Although we and the Europeans are pressing
Japan t o i n v i t e Y e l t s i n , Japan i s r e l u c t a n t t o do so because o f the
dispute w i t h Russia over the K u r i l e Islands. The Japanese say,
however, t h a t the f i n a l decision on i n v i t i n g Y e l t s i n rests w i t h a l l
members o f the G-7.
Finance M i n i s t e r s and Central Bank Governors o f the Summit countries
also meet several times a year. Their work often contributes t o the
Summit, and the Summit sometimes tasks t h i s G-7 group on p a r t i c u l a r
issues.
B r i t i s h Concerns
Following t h i s f a l l ' s suspension o f the B r i t i s h pound from the
Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System and i t s
subsequent depreciation, Prime M i n i s t e r Major c a l l e d f o r greater
G-7 monetary p o l i c y coordination, a p o s i t i o n he may push during the
run-up t o the Summit.
Prime M i n i s t e r Major has argued f o r a less formal, more f l e x i b l e
Summit t h a t meets less frequently. Japan i s r e s i s t i n g changing the
format f o r Tokyo, but may agree t o streamlining i t i n 1994.
The B r i t i s h have indicated they w i l l press f o r a G-7 statement on
the Rushdie a f f a i r which declares Iran's decree against Rushdie
"contrary t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l law."
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THE UK AND AFRICA
The UK remains our most r e l i a b l e partner on major A f r i c a n issues
and c r i s e s . Although sub-Saharan A f r i c a has s l i d down the UK
agenda i n recent years as other issues came t o the f o r e , the
B r i t i s h remain serious players i n a dozen A f r i c a n countries,
i n c l u d i n g v i r t u a l l y a l l the major countries (South A f r i c a , Kenya,
Nigeria, Ghana, Angola, and Mozambique) of most' i n t e r e s t t o us.
B r i t i s h commercial i n t e r e s t s i n the f i r s t four dwarf ours (over
one b i l l i o n pounds of d i r e c t investment i n Kenya and N i g e r i a and
nearly f o u r b i l l i o n pounds i n South A f r i c a ) and t h e i r p o l i t i c a l
t i e s run deep.
Southern A f r i c a
The U.S. and UK hold s i m i l a r views and have coordinated c l o s e l y
on the t h r e e major southern AFrica issues, Angola, Mozambique and
South A f r i c a .
C i v i l war resumed i n Angola i n l a t e 1992 a f t e r UNITA r e j e c t e d the
September 29-30 e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s . UNITA i s pressing i t s m i l i t a r y
advantage; an immediate ceasefire i s u n l i k e l y . The second round
of d i r e c t t a l k s between the government and UNITA has been delayed
while both sides attempt t o improve t h e i r bargaining p o s i t i o n
through success on the b a t t l e f i e l d . The UK has t o l d us i t
considers i t s evenhanded approach has been unproductive and now
intends t o be more openly supportive of the government. H G
M
would l i k e us t o recognize i t .
In Mozambique, despite delays i n the deployment of UN
peacekeeping forces (ONUMOZ), the cease-fire i s holding and food
r e l i e f i s g e t t i n g t o needy areas. The U.S. and UK p a r t i c i p a t e i n
several UN-chaired commissions overseeing the peace accord. We
are now considering a UN request f o r a U.S. engineer b a t t a l i o n
for ONUMOZ. The B r i t i s h , w i t h the French and Portuguese, w i l l
t r a i n the new, u n i f i e d Mozambican m i l i t a r y .
The South A f r i c a n Government (SAG) and the A f r i c a n National
Congress (ANC) are making progress i n b i l a t e r a l t a l k s on the
process and timetable f o r n e g o t i a t i n g South A f r i c a ' s t r a n s i t i o n
to n o n r a c i a l democracy. However, large gaps remain over key
issues such as powersharing and federalism. The SAG and ANC hope
to resume m u l t i - p a r t y negotiations i n March and hold the
country's f i r s t democratic e l e c t i o n w i t h i n a year. I t i s unclear
whether Inkatha leader Buthelezi w i l l j o i n the n e g o t i a t i o n s .
P o l i t i c a l violence remains widespread, although the major South
A f r i c a n p a r t i e s agree t h a t the UN and other i n t e r n a t i o n a l
observers have been a very p o s i t i v e f a c t o r . Meanwhile, the
economy continues t o d e t e r i o r a t e , r e s u l t i n g i n a nearly 50%
unemployment r a t e among blacks.
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SOMALIA
The UK has provided approximately $60 m i l l i o n toward humanitarian
r e l i e f i n Somali since January 1992. While the UK has not
furnished ground forces t o t h e U n i f i e d Task Force (UNITAF), i t
has deployed 90 airmen and two C-130s t o support c o a l i t i o n
t r a n s p o r t operations i n Somalia.
The B r i t i s h p r e f e r American replacements f o r departing UN Special
Representative K i t t a n i as w e l l as r e l i e f coordinator Johnston.
HMG also supports the idea o f "seconding" p r o f e s s i o n a l s t a f f from
U.S. and UK diplomatic and development agencies as a means of
strengthening UN operations i n Somalia.
The UK s t r o n g l y backs us on t h e need f o r a Security Council
r e s o l u t i o n g i v i n g UNOSOM I I an expanded mandate i n Somalia,
i n c l u d i n g f l e x i b l e rules o f engagement. Overseas Development
M i n i s t e r , Baroness Lynda Chalker, deserves our thanks f o r
convincing Kenyan President Moi t o agree " i n p r i n c i p l e " t o the
deployment o f UN peacekeeping forces on t h e Kenyan side o f the
Kenya/Somalia border. This could prevent incursions i n t o Somalia
by forces reportedly l o y a l t o former Somali d i c t a t o r Siad Barre.
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�TARIFF RECLASSIFICATION OF
MULTIPURPOSE VEHICLES (RANGE ROVERS)
The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n i s reviewing the t a r i f f c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f
four-door multipurpose v e h i c l e s , i n c l u d i n g minivans and possibly
the Range Rover. R e c l a s s i f y i n g these vehicles as t r u c k s rather
than automobiles would r a i s e the t a r i f f applied from 2.5% t o 25%.
Range Rover claims the t a r i f f increase would add $7,000 t o the
$42,000 cost o f each o f the 3400-3500 Range Rovers s o l d i n the
U.S. annually. The B r i t i s h and EC are aware o f the issue and are
a c t i v e l y lobbying against i t . Both have threatened t o challenge
any r e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n as a v i o l a t i o n o f U.S. GATT o b l i g a t i o n s .
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�TSOHFIDENTIAtr
SPRINT'S APPLICATIONS TO BUILD
TELEPHONE NETWORK IN THE UK
In November 1991, the B r i t i s h Government issued a White Paper
opening t h e UK telecommunications market. Consistent w i t h t h i s
new p o l i c y . S p r i n t , i n January 1992, applied f o r permission t o
b u i l d and operate a n a t i o n a l network i n the UK and t o connect
t h i s network t o a Sprint owned i n t e r n a t i o n a l network. This would
allow S p r i n t t o o f f e r end-to-end service on S p r i n t f a c i l i t i e s .
Early discussions w i t h HMG were promising. However, a f t e r the
A p r i l 1992 e l e c t i o n s , the new p o l i t i c a l leadership a t the
Department o f Trade and Industry began t o r a i s e o b j e c t i o n s t o
Sprint's a p p l i c a t i o n t o own and operate i n t e r n a t i o n a l c i r c u i t s .
Instead, they have suggested t h a t Sprint lease i n t e r n a t i o n a l
c i r c u i t s from e i t h e r o f the UK c a r r i e r s , B r i t i s h Telecom or
Mercury. Sprint contends t h a t t h i s would place them a t a
competitive disadvantage and makes t h e i r investment i n a UK
domestic network h i g h l y questionable.
The United States has allowed Mercury's parent company, Cable and
Wireless, t o construct and operate a network i n the United
States. C&W i s authorized t o own and operate i t s own f a c i l i t i e s
between the United States and Canada, our l a r g e s t
telecommunications t r a d i n g p a r t n e r . C W has a p p l i c a t i o n s pending
&
before the FCC t o own and operate f a c i l i t i e s between the United
States and the UK and Hong Kong.
There i s an imbalance between the way the USG has t r e a t e d the UK
company, and HMG i s t r e a t i n g S p r i n t . To achieve a balance, HMG
should, a t a minimum, be prepared t o grant the U.S. applicant the
r i g h t t o operate i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y between the UK and the U.S.,
B r i t a i n ' s l a r g e s t telecommunications t r a d i n g p a r t n e r .
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�CECRET
BRITAIN, MAASTRICHT AND THE EC
Status o f Maastricht R a t i f i c a t i o n i n the UK
In December 1991, EC leaders agreed at a summit i n Maastricht,
Netherlands, t o a broad-ranging t r e a t y which w i l l , i f r a t i f i e d ,
move Europe toward deeper i n t e g r a t i o n and broader membership.
Denmark's r e j e c t i o n o f the Maastricht t r e a t y i n a referendum
l a s t June fueled o p p o s i t i o n i n the UK. Major, who supports
the t r e a t y , i s caught between the r i g h t o f h i s own party and
the o p p o s i t i o n Labor Party.
Denmark votes again May 18 on the basis o f a special
agreement intended t o meet p u b l i c concern about loss o f
sovereignty.
Most b e l i e v e t h a t t h e UK parliament w i l l r a t i f y the t r e a t y ,
assuming the Danish referendum succeeds. But i t w i l l be a
d i f f i c u l t process i n any case and could go e i t h e r way.
A l l three UK parliamentary p a r t i e s , i n c l u d i n g a m a j o r i t y of
Conservatives, support i t i n p r i n c i p l e . Major has staked
his personal p r e s t i g e , i f not h i s government, on
ratification.
I f the Danes r e j e c t i t a second time, however, the UK w i l l
probably not r a t i f y e i t h e r , s e t t i n g o f f an EC c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
crisis.
European i n t e g r a t i o n would probably continue but a t a
slower, more uneven pace and i n a d i f f e r e n t format.
B r i t a i n ' s Place i n the EC
Major has moved the debate about B r i t a i n ' s place i n Europe form
Thatcher's i n t r a n s i g e n t r h e t o r i c t o a general acceptance o f a
more a c t i v i s t and engaged European p o l i c y while at t h e same time
r e t a i n i n g opt-outs on monetary and s o c i a l issue p r o v i s i o n s of the
Maastricht t r e a t y .
Major used the EC Presidency r o l e during the l a t t e r h a l f of
1992 t o successfully advance the UK's concept o f the EC.
With the agreement reached at the Edinburgh Summit l a s t
December t o begin negotiations t o admit Sweden, A u s t r i a and
Finland t o the EC, and t o eventually admit Poland, Hungary
and the Czech and Slovak Republics, the UK got i t s sougha f t e r widening of the EC. The prospects f o r the more
f e d e r a l v i s i o n of the Community, most c l o s e l y associated
w i t h the French, are now much less c e r t a i n .
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�•ER'.
CGEE
As B r i t a i n becomes "a b e t t e r European," more c l o s e l y t i e d t o
the EC, t h e UK w i l l be less able t o break ranks w i t h i t s EC
colleagues on issues o f importance t o us. t h i s dynamic can
already be seen i n the UK's p o s i t i o n on such issues as the
r e c o g n i t i o n o f Macedonia where i t s p o s i t i o n has been
circumscribed by i t s EC allegiance.
'OECRET
LINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�B r i t a i n and European Security A r c h i t e c t u r e
B r i t a i n has been one our most a c t i v e a l l i e s i n t r y i n g t o ensure
t h a t the development o f a European s e c u r i t y and defense i d e n t i t y
not b r i n g about a rupture i n t r a n s - a t l a n t i c r e l a t i o n s , or, at a
minimum, f o s t e r an inward-looking America. The B r i t i s h have a
second set o f concerns as w e l l : proving t h e i r European bona
f i d e s by demonstrating t o the French, Germans and others t h a t
Europe should take a c t i o n i n the s e c u r i t y and defense f i e l d ,
while t r y i n g t o ensure t h a t we remain committed t o a strong NATO,
and a s i g n i f i c a n t (e.g., 100,000) U.S. troop presence i n Europe.
B r i t i s h p o l i c y has been manifested through i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h the
French i n NATO, actions i n the West European Union (WEU),
a t t i t u d e toward the Franco-German corps, and support f o r
expanding NATO membership.
Dealing With t h e French. The B r i t i s h see an e v o l u t i o n i n French
s e c u r i t y p o l i c y v i s a v i s NATO, and, despite the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n
dealing w i t h the French i n the NATO context, p r e f e r t o see as
much work as possible done i n cooperation w i t h the French. This
i s p a r t i c u l a r l y important t o them (and t o us) given French
w i l l i n g n e s s t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n peacekeeping operations — an
i n c r e a s i n g l y important r o l e f o r NATO.
WEU. The B r i t i s h supported the WEU's move from London t o
Brussels ( l a s t month) and i t s embryonic planning a c t i v i t i e s .
That said, they i n s i s t on close t i e s between WEU and NATO (they
have dual-hatted t h e i r NATO ambassador t o the WEU), and want f u l l
transparency i n planning. Their view i s t h a t , when serious
s e c u r i t y issues are at stake (e.g., contingency planning toward
enforcing the No-Fly-Zone) NATO must take p r i o r i t y over the WEU.
Franco-German Corps. The B r i t i s h pushed very hard t o ensure t h a t
t h i s corps would not form the nucleus o f an independent European
army w i t h only minimal t i e s t o NATO. They were s a t i s f i e d w i t h
the successful n e g o t i a t i o n s (conclude l a s t month) between SACEUR
and the French and German m i l i t a r i e s which t i e d the corps t o
NATO. (They were also pleased w i t h the close coordination w i t h
us i n r e s o l v i n g t h i s dispute.
NATO Membership. The B r i t i s h are on record as f a v o r i n g an
expansion o f NATO membership t o keep pace w i t h the l i k e l y
expansion o f the EC and the WEU.
They see t h i s i s a slow,
gradual process, and over the l a s t year discussed q u i e t l y w i t h us
the idea o f using the same c r i t e r i a used i n accepting new members
i n t o the EC/WEU as f o r NATO. The debates over Maastricht which
have focused EC a t t e n t i o n on deepening i t s u n i t y (rather than
broadening i t s membership) have put these plans on hold.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�SECRET•
BRITISH DEFENSE POSTURE
Despite Defense Secretary Malcolm R i f k i n d ' s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of
the UK as " p r i m a r i l y a middle-ranking European power," B r i t a i n ,
alone among our a l l i e s , i s a s t r a t e g i c nuclear power, a f u l l and
major m i l i t a r y partner i n NATO, and a s u b s t a n t i a l m i l i t a r y power
w i t h worldwide commitments. The B r i t i s h are determined t o remain
our c l o s e s t partner and are predisposed t o e n l i s t w i t h us when
t r o u b l e brews. Nevertheless, the collapse of the Soviet Union
has created f a m i l i a r pressures t o cut back the m i l i t a r y , a
process now p a i n f u l l y underway i n the UK.
Nuclear weapons, seen as the u l t i m a t e guarantor of B r i t a i n ' s
s e c u r i t y , have so f a r escaped the budget-cutting ax, but B r i t i s h
conventional forces have not. By the mid-1990's, army manpower
w i l l drop from 145,400 t o 116,000. UK troops i n Germany w i l l
plunge from a f u l l corps t o l i t t l e more than a d i v i s i o n . A i r
Force manpower w i l l be trimmed, and the Royal Navy's t o t a l o f 47
f r i g a t e s and destroyers w i l l shrink t o 40 or fewer.
Although the government has recently r e l u c t a n t l y bowed t o strong
Parliamentary pressure t o r e t a i n some army u n i t s scheduled f o r
e l i m i n a t i o n (much of the pressure arises from sentimental
attachment t o h i s t o r i c regiments), the planned reductions w i l l
s t r e t c h a UK m i l i t a r y whose commitments are growing, a t least i n
the short term. Almost 20,000 B r i t i s h troops are deployed t o
Northern I r e l a n d ; another 5,000 are now committed — e i t h e r on
the ground or i n a support r o l e — t o the Bosnia c r i s i s .
UK o f f i c i a l s assert t h a t modernization w i l l compensate f o r
smaller conventional forces, but we b e l i e v e t h a t both operational
f l e x i b i l i t y and e f f e c t i v e n e s s could s u f f e r . That matters t o us:
as the B r i t i s h showed i n the Gulf, they are the a l l y most l i k e l y
to j o i n i n w i t h a major m i l i t a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n — i n c l u d i n g ground
troops — when i t counts. The B r i t i s h recognize the value o f
c o a l i t i o n - t y p e operations (such as p o l i c i n g the n o - f l y zones over
Iraq) and are usually w i l l i n g t o c o n t r i b u t e .
But w i t h l i m i t e d assets, London now has t o set p r i o r i t i e s on i t s
deployments, and f u t u r e U.S. requests f o r even small
c o n t r i b u t i o n s from the UK might prove more d i f f i c u l t . For
example, B r i t a i n v i r t u a l l y opted out o f "Restore Hope" i n
Somalia. Even i f peacekeeping and other contingency operations
pass the means t e s t , they w i l l face tougher p o l i t i c a l s c r u t i n y .
Growing UN demands f o r peacekeeping forces have t r i g g e r e d a
debate i n the UK about the use of B r i t i s h forces f o r nont r a d i t i o n a l defense r o l e s . Defense Secretary R i f k i n d i s adamant
t h a t UK forces w i l l not expand t h e i r r o l e i n Bosnia beyond the
present humanitarian r e l i e f one. Although Foreign Secretary Hurd
r e c e n t l y r e a f f i r m e d t h a t B r i t a i n w i l l do i t s p a r t , he and other
senior B r i t i s h leaders w i l l prove ever warier about committing UK
forces, e s p e c i a l l y i f the commitment seems open-ended or i l l defined.
SSSsify «6LI#P0N LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET
THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT
A n g l o - I r i s h Agreement was signed on November 15, 1985 by PM
Thatcher and PM Garret F i t z g e r a l d . I t can be seen as e s s e n t i a l l y
g i v i n g I r e l a n d an agreed r o l e i n the a f f a i r s of the North (and
thus a voice i n p r o t e c t i n g the Catholic community there) i n
r e t u r n f o r an a f f i r m a t i o n t h a t the status o f Northern I r e l a n d
w i l l only be changed i n accord w i t h the w i l l of i t s i n h a b i t a n t s .
I r e l a n d gains i t s r o l e i n the North through the Intergovernmental
Conference, which meets about once every s i x weeks a t the l e v e l
of I r i s h Foreign M i n i s t e r - B r i t i s h Secretary o f State f o r Northern
I r e l a n d t o discuss p o l i t i c a l , s e c u r i t y , and l e g a l matters and
cross-border cooperation. I n general, the I r i s h use the meetings
t o r a i s e concerns about d i s c r i m i n a t i o n against Catholics and
problems i n t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of j u s t i c e (use o f excess force,
harassment by cooperation i n f i g h t i n g t e r r o r i s m . For the U.S.
the A n g l o - I r i s h Agreement has the advantage of g e t t i n g the GOI
and HMG speaking t o (not shouting at) each other - thereby making
r e l a t i o n s w i t h two close friends easier.
PER E.0.13526
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y
�L e t t e r hand d e l i v e r e d t o NSA Advisor Lake
from S i r Robin Renwick.
ANGLO-IRISH A
UT
ARTICLE 1
The two Governments
(a)
a f f i r m t h a t any change i n t h e status o f Northern
I r e l a n d would only come about w i t h t h e consent o f a
m a j o r i t y o f t h e people o f Northern I r e l a n d ;
(b)
recognise t h a t t h e present wish o f a m a j o r i t y o f t h e
people o f Northern I r e l a n d i s f o r no change i n t h e status
of Northern I r e l a n d ;
(c)
declare t h a t , i f i n t h e f u t u r e a m a j o r i t y o f t h e
people o f Northern I r e l a n d c l e a r l y wish f o r and f o r m a l l y
consent t o t h e establishment o f a u n i t e d I r e l a n d , they w i l l
introduce and support i n t h e respective Parliaments
l e g i s l a t i o n t o give e f f e c t t o t h a t wish.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�•SECRET •
THE INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR IRELAND
The Fund was established i n 1986 as a way o f showing U.S. support
f o r the A n g l o - I r i s h Agreement. Since then, the U.S. Congress has
appropriated $210 m i l l i o n f o r the Fund. Other donors are Canada,
New Zealand and the EC. The former have given small amounts; t h e
EC has been c o n t r i b u t i n g about $18 m i l l i o n annually since 1989.
The Fund concentrates on employment programs, t r a i n i n g , and the
encouragement of p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e i n Northern I r e l a n d and i n
s i x border counties o f the Republic. I n c r e a s i n g l y i t i s
focussing on disadvantaged areas, such as West B e l f a s t and remote
towns along the border. Because o f f i n a n c i a l c o n s t r a i n t s , a
sense t h a t the Fund had s u f f i c i e n t funds f o r the p r o j e c t s
i d e n t i f i e d , and a b e l i e f t h a t other donors could do more, t h e
Executive Branch d i d not i t s e l f propose appropriations f o r the
Fund i n recent years. The i n i t i a t i v e has come f o r the Congress
( p a r t i c u l a r l y the House of Representatives) while appropriate
nearly $20 m i l l i o n y e a r l y .
PR..
EEO
SECRET
Bisi^sify cg|_I#K)N LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�BRITAIN AND THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
Along w i t h other Europeans, the B r i t i s h o f t e n show greater
sympathy t o Arab p o s i t i o n s than t o I s r a e l ' s , p a r t i c u l a r l y
regarding the occupied t e r r i t o r i e s . This r e f l e c t s t r a d i t i o n a l
B r i t i s h l i n k s t o the Arab world, plus the influence of Foreign
Office Arabists.
Nevertheless, the UK s t r o n g l y supports the U.S.-brokered ArabI s r a e l i peace process. I t has, f o r example, followed our lead on
the P a l e s t i n i a n deportees issued, w h i l e i n f o r m a l l y l o o k i n g f o r
ways t o check u n h e l p f u l a c t i v i t y at the UN. The B r i t i s h back us
i n demanding balanced treatment o f I s r a e l i n UN r e s o l u t i o n s , and
they have worked t o shape EC ( p a r t i c u l a r l y French) designs on the
peace process t o meet U.S. concerns. They are, however, j u s t as
i n s i s t e n t as the French and others t h a t Europe's s e c u r i t y ,
p o l i t i c a l and economic i n t e r e s t e n t i t l e the EC t o a prominent
seat at the t a b l e .
The moderate B r i t i s h approach t o the PLO o f f e r s some advantages
t o us. London maintains contact through the B r i t i s h Embassy i n
t u n i s i a and through an i n d i v i d u a l i n London who c a l l s himself the
PLO r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , but who has no o f f i c i a l standing. These
channels enable the FCO, a t our behest, t o urge moderation on
P a l e s t i n i a n n e g o t i a t o r s , the PLO and Arab governments.
HMG does not advocate a P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e and regards the PLO
only as an umbrella o r g a n i z a t i o n expressing P a l e s t i n i a n i d e n t i t y
and a s p i r a t i o n s . Despite strong FCO i n t e r e s t at both the working
and the p o l i t i c a l l e v e l , the B r i t i s h have deferred t o our wish t o
put o f f m i n i s t e r i a l - l e v e l contacts w i t h the PLO.
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�PALESTINIAN DEPORTEES
When I s r a e l announced i t s package o f measures t o resolve the
d e p o r t a t i o n issue on Feb 1, B r i t a i n i n s i s t e d t h a t I s r a e l should
comply f u l l y w i t h UNSCR 7 99.
The Foreign O f f i c e agreed w i t h us t h a t r e i n v i g o r a t i n g the peace
process should be the t o p p r i o r i t y , but they doubted t h a t Rabin
had o f f e r e d enough t o enable the P a l e s t i n i a n s t o r e t u r n t o the
negotiations.
The B r i t i s h supported the scenario worked out at the Security
Council February 12, i n which the SC President obtained the
Council's approval t o convey f i v e p o i n t s t o the I s r a e l i
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . The B r i t i s h Perm Rep played a h e l p f u l r o l e .
The B r i t i s h now agree t h a t the deportation issue i s
behind us and t h a t we should focus on moving forward i n
the peace process.
B r i t a i n remains concerned at P a l e s t i n i a n r e j e c t i o n o f
the Council's actions and would support f u r t h e r I s r a e l i
gestures t o the P a l e s t i n i a n s .
As Hams-sponsored t e r r o r i s t attacks on I s r a e l i s continue, we
doubt Rabin i s i n c l i n e d t o o f f e r anything f u r t h e r t o the
P a l e s t i n i a n s a t t h i s time.
B r i t a i n could u s e f u l l y employ i t s contacts w i t h the PLO t o urge
the P a l e s t i n i a n s not t o allow Hamas and other opponents o f the
peace process t o block the n e g o t i a t i o n s .
PER E.O. 13S26
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�IRAN
U.S. p o l i c y toward I r a n has focused on a l t e r i n g I r a n i a n behavior
i n key areas - t e r r o r i s m , weapons of mass d e s t r u c t i o n , t h r e a t s t o
i t s neighbors, and human r i g h t s - through s p e c i f i c sanctions and
p u b l i c condemnation.
I r a n i s the most a c t i v e state sponsor of t e r r o r i s m we face
today. I r a n i a n agents assassinate I r a n i a n d i s s i d e n t s
r e s i d i n g abroad. I r a n also provides v i t a l support t o
t e r r o r i s t groups such as H i z b a l l a h and Hamas, and seeks t o
expand i t s t i e s t o r a d i c a l I s l a m i s t groups i n North A f r i c a .
I r a n i s pursuing nuclear, chemical and b i o l o g i c a l weapons
programs. I t also seeks t o acquire other d e s t a b i l i z i n g
weapons systems, such as m i s s i l e s and submarines, w i t h which
i t could threaten i t s neighbors.
Iran's dismal human r i g h t s record includes summary
imprisonment and executions, and a denial of basic l e g a l
rights.
We seek broad i n t e r n a t i o n a l support t o make our pressures
more e f f e c t i v e , i n the b e l i e f t h a t I r a n w i l l change i t s
p o l i c i e s only i f the economic or p o l i t i c a l p r i c e i s high.
The U.K. shares our concerns and has worked closely w i t h us i n
developing a common G-7 p o l i t i c a l approach on Iran and on seeking
t o coordinate G-7 export c o n t r o l p o l i c i e s . I t has been more
w i l l i n g than many i n the G-7 t o use p o l i t i c a l and economic
pressures t o change Iranian behavior.
But B r i t a i n ' s p o l i c y toward Iran i s t o r n between p o l i t i c a l and
economic i n t e r e s t s . Government and Parliamentary concerns about
I r a n i a n sponsorship of t e r r o r i s m , Iran's arms buildup and the
"fatwah" against author Salman Rushdie have confined r e l a t i o n s t o
a low l e v e l . The I r a n i a n market's a t t r a c t i o n t o B r i t i s h business
argues f o r b e t t e r r e l a t i o n s . The r e s u l t i s a c e r t a i n
ambivalence.
For example, the UK has pushed hard f o r a tough EC
l i n e against I r a n i a n support f o r t e r r o r i s m , while arguing t h a t
our l a t e s t G-7 proposals on export controls are excessive.
However, f o l l o w i n g B r i t a i n ' s "arms t o I r a q " scandal, the
government reviewed export p o l i c y and has announced new, t i g h t e r
r e g u l a t i o n s closer t o our own.
The B r i t i s h have also been more outspoken on Rushdie's behalf and
w i l l ask you t o do so too.
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�LIBYA/PAN AM-103
Security Council sanctions ( a v i a t i o n and arms embargoes) imposed
l a s t year are having an impact, but Libya has not complied w i t h
Resolutions 731 and 748.
Libya continues t o delay and search f o r p r i v a t e
channels t o negotiate new terms.
I t has taken only a few cosmetic, e a s i l y r e v e r s i b l e
steps such as c l o s i n g some t e r r o r i s t t r a i n i n g camps.
The S e c u r i t y Council r e s o l u t i o n s r e q u i r e Libya t o t u r n over the
i n d i c a t e d Pan Am bombing suspects f o r t r i a l i n the U.S. or UK,
cooperation w i t h the French on the UTA bombing, compensate
v i c t i m s and cut i t s t i e s t o t e r r o r i s m .
The S e c u r i t y Council w i l l next review sanctions i n m i d - A p r i l .
The U.S., UK and France said p u b l i c l y i n November t h a t
i f Libya d i d not comply, new steps might soon need t o
be taken.
A new sanction not a f f e c t i n g o i l revenues would be u n l i k e l y t o
sway Libya, but i t w i l l be d i f f i c u l t t o get an o i l - r e l a t e d
sanction through the Security Council.
The P a l e s t i n i a n deportation issue and Bosnia have
heightened the sense among many T h i r d World states t h a t
the.West has a double standard on r e s o l u t i o n s i n v o l v i n g
Muslim states.
Some Western European a l l i e s (e.g., Spain, I t a l y ,
Germany) are heavy purchasers of Libyan o i l .
We are i n close contact w i t h the B r i t i s h and French, and a l l
options remain open.
The B r i t i s h believe a f u l l embargo on Libyan o i l may be
too d i f f i c u l t , but they would probably support an
e f f o r t t o get an embargo on shipment of o i l technology
to Libya. Over a year or so, such an embargo, i f
r i g o r o u s l y enforced, would severely r e s t r i c t Libya's
a b i l i t y t o produce o i l .
I f we seek an o i l sanction, we w i l l need t o launch a
major diplomatic campaign i n March. The f i r s t step
w i l l be f u l l coordination w i t h the B r i t i s h and French,
followed by c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h other Council members.
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�UN SECURITY COUNCIL EXPANSION
Background
Many o f t h e non-aligned and others support expansion i n the
number o f t h e Security Council's permanent members. Japan,
Germany, and several others aspire t o permanent seats. We would
support permanent seats f o r Germany and Japan, but expanding the
Council without d i m i n i s h i n g i t s operational e f f e c t i v e n e s s w i l l be
difficult.
We would want t o avoid too large an expansion. At i t s l a s t
session, t h e General Assembly approved by consensus a r e s o l u t i o n
on e q u i t a b l e representation and increase i n t h e membership of the
Security Council, the r e s o l u t i o n asks member states t o submit
comments on t h e issue t o t h e SYG p r i o r t o June 30 and f o r the SYG
t o r e p o r t on t h e matter t o t h e next UNGA. There i s no consensus
among UN members about how t o manage expansion.
Disagreement
also e x i s t s over whether permanent members should have the veto.
B r i t i s h Views
Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , the B r i t i s h are unenthusiastic about making
changes i n t h e Security Council. Foreign Secretary Hurd
responded t o a question r e c e n t l y on the subject w i t h the r e t o r t ,
" I f i t a i n ' t broke, don't f i x i t . "
Prime M i n i s t e r Major relayed t h i s mood of caution i n p r i v a t e
comments he made t o our Ambassador i n India l a s t month. Major
noted t h a t i f Germany t r i e d t o become a permanent SC member, the
developing world would object s e r i o u s l y t o three permanent seats
going t o Western Europe. He p r e d i c t e d t h a t the U.S. would not be
pleased w i t h the nature of French-German cooperation on t h e
Council. Major i n d i c a t e d he would support Japan coming on alone.
Major cautioned t h a t t h e U.S. (and UK) should avoid c a s t i n g a
veto (against Japan) but feared China and Russia might eventually
do so.
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�SECRET
THE FALKLANDS
Foreign Secretary Hurd's January v i s i t t o Argentina, the f i r s t by
a B r i t i s h cabinet secretary since the 1982 Falklands War, marked
an important step i n normalizing UK-Argentina r e l a t i o n s .
Although both countries continue t o claim sovereignty over the
Falkland Islands (the U.S. i s neutral on the issue), the UK and
Argentina i n 1990 agreed t o disagree about t h e i r competing claims
and not l e t i t a f f e c t progress on other issues negatively. This
so-called "sovereignty umbrella" paved the way f o r the UK and
Argentina t o r e e s t a b l i s h diplomatic relations three years ago.
By pushing the sovereignty issue aside, the two countries have
been able t o seek solutions t o other sources of b i l a t e r a l
f r i c t i o n , c h i e f l y o i l exploration and f i s h i n g r i g h t s i n the
waters surrounding the Falkland Islands.
Despite the improvement i n r e l a t i o n s , the UK continues i t s
embargo, established during the Falklands War, of arms sales t o
Argentina. I n recognition of Argentina's return t o democracy and
improved human r i g h t s record, the U.S. resumed l i m i t e d arms sales
to Argentina i n 1983.
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CYPRUS
Now t h a t the Cypriot P r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n s have been decided,
the UN-sponsored Cyprus n e g o t i a t i o n s , i n recess since midNovember, can again go forward, although newly-elected President
Clerides has s t a t e d h i s i n t e n t i o n t o consult f i r s t w i t h the
Greeks — c o n s u l t a t i o n s which might s l i p the UN schedule f o r
talks.
The U.S. t o l d both sides we expect them t o r e t u r n t o
New York as agreed i n March and t o be ready t o make the
decisions necessary t o b r i n g the n e g o t i a t i o n s t o a
successful conclusion.
Glafcos Clerides's v i c t o r y i n the February 14 Cypriot
p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n may w e l l cause a temporary delay
while he gets organized and puts h i s stamp on the UN
proceedings. However, he may be able t o make up l o s t
time l a t e r due t o h i s greater i n f l u e n c e w i t h Parliament
and w i t h t h i s community. His anti-UN "set o f ideas"
campaign p o s t u r i n g w i l l give way r a p i d l y t o a more
pragmatic approach f o r which he i s known.
Turkey w i l l have t o put a great deal of pressure on
Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash i f he i s t o be brought
i n t o l i n e . The UK, as a respected European power and a
member of the EC can and should dangle p o l i t i c a l and
economic b a i t i n f r o n t of the Turks t o motivate them t o
lever Denktash i n t o p o s i t i o n .
The U.S. and the UK have cooperated closely throughout the UNsponsored t a l k s .
On February 19, U.S. Special Cyprus Coordinator John
Maresca met i n London w i t h h i s counterparts t o discuss
possible approaches t o the next round of UN
negotiations.
The U.S. and the UK agree on confidence-building measures
(CBM's), which were recommended by Boutros-Ghali and unanimously
endorsed by the Security Council (UNSCR 789). The U.S. p o s i t i o n
was conveyed t o a l l p a r t i e s : CBM's are not a package; each side
should s t a r t implementing at l e a s t some CBM's even before the
t a l k s resume; and implementation of CBM's i s not a p r e c o n d i t i o n
for resumption of the t a l k s and should not d i s t r a c t the p a r t i e s
from the t a l k s .
The UK has announced t h a t i t w i l l reduce i t s troop commitment t o
UNFICYP by 50 percent and has begun the f i r s t (25%) stage of t h a t
reduction. This, along w i t h the already completed t o t a l
withdrawal by Finland and the planned Canadian t o t a l withdrawal
(mid-1993) w i l l reduce UNFICYP strength from 2,400 i n mid-1992 t o
below 1,000.
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�.CECRET
The UN S e c r e t a r i a t has consulted troop c o n t r i b u t o r s on
how UNFICYP's organization and mission w i l l be changed.
The UK (which s t i l l has Sovereign Base Areas i n Cyprus)
i s t a k i n g a leading r o l e i n these c o n s u l t a t i o n s .
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Opening Tuzla A i r p o r t
London has p u b l i c l y welcomed the proposed a i r drop operation, but
b e l i e v e s t h a t high a l t i t u d e parachuting o f supplies has l i m i t e d
e f f e c t i v e n e s s ; a longer-term s o l u t i o n must be found f o r Eastern
Bosnia. Opening the a i r p o r t at Tuzla may o f f e r a p a r t i a l
s o l u t i o n as w e l l as represent a much needed supplement t o
Sarajevo, The B r i t i s h b e l i e v e the a i r p o r t could be opened w i t h
engineers (and are w i l l i n g t o share t h e i r t e c h n i c a l assessments);
large-scale s e c u r i t y forces would not be required, as the a i r p o r t
i s , i n t h e i r view, reasonably secure.
Major may suggest t h a t t h e U.S. take t h e lead i n opening and
running Tuzla a i r p o r t , since the B r i t i s h are stretched too t h i n
on t h e ground.
Our own assessment roughly corresponds t o London's. Tuzla i s i n
Muslim hands ( i n f a c t , Bosnian Foreign M i n i s t e r S i l a d z i c has
asked the U.S. several times t o run an a i r l i f t operation i n t o
Tuzla). The Serbs, although located i n t h e mountains some 6-8
miles outside the c i t y , are not s h e l l i n g t h e town s e r i o u s l y . The
a i r p o r t i t s e l f l i e s about 6 miles south o f Tuzla, and we have no
r e p o r t s t h a t i t has been s h e l l e d (suggesting t h a t i t may j u s t l i e
at the margins of Serb a r t i l l e r y range). The a i r p o r t has l i m i t e d
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e and no warehouses t o speak o f ; the main runway (C130 capable) has been c r a t e r e d , but i s now repaired. The road
from the a i r p o r t t o Tuzla i s good, but roads t o other p a r t s o f
Eastern Bosnia are poor, and at times impassable i n w i n t e r .
We suggest the President hear Major out and o f f e r t o have our
m i l i t a r y experts meet w i t h t h e i r s t o explore the p o s s i b i l i t i e s
t h a t Tuzla may o f f e r as w e l l as the e f f o r t and r i s k s involved i n
g e t t i n g i t up and running.
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—
We v a l u e t h e c l o s e p a r t n e r s h i p we have m a i n t a i n e d w i t h t h e
U n i t e d Kingdom i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l e f f o r t s t o ensure I r a q i
compliance w i t h a l l S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l r e s o l u t i o n s .
I t h i n k we are i n g e n e r a l accord i n our view o f
Saddam's c o n t i n u i n g menace and how t o d e a l w i t h i t .
—
Our r e s o l v e t o see I r a q comply f u l l y w i t h a l l S e c u r i t y
C o u n c i l r e s o l u t i o n s remains s t r o n g , as does our support f o r
measures enacted by t h e C o a l i t i o n t o m o n i t o r and e n f o r c e
those r e s o l u t i o n s .
I r a q i s n o t c l o s e t o being i n compliance. We expect
s a n c t i o n s w i l l be renewed i n March and Saddam w i l l
l i k e l y resume h i s c h a l l e n g e s t o t h e C o a l i t i o n s h o r t l y
thereafter.
A l e s s e n i n g o f t h e pressure now would have s e r i o u s
l o n g - t e r m consequences.
—
Through our j o i n t commitment t o O p e r a t i o n P r o v i d e Comfort,
we have succeeded i n n o r t h e r n I r a q i n e n f o r c i n g R e s o l u t i o n
688's requirement t h a t I r a q s t o p r e p r e s s i n g i t s people.
We
have made i t p o s s i b l e f o r t h e UN t o execute i t s
humanitarian mission i n northern I r a q .
I n t e r i m r e p o r t s suggest t h a t a t t h e p r e s e n t pace o f
a i d d e l i v e r y t h e r e w i l l n o t be a repeat o f t h e
widespread d e p r i v a t i o n and p o p u l a t i o n movements o f
1991.
However, I r a q c o u l d e a s i l y d i s r u p t d e l i v e r i e s and p u t
that population at r i s k .
—
Our e f f o r t s t o p r o v i d e h u m a n i t a r i a n r e l i e f t o t h e people o f
n o r t h e r n I r a q w i l l have t o be repeated i f we do n o t f i n d a
way t o h e l p them p r o v i d e f o r themselves i n t h e long term.
Relaxing sanctions s e l e c t i v e l y f o r t h e n o r t h i s a
p o s s i b l e s o l u t i o n . But we c o u l d r i s k i n t e r n a t i o n a l
u n i t y on s a n c t i o n s by c r e a t i n g a d i f f e r e n t s e t o f
rules f o r the north.
—
We b e l i e v e t h a t i n t h e long term, t h e s e c u r i t y and
s t a b i l i t y o f I r a q depends on t h e c r e a t i o n o f a d e m o c r a t i c ,
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e government w i t h i n t h e c o n f i n e s o f I r a q ' s
current borders.
With t h e support of r e g i o n a l s t a t e s , we b e l i e v e t h a t
the I r a q i N a t i o n a l Congress c o u l d h e l p f a c i l i t a t e t h e
process o f c r e a t i n g a democratic s t a t e .
CLINTON LtM^LPHOTOCOPY
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I r a n under R a f s a n j a n i has pursued a t w o - t r a c k f o r e i g n p o l i c y
which i n c r e a s i n g l y emphasizes domestic economic p r i o r i t i e s and
n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s , some but not a l l of w h i c h c o n f l i c t s h a r p l y
w i t h o u r s . At the same t i m e , I r a n c o n t i n u e s t o serve as the
champion f o r p o l i t i c a l I s l a m i c movements, i n c l u d i n g those which
engage i n v i o l e n c e or seek t o p l a y a d e s t a b i l i z i n g r o l e .
U.S. p o l i c y toward I r a n has focused on a l t e r i n g I r a n i a n
b e h a v i o r i n key a r e a s — t e r r o r i s m , weapons of mass d e s t r u c t i o n ,
t h r e a t s t o i t s n e i g h b o r s , and human r i g h t s — t h r o u g h s p e c i f i c
s a n c t i o n s and p u b l i c condemnation.
I r a n i s the most a c t i v e s t a t e sponsor of t e r r o r i s m we f a c e
today. I r a n i a n agents a s s a s s i n a t e I r a n i a n d i s s i d e n t s
r e s i d i n g abroad. I r a n a l s o p r o v i d e s v i t a l s u p p o r t t o
t e r r o r i s t groups such as H i z b a l l a h , and seeks t o expand i t s
t i e s t o r a d i c a l I s l a m i s t groups i n N o r t h A f r i c a .
I r a n i s p u r s u i n g n u c l e a r , chemical and b i o l o g i c a l weapons
programs. I t a l s o seeks t o a c q u i r e o t h e r d e s t a b i l i z i n g
weapons systems, such as m i s s i l e s and submarines, w i t h
which i t c o u l d t h r e a t e n i t s n e i g h b o r s .
I r a n ' s d i s m a l human r i g h t s r e c o r d i n c l u d e s summary
imprisonment and e x e c u t i o n s , and a d e n i a l of b a s i c l e g a l
rights.
We seek broad i n t e r n a t i o n a l s u p p o r t t o make our p r e s s u r e s
more e f f e c t i v e , i n the b e l i e f t h a t I r a n w i l l change i t s
p o l i c i e s o n l y i f the economic or p o l i t i c a l p r i c e i s h i g h .
The U.K.
shares our concerns and has worked c l o s e l y w i t h us i n
d e v e l o p i n g a common G-7 p o l i t i c a l approach on I r a n and on
seeking t o c o o r d i n a t e G-7 e x p o r t c o n t r o l p o l i c i e s . I t has been
more w i l l i n g than many i n the G-7 t o use p o l i t i c a l and economic
p r e s s u r e s t o change I r a n i a n b e h a v i o r .
But B r i t a i n ' s p o l i c y toward I r a n i s t o r n between p o l i t i c a l and
economic i n t e r e s t s . Government and P a r l i a m e n t a r y concerns
about I r a n i a n s p o n s o r s h i p of t e r r o r i s m , I r a n ' s arms b u i l d u p and
the " f a t w a h " a g a i n s t author Salman Rushdie have c o n f i n e d
r e l a t i o n s t o a low l e v e l .
The I r a n i a n market's a t t r a c t i o n t o
B r i t i s h business argues f o r b e t t e r r e l a t i o n s . The r e s u l t i s a
c e r t a i n ambivalence. For example, the UK has pushed h a r d f o r a
tough EC l i n e a g a i n s t I r a n i a n s u p p o r t f o r t e r r o r i s m , w h i l e
a r g u i n g t h a t our l a t e s t G-7 p r o p o s a l s on e x p o r t c o n t r o l s are
e x c e s s i v e . However, f o l l o w i n g B r i t a i n ' s "arms t o I r a q "
s c a n d a l , the government reviewed e x p o r t p o l i c y and i s about t o
announce new, t i g h t e r r e g u l a t i o n s c l o s e r t o our
own.
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ONLY I F ASKED:
We a r e concerned, as you are, by I r a n ' s s u p p o r t f o r
t e r r o r i s m ( i n c l u d i n g t e r r o r i s m aimed a t d e r a i l i n g t h e
M i d d l e East peace p r o c e s s ) , i t s p u r s u i t o f weapons o f mass
d e s t r u c t i o n and o t h e r d e s t a b i l i z i n g weapons systems, and
i t s d i s m a l human r i g h t s r e c o r d .
As you know, we have worked c l o s e l y w i t h your government
and o t h e r G-7 members t o develop a common p o l i t i c a l
approach on I r a n and t o harmonize n a t i o n a l e x p o r t c o n t r o l
p o l i c i e s . We g r e a t l y a p p r e c i a t e t h e UK's c o n s t r u c t i v e
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n and c o n t r i b u t i o n t o these e f f o r t s .
—
We l o o k f o r w a r d t o c o n t i n u i n g d i s c u s s i o n s o f t h e f a c t s o f
I r a n i a n b e h a v i o r , on whether we should c o n s i d e r new
t a c t i c s , and on how we can work t o g e t h e r , and w i t h o t h e r
G-7 s t a t e s , t o advance our shared o b j e c t i v e s .
1
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FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
The B r i t i s h t r o o p s engaged i n h u m a n i t a r i a n r e l i e f i n Bosnia
are p e r f o r m i n g h e r o i c a l l y under dangerous and d i f f i c u l t
conditions.
They are r i s k i n g t h e i r l i v e s t o save t h e l i v e s
of c o u n t l e s s i n n o c e n t c i v i l i a n s .
I t takes p o l i t i c a l l y courageous l e a d e r s , and an e n l i g h t e n e d
and compassionate c i t i z e n r y , t o u n d e r t a k e t h i s k i n d o f
h u m a n i t a r i a n m i s s i o n . C l e a r l y B r i t a i n has b o t h .
But I know i t i s n o t easy t o keep your t r o o p s t h e r e .
I am
committed t o having t h e U.S. p l a y a more a c t i v e r o l e i n
s u p p o r t o f UN and EC e f f o r t s i n Bosnia.
We want t o work
w i t h Vance and Owen t o f i n d a f a i r s o l u t i o n , and t o make i t
work.
R e a c t i o n t o our i n i t i a t i v e on p o l i c y toward
Y u g o s l a v i a has been l a r g e l y p o s i t i v e .
former
Amb. Bartholomew, our s p e c i a l envoy, had a s u c c e s s f u l v i s i t
to Moscow. We w i l l c o n t i n u e our e f f o r t s t o keep t h e
Russians engaged c o n s t r u c t i v e l y . We have asked f o r
Moscow's h e l p i n persuading t h e Bosnian Serbs t o a l l o w
h u m a n i t a r i a n convoys t o move f r e e l y , e s p e c i a l l y t o e a s t e r n
Bosnia.
Amb. Bartholomew i s now b e g i n n i n g t o meet w i t h Cy Vance and
L o r d Owen and w i t h t h e p a r t i e s . He w i l l emphasize t o them
t h a t we w i s h t o a s s i s t , n o t take over, these n e g o t i a t i o n s .
We w i s h t o b u i l d on what has a l r e a d y been agreed, and we
understand t h a t a l l p a r t i e s must be prepared t o compromise.
I t i s e s s e n t i a l t h a t P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c be engaged i n
the n e g o t i a t i o n s .
I have sent a message t o P r e s i d e n t
I z e t b e g o v i c asking him t o come t o t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s .
The
V i c e P r e s i d e n t and Amb. Bartholomew w i l l f o l l o w up w i t h
him.
—
We are a l s o i n t h e process of t a k i n g a hard l o o k a t
t i g h t e n i n g s a n c t i o n s and s a n c t i o n s enforcement.
We l o o k
f o r w a r d t o d i s c u s s i n g our ideas on t h i s w i t h you s h o r t l y .
—
We s u p p o r t t h e B r i t i s h - F r e n c h - S p a n i s h S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l
r e s o l u t i o n d r a f t t h a t c a l l s f o r t h e admission o f Macedonia
to t h e UN under t h e p r o v i s i o n a l name, "Former Yugoslav
R e p u b l i c of Macedonia." I t i s n o t c e r t a i n , however,
whether t h e t e x t w i l l be a c c e p t a b l e t o t h e two p a r t i e s . I t
may r e q u i r e some changes.
Our two governments must c o n t i n u e t o cooperate i n our
a t t e m p t s t o ensure t h a t Macedonia i s q u i c k l y a d m i t t e d t o
the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , but w i t h as l i t t l e damage as p o s s i b l e
to our r e l a t i o n s w i t h Greece.
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The Russian economy continues to d e c l i n e . Y e l t s i n has achieved
a number of important accomplishments — monetizing the
economy, c r e a t i n g market mechanisms, l i b e r a l i z i n g t r a d e ,
u n i f y i n g the currency exchange r a t e , and undertaking an
ambitious p r i v a t i z a t i o n program — but a l l of these gains could
be swept away by h y p e r i n f l a t i o n . ( I n f l a t i o n i s now running at
a monthly rate of about 30 percent.)
Under present economic conditions an IMF stand-by program i s
not j u s t i f i a b l e f o r Russia. Such a program i s a p r e - r e q u i s i t e ,
however, f o r other forms of f i n a n c i a l support, i n c l u d i n g a $6
b i l l i o n currency s t a b i l i z a t i o n fund promised at the G-7 summit
l a s t year. Given Russia's need and the i n a b i l i t y of producing
an IMF standby agreement any time soon, we are c u r r e n t l y
examining new ways i n which we could render aid to Russia.
The new Chernomyrdin government recognizes t h a t s t a b i l i z i n g the
economy i s i t s main economic p r i o r i t y , but i t w i l l face s t i f f
resistance to i t s proposed a u s t e r i t y measures from the Supreme
Soviet and Central Bank. Parliamentary opposition to Y e l t s i n ,
led by speaker Khasbulatov, has continued t o chip away at
Y e l t s i n ' s powers and p o l i c i e s .
Y e l t s i n had hoped to break both the p o l i t i c a l and economic
impasse by means of a n a t i o n a l referendum on c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
reform t o be held A p r i l 11. Opposition from parliamentarians
as w e l l as r e g i o n a l leaders, fear of a b e t t i n g s e p a r a t i s t
tendencies w i t h i n Russia i t s e l f , and u n c e r t a i n t y over the
outcome of the vote apparently have forced him, however, to
consider other ideas.
Y e l t s i n has proposed instead e a r l y parliamentary and
p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n s during 1994 and 1995 r e s p e c t i v e l y .
Unless accompanied by a genuine consensus on economic and
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reform, t h i s proposal would continue the current
stalemate f o r the next year w i t h no guarantee t h a t e l e c t i o n s
would produce a more p l i a b l e l e g i s l a t u r e . Y e l t s i n ,
Khasbulatov, and C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Court Chairman Zorkin are
engaged i n n e g o t i a t i o n s to hammer out a s o l u t i o n t o Russia's
p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s . Pressure i s increasing on a l l the
p a r t i c i p a n t s and the outcome i s f a r from c e r t a i n . I f agreement
i s reached, an e x t r a o r d i n a r y session of the Congress of
Peoples' Deputies could convene i n e a r l y March to r a t i f y the
agreement.
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�-2Absent some renewal o f Y e l t s i n ' s a u t h o r i t y , t h e Russian
domestic and f o r e i g n p o l i c y m a k i n g process w i l l c o n t i n u e t o be
marked by b u r e a u c r a t i c i n f i g h t i n g combined w i t h p a r l i a m e n t a r y
p r e s s u r e s toward g r e a t e r a s s e r t i v e n e s s of Russia's p r e r o g a t i v e s
as a g r e a t power. On a number of f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e s
( B o s n i a , I r a q , n o n - p r o l i f e r a t i o n ) , Y e l t s i n ' s margin f o r
maneuver w i l l be c o n s t r a i n e d .
D e s p i t e t h e p r e s s u r e s , he has shown no s i g n o f abandoning h i s
b a s i c pro-Western o r i e n t a t i o n .
—
Almost s i n c e e l e c t i o n day, t h e Russians have been p r e s s i n g
f o r an e a r l y summit.
The p r e l i m i n a r y Russian r e a c t i o n t o our new
e x - Y u g o s l a v i a has been p o s i t i v e .
—
approach on
We c o n t i n u e t o cooperate c l o s e l y on arms c o n t r o l .
Yeltsin
has f o r m a l l y s u b m i t t e d START I I t o t h e Supreme S o v i e t f o r
r a t i f i c a t i o n , and we are w o r k i n g c l o s e l y w i t h t h e Russians
t o persuade t h e p a r l i a m e n t t h a t t h e t r e a t y i s f a i r and
balanced.
The most u r g e n t t a s k i n arms c o n t r o l i s t o o b t a i n f u l f i l l m e n t
Ukraine,
of t h e L i s b o n P r o t o c o l by Ukraine and Kazakhstan.
which has n e i t h e r r a t i f i e d t h e START I T r e a t y nor adhered t o
the NPT, i s key here.
( B e l a r u s has a l ready approved START and
NPT; Kazakhstan has approved START but not y e t adhered t o t h e
NPT.)
We have pressed t h e U k r a i n i a n s t o f u l f i l l t h e i r
commitments under t h e L i s b o n P r o t o c o l , and b o t h we and t h e UK
have o f f e r e d them s e c u r i t y assurances and a s s i s t a n c e i n t h e
dismantlement o f s t r a t e g i c arms.
At t h e same t i m e , we have urged t h e Russians t o amend t h e i r own
s e c u r i t y assurances t o Ukraine i n o r d e r t o t a k e account o f
U k r a i n i a n concerns.
We have a l s o i n s i s t e d t h a t t h e proceeds of
Russian s a l e s t o t h e U.S. of h i g h l y e n r i c h e d uranium (HEU) from
d i s m a n t l e d former S o v i e t n u c l e a r warheads be e q u i t a b l y shared
w i t h U k r a i n e , B e l a r u s , and Kazakhstan, something t h e Russians
have r e s i s t e d .
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RUSSIA
Russian I n t e r n a l S i t u a t i o n
P r e s i d e n t Y e l t s i n has been on t h e p o l i t i c a l d e f e n s i v e s i n c e
the l a s t December Congress o f Peoples' D e p u t i e s and may now
be backing away from t h e idea o f h o l d i n g a n a t i o n a l
referendum on c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m .
Y e l t s i n i s t r y i n g t o reach a compromise agreement w i t h t h e
p a r l i a m e n t on l e g i s l a t i v e - e x e c u t i v e p o w e r - s h a r i n g . Such
agreement c o u l d o b v i a t e t h e need f o r a referendum, b u t
under p r e s e n t c i r c u m s t a n c e s any compromise w i l l l i k e l y
f a v o r p a r l i a m e n t a t Y e l t s i n ' s expense.
Economy
—
Y e l t s i n ' s p o s i t i o n has been f u r t h e r weakened by t h e
s t a t e o f t h e Russian economy. We are encouraged by
Y e l t s i n government's development o f a s t a b i l i z a t i o n
to f i g h t i n f l a t i o n .
The program appears p r o m i s i n g ,
government faces an u p h i l l b a t t l e t o secure passage
parliament.
poor
the
program
but t h e
by t h e
Economic c o n d i t i o n s are u n l i k e l y t o show improvement any
t i m e soon.
Any h e l p we can render t h e government's s t a b i l i z a t i o n
program c o u l d s t r e n g t h e n Y e l t s i n ' s hand i n implementing
reform.
I f t h e Russians g a i n c o n t r o l o f t h e i r monetary and f i s c a l
p o l i c i e s , we and t h e G-7 w i l l need t o work w i t h them t o
f a c i l i t a t e new c a p i t a l f l o w s .
Since t i m e i s o f t h e essence and s i n c e an IMF s t a n d b y
program i s not l i k e l y t o be a c h i e v a b l e soon, we a r e
r e v i e w i n g our b i l a t e r a l a s s i s t a n c e t o see what new
i n i t i a t i v e s c o u l d be announced t o s u p p o r t a Russian
s t a b i l i z a t i o n program a t my f i r s t meeting w i t h Y e l t s i n .
—
A c t i o n on debt r e s c h e d u l i n g i s e s s e n t i a l .
We need t o be
f l e x i b l e and accept any s e n s i b l e arrangement worked o u t
between Russian and U k r a i n e on r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e d e b t .
--
We a l s o need t o be f l e x i b l e on how much we ask Russian t o
pay i n 1993.
I hope you w i l l work w i t h me t o c o n v i n c e o t h e r s i n t h e G-7
and i n t h e P a r i s Club o f t h e need t o be f l e x i b l e .
-€eWFIDEMTIAL'
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We welcome your c l o s e c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h us i n w o r k i n g w i t h
the U k r a i n i a n s t o get START I r a t i f i e d . Three i s s u e s need
t o be r e s o l v e d t o get t h e U k r a i n i a n s on board: (1) t h e
problem o f s e c u r i t y assurances t o U k r a i n e ; (2) s h a r i n g o f
the proceeds from t h e s a l e t o t h e U.S. o f h i g h l y e n r i c h e d
uranium (HEU) t a k e n from d i s m a n t l e d warheads; and (3)
a s s i s t a n c e i n e l i m i n a t i n g s t r a t e g i c o f f e n s i v e arms.
—
We have r e i t e r a t e d t o b o t h U k r a i n i a n s and Russians t h a t
w i l l not n e g o t i a t e on our s e c u r i t y assurances package,
a l t h o u g h we might agree t o minor t e c h n i c a l changes.
we
The Russians have t o l d us t h a t t h e y can agree t o r e f e r t o
CSCE p r i n c i p l e s i n t h e s e c u r i t y assurances t h e y are
prepared t o o f f e r t h e U k r a i n i a n s . We have urged t h e
Russians t o convey t h e amended assurances t o t h e U k r a i n i a n s
as soon as p o s s i b l e , but t h e y have not y e t done so.
—
We would welcome your w e i g h i n g - i n w i t h t h e Russians on t h i s
p o i n t . Once t h e Russians have amended t h e i r assurances, we
s h o u l d press hard f o r U k r a i n i a n c l o s u r e .
On HEU, we are w o r k i n g hard on an agreement f o r t h e U.S. t o
purchase HEU from d i s m a n t l e d former S o v i e t n u c l e a r weapons.
—
As you know, we have t o l d Russia — a t a l l l e v e l s — i t i s
e s s e n t i a l t h a t t h e y reach agreement w i t h B e l a r u s ,
Kazakhstan and Ukraine on an e q u i t a b l e s h a r i n g o f t h e
proceeds from the s a l e of HEU t o t h e U.S.
We w i l l not
implement any c o n t r a c t u n t i l t h e Russians have worked out a
s h a r i n g arrangement.
Regarding a s s i s t a n c e on e l i m i n a t i o n o f s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r
d e l i v e r y v e h i c l e s (SNDVs), we have h e l d s e v e r a l rounds o f
t e c h n i c a l d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h U k r a i n e and have pledged $175
m i l l i o n i n Nunn-Lugar f u n d i n g toward t h e e l i m i n a t i o n
process.
D u r i n g t h e e l e c t i o n , I s a i d I f a v o r e d a comprehensive t e s t
ban.
I would l i k e t o go f o r w a r d w i t h t h i s p r o p o s a l , but I
wanted f i r s t t o d i s c u s s i t w i t h you and t h e n g i v e our
e x p e r t s an o p p o r t u n i t y t o c o n s u l t on t h e mechanism f o r
proceeding.
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IRAQ
The UK c o n t i n u e s t o be one of t h e s t r o n g e s t s u p p o r t e r s o f our
I r a q p o l i c y , p a r t i c i p a t i n g f u l l y i n a l l m i s s i o n s , whether
p o l i t i c a l , m i l i t a r y , or h u m a n i t a r i a n . B r i t i s h l e a d e r s b e l i e v e
t h a t c o n t i n u e d , steady, p r o p o r t i o n a t e p r e s s u r e must be
m a i n t a i n e d on Saddam Hussein.
Prime M i n i s t e r Major w i l l be coming t o Washington hoping f o r
answers on fundamental q u e s t i o n s on U.S. p o l i c y on I r a q
i n c l u d i n g : whether we i n t e n d t o e n f o r c e t h e s t i l l s t a n d i n g
demand t h a t I r a q remove i t s SAMs from t h r e a t e n i n g p o s i t i o n s i n
the n o - f l y zones; whether we are prepared t o respond w i t h f o r c e
to renewed c h a l l e n g e s t o t h e n o - f l y zone or n o r t h e r n r e l i e f
e f f o r t ; and whether we w i l l keep t h e d i p l o m a t i c and economic
p r e s s u r e on I r a q .
The B r i t i s h doubt t h a t l o w - l e v e l a c t i o n s such as s t r i k e s a g a i n s t
SAM s i t e s w i l l undermine Saddam's p o s i t i o n . They b e l i e v e we
w i l l need t o do more t o shore up what t h e y view as i n c r e a s i n g l y
f r a g i l e s u p p o r t from t h e Arabs and Turkey. I f f u r t h e r m i l i t a r y
a c t i o n a g a i n s t I r a q becomes necessary, t h e B r i t i s h w i l l be even
more p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h concerns about l e g a l i t y and
proportionality.
US p o l i c y on I r a q remains t o i n s i s t upon f u l l I r a q i compliance
w i t h a l l S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l r e s o l u t i o n s and r e s p e c t f o r measures
enacted by t h e C o a l i t i o n t o m o n i t o r and e n f o r c e those
resolutions.
I r a q ' s c u r r e n t "charm o f f e n s i v e " aims t o show i t i s i n
" s u f f i c i e n t " compliance w i t h UNSC r e s o l u t i o n s f o r
s a n c t i o n s t o be eased a t t h e next r e v i e w i n March.
Past e x p e r i e n c e suggests t h a t I r a q w i l l not f u l l y
comply by March and t h a t , i f i t s s t r a t e g y does not
work, I r a q w i l l r e t u r n t o open d e f i a n c e .
J o i n t UN, US, UK and EC h u m a n i t a r i a n r e l i e f e f f o r t s are showing
some s i g n s of success. I n t e r i m r e p o r t s suggest t h a t at t h e
p r e s e n t pace of a i d d e l i v e r y t h e r e w i l l not be a r e p e a t of
widespread d e p r i v a t i o n and p o p u l a t i o n movements o f 1991.
However, I r a q c o u l d e a s i l y d i s r u p t d e l i v e r i e s and
the p o p u l a t i o n at r i s k .
put
I n o r d e r t o make n o r t h e r n I r a q l e s s r e l i a n t on o u t s i d e a i d , t h e
UK i s l e a n i n g toward f i n d i n g ways t o o b t a i n s a n c t i o n s exemptions
to p r o v i d e a s s i s t a n c e which would r e a c t i v a t e l i g h t i n d u s t r i e s
and improve i n f r a s t r u c t u r e i n t h e r e g i o n .
We support t h i s i d e a , but e s t a b l i s h i n g a d i f f e r e n t s e t
of i m p o r t / e x p o r t r u l e s f o r n o r t h e r n I r a q c o u l d t h r e a t e n
the i n t e r n a t i o n a l consensus behind s a n c t i o n s .
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CLINTON LIBfWTPHOTOCOPY
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BRITAIN, THE U.S. AND THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS
The B r i t i s h have welcomed t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s i n i t i a t i v e on
Bosnia, which t h e y see as r e f l e c t i n g t h e i r own views and
concerns.
John Major comes t o Washington eager t o do a l l he
can t o h e l p i t succeed.
The B r i t i s h have c o n s i s t e n t l y argued t h a t t h e West has l i t t l e
choice b u t t o s u p p o r t t h e Vance-Owen p l a n , however f l a w e d i t
may be. I n r e c e n t weeks t h e y urged t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and
NATO p l a y a l a r g e r r o l e i n r e a c h i n g and implementing a
Vance-Owen b r o k e r e d s e t t l e m e n t , i n c l u d i n g p r o v i d i n g t r o o p s .
Our i n i t i a t i v e addressed both these p o i n t s , much t o John
Major's s a t i s f a c t i o n .
The U.S. i n i t i a t i v e a l s o p u t o f f t h e k i n d o f a c t i o n London most
dreads —
use o f f o r c e , such as n o - f l y zone enforcement o r
a i r s t r i k e s a g a i n s t Serb t a r g e t s . London f e a r s t h a t such
a c t i o n would t r i g g e r r e p r i s a l a g a i n s t UN ( i n c l u d i n g B r i t i s h )
t r o o p s on t h e ground, t h e c o l l a p s e o f t h e h u m a n i t a r i a n e f f o r t ,
and e v e n t u a l i r r e s i s t i b l e p r e s s u r e f o r massive Western
i n t e r v e n t i o n . The B r i t i s h b e l i e v e t h a t once i n , t h e West would
be a long t i m e g e t t i n g o u t . They were v a s t l y r e l i e v e d t h a t
t h e i r warnings were heard i n Washington, and encouraged t h a t
the new A d m i n i s t r a t i o n i s ready t o c o n s i d e r c o n t r i b u t i n g more
m i l i t a r i l y t o peacekeeping o r h u m a n i t a r i a n e f f o r t s .
Since Y u g o s l a v i a e r u p t e d i n open f i g h t i n g i n 1991, t h e B r i t i s h
have doubted t h e a b i l i t y o f o u t s i d e r s t o h e l p s o l v e t h e
crisis.
S t i l l , B r i t a i n agreed w i t h i t s more a c t i v i s t EC
p a r t n e r s t h a t the Community should t a k e t h e l e a d i n t h e e f f o r t
t o b r o k e r a s e t t l e m e n t . When the EC proved unequal t o t h e
t a s k , HMG as EC P r e s i d e n t launched t h e August 1992 London
Conference on Y u g o s l a v i a t o regenerate a peace process, t h i s
t i m e w i t h deeper UN i n v o l v e m e n t .
The B r i t i s h c o n t i n u e t o work
a c t i v e l y i n the UN t o r e s o l v e t h e Greek-Macedonian impasse.
So long as t h e f i g h t i n g i s c o n f i n e d t o former Y u g o s l a v i a ,
London sees no n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s d i r e c t l y a t s t a k e . But
domestic p r e s s u r e t o "do something" p l u s EC c o n s i d e r a t i o n s (and
U.S. p r e s s u r e f o r an " a l l necessary means" r e s o l u t i o n i n t h e
UN) prompted HMG t o deploy some 2,500 s o l d i e r s t o Bosnia.
B r i t a i n i s among t h e l a r g e s t t r o o p c o n t r i b u t o r s i n
e x - Y u g o s l a v i a , and operates i n one o f t h e t o u g h e s t areas.
Defense S e c r e t a r y R i f k i n d , w i t h m i l i t a r y and Tory backbench
s u p p o r t , s t r o n g l y opposes any UK m i l i t a r y engagement beyond
h u m a n i t a r i a n r e l i e f . C o n t r i b u t i n g t o a peacekeeping e f f o r t i n
support o f a brokered agreement would be a hard d e c i s i o n i n
London. Major and F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y Hurd say t h e y w i l l need
c l o s e c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h Washington i f t h e y a r e t o overcome
R i f k i n d ' s r e s i s t a n c e . NATO l e a d e r s h i p , and commitment o f U.S.
ground t r o o p s , i s p r o b a b l y a necessary p r e c o n d i t i o n t o f u r t h e r
B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y involvement i n e x - Y u g o s l a v i a .
CLINTON LlflfWPHOTOCOPY
�•EGRET
PALESTINIAN DEPORTEES
When I s r a e l announced i t s package o f measures t o r e s o l v e
t h e d e p o r t a t i o n i s s u e on Feb. 1 , B r i t a i n i n s i s t e d t h a t
I s r a e l s h o u l d comply f u l l y w i t h UNSCR 799.
The F o r e i g n O f f i c e agreed w i t h us t h a t r e i n v i g o r a t i n g t h e
peace process should be t h e t o p p r i o r i t y , b u t t h e y doubted
t h a t Rabin had o f f e r e d enough t o enable t h e P a l e s t i n i a n s t o
return t o the negotiations.
The B r i t i s h s u p p o r t e d t h e s c e n a r i o worked o u t a t t h e
S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l February 12, i n which t h e SC P r e s i d e n t
o b t a i n e d t h e C o u n c i l ' s a p p r o v a l t o convey f i v e p o i n t s t o
t h e I s r a e l i r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . The B r i t i s h Perm Rep p l a y e d a
helpful role.
The B r i t i s h now agree t h a t t h e d e p o r t a t i o n i s s u e i s
behind us and t h a t we s h o u l d focus on moving f o r w a r d
i n t h e peace process.
B r i t a i n remains concerned a t P a l e s t i n i a n r e j e c t i o n o f
the C o u n c i l ' s a c t i o n s and would s u p p o r t f u r t h e r
I s r a e l i gestures t o the P a l e s t i n i a n s .
As Hamas-sponsored t e r r o r i s t a t t a c k s on I s r a e l i s c o n t i n u e ,
we doubt Rabin i s i n c l i n e d t o o f f e r a n y t h i n g f u r t h e r t o t h e
Palestinians a t t h i s time.
B r i t a i n c o u l d u s e f u l l y employ i t s c o n t a c t s w i t h t h e PLO t o
urge t h e P a l e s t i n i a n s n o t t o a l l o w Hamas and o t h e r
opponents o f t h e peace process t o b l o c k t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s .
-SECRET-.
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�POINTS TO BE MADE
PALESTINIAN DEPORTEES
—
We a p p r e c i a t e B r i t a i n ' s t i m e l y s u p p o r t f o r t h e s c e n a r i o
worked o u t a t t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l on t h e i s s u e o f t h e
P a l e s t i n i a n deportees.
Now t h a t I s r a e l has conveyed t o t h e C o u n c i l t h a t i t s
a c t i o n s are c o n s i s t e n t w i t h UNSCR 799, we can proceed t o
focus o u r a t t e n t i o n on t h e peace process.
B r i t a i n ' s support f o r t h e peace process i s i m p o r t a n t .
—
We would a p p r e c i a t e B r i t a i n ' s a s s i s t a n c e i n c o u n s e l i n g t h e
PLO t h a t t h e P a l e s t i n i a n s ' i n t e r e s t s a r e best served by
returning t o the negotiations.
Hamas should n o t be a l l o w e d t o pose an o b s t a c l e t o t h e
peace process.
PER E O 13526
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�• COfflEIBEMTTgL
UN SECURITY COUNCIL EXPANSION
Background
—
Many o f t h e n o n - a l i g n e d and o t h e r s s u p p o r t expansion i n t h e
number o f t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l ' s permanent members.
—
Japan, Germany, and s e v e r a l o t h e r s a s p i r e t o permanent
seats.
—
We would support permanent seats f o r Germany and Japan, b u t
expanding t h e C o u n c i l w i t h o u t d i m i n i s h i n g i t s o p e r a t i o n a l
e f f e c t i v e n e s s w i l l be d i f f i c u l t .
—
We would want t o a v o i d t o o l a r g e an expansion.
—
A t i t s l a s t s e s s i o n , t h e General Assembly approved by
consensus a r e s o l u t i o n on e q u i t a b l e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and
i n c r e a s e i n t h e membership o f t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l . The
r e s o l u t i o n asks member s t a t e s t o submit comments on t h e
i s s u e t o t h e SYG p r i o r t o June 30 and f o r t h e SYG t o r e p o r t
on t h e m a t t e r t o t h e next UNGA.
—
There i s no consensus among UN members about how t o manage
expansion.
Disagreement a l s o e x i s t s over whether permanent
members s h o u l d have t h e v e t o .
B r i t i s h Views
—
Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , t h e B r i t i s h are u n e n t h u s i a s t i c about
making changes i n t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l . F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y
Hurd responded t o a q u e s t i o n r e c e n t l y on t h e s u b j e c t w i t h
the r e t o r t , " I f i t a i n ' t broke, don't f i x i t . "
—
Prime M i n i s t e r Major r e l a y e d t h i s mood o f c a u t i o n i n
p r i v a t e comments he made t o our Ambassador i n I n d i a l a s t
month. Major noted t h a t i f Germany t r i e d t o become a
permanent SC member, t h e d e v e l o p i n g w o r l d would o b j e c t
s e r i o u s l y t o t h r e e permanent seats going t o Western
Europe. He p r e d i c t e d t h a t t h e U.S. would n o t be pleased
w i t h t h e n a t u r e o f French-German c o o p e r a t i o n on t h e
C o u n c i l . Major i n d i c a t e d he would s u p p o r t Japan coming on
alone. Major c a u t i o n e d t h a t t h e U.S. (and UK) s h o u l d a v o i d
c a s t i n g a v e t o ( a g a i n s t Japan) b u t f e a r e d China and Russia
might e v e n t u a l l y do so.
•CONriDENTIAL
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�COMriDDM'l IAL
POINTS TO BE MADE
UN SECURITY COUNCTL ENLARGEMENT
(ONLY IF ASKED):
— UN S e c u r i t y Council composition r e f l e c t s the immediate post
World War I I s i t u a t i o n rather than c u r r e n t r e a l i t i e s .
— We would support a well-thought-out e f f o r t t o update
Council membership.
— As you know, we support permanent seats f o r Japan and
Germany.
-- We recognize and share many of the concerns your
government has i n regard t o t h i s issue.
—
Our o v e r r i d i n g concern must be Council e f f e c t i v e n e s s . We
could not support an enlargement t h a t might get out of
c o n t r o l or detract from the Council's a b i l i t y t o do
business.
— We need t o t h i n k c r e a t i v e l y about how t h i s issue can be
managed and how t o address the perception t h a t the Council
should b e t t e r r e f l e c t c u r r e n t global r e a l i t i e s .
•CONFIDENTIAL
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HONG KONG AND THE
UK
DECLASSIFIED
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B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s expect t h e l a s t f i v e years o f t h e i r r u l e i n
Hong Kong t o be among t h e most d i f f i c u l t i n t h e c o l o n y ' s
h i s t o r y . T h e i r goals a r e :
t o p r e s e r v e t h e s t a b i l i t y and p r o s p e r i t y of Hong Kong
t h r o u g h 1997 and beyond;
t o b u i l d democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s capable o f w i t h s t a n d i n g
expected Chinese p r e s s u r e a f t e r t r a n s i t i o n ;
t o achieve the l e a s t d i s r u p t i v e t r a n s f e r o f power p o s s i b l e ;
t o m a i n t a i n t h e commercial p o s i t i o n of B r i t i s h f i r m s i n
Hong Kong and China; and
t o p r e v e n t Hong Kong f r o m becoming a domestic p o l i t i c a l
football in Britain.
These g o a l s have a l r e a d y come i n t o c o n f l i c t , most n o t a b l y over
Governor C h r i s Patten's p r o p o s a l s t o broaden m o d e s t l y t h e
f r a n c h i s e o f t h e 1995 e l e c t i o n s t o t h e L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l ,
which w i l l c o n t i n u e t o s i t when China t a k e s over s o v e r e i g n t y i n
1997.
Progress towards t h e smooth t r a n s i t i o n t o PRC
s o v e r e i g n t y has a l s o been marred by an ongoing d i s p u t e over
c o n s t r u c t i o n of a new Hong Kong a i r p o r t .
B e i j i n g r e a c t e d vehemently t o P a t t e n ' s p r o p o s a l s , making
t h r e a t s r a n g i n g from undoing any changes t o a n n u l l i n g c o n t r a c t s
made w i t h o u t i t s consent a f t e r 1997.
A l t h o u g h t h e Chinese may
o n l y be p o s t u r i n g , the v e r b a l barrage weakens t h e f o u n d a t i o n
f o r a smooth t r a n s i t i o n , has caused t h e s t o c k market t o
r e v e r b e r a t e , and has shaken l o c a l c o n f i d e n c e i n Hong Kong's
future s t a b i l i t y .
There are s i g n s , however, t h a t B e i j i n g i s moving t o resume
t a l k s w i t h B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s on Hong Kong's f u t u r e .
Coming
back t o t h e t a b l e would r e p r e s e n t a major Chinese c o n c e s s i o n ,
and would h e l p t o defuse t h e c r i s i s over P a t t e n ' s p r o p o s a l s .
But i t i s s t i l l u n c l e a r whether t h e Chinese are p r e p a r e d t o
resume s u b s t a n t i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h Hong Kong o f f i c i a l s , or
s i m p l y p l a n t o use the t a l k s t o d e l a y l e g i s l a t i v e a c t i o n on
Patten's proposals.
Hong Kong, China, and
MFN
HMG b e l i e v e s MFN i s the wrong t o o l f o r t r y i n g t o remedy human
r i g h t s abuses i n China.
The B r i t i s h c l a i m t h a t Hong Kong c o u l d
lose up t o $16 b i l l i o n of i t s o v e r a l l t r a d e and as many as
60,000 j o b s i f MFN were suspended. A l t h o u g h Governor P a t t e n
has on o c c a s i o n h i n t e d t h a t he might f a v o r an i n f o r m a l l i n k a g e
between China's a t t i t u d e toward Hong Kong and MFN, he has most
r e c e n t l y emphasized t h a t t h e r i s k s of such l i n k a g e are f a r
g r e a t e r than t h e p o t e n t i a l b e n e f i t s .
eewriDENTiAL
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�•GOWFIBEMTIAL'
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POINTS TO BE MADE
HONG KONG
The 1984 J o i n t D e c l a r a t i o n p r o v i d e s a good framework f o r
Hong Kong's r e v e r s i o n t o PRC s o v e r e i g n t y .
We r e c o g n i z e t h a t d u r i n g t h e next few years s p e c i f i c i s s u e s
r e l a t i n g t o Hong Kong's t r a n s i t i o n are f o r t h e UK and the
PRC t o determine.
However, our own i n t e r e s t s i n Hong Kong make t h e U.S. a
keen observer o f t h e t r a n s i t i o n process and d r i v e our
p o l i c y commitment t o p l a y a s t r o n g and s u p p o r t i v e r o l e i n
d o i n g what we can t o ensure a s u c c e s s f u l and s t a b l e
transition.
We i n t e n d t o m a i n t a i n and expand our s t r o n g t i e s w i t h Hong
Kong. We want t o conclude a p p r o p r i a t e b i l a t e r a l
agreements, c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the J o i n t D e c l a r a t i o n , t o
p r o v i d e a long term framework f o r those r e l a t i o n s .
We view t h e e s c a l a t i o n o f t e n s i o n s between t h e HKG and t h e
PRC w i t h concern, and have made those concerns known t o t h e
PRC.
We have not endorsed Governor Patten's p r o p o s a l s , b u t
b e l i e v e t h e y are w o r t h y o f c o n s i d e r a t i o n by a l l p a r t i e s .
We would welcome t h e resumption o f t h e S i n o - B r i t i s h J o i n t
L i a i s o n Group d i s c u s s i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e f u t u r e o f Hong
Kong .
China's MFN s t a t u s i s c r u c i a l t o c o n t i n u e d s t a b i l i t y i n
Hong Kong's business community and t o American businesses
o p e r a t i n g i n Hong Kong.
We are deeply t r o u b l e d by the r a p i d i n c r e a s e i n i l l e g a l
i m m i g r a t i o n from China and t h e use o f Hong Kong as a p l a c e
t o o u t f i t v e s s e l s used by smugglers o f i l l e g a l a l i e n s .
F i f t e e n o f these v e s s e l s have e n t e r e d U.S. w a t e r s i n t h e
past year and we understand another 15-20 s i m i l a r l y
o u t f i t t e d v e s s e l s are i n Hong Kong harbor ready t o d e p a r t .
We hope t h e Hong Kong government w i l l use a l l l e g a l means
a v a i l a b l e t o d i s c o u r a g e such o p e r a t i o n s and p r e v e n t such
a t t e m p t s which u s u a l l y e n t a i l g r e a t human s u f f e r i n g . The
s t o r i e s o f t h e 537 Chinese m i g r a n t s aboard t h e Eastwood who
are now a w a i t i n g r e p a t r i a t i o n on K w a j a l e i n ( M a r s h a l l
I s l a n d s ) t e s t i f y t o t h e need t o end t h i s p r a c t i c e
expeditiously.
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BRITAIN AND THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
Along w i t h o t h e r Europeans, t h e B r i t i s h o f t e n show g r e a t e r
sympathy t o Arab p o s i t i o n s than t o I s r a e l ' s , p a r t i c u l a r l y
r e g a r d i n g t h e occupied t e r r i t o r i e s .
This r e f l e c t s t r a d i t i o n a l
B r i t i s h l i n k s t o t h e Arab w o r l d , p l u s t h e i n f l u e n c e o f F o r e i g n
Office Arabists.
N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e UK s t r o n g l y supports t h e U.S.-brokered
A r a b - I s r a e l i peace process.
I t has, f o r example, f o l l o w e d our
lead on t h e P a l e s t i n i a n deportees i s s u e , w h i l e i n f o r m a l l y
l o o k i n g f o r ways t o check u n h e l p f u l a c t i v i t y a t t h e UN. The
B r i t i s h back us i n demanding balanced t r e a t m e n t o f I s r a e l i n UN
r e s o l u t i o n s , and t h e y have worked t o shape EC ( p a r t i c u l a r l y
French) designs on t h e peace process t o meet U.S. concerns.
They a r e , however, j u s t as i n s i s t e n t as t h e French and o t h e r s
t h a t Europe's s e c u r i t y , p o l i t i c a l and economic i n t e r e s t e n t i t l e
the EC t o a prominent seat a t t h e t a b l e .
The moderate B r i t i s h approach t o t h e PLO o f f e r s some advantages
t o us. London m a i n t a i n s c o n t a c t t h r o u g h t h e B r i t i s h Embassy i n
T u n i s i a and t h r o u g h an i n d i v i d u a l i n London who c a l l s h i m s e l f
the PLO r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , b u t who has no o f f i c i a l s t a n d i n g .
These channels enable t h e FCO, a t our behest, t o urge
moderation on P a l e s t i n i a n n e g o t i a t o r s , t h e PLO and Arab
governments.
HMG does n o t advocate a P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e and regards t h e PLO
o n l y as an u m b r e l l a o r g a n i z a t i o n e x p r e s s i n g P a l e s t i n i a n
i d e n t i t y and a s p i r a t i o n s . D e s p i t e s t r o n g FCO i n t e r e s t a t b o t h
the w o r k i n g and t h e p o l i t i c a l l e v e l , t h e B r i t i s h have d e f e r r e d
t o our w i s h t o p u t o f f m i n i s t e r i a l - l e v e l c o n t a c t s w i t h t h e
PLO.
•eeNFIDENTIAk
DECL:OADR
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�SECRET"
POINTS TO BE MADE
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
The p u r s u i t o f peace i n the M i d d l e East i s a v e r y h i g h
p r i o r i t y f o r my A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .
We a r e s t r o n g l y committed t o t h e M a d r i d process.
We w i l l
work hard t o make i t succeed, and b e l i e v e t h e r e a r e r e a l
o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r progress t h i s y e a r .
We a p p r e c i a t e t h e c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t we have had w i t h
you on t h e peace process, n o t o n l y on a b i l a t e r a l b a s i s b u t
a l s o over t h e past s i x months d u r i n g t h e U n i t e d Kingdom's
Presidency o f t h e European Community. I hope t h i s c l o s e
c o o p e r a t i o n w i l l c o n t i n u e as we move f o r w a r d .
As you a r e aware. S e c r e t a r y C h r i s t o p h e r i s v i s i t i n g t h e
r e g i o n t o c o n s u l t d i r e c t l y w i t h t h e p a r t i e s on next steps
f o r c o n t i n u i n g t h e peace n e g o t i a t i o n s . He w i l l attempt t o
gauge t h e p a r t i e s ' views and t o determine how best t o g e t
t h e t a l k s back on t r a c k .
We are h o p e f u l t h a t we can f i n d enough common ground t o
reconvene t h e b i l a t e r a l t a l k s as soon as p o s s i b l e a f t e r
S e c r e t a r y C h r i s t o p h e r r e t u r n s , and t h e m u l t i l a t e r a l t a l k s
i n A p r i l and May.
Together w i t h you and t h e EC, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s remains
opposed t o I s r a e l ' s use o f d e p o r t a t i o n s , and has made t h i s
c l e a r t o t h e Rabin government. We s u p p o r t UNSCR 799 and
want t o see a s o l u t i o n t o t h e i s s u e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h i t .
We b e l i e v e t h a t w i t h t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g s reached w i t h t h e
I s r a e l i s , a process has been c r e a t e d w h i c h :
allows a
s i g n i f i c a n t number o f deportees t o r e t u r n t o I s r a e l o r t h e
occupied t e r r i t o r i e s i m m e d i a t e l y ; h a l v e s t h e sentences o f
the remainder; and assures t h e d e l i v e r y o f h u m a n i t a r i a n
assistance.
These steps r e p r e s e n t the best and most p r a c t i c a l approach
t o seeing r e s o l u t i o n 799"s o b j e c t i v e s r e a l i z e d . We need t o
g i v e t h i s process a chance t o work. We were v e r y pleased
w i t h t h e e f f o r t s o f t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l l a s t week t o p u t
t h i s i s s u e behind us and we want t o thank you f o r your
s u p p o r t i n a c h i e v i n g t h i s end.
PER E.0.13526
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CLINTON LIBRafW"PHOTOCOPY
�DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13S26
NORTHERN IRELAND
British Sensitivity
Few i s s u e s have more p o t e n t i a l f o r c r e a t i n g problems i n
Anglo-American r e l a t i o n s than N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d .
—
The
B r i t i s h r e g a r d i t as an i n t e r n a l m a t t e r .
—
They b e l i e v e t h a t t h e U.S.
n a t i o n a l i s t perspective.
tends t o view i t from the
The e x t e n s i o n of t e r r o r i s t campaigns t o England, i n n o c e n t
l o s s o f l i f e , and t h e t a r g e t i n g o f B r i t a i n ' s p o l i t i c a l
l e a d e r s h i p have made HMG s e n s i t i v e t o a d v i c e from o u t s i d e .
I n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d , t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s campaign statements
aroused hopes i n t h e C a t h o l i c community and f e a r s among t h e
U n i o n i s t s t h a t t h e USG would weigh i n on t h e n a t i o n a l i s t s i d e .
Status of the Talks
The p o l i t i c a l t a l k s , which broke o f f i n November w i t h o u t
agreement, c o n t a i n t h r e e " s t r a n d s " — d e v o l v e d government i n
N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d , r e l a t i o n s between N o r t h and South i n I r e l a n d ,
and t i e s between t h e UK and I r e l a n d .
The major s t u m b l i n g b l o c k s a r e : 1) who w i l l e x e r c i s e
e x e c u t i v e power i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d , 2) D u b l i n ' s r o l e i n
N o r t h e r n I r i s h a f f a i r s , and 3) t h e U n i o n i s t s ' demand t h a t
I r e l a n d r e v i s e i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c l a i m t o the North.
I n f o r m a l t a l k s c o n t i n u e and f o r m a l sessions may resume
soon. Dick S p r i n g , t h e new I r i s h F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r , i s
expected t o press f o r an agreement.
Terrorism
The l e v e l of v i o l e n c e (84 deaths i n 1992 i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d )
i s w e l l down from i t s 1972 peak of more t h a n 450 deaths.
Two
r e c e n t t r e n d s , however, are worrisome:
1) t h e i n c r e a s e d
p r o f i c i e n c y of t h e l o y a l i s t ( P r o t e s t a n t ) p a r a m i l i t a r i e s , who
caused more deaths l a s t year than t h e IRA; 2) t h e IRA's bombing
campaigns i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d and on t h e B r i t i s h mainland.
Human R i g h t s
Harassment by the s e c u r i t y f o r c e s , u n f a i r d e t e n t i o n and
t r i a l s , and use of excessive f o r c e p e r s i s t .
C a t h o l i c unemployment r a t e s remain h i g h d e s p i t e a tough
1989 a n t i - d i s c r i m i n a t i o n law. New investment i s r e q u i r e d .
-gONFTPFNTTM,
CLINTON LIBRM?"PHOTOCOPY
�CONriDEHTTglT
POINTS TO BE MADE
NORTHERN IRELAND
I u n d e r s t a n d what a s e r i o u s problem N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d has
been f o r you. Do you see any s i g n s o f improvement?
As a c l o s e f r i e n d o f b o t h t h e UK and I r e l a n d and w i t h c l o s e
t i e s t o people from b o t h t r a d i t i o n s , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
wants t o be h e l p f u l .
At t h e same t i m e we do not w i s h t o get i n t h e way o f t h e
t a l k s process, which we hope w i l l be s u c c e s s f u l .
I am c o n s i d e r i n g t a k i n g t h e f o l l o w i n g s t e p s ; I would
your comments on them:
like
The appointment o f Speaker o f t h e House F o l e y as my s p e c i a l
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o review t h e s i t u a t i o n i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d
and r e p o r t back. The g o a l i s f a c t f i n d i n g , not m e d i a t i o n .
The Speaker i s w i l l i n g t o u n d e r t a k e t h i s t a s k . I f you and
t h e I r i s h are amenable, I p l a n t o announce the appointment
soon and a t t h e same t i m e express my s t r o n g s u p p o r t f o r t h e
e a r l y resumption o f t h e t a l k s process.
C o n t i n u e d s u p p o r t f o r t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Fund f o r I r e l a n d ,
w h i c h I understand has been a g r e a t h e l p i n promoting
inter-communal a c t i v i t i e s and economic development.
DECLASSIFIED
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CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
rrwiPTimTriTi
GATT-URUGUAY ROUND
The Uruguay Round (UR), w h i c h i n v o l v e s 108 c o u n t r i e s , has been
under n e g o t i a t i o n s i n c e 1986 w i t h U.S. p a r t i c i p a t i o n a u t h o r i z e d
by f a s t t r a c k a u t h o r i t y t h a t e x p i r e s June 1. USTR K a n t o r
announced February 11 t h a t t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n would seek
renewal o f f a s t t r a c k a l t h o u g h d e t a i l s o f t h e r e q u e s t would be
decided a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h Congress. We are a l s o
r e v i e w i n g our UR n e g o t i a t i n g p o s i t i o n s .
GATT D i r e c t o r - G e n e r a l Dunkel a t t e m p t e d t o a c c e l e r a t e t h e t a l k s
i n December 1991 by i s s u i n g a d r a f t " F i n a l A c t " (DFA), w h i c h
i n c o r p o r a t e d agreements a l r e a d y reached and proposed s o l u t i o n s
to u n r e s o l v e d i s s u e s .
Most governments w i l l accept t h e DFA w i t h o u t changes
beyond U.S.-EC amendments on a g r i c u l t u r e r e s u l t i n g
from t h e November " B l a i r House Accord." The EC i s
p r e s s i n g t h i s approach, a l t h o u g h i t a l s o wants
comprehensive market access agreements, w i t h U.S.
concessions, t o "balance" t h e agreement b e f o r e
c o n c l u d i n g t h e Round.
The U.S. p o s i t i o n has been t h a t we need s u b s t a n t i a l p r o g r e s s i n
market access i n goods ( i n c l u d i n g f r e e t r a d e i n key s e c t o r s ) ,
a g r i c u l t u r e , and s e r v i c e s as w e l l as improvements i n t h e DFA.
The U.S. agreed t o use t h e DFA as t h e b a s i s f o r
n e g o t i a t i n g a f i n a l agreement, b u t s t a t e d t h a t
improvements were necessary, e s p e c i a l l y on
antidumping, i n t e l l e c t u a l p r o p e r t y , t r a d e - r e l a t e d
environment i s s u e s , and t h e M u l t i l a t e r a l Trade
O r g a n i z a t i o n (MTO).
The UK has worked e n e r g e t i c a l l y as an EC member and as EC
P r e s i d e n t i n July-December 1992 t o complete t h e UR as soon as
p o s s i b l e . W h i l e t h e UK can accept t h e DFA, i t a l s o f a v o r s
tougher antidumping r u l e s and i s t h e EC c o u n t r y most w i l l i n g t o
accommodate U.S. i n t e r e s t s . The UK wants t h e U.S. t o reduce
"peaks" ( i . e . h i g h t a r i f f s on ceramics and t e x t i l e s ) and i s
prepared t o meet our z e r o - f o r - z e r o s e c t o r o f f e r s ( e . g .
n o n - f e r r o u s m e t a l s , paper and wood).
Prime M i n i s t e r Major can be expected t o urge
c o m p l e t i n g t h e Round as q u i c k l y as p o s s i b l e .
The U.K. and t h e EC have urged us t o l i m i t f a s t t r a c k
a u t h o r i t y e x t e n s i o n t o t h r e e months i n o r d e r t o
m a i n t a i n needed p r e s s u r e t o conclude t h e Round.
The U.K. w i l l r e s i s t a t t e m p t s t o r e i n s t a t e super 301
i n f a s t t r a c k renewal due t o s e n s i t i v i t y about
u n i l a t e r a l U.S. e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l a c t i o n s .
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBWPPHOTO
DY
�COMFIDEMTIAL
POINTS TO BE MADE
URUGUAY ROUND/GATT
We w i l l pursue a successful conclusion t o the Uruguay Round.
—
We want t o renew f a s t t r a c k a u t h o r i t y , but I can't provide
d e t a i l s u n t i l we consult w i t h Congress.
—
We want t o progress as r a p i d l y as possible, but i t i s v i t a l
t h a t we get the agreement r i g h t .
—
We appreciate the personal e f f o r t s you have made t o advance
the n e g o t i a t i o n s and would l i k e t o hear your thoughts on
how best t o proceed.
I t i s c l e a r t h a t achieving balanced r e s u l t s w i t h the EC i n
market access i s key t o continued progress.
We also are seeking some changes i n the Dunkel t e x t .
I hope t h a t you w i l l j o i n us i n pressing other EC members,
p a r t i c u l a r l y France, t o make the tough decisions needed.
DECLASSIFIED
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DECLASSIFIED
G 7 E O O I SUMMIT
- CNMC
—
PER E.O. 13526
T h i s year's Economic Summit w i l l t a k e p l a c e i n Tokyo
J u l y 7-9. Economic i s s u e s w i l l be a major focus o f t h e agenda
(macro p o l i c i e s and growth, t r a d e , economic r e f o r m i n C e n t r a l
and E a s t e r n Europe and Russia, and r e l a t i o n s w i t h d e v e l o p i n g
c o u n t r i e s ) . F o r e i g n and Finance M i n i s t e r s w i l l a t t e n d .
—
EC P r e s i d e n t D e l o r s r e c e n t l y c a l l e d f o r an e a r l y G-7 Summit
t o c o n s i d e r measures t o s t i m u l a t e economic growth.
We a r e
e v a l u a t i n g t h e idea and t r y i n g t o weigh t h e views o f o t h e r
prospective p a r t i c i p a n t s .
—
The agenda w i l l a l s o f e a t u r e p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s ( e . g . , FSU,
ex-Yugoslavia, I r a q ) and c r o s s - b o r d e r i s s u e s such as g l o b a l
e n v i r o n m e n t a l concerns, t e r r o r i s m , n u c l e a r s a f e t y ,
n o n - p r o l i f e r a t i o n and human r i g h t s .
—
Summit p r e p a r a t i o n s a r e handled t h r o u g h a network o f p a r a l l e l
"Sherpa," sub-Sherpa and p o l i t i c a l d i r e c t o r s meetings
i n v o l v i n g S t a t e , T r e a s u r y , NSC and o t h e r USG agencies. The
Sherpas prepare t h e d r a f t Summit communique (economic
d e c l a r a t i o n ) and t h e p o l i t i c a l d i r e c t o r s p r e p a r e t h e p o l i t i c a l
declaration.
—
The Summit p r o v i d e s a unique o p p o r t u n i t y f o r f r a n k , i n f o r m a l
exchanges a t t h e c h i e f o f s t a t e / h e a d o f government l e v e l , b u t
the r i g i d i t y o f a "pre-cooked" agenda and communique sometimes
p r e c l u d e s such exchanges.
-- To show Western s u p p o r t f o r r e f o r m , S o v i e t / R u s s i a n l e a d e r s
have been i n v i t e d t o j o i n the Summit a f t e r f o r m a l meetings,
Gorbachev i n 1991 and Y e l t s i n i n 1992.
A l t h o u g h we and t h e
Europeans are p r e s s i n g Japan t o i n v i t e Y e l t s i n , Japan i s
r e l u c t a n t t o do so because o f t h e d i s p u t e w i t h Russia over t h e
Kurile Islands.
-- Finance M i n i s t e r s and C e n t r a l Bank Governors o f t h e Summit
c o u n t r i e s a l s o meet s e v e r a l times a year.
T h e i r work o f t e n
p r o v i d e s i n p u t f o r t h e Summit, and t h e Summit sometimes t a s k s
t h i s G-7 group on p a r t i c u l a r i s s u e s .
B r i t i s h Concerns
—
F o l l o w i n g t h i s f a l l ' s suspension o f t h e B r i t i s h pound from t h e
Exchange Rate Mechanism o f the European Monetary System and
i t s subsequent d e p r e c i a t i o n , Prime M i n i s t e r Major c a l l e d f o r
g r e a t e r G-7 monetary p o l i c y c o o r d i n a t i o n , a p o s i t i o n he may
push d u r i n g t h e run-up t o t h e Summit.
—
PM Major has argued f o r a l e s s f o r m a l , more f l e x i b l e Summit
t h a t meets l e s s f r e q u e n t l y . Japan i s r e s i s t i n g changing t h e
format f o r Tokyo, b u t may agree t o s t r e a m l i n i n g i t i n 1994.
—
The B r i t i s h have i n d i c a t e d they w i l l press f o r a G-7 statement
on the Rushdie a f f a i r which d e c l a r e s I r a n ' s decree a g a i n s t
Rushdie " c o n t r a r y t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l law."
CLINTON LIBRABy^fiHOTOCOPY
DECL: OADR
�POINTS TO BE MADE
G-7 ECONOMIC SUMMIT
R e v i t a l i z i n g t h e U.S. economy i s my t o p p r i o r i t y .
The U.S.
r e c o v e r y i s underway, b u t we a r e concerned t h a t weak
economic growth i n Europe and Japan may hamper a g l o b a l
recovery.
We need t o work t o g e t h e r f o r h i g h e r w o r l d growth. The
Tokyo Summit s h o u l d p r o v i d e t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o encourage
the a d o p t i o n o f g r o w t h - o r i e n t e d g l o b a l economic p o l i c i e s
c r i t i c a l f o r o u r own c i t i z e n s , r e f o r m i n g economies i n
E a s t e r n Europe and t h e former S o v i e t Union, and t h e
developing world.
We agree w i t h you t h a t t h e Summit process should be
r e i n v i g o r a t e d t o a l l o w f o r f r a n k and i n f o r m a l exchanges.
We a r e prepared t o work w i t h you t o achieve t h i s g r e a t e r
f l e x i b i l i t y , i f n o t f o r t h i s year, c e r t a i n l y f o r 1994.
—
We a l s o remain committed t o u s i n g t h e Summit forum f o r
c l o s e and r e g u l a r p o l i t i c a l c o n s u l t a t i o n s .
—
We a r e d e v e l o p i n g o u r ideas a t t h i s p o i n t on t h e p o l i t i c a l
s u b j e c t s t o be d i s c u s s e d a t t h e Tokyo Summit and w i l l be
d i s c u s s i n g them i n t h e r e g u l a r process f o r p r e p a r i n g t h e
Summit agenda and d r a f t P o l i t i c a l D e c l a r a t i o n .
ONLY I F ASKED:
We a r e r e v i e w i n g Jacques D e l o r s ' p r o p o s a l f o r an e a r l y
Summit. L a y i n g t h e groundwork i s key t o a s u c c e s s f u l
Summit, and a c c e l e r a t i n g t h e t i m e frame might reduce our
chances f o r a c o o r d i n a t e d p o l i c y approach. What a r e your
views?
•GOMFIDEMTIAB
DECL: OADR
PER E.O. 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�LIBYA/PAN AM-103
S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l s a n c t i o n s ( a v i a t i o n and arms embargoes)
imposed l a s t year are having an impact, but L i b y a has not
c o m p l i e d w i t h R e s o l u t i o n s 731 and 748.
— L i b y a c o n t i n u e s t o d e l a y and search f o r p r i v a t e
channels t o n e g o t i a t e new terms.
— I t has t a k e n o n l y a few c o s m e t i c , e a s i l y r e v e r s i b l e
s t e p s such as c l o s i n g some t e r r o r i s t t r a i n i n g camps.
The S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l r e s o l u t i o n s r e q u i r e L i b y a t o t u r n over
t h e i n d i c t e d Pan Am bombing suspects f o r t r i a l i n t h e U.S.
or UK, c o o p e r a t e w i t h t h e French on t h e UTA bombing,
compensate v i c t i m s and c u t i t s t i e s t o t e r r o r i s m .
The S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l w i l l next r e v i e w s a n c t i o n s i n
mid-Apri1.
— The U.S., UK and France s a i d p u b l i c l y i n November
t h a t i f L i b y a d i d not comply, new steps might soon
need t o be t a k e n .
A new s a n c t i o n not a f f e c t i n g o i l revenues would be u n l i k e l y
t o sway L i b y a , but i t w i l l be d i f f i c u l t t o get an
o i l - r e l a t e d sanction through the S e c u r i t y Council.
— The P a l e s t i n i a n d e p o r t a t i o n i s s u e and Bosnia have
h e i g h t e n e d t h e sense among many T h i r d World s t a t e s
t h a t t h e West has a double s t a n d a r d on r e s o l u t i o n s
i n v o l v i n g Muslim s t a t e s .
— Some Western European a l l i e s (e.g., Spain, I t a l y ,
Germany) are heavy purchasers o f L i b y a n o i l .
We are i n c l o s e c o n t a c t w i t h t h e B r i t i s h and French,
a l l o p t i o n s remain open.
and
— The B r i t i s h b e l i e v e a f u l l embargo on L i b y a n o i l
may be too d i f f i c u l t , but t h e y would p r o b a b l y support
an e f f o r t t o get an embargo on shipment of o i l
t e c h n o l o g y t o L i b y a . Over a year or so, such an
embargo, i f r i g o r o u s l y e n f o r c e d , would s e v e r e l y
r e s t r i c t L i b y a ' s a b i l i t y t o produce o i l .
— I f we seek an o i l s a n c t i o n , we w i l l need t o launch
a major d i p l o m a t i c campaign i n March. The f i r s t s t e p
w i l l be f u l l c o o r d i n a t i o n w i t h t h e B r i t i s h and French,
f o l l o w e d by c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h o t h e r C o u n c i l members.
ED
PERE.O. 13526
CLINTON LIBRAg^PHOTOCOPY
�POINTS TO BE MADE
LIBYA/PAN AM-103
I am committed t o seeing j u s t i c e done on the Pan Am
and UTA bombings. During my campaign, I said that the
"United States should make i t clear t h a t i f they (the
i n d i c t e d Libyans) are not turned over, i t w i l l press
the United Nations to broaden the sanctions to include
an o i l embargo."
I f Libya succeeds i n f l o u t i n g the S e c u r i t y Council, i t
w i l l damage our j o i n t e f f o r t s t o make the United
Nations a cornerstone of a p r i n c i p l e d f o r e i g n p o l i c y .
The Council next considers t h i s subject i n A p r i l , the
anniversary of the sanctions imposed l a s t year.
We
need an e f f e c t i v e strategy.
You and I w i l l need to keep the French w i t h us and t o
ensure t h a t t h e i r i n t e r e s t s i n the UTA bombing are
t r e a t e d equally w i t h ours on Pan Am.
Do you b e l i e v e we can get some kind of sanction on
o i l , i f not a f u l l embargo on the purchase and sale of
Libyan o i l , then a more l i m i t e d embargo on the
p r o v i s i o n of o i l technology t o Libya?
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CYPRUS (ONLY I F ASKED)
Now t h a t t h e C y p r i o t P r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n s have been decided,
the UN-sponsored Cyprus n e g o t i a t i o n s , i n recess s i n c e
mid-November, can again go f o r w a r d .
The U.S. t o l d b o t h s i d e s we expect them t o r e t u r n t o New
York as agreed i n March and t o be ready t o make t h e
d e c i s i o n s necessary t o b r i n g t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s t o a
successful conclusion.
G l a f c o s C l e r i d e s " s v i c t o r y i n t h e February 14 C y p r i o t
p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n may w e l l cause a temporary d e l a y
w h i l e he g e t s o r g a n i z e d and p u t s h i s stamp on t h e UN
proceedings.
However, he may be able t o make up l o s t
t i m e l a t e r due t o h i s g r e a t e r i n f l u e n c e w i t h P a r l i a m e n t
and w i t h h i s community.
Turkey w i l l have t o p u t a g r e a t d e a l o f p r e s s u r e on
T u r k i s h C y p r i o t leader Denktash i f he i s t o be brought
into line.
The UK, as a r e s p e c t e d European power and a
member o f t h e EC, can and s h o u l d dangle p o l i t i c a l and
economic b a i t i n f r o n t o f t h e Turks t o m o t i v a t e them t o
l e v e r Denktash i n t o p o s i t i o n .
The U.S. and t h e UK have cooperated c l o s e l y t h r o u g h o u t t h e
UN-sponsored t a l k s .
On February 19, U.S. S p e c i a l Cyprus C o o r d i n a t o r John
Maresca met i n London w i t h h i s c o u n t e r p a r t s t o d i s c u s s
p o s s i b l e approaches t o t h e next round o f UN
negotiations.
The U.S. and t h e UK agree on c o n f i d e n c e - b u i l d i n g measures
(CBM's), which were recommended by B o u t r o s - G h a l i and unanimously
endorsed by t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l . The U.S. p o s i t i o n was conveyed
to a l l p a r t i e s : CBM's are n o t a package; each s i d e s h o u l d s t a r t
implementing a t l e a s t some CBM's even b e f o r e t h e t a l k s resume;
and i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f CBM's i s n o t a p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r resumption
of t h e t a l k s and s h o u l d n o t d i s t r a c t t h e p a r t i e s from t h e t a l k s .
The UK has announced t h a t i t w i l l reduce i t s t r o o p commitment t o
UNFICYP by 50 p e r c e n t and has begun t h e f i r s t (25%) stage o f t h a t
r e d u c t i o n . T h i s , along w i t h t h e a l r e a d y completed t o t a l
w i t h d r a w a l by F i n l a n d and t h e planned Canadian t o t a l w i t h d r a w a l
(mid-1993) w i l l reduce UNFICYP s t r e n g t h from 2,400 i n mid-1992 t o
below 1,000.
The UN S e c r e t a r i a t has c o n s u l t e d t r o o p c o n t r i b u t o r s on how
UNFICYP's o r g a n i z a t i o n and m i s s i o n w i l l be changed.
The UK (which s t i l l has Sovereign Base Areas i n Cyprus) i s
t a k i n g a l e a d i n g r o l e i n these c o n s u l t a t i o n s .
CONFIDENTI-Afe.
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POINTS TO BE MADE (ONLY I F ASKED)
CYPRUS
We want t o c o n t i n u e our c l o s e c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h t h e UK on
t h e Cyprus i s s u e .
A U.S. team l e d by our S p e c i a l Cyprus C o o r d i n a t o r was i n
London February 19 t o d i s c u s s w i t h your F o r e i g n and
Commonwealth O f f i c e ways t o ensure t h e success o f t h e UN
n e g o t i a t i o n s now t h a t t h e C y p r i o t e l e c t i o n s have been
decided.
We have t o l d b o t h s i d e s we expect them t o r e t u r n t o New
York as scheduled and t o be ready t o make t h e d e c i s i o n s
necessary t o s u c c e s s f u l l y conclude t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s .
We want t h e UK t o c o n t i n u e t o e x p l a i n t o Turkey t h e
c o n s i d e r a b l e economic and p o l i t i c a l b e n e f i t s which i t c o u l d
g a i n i n Europe by m o t i v a t i n g Denktash and t h e T u r k i s h
C y p r i o t s t o reach an agreement on t h e b a s i s o f t h e UN " s e t
of ideas."
We b e l i e v e t h a t each s i d e s h o u l d s t a r t implementing a t
l e a s t some o f t h e S e c r e t a r y General's c o n f i d e n c e - b u i l d i n g
measures. However, i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f CBM's s h o u l d n o t be a
p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r resumption o f t h e t a l k s and s h o u l d n o t
d i s t r a c t a t t e n t i o n from t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s .
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�SECRET
THE FALKLANDS (ONLY I F ASKED)
Foreign Secretary Kurd's January v i s i t t o A r g e n t i n a , t h e f i r s t
by a B r i t i s h cabinet s e c r e t a r y since t h e 1982 Falklands War,
marked an important step i n n o r m a l i z i n g UK-Argentina
r e l a t i o n s . Although both c o u n t r i e s continue t o c l a i m
s o v e r e i g n t y over t h e F a l k l a n d Islands ( t h e U.S. i s n e u t r a l on
the i s s u e ) , t h e UK and Argentina i n 1990 agreed t o disagree
about t h e i r competing claims. This s o - c a l l e d " s o v e r e i g n t y
umbrella" paved t h e way f o r t h e UK and Argentina t o r e e s t a b l i s h
d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s t h r e e years ago. By pushing t h e
s o v e r e i g n t y issue aside, the two c o u n t r i e s have been able t o
seek s o l u t i o n s t o other sources of b i l a t e r a l f r i c t i o n , c h i e f l y
o i l e x p l o r a t i o n and f i s h i n g r i g h t s i n t h e waters surrounding
the F a l k l a n d I s l a n d s .
Despite t h e improvement i n r e l a t i o n s , t h e UK continues i t s
embargo, e s t a b l i s h e d d u r i n g t h e Falklands War, o f arms sales t o
Argentina.
I n r e c o g n i t i o n of Argentina's r e t u r n t o democracy
and improved human r i g h t s record, t h e U.S. resumed l i m i t e d arms
sales t o Argentina i n 1983. I
EO 13526 1 4
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POINTS TO BE MADE (ONLY I F ASKED)
FALKLANDS
Argentina's dramatic democratic and m i l i t a r y reforms and
the r e o r i e n t a t i o n of Argentine f o r e i g n p o l i c y toward the
U.S. and t h e West have made c o n f l i c t over t h e Falklands
less l i k e l y .
The c o n t i n u i n g improvement i n UK-Argentine r e l a t i o n s
r e i n f o r c e s Argentina's t u r n t o t h e West, as do our e f f o r t s
to s t r e n g t h e n U.S.-Argentine m i l i t a r y t i e s .
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NUCLEAR TESTING
—
We w i l l , of course, comply w i t h the requirements of our
l e g i s l a t i o n on nuclear t e s t i n g .
—
W i t h i n that framework, we want t o accommodate your t e s t i n g
requirements.
—
As I have stated p u b l i c l y , I t h i n k we should pursue a
phased-in m u l t i l a t e r a l comprehensive ban on nuclear t e s t i n g
This i s a complicated issue.
i n t e r n a l review.
—
We have only j u s t begun our
We want t o consult w i t h you c l o s e l y every step of the way.
GONFIDENTIAL
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�•COHFIBCMTIALPOINTS TO BE MADE (ONLY I F ASKED)
FUTURE OF NATO/EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
Events i n t h e f o r m e r Y u g o s l a v i a are t e s t i n g European
c a p a c i t i e s and h i g h l i g h t i n g t h e c o n t i n u i n g need f o r
c a p a b i l i t i e s o n l y NATO possesses.
and UN
We must f u r t h e r develop NATO's peacekeeping c a p a b i l i t i e s t o
ensure t h e y w i l l be ready t o h e l p i n o t h e r European c r i s e s .
B r i n g i n g Russia and o t h e r E a s t e r n s t a t e s i n t o c o o p e r a t i o n
on peacekeeping t h r o u g h NACC i s another u r g e n t p r i o r i t y .
CSCE can h e l p shape a European consensus on p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s
and address r e g i o n a l t e n s i o n s and l o w - i n t e n s i t y c o n f l i c t .
Reviewing i n t e r n a t i o n a l budgets i s necessary, b u t p r o v i d i n g
NACC and CSCE adequate resources w i l l y i e l d l a r g e r e t u r n s .
We s u p p o r t t h e 1991 Rome/Maastricht framework f o r a European
s e c u r i t y and defense i d e n t i t y t h a t w i l l r e i n f o r c e NATO and
assure b e t t e r s h a r i n g o f s e c u r i t y l e a d e r s h i p and defense
burdens.
An approach t o European i n t e g r a t i o n t h a t comes a t NATO's
expense w i l l n o t be s u s t a i n a b l e . We must c o n s u l t t o ensure
t h a t a European s e c u r i t y and defense i d e n t i t y and NATO a r e
mutually reinforcing.
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�THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
OONPIDEMTIAL
DECL: OADR
9403918
February 25, 1994
TO:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Warren Christo.pherjjl/^
SUBJECT: Meetings w i t h B r i t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r John Major
I.
SETTING
A prime goal f o r Prime M i n i s t e r Major's v i s i t i s t o
demonstrate, t o a nervous B r i t i s h p u b l i c and i s k e p t i c a l
a
American one, why and how the U.S.-UK r e l a t i o n s h i p m a t t e r s . - to a prosperous w o r l d economy, t o a s t a b l e Europe, and t o our
a b i l i t y t o achieve our o b j e c t i v e s i n Bosnia, Russia, South
A f r i c a , . Hong- Kong, and elsewhere.
Over the past year our l o n g - s t a n d i n g p a t t e r n o f c l o s e
communication and c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h t h e B r i t i s h has c o n t i n u e d on
a range o f issues — GATT agreement, n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n , L i b y a
and I r a q s a n c t i o n s , t o name.a f e w — but i t i s t h e d i f f e r e n c e s
t h a t have provoked the h e a d l i n e s , and t h e angst i n London. The
Gerry Adams v i s a d e c i s i o n was a blow t o London, and subsequent
press coverage r-eopened e a r l i e r , s t i l l - t e n d e r wounds o f
b i l a t e r a l d i s c o r d over issues from Bosnia p o l i c y t o t h e 1992
P r e s i d e n t i a l campaign.
:
I t i s i m p o r t a n t t h a t we move beyond our d i f f e r e n c e s arid
r e i n v i g o r a t e our d i a l o g u e w i t h t h e B r i t i s h .
I n any l i k e l y
s c e n a r i o f o r Europe over the next.few y e a r s , we w i l l f i n d i t
very d i f f i c u l t t o advance our i n t e r e s t s absent B r i t i s h
engagement. The events on your schedule w i t h Major i n
P i t t s b u r g h , t h e f l i g h t back t o g e t h e r on A i r Force One, and
o v e r n i g h t a t t h e White House w i l l send t h e B r i t i s h a r e a s s u r i n g
message t h a t they s t i l l count i n Washington.
The t r i p t o P i t t s b u r g h also p r o v i d e s a p o w e r f u l backdrop
f o r the o t h e r main messages o f t h i s v i s i t .
Domestic and
f o r e i g n p o l i c y are l i n k e d , and nowhere more so t h a n i n t h e
U.S.-UK economic and t r a d i n g r e l a t i o n s l i i p . Our many common
i n t e r e s t s , shared h i s t o r y , o u t l o o k , and v a l u e s are o f c o n t i n u e d
relevance as we l o o k . f o r s o l u t i o n s t o shared problems such as
p e r s i s t e n t unemployment and e n v i r o n m e n t a l d e g r a d a t i o n . Your
j o i n t appearances i n P i t t s b u r g h w i l l h i g h l i g h t t h e s e themes,
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�-CONriDENTIMj
-2and preview the March G-7 Jobs Conference. While i n the home
c i t y of USAir, you should push Major, on the need f o r a more
f o r t h c o m i n g B r i t i s h approach t o our c i v a i r n e g o t i a t i o n s , which
are f o u n d e r i n g over B r i t i s h r e l u c t a n c e t o p r o v i d e adequate
.access,to Heathrow A i r p o r t f o r U . S . a i r 1 ines .
:
On Bosnia, Major and h i s Cabinet are pleased w i t h our
d e c i s i o n t o become more a c t i v e i n the n e g o t i a t i o n s , though
s t i l l deeply uncomfortable w i t h the l i n g e r i n g p o s s i b i l i t y of
the use of f o r c e . Although the B r i t i s h c o n t i n u e t o ask t h e
tough q u e s t i o n s , m a i n t a i n i n g t r a n s a t l a n t i c u n i t y i s Major's
o v e r r i d i n g concern i n Bosnia p o l i c y . You should e x p l o i t t h i s .
Major w i l l want t o expand on h i s impressions from h i s Russia
trip.
He w i l l hope t o come t o a meeting of t h e minds w i t h you
on N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d , a f f i r m i n g h i s commitment t o work c l o s e l y
w i t h the I r i s h government, but warning t h a t no amount of
B r i t i s h "persuasion" of U n i o n i s t s w i l l work i f the IRA keeps
k i l l i n g or i f U n i o n i s t s f e e l they have been abandoned.
II.
TOPICS
O u t l i n e our s t r a t e g y on Bosnia.
Underscore the importance
of p r e s e n t i n g a u n i t e d f r o n t t o t h e Serbs, i n c l u d i n g our
readiness t o use f o r c e i f necessary.
Exchange views on r e f o r m i n Russia
toward i t s neighbors. .
and Moscow's p o l i c i e s
o
Respond t o Major's ideas on i m p r o v i n g G-7 e f f e c t i v e n e s s i n
promoting g l o b a l economic goals and Russian r e f o r m .
o
Note progress o n , U k r a i n i a n d e n u c l e a r i z a t i o n and urge more
B r i t i s h f i n a n c i a l and t e c h n i c a l h e l p .
o
Urge s t r o n g B r i t i s h support f o r P a r t n e r s h i p f o r Peace,
i n c l u d i n g adequate f u n d i n g .
o
Hear Major out on the prospects f o r renewed p o l i t i c a l
t a l k s on Northern I r e l a n d . Discuss how t h e U.S. can h e l p
keep the pressure on Sinn F e i n t o j o i n the t a l k s .
S t r e s s the importance of progress i n our
b i l a t e r a l c i v i l aviation negotiations.
stalemated
Review p l a n n i n g f o r your June a c t i v i t i e s i n B r i t a i n ,
o u t l i n i n g your o v e r a l l goal of d e f i n i n g and d e m o n s t r a t i n g
the meaning of U.S. t i e s t o Europe and t o B r i t a i n f o r the
post-Cold War era.
^CQNg-fr&ENTIAfr
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�United States Department of State
Washington, D.C.
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May 27, 1994
M FOR ANTHONY LAKE
WHITE HOUSE
r t o U.K. Prime M i n i s t e r John Major
outh A f r i c a
4?
c
P r e s i d e n t C l i n t o n on May 6 sent l e t t e r s t o Heads o f
Governments o f G-7 n a t i o n s u r g i n g t h e major donor c o u n t r i e s t o
support: South A f r i c a ' s t r a n s i t i o n t o n o n r a c i a l democracy and t o
i n c r e a s e t h e i r a s s i s t a n c e t o South A f r i c a .
I n h i s May 16 response t o P r e s i d e n t C l i n t o n ' s l e t t e r , U.K.
Prime M i n i s t e r John Major agreed t h a t t h e changes i n South
A f r i c a were t r u l y s i g n i f i c a n t and t h a t t h e new government f a c e d
enormous c h a l l e n g e s .
For i t s p a r t , t h e U.K. government i s
i n c r e a s i n g i t s a s s i s t a n c e t o South A f r i c a t o o v e r 100 m i l l i o n
pounds o v e r t h e next t h r e e y e a r s .
The Prime M i n i s t e r s t a t e d
t h a t t h e B r i t i s h government would be d i s c u s s i n g South A f r i c a ' s
r e q u i r e m e n t s w i t h t h e new government and urged t h e donor
community t o c o o r d i n a t e i t s e f f o r t s c a r e f u l l y .
We b e l i e v e t h a t t h e P r e s i d e n t s h o u l d acknowledge t h e Prime
M i n i s t e r ' s l e t t e r and t h e U.K.'s enhanced a s s i s t a n c e t o South
A f r i c a and emphasize t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f c o o r d i n a t i n g a s s i s t a n c e
efforts.
X j l a r c Grossman"
Executive Secretary
Attachments:
Tab 1
Tab 2
Tab 3
Draft Presidential Letter
U.K. Prime M i n i s t e r John M a j o r ' s l e t t e r t o t h e
President
P r e s i d e n t ' s May 6 l e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r
John Major
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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
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March- 28, 1995
«CONriDENTIAL
DECL: 4/4/15
MEMORANDUM FOR:
The
FROM:
Warren C h r i s t o p h e r
SUBJECT:
M e e t i n g w i t h UK Prime M i n i s t e r John Major
I.
President
PER E.0.13526
SETTING
A l t h o u g h r e l a t i o n s are g o i n g t h r o u g h a t r o u b l e d p e r i o d , t h e
U.S. and UK remain each o t h e r ' s most i m p o r t a n t g l o b a l p a r t n e r s .
We are w o r k i n g t o g e t h e r c o n s t r u c t i v e l y on a wide range o f
i m p o r t a n t i s s u e s , i n c l u d i n g , f o r example, NATO expansion,
Bosnia, I r a n , and Russia. However, on t h e s e n s i t i v e s u b j e c t o f
N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d , London has d i s a g r e e d w i t h a t l e a s t t h e t i m i n g
o f our d e c i s i o n r e g a r d i n g G e r r y Adams. Prime M i n i s t e r Major
f u l l y deserves t h e p u b l i c p r a i s e you have o f f e r e d f o r h i s
p o l i t i c a l courage on N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d . He i s p e r s o n a l l y
committed t o making the most o f t h i s chance f o r peace, b u t
faces c o n s i d e r a b l e d i s c o n t e n t and m i s t r u s t from U n i o n i s t
l e a d e r s , e s p e c i a l l y over t h e J o i n t Framework Document he
n e g o t i a t e d w i t h PM B r u t o n . How t o address t h a t problem w i l l be
near t h e t o p o f h i s agenda f o r t h i s v i s i t .
The o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s f u l l y back Major's I r e l a n d p o l i c y ,
but o t h e r w i s e , he i s i n - e r i o u s p o l i t i c a l t r o u b l e .
Elections
are l i k e l y n e x t year. He t r a i l s Labor's new l e a d e r Tony B l a i r
by huge margins i n the p o l l s , and h i s own p a r t y i s b a d l y d i v i d e d
over "Europe" as B r i t a i n t r i e s t o develop a p o s i t i o n and seek
out a l l i e s f o r t h e EU's 1996 I n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l Conference.
You w i l l not f i n d Major s e n t i m e n t a l about the " S p e c i a l
R e l a t i o n s h i p " (a t e r m he and Douglas Hurd a v o i d ) , but i n s t e a d
hard-headed and p r a g m a t i c . I n f a c t , more t h a n h a l f a c e n t u r y
of h i s t o r y has made our t i e s w i t h the UK d i f f e r e n t from those
w i t h any o t h e r c o u n t r y . I t has been our c l o s e s t p a r t n e r by f a r
i n t h e s i n g l e b i g g e s t f o r e i g n p o l i c y t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i n U.S.
h i s t o r y -- our s h i f t from non-involvement w i t h the w i d e r w o r l d
to- g l o b a l engagement. London has worked h a n d - i n - g l o v e w i t h us
i n e v e r y r e g i o n o f the g l o b e , and wants t o keep d o i n g so.
N e i t h e r our deepening involvement w i t h the c o u n t r i e s o f t h i s
hemisphere and t h e P a c i f i c Rim, o r the UK's own h e s i t a n t steps
towards "Europe," need d e t r a c t from t h e Anglo-American a l l i a n c e .
Beyond the bonds o f c u l t u r e and language, t h e r e are u n p a r a l l e l e d
s t r u c t u r e s and h a b i t s o f c o o p e r a t i o n b u i l t up over f i f t y years
of g l o b a l p a r t n e r s h i p , i n c l u d i n g u n i q u e l y c l o s e i n t e l l i g e n c e ,
n u c l e a r , and m i l i t a r y l i n k s . The U.S. and UK are each o t h e r s '
t o p i n v e s t o r s , w i t h some $95 b i l l i o n g o i n g i n each d i r e c t i o n .
CONriDENTIAL
�-COMriDDMTIMj
- 2T h i s meeting i s an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r you t o e s t a b l i s h a
common approach w i t h Major on a wide range o f i s s u e s . I can
f o l l o w up w i t h Douglas Hurd when he i s here A p r i l 18. The UK
i s u s u a l l y o u r s t r o n g e s t s u p p o r t e r on f r e e t r a d e and o u r
c l o s e s t a l l y on d e v e l o p i n g European s e c u r i t y s t r u c t u r e s . The .
b r e a d t h o f c u r r e n t and p o t e n t i a l p r a c t i c a l c o o p e r a t i o n i s
extraordinary.
I n t h e l i s t o f t o p i c s below, t h e f i r s t f i v e a r e
those on w h i c h Major i n t e n d s t o p l a c e s p e c i a l p r i o r i t y .
II.
TOPICS
o
N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d , e s p e c i a l l y k e e p i n g t h e U n i o n i s t s on
board, advancing o u r common agenda on decommissioning,
k e e p i n g t r a c k o f Sinn F e i n funds r a i s e d , and m a i n t a i n i n g
t h e f o c u s o f y o u r May conference on t r a d e and i n v e s t m e n t ;
o
Russia, i n c l u d i n g d e v e l o p i n g a common Western approach on
V-E Day, as w e l l as developments i n Chechnya and t h e r e f o r m
process (we would p a r t i c u l a r l y l i k e UK h e l p i n m o b i l i z i n g
t h e EU on balance-of-payments s u p p o r t f o r t h e N I S ) ;
o
The M i d d l e East, where we s h o u l d urge t h e UK t o m o b i l i z e
European p o l i t i c a l s u p p o r t f o r t h e MEDB and f i n a n c i a l
support f o r t h e P a l e s t i n i a n A u t h o r i t y ; •
o
I r a q i s a n c t i o n s , where t h e UK i s o u r s t a u n c h e s t a l l y i n
Europe and among t h e UNSC Permanent F i v e ;
o
B o s n i a / C r o a t i a , where, as noted above, we a r e w o r k i n g much
more c l o s e l y and p r o d u c t i v e l y w i t h t h e UK;
o
Trade, where t h e UK can h e l p open markets f o r U.S. e x p o r t s
t o t h e EU i n a u d i o / v i s u a l , t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , and a i r
s e r v i c e s -- p l u s choose U.S. a t t a c k h e l i c o p t e r s i n a $3
b i l l i o n purchase t h i s year;
o
N o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y t h e NPT, where t h e UK has used
i t s w o r l d w i d e i n f l u e n c e i n support o f o u r p o l i c y o f g e t t i n g
50% + 1 f o r u n l i m i t e d i n d e f i n i t e e x t e n s i o n , and w i l l be key
i n g e t t i n g o t h e r Europeans t o conclude a new U.S./EURATOM
T r e a t y and e s t a b l i s h a COCOM successor regime;
o
NATO expansion, where t h e UK i s h a r d a t work t o h e l p o u r
s t r a t e g y f o r t h i s year succeed, and wants t o c o l l a b o r a t e
w i t h us as we develop a game p l a n f o r n e x t year;
o
European s e c u r i t y and defense c o o p e r a t i o n , where Major has
p e r s o n a l l y proposed i n i t i a t i v e s i n t e n d e d t o ensure t h a t WEU
development does n o t come a t NATO's expense; and
o
C o u n t e r - t e r r o r i s m , where t h e UK i s i n l o c k s t e p w i t h us on
p r e s s i n g L i b y a t o t u r n over t h e Pan Am 103 suspects.
^^TPFNTTV
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
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C00123268
The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict
to National and International
Order in the 1990s: Geographic
Perspectives
A Conference Report
R7T 9-10039
October 1995
�C00123268
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�C00123268
The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict
to National and International
Order in the 1990s: Geographic
Perspectives
A Conference Report
RTT 95-1 0039
October 1995
�C00123268
�C00123268
The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict
to National and International
Order in the 1990s: Geographic
Perspectives
Scope Note
This report contains the proceedings from a conference entitled, The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict to NationalandInternationalOrder in the 1990s:
GeographicPerspectives,which took place from 30 September to 1 October
1993. The conference was sponsored by the Central Intelligence Agency's
Geographic Resources Division.' It featured academic geographers and
anthropologists who are specialists in ethnic issues and US Government officials with practical experience in dealing with the consequences of ethnic
conflict.
This report contains the papers that the participants presented as well as the
key points of the discussions that followed. Where appropriate, the authors
have updated their papers to reflect events since the conference. The views
herein are those of the individual participants and not necessarily those of
their affiliated organizations, the Central Intelligence Agency, or any other
US Government agency.
As of June 1995, Geographic Resources Division was renamed Conflict Issues Division.
Reverse Blank
iii
R7T 95-10039
October 1995
�C00123268
�C00123268
Contents
Page
Scope Note
Overview
Part I: Framing the Discussion
Geographic Perspectives on Ethnic Conflict
Dr. Alexander Murphy
Identity, Territory, and Self-Determination: Factors Underlying
Potential National and International Conflict
Dr. David B. Knight
Part II: Regional Manifestations
Eastern Europe
Ethnic and Territorial Conflicts in Eastern Europe
Dr. Ronald Wixman
Discussant: Dr. Thomas Poulsen
Western Europe and Canada
Ethnic Conflict Within Western Europe
Dr. Colin H. Williams
Discussant: Dr. Alexander Murphy
Former Soviet Union
iii
1
5
15
25
42
59
Ethnoterritorial Conflict in the Former Soviet Union
Dr. Robert Kaiser
Discussant: Dr. Ronald Wixman
Africa
Geographic Factors in Ethnic Conflict in Africa
74
Dr. Harm J. de Blij
Discussant: Dr. Rex Honey
Latin America
The Ethnic Challenge to National and International
Order in South America, Mexico, and the Caribbean
86
During the 1990s: Geographical Perspectives
Dr. Gary S. Elbow
Discussant: Mr. Mac Chapin
Middle East
Ethnicity and Nationality in the Middle East
Dr. Marvin W. Mikesell
Discussant: Dr. Mildred Berman
Southeast and East Asia
99
108
Ethnicity Theory and Ethnic Conflict in China:
The New Politics of Difference
Dr. Dru Gladney
Geographic and Ethnographic Perspectives on Ethnic
Conflict in Southeast Asia
Dr. Eric Crystal
V
120
�C00123268
South Asia
Evolving Ethnicity in South Asia With Particular
130
Reference to India
Dr. Joseph E. Schwartzberg
Discussant: Dr. Robert Stoddard
Part-III: Regional Comparisons and Implications for the United States and
the International Community
The Demographic Backdrop to Ethnic Conflict:
A Geographic Overview
Dr. Gary Fuller
Ethnic Conflict and Population Displacement
Dr. Martin Kenzer
151
155
Forced Migration and Ethnicity
Dr. Lee Schwartz
Ethnic Conflict: A Comparative Examination
Dr. Thomas M. Poulsen
Patterns, Trends, and Regional Comparisons
Discussants: Dr. Marvin W. Mikesell and Dr. Mildred Berman
157
US Policy Perspectives: A Conceptual Approach
178
166
175
Dr. Jon Gundersen
Ethnic Conflict and US Policy
Dr. Wade Hinkle
Concluding Comments: Implications for the United States and the
International Community: Problems and Prospects
Dr. Stanley D. Brunn
Discussants: Dr. Rex Honey and Dr. Harm J. de Blij
vi
184
187
�C00123268
The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict
to National and International
Order in the 1990s: Geographic
Perspectives
Overview
Part 1: Regional Manifestations
Since the end of the Cold War, ethnic conflicts have
been of increasing importance-posing a threat to
international order and demanding the attention of
US policymakers. The aim of this conference report is
to highlight geographic concepts and factors that contribute to our understanding of these conflicts and to
identify sources of potential ethnic strife. Following
the order of the conference, this report is divided into
three parts:
Eastern Europe
Dn.Ronald Wixman, Professor of Geography, University of Oregon, identifies some potentially serious
ethnoterritorial conflicts that may arise in Eastern
Europe as well as others that have implications
beyond the region. He also discusses the impact of
Western nonaction in Bosnia and Herzegovina and
presents a worst case scenario for the situation in the
Balkans.
- The conference's conceptualframework.An examination of the geographic approach to the study of
ethnic conflict.
Drn Thomas Poulsen, the respondent, is Professor of
Geography at Oregon State University. He underscores some of the key elements that affect the Bosnia
situation.
e
Regional manifestations.Current and potential ethWestern Europe and Canada
Dn. Colin Williams, Research Professor at the University of Wales, College of Cardiff, examines ethnic
issues in Western Europe, highlighting the most pressing and drawing out the implications for multiethnic
nic conflicts by region.
- Implications.Looking at ethnic conflicts from a
comparative basis and viewing consequences for the
United States and the international community.
accommodation to a changing world order. He emphasizes the significance of the spatial perspective at
urban, regional, and continental scales.
Part I: Framing the Discussion
Dr: Alexander Murphy, Associate Professor in the
Department of Geography at the University of Oregon,
establishes the groundwork in his keynote address. He
examines the geographer's unique approach to analyzing ethnic tensions and discusses how the geographic
Dr.Alexander Murphy's response provides further
observations on ethnic dynamics in the region and on
the impact of Western Europe's changing political
geography on ethnic conflict.
perspective can aid in understanding these tensions, in
Former Soviet Union
identifying destabilizing ethnic conflicts, and in developing effective policy responses. His discussion
focuses on the core concepts of location, territory, and
environment.
Dr.Robert Kaiser,Professor of Geography at the
University of Missouri-Columbia, explores the factors underlying the regional variations in the ethnoterritorial conflicts in the former Soviet Union. Among
these factors are the degree of national consciousness,
the strength of attachment to place, the nature of
ethnodemographic trends, and the social mobility and
relative deprivation of the ethnic group. He also discusses how various groups have reacted to rising territorial nationalism.
Drn David Knight, Dean of Social Sciences at the University of Guelph, provides additional insights on the
geographic perspective, exploring the linked concepts
of identity, territory, territoriality, and self-determination as well as numerous territorial processes that
function within the nation-state system.
1
�C00123268
Drn Ronald Wixman, in his response, discusses the
region from a slightly different perspective, viewing
the Soviet Union as an empire that is going through
stages of decolonization.
Africa
Southeast and East Asia
Dr: Dru Gladney,Research Fellow, Program for
Cultural Studies at the East West Center, Hawaii,
illustrates some of the potential ethnic and subethnic
faultlines in Chinese society. He explores ethnicity in
the context of the shifting nature of identity and pro-
Dr.Harm J. de Blij, Landegger Distinguished Professor of Geography at Georgetown University, examines
poses some policy considerations.
the three kinds of ethnic conflict in Sub-Saharan
Africa: religious, tribal, and strategic. He then looks in
Dr: Eric Crystal, Coordinator for Southeast Asia Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, presents
detail at current ethnic strife in Liberia, Sudan, Dji-
four key focuses for understanding ethnic tensions in
bouti, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, and Angola and
assesses the potential for ethnic conflict in Nigeria and
South Africa.
Dr.Rex Honey, Associate Professor of Geography at
Southeast Asia: highland-lowland divides, religious
identification, cultural and linguistic differences in border regions, and ideological conflicts articulated in
terms of ethnic interest. Dr. Crystal highlights the
impact of outside intervention on inflaming ethnic ten-
the University of Iowa, responds by placing African
sions in the region since World War II and concludes
ethnic conflict in a historical perspective. He associ-
with some observations for policymaking.
ates current problems with the European colonialists'
imposition of boundaries and of the modern nation-
South Asia
state system.
Dr Joseph Schwartzberg, Professor of Geography at
the University of Minnesota, examines evolving eth-
Latin America
nicity in South Asia, focusing on postindependence
Dr.Gary S. Elbow, Professor of Geography, Texas
India. Among the issues he discusses are the processes
Tech University,.discusses the potential for ethnic
conflict in South America, Mexico, and the Caribbean
ofethnic identity formation, linguistic affiliation as an
organizing principle, and Hindu nationalism.
in.the 1990s. Helfocuses on the potential for confron-
tation between indigenous peoples and national gov-
Dr Robert Stoddard, the respondent, is Professor
ernments.
of Geography at the University of Nebraska. He discusses the regionalization of the Tamil population in
Mr.Mac Chapin of Rights and Resources responds
by discussing ethnic tensions among groups in Central
Sri Lanka and comments on two major perspectives of
Indian nationalism, the secular and the Hindu.
America. He concentrates on the marginalization of
the indigenous population.
Part III: Regional Comparisons and
Middle East
Implications for the United States and the
Dr Marvin Mikesell, Professor of Geography at the
University of Chicago, examines the ethnic realities
International Community
that make the Middle East a region of inherent instability and the persistent conflict between ethnic groups,
Perspectives on Demographic and
Humanitarian Issues
many of whom share a common language and religion.
Dr. Gary Fuller,Professor of Geography and Population Studies at the University of Hawaii, examines the
Dr Mildred Berman, Professor of Geography at
Salem State College, calls attention to refugees as
another of the destabilizing aspects of the region's
human geography.
demographic underpinnings of ethnic conflict. He
argues that certain demographic data, such as infant
2
�C00123268
mortality, are good indicators of a particular ethnic
group's well-being. He also looks at how youth
bulges-when the 15 to 24 age cohort exceeds 20 per-
agenda over the long term. Concentrating on Europe
and the former Soviet Union, he questions what type
of state structure can best protect ethnic groups in the
cent of a given population-affect stability within
ethnic groups.
region. He concludes by suggesting that the problem
of ethnic conflict in Europe could be addressed
through a united, decentralized Continent governed by
mutually accepted rules of behavior.
Dr Martin Kenzer, Associate Professor of Geography
at Florida Atlantic University, provides a review of
post-World War II ethnically driven refugee movements and assesses the current refugee picture.
Dr. Lee Schwartz, Office of the Geographer, Department of State, examines the linkage between forced
migration and ethnicity. He presents a typology of
Mr. Wade Hinkle, Department of Defense, reiterates
then Secretary of Defense Les Aspin's view that ethnic/national conflict is one of the main dangers to
US national security in the post-Cold War era. He
then summarizes the key points of US national security strategy: remaining engaged in international
forced movements of people and a geography of the
affairs, preventing the effects of ethnic conflict, and
ethnic composition of such migration.
forming partnerships with like-minded democratic
countries.
States, Nations, and Ethnic Conflict
Dr. Thomas Poulsen looks at how overlapping patterns of states (sovereign countries) and nations
(groupings of peoples with common identities) affect
current affairs. He then examines factors that aggravate or ameliorate ethnic conflicts, especially where
nations and states do not correspond, and presents
some political-geographic truisms that the United
States should consider in dealing with ethnic conflict
abroad.
Conclusions: Implications for the United States
and the International Community-Problems
and Prospects
Dr.Stanley Brunn, Professor of Geography at the University of Kentucky, examines the state of the world
political map and itemizes six factors that will affect
global politics over the next 20 years: environment,
religion, secularization, sports, territoriality, and comPatterns, 'Tends, and Regional Comparisons
Dr Marvin Mikesell suggests that some countriessuch as Finland-have done a good job accommodating minority populations and that neighboring countries could learn from this.
munications.
In her discussion, Dr. Mildred Berman relays the
importance of examining population trends.
Dr. Harm J. de Blij, the concluding discussant, points
out that ethnic strife may be related to deteriorating
environmental conditions in parts of the world.
In the discussion, Dr Rex Honey calls for understanding that oppressed ethnic groups have legitimate
grievances and for support of human rights globally.
Ethnic Conflict and US Policy
Dr Jon Gundersen, Department of State, presents his
view that US foreign policy must take into account
ethnic conflict, which will be on the international
Reverse Blank
3
�C00123268
�C00123268
�C00123268
Geographic Perspectives on Ethnic Conflict
Alexander Murphy
Associate Professor of Geography
University of Oregon
Introduction
The topic of ethnic conflict has long interested geographers, and in recent years the geographical literature
on the subject has attracted considerable attention.
Although some of the issues raised in this literature
are similar to those examined by political scientists
and sociologists, the emphasis in geography on spatial, territorial, and environmental issues has translated into a distinctly different analytical approach to
ethnic conflict. The purpose of this paper is to summarize the most important aspects of this approach and to
discuss how a geographical perspective can help us
understand ethnic tensions, identify potentially destabilizing ethnic conflicts, and develop effective policy
responses to those conflicts.,
The ensuing discussion centers around three core geographical concepts: location, territory, and environment. In the United States, the discipline of geography
is sometimes equated with efforts simply to locate and
describe the physical and human attributes of the
earth's surface. Geography is, however, much more
than this; it is concerned with analyzing and explaining the nature and significance of the spatial and environmental contexts within which events and processes
unfold. Geographers seek to understand and explain
the patterns that make up the earth's surface, the relationship among phenomena in particular places, the
situation of places and peoples in relation to one
another, and peoples' understandings of the places
where they live.
Core Concepts
The three core concepts around which this paper is
structured are at the heart of these geographical concerns. The concept of location. deals not only with the
spatial distribution of ethnic groups but also with the
relationship between ethnic patterns and other human
and physical patterns. Territory is a rich concept that
encompasses the nature and function of formal ethnic
territories and group sense of place. The environmental concept is concerned with the relationship between
ethnic groups and their tangible physical setting,
including the ways in which environmental percep-
tions affect group definition and intergroup relations.
There are obvious overlaps among these concepts, and
they do not encompass all relevant aspects of geographical inquiry. Nonetheless, they provide a useful
organizing framework around wh'ich a discussion of
the most important geographical insights on ethnic
conflict can be built.
Location: A Key To Understanding Relationships
Between Ethnic Groups
In any attempt to understand ethnic conflict, the location of the groups in question must be taken into consideration. On its surface this seems obvious, but many
general analyses of ethnic conflict pay remarkably little attention to locational issues. Instead, it is simply
assumed that groups live in the political units or historical homelands with which they are most readily identified. Too often studies note that the Bretons live in
Brittany, the French speakers of Canada in Quebec,
and the Tamils in Tamil Eelam without any consideration of the distributional complexities that lie behind
these generalizations.
Approaching ethnic conflict from a geographical perspective implies a much greater concern with the
details of location and distribution. This means focusing on the precise character of ethnic patterns and
their relationship to other political, social, and environmental patterns. A critical entry-level problem in
such an endeavor is to decide who does and does not
belong to a given ethnic group (see Smith 1986). How
an ethnic group is delimited depends on circumstances
and purpose, of course, but the process is not always
straightforward or obvious. There are more people
that Welsh autonomists would like to include in their
ethnic group than there are people who identify themselves primarily as Welsh. The Tamils of Sri Lanka
encompass two different groups from a historical and
religious standpoint. On a larger scale, the Russians in
5
�C00123268
the Baltic countries or the Germans in Eastern Europe
cannot necessarily be viewed as one group. Russian
and German migrations into these regions took place
over long periods of time, and those who came earlier
have distinctly different perspectives from those who
migrated during the past few decades.
later, helps explain the negative reactions that the plan
engendered. Similarly, a detailed understanding of the
distribution of Tamils in Sri Lanka sheds light on the
problems facing the Sinhalese-dominated government
in its efforts to quell separatist threats through the devolution of power to regional governments. As regional
governments grow in power, ethnically heterogeneous
administrative districts such as Puttalam and Ampara
increasingly become the focuses of conflict.
Once the issue of defining ethnic groups has been
addressed, there is much to learn from a careful analysis of group location and distribution. This can be seen
through an examination of the effects of different distributions at a large scale. As Marvin Mikesell and I
demonstrated in a recent article (Mikesell and Murphy
1991), the basic distribution of a minority group within
a state influences the types of demands the group is
likely to raise. We posited three scenarios (figure 1),
each involving a dominant group (A) that constitutes
90 percent of the population and a minority group (B)
that constitutes 10 percent of the population. In the first
scenario, group B is concentrated in one area within
the state. In the second scenario, group B is intermixed
with group A throughout the state territory. In the third
scenario, a significant portion of group B is concentrated in one territory, but many members of group B
live in other parts of the state. We went on to show that
if a minority group feels marginalized or repressed, in
the first scenario it is likely to make demands for separation (S), autonomy (A), or even independence (I).
This was the case for the Basques in Franco's Spain .
The forgoing examples suggest that a geographical
perspective on location involves more than simply
identifying where the members of ethnic groups live.
It is concerned with a group's location in relation to
other physical and human phenomena of importance.
Analyzing a group's "relative location" can provide
insight into the likelihood that one group will seek to
exert control over another, the opportunities and catalysts for ethnic group mobilization, the strategies
employed by groups during times of overt conflict,
and the possibilities for a conflict to spill beyond state
boundaries. A brief examination of each of these
points is instructive.
Attempts by one ethnic group to exert control over
another often occur when one group lives in an area
that is highly prized by another (see, for instance,
a number of the essays in Johnston, Knight, and
Kofman 1988). This is evident in the history of rela-
and is still the case for the Tibetans in China. In the
tions between dominant and minority groups in states
second scenario, by contrast, the demands are likely to
be for recognition (r), access (a), and participation (p),
as exemplified by African-Americans in the United
States. The third scenario, which corresponds to the
situation of the French speakers of Canada, is likely to
yield a mixture of demands and a greater heterogeneity
of ethnic group aspirations.
as diverse as Australia, Turkey, and France. In each
case, minorities concentrated in areas thought to have
little value or importance were generally left alone or
ignored. Those living in areas of economic, military,
political, or cultural significance, however, often
encountered interference and domination by the
group in power, which in turn frequently led to
conflict. In making this point, it is important to stress
that the perceptual importance of an area is not simply
a function of its economic and strategic attributes;
places with great historical-cultural meaning or
An understanding of ethnic patterns at a variety of
scales can tell us much about the nature of conflict and
about the viability of proposals to ameliorate conflict.
Take the case of Bosnia, for example. Generalized eth-
political significance can become focuses of conflict
nic distributions shown on large-scale maps became
the basis for the Vance-Owen plan to divide up the
country into discrete ethnic territories. A closer examination of ethnic patterns, however, reveals distributions that are much more nuanced than those reflected
in the Vance-Owen plan. Awareness of these, together
with some of the territorial issues that will be raised
as well. Thus, the presence of Albanians in Kosovo
and of French speakers in the communes around
Brussels have generated serious discord because of
the historical-cultural significance of Kosovo to Serbians and the political-cultural significance of the
communes around Brussels to Flemings.
6
�C00123268
Figure 1
Minority Aspirations: Significance of Distribution and Size
A
B
B
SAI
B
B
B
B
rap
B
B
B
BBB
B
B
B
AB
B
rap
SAI
B
Source: Mikesell, M., and Murphy, A., "A Framework for Compamtive Study of Minority Group Aspirations," Annals of the American Geographers,
Volume 81, Number 4, page585, 1991.0
7
349175 6-95
�Coo123268
Turning to the importance of relative location for ethnic mobilization; groups living within areas that are
disadvantaged from a socioeconomic standpoint can
use that disadvantage to foster a sense of discrimination. This does not mean that ethnicity is simply a
product of socioeconomic differences, but comparative
times of armed conflict. Assessing the strategies that
are likely to be employed in such conflicts requires an
understanding of a group's location in relation to
places of strategic or perceptual importance, the difficulties of exerting control over those places, and the
advantages that can follow if control is successfully
standards of living often become points of contention
asserted. In the case of recent Serbian initiatives, for
in ethnic conflicts (see, for instance, many of the
essays in Chisholm and Smith 1990). In former Yugoslavia, for example, Serbian resentment of Croats and
Slovenes was heightened by the disproportionate share
of tourism-related revenue that flowed into Croatia and
Slovenia. The Croats and Slovenes, in turn, resented
the central government's efforts to redistribute some of
that revenue to other parts of Yugoslavia.
example, Ronald Wixman has argued that it is impossible to understand the military objectives of the Serbs
without considering the geopolitical and strategic
advantages that will follow from a successful Serbian
attempt both to control the Krajina region of Croatia
and to connect it to Serbia (editorial, The Register
Guard,Eugene, Oregon, 6 June 1993, section B, pp. 1
and 4).
The capacity of a group to mobilize is also tied to its
location in relation to demographic and settlement
patterns. There is considerable evidence to suggest
that culturally distinct groups without a significant
urban base are unlikely to develop and sustain a serious ethnic movement (Murphy 1992). Most ethnic
movements begin among an intelligentsia with some
access to established lines of power and communication (Smith 1982). Such movements develop and grow
through the successful mobilization of people and
resources, which in turn requires the establishment of
an institutional base that is convenient to a significant
number of group members and that offers access to
channels of communication. Since these elements are
found primarily in cities, an urban base is almost a
prerequisite for ethnic mobilization. Thus, in Western
Europe most successful ethnic challenges have come
from groups such as the Catalans and the Flemings
that have major cities within their territories. By contrast, efforts to challenge existing arrangements
among Saami activists in Norway or their Basque
counterparts in France have been frustrated by the
lack of a central place that could become the focus of
identity and nationalist activism.
A final important dimension of "relative location" is
the situation of a group in relation to similar or sympathetic groups in other states. Social scientists and policymakers are so much in the habit of looking at issues
on a state-by-state basis that they often ignore cultural/ethnic continuities across international boundaries. Yet Azerbaijanis live in Iran as well as
Azerbaijan, and Armenians are found in Turkey as
well as in Armenia. Focusing on the relationships
among the peoples living on either side of these
boundaries is of critical importance if we are to understand the forces that will affect political stability in
Western and Central Asia in the years ahead. Indeed,
given the increasing permeability of international
boundaries, an awareness of cross-border cultural continuities and interaction patterns in many parts of the
world is going to be necessary if we are to comprehend the ways in which conflicts develop and their
likely ramifications.
Turning to the significance of relative location for the
strategies employed by ethnic groups in situations of
overt conflict, it has long been understood that a
group's position in relation to physical features, transportation routes, and settlement patterns affects the
Territory: At The Heart of Ethnicity and
Ethnic Conflict
A territory is generally understood to be a bounded
area that has some political character or meaning. As
the embodiment of a particular way of understanding
and using the earth's surface, territory is at the heart of
geographical thinking about ethnicity and nationalism.
Geographers are concerned with the functional and
tactics of conflict. As is discussed in more detail
below, ethnic conflicts often revolve around territorial
issues, and control over territory is a primary goal in
8
�C00123268
perceptual attributes of territory, the ways in which
falls within more than one group's sense of territory,
territory acquires significance in human affairs, and
the nature and impact of competing strategies to control territory (Knight 1982). Much of the social science and public policy literature on ethnicity fails to
consider these issues; instead, territories are treated
simply as fixed units within which political and social
developments are situated. This does not mean that
territories are entirely ignored. Questions are asked
about the role of Quebec in Canadian national politics,
the political tactics of the Armenian minority living
within Azerbaijan, the social consequences of ethnic
heterogeneity within the states of India, and the problems that interstate resource inequalities pose for
political stability in Nigeria. These questions tend to
be addressed, however, without any consideration of
the historical development, perceptual attributes, or
spatial configuration of the territorial units involved.
The importance of such questions becomes immediately apparent if we pose a series of counterfactual
questions. Would ethnolinguistic identity and intergroup conflict in Canada be different if Quebec had
the potential for conflict is heightened (see, for
instance, White 1992).
developed as three separate provinces instead of one?
monoethnic rationale, yet each would be ethnically
Would Armenian-Azerbaijani relations be any differ-
heterogeneous and would fall within more than one
ent if Stalin had not created an Armenian enclave
group's sense of territory (Jordan 1993).
within Azerbaijan? Would ethnic relations in Nigeria
be different if the state had been divided into 30
The Bosnian example suggests that, when policies are
instead of 19 constituent units? The obvious "yes" that
implemented that ignore underlying territorial ideolo-
each of these questions commands indicates the
importance of going beyond approaches that take the
territorial status quo for granted.
gies, instability is likely to result. The issue of sense of
territory is thus closely linked to the second core territorial issue: the development and institutionalization
of particular political-territorial arrangements. Focusing on the process by which formal territories come
into being is important because it can provide insights
into how territorial arrangements shape ethnic identity
and interaction, how conflicts develop and are sustained, and how territory is used to advance particular
political ends (see generally Sack 1986).
Two related territorial issues are at the heart of geographical work on ethnic conflict: (1) the nature and
scope of ethnic senses of territory and (2) the development and institutionalization of particular politicalterritorial arrangements. Turning to the first issue, the
habit of taking territorial arrangements for granted
means that we often do not consider the disjunction
between territorial structures and group sense of territory. Yet a map showing group sense of territory can
It is important to note that not all senses of territory
are monoethnic in character. One of the fundamental
flaws of many analyses of pre-civil-war Bosnia is the
failure to recognize the strength of a multiethnic Bosnian sense of territory. The number of people in Bosnia who were declaring themselves as "Bosnian" on
census and survey forms grew steadily in the postWorld War II era, and many inhabitants came to think
of the country as a territorial synthesis of cultures. The
recent partition plans developed for Bosnia fail to
grasp this reality. Instead they propose dividing the
country into ethnically discrete units. Since such proposals neither can build upon preexisting senses of
territory nor can possibly lead to the establishment of
truly monoethnic territories-the groups are too intermingled for that to happen-their implementation
would at best create a highly unstable situation; each
of the new subdivisions would have an explicitly
Many groups sharing basic cultural traits did not
become self-conscious ethnic groups until fairly
tell us much more about the likelihood of conflict than
1
recently. Some 200 years ago there was no widespread
can a static political map. It is, of course, difficult to
delimit a group's sense of territory with any precision,
but insights can be gained through an examination of
' historical political patterns, group rhetoric and ico.nography, population concentrations, and the distribution of sites with particular ethnocultural significance
(see Gottmann 1973). When the same area clearly
sense of Palestinian, Kurdish, or Flemish identity.
Those identities were forged in the context of political-territorial developments that served to differentiate
peoples based on cultural characteristics. In the case
9
�C00123268
of the Kurds, a larger sense of group identity developed out of a territorial struggle that marginalized and
ignored the Kurdish peoples. In the Flemish case, the
implementation of a territorial strategy by a movement initially focused on individual language rights
provided a crucible in which a larger sense of ethnic
identity could develop. In both cases, ethnic demands
and intergroup relations are fundamentally tied to the
development and institutionalization of particular territorial arrangements.
The political-territorial history of a region is also
implicated in the development and conduct of intergroup conflict. This is because particular issues take
on significance as territorial structures come into
being and because those structures, in turn, provide
the frameworks within which the issues in question
are confronted. This complex point can best be illustrated through an example. In early 20th century Belgium, the Flemish movement sought to secure the
rights of Dutch or Flemish speakers to use their language in public life. Frustrated by their lack of success
and concerned about the growing use of French in
northern Belgium, they changed strategies and began
to call for the partitioning of the country along language lines. This eventually occurred, and the country
is now a federation made up of language regions with
broad competencies over economic, social, and cultural matters. The adoption and implementation of a
territorial approach to the language problem shifted
attention away from individual language rights and
directed it toward territorial issues; disputes over the
use of language in governmental and commercial
affairs were replaced by conflicts over the regional
affiliations of certain communes along the language
boundary and around Brussels. Moreover, since powers over a broad array of issues were devolved to the
language regions, many economic, social, and political matters took on ethnoregional significance. As a
result, the internal territorial structure of Belgium has
promoted ethnoregionalism. Without a consideration
of the development and institutionalization of territorial arrangements in Belgium, this point could easily
be missed.
A final reason for focusing on the processes by which
territorial arrangements come into being is that such
us much about the circumstances that lead to ethnic
conflict (see Wixman 1986). General analyses of legal
arrangements in multiethnic states draw a distinction
between "personal" and territorial policy approaches.
The latter encompasses laws that set aside some territory for a given ethnic group. The assumption is often
made that these laws are pluralist in intent and effect;
it is assumed that they are acknowledgments of the
existence of ethnic diversity and that they operate to
sustain that diversity. A closer examination of territorial policies in multiethnic states reveals a much more
complicated picture (Murphy 1989). In some cases,
territorial policies reflect a desire to recognize and
sustain diversity (for instance, Switzerland, India, and
Canada). In other instances such policies have distinctly different intents and effects. Territorial policies
are adopted to diffuse international pressure (for
instance, the recognition of-ethnic territories in
Burma), to promote rivalry between groups (for
instance, Soviet manipulation of borders in the Caucasus and Central Asia), and even deliberately to constrain ethnic rights (for instance, the creation of
"homelands" for the indigenous peoples of South
Africa). Understanding the intent and effect of such
policies is clearly important if we are to judge what a
territory means for a given group and the role that the
territorial context plays in intergroup relations.
Environment: Its Context in Ethnic Conflict
Geographers are fundamentally concerned with the
relationship between people and the environment.
This relationship is important in the context of ethnic
group relations because ethnic identity is often tied to
a particular environmental context, because ecological
issues can become focuses of intergroup conflict, and
because the manipulation of the environment is a frequently used tactic to advance particular ethnoterritorial ends. A brief examination of these three factors
provides insight into the importance of the geographical concern with the environmental foundations of
ethnic relations.
In many parts of the world, ethnic identity is closely
linked to a people's understanding and use of the environment. The strong tie between ethnic identity and
an approach provides insight into the purposes behind
the creation of ethnic territories. This, in turn, can tell
10
�C00123268
environmental context can often be seen in the rhetoric
and iconography of ethnic movements; great attention
is paid to the unique physical characteristics of a
group's homeland in the songs, poems, art, and literature of the group. In many cases, these environmental
characteristics are so much a part of group identity that
any threat to them can precipitate a crisis. The link
between ethnicity and environmental context is even
deeper in parts of the world where differences in subsistence practices define ethnic boundaries. In the
highlands of Nepal, agriculture and ethnicity are
closely linked. An understanding of the intricacies of
that link is of considerable importance if we are to gain
insight into the types of events that can precipitate
conflict. Knowing that the Hindus equate brown grains
with impurity, for example, allows us to understand
the potential implications of a decision emanating
from Katmandu to introduce brown rice into the area.
The state of the environment in an ethnic region can
also become a source of conflict. The ethnopolitical
consequences of ecological degradation were apparent
in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s; concerns over the
rapidly deteriorating state of the environment in Bul-
garia, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and
Poland provided a rallying point for those seeking to
bring down Soviet hegemony in the region. Within
states, policies that promote environmental degradation in ethnic homelands or territories, whether intentional or not, can spark dissention and conflict. This
can be seen in former Czechoslovakia where the central government decided to support the GabcikovoNagymaros hydroelectric dam project on the Danube
disputed territories (for instance, the establishment of
settlements by Israeli Jews in the West Bank). More
subtle land use decisions are also linked to ethnic conflict. In a provocative recent study, Shaul Cohen
(1993) has shown how the Israeli Government and the
Palestinians use tree planting to assert their claims to
land, the former through afforestation schemes and the
latter through the planting of olive groves. Studies of
this sort highlight the importance of landscape and
land use issues for understanding ethnic conflict.
Policy Implications and Conclusion
The forgoing account has only scratched the surface
of the ways in which geographical perspectives can
enhance our understanding of ethnic conflict. Each of
the highlighted themes could be greatly expanded, as
will undoubtedly become clear in the regional papers
that follow. Looking at ethnicity through a geographical lens has a variety of implications for the formulation of policy responses to ethnic conflict, but three
stand out: (1) the importance of looking beyond political leaders, (2) the importance of looking beyond indi-
vidual states, and (3) the importance of looking at
maps-not just political maps, but ethnic, economic,
environmental, and perceptual maps as well.
Turning to the first two points, most of the questions we
ask about the world are framed in terms of states and
state leaders. The assumption is made that states are the
units that really matter in the world today, and the key
questions are thought to be those that focus on the via-
River. The project, which will result in the flooding of
bility and policy stances of political regimes. While this
land within the part of Slovakia where Hungarians are
concentrated, sparked protests amongst Slovakia's
Hungarian minority.
assumption made some sense during the Cold War era,
it is increasingly problematic. The very ubiquity of ethnic conflict points to its limitations. If we are to grasp
the dynamics and power of ethnic conflict in the modern world, we must be prepared to look at ethnicity
from a bottom-up perspective, one that begins with the
aspirations and needs of groups, not one that always
begins with the existing pattern of states.
Manipulation of the environment is also frequently
used as a tactic in ethnic conflicts. In some cases,
efforts are made to demarcate the boundaries of ethnic
territories through the building of particular structures
(for instance, walls and fences), the erection of signs,
or the emplacement of more subtle indicators of ethnic
group territoriality (for instance, symbolic icons or
structures) (see Rumley and Minghi 1991). In other
cases, land use decisions are made with the goal
of asserting control over a given area. This is most
clearly seen when settlements are established in
This is where geography comes in, for a geographical
perspective provides important insights into ethnicity
and ethnic relations that go beyond conventional
11
�C00123268
political analyses. Its power is ultimately to root
our understanding of ethnicity in a context that is not
simply one of political leadership and political initiatives. By focusing on the locational, territorial, and
environmental dimensions of ethnic conflict, a geographical perspective directs attention to basic opportunities and constraints, to issues that may precipitate
tensions, and to vital connections across international
boundaries that may be missed if we approach ethnic
conflict on a state-by-state basis. Maps can be extraor-
in a way that transcends conventional assumptions
about the power and static character of the existing
political-territorial order. Ethnic conflicts are likely to
intensify, not abate, in the years ahead, and in places
they may well lead to changes in the political organization of territory. Since there is little the United
States can do to alter this situation, US foreign policy
should not be driven by the assumption that regional
stability is most likely to occur in places where there
are no changes in the world political map. Instead,
dinarily important tools in this endeavor, for they
long-term stability is likely to be achieved only in sit-
encourage us to think about the relationships between
ethnic processes on the one hand and their territorial
and environmental contexts on the other. Maps should
not be seen as ends unto themselves, however. Rather,
their usefulness is in helping us to see relationships and
issues that otherwise might be missed.
uations where political and territorial arrangements
are organized to protect the basic cultural and political
rights of ethnic groups. This implies the need for a
US foreign policy that is open to political-territorial
structures that promote representative pluralism,
whether or not those structures reflect the existing
pattern of states.
The perspectives on ethnic conflict outlined in this
paper are suggestive of a larger challenge for US foreign policy: the need to redefine our national interest
12
�C00123268
References
Agnew, John A. Placeand Politics: The Geographical Mediation of State and Society. Boston: Allen &
Unwin, 1987. An excellent overview of the importance of location, local context, and sense of place in
political and social processes. Includes an extended
discussion of the ways in which place affects ethnic
identity with examples from the Scottish and American contexts.
the links between ethnicity and political geography in
a variety of contexts. The essays provide a good sense
of the range of issues that geographers consider when
studying ethnic conflict.
Chisholm, Michael and Smith, David M., eds. Shared
dnici, 1993; pp. 133-142. A useful assessment of the
Space: Divided Space. Essays on Conflict and Territo-
rial Organization.London: Unwin Hyman, 1990. A
good collection of essays showing how territorial
issues come into play in many ethnic conflicts. The
essays include case studies in Western Europe, the
Middle East, the former Soviet Union, South Asia,
South Africa, Australia, and North America.
Clarke, Colin; Ley, David; and Peach, Ceri., eds.
Geography and Ethnic Pluralism.London: Allen &
Unwin, 1984. The essays in this book employ geographical concepts to analyze ethnic and racial ten-
Jordan, Peter. "The Problems of Creating a Stable
Political-Territorial Structure in Hitherto Yugoslavia."
In Croatia:An New EuropeanState. Edited by 1.
Crkvenci, M. Klemencic, and D. Feletar. Zagreb: Uredifficulties of creating mono-ethnic territories in Bos-
nia. The study also highlights the disjunction between
proposed territorial partitions for Bosnia and preexisting functional regions.
Knight, David B. "Identity and Territory: Geographical Perspectives on Nationalism and Regionalism."
Annals of the Association ofAmerican Geographers,
72 (4), 1982; pp. 514-531. An important statement on
the nature and meaning of territory for ethnonationalist groups. The study demonstrates the significance of
the emotional bonds that people develop to territory.
sions in Third World and metropolitan contexts.
Several of the case studies highlight the importance of
distributional issues for ethnic relations.
and Davies, Maureen. Self-Determination: An
Annotated Bibliography.New York:
Interdisciplinary
Garland, 1987. A useful bibliography of works on eth-
Cohen, Shaul E. The Politics of Planting: Israeli-Pal- nicity and nationalism, including many written by
estinian Competitionfor Control of Land in the Jerusalem Periphery.Geography Research Paper No. 236.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993. A fascinating case study of the use of planting as a means of
asserting control over land. The study demonstrates
the importance of the environment in ethnic relations.
Gottmann, Jean. The Significance of Territory.Char-
lottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1973. A semi-
geographers.
Mikesell, Marvin W. "The Myth of the Nation State."
Journal of Geography, 82 (6), 1983; pp. 257-260. A
highly accessible overview of the disjunction between
political and ethnic patterns in the modern world and
the significance of that disjunction for political stability.
nal study of the ways in which territory reflects and
shapes our ideas about politics and society. The study
adopts a historical approach to show how the nature
and Murphy, Alexander B. "A Framework for
Comparative Study of Minority Group Aspirations."
Annals of the Association ofAmerican Geographers,
and meaning of territory has changed over time.
81 (4), 1991; pp. 581-604. A study of ethnic group
Johnston, R. J.; Knight, David B.; and Kofman, Eleonore., eds. Nationalism,Self-Determination and
Political Geography.London: Croom Helm, 1988. A
collection of essays by geographers that focuses on
relations in comparative prespective, including a proposed framework for understanding the relationship
13
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References (continued)
between ethnic gioup aspirations and government policies. The study also examines the significance of geographical context for minority group goals.
of the role that elites play in the development of ethnic
movements. The study provides interesting insights
into the circumstances that are likely to lead to ethnic
mobilization.
Murphy, Alexander B. "Territorial Policies in Multiethnic States." GeographicalReview, 79 (4), 1989;
pp. 410-421. An overview of the nature and impact of
different kinds of ethnoterritorial policies in culturally
heterogenous states. The study shows that territorial
policies are not necessarily pluralist in intent and
effect.
. The Ethnic Originsof Nations. Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1986. A seminal work on the nature of ethnicity and nationalism. The study adopts a historical
approach to show the continuities and discontinuities
between modern ethnic nationalism and its premodern
antecedents.
"Urbanism and the Diffusion of Substate
Nationalist Ideas in Western Europe." History of
EuropeanIdeas, 15 (4-6), 1992; pp. 639-645. An
examination of the importance of settlement structure
for the development and dissemination of ethnonationalist ideas. Te study points to the importance ofan urban base for a minority group's ability to extract
concessions from state authorities.
Rumley, Dennis and Minghi, Julian V., eds. The Geography of BorderLandscapes.London: Routledge,
1991. An interesting collection of essays looking at
the various ways in which groups use landscapes to
establish and maintain borders for political and cultural purposes. The book includes case studies from a
variety of different settings.
Sack, Robert D. Human Territoriality:Its Theory and
History. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University
Press, 1986. A major statement on human efforts to
exert control over geographical space. The study discusses the historical development of territoriality,
examines some of the reasons for adopting a territorial
approach, and indicates some of the implications ofsuch an approach.
White, George W. "The Territorial Dimension of Hungarian Ethnic Identity." Yearbook of the Association of
Pacific Coast Geographers,44, 1992; pp.23-48. A
thoughtful overview of Hungarian territorial issues in
the aftermath of World War I. The study highlights the
importance of group sense of territory in the delimitation of national boundaries.
Williams, Colin H. and Smith, Anthony D. "The
National Construction of Social Space." Progressin
Human Geography, 7 (4), 1983; pp. 502-518. A good
overview of the ways in which geography is implicated in ethnicity and ethnic relations. The article
focuses on a variety of spatial and territorial issues
that are relevant to ethnic conflict.
Wixman, Ronald. "Applied Soviet Nationality Policy:
A Suggested Rationale." In PasseTurco-TatarPrisentSovietique: Etudes Offertes &Alexandre Bennigsen. Edited by Ch. Lemercier-Quelquejay, G. Veinstein, and S. E. Wimbush. Louvain: Editions Peeters,
1986; pp. 449-468. An interesting case study that
shows how ethnic territories have been manipulated to
achieve particular political ends. The study focuses
attention on the importance of the historical development of territorial structures for ethnic group relations.
Smith, Anthony D. "Nationalism, Ethnic Separatism,
and the Intelligentsia." In NationalSeparatism.Edited
by Colin H. Williams. Vancouver: University of-British Columbia Press, 1982; pp. 17-41. A good analysis
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Identity, Territory, and Self-Determination:
Territory
Factors Underlying Potential National and
David B. Knight
Territory by itself is a passive concept. People, by
their beliefs, decisions, and actions, give meaning to
territory. Territory thus is not; rather, it becomes! It is
true that many people obtain meaning from "their"
Dean of Social Sciences
territory and the landscape within it by believing that
International Conflict
University of Guelph
The State
States' remain the principal territorial framework for
international society. Whereas all States are legally
equal within the international system, in geographical
terms there are great differences within and between
States, including differences that find reflection in the
way individual States may be perceived as partici-
pants in the system (Cohen 1991; Knight, 1993).
The State, a physical and legal entity, is a bounded
container for the contents of a particular portion of the
earth's surface, which includes the people, their govemnment, resources, and means for communication
and movement. The State, theoretically, is "the chief
custodian of overall social order; it is monitor, comptroller, arbitrator" of all people, things, and processes
operating within the delimited bounds (Greer and
Orleans, cited in Knight, 1982). Further, as Johnston
(1982) has observed, the State acts as the promoter of
accumulation, as the legitimator of capitalism, and .as
the creator of social consensus and order. In order to
perform these three roles, each State develops its own
instruments and mechanisms by which the structural
links between social formation and the State can function hierarchically and so enable the reproduction of
the system.
The State is thus itself a geographical factor because
things happen that have spatial consequences as a
result of decisions and actions by State agents and
institutions. States' actions pertain to their own and
others' territories. An essential quality of statehood is
territory; all States have territory that is bounded, formally or informally, by human decisions and actions.
the territory and its landscape are living entities that
are already filled with meaning. And it is true that
such meanings may be reflected in a people's cultural
ecology, the spatial patterning of their settlement and
land use systems, their naming of places, their patterns
of movement, and perhaps in reverential beliefs they
hold about specific parts of the landscape around
them. To suggest that these meanings are simply figments of the collective imagination-parts of the
"geographies of the mind"-is to be radical, at least
for those people who accept the apparent truth of such
meanings. Meanings gained from territory-which are
really attributions to .the territory-reflect a cultural
relationship with the territory. Consider, for instance,
the powerful links most US citizens have to Washington, DC, where the human-created capital landscape
serves as an important symbolic place for members of
the American nation.
A State's territory is thus not value-free; it holds different kinds of meanings for its people versus-but
from quite different perspectives and degrees of
knowledge, insight, and appreciation-those who do
not belong. People of the State will revere and gain
strength from their territory. People will see certain
structures or specific locations, such as statues, capital
cities, battlefields, and even the territory as a whole, as
sacred or at least very special. In sum, territory is a
social construction (Williams and Smith, 1983).
If it is accepted that territory "becomes," then States
are not geographical givens. No State exists because
of firm geographical factors. States and their spatial
parameters-dimensions, shapes, and boundariesexist because human actions and various local and
world economic-political-social processes have led to
their creation and continuation. These actions and processes occur in specific time-space settings and so
' State, with a capital "s" herein, refers to an internationally recognized independent, self-governing territory, sometimes called a
country. State with a lowercase "s" refers to a politico-territorial
unit within a State, such as Minnesota within the United States.
15
�C00123268
involve geographical considerations, with resulting
actions and processes having sometimes profound,
sometimes subtle geographical impact.
Territorial Processes
The attachments people have to their territory can
have spiritual and psychological bases that go deeper
than anything generated simply by economic factors.
These attachments and linkages help to bond people
both to their territory and to others who also "belong"
to it and accept it as theirs.
For any State to exist there must be numerous "centripetal forces" operating that link people, places, and
socioeconomic and political processes (Whebell 1983;
table 1). A key process is centralization,whereby the
people and their territory are "welded" together via
socioeconomic and political integration. Centralization processes vary, and the degrees of success in
achieving unification, if-such is the goal, also vary. It
has been almost an article of faith that by the modernization of all within the State's bounds a unified developed State can be achieved, with the center-be it
political or economic-providing supposed solutions
to the development needs of periphery. The efforts of
the 1950s and 1960s, in many States, did not achieve
such a goal. Still, even when unity eluded States,
modernization processes generally linked people and
regions together. Core-periphery relations have internal and international dimensions for all States (Gottmann, ed., 1980). They operate in colonial situations
too, as when the center establishes and then strengthens its links to the colonial periphery center.
Territory, according to the French geographer Jean
Gottmann (1973), when delimited with a system of
government that has effective control over it, provides
States also constantly have to deal with various decentralizingprocesses. Whereas various centripetal forces
strengthen and unify the State, countervailing, centrif-
both security and opportunity for those who live
ugal forces reduce its cohesion. A weak central gov-
within its bounds. On the one hand, there is security to
be gained from being an isolated community, whereas,
on the other hand, there is opportunity to be derived
from being a part of a larger whole. Inwardness and
security, outwardness and opportunity-stress is
caused by these contradictory dimensions of territory,
for elements of both undoubtedly are always present
in any situation. In terms of foreign policy and international trade and other linkages, States may be further along the continuum toward one extreme or the
other at different times, thus more toward stressing an
outward-looking opportunity perspective than an
inward-looking security perspective at one time, and
vice versa at another. That there is an interplay
between the two contrasting, fundamental dimensions
of territory is vital to any understanding of the political geography of specific States, the international system of States, and the various group politico-territorial
identities around the globe that are challenging the
status quo.
ernment; poor communications; or significant ethnic,
cultural, religious, or other divisions among people
within the State serve as examples of centrifugal
forces. If the divide is too great between a regionally
based group and the central government, self-determination and secession may be demanded. To deal with
demands from a peripheral portion of the State, the
government may grant devolution whereby legislative
power is devolved from the center to a region-such
as what Scots nationalists want from the English-dominated parliamentary center in London or when a new
sub-State territory is created as in Jura in Switzerland
(Jenkins, 1986). If centrifugal forces prove to be too
destructive within a State, a people may demand internal self-determination by throwing out a government
and reforming the State, as happended early in the
1990s in Poland and Hungary when Communist governments and their apparatuses were overthrown and
For those who belong to and control a territory, there
will undoubtedly be powerful symbolic links to
"their" territory, no matter how little the territory is
actually known or how weakly it is perceived; it is
enough that it is theirs! But what if the territory in
question does not coincide with the bounds of a particular State, either in terms of its internal or inter-State
structures? Where there is a distributional disparity,
there is the potential for conflict.
The Inherent Contradictions of Territory
16
�C00123268
Territorial Processes
Centralization subsumed:
Boundary establishment's three stages:
- "Centripetal forces."
- Definition.
* Socioeconomic and political integration.
- Delimitation.
Modernization.
e
* Metropolitanism.
- Demarcation.
Expansionist subsumed:
Imperialism.
- Core-periphery relationships.
*
Decentralization subsumed:
Irredentism subsumed:
" "Centrifugal forces."
* Annexationism-change in political control from
one unit to another.
" Self-determination-processesinvolved in a demand
for the restructuring of the State, with new power to
the people.
Separatism subsumed:
Devolution-legislative power from center to
region(s).
e
- Colonial rule.
Autonomism-implies territorial distinctiveness.
involved in a demand
* Self-determination-processes
to be separated from the existing State.
" Decolonization-initiated by colony.
" Decolonization-instigated by the imperial power:
e
Capital city location:
e
Site selection process and consequences of site
selection.
replaced by multiparty democratic systems responsive
to ballot box results. Colonial rule, under the guidance
of a governor, is a form of decentralization, as is
Secessionism-detachment to create a new territory.
CBased on Whebell (1983), with modifications and additions by
Knight.
can itself be a territorial process, as evidenced by the
bitter case in Canada in the 19th century (Knight,
1992) and in united Germany over whether Berlin
decolonization that occurs by imperial action.
should once again become the capital.
All States, through their governments, deal with competing centripetal and centrifugal forces. Competition
between and among the regions of the State and with
the center provides evidence of this. The selection of a
capital city generally brings both forces to the surface
as competing territorially based biases and opinions
are expressed. Hence the selection of a new capital
Other territorial processes include:
- Boundary establishment-the creation of limits to a
territory. This can involve dynamic processes, as
governments determine the areal extent of their control. Boundary conflicts remain the primary cause
for conflict between States (Boundary Bulletin).
17
�C00123268
- Expansionism-the areal extension of a State and
domination of neighboring States' territories and
peoples (Parker, 1988) or the claiming of others' ter-
ritories overseas (Christopher 1988).
- Irredentism-the claiming or taking of another
State's territory based on a cultural claim, whether
true or not. Nazi Germany's claiming and taking the
Sudetenland (in Czechoslovakia) in 1938 is the classic example.
- Separatism-the separation of one part from another,
identity"; that is, if the group becomes active in a
political manner and makes it needs known with the
State, it becomes a "group politico-territorial identity"
(Knight, 1982).
Group territorial identities, involving as they do
numerous ways for people to identify and bond and
yet also to be separate, form an aspect of the geographies of the mind, because the links-while sometimes having physical expression, as with flags,
national anthems, favored symbolic sites (Zelinsky,
1988)-remain essentially in the mind, to turn off or
whether partially or totally. If a regionally based
on. Each definition of group self implies some other
group causes friction between the region and the center, accord may be achieved by the granting of autonomy as in Euskadi, northern Spain. Decolonization
and the granting of statehood due to demands from
within a colony is another form of separatism; it is
significant that most colonies obtained independence
within their colonially derived boundaries because
separatist threats were perceived to be too great to
permit otherwise. 2 If an internal-to-a-State solution
to discord is not enough, the State may disintegrate
as a result of secessionism, whereby the territory is
divided into two or more parts as with the recent
breakup of Czechoslovakia.
group, with different values, different attachments,
and different allegiances-the description of which
may not reflect reality from the perspective of that
other group (Said, 1993; Godlewska and Smith 1994).
Just as territory has inward and outward consequences, so too does identity. Some groups look
inward, stressing the need for security, whereas others
are keen to look outward, seeking opportunities for
interaction with others. The concepts of territory and
identity thus share a fundamental tension between
these competing elements.
Measures of Identity
All these territorial processes imply people. Of concern here are people in groups. The word "people" has
legal meaning; it normally encompasses all the inhabitants of a State. All people living within Botswana,
for example, are said to be Batswana, whether or not
they all have allegiance to such a definition of group
"self." Some sub-State groups claim they are "people"
and thus deserve international recognition (Knight
1988; Crawford 1988). Many other terms are used to
describe groups of people, including nations, ethnic
groups, and tribes. All evoke feelings of self-worth by
members and feelings of suspicion toward nonmembers. To get around the problems of evocative definitions, I have offered the phrase "group territorial
This conservative view is under threat, as demonstrated by the
recent creation of Eritrea out of part of Ethiopia, a territorial break
that perhaps is but a prelude to territorial partitioning and new State
creation that could occur throughout Africa.
2
We operate at several levels of identity. At the center
is the self, normally set within a family. Beyond that,
we are amazing creatures because we have the capacity to attach ourselves to many aspects of our group
identities, such as in a neighborhood, a religious com-
munity, a scout troop, a football team, a region of the
country, or even the nation-all of which are tied to
particular places (Tuan, 1977). We can flick a switch
in our minds and change attachments, as is appropnate
at the moment. But each of us ultimately gives priority
of belonging to a particular level of abstraction of
identity. For many people priority in the people-to-territory link is at the level of the State. However, for
many others, priority is given to a lower order allegiance. For instance, some may have allegiance to a
regionally based identity, as to Punjab rather than to
India. Others may give primary allegiance to their
tribe/ethnic group/sub-State nation. The latter three
forms of group identity may be based on claims of
common ancestry; common language; (selective) history; traditions; and, above all, in the name of the
group, a particular territory.
18
.
�C00123268
What is not well understood is why people can at one
moment share a higher level of identity that links two
or more separate identities but then drop back into placing their local level of identity first, thus leading to the
exclusion of previously accepted neighbors and, perfor
haps, to conflict. For example, in Yugoslavia people
a time accepted a trans-subgroup "Yugoslavian" identity but then, as the State apparatus rapidly crumbled,
shucked that ephemeral level of identity and returned to
giving priority to their age-old ethnic identities.
is attached by a distinctive group who hold or covet
that territory and who desire to have full control of it
for the group's benefit" (Knight, 1982, p. 526). Selfdetermination is at once a legal concept that finds
expression in international law and a geographical concept because it links identity, territory, and the desire
for control and has territorial processual consequences.
Territoriality
We are all territorial beings, exhibiting territoriality in
varying manners, depending upon in which culture we
are brought up. Although people vary from one culture to another in terms of what they regard as their
personal space, most will defend their home turf at'a
personal scale-be it the home from burglars, the
team's territory during a hockey game, or the claimed
locations for our desks in the office. At a different
scale, ethnic and national territory may also be
defended if threatened. Groups, as with individuals,
exhibit territoriality. Geographer Robert Sack (1981,
1986) notes that territoriality is a powerful and indispensable geographic strategy for controlling people
and things by controlling area. Territoriality implies
the need to possess, occupy, and defend a particular
territory.
Why should people sometimes link together and at
other times not? It is not a given that some people can
be
cooperate and share territory whereas others must
divided. The link between territory, identity, and terntoriality becomes especially dynamic when discord
exists between two or more group territorial identities
that share a single space-such as Walloons and
Flemings in Belgium, Greek and Turkish Cypriots in
Cyprus, contrasting peoples in Sudan-or, indeed, lie
across the shared bounds of two or more States, as do
the Kurds in Southwest Asia.
Self-Determination
In the West there is a tendency to discuss human rights
from an individual basis, whereas in the former USSR
and in many Third World States stress is given to
group rights. Group rights form the basis for many
claims, especially when the nation is involved,
because most people today still put the needs of their
nation above personal needs-thus the call to arms is
so often heeded in times of danger. Group rights also
find expression in self-determination, for the term is
used to refer to groups, not individuals. Maoris in
New Zealand use the word turangawaewaeto refer,
literally, to "the standing place for the feet." Implied
in this is "the rights of a tribal group in land and the
consequential rights of individual members of the
group" (cited in Knight, 1988, p. 126). This phrase
links identity, territory, and rights. Control is implied
too, for without control the people's rights and responsibilities cannot be fulfilled, and the identity within
territory is threatened. Control over both identity and
territory is self-determination. Many groups, varying
defined, claim self-determination by maintaining they
have valid links between their identity and their territory and have the expectation of rights and control that
would come from the granting of self-determination.
Despite the clamoring for self-determination and its
application following World War I in many places in
Europe, Woodrow Wilson's Secretary of State, Robert
Lansing, in 1921 believed that national safety, historic
rights, and economic interests should take precedence
over self-determination. He felt the term self-determination was "loaded with dynamite!" Thus Lansing
and other politicians then and later, even to this day,
have given priority to existing States (Knight 1985).
Although the UN Charter states that "all people have
the right to self-determination," the UN-which is
made of representatives of States, after all-gives priority to respecting the territorial integrity of existing
When the concern for identity, territory, territoriality,
and self-determination are combined, a dynamic definition is possible: "territory is.. . space to which identity
19
�C00123268
States over any substate group politico-territorial
identity's claim to part of the State's territory; to do
otherwise would "dismember or impair, totally or in
part, the existing State" (UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XV), cited in Knight, 1985, p. 259).
There is an out, for under international law, as currently written, secession may occur if the majority of
the people of the total State-or the government,
which claims to speak in their name-agrees to the
dismantlement of governmental authority in part of
the State and to its secession.
The concern for the territorial integrity of States has
recently been severely challenged by three things.
First, by the development of human rights expectations that are said to apply to all States. Second, by the
disintegration of the former USSR and the claiming of
self-determination by numerous formerly sub-State
groups-some of whom find themselves to be still
sub-State groups but now within different or restructured States. Third, by US-led UN interventionist
actions in several States. Perhaps we will soon see a
rewriting of international law. Any application of selfdetermination implies change, whether change within
a territory or change as a consequence of-the splitting
of a territory into at least two parts. In each case, people, with distinctive identities, seek change.
variety of additional factors need to be considered
when examining potentials for ethnic or national conflict (Kliot, 1989; Gosar, ed., 1993), it is necessary to
appreciate the importance of the essential concepts
and processes discussed here to more fully appreciate
why certain conflicts are due to ethnic and national
tensions, bounded as they are within certain territorial
structures and influenced by-or which cause-certain territorial processes.
Pressures are mounting for territorial (and other) alterations to the existing international system of States.
Some of the pressures are now severe, as evidenced by
savagery in parts of the former USSR and Eastern
Europe, where many distinct group politico-territorial
identities have sought or are seeking to establish their
own States separate from the politico-territorial units
in which they now find themselves. Is the day far off
before similar pressures mount elsewhere-in Africa,
Asia, or even the Americas-for secession, with or
without violence? Not all claims for self-determination need involve secession, as suggested above,
because accommodations are often reached within
existing State structures. Nevertheless, secession as a
recourse to discord remains-and, indeed, has become
increasingly-an option.
Conclusion
The linked concepts of identity, territory, self-determination, and numerous territorial processes give power
and meaning to the actions of many group politico-territorial identities who seek to better their lot. While a
20
�C00123268
References
Boundary Bulletin, Durham, England: International
Boundaries Research Unit.
Knight, David B. "Territory and People or People
and Territory: Thoughts on Post-Colonial Self-
Determination," International PoliticalScience
Cohen, S. B. "Global Geopolitical Change in the
Review, Vol. 6, 1985; pp. 248-272.
American Geographers,Vol. 81, 1991; pp. 551-580.
Knight, David B. "Self-Determination for Indigenous
Christopher, A. J. The British Empire at its Zenith
London: Croom Helm, 1988.
Self-Determination and PoliticalGeography,R. J.
Johnston, D. B. Knight and E. Kofman, eds. London:
Croom Helm, 1982; pp. 117-134.
Post-Colonial War Era," Annals of the Association of
Crawford, James, ed. The Rights of Peoples, Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1988.
Godlewska, Anne and Neil Smith, eds. Geography
and Empire, Oxford: Blackwell, 1994.
Gosar, A., ed. "Ethnicity and Geography," special
issue of GeoJournal,Vol. 30, 1993; pp. 199-364.
Gottmann, Jean. The Significance of Territory
Charlottesville: The University Press of
Virginia, 1973.
Peoples: The Context for Change," in Nationalism,
Knight, David B. A Capitalfor Canada: Conflict
Resolution in a ParliamentarySystem, Ottawa:
Carleton University Press, 1992.
David B. Knight. "Geographical Considerations in a
World of States," in States in a Changing World,
A. M. James and R. Jackson, eds. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1993.
Parker, Geoffrey. The Geopoliticsof Domination
London: Routledge, 1988.
Gottmann, Jean, ed. Centre and Periphery:Spatial
Rumley, Dennis and J. V. Minghi, eds. The Geography
Variationin Politics,Beverly Hills: Sage, 1980.
of BorderLandscapes, London: Routledge, 1991.
Jenkins, J. R. G. Jura Separatism in Switzerland
Sack, Robert D. "Territorial Bases of Power," in
Oxford: Clarendon, 1986.
Johnston, R. J. Political Geographyand the State
PoliticalStudies From Spatial PerspectivesNew
York: Wiley, 1981.
New York: St. Martin's, 1982;
Sack, Robert D. Human Territoriality:Its Theory and
History, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Kliot, Nurit. "Mediterranean Potential for Ethnic
Conflict: Some Generalizations," Tijdschri voor
Economische en Sociale Geografie, Vol. 80, 1989;
Press, 1986.
pp. 147-163.
Knight, David B. "Identity and Territory: Geographi-
cal Perspectives on Nationalism and Regionalism,"
Said, Edward R. Culture and Imperialism, New York:
Knopff, 1993.
Tuan, Yi-Fu. Space and Place,Minneapolis: Univer-
sity of Minnesota Press, 1977.
Annals of the Association of American Geographers,
Vol. 72, 1982; pp. 514-532.
21
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References (continued)
Whebell, C. F. J. "Political-Territorial Process," paper
presented at International Political Geography Conference, School of Geography, Oxford University, 1983.
Williams, Colin and A. D. Smith "The National Construction of Social Space," Progress in Human
Geography, Vol. 7, 1983; pp. 502-518.
Zelinsky, Wilbur. Nation Into State, Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1988.
22
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Summary of General Discussion
DR. POULSEN: I would like to elaborate on one of
the points that Dr. Murphy made about ethnic mobilization and socioeconomic status as they relate to terri-
toriality. Dr. Murphy referred to the ability of the
Serbs to mobilize themselves on the basis of their
envy and resentment toward the Slovenes and Croats,
who are much more economically developed. Ethnic
group mobilization can work in the reverse as well,
when more developed regions resent the flow of
resources to poorer regions. For example, the Croatian
identity that developed since the 1960s certainly originated, in part, because this group was the productive
part of Yugoslavia and the Croatians felt that the revenues they generated were being wasted in Serbia and
in the southern parts of the country. One can point to a
similar situation in Spain where the separatist feelings
that exist among the Basques and the Catalonians
come, not because they lack resources, but, again,
because they reside in the most productive part of
Spain-on a per capita basis-and their productivity
goes to the benefit of non-Catalonian and non-Basque
regions.
DR. MURPHY: That is an important point. I tried to
allude to this after saying there was Serbian resent-
ment of Croats and Slovenes because of the dispropor-
tionate share of tourism-related revenues that they
receive. The key to understanding socioeconomic patterns in terms of relative location, which is the way I
framed it, is not simply to think that a map of socioeconomic well-being necessarily tells us something
about ethnicity, but rather to think about socioeconomic well-being in relation to how it is understood
and interpreted. Whether you are well off or poor, the
is
key issue is whether you feel like your well-being
threatened-a feeling of marginalization. That is what
is important in considering patterns of socioeconomic
differentiation,
dynamic is engaged in places like Bosnia, what can
that can
the geographic discipline tell policymakers
conflict resolution-especially
help us as we attempt
in cases where the conflicts are violent?
DR. MURPHY: Conflict resolution is clearly one of It
the most important issues that we have to deal with.
is difficult to answer that briefly in a way that gets
beyond generalities. Nevertheless, let me say a few
things.
Understanding the issues of territory, scale, and location is necessary to make sensible and intelligent proposals to ameliorate existing conflicts.
First of all, conflict resolution requires an understanding, in part, of the strategies that are likely to be
employed by the participants. This, in turn, requires an
understanding of how participants understand and perceive territory. I think it is actually fairly clear why the
Serbian military has pursued aggression in particular
in terms
areas. It is further clear why that is happening
of basic strategic concerns. An understanding of
underlying territorial motives and objectives, I think,
is helpful in formulating any kind of response to
something like the current conflict in the Balkans.
Another issue that it is necessary to understand in
terms of conflict resolution is that of scale. One must
be cognizant of the impact of a particular proposal for
resolving conflict. An important question that needs to
be asked is, "What does this solution mean for Bosnia?" "What does it mean for the larger Islamic
world?"
But third, and most important, is the need to have a
ethnic
clear understanding of a region's territorial and
Conflict resolution implies some kind of plan
realities.
to create a stable situation. I made some comments
about the inefficacy of the Vance-Owen plan. I made
them because the plan and other plans that have been
articulated for the division of Bosnian territory into
QUESTION: Both the speakers have presented some
sevmonoethnic regions fail to take into consideration
very tantalizing concepts that I think would fit well
and ethnic realities-one
eral fundamental territorial
into a strategy of conflict prevention, which I hope we
of which is that, for all the usefulness of the generalthe next two days. I would like
talk a little bit about in
ethnic map of the country, it hides as much as it
to ask Dr. Murphy to say something about conflict res- ized
olution. Once people have decided to use guns to
that
readjust these territorial boundaries and once
23
�C00123268
To draw on the Belgium case again, one could take a
look at that country in the late 19th century and generalize about the north. One could say that northern Belgium was then less well off than southern Belgium, so
that must be a reason why the Flemish movement
mobilized at that time. That is a tempting interpretation if you think in simplistic regional terms-but the
modern ethnolinguistic regions of Belgium had no
meaning at that time. There were socioeconomic difOne would have to use different kinds of strategies in
the north and the south, but they
dealing with other problems. In the case of Belgium, if ferences between
were understood to be a rural-urban rather than a
on how to
I were advising the Belgian Government
regional phenomenon. Although a statistical correlakeep its ethnoregional situation under control, I would
differtion existed between region and socioeconomic
suggest giving the old provinces more political-terrilate 19th century, this did not really
ences in the
torial significance within the state. Then their citizens
explain ethnic mobilization at that time. The mobilizacould vote on a fiscal issue and have it not always be
tion had much more to do with the inability of Flemish
an ethnoregional issue. So the answer, of course, has
speakers to use their language in public life. That
to be tied to the particularities of each case. It seems
in turn, began to take on regional significance as
that the issues of territory, scale, and location are part issue,
efforts to achieve greater language rights were frusof what has to be in the mix in order to make sensible
trated.
and intelligent decisions.
reveals. We have to recognize that. It is not a reflection of underlying patterns of territorial ideology, nor
of functional patterns of interaction before the 1989
civil war. It is, in fact, not even really in any conceivable way possible to create monoethnic territories in
that region. This implies the need for a different kind
of strategy to conflict resolution.
QUESTION: Is there a correlation between socioeconomic status and ethnic conflicts? Would it be valid to
say that a commonality in socioeconomic status would
ameliorate ethnic conflict? Is socioeconomic status a
factor we should examine in attempting to determine
whether there is a potential for ethnic conflict?
How important is marginalization of the deprived
to
population a factor in ethnic conflict as opposed
merely a difference in socioeconomic status?
Socioeconomic differences can be significant; the key
is to understand how these are perceived and used.
Would a commonality of-socioeconomic status mean
that conflicts would not be as intense in many cases?
Yes. Would it mean ethnic conflict would cease
entirely? Probably not, because there are lots of other
issues that correlate as well. I think we made a mistake about 15 years ago when we wanted to reduce
not
ethnicity to economics. Ultimately, it just does
work.
DR. MURPHY: Is there a correlation? Yes. Is it reducible to socioeconomic differences? The short answer is
no. The key question-and this plays off of some of
Dr. Knight's comments-is one of perception. How are
socioeconomic differences understood and perceived?
24
�C00123268
�C00123268
related to experiences with ethnic cleansing and population resettlement policies in the near or distant past.
We must be careful to distinguish between issues that
that
potentially could lead to serious conflict and those
Ronald Wixman
cultural demands. In the latter cateare
ProfessorofGeograhy merely local
gory are issues related to simple demands for ethnic
Geograp
UnivProfessor of
insti-
Ethnic and Territorial Conflicts in Eastern Europe
recognition or the right to one or another cultural
Introduction
Latvia,
Today's Eastern Europe consists of Estonia,
Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republics,
Lithuania,
Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Croatia, Bos-
tutions (native language in the media and education,
native language press, or freedom of religion) that do
not threaten to destabilize any given state or nation or
between
that will probably not result in open hostility
groups.
nia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Yugoslavia (consisting today of Serbia and Montenegro), Albania,
Greece, and European (or Thracian) Turkey. One can
Quite serious to a rapidly changing picture of causes
for interethnic conflict in Eastern Europe is the war in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The current war in Bosnia
region. At this point in time, on the other hand, Eastemn Germany and Austria should not be considered
part of the East European realm. The reasons for
the conflict. In addition, the applied policies by the
Western powers toward this ongoing conflict affect
not only the Balkans as a whole but also other parts of
also add to this list Moldova (Bessarabia) and the
western part of Ukraine, as they are culturally, historically, and geographically tied to the rest of this greater
inldnPree
n
hainTukyi-atr
Europe are both historical anc ral a Easterd
reality important to the current geopolitical situation
in the Balkans. These last two regions have always
for
been part of the East European culture realm, but
the
purely political and military reasons related to
classified differently.
Cold War period they were
Throughout Eastern Europe, there are serious issues of
nationalism that threaten the stability of individual
te rgio s
coutris a wel asa hol. Mst eri
ous of these are conflicts stemming from ethnic- and
ousal-serc
ads
by one
or more parties. While some of the issues, center primarly on ethnic, religious, linguistic, or cultural
rights and privileges, others are manifested in
extremely serious demands for control of given
regions, in open conflict based on ethnic or territorial
claims or in international disputes over the recognition
or nonrecognition of given countries.
Most serious for Europe and the United States, however, are those that deal with territorial conflict based
on various ethnic claims that demand changes in
national control of these regions and/or population
exchanges or attempts at ethnic cleansing. Indeed,
are
many of the justifications for current actions
may be the precursor to an even greater war that might
involve many other nations, including America's
NATO Allies Turkey and Greece on opposite sides of
Eastern Europe and the Middle East. The response, for
ethnic
for
genocide ethnic cleansing) both sets a precedent
and forces
other countries with problematic minorities
others to assess their own situations relative to foreign
nations with exclave populations.
Before discussing ethnic conflicts in Eastern Europe
today and the impact of Western policy in the "Yugois
t
d
o
slav War," a brief discussion
and siediontonds fo
tncton etwenthe reasons sfor
territorial claims. This distinction
is necessary if one
wishes to obtain an accurate picture of ethnoterritorial
,conflict in this diverse region. Claims to territory on
ethnic, national, religious, linguistic, and historical
grounds are common around the world. Sometimes
two groups claim the same territory with differing but
equally understandable reasons for doing so. The Jewish/Palestinian conflict represents such a situation.
Here two peoples are fighting over the same piece of
territory, as it is tied to their current ability to exist as
distinct nations. On the other hand, many conflicts are
tied to far more distant issues in which historical
25
�C00123268
events are distorted to provide a legitimacy for current
claims. The Greek claim to the name Macedonia is a
good example of the use of historical justification.
Reasons deal with actual situations related to actual
(or perceived) threats, actual security issues, or
attempts to redress recent injustices that have resulted
in Poland; the Czech, Slovak, and Croatian Republics;
Romania; and Hungary. Vlah communities exist in
various parts of former Yugoslavia, Albania, and
Greece.' In Latvia one also finds a territorially compact group of Latgalians (Catholic Latvians who
speak a distinct dialect of the Latvian language)
around the city of Daugavpils. Similarly there are
in serious problems for a given people, nation, or
state. Justifications,on the other hand, are excuses
used to legitimize the desires or actions of one or
another group to achieve their own aims. A variety of
historical-and more so folkloric-historical-justifications, for example, have played a major role in Serbia's aggression against Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and in Greece's anti-Macedonian
stance. These two are deeply intertwined and explain
to a great extent Greece's open support for Serbia in
ret cWhile
Potential for Ethnic Conflict in Eastern Europe
We can divide the current issues of ethnic conflict in
Eastern Europe into three categories. The first represents the least problematic situations where individual
groups request recognition of minority rights. These
are composed of individual ethnic groups that do not
threaten the territorial integrity of any nation or whose
demands or requests will not result in anything more
than local demonstrations (even violent ones) or protests. The second category is made up of those ethnic
issues, that may result in some degree of violence or
even territorial changes that are of local importance
greater
only (for instance, those that do not threaten
instability throughout the region) or those that are
(or the
quite serious but in which the Western Allies
not become
United States individually) should
involved. The last category represents those ethnic
issues that could lead to serious regional conflicts, to
major international conflict, or to major regional
destabilization that may require outside intervention.
Minority Rights Issues
Minority
culture
groups exist in every country in East-
ern Europe. There are, for example, populations of
Jews and Roma (Gypsies) in every country. In addition, there are ethnic Germans in significant numbers
Tatars in Romania, Bulgaria, and Moldova who have
begun to ally themselves with the Turks in Turkey. A
full listing of ethnic, cultural, and religious minorities
in the region is not useful because most are of little
importance other than in cultural contexts. These and
other cultural questions need not, and should not, be
given too much shrift by American policymakers.
In many cases, there are also small groups of one or
another nationality living in neighboring territories.
those of the Russians, Serbs, and Hungarians in
neighboring countries present serious problems (albeit
to varying degrees), others do not. Although Slovenians in Slovenia hope that the Slovene minorities i
Italy, Hungary, and Austria will be treated fairly and
that support will be given to the survival of the Slovene language and culture in those areas, there is little
chance that any major conflict will erupt involving
Slovenes in these countries in the near future. The
same can be said for the small colonies of Croats and
Serbs in Hungary, the Romanians in border areas of
Bulgaria and Serbia, or the Poles in Belarus or
Ukraine.
Potentially Serious Conflicts on a Local Level
The second category of ethnic issues in the region
conflict
comprises situations that may lead to serious
country or
between two or more peoples within a
between neighboring states. This last group is represented by two types of issues: those related to
I The Vlahs are the descendants of Latinized Myrians from the
coastal regions of Dalmatia (Latinized during the Roman period)
who maintained a nomadic or seminomadic way of life through the
mid-20th century. For the most part, they have been assimilated by
other Balkan nations, but communities of Vlahs still live in Greece,
Macedonia, Serbia, Albania. and Bosnia. These peoples should not
be confused with Romanians who migrated out of Wallachia into
bordering areas of Serbia and Bulgaria but who are also locally
called Vlahs (Vast).
26
�CU0l2332268
be
demands for the return of territories deemed to
foreign groups or states,
unjustly under the control of
and those related to the liberationof coethnics living
or
in excave communities in neighboring countries
those
regions. In this first category, I include only
issues in which the Western powers cannot or should
may
not become involved, in spite of the fact that they
In many of these, however,
result in open warfare.
of hostilidiplomatic discussion before the outbreak
BalPeipus (Chudskoe Ozero in Russian) as far as the
clear majority of the populatic Sea, Russians form a
on. Indeed, Narve is a Russian city in Estonia. There
is a great potential for a Russian attempt to secede
from Estonia and join Russia itself. This would lead to
not
a great deal of conflict. Most of these Russians do
the descendants of early Russian immigrants
represent
to Estonia but rather part of the huge Russian population that arrived after World War II.
ties may be useful.
There are six potentially serious local conflicts that
may arise in Eastern Europe that are based on ethnoterritorial issues. These include both claims to territories in other countries that are based on historical
grievances and issues of national liberation of ethnic
Four conminorities living in someone else's country.
cern transborder peoples: 1) the Russian minorities in
Ukraine and the Baltic states; 2) the Moldovan question, which includes both issues of ethnic rights for
Russians and Ukrainians in Moldova and border
issues between Ukraine and Romania 3) a possible
secessionist movement in western Ukraine; and 4)
Hungarian minorities in neighboring Slovakia, Serbia,
and Romania. Two involve minority issues: Muslim
minorities living in the former Yugoslav lands and
Bulgaria and ethnic Turkish minorities in the Balkans.
The collapse Ukraine and and the declaration of indeRussians in of the USSR teBlcSaes
left
pendence by the former non-Russian republics has
is
millions of Russians outside Russia. Their situation
debated both locally and in Russia and plays a major
role in the current political relations of Russia and
just cul-
these states. In a few cases, the issue is not
tural and ethnic. In the cases of Ukraine and Estonia,
the Russian population has a significant presence on
with
the border of Russia and in those two cases (as
Kazakstan), Russian nationalists are demanding that
these areas be reincorporated into Russia. In eastern
Ukraine and eastern Estonia, this can be even more
serious because these regions are major industrial
areas vital to the economic well-being of these new
republics.
In Latvia, Russians-when combined with Belorussians and Ukrainians-account for slightly less than
half the country's population. In Riga, Slays far outas
number native Latvians. In both Latvia and Estonia,
well as in neighboring Lithuania (where the Slays
compose only about 20 percent of the population),
presence of
there is a fear that Russia may use the
these significant Russian minority populations as a
pretext (i.e., a justification) to reincorporate these
small countries into a new Russian-dominated state.
In Estonia, Latvia, and-to a lesser extent-Lithuania,
local governments are devising various forms of legisis
lation to induce the Russians to leave. Although it
reasonable for Estonians and Latvians to demand that
citizens learn the local language and swear allegiance
to those countries-as all nations of the world demand
allegiance to the new homeland to obtain citizenrid
the two
ship-it is clear thathostility states desire to getuponof
the Russians. Open
toward or attacks
it is
Russians will provoke problems with Russia, so
a
left to a game of politics. This could escalate into
serious conflict with Russia, especially if a Russian
nationalist government arises in Moscow. Regardless
and
of how this goes, it is clear that the United States
its Western allies cannot and should not do anything in
the event of such a showdown. On the other hand, the
West's inaction in the Croatian and Bosnian conflict
may play a great role in increasing hostilities and conthis
flicts in the Baltic region. This is discussed later in
paper.
The Moldovan Question
Upon declaring independence from the USSR, Moldova found itself in a unique position among the former
The situation of the Russians in Estonia is serious.
Here the Russian issue is not merely ethnic but also
finds
territorial. On the eastern margins of Estonia one
area north of Lake
a large Russian population. In the
27
�C00123268
Soviet Republics. Rather than seeking mere independence, it proclaimed its desire to join, or rather rejoin,
Romania. The Moldovans are Romanians who as a
result of history found themselves under Russian rule.
While Russians in Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine, and other
the inderepublics were in general not frightened of
other non-Romanians of the region. This has the
potential to become a serious problem not only on a
local level but also in Romania as well. We should
remember that one of Ceasuescu's major demands
from Brezhnev was the return of Moldova to Romanian control.
pendence movements taking place in the non-Russian
republics, that of Moldova threatened to place them
The Gagauz (Bulgarian Orthodox Turks) of Moldova
Ukraine.
themselves with the Russian and Ukrainian popula-
Moldova itself became part of Russia as a result of
2
Russian imperial expansionism. Moldova was
annexed from the Ottoman Empire. After World War I
it was reunited with Romania, only to find itself being
passed back to the USSR after World War II. This war
resulted in a drastic diminution of the Jewish and German populations,'and many Tatars also left for Turkey
Western Ukraine
The western part of Ukraine (Galicia and Ruthenia)
became part of the Russian Empire and the USSR for
under alien (Romanian) rule. Violent protests erupted,
and open warfare ensued in the Trans-Dniestr region,
which attempted to secede from Moldova and join
have also expressed serious concerns about the rise of
Moldovan-Romaian nationalism and fear the merger
3
of Moldova with Romania. As such, they have allied
tions in Moldova. In and of themselves they do not
represent a serious problem to Moldova, Romania, or
Ukraine. Their importance is transient and is tied to
the greater Slavic-Romanian split in Moldova.
and Romania. On the other hand, Stalin deported
the first time after World War II. In this area there had
Chernivtsy) was detached from Romania and trans-
demands for its recognition are great throughout the
many Moldovans, attached the southern part of Moldova (Budjak) to Ukraine, and induced the in-migration
of hundreds of thousands of Russians and Ukrainians.
In addition, the Trans-Dniestr region, which was formerly part of Ukraine, was added to Moldova (in an
attempt to gerrymander borders, effectively reducing
the Moldovan proportion of Moldova's population)
and Bucovina/Bukovina (the area around Chernovits/
ferred to Ukraine.
Deep antagonisms exist between Ukrainians and.
Romanians, between Russians and Ukrainians in
Moldova, and between ethnic Russians and Moldovan-Romanians in Romania. Moldovan nationalist
talk of anschluss between Moldova and Romania has
led to uprisings among the Russians, Ukrainians, and
In the 19th century, the Russian Empire expanded into areas
under Ottoman-Turkish control. The region of Bessarabia was
taken by Russia. No Romania existed at that time. The population
of Moldova was changed dramatically as a result of this. It already
had a large Tatar and Jewish population that had come during the
period of the Ottomans, but, with incorporation into the Russian
Empire, Orthodox Christians from Bulgaria and other parts of the
Ottoman Empire (Bulgars, Greeks, Romanians, Gagauz, and even
some Albanians and Serbs) migrated to Bessarabia. In addition to
these, Cossacks from'the northern Caucasus were settled there by
as
Catherine the Great, and Germans were invited to settle there
well. Thus, by the 20th century, it already had a very mixed poputhe
lation, even though the Romanians (Moldovans) were still in
majority.
2
been a strong Central European and Catholic influence. Here distinct dialects of Ukrainian are spoken,
and the Uniate Church has recently been reinstated as
an officially recognized religion. The Uniate Church
(Byzantine Rite Catholics) had millions of followers
among the Ukrainians, Slovaks, Romanians, and Hungarians. In most cases this religious institution was
declared illegal during the Soviet period. Although the
greater region of Ukraine, only in the western part of
Ukraine does it represent any potential threat to the
stability of a nation. Because western Ukraine became
part of the Soviet Union only in the post-World War II
period and because the Uniate Church in that region
used Ukrainian and not Russian as the language of the
church, it is considered by its members as the "true"
Ukrainian church. Among Ukrainians themselves
there is a deep cultural split between those who lived
under Russian and Soviet rule for the past 200-plus
ears and those who lived under Polish or Austrian
years
The origin of the Gagauz is still debated. They are either hnguistically Turkified Bulgarians, Bulgarian Orthodox Christianized
Turks, or a combination of both. Regardless of actual origin, today
they are Turkish in speech (for instance, Istanbul Turkish) and are
Bulgarian Orthodox in religion.
7
28
�C00123268
rule. Western Ukrainians are demanding more cultural
and religious autonomy from Ukraine, and this may
create some potential for real conflict. As yet, however, it is. merely cultural and not political and territorial. Even if it were to bring about open conflict, this is
a purely internal matter and not of any concern for the
staes.Vojvodina.
Westor nighorin
HunHungarianMinorities. The borders of current
after World War I and represent,
were established
n the eyes of ethnic Hungarians, a diminished state.
Across those borders are a number of regions with sig-
nificant Hungarian populations. In some, like parts of
southern Slovakia and northern Vojvodina-in northern Serbia-the Hungarian population forms the
majority of inhabitants. In Romania, Hungarian communities exist throughout western Romania and in
Transylvania-a region with great cultural and historical significance to the Hungarian people. We must
remember that for more than 150 years Hungary was
under Ottoman Turkish domination. During that time
Transylvania and southern Slovakia, as Hungarian
regions, were independent of the Turks. Indeed, during this time Bratislava (Pozsony in Hungarian) was
the capital of a free Hungary, and until World War I
ethnic Hungarians outnumbered Slovaks in this city,
the capital of Slovakia.
The division of Czechoslovakia into two states has
changed the sectarianism of living in the area.' While
Hungarians were not subject to open policies of Slvakization under the Czech-dominated Czechoslovak
Government, the situation today is different. The position of the Slovak Government is that the Hungarians
are really Slovaks whose ancestors were forced to
become Hungarians (Magyars) during the 1,000 years
of Hungarian rule and therefore should be re-Slovakized. The Hungarians consider southern Slovakia as
Indeed
part of the Kingdom of Hungary historically.
of modern Hungarian nationalism,
Kossuth, the father
was born in Slovakia (in fact he was a Magyarized
Slovak). Here we see the use of historical figures and
events by ethnic groups as the justification for current
demands on both sides.
At high levels in the Hungarian Government, it has
been made clear to the Slovaks that Hungary does not
claim territory from Slovakia but that it requests that
Hungarians in Slovakia be given full citizenship and
rights as a minority. This is the same position held by
the Hungarian Government vis a vis Transylvania and
But many ethnic Hungarians and lower
level political leaders are demanding the "return" of
these "Hungarian lands" to Hungary. As a minimal
demand, the Hungarians in Hungary appear to be concerned about the rights of their ethnic brethren in
neighboring countries but are not demanding border
changes. However-and this is a big however-this
stance is contingent on fair treatment of Hungarians
and a continued moderate position of the Hungarian
regime. Persecution of Hungarians in any neighboring
country may lead to a severe shift in Budapest's official position. This is now being tested in Vojvodina,
where the Serbian Government is relocating Serbs
from other areas of Yugoslavia into areas dominated
by ethnic Hungarians and where young Hungarian
males are subject to the draft and are being sent to the
war zone in Bosnia. Many Hungarians have fled
Vojvodina to Hungary. This is leading to a rise in
rightwing Hungarian nationalism that may change the
official position of the Hungarian Government. The
-impact of Western inaction in Bosnia on the Hungarian issues in Vojvodina, Slovakia, and Romania is discussed later in this paper.
Muslim Minorities in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria
After the Ottoman Empire withdrew from the Balkans
in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a number
of Islamicized groups remained. Among these were
Muslim Bosnians (now called Muslimani), Serbs
(mostly in the Sandzak and Kosovo-Metohija regions
of Serbia), Macedonians (called Torbesi), Bulgarians
5
(called Pomaks), Greeks, and Albanians. Only
did the Muslim converts form
among the Albanians
These Muslims should not be confused with ethnic Turks who
form a distinct ethnic minority in Bulgaria, Macedonia, Bosnia and
Greece and who ethnic backgrounds.
Hekzegovisa, Romania, andTurkish and other are either the descendants of Turks or of mixed
Their ethnic identity is with Turkey, and they do not consider themselves to be of local origin.
J
civi'The Hungarians saw the Czech majority as advanced and
themselves. The Hungarian view of Slovaks as a people is
lized as
and
quite different. Slovaks are seen as low in levels of civilization,
the Slovaks are also far more anti-Hungarian than the Czechs.
29
�C00123268
a majority population in the given group. In all other
cases the Christian majorities attempted to force conversion to Christianity or to have the Muslims reclasIn
sify themselves as Turks and emigrate to Turkey.
population exchanges took place
addition, a series of
during which Muslim groups went to Turkey and
Christians were resettled in the Balkans. This was
especially true of the Greeks; hundreds ofthousands
of Greeks emigrated from western and northeastern
literally millions of Turks have ancestors who immigrated from various Balkan countries. These groups
lobby for Turkish involvement in their homelands to
The
protect the Turkish and Muslim peoples there.
situation is discussed at the end of this presenTurkish
tation with particular reference to its relationships
with Europe and the EU.
Turkey and were resettled in what is today Greek
Potentially Serious Conflicts With Implications
Macedonia and other parts of Greece.
Extending Beyond the Region
a
After World War I, Serbian nationalists followed
(both Muslim Slavs
policy of intimidation of Muslims
and Albanians) in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and Macedonia (then called South Serbia). Tens of
thousands fled to Turkey at that time. Bulgaria has
continued to harass its Muslim Bulgarian population.
The Macedonian Question
A very serious situation exists regarding Macedonia,
in which major ethnic groups-Greeks and Serbsand their respective states are attempting to use historical issues and incidents as justifications for their positions regarding this territory.
Policies outlawing Muslim cultural practices and
enforcing name changes (to Christian ones) led to
massive emigrations to Turkey as well. It was convenient for Greeks, Serbs, Macedonians, Bulgarians, and
or
others to purport that these were Turks-not Slavic
ancestors chose to adopt the
Greek peoples whose
Islamic religion-and to promote emigration.
The Muslim subgroups, although persecuted, do not
pose serious threats to their regions. It is interesting to
note that the Torbesi of western Macedonia and many
Serbian Muslims of the Sandzak and Kosovo have
reclassified themselves as Albanians, rather than
assimilate into the greater Serbian or Macedonian
nations.
The Turkish Minorities
The Turkish question is still an open one. To date,
however, the Turkish position (for instance, that of the
Republic of Turkey) is similar to that of the Hungarians regarding their ethnic compatriots in neighboring
states. The Turkish Government basically expected
ethnic
Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to respect the Turks as
minorities in those countries. Recently, Bulgaria pressured ethnic Turks into emigrating toTurkey. Approx-
imately 300,000 Turks left. Although the Turkish
Government protested this, it did not invade. The
Turks feel pressured by European powers who use the
issue of Turkish entry into the European Union as a
means of keeping Turkey out of intervention in Bulitself;
garia and parts of former Yugoslavia. In Turkey
The Greeks claim title to the name Macedonia based
on fallacious historical claims. They assert that AlexMaceander the Great was a Greek and that thereforerecords.
donia is Greek-a claim backed by historical
Not only do all early Greek sources make the point
that he was a non-Greek (the Macedonians were Illyrians related to today's Albanians) but also that the
Macedonians were the enemy of Greece. Certainly the
Macedonian Empire maintained Greek language as
the lingua-franca of the Empire and had a policy of
Hellenism, but Macedonia was itself not Greek.
Rather than engage in debates about a man who lived
in the 4th century BCE, one should consider more
important historical facts as well as current realities.
Does the concern deal with the name, with Alexander
the Great's nationality, or with current ethnoterritorial
realities? Clearly it is the latter. After the arrival of the
Slays in Macedonia (including what is today Greek
Macedonia) starting in the 4th century CE, the Macedonian Slavs maintained close relations with those of
came
Bulgaria. The Macedonian and Bulgarian Slavs
to form one people with a common language and
church. After the arrival of the Turks their territory
was administratively (not ethnically) divided. This
division lasted into the 19th century when Bulgarians
(with the help of the Russians) tried to reunite with
their ethnic Macedonian kinsmen. As a result of Western intervention this was not accomplished.
30
�C00123268
During the second Balkan War (1912-13) the Greeks
and Serbs, with the help of the Romanians, invaded
Bulgaria and took land from: it. Romania seized
Dobrudja (Dobrogea) while the Serbs and Greeks
divided Macedonia between them. Not only did they
take the land, but also they instituted policies aimed at
eradicating the Bulgarian presence and claim. Serbia
renamed northern Macedonia South Serbia and outlawed both the Bulgarian language and church (those
used by the Macedonians themselves) and replaced
them with the Serbian language and church. It was
early 13th century. According to legend, the Serbs
were defeated at the battle of Kosovo and later fled
7
north into what is today Greater Serbia. Historically,
however, the Serbs came from the north and were concentrated along the Morava valley in what is today the
heartland of the Serbs.$ It is important to note that it
was church policy to have geographical diocese
within which an official language was used. There is
no question that Kosovo was within the territorial
domain of the Serbian Orthodox Church, but that does
not mean that the population living there was Serbian.
hoped that the Macedonians of South Serbia would
become Serbs. Greece was far worse in its treatment
of Macedonians. Slavic Macedonians (and Bulgarians
in Thrace) were forced to accept Greek names and call
themselves Greeks or flee the country. A policy of
Hellenization was instituted throughout the region.
II,
Between the second Balkan War and World War
wropnySerbianization,
cles
pasolicies ofwerbanzacti
a
cdHellenization, Macnd ethnic
ced in bh Macedonia
and Thrace. The region was also ethnically cleansed
of Macedonians and Bulgarians, as was Greek Thrace,
which had a Slavic majority. In addition to this, hun-
dreds of thousands of Greeks from the Pontic region
of Turkey were resettled into those parts of Macedonia
under Greek control.
The Greek objection to the recognition of a Republic
of Macedonia derives from more than issues related to
an ancient conqueror. Greece fears the demand for the
return of the homeland by a free Macedonia and reparations for past atrocities. Greece also fears that the 6
ethnic Macedonians will demand their homes back.
This is potentially one of the most serious issues in
Eastern Europe, as it can involve Greece, Bulgaria,
Serbia, Macedonia, and even Albania in a real war.
More is said on this later.
The Serbs and Kosovo
A similar situation exists in Kosovo, a land claimed
eviby both ethnic Albanians and Serbs. Geographical
rbs.
leand i eraicatindebce (sch as plaenams) clearly indicates a conti(such as place names)
dence
uous settlement of the region by ethnic Albanians. The
Serbian claim is based on a war that took place in the
to the Ser6 Macedonians from Greek (Aegean) Macedonia fled
areas of Macedonia as well as to Bulgaria, Austrabian-controlled
lia, Canada, and the United States after 1913.
The Battle of Kosovo, the role of Krali Marko, or
other folktales should not be accepted as a justification
for Serbian aggression against ethnic Albanians who
compose about 90 percent of that region today.
was
A propaganda campaign against ethnic Albanians curpart and parcel of Serbian policy long before the
rent crises in Krajina and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Serbian propoganda claimed that the Patriarsija Convent in Pee was burned to the ground by Albanians
and that the Serbian nuns there had been raped. I was
there one year after the alleged fire and rape, and the
Serbian nuns in the convent knew nothing about such
an event. The convent was still standing, and there
was no damage to it whatsoever. Claims were also
made that Albanians killed, raped, and tortured Serbs
in the region, yet the local Serbs in Kosovo declared
to me that that was a rare occurrence. Many Serbs of
Prizren, Pec, Orahovac, and Djakovica (in the western
part of Kosovo), on the other hand, told me that poverty forced Serbs to sell their homes and move to Serbia proper. Some laughed at the fact that many Serbs
who sold their homes to ethnic Albanians in Kosovo
7 Part of the claim is also that Prince Marko (Krali Marko) was a
Serb and that he was killed at this battle. According to their own
is
sources, he came from Prilep (in Macedonia). As such, he
by Macedonians as a Macedonian and by Bulgarians as a
claimed
Bulgar. He may also have been a Vlah, a people renowned for their
military abilities at the time. One need recognize that Albanians
songs about this battle inwhich should not be
also have epickilled, not only a Serbian one. Wethree Albanian dis-
princes were
cussing the right to rule Kosovo, as argued by Serbs and Albanians,
based on 13th century battles or folk songs, or we will have a Bulone.
well as a (Moravia) referred
garian-Macedonian-Serbian war asof MoravaSerbian-Albanian to
S This is most likely the Kingdom
Metod
and
in the ancient texts regarding the brothers Kiril (Cyril)
(Methodius), not Moravia in the Czech Repubhic.
31
�C00123268
later claimed to have been forced out in order to get
and
special treatment (houses and jobs) in Belgrade
other parts of Serbia where housing and jobs are in
short supply.
unhappy with their large Albanian population. Thus, a
and
war in Kosovo would probably lead to Albanian
Macedonian involvement. Such a war has the potential to also drag in Greece and Turkey.
Milosevic and other Serbian nationalists used this type
of scare tactic to justify the Serbian invasions of eastern Croatia (Srem), Croatia's Krajina region, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The threat to Serbian lives,
property, and security were used, in spite of the fact
that no such provocations existed. The same tactics
used in Kosovo were applied to other areas where
Serbs lived outside Serbia.
There is a great potential for conflict in Kosovo
because approximately 1.7 million Albanians reside
there and because the Serbs claim that Kosovo is not
only Serbian but also is the Urheimat(original homeland) of the Serbian people. The Serbians are persecuting Albanians-closing Albanian ethnic
institutions, engaging in summary arrests and torture
of Albanians, and expelling Albanians. The Serbian
regime is also now settling Serbs in the region. This
region has the greatest potential for ethnic conflict in
all of Eastern Europe. If the Serbs attempt a similar
policy as that applied in Bosnia to its native Muslim
population, it is most likely that Albania will not
remain inactive.
Albanians in Macedonia and Kosovo
The Implications of Western Nonaction in Bosnia
and Herzegovina
The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in parts of
Croatia has destabilized the entire region. While some
may see this as only a local issue of those republics,
and, as such, not of vital interests to the United States
or its Western allies, others with more expertise and
experience in this region recognize the broader implications of this conflict. The situation of Muslims in
Serbia and Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia has
worsened dramatically as a result of the Serbian policies in Croatia and Bosnia. It is not only Serbian
action but also the response by the West that has
added to the instability.
Fear of greater Serbian aggression is resulting in a rise
in anger among the Albanians throughout the region.
The "what if" scenarios are too numerous to discuss in
this paper because they depend on many other countries and issues. What is clear, however, is that Albanians in Kosovo for the moment are resisting Serbian
attempts to get them to rise up and give the Serbs an
excuse to come in and smash them. In the event of a
Directly across the border from Kosovo is Macedonia,
real war, however, the violence in this region would
and Albania (like Tetovo and Gostivar), Albanians
not as traditionally docile as the Bosnian Muslims. In
with a large Albanian population. In all Macedonia's
western communes (counties), the Albanians form a
majority of the population. In those bordering Kosovo
compose over 90 percent of the local population.
Because Albanians in Macedonia boycotted the last
census and because the ethnic Macedonians were satisfied that they did, it is unclear as to the actual population of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia itself. Having
traveled there in 1990, it was obvious that throughout
western Macedonia the Albanians form a distinct
majority, and in much of northern and central Macedonia they form a significant minority. Should a war
break out in Kosovo, it is doubtful that Macedonian
Albanians would not become involved. Refugees from
Kosovo would flee into Macedonia, which would be
intolerable to the Slavic Macedonians who already are
be far greater than that of Bosnia. On the one hand, the
Serbian attachment to Kosovo is far greater than that
to Bosnia, and, on the other hand, the Albanians are
addition, Kosovo borders an ethnically Albanian
nation-state.
The West's general inaction in Bosnia has also played
a major role in creating greater destabilization. While
many Westerners close their eyes to the greater and
broader implications of this war, members of other
countries and regions have watched keenly. Two distinct issues must therefore be addressed: 1) the precedent set and its implications in Eastern Europe itself
32
�C00123268
and 2) the implications for Turkey and the Middle
East. A possible scenario is presented at the end of
this presentation to illustrate the magnitude that these
events may take.
Regardless of actual motive in not aiding the Bosnian
Muslims or the Croats, the West has created a new situation throughout the region. Had the United States
and its European allies come to the rescue of the
newly established Croatian and Bosnian nations when
they were invaded by the Serbs, a clear message
would have been sent that the Western countries supported democratic multinational states in the newly
forming countries in Eastern Europe. Many of these
countries, as fledgling democracies, are struggling
with situations of multiculturalism and of having large
and influential ethnic minorities. By not supporting
such ideas in Croatia and Bosnia, the opposite message was sent.
The inaction on the part of the West to the plight of
Muslims and Croats in former Yugoslavia may open a
Pandora's box by promoting, rather than inhibiting,
ethnic nationalism. A green light has been given in
regions in which the fires of nationalism were already
rising as a result of their newfound freedom. In all
cases of decolonization, ethnic nationalism rises in the
newly created state. This often results in a demand
that the colonizer go home. Russians and Serbs today
are victims of such policies of decolonization, as were
forthe English, French, Germans, and others in lands
merly controlled by them.
for
When nothing was done to stop or punish the Serbs
their outrageous behavior, the message was also sent to
nations that they better get rid of problematic minorities
now rather than risk intervention from the outside.
Romanians, Serbs, and Slovaks may perceive the Hungarian minorities as a greater threat because the Hungarian nationalists in Hungary may try to use the
existence of Hungarian colonies in neighboring counOn the one hand, it was clear by implication that the
tries as a pretext to change the borders. Similarly, Estomatters of
West would not interfere in the internal
nians and Latvians will fear even more so the existence
these states regarding ethnic issues and, on the other,
large Russian population if the West as made it
that ethnic cleansing and brutality were to be only ver- of a
clear that in principle it is all right for Russia to liberate
bally censored. This leads to two problems regarding
their people-the Russians-in Latvia and Estonia.
ethnic stability in the region. One is the reaction of
Estonian and Latvian nationalists may feel an even
countries to their ethnic minorities that they perceive
greater urgency to induce the Russians to leave, so as to
to be problematic. The other is to actions of states
minimize their chances of losing their independence.
fearing outside aggression in the guise of defending
coethnics in their states.
In the first case we have indicated to Russia that, if it
should so desire to reincorporate the Baltic states,
Ukraine, or Kazakhstan on the pretext of defending
the ethnic Russians in those territories, then the West
is unconcerned. This may add fuel to the existing Russian nationalist groups that demand the return of those
lands because: 1) they have ethnic Russians living
there who need to be protected, therefore these lands
should be under Russian control; and 2) lands once
under the Russian people must always be part of
Mother Russia. Similarly, Hungarian nationalists can
use the same argument to demand the return of Vojvodina and parts of Slovakia and Romania. If it is all
right for Serbs to invade and ethnically cleanse in the
name of protecting Serbs in these other regions, then
or
why not allow Hungarians, Romanians, Bulgarians,
to readjust national borany number of other peoples
ders or protect ethnic minorities in other states?
If the United States and its allies do nothing to stop the
Serbs in their nationalist drive to ethnically cleanse
Bosnia and to incorporate other parts of the former
Yugoslavia, then why should the Serbs not do the
same in Kosovo and Vojvodina? If the West did nothing in those cases, it most certainly is not going to do
any more over Kosovo. We have thus promoted more
Serbian aggression as well as paved the way for possible Hungarian, Romanian, Russian, Slovak, Estonian,
Albanian, or other acts of ethnic violence against other
nations and peoples.
Had the Serbs been stopped and punished (as the Germans were during World War II), a clear message
would have been sent that we do not accept undemocratic behavior. Would it not be better to send the
West
message that multinational policies are what the
33
�C00123268
expects and that the well-being of these states, diplomatic recognition, and financial aid are contingent on
fair treatment of their ethnic. minorities. That the West
bowed to the wishes of Greece and did not recognize
Macedonia's right to independence based on its concern over a name showed a lack of resolve on the part
Throughout the Middle East anti-Westernism and antiAmericanism are rising as the Western democracies
that bomb Iraq, support Israel, and intervene in Middie Eastern affairs at will do nothing to stop a Christian country from annihilating a Muslim people.
of the West and made it clear to all in Eastern Europe
that consistency, democracy, and recognition of the
principle of self-determination is not a part of current
Western thinking. The messages from this are all
too clear to the Bulgarians, Macedonians, Turks, and
others.
In addition, the example set by inaction in Bosnia
made it painfully clear to the Muslims in the Middle
East, including our important ally Turkey, that the
West does not stand up for the rights of Muslims as a
people. This perception has been reinforced by the
ultraright's win in Parisian elections (in which it took
80 percent of the vote) with the slogan, "Charles le
Magne stopped the Moors at the Pyrenees and Mitterrand gave them Paris and Marseilles, " and the antiTurkish acts of violence in Germany. By not acting to
defend the Bosnian Muslims and by tolerating the acts
of rape, murder, and terror against them by the Serbs,
the message was given that the West is no friend of
either Muslims or of the Middle East.
We should add to this the lack of Western resolve to
stop the Greeks when they infiltrated Cyprus and precipitated the invasion by the Turks. Although Westerners did not condemn Greek acts of violence against the
Turks, they did condemn the Turks for invading the
island-and partitioning it. The Turks ask themselves,
"Why are we condemned for saving the lives of our
people in Cyprus while the Serbs are permitted, in the
guise of defending their people, to murder innocent
Muslims?" During the summer of 1993 throughout
Turkey pictures were hanging on billboards of a Bos-
nian child with one leg cut off by Serbs with the caption Bosnanin En Kucuk Gazisi (Bosnia's Youngest
Warrior of the Faith). This was a tongue in cheek swat
at the Serbs who.call the Bosnian Muslims Islamic
fundamentalists and claim that they (the Serbs) are
defending Europe against the Muslim menace.
A Worst Case Scenario
Given the above considerations, there is a possibility
of a major war breaking out in the Balkans. Serbs are
determined not to allow the formation of an Albanian
ethnic entity in Kosovo, as they see it as their original
homeland. Having ethnically cleansed much of Bosnia
of Muslims and Croats, they have become greatly
(continued)emboldened with their success. This has
been exacerbated by the lack of any real deterrents by
the Western powers. A Serb attempt to ethnically
cleanse Kosovo may trigger a series of events that will
draw other peoples and powers into the dispute. It is
doubtful that Albania will be able to remain neutral
under those circumstances, and it is most likely that
Kosovar Albanians would be forced to flee into Macdonia and/or Albania itself.
A regional war might break out that would create
great instability. The existence of Macedonia as a state
would again come into question. One possibility is
that Macedonia would seek reentry into a Yugoslav
entity. However, the large Albanian population would
oppose that, and war would be imminent between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians in such a case. Macedonia lies among hostile Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and
Albania, all of whom lay claim to its land.
In a war in the Balkans, it is highly possible that Tur-
key might get involved, especially if requested to by
Albania. We need also consider that hundreds of thousands of Turks in Turkey today are of Albanian-, Bosnian-, Serbian-, Macedonian-, Greek- or BulgarianMuslim extraction. Indeed, Kemal Ataturk, the
founder of the modern Turkish republic, was of Albanian ancestry from Thesalonika (Greece). Just as ethnic Americans lobby our goverment regarding issues
in their ancestral homelands, so do Turks of Balkan
descent.
If the West is truly concerned about the rise of Islamic
fundamentalism, then it should reevaluate its position
regarding the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
34
�C00123268
The Turks probably would not heed a call from the
West to stay out of the conflict because they are absolutely fed up with their so-called Western allies. During my visits to Turkey in 1992 and 1993, antiWesternism was apparent everywhere. The lack of
support for the Turkish position on Cyprus is only a
minor irritant as compared to Western callousness
over the issue of Islam in the Balkans. We should not
forget that it was the Turks who introduced Islam into the region and who built the cities of Sarajevo,
Mostar, Jajce, Konjic, and others that are now sitting
in ruin. They identify greatly with the monuments
built by their ancestors and their coreligionists in that
region. The West has asked much of the Turks in past
decades-to be a bulwark against Soviet Communism
during the Cold War; to embargo goods from Iran and
Iraq (much to the detriment of the Turkish economy);
and, most recently, to act as a moderating influence
of the new
and as a surrogate for the West in many
nations of Central Asia. In each case, Turkey has met
these requests. The Turks are understandably upset,
to
then, when the West does not respond to their call
or Kosprotect Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina
9
in Cyprus or Bulgaria.
ovo or to protect ethnic Turks
Involvement by Turkey in any Balkan conflict would
most assuredly guarantee that Greece would aid Ser-
bia. Of all their territorial and ethnic problems, theseriTurks agree that it is the Greeks who are the most
ous for them.
The worst case scenario probably hinges on the Bulgarians, not only because their country lies between
Greece, Turkey, Serbia, and Macedonia but also
because they have real grievances against the Serbs
(over Macedonia) and Greeks (over Macedonia and
Thrace). Bulgarians are now terrified about their
neighbors going to war; they wish to remain out of the
fray. However, in the event that Greece and Serbia are
fighting against Turkey and Albania, Bulgaria might
be forced into the war. Bulgaria could side with Serbia
per9Not only did Bulgaria maintain a policy of intimidation and
secution of Bulgarian Muslims (Ponaks) during the 1970s and
1980s, which resulted in a substantial emigration of Pomaks to
than
Turkey, but also in the late 1980s and early 1990s more
300,000 ethnic Turks fled Bulgaria as a result of extreme oppreswas no
sion. The West did little more than protest these acts. This
of
different from the West's reaction to the Greeks' infiltration
mass murder of ethnic Turks.
Cyprus and the
and Greece (their coreligionists) against the Muslim
Turks and Albanians, but the Bulgarians have a deep
hatred of the Greeks and Serbs, and Sofia would gain
nothing from such a situation. On the other hand, if
Bulgaria sided with Turkey and Albania, it could gain
territory that it has demanded for two centuriesYugoslav and Greek Macedonia, and Greek Thrace
(thereby gaining access to the Aegean)-and address
its grievances against Serbia and Greece. Turkey
would certainly prefer Bulgarian hegemony over
Thrace, thereby eliminating a border with Greece.
Turkish seizure of the islands off its coast would also
guarantee Turkey full access to the Mediterranean
from Istanbul (something that is currently a problem
for them because Greece is uncooperative on passage
through its territorial waters by Turkish ships).
If such a war broke out, the Croats and Muslims of
Bosnia and Herzegovina would take revenge against
the Serbs, and Hungary might use that as a way to
comseize some of the Hungarian-populated northern an
Hungarian involvement in
munes of Vojvodina.
in another
international dispute regarding Hungarians
country might lead Romania and/or Slovakia to
become aggressive against Hungary or the Hungarian
minorities in their countries.
If a major war broke out with Greece and Turkey on
opposite sides, what would the West do? If it backed,
Greece and closed all possibilities of Turkey joining
the EU, Turkey would undoubtedly shift away from
the West to a more Islamic position. Clearly, internal
pressures in Turkey-which are already mountingof
would dictate such a move regardless of the desires
by
the moderate government. Even a neutral stance
the West would result in a Turkish popular backlash.
heoi
Of great iportance istepoionfRusasa
major power. While Russia may back Serbia in its war
against Croatia or the Bosnian Muslims, it would back
Bulgaria and Turkey should they become allies against
always been Bulgaria and not Serbia (which in the
Cold War sided with the anti-Soviet West). It would
also be useful to Russia to use such a stance to improve
35
�C00123268
its relations with Turkey. Thus, in the event of a widening war, we may find Serbia and Greece isolated and
Turkey, Bulgaria, and Albania backed by Russia,
Croatia, Hungary, and many Middle Eastern States. It
is doubtful that we could do anything under those circumstances in terms of any involvement,
Although one can paint other scenarios, one thing is
clear-the West made a grave error in allowing and
promoting Serbian aggression. Some say it is too late
to do anything. That is an absurd position. In 1940 one
could say that Germany had won the war and that it
was too late to do anything to free Poland or Czechonot
slovakia. The Russians proved otherwise. Serbia is
great power and need not be feared. If after three
a
still have
years of vast military superiority the Serbs
to push back. The mainnot won, they would be easy
tenance of the embargo against the Bosnian Muslims
should be lifted and airpower should be used to liberate Bosnia. It is certainly not too late to do that.
By continuing to legitimize Serbian aggression, we
are once again letting the people of Eastern Europe
know that we do not support democratic governments
or independent nation-states in that region. We should
therefore not be surprised that a greater and far more
serious war may be looming on the horizon. The
alienation of the Turks and of Turkey is a far more
serious issue in the realm of geopolitical reality than
the support of Serbian delusions of grandeur. We risk
not only a great Balkan war but also one that may
result in Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey changing their
national borders. Inaction in Bosnia has also resulted
in a massive rise of anti-Western and anti-American
sentiment throughout the Middle East and other Muslim areas. The United States should rethink its position on Serbia.
36
�)
C00123268
References
OriBanac, Ivo. The National Question in Yugoslavia:
NY: Cornell University
gins, History,Politics.Ithaca,
Press, 1984. A good account 9f the various national
issues in Yugoslavia. Especially valuable is the analysis of the issues in terms of how and why they came
Erdei, Ferenc, ed. Information Hungary. New York:
posiPergamon Press, 1968. Good on the Hungarian
tion. It is not ultranationalistic while it presents the
Hungarian view.
about and the political ramifications thereof.
Cvijic, Jovan. "The Geographical Distribution of the
Balkan Peoples." GeographicalReview. Vol. 5., May
1918; pp. 345-361. Important work as it was used to
establish boundaries in the Balkans after World War
II. It is pro-Serbian and defines Macedonia as South
Serbian. An excellent example of the use of propaganda (often using real historical issues) to justify a
given nationalist position.
Davies, Norman. God's Playground:A History of
Poland Two vols. New York: Columbia University
of
Press, 1982. One of the best accounts of the issues
Polish nationalism and history. Frequently referenced.
Deak, Francis. Hungary at the ParisPeace Conference: The DiplomaticHistory of the Treaty of Trianon.
H-obsbawn, E.J. "Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe
Today." Anthropology Today. Vol. 8, No. 1, 1992. pp.
3-13. An excellent source on issues of ethnicity and
nationalism in contemporary Europe, including Eastern Europe.
Horne, Donald. The GreatMuseum: The Re-P resentation of History.London: Pluto Press, 1984. Good
source on the use of folktales, incidents, and heroes as
historical figures and issues in nationalism.
Jelavich, Charles and Barbara. The Establishment of
the Balkan National States, 18041920. A History of
East Central Europe. Eds., Peter Sugar and Donald
Treadgold. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
Vol. 8, 1977. Presents a fairly unbiased history of the
Balkan region. One of the best texts on the subject.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1942. Excel-
Konnyu, Leslie. A Condensed Geographyof Hungary.
1971. An
Struggle in
Dragnich, Alex N. Serbs and Croats: the
Jovanovich,
Yugoslavia. New York. Harcourt, Brace,
1992; Emmert, Thomas A. Serbian GolgothaKosovo,
1389. New York: East European Monographs, 1990;
and Morison, W. A. The Revolt of the Serbs Against
from the Serbian
the Turks (1804-1813): Translations
Cambridge: CamNationalBallads of the Period.
are
bridge University Press, 1942. These three books
Mellor, Roy E.H. Eastern Europe: A Geography of
Comecon Countries. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1975. Good as a general geography text but not
very detailed and poor on issues of nationalism and
boundary disputes. Very encyclopedic.
lent work on the Paris Peace Conference.
good sources on the use of Serbian nationalist storiesa
All represent
as a means to achieve a nationalist end.
Serbian nationalist position. Are useful to understand
the mentality and dimension of Serbian nationalism.
St. Louis: The American Hungarian Review,
excellent source as representative of ultra-Hungarian
nationalist views.
Okey, Robin. Eastern Europe 1740-1 98S: Feudalism
1986. One of
to Communism. London: Hutchinson,
the best books on the subject of the historic evolution
of the states of the region. Also provides excellent and
unbiased treatment of nationality issues.
Deletant, Dennis and Hanak, Harry, eds. Historiansas
LonNation-Builders:Central and Southeast Europe.
on
don: Macmillan Press, 1988. One of the best works
good
Central Europe and the Balkans. It is especially
in its discussions of how intellectuals, and particularly
historians, play a role in the rise of nationalism.
37
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References (continued)
Rugg, Dean S. Eastern Europe. New York: Longman,
1985. Excellent on the German influence (albeit quite
germanophilic in its bias) on the states of Central
basic texts with information on the geography,
economy, and politics of Eastern Europe from a
geographical point of view.
Europe. It gives little shrift to issues of the Slavs and
their contribution to the region and is very poor on the
Balkans.
Sugar, Peter ed., Ethnic Diversity and Conflict in Eastern Europe. Santa Barbara: University of California
Press, 1980. This is one of the best books ever written
on ethnic issues in Eastern Europe. It is a classic.
Turnock, David:
The Making of Eastern Europe: From Earliest
Times to 1815. New York: Routledge, 1988;
The Human Geographyof Eastern Europe. New
White, George W. The Nation-State Idealand the
Emergence ofModern Hungary. MA Thesis, Geography Department, University of Oregon, 1990. One of
the best works on ethnoterritorial issues in Central
Europe. Deals with the concept of territoriality and
ethnic identity using the example of Hungarians and
Hungary.
Wilkinson, Henry Robert. Maps and Politics: a
Review of the EthnographicGeographyof Macedonia. Liverpool: University of Liverpool Press, 1951.
An excellent work on how maps are used to promote
nationalist claims. It is especially good for its treat-.
ment of the Macedonian question.
York: Routledge, 1989; and
Eastern Europe: An Economic and PoliticalGeography.New York: Routledge, 1989. These are good
38
�C00123268
Summary of Discussion
demise of the Czechoslovakian state as much to the
effort of Americans of Slovak ancestry who returned
after the fall of Communism with images and feelings
of the 1920s and the 1930s as to any real problems in
the region. The same can be said, perhaps, for some of
Discussant: Thomas Poulsen
Professor Wixman has laid out both in the paper that
the stronger original aspects of Croatian nationalism.
he wrote and in summary presentation some of the key
elements that explain the Bosnian situation. I would
like to underscore a few of them. The first element has
to do with the Serbian justification for their actions. A
concept that is helpful in explaining the Serbian position is that of iconography, which was coined a number of years ago by the geographer Jean Gottman.
Gottman defined iconography as the sum total of the
perceptions of history, national symbols, and trivia
that go to segregate one nation from another.
However, many Croatians who were content to live in
Yugoslavia and be proud of their Roman Catholic ethnic heritage became Croatian nationalists as a reaction
to Serbian action.
According to Serbian iconography, they are a heroic
people. The Serbs believe that they saved Europe from
the Muslim hordes. They also believe that Yugoslavia-the Yugoslavia created in 1918-was their
nation-state and that it was their rightful prize because
they had won World War I, which was just a continuation of their long defense of Europe. This perception
can help to explain why the Serbs still see themselves
as victims in the current conflict when most outside
observers see them as the aggressors.
My last point deals with the issue of core and periphery. It has been suggested that, in looking at the intensity of national feelings, we should consider core
regions and intellectuals. Certainly-based on my
experience-for an extended period of time those in
Croatia who promoted a sense of difference and the
need to get Croatian "rights" somehow satisfied were
the professors, the schoolteachers, and the intellectuals. But in addition to students, those who were most
motivated to obtain such rights were not the people of
the core area but were, in fact, the people in the border
regions. This is a point that Dr. Wixman also made. In
Croatia, for example, the strongest members of the
Ustasha, the Croatian nationalist party during World
War II, did not come from Zagreb but from the outer
periphery, particularly in eastern Slavonia adjacent to
The Serbs also believe that their homeland was Kos-
their Croatian identity by living with Serbs. To use a
ovo, a belief derived from the fact that they suffered
more local example, during my lifetime, one could
their greatest defeat in the Battle of Kosovo in 1389,
although Dr. Wixman can convincingly argue that this
belief is not based on fact. He could cite an examination of place names and a number of other features
that cast doubt on the Serbian assertion. But such
arguments would not change Serbian beliefs. All justifications are real to the justifiers, and in the case of the
Serbs-as with most people-it's not what really happens that counts, but what people believe happened.
The Serbs were wrong in trying to. maintain control of
all of Yugoslavia. They are wrong now in trying to
maintain control of all of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I
still think they have pretensions to the rest.
find "120-percent Americans" in the Canal Zone more
frequently than in the state of Oregon.
the Serbian region. There, they had been challenged in
General Discussion
QUESTION: Professor Wixman, could you discuss
the origin of the Muslim population in the Sandzak?
DR. WIXMAN: The origin of the Muslim people is
the same as that of the Muslim peoples of Bulgaria
(Pomaks), Macedonia (Torbesi), Bosnia and Hercegovina (Muslimani), Albania, and Serbia, including
the Sandzak. When the Turks came into the Balkans a
major conversion of local populations occured. Most
Another point that Dr. Wixman brought up that I
would like to comment on is that of the role of emigres in defining national identity. There are some who
would attribute the Slovak separatism that led to the
39
�C00123268
of the converts were related to the Nestorian Christian
The Sandzak Muslims are under pressure to convert in
movement (Bogomils) who formed a third Christian
order to prove that they are true Serbo-Macedonians.
group throughout the Balkans at that time-that is, in
addition to the formal Catholic and Eastern Orthodox
groups. Having been persecuted by these churches,
the Bogomils welcomed the Turks and willingly
embraced Islam. Those peoples of mixed Turkish
(usually the descendants of Turkish soldiers and
locally converted women) tended to call themselves
Turks, while those that were not of mixed ancestry
retained other appellations (as mentioned above). In
the Sandzak many locals adopted Islam, along with
many of the Albanians. It is important to note that
among the Greeks and Serbs when someone converted
to Islam they were rejected as members of those ethnic communities'and were usually considered Turks.
On the other hand, among the Macedonian, Albanian,
and Bulgarian peoples there was a tendency to identify the converts as Moslem Macedonians, Albanians,
and Bulgarians, or just as Moslems. Those who converted to Islam frequently intermarried with Turks and
with each other. The Sandzak Moslems of Serbia
In terms of conflict, these Muslims know that they
have no choice but to ally themselves with Albanians.
There is an interesting demographic trend taking
place. The Muslims of Macedonia have made their
position clear: they are giving up Macedonian and are
beginning to speak Albanian. Albanianism has
become almost a rallying point for Muslims of Serbia
and Macedonia under the current context.
DR. POULSEN: To understand Bosnia, I think, perhaps, a better perspective is to look at the situation in
Northern Ireland because that is not a religious war
either. Although people are identified on the basis of
the traditional religions that they have inherited, the
roots of the conflict lie in two different nations that are
warring in a very small area.
DR. WIXMAN: With regard to the situation in the
former Yugoslavia, the most important issue to the
Croats today is the Krajina. They will never compro-
were, as the other Muslim peoples of the Balkans, pro-
mise on it and they cannot. If the Serbs take Krajina
Turkish in their cultural and political leanings.
and create a separate state or annex it to the new Serbian republic of Bosnia, all coastal Croatia and Herze-
QUESTION: What role does religion play in the con-
govina would be isolated and would fall of its own
flict in former Yugoslavia?
accord. Serbs will temporarily accommodate Croatian
positions because they know that, as long as the West
DR. WIXMAN: It is the position of the Catholic lead-
insists that there be a peace treaty in which this
ers of Zagreb and the Serbian patriarch in Belgrade
that this is not a religious war. The religious overtones
of the current conflict are largely the result of the
elites-former Communist Party heads and intellectuals-of Zagreb, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Budapest
assigning identities to local populations who often did
not self-identify on the basis of religion. For example,
Muslim Serbs and Muslim Croats never defined themselves as a people. They never said that they were
Muslims. They called themselves Bosnians (Bosniaks). They were defined by the Yugoslav Government in 1971 as Muslimani. When the conflict got out
of hand in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belgrade pressed
the idea that the Muslims must become Christian. In
the Sandzak no one thought of themselves as Serbs or
as Muslims. In the same way, the former atheistic Bulgarian Communist Government said that, in order to
be a good Bulgarian, Turks had to change their names
to Bulgarian names-that means from Muslim to
Christian ones. In Albania, it was the reverse.
remains in Serbian hands, this falls tomorrow.
Serbian goals are to create a greater Serbia. The Serbs
of Serbia do not care about the Serbs of Krajina. The
Serbs want Krajina as a piece of geographical territory, and the Serbs who live there became their excuse
to get it.
QUESTION: Dr. Wixman, could you comment on the
conditions under which you think Albania might actually become involved in the Kosovo situation? I ask
this against the backdrop that many people think of
Albania itself as an ethnically homogeneous country.
In fact, as you well know and have written about, it is
a country divided between Tosks and Gegs, and the
Tosks are very much in control in Albania, yet it's the
Gegs who are in Kosovo.
40
�C00123268
DR. WIXMAN: I think that's very crucial to understanding why the Albanians never claimed Kosovo.
Of the 5 million Albanians in the Balkans, 3 million
are Gegs. But two-thirds of Albanians in Albania are
Tosk, and one-third are Geg. If Albania incorporated
toward the Serbs is growing throughout the area. If the
Serbs really attempt to annihilate the Kosovar Albanians as they did the Bosnian Muslims, can Albania
sit back and maintain any credibility?
Kosovo with its Geg majority-and, by the way, the
I think Albania thinks that it may be backed by Tur-
Geg and Tosk dialects are not close enough to be
mutually understandable, and the two peoples have
very different cultures-Albania would have been
dominated by Gegs. This is one reason why Albania
as a state and as a nation is cool toward the idea of
incorporating Kosovo. However, that said, the hatred
key, which in reality may be the case. The Turks are
improving their relations with Albania and are making
it clear that Kosovo is where they draw the line.
4
41
�C00123268
Ethnic Conflict Within Western Europe
Colin H. Williams
Research Professor,
Department of Welsh
University of Wales
College of Cardiff;
Honorary Professor,
Center for Ethnic and Geolinguistic Research
a number of pivotal agencies-principally the education system, conscription into the armed forces, and
legislation. These new state-controlled domains structured the range of identities that were to be recognized
and sanctioned in the public realm. As a consequence,
many of the current conflicts based in part upon ethnic
considerations are the result of this historical lack of
congruence among self-determination, economic
development, and political representation.
I will address several types of ethnic issues facing
contemporary Western Europe, highlight the most
Division of Geography,
pressing, and draw implications for multiethnic
Staffordshire University
accommodation and adjustment to a changing global
order. My concern throughout will be to emphasize a
spatial perspective at urban, regional, and continental
scales.
Introduction
Ethnic conflicts that challenge the existing order are a
recurrent feature of the European political landscape.
A critical feature of European history, which has produced successive periods of ethnic conflict, has been
Ethnic Tensions Along a Frontier Divide: Northern
Ireland
the relative lack of congruence among population, set-
The Northern Ireland problem-misguidedly labeled
tlement patterns, and the political organization of
space and territory. Sovereignty over European territory was initially determined by church and dynastic
settlements following periodic warfare and population
transfer. Indigenous majorities usually, albeit not necessarily, formed the constituent population of essentially multiethnic states and often discriminated
against nonnationals.
Central to the process of legitimizing some cultures
and alienating others has been the rise of the "territorial nation-state." Most histories of state formation
a religious conflict-is a classic illustration of the juxtaposition of two ethnic groups, a common feature of
European borderlands. It is also the most persistent,
intractable ethnic conflict at present within the European Community. As a result of the English colonization of Ireland, a process that was contemporary with
the English colonization of North America (see
R. Sack, 1986, pp. 138-140), a major "shatter belt"
was created in Ulster. This belt divided Catholic from
Protestant, Celt from Anglo-Saxon, the gavelkind
from the primogeniture inheritance system, and an
agrarian economy from an industrial one (see T. Jor-
and nation building have involved the institutional
dan, 1988, pp. 89-146, 393-407).
denial of minority rights-initially justified on religious grounds and more recently reflecting the exigen-
A cultural border is evident in Belfast; the neighbor-
cies of state nationalism. During the period of
chauvinistic nationalism and state expansion-
hood divide equates to a national, if not an international, divide. The divide is a permanent focus of
roughly 1789 to 1919-the destruction of-ethnic
minority cultures was deemed a necessary concomitant of modernity and progress. As the uneven effects
of capitalism penetrated into the marginal, ethnically
differentiated peripheries of Europe, outmoded cultures were considered to be anathema to the realization of a fully integrated national market. "Nation
states" often sought to socialize their citizenry through
stress and violence because it is not only a placespecific frontier zone but also the cultural interface
between two opposing systems. In an excellent overview of the political geography of Belfast's main
troublespot, the Shankill-Falls divide, Boal and Livingstone (1983, pp. 138-58) examine the context in
which the conflict takes place.
42
�C00123268
In coming to grips with the behavioral patterns in the
Shankill-Falls frontier,... it must be recognized that
the two territories forming the frontier zone do not
nest compatibly within the same state-they are parts
of two apparently incompatible nationalisms, the
Irish on the one hand and the Northern Irish version
of the British on the other.. . .Thus the orientation of
the Protestant Shankill is "Ulster and British" while
the Roman Catholic Clonard is "Celtic Irish" in inclination. This suggests, therefore, that the local frontier
in the vicinity of Cupar Street is not just an expression of urban ethnic differences, but is a microcosm
of national division. Boal and Livingstone, 1983, p.
The current cease-fire and complex negotiations to
reintroduce Sinn Fein into the political process as a
constitutional actor are finely balanced-dependent
on a combination of Republican political realism and
Conservatist/Unionist compromise. However, the
British-Irish border, together with the urban enclaves
of Republican support in Belfast and Derry, will be
significant geographic reminders that political ideals
and principles are often rooted in very specific locales
and are given real purchase by varying perceptions of
place.
154. (See figure 2.)
Minority Nationalism
Boal and Livingstone draw attention to the significance of scale and the possibility of international tensions being focused within an urban district.
Depending on which level in the scale hierarchy one
chooses, specific places, such as the Clonard and
Ethnic minorities are an important element in the
political landscape of Western Europe. Much of the
power of minority autonomist nationalism in the
region lies in the ability of minority leaders to mobi-
South Shankill, can be successively interpreted as:
lize people on the basis of their historical occupation
1) peripheries of West Belfast; 2) peripheries of their
respective national cores-Roman Catholic Ireland
and Protestant Northern Ireland; or 3) a periphery
within a periphery of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, what Seamus Heaney (1975, p. 60) has called
the "besieged within the siege." (See figure 3.)
of the land. Territory figures prominently as a context
for sociopolitical processes and as a repository for a
threatened group identity and sustenance, while
nationalism-despite its potential for destructionprovides a beguilingly complete sociocultural framework for political and economic action. Herein lies the
In their discussion, Boal and Livingstone also bring to
the fore the question of how to interpret place specific
events in such a context. They analyze the influence
that culture, stress, violence, gnd lack of information
have on the conduct and intensity of group conflict
where key strategic locations are so infused with symbolic meaning that any criminal act can be interpreted
as a "political demonstration of loyalty" to one side or
the other. This is the geographic equivalent of some
prisoners, who, as in the Easter Rising of 1916, refuse
to accept their classification as "common criminals"
but rather as "political prisoners of war" regardless of
the nature and type of offence committed. History has
a way of mythologizing the mundane, and often
squalid, acts of man as martyrdom and heroism,
both material and culturallideological terms and the
concern with developing a comprehensive definition
of the nation and its territory to establish political
legitimacy that can provide the basis for a call for
some form of autonomy (Williams, 1994). A. D.
Smith (1993, p. 11) has phrased its allure thus:
significance of resisting harmful outside influences in
nations derive their profound hold over the feelings
and imaginations of the people because they are historically embedded. They are rooted in older and
more long-lasting ethnic ties, myths, and sentiments
from which these modern nations draw much of their
emotional and cultural sustenance and much of what
makes them distinctive, even unique. If nationalism is
the normalization of the unique, then we should not
be baffled by its global power. It satisfies the dual
craving to preserve what is felt to be a collective self
and all its special culture values, while inserting that
self as a political community into the community of
nations by endowing it with the standard attributes of
the nation.
This concept of a frontier divide could also be applied
elsewhere in Europe, for example, within Brussels and
along the Belgian linguistic divide. It also has meaning for the cultural zone of transition separating Quebec from the rest of Canada.
43
�C00123268
Figure 2
The Distribution of Protestants and Catholics, South Shankill-Clonard Frontier Zone
SHANKILL - CLONARD
Shankill Road
RELIGION
*
*
SOUTH
SHANKILL
Roman Catholic
Protestant
*
"
land on
"
Nonre
o --
.
"
*
-.
*.*
metre.
150
.
"sn0
.
:
*:..:-
A
9* *
0
:vede
e
*
.
CLONVARD
DATA SOURCE-SAMPLE SURVEY/I
DECEMBER 1967-JANUARY 1968
Source: Boal F., and L1ingstone, D.N., The Internal Frontierin Microcosm-The Shankill-Falls Divide," in Kiot, N., and Waterman, S., eds.,
Pluralism and Political Geography, page 143.,1983.0
44
736069 6-95
�C00123268
Figure 3
Multiple Peripherality and the South Shankill-Clonard Area, 1981
CLONARD
(C)
SOUTH
SHANKILL (SS)
I
I
t
t
FALLS
(F)
SHANKILL
(S)
f
1
ri
ROMAN CATHOLIC
IRELAND (RC)
--
PROTESTANT
NORTHERN
IR'ELAND
F
(P)
IRISH
NORTERN
REPUBLIC (RC)
El
-
.--
:.
.-
UNITED
-RELND;KINGDOM
.RC):.
PERIPHERIES
Source: Boal F., and Livingstone, D.N., "ibe Internal Frontier in Microcosm--The Shankill-Falls Divide," in Kliot. N., and Waterman, S., eds.,
Pluralism and Political Geography, 1983.0
45
349176 6-95
�C00123268
The inset in the column to the right outlines 10 structural characteristics of minority nationalism; figure 4
illustrates where such nationalism is most virulent
of
Some StructuralCharacteristics Minority
Nationalism
today.
1. Defense of a unique territory,the homeland,and
the protectionof a valued environment.
Ethnicity and Territorial Separatism: The Basques
The most critical form of minority nationalism in the
European Union (EU) today is separatism, which is
manifest in a surprisingly large number of member
states and which in some respects acts as a counter to
the general thrust of globalization and integration so
suggestive of the so-called "postmodernist New World
Order" (Williams, 1993). The complex process of separatism can be schematized as in figure 5, which is
derived from a larger project on political territorial
2. Defense and promotion of a culture and identitylanguage, religion, social existence.
3. Resistance to centralist trends and relativepowerlessness over decisionmaking.
4. Perceptionof exploitation and underdevelopmentstructuraldiscrimination.
5. Resistance to outsiders,immigrants, settlers, colo-
adjustment being undertaken by C. F. J. Whebell.
nizers.
In postwar Europe, separatism is best illustrated by the
Basque case, though it has relevance in explaining the
Corsican, Flemish, and various Celtic cases as well.
The Basques have enjoyed long periods of relative
autonomy before their incorporation into the Spanish
state; elements of their institutional distinctiveness,
the fueros, survived until fairly recently and were used
as evidence of a prior claim to legitimate statehood.
Their language and culture were deemed unique
because they were unrelated to any Indo-European
language group and were among the oldest surviving
elements of civilization in Europe.
6. Fearof loss of local dominance and influence
expressed through cultural attrition.
Under the impress of state building, the government
sought to ruthlessly eradicate non-Spanish elements,
producing a deep resentment within the Basque community. State oppression was confirmed during the
Spanish Civil War and sustained thereafter when the
Spanish forces were regarded as constituting an internal colonial military occupation. This is similar to the
Irish Republican nationalist interpretation of the role
of British troops in Northern Ireland. Thereafter, vio-
7. Violent and nonviolent expressionof ethnic dissent
and discord-escalation risks.
of
8. Group-learning,myth formation, persistent inequalities that shape current ideology and define contemporary identity in light of historicallysignficant
acts of oppression.
9. Antistate, antistatus quo politicalaction intended to
realize a new basis of legitimacy.
10. Redefinition of the problem situationand of conflict in light of the most recent events and renewed
reforms, concessions,political accommodations, and
gainsfor beleaguredminority within the dominant
system.
lence and oppression characterized Basque-Madrid
has provided an excellent overview of the growth and
relations as the Franco regime sought to eradicate
development of ETA. He argues that it was the special
local political dissent and to destroy Basque cultural
combination of the defense of traditional cultural val-
identity.
ues, rapid industrialization, and opposition to Spanish
internal colonialism, that nurtured and sustained the
The creation in 1957 of Euskadi ta Askatasuna
(ETA)-Basque Homeland and Liberty-reinvigorated Basque nationalism. Robert Clark (1979, 1984)
46
�C00123268
Figure 4
Selected Minority Areas in Western Europe
* Major centres of politioal violence
*
Non-violent resistance
*
Elected Assemblies
Selected minority areas of Western Europe
1 Scotland
2 Wales
3 Ulster
4 Flanders
1 Wallonla
a Brittany
7 Alsace
8 Corsica
8 Euskadl
10 Catalonia
11 Gallcla
12 Jura
13 South Tyrol
ArDEN
IRELAND
14 Sardinia
15 Silolly
16 Occltante
2
17 Friuli
e~
N
NW
SWEDEN
ARK
(
L +s
UNITED
KINGDOM
NETH
D6
6LA
GERMANY
4IU
B
PRANCE
12
AUSTRIA
SWITZERLAND
11
3
ITALY
SPQ
10
-t
;
736070 6-95
47
�C00123268
role of violence as a movement strategy. He has also
drawn attention to the manner in which the Spanish
state sought to placate ethnic demands for separatism
by offering a form of regional autonomy to Euskadi,
Catalonia, Gallicia, and Andalucia. The gesture originally generated much euphoria but was followed by a
decade of disappointment that was manifest in what
he calls the "rejectionist option"-whereby the majority of the electorate in the Basque provinces consistently voted in an anti-Madrid fashion. The trend is
obvious in each-of the seven elections held since the
Basque Autonomy Statute entered force. The situation
was compounded by the post-1987 trend in which
regionalist parties gained electoral strength in Valencia, Aragon, Navarra, Majorca, Cantabria, and Canarias-areas that had little, if any, sense of historical
regionalism.
The nature of Basque nationalism is likely to change
as postindustrial Spain continues to evolve and adjust.
The trend toward a loosening of the central grip on the
constituent regions is gathering pace here as in many
other European states. Clark forecasts that:
as advanced industrial societies become more complex, diverse, and pluralistic, they require regimes
that are more decentralized, disaggregated, and
autonomous. In Spain, where the existing local and
provincial units may be too small or too restricted in
other ways to assume a vigorous role in the management of society, the solution lies in the creation of
middle-range political entities called 'meso-governments,' smaller than the nation-state, but larger and
more encompassing than cities and provinces"
(p. 41).
This conclusion is valid for Italy, France, Belgium,
and the United Kingdom but unlikely to be adopted
willingly, especially in the latter.
The nation-state structure, though fiercely criticized,
is also a near-permanent political feature, and it will
structure the degree of regional autonomy available to
substate nationalities. A "Europe of the Nations" ideal
is still a long way removed from the regional economic reality that most groups must face but, despite
the apparent impracticability of the desire for regional
autarky, remains one of the most strident voices heard
in Europe.
The Nation-State in Transition?
The nation-state is being challenged and reevaluated
by a number of contemporary forces, both from above
and from below. Within the new European order, two
trends have a particularbearing on the capacity of ethnolinguistic minorities to renegotiate their role in the
European division of labor. The first is the weakening
of national economic sovereignty and the transfer of
key economic powers from state legislatures to the
European Commission, and the second is the sharing
of political authority among units in the state system.
Despite the current difficulties with the European
Monetary Regime (ERM) and the post-Maastricht
negotiations, the European Union has gone a long way
toward an integrated management of the constituent
economies. It has established policies on competition,
trade, monetary exchange rates, science and technological research, and-to some extent-foreign
affairs. At the regional level the growth of agreements
such as the Four Motors program, which linked
Baden-Wurttemberg, Rhones Alpes, Lombardy, Catalonia, and Wales, help sustain an element of relative
autonomy from the central state apparatus; this is particularly important for job creation and for constructing a more diverse economic profile than has hitherto
been the case. In places like Catalonia and Wales,
If the drift toward separatism in Spain is contained,
however, a significant ethnic issue will remain in
where inhabitants continue to speak indigenous languages, this decentralization is an obvious way to
Euskadi and Catalonia. There is increasing evidence
slow down outmigration and language shift, thereby
that the post-Franco reforms designed to introduce
Eusquerra and Catalan to new public domains, such as
education, commerce, the media, and the law, have
been less effective than anticipated in assimilating
nonindigenous Spaniards and North Africans into the
new nationalist social order.
easing one of the key determinants of ethnic antagonism. Such moves represent a broader pattern of
attempts that seek to bypass some central state authority and nurture regional-level power.
48
�C00123268
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49
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�C00123268
We may not need to establish a de jure Federal Europe
The resulting tension in the hindrance of the free
if many regions will increasingly operate as if they
were constituents of a de facto Federal Europe. This is
movement of people, ideas, and goods is a major
source of ethnic tension. Neonationalism, facism,
because both at the state and, to a lesser extent, at the
regional level, conventional political authority--traditionally encapsulated in the concept of sovereigntyis increasingly shared among a number of units within
crypto-Communism, and blatant racism are all too
obvious a response.
Race and Ethnicity
the state system. The absolute nature of the nation-
It might have been assumed that in tandem with the
state can no longer be sustained as if it were a closed
system. Pooled sovereignty, permeable borders, Euro-
so-called "ethnic revival" of postwar Europe would
have come an increased tolerance to racial as well as
pean Community-wide socioeconomic and environ-
-ethnic minorities. However, this is not the case. As
mental policymaking, freedom of movement and to a
lesser extent shared foreign policy-through interrelated agencies such as the Western European Union,
NATO, CSCE--all characterize the contemporary
state system and render it more interdependent, both
MacLaughlin (1993) demonstrates, both ethnicity and
race are being used to categorize groups and structure
policies in ways that defend the integrity of Europeans. Within sections of the European media and the
political arena, ethnicity is increasingly used to refer
on respective member states and on subordinate con-
to the positive, quasibiological identity that links an
stituent regions. Clearly such integration and mutual
dependence is not without its structural strains.
indigenous group to a specific place in Europe. Race,
in contrast, has come to "signify a set of imaginary
properties of inheritance that fix and legitimate real
positions of social domination or subordination in
terms of cultural differences between native and foreigner in the European Community," (MacLaughlin,
1993). As a classificatory category it reflects primarily, if not exclusively, negative tendencies of dissociation and exclusion at state and EU levels.
Ethnic Insiders and Ethnic Outsiders
The major ethnic issue facing Western Europe in the
coming decade is the question of the status of outsiders. Since the 1960s several regions have experienced
an influx of migrants who are often religiously, ideologically, and racially different from indigenous Euro-
Ethnicity, Migration, and Frontiers
peans. Approximately 30 million people entered
For this crude distinction between ethnic and racial
Western Europe between 1945 and 1975, one of the
largest migratory movements in modern history. An
estimated 13 million legally settled non-Europeans,
categorization to be maintained in an increasingly
multiethnic world, Europe has to reinterpret its position, to defend its frontiers from incursions from the
and perhaps as many as 2 million "illegals," are within
east, mass migration from the south, and refugee
the European Union. Tension between indigenous
Community members and "outsiders" is present and
absorption from the Balkans. What sort of society
would a fortress Europe thus conceived seek to con-
most likely will increase.
struct? Surely such isolationism, state-inspired nation-
The "outsider" question has become significant in the
alism, and racial cleansing is an anathema to the
European dream of free movement of labor and open
context of the collapse of the bipolar system and the
borders? Unfortunately not; the lessons of history
emergence of a new world order. At least two major,
remind us that every generation since 1648 has fought
contradictory processes are at work here. The first is
for the control of the Lotharingian Axis-the Rhine-
the opening up of Europe to democratic ideals and
representative politics, which follows the advance of-
Rhone Corridor-and its associated networks.
Granted that the European Union exists in part to seal
capitalism eastward and its penetration and creation of
markets, resources, and supply sources. The other,
the respective futures of West European societies
within one common framework, but the issues of
occurring simultaneously, is a reaction that seeks to
protect the individual character of West European
states by closing borders and limiting immigration.
50
�C00123268
movement and border vigilance have not been lost,
merely shifted further east. Geographers, who have a
long-established interest in migration, displacement,
and territorial adjustment, are contributing to our
understanding of the changing patterns.
further 310,000 de facto refugees should be taken into
account as constituting the non-German sector of the
population.
James Walsh (1992) has provided an overview that
Since unification and its attendant economic and fiscal
difficulties, this liberal attitude has been openly challenged. Anti-immigrant violence has made many Ger-
suggests that in France the threat of increasing migration of Muslims animates racial passions. Fully
man citizens wary of an extension of their open-door
policy, especially when the media are quick to point
3.5 million foreigners make up 6.2 percent of the total
population. The migrants are accused of such things as
depressing average economic wage levels, refusing to
integrate, clustering in Islamic neighborhoods, and
undermining French culture.and customs. Such
charges serve the cause of the National Front under
out that 93 percent of asylum seekers do not have a
valid case. Thus, one inescapable conclusion is that
many places within Germany are going to witness
sporadic and deep-seated violence. When this general
trend is applied to the borders with Poland, the Czech
Republic, and Austria, it is evident that one major
Le Pen, who won 38 percent of the November 1991
cause of future conflict will be the manner in which
election vote and, in the regional elections of 1992,
gave the National Front a larger percentage of the vote
than the Socialist Party under Francois Mitterrand.
cross-border movement is handled.
Bruno Megret, a leading theoretician of the National
The German state's response is to attempt to quench
the migration flow at the source through a massive
investment in the emergent capitalist economies of the
Front, has announced a package of migration-curbing
proposals: 1) posting of $180,000 bond by all nonEuropean visitors, 2) mandatory AIDS testing,
3) review of the status of all aliens in France, 4)
east and increased immigration control at external EU
borders. To some extent this will be welcomed by
dependent economies that will replace the ruble with
the mark, but it is also likely to create deep-seated.
stricter border control, 5) no family unity doctrine,
6) repeal of the agreement on freedom of movement
resentment and accusations of internal colonialism,
'reminiscent of the first waves of German expansion in
for EC-member migrants, 7) no social benefits to
previous centuries. Such border controls will facilitate
migrant children, 8) priority for French citizens in
the removal of internal EU border checks but only to
housing and social benefits, and 9) immediate deporta-
the extent that each constituent country is as efficient
tion for migrants with improper or no official documents, (Walsh, 1992, p. 21). Clearly such blatant state
nationalism will not be adopted in policy terms by any
responsible French Government, but more subtle vari-
and determined as Germany, France, and the United
Kingdom in employing external controls, a doubtful
assumption.
ants of these elements have entered the agenda of
The most recent migrants are incorrectly viewed as
respectable political parties and interest groups and
economically dependent and relatively unskilled-a
will be set in sharper focus as the key policy alterna-
drain on EU resources. Miles (1992, p.41) is especially
tives each time urban racial violence occurs.
sensitive to this assumption. He argues that "this
The former German Federal Republic was a logical
destination for many displaced Europeans and others
because of its historically sympathetic reception of
refugees that is enshrined in Article 16 of the German
Basic Law. It is estimated that some 400,000 asylum
seekers were processed into Germany in 1992. Walsh
homogenization of migration flows is factually mistaken and analytically problematic" and that "...large
numbers of recent migrants originate from Eastern
Europe, the migration of aussiedler into Germany
being of special significance; that the most important
category of internal labor migration within the EU is
that of skilled professional and managerial labour; and
suggests that 80 percent came from the Third World
and that the vast majority were Muslim; he argues that
an additional 4 million Turks and their families and a
51
�C00123268
that one of the fastest growing categories on non-EU
switching than has hitherto been the norm. Evidence
migration into the European Union includes similarly
highly skilled nonmanual labor from other sectors of
of partial success is available in domains such as
education, public administration, and the law. The
the advanced capitalist world economy. In light of the
new immigration, the stereotyping of immigrants as
key instrument is the degree of influence exercised
on the local state apparatus to institutionalize pat-
blacks originating from the Third World ironically mir-
terns of-language behavior and service provision in
rors and legitimates the discourse of EU states about
new domains. One of the great ironies of many
the problem of immigration." This is an important
lesser used language groups is that they are simulta-
qualification and should alert us to read between the
lines of official pronouncement and localized reaction.
neously witnessing the erosion of their traditional
strength in heartland areas and key cities while
beginning to harness the potential of mass commu-
The Implications of Globalization, Technology, and
Accessibility for Ethnic Relations
If we shift attention from the conventional territorial
nication and electronic networking.
- Third, and most intriguing from a geographer's
and urban contexts for social interaction, it is evident
that a major source of ethnic-racial conflict will be the
viewpoint, pressure will increase on local and metropolitan authorities to provide mother-tongue edu-
differential access groups enjoy to information, space,
and power in Europe. The whole history of the West
cation and other public services to the children of
mobile workers and their families in multicultural
has been a constant, if traumatic, dialogue between
cities such as Milan, London, Paris, and Frankfurt.
periods of opening and closing, between diversifica-
This is set to become the major policy issue within
tion and uniformity. The technological trends underpinning closer European integration suggest four
trends as they relate to the interaction of language,
ethnicity, identity, and the state system:
public administration if a fully functional European
Union is to be realized.
- First, we have already witnessed the emergence of
English as the linguafranca of Europe, if not of the
world. This has caused other international languages
- Fourth, and most strategical, demand will grow at
the Community level to provide resources for the
instruction, absorption, and occupational integration
of the children and dependents of non-EU migrant
workers. An inability or a refusal to provide such
such as French, German, and Spanish to jockey for
position in a secondary role within the educational,
public facilities, especially in education, health services, and community care, will undoubtedly
legal, and commercial domains of a restructured and
increase the scale of ethnic tension and call into
enlarged Europe. Fears are already expressed about
the dominance of English and of the infiltration
question the nature and direction of the multicultural
character of the European Union itself.
thereby of non-European, for instance, North Amer-
ican influence. Thus serious consideration is being
A more virulent expression of such tension will be the
given to the following proposals: a) there should be
two foreign languages for every EU citizen, b) a first
continued importation of non-European conflicts into
the multicultural cities of the Community. One chief
foreign language should be obligatory, c) English
characteristic of globalization is that the safety valve
should be taught as a second foreign language, never
of relative insulation from other countries' problems
as the first, and d) less information and cultural loss
will occur if the principle of multilingualism in most
affairs can be instituted.
and issues no longer operates in a "nationally
bounded" manner. In consequence, the "higher the
level of globalization, the narrower the scope for
escape alternatives. In this sense, globalization is also
a kind of totalitarianization of world space" (Mlinar,
1992. p. 20; Williams, 1993, p. 2).
- Second, indigenous language groups, such as Welsh,
Irish, or Basque (see inset on p.53) will be further
marginalized unless they can influence the patterns
of stable bilingualism with a much reduced language
52
�C00123268
Wt
E
Lmajor
Western Europe 's Lesser Used Languages
Belgium
German
Denmark
German
France
Breton
Catalan
Basque
Corsican
Dutch
German/Alsatian
Occitan
Germany
North Frisian
East Frisian
Danish
Polish
Greece
Arvinite
Turkish
Italy
French (Franco-Provencal)
Occitan
German
Ladin
Slovene
Friulan
Sard
Catalan
Greek
Croatian
Albanian
Luxembourg
Letzebuergesch
challenge facing us is in interpreting the trends
that emerge as a result of the disjuncture between the
formally structured political units-at whatever scale
from local to superstructural-and the actual social
behavior of an increasingly autonomous and individualistic citizenry. Coping with this new complex reality
by learning to read between the lines will be the chief
social skill required of both active citizen and specialist observer alike. Let me end by raising a few critical
questions that geographers and others will need to
address if Europe is to honor the basic rights of all its
constituent citizens:
e
On what basis will the new European identity be
constructed-federal, regional, racial, or national?
* What effect will the enlargement of the European
Union have on the internal ethnolinguistic and
regional management of the Community?
Netherlands
West Frisian
* To what extent will border tensions spill into Com-
Spain
Catalan
Gallego
Basque
Occitan
munity states, and how will these effect the grand
design of opening up the frontiers of Europe?
* How permeable are the new frontiers of the Euro-
pean Community?
Macedonian
Vlak
Ireland
Irish
United Kingdom
Gaelic
Scots
Cornish
Irish
Welsh
*
increase or decrease with greater political-economic
integration?
- How will political organizations, especially metropolitan authorities, cope with the increased diversity
of their constituent citizens and the newly enfranchised rights of cultural pluralism?
e
Conclusion
Ethnic mobilization is so often a surrogate for other
issues such as political struggle, economic depriva-
Will ethnicity, as a base for social mobilization,
What role will territory and place have in structuring
the life chances of hitherto discriminated minorities?
- Will we have a nested hierarchy of disadvantage
aggravated by global economic changes inducing
tion, and psychological adjustment to the status quo.
the expansion of domination and dependence of the
Ethnic issues, whether as purposive or reactive ele-
poor and the racially distinct?
ments, are likely to increase in their salience as Western Europe avers a more open, pluralistic society.
Geographers can play an important role in analyzing
the conventional elements of migration, distribution,
and territorial organization of society. However, the
e
53
Who controls access to information within the
mother tongue and the working languages of the
European minorities?
�C00123268
- Are minorities destined to a more dependant role,
even within their own countries, because of superstructural changes favoring the dominant groups?
e
Or will they achieve some relative sociocultural
autonomy through the adoption of mass technology
and internal communicative competence?
- What effect will globalization have on strengthening
or weakening the regional-local infrastructure on
which European ethnic minority groups depend?
- What role will intractable ethnic conflicts play in
triggering major regional clashes, and how will the
new security architecture of Europe react to such
conflagrations?
54
�C00123268
Summary of Discussion
I would like to highlight a few things that I think are
A focus on the territorial setting for ethnic conflict can
highlight some issues that Dr. Williams did not touch
on but that are relevant for our thinking about what is
happening in Europe. First, differences in how States
define citizenship is critically important. One need
only think about the different ways in which the Ger-
particularly significant and to raise a couple of related
mans, French, or British have defined citizenship his-
questions. At the heart of Professor Williams' presentation is a dichotomy between two fundamentally different kinds of ethnic issues that Western Europe will
face in the years ahead. One concerns the longstanding, regionally specific minority groups, and the other
concerns the migrants who have come in from North
Africa and the Middle East over the last 30 or 40 years
and more recently from Eastern Europe. It is important to recognize that each of these poses a fundamen-
torically. Second, several different migrant groups
exist: older new migrants, newer new migrants, and
newer newer new migrants. The most recent come
from Eastern Europe and look different from earlier
migrants not only in terms of external characteristics
but also in terms of the kinds of skills they bring and
their potential level of acceptance within West European societies.
tally different problem for Europe in the 1990s. Most
obviously, their geography differs. Longstanding
One of the critical contemporary issues is the effect
that the new immigrants are having on the old immi-
minority groups often operate from a distinct regional
territorial base. The migrant groups, on the other hand,
are corcentrated overwhelmingly in cities and do not
have the same kind of territorial base. The geography
of social disruption associated with each group also
differs. With longstanding minority and regional
minority groups, the issues, tensions, and conflicts, in
grants. The relatively highly skilled immigrants coming in from Poland and the former western republics
of the former Soviet Union are likely to be more easily
integrated within the cultural traditions of the West. If
this occurs, Turks and other non-Western migrants
will be further marginalized.
general, tend to be localized, whereas migrant group
Finally, Dr. Williams raises two critical questions. The
issues tend to be focused for political mobilization at
first is that the changing political geography of Europe
the national level and are often far reaching in their
is affecting ethnicity and ethnic conflict. In my own
impact on society. These differences are evident in the
public reactions to them. I agree with Dr. Williams
that we are seeing a greater acceptance of the long-
view, centralization as a component of European integration has currently gone about as far as it can go. A
key current issue is the importance of regions and
standing minority groups and that the focus of opposi-
regionalization. An example of this is a map produced
tion politics around the recent migrants is one of the
fundamental issues for Europe in the years ahead.
Having identified those twin issues, I will move on to
note what I see as the two key geographical perspec-
by the Commission of the European Communities that
illustrates European integration from a geographical
perspective. It identifies development zones within
Europe. These development zones do not conform to
those defined by the European Regional Development
tives that Dr. Williams highlighted:
Fund; they are not based on political-administrative
. First, ethnic conflicts play out at different scales, and
these scale differences have implications for our
understanding. Dr. Williams highlighted the importance of scale in his discussion of Northern Ireland.
regions within existing nation-states. Rather, the map
looks at Europe without nation-state boundaries, playing off of some of the transboundary developments
currently underway that are beginning to define a new
kind of European political space.
Discussant: Alexander Murphy
e
Second, of course, is the importance of territorial
setting for ethnic conflict. Some of the comments
about the changing significance of regions were particularly interesting in this regard.
57
�C00123268
The second question is: how do we evaluate the policies of individual states in relation to minority groups,
in particular, territorial policies? There was an
extended discussion in the paper of the Basque situation, where power has been devolved to regions of a
quasiautonomous nature. Despite this devolution, a
continuation of fairly strong anti-Madrid bias can still
be seen in voting patterns in Spain. At the same time,
overt violence has been reduced. This raises questions
about the impact of state policies that acknowledge
the existence of ethnic concentrations and use territo-
rial policies to incorporate ethnic groups in the decisionmaking process. It may mean-as has happened
to a degree in the Basque case-that bringing a separatist group into the decisionmaking structure may
marginalize the more violent elements of the group.
DR. MURPHY: The United States has an interest in a
stable and economically vital Europe. This would suggest that it is in the US interest to promote the kind of
policy options that lead to stability from an ethnic
standpoint. That may mean some of the kinds of territorial policies that I suggested. It also means that the
United States should promote the idea of a European
Community that does not just look like a much more
centralized community but one that actually facilitates
the kinds of regional linkages that Dr. Williams has
outlined. We should be not be scared of the fact that
the nation-state is changing. It is in the US interest to
promote the kind of regional arrangements that will
lead to a more stable and outward-looking Europe.
General Discussion
QUESTION: With regard to ethnic issues, what policies are likely to best promote US interests in the
region?
58
�C00123268
Ethnoterritorial Conflict in the
Former Soviet Union
Robert Kaiser
Professor of Geography
University of Missouri-Columbia
Introduction
The former USSR has been the scene of scores of
active and potential ethnoterritorial conflicts. More
than 200 ethnic and territorial disputes have been
identified in this region since 1989, encompassing
nearly all the territory of the former USSR (see
figure 6). However, not all the disputes have erupted
into violent conflict. In Latvia and Estonia, ethnic conflict has taken the form of "constitutional nationalism"
or "ethnic democracy," as Latyian and Estonian political elites restructure ethnic relations through the use
of legislation to exclude nonmembers.' In Transcaucasia, ethnoterritorial conflicts between titular nations
and indigenous minorities began before 1991 and
quickly escalated to open warfare. In Central Asia,
sporadic outbreaks of ethnic violence against nontitular populations have occurred but have not been orga-
Soviet Union. 2 The factors and consequences briefly
discussed are generalizations drawn from comparative
research on nationalism and territoriality and from the
disputes that have emerged in the former USSR. They
are by no means the only important factors, and, to
fully understand why some ethnoterritorial disputes
escalated to violent conflict and others did not, it is
necessary to explore each dispute in detail and to
examine it from each side's perspective. Nonetheless,
it is also essential to understand the geographic variability in ethnoterritorial conflict in the former USSR
more generally and to place the events in this critical
world region in the context of a broader conceptual
framework.
Ethnoterritorial Conflicts: Factors Underlying
Regional Differences
The Degree of National Consciousness
The formation of a national identity is one of the most
important, but also one of the most difficult, factors to
grasp. Nationalists throughout this region tend to
depict their nations as "primordial organisms" that
were dormant during the oppressive Soviet period and
were reawakened during the Gorbachev era (for
example, RUKH 1989). However, it is more accurate
nized by indigenous political elites pursuing the
to view the Soviet period as crucial to the national for-
politics of territorial nationalism. In the Russian Federation, disputes over the level of territorial autonomy
for non-Russians have risen, but, aside from a few
specific republics, a process of political disintegration
comparable to that which occurred in the USSR does
not appear to be on the horizon.
mation process, during which time nations became
mass-based communities of interest and belonging
that developed a sense of identity and a sense of
homeland more extensive than their local environment
(Kaiser 1994). However, even though this nationalization process during the Soviet era resulted in a higher
and more mass-based national consciousness than
existed before, not all groups are equally national.
Rather than provide a descriptive summary of all 200
plus ethnoterritorial conflicts, this paper explores the
factors underyling the regional variation in the ethnoterritorial conflicts that have arisen in the former
'The term constitutional nationalism; its use by the political elites
of the dominant nation, the consequences of the new political reality for nonmembers, and reactions leading to violent ethnoterritorial conflict was recently elaborated by Robert Hayden (1992) with
reference to Yugoslavia. According to Hayden, "constitutional
nationalism envisions a state in which sovereignty resides with a
particular nation, the members of which are the only ones who can
decide fundamental questions of state form and identity." Ethnic
democracy has been defined by Smooha and Hanf (1992, 31) as "a
democracy in which the dominance of one ethnic group is institutionalized."
Because national consciousness is essentially subjective, it is difficult to measure the degree to which it has
become mass-based. Soviet censuses did ask a question on national identity, and this data provided one
indicator of groups that were losing members as a
2 For such a descriptive summary of the conflicts that had emerged
by 1992, see Kolossor (1992).
59
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C00123268
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�C00123268
result of ethnonational reidentification or assimilation
over time (Silver 1986). According to this measure,
the least nationally conscious communities are the
small groups of people of the Siberian north and also a
number of Finnic groups such as the Karelians and
Mordvinians, whose members were undergoing a process of reidentification toward Russians during much
of the Soviet period. It is also true that members who
live outside their home republics are more likely to
acculturate and assimilate through an intergenerational process of reidentification (Kaiser 1988, 1994).
Although ethnic reidentification is a useful general
indicator of national consciousness, this measure does
have limits because it does not indicate the strength of
national consciousness amohg the population that
has become an activated strategy. The Baltic nations
have clearly been most nationalistic; close to the
entire membership turned out for independence rallies-indicating a high degree of national consciousness-and they were least willing to compromise on
the question of political independence. The least
nationalistic of the titular groups in the former Union
republics are in Central Asia. For example, Tajikistan
has erupted into civil war; the conflict is, at least in
part, intranational and interethnic, indicating a low
level of national consciousness and the continued primacy of subnational, localized ethnic identities. The
degree of national solidarity is lowest in Central Asia,
and the nationalized elites have had the most difficulty
calling their groups to action.
considered itself to be part of the nation (that is, those
who did not reidentify).
Another way of assessing national consciousness is to
study the behavior of indiviiluals and to determine to
what degree each member of the nation behaves in a
way that is consonant with nationalism. Nationalism
here is defined as both an ideology and a political
strategy. In Nationalismand the State (1982, 3), John
Breuilly states that the political doctrine of nationalism has three essential tenets:
- "There exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar
As a final point regarding this factor, it is important to
note that there is a lack of correspondence between the
degree of national consciousness and the level of
interethnic violence. For example, the Tajik civil war
has resulted in much greater loss of life and dislocaion than has the constitutional nationalism pursued by
Estonians and Latvians.
Strength of Attachment to Place of Residence
A sense of homeland rises with national consciousness (Kaiser 1991, 1994). As an ethnonational com-
munity becomes more nationalistic, this sense of
character."
"The interests and values of the nation take priority
geographic ideology and strategy, a political action
over all other interests and values."
e
homeland becomes politicized and is converted into
territorial nationalism. 3 Nationalism is an explicitly
program to make the borders of state and homeland
congruent (Williams 1989; Gettner 1983).
- "The nation must be as independent as possible.
This usually requires at least the attainment of political sovereignty."
National consciousness as discussed above is
addressed in Breuilly's first tenet. Beyond this, the pri-
Nationality policies in the USSR facilitated the development of a politicized sense of homeland. First, the
federal structure helped give definite shape, size, and
borders to homelands that for the masses of most
groups were only vaguely perceived in the 1920s (see
macy of national identity and the political objective
figure 7).
that this inspires (that is, the attainment of independence) are of crucial importance in understanding
7
nationalism as a political and geographic action pro-
place where the nation can survive and prosper in the future. If
gram. Applying this to the former USSR, it is relaively obvious at this point that ethnoregional
differences exist in the degree to which nationalism
nationalists view the nation as a primordial organism, they also
From a nationalist perspective, the ancestral homeland is the only
typically view it as an organism that can thrive only when rooted in
the soil of the ancestral homeland.
61
�C00123268
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Second, Korenizatsiya (indigenization) policies that
targeted members of the titular nation for preferential
treatment in their home republic clearly fostered a
more ethnically exclusionary outlook regarding the
appropriate status of the titular nation vis a vis all
other nations in the republic. Most nationalists have
come to view all their former republic as homeland,
even while many nationalists lay claim to a more
extensive homeland.
of the Russian population, a more localized, subnational identity is also apparent. Both of these detract
from the strength of a Russian national identity and a
sense of homeland. As a result, there has been a lively
debate within the Russian community over the question: "What is Russia?".
On the one hand, the federal' structure reduced the ethnoterritorial conflict that might otherwise have
occurred-it provided the political geographic structure for a relatively peaceful dissolution of the USSR.
On the other hand, several of those national communities with units that were only autonomous have
attempted to secede from the successor states in which
their homelands are located. This has resulted in conflict escalation at the intrarepublic scale, which has
been particularly severe in the Caucasus.
Most nationalists view the ideal polity as an ethnically
pure nation-state with all members of the nation in and
no outsiders present and with political borders drawn
on the basis of the (mythical) ancestral homeland, that
is, the state ideally is viewed as the political geographic embodiment of the nation. However, none of
the successor states encompasses one and only one
nation (see tables 1 and 2):
Territorial nationalism is strongest in the regions
Ethnodemographic 'Tends
" Armenia is ethnically homogeneous but has the
highest percentage of members living outside a successor state.
where nations are most fully formed. Again, Estonia
and Latvia-with their exclusionary citizenship laws,
constitutions, and so forth -may be seen as most
nationalistic. The state-building project in these two
republics is synonymous with the exclusion of ethnic
others, particularly Russians, even though their policies have excluded the population arriving since
World War II rather than all nontitular people.
Ethnic conflict is more likely where two or more
nations feel a strong sense of homeland toward the
same place, where both groups have become politicized, and where the power relationship between the
two groups has shifted to favor one over the other.
This is certainly true in the case of conflicts over
Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan and Abkhazia and
South Ossetia in Georgia.
A final note under this factor: it has become increasingly apparent over the past few years that a Russian
- Almost all Estonians, Latvians, and Georgians are
included in their respective states, but members of
nontitular groups are also present.
Demographic dilution of the indigenous nation in its
homeland, usually occurring as the result of the inmigration of Russians, tended to exacerbate interethnic relations and was a catalyst for rising nationalism.
Latvians and Estonians experienced the greatest
demographic dilution in their homelands between
1960 and 1990, and the feared demographic Russification became the cornerstone of their nationalistic programs (Parming, 1980). Abkhazians similarly cited
Georgian in-migration and Abkhazian dilution as a
critical factor in the need for Abkhazia to be independent, and the Armenian declaration of independence
in Nagorno-Karabakh was preceded by a decade of
Azeri in-migration.
sense of national consciousness and sense of home-
By way of contrast, Kyrgyzstan has about the same
land are not well developed. Russians as the dominant
group in the USSR experienced an overlapping sense
of identity with the Soviet People idea, and with the
entire USSR as the Russian homeland/Socialist fatherland. Also, because of the great geographic dispersal
level of demographic dilution as Latvia, but this has
not been a major issue in Kyrgyzstan. In the Central
63
�C00123268
Table 1
National Composition of the Population, 1989
Population in thousands (and percentages)
Republic
'Titular
Of Nontitular:
Russians
Nontitular
(18.5)
(81.5) 27,156
119.866
(27.3)
14.033
(72.7)
37,419
(22.1)
2,247
(77.9)
7.905
(35.5)
1,541
(64.5)
2,795
(28.6)
5,668
(71.4)
14,142
Uzekistan
(60.3)
9,930
(39.7)
6,535
Kazakstan
(47.6)
2,028
(52.4)
2,230
Kyrgyzstan
(37.7)
1,920
(62.3)
3.172
Tajikistan
(28.0)
986
(72.0)
2,537
Turkrnenistan
(29.9)
1.613
(70.1)
3.787
Georgia
(17.3)
1,216
(82.7)
5,805
Azerbaijan
(6.7)
221
(93.3)
3.084
Armenia
(20.4)
751
(79.6)
- 2,924
Lithuania
(48.0)
1,279
(52.0)
1.388
Latvia
(38.5)
602
(61.5)
963
Estonia
Note: Indigenous minorities include those ethnonational communities with autonomous territories in the Union republics of the
former USSR. In addition, in Moldova the Gagauz are included,
and in Ukraine the Crimean Tatars are included. The category
"Neighbors" includes the members of the titular nations of the
Union republics whose borders arc adjacent to the republic in
Russia
Ukraine
Belarus
Moldova
indigenous Minorities Neighbors
(24.9)
6,765
(63.6)
17,283
(9.1)
1,282
(0.3)
47
(31.9)
716
(39.0)
600
(10.0)
153
(36.5)
2,067
(7.3)
412
1,123 (113)
(34.3)
695
(66.8)
1,282
(41.7)
411
(46.2)
745
(16.1)
260
(15.3)
186
(32.1)
391
(39.0)
86
(43.4)
325
(12.3)
158
(80.9)
11.356
(59.7)
1.342
(36.5)
562
(29.2)
1,653
(62.7)
6,228
(45.2)
917
(20.2)
388
(33.9)
334
(21.1)
341
(32.3)
392
(23.3)
52
(45.9)
344
(70.8)
906
(78.8)
475
Source: Goskomstat SSSR,Ilogi Vsesoiuznoi PempisiNaselenila 1989 Goda, Volume 7, parts 1 and 2. Minneapolis: East
View Publications, 1993.
question.
groups. Under these conditions, in-migrating "for-
Asian republics, demographic indigenization rather
eigners" tend to be blamed. Because Russians and
other European groups occupy the higher status posi-
than greater demographic Russification has been the
trend for most of the postwar period.
Social Mobility and Relative Deprivation
tions in Central Asia's urban/industrial sectors, this
tendency is not unjustified. These socioeconomic con-
Ethnoterritorial conflict tends to be more violent in
ditions provided the catalyst for sporadic antiforeigner
resulted in equally dramatic increases in aspirations.
These aspirations were not met due to economic stag-
' Byron Weiner (1978) found these same conditions underlying the
places where indigenous access to upward mobility is
blocked by socially mobilized outsiders, creating a
condition of "aspirational deprivation" (that is, where
a group's rising aspirations go unfulfilled) (Gurr
1970). This is particularly apparent in Central Asia,
where dramatic increases in the levels of indigenous
educational attainment during the 1970s and 1980s
g-
nation and more recently economic depression in the
region, resulting in rising unemployment, especially
among the young educated members of the indigenous
violence in Central Asia, often conducted by unemployed educated indigenous youths against a vulnerable population that was depicted as receiving
preferential access to scarce economic goods such as
housing, jobs, and food (for example, Meskhetian
4
Turks in Uzbekistan, Armenians in Dushanke).
rise of indigenous nativism among India's so-called sons of the
soil. Nativism is defined by Weiner as "intense opposition to
minorities because of their foreign origin."
64
�C00123268
Percent
Table 2
Ethnodemographic Trends, 1959-89
Titular Nation in the Total Population
Titular Nation in the Homeland
Republic
Russia
Ukraine
Belarus
Moldova
Uzbekistan
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Georgia
Azerbaijan
Armenia
Lithuania
Latvia
Estonia
Source: Robert Kaiser, The
4.1 and 4.3.
Percentage
Percentage
Point Change
Point Change
1959
1989
1959
1989
81.5
-1.8
83.3
82.6
-3.2
85.8
72.7
-4.1
76.8
84.7
-1.6
86.3
77.9
-3.2
-3.7
81.1
82.5
78.8
65.4
64.5
-0.9
85.2
83.4
-1.8
71.4
9.3
62.1
0.9
83.8
84.7
9.7
39.7
3.1
30.0
80.3
77.2
11.9
1.8
40.5
52.4
86.4
88.2
9.2
62.3
53.1
0.1
75.3
75.2
72.0
11.1
60.9
0.8
92.2
93.0
5.8
-1.5
64.3
70.1
96.6
95.1
84.8
85.7
0.9
67.5
82.7
15.2
5.3
93.3
11.0
88.0
66.7
55.7
79.6
0.3
95.3
2.8
79.3
92.5
92.7
95.1
2.4
62.0
52.0
-10.0
61.5
-13.1
74.6
3.5
93.8
90.3
Geography ofNationalism in Russia and the USSR (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, in press), tables
In Georgia a slightly different interethnic dynamic
regarding social mobility and relative deprivation
developed. The Georgians in Abkhazia, who view this
territory as part of their homeland, were angered by
the preferential treatment accorded Abkhazians as part
of the indigenization program. Abkhazians were only
evidence that socioeconomic development or modernization, and even the provision of indigenous privileges, did not solve the national problem.
Nearly all non-Russians have used the rhetoric of
internal colonialism. The least developed, such as the
17 percent of the population but, as the titular group in
Tajiks, charge that the USSR did not live up to its
Abkhazia, had a much higher percent of slots in
promise of interethnic and interregional equalization.
higher education, high status jobs, and political repre-
The most developed; such as the Estonians, charge
sentation reserved for them. In Nagorno-Karabakh the
demographic shift toward Azeris was coupled with
Azeri challenges to Armenian privileges in the region.
In both cases the Georgian and Azeri attempts to
remove or reduce Abkhazian and Armenian privileges
resulted in civil warfare, as Abkhazians and Armenians in Nagoma-Karabakh sought to secede.
that they would be even more developed if they had
their independence. This feeling of relative deprivation was a potent catalyst for rising territorial nationalism that ironically was perhaps most influential in the
most developed republics because the message of
external exploitation and domination interacted with
the trend toward demographic dilution among nations
It is also true, however, that the most socially mobilized titular nations, that is, the Estonians, Latvians,
Georgians, and Armenians-are also among the most
with a highly developed national consciousness and a
sense of homeland.
nationalistic. The Soviet case provides convincing
65
�C00123268
Reaction by Members of Nontitular Groups to
Table 3
Rising Territorial Nationalism
Population Born in the Republic of
Current Residence, 1989
Acceptance and Accommodation
A certain segment of the nontitular population that
was ethnically marginal was undergoing process of
acculturation and assimilation either with the titular
nation or with the local Russian population. For the
most part, these were nontitular people who had lived
outside their homelands for several generations and
whose ancestors had moved from their homeland
before nationalization processes had begun (Kaiser
1994). Of this acculturating/assimilating segment of
the nontitular population, those who are becoming
acculturated to the indigenous nation will accept, and
even promote, the new ethnic reality if they are
accepted by the titular nation. On the other hand, those
undergoing a process of Russification may respond as
the local Russian population does. Conversely, the
process of Russification itself may be reversed. For
example, children with Russian and Ukrainian parents
who claimed to be Russians in the past may prefer to
identify themselves as Ukrainians, particularly in
states where titular nationalism is directed against the
local Russians (for instance, in Latvia and Estonia).
Percent
Republic
Titular
Russians
NonRussians
Ukraine
Belarus
Moldova
Uzbekistan
Kazakhstan
96.4
97.6
98.1
98.2
95.1
98.5
98.5
98.9
98.8
96.7
56.7
67.5
42.2
52.0
55.0
66.6
59.1
48.5
66.9
72.1
82.4
63.5
76.4
87.3
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
79.9
52.0
Turkmenistan
89.1
48.3
Georgia
87.9
65.5
Azerbaijan
82.9
26.4
78.4
Armenia
66.0
49.7
97.8
Lithuania
35.9
54.7
96.9
Latvia
23.6
42.9
95.6
Estonia
In successor states that have experienced violent conflict:
Abkhazlans
Ossetians
98.3
97.1
Georgia
Armenians
Azerbaijan
Beyond this ethnically marginal population, there is
also a segment of the nontitular population that has
lived in the same republic and locality for generations
and has developed a strong sense of homeland (see
table 3). Several indicators of acceptance have
become apparent, particularly for the Russians living
in the non-Russian successor states. For example, a
relatively high percentage of Russians favored the
independence of the republics they lived in and voted
for independence-oriented parties, and a relatively
high percentage of Russians also identified Estonia as
their homeland (Drobizheva 1991). Surveys of Russian interethnic attitudes tended to show a willingness
to remain in the newly independent states, at least
immediately after independence. It may appear
counter-intuitive, but the Russian reaction to the new
94.0
Azeris
Armenia
91.2
Gagauz
Ukrainians
Moldova
96.0
67.0
Uzbeks
Kyrgyzstan
93.8
Source: Goskomstat SSSR, Itogi Vsesoiuznoi PerepisiNaseleniia
1989 Goda, Volume 12, (Minneapolis: East View Publications,
1993).
However, acceptance and accommodation are also
dependent on the behavior of the titular nationalists. In
the case of Estonia, nationalists seeking to reduce the
Russian presence have alienated Russians who had
behaved as Estonian patriots. A similar situation
occurred in Latvia. Under these conditions, Russians
ethno-political realities in the successor states appears
more accommodative than resistant thus far; this may
are unlikely to remain accommodative of titular
nationalism. Russian opposition is on the rise in the
reflect the limited degree of Russian national con-
Baltic states, as well as in Kazakstan-two regions
sciousness and nationalism. The republics where Rus-
sians comprised the highest proportion of nontitular
population are those without violent ethnic conflict.
where Russian acceptance and accommodations were
dominant through 1992.
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Emigration
Nontitular outmigration occurs in regions of violent
ethnic conflict such as the Transcaucasus and Central
Asia, and among nontitular populations without a
strong sense of homeland. The first wave of nontitular
emigration was primarily of those nonindigenes who
had recently immigrated to the region. In the past two
years, an increasing number of those nontitular members with deeper roots in the regions are leaving, particularly in areas of interethnic violence. This latter
migration is referred to as refugee migration, and it
had exceeded 3 million by early fall 1993. I will limit
my remarks here because Dr. Schwartz will be providing the details of this aspect of ethnic conflict in the
former USSR later.
Resistance
Separatism. This reaction is more likely in areas of
nontitular concentration where the local population
has developed a strong sense of homeland that is
directly threatened by the territorial nationalism of the
titular nation. The nontitular group or indigenous
minority seeks to gain greater territorial autonomy as
a way to minimize the impact of titular nation's
nationalism. This nontitular reaction in turn has typically provoked a stronger counteraction on the part of
the titular nation, leading to'conflict escalation. Of
- Russia narrowly averted conflict over Chechnya's
declaration of independence in 1991; the North Caucasus is the most likely region in Russia to become
the scene of conflict escalation in the future. 5
- The Tatars,.Bashkirs, Yakuts, Tuvins, and Buryatsmore highly nationalized communities in Russiahave pressed for greater independence in a more
confederal Russia. If they are unhappy with the new
constitution being worked out, the potential exists
for rising national separatism.6 Of course, this will,
and indeed already has, provoked rising Russian territorial nationalism in the republic.
" Russians in Narva and Sillamae declared territorial
autonomy but backed down when the Estonian
Supreme Court declared these referendums illegal.
- Russians in Crimea have declared their autonomy
and their intent to secede from Ukraine. This has
been the site of rising interethnic tensions among
Russians, Ukrainians, and Crimean Tatars returning
from exile in Central Asia.
- Russian nationalist parties in northern Kazakstan
have also proclaimed their goal of secession from
Kazakstan and merger with Russia, but thus far this
course, early examples of this occurred in Transcauca-
objective is not shared by a majority of Russians in
sia (Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia), and in Moldova (Trans-Dinestria and among the
Gagauz).
the region. This is in part because Kazakh territorial
nationalism has been muted in the republic by moderate Kazakh political elites at least through 1992. It
may also be true that the demographic status of two
Most autonomous units of the Soviet federation
declared their sovereignty immediately following the
declarations of sovereignty by the Union republics in
1990. But not all are equally separatist. Ethnic and
regional variations again depend on the degree of
national consciousness on the part of the indigenous
minority, the history of majority-minority relations in
the region, and the degree to which the territorial
nationalism of the majority group is perceived as a
threat to the future viability of the indigenous minority:
relatively equal communities has tended to dampen
titular nationalism.
Political Opposition. Nontitular groups have also
attempted to organize opposition political parties and/
or movements. For example, the Russian "international fronts" in the Baltic republics developed in
opposition to the rise of titular "national front" movements. Nontitular groups and indigenous minorities
have also boycotted referendums and elections. This
s Conflict finally did erupt in December 1994.
* The new Russian Constitution did represent a loss of autonomy
for the non-Russian imdigenous minorities.
. Sovereignty declarations resulting in conflict escala-
tion include: Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, the Trans-Dniestrian Republic, and the
Gagauz Republic in Moldova.
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type of resistance has typically not provoked the same
level of titular reaction that territorial autonomy/independence movements have.
Conclusion
There are several important lessons that have been
learned in the emergent territorial nationalism found
in the former Soviet Union.
Conflict escalation to violent confrontation is an interactive process. It has normally started with territorial
nationalism of the titular nation, whose members
attempt to establish their hegemony in their homeland.7 This in turn means that the rights and privileges
of nontitular peoples living in the emergent nationalistic state are seriously eroded or restricted, resulting in
a reactive nationalism on the part of such nontitular
nations. Indigenous minorities have tended to react by
declaring their sovereignty over the geographic area
perceived as their homeland, and this has frequently
led to a strong reaction on the part of such titular
nation. This pattern of conflict escalation revolving
around territorial control is found in the ArmenianAzeri dispute, in Georgia, in the North Caucasus, in
Ukraine (especially Crimea), and in Moldova.
In areas where the nontitular groups have not developed a strong sense of homeland with their local
places of residence, resistance in the form of political
opposition-as in the case of the Russians in the Baltic republics. Alternatively, emigration or even acceptance if the nontitular group has come to identify with
the titular nation and its homeland are also reactions
found among certain segments of the nontitular population. Conflict escalation to violent confrontation is
not inevitable. Nontitular emigration is found among
nonindigenous groups in Transcaucasia and Central
Asia. Acceptance is found most often among nontitular groups that are ethnically similar to the titular
nation and whose members have lived outside their
ancentral homeland for generations.
As a final comment, several analysts of ethnoterritorial conflict in the former USSR have argued that it
was the federal structure, based as it was on ethnic
homelands, that was the cause of the disintegration in
the USSR and the cause of interethnic conflict today.
They also state that the successor states are ethnically
mixed and that ethnonational identity and territorial
identity must be separated to avoid the kind of ethnoterritorial cleansing that has occurred in Yugoslavia
and in Transcaucasia. As laudable as this sentiment
may be, it does not accord with the reality of-territorial
nationalism in the region. National identity and territorial identity have been intimately interrelated, and a
rising sense of national consciousness has coincided
with a rising sense of exclusiveness toward the region
identified as the national homeland. Attempts to
decouple this geographic relationship between nation
and homeland will fail and are likely to cause heightened interethnic tensions and conflicts in the region. A
more informed approach to the problem of territorial
nationalism should begin with an acknowledgement
of the importance of homeland in the perceptions of
nationalists and attempt to regulate interethnic tensions and conflicts that are likely to emerge as a consequence of these perceptions before these conflicts
escalate to violent confrontation.
See Hennayake (1992), who recently elaborated a theory of
"interactive ethnonationalism."
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References
Breuilly, John. Nationalism and the State. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982.
Drobizheva, Leokadia. "Etnicheskoye samosoznaniye Russkikh v soremennykh usloviyakh:
ideologiya i praktika," Sovetskaya etnografiya (#1):
3-13, 1991.
Gellner, Ernest. Nations and Nationalism.
Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1983.
Kolossov, Vladimir. Ethno-Territorial Conflicts and
Boundaries in the Former Soviet Union. Durham, UK:
University of Durham International Boundaries
Research Unit (IBRU) Press (Territory Briefing 2),
1992.
Parming, Tonu. "Population Processes and the Naitonality Issue in the Soviet Baltic," Soviet Studies 32,
1980, pp. 398-414.
RUKH. RUKH Program and Charter.Ellicott City,
Hayden, Robert. "Constitutional Nationalism in the
Formerly Yugoslav Republics," Slavic Review 51 (4),
1992, pp. 654-673.
MD: Smoloskyp, 1989.
Hennayake, Shantha. "Interactive Ethnonationalism:
Silver, Brian. "The Ethnic and Language Dimensions
in Russian and Soviet Censuses," In Ralph Clem, ed.,
Research Guide to the Russian and Soviet Censuses,
An Alternative Explanation of Minority Ethnonationalism," Political Geography 11 (6), 1992. pp. 526-
pp. 70-97. Ithaca and London: Cornell University
Press, 1986.
549.
Smooha, Sammy, and Theodor Hanf. "The diverse
Kaiser, Robert. The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1994.
modes of conflict-regulation in deeply divided societies." In Anthony Smith, ed., Ethnicity and Nationalism, pp. 26-47. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992.
Kaiser, Robert. "Nationalism: The Challenge to Soviet
Federalism." In Michael Bradshaw, ed., The Soviet
Union: A New Regional Geography?, pp. 39-65. London: Belhaven Press, 1991.
Weiner, Myron. Sons of the Soil: Migration and Ethnic Conflict in India. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978.
Williams, Colin. "The Question of National Congruence." In R. J. Johnston and Peter Taylor, eds., A
World in Crisis? Geographic Perspectives (2nd edition). Oxford, UK; Basil Blackwell, 1989.
Kaiser, Robert. "National Territoriality in Multinational Multihomeland States: A Comparative Study of
the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia."
New York: Columbia University (unpublished PhD
dissertation), 1988.
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Summary of Discussion
Discussant: Ronald Wixman
I would like to discuss the region from a slightly different perspective. I think it is a grave error to view
the former Soviet Union as a unitary state. It never
was. It might be useful, instead, to view the Soviet
Union as a colonial empire that is now, as other colonial empires have, going through the various stages of
decolonization. The former Soviet Union is the Russian empire, and the Russian empire is falling apart.
The situation is not unique, as evidenced by the situation of the Germans in Eastern Europe after World
War I. After Germany lost its holdings and the AustroHungarian Empire fell apart, Germans were left in
such places as Moravia, Slilesia, and the Banat. In
fact, in the Banat, there were more Germans than
Romanians or Serbs. In many areas, they were in the
majority. But just as the Russians did in the outlying
republics, the Germans went from having majority
status to minority status.
The process of nativization of the republics has gone
through phases. The initial stage was not to produce a
Ukrainian Ukraine or an Uzbek Uzbekistan or an
Estonian Estonia. Instead, the Russians co-opted the
elites in the same way that the British co-opted the
Rajas of India. The next generation is ambivalent, and
after that a shift occurs in which many of these elites
produced by the state, and for the state, turn on it. The
Soviet Union went through this process of decolonization, when the native elite turned away from serving
Moscow and decided to serve their own peoples'
interests. This is what happened throughout Eastern
Europe after World War I, when the co-opted elite
turned against Austria, Hungary, and the Ottomans.
What does all this mean? We are seeing the newly created republics in borders that did not exist before. The
borders of the Soviet republics were constructed specifically by the central government. Uzbekistan did
not create its borders, Armenia did not create its, and
baijanis and the Azeri language was not created in
Azerbaijan. It also came from Moscow. So, to speak
of a federal structure is difficult. In the decolonization
policy, the people of the former republics are saying,
"our people, our language, and our culture are not
dominant." As in all other colonial areas, what happens to those people who are not members of this
majority? Should the leftover colonials learn the
national language? Should the French in Algeria have
learned Arabic? They did not have to become Muslim,
but should they have sworn allegiance to Algeria
rather than to France? Who comes to the United States
and keeps their allegiance to their old country and
cannot speak English?
The Russians are dealing with the issues of what they
can and cannot keep and of what belongs and does not
belong to the state. For example, Moscow claims the
Black Sea Fleet because the government built it.
Ukrainians say the fleet does not belong to Moscow
because they believe they built it as much as the govemient did. When Russians say that the Crimea is
Russian, Ukrainians say, "only because Moscow
never let Ukrainians move there."
The West needs to see the former Soviet republics not
only in the context of people finding a new nationalism but also in that of the people directing anger
against the colonial state for having forbidden them
their rights in their own territory.
Similarly, the minorities in these republics have found
themselves in the same position that minorities have
found themselves in all other newly independent
former colonial states. The West has been viewing
East Europeans and the former Soviet peoples in a different light than it has viewed everyone else in the
world, and I think we should recognize this and
change the view. The former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia have been suffering from a majority problem
for many years, not so much a minority problem.
you can be sure neither the Abkhaz nor the Georgians
created Abkhazia. These were created in Moscow, by
Moscow, and for Moscow. The policy toward Azer-
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QUESTION: Dr. Wixman, if we accept your analogy
The other thing we are seeing in Russia is not only the
non-Russians asking for or demanding as much independence or autonomy as they can get but also Rus-
that the disintegration of the Soviet Union can be
compared with the disintegrations of previous
sians declaring their independence as republics. So a
federation of maybe 88 republics may exist when
empires, can we also look at the Russian federation
now as an empire? Is there a possibility of the Russian
federation also disintegrating like the Soviet Union?
everything is finished. Russian localism is, in part, a
response and a reaction against minority nationalism,
particularly among the nationally conscious groups
like the Tatars, but it also may reflect a limited level of
Russian nationalism itself that would be more centripetal in its orientation.
General Discussion
DR. WIXMAN: For the most part, no. There are very
few regions of the Russian federation within which
the Russians are not the vast majority. Siberia and the
Far East is now-whatever it was before-extremely
Russian in makeup.
The Russian Federation is basically Russia. The biggest threat to Russia today in terms of its internal territorial integrity is not going to come from minorities. If
I had to guess where a problem might arise, and I was
just there for the sixth time in .10 years, it is in the
Russian Far East. I think that the Russians are going to
have more problems dealing with Russian territories
that perceive themselves as different and that resent
Muscovite rule than from the minorities themselves.
There is a strong movement in the Far East for that.
DR. KAISER: I agree with parts of what Dr. Wixman
has said. As I indicated in my presentation, a sense of
national consciousness is something that typically precedes the drive for independence, and it is really
absent for the most part in a lot of these smaller nonRussian groups to the east. One region that Dr. Wixman didn't mention, which I think is critically important, is the North Caucasus. It is an area without a
large Russian population. Russians are leaving that
area too, setting up the conditions through which a rising call for independence may occur.
The Chechen republic, first of all, declared its independence from the Chechen Ingush ASSR and
declared its independence from Russia. It is the only
one that has actually declared its outright independence. At the same time, a lot of the North Caucasian
peoples have joined together in a confederation. They
are still a part of Russia but almost once removed in
that sense.
QUESTION: Of the 22 republics within the current
Russian federation, one has seceded, several others
have threatened to secede, and some are developing
their own economic policies-in other words, economically seceding. Is the center giving power to the
regions or are the regions taking power from the center? In the latter case, is it really a camouflage confederation?
DR. KAISER: This looks more to me like localism
and regionalism than it does territorial nationalism. It
is similar to the previous disintegrative process, but it
does not appear as though an impetus for outright
independence exists to the same degree that it did at
the level of the Union republics. I should add a caveat
here: not all Union republics were equally secessionist, and the Central Asian republics were not necessarily all that proindependence when this process first
began. It was the Baltic states that were pushing this
forward, and a kind of diffusion occurred from there.
Some of the republics even accepted independence as
a fait accompli after August 1991.
In short, all the groups do not have to be nationalistic,
but the wave of territorial nationalism that is needed to
get the ball rolling toward the ultimate point of disintegration currently does not appear to exist within the
Russian Federation.
DR. WIXMAN: The real issue within the Russian
state-with the few exceptions of some of the nationals on the periphery who are really inconsequential to
71
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Russia anyway-is a question of decentralization versus centralization, more than of ethnicity.
QUESTION: To what extent will patterns of trade and
commerce shift the regional identification of the Russians who live in the Far East from considering them-
selves to be Russians to considering themselves a part
of the Pacific Rim or the Northeast Asian community?
Will such patterns accelerate the trends that you are
speaking of in terms of localization?
people who were sent there after 1917. This is the
group-of people in the Russian empire who, more than
anyone else, has had an antagonistic attitude toward
Moscow for decades. They are located on the Pacific,
so a strong movement exists toward stronger ties to
Korea, Japan, the United States, and Canada.
QUESTION: Would you comment on the relation
between ethnicity and environment?
DR. KAISER: At the beginning of the independence
movements, a lot of national fronts-particularly in
a
DR. KAISER: Dr. Wixman seems to see more of
the Baltic states and in Belarus-began as environamong the
potential for separatism in the Far East
mental movements. Environmentalism and nationalRussians themselves than I do. On the ethnic map of
ism-especially national independence-were very
Russia, the Far East is overwhelmingly Russian and
closely tied, not only in the Baltic states but also in
has been since about 1700. Even so, the region is
many of the European republics.
live
sparsely populated; only about 25 million people
a redirection or reorientaeast of the Urals.. I suppose
This should not be surprising because people considtion of the population could occur, because there is a
ered their soil to be sacred-as the only place where
great deal of localism there. Two different regional
their nation could survive and prosper-and they
restructuring processes have been at work, however.
became angry when it was polluted by forces outside
and
First, the Russians themselves are reorganizing
their control. Indeed, a lot of the region's polluting
directing their attention to the Pacific Rim and thinkindustries were moved in at the behest of Moscow.
second, the
ing more in local and economic terms;
came Russians, so the ethnic feature
non-Russian population is banding together in groups_ Along with them
was added on top of the environmental one.
political clout. Neither of
and organizing to try to gain
these restructuring processes is on the same level as an
independence, environmentalism has often
independence movement and certainly not on that of a Since
taken a back seat to nationalism and independence.
movement based on ethnonationalism. Instead, local
in Estonia who had
Russian areas are demanding more autonomy within a For example, nationalists
lamented the fact that Russians had set up an oil shale
particularly seek
more decentralized Russia and
mining operation there now say they need to keep that
greater control oyer the economic wealth that flows
operation going so as not to rely on Russia for oil. The
their region. Because these Russians are not
through
same thing occurred in Lithuania with the Ignalina
sacrificing for the good of Mother Russia and all Rusnuclear plant. The Lithuanians have talked about addlevel of their
sians, one could probably question the
ing a third unit to that nuclear facility-even though
Russian national consciousness and their common
before independence it was a symbol of Soviet
of homeland, but this localism/regionalism is
sense
oppression and a symbol of the environmental degranot on the same order of magnitude as separatist
dation of the homeland. In Ukraine, there is even talk
nationalism.
about keeping Chornobyl' (Chernobyl') in operation
and maybe expanding it as well. In Armenia, a nuclear
DR. WIXMAN: I think the movement for autonomy
plant had been shut down by grassroots opposition
in the Russian Far East is greater than in even the eth-
nic regions. There is a strong anticentralist feeling.
There is no question that the population is Russian;
they are just as Russian as anyone else. But who
resides in the Russian Far East? The descendants of
the people who fled to the Far East to escape central
authority before the Soviets took over and of those
because it was on a geologic faultline and has been
damaged by earthquakes. Now the Armenians are
considering reopening it because they need local
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energy sources since the pipelines from Azerbaijan
and Georgia have been cut. Fnvironmentalism is on
the back burner and has been decoupled from nationalism in these kinds of economic decision making processes. Environmentalism was promoted when it was
useful to the nationalists and their struggle for independence, but it is now seen as competing with the
nations' efforts to be less dependent on external
resources--especially those supplied by Russia.
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Geographic Factors in Ethnic
pandemic in tropical Africa and the realm's pernicious
Conflict in Africa
and debilitating plagues and diseases. Such population
Harm J. de Blij
Landegger Distinguished Professor
growth, attended by doubling times as low as 18
years, fills natural ethnic buffer zones, places further
stress on already overexploited environments, and creates a growing urbanward flow.
of Geography
Georgetown University
Introduction
Over the past decade, no geographic realm has suffered as severely from ethnic conflict as Africa. Entire
countries have been devastated by years of ethnic
strife. Millions of Africans have become displaced
persons in their own countries or refugees in others.
Hundreds of thousands are imperiled by hunger and
starvation, and ruling regimes are in some instances
preventing food and medicine from reaching the dislocated.
This paper will focus on the geographic realm of
Africa, not the entire African continent. Geographically defined, this realm extends from the zone of
Islamic contact along the southern margins of the
Sahara to the Cape of Good Hope. It includes nearly
50 countries, an area of more than 8 million square
miles, and-as of midyear 1994-a population of
572 million.
Factors Aggravating Ethnic Divisiveness
The prevalence of ethnic conflict and dislocation in
Africa must be seen against a background of: (1) rapid
population growth, (2) a problem-ridden international
and internal boundary framework, (3) rising religious
fundamentalism, (4) persistent neocolonialism,
(5) historic animosities, and (6) stagnant or deteriorating economies-factors that serve to aggravate existing divisions.
In rural as well as in urban areas, Africa's high growth
rates contribute to the ethnic tensions and conflicts
that afflict the realm. As a world geographic realm,
Africa presently exhibits the highest rates of natural
population growth. This continues despite the AIDS
Sub-Saharan Africa's existing boundaries have contributed to, rather than mitigated, ethnic conflict in
Africa. The framework of the continent's international
political boundaries, as has been said ad infinitum, is a
troublesome legacy of the colonial period. This is
more true in some areas (such as the Horn) than in
others (the South), but overall, such boundaries still
divide people of common origins; elsewhere they
throw a girdle around peoples with adversarial histories. Many African states have sought to accommodate the latter by manipulating their internal borders.
Rising religious fundamentalism in Africa mirrors
what is happening all over the world today, from
Algeria to India to America. A number of African
countries lie astride religious transition zones, including Nigeria and Sudan, and religious fervor is contributing to ethnic strife in these countries.
Neocolonialism remains a factor in Sub-Saharan
Africa in various forms, ranging from outright inter-
ference in national affairs to economic intervention.
French forces have acted in support of governments in
countries plagued by ethnic strife; in effect, the French
involved themselves in ethnic conflicts-recently in
Burundi, earlier in Chad. US support for Zaire's
Mobutu has contributed to the continued comparative
stability of that vast country; it undoubtedly has
staved off-ethnic strife there, and it has played a useful
role-from the US viewpoint-in the war in neighboring Angola. Accusations of-collaboration with
"neocolonial" interests often stoke the fires of ethnic
conflict.
Sub-Saharan Africa's economies, in aggregate, are
alone in showing an overall decline over the past
decade. Declining living standards tend to exacerbate
ethnic rivalries; in comparatively wealthy Europe, the
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economic slowdown has also been attended by
increasing ethnic strife. Even during the expansion of
the 1980s, African economies lagged; with the world
economy slowed down, African economies deteriorate. Economic growth provides opportunities and
lessens frustrations. In Africa, the opposite situation
prevails.
This is not the place to recapitulate the historical
geography of black Africa, but its outlines-West
Africa's cultural flowering, that region's ancient
savanna states, the arrival and diffusion of Islam, the
European colonial intervention, the imposition of the
boundary framework, contrasting colonial policies
and practices, and the rise of African nationalismmust be kept in mind, for they are etched on cultural
landscapes, and they still influence interethnic relations today.
cause of conflict often is religious, as is the case in
Sudan today and has been in Chad. This should not
imply that religion is the sole incentive, but it does
dominate here. In the case of Sudan, fear of Khartoum's imposition of sharia criminal law upon Christian and animist southerners is a catalyst for conflict.
A second form of conflict may be designated as tribal
and is exemplified by what is happening today in
Liberia. With a population well under 3 million,
Liberia incorporates more than a dozen major ethnic
groups, including the Kpelle (about 20 percent of the
population), Bassa (14 percent), Grebo (9 percent),
Gio (8 percent), Kru (7 percent), and Mano (7 percent). In 1990 the country collapsed into civil war, in
which tribal loyalties were paramount. Tens of thousands were killed, and nearly 1 million refugees
streamed across Liberia's borders.
No African region has been immune from costly ethnic conflict. In West Africa, the most destructive conflict since the Biafra War has ravaged Liberia. In
A third kind of ethnic conflict has strategicorigins: it
may have started as a tribal struggle but has worsened
by external interests. In early 1995, one of these conflicts had recently abated: the war between Popular
Equatorial Africa, southern Chad and the southern
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and
Sudan have been engulfed by war. In the Horn, Somalia has become synonymous with ethnic strife, and
Ethiopia and Eritrea witnessed years of tribal fighting.
In East Africa, Uganda has been a caldron of ethnic
conflict, and today Rwanda and Burundi continue to
suffer. And in southern Africa an uncertain truce has
quieted decades of war in Angola, while ethnic strife
is at least temporarily quiescent in South Africa.
This incomplete summary of current and recent ethnic
conflict notwithstanding, some African countries have
achieved ethnic accommodation against great odds.
Africa is divided into more than 1,000 ethnolinguistic
domains, creating cultural mosaics that make the
former Yugoslavia look uncomplicated by compari-
son. Political geographers often point to India as miracle of multicultural stability, but Nigeria's continuity
may be a greater achievement still. Senegal, Tanzania,
Zambia, Botswana, and Namibia are other success
stories.
A Typology of Ethnic Conflict in Africa
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA) forces in Angola. A fourth form of conflict
may be categorized as reformist. This has its origins in
the political transformation of a state. For example, in
Kenya during the runup to independence, the Mau
-Mau rebellion was essentially a Kikuyu movement
aimed not only against whites but also against "collaborators." In fact, many more Africans than Europeans
lost their lives during that period, and animosities
between Kikuyu and non-Kikuyu endured after independence. The first clashes in Liberia involved the
ouster of the Americo-Liberian elite by the so-called
aborigines, as the indigenous peoples of Liberia were
called. In Zimbabwe, Mashona/Matabele conflict
arose in similar context.
In Africa today, the geographic dimension of ethnic
conflict is this: religious strife affects principally the
northern cultural transition zone; reformist conflict
prevails in the south; and tribal war not directly
related to external influences afflicts the central zone,
most severely in Rwanda and Liberia. Persistent strategic conflict has devastated Angola and, while quiescent at present, still looms in Mozambique.
Ethnic conflict in Africa has variable roots, suggesting
a typology that may help assess it. Along the Islamic/
non-Islamic transition zone in the north, the ultimate
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The Environment as a Factor
Although news media have paid comparatively little
attention to it, searing, decadelong drought, the worst
in living memory, has prevailed over interior southern
Africa, affecting lives and economies from Malawi and
Zambia to South Africa (Tanzania and southern Zaire
also were affected). This drought, which came at a time
when nearly I million refugees from Mozambique
crossed into Malawi and when Angola was consumed
by a civil war; contributed to food shortages and political unrest in Zambia; one is tempted to speculate that,
without it, Kenneth Kaunda still would be President.
Perhaps more important, the drought has done much
damage in Zimbabwe, where small farmers on the African-owned lands suffered visibly while white owners of
large estates fared better: As economic conditions worsened and the Mugabe government's popularity plummeted, the dormant land issue was revived-in the form
of the 1992 Land Acquisition Bill. Zimbabwe's commerIn Ethiopia, several successive years of drought turned cial farmers, who number almost 4,500 (nearly all
white) still own 30 percent of all of Zimbabwe. They
out to be a more formidable adversary to the Marxist
have sustained the agricultural economy, producing
regime in Addis Ababa than any insurrection waswhen the crops failed and people streamed off the land, about 80 percent of the country's cash crops. The Zimbabwean Government wants to force the sale of half the
the insurgency became unstoppable. Now, with Eritrea
an independent state, Ethiopia is landlocked-its politi- whites' landfor the purpose of resettling black farmer
by Zimbacal future farfrom certain. In addition, Eritrean ethnic families. Although the program is opposed
bwe's donors and lenders, including Britain and the
unity is a myth; for example, the Afar (who extend into
IMF it is likely to proceed. All this is happening at a
Djibouti and whose domain centers on the port of
time when multiparty democracy is being forced on a
Assab) have a claim to nationhood that may well
government that controls 147 of the 150 seats in the
reemerge in the future. Environmental conditions also
parliament. The droughtforces the land issue; the land
contributed to the downfall of the Barre regime in
issue will cause ethnic discord in a country long known
south led to
Somalia. Crop failures andfamines in the
ofpeople and livestock across traditional for its successful transition.
the movement
clan-territorial boundaries, and in the ensuing clashes
In a realm where most of the population continues to
lay the origins of the weak government's collapse. The
live on and depend directly on the land, environmental
current conflict in Somalia, it should be noted, however
swings soon lead to human dislocation, and dislocation
is not an "ethnic" conflict in the terms of this discustranslates into conflict-often ethnic conflict. As the
or reformist.
sion; it is not religious, tribal, strategic,
growing rifts in the European Union remind us, interculThe Somali nation's ethnic and religious uniformity
does not extend to territorial unity: six major clans and tural harmony is easiest to generate when economic
times are good. When livelihoods are threatened, the
hundreds of subclans occupy bounded and inviolable
spaces not only in Somalia but also in eastern Ethiopia, human reaction is to blame outsiders-that is, nonetheastern Kenya, and southern Djibouti. Significantly, the nics, whether they be North African or Turkish immigrants or local minorities. In Europe, the problem is
north, which suffered least from drought and resultant
recession; in Africa, it is unpredictable, fluctuating envidislocation, has been virtually untouched by the probronments.
lems of the south.
It is drought that has been, and continues to be,
Africa's greatest and most consequential environmental problem. The pulsations of the Sahara are now better understood than they were during the 1970s, when
the word "sahel" became synonymous with environmental disaster. Not only did that desertification phase
claim as many as a halfmillion human (and countless
animal) lives but 'it also caused ethnic strife in countries to the south. The geographer Thomas Bassett
documented the results when cattle herders from the
desiccated savannas took their livestock into farmlands in the Cote d'Ivoire, where crops were trampled
and fighting broke out. Soon, the northerners were
blaming the (then) Abidjan-based government for not
supporting them effectively during the crisis, and
North-South relations-always difficult in coastal
West African countries-worsened.
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Current Ethnic Conflicts
In Africa it often is difficult to distinguish ethnic conflict of the kind being discussed here from local or
temporary strife resulting from political processes.
The worldwide democratization movement is also
affecting African countries, and frequently this has
ethnic overtones because one-party rule tends to mean
one-culture dominance and because military rule often
(although not always) means the same. When multiparty politics reached Togo, there were deathly riots
that might have led to ongoing ethnic strife, but that
did not follow. In Ghana, the continued rule of strongman Jerry Rawlings is greased by comparatively
strong economic growth, but ethnic issues are forcibly
submerged. In Chad, seemingly always on the verge
of civil war, successive coup attempts and French mil-
itary involvement punctuate'the apparently hopeless
struggle toward representative government. Indeed, in
1994, full-scale ethnic conflict was in progress in several locations.
Liberia
ECOMOG, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) peacekeeping force, has suppressed but not eliminated the carnage. What began as
the ouster of the Americo-Liberian regime in Mon-
rovia (and thus as a reformist conflict) evolved into an
ethnic struggle involving supporters of the strongman,
President Samuel Doe, and two rebels, Taylor and
Johnson. Now a tribal conflict, the struggle has no end
in sight, and the survival of Liberia as an entity is in
doubt.
Sudan
The latest phase of four decades of regional conflict in
the Sudan is more than 10 years old. It is classic religious-ethnic struggle on the northern perimeter of
black Africa, but it is not sirnply a contest between
north and south. Sudan has a complex ethnolinguistic
mosaic. The northern provinces contain about 60 percent of the total population, and, while the north is
propaganda targets of the (south based) Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). In the years leading up to and following the coup that ousted Nimieri,
conflict among non-Arab Northern ethnic groups,
notably the Nuba and the Beni Amer in Red Sea Province, continued even as the larger war intensified.
The SPLM's military wing, the Sudan People's Liberation Army, began its war against "the North" in 1983,
in opposition to the Nimeiri government, which in that
year announced the imposition of the sharialaw over
all of Sudan. The North-South war has swept back and
forth across the countryside, devastating infrastructure
and livelihoods and seemingly incapable of resolution.
In the southern provinces, too, joint opposition to
Khartoum's rule was not enough to submerge ethnic
conflicts. The schism between the Dinka-dominated
faction, led by John Garang, and the mainly Nuer faction, a breakaway group led by Riek Mashar, has produced a three-way struggle. (The Dinka are from the
west bank of the Nile, the Nuer, from the east, on the
Ethiopian border). In mid-1992, a further power struggle produced still another split in the southern ranks.
In June 1992, the warring parties met but without a
settlement. In 1994, the North appeared poised to
overcome the divided Southern forces, and promises
of freedom of belief and religious observance, made
by the government in 1992 in Abuja during negotiations under Nigerian auspices, were no longer heard.
The regime that took power in 1989 is intransigent
and virulently anti-Christian and anti-Western; in the
wake of the World Trade Center bombing, when the
United States declared Sudan a "terrorist state," it
expressed fears it shared with the southerners about to
come under Khartoum's shariaheel. The human cost
of the Sudan conflict is staggering: in 1994 there were
an estimated 7 million malnourished and 3 million
starvation-threatened refugees in Sudan. Both the
Khartoum regime and the southern factions have
impeded the flow of relief to these refugees on the
grounds that such aid has "strategic" value.
overwhelmingly Muslim, only about two-thirds of the
northerners speak Arabic as their native language. The
Muslim but non-Arab northerners-including the Fur
and Zaghawa in Darfur, the Nuba in South Kordofan,
the Nubians of the far north, and others-have been
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Djibouti and Somalia
Although Djibouti and Somalia lie on the African continent, they are not, by regional definition, African
states. The situation in Somalia has been summarized.
In Djibouti, two dominant ethnic groups, the Afars (or
Danakil) and the Issas, have a history of conflict. The
Issas, who constitute about one-third of the total population of about 500,000, inhabit the southern third ofthe country. They spill over into Somalia (where they
number about 60,000) and Ethiopia (some 250,000).
In Djibouti, they constitute the majority. The Afars
inhabit the northern two-thirds of Djibouti; they form
about one-fifth of the total population. Their domain
extends into Eritrea as well as Ethiopia, where they
number some 600,000. Five other main ethnic groups
make up the rest of the population.
Power in Djibouti has resided with the Issas, who
dominate the armed forces. In 1991, a guerilla movement arose in Afar territory, culminating in December
in the notorious Arhiba massacre in Djibouti City,
when government troops killed numerous Afars.
Although efforts were made (with French involvement) to defuse the situation, things remained violent
and tense in 1993. Some observers suggest that the
independence of Eritrea will impel a reorganized Ethiopia to involve itself in Djibouti's affairs.
Rwanda and Burundi
This country lies between countries in which some ofAfrica's bloodiest ethnic conflict has taken place,
Uganda and Burundi. In Uganda, the Baganda were at
the center of the strife; in Rwanda and Burundi, the
long-term issue is between the Tutsi (Watusi) and the
Hutu. During four months in 1972, more than 100,000
Hutus were killed by the minority Tutsi in Burundi.
Ethnic strife in Octbber 1993 and April 1994 added
more than 600,000 to the death toll.
Historically, the Tutsi were smaller in number, but
stronger in terms of power, than were the Hutu. The
Tutsi, organized into kingdoms, acquired land and
subjugated the Hutu. Social standing more than tribal
origin distinguished Hutu from Tutsi. Repression,
rebellion, and chaos followed independence, with the
episode and its excesses in Uganda, but its costs were
nevertheless enormous.
The latest phase began in late 1990, when a contingent
of Tutsi refugees in exile in Uganda invaded northern
Rwanda. The (Hutu) Habyarimana government
responded not only by sending a defending army but
also by arresting and executing Tutsis in the country.
The Tutsi force, under the banner of the Rwanda Patriotic Front, survived an early setback and moved
toward the capital, Kigali. According to correspondents on the scene, external forces also played a role
in the conflict. The French helped the Kigali government, and there were reports of Ugandan support for
the rebels. French support was based, reportedly, on
the Francophone nature of Rwanda's upper crust; the
Tutsi had been "anglicized" in Uganda, and there were
French fears of Francophone loss in the event of Tutsi
success.
All this became moot in April 1994 following the
death of Rwanda's President in a suspicious plane
crash at Kigali Airport. Hutu militias embarked on an
orgy of (apparently planned and premeditated) murder
of Tutsis and "moderate" or "collaborationist" Hutus.
The ensuing refugee flow carried as many as 2 million
Rwandans into Zaire and Tanzania; as many as
600,000 were killed. In March 1995, Tutsi in Burundi
attacked Hutu, and the cycle of violence returned to
this country. No end to this tribal conflict is in sight.
Angola
The disastrous and continuing conflict in Angola was
an ethnic conflict magnified by strategic forces, and in
the aftermath of the Cold War it continued unabated.
Dominant in the ethnic jigsaw of Angola have been
the Mbundu in the east, the Ovimbundu of the center
and west, the Bakongo of the north, and the Ovambo
of the south. Luanda, the capital, lies in the Mbundu
heartland. In the anticolonial struggle, each ethnic
group formed its own movement: the Mbundudominated MPLA in the Luanda hinterland, the
Bakongo-run FNLA, and Ovambo-Ovimbundu
UNITA of the south. In the postindependence civil
war, the FNLA was quickly ousted, and a prolonged
Hutu staking their claim to power and privilege and
the Tutsi fighting to retain it. The conflict always had a
lower profile in international affairs than the Amin
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battle between the MPLA and UNITA began. Eventually this conflict became internationalized with Cuban
troops in support of the MPLA and South African and
other external assistance to UNITA. The role of Zaire
in the issue was significant. After the FNLA went into
oblivion, Zaire moved its support to UNITA; this was
a natural move, given Mobutu's dependence on the
United States. Zaire's taking sides in Angola's civil
war had the effect of creating behind-the-back security for Savimbi's UNITA.
After the withdrawal of Cuban troops, the collapse of
the MPLA's sponsor-the Soviet Union-and the
withdrawal of South African support for UNITA,
mediation by Herman Cohen and his staff produced an
agreement for a multiparty election in 1992. In that
election, the Dos Santos-led MPLA was victorious,
winning 128 seats in the legislature to 71 for UNITA.
Neither Dos Santos nor Savimbi received 50 percent
of the vote, however, creating the need for a presidential runoff election. Savimbi charged that the election
had been fraudulent, and, on 30 October 1992, fighting broke out in Luanda and the civil war resumed.
Neither side appeared capable of vanquishing the
other completely, at least not without external, massive help. The question arose whether it should be US
policy to promote a partition of this large country; the
latitudinal morphology of the territory might make
such a solution the sole alternative to endless ethnic
strife. In 1994, renewed international efforts to mediate the Angolan conflict again appeared to have success, and a government was installed in Luanda. But
the fundamental divisions of Angola remain.
Potential Ethnic Conflicts
Latent ethnic conflict exists in many African countries. In Southern Africa, Mozambique has just
emerged from years of ethnic strife, but the situation
remains fragile, and many thousands of refugees have
not yet returned home. In Zaire, the inevitable political transition may yield an explosion of long-sup-
Other plural African societies, from Sierra Leone to
South Africa, contend with potential ethnic conflict as
a matter of course.
Nigeria
Nowhere are the risks as great, the stakes as high, or
the divisions as deep as they are in Nigeria, Africa's
most populous country. Nigeria's arid north lies
deeply embedded in Islamic Africa, and its palmfringed southern coastlines are part of Africa's Christian and animist world. British colonialism threw a
lasso around some 200 ethnolinguistic groups scattered across a wide range of environmental and cultural zones. The survival of Nigeria (despite a bitter
war of secession) is an African achievement of notable proportions. Now Nigeria's unity is threatened.
Nigeria's population may number 100 million or
more; the issue of census accuracy has roiled its politics for years. Among more than 200 ethnic groups,
three are dominant: the Hausa-Fulani of the North, the
Yoruba of the Southwest, and the Ibo (Igbo) of the
Southeast. These major nations (for such they are)
have considerable disdain for each other. Muslim
Hausa say that Yoruba are godless and uncultured. Ibo
describe the Hausa as backward and uneducated. To
Northerners, the Ibo are money-mad merchants who
will do anything for a price. Nigeria was born an
uneasy federation with three states centered on these
dominant nations; today it is a country of 30 states trying to emulate not Westminster's system but Washington's.
The religious composition of the Nigerian population
is estimated as follows: Muslims, 50 million; Christians, 37 million; others (chiefly animists) 12 million.
(The much disputed 1991 census of Nigeria did not
require Nigerians to answer questions about religion.)
A substantial number of Yoruba, perhaps 2 million,
are Muslims, but Islam in Nigeria long has had a moderate tone. Some geographers have described the
Yoruba as "middlemen" between Christian Easterners
and the more dogmatic Muslim Northerners, defusing
tensions that might have led to religious conflict.
pressed ethnic conflict. In long-stable Kenya, the risk
of ethnic strife has risen in recent years, apparently
stoked by official actions. In Chad, major conflict has
recurred for decades and is likely to take place again.
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The rise of religious fundamentalism-not just
Islamic, but also Christian fundamentalism-threatens
Nigeria's future. In.the North, where Islam predominates, Christianity has footholds, and coexistence has
been the rule. Despite sporadic skirmishes, tensions
along religious lines have excalated in recent years.
There are a growing number of Muslim preachers who
advocate Islamic radicalism and who call for an
"Islamic republic" in Nigeria. In 1991, a Muslim fundamentalist in Katsina whipped up anti-Christian fer-
vor that spread to Bauchi State and led to the killing of
more than 1,000 people in religious riots. In 1992,
hundreds of Hausa Muslims were massacred by Christians in Kaduna State. Significantly, that conflict had
ethnic as well as religious overtones-the Christians
were Katafs.
In the southern states, Islamic radicalism is viewed
with a growing concern. In 1986, General Babangida,
the country's strongman president, allowed Nigeria to
join the Organization of the Islamic Conference
(OIC), the global association of Islamic countries;
Christian leaders in the South were outraged and said
so from pulpits. For the first time since the Biafra War,
voices favoring secession are heard in the South, notably in the southeast, but also in Yorubaland.
Will things fall apart? The potential for conflict is
greater today than it has been at any time since the
Biafra War a quarter of a century ago. Frustration with
incompetent and despotic military government is rife.
Corruption is endemic. Infrastructure lies in ruins,
from impassable roads to shuttered universities. Domination of national affairs by Muslims is becoming an
issue in the South at a time when Muslim fundamentalism is on the rise.
Nigeria may dissolve into ethnic conflict much as
Sudan has, but, to the world at large, this prospect is
far more worrisome in Nigeria's case. Nigeria is an
African cornerstone, a country well connected to ihe
rest of the world, OPEC's fourth-largest oil producer,
South Africa
In terms of international importance, regional impact,
or virtually any other measure, the prospect of South
Africa's collapse into ethnic conflict would be incomparable., South Africa's multicultural society is a
microcosm of the world, with linkages to Europe,
America, and Asia. It remains Africa's most powerful
and productive economy. It is a land not only of great
potential for the long term but also of great danger for
the near future.
It may be inappropriate to place South Africa in a
rubric of "potential" ethnic conflict. In fact, ethnic
conflict has existed in South Africa for many decades,
even centuries. Today, thousands are dying every year
in ethnic strife as the apartheid system is dismantled.
South Africans of all races are trying to achieve a transition that has been accomplished by revolution elsewhere; but some on several sides of this complicated
process are, or appear to be, intent on promoting conflict.
Actual and potential ethnic conflict in South Africa
exists at several levels: these may be categorized as
intraethnic, interethnic, and interracial.
Violent conflict within ethnic sectors of the South
African population rose with the political tide and
with the approach of constitutional resolution.
Although newspaper and television accounts sometimes give the impression that the Zulu nation (for
such it is) largely supports Inkatha and opposes Mandela's African National Congress (ANC), the fact is
that much of the deathly violence in Natal and on the
Rand was between Zulu Inkatha supporters on the one
hand and Zulu ANC members on the other. The Zulu
nation is fragmented by a myriad of clan lineages and
boundaries, and clan conflict has worsened severely as
a direct result of the political contest.
Violent conflict between ethnic groups in the republic
occurs in the squalid townships and sometimes on
railroad cars taking people to and from work, but, in
and a model of Christian-Islamic coexistence on
fact, South Africa has hitherto escaped widespread,
regional strife of this kind. Undoubtedly some of the
Africa's troubled transition zone. The breakup of
Nigeria would be a geopolitical catastrophe.
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ongoing Inkatha-ANC violence has ethnic overtones,
but given the circumstances id the country, interethnic
violence has been limited. This is undoubtedly due to
the multiethnic, indeed multiracial, character of the
ANC leadership. Just as Inkatha does not represent all
(or even most) Zulu, so the ANC is not an all-Xhosa
organization. Still, in the popular'image, the InkathaANC political struggle often is seen, in the final analysis, as a Zulu-Xhosa clash, a continuation of historic
rivalries, and the preamble to another round between
ancient adversaries.
The April 1994 elections that brought the ANC to
power also produced a delicate regional balance. As
early as February 1995, the Inkatha members of parliament grew restive under the new system and
walked out of the assembly, underscoring the potential
weaknesses of the system. The growing risk is that not
only Inkatha but also other components of South
Africa's polity will feel that the new order disadvantages them.
This is not to suggest that interethnic conflict is not
latent and potentially explosive. The assassination of
Communist Party leader Chris Hani was done by a
white killer, but what might have happened had the
assassin been an African? So much now depends on
the lives of Mandela and Buthelezi.
as perhaps no other could. The notion that economic
sanctions would hasten the end of apartheid led to
some voluntary and much involuntary adherence in
this country; those who argued that they would lead to
economic disaster that would doom a postapartheid
transition were branded as racists. In the streets and on
campuses, the prosanction movement generated
marches and demonstrations. One must therefore contemplate the impact in this country of ethnic and/or
racial conflict in South Africa: such conflict would
The ultimate question, of course, is whether ANC
dominance of government will be followed by a struggle among the victors in whiclh, for example, those
supporting Winnie Mandela might play a crucial role,
In Kenya, the'ouster of the colonialists was followed
Should the South African transition collapse into vio-
lence, that conflict will resonate in the United States
resonate in the United States, possibly with the ferocity of Northern Ireland's conflict in Britain. Interracial
by an interethnic struggle that relegated the Luo to
lesser standing in the Kikuyu-dominated state. But
that conflict claimed comparatively few lives, certainly as compared to what happened in Zimbabwe
after its independence. There, the Mashona-dominated
Mugabe regime ruthlessly suppressed the Nkomo-led
Matabele in regional/ethnic conflict of enormous cost
in lives and property. Since then, Bulawayo and
conflict in Zimbabwe could be ignored; interethnic
strife in Bosnia, complete with hundreds of thousands
of casualties and concentration camp horrors, barely
roils American society. But South Africa has the
ingredients to force the issue: a growing link between
the US black community and ANC leadership; a latent
sympathy for the white plight in a revolution-torn
South Africa on the part of political conservatives in
Matabeleland have been the disadvantaged corners on
this country; and the recent history of involvement,
Observers argue that South Africa's considerable ethnic integration would be likely to mitigate such
events; there is so much ethnic mixture, the argument
first by businesses adhering to the Sullivan principles,
then by sanctions advocates in driving them out. For
the United States, there is more at stake, perhaps, in
South Africa's difficult transition than there is in the
ethnic conflicts of all other African countries com-
goes, that regional conflict is unlikely. But in other
bined.
Zimbabwe's map.
countries, such mixture also has led to chronic strife
(for example among Muslims and numerous Christian
minorities in Nigeria's North). Much will depend on
the political campaign now in progress and on the
ANC's ability to avoid factionalization along ethnic
lines.
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References
General
South
Berger, P. L. and Godsell, B., eds. A Future
Africa: Visions, Strategies and Realities. Boulder:
Westview, 1989.'
New
Best, A. C. G. and De Blij, H. J. African Survey.
York: Wiley, 1977.
Morton, J. "Ethnicity and Politics in Red Sea ProvJanuince, Sudan," African Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 350,
ary, 1989.
Decalo, S. "The Process, Prospects, and Constraints of
Democratization in Africa," African Affairs, Vol. 91,
No. 362, January, 1992.
De Blij, H. J. "Africa's Geomosaic Under Stress," The
Blumenfeld, J., ed. South African Crisis.Beckenham:
Croom Helm, 1987.
Christopher, A. J. ColonialAfrica: An Historical
Geography Totowa: Barnes & Noble, 1984..
Christopher, A. J. South Africa: The Impact of Past
Geographies.Cape Town: Juta, 1984.
Smith, D. M. Apartheid in South Africa. Cambridge
Journalof Geography,Vol. 90, No. 1, January/February, 1991.
Rogge, 3. Too Many Too Long: Sudan's Twenty-Year
Refugee Dilemma. Totowa: Rowman & Allanheld,
Suberu, R. T. "The Struggle for New States in Nigeria," African Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 361, October, 1991.
University Press, 1990.
Rantete, J. and Giliomee, H. "Transition to DemocNegotiations
and
Mountjoy, A. and Hilling, D. Africa: Geography
can Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 365, October, 1992.
Development. Totowa: Barnes & Noble, 1987.
racy Through Transaction? Bilateral
Africa" AfriBetween the ANC and the NP in South
Smith, D. M. "Redistribution After Apartheid: Who
Other
Schraeder, P. J. "Ethnic Politics in Djibouti: From
'Eye of the Hurricane' to 'Boiling Cauldron'," African
Affairs, Vol. 92, No. 367, April, 1993.
Gets What and Where in the New South Africa,"
Area, December, 1992.
Pedder, S. "Nigeria: Anybody Seen a Giant?" August
21, 1993. Vol.24. No. 4. The Economist.
Christopher, A. J. "Apartheid Within Apartheid," The
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ProfessionalGeographer,Vol. 41, August,
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Summary of Discussion
Discussant: Rex Honey
I think we need to keep the African experience, as
with the former Soviet Union experience, in historical
context. We need to look at precolonial Africa to
understand the Africa of today. Much of the culture of
contemporary Africa predates the colonial time. To
take a word from social theory jargon, the cultures of
Africa have been deeply sedimented within traditional
structures that resist change. Nevertheless, existing
structures, such as kinship and traditional social ties
are being battered by the kind of changes that are now
occurring,
This is not to suggest that, before the colonial period,
there was an Africa that was stagnant. In the 19th century, the Islamic Jihad had an impact across the Sahelian region and penetrated south. Sub-Saharan Africa
has traded with other areas, such as the Middle East
and Europe, for a long time. Of course slave trade was
a terrible aspect of that trade; but only part of it; there
was trade before and considerable trade afterward. In
addition, there have always been migrations of African peoples.
During the colonial period, there occurred the imposition of protostates and, eventually, the European
nation-state model on Africa, I think it would be useful to consider how European states came about, the
structure of these states, and the kinds of things that
led to successful or unsuccessful states in Europe, and
then to look at the African states to see how they compare. A very telling description of the evolution of the
European national-state-and I will use that term
instead of nation-state, because it is broader-is, that
over the past millennium, successful states in Europe
were those that were able to accumulate capital-that
is to say, economic power-and to amass the power of
coersion to defend themselves, conquer others, and
maintain law and order.
The sad part of what has happened in Africa is that the
imposition of this European national-state has come
at a time when the technology for coercing is at the
in terms of
greatest it has ever been in history-both
weapons and of the electronic media. As such, the
ability of states to get from their people what they
want has never been so high. The biggest difference
between the bullies of Europe in earlier times and the
bullies of Africa now is that those in Africa have a lot
more power in terms of weapons and communication
controls.
Another factor that is a legacy of the colonial time is
the introduction and spread of Christianity. Christianity mainly came into Sub-Saharan Africa in the 19th
century and spread north at the same time that Islam
was spreading south. Colonial regimes impacted the
current religious map because they often controlled
where the missionaries were able to work. This was
certainly the case in Nigeria.
In Nigeria, about 50 percent of the population is Muslim, about 40 percent is Christian, and 30 percent is
animist, and I do mean those numbers-they total
120 percent. The indigenous cultures of Nigeria are
still important in post-Cold War Africa. Cold War
influences have also been important; Professor de Blij
touched on some of that. Certainly, many Cold War
battles were fought, and some are still being fought, in
Africa. Angola, certainly, is an example. The impacts
of the Cold War have damaged Africa tremendously.
The African economies have been very much transformed by the penetration of international capital,
largely with alliances of convenience between the
leaders of the African countries and the transnational
companies that have invested in them. It is no accident
that the wealth of Mobutu is purported to be about
equal to Zaire's national debt.
The politics of many of the Sub-Saharan African
countries is ethnic. The major prize within those countries is gaining control of the state, because control of
the state is the source of wealth. A client-patron structure, which is a modification of traditional structures
adapted to fit the current time, functions in many of
these states. In many ways, the traditional leaders are
stronger than they have ever been because the kinds of
power they have access to are now much greater than
those they formerly held.
83
�C00123268
Individuals often retain their allegiance to an ancestral
group, but Americans probably misread what that alle-
giance is. My reading of Nigerians and of other West
Africans is that it is not an ethnic allegiance-rather it
is a more diverse allegiance to the ancestral place. The
What can be done? We have to reconsider sovereigntyI
and the relationships of what goes on in states. When
am optimistic, I look at the European Community as
the model to address some problems that Africans
Yoruba of southwest Nigeria are clearly the major
group, yet little Yoruba consciousness exists except
for such cases as the recently aborted election, in
which a Yoruba was elected president but not allowed
as
to take office. The Yoruba fight among themselves
much as they fight with other groups, and the same
thing holds true for the Ibo. They are only pulled
together when they go up against the other groups.
In Nigeria. one major factor in modern political life
has been the hegemony of the north. Every Nigerian
In
president has been a general or a Muslim ahajiA
they have been both.
most cases,
In Nigeria, there has been a politicization of ethnic
a
identity and of ethnicity, even to the point of creating
to a Nigerian colleague
new ethnic group. According
of mine, the major ethnic group of the country, the
Hausa-Fulani of the north, is something very new.
Within Nigeria there has recently been a reemergence
of the national question: is Nigeria a given? Professor
face. In Europe there is a multitiered, flexible sovereignty that allows the movement of people and trade
within the larger area but maintains local autonomy
for cultural issues.
The colonial boundaries are a continuing problem.
The peoples of Africa never chose what their bound-
aries should be-they were imposed by outsiders. The
borgandaries that essentially says he boundaries are
fixed and should not be reconsidered; what would
happen if that policy got turned upside down? How
so
can we formulate some kind of political process
each other?
that Africans can choose it without killing
That presents a problem in terms of selfdetermination; and without self-determination, how
not
do ethnic groups have rights? If ethnic groups do
will occur in those groups,
have rights, then conflict
see
and it is in out interest to take a look at that and
and how we can be
what kinds ofthings can be done
in
involved. I do think that important questions remain
United States can do alone, which is
terms of what the
de Blij was right; Nigeria's continued existence is in
not nserting our forces over theremal simpl exacexc
jepad.tainetnoufocsoethrmasimply
erbate the problem.
is
The power of the state, of the current state,
extremely important. The state is the source of money;
international money gets funneled into countries primarily through the.state apparatus, as do the revenues
General Discussion
from the country's major source of income-thein the
state
United Nations playing in Rwanda and Liberia?
petroleum sector. The preeminence of the
formal economy has been important, and, in looking
at how the economy works, we need to recognize that.
The power of the state to coerce has also increased.
What are the prospects? Clearly, economic depression
leads to violence; that occurs in a lot of places. Part of
of
Africa's problem is that, in immediate terms, much
Africa is not crucial to the West. South Africa is more
crucial, given that country's wealth. That is not to say
that we should not pay attention but that we do not pay
attention.
UESTION What
of a role do you see the
oed o e h
QUETO:Wa type o
DR DE BL: The UN's policy has been either to
toward
have a massive presence with a clear directionIt is one
a particular goal or to have no presence at all.
of the tragedies of the New World Order that this conflict has to be allowed to run itself out as West Europeans are allowing it to do in Bosnia. Political scientists
say that, when a situation like this occurs, an average
I One who has made the haj to Mecca.
84
�C00123268
ratio of 10 UN forces to I rebel force is needed to contain the anarchy; with the UN's current resources, that
is not feasible. Furthermore, countries that participate
in the UN peacekeeping operations, as in Somalia, and
that experience casualties, will develop a great reluctance to participate in support of this kind of policing
action.
Perhaps there ought to be standing regional forces in
Africa, South America, and Central America for
emergencies of this kind so that imperialist powers do
not get involved in the kind of peacemaking that get
soldiers killed. I am encouraged that ECOMOG, the
West African force, has achieved as much as it has. I
still believe that, with the UN's limitations, having
standing regional forces is the way for regional problems to be solved. I am a great believer in UN intervention, but I am not sure that the United Nations has
the resources to intervene at the level it should have.
DR. HONEY: I think what really needs to be done is
to formulate a UN policy that provides a generic,
rather than ad hoc, structure for intervening. I think
the difficulty we have now is that we are building a
house without a blueprint. Obviously, the world is not
going to stop, but, if we really are going to have successful interventions, we need to figure out institutionally how they will work. Then I think we will have a
chance of some successes.
going to have to run that economy well to be able to
make it work. I think that there is going to be a tremendous effort by the leadership to hold things
together. There are so many incentives in terms of the
potential for South Africa that I think the possibility
that people will actually get together and make things
work is every bit as high as the possibility that we will
have a conflagration.
DR. DE BLIJ: I think that Professor Honey might be
right except for the effect of sanctions. Those of us
who supported the sanctions helped create in South
Africa an ungovernable minority of hundreds of thousands of young, uneducated Africans who said "liberation before education." These youths will now be
Nelson Mandela's major problem and are the major
source of violence in the townships. Those people are
not retrievable. Unemployment in South Africa is 48
percent, not because there are not people to employ
but because they have no skills to employ them with.
These people are going to have a revolution of rising
expectations, and, believe me, a revolution South
Africa will get.
Another problem will be the integration of the armed
forces.
QUESTION: Regarding your point that US forces.
should not be in Somalia, is that a reflection of what's
happening now or would you never have sent them
QUESTION: You had mentioned the need for interna-
there in the first place?
DR. DE BLIJ: In the case of South Africa, I think a
massive intervention that might keep the peace there,
should it be needed, would pay for itself for a century
to come, whereas that might not be the case in, say
Somalia or Rwanda.
DR. DE BLIJ: I never would have sent them in the
first place. I thought our job was to feed people. It
could have been done from the air. It could have been
done with the help of the agencies already there. I
think our tactics in Somalia were wrong. Frankly, it is
going exactly the way I though it would go. It is a
quagmire, and it may, in fact, lead to a fragmented
Somalia in the end, that is not what we had in mind. If
feeding the population is the objective, it ought to be
done from a distance. What is now happening-the
policing action that you can see coming-builds
resentment to the presence of a large foreign force and
is not acceptable.
tional intervention in South Africa-potential UN
intervention. I know that, currently, we're talking
about election monitors. Is that sufficient to tide South
Africa over until the election and afterwards?
DR. HONEY: I am more optimistic about South
Africa's future than Professor de Blij. We do not have
a crystal ball, but I have a hunch that pragmatism is
going to prevail. Clearly the ANC leadership, despite
its at least titular Marxist past, understands that it is
85
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The Ethnic Challenge to National
and International Order in South
America, Mexico, and the Caribbean
During the 1990s: Geographical
Perspectives
Gary S. Elbow
Professor of Geography
Texas Tech University
Introduction
As in so many other regions of the world, there is
much ethnic diversity in Latin America and the Caribbean. In addition to the well-recognized Amerind,
African, and Iberian elements, one finds representatives of nearly all major European ethnic groups as
well as many Middle Eastern and East and South
Asian groups. In contrast to many other areas of the
world, most of these ethnic populations are immigrants to the region who lack longstanding historic
associations with New World territory but who have
generally been well integrated into the national cultures of the countries in which they reside. As such,
most are not considered ethnic minorities but rather
members of the national culture whose ancestors came
from a non-Hispanic area. Two countries, Argentina
and Peru, are currently governed by non-Hispanics,
Carlos Satil Menem, a Syrian-Argentine, and Alberto
and
Fujimori, a Japanese-Peruvian, respectively,
non-Iberian immigrant
members of these and other
groups are locally important in politics, business, or
industry. For example, the Bucaram, Nebot, and Saad
families are important in Guayaquil, Ecuador, as are
insurgencies of Sendero Luminoso and Tupac Amaru
in Peru, the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua, the
civil war in El Salvador, and recent outbreaks of violence in Venezuela are largely nonethnic conflicts.
Although these conflicts may involve disaffected
members of nonruling ethnic groups, the root causes
of the violence lie more in nonethnic issues. Frequently, ethnic groups are drawn unwillingly into
political conflicts or are duped into participation by
one side or the other, even though there is no explicitly "ethnic" agenda in the objectives of the opposing
sides. Thus, the presence of minority ethnic groups on
one side or the other of a Latin American political or
armed conflict does not necessarily mean that it has its
origin in ethnic issues.
Although Latin America is not an area in which ethnic
conflict is likely to escalate to a level of international
importance on a par with, for example, the Middle
East, Africa, or the Balkan states, considerable tension
does exist among ethnic groups in South America,
Mexico, and the Caribbean. There have been frequent
ethnic conflicts in the past, and the potential for future
conflict, either armed or through political action,
exists in several parts ofthe region. The most active
conflicts at present, and probably for the remainder
of the decade and longer, are in areas of traditional
Indian occupation and involve encounters between
Indians and the state.'
Indian Populations and the State
The regional bases-of conflict between the Latin
be
American states and their Indian populations mayIn a
divided conveniently into highland and lowland.
various families of Syrian and Lebanese descent in
San Pedro Sula, Honduras, and of Japanese descent in
Brazil.refers
Brazil.
'Indian is a very complex term as used in Latin America because it
to cultural identity not biological characteristics. Thus. Indians are people who self-identify as Indians and who retain distincset
tive characteristics of dress, language, economy, and beliefs that
the Hispanicized population of th country in
them apart from
In general, Latin America is less prone to ethnic conPeople who are borm Indians may pass into the
which they reside.by learning Spanish, leaving their community of
majority
ithi thnemany regionse of the orld Conflicts -mestizo
flict than many other regionsofte world. oflts
traits. This process has
within the regiori are more often related to class differ- birth, and adopting other Hispanic cultural
occurred since earty colonial times and accounts for a large share
ences, declining standards of living, and unequal
distribution of access to resources, employment
of the mestizo population in many Latin American countries.
to
opportunities, or political power than they are
For example, the guerrilla
purely ethnic factors.
86
�C00123268
general sense, these two areas equate with the geographic concepts of core and p eriphery.2
Highland Indians
The highlands have been core areas since well before
the Spanish conquest. Highland Indians are the modern descendants of the population of Indian states with
relatively well-developed political organizations, such
as the Aztec, Inca, and Maya who were the focus of
Spanish colonization beginning in the 16th century.
Spanish colonial interests focused their efforts in areas
that possessed large numbers of Indians who were
easily mobilized for employment in the mines and
agricultural estates that supported the colonial economy. As a result of as much as 450 years of contact
with and exposure to Hispanic culture, these Indians
are heavily acculturated and have developed more or
less stable relationships with the state and its representatives; nevertheless, they still retain strong Indian
identity. In the highlands, clashes often center around
a growing sense of "Indian consciousness," which is
expressed in demands by Indian communities for the
state to grant greater collective rights to political and
economic self-determination,
Core area Indians-often peasant farmers who work
marginal lands-are very sensitive to change in the
status of their land or in any subsidies or other benefits
they may receive from the state. When these issues
affect mestizo peasant farmers and laborers, as they
often do, Indians may unite across ethnic lines with
them to defend their common interests. Core area
Indians may unite with lowland Indians to promote
ethnically related agendas such as the establishment of
autonomous areas, bilingual education, or defense of
Indian cultural heritage, as they have in Ecuador.
Guerrilla movements have taken advantage of indigenous hostility to national governments by recruiting
Indians to their cause. However, leftist guerrilla orga-
views ethnic issues as an extension of the class struggle. For this reason guerrilla groups normally do not
include ethnic concerns in their programs, which limits their appeal to Indians. One recent example is
Peru's Sendero Luminoso, which has Indian members
and which recruits in Indian communities but has no
explicitly ethnic elements in its revolutionary agenda
and has been guilty of mistreating Indians who are not
cooperative. It may be that Sendero Luminoso has
driven as many or more Indians to support the Peruvian Army as it recruited.
Where Indians make up a large share of the population
they may work toward the establishment of regional
or national political control. In Bolivia and Peruwhere they account for more than 50 percent and as
3
much as 25 percent of the population, respectively Indians represent a potentially crucial element in
national politics if they can be induced to vote as a
bloc. Moreover, they have the potential to create conflict if they are denied the right to vote or if their votes
are negated by fraud and corruption. In Bolivia's
recent presidential election one non-Indian candidate
ran a "pro-Indian" campaign, and the winning vicepresidential candidate was an Indian.
If political gains are not translated into achievement of
Indian agendas such as access to land, employment,
and some level of self-determination, more violent
forms of conflict are possible.' Exploitation and
repression of highland Indians has triggered conflict in
3These estimates of Indian population fall at the high end of a wide
range. Because the identification of Indians is somewhat subjective, national policies such as those which favor integration of Indians into the national culture may influence estimates of Indian
population. Another factor is that increasing numbers of Indians
adopt mestizo culture and cease to self-identify with their cultural
origins. Furthermore, many Latin American countries do not collect information on ethnic affiliation in their national censuses.
Thus, estimates of the percentage of Indian population in Latin
American countries varies greatly, depending on the source of the
"
nizations are often steeped in Marxist theory, which
The core-periphery concept has two distinct senses. Their early
use was in reference to central, developed areas of a country in
contrast to those places that lie outside of them and do not share the
same levels of infrastructuredevelopment or other inputs from the
national government. Recently, the terms core and periphery have
been applied to international distinctions in economic development, as between the "developed world" and the "underdeveloped
world." In this paper the terms carry their earlier meaning.
:
o Guatemala is especialy instructive as an example of
how Indian demands for greater participation in the economic and
political life of a country may be met with a violent reaction from
the state. For details of this process, see the articles contained in
Robert M. Carmack, ed., Harvest of Violence: The Maya Indians
and the Guatemalan Crisis, University of Oklahoma Press, 1988.
87
�C00123268
likely to prothe past. Indians in Bolivia and Peru are
test any attempt to reduce coca production in that
country if they are not matched with the development
of an alternative source of comparable income
Because most producers in both countries are Indian
and because coca production and consumption are so
strongly linked to Indian culture, the issue of reducing
1993 murlevels. One excellent example is the August
der of a number of Yanomami Indians by Brazilian
miners in the Brazil-Venezuela frontier area This
incident had international implications for several reasons. The Brazilian miners apparently attacked the
Indians in Venezuelan territory, which makes the ccident of interest to that state, and the Indians have close
on the part
production may be seen as one more effort from full
Indians
of the white-mestizo state to keep
participation in the national economy. Nevertheless,
the immediate prospects for large-scale violent ethnic
conflict do not seem great in the Andean countries.
$even
Lowland Indian~
Indians, unlike their highland counterparts,
Lowland
have been little influenced by European culture. Contact between these indigenous groups and the state has
been relatively recent. Most peripheral or lowland
areas have been opened up for development-bringconing military, colonists, and developers into direct
frontation with their long-term Indian occupants-
only during the past half-century.
The incorporation of peripheral territories, formerly
considered empty and useless, into the effective
Suri
national territory of the Amazon states-Brazil,
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru,
name, Guyana, Venezuela,
and Bolivia-has inevitably disrupted the cultures of
the unacculturated or partially acculturated native
results of
inhabitants of the region. The unfortunate include: the
these contacts are well documented. They
susceptible popuspread of deadly diseases to highly
of land, forced acculturation to Western
lations, loss
life styles, and incorporation into the cash-based econ-
omy. In addition, many Indians have been killed by
of
intrudersof
and
mn
their teritry.colonists, miners, sin other ar
the military, cnithes,00
their territory. In the 500 years since the arrival of
Europeans in the Western Hemisphere, the number of
from
Indians in the Amazon Basin has been reduced
an estimated 6-12 million to about 200,000. The pro-
cess has nearly reached its conclusion, since few, if
avoid
any, refuges remain where native peoples can
contact with bearers of national culture.
in the
ties to cultural and environmental organizations
Brazil,
United States and Europe as well as within
far
itself. Thus, the impact of this incident extended
upper Orinoco River,
beyond the rain forests of the
Brazil's
where it took place. It threatened to reinforce
already negative image as a country that permits or
promotes environmentally destructive development, ignores or violates the boundaries of national
parks and cultural or biological reserves, mistreats
Indians, and has laws that favor concentration of
wealth in the hands of a small elite while millions of
poor barely survive in urban slums or on tiny farms.
These conflicts between native peoples and the state in
Latin America have parallels in other parts of the
Burma,
world, especially in Indonesia, Malaysia,
In
Thailand, and the Philippines in Southeast Asia.
mineral exploitation, resettlethese countries logging,
ment programs, nd land development have displaced
econoor threaten to displace native populations.with
mies based on shifting agriculture or hunting and
gathering. Some African ethnic conflicts have similar
root causes, but longstanding disputes among ethnic
groups are more often responsible for setting off
hostilities.
s This incident illustrates the difficulty of preventing conflict
are
between Indian groups and outsiders where valuable resources and
both military
isolated areas where
at stake. The Indians live in to provide, even if the national governpolice protection is difficult
ment wishes to provide it, which is not always the case. And,
because of certain taboos or customs of the Indians, it may be diffia conflict may be.
cult for outsiders to assess exactly how serious in the August 1993
For example, the estimates of Yanomami killed
raid ranged from 20 to 73, with the final number probably lying
closer to the lower end of-the range. The Yanomami believe that
to haunt the living
mentioning the dead will bring back their spirits two; therefore, it
and their counting system does not extend beyond
is extremely difficult to get them to reveal basic numeric data on an
incident such as the miners' raid.
Indians,
Despite the declining numbers of lowland
contacts between them and outsiders have the p.otential
to international
to produce conflicts that can escalate
88
�CO0123268
Growing Indian Militancy
of
One response by South American Indians to threats
territorial invasion has been to organize into political
action groups. Indians have been aided in this effort
by Roman Catholic missionaries, anthropologists,
Noteworthy
environmental organizations, and others.
among these groups is the Federation of Shuar Centens (Federacin de CentrosShuar) in Ecuador, which
was organized in 1964 at a time when development
was first penetrating the local Indians' territory. This
group provides a model that has been followed by
many other Amazon Indian groups within Ecuador
and elsewhere. The Shuar Federation has allied with
Spanish-language education, indoctrinating Indians
in national history, and similar programs. The Indian
organizations-which support the idea of a plurina-
tional or multinational state that would accommodate
the various Indian ethnic groups, Afro-Ecuadorians
from the Pacific Coast, and the dominant mestizo
national culture-are working toward a plurinational
state that would grant a degree of political and cultural autonomy to Indian groups. Similar agendas
exist in other Andean countries. For example, Peru
recognizes Quechua as an official language, and Indians in Bolivia are increasing their influence on
other Indian organizations representing both lowland
national government policy.
unions, peasant farmer leagues, and other non-Indian
groups to advance common interests.
In Ecuador and other Andean countries, Indian interests clash with a number of national goals, both stated
and implicit. Thusfar; differences over these conflict-
The objectives of newly emerging Indian militancy
have begun to extend beyond land, mineral, and biotic
resource-relatedissues to broader policy areas. In
ing interests have generally been headed off by the
through
national governments or resved
m
process. However as the Indian groups
the political
and highland groups, and it also works with labor
Ecuador the Indian political action organizations are
working hard to change the government policy ofdifethnic
national integration aimed at eliminating
ferences and creating a unified mestizo national culture. The policy, grounded in the assumption that
eventually all Indian peoples will be brought into the
mestizo-based national culture and that ethnic minorities will cease to exist, is implemented through
become more militant, they will demand to have an
policy
increasingly more active role in setting nationalpreser-
with respect to land, resource use, and cultural
vation. The militancy of Indian organizations clearly
sets the stage for potential conflict with the non-Indian
groups who perceive that their interests may be undermined by granting greater autonomy to Indians.
Mexico's Indian Populations
(PRI), have limited Indian protests during the latter
half of the century. However, conflicts continue to
Mexico has a history of ethnic conflict that began in
the pre-Columbian past and continues to the present.
Indians have been involved in the great revolutions of
Mexican history. They were recruited by Padre
Hidalgo at the beginning of the revolution against
occur on a local level, and some have involved the
national government. Most of these conflicts are in the
southern part of the country or the Yucatan Peninsula,
where most of the traditional Indian communities are
located.
Spain in 1811 and followed Emiliano Zapata during
the Revolution of 1910-17. Indian rebellions include
the Caste Wars of the 19th century in Yucatan and the
and
Cristero rebellion of 1926 in Michoacan, Jalisco,
The land reforms that followed the RevoluColima.
tion of 1910, along with close control by the ruling
have
As in South America, ethnic conflicts in Mexico
over land, mineral resources,
their roots in disputes
of
and cultural preservation policy. Despite the claim
the PRI to be a defender of the interests of the people,
Indian concerns consistently take a back seat to
political party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party
89
�C00123268
projects perceived to be of benefit to the government.
Mexico's Indians are, at best, little better off economically than Indians in other Latin American countries,
and they also encounter policies that promote adoption of mestizo culture. Government-sponsored development projects, expansion of the oil industry,
relocation of mestizo settlers in Indian territories, and
government ignorance of or attempts to suppress
Indian culture are all factors that contribute to conflict
between Indians and the state.
Nonindigenous Flash Points: Afro-Americans/
East Indians
In the African-influenced areas, especially parts of
Brazil and the Caribbean, there is also potential for
racial or ethnic conflict, especially if a black consciousness movement should develop. The root causes
of friction among members of African- and Asian-origin groups are quite different from those that involve
American Indians and representatives of the Hispanic
states.
Other sources of potential conflict include land disBrazil, the Guianas, and the West Indies have large
putes between Indian communities and the presence
Afro-American populations. In Brazil, African minorof Guatemalan refugees. Most conflicts over land are
ities are not normally separated spatially from the
highly localized and involve differences between
main culture as are Indians. Rather, they live in the
neighboring towns over the boundaries of communal
same cities and towns, and they usually share, to a
land holdings. Many of these disputes originated durgreater or lesser extent, most elements of the common
ing the colonial period. The migration of refugees
national culture. However, despite disclaimers about
from the Guatemalan civil war into the Mexican state
the absence of racial prejudice, clear differences exist
in
of Chiapas and their relocation to settlements
in the social and economic attainment of blacks and
Yucatan is also problematic. Although some of these
whites in Brazil. So far, these differences have not
refugees have returned to Guatemala in response to
resulted in racially based conflicts. Nevertheless,
government repatriation programs, several thousand
given the myth of racial equality, if a black consciousto
others will probably remain in Mexico. It remains
peo- ness movement should emerge in Brazil, it could probe seen what sort of long-term relationships these
vide a base for development of racial frictionple will work out with the Mexican Government and
although the potential for this to occur does not seem
with neighboring Mexican Indian and mestizo comvery great.
munities.
The rebellion of the Zapatista National Liberation
Army in January 1994 is an example of the influence
of the factors noted above. Despite its rhetoric, the
In some islands Afro-Americans are a single, dominant ethnic group; these areas have little potential for
ethnic conflict. Suriname, Guyana, and Trinidad and
Tobago have mixed populations comprised of AfroMexican Government has done little to incorporate
Americans, East Indians, and-in Surinamethe Indians of Chiapas into the national economy.
6
Javanese. Creoles-Afro-Americans and MulatLand the Indians had traditionally considered to be
toes-and East Indians tend to belong to different
theirs was claimed by mestizo farmers and ranchers
political parties, to live in distinct areas, and to interand, in some cases, incorporated into large landholdact largely within their own communities. In Trinidad
ings. Resettlement of Guatemalan refugees contriband the Guianas, where Afro-Americans and East
uted to conflict, as did the Salinas de Gortari
Indians share national territories, conflict reflects, to a
government's decision to eliminate the constitutional
protections of ejido land. The final straw for the rebels
D
espite their location on the mainland, Guyana and Suriname are
of the North
was approvalwhihoa wasoftheAmerican Free Tr'ade
culturally and historically much more closely linked to the Caribeenby IdiansFe as settin
bean than they are to their culturally Iberian South American
Agreement, which was seen by the Indians as settig
neighbors.
the stage for further concentration of economic
more developed northern regions of
resources in the
the country at the expense of Indian and peasant farmers in the south.
90
�C00123268
The Impact of Resource Development
The expansion of national culturesfrom the core to
peripheralareas is a direct prbduct of the increased
demandfor landand resources,and this, in turn, often
reflects nationalpolicies that govern the distribution
of resources in the previously developed core areas.
Colonization of the "empty" peripheryoften is viewed
by nationalpolicymakers as a way of relieving pressure for redistributionof land in the older core, where
a combinationof concentrationof land in the handsof
the elite, rapidpopulation increase in rural areas,
degradationofpeasant-controlledland through erosion and decliningfertility, and lack of employment
opportunities contributesto substantial land hunger.
Moreover,wealthy and influential members of the ruling elites, along with members of the military or representatives of internationalenterprises,often
promote colonizationas a means ofobtaining large
blocks of land.Mineral resource development, especially that relatedto high-value commodities such as
oil and gold, is another cause of conflict. Frequently,
mineral resource development is linked to multinational enterprisessuch as oil Companies or international mining concerns. These developments may also
have internationallinks through organizationssuch as
OPEC,the LatinAmerican FreeTrade Association, or
the Andean Pact.
Invariably, development of tropicallowland areas is
seen as favorable to nationaland international interests, and maintenance of land in an "undeveloped"
state is viewed as wasteful, even if it provides suste'nancefor native populations that have lived therefor
centuries ormillennia. Conservationinterests lobby for
slow-growth or no-growth policiesbut to little avail.
Even when areas are set aside in parks or reserves,
effective provisionsforprotecting them are lacking, and
the allocationof large blocks of land to Indian communities may create a backlash amyong landless or land
hungrypeasants and members of the urban working
classes, who fail to understandthe reasonsfor giving so
much land to sofew people. Often these protests are
supportedby members of the upper and middle classes
who oppose the removal of large blocks of landfrom
accessfor large-scaledevelopment.
As might be expected, governments have not
attempted to solve the "Indianproblem" by dealing
with the root causes that are noted above. Rather; they
have responded to pressure groups by passing legislation that is unenforced or by buying off the groups or
their leaders in other ways. Examples are minimalist
land reform legislationor creation of largely unprotected national parks, reserves, or dedicated Indian
territories.If these time-tested Latin American strategiesfail to work, heavier-handedapproachesmay be
attempted, such as calling in the army or police; but
these strategiesare resorted to less and less because
of their negative consequences, both internallyand on
the country's international standing.Mexico's relatively benign treatment of the Zapatista NationalLiberationArmy, at least until February1995, is a good
example of how international opinion can affect government response to dissident groups.
In Brazil, the tendencies to expand development into
the Amazon Basin have been stimulated by the government's expansionistdevelopment policies. Since
colonial times Brazil has aggressively extended its
frontiers at the expense of all its neighbors.
political
policy of building roads into
More recently, a national
and clearing the tropicalforestforfarmthe interior
ing and ranching, which was fostered in part by the
geopoliticalstrategiesofsome military officers, has
led to large-scaledevelopment of that country's Amazon lands. When Brazil builds roadand colonizes near
itspoliticalfrontiers, it triggersa counterresponseby
neighboringAmazon Basin countries such as Peru,
Colombia, and Venezuela, which build roadsof their
own and encourage colonizationofformerly undeveloped lowland tropicalforests to counter what is seen
as a possible Brazilian threat to nationalsovereignty.
Ecuadorhas embarked upon a similar policy of settling its Amazon lowlands with highlandersin
response to a longstanding border dispute with Peru.
It remains to be seen how the flare-up offighting in
early 1995 will affect these policies.
91
�C00123268
certain extent, differences in urban settlement patterns, although a more fundamental cause of conflict is
over which group will control the national government and gain the benefits that come from such control. East Indians and Afro-Americans are roughly
Afroequally represented in Trinidad-43 percent
In Guyana the East
American, 40 percent East Indian.
Indians comprise 51 percent of the population and
Creoles account for 44 percent; but, in Suriname, Cre-
to meet the need for agricultural labor in the country. If
large numbers of Haitians try to settle in Dominican
territory, there is always the possibility of another violent response on the part of the Dominicans.
Conclusion
Probably the most common source of ethnic conflict
oles make up only 31 percent of the population while
for
between Indians and the state, whether located in the
lowlands or highlands, is the dispute over control of
Relations among East Indians and Creoles have been
particularly tense in Guyana, where politics has been
characterized by violence and conflict between members of political parties that are strongly linked to ethnic groups. Cheddi Jagan was elected President of
Guyana in October 1992, ending more than 25 years
of Creole domination of the government. The election
territory and mineral or biotic resources. Ethnic group
autonomy and greater participation in the political
system are often secondary factors in ethnic conflict.
The principal areas of current ethnic conflict are in the
Amazon Basin and other lowland areas where native
Indian populations confront expanding national states.
These conflicts involve small numbers of people, but
they are locally important and may have international
implications when they occur in border areas or if they
East Indians, Javanese, and Bush Negro account
37 percent, 15 percent, and 10 percent, respectively.
was accompanied by riots and violent conflict among
members of the two dominant political parties, but the
situation seems to have stabilized since then. As long
involve international environmental or cultural protection organizations or political or lending organizations
such as agencies of the UN, the World Bank. and the
i
etccntry's depeed economic
affected countries,
as Jagan remains in power, he may be able to limit
ethnic conc respecially if he is able to improve the
and bring
ialtoconditions ipand
better lives to both Creoles and East Indians. However, unless he is able to establish institutions that
break down longstanding ethnic differences, hostilities may accompany the next election.
Other areas that might bear watching include Suriname
and the longstanding international dispute between
Haiti and the Dominican Republic. In the latter, racial
and cultural differences and a history of-conflict, combined with Dominican concerns about migration of
land-hungry Haitians, has led to repeated expulsions of
Haitian migrants. However, Haitians have been welcomed at times when Dominican workers were unable
Interamerican Development Bank. Such local conthe
flicts may cause problems for governments in affect
will undoubtedly
they
the course of natural resources development.
Indian political action organizations are likely to
become increasingly more powerful in national politics. They will receive help from international organizations with whom they share common interests. To
the
the extent that national governments accommodate ethdemands of these organizations, they may reduce
nic tensions. If ethnic interests are ignored, conflicts
are likely to develop, as in Mexico in 1994.
92
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References
Arevalo-Jimenez, Nelly and Andrew L. Cousins,
"False Promises," Cultural survival Quarterly, 16:1
(Winter 1992), pp. 10-13. An account of Venezuelan
30 years of experience working in Chiapas, Collier
places the Zapatista rebellion of 1994 in the context of
conflict over access to land at the local level. This
and the creation of the Casiquiare Biosphere Reserve
in 1991. Indigenous people were not included in the
planning phases of the reserve, and it is unclear how
they will be affected by it. The authors' belief that the
park will be difficult to protect seems borne out by
recent invasions by Brazilian miners.
election in Mexico.
Government policies toward the Yanomami people
Burbach, Roger and Peter Rosset, Chiapas and the
Crisis of Mexican Agriculture. Policy Brief. Oakland,
CA: Institute for Food and bevelopment Policy,
December 1994. A concise report on the problems of
land distribution and peasant agriculture in Mexico,
with a focus on the situation in Chiapas.
Burguete Cal y Mayor, Araceli, "Elections in Mexico:
Indigenous Suffrage Under protest," Abya Yala News,
8:3 (Fall 1994), pp. 6-8. A brief report on Indian participation in the August 1994 presidential election in
Mexico and efforts to develop a national Indian electoral strategy. The article discusses voting in Chiapas
book is current up to the August 1994 presidential
Dennis, Philip A., Intervillage Conflict in Oaxaca.
New Brunswick and London, Rutgers University
Press, 1987. A study of the origins of conflict over
land between two Zapotec Indian villages. Conflict is
seen as a device that has served to isolate Indian communities and to make them dependent on the state for
resolution of land disputes.
Eckstein, Susan, ed., Power and Popular Protest:
Latin American Social Movements. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989. A collection of
10 essays that deal with various aspects of Latin
American protest movements. Essays by McClintock
on Sendero Luminoso, Wickham-Crowley on guerrilla movements, and Nash on Bolivian mining communities are the most relevant to the subject of ethnic
conflict.
in August 1994.
Ewen, Alexander, ed. "Chiapas: Challenging History,
Campbell, Howard, "Juchitin:The Politics of Cultural
(Summer 1994). A special issue of the journal dedi-
Akwe:kon: A Journal of Indigenous Issues, 11:2
Revivalism in an Isthmus Zapotec Community," The
Latin American Anthropology Review, 2:2 (Winter
1990), pp. 47-55. An account of the rise of a leftist
Indian political party in a Mexican Indian community
and of the government's reaction to its election victory. This is a useful article for understanding some of
the causes of ethnic conflict in Mexico.
cated to articles on the Chiapas rebellion.
Choque, Maria Eugenia and Carlos Mamani, "Recon-
The author attributes most conflict to agricultural
State, Abya Yala News, 8:3 (Fall 1994), pp. 9, 33. A
nomic interests while causing a general decline in
Foley, Michael W. "Agrarian Conflict Reconsidered:
Popular Mobilization and Peasant Politics in Mexico
and Central America," Latin American Research
Review, 26:1 (1991), pp. 216-38. This article reviews
nine books, including four in Spanish and one in
English on Mexican campesino (peasant) movements.
structing the Ayllu: Toward Renewal of the Bolivian
modernization, which has strengthened powerful eco-
brief but timely analysis of the Indian political move-
rural living standards. Thus, "{e]thnic divisions, gen-
ment in Bolivia.
der issues, factional and familial rivalries, and plain
Collier, George A., with Elizabeth Lowery
whose ultimate sources lie elsewhere."
machismo may generate conflict and shape clashes
Quaratiello, Basta!: Land and the Zapatista Rebellion
in Chiapas. Oakland, CA: Institute for Food and
Development Policy, 1994. An anthropologist with
93
�CU0l23268
Forests, Ronald A., "Amazonia and the Politics of
Geopolitics," The GeographicalReview, 82/2 (1992),
pp. 128-42. Article contains a review of Brazilian geopolitical thought and discusses the ways in which its
application has affected Amazonian development.
GuyGopal, Manan M., Politics,Race, and Youth in
Research University
ana. San Francisco: Mellen
historical background and analysis of the Guyanese
situation through the end of the Burnham era.
.Kimmerling, Judith, Amazon Crude. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 1991. An informative but
on
polemical report on the impact of oil production
of the Ecuadorian Amathe environment and people
Press, 1992. This study of the attitudes of Indian youth
toward changes in race relations in Guyana contains
interesting information on the history of race relations
in the country. The author concludes that there is considerable sentiment on the part of Guayanese citizens
(as expressed by the youths who were interviewed) for
manipuunity across racial lines but that government
lation of the electoral process prevented this from happening.
zon.
Little, Paul E., EcologiaPoliticadel Cuyabeno:
El Desarrollono Sostenible de la Amazonia. Quito:
Instituto Latinoamericano de Investigaciones
Sociales (ILDOS) y Ediciones Abya-Yala, 1992. A
timely analysis of impacts of oil exploration and proand its
duction on Ecuador's Cuyabeno National Park
is a useful introduction to the
population. This book
principal points of conflict within the Ecuadorian
Amazon.
Greenberg, James B., Blood Ties: Life and Violence in
Rural Mexico. Tucson: The University of Arizona
Press, 1989. Analyzes violence in rural Mexico
through use of the biography of an Indian man from
the village of Yaitepec, followed by scholarly analysis
of the reasons for violence. See especially chapter
12 on land conflicts and the following Part II, "Explanations of Rural Violence in Mexico."
Hecht, Susanna and Alexander Cockburn, The Fate of
the Forest:Developers, Destroyers and Defenders of
the Amazon. London & New York: Verso, 1989. This
book has become one of the most quoted sources on
the policies and processes that account for environmental and human destruction in the Amazon Basin.
The focus is on Brazil. This book is essential reading
for background on ethnic conflict in the South American lowlands,
Hemming, John, ed., "The Frontier After a Decade of
Colonization," Changein the Amazon Basin, vol. II,
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985. A
collection of 20 papers that deal with the impact of
colonization in the Amazon Basin. This volume deals
with the processes and impacts of colonization but not
explicitly with ethnic conflict.
Jeffrey, Henry B. and Colin Baber, Guyana: Politics,
Economics and Society, Beyond the Burnham Era.
Mallon, Florencia E., "Indian Communities, Political
Cultures, and the State in Latin America, 1780-1990,"
JournalofLatin American Studies, 24: Quincentenary
Supplement (1992), pp. 35-53. A review of the history
of the role of indigenous political cultures to the formation of nation-states in Latin America. The author
concludes that Indian movements will play an increascultural
ingly important role in resolving the region's
and environmental conflicts.
Mars, Perry, "Ethnic Conflict and Political Control:
The Guyana Case," Social and Economic Studies,
39:3 (1990), pp. 65-94. A review of the history of ethnic conflict in Guyana before and following independence and up to the death of Forbes Burnham in 1985.
The author concludes that there is a close connection
between ethnic conflict and class conflict. Also, ethnic
conflict varied depending on the nature of the political
environment, with pluralist pre-independence systems
leading to relatively peaceful relationships while the
authoritarian Burnham government intensified ethnic
conflict.
Nietschnamm, Bernard, "The Third World War," Cul-
tural Survival Quarterly, 11:3 (1987), pp. 1-6I
h
recognized expert on ethnic conflict among geographers reviews conflicts between states and "autonomous nations," (traditional ethnic minorities) around
the world. A fundamental introduction to the topic.
London: Francis Pinter and Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner, 1986. A survey that provides interesting
94
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Russell, Philip L., The Chiapas Rebellion. Austin
Texas: The Mexican Resource Center, 1995. The
author is ajournalist with years of experience in Mexico who presents detailed background information on
the long-term abuses of Indian rights in Chiapas. The
book is current through the August 1994 presidential
elections.
Schmink, Marianne and Charles H. Wood, eds., Frontier Expansion in Amazonia. Gainesville: University
of 20 papers from
of Florida Press, 1984. A collection
the Second Conference on the Amazon, held at the
University of Florida in 1982. The focus of the papers
is on colonization policies of the Amazonian nations,
clasand some papers have become widely cited near
sics.
Starn, Orrin, "New Literature on Peru's Sendero
Luminoso," Latin American Research Reiew, 27:2
(1992), pp. 2 12-226. A comparative review of six
recent (1989-91) books on Peru's Maoist guerrilla
movement. Five of the six books reviewed are pub-
lished in Spanish in Peru. This review notes the lack
of "any appeal to 'Indianness' in Sendero's official
ideology" cited by "many recent observers."
Stavenhagen, Rodolfo, "Challenging the Nation-State
in Latin America," Journal of International Affairs,"
45:2 (Winter 1992), pp. 421-440. This brief paper by
one of Mexico's most highly regarded social scientists
relapresents a clear and succinct survey of changing
the state and Indians in Latin America.
tions between
This article provides important background for understanding current state-Indian relations in the region.
Urban, Greg and Joel Sherzer, eds., Nation-States and
Indians in Latin America. Austin: The University of
Texas Press, 1991. A collection of 12 essays describing various aspects of the relationship of Latin American Indians with the state. These essays provide a
theoretical framework for analysis of Indian responses
to conflict with national governments.
Winant, Howard, "Rethinking Race in Brazil," Journal of Latin American Studies, 24:1 (February 1992),
exists indepp. 173-92. The author argues that racism
pendently of class in Brazil. Black political organizais
tions are named, and the emergence of the race issue
explored. The paper concludes that politicization of
race has become a fact of life in Brazil.
Yelvington, Kelvin, ed., Trinidad Ethnicity. Knoxville:
The University of Tennessee Press, 1993. This book
contains 12 essays that cover various aspects of ethnic
relations and ethnicity in Trinidad and Tobago. Offer-
ings range ftom social and political topics to literature
and music.
"utml:My
Zapeta, Estuardo, "Guatema
oeeta
Maya Movemnt at
(Fall
the Political Crossroads," Abya Yala News, 8:3 politi1994), pp. 10-13. Analysis of the Maya Indian
cal movement in Guatemala. Concludes that the
movement has great potential for gaining political
power but so far falls short of achieving its promise.
of
The Army is a significant barrier to achievement
true power.
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did not even send priests for several centuries-and
others migrated tovard the Atlantic coast jungles.
Summary of Discussion
Discussant: Mac Chapin
Although we all saw a good deal about Central Amer-
the
ica on television and in the newspapers during in
1980s, interest in the region has been eclipsed
recent years by events in Eastern Europe, Russia, the
Middle East, and so forth. Central America is a relatively tiny area; it has less than 5 percent of the land
surface of the United States and about one-tenth of its
population. One of the big differences between this
part of the world and the other regions that we have
been discussing is that we are not going to find separatist indigenous groups in Latin America. Certainly,
in Central America, there are no Indian groups that are
going to attack the central governments.
.
1 want to talk about the indigenous people who are,
aside from a few isolated groups in Central America,
virtually invisible. The region's indigenous peoples
are located primarily in two regions, the Guatemalan
highlands and the coastal regions adjacent the Caribbean Sea. Both locations are classic areas of refuge.
Mayan Indians speaking 22 different languages
inhabit the densely populated Guatemalan highlands.
The region has three countries of some importance
from an ethnic standpoint: Guatemala, El Salvador,
and Nicaragua. The largest concentrations of Indians
in Latin America are found in the G3uatemnalan highand
lands. The hatred between the country's Latinos
Mayan Indians is palpable. This intense ethnic hatred,
which has grown over time, was most recently manifested in the extremely bloody civil war that reached
intensity in the mid-1970s and that lasted until about
1983. DIring that period 100,000 Indians were killed.
of
Scorched earth policies were practiced by a number
extermination.
Guatemalan leaders. It was a war of
The Guatemalan Government used the military
against the ethnic population.
The situation in El Salvador is similar to that in Guatemala. El Salvador currently has an Indian population
of about 500,000. Over the centuries, there have been
a series of attempts to eliminate the Indian populations. In the 1880s the last communal territories were
abolished by decree and the Indians were displaced.
The last ethnic war in El Salvador was in 1932 when,
within the space of about a week, the military
It conmarched out and killed about 35,000
Numbering approximately 4.5 million people, they
compose half the country's population and half the
sciously searched out people who were dressed like
who
Indians, who looked like Indians, and ethnicspoke an
conflicts
all the other Indians of the region are found stretched
in El Salvador since that time. The conflict has really
indigenous population of Central America. Virtually
along the Caribbean coast between the southern porf
tion of Toledo district in Belize and P-anama.
the
At the time of the arrival of the Spaniards, most of
in Central America were
6 million Indians then living
located in population centers along the Pacific side of
the region where there were much better soils, a more
hospitable climate, and less rainfall. After the Spaniards arrived, approximately 80 percent of the population was killed off largely through diseases;
demographically, the Indians are just now starting to
recover.
Indian language. There have been no
shifted; the rural poor have become the surrogates for
the ethnic population. An extension of the same battle,
it is essentially over land and resources. During the
1980s the target was principally peasants-in contrast
to the Indians, who were organized.
During the Nicaraguan civil war, the Mosquito Indians who inhabit the Atlantic coast region with its forestry and offshore marine resources were forcibly
relocated. Since the end of the war they have returned
to their homes but have beenin the middle of attempts
by multinationals to cut down the coastal forests..
who were
Many of the region's Indian populations,
moved to areas
not either assimilated or exterminated,
where the Spanish had no interest. Some groups
moved to the highlands of Guatemala-where they
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I would like to reiterate a point that Professor Elbow
made, which is that virtually all the conflicts today in
Central America and also in South America are over
land and resources. Indian populations inhabit rich
forested areas, and there is a push-not necessarily by
the state but often by a combination of corrupt and
greedy government officials, landless peasants, and
multinationals-to resettle the Indians and to take
resources away from them.
In Central America the problem areas will be the lowlands. An examination of the remaining forestry
resources of the region shows the correspondence
between the forests and the lands currently inhabited
by the region's Indian populations. Although there are
incipient indigenous group organizations throughout
the areas, they are not strong enough to present any
real opposition to outside forces. These organizations
will need to be nurtured if they are going to be helpful
in protecting the region's remaining natural endow-
ment.
Ecuador has, according to the latest reports, something
on the order of about 20 years worth of oil left, and,
as far as I can determine, industry and government are
trying to get it out in 15 years. The government has
allowed the oil companies to move into areas that are
supposedly reserved for Indians and are not supposed
to be exploited. The oil companies can pretty much go
wherever they want to. Now, because of bad press, the
government and the oil companies as well have had to
do a little bit to clean up their act. So pollution has perhaps been reduced, but the real problem is that where
oil companies go, others follow. The development of
roads by the oil companies has led to the opening up of
the region to colonization. When oil companies clear a
little stretch of road that is 10 meters or more wide, the
colonists come in and take out the rest.
MR. CHAPIN: Initially, when the oil development
started down in the Amazon area, CONOCO and an
Indian group was involved. Then the National
Resources Defense Counsel and others became
engaged. The theory behind the outside involvement
was that negative publicity would pressure CONOCO
General Discussion
to act responsibly. A lot of NGOs then got involved,
Indian groups protested CONOCO actions, and
QUESTION: Would either of you like to comment on
the possibility of racial strife in Cuba?
CONOCO pulled out. When CONOCO left, a number
of small wildcat groups, who could not be pressured
on anything, went in and started taking it over. So that
MR. CHAPIN: I don't think that's an issue.
is the current situation.
DR. ELBOW: Most of the whites are living in Miami.
QUESTION: The UN working group on the rights of
What's left, from my understanding, is a fairly predominantly mulatto and black population.
QUESTION: Would either or both speakers comment
further on the role of nonstate actors such as NGOs
and industry in conflicts in the region? I'm thinking in
particular of attempts to develop oil in Ecuador.
DR. ELBOW: Yes, I am quite familiar with the case of
Ecuador. Both industry-in particular, but not exclu-
sively, the oil industry-and NGOs are active. They are
engaged in a sort of holy war, if you want to think of it
that way, over the Amazon. The NGOs are trying to
preserve what's left of the resources, and the oil companies and the government are attempting to mine them.
indigenous people has been developing a declaration
that will eventually work its way up in the UN system.
This declaration addresses the issue of rights and control of resources by indigenous peoples. Do you see
much of a chance for this declaration being passed by
the UN, and, if so, how would that impact upon the
relationship between indigenous peoples and the
state? Would it tend to lessen friction or increase it?
MR. CHAPIN: I don't think it will have much effect
at all simply because any resolution passed by the
UN has no legal status in any of these countries. If
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anything, it antagonizes the government. Most of
these governments have laws that any subsurface minerals belong to the state,
impression that this is due largely to this ethnic interaction or to the economic downturn, or is it a combination of both?
DR. WIXMAN: In the former Soviet Union, there is a
DR. ELBOW:. I suspect it's a combination of both.
very interesting movement that I think parallels something happening in the United States in the environmental movement. The preservation of indigenous
people, such as the native American and, in the case of
the former Soviet Union, the native Siberian, are portrayed as synonymous with the preservation of the
natural environments. Indigenous people who no one
had ever heard of or cared about have become a political symbol. Do you see a movement of this type taking place in Latin America among any of the young
people in which the survival of a particular indigenous
group symbolizes either the survival of the country as
a whole or of its environment? Are there young Cen-
Trinidad had, 10 years ago, the highest per capita
income in Latin America. In addition, local political
parties have been built essentially upon an ethnic base.
Ethnicity is used, or perhaps exploited, as a political
tool. That is also true in Guyana.
tral Americans, let us say among students in universi-
inputs from the Catholic Church, the Peace Corps, and
QUESTION: What are the sources of support for
reform in Central and South America?
DR. ELBOW: That is a difficult question. To the
extent that reform is taking place, it comes from a
combination of groups and institutions. In the Guatemalan case, it has been a cooperative movement with
ties, that are beginning to hold up the Indian as the
symbol of the preservation?
DR. ELBOW: It is occurring in Ecuador. One of the
things that I think is an interesting, unexplored topic,
NGOs. Benefits from these efforts include: leadership
training, education, the breaking down of linguistic
barriers so that the Indians can communicate with
each other in Spanish, and the development of Indian
self-awareness and a sense of Pan-Indian identity.
Ironically, often, it is when it looks like the Indians are
going to begin to have some political power and to
make some impact, that the tendency for a backlash
is what causes a green movement to develop in certain
begins. In some cases the army has stepped in and
countries and not in others. Why Costa Rica? Why
now an emerging green movement in Ecuador, for
countered the development. If you look at Ecuador,
you can see this sort of scenario developing. In 1991
example?
the Indians had a big sit-in in the National Cathedral.
MR. CHAPIN: Yes, especially in Mexico but also in
other places to some extent.
In 1992 they had demonstrations against the 500th
anniversary of Columbus's landing. Ecuador is not
Guatemala, however. It does not have the same history
of-violence that Guatemala has, but I could still imagine the government getting to the point where it feels
so squeezed that the military steps in and says it has
QUESTION: Professor Elbow, you had mentioned, in
general, that there was not much in the way of evidence for the ethnic conflict in South American. You
.touched on two countries, Suriname and Trinidad and
Tobago, where there are mixtures of ethnic groups and
a lot of conflicts. The Trinidadian press is quite con-
had enough.
cerned with the general upswing in violence. Is it your
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Ethnicity and Nationality in the
Middle East
Marvin W. Mikesell
Professor of Geography
University of Chicago
The Middle East, with its immense petroleum reserves
and unique role as a crossroads between Europe, Asia,
and Africa, is a region of manifest global importance.
It is also a region of inherent instability. Tension, if
not open conflict, between states and among groups
within states is a persisting reality. Add extreme disparity between wealth and poverty, numerous disputed
boundaries, the problems created by frustrated Palestinian and Kurdish political-territorial aspirations, the
spreading influence of Islamic fundamentalism, and
the prevalence of nondemocratic governments and it
is no wonder that the Middle East is perceived universally to be a region of contention and danger.
rather than one continues to be a perplexing question
for the people and contending monarchs and dictators
of the region. At the end of the Cold War-as was the
case at the end of the two world wars-most of the
countries of the Arab realm are anachronistic and, for
the most part, are arbitrary units of former empires.
Nevertheless, jealousy or suspicion of neighboring
states plus the ambition of state leaders has fostered
keen feelings of nationalism even in countries that had
only provincial or mandate status before their independence.
"Turkistan"
It is ironic that a region blessed with a high degree of
cultural unity should exhibit so much evidence of discord. Arabic is the official language of no less than
18 countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan,
Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia,
United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Moreover, with
the exception of Bahrain, Iraq, and Lebanon, Sunni
A similar perplexing question must now be posed in
regard to Pan-Turkish aspirations. Before the breakup
of the USSR, the world had only one Turkish state-or two if we include the dubious "'Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus." With the independence of the
former Soviet Republics of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan,
Kazakstan, Kirgizstan, and Uzbekistan, there are five
additional ones. To date, concern about the character
of this enlarged realm and indeed of a "Turkistan" that
might include other Turkish-speaking peoples has
centered on practical issues such as what alphabet
should be used, economic reforms, and the efficacy of
secular or religious forms of government. The present
and potential influence of Russia, Turkey, Iran,
Afghanistan, and China in this vast area has invited
considerable speculation. It is possible that developments in "Turkistan" will be influenced by more specific ethnic interests. For example, it is easy to
Muslims are the majority religious group in each of
imagine Azeri-speakers from Iran serving as volun-
these countries. This remarkable degree of linguistic
and religious commonality might have inspired a pervasive feeling of unity. In fact, the 18 Arab countries
have seldom been able to function as a geopolitical
bloc, and rivalry among prospective Pan-Arab leaders
has produced and doubtless will continue to produce
tension in the region.
teers in the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
Conflict in Persian-speaking Tajikistan has already
encouraged participation by the well-armed Tajiks of
northern Afghanistan. Conflict elsewhere in Central
Asia could encourage participation by Turkmen from
Iran and Kazakhs and Uzbeks from Afghanistan or
even from China. The fact that the Turkish- and Persian-speaking countries of the former Soviet Union all
have substantial minority groups complicates the picture considerably. From an American or European
perspective, Turkey's aspiration to be a Western-oriented role model for Central Asia has obvious appeal.
The Mirage of Arab Unity
Attempts to merge various of the Arab states-for
example, Egypt and Syria in the United Arab Republic
during 1958-61-have been sporadic and ephemeral.
Nor has any of the great cities of the region-Cairo,
Damascus, and Baghdad-been able to function as a
Pan-Arab capital. Why there are 18 Arab countries
99
�C00123268
It must be remembered that this aspiration derives
from awareness of.linguistic affiliation rather than any
realistic assessment of Turkey's political influence or
economic power.
Afghanistan and the religious complexity of Lebanon
are so striking that these countries might be described
as nonnation states.
Significant Minorities
"Nations" in the Middle Eastern Context
"Nation-states," although often alluded to, are rarely
found in the modern world. Perhaps only Iceland can
be regarded as a perfect example. In the Middle East,
Tunisia (minus its several communities of Berber
speakers) is an approximate example. Most Middle
Eastern countries include more than one linguistic or
religious group and so can be described as multinational states. For example:
In addition to the major groupings that create the
impression of a three-part linguistic division (Arabic,
Turkish, Persian) or a two-part religious division
(Sunni and Shia Islam), the Middle East has numerous
minority groups, and some of these have political
agenda that are in conflict with national policies. The
tension between substate identity and national affiliation, eviden't in most of the world, has several clear
manifestations in the Middle East.
e
Syria has Kurdish and other non-Arab ethnic minorities, and-besides its Sunni Muslim majority-has
significant Christian, Druze, and Alawite religious
Minority-or otherwise unempowered-groups that
have expressed separatist ideals or at least a desire for
an enhanced degree of national recognition include
groups.
e
Uzbeks and Tajiks in Afghanistan; Baluchi in Iran;
Shiites in Iraq and Lebanon; Christians in Egypt,
Iran has both Shia and Sunni Muslims and a number
of non-Persian linguistic groups, including Azeri,
Arabs, Kurds, Baluchi, Luri, Basseri, Bakhtiari, and
Turkmen.
Syria, and Iraq; and Arabs in Israel and Israeli-occupied territory. Each of these groups has aspirations
that are in conflict with policies formulated by ruling
groups in the respective countries. The region's most
serious conflict along these lines is in southern Sudan
where Arab or Arabized Muslims have been fighting
linguistically diverse Christians and animists for several decades.
- Lebanon has six major religious groups-Maronite,
Greek Catholic, and Greek Orthodox Christians;
Sunni and Shia Muslims; and Druze.
- Egypt has a large population (about 10 million) of
Coptic Christians.
- Turkey has several million Kurds and many smaller
minority groups, including Arabs, Laz, Greeks,
Tatars, and Circassians.
The idea that the Arabic or Turkish languages might
be the basis of a niultistate nation has already been
alluded to and dismissed as having only tentative or
hypothetical meaning. "Arabistan" and "Turkistan"
are debatable concepts rather than geopolitical realities. The same can probably be said of the idea of a
"multistate nation of Islam." More important in the
The largest minority group within the Arabic realm is
not politically significant. About 40 percent of the
people or Morocco and about 20 percent of the people
of Algeria speak Berber rather than or in addition to
Arabic. However; the scattered distribution of these
people, mainly in mountain areas, the numerous dialects they speak, and the lack of any written or standardized form of their language have precluded the
development of any separatist movement among Berbers.
Some other minority groups are too weak numerically
to pose a threat to national authorities or compel recognition of their linguistic or religious identity. The
context of the Middle East are nonstate nations, of
Assyrians (Aramaic-speaking Christians) of northern
which Palestine and Kurdistan are the most conspicuous examples. Finally, the linguistic complexity of
100
�C00123268
Iraq exemplify this situation, in spite of claims made
Kurdish people and the lifting of some of the restric-
on behalf of autonomy for them by Assyrian immigrant groups in the United States. Nor have the Arabs
of southeastern Turkey or in the Khuzistan Province
of Iran posed a serious threat to Turkish or Iranian
authority. Indeed, when the Iraqis invaded Iran in
1980 they expected the Arabic-speakers of Khuzistan
to welcome liberation from Iranian rule. Instead, as
Shiites, the Arabs in this part of Iran had good reason
to see benefit in the rule of Ayatollah Khomeini and
danger for them in the Sunni or secular bias of the
government of Saddam Husayn. The same religious
bond explains why the Azeri of northern Iran rejected
the prospect of merger with the neighboring Soviet
Republic of Azerbaijan during World War II.
tions on the use of the Kurdish language.
The Problem of Kurdistan
Kurds have adopted different strategies for promotion
of their cause, depending on opportunities available in
the countries where they reside. They have seldom
expressed enthusiasm for the benefits of Iranian, Iraqi,
or Turkish citizenship. It is Kurdish citizenship that
they desire or at least autonomy as a transitional stage
en route to independence. The frustration of Kurdish
nationalism has been a consequence of its collision
with Iranian, Iraqi, and Turkish nationalism. The location of the Kirkuk oilfield in northern Iraq is an additional complication. Kurdish successional aims in Iraq
have been supported by Iran and, to a lesser extent, by
Turkey, while Kurdish nationalism in both these countries has been suppressed. Because assimilation is
rejected by Kurdish leaders, Kurdistan is and doubt-
less will remain a nonstate nation.
Estimates of the number of Kurds vary widely, from
less than 15 million to more than 30 million. In the
Kurdish nationalism is an even more intractable prob-
negotiations that accompanied the division of the
Ottoman Empire after World War I, various prospects
were suggested for the Kurds, ranging from local
autonomy to independence. In fact, they became a
shadow nation in northwestern Iran, northern Iraq, and
southeastern Turkey. During World War II, when
Soviet troops occupied northern Iran, Kurds enjoyed
some autonomy and, under the Mahabad Republic of
1946, even a brief period of nominal independence. In
lem than Palestinian nationalism. Although the latter
problem has a large international dimension, it relates
essentially to the relationship between two nonassimilable peoples: Arabs and Jews. The nonstate status of
Kurdistan derives from a more complicated relationship among Kurds and Arabs, Turks, and Iranians. In
each case they have been or can be regarded as candidates for absorption. Although autonomy may be a
realizable aspiration, independence within a territory
1974, after several years of civil war, Kurds in north-
relinquished by three states is difficult to imagine.
ern Iraq were granted a high degree of autonomy,
including recognition of the coequal status of Kurdish
and Arabic as official languages of the region. Most of
the provisions of this agreement were never implemented, and Kurdish autonomy became a dead issue
when the Iran-Iraq war began in 1980. In Turkey,
Kurds, often called "Mountain Turks," have sought to
achieve recognition and hence to resist assimilation.
Kurdish nationalism in Turkey developed in response
to denial of such recognition 4nd the enforcement of
Kurdistan is best described, therefore, as a cultural
geographic reality that happens coincidentally to be a
political geographic impossibility.
laws inspired by Article 57 of the Turkish constitu-
countries, into warfare. For three decades Lebanon
tion, which forbids "activities that aim at destroying
the ethnic unity of the Turkish people." In response to
the Gulf war and some pressure from the European
Community, the Turkish Government is now enter-
seemed to be functioning not only as a plural society
but, more remarkably, also as the world's only pluralistic theocracy. We now know that it was only an
unsuccessful experiment.
Lebanon in Retrospect
The disastrous conflict in Lebanon offers a useful
focus for examination of the circumstances that can
transform instability, present in many Middle Eastern
taining thoughts of at least qualified recognition of the
101
�C00123268
Lebanon was created by the French as a homeland for
Christian Arabs, especially the Maronites. The French
began to treat the Maronites as proteges early in the
19th century when Paris was competing with London
encouraged persistent tension. Moreover, because the
Lebanese who found employment abroad and sent
remittances from abroad were almost exclusively
Christians, the country soon developed a pattern of
for economic and political influence in the Middle
extreme disparity in standards of living. The deeply
East. In 1860 the French intervened militarily to protect their clients. during a Muslim-Christian civil war.
After that intervention the Maronite area enjoyed privileged status as an autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire. The dismemberment of the Empire after
World War I permitted the French to exercise direct
control over this district and also over the much larger
adjacent territory of Syria. The French desire to create
rural Shia areas of southwestern and northeastern Lebanon were conspicuously backward. Even in the more
prosperous Christian districts, democracy was compromised by nepotism and the inability of elected
leaders to think of national rather than sectarian interests.
a state for theirChristian proteges posed an interesting
Arab-Israeli conflict, its tensions and ambiguities
dilemma. The territory occupied predominantly by
Maronites (roughly the northwestern quarter of mod-
might have been countered by faith that the country
was somehow better off than its neighbors. When Pal-
em Lebanon) would have been too small to be an
estinian refugees acquired sufficient strength in Leba-
effective state. Therefore, they added land from their
Syrian mandate and announced the birth of a "Greater
Lebanon," three times the size of the Maronite area.
This larger territory included a substantial number of
Sunni and Shia Muslims, non-Maronite Christians,
and Druze.
non to wage their battle from Lebanon, the tottering
Humpty Dumpty created by the French could not
remain on the wall. The reason why the country disintegrated so rapidly can be explained not only by its
inherent cultural problems but also by the ineffectiveness of the small national army, which consisted
mainly of Christian officers and Muslim enlisted men.
Caught in the crossfire of Palestinians already in Lebanon, Israelis who felt free to attack them anywhere in
Lebanon, and Syrian "deterrent" forces that occupied
the eastern half-of Lebanon, it is no wonder that the
Lebanese Army went AWOL. With its departure the
Lebanese Government, no longer able to protect its
citizens, could not prevent the proliferation of divisive
militias and the beginning of a civil war-immensely
complicated by foreign interventions-that led to the
de facto partition of Lebanon into areas controlled by
Maronites, Shiites, Syrians, Israelis, and Palestinians.
A French-sponsored census of 1932 suggested that
Christians formed a slight majority of the population
of Greater Lebanon and that Maronites, with about
30 percent of the total, were the largest specific group.
This was Lebanon's only formal census, and a vast
array of subsequent problems can be traced to doubts
about its accuracy. Suggestions that a new census
should be made were checked by insistence that
Maronites and other Christians "temporarily living
abroad" should also be counted. Because the number
of Christian Lebanese abroad could be ascertained
only by those remaining in Lebanon, that prospect was
never accepted by Muslims. The absence of believable
If Lebanon had been able to remain aloof from the
data on the size of religious groups in a country where
citizenship was defined by religion and political
The Middle East in the Coming Decade
power, and even minor government positions, were
allocated on the basis of religious affiliation inhibited
the development of any collective sense of national
Scholars devoted to the Middle East have often been
able to offer convincing retrospective explanations of
developments in this complex and troubled region.
identity.
Examples of-successful prediction are more difficult
to find. Within the past two decades, surprising events,
such as the collapse of the regime of the Shah, the
The list of problems inspired by the census controversy is long and melancholy. For example, the tendency of each religious group to try to get more than
its dubious "official" share of government largess
102
�C00123268
subsequent revolutionary rule of
Ayatollah Khomeini,
the assassination of An war Sadat,
and the Iraqi invaSentire region.
te
eatereionsi. Uncertaind isa certaizt in n
nTinty a rtanet
Eastern studies. This a priori generalizationMiddle
is sustaed
by another equally obvious generalization
Each of the dictators and monarchs
is mortal, and we
can only speculate on what their
departure might
mean for the region. Taking account
of the many disputed boundaries in the regio (for
example, Iraq-Ian,
Israel-Syria, ibya-Chad, Morcco-Algera)
invites
additional speculation.
only Arabic. This process of gradual,
voluntary assimilation should also result in the Arabization
of the
speakers of several languages in the Sahelian zone. On
the other hand, some numerically small groups,
defined by either language or religion,
may avoid or
be able
to resist assimilation, especially if
they have
low national visibility. The non-Iranian
linguistic
groups in the Zagros Mountains
may exemplify this
prospect. Christians will doubtless
survive and even
prosper in countries that are able
to resist the pressures
of Islamic fundamentalism. Lebanon,
Syria, and possibly Iraq could exemplify this
prospect. The alterna-
The iffsionwitin
he regi
fThe diffusion within the rgid ofvarius x
;tive situation, in which non-Muslims are threatened,
n
of Islamic fundamentalism is'a of various expressions would occur inevitably in any country
cause of further and
that is captured
by Islamic fundamentalists.
more serious uncertainty. Islamic fundamentalism can
result in persecution of heterodox Muslim
groups,
such as the Druze, Alawites, Yezidis, and Bahais, and
can exacerbate the tension between Sunni and Shia
Muslims and among Muslims who might be labeled
variously as worldly or other-worldly, pro-Western or
anti-Western, and moderate or radical. At present, Iran
is the principal exporter and coordinator of movements designed to subvert and eventually supplant
secular authority. This movement has crossed the
region's Sunni-Shia faultline, now presents a seiwish
threat to the Governments of Egypt and Algeria
d
is a potential threat elsewhere. Even Turkey, officially
secular since the time of Ataturk, has experenced
unrest inspired by Islamic zealots. Because it is military rather than civil authority that is most likely to be
effective in blocking revolutioiary religious movements, Islamic fundamentalism acts both directly and
indirectly in the frustration or delay
of democratic
development in the region. The
thinly disguised Army
coup of January 1993 in Algeria
is a good illustration
of this principle.
In spite of this recitation of circustances that make
npe
hi ecttion ofusih
cicumstancs ithtmk
prediction hazardous in the Middle
East, it is possible
to point
to some happy and unhappy constants
regard-
ing minority groups. For example, it is safe to assume
that the Arabization of the Berber areas of North
Africa will continue without interruption. As a result
of improvements in communication and education,
mountain and desert peoples who now speak
only
Berber will become bilingual and
eventually speak
103
Finally, it is probably
of Palestine isnot likely to beasolved coampletely
m
within the coming decade. The various ideas that have
been entertained for solution of the Israeli-Palestinian
problem seem without exception to have inherent contradictions. Trading land for peace presupposes Israeli
willingness to trade enough land to satisfy Palestinian
aspirations. This unrealistic formula also Presuppose
that Jewish settlers n pottial also
prritposes
pers
indpotential Palestinisninirritory
be
lie
aded to leave. Again,
tan
may
denebut only if this isa transitional rather than a
ernet
ongeent. is
a
Palethana
Jordanian confederaton are also being entertained,
but this prospect merely defers questions about the
character and area of the Palestinian part of the union.
Because it is not likely that Arabs will ever be able to
live contentedly in a Jewish state
or Jews in an Arab
state and no realistic proposal
has been advanced that
could result in the separation of
the two peoples, the
Arab-Israeli problem probably
will be with us for
many years.
The problem of Kurdistan also
seems to be intractable
and so canbergddasacnttinheMdl
Eastern culturalpolitical equation. If the area now
occupied by Kurds were to become an independent
state, it would be no less viable than many of the
existing states in the region. It would have abundant
�C00123268
land suitable for cereal farming and horticulture, a rich
petroleum field, several cities, and a population of
15-30 million. None of these observations distracts
attention from a reality that precludes any prospect for
the creation of an independent Kurdistan because a
Kurdish state could come into being only if Iraq, Turkey, and Iran were to display unprecedented cooperation and generosity.
These speculative remarks reinfprce a comment made
at the beginning of this review: the Middle East is and
will continue to be an area of contention and danger.
As the only superpower and, indeed, the only external
power capable of influencing events in the region, the
United States has an unavoidable responsibility. At the
least, we might hope that our experience since 1776
could be a source of illumination for those Middle
104
Easterners--the vast majority of them-who have
never known democracy. Other hopes can be entertained. By encouraging government reforms, discouraging excessive military expenditures, exposing
human rights abuses, seeking by diplomatic means to
promote peaceful settlement of border disputes, and
organizing boycotts when such are required to prevent
or punish reckless national behavior, the United States
could expect to play a constructive role in the Middle
East. We also need to recognize that the United States
has been, and will continue to be, viewed with suspicion and even contempt as a new colonial power, well
aware of the natural resources and strategic position of
the region but incapable of understanding the aspirations and frustrations of its "difficult people."
�C00123268
References
The primary source of information on all aspects of
the geography of the Middle East is the Tubinger Atlas
des Vorderen Orients (Wiesbaden, 1968-1993). The
several hundred sheets of this serial publication and its
many supplementary monographs include a wealth of
information on most of the linguistic and religious
groups in the region.
A convenient list of useful literature on the human and
physical geography of the region appears in the
section devoted to Southwest Asia and North Africa
in A Geographical Bibliography for American
Libraries(Washington, DC: Association of American
Geographers, 1985).
The London-based Minority Rights Group has issued
The coverage of the Middle East in Atlas Narodov
Mira (Moscow, 1964) was remarkably explicit at that
time and is still useful as a source of information on
the location of linguistically defined groups.
several reports on Middle Eastern topics. No one volume deals adequately with ethnicity and nationality in
the Middle East. However, Carleton Coon's Caravan:
The Story of the Middle East (New York, 1951) is still
useful and stimulating in spite of its early postcolonial
date.
The Middle EastJournaland Asian Bulletin are good
sources for information on recent events.
105
�C00123268
The outlook for Kurds achieving a state is grim. Pro-
Summary of Discussion
fessor Mikesell says it is impossible, and maybe it is.
But in this region we can never say never, as evidenced by the recent gasp-provoking handshake
between PLO Chief Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister
Rabin on the lawn of the White House. In the past,
some outside assistance has gone to the Kurds in an
effort to destabilize the regime in Iraq. During the
1970s, for instance, Israel and the United States sent
in arms to shore up the Kurdish cause, but, as we all
know, this did not work. Since the Persian Gulf war,
there has been a fair amount of pressure brought to
bear on Turkey in the hope that it might promote some
Kurdish autonomy in the area, but this does not seem
to be working. The tragedy is that, with so many other
things going on in this part of the world, the Kurdish
cause is definitely on the back burner.
Discussant: Mildred Berman
In contrast to some areas we have talked about, the
Middle East is relatively small in terms of total population. It contains some 300 million people--only
about 6 percent of the world's population-although it
certainly takes up a disproportionate share of the
headlines.
This is an area with a long cultural history. Three of
the world's most influential religions have come from
here. It has been an area of the first domestication of
crops, first settlement, first cities, and so on.
In addition, this is a place through which tribes as well
as empires have moved, changed, and reinvented
themselves. This means, then, that the areal extent of
the region keeps shifting like the sands. We have
heard the area called the Near East, the Hither East,
and Southwest Asia. The terms Near East and Hither
East included the Balkans because they were part of
the Ottoman Empire. Today, the term Middle East is
common, but during World War II the Middle East
Command went as far south as Kenya.
Regarding Lebanon, that country-a very unsuccessful experiment as Professor Mikesell has so rightly
described-was programmed for failure from the
beginning. The separation of Lebanon from Syria
overlooked the fact that members of the country's
17 individual sects had loyalties not only to their religious groups but also to tribes and villages as well.
This has continued until the present time. Lebanon
then has had no real political control over its many
peoples.
One of the terms that geographers and anthropologists
use when discussing this region is "mosaic." It is a
The country began to unravel in the 1970s with the
very poetic term and appropriate because of the won-
establishment of individual fiefdoms and, again, with
derful mosaic floors left by the Romans and the
mosaic work on the mosques throughout much of-the
area. But a mosaic implies symmetry, and, as you have
just heard from Professor Mikesell, the intense variety
of people here is not very symmetrical. In talking
about mosaics, I recently read something very interesting. After Jerusalem was retaken by the Saracens
under Saladin in the 12th century, many tiles of the
Dome of the Rock had to be replaced because they
had begun to fall off. The people who put the tiles
back were not Muslim artisans, but Armenian Christians; one of the great monuments in the Muslim
The Syrian Army presence remains a real danger;
there are 40,000 Syrian troops in the country, and they
show no sign of moving. The Christians are very
much concerned about what may happen if the Syrians move to annex Lebanon. They fear that this will
the PLO ministate, which was destroyed by the 1982
incursion of the Israel Defense Forces. Today, the
infrastructure in Beirut and Southern Lebanon is in
shambles. It is uncertain whether the country will ever
reemerge as a banking center, tourist attraction, or an
air transport hub.
be bad for them, and many Muslims in the area also
world was repaired by laborers from another religion.
fear the repressiveness of the Syrian regime.
I would like to comment on two of the issues that Professor Mikesell adressed: the Kurdish situation and
Lebanon.
106
�COO123268
Finally, the major concern the Lebanese currently
have is the 300,000 Palestinian refugees who are in
the southern part of their country. They would like to
see them moved out. This is another of the destabilizing aspects of the human geography of the Middle
East.
The Turks see themselves as living in a unitary state, a
nation-state. They know a lot of diversity exists in the
country, but they have not allowed allow citizenship to
be defined in reference to anything other than Turkish
identity.
QUESTION: Do you think that there will be an alienation of those Kurds who have been integrated into
Turkish society, particularly within the military and
General Discussion
the intelligence services?
QUESTION: I'd like to focus Xhe Kurdish question on
Turkey. What do you think the prospects are for
Turks-who seem adamantly ppposed to any kind of
acknowledgment of the Kurds. at all-to ever try to
solve the Kurdish problem politically or socially
rather than just militarily? Is this insurgency ever
going to end?
DR. MIKESELL: The recent statements from Prime
Minister Ciller simply reinforce what has been said
before. When asked about this, she said, "Why is there
a problem? The Kurds have the same rights as all
other Turkish citizens." In other words, the Turks are
quite emphatic in the idea that, although they recognize they have minorities, they cannot have minority
citizenship.
There is a Kurdish party represented in the parliament
in Ankara. When the delegates arrived and wanted to
use the Kurdish language, however, they were accused
of treason and violation of law,
107
DR. MIKESELL: Turkey has used military conscription as a way of promoting national identity, and,
when a Kurd is drafted into the army, he gets shipped
away from Kurdistan. The Turks have used military
service and crash programs in literacy to try to Turkify
the non-Turkish population. It would be very difficult
to find out how much assimilation has taken place,
however, because Turks are so sensitive to this issue.
Regardless, I can't imagine an assimilated Kurd who
has changed his name and who knows Turkish going
back to being a Kurdish nationalist.
�C00123268-
seems to me, when we examine China in this regard,
is "which seams."
Ethnicity Theory and Ethnic Conflict
in China: The New Politics of
Difference
With the rise of a unipolar world led by the United
States, the question of China's domestic integrity
becomes paramount (Garver 1992). However, geopoDru Gladney
litical strategists and scholars may be tempted to abanResearch Fellow,
don their interest in the minorities of China-key
Program for Cultural Studies
players in the border disputes between the two former
East-West Center
neighboring adversaries-who were often only of
The Chinese people have shown the greatest loyalty to interest as potential irritants to Sino-Soviet relations.
China now shares a much reduced border with Russia
family and clan with the result that in China there
have been familyism and clanism but no realnational- and is instead faced with several new nations with
much less political clout. This may lead scholars to
ism. Foreignobservers say that the Chinese are like a
disregard the ethnics within and without China as no
sheet of loose sand.. . . The unity of the Chinese people has stopped short at the clan and has not extended longer of strategic or political interest.
to the nation ...
What are the pressures within China for ethnic conSun Yat-sen, Three People's Principles(1924:2,5) flict, and why have they changed with the demise of
the USSR? How do we begin to conceive of China as
something more than a monocultural society with a
Shenzhen is Hong Kongized, Guangdong is Shenzhen- 6,000-year writien history? Do the politics of difference make a difference for the average Chinese citiized, and the whole country is Guangdongized.
zen? This paper will seek to address these questions as
Popularsaying in southern China I outline what I see to be some of the ethnic "contours
of power" (Yang 1989) within Chinese society.
Introduction: The Disuniting of China
In his recent statement to the United Nations, the Russian Foreign Minister Andrey V. Kozyrev declared
that the threat of ethnic violence today is "no less serious than the threat of nuclear war was yesterday."
Although most people would agree that this is certainly true for the troubled regions of the former
Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Africa, the Middle
East, and much of the Americas, few would acknowl-
Although Sovietologists could never have predicted
the rapid events that dismantled the USSR at the
beginning of this decade, and I do not envision the
immediate dissolution of China, attention to the preexisting faultlines within these superpowers might yield
significant insight into the political maps that characterize their present and possible futures. (See figure 8.)
Ethnic Faultlines
edge that China is also faced with such a threat. While
The Rise of Southern Nationalisms
the former Soviet Union, in particular, is seen to be
riddled with ethnic and nationalist strife, China is still
regarded as a relatively peaceful monolith that is dom-
There is a new feeling in China, reflected by the
popular saying: "Northerners love (ai) the nation;
Southerners sell (mat) the nation." Accompanying
inated by a militaristic centralized power structure
the dramatic economic explosion in southern China,
intent on maintaining its control at all costs. This
paper will not dispute that received wisdom. Rather, it
will seek to demonstrate why we continue to see
China in this way and to attempt to illustrate some of
the potential faultlines in the system, should it ever
begin to come apart at the seams. The real subject, it
Southerners and others have begun to assert their
cultural and political differences. Recent studies by
108
�C00123268
Figure 8
Segmental Oppositional Hierarchy
K
I
G
E
F
D
C
A
J
H
B
736073 6-95
109
�C00123268
Edward Friedman (1993), Emily Honig (1991), and
others have demonstrated a new rising importance of
the politics of ethnic and cultural difference within
China proper. Not only have the "official" minorities
in China begun to more strongly assert their identities,
pressing the government for further recognition,
autonomy, and special privileges, but also different
groups from within the so-called "Han" majority have
begun to rediscover, reinvent, and reassert their ethnic
differences.
their landlords. People now often praise Zhou Enlai by
stressing his southern Jiangnan linkages. And even
Jiang Jieshi-Chiang Kai-shek-was praised as a
Southerner who knew how to get money out of the
United States.
Liao Ping-hui (1993), a Taiwanese sociologist, reports
that Taiwan is also experiencing a dramatic reassertion of the gaoshan "aboriginal" peoples to their
indigenous rights and claims. Age-old Taiwanese/
Mainlander ethnic cleavages (Hill Gates 1981) have
given way to a predominance of Taiwanese language
and political figures in everyday life as well as a host
of other groups maneuvering along traditional cultural
and linguistic grounds for political power.
In the south especially, there has been a recent rewriting of history, illustrated by a newfound interest in the
southern Chu Kingdom as key to southern success.
Edward Friedman reports the establishment of museums throughout southern China dedicated to the glorious history of the southern Kingdom of Chu, as
manifested in both the Warring States period,
The assertions of the politics of difference within the
majority Han society militate against traditional
475-221 BC and the Three Kingdoms 220-265 AD.
assumptions about the "homogeneous" Chinese, the
Many Southerners now see the early Chu as essential
to Chinese culture and as distinct from the less important northern dynasties. In a significant departure from
traditional Chinese historiography, southern scholars
are beginning to argue that by the 6th century BC the
bronze cultures of the Chu spread north and influenced the development of Chinese civilization, not the
other way around. This argument supports a reevaluation of the importance of the south to China's past, as
well as economic and geopolitical future (Friedman
1993).
monoculturalism of China, and the predominance of a
91-percent Han majority nationality. Local differences
are now becoming recognized as "ethnic," (Honig
1992), whereas previously most China scholars dismissed them as merely "regional." This semantic
shift, from "regional" to "ethnic" reflects a new
salience placed upon the politics of difference in the
People's Republic.
Rising consciousness of the southern Chu, or Cantonese, is paralleled by reassertions of identity among
the Hakka people,.the southern Fujianese Min or Hokkien, the Swatow, and a host of other peoples empowered by economic success and embittered at age-old
restraints placed on them from the north. Many people
are beginning to note the southern leanings and origins of central party political figures, and it is not
unusual to hear reports that so-and-so is a Hakka and
Traditional China studies emphasized "China"as one
civilization, one country, and one culture. Rarely was
there serious attention paid to cultural and political
difference in China studies unless it concerned the
"exotic" minority border peoples, almost always
regarded as marginal to power and politics in the People's Republic. Most studies dealt only with ethnic
differences as related to the 55 official minority
nationalities of China. While two recent collections in
Daedalus and two new edited volumes on Chinese
national identity have begun to address this issue,
most of them approach the issues of cultural identity
therefore has acted in a certain way. Leading figures
from the other direction, that is, asking what binds the
considered to be Hakka or part Hakka include Deng
Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, and Ye Jianning-father of
Guangdong's previous governor. It is now widely
known that all members of the Chinese Communist
Party's (CCP) southern bases in the 1920s and 1930s
Chinese together-Confucianism, Communism, stateauthoritarianism, familism, or language-rather than
what might be pulling them apart. Conflicts with
China's long divisiveness over cultural, linguistic, and
were Hakka, as were their leaders. Mao successfully
mobilized Hakka hatred against other Southerners and
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historical power lines are noted in Frank Dikotter's
recent book, The Discourse of Race in Modern China.
During the Qing, interethnic conflicts (fenlei xiedou)
or "armed battles to separate types (lei)," became
comnon between Han and Muslims; Hakka (a minority group of southeast China) and Hoklo (HokkienPthe boundaries" strove to "clear
tonese). Ethnic feuand
by ejecting exogenous groups from their respective
territories. Such ethnic clashes could be extremely
violent: a major conflict between the Hakka and Punti
in 1856-67 took a toll of 100,000 victims. The
reformers' interpretation of racial war was based on
lineage feuds. This vision was sustained by the
semantic similarity between' zu as lineage and zu as
race. "Race," as will be demonstrated in the next
chapter, would create nationhood. On the basis of
internal conflicts between lineages, the reformers
constructed a representation'of external conflicts
between races (Dikbtter, 1992: 70-71).
In an articulated hierarchy of escalating opposition,
interlineage conflicts became the model for antiforeignism-"us" against "them," our race against
theirs. It is this awareness of internal conflict, lineage,
ethnic, and racial difference that drives a deep-seated
anxiety about the possibility of China breaking up.
The "Official" Minority Nationalities and Ethnic
Separatism
China is a multinational, multiethnic nation with
55 "official" minority nationality groups, identified
mainly in the 1950s, that now total more than 92 million in population (see Dreyer 1976). This includes
10 Muslim nationalities-with a total population of at
least 20 million-located primarily on China's borders with Russia and the new mainly Muslim Central
Asian States. In the south, there are nearly 12 million
Austro-Malay-speaking Zhuang people on the Vietnam border and more than 24 separate minority
groups in Yunnan Province alone, where cross-border
relations with Burma, Cambodia, and Thailand have
increased dramatically in the past few years. The state
has assigned levels of minority autonomous administration. There are five autonomous regions, scores of
autonomous districts, and hundreds of autonomous
counties and villages. Autonomous here primarily
means that there is more local control over the administration of such things as resources, taxes, birth planning, education, and legal jurisdiction. It does not
mean that control is in minority hands. Although most
minority regions and districts have minority government leaders, the Communist Party in all these areas is
dominated by the Han majority, reflecting China's
active watch over these so-called autonomous areas.
The Chinese, in my opinion, never take China for
granted, culturally, politically, or otherwise. This is
because most Chinese are all too aware of how easily
and naturally China could break into its constituent
parts. It was widely believed for a short period following the Tiananmen crackdown that the Beijing-based
forces were more loyal to their city's residents and
would refuse to obey the command, while other
armies, such as the Wuhan-based military district,
were loyal to Deng Xiao-ping. At one point, heavy
gunfire was widely reported to be heard on the outskirts of the city. It was thought to be between the various military forces converging on the city. These
deep-seated fears reflected a concern that China was
on the verge of spiraling into a civil disunion reminis-
cent of the warlord era, when local militarists commanded personal armies and built up cultural,
linguistic, and regional political power bases.
I1l
The recent detonation of two bombs in a Kashgar
Hotel in southern Xinjiang that killed at least six people convinced Beijing that its fears were well founded
regarding Uighur separatism and the increasing influence from the newly independent Turkic states on its
borders. The longstanding struggles of Tibetan independence movements are also well documented (see
Goldstein 1990). This supports the 1970s prediction
by Victor Louis, understood to be a Soviet intelligence
operative, who wrote in The Coming Decline of the
Chinese Empire that China would fall apart due to the
"national aspirations of the Manchu, Mongols,
Uighurs, Tibetans, and other non-Chinese peoples"
(cited in Friedman 1993: 270).
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Until now, most China scholars have dismissed the
possibility as remote, and the violent incidents on the
margins of China's great landmass were not considered a serious threat to the monolith. The Uighur,
Kazakhs, Tajiks, Mongols, and even the Tibetans are
still felt to be insignificant minorities: politically and
Anderson (1983), it is the feeling of "otherness" one
experiences while in exile or, I would add, while being
incorporated and dominated into a nation-state that
may more than anything lead to a strong sense of ethnicity. To follow Dorine Kondo (1989:43), the notion
of relational identity stresses "multiplicity, contextual-
militarily inept, internationally isolated, and expected
ity, complexity, power, irony, and resistance." It is the
to go the way of the Manchu and others who have
been thought to be long assimilated into the Chinese
mainstream. Although I am not predicting or advocating the dissolution of China along the lines that Victor
Louis predicted, in this paper I argue that recent
events among the Uighur in Kashgar are related to the
Hakka in Canton and explain why these linkages have
generally been ignored by China scholarship.
articulation of the multiplicities of these identities,
within the context of where they have been expressed,
that these identities become salient.
I suggest that we need new ways of thinking about
ethnic and regional identity that often leads to local
conflict along unexpected lines. What is going on in
southern China is linked to the rise of local ethnic
nationalisms-the rise of the Cantonese, the assertion
of the Hakka, and the galloping economy of the southern Fujianese-to traditional nationalisms on China's
borders as well as global trends that have affected
China domestically and internationally. My research
parallels work in contemporary anthropological and
ethnographic theory, which rejects notions of homogenized cultures and posits the existence of multiple
identities and shifting associations.
Despite the frequent wishing away of ethnic and
nationalist loyalties, we are witnessing the rise of ethnic nationalisms that define the arenas of conflict
across the globe. This flies in the face of earlier predictions by both modernization theorists and even Marxist
ideologues that ethnic identities would fade in favor of
individual, secularized, economic-based behaviors.
"'Ilibalism," thought to be a thing of the past, is now
the watchword of the 1990s. Most people are surprised
at the viciousness with which people, who were long
thought to be assimilated, modernized, and secularized,
Nationalism is not just an idea but also a certain style
of representation that is now most often defined by
interactions within or resistance to the nation-state. As
Hobsbawm argues, "Nationalism is a political program ... .Without this programme, realized or not,
'nationalism' is a meaningless term," (Anthropology
Today 1992:4). Nationalism is not arbitrary, but neither is there any core content to it. It has no essential
essence. It is not shifted and redefined.
I began to think much more about the nature of what
relational and oppositional identity means (see Gladney 1991) after interviewing Turkestani refugees and
emigres in Turkey. It convinced me that much of what
I had been reading in ForeignAffairs and other journals about the resurgence of "tribalisms" in Central
Asia now that the Soviets have withdrawn was very
wrong. I became convinced that these people were
profoundly different than they were before their domination by the centzalizing states of Soviet and Chinese
Central Asia and that their multifaceted identities are
anything but tribal.
Han Nationalism and the Rise of the Chinese
Nation-State
As yet, no larger studies of the creation of Han nationalism have emerged-mainly because it is assumed by
sinologists trained in the dominant tradition that
"Han" is generally equal to "Chinese"-a tradition
created and maintained by the current regime in
are assaulting and "cleansing" others in the name of
power. Studies of Chinese nationalism have generally
primordialized self-identity, self-determination, and
,ethnic nationalism. What is going on here?
ignored the issue of-the creation of the Han majority in
favor of the larger question of Chinese identity. Few
have questioned how the Han became the 94-percent
majority of China. Perhaps, the traditional Confucian
National identities, although imagined, are never arbitrary but arise in particular sociopolitical contexts in
relational opposition to specific others. To follow Ben
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preoccupation with order and harmony in a society
held tenuously together by proper relationships may
be one reason why these categories have never been
revolution. The critical link between Sun Yat-sen's
Five Peoples policy and his desire to unify all of
China is made crystal clear from his discussion of
challenged. The very Confucian practice of the "recti-
nationalism-the first of his Three People's Principles
fication of names" (zheng ming) is of primary concern
to the Chinese ethnographers; once the Han and all the
minority nationalities have been identified or named,
order is restored, and all is well in the world. I would
argue that it is the anxiety about differences within
Chinese society, not the affection shared within, that
has managed to hold China together.
(Sanmin Zhuyi). It is here that Sun argued the Chinese
were a disconnected, loose sheet of sand, with no
sense of the nation.
The notion of "Han ren" (Han person) has existed for
many centuries as those descendants of the Han
dynasty, which had its beginnings in the Wei River
valley. However, I submit that the notion of "Han zu"
or "Han min" (Han nationality) is an entirely modern
phenomenon-it arises with the shift from empire to
nation, as argued above. While the concept of a Han
person certainly existed, the notion of a unified Han
nationality that makes up 94 percent of China's population gained its greatest popularity under Dr. Sun Yat-
It is also not at all surprising that Dr. Sun should turn
to the use of the all-embracing idea of the Han as the
national group, which included all the regional peoples and Sino-linguistic speech communities. Sun Yatsen was Cantonese, raised as an overseas Chinese in
Hawaii. As one who spoke little Mandarin, and with
few connections in northern China, he would have
easily aroused traditional northern suspicions of
southern radical movements extending back to the
Song dynasty (10th century) that were, of course, well
known to him. This recurring historical pattern and the
traditional antipathy between the Cantonese and
northern peoples would have posed an enormous barrier to his promotion of a nationalist movement. Dr.
sen. Dr. Sun was most certainly influenced by strong
Sun found a way to rise above deeply embedded
currents of Japanese nationalism during his long-term
stay in Japan. Sun argued that the ruler-subject relation that had persisted throughout China's dynastic
history would need to be fundamentally transformed if
a true nationalist movement were to sweep China andengender support among all its peoples. More practically, Dr. Sun needed a way tomobilize all Chinese
against the imperial rule of the. Qing, a dynasty
founded by a northeastern people who became known
as the Manchu. By invoking the argument that the
north-south ethnocentrisms. The use and perhaps
invention of the term "Han minzu" was a brilliant
attempt to mobilize other non-Cantonese, especially
northern Mandarin speakers, and the powerful Zhejiang and Shanghainese merchants into one overarching national group against the Manchu and other
foreigners during the unstable period following the
Unequal Treaties. The Han were seen to stand in
opposition to the "Others" on their borders-the Manchu, Tibetan, Mongol, and Hui, as well as the Western
majority of the people in China were Han, Sun effec-
imperialists. By distinguishing these "Others" in their
tively found a symbolic metaphorical opposition to
the Manchu to which the vast majority of peoples in
China would easily rally.
midst, the nationalists cultivated the imagined identity
of the "we" Han, as opposed to the "they" minorities
and foreigners. In Ben Anderson's terms, Dr. Sun was
engaged in "stretching the short, tight skin of the
nation over the gigantic body of the empire."
Dr. Sun Yat-sen advocated the idea that there were
"Five Peoples of China" (wuzu gonghe): the Han, the
Man (Manchu), the Meng (Mongolian), the Zang
The Communists stretched this skin even further, fol-
(Tibetan), and the Hui-a term that included all Muslims in China who are now divided into the Uighur,
Kazakh, Hui, and so forth. This recognition of the
Five Peoples of China served as the main platform for
his Nationalist revolution, which overthrew the Qing
lowing the Soviet model and identifying not five, but
55, nationality groups, with the Han in the 91-percent
majority. My argument is that both for the nationalists
and the Communists, it was not only the political
empire and established the first "People's Republic."
One must have peoples if there is to be a people's
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necessity of enlisting the support of the ethnics on
their borders that led them to recognize minority
nationalities but also the desire to unify the nation
against the outsiders in order to overcome internal difference. Now that there is no longer an external threat,
it is this internal difference that will most pull them
apart
The best analogy here is that of Europe and the
Roman Empire. Lucien Pye (1993) has recently
observed that "China today is what Europe would
have been if the unity of the Roman Empire had lasted
until now and there had not been the separate emergence of the separate entities of England, France, Germany, and the like." China is a multilingual nation
with large populations that can be divided among the
six major language groups. Linguists such as John De
Francis and Jerry Norman have demonstrated that
there is as much diversity "among the Chinese dialects
as ... among the Romance languages.. . .To take an
noted that the only reason the Central Asians first told
Bartold they were Muslims was because they perceived him as a European Christian and part of the
Czarist colonial project. In similar fashion, Hakka
have always told anthropologists that they are Han
persons, but, among themselves, they and most Southerners believe they are Tang persons.
By looking at ethnic identity and conflict in relational
terms, one can immediately understand why a person
from a certain lineage in southern China can be
Toisan, Cantonese, Southern, Han, and a Chinese citizen, all at once or selectively, depending on to whom
they are talking-foreigner, non-Han, Northerner,
non-Cantonese, or non-Toisan Cantonese. It is finding
out when and how one assumes these different identities that is key here, not what any one identity will be
in some essentialized permanent form that exists outside of historical contingency.
extreme example, there is probably as much differ-
Sir Edmund Leach (1954) was the first anthropologist
there is between Italian and French; the Hainan Min
power oppositions; the Kachin in Highland Burma
ence between the dialects of Peking and Chaozhou as
to argue that ethnic identity is formed as the result of
dialects are as different from the Xian dialect as Spanish is from Rumanian," (Norman 1988). Much like
Latin in the Middle Ages, China's diverse language
groups all are served with one standard writing system, Chinese ideographs that vary in some styles, such
as Cantonese, although the speech communities are
mutually exclusive. What holds these diverse communities together is oppositionalhierarchy.The politics
of difference, until now, have not reached to this level.
only acted ethnically when in opposition to the Shans.
Evans-Pritchard's (1940) classic study of the Nuer
determined the unique expansive-contractive nature of
hierarchical segmentary lineages among nomadic
societies that lack a distinct leader. When the Nuer
were confronted with an outside power, they unified
and organized to a high degree of political complexity
in order to respond to the challenge. When the threat
subsided, they diversified and atomized.
Ethnic and Oppositional Identity
It is oppositional hierarchy, the shifting nature of identity, that now enlivens Chinese cultural nationalism.
This relates to the popular Arab Bedouin proverb:
Me against my brother, my brother and I against our
cousin, our cousin and us against you.
Ethnic identities are often seen to coalesce and crystallize in the face of higher order oppositions. These ethnic identities form and reform according to articulated hierarchies of interaction with the particular.
oppositional power in question (see diagrams). In
From Empire to Nation, Rupert Emerson (1960) provides a perceptive definition of the nation as "the largest community, which when the chips are down,
effectively commands men's loyalty" (cited in Connor
1984). Julian Huxley and A. C. Haddon proposed: "A
'nation' has been cynically but not inaptly defined as a
society united by a common error as to its origin and a
common aversion to its neighbors."
As the great Central Asianist Bartold once said:
"When you ask a Turkestani what his identity is, he
will answer that he is first of all a Muslim, then an
inhabitant of such or such city or village. . . , or, if he
is a nomad, member of such or such tribe." But as
Nazif Shahrani pointed out, later Muslim travelers
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Now that the global map is most defined by the
nation-state, the peoples within must define them-
the situation. Analysis and policy decisions regarding
ethnic conflict in China should consider several issues,
selves vis-a-vis the nation-state. E. K. Francis, in his
which follow.
InterethnicRelations (1978); argued that the rise of
ethnic identities and interethnic conflict was a phenomenon tied most directly to the nation-state. It is the
nation-state that takes upon itself the task of legislating identity. Empires were consumed more with ruling, rather than legislating and identifying the peoples
under their spheres of influence. In the modern era, it
is often the nation-state apparatus itself with which
ethnic groups find themselves in opposition. By agreeing to articulate their identities along the contours
shaped by ethnic identification policies and censuses,
ethnic groups demonstrate their desire to form coalitions at the highest possible level in order to interact
as a powerful collectivity with the state apparatus.
These ethnic identities are "imagined" in Ben Anderson's (1983) terms, but they are never arbitrary. They
form according to cultural, historical, and political
power oppositions and alliances. What we are witnessing today with the end of the Cold War is the
moving down of oppositional alliances to levels that
now emphasize the importance of the politics of difference below the level of the Han. The opposition to
the West, to imperialism, and to the Japanese is no
longer a motivating force binding China together.
Cultural nationalism and ethnic difference should be
taken seriously. This is true not only among the "official" minority nationalities, who are stigmatized or
empowered because of that designation, but also .
among at least two other kinds of groups: applicant
groups and sub-Han groups.
Applicant groups are seeking or have sought to be recognized as "official" minority nationalities. Many of
these groups were not recognized in the 1940s and
1950s during the nationality identification programs,
and some have sought, indeed militated for and politically organized around, nationality recognition. There
are at least 15 groups who have applied and are under
consideration for nationality recognition by the State
Commission for Nationalities (guojia minzu shiwu
weiyuanhui). These groups include the Chinese Jews
(you tai ren), Khmer, Sherpas, Ku Cong, Deng (a
Tibetan sub-group), Chuanqing, and several others
(see Heberer 1990). Some 900,000 people in Guizhou
Province alone applied for minority recognition in the
early 1980s, and the 1982 census reported that
799,705 "unidentified" people remained in China. Of
interest are the Chinese Jews, once thought to be
extinct but now claiming a membership of 8,000 and
under consideration for rapid recognition due to
Ethnic Nationalism in China: Some Policy
Considerations
The increasing importance of playing the politics of
difference for personal and corporate gain out of
response to stigmatized identities, or just out of a
renewed sense of the meaningfulness of one's history
in China, has important implipations for how we
understand ethnic identity and the potential for conflict. Although this paper does not predict ethnic conflict along any predetermined lines, the argument here
is to suggest the importance of certain faultlines,
should fragmentation, most iiportant at the center of
the state's power structure, occur. The Uighur will
never become independent as long as Beijing is in
China's official diplomatic ties to and improving relations with Israel. Although this group is certainly not
militant, it stands to benefit considerably from recognition, perhaps leading to local-level rivalries with
other groups, particularly with Hui Muslims, to whom
many of the Chinese Jews formerly belonged. Another
group, the Ku Cong, presently classified as a branch of
the Lahu nationality in Yunnan and known as the Yellow Lahu, are worth noting because one of their members, Wang Zhengcun, was the elected leader of the
Tiananmen Square Nationalities Institute's student
democratic group and was sought and arrested as
number 3 on the most wanted list. He has long been
known as a "Ku Cong" nationalist, seeking recognition of his people, illustrating the importance of this
firm control, but Beijing is increasingly dependent on
issue for political activism (see Gladney 1990).
Canton, and, if Canton should make a move, many
Uighur would be only too glad to take advantage of
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As noted above, other groups to watch outside the
official nationalities are particularly those so-called
"sub-H-an" groups that have maintained local, linguis-
tic, and ethnic ties throughout the CCP period, despite
lack of recognition. Especially important are those
with outside transnational links or large populations
outside the China mainland, such as the Hakka in Taiwan and Hong Kong; the Swatow in Hong Kong,
Thailand, and Indonesia; and the Min-speaking (Hokkien, Fujianese) populations in Southeast Asia and
Taiwan. Although other local level ethnic differences
are important in regional and ethnic politics throughout China, it is these groups that have the economic
and international clout to make a difference in the
domestic scene. This again does not suggest that any
one of these groups alone is sufficient to destabilize a
region of China or.engage in strong political activism,
Instead, I am arguing that, as Rupert noted above,
when the "chips are down" these are the kinds of
groups best positioned to exploit their cultural and
advanced nationality in China); and Mongol groups.
Domestically, it has been important for their establish-
ing national networks, often through state
institutions
such as the Nationalities Institutes, Islamic and Buddhist Associations, and regional Nationality Commissions. It has also been important for the reawakening
of national consciousness, such as among the Manchu,
who have established three new autonomous counties
in the northeast during the past 10 years.
Population politics should be watched closely. As
China more severely enforces its one-child policy,
minority recognition will become more important as a
means to having more children. In the past, China has
been rather reluctant to enforce restriction on minority
births in rural areas; minorities were "encouraged" to
limit births to one more child than the Han in their
area, but in general they had as many as they wanted.
Now the government is attempting to enforce this policy despite strong opposition. Minorities are reluctant
to adhere to increasingly applied birth planning polipolitical resources.
cies. For example, the requirement to limit births to
three among minorities led to riots among Uighurs
Closer attention should be paid to debates in the Chiand Mongols in 1989 and 1990. Chinese often redenese community within and outside China regarding
fine themselves as minorities. Children of mixed marChinese national
the construction of Chineseness, or
riages are almost always opting for minority identity,
identity. Like Sun Yat-sen's own historic formulation,
preferred as potential
outcome of these debates may determine the direc- and minorities are increasingly
the
has led to a phenomenal popumarriage partners. This
tion of public policy, whether it be pluralist, federalist,
lation growth of 35 percent between 1982 and 1990
monoethnic, or even racist. At the same time, studies
among minorities, while the Han population only
cultural difference
of "sub-Han" national identity and
grew by 10 percent. Some groups grew dramatipopular in the mainland, with Xu
have become
cally-the Manchu grew by 114 percent, the Tujia by
Jiexun's (1985) series of publications, New Explora140 percent, the Hui by 40 percent, and the Uighur by
tions in the Han Nationality's History and Culture,
40 percent. The Gelao-a Yunnan minority-grew by
being just the beginning of this important trend (first
an incredible 714 percent. The vast majorty of these
collection).
begun perhaps with Fan Wenlan's 1957
increases are due to redefining and reregistration of
Xu, a historian and political scientist at the Guangxi
people who were previously classified as Han (see
Institute of Natiopalities in Nanning, has effectively
Gladney 1991: 240 ff.; Banister 1987).
used the Han categorization as a "nationality" (minzu)
within the Han.
as a means to study cultural difference
The administration of minority privileges should be
watched. Both the extent of the privileges-such as
Study of minority nationalities in China should focus
tax breaks, birth planning, educational incentives, and
not only on their traits, population, history, and culture
economic development investment-and the effect
but, more important, also on their interconnectedthey have among the majority population should be
regional
ness-the articulation of their identity across
considered. In any society affirmative action programs
and national boundaries. In the international sphere,
been important for Tibetan; Musthis has certainly
lim-especially the Uighur, Kazakh, Tajik, and Hui;
Korean (the most educated and economically
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often alienate the majority, and in China this has led to
resentment and ethnic conflict in some areas. This is
particularly true for groups such as the Hui, Manchu,
She, and Zhuang, who closely resemble the Han
The Taiwan aboriginal movement should be monitored
as to its impact on Republic of China policy and its
coverage in the People's Republic of China media. The
outcome over this debate about indigenous peoples'
majority in their areas. It has led to accusations that
these groups are faking ethnic identity in order to have
more children or receive special government assistance (see my discussion of the "two-child Hui" Muslims, Gladney: The Journal of Asian Studies).
land rights, their desire for native language training,
and the need for cultural preservation will have serious
repercussions on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
Popular culture should be monitored as an indication
of the rising importance of ethnic or cultural difference. In Beijing, whereas only' a few years ago Southerners and southern accents were pilloried and
stigmatized by many "crosstalk" comedians and entertainers, Cantonese terms and accents are now highly
valued and affected. Canton, Shenzhen, and Hong
Kong songs, movies, clothing styles, and entertainers
are extremely popular throughout China, even though
they are frequently not understood. At the same time,
"ethnic art" that exoticizes, romanticizes, and often
eroticizes the minorities in Yunnan and Tibet, is
The military has been drastically overhauled since
questions were raised about regional loyalty during
the Tiananmen incident. Further attention should be
paid to the origins and cultures of the officers in
charge and of the forces under their commands.
China's military districts occupy important macroregions that William Skinner (1965) once argued were
entirely separate focuses around which the rest of
China moved. Although China, unlike the USSR, has
not employed many "official" minorities in the military, many commanders and their forces may have significant local and regional attachments. Military
researchers have tended to dismiss these local and
regional differences because of certain assumptions
extremely popular inside and outside China, leading to
the founding of the Yunnan Ark School (see Gladney:
about Han and Chinese identity. The ethnic and cultural makeup of the military may not have much influ-
Asian Visions of Authority: Religion and the Modern
States of East and Southeast Asia).
ence on military decision making, nonetheless, it may
effect the relationship with the local populations, as
we saw briefly in Beijing.
The ethnic makeup of "floating populations" and other
labor groups should be examined, particularly as it
In the mid-1980s, political scientists initiated a series
relates to large migrations of peoples and the growth
of studies and conferences under the rubric of "bring-
of ethnic economic niches. Dorothy Solinger in a
series of articles has documented the rising prominence of "floating" migrant populations but has not
analyzed why it is that most of the groups are members of certain ethnic sub-Han communities. For
example, almost all shoe repair in China is dominated
ing the state back in" (see Skocpol 1985), leading to a
stronger consideration of the role of the state in defining state-society relations. This was an added corrective to earlier, particularist studies, which emphasized
microeconomic and community or individual-actorbased approaches. However, in both approaches cul-
by Zhejiangese from a certain county; child care
ture as a political force was somehow lost. As a politi-
workers and domestics in Beijing almost all come
from one part of Anhui; the Subei people dominate
specific "unclean" occupations in Shanghai (see
Honig 1991); Cantonese now cbntract almost all of
cal and cultural anthropologist, I am arguing for the
necessity of bringing culture back into the debate, not
as a determining'force in social relations but as an
important factor in understanding the options avail-
their agricultural labor to Hunanese peasants; and,
until recently, the Uighur dominated the moneychang-
able to political actors in the field of social relations.
ing black market.
117
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Geographic and Ethnographic
Perspectives on Ethnic Conflict in
Southeast Asia
Eric Crystal
Coordinator
Center for Southeast
Asia Studies
7
University of California at Berkeley
Identifying Key Issues in Ethnic Relations
For purposes oTthis discussion, I will focus on four
key aspects of ethnic tension in the Southeast Asian
region. The first factor relates to environmental issues
and the competition for agricultural land in highland
regions. The second factor is centered on religious
affiliation, identification, and proselytization. The
third factor focuses on tensions in the border regions
of Southeast Asia. The fourth aspect relates to vestigial ideological conflicts in this region often articulated in terms of ethnic interest.
Geographic/Ethnographic Overview
Few regions of the world present so wide a range of
natural environments and sociocultural adaptations as
does Southeast Asia. The enduring geographic and
ethnographic diversity of the region has been compounded in recent decades by the forces of nationalism, impact of ideology, intervention of external
powers, and differential pace of development in the
10 nations of the region. In brief, Southeast Asia today
provides an extraordinary range of economies, societies, cultures, and geographical regimes. Per capita
income ranges from $17,000 per year in Brunei to
$120 per year in Laos. The stability and technological
sophistication of Singapore, the newly industrialized
status of Thailand, and the burgeoning agroindustrial
base of Malaysia contrast strongly with the stark reality of brutal military rule in Burma, the current
attempt at national reconciliation in Cambodia, and
the efforts to emerge from a subsistence economy in
Laos
Highland-Lowland Ecological Distinctions and
Ethnic Tensions
From the perspective of precolonial India and early
China, Southeast Asia was a frontier region, inhabited
by exotic races and peoples. Relatively low in populaas
tion in comparison to India and China in prehistoric
yielded
well as more recent times, Southeast Asia
valuable tribute and trade products such as aromatic
sandalwood, exotic bird of paradise feathers, and
much coveted rhinoceros horn (Hickey, 1982; 33-34).
From late neolithic times to the present, the geographical distinction between the alluvial plains and mountain hinterlands tended to define interethnic relations
in the area and from the earliest articulation of state
society-perhaps in the second century AD-to the
present a sharp division between lowland and highland populations has obtained in Southeast Asia.
Plains dwellers adapted and refined wet-rice cultivation, producing surpluses and articulating stratified
here, I wish to discuss
In the brief time allotted to me
societies well over 2,500 years ago. Early kingdoms in
the past, present, and prospective dangers posed by
Southeast Asia such as Oc-eo in Vietnam and Funan
ethnic tensions in a region that, in the past decade, has
further articulated the development of
evidenced an average rate of economic growth (7 per- in Cambodia
culture to the level of the state. Kingdoms in the
cent) higher than any other on the globe. Although
region from Myanmar (Burma) to Cambodia soon
poverty and lack of human and natural resources may
adopted the religion and the buttressing ideology of
contribute to ethnic tensions, so also may the rise of a
Hinduism, which was brought in the wake of Hindu
middle class and the perception of the monopolization
trade missions to the wealthy frontier states in "the
of power by discrete minorities in the most economi-
cally successful of Southeast Asian states.
lands below the wind" in Southeast Asia (Reid; 1988).
'The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author.
120
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In contrast to the largely homogeneous lowland irrigated-rice-tilling peoples, the mountain inhabitants
were fragmented into many small tribal groups. A
stability of economy and polity naturally emerges
from irrigated rice agriculture. By contrast, shifting
cultivation in the mountains normally dictated the
cyclical mobility of tribal peoples, offering as well
opportunities for new migrating groups to till Southeast Asian fields in the wake of the unyielding expansion of Han populations in southern China. The
different languages, religions, socioeconomic adaptations, and political loyalties of the lowlanders and
highlanders engendered tension and conflict even in
refined earlier in other parts of the world, oftentimes
were articulated by the English in Burma, the Dutch in
Indonesia, and the French in Indochina in maintaining
the social and political control of majority lowland
peoples. Highland minorities oftentimes were given
strategically crucial roles to play in colonial armed
forces. Often such tribal groups were the first to be
weaned from traditional religion by Christian missionaries dispatched with official sanction from the metropole.
precolonial times.
in Indochina. In Laos the highland-lowland geo-
Presently the frontier of the Southeast Asian mountain
hinterland seems to be in the final stages of closing.
graphic division took on special significance. Here the
handful of French-trained Hmong soldiers were subsequently nurtured by American operatives as the core
Until three decades ago, highland slash-and-burn cul-
cadre of a large, secret army based at Long Chieng
tivators could always count on another forest or an
additional mountain swidden field to provide subsistence sustenance in the wake of the exhaustion of old
farming plots. Today, throughout Southeast Asia, population expansion, commercial exploitation of timber
and mineral reserves, and initiatives to conserve the
rainforest constrain-if not absolutely deny-the traditional exploitation of the highland farming environment by minority tribal peoples. In the past
lowlanders were content to conduct barter trade with
upland tribal societies, secure in the knowledge that
the only constraint on the expansion of their irrigated
plains was the lack of available labor. Today the plains
(Hamilton-Merritt; 1993). For nearly 15 years this
superbly motivated, well-armed, amply supplied, and
professionally advised force struck as guerrilla units
along the Ho Chi Minh trail, fought a rear guard
action to try to hold territory in northern Laos, and
assisted in the rescue of downed US airmen. The
"secret army" consisted of not only Hmong but also of
Mien and Lahu peoples of the high mountains of
northern Laos. In the end their loyalty was not reciprocated. Some 250,000 highlanders who were abandoned in the spring of 1975 eventually fled their
native Laos, while untold numbers fell victim to ethnic reprisal inside Laos. Over the past 17 years, at
have in many areas reached their absolute carrying
least 100,000 highland Laotians who qualified as
capacity. For the lowland rural poor and landless
political refugees have resettled in the United States.
laborers, survival strategies include migration to urban
In Laos, low-intensity conflict has persisted to the
areas or colonization of upland regions that have been
the historic preserve of minority cultivators. With
each passing decade the pressure on tribal peoples to
permanently settle, abandon their claims to wide
present, pitting highland rebels against the central
government.
expanses of land, and assimilate to national culture
in conflicts over land, political control, and ideology
have intensified. Government population-transfer programs lend the legitimacy of state planning to the shift
of lowland populations to the uplands. Highlander
perceptions of second-class citizenship status (if such
citizenship is recognized at all) clearly pose the threat
of conflict. The role of major powers in the highlands
of Southeast Asia in the recent past clearly deserves at
least passing mention in the context of this conference. Colonial divide-and-rule policies, perhaps
are amply demonstrated by the example of Laos. The
fundamental question for the future is the role that
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), multilateral
lending agencies, and national aid programs will play
toward ameliorating these conflicts. In the past,
national intelligence agencies have oftentimes purposefully aggravated extant tensions, the better to win
No discussion of ethnic conflict in Southeast Asia
could proceed without direct reference to the conflict
Highland-lowland geographic distinctions articulated
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the loyalty, allegiance, and cooperation of ethnic
groups whose interests were perceived as similar
to those of the funding agency. But, as the recent
example of Afghanistan indicates, it is often easier to
inflame ethnic, religious, and tribal passions than to
Christianity advances, both in the mountains and also,
in distinct urban and lowland mainstream communities, the potential for tension rises. Such tension may
be based on longstanding differences between the
established religion in the lowlands and the new world
control them.
religious affiliation in the highlands. Such tension may
Religious Tensions
Southeast Asia has generally been regarded as a
region of religious tolerance. Indonesia, the nation
with the largest Muslim population, is located here, as
are the majority of the world's Theravada Buddhists.
well
Major Christian communities are found here as
Philippines but also as minorities in
not only in the
almost all the nation-states of the region. In the cities,
Chinese-Southeast Asians worship at Buddhist, Confucian/Taoist, and-increasingly-at Christian sanctuaries. In the recent past, ethnic, religious, and
ideological conflicts have sometimes been bound as
one.
Tensions in Malaysia and Indonesia between Muslim
led
majority populations and Christian minorities has
in the past and may do so in the future. In
to violence
Indonesia tensions between Christians and Muslims
have been rising, especially in light of the ongoing
advance of Christianity in remote outer island regions
and in parts of Java formerly inclined towards preHindu religious affiliation. Similarly, in Malaysia the
underlying tensions between Christian and Confucian
The most gruesome expression of intracommunal conflict since the close of the colonial era in Southeast
Asia transpired in Indonesia-largely on Java and
Bali-in the wake of an abortive Communist coup in
1965. As the Indonesian Army moved to seizepower
from President Soekarno, a massive slaughter of Communist and Communist-affiliated intellectuals, peasants, and workers was sanctioned (Hefner, 1990:
193-215). The victims were depicted as godless traitors. The executioners were largely drawn from
fanatic Muslim youth groups. The rhetoric was that of
national salvation through righteous retribution. The
reaction of the Western world to these events was generally one of unrestrained approval. In the context of
the Cold War, the destruction of the largest Communist party outside the Eastern Bloc was deemed to be a
major victory for the West. The conflict with the Communists was carefully couched in religious terms in
Indonesia to generate maximum support for the new
regime.
A little noted but.clearly significant element in the
Southeast Asian religious landscape is the rapid
spread of Christianity in recent years. The traditionally animist highlanders across much of the region
have opted for Christian conversion as a means of
maintaining their distinct identity in the face of-Buddhist or Muslim lowland pressures to assimilate. As
also result from newly acquired skills in literacy,
enhanced ethnic consciousness, and strengthened
resistance in the face of perceived lowland cultural
assimilation policies.
Chinese and Muslim Malays has erupted in significant
violence in the recent past (1969) and could certainly
do so in the future. In Vietnam largely clandestine foreign missionary operations are underway in many
parts of the country. These could engender internal
conflicts and ignite ethnic and nationalist passions in
ways unintended by their proponents. Highland Burmese rebels, especially in Karen and Lahu regions,
have, since independence, always manipulated their
Christian affiliation as one of the several aspects of
regional independence threatened by Burmese nationalism as defined in Rangoon. In Thailand, the relatively small highland population-about 9 percent of
the country-is increasingly constrained from practicing shifting cultivation. Pressure on the land has led to
accelerated conversions among groups such as the
Karen and the Akha in recent years. Such affiliation
may indeed strengthen the will, resolve, and capability
of formerly isolated peoples to resist incursions upon
land and culture. As the case of Burma indicates, ethnic conflict can result if the relations between minority
and majority communities fail to be negotiated with
tact and understanding.
Border Regions
In a region as diverse as Southeast Asia, subprovincial
district borders are often isomorphic with linguistic
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A subtext on the Irian border problem is that of East
Timor. The world was shocked to learn of the Santa
Cruz cemetery massacre there in 1991. There is every
indication that during the 1975-80 period when Cambodia was wracked by the autogenocidal policies of
the Khmer Rouge violations of human rights on an
equal scale were underway in East Timor. The armed
Timorese independence movement has been largely
quashed. The aspirations, identity, and yearning for
dignity and self-governance of the people of East
Timor clearly remain strong. Hopefully the current
international pressure being brought on Indonesia may
result in a reasonable compromise, perhaps facilitating
the establishment of the region as an autonomous area
within the Indonesian Republic. Administrative precedents for such action-Aceh in northernmost Sumatra,
Yogyakarta in central Java-have worked reasonably
well. If the current military repression continues, rebel
forces there may in the future successfully regroup.
The case of East Timor is a clear example of selective
Western interest in human rights abuses (Dunn; 1983).
The Indonesian invasion of the area occurred shortly
after the fall of Saigon. Jakarta was concerned that the
and cultural distinctions. National borders inevitably
demarcate major ethnic distinctions marked by unique
linguistic, religious, and historical traditions. Of
course there is no reason why the existence of national
distinctions as demarcated by the borders of neighboring states should necessarily induce conflict. Yet a
closer look at a few key bordei regions should at least
occasion cause for reflection.
Indonesia-Papua New Guinea. Indonesia, fourthmost-populous nation on earth, presents a generally
positive example of national integration in a multiethnic, geographically fragmented state. Indonesian
nationalists in this century have successfully promulgated a national language, wrested independence from
an intransigent Dutch metropole, welded a disparate
archipelago of 5,000 inhabited islands into a coherent
national entity, and confronted and contained a host of
regional insurrections and irredentist rebellions. Nevertheless, several problem regions continue to trouble
policymakers in Jakarta.
The Indonesian state extends deep into the cultural
heartland of Melanesia on the island of New Guinea.
leftist Fretilin independence forces would prove to be
Here a low-level transnational conflict has festered for
years. The issue is not one of border demarcation. It
relates, more specifically, to the future of the indige-
a major security risk to the republic. Washington
assisted the Indonesian military with significant
equipment sales-OH-10 Bronco aircraft directed
nous Melanesian population of the Indonesian prov-
specifically toward the counterinsurgency require-
ince of Irian Jaya-population, 1.6 million. This area
was not ceded to Indonesia by the Netherlands at the
transfer of sovereignty in 1949. Indeed, only after
Indonesia threatened to invade in 1962 did US pres-
ments of the Indonesian armed forces in Timor.
China-Vietnam. The China-Vietnam border witnessed a major military conflict in early 1979. The
sure and UN administrative machinery facilitate
history of Vietnam is essentially that of a relatively
small country defending national territory against an
aggressive colossus to the north. The wars with France
and the United States are fundamentally subtexts on
the unique cultural and politicomilitary relationship
between China and Vietnam. Because both states are
currently ideologically consistent, ancient animosities
and contemporary trade and territorial disputes-the
Spratly and Paracel Islands-most probably will
Dutch withdrawal in 1963. Since that time the local
population has become increasingly marginalized in
Irian urban areas as thousands .of entrepreneurial
migrants from central Indonesia have poured into the
resource-rich province. The languages and cultures of
the indigenous population are distinct from those of
central Indonesia. Rebel forces have frequently found
refuge across the border in Papua New Guinea (PNG).
remain muted in the near future. Chinese military
Both Indonesia ahd the PNG national government
have worked hard to minimize border incidents. Still,
this border area could pose serious problems in the
future, problems that arise from fundamentally distinct perceptions of interest of the indigenous Irianese
population on the one hand and the government in faroff Jakarta on the other.
expansion and internal armament procurement are of
concern throughout Southeast Asia. This is particularly true in Vietnam, where disputes over the South
China Sea islands have broken out in fierce, if abbreviated, conflict in the recent past.
123
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Cambodia-Vietnam. Cambodia remains a cause for
major concern. Once the greatest of precolonial
nation-states in Southeast Asia, the kingdom of the
Khmer has been in decline for many centuries, victimized by cohesive and stronger Thai and Vietnamese
forces and by an unusually fractious elite. The enmity
expressed by Cambodians toward their Vietnamese
neighbors courses deep and is widely shared among
the populace. The Cambodians feel that Vietnam is
determined to swallow up what remains of their culture and country-much as ancient Vietnam destroyed
the coastal kingdom of Champa in 1471 (Tarling,
1992; 156). In the past Cambodian demagogues have
manipulated such sentiments to their own ends.
Anti-Vietnamese pogroms have facilitated the careers
of Lon Nol and Pol Pot; anti-Vietnamese rhetoric has
been consistently employed during the recent UNsupervised election campaign. At present, it seems as
if the long internal nightmare of Cambodia is coming
to an end. If things go wrong, however, violence
directed against the Vietnamese minority in Cambodia
and along the CambodianVietnamese border could
again arise.
Laos-China. A final border area of some interest is
that which divides Laos and China. At present this
area is calm and hopefully will remain so. During the
Indochina conflict, China, the USSR, and the Pathet
Lao worked closely together. Despite the efforts of the
United States, aided by its tribal allies in the moun-
tains of Xieng Khuang and Nam Tha in northern Laos,
Communist forces consistently advanced, supplied
overland by Chinese trucks. After 1975 Laos quickly
was drawn into Vietnam's political orbit. As a satellite
state hosting some 40,000 Vietnamese troops, Laos
after 1979 expressed the same hostility towards China
as did Vietnam. Vietnam responded by arming and
training highland rebels. Indeed, many tribal guerrillas
who formerly had fought for the United States now
rallied to a cause supported by Beijing. China's support for such movements has ceased, and currently
significant efforts are underway to develop a trade and
communications infrastructure that will link southwest China to the sea through Laos and Vietnam.
Tibal rebels these days operate, as far as is known,
without the support of-any major government,
financed by opium sales and by fund transfers from
rights, and assures land title to upland farmers, the
Laos-China border area may become a new development growth pole in the future. Failure to carefully
negotiate the mutual interests of the government in
Vientiane and minority highlands in the north could
ignite further conflict between the lowland Lao and
the Hmong, Mien, and Lao in this sensitive border
region.
Ideological Conflicts
Of the five Leninist regimes current functioning in
today's world-China, North Korea, Cuba, Laos, and
Vietnam-two are situated in Southeast Asia. Whatever the threat of-the expansion of Communism may
have been in the past, it is certainly clear that this
threat does not exist in Southeast Asia today. Laos, a
workers' state with precious few industrial workers,
generates most of its meager foreign. income by selling electricity to Thailand. Overseeing the poorest,
least developed, most remote country in Southeast
Asia, the present and previous Lao administrations
have experienced considerable difficulty in governing
their highly diverse populations, much less in interfering in the affairs of other nations. Vietnam is clearly in
the process of reintegrating itself into the East Asian
economy. Vietnam is receiving considerable foreign
investment, manages its infrastructure with demonstrable talent in the face of meager resources, and
shows every indication of an economic recovery from
the policy disasters of 15 years ago (Jamieson, 1993;
373). In sum, the end of ideology as a factor in
national conflict can clearly be perceived in Southeast
Asia today. But this situation hardly portends "the end
of history," about which so much has been written in
recent years. Indeed, it is the burden of history, and
not of ideology, which has driven the ethnic enmities,
national disputes, and international conflicts that have
beset this region during the current century.
Conclusion
Given the expanse and complexity of the Southeast
Asian geographical region it would be impossible to
recount all the past, present, and possible ethnic
distinctions, rivalries, and disputes in this region. I
have mentioned a few areas of-concern and noted that
relatives in the United States. If the Vientiane government demonstrates interest in assuring development
equity for the highlands, respects minority cultural
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�C00123268
environmental/highland-lowland, ethnic, religious,
border area, and ideological concerns have in the past
driven the engine of ethnic conflict in Southeast Asia.
Ethnic divisions and incipient tensions exist everywhere in the world. The management of such conflicts
Although it would be easy to suggest that the Government of the United States follow a strict policy of noninvolvement in overseas ethnic disputes, such is not
my view. If the United States were to be totally uninvolved, then major rescue operations such as that
in Somalia or refugee efforts such as that on the
is part-and-parcel of the business of government and
Thailand-Cambodia border in 1979 would have been
trol (Geertz, 1973; 259-269). The modern history of
built to address urgent health needs, and if roadways
of no concern to the American public. Given the
uniquely threatening nature of ethnic disputes and
controversies, there is no choice but to actively monitor and to intervene positively where necessary. Intervention in the cause of the exacerbation of ethnic
conflict should never be justified. Intervention, as we
have seen in the recent case of Congressional action
on East Timor, can serve as a wake-up call to governments that once could cavalierly dismiss overseas
concerns about internal repression as the remonstrations of the political periphery. The nature of such
positive intervention might take the form of channeling foreign aid to rural regions with wide disparities in
household income or constraining trade opportunities
for governments deemed repressive and insensitive to
ethnic minority demands. Support could be provided
for indigenous NGOs equipped to mediate disputes
and negotiate issues that obtain between opposing
Governments have often endeavored to build national
groups. The most important contribution developed
consensus on the basis of mijority ethnic loyalty and/
countries can make to the amelioration of tension
on the basis of threats to
or justify foreign adventures
between ethnic groups is to address issues of social
ethnic security or purity. The exacerbation of what
conanthropologist Clifford Geertz has termed "primordial inequality, which so often are the root cause of
flicts and clashes. If a mountain tribal people is
at the manipulation of
sentiments" by agencies skilled
media and the mobilization of mass organizations has awarded rights to permanent agricultural land, if
schools are built for minority children and clinics are
often unleashed forces difficult to subsequently con-
increasingly the concern of a unipolar international
community. In the recent past agencies representing
world powers have intentionally inflamed and exacerbated such tensions in the process of furthering the
short term strategic concerns of their national capitals.
The consequences of such actions are sometimes tragedies writ in Homeric proportions. Did such involvement occur in the physical annihilation of the
Indonesian Communist Party? Did the massacres of
Vietnamese civilians living in Cambodia in 1970 at
the birth of the Khmer Republic occur in a political
and strategic vacuum in the context of the Vietnam
war? Some 70,000 tribal Laptians currently reside in
the state of California; what'conundrum of political
and social policies conspired to transport so remote a
people to so alien and unfamiliar a land?
Southeast Asia is rife with examples of such manipulation of ethnic passions. In the wake of the Cold War,
somewhat more evenhanded concerns for human
rights are already emerging. That differences in ethnic
identity, religious affiliation, ideological persuasion,
or linguistic preference obtain in Southeast Asia is
fundamental to the local social landscape. Southeast
Asians have formed nation-states of "imagined communities" on the bases of colonial entities erected on
the ruins of ancient civilizations (Anderson; 1991).
The same passions that inflamed modern European
nations 100 years ago (or that are presently at work in
the Balkans) are liable to remain potentially threatening in the relative young national entities of Southeast
Asia.
are constructed to facilitate commerce, then the root
cause of resentment and rebellion will be effectively
addressed. Resources that once were invested in heavy
armaments might in the present circumstance best be
invested in the tasks of reducing infant mortality,
enhancing family incomes, and facilitating equity in
national development in Southeast Asia. With
resources currently at hand, the tragedies of the past
need not necessarily serve as prologue for the future.
Understanding the past role of intelligence agencies in
directly influencing the ethnic conflicts during the
125
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Cold War will undoubtedly be of some help in formulating future policies and plans. Until recently, access
to sensitive records on such subjects was extremely
restricted. Next year information on developments
over the past 30 years in Indochina and Indonesia
should be much more readily available. A clear vision
of the future will most probably be enhanced by an
recent
objective and unbiased understanding of the
before long we shall learn much more
past. Perhaps
about the role of foreign intelligence agencies in the
northern
generation of clandestine tribal armies in
Cambodian monarchy in
Laos, in the overthrow of the
1970, and in the assumption of power of a Westernoriented military regime in Indonesia. As events have
often proven, the short run triumphs of political tacticians can sometimes result in the ruin of long-term
strategic plans (i.e. Iran). Scholarly investigation of
the past may prove to be of more than passing utility
in charting the future.
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References
Anderson, Benedict 1991. Imagined Communities:
Reflections on the Origin a,'d Spread ofNationalism,
Verso Press, New York.
Dunn, James 1993. Timor: A People Betrayed,Jacaranda Press, N.S.W., Australia.
Geertz, Clifford 1973. The Interpretationof Culture
Hickey, Gerald 1982. Sons of the Mountains, Yale
University Press, New Haven.
Jamieson, Neil 1993. UnderstandingVietnam, University of California Press, Berkeley.
Reid, Anthony 1988. Southeast Asia in the Age of
Commerce, Yale University Press, New Haven.
Basic Books, New York.
Hamilton-Merritt Jane 1993. Tragic Mountains, University of Indiana Press, Bloomington.
Tarling, Nicholas The CambridgeHistory ofSoutheast
Asia, Volume 1, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York.
Hefner, Robert 1990. The PoliticalEconomy ofMountain Java,University of California Press, Berkeley.
127
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Summary of Discussion
QUESTION: Would you comment on the issues of the
General Discussion
comments.
DR. WIXMAN: I would like to make two
First, I think that we need to keep in mind that our
analysis is colored by our own Anglo-American or
Western ethnic perspective and that it affects the way
in which we perceive the rest of the world geopolitically. Second, with regard to the hierarchical context
that Dr. Gladney discussed, I think one has to recognize that context is key to our understanding on the
international and political level as well. When people
ask someone if they are Uzbek, the answer is yes.
When they ask them if they are Central Asian, theanswer is yes. When they ask them if they are Muslim,
the answer is yes. It all depends on the set of-circumstances, the context. In one case, these groups will
fight each other; and in another, they will fight
together against the "outsider." I think one of the
potential for the rise of Southern Chinese-nationalism?
an enorDR. GLADNEY: There is the potential for
in terms of our understanding of
mous shift of focus
of the late
China as Hong Kong becomes the issue
1990s. I am not saying Cantonese separatism is going
to pull China apart, but I am saying that a strong feeling of difference exists in the south, and the politics of
difference are becoming very important for China's
domestic future. We have tended to focus on border
minorities, yet, when I travel in China, I find that the
Chinese are not worried about the Tibetans or
Uighur-they are concerned that the Cantonese are
getting rich and that they can buy their country three
times over, and they are worried about those people
who are poor and who keep coming into our city taking all their jobs-this whole issue of floating population. The government can no longer say, "Hey, keep
these differences at bay because we have the Soviets,
the Americans, or the Japanese to worry about." I pre-
that often we
problems in making foreign policy isbigger picture.
the local level and miss the
focus on
One issue that we need to take into account when
groups
making foreign policy is that, although two may be
may hate each other, if we get involved, they
drawn together against us.
I referred
DR. GLADNEY: Yes, the old proverb that
I against each other, you and me
to earlier, "You and
cousagainst my brother, my brother and I against our
against you," articulates such a
ins, our cousins and I
hierarchy. I am very uncomfortable with this whole
discourse on tribalism. The notion of the tribe was
basically refuted 60 years ago. Now, suddenly, it is
back. A simplistic interpretation of the notion can lead
to misunderstanding. For example, many assume that
the Soviet Union somehow held back these ethnic tensions, and now, with the Soviets out, these tensions
In fact, in many caseshave bubbled to the surface. Uzbek or the Uzbek veras the Tajik versus the
such
sus the Uighur-khe Soviets created the divisions and
ethnic conflicts between groups who are essentially
very similar peoples. Scholars and analysts need to
continlook at the historical processes and historical
we are always looking in
gencies. As anthropologists,
dict that these local level conflicts will become more
important.
contraQUESTION: I'm puzzled by two seemingly economy
trends in China. One is an increased
dictory
imply peaceand international trade, which appears to
the other is an increased military,
ful pursuits, and
How do
including substantial offensive capabilities.
these fit together?
DR. GLADNEY: It is a very complex situation, and, in
my opinion, the whole issue has to be framedin terms
of this post-Cold War society. China no longer sees
itself in opposition to the Soviets. It is interested much
more in microlevel issues. The economic aspects of
this drive a lot of these issues, particularly China's relationship with the Middle East in terms of exporting
military hardware. But I think also the issue is a feeling
Tiananmen Square
of internal insecurity. During thethe military was not
incident, there was a rumor that
obeying the leadership's orders to crack down on protesters. Since then, and I referred to this in my paper,
the government has reorganized the military, fired genplaces.
erals, and tried to put more loyal people in their
terms of context-when, where, why, and how-and
are not drawing these broad generalities.
128
�C000123268
However, many of them have regional loyalties that
Beijing can no longer trust. The economic discrepancies between the south and east, on the one hand, and
the north and west, on the other, are extraordinary. You
have the Fourth World and Firat World side by side in
one country. The people in the south are becoming
very tired of carrying the north. I think Hong Kong
may be an issue. I think, in some ways, a military
buildup may be also for domestic concerns. I do not
think people have focused on that issue.
DR. CRYSTAL: The animosity toward the Vietnamese remains the most significant source of ethnic tension. Hopefully, this tortured land will have some time
to reconstitute its policy. The Vietnamese have withdrawn, the United States seems to have played a
benign role during this recent election, and the UN
peacekeeping force was a success-despite the prediction of most everyone. Hopefully, we can look forward to a time when these inflamed ethnic passions
will subside.
COMMENT: Dr. Crystal, when you spoke of Cambodia, you focused mostly on the anti-Vietnamese sentiment. What are your thoughts on the country's other
ethnic problems?
129
�C00123268
Evolving Ethnicity in South Asia
With Particular Reference to India
ethnic agendas accordingly. They base them not only
in isoon their own social and economic interests seen
the interests of
lation but also on their perceptions of
comothers in the same arena with whom they must
assets. Ethnic groups have
pete for limited political
Joseph E. Schwartzberg
sought to advance their interests by a wide variety of
Professor of Geography
of
means. These include the formation and support
University of Minnesota
political parties and other organizations; selective supand sympathetic
port for nonethnic political parties
legislation when an ethnic
candidates; discriminatory
Introduction
group controls the government at a particular level;
and, when the group is out of power, propaganda,
The following survey of evolving South Asian ethnicso
strikes, demonstrations, economic boycotts, and
ity generally supports the position of Paul Brass
deliberately resort to the use of
forth. Groups may also
(1991, p. 8), who asserts that:
force, even to the point of large-scale insurrection.
confronMore often, however, violence occurs when
ethnicity and nationalism are not 'givens' but are
tations with other groups or with the government get
social and political constructions. They are creations
out of control. Violence has, in fact, at times marked
sometimes fabof elites, who draw upon, distort, and
virtually every type of ethnic movement discussed in
ricate materials from the cultures of the groups they
this paper and has repeatedly affected every major
wish to represent in order to protect their well-being
region and virtually every state of India, as well as the
and economic advanor existence or to gain political
tage for their groups, as well as for themselves.
phe[Further] ethnicity and nationalism are modern
The Government of India has responded to the politinomena inseparably connected with the modern cencal demands of ethnic groups in ways no less varied
tralizing state.
On numerthan those used by the groups themselves.
Bhowregard to state reorganization and
more importance than Brassous
occasions, as in
I would attach
organized
ion'brh.Wletsemyotbimuae ub
s, it
has to
the deman for quotas, it asd bowed to organized -pubthe demand
ever, to the so-called primordial loyalties that inhere
be immutable giv-often
in one's birth. While these may not
force, especially in
ens, they do represent a reservoir of cultural identifiers resorted to the use of substantial
movements in its border
dealing with secessionist
from which elites can draw as they assess specific
regions, whether they be of tribals in the northeast or
situations and make a calculus of the costs
political
Sikhs or Kashmiris in the northwest. Between these
types of
and benefits of seeking to elicit particular
extremes, numerous options existed. At times the govare caste, religion,
support. Among these identifiers
sect (which may be locally important, but which I can- ernment successfully co-opted the leadership of specific groups, made expedient compromises with them,
not explore in this brief paper), language, dialect (also
loyalty. Birth within a
not discussed), and regional
control over local polities, prowi
nr ms yin ea or acquiesced in their
Alternaad r e r. ly al
particular
vided they did not transcend certain limits.
e
m aw
platicular gohey are matty, t be
has used its substantial
government
Hence, politi. tively, the central
other economic
They are potent and they tend to endure.
control over fiscal resources and
Hidentities.
levers to gain favor or punish dissent; it has also interSonty so tfar
reshaping ethmc
cians can go only sfand innd eshapindue.hc
of
fered in numerous ways in local politics-a cause
I would also stress more than Brass and other political
commentators do the importance of geographic arenas. I repeatedly refer in this paper to changes in politactors
ical boundaries and show that the political
together within the administrative limits of
thrown
state adjust their
any newly reconfigured country or
particular alienation in the case of Kashmir-declaring certain groups and activities illegal, jailing dissidents, and frequently suspending the elected
130
�C00123268
Figure 9
Ethnic Violence in India, 1972-1990
Months of Ethnic Violence
as a Percentage of
Total Number of Months
Percent
35
.::,,,
..
20
10
NE
0'
-
State or union territory boundary
%
736075 6-95
131
�C00123268
legislative assembly and imposing President's or Governor's Rule.
Processes of Ethnic Identity Formulation
The potential for serious and enduring damage to
existing polities from ethnically rooted violence, both
intranationally and internationally, is great and
Birth into a particular group still matters far more in
South Asia than it does in areas of other major civilizations. One is expected to be "true to one's salt";
one's essence and traditions are all determined by
appears to be increasing. From 1972 to 1980, India
birth.
experienced serious ethnic violence in 67 percent of
all months, and South Asia as a whole experienced
such violence in 95 percent of all months. For the
period 1981 to 1990, the figures rose to 94 percent and
100 percent for India and South Asia, respectively.
Jati,which generally connotes caste, translates literally as birth. One is born into a particular caste in
accordance with one's karma-the net merit or
demerit of actions performed in previous existences. If
From an ethnic perspective, South Asia is arguably the
one properly follows in the present life the forms of
most complex and one of the most turbulent regions of
our planet. Its political map is far from frozen. One
may safely anticipate a number of changes in the foreseeable future, many of which will be driven by agendas of specific ethnic groups. Whatever these changes
may be, they will, in turn, surely give rise to new
manipulations of ethnic identities to suit the needs of
new situations.
This presentation considers the various historical processes that have shaped ethnic identities in South
Asia, concentrating, because of limitations of time and
space, on India and on the postindependence period. It
also discusses specific bases for establishing ethnic
behavior appropriate to caste status, one may aspire to
rebirth in a higher caste. This axiomatic belief forms
the essence of Hindu dharmna, which may be translated either as duty or religion. These observations are
made with specific reference to Hinduism but are
equally applicable to Buddhism and Jainism. The
behavioral norms on which they are based have
strongly influenced communities of other coexisting
faiths of South Asia as well, even Muslims, for whom
the very notion of caste is theoretically anathema. For
example, few Indian Muslims, before the creation of
Pakistan, would have hesitated to identify the social
group to which they belonged by a name that would
conjure up in the minds of their non-Muslim neigh-
identities and the periods, situations, and locales in
bors a particular caste-defined set of roles and a spe-
which they assumed importance. It also notes the
means by which ethnic groups seek to advance their
interests and by which governments respond to such
efforts. I shall not, however, strive for completenessthe topic is simply too vast. Omitted from consideration here is any discussion of ethnic relations in
Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and Nepal. Even for India, I
shall do no more than touch lightly on the two most
troublesome contemporary ethnic problems: the Sikh
struggle for an independent Khalistan and the complex struggle in Kashmir being waged simultaneously
by forces seeking independence, on the one hand, or
merger with Pakistan on the other. Virtually all the
cific genre de vie.
empirical data that I shall be presenting are drawn
communal activities at an all-India level were nonex-
from the updated 1992 edition of the HistoricalAtlas
of South Asia, which synthesizes information from a
istent. At a regional level, devotion to the cult of a particular deity or to a saintly figure and participation in
multitude of sources, only a small part of which are
major fairs and pilgrimages did provide some feeling
For most South Asians and for most of the region's
history, caste was the principal referent of one's place
in society. The vast majority of the population lived in
villages in which. their appropriate social and economic roles were rooted primarily in caste. Social and
intellectual horizons in such a setting were typically
very limited, and political action, such as it was, was
generally confined to a narrow spatial arena. Affairs of
state were the domain of small classes of elite.
Although the encompassing sacred realm of Bharat, or
India, found a place in the consciousness of Hindus,
noted in the bibliography accompanying this paper.
Although the interpretations of those data are my own,
I doubt that any are wholly original.
132
�C000123268
of community, but the sensed bonds of religion, I
would argue, were generally weaker, at least among
Hindus, than were those of caste.
The unification of India under the British and the
accelerating expansion, thereafter, of the transportation and communications network, literacy, the press,
and notions of democratic governance brought about a
number of important changes in the way that people
saw themselves and in their patterns of interaction.
While identification with and loyalty to one's caste
remained important, other social attributes became
increasingly salient as wider arenas of economic and
Anglo-Indians, Europeans, and Scheduled Castes as
well as for such special interests as Indian commerce
and industry, European commerce, landholders, labor,
and even women. Whether the course adopted was an
attempt to gradually establish a liberal representative
democracy or a cynical policy of "divide and conquer" depends on whose version of history one
chooses to believe. In any event, a policy of recognizing the en bloc claims of particular constituencies to a
share of the political pie was set firmly in place,
thereby reinforcing ethnic sensitivities.
The establishment of quotas remains a part of the
political interaction were established. New, more-or-
political modus operandi to this day, although the
ism. In other contexts, however, socially and cultur-
acceptances to institutions of higher education. Rules
less Westernized commercial and bureaucratic elites
came into being. Although they were mainly Hindu,
these new elites drew also fronh other religious communities and from many linguistic regions. In some
situations, especially after the creation of the Indian
National Congress in 1885, they formed the nucleus
for an emerging PanIndian, nontraditional, national-
rules for fixing quotas varied from one context to
another. Some quotas are in strict proportion to population. Depressed groups-officially designated
"Scheduled Castes" and "Scheduled Tribes"-are
guaranteed certain numbers of seats in national and
state legislatures, of positions in various lower and
middle levels of government employment, and of
ally defined groups vied with one another for privilege
and power. Thus, in addition to their caste and religious identities, many Indians became increasingly
aware of regional attachments that were previously
only dimly sensed within areas dominated by a particular language or dialect. The range of politically relevant primordial loyalties-those that form the basis
for what we now recognize as ethnicity-was
expanded accordingly. In a sense, then, we may say
that one's identity-or jati-today means much more
than caste alone.
of this type are institutionalized in the Constitutions of
India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Other informal quotas for places on party tickets, for participation in state
and provincial ministries, or for a share of the economic largess over which certain agencies of government have control, are more flexible and situationspecific. These informal quotas are often determined
by deals made by party bosses in response to promises
of support or various pressures by specific groups.
Institutionalized religious quotas are presently
unthinkable within the secular democracy of India, but
The British rulers recognized the latent potential for
disunity inherent in the social and cultural complexity
of the subcontinent, and they responded fitfully and
often grudgingly to Indian demands for greater control
over their own destinies. In each of a series of major
constitutional reforms, such as the Indian Councils
Act of 1909 and the Governmeht of India Acts of
total Indian electorate and much more than that in several regions-retains an informal claim to a share of
power. In Pakistan the small Ahmadiya sect, which
the Constitution has declared to be outside the pale of
Islam, has been allotted reserved seats in both the
national and provincial legislatures, as have other
minorities and women.
1919 and 1935, they acknowledged the claims of specific minorities to separate electorates to guarantee
some semblance of fair representation in the evolving
legislative apparatus. At first only the Muslim population was accorded special recognition. Subsequently,
concomitant with an expanding franchise, elected
seats were reserved also for Sikhs, Indian Christians,
the Muslim voting bloc-roughly one-ninth of the
Sociocultural identities in South Asia have never been
fixed. The corporate mobility of particular groups,
some ascending and others descending in the local
133
�000123268
So
social hierarchy, has been abundantly documented.
too has been the frequent creation of new groups
through fission of older ones and the less common
amalgamation or fusion of-groups when that suited a
particularpurpose. While these processes have operated since ancient times, the pace of change has accelerated greatly over the past century. Many new fortes
of identity have been socially, and often deliberately,
constructed in response to the evolving corporate
agendas of would-be players on the political stage.
attenThe institutionalization ofdemocracy and the
previously inert
dant politicization of more and more
have
groups underlie these changes. Clever politicians
the right buttons" to elicit
recognized that "pushing
some sort of ethnically rooted response-whether
based on religion, language, caste, tribal affiliation, or
way ofregional sentiment-was the most efficacious
and attaining power. Temporary
attracting a following
alliances of convenience with others playing the same
espegame were often established. This strategy was
persons held
cially common in regions where few
deep ideological convictions.
Types of Ethnic Identity in the 20th Century
Emergent Nationalism
itl atieasm
Twoe
cle for the
essenwas the idea that India's population consisted
tially of a Hindu nation and a Muslim nation whose
core identities and goals were so fundamentally different that there was no hope that they could coexist
within a single independent state without serious
adverse consequences for the Muslim minority. In
1947, Jinnah's dream of an independent Pakistan was
fulfilled. At the same time, the Congress dream of a
secular, all-embracing Indian nation was shattered.
that folPartition and the massive population transfers
roughly a third of South Asia's Muslowed still left
provide a
lims in India; this concentration continues to
than 100 million
basis for ethnic tensions. The more
world's
Muslims in India today constitute by far the
of the country are
largest ethnic minority. Few parts
the
without a significant Muslim presence. Within
of Jammu
Indian-held portion of the disputed state
and Kashmir, Muslims form a substantial majority.
of two
The dispute over Kashmir has been the cause
and the area also figwars between India and Pakistan,
ured prominently in the war that led to the independence of Bangladesh. Within Kashmir a bitter
multisided insurrection is now in progress as some
others
separatists seek an independent state andenmity union
pern-
with Pakistan. Sustained Indo-Pakistani
odically makes life precarious for India's Muslims
despite the country's constitutional commitment to a
secular state with religious liberty for all.
xpression f emergent Nationalism during the preindependence period. The creation of the Indian
Muslims, of course, are not the only significant reliNational Congress in 1885 was an outcome of a newly
gious minority in India. Five of India's 25 states have
Congress quickly
nascent Indian nationalism. The
Sikh, Christian, or animistic majorities (figure 10)of
became the principal Pan-Indian vehicle for the freeand, with the exception of the mainly tribal state of
dom struggle. When the Muslim League came into
Arunachal Pradesh in the far northeast, all have been
being in 1906, however, it embarked on a more paroscenes of bitter ethnic struggles in the postindepenits agenda as much by its percepchial course. It set
dece period. The most intense of these struggles is
tions of the likely effects of Congress activities on the
that of Punjab's Sikhs for an independent Khalistan,
welfare of India's Muslim community as on its views
waged intermittently since 1981. The present period is
of the British raj. Not surprisingly, the League vacilone of relative quiescence, but the problem remains
with the Conlated between periods of cooperation
unresolved. I shall defer trill later discussion of the ethgress and periods of fierce opposition to it. As powers
nic struggles of several tribal regions.
were devolved toward the provinces, the importance
the
of success in electoral contests gradually widened
1940
rift between the two parties. Yet it was not until
cast in favor of establishthat the die was irrevocably
ing a separate state for India's Muslim community.
state
The requisite ethnic rationale invented for that
was Muhammad Ali Jinnah's "two-nation" theory. It
134
�C00123268
Figure 10
Distribution of Non-Hindus in India, 1981
,5
.11
33
16
11
a
29
l1
110
23
10
Leading Religion in Area
.5
-
of Non-Hindu Majority
4
-ANIMIST
19
BUDDHIST
- 11
CHRISTIAN
3
MUSLIM
14-.
1
.mAreas
-
14
SIKH
in which nona
Hindus comprise
25-50% of population
--- State or union territory boundary ~
Figures ineach state or union territory indicate
non-Hindu proportion of total population as of 1981
736076 6-95
135
�C0 012 32 68
Linguistic Affiliation as an Organizing Principle
majority. Figure 11 reveals the extensive changes
Language, formerly of relatively little political impor-
wrought by linguistic reorganization over the period
tance, has since 1947 emerged as a potent political
force in Hindu-majority areas despite the lingering
role of religion as an aspect of ethnicity in postpartition. As a matter of organizational convenience, the
1951-72.
The government's conciliatory attitude in regard to
linguistic reorganization did not mollify linguistic
Congress Party, beginning with Bihar in 1908, began
groups sufficiently to guarantee their loyalty to the
to organize itself into linguistic provinces, even
though most of the provinces of British India and several of the larger princely states were multilingual
entities. It was not until 1920, however, that the Congress Party established linguistic units throughout
British India and made the creation of linguistic
administrative provinces a plank in its platform for
political reform.: As Congress saw it, the arbitrariness
of the political map that resulted from the unplanned
history of British territorial acquisition in India was an
affront to the natural aspirations of-India's major linguistic groups. In any event, the call for linguistic
Union government. Within Madras, in particular, a
demand arose for an independent Dravidian nationsometimes dubbed "Dravidistan"-to comprise the
four new linguistic states in which Dravidian languages were spoken. As matters transpired, the three
other Dravidian states of South India showed relatively little enthusiasm for a Tamil-led Dravidian
nation, and the movement lost its momentum. But one
lasting outcome was the rise to power of the D3ravida
Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), a Tamilian ethnic party
established in 1949. Alone or at the head of-a multiparty coalition, the DMK has ruled Madras, or Tamil
provinces was overshadowed as an issue by the more
Nadu as it was renamed in 1969, for all but six years
inclusive agenda of Gandhi's noncooperation movement. Conceivably, an unstated motive in the Congress Party's call for linguistic provinces was to divert
popular attention away from communally based politics.
since it first came to power in 1967. Arguably, the prudent willingness of the Congress Party to allow ethnically minded Tamil politicians to enjoy the rewards of
power did as much as the lack of separatist ardor in
neighboring Dravidian states to blunt secessionist
demands. Had the movement succeeded, it would
almost certainly have led to the Balkanization of
India.
The first postindependence demand for a linguistic
state came from Telugu speakers, the largest among
several major minorities in the then Tamil-dominated
state of Madras. The demands persisted, and Congress
Demands for reorganizing the political map of inde-
conceded by establishing the new Telugu-speaking
pendent India were not all rooted in linguistic con-
state of Andhra in 1954. This opened the floodgates to
calls for additional states based on linguistic criteria.
The government then established a States Reorganiza-
sciousness. Several newly created linguistic states
contained regions that lagged notably behind others in
levels of economic and social development. As a rule,
tion Commission to study the problem, and ultimately
areas that had formed a part of British India were gen-
the States Reorganization Act of 1956 led to a radical
redrawing of the political map. The 1956 Act, however, failed to divide the essentially bilingual state of
Bombay and the putatively bilingual state of Punjab.
These intentional departures from the new linguistic
state norms were short lived. Bombay was partitioned
in 1960 to form the Marathi-speaking state of-Maharashtra and the Gujarati-speaking state of Gujarat. In
1966, Punjab was also partitioned, allegedly on a linguistic basis, but in actuality on communal grounds;
when the government acceded to the Sikh demands
for a reconfigured Punjab, the reduced area of-the new
state was one in which Sikhs became an absolute
erally more advanced than those previously ruled by
the less progressive princes, such as the Nizam of
Hyderabad. Regions lagging behind the political core
areas of the states to which they were joined soon
sensed that the state was not doing enough to rectify
the ill-effects of past neglect. This, in turn, led to several demands for separation, fueled by local politicians who sought to harness local discontent as the
vehicle for furthering their own political ambitions. To
what extent those politicians and their followers were
136
�C00123268
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�C00 123268
period has
The role of caste in the postindependence
considerably. In the past, power at the local
changed
landholdlevel was typically shared by the dominant
Brahmans. Each
ing group and the ritually supreme
group legitimized the role of the other in its appropriAnother outcome of states reorganization was the
ate sphere. With the coming of democracy, however,
moveescalation of what have been called "nativistic"
other claims
numbers, rather than ritual ascendancy or
linguistic
ments. In such movements the dominant
important determito elite status, became increasingly
as "sons
group of a particular state, styling themselves
govnants of power. Throughout India, at all levels of
of the soil," sought, by a combination of legal meaacross the political spectrum, parties
the opportu- ernment and
to
sures, intimidation, and violence, to limit
appealed to particular types of caste constituencies
other states-and
nities of immigrant groupsfrom
to control
gain support. Local magnates-believed
in
sometimes of indigenous Muslims as well-and,
settle- large "vote banks" of their caste followers-offered
their
some instances, to create legal obstacles to
a place on
their support to specific parties in return for
The strongest of these movements were in
ment.
ballot. Single castes rarely composed an absolute
vthe
rngsta.
Asamn h
majority of the electorate; alliances among various
Assam and Maharashtra.
caste groups were therefore common.
Tribal and Caste-Based Ethnicity
A number of tribal groups who aspired either to statehad
Anti-Brahmanisn become a potent political force
hood within the Indian union or to full independence
in some regions even in the preindependence period.
were disregarded in the initial phase of the linguistic
The appeal of Charan Singh to a wide spectrum of
reorganization. In the mineral-rich Chhota Nagpur, in
middle-level peasant castes over much of the Hinditribals had estabthe northeast of peninsular India,
cannot
able to construct a regional sense of ethnicity
of these attempts to
readily be determined, but none
achieve a separate state succeeded.
lished a forerunner of the present-day JharkhandParty
speaking area of India was a key factor in catapulting
as early as 1939. The party has campaigned intermittently for a tribal state since the parliamentary elections of 1957. Other groups, most notably the Nagas
and later the Mizos along India's northeastern borders,
resorted to armed rebellion. Many among these frontier tribals were Christians, almost all spoke languages
unrelated to the major languages of the states in which
to power in tiated following Gndhi in
of emergency
the
hi n
n
initiatena
eerenfor
period
middle1975. The desire for empowerment among
level groups found expression during the period of
Janata rule in the creation of the Mandal Commission,
which drew up a report in 1982 suggesting a new set
the
imily to sose
of quotas for te
guaranteed to Scheduled Castes
they lived, and very few had reason to feel a deep
Backwardons stuiol
sense of loyalty to Ind
Christian groups as well as by Pai-
and Scheduled Tribes. Although the Janata Party did
with moral
stan and China, all of which provided them
and/or material support.
The Indian Government's attitude in dealing with
tribal demands was generally less conciliatory than it
was in respect to other ethnic groups. Ultimately,
however, through a combination of military suppression, co-optation of compliant leaders, and other tactics, accommodations were reached with elements of
each of the rebellious frontier groups, and many new,
tribally dominated administrative units-either uno
The
territories or fullfiedged states-were established.
tribal
much more numerous, but also more pacific,
to find their political aspigroups, however, continue
the
not remain in power long enough to implement
of the Commission's report, the decision to
provisions
1990
do so by a new National Front government in
over large parts
touched off a wave of violent protest
of India and contributed to the government's collapse
shortly thereafter.
Below the OBCs in India's social hierarchy are the
Scheduled Castes, formerly untouchables, who conon
pose rough le for equality before the lwpouati
heirnstre
gop
foequbytaitionally sueriwanor
humane treatment by traditionally supe
rations frustrated.
138
a
�C00123268
been a difficult one, reminiscent in many ways of the
American civil rights movement in respect to blacks.
In some parts of India, especially Bihar, the peas-
antry-for whom the Scheduled Castes mainly work
as landless laborers-have responded with incredible
brutality to attempts by Scheduled Castes to better
their lot. In other areas, most notably Maharashtra,
large numbers of the group have adopted a new ethnic
identity by conversion to Buddhism, employing a
social dynamic comparable to that of the Black Muslim movement among blacks in America. Other Harijans have been converting to Islam.
Hindu Nationalism
Hindu ethnicity sank roots even before the turn of the
present century. Within the Congress Party there
emerged the powerful conservative voice of a Marathi
Brahman, Bal Gangadhar Tilak, who perceived in the
heightened respectability by being admitted into the
hodgepodge anti-Congress Janata coalition that swept
to power in 1977. The period 1990-91 witnessed a
dramatic rise in the strength of the Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP), successor to the Jan Sangh. This was
especially marked in India's conservative Hindi heartland.
Some observers of the Indian political scene anticipate
that the BJP will be able to form the next government,
either alone or at the head of a new anti-Congress coalition. The changed fortunes of the Hindu nationalists
may be attributed to a variety of factors. Among them
are the termination of the Nehru family dynasty, the
decline in public confidence in the long-ruling and
increasingly corrupt and scandal-ridden Congress
Party, and the failure of any other ideologically based
party to win the allegiance of a major segment of dis-
increasing Westernization of India's elite the seeds of
enchanted Congress supporters. No less important has
could hardly extinguish its appeal. Even before Tilak's
anti-Islamic sentiment vis-a-vis both Pakistan's and
the destruction of Hindu culture. He sought, sometimes violently, to oppose the British presence. No
less conservative in some respects, but far more tolerant of non-Hindu perspectives, was Mohandas Gandhi. Gandhi's commitment to nonviolence and his
fruitful collaboration with the liberal and secularminded Jawaharlal Nehru lessened the following for
Tilak's brand of Hindu nationalism for decades but
been the BJP's ability to project the sense that it stands
for the true India. It appeals mainly to the landed,
albeit nonelite, segments of the rural population and to
the lower middle class of the urban population. Neither of these groups has previously enjoyed a large
share of political power over any sustained period.
Implicit in the appeal of the BJP is a certain rejection
of Western influences, along with a generous dose of
death in 1920, Hindu nationalism was institutionalized
India's own Muslim population.
ation of the Muslim League. Although never posing a
serious challenge to Congress, the Mahasabha was
particularly influential in the period before and just
after partition in fomenting anti-Muslim activities and
in giving credibility to Jinnah~s aforementioned twonation theory. Also noteworthy is the militant and fascistic Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (National Volunteer Association), one of whose members
assassinated Gandhi in 1948. Founded in 1925, it
remains a potent force, especially in Maharashtra, the
region of its inception.
The BJP's cynical exploitation of popular Hindu emotional sentiment in regard to the controversial destruction of a 16th-century mosque allegedly built over the
site of Lord Rama's birth put the BJP at the center of
public attention and was instrumental in bringing on
the most serious wave of Hindu-Muslim communal
violence since the period of partition. This led to the
dismissal of BJP ministries in four states in December
1992 and their replacement by President's Rule. (This
is shown on figure 12.) Some commentators argue that
the BJP leadership is more representative of the true
India than was the Congress Party-as well as less
corrupt-and anticipate that, once in power, the party
Despite their high visibility and local prominence, no
will act with a considerable degree of responsibility
in various guises, beginning with the Hindu Mahasabha, founded in 1907 in part as a reaction to the cre-
Hindu nationalist party in the postindependence
any
period even came close to gaining control over
Parliament, until
state legislature, not to mention
1990. The Bharatiya Jan Sangh, however, gained
and will restore stability to the nation. I am inclined to
doubt that assessment.
139
�C000123268
Figure 12
Parties, 1965-1993
in States Governed by Ethnic
Proportion of India's Population
Percent
States.d
etc., are treated as
Delhi, Goa, Pondicherry,
of
Union Territories
governed by ethnic parties
The number of States or Union Territories
is noted for each year.
month of March.
Figures for each year are as of the
35
the
25
5
20
5
6 5
6
g 6
6
15
8
3 77
5
10
5
7
7 4
4
6
6
6
4
3
6
5
3
3
1966
1970
1975
5i
2
1980
1985
1990
1993
349178 6-95
140
�C00123268
Postscript
In legislative assembly elections held in November
1993, the BJP suffered dramatic losses in three of five
states in which it was formerly the ruling party,
including Uttar Predesh, India's most populous state.
On the other hand, it bettered its formerly dominant
position in Rajasthan and won a smashing victory in
Delhi. To a considerable extent, BJP losses were
reflected in Congress gains. Whether, as some observers suggest, the 1993 elections signal that the BJP tide
has crested and begun to fall remains to be seen.
141
�C00123268
References
Paul Brass. Ethnicity and Nationalism. Theory and
Comparison.New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1991. A
penetrating analysis based primarily on the author's
abundant empirical research in India, with numerous
comparisons to the Soviet Union and other areas.
Harrison, Selig S. India: The Most Dangerous
Decades.Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1960. A penetrating and prescient look at the
political dynamics of the early period of Indian independence, focusing, inter alia on regional elites, caste
lobbies, and various ethnically based stresses.
Breton, Roland J. L. Atlas geographiquedes langues
et des ethnies de l'inde et du subcontinent: Bangladesh, Pakistan.Sri Lanka. Nepal. Bhoutan. Sikkim.
Quebec: Les Presses de l'Universite Laval, 1976.
Includes scores of ingenious maps and other graphics,
treating census data on language diachronically and
more completely than in any other work.
Kothari, Rajni, ed., Caste in Indian Politics.New
Delhi: Orient Longman, Ltd., 1970. Includes nine case
studies of caste movements and of-the involvement of
castes in specific political contexts from a wide variety of regional contexts.
Crane, Robert I., ed., Regions and Regionalism in
South Asian Studies: An Exploratory Study. Durham,
North Carolina: Duke University Program in Comparative Studies on Southern Asia, Monograph and Occa-
Mahar, J. Michael, ed., The Untouchablesin ContemporaryIndia. Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona
Press, 1972. An excellent anthology providing a
diversity of views and empirical studies relating to the
formerly untouchable castes of India.
sional Paper Series, Monograph Number Five, 1967.
Studies from the disciplinary perspectives of geography, history, anthropology, sociology, and political
science together with critical commentary.
David, Kenneth, ed., The New Wind: Changing Identities in South Asia. The Hague and Paris: Mouton Pub-
Maloney, Clarence. Peoples of South Asia. New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1974. Written as a
textbook, this work provides a very balanced, easy to
comprehend overview of the many factors that contribute to South Asian identities.
lishers, 1977. The 17 papers in this anthology, all by
anthropologists (including 10 from South Asia itself)
Mandelbaum, David G. Societv in India. vol. I, Continuity and Change and vol. 2, Change and Continuity.
are mainly theoretical and deal with identities in contexts that, although generally not ethnic, nevertheless
will provide numerous insights applicable to the study
of ethnicity.
Berkeley, California: University of California Press,
1970. This work covers much the same ground as that
of Maloney but in greater depth and with more
emphasis on changes over time.
Gleason, Henry Allan, Jr. Religious Communities in
the Indias.Fancy Gap, Virginia: 1946. An empirical
study marked by historical depth and exceptionally
detailed maps of individual religious groups in many
regions of South and Southeast Asia.
Raza, Moonis and Ahmad, Aijazudduin. An Atlas of
Tribal India, With Computed Tables of DistrictLevel
Dataand Its Geographical
Interpretation.New Delhi:
Concept Publishing Company, 1990. Mapping of data
on tribal population from the 1961 and 1971 censuses
of India, throwing much light on the distribution and
social and economic status of tribal populations.
Grierson, Sir George Abraham. Linguistic Survey of
India. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1967-68. 11 vols.
[lst ed. Calcutta: Office of the Superintendant of Gov-
emnment Printing, 1903-22]. Despite its early date and
Risley, Sir Herbert Hope. The People of India. 2nd
edition, ed. by W. Crooke. Delhi: Oriental Books
its largely technical nature, this pioneering and monu-
mental study retains remarkable utility.
142
�C000123268
References (continued)
Reprint Corporation, 1969. (Original edition, Calcutta: Thacker, Spink, 1915). Although its anthropometrically based views on Indian races are antiquated,
its maps of caste distributions and discussion of how
castes are regarded, often stereotypically, by Indians
themselves are useful.
Schermerhorn, R. A. Ethnic Plurality in India. Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona Press, 1978.
Focuses on 10 minorities: Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, seven religious minorities, and Chinese,
with emphases on identity formation and group mobility.
Schwartzberg, Joseph E. "The Distribution of
Selected Castes in the North Indian Plain," The Geo7 9
graphical Review. vol. 55, no. 4, 1965, pp. 47 - 5
plus a large folded insert. Based on extensive field
research, this work employs acombination of maps
and graphs to indicate, at various scales, how castes
are distributed over a large part of northern India.
Schwartzberg, Joseph E., ed., A Historical Atlas of
South Asia. New York: Oxford University Press,
1992; updated edition (1st edition, Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1978.) Maps Indian perceptions of
their own geography at various periods, beginning in
Vedic times. For the modern period, maps show the
distribution of religions, sects; languages, dialects,
and castes based on various censuses from 1872 to
1961. Maps, graphs, and discusses ethnically related
disturbances throughout the past century, but particularly in the postindependence period.
Singer, Milton and Bernard S. Cohn, Structure and
Change in Indian Society. Chicago: Aldine Publishing
Co., 1968. (Also published through Current Anthro-
pology for the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthro-
pological Research, Inc., 1968, Viking Fund
Publications in Anthropology, No. 47.) Includes
numerous studies on caste, language, and social structure, among which several focus on intergroup
dynamics and recent social change.
-
K. S. Singh. The People of India: An Introduction.
Calcutta: Anthropological Survey of India, 1992. This
is the largely methodological introductory volume to
the Anthropological Survey's massive People of India
Project, begun in 1985 and destined to provide "a
brief, descriptive anthropological profile of all the
(4,635!) communities of India, studying the impact on
them of change and the development process and the
linkages that bring them together."
K. S. Singh, ed., Tribal Movements in India (two volumes). New Delhi: Manohar, 1982. Presents papers
given at a seminar organized by the Anthropological
Survey of India at which 36 ongoing tribal movements
were identified. Fourteen of these, all in the northeast,
are treated in volume one and the remainder, from
other regions, in volume two.
Smith, Donald Eugene, ed., South Asian Politics and
Religion. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1986. The four major sections of this excellent
anthology are "South Asia: Unity and Diversity,
"India: The Politics of Religious Pluralism," "Pakistan: The Politics of Islamic Identity," and "Ceylon:
The Politics of Buddhist Resurgence."
Sopher, David E., ed., An Explorationof India. Ithaca,
New York: Cornell University Press, 1980. Includes,
inter alia a critical overview of Indian regions by
Bharat L. Bhatt, a valuable study of linguistic boundaries by Charles J. Bennett, and a highly original overview of the regional patterning of culture in India by
the editor.
Wallace, Paul, ed., Region and Nation in India. New
Delhi: Oxford & IBH Publishing Co. and American
Institute of Indian Studies, 1985. Particularly useful
are a wide-ranging bibliographical and historiographic
essay on regionalism by N. Gerald Barrier and substantive essays on regional cultures by Ainslie T.
Embree and on linguistic states reorganization by
Joseph E. Schwartzberg.
143
�c00123268
References (continued)
Weiner, Myron. Sons of the Soil: Migrationand Ethnic Conflict in India. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1978. Detailed analyses of migration
to Assam, Chhota Nagpur, and the city of Hyderabad
and local responses, followed by theoretical discussion of nativistic movements and of the legal aspects
of various situations stemming from migration.
144
�C00123268
Summary of Discussion
defining territorial belongingness to the group having only a plurality. In most administrative subdivisions of Sri Lanka, one or another of the ethnic
groups has a very large majority, so the potential for
this kind of controversy is limited to only a few
areas. But these few areas are the critical places of
conflict and are where "ethnic cleansing" is most
likely to occur. Even though intense fighting has
taken place in the Tamil heartland of Jaffna, some of
the severest suffering by noncombatants has
occurred in the peripheral or frontier areas, where no
ethnic group possesses a majority.
Discussant: Robert Stoddard
I am going to try to achieve two things: first, integrate
content with what Alex Murphy said yesterday about
general principles through an illustration in South
Asia, using Sri Lanka as an example and, second,
build upon what Dr. Schwartzberg has said about the
background of ethnic diversity in South Asia, but giving a slightly different prediction about India's political future.
- The size of the arealunits. The real crux of the territorial problem is one of scale because the homogeneity of a region depends upon the size of the areal
unit that is being clustered to form a regional whole.
The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is primarily between
the Sri Lankan Tamils and the,mostly Sinhalese government. The Tamils want greater political control
over their lives; therefore, they seek greater autonomy
or even sovereignty over a specific territory. My comments pertain to the controversy over the delineation
of such an area, a territory I will call "the Tamil
- The decision about the necessityfor regional contiguity. There is a strong argument for avoiding ethnic
enclaves in any administrative unit. In the Sri Lan-
region."
kan situation, it is difficult to achieve complete contiguity because of the spatial distributions of the
At first glance, it would seem that a map showing the
spatial distribution of people according to their ethnicity would provide a fairly objective method for drawing boundaries. However, even so-called objective
regionalization depends upon agreement about, at
least, four conditions which involve fundamental geographic issues. These are:
ethnic populations.
Let us examine this regionalization task-that is, the
objective delineation of a Tamil region-by looking at
the distributions of ethnic populations at three areal
scales.
On the provincial level, eight of the nine Sri Lankan
provinces have large majorities consisting of only a
single ethnic group. Furthermore, their geographic
arrangement does not violate the goal of contiguity
" The definition of the pertinentpopulation. What
constitutes membership in the ethnic group being
regionalized is illustrated in Sri Lanka by the uncer-
tain status of those classified as Indian Tamils.
(figure 13). In the Eastern Province, however, the larg-
Because the Indian Tamils have an uncertain citizenship status, have been less politically active, and
est group has only a plurality. Sri Lankan Tamils, who
have the plurality in this province, insist that it should
generally belong to a lower caste than the Sri Lan-
be part of their region of control, even though it differs
kan Tamils, they are usually omitted from the population that defines the Tamil region. But such an
a little bit from the traditional historical lands. The
government disagrees.
omission is not universally accepted and, as I will
presently show, the inclusion of Indian Tamils can
make a difference.
- The definition of ethnic territory.Territorial belong-
If we look at the district level, the complexity of the
territorial issue is even more evident. In over half the
24 districts, the majority ethnic group exceeds 80 percent of the population. In only three districts does the
ingness is normally based upon the existence of a
demographic majority. But in a census unit where no
group exceeds 50 percent, a case can be made for
145
�C00123268
Figure 13
Ethnic Composition in Sri Lanka, 1981
4.
.
By District
By Province
Sinhalese Majority
By Division
B DFvo
Sinhalese Plurality
Lankan Tamil Majority
"Sri
- -
- -
Sri Lankan Tamil Plurality
'Indian Tamil Majority
- -- - .
.
.
.
.
S-
Indian Tamil Plurality
." . -
Moor Majority
- - -
*
Moor Plurality
736079 6-95
146
�C00123268
percentage drop below 50 percent. However, the location-and here we come into the geographic aspects
that were emphasized by Dr. Murphy-of these three
districts complicates the task of regionalization. Two
of the plurality districts-Trincomalee and Amparaiare in Eastern Province and present the same defini-
ethnoregionalism more than on the nonspatial interclass struggles for power. However, interclass strategies have real implications for the Hindu nationalist
movement.
tional problem as produced by the larger provincial
perspectives on Indian nationalism, the secular and the
units. The third district, Nuwara Eliya, is located in
the center of the country, where it is surrounded by
Sinhalese majority districts. Furthermore, the ethnic
population that holds the plurality is the Indian Tamil
community. Therefore, if a definition of "Tamil population" were to be expanded to combine both the Sri
Hindu. Indian secular nationalism is well illustrated
by the leadership of Nehru, who expounded, practiced, and institutionalized the pluralistic society.
From this perspective, the Indian nation-state is based
upon a syncretic view of Indian culture and a federal
system of government. All religions, all jatis, all lan-
Lankan and Indian Tamils, the resulting different eth-
guages, and all people within the territory of this
nic map would produce a Tariil region having a noncontiguous exclave,
country have equal opportunity under the law, according to the Constitution. The laws of the land accommodate both the wishes of the majority, as expressed
by free and democratic elections, and the rights of the
minorities.
Minor civil divisions below the district level are too
small for political autonomy. Tmat does not mean,
however, that these units cannot be used as a basis for
a regionalization scheme. However, the spatial fragmentation of the Sri Lankan Tamils in the peripheral
zone persists at this scale. In the Trincomalee District,
the population residing along a narrow coastal sliver
It is critical to note thatwe are dealing with two major
In contrast, Hindu nationalists believe that the nation
should be based not only on common culture but also
upon the religion of Hinduism. The more extreme
forms want to rule India as a Hindu state and rid the
forms a plurality consisting of a third ethnic groupthe Moors. The geometric complexity of ethnic con-
country of all non-Hindu persons and influences. The
more benign forms of Hindu nationalism seek unity
centrations is partially solved if the Sri Lankan Tamils
among the various castes and languages in India
and Indian Tamils are considered as members of the
same ethnic category because the plurality population
through the common heritage of living within a "Hinduized" land.
of this coastal strip shifts to being Tamil. Although
such a redefinition of the Tamil population tends to
From the perspective of the Hindu nationalists, Bud-
solve some of the problems of contiguity along the
dhists, Jains, and Sikhs already share a more or less
east coast, as noted above, it complicates the regionalization task in the central part of the country.
Thus, it is evident that a major contributor to ethnic
conflicts is the distributional pattern of contending
simliar sacred geography. Because of their origins,
their holy lands are within the same Hinduized land.
The Jews and the Parsis came from foreign areas, but,
because these communities are small, they have-not
been a particular problem. On the other hand, Hindus
populations. Also, this Sri Lankan situation reinforces
the generalization made yesterday: the areas where
view Christians and Muslims-with their doctrinaire
ideas-as a problem. The nonacceptance of Muslims
atrocities are most likely to occur, and from which
most refugees would originate, are the zones of ethnic
is especially strong because:
transition between the regional core areas of the dif-
e
fering ethnic groups.
Muslims are associated with the invasions from
circa 1000 to later than 1500.
Now, let me shift to the second topic which concerns
India, where I would like to deal with a nonterritorial
conflict. My own interests have usually focused upon
147
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�C00123268
- Some Muslim leaders, insisting that Muslims belong
to a separate nation, carved Pakistan from a "part of
India."
and has accommodated differences through the ages.
The eclectic and nonideological nature of Hinduism
and the other indigenous religions of South Asia cer-
tainly provides a deeply ingrained cultural propensity
- The Indian Muslim population is large enough to
make a significant difference.
If the BJP were to gain national power, it is difficult to
predict whether stability would be restored to the
nation. But we can predict that, if the right wing of the
Hindu nationalists should gain power, there would
most likely be mass, even widespread, conflicts in
areas where significant Muslim populations now live.
A plausible scenario would be massive outmigrations
similar to those that occurred during partition. A worst
case scenario would be another war between India and
Pakistan-this time with nuclear weapons.
In spite of several conditions that can lead to conflict,
there are strong reasons for believing that India will
not erupt into major ethnic wars, with the possible
exception of Kashmir. Other than Kashmir, there is
strong evidence that India is not as ethnically volatile
as many other regions in the world. First, note that the
population of India exceeds all of Africa, all of Latin
America, or all of Europe, none of which is in a single
nation-state or single country. All these other regions
are splintered into many states, and the people within
each show little evidence of uniting politically. In contrast, even with all the diversity among the people of
India, the nation has remained together for almost half
a century. Furthermore, this has been accomplished
within a mostly democratic environment again, some-
thing that has not been achieved in Third World countries in Africa or in Latin America. It also contrasts
with the situation in Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union, where ethnic feelings were suppressed
by dictatorial governments. That success provides a
basis for predicting that ethnic conflicts will not be
more severe in India than elsewhere.
for the acceptance of differences. It is true that
throughout most of history the people of the subcontinent did not live in a single political unit and that the
various regional states did engage in fighting, but
most conflicts did not result from the kind of major
ideological crusade that separates people for centuries
and produces long-lasting hatreds.
Certainly it is in the best interest of the United States,
as the leader of the democratic world, to support the
forces of pluralism in South Asia.
General Discussion
DR. GLADNEY: I am always, and I think everybody
is, amazed that India is still together. You mentioned
the term success in that regard. I wonder if you could
talk a little bit more about why this is a success, particularly considering the poverty of India, the civil
strife, the Hindu-Muslim clashes, and the separatists
like the Kashmiris. Why is it that keeping the country
together is successful?
DR. STODDARD: Maybe the term "success" is a little bit strong, especially if we define a successful state
as one that eliminates poverty, as well as reducing
civil strife. And, I do not deny that the Hindu-Muslim
clashes are just as worrisome in India as religious con-
flicts in Northern Ireland, in the Caucasus, or in Lebanon. Furthermore, half a century may be too short a
time to declare full success. Moreover, the durability
of India as a state may partly reflect the lack of a
highly politicized populace. After all, the 67 percent
of the population that resides in rural areas live a life
that is pretty much circumscribed by their local environment. Although there is a rising politicization, as
A second reason for predicting fewer ethnic conflicts
within India than in many other major world regions is
based on the Indic culture. Maybe India's success is
just a happenstance of outstanding secular leadership
at the time of, and immediately after, independence
and, therefore, will dissipate with time. Yet, secular
nationalism does seem to have a firm foundation,
namely the Indic culture, which has nurtured tolerance
148
expressed by the percentage of people who have voted
in the recent elections, the stability of a peasant agrarian economy or agrarian society probably goes a long
way toward explaining the relative success.
�C00123268
DR. SCHWARTZBERG: The Indian Government has
been willing to pull back. This has not happened yet in
Kashmir and Punjab, however
QUESTION: Would you comment on the Kashmir situation?
DR. SCHWARTZBERG: I plan to work on Kashmir
during the coming year. The people in Kashmir are
alienated to a degree that will preclude their reconciliation with India. I cannot predict exactly the shape of
the future of Kashmir, but I will predict that there will
be a significant change in the situation there.
I am more optimistic in the case of Punjab, a richer
area and strategically much more important. There
seem to be signs that India has the Punjab situation
Reverse Blank
149
under control. However, the raid on the Golden Temple will not soon be forgotten, nor the many other
human rights abuses that the Indian Government has
committed in the name of quelling that insurrection. I
believe, however, that the prospects for reconciliation
exist, and many people who know Punjab better than I
do say that, even at the worst of times, the majority of
Sikhs were always moderate and that the extremists
never represented the Sikh rank and file.
One fundamental difference between Kashmir and the
Punjab is that the dissociation of Punjab from India
would probably let loose an unstoppable Balkanization of India, while dissociation of Kashmir would not
necessarily result in such an outcome.
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�C00123268
The Demographic Backdrop to
Ethnic Conflict: A Geographic
Overview
Gary Fyller
Professor of Geography and
Population Studies
University of Hawaii
Introduction
Following the breakup of the former Soviet Union,
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan strongly criticized
US intelligence estimates that, he alleged, had ignored
Soviet demographic and health statistics. Moynihan
argued that any society that exhibited the symptoms of
the USSR-which included rising overall mortality
and a high incidence of alcoholism-could not be a
adjustment of demographic data. Most such data,
moreover, are not seen as threatening by governments.
Certainly there are cases where certain population
information is viewed as terribly dangerous (Lebanon
or Iraq's religious compositions, for example), but,
even when this is the case, other demographic data
unrelated to policymakers' phobias may be unaffected. Finally, censuses have to be conducted openly.
Information about their quality and the nature of their
biases is widely circulated in the demographic community, and sometimes "corrections" are advanced by
demographers outside the country. The only effective
way to keep demographic data secret is not to collect
them.
Demographic Indicators of Instability
Consider also that certain demographic trends corre-
late highly with socioeconomic variables; were it not
legitimate economic or military threat to the United
for this fact, demographic transition would be an
States. The criticism is unfair in one sense, since it
does not require national health or sobriety to launch
missiles. Nevertheless, Moynihan's observation about
the role of demographic statistics in intelligence analysis is insightful.
States sometimes go to great lengths to disguise data
about their economies and societies, usually with the
motive of misleading their enemies (and perhaps their
own citizens as well). More commonly, however,
accurate data are elusive because they are difficult and
expensive to collect, analyze, and interpret. I once
spent several months visiting and collecting data from
remote family planning clinics in Chile, and I was
struck with how different thesituation at the clinics
was compared with the official reports in Santiago.
My experience is highly typical, I think, and is shared
by most who have done field research.
Demographic data are almost'always the best data that
are available for a society. This is not to say that they,
are good; indeed, they are often very poor. I am only
here advancing a comparative judgment. Govern-
ments collecting demographic data (whether censuses,
vital registers, or surveys) can call upon an impressive
body of international experience and knowledge concerning the planning, execution, interpretation, and
151
arcane model of little interest to any but abstract theorists. Thus, it requires only a small logical step to see
that socioeconomic data and trends (perhaps closely
guarded or disguised) are imbedded in demographic
data that are open and aboveboard. Hungary offers an
interesting example. As a former Warsaw Pact member, Hungary was quite guarded in releasing social
and economic data, but its population data are among
the best in the world.
I do not mean to imply either that censuses ought to
replace electronic surveillance in the intelligence kit
bag or that demographic data can entirely compensate
for a lack of socioeconomic data. My point is that
population data are a rich vein that is not mined sufficiently and that academic researchers and intelligence
analysts have the opportunity to use census data in
creative ways that give new insight into societal
trends. Perhaps because the data are easy to come
by,
their value is not fully appreciated.
A comprehensive case for the value of the demographic perspective in assessing intelligence issues
would require more space than I have available. I hope
a few aspects of the "correlation" I mentioned earlier
will suffice.
�C00123268
A society whose fertility begins to fall rapidly is
undergoing a profound transformation. Most basically,
it has begun to trust the permanence of lowered infant
and childhood mortality, something that is hard to perceive at the family level, and something that may
require denial .offirmly'embedded beliefs. The society
has otherwise begun to change its traditional way of
life by moving away from rural, agrarian values and to
embrace the smaller family norms associated with
urbanization and economic development.
area have led me to some hypotheses about demographic processes that correlate strongly with societal
troubles. It is important at the onset to understand that
such correlation is modest at best with general population growth. That, of course, is why so many extreme
neo-Malthusians insist very loudly that you believe
them; the ideology is strong, but the evidence is weak.
I will limit my remarks here to a single case of ethnic
strife, that of Sri Lanka's two postwar insurgencies.'
Rostow's term "takeoff," which used to describe a
The Youth Bulge in Sri Lanka
stage in economic development, has been largely discredited by other economists (although it is not clear
whether this is because Rostow was overall simplistic
or because he went to work for US President
Johnson). "Takeoff," however, seems appropriate to
describe certain changes in fertility and growth that
change the "momentum of growth" from positive to
negative. Brazil and Mexico are both at that point
now, and, while any number of observers of different
stripe continue to focus attention on the problems of
As Professor Stoddard implied, if you look at the historical or cultural context of the ongoing conflict in Sri
Lanka, a complex situation emerges. Indeed, political
scientists and analysts in the State Department and
elsewhere have accounted for this in many ways.
Many cite ancient animosities between Tamils and
Sinhalese.
The demographic data suggest another reason behind
severe poverty that haunt sectors or regions of both
the conflict, however. Figure 14 shows the age struc-
countries, the demographic picture is reasonably optimistic. Rely on the pessimistic reports if you will, but
the economic transformation of both societies is inherent in their current demographic profiles.
ture of the two ethnic groups in Sri Lanka. Using Dallas Fernando's method of looking at the Sri Lankan
population by revenue district, we are able to break
down ethnic group data to determine age structure of
the populations. This graph reflects two distinct demographic transitions-a leading transition for the Sinhalese, who predominantly live in the country's wet
zone, and a lagging one for the Tamils, who live in the
dry zone. It reveals a correlation between the incidents
of conflict between the two ethnic groups and the proportion of each population that is youthful (ages 15 to
24)-those who are in demand of land, jobs, higher
education, opportunity, and other kinds of resources in
the society.
Infant mortality data offer a measure of societal wellbeing that is highly sensitive to change. Public health
authorities argue that the infant mortality rate is the
best measure of-the health of-a society, and, even if
this is hyperbole, surely there is a high correlation
between such mortality and the prosperity of a society.
Overall mortality is also a valuable indicator. Mortality remained constant in Eastern Europe from the mid1960s until the late 1980s-and actually increased in
the USSR during the same period-while mortality
was falling in virtually all other countries. There is,
indeed, good reason to suspect that these mortality
trends have real meaning, just as Moynihan pointed
out.
When the British left Sri Lanka, they left these
resources largely under Tamil control. After all, the
Sinhalese had resisted British penetration, while the
Tamils had worked in the civil service not only in Sri
Lanka but elsewhere in the empire as well.
Within the context of this discussion, demographic
data should be considered as analogous to an air photo
in which "signatures" of various kinds indicate a dangerous ground truth. My initial investigations into this
152
See Population Geography, June 1984, pp. 1-11.
�C0012 3268
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153
o
�C00123268
When the proportion of the Sinhalese population who
were young adults reached 20 percent of the total population-what we term a youth bulge-the Sinhalese
insurgency of 1970 occurred. Although other factors,
which I do not mean to diminish, were behind the
uprising, it is more than coincidental that the peak in
Let me switch the venue to the case of India. My graduate student, Joan Butler-Qazi, meticulously went
through numerous Indian newspapers and other publications and came up with measures of violence for
each of the country's districts. Then she correlated
these measures of violence with the size of-the 15-to-
that age group took place as conflict broke out.
24 age cohort in 1981. The correlation for India as a
Indeed, a former US Ambassador to Sri Lanka told me
that all the insurgents in the rebellion were under 24
years old.
whole was an R squared of 0.77.2 Here, the overall
demographic variable is driving ethnic conflict generally.
The Tamil population shows a similar story. At the
time of the Sinhalese insurgency, the percent of the
Tamil population that was age 15 to 24 was low and,
thereby, caused no problem. In response to the Sinhalese insurgency, the government made changes in the
allocation of resources, jobs, land, and higher educational opportunities. So by the time the Tamil youth
bulge occurred, numerous institutions and laws were
in place that favored the Sinhalese rather than the
Tamils. As such, the outbreak of a much more serious
episode of violence took place coincident with the rise
Conclusion
We have also examined the youth bulge situation
more broadly, not only as it relates to ethnic conflict.
For South Korea, for example, we predicted flatly that
youth riots would taper off and eventually disappear
as a result of the shrinking of-a youth bulge.? Finally,
one tremendous advantage in using demographic variables for analyzing conflicts, including ethnic ones, is
that often the data are quite easy to come by.
of the Tamil youth bulge. This bulge, incidentally, has
lasted such a long time that it has become entrenched
in the society. Even when it goes away-probably by
1995-its effects are going to linger because of its
longevity.
2
The publication of this research is forthcoming.
1
See PoliticalGeography,January 1990, pp. 9-21.
154
�C00123268
Ethnic Conflict and Population
Displacement
did not see them as a symptom of the international
geopolitical restructuring that they had themselves
engineered.
Martin Kenzer
The common view of the various organizations that
Associate Professor of Geography
Florida Atlantic University
came into being after World War II was that they
would provide for the security and welfare of the
Historical Review of Postwar Refugee Populations
In large measure, today's so-called ethnically driven
refugee populations are the ektension of territorial
conflicts that were waged immediately before or just
after World War I. To one degree or another, that war
partially resulted from particular territorial tensions
released by the collapse of former empires. The same
ethnic or territorial zones were then, again, suspended
by the onset of World War II, which was another ethnic contest that eventually foynd most of the world's
peoples fighting either for or against what often
became known as ethnic virtue. During the war, however, the battle focused not on the individual ethnic
groups that had been fighting one another for generations but on larger, national, territorial campaigns,
When World War II ended, the focus quickly switched
to the emerging superpowers-two foes who were
able to stifle domestic ethnic conflicts by squaring off
powerful armies against one another. Internal ethnic
conflicts were squelched in order to amplify national
uprooted only until the needs of the displaced were
accommodated. It was fully believed after the war that
agencies such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) would only exist for a short period
because they would soon get everyone resettled and
all problems would go away. Obviously, this proved to
be erroneous.
The Current Picture
Recently, another empire, the former Soviet Union,
has collapsed, and, once again, the world is experiencing a wave of territorial/ethnic tensions. To one degree
or another, almost all these tensions are expressions of
dormant territorial hatreds that in some locales date
back centuries. They have been inactive for decades
because the two major superpowers have muffled
them and/or used them to their own respective needs.
Today, there are far more displaced peoples than there
were at the end of World War II, and they are found on
more continents. Forced migrations have increasingly
come to dominate the patterns and processes involved
unity and the projecting of a front.
in international population movements. Ironically and
Also following World War II, it was believed that the
world's refugee problem would soon disappear. Motivated at the time by both geopolitical and humanitarian concerns, the predominant powers-principally
the victorious West-sought to accommodate the
tragically, however, a majority of these people, despite
their refugeelike experience, do not find themselves
protected or cared for by national or international refugee relief agencies because they still do not fall
under the legalistic, post-World War II definition of
"refugee."
needs of the many and diverse dislocated groups. Several local, regional, national, and international refugee
relief and repatriation/resettlement agencies-many
associated with the United Nations-were established
to deal with the day-to-day needs of the then-homeless
peoples and political refugees. These also promoted
As officially defined, refugees are persons who have
crossed a recognized political border and who have
then registered with an official group, which most
often is the UNHCR. If a person does not do that, the
international community does not recognize him or
the eventual settlement of those peoples to either historical or new homelands. The postwar New World
Order architects, who were also the founders of the
United Nations, generally perceived that these displaced peoples and the refugees were a problem but
her as a refugee. Today, many, even in the United
Nations, argue that this definition has become increasingly blurred. Indeed, the distinction between who is
155
�C00123268
and who is not a refugee is probably irrelevant, given
the ever-expanding number of groups worldwide who
are just as persecuted and uprooted as official refugees.
The problem of accurate accounting of refugees goes
way beyond the definitional problem, however. Every
day, we hear new figures about how many refugees are
here or there. Refugee statistics are fraught with
untruths and inaccuracies. Do not believe any of the
figures you hear; they are all made up. Most of these
figures are from thirdhand or fourthhand sources,
many of whom are unreliable. There are vested
groups-including the refugees themselves-who
want those figures either inflated or deflated for their
particular interests. The numbers only provide a rela-
not consider themselves to be part of-any country and
have no sense of belonging to an individual, extant
country. That is the case whether we are talking about
Georgia or Burma or Afghanistan.
Meeting Refugee Needs
In terms of who attends to refugees, it is quite telling
to look at where the money comes from to support refugee aid. In absolute terms, the United States devotes
the most money, while the European Community as a
whole devotes the second-largest amount. I think a
better way to look at this, however, is on a per capita
basis. North European countries-notably, Norwaygive a disproportionate amount of money to the care
tive approximation of how many are in one region vis-
and treatment of refugees. Using this criteria, the
a-vis another, and they change dramatically over time.
United States falls to about 10th or 11th place.
Today, official recognized bona fide refugees-those
who register with the UN after crossing an international border-number over 17 million. Broken down
There are strings attached to all this money. When a
country donates money to the UN, it always attaches a
string dictating where its aid can go. Aid from the
regionally, they include:
United States and the European Community always
- In Africa, 5.7 million. This is so far below the actual
number; it is not even close. Africa is one of the
worst regions.
- In Europe and North America, 3.4 million. Of
course, this does not include what is going on in
Georgia.
. In Latin America, 107,700, primarily in Central
America.
goes to countries and regions where strong trade alliances exist with the donor.
In any case, the people with the power and the money
are in the United States and Europe; they do not give
money to Africa until conditions there get out of control. And often, the humanitarian situation in Africa is
muted because many of-those affected are not, by definition, real refugees because they have not crossed
any international borders. As far as the displaced are
concerned, however, when they leave their tribal or
clan homeland, they have crossed a border; they do
e
In East Asia and the Pacific, 399,000.
- In the Middle East, 5.5 million.
- In South and Central Asia, 2.3 million.
More important than these numbers, however, are the
50 million internally displaced people who are not
not need to go any farther than that. (Indeed, many
Africans do not recognize international borders on
their continent except as lines on the map.) As such,
money is not earmarked for most African areas until
conditions flare up to the extent that they become of
international concern. This usually occurs only after
the situation has already spiraled out of control.
recognized as refugees. These are the people who
have never had any form of internationally recognized
status and who are probably never going to attain
nationhood. They are not counted. They are the
majority of displaced peoples in the world. They do
156
�C00123268
Forced Migration and Ethnicity
particularly concerning the right of self-determination in a world where the traditional state system is
admittedly breaking up (if not down). Where do you
draw boundaries? Which people get to determine on
which territory lies the future of their own ethnic
communities? Another factor to consider is access to
power; when people are eliminated from access to
power, it often is a causal factor of warfare, which
tends to produce forced migrations.
Lee Schwartz
Office of the Geographer
Department of State
Introduction
The main reason for deciding to speak on forced
migration and ethnicity is because I recently
addressed that topic at a conference-organized by
the International Geographical Union's Commission
on Population Geography in Ljubljana, Sloveniawhich focused on the topic of ethnicity and geography. Obviously this is a topic that is of current concern
not just in the United States but also in other areas of
the world; indeed, one of the major causal factorsand consequences-of forced migration in the world
today is ethnic conflict. When I found out that Dr.
Kenzer was going to speak on a similar topic, I
thought I would attempt to organize my comments
today more broadly in order to address also some
related humanitarian issues; after all, this session is
titled, "Perspectives on Demographic and Humanitarian Issues." I think my role here today, therefore, will
be to highlight a few of these perspectives, some of
which have already been mentioned and others of
- Conflict resolution. I think Wade Hinkle yesterday
raised a good point. Hindsight is 20/20, and geographers have been strong in terms of trying to understand regions and relationships between ethnicity
and territoriality, but geographic knowledge is not
necessarily sufficient in terms of trying to come to a
resolution of some conflict that has already begun.
Most geographic analysis has not been predictive in
terms of where conflict will break out. I think that
geography and geographers can best contribute to an
understanding of ethnic conflict by focusing not on
conflict resolution but on preventing conflict exacerbation.
Typology of Forced Migration
My office director, Bill Wood, has developed a typol-
ogy of forced migration that we have applied to differ-
which may be new.
ent regions to help understand different causal
components of forced migration (see figure 15). It is
not necessarily important in this model to draw distinctions between refugees, forced migrants, and internally displaced persons, although when it comes to
providing humanitarian aid or support, refugees are
favored over both internally displaced persons and
illegal immigrants, who tend to "disappear" and are
not accorded rights in the countries in which they live.
When dealing with the topic of forced migrationparticularly in trying to understand its ethnic components-three themes come to mind. These are somewhat in line with what the current administration
probably considers its priorities:
- Human rights. From a global perspective, human
rights with respect to migration are severely limited
because little freedom of movement exists on an
There is also an ethnic component to each of the three
international scale. Both refugee movement and
"free," or economic, migration are heavily con-
trolled by increasingly stringent regimes and quotas.
- Democracy. We have heard about a lot of geographic concepts-such as national territoriality,
regionalism, homeland, andfrontier-at this confer-
ence. It is instructive to see how these might manifest themselves in terms of democratic principles,
157
subsets shown on figure 15. It is strongest in the category of political instability and civil unrest-largely
governmental persecution. That is because this persecution is often directed toward a particular ethnic
group or may have consequences for specific ethnic
groups. Ethnicity is a factor when looking at forced
�C00123268
Figure 15
FORCED MIGRATION FLOWSi
Subnational Causal Factors &
International Migration Categories
-N Economic/
msggy
Poitc
IntRBPvterty
~+:r
////////
DISPLACED
c
Dmigradatin/
i".''i' ; ; \Life Threatening
Q Refugees/
Legal
AsylurmSek \\\ \\Natural
o;':°'
\
//llegal
ifet
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FGuesasters'
Subnationai;.
International
Refugees/
Asylum Seekers
Illegal
L~egal
Immigrants
Immigrants/
'Guest Workers'
For a full description of this typology, see William B. Wood. Forced Migration: Local Conflict and International Dilemmas,"
Annals of the AAG, Vol. 84, No. 4, Dec. 1994: 607-634.0
158
349179 6-95
�C00123268
migration, not just at the source but also at the destination as well. Whether a group is territorially concentrated or not, if its members move from one territory
into another, they are changing the ethnic balance in
two regions; it is a source-anti-destination dynamic.
During periods of economic decline, a high percentage of forcibly displaced persons are members of certain ethnic groups that are underprivileged or in the
worst poverty-stricken regions. These are also often
the first ones who are susceptible to famine or ecological disasters. So the way to look at the ethnic dimension of people who have fled and need to be
supported-whether they be forcibly displaced refu-
gees or internally displaced persons or illegal
migrants-is in a typology such as that in figure 15, in
which an ethnic component can be identified in each
of the three subsets.
Forced migration has traditionally been thought of as
a process that produces refugees, who are defined as ;
such because they cross international boundaries. It is
quite clear, and every speaker has touched on the facts
that increasing mobility and decentralization, devolution of political power, the breakdown of one-party
state systems, and the rise of territoriality-be it
regional or national-make it incumbent on us to
increasingly think of forced migration processes at the
intrastate level. It is a question of scale, I think, in
terms of how we do our analysis.
From the humanitarian perspective, the different categories and classifications for migrants not only tend to
lose their importance but also can often infringe upon
the civil rights of certain groups that are mobile. In
many cases, those accorded refugee status are privileged forced migrants. The new restrictive definitions
and laws being imposed in Europe, for instance, have
Another important point to raise, which Dr. Kenzer
touched on earlier, is that internally displaced people
are not being accorded sufficient attention by the
international community. With regard to humanitarian
concerns, the internally displaced are often the most
problematic. In these cases, many of the geographic
concepts mentioned at this conference can be applied:
the question of core and periphery relations, for
instance-most of the internally displaced are located
at the peripheries of states and are often the first to
cross borders and become refugees.
Crossing Boundaries
In fact, many refugees were first internally displaced
people before crossing an international border. What
made them refugees is that they managed to cross
such a border and were thereby accorded official refugee status. Many internally displaced people can be
considered to function as refugees, particularly
because internecine conflict often leads to situations
where borders within states begin to function more as
international borders. Look at the situation in the Caucasus or with Gorno-Badakhshan in Tajikistan, where
the internal borders are functioning virtually as international ones with regard to population movements. In
many cases, therefore, whether someone being forced
to move is called an internally displaced person or a
refugee is a moot point in terms of how the international community needs to support them or deliver aid
to them.
We should also be thinking more about the changing
nature of political boundaries. The international community is increasingly recognizing that the sacrosanct
nature of these boundaries is not as strong as it once
was. Although many members of the international
produced an upsurge in illegal migrants-many of
whom are disenfranchised in the country in which
they reside-most of whom are not counted. There are
reports out of Bosnia that tens~of thousands of Bos-
nian Muslims are still moving into the rest of Europe.
Now that the European refugee regime has become
stricter, however, they have found ways to enter as
illegal immigrants and never get counted.
159
community considered Serb and Croat discussions
about territorial exchanges to be an anathema, there is
nothing sacrosanct about these boundaries just
because they have been in existence and have been
fairly permanent for so long. We are definitely seeing
grudging change in this direction. At the same time,
we should not underestimate the state boundaries in
�C00123268
isolated. So that even when the cause of a conflict is
not rooted in ethnicity, it can result in ethnic "modification" of-a region by selectivity of the forced
migrants.
Africa, for instance. While they might not necessarily
have a great deal of meaning to the local peoples, they
have a tremendous impact in terms of how the international community officially views various populations.
Geography of Refugee Populations
Ethnicity and Identity
What can probably be agreed upon in trying to understand ethnic conflict is the importance of scale and of
having the appropriate approach to investigate events
at the substate or intrastate level. I want to briefly
present a few maps here to show how different scales
might operate in terms of attempting to understand the
ethnic components of forced migration.
Another concept related to forced migrations, which
Dr. Knight referred to yesterday, is the primacy of
identity and the inability of people to adjust quickly
their primary identity. It is important to understand in
this context the role of a catalyst or a trigger that
might cause a nation either to latch more strongly onto
a specific identity or to change its primary identity.
Africa is the most turbulent continent in terms of num-
Ethnicity in most of the world, in fact, is quite dor-
bers of refugees (see figure 16). Most African refugees
mant most of the time; it is only once ethnic forces are
activated that they become politicized and can lead to
conflict. We can try to understand ethnicity and the
relationships between ethnic groups and regions, but
that alone has little predictive value. That is why when
addressing policy options-trying to be proactive as
opposed to reactive-it is not enough to know a
region and the nature of its ethnic groups. What might
be a passive ethnicity can very quickly become activated if something is denied a particular group or if a
group perceives a threat to its territorial homeland,
language, culture, or religion. The interrelationship
tend to be the economically deprived and, as a result,
they do not move far across neighboring borders. The
African continent is also where the largest number of
internally displaced peoples exists; when they cannot
cross the border, they tend to congregate along the
fringes of states, often beyond the limits of central
authorities. In Africa, there are three or four times as
many displaced persons as refugees.
between ethnicity and territory is quite complex.
the non-Slavic south. The economically able groups
I want to mention, briefly, the factor of warfare. War-
can move farther, often before the outbreak of violence.
In the former Soviet Union, there is a combination of
short- and long-distance migration (see figure 17).
Most of this movement is based on national conflict in
fare is quite obviously the major cause of forced
migrations in terms of-generating ethnic populations
on the move, and national territoriality is frequently
the underlying cause of much of this fighting. What is
important to understand about situations where territoriality acts as a catalyst to politicize ethnicity is that,
even in warfare situations that are not based on ethnic
conflict, groups are often dislocated because of their
ethnicity. Warfare leads to ethnic-selective dislocations when a particular region that has been overrun
has a concentration of one ethnic group or contains
groups that are economically vulnerable or culturally
Bringing it down to a larger scale, within the states of
Tajikistan and Georgia, for example, one gets below
the ethnic and into the various historical and factional
clan conflicts that are at the basis of-groups attempting
to reestablish historical regions by pushing people off
territory and back from whence they came (see figure
18).
160
�C00123268
Figure 16
REFUGEE FLOWS FROM COUNTRIES WITH
MOROCCO
HIGH LEVELS OF FORCED MIGRATION= AFRICA
/ALGERIA
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�C00123268
Figure 17
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Major Cross-Border Refugee
Flows in the Former
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Over 100.000 refugees
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10.000 to 100.000 refugees
1,000 to 10,000 refugees
map
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�C00123268
Figure 18
Tajikistan: Major Flows of Refugees
KAZAKSTAN
Itrainlbudr
*Tashkent
Administrative center
Direction of flow of refugees
and displaced persons
75 k1omete
/0
UZBEKIST AN
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75 mies
Names and bounary representation
are not necassoiy authoritative.
KYRGYZSTAN
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Primary Location of
Internally-Displaced Tajiks*
Dushanbe City
120,000
Kurgan-Tyube Region
Garmn Region
120,000
Pamir Mountain Region
60,000
50,000
736084 6-95
163
�C00123268
Conclusion
Let me conclude by noting one of the main problems
of the international response to forced migrations with
ethnic components. That is, that migration regimes are
set up on a bilateral basis that impinge on multilateral
responses to regional problems. Individual states are
setting laws while the responses to refugee-producing
crises-often related to ethnic conflict-are multilateral.
Further, the UN is increasingly finding it difficult to
intervene in many countries; they do not have the full
mandate to deal with the internally displaced. In con-
clusion, it is difficult for policymakers to do more than
react to the latest refugee crises. By attempting to mitigate refugee flows by tailoring policies to react to
events at local and regional levels, it will be easier to
respond to, if not predict, ethnic conflict that disrupts
the entire state. If that is done, governments will be
able at least to reduce the trauma of forced migrants
and refugees, if not eliminate the cause of their movement altogether.
164
�C00123268
Summary of
discussion
DR. KENZER: You can sum it up in one word, politics. How can you say that Cubans are refugees and
Haitians are not? It's a political issue. People do not
want to hear that underlying our definitions for entry
are issues of race and other things.
General Discussion
DR. WIXMAN: While we often hear about high birthrates being major causes of nationalism, the reverse-
DR. SCHWARTZ: There is still the distinction
that is, where low fertility is one of the primary reasons for rises in nationalism-is also important. In the
former Soviet Union, for example, the rapid rise in
Russian nationalism was very much tied to a sense of
rapidly declining fertility. In Germany, the lowering of
the birthrate is also one of the primary factors in the
rise of the German national consciousness. Are there
people doing work on the corelation between declining fertilities and the rise of ethnic national consciousness?
between economic migrants and political refugees.
The United States does not have a category of an economic refugee.
DR. FULLER: Yes, exactly along the lines you say
Americans and people beyond.
and for exactly the reasons that you say. In fact, I can
say that the people that are sponsoring this conference
have published a paper along exactly those lines.
DR. DE BLIJ: We do not. It's irrelevant. The definition of a refugee is someone from a Communist country.
DR. KENZER: The distinction is becoming an important issue. We are going to see refugees being cast in a
different light; all emphasis is going to be on Central
DR. SCHWARTZ: A good test case would be Nicaragua, from where we once accepted political refugees
but after the government changed, the departees
became economic migrants.
QUESTION: Why does the Upited States distinguish
between ethnic and political refugees in the way they
are treated?
DR. DE BLIJ: We also do not accept people from
Communist China, but we do take people from Com-
DR. SCHWARTZ: Frankly, in part to keep out people
munist Cuba.
from coming in who are seen as potentially draining to
the economy. This is a complicated issue, however.
QUESTION: We do accept Chinese refugees; they are
the ones who are allowed to have only one child.
DR. DE BLU: The distinction between refugees is a
holdover from the Communist period. The current
DR. DE BLU: You are right.
definition of refugees is related to the political system
they leave when they come here.
DR. SCHWARTZ: The definitions come from the
1951 UN convention and the 1967 protocol. The 1951
convention was based on the post-World War II refugee regime, while the 1967 protocol was attached onto
that in order to deal with peoples from other areas of
the world. Dr Kenzer, do you want to elaborate on
that?
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Ethnic Conflict: A Comparative
Examination
Thomas M. Poulsen
Professor of Geography
Portland State University
The conventional political map of the world displays
170 political geographic features that properly are
termed sovereign states. They constitute the habitual
framework for contemplating international affairs.
Unfortunately, the conventional map can be a most
misleading instrument in presenting the political
geography of the world. The map depicts relative sizes
and shapes of countries and the locations of their capital cities, but these are among their least significant
qualities. Indeed, it should be noted that traditional
political maps of the world typically distort the size of
states because their customary Mercator projection
creates great area disparities between tropical and
polar regions. Although Greenland is about one-seventh the size of South America, it actually appears
larger on most political maps.
Among features of a state critical to governmental
functioning that are ignored on political maps are:
- The territory really under effective control of the
state's goyernment.
- The area of the state actually settled and productive.
- The degree of centralization of governmental decisionmaking and authority within the state.
" The dependence of the given state upon another
state.
coextensive with state boundaries. The term nation is
a useful generalizing concept that can be applied to a
variety of human groupings. At the simplest level,
nations may be viewed as collective, subjective states
of mind in which individuals habitually segregate
other persons into "our folks" and "foreigners." Many
of the world's ills are the result of conflicting national
identities. However, nations can also be appreciated
for some positive effects, including providing legitimacy to governmental actions and facilitating economic interdependence through a climate of trust.
The concept of nation is questioned by some because
of the great diversity of circumstances the notion
embraces, with resulting difficulties in definition and
measurement. Unfortunately, although most national
groups share a number of elements in common, each
nation, like each state (and virtually every other phenomenon studied by geography), ultimately is a
unique entity. Questionnaires and other techniques
that may effectively identify members of a nation in
one region may prove inappropriate or erroneous
when applied to groups in another area. The great
diversity among nations does not make the concept
any the less useful, however. Although some individuals may have a problem with the subjective quality of
the abstraction, this does not mean that idea is erroneous or that nations do not exist because they cannot be
measured.
The advantage of thinking in terms of nations rather
than the more diffuse "ethnic groups" is the political
dimension inherent in the concept. The most important common denominators distinguishing nations
from tribes, castes, and other human groupings are
collective self-awareness and a consensual political
agenda. Members of a nation are conscious of that
identity, and most believe that their interests are. best
served by having a state of their own.
" Whether the state is a nation-state or a multination
state. The last-named is the most pivotal.
Nations
Numerous ethnic groups throughout the world do not
satisfy these two criteria. Although anthropologists
and other social scientists may identify common elements that stamp a given population group as distinc-
tive from its neighbors, a lack of group awareness of
individuals beyond extended kinship patterns or
A key element in understanding the modern world is
to appreciate the fact that occupying space concurrently with states are more than 250 mutually exclusive nations, and these have few outer limits that are
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shared religious beliefs and the absence of common
political goals makes it more appropriate to designate
such groups by the more neutral term peoples. Nations
may be viewed as peoples who have become group
conscious and politically activated. The process is a
continuing one and now is occurring among Quechuaspeakers of the Oriente of Peru, galvanized by the
Sendero Luminoso guerrillas.
The commonly accepted starting point for the appearance of nations is the French Revolution. The inhabitants of France not only transformed their state at the
end of the 18th century, but also in a sense they
became Frenchmen for the first time. Before that time
few associated themselves with the Kingdom of
France. Their identities were with family and locality
and, at a higher level, with their true Christian faith.
Following the Revolution they increasingly gained a
sense of personal participation in a greater culturalpolitical organism. They were manipulated by the
Language still plays a fundamental role in the identity
of virtually all nations. Linguistic homogeneity is a
characteristic of every national group, with the notable
exception of the Swiss, and even there group tensions
exist, particularly between the Italian-Swiss and the
German-Swiss. One of the most common causes of
ethnic tensions within a state is a group's opposition to
perceived threats to its language. Attempts by Magyars to impose Hungarian as a uniform language
throughout their kingdom in the 1870s stimulated
Croatian-speakers to become the nation of Croats. A
century later, Croatian intellectuals again used a linguistic threat as a national rallying symbol, decrying
the degrading of the Croatian literary language by
attempts of the Yugoslav regime to blend it with Serbian vocabulary and usage to form an "artificial"
Serbo-Croatian statewide language.
Religious tradition also plays a role in the identities of
most nations. The militancy of the Croatians about
Jacobins, dedicated believers in "the people," who,
their literary language was a symptom of deeper divi-
denigrated traditional Catholicism and enthusiastically preached a new form of belonging that celebrated the interests of the "masses." This
revolutionary system of beliefs took hold because traditional religion no longer was able to meet spiritual
needs in the challenges of a rapidly changing society.
Urbanization and industrialization presented difficult
problems for individuals for whom traditional religious establishments had no answers.
From the beginning, language proved a critical element in national identity. To be French meant sharing
of French culture, and this meant particularly the
sions among the South Slavs based upon their differing religious heritages. Croatian culture has been
bound up for more than a millenium with the Roman
Catholic world, while Serbian traditions stem from an
Eastern Orthodox inheritance. It should be stressed
that religious dimensions of modern national identities
need not derive from active worship but generally
come from the shared values, customs, and images
accumulating in a society from a common religious
legacy. Avowedly atheistic members of the League of
Yugoslav Communists, although speaking a common
Serbo-Croatian language, remained always partitioned
into distinctive bodies of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims,
French language. Among proposals voiced in France's
separated from each other by their respective religious
revolutionary parliament was expulsion of all Alsa-
cultures. A similar.cultural disparity separates
tians across the country's "natural border" of the
English-speaking Roman Catholic partisans of the
Rhine because they were "foreigners'; their vernacular was German, not French.
Irish Revolutionary Army from Protestant supporters
of the Ulster Defence Association.
The new ideas proved exciting and satisfying, and
Napoleon's troops spread them across the territory
they conquered. However, talk of "liberty, equality,
and brotherhood" by enthusiastic French soldiers did
not co-opt civilians speaking German, Italian, and
other languages into becoming part of the new French
Thus, although a common language appears to be a
major element of national identity, in itself it does not
provide a sufficient base for identification with a
nation. The French nation never managed to incorporate the adjacent French-speaking Belgian Walloons
or the Swiss francophones of Geneva. Closer to home,
nation. Although large numbers readily accepted the
although virtually all citizens of the United States and
secular ideas of their occupiers, each linguistic group
evolved a separate national identity.
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two-thirds of Canadians exclusively speak English,
they remain separate nations. There are 20 different
nations in Latin America who speak Spanish and at
least 17 different Arabic-speaking nations in the Middie East and North Africa.
Since language appears to be an essential but not decisive element in national identity, the question remains
of what distinguishes Americans from Canadians,
Germans from Austrians, or Uruguayans from Argentineans. Certainly a key element is an association with
a particular "homeland." This is the hallowed land of
forefathers, whose legacy of monuments and structures are encountered every day. A number of otherwise homogeneous and exclusive peoples have failed
to forge themselves into nations because they lack distinctive territories of their own, including Gypsies in
Europe and Parsees in India.
minorities, Hispanics and African Americans,
although manifesting characteristics that distinguish
themselves from other Americans, have not forged
separate nations as major minorities have done in
most other countries. This is primarily because they
are dispersed throughout the United States and thus
lack a specific homeland in which they are a majority.
Although Hispanic Americans have the potential to
become a separate nation within this country through
retention of their distinctive Spanish language, their
religious traditions, and for many their association
with Mexico, it should be noted that separatists among
African Americans have always faced difficulties in
attempting to mobilize political sentiments because
their group shares with all other Americans a common
language and religious-derived values and traditions,
in addition to their scattered location.
Homeland is a key part of what the French political
geographer Jean Gottman termed the "iconography"
of nations. He included in the concept the sum total of
Part of'the American iconography in recent years has
been an increasing distrust by many of anything that
smacks of "nationalism." This properly should not be
seen as the same as "national identity." Nationalism
"icons" shared by a given group, including their
refers to active political movements that play upon
national symbols, perceptions of history, traditional
myths, poetry, pastimes, and a host of other elements
that otherwise can be termed little more than "trivia."
To be a Canadian is to love ice hockey, to be senti-
mental about the song "O Canada," and to resist the
national group values, symbols, and prejudices.
National identity is a passive shared state of mind that
most individuals would consider a natural way of
looking at things. When asked about their own
national identity, many highly educated Americans
"colossus of the south." Americans share George
Washington's mythic cherry tree and contact football.
would profess a lack of such. However, they cannot
escape the fact that they are members of the American
The traditions of Islam and the values of Buddhism
nation, living in a world of Babe Ruth, "we the peo-
are foreign to both groups, however much a minority
of their individuals may treasure them.
Iconographies are the products of inherited traditions,
indoctrination in the education process, and mass
media. They also are subject to change. Bing Crosby
was once a significant element in the American iconography; his place has been taken by Elvis Presley
and Garth Brooks.
Americans have difficulty in contemplating the notion
of nationhood. Unlike Europeans, most of whom
dwell within 100 miles of an international border, few
Americans ever face challenges to their national identities. Also, our society is a multicultural one, something increasingly celebrated. Our principal ethnic
ple," and "liberty and equality for all." Accustomed to
life in a successful melting pot, Americans cannot
understand why Serbs, Croats, and Muslims cannot be
just Yugoslavs or why Europe has had such difficulty
uniting, now that 1992 has passed. However, it is
ironic that some of the most avowedly nonnationalists
or antinationalists in America opposed the North
American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) because
it will export "our"jobs to "those" Mexicans.
Part of the minimal active awareness of national identity of Americans is the lack of a long history of
English-speaking settlement in North America. Discounting the structures of Native Americans who
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established impressive civilizations long before the
advent of Europeans to the New World, the oldest
buildings Americans see in their homeland are less
than four centuries old, and orn the West Coast they are
barely 150 years old. In contrast, Europeans daily
walk past cathedrals erected 10 centuries or more ago.
European perceptions are of a national continuity with
the forebears who constructed those buildings, even
though the national identities to which they adhere are
products primarily of the 19th century.
from an appellation applied by Italians to their "unredeemed" fellow nationals who lived outside the Kingdom of Italy.-The concept has become a universal one
applied to members of nations living outside the
boundaries of a state dominated by people like themselves. Irredentist minorities pose particular problems
to world peace because their causes may elicit active
support from adjacent states governed by members of
their nations.
World Patterns of Nations and States
Overlapping Patterns of States and Nations
Lack of coincidence between the patterns of states and
nations is a principal driving force in world affairs.
Present configurations are a consequence of historical
processes and events unique to each area. In many
cases, including that of the Japanese and the Portuguese, the nation is clearly a product of an ancient
state and coincides closely with it. In other instances,
such as that of the Croatians or Belarusians, the nation
emerged despite strong efforts at suppression by state
The pattern of nation-and-state combinations differs
from region to region around the world. Only a few
states may be classed as pure nation-states lacking
minority nations that seek autonomy or separation.
Interestingly, France, which often is held out as the
archetype of the nation-state, is not one of these. It
embraces at least four minority nations that increasingly seek recognition of their distinctive status and
territories: the Corsicans, Bretons, Basques, and Occitanians.
authorities.
. Although the vast majority of states feature single
dominant nations, most also contain inconvenient
other national groups. In many cases this asymmetry
is the result of past state-building when petty units
were melded together with no thought given to cultural characteristics of inhabitants. A degree of homo-
geneity resulted from imposition of the ruler's
More than three-quarters of the states of Europe are
multinational, although this percentage has decreased
in recent years with the divisions of Yugoslavia and
Czechoslovakia. However, newly independent Macedonia must deal with a 20-percent minority of Albanians, and Slovakia must accommodate 10 percent of
its citizens who are Magyars and 7 percent who are
Ruthenians.
religion, although language resisted assimilation. In
other instances, the intermixture of groups in frontier
The former Soviet Union held the dubious distinction
zones between culture areas made impossible the
drawing of boundary lines between new nation-states
that did not include minorities, Thus, all the states
formed in the East European "shatter zone" after
of being the most diverse state in the world, with at
least 30 groups that could be termed nations and more
than 70 other peoples inhabiting its land space. The
dominant Russians numbered barely half its total pop-
World War I encompassed minorities approaching 20
ulation. Despite the USSR's fragmentation, few of the
percent or more. Similarly, no ideal line could be
drawn between Muslims and Hindus when independence came to India and Pakistan and tragedy
Soviet successor countries can be termed nationstates, as witnessed by Azerbaijan's problems with
Armenians and Georgia's difficulties with Abkhazians
resulted-and continues in Kashmir-when a line was
established.
and Ossetes.
Despite the seeming homogeneity in religion and language of the Middle East and North Africa, virtually
none of the region's states are without minority problems. Several, including Lebanon, Turkey, Iran, and
In surveying minority nations, a meaningful distinction rests between those that are self-contained and
those that are "irredentist." The latter term is derived
169
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Iraq, have endured violent ethnic strife in recent years.
African states likewise are diverse, with clashes
occurring particularly along the Sahelian fault zone
between Arabic and Sub-Saharan cultures. For a vanety of reasons, few nations have emerged south of the
Sahara. Extreme tribal and linguistic diversity characterizes most Sub-Saharan states. Nigeria contains
more than 300 distinctive groups and Zaire more than
200.
Diversity also characterizes the states of South Asia.
India long has encountered secessionist movements in
its northeastern and northwestern wings, and it has
mounting troubles with its Sikh and Dravidian minorities. Pakistan already has lost Bangladesh and faces
severe problems with Pathans, Sindhis, and Baluchis.
Even a tiny state like Bhutan must contend with an 18percent regional minority of Nepalese.
Although the states of mainland and insular Southeast
Asia are typified by well-developed dominant nations,
each contains numerous minorities, some of which
now are evolving into true minority nations. Burma,
Indonesia, and the Philippines endure continuing strife
in their outer areas. In contrast, East Asian states are
remarkably homogeneous and calm, with the notable
exception of China. Although 92 percent of its population may be considered members of the Chinese
nation, the remaining 8 percent dominate more than
60 percent of its total territory.
The Anglo-American, Latin-American, and Australasian states are notable for minimal minority problems.
The chief exception is Qu6begois separatism in Canada. The indigenous population in many states of
Latin America shows signs of restiveness, however,
particularly in the Andean region and in Central
America.
Although a number of political geographers have
addressed questions of ethnicity, they have not come
up with a viable theory that would allow identification
of what circumstances escalate diversity into conflict
or prediction of when and where such conflict is likely
to occur. This is not to say that they have not developed interesting insights. One of the more useful theoretical concepts that have been developed in recent
years is that of "core-periphery" relationships. In
many states the capital city and its surrounding area
dominate the economy, politics, and culture of a coun-
try. The American geographer Mark Jefferson
observed this recurring regularity at the turn of the
century and called it "The Law of the Primate City."
In core-periphery theory, the metropolitan center
exploits peripheral areas, a high proportion of which
differ from the dominant area in ethnicity and standard of living. Although attractive for its seeming universality, core-periphery theory proves to be of little
use as a guide to specific problems. While its premise
fits many states, it runs counter to the situation in
many others. Thus, the peripheral areas of Catalonia
and the Basque region long have dominated the economy of Spain, and living standards in Alsace-Lorraine
are higher than in most of the rest of France.
Ethnic conflict is unpredictable. Each state situation
constitutes a unique combination of differing groups,
inherited traditions, and external circumstances.
Although one may wish to see recurring regularities or
scientific laws at work, there are simply too few cases
that individually differ too much to permit an elaboration of theory comparable to that of the physical sciences.
Factors Aggravating or Ameliorating
The unpredictability of-conflict perhaps is best seen in
the internecine struggle in Somalia. Of all the states of
Sub-Saharan Africa, internal strife would seem least
likely to occur in that country due to its homogeneity
in language and religion. However, Somalia's unique
clan system has much in common with national diver-
Ethnic Conflict
sity in Europe and elsewhere, and warfare between
The currently escalating frictions among nations
within states can be ascribed to a number of factors,
clans came on the heels of the failure of a highly centralized, despotic regime.
including the increasing media avenues for promoting
Despite the seeming impossibility of formulating a
nationalist views and the post-Cold War drying up of
superpower funds that often were used by client states
viable theory to examine potentials for ethnic conflict,
to appease or suppress troublesome minorities.
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a generalized framework is feasible. First, it is important to distinguish between unstable group circumstances and triggering actions that lead to strife.
Almost by definition, the presence of a minority
nation constitutes an unstable situation. Identifying
the presence of such nations is an essential first step.
Next, it is important to consider possible elements that
can set off conflict. Regimes control volatile internal
situations through a variety of devices, ranging from
totalitarian suppression to meaningful autonomy. No
matter how successful a policy may be, even in the
long term, it will not satisfy all individuals. Extremists
for a national cause can find ways to manipulate group
opinion that is disaffected for any reason. A dramatic
change of circumstances can Provide the extremists
with strong levers. We recently witnessed the mobilization of latent national antagonisms in Yugoslavia,
despite more than four decades of universal indoctrination of the population in the slogan of "brotherhood
and unity." A disastrously deteriorating economy, a
conflicts in that tortured land and allowed a peaceful
transition to separate states.
- Maintenance of an unsatisfactory ethnic status quo
is generally futile for a country and certainly can be
costly in terms of transfer payments and policing.
Although the United States sided with Gorbachev in
attempting to preserve the Soviet Union intact, Russia's loss of its Central Asian territories was of longterm benefit to the Russian people in stemming the
outflow of funds to a region that has grave social
and economic problems.
- Gains or losses of territory generally affect only the
local inhabitants of the areas involved, with little
impact upon the overall economy and standards of
living. Although difficult to believe, even the United
States could cede Texas or California to Mexico and
still maintain much the same well-being of its
remaining inhabitants, whether or not NAFTA came,
into existence.
model of political change presented by a collapsing
Soviet Union, and unwise actions by a federal army
attempting to suppress autonomy allowed nationalist
true believers to mobilize their nations. Once ignited,
national passions fed upon themselves, each group's
reactions engendering countetactions from the others.
Virtually nobody remains a "'ugoslav" any more,
Some Suggestions for American Policy in Dealing
" Small independent states can flourish if they are
willing to yield economic sovereignty to a broader
common market. The inhabitants of 999-squaremile Luxembourg have done quite well for themselves as part of Benelux and now the European
Community. Communist Albania, in contrast, committed economic suicide by cutting ties to all neighbors and potential partners.
With Ethnic Conflict Abroad
Political geography has evolved some truisms over the
years that are useful for considering ethnic conflict.
Among them are the following:
- The present configuration of states is far from ideal
and embodies tensions that have the potential to
result in fragmentations and shifts of territory.
Attempts to preserve the existing status quo in the
name of peace can well exacerbate unstable situations and even hasten conflict. It is unfortunate that
the United States Government tacitly supported the
. Allowing national groups to form states of their own
does not inherently result in more intense nationalisms and potentials for greater international strife
but, on the contrary, can have a sobering effect.
Latvians and Slovaks are having second thoughts
about their national quests for independence as they
must now assume full responsibility for maintaining
themselves.
Above all, it is important to perceive states in terms of
their total political geography. More specifically, it is
the ethnic content of a state that is important, not its
Serbian-dominated regime's attempt to maintain
external boundaries. This was a principal fallacy of
intact the Yugoslav state in the face of escalating
national minority demands for secession. A firm
statement to the Yugoslav Government that the use
geopolitical thinking, which laid stress upon the
geometry of states, their positions, sizes, and
"resources," rather than upon their degrees of unity
of force to maintain unity was intolerable to the
and the abilities of their governments to elicit support
United States might have obviated the current
from inhabitants for "my country, right or wrong."
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Summary of Discussion
General Discussion
QUESTION: Do you think that political arrangements
have very little to do with the consolidation of nationalism of our nation states?
DR. POULSEN: Geographers are concerned with
at
things that give character to territory; we look
of such.
nations as one of the critical components
you pointed out, and, where the countries are very
strong, there are more national states than nationstates. They clearly are very important actors and, in
most states, they are not forcing people into a single
form. Clearly, that is the case in the United States, in
Britain, and in France. National identity is important,
but it is not necessarily an identity that requires everybody to be the same. As we look at the newer states of
the world, the states that have been created after
World War II, virtually none of them come anything
states.
close to the nation-state. They are national
The way governments adjust their institutional
arrangements to accommodate the national diversity is
a question more properly in the province of a political
DR. POtLSEN: Well, we obviously differ on this.
One of the fundamental facts is that the world is partitioned into states, and this cannot be ignored. The
states are very significant in determining what is pro-
that one of the most important characteristics
territory.
tory is the prevailing national identity in that
same level, we have, in fact, national identities so
simulwithin a state there may be two quite different
systems based upon this identity.
taneously operating
agree
scientist. Nevertheless, many geographers willofter-
One cannot understand this section of the United
States without knowing that English is the common
language and that Americansmake thelot of common
images and values that help share a country go.
Where you have diversity within the state, serious
problems exist. I made a particular point of-distinguishing between nations and other groups; the caste
system in India, for instance, is a very fundamental
does not fit into
part of understanding India and really
useful framework.
this otherwise
duced, how. people do things, and the like. But at the
that
If we go the way of the anthropologist and look at
this is cer
grouping
every singleof looking of people-and do not get to y
a valid way
at things-we
The
some of the big problems that generate conflict.
interrelationships between nations within states and
also of national interests between states are the key
ingredients in conflict.
DR. HONEY: I would suggest that our notion of the
nation-state is really oversimplified and that we would
be better off if we adopted Tilly's definition of the
national state. There are few really national states, as
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Patterns, Trends, and Regional Comparisons
Summary of Discussion
Discussant: Marvin W. Mikesell
In discussing nations and states, there are various
terms that we can use:
. Nation-state. An example is Iceland.
Multinational state. There are many examples; India
e
would fit very well.
- Multistatenation."Germania," "Francophonia," and
many others fit that category.
Nonstate nations.In this group we have Khalistan,
Kurdistan, Palestine, and others.
e
e
Nonnation states. Two unhappy examples would be
Lebanon and Afghanistan; a happy example is the
Vatican.
It struck me that in all the presentations thus far we
have been dealing with pathology rather than any kind
where they are not needed for any functional reason.
Now, if you tell an Estonian, "For Heaven's sake, get
on a boat and go to Helsinki and learn something," he
would say, "Well, it's a totally different situation.
These Russians are occupiers. They're colonists."
We also have examples of states than denounce mistreatment of minorities in neighboring states while
seeming to be surprisingly indifferent to parallel circumstances within their own borders. Until quite
recently, for example, the Turkish press bitterly
denounced the treatment of the Turkish minority in
Bulgaria. They were denied recognition and forced to
change their names. If a Bulgarian Turk tried to regis-
ter a child or get a driver's license, he would immediately be told he must have a Bulgarian name. This
effectively was nonrecognition of a minority that
composed about 10 percent of Bulgaria's population,
and the Turks were furious about this. At the same
time, the Turks were treating their country's minority
Kurds exactly the same way: not recognizing their
language, refusing to register names, not even allowing music with Kurdish lyrics on the radio.
That is the problem: we do not have transfer of wis-
dom. We do not have people going into Finland from
Bulgaria, Turkey, Sri Lanka, etc. to study what hap-
pened there since 1918. They could learn from it.
of medicine or cure. In fact, in some cases, death certificates have even been written, but we have had very
Discussant: Mildred Berman
little in the way of looking for good examples of
where accommodation has occurred rather than con-
flict. Part of the problem is that countries just do not
learn from other countries on issues of minority rights,
human rights, and questions of culture and nationality.
This is surprising because legal codes are borrowed;
entire constitutions are virtually plagiarized from one
country to another. Yet it is rare to find one country
saying to another country, "You seem to have a nice
situation here; maybe we can learn from you."
An interesting case would be Estonia. The Estonians
are making terrible blunders in dealing with their Russian population. All they have to do is go to Helsinki
One of the references to which I immediately turned
when I was invited to come to this conference was
Isaiah Bowman's The New World. That book has a
very fine analysis of what led up to the ethnic prob-
lems that resulted in World War I, plus a lot of good
maps. Bowman says, "But the world's people are fun-
damentally unlike, and the road to success passes
through a wilderness of experiment." I think that is
what we have been hearing these two days.
I would like to address population, particularly fertility. Indonesia recently has been successful in cutting
its fertility rate down to a little more than two children
and examine what Finland has done with its Swedish
per woman. The Indonesians could get it down to
minority; it has anticipated their needs and, in a sense,
treated a 10-percent minority as though it were a
49-percent one. Finland has bilingual signs even
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replacement level soon. This is encouraging, because
Indonesia is the world's most populous Islamic nation.
It is not a highly industrialized state, but the government keeps pushing the idea publicly that small families are happy families. I think that is worth
considering in many parts of the world that are growing rapidly.
General Discussion
DR. WIXMAN: In light of a comment made by Professor Mikesell, I agree that, in terms of conflict resolution, the example of Finland is superb. Why did the
Finns give such rights to the Swedes? Because they
had been under Russian rule. A little earlier in history,
when Rissia took Finland from Sweden, it was antiSwedishism that became the symbolism in pro-Russi-
anism.
What we need to look at in terms of conflict resolution
There are four core-applied questions that come to
mind:
- Under what circumstances do ethnic groups become
politicized in the first place?
- Under what circumstances do politicized groups
come into conflict?
- What circumstances aggravate or ameliorate con-
flict?
- What are the implications of conflict for national/
international order?
Those are, it seems to me, the strongest set of applied
questions we should deal with. If there is a message
related to those questions, each one of which could be
addressed at some length, it seems to me, it is that we
are not living in a simple world. I will avoid the ugly
term complexification, but it seems to me that what
is how reconciliation can take place. The reason
continues to come across is that context matters, and
DR. MIKESELL: Another example of a government
maintaining a keen awareness of minority-group
needs would be that of-the Netherlands. About 10 per-
If there is a value to geography, it is not that it studies
a particular thing but that it tries to look at how things
come together and interact with core concepts like territory, location, and environment. The key advantage
of a geographical perspective is its ability to try to
Armenians still hate Turks is that there has never been
reconciliation. Similarly there will be no ability for
Bosnian Croats, Serbs, and Muslims to live together
until reconciliation occurs.
cent of the country's population is Frisian, but only
10 percent of the Frisians vote for the Frisian National
Party. There is a Frisian academy; there are chairs in
the language in Dutch universities. It is almost as
context is a complicated array of things that come
together.
think about the relationships among and between phenomena in places. This is where political science and
geography really come together. Politics and power
are expressed territorially, and looking at the relation-
though the government has said to the Frisians, "You
ships among and between the territorial units and the
are recognized. We would be pleased if you would
engage in activities to promote your identity. We'll
even subsidize it."
expression of powers is critical to understanding the
circumstances that lead to each of those four applied
questions that I noted.
Also, Switzerland recognized its Romansche-speakers
DR. DE BLU: The examples that Dr. Mikesell men-
before they clamored for recognition. This is partly
because Mussolini considered Romansche to be an
Italian dialect, and that frightened the Swiss. But we
have so few other examples of that happening. I
would say that treating a 10-percent minority as
though it were a 49-percent minority works, but it
requires extraordinary sophistication on behalf of the
majority side.
tioned of countries that were gracious to their minorities were also countries that were relatively well off at
the time they made those concessions.
When Germany was thriving, the Turkish minority
was welcome. When Germany had an economic
recession, the Turkish minority became disliked.
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There is some relationship to the well-being of a state
that has chances of overcoming ethnic disrepair and
the economic downturn that might presage it. This
relates a little bit also to what Dr. Fuller said earlier. It
might also mean that we ought to think twice before
that the world wants to emulate and, yet, this indeed is
happening all the time. It is the redundancy of this
pathology that I find so depressing.
QUESTION: If this policy of nonrecognition is a key
we use sanctions and economic destruction to achieve
aggravating factor, can you identify the flip side of
our aims in a foreign country. I still feel that, had sanctions not been imposed on South Africa, the democratization process might have taken longer but would
have cost far fewer lives and have had a more satisfactory outcome.
that? Can you put a name on a key ameliorating factor
that is helping to contain that?
DR. MIKESELL: I would say of all national policies,
was made a partner from the beginning. In this case,
the one that is most likely to result in violence is nonrecognition; to say simply, "Ypu don't exist. Your language is merely a dialect. Your religion is a
heterodoxy." It drives people crazy to be told that they
do not exist. It hardly seems conceivable that Mussolini's policy toward South Tyrol would be the model
DR. MIKESELL: That would involve cases where
there seems to be accommodation, such as the extraordinary examples of Finland, where a minority group
the Finns anticipated the needs of the Swedish minority, rather than waiting until the Swedes were shouting
and demonstrating. Unfortunately, there are very few
examples of this enlightened policy.
r
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US Policy Perspectives:
A Conceptual Approach
Jon Gundersen
US Department of State
Americans are uncomfortable with ethnic politics.
Why shy away from distinction based on race, religion, or nationality-at least in our public rhetoric.
During the Cold War, ethnic conflicts were understandably ignored by Western policymakers. Forty
plus years of finely crafted and cleared NATO talking
points provided all the answers we seemed to need in
a bipolar world. In a brave new Europe, without an
identifiable enemy, we now have to think for a living.
The ethnic killing fields of Bosnia confronted the
West with a number of options-all of them unattractive. Compassion fatigue set in when our initial
attempts to draw up convoluted ethnic maps were
rejected and scenes of starving babies became all to
commonplace on CNN. Was this fratricide not a
uniquely Balkan curse, Europeans silently wondered?
Could we not quarantine the carriers? This approach,
of course, provided a convenient rationale for Western
noninvolvement. It is also proved to be wishful and
dangerous thinking,
Setting aside the humanitarian rationale, there is a
compelling strategic argument for Western engagement. The nations of the East already perceive themselves in a political, economic, and security vacuum.
Without a sense of being part of a larger communitygoverned by accepted rules of behavior-neo-Communist and ethnic nationalists may once again set the
rules. Already the unprecedented flows of refugees
from the East have spilled over even to prosperous
avenues of Paris and Frankfurt. Xenophobia and ethnic politics have become forces to be reckoned with
throughout the West.
Ethnic conflict will be on the international agenda for
rights, not group entitlements. Second, it calls for a
Europe that is both more united and more autonomous. More autonomous in the sense that decisions
are made-on a practical, not ideological basis-at
the lowest possible administrative level. At the same
time, autonomy can lead to anarchy and increased ethnic strife unless guided by universal, shared values.
Therefore, the paper suggests ways to create civil
societies in the East and to integrate these societies
into a democratic family of nations.
Ethnic Issues in Bipolar World
Since the end of World War II, we viewed our policy
in Europe through the optics of the Cold War. The policy of containment-with NATO as its operative manifestation-aimed at providing collective defense
against a real Soviet threat. In this regard, the policy
was extraordinarily successful. We deployed our
forces and accomplished our mission without a shot
being fired. In the process, we helped build viable
democracies and, ultimately, witnessed the systematic
and systemic defeat of our main adversary.
In a bipolar world, however, other issues, such as ethnic conflicts, were largely ignored by Western policymakers. In the West, the emphasis was on centrally
organized solutions to security and economic problems; for example, NATO and the EC. While these
organizations have fulfilled their primary Cold War
missions of uniting Western Europe, they have tended
to avoid, perhaps understandably, issues such as
national identity, regional autonomy, and ethnic conflict. Few commentators were prepared, for example,
for the anti-Brussels backlash following Maastrict. In
the East, more ominously, long-simmering ethnic disputes remained submerged or suppressed by totalitarian regimes controlled by Moscow. There was no
chance to resolve differences in an open and evolutionary manner. Moreover, generations of Western
diplomats, scholars, and journalists working out of
Moscow-and Belgrade-rarely journeyed to the
provinces. If they did, they were greeted by party loyalists who owed their positions to the central authorities. In a sense, we tacitly accepted the Leninist
imposed view of the new man shorn of ethnic identity.
the foreseeable future. This paper traces the historic
and philosophical reasons why Americans have been
so ill prepared to confront the issue and then suggests
a conceptual framework to deal with ethnic conflict in
Europe. First, it argues that we should look at the ethnic issue through the prism of individual and human
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The Return, Not the End, of History
these rights as they have in coming up with an allEuropean recipe for sausage.
Western policymakers were thus ill prepared to anticipate the breakup of the Soviet empire or the disintegration of Yugoslavia. We believed that a democratic
Soviet Union could solve themessy nationality prob-
Americans intuitively approach this subject from a
different perspective. Group rights, in our view, serve
to delineate and emphasize differences among people
lems ignored or suppressed b czars and commissars
and tend to separate rather than unite. From the time
for centuries. In August 1990, in his famous "Chicken
Kiev" speech, President Bush cast his lot with the central authorities in Moscow, deriding "suicidal nationalism" and averring that "democracy does not mean
independence." Three weeks later Ukraine declared its
independence; five months layer the Soviet Union collapsed. Later in that same year, Secretary of State
of our Declaration of Independence and Constitution,
especially the Bill of Rights, we have held that individual rights are primary and not subordinated to the
rights of a particular group, some of whom may also
belong to national minorities. Even in a politically
correct age, many Americans are uncomfortable with
distinctions based on race, religion, and nationality.
Baker declared a "one Yugoslavia" policy, thereby,
according to many, encouraging Milosovic to pursue a
"one Serbia" policy. By the end of the year, the world
had become all too familiar with the term "ethnic
cleansing." Far from witnessihg the "end of history,"
we are witnessing the "return of history," which all too
often in Europe has been characterized by ethnic
strife.
American Ideals and European Solutions
We are also witnessing the geopolitical legacy of
Stalin's ethnic policies. By remnoving ethnic minorities
from their homelands and often replacing them with
ethnic Russians, Stalin laid the basis for today's seem-
In practical terms, what principles guide the American
policymaker in addressing the issue of ethnic conflict
in Europe? Is the concept of individual rights applicable to ethnic and minority issues Europe? Or is it too
anachronistic and too American for dealing with 21stcentury Europe? Can we respect the right of individual and group self-determination and, at the same
time, defend the territorial integrity of existing nationstates? In other words, are the Helsinki Final Act principles valid or even reconcilable in formulating our
policy toward ethnic conflict? In a changing Europe,
we will be increasingly confronted with uncomfortable choices. Without a conceptual context, we will be
ingly irreconcilable tendencies of independence and
forced to rely on ad hoc solutions.
Russians: "Can't Live With Them, Can't Live
Without Them"
interdependence. The former Soviet Republics all
have economic and blood ties'to their Russian big
brothers. And they all resent it.
It is perhaps easier to begin to answer some of these
questions by identifying what should not be our policy. Many Europeans and Americans are ill at ease in
this brave new world. They view the alleged stability
Group Versus Individual Rights
of Cold War Europe with some nostalgia; some even
In addition to these historic reasons, Americans have
Both of these remedies are false and dangerous. The
another, perhaps more fundaniental, reason for our
inability to come to terms with ethnic conflict in
Cold War resulted in the systematic suppression of the
most basic human and national rights in much of
Europe: we hold the individual, not the group,
supreme. European nations have long recognized and
promoted the concept of "group and ethnic rights,"
even if Europeans have as much difficulty in defining
Europe and a massive misuse of scarce resources.
Solutions based on ethnic purity violate the most basic
tenets of Judeo-Christian beliefs. They are particularly
seek solutions in monolithic ethnically pure states.
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repugnant to a pluralistic society such as the United
States. Ultimately, instability is not caused by democratically expressed claims by individuals and
national communities but by the denial of these
claims.
The above solutions should be categorically rejected.
Other policy prescriptions offer more traditional solutions. In the name of stability, the Realpolitik school
calls for working within the existing state system. The
so-called Sonnenfeld Doctrine of the mid-1970s, in
effect, accepted the status quo in Europe; that is,
spheres of American and Soviet influence. The proponents of this school emphasize Principles 3 and 4 of
the Helsinki Final Act, respectively the inviolability of
frontiers and respect for territorial integrity. What they
fail to recall is that the Helsinki Final Act is a carefully balanced document based on centuries of sad
European history. Using time-honored Jesuitical logic,
the Helsinki drafters declared that "all principles are
equal." The first Helsinki principle, for example, notes
that "frontiers can be changed by peaceful means and
agreement. Thus the United States recognized the
peaceful unification of Germany in 1990 and the
peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.
first time in over 400 years, no major power sought
hegemony in Eastern Europe. With visions of a new
Marshall Plan, the nations of Central and Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union understandable,
if naively, believed that the West would willingly open
its doors-and coffers-to their former adversaries.
Despite rhetorical sympathy, this has not been the
case. Perhaps it was inevitable, but new (and age-old)
problems-ethnic strife, ultranationalism, and massive migration-quickly replaced Soviet Communism as the primary threats to Europe. When the walls
came down in the East, economic and other barriers
were erected in the West. European governments,
beset by recession, worried more about halting the
westward flow of goods and people than about integrating the economies of the East into the European
Community.
Adrift between East and West, the countries of the
former Warsaw Pact perceive themselves in a political, economic, and security vacuum. And demagogues, often seeking ethnic scapegoats, plow fertile
fields of public discontent. Without a sense of being
part of a larger community-governed by accepted
rules of behavior-neo-Communist and ethnic nationalist may once again set the rules.
The Wilsonian model, on the other hand, stresses the
promotion of ethnic rights through national self-determination. It has certain academic allure. However, as
much as European statesmen paid lipservice to this
ideal at Versailles, it was more honored in the breech
than the observance in the interwar period. Moreover,
carried to its discouragingly logical conclusion, this
model, like Russian nesting dolls, might well lead to a
state structure composed of increasingly small (and
untenable) states-Yugoslavia divided into five or six
states; Bosnia divided into three states; or the Soviet
Union divided into 15 states, Russia (or Georgia)
divided into x states, ad infinitum,
From Marx to Milosovic
For many the collapse of the Soviet Union represented
the ultimate triumph of Western liberal democracy.
Marxist-Leninism had been thoroughly discredited
The Nation-State and Ethnic Rights
What type of state structure can best protect the ethnic
groups of Europe? The European nation-state has
been both the traditional protector and persecutor of
indigenous ethnic groups. Historically, both Germany
and Russia have assumed a special responsibility for
their ethnic counterparts wherever they might live.
(Even today, Germany grants automatic citizenship to
all ethnic Germans.) These same nation-states, however, have a melancholy history regarding the treatment of-other minority ethnic and religious groups. By
the same token, the decline of the nation-state, partic-
ularly in the East, can also lead to increased ethnic
tensions, as we have witnessed in the former Yugoslavia. If the traditional nation-state system has often
as a method of-organizing society. Moreover, for the
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Can Europe's ethnic problems be solved by redrawing
state frontiers? National and ethnic identities existed
for centuries before state borders were drawn and
redrawn, usually by outside interests. What year
would we use to define the nation-state structure in
Autonomy can lead to anarchy, however, unless it is
accompanied by rules of the road to guide the development of a civil society in the East. Without an active
partnership with the West, it is doubtful whether this
model can flourish in nations unaccustomed to unrestrained democracy. Thus, the process of devolution
of power, particularly in the East, could exacerbate
ethnic tensions and ultimately threaten democracy
Europe? 1993? 1989? 1945? 1917? Clearly, there is no
unless it is guided by institutions based on shared val-
magic formula. While we should not encourage that
ethnic conflict be solved by changing national boundaries, we should not exclude that these boundaries can
be changed by peaceful means. As in the case of a.
reunified Germany, border changes can be countenanced by the international community if they are
accepted by all interested parties and accompanied by
guarantees protecting individual rights and minority
communities.
ues. The only appropriate Western response is to integrate the countries east of the Oder-Niesse line to the
family of democratic nations. This must be done in the
political sphere by supporting Eastern reform and
reformers, in the economic sphere by opening Western
markets to Eastern goods and in the strategic sphere
by opening Eastern Europe and eventually nations of
the former Soviet Union into Western security structures.
A Kinder and Gentler Europe
NATO: A New Mission
Is there an ideal-or even preferable-state structure
for Europe today? Perhaps this is the wrong question,
We should rather ask how Europe can best accommodate individual rights, as well as national and ethnic
pluralism? Clearly, there are no simple answers. How-
The security of Europe is indivisible. Ethnic conflict,
ultranationalism, or massive flows of refugees anywhere threaten stability everywhere, including the
most advanced West European democracies. What
happens in Central and Eastern Europe also has a
failed to protect ethnic minorities, the collapse of the
nation-state has not offered an appealing alternative.
ever, we might begin by contemplating a Europe that
direct bearing on the fate of the Newly Independent
is both more united and less centralized. While the
nation-state remains the most:significant unit in
States (NIS)-and vice versa. Without the successful
expansion of the democratic community of nations to
Europe today, its political role is increasingly being
the East, the stability of Europe cannot be guaranteed.
supplemented by both supernational and subnational
A stable security framework, in the view of many
units. This development is fraught not only with dan-
Eastern democrats, is a precondition for building
gers but also with opportunities for a kinder and gentier Continent.
democracies and strong economies in their part of the
world. While this argument can easily be turned
around-building viable economies is the best way to
A Europe, which respects individual and ethnic rights,
ensure security-there is no doubt that this perception
can only be achieved on a demtocratic basis if there is
grass roots involvement in the process. Logically,
decisions are best made at the lowest possible level.
Europeans have dubbed this concept-in the best
is widely shared.
Brussels bureaucratese-"subsidiarity'; Americans
have learned through painful history that the United
might call it "federalism." This very American
approach can lead to practical, not ideological, solutions to local problems from garbage collection to
minority rights, from electing Tegional governments to
States cannot remain indifferent to threats to European
stability. The ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia
should serve as a poignant reminder that Europe is
Three times in this century the United States has been
drawn into European wars (two hot, one cold). We
establishing native-language schools.
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still a dangerous place and that only one institution
has the operational capabilities and habits of cooperation to preserve peace and stability on the Continent in
the post-Cold War era: NATO.
To accomplish this mission, however, NATO must
transform itself from an Alliance based on collective
defense against an identifiable threat into an Alliance
committed to projecting democracy, stability, and
crisis management throughout the Continent. This
cannot be done without engaging the nations to the
East. The real and potential hotspots in Europe all lie
in this area. If NATO does not deal with these nations,
it will become increasingly irrelevant-a closed,
chummy club without a mission or a message. Any
new security structure, therefore, must be inclusive
rather than exclusive; it should not lead to the redivision of Europe into blocs.
Over time, therefore, NATO must be open to new
members, largely to the East but also to include the
neutral and nonaligned states of Europe. This
Neither parochial nor EC-only solutions, however,
address the unavoidable fact that the West cannot
insulate itself from economic decline, ethnic strife,
and political instability in the East. Their fates are
intertwined. Ethnic minorities have perhaps most at
stake in a stable and prosperous Europe. In times of
recession, populist leaders seek scapegoats, most
often ethnic minorities. Such conditions create economic refugees throughout Europe.
While Europeans must ultimately determine their own
economic architecture, Americans have a large stake
in the outcome. A successful Uruguay Round of the
world trade talks, to a large degree, hinges on the amenable conclusion of inter-European and US-EC negotiations. It is in our mutual interest, therefore, to
decrease trade barriers and to increase market access
to our respective markets.
European economic integration is of particular interest
to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the
NIS. Without an outlet for their products, many of the
approach-which has been called the "Partnership for
leaders of these countries will be tempted to return to
membership. In short, future expansion should be evo-
global trading system. We should lower or eliminate
Peace" program-would provide a framework within
the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) for
enhanced political and military cooperation. Under
this rubric the militaries of East and West would plan,
train, and exercise together. Active cooperation in this
partnership could lay the foundation for full NATO
the false stability and the failed statist policies of the
past. Just as in the security field, American policymakers should seek to extend the zone of economic
prosperity eastward. We should encourage the expansion of the EC eastward. We should welcome the
greater integration of the former East Bloc into the
lutionary, inclusive, and aimed at enhancing the stability of Europe.
inefficient subsidies. In short, trade, not aid, is the best
guarantee for a prosperous Europe.
Trade, Not Aid
CSCE: Conscience of Europe
While the Soviet empire was fragmenting, West European officials smugly maintained that they had
resolved their remaining differences at Maastricht. A
united and prosperous European Community, they
believed, could be protected from the economic and
The CSCE has recently been called the conscience of
Europe. European statesmen from Vacel Havel to
Margaret Thatcher to Andrey Sakharov have credited
the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the founding document
of CSCE, for providing the intellectual basis for the
political instability in the East. The euphoria was short
lived. Many Europeans now conclude the Maastricht
Treaty was drafted "too soon and too quickly." Faced
with depressed economies and weak governments,
European polities, like their American brethren, seek
demise of Communism. The CSCE has not always
received such good press. In 1975 the Soviet leadership believed that the Final Act legitimized the Soviet
presence in Europe; that is, a sphere of influence.
national solutions to global problems. Western Europe
threatens to define itself and its world role narrowly.
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American critics, including Ronald Reagan, concurred; the West had sold out to Moscow.
that neither NATO, the EC, nor any other European
institution can play in preventing Bosnia-like conflicts
and, ultimately, in integrating Eastern Europe and the
However, the leaders who founded the CSCE, perhaps
unknowingly, began a process that would ultimately
lead to the collapse of the Soviet Empire. By acknowledging that certain principles are inherent and univer-
NIS into a new Europe.
sal, Moscow, in effect, acknowledged limits to its
power. It did not have the sovereign right to transgress
the Helsinki principles either in its colonies or even in
Mother Russia. Of course, this did not prevent successive Soviet leaders from ignoring these principles;
they did, however, lose their intellectual cover. The
CSCE, with its broad definition of security founded on
human rights and democracy And its inclusive membership, helped win the Cold War.
The CSCE can now help win the peace in Europe by
establishing human rights noris, protecting ethnic
minorities, and pursuing low-intensity conflict prevention and peacekeeping activities. Helsinki's broad definition of security also encompasses the conciliation
and crisis management. To cope with existing and
potential crises, largely fueled by ethnic conflicts, the
CSCE has deployed monitor missions to Kosovo, Serbia proper, and Macedonia to prevent a spillover from
the Bosnian tragedy. It has also deployed or is considering deploying missions to deorgia, Estonia, and
Moldova in the former Soviet Union. It has brought
the parties of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute to the
table.
We should build on these quiet successes. For
instance, the CSCE High Conmissioner on National
Minorities now has the authority to provide "early
warning" and, as appropriate,. "early action" to
national minority issues, which have "the potential to
develop into a conflict." The CSCE can play a role
Conclusion
The United States is a nation of idea-not of blood,
birth or creed. It has largely avoided ethnic strife
because it has not attempted to build a state based on
ethnic, racial, or religious homogeneity. If human
rights and fundamental freedoms belong to the mdividual, then group or collective rights can best be
addressed through the protection of individual rights.
As long as ethnicity is seen as the only basis for sorting out human relations or creating nations, we will
have ethnic conflict in Europe. Group rights can have
no meaning if the basic human rights are ignored by
ethnic zealots.
The best way to address ethnic conflict in Europe is
through a united, but decentralized, Europe governed
by mutually accepted rules of behavior. The integration of Western Europe into institutions-NATO, the
EC, and the CSCE-founded on fundamental human
rights, has gone a long way to eliminating territorial
disputes, irredentist claims, and ethnic grievances
among and within its member states. We must now
find creative ways to use these institutions to deal with
emerging ethnic-and other subregional-tensions
before they erupt into shooting conflicts. We must
avoid the situation where every crisis presents a
choice between inaction and military intervention. We
must now extend these habits of cooperation to the
East.
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Ethnic Conflict and US Policy
involves an understanding that the notion of economic prosperity abroad is an important component.
of US national security.
Wade Hinkle-----Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
1
for Policy Planning Department of Defense
My task in the next eight minutes is to discuss ethnic
and national conflict and the US policy response to it.
Let me tell you what a difficult task it will be; it took
more than eight minutes for the conference coordinators to describe to me what it was they wanted me to
cover. Nevertheless, let me take a shot at it.
Clearly, the last four years have been an exciting time
to be a planner in defense and national security strategy. I subscribe to what Dr. Gundersen said about the
end of the Cold War being, in a military sense, the end
of a very comfortable period of time, when the universe and its problems were well understood and well
bounded. I think, however, that we have made some
progress in the last four years in thinking through
these issues in the perspective of US national security.
I also think that Secretary of Defense Les Aspin made
a good start in his conceptualization of this problem
by talking about what he called the four dangers to US
national security in the post-Cold War era:
e
The new nuclear danger Partly an artifact of the
Cold War, this involves the security of the 30,000 to
45,000 nuclear weapons that were present on former
Soviet territory when the Soviet Union broke up.
Also it involves the possibility of weapons of mass
destruction proliferating throughout the world.
- The dangerto democracy.This is the possibility of a
failure of reform in the former Soviet Union.
- The new economic danger.The Clinton Administration believes that, without a robust and growing
economy in the United States, the United States will
not be strong domestically and will be unable to be
an effective actor internationally. This danger also
- Ethnic and nationalconflict. Mr. Aspin clearly sees
this as one of the principal challenges to US national
security in the post-:Cold War era.
The United States is in the process of making substantial reductions to its military forces and military budget. By the time the reductions envisioned in the
Clinton defense program have been implemented, we
will have eliminated over 1 million people in uniform
and another quarter of a million civilians from the
Defense Department. We will have eliminated onequarter to one-third of our military forces, and defense
spending by the end of 1997 will be down to below
3.5 percent of gross domestic product-the lowest
level since 1939.
From the perspective of the defense planner, one of
the main concerns in making reductions of that scale
is the possibility that ethnic and national conflict may
occur in ways that will challenge American and
defense interests. Some debate has occurred in my
field of conflict studies, about whether the demise of
the Cold War has increased or decreased the possibility of ethnic and national conflict.
George Kohn's database on conflict shows that there
have been about three large-scale ethnic and national
conflicts per year since 1945. This rate did not tail off
as a result of the end of the Cold War. In terms of nonstate conflict, there have been about nine serious ethnically motivated coup attempts each year since 1987.
But whether ethnic and national conflict is increasing
or simply remaining at high levels, it-clearly poses a
danger not only to participants and nearby neighbors
but also to us. This is either because the conflict is
occurring in critical areas-as with the case in the
Persian Gulf-or because some of the participants
are gaining access to increasingly deadlier and more
Dr. Hinkle has since left the government and is now a member of
the Institute for Defense Analyses.
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far-reaching weapons and technology. So the Defense
Department, and the US Government in general, has
quite an interest in this phenomenon and is trying to
understand it and construct a strategy to address it.
partnership to either prevent or to contain conflict.
We need to work together in a variety of multilateral
and bilateral ways to marshal all those resources
together as a partnership for addressing the issue.
In attempting to grapple with this issue, initial thinking on a Clinton national security strategy has focused
2
on three elements:
The government needs much more analysis to understand in a robust way the phenomenon of ethnic and
national conflict. We need academic researchers to
turn toward applied robust, rigorous, and predictive
research that we can bring inside the government in
testable ways and see if we can motivate policy. We
are not interested in sponsoring more original
research; as Dr. Ted Gurr wrote in his book on conflict
a few years ago, there are 686 books on the theory of
conflict-we do not want a 687th. What we want are
robust, testable, applied research and models that we
can bring inside the government. We take this problem
seriously. It is a critical issue of US national security.
- Engagement. The United Slates is committed to
remaining engaged in international affairs.
- Prevention.We want to prevent or contain the
effects of ethnic conflict. We want to use all the elements of national power, development assistance,
and trade assistance to prevent conflict, and, if that
does not work, we want to act early to keep the conflict small.
- Partnership.We want to expand the core group of
like-minded democratic coontries that we forged
during the Cold War and have this group work as a
In July 1994, the Clinton Administration published its first comprehensive national security strategy, which used as its conceptional framework the elements of "engagement" and
"enlargement."
2
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Summary of Discussion
General Discussion
QUESTION: In your studies of conflict resolution,
can you give us some examples of effective outside
intervention into situations of aggressive ethnic
nationalism. The only good example I can think of is
the tremendous commitment that was necessary to
stop Nazi Germany, an aggressive ethnic nationalistic
state. These kinds of examples are important as we
think about getting into the situation in Bosnia.
DR. HINKLE: My field is microstates, and I can tell
you it worked pretty well in Grenada. But I take your
point. That is why I think that the emphasis really
should be on prevention, not intervention. That way,
not be
you can act more effectively at lower cost and
with intervenin the position where you are dealing
tion.
Imagine if Saddam Husayn had actually succeeded.
Twenty years from now, he would have effective control of 45 percent of the world's oil reserves and
would be industriously working to build nuclear
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. If we
had the foresight in 1958 to act to facilitate a demo-
QUESTION: When there was a bipolar world, it was
fairly easy to identify the strategic interests of the
United States and the Soviet Union. How would the
United States feel in regard to Russia resolving ethnic
conflict in the former Soviet Union.
and
DR. GUNDE1BEN: We view the issue of conflict
in the former Soviet Union from the
peacekeeping
outlook of preventive diplomacy. We do not want to
see a reenactment of the old view that there is a sphere
of influence of Russia over the Soviet Union. As long
as Russia's involvement in its former periphery is
mandated by an international body-be it the UN or
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe-and as long as certain rules are followed and
the interests of all the parties are taken into account,
we are not, in principal, opposed to Russian involvement.
We also want to contain any ethnic difficulties before
they spill over. In Tajikistan, more people are being
killed every day than in Bosnia. We do not hear about
it because CNN is not there, but certainly there are
Iranian, Chinese, Turkish, and Russian interests in
Tajikistan, so we cannot ignore the situation there. I
think we should be a little more involved in preventive
diplomacy there. We have limited funds, however, so
it is difficult going between ends and means.
cratic transition in Iraq, however, we would not have
needed the level of resources we used in Desert Storm,
and the world might be a happier place. Even in
Grenada, if we just had the foresight to spend a couple
hundred thousand dollars to preempt the revolution of
1979, we would have saved 108 American casualties
in 1983.
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Concluding Comments: Implications for the
United States and the International Community:
Problems and Prospects
Stanley D. Arunn
Professor of Geography
University of Kentucky
During the past two days we lave heard a number of
map reflects constant dynamism in name changesborder adjustments, political realignments, as well as
flashpoints and conflict. There are a wide variety of
states with varying degrees of stability and instability.
It is important to keep in mind that world order and
disorder can be viewed in a variety of contexts. While
the term new political order may be in vogue this year,
there is not just one order, but many. At various times
and places on the world map, order or disorder can be
observed at local, regional, and macroregional levels.
formal presentations about ethnic conflict and nationalism in various world regions. These examinations of
ethnic and cultural compositio'n and conflict, as well as
the panel discussions, illustrate the ways geographers
look at the world and how they envision contemporary
and future worlds. In summarizing the conference, I
would like to make the following observations:
We Live in Shared/Divided Spaces
All humans live to some degree in "bounded spaces.
Some of those may be spaces defined by majority populations, others defined by outside powers. Within
those bounded spaces, we often find people of varying
ethnic, religious, linguistic, racial, or other heritages.
The distribution of various groups often overlap.
- We live in two different worlds. First, I would like to
Those groups may live in harmony-sharing the same
thank those individuals for organizing a conference
devoted specifically to ethnic conflict, nationalism,
and changing world order and for inviting academic
geographers to share with members of the Intelligence Community what they know-and do not
know-about the current political world. I see this
conference as serving many useful purposes, one
being that while "we live in two different houses,"
we share much in common, especially our interests
in being able to understand what is happening around
the world-whether in regard to ethnic conflict,
We Live in Local and Global Worlds
The world political map is much more complicated
than the standard reference maps that depict close to
200 political states. There are many scales at which
groups and communities interact. Some interactions
are local, others are global. It is important that those of
us who analyze political development acknowledge
these complexities.
nationalism, or emerging democracies. It is important that the avenues of communication and information sharing between those in the university and
government intelligence communities remain open.
e
How do we look at the world? How we look at the
world reflects our backgrounds as well as our dayby-day work experiences and assignments. These
experiences are of utmost importance in helping us
and others see how we look at our culture vis-a-vis
others.
work, play, worship, and family spaces or they may be
divided.
Are We "Prisoners" of Our Maps?
In listening to the presenters the past several days and
in the discussions among panel members and the audience, it seems that we may, in fact, be "prisoners" of
our maps, especially the familiar political map of the
world-which simplifies political space and reinforces the status quo. Do we still use time-honored
Mercator projections, which distort the spaces in the
high latitudes? Are the maps we use Europe centered,
as if subtly conveying the notion that Europe is the
most important region of the world? How do we look
at polar areas, with maps that have such areas at the
The Dynamic Political World
"top" and "bottom"? How do we look at the Pacific
Rim countries, with maps splitting the Pacific Ocean
What Is the State of the World Political Map?
At any time it is useful to remember the state of the
world, or, better stated, the world political map. That
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at the left and right sides? Or do we have maps with
the Pacific Ocean in the middle and the Asian and
American landmasses at the left and right. Perhaps
one of-our difficulties is using old maps with old.
boundaries and names, which tend to convey messages of stability at global and regional levels. Do we
regularly in our research, classroom, and lectures utilize maps that portray boundary stability, ethnic har,
mony or complexity, or gradations of tyranny and
Powerful messages are conveyed through
democracy?
maps and projections. As an instructor, I am reminded
how more valuable the maps are in the State of the
World Atlases-including the specialized ones on
women, military, and environment-than are those in
our textbooks and frequently used atlases. We would
do well to develop other innovative maps for various
users.
How "Green" Is Your Thinking?
Environmental questions are being raised in all areas
of human livelihood. This includes making decisions
about where crops will be grown as well as where
industries will locate. Although there is much support
for environmental thinking and policies, progress is
not attained easily, in part because many people have
difficulty seeing the need to incorporate green thinking into education, religion, politics, and economies.
A true test is whether those who teach political geography will successfully incorporate green thinking
into spheres traditionally excluded from such thought.
Which Way Are We Looking as We Approach the
the Middle East that illustrates the significance of this
Next Century?
At this time it is useful to think about how we
approach the study of the future. Are we looking backwards as we look ahead or do we look ahead without
the burden of hindsight? The question might be similar to that raised above about map projections. Are we
too frozen in our thinking to look at the dynamics
occurring around us? Certainly the next 10 to 20 years
will call for looking at the world differently than the
past 10 to 20 years. Will we try to use models, theories, and policies from the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s-
many of which did not help us then-for the future?
Or will we be willing to realize the need for working
constantly with alternative systems and models that
may be completely non-Western in logic, purpose, and
Religion as if Politics Mattered
As the events of the past couple decades have demonstrated, religion is an important element in our examination of foreign affairs. It is not only the rise of
Islamic fundamentalism-again, a Western label-in
issue but also militancy in the name of religion in Ireland, Israel/Palestine, India, and Pakistan. Evangelical
groups and liberation theologians have confronted the
politics in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. In South
Africa as well as in former Eastern Europe, the church
at times has been active in pushing for political
reforms. In many countries, those seeking political
office are courted and supported by certain religious
groups. The importance of religion as a component in
the politics in many states and regions cannot be overlooked. Leaders often look to the state-church or to
important church leaders for support and encouragement. To dismiss the growing importance of religion
in emerging democracies, the blurring of church-state
separateness in others, and the importance of the spiri-
design? The true test will be whether scholars, and
those communities that rely on scholarly inquiry, will
be able to be imaginative and creative in exploring the
purposes and cross-purposes of what is being
observed, written, and practiced.
tual dimension in human life is to neglect an important
component of raison d'etre in many societies. Academics and policymakers would be wise to devote as
much time to studying a society's religion as they do
its economy in order to understand the decisions and
actions of leaders, political parties, and citizen groups.
Major Issues Meriting Attention
The Rise of Secularization
The rise of secularization in the world is not questioned. I do not see this emergence as a corollary to
what I stated about religion above. But I observe there
As a geographer interested in global politics, I identify
six major areas that I think will be important within
is a growth of a secular society, including emphasis on
the next 20 years. They are the environment, religion,
secularization, sports, territory,and information/communication.
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consumerism and, especially,-American products; the
demise of traditional institutions, including political
ideology; and the rise of a "h re and now" mentality
that stresses individualism, the appearance of wealth,
and a veneer of globalism in foods, clothing, music,
and lifestyles. Secularization on the rise leads to a
decline in traditional institutions, be they family and
community, formal political parties, the role of the
church, the functions of schools, or the importance of
collective memories.
defined spaces who want their own spaces; in short,
their own places to govern themselves. Those who
support self-determination claim that they cannot be
represented by majority populations in the bounded
spaces who have little interest in minority group concerns. Those minorities may be religious, ethnic, or
linguistic. These "stateless" peoples believe that they
have a legal claim to govern themselves; in some
cases, they present historical claims to spaces that
were previously taken from them by outsiders.
Sports and Society: The Ne* Ball Game
One of the emerging forms of social identity in many
countries is sports. Sports not'only represent outlets
for a public's need for entertainment but also something deeper about society's need for identity and representation. What started out during pretelevision days
as teams of athletes who were paid to entertain local
It is not only the territory that is in question but also
what is in and on that land. The land may contain
places of historical settlements, ceremonial and burial
grounds, and sites of sacred rivers, mountains, or forests. These places may be an important part of the
unwritten histories of minority and disenfranchised
groups. The importance of land is not to be dimin-
or regional audiences has now changed into national
ished as we approach the next century. It seems very
ated, further increasing local identity, regionalism, and
tional courts seem likely to be involved in the litiga-
teams that somehow stand for and represent a city, a
region, or even the state itself, As audiences follow
favorite teams, more and more teams have been cre-
likely that there will be emerging claims and counterclaims to land and water spaces by competing groups
now living in the same spaces. National and interna-
national pride-all in the name of "friendly" competition. Nevertheless, more than one local conflict has
emerged between fans of one national team fighting
fans of another. The political geographer or policy
tion efforts by unrepresented and underrepresented
groups.
tion of a society would be wise to ferret out the role
sports play in the political ide'ntity of a group or society.
are or will be able to understand the role of the United
States in the world community of states during the
next few decades rests in large part on how much they
understand about information and communications.
These two areas of postindustrial society were not key
20 to 40 years ago but are becoming more important
each day. In the same way that leaders and practittoners will need to know the role of environment, religion, and secularization, so they will need to grasp the
realities of global information and communication. I
consultant interested in understanding the seculariza-
Land: Yours or Mine
Land or territory was historically associated with the
definition of the state. This raison d'etre was important in conveying to those within the state that certain
spaces gave the state and people identity. Those
spaces were to be protected from outsiders, should
they decide to enter. The past several centuries of
Europeanizing the world conveys strongly the importance of land, territory, ownership, governance, and
protection. Those spaces "on the ground" and on the
map further gave legitimacy to strongly held views
about ownership, symbolism, and identity.
Information and Communication
Whether scholars and government offices and officers
have identified several crucial issues that relate to
those with interests in ethnicity, conflict, social
change, and political decisionmaking:
e
While many of the bounded spaces on the planet may
seem static, there are dynamics linked to some spaces;
That dynamism is associated with groups within those
189
The information blizzard. How do we decide what is
important and what is not? With the volumes of
information that cross our desks, deciding what is
most and least important is crucial. One might well
expect the information load to increase at least
�C00123268
50 percent within the next decade as more information is generated and stored but not necessarily analyzed or understood. Sometimes, I think "we don't
know what we don't know." Such information gaps
are especially apparent when working with new
democracies, new ideologies, and problems related
to human welfare.
- How do we communicate? How we communicate is
and regional conflict, and conflict assumes different
forms in different locations and political settings.
There is no question that the geographies and politics
of conflict-especially ethnic and racial conflict-will
assume center stage in many regions during the next
few decades.
While we spend time and energy studying the causes
and geographies of conflict, we also would be wise to
always a problem and will remain so far among
investigate conflict resolution. That is, what are the
nected. It is important to know from where the infor-
what can be done to lessen or resolve the conflict or
those who attempt to understand global political
changes. The introduction of faster and cheaper
modes of communication-modems, FAX machines
and e-mail-literally place more locations on the
planet within easy reach of others that are conmation comes and its credibility.
e
alternatives to keep conflict? What are useful local
and regional strategies that governments and other
institutions-including religious, educational, and
volunteer ones-might implement to conflict situations from emerging. Or, once conflict has surfaced,
prevent it from spreading. Much of the conflict resolu-
CNN and photographs.CNN, out of Atlanta, is
tion literature focuses on information-who knows
what about another group. Understanding conflict and
replacing the standard news organizations and
conflict resolution is best not left only to experts in the
all parts of the world. What viewers see are CNN's
views of the world. Literally, we could say that "We
are watching CNN and CNN is watching us." The
second part of this instant television of the-world is
the growing importance of images conveyed to global audiences by CNN and other television networks. Photos are replacing words and speeches as
the important elements in many international policy
tics, and social change. It also must be an integral part
of the educational system in early and middle school
years. Just as one learns to hate and practice discrimination, so one can learn strategies to reduce conflict,
hatred, and discrimination and see the benefits of reconciliation.
sources. This "global newspaper of the air" reaches
decisions.
- Surveys and polls. One of the consequences of the
information revolution is the increased use of polls
and surveys at local, regional, and global levels.
Those groups surveyed may have narrow or broad
support among a state's population; for this reason,
the geographic results of surveys and polls take on
added meaning. The use of these surveys, whether
designed and conducted fairly or manipulated, can
form an important weapon on the part of the state to
conduct specific policies in certain regions and with
certain groups.
Learning About Conflict and Cooperation
government or universities who study cultural, pol-
Looking Ahead
In closing, I think it is important to train and retrain
professionals for the future geopolitical worlds of the
next 25 to 50 years. This entails an understanding and
appreciation of the new global diversities that the
planet's leaders and citizens will face. There are not
one or two best solutions to problems, but potentially
a host of alternatives. Somehow it is important to
develop familiarity with various models and methodologies ranging from scenario writing to complex
mathematical computer gaming. Specialists need to be
constantly investigating creative alternatives to existing or anticipated problems. Being bold, creative, and
imaginative are more important than being bound by
disciplinary strategems, traditional solutions, and regimented ideologies and philosophies.
Much of the discussion during the past few days has
focused on ethnic conflict within states and regions.
As we have learned, there are multiple causes of local
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Finally, there is much discussion these days about
inventing and reinventing institutions. These terms
and "y" to another, those are best examined in transdisciplinary and interdisciplinary contexts. To accom-
potentially could usher in new thinking in universities,
plish this will most likely call for an overhaul of many
governments, and the private sector. The major issues
of the next 25 to 50 years will call for specialists
trained differently than in the past and today. Already
I have indicated that information, communication,
of the ways we learn, conduct business, and solve
problems. This is a challenge best met by transdisciplinarians and by specialists who look both backward
and forward and have both local and global outlooks.
environment, religion, conflict, and secularization
need to be pervasive threads in learning and practice.
Rather than delegating "x" subject to one discipline
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Summary of Discussion
Discussant: Rex Honey
I would like us to be able to understand history but not
be trapped by it. One of the things that makes resolving some problems in Africa more likely than in Bosnia is that the Africans do not have the kind of written
history that dates back several hundred years. As such,
they cannot pinpoint who the villains were: the names
of the groups have changed.
We need to understand that oppressed people have
legitimate grievances, and we need to make sure that
we do not support oppressive regimes. With the Cold
War over, the latter may not be as likely as it has been
in the past. But we need to be a part of a forward-lookto help
ing movement that will establish institutions
to existing ones.
prevent problems and to respond
In addition, we need to support human rights globally,
also in terms
not just in terms of individual rights but
being able to study
of cultural rights. This includes
in your own language rather than in an alien one. If
then
people see themselves as being treated justly,
existing problems will be lessened, and we will be
reparations that were not made three centuries ago
has also been raised. Reparations are a serious issue
because it is the objective of certain ethnic groups to
raise the issue of who did wrong to whom and who
should pay for that wrong.
I would also like to make an observation on environmental change as it relates to changes in the sociopolitical sphere. Although many people are sceptical of
interlinkages, I want to suggest seriously that many of
the problems that we are seeing in the world today,
such as fragmentation, dislocation, migration, sunbelt
movements, and other locational changes, are in part
an instinctive human reaction to environmental
change. I would refer you to a book by Jean Grove
called The Little Ice Age. It may be that our behavior,
including ethnic strife, has something to do with the
deteriorating environments in which relations among
groups are being played out.
General Discussion
DR. WIXMAN: An interesting point that came out
particularly in this last session is that we talk about
voluntarism on the part of the peoples involved.
able to prosper along with the people with whom we
The falling apart of the Soviet Union will probably be
share this globe,
Kazakhs, and Ukrainians can do voluntarily through
mutual respect and independence is probably a lot better than the situation when the Soviet Union was dom-
Discussant: Harm J. de Blij
I was born in the Netherlands, and I'm interested in
the news ofthe day from there. Today, the news from
Holland had two items relevant to our discussion.
First, Curacao is considering holding a vote on whether
to reenter the Kingdom of the Netherlands as a prov-
ince or a colony. Things are not going well economically in Curacao, and the island is seriously considering
becoming the Martinique of the Netherlands' empire.
Second, the Province of Zeeland discovered about a
month ago that in 1648, when the seven states of the
Netherlands signed a peace agreement with Spain, it
did not sign the agreement. Although Zeeland is now
followed by a restructuring, and what Estonians,
inated by the center.
I think one of the keys to future stability is not to
oppose the secessionist movements but to tallower elations between the seceder and the parent state.
DR. DE BLU: But the problem with that is, "where
does the secessionist sequence end?"
DR. WIXMAN: True.
DR. DE BLU: Someone today talked about the necessity of providing recognition. Well, the problem in
the case of Bosnia was that recognition was given
planning to sign the agreement and is inviting Spain
to the signatory ceremony, the issue of paying the
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prematurely. This then precipitated a concern on the
part of Serbs who did not want to be a part of an independent state in which, they felt, their human rights
would be threatened.
Take the case of Georgia. Georgia, which seceded
DR. MURPHY: Dr. de Blij's last comment, in a sense,
touched on a point I wanted to make. When we think
about the issue of potential fragmentation, what are
we thinking about in terms of the units we end up
with? I think our tendency is to think about conventional units of sovereign states.
from Russia, is now trying to stop Abkhazia from
DR. HONEY: I agree with you. Virtually no state in
Africa has an order that was determined by African
One of the most remarkable things Dr. Williams
alluded to yesterday was that, in Western Europe, the
major threats are not seen as the regional secessionist
movements. Why is that the case? It could well have
something to do with the changing nature of sovereignty in Europe. It could also have to do with the fact
that it is possible for someone in a region within a
peoples. Why should the peoples of Africa not have
state to feel multiple layers of identity, some of which
the same kind of self-determination that at least some
non-Africans have enjoyed in'other places?
are attached to being a European.
seceding. Where does it all end? This trouble comes
with every secession. Unless there is some way in
which that can be codified and stratified, it will be
chaos.
DR. WIXMAN: But what often happens when the
secessionist movement is denied? Are we going to
dictate that people live together in shotgun wedding
relationships? Should we say to Croats, Muslims, and
Serbs, "You must live together," when we would not
do that ourselves? I agree that'there are perils of secessionism, but the peril of not doing it, I think, is equally
dangerous.
DR. HINKLE: We seem to be, in one sense, moving
toward an international norm of the rule of law in governing intrastate relations, individual human rights,
and collective group rights. It is going to be hard to
reconcile that with the proposition that you cannot
allow norms of international behavior to stand in the
way of a rational adjustment of international boundaries just because it seems to balance out in terms of
demographics or some other factor.
Do we tell Moldova that it cailnot become indepen-
DR. DE BLU: But we are trapped in such a boundary
dent from the Soviet Union because 12 percent of its
population would be unhappy? Do we tell Georgia
that it should not secede because 100,000 out of 6 mil-
in South Africa. In that country, partition, even some
sort of a temporary confederal arrangement, might
ease the fears that are presently ripping the place
lion people will be unhappy? I think countries need to
apart. What is so great about keeping South Africa in
be prepared for independence; not leap into it, but the
lack of preparation is the prob em.
one piece? It has no history of integration. It has
always been a divided country.
DR. DE BLU: May I make one other point? That
relates to the issue of boundaries. In 1992 the United
States went to the Baltic stated and talked about solving problems within existing borders. When this
occurred, I cringed; just as pipelines and roads can be
moved, boundaries, which are here to serve us, can be
moved. If it is time to move them, let them be moved.
DR. HONEY: Dr. Gundersen said we should not ask
for redrawn boundaries because such change would
have to be agreed upon by all parties. Well, if it is
democratic, what does that mean? Democratic can
mean 50 percent plus one.
DR. GUNDERSEN: I would just refer to the facts of
the last two years. In alluding to the statement by
former Secretary of State Baker on Yugoslavia and the
statement by former President Bush on Kiev, I was
saying that the United States was trapped in a certain
east-west bipolar context.
You are never going to have total agreement on moving boundaries. In fact, hundreds of thousands of
casualties occurred when Pakistan was separated from
India. Nevertheless, this actioi probably saved mil-
lions of lives. All countries andl all people should be
able to argue about moving their boundaries.
193
�C00123268
Today, we have 53 states in Europe; there were 32 in
1991.That is a major change. It is the largest change
you
in Europe since 1917 or 1648, depending on how
largely without violence
look at it. It has been done
and largely within a relatively democratic context, and
it has been agreed to by those states. The United
States has recognized those states: the Czech Republic, Slovakia, the Baltic states, and the other states that
have emerged from the former Soviet Union, as well
as those from Yugoslavia.
So it is possible to reconcile the idea ofaccepting the
concept of territorial integrity and that of peaceful
changes of borders. It is difficult, but I do not see any
major intellectual pitfall. I think US policy has certainly evolved over the last two years on this quest.
organs, the Trusteeship Council, has virtually nothing
to do any longer. There is no reason why the Council
Counshould not be transformed into a Human Rights
by a high commissioner for human
cil and be run
rights, who would have greatly expanded powers.
While very few nations are not guilty of some
excesses in regard to human rights, some are much
worse than others, and those are the ones that have to
be tackled first. We need an agency with legitimacy to
do that.
The UN can do that. It will make mistakes to be sure.
but we should get behind the UN and give it power to
address global problems. Global problems require global solutions. The UN ought to be the global instrument.
DR. SCHWARTZBERG: One of the things that I
think we can do is to try to empower the only international organization that ought to have universal legitimacy-the United Nations. One of the UN's major
194
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Dublin Core
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Bosnian Declassified Records
Description
An account of the resource
<p>This collection consists of more than 300 declassified documents related to the Director of Central Intelligence Interagency Balkan Task Force (BTF) and the role of intelligence in supporting policymaking during the 1992-1995 Bosnian War. The compilation contains Summaries of Conclusions from National Security Council meetings where senior officials made decisions on the Bosnian conflict, BTF memoranda pertaining to those meetings, key intelligence assessments, and selected materials from the State Department, the National Security Council, and the Department of Defense. The records center around 1995, the year in which the Dayton Accords ending the Bosnian War were signed.</p>
<p>A symposium was held October 1, 2013 at the Clinton Presidential Library and Museum with President Clinton and former key Administration officials. They discussed intelligence and presidential policy making during the 1992-95 Bosnian War. A booklet, "<a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/international-relations/bosnia-intelligence-and-the-clinton-presidency" target="_blank">Bosnia, Intelligence, and the Clinton Presidency</a>," was created for the conference. <a href="http://vimeo.com/75959093" target="_blank">Video from the conference</a> is made available from the <a href="http://www.clintonfoundation.org/" target="_blank">Bill, Hillary, and Chelsea Clinton Foundation</a>.</p>
Text
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Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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1995-10-01A, Report re The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict to National and International Order in the 1990s Geographic Perspectives
Format
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Adobe Acrobat Document
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Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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Reproduction-Reference
Date Created
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10/1/2013
Source
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1995-10-01A-Report-re-The-Challenge-of-Ethnic-Conflict-to-National-and-International-Order-in-the-1990s-Geographic-Perspectives
Declassified
Northern Ireland